Law of costs [3rd edition.] 9780409334791, 0409334790

Table of contents :
Cover Page
Full Title
Dedication
Copyright
Preface
Table of Cases
Table of Statutes
Abbreviations
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Prologue
Part I Costs Between Lawyer and Own Client
Chapter 2. Retainer and Costs Disclosure
Chapter 3. Costs Agreements
Chapter 4. Restrictions on the Recovery of Lawyer-Client Costs
Chapter 5. Assessment of Lawyer and Own Client Bills
Part II Costs Between Party and Party
Chapter 6. Jurisdiction and Discretion to Order Costs
Chapter 7. The Costs Indemnity Rule
Chapter 8. Ouster of General Rule that Costs Follow the Event
Chapter 9. Public Interest and Test Case Litigation
Chapter 10. Costs Out of a Fund
Chapter 11. Costs of Multiple Parties
Chapter 12. Costs Sanctions for Proceedings in Wrong Court
Chapter 13. Costs Consequences of Rejected Settlement Offers
Chapter 14. Timing of Costs Order
Part III Quantification of Party and Party Costs
Chapter 15. Nature of Party-Party Costs Quantification
Chapter 16. Bases of Costs Quantification
Chapter 17. Allowances on Costs Quantification Between Party and Party
Chapter 18. Procedure Relating to Costs Quantification
Chapter 19. Interest on Party and Party Costs
Part IV Costs in Appeals
Chapter 20. Appeals
Chapter 21. Suitors’ and Appeal Costs Funds Legislation
Part V Non-Party Costs Orders
Chapter 22. Costs Orders and Non-Parties
Chapter 23. Costs Orders Against Lawyers
Part VI Costs in Criminal Cases
Chapter 24. Costs in Criminal Cases
Chapter 25. Costs in Criminal Cases Legislation
Part VII Securing Costs Entitlements
Chapter 26. The Retaining Lien
Chapter 27. The Particular Lien
Chapter 28. Nature of Security for Costs Order
Chapter 29. Discretion to Order Security for Costs
Index

Citation preview

Law of Costs Third Edition

G E Dal Pont Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania

LexisNexis Butterworths Australia 2013

Like the first and second editions of this book, this third edition is dedicated to my father

Giacomo DAL PONT

who passed away as the second edition was to go to press

Per il suo incoraggiamento il suo esempio

AUSTRALIA

ARGENTINA AUSTRIA BRAZIL CANADA CHILE CHINA CZECH REPUBLIC FRANCE GERMANY HONG KONG HUNGARY INDIA ITALY JAPAN KOREA MALAYSIA NEW ZEALAND POLAND SINGAPORE SOUTH AFRICA SWITZERLAND TAIWAN UNITED KINGDOM USA

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LexisNexis, Miamisburg, OHIO National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Author: Title: Edition: ISBN: Notes: Subjects: Dewey Number:

Dal Pont, G E (Gino Evan). Law of Costs. 3rd edition. 9780409334784 (hbk). 9780409334791 (ebk). Includes index. Costs (Law) — Australia. 347.94077.

© 2013 Reed International Books Australia Pty Limited trading as LexisNexis. First edition 2003; reprinted 2007; second edition 2009. This book is copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), no part of this publication may be reproduced by any process, electronic or otherwise, without the specific written permission of the copyright owner. Neither may information be stored electronically in any form whatsoever without such permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Typeset in Goudy. Printed in China. Visit LexisNexis Butterworths at www.lexisnexis.com.au

Preface The second edition of this work appeared in early 2009. Over four years later there are good reasons to justify a third edition. The law of costs remains one of the most litigated aspects of Australian law, in part because practically every case has a costs dimension, which is almost invariably framed by reference to judicial discretion. Each year there are accordingly 1000s judicial statements or determinations on costs issues by Australian judges. That the various costs looseleaf services are updated several times each year indicates the fluidity of the area. Aside from the copious stream of case law on costs, this new edition takes into account various changes in court rules governing costs as between party and party. Most significant is the enactment of the Federal Court Rules 2011, in place of the original 1979 rules. And most recently, as from 1 April 2013, note should be made of changes to the Victorian rules, which have translated to alterations in the approach to assessing costs as well as a new scale. In the period straddling the second and third editions, moreover, Victoria has witnessed the establishment of a Costs Court, which remains unique in the Australian legal landscape. At least in Australian law, this work remains unique. The only comparable work elsewhere in the common law world seems to be Mark Friston’s Civil Costs: Law and Practice1 (now in its second edition, published in 2012, following hot on the heels of the 2010 first edition), a compendious practicedirected volume approaching 1500 pages. The once comparable Canadian volume by Mark Orkin has since translated to a two volume looseleaf service.2 Yet the need to refer to case law, in particular, from other common law jurisdictions, has abated in time, as Australian costs rules and statutes have progressively moved away from their English forebears. The same may be said of parallel developments in other English-derived jurisdictions, such as Canada and New Zealand. At the same time, this has made the task of preparing a new edition a little less burdensome, a burden exacerbated by the remaining (and ostensibly increasing) divergence in court rules governing

costs as between Australian jurisdictions. The drive to at least substantial similarity in regulating costs as between lawyer and client via the legal profession legislation, though laudable, may well see further divergence consequent upon steps to pursue a fragmented adoption of the most recent ‘national’ legal profession reforms. The policy issues underscoring costs remain at the forefront of aspects of access to justice. It is no surprise that costs are more than just a legal issue, but a political one. The pressures to modify costs rules, not just in Australia but elsewhere,3 are testament to this, as are arguably the attendant debates. These, it can safely be assumed, are unlikely to subside. In any work of this kind, there is always the need to draw a temporal line, especially as the law of costs is hardly static. I have chosen to set a temporal line at 1 April 2013, although I have managed to include a handful of subsequent developments (including reference to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, in place of the former Federal Magistrates Court, as from 12 April 2013). Three notable appellate decisions, though, were published too late to impact on the text. Some remarks in Prantage v Prantage,4 cited in notes 327 and 331 of Chapter 8, dealing (in part) with the (now repealed) s 117AB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), must now be read subject to the reasons on appeal.5 Similarly, some remarks of Murphy J in Kelly v Willmott Forests Ltd (in liq),6 referred to in 29.62 and 29.63, must now be seen through the prism of the reasons on appeal.7 Finally, s 189A of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA), discussed at 24.32, has now received closer judicial scrutiny in Police v Murray.8 In the preface to the second edition of this work I noted that, in the law of costs, there is indeed the historical bugbear of ‘the multiplication of laws and restrictions’.9 It is hoped that this work, albeit in a small way, can assist in making those laws and restrictions more accessible. Thanks must be extended to Mr R J Walker, formerly Deputy Registrar, Supreme Court of Tasmania, whose detailed comments, analyses and corrections to the manuscript of the first edition of this work maintain their value in this third edition. Mistakes again remain my own responsibility. I am also indebted to Felicia Gardner for her excellent editing, and to Hayley Moore of LexisNexis Butterworths for managing the project.

G E Dal Pont Hobart 21 July 2013

1.

Jordans, Bristol, 2012.

2.

M M Orkin, The Law of Costs, 2nd ed, Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd, Ontario.

3.

For instance, see the coverage of the most recent English reforms discussed in issue 2 of (2013) 32 CJQ.

4.

[2012] FamCA 661; BC201250891.

5.

Prantage v Prantage [2013] FamCAFC 105; BC201350284 (4 July 2013).

6.

[2012] FCA 1446; BC201209924.

7.

Madgwick v Kelly [2013] FCAFC 61 (14 June 2013).

8.

[2013] SASCFC 68; BC201310752 (3 July 2013).

9.

L Cranmer-Byng and S A Kapadia (eds), Musings of a Chinese Mystic, John Murray, London, 1927, p 11.

Table of Cases References are to paragraphs

A A Team Diamond Headquarters Pty Ltd v Main Road Property Group Pty Ltd (2009) 25 VR 189; [2009] VSCA 208; BC200908735 …. 16.52 A v B [1984] 1 All ER 265 …. 26.14, 26.21, 26.22, 26.23, 26.47 — v GS (2005) 193 FLR 416; [2005] FamCA 785 …. 8.70 A & R Constructions Pty Ltd v Lees (1982) 7 ACLR 900 …. 28.65 A Ltd v B Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 665 …. 28.45 Aaronisle Pty Ltd v Thorpe [2005] WASC 87; BC200503454 …. 4.34 Abbott v Pilot Development Corporation Pty Ltd (in liq) [2006] NSWSC 1178; BC200609017 …. 27.11 ABC v Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) [2008] 2 Qd R 101; [2007] QSC 134; BC00704406 …. 24.13 Abdelrazik v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) [2008] FC 839 …. 14.20 Abdul-Karim v Attorney-General’s Department [1999] NSWSC 79; BC9900623 …. 27.1, 27.6, 27.15 Abdurahman v Field (1986, unreported); BC8601205 …. 29.109 Abedi v Penningtons (a firm) [2000] 2 Costs LR 205 …. 4.52 Aberdare & Plymouth Co v Hankey (1888) 32 Sol Jo 644 …. 28.34 Abigail, Re (1904) 21 WN (NSW) 16 …. 5.28 Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v Peninsula Balmain Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] NSWSC 1016; BC200106971 …. 8.7, 8.8, 19.23 Abigroup Ltd v Sandtara Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 45; BC200200596 ….

15.41, 15.55 Aboriginal Group Training WA (Inc) v Peedac Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 51; BC200401332 …. 29.8, 29.80 Aboriginal Hostels Ltd v Fisher (1997, unreported); BC9706288 …. 21.17, 21.20, 21.52 Abraham v Jutsun [1963] 2 All ER 402 …. 23.15, 23.19, 23.51, 23.67 — v Thompson [1997] 4 All ER 362 …. 29.13, 29.15 Abrahams v Catip [1942] QWN 19 …. 13.53 — v Wainwright Ryan [1999] 1 VR 102 …. 5.37 Abrego v Simpson [2008] NSWSC 215; BC200801583 …. 7.48 Abruzzese v David Jones Ltd (No 1) [2003] FMCA 280; BC200303921 …. 26.39 Access Services Group Pty Ltd v McLoughlin (2006) 57 ACSR 725; [2006] NSWSC 532; BC200604077 …. 22.8 ACN 007 528 207 Pty Ltd (in liq) v Bird Cameron (No 5) [2002] SASC 236; BC200204141 …. 28.35, 28.64 ACN 068 691 092 Pty Ltd v Plan 4 Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2012) 112 SASR 329; [2012] SASCFC 25; B201201551 …. 11.37 ACN 074 971 109 Pty Ltd (as Trustee for Argot Unit Trust) v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia [2012] VSC 177; BC201202714 …. 8.39, 13.75 — v — [2013] VSC 137; BC201301434 …. 15.17 Acohs Pty Ltd v Merck Pty Ltd (1997, unreported); BC9702789 …. 29.21, 29.25, 29.126 — v Ucorp Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 41; BC200800245 …. 14.48 — v — (No 4) [2010] FCA 956; BC201006420 …. 13.12, 16.35 Acquilina v Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd (1965) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 531 …. 21.1, 21.21, 21.22, 21.23, 21.27, 21.35, 21.50, 21.51, 21.55

ACT Fire Brigade v Nester [2004] ACTSC 125; BC200408509 …. 8.29, 21.4 Actew Corporation Ltd v Mihaljevic [2007] ACTSC 39; BC200704765 …. 4.30 Acuthan v Coates (1986) 6 NSWLR 472; BC8600588 …. 24.40, 24.42 Adam & Harvey Ltd v International Maritime Supplies Co Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 445 …. 14.58 Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170; BC8100095 …. 20.28, 20.29 Adams v London Improved Motor Coach Builders Ltd [1921] 1 KB 495 …. 7.11, 7.13, 7.14 — v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 1394; BC200811342 …. 22.70 Adamson v Liu (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 864; BC200907992 …. 8.29 — v Williams [2001] QCA 38; BC200100324 …. 2.4, 4.46, 4.47 Adelaide Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Pegasus Securities Ltd (in liq) (1996, unreported); BC9606550 …. 16.45 Adelphi Hotel (Brighton) Ltd, Re [1953] 2 All ER 498 …. 15.40, 15.45, 15.48, 15.49, 15.50, 15.54 Adkins v Adkins [2009] TASSC 32; BC200904245 …. 10.35 Adlam v Noack [1999] FCA 1606; BC9907694 …. 16.68 Admiral Management Services Ltd v Para-Protect Europe Ltd [2002] 2 All ER 1017; [2002] EWHC 233 …. 1.20, 7.29, 17.3, 17.37 ADS Aerospace Ltd v EMS Global Tracking Ltd (2012) 145 Con LR 29; [2012] EWHC 2904 …. 8.51 Adsett v Berlouis (1992) 37 FCR 201; BC9203637 …. 10.8, 10.48, 10.53, 10.56 Adult Guardian v B (2002) 29 Fam LR 384; [2002] FamCA 874 …. 28.61, 29.107 Advan Investments Pty Ltd v Dean Gleeson Motor Sales Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 201; BC200303342 …. 16.69

Advanced Building Systems v Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 121; BC9702855 …. 20.13 Advanced Gaming Technologies Pty Ltd v Ahern [1999] NSWSC 45; BC9900674 …. 2.31, 3.20 Advanced Management Consultancy Pty Ltd v Martin Con Beech [2003] NSWSC 638; BC200303894 …. 18.32 Advantage Rent-A-Car Inc v Advantage Car Rental Pty Ltd (2001) 52 IPR 24; [2001] FCA 683; BC200103001 …. 9.21 Aeronave SpA v Westland Charters Ltd [1971] 3 All ER 531 …. 29.68 Agabeg v Hartwell (1842) 5 Beav 271; 49 ER 582 …. 1.25 AGC (Advances) Ltd v West (1984) 5 NSWLR 301 …. 15.45, 15.52, 16.19 Ager v Blacklock & Co (1887) 56 LT 890 …. 11.57 Ahmadi v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1191; BC201008197 …. 7.5 Ahmed v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1436; BC200006094 …. 14.59 Ahnee v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] 2 WLR 1305 …. 9.8 AHP v MP [2008] QSC 217; BC200809075 …. 8.53 Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd [1986] AC 965 …. 11.64, 22.2, 22.3, 22.5, 22.6, 22.17, 22.34 Ainger v Coffs Harbour City Council (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 212; BC200706649 …. 13.86, 16.56 Ainsworth v Wilding [1896] 1 Ch 673 …. 6.21 — v — [1900] Ch 322 …. 4.30 Airservices Australia v Jeppesen Sanderson Inc [2006] FCA 906; BC200605370 …. 14.51 Airtourer Cooperative Ltd v Millicer Aircraft Industries Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1400; BC200407226 …. 29.8 Aitken v Ettershank (1885) 7 ALT 16 …. 1.6

Ajkay v Hickey & Co Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 822; BC201105837 …. 14.47 Akedian Co Ltd v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd [1999] 1 VR 80; BC9800417 …. 22.78 Akiba v Queensland [2010] FCA 321; BC201001798 …. 22.15 Akki Pty Ltd v Martin Hall Pty Ltd (1994) 35 NSWLR 470 …. 27.2, 27.6, 27.19, 27.24, 27.29 Al Amanah College Inc v Minister for Education and Training (No 4) [2012] NSWLEC 26; BC201201945 …. 8.86, 13.80, 13.81 Alabakis v Alabakis (Costs) [2012] VSC 496; BC201208130 …. 13.59 Albertinni v Podopoulos [2010] FamCA 405; BC201050467 …. 8.78 Alcock v Public Trustee (1936) 53 WN (NSW) 192 …. 14.11 Aldag v Eistis (No 2) [2008] NSWDC 186; BC200840243 …. 13.82 Aldridge v Victims Compensation Fund Corporation (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 1040; BC200808822 …. 8.35 Alessio v Daniels (1983, unreported) …. 26.40 Alexander Stewart & Sons Ltd v Robinson (1921) 29 CLR 325; BC2100025 …. 17.93 Alexander, Marriage of (1977) 29 FLR 239 …. 14.16, 28.18 — v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority (No 3) [2010] FCA 506; BC201003460 …. 13.69, 13.77 — v Cambridge Credit Corporations Ltd (receivers appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 …. 20.13 — v Home Wilkinson Lowry [2007] VCAT 2297 …. 2.33 — v Renney (1995, unreported); BC9507255 …. 21.60, 24.46 Algama v Wainwright Ryan [1993] ANZ Conv R 79; BC9200803 …. 4.24 Alginates (Australia) Pty Ltd v Thomson & Carroll Pty Ltd [1970] VR 570 …. 8.50 Alice Springs Commercial Broadcasters Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1992, unreported); BC9203761 …. 22.61

Aljade Development and Construction Sdn Bhd v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd [2004] VSC 351; BC200406915 …. 13.61, 13.68 Al-Koronky v Time-Life Entertainment Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1123 …. 28.41 All Services Australia Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 330; [2000] FCA 375; BC200001251 …. 14.51 Allbeury v Corruption and Crime Commission [2012] WASCA 84; BC201208946 …. 8.67 Allen v Aldridge (1844) 5 Beav 401; 49 ER 633 …. 5.40 — v Tobias (1958) 98 CLR 367 …. 1.6 Alliance to Save Hinchinbrook Inc v Cook [2005] QSC 355; BC200510378 …. 9.34 Allied Collection Agencies Ltd v Wood [1981] 3 All ER 176 …. 14.24, 14.58 Allied Glass Manufacturers Ltd, Re (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 409 …. 27.6 Allman v Daly (No 2) [1959] VR 614 …. 11.22, 11.28, 22.21 Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 13) (1995, unreported); BC9501951 …. 14.51 — v — (No 14) (1995, unreported); BC9506840 …. 14.51 — v — (No 19) (1995) 134 ALR 187; BC9502005 …. 28.32, 28.33, 28.35 Alltrans Express Ltd v CVA Holdings Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 685 …. 8.39, 13.52, 20.32, 20.41, 20.44 Allwood (Estate of) v Benjafield [2009] NSWSC 1383; BC200911170 …. 4.24 Alman v MacDonald Rudder [2001] WASC 65; BC200101011 …. 3.18, 3.37 Almeida v Universal Dye Works Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] NSWCA 156; BC200107129 …. 11.23, 11.24, 11.26 Almond Investors Ltd v Emanouel [2012] VSC 479; BC201208019 …. 16.40 Alpine Hardwoods (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hardys Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 190 ALR 121; [2002] FCA 224; BC200200734 …. 13.57, 13.61

Alpine Holdings Pty Ltd v Warwick Entertainment Centre Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 53; BC200304787 …. 13.61 Alpine Shire Council v MHSC Transportation Services Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 58; BC200201052 …. 16.28 Alramon Pty Ltd v Lifuli Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWADT 49 …. 8.94 Alsop Wilkinson (a firm) v Neary [1995] 1 All ER 431 …. 10.5, 10.7, 14.11 Alstom Power Ltd v Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2006) 244 LSJS 65; [2006] SASC 87; BC200601564 …. 14.51, 14.55 — v — (No 9) [2012] SASC 163; BC201207297 …. 16.22 Altamura v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1974] VR 33 …. 11.18, 11.23, 11.28 Altorfer & Stow (a firm) v Lindsay [2005] WASCA 73; BC200502039 …. 7.16, 18.53 Alucraft Pty Ltd (in liq) v Grocon Ltd (1994, unreported); BC9401087 …. 15.69 Alves v Patel [2005] NSWSC 841; BC200507820 …. 13.75, 13.79 Alwar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 57 ALD 343; [1999] FCA 1111; BC9904937 …. 9.28 Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell [2007] WASCA 158; BC200801646 …. 8.5 Amaca Pty Ltd v Novek (2009) 9 DDCR 199; [2009] NSWCA 50; BC200901583 …. 13.89 Amalgamated Holdings Ltd v North Sydney Council (2012) 191 LGERA 51; [2012]; NSWLEC 138; BC201204709 …. 19.13 Amalgamated Mining Services Pty Ltd v Warman International Ltd (1988) 19 FCR 324 …. 28.52, 28.58 Amanatidis v Darmos (Costs) (No 2) [2011] VSC 216; BC201103136 …. 12.17, 12.22, 13.50 Amand v Home Secretary and Minister of Defence of Royal Netherlands Government [1943] AC 147 …. 24.12, 24.15

Ambassador Homes Pty Ltd v Dopel (2008) 58 SR (WA) 198; [2008] WADC 66; BC200840072 …. 28.23 Amber v Stacey [2001] 2 All ER 88; [2000] EWCA Civ 286 …. 13.52 Ambrose v Sandford Pty Ltd (1989) 42 A Crim R 324 …. 24.61 Ambulance Service of New South Wales v Worley (No 2) (2006) 67 NSWLR 719; [2006] NSWCA 236; BC200606639 …. 13.11 AMC Commercial Cleaning (NSW) Pty Ltd v Coade [2013] NSWSC 192; BC201301131 …. 27.11, 27.15 Andersen v Lockhart [1991] 1 Qd R 501 …. 26.36 Andrews v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1982) 60 FLR 261 …. 29.36, 29.37, 29.38, 29.41 Ames v Richardson [1921] SASR 224 …. 7.19 AMEV Finance Ltd v Artes Studios Thoroughbreds Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 486 …. 13.64 Amirbeaggi v Business in Focus (Australia) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 421; BC200803506 …. 4.10, 4.27 Amos v Brisbane City Council [2006] 1 Qd R 300; [2005] QCA 433; BC200510069 …. 7.56 — v Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd [2008] 1 Qd R 304; [2007] QCA 235; BC200705735 …. 15.85 — v — [2009] 2 Qd R 303; [2009] QCA 65; BC200901842 …. 15.15, 15.16, 15.21, 20.34 AMP Capital Investors v Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation (No 3) [2007] NSWLEC 724; BC200709470 …. 8.86 — v — (2008) 163 LGERA 245; [2008] NSWCA 325; BC200810501 …. 8.86 AMP Services Ltd v Manning (No 3) [2007] FCA 510; BC200702466 …. 8.6, 12.2, 12.4 Anderson v Bowles (1951) 84 CLR 310; BC5100370 …. 7.22 — v Director-General, Department of Environment and Climate Change

[2008] NSWLEC 299; BC200809581 …. 9.4 — v Glen Ewin & Staff Pty Ltd (1985) 41 SASR 42 …. 17.77, 24.53 — v McPherson (No 2) [2012] WASC 19 (S2); BC201208919 …. 13.22 — v New South Wales Minister for Planning (No 2) (2008) 163 LGERA 132; [2008] NSWLEC 272; BC200808873 …. 9.4, 9.5, 9.10 — v Wellington Publishing Co Ltd [1962] NZLR 1034 …. 12.22 Anderson Group Pty Ltd v Tynan Motors Pty Ltd (No 2) (2006) 67 NSWLR 706; [2006] NSWCA 120; BC200603504 …. 13.7, 13.67 Anderson Stuart v Treleaven [2000] NSWSC 536; BC200003435 …. 21.18 Andrewartha v Andrewartha (No 2) (1987) 45 SASR 85 …. 17.79 Andrews v Barnes (1888) 39 Ch D 133 …. 6.2, 16.3 — v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 184 …. 20.13 Anfrank Nominees Pty Ltd v Connell (1991) 6 WAR 271 …. 11.4 Angerstein, Ex parte (1874) LR 9 Ch App 479 …. 10.48, 10.53 Anghel v Minister for Transport (No 2) [1995] 2 Qd R 454; BC9404344 …. 9.34 Anglo-Cyprian Trade Agencies Ltd v Paphos Wine Industries Ltd [1951] 1 All ER 873 …. 8.39, 8.57 Anglo-Italian Holdings Pty Ltd v Varallo (2005) 12 VR 257; [2005] VSCA 257; BC200509383 …. 17.25, 17.27 Anglo-Moravian Hungarian Junction Railway Co, Re (1875) 1 Ch D 130 …. 2.16 Angor Pty Ltd v Ilich Motor Company Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 65; BC9203632 …. 7.13, 7.14 Angus v McLachlan (1883) 23 Ch D 330 …. 26.46 ANI Corporation v Unisys Pty Ltd (1993, unreported); BC9302306 …. 13.61 Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd, Re (1997) 1 Qd R 116; BC9701885 …. 23.1 Ansett Australia Ltd (all admins apptd), Re (2002) 41 ACSR 598; [2002]

VSC 114; BC200201750 …. 10.57 Anstee v Jennings [1935] VLR 144 …. 7.5, 24.40 Anstis, Marriage of (1999) 26 Fam LR 548; [1999] FamCA 842 …. 23.5, 23.35 Anthony v Maxam Australia Pty Ltd [2012] TASSC 42; BC201205197 …. 6.5 ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd v Gibson [1986] 1 NZLR 556 …. 15.44, 15.45 Aoun v Bahri [2002] 3 All ER 182; [2002] EWHC 29 …. 28.45 Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Department of Mines and Petroleum [2012] WASCA 167; BC201206288 …. 20.34, 20.38 APC Marine Pty Ltd v Ship ‘APC Aussie 1’ [2011] FCA 679; BC201104276 …. 15.61 APEP Pty Ltd v Smalley (1984) 2 ACLC 49 …. 28.40, 29.101, 29.126, 29.130 Apex Frozen Foods Ltd (in liq) v Ali [2007] EWHC 469 …. 22.41 Apitzsch v Gayle [2003] NTSC 23; BC200300957 …. 16.8 Apollinaris Co’s Trade Marks, Re [1891] 1 Ch 1 …. 29.79 Apollo 169 Management Pty Ltd v Pinefield Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] VSC 475; BC201007817 …. 23.5, 23.31, 23.40 Apostolidis v Kalenik (No 2) [2011] VSCA 329; BC201108296 …. 8.80, 13.66 Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 3) [2009] FCA 1069; BC200908662 …. 14.34 Appeal Costs Board, Re (2001) 120 A Crim R 361; [2001] WASCA 53; BC200100549 …. 21.29 Appellants v Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory (2011) 252 FLR 209; [2011] ACTSC 133; BC201106410 …. 6.8, 6.10 Appleglen Pty Ltd v Mainzeal Corporation Pty Ltd (1988) 79 ALR 634 …. 28.26, 28.49, 29.27, 29.84

Appleton French & Scrafton Ltd, Re [1905] 1 Ch 749 …. 22.5 Applicant NAGM of 2002 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 125 FCR 488; [2002] FCAFC 396; BC200207297 …. 22.56 Applicant NAQG of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1044; BC200204831 …. 22.56 Applicants A1 and A2 v Brouwer (No 2) [2007] VSCA 269; BC200710290 …. 21.60 April Fine Paper Macao Commercial Offshore Ltd v Moore Business Systems Australia Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR 619; [2009] NSWSC 867; BC200907827 …. 17.62, 29.123 Aqua Blue (Noosa) Pty Ltd v Soil Surveys Engineering Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 176; BC201003606 …. 28.64 Aqua-Marine Marketing Pty Ltd v Pacific Reef Fisheries (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 6) [2012] FCA 1048 …. 13.15 Aquatec Max-Con Pty Ltd v Barwon Region Water Authority (No 8) [2007] VSC 363; BC200708490 …. 13.10 Aquilina Holdings Pty Ltd v Lynndell Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] QSC 98; BC200803721 …. 15.14 Aqwell Pty Ltd v BJC Drilling Services Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 266; BC200810280 …. 28.49, 29.27 Aratra Potato Co Ltd v Taylor Joynson Garrett (a firm) [1995] 4 All ER 695 …. 3.60 Arc Energy Ltd (No 2), Re [2008] FCA 1412; BC200808109 …. 11.43 Archbishop Petros v Biru [2006] VSC 404; BC200609258 …. 14.25 Archer Pty Ltd v Woodhead Australia Pty Ltd (1995, unreported); BC9503154 …. 29.109 Archital Luxfer Ltd v Henry Boot Construction Ltd [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 642 …. 13.56 Arden Anglican School v Hornsby Shire Council (2008) 158 LGERA 224; [2008] NSWLEC 103; BC200801439 …. 8.84

Arena Management Pty Ltd (receiver and manager appointed) v Campbell Street Theatre Pty Ltd (2011) 80 NSWLR 652; [2011] NSWCA 128; BC201103285 …. 20.37, 22.9 Aretzis v Larwood (2002) 223 LSJS 192; [2002] SASC 367; BC200207035 …. 11.9 Argus Industrial Group Holdings Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2010] NSWADT 136 …. 17.7 Arian v Nguyen (2001) 33 MVR 37; [2001] NSWCA 5; BC200100266 …. 8.65, 12.15 Ariss v Express Interiors Pty Ltd (in liq) [1996] 2 VR 507; BC9503939 …. 29.5, 29.20, 29.24, 29.26 Ark Hire Pty Ltd v Barwick Event Hire Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 488; BC200703602 …. 16.68 Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2005] 3 All ER 613; [2005] EWCA Civ 655 …. 22.20 Armitage v Jessop (1866) LR 2 CP 12 …. 1.19 — v Parsons [1908] 2 KB 410 …. 6.23 Armstrong v Boulton [1990] VR 215 …. 16.22, 20.8 — v Landmark Corporation Ltd [1967] 1 NSWR 13 …. 8.4 Arnett v Holloway [1960] VR 22 …. 6.22 Arnold v Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 (No 4) [2009] NSWLEC 87; BC200904913 …. 9.2, 20.10 — v Queensland (1987) 73 ALR 607 …. 11.42, 29.90, 29.97, 29.120, 29.124, 29.132 Arrowsmith, Ex parte (1806) 13 Ves 124; 33 ER 241 …. 5.51 Artistic Builders Pty Ltd v Nash [2007]] NSWSC 1279; BC200709676 …. 14.35 Arundel Chiropractic Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 179 ALR 406; [2001] HCA 26; BC20010218 …. 16.18, 16.28, 16.51, 22.6, 22.17, 22.76

Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 4) [2012] FCA 1411; BC201209686 …. 8.69 Asher, Ex parte (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 71 …. 6.13 Ashfield Municipal Council v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2001) 112 LGERA 389; [2001] NSWLEC 10; BC200100837 …. 8.87 Ashrafinia v Ashrafinia [2012] NSWSC 500; BC201203155 …. 23.23 Asian Investments Corporation Ltd v Symons (1996, unreported) …. 28.29 Aspden v Seddon [1877] WN 207 …. 11.2 Aspendale Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v W J Drever Pty Ltd (1983) 7 ACLR 937 …. 28.40, 29.124, 29.126 Assets Development Co Ltd v Close Brothers & Co [1900] 2 Ch 717 …. 15.69 Associated Confectionery (Aust) Ltd v Mineral and Chemical Traders Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 349 …. 13.70 AT v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 131; BC201003728 …. 8.60, 8.91 Athanasiou v Ward Keller (6) Pty Ltd (1998) 122 NTR 22; BC9802157 …. 3.17, 3.23, 3.27, 3.37 Athenic, The [1932] WN 10 …. 11.45 Atherton Tableland Maize Board v Clements & Marshall Pty Ltd [1927] St R Qd 176 …. 15.34, 17.94 Athprom Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 5 ACLC 711; BC8700592 …. 28.55, 29.95 Atkins v Purslowe [1966] WAR 46 …. 11.23, 11.28 Atkinson (deceased), Re [1971] VR 612 …. 10.5, 14.11 Atkinson v Hastings Deering (Qld) Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 103 …. 16.68 — v Pengelly [1995] 3 NZLR 104 …. 4.54, 26.10, 27.2, 27.7 Atlas Corporation Pty Ltd v Kalyk [2001] NSWCA 10; BC200100339 ….

7.37, 7.40 Atlantic 3-Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd v Marler [2004] 1 Qd R 579; [2003] QCA 529; BC200307197 …. 4.8 Attenborough v Kemp (1861) 14 Moo PCC 351; 15 ER 338 …. 20.43 Attorney-General v Birmingham Drainage Board (1908) 52 Sol Jo 855 …. 17.37 — v British Broadcasting Corporation [1979] 3 All ER 45 …. 21.18 — v Drapers Company (1869) LR 9 Eq 69 …. 17.33 — v Kennedy Miller Television Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 729; BC9802854 …. 18.67 — v Logan [1891] 2 QB 100 …. 22.3 — v Lord Carrington (1843) 6 Beav 454; 49 ER 901 …. 19.5 — v Murdoch (1856) 2 K & J 571; 69 ER 910 …. 10.13 — v Shillibeer (1849) 4 Ex 606; 154 ER 1356 …. 7.19, 17.22, 17.23 — v Transport Control Systems (NZ) Ltd [1982] 2 NZLR 19 …. 28.40, 29.20, 29.25, 29.100 — v Trueman (1843) 11 M & W 694; 152 ER 983 …. 26.26 — v Walmsley (1843) 1 M & W 179; 152 ER 1160 …. 26.26 Attorney-General (Botswana) v Aussie Diamond Products Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 299; BC200910197 …. 29.127 Attorney General of Canada v Al Telbani [2011] FC 945 …. 14.20 Attorney-General (Ontario) v Dieleman (1995) 123 DLR (4th) 757 …. 9.20, 9.37, 24.71 — v Winner [1954] AC 541 …. 11.42 Attorney-General (NSW) v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd (1993, unreported); BC9302015 …. 24.47 Attorney-General (Queensland) v Holland (1912) 15 CLR 46; BC1200033 …. 24.2

Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545; [2003] HCA 67; BC200306764 …. 22.74 Attorneys and Solicitors Act 1870, Re (1875) 1 CPD 573 …. 3.46 Attrill v Richmond River Shire Council (1995) 38 NSWLR 545; BC9501777 …. 9.37 Auckland Bulk Gas Users Group v Commerce Commission [1990] 1 NZLR 448 …. 6.15, 6.16 August Investments Pty Ltd v Poseidon NL (1971) 2 SASR 65 …. 28.5, 28.6 Aurukun Shire Council v Chief Executive Officer, Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing in the Department of Treasury [2012] 1 Qd R 1; [2010] QCA 37; BC201001015 …. 9.29 Ausino International Pty Ltd v Apex Sports Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1119; BC200608585 …. 14.25 Auspine Ltd v Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd (1999) ANZ Conv R 349; BC9202071 …. 3.33 — v — (1999) 93 FCR 1; [1999] FCA 673; BC9902639 …. 15.19, 15.79, 15.80, 15.81, 17.37 Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) ATPR ¶41-444; BC9502826 …. 29.114 Aussie Invest Corporation Pty Ltd v Hobsons Bay City Council (2004) 22 VAR 212; [2004] VCAT 2188 …. 7.26 Aussie Red Equipment Pty Ltd v Antsent Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1641; BC200107235 …. 14.69 Austen v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 403; BC9304959 …. 8.25 Austin v Old Paradians Football Club [2007] VCC 393 …. 13.82 Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Lodestar Anstalt [2009] FCA 1228; BC200909778 …. 28.34, 28.47 — v — (No 2) (2012) 202 FCR 506; [2012] FCAFC 72; BC201203075 …. 13.90

Australasian Academy of Natural Medicine Pty Ltd v Walters (2003) 85 SASR 36; [2003] SASC 56; BC200300558 …. 22.27 Australasian Memory Pty Ltd, Re (2000) 34 ACSR 158; [2000] NSWSC 333; BC200001940 …. 14.34, 14.44 Australasian Performing Rights Association Ltd v Marlin [1999] FCA 1006; BC9905295 …. 15.16 — v Metro on George Pty Ltd (2004) 64 IPR 57; [2004] FCA 1371; BC200407052 …. 12.4 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Alirezai (No 2) [2002] QSC 205; BC200204120 …. 13.13 — v Dzienciol [2001] WASC 30 …. 22.68 — v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd (1977) 137 CLR 252; BC7700065 …. 10.7 — v Parker (1997, unreported); BC9701229 …. 14.45 — v Permewan Wright Consolidated Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 327; BC9905899 …. 23.24 Australia Equity Investors, An Arizona Ltd Partnership v Colliers International (NSW) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1209; BC201008242 …. 28.34, 29.22, 29.25 Australian Aqua Air Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2009] NSWADT 239 …. 8.94 Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Ltd v Evans and Tate Premium Wines Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 374; [2007] NSWCA 57; BC200701811 …. 8.15, 8.16 — v Redrock Co Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 114; BC200800779 …. 7.16, 7.17 Australian Bight Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Haagmans (2010) 106 SASR 59; [2010] SASC 6; BC201000194 …. 22.39 Australian Blue Metal Ltd v Hughes [1970] 2 NSWR 119 …. 17.38, 17.49, 17.92 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199; [2001] HCA 63; BC200107043 …. 20.2

— v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46; BC200607692 …. 20.2, 29.86 Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders Labourers Federation v Commonwealth Trading Bank [1976] 2 NSWLR 371 …. 29.7, 29.70, 29.77 Australian Capital Holdings Pty Ltd v Mackay City Council [2008] QCA 188; BC200806626 …. 6.23 Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621; BC5300020 …. 5.22, 15.32, 15.34, 15.35, 18.52, 18.68, 20.28 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (No 3) (2002) ATPR ¶41-901; [2002] FCA 1294; BC200206240 …. 8.9 — v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] FCAFC 163; BC200304322 …. 20.4 — v Amcor Printing Papers Group Ltd [1999] FCA 533; BC9902748 …. 9.21 — v Chaste Corporation (No 2) (2003) 127 FCR 433; [2003] FCA 195; BC200300969 …. 14.48, 15.12 — v Global Prepaid Communications Pty Ltd (in liq) [2008] FCA 874; BC200804645 …. 15.20 — v Harris Scarfe Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 433; BC200903669 …. 8.53, 13.78 — v IMB Group Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 886; BC200204952 …. 8.5 — v IMB Group Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] FCA 1592; BC200408250 …. 7.24, 7.29 — v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (2007) ATPR ¶42-200; [2007] FCA 1844; BC200710346 …. 16.54, 16.66 — v Metcash Trading Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 55; BC201202182 …. 13.28 — v MHG Plastic Industries Pty Ltd (2003) 136 FCR 1; [2003] FCA 1624;

BC200308427 …. 1.20 — v Seal-A-Fridge Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 681; BC201004485 …. 8.29 — v SIP Australia Pty Ltd (2003) ATPR ¶41-937; [2003] FCA 336; BC200301754 …. 11.3 — v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 201 ALR 618; [2002] FCA 192; BC200200656 …. 13.61, 13.69 — v Visy Paper Pty Ltd (2000) 186 ALR 731; [2000] FCA 1640; BC200006997 …. 9.21 — v World Netsafe Pty Ltd (2003) 133 FCR 279; [2003] FCA 1501; BC200307764 …. 16.68 Australian Democrats WA Division Inc v Australian Democrats Vic Division Inc (1998, unreported); BC9805206 …. 29.121 Australian Development Corporation Pty Ltd v White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 280; BC200202286 …. 19.1 Australian Electoral Commission v Towney (No 2) (1994) 54 FCR 383 …. 16.40, 16.74 Australian Federation of Consumers Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd (1991) 100 ALR 568; BC9103110 …. 16.24, 16.64, 16.72, 16.73 — v — (No 2) (1991) 30 FCR 548; BC9103330 …. 15.9, 20.13 Australian Flight Test Services Pty Ltd v Minister for Industry, Science and Technology (1996, unreported); BC9601453 …. 14.51 Australian Forest Managers Ltd (in liq) v Bramley (1996) 65 FCR 13; BC9600943 …. 22.6, 22.12 Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v De Jager [1984] VR 483 …. 11.37, 11.64 Australian Incentive Plan Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (Vic) (No 2) [2012] VSCA 251; BC201207603 …. 20.16 Australian Postal Commission v Dao (No 2) (1986) 6 NSWLR 497 …. 6.17, 11.47, 21.17, 21.18 Australian Postal Corporation v Harris [2000] FCA 1252; BC200005248 ….

21.60 Australian Provincial Insurance Association Ltd v Commissioner of Land Tax [1945] ALR 500 …. 17.35 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Holloway (2000) 35 ACSR 276; [2000] FCA 1245; BC200005264 …. 8.7 Australian Receivables Ltd v Tekitu Pty Ltd (2012) 260 FLR 243; [2012] NSWSC 170; BC201200992 …. 27.6 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Atlantic 3-Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] 2 Qd R 399; [2006] QCA 540; BC200610475 …. 2.4, 3.8, 5.43 — v — [2008] 2 Qd R 298; [2008] QSC 9; BC200800427 …. 15.17 — v Cassimatis [2011] FCA 796; BC201105188 …. 14.51 — v Edwards — Costs [2006] NSWSC 498; BC200603664 …. 9.21 — v Farley (2001) 51 NSWLR 494; [2001] NSWSC 326; BC200101937 …. 24.26 — v GDK Financial Solutions Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 4) (2008) 169 FCR 497; [2008] FCA 858; BC200804403 …. 14.4, 14.21 — v Plymin (No 2) (2003) 21 ACLC 1237; [2003] VSC 230; BC200303372 …. 9.21 — v West (2008) 100 SASR 496; [2008] SASC 111; BC200803351 …. 16.66 Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Pty Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 194; 11 ACSR 539; BC9304961 …. 14.59, 14.66, 14.68, 14.70, 22.6, 22.45 — v Berona Investments Pty Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 772; BC9506844 …. 14.66 — v Melbourne Asset Management Nominees Pty Ltd (receiver and manager appointed) (1994) 49 FCR 334; BC9405684 …. 10.57 Australian Security Estates Pty Ltd v Bluecrest Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (2002) 169 FLR 111; [2002] NSWSC 491; BC200202879 …. 22.10

Australian Super Pty Ltd v Woodward (2009) 262 ALR 402; [2009] FCAFC 168; BC200910789 …. 7.24 Australian Trade Commission v Disktravel [2000] FCA 62; BC200000251 …. 8.7 Australian Transport Insurance Pty Ltd v Graeme Phillips Road Transport Insurance Pty Ltd (1986) 10 FCR 177 …. 16.13 Australians for Sustainable Development Inc v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 70; BC201104234 …. 14.65 Australiawide Airlines Ltd v Aspirion Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 365; BC200611167 …. 14.63 Auswest Timbers Pty Ltd v Secretary to the Department of Sustainability & Environment (No 2) [2010] VSC 513; BC201008428 …. 13.80 Aveling v UBS Capital Markets Australia Holdings Ltd (No 3) [2005] FCA 1320; BC200507323 …. 4.30 Aveling Barford Ltd, Re [1988] 3 All ER 1019 …. 26.39 Avenhouse v Hornsby Shire Council (1998) 44 NSWLR l; BC9801812 …. 7.22 Avonbank Dairy Co Pty Ltd, Re [1962] Tas SR 121 …. 6.13 Avspares Pty Ltd v Skywest Aviation Pty Ltd (1997) 24 ACSR 272; BC9703152 …. 29.27 Ayyoush v Samin (1994, unreported); BC9406627 …. 29.108, 29.110 Axe Australasia Pty Ltd v Australume Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 844; BC200605071 …. 12.3, 12.4

B B & Associates (a firm of solicitors) v Bloomfield [2003] 31 Fam LR 1; [2003] FamCA 420 …. 5.26 B and B (Costs Certificates) (2007) 214 FLR 284; [2007] FamCA 1177; BC200750250 …. 21.59 B and B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Costs) (1997) 22 Fam LR 453 ….

11.47, 11.49, 11.50 B v J (2006) 198 FLR 354; [2006] FamCA 256 …. 8.28 — v P [2000] FamCA 392 …. 7.29 — v Pendlebury (2002) 152 NLJ Rep 1072 …. 23.62 B(R) v Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto (1995) 122 DLR (4th) 1 …. 11.47 Baalman v Dare Reed (1984) 68 FLR 458 …. 5.43, 5.51, 16.15 Babcock v Carr (1981) 127 DLR (3d) 77 …. 11.13 Babrow v Rackley (Costs) [2010] FamCA 806; BC201050905 …. 13.43 Bacal Contracting Ltd v Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd [1980] 2 All ER 655 …. 22.43, 22.44 Backhouse v Judd [1925] SASR 395 …. 7.14 Bacon v Purcell (1916) 22 CLR 307 …. 4.52 Bacup Corp v Smith (1890) 44 Ch D 395 …. 29.56 Badger Chiyoda v CBI NZ Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 599 …. 28.32, 28.33, 28.48, 29.4, 29.88 Bagley v Pinebelt Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 655; BC200003814 …. 22.10, 23.12, 23.13 Bagshaw v Pimm [1900] P 148 …. 11.44 — v Scott [2005] FCA 104; BC200500325 …. 23.4, 23.22 Bahr v Nicolay (No 1) (1987) 163 CLR 490; BC8701792 …. 28.7 Baida Holdings Pty Ltd v Pocknell [2002] ACTSC 88; BC200205155 …. 29.54 Baile v Baile (1872) LR 13 Eq 497 …. 22.68 Bailey v Beagle Management Pty Ltd (2001) 105 FCR 136; (2001) 182 ALR 264; [2001] FCA 60; BC200100211 …. 14.48, 20.29, 29.124, 29.129 — v Gundry (1836) 5 LJ Ch 199 …. 29.80 — v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529; BC7100470 …. 6.21, 6.22

— v Wallace [1970] VR 109 …. 17.86, 24.53 Baillieu Knight Frank (NSW) Pty Ltd v Ted Manny Real Estate Pty Ltd (1992) 30 NSWLR 359 …. 6.16, 16.45 Bain Gasteen & Co’s Bill of Costs, Re [1990] 1 Qd R 412 …. 5.43 Baird v Baird [1946] QWN 37 …. 13.53 Bake v French (No 2) [1907] 2 Ch 215 …. 3.11 Baker Johnson Lawyers v Jorgensen [2002] QDC 205 …. 3.5, 3.49, 3.51 Baker Johnson’s Bill of Costs, Re [1995] 2 Qd R 234 …. 5.24, 5.38 Baker v Legal Services Commissioner [2006] 2 Qd R 249; [2006] QCA 145; BC200602974 …. 4.44 — v Towle (2008) 39 Fam LR 323; [2008] NSWCA 73; BC200802889 …. 8.80 Balch v Symes (1823) Turn & R 87; 37 ER 1028 …. 26.45 Baldi v N G Green & Co (1975, unreported) …. 5.29 Balenzuela v De Gail (1959) 101 CLR 226 …. 21.2 Bale-Sutch v Bale-Sutch [2007] FamCA 463 …. 8.70 Ball v Morgan [2001] FMCA 127; BC200108534 …. 9.28 Ballard v Brookfield Australia Investments Ltd [2012] NSWCA 434; BC201210044 …. 29.110 Ballato v Co-operative Bulk Handling Ltd (1990, unreported); BC9001524 …. 16.23 Ballesteros v Chidlow [2006] QCA 368; BC200607592 …. 13.91 Balnaves v Smith [2012] QSC 408; BC201210231 …. 13.6 Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1 …. 16.28, 16.45, 16.74, 20.34 — v — (1993) 176 CLR 344; BC9303547 …. 4.44 Bandwill Pty Ltd v Spencer-Laitt (2000) 23 WAR 390; [2000] WASC 210; BC200005103 …. 23.21

Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v Taylor [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 484 …. 11.59 Bank of Australasia v Herrick (1886) 12 VLR 832 …. 20.41 Bank of Baroda v Panessar [1987] Ch 335 …. 15.41 Bank of New South Wales v Withers (1981) 35 ALR 21 …. 1.6, 1.7, 5.48, 15.2 Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Donald Export Trading Ltd [1980] 1 NZLR 97 …. 28.19 Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Marsh [2000] WASC 208; BC200004912 …. 15.41, 15.51 — v O’Neill (1999, unreported); BC9900058 …. 7.20, 17.22, 17.23 — v Ponga (1998, unreported); BC9806543 …. 15.41 Bankamerica Finance Ltd v Nock [1988] AC 1002 …. 11.13, 11.14, 20.41 Banno v Commonwealth (1993) 45 FCR 32; BC9304996 …. 8.86, 8.87 Bantick v Boss Properties Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] VSC 165; BC200002342 …. 12.11 Barakat v Bazdarova [2012] NSWCA 140; BC201203248 …. 13.10, 13.25 Barameda Enterprises Pty Ltd v O’Connor [1988] 1 Qd R 359 …. 7.4, 8.22 Baramon Sales Pty Ltd v Goodman Fielder Mills Ltd [2001] FCA 1819; BC200108056 …. 14.58 Baranski v Baranski (Costs) [2012] FamCAFC 76; BC201250318 …. 20.11 Barclays Bank v Tom [1923] 1 KB 221 …. 11.32 Barescape Pty Ltd v Bacchus Holdings Pty Ltd (No 12) [2012] NSWSC 1591; BC201210768 …. 7.49, 8.4 Baresic v Slingshot Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 160; BC200503069 …. 13.89 Barfield v Friedman (1997, unreported); BC9704216 …. 3.1, 3.25, 3.29 Bariamis v Coadys [2007] VCAT 645 …. 2.31

Barker & Co v Hemming (1880) 5 QBD 609 …. 8.15 Barker, Re (1834) 6 Sim 476; 58 ER 573 …. 5.51 — v St Quintin (1844) 12 M & W 441 …. 27.1, 27.6 — v Walker (1917) 13 Tas LR 109 …. 17.37 Barnes v Davies (1929) 30 SR (NSW) 5 …. 17.67 Barnett v Eccles Corporation [1900] 2 QB 423 …. 7.22, 15.55 — v Rogers [1914] SALR 138 …. 10.4 Baronglow Pty Ltd v Thomas (No 7) (2008) 253 LSJS 251; [2008] SASC 33; BC200800668 …. 18.18, 18.19, 18.86 Barr v Police [2010] 2 NZLR 1; [2009] NZSC 109 …. 25.26 Barradine Pty Ltd v Westworld Holdings Pty Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 498 …. 7.4, 11.14, 11.17 Barratt v Gough-Thomas [1951] Ch 242 …. 26.3, 26.4, 26.8 Barrell Insurances Pty Ltd v Pennant Hills Restaurants Pty Ltd (1983) 49 ALR 384; BC8300113 …. 6.23 Barrett-Peacock v State of Tasmania (1995, unreported); BC9506699 …. 29.112 Barrett v Whitten (1992) 15 Fam LR 693 …. 3.14 Barrett-Peacock v State of Tasmania (1995, unreported); BC9506699 …. 9.1 Barrett Property Group Ltd v Metricon Homes Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1823; BC200710263 …. 14.51, 16.67 Barrister (Wasted Costs Order) (No 1 of 1991), Re a [1993] QB 293 …. 23.1, 23.58 Barrister and Solicitor, Re a (1979) 40 FLR 26 …. 4.32, 26.2, 26.4, 26.10, 27.1, 27.3, 27.4, 27.6 Barristers’ Board v Palm Management Pty Ltd [1984] WAR 101 …. 15.58 Barro v Barro (1980, unreported) …. 14.16 — v — (1981, unreported) …. 14.16

Barry (deceased), Re [1971] VR 395 …. 20.2 Barry v Shoobridge [1971] Tas SR 265 …. 21.2 Bartex Fabrics Pty Ltd v Phillips Fox (1994) 13 ACSR 667; BC9402622 …. 3.35, 4.14 Bartkus v Bartkus [2010] NSWSC 889; BC201005697 …. 10.40 Bartlett v Higgins [1901] 2 KB 230 …. 16.16, 16.17, 17.32 Barton v Berman [1980] 1 NSWLR 63 …. 7.5, 24.40 — v Minister for Foreign Affairs (1984) 2 FCR 463 …. 28.34. 28.42, 29.1, 29.65, 29.68, 29.73 Barwick v Barwick (1937) 33 Tas LR 1 …. 17.3, 17.37 Barwon Region Water Authority v Aquatec-Maxcon Pty Ltd (2007) 17 VR 480; [2007] VSCA 186; BC200707688 …. 13.12 Basapa v Burton (1991) ASC ¶56-049; BC9101178 …. 21.17 Base Metals Exploration NL (in liq) v Huntley Management Ltd (formerly Teys Management Ltd) [2007] QSC 194; BC200706827 …. 17.20 Bass Coast Shire Council v King [1997] 2 VR 5; BC9604973 …. 16.40, 16.45 Bastian, Re (1922) 24 WALR 119 …. 25.26 Bat Advocacy NSW Inc v Minister for Environment Protection, Heritage and the Arts (No 2) (2011) 280 ALR 91; [2011] FCAFC 84; BC201104896 …. 9.2, 9.16, 20.10 Bateman v Clarke [1973] WAR 101 …. 24.52 Bateman Long and Maloney Pty Ltd v Long Beach Land Co Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1495; BC201109690 …. 22.37 Bates v Lloyd [2005] NSWSC 1253; BC200511044 …. 8.46 Bathurst City Council v Stamatopoulos (No 2) (Costs) (2002) 121 LGERA 152; [2002] NSWLEC 118; BC200204094 …. 8.44 Battams & Hutchinson, Re [1897] 1 Ch 699 …. 5.43 Batten v CTMS Ltd [1999] FCA 1576; BC9907364 …. 14.51

Batterham v Makeig (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 314; BC200909386 …. 28.21 Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v Gordian Runoff Ltd [2006] NSWSC 583; BC200604424 …. 13.70, 16.66 — v — (No 2) (2009) 15 ANZ Ins Cas ¶61-795; [2009] NSWCA 12; BC200900573 …. 13.69 Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd v Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd (1998, unreported); BC9806830 …. 21.51 — v Qantas Airways Ltd [2003] FCA 325; BC200301632 …. 8.4 Baulkham Hills Shire Council v Ko-veda Holiday Park Estate Ltd (No 4) [2010] NSWLEC 239; BC201008969 …. 8.53 Bax v R (1931) 26 Tas LR 80 …. 24.64 Baychek v Baychek [2010] NSWSC 987; BC201006441 …. 7.48, 15.20 Bayford v St George Bank Ltd (No 2) (2003) 229 LSJS 59; [2003] SASC 242; BC200304378 …. 15.41 Baygol Pty Ltd v Foamex Polystyrene Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1089; BC200505920 …. 13.67 Baylis, Re [1896] 2 Ch 107 …. 3.17, 3.37 Baylis Baxter Ltd v Sabath [1958] 1 WLR 529 …. 20.41, 20.42, 20.43 Baynes v Kalyk [2003] NSWSC 607; BC200303612 …. 2.31 BBC Nominees (WA) Pty Ltd v Yangebup Developments Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 81; BC200803410 …. 28.26 BE Australia WD Pty Ltd v Sutton (2011) 285 ALR 532; [2011] NSWCA 414; BC201110353 …. 10.57 BE Studios Ltd v Smith & Williamson Ltd [2006] 2 All ER 811; [2005] EWHC 2730 …. 22.32, 22.37 Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1992) 7 ACSR 203; BC9203374 …. 28.23 — v — (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119; BC9507552 …. 15.14, 15.15, 15.20, 15.21, 15.25 — v Kennedy [1999] 48 NSWLR 1; [1999] NSWCA 408; BC9907249 ….

2.7 Beach Retreat Pty Ltd v Mooloolaba Marina Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 356; [2009] QSC 84; BC200903944 …. 15.17, 16.56, 22.31, 22.37, 22.38 Beagle Holdings Pty Ltd v Equus Financial Services Ltd [2000] WASC 128; BC200002638 …. 8.7 Bear v Waxman [1912] VLR 292 …. 3.3 — v — [1912] VLR 252 …. 3.24 Bearcroft, Ex parte (1767) 1 Doug 200n …. 5.51 Beardmore v Franklins Management Services Pty Ltd [2003] 1 Qd R 1; [2002] QCA 60; BC200200904 …. 12.20, 20.36 Beasley v Marshall (No 3) (1986) 41 SASR 321 …. 17.75, 17.76, 17.77, 17.78, 17.83 Beaumont v Greathead (1846) 2 CB 494; 135 ER 1039 …. 8.39 — v Senior [1903] 1 KB 282 …. 11.8 Beba Enterprises Pty Ltd v Gadens Lawyers [2013] VSCA 136; BC201310083 …. 5.7 Bechara v Atie [2005] NSWCA 268; BC200505869 …. 26.19 — v Campbell-Williams [2011] NSWCA 177; BC201105032 …. 23.7, 23.13, 23.31, 23.36 Becker v Public Trustee of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 1146; BC200608858 …. 10.25 — v Queensland Investment Corporation (No 2) [2009] ACTSC 147; BC200909964 …. 13.59, 13.73, 20.13 Beckwith, Re (1993) 43 FCR 256; BC9304916 …. 4.4, 4.14 — v Pedler [2000] VSCA 86; BC200002772 …. 16.28 Beddoe, Re [1893] 1 Ch 547 …. 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.8, 14.6, 14.11 Beecher v Mills [1993] MCLR 19 …. 15.55 Beeson v Carrello [2010] WASCA 155; BC201005639 …. 14.61

Belar Pty Ltd (in liq) v Mahaffey [2000] 1 Qd R 477; [1999] QCA 2; BC9900153 …. 10.53 Bele v Vaughan (Costs) [2012] FamCAFC 198; BC201250755 …. 16.4 Bell v Bell [2007] FCA 137; BC200700683 …. 16.68 — v McConnel (2012) 272 FLR 1; [2012] NTSC 66; BC201207087 …. 5.39, 5.62 Bell Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1998) 16 ACLC 65; BC9706463 …. 10.53 Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1 …. 28.7, 28.16, 29.2, 29.5, 29.22, 29.25 Bellchambers v Jackson (2009) 19 Tas R 338; [2009] TASSC 113; BC200911679 …. 8.79, 8.80 Bellevarde Constructions Pty Ltd v CPC Energy Pty Ltd (2011) 12 DCLR (NSW) 304; [2011] NSWDC 55; BC201140152 …. 15.3, 15.30, 16.28, 18.46, 18.74 Bellgrove v Marine & General Insurance Services Pty Ltd (1996) 5 Tas R 409; BC9601482 …. 29.13, 29.35, 29.36, 29.42, 29.43, 29.44, 29.50, 29.52 Beluga Developments Pty Ltd v Sobel Investments Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 303; BC201004544 …. 29.129 Benbow v Davies (1848) 11 Beav 369; 50 ER 859 …. 10.14 Bendeich (No 2), Re (1994) 53 FCR 422; BC9405707 …. 23.12, 23.14, 23.16 Bengarin, The (1916) 12 Tas LR 26 …. 7.19, 17.23 Benjamin v GB Franchising Australia Pty Ltd [2011] ACTCA 26; BC201110330 …. 28.66, 28.67, 29.105 Bennett & Co v CLC Corporation (2001) 23 WAR 344; [2001] WASCA 51; BC200100580 …. 26.29 Bennett, Re [1909] VLR 205 …. 10.35 — v Chief Executive Officer, Customs [2003] 77 ALD 375; [2003] FCA 53; BC200301497 …. 4.30

— v Pieros Corporation Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 8 …. 16.57 — v Seaman (1993) 117 ACTR 1 …. 15.29, 17.8, 17.17, 17.25, 17.27, 17.72, 17.93 Bennette v Cohen (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 162; BC200905421 …. 13.90 Bent v Gough (1992) 36 FCR 204; BC9203543 …. 22.4, 22.6, 22.40, 22.41 Bentley v Brennan (No 2) [2006] VSC 226; BC200604911 …. 10.33, 10.40 — v Gaisford [1997] QB 627 …. 26.3, 26.5, 26.20, 26.33, 26.37, 26.43 Beoco Ltd v Alfa Laval Co Ltd [1995] QB 137 …. 14.37 Bergman v Bergman (No 3) [2009] FamCA 1172; BC200951102 …. 16.4 Berkeley Administration Inc v McClelland [1990] 1 All ER 958; [1990] FSR 565 …. 16.64, 16.67, 29.72 Berkett v Cave [2001] 1 NZLR 667 …. 14.19 ‘Bernisse’, The and The ‘Elve’ [1920] P 1 …. 28.65 Berowra Holdings Pty Ltd v Gordon (2006) 225 CLR 364; [2006] HCA 32; BC200604256 …. 13.6 Berrigan Shire Council v Ballerini (No 2) [2006] VSCA 65; BC200601476 …. 13.69 Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306 …. 6.17, 7.4, 7.22, 7.23, 8.25 Bertini (No 2), Re [2010] WASC 86; BC201002653 …. 7.26 Bertram v Beaurepaire Tyre Service Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 685 …. 14.58 Besgrove v Larson (2001) 22 Qld Lawyer Reps 82; [2001] QDC 144 …. 6.4, 24.3, 24.29 Beshara v M Ltd (1988) 52 SASR 178 …. 24.4 Besterman v British Motor Cab Company Ltd [1914] 3 KB 181 …. 11.18, 11.19, 11.20, 11.21, 11.24 Betts v Cleaver (1872) 7 Ch App 513 …. 15.58, 17.92 Bevwizz Group Pty Ltd v Transport Solutions Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1399;

BC200812484 …. 28.55 Bew v Bew [1899] 2 Ch 467 …. 20.30, 20.32 Bhagat v Royal & Sun Alliance Life Assurance Australia Ltd [2000] NSWSC 159; BC200001012 …. 8.34 Bham v Medical Board of Western Australia [2007] WASC 90; BC200702642 …. 14.65 BHP Billiton Ltd v Registrar of The Dust Diseases Tribunal of New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 562; BC201003662 …. 18.15 BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corp Pty Ltd v Steuler Industriewerke GmbH (No 3) [2012] VSC 414; BC201206949 …. 8.9 BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v National Competition Council (No 2) [2007] FCA 557; BC200702800 …. 8.5 BHP Coal Pty Ltd v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG (No 2) [2009] QSC 64; BC200902338 …. 8.7, 8.12, 16.40 Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd (No 4) (1993) 13 WAR 11; BC9301490 …. 14.9 Bickford v Bickford [1923] SASR 148 …. 17.72, 17.76 Biddencare, Re [1994] 2 BCLC 160 …. 14.11 Biernacki v Klenka (1988) 80 ACTR 1 …. 8.21 Biggs v Hoddinott [1898] 2 Ch 307 …. 4.34 Bignol v Bignol (1805) 11 Ves 328; 32 ER 1114 …. 5.51 Bil (NZ Holdings) Ltd v Era House Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 280 …. 28.5, 28.20 Bilkus v Stockler Brunton (a firm) [2010] 3 All ER 64; [2010] EWCA Civ 101 …. 5.58 Billington v Billington [2008] FamCA 348; BC200850627 …. 8.72 Billington (J H) Ltd v Billington [1907] 2 KB 106 …. 28.6 Billinudgel Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1998, unreported); BC9800958 …. 28.29

Billson v Residential Apartments Ltd [1992] 1 AC 494 …. 16.75 Biltoft Holdings Pty Ltd v Casselan Pty Ltd (1993, unreported); BC9301077 …. 18.40 Biposo Pty Ltd (No 3), Re (1995) 17 ACSR 730; BC9505186 …. 10.56 Bir v Sharma, The Times, 1988 …. 16.67 Birchall v Pugin (1875) LR 10 CP 397 …. 27.9, 27.11 Biritz v National Australia Bank Ltd (2002) 121 FCR 298; [2002] FCAFC 172; BC200203159 …. 18.33 Birkdale Service Station Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 1 NZLR 293 …. 20.30, 20.31 Birkman, Re (1860) 1 QSCR 14 …. 6.4 Birmingham (deceased), Re [1959] 1 Ch 523 …. 26.5 Bischof v Adams [1992] 2 VR 198 …. 22.6, 22.17, 22.19, 22.20, 22.33, 22.75 Bishop v Financial Trust Ltd [2008] NZCA 170 …. 15.54, 16.75 Bitannia Pty Ltd v Parkline Constructions Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 32; BC200901045 …. 14.63 Bitek Pty Ltd v IConnect Pty Ltd (2012) 290 ALR 288; [2012] FCA 506; BC201203352 …. 15.16, 15.22 Bjelke-Petersen v Warburton [1990] 1 Qd R 517 …. 18.71 Bjorninen v Mercredi (1984) 6 DLR (4th) 241 …. 20.41 Black Stump Enterprises and Associated Companies (No 2) (The), Re [2006] NSWCA 60; BC200602133 …. 23.9 Black v Lipovac (1998) 217 ALR 386; [1998] FCA 699; BC9802571 …. 13.61 — v Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of South Melbourne (1964) 38 ALJR 309 …. 14.44 Blackall v Trotter (No 1) [1969] VR 939 …. 7.19 Blackman v Blackman [2003] NSWSC 1200; BC200308546 …. 21.30

— v Gant (No 2) (2010) 29 VR 29; [2010] VSC 246; BC201003851 …. 13.60 Blacktown City Council v Wilkie (No 11) [2011] NSWLEC 216; BC201109269 …. 23.45 Bladel v Russell Allport (1964, unreported) …. 14.42 Blair & Girling, Re [1906] 2 KB 131 …. 1.8, 1.9 Blake, Re [1945] Ch 61 …. 27.9 — v Norris (Solicitor Costs) [2003] NSWSC 199; BC200302272 …. 23.4 Blakes Estates Ltd v Government of Montserrat [2006] 1 WLR 297; [2005] UKPC 46 …. 8.36, 8.88 Blanch v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2008] NSWADT 24 …. 17.7 Blanchfield v Johnston [2007] NSWSC 143; BC200701284 …. 7.48 Bland v Ingram’s Estates Ltd (No 2) [2002] 1 All ER 244; [2001] EWCA Civ 1088 …. 14.40 Blanda v Kemp Strang Lawyers Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 48; BC200602515 …. 2.31, 26.13, 27.13 Blenkinsopp v Blenkinsopp (1850) 12 Beav 568; 50 ER 1177 …. 11.13 Bligh v Bligh [2009] FamCA 1170; BC200951094 …. 22.71 — v Tickle Industries Pty Ltd [1958] Qd R 121 …. 15.35, 16.15, 17.3 — v Tredgett (1851) 5 De G & SM 74; 64 ER 1024 …. 22.68 Bloomfield v Liebherr-Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 39 SR (WA) 301; [2005] WADC 113; BC200540016 …. 18.40 Blue Cross Properties (Toorak) Pty Ltd v Mackie & Staff Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 304; BC200707077 …. 8.51 Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc v Delta Electricity (2009) 170 LGERA 1; [2009] NSWLEC 150 …. 14.19 Blue Seas Investments Pty Ltd v Mitchell and McGillivray (1999) 25 Fam LR 65; [1999] FamCA 745 …. 8.77, 16.51

Blue Wedges Inc v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts (2008) 165 FCR 211; [2008] FCA 8; BC200800040 …. 9.25 Blume, Ex parte [1958] SR (NSW) 334 …. 22.60 Blyth v Fladgate [1891] 1 Ch 337 …. 2.3 Blyth and Fanshawe, Re (1882) 10 QBD 207 …. 5.26, 5.31, 5.32, 16.24 Blyth and Hooper v Dennis [2007] Blyth and Hooper v Dennis [2007] WASC 177; BC200706266 …. 5.12 Board of Examiners v XY (2006) 25 VAR 193; [2006] VSCA 190; BC200607419 …. 8.29, 8.30, 8.32, 20.8 Board of Management of the Agricultural Bank of Tasmania v Brown [1958] Tas SR 22 …. 19.20 Boase v Sullivan Commercial Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 195; BC201300961 …. 7.40 Bob Jane Corp Pty Ltd v Barrot FT Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 113 SASR 25; [2012] SASC 89; BC201203963 …. 22.36 Bodman, Re [1972] Qd R 281 …. 10.40 Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651; [2007] HCA 14; BC200702595 …. 9.30 Bodycorp Repairers Pty Ltd v Edwards [2007] VSC 124; BC200703569 …. 26.14 Boguslawski v Gdynia Ameryka Linie (No 2) [1951] 2 KB 328 …. 11.4 Bolger v Bolger (1985) 82 FLR 46 …. 26.3, 26.13, 26.14 Bollag v Attorney-General (Cth) (1997) 149 ALR 355; BC9705736 …. 16.63 Bolster v McCallum [1966] NSWR 660 …. 26.2, 26.3, 26.5, 26.39 Bolton v Strange [2001] WASCA 34; BC200100368 …. 2.14, 25.26 Bolton Metropolitan District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1996] 1 All ER 184 …. 6.17, 11.57 Bombala Farmers’ Flour Mills Co v Victoria Insurance (1887) 8 LR (NSW) L 85 …. 15.34

Bombay Civil Fund Act, Re (1882) 40 Ch D 288 …. 6.13 Bonaccorso (F & D) Pty Ltd v City of Canada Bay Council (No 3) [2007] NSWLEC 569; BC200707726 …. 8.7 Bonang Gold Mining Co Ltd, Re (1893) 14 LR (NSW) Eq 262 …. 10.54 Bond v Freke [1884] WN 47 …. 14.40 — v Pearcy (Costs) [2010] FamCA 1217; BC201051357 …. 8.51 — v Trustee of the Property of Alan Bond, A Bankrupt (1994) 20 AAR 1; BC9405742 …. 29.15, 29.16, 29.96, 29.120 Bonic v Pacific General Securities Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1221; BC200910272 …. 8.48 Bonlac Foods Ltd, Re (2001) 37 ACSR 457; [2001] VSC 75; BC200101364 …. 22.6, 22.17, 22.19, 22.32 Bonnyrigg Turkish Islamic Cultural Association v Abdullah [2002] NSWSC 100; BC200200517 …. 14.4, 14.19 Booker v Gill (1898) 15 WN (NSW) 158 …. 6.9 Bool v Bool [1941] St R Qd 26 …. 10.25, 20.2 Booth v Bosworth [2001] FCA 1718; BC200107623 …. 9.2, 9.11, 9.13, 9.35 Boothman, Re [1999] WASC 102; BC9904330 …. 21.17, 21.39 Boral Timber Industries Ltd v Lindquist [2004] NSWSC 341; BC200402178 …. 18.74 Boral Window Systems Ltd v Rolfe [2010] QSC 246; BC201004773 …. 15.27, 18.10 Boreland v Docker [2007] NSWSC 53; BC200700494 …. 15.41, 15.54 Born, Re [1900] 2 Ch 433 …. 27.1 Boscaini v Corporation of the City of Kensington and Norwood [1999] SASC 327; BC9904460 …. 14.70 Bosco v Solomon Brothers [2006] WASC 307; BC200610859 …. 5.12 Bosewell v Irish (1767) 4 Burr 2104; 98 ER 98 …. 29.65

Bostik Australia Pty Ltd v Liddiard (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 304; BC200908727 …. 11.23 Bostock v Ramsey Urban District Council [1900] 2 QB 616 …. 8.25, 8.27, 8.44 Boswell v Coaks (1887) 57 LJ Ch 101 …. 19.6 Bosworth v Firkins [2013] FamCA 7; BC201350042 …. 8.79 Botany Municipal Council v Secretary, Department of Arts, Sport, Environment, Tourism and Territories (1992) 34 FCR 412; BC9203407 …. 16.45 Bottoms v Reser [2000] QSC 413; BC20008761 …. 16.24 Boughton v Knight (1873) LR 3 P & D 64 …. 10.28 Boulton v Sanders (2004) 9 VR 495; [2004] VSCA 112; BC200403477 …. 10.30 — v — (No 2) [2003] VSC 409; BC200306152 …. 10.30 Bouras v Grandelis (2005) 65 NSWLR 214; [2005] NSWCA 463; BC200511040 …. 16.6, 16.19, 16.28 Bourchier v Mitchell (1891) 17 VLR 27 …. 20.27 Bourns Inc v Raychem Corp [1999] 3 All ER 154; [1999] EWCA Civ 1128 …. 18.24 Bovis Lend Lease Pty Ltd v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2009] FCA 650; BC200905309 …. 16.68 Bow Ye Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) [2009] VSCA 278; BC200910947 …. 6.5 Bowditch v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2012] NSWSC 702; BC201204623 …. 10.38 Bowen Investments Pty Ltd v Tabcorp Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 878; BC200704428 …. 12.4 — v — (No 2) [2008] FCAFC 107; BC200804480 …. 8.5, 8.13 Bowen v Alsanto Nominees Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 39; BC201105691 …. 8.5, 20.12

— v Campbell (1997, unreported) …. 5.55 Boman Irani Pty Ltd v St George Bank Ltd (2008) 22 VR 135; [2008] VSCA 246; BC200810745 …. 15.41 Bowyer v Wood (2007) 99 SASR 190; [2007] SASC 327; BC200707701 …. 10.38, 10.39 Boyapati v Rockefeller Management Corporation (No 2) (2008) 78 IPR 600; [2008] FCA 1375; BC200808100 …. 15.15 Boyce v McIntyre (2009) 78 NSWLR 152; [2009] NSWCA 185; BC200906235 …. 5.9 Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd v Williams Refrigeration Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 65 NSWLR 717; [2006] NSWCA 100; BC200603845 …. 7.51 Boyne v Non-Marine Underwriters at Lloyd’s (1973) 32 DLR (3d) 343 …. 8.58 Boys v Australian Securities Commission [2001] FCA 1440; BC200106297 …. 18.71 Bozon v Bolland (1839) 4 My & Cr 354; 41 ER 138 …. 26.3, 26.13, 27.1 BPM Pty Ltd v HPM Pty Ltd (1996) 14 ACLC 857; BC9601332 …. 29.25, 29.101 Bradley v Lawson [1978] Tas SR 213 …. 25.20 Bradman v Allens Arthur Robinson (No 2) [2009] SASC 180; BC200905564 …. 14.48 Brady v Bale Boshev Solicitors (2009) 10 DCLR(NSW) 284; [2009] NSWDC 387; BC200940506 …. 3.49 — v Edmonson [1917] 2 Ch 285 …. 11.56 Braithwaite v Braithwaite [2007] FamCA 468 …. 8.28 Brampton Manor (Leisure) Ltd v McLean [2009] BCC 30; [2007] EWHC 3340 …. 22.26, 22.37 Branson v Tucker [2012] NSWCA 310; BC201207385 …. 5.51 Brasington v Overton Investments Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 571; BC200102374 …. 14.48

Brava Trading Pte Ltd v Leybourne Nominees Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 23; BC201300699 …. 13.26 Bray v Dye (No 2) (2010) 27 VR 324; [2010] VSC 152; BC201002877 …. 23.23, 23.24, 23.25 — v F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 317; [2003] FCAFC 153; BC200303796 …. 29.61 Brazendale v Kenna [1961] Tas SR 199 …. 11.63 Breedon v Kongras (1996, unreported); BC9604694 …. 25.32 Breen v Breen (1991) 65 ALJR 195 …. 14.17 Brenner v First Artists’ Management Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 221 …. 17.50 Brereton v Sinclair (2000) 2 VR 424; [2000] VSCA 211; BC200006910 …. 14.23 Brett Wolinski Building Pty Ltd v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd [2003] ANZ Ins Cas ¶61-575; [2003] NSWSC 475; BC200302908 …. 6.13 Brew v Whitlock (No 3) [1968] VR 504 …. 6.22 Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (No 1) (1973) 32 LGRA 170 …. 8.88 Brian Fisher Plumbing Supplies Pty Ltd v Elgas Ltd (1997, unreported); BC9700240 …. 12.14, 12.16 Brian Gardner Motors Pty Ltd v King [2007] WASC 48; BC200701167 …. 20.36 Bride v Stewarthttp (1990, unreported); BC9003288 …. 29.49 Bridges v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1970, unreported) …. 20.13 Bridgetown-Greenbushes Friends of the Forest Inc v Executive Director of the Department of Conservation and Land Management (1998, unreported); BC9800621 …. 17.24 Bridie v Messina (1965) 66 SR (NSW) 446 …. 25.2 Briese, Marriage of (1986) FLC ¶91-713 …. 8.75 Briggs v Glentham Pty Ltd (1993, unreported); BC9301232 …. 15.72

Bright’s Trustee v Sellar [1904] 1 Ch 369 …. 17.3 Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 6 ACLC 942; BC8801632 …. 28.64 Brisbane City Council v Ferro Enterprises Pty Ltd [1976] Qd R 332 …. 21.1, 21.50 Briscoe v Briscoe [1892] 3 Ch 543 …. 27.6 Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v F H Faulding & Co Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 36; [2000] FCA 902; BC200003841 …. 20.4 British Airways Pension Schemes, Re [2000] PLR 311 …. 14.14, 14.15 British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band [2003] 3 SCR 371; [2003] SCC 71 …. 14.20 British Dominion Films Ltd v Dent [1935] VLR 157 …. 8.40 British Natural Premium Provident Association v Bywater [1897] 2 Ch 531 …. 1.17, 14.26 British United Shoe Manufacturing Co Ltd v Holdfast Boots Ltd [1936] 3 All ER 717 …. 17.3 British Waterways Board v Norman (1993) 26 HLR 232 …. 3.52 Brittain v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 427; BC200408102 …. 20.19, 20.24 Broad and Broad, Re (1885) 15 QBD 420 …. 5.26, 5.32, 17.92 Brock v Roads and Maritime Services (formerly Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW) (2012) 191 LGERA 267; [2012] NSWCA 404; BC201209828 …. 8.86, 8.88 Brocklebank & Co v King’s Lynn Steam Ship Co (1878) 3 CPD 365 …. 28.37 Bronley v Sanderson [2012] FamCA 656; BC201250887 …. 16.40 Brookfield v Davey Products Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 1005 …. 29.94 — v — (1997, unreported) …. 15.15, 15.80, 17.27 Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd

(No 4) [2009] FCA 803; BC200906875 …. 13.3, 13.9, 13.24, 13.28 Brooklyn Lane Pty Ltd v MIC Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] VSC 49; BC200100981 …. 16.39 Brooks Maher v Cheung [2001] NSWADT 18 …. 8.90 Broomhall v National Roads and Motoring Association Insurance Ltd (No 2) [2004] VSC 366; BC200406605 …. 13.16, 13.80 Brott v Almatrah [1998] 2 VR 83; BC9701589 …. 7.37, 7.38 — v Estate of Abeles [2007] 36 Fam LR 543; [2007] FamCA 28 …. 5.22 Brougham, Re [1926] SASR 423 …. 18.38, 18.40 Brown (deceased), Re [1948] St R Qd 280 …. 11.56 Brown, Marriage of (1991) 105 FLR 329 …. 28.2, 29.112 —, Marriage of (2002) 29 Fam LR 426; [2002] FamCA 389 …. 21.59 — v Bennett (No 2) [2002] 1 WLR 713 …. 23.10, 23.37 — v Burdett (1887) 37 Ch D 207 …. 23.61 — v Dibbs (1874) 12 SCR (NSW) 339 …. 17.31 — v DML Resources Pty Ltd (in liq) (2001) 165 FLR 390; [2001] NSWSC 947; BC200106731 …. 6.22 — v Glen Eira City Council [2012] VSC 198; BC201203134 …. 24.53, 24.54 — v — (No 2) [2012] VSC 273; BC201205454 …. 24.55 — v Heathcote County Council (No 2) [1982] 2 NZLR 618 …. 11.15, 11.17, 11.21, 11.29, 11.31 — v Mahony [1967] Qd R 592 …. 20.19, 20.24 — v McEncroe (1890) LR 11 (NSW) Eq 134 …. 10.23 — v — (1891) 12 LR (NSW) Eq 93 …. 17.25 — v Members of the Classification Review Board of the Office of Film & Literature Classification (1997, unreported); BC9702310 …. 9.31 — v Owners Corporation SP021532U (Ruling No 2) [2013] VSC 127;

BC201301307 …. 13.16, 13.18, 13.30 — v Sandhurst Trustees Ltd (No 2) [2009] VSC 406; BC200908438 …. 10.28 — v Sewell (1880) 16 Ch D 517 …. 17.59, 17.71 — v Talbot and Olivier (1993) 9 WAR 70 …. 3.25, 3.32, 3.33 — v Tibbits (1862) 11 CBNS 855; 142 ER 1031 …. 4.23 — v Youde [1967] 1 WLR 1544 …. 18.40 Browne v Barber [1913] 2 KB 553 …. 1.9, 7.10 — v Black [1912] 1 KB 316 …. 4.20 — v Green (2002) 29 Fam LR 428; [2002] FamCA 791 …. 8.78, 13.43 Brownie Wills v Shrimpton [1998] 2 NZLR 320 …. 7.37, 7.38 Bruce Pie & Sons Pty Ltd v R H Mainwaring, English and Peldan [1985] 1 Qd R 401 …. 28.36, 28.41, 28.47, 28.48, 28.60, 29.[21 Bruinsma v Menczer (1995) 40 NSWLR 716; BC9501782 …. 13.64 Brundza v Robbie & Co (No 2) (1952) 88 CLR 171; BC5200700 …. 28.34, 29.11, 29.76, 29.124, 29.134 Bruns, Re (1998, unreported) …. 7.39 Bryan E Fencott and Associates Pty Ltd v Eretta Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 497 …. 28.39, 29.11, 29.13, 29.20, 29.24, 29.31, 29.85, 29.98, 29.124, 29.125 Bryant, Ex parte (1815) 1 Madd 49; 56 ER 19 …. 27.2 Bryce, Re [1996] 1 Qd R 15; BC9506069 …. 14.25 Bryer Merchandisers Pty Ltd v Nike Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 198; BC200400852 …. 14.48, 14.51 Brymount Pty Ltd v Cummins (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 69; BC200501363 …. 13.79, 13.82, 13.89 Bubnich, Re [1965] WAR 138 …. 20.16 Buckingham Gate International Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand

Banking Group Ltd (2000) 35 ACSR 411; [2000] NSWSC 946; BC200006009 …. 23.33 Buckland v Watts [1970] 1 QB 27 …. 1.8, 7.29, 7.36, 7.37, 7.38 Buckley v Bennell Design and Constructions Pty Ltd (1974) 1 ACLR 301 …. 28.19, 28.59, 29.5, 29.9, 29.124, 29.125, 29.129 Buckton, Re [1907] 2 Ch 406 …. 10.15 Buckwell & Berkeley, Re [1902] 2 Ch 596 …. 1.9 Buddle Findlay v Isaac (1996) 7 NZCLC ¶96-705 …. 26.29, 26.36, 26.37 Buddhist Society of Western Australia (Inc) v Shire of Serpentine-Jarrahdale [1999] WASCA 55; BC9903248 …. 9.8 Budziszewski, Re (1981) 7 Fam LR 284 …. 3.25 Buena Vista Motors Pty Ltd (in liq), Re [1971] 1 NSWLR 72 …. 10.52, 10.53 Bufalo Corp Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (in liq) v Lendlease Primelife Ltd (No 3) [2010] VSC 263; BC201004146 …. 29.58, 29.59, 29.100 Builders Licensing Board v Pride Constructions Pty Ltd [1979] 1 NSWLR 607 …. 21.17, 21.52 Buksh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 32; BC200400120 …. 23.34 Bull Nominees Pty Ltd v McElwee (1997) 7 Tas R 339; BC9707324 …. 14.58 Bull v Faulkner (1848) 2 De G & Sm 772; 64 ER 346 …. 26.4 Bullfinch Surprise Gold Mining Co NL v Butler (1913) 35 ALT 99 …. 22.3 Bullock v Federation Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 2) (1985) 58 ALR 373 …. 21.50, 21.54 — v London General Omnibus Company [1907] 1 KB 264 …. 11.20, 11.23 Bunch v Victorian Workcover Authority [2008] VCC 1419 …. 15.58, 17.73 Bunker v James (1980) 26 SASR 286 …. 12.22 Buratti v Ramsay [1962] NSWR 1217 …. 20.26

Burbidge v Wolf [2008] NSWSC 60; BC200800449 …. 4.11 Burchall v Ballamy (1771) 5 Burr 2693; 98 ER 414 …. 20.19 Burchell v Bullard [2005] BLR 330; [2005] EWCA Civ 358 …. 8.51 Burford v Allan (1997) 68 SASR 217; BC9700157 …. 17.34 — v — (1998, unreported); BC9802071 …. 19.18, 20.37 Burford, Corporation of v Lenthall (1743) 2 Atk 551; 26 ER 731 …. 6.2 Burgess v Centrelink (2007) 159 FCR 500; [2007] FCA 595; BC200705068 …. 29.93 — v D’Alessandro & Associates [1993] ANZ Conv R 14; BC9201202 …. 3.17, 3.37 Burgoine v Taylor (1878) 9 Ch D 1 …. 1.23, 14.39 Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Ltd (recs & mgrs apptd) (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 3) (1992) 37 FCR 492; BC9203666 …. 3.37 Burke v Gillett [1996] 1 VR 196; BC9401269 …. 11.34 — v Lunn [1976] VR 268 …. 12.14, 13.53 Burns Philp & Co Ltd v Bhagat [1993] 1 VR 203 …. 11.59, 22.3, 22.6, 22.20 Burns Philp Investment Pty Ltd v Dickens (No 2) (1993) 31 NSWLR 280 …. 3.33 Burns v Cunningham (No 2) [2012] NSWADT 53; BC201255020 …. 8.93 — v State of Queensland [2007] QCA 240; BC200705842 …. 22.35 Burrawong Investments Pty Ltd v Lindsay [2002] QCA 313; BC200205351 …. 16.63 Burridge v Bellew (1875) 32 LT 807 …. 2.18 Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) v Oswal (No 5) [2012] FCA 191; BC201200978 …. 28.29 Burt, Boulton & Hayward v Bull [1895] 1 QB 276 …. 22.43 Burton v Litton Business Systems Pty Ltd (1977) 16 SASR 162 …. 12.9, 12.15, 12.16

Busby v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1992] FCA 78; BC9203352 …. 18.25, 18.26, 18.28 Bush, Re (1844) 8 Beav 66; 50 ER 26 …. 4.18 — v Condon & Barrett Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 260 …. 17.32, 17.73, 17.80 Business Acquisitions Australia Pty Ltd v Renshall (Costs) [2006] NSWSC 1399; BC200610481 …. 16.57 Busuttil v Holder (1996, unreported); BC9603488 …. 15.29 Butcher v Colonial Wholesale Meat Co Ltd (1921) 38 WN (NSW) 24 …. 8.15, 27.17 — v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 558; [2002] NSWCA 237; BC200204907 …. 15.15 — v Pooler (1883) 24 Ch D 273 …. 10.1 Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd (2011) 81 NSWLR 47; [2011] NSWCA 109; BC201103281 …. 17.26 BW Offshore Ltd v Anzon Australia Ltd [2009] FCA 1133; BC200909103 …. 29.68 Bydand Holdings Pty Ltd v Pineland Property Holdings Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 959; BC200908599 …. 16.68 Byrne v Sefton Health Authority [2002] 1 WLR 775; [2001] EWCA Civ 1284 …. 23.7, 23.17 Byrnes v Barry (2003) 180 FLR 171; [2003] ACTSC 84; BC200306319 …. 24.17 — v — [2004] 150 A Crim R 471; [2004] ACTCA 24; BC200408139 …. 24.17 Byrns v Davie [1991] 2 VR 568 …. 8.9 Byron Shire Businesses for the Future Inc v Byron Shire Council and Holiday Villages (Byron Bay) Pty Ltd (1994) 83 LGERA 59; BC9402766 …. 29.8, 29.40, 29.82, 29.84, 29.118, 29.121, 29.123 Byrt v Giannopoulos (1993, unreported); BC9300240 …. 28.14 BZAS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

[2005] FCA 449; BC200502200 …. 15.16

C C v C [2006] FamCA 867 …. 29.107 ‘C’ v Marsh [2006] WASC 41; BC200607302 …. 24.55 C Pty Ltd v PGW as Liquidator of S Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] FamCAFC 230; BC201150708 …. 16.40 C(LL) v C(AR) (1999) 180 DLR (4th) 361 …. 7.34, 15.16 Cabal v United Mexican States (No 6) (2000) 174 ALR 747; [2000] FCA 651; BC200002485 …. 24.14 Cabburn, Re (1882) 46 LT 848 …. 10.8 Caboolture Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1993) 45 FCR 224; BC9305024 …. 22.77 Cachia v Hanes (1991) 23 NSWLR 304 …. 7.24, 7.27, 7.28, 7.29, 7.30, 7.31, 7.32 — v — (1994) 179 CLR 403; BC9404608 …. 7.24, 7.25, 7.26, 7.27, 7.28, 7.32, 7.33, 7.35, 7.36, 7.38, 7.39, 7.40, 15.5 — v Isaacs (1985) 3 NSWLR 366 …. 4.45, 4.46, 4.48, 4.52, 5.35, 5.36 — v Wallbank (1992, unreported); BC9201892 …. 5.43 Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 5) (2006) 69 IPR 273; [2006] FCA 850; BC200605165 …. 16.53, 16.66 — v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 3) [2007] FCAFC 119; BC200707309 …. 20.4 — v — (No 9) [2008] FCA 1115; BC200806933 …. 17.32 Cade Pty Ltd v Thomson Simmons (No 2) (2000) 211 LSJS 49; [2000] SASC 369; BC200006628 …. 27.17 Cadoks Pty Ltd v Wallace Westley & Vigar Pty Ltd (2000) 2 VR 569; [2000] VSC 167; BC200002336 …. 2.4 Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 328; BC200205647 …. 10.59, 10.60

— v — (No 2) (2002) 41 ACSR 58; [2002] NSWSC 127; BC200200790 …. 10.59, 10.60 Caine v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 109; BC200803845 …. 13.25 Calcagno v State Government Insurance Commission (1992, unreported) …. 17.34 Calder v Commissioner of Taxation [2006] FCA 1299; BC200607803 …. 18.6 Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93 …. 13.56, 13.57, 13.59, 13.65 Caldwell v Sumpters [1972] Ch 478 …. 26.43 — v Treloar (1982) 30 SASR 202 …. 4.44, 4.48, 4.52 Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd v Maritime Services Board of New South Wales (1995) 36 NSWLR 552; BC9504766 …. 6.15, 24.26, 24.52 Cameron, Ex parte (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 393 …. 5.55 —, Will of [1918] VLR 346 …. 10.10 — v Dennis [2006] 3 DCLR(NSW) 392; [2006] NSWDC 32; BC200640261 …. 4.11, 4.18 — v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (No 2) [1992] 1 Qd R 133 …. 11.59 — v Nominal Defendant [2001] 1 Qd R 476; [2000] QCA 137; BC200001894 …. 13.3, 13.18, 21.2 Cameron’s Unit Services Pty Ltd v Kevin R Whelpton & Associates (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 13 FCR 46 …. 28.7, 29.4, 29.21, 29.39, 29.121 Campbell, Ex parte (1969) 91 WN (NSW) 691 …. 4.24 —, Re (1892) 11 NZLR 514 …. 10.10 — v Airport Transfer System Pty Ltd (2006) 18 NTLR 69; [2006] NTSC 40; BC200603862 …. 23.4, 23.5, 23.14, 23.29 — v Campbell [2012] QSC 302 …. 16.57, 23.5 — v Jones [2003] 1 Qd R 630; [2002] QCA 332; BC200205062 …. 12.15,

12.20 — v Turner (No 2) [2007] QSC 362; BC200710605 …. 12.18 Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386; [2006] HCA 41; BC200606677 …. 3.44, 3.45, 3.47, 29.58 Canatan Holdings Pty Ltd v Audori Pty Ltd (1994, unreported) …. 27.6, 27.8 — v — [1995] FCA 1081 …. 18.28 Candibon Pty Ltd v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2012] VSC 424; BC201207091 …. 13.29, 22.15, 22.37 Canvas Graphics Pty Ltd v Kodak (Australasia) Pty Ltd (1998, unreported); BC9800050 …. 15.21, 15.22 Cao, Re [1996] ANZ Conv R 321; BC9507613 …. 26.5, 26.25 Cape v Redarb Pty Ltd (receiver and manager appointed) (1992) 107 FLR 362 …. 10.8, 10.58 Capital Finance Australia Ltd v Citadel Property Group Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 196; BC200906212 …. 29.133 Capital Fire Insurance Association, Re (1883) 24 Ch D 408 …. 26.25, 26.30 Capital Webworks Pty Ltd v Adultshop.Com Ltd [2008] FCA 423; BC200802091 …. 28.29, 28.64 Capolingua v Phylum Pty Ltd (1991) 5 WAR 137 …. 8.48 Cappuccio v Chrysler Australia (Sales) Pty Ltd (1980) 42 FLR 274 …. 6.29 Caraher v Gillespie (1906) 23 WN (NSW) 161 …. 29.13 Caratti v Caratti [2012] WASC 357; BC201207497 …. 14.47, 14.57 Carazzo v Weyman [1944] 3 All ER 783 …. 15.36 Carberry v Davies [1968] 2 All ER 817 …. 22.69 Carborundum Abrasives Ltd v Bank of New Zealand Ltd [1992] 3 NZLR 187 …. 22.4 — v — (No 2) [1992] 3 NZLR 757 …. 22.4, 22.17, 22.20, 22.36, 22.37, 22.44

Carbure Pty Ltd v Brile Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] VSC 313; BC200204407 …. 15.54 Cardinia Shire Council v Stoiljkovic (2002) 12 VPR 61 …. 7.26 Carew Counsel Pty Ltd v French (2002) 4 VR 172; [2002] VSCA 1; BC200200298 …. 27.14, 27.21 Carey v Korda [2012] WASCA 228; BC201208726 …. 4.30 — v Korda and Winterbottom (No 2) [2011] WASC 220 …. 15.21 — v Robson (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 1199; BC200910083 …. 10.39, 10.40, 10.41 Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1334; BC200406885 …. 29.106 Caritativo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2002] FCA 735 …. 23.29 Carleton v Strutt and Parker (a partnership) [2008] EWHC 424 …. 8.52 Carn, Re [2011] VSC 275; BC201102601 …. 10.39, 10.41 Carnie v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 398; BC9506432 …. 11.59, 11.60 Caroona Coal Action Group Inc v Coal Miners Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 170 LGERA 22; [2009] NSWLEC 165; BC200908713 …. 7.40, 7.45 — v — (No 3) (2010) 173 LGERA 280; [2010] NSWLEC 59; BC201002532 …. 9.3, 9.5, 9.10 Carpathian Resources Ltd v Hendriks (2012) 290 ALR 252; [2012] FCA 496; BC201202993 …. 23.13 Carr v Stringer (1858) El Bl & El 123; 120 ER 454 …. 6.13 Carragher v Crook [2009] NSWSC 191; BC200901978 …. 7.48 Carrazzo v Weyman [1944] VLR 207 …. 17.86, 17.87 Carriage v Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 123 LGERA 214; [2002] NSWLEC 217; BC200207664 …. 29.119 — v Stockland Development Pty Ltd [2004] NSWLEC 321; BC200404651

…. 29.119 Carroll v Cowburn [2003] NSWSC 248; BC200301482 …. 7.48 — v Kynaston [2011] 2 WLR 1346; [2010] EWCA Civ 1404 …. 7.23 Carson v Bunning [1965] WAR 213 …. 5.57 — v Pickersgill & Sons (1885) 14 QBD 859 …. 7.10 Carta Para Mining Co, Re (1881) 39 Ch D 457 …. 29.49 Carter Newell’s Bill of Costs, Re [1993] 2 Qd R 593 …. 5.54, 5.55 —, Re [1996] 2 Qd R 13; BC9404358 …. 4.29, 8.5 Carter v Coombe (1989) 154 LSJS 3187; BC8900158 …. 17.93, 24.53 — v Managing Partner, Mallesons Stephen Jaques (1993) 11 WAR 159 …. 24.15, 24.17 — v Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 474 …. 11.4 Carthew, Re (1884) 27 Ch D 485 …. 5.45 Cartwright, Re [1975] 1 WLR 573 …. 18.28 Caruana v Fisher [1963] NSWR 661 …. 17.66 Caruso Australia Pty Ltd v Portec (Australia) Pty Ltd (1984) 2 ACLC 286 …. 28.37, 29.117, 29.126 Carven, Re (1845) 8 Beav 436; 50 ER 171 …. 5.54 Carver v Legal Profession Disciplinary Tribunal (1991) 7 LPDR 8 (CA(NSW)) …. 4.56 Cary v Owners of Strata Plan No 7241 [2002] FMCA 18; BC200200379 …. 7.29 Casaceli v Morgan Lewis Alter [2001] NSWSC 211; BC200101274 …. 18.52, 18.74 CASAW Local 1 v Alcan Smelters and Chemicals Ltd (2001) 198 DLR (4th) 504 …. 10.15 Casey v Quabba [2005] QSC 356; BC200510379 …. 2.21 — v — [2007] 1 Qd R 297; [2006] QCA 187; BC200603976 …. 2.21, 3.8,

15.59 Cashman & Partners v Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health (1995) 61 FCR 301 …. 7.37, 7.38 Cassaniti v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 49 ATR 104; [2001] FCA 362; BC200101424 …. 14.66 Cassegrain v CTK Engineering Pty Ltd (2005) 54 ACSR 249; [2005] NSWSC 495; BC200503465 …. 14.65 — v — [2008]] NSWSC 457; BC200803475 …. 18.65, 18.74 Cassidy v Murray (1995) 124 FLR 267 …. 23.2, 23.4, 23.5, 23.12, 23.16, 23.18, 23.50, 23.67 — v Sydney Water Corporation (No 2) [2008] NSWLEC 246; BC200807574 …. 8.87 Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v TCL Airconditioner (Zhongshan) Co Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 92; BC201301024 …. 14.29 — v Wilmoth Field Warne (a firm) [2012] VSC 481; BC201209063 …. 26.34 Castlebar Holding Pty Ltd v Riley (2005) 138 LGERA 338; [2005] NSWCCA 105; BC200501843 …. 24.58 Castlepoint Holdings Pty Ltd v Frederici (1967) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 225 …. 21.17 Castro v Hillery [2003] 1 Qd R 651; [2002] QCA 359; BC200205493 …. 13.30, 13.76 Cates v Glass [1920] NZLR 37) …. 7.2, 8.25 Catlin, Re (1854) 18 Beav 508; 52 ER 200 …. 5.64, 17.14 Catto v Hampton Australia Ltd (in liq) [2007] 251 LSJS 164; [2007] SASC 360; BC200708773 …. 2.4, 3.28 — v — (2008) 257 LSJS 245; [2008] SASC 231; BC200807439 …. 18.19, 18.75 Cau v Macauley (1976) 28 FLR 263 …. 13.36 Cavallaro v FNE Lawyers [2012] SASC 189; BC201207918 …. 3.25

Cave v Efron & Associates (a firm) [2000] VSC 38; BC200000712 …. 5.8 Cayron v Russell (1899) 25 VLR 379 …. 17.27 CBS Records Australia Ltd v Telmak Teleproducts (Aust) Pty Ltd (1987) 72 ALR 270 …. 29.1 CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc (No 2) [1988] 1 WLR 364 …. 17.48 Ccom Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 902; BC9405757 …. 5.49, 5.50 Cedeno v Logan [2001] 1 WLR 86 …. 24.71 Ceil Comfort Insulation Pty Ltd v ARM Equipment Finance Pty Ltd (2001) 159 FLR 310; [2001] NSWSC 28; BC200100087 …. 29.70 Ceissman v Donovan [1983] 2 NSWLR 491 …. 6.9 Cementation Construction v James D Keaveney (a firm), The Times, 21 July 1988 …. 17.33 Central Goldfields Shire v Haley (No 2) [2009] VSCA 203; BC200908737 …. 11.28 Central Queensland Developments Pty Ltd, Re [1988] 2 Qd R 476 …. 5.25 Centronics Systems Pty Ltd v Nintendo Co Ltd (1992) 39 FCR 147; BC9203828 …. 20.8 Cerini v McLeods (a firm) [2004] WASC 45; BC200401259 …. 3.29, 5.18 Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross (2012) 293 ALR 412; [2012] HCA 56; BC201209680 …. 7.51, 7.52 Cetinkaya v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2012] FCA 611; BC201204097 …. 14.61, 14.63 CF v State of New South Wales [2003] NSWSC 620; BC200303685 …. 9.18 CGU Workers Compensation (Vic) Ltd v Rees (2003) 6 VR 227; [2003] VSCA 18; BC200301202 …. 17.41 Chacmol Holdings Pty Ltd v Handberg [2005] FCAFC 191; BC200507912 …. 21.1

Chahal v Director of Public Prosecutions (2008) 185 A Crim R 580; [2008] NSWCA 152 …. 25.12 Chahwan v Euphoric Pty Ltd (2009) 73 ACSR 252; [2009] NSWSC 805; BC200907321 …. 14.34, 14.35 Chaina v Alvaro Homes Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 353; BC200811259 …. 16.40 — v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No 4) [2011] NSWSC 524; BC201104683 …. 26.19 Chakera v Kuzamanovic [2003] VSC 92; BC200301504 …. 2.31, 4.18 Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd (1998) 201 LSJS 44; BC9806981 …. 19.18 Challen v Golder Associates Pty Ltd [2012] QCA 307; BC201208543 …. 5.11 — v Paul O’Halloran & Associates [2008] WASC 169; BC200807280 …. 1.8, 4.29 Challenger Property Asset Management Pty Ltd v Stonnington City Council [2012] VSC 67; BC201200806 …. 9.35 Chamberlain v Boodle & King (a firm) [1982] 3 All ER 188 …. 3.5, 3.10, 3.11, 3.33 Chambers and Campbell v Merchants Bank of Canada (1922) 68 DLR 381 …. 8.58 Champagne View Pty Ltd v Shearwater Resort Management Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 214; BC200003133 …. 14.64, 14.67 Chan v Batemans [2009] WASC 177; BC200905412 …. 3.29 — v Chen (No 3) [2007] VSC 52; BC200701305 …. 16.68 Chandless v Whittome (1987) LS Gaz (11 March) 735. …. 28.43 Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Mahommed (No 2) (2011) 80 NSWLR 210; [2011] NSWCA 6; BC201100839 …. 13.50 Chant v Brown (1852) 9 Hare 790; 68 ER 735 …. 4.30 Chanter v Blackwood (No 3) (1904) 1 CLR 456 …. 17.32, 17.38

— v Catts (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 179; BC200605062 …. 8.80 Chapman, Re (1894) 72 LT 66 …. 10.8 —, Re [1918] St R Qd 226 …. 10.38 — v Conservation Council of South Australia (2002) 218 LSJS 295; [2002] SASC 70; BC200201355 …. 15.15, 15.23 — v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 7) [2002] FCA 1098; BC200205253 …. 22.27, 22.50 — v Pindara Private Hospital Pty Ltd (1991, unreported) …. 12.16 — v Richards [2008] QSC 164; BC200806943 …. 9.34 Chapman (T G A) Ltd v Christopher (1996, unreported) …. 22.52 — v — [1998] 1 WLR 12 …. 22.52 Chapmans Ltd v Yandell [1999] NSWCA 361; BC9906483 …. 18.74 Chappell v Mehta [1981] 1 All ER 349 …. 5.54, 5.58 Chapple, Re (1884) 27 Ch 584 …. 2.36 Charles Osenton and Co v Johnston [1942] AC 130 …. 20.32 Charles v Charles [2007] FamCA 276 …. 8.59 Charlick Trading Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission [2001] FCA 629; BC200102744 …. 15.20, 15.79, 15.81, 17.9, 17.45, 17.73, 17.93, 17.95, 18.77 Charlton, Ex parte (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 158 …. 6.13 — v Baber (2003) 47 ACSR 31; [2003] NSWSC 745; BC200304563 …. 14.10 Charteris v General Manager, Leichhardt Municipal Council (No 2) [2001] NSWADTAP 39 …. 8.27 Chatley v Northern Territory of Australia [2001] NTSC 89; BC200106335 …. 12.2 — v — [2002] NTSC 20; BC200206243 …. 17.54 Chau v Oreanda Pty Ltd [2001] FMCA 114; BC200107940 …. 16.50

Cheal Industries Pty Ltd, Re [2012] NSWSC 932; BC201206355 …. 8.41, 13.73 Check-Out Pty Ltd v Eagle Eye Inspections Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1475; BC200106456 …. 28.40, 29.5, 29.11 Cheedy v State of Western Australia (No 2) (2011) 199 FCR 23; [2011] FCAFC 163; BC201110544 …. 8.69 Chell Engineering Ltd v Unit Tool & Engineering Co Ltd [1950] 1 All ER 378 …. 8.4 Chellaram (P S) & Co Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co (1991) 102 ALR 321; BC9102621 …. 29.10, 29.28, 29.68, 29.75, 29.87 Chellew v Brown [1923] 2 KB 844 …. 29.80, 29.81 Chen v Chan (No 2) [2009] VSCA 233; BC200909178 …. 13.91 — v Kevin McNamara & Son Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 229; BC201207238 …. 15.56 Chessels v British Telecommunications plc [2002] PLR 141 …. 8.32, 14.15 Chessum & Sons v Gordon [1901] 1 KB 694 …. 6.23 Chester v Cassidy Gibson Howlin (1995) 18 Fam LR 463 …. 27.6 — v Chester (1995) FLC ¶92-612 …. 14.17 Chester & Fein Property Develpments Pty Ltd v Candam Investments Pty Ltd (1985) 9 FCR 419 …. 28.26, 29.22, 29.23 Chesterfields Preschools Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2013] NZCA 44 …. 19.15 Child v Stenning (1879) 11 Ch D 82 …. 11.20 Child Support Registrar v Kanavos (2010) 44 Fam LR 422; [2010] FamCAFC 244 …. 8.59 Chin v Hall [2009] WASCA 216; BC200911072 …. 27.9 Chisholm v State Transport Authority (1986) 41 SASR 317 …. 4.44 ChongHerr Investments Ltd v Titan Sandstone Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 278; BC200707084 …. 15.16, 17.82, 17.84

Christian Revival Crusade Inc v Milne (No 3) (2008) 255 LSJS 72; [2008] SADC 55; BC200840581 …. 23.23, 23.25 Christodoulou v Disney Enterprises Inc [2006] FCA 38; BC200600356 …. 29.106 — v — [2006] FCA 902; BC200605401 …. 14.61 Christou v Stanton Partners Australasia Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 176; BC201106003 …. 29.124, 29.128, 29.137 Ciaglia v Beilby Poulden Costello Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 748; BC201004758 …. 18.74 Ciappina v Ciappina (1983) 70 FLR 287 …. 28.32, 28.33, 28.34, 29.109 Ciarniello v Ontario (2006) 270 DLR (4th) 365 …. 24.2 CIBC Mellon Trust Company v Stolzenberg [2005] 4 Costs LR 617; [2005] EWCA Civ 628 …. 22.38 Cifuentes v Fugro Spatial Solutions Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 316; BC200910176 …. 15.72 Cilli v Abbott (1981) 53 FLR 108 …. 7.5, 24.40 Cinema Press Ltd v Pictures & Pleasures Ltd [1945] KB 356 …. 8.5 Cing International Pty Ltd v Victory Hill Pty Ltd (1998, unreported); BC9802061 …. 14.62 Circuit Finance Australia Ltd (recs & mgrs apptd) (in liq) v Sobbi [2010] NSWSC 912; BC201005901 …. 16.68 Circuit Finance Pty Ltd v Gardner [2006] VSC 70; BC200601537 …. 14.45 Citibank Ltd v Parker (2000) 181 ALR 115; [2000] FCA 1914; BC200008055 …. 10.48, 10.50 Citibank Savings Ltd v Nicholson [1998] ANZ Conv R 443; BC9801002 …. 15.41, 15.51 Citicorp Australia Ltd v Cirillo [2001] SASC 233; BC200104043 …. 16.53 — v — (2003) 228 LSJS 132; [2003] SASC 204; BC200303574 …. 29.109 Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 1) [2009] FCA

498; BC200904151 …. 22.50 — v — (No 3) [2006] FCA 1498; BC200609253 …. 29.132 — v — (No 5) [2006] FCA 1672; BC200610092 …. 28.37 Cittadini v R [2010] NSWCCA 291; BC201009505 …. 25.3, 25.11 City & Country Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd v Webster [2000] QSC 8; BC200000094 …. 22.58, 22.59 City & Suburban Pty Ltd v Smith Smith (1998, unreported); BC9803676 …. 10.56 City Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar General of the Northern Territory [2001] NTSC 103; BC200107261 …. 11.53 City of Burnside v Attorney-General (SA) (1994) 63 SASR 65; BC9405368 …. 11.43, 11.44 City of Canning v Avon Capital Estates (Australia) Ltd [2009] WASCA 120; BC20090948 …. 16.54 City of Joondalup, Re [2003] WASC 293; BC200402551 …. 15.11 City of Moscow Gas Co v International Financial Society (1872) 7 Ch App 225 …. 28.25 City of Rockingham v Curley [2000] WASCA 202; BC200104473 …. 15.73 City of Subiaco v Minister for Planning and Heritage (1997, unreported) …. 22.59 City of Swan v Lehman Bros Australia Ltd (No 3) [2009] FCA 1190; BC200909571 …. 11.2 City of Warrnambool v Tabone (1992, unreported); BC9203233 …. 15.69 Civil Properties Pty Ltd v Miluc Pty Ltd (2011) 184 LGERA 150; [2011] WASCA 195; BC201107388 …. 15.64 Civil Service Co-operative Society Ltd v General Steam Navigation Co [1903] 2 KB 756 …. 20.41 CJD Equipment Pty Ltd v A & C Constructions Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 502; BC201003563 …. 8.41

CJL v JMG [2007] QSC 179; BC200705671 …. 8.79 Clairs Keeley (a firm) v Treacy [2005] WASCA 86; BC200502959 …. 4.45 Clack v Collins (No 1) [2010] FCA 513; BC201003432 …. 29.104 Clare v Joseph [1907] 2 KB 369 …. 3.3, 3.4, 3.37 Clarence Street v ISIS Projects Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 380; BC200702909 …. 29.126 Clancy v Santoro [1999] 3 VR 783; BC9704275 …. 16.76, 20.44 Claringbold v James (Costs) [2008] FamCA 57; BC200850995 …. 15.17 Clark, Re (1876) 4 Ch D 515 …. 26.40 — v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCA 415; BC201002597 …. 13.9, 13.28, 13.73 — v State of Tasmania (1999) 9 Tas R 54; [1999] TASSC 130; BC9907730 …. 13.18, 13.24, 13.25, 13.26, 13.30, 13.84 Clark King & Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1978) 140 CLR 120; BC7800057 …. 11.47 Clark, Tait & Co v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931) 47 CLR 142; BC3190105 …. 17.32, 17.37, 17.49 Clarke v Australian Broadcasting Corporation BC200104567 …. 13.57, 13.77, 13.80

[2001]

VSC

274;

— v Avondale Transport Ltd [1969] NZLR 361 …. 11.23 — v Clarke (1901) 1 SR (NSW) (B & P) 25 …. 10.23 Clarke & Chapman v Hart (1858) 6 HLC 633; 10 ER 1443 …. 7.5 Clarkson v Parker (1838) 4 M & W 532; 150 ER 1540 …. 4.24 Classic Ceramic Importers Pty Ltd v Ceramica Antiga SA (1994) 13 ACSR 263; BC9402515 …. 28.58 Clay v Karlson (1998, unreported); BC9802953 …. 18.64 — v Kurelic [2001] WASC 318; BC200107329 …. 18.1, 18.24 Cleary Bros (Parramatta) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2009]

ACTSC 72; BC200905682 …. 16.45, 16.62 Clifford and O’Sullivan [1921] 2 AC 570 …. 24.12 Clifford Harris & Co v Solland International Ltd [2005] 2 All ER 334; [2005] EWHC 141; BC9301999 …. 4.59, 26.48, 27.3, 27.31 Clift v Timms (1997, unreported); BC9701026 …. 13.13 Clivery v Conway (Security for Costs) [2007] FamCA 1436; BC200750011 …. 29.12, 29.107 Clune, Re (1988) 14 ACLR 261 …. 27.1 Clutha Ltd (in liq) v Millar (No 5) (2002) 43 ACSR 295; [2002] NSWSC 833; BC200206435 …. 22.10 Clyde Industries Ltd v Ryad Engineering Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACLC 325; BC9301087 …. 29.11, 29.27 Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186; BC6000600 …. 3.48, 3.51 — v Wrigley [1980] 1 NSWLR 599 …. 6.8, 24.59 CMA Contracting Pty Ltd v John Holland Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 249; BC201107401 …. 15.74, 15.76 Coadys (a firm) v Getzler (2007) 18 VR 288; [2007] VSCA 281; BC200710692 …. 3.59 Coastal Hire Pty Ltd v Ewers [2009] WASCA 36; BC200904459 …. 11.17 Coates v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1047; BC200909035 …. 19.1 Cobbett v Wood [1908] 2 KB 420 …. 4.17 Coburn v College [1897] 1 QB 702 …. 4.1, 4.4 Cockburn v Edwards (1881) 18 Ch D 449 …. 4.34, 7.21 Cohen v State of Victoria (No 3) [2011] VSC 229; BC201103573 …. 23.5, 23.23, 23.25 Cohuna Sewerage Authority v Flannery (1977) 14 ALR 146; BC7700041 …. 17.49

Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; BC9103089 …. 9.32 Colburt v Beard [1992] 2 Qd R 67 …. 8.3, 15.15, 20.32 Cole v Eley [1894] 2 QB 180; [1894] 2 QB 350 …. 4.39, 27.23 — v Gardner Bros (Qld) Pty Ltd [1971] QWN 32 …. 17.80 Coleman v Greenland [2004] QCA 93; BC200402042 …. 29.106 — v Harper (1992, unreported); BC9200089 …. 24.39 Colgate Palmolive Ltd v Markwell Finance Ltd [1990] RPC 197 …. 13.80 Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225; BC9305213 …. 15.5, 16.13, 16.32, 16.41, 16.45 Collett v Knox [2010] QSC 132; BC201003226 …. 10.31 Collex Pty Ltd v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2007) 154 LGERA 95; [2007] NSWLEC 433; BC200705547 …. 13.81, 13.86 Collier (A Bankrupt), Re [1996] 2 NZLR 438 …. 7.39 Collier Constructions Pty Ltd v Foskett Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 591; BC9203307 …. 12.2, 12.3, 12.4 Collignon Developments Pty Ltd v Wurth (1975) 1 ACLR 314 …. 14.25, 28.40, 28.60 Collins, Marriage of (1985) 75 FLR 84 …. 6.14, 8.72, 11.42, 22.11, 22.65, 23.15, 23.38 — v AMP Superannuation Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 565; BC9703146 …. 10.3 — v Sydney Ports Corporation [2012] NSWSC 1316; BC201210524 …. 13.11 — v Westralian Sands Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 56 …. 15.73, 16.12 — v Worley (1889) 60 LT 748 …. 17.59 — v Young & Young (2006) 35 Fam LR 456; [2006] FamCA 610 …. 5.12 Collins and Fox, Re (1894) 11 WN (NSW) 93 …. 5.55 Collins and the Victorian Legal Aid Commission (1984) FLC ¶91-508;

(1984) 122 FLR 443 …. 22.65 Color Point Pty Ltd v Markby’s Communication Group Pty Ltd (1998, unreported); BC9806327 …. 27.1, 27.8, 27.14, 27.23 Colvin v Fraser (1829) 2 Hagg Ecc 266; 162 ER 856 …. 11.44 Colzato v Commissioner for Railways [1967] 2 NSWR 656 …. 20.19 Combined Property Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Pullenvale Estates Pty Ltd (2001) 19 ACLC 765; [2001] QSC 76; BC200101094 …. 28.24, 28.40, 28.61, 29.88 Comcare Australia v Hill (1999) 56 ALD 487; [1999] FCA 488; BC9902339 …. 20.10 — v Labathas (1995) 61 FCR 149; BC9502443 …. 1.20, 17.3 Comcorp Australia Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1998, unreported); BC9802898 …. 29.26 Comlaw (No 62) Pty Ltd v Owens [2003] VSC 35; BC200300697 …. 2.4, 2.6 Commercial Bank of Australia v Godfrey (1893) 9 WN (NSW) 164 …. 14.59, 14.64 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Preston [1981] 2 NSWLR 554 …. 14.25 Commercial Bank Ltd v City of Melbourne Bank Ltd (1900) 6 ALR (CN) 17 …. 17.25 Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Green [1978] VR 505 …. 17.86 — v Harvey [1980] VR 669 …. 22.10 Commissioner of Corrective Services v Government and Related Employees Appeal Tribunal (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 337; BC200406277 …. 21.17, 21.21 Commissioner of Income Tax (Queensland) v Bank of New South Wales (1914) 18 CLR 207 …. 17.93 Commissioner of Main Roads v Sherry [1964] Qd R 388 …. 8.2 Commissioner of Police v Salasch (2001) 162 FLR 285; [2001] ACTSC 70; BC200104097 …. 24.15

Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Edmunds [1989] 1 Qd R 271 …. 8.18 — v Westleigh Management Services Pty Ltd (2001) 47 ATR 327; [2001] QSC 176; BC200104587 …. 22.7, 22.17, 22.20, 22.23, 23.20 Commissioner of State Revenue v Challenger Listed Investments Ltd (No 2) [2011] VSCA 398; BC201109257 …. 13.67 Commissioner of Taxation v Crown Insurance Services Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 182; BC201209936 …. 13.7, 13.20 — v Evenfont (No 2) (2009) 223 FLR 28; [2009] NSWSC 9; BC200900366 …. 13.9 — v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1992) 36 FCR 314 …. 27.1, 27.12 — v MacPherson [2000] 1 Qd R 496; BC9806415 …. 24.29, 24.47 Commissioner of Taxes v Rooney [1936] SASR 289 …. 6.13 Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Razzi (No 2) (1991) 30 FCR 64; BC9103238 …. 5.33, 8.7, 16.18, 17.54 Commissioners for Railways, Re (1902) 18 WN (NSW) 296 …. 8.18 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Aspenview Productions Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 499; BC200108058 …. 15.51 — v Eise (1991) 6 ACSR 1 …. 29.109 — v Hattersley (2001) 51 NSWLR 333; [2001] NSWSC 60; BC200100604 …. 17.22, 17.23 Commonwealth of Australia v Cable Water Skiing (Australia) Ltd (1994) 116 FLR 153; BC9400819 …. 28.62 — v Gretton [2008] NSWCA 117; BC200803965 …. 13.11, 13.26, 13.72, 13.76, 13.77, 13.85 — v Lewis [2007] NSWCA 127; BC200704314 …. 14.41 — v Magriplis (1962) 3 FLR 47 …. 17.56, 17.57 — v Smith [2005] NSWCA 478; BC200511378 …. 14.42 — v — [2006] HCA Trans 242 …. 14.41

— v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394; BC9002931 …. 14.43 Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia v Raso (1982) 43 ACTR 3 …. 18.53 Como v Helmers [2011] WASC 179; BC201110741 …. 15.73 Company (No 006798 of 1995), Re A [1996] 2 All ER 417 …. 23.16, 23.45 Computer Accounting & Tax Pty Ltd v Bowen Buchbinder Vilensky [2009] WASC 171 …. 3.29 Computer Machinery Co Ltd v Drescher [1983] 1 WLR 1379 …. 13.57 Computer Training Services Ltd v Universal Data Systems Ltd [2001] BCL 497 …. 28.43, 29.131 Concorde Enterprise Ltd v Anthony Motors (Hutt) Ltd (No 2) [1977] 1 NZLR 516 …. 28.33 Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers and Gas Fitters Employees’ Union of Australia (No 2) (1987) 72 ALR 415 …. 16.24 Concrete Industries (Monier) Ltd v Whitelaw [1975] VR 485 …. 6.27 Conder v Silkbard Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 459; BC9908057 …. 4.28, 20.8 Conduit v Lisa Lodge Pty Ltd [2006] VCC 1832 …. 17.55 Connect.com.au Pty Ltd v Goconnect Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 178 ALR 348; [2000] FCA 1148; BC200004927 …. 16.27, 16.40 Connell v Sund & Sund [2006] VCC 1923 …. 15.59, 17.55 Connolly v Skratulja (1993, unreported) …. 13.16 — v Standard Telephones and Cables Pty Ltd (1991) 100 ALR 174; BC9103029 …. 26.15 — v ‘Sunday Times’ Publishing Co Ltd (1908) 7 CLR 263; BC0800009 …. 8.40 Connor v Hatgis (No 2) (1995, unreported); BC9501810 …. 13.27 Connop v Varena Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 71 …. 28.42, 29.66, 29.73 Conquest v Maffey (1897) 22 VLR 616 …. 26.15, 26.18

Conroy, Marriage of (1990) 103 FLR 233 …. 26.39 Consolidated Byrnes Holdings Ltd v Hardel Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 176 FCR 348; [2009] FCA 399; BC200903353 …. 22.14, 22.77 Constantine v Sanders [2007] NSWSC 250; BC200701915 …. 16.75 Constantino v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2005) 144 LGERA 224; [2005] NSWLEC 209; BC200502699 …. 8.87 Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd (2003) 196 ALR 350; [2003] FCAFC 13; BC200300380 …. 16.68 — v Queensland Coal and Oil Shale Mining Industry (Superannuation) Ltd (2003) 132 FCR 516; [2003] FCA 1174; BC200306210 …. 9.3, 11.43 Contractors Bonding Ltd v Waterhouse [2012] 3 NZLR 826; [2012] NZCA 399 …. 3.45 Contractreal Ltd v Davies [2001] EWCA Civ 928 …. 1.20 Conway-Cook v Town of Kwinana [2001] WASC 37; BC200100293 …. 15.73 Conway v Critchley (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1542; BC201209838 …. 14.47 Coogi Australia Pty Ltd v Hysport International Pty Ltd (1998, unreported); BC9805610 …. 7.14, 8.44 Cook v Pasminco Ltd (2000) 107 FCR 44; [2000] FCA 1819; BC200007576 …. 3.61, 23.5, 23.6, 23.39 — v Whellock (1890) 24 QBD 658 …. 29.36, 29.44 Cook’s Construction Pty Ltd v Stork Food Systems Australasia Pty Ltd [2008] 2 Qd R 453; [2008] QCA 322; BC200808919 …. 20.13 Cooke, Marriage of (1992) 16 Fam LR 400 …. 5.37 —, Re [1997] 1 Qd R 15; BC9506004 …. 6.14, 15.31, 21.1, 21.17 — v Watson (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 36 …. 10.28 Coombes v Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations (No 2) [2008] FCA 1078; BC200806730 …. 8.44 — v Roads and Traffic Authority (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 70; BC200702155

…. 13.90 — v Ward (No 2) [2002] VSC 84; BC200201249 …. 10.33, 10.40 — v Ward [2004] VSCA 51; BC200401682 …. 7.46, 20.15 Cooper, Ex parte (1878) 10 Ch D 313 …. 8.58 — v Graves (1997) 6 Tas R 390; BC9701285 …. 25.17 — v Minister for Lands and Works [1954] Tas SR 57 …. 17.37 — v Moloney (No 6) [2012] SASC 212; BC201209069 …. 28.14 Co-operative Farmers’ and Graziers’ Direct Meat Supply Ltd v Smart [1977] VR 386 …. 29.8, 29.56, 29.57 Copini (A C J & M E) & Sons v Skopalj (1985) 42 SASR 100 …. 23.3, 23.15, 23.16, 23.49, 23.60, 23.61 Copping v ANZ McCaughan Ltd (1995) 63 SASR 523; BC9503036 …. 7.4, 8.22, 20.41 Coppins v Helmers & Brambles Constructions Pty Ltd [1969] 2 NSWR 279 …. 6.21, 6.22 Copson v DCM Coffee and Donuts Pty Ltd (1996) ATPR ¶41-505; BC9602579 …. 28.57 Corbett v Nguyen [2008] NSWSC 1265; BC200810515 …. 29.66, 29.67 Corbishley, Ex parte (1967) 67 SR (NSW) 396 …. 22.58 Corby v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 245; BC200801989 …. 29.66, 29.76, 29.126 Corcoran v Virgin Blue Airlines Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 864; BC200804570 …. 7.44, 7.45 Cordell v Goodwin [1976] 1 NSWLR 417 …. 21.50 Corfu Navigation Co v Mobil Shipping Co Ltd (The ‘Alpha’) [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 52 …. 29.65 Cormack v Washbourne [2000] Lloyd’s Rep PN 459 …. 22.53 Cornes v Ten Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] SASC 141; BC201106590 …. 13.50

Coromandel Place Pty Ltd v CL Custodians Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 30 ACSR 377; [1999] FCA 144; BC9900553 …. 22.10, 22.43 Corporate Affairs Commission v Bradley [1974] 1 NSWLR 391 …. 11.41, 11.42 Corradini v O’Brien Lovrinov Crafter Pty Ltd [2000] SASC 351; BC200006637 …. 28.31, 28.64 Corrigan and Gibson v Watson [2009] NSWADT 110; BC200955038 …. 8.92 Corruption and Crime Commission of Western Australia v Allen [2012] WASCA 242 …. 21.53 Cortez Investments Ltd v Olphert & Collins [1984] 2 NZLR 434 …. 5.3 Cory-Wright and Salmon Ltd v KPMG Peat Marwick [1993] 2 NZLR 701 …. 29.54 Cosgriff v Issac Brott & Co [2008] VSC 515; BC200810291 …. 26.15, 26.34 Coshott v Barry [2012] NSWSC 850; BC201206340 …. 4.1 — v Learoyd [1999] FCA 276; BC9901021 …. 13.22 — v Sakic (1998) 45 NSWLR 667; BC9804432 …. 2.4, 2.8 — v Stegnajic [1984] 2 NSWLR 632 …. 26.29, 27.30 — v Woollahra Municipal Council [2008] NSWCA 176; BC200806951 …. 7.16 Costa v Murcia Pestell Hillard Pty Ltd [2013] WASC 44; BC201300658 …. 3.14 — v Parks [2008] VSC 47; BC200801041 …. 24.36 Cotter v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 705; BC200304388 …. 17.81 Cotterell v Stratton (1872) 8 Ch App 295 …. 10.4, 15.44 Coulson v Gosford Meats Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 106 …. 21.11 Council of Kangan Batman Institute of Technology and Further Education v

Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2006) 156 FCR 275; [2006] FCAFC 199; BC200610701 …. 24.26 Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Beazley [2012] NSWADT 153 …. 4.56 — v Mee Ling [2012] NSWADT 146 …. 4.56 — v Stormer [2010] NSWADT 240 …. 26.1 Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Roche [2004] 2 Qd R 574; [2003] QCA 469; BC200306399 …. 3.14, 3.28, 3.34 Council of the Shire of Lachlan v Towers (1935) 52 WN (NSW) 164 …. 8.50 Count Tolstoy-Miloslavsky v Lord Aldington [1996] 2 All ER 556 …. 23.16, 23.39 Country Law Services Pty Ltd v Duff (2007) 13 BPR 24,953; [2007] NSWSC 1509; BC200711718 …. 4.36 County Securities Pty Ltd v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 273; BC200809401 …. 13.30 Court v Whyte (1980) 26 SASR 307n …. 12.22 Courtney v Medtel Pty Ltd (No 3) [2004] FCA 347; BC200401460 …. 14.51 Cowell v Simpson (1809) 16 Ves 275; 33 ER 989 …. 26.45 — v Taylor (1885) 31 Ch D 34 …. 29.13, 29.31, 29.42, 29.50, 29.104 Cox, Ex parte (1896) LR 9 QB 557 …. 22.60 — v Crooks (No 2) [2000] TASSC 34; BC200001864 …. 13.70 — v Mosman [1908] St R Qd 210 …. 14.34 Coyle v Cassimatis [1994] 2 Qd R 262 …. 29.35, 29.45, 29.56 Coyne v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (No 1) (1996) 15 WAR 51; BC9600653 …. 29.14 Craft Printing Pty Ltd v Dwyer (Costs) (2009) 9 DCLR (NSW) 199; [2009] NSWDC 191; BC200940249 …. 13.32 Craig, Re (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 265 …. 2.36

Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1923] VLR 623 …. 19.20 Cramer v Davies (1997) 72 ALJR 146 …. 21.58 Crapp v Crocker (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 146 …. 13.53 Craske v Wade (1899) 80 LT 380 …. 18.53 Craven v South British Insurance Co Ltd [1952] VLR 260 …. 11.22 Crerar v Parkes (No 2) (2005) 15 Tas R 147; [2005] TASSC 93; BC200507170 …. 14.41 Cresswell v Byron (1807) 14 Ves 271; 33 ER 525 …. 4.44 Cressy v Johnson (No 2) [2009] VSC 42; BC200900623 …. 16.59, 16.63, 16.66 Cresvale Far East Ltd (in liq) v Cresvale Securities Ltd (No 2) (2001) 29 ACSR 622; [2001] NSWSC 791; BC200106726 …. 22.10 Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 …. 6.15, 8.3, 8.6, 8.7, 8.62, 20.28, 20.31 Crimson SRL v Claudia Shoes Pty Ltd (No 5) [2007] FMCA 1768; BC200710422 …. 16.45 Cripps v G & M Dawson Pty Ltd [2006] ANZ ConvR 350; [2006] NSWCA 81; BC200602234 …. 8.90 Crisp v Keng (1993, unreported); BC9302116 …. 20.32 Cristovao v John Horton & Associates [2012] WASCA 12; BC201205241 …. 16.63 Critchley v Australian Urban Investments Ltd [1979] VR 374 …. 20.38 Crittendon, Re [1958] VR 101 …. 6.13 Crockett v Roberts (No 2) [2001] TASSC 106; BC200104958 …. 14.48 Croker v Commissioner of Taxation [2001] NSWSC 188; BC200101054 …. 18.67 — v — (2002) 124 FCR 286; [2002] FCA 1432; BC200206965 …. 7.38 — v — (2005) 145 FCR 150; [2005] FCA 127; BC200500522 …. 18.32

Crooke v David Crooke Pty Ltd (1996, unreported); BC9601195 …. 5.16 Cross v Beaumont (2008) 39 Fam LR 389; [2008] FamCAFC 68; BC200851271 …. 13.44 Crossley v Crossley [1990] WAR 232 …. 15.36 Crouch & Lyndon’s Bill of Costs, Re [1998] 2 Qd R 228; BC9705115 …. 5.22, 5.27 Crowder v Shee (1808) 1 Camp 437; 170 ER 1013 …. 4.21 Crowe v Bennett [1993] 1 Qd R 57 …. 6.9 Crowley v Glissan (1909) 26 WN (NSW) 131 …. 27.28 — v Willis (1994, unreported); BC9405511 …. 18.69 Crozat v Brogden [1894] 2 QB 30 …. 29.65 Crump v Equine Nutrition Systems Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1080; BC200407642 …. 16.63 CRW v CML (No 2) [2003] FMCAfam 446; BC200306278 …. 8.30 Crypta Fuels Pty Ltd v Svelte Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 19 ACSR 68; BC9500104 …. 29.125 Crystal Theatres Ltd v Fuss (1940) 57 WN (NSW) 107 …. 28.25, 28.59 Crystall v Crystall [1963] 1 WLR 576 …. 20.38 CSR Ltd v Eddy (2005) 226 CLR 1; [2005] HCA 64; BC200507889 …. 20.2 — v — (2008) 70 NSWLR 725; [2008] NSWCA 83; BC200803017 …. 3.61, 16.26 — v Fairfield City Council (2001) 117 LGERA 77; [2001] NSWLEC 221; BC200105780 …. 8.81 Cullen v ZBC Behring LLC [2006] NSWSC 359; BC200602721 …. 13.81 Cultus Petroleum NL v OMV Australia Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 435; BC9902283 …. 16.58 Cummins v Mackenzie [1979] 2 NSWLR 803 …. 22.59 Cummings v Lewis (1991) 32 FCR 534; BC9103530 …. 29.33, 29.36, 29.44

Cunliffe v Darkinjung Local Aboriginal Land Council (No 2) [2010] NSWADT 185; BC201055189 …. 8.60 Cunningham, Re (1914) 31 WN (NSW) 44 …. 10.15 Curnow v Police (2008) 100 SASR 290; [2008] SASC 84; BC200802109 …. 24.33, 24.34, 24.54 Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales [2000] NSWSC 232; BC200001561 …. 6.24, 6.25, 11.8, 18.57, 18.74 Currie v Glen (1935) 54 CLR 445; BC3690111 …. 20.15 — v Johnson (1992, unreported); BC9201839 …. 4.14 — v Robinson [1968] QWN 25 …. 4.14 Currie & Co v Law Society [1977] 1 QB 990 …. 23.3, 23.16, 27.10, 27.28, 27.29 Curwen v Milburn (1889) 42 Ch D 424 …. 26.27, 26.49 Cutcliffe’s Estate, Re [1959] P 6 …. 10.19, 10.25 Cuthbert v Gair [2008] EWHC 90014 …. 7.29, 17.37 Cuthbertson & Richards Sawmills Pty Ltd v Thomas (No 2) [1999] FCA 1789; BC9908479 …. 10.54 Cutts v Buckley (1933) 49 CLR 189; BC3390116 …. 20.27 — v Head [1984] Ch 290 …. 13.55, 13.56, 13.57, 13.64 Cytel Pty Ltd v Peoplebank Recruitment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 697; BC200803749 …. 14.51

D D v D [1963] 1 WLR 194 …. 23.49 — v R [1995] 3 NZLR 366 …. 25.20 — v V [2006] FamCA 918 …. 20.11 D(J), Re [1982] Ch 237 …. 13.57 D’Adamo v Marchesi (2007) 215 FLR 187; [2007] WASC 282; BC200710154 …. 14.61

D’Alessandro & D’Angelo v Bouloudas (1994) 10 WAR 191; BC9406781 …. 1.8, 15.31 — v Cooper (1995, unreported); BC9503598 …. 3.6 D’Alessandro and Associates v Matthews (1993, unreported); BC9301334 …. 14.71 D’Anglers Paradise Pty Ltd v MMI General Insurance Australia Ltd (1998, unreported); BC9805204 …. 14.48 Da Silva v Bresond Pty Ltd (2008) 65 ACSR 630; [2008] NSWSC 158; BC200801250 …. 28.22 Dacey, Re (1981) 51 FLR 389 …. 17.57 Dagenham Nominees Pty Ltd v Shanks (2011) 110 SASR 577; [2011] SASC 163; BC201107608 …. 28.21, 29.109 Dagley v Kentish (1831) 2 B & Ad 411; 109 ER 1195 …. 5.51 Dagnell v J L Freedman & Co (a firm) [1993] 2 All ER 161 …. 10.4, 14.11 Dahler v Thor (2010) 44 Fam LR 191; [2010] FamCAFC 164; BC201050797 …. 21.10 ‘Daily Express’ (1908) Ltd v Mountain (1916) 32 TLR 592 …. 4.30 Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co [1916] AC 307 …. 23.24 Dais Studio Pty Ltd v Bullet Creative Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 42; BC200800244 …. 13.72 Dalecoast Pty Ltd v Monisse [1999] WASCA 242; BC9907487 …. 23.60 Dalgety Australia Operations Ltd v F F Seeley Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 75 …. 7.24, 17.12, 17.48, 17.64, 17.93 Dallaway, Re [1982] 3 All ER 118; 1 WLR 756 …. 14.12 Dallow v Garrold (1884) 14 QBD 543 …. 27.23 Dalma Formwork (Australia) Pty Ltd v Maricic (No 3) [2008] NSWCA 29; BC200801457 …. 20.36 Dalrymple Holdings Pty Ltd v Gohl (1991) 34 FCR 397; BC9103647 …. 14.48, 15.29, 18.1

Dalton v Paull (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 803; BC200705720 …. 7.44, 7.48 Danidale Pty Ltd v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 552; BC200711346 …. 8.39, 13.22, 13.86 Dann v Curzon (1910) 104 LT 66 …. 8.47 Dansk Rekylriffel Syndikat Aktieselskab v Snell [1908] 2 Ch 127 …. 11.2, 11.4 Darcey v Pre-term Foundation Clinic [1983] 2 NSWLR 497 …. 6.9 Dare v Bellette (1994) 4 Tas R 138; BC9400395 …. 25.16 Darelvale Holdings Australia Pty Ltd v Waterjet Designs Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 863; BC200304778 …. 28.41 Dargie (deceased), Re [1954] Ch 16 …. 16.35 Darling Harbourside (Sydney) Pty Ltd v Sanirise Pty Ltd (1996, unreported); BC9603105 …. 28.64 Darlinghurst Residents’ Association v Elarosa Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1992) 75 LGRA 214; BC9203019 …. 9.3, 9.17, 9.24 Darnborough v Darnborough (1929) 45 TLR 603 …. 11.49 Darwin Broadcasters Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 21 FCR 524; BC9003401 …. 14.43 Dash v Leeper (1900) 9 QLJ (NC) 146 …. 7.38 Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2010] NSWCA 154; BC201004639 …. 20.38 Datadot Technology Ltd v Alpha Microtech Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1449; BC200307630 …. 15.21 Daubney v Phipps (1849) 16 QB 504; 117 ER 972 …. 4.21 Daulizio v Trust Company of Australia [2005] VSCA 215; BC200506376 …. 10.26, 20.30, 20.32 Davey v Aylesbury Vale District Council [2008] 2 All ER 178; [2007] EWCA Civ 1166 …. 9.16 — v Barrow [1954] VLR 593 …. 24.40 — v Herbst (No 2) [2012] ACTCA 19; BC201202390 …. 29.106

David v Rees [1904] 2 KB 435 …. 8.15 David Truex Solicitor (a firm) v Kitchin [2007] 2 FLR 1203; [2007] EWCA Civ 618 …. 2.37 Davids Holdings Pty Ltd v Coles Myer Ltd (1995) ATPR ¶41-383; BC9507223 …. 14.62, 16.56 Davidson, Re (1993, unreported) …. 25.18 Davidsons v Jones-Fenleigh [1980] Costs LR (Core Vol) 70 …. 4.44 Davies v Fay [1995] 1 Qd R 509 …. 13.5 — v Gertig (No 2) (2002) …. 8.16 — v Gregory (1873) LR 3 P & D …. 10.18 — v Kur-ring-gai Municipal Council [2003] NSWSC 1010; BC200306804 …. 19.14 — v Sydney Water Corporation (No 2) (2012) 188 LGERA 451; [2012] NSWLEC 150; BC201205108 …. 13.59 Davies (Joseph Owen) v Eli Lilly & Co [1987] 1 WLR 1136 …. 29.78 Davis, Ex parte (1901) 1 SR (NSW) 187 …. 22.68 — v City North Infrastructure Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] QSC 312; BC201108131 …. 9.32 — v Dysart (Earl) (No 2) (1855) 21 Beav 124; 52 ER 805 …. 18.49, 18.90 — v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 946; BC200808084 …. 13.48, 13.49, 13.50, 13.51 — v Wangenheim (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 453 …. 10.19, 10.21 Davy-Chiesman v Davy-Chiesman [1984] Fam 48 …. 23.16, 23.17, 23.29, 23.36, 23.37, 23.38 Dawson v Bethonga Whole Foods Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 172; BC200903376 …. 21.17 — v Joyner (No 2) [2012] QSC 24; BC201200602 …. 10.40, 10.43 Day v Trustees of the Estate of George Adams (deceased) (1997, unreported); BC9701284 …. 8.48

DCL Constructions Pty Ltd v Di Lizio [2007] NSWSC 653; BC200705032 …. 18.74 — v — [2007] NSWSC 1180; BC200708922 …. 18.74 De Alwis v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 77; BC200401354 …. 16.51 De Domenico v Marshall (No 2) (2001) 107 FCR 11; [2001] FCA 135; BC200100624 …. 21.8 De Groot, Re [2001] 2 Qd R 359; BC9909153 …. 27.19, 27.21, 27.23, 29.101 de Groot v Nominal Defendant [2004] NSWCA 88; BC200401383 …. 29.109 — v — [2005] NSWCA 61; BC200511033 …. 13.80, 23.14 De L v Director-General Department of Community Services (No 2) (1997) 190 CLR 207; BC9701054 …. 7.5 De Pasquale Bros Pty Ltd v NJF Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) Q ConvR ¶54-536; [2000] QSC 4; BC200000090 …. 14.71 De Rose v State of South Australia (No 2) [2005] FCAFC 137; BC200505350 …. 8.69 De Sousa v Minister of State for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 41 FCR 544; BC9304772 …. 23.7, 23.19, 23.40, 23.66 Dean v Allin and Watts (a firm) [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 249; [2001] EWCA Civ 758 …. 2.7 — v Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 141; BC201004114 …. 13.7, 13.10, 13.59 Deane v Railway Commissioners (1897) 18 LR (NSW) L 294 …. 17.71, 17.92 Debtor, Re a (No 2) [1951] Ch 612 …. 27.26, 27.29 Dechant v Law Society of Alberta (2001) 203 DLR (4th) 157 …. 7.35 Dee Estates Ltd, Re [1911] 2 Ch 85 …. 26.1, 26.7 Dee-Tech Pty Ltd v Neddam Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 517;

BC201203275 …. 14.40 Deepsilver Pty Ltd v Aquatherm Australia Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 171; BC200706668 …. 28.21 Degiorgio v Dunn (No 2) (2005) 62 NSWLR 284; [2005] NSWSC 3; BC200500375 …. 23.53, 23.55 Degmam Pty Ltd (in liq) v Wright (No 2) [1983] 2 NSWLR 354 …. 16.60 Dein v Wentworth Gold Field Pty Co (1899) 15 WN (NSW) 280 …. 11.63 Del Borrello v Friedman and Lurie (a firm) [2001] WASCA 348; BC200106989 …. 4.45 Del Bosco v Outtrim [2008] NSWSC 105; BC200800688 …. 29.96 Delaroque v S S Oxenholme & Co [1883] WN 227 …. 17.32 Delstrat Pty Ltd v Bond (2004) 36 SR(WA) 212; [2004] WADC 158; BC200440151 …. 15.72 Delta Electricity v Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc (2010) 176 LGERA 424; [2010] NSWCA 263; BC201007625 …. 7.45, 9.4, 14.19 Demag-Lauchhammer Maschinenbau und Stahlbau GmbH v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd [1966] 2 NSWR 3 …. 28.56, 29.88 Dempster v McAndrew [2003] NSWSC 994; BC200306534 …. 23.26 — v National Companies and Securities Commission (1993, unreported); BC9303618 …. 24.67 Denaby & Cadeby Main Collieries (Ltd) v Yorkshire Miners’ Association (1907) 23 TLR 635 …. 17.92 Dennis v Cameron [2007] NSWCA 228; BC200707568 …. 4.11, 4.18, 4.19 — v Malcolm [1934] Ch 244 …. 6.13 Department of Community Services v SM (2008) 6 DCLR(NSW) 384; [2008] NSWDC 68; BC200840116 …. 8.69 — v SP (2006) 4 DCLR(NSW) 113; [2006] NSWDC 168; BC200640246 …. 8.69 Department of Human Services v RA (No 2) [2010] NSWADTAP 37;

BC201055128 …. 8.92 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Gashi (No 3) [2011] VSC 448; BC201107118 …. 16.68 — v Healy [2003] 52 ATR 330; [2003] WASC 38; BC200301167 …. 6.21 — v Levick (1999) 43 ATR 621; [1999] FCA 1580; BC9907803 …. 23.7, 23.19, 23.40 Derek v Derek (2006) FLC ¶93-260; [2006] FamCA 339 …. 29.107 Derwent v Dickens [1993] 1 VR 557 …. 24.36 Dessau v Peters, Rushton and Company Ltd [1922] 1 Ch 1 …. 26.36 Deva v University of Western Sydney [2008] 175 IR 89; [2008] NSWCA 137; BC200804540 …. 7.24 Development Finance Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Bielby [1991] 1 NZLR 587 …. 15.58 Devenish v Jewel Food Stores Pty Ltd (1990) 94 ALR 664; BC9002937 …. 29.121, 29.124 Deves v Porter [2003] NSWSC 878; BC200305677 …. 7.48 Devon Downs Administrators Pty Ltd v Theodoropoulos (1982, unreported); BC8200012 …. 11.33 Devy, Re (1996) 67 FCR 355; BC9603045 …. 4.4 Dew v Richardson [1999] QSC 192; BC9905008 …. 2.4 Di Battista v Motton [1971] VR 565 …. 21.50, 21.53 Di Petro v International Airline Services Pty Ltd [2011] VCC 499 …. 17.50 Diakos v Mason [2010] SASC 108; BC201002826 …. 29.104, 29.109 Diamond v Diamond and Elliott (1950) 51 SR (NSW) 84 …. 14.65 — v Simpson (No 2) [2003] NSWCA 78; [2003] NSWCA 78 …. 13.90 Dibbs and Farrell, Re (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 249 …. 1.5, 1.6, 5.45, 5.54 Dibeek Holdings Pty Ltd v Notaras (1998) 143 FLR 132; BC9800408 …. 14.23

Dibley v Sydney West Area Health Service [2009] NSWSC 856; BC200907825 …. 14.41 Dicas v Stockley (1836) 7 C & P 587; 173 ER 258 …. 26.44 Dickie, Re (1916) 23 BCR 538 …. 2.4 Dicks v Yates (1881) 18 Ch D 76 …. 8.62 Dickson (No 2), Marriage of (1999) 25 Fam LR 79; [1999] FamCA 768 …. 8.70 Dictating Machine Centre Pty Ltd v Combe (1981) 26 SASR 316 …. 29.9 Dighton v Nominal Defendant (No 4) [2012] SADC 24; BC201240263 …. 13.24, 13.25 Digital Cinema Network Pty Ltd v Omnilab Media Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1242; BC201008448 …. 28.34 Dillon v Gosford City Council (2011) 284 ALR 619; [2011] NSWCA 328; BC201108747 …. 8.86, 8.88, 20.38 Dimos v Hanos [2001] VSC 173; BC200102765 …. 4.57, 4.58 — v Willetts (2000) 2 VR 170; [2000] VSCA 154; BC200005177 …. 11.8, 11.9 Director, Office of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2013] FCAFC 34; BC201301475 …. 14.35, 14.45 Director General, Department of Community Services v Houdek [1999] NSWSC 1031; BC9906577 …. 6.9 Director of Family Services v Campione (1998) 83 FCR 63; BC9801262 …. 6.16, 9.1 Director of Public Prosecutions v Ali (No 2) (2009) 25 VR 656; [2009] VSCA 243; BC200909513 …. 6.5, 9.36 — v Barnes [2010] NSWSC 1040; BC201006773 …. 24.25 — v Deeks (1994) 35 NSWLR 523; BC9404935 …. 24.9 — v Donaczy [2007] NSWSC 923; BC200707529 …. 6.9

— v Hayden (No 2) [2006] VSCA 155; BC200605898 …. 21.45 — v Howard (2005) 64 NSWLR 139; [2005] NSWSC 987; BC200507494 …. 25.2 — v Le (No 2) VSCA 57; BC200702308 …. 6.5 — v Nguyen [2009] VSCA 147; BC200905485 …. 9.36 — v Petropoulos (1998, unreported); BC9800887 …. 24.53 — v Sher (No 2) (2000) 116 A Crim R 458; [2000] VSC 350; BC200005624 …. 21.1, 21.21 — v Su (1996) 19 ACSR 572; BC9601529 …. 24.53, 24.54, 24.55 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Roslyndale Shipping Company Pty Ltd (2004) 148 A Crim R 341; [2004] NSWCCA 262; BC200404828 …. 6.13 Director-General, Dept of Communities (Child Safety Services) v Rolfston (Costs) (2011) 44 Fam LR 476; [2011] FamCAFC 23; BC201150054 …. 8.70 Director-General of Fair Trading v O’Shane (1997, unreported); BC9703791 …. 21.17 Director-General, Department of Education and Training v MT (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 320; BC200609508 …. 8.32, 20.11 Director-General Department of Land and Water Conservation v Ramke [1999] NSWLEC 22; BC9901366 …. 8.29, 8.30 Director-General, NSW Department of Community Services v JLM (2001) 28 Fam LR 243; [2001] FamCA 1338; BC200108628 …. 8.70 Dish Network LLC v Rex [2012] BCCA 161 …. 14.20 Dissidomino v Butcher Paull & Calder (a firm) [2005] WASCA 210; BC200509914 …. 22.68 — v Mossensons (1999, unreported); BC9900105 …. 3.27 Distant v Queensland Rail [2002] QSC 271; BC200205316 …. 12.16 Ditton v Gallagher (1992) 110 ACTR 12 …. 7.19, 12.2, 12.5

Diver v Neal (2009) 2 ASTLR 89; [2009] NSWCA 54; BC200901634 …. 10.35, 10.37 DJL v Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226; [2000] HCA 17; BC200001746 …. 6.21, 6.22 DJZ Constructions Pty Ltd v Pritchard [2010] NSWSC 1472; BC201009746 …. 23.18 Do v Bowers (1996, unreported); BC9604721 …. 24.48 Dobb v Hacket (1993) 10 WAR 532 …. 13.57 Dobree v Hoffman (1995) 14 WAR 408; BC9502706 …. 7.38 — v — (1996) 18 WAR 36; BC9606034 …. 7.38, 7.39 Dodd v Gillis (1989) 16 NSWLR 623 …. 4.28 Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 261; BC9304823 …. 8.4, 8.5 Dodds v Kennedy [2011] WASCA 32 …. 29.106 Doe v Filliter (1844) 13 M & W 47; 153 ER 20 …. 15.5 Doe d Bennett v Hale (1850) 15 QB 171; 117 ER 423 …. 4.54 Doe d Masters v Gray (1830) 10 B & C 615; 109 ER 579 …. 22.3 Doherty, Marriage of (1996) FLC ¶92-652 …. 8.72, 15.15, 15.17 Dolan v Dolan [2007] WASC 249; BC200709256 …. 10.20 Dolphin Quays Developments Ltd v Mills [2007] 4 All ER 503; [2007] EWHC 1180 …. 22.45 — v — [2008] 4 All ER 58; [2008] EWCA Civ 385 …. 22.45 Dominello v Dominello (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 257; BC200907815 …. 11.23, 11.27 Dominion Brewery Ltd v Foster (1897) 77 LT 507 …. 28.33, 28.34, 28.39 Donaghy v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (No 2) [2012] NSWADT 170 …. 4.56 Donald Campbell & Co Ltd v Pollak [1927] AC 732 …. 6.15, 7.2, 8.27, 14.1,

20.32, 20.42, 20.43 Donaldson, Re (1884) 27 Ch D 544 …. 15.45 — v Western Australia (2005) 31 WAR 122 …. 21.30 Dong v Hughes [2005] NSWSC 84; BC200501014 …. 24.26 Donnelly v Delta Gold Pty Ltd [2002] NSWLEC 44; BC200201332 …. 9.25 — v Edelsten (1994) 49 FCR 384; BC9405840 …. 10.48 — v Maxwell-Smith [2010] FCAFC 154; BC201009661 …. 1.24, 10.4 Donohoe v Britz (No 2) (1904) 1 CLR 662; BC0490112 …. 15.34, 16.15, 17.87, 17.92 Donovan v Cammell Laird & Co [1949] 2 All ER 82 …. 11.22 — v Miller [1987] VR 221 …. 17.53 Dore v Gormley (1962) 9 LGRA 187 …. 8.18 Douglas (A & D) Pty Ltd v Lawyers Private Mortgages Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 690; BC200604091 …. 7.37 Douglas v Douglas (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 466 …. 27.1 Douglass v Lawton Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 90; BC200702833 …. 14.35 Doulman v ACT Electronic Solutions Pty Ltd [2011] FMCA 232; BC201102320 …. 23.23 Doval v Anka Builders Pty Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 1 …. 8.49 Dover Beach Pty Ltd v Geftine Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 442; [2008] VSCA 248; BC200811150 …. 13.6, 13.10 Dowd v President of Violet Town Shire (1899) 6 ALR (CN) 1 …. 6.13 Dowdeswell, Marriage of (1983) 8 Fam LR 868 …. 6.12 Dowling (No 2), Ex parte (1904) 21 WN (NSW) 52 …. 15.34 Downie v Kenny & Kenny Pty Ltd (1986) NSW ConvR ¶55-270; BC8500545 …. 16.57 Downs v Civil Aviation Authority (1992) 57 SASR 303 …. 11.52, 11.53

Downsview Ltd v First City Corporation Ltd [1993] AC 295 …. 22.44 Dowsett v Fitness First Australia Pty Ltd [2008] NSWADT 226; BC200855113 …. 8.93 Doyle v Hall Chadwick [2007] NSWCA 159; BC200705261 …. 5.18, 18.74 Doyles Construction Lawyers v Harsands Pty Ltd (1996, unreported); BC9606389 …. 26.28, 27.15 Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 602; BC200002244 …. 13.70 Drake-Brockman v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2007] NSWLEC 777; BC200710303 …. 9.26 Drakos v Keskinides [2003] QCA 109; BC200301344 …. 2.4 Drax, Re [1903] 1 Ch 781 …. 27.12 Dream Developments Pty Ltd v Whitney [2012] NSWSC 108; BC201208314 …. 13.58 Dresna Pty Ltd v Linknarf Management Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2006] FCA 755; BC200604791 …. 13.69 Driwater Inc v Perre [2001] FCA 1264; BC200105344 …. 28.24 Dromana Estate Ltd v Wilmoth Field Warne [2010] VSC 308; BC201005046 …. 5.11 Drumdurno Pty Ltd v Braham (1982) 42 ALR 563 …. 28.40, 29.25, 29.101 Drummond and Rosen Pty Ltd v Easey (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 331; BC200909763 …. 19.13 Drummond v Drummond [1999] NSWSC 923; BC9905742 …. 10.4 DS Parklane Developments Pty Ltd v Korea First Finance Ltd (1997, unreported); BC9703785 …. 29.73 DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v InterTAN Inc (2004) 51 ACSR 555; [2004] FCA 1251; BC200407049 …. 13.71 DSQ Property Co Ltd v Lotus Cars Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 127 …. 28.19 DTC (CNC) Ltd v Gary Sargeant and Co (a firm) [1996] 1 WLR 797 ….

26.30 Du Boulay v Worrell [2009] QCA 63; BC200901840 …. 16.50 Dubbo Refrigerating & Co v Rutherford (1898) 14 WN (NSW) 180 …. 1.15, 8.4 Duchman v Oakland Dairy Co Ltd [1930] 4 DLR 989 …. 11.8 Duckworth v Chopra [2001] WASC 146; BC200102978 …. 3.17, 3.18 Dudzinski v Kellow [2000] FCA 740; BC200002933 …. 18.6 — v Spender [2008] QSC 54; BC200801837 …. 24.3 Duffy v Hepron Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 106; BC200704457 …. 13.30 Duic v Duic [2012] NSWSC 542; BC201203396 …. 16.68 Duke Eastern Gas Pipeline Pty Ltd (2001) ATPR ¶41-827; [2001] ACompT 3 …. 6.19 Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1998, unreported); BC9802183 …. 13.61 Duke Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2009) 264 LSJS 401; [2009] SASC 245; BC200907591 …. 29.59, 29.90 Duke of Norfolk’s Settlement Trusts, Re [1982] Ch 61 …. 10.10 Duke’s Will, Re [1907] VLR 632 …. 5.26, 5.30, 17.17 Dukemaster Pty Ltd v Bluehive Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 1; BC200300033 …. 13.22, 13.26, 13.27, 13.86 Duncan v Chief Executive Officer, Centrelink (No 2) [2008] FCA 667; BC200803462 …. 9.27 — v Hyland [1922] SASR 475 …. 12.2, 12.14, 12.17 — v Moore (2000) 107 LGERA 430; [2000] NSWLEC 64; BC200001577 …. 6.13 — v National Australia Bank Ltd (2006) 95 SASR 208; [2006] SASC 239; BC200606194 …. 28.67 Duncan & Weller Pty Ltd v Mendelson [1989] VR 386 …. 13.65 Dunford Publicity Studios Ltd v News Media Ownership Ltd [1971] NZLR

961 …. 8.11 Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations (No 4) (2012) 200 FCR 154; [2012] FCAFC 50; BC201201916 …. 22.6, 22.28 Dunn, Estate of [2002] NSWSC 900; BC200206252 …. 10.20 Dunne v Byrne (1912) 16 CLR 500 …. 10.21, 20.16 Dunstan, Re (2000) 155 FLR 189; [2000] ACTSC 33; BC200002048 …. 23.7, 23.16, 23.40, 26.32 — v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (No 3) [2006] FCA 916; BC200605651 …. 15.15 — v Rickwood (No 2) (2007) 38 Fam LR 491; [2007] NSWCA 266; BC200708317 …. 8.80, 13.81 — v Seymour [2006] FCA 917; BC200605652 …. 15.9, 15.17 Dunwoody v Jefferson [2000] FCA 456; BC200001647 …. 10.9 Dupont v Crook (1885) 2 TLR 49 …. 29.76 Durall Construction Ltd v H J O’Connell Ltd (1977) 16 OR (2d) 713 …. 27.29 Durham v Collins [1999] SASC 163; BC9901923 …. 6.16, 8.27 Duskwood Pty Ltd v Bellara Willows Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 281; BC200106540 …. 22.6 Dwight v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 37 FCR 178; BC9203452 …. 28.67, 28.68, 28.69 Dwyer v National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd (No 3) [1940] VLR 366 …. 15.36 Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 407; BC201202259 …. 15.15 — v Fisher Cartwright Berriman Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 895; BC201005700 …. 5.12, 14.41 Dykes v Heatherway Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWADTAP 46; BC200755088 …. 8.90

Dyktynski v BHP Titanium Minerals Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 203; [2004] NSWCA 154; BC200402706 …. 7.17 Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bilgola Enterprises Ltd [1999] 3 NZLR 239 …. 15.15 — v Todd [2004] 1 WLR 2807; [2004] UKPC 39 …. 22.17, 22.20, 22.27, 22.32, 22.47, 22.49, 22.50, 22.77

E Eady v Berger (1995, unreported); BC9504320 …. 2.8 — v Elsdon [1901] 2 KB 460 …. 22.68 Earle Hermann (J) Ltd v Council of the Municipality of North Sydney (1914) 31 WN (NSW) 166 …. 27.26 Earnshaw v Loy (No 2) [1959] VR 252 …. 6.15, 8.66 Earp Woodcock Beveridge & Co Ltd v Gordon (1927) 44 WN (NSW) 123 …. 20.25 East Australian Pipeline Ltd, Re [2005] ATPR ¶42-047; [2005] ACompT …. 6.19 East Grace Corporation v Xing (No 1) [2005] FCA 219; BC200504852 …. 28.1 Eastwood (deceased), Re [1975] 1 Ch 112 …. 17.21, 17.22 Eat Media Pty Ltd v Mulready Media Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1058; BC200908594 …. 12.4 — v — (No 2) (2010) 267 ALR 573; [2010] FCA 392; BC201002461 …. 15.14, 15.16 Eatock v Bolt (No 2) (2011) 284 ALR 114; [2011] FCA 1180; BC201108031 …. 13.65, 13.72, 13.78 Eaton (deceased), Re [1964] 1 WLR 1269 …. 10.6 Eaves v Eaves and Powell [1956] P 154 …. 18.64 Eberlein v Eberlein (1887) 8 LR (NSW) Eq 1 …. 8.62 Ebrard v Gassier (1884) 28 Ch D 232 …. 29.75, 29.79

Ecrosteel Pty Ltd v Perfor Printing Pty Ltd (1996) 37 IPR 22; BC9606078 …. 16.67 ECS v Martin [2012] WASC 51; BC201200564 …. 25.29 Edelman v Badower [2010] VSC 427; BC201007050 …. 14.36 Edenmead Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1984) 4 FCR 348 …. 14.24 Eddy v Mac Audio Pty Ltd (in liq) [2000] SASC 145; BC200003912 …. 29.54, 29.132, 29.133 Edgar and Walker v Meade (1916) 23 CLR 29 …. 15.15 Edgar v Public Trustee for the Northern Territory [2011] NTSC 21; BC201101283 …. 10.44 Edgen Murray Pte Ltd v Clough Projects International Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 402; BC200911880 …. 14.35, 14.47 Edginton v Clark [1964] 1 QB 367 …. 11.33, 11.39 Edinburgh Entertainments Ltd v Stevenson [1925] SC 848 …. 28.24 Edison (No 2), The [1934] P 115 …. 8.21 Edith Cowan University Student Guild v Edith Cowan University [2004] WASC 83; BC200402605 …. 16.49 Edlin v Williams [1998] QCA 439; BC9807404 …. 15.51 Edmund v Martell (1907) 24 TLR 25 …. 8.27, 20.42 Edwards v Edwards [1958] P 235 …. 23.2, 23.7, 23.8, 23.16, 23.18, 23.19, 23.21, 23.29, 23.33, 23.38 — v Hope (1885) 14 QBD 922 …. 8.16, 8.17 — v Lawless (1848) 6 CB 329; 136 ER 1278 …. 4.21 — v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act (1985) 55 LGRA 171 …. 29.41 — v Stocks (2009) 17 Tas R 454; [2009] TASSC 11; BC200901137 …. 8.29, 11.36 Edwards Madigan Torzillo Briggs Pty Ltd v Stack [2003] NSWCA 302;

BC200306180 …. 14.69 EDWF Holding 1 Pty Ltd v EDWF Holdings 2 Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 275; BC200900214 …. 15.76 Edwin Sutherland & Co’s Bill of Costs, Re [1971] Qd R 318 …. 5.54, 5.55, 5.58, 5.60 Egankarra Pty Ltd v Vince (1990) 2 ACSR 463 …. 22.40 Egel, Re [1939] SASR 477 …. 10.17 Eggington v Cumberledge (1847) 1 Ex 271; 154 ER 114 …. 4.21 Ehsman v Nutectime International Pty Ltd (2006) 58 ACSR 705; [2006] NSWSC 887; BC200606889 …. 14.10 El Deeb v Magistrates Court of South Australia (1999) 72 SASR 596; [1999] SASC 113; BC9901081 …. 22.59, 22.60 El Greco (Australia) Pty Ltd v Mediterranean Shipping Company SA [2003] FCA 747; BC200303904 …. 12.2 El-youfi v Alcazar [2001] ACTSC 1; BC200100003 …. 13.76 Elders Rural Finance Ltd v Tapp (1993) 113 FLR 351 …. 26.36 Elders Trustee & Executor Co Ltd v Eagle Star Nominees Ltd (1986) 4 BPR 9205 …. 15.45, 15.53 — v Eastoe [1963] WAR 36 …. 6.16 — v E G Reeves Pty Ltd (1988) 20 FCR 164 …. 15.41, 15.44 — v Herbert (1996) 132 FLR 24; BC9601883 …. 1.5, 1.8, 17.20 Electrical Trades Union v Tarlo [1964] 2 WLR 1041 …. 5.51 Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2011] WASC 268 (S2); BC201110857 …. 17.92 Electrolytic Zinc Co of Australasia Ltd v Cieslak [1969] Tas SR 50 …. 20.19, 20.20 Electrona Carbide Industries Pty Ltd v Baillieu Bowring (Tas) Pty Ltd (1987, unreported); BC8700018 …. 16.22 — v Tasmanian Government Insurance Board [1985] Tas R 68 …. 28.35,

28.36, 28.37, 28.39, 29.29 Eleninovska v Patronis (No 2) [2007] FMCAfam 906; BC200709702 …. 8.75 Elgindata Ltd (No 2), Re [1993] 1 All ER 232; [1992] 1 WLR 1207 …. 8.6, 8.8, 8.65 Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon [2007] NSWCA 322; BC200709738 …. 13.71, 13.79, 13.81, 13.82 — v — (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 373; BC200711102 …. 20.4 Elkington v Shell Australia Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 11 …. 20.2 Ellingsen v Det Skandinaviske Compani [1919] 2 KB 567 …. 11.3 Elliot v Kendrick (1840) 12 Ad & E 597; 113 ER 938 …. 29.49 Elliott v Lord Rokeby (1881) 7 App Cas 43 …. 20.4 Ellis v Leeder (1951) 82 CLR 645 …. 20.29 — v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399 …. 3.44 Elphick v Elliott [2003] 1 Qd R 362; [2002] QSC 285; BC200205503 …. 8.16 — v MMI General Insurance Ltd [2002] QCA 347; BC200205205 …. 8.17 Elvidge Pty Ltd v BGC Construction Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 264; BC200700038 …. 13.90 Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385; BC9501558 …. 6.21, 6.22 Emanuel Management Pty Ltd (in liq) v Foster’s Brewing Group Ltd [2003] QCA 552; BC200307672 …. 28.34, 28.35 — v — [2003] QSC 299; BC200305315 …. 8.9 — v — [2003] QSC 484; BC200308506 …. 20.36 — v — [2004] 2 Qd R 11; [2003] QCA 516; BC200307018 …. 20.45 Emanuele v Dau (1996) 133 FLR 312; BC9603337 …. 15.16, 24.43, 24.47, 24.48, 24.52, 24.53, 24.55

— v Hedley (1997, unreported); BC9707399 …. 16.14 Emden v Carte (1881) 19 Ch D 311 …. 27.20 Energy Drilling Inc v Petroz NL (1989) ATPR ¶40-954 …. 29.74 Emeritus Pty Ltd v Mobbs (1991) NSW Conv R ¶55-588; BC9101842 …. 3.3, 3.24, 3.37, 26.17 EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59 …. 16.13, 16.19, 16.21, 16.23, 16.24, 16.28, 16.35, 16.68 Emirates v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (No 2) [2009] FCA 492; BC200904147 …. 8.6 Enerka Apex Belting Pty Ltd v Vickers Systems Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] VSC 409; BC200205454 …. 13.7, 13.11 Engadine Area Traffic Action Group Inc v Sutherland Shire Council (No 2) (2004) 136 LGERA 365; [2004] NSWLEC 434; BC200405380 …. 9.3, 9.25 English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] 3 All ER 385; [2002] EWCA Civ 605 …. 3.20, 18.64, 20.33 Ensabella, Marriage of (1980) …. 8.76 Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co v Shapiro, Cohen, Andrews, Finlayson (1998) 157 DLR (4th) 322 …. 4.50 Entirity Business Services v Garsoft (No 2) [2011] FCA 334; BC201101918 …. 13.81 Entsch v Smith (1992, unreported); BC9202464 …. 21.54 Environment Protection Authority v Alkem Drums Pty Ltd (1996) 93 LGERA 83; BC9606960 …. 7.19 — v Iron Gates Pty Ltd (1997, unreported); BC9705336 …. 7.19 — v Shell Company of Australia Ltd (2001) 113 LGERA 463; [2001] NSWLEC 66; BC200102281 …. 24.48 — v Taylor Woodrow (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1997) 97 LGERA 368; BC9705360 …. 7.19, 17.21, 17.22 Environmental Protection Authority v Cooke (1996) 90 LGERA 61;

BC9600602 …. 6.8 Epas Ltd v James [2007] QSC 49; BC200701266 …. 20.36 Epping Plaza Fresh Fruit & Vegetables Pty Ltd v Bevendale Pty Ltd [1999] 2 VR 191; [1999] VSCA 43; BC9902009 …. 28.49, 29.27, 29.28 Equity Access Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1989) ATPR ¶40-972 …. 28.7, 29.1, 29.83, 29.92, 29.101, 29.117, 29.124 Equity 8 Pty Ltd v Shaw Stockbroking Ltd [2007] NSWSC 503; BC200703636 …. 13.26 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 414; BC200608427 …. 13.91 — v Wilmoth Field Warne (a firm) [2003] VSC 268; BC200304236 …. 26.49 — v — (No 3) [2004] VSC 164; BC200403876 …. 2.4, 3.3, 3.5, 3.9 — v — (No 4) [2007] 18 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 280; BC200710691 …. 3.9, 3.57, 3.59 Erglis v Buckley [2005] QSC 25; BC200500589 …. 17.81 Eric Preston Pty Ltd v Euroz Securities Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1068; BC201007236 …. 13.9, 13.80 Erolen v Baulkham Hills Shire Council (1993) 10 ACSR 441; BC9301911 …. 29.27, 29.28 Ervin Mahrer and Partners v Strathfield Council (2002) 123 LGERA 24; [2002] NSWLEC 97; BC200203746 …. 1.17, 1.22, 14.30 Esdale v Schenk (2012) 46 Fam LR 547; [2012] FamCA 111; BC201250169 …. 6.13, 8.72 Esposito v Commonwealth of Australia (1988) 80 ACTR 9 …. 12.14 Estates Property Investment Corporation Ltd v Pooley (1975) 3 ACLR 256 …. 28.37, 29.129 Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 400; BC9201030 …. 6.21, 6.28, 15.74 ET Petroleum Holdings Pty Ltd v Clarenden Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWSC

562; BC200504614 …. 8.51 Etna v Arif [1999] 2 VR 353; [1999] VSCA 99; BC9903854 …. 20.39, 20.44, 20.45, 23.3, 23.51, 23.52 Ettinghausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 404; BC9501648 …. 13.90, 13.93 Eunson v Beaulieu United Ltd (2002) 190 ALR 110; [2002] FCA 366; BC200201213 …. 14.48 Eure v Tidwell (1995) 121 FLR 369 …. 8.72 European Hire Cars Pty Ltd v Beilby Poulden Costello [2009] NSWSC 526; BC200905190 …. 23.29 Europeans Ltd v Revenue and Customs [2011] BCC 527; [2011] EWHC 948 …. 22.17, 22.27, 22.36, 22.37 Evans (deceased), Re [1957] St R Qd 345 …. 10.9 Evans, Re (1884) 26 Ch D 58 …. 10.4 — v Bartlam [1937] AC 473 …. 1.13, 6.17, 20.28 — v Clayhope Properties Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 359 …. 14.23 — v Evans [2011] NSWCA 92; BC201102303 …. 21.26 — v Johnston [1908] St R Qd 150 …. 8.44 — v Rees (1842) 2 QB 334; 114 ER 131 …. 22.3, 29.31 — v Rochford (2003) 30 Fam LR 336; [2003] FamCA 314 …. 8.29 — v Savarin Ltd (1980) 109 DLR (3d) 510 …. 23.23 Evans and Tate Premium Wines Pty Ltd v Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Ltd (2006) 230 ALR 184; [2006] NSWSC 560; BC200404222 …. 8.15, 8.16 Evans Deakin Pty Ltd v Sebel Furniture Ltd [2003] FCA 282; BC200301395 …. 8.4, 8.9 Evatt v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 2) [1999] NSWCA 143; BC9902713 …. 13.90 Evenco Pty Ltd v Australian Building Construction Employees & Builders

Labourers Federation (Qld branch) [2001] 2 Qd R 118; [2000] QCA 108; BC200001497 …. 16.68 Eweida v British Airways plc [2010] 1 Costs LR 43; [2009] EWCA Civ 1025 …. 14.19 Ewellyn v Ewellyn [2010] FamCA 526; BC201050602 …. 16.4 Ewer, Re (1903) 4 SR (NSW) 240 …. 8.18 Ex Christmas Islanders Association Inc v Attorney-General (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 233 ALR 97; [2006] FCA 671; BC200603860 …. 23.9 Exell v Exell [1984] VR 1 …. 14.45 Eyre v Hughes (1876) 2 Ch D 148 …. 4.34 Ezekiel-Hart v Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory (No 2) [2012] ACTSC 135; BC201205857 …. 8.51, 14.30

F Fagan v Morien [2008] WASC 54; BC200808226 …. 15.73 FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Burns (1997) 9 ANZ Ins Cas ¶61-384; BC9603600 …. 16.45, 16.66 — v MMI-CMI Insurance Ltd (1992, unreported); BC9200109 …. 21.50, 21.51 FAI Traders Insurance Co Ltd v Ferrara (1996) 41 NSWLR 91; BC9603596 …. 4.4 Fairbairn v Cummins [1961] VR 105 …. 20.19 Faircloth v R (1987, unreported); BC8700047 …. 25.22 Fairfold Properties Ltd v Exmouth Docks Co Ltd (No 2) [1993] Ch 196 …. 27.1, 27.9 Fairway Construction Ltd v McGuire (1969) 71 WWR 396 …. 5.54 Faithfull v Ewen (1878) 7 Ch D 495 …. 27.23 Fakes v Taylor Woodrow Construction Ltd [1973] 1 QB 436 …. 29.101 Falcetta v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 56 ATR 194; [2004]

FCAFC 194; BC200404829 …. 20.4 Faraday v Rappaport [2007]] NSWSC 253; BC200701771 …. 8.47, 14.37 Fardi v Loveday (No 2) [2010] SADC 82 …. 16.50, 16.56 Farkas v Northcity Financial Services Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1036; BC200607961 …. 19.13 Farland v Farland (Costs) [2010] FamCAFC 28; BC201050138 …. 8.29 Farlow v Farlow [2009] FamCA 46; BC200950075 …. 13.59 Farmers’ Fertilizers Corporation Ltd, Ex parte (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 645 …. 4.14, 18.77 Farmitalia Carlo Erba SrL v Delta West Pty Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 336; BC9405878 …. 28.34, 28.35, 28.36, 29.1, 29.74 Farnell v Penhalluriack (2010) 29 VR 727; [2010] VSCA 305; BC201008594 …. 28.29, 28.30 Farquar v Farquar (No 2) [2008] FamCA 682; BC200850533 …. 7.29 Farraday v Tamworth Union (1916) 86 LJ Ch 436 …. 17.33 Farrell v Bridge (1991, unreported); BC9102783 …. 24.47 — v Royal Kings Park Tennis Club (Incorporated) [2007] WASCA 173; BC200706670 …. 22.68, 29.71, 29.104, 29.106 Farrer v Lacy, Hartland, and Co (1885) 28 Ch D 482 …. 29.100 Farrow v Registrar of Building Societies [1991] 2 VR 589 …. 14.9, 14.10 Farrow Finance Co Ltd (in liq) v ANZ Executors and Trustee Co Ltd (1997) 23 ACSR 521 …. 10.57 Farrugia v Farrugia [2000] FCA 516; BC200001987 …. 23.4, 23.6 Fashion Warehouse Pty Ltd v Pola [1984] 1 Qd R 251 …. 1.23, 17.54 Fasold v Roberts (1997, unreported); BC9704250 …. 12.4 Fastlane Australia Pty Ltd v Nolmont Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 492; BC200703246 …. 14.26 Fat-sel Pty Ltd v Brambles Holdings Ltd (1985) ATPR ¶40-544 …. 28.24,

29.101, 29.102, 29.103 Fattal v Walbrook Trustees (Jersey) Ltd [2009] 4 Costs LR 591; [2009] EWHC 1674 …. 19.1, 19.6 Fay v Moramba Services Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 725; BC201004657 …. 8.29 Feaver v Smith (2008) 58 SR (WA) 204; [2008] WADC 72; …. 15.74 Federal Commissioner of Land Tax v Jowett (1930) 45 CLR 115; BC3000011 …. 17.93, 20.31 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v B & G Plant Hire Pty Ltd (1994) 123 ALR 699 …. 9.37 Federow v Heathcote (1984) 57 ACTR 3 …. 24.56 Feehan v Pocock Floors Ltd [1971] 4 WWR 572 …. 27.11 Feeney v Pieper [1964] QWN 23 …. 22.69 Feez Ruthning’s Bill of Costs, Re [1989] 1 Qd R 55 …. 1.11, 6.4, 15.58 Felsink Pty Ltd v City of Maribyrnong [2007] VSC 49; BC200701195 …. 29.124 Ferraro v PD Properties Pty Ltd (1993, unreported); BC9301838 …. 26.33 Fejsa v R (1995) 82 A Crim R 253; BC9505384 …. 25.10, 25.11 Felstead v Giersch (1976) 14 SASR 27 …. 15.16, 16.24, 24.53, 24.54, 24.55, 24.61 Felton, Re (1943) 60 WN (NSW) 16 …. 5.26, 5.27, 5.32 Fennell v Aherne (No 2) [2005] SASC 364; BC200507425 …. 13.12 — v Supervision and Engineering Services Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 47 SASR 6 …. 11.18, 11.23, 11.24 Ferizis v Nash [2007] NSWDC 109; BC200740267 …. 16.45 Fernandez v Perez (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1602; BC201210542 …. 13.29 Fernando v Medical Complaints Tribunal (2007) 16 Tas R 237; [2007] TASSC 44; BC200704696 …. 22.61, 22.63

— v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 5) (2008) 107 ALD 568; [2008] FCA 1953; BC200811402 …. 8.32 Fernon v Lawton (2012) 31 NTLR 71; [2012] NTSC 7; BC201200342 …. 8.80 FernŽe v Gorlitz [1915] 1 Ch 177 …. 22.68 Ferrier v Civil Aviation Authority (1994, unreported); BC9405882 …. 10.53 Ferris v Winslade [1998] ACTSC 38; BC9802610 …. 8.79 Fertinova Australia Pty Ltd v Samardzija (1995, unreported); BC9507174 …. 11.36 Fesl v Delegate of the Native Title Registrar (No 2) (2008) 173 FCR 176; [2008] FCA 1479; BC200808638 …. 8.69 Fetherston v Peninsula Health (No 2) (2004) 137 FCR 262; [2004] FCA 594; BC200402589 …. 9.28 Fewster v Briggs [2000] WASCA 36; BC200000428 …. 24.53, 25.29 Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) (1998) 30 ACSR 20; BC9806555 …. 8.5, 8.7, 8.47, 14.9 FFE Minerals Australia Pty Ltd v Mining Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 22 WAR 241; [2000] WASCA 69; BC200001140 …. 28.24, 29.4 Fibreglass Pool Works (Manufacturing) Pty Ltd v ICI Australia (Operations) Pty Ltd (1997, unreported); BC9703128 …. 14.35 Fick v Groves (No 2) [2010] QSC 182; BC201003608 …. 16.53 Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 1; [2002] NSWSC 432; BC200202544 …. 14.47 Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2004) 208 ALR 564; [2004] NSWSC 664; BC200404777 …. 29.7 Field v Director of Public Prosecutions (2010) 11 DCLR (NSW) 74; [2010] NSWDC 144; BC20104023 …. 25.11 Field v Great Northern Railway Co (1878) 3 Ex D 261 …. 20.19 Field (T A) Pty Ltd v Frigmobile of Australia Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NSWLR 488 …. 19.6

Fifteenth Eestin Nominees Pty Ltd v Rosenberg (No 2) (2009) 74 NSWLR 173; [2009] NSWCA 113; BC200904010 …. 1.20 Filaria Pty Ltd v Kazar [2002] ACTSC 82; BC200204837 …. 14.59 Filmlab Systems International Ltd v Pennington [1994] 1 All ER 673 …. 23.62 Fimiston Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Pecker Maroo Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 356; BC201110056 …. 28.37 Fimiston Mining NL v Western Reefs Ltd (1996) 14 WAR 387; BC9600610 …. 11.18 Fina Research SA v Halliburton Energy Services Inc [2002] FCA 1331; BC200206416 …. 29.74 Finch v Finch (Costs) [2012] FamCA 543; BC201250770 …. 8.59 Findlay v Railway Executive [1950] 2 All ER 969 …. 20.44 Fiorentini v O’Neill (1998, unreported); BC9806451 …. 10.35, 10.36, 10.37, 10.44 Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd v Rousianos (1989) 19 NSWLR 57 …. 12.2, 12.15, 12.18, 20.32 Firmer v Britton [2012] FamCA 576; BC201250812 …. 8.72 First Industry Corp v Goh [2004] WASC 89; BC200402635 …. 27.10 Firth v Centrelink [2002] 55 NSWLR 451; [2002] NSWSC 564; BC200203753 …. 4.38, 4.39, 4.40, 27.1, 27.6, 27.12, 27.14, 27.25 — v Centrelink (No 2) [2002] 55 NSWLR 494; [2002] NSWSC 850; BC200205434 …. 4.40 — v Kasumovic [2001] NSWSC 341; BC200102107 …. 18.74 — v Latham [2007] NSWCA 40; BC200701462 …. 23.57 Fischer v David Syme & Co Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 606 …. 19.3, 19.6 Fish v Huon Channel and Peninsula Steam Company Ltd (1916) 12 Tas LR 7 …. 16.15 Fisher, Re [1894] 1 Ch 450 …. 8.62

Fisse v Secretary, Department of the Treasury (No 2) (2008) 253 ALR 52; [2008] FCAFC 200; BC200811598 …. 9.31, 9.32 Fitch v Fort Frances Pulp & Paper Co [1927] 4 DLR 811 …. 3.10 Fitzgerald v Fish (2005) 33 Fam LR 123; [2005] FamCA 158 …. 8.71 — v Golden (1995, unreported); BC9502610 …. 24.48 — v Wilson (1917) 13 Tas LR 50 …. 15.5, 17.38 Fitzgerald (J F) & Seymour’s Bill of Costs, Re [1960] Qd R 430 …. 2.15, 4.29 Fitzpatrick v Keelty (No 2) [2008] FCA 742; BC200803832 …. 8.29, 8.34 — v Waterstreet (1995) 18 ACSR 694; BC9505525 …. 7.38 Fitzroy Football Club Ltd v Brisbane Bears-Fitzroy Football Club Ltd [2010] VSC 180; BC201002646 …. 29.8 582 St Kilda Road v Campbell (1975, unreported) …. 15.32 Fladgate LLP v Harrison [2012] EWHC 67 …. 2.4 Flatow v Mullins (1984, unreported); BC8491008 …. 24.53 Fleeton v Fitzgerald (1998) 9 BPR 16,715; BC9806793 …. 2.9 Fleischmann Distilling Corp v Maier Brewing Co (1967) 87 Sup Ct 1404 …. 7.6 Fleming v Fleming (Review of Costs) (2009) 42 Fam LR 29; [2009] FamCA 552; BC200950450 …. 17.49 Fletcher v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 23 ATR 555 …. 29.15, 29.109 Flew v Mirvac Parking Pty Ltd [2006] FMCA 1818; BC200610908 …. 7.47 Flexible Manufacturers Systems Pty Ltd v Lewis [2002] NSWSC 932; BC200206013 …. 26.28 Flinders Diamonds Ltd v Tiger International Resources Inc [2006] SASC 139; BC200603179 …. 11.2 — v Tiger International Resources Inc (No 2) (2006) 244 LSJS 435; [2006] SASC 180; BC200604598 …. 13.5

Flinn v Flinn [1999] 3 VR 712; [1999] VSCA 109; BC9904617 …. 20.2 — v — [1999] 3 VR 712; [1999] VSCA 134; BC9905824 …. 22.17, 22.35 Florence Investments Pty Ltd v H G Slater & Co [1975] 2 NSWLR 398 …. 4.14, 4.17, 5.55 Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority (2003) 28 WAR 95; [2003] WASC 122; BC200305099 …. 15.59, 15.75, 16.26, 16.30, 16.31, 17.55 Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773; BC9903036 …. 23.2, 23.5, 23.21, 23.22, 23.30, 23.31, 23.37 — v — (2001) 109 FCR 280; [2001] FCA 370; BC200102364 …. 19.24 Flower & Hart’s Bill of Costs, Re [1969] QWN 41 …. 15.58 —, Re [1991] 2 Qd R 20 …. 5.51 Fogarty (No 2), Re Estate of (2007) 1 ACTLR 97; [2007] ACTSC 40; BC200704730 …. 10.17, 23.9 Foley v Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd [2008] NSWSC 778; BC200807103 …. 14.65 — v Herald-Sun TV Pty Ltd [1981] VR 315 …. 8.68 Foljambe, Re (1846) 9 Beav 402; 50 ER 398 …. 4.24 Folk v Leda Ltd (1997) 140 FLR 331; BC9703592 …. 18.69 Fong v Chan (1999) 181 DLR (4th) 614 …. 1.1, 7.34, 7.35 Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network, GP [2009] FCA 68; BC200900496 …. 29.25, 29.106 Foody v Horewood (2000) 96 FCR 386; [2000] FCA 37; BC200000124 …. 21.10 Forbes-Smith v Forbes-Smith [1901] P 258 …. 22.2 Forbes v Frigger [2009] WASC 77; BC200902052 …. 15.71, 16.31 Forbes Engineering (Asia) Pte Ltd v Forbes (No 5) [2009] FCA 873; BC200907360 …. 20.4

Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd v Lo Presti (2009) 41 WAR 1; [2009] WASCA 115; BC200905594 …. 13.61, 13.62, 13.72, 13.73, 13.76, 13.85 Ford v GKR Construction Ltd [2000] 1 All ER 802 …. 13.30 Fordham v Fordyce (2007) 154 LGERA 49; [2007] NSWCA 129; BC200704391 …. 14.34, 20.36 Fordyce v Fordham (2006) 67 NSWLR 497; [2006] NSWCA 274; BC200607906 …. 14.63 Forest Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) v Keen Bay Pty Ltd (1991) 4 ACSR 107 …. 6.16, 22.25, 22.44, 22.45, 22.54, 28.35, 29.20, 29.39 Forestry Tasmania v Ombudsman (No 2) [2010] TASSC 52; BC201008424 …. 22.74 Forestview Nominees Pty Ltd v Perron Investments Pty Ltd [1999] 162 ALR; [1999] FCA 405; BC9901615 …. 2.12 Forlyle Pty Ltd v Tiver [2007] SADC 55; BC200740702 …. 8.25 Forman v Rattray [2006] NSWSC 260; BC200602275 …. 18.74 Forney v Bushe (1954) 104 LJ 604 …. 4.48 Forrest (A W & L M) Pty Ltd v Beamish (1998) 146 FLR 450; BC9804350 …. 23.23, 23.25 Forsyth v Sinclair (No 2) (2010) 28 VR 635; [2010] VSCA 195; BC201005509 …. 10.31, 10.34, 13.64 Fortron Automotive Treatments Pty Ltd v Eurotime Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 384; BC200107726 …. 13.26 Fosse v Director of Public Prosecutions (1989) 16 NSWLR 540 …. 24.52 — v — [1999] NSWSC 367; BC9901959 …. 24.26 Foster, Re (1994) 121 ALR 494 …. 22.6, 22.47, 22.75 —, Re [1920] 3 KB 306 …. 5.51 Foster v Farquhar [1893] 1 QB 564 …. 8.25 — v Galea (No 2) [2008] VSC 331; BC200807708 …. 13.22

— v Great Western Railway Co (1881) 8 QBD 25 …. 20.32 — v — (1882) 8 QBD 515 …. 8.62 Fotheringham v Fotheringham (No 2) (1999) 46 NSWLR 194; [1999] NSWCA 21; BC9902029 …. 13.90 Foti v Foti [2009] SASC 177; BC200905536 …. 11.52 Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397 …. 16.27, 16.51 4WD Systems Pty Ltd v McNamara [2009] SASC 166; BC200905199 …. 4.12 Fowdh v Fowdh (1993, unreported); BC9302200 …. 13.76 Fowler v Nield [1961] SR (NSW) 152 …. 20.15 Fowler, Corbett and Jessop v Toro Constructions Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 178; BC200807098 …. 23.56, 23.57 Foxeden Pty Ltd v IOOF Building Society Ltd (No 3) [2006] VSC 207; BC200604400 …. 15.69 Foxgold Pty Ltd v Paterson [2005] SASC 376; BC200507295 …. 29.109 Foyster v Foyster Holdings Pty Ltd (prov liq apptd)) (2003) 44 ACSR 705; [2003] NSWSC 135; BC200300884 …. 14.10 FPM Constructions Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Blue Mountains [2005] NSWCA 147; BC200502851 …. 28.21, 29.108, 29.124 — v — [2005] NSWCA 340; BC200507704 …. 22.17, 22.28, 22.36 Framar Money Management Pty Ltd v Territory Insurance Office (1986) 87 FLR 251 …. 11.28 Frances Pulp & Paper Co v Telegram Printing Co [1927] 4 DLR 77 …. 27.23 Franchini v Moroni [2012] FamCAFC 126; BC201250512 …. 22.71 Francis v Francis and Dickerson [1956] P 87 …. 16.16, 17.76 Franicevich v Strong [1997] 1 NZLR 460 …. 26.8 Frank Jasper Pty Ltd v Glew (No 3) [2012] WASC 24; BC201208920 …. 15.58, 15.73

Frankenburg v Famous Lasky Film Service Ltd [1931] 1 Ch 428 …. 16.21, 17.5, 17.35 Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 603; [2009] NSWCA 407; BC200911627 …. 8.39 Franks v Warringah Council [2003] FCA 1254; BC200306692 …. 13.7, 13.28 Frankston Ambassador Pty Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1991) 9 ACLC 790 …. 29.94, 29.95 Frape (No 2), Re [1894] 2 Ch 290 …. 5.43 Fraser v Palmer (1838) 1 Y & C Ex 279; 160 ER 707 …. 29.80 — v The Queen (No 2) (1985) 1 NSWLR 680 …. 25.4 Freehill Hollingdale & Page’s Bill of Costs, Re [1998] 1 Qd R 616; BC9701884 …. 5.51, 21.17 Freehills, in the matter of New Tel Ltd (in liq) (No 4) [2008] FCA 108; BC200806704 …. 7.40 Freeman v McNally [2003] NSWSC 780; BC200304818 …. 5.21, 18.67 — v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2004) 21 VAR 8; [2004] VSCA 4; BC200400335 …. 20.6 Freemantle’s Pastoral Pty Ltd v Hyett [1999] VSC 188; BC9903224 …. 13.29 Freideberg, The (1885) 10 PD 112 …. 6.16 Fremarle Acceptance Corporation Pty Ltd v Coumbis (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 183 …. 20.31, 20.32 French v Carter Lemon LLP [2011] EWHC 3252 …. 4.48 — v Carter Lemon Camerons LLP [2012] 6 Costs LO 879; [2012] EWCA Civ …. 26.14, 26.16 — v McKenna (No 2) [2012] TASSC 8; BC201201469 …. 14.39 Fricker v Van Grutten [1896] 2 Ch 649 …. 23.24, 23.25 Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] FCA 1280; BC200105298 ….

13.76 Friend v Rye [2001] QSC 12; BC200100171 …. 13.24 — v Solly (1847) 10 Beav 329; 50 ER 608 …. 17.75 Friends of Hay Street Inc v Hastings Council (1995) 87 LGERA 45; BC9504756 …. 9.16, 9.24 Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc v Minister for Environment (No 1) (1996) 69 FCR 1; BC9605247 …. 28.16, 29.8, 29.118 — v — (No 5) (1998) 84 FCR 186; BC9801443 …. 9.2 Friends of King Edward Park Inc v Newcastle City Council [2012] NSWLEC 113; BC201204394 …. 9.13, 29.8 Friends of Turramurra Inc v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 170; BC201107802 …. 9.5 Frigger v Lean [2012] WASCA 66; BC201201613 …. 15.73 — v Murfett Legal Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 447; BC201209338 …. 5.12 — v Nigam [2007] 53 SR(WA) 308; [2007] WADC 138; BC200740137 …. 6.23 Friis v Paramount Bagwash Company Ltd (No 2) [1940] 2 KB 654 …. 1.18 Frost v Frost [1941] 1 DLR 774 …. 15.33 Frumar v Owners of Strata Plan 36957 (2006) 67 NSWLR 321; [2006] NSWCA 278; BC200608291 …. 5.21, 18.67 Fryer v Frost (2009) 236 FLR 356; [2009] NTSC 65; BC200911342 …. 18.60 Fugen Industrial Co Ltd v Melsom (1994) 12 ACSR 749 …. 10.54, 10.55 Fuld (deceased), Re Estate of (No 4) [1968] P 727; [1967] 2 All ER 649 …. 27.4, 27.6, 27.10, 27.12 Fullard (deceased), Re [1982] Fam 42 …. 10.38 Fuller, Ex parte (1881) 16 Ch D 617 …. 26.9 — v Minister for Primary Industries and Energy (1998, unreported); BC9801294 …. 18.6

— v Municipal Tramways Trust [1921] SASR 109 …. 8.2, 8.3 Fuller Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (1979) 21 SASR 212 …. 15.34, 17.73 Funds First Pty Ltd v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 66609 (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 428; BC200803793 …. 28.26, 29.7 Furber v Stacey [2005] NSWCA 242; BC200505308 …. 11.37, 11.38 Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd (No 3) [2008] FCA 896; BC200804485 …. 12.4 — v — [2009] FCAFC 40; BC200901917 …. 13.87 FWB Pty Ltd v Robinson [1975] 1 NSWLR 85 …. 21.52 Fyna Foods Australia Pty Ltd v Cobannah Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2004] FCA 1212; BC200406043 …. 13.69

G G & J Shopfittings & Refrigeration Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lombard Insurance Company (Aust) Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 363 …. 20.24 G, Re [1999] 4 All ER 371 …. 23.45 — v N (No 2) [2002] FMCAfam 68; BC200204653 …. 8.72 Gabel (P G) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Katherine Enterprises Pty Ltd (1977) 29 FLR 108 …. 29.125, 29.130 Gadens Lawyers v Beba Enterprises Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 519; BC201208528 …. 5.7 Gadens Ridgeway v Paroulakis (1992) 15 Fam LR 586 …. 11.49, 27.6, 27.18 Gagarimabu v BHP Billiton Ltd [2003] VSC 416; BC200306630 …. 6.23 Gagliardi (No 2), Ex parte (1895) 6 QLJ 200 …. 17.23 Galambos (D) & Son Pty Ltd v McIntyre (1974) 5 ACTR 10 …. 8.17 Galaxidis v Galaxidis (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 387; BC200407253 …. 20.4 Galbraith v Murray, Robertson & Thomas [1930] 4 DLR 1005 …. 3.23 Gale v Gale (1914) 18 CLR 560; BC1400025 …. 20.15

Galea v Commonwealth (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 260; BC200802617 …. 14.41 Gales Holdings Pty Ltd v Valuer General [2007] NSWLEC 14; BC200700051 …. 8.49 Gallagher v CSR Ltd (1994, unreported); BC9401606 …. 16.12, 19.22 — v Gallagher [1965] NSWR 409 …. 17.82 Gallaher International Ltd v Tlais Enterprises Ltd [2008] EWHC 2046 …. 15.15, 16.23, 16.28, 16.52 Galland, Re (1885) 31 Ch D 296 …. 26.23, 26.49, 27.1 Galstian v Galstaun [2010] NSWSC 1214; BC201007803 …. 14.16, 14.17 Gambro Pty Ltd v Fresenius Medical Care South East Asia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 407; BC200001424 …. 14.34 Gamlen Chemical Ltd v Rochem Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 1049 …. 26.13, 26.14, 26.21 Ganke v Somerset (1995, unreported); BC9504273 …. 4.28 Gannon v White (1886) 12 VLR 589 …. 8.40 Gao v Zhang (2005) 14 VR 380; [2005] VSCA 200; BC200505785 …. 14.45, 20.36 Garbutt v Edwards [2005] 1 All ER 553; [2005] EWCA Civ 1206 …. 2.26 Garcia v Fowler [2000] NSWSC 576; BC200004427 …. 13.64 Gardiner, Re (1890) 16 VLR 641 …. 22.3 Gardner v Jay (1885) 29 Ch D 50 …. 1.13, 6.17 — v London Chatham and Dover Railway Co (1867) LR 2 Ch App 201 …. 22.43 — v Marshall (1845) 14 Sim 575; 60 ER 481 …. 1.17, 14.26 Gardner’s Trusts, Re (1902) 19 WN (NSW) 106 …. 8.18 Garnaut v Child Support Registrar [2004] FCA 1303; BC200406658 …. 8.34 Garnett v Bradley (1878) 3 App Cas 944 …. 6.2, 6.3, 6.4

Garrard v Email Furniture Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 662; BC9304276 …. 15.29, 18.28, 18.68 Garrett v Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd (1900) 26 VLR 310 …. 29.78 — v Yiasemides [2004] NSWSC 828 …. 10.13 Garstone v Sullivan (1996) 14 WAR 480; BC9601174 …. 24.52 Garthwaite v Sherwood [1976] 2 All ER 1015 …. 17.44, 17.45 Garwolin Nominees Pty Ltd v Statewide Building Society [1984] VR 469 …. 14.64 Gatnom Capital and Finance Ltd v Sanders [2012] BPIR 299; [2011] EWHC 3716 …. 22.27 Gaunt v Taylor (1840) 2 Beav 346; 48 ER 1215 …. 11.56 Gava v Grljusich (1996, unreported); BC960082 …. 10.13 GB Radio (Australia) Pty Ltd v Marchant (No 3) [2005] VSC 222; BC200504386 …. 28.63, 28.64 GBT Corporation Pty Ltd v Scott (1994) 116 FLR 266 …. 7.37, 11.52, 17.16, 17.56 GCT (Management) Ltd v Laurie Marsh Group Ltd [1973] RPC 432 …. 16.68 Geary v Benning [1961] NSWR 646 …. 15.32, 17.80 GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd (2003) 201 ALR 55; [2003] FCA 688; BC200303795 …. 11.35, 11.37 Gedye, Re (1851) 14 Beav 56; 51 ER 208 …. 4.19 Gee v Port Stephens Council (2003) 131 LGERA 325; [2003] NSWLEC 260; BC200306515 …. 8.83 Geeveekay Pty Ltd v Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria (No 2) [2008] VSC 152; BC200803205 …. 9.15 Geffen v Goodman Estate (1991) 81 DLR (4th) 211 …. 10.4, 20.18 Geilinger v Gibbs [1897] 1 Ch 479 …. 23.24 Gelonese v Blanken (1977) 24 ACTR 30 …. 13.39

General of Berne Insurance Co v Jardine Reinsurance Management Ltd [1998] WASC 252; BC9908569 …. 7.5 Geneva Finance Ltd (receiver and manager appointed) v Resource & Industry Ltd [2002] WASC 121; BC200207490 …. 15.11, 15.72 Genovese v Homestyle Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 189; BC200708117 …. 20.6 Gentry Bros Pty Ltd v Wilson Brown & Associates Pty Ltd (1992) 8 ACSR 405; BC9203659 …. 28.34, 28.49, 29.4, 29.11, 29.22, 29.85 Geoform Design Pty Ltd v Randwick City Council (1995) 87 LGERA 140; BC9504743 …. 6.6, 22.15 George v Fletcher (Trustee) (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 71; BC201004076 …. 7.38 Geoghegan v Szelid [2011] NSWSC 1440; BC201111017 …. 7.48, 10.31 Geraghty v Woodforth and Stewart (No 2) [1957] QWN 42 …. 4.30 Geraldton Building Company Pty Ltd v Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd (1994) 13 WAR 242 …. 15.73 Gerson v Simpson [1903] 2 KB 197 …. 11.34 Gersten v Minister for lmmigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 922; BC200003842 …. 23.4, 23.6, 23.37 — v — [2001] FCA 260; BC200100995 …. 16.57, 23.4, 23.6, 23.37 Gertig v Davies (2003) 85 SASR 226; [2003] SASC 86; BC200301269 …. 8.17 Gerula v Flores (1995) 126 DLR (4th) 506 …. 16.67 Ghunaim v Bart (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 82; BC200602685 …. 13.81 Giannarelli v Wraith (No 2) (1991) 171 CLR 592; BC9102632 …. 18.24 Gibbs v Gibbs [1952] P 332 …. 16.21 Gibbs Holdings Pty Ltd v Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Australia) Ltd [2001] QCA 481; BC200107167 …. 1.19 Gibson v May (1853) 4 De GM & G 516; 43 ER 607 …. 26.40 — v Mosman Municipal Council (2001) 116 LGERA 397; [2001] NSWLEC

201; BC200105410 …. 8.81 — v Snaith (1915) 21 DLR 716 …. 20.41 Gibson’s Settlement Trusts, Re [1981] 1 Ch 179 …. 1.20, 17.4, 18.64, 18.65 Gigi Entertainment Pty Ltd v Macree (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 869; BC201106217 …. 26.23, 27.13 Gilbert, Will of (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318 …. 20.29 — v Kozicki [2007] QSC 268; BC200708144 …. 4.24 Gilbey (W A) Ltd v Continental Liqueurs Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 527 …. 16.16, 16.17, 17.31 Giles v Pierce (1982) 44 ACTR 6 …. 11.33 — v Randall [1915] 1 KB 290 …. 16.19, 16.21 — v Samuels (1972) 3 SASR 307 …. 24.40 — v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142 …. 3.43 Giller v Procopets [2002] VSC 305; BC200204941 …. 14.16, 14.17 — v — (No 2) (2009) 24 VR 1; [2009] VSCA 72; BC200902384 …. 8.57, 13.59 Gills v Commonwealth of Australia [1961] Qd R 599 …. 17.11 Gilshenan and Luton v Commissioner of Taxation [1984] 1 Qd R 199 …. 26.10 Ginnity v Prefsure Life Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSC 293; BC200706610 …. 21.21, 21.50 GIO General Ltd v ABB Installation and Service Pty Ltd (2000) 19 NSWCCR 720; [2000] NSWCA 118; BC200002307 …. 13.69 Gippsreal Ltd v Kurek Investments Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 344; BC200907472 …. 23.2 Girotto v Phillips Fox (a firm) [2011] VSC 293; BC201104679 …. 2.7 Gittins v W H C Stacy & Son Pty Ltd (1964) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 157 …. 6.11

Gizah Pty Ltd v AXA Trustees Ltd (No 2) [2001] NSWADT 164 …. 8.90 GJL v DBL [2006] FamCA 404 …. 29.107 Gladstone, Re (1971) 25 DLR (3d) 43 …. 26.36 Gladstone Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Wills (1984) 6 FCR 496 …. 11.35 Glamorgan County Council v Great Western Railway Co [1895] 1 QB 21 …. 17.92 Glandon Pty Ltd v Strata Consolidated Pty Ltd (1988, unreported); BC8802270 …. 8.46 Glare v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 493; BC200007095 …. 12.22 Glasson v Barry (1912) 12 SR (NSW) 716 …. 8.4, 15.31 Gleeson v Fitzpatrick (1920) 29 CLR 29; BC2090126 …. 10.9 Glekis v Conson (1933) 50 WN (NSW) 55 …. 20.5 Glen v Union Trustee Company of Australia Ltd (1936) 54 CLR 463; BC3600045 …. 11.55 Glenorchy City Council v Miller (1995, unreported); BC9503011 …. 24.55 Glenwood Homes Pty Ltd v Eberhard [2009] 1 Qd R 127; [2008] QSC 192; BC200807566 …. 18.11 Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2008] WASCA 186; BC200807985 …. 16.31 Globaltech Pty Ltd v Pareek [2006] WASC 30; BC200603520 …. 13.58, 13.69, 13.79, 13.86 Globe Equities Ltd v Globe Legal Services Ltd [1999] BLR 232 …. 22.17, 22.20 Glynn v R (1984) 11 A Crim R 229 …. 24.61 Go Exports Pty Ltd v Livestock Shipping Services Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 218; BC200205344 …. 14.58 Godden v Alford [1960] WAR 235 …. 8.4 Gold v Patman and Fotheringham Ltd [1958] 2 All ER 497 …. 8.9

Gold Coast Bakeries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Heat & Control Pty Ltd [1992] 1 Qd R 162 …. 11.33, 11.35 Golden Casket Art Union Office, Re [1995] 2 Qd R 346; BC9404182 …. 20.38 Golden City Car & Truck Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 46 ATR 51; [2000] FCA 1697; BC200007145 …. 14.66, 14.68 Goldman v Hesper [1988] 1 WLR 1238 …. 18.24 Goldsmith v Villanueva [2000] NSWSC 1181; BC200007611 …. 5.18 Goldsworthy v Bickell [1987] Ch 378 …. 11.28 Goliath Portland Cement Company Pty Ltd v McNalley Australia Pty Ltd (No 6) (1993, unreported); BC9300090 …. 28.20, 28.56 Golski v Kirk (1987) 14 FCR 143 …. 14.34, 20.44 Gomba Holdings (UK) Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd (No 2) [1993] Ch 171 …. 15.2, 15.41, 15.45, 15.46, 15.53 Gometto v A Firm (No 2) [2010] FamCA 849; BC201050952 …. 8.70 Gompertz v Kensit (1872) LR 13 Eq 369 …. 11.56 Goninan (A) & Co Ltd v Gill (2001) 51 NSWLR 441; [2001] NSWCA 77; BC200101568 …. 9.35, 9.36, 18.74 Gonzales v Owners of Strata Plan 74146 (Costs) [2010] NSWDC 50; BC201040107 …. 13.9 Good Motel Co Pty Ltd (in liq) v Shepherd (1992) 110 FLR 87 …. 29.22 Goodacre v Smith (1867) LR 1 P & D 359 …. 10.25 Goodfellow v Gray [1899] 2 QB 498 …. 8.15 Goodman v J Eban Ld [1954] 1 QB 550 …. 4.19 Goodman Estate v Geffen (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 765 …. 20.18 Goodwood Recoveries Ltd v Breen [2006] 2 All ER 533; [2005] EWCA Civ 414 …. 22.20 Gorczynski v Annandale Services Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 71; BC200401199

…. 20.36 — v AWM Dickinson & Son [2005] NSWSC 277; BC200501852 …. 5.55 — v Beilby [2005] NSWSC 884; BC200506604 …. 5.21, 18.67 — v Leichhardt Council [2007] NSWSC 202; BC200701455 …. 18.57 Gordano Building Contractors Ltd v Burgess [1988] 1 WLR 890 …. 28.63 Gordon & Gotch (Australasia) Ltd v Cox (1923) 32 CLR 465; BC2300017 …. 20.2 Gore v Justice Corporation Pty Ltd (2002) 119 FCR 429; [2002] FCAFC 83; BC200201207 …. 22.6, 22.17, 22.27, 22.49 Gorman v Gorman [2004] NSWSC 741; BC200405181 …. 6.6, 6.16 — v Wills (1906) 4 CLR 764; BC0600012 …. 20.19, 20.21, 20.32 Gosford Shire Council v Anthony George Pty Ltd (1969) 89 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 350 …. 21.18 Gosling v Gaskell [1897] AC 575 …. 22.44 Gothard v Davey (No 2) (2011) 277 ALR 172; [2011] FCA 59; BC201100358 …. 10.57 Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215; BC8501055 BC8400486 …. 6.22, 11.17, 11.18, 11.20, 11.24, 11.25, 20.43 Gove v Black [2006] WASC 298 (S2); BC200705326 …. 11.2, 11.7 Government Insurance Office New South Wales v Ivanoff (1991) 22 NSWLR 368 …. 14.3 Grace v Jeneka (2004) DFC ¶95-289; [2002] QCA 335; BC200205487 …. 8.79 — v Thomas Street Cafe Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 72; BC200802888 …. 13.89 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (No 2) [2000] FCA 1220; BC200005095 …. 16.40, 16.45 Graigola Merthyr Co Ltd v Swansea Corporation [1927] WN 30 …. 17.35 Grainger v Williams [2009] WASCA 60; BC200901575 …. 7.22

Granitgard Pty Ltd v Termicide Pest Control Pty Ltd (No 6) [2010] FCA 381; BC201002314 …. 13.9, 13.24, 13.25 Grant v Australian Knitting Mills [1937] SASR 113 …. 16.16, 16.17, 17.72 — v Banque Franco-Egyptienne (1876) 1 CPD 143 …. 29.124 — v Brewarrina Shire Council (No 3) (2003) 125 LGERA 348; [2003] NSWLEC 108; BC200302709 …. 8.39 — v Kiama Municipal Council [2006] NSWLEC 70; BC200600828 …. 8.84 Grant & Associates, Matter of a Bill of Costs of [1995] ANZ Conv R 323 …. 5.58, 5.59 Grant, Bulcraig & Co, Re [1906] 1 Ch 124 …. 5.3, 5.54, 5.58, 15.3 Gray (No 2), Re Estate of [2010] VSC 269; BC201004093 …. 10.44 Gray v Ferguson [2008] NSWSC 1066; BC200808869 …. 16.66 — v Going Places Leisure Travel Ltd [2005] 3 Costs LR 405; [2005] EWCA Civ 189 …. 23.62 — v Guardian Trust Australia Ltd [2003] NSWSC 887; BC200305726 …. 19.14 — v Hart (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1562; BC201209989 …. 10.17, 10.19 — v Minister for lmmigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 38 FCR 351; BC9203763 …. 9.31 — v Morris [2004] 2 Qd R 118; [2004] QCA 5; BC200400179 …. 2.33 — v Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd (1928) 40 CLR 558 …. 10.21 — v Sirtex Medical Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 1; [2011] FCAFC 40; BC201101296 …. 7.21, 7.22, 7.23 — v Staffa [2004] …. 2.7 Grazebrook, Re [1928] VLR 212 …. 10.47 Graziano v Graziano (2010) 272 LSJS 572; [2010] SASC 320; BC201008674 …. 18.18 Grbavac v Hart [1997] 1 VR 154; BC9601881 …. 13.6, 13.57, 13.58, 13.65, 13.88, 13.91, 13.94

Great Central Freehold Mines Ltd v Chapman [1905] VLR 294 …. 17.62 Great Eastern Cleaning Services Pty Ltd, Re [1978] 2 NSWLR 278 …. 11.41 Great Gulf Company v Sutherland (1873) 4 AJR 164 …. 20.8 Great Lakes Council v Lani (2007) 158 LGERA 1; [2007] NSWLEC 681; BC200709330 …. 16.46 Great Western Railway Company v Carpalla United China Clay Company Ltd (No 2) [1909] 2 Ch 471 …. 17.37, 17.92 — v Fisher [1905] 1 Ch 316 …. 15.55 Greaves v Blackborrow (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 517 …. 21.29, 21.31, 21.32 — v Nabarro (1940) 56 TLR 339 …. 17.71 Greedy, Marriage of (1982) FLC ¶91-250 …. 20.33 Green v Australian Industrial Investment Ltd (1989) 25 FCR 532 …. 28.45 — v Browne [2004] NSWSC 240; BC200401605 …. 18.74 — v CGU Insurance Ltd (2008) 67 ACSR 105; [2008] NSWCA 148; BC200804751 …. 29.53, 29.55, 29.58, 29.94, 29.128 — v Hoyle [1976] 2 All ER 633 …. 15.58 — v Schneller [2000] NSWSC 1207; BC200007852 …. 12.21 — v — [2003] NSWSC 202; BC200301480 …. 8.47 — v Wilden Pty Ltd [2005] WASC 83; BC200502940 …. 15.72, 15.73 — v Pepper [1970] 3 NSWR 495 …. 17.83 Green (W J) & Co v Cooper & Oxley Constructions Co Pty Ltd (1993) 10 WAR 227 …. 22.46 Green (W J) & Co (1984) Pty Ltd v Tace Pty Ltd (No 4) [2010] WASC 363; BC201009359 …. 18.64, 18.70 Green Line Investor Services Ltd v Cresvale Securities Ltd [1999] FCA 68; BC9900271 …. 7.4 Greenberg & Arpin v Donald Hart Ltd (1957) 8 DLR (2d) 551 …. 1.10 Greener v E Kahn & Co Ltd [1906] 2 KB 374 …. 29.51

Greer v Young (1883) LR 24 Ch D 545 …. 27.9 Gregg, Re (1914) 31 WN (NSW) 180 …. 5.55 Gregg & Co v Gardner [1897] 2 IR 122 …. 17.32 Gretton v Commonwealth of Australia [2007] NSWSC 149; BC200701142 …. 13.11, 13.26, 13.72, 13.76, 13.77, 13.85 Gribbles Pathology Pty Ltd v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 80 FCR 284; BC9707018 …. 14.66, 14.67 Gribbles Pathology (Vic) Pty Ltd v Shandford Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 51 ACSR 578; [2004] FCA 1466; BC200408164 …. 17.26 Grice v State of Queensland [2005] QCA 298; BC200506020 …. 13.88 Griffin, Ex parte (1880) 14 Ch D 37 …. 27.26 Griffith Jones & Co, Re (1883) 53 LJ Ch 303 …. 15.45 Griffith v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 145; BC201103885 …. 8.9 Griffiths & Beerens Pty Ltd v Duggan (No 3) [2008] VSC 462; BC200809771 …. 7.5 Griffiths v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd (No 2) (2006) 157 FCR 112; [2006] FCAFC 196; BC200610875 …. 8.5 — v Evans [1953] 1 WLR 1424 …. 2.4 Griggs v Petts [1940] 1 KB 198 …. 20.28, 20.38 Grimwade v R (1990) 51 A Crim R 470 …. 21.30 Grizonic v Suttor [2011] NSWSC 471; BC201103427 …. 10.5 — v — [2011] NSWSC 812; BC201105722 …. 23.65 Grogan v Orr [2001] NSWCA 114; BC200104437 …. 4.38, 4.39 — v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1101; BC200008015 …. 19.14, 19.23 Groom v Cheesewright [1895] 1 Ch 730 …. 27.2, 27.10, 27.14 — v Crocker [1939] 1 KB 194 …. 2.3

Grossman v Toronto General Hospital (1983) 146 DLR (3d) 280 …. 16.23 Grubb (W A) Pty Ltd, Ex parte (1949) 66 WN (NSW) 224 …. 7.19 Grundmann v Georgeson (1996) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-396; BC9602561 …. 20.36 — v — [2000] QCA 394; BC200005790 …. 7.14 Grygiel v Baine (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 434; BC200510758 …. 21.18 GT Corporation Pty Ltd v Amare Safety Pty Ltd (No 3) [2008] VSC 296; BC200807227 …. 8.5, 8.6 Guazzini v Pateson (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 275 …. 10.10, 10.13 Guernier v Patterson (1992) 110 FLR 178 …. 14.29, 14.53 Guide Dog Owners’ and Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dog Association of New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory (1998, unreported); BC9803260 …. 8.33 Guides Australia Inc v McMartin (2006) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-828; [2006] NSWCA 20; BC200600633 …. 20.4 Gujarat NRE Australia Pty Ltd v Williams [2006] NSWSC 992; BC200608292 …. 29.131 Gulbis v Strikis [2012] NSWSC 807; BC201205408 …. 26.28 Guler v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2012] NSWSC 1369; BC201210557 …. 22.70 Gummer v R (1994) 71 A Crim R 140 …. 24.49 Gummow v Bloom [1930] VLR 81 …. 2.4 Gundry v Sainsbury [1910] 1 KB 645 …. 3.4, 7.10 Gunns Ltd v Alishah (No 3) (2009) 19 Tas R 401; [2009] TASSC 103; BC200910329 …. 8.12, 8.25, 14.29, 14.45, 14.47, 14.51 — v Tasmanian Conservation Trust Inc [2012] TASSC 51; BC201205853 …. 29.123 Gupta v Comer [1991] 1 QB 629 …. 23.50 Gurnett v Macquarie Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (No 2) (1956) 95 CLR 106;

BC5600230 …. 21.1, 21.2, 21.28, 21.53, 21.55, 21.57 Gusdote Pty Ltd v Ashley (2011) 193 FCR 227; [2011] FCA 250; BC201101352 …. 23.23 Guss v Geelong Building Society (in liq) [2001] VSC 288; BC200104993 …. 23.51 — v Veenhuizen (No 2) (1976) 136 CLR 47; BC7600103 …. 7.37, 7.38, 7.40 Guy v Churchill (1887) 35 Ch D 489 …. 27.2, 27.9, 27.20 Gwinnett v Day (No 2) [2012] SASC 61; BC201202333 …. 7.4, 8.22 Gwozdecky v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 65 A Crim R 160 …. 25.8 Gyopar v Cohens Frenkel Berkovitch Kerford & New (1987) FLC ¶91-839 …. 5.32 Gyselman and Gyselman, Re (1992) FLC ¶92-289 …. 21.9

H H, a Solicitor (No 2), Re [1962] Qd R 1 …. 18.68 H v H [2006] FamCA 257 …. 7.29 — v L [2007] FMCAfam 125; BC200701948 …. 21.11 — v M [2007] QSC 321; BC200709346 …. 8.79 H & R Management Consulting Pty Ltd v Bickford [2010] QSC 144; BC201002940 …. 28.29 H & W Wallace Ltd (in liq), Re [1994] 1 NZLR 235 …. 27.2, 27.4, 27.6, 27.20, 27.22 Haag v Underdown (1968) 13 FLR 235 …. 24.40 Hackshaw v Hackshaw (Costs) [2011] FamCA 570; BC201150652 …. 8.59, 13.43 Haddon v Everitt (2001) 126 A Crim R 418; [2001] WASCA 420; BC200108160 …. 25.32 — v Forsyth (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 693; BC201104998 …. 13.49

Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341; 156 ER 145 …. 11.63 Hagan v Waterhouse (No 2) (1992) 34 NSWLR 400 …. 10.4 Haigh, Re (1849) 12 Beav 307; 50 ER 1079 …. 1.9 Haines v Croft (2001) 146 ACTR 59; [2001] ACTSC 77; BC200105827 …. 14.59 Hales v Consumer Claims Tribunal (1990, unreported); BC9001705 …. 21.62 Hali Retail Stores Pty Ltd v Hafaz [2007] NSWSC 427; BC200703075 …. 13.81 Hall, Ex parte (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 374 …. 8.45 — v Australian Finance Direct Ltd [2005] VSC 306; BC200505789 …. 29.63 — v Snowdon, Hubbard & Co [1899] 1 QB 593 …. 29.2 — v Wilson [1954] VLR 576 …. 11.28 Hall & Barker, Re (1879) 9 Ch D 538 …. 4.44, 4.51 Hall Chadwick Pty Ltd v Doyle [2006] NSWSC 1195; BC200609205 …. 5.18, 18.74 Hallett’s Bill of Costs, Re [1997] 1 Qd R 164 …. 5.37 Halley v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (No 3) [2011] NSWLEC 94; BC201103802 …. 8.86 Halliday v High Performance Personnel Pty Ltd (in liq) (1993) 113 ALR 637; BC9303570 …. 20.37 Halpin v Department of Gaming and Racing [2007] NSWSC 815; BC200708816 …. 24.26 Halsey v Milton Keynes NHS Trust [2004] 4 All ER 920; [2004] EWCA Civ 576 …. 8.51 Halsted v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 2) (2012) 202 FCR 373; [2012] FCA 66; BC201200359 …. 15.48 Halvanon Insurance Co Ltd v Central Reinsurance Corp [1988] 3 All ER 857 …. 27.1, 27.7, 27.10, 27.17, 27.19

Hamdan v Widodo (No 2) [2010] WASC 6; BC201000103 …. 19.22 Hamdorf v Riddle [1971] SASR 398 …. 24.40, 24.42 Hamer v Giles (1879) 11 Ch D 942 …. 10.1 Hamilton v Al Fayed (No 2) [2003] QB 1175; [2002] EWCA Civ 665 …. 22.50 — v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd [1964] Tas SR 224 …. 15.35, 15.36, 16.24, 17.48, 17.49, 17.58, 17.59, 17.60, 17.67 — v Hamilton (1913) 30 WN (NSW) 46 …. 11.41, 11.44 — v Seal [1904] 2 KB 262 …. 20.21 Hamilton-Smith v Bernsteen Pty Ltd (in liq) [2005] SASC 190; BC200503541 …. 20.36 Hammerstone Pty Ltd v Lewis [1994] 2 Qd R 267; BC9303056 …. 26.32, 26.33 Hammond & Co v Bussey (1887) 20 QBD 79 …. 11.63 Hamod v State of New South Wales (2002) 188 ALR 659; [2002] FCAFC 97; BC200201594 …. 16.23 — v — [2007] NSWSC 707; BC200705345 …. 14.47 — v — (No 13) [2009] NSWSC 756; BC200906900 …. 15.15, 15.21 Hamstra (Guardian ad Litem of) v British Columbia Rugby Union (1995) 124 DLR (4th) 607 …. 20.21, 20.22, 20.26 Han Sens Pty Ltd v ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd [1993] 2 Qd R 144; BC9102578 …. 28.20, 29.68, 29.70, 29.71, 29.133 Hanave Pty Ltd v LFOT Pty Ltd (1998, unreported); BC9805973 …. 13.70 — v — (1999) 168 ALR 318; [1999] FCA 1568; BC9907362 …. 2.7 Hanbury, Re (1896) 75 LT 449 …. 26.49 Hancock (deceased), Re (1895) 17 ALT 37 …. 15.31 Hancock, Ex parte (1946) 63 WN (NSW) 268 …. 20.5 — v Arnold (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 19; BC200900800 …. 13.67

— v Tynan (1984, unreported) …. 17.53 Handberg v Chacmol Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] FCA 680; BC200503546 …. 22.15 Hanisch v Strive Pty Ltd (1997) 74 FCR 384; BC9701520 …. 7.44 Hanlon v Brookes (1997) 15 ACLC 1626; BC9705049 …. 20.30, 20.32, 20.39 Hannan v Hannan [1965] NSWR 739 …. 17.62 Hansen Beverage Co v Bickfords (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 601; BC200803235 …. 14.31 Hansen v Pennefather [2003] NSWSC 1049; BC200306896 …. 29.94 Haraksin v Murrays Australia Ltd (2010) 275 ALR 520; [2010] FCA 1133; BC201007735 …. 7.45 Harbin v Gordon [1914] 1914] 2 KB 577 …. 17.38, 17.39 Hardy, Re (1901) 19 NZLR 845 …. 27.1 — v Gadens Lawyers (a firm) [2008] VSC 603; BC200811360 …. 4.5 Harith v Beale [2003] QSC 411; BC200307434 …. 14.38 Harkness v Harkness (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 35; BC201203038 …. 10.40 Harlan v Hayward (1996) 131 FLR 418 …. 24.28, 24.40, 24.61 Harley v McDonald [1999] 3 NZLR 545 …. 23.16, 23.18, 23.36, 23.40, 23.41, 27.6 — v — [2001] 2 AC 678; [2001] UKPC 18 …. 23.3, 23.18, 23.40, 23.41, 23.67, 27.6 Harold v Smith (1860) 5 H & N 381; 157 ER 1229 …. 7.5 Harpur v Ariadne Australia Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 523 …. 29.5, 29.7, 29.13, 28.18, 29.78 Harrem Pty Ltd v Tebb [2008] NSWSC 510; BC200803888 …. 8.47 Harrington v Binns (1863) 3 F & F 942; 176 ER 429 …. 4.48 — v Greenwood Grove Estate Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1598;

BC201110441 …. 8.48 Harrington Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Harrington [2003] NSWCA 89; BC200301823 …. 28.21 Harris, Marriage of (1986) FLC ¶91-763 …. 13.42 —, Marriage of (1987) 11 Fam LR 629 …. 13.42 — v Bagot’s Executor and Trustee Company Ltd [1935] SASR 355 …. 11.44 — v Bennett (No 2) [2002] VSC 163; BC200202244 …. 8.32, 16.49, 21.21 — v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84; BC9102648 …. 6.11 — v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1995) ATPR ¶41-445 …. 14.51 — v De Kerloy (1927) 30 WALR 58 …. 17.42 — v Osbourn (1834) 2 Cr & M 629; 149 ER 912 …. 4.44 Harrison v Harrison [2009] 1 FLR 1434; [2009] EWHC 428 …. 23.7 — v Hocking [2000] WASC 188; BC200004249 …. 3.3, 3.4, 3.17, 3.18, 3.37, 5.12 — v Mills [1976] 1 NSWLR 42 …. 10.9 — v Petersen [2000] QSC 415; BC200007325 …. 16.35 — v Racing Penalties Appeal Tribunal of Western Australia (1996, unreported); BC9602432 …. 21.19 — v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR 738; [2002] NSWCA 213; BC200203657 …. 15.15, 15.20 — v Tew [1990] 2 AC 523 …. 5.51 — v Turner (1847) 10 QB 482; 116 ER 184 …. 4.23 Harrison’s Settlement Trusts, Re [1965] 3 All ER 795 …. 10.13 Harry S Bagg’s Liquidation Warehouse Pty Ltd v Whittaker (1982) 44 NSWLR 421; BC8200008 …. 23.24, 24.25 Harry Smith Car Sales Pty Ltd v Claycom Vegetable Supply Co Pty Ltd (1978) 29 ACTR 21 …. 1.15, 14.25 Hart (V M) v Rawlinson [1961] NSWR 39 …. 15.33, 17.80, 17.88

Hartford (Holdings) Pty Ltd v CP (Adelaide) Pty Ltd (2004) 234 LSJS 66; [2004] SASC 161; BC200403332 …. 7.38, 13.77 Harvey v Goodman Law Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 340; BC201103370 …. 5.12 — v Olliver (1887) 42 LT 239 …. 10.13 Harwood v Nell (1992, unreported); BC9200942 …. 25.30 Haskins Contractors Pty Ltd (in liq) v Sydney Airport Corporation Ltd [2002] NSWSC 267; BC200201446 …. 29.101 Haslam v Emu Charter Pty Ltd (1998) 200 LSJS 454; BC9806336 …. 24.53, 24.54 Hastings Point Progress Association Inc v Tweed Shire Council (No 3) (2010) 172 LGERA 157; [2010] NSWCA 39; BC201001448 …. 9.2, 9.4, 9.8, 9.11, 9.13, 9.15 Hauxwell, Ex parte (1883) 23 Ch D 626 …. 20.8 Haviv Holdings Pty Ltd v Howards Storage World Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 652; BC200905779 …. 11.5 Hawke v Limbo (1990, unreported); BC9003880 …. 16.58 Hawkes, Re [1898] 2 Ch 1 …. 26.36, 26.39 Hawkins v Angus & Coote Pty Ltd (1946) 63 WN (NSW) 2 …. 15.33, 17.62 — v Roe (2012) 47 Fam LR 526; [2012] FamCAFC 77; BC201250322 …. 8.74 Hawthorn Cuppaidge & Badgery v Channell [1992] 2 Qd R 488 …. 7.37 Hay (S P) Pty Ltd v Allcorp Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 77; BC200402740 …. 28.55 Hayes v Gunbola Pty Ltd (1986) 4 BPR 9247; BC8600926 …. 14.40, 16.75 — v Jones [1926] VLR 459 …. 4.57 — v Maquis [2008] NSWCA 10; BC200800783 …. 8.80 Haymes v Cooper (1864) 33 Beav 431 …. 27.23 Haynes v Hughes [2001] WASCA 169; BC200102888 …. 25.29

Hayward v Giffard (1838) 4 M & W 194; 150 ER 1399 …. 22.3 Hazeldene’s Chicken Farm Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority (No 2) (2005) 13 VR 435; [2005] VSCA 298; BC200510663 …. 13.61, 13.73 Headington v Holloway (1830) 3 Hag Ecc 280; 162 ER 1158 …. 10.27 Healey v Williams (1985) 10 FCR 254 …. 14.65 Healey (G H) & Company - Bondi v Grasso [1999] NSWSC 147; BC9904345 …. 5.55 Health & Life Care Ltd v SA Asset Management Corp (1995) 65 SASR 48; BC9503755 …. 22.32, 22.40 Health & Life Care Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) v Price Waterhouse (1993) 11 ACSR 326; BC9300455 …. 28.16, 28.49, 28.60, 29.1, 29.2, 29.9, 29.31, 29.45 Healy Airconditioning Pty Ltd v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 21 ACLC 866; [2003] WASC 78; BC200301659 …. 10.52 Heaps v Addison Wesley Longman Australia Pty Ltd (2000) NSW Conv R ¶55-945; [2000] NSWSC 542; BC200003267 …. 15.54, 16.6, 16.19 Heartlink Ltd v Jones [2007] WASC 254; BC200709441 …. 15.73 Heath (C E) Underwriting and Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd v Daraway Constructions Pty Ltd (1995, unreported); BC9503967 …. 22.77 Heather, Re (1870) 5 Ch App 694 …. 5.54 Heddich v Dike (1981) 3 A Crim R 139 …. 24.40 Hedges v Farrow [1979] 1 NSWLR 106 …. 11.17 Hedrich v Standard Bank of London Ltd [2009] PNLR 3; [2008] EWCA Civ 905 …. 23.67 Helljay Investments Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 166 ALR 302; [1999] HCA 56; BC9906414 …. 22.76 Hellyer v Sheriff of Yorkshire [1975] Ch 16 …. 20.41 Helm v Helm [2011] NSWSC 1595; BC201110438 …. 27.15 Henchman v Hannes (1993, unreported); BC9302176 …. 4.14

Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1341; BC9600947 …. 8.8, 11.6, 13.58, 16.49, 17.50, 17.92 — v Johnson & Henderson [1969] WAR 3 …. 27.9 — v Merthyr Tydfil Urban District Council [1900] 1 QB 434 …. 7.19 — v Simon Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd [1988] VR 867 …. 11.10, 11.11, 13.3, 13.5 Henderson Borough Council v Auckland Regional Authority [1984] 1 NZLR 16 …. 7.20 Hendrie v Rusli [2000] WASCA 420; BC200008003 …. 13.88 Hendriks v McGeoch [2008] NSW ConvR ¶56-216; [2008] NSWCA 53; BC200802127 …. 2.31 Hendy v Deputy Child Support Registrar (2001) 27 Fam LR 641; [2001] FamCA 632 …. 20.30 Henley v State of Queensland [2005] QDC 94 …. 17.10 Hennessy v Lynch (No 4) (2008) 7 DCLR(NSW) 24; [2008] NSWDC 15; BC200840124 …. 8.9, 13.48, 13.49 Hennessey Glass and Aluminium Pty Ltd v Watpac Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 69 ATR 374; [2007] QDC 57 …. 17.50, 17.67 Henschke (C A) & Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (1999) 48 IPR 621; [1999] FCA 1813; BC9908481 …. 16.65 — v — (2000) 52 IPR 42; [2000] FCA 1539; BC200006518 …. 16.65, 20.32 Heperu Pty Ltd v Morgan Brooks Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 80; BC200800557 …. 8.65 Herbert, Re (1887) 34 Ch D 504 …. 5.43 Herbert v Tamworth City Council (No 4) (2004) 60 NSWLR 476; [2004] NSWSC 394; BC200402656 …. 7.54 Herbert Brothers (deceased), Re (1990) 101 FLR 279 …. 10.25 Herbertson v Kenyons Lawyers [2000] QSC 209; BC200004632 …. 4.25 Hercules v Magistrates Court of Victoria [2008] VSCA 1; BC200800250 ….

20.34 Hermann v Charny [1976] 1 NSWLR 261 …. 1.1, 20.30 Heslop v Cousins [2007] 3 NZLR 679 …. 4.48, 26.10 Hession v Century 21 South Pacific Ltd (in liq) (1992) 28 NSWLR 120 …. 20.30, 22.40, 29.22, 29.53, 29.55 Hewitt v Manager, Support Systems of the Supreme Court of New South Wales [2001] NSWSC 518; BC200103257 …. 18.57 — v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd [1996] ACTSC 78; BC9603167 …. 19.12 Heywood v Wellers [1976] 1 QB 446 …. 23.50 Hickey v Clibborn [1964] Qd R 432 …. 15.29, 17.78, 17.90 Hickman v Blake Lapthorn [2006] EWHC 12 …. 8.51 Hicks v Trustees Executors and Agency Company Ltd (1901) 27 VLR 389 …. 20.24 Higgins v Nicol (No 2) (1972) 21 FLR 34 …. 15.35, 17.3, 17.9, 17.13, 17.67, 17.69, 17.71 — v Scott (1831) 2 B & Ad 413; 109 ER 1196 …. 26.27 Highfield Property Investments Pty Ltd v Commercial & Residential Developments (SA) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] SASC 191; BC201207997 …. 16.53, 16.62 Highstoke Pty Ltd v Hayes Knight GTO Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 36; BC200700241 …. 11.42 Hill, Re (1886) 33 Ch D 266 …. 27.12 — v Featherstonehaugh (1831) 7 Bing 569; 131 ER 220 …. 5.24 — v Hill [2001] VSC 135; BC200102509 …. 10.30 — v Peel (1870) LR 5 CP 172 …. 15.32, 15.35 Hill & Taylor Bill of Costs, Re (1993, unreported); BC9303426 …. 5.37 Hill Corcoran Constructions Pty Ltd v Navarro (1992, unreported); BC9202489 …. 21.52

Hill Top Residents Action Group Inc v Minister for Planning (No 3) (2010) 176 LGERA 20; [2010] NSWLEC 155; BC201006052 …. 9.5 Hillier v Sheather (1995) 36 NSWLR 414; BC9504564 …. 13.24, 13.25, 13.33 Hillig v Darkinjung Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 147; BC200804778 …. 23.7, 23.23 Hills v Raunio [2004] ACTSC 98; BC200406408 …. 23.4 Himalaya Properties Ltd v Rodionov [1991] ANZ Conv R 37 …. 15.54 Hinch v Attorney-General (Victoria) (1987) 164 CLR 15; BC8701810 …. 8.67 Hirst & Capes, Re [1908] 1 KB 982 …. 5.43 Hiscox v Woods [2002] QSC 64; BC200201094 …. 3.24, 13.30 Hitch v Hitch (2012) 47 Fam LR 603; [2012] FamCAFC 124; BC201250505 …. 8.78 Hitchins v Mayor etc of Port Melbourne (1889) 15 VLR 358 …. 29.113 Hivis, Ex parte (1933) 50 WN (NSW) 90 …. 24.40 Hoare v Frames Carrying Company Ltd [1961] NZLR 891 …. 11.34 Hobart City Council v Triffett [2001] 10 Tas R 471; [2001] TASSC 139; BC200108039 …. 1.20 Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd v Union Insurance Co Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 358 …. 7.21, 11.63, 16.64 Hobbs v Marlowe [1978] AC 16 …. 8.27, 20.32 Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 386; BC201006180 …. 24.53 Hock v AWAP SGT 26 Investment Ltd [2008] FCA 540; BC200803013 …. 29.74 Hocking v Southern Greyhound Racing Club Inc (1993) 61 SASR 213; BC9303973 …. 11.40, 11.41, 11.42 Hodgkins v District Council of Burnside (1892) 25 SALR 37 …. 8.62

Hodgkinson, Re [1895] 2 Ch 190 …. 1.24 Hodgkinson v Doepel & Associates Architects Pty Ltd [2006] WASC 237; BC200704684 …. 15.73 Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (No 8) [2012] VSC 162; BC201202439 …. 6.21, 6.22 — v Amcor Ltd (No 10) [2012] VSC 294; BC201205199 …. 8.55 — v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 673 …. 3.61, 23.39 Hodson v Consolidated Transport Industries Ltd [2007] VCC 838 …. 17.25, 17.27 Hofer v Howell (No 2) (2001) 113 LGERA 391; [2001] NSWLEC 42; BC200101288 …. 6.16 Hoffmann v Walters (2007) 98 SASR 500; [2007] SASC 273; BC200705857 …. 10.30 Hogan, Marriage of (1986) 10 Fam LR 681 …. 14.16 Hogarth v Gye [2002] NSWSC 32; BC200200618 …. 2.27, 3.10, 3.57 Holden v Architectural Finishes Ltd [1997] 3 NZLR 143 …. 17.37 — v Cronulla Golf Club Ltd (1986, unreported); BC8600900 …. 8.44 Holden & Co v Crown Prosecution Service [1990] 2 QB 261 …. 23.1, 23.3, 23.4, 23.16, 23.50 — v — (No 2) [1994] 1 AC 22 …. 7.2, 20.2 Holding v Jennings [1979] VR 289 …. 17.82 Holland v Queensland Law Society Inc [2003] QSC 327; BC200305631 …. 4.43 Holland Stolte Pty Ltd, Re [1993] 2 Qd R 247; BC9202621 …. 28.7, 28.10, 28.57, 29.5, 29.19 Hollier v Australian Maritime Safety Authority (No 2) [1998] FCA 975; BC9804016 …. 7.8, 8.29, 9.14 Hollingdale v North Coast Area Health Service (No 2) [2006] FMCA 585; BC200602847 …. 9.28 Holloway v B Markich Pty Ltd (1993, unreported); BC9303894 …. 2.8

Holman v Dynabuild Pty Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 334 …. 28.7 Holmden v Bitar (1987) 47 SASR 509 …. 24.4 Holmes v Alfred McAlpine Homes (Yorkshire) Ltd [2006] EWHC 110 …. 3.6 — v DMS Pacific Exports Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 563; BC200704189 …. 23.35 — v National Benzole Co Ltd (1965) 109 Sol Jo 971 …. 23.29 Holroyde and Smith, Re (1881) 43 LT 722 …. 5.54, 5.58 Holt v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 82 NSWLR 293; [2012] NSWSC 968; BC201206979 …. 8.41, 13.49 — v Wynter (2000) 49 NSWLR 128; [2000] NSWCA 143; BC200003501 …. 14.41 Holton’s Settlement Trusts, Re (1918) 119 LT 304 …. 10.8 Hometeam Constructions Pty Ltd v McCauley (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 278; BC200708673 …. 21.56 Hong v A & R Brown Ltd [1948] 1 KB 515 …. 1.12, 11.17, 11.20, 11.21, 11.23, 11.24, 20.41 Hooker v Gilling (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 214; BC200706650 …. 20.6 Hopeshore Pty Ltd v Melroad Equipment Pty Ltd (2004) 212 ALR 66; [2004] FCA 1445; BC200407452 …. 8.51 Hopkins, Re (1891) 17 VLR 85 …. 5.54 Hopkins v QBE Insurance Ltd (1992) 2 NTLR 147 …. 14.29 Hordern v Bull (1905) 5 SR (NSW) 518 …. 10.11 Hornby v Cardwell (1881) 8 QBD 329 …. 11.33 Horne v Frank [2001] QDC 29 …. 6.13 Horsley v Dunlop (1894) 5 QLJ 85 …. 10.17 Hotline Communications Ltd v Hinkley (1999) 44 IPR 445; [1999] VSC 74; BC9901606 …. 28.41, 29.74

Houatchanthara v Bednarczyk (1996, unreported); BC9604998 …. 13.25, 13.27 Hough v Edwards (1856) 1 H & N 171; 156 ER 1164 …. 27.23 House v Life Insurance Co of Australia Ltd [1930] VLR 165 …. 15.36 — v R (1936) 55 CLR 499; BC3690121 …. 20.28, 20.30 House of Golf Chatswood Pty Ltd v McManus (2005) 225 ALR 786; [2005] NSWSC 1246; BC200510734 …. 22.8 House Property Company of London v Whiteman [1913] 2 KB 382 …. 1.20 Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378 …. 20.33 How v Winterton (Earl) (No 4) (1905) 91 LT 763 …. 1.16, 1.17 Howard, Marriage of (1982) FLC ¶91-279 …. 8.75 — v Lovegrove (1870) LR 6 Ex 43 …. 15.55 — v Mechtler [2000] NSWSC 455; BC200003261 …. 7.16 — v Rhodes (1837) 1 Keen 581; 48 ER 431 …. 10.14 Howard Smith Industries Pty Ltd v Richards [1999] FCA 1310; BC9906248 …. 21.53 Howards Storage World Pty Ltd v Haviv Holdings Pty Ltd (2010) 182 FCR 84; [2010] FCAFC 5; BC201000411 …. 11.5 Howe v Harvey [2007] 173 A Crim R 14; [2007] VSC 130; BC200703378 …. 24.47 Howell v Dering [1915] 1 KB 54 …. 8.3 — v Marsh (1906) 23 WN (NSW) 17 …. 10.24 Howes v Barber (1852) 18 QB 588; 118 ER 222 …. 17.39 — v Clyde Engineering Co Ltd (1940) 56 WN (NSW) 210 …. 17.62, 17.66, 17.76 Howitt v W Alexander & Sons Ltd [1948] SC 154 …. 6.15 Howlin v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (No 2)

(2009) 18 Tas R 397; [2009] TASSC 20; BC200901822 …. 21.17 HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v Dierickx (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1430; BC201210601 …. 8.7, 8.9, 14.37 Hudgson v Endrust (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 152 …. 2.14 Hudson, Re (1986) 11 FCR 141 …. 1.20, 1.23 — v Entsch [2005] FCA 557; BC200502835 …. 9.2 Hudson Strumpffabrik GmbH v Bentley Engineering Co Ltd [1962] QB 587 …. 29.68 Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning & Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (Ruling No 1) [2010] VSC 495; BC201008371 …. 16.62 — v — (No 4) [2013] VSC 14; BC201300277 …. 23.42, 23.61 Hufnagl v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2007) 5 DCLR (NSW) 159; [2007] NSWDC 130; BC200740276 …. 24.9 Hugall v Hume (2002) 127 A Crim R 565; [2002] WASCA 29; BC200200411 …. 25.27 Huggard v Huggard [1902] ALR 178 …. 16.18 Hughes, Re (2010) 183 FCR 150; [2010] FCA 141; BC201000853 …. 6.7, 14,.47, 22.14 — v Canon Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 8 ACLC 209; BC9003311 …. 29.84, 29.117 — v Clubb (1987) 10 NSWLR 325 …. 21.18 — v Hughes [1958] P 224 …. 26.2, 26.14, 26.32 — v Janrule Pty Ltd (2011) 177 ACTR 1; [2011] ACTCA 15; BC201105884 …. 29.63, 29.105, 29.109 — v St Barbara Ltd [2011] WASCA 234 …. 13.88, 13.90, 20.4 — v Western Australian Cricket Association Inc (1986) ATPR ¶40-748 …. 8.4 Hughes Bros v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church [1999] NSWSC 1051; BC9907002 …. 11.15, 13.77, 19.14

Hultquist v Universal Pattern and Precision Engineering Co Ltd [1960] 2 QB 467 …. 13.52 Humphreys v Morten [1905] 1 Ch 739 …. 14.40 Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 422 …. 7.2, 12.3, 12.22, 12.23, 13.1, 13.76, 17.83, 17.88, 17.95 Hunt v McKay (1991, unreported); BC9100912 …. 6.16, 8.27 — v R M Douglas (Roofing) Ltd [1990] 1 AC 398 …. 19.6, 19.7, 19.17 Hunter Development Brokerage Pty Ltd v Cessnock City Council (No 2) (2006) 68 NSWLR 177; [2006] NSWCA 292; BC200608774 …. 6.16, 8.82 Hunter v Hunter [1938] NZLR 520 …. 10.13 — v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy of the Southern District of the State of Queensland (1980) 50 FLR 168 …. 10.48 Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 …. 14.39 Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) v Corrs Chambers Westgarth [2011] WASC 44; BC201100907 …. 7.38 Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd v Mallesons Stephen Jaques [2013] WASC 48 …. 2.23, 3.7 Huntsman Chemical Company Australia Ltd v International Pools Australia Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 242; BC9504308 …. 16.40, 16.44, 16.55, 16.56 Huon Shipping and Logging Co Ltd v South British Insurance Co Ltd [1923] VLR 216 …. 28.65 Hurley v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [1999] FCA 466; BC9906945 …. 9.21 Hursey v Williams (1960, unreported) …. 11.4, 11.55, 17.62, 17.72 Hurstville Municipal Council v Connor (1991) 24 NSWLR 724 …. 16.52, 16.61, 16.62 — v Minister for Planning and Infrastructure (No 2) [2012] NSWLEC 196 …. 19.13 Hurworth Nominees Pty Ltd v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1360; BC200511902 …. 28.23

Hussain v Canberra Taxi Industry Association Ltd [2007] ACTSC 79; BC200708225 …. 7.25 — v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241; [2008] FCAFC 128; BC200805498 …. 9.31 Hussey v Page [1973] Qd R 509 …. 12.8 Hutchings Electrical v Director General, Department of Fair Trading (No 2) [2002] NSWADT 255 …. 8.90 Hutchins v Blaney [2011] FamCA 25; BC201150027 …. 22.71 Hutchinson v Greenwood (1854) 4 El & Bl 324; 119 ER 125 …. 22.3 — v Police (2012) 113 SASR 460; [2012] SASC 126; BC201205346 …. 24.46 Hutchison Telephone (UK) Ltd v Ultimate Response Ltd [1993] BCLC 307 …. 28.55 Huxley v West London Extension Railway Co (1889) 14 App Cas 26 …. 8.27, 8.47 Hyder Consulting (Vic) Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd [2003] VSC 223; BC200303427 …. 14.65, 14.67 Hydrocool Pty Ltd v Hepburn (No 2) [2010] FCA 285; BC201001596 …. 29.129 Hyperion Technology Pty Ltd v Queensland Motorways Ltd [2013] QSC 20; BC201300697 …. 28.40, 29.94, 29.129 Hyndes v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 349; BC201208956 …. 13.49 Hypec Electronics Pty Ltd (in liq) v Mead (2004) 61 NSWLR 169; [2004] NSWSC 731; BC200405114 …. 10.54

I I, Marriage of (No 2) (1995) 22 Fam LR 557 …. 8.78 — v I (No 2) (1995) FLC ¶92-625 …. 8.74 IBA Ltd v Stanley’s Nightclub Ltd [2007] NZCA 60 …. 15.54, 16.75

IceTV Pty Ltd v Ross [2007] NSWSC 1232; BC200709455 …. 29.84, 29.85 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2002] NSWSC 18; BC200200185; [2002] NSWCA 271; BC200204579 …. 28.29 — v — [2007] NSWSC 23; BC200700370 …. 15.15, 15.19, 15.20, 15.21, 15.22, 15.24 IFTC Broking Services Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 268 ALR 1; [2010] FCAFC 31; BC201001891 …. 13.23, 13.62, 13.87 Igaki Australia Pty Ltd v Coastmine Pty Ltd (1994, unreported); BC9406611 …. 8.56 — v — (1996) 34 IPR 37; BC9600981 …. 8.56 Igloo Homes Pty Ltd v Sammut Constructions Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 85; BC200501200 …. 13.67 Ilic v Michael Radin and Associates (1991, unreported); BC9102656 …. 3.3, 3.35 Illawong Village Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales [2005] NSWSC 524; BC200503900 …. 19.14, 20.13 Imagecolor (SA) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Haslam [2002] SASC 200; BC200203591 …. 29.55, 29.64 Imaging Applications Pty Ltd v Sun Alliance Australia Ltd [1999] VSC 230; BC9903965 …. 29.95, 29.130 IMF (Australia) Ltd v Meadow Springs Fairway Resort Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2009] FCAFC 69; BC200904878 …. 13.90, 13.93 Imperial Bank of China, India, and Japan v Bank of Hindustan, China and Japan (1866) 1 Ch App 437 …. 28.32 Imperial Leatherware Co Pty Ltd v Macri & Marcellino Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 653 …. 28.7 Impex Pty Ltd v Crowner Products Ltd (1994) 13 ACSR 440; BC9404478 …. 29.24, 29.102 Inchcape (Earl of), Re [1942] Ch 394 …. 6.22, 6.24 Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Re [1999] 2 Qd R 365; BC9806884

…. 29.75 Indian, Kingston and Sandhurst Mining Company, Re (1882) 22 Ch D 83 …. 29.134 Individual Homes v Macbreams Investments (2002, unreported) …. 22.15 Ingles v Gould [1993] 2 Qd R 250; BC9202497 …. 19.16 Inglis v Moore (No 2) (1979) 46 FLR 470 …. 7.19 Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets [2002] NSWSC 609; BC200203723 …. 28.45, 29.73, 29.78 — v — [2003] NSWSC 1102; BC200307243 …. 16.62 — v — (No 7) (2008) 65 ACSR 324; [2008] NSWSC 199; BC200801581 …. 13.76, 15.20, 16.45, 16.52, 16.56 Inlay Hardwood Floor Co Ltd v Dierssen [1928] 2 DLR 560 …. 27.29 Inn Leisure Industries Pty Ltd v D F McCloy Pty Ltd (No 2) (1991) 28 FCR 172 …. 8.7 Inspiration Homes Ltd, Re [1997] 3 NZLR 169 …. 7.39 Instant Colour Pty Ltd v Canon Australia Pty Ltd (1996, unreported); BC9606113 …. 8.27 Instrumatic Ltd v Supabrase Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 519 …. 21.2 Insurance Australia Ltd v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2007] VSCA 258; BC200709875 …. 12.17 Interchase Corporation Ltd v ACN 010 087 573 Pty Ltd (2000) 45 ATR 445; [2000] QSC 13; BC200000188 …. 8.13, 13.3, 13.61, 13.83 Interchase Corporation Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No 3) [20031 Qd R 26; [2001] QCA 191; BC200102580 …. 8.2 Interclean Industrial Services Ltd v Auckland Regional Council [2000] 3 NZLR 489 …. 25.32 Intercraft Cabinets Pty Ltd v Sampas Pty Ltd (1997) 18 WAR 306 …. 29.28 Interim Advance Corporation Pty Ltd v Fazio [2008] WASCA 140; BC200807511 …. 24.68

Interior Projects Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (1997, unreported) …. 14.34 International Paper Co v Spicer (1906) 4 CLR 739; BC0600014 …. 20.28, 20.30 InterTAN Inc v DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 54; BC200502580 …. 20.34 Interwest Ltd v Tricontinental Corporation Ltd (1991) 5 ACSR 621 …. 28.34, 28.52, 28.56, 29.5, 29.6, 29.19, 29.29 Ipex Info Tech v Department of Info Tech Services SA (No 2) (1998, unreported) …. 1.19 IPEX ITG Pty Ltd (in liq) v State of Victoria (No 2) [2011] VSC 39; BC201100589 …. 22.36 Ipex ITG Pty Ltd v Melbourne Water Corp (No 4) [2008] VSC 497; BC200810247 …. 28.37 Irani v St George Bank Ltd (No 3) [2005] VSC 456; BC200509992 …. 15.41 Ireland v Retallack (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1096; BC201107238 …. 7.48, 15.16, 23.45 — v Trilby Misso Lawyers [2011] 2 Qd R 320; [2011] QSC 127; BC201103706 …. 3.49, 4.44, 4.46 Irons v Merchant Capital Ltd (1994) 116 FLR 204 …. 10.52 lrvine, Re (1996, unreported); BC9603454 …. 5.37 Irving v Gagliardi (1895) 6 QLJ 155 …. 7.10, 7.19 Irwin Alsop Services v Mercantile Mutual Insurance Co Ltd [1986] VR 61 …. 29.94, 29.95 Isaac, Re [1897] 1 Ch 251 …. 11.56 Ismail v Richards Butler (a firm) [1996] 2 All ER 506 …. 26.15, 26.17, 26.23 Ivory v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2001] QSC 102; BC200102087 …. 16.67

J J (an applicant), Re (1928) 29 SR (NSW) 20 …. 7.5

J and P, Marriage of (1985) 80 FLR 126 …. 8.47, 8.78 J v Australian Capital Territory (No 2) [2011] ACTSC 36; BC201101117 …. 22.68 Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 185 ALR 463; [2000] FCA 595; BC200008466 …. 22.37 Jacenko, Marriage of (1986)) FLC ¶91-776 …. 14.34 Jachimowicz v Jachimowicz (1986) 81 FLR 459 …. 23.16, 23.20, 23.46, 23.48 Jackson v Creswick Middleton (2000) 21 Qld Lawyer Reps 66; [2000] QDC 46 …. 4.5, 4.14 — v Richards (2005) 12 BPR 23,091; [2005] NSWSC 630; BC200504860 …. 27.15 — v Riley (1989, unreported); BC8902497 …. 10.31 — v Thakrar [2007] EWHC 626 (TCC); [2008] 1 All ER 601; [2007] EWHC 626 …. 22.20, 22.50 Jackson Nominees Pty Ltd v Hanson Building Products Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 159; BC200603190 …. 21.56 Jacomb v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical & Services Union [2004] FCA 1600; BC200408394 …. 13.69 Jaffari v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 10; [2001] FCA 985; BC200104371 …. 8.32 Jagwar Holdings Ltd v Julian (1992)) 6 PRNZ 496 …. 7.39 Jaha v Defteros [2012] VSC 512; BC201208256 …. 3.10 Jakeman v Jakeman [1964] P 420 …. 23.49 Jakovljevic v Law Society of Upper Canada (1996) 129 DLR (4th) 761 …. 15.5 Jalfox Pty Ltd v Motel Association of New Zealand Inc [1984] 2 NZLR 647 …. 28.42, 29.9, 29.72, 29.73 Jalmoon Pty Ltd, Re [1986] 2 Qd R 264 …. 26.10, 27.8, 27.22

Jamal v Secretary, Department of Health (1988) 14 NSWLR 252 …. 20.2 James v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 1) (1985) 9 FCR 442 …. 28.16, 29.130, 29.132, 29.136 — v Bradley [1980] WAR 11 …. 4.23, 4.24, 5.51 — v Nolmont Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1604; BC200708987 …. 28.41 James Aris & Associates v Minister for Works (1994) 11 WAR 390; BC9406787 …. 17.18 James Bibby Ltd v Woods [1949] 2 All ER 1 …. 27.1, 27.6 Jamieson v Burgess (1912) 15 GLR 393 …. 8.11 — v Gosigil Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 117 …. 15.45, 15.48 Jane, Re Will of [2011] NSWSC 624; BC201105369 …. 10.30 Jankar (J & M) Pty Ltd v Dellmain Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 766; BC200908098 …. 6.7, 22.14 Jankowski v Mastoris [1996] ANZ Conv R 324 …. 26.15 Jansen v Dewhurst [1969] VR 421 …. 21.1 January Force Pty Ltd v Tricon Restaurants Australia Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1746; BC9908200 …. 29.126 Jarena Pty Ltd v Sholl Nicholson Pty (1996) 136 ALR 427; BC9600889 …. 3.4 Jarman, Ex parte (1877) 4 Ch D 835 …. 4.24 Jarrad v Santamaria (2005) 91 SASR 514; [2005] SASC 196; BC200503611 …. 24.32 — v Santamaria (No 2) [2007] SADC 31; BC200740679 …. 8.65 Jarrett v Strempel [1911] VLR 179 …. 17.40, 17.41, 17.42 Jaszkowski v Appeal Costs Board [1986] WAR 275 …. 21.39 Jaybird Group Ltd v Greenwood [1986] BCLC 319 …. 14.9 Jaycar Pty Ltd v Lombardo [2011] NSWCA 284; BC201107097 …. 20.2, 20.11, 20.19, 21.1

Jazabas Pty Ltd v Haddad [2006] NSWSC 880; BC200607255 …. 28.61, 29.2, 29.27, 29.28, 28.85 Jazairy v Malouf [2005] NSWSC 808; BC200505857 …. 3.20 J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers, Western Australian Branch (No 2) (1993) 46 IR 301; BC9304556 …. 16.51, 16.55 Jeffcott Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Paior (1995) 18 ACSR 213; BC9502427 …. 26.25, 29.94 Jeffery v Guider [2010] NSWSC 705; BC201004577 …. 10.36 Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75; [2009] HCA 43; BC200909275 …. 22.9, 22.29, 22.47 JEL v DDF (2001) 28 Fam LR 119; [2001] FamCA 907 …. 8.78, 13.42, 13.43, 13.45 Jelbarts Pty Ltd v McDonald [1919] VLR 478 …. 8.3 Jelic v Co-operative Press Ltd [1947] 2 All ER 767 …. 29.76 Jemella Australia Pty Ltd v GHD Australia Direct Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 599; BC200904931 …. 3.33 Jenkins v G J Coles & Co Pty Ltd [1993] 1 VR 155 …. 15.69 — v Gleeson (1983) 67 FLR 469 …. 21.2 — v Hope [1896] 1 Ch 278 …. 8.42 — v Jonkay Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 858; BC200705915 …. 10.53 — v Lanfranchi (1910) 10 CLR 595; BC1000046 …. 20.44 — v Martin [2004] QSC 417; BC200407878 …. 29.106 Jennings-Kelly v Gosford City Council [2012] NSWDC 84; BC201240043 …. 29.109 Jensen, Marriage of (1982) FLC ¶91-263 …. 8.75, 8.78 — v Young [2000] TASSC 71; BC200003422 …. 25.25 Jerred v T Roddam Dent & Son Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 104 …. 11.34

Jet Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd v Petres Pty Ltd (1985) 10 FCR 289; BC8501565 …. 18.1, 18.60, 28.37 Jewel Walk Pty Ltd v Kondinin Group Inc [2001] WASC 197; BC200104311 …. 15.72 Jianshe Southern Pty Ltd v Get Motor Cycles Pty Ltd (No 3) [2007] FCA 1078; BC200705883 …. 29.126 Jireh International Pty Ltd v Western Export Services Inc (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 294; BC201107168 …. 8.41 Jirehouse Capital (an unlimited company) v Beller [2009] 1 WLR 751; [2008] EWCA Civ 908 …. 28.23 JJT, Re (1998) 195 CLR 184; BC9802630 …. 1.6, 6.4, 6.8, 8.70, 14.16, 22.11, 22.17 JL Holdings Pty Ltd v State of Queensland (1996) 71 FCR 545 …. 28.31 JM Properties Pty Ltd v Strata Corporation No 13975 Inc [2006] SASC 227; BC200605838 …. 29.109, 29.110 — v — (No 3) [2006] SADC 46; BC200640378 …. 16.23 Jodast Pty Ltd v A & J Blattner Pty Ltd (1991) 104 ALR 248 …. 28.1, 28.7, 28.16, 28.20, 29.2, 29.11, 29.19, 29.83, 29.85, 29.99, 29.101, 29.113 John Arnold’s Surf Shop Pty Ltd (in liq) v Heller Factors Pty Ltd (1979) 22 SASR 20 …. 28.54, 28.59, 29.5 John Barry & Co’s Bill of Costs, Re [1979] Qd R 15 …. 5.43 John Bishop (Caterers) Ltd v National Union Bank Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 707 …. 29.6 John Caines Management Pty Ltd v Adrenalin International Powersports Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 747; BC200403562 …. 29.106 John D Hope & Co v Glendinning [1911] AC 419 …. 27.1 John Fairfax and Sons Pty Ltd v E C de Witt & Co (Australia) Pty Ltd [1958] 1 QB 323 …. 22.2 — v Palmer (1987) 8 NSWLR 297 …. 12.2, 12.3, 12.14, 12.21, 20.32 John Goss Projects Pty Ltd v Thiess Watkins White Constructions Ltd (in liq)

[1995] 2 Qd R 591; BC9505807 …. 13.65, 18.12 John S Hayes & Associates Pty Ltd v Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 201; BC9405929 …. 13.52, 13.54, 13.61, 14.73 John Tweedle & Co, Re [1910] 2 KB 697 …. 20.41 Johns Perry Industries Pty Ltd v International Rigging (Aust) Pty Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 556 …. 13.57 Johns v Cassel (1993) FLC ¶92-364; BC9301999 …. 27.3, 27.12 — v Law Society of New South Wales [1982] 2 NSWLR 1 …. 26.3, 26.4, 26.10, 27.5 Johnsey Estates (1990) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [2001] 2 EGLR 128; [2001] EWCA Civ …. 20.28 Johnson, Marriage of (1999) 26 Fam LR 485; [1999] FamCA 959 …. 20.6 — v District Council of Willunga (1995) 80 A Crim R 250; BC9502298 …. 24.39, 24.46 — v Johnson (No 2) (Costs) (1999) 26 Fam LR 485; [1999] FamCA 959 …. 21.55 — v Page [2007] FLC ¶93-344; [2007] FamCA 1235 …. 22.71 — v Reed Corrugated Cases Ltd [1992] 1 All ER 169 …. 15.79 — v Ribbins [1977] 1 All ER 806 …. 11.36 — v Santa Teresa Housing Association (1992) 83 NTR 14 …. 7.16 Johnson and Weatherall, Re (1888) 37 Ch D 433 …. 5.53 Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd (1999) 94 FCR 167; [1999] FCA 1363; BC9906343 …. 11.62 Johnsons Tyne Foundry Pty Ltd v Maffra Corporation (1948) 77 CLR 544; BC4800490 …. 11.13, 11.18, 11.23, 11.24, 11.25 Johnston v Cameron [2002] FCAFC 301; BC200205778 …. 11.42 — v Johnston (2004) 32 Fam LR 308; [2004] FamCA 556 …. 13.6, 13.42 — v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2005) 62 NSWLR 309; [2005] NSWCA 17; BC200500868 …. 20.36

— v Public Trustee (1929) 24 Tas LR 71 …. 10.17, 10.19, 11.40, 11.44 — v Todd (1845) 8 Beav 489; 50 ER 192 …. 10.47 Johnstone, McGee & Gandy Pty Ltd v Hockey Tasmania Inc [2012] TASSC 12; BC201201607 …. 7.21 Jonamill Pty Ltd v Alramon Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWADTAP 3; BC201055025 …. 8.92 Jonathan Alexander Ltd v Proctor [1996] 1 WLR 518 …. 7.36 Jones, Ex parte (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 313 …. 24.40 —, Marriage of (2001) 27 Fam LR 632; [2001] FamCA 460 …. 28.34, 29.104 —, Re (1887) 36 Ch D 105 …. 5.43, 5.44 —, Re [1895] 2 Ch 719 …. 3.11 — v Apps (No 2) [2009] VSC 366; BC200907793 …. 8.44 — v Baker (2002) 10 BPR 19,115; [2002] NSWSC 89; BC200200482 …. 4.34 — v Bradley (No 2) [2003] NSWCA 258; BC200305520 …. 13.61 — v Brian K Deegan & Associates [2011] SASC 44; BC201101721 …. 2.4 — v Coxeter (1742) 2 Atk 400; 26 ER 642 …. 6.2 — v Curling (1884) 13 QBD 262 …. 8.25 — v D Davies & Sons Ltd [1914] 3 KB 549 …. 17.3, 17.37 — v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; BC5900240 …. 17.26 — v Jones [2012] QSC 342; BC201209439 …. 10.39 — v Linton (1881) 44 LT 601 …. 4.34 — v Litchfield [2011] SADC 102; BC201140530 …. 3.12 — v McKie [1964] 2 All ER 842 …. 20.41 — v Merionethshire Permanent Benefit Building Society [1892] 1 Ch 173 …. 8.55, 20.6 — v North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc (1985) 82 FLR 264

…. 6.16, 8.47 — v Police (2009) 263 LSJS 71; [2009] SASC 137; BC200904462 …. 24.33 — v Richards (1899) 15 TLR 398 …. 20.21 — v Secretary of State for Wales [1997] 1 WLR 1008 …. 17.68 — v Skelton (1966) 9 FLR 318 …. 21.24 — v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd (2005) 40 SR (WA) 328; [2005] WADC 101; BC200540003 …. 14.48 — v Sutton (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 203; BC200504148 …. 13.30, 17.81 — v Turnbull (1837) 2 M & W 601; 150 ER 897 …. 27.20 Jones & Son v Whitehouse [1918] 2 KB 61 …. 5.51 Jovetic v Stoddart & Co (1992) 7 WAR 208 …. 3.17, 3.32 — v — (1993) 8 WAR 420; BC9301102 …. 3.32 Joseph v Joseph [2007] WASCA 27; BC200700296 …. 29.106 Jovanovic v Law Society of Tasmania [2003] TASSC 116; BC200306550 …. 29.105, 29.106 Joyce v Kammac (1988) Ltd [1996] 1 All ER 923 …. 7.10 — v Palassis [2006] WASC 242; BC200608918 …. 14.45, 14.58 Junek v Busuttil [2004] VSC 115; BC200401840 …. 24.46, 24.47 Junius v Messenger Press [1999] SASC 484; BC9907559 …. 20.36, 20.41 Juras, Ex parte (1996, unreported); BC9606460 …. 21.17, 21.39 Justelius, Ex parte [1970] 2 NSWR 610 …. 24.40 Jvancich v Kennedy (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 397; BC200407396 …. 7.48, 10.40 JWH Turner & Co Ltd v O’Riordan (1923) 40 WN (NSW) 64 …. 28.37

K K, Re (1994) 17 Fam LR 537 …. 11.50

— v K (Divorce Costs: Interest) [1977] Fam 39 …. 19.6 Kain v Wynn Williams & Co [2013] 1 NZLR 498; [2012] NZCA 563 …. 3.48 Kaldawi v Housing Guarantee Fund Ltd [2004] VCAT 2024 …. 6.17 Kalejs v Minister for Justice and Customs (2001) 111 FCR 442; [2001] FCA 1769; BC200107770 …. 14.65 Kallinicos v Hunt (Costs) [2006] NSWSC 723; BC200605525 …. 23.11 Kalls Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) v Baloglow [2006] NSWSC 1021; BC200607960 …. 13.77, 16.6 Kamay v Miss X (1986) FLC ¶91-754 …. 4.28 Kapeleris v Bytenet Pty Ltd (1997, unreported); BC9704788 …. 13.28 Karacominakis v Big Country Developments Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 2; BC200100109 …. 15.17 Karam v Palmone Shoes Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 97; BC201203518 …. 16.50, 16.56 Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd (in liq) v Pham [2010] NSWSC 886; BC201005737 …. 29.124 Kardos v Sarbutt (No 2) (2006) DFC ¶95-337; [2006] NSWCA 206; BC200605726 …. 6.20, 8.80, 10.1, 20.14, 12.6 Kardynal v Dodek [1978] VR 414 …. 29.113 Kawarindrasingh v White [1997] 1 All ER 714 …. 5.22 Karwala v Skrzypczak [2007] NSWSC 931; BC200706890 …. 23.4 Kasmeridis v McNamara Business & Property Law [2006] 245 LSJS 31; [2006] SASC 200; BC200605336 …. 3.27, 3.35 Kassem v Zhang [2008] NSWSC 1287; BC200810789 …. 10.53 Katherine Stores Pty Ltd (in liq) v B & D Lane Pty Ltd (1996) 5 NTLR 152 …. 22.40, 22.41 Katsaounis v Belehris [1995] ANZ Conv R 114; BC9400882 …. 15.44, 15.45, 15.49, 16.21

Kaufman v Kaufman [2010] FamCA 254; BC201050279 …. 8.29 Kawicki v Ralph (1997, unreported); BC9703998 …. 21.52 Kaycliff Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1989) 19 ALD 315; BC8908561 …. 6.20, 8.7 Kazar v Kargarian (2011) 197 FCR 113; [2011] FCAFC 136; BC201108412 …. 6.15, 6.16, 7.2, 7.5 Keane (deceased), Re [1909] VLR 231 …. 10.28 Keays v JP Morgan Administrative Services Australia Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 547; BC201103313 …. 13.86 Kebaro Pty Ltd v Saunders [2003] FCFCA 5; BC200300185 …. 22.27, 22.35, 22.49 Keddie v Foxall [1955] VR 320 …. 8.47, 20.22, 20.44 — v Stacks/Goudkamp Pty Ltd (2012) 293 ALR 764; [2012] NSWCA 254; BC201206228 …. 23.56 Keen v Telstra Corporation Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 930; BC200605548 …. 15.16 — v Towler (1924) 41 TLR 86 …. 11.8 Keesing v Adams [2010] NSWSC 336; BC201002421 …. 4.57, 5.18 Keet v Ward [2011] WASCA 139; BC201104765 …. 8.11 Kehoe v Williams [2008] NSWSC 807; BC200807329 …. 18.74 Keith Bray Pty Ltd v Hamburg-Amerikanische [1970] 3 NSWR 226 …. 8.4 Keith Hercules & Sons v Steedman (1987) 17 FCR 290; BC8702233 …. 5.47, 5.48, 5.49, 5.50 Kelaw Pty Ltd v Catco Developments Pty Ltd (1989) 15 NSWLR 587 …. 22.43 Kellar v Williams [2004] UKPC 30 …. 2.1, 3.48 Kells v Mulligan [2002] NSWSC 769; BC200204991 …. 18.58 Kelly, Marriage of (1996, unreported) …. 15.17

—, (No 2) (1981) 7 Fam LR 762 …. 8.78 — v Council of the City of Lake Macquarie (1997, unreported); BC9702213 …. 17.54 — v Hogan [2004] NSWSC 238; BC200401603 …. 2.31, 27.13 — v Jowett (2009) 76 NSWLR 405; [2009] NSWCA 278; BC200908149 …. 23.65 — v Kelly and Brown [1961] P 94 …. 14.65 — v London Transport Executive [1982] 2 All ER 842 …. 23.38 — v Norris (2004) 41 MVR 451; [2004] NSWCA 260; BC200404971 …. 17.26 — v Noumenon Pty Ltd (1988) 47 SASR 182; BC8800384 …. 7.24, 7.29, 7.30, 24.25 — v South Manchester Health Authority [1997] 3 All ER 274 …. 22.65, 23.63 — v Willmott Forests Ltd (in liq) [2012] FCA 1446; BC201209924 …. 29.61, 29.62, 29.63 Kelly’s Directories Ltd v Gavin and Lloyds [1901] 2 Ch 763 …. 11.9 Kelso v McCulloch (1994, unreported); BC9403180 …. 27.1, 27.15 Kelvin v Whyte, Thomson & Co (1909) 26 RPC 731 …. 17.30 Kemp v Coastal Constructions Pty Ltd (1993, unreported); BC9303209 …. 22.42 Ken Morgan Motors Pty Ltd v Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd (1993, unreported); BC9304156 …. 22.78 Kenai Lumber Co Inc v LeResche (1982) 646 P 2d 215 …. 9.3 Kendirjian v Ayoub [2008] NSWCA 194; BC200807318 …. 23.26 Kenman Kandy Australia Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks (2002) 122 FCR 494; [2002] FCAFC 273; BC200204949 …. 9.21 Kenneally v Pouras (2007) 250 LSJS 248; [2007] SASC 303; BC200706599 …. 16.49

Kennedy, Re [1920] VLR 513 …. 10.38 — v Broun (1863) 13 CBNS 677; 143 ER 268 …. 4.54 Kennett v Charlton [2007] NSWSC 190; BC200701447 …. 10.2 Kenny v Wilson (1911) 11 SR(NSW) 460 …. 10.19, 10.25 Kenric Print Ltd (in rec) v Duromark Industries (1985) Ltd (1987) 3 NZCLC 100,062 …. 28.25 Kent Heating Ltd v Cook-On Gas Products Pty Ltd (1984) 59 ALR 277 …. 28.40, 28.41 Kent v Cavanagh (1973) 1 ACTR 43 …. 9.20 — v Ward (1894) 70 LT 612 …. 1.8 Kenyon v Akeroyd [2007] VSCA 50; BC200701954 …. 29.109, 29.110 Keogh v Medical Board of South Australia (No 2) [2007] SASC 421; BC200710329 …. 22.62 Kerr v Colley [2002] VSC 209; BC200203440 …. 20.33 — v J P & M Kerr (Billabidgee) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1044; BC200607962 …. 10.1 Kerridge v Foley (1970, unreported) …. 7.35, 7.36, 17.37 Kerry (Canada) Inc v Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2007) 282 DLR (4th) 625 …. 10.15 Kertz v Kertz [2010] FamCA 975; BC201051094 …. 14.41 Kestrel, The (1866) LR 1 A & E 78 …. 15.33 Keswick Motor Company Ltd, Re [1922] SASR 241 …. 2.16 Ketteman v Hansel Properties Ltd [1987] AC 189 …. 14.44 Kevans v Joyce [1897] 1 IR 1 …. 1.25, 20.2 Khatri v Price (1999) 95 FCR 287; [1999] FCA 1289; BC9905891 …. 6.13 Kheirs Financial Services Pty Ltd v Aussie Home Loans Pty Ltd (2010) 31 VR 46; [2010] VSCA 355; BC201009771 …. 11.33, 11.34, 11.36, 11.57 Khera v Jones [2006] NSWCA 85; BC200602698 …. 7.37, 7.40

Khneiger v Cookson [2013] SASC 12; BC201300464 …. 29.109 Kiama Council v Grant (2006) 143 LGERA 441; [2006] NSWLEC 96; BC200601135 …. 14.65 Kickers International SA v Paul Kettle Agencies Ltd [1990] FSR 436 …. 14.26 Kiely v Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd (1991) 6 WAR 521 …. 29.109 Kiernan v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police (No 3) [2010] NSWADTAP 32; BC201055117 …. 8.60 Kilby v O’Brien (No 2) [2006] ACTSC 90; BC200607165 …. 8.80 Kilich v Wood (2003) 31 Fam LR 274; [2003] FamCA 629 …. 13.40 Killalea v In Print Publishing Co Ltd [1966] NZLR 70 …. 12.2, 12.15, 12.22, 12.22 Killen v Leigo (1997, unreported); BC9700736 …. 10.13 Kilmac Investments Pty Ltd v NHLS & Co Ltd [2008] QSC 240; BC200808611 …. 28.49 Kilner (R G) & Black’s Bills of Costs, Re [1997] 1 Qd R 188; BC9502205 …. 4.18 Kilpatrick Green Pty Ltd v Kockums Industries Pty Ltd (1998, unreported); BC9801123 …. 14.62 Kim v Song [2012] NSWSC 103; BC201201313 …. 29.66, 29.76 Kimberley v Butcher [2001] WASC 118; BC200102523 …. 10.38, 10.43 Kimpura Pty Ltd v JWH Group Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 134; BC200403774 …. 8.11 Kinder v Gross [2008] WADC 69; BC200840167 …. 15.73 Kindimindi Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Cove Council (2007) 150 LGERA 333; [2007] NSWCA 38; BC200701281 …. 9.2, 20.10 King, Re (1994) 54 FCR 493; BC9405938 …. 2.1 — v AG Australia Holdings Ltd (2002) 121 FCR 480; [2002] FCA 872; BC200203825 …. 11.59

— v Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 289; BC2090113 …. 29.2, 29.4, 29.124 — v Crowe [1942] St R Qd 288 …. 20.19, 20.21 — v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (2001) 116 FCR 509; [2001] FCA 1773; BC200107826 …. 22.15 — v Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd (2012) 286 ALR 149; [2012] FCA 8; BC201200037 …. 7.46 — v — [2012] FCA 413; BC201202370 …. 7.46 — v Yurisich (No 2) [2007] FCAFC 51; BC200702569 …. 13.12, 16.45 King (F) & Co v Gillard & Co [1905] 2 Ch 7 …. 8.27, 20.32, 20.42 King Network Group Pty Ltd v Club of the Clubs Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 204; BC200906236 …. 11.6 King William Law Chambers and Williamson & Co v Mobitel (International) Pty Ltd (1981) 29 SASR 316 …. 5.43, 5.51 Kingham v Yorkston [2002] QSC 69; [2002] 2 Qd R 595; BC200200950 …. 1.17, 14.30, 22.59, 22.60 Kingscote District Council v Kangaroo Island Eco Action Inc (No 2) (1996) 67 SASR 422; BC9605560 …. 9.11, 9.20 Kingsheath Club of the Clubs Ltd (in liq), Re [2003] FCA 1589; BC200308212 …. 16.54 Kingston v QBE Insurance Ltd [2001] TASSC 83; BC200104319 …. 29.105 Kinsela v Metropolitan Mutual Provident Building and Investment Association (1887) LR 8 NSW 277 …. 8.46 ‘Kintail’, Owners of v Camm (1995, unreported); BC9502667 …. 17.54 Kirk v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1988) 19 FCR 530 …. 4.31, 26.10, 26.36 Kirkland-Veenstra v Stuart (No 2) (2008) 23 VR 36; [2008] VSCA 211; BC200809496 …. 21.60 Kirkwood v Webster (1878) 9 Ch D 239 …. 17.92

Kirsch v Dolman (2001) 123 A Crim R 331; [2001] VSC 234; BC200104511 …. 21.17, 21.60 Kirwan v Cresvale Far East Ltd (in liq) (2002) 44 ACSR 21; [2002] NSWCA 395; BC200207448 …. 10.56 Kirwin v Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 99; BC201208924 …. 15.58, 17.92 Kison v Papasian (1994) 61 SASR 567; BC9405581 …. 27.6, 27.21 KKL Investments Pty Ltd v Daikyo (North Queensland) Pty Ltd [1995] QCA 146; BC9505772 …. 20.8 Klahn v Talbot (1995) 83 A Crim R 535; BC9506571 …. 25.3, 25.26 Klas Pty Ltd v Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd [2007] WADC 79; BC200740076 …. 17.53 Klease, Re [1972] QWN 44 …. 10.40 Klement v Randles (No 2) [2010] VSCA 336; BC201009672 …. 8.29, 16.50 Knaggs v J A Westaway & Sons Pty Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 476; BC9605361 …. 23.15 Knight, Re (1887) 57 LT 238 …. 22.3 — v Beyond Properties Pty Ltd [2007] 1 All ER 91; [2006] EWHC 1242 …. 7.47 — v Clifton [1971] Ch 700 …. 8.62, 8.63, 8.65, 8.68 — v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178, BC9202673 …. 19.25, 22.1, 22.3, 22.6, 22.7, 22.9, 22.11, 22.17, 22.18, 22.25, 22.29, 22.35, 22.37, 22.43, 22.44, 22.45, 22.54, 22.75 — v Ponsonby [1925] 1 KB 545 …. 29.80, 29.85 Knight and Tabernacle Permanent Building Society, Re [1892] 2 QB 613 …. 1.20 Knight’s Will, Re (1884) 26 Ch D 82 …. 10.8 Knope v Webster [2009] SASC 152; BC200904599 …. 13.18 Knott v Signature Security Group Pty Ltd (2001) 104 IR 84; [2001] NSWIR

Comm 12 …. 28.6, 29.10, 29.68, 29.72, 29.73, 29.74 Knowles v Green (No 2) [2009] FamCA 541; BC200950445 …. 8.74 — v Gutteridge, Haskins and Davey Pty Ltd (1993, unreported); BC9300783 …. 19.19, 19.21 Knox v Brown (1787) 1 Cox 359; 29 ER 1202 …. 14.64 Knudsen v Kara Kar Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] 52 NSWLR 254; [2000] NSWSC 943; BC200006493 …. 1.27 Kodrum (No 5) Pty Ltd v Shandy Pty Ltd (1996, unreported); BC9600701 …. 28.34 Koetsveld v Whitehorse City Council [2009] VCC 545 …. 17.50 Kohan, Marriage of (1992) 16 Fam LR 245 …. 15.59, 16.13, 16.40 Kohn, Marriage of (1977) 30 FLR 175 …. 8.70 — v Rinson & Stafford (Brod) Ltd [1948] 1 KB 327 …. 29.68 Kong, Re (1974) 45 DLR (3d) 293 …. 5.51 Konieczka v Police (2006) 245 LSJS 458; [2006] SASC 288; BC200607296 …. 24.34, 24.54 Konstandopoulos v Giammaria [2004] NSWSC 1010; BC200408584 …. 27.29 Kooee Communications Pty Ltd v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 85; BC200803122 …. 13.5, 13.11 Kooky Garments Ltd v Charlton [1994] 1 NZLR 587 …. 23.35 Koorneef v Lewkowicz [2001] ACTSC 81; BC200104647 …. 10.41, 10.44 Kordister Pty Ltd v Director of Liquor Licensing (No 2) [2013] VSCA 30; BC201300730 …. 9.37 Korner v H Korner & Co Ltd [1951] Ch 10 …. 11.5, 11.9 Kossert v Ruggi (No 3) [2012] WASC 454; BC201209230 …. 3.33, 7.49 Kostic v Chaplin [2008] WTLR 655; [2007] EWHC 2909 …. 10.17, 10.18 Koutsourais v Metledge & Associates [2004] NSWCA 313; BC200408094

…. 4.10, 4.11 Kowal v Zoccoli (2002) 4 VR 399; [2002] VSCA 100; BC200203494 …. 7.24, 7.35, 17.39 Kowalski v Domestic Violence Crisis Service Inc [2002] FCA 1227; BC200205852 …. 21.4 — v Repatriation Commission (2009) 259 ALR 444; [2009] FCAFC 107; BC200907866 …. 6.13, 16.50 KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189; BC9507833 …. 28.51, 28.52, 28.56, 29.2, 29.5, 29.22, 29.27, 29.28, 29.85, 29.92, 29.100 KQ v HAE [2007] 2 Qd R 32; [2006] QCA 489; BC200609627 …. 20.36 Krach v Krach (No 2) [2009] FamCA 886 …. 8.59 Kraft v Kupferwasser (1991) 23 NSWLR 236 …. 10.1 Kral v Hydro-Electric Commission [1977] Tas SR NC 11 …. 6.23 Krause v Sinclair [1983] 1 VR 73 …. 10.35 Krix v Citrus Board of South Australia (2003) 87 SASR 229; [2003] SASC 387; BC200307693 …. 16.51 Kroehn v Kroehn (1912) 15 CLR 137; BC1200035 …. 17.76, 17.77, 17.92 Kruse v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2001) 122 A Crim R 13; [2001] NSWCA 59; BC200101338 …. 25.6 KT v KJ and TH (2000) FLC ¶93-032; [2000] FamCA 831 …. 8.77 Kublins, Marriage of (1993, unreported) …. 8.70 Kudelka, Marriage of (1986) FLC ¶91-719 …. 21.2, 21.54, 21.55 Kuek v Devflan Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 91; BC200901667 …. 18.73 — v — (2011) 31 VR 264; [2011] VSCA 25; BC201100364 …. 7.10, 7.15 Kumar v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 133 FCR 582; [2004] FCA 18; BC200400124 …. 23.9 Kumer v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2007] QCA 175; BC200704022 …. 21.56

Kunz v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (No 2) (1996) 62 FCR 345; BC9600636 …. 21.8 Kupe Group Ltd v Seamar Holdings Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 209 …. 4.30 Ku-ring-gai Municipal Council v Attorney-General (1954) 55 SR (NSW) 65 …. 11.41 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (No 2) [1995] 1 All ER 790 …. 19.6, 20.12 Kyabram Property Investments Pty Ltd v Murray [2005] NSWCA 87; BC200501713 …. 15.41 — v — [2006] NSWSC 54; BC200600663 …. 15.41, 15.51 Kymar Nominees Pty Ltd v Sinclair [2006] VSC 488; BC200610562 …. 24.46 Kyriacou v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2009] NSWADT 175 …. 8.91, 17.7

L L’Huillier v State of Victoria [1996] 2 VR 465; BC9600593 …. 12.15 La Fontaine v Manley [2000] NSWSC 1252; BC200008452 …. 4.36 Lababidi v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] FCA 1568; BC200708813 …. 8.29 Labor Daily Ltd v Keller (1939) 56 WN (NSW) 113 …. 28.25, 29.129 Lace v Yonan [1999] NSWSC 1072; BC9907179 …. 18.74 Lacey v Public Trustee [2010] NTSC 1; BC201000006 …. 10.38 Lackersteen v Jones (No 2) (1988) 93 FLR 442-3 …. 11.8, 11.12, 11.19, 11.24, 11.25, 11.28 Ladd v London Road Car Co (1900) 110 LT Jo 80 …. 3.48 Laderma International Pty Ltd v Taurean Systems Ltd [2009] NSWSC 905; BC200908150 …. 28.37 Ladner Downs and Crowley, Re (1987) 41 DLR (4th) 403 …. 3.33, 4.50

Ladner Downs and Thauberger, Re (1983) 149 DLR (3d) 21 …. 5.3, 5.51 Lagarna Pty Ltd v Bridge Wholesale Acceptance Corporation (Australia) Ltd [1995] 1 VR 150 …. 28.26, 29.23 Laguillo v Haden Engineering Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 306 …. 6.16, 8.4, 8.25 Lahoud v Lahoud [2006] NSWSC 126; BC200601167 …. 19.1, 19.13, 19.14 — v — [2011] NSWSC 994; BC201106786 …. 3.61, 19.1 — v — [2012] NSWSC 284; BC201201634 …. 8.16 Laity v Warren (1995) DFC ¶95-161 …. 14.17 Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (t/as Uncle Ben’s of Australia) (1994) 126 ALR 58; BC9400006 …. 4.30 Lall v 53-55 Hall Street Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 310 …. 29.108, 29.109 Lamb v Brisbane City Council [2008] QCA 109; BC200803210 …. 21.56 Lambert v Buckmaster (1824) 2 B & C 616; 107 ER 513 …. 26.25 Lamesa Holdings BV v Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 74 FCR 416; BC9701971 …. 16.23, 16.58 Lampropoulos v Kolnik [2010] WASC 193; BC201009410 …. 15.76, 19.22, 19.23 Lamrock, Brown & Hall, Matter of the Bill of Costs of [1908] VLR 238 …. 5.24, 5.26, 5.32, 5.33, 5.64 Land and Property Trust Co plc, Re [1991] 1 WLR 601 …. 20.45, 22.17 Landowners West of England and South Wales Land Drainage and Inclosure Co v Ashford (1884) 13 WR 41 …. 19.6 Lane v McConochie [2006] FMCA 376; BC200601616 …. 22.6 Lane Group Ltd v D I & L Paterson Ltd [2000] 1 NZLR 129 …. 11.20, 11.22, 11.23, 11.24, 11.25, 11.29, 11.30 Langdon v Pearce (1899) 20 LR (NSW) L 329 …. 5.55 Lange v Back & Schwartz [2009] NSWDC 180; BC200940236 …. 18.74

Langham v McDonald [2009] WADC 2; BC200940014 …. 12.13 Langley v Foster (1909) 10 SR (NSW) 54 …. 14.40, 16.75 — v The Age Company Ltd [2002] VSC 243; BC200203881 …. 13.5 Langmaid v Millhouse (2001) 10 Tas R 170; [2001] TASSC 58; BC200102584 …. 25.20, 25.23 Langmeil v Grange (2010) FLC ¶93-427; [2010] FamCAFC 12; BC201050096 …. 21.53 Lansen v Minister for the Environment and Heritage (No 3) (2008) 162 LGERA 258; [2008] FCA 1367; BC200807903 …. 8.36, 22.47 Lansley v Knight (1992) 113 ACTR 1 …. 24.44, 24.53, 24.54 Larrain v Clark (1995, unreported); BC9503838 …. 24.46, 24.55 Lashansky v Bruvecchis Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 793; BC200604793 …. 15.80 — v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2005] WASCA 217; BC200509734 …. 4.30 — v Legal Practice Board [2006] WASC 247; BC200609172 …. 27.4, 27.10, 27.15 Lathlain v Simons (1920) 23 WALR 15 …. 8.40 Lathwell v Lathwell [2008] WASCA 256; BC200901111 …. 20.16 Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534; BC9002896; BC9002896 …. 6.15, 6.18, 7.5, 7.8, 8.4, 8.36, 13.2, 24.6, 24.8, 24.26, 24.29, 24.36, 24.39, 24.40, 24.41, 24.42, 24.43, 24.44, 24.45, 24.46, 24.48, 24.50, 24.54, 25.26 Latrobe Council v Williams (2008) 18 Tas R 138; [2008] TASSC 56; BC200808383 …. 11.25 Lauchlan v Hartley [1979] Qd R 305 …. 7.2, 20.41, 20.42 Laundry Coin-Wash Nominees Pty Ltd v Dunlop Olympic Ltd (1985) ATPR ¶40-584 …. 28.7, 28.26, 29.126 Lauro v Marble House of Australia [2013] SASC 17; BC201300591 …. 29.109

Lavey, Re [1921] 1 KB 344 …. 16.37 Lavorato v R [2012] NSWCCA 61; BC201202358 …. 24.59 Law v Wilson (2003, unreported) …. 25.32 Law Society of New South Wales v Davidson [2007] NSWADT 264 …. 4.56 — v Foreman (No 2) (1994) 34 NSWLR 408; BC9404933 …. 1.10, 3.33, 3.35 — v Kurland (1992, unreported); BC9201968 …. 7.20, 17.22 Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory and Roche, Re (2002) 171 FLR 138; [2002] ACTSC 104; BC200206227 …. 3.29, 3.48 Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Lardner [1998] ACTSC 24; BC9801211 …. 3.48, 15.58, 17.16, 17.56 Lawecki v Marcel Kalfus & Co (1985) 10 Fam LR 464 …. 5.12 Lawes v Nominal Defendant [2007] QCA 437; BC200710638 …. 13.91 Lawler v Ewington (2009) 19 Tas R 250; [2009] TASSC 7; BC200900692 …. 8.80 Lawless v Mackendrick (No 3) [2011] WASC 298; BC201108705 …. 29.129, 29.135 Lawrance v Commonwealth (No 2) [2008] FCA 1060; BC200806650 …. 28.64 Lawrence v Hannaford (1997, unreported); BC9700915 …. 5.33 — v M D Nikolaidis & Co (2003) 57 NSWLR 355; [2003] NSWCA 129; BC200303669 …. 7.29, 7.35, 7.38, 17.11 Lawry, Ex parte (1868) 7 SCR (NSW) 183 …. 6.13 Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1989) 85 ALR 659 …. 20.4 — v Collins Exposed Aggregate Pty Ltd (1997, unreported); BC9700840 …. 11.63 — v National Grid Company plc [1998] PLR 205 …. 14.14 Lawson v British Columbia (Solicitor-General) (1992) 88 DLR (4th) 533 …. 11.42, 22.50

— v Gault [2002] FCAFC 308; BC200206127 …. 21.50 Lawyers v D’Jamirze [2004] NSWSC 507; BC200403516 …. 27.3 Lawyers for Forests Inc v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts [2008] FCA 588; BC200803041 …. 29.8 — v — (No 2) [2009] FCA 466; BC200903611 …. 8.29, 9.2, 9.13, 9.16 Layzell v British Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd [1961] 1 All ER 244; [1961] 1 WLR 557 …. 15.55, 16.35, 22.68 Le Boursicot (1994) 79 A Crim R 548 …. 24.26 Le Brasseur and Oakley, Re [1896] 2 Ch 487 …. 4.54, 4.55 Le Brun v Joseph [2008] WASCA 205; BC200808811 …. 22.68 Le Serve v Great Wall Resources Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1213; BC201007862 …. 2.4 Leading Edge Events Australia Pty Ltd v Te Kanawa (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 568; BC200704399 …. 8.7, 8.8, 11.20 Leamey v Heath [2001] NSWSC 1095; BC200107412 …. 18.15 Leary v Leary [1987] 1 WLR 72 …. 15.19, 15.24 Leaver v Golsby [1964–5] NSWR 1833 …. 11.39 LED Builders Pty Ltd v Hope (1994) 53 FCR 10; BC9400291 …. 12.4 Leda Holdings Pty Ltd v Oraka Pty Ltd [1999] ANZ Conv R 622; [1999] FCA 444; BC9901775 …. 15.54 Leda v Weerden (No 3) [2006] NSWSC 220; BC200602050 …. 13.30 Leeds Forge Company Ltd v Deighton’s Patent Flue and Tube Company Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 475 …. 17.32, 17.65 Leeper v Primary Producers’ Bank of Australia Ltd (in vol liq) (1935) 53 CLR 250 …. 26.2, 26.34, 26.35 Legal Aid Commission of Victoria, Re (1983) FLC ¶91-363 …. 5.54, 17.15 Legal Practitioners Act 1970, Re (1991) 103 ACTR 1 …. 4.41 Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Reyburn [2009] WASAT 86 ….

2.31 Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Gandini [2010] WASAT 166 …. 4.13 — v O’Halloran [2011] WASAT 95 …. 3.33 Legal Services Commissioner v Barrett [2012] VCAT 1800 …. 3.43, 3.54 — v Dempsey [2007] QSC 270; BC200708140 …. 1.8, 4.43 — v — [2008] 2 Qd R 272; [2008] QCA 122; BC200803896 …. 1.8, 4.43 — v — [2009] LPT 20 …. 4.43 — v Mercader [2011] VCAT 2062 …. 4.36 — v Nikolaidis (No 3) [2005] NSWADT 200 …. 15.31 — v Wright [2012] 2 Qd R 360; [2010] QCA 321; BC201008678 …. 2.23, 3.7, 5.9 Legal Services Society v British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1997) 140 DLR (4th) 372 …. 4.30 Legg v J J Craig Ltd [1954] NZLR 258 …. 11.26 — v Mackrell (1860) 2 De GF & J 551; 45 ER 735 …. 10.14 Leibler v Air New Zealand Ltd [1998] 2 VR 525; BC9705009 …. 20.39 Leicester v Walton (1995, unreported); BC9501770 …. 22.8, 23.58 Leichhardt Municipal Council v Green [2004] NSWCA 341; BC200406280 …. 13.61, 13.69 Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Public Transport Authority of Western Australia (No 7) [2009] WASC 218; BC200907127 …. 8.7, 17.73 Leighton’s Conveyance, Re [1937] 1 Ch 149 …. 15.45 Leisure Investments Pty Ltd v Bilioara Pty Ltd [2001] NTSC 3; BC200100257 …. 10.1 Lemery Holdings Pty Ltd v Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd (2008) 221 FLR 241; [2008] NSWSC 1114; BC200809428 …. 23.65 Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA

153; BC200502983 …. 23.14, 23.54, 23.55, 23.56, 23.57, 23.62, 23.68 Lend Lease GPT (Rouse Hill) Pty Ltd v Hills Shire Council (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 26; BC201102660 …. 8.37 Lend Lease Retail Projects Pty Ltd v Construction Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd [2000] VSCA 114; BC200003515 …. 11.10, 11.11 Lenova v Lenova (Costs) [2011] FamCAFC 141; BC201150394 …. 8.29, 13.43 Lenthall v Hillson [1933] SASR 31 …. 7.19, 17.23 Leong v J P Sesto & Co (Legal Practice) [2009] VCAT 99 …. 3.16 Leota v The Queen (2007) 5 DCLR (NSW) 173; [2007] NSWDC 146; BC200740298 …. 24.26 Lesiak v Foggenberger (1995, unreported); BC9507196 …. 12.11, 12.15 Lester v Ashton Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 193 LGERA 293; [2012] NSWLEC 254; BC201208859 …. 9.5 Lever (J H) & Co Pty Ltd v Maniotis [2006] FCA 1668; BC200610083 …. 15.15, 15.20 Lever v McCormick Foods Australia Pty Ltd (2011, unreported) …. 17.50 Levetus v Newton (1883) 28 Sol Jo 166 …. 17.32 Levick v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 102 FCR 155; [2000] FCA 674; BC200002670 …. 23.9, 23.33 Levy v Bergseng (2008) 72 NSWLR 178; [2008] NSWSC 294; BC200802263 …. 5.33, 5.34, 18.74 — v Union Bank of Australia Ltd (1896) 21 VLR 683 …. 4.57 — v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579; BC9703254 …. 22.73 — v Watt (No 2) [2012] VSC 580; BC201209281 …. 8.26, 8.37 Lewincamp v ACP Magazines Ltd (No 2) [2008] ACTSC 73; BC200807231 …. 19.12 — v — (No 3) [2008] ACTSC 81; BC200807795 …. 20.13 Lewis v Doran [2008] NSWSC 186; BC200801247 …. 1.8, 17.37

— v Powell [1897] 1 Ch 678 …. 26.37 — v Strickland [2004] QCA 134; BC200402222 …. 29.106 — v Utting [1985] 1 Qd R 423 …. 24.29, 24.40, 24.43, 24.46 Lewis Blyth and Hooper v Dennis [2007] WASC 177; BC200706266 …. 4.45, 4.50 Leyvand v Barasch (2000, unreported) …. 29.67 LGS (NSW) Pty Ltd v Barbagallo [2013] NSWSC 68; BC201300869 …. 15.17 Li v Toyota Motor Corp Australia Ltd [2012] VSC 196; BC201202983 …. 1.20 Liati v Fitzsimons (1996) 68 FCR 402; BC9606441 …. 4.3, 4.4 Liberty Financial Pty Ltd v Scott (No 4) [2005] VSC 472; BC200510448 …. 16.62 Life Airbag Company of Australia Pty Ltd v Life Airbag Company (New Zealand) Ltd (1998, unreported); BC9801995 …. 14.51 Life Therapeutics Ltd v Bell IXL Investments Ltd (No 2) (2008) 170 FCR 595; [2008] FCAFC 158; BC200807590 …. 21.50, 22.15 Lightforce Australia Pty Ltd v Culley [2012] SADC 88; BC201240302 …. 16.70 Lillis v Lillis [2010] NSWSC 359; BC201002556 …. 10.40 Limousin v Limousin (Costs) (2007) 38 Fam LR 478; [2007] FamCA 1178; BC200750689 …. 8.77, 8.78, 23.11, 23.42 — v Limousin (Security for Costs) [2007] FamCA 1179; BC200750251 …. 28.17 Lin v Katamon Pty Ltd [1995] NTSC 61 …. 16.8, 16.24 Lindner v Lindner (1985) FLC ¶91-638 …. 21.11 Lines v Tana Pty Ltd [1987] VR 641 …. 28.6, 29.2, 29.135, 29.136 Ling v Police (1996) 90 A Crim R 376; BC9605562 …. 24.40, 24.46 Lingham v National Cash Register Co (1901) 18 WN (NSW) 252 …. 29.76

Links Golf Tasmania Pty Ltd v Sattler (No 2) (2012) 297 ALR 724; [2012] FCA 1271; BC201208949 …. 14.10 Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1985] QB 526 …. 9.9 Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd v Coopers Brewery Ltd (No 3) [2006] FCA 1023; BC200608782 …. 14.25 Lippe v Hedderwick (1922) 31 CLR 148; BC2290103 …. 10.20, 20.14, 20.15 Lippiatt & Co’s Bill of Costs, Re [1998] 1 Qd R 69; BC9701536 …. 5.56, 5.60 Liquorland (Australia) Pty Ltd v GYG Holdings Pty Ltd (1995, unreported); BC9505008 …. 13.64 Lisa Joy Pty Ltd v Brothers Neilsen International Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 986; BC200305628 …. 28.36 Lissa v Browne (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 1161; BC200909911 …. 16.53 Litmus Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Canty (2007) 25 ACLC 1141; [2007] NSWSC 670; BC200705049 …. 29.126, 29.129 Little v Saunders [2004] NSWSC 655; BC200404771 …. 13.7 Little Olympian Each Ways Ltd, Re [1994] 4 All ER 561 …. 29.66 Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue) [2007] 1 SCR 38; [2007] SCC 2 …. 14.20, 14.21 Liu v Adamson [2003] 12 BPR 22,205; [2003] NSWSC 74; BC200300579 …. 3.14, 4.34 Liverpool City Council v Estephan [2009] NSWCA 161; BC200905834 …. 16.45, 16.55 — v Hodge (2006) 143 LGERA 261; [2006] NSWLEC 21; BC200600101 …. 24.54 — v Turano (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 176; BC200905710 …. 13.90 — v Weir (1984) 53 ALR 77; BC8400533 …. 11.42 Livingspring Pty Ltd v Kliger Partners (2008) 20 VR 377; [2008] VSCA 93; BC200804103 …. 28.23, 29.5, 29.94

— v — [2007] VSC 443 …. 29.94 Llewellin, Re [1891] 3 Ch 145 …. 26.4, 26.36, 26.38 Lo Presti v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (No 2) [2008] WASC 12; BC200801648 …. 13.61, 13.76, 13.85, 16.49 Loates v Loates (2000) 185 DLR (4th) 525 …. 23.12, 23.33 Lobster Group Ltd v Heidelberg Graphic Equipment Ltd [2008] 2 All ER 1173; [2008] EWHC 413 …. 28.38 Locke v Camberwell Health Authority [1991] 2 Med LR 249 …. 23.36 Lockley v National Blood Transfusion Service [1992] 1 WLR 492 …. 8.16 Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCAFC 172; BC200709927 …. 8.8 Logue v Hansen Technologies Ltd (2003) 125 FCR 590; [2003] FCA 81; BC200300260 …. 29.66 Loizos v Carlton & United Breweries (1993) 113 FLR 239 …. 29.106, 29.110, 29.120 Lollis v Loulatzis (No 2) [2008] VSC 35; BC200800654 …. 8.48, 13.74 Lolomanaia v Roads & Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2002] NSWSC 918; BC200206012 …. 19.14 Lomax v Hide (1690) 2 Vern 185; 23 ER 721 …. 15.45 Lombard Insurance Co (Australia) Ltd v Pastro (1994) 175 LSJS 448 …. 11.37 Lomer v Waters [1898] 2 QB 326 …. 14.73 London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co v South-Eastern Railway Co (1889) 60 LT 753 …. 17.32, 17.92 London County Council v Churchwardens and Overseers of West Ham [1892] 2 QB 173 …. 24.16 London Metallurgical Co, Re [1895] 1 Ch 758 …. 10.48, 10.53 —, Re [1897] 2 Ch 262 …. 2.16 London Scottish Benefit Society v Chorley (1884) 13 QBD 872 …. 7.36,

7.37, 7.38 London Welsh Estates Ltd v Phillip (1931) 144 LT 643 …. 8.62 Lonergan v R [1963] Tas SR 158 …. 24.64 Long, Re [1929] VLR 318 …. 26.12 — v R [1996] 1 NZLR 377 …. 25.20 Lonsdale Investments Pty Ltd v OM (Manganese) Ltd (No 3) [2012] WASC 185 …. 11.2 Lord Advocate v Stewart (1899) 36 Sc LR 945 …. 7.19 Lord Strathcona (No 3), The [1926] WN 270 …. 17.32 Lonrho plc v Fayed (No 5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489 …. 7.22, 7.23 Loreva Pty Ltd v CEFA Associated Agencies Pty Ltd (1982) 7 ACLR 164 …. 29.124 Louch, Re [1930] 2 Ch 63 …. 5.54 Lourey v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2012] WASCA 112; BC201203765 …. 8.89 Louthnan v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1897) 16 NZLR 299 …. 1.8 Love v Kempton [2010] VSC 254; BC201003957 …. 16.57 — v Love (1914) 16 WALR 131 …. 10.4 — v Roads Corporation [2011] VSCA 434; BC201110012 …. 8.85, 8.86, 13.1, 17.92 — v State of Victoria (No 2) [2009] VSC 531; BC200910873 …. 13.60, 13.69, 13.72, 13.75 Lovejoy v Johnson (1997, unreported); BC9705272 …. 24.53, 24.54 Loveridge v Botham (1797) 1 Bos 49; 126 ER 772 …. 5.54 Luadaka, Marriage of (1998) 148 FLR 421 …. 28.3, 29.12 Lucas v NRMA Insurance Ltd [2005] ACTCA 34; BC200506791 …. 23.4 — v Simpson [1969] QWN 19 …. 17.62, 17.80 — v Yorke (1983) 50 ALR 228; BC8300125 …. 29.2, 29.13, 29.97, 29.100,

29.105 Lukes Law v Collins [2008] FamCA 969; BC200850442 …. 22.71 Luther v Milner [2009] VSC 595; BC200911270 …. 16.57 Luxmore Pty Ltd v Hydedale Pty Ltd (2008) 20 VR 481; [2008] VSCA 212; BC200809499 …. 6.16 Ly, Re (1995) 62 FCR 432; BC9500239 …. 26.43, 26.44 — v Jenkins (2001) 187 ALR 178; [2001] FCA 1640; BC200107326 …. 17.22, 24.25 Lydall v Martinson (1877) 5 Ch D 780 …. 1.23, 14.38 Lyddon v Moss (1859) 4 De G & J 104; 45 ER 41 …. 4.59 Lyell, Re [1941] VLR 207 …. 11.55, 11.58 Lynch v Sydney Ferries Corporation [2010] NSWSC 1463; BC201009722 …. 13.14 Lynnebry Pty Ltd v Farquhar Enterprises Pty Ltd (1977) 3 ACLR 133 …. 29.5, 29.100 Lyon v Lyon [1953] P 1 …. 16.21 — v Mercer (1823) 1 Sim & St 357; 57 ER 143 …. 1.18 Lyons v Wende [2007] NSWSC 100; BC200700693 …. 18.74 — v — [2007] NSWSC 101; BC200700694 …. 18.74 — v Winter (1899) 25 VLR 464 …. 13.53 Lyris v Hatziantoniou (1999) 24 Fam LR 391; [1998] FamCA 1311 …. 7.19, 8.72 Lysnar v National Bank of New Zealand Ltd [1935] NZLR 557 …. 7.39

M M (a child) v The Queen (1994) 13 WAR 306 …. 25.27 M v W (2006) 96 SASR 105; [2006] SASC 347; BC200609574 …. 6.14, 14.16, 14.17, 14.20

MA Productions Pty Ltd v Austarama Television Pty Ltd (1982) 7 ACLR 97 …. 28.34 Maatschappi voor Fondsenbezit v Shell Transport and Trading Co [1923] 2 KB 166 …. 28.52, 28.53 McAlpin, Marriage of (1993) 16 Fam LR 888 …. 8.72, 8.78, 20.30, 22.11, 22.17, 22.75 McAra v Evans (No 2) (1977) 14 Tas R 64 …. 24.64 Macarthur & Macleod Pty Ltd v Carey [1931] VLR 269 …. 20.19, 20.21 Macartney v Macartney [1908] VLR 649 …. 10.21 McAusland v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 47 FCR 369; BC9305144 …. 23.24 MacBean v Trustees Executors and Agency Company Ltd [1916] VLR 425 …. 10.10 MacCarthy v Agard [1933] 2 KB 417 …. 6.22 McCay, Ex parte (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 592 …. 11.52 McClung (deceased), Re [2006] VSC 209; BC200604264 …. 2.36 McCook, Re (1887) 3 WN (NSW) 86 …. 4.29 McCoombes v Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd [2001] QDC 142 …. 17.36, 18.1, 18.12, 18.45 McCoughtry v Schrick [1947] VLR 342 …. 15.36 McCracken & McCracken v Pippett [2000] VSCA 20; BC200000808 …. 11.24 McCreedy, Re [1938] St R Qd 293 …. 10.38 McCullough v Australian Human Rights Commission [2012] FCA 1470 …. 9.32 McCullum v Ifield [1969] 2 NSWR 329 …. 7.10, 7.16 McDermott v Bond (Costs) [2010] FamCA 81; BC201050082 …. 8.32, 22.71 McDevitt v Irwin [2005] ACTSC 133; BC200510570 …. 13.68, 13.69

Macdonald Contractors (Australia) Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2007] NSWADT 56 …. 17.7 MacDonald v Pottinger [1953] NZLR 196 …. 8.11 McDonald, Marriage of (1994) 18 Fam LR 265 …. 8.72 — v FAI (NZ) General Insurance Co Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 583 …. 27.6 — v Finlayson [2009] VSCA 76; BC200902426 …. 29.109 — v Horn [1995] 1 All ER 961 …. 10.4, 10.8, 10.15, 14.11, 14.14 — v McDonald (1994) FLC ¶92-508 …. 8.74 McDonald Crawford v Morrow (2004) 244 DLR (4th) 144 …. 3.53 McDonnell v McDonnell [1977] 1 WLR 34 …. 13.56 MacDonnell, Henchman & Hannam, Re [1910] St R Qd 324 …. 15.34 Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Thompson (2009) 170 LGERA 41; [2009] VSCA 209; BC200908720 …. 16.50, 16.53, 16.54 Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc, Application of [2004] NSWSC 388; BC200402448 …. 14.12 —, Application of (No 2) (2005) 63 NSWLR 441; [2005] NSWSC 558; BC200504122 …. 10.8 — v His Eminence Petar the Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Diocese of Australia and New Zealand (2008) 237 CLR 66; [2008] HCA 42; BC200807738 …. 10.5, 10.15 McElligott v McElligott and Kelly [1954] Tas SR 10 …. 17.77 McEwen v Siely (1972) 21 FLR 131 …. 24.40, 24.50 McFadzean v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (2007) 20 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 289; BC200710889 …. 8.8, 20.36 McGlinn v Waltham Contractors Ltd (No 1) [2005] 3 All ER 1126; [2005] EWHC 1419 (TCC) …. 17.3 McGoun, Re [1910] VLR 153 …. 10.35 McGowan v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [2002] 2 Qd R 499; [2001] QCA 236; BC200103217 …. 4.44

McGrath v Cherry [2012] NSWSC 569; BC201203642 …. 16.57 — v Roe (1996, unreported); BC9601315 …. 4.14 McGregor v Clancy and Triado Pty (1991) 14 Fam LR 690 …. 5.37, 5.38 McGregor-Dey v South Australian College of Advanced Education (1993) 171 LSJS 290 …. 8.17 McIlraith v Ilkin (Costs) [2007] NSWSC 1052; BC200708523 …. 7.38, 7.40 — v — [2008] NSWCA 11; BC200800782 …. 7.37, 7.40 McIlwraith McEacharn Operations Ltd v C E Health Underwriting & Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 1) [1994] 2 Qd R 605 …. 20.38 McInnes v Twigg (1992) 16 Fam LR 185 …. 3.3, 3.5, 3.14, 3.17, 3.27, 3.37, 3.38, 5.51 McIntire v Pettit (1986, unreported); BC8600948 …. 29.129 McIntyre, Re [1993] 2 Qd R 383 …. 7.46, 20.14, 20.15 — v Perkes (1988) 15 NSWLR 417; BC8801160 …. 1.20, 16.68 McIntyre Estate v Ontario (Attorney-General) (2002) 218 DLR (4th) 165 …. 3.47 McIver & Co Ltd v Tate Steamers Ltd [1902] 2 KB 184 …. 17.44 McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads (No 7) (2011) 185 LGERA 118; [2011] WASC 223; BC201111031 …. 8.86, 13.72, 13.80 McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1639; BC9907778 …. 14.51 McKenna v McKenna [1984] VR 665 …. 6.17 McKenzie v Director-General of Conservation & Natural Resources [2001] VSC 220; BC200104173 …. 26.14, 26.32 Mackenzie v Mackintosh (1891) 64 LT 706 …. 26.10 McKeon v Myer Southern Stores Ltd [1979] Tas R (NC) 1 …. 12.10, 12.23 McKerlie v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2000] NSWSC 1159; BC200007818 …. 13.69

McKewins Hairdressing and Beauty Supplies Pty Ltd (in liq) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 171 ALR 335 …. 23.7 Mackie v Clough (1891) 17 VLR 201 …. 29.50, 29.53 Mackinnon v Bluescope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 229; BC200906749 …. 13.65 MacKinnon v Petersen (1989, unreported); BC8902277 …. 8.7 McKinnon v Adams (No 2) [2003] VSC 502; BC200308459 …. 16.68 McKnight v Ice Skating Queensland (Inc) [2007] QSC 279; BC200708433 …. 10.9 Macks v Hedley (1999) 94 FCR 188; [1999] FCA 1208; BC9905645 …. 16.14, 22.41, 22.42 — v Valamios (2003) 47 ACSR 686; [2003] NSWSC 1044; BC200306799 …. 29.50 McLaughlin, Ex parte (1908) 8 SR (NSW) 158 …. 5.43 —, Re (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 382 …. 15.45 — v City Bank of Sydney (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 491 …. 15.34, 17.37, 17.75 MacLaurin v Hall (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 114 …. 7.19 MacLaw No 469 Pty Ltd v Ilana Accessories Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 563; BC200008387 …. 14.62 McLean v Brisbane Tramways Co (1899) 9 QLJ (NC) 60 …. 17.30 — v Kerville (1986, unreported); BC8600001 …. 15.72 Maclean v Rottnest Island Authority [2001] WASCA 323; BC200106541 …. 13.80 McLeish v Palmer (1921) 22 SR (NSW) 53 …. 26.2 McLennan v Fisher (1889) 10 LR (NSW) Eq 246 …. 10.22 — v McBroom [1969] VR 566 …. 21.50, 21.54 McMichael (deceased), Re [1917] VLR 251 …. 10.10 McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd (No 6) (1997, unreported);

BC9706245 …. 11.61 McMurdo, Re [1897] 1 Ch 119 …. 4.22 McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis [2005] 92 SASR 382; [2005] SASC 269; BC200505207 …. 2.4, 3.12, 3.25, 3.28 — v — [2007] 95 SASR 129; [2007] SASC 90; BC200701559 …. 3.3, 3.25, 3.27, 3.28, 3.33, 3.35 Macnamara’s Costs, Re (1884) 5 LR (NSW) L 342 …. 5.55 McNeil v Bonner [1968] NTJ 820 …. 24.40 McPherson, Thom & Co v Sandhurst and Northern District Trustees, Executors and Agency Co Ltd [1929] VLR 295 …. 10.2 Macphillamy v Vizovitis [2003] ACTSC 60; BC200304187 …. 17.48, 17.57 Macplan Logistics Systems Pty Ltd v Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 324; BC9601338 …. 13.5 Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney South West Area Health Service (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 171; BC201104714 …. 8.9, 8.39, 16.54 — v — (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 1139; BC201007454 …. 15.54, 22.9 Macquarie Radio Network Pty Ltd v Dent (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 339; BC200710315 …. 13.11, 13.25, 13.27 McQueen v Strickland [1983] Tas R 25 …. 24.35, 24.48 McSharry v Railway Commissioners (1897) 18 LR (NSW) L 33 …. 29.13, 29.15, 29.35, 29.37 Macteldir Pty Ltd v Dimovski (2005) 226 ALR 773; [2005] FCA 1528; BC200509237 …. 23.7, 23.18 — v — (2006) 152 FCR 487; [2006] FCA 489; BC200602864 …. 20.45 — v Roskov [2007] FCAFC 49; BC200702500 …. 23.31 Macura, Marriage of (1982) FLC ¶91-252 …. 8.76 McVicar v S & J White Pty Ltd (2006) 245 LSJS 177; [2006] SASC 233; BC200605899 …. 29.109

— v — (No 2) (2007) 249 LSJS 110; [2007] SASC 199; BC200704278 …. 22.46, 22.53 McWilliam v McWilliam [1969] 1 NSWR 159 …. 5.64 — v Penthouse Publications [1999] NSWCA 2; BC9901579 …. 29.109, 29.110 McWilliams Wines Pty Ltd v Liaweena (NSW) Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 190; BC9303918 …. 6.14, 19.23, 19.24, 19.25 Madden v Hemmings [1960] SR (NSW) 478 …. 15.34, 17.79, 17.80, 17.85, 17.88 — v New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corporation [1999] NSWSC 196; BC9900828 …. 17.55, 18.65, 18.67, 18.74 Madden as Official Liquidator of Aquanaut Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq), Re [2001] NSWSC 1051; BC200107586 …. 8.7 Magarey Farlam Lawyers Trust Accounts, Re [2007] 99 SASR 40; [2007] SASC 307; BC200706859 …. 6.8 Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele Australia Pty Ltd [2001] 2 Qd R 187; [2000] QSC 220; BC200005384 …. 28.40, 29.28, 29.122 — v — (No 2) [2002] 1 Qd R 183; [2001] QSC 78; BC200100974 …. 17.18, 17.20 Magic Menu Systems Pty Ltd v AFA Facilitation Pty Ltd (1997) 72 FCR 261; BC9700030 …. 3.44 Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Heidelberg v Robinson (2000) 2 VR 233; [2000] VSCA 198; BC200006512 …. 22.58, 22.60, 22.61 Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v Coffee (No 2) [1982] VR 97 …. 15.33, 15.35, 17.14, 17.15, 17.48, 17.49, 17.60, 17.67 Magnamain Investments Pty Ltd v Baker Johnson Lawyers [2008] QSC 245; BC200808845 …. 26.10 Mahenthirarasa v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (No 2) (2008) 72 NSWLR 273; [2008] NSWCA 201; BC200807693 …. 8.60, 8.61 Maher v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2008] VSCA 122; BC200804917 …. 7.20

— v Gabriel (1988, unreported); BC8800507 …. 17.72 — v Network Finance Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 694 …. 8.95, 15.41 Maher and Messrs Stedman, Cameron, Meares and Hall, Re (1980) FLC ¶90889 …. 5.12 Maiden v Maiden (1909) 7 CLR 727; BC0915248 …. 20.32 Maidstone Pace Health Club Pty Ltd v GRE Insurance Ltd (1990) 8 ACLC 386 …. 29.95 Mailes, In the Will of [1908] VLR 269 …. 10.35 Main-Road Property Group v Pelligra & Sons Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] VSC 174; BC200903520 …. 16.52 Maitland Hospital v Fisher (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 721; BC9201767 …. 13.3, 13.14, 13.24, 13.25, 13.27, 13.90, 13.91, 13.92, 13.93, 28.21 Major v Woodside Energy Ltd (No 3) [2009] WASC 246; BC200908171 …. 14.25 Major Projects Pty Ltd v Sibmark Pty Ltd [1992] ANZ Conv R 349; BC9202071 …. 3.33, 3.35, 26.15, 26.17, 26.18 Makela v Bass [2009] TASSC 120; BC200911674 …. 25.21 Makryllos v George Laurens (NT) Pty Ltd (1992) 111 FLR 204 …. 12.7, 12.15, 12.17 Makucha v Albert Shire Council (1992, unreported); BC9202514 …. 21.54 Malaugh Holdings (No 2) Pty Ltd v Seal (No 2) (2011) 274 LSJS 504; [2011] SADC 37 …. 15.33, 18.61, 19.17 Malcolm v Hodgkinson (1873) LR 8 QB 209 …. 29.49 Maley, Re [1944] SASR 99; BC1300006 …. 10.21, 20.8 Malkinson v Trim [2003] 2 All ER 356; [2002] EWCA Civ 356 …. 7.38 Malleson, Stewart, Stawell & Nankivell, Re [1931] VLR 127 …. 17.62 — v Williams [1930] VLR 410 …. 4.14 Mallet v Mallet (1984) 156 CLR 605; BC8400526 …. 1.13, 20.28

Malliaros v Moralis [1991] 2 VR 501 …. 14.72 Malpas v Malpas (1885) 11 VLR 670 …. 20.19, 20.24 Mana Property Trustee Ltd v James Development Ltd [2011] 2 NZLR 25; [2010] NZSC 124 …. 22.40, 22.42 Management 3 Group Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lenny’s Commercial Kitchens Pty Ltd (No 3) (2011) 278 ALR 754; [2011] FCA 725; BC201104600 …. 13.81 Mancini v Ward (1997) 93 A Crim R 456; BC9701573 …. 24.39, 25.28 Mandarin International Developments Pty Ltd v Growthcorp (Australia) Pty Ltd (1998) 143 FLR 408; BC9801315 …. 16.40, 16.56 Mander v Hutton (1870) 4 SALR 131 …. 20.21 Manderson M & F Consulting (a Firm) v Incitec Pivot Ltd (No 3) [2011] VSC 441; BC201107364 …. 16.54, 22.36 — v — [2012] VSC 618; BC201210112 …. 28.37, 29.128 Mandurah Enterprises Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2008] WASCA 211; BC200900897 …. 6.25 Manefield v Child Care NSW (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 104; BC201101826 …. 13.1, 13.50 Mangan v Mendum (1970) 4 ACTR 44 …. 13.36, 13.37 Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Spencer [2008] QCA 392; BC200810763 …. 20.6 — v Whitton (No 2) [2011] FCA 845 …. 14.51 Mann v Carnell (2001) 159 FLR 466; [2001] ACTSC 18; BC200100973 …. 6.16, 7.2, 8.25, 9.20 — v Dabelstein [2006] WASCA 176; BC200607162 …. 29.106 Mannix v Mannix [2008] NSWSC 1228; BC200810255 …. 7.48 Mannix (G J) Ltd, Re [1984] 1 NZLR 309 …. 7.39 Mansfield v Robinson [1928] 2 KB 353 …. 8.95, 15.41 Mant v Smith (1859) 4 H & N 324; 157 ER 864 …. 4.21

Mantaray Pty Ltd v Brookfield Breeding Co Pty Ltd (1990) 8 ACLC 304 …. 28.49, 29.90 Mantel v Anstee (2001) 116 LGERA 269; [2001] NSWLEC 202; BC200105411 …. 24.47, 24.48 Mantova Holdings Pty Ltd v Rajlaw Pty Ltd [2010] WASC 128; BC201003891 …. 5.12 Manuel v Police (No 2) (2010) 107 SASR 501; [2010] SASC 230; BC201005215 …. 24.54 Marand Holdings Pty Ltd v Cateus International Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 238; BC200307286 …. 28.56 Maranda v Richer [2003] 3 SCR 193; [2003] SCC 67 …. 4.30 Marano v Quagliero [2006] NSWSC 1364; BC200610353 …. 5.40 Marchesi v Vasiliou [2009] VSC 213; BC200904854 …. 16.57 Margetson and Jones, Re [1897] 2 Ch 314 …. 27.18 Marinko, Marriage of (1983) FLC ¶91-307 …. 8.75 Maritime Services Board of New South Wales v Citizens Airport Environment Association Inc (1992) 83 LGERA 107; BC9203007 …. 29.3, 29.85, 29.109, 29.121, 29.122, 29.123 Mark Sensing Shanghai Paper Products Co Ltd v Baldock [2010] VSC 124; BC201002159 …. 28.40 Markdale Ltd v Ducharme (1998) 238 AR 98 …. 23.35 Marketing Advisory Services v Tasmanian Football League Inc [2002] FCA 990; BC200204424 …. 18.60 Markisic v Vizza [2002] NSWCCA 53; BC200207794 …. 6.13 Markorp Pty Ltd v King (1992) 106 FLR 286 …. 14.51, 14.52, 14.53 Markoska v Markoska (Costs) (2011) 46 Fam LR 598; [2011] FamCA 833; BC201150786 …. 22.15 Markovic v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [1998] 1 VR 235; BC9606063 …. 8.50

Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128; BC9602187 …. 7.4, 11.60, 13.64, 16.42, 16.48, 16.49 Marks-Isaacs v Fowler [2005] NSWCA 37; BC200500866 …. 29.110 Markt & Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Co Ltd [1910] 2 KB 1021 …. 11.59 Marlow v Walsh (No 2) [2009] TASSC 40; BC200904646 …. 13.26, 13.90 Marnham v Grice (1896) 22 VLR 108 …. 11.53 Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd [2001] NSWSC 854; BC200106186 …. 7.28, 7.31 — v — [2002] NSWSC 838; BC200207616 …. 7.29 Marrick Productions Pty Ltd v Traders of Australia Pty Ltd [1959] QWN 11 …. 29.132 Marsden v Winch (Costs) [2008] FamCAFC 32; BC200850099 …. 21.9 Marsh v Marsh (2009) 42 Fam LR 310; [2009] FMCAfam 1160; BC200910569 …. 21.11 Marsland & Marsland, Re [1902] St R Qd 219 …. 16.22 Marsland & Marsland’s Costs, Re (1890) 4 QLJ 3 …. 15.58 Marson Pty Ltd v Pressbank Pty Ltd (1983) 7 ACLR 905 …. 28.26 Martin v Benson [1927] 1 KB 771 …. 8.40 — v Carlisle [2008] NSWSC 1276; BC200810784 …. 16.57 — v Harris [2010] FamCA 239; BC201050276 …. 23.21 — v Listowel Memorial Hospital (2000) 192 DLR (4th) 250 …. 20.31 — v Wiggins [1984] Tas R 188 …. 6.4 Martin French (A) v Kingswood Hill Ltd [1961] 1 QB 96 …. 13.52 Martinovic v Chief Executive, Queensland Transport [2005] 1 Qd R 502; [2005] QCA 55; BC200500961 …. 20.45 Marton v Mann (1880) 14 Ch D 419 …. 29.133 Masha Nominees Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] VSC 56; BC200600782 …. 16.66

Maslin, Re [1908] VLR 641 …. 10.38 Mason v D Mitchell & Co Ltd (1938) 55 WN (NSW) 17 …. 15.34, 17.62 — v Mason and Cottrell [1933] P 199 …. 27.1 Mason and Taylor, Re (1878) 10 Ch D 729 …. 26.8 Mason-Jones v Jones (1987) 11 NSWLR 583 …. 5.36 Massey v Allen (1879) 12 Ch D 807 …. 29.76 — v Wales (2003) 57 NSWLR 718; [2003] NSWCA 212; BC200304485 …. 23.23 Massey & Carey, Re (1884) 26 Ch D 459 …. 5.36, 5.37 Mastercigars Direct Ltd v Withers LLP [2008] 3 All ER 417; [2007] EWHC 2733 …. 4.3, 4.4 Mastrangelo v Reynolds (2001) 25 WAR 133; [2001] WASCA 347; BC200106897 …. 21.21, 24.68, 25.28 Masureik & Allan Pty Ltd, Re (1981) 6 ACLR 39 (SC(NSW)) …. 10.57 Mathias v Yetts (1882) 46 LJ (NS) 497 …. 22.22 Matsen v Matsen [2008] NSWSC 226 …. 23.68 Maule v Liporoni (No 2) (2002) 122 LGERA 216; [2002] NSWLEC 140; BC200204783 …. 1.20, 16.59 Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd v Burmingham [2009] VSC 20; BC200901686 …. 3.3, 3.5 Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2001) 51 NSWLR 673; [2001] NSWCA 78; BC200103188 …. 6.18, 8.81 — v — (2003) 212 CLR 111; [2003] HCA 8; BC200300217 …. 6.18, 8.81 — v — (No 8) (2007) 155 LGERA 115; [2007] NSWLEC 37; BC200700308 …. 8.82, 9.31 Mauroux v Sociedade Commercial Abel Pereira Da Fonesca SARL [1972] 1 WLR 962 …. 23.2, 23.3, 23.18, 23.60 MAV v ABA [2007] QCA 380; BC200709602 …. 6.23

Mavani v Ralli Bros Ltd [1973] 1 WLR 468 …. 28.8, 29.72 Maxim v Godson & Sons [1916] 1 Ch 21 …. 17.35 Maxim’s Caterers Ltd v Magnona Pty Ltd (No 1) [2010] FCA 450; BC201002924 …. 29.73 Maxwell, Ex parte (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 333 …. 2.12, 2.13, 4.48, 5.64 — v Mayer (1760) 2 Burr 1026; 97 ER 688 …. 29.65 May v Burcul (1982, unreported); BC8200444 …. 2.4 — v Christodoulou (2011) 80 NSWLR 462; [2011] NSWCA 75; BC201101949 …. 22.36 — v Hutcherson and Newton [1964] Qd R 426 …. 17.79, 17.80, 17.83 Mayer (deceased), Re [1947] VLR 363 …. 17.53 Mayer v Harte [1960] 2 All ER 840 …. 11.13, 11.14 Maylord Equity Management Pty Ltd v ReelTime Media Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 1133; BC200809490 …. 22.10 Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2004] FCAFC 159; BC200403619 …. 18.6 MB v Protective Commissioner [2000] NSWSC 882; BC200005206 …. 13.64 MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; BC9102633 …. 19.25 Mbuzi v Hall [2010] QSC 359; BC201007020 …. 29.136 Mead v Watson (2005) 23 ACLC 718; [2005] NSWCA 133; BC200502533 …. 10.54, 22.42, 22.76 Meade v Queensland Ambulance Service (1996, unreported); BC9601380 …. 11.4, 15.58 Meadow Gem Pty Ltd v ANZ Executors and Trustees (1996, unreported); BC9602422 …. 14.31 Medcalf v Mardell [2003] 1 AC 120; [2002] UKHL 27 …. 23.10, 23.40, 23.55, 23.67 Medical Assessment Panel, Re (2003) 27 WAR 242; [2003] WASC 154;

BC200304618 …. 11.42, 22.73 Medlicott v Emery [1933] All ER Rep 655 …. 4.54 Mednis v Chand [2003] NSWSC 680; BC200304266 …. 4.57, 27.16 Medway’s Will, Re (1897) 14 WN (NSW) 29 …. 10.14 Mee v DWD Hotels Ltd (No 2) [1974] 2 NZLR 272 …. 11.15, 15.55 Meekin Enterprises v Gersbach (1997, unreported); BC9703425 …. 10.1 Meerkin & Apel v Rossett Pty Ltd [1998] 4 VR 54; BC9707344 …. 2.4, 2.10 Mees v Kemp (No 2) [2004] FCA 549; BC200402290 …. 9.27 — v Roads Corporation [2003] FCA 410; BC200302072 …. 13.67 Meguerditchian v Lightbound [1917] 2 KB 298 …. 27.2 Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners v Cuming, Smith and Co Pty Ltd [1906] VLR 192 …. 6.23 Melbourne Parking Station Ltd, Re [1929] VLR 5 …. 4.57, 5.64, 15.36, 16.38 Melbourne Steamship Co v Moorehead (1912) 15 CLR 333; BC1200025 …. 8.60 Mellos v Sheppar (2005) 37 SR (WA) 373; [2005] WADC 14; BC200540045 …. 18.64 Melunu Pty Ltd v Claron Constructions Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1064; BC200407636 …. 29.101 Melvey, Re (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 289 …. 3.43 Melville v Craig Nowlan & Associates Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 82; [2002] NSWCA 32; BC200200539 …. 29.108, 29.119 Memutu Pty Ltd v Lissenden (1983) 8 ACLR 364 …. 29.20, 29.27, 29.85 Mendarma Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2), Re (2007) 61 ACSR 601; [2007] NSWSC 99; BC200701685 …. 10.54 Menhaden v Citibank NA (1984) 1 FCR 542 …. 28.34 Meni’s Tailoring and Alterations Pty Ltd v Jeans West Corp Pty Ltd [2003]

FCA 1108; BC200307069 …. 28.23 Mentink v Registrar of Ships [2009] FCA 871; BC200907359 …. 29.66 Mentors Ltd v Evans [1912] 3 KB 174 …. 1.18, 18.68 Menzies v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1161; BC201108166 …. 23.22 Mercer v Graves (1872) LR 7 QB 499 …. 27.3, 27.5 — v Western Australian Planning Commission [2008] WASC 124; BC200900896 …. 8.86, 8.87, 15.75 Mercury Model Aircraft Supplies Ltd, Re [1956] 1 WLR 1153 …. 16.16 Meredyth v Hughes (1829) 3 Y & J 188; 148 ER 1146 …. 11.2 Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] Ch 197; [2007] EWHC 2635 …. 2.14 Meriton Properties Pty Ltd v DCM Leases-Five Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWADT 11; BC201055018 …. 8.91 Merkel v Superannuation Complaints BC201003717 …. 22.62, 22.64

Tribunal

[2010]

FCA

564;

Merribee Pastoral Industries Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1998) 193 CLR 502; BC9802401 …. 28.7, 28.10, 29.2, 29.11, 29.13, 29.82, 29.84, 29.87, 29.120 Merrin v Cairns Port Authority [2002] 1 Qd R 271; [2002] QCA 290; BC200204475 …. 5.51 — v Commissioner of Police [2012] QCA 181; BC201204684 …. 7.24 Mertelmeyer v Mertelmeyer (No 2) (1904) 21 WN (NSW) 76 …. 14.35 Messade v Baires Contracting Pty Ltd (Ruling No 5) [2011] VSC 177; BC201102638 …. 21.31, 21.34 Messiter v Hutchinson (1987) 10 NSWLR 525 …. 13.58 Metalloy Supplies Ltd (in liq) v MA (UK) Ltd [1997] 1 All ER 418 …. 10.53, 22.17, 22.29, 22.36, 22.41 Metcash Trading Ltd v Bunn (No 6) [2009] FCA 266; BC200901920 ….

16.68 — v Hourigan’s IGA Umina Pty Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 21,129; [2003] NSWSC 683; BC200304169 …. 2.33 Meter Cabs Ltd, Re [1911] 2 Ch 557 …. 27.4, 27.5, 27.12, 27.20 Metropolitan Coal Consumers’ Association, Re (1890) 45 Ch D 606 …. 11.4 Metropolitan Petar v Macedonian United Society of Western Australia Inc [2007] WASC 19; BC200700335 …. 29.134 Metsikas v Quirk [2010] NSWSC 756; BC201004761 …. 8.37 — v — (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 757; BC201004762 …. 23.36 Metz Holdings Pty Ltd v Simmac Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] FCA 1450; BC201109797 …. 13.14 MG v WJG [2005] 34 Fam LR 612; [2005] FamCA 1381 …. 3.37 MG Corrosion Consultants Pty Ltd v Vinciguerra (No 2) (2011) 276 ALR 319; [2011] FCAFC 48; BC201101696 …. 22.6 MGICA (1992) Pty Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 70 FCR 236; BC9604664 …. 13.24, 13.61, 16.45 MGV Pty Ltd v Phonographic Performance Co of Australia Ltd [2000] ACopyT 8 …. 6.19 MHG Plastic Industries Pty Ltd v Quality Assurance Services Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 821; BC200203580 …. 28.34, 28.61, 29.21, 29.25, 29.129, 29.132 Michael v Freehill Hollingdale & Page (1990) 3 WAR 223 …. 20.45, 23.3, 23.60 Michael Bickley Pty Ltd v Westinghouse Electric Australasia Ltd (1983) 1 ACLC 967 …. 29.100, 29.102, 29.126 Michel v Bullen (1818) 6 Price 87; 146 ER 749 …. 11.2 Michell Sillar McPhee (a firm) v First Industries Corp (2006) 32 WAR 1; [2006] WASCA 24; BC200600795 …. 27.9, 27.10 Michelotti v Roads Corporation (2009) 26 VR 609; [2009] VSC 195; BC200904026 …. 14.41

Michie (A D), Re (1898) 24 VLR 440 …. 5.54 Michigan (Great Britain) Ltd v Mathew [1966] RPC 47 …. 16.68 Mickelberg v State of Western Australia [2007] WASC 140; BC200705917 …. 8.5, 8.7 Microbio Resources Inc v Betatene Ltd (1993, unreported) …. 28.29 Microsoft Corporation v Marks (No 2) (1996) 69 FCR 144; BC9604154 …. 8.32 Mid-City Skin Cancer and Laser Centre Pty Ltd v Zahedi-Anarak [2006] NSWSC 1149; BC200608956 …. 8.39, 13.66 Middle Harbour Investments Ltd (in liq), Re (1976, unreported); BC7600129 …. 20.13 Middlebrook v Middlebrook (1962) 36 ALJR 216 …. 10.17, 10.22 Middleton v Middleton [2000] WASC 278; BC200007022 …. 15.73 Mifsud v ICT Pty Ltd (1997) 7 Tas R 148; BC9705250 …. 11.19, 11.28, 11.35, 11.36 Mignon Cakes Pty Ltd v Hiltide Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 142; BC200400753 …. 28.61 Mike Gaffikin Marine Pty Ltd v Princes Street Marina Pty Ltd (1996, unreported); BC9603588 …. 11.2 — v — (1997, unreported); BC9707668 …. 11.2 Mikono v Perez (Costs) [2012] FamCA 762; BC201250763 …. 22.71 Mila Properties Pty Ltd v Caldwell [2009] WASC 282; BC200908763 …. 29.124 Milham and Stanford, Marriage of (2001) 27 Fam LR 556; [2001] FamCA 294 …. 6.22 Milillo v Konnecke (2009) 2 ASTLR 235; [2009] NSWCA 109; BC200903916 …. 10.34 Milingimbi Education and Cultural Association Inc v Davies [1990] NTSC 35 …. 14.29

Millar, Will of [1908] VLR 682 …. 10.24 Millea and Duke, Marriage of (1994) 122 FLR 449 …. 22.11, 22.19, 22.20, 22.66 Miller v Australian Record Co Ltd (1955) 73 WN (NSW) 469 …. 29.109, 29.129 — v Baker (1995) 5 Tas R 322; BC9506691 …. 24.2, 24.35, 25.17 — v Cameron (1936) 54 CLR 572; BC3600025 …. 10.13 — v Chapman (2001) 46 ATR 317; [2001] FCA 105; BC200100399 …. 22.76 — v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 249; BC200405423 …. 8.15 — v Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269; BC7800076 …. 20.8 Miller & Co Machinery Pty Ltd v Bear [1934] VLR 85 …. 27.29 Mills v Clifford-Ames [1963] QWN 28 …. 17.80 — v R (1907) 9 WALR 167 …. 27.3 — v Rogers (1899) 18 NZLR 291 …. 26.10 Mills’ Estate, Re (1886) 34 Ch D 24 …. 6.3, 20.32 Millwall, The [1905] P 155 …. 11.63 Milne v Attorney-General (Tas) (1956) 95 CLR 460; BC5600450 …. 7.2 Milner (J H) and Son v Percy Bilton Ltd [1966] 2 All ER 894 …. 4.52 Milosevic v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 31 NSWLR 323; BC9303930 …. 16.13, 16.23, 16.40, 16.41 Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1997, unreported); BC9702144 …. 11.14 Milson v Carter [1893] AC 638 …. 6.21 Milton v Trenerry [2000] NTSC 81; BC200005654 …. 24.46 Minerals Corporation Ltd v Abbot [2004] NSWSC 246; BC200401608 …. 5.38, 5.39 Mineralogy Pty Ltd v National Native Title Tribunal (1998, unreported);

BC9807061 …. 14.61 Minister Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 v Carson (1994) 35 NSWLR 342; BC9403133 …. 19.3, 19.5, 19.6, 19.7, 19.25 Minister for Community Welfare v BY and LF (1988) 93 FLR 104 …. 11.43 Minister for Home Affairs v Beale (1916) 22 CLR 98 …. 17.65, 17.66 Minister for Home and Territories v Smith (1924) 35 CLR 120; BC2090118 …. 1.20 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW (No 3) [2010] FCAFC 102; BC201006025 …. 21.50 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Re (1997) 186 CLR 622; BC9700811 …. 14.66, 14.67 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Re (2004) 217 CLR 264; [2004] HCA 27; BC200403489 …. 24.4 — v Shen (2002) 70 ALD 636; [2002] FCA 899; BC200204043 …. 23.31 — v ‘X’ [2002] FCAFC 93; BC200201392 …. 9.29 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Fonua [2004] FCA 148; BC200400862 …. 22.56 Minister for the Environment v Florence (1979) 21 SASR 108 …. 8.86 Minister for Works v Australian Dredging and General Works Pty Ltd [1986] WAR 235 …. 17.18 Mir Bros Developments Pty Ltd v Atlantic Constructions Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 491 …. 21.17 Mischel v Mischel Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2012] VSC 421; BC201207018 …. 13.73, 13.76, 13.80, 13.82, 13.85, 22.40 Mitanis v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd (1998) ATPR ¶41-623; BC9800783 …. 14.47 Mitchell v Gard (1863) 3 Sw & Tr 275; 164 ER 1280 …. 10.17, 10.18 — v Mitchell (1971) 19 FLR 100 …. 15.83, 17.18

— v Pacific Dawn Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 179; BC200303062 …. 13.7 Mitropoulos v Greek Orthodox Church and Community of Marrickville & District Ltd (1993) 10 ACSR 134; BC9302040 …. 8.44 Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pte Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 344; BC201108674 …. 13.25, 13.73, 13.76, 13.81, 13.89 Mizzi v Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 37; BC200701663 …. 8.6 MLW Technology Pty Ltd v May (No 4) [2003] VSC 293; BC200304423 …. 8.39 Moama Bowling Club Ltd v Armstrong (No 2) (1995) 64 IR 264 …. 21.18 Mobbs v Vandenbrande (1864) 33 LJ (NS) QB 177 …. 22.3 Mobilia v Voudiotis (2002) 4 VR 327; [2002] VSCA 72; BC200202718 …. 29.109, 29.122 Modra v State of Victoria [2012] FCA 240; BC201201405 …. 23.27, 23.37 Mohamed v State of Victoria [2007] VSC 538; BC200711041 …. 13.65 Moir v Vodafone [2009] SASC 234; BC200907335 …. 28.14 Mok v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1993) 47 FCR 81 …. 8.6 Mokau Timber Co v Berry (1908) 11 GLR 212 …. 28.33 Moloney v Collins [2011] NSWSC 628; BC201104690 …. 2.22 — v Coppola [2012] NSWSC 728; BC201205111 …. 4.36 — v Marler & Duvall [2004] QCA 310; BC200405477 …. 26.40 — v Smith [2004] 235 LSJS 158; [2004] SADC 115 …. 2.32 — v Workers Compensation Tribunal (2010) 108 SASR 1; [2010] SASCFC 17; BC201005440 …. 1.7 Molony v ACN 009 697 367 Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] QCA 151; BC200402470 …. 29.106 Momibo Pty Ltd v Adam (2004) Momibo Pty Ltd v Adam (2004) 1 DCLR (NSW) 316 …. 23.56, 23.57

Monaco v Arnedo Pty Ltd (1994) 13 WAR 522; BC9402083 …. 6.21, 20.19 Monazeh v Wheaton [2008] QDC 189 …. 8.34 Mond v Berger (2005) 21 BCL 125; [2004] VSC 150; BC200402294 …. 8.7, 11.2 Mondial Trading Co GmbH v Gill & Duffus Zuckerhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 376 …. 28.36 Money v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) ATPR ¶40-894 …. 15.41 Monie v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 15; BC200801536 …. 13.65, 13.89, 20.24 Monier Ltd v Metalwork Tiling Company of Australia Ltd (No 2) (1987) 43 SASR 588 …. 8.57 Monitronix Ltd v Michael (1992) 7 WAR 195 …. 15.35, 16.52, 23.22, 23.43, 23.60, 23.61 Monkton Court v Perry Prowse (Insurance Services) Ltd [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 566 …. 22.53 Monopak Pty Ltd v Maxim Litigation Consultants [2007] WASC 112; BC200704096 …. 5.12 Montevento Holdings Pty Ltd v Scaffidi Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] WASC 180; BC201005198 …. 23.23 Montgomery v Egan Simpson Solicitors [2005] NSWSC 886; BC200506550 …. 18.74 Moodemere Pty Ltd (in liq) v Waters [1988] VR 215 …. 27.23 Moon v Abrahams [2010] NSWSC 69; BC201000593 …. 7.48 Moore, Re (1996, unreported); BC9605364 …. 4.29 Moore (deceased), Will of (1896) 17 LR (NSW) B & P 78 …. 10.10 Moore v AI Automotive Pty Ltd (2012) 113 SASR 123; [2012] SASCFC 64; BC201204221 …. 24.34 — v Gannon (1915) 32 WN (NSW) 60 …. 8.46 — v Macks [2007] FCA 509; BC200702439 …. 29.106

— v Moore [2004] NSWSC 587; BC200404111 …. 7.48 — v Roe (1629) 1 Rep Ch 38; 21 ER 501 …. 4.55 — v Smith (1859) 1 E & E 597; 120 ER 1034 …. 24.2 — v Woodforth (No 2) [2003] NSWCA 46; BC200301140 …. 13.89 Moore’s (Wallisdown) Ltd v Pensions Ombudsman [2002] 1 WLR 1649 …. 11.55 Moran v House (1924) 35 CLR 60 …. 20.15 Moray v Lane (1993, unreported); BC9303682 …. 4.14 Morbidelli v Resourceco Pty Ltd (2010) 269 LSJS 103; [2010] SASC 107; BC201002639 …. 22.31, 22.50 Mordaunt v Director of Public Prosecutions (2007) 171 A Crim R 510; [2007] NSWCA 121; BC200703976 …. 25.1, 25.8, 25.12 Mordue v Palmer (1870) 6 Ch App 22 …. 16.3 Moreton v Moreton (Costs) [2009] FamCA 51; BC200950079 …. 13.1 Morgan (J P) Portfolio Services Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu [2006] FCA 84; BC200600499 …. 14.48, 16.40 Morgan v Bell (No 2) [2011] VSC 393; BC201106285 …. 14.31 — v Biddle (1980, unreported) …. 24.53 — v Carmarthen Corporation [1957] Ch 455 …. 16.68 — v IT SA Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 119; BC201301228 …. 18.63 — v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 208 …. 20.21, 20.24 — v Meissner [1975] 1 NSWLR 614 …. 4.14 Morlea Professional Services Pty Ltd v Richard Walter Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 764; BC9903235 …. 29.104 Morley v Senewiratne (2010) 30 Qld Lawyer Reps 129; [2008] QDC 296 …. 24.54 Morris, Re [1908] 1 KB 473 …. 26.45 —, Re (1986) 66 ALR 699 …. 21.11

— v Hanley [2001] NSWCA 374; BC200106752 …. 20.33, 29.130 — v Hunt (1819) 1 Chit 544 …. 4.55 — v McEwen (2005) 92 SASR 281; [2005] SASC 284; BC200505379 …. 13.1, 13.57, 13.76, 13.83 — v Riverwild Management Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 439; BC200908994 …. 11.3 Morris Fletcher & Cross’ Bill of Costs, Re [1997] 2 Qd R 228 …. 3.14, 3.33, 3.34, 4.14, 4.17, 4.24, 4.25, 5.51, 5.53 Morrison, Re (1868) LR 4 QB 153 …. 27.6 — v Cook (1971) 4 ACTR 47 …. 13.38 — v Defence Maritime Services Pty Ltd (2007) 156 LGERA 365; [2007] NSWLEC 552; BC200707762 …. 13.2 — v Hudson [2006] 2 Qd R 465; [2006] QCA 170; BC200603675 …. 20.36 Morse v Australian Steam Navigation Company (1870) 9 SCR 81 …. 6.13 Morton v Official Receiver for the Bankruptcy Division of the State of Victoria (1996) 68 FCR 360; BC9603344 …. 7.24, 7.35 — v Palmer (1882) 9 QBD 89 …. 20.19 Moses v State of New South Wales (No 4) (2010) 12 DCLR(NSW) 69; [2010] NSWDC 286; BC201040423 …. 13.51 Mosley, Re (1953) 16 ABC 195 …. 26.1, 26.25 Moss, Re (1866) LR 2 Eq 345 …. 4.48 Mossensons (a firm) v Coastline Associates (1997, unreported); BC9706734 …. 18.40 Mostyn v Mostyn (1870) 5 Ch App 457 …. 4.54 Motakov Ltd v Commercial Hardware Suppliers Pty Ltd (1953) 70 WN (NSW) 64 …. 28.52, 28.57, 29.88 Motium Pty Ltd v Arrow Electronics Australia Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 65; BC201106049 …. 8.39, 8.41 Motor Trades Association of Australia Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd v

Rickus [2007] FCA 1878; BC200711587 …. 11.42, 14.47, 15.17 Motor Vehicle Industry Board v Dawson (2006) 41 SR (WA) 343; [2006] WASAT 8 …. 8.89 Motorplex (Australia) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (No 2) [2007] NSWLEC 770; BC200710300 …. 29.12 Moulding Services Ltd v Rogers (1987) 3 NZCLC 99,900 …. 29.54 Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission (2006) 157 LGERA 1; [2006] WASC 82; BC200704683 …. 8.88, 13.68 Mousawy v Howitt-Stevens Constructions Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 1398; BC201009430 …. 22.68 Mowbray College v Exhib Design & Construction Pty Ltd (in liq) (1987) 5 ACLC 478; BC8600188 …. 28.20 MSW Property Pty Ltd v Law Mortgages Queensland Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 47; BC200400561 …. 15.48 MT Associates Pty Ltd v Aqua-Max Pty Ltd (No 3) [2000] VSC 163; BC200002334 …. 13.58, 13.59, 13.61, 13.65, 13.66, 13.71 Mudie v Gainriver Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] 2 Qd R 271; [2002] QCA 546; BC200207639 …. 8.69 Muller v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1997, unreported); BC9703101 …. 7.42 — v Marriott (1921) 22 SR (NSW) 100 …. 10.21 Mulready v J H & W Bell Ltd [1953] 2 All ER 215 …. 11.28 Multicon Engineering Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corporation (1996) 138 ALR 425; BC9602511 …. 13.22, 13.61 Multistar Pty Ltd v Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning (No 3) (2001) 114 LGERA 106; [2001] NSWLEC 101; BC200102842 …. 7.2 Munday and Bowman, Marriage of (1997) 22 Fam LR 321 …. 16.40 Mundine v Brown (No 7) [2011] NSWSC 170; BC201101510 …. 13.48 Municipal Insurance Associations of British Columbia v British Columbia

(Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1996) 143 DLR (4th) 134 …. 4.30 Munro v West (1997, unreported); BC9706284 …. 22.60 Murano v Bank of Montreal (1998) 163 DLR (4th) 21 …. 15.25, 20.38 Murchie v Big Kart Track Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] 1 Qd R 528; [2002] QCA 339; BC200205207 …. 29.106 Murcia & Associates (a firm) v Grey (2001) 25 WAR 209; [2001] WASCA 240; BC200104876 …. 6.13 Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd v Roads Corporation (2007) 155 LGERA 13; [2007] VSC 175; BC200704110 …. 8.85, 14.62 Murdocca v Murdocca (No 2) [2002] NSWSC 505; BC200203390 …. 20.14 Murdoch v Greer (1900) 17 WN (NSW) 1 …. 11.3 Muriniti v Lyons [2004] NSWSC 135; BC200400840 …. 18.74 Murphy v Liesfield [1930] VLR 142 …. 2.4 — v Young & Co’s Brewery plc [1997] 1 All ER 518 …. 22.17, 22.48, 22.52, 22.53 Murran Investments Pty Ltd v Aromatic Beauty Products Pty Ltd (2000) 191 ALR 579; [2000] FCA 1732; BC200007392 …. 14.48 Murray, Marriage of (1990) 14 Fam LR 311 …. 13.46, 13.47 — v Kingston City Council (2004) 9 VR 261; [2004] VSCA 249; BC200409419 …. 8.45 — v Kirkpatrick (1940) 57 WN (NSW) 162 …. 22.68 Murrell Stephenson, Matter of Bills of Costs of [1992] ANZ Conv R 338 …. 5.51 Murtough v New South Wales Bar Association [2008] NSWADT 166; BC200855242 …. 8.89 Muschinski v Dodds (1986) 160 CLR 583; BC8501051 …. 1.12 Mustac v Medical Board of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 128; BC200706666 …. 21.60

Mustafa v Velos [2012] VSC 133; BC201202226 …. 5.12 Mutual Community Ltd v Lorden Holdings Pty Ltd (1993, unreported); BC9303878 …. 13.18 Myatt v National Coal Board (No 2) [2007] 4 All ER 1094; [2007] EWCA Civ 307 …. 22.24, 22.27, 23.42 MyEnvironment Inc v VicForests [2012] VSC 111; BC201201609 …. 9.6, 16.72 Myer v Myer [1932] VLR 322 …. 1.20, 16.14 Myers v Defries (No 2) (1880) 5 Ex D 5 …. 8.2 — v — (No 2) (1880) 5 Ex D 180 …. 8.2 — v Elman [1940] AC 282 …. 23.2, 23.3, 23.15, 23.16, 23.17, 23.18, 23.21, 23.43, 23.65

N Naamlooze Vennootschap Beleggings Compagnie ‘Uranus’ v Bank of England [1948] 1 All ER 465 …. 28.52, 29.66 Nabatu Pty Ltd v Crawley (1998, unreported); BC9801175 …. 18.39 Nabour v Harris and Churruca [1963] Qd R 321 …. 11.17 Nacika v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 269; BC200104129 …. 9.30 Nadilo v Director of Public Prosecutions (1995) 35 NSWLR 738 …. 25.1, 25.2 NAES v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1221; BC200205846 …. 18.6 NAFL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2006] FMCA 406; BC200602842 …. 22.56 Naidoo v Williamson (2008) 37 WAR 516; [2008] WASCA 179; BC200807578 …. 22.15 Najjar v Haines (1991) 25 NSWLR 224 …. 22.58 Nally v Walsh (1898) 24 VLR 41 …. 1.19

Naomi Marble and Granite Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Company Ltd (No 2) [1999] 1 Qd R 518 …. 13.61, 16.27, 22.17, 22.37, 22.76 Nardell Coal Corporation (in liq) v Hunter Valley Coal Processing Pty Ltd (2003) 46 ACSR 467; [2003] NSWSC 642; BC200304047 …. 14.34 NARI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2003] FMCA 510; BC200307227 …. 23.23 Narradine Pty Ltd v Mascot Steel & Tools Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 385; BC201202777 …. 28.41 Nasic v Dimovski [1988] VR 94 …. 28.7 Nashvying Pty Ltd v Giacomi [2009] QSC 31; BC200901296 …. 17.50 Nasser v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 149 LGERA 289; [2006] NSWLEC 562; BC200607577 …. 8.86 — v United Bank of Kuwait [2002] 1 All ER 401; [2001] EWCA Civ 556 …. 28.42, 29.72 Nassif v Fahd [2007] NSWCA 308; BC200709516 …. 20.8 Nassour v Malouf [2011] NSWSC 356; BC201104016 …. 5.18 Natcraft Pty Ltd v Det Norske Veritas [2002] QCA 241; BC200204104 …. 29.104 National Australia Bank Ltd v Chen-Conway (2008) 2 BFRA 637; [2008] NSWSC 485; BC200803850 …. 15.41, 15.51 — v Hokit Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 377; BC9602450 …. 22.74 — v Juric (No 2) [2001] VSC 398; BC200106690 …. 16.68 — v KDS Construction Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (1987) 163 CLR 668; BC8701823 …. 20.8 — v Larter (No 4) [2007] FMCA 927; BC200704993 …. 23.23, 23.24 — v Petit-Breuilh (No 2) [1999] VSC 395; BC9906930 …. 16.66 — v Skaventos (1996, unreported) …. 23.42 National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Donald Export Trading Ltd [1980] 1 NZLR 97 …. 28.34, 28.41, 28.63, 29.21, 29.24

National Bank of Wales, Re [1902] 2 Ch 412 …. 4.29 National Life Insurance Co Ltd (in liq), Re [1978] 1 WLR 45 …. 16.37 National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Chris Poulson Insurance Agencies Pty Ltd (1998) 8 Tas R …. 16.13, 22.6, 22.26, 22.28, 22.36 National Provincial Bank of England v Games (1886) 31 Ch D 582 …. 15.45 National Safety Council of Australia Victorian Division (in liq), Re (1991) 9 ACLC 675 …. 2.16, 4.29 —, Re (No 2) [1992] 1 VR 485 …. 2.16, 4.57, 5.64, 16.22, 16.35, 16.37, 16.38, 18.65, 18.84 National Westminster Bank Plc v Rabobank Netherland [2008] 1 All ER (Comm) 266; [2007] EWHC 3163 (Comm) …. 7.23 NCR Australia Pty Ltd v Credit Connection Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1118; BC200509669 …. 16.68 Neck v Taylor [1893] 1 QB 560 …. 28.57 Neely v Attorney-General [1984] 2 NZLR 636 …. 29.79 Neesham v 6PR Southern Cross Radio Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] WASC 72; BC200803407, BC200909487 …. 15.74, 16.62 Negus, Re [1895] 1 Ch 73 …. 15.58 Neilson Investments (Qld) Pty Ltd v Spud Mulligan’s Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 295; BC200205740 …. 12.20 Nelipa v Robertson [2009] ACTSC 16; BC200901251 …. 8.60 Nella v Kingia Pty Ltd (1989) ATPR ¶40-952; BC8908172 …. 11.23 Nelmac Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union [1999] FCA 929; BC9904506 …. 14.51 Nelson, Re (1991) 106 ACTR 1 …. 4.32, 4.34, 4.35 — v Nelson [1997] 1 All ER 970 …. 4.48, 23.23 Nelson Capital Pty Ltd v Short [2003] WASC 152; BC200304619 …. 28.40 Nemeth, Marriage of (1987) FLC ¶91-844 …. 8.75

— v Prynew Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 511; BC200904999 …. 13.81 Nendy Enterprises Pty Ltd v New Holland Australia Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 582; BC200107742 …. 28.34, 29.60 Network Welding (in liq) (No 2), Re [2001] NSWSC 809 …. 10.54 Neville, Ex parte (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 372 …. 21.17 —, Re (1896) LR 17 (NSW) (B & P) 24 …. 4.55 New Cap Reinsurance Corporation Holdings Ltd, Re [2001] NSWSC 1001; BC200106853 …. 10.57 New Fenix Compagnie Anonyme D’Assurances de Madrid v General Accident, Fire, and Life Assurance Corp Ltd [1911] 2 KB 619 …. 28.55, 29.65 New Pinnacle Group Silver Mining Co v Luhrig Coal and Ore Dressing Appliances Co (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 50 …. 7.16 New South Wales v Hamod [2011] NSWCA 376; BC201109748 …. 14.45 — v Williamson (2012) 293 ALR 440; [2012] HCA 57; BC201209681 …. 7.52 New South Wales Attorney-General’s Department v Cianfrano [2007] NSWADTAP 71; BC200755188 …. 8.34 New South Wales Bar Association, Ex parte [1967] 1 NSWR 609 …. 3.46 — v Livesey [1982] 2 NSWLR 231 …. 4.54 New South Wales Crime Commission v Fleming (1991) 24 NSWLR 116; BC9101668 …. 3.24, 3.28, 3.33, 3.35, 3.37, 3.38, 4.54, 4.55, 5.3 New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corporation v Reeve (1993) 42 NSWLR 100 …. 13.25, 13.26 New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd v Crawford (1993) 31 NSWLR 469; BC9303940 …. 16.40, 16.45, 16.73 New South Wales Ministerial Corporation v Abualfoul (1999) 94 FCR 247; [1999] FCA 433; BC9901640 …. 22.68, 22.69 New South Wales Treasurer v Wade (1994, unreported); BC9402561 …. 25.10

New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General (NZ) [1994] 1 AC 466 …. 14.19 Newark Pty Ltd (in liq), Re [1993] 1 Qd R 409 …. 10.53 Newbiggin-by-the-Sea Gas Co v Armstrong (1879) 13 Ch D 310 …. 23.24 Newcastle City Council v McShane (No 3) [2005] 65 NSWLR 155; [2005] NSWCA 437; BC200511168 …. 7.53, 7.54 — v Wieland (2009) 74 NSWLR 173; [2009] NSWCA 113; BC200904010 …. 1.20 Newell (G R) (deceased), Re (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 181 …. 17.47 Newmont Yandal Operations Pty Ltd v J Aron Corp (2007) 70 NSWLR 411; [2007] NSWCA 195; BC200706351 …. 6.21 Newtimber (Operations) Pty Ltd v Tarong Energy Corp Ltd [2011] FCA 123; BC201100518 …. 29.25 Newton v Grand Junction Railway Company (1846) 16 M & W 139; 153 ER 1133 …. 19.5 Newton and a Solicitor, Re (1983) FLC ¶91-348 …. 5.44 Newtrend Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd [1990] WAR 1 …. 28.32, 29.25 Nexus Minerals NL v Brutus Constructions Pty Ltd (1997, unreported); BC9704267 …. 8.39 Ng v Chong [2005] NSWSC 385; BC200502550 …. 8.39 — v IP [2009] VSC 199; BC200904272 …. 24.46 Nguyen v Hoekstra (1998) 99 A Crim R 497; BC9800601 …. 24.46 NIAA Corporation Ltd (in liq), Miller v Hindmarsh (1993, unreported); BC9303640 …. 16.35 Niagara Structural Steel (St Catherines) Ltd v W D Laflamme Ltd (1987) 58 OR (2d) 773 …. 13.91 Nicholls v Hall (2009) 2 ASTLR 419; [2007] NSWCA 356; BC200710898 …. 10.38, 10.39 Nicholson, Re (1883) 53 LJ Ch 302 …. 26.8

— v Knaggs (No 2) [2009] VSC 187; BC200904317 …. 26.15 Nicol, Re (2009) 181 ACWS (3d) 178 …. 23.26 Ninan v St George Bank Ltd (2012) 294 ALR 190; [2012] FCA 905; BC201206226 …. 29.73, 29.74 Nieborak v Piper (1990, unreported); BC9001658 …. 16.25, 16.26 Nielsen, Re [1968] Qd R 221 …. 10.35 Niemann v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs [1985] VR 147 …. 2.16 Nigel Witham Ltd v Smith [2008] TCLR 3; [2008] EWHC 12 (TCC) …. 8.7, 8.52 Nikolaou v Papasavas, Phillips & Co (1989) 166 CLR 394 …. 20.2 Nilant v Macchia [2000] FCA 1414; BC200005961 …. 21.8 NIML Ltd v MAN Financial Australia Ltd (No 2) [2004] VSC 510; BC200408704 …. 16.59 Nine Films & Television Pty Ltd v Ninox Television Ltd [2006] FCA 1046; BC200606184 …. 15.15, 15.21 Nixon v Howes (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 156 …. 1.15 NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 2) (2001) 109 FCR 77; [2001] FCA 480; BC200101932 …. 13.61, 16.46 Nobrega v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney (No 2) [1999] NSWCA 133; BC9902730 …. 13.61, 13.64 Nock v Austin (1918) 25 CLR 519; BC1800001 …. 10.25 Nokes v Warton (1842) 5 Beav 448; 49 ER 651 …. 4.14 Nokia Corporation v Liu (2009) 179 FCR 422; [2009] FCAFC 138; BC200909077 …. 12.4 Nolan v George [1959] Qd R 315 …. 7.19 — v Kerry (Canada) [2009] 2 SCR 678; [2009] SCC 39 …. 10.15 — v Nolan (No 2) [2003] VSC 136; BC200302148 …. 13.10 — v — (No 2) [2004] VSCA 134; BC200405042 …. 20.4

Nominal Defendant v Hawkins (2011) 58 MVR 362; [2011] NSWCA 93; BC201103692 …. 13.25 — v Kisse (2001) 22 Qld Lawyer Reps 110; [2001] QDC 290 …. 23.5, 23.23, 23.24, 23.25 Noon v Bondi Beach Astra Retirement Village Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 285; BC201008165 …. 13.76 Noone v Mericka (No 2) [2012] VSC 2; BC201202425 …. 9.9, 9.15 Noosa Shire Council v Johns (2007) 1 PDQR 252; [2007] QPEC 68 …. 8.69 Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513; BC8601421 …. 1.13, 6.17, 20.28, 24.64 Norcast SarL v Bradken Ltd [2012] FCA 765; BC201205357 …. 28.34, 28.36 Nord v Truitt (1987) AIPC ¶90-457 …. 28.7, 28.19, 28.42, 29.33, 29.38, 29.63, 29.71, 29.73 Nordstern Allgemeine Versicherungs AG v Internav Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 139 …. 22.20 Nordstrand v Olsen (1968) 68 DLR (2d) 645 …. 20.22 Norilya Minerals Pty Ltd v Ireland (1994) 12 WAR 485 …. 11.41, 16.70 Norman v Spiers [2005] ACTCA 14; BC200502003 …. 21.4 Norman South Pty Ltd v da Silva (No 2) [2012] VSC 622; BC201209865 …. 23.42 Norris v Hamberger [2008] NSWSC 785; BC200806910 …. 14.65 — v McGeachy [2010] TASSC 20; BC201002606 …. 29.106, 29.123 North Albury Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Albury Municipal Council (1983) 49 LGRA 215 …. 8.87 North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (No 2) [2002] FCA 564; BC200202158 …. 7.16 North Australian Haulage Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1970) 15 FLR 487 …. 12.15

North Groongal Pty Ltd v ANZ McCaughan Ltd (1993) 61 SASR 302 …. 29.13, 29.39, 29.100 North Phoenix Gold Mining Co Ltd v Phoenix Gold Mining Co Ltd (1896) 6 QLJ 307 …. 20.32 North West Construction Co Pty Ltd (in liq) v Marian [1965] WAR 205 …. 27.1, 27.3, 27.4, 27.8, 27.22 Northern Territory of Australia v Doepel (No 2) [2004] FCA 46; BC200400132 …. 9.3 — v Lands and Mining Tribunal (2002) 12 NTLR 139; [2002] NTSC 57; BC200205783 …. 7.26 Northern Territory Fuels Pty Ltd v Hart (1985) 73 FLR 405 …. 14.35 Northampton Coal, Iron, and Waggon Co v Midland Waggon Co (1878) 7 Ch D 500 …. 28.25, 29.19 Northwest Capital Management v Westate Capital Ltd [2012] WASC 121; BC201208926 …. 13.81 Norton v Cooper (1856) 3 Sm & G 375; 65 ER 701 …. 23.23 — v Halse (trustee of bankrupt estate of Payne) (1996) 137 ALR 593; BC9602149 …. 10.50 — v Herald (1913) 17 CLR 76; BC1400060 …. 15.35, 17.93 — v Morphett (1995) 83 A Crim R 90; BC9502468 …. 16.24, 16.25, 24.41, 24.52, 24.53, 24.54 Norwest Refrigeration Services Pty Ltd v Bain Dawes (WA) Pty Ltd (1984) 157 CLR 149; BC8400481 …. 11.17, 11.18 Norwood v Pokaka Timber Company Ltd [1955] NZLR 827 …. 11.20, 11.30 Nossen’s Letter Patent, Re [1969] 1 WLR 638 …. 7.29, 17.37 Notaras v Hugh [2003] NSWSC 919; BC200306111 …. 13.22 Novamaze Pty Ltd v Cut Price Deli Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 1421; BC9805964 …. 1.19 Novasource Consulting Pty Ltd v Primelife Property Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) v ConvR ¶54-671; [2002] VSC 568; BC200207581 …. 16.46

Noye v Robbins (No 6) [2008] WASC 266; BC200810214 …. 7.14, 7.15 — v — [2010] WASCA 83; BC201002738 …. 7.14, 7.15 NRMA Insurance Ltd v B & B Shipping and Marine Salvage Co Pty Ltd (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 273 …. 20.8 Nu Line Construction Group Pty Ltd v Fowler [2012] NSWSC 816; BC201205379 …. 13.79 Nuclear Utility Technology and Environmental Corporation Inc v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2009] NSWSC 78; BC200900997 …. 23.14 Nudd v Mannix [2009] NSWCA 327; BC200909764 …. 7.48 Nudrill Pty Ltd v La Rosa [2010] WASCA 158; BC201009421 …. 20.20, 20.24 Nuncomar v Burdett (1774) 1 Cowp 158; 98 ER 1020 …. 29.65 Nurse v Durnford (1879) 13 Ch D 764 …. 23.24 NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd (2008) 79 IPR 286; [2008] FCA 1542; BC200809001 …. 28.47 Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) [1997] 1 WLR 1627 …. 19.24 Nylex Corp Pty Ltd v Basell Australia Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 97; BC200901898 …. 28.25 Nysan Asia Pacific Pty Ltd v R & D Automation Technology Corp [2012] FCA 193; BC201201082 …. 28.34

O O’Brien, Re (1895) 21 VLR 100 …. 23.31 — v Doherty [2008] NSWSC 205; BC200801428 …. 18.74 — v Tracy (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 44 …. 10.4, 16.35 O’Brien (J & M) Enterprises Pty Ltd v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (1983) 70 FLR 261 …. 28.19 O’Callaghan v Duhst [1931] SASR 369 …. 28.6

O’Connell v Short (1985) 20 A Crim R 111 …. 24.10 O’Connor v Fitti [2000] NSWSC 540; BC200003316 …. 18.74 — v Star Newspaper Co Ltd (1893) 68 LT 146 …. 8.40 O’Connor’s Bills of Costs, Re [1993] 1 Qd R 423 …. 17.18 O’Dea v Fletcher (1992, unreported); BC9200904 …. 24.39 O’Donnell, Re [1929] SASR 256 …. 10.17, 10.23 O’Donoghue v Downer & Co Ltd [1953] NZLR 758 …. 4.55 O’Dougherty v McMahon [1971] VR 625 …. 12.2, 12.14, 12.15 O’Driscoll (Elizabeth), Will of (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 559 …. 10.17, 10.24 O’Halloran v Stephen (1991) 7 WAR 477 …. 4.44, 4.49, 23.58, 23.60 O’Hara, Matthews & Co v Elliott & Co [1893] 1 QB 362 …. 17.59 O’Keefe v Australian Trencher Company Pty Ltd (1991, unreported); BC9100297 …. 12.17, 12.22 — v Hayes Knight GTO Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1559; BC200509352 …. 22.15 — v Seafresh Holdings Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1090; BC200909362 …. 29.74 O’Keeffe Nominees Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (No 2) (1995) 55 FCR 591; BC9507763 …. 11.42, 11.46, 14.23, 14.30, 22.15 O’Neill v De Leo (1993) 2 Tas R 225 …. 22.17, 28.6, 29.30 — v Mann [2000] FCA 1680; BC200007290 …. 14.63 — v Williams (costs) [2007] NSWSC 51; BC200700492 …. 8.36, 8.47 — v Wilson [2011] QSC 220; BC201105802 …. 3.11 O’Rourke v Commissioner for Railways (1893) 10 WN (NSW) 49 …. 15.33, 15.34, 15.36, 16.15, 17.30, 17.31 — v P & B Corporation Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 36; BC200812453 …. 15.73 O’Shea v O’Shea (1890) 15 PD 59 …. 24.13 O’Sullivan, Re [1937] QSR 50 …. 2.4

— v Morton [1911] VLR 249 …. 8.2, 8.17 — v New South Wales Medical Board (No 2) [2010] NSWADT 188; BC201055179 …. 8.93 O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 232; BC9102638 …. 11.46, 11.47 — v Scott [1965] AC 939 …. 6.9 Oasis Hotel Ltd v Zurich Insurance Co (1981) 124 DLR (3d) 455 …. 22.55 Obad v McDonald (1999) 28 MVR 323; [1999] ACTSC 3; BC9900186 …. 24.46 Obirek v Rur Mun of Bifrost & Coleman [1931] 2 DLR 476 …. 27.18 Octocane Pty Ltd v SRJ Property Development Pty Ltd (1999) 74 SASR 471; [1999] SASC 231; BC9902914 …. 29.100, 29.129 Octaviar Ltd (No 8) [2010] QCA 57; BC201001434 …. 11.53 Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Forrest [2000] FCA 907; BC200003757 …. 21.11 — v Kioussis (2000) NSW ConvR ¶55-936; [2000] NSWSC 248; BC200001428 …. 26.40, 26.41 Ofria v Cameron [2008] NSWCA 159; BC200805339 …. 4.57 Ogier v Norton (1904) 29 VLR 536 …. 7.37, 7.38, 17.57 Ogilvie, Re [1910] P 243 …. 15.35 Olbourne v Olbourne (1950) 67 WN (NSW) 106 …. 27.28 Old v Hodgkinson [2010] NSWSC 1335; BC201008767 …. 10.1 — v McInnes [2011] NSWCA 410; BC201110349 …. 13.11, 13.59 Oldaker v Currington [1987] VR 712 …. 16.16, 17.72, 17.75, 17.76, 17.80, 17.86, 20.28 Olivaylle Pty Ltd v Flottweg GMBH & Co KGAA (No 6) [2011] FCA 688; BC201104321 …. 15.14, 15.15, 15.20 Oliveri v P M Sulcs & Associates Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1198; BC201210316 …. 2.21, 4.17

— v P M Sulcs & Associates Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] NSWCA 84; BC201301951 …. 4.17 Olsen v Nodcad Pty Ltd (1999)) 32 ACSR 118; [1999] NSWSC 364; BC9901896 …. 10.53 Olympic Holdings Pty Ltd v Lochel [2004] WASC 61; BC200401675 …. 2.1 1465778 Ontario Inc v 1122077 Ontario Ltd (2006) 82 OR (3d) 757 …. 7.15 One.Tel Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 101 FCR 548; [2000] FCA 270; BC200000891 …. 14.65 Onions v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 270 …. 21.17 Ontario, 671122 Ltd v Canadian Tire Corp (1993) 107 DLR (4th) 207 …. 28.19 Opalswan Pty Ltd v Commercial & General Acceptances Pty Ltd (1996, unreported); BC9606373 …. 12.4 Oppenshaw v Whitehead (1854) 9 Ex 383; 156 ER 163 …. 11.4 Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 156; BC200501227 …. 19.14 Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board [1987] 1 QB 565 …. 23.7, 23.8, 23.9, 23.30, 23.38, 23.60, 23.62, 23.67 Orcher v Bowcliff Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1429; BC201209135 …. 13.11 Oreski v Ikac [2007] WASC 195; BC200708581 …. 10.18 — v — [2008] WASCA 220; BC200809666 …. 10.18 Oriakhel v Vickers [2008] CP Rep 37; [2008] EWCA Civ 748 …. 22.20 Oriental Bank Corporation, Re (1887) 56 LT 868 …. 20.31 Orio Holdings Pty Ltd v Costi & Co (No 1) [2007] SASC 403; BC200709912 …. 2.4 Orpen v Tarantello [2009] VSC 143; BC200902664 …. 23.28 Orr v Grogan (2000) NSW Conv R ¶55-931; [1999] NSWSC 665; BC9903744 …. 4.38

— v Lusute (1987) 72 ALR 617 …. 29.2 — v I P Shannon Ltd [1966] NZLR 479 …. 11.34 — v State of Tasmania [2010] TASSC 28; BC201004313 …. 7.25, 17.56 Orrong Strategies Pty Ltd v Village Roadshow Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSC 205; BC200704581 …. 8.5, 13.85 Osborn & Osborn, Re [1913] 3 KB 862 …. 5.54, 16.21 Osborne, Re (1858) 25 Beav 353; 53 ER 671 …. 5.40 — v Kelly (1999) 75 SASR 392; [1999] SASC 486; BC9907380 …. 19.17, 19.18, 19.19 — v Smith (1960) 105 CLR 153; BC6000780 …. 11.41 Oscar, Re [2002] NSWSC 887; BC200205814 …. 21.17 Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1994) 82 LGERA 236; BC9402433 …. 9.24 — v — (1998) 193 CLR 72; BC9800310 …. 6.15, 6.16, 6.17, 7.2, 7.5, 8.39, 9.2, 9.4, 9.7, 9.8, 9.11, 9.12, 9.14, 9.16, 9.18, 9.19, 9.20, 9.24, 9.25, 9.26, 14.1 — v Rous Water (No 3) [2012] NSWLEC 132; BC201204204 …. 9.5 Osment, Estate of [1914] P 129 …. 10.25 Osmond v Mutual Cycle and Manufacturing Supply Company Ltd [1899] 2 QB 488 …. 5.32 Oswald v Australian Steamships Ltd [1914] VLR 329 …. 20.24 Otter Gold NL v Barcon (NT) Pty Ltd (2000) 10 NTLR 189; [2000] NTSC 100; BC200007970 …. 14.29, 14.53 Our Town FM Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 3) (1987) 77 ALR 609 …. 22.63 Ottway v Jones [1955] 1 WLR 706 …. 8.62, 8.64, 20.30 Outdoor Australia Pty Ltd v Auburn Council (1996) 89 LGERA 365 …. 6.18 Overton Investments Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the Environmental

Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (2001) 113 LGERA 439; [2001] NSWCA 137; BC200102232 …. 6.15, 8.86, 20.32 Owen v Musladin (No 2) [2010] ACTCA 24; BC201007551 …. 13.93, 14.35 — v Willtara Construction Pty Ltd [1998] NSWLEC 216 …. 24.47, 24.48 Owners Strata Plan 45205 v Andreones Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1189; BC200910025 …. 3.5 Owners Strata Plan 61172 v Stratabuild Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1568 …. 21.18 Owners Strata Plan 70150 v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2010] NSWSC 759; BC201004763 …. 19.13 Ox Operations Pty Ltd v Land Mark Property Developments (Vic) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2007] FCA 1221; BC200706519 …. 23.24 Oxer v Astec Paints Australia Pty Ltd [2008] 254 LSJS 57; [2008] SASC 64; BC200801568 …. 20.45 Oz B & S Pty Ltd v Elders IXL Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 128; BC9304936 …. 22.37, 22.47 Ozkilinc v R [2000] TASSC 59; BC200002891 …. 25.22

P P (a barrister), Re [2002] 1 Cr App R 207; [2001] EWCA Crim 1728 …. 23.3, 23.18, 23.67 P v Australian Crime Commission (No 3) (2008) 71 ATR 816; [2008] FCA 1520; BC200809371 …. 11.42 P’s Bill of Costs, Re (1982) 8 Fam LR 489 …. 3.24, 3.25 Pacific Acceptance Corporation Ltd v Forsyth (No 2) [1967] 2 NSWR 402 …. 28.19, 29.24 Pacific Blue Australia Pty Ltd v Somalis [2008] NSWSC 75; BC200800526 …. 16.57 Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] FCA 401; BC200502073 …. 16.54

Pacific Indemnity Underwriting Agency Pty Ltd v Maclaw No 651 Pty Ltd (2005) 13 VR 483; [2005] VSCA 165; BC200504451 …. 15.57 Pacific Publications Pty Ltd v Next Publishing Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 971; BC200505045 …. 16.49 Packer v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) [1985] 1 Qd R 275 …. 4.30 — v Meagher [1984] 3 NSWLR 486 …. 16.58 Packing In Ltd (in liq) v Chilcott (2003) 16 PRNZ 958 …. 22.77 Pagliarella, Marriage of (No 3) (1994) 122 FLR 443 …. 22.11, 22.17, 22.65 Paino v Paino — Costs [2006] NSWSC 886; BC200606957 …. 8.80 Painting v University of Oxford [2005] 3 Costs LR 394; [2005] EWCA Civ 161 …. 8.53 Palamore Pty Ltd v Shire of Broome (1998, unreported); BC9803477 …. 21.2 Palmdale Insurance Ltd, Re (1994) 122 FLR 15 …. 21.11 Palmer v Haddad (2000) 26 Fam LR 359; [2000] NSWSC 545; BC200003325 …. 20.30 — v Walesby (1868) 3 Ch App 732 …. 22.3 Pampered Paws Connection Pty Ltd v Pets Paradise Franchising (Qld) Pty Ltd (No 7) [2010] FCA 626; BC201004088 …. 28.64 Pamplin v Express Newspapers Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 689 …. 18.24 Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd, Re (2004) 48 ACSR 681; [2004] NSWSC 129; BC200400814 …. 22.15 Pangas v Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd [2000] NSWSC 140; BC200000879 …. 15.44, 15.53 Panieras and Home Owners Warranty, Re (2000) 17 VAR 65; [2000] VCAT 2500 …. 15.38 Papas v Papas [2004] WASCA 6; BC200400144 …. 6.20 Paramount Lawyers Pty Ltd v Maneschi [2012] NSWSC 877; BC201205777

…. 4.57 Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board (2007) 33 WAR 361; [2007] WASCA 97; BC200703452 …. 8.89 Paris King Investments Pty Ltd v Rayhill [2006] NSWSC 578; BC200604301 …. 28.37 Paris, The [1896] P 77 …. 27.9, 27.23 Parish v Wu (No 2) [2010] VSC 64; BC201001222 …. 13.30 Parisi v Nigro [2006] NSWCA 121; BC200603286 …. 16.59 Park, Re (1889) 41 Ch D 326 …. 5.51 Parker v Blenkhorn (1888) 59 LT 906 …. 5.54 — v Falkiner (1889) 10 LR (NSW) L 7 …. 20.23 — v Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities (No 2) [2012] FCA 263; BC201201485 …. 9.14 — v National Roads and Motorists’ Association (1993) 11 ACSR 370; BC9302091 …. 14.9, 16.36 — v Parker (1992) 16 Fam LR 458; BC9201709 …. 14.16 Parker-Tweedale v Dunbar Bank plc (No 3) [1991] Ch 26 …. 15.46 Parkesinclair Chemicals (Aust) Pty Ltd v Asia Associates Inc [2000] VSC 336; BC200005192 …. 21.21 Parkes-Linnegar v Watson (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 181; BC201104913 …. 10.4, 10.9 Parkins v McDonald (1969) …. 23.43 Parlin Pty Ltd v Choiceone Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 19; BC201208941 …. 13.14, 13.61, 13.90 Paron v Fry (No 2) [1990] 1 Qd R 550 …. 11.35 Paroz v Clifford Gouldson Lawyers [2012] QDC 151 …. 2.31, 3.6, 3.11 — v Paroz [2010] QSC 157; BC201003065 …. 16.62 Parramatta River Lodge Pty Ltd v Sunman [1991] 5 BPR 12,038;

BC9101975 …. 4.28, 4.29, 5.13, 16.25 Parsons, Ex parte (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 380 …. 21.17 Partridge v Hobart City Council (No 2) [2013] TASFC 1; BC201300256 …. 13.18, 20.4, 21.21 Pasdale Pty Ltd v Concrete Constructions (1995) 131 ALR 268; BC9506502 …. 29.20, 29.22, 29.101 Pascoe v National Futrax Pty Ltd (1995) 33 IPR 43; BC9501562 …. 16.54 Pascon Pty Ltd v San Marco in Lamis Cooperative Social Club Ltd [1991] 2 VR 227 …. 21.51, 21.54 Passenger, Re (1900) 26 VLR 194 …. 5.45 Passey v Chanaka Bandarage [2002] ACTSC 105; BC200206449 …. 3.25, 3.29 Pastras v Commonwealth of Australia [1967] VR 161 …. 20.19 Pastrello v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2000) 110 LGERA 223; [2000] NSWLEC 209; BC200006026 …. 8.86, 8.87, 8.88 Pate v Buckley [2006] VCC 1269 …. 17.55 Patent Gesellschaft AG v Saudi Livestock Transport and Trading Company (1996) 33 IPR 461; BC9607070 (FCA) …. 8.6 Paterson v Provost etc of St Andrews (1881) 6 App Cas 833 …. 20.6 Pathak v James Nourse Ltd [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 467 …. 14.37 Pathway Investments Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2012] VSC 97; BC201201544 …. 28.33, 28.38, 28.40 Patience, Ex parte (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 96 …. 26.43, 27.1, 27.3, 27.6, 27.12, 27.14 Paton v Campbell Capital Ltd (1993, unreported); BC9304881 …. 29.105 Patrick Stevedores (No 1) Pty Ltd v Vaughan [2002] NSWCA 422; BC200208052 …. 13.90 Patros v Patros (2007) 16 VR 182; [2007] VSC 83; BC200701996 …. 10.11 Patterson v Cohen [2005] NSWSC 635; BC200504862 …. 2.31, 27.13

— v Wooler (1876) 2 Ch D 586 …. 10.8 Paul & Paul Pty Ltd v Business Licensing Authority (No 2) [2010] VSC 500; BC201008331 …. 21.60 Pavelic Investments Pty Ltd, Re (1983) 8 ACLR 417 …. 29.54 PCRZ Investments Pty Ltd v National Golf Holdings Ltd [2002] VSCA 24; BC200201065 …. 16.45 Pearl Hill Pty Ltd v Concorp Construction Group (Vic) Pty Ltd (2011) 32 VR 247; [2011] VSCA 99; BC201101872 …. 14.61 Pearl Lingerie Australia Pty Ltd v TGY Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 451; BC201207466 …. 16.57, 23.6 Pearson, Re (1993) 46 FCR 55; BC9305096 …. 10.50 — v Naydler [1977] 3 All ER 531 …. 28.19, 28.33, 28.39, 29.4, 29.5, 29.6, 29.7, 29.9, 29.19, 29.78 — v Williams [2002] VSC 30; BC200200650 …. 13.58, 13.65, 13.66 Peat v Clayton [1906] 1 Ch 659 …. 26.26 Pecheries Ostendaises (Soc Anon) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co [1928] 1 KB 750 …. 16.3, 16.10, 16.14, 17.3, 17.4, 17.5, 17.6 Peden Pty Ltd v Bortolazzo [2006] QCA 405; BC200608426 …. 21.54 Peel v London & North Western Railway Co [1907] 1 Ch 607 …. 16.14, 17.92 Peet Ltd v Richmond [2010] VSCA 71; BC201001807 …. 16.56 Pegrum v Fatharly (1996) 14 WAR 92; BC9601333 …. 2.7, 2.9, 2.10 Peile v Nobel (Australasia) Pty Ltd [1966] VR 433 …. 17.76, 17.77, 17.78, 17.80 Pelly v Wathen (1851) 1 De G M & G 16; 42 ER 457 …. 26.36 Pelster v Pelster [1936] 3 All ER 783 …. 15.35 Pendennis Shipyard Ltd v Magrathea (Pendennis) Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 315 …. 22.53 Pender, Re (1846) 8 Beav 299; 41 ER 868 …. 4.19

—, Re (1847) 10 Beav 390; 50 ER 632 …. 4.14, 4.19 Penfold v Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311; BC8000063 …. 8.70, 8.71, 8.72, 8.75, 20.33 Peninsula Watchdog Group (Inc) v Couer Gold New Zealand Ltd [1997] 3 NZLR 463 …. 9.11 Penn v Bristol & West Building Society [1997] 1 WLR 1356 …. 7.22 Pennington (deceased), Re [1972] VR 869 …. 21.1, 21.23 Pennington v Reliance Motor Works Ltd [1923] 1 KB 127 …. 26.43 Pennisi, Marriage of (1997) 22 Fam LR 249 …. 13.43, 13.44 Penrith City Council v Parks (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 381; BC200407208 …. 7.54 Pentelow v Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 111; BC201301265 …. 3.6, 4.57, 4.58 Pentroth Pty Ltd v Kirschild Pty Ltd (2006) 96 SASR 129; [2006] SASC 356; BC200609675 …. 14.63, 24.34 Pepys v London Transport Executive [1975] 1 WLR 234 …. 6.16 Perkins v Adcock (1845) 14 M & W 808; 153 ER 703 …. 29.41 — v County Court of Victoria (2000) 2 VR 246; [2000] VSCA 171; BC200005953 …. 24.13, 24.15, 24.17 — v Williams (1905) 22 WN (NSW) 107 …. 10.47 Perks v Cox [1964] NSWR 71 …. 1.10, 15.2, 15.32, 15.33, 15.34, 16.14, 17.80, 17.83, 17.88 Perlman v Perlman (1984) 155 CLR 474; BC8400537 …. 11.47 Permanent Building Society v Wheeler (No 2) (1993) 10 WAR 569 …. 8.4, 8.11 Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (1998, unreported); BC9802305 …. 8.5 Permanent Trustee Co, Ex parte (1897) 14 WN (NSW) 61 …. 8.62 — v Redman (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 353 …. 10.1

Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association of Australia Ltd v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Company Ltd (1903) 29 VLR 427 …. 17.3, 17.4 — v Wright (1917) 23 CLR 185; BC1700038 …. 20.16 Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v Baker [1999] NSWCA 244; BC9904032 …. 10.18, 10.21, 20.18 — v Watson (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 13 …. 10.28, 11.58 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Barker (2004) 232 LSJS 400; [2004] SASC 58; BC200400942 …. 15.48 — v Schmidt (No 3) [2010] VSC 261; BC201004092 …. 15.55 Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Cipri [2009] NSWSC 335; BC200903367 …. 13.65 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1998) 157 ALR 433; BC9804988 …. 28.45, 29.87 Perry v Comcare (2006) 150 FCR 319; [2006] FCA 33; BC200600209 …. 13.65 — v Jackson [1998] 4 VR 463; BC9801087 …. 29.31, 29.33, 29.37, 29.47 — v R [1975] WAR 33 …. 21.39, 24.18 — v Rolfe [1948] VLR 297 …. 15.44 Perry & Co Ltd v I Hessin & Co (1913) 108 LT 332 …. 17.44 Pester v Hydro-Electric Corporation (1997) 7 Tas R 233; BC9705851 …. 11.4, 11.5 Petar v Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 142; BC200704622 …. 6.16, 14.25 Peter Breese & Associates Pty Ltd v CCI Holdings Ltd (2004) 2 DCLR(NSW) 157 …. 22.37, 22.77, 22.78 Petera Pty Ltd v EAJ Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 375 …. 8.27 Peters v Peters (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 398 …. 6.15, 6.16, 10.24 Petersen v R [1950] NZLR 691 …. 20.21 Peterson v Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 5) (2010) 87 IPR 234; [2010] FCA 605; BC201004085 …. 8.6

Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras [2007] 2 Costs LR 212; [2006] EWCA Civ 1038 …. 22.28, 22.29, 22.38 Petrotrade Inc v Texaco Ltd [2001] 4 All ER 853; [2000] EWCA Civ 512 …. 16.23 Petrunic v Barnes [1989] VR 927 …. 17.39 Pezet v Pezet (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 45 …. 6.13 PGA Group Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 789) Ltd [2011] VSC 420; BC201106666 …. 8.10 PGF II SA v OMFS Company [2012] EWHC 83 (TCC) …. 8.51 Pharmos Nominees Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Taxation (No 2) [2012] SASC 34; BC201201360 …. 8.6 Philby v Nazle (1860) 8 CBNS 647; 141 ER 1320 …. 4.14 Philippa Power & Associates v Primrose Couper Cronin Rudkin [1997] 2 Qd R 266; BC9700271 …. 26.10, 27.1, 27.21 Philips Electronics Australia Pty Ltd v Matthews (2002) 54 NSWLR 598; 2002] NSWCA 157; BC200202749 …. 28.6, 28.7 Phillips v Morris [1999] 1 Qd R 89; BC9800983 …. 6.9, 24.29 — v Symes [2004] 4 All ER 519; [2004] EWHC 2330 …. 22.20 Philmac Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks (No 2) (2003) 57 IPR 526; [2003] FCA 207; BC200301041 …. 9.21 Phipson Nominees Pty Ltd v French (1989) 91 ALR 509 …. 21.2 Photographic Artists Co-op Supply Association, Re (1883) 23 Ch D 370 …. 29.111 Physical Disability Council of New South Wales v Sydney City Council [1999] FCA 815; BC9903263 …. 9.20 Pickering v Smoothpool Nominees Pty Ltd (No 6) (2001) 217 LSJS 178; [2001] SASC 440; BC200108219 …. 18.77 Pickford v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1981] VR 583 …. 21.1, 21.58 Pico Holdings Inc v Voss [2002] VSC 319; BC200204469 …. 16.68

Picone v Velos [2007] FCA 1183; BC200706449 …. 16.59 Piddington v Bennett & Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533; BC4090107 …. 20.24 — v Philip (1893) 14 LR (NSW) Eq 159 …. 8.57 Pikor v Fletcher [1980] Tas R 55 …. 24.12, 24.13, 24.64 — v Smith [1982] Tas R 239 …. 24.35 Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) [2002] SASC 230; BC200204306 …. 20.36 Pine v Law Society [2002] 2 All ER 658; [2002] EWCA Civ 175 …. 5.40 Pink v J A Sharwood & Co Ltd [1913] 2 Ch 286 …. 22.68 Pinna v Kuek [1999] 8 Beav 66; 50 ER 26 …. 4.18 Pinot Nominees Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 181 FCR 392; [2009] FCA 1508; BC200911393 …. 13.64 Pinto v Kinkela [2003] WASC 126; BC200303434 …. 14.64 Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (in liq) v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1176; BC200609151 …. 8.27 — v — (2007) 65 ACSR 383; [2007] NSWCA 344; BC200710441 …. 28.21, 29.92, 29.94, 29.95, 29.96, 29.108, 29.113 Piper Alderman (a firm) v Australian Medic-Care Company Ltd [2011] SASC 234; BC201109979 …. 2.4 Piras v Egan [2007] NSWCA 26; BC200700931 …. 29.109 Pirone v Craig J Roberts (Solicitor) Pty Ltd (2006) 244 LSJS 284; [2006] SASC 134; BC200603180 …. 3.49 Pirrotta v Citibank Ltd (1998) 72 SASR 259 …. 13.18, 13.24, 13.57, 13.58, 13.61, 13.83, 20.30 Pisani v Rodgers [2009] FamCA 346; BC200950218 …. 8.32, 22.71 Pittman v Prudential Deposit Bank Ltd (1896) 13 TLR 110 …. 3.46 Pittman Estate v Bain (1994) 112 DLR (4th) 494 …. 11.3 Pittorino v Yates [2009] NSWCA 87; BC200903190 …. 13.5

Pittwater Council v Bolitho [2007] NSWLEC 355; BC200704811 …. 7.29 Pizimolas v Pizimolas (No 2) [2010] SASC 209; BC201004890 …. 10.34 Planet International Ltd v Turfella Pty Ltd (1991, unreported); BC9101458 …. 17.12, 17.16, 17.56, 17.62 Plante v James [2011] QCA 109; BC201103680 …. 22.36 Plating Co v Farquharson (1881) 17 Ch D 49 …. 16.68 Playcorp Group of Companies Pty Ltd v Bodum A/S (No 2) [2010] FCA 455; BC201003279 …. 15.15 Player v Anderson (1846) 15 Sim 104; 60 ER 556 …. 29.80 Plaza Print Pty Ltd v South British Insurance Co Ltd (1984) 68 FLR 340 …. 28.34, 29.5 Plimsoll v Drake (No 2) (1995, unreported); BC9503804 …. 10.11 Plumb v Comcare (1992) 39 FCR 236; BC9203846 …. 6.13 — v Penrith City Council (2003) 126 LGERA 109; [2003] NSWLEC 161; BC200303734 …. 9.25 Polak v Winchester (Marchioness) [1956] 2 All ER 660 …. 5.58, 18.90 Poletti, Marriage of (1990) 15 Fam LR 794 …. 14.16 Police v McIntosh [2009] SASC 253; BC200908115 …. 24.32 — v Pericic (2008) 100 SASR 141; [2008] SASC 59; BC200801204 …. 24.34 Polkinghorne v Holland (1934) 51 CLR 143; BC3400018 …. 2.12 Pollard v Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 486; BC200703557 …. 13.81 Polwood Pty Ltd v Foxworth (No 2) (2008) 79 IPR 168; [2008] FCAFC 168; BC200808846 …. 8.5 Polycarpou v Police [2008] SASC 113; BC200802863 …. 24.33 Ponser v McDiarmid Co Ltd [1931] 2 DLR 598 …. 27.18 Ponsonby Mall Trust Ltd v New Zealand Food Industries Ltd (2006,

unreported) …. 14.40 Pope v Pope (Costs) [2012] FamCA 655; BC201250506 …. 8.78 Popovic v ACN 098 054 678 Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 612; BC201209693 …. 11.18, 11.28 — v Murray (1991, unreported) …. 8.65 Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Braverus Maritime Inc (No 2) (2004) 212 ALR 281; [2004] FCA 1437; BC200407318 …. 13.25, 13.30 Port Macquarie-Hastings Council v Lawlor Services Pty Ltd (No 7) (2008) 159 LGERA 87; [2008] NSWLEC 75; BC200800832 …. 24.26 Port Stephens Council v Samson [2007] 156 LGERA 125; [2007] NSWCA 299; BC200709106 …. 6.17, 8.82, 8.83, 8.84 — v Theodorakakis (No 2) (2006) 67 NSWLR 299; [2006] NSWCA 143; BC200604520 …. 7.54 Portazon Pty Ltd v Fair Trading Tribunal [1999] NSWSC 1084; BC9907283 …. 21.18 Porter v Aalders Auctioneers and Valuers Pty Ltd [2011] NSWDC 96; BC201140120 …. 29.66 — v Australian Prudential Regulations Authority [2009] FCA 1148; BC200909253 …. 16.47 — v Bonarrigo (No 2) [2010] VSC 302; BC201005165 …. 13.86 — v Gordian Runoff Ltd [2004] NSWCA 171; BC200405168 …. 29.110 — v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 680; BC200104664 …. 3.51, 16.26, 17.55, 17.81 Porzelack KG v Porzelak (UK) Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 420 …. 29.65, 29.68, 29.72, 29.82, 29.84, 29.85, 29.90 Post v Colbert (1978) 20 SASR 62 …. 11.8, 11.22, 11.23 Potier v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCA 520; BC200402298 …. 18.6 Potter v Dickenson (1905) 2 CLR 668; BC0500010 …. 1.6

— v Potter [1982] 1 WLR 1255 …. 13.56 Potter Drug & Chemical Corporation v Malouf (1900) 17 WN (NSW) 140 …. 6.16, 7.8 Potts (W T), Re [1935] 1 Ch 334 …. 17.80, 17.90 Potts v Commissioner of Public Works [1939] SASR 400 …. 13.38 — v Moran (1976) 16 SASR 284 …. 12.22 Poulin v Pettitt (1992) 10 CPC (3d) 29 …. 27.29 Poulton v Moore [1913] WN 349 …. 11.22 Pourzand v Telstra Corp Ltd [2012] WASC 210; BC201204442 …. 13.73, 13.75, 17.39 Powell, Re (1894) 6 QLJ 36 …. 24.2 Powell (A L) Holdings Pty Ltd v Dick [2012] QCA 254; BC201207353 …. 20.40 Power v Lewis (2007) 28 Qld Lawyer Reps 146; [2007] QDC 188 …. 24.29, 24.31 Power & Power’s Bills of Costs, Re [1996] 2 Qd R 202; BC9404063 …. 5.43 Powers v R (2000) 9 Tas R 323; [2000] TASSC 155; BC200006621 …. 25.17 PPCS Ltd v Richmond Ltd [2005] 1 NZLR 201; [2004] NZCA 219 …. 9.17 Prantage v Prantage [2012] FamCA 661; BC201250891 …. 8.59, 15.59 Pratten v Warringah Shire Council (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 134 …. 8.44, 8.45 Pray v Edie (1786) 1 TR 267; 99 ER 1087 …. 29.65 Preddis v Coombes (1931) 26 Tas LR 168 …. 17.59, 20.21, 20.26 Prees v Coke (1871) 6 Ch App 645 …. 4.34 Prekookeanska Plovidba v LNT Lines Srl [1988] 3 All ER 897 …. 26.10 Premier Building & Consulting Pty Ltd v Spotless Group Ltd (No 13) [2007] VSC 516; BC200711357 …. 13.69

Premier Capital (China) Ltd v Sandhurst Trustees Ltd [2011] VSC 572; BC201108797 …. 28.40, 28.51, 29.74 Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Scots Church Development Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 797; BC200705717 …. 14.34 Presland v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] NSWDC 178; BC200940224 …. 25.10, 25.11 Preston v Harbour Pacific Underwriting Management Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 247; BC200711769 …. 29.109, 29.110 — v Preston [1936] ALR 104 …. 15.34 — v — [1982] 1 All ER 41 …. 16.64 Preston Banking Co v William Allsup & Sons [1895] 1 Ch 141 …. 6.22 Preti v Conservation Land Corporation (2007) 20 NTLR 121; [2007] NTSC 34; BC200703854 …. 13.6, 13.30 — v Sahara Tours Pty Ltd (2008) 22 NTLR 215; [2008] NTCA 2; BC200802238 …. 13.6, 13.30 — v — (No 2) (2008) 22 NTLR 228; [2008] NTCA 3; BC200804036 …. 13.89, 13.91 Price (deceased), Re [1941] St R Qd 205 …. 15.34, 17.87 Price, Re (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 444 …. 11.58 — v Clinton [1906] 2 Ch 487 …. 15.58 — v Ikin [2004] NSWSC 706; BC200405453 …. 14.65 — v Rhondda Urban District Council [1923] All ER 679 …. 11.59 Priest v Whitney and Houston (No 2) [1961] QWN 4 …. 11.17 Prime Forme Cutting Pty Ltd v Baltica General Insurance Co (1989) 8 ACLC 29 …. 29.94, 29.95 Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd v CCP Australian Airships Ltd (No 2) [2003] VSC 141; BC200302234 …. 13.6, 13.82, 13.85 Prince v Haworth [1905] 2 KB 768 …. 8.95 Principal Strategic Options Pty Ltd v Coshott (2003) 130 FCR 143; [2003]

FCA 932; BC200305021 …. 13.11, 13.57 Prineas v Forestry Commission of New South Wales (1983) 49 LGRA 403 …. 9.13 — v — (1984) 53 LGRA 160 …. 9.13 Pringle v Gloag (1879) 10 Ch D 676 …. 8.14, 8.16, 8.17 Prior v Lansdowne Press Pty Ltd [1977] VR 65 …. 12.15 Pritchard v Roberts (1873) LR 17 Eq 222 …. 22.68 Probiotec Ltd v University of Melbourne (2008) 166 FCR 30; [2008] FCAFC 5; BC200800400 …. 11.6 Process Engineering Pty Ltd v Derby Meat Processing Co Ltd [1977] WAR 145 …. 29.4 Procon (GB) Ltd v Provincial Building Co Ltd [1984] 2 All ER 368 …. 28.33, 28.34, 28.35, 28.36, 28.37, 28.39, 28.40, 28.62 Prodromos Anastasi Foukkare v Angreb Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 335; BC200609700 …. 14.63 Production Spray Painting & Panel Beating Pty Ltd v Newnham (1991) 27 NSWLR 644 …. 21.17 Programmed Solutions Pty Ltd v Dectar Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 385; BC200709607 …. 28.62 Project Development Co Ltd SA v KMK Securities Ltd [1982] 1 WLR 1470 …. 16.70 Project Research Pty Ltd v Permanent Trustee of Australia Ltd (1990) 5 BPR 11,225 …. 15.44 Prosperity Advisers Pty Ltd v Secure Enterprises Pty Ltd(2012) 17 ANZ Ins Cas ¶61-943; [2012] NSWCA 192; BC201204919] …. 13.8 Proude v Visic (No 3) [2012] SASC 234; BC201210180 …. 28.14 Proust v Blake (1989) 17 NSWLR 267 …. 6.8, 6.13 Prudential Finance Ltd v Davander Nominees Pty Ltd [1992] 1 VR 468 …. 16.14, 17.48, 17.50, 17.51, 17.60, 17.67, 17.68

Pryles & Defteros (a firm) v Green (1999) 20 WAR 541; [1999] WASC 34; BC9902816 …. 2.1, 3.3, 3.4, 5.52, 7.12, 15.71, 18.38, 18.40 Prynew Pty Ltd v Nemeth (2010) 28 ACLC 10-026; [2010] NSWCA 94; BC201002806 …. 29.27 Pryor v Hennessy [1973] VR 221 …. 13.36, 13.53 — v Windsor (1993, unreported); BC9300118 …. 12.10, 12.15 Psychologists’ Registration Board of Victoria v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd [2000] VSCA 118; BC200004111 …. 22.64 Public Trustee of Queensland, Re [2000] 1 Qd R 409; BC9901718 …. 16.20, 16.24 Public Trustee (WA) v Brumar Nominees Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] WASC 6 …. 10.1 Public Trustee v Auckland Electric Power Board [1944] NZLR 782 …. 11.21 — v Newman (2012) 112 SASR 299; [2012] SASCFC 18; BC201201358 …. 13.17, 19.19 Puddephatt v Leith (No 2) [1916] 2 Ch 168 …. 8.16, 8.17, 27.3, 27.28 Puddy v Borg [1973] VR 626 …. 7.5, 24.40 Pullinger Readhead Lucas v Golden West Resources Ltd [2009] WASC 140; BC200904248 …. 5.12 Puntoriero v Water Administration Ministerial Corporation [2002] NSWSC 217; BC200201120 …. 19.14 Purcell v Bacon (1914) 19 CLR 241; BC1490117 …. 4.52 — v R M [2004] VSC 78; BC200401089 …. 17.38 Pure Spirit Co v Fowler (1890) 25 QBD 235 …. 29.19 Purfleet Farms Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions [2003] 1 P & CR 20; [2002] EWCA Civ 1430 …. 8.88 Puruse Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Sydney (2009) 169 LGERA 85; [2009] NSWLEC 163; BC200908712 …. 23.26, 23.27 Pyman & Co v Burt and Boulton [1884] WN 100 …. 19.6

Pyramid Building Society (in liq) v Farrow Finance Corp Ltd (in liq) [1995] 1 VR 464 …. 22.15

Q Qantas Airways Ltd v Cameron (No 3) (1996) 68 FCR 387 …. 9.2, 9.17 — v Dillingham Corporation (1987, unreported); BC8701371 …. 16.41, 16.62 QCoal Pty Ltd v Cliffs Australia Coal Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 479; BC201009791 …. 2.4, 3.14, 4.50 Qidwai v Brown [1984] 1 NSWLR 100 …. 21.18 QGC Pty Ltd v Bygrave [2012] FCA 309; BC201202007 …. 22.74 Quadrant Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) v Morgan Smith Barney Australia Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 455; BC200909213 …. 28.33, 28.34 — v Morgan Smith Barney Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 535; BC200910673 …. 21.21 Quadrascan Graphics Pty Ltd v Crosfield Electronics ANZ Pty Ltd (1995, unreported); BC9507757 …. 15.51 Quality Corporation (Aust) Pty Ltd v Millford Builders (Vic) Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 137; BC200503500 …. 6.23 Quality House Pty Ltd (in liq) and the Companies Act, Re [1969] 2 NSWR 54 …. 2.16, 2.17, 16.37, 17.15 Quancorp Pty Ltd v MacDonald [1999] WASCA 101; BC9904546 …. 16.54 Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre (1883) 11 QBD 674 …. 7.21, 7.22 Queen’s Hotel Co, Cardiff, Ltd, Re [1900] 1 Ch 792 …. 15.45 Queanbeyan Leagues Club Ltd v Poldune Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1100; BC200007463 …. 7.21 Queensland v Hayes (No 2) [2013] QSC 80 …. 13.73 — v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146; BC9700005 …. 14.43 Queensland Building Services Authority v Mahony [2012] QDC 226 ….

1.20, 17.11 — v Proprietors of ‘The View’ (1998, unreported); BC9806827 …. 21.51 Queensland Conservation Council Inc v Xstrata Coal Queensland Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 377; BC200709354 …. 21.20 Queensland Fish Board v Bunney [1979] Qd R 301 …. 6.4, 6.9, 6.11 Queensland Trustees Ltd v Fawckner [1964] St R Qd 153 …. 20.28, 20.32 Quichorn Pty Ltd v Broad (1994, unreported) …. 29.94 Quilter v Mapleson (1882) 9 QBD 672 …. 14.40 Quinlan v A & J Brady Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1533; BC200708455 …. 16.54 Quinlivan v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2012] WASCA 263 …. 8.89 Quintano v B W Rose Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 626; BC200905732 …. 11.14 Quirk v Bawden (1992) 112 ACTR 1 …. 13.61, 13.77, 16.13, 16.28

R R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2005] 4 All ER 1; [2005] EWCA Civ 192 …. 14.19, 14.20 R (Davies) v Birmingham Deputy Coroner [2004] 3 All ER 543; [2004] EWCA Civ 207 …. 22.62, 22.63 R (Ministry of Defence) v Wiltshire and Swindon Coroner [2005] 4 All ER 40; [2005] EWHC 880 …. 14.19 R & W Realty Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2000) 112 LGERA 351; [2000] NSWLEC 167; BC200004706 …. 6.18, 8.81 R v Accused (T 30/91) (1991) 7 CRNZ 686 …. 25.32 — v Agritraders Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 1006 …. 1.25 — v Andri (No 2) (2002) 220 LSJS 62; [2002] SADC 76 …. 24.13 — v Archbishop of Canterbury [1903] 1 KB 289 …. 7.13 — v Armstrong [1972] 1 NSWLR 559 …. 25.2, 25.8, 25.12

— v Bach (1821) 9 Price 349; 147 ER 115 …. 5.51 — v Bairstow (2011) 28 NTLR 111; [2011] NTSC 14; BC201100938 …. 24.8 — v Barbaro (1992) 108 ACTR 1 …. 6.9, 7.19 — v Barnet London Borough Council [1983] 2 AC 309 …. 29.66 — v Beeby (1999) 104 A Crim R 142; [1999] NSWCCA 30; BC9900748 …. 24.9 — v Bucksath (2000) 114 A Crim R 1; [2000] NSWCCA 135; BC200002110 …. 24.9 — v Bui (2011) 5 ACTLR 230; [2011] ACTSC 102; BC201104186 …. 24.8, 24.10, 24.55 — v Burgess [1937] ALR 363 …. 17.92 — v Burles (1990, unreported); BC9000009 …. 25.20, 25.23 — v Caron [2011] 1 SCR 78; [2011] SCC 5 …. 14.20 — v Carrick (2003) 57 NSWLR 606; [2003] NSWSC 313; BC200302062 …. 25.2 — v Cashinella (1994, unreported); BC9400498 …. 25.22, 25.23 — v CD [1976] 1 NZLR 436 …. 25.18, 25.20 — v Central Criminal Court [2012] EWHC 3218 …. 16.53 — v Clifford (1824) 2 LJ OS (KB) 210 …. 24.14 — v Cowling (1994) 71 A Crim R 198 …. 21.17 — v CPR (2009) 9 DCLR (NSW) 362; [2009] NSWDC 219; BC200940403 …. 25.10 — v Cripps [1984] QB 686 …. 6.21 — v Dainer (1988) 91 FLR 33 …. 24.46 — v Director of Corrective Services (2001) 10 Tas R 141; [2001] TASSC 21; BC200100810 …. 21.17, 21.60 — v Dixon (1883) 9 VLR (L) 2 …. 22.58

— v Dunne (1990, unreported); BC9002442 …. 25.9, 25.10, 25.11 — v Farrell [1988] Tas R 152 …. 25.23 — v Fisher [2003] 56 NSWLR 625; [2003] NSWCCA 41; BC200300810 …. 24.9 — v Fletcher (1876) 2 QBD 43 …. 24.13 — v Foggo [1989] 2 Qd R 49 …. 21.46, 21.62, 24.8 — v Foote (1883) 10 QBD 378 …. 24.13 — v Forbes (1972) 127 CLR 1; BC7200520 …. 6.11, 28.6 — v Freshney [1977] Tas SR 126 …. 25.20, 25.23 — v Garrett [1917] 2 KB 99 …. 24.13 — v Garth (2008) 21 VR 203; [2008] VSCA 252; BC200811131 …. 24.17 — v Gaston [1971] 1 All ER 128n …. 8.30 — v Gilfillan (2003) 139 A Crim R 460; [2003] NSWCCA 102; BC200301672 …. 21.62 — v Goia (1988) 19 FCR 212 …. 24.13, 24.17 — v Gold Coast City Council [1971] QWN 13 …. 14.68 — v Goodall (1874) LR 9 QB 557 …. 22.60 — v Green (1998) 100 A Crim R 539 …. 24.39, 25.30 — v Hall (2001) 4 VR 23; [2001] VSCA 181; BC200106319 …. 21.33 — v Hanrahan [2006] 43 SR (WA) 16; [2006] WADC 74 …. 22.68 — v Hatfield (2001) 126 A Crim R 169; [2001] NSWSC 334; BC200105367 …. 25.11 — v Hermes (1984) 53 ACTR 15 …. 24.47 — v Hookham (No 2) (1993) 32 NSWLR 345; BC9302293 …. 21.1, 21.50, 21.51, 21.52, 21.54 — v Hore [1969] Qd R 75 …. 11.4 — v Horsham District Council [1994] 4 All ER 681 …. 23.9, 23.50

— v Hutchins [1959] SASR 189 …. 11.55 — v Industrial Disputes Tribunal [1954] 2 All ER 764 …. 11.55 — v Ironfield [1971] 1 All ER 202n …. 24.19 — v Jackson [1962] WAR 130 …. 24.20, 25.26 — v Jenkins [1970] Tas SR 13 …. 21.2 — v Johnston [2000] NSWCCA 197; BC200002820 …. 25.3, 25.11, 25.14 — v JS (No 2) (2007) 179 A Crim R 10; [2007] NSWCCA 309; BC200710048 …. 24.59 — v Justices of South Brisbane (1901) 11 QLJ 81 …. 6.4 — v Karout (2004) 1 DCLR(NSW) 365 …. 25.2 — v Khoury [2003] QDC 235 …. 21.30 — v Kimmins [1980] Qd R 524 …. 24.13 — v Kinal [1978] Tas SR 91 …. 25.6, 25.16 — v Krishna [1999] NSWSC 525; BC9902858 …. 25.9 — v KT [2009] NSWDC 224; BC200940435 …. 25.10, 25.11 — v Lacey [2009] QDC 303 …. 21.30 — v Lawrence (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 425 …. 25.12 — v Lilley (2000) 111 A Crim R 468; [2000] NSWCCA 57; BC200000874 …. 21.62 — v Liverpool Justices [1960] 1 WLR 585 …. 22.60 — v Llorente [2001] 2 Qd R 415; [2000] QCA 377; BC200005674 …. 21.21 — v Lord Chancellor [1998] 2 All ER 755 …. 14.19 — v Lubik (No 2) [2011] VSC 270; BC201104284 …. 21.34 — v Lynch [1978] Tas SR 190 …. 24.64 — v Manley (2000) 49 NSWLR 203; [2000] NSWCCA 196; BC200002821 …. 25.3, 25.7, 25.8, 25.10, 25.11, 25.12, 25.14 — v Marshall [1984] VR 211 …. 21.17

— v — [1986] VR 19 …. 21.17 — v Martin [1980] Tas SR 280 NC 12 …. 25.16 — v — (1984) 53 ALR 84; BC8400552 …. 24.71 — v Martiniello [2005] ACTSC 9; BC200500260 …. 24.10 — v — [2005] ACTSC 109; BC200509404 …. 17.54 — v Miller [1983] 3 All ER 186 …. 2.7, 7.16 — v Mosely (1992) 28 NSWLR 735; BC9203074 …. 24.9 — v Municipality of Glenorchy [1958] Tas SR 32 …. 17.72 — v Nicholl (1979) 1 A Crim R 306 …. 24.24 — v Osborne [1970] 1 NSWR 622 …. 25.12 — v Pavy (1997) 98 A Crim R 396; BC9706537 …. 25.9, 25.10, 25.11 — v Payara [2012] VSCA 266; BC201208368 …. 24.66 — v Percy (1975, unreported) …. 24.64 — v Police Magistrate at Hughenden and Reid [1915] St R Qd 147 …. 1.6 — v Powell [1985] Tas R 63 …. 25.23 — v Racing, Gaming and Liquor Commission (1988) 91 FLR 62 …. 6.16, 11.55 — v Rada Corporation Ltd [1991] 2 NZLR 122 …. 25.20 — v Robinson (1999) 142 CCC (3d) 303 …. 24.2 — v Rouse (No 2) (1990, unreported); BC9000021 …. 24.64 — v S (1997) 94 A Crim R 445; BC9702831 …. 24.3 — v Scott (1993) 42 FCR 1; BC9304989 …. 24.8, 24.12, 24.13, 24.14, 24.16, 24.17 — v Seebag (1993, unreported); BC9304325 …. 24.9 — v Staffordshire County Council [2007] EWHC 2441 …. 23.7 — v Stavropoulos [2008] NSWCCA 68; BC200802125 …. 24.59 — v T [1992] 3 NZLR 215 …. 25.19, 25.20

— v Thomas [1948] 4 DLR 492 …. 6.15 — v Tran [2008] NSWDC 43; BC200840100 …. 24.9 — v Turner [1980] 1 NSWLR 19 …. 25.2 — v Ulman-Naruniec (2003) 143 A Crim R 531; [2003] SASC 437; BC200308151 …. 24.10 — v Upton [2005] ACTSC 52; BC200504507 …. 24.10 — v Walker (1987, unreported); BC8700040 …. 25.18, 25.23 — v Walters [1978] Tas SR 122 …. 25.7, 25.16 — v Watling (1998) 7 Tas R 404; BC9802015 …. 21.17 — v Watt [1912] VLR 225 …. 24.13 — v Webster [1987] 1 Qd R 45 …. 21.17 — v Whitchurch (1881) 7 QBD 534 …. 24.13 — v Whitworth (1988) 164 CLR 500; BC8802599 …. 24.71 — v Willesden Justices [1948] 1 KB 397 …. 22.58 — v Williams [1970] 1 NSWR 81 …. 25.12 — v Wiltshire Primary Health Care Trust [2009] 1 All ER 978; [2008] EWCA Civ 749 …. 14.19 — v Winder [1900] 2 QB 666 …. 18.1 — v Wright, Danci and Currie (1992) 77 A Crim R 67; BC9203036 …. 24.3, 24.8 Radnor’s Trusts (Earl of), Re (1890) 45 Ch D 402 …. 20.16 Rae v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force (GD) [2011] NSWADTAP 30; BC201155191 …. 8.93 Raethel v Director-General, Department of Education and Training [2000] NSWADT 56 …. 8.90, 17.7 Rafferty v Time 2000 West Pty Ltd (No 3) (2009) 257 ALR 503; [2009] FCA 727; BC200905923 …. 14.48, 26.14, 26.15, 26.34 Ragata Developments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1993) 217

ALR 175; BC9304345 …. 16.40, 16.45 Rahman v Ahmed [2009] NSWSC 1028; BC200908925 …. 10.1 Rail Corporation New South Wales v Leduva Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 138; BC200501052 …. 15.41 — v Vero Insurance Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 926; BC201206350 …. 13.10 Railton-Latrobe Shale Oil Co NL v Knight (1916) 12 Tas LR 64 …. 15.5, 17.40 Rainbow v Kittoe [1916] 1 Ch 313 …. 29.31, 29.47, 29.51, 29.104 Raja v Rubin [2000] Ch 274 …. 16.45 Raja Bahrin, Marriage of (1986) 11 Fam LR 233 …. 14.16, 21.5, 28.18 Rajendran v Tonkin (2004) 9 VR 414; [2004] VSCA 43; BC200401689 …. 16.40 Rajski v Computer Manufacture & Design Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 443 …. 28.6, 29.30 Rakusen v Ellis, Munday and Clarke [1912] 1 Ch 831 …. 4.44 Ralena Pty Ltd v VCAT (No 3) (2007) 25 VAR 377; [2007] VSC 12; BC200700285 …. 22.27 Ralkon Agricultural Company Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Development Commission (1986, unreported); BC8601705 …. 15.58, 17.27, 17.48, 17.62, 17.64, 17.67, 18.71 Ralph Hume Garry (a firm) v Gwillim [2003] 1 All ER 1038; [2002] EWCA Civ 1500 …. 4.14, 4.17 Ralston v Burkinshaw (2002) 12 ANZ Ins Cas ¶61-531; [2002] NSWSC 542; BC200203797 …. 15.57 Ram Coomar Coondoo v Chunder Canto Mookerjee (1876) 2 App Cas 186 …. 22.3 Ramadan v Moussa [1984] VR 713 …. 12.2, 12.14 Rambaldi v Woodward (No 2) [2013] FCA 104; BC201300615 …. 7.40

Ramirez v Sandor’s Trustee (No 2) (1997, unreported); BC9705824 …. 10.53 Ramsden v Langley (1705) 2 Vern 536; 23 ER 947 …. 15.45 Ramsey v Hartley [1977] 2 All ER 673 …. 29.13, 29.36, 29.44 Ramskogler v Director of Public Prosecutions (1995) 82 A Crim R 128; BC9505444 …. 25.8 Rana v University of South Australia (No 2) [2007] FCA 941; BC200704910 …. 16.59 Ranclaud v Cabban [1988] ANZ Conv R 134 …. 2.4 Randall Pty Ltd v Willoughby City Council (2009) 9 DCLR(NSW) 31; [2009] NSWDC 118; BC200940205 …. 18.58, 18.67 Raper v Bertrand [1967] VR 53 …. 20.19 Rapid Road Transit Co, Re [1909] 1 Ch 96 …. 26.14, 26.36 Rapid Roofing Pty Ltd v Natalise Pty Ltd [2008] QCA 237; BC200807241 …. 6.28 Rapoff v MacDonald Rudder (1990, unreported); BC9001236 …. 5.43 Rapuano v Karydis-Frisan (No 2) [2012] SADC 177; BC201240431 …. 13.5, 13.6, 13.21, 13.64 Rasch Nominees Pty Ltd v Batholomaeus (No 3) [2013] SASC 14; BC201300646 …. 11.8 — v R [2006] FamCA 808 …. 29.107 Ratcliffe v Ratcliffe [2003] WASC 79; BC200301658 …. 29.132 Ratepayers and Residents Action Association Inc v Auckland City Council [1986] 1 NZLR 746 …. 28.44, 29.8, 29.9, 29.10, 29.115, 29.118 Raven, Re (1881) 45 LT 742 …. 3.11 Ravi Nominees Pty Ltd v Phillips Fox (1992) 10 ACLC 1313; BC9201117 …. 29.124, 29.126, 29.127, 29.129 Rawlinson v Moss (1861) 4 LT 619 …. 26.27 Ray v Greenwell [2009] NSWSC 1197; BC200910027 …. 10.35

Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Tectran Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 77 ALR 190; BC8802659 …. 6.23 Raynes Park Golf Club, Re [1899] 1 QB 961 …. 20.41 Rbil v Ryhurst [2011] BR 721; [2011] EWHC 2209 …. 28.41 RDCW Diamond (Pty) Ltd v Da Gloria [2007] NSWSC 1325; BC200710317 …. 23.29 Read (deceased), In the Will and Codicils of [1910] VLR 68 …. 10.35 Read v Chown (1929) 46 WN (NSW) 154 …. 11.52 Reading Entertainment Australia Pty Ltd v Burstone Victoria Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] VSC 137; BC200502934 …. 15.41 — v Whitehorse Property Group Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 309; BC200711130 …. 15.41 Readymix Holdings International Pte Ltd v Wieland Process Equipment Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 373; BC200802341 …. 29.74 Real Tech Systems Integration Pty Ltd v Meuross (1998) 82 FCR 150; BC9800915 …. 14.23 Reale v Duncan Reale Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1099; BC200608467 …. 14.9, 14.10 Rebenta Pty Ltd v Wise (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 334; BC200909365 …. 13.90 Reches Pty Ltd v Tadiran Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 514; BC9802451 …. 28.49, 29.20, 29.27 Red Engine Group Pty Ltd v Hotel Agencies Pty Ltd [2007] VCC 398 …. 13.82 Red Hill Iron Pty Ltd v API Management Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 323; BC201208939 …. 17.9 Redden v Chapman (1949) 50 SR (NSW) 24 …. 6.16, 8.44 Redfearn v Sowerby (1818) 1 Swans 84; 36 ER 307 …. 26.27 Redfern v Mineral Engineers Pty Ltd [1987] VR 518 …. 5.3, 5.58, 5.59

Rediffusion Simulation Ltd v Link-Miles Ltd [1993] FSR 369 …. 8.6 Redl v Toppin (1993, unreported); BC9300621 …. 24.46, 24.47 Redondo v Chaytor (1879) 4 QBD 453 …. 29.65, 29.75, 29.80 Redowood Pty Ltd v Goldstein Technology Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 515; BC200403817 …. 23.14, 23.62 Redshaw, Marriage of (1989) 13 Fam LR 495 …. 21.11 Redwin Industries Pty Ltd v Feetsafe Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 448; BC200206209 …. 16.67, 16.70 Reed v Gray [1952] Ch 337 …. 16.21 Reed Constructions Australia Pty Ltd v DM Fabrications Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1409; BC200710569 …. 14.25 Reed Executive plc v Reed Business Information Ltd [2004] 4 All ER 942; [2004] EWCA Civ 887 …. 13.64 Reeve v Fowler [1965] NSWR 110 …. 21.50, 21.57, 21.58 Reeve’s Trusts, Re (1877) 4 Ch D 841 …. 10.21 Refina Pty Ltd v Binnie (Costs) [2009] NSWSC 1098; BC200909449 …. 16.54 Regency Media Pty Ltd v AAV Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 368; BC200910207 …. 13.7, 13.8, 13.25 Registrar of Titles v Watson [1954] VLR 111 …. 17.21, 17.23 Regular v Law Society of Newfoundland and Labrador (2011) 336 DLR (4th) 1; [2011] NLCA 54 …. 2.7 Rehins Pty Ltd v Debin Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] WASC 168 …. 15.73, 16.54, 16.62 Reid v Campbell Wallis Moule & Co Pty Ltd [1990] VR 859 …. 11.20, 11.26, 11.28 — v Cupper [1915] 2 KB 147 …. 8.15, 8.16, 8.17 — v Hubbard (No 2) [2004] FCA 180; BC200400733 …. 23.7, 23.8, 23.61 — v Robert Nettlefold Pty Ltd [1958] Tas SR 13 …. 15.5

— v State of South Australia [2007] FCA 1479; BC200708106 …. 8.69 — v Sydney City Council (1995) 35 NSWLR 719 …. 21.18 Reid, Hewitt & Co v Joseph [1918] AC 717 …. 8.2, 8.3 Reid Minty (a firm) v Taylor [2002] 2 All ER 150; [2001] EWCA Civ 1723 …. 16.45 Reidy’s Lures Pty Ltd v Basser Millyard Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1242; BC200306491 …. 12.4 Reilly v Provincial Court of Alberta, Chief Judge (2000) 192 DLR (4th) 540 …. 20.32 Reis Bros v E W Carling & Co (1908) 5 CLR 673; [1908] St R Qd 76; BC0800052 …. 19.6, 19.16 Reisner v Reisner (Costs) [2010] FamCA 588; BC201050614 …. 21.11 Remely v O’Shea [2008] QCA 119; BC200804293 …. 20.13 Remm Construction (SA) Pty Ltd v Allco Newsteel Pty Ltd (1992) 57 SASR 180 …. 28.2, 28.28, 28.29, 28.34, 28.43, 29.94, 29.131 Remnant, Re (1849) 11 Beav 603; 50 ER 949 …. 1.8 Ren v Shi [2012] VSC 271; BC201204427 …. 16.57 Renehan v Leeuwin Ocean Adventure Foundation Ltd (2006) 17 NTLR 124; [2006] NTSC 28; BC200601840 …. 13.69 Rennie v Massie (1866) LR 1 P & D 118 …. 10.28 Renton Resources Pty Ltd v Johnson Winter & Slattery (2005) 240 LSJS 434; [2005] SASC 231; BC200504836 …. 5.19 Repatriation Commission v Cornelius (2002) 69 ALD 250; [2002] FCA 930; BC200204174 …. 21.51, 21.55 Republic of Kazakhstan v Istil Group Inc [2006] 1 WLR 596; [2005] EWCA Civ 1468 …. 28.63, 28.64 Reschke v Hensley [1915] SALR 159 …. 1.22 Residents Against Improper Development Inc v Chase Property Investments

Pty Ltd [2006] 149 LGERA 360; [2006] NSWCA 323; BC200609559 …. 8.83 Resort Management Services Ltd v Noosa Shire Council (No 2) [1995] 1 Qd R 56 …. 17.77 Resource Equities Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v Garrett [2010] NSWSC 44; BC201000968 …. 16.59 Retail Equity Pty Ltd v Murie & Edward (1994, unreported); BC9401605 …. 5.12 Retawil Pty Ltd v Olivetti Australia Pty Ltd (1991, unreported); BC9101159 …. 15.72 Retemu Pty Ltd v Ryan (2010, unreported) …. 5.11 Reynolds v Caswell (1811) 4 Taunt 193; 128 ER 303 …. 4.22 — v Howell (1873) LR 8 QB 398 …. 23.24 — v Reynolds (1909) 26 TLR 104 …. 27.18 — v Whittens [2002] 57 NSWLR 271; [2002] NSWSC 155; BC200200797 …. 2.31, 5.16, 18.39 Rhema Ventures Pty Ltd v Stenders [1993] 2 Qd R 326 …. 29.9, 29.125, 29.126 Rhode, Marriage of (1983) 9 Fam LR 159 …. 26.14, 26.33 Rhodes v Dawson (1886) 16 QBD 548 …. 29.56 — v Fielder, Jones and Harrison [1918–19] All ER Rep 846 …. 4.56 — v Tower Australia Superannuation Ltd [2004] FCA 812; BC200403850 …. 8.47 Riabkoff v Abenergy Properties Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 724; BC201205110 …. 10.2 Richard Brady Franks Ltd v Price (1936) 37 SR (NSW) 37 …. 11.55 — v — (1937) 58 CLR 112; BC3700026 …. 11.55 Richard Buxton (a firm) v Mills-Owen [2010] 1 WLR 1997; [2010] EWCA Civ 122 …. 4.48

Richard Pitt & Sons Pty Ltd, Re (1980) 4 ACLR 917 …. 21.50 Richards, Re [1912] 1 Ch 49 …. 5.58 — v Faulls Pty Ltd [1971] WAR 129 …. 21.1, 21.50, 21.54 — v Platel (1841) Cr & Ph 79; 41 ER 419 …. 26.32 Richardson, Re [1920] SALR 24 …. 10.38 — v Lander (1948) 65 WN (NSW) 74 …. 3.3, 3.24 — v — (No 2) (1948) 65 WN (NSW) 81 …. 5.45, 5.58 — v Richardson [1895] P 346 …. 7.10, 15.4 Richardson (G) Ltd v Tuakau Sands Ltd [1974] 1 NZLR 365 …. 28.25 Richfort Pty Ltd v Baluyut (1999) 152 FLR 203; 152 FLR 203; BC9905936 …. 1.5, 1.6, 1.11 Richmond River Council v Oshlack (1996) 39 NSWLR 622; BC9602789 …. 9.24 Rickaby, Marriage of (1995) 127 FLR 1 …. 13.43 Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Bonacci Rickard (NSW) Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1124; BC200007469 …. 29.94 — v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 481; BC200503634 …. 13.68, 13.69, 13.72, 13.85 Ricks v White [1995] 2 Qd R 302 …. 16.15, 17.35, 17.79 Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 …. 23.1, 23.7, 23.9, 23.10, 23.12, 23.14, 23.30, 23.36, 23.38, 23.40, 23.43, 23.45, 23.50, 23.58, 23.61, 23.63, 23.67 Ridgeway & Irwin, Re (1903) 29 VLR 130 …. 5.40 Right Home Improvements International Pty Ltd v Imperial Alarm Screens (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) ATPR ¶40-641 …. 28.46, 29.100 Rigoli Lawyers v Arman (2009) 40 Fam LR 676; [2009] FamCA 42; BC200950095 …. 4.48, 26.16 Riley v Bankstown City Council [2005] NSWSC 748; BC200505415 …. 23.57

Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1446; BC200608934 …. 15.41 Riot Nominees Pty Ltd v Suzuki Australia Pty Ltd (1981) 52 FLR 265 …. 29.32, 29.47, 29.49 Rip Curl International Pty Ltd v Phone Lab Pty Ltd (2004) 63 IPR 496; [2004] FCA 1215; BC200406076 …. 16.68 Ritchie v Styles (No 2) [2011] TASSC 60; BC201108792 …. 8.37 Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 …. 8.9, 8.25, 8.27, 8.44, 8.47, 8.57, 8.64, 20.32 Rittman v Rittman (No 4) [2011] FamCA 361; BC201150434 …. 20.13 Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1989) AIPC ¶90-567 …. 8.8 Rivera v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2005) 144 FCR 334; [2005] FCA 661; BC200503415 …. 29.67 Riverside Nursing Care Pty Ltd v Minister of State for Aged Care (2000) 63 ALD 122; [2000] FCA 1054; BC200004505 …. 28.37, 29.21, 29.104 Rivett Agricultural & Waste Equipment Hire Pty Ltd v Evans (No 2) [2007] SASC 197; BC200704125 …. 13.91 Rivington v Garden [1901] 1 Ch 561 …. 15.69 Rizal v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 334; BC9901294 …. 14.67 Roach v Grave [1979] Tas R (NC) 8 …. 12.10, 12.15 — v Home Office [2010] QB 256; [2009] EWHC 312 …. 17.3 — v Page (No 1) [2003] NSWSC 722; BC200305948 …. 29.7 — v Winnote Pty Ltd (2006) 227 ALR 758; [2006] NSWSC 231; BC200602059 …. 14.10 Road Chalets Pty Ltd v Thornton Motors Pty Ltd (1986) 47 SASR 532 …. 15.44, 20.30, 20.38, 20.41 Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Palmer (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 140; BC200502986 …. 6.23, 11.27

Roads Corporation v Love [2010] VSC 581; BC201009593 …. 13.65, 16.50, 17.92 — v — (No 2) (2010) 31 VR 551; [2010] VSC 154; BC201002382 …. 13.1, 17.92 Roam Australia Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (1997, unreported); BC9704567 …. 27.12, 27.15 Robarts v Buée Hall (1878) 8 Ch D 198 …. 27.26 Robb Evans of Robb Evans & Associates v European Bank Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 170; BC200905581 …. 13.8, 19.13 Robb, Re (1996) 134 FLR 294; BC9602649 …. 3.42, 3.43, 3.48, 4.3, 4.55, 4.56 Robbins v Rosemount (No 2) [2008] FamCA 494; BC200850810 …. 22.71 Roberts, Re [1919] VLR 125 …. 10.38 —, Re (1983) 20 NTR 13 …. 10.13 —, Re (1994, unreported); BC9407006 …. 5.38 — v Jones [1891] 2 QB 194 …. 8.40 — v Kroll [1971] 5 WWR 133 …. 2.4 — v Prendergast [2013] QCA 89; BC201309452 …. 13.73 — v Rodier [2006] NSWSC 1084; BC200608337 …. 8.5, 13.65, 15.85 Robertson & Son v Perkins and Co Ltd (1886) 2 QLJ 173 …. 8.46 Robertson (a Solicitor), Re (1889) 42 Ch D 553 …. 5.54 Robertson v Graham (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 676 …. 10.9 — v Oskar [1984] WAR 376 …. 10.58 Robertson’s (J H) Application for Letters Patent, Re [1930] 1 Ch 186 …. 6.13 Robins v Goldingham (1872) LR 13 Eq 440 …. 26.14, 26.18 Robinson v Malcolm & Co Ltd (1899) 5 ALR 204 …. 17.37 Robinson and Morgan-Coakle v Behan [1964] NZLR 650 …. 4.55

Robson v Carter (1982, unreported); BC8291095 …. 25.26 — v Kemp (1802) 4 Esp 233; 170 ER 703 …. 26.25 — v Robson [2008] QCA 36; BC200801078 …. 28.11, 28.13, 29.67, 29.81 Roche v Varnavides [2004] WASC 164; BC200500112 …. 13.6, 13.65 Rockcote Enterprises Pty Ltd v FS Architects Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 205; BC200807789 …. 13.71 Rodgers v Pisani [2007] FamCA 1510; BC200750002 …. 29.107 Rodwell v Hutchinson [2010] WASCA 197; BC201007547 …. 16.31 Roe v Director General, Department of Environment and Conservation (WA) [2011] WASCA 57; BC201105690 …. 9.3 Roebuck v Smoje [2001] WASC 95; BC200101625 …. 10.25 Rogers v Kabriel (No 2) [1999] NSWSC 474; BC9902504 …. 11.2 Rogers Ltd v MacPherson & Rogers Ltd [1904] QWN 32 …. 28.25 Rolls Royce Industrial Power (Pacific) Ltd v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 626; [2001] NSWCA 461; BC200108080 …. 13.33, 13.76 Roluke Pty Ltd v Lamaro Consultants Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 671; BC200705050 …. 8.7 Romer & Haslam, Re [1893] 2 QB 286 …. 4.44, 4.51 Ronaldson v Rankin [1948] NZLR 850 …. 11.30, 11.31 Roney & Co, Solicitors, Re [1914] 2 KB 529 …. 5.27 Ronowska v Kus (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 817; BC201205605 …. 16.68 Rooney (Litigation Guardian of) v Graham (2001) 198 DLR (4th) 1 …. 11.12, 11.18, 11.28 Rose v Barwon (No 2) [2010] FamCA 738; BC201050816 …. 8.29 — v Boxing NSW Inc (Costs) [2007] NSWSC 256; BC200701773 …. 8.33 — v Nikolaidis [2004] NSWSC 1011; BC200408257 …. 4.36 Rosebridge Nominees Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2004]

WASC 60; BC200404466 …. 28.49 Rosemin Pty Ltd v Gasp Jeans Chadstone Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 406; BC201003245 …. 13.69, 13.77 Rosengrens Ltd v Safe Deposit Centres Ltd [1984] 3 All ER 198 …. 28.45, 28.46, 29.99 Rosenthal v Rosenthal (1910) 11 CLR 87; BC1000037 …. 20.16 Roses are Red Ltd v Board of Administration of the Methodist Church of New Zealand (2009) 19 PRNZ 369; [2009] NZCA 237 …. 14.40 Rosniak v Government Insurance Office (1997) 41 NSWLR 608; BC9702453 …. 16.45 Ross Ambrose Group Pty Ltd v Renkon Pty Ltd (No 2) [1999] TASSC 127; BC9907729 …. 11.63 Ross v Buxton (1889) 42 Ch D 190 …. 27.17, 27.18 — v Caunters [1980] Ch 297 …. 7.21 — v Milzewski [2000] 2 Qd R 193; BC9702484 …. 15.37 — v R (1979) 141 CLR 432 …. 24.4 — v Ross (No 5) [2008] WASC 278; BC200810530 …. 15.16 — v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2002] QCA 93; BC200201060 …. 13.30 Ross Ambrose Group Pty Ltd v Renkon Pty Ltd (2007) 17 Tas R 23; [2007] TASSC 75; BC200708303 …. 28.40, 29.124, 29.126 Rosselli v Rosselli (No 2) [2007] VSC 438; BC200709781 …. 8.7, 13.73 Rothwell v Gadowski (1966, unreported) …. 16.15, 17.27 Rouse v IOOF Australia Trustees Ltd (No 3) [1999] SASC 208; BC9902623 …. 10.4 — v Shepherd (No 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 277 …. 16.40, 16.65 Rowan v Cornwall (No 6) [2002] 220 LSJS 187; [2002] SASC 234; BC200204140 …. 7.24, 17.41 Rowland v Portus (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 74 …. 8.44, 10.17

Rowling v Fred A Mashman (Sutherland) Pty Ltd [1964–5] NSWR 1024 …. 1.10, 17.79, 17.84 Rowston v Dunstan [2011] NTSC 30; BC201102708 …. 8.80 Royal Australian Naval Reserve Rifle Club Inc v New South Wales Rifle Association Inc [2010] NSWSC 351; BC201002509 …. 15.15, 15.21 Royds v Sumner Potts [2005] QSC 15; BC200500231 …. 4.55 RTZ Pension Property Trust Ltd v ARC Property Developments Ltd [1999] 1 All ER 532 …. 14.64 Ruane v Bachmann-Ruane (No 2) [2012] FamCA 751; BC201250975 …. 8.78 Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 115 FCR 229; [2001] FCA 1865; BC200108231 …. 9.29 Rudow v Great Britain Mutual Life Assurance Society (1881) 17 Ch D …. 11.13, 11.20 Rudstein Kron Lawyers v Pisanelli [2003] VSCA 166; BC200306489 …. 3.14 Ruff v Milton [1996] 2 Qd R 80; BC9502042 …. 13.91 Rule Chambers Pty Ltd v Badge Constructions (SA) Pty Ltd (2009) 261 LSJS 434; [2009] SASC 70; BC200901540 …. 13.6 Rumball v Mortimore [2000] WASC 126; BC200002548 …. 15.41 Rural & General Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2004] ACTSC 14; BC200401483 …. 28.23 — v — (2009) 231 FLR 199; [2009] ACTSC 67; BC200905250 …. 14.59, 14.63, 14.65 Rushby v Roberts [1983] 1 NSWLR 350 …. 11.40, 11.41 Rushcutters Bay Smash Repairs Pty Ltd v H McKenna Netmakers Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 670; BC200304118 …. 11.2 Rushton (Qld) Pty Ltd v Rushton (NSW) Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 47; BC200401109 …. 22.36 Russell v Adwan Pty Ltd (2000) 144 ACTR 1; [2000] ACTSC 90;

BC200006188 …. 7.2, 8.18 — v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (2009) 74 ATR 760; [2009] FCA 1469; BC200911160 …. 7.29 Russian and English Bank v Baring Bros and Co Ltd [1935] Ch 120 …. 23.25 Russo v Russo [1953] VLR 57 …. 17.40, 17.41 Rutherford v Powell (1878) 4 VLR (L) 384 …. 27.3 Ryan v Caelli (1903) 25 ALT 6 …. 20.24 — v Dries (on costs) [2002] NSWCA 112; BC200201958 …. 1.22 — v Great Lakes Council (1998) 154 ALR 584; BC9801418 …. 29.60 — v — (1998) 155 ALR 447; BC9802389 …. 29.60 — v Hansen (2000) 49 NSWLR 184; [2000] NSWSC 354; BC200002113 …. 5.24, 5.36, 5.39, 15.3, 18.15 — v Petherbridge [1902] St R Qd 193 …. 10.19 — v Whitten[1999] NSWSC 865; BC9905489 …. 5.12 Ryde City Council v Tourtouras (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 262; BC200708279 …. 13.67

S S, DJ v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd (2007) 97 SASR 118; [2007] SASC 80; BC200701491 …. 14.29, 14.55 S, Marriage of (1997) 138 FLR 361 …. 22.11 — v A Solicitor (1998) 23 Fam LR 641; [1998] FamCA 130 …. 7.37, 7.38, 8.77 — v S [2006] FamCA 344 …. 21.59 Saarinen v Clay [1935] VLR 392 …. 13.36 Saathoff, Marriage of (1987) 11 Fam LR 643 …. 17.49 Sabaza Pty Ltd v AMP Society (1981) 6 ACLR 194 …. 28.36, 28.41, 29.4, 29.102

Sabelberg (deceased), Will of [1911] VLR 157 …. 10.29 Sacks v Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd (1993) 45 FCR 509; BC9305065 …. 7.42, 7.44 Sadd v Griffin [1908] 2 KB 510 …. 4.55, 5.54, 18.90 Safetycare Australia Pty Ltd, Re [1999] VSC 321; BC9905559 …. 6.6 Saffery v Ellery (2001) 22 Qld Lawyer Reps 61; [2001] QDC 91 …. 24.29, 24.39 Saga Holidays Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2006] FCA 128; BC200601404 …. 9.3 — v — (2006) 156 FCR 256; [2006] FCAFC 191; BC200610703 …. 9.3 Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd (No 5) [2010] FCA 630; BC201004133 …. 13.9, 13.69 — v — [2011] FCAFC 53; BC201102220 …. 13.9, 13.69 Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd v Symbion Health [2007] NSWCA 205; BC200706645 …. 28.37 Sahinovic v McGauchie [2007] VCC 109 …. 17.25 Sailbay Pty Ltd v Tubby Trout Pty Ltd (1994, unreported); BC9400144 …. 12.4 Saizeriya Co Ltd v Peregrine Management Group Ltd Pty [2005] FCA 1174; BC200506174 …. 16.40 Salaman, Re [1894] 2 Ch 201 …. 5.50, 7.31 Salah v Aharat [2008] FamCA 19 …. 21.10 Saldanha v McAdam [2007] WASC 297; BC200803672 …. 7.31 Salfinger v Niugini Mining (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2007] FCA 1594; BC200708892 …. 16.50, 20.13 — v Niugini Mining (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 5) [2008] FCA 1119; BC200807005 …. 15.20 Salmi v Sinivuori [2008] QSC 321; BC200810933 …. 10.6 Salmon, Re (1889) 42 Ch D 351 …. 11.35

Salon Today Pty Ltd v MMIR Pty Ltd [2009] NSWADT 71; BC200955195 …. 8.91, 8.92, 8.94 Saltoon v Lake [1978] 1 NSWLR 52 …. 8.58, 23.22 Salvation Army (South Australia Property Trust) v Rundle [2008] NSWCA 347; BC200810947 …. 14.41 Samaha v El-Hawache [2005] NSWSC 967; BC200507266 …. 4.26 Samson Capital Pty Ltd v Westpac Private Equity Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 453; BC200710919 …. 17.20 San v Rumble (No 2) (2007) 48 MVR 492; [2007] NSWCA 259; BC200708156 …. 13.11 Sanchez, Re (1994) 49 FCR 326; BC9406813 …. 7.4 Sande v Medsara Pty Ltd (No 2) [2004] NSWSC 262; BC200401614 …. 16.46, 16.67 Sanders v Snell (No 2) (2000) 174 ALR 53; BC200004453 …. 8.7, 18.70, 21.5 Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] 2 KB 533 …. 11.13, 11.17, 11.18, 11.20, 20.44 Sands & McDougall Wholesale Pty Ltd (in liq) v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (No 2) [1999] 2 VR 114; [1999] VSCA 36; BC9901597 …. 6.25 Sands v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] SASC 365; BC200910706 …. 13.29, 13.51 Sandtara Pty Ltd v Australian European Finance Corporation Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 82 …. 7.34, 15.45, 15.51 Sanelli v Acee Victoria Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 190; BC20202986 …. 22.3, 22.17, 22.36, 22.37 — v Sanelli [2010] VSC 78; BC201001386 …. 16.54 Sangar v Gardiner (1838) CP Cooper 262; 47 ER 497 …. 11.2 Sankey v Whitlam [1977] 1 NSWLR 333 …. 22.60 Sanko Steamship Co Ltd v Sumitomo Australia Ltd (1996, unreported); BC9600133 …. 13.72

Sansom Nominees Pty Ltd v Meade [2005] WASC 9; BC200503963 …. 16.31 Santoro v Santoro [2010] FamCA 126; BC201050324 …. 21.10 Santos Ltd v Delhi Petroleum Pty Ltd [2005] 240 LSJS 366; [2005] SASC 242; BC200504514 …. 1.8, 17.18, 17.19, 17.20, 18.77 Santosa v Guerin (2008) 29 Qld Lawyer Reps 163; [2007] QDC 335 …. 24.31 Saraceni v Jones [2012] WASCA 59 …. 15.39 Sartori v Macleod (1897) 22 VLR 498 …. 22.68 SAS Global Forrestdale Pty Ltd v Samsera Pty Ltd [2010] WASC 309; BC201008205 …. 29.23 Sasterawan v Morris (No 2) [2007] NSWCCA 341; BC200710764 …. 24.59 Saunders v Houghton [2010] 3 NZLR 331; [2009] NZCA 610 …. 3.45, 28.41, 29.59 — v McKenna [1961] Qd R 425 …. 20.38 Saunderson v Glass (1742) 2 Atk 296; 26 ER 581 …. 3.31 Savage v Bozier [1987] 1 Qd R 468 …. 24.40 Save the Ridge Inc v Commonwealth of Australia [2005] FCA 355; BC200501734 …. 29.106 — v — (2006) 230 ALR 430; [2006] FCAFC 51; BC200602305 …. 20.10 Save the Showground for Sydney Inc v Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning (1998) 105 LGERA 254 …. 9.16 Savic v Kim [2010] NSWSC 1401; BC201009735 …. 10.40 Sawer v Sawer [2007] FamCA 140 …. 29.107 Saywood v Cross (1884) 14 QBD 53 …. 12.2 SCA Properties Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (1999) 17 ACLC 1611; [1999] QSC 180; BC9905893 …. 16.51, 16.55 Scaffidi v Montevento Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 146; BC201110748 …. 14.35

Scammell & Co v WorkCover Corporation (2006) 95 SASR 278; [2006] SASC 258; BC200606538 …. 27.12, 27.30 Scanlan v Greenport Nominees Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 307; BC200106999 …. 28.24, 29.132 Scappaticci (1989) 41 A Crim R 379 …. 24.40 Scarboro Golf & Country Club Ltd v City of Scarborough (No 2) (1986) 32 DLR (4th) 732 …. 11.28 Scerri v Northam Holdings Pty Ltd [1967] VR 674 …. 29.109 Schaaf v Lamshed (1988) 49 SASR 431 …. 24.48 Schaftenaar v Samuels (1975) 11 SASR 266 …. 6.16, 24.47 Scherer v Counting Instruments Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 615 …. 6.15, 7.2, 7.8, 8.50, 8.62, 14.23, 20.41, 20.43 Schiffahrtsagentur Hamburg Middle East Line GmbH v Virtue Shipping Corpn (The ‘Oinoussian Virtue’) [1981] 2 All ER 887 …. 20.2 Schiliro and Gadens Ridgeway (1995) 19 Fam LR 196 …. 2.13, 3.3, 3.17, 3.32, 3.37, 3.38, 5.31 Schimmel v Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 113 FLR 205 …. 19.15 Schindler Lifts Australia Pty Ltd v Debelak (1989) 89 ALR 275 …. 8.47 Schlieske v Overseas Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1960] VR 195 …. 23.25 Schloithe v Police [2011] SASC 156; BC201107461 …. 24.33, 24.34, 24.46 Schmidt v Gilmour [1988] WAR 219 …. 15.72 Schneider v Alusa Pty Ltd [2012] QSC 37; BC201200963 …. 29.49 Schofield, Ex parte [1891] 2 QB 428 …. 24.13 Schokker v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (2000) 106 FCR 134; [2000] FCA 1734; BC200007314 …. 3.48 Schroeder v Cleugh (1877) 46 LJQB 365 …. 19.6 Schulte-Hordelhoff v Patons Brake Replacements Pty Ltd [1965] VR 369 …. 13.58

Schweppes’ Ltd v Archer (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 178 …. 15.34, 15.35, 17.33, 17.34 Scope Data Systems Pty Ltd v Aitken (No 2) [2010] NSWDC 65; BC201040139 …. 18.74 Scott v Evia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSC 110; BC200702763 …. 16.68 — v Municipal Tramways Trust [1920] SALR 442 …. 12.15, 12.17 — v Northern Territory of Australia [2005] 15 NTLR 158; [2005] NTCA 4; BC200504732 …. 7.24 — v Pascall (1847) 2 Ph 390; 41 ER 993 …. 11.59 — v Prowse (1979, unreported) …. 12.22 — v Scott (2003) 31 Fam LR 257; [2003] FamCA 1129 …. 8.77 — v Secretary, Department of Social Security (No 2) [2000] FCA 1450; BC200006175 …. 8.29 Scott (J C) Constructions v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 413 …. 3.46 Scott Fell v Lloyd (1911) 13 CLR 230; BC1100001 …. 10.48 Scott, Sibbald and Company Pty Ltd, Matter of (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 634 …. 8.15 Scottish Gympie Gold Mines Ltd v Carroll [1902] St R Qd 311 …. 8.44 Scripture Union v Prime Industrial Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 38; BC200600465 …. 11.2 SDS Corporation Ltd v Pasdonnay Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 26 (S2); BC200404600 …. 15.72, 15.73, 17.19, 17.20 Seabird Corporation Ltd (receiver and manager appointed) (in liq) v National Securities Exchanges Guarantee Corporation Ltd (1989) 7 ACLC 1263 …. 29.57 Seal v Malaugh Holdings (No 2) Pty Ltd [2008] SASC 223; BC200807794 …. 7.5 Seavision Investment SA v Evennett and Clarkson Puckle Ltd (The ‘Tiburon’) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 26 …. 7.21, 7.23, 16.8

Sebastian v Strongwall International Ltd (Deregistered) (No 2) [2011] FCA 1105; BC201107456 …. 16.70 Second Lenbourne Pty Ltd v Beagle Management Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 486; BC9901891 …. 28.26 Secretary, Department of Business and Innovation v Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 586; BC201209462 …. 13.59, 13.65, 13.66, 13.79 Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs v Mouratidis (2012) 200 FCR 464; [2012] FCAFC 29; BC201201402 …. 21.5, 21.50 Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade v Boswell (No 2) (1992) 39 FCR 288; BC9203911 …. 7.35, 7.36 Secure Parking (WA) Pty Ltd v Wilson [2006] WASCA 135; BC200605250 …. 20.13 — v — (No 2) [2009] WASCA 78; BC20090623 …. 20.12 Securitibank Ltd v Rutherford (Securitibank judgment No 28) (1984) 2 NZCLC 99,073 …. 29.54 Securities Commission v Kiwi Cooperative Dairies Ltd [1995] 3 NZLR 26 …. 9.37 Segalov (deceased), Estate of [1952] P 241 …. 18.91 Selliah v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998, unreported); BC9801672 …. 8.29, 9.28 Semco Developments Pty Ltd v Graham [2005] VSCA 268; BC200509891 …. 13.71 Seminars Australia Pty Ltd v ABN Amro Morgans Ltd [2006] ACTSC 101; BC200608278 …. 28.26 Semler v Murphy [1968] Ch 183 …. 29.35, 29.43, 29.44, 29.50 Sent v Jet Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 201 …. 20.28, 20.29, 28.7, 29.22, 29.39 Separate Representative v J H E and G A W (1993) 16 Fam LR 485; (1993) 138 FLR 361 …. 22.11, 22.17, 22.71, 22.72

Sequel Drill & Blast Pty Ltd v Whitsunday Crushers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] QCA 239; BC200907590 …. 20.4 Serbian Cultural Club ‘St Sava’ Inc v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (No 2) [2008] NSWLEC 78; BC200800831 …. 8.85, 8.88 Sergi v Sergi [2012] WASC 18; BC201200107 …. 7.40, 7.49 Serrell v Bryant (1998, unreported); BC9801126 …. 25.29 Service v Flatau (1900) 16 WN (NSW) 248 …. 6.4, 6.11 Settlement Wine Co Pty Ltd v National & General Insurance Co [1994] 175 LSJS 282; BC9400551 …. 8.17 — v — (1997) 190 LSJS 101; BC9700380 …. 23.14 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd v United Petroleum Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 85; BC201102264 …. 6.7 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2007) 244 ALR 374; [2007] FCA 1489; BC200708209 …. 13.22, 13.23, 13.26, 13.29, 13.72 — v — [2007] FCA 2059; BC200711302 …. 15.20, 15.21 — v — (2009) 182 FCR 160; [2009] FCAFC 166; BC200910812 …. 13.19 Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Warburton (No 2) (2011) 206 IR 450; [2011] NSWSC 386; BC201102933 …. 17.92 70 Pitt St Sydney Pty Ltd v McGurk [2004] NSWSC 449; BC200403132 …. 23.27 Seward v Quigley (1901) 18 WN (NSW) 35 …. 8.18 Sewell v Hampel (1910) 13 WAR (L) 44 …. 27.3, 27.9 Shackles v Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd [1996] 2 VR 427; BC9404872 …. 29.13, 29.63, 29.72, 29.92, 29.123, 29.124, 29.135 Shaddick v JDV Ltd [2012] WASC 120; BC201208925 …. 13.73 Shaddock (L) & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 2) (1982) 151 CLR 590; BC8200124 …. 6.22, 6.28 Shand v Doyle [1997] ANZ Conv R 134; BC9604501 …. 4.55, 4.57 — v M J Atkinson Ltd (in liq) [1966] NZLR 551 …. 26.10, 26.43, 27.1

Shang v Zhang (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 1355; BC200710325 …. 11.2, 11.3 Shannon, Will of [1977] 1 NSWLR 210 …. 2.36 — v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 2) [1994] 2 Qd R 563 …. 28.7, 28.34, 28.39, 29.135 Sharma v Hunters [2011] WTLR 259; [2011] EWHC 2546 …. 23.62 Sharp, Re [1923] St R Qd 102 …. 10.35 — v Dane [1903] ALR 155 …. 4.28 — v Lush (1879) 10 Ch D 468 …. 22.3 Sharples v Crime and Misconduct Commission [2004] QSC 306; BC200406081 …. 9.34 — v Minister for Local Government (2008) 159 LGERA 391; [2008] NSWLEC 67; BC200800738 …. 29.15 — v — (2010) 174 LGERA 129; [2010] NSWCA 36; BC201006292 …. 9.4 Shatin Bernstein (a firm) v Dickinson (1998, unreported); BC9801756 …. 2.8 Shaw v Commonwealth (1995) 124 FLR 190 …. 19.15 — v Jarldorn (1999) 76 SASR 28; [1999] SASC 529; BC9908346 …. 13.3, 13.5, 13.18, 13.24, 13.25, 13.26, 13.30, 13.33 — v Neale (1858) 6 HLC 581; 10 ER 1422 …. 27.1, 27.9 — v Yarranova Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSCA 48; BC200701826 …. 13.6 — v — (No 2) [2010] VSC 125; BC201002209 …. 16.50 — v — [2011] VSCA 55; BC201100801 …. 7.10, 7.14 Shaw and Dickens v Marshall (1858) 1 Sw & Tr 129; 164 ER 660 …. 11.44 Sheahan v Northern Australia Land and Agency Co Ltd (1993, unreported) …. 16.51 Shears v Shears [2005] FamCA 852 …. 21.59 Sheehan, Re (1990) 13 Fam LR 736 …. 3.46, 3.48, 3.60, 15.40, 15.56 Sheehy v Mitchell Crane Hire Pty Ltd (1991) 104 FLR 96 …. 8.4, 10.15, 20.14

Sheffield v Eden (1878) 10 Ch D 291 …. 26.6 Sheikholeslami v Tolcher (No 2) [2012] FCA 199; BC201201083 …. 10.48 Sheil v Doneley (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 60 …. 10.47 Shell Oil Co of Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1931] AC 275 …. 21.18 Shellharbour City Council v Johnson (No 2) (2006) 67 NSWLR 308; [2006] NSWCA 114; BC200605024 …. 7.51, 7.54, 13.25 — v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2012] NSWLEC 96 …. 9.5, 9.10, 9.32 Shellie v Davidson [2010] VSC 575; BC201009379 …. 16.57 Shelton v Repatriation Commission (1999) 85 FCR 587; [1999] FCA 181; BC9901816 …. 9.8, 9.31 Shephard v Blueberry Farms of Australia (Corindi) Ltd (2001) 162 FLR 339; [2001] FMCA 2 …. 7.29 Shepherd v Baster [2006] WASC 176; BC200702363 …. 13.76 Shepparton Projects Pty Ltd v Cave Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] VSC 384; BC201106965 …. 15.51 Shepperdson v Lewis [1966] VR 418 …. 8.50 Sherar v R (1991) 65 A Crim R 137 …. 25.9, 25.11, 25.13 Sherborne Estate (No 2), Re (2005) 65 NSWLR 268; [2005] NSWSC 1003; BC200507645 …. 7.44, 7.48, 10.40, 10.44 Shercliff v Engadine Acceptance Corp Pty Ltd (No 2) (1982) 3 BPR 9207 …. 8.2, 15.45, 15.51, 15.52 Sherman v Minister of National Revenue (2003) 226 DLR (4th) 546 …. 7.34, 7.35 Sherwell v Armour [1962] VR 197 …. 12.14 Shiell v Coach House Hotel Ltd (1982) 136 DLR (3d) 470 …. 28.7, 29.3, 29.68 Shippey v Gray (1880) 49 QBD 524 …. 27.23 Shircore v Andersons (1996, unreported); BC9600777 …. 26.22, 26.28

Shire of Gisborne v King [1995] 1 VR 103 …. 23.61, 23.68 Shoesmith v Northern Territory [1995] NTSC 118 …. 11.10, 11.11 Shore v Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) [2009] SADC 66; BC200940662 …. 17.73 Short v Crawley (No 40) [2008] NSWSC 1302; BC200811010 …. 16.53 Shrapnel v Laing (1887) 20 QBD 334 …. 18.68 Shtrambrandt v Brott (No 2) [2006] VSC 483; BC200610470 …. 23.35 Shun Wah & Galvin (a firm), Re (1993, unreported); BC9303384 …. 26.34 Sibthorpe v Southwark London Borough Council [2011] 2 All ER 240; [2011] EWCA Civ 25 …. 3.48 Sidameneo (No 456) Pty Ltd v Ward [2011] VSC 559; BC201108626 …. 14.62 Sierra Club of Western Canada v British Columbia (Chief Forester) (1994) 117 DLR (4th) 395 …. 9.14 Sievwright v Ward [1935] NZLR 43 …. 3.48 Sigalla v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1419; BC201009496 …. 29.66 Sigma Chemicals (1986) Pty Ltd v Brown [2002] WASC 12; BC200200145 …. 16.70 Silver Fox Company Pty Ltd v Lenard’s Pty Ltd (No 3) (2004) 214 ALR 621; [2004] FCA 1570; BC200408372 …. 13.64 Silver Valley Mines, Re (1882) 21 Ch D 381 …. 1.13, 10.53 Silverblade v Nelson (1980) 24 SASR 310 …. 12.9, 12.14 Silverstone Holdings Pty Ltd v American Home Assurance Co [2003] WASC 139; BC200304351 …. 29.94, 29.128 — v Edward [2000] WASC 290; BC200007317 …. 5.43 Silvia v Brodyn Pty Ltd (2007) 25 ACLC 385; [2007] NSWCA 55; BC200702048 …. 10.54, 10.59 Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington Gears Ltd (1986, unreported)

…. 29.89 Simcoe v Jacuzzi UK Group plc [2012] 2 All ER 60; [2012] EWCA Civ 137 …. 19.6, 19.19 Siminton v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2006) 152 FCR 129; [2006] FCAFC 118; BC200605672 …. 20.8 Simmons v Colly Cotton Marketing Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1092; BC200708549 …. 19.23 — v Storer (1880) 14 Ch D 154 …. 1.19 — v Story [2001] VSCA 187; BC200106564 …. 2.3, 2.7 Simonovski v Bendigo Bank Ltd (No 2) [2003] VSC 139; BC200302181 …. 13.11, 13.25, 13.30 Simpson v Bagnall [2008] NSWLEC 79; BC200800830 …. 8.86 — v British Industries Trust Ltd (1923) 39 TLR 286 …. 11.34 — v Burton (1839) 8 LJ Ch NS 328 …. 29.80 Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd v Hendon Corporation [1964] 3 All ER 833 …. 15.36, 17.68 Sinclair v William Arnott Pty Ltd (1963) 64 SR (NSW) 88 …. 11.34 Sinclair-Jones v Kay [1989] 1 WLR 114 …. 23.50 Singer v Berghouse (1993) 114 ALR 521; BC9303604 …. 28.4, 29.72 Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998, unreported); BC9803721 …. 9.31 — v Observer Ltd [1989] 2 All ER 751 …. 16.40, 22.50, 22.75, 22.76 Singleton v Macquarie Broadcasting Holdings Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 103 …. 3.33, 15.59, 16.26 SingTel Optus Pty Ltd v Weston [2012] NSWSC 1002; BC201206877 …. 10.56 Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd v Triplan Ltd [1973] 1 QB 609 …. 29.4, 29.88, 29.132 Sisu Capital Fund Ltd v Tucker [2006] 1 WLR 638 …. 7.29

— v — [2006] 1 All ER 167; [2005] EWHC 2321 …. 17.37 Sitch (deceased) (No 2), Re Will of [2005] VSC 383; BC200507079 …. 10.35, 10.39, 10.44 Sitzler Savage Pty Ltd v Northern Mining Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 104; BC201201452 …. 23.25 Sivritas v Sivritas (No 2) (2008) 23 VR 349; [2008] VSC 580; BC200811374 …. 8.16 Skalkos v Assaf (No 2) [2002] NSWCA 236; BC200204574 …. 13.93 — v T & S Recoveries Pty Ltd (2004) 65 NSWLR 151; [2004] NSWCA 281; BC200405462 …. 15.85 Skidmore v Blackmore (1995) 122 DLR (4th) 330 …. 7.34 Skinner v Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia (1994, unreported); BC9400618 …. 11.33 — v Jeogla Pty Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 106; [2001] NSWCA 15; BC200100356 …. 20.36, 20.37 Skinner & Edwards (Builders) Pty Ltd v Australian Telecommunications Corporation (1992) 27 NSWLR 567 …. 11.63 Skinner & Smith’s Bills of Costs (No 2), Re [1990] 1 Qd R 180 …. 5.32 Skipworth v State of Western Australia (No 2) (2008) 218 FLR 16; [2008] FMCA 544; BC200803315 …. 6.21 Skylight Maritime SA v Ascot Underwriting Ltd [2005] PNLR 25; [2005] EWHC 15 …. 23.24 Skyring v Sweeney [1999] FCA 61; BC9900200 …. 29.106 Slack, Ex parte (1884) 6 ALT 23 …. 7.19, 17.23 Slack-Smith v Director-General of the Department of Land and Water Conservation (No 2) (2003) 129 LGERA 340; [2003] NSWLEC 266; BC200306615 …. 8.7 Sladin v Scabel [2008] FamCA 72; BC200851033 …. 22.71 Slaveski v State of Victoria [2010] VSC 569; BC201009380 …. 8.60, 13.65

— v — [2013] VSC 76; BC201300831 …. 8.15, 8.16 Slazengers Ltd v Seaspeed Ferries International Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 221 …. 29.78 Slim v Kabra [2006] NSWSC 837; BC200606400 …. 10.1 Slingsby v Attorney-General [1918] P 236 …. 15.29, 15.35, 15.36, 17.14, 18.77 Sloane v McDonald & Sutherland (1998, unreported); BC9800098 …. 13.88, 13.90 Sloyan (T) & Sons (Builders) Ltd v Brothers of Christian Instruction [1974] 3 All ER 715 …. 28.36, 28.39, 28.40, 28.56, 29.1, 29.2 Sluggett v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2002] FCA 1060; BC200204871 …. 9.32 Smail v Burton [1975] VR 776 …. 29.112, 29.113, 29.124, 29.129 Small v Walker (1985, unreported); BC8591196 …. 25.28 Smallacombe v Lockyer Investment Co Pty Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 97; BC9304865 …. 13.58, 13.70 Smalley v Department of Health and Ageing (No 2) [2011] FCA 374; BC201102055 …. 9.32 Smart Co Pty Ltd (in liq) v Clipsal Australia Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 821; BC201105352 …. 22.40 — v — (No 7) [2011] FCA 1359; BC201109220 …. 15.15 Smart Co Pty Ltd v Yeoman Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] SASC 354; BC200811058 …. 18.18, 18.19 Smeaton Hanscomb & Co Ltd v Sassoon I Setty, Son & Co (No 2) [1953] 2 All ER 1588 …. 8.25 SMEC Testing Services Pty Ltd v Campelltown City Council [2000] NSWCA 323; BC200007054 …. 13.57, 13.61 Smirnios v Byrne (No 2) [2009] VSC 86; BC200901551 …. 2.24 Smith (deceased), Re (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 422 …. 2.36

Smith (deceased) (No 2), Re (1991) 6 WAR 299 …. 16.27, 16.46, 16.73 Smith, Re (1844) 13 M & W 477; 153 ER 199 …. 5.26 —, Re (1932) 4 ABC 187 …. 1.19 — v Airservices Australia (2005) 146 FCR 37; [2005] FCA 997; BC200505203 …. 14.59, 14.67 — v Ash [2011] 2 Qd R 175; [2010] QCA 112; BC201003117 …. 24.45 — v Betty [1903] 2 KB 317 …. 26.27 — v Buller (1875) LR 19 Eq 473 …. 15.35, 16.15 — v Croft [1986] 2 All ER 551 …. 14.6, 14.8, 14.9 — v Covington Spencer Ltd [2008] 1 NZLR 75; [2007] NZCA 224 …. 29.29 — v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 37 ATR 314; BC9704326 …. 13.25 — v Dwyer [1999] NSWSC 114; BC9900633 …. 18.65 — v Hanrahan (2007) 49 SR (WA) 37; [2007] WADC 1; BC200740000 …. 17.41 — v Madden (1946) 73 CLR 129; BC4600026 …. 17.87 — v Moloney [2005] 92 SASR 498; [2005] SASC 305; BC200505634 …. 2.32 — v Retirement Benefits Fund Investment Trust (No 3) (1994, unreported); BC9400496 …. 20.21, 20.22, 20.24, 20.27 — v Robinson [1980] Qd R 372 …. 24.40 — v 600 Machinery Australia Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1029; BC9605672 …. 13.25 — v Smith [1906] VLR 78 …. 16.28, 17.25 — v — [1987] 2 Qd R 807 …. 13.58, 20.31 — v — (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1105; BC201110923 …. 10.31 — v Springford [2009] WTLR 705; [2007] EWHC 3446 …. 10.29 — v Visser (2001) 10 Tas R 115; [2001] TASSC 40; BC200101578 ….

21.60 Smiths Ltd v Middleton (No 2) [1986] 2 All ER 539 …. 20.28 Smits v Roach (2002) 55 NSWLR 166; [2002] NSWSC 241; BC200203295 …. 3.51 — v — [2004] 60 NSWLR 711; [2004] NSWCA 233; BC200404415 …. 3.46, 3.51, 3.57, 4.44 — v — (2006) 227 CLR 423; [2006] HCA 36; BC200605512 …. 3.46, 3.51, 3.57, 4.44 — v Tabone [2007] QCA 337; BC200708680 …. 16.57 Smolle v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1967; BC200710881 …. 16.24 Smorgon Foundation Ltd v De Lucia (1987, unreported); BC8700420 …. 17.72 Sneaths Freightlines Pty Ltd v Pertsinidis (No 2) (2008) 253 LSJS 172; [2008] SADC 3; BC200840540 …. 12.9, 13.73 Snedden v Republic of Croatia (No 2) [2009] FCAFC 132; BC200908915 …. 20.12 Snell, Re (1877) 6 Ch D 105 …. 26.8 — v Pryce (No 2) (1992) 109 FLR 328 …. 6.26, 24.28 Snowtop Mushrooms v Powley (1982, unreported); BC8291124 …. 15.11 Sobey v Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCA 1621; BC200810059 …. 1.23, 14.38 Sobh v Children’s Court of Victoria (1994) 74 A Crim R 453; BC9401359 …. 24.52 Software AG v Racing & Wagering Western Australia (2009) 175 FCR 121; [2009] FCAFC 36; BC200901760 …. 13.73 Soh v Commonwealth of Australia [2008] FCA 1524; BC200808943 …. 29.106 Soia v Bennett [2003] WASC 158; BC200304616 …. 26.35

Solak v Registrar of Titles (No 3) [2010] VSC 235; BC201003561 …. 15.38 Soldatenko v R (1984, unreported); BC8471009 …. 25.19, 25.21 Solicitor, Re a [1961] Ch 491 …. 5.51 —, Re a [1968] 3 NSWR 404 …. 26.15, 26.18 —, Re a [1972] 1 OR 684 …. 5.3 Solicitors, Re (1917) 37 DLR 763 …. 26.27 Solicitor-General v Moore [2000] 1 NZLR 533 …. 25.20 Solicitor’s Bill of Costs, Re a (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 132 …. 15.34, 15.41, 15.45, 15.51 Solomon v Miller (1865) 2 WW & A’B (Eq) 135 …. 20.2 Solomon Brothers (a firm) v Gibney (1998, unreported) …. 23.49 Solomons v District Court of New South Wales (2000) 49 NSWLR 321; [2000] NSWCA 99; BC200003899 …. 25.6, 25.12 — v — (2002) 211 CLR 119; [2002] HCA 47; BC200205985 …. 25.6 Somers v Somers (2011) 45 Fam LR 123; [2011] FamCA 103; BC201150147 …. 8.59 Somersall Investments Ltd v Pinnacle Vrb Ltd [2001] VSC 283; BC200104861 …. 28.49 Somerville Retail Services Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority [2011] VSCA 188; BC201104607 …. 16.56 Sommerville v Brennan (1902) 18 WN (NSW) 287 …. 8.17 Sons of Gwalia Ltd (subject to deed of company arrangement) v Margaretic (2006) 232 ALR 119; [2006] FCAFC 92; BC200604308 …. 10.7 Sony Entertainment (Australia) Ltd v Smith (2005) 215 ALR 788; [2005] FCA 228; BC200500963 …. 15.21 Sophiadakis v Reljic [1999] VSC 147; BC9902667 …. 1.8, 1.9 Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 …. 3.20, 18.64, 20.33

South Australian Superannuation Fund Investment Trust v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (1996) 66 SASR 509; BC9600393 …. 16.28 South Coast Shipping Co Ltd v Havant Borough Council [2002] 3 All ER 779; [2001] EWHC 9017 …. 18.24 South Melbourne City Council v Hallam (No 2) (1994) 83 LGERA 307 …. 6.15, 9.2, 9.3, 9.8, 9.18, 9.36, 10.21 South Sydney (Council of City of) v Forte Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993, unreported); BC9303760 …. 1.20 Southbourne Sheet Metal Co Ltd, Re [1993] 1 WLR 244 …. 9.2 Southeastern Sydney Area Health Service v King [2006] NSWCA 2; BC200600916 …. 13.25 Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 114 …. 26.37 — v — (1986, unreported); BC8601109 …. 15.81 Southern Cross Pipelines Australia Pty Ltd v Michael [2002] WASC 316; BC200208166 …. 22.63 Southern Equities Corp Ltd (in liq) v Bond (No 4) [2000] SASC 358; BC200006635 …. 14.25 Southern Star Group Pty Ltd v Byron (No 2) (1995, unreported); BC9501738 …. 1.26 Southon v Plath (2010) 181 LGERA 352; [2010] NSWCCA 292; BC201009506 …. 24.25 South-West Forest Defence Foundation Inc v Executive Director of Department of Conservation and Land Management (No 2) (1998) 154 ALR 411; BC9801851 …. 9.25 — v Lands and Forest Commission (No 2) (1995) 86 LGERA 382; BC9503570 …. 9.2 Southwell v Jane [2012] FamCA 43; BC201250060 …. 29.12 Spagnolo v Body Corporate Strata Plan 418979Q [2007] VSC 423; BC200709258 …. 13.79

Spalding (A G) v A W Gamage Ltd [1914] 2 Ch 405 …. 11.55 Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 8) [2006] FCA 1537; BC200609555 …. 16.50 Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (1998, unreported); BC9800513 …. 15.19, 15.21, 15.79, 15.80, 15.82, 17.27 Sparta Nominees Pty Ltd v Orchard Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 54; BC200207487 …. 16.75 SPCB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 26; BC200400122 …. 23.13 Specialised Building Materials Pty Ltd v EU Occusted Pty Ltd (1981) 58 FLR 270 …. 28.59, 29.5, 29.28 Specsavers Pty Ltd v Optical Superstore Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 183; BC201209849 …. 13.6 Spedding v Nobles (No 2) (2007) 69 NSWLR 100; [2007] NSWCA 87; BC200702583; BC200700962 …. 19.13, 19.14 Speedfix Building Products Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (1987) 11 ACLR 863 …. 10.53 Spence v Gerard Malouf & Partners Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 764; BC201004939 …. 3.49, 4.44, 26.24 Spencer v Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 418; BC0700011 …. 13.53 — v Dowling [1997] 2 VR 127; BC9603333 …. 15.39, 20.39 Speno Rail Maintenance Australia Pty Ltd v Metals & Minerals Insurance Pte Ltd [2009] WASCA 31; BC200902269 …. 11.42 Spicer v Carmody (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 348 …. 6.11 Spiers v English [1907] P 122 …. 10.17 — v Lane (1989, unreported) …. 5.43 Sports Café Ltd v Registrar of TradeMarks (1998) 42 IPR 552; BC9806807 …. 9.21 Spotless Group Ltd v Premier Building and Consulting Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 115; BC200804692 …. 8.5, 11.8

Spotwire Pty Ltd v Visa International Service Association (No 2) [2004] FCA 571; BC200402521 …. 14.29 Spurling’s Will Trusts, Re [1966] 1 All ER 745 …. 10.4, 11.56 St Clair v Timtalla Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] QSC 480; BC201010011 …. 13.30 St George Bank Ltd v Howell [2002] NSWSC 130; BC200200635 …. 15.53 — v Irani [2008] VSC 98; BC200802081 …. 15.41 St Helens Area Landcare and Coastcare Group Inc v Break O’Day Council [2005] TASSC 46; BC200503552 …. 29.104, 29.118 St James’ Preservation Society v Toronto (City) (2006) 272 DLR (4th) 149 …. 9.3, 9.20 St Peters Corporation v Dangerfield (1971) 1 SASR 583 …. 17.33 Stacey v Meagher [1978] Tas SR 56 …. 21.50, 21.54 Stack v Brisbane City Council (1996) 71 FCR 523; BC9606435 …. 14.48, 14.51, 29.130 Staffordshire Gas and Coke Co, Re [1893] 3 Ch 523 …. 10.48, 10.53 Staley v Pivot Group Pty Ltd (No 4) [2010] WASC 120; BC201003596 …. 15.11, 15.74 — v — (No 6) [2010] WASC 228; BC201009412 …. 16.40, 16.62 Staniar v Evans (1886) Ch 197; [2007] EWHC 2635 …. 2.15 — v — (1886) 34 Ch D 470 …. 26.42 Stanistreet, Marriage of (1987) 89 FLR 419 …. 5.32, 16.18 Stanizzo v Grpcevski [2005] NSWSC 1185; BC200510047 …. 18.74 Stanke & Sons Pty Ltd v Von Stanke (No 2) [2007] SASC 109; BC200701970 …. 14.51, 14.55 Stanley v Layne Christensen Company [2006] WASCA 56; BC200601844 …. 14.34, 14.35 — v Phillips (1966) 115 CLR 470; BC6600570 …. 17.75, 17.76, 17.77, 17.78, 17.79, 17.85, 17.86

Stanley-Hill v Kool [1982] 1 NSWLR 460 …. 28.52 Stanton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1958] Qd R 155 …. 17.76, 17.87 Star v Silvia (No 2) (1994, unreported) …. 10.53 Stark v Dennett [2008] 2 Qd R 72; [2008] QCA 50; BC200801302 …. 4.46, 26.16, 26.17, 26.19 Starkey v Salm (1895) 7 QLJ (NC) 79 …. 20.32 — v State of South Australia (No 2) (2011) 274 LSJS 636; [2011] SASC 64; BC201102235 …. 9.10 Starling v Edmunds [2012] WASC 14; BC201208917 …. 25.26 Starr-Diamond v Diamond [2013] NSWCA 7; BC201300520 …. 29.104, 29.110 State Government Insurance Commission v Lane (1997) 68 SASR 257; BC9701802 …. 16.40 State Planning Commission v Della Vedova (1992) 7 WAR 81 …. 19.22 Stateland Developments Pty Ltd v Princi [2007] NSWSC 709; BC200705094 …. 14.66 Statham v Shephard (No 2) (1974) 23 FLR 244 …. 11.52, 11.53, 11.54 Stead v Foster (1998, unreported); BC9804491 …. 14.65 Steeden v Walden [1910] 2 Ch 393 …. 22.68 Steedman v Golden Fleece Petroleum Ltd (1987) 73 ALR 317 …. 5.51 Steel, Ex parte (1898) 15 WN (NSW) 96 …. 5.55 — v Appeal Costs Board [1981] WAR 299 …. 21.1, 21.23, 21.25 Steele v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 48 …. 21.54 Steele-Smith v Liberty Financial Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 487; BC200503391 …. 8.34 Stefanou v Fairfield Chase Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 605; BC9305153 …. 3.37, 3.40, 4.24, 4.28, 5.33

Stein, Marriage of (2000) 25 Fam LR 727; [2000] FamCA 102 …. 8.78 Steindl Nominees Pty Ltd v Laghaifar [2003] 2 Qd R 683; [2003] QCA 157; BC200301794 …. 23.8 Stelmag Pty Ltd v Tifferly Manufacturing Pty Ltd [2002] ACTSC 99; BC200205842 …. 28.24 Stemm v Feigelsohn [1964] Qd R 416 …. 17.78, 17.83, 17.84 Stemson v AMP General Insurance (NZ) Ltd [2007] 1 NZLR 289; [2006] UKPC 30 …. 16.67 Step v Northern Territory of Australia (2007) 20 NTLR 141; [2007] NTCA 6; BC200709089 …. 7.24 Stephens v Stephens [1991] 1 NZLR 633 …. 23.17, 23.67 Stephenson v Geiss [1998] 1 Qd R 542; BC9702989 …. 16.35, 22.68 Steppke v National Capital Development Commission (1978) 21 ACTR 23 …. 11.24 Stevens v Barnett (1900) 17 WN (NSW) 38 …. 6.13 — v Canada (Privy Council) (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 85 …. 4.30 — v Chandler (1988) 46 SASR 541 …. 12.9, 12.19 — v Economic House Builders Ltd [1938] 1 All ER 654 …. 20.13 — v Keogh (1996, unreported); BC9606098 …. 4.13 Stevens (A M) Pty Ltd v Australian Red Cross Society [2002] FCA 91; BC200200240 …. 14.51 Stevenson Group Investments Pty Ltd v Nunn [2012] QCA 351; BC201209678 …. 8.69 Stewart v Eastern Health [2012] VSC 197; BC201203042 …. 27.32 — v McKinley (1885) 11 VLR 802 …. 20.21, 20.22 — v Strevens [1976] 2 NSWLR 321 …. 26.10, 27.5 Stipanov v Mier (No 2) [2006] VSC 424; BC200609465 …. 13.22, 13.76 Stirkis v Legal Services Commissioner [2012] NSWADT 68 …. 26.1, 26.12

Stobbart v Mocnaj [1999] WASC 252; BC9908569 …. 1.8, 7.5, 16.23 Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd v Darryl I Coombs Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 252; BC200501848 …. 16.54 Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co (No 2) [1999] 3 All ER 822 …. 3.44 Stoddart & Co v Jovetic (1993) 8 WAR 420; BC9301102 …. 3.16, 3.30, 3.32 — v — (1993) 9 WAR 70 …. 3.25 Stojanovski v Willis & Bowring [2002] NSWSC 392; BC200202230 …. 18.74 Stone v Registrar of Titles [2012] WASC 21; BC201202673 …. 7.15 Storer & Co v Johnson (1890) 15 App Cas 203 …. 5.53 Storey & Keers Pty Ltd v Johnstone (1987) 9 NSWLR 446 …. 6.22 Strachan Thomas v Clough [1999] SASC 298; BC9904444 …. 7.37 Straker v Tudor Rose (a firm) [2007] EWCA Civ 368 …. 20.29 Strand Nominees Pty Ltd v Pennywise Smart Shopping Australia Pty Ltd (1991) 1 NTLR 17 …. 6.26 Strand Wood Co Ltd, Re [1904] 2 Ch 1 …. 29.53 Strata Consolidated (Australia) Pty Ltd v Bradshaw [2000] NSWCA 114; BC200002306; [2000] NSWCA 225; BC200004852; …. 28.21, 29.109 Stratford (J T) and Son Ltd v Lindley (No 2) [1969] 3 All ER 1122 …. 1.15, 1.16, 14.24, 14.66 Strauss v Wykes [1916] VLR 200 …. 10.10 Strazdins, Re (No 3) [2009] FCA 1410; BC200910826 …. 14.40 Street v Luna Park Sydney Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1317; BC200610115 …. 28.26, 29.6, 29.7 Stringer v Flehr and Walker (a firm) [2003] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-718; [2003] QSC 370; BC200306447 …. 2.7 Strother v 3464920 Canada Inc [2007] 2 SCR 177 …. 2.4

Struther, Re (2005) 64 NSWLR 392; [2005] NSWSC 1113; BC200510078 …. 22.14 Struthers (E & L), Re (No 3) (2005) 64 NSWLR 392; [2005] NSWSC 1113; BC200510078 …. 28.22 Stuart, Re [1893] 2 QB 201 …. 3.17, 3.23, 3.24 Stuart Pty Ltd v Condor Commercial Insulation Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 379; BC200610813 …. 16.53 Stumm v Dixon & Co (1889) 22 QBD 529 …. 11.5, 11.6 Stumore v Campbell & Co [1892] 1 QB 314 …. 26.40 Sturmer and Town of Beavertown, Re (1912) 2 DLR 501 …. 22.35 —, Re (1912) 25 DLR 566 …. 22.3 Sub Rosa Holdings Pty Ltd v Salsa Sudada Production Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 916; BC200607054 …. 14.10 Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462; [1999] HCA 30; BC9903377 …. 21.60 Suffolk v Suffolk [2010] FamCA 170; BC201050197 …. 17.9 Suitors’ Fund Act 1964 (WA), Re (2002) 135 A Crim R 48; [2002] WASC 243; BC200206264 …. 21.29 Sulcs (P M) & Associates Pty Ltd v Oliveri [2009] NSWSC 456; BC200904803 …. 3.6, 26.15 Sullivan and Department of Industry, Science and Technology, Re (1998) 51 ALD 767 …. 7.29 Sullivan Brothers, Re (1915) 32 WN (NSW) 127 …. 5.54, 5.58 Sullivan v Police [2000] SASC 171; BC200003485 …. 24.63 Sullivans Cove IXL Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2), Re [2011] TASSC 53; BC201107675 …. 10.57 Summer Hill Business Estate Pty Ltd v Equititrust Ltd [2011] NSWCA 211; BC201105605 …. 28.67 Summerfield v Summerfield [2007] FamCA 804; BC200750399 …. 15.16 Summerville v Paul O’Halloran & Associates [2007] WASC 245;

BC200709172 …. 18.65 Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud [1989] VR 8 …. 3.20, 18.64, 20.33 Sunday Times Newspaper Company Ltd v McIntosh (1933) 33 SR (NSW) 371 …. 11.57, 28.33 Sundell v Queensland Housing Commission (1954) 94 CLR 531; BC5400090 …. 17.71, 17.92 Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd v Prudentia Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] VSC 399; BC201207016 …. 15.15, 16.46, 16.51, 16.56 Sunlec International Ltd v Carroll Australasia Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 354; BC200108258 …. 13.3, 13.13, 13.29 Sunset Pty Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd (1999) 92 FCR 1; [1999] FCA 702; BC9902809 …. 11.26 Super 1000 Pty Ltd v Pacific General Securities Ltd [2007] NSWSC 171; BC200701277 …. 4.48 Sural SpA v Downer EDI Rail Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1292; BC200709766 …. 13.74 Sutcliffe v Smith (1886) 2 TLR 881 …. 8.45 Sutton v Sears [1960] 2 QB 97 …. 5.53 Suttor, Re (1890) 11 LR (NSW) L 401 …. 27.3 Sved v Council of the Municipality of Woollahra (1998) NSW ConvR ¶55842; BC9800281 …. 11.25 SVI Systems Pty Ltd v Best & Less Pty Ltd (2001) 187 ALR 302; [2001] FCA 279; BC200101071 …. 7.4 Swain Investments Ltd v Danumet Pty Ltd (1989, unreported); BC8902202 …. 29.73 Swain Mason v Mills & Reeve (a firm) [2012] STC 1760; [2012] EWCA Civ 498 …. 8.51, 20.30 Swan v Bank of New Zealand (1890) 24 SALR 20 …. 15.5, 17.67, 17.71 Swane v Marsh [1980] ANZ Conv R 132 …. 4.28

Swanson v Dungey (1892) 25 SALR 87 …. 10.13 Sweeney & Vandeleur Pty Ltd v BNY Australia Ltd (1993) 11 ACLC 1071; BC9304087 …. 22.76 Sweeting, Re [1898] 1 Ch 268 …. 7.10 Swiftcrete Pty Ltd, Re (1977) 2 ACLR 411 …. 7.8 Swisstex Finance Pty Ltd v Lamb [1993] 2 Qd R 463; BC9303358 …. 11.36 Sydmar Pty Ltd v Statewise Developments Pty Ltd (1987) 5 ACLC 480; BC8701485 …. 28.56, 28.59, 29.5 Sydney City Council v Geftlick [2006] NSWCA 280; BC200608331 …. 17.88 — v Geftlick (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 374; BC200611117 …. 20.4 Sydney Harbour Trust Commissioners v Warburton (1906) 23 WN (NSW) 53 …. 15.33 Syron v Newells Creek Sawmilling Pty Ltd (1995, unreported); BC9505128 …. 13.93 SWM Financial Services Pty Ltd v Lloyd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 202; BC201201247 …. 8.39 Sykes v Sacerdoti (1885) 15 QBD 423 …. 28.55 — v Sykes (1869) LR 4 CP 645 …. 29.31 Symbol Park Lane Ltd v Steggles Palmer (a firm) [1985] 2 All ER 167 …. 5.52, 5.53 Syme v United Victoria Permanent Building Society [1905] VLR 11 …. 17.59, 17.62 Symes v Commonwealth of Australia (1987) 89 FLR 356 …. 6.24, 12.15 Symonds v Raphael (1998) 148 FLR 171 …. 3.17, 3.18 — v Vass [2007] NSWSC 1274; BC200709763 …. 2.6 — v — [2009] 257 ALR 689; [2009] NSWCA 139; BC200905947 …. 2.6 Symphony Group plc v Hodgson [1994] QB 179 …. 22.17, 22.18, 22.20, 22.23, 22.24

Sympson v Prothero (1857) 26 LJ Ch 671 …. 27.23 Syron v Newells Creek Sawmilling Pty Ltd (1995, unreported); BC9505128 …. 13.33, 13.94 Systemcare (UK) Ltd v Services Design Technology Ltd [2011] 4 Costs LR 666; [2011] EWCA Civ 546 …. 22.24, 22.28, 22.36 Sywak v Visnic (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 374; BC201002673 …. 29.136 SZABF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 175 FLR 87; [2003] FMCA 141; BC200301762 …. 23.26 SZCAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 779; BC200503931 …. 15.16 SZEKQ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FMCA 390; BC200603324 …. 23.26 SZFDZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1366; BC200608506 …. 22.56 SZLKH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 745; BC200803714 …. 15.16 SZNSL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1543; BC200911567 …. 15.16 Szencorp Pty Ltd v Clean Energy Council Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 196; BC200901383 …. 13.69 Szlazko v Travini [2004] NSWSC 610; BC200404329 …. 10.31 SZMJQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2009] FMCA 1137; BC200910585 …. 13.28 Szmulewicz v Recht [2011] VSC 368; BC201105930 …. 2.36

T T v Collector of Customs (1995, unreported) …. 25.32 — v L [2006] WASCA 46; BC200601730 …. 8.70 — v R [2006] FamCA 405 …. 29.107 Tabtill No 2 Pty Ltd v DLA Phillips Fox (a firm) [2012] QSC 115;

BC201202498 …. 4.17, 5.11 Tadawan v State of South Australia [2001] FMCA 25 …. 9.31 Tait v Bindal People [2002] FCA 322; BC200201020 …. 29.104 Talacko v Talacko [2009] VSC 579; BC200911222 …. 15.56 Talbot v Truslove (1926) 28 WALR 86 …. 20.30, 20.41 Talk Finance and Insurance Services Pty Ltd, Re [1994] 1 Qd R 558 …. 22.37, 22.76 Taly NDC International NV v Terra Nova Insurance Co Ltd [1986] 1 All ER 69 …. 28.60 Tamwoy v Solomon [1996] 2 Qd R 93; BC9502040 …. 13.91, 13.92 Tanner v Marquis Jackson, Cahill and Associates (1975) 6 ACTR 9 …. 13.36, 13.38 Tapp v Public Trustee (No 2) [2009] TASSC 62; BC200907215 …. 10.37 Tara Communications Group Pty Ltd v Simons Ravden Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 862; BC201205772 …. 23.25 Tarabay v Bechara [2010] NSWSC 202; BC201001571 …. 23.7, 23.13, 23.31, 23.36 Taree Pty Ltd v Bob Jane Corp Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 228; BC200806537 …. 15.41 Tarlinton v Hall (1981) 51 FLR 282 …. 19.3, 19.7, 19.8, 19.12 Tarrant v Lier (1968) 12 FLR 248 …. 15.34, 17.93, 17.94 Tarry v Pryce (No 2) (1987) 88 FLR 270 …. 15.2 Tasker v Algar and Algar [1930] NZLR 61 …. 20.25, 21.29 Tasmania v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (2008) 17 Tas R 227; [2008] TASSC 23; BC200803676 …. 8.32 — v Bennett [2004] TASSC 15; BC200401036 …. 4.20 — v Effingham Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] TASSC 32; BC200603008 …. 8.88 Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Ltd v Woodhall Ltd [1972] Tas SR 41

…. 21.1, 21.2, 21.50, 21.52, 21.53, 21.54, 21.55 Taussig v Langworthy (No 2) (1966, unreported) …. 17.16, 17.89 Taxation of Costs, Re [1943] KB 69; Ch 48 …. 5.55, 5.58 Tayles v Davis (No 2) [2010] VSCA 107; BC201002778 …. 20.4 Taylor, Ex parte (1924) 41 WN (NSW) 81 …. 22.59 —, Re (1992) 37 FCR 194 …. 29.66 — v Edwards [1967] 1 NSWR 689 …. 20.23 — v Pace Developments Ltd [1991] ECC 406 …. 22.36 — v Port Macquarie-Hastings Council (2010) 175 LGERA 189; [2010] NSWLEC 153; BC201005769 …. 8.86, 13.1, 13.32 Taylor, Stileman & Underwood, Re [1891] 1 Ch 590 …. 26.5, 26.45, 26.46 Taylor-White v Taylor-Bowman [2004] WASC 281; BC200409179 …. 16.31, 23.19 Tchadovitch v Tchadovitch [2010] NSWCA 316; BC201008883 …. 10.31 TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Scotney (1994, unreported); BC9400018 …. 8.44 Team Dynamik Racing Pty Ltd v Longhurst Racing Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 36; BC200801227 …. 8.16 Technomin Australia Pty Ltd v Xstrata Nickel Australasia Operations Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] WASC 225; BC201006117 …. 29.129 Tector v FAI General Insurance Company Ltd [2001] 2 Qd R 463; [2000] QCA 426; BC200006187 …. 13.91, 13.92 Telfer, Marriage of (1996) 20 Fam LR 619 …. 8.72, 22.72 Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal (No 2) [2009] FCAFC 34; BC200901762 …. 8.5 — v Corporation of the City of Marion [2001] SASC 350; BC200106584 …. 14.61 — v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1463; BC201109887 …. 15.21

Templar v R (1992) 1 Tas R 133 …. 24.39, 24.64 Ten Group Pty Ltd v Cornes (2012) 114 SASR 46; [2012] SASCFC 99 …. 13.50 — v — (No 2) (2012) 114 SASR 106; [2012] SASCFC 106; BC201207172 …. 13.48, 13.50 Tenbohmer v Eden (1992) 6 WAR 366 …. 16.12 Tenji v Henneberry & Associates Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1259; BC9905788 …. 12.4 Tennant v Cross (1886) 12 PD 4 …. 11.44 Tenth Anemot Pty Ltd v Colonial Mutual General Insurance Co Ltd [1993] 2 VR 48 …. 29.94 Tenthy v Curtis (1988) 91 FLR 40 …. 24.40, 24.48, 24.54 Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 3) (2009) 167 LGERA 432; [2009] NSWLEC 121; BC200906843 …. 9.9 Territory Broadcasting Pty Ltd v Darwin Broadcasters Pty Ltd (1992) 106 FLR 66 …. 28.49 Territory Sheet Metal Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 3) [2010] NTSC 13; BC201002014 …. 8.5, 8.7 Terry v MacDonald [1935] 2 DLR 812 …. 27.18 — v Official Receiver (1998, unreported); BC9805649 …. 10.50 Testator’s Family Maintenance Acts, Re (1916) 12 Tas LR 11 …. 10.38 Tetijo Holdings Pty Ltd v Keeprite Australia Pty Ltd (1991, unreported); BC9103657 …. 16.45 Tey v Optima Financial Group Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 192; BC201207715 …. 16.50 Thaina Town (on Goulburn) Pty Ltd v City of Sydney Council (2007) 156 LGERA 150; (2007) 71 NSWLR 230; [2007] NSWCA 300; BC200709105 …. 6.18, 8.82, 8.83, 9.31 Theden v Nominal Defendant [2008] 2 Qd R 367; [2008] QCA 71; BC200802172 …. 17.19

Thew (R & T) Ltd v Reeves (No 2) [1982] QB 1283 …. 23.3, 23.16, 23.17, 23.18, 23.61 Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 5) [1994] 1 Qd R 156 …. 8.2, 8.12, 20.30 Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 166; BC200102752 …. 8.39 Thiess Watkins White Construction Ltd (in liq) v Witan Nominees (1985) Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 452 …. 11.2, 11.5 Thirteenth Corporation Pty Ltd v State (2006) 232 ALR 491; [2006] FCA 979; BC200605879 …. 28.29 33 South Pty Ltd v Fitzgerald [2008] FCA 1960; BC200811684 …. 29.104 Tho v L Firm [2009] NSWSC 456; BC200904803 …. 3.6 — v — [2012] FamCA 384; BC201250526 …. 3.6, 3.14 Thomas v Bunn [1991] 1 AC 362 …. 19.6 — v Nash (No 2) (2010) 107 SASR 338; [2010] SASC 171; BC201003969 …. 10.23 — v Powercor Australia Ltd (No 9) [2012] VSC 207; BC201203141 …. 15.14, 15.69 — v Schwager (1997) 98 A Crim R 486; BC9707383 …. 17.24, 24.53 — v Times Book Company Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 911 …. 11.33, 11.36 Thomas (Joseph) v Cunard White Star Ltd [1951] P 153 …. 17.3 Thomas Watts & Co (a firm) v Smith [1998] 2 Costs LR 59 …. 5.51 Thomopoulos v Faulks (No 2) [2006] VSC 286; BC200605896 …. 13.82 Thompson, Re (1885) 30 Ch D 441 …. 5.54, 5.60 — v Australian Capital Television Pty Limited (1998) 133 ACTR 1 …. 19.19, 19.25 — v Eugenia Mitrakis & Co [1993] ANZ Conv R 77; BC9200676 …. 5.40 — v Mason (1910) 12 GLR 673 …. 20.21

— v Parish (1859) 5 CBNS 685; 141 ER 276 …. 1.19 — v Robinson [2005] QCA 253; BC200505139 …. 29.106 Thompson Land Ltd v Lendlease Shopping Centre Development Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 140; BC200002280 …. 11.34, 11.36 Thomson v Mosman Council [1999] NSWLEC 86; BC9909322 …. 14.69 Thorne v Doug Wade Consultants Pty Ltd [1985] VR 433 …. 11.12, 20.38 — v Thorne [1979] 3 All ER 164 …. 18.38, 18.40 Thorpe v Sizer Developments Pty Ltd [2006] WASC 151; BC200605836 …. 4.36 Thorpe Nominees Pty Ltd v Henderson & Lahey [1988] 2 Qd R 216 …. 20.38 Thors v Weekes (1989) 92 ALR 131 …. 16.13, 16.28 Thunderdome Racetiming and Scoring Pty Ltd v Dorian Industries Pty Ltd (1992) 36 FCR 297; BC9203551 …. 14.29, 14.51, 28.54, 29.132 Thurai Rajah Lawyers v Villanueva [2001] NSWSC 597; BC200103970 …. 18.52 Tibmor Pty Ltd v Nashlyn Pty Ltd [1989] 1 Qd R 610 …. 26.44 Tichy, Marriage of (1991) FLC ¶92-259 …. 14.43, 14.44 Tickell v Trifleska Pty Ltd (1990) 25 NSWLR 353 …. 13.1, 13.7 Tigers Australian Football Club (Mayne) Inc v Australian Football League [2000] FCA 1650; BC200007035 …. 29.117 Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Nauri Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 563; BC200905277 …. 29.129 — v — [2011] NSWSC 11; BC201101168 …. 15.17 Timbertown Community Enterprises Ltd v Holiday Coast Credit Union Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 1679; BC9705830 …. 29.53 Timms v Van Diemen [1968] SASR 379 …. 24.40 Timor Transport Pty Ltd (in liq) v Murlroam Pty Ltd (1992) 110 FLR 53 …. 23.48

Tinda Creek Spiritual & Environment Centre v Baulkham Hills Shire Council (1998) 100 LGERA 432 …. 22.27 Tindle v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1990) 21 NSWLR 492 …. 11.41 Tinseltime Ltd v Roberts [2012] TCLR 9; [2012] EWHC 2628 …. 22.51 Tipperary Developments Pty Ltd v State of Western Australia (1996) 22 ACSR 241; BC9605263 …. 28.24, 29.23 — v — [2006] WASC 137; BC200605339 …. 15.72 — v — (2009) 38 WAR 488; [2009] WASCA 126; BC200906297 …. 14.31 Tisdale v Ballanday Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 56; BC200900654 …. 21.17 Titan v Babic (1991) 104 FLR 220 …. 13.37 — v — [1995] FCA 813; BC9502898 …. 15.79, 18.64, 18.71 — v Romano [1998] ACTSC 129; BC9806402 …. 18.64 Titterton v Oates (1998) 143 FLR 467; BC9800951 …. 10.13, 10.15 TNT Bulkships Ltd v Hopkins (1989) 65 NTR 1 …. 7.10, 17.19 Tobacco Control Coalition Inc v Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd (2000) ATPR (Digest) ¶46-205; [2000] FCA 1004; BC200004174 …. 29.60, 29.113 Tobias v Allen [1956] VLR 683 …. 7.37 Tobin v Ezekiel [2006] NSWSC 694; BC200605243 …. 16.57 — v Melrose [1951] SASR 139 …. 26.49 Todd v Novotny [2001] WASC 171; BC200108984 …. 14.25 Todrell Pty Ltd v Finch [2008] 2 Qd R 95; [2007] QSC 386; BC200710945 …. 8.6, 8.9 Tokenhouse Investments, Re [1934] St R Qd 189 …. 10.52, 10.53, 10.54 Tomlinson v Land & Finance Corp (1884) 14 QBD 539 …. 28.52 Toms v Fuller [2010] QCA 73; BC201001676 …. 29.106 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 129; BC201205494 …. 11.42

Toomey v Scolaro’s Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd (No 3) [2001] VSC 477; BC200108059 …. 15.69 — v Scolaro’s Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd (No 4) [2002] VSC 28; BC200200605 …. 11.10, 13.6 Topseal Concrete Services Pty Ltd v Sika Australia Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 57; BC200803126 …. 14.25 Toronto General Trusts Corp v Maryfield Rural Municipality [1946] 1 DLR 90 …. 8.58 Total & Universal Pty Ltd v Kingsway Property Investments (No 2) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 581; BC200710196 …. 8.27, 13.67 Total Spares & Supplies Ltd v Antares SRL [2006] BPIR 1330; [2006] EWHC 1537 …. 22.20, 22.37 Toubia v Schwenke (2002) 54 NSWLR 46; [2002] NSWCA 34; BC200200540 …. 14.31 Touzell v Cawthorn (1995) 18 ACSR 328; BC9505517 …. 4.24, 5.25 Tovehead v Freeman [2003] NTCA 12; BC200303652 …. 8.67 Tovey v Ferre [1981] WAR 21 …. 25.28 Towie & Woodbury Croft Pty Ltd v Medi 7 Australia Pty Ltd (1997, unreported); BC9703213 …. 14.45 Town of Port Hedland v Hodder (No 2) [2012] WASCA 212 …. 17.93 Townsend v Collova [2005] WASC 4; BC200501571 …. 13.61 Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd v Lambra Pty Ltd (1993, unreported); BC9300803 …. 23.23 Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (1979) 28 ALR 201 …. 8.65 — v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3) (1979) 42 FLR 213 …. 8.45, 8.47, 8.62, 11.2, 11.3 Tradestock Pty Ltd v TNT (Management) Pty Ltd (No 1) (1977) 30 FLR 343 …. 29.5, 29.9, 29.24 Tramountana Armadora SA v Atlantic Shipping Co SA [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep

391 …. 13.56 Tran v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2006) 228 ALR 727; [2006] FCA 199; BC200601120 …. 23.31 Tranchita v Danehill Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] WASC 248; BC200709176 …. 14.69 Transglobal Capital Pty Ltd v Yolarno Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 143; [2004] NSWCA 136; BC200402460 …. 29.109, 29.110 Transocean Capital Pty Ltd v Afsig Pty Ltd (2006) 202 FLR 270; [2006] NSWSC 806; BC200606178 …. 28.26 Tranter, Ex parte (1867) 7 SCR (NSW) 213 …. 22.60 Trask v R (1987) 37 CCC (3d) 92 …. 24.71 Trautwein, Re Will of [1967] 1 NSWR 558 …. 17.35 Travaglini v Raccuia [2012] FCA 620; BC201204134 …. 14.59 Travelodge Australia Ltd, Re (1978) 21 ACTR 17 …. 28.53 Treadwell v Hickey [2010] NSWSC 1119; BC201007302 …. 23.54 Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1980] QB 629 …. 3.43 Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2), Re [1963] Ch 199 …. 3.43, 3.60 Trevorrow v State of South Australia (No 7) (2008) 251 LSJS 91; [2008] SASC 5; BC200800253 …. 7.14 Tricorp Pty Ltd (in liq) v DCT (WA) (1992) 6 ACSR 706; BC9201334 …. 29.111 Trikas v Rheem (Australia) Pty Ltd [1964–65] NSWR 645 …. 1.24 Trilogy Computer Systems Pty Ltd v CTI Communications Ltd [2001] FCA 1778; BC200107816 …. 28.40 Trimble v Kirkland (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 417 …. 10.9, 10.14 Trimboli (C & M) Plasterers v Fazzolari (1997, unreported); BC9700427 …. 21.19 Trivett v Hurst [1937] St R Qd 265 …. 20.32

Trkulja v Yahoo! Inc LLC and Yahoo! 7 Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 217; BC201203557 …. 13.48 Troisi Steel Fabrications Pty Ltd (receiver and manager appointed) v Johns Perry Industries Pty Ltd (1992) 165 LSJS 333 …. 29.57 Troupp v Caffery [1920] QWN 27 …. 11.8 Trout, Bernays & Co, Re [1955] St R Qd 398 …. 17.72 True Conservation Association Inc v Minister Administering the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 [2008] NSWLEC 221; BC200806967 …. 14.65 Trueman’s Estate, Re (1872) LR 14 Eq 278 …. 2.16 Trust Company of Australia Ltd v Daulizio (No 2) [2003] VSC 381; BC200306780 …. 10.26 — v Skiwing Pty Ltd (2006) 68 NSWLR 366; [2006] NSWCA 387; BC200610810 …. 21.18 Trustee Corporation v Nadir [2001] BPIR 541 …. 14.15 Trustee for the Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust v Becker (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 194; BC200706430 …. 13.58, 13.59, 13.89 Trustees, Executors and Agency Co Ltd v Clarke [1905] 12 FLR 248 …. 15.34 — v — [1905] VLR 84 …. 17.3 — v Jope (1902) 27 VLR 706 …. 10.8 Trustees of the Legal Contribution Trust v Bailey [2004] WASC 175; BC200405105 …. 4.44, 4.45, 4.52 Trustees of the Property of Zoltan Sandor (a bankrupt) v Ramirez [1999] NSWCA 261; BC9905624 …. 10.48, 10.53 Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd [2001] FCA 1603; BC200107068 …. 28.31, 28.64 Tryon, Re (1844) 7 Beav 496; 49 ER 1158 …. 10.14 TS & B Retail Systems Pty Ltd v 3fold Resources Pty Ltd (No 2) [2004] FCA 1101; BC200405411 …. 16.68

Tsaprazis v Goldcrest Properties Pty Ltd (2000) NSW ConvR ¶55-953; [2000] NSWSC 765; BC200004417 …. 14.69 Tsekouras v Xenos (1997, unreported); BC9703799 …. 5.12 Tsu v Nemeth [2012] NSWCA 29; BC201201163 …. 11.3 Tsui v Westpac Banking Corporation [2002] 2 Qd R 335; [2001] QCA 276; BC200104011 …. 22.27 TTE Pty Ltd v Ken Day Pty Ltd (1990) 2 NTLR 143 …. 14.29, 14.53 TTS Pty Ltd v Griffiths (1991) 105 FLR 255 …. 24.28 Tu v Pakway Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 227 ALR 287; [2006] FCA 34; BC200600304 …. 12.4 — v University of Sydney (No 2) [2002] NSWADT 22 …. 8.93 Tubby Trout Pty Ltd v Sailbay Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 894; BC9406542 …. 8.57 Tuheta Pty Ltd v Ehrenfeld [2010] NSWSC 799; BC201005084 …. 13.11 Tulloch Ltd v Walker (1976, unreported); BC7600135 …. 29.20, 29.22, 29.25 Tuohey v Tuohey (No 2) [2002] VSC 181; BC200202772 …. 10.15 Tuohy v Blackmore (1977) 20 SASR 161 …. 12.9, 12.15, 12.16 Turnbull v Jansen (1878) 3 CPD 264 …. 15.34, 17.71 Turner, Re [1907] 2 Ch 126 …. 27.24 — v Leda Commercial Properties Pty Ltd [2002] ACTSC 5; BC200201150 …. 29.13 — v Mitchells Solicitors and Business Advisers Qld (2013) 33 Qld Lawyer Reps 96; [2011] QDC 61; BC201140054 …. 4.17, 5.11 — v Randall [1988] 1 Qd R 726 …. 24.29, 24.40 — v Telecommunication Workers Pension Plan (2001) 197 DLR (4th) 533 …. 14.15 Turner & Co (a firm) v O Palomo SA [1999] 4 All ER 353; [1999] EWCA Civ 2007 …. 5.51

20th Century Television & Appliances Ltd v Midnapore Property Investments Ltd (1991) 86 DLR (4th) 628 …. 22.45 Twigg v Keady (1996) 135 FLR 257 …. 27.6, 27.15, 27.19, 27.21, 27.23 — v Kung (2002) 55 NSWLR 485; [2002] NSWCA 220; BC200203801 …. 4.38, 4.39, 4.40 Twigg and Twigg v Kung (1994) 121 FLR 227; (1994) 17 Fam LR 391 …. 3.14, 3.23, 21.9 Twist v Tye [1902] P 92 …. 10.17, 11.44 TX Australia Pty Ltd v Broadcast Australia Pty Ltd (Costs) [2012] NSWSC 1200; BC201210671 …. 13.7, 13.9 Tyco Australia Pty Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 333; BC200406224 …. 20.38 Tyler v Krause [2002] QCA 544; BC200207637 …. 23.23, 23.25 Tyneside Property Management Pty Ltd v Hammersmith Management Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 156; BC201101895 …. 26.17, 26.28, 26.39 Tyson, Re (1906) 7 SR (NSW) 91 …. 22.68 Tyson and Tyson (No 2) (1993) FLC ¶92-401 …. 21.5, 21.55 Tzavellas v Canterbury City Council (1999) 105 LGERA 262 …. 8.29, 8.30

U UEB Industries Ltd Pension Plan, Re [1989] 2 NZLR 252 …. 14.15 UFH Holdings Pty Ltd v Ord Minnett Corporate Finance Ltd (1998, unreported); BC9804134 …. 16.56 Ugly Tribe Co Pty Ltd v Sikola [2001] VSC 189; BC200103454 …. 16.52, 16.67 UK Decorative Coatings Pty Ltd v Mirotone Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1074; BC200407638 …. 29.130 Umphelby v Grey (1898) 24 VLR 979 …. 7.37 Underdown v Secretary, Dept of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (No 2) [2009] FCA 1223; BC200909746 …. 8.30

Underwood, Son & Piper v Lewis [1894] 2 QB 306 …. 4.44, 4.48 Underwood v Underwood (2009) 4 ASTLR 150; [2009] QSC 107; BC200903633 …. 10.37 Uniline Australia Ltd v SBriggs Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 82 IPR 56; [2009] FCA 920; BC200907642 …. 13.9, 13.25 Unioil International Pty Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (No 2) (1997) 18 WAR 190; BC9704984 …. 16.30, 16.64, 16.65 Union Bank of Canada v Ballard (1919) 49 DLR 640 …. 27.28 Union Discount Co Ltd v Zoller [2002] 1 WLR 157; [2001] EWCA Civ 1755 …. 7.23 United Petroleum Pty Ltd v Skorpos (No 2) [2012] SASC 215; BC201209375 …. 13.21 Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) v Takacs (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 172; BC200806906 …. 13.26, 13.27 Universal City Studios LLLP v Hoey (2007) 73 IPR 45; [2007] FCA 806; BC200704120 …. 16.68 Universal Distributing Company Ltd (in liq), Re (1933) 48 CLR 171; BC3300034 …. 27.23 University of Western Australia v Gray (No 21) (2008) 249 ALR 360; [2008] FCA 1056; BC200806572 …. 13.71, 13.72, 13.80 University of Wollongong v Metwally (1985) I NSWLR 722 …. 11.47 Uppu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2012] FMCA 157; BC201201139 …. 23.32 Upton v Tasmanian Perpetual Trustees Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1336; BC200608107 …. 29.106 — v TVW Enterprises Ltd (1984) 57 ALR 361 …. 29.37, 29.63 Uptown Sydney Development Corporation Pty Ltd v Bank of New Zealand (No 1) (1993) II ACSR 300; BC9303646 …. 28.21, 29.6, 29.109 Utah Construction and Mining Company v Watson [1969] NZLR 1062 …. 23.67

UTSA Pty Ltd (in liq) v Ultra Tune Australia Pty Ltd [1999] 1 VR 204; [1998] VSC 13; BC9803725 …. 22.14, 22.77, 22.78

V V & v Properties Pty Ltd v CSR Building Products Ltd (No 2) [2009] QSC 240; BC200907607 …. 16.40 Vagg, Re (1886) 13 VLR 172 …. 29.124 Vale v Oppert (1875) 10 Ch App 340 …. 26.37 Valimi Pty Ltd v Maniotis [2001] VSC 157; BC200103016 …. 14.56 — v — [2003] VSC 357; BC200305406 …. 12.11 Vallant Hooker & Partners v Proceedings Commissioner [2001] 2 NZLR 357 …. 26.26 Van Eeden v Henry [2005] 62 NSWLR 301; [2005] NSWCA 14; BC200500882 …. 11.52, 11.55 Van Essen v Lee [1971] Tas SR 324 …. 8.2, 13.52, 13.89, 20.2 Van Gils v Police [2008] SASC 270; BC200808998 …. 24.54 Van Koll v Rolling Hills Pre-School Inc (2010, unreported) …. 17.50 Van Sandau v Moore (1826) 1 Russ 441; 38 ER 171 …. 14.64 Van Velsen v Rudek (1985) 40 SASR 213 …. 24.4 Van Zonneveld v Seaton (2005) DFC ¶95-311; [2005] NSWSC 175; BC200501291 …. 13.70 — v Seaton (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 175; BC200501291 …. 7.48 Vance v Cheynes Beach Whaling Co [1966] WAR 16 …. 11.13 Vanderclay Development Co Ltd v Inducon Engineering Ltd (1968) 1 DLR (3d) 337 …. 16.40 Varma v Varma [2010] NSWSC 785; BC201004953 …. 22.68 Vasram v AMP Life Ltd [2002] FCA 1286; BC200206235 …. 13.69, 23.4 Vasyli v AOL International Pty Ltd (1996, unreported); BC9604273 …. 14.51

Vaughan, Marriage of (1990) 99 FLR 69 …. 8.77 Vaughan (G R) (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Vogt [2006] NSWCA 263; BC200607700 …. 8.62 Vecchio v Sterling (1991, unreported); BC9100746 …. 24.47 Veetemp Australasia Pty Ltd v GRD Group NT Pty Ltd [2012] NTSC 93; BC201209197 …. 13.71 Velissaris v Fitzgerald [2008] VSCA 152; BC200807533 …. 16.47, 20.30, 20.32, 20.34 Vella v Gustafson [2009] QSC 424; BC200911669 …. 2.4, 2.7 — v Ivanovski [1984] WAR 8 …. 12.15, 12.16 — v Larson [1982] Qd R 298) …. 21.50, 21.51, 21.54 Veney, Marriage of (1983) FLC ¶91-355 …. 21.11 Venning v Chin (1974) 8 SASR 397 …. 8.18 Ventouris Enterprises Pty Ltd v Dib Group Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 1479; BC201010031 …. 16.46 — v — (No 4) [2011] NSWSC 720; BC201105044 …. 3.58 Verdell Pty Ltd v F & G Nominees Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 58 (S2); BC200208143 …. 15.76 Verduci v Catanzarita (1980) 53 FLR 156 …. 11.57 Vered v Inscorp Holdings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 290; BC9304097 …. 26.4 Vergola Pty Ltd v Vergola Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd (2002) 217 LSJS 198; [2002] SASC 5; BC200200037 …. 14.54, 14.58 Verna Trading Pty Ltd v New India Assurance Co Ltd [1991] 1 VR 129 …. 8.62, 8.63, 8.64, 8.65 Vero Insurance Ltd v Gombac Group Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 117; BC200703206 …. 6.17 Veron, Re [1966] NSWR 511 …. 3.46 Versace v Monte [2002] FCA 781; BC200203314 …. 14.51

Verson Clearing International v Ward & Partners (1997) 9 ANZ Ins Cas ¶61352; BC9605860 …. 26.28 Vertzayias v King [2011] NSWCA 215; BC201105658 …. 15.41 Verus Capital Ltd and Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Re (2001) 39 ACSR 430 …. 6.10 Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449; BC9804761 …. 20.30, 22.6, 22.16, 22.17, 22.18, 22.20, 22.23, 22.24, 22.28, 22.29, 22.30, 22.32 Vicon Services Pty Ltd v BHP Billiton Worsley Alumina Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 109; BC201201769 …. 28.23 Victoria v Australian Building Construction Employees’ and Builders Labourers’ Federation (No 2) (1982) 152 CLR 179; BC8200132 …. 21.14 — v Grawin Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 157; BC201202471 …. 6.5 — v Master Builders Association of Victoria (1994, unreported); BC9406430 …. 8.6 — v Sportsbet Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 174; BC201209565 …. 8.6, 17.7 Victoria Legal Aid v County Court of Victoria (2004) 9 VR 686; [2004] VSCA 113; BC200404494 …. 22.15, 23.43 Victoria University of Technology v Tullett and Tokyo (Victoria) Pty Ltd (1994, unreported); BC9406133 …. 11.36 Victorian Education Foundation Ltd v AC Hall Airconditioning Contracting Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 32; BC201300731 …. 13.10, 13.11 Victorian Mortgage & Deposit Bank Ltd v Australian Financial Agency & Guarantee Co Ltd (1892) 18 VLR 754 …. 28.25 Victorian Phillip-Stephan Photo Litho Co v Davis (1890) 11 LR (NSW) L 257 …. 6.11 Victorian Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Farlow [1963] VR 594 …. 20.19 Victorian WorkCover Authority v Kagan Bros Consolidated Pty Ltd (2011) 31 VR 386; [2011] VSCA 91; BC201101871 …. 11.21, 11.28

Vilensky v Banning (1996, unreported); BC9602641 …. 3.33 Vincent, Ex parte (1900) 16 WN (NSW) 215 …. 22.59 —, Re [1909] 1 Ch 810 …. 10.46 — v Hunter (1846) 5 Hare 320; 67 ER 935 …. 28.55 Vink v Tuckwell (No 3) (2008) 67 ACSR 547; [2008] VSC 316; BC200807492 …. 16.50 Virgona (Estate of) v De Lautour (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 323; BC200709861 …. 13.90 Virgtel Ltd v Zabusky (No 2) [2008] QSC 316; BC200810765 …. 14.45 — v — [2009] 2 Qd R 293; [2009] QCA 92; BC200902845 n …. 20.37 — v — [2009] QCA 349; BC200910090 …. 20.13 Viscariello v Macks (No 7) [2012] SASC 41; BC201201560 …. 18.18 — v — (No 9) [2012] SASC 132; BC201205617 …. 19.13, 19.19 — v Oakley Thompson & Co Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 351; BC201206167 …. 5.10 Visco v Minter [1969] P 82 …. 28.55, 28.56, 28.57 Visible Results Properties Inc v Sushi Train (Australia) Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 514; BC200703107 …. 8.4 Vocisano v Vocisano (No 1) (1973) 1 ACTR 138 …. 17.75, 17.78 Voge, Ex parte (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 345 …. 8.45 Vollmer v Hauber Davidson (2007) DFC ¶95-400; [2006] NSWCA 79; BC200602235 …. 8.80 von Reisner v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) (2009) 262 ALR 430; [2009] FCAFC 172; BC200911025 …. 7.38 Voyce v Lawrie [1952] NZLR 984 …. 7.2, 8.25, 8.43 Vriend v Alberta (1996) 141 DLR (4th) 44 …. 9.36, 9.37, 14.22 — v — [1998] 1 SCR 493 …. 9.37 Vucadinovic v Lombardi [1967] VR 81 …. 7.2, 11.8, 11.14, 11.24

Vulich v Slater & Gordon Ltd [2011] WADC 209; BC201140443 …. 12.13 Vumbaca v Sultana [2012] NSWDC 237; BC201240463 …. 1.8, 18.74

W W v W [2006] FamCA 860 …. 21.59 W (deceased) v W [2004] FamCA 319 …. 7.29 Wade v Wade [1903] P 16 …. 11.49 Wade-Ferrell, Marriage of (2001) 27 Fam LR 484; [2001] FamCA 138 …. 11.49, 21.6, 21.9 Wadsworth, Re (1886) 34 Ch D 155 …. 27.7, 27.10 WAEY v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1314; BC200306900 …. 8.29 WAFU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FMCA 325; BC200208382 …. 8.30 Wagman v Vare Motors Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 853 …. 13.52 Waine v King (1994, unreported); BC9403131 …. 10.11 Waiviata Pty Ltd v New Millenium Publications Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 481; BC200201897 …. 13.86, 16.56, 22.76 Wakim v Bowen (1992, unreported); BC9202013 …. 3.6 Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561; BC8701815 …. 24.51 Waldron v Mitchell (1892) 8 WN (NSW) 117 …. 22.3 Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority [2010] NSWLEC 27; BC201001087 …. 8.86 Walker v Citygroup Global Markets Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1866; BC200510968 …. 16.67 — v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (No 2) (2004) 234 LSJS 18; [2004] SASC 139; BC200403086 …. 13.67 — v D’Alessandro [2010] VSC 15; BC201000287 …. 2.36 — v Law Society of Tasmania [1991] Tas R 121 …. 17.50, 17.59, 17.67,

17.68, 17.93, 18.69 — v — (No 2) (1991, unreported); BC9100015 …. 21.17, 21.18 — v Wilsher (1889) 23 QBD 335 …. 13.55, 13.56 Wall v Halford [1960] QWN 36 …. 17.62 Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373 …. 3.43, 3.48, 14.5, 14.6, 14.7, 14.8, 14.9 Wallis, Re (1890) 25 QBD 176 …. 15.44 Walsh v Kerr [1987] 2 NZLR 166 …. 8.39 Walsh Halligan Douglas’ Bills of Costs, Re [1990] 1 Qd R 288 …. 4.14 Walter v Bewicke, Moreing & Co (1904) 90 LT 409 …. 1.16, 14.24 — v Buckeridge (No 5) [2012] WASC 495; BC201210335 …. 2.31, 3.6, 3.16, 15.72, 15.73, 15.75 Walters v Owens (1973) 21 FLR 138 …. 24.40 Walton, Ex parte (1881) 17 Ch D 746 …. 20.6 — v McBride (1995) 36 NSWLR 440; BC9504455 …. 7.31, 7.32, 16.13, 16.60, 16.62, 17.39 Wang v D’Ambrosio [1999] NSWSC 227; BC9901163 …. 10.37 Want v Moss (1892) LR 13 (NSW) Eq 96 …. 27.26 Ward v Schembri (2005) 33 Fam LR 546; [2005] FamCA 568 …. 21.11 — v Western Australia (1999) 93 FCR 305; [1999] FCA 580; (1999) 163 ALR 149; BC9902172 …. 6.11, 8.69 Wardle v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 388; BC201210610 …. 20.22 Warley Hospital Inc v Attorney-General (Vic) [2011] VSC 145; BC201102031 …. 1.6 Warmingtons v McMurray (1936) 52 TLR 381 …. 4.44, 4.48 — v — (1937) 52 TLR 395 …. 4.44, 4.48 Warner v Donoghue (1967, unreported) …. 17.41

— v Miles (1881) 19 Ch D 72 …. 15.34 Warnock v McCulloch (1902) 28 VLR 117 …. 20.21 Warren Mitchell Pty Ltd v Australian Maritime Officers’ Union (1993) 12 ACSR 1; BC9305079 …. 28.23, 28.25, 29.27, 29.117 Waters v P C Henderson (Australia) Pty Ltd 254 ALR 328; BC9404952 …. 8.7 Watkins (F) Pty Ltd, Re [1936] VLR 92 …. 1.6 Watkins Ltd v Ranger Uranium Mines Pty Ltd (1985) 35 NTR 27 …. 8.17, 18.28, 29.4, 29.5, 29.19, 29.20 Watson v Lyon (1855) 7 De GM & G 288; 44 ER 113 …. 26.43 — v Ralph (1982) 148 CLR 646; BC8200081 …. 10.21 — v Rodwell (1879) 11 Ch D 150 …. 4.34 Watson & Son Ltd v Active Manuka Honey Association [2009] NZCA 595 …. 15.55 Watson Wyatt Superannuation Pty Ltd v Oberlechner (2008) ASC ¶155-091; [2008] NSWSC 272; BC200802003 …. 15.41, 15.48 Watt v Watt (1988) 12 Fam LR 589 …. 13.64, 13.80 Watts v The Crown [2011] QDC 194 …. 21.30 Waverley Council v Refkin Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1469; BC200106323 …. 14.62 Way v Latilla [1937] 3 All ER 759 …. 2.1 — v Swan Television and Radio Broadcasters Ltd (1991) 5 WAR 323 …. 15.72 WDD v SMI [2007] QSC 283; BC200708608 …. 8.53 Webb v Malcolm J Bateman & Co (1986, unreported) …. 5.12 — v Ryan (No 2) [2012] VSC 431; BC201207161 …. 10.39, 10.40 Webster, Marriage of (1998) 24 Fam LR 198; [1998] FamCA 1517 …. 20.6 — v Coles Myer Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWDC 128; BC200940190 …. 17.81

— v Lampard (1993) 112 ALR 174; BC9303616 …. 29.68, 29.87 Wedgwood, Re (1993) 116 ALR 153; BC9304932 …. 10.50 Weedman, Re [1996] FCA 1112; BC9606375 …. 26.14, 26.15, 26.34 —, Re (1998) 83 FCR 366; BC9802171 …. 5.47 Weeks v Bradbury (1970) 16 FLR 476 …. 13.36, 13.38 Weger v Boola Boola Petroleum and Natural Gas Co NL [1923] VLR 570 …. 28.40 Weily’s Quarries v Devine Shipping Pty Ltd (1994) 14 ACSR 186; BC9400407 …. 28.20, 28.25, 28.56, 29.4, 29.5 Weingarten v Fletcher [2003] VSC 448; BC200306836 …. 16.57 Weingarten Bros v G & R Wills & Co [1908] SALR 28 …. 19.6 Weir, Marriage of (1992) 110 FLR 403 …. 8.75 Weis Restaurant Toowoomba v Gillogly [2013] QCA 49; BC201301235 …. 21.52 Weiss v Barker Gosling (1993) 8 Fam LR 489 …. 3.24 — v — (1993) 16 Fam LR 728 …. 3.17, 3.23, 3.39 — v — (No 2) (1993) 118 FLR 218 …. 3.35, 3.37, 3.38, 5.26, 5.31, 5.32 Welch v Bank of England [1955] Ch 508 …. 11.63 Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1919] 1 KB 520 …. 8.39 — v — [1920] AC 956 …. 8.39 Weld Street Takeaways & Fisheries Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [1986] 1 NZLR 741 …. 29.9, 29.82, 29.100 Weldon v Maples Teesdale & Co (1887) 20 QBD 331 …. 29.108 Wellington v Police (2009) 105 SASR 215; [2009] SASC 294; BC200908762 …. 7.24 Wells v Wells [1914] P 157 …. 4.55 Welsh v Digilin Pty Ltd ACN 078 278 449 [2007] FCA 2064; BC200711511 …. 14.45

— v Hole (1779) 1 Dougl 238; 99 ER 155 …. 27.5, 27.17, 27.18 Wende v Horwath (NSW) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1241; BC200810507 …. 18.67, 18.74 Wendt v Northwood (No 2) [2003] NSWSC 871; BC200305609 …. 14.35 Wenkart v Pantzer (2010) 269 ALR 641; [2010] FCA 866; BC201005885 …. 1.7 — v — (No 3) [2010] FCA 1423; BC201009869 …. 15.17 Wenpac Pty Ltd v Allied Westralian Finance Ltd (1994) 123 FLR 1; BC9401476 …. 8.5, 15.55 Wentworth v Attorney-General (NSW) (1984) 154 CLR 518; BC8400554 …. 6.14, 22.3 — v Rares (1991, unreported); BC9101301 …. 6.13 — v Rogers (No 3) (1986) 6 NSWLR 642 …. 20.32, 20.44 — v — (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 …. 16.61 — v — [1999] NSWCA 403; BC9907174 …. 23.21, 23.60 — v — (No 1) [2002] NSWSC 651; BC200204702 …. 19.14 — v — (No 2) [2002] NSWSC 674; BC200204703 …. 19.14 — v — [2002] NSWSC 709; BC200204532 …. 3.8, 3.9, 3.19, 5.18 — v — [2003] NSWSC 944; BC200306248 …. 8.36, 16.50 — v — [2005] NSWSC 143; BC200501387 …. 2.5, 3.9 — v — [2006] 66 NSWLR 474; [2006] NSWCA 145; BC200604064 …. 3.7, 5.18, 7.15, 18.74 — v Wentworth (1994, unreported); BC9403409 …. 8.15 — v — (1995) 37 NSWLR 703; BC9505254 …. 10.41 — v — (1996, unreported); BC9600213 …. 15.17, 17.43, 18.68 — v — (1999) 46 NSWLR 300; [1999] NSWSC 317; BC9901514 …. 15.28, 18.28, 21.17, 21.18, 22.19, 22.20, 22.32, 22.58 — v — (2000) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] NSWCA 350; BC200007784 ….

15.28, 18.28, 21.17, 21.18, 22.8, 22.19, 22.20, 22.32, 22.58 Werner (R D) & Co Inc v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 134 …. 28.6, 28.64 West v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 767; BC200304854 …. 12.21 — v Public Trustee [1942] SASR 109 …. 10.4 West Australian Bank v Royal Insurance Co (1908) 7 CLR 385; BC0800014 …. 17.93 West Australian Metals Ltd ACN 001 666 600, Re [2008] WASC 279; BC200810709 …. 16.31, 16.54 West, King & Adams, Re [1892] 2 QB 102 …. 4.24 Westdock Realisations Ltd, Re [1988] BCLC 354 …. 14.11 Western Areas Exploration Pty Ltd v Streeter (No 2) [2008] WASC 217; BC200808816 …. 29.130 Western Australia v Burke (No 2) [2012] WASCA 129; BC201204644 …. 21.17, 21.25 — v Quartermaine (No 2) [2012] WASC 138; BC201202477 …. 21.30 Western Australian Planning Commission v Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 295; BC200307431 …. 19.23 Western Ventures Pty Ltd v Resource Equities Ltd (2005) 53 ACSR 568; [2005] WASC 53; BC200502004 …. 22.75 Westgold Resources NL v St George Bank Ltd (1998, unreported); BC9806689 …. 8.7 Westminster Corporation v St George Hanover Square (Rector and Churchwardens) [1909] 1 Ch 592 …. 20.16 Weston v Central Criminal Court Courts Administrator [1977] QB 32 …. 23.2 — v Connor (1998, unreported); BC9800118 …. 4.34 Westonia Earthmoving Pty Ltd v Cliffs Asia Pacific Iron Ore Pty Ltd [2013] WASC 57; BC201301166 …. 28.49, 29.92, 29.101

Westpac Banking Corp v Gibbons (No 4) [2012] SASC 80; BC201204154 …. 11.40, 11.42 — v Hilliard [2001] VSC 198; BC200103806 …. 16.70 — v Ollis [2007] NSWSC 1008; BC200707686 …. 16.51 Westpoint Finance Pty Ltd v Chocolate Factory Apartments Ltd (2002) 12 BPR 22,969; [2002] NSWCA 287; BC200205071 …. 14.25 West’s Process Engineering Pty Ltd v Westralian Sands Ltd (1998) 144 FLR 340; BC9801242 …. 28.15, 29.54 Westsub Discounts Pty Ltd v Idaps Australia Ltd (No 2) (1990) 94 ALR 310; BC9003389 …. 6.21, 6.23, 6.25, 13.52 WFM Motors Pty Ltd v Maydwell [1994] ANZ Conv R 454; BC9402293 …. 26.10, 26.40 Whalley, Re (1855) 20 Beav 576; 52 ER 726 …. 5.58 Wharton v Bancroft [2012] EWHC 91 …. 10.25 Wheeler v Riverside Coal Transport Co Pty Ltd [1964] Qd R 113 …. 8.2 — v Somerfield [1966] 2 QB 94 …. 20.38 Whelan v Rizzo (1995) FLC ¶92-567 …. 8.78 Whild v GE Mortgage Solutions Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 322; BC201205625 …. 15.49 Whipp v Richards (Costs) [2012] FamCAFC 91; BC201250377 …. 8.77, 8.78 Whitaker v Paxad Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 47; BC200904938 …. 13.83 Whitbread v Vellaris [1969] SASR 291 …. 7.19 White v Altrincham Urban District Council [1936] 1 All ER 923 …. 15.35 — v Bini [2003] FCA 669; BC200303557 …. 26.12 — v Butt [1909] 1 KB 50 …. 29.42, 29.49 — v Newton (1986) 85 FLR 416 …. 24.40, 24.47 — v Pearce (1849) 7 Hare 276 …. 27.17

— v Police (1997, unreported); BC9706341 …. 24.50 — v State of South Australia (No 2) (2010) 270 LSJS 264; [2010] SASC 185; BC201004274 …. 12.17 — v White (No 2) [1923] St R Qd 69 …. 6.13 White (C) (deceased), Re (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 178 …. 10.42 White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169; BC9803173 …. 23.2, 23.5, 23.21, 23.22, 23.30, 23.31, 23.37 White Resource Management Ltd v Durish (1997) 154 DLR (4th) 158 …. 27.19, 27.29 Whitehall Holdings Pty Ltd v Custom Credit Corporation Ltd (1992, unreported); BC9201139 …. 14.25 Whitehead v Lord (1852) 7 Ex 691; 155 ER 1126 …. 4.44, 4.48 — v Maas (1991) 56 SASR 362 …. 13.18, 13.26 Whiterod v Taylor (2006) FLC ¶93-266; [2006] FamCA 433 …. 16.40 Whitington v Whitington (No 2) [2009] SASC 178; BC200905646 …. 10.31 Whitlam v Insurance Australia Group Ltd (2005) 214 ALR 703; [2005] NSWSC 200; BC200501202 …. 13.75 Whitley (deceased), Re [1962] 3 All ER 45 …. 17.69 Whittle v Filaria Pty Ltd [2004] ACTSC 131; BC200408767 …. 13.65 Whittlesea Land Co Ltd v Gutheil (1897) 3 ALR 275 …. 17.57 Whyked Pty Ltd v Yahoo Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1236; BC200609420 …. 29.7 Whyte v Brosch (1998) 45 NSWLR 354; BC9806315 …. 14.34, 14.38 Wick v Nominal Defendant (1983) 19 NTR 1 …. 17.45 Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1; BC9203970 …. 20.8 — v Biggs (1885) 52 LT 428 …. 17.32 Wide Bay Conservation Council Inc v Burnett Water Pty Ltd (No 9) (2011)

194 FCR 250; [2011] FCA 661; BC201103877 …. 9.9, 15.16, 15.80, 17.48, 17.50, 17.72 Wiggins v Department of Defence — Navy (No 3) [2006] FMCA 970; BC200605193 …. 9.28 Wightman v Johnston [1995] 2 VR 637; BC9503972 …. 18.65 Wilcox (No 2), Re (1996) 72 FCR 151; BC9606513 …. 16.23, 16.40, 16.43, 16.63 Wilczak v Alpine Refrigeration & Air Conditioning Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 35; BC200500155 …. 20.4 Wild v Plant [1926] P 139 …. 10.17, 10.25 — v Simpson [1919] 2 KB 544 …. 3.60, 4.44 Wildbeach Corporation Pty Ltd v Atkins [2008] WASC 29; BC200801621 …. 16.50, 16.68 Wilden Pty Ltd v Greenco Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 55; BC200401618 …. 18.25 Wilderness Society Inc v Minister for Environment and Water Resources (2008) 101 ALD 1; [2008] FCAFC 19; BC200801494 …. 9.27, 11.54 — v Turnbull (2007) 98 ALD 651; [2007] FCA 1863; BC200710387 …. 9.3, 9.26 Wilhelm v Marla (2009) FLC ¶93-400; [2009] FamCAFC 5 …. 21.11 Wilkie v Gordian Runoff Ltd [2005] NSWSC 873; BC200506431 …. 5.34 Wilkinson v Wilkinson [1963] P 1 …. 23.29 Wilkshire v Registrar of Trade Marks (No 2) [2009] FCA 1505; BC200911392 …. 16.50 Willcox v Kettell [1937] 1 All ER 222 …. 13.52 Willesee v Willesee [1974] 2 NSWLR 275 …. 22.60 Willey v Synan (1935) 54 CLR 175; BC3600048 …. 28.57, 28.58 William Buck (Vic) Pty Ltd v Perception Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 385; BC200608318 …. 28.37, 29.94

William Buck (WA) Pty Ltd v Faulkner (No 2) [2012] WASC 257; BC201205219 …. 17.27 Williams (deceased), Re [1949] QWN 43 …. 17.72 Williams v BALM (NZ) Ltd (No 4) [1951] NZLR 901 …. 20.20 — v Barrick Australia Ltd [2004] NSWLEC 306; BC200403762 …. 8.32, 8.35 — v Beverly (1998, unreported); BC9804278 …. 25.29 — v Commonwealth of Australia [2007] NSWSC 1342; BC200710956 …. 14.41 — v Grillet (1979) 21 SASR 258 …. 24.40 — v Lewer [1974] 2 NSWLR 91 …. 6.15 — v Miller (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 270 …. 14.59, 14.64 — v Minister for Environment and Heritage [2004] 132 LGERA 368; [2004] FCAFC 58; BC200401141 …. 9.16, 22.56 — v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [1965] NSWR 1517 …. 29.71 — v Sharpe [1949] Ch 595 …. 16.10 — v Stevens [1965] VR 3 …. 20.19 Williams Advanced Materials Inc v Target Technology Co LLC (2004) 63 IPR 645; [2004] FCA 1405; BC200407161 …. 15.21 Williamson v Bors (1900) 21 LR (NSW) Eq 302 …. 8.43 — v Spelleken [1977] Qd R 152 …. 10.17 Willing v Hollobone (1972) 3 SASR 532 …. 7.24, 7.31 Willis v Edgar [1963] NSWR 664 …. 15.33, 15.34, 15.35, 16.14, 17.76, 17.79, 17.80, 17.89, 17.90, 17.91 — v State of Western Australia (No 2) [2009] WASCA 205; BC200910175 …. 23.27 — v Trotter (1897) LR 18 (NSW) Eq 155 …. 11.3 — v Wilson and Mackinnon [1922] VLR 453 …. 1.19

Willmott v Barber (1881) 17 Ch D 772 …. 7.10, 15.15 Willoughby v Clayton Utz [2008] WASCA 93; BC200803048 …. 29.106 Wilmot v Buckley (1984) 2 FCR 540; BC8441017 …. 18.28 Wilson, Marriage of (1989) 13 Fam LR 205 …. 14.16 Wilson (No 2), Marriage of (1994) 123 FLR 159 …. 8.71, 8.72 Wilson v Bourke Shire Council (2001) 116 LGERA 287; [2001] NSWLEC 200; BC200105409 …. 8.81 — v General Commissioners for Leek [1994] BTC 22 …. 23.24 — v Gutteridge (1824) 3 B & C 157; 107 ER 693 …. 5.51 — v Jones (1911) 12 CLR 394; BC1190127 …. 10.17 — v McDonald (2009) 193 A Crim R 80; [2009] WASCA 39; BC200903987 …. 21.21, 24.67, 24.68 — v McDougall (1987) 11 NSWLR 241 …. 6.9 — v R (1984, unreported); BC8471020 …. 25.20, 25.22 — v Richmond River Shire Council [2000] NSWSC 71; BC200000483 …. 7.16 Wilson (E K) and Sons Ltd, Re [1972] 1 WLR 791 …. 29.111 Wilson & Horton Ltd v Attorney-General [1997] 2 NZLR 513 …. 20.30 Wilson Lovatt & Sons Ltd, Re [1977] 1 All ER 274 …. 10.52, 10.53, 10.54 Wimbourne v Fine [1952] Ch 869 …. 27.17 Wimmera Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd v RGC Mineral Sands Ltd (1997, unreported); BC9706390 …. 14.34 Windbank v Bradley (1970) 4 ACTR 14 …. 13.30, 13.36 Windeyer, Fawl & Co, Re (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 145 …. 5.24, 5.26, 5.28, 15.5 Windsor v Buxton [2001] QSC 81; BC200101204 …. 16.57 Windsurfing International Inc v Petit (1987) AIPC ¶90-441 …. 8.3, 8.6 Windy Dropdown Pty Ltd (subject to a Deed of Company Arrangement), Re

[2010] NSWSC 1099; BC201007003 …. 15.14 Wingfield & Blew (Solicitors), Re [1904] 2 Ch 665 …. 4.46 Winn v Garland Hawthorn & Brahe (a firm) [2006] VSC 476; BC200610439 …. 5.37 — v — [2007] VSC 360; BC200708066 …. 7.37 Winnote Pty Ltd (in liq) v Page (2005) 64 NSWLR 244; [2005] NSWCA 362; BC200508998 …. 28.21, 29.109 Winter v Fleeton [2002] WASCA 73; BC200201807 …. 7.29 Winterfield v Bradnum (1878) 3 QBD 324 …. 29.88 Wiseline Corporation Ltd v Hockey [2007] NZHC 456; MG Corrosion Consultants Pty Ltd v Vinciguerra (No 2) (2011) 276 ALR 319; [2011] FCAFC 48; BC201101696 …. 22.37 Wishart v McEwan (1998) 16 FRNZ 528 …. 15.16, 16.45 Witcombe v Talbot & Olivier (No 2) [2009] WASC 173; BC200906554 …. 8.41 Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525; BC9506443 …. 29.122 Withers LLP v Langbar International Ltd [2012] 2 All ER 616; [2011] EWCA Civ 1419 …. 26.10, 26.40 Wodrow v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 129 FCR 182; [2003] FCA 403; BC200302096 …. 15.59, 18.25 Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant (No 2) [1968] VR 533 …. 6.16, 8.25, 20.19 Wolfe v Alsop (1886) 12 VLR 887 …. 20.38 Wollong Pty Ltd v Shoalhaven City Council (2002) 122 LGERA 331; [2002] NSWLEC 164; BC200205964 …. 8.87 Wollongong City Council v FPM Constructions Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 523; BC200403860 …. 28.33 — v Smith [1999] NSWSC 473; BC9902602 …. 7.24 Wong v Kelly (1999) 154 FLR 200; [1999] NSWCA 439; BC9908015 ….

2.3 — v Silkfield Pty Ltd (1998) ATPR ¶641-613; BC9800077 …. 29.60 Wood (deceased), Re [1949] St R Qd 17 …. 11.56 Wood v Crawford (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 252; BC201001889 …. 8.44 — v Inglis [2010] NSWSC 749; BC201004718 …. 19.13, 19.14, 23.23 — v Links Golf Tasmania Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 570; BC201003834 …. 14.10 — v Merck Sharp & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd [2000] NSWDDT 8 …. 29.109 Woodgate v Keddie [2006] FCA 1728; BC200610398 …. 3.49 — v — (2007) 242 ALR 234; [2007] FCAFC 129; BC200706758 …. 3.49 Woodger v Federal Capital Press of Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 107 ACTR 1 …. 12.15, 12.17, 12.22 Woodhall, Ex parte (1888) 20 QBD 832 …. 24.13 Woodhouse v McPhee (1997) 80 FCR 529; BC9707275 …. 11.60, 29.60 Woodlands v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 139; BC9507948 …. 7.47, 9.4, 11.59, 11.61 Woodley v Time [2008] FamCA 162; BC200851185 …. 11.49 Woods (RL & CA) Pty Ltd v Pacific National (Victoria) Ltd (2009) 54 MVR 307; [2009] NSWCA 298; BC200909904 …. 11.27 Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2012] TASSC 11; BC201201552 …. 14.29, 14.51 — v Walsh (1989) 22 FCR 204 …. 14.30 — v Woods [2001] NSWSC 1108; BC200107587 …. 19.14, 19.23, 19.25 Woodtree Pty Ltd v Zheng (No 2) [2008] FCA 2; BC200800064 …. 13.89 Woodward v Moon [1991] Tas R 93 …. 5.58, 18.49, 18.90 Woodworth v Conroy [1976] QB 884 …. 26.32 Woolf v Snipe (1933) 48 CLR 677; BC3300028 …. 5.51 — v Trebilco [1933] VLR 180 …. 3.3, 3.4, 5.43

Woollahra Municipal Council v Kincorp (NSW) Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 165 LGERA 312; [2009] NSWLEC 44; BC200902529 …. 24.26 Woolnough v Public Trustee (No 2) [2005] TASSC 102; BC200507799 …. 10.45 Worchild v Petersen [2008] QCA 26; BC200800774 …. 7.37 Worrell v Power & Power (1993) 46 FCR 214; BC9305109 …. 27.5, 27.14, 27.20, 27.21 Worth v Police (1998, unreported); BC9801790 …. 24.48 Wortley v Giamo (1997, unreported); BC9702400 …. 14.39 Wridgemont Display Homes Pty Ltd, Re (1992) 39 FCR 193; BC9203863 …. 22.6, 22.12, 22.14 Wright, Re (1984) 1 FCR 51 …. 26.8, 26.40, 26.42, 27.6 — v Barry (1992) 110 FLR 67 …. 8.77, 21.9 — v Bennett [1948] 1 All ER 410 …. 17.30 — v Public Trustee [2007] NSWSC 1069; BC200708190 …. 7.48 Wright & Francey Pty Ltd v Corbett (1992, unreported); BC9202574 …. 20.42 Wright (DM) & Associates v Archer [2000] QCA 296; BC200004238 …. 5.40 Wrigley (W M) JR Company v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1186; BC200606839 …. 15.17 WSA Online Ltd v Arms (No 2) [2006] FCAFC 108; BC200605238 …. 13.58 Wu v Avin Operations Pty Ltd (No 3) [2006] FCA 1321; BC200608018 …. 29.66 — v Dardaneliotou [2008] NSWSC 1319; BC200810914 …. 16.57 Wyatt v Albert Shire Council [1987] 1 Qd R 486 …. 6.4 Wynsix Hotels (Oxford St) Pty Ltd v Toomey [2004] NSWSC 236; BC200401426 …. 16.75

Wyong-Gosford Progressive Community Radio Inc v Australian Communications and Media Authority [2006] FCA 625; BC200603719 …. 29.8

X X and X, Marriage of (1999) 26 Fam LR 51; [1999] FamCA 2254 …. 20.9 Xat Ky v Australvic Property Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1785; BC200710258 …. 11.42, 11.43 Xiros v Fortis Life Assurance Ltd (2001) 162 FLR 433; [2001] FMCA 15 …. 8.34, 9.28 Xu v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 430; BC200911614 …. 26.26 — v Liu (1998, unreported); BC9803602 …. 18.74 XX v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2010) 11 DCLR(NSW) 123; [2010] NSWDC 147; BC201040233 …. 8.69

Y Y v M [1994] 3 NZLR 581 …. 8.58, 23.22 Yakmor v Hamdoush (No 2) (2009) 76 NSWLR 148; [2009] NSWCA 284; BC200909126 …. 22.68 Yalden, Ex parte (1876) 4 Ch D 129 …. 26.14 Yamacoe Pty Ltd v Michel Survey Group Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 393; BC200207291 …. 11.15, 22.76 Yandil Holdings Pty Ltd v Insurance Co of North America (1985) 3 ACLC 542; BC8500782 …. 29.5, 29.24, 29.25, 29.27, 29.90 Yanner v Easton (1999) 201 CLR 351; [1999] HCA 53; BC9906413 …. 20.2 Yara Nipro Pty Ltd v Interfert Australia Pty Ltd [2010] QCA 164; BC201004404 …. 13.91 Yarra Valley Dairy Pty Ltd v Lemnos Foods Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 283; BC201101802 …. 13.24, 13.25

Yates v Ali [2007] NSWSC 1475; BC200711120 …. 14.25 — v Boland [2000] FCA 1895; BC200007991 …. 16.55, 22.6, 22.24, 22.28, 22.76 Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (No 2) (1997) 147 ALR 685; BC9703585 …. 16.55, 22.6, 22.28, 22.37, 22.76 — v — (2000) 179 ALR 664; [2000] FCA 1106; BC200004474 …. 14.69 Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd (in liq) v Boland (1998) 157 ALR 30; BC9803621 …. 23.36 Yelner v Yelner (Costs Certificates) [2013] FamCAFC 18; BC201350026 …. 21.59 Yici Pty Ltd v Sun Wah Marine Products (HK) Co Ltd (No 2) [2010] WASC 27; BC201000740 …. 29.83 Yilan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1212; BC9905568 …. 8.29 Ying v Song [2011] NSWSC 618; BC201104498 …. 13.71 Yip v Frolich (2004) 89 SASR 467; [2004] SASC 287; BC200406054 …. 20.37 Yohana v Barclay Benson Lawyers [2012] NSWSC 159; BC201201269 …. 5.18 York v Green (1903) 19 WN (NSW) 309 …. 11.55 Yorke v Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd [1918] 1 KB 662 …. 8.7 Young Sid, The [1929] P 190 …. 1.1, 6.16, 6.17 Young, Re [1968] NZLR 1178 …. 10.35 — v Annis-Brown t/as Lincoln Smith & Co (No 3) [2011] NSWSC 1267; BC201109936 …. 20.13 — v Davidovic Pty Ltd (2011) 255 FLR 422; [2011] NSWSC 660; BC201104730 …. 26.4 — v King [2004] NSWLEC 93; BC200401157 …. 23.15 — v Thomas [1892] 2 Ch 134 …. 20.41

— v Young (1990) 75 DLR (4th) 46 …. 23.2, 23.3, 23.7, 23.20, 23.30, 23.33 — v — (1993) 108 DLR (4th) 193 …. 23.20, 23.33, 23.40 Youssef v Victoria University of Technology (No 2) [2005] VSC 385; BC200507291 …. 8.57 Yow v Northern Territory Gymnastic Association Inc (1991) 1 NTLR 180 …. 14.29, 14.53 Yu v Spiers [2001] NSWCA 373; BC200106751 …. 14.41 Yunghanns v Yunghanns (2000) FLC ¶93-029; [2000] FamCA 681 …. 21.1, 21.50, 21.52 Yunupingu v Goodsell (1998, unreported); BC9807337 …. 6.6

Z Z (A Solicitor) v Limousin (2010) FLC ¶93-433; [2010] FamCAFC 59; BC201050151 …. 23.42 Z (No 4), Re (1997, unreported) …. 11.43, 22.11 Zabic v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1983) 72 FLR 255 …. 19.15 Zachariah v Ajay Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) (1983) 33 SASR 426 …. 11.24 Zagari v Habib (Costs) [2010] FamCAFC 192; BC201050914 …. 21.54 Zandata Pty Ltd v Riley [2013] NSWSC 49; BC201300781 …. 12.6 Zappia v Parelli [2007] NSWSC 972; BC200707409 …. 7.48 Zappulla v Perkins (No 2) [1978] Qd R 401 …. 21.50, 21.54 Zardo v Parisi (2007) 1 ACTLR 68; [2007] ACTSC 63; BC200706528 …. 18.12 Zelino v Budai (2001) 47 ATR 488; [2001] NSWSC 501; BC200104181 …. 8.56 Ziliotto v Dr Hakim (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1079; BC201208607 …. 13.11 Zimmerman Holdings Pty Ltd v Wales [2002] NSWSC 447; BC200203018 …. 23.23 Zisti v Ryde Joinery Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 7 BPR 15, 217; BC9602667 ….

13.58 Zizza v Seymour [1976] 2 NSWLR 135 …. 4.3 Zschokke, Marriage of (1996) 20 Fam LR 766 …. 14.16, 14.17 Zukanovic v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Moorabbin (No 2) (2011) 32 VR 216; [2011] VSC 160; BC201102637 …. 22.60 Zuliani v Viera [1994] 1 WLR 1149 …. 5.58 Zurich Australia Insurance Ltd v Motor Accidents Authority of NSW (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 268; BC201002177 …. 13.25 Zurich Bay Holding Pty Ltd v ATM Enterprises Pty Ltd [2011] WADC 48 …. 12.13

Table of Statutes References are to paragraphs

NATIONAL SCHEME LAWS Corporations Law s 439A …. 14.44 s 530B(1) …. 26.29 s 597(10) …. 26.29 s 1335(1) …. 28.20 s 1335(2) …. 22.12, 22.13, 22.14

COOPERATIVE SCHEME LEGISLATION Companies Code s 533(1) …. 28.19 s 533(2) …. 22.12 National Credit Code s 70(1) …. 15.52 s 70(7) …. 15.52

COMMONWEALTH Access to Justice (Civil Litigation Reforms) Amendment Act 2009 …. 2.38, 8.10, 8.20, 23.42 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 s 29 …. 4.20 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975

s 23 …. 21.13 s 30A(2) …. 11.43 s 69B …. 6.10 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 …. 6.20, 9.32, 29.38 Admiralty Act 1988 …. 12.4 Admiralty Rules 1988 …. 12.4 Australian Passports Act 2005 s 54 …. 26.26 Bankruptcy Act 1966 …. 21.24 s 32 …. 6.7, 6.13, 22.6 s 122 …. 28.23 s 122(4(c)(i) …. 28.23 s 139(1) …. 10.49 s 139ZQ …. 10.50 Pt 10 …. 29.43 Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 …. 3.52 Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 s 6 …. 8.54, 23.42 s 6(2) …. 8.54, 23.42 s 7 …. 8.54, 23.42 s 7(2) …. 8.54, 23.42 s 9 …. 23.42 s 12(1) …. 8.54 s 12(2) …. 8.54, 23.42 s 12(3) …. 8.54, 23.42 Commonwealth Constitution …. 11.47

s 71 …. 6.11 s 109 …. 24.29 s 117 …. 29.70 Commonwealth Employees’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 s 67(8) …. 6.13 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 …. 29.38, 29.117 s 2(1) …. 2.33 s 18 …. 29.103, 29.117 s 24 …. 3.14 s 45 …. 29.117 s 45D …. 29.121 s 236 …. 29.103 Sch 2 …. 2.33, 3.14, 15.52, 29.103, 29.117 Sch 2 s 24 …. 15.52 Sch 2 Pt 2-3 …. 3.14, 4.34, 15.52 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 …. 29.38 Conciliation and Arbitration Regulations reg 98A …. 15.35 Copyright Act 1968 s 174 …. 6.19 Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2004 …. 14.10 Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 …. 28.22 Corporations Act 2001 …. 11.42, 22.13 s 9 …. 28.22 s 236 …. 14.10

s 236(1) …. 14.10 s 236(3) …. 14.10 s 237 …. 14.10 s 242 …. 14.10 s 420(2)(k) …. 22.44 s 439A …. 14.44 s 442A(c) …. 10.59 s 445D …. 22.10 s 445G …. 22.10 s 447A …. 22.10 s 447E …. 22.10 s 449B …. 22.10 s 459G …. 28.58 s 466(2) …. 18.79 s 477(2)(a) …. 10.51, 22.44 s 530B(1) …. 26.29 s 556(1) …. 10.53 s 588FF(1) …. 10.53 s 1330 …. 11.40 s 1335 …. 28.23, 29.9, 29.39 s 1335(1) …. 28.16, 28.19, 28.20, 28.21, 28.22, 28.23, 28.32, 28.59, 28.65, 29.4–29.9, 29.18, 29.19, 29.20, 29.21, 29.24, 29.27, 29.28, 29.39, 29.55, 29.108 s 1335(1A) …. 28.22 s 1335(2) …. 6.7 Pt 5.3A …. 10.59, 22.10, 28.15 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 …. 9.28

Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 s 487 …. 9.13 Evidence Act 1995 s 131(1) …. 13.64 s 131(2)(h) …. 13.64 s 131(5)(b) …. 13.2 Fair Work Act 2009 s 376(1)(a)(ii) …. 23.32 s 570(2)(a) …. 8.69 Family Law Act 1975 …. 3.52, 8.59, 28.17 s 4(1) …. 20.11 s 68L(2) …. 22.71 s 70NFB(1) …. 8.70 s 70NFB(2)(g) …. 8.70 s 79 …. 13.1 s 80(1)(h) …. 14.16, 28.18 s 80(1)(k) …. 14.16, 28.18 s 91 …. 11.40, 11.50 s 91(2) …. 11.49 s 91A …. 11.50 s 91A(4) …. 11.49 s 91B …. 11.40 s 91B(2)(b) …. 11.49 s 92 …. 11.40, 11.49, 11.50 s 92(3) …. 11.49 s 92A …. 11.40

s 92A(3) …. 11.49 s 117 …. 6.12, 8.59, 8.70, 8.72, 8.79, 21.9 s 117(1) …. 6.13, 8.69, 8.70, 8.72, 20.11, 22.11, 28.3, 28.17, 29.12, 29.107 s 117(2) …. 8.70, 8.72, 13.40, 14.16, 20.11, 22.11, 22.65, 28.3, 28.17, 28.18, 29.12, 29.105 s 117(2A) …. 6.12, 8.70, 8.71, 8.72, 8.77, 11.49, 13.40, 13.43, 13.47, 22.11, 28.3, 29.12 s 117(2A)(a)-(f) …. 8.72 s 117(2A)(a) …. 8.32, 8.78, 9.20 s 117(2A)(b) …. 8.78 s 117(2A)(f) …. 13.40, 13.43, 13.46 s 117(2A)(g) …. 8.72, 8.78, 13.40, 22.11, 23.42 s 117(3) …. 22.71 s 117(4) …. 8.70, 22.71 s 117(5) …. 8.70, 22.71 s 117AA …. 8.70 s 117AB …. 8.59, 8.76 s 117AC …. 8.70, 28.17 s 117B …. 19.11 s 117B(1) …. 19.11 s 117B(2) …. 19.11 s 117C …. 13.40 s 117C(1) …. 13.40 s 117C(2) …. 13.40 s 117C(3) …. 13.40 s 117C(4) …. 13.40

s 118 …. 8.70 Pt VI …. 13.40 Pt VII Div 6 …. 13.40 Pt VII Div 9 …. 13.40 Pt VII Div 13 …. 13.40 Family Law Amendment Rules 2008 (No 2) …. 16.4 Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Act 2011 (Cth) …. 8.59 Family Law Regulations 1984 Sch 4A …. 8.70, 28.17 Family Law Rules 1984 O 31 r 6(2)–6(4) …. 6.21 O 38 r 3 …. 19.11 O 38 r 10 …. 5.26 O 38 r 23(3) …. 17.49 O 38 r 23(4) …. 17.70 O 38 r 23(5) …. 17.70 O 38 r 23(6) …. 17.59 O 38 r 29(a) …. 14.2 O 38 r 33 …. 14.32, 20.12 O 38 r 35(5)(a) …. 23.43 O 38 r 35(5)(b) …. 23.43 O 38 r 35(5)(c) …. 23.43 O 38 r 35(6) …. 23.68 O 38 r 35(6)(a) …. 23.68 O 38 r 43(1) …. 15.27

O 38 r 48(1) …. 15.30 O 38 r 48(2) …. 15.31 O 38 r 51(4) …. 16.4 O 38 r 53 …. 15.62 O 38 r 55(1) …. 17.74 O 38 r 56 …. 18.26 Sch 2 Pt 2 item 13 …. 17.70 Sch 2 Pt 2 item 14 …. 17.70 Family Law Rules 2004 …. 16.13 r 1.04 …. 7.48 r 1.07 …. 8.51, 14.47, 16.66, 29.124 r 1.07(c) …. 7.48, 15.85, 29.123 r 1.14 …. 18.27 r 10.01(3)(a) …. 13.40 r 10.02(1) …. 13.41 r 10.02(2) …. 13.41 r 10.02(3) …. 13.41 r 10.02(4)(b) …. 13.41 r 10.03(1) …. 13.41 r 10.03(2) …. 13.41 r 10.03(3) …. 13.41 r 10.06(1) …. 13.41 r 10.06(1)(b) …. 13.41 r 10.06(2) …. 13.41 r 10.07 …. 13.42 r 16.10 …. 2.35

r 16.13 …. 2.35 r 17.02 …. 6.21 r 17.03 …. 19.11 r 19.02 …. 19.11 r 19.03 …. 2.35 r 19.03(1) …. 2.35 r 19.04(1) …. 2.35 r 19.04(2) …. 2.35 r 19.04(3)(a) …. 2.35 r 19.04(4) …. 2.35 r 19.04(7) …. 2.35 r 19.05(2) …. 28.11, 28.17, 29.12, 29.107 r 19.06 …. 28.27 r 19.07(1) …. 28.66 r 19.07(3) …. 28.66 r 19.08(2)(a) …. 14.2 r 19.08(3) …. 15.59 r 19.09 …. 14.32, 20.12 r 19.10(1)(a) …. 23.48 r 19.10(1)(b) …. 23.48 r 19.10(1)(c) …. 23.44 r 19.10(1)(d) …. 23.44 r 19.10(2) …. 23.7 r 19.10(2)(a) …. 23.43 r 19.10(2)(b) …. 23.43 r 19.10(2)(c) …. 23.43

r 19.10(2)(d) …. 23.43 r 19.10(2)(e) …. 23.43 r 19.11(1) …. 23.68 r 19.11(2) …. 23.68 r 19.18(1)(b) …. 16.4 r 19.18(1)(c) …. 15.62 r 19.18(2) …. 16.4 r 19.18(3) …. 15.62, 16.4 r 19.19 …. 15.62 r 19.19(2)(c) …. 15.62 r 19.21(1)(b) …. 18.7 r 19.21(2) …. 18.7 r 19.22(1) …. 18.80 r 19.22(2) …. 18.80 r 19.22(3) …. 18.80 r 19.22(4) …. 18.80 r 19.23 …. 18.7 r 19.24(1) …. 18.7 r 19.24(2) …. 18.7 r 19.24(3) …. 18.7 r 19.25 …. 18.90 r 19.26(1) …. 18.8 r 19.26(2) …. 18.8 r 19.28 …. 18.8 r 19.29(1) …. 18.8 r 19.29(2) …. 18.8

r 19.30(1) …. 18.8 r 19.30(2) …. 18.8 r 19.30(3) …. 18.44 r 19.31 …. 18.8 r 19.32(1) …. 18.9 r 19.32(2) …. 18.9 r 19.32(3)(a) …. 18.9 r 19.32(4) …. 18.66, 18.72 r 19.33(1) …. 15.30 r 19.33(1)(i) …. 15.31 r 19.33(1)(m) …. 18.44 r 19.34(1) …. 16.4 r 19.34(2) …. 16.4, 16.23 r 19.34(2)(b) …. 15.59, 16.26, 17.55 r 19.34(3) …. 16.4, 16.23 r 19.34(3)(b) …. 15.59, 16.26, 17.55 r 19.34(4) …. 16.4 r 19.35(1) …. 15.62 r 19.35(2) …. 15.59, 15.62 r 19.36 …. 18.26 r 19.37(1) …. 18.7 r 19.37(2) …. 18.7 r 19.51 …. 17.47 r 19.52(2) …. 17.74 r 19.52(3) …. 17.59 r 19.52(4)(a) …. 17.52

r 19.52(4)(b) …. 17.49 r 19.52(4)(c) …. 17.70 r 19.52(4)(d) …. 17.70 r 19.54(1) …. 18.72 r 19.54(2) …. 18.72 r 19.55 …. 18.72 r 19.56(1)(a) …. 18.72 r 19.56(1)(c)(i) …. 18.72 r 19.56(2) …. 18.72 r 19.56(2)(b) …. 18.72 r 19.56(3) …. 18.72 r 22.42(2) …. 14.61 Dict …. 1.6, 13.41 Div 19.6.2 …. 15.27 Pt 1.2 …. 10.31, 10.39, 11.52, 15.15, 16.55 Pt 10.1 …. 13.40 Sch 3 …. 15.62 Sch 3 items 101–105 …. 15.62 Sch 3 item 106 …. 15.62 Sch 3 item 107 …. 17.27 Sch 3 item 108 …. 15.62 Sch 3 items 201–206 …. 15.62 Sch 3 item 203 …. 17.70 Sch 3 item 204 …. 17.70 Sch 3 items 301–305 …. 15.62 Sch 4 …. 15.62

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 s 79(2) …. 22.6 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 r 16.05(2) …. 6.21 r 21.03(1) …. 7.42 r 21.03(2) …. 7.47 r 21.03(3) …. 7.47 Federal Court Amendment Rules 2003 (No 3) …. 23.44, 23.48 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 …. 9.31 s 4 …. 13.87 s 23 …. 5.47, 5.48, 6.21 s 33N(1)(a) …. 11.60 s 33Q …. 11.60 s 33Q(3) …. 11.60 s 33R …. 11.60 s 33ZF(1) …. 11.60 s 33ZG(c)(v) …. 29.60 s 33ZJ …. 11.61 s 33ZJ(2) …. 11.61 s 35A(1)(g) …. 18.6 s 37M …. 10.31 s 37M(1) …. 2.38, 7.48, 8.51, 11.52, 14.47, 15.15, 16.55, 23.42, 29.124 s 37M(2)(e) …. 7.48, 15.85, 29.123 s 37M(3) …. 7.48, 15.85, 29.123 s 37N(1) …. 7.48, 15.85, 23.42, 29.123 s 37N(3) …. 2.38

s 37N(4) …. 7.48, 15.85, 16.66, 29.123 s 38(2) …. 6.29 s 43 …. 7.4, 8.53 s 43(1) …. 1.7, 6.7, 6.13, 14.45, 19.24, 22.6, 22.12, 22.13 s 43(1A) …. 11.60, 29.60, 29.61 s 43(2) …. 6.7, 22.12, 22.13 s 43(3)(a) …. 14.2 s 43(3)(b) …. 8.10 s 43(3)(c) …. 8.10 s 43(3)(d) …. 15.9 s 43(3)(e) …. 8.20 s 43(3)(f) …. 23.42 s 43(3)(g) …. 16.3, 16.23 s 51A …. 19.24 s 52 …. 19.24 s 53A …. 8.51 s 53B …. 13.64 s 56 …. 28.6 s 56(1) …. 28.16, 29.105 s 56(2) …. 28.31 s 56(3) …. 28.31 s 56(4) …. 28.29, 28.30 s 56(5) …. 28.16 s 59(2)(o) …. 5.48 s 59(2)(t) …. 5.48 Pt IVA …. 11.60, 29.60, 29.61, 29.62

Pt VB …. 10.39 Federal Court Rules 1979 O 1 r 8 …. 18.6 O 3 r 3 …. 18.6 O 5 r 1 …. 11.32 O 6 r 13 …. 11.59 O 18 r 2 …. 14.31 O 22 r 3 …. 14.59 O 22 r 8 …. 14.60 O 23 …. 13.58, 13.87 O 23 rr 2–4 …. 13.5 O 23 r 5(1)–(3) …. 13.5 O 23 r 5(4) …. 13.5 O 23 r 5(5) …. 13.5 O 23 r 5(7) …. 13.5 O 23 r 7 …. 13.5 O 23 r 8(1) …. 13.5 O 23 r 8(2) …. 13.5 O 23 r 8(3) …. 13.5 O 23 r 11(1) …. 14.72 O 23 r 11(4) …. 13.14 O 23 r 11(5) …. 13.19 O 23 r 11(6) …. 13.23, 13.28 O 23 r 11(7) …. 13.13 O 23 r 11(8) …. 13.13, 13.19 O 25A r 8(1) …. 14.25

O 25B r 7(1) …. 14.25 O 28 …. 28.6 O 28 r 1 …. 28.54 O 28 r 3(1) …. 28.12 O 28 r 3(1)(a) …. 29.66 O 28 r 3(1)(b) …. 29.32, 29.47 O 28 r 3(2) …. 28.12 O 28 r 5(1) …. 28.29 O 28 r 5(1)(a) …. 28.27 O 28 r 5(3) …. 28.63 O 28 r 6 …. 28.12, 28.16 O 35 r 7(3) …. 6.21 O 35 r 8 …. 19.10 O 40.02 …. 16.3 O 43 …. 22.68 O 52 r 19 …. 14.61 O 52 r 20 …. 29.105 O 62 …. 5.48 O 62 r 1A …. 17.22 O 62 r 3(1) …. 14.2 O 62 r 3(2) …. 14.45 O 62 r 3(3) …. 14.45, 14.48, 14.51 O 62 r 4(1) …. 15.9 O 62 r 4(2) …. 15.9 O 62 r 5 …. 14.32, 20.12 O 62 r 7(1) …. 15.12

O 62 r 7(1)(a) …. 14.48 O 62 r 8 …. 5.48, 15.27 O 62 r 9 …. 23.7, 23.58 O 62 r 9(1) …. 23.44 O 62 r 9(1)(a) …. 23.43 O 62 r 9(1)(c) …. 23.43 O 62 r 9(1)(d) …. 23.43 O 62 r 9(2) …. 23.48 O 62 r 9(5) …. 23.69 O 62 r 12(1) …. 15.60 O 62 r 14 …. 14.26 O 62 r 15 …. 1.17, 14.30 O 62 r 17 …. 18.25 O 62 r 18 …. 18.26 O 62 r 19 …. 16.3, 17.9 O 62 r 22(2) …. 15.59 O 62 r 23 …. 14.42 O 62 r 24 …. 14.31 O 62 r 25 …. 14.31 O 62 r 26(1) …. 14.59 O 62 r 29 …. 14.28 O 62 r 30 …. 14.33 O 62 r 31(a) …. 17.74 O 62 r 31(b) …. 17.52 O 62 r 32 …. 17.59 O 62 r 33(2) …. 17.47

O 62 r 34(1) …. 17.47, 17.59 O 62 r 34(2) …. 17.47, 17.59 O 62 r 35 …. 17.57 O 62 r 36(1) …. 8.20 O 62 r 36(2) …. 15.84 O 62 r 36A(1) …. 12.4 O 62 r 36A(2) …. 12.4 O 62 r 36A(3) …. 12.4 O 62 r 37 …. 11.42 O 62 r 38 …. 15.30 O 62 r 39(1) …. 15.27 O 62 r 40 …. 18.79 O 62 r 40A …. 18.79 O 62 r 40B …. 18.79 O 62 r 40C …. 18.79 O 62 r 40D …. 18.79 O 62 r 41(1) …. 18.5 O 62 r 41(2) …. 18.5 O 62 r 41(3)-(5) …. 18.5 O 62 r 41(6) …. 18.5 O 62 r 41(8) …. 18.5 O 62 r 42 …. 18.51 O 62 r 42(1A) …. 18.60 O 62 r 42(2) …. 18.60 O 62 r 42(3) …. 18.60 O 62 r 42(4) …. 18.60

O 62 r 42(5) …. 18.60 O 62 r 42(6) …. 18.60 O 62 r 43 …. 18.51 O 62 r 43(1)(a) …. 18.60 O 62 r 43(1)(b) …. 18.60 O 62 r 43(2) …. 18.60 O 62 r 43(3) …. 18.60 O 62 r 44 …. 5.50 O 62 r 44(1) …. 18.71 O 62 r 44(3) …. 18.71 O 62 r 44(4) …. 18.71 O 62 r 44(4)(a) …. 18.71 O 62 r 44(4)(b) …. 18.71 O 62 r 44(5)(a) …. 18.71 O 62 r 45(1) …. 18.30 O 62 r 45(2) …. 18.30 O 62 r 45(6) …. 18.30, 19.10 O 62 r 46(3)(a) …. 18.6 O 62 r 46(3)(b) …. 18.6 O 62 r 46(3)(c) …. 18.6, 18.43 O 62 r 46(3)(ca) …. 18.6 O 62 r 46(3)(d) …. 18.6 O 62 r 46(4)(c) …. 18.6, 18.43 O 62 r 46(4)(ca) …. 18.6 O 62 r 46(4)(d) …. 18.6 O 62 r 46(4A) …. 18.43

O 62 r 46(4B) …. 18.43 O 62 r 46(4C) …. 18.43 O 62 r 46(6) …. 18.6 O 62A …. 7.44 O 62A r 1 …. 7.42 O 62A r 2 …. 7.47 O 62A r 4 …. 7.47 O 80 …. 7.15 O 80 r 9(2) …. 7.15 Sch 2 …. 15.60 Sch 2 item 16 …. 17.27 Sch 2 item 28 …. 15.60 Sch 2 item 41 …. 15.61 Sch 2 item 42 …. 17.70 Sch 2 item 44 …. 17.33 Federal Court Rules 2011 …. 11.42, 13.13, 14.42, 28.16 r 1.34 …. 18.6 r 1.35 …. 14.45 r 1.38 …. 18.6 r 1.39 …. 18.27 r 7.38(1) …. 14.25 r 7.47(1) …. 14.25 r 9.21 …. 11.59 r 9.22 …. 11.59 r 9.62 …. 22.68 r 15.01 …. 11.32

r 19.01(1)(b) …. 28.27 r 19.01(1)(c) …. 28.29 r 19.02 …. 28.12 r 19.02(b) …. 29.66 r 19.02(c) …. 29.32 r 22.02 …. 14.31 r 22.03 …. 14.31 r 25.01-25.04 …. 13.5 r 25.05 …. 13.5 r 25.05(1) …. 13.30 r 25.05(3) …. 13.31 r 25.05(4) …. 13.5 r 25.06(1) …. 13.5 r 25.06(2) …. 13.5 r 25.06(3) …. 13.5 r 25.07 …. 13.5 r 25.08 …. 13.5 r 25.12 …. 14.72 r 25.14(1) …. 13.20, 13.23 r 25.14(2) …. 13.20, 13.23 r 25.14(3) …. 13.15, 13.20, 13.23 r 26.12(7) …. 14.59 r 26.15 …. 14.60 r 36.09(1) …. 29.105 r 36.73(4) …. 14.61 r 39.05(c) …. 7.47

r 39.05(g) …. 6.21 r 39.05(h) …. 6.21 r 39.06 …. 18.30, 19.10 r 40.01 …. 16.3, 16.43 r 40.02 …. 15.9, 16.23 r 40.03 …. 1.17, 14.30 r 40.04 …. 14.28, 14.33 r 40.05 …. 14.32, 20.12 r 40.06 …. 8.20 r 40.06(b) …. 15.84 r 40.07 …. 23.7 r 40.07(1) …. 23.44, 23.58 r 40.07(1)(a) …. 23.43 r 40.07(1)(c) …. 23.43 r 40.07(1)(d) …. 23.43 r 40.07(2)(a) …. 23.48 r 40.07(2)(b) …. 23.44 r 40.08 …. 12.4 r 40.12 …. 15.9 r 40.13 …. 14.45, 14.48 r 40.14 …. 14.48, 15.12 r 40.15 …. 18.25 r 40.16 …. 18.26 r 40.17 …. 18.5 r 40.18 …. 18.79 r 40.18(b) …. 18.5

r 40.19 …. 18.5 r 40.20(1) …. 18.6 r 40.20(2) …. 18.6 r 40.20(3) …. 18.6 r 40.20(4) …. 18.6 r 40.21 …. 18.43 r 40.21(1) …. 18.6 r 40.21(2) …. 18.6 r 40.22 …. 18.6 r 40.23(1) …. 18.6 r 40.23(2) …. 18.6 r 40.23(3) …. 18.6 r 40.23(4) …. 18.6 r 40.23(5) …. 18.6 r 40.24(c) …. 18.6 r 40.25 …. 18.5 r 40.25(1) …. 18.5 r 40.26 …. 18.5 r 40.27(3) …. 18.5 r 40.27(6) …. 18.5 r 40.28 …. 15.30 r 40.29 …. 15.60 r 40.30(a) …. 17.47 r 40.30(b) …. 16.3 r 40.31 …. 15.59 r 40.32(1) …. 18.30, 19.10

r 40.32(2) …. 18.28, 18.30 r 40.32(3) …. 18.30, 19.10 r 40.33(1) …. 18.43 r 40.34 …. 5.50, 18.71 r 40.34(1) …. 18.71 r 40.34(2) …. 18.71 r 40.34(3) …. 18.71 r 40.34(4) …. 18.71 r 40.34(5) …. 18.71 r 40.34(6) …. 18.71 r 40.35 …. 18.71 r 40.41 …. 18.79 r 40.42 …. 18.79 r 40.43 …. 18.79 r 40.44 …. 18.79 r 40.51 …. 7.44 r 40.51(1) …. 7.42 r 40.51(2) …. 7.47 Div 9.6 …. 22.68 Form 127 …. 18.79 Pt 18 …. 10.2 Pt 19 …. 28.6 Pt 25 …. 13.58, 13.87 Sch 1 …. 15.27, 16.3, 17.7, 28.54 Sch 3 …. 15.60 Sch 3 item 9 …. 17.27

Sch 3 item 11 …. 15.61 Sch 3 item 12 …. 15.61 Sch 3 item 16(1) …. 17.70 Sch 3 item 17.1 …. 17.28 Sch 3 item 17(2) …. 17.33 Federal Magistrates Court Act 1999 s 79(2) …. 22.6 Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 …. 21.1, 21.4 s 3(1) …. 21.4, 21.5, 21.8, 21.10 s 4(1) …. 21.5 s 4(2)(a) …. 21.5 s 4(2)(b) …. 21.5 s 6 …. 20.10, 21.5, 21.9, 21.58, 21.59 s 6(1) …. 21.5, 21.6 s 6(2) …. 21.5, 21.6 s 6(3) …. 21.5 s 6(3)(b) …. 21.9 s 7 …. 21.6 s 7(1) …. 21.6 s 7(1)(a) …. 21.9 s 7(2) …. 21.6 s 7A(1) …. 21.7 s 7A(2) …. 21.7 s 8 …. 21.8, 21.9, 21.58 s 8(1) …. 21.8 s 8(2) …. 21.8

s 8(3) …. 21.8 s 9 …. 21.9, 21.58, 21.59 s 9(1) …. 21.9 s 9(1)(a) …. 21.2 s 9(1)(b) …. 21.9 s 9(2) …. 21.9 s 10 …. 21.10 s 10(1) …. 21.10 s 10(2) …. 21.10, 21.11, 21.14 s 10(3) …. 21.11, 21.14 s 10(4) …. 21.12 s 10(5) …. 21.10 s 10A …. 21.13 s 10A(1) …. 21.13 s 10A(2) …. 21.13 s 10A(3) …. 21.50 s 11 …. 21.5 s 13 …. 21.50 s 14(1) …. 21.60 s 15(1) …. 21.5 s 15(2) …. 21.6 s 15(3) …. 21.9 s 16(1) …. 21.14 s 16(2) …. 21.14 s 17(1) …. 21.14 s 17(2) …. 21.14

s 17(3) …. 21.14 s 18(1) …. 21.14 s 18(2) …. 21.14 s 18(2A) …. 21.14 s 19 …. 21.14 Sch …. 21.14 Foreign Judgments Act 1991 s 5(1) …. 29.73 Foreign Judgments Regulations 1992 …. 29.73 Freedom of Information Act 1982 s 33A …. 29.120 Gas Pipelines Access Law s 38(1) …. 6.19 High Court Rules 1952 O 17 r 10 …. 11.33 O 27 r 1(2) …. 14.59 O 29 r 11 …. 6.21 O 43A r 2 …. 19.10 O 70 r 1(1) …. 6.14 O 70 r 7(2) …. 28.45 O 70 r 7(4) …. 28.29 O 70 r 7(5) …. 28.31 O 71 r 1(1) …. 6.7 O 71 r 3 …. 14.32 O 71 r 4 …. 23.48 O 71 r 5 …. 28.11

O 71 r 6(1) …. 29.76 O 71 r 7 …. 29.69 O 71 r 9(1) …. 15.8 O 71 r 9(1)(c) …. 6.14 O 71 r 10 …. 23.7, 23.43, 23.44, 23.58, 23.66 O 71 r 11 …. 22.68 O 71 r 12(1) …. 8.17 O 71 r 19 …. 15.27 O 71 r 23 …. 15.60 O 71 r 25 …. 14.26 O 71 r 26 …. 14.28 O 71 r 28 …. 1.17, 14.30 O 71 r 32 …. 18.26 O 71 r 33 …. 18.78 O 71 r 35(1) …. 18.78 O 71 r 35(2) …. 18.78 O 71 r 39 …. 14.66 O 71 r 46 …. 17.25 O 71 r 54 …. 17.28 O 71 r 60(1) …. 17.61 O 71 r 62(1) …. 6.29 O 71 r 65(1) …. 8.20 O 71 r 65(2) …. 8.20 O 71 r 65(3) …. 15.84 O 71 r 70 …. 15.30 O 71 r 73 …. 18.25

O 71 r 74 …. 16.3, 16.43 O 71 r 76 …. 15.61 O 71 r 79 …. 15.12 O 71 r 80(4) …. 18.42 O 71 r 81 …. 18.29 O 71 r 82 …. 17.33 O 71 r 87(1) …. 18.53 O 71 r 87(2) …. 18.53 O 71 r 87(3) …. 18.53 O 71 r 88(1) …. 18.54 O 71 r 88(2) …. 18.54 O 71 r 88(3) …. 18.55 O 71 r 88(4) …. 18.39, 18.55 O 71 r 89(1) …. 18.70 O 71 r 89(2) …. 18.70 O 71 r 89(3) …. 18.69 O 71 r 90 …. 18.70 O 71 r 94 …. 17.57 O 71 r 105(1) …. 18.27 High Court Rules 2004 r 3.01.2 …. 6.21 r 8.06.2 …. 19.10 r 11.05 …. 8.67, 16.68 r 21.08 …. 22.68 r 27.10.6 …. 14.59 r 41.12.2 …. 14.61

r 42.14.2 …. 14.61 r 50.01 …. 6.7, 6.14 r 50.02.1 …. 15.8 r 50.02.2 …. 15.12 r 50.05.2 …. 23.7, 23.43, 23.44, 23.58, 23.66 r 50.03 …. 14.32 r 51.01 …. 1.17, 14.30 r 51.02 …. 14.28 r 51.03.1 …. 14.26 r 51.03.2 …. 14.48 r 52.01 …. 15.8 r 52.02 …. 15.60 r 53.01 …. 15.27 r 53.02 …. 15.27 r 53.04.1 …. 15.30 r 53.04.2 …. 18.25 r 53.04.3 …. 18.26 r 53.04.4 …. 18.27 r 54.01 …. 18.4 r 54.02.1 …. 18.78 r 54.02.2 …. 18.78 r 54.02.3 …. 18.78 r 54.02.4 …. 18.78 r 55.01 …. 16.3, 16.43 r 55.03 …. 15.61 r 55.05 …. 15.61

r 56.01 …. 15.61 r 56.03 …. 17.28 r 56.05 …. 17.25 r 56.09.1 …. 17.61 r 56.09.2 …. 17.57 r 56.09.3 …. 18.78 r 56.09.4 …. 17.22 r 56.09.5 …. 7.15 r 56.10 …. 17.33 r 56.11.2 …. 22.68 r 56.11.3 …. 22.68 r 56.12.1 …. 8.20 r 56.12.2 …. 8.20 r 56.12.3 …. 15.84 r 57.01 …. 18.42 r 57.01.1 …. 18.4 r 57.01.3 …. 18.4 r 57.01.4 …. 18.4 r 57.01.5(a) …. 18.4 r 57.01.5(b) …. 18.4 r 57.01.6 …. 18.4 r 57.02.1 …. 18.4 r 57.02.2 …. 18.4 r 57.02.3 …. 18.4 r 57.02.4 …. 18.4 r 57.03.1 …. 18.53

r 57.03.2 …. 18.53 r 57.03.3 …. 18.53 r 57.03.4 …. 18.54 r 57.03.5 …. 18.54, 18.64 r 57.03.6 …. 18.55 r 57.03.7 …. 18.39, 18.55 r 57.04.1(a) …. 18.29 r 57.04.2 …. 18.29 r 57.04.3 …. 18.29 r 57.05.1 …. 18.70 r 57.05.3 …. 18.70 r 57.05.4 …. 18.69 r 57.05.5 …. 18.70 r 58.01 …. 18.42 r 58.02.1 …. 18.42 r 58.02.2 …. 18.4 r 58.03 …. 18.42 r 58.04 …. 18.42 r 59.01 …. 28.11, 29.105 r 59.02.1 …. 28.45 r 59.03 …. 28.29 r 59.04 …. 28.31 Sch 2 …. 15.60 Sch 2 item 22 …. 17.27 Sch 2 item 28 …. 15.60 Sch 2 item 44 …. 17.46

Sch 2 item 48 …. 15.61 Sch 2 item 49 …. 17.33 Sch 2 item 52 …. 17.40 Sch 2 item 53 …. 17.37 Sch 2 item 54 …. 17.33 Sch 2 item 55 …. 17.70 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 s 97 …. 28.69 Judiciary Act 1903 s 26 …. 6.7, 6.13, 22.6, 28.10 s 27 …. 20.36 s 35A …. 29.87 s 64 …. 24.4 s 68 …. 25.6 s 68(1) …. 25.6 s 68(2) …. 25.6 s 77S(1) …. 28.11 s 77S(2) …. 28.29, 28.30 s 77S(3) …. 28.16 s 77N …. 19.10 s 78A …. 11.47 s 78A(1) …. 11.40, 11.46 s 78A(2) …. 11.46, 11.47 s 78A(4) …. 11.46 s 78B(1) …. 11.48 s 78B(2) …. 11.48

s 78B(4) …. 11.48 s 79 …. 25.6 Migration Act 1958 …. 3.52, 15.16 s 5(1) …. 22.56 s 486E(1) …. 22.56, 23.32 s 486E(2) …. 22.56, 23.32 s 486E(3) …. 23.32 s 486F(1) …. 22.56, 23.32 s 486F(3) …. 23.61 s 486F(4) …. 23.64 s 486G …. 23.68 s 486H …. 23.9 s 486J …. 22.56 s 486K …. 22.56 Pt 8B …. 22.55, 23.32 Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 …. 22.56, 23.32 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 Sch 1 …. 15.52 Native Title Act 1993 s 85A(1) …. 8.69 s 85A(2) …. 8.69 Privacy Act 1988 …. 26.1 Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 s 105 …. 29.71 Social Security Act 1991 s 1233 …. 4.39

Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 s 320 …. 11.40 Taxation Administration Act 1953 s 8ZN …. 24.29 Trade Practices Act 1974 …. 29.38 s 45 …. 29.117 s 45D …. 29.121 s 52 …. 15.41, 29.103, 29.117 s 82 …. 29.103 s 87 …. 12.4, 15.41 World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 s 13(5) …. 29.118 s 14 …. 29.118

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 …. 6.10 s 48(1) …. 8.89 s 48(2) …. 8.89 Barristers’ Rules r 115 …. 4.57 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 s 139K(2) …. 13.48 s 180 …. 7.51, 7.52 s 181(2) …. 7.51 s 181(6) …. 7.51 s 182(1) …. 7.54

s 182(2) …. 7.54 s 183 …. 7.54 s 184 …. 7.54 s 185 …. 7.51 s 189(1) …. 23.54, 23.61 s 189(3) …. 23.54 s 189(4) …. 23.54 s 195 …. 8.51 Pt 2 …. 7.52 Pt 14.2 …. 23.53 Court Procedures Act 2004 Pt 3 …. 12.5 Court Procedures Rules 2006 r 9(2) …. 2.36 r 20 …. 28.54 r 21 …. 7.48, 8.51, 10.31, 10.39, 11.52, 14.47, 15.15, 16.55, 16.66, 29.124 r 266 …. 11.59 rr 275–278 …. 22.68 r 277 …. 22.68 r 302 …. 11.32 r 513 …. 14.36 r 709 …. 10.46 r 745(1) …. 14.25 r 755(1) …. 14.25 rr 1000–1005 …. 13.34

r 1011 …. 13.34, 13.36, 13.38 r 1011(4) …. 13.35 r 1011(5) …. 13.35 r 1012 …. 13.34, 26.28 r 1163 …. 14.59 r 1169 …. 14.60 r 1617(3) …. 19.12 r 1617(4) …. 19.12 r 1700 …. 14.29, 16.33, 23.43, 28.12 r 1701(1)(a) …. 14.2 r 1701(2) …. 14.58 r 1702(2) …. 18.13 r 1702(3) …. 18.13 r 1703 …. 22.68 r 1703(1) …. 22.8 r 1703(2) …. 22.8 r 1703(3) …. 23.61 r 1704 …. 22.8 r 1705(1) …. 8.12 r 1705(2) …. 8.12 r 1706 …. 14.71 r 1707(1) …. 14.32 r 1707(2) …. 14.32 r 1707(3) …. 14.32 r 1720(1) …. 14.1 r 1720(2) …. 15.9

r 1720(3) …. 15.9 r 1721 …. 6.14, 10.32, 24.8 r 1721(1) …. 6.7 r 1721(2) …. 14.29 r 1722(1) …. 15.63 r 1722(4) …. 15.63 r 1725 …. 12.5 r 1725(1) …. 12.5 r 1725(2) …. 12.5 r 1725(3) …. 12.5 r 1725(4) …. 12.5 r 1725(5) …. 12.5 r 1725(6) …. 12.5 r 1725(7) …. 12.5 r 1726(1) …. 14.36 r 1726(2) …. 14.36 r 1727 …. 11.42 r 1728 …. 1.17, 14.30 r 1729 …. 14.42 r 1730 …. 10.46 r 1732(2)(b) …. 16.33 r 1732(3) …. 10.1 r 1733 …. 22.68 r 1735 …. 17.61 r 1736(1) …. 17.28 r 1736(2) …. 17.37

r 1737 …. 17.57 r 1738 …. 17.52 r 1751 …. 16.5 r 1751(1) …. 16.5, 16.43 r 1751(2) …. 16.5, 17.61 r 1752(2) …. 16.5, 16.33, 16.45 r 1752(2)(c) …. 16.66 r 1752(3) …. 16.5 r 1752(4) …. 16.5 r 1752(4)(a) …. 16.23 r 1752(4)(b) …. 15.59, 16.26, 17.55 r 1753(1)(a) …. 23.48 r 1753(1)(b) …. 23.44, 23.58 r 1753(2) …. 23.7 r 1753(2)(a) …. 23.43 r 1753(2)(b) …. 23.43 r 1753(3) …. 23.43 r 1754(1)(a) …. 8.21 r 1754(1)(b) …. 8.21 r 1754(2) …. 8.21, 15.84 r 1760 …. 5.2, 15.30 r 1760(d) …. 18.27 r 1761 …. 5.2, 15.59 r 1800(1) …. 18.10 r 1800(1)(b) …. 15.40 r 1800(2) …. 15.27, 18.10

r 1800(3) …. 18.10 r 1800(4) …. 18.10 r 1800(5) …. 18.10 r 1802 …. 18.81 r 1803(1) …. 18.25 r 1803(2) …. 18.25 r 1803(3) …. 18.25 r 1804 …. 18.81 r 1805 …. 17.18 r 1805(1) …. 18.82 r 1805(2) …. 18.82 r 1805(3) …. 18.82 r 1805(4) …. 18.82 r 1806(1) …. 18.50, 18.90 r 1806(2)(a) …. 18.50 r 1807 …. 18.56 r 1807(1) …. 18.11 r 1807(2) …. 18.11 r 1807(3) …. 18.11 r 1808 …. 18.11 r 1809 …. 18.31, 18.56 r 1809(1) …. 18.11 r 1809(2) …. 18.11 r 1809(3)(a)(ii) …. 18.45 r 1809(3)(a)(iii) …. 18.11, 18.39 r 1810(1) …. 18.38

r 1810(2) …. 18.38 r 1811 …. 18.45 r 1811(1) …. 18.12 r 1811(2) …. 18.12 r 1811(3) …. 18.12 r 1811(4) …. 18.12 r 1812 …. 18.31 r 1812(1) …. 18.12 r 1812(2) …. 18.12 r 1813(1)–(3) …. 18.45 r 1813(4) …. 18.45 r 1832 …. 18.26 r 1833(1) …. 8.14, 27.27 r 1833(2) …. 27.27 r 1834 …. 18.50 r 1835(1)–(3) …. 18.31 r 1835(4) …. 18.31 r 1835(5) …. 18.31 r 1835(6) …. 18.28, 18.31 r 1836 …. 18.31, 18.56 r 1851(1) …. 18.56 r 1851(2) …. 18.56 r 1851(3) …. 18.56 r 1852 …. 18.31 r 1852(1) …. 18.56 r 1852(2) …. 18.56

r 1852(4) …. 18.56 r 1852(5) …. 18.56 r 1852(6) …. 18.56 r 1853(1) …. 18.56 r 1853(2) …. 18.56 r 1853(3) …. 18.56 r 1853(4) …. 18.56 r 1854(1) …. 18.56, 18.64 r 1854(2) …. 18.56 r 1855(1) …. 18.73 r 1855(2) …. 18.73 r 1855(3) …. 18.73 r 1855(4) …. 18.73 r 1855(5) …. 18.73 r 1855(6) …. 18.73 r 1900(1) …. 28.12, 28.32 r 1901 …. 28.12, 28.16 r 1901(a) …. 29.18 r 1901(b) …. 29.32 r 1901(c) …. 29.80 r 1901(d) …. 29.80 r 1901(e) …. 29.66, 29.71 r 1901(f) …. 29.76 r 1901(g) …. 28.16 r 1901(h) …. 28.16 r 1902 …. 29.11

r 1902(1) …. 28.11 r 1902(1)(b) …. 29.86 r 1902(1)(d) …. 29.18 r 1902(1)(e) …. 29.100 r 1902(1)(f) …. 28.54, 29.79 r 1902(1)(h) …. 29.90 r 1902(1)(i) …. 29.121 r 1902(1)(j) …. 29.88 r 1902(1)(k) …. 29.135 r 1902(1)(l) …. 29.71, 29.72 r 1902(1)(m) …. 29.123 r 1902(2) …. 28.11 r 1903(1) …. 28.31 r 1903(2)(a) …. 28.45 r 1904 …. 28.27 r 1904(3)(b) …. 28.29 r 1905 …. 28.63 r 1906(1) …. 28.66 r 1906(2) …. 28.66 r 1906(3) …. 28.66 r 2507 …. 8.67, 16.68 r 3781(3) …. 7.25 r 5055(1) …. 29.105 r 5174(3) …. 14.61 r 5302(1) …. 29.105 r 6351 …. 18.27

r 6906 …. 6.21 Form 2.45 …. 18.81 Form 2.46 …. 18.31 Form 2.47 …. 18.56 Form 2.48 …. 18.56 Pt 2.19 …. 10.2 Sch 2 Pt 2.2 …. 19.12 Sch 4 …. 15.63 Sch 4 Pt 4.1 cl 4.1 …. 15.64 Sch 4 Pt 4.1 cl 4.2 …. 15.64 Sch 4 Pt 4.1 cl 4.2(2) …. 15.64 Sch 4 Pt 4.1 cl 4.2(3) …. 15.64 Sch 4 Pt 4.1 cl 4.10 …. 17.64 Sch 4 Pt 4.1 cl 4.11 …. 17.53 Sch 4 Pt 4.2 item 16 …. 17.27 Sch 4 Pt 4.2 item 29 …. 17.46 Sch 4 Pt 4.2 item 33 …. 17.46 Sch 4 Pt 4.2 item 36 …. 17.29 Sch 4 Pt 4.2 item 37 …. 17.70 Sch 4 Pt 4.2 item 46 …. 17.29 Sch 4 Pt 4.2 item 48 …. 17.70 Courts Procedures Amendment Rules 2011 (No 4) …. 12.5 Domestic Relationships Act 1994 …. 8.79 Electronic Transactions Act 2001 s 9 …. 4.19 Evidence Act 2011

s 131(5)(b) …. 13.2 Family Provision Act 1969 …. 10.31 Legal Aid Act 1977 s 34 …. 8.69, 22.65, 23.38, 29.30 Legal Practitioners Act 1970 s 178(1) …. 4.5 s 178(2) …. 4.7 s 179(1) …. 4.5 s 179(1A) …. 4.5 s 180 …. 5.8 s 180(2) …. 5.13 s 180(3) …. 5.13 s 184 …. 5.46 s 186 …. 5.61 s 187 …. 5.14 s 190(1) …. 5.18 s 190(2) …. 3.7 s 190(3) …. 3.8 s 190(4) …. 3.8 s 191 …. 3.19 s 191(1) …. 3.16 s 191D …. 17.19 Legal Profession Act 2006 s 73 …. 17.19 s 186 …. 23.53 s 188(1) …. 23.53

s 188(2) …. 23.53 s 229(1)(a) …. 26.11 s 229(1)(b) …. 4.32 s 229(2) …. 4.32 s 261 …. 3.51, 4.13, 4.16, 5.7, 5.12, 5.18 s 261A(1) …. 2.23, 3.7, 5.9 s 261A(1)(a) …. 5.9 s 269 …. 2.21 s 270 …. 2.22 s 271 …. 2.25 s 272 …. 2.30 s 273 …. 2.29 s 274 …. 2.21, 3.53 s 275 …. 2.24 s 276 …. 2.26 s 277 …. 2.31 s 278(1) …. 2.28 s 278(3) …. 2.28 s 279 …. 2.1, 3.2 s 280 …. 4.33 s 281(1) …. 4.60 s 281(2) …. 4.60 s 281(3) …. 4.60 s 281(4) …. 4.60 s 281A(1) …. 2.23 s 281A(2) …. 2.25

s 282(1) …. 3.7 s 282(1)(a) …. 4.58 s 282(1)(b) …. 4.58 s 282(1)(c) …. 4.58 s 282(2) …. 3.8 s 282(3) …. 3.11 s 282(4) …. 3.11 s 282(5) …. 5.18 s 283(1) …. 3.51 s 283(2) …. 3.52 s 283(3)(a) …. 3.51 s 283(3)(b) …. 3.51 s 283(3)(c)–(e) …. 3.51 s 283(4) …. 3.51 s 283(5) …. 3.51 s 283(6) …. 3.51 s 284(1) …. 3.53 s 284(2) …. 3.53 s 284(3) …. 3.53 s 284(4)(a) …. 3.53 s 284(4)(b) …. 3.53 s 285 …. 3.54 s 286 …. 3.6 s 286(1) …. 4.58 s 287(1) …. 3.8, 3.57 s 287(2) …. 3.57

s 287(3) …. 3.58 s 287(4) …. 3.58 s 287(5) …. 3.58 s 287(6) …. 3.60 s 288(1) …. 3.16 s 288(3) …. 3.16 s 288(3)(h) …. 3.16 s 288(5) …. 3.19 s 288(6) …. 3.19 s 288(7) …. 3.19 s 288(8) …. 3.19 s 288(9) …. 3.16 s 289(1) …. 4.5, 4.21 s 289(2) …. 4.7 s 289(3) …. 4.8 s 289(4) …. 4.6 s 290(1) …. 4.12 s 290(2) …. 4.18 s 290(3) …. 4.18 s 290(4) …. 4.18 s 290(5) …. 4.20 s 290(7) …. 4.20 s 290(8) …. 4.20 s 291(1) …. 4.16 s 291(2) …. 4.16 s 292(1) …. 4.5, 4.12

s 292(2) …. 4.5, 4.12 s 292(3) …. 4.5, 4.12 s 292(4) …. 4.12 s 292(6) …. 4.5 s 292(7) …. 4.5 s 292(8) …. 4.29 s 292(10) …. 4.5, 4.12 s 293(1) …. 4.17, 4.50 s 294A(1) …. 5.8 s 294A(2) …. 5.8 s 294A(3) …. 5.8, 5.13 s 294A(4) …. 5.13 s 294A(5) …. 5.10 s 294A(6) …. 5.10, 5.12 s 294A(7) …. 5.10, 5.12 s 295(1) …. 5.8 s 295(2) …. 5.13 s 295(3) …. 5.13 s 295(4) …. 5.10 s 296(1)–(3) …. 5.8 s 296(4) …. 5.10 s 298(b) …. 4.1, 5.14 s 300(1) …. 5.16 s 300(2) …. 5.16 s 300A(1) …. 5.18 s 300A(2) …. 5.18

s 300B …. 5.20 s 301 …. 5.57 s 302(2) …. 5.46 s 303(1) …. 5.23 s 303(2) …. 5.23 s 304A …. 5.7 s 416(3) …. 6.10 s 442 …. 4.1 s 442(2)(b) …. 26.31 Dictionary …. 3.6, 4.4, 4.31, 5.3, 5.41 Div 3.2.5 …. 3.57 Legal Profession Regulation 2007 reg 62 …. 4.32 reg 83 …. 2.30 Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007 r 5.1 …. 4.46 r 5.2 …. 4.48 r 5.3 …. 4.48 r 6.2 …. 26.14 r 26.3 …. 26.14 r 26.4 …. 26.18 r 26.5 …. 26.18 r 40.3 …. 3.54 Legislation Act 2001 s 250(1) …. 4.20 Limitation Act 1985

s 11 …. 3.18 s 13 …. 3.18 Magistrates Court Act 1930 s 97 …. 24.24 s 219F(2)(c)(ii) …. 24.24 s 244 …. 24.36 s 244(a) …. 24.24, 24.52 s 244(b) …. 24.24, 24.52 s 244(c) …. 24.52 Professional Conduct Rules r 3 …. 2.21 Supreme Court Act 1933 s 10 …. 5.2 s 22 …. 8.40, 12.22 s 23 …. 24.8, 24.16 s 23(3) …. 24.11 s 37E …. 5.61 s 70 …. 19.12 Supreme Court Rules 1937 O 19 r 10 …. 11.59 O 19 rr 16–22 …. 22.68 O 20 r 1 …. 11.32 O 20 r 11 …. 11.33 O 26 …. 13.34 O 26 r 2 …. 13.35 O 26 r 6 …. 13.36, 13.38

O 30 r 1(1) …. 14.59 O 30 r 1(3) …. 14.59 O 30 r 4 …. 14.60 O 32 r 13 …. 14.36 O 32 r 14 …. 6.21 O 33B r 1 …. 28.54 O 33B r 3 …. 28.12 O 33B r 3(1)(a) …. 29.66, 29.71 O 33B r 3(1)(b) …. 29.80 O 33B r 3(1)(c) …. 29.80 O 33B r 3(1)(d) …. 29.32 O 33B r 4 …. 28.31 O 42 r 3 …. 19.12 O 52 r 8 …. 26.28 O 65 r 1(1) …. 6.7, 6.14 O 65 r 3 …. 23.48 O 65 r 7 …. 15.63 O 65 r 7A …. 12.5 O 65 r 8 …. 23.43 O 65 r 9 …. 22.68 O 65 r 10 …. 8.17 O 65 r 11 …. 10.1 O 65 r 18(2) …. 18.81 O 65 r 20(1) …. 6.14 O 65 r 31 …. 17.28 O 65 r 37 …. 17.61

O 65 r 40 …. 18.31 O 65 r 43 …. 8.21, 15.84 O 65 r 44 …. 8.14 O 65 r 46 …. 11.42 O 65 r 48 …. 15.30 O 65 r 49 …. 15.27 O 65 r 52 …. 18.25 O 65 r 57 …. 15.12 O 65 r 58 …. 18.12 O 65 r 58(1) …. 18.10 O 65 r 58(2) …. 18.10 O 65 r 58(6)–(10) …. 18.12 O 65 r 59 …. 18.31 O 65 r 61 …. 15.59 O 65 r 63 …. 18.50 O 65 r 64 …. 18.53 O 65 r 68 …. 17.52 O 65 r 72 …. 17.53 O 65 r 78 …. 18.26 O 65 r 80 …. 18.27 O 65 r 83 …. 17.57 O 81 r 11(1) …. 29.105 Wills Act 1968 ss 16A–16I …. 10.30

NEW SOUTH WALES

Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 s 88 …. 8.90, 8.93, 20.11 s 88(1) …. 8.89, 8.90, 8.91 s 88(1A) …. 8.89, 8.91, 8.92, 17.7 s 88(1A)(a) …. 8.92 s 88(1A)(b) …. 8.92 s 88(1A)(c) …. 8.92 s 88(1A)(d) …. 8.92 s 88(1A)(e) …. 8.92, 8.94 s 119 …. 20.11 Administrative Decisions Tribunal Amendment Act 2008 …. 8.90 Administrative Decisions Tribunal Amendment Act 2009 …. 8.91 Anti Discrimination Act 1977 …. 8.93 Barristers’ Rules r 15 …. 4.57 r 17 …. 4.57 r 24A …. 4.57 r 24B …. 4.57 Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 …. 21.18 Child Welfare Act 1939 …. 6.9 Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 s 88 …. 8.69 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 s 7(2) …. 8.69, 8.89 Civil Liability Act 2002

s 3 …. 3.53 s 11 …. 7.52 Pt 2 …. 7.52 Civil Procedure Act 2005 …. 23.44 s 4 …. 23.15 s 22 …. 11.32 s 26 …. 8.51 s 30(4)(a) …. 13.64 s 56 …. 10.39, 16.6, 16.55 s 56(1) …. 7.48, 8.51, 10.31, 11.52, 14.47, 15.15, 16.55, 29.124 s 56(5) …. 16.66 s 60 …. 7.48, 8.41, 10.31, 15.85, 29.123 s 98 …. 7.32, 8.81 s 98(1) …. 14.32 s 98(1)(a) …. 6.7, 6.14, 19.23 s 98(1)(b) …. 6.14, 19.23, 22.6 s 98(1)(c) …. 16.6 s 98(2) …. 14.1 s 98(3) …. 14.2, 23.64 s 98(4) …. 15.9 s 98(6)(b) …. 20.12 s 98(6)(c) …. 14.32 s 99 …. 23.15 s 99(1) …. 23.44, 23.58 s 99(2) …. 23.7, 23.68 s 99(2)(a) …. 23.43

s 99(2)(b) …. 23.43 s 99(2)(c) …. 23.43 s 99(3) …. 23.66 s 99(4) …. 23.68 s 99(5) …. 23.69 s 101(4) …. 19.13 s 101(5) …. 19.13, 19.14 s 101(7) …. 19.14 s 166(1)(a) …. 11.60 s 168 …. 11.60 s 169 …. 11.60 s 181 …. 11.60, 29.60 s 183 …. 11.60 s 184 …. 11.61 Pt 10 …. 11.60 Sch 1 …. 23.15 Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001 s 52(2) …. 6.13 s 52(3)(a) …. 6.13 s 52(4) …. 6.13 Contracts Review Act 1980 …. 3.14, 4.34, 15.52 Corporations (NSW) Act 1990 s 29(2) …. 25.6 Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 …. 24.9 s 1A …. 25.4 s 2 …. 25.2, 25.6, 25.8

s 2(1) …. 25.2, 25.6, 25.12 s 2(1)(a) …. 25.2 s 2(1)(b) …. 24.60 s 2(2) …. 25.2 s 2(3) …. 25.2 s 3 …. 25.3, 25.7, 25.8, 25.9 s 3(1) …. 25.3, 25.8, 25.11, 25.12 s 3(1)(a) …. 25.9, 25.10, 25.12, 25.13 s 3(1)(b) …. 25.14 s 3A …. 25.12 s 3A(1) …. 25.8, 25.12 s 3A(2) …. 25.12 s 3A(3) …. 25.12 s 4 …. 25.4 s 4(1) …. 25.4 s 4(2) …. 25.4 s 4(3) …. 25.4 s 4(4) …. 25.4 s 4(5) …. 25.4 s 5(1) …. 25.4 Courts and Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2010 …. 11.60 Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2005 …. 23.15 Courts of Petty Sessions (Civil Claims) Act 1970 s 35(b) …. 11.17 Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 s 70 …. 24.58

s 70(1) …. 24.26, 24.58 s 70(2) …. 24.58 Criminal Appeal Act 1912 s 5 …. 24.59 s 5AA …. 24.59 s 5AB …. 24.59 s 5AD …. 24.59 s 5AE …. 24.59 s 5B(1) …. 6.8, 24.59 s 5B(2) …. 24.59 s 5BA …. 24.59 s 6AA …. 21.29 s 17(1) …. 24.59 Criminal Appeal Rules r 14 …. 24.59 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 ss 116–120 …. 24.25 s 116(1) …. 24.25 s 116(1)(b) …. 24.25 s 116(2) …. 24.25, 24.52 s 116(3) …. 24.52 s 116(5) …. 24.25 s 117(1) …. 24.26 s 117(2) …. 24.26 s 118(1)–(3) …. 24.27 ss 211–218 …. 24.25

s 211 …. 24.25 s 213(1) …. 24.25 s 213(2) …. 24.25, 24.52 s 213(3) …. 24.25 s 213(5) …. 24.52 s 214(1) …. 24.26 s 214(2) …. 24.26 s 215(1) …. 24.25 s 215(1A) …. 24.25 s 215(1B) …. 24.25 s 215(2) …. 24.25 s 216(1)–(3) …. 24.27 ss 257A–257G …. 24.25 s 257A …. 24.25 s 257B …. 24.52, 24.55 s 257B(1) …. 24.25 s 257C …. 24.25 s 257C(1) …. 24.52, 24.55 s 257D(1) …. 24.26 s 257D(2)(a) …. 24.26 s 257F(1) …. 24.27 s 257F(2) …. 24.27 s 257F(4) …. 24.27 s 257G …. 15.7, 15.13, 18.15, 24.25, 24.52, 24.55 Ch 3 Pt 2 Div 7 …. 24.25 Ch 4 Pt 2 Div 4 …. 24.25

Ch 4 Pt 5 Div 4 …. 24.25 Crown Proceedings Act 1988 s 5(2) …. 24.4 Defamation Act 1974 s 48A(2) …. 13.48 Defamation Act 2005 s 21(1) …. 8.40 s 22(3) …. 12.22 s 40 …. 8.41 s 40(1) …. 8.40 s 40(2) …. 13.48 Defamation Amendment Act 2002 …. 13.48 District Court Act 1973 …. 24.9 s 4(1) …. 12.6 s 6 …. 24.9 s 9(1) …. 28.6 s 44(1)(a) …. 12.6 s 148A …. 16.13 s 148B(1)(c) …. 16.13 s 156(1) …. 28.6 s 162(2)(j) …. 28.6 District Court Rules 1973 Pt 19A r 9 …. 13.25 Pt 39A r 20 …. 14.31 Pt 40 r 1 …. 28.6 Electronic Transactions Act 2000

s 9 …. 4.19 Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 …. 8.53 s 123 …. 9.13 s 123(1) …. 29.119 Evidence Act 1995 s 131(1) …. 13.64 s 131(2)(h) …. 13.64 s 131(5)(b) …. 13.2 Fair Trading Act 1987 s 4(1) …. 2.33 Fair Trading Tribunal Act 1998 s 48(5) …. 6.13 s 48(6) …. 6.13 Family Provision Act 1982 …. 10.40 Interpretation Act 1987 s 12(1)(b) …. 25.6 s 76 …. 4.20 Justices Act 1902 s 41A …. 24.25, 24.52 s 41A(1) …. 24.52 s 41A(1)(b) …. 24.25 s 41A(2) …. 24.52 s 41A(2A) …. 24.26 s 81 …. 24.25 s 81(1)(a) …. 24.52 s 81(1A) …. 24.52

s 81(2) …. 24.52 Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 …. 13.2 Land and Environment Court Act 1979 s 17 …. 8.84 s 18 …. 8.84 s 19 …. 8.84, 8.85 s 56A …. 21.21 s 69(2) …. 6.18, 8.81 s 69AA …. 23.15 Land and Environment Court Rules 1996 Pt 16 r 4(1) …. 8.82 Pt 16 r 4(2) …. 6.17, 8.82, 29.12 Land and Environment Court Rules 2007 r 3.7(1) …. 8.82 r 3.7(2) …. 8.82 r 3.7(3) …. 8.84 r 4.2 …. 9.2, 9.4 r 4.2(1) …. 9.4, 9.5, 9.6 r 4.2(2) …. 29.121 Legal Aid Commission Act 1979 s 4(1) …. 21.61 s 47 …. 22.65 s 47(1) …. 8.69, 23.38, 29.30 Legal Practitioners Act 1898 39A …. 27.8 Legal Profession Act 1987 …. 2.19, 3.20

s 38I(3) …. 4.57 s 48Q …. 17.19 s 61(3)(d) …. 26.11 s 175 …. 2.21 s 176 …. 2.22 s 177(2) …. 2.22 s 178 …. 2.25 s 178(4) …. 2.26 s 180 …. 2.30 s 182 …. 2.31 s 182(3) …. 5.46 s 183 …. 2.31 s 184 …. 3.7 s 184(1) …. 3.7, 4.58 s 184(2) …. 3.7, 4.58 s 184(3) …. 3.7 s 184(4) …. 3.8 s 184(6) …. 3.11 s 186(1) …. 3.51 s 186(2) …. 3.51 s 186(3) …. 3.52 s 186(4) …. 3.51 s 186(5) …. 3.51 s 187(1)-(3) …. 3.53 s 187(1) …. 3.53 s 187(2) …. 3.53

s 188 …. 3.54 s 189(1) …. 3.57 s 189(2) …. 5.18 s 191 …. 4.33 s 192(1) …. 4.5 s 192(2) …. 4.7 s 194(1) …. 4.18 s 194(2) …. 4.18 s 195 …. 4.20 s 196 …. 4.42 s 198B(1) …. 5.5 s 198B(4) …. 5.5 s 198C(1) …. 7.52 s 198C(2) …. 7.51 s 198D(2) …. 7.51 s 198D(4)(b) …. 7.51 s 198D(4)(c) …. 7.51 s 198D(5) …. 7.51 s 198F(1) …. 7.54 s 198F(2) …. 7.54 s 198G …. 7.54 s 198H(1) …. 7.51 s 198I(1) …. 7.51 s 198I(2) …. 7.51 s 198J(1) …. 23.53 s 198J(2) …. 23.53

s 198J(4) …. 23.53 s 198M …. 23.62 s 198M(1) …. 23.53, 23.54, 23.61 s 198M(3) …. 23.54 s 198M(4) …. 23.54 s 199(1) …. 5.8 s 199(2) …. 5.10, 5.12, 5.13 s 199(3) …. 5.13 s 200(1) …. 5.8 s 200(2) …. 5.10 s 200(3) …. 5.10, 5.13 s 200(4) …. 5.10 s 201 …. 5.8 s 201(2) …. 5.10 s 202(1) …. 15.13, 18.15 s 202(2) …. 15.7 s 202(3) …. 15.7, 15.13, 18.15 s 203 …. 15.13, 18.15 s 206(1) …. 15.13, 18.15 s 206(2) …. 18.15 s 208(1) …. 18.15 s 208(2) …. 18.15 s 208(3)(b) …. 5.18 s 208A(1) …. 5.16 s 208A(2) …. 3.19 s 208B …. 5.16

s 208C …. 5.18 s 208D(1) …. 3.16 s 208D(2)–(4) …. 3.16 s 208F(1) …. 16.6 s 208F(4) …. 18.46 s 208F(5) …. 18.46 s 208G …. 16.7 s 208H …. 15.59, 16.26, 17.55 s 208J(1) …. 18.32 s 208J(2) …. 18.32 s 208J(3) …. 18.32 s 208J(4) …. 18.32 s 208JA(1) …. 18.46 s 208JA(2) …. 18.46 s 208JA(4) …. 18.46 s 208JA(5) …. 18.46 s 208JAA …. 5.21 s 208JAA(1) …. 18.32, 18.67 s 208JB …. 18.39 s 208K …. 18.57, 18.69 s 208KA(1) …. 18.57 s 208KA(2) …. 18.57 s 208KA(5) …. 18.57 s 208KB …. 18.58 s 208KC(1) …. 18.58 s 208KC(2) …. 18.58

s 208KC(3) …. 18.58 s 208KC(4) …. 18.58 s 208KE …. 18.58 s 208KF(1) …. 18.58 s 208KF(2) …. 18.59 s 208KF(3) …. 18.58 s 208KG(1) …. 18.58 s 208KH(2) …. 18.59 s 208KH(3) …. 18.59 s 208KH(4) …. 18.59 s 208KH(7) …. 18.59 s 208KH(8) …. 18.59 s 208KH(10) …. 18.59 s 208KHA …. 18.39 s 208KI …. 18.58, 18.74 s 208L …. 18.58 s 208L(1) …. 18.74 s 208L(2) …. 18.74 s 208L(3) …. 18.74 s 208M …. 18.58, 18.74 s 208M(2) …. 18.74 s 208M(3) …. 18.74 s 208M(4) …. 18.74 s 208M(5) …. 18.74 s 208N(1) …. 18.74 s 208N(2) …. 18.74

s 208NA …. 18.74 s 208NC(1) …. 18.67, 18.74 s 208Q …. 5.23 s 208S(1) …. 5.2, 15.27 s 208S(4) …. 5.2, 15.31 s 208SA …. 15.28 s 209C …. 26.19, 26.28 s 209C(1)(a) …. 4.24 Pt 10 Div 2 …. 5.5 Pt 11 Div 5C …. 23.53 Pt 11 Div 6 …. 18.57 Pt 11 Div 6 Subdiv 4A …. 5.61 Pt 11 Div 6 Subdiv 4B …. 5.61 Sch 7 …. 5.2 Sch 7 cl 1 …. 15.27 Sch 8 Pt 13 cl 73(2) …. 23.53 Sch 8 Pt 13 cl 73(4) …. 23.53 Legal Profession Act 2004 …. 3.57, 24.55 s 4(1) …. 1.5, 3.6, 4.4, 5.3, 5.41 s 83(3) …. 4.57 s 100 …. 17.19 s 243(1) …. 4.31 s 261(1)(a) …. 26.11 s 261(1)(b) …. 4.32 s 261(2) …. 4.32 s 302(1) …. 3.2, 3.51, 3.54, 3.57, 4.13, 4.16, 4.42, 5.7, 5.12, 5.18, 5.20,

18.77 s 302A(1) …. 2.23, 3.7, 5.9 s 302A(1)(a) …. 5.9 s 309 …. 2.21 s 310 …. 2.22 s 311 …. 2.25 s 312 …. 2.30 s 313 …. 2.29 s 314 …. 2.21, 3.53 s 315 …. 2.24 s 316 …. 2.26 s 316(1) …. 4.42 s 317 …. 2.31 s 318(1) …. 2.28 s 318(3) …. 2.28 s 318A(1) …. 2.23 s 318A(2) …. 2.25 s 319 …. 2.1, 3.2 s 319(2)(a) …. 4.29 s 320 …. 4.33 s 321(1) …. 4.60 s 321(2) …. 4.60 s 321(3) …. 4.60 s 321(4) …. 4.60 s 322(1) …. 3.7 s 322(1)(a) …. 4.58

s 322(1)(b) …. 4.58 s 322(1)(c) …. 4.58 s 322(2) …. 3.8 s 322(3) …. 3.11 s 322(4) …. 3.11 s 322(5) …. 5.18 s 323(1) …. 3.51 s 323(2) …. 3.16, 3.52 s 323(3)(a) …. 3.51 s 323(3)(b) …. 3.51 s 323(3)(c)–(e) …. 3.51 s 323(4A) …. 3.51 s 323(4B) …. 3.51 s 323(5) …. 3.51 s 324(1) …. 3.53 s 324(2) …. 3.53 s 324(3) …. 3.53 s 324(4) …. 3.53 s 324(5) …. 3.53 s 325 …. 3.54 s 326 …. 3.6, 4.58 s 327(1) …. 3.8, 3.57 s 327(2) …. 3.57 s 327(3) …. 3.58 s 327(3A) …. 3.58 s 327(4) …. 3.58

s 327(5) …. 3.60 s 328(1) …. 3.16 s 328(1A) …. 3.16 s 328(2) …. 3.16 s 328(4) …. 3.19 s 328(5) …. 3.19 s 328(6) …. 3.19 s 328(7) …. 3.19 s 328(8) …. 3.16 s 328(9A) …. 3.20 s 328(10) …. 3.21 s 328(11) …. 3.21 s 331(1) …. 4.5, 4.21 s 331(2) …. 4.7 s 331(3) …. 4.8 s 331(4) …. 4.6 s 332(1) …. 4.12 s 332(2) …. 4.18 s 332(3) …. 4.18 s 332(4) …. 4.18 s 332(5) …. 4.20 s 332(6A) …. 4.20 s 332(7) …. 4.20 s 332A(1) …. 4.12 s 332A(2) …. 4.12 s 332A(4) …. 4.5

s 332A(5) …. 4.5 s 332A(6) …. 4.29 s 333(1) …. 4.16 s 333(2) …. 4.16 s 334(1) …. 4.17, 4.50 s 336(1) …. 5.5 s 336(3) …. 5.5 s 336(5) …. 5.5 s 337(1) …. 7.52 s 337(2) …. 7.51 s 338(2) …. 7.51 s 338(4) …. 7.51 s 338(5)(b) …. 7.51 s 338A …. 7.51 s 340 …. 7.54 s 341 …. 7.54 s 342(1) …. 7.51 s 343(1) …. 7.51 s 343(2) …. 7.51 s 345(1) …. 23.53 s 345(2) …. 23.53 s 345(4) …. 23.53 s 347 …. 8.7 s 348 …. 23.14 s 348(1) …. 23.53, 23.54, 23.61 s 348(3) …. 23.54

s 348(4) …. 23.54 s 350(1) …. 5.8 s 350(2) …. 5.8 s 350(3) …. 5.13 s 350(3A) …. 5.13 s 350(4) …. 5.10 s 350(5) …. 5.12 s 351(1) …. 5.8 s 351(2) …. 5.13 s 351(2A) …. 5.13 s 351(3) …. 5.10 s 351(4) …. 5.10 s 352(1)–(3) …. 5.8 s 352(4) …. 5.10 s 353(1) …. 15.13, 18.15 s 353(2) …. 15.7 s 353(3) …. 15.7, 15.13, 18.15 s 354 …. 15.13, 18.15 s 355(b) …. 4.1, 5.14 s 357(1) …. 15.13, 18.15 s 357(2) …. 18.15 s 358 …. 15.30 s 359(1) …. 18.15 s 359(2) …. 18.15 s 359(3)(b) …. 5.18 s 361(1) …. 5.18

s 361(2) …. 5.18 s 362 …. 5.20 s 363(1) …. 5.16 s 363(2) …. 5.16 s 364 …. 18.77 s 364(1) …. 16.6 s 364(2) …. 16.7 s 365 …. 15.59, 16.26, 17.55, 18.77 s 366 …. 18.77 s 367(1) …. 5.15 s 368(1) …. 18.32 s 368(2) …. 18.32 s 368(3) …. 18.28, 18.32 s 368(5) …. 18.32 s 369(2A) …. 18.46 s 369(3)(a) …. 5.46 s 369(3)(c) …. 5.46, 18.46 s 369(5) …. 18.46 s 369(7) …. 18.46 s 369(8) …. 18.46 s 369(9) …. 18.46 s 370 …. 5.21, 18.32, 18.67 s 371 …. 18.39 s 372 …. 18.57, 18.69 s 373(1) …. 18.57 s 373(2) …. 18.57

s 373(5) …. 18.57 s 374(1)(a) …. 18.58 s 374(2) …. 18.58 s 375(1) …. 18.58 s 375(2) …. 18.58 s 375(3) …. 18.58 s 375(4) …. 18.58 s 377 …. 18.58 s 378(1) …. 18.58 s 378(3) …. 18.58 s 378(4) …. 18.58 s 379(2) …. 18.59 s 379(3) …. 18.59 s 379(4) …. 18.59 s 379(7) …. 18.59 s 379(8) …. 18.59 s 379(10) …. 18.59 s 380(1) …. 18.58, 18.64 s 381 …. 18.39 s 382 …. 18.58, 18.74 s 384 …. 18.39, 18.58 s 384(1) …. 18.74 s 384(2) …. 18.74 s 384(3) …. 18.74 s 385 …. 18.39, 18.58, 18.74 s 385(1) …. 18.74

s 385(3) …. 18.74 s 385(4) …. 18.74 s 385(5) …. 18.74 s 386(1) …. 18.74 s 386(2) …. 18.74 s 387 …. 18.74 s 389 …. 18.67, 18.74 s 390(1) …. 5.2, 15.27 s 390(4) …. 5.2, 15.31 s 391 …. 15.28 s 393(1) …. 5.23 s 393(2) …. 5.23 s 395A …. 5.7 s 571(2) …. 4.1 s 571(2)(b) …. 26.31 s 728 …. 26.19, 26.28 s 728(1)(a) …. 4.24 Pt 3.2 Div 5 …. 3.57 Pt 3.2 Div 11 …. 18.57, 18.77 Pt 3.2 Div 11 Subdiv 5 …. 5.61 Pt 3.2 Div 11 Subdiv 6 …. 5.61 Pt 7.3 …. 5.5 Sch 5 …. 5.2 Sch 5 cl 1 …. 15.27 Legal Profession Reform Act 1993 …. 2.19 Legal Profession Regulation 2002

cl 45 …. 4.15 cl 45(3) …. 4.17 cl 55 …. 15.13, 18.15 cl 56 …. 15.13 cl 56(1) …. 18.15 cl 56(2) …. 18.15 cl 57 …. 18.46 cl 58(2)(b) …. 15.34 cl 61(2) …. 5.21, 18.67 cl 61(3) …. 5.21 cl 64 …. 18.57 cl 66 …. 18.57 cl 68(1) …. 18.58 cl 70(2) …. 18.58 Legal Profession Regulation 2005 cl 88 …. 4.32 cl 110 …. 2.30 cl 111 …. 4.20 cl 111B …. 4.15, 18.77 cll 112–115 …. 4.42 cl 124 …. 15.13, 18.15 cl 125 …. 15.13 cl 125(1) …. 18.15 cl 125(2) …. 18.15 cl 126 …. 18.46 cl 127(b) …. 15.34

cl 128(1) …. 5.21, 18.67 cl 128(2) …. 5.21 cl 131 …. 18.57 cl 132 …. 18.57 cl 134(1) …. 18.58 cl 137(2) …. 18.58 Legal Services Commission Act 1979 s 47 …. 22.65 Limitation Act 1969 s 14 …. 3.18 s 16 …. 3.18 Local Court Act 2007 s 29(2) …. 12.6 Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act 1993 s 4 …. 3.44 s 6 …. 3.44 Medical Practice Act 1992 s 161 …. 16.13 Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 s 19 …. 25.2 Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 s 19 …. 25.2 Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 1995 r 1.3 …. 2.30 r 2.1 …. 2.30 r 5.1 …. 4.46

r 5.2 …. 4.48 r 5.3 …. 4.48 r 6A …. 2.37 r 7 …. 4.41 r 8.3 …. 26.14 r 11.1 …. 2.36 r 29.3 …. 26.14 r 29.4 …. 26.18 r 29.5 …. 26.18 Property (Relationships) Act 1984 …. 7.48, 8.79 s 20 …. 12.6 s 27 …. 12.6 Retail Leases Act 1994 …. 8.90 Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 s 67(8) …. 6.13 Succession Act 2006 ss 18–26 …. 10.30 s 99(1) …. 10.32 Pt 3.2 …. 10.31 Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 …. 21.1, 21.18, 21.29 s 2(1) …. 21.17, 21.18, 21.22, 21.23, 21.25, 21.61 s 6 …. 21.1, 21.22 s 6(1) …. 21.21 s 6(1A) …. 21.21 s 6(1AA) …. 21.21 s 6(1B) …. 21.22

s 6(2) …. 21.22, 21.25 s 6(2)(a) …. 21.25 s 6(2)(b) …. 21.22, 21.25 s 6(2A) …. 21.26 s 6(2B) …. 21.26 s 6(3) …. 21.27 s 6(4)(a)(i)–(iv) …. 21.28, 21.35 s 6(4)(a)(v) …. 21.28 s 6(4)(a)(vi) …. 21.28 s 6(4)(b) …. 21.28, 21.35 s 6(5) …. 21.50 s 6(5A) …. 21.61 s 6(7)(a) …. 21.60 s 6(7)(b) …. 21.60 s 6(7)(c) …. 21.60 s 6A …. 21.21 s 6A(1)(a) …. 21.29 s 6A(1)(a1) …. 21.29 s 6A(1)(b) …. 21.29 s 6A(1)(c) …. 21.29 s 6A(1A) …. 21.32 s 6A(1B) …. 21.33 s 6A(2) …. 21.33 s 6A(2)(a) …. 21.60 s 6A(2)(b) …. 21.60 s 6A(2)(c) …. 21.60

s 6B …. 21.21 s 6B(1) …. 21.35 s 6B(1)(a) …. 21.36 s 6B(1)(b) …. 21.35, 21.36 s 6B(1)(i) …. 21.36 s 6B(1)(ii) …. 21.36 s 6B(2) …. 21.35 s 6B(3) …. 21.50 s 6B(4) …. 21.35 s 6B(4A) …. 21.35 s 6B(5A) …. 21.35 s 6B(6)(a) …. 21.60 s 6B(6)(b) …. 21.60 s 6B(6)(c) …. 21.60 s 6C …. 21.62 s 6D …. 21.22 Supreme Court Act 1970 s 19(1) …. 7.32, 19.23 s 23 …. 11.41, 28.7 s 46A …. 21.29 s 76 …. 7.32 s 76(1)(a) …. 6.7, 6.14, 19.23 s 76(1)(b) …. 6.14, 19.23, 22.6 s 76(1)(c) …. 16.6 s 76C(1) …. 23.44, 23.64 s 76C(1)(a) …. 23.43

s 76C(1)(b) …. 23.43 s 76C(1)(c) …. 23.43 s 76C(2) …. 23.66 s 76C(3) …. 23.68 s 78 …. 11.32 s 95(3) …. 19.14, 19.23 s 95(4) …. 19.14 s 101(2)(c) …. 20.36 Supreme Court Rules 1970 Pt 15 r 24(1) …. 13.35 Pt 20 r 10(1) …. 6.21 Pt 21 r 8 …. 14.60 Pt 22 r 3(1)–(3) …. 13.5 Pt 22 r 3(5) …. 13.5 Pt 22 r 3(6) …. 13.5 Pt 22 r 3(8) …. 13.5 Pt 22 r 6 …. 13.5 Pt 22 r 7(1) …. 13.5 Pt 22 r 7(2) …. 13.5 Pt 22 r 7(3) …. 13.5 Pt 40 r 3(4) …. 19.14 Pt 40 r 3(5) …. 19.14 Pt 40 r 8 …. 14.59 Pt 52 r 23(2) …. 7.32 Pt 52 r 67 …. 7.25 Pt 52A …. 7.32

Pt 52A r 4 …. 22.9 Pt 52A r 4(5)(a) …. 22.10 Pt 52A r 5 …. 14.2 Pt 52A r 6(1) …. 15.9 Pt 52A r 6(2) …. 15.9 Pt 52A r 7 …. 14.32, 20.12 Pt 52A r 8 …. 14.1 Pt 52A r 9 …. 14.45 Pt 52A r 11 …. 7.4 Pt 52A r 15 …. 14.36 Pt 52A r 16 …. 14.28 Pt 52A r 17 …. 14.42 Pt 52A r 18 …. 13.35 Pt 52A r 19 …. 14.31 Pt 52A r 20 …. 14.31 Pt 52A r 21 …. 14.59 Pt 52A r 22(1) …. 14.72 Pt 52A r 22(4) …. 13.14, 13.90 Pt 52A r 22(5) …. 13.14 Pt 52A r 22(6) …. 13.19 Pt 52A r 22(7) …. 13.19 Pt 52A r 22(8) …. 13.13 Pt 52A r 22(9) …. 13.13 Pt 52A r 22(10) …. 13.13, 13.19 Pt 52A r 22(11) …. 13.14, 13.19 Pt 52A r 25 …. 8.49

Pt 52A r 27 …. 14.25 Pt 52A r 32 …. 16.6, 16.43 Pt 52A r 33 …. 12.6 Pt 52A r 34(a)–(c) …. 12.6 Pt 52A r 35(1) …. 12.6 Pt 52A r 35A(1) …. 7.42 Pt 52A r 35A(2) …. 7.47 Pt 52A r 35A(4) …. 7.47 Pt 52A r 37(a) …. 16.33 Pt 52A r 37(b) …. 16.6, 16.23 Pt 52A r 41 …. 22.68 Pt 52A r 42(2) …. 10.1, 10.4 Pt 52A r 43 …. 22.10 Pt 52A r 43(1) …. 23.7, 23.58, 23.68 Pt 52A r 43(1)(a) …. 23.43 Pt 52A r 43(1)(b) …. 23.43 Pt 52A r 43(1)(c) …. 23.43 Pt 52A r 43(2) …. 23.48 Pt 52A r 43(3) …. 23.66 Pt 52A r 43(4) …. 23.68 Pt 52A r 43(5) …. 23.69 Pt 52A r 43A …. 22.10 Pt 52A r 43A(1) …. 23.7, 23.58 Pt 52A r 43A(1)(a) …. 23.43 Pt 52A r 43A(1)(b) …. 23.43 Pt 52A r 43A(1)(c) …. 23.43

Pt 52A r 43A(2) …. 23.48 Pt 52A r 43A(3) …. 23.66 Pt 52A r 43A(4) …. 23.68 Pt 52A r 43A(5) …. 23.69 Pt 52A r 44 …. 23.68 Pt 52A r 46(1) …. 18.32, 18.46 Pt 53 r 2 …. 28.7 Pt 53 r 2(1) …. 28.12, 28.27 Pt 52 r 2(1)(a) …. 29.66, 29.70 Pt 53 r 2(1)(b) …. 29.32 Pt 53 r 2(1)(c) …. 29.80 Pt 53 r 2(1)(e) …. 29.18 Pt 53 r 2(1)(d) …. 29.80 Pt 53 r 2(2) …. 28.12 Pt 53 r 3(1) …. 28.31 Pt 53 r 3(2) …. 28.31 Pt 53 r 4 …. 28.29 Pt 53 r 5 …. 28.12, 28.16 Pt 63 …. 22.68 Sch G, Table 1, Appendix A, cl 41 …. 15.81 Trustee Act 1925 s 93 …. 10.9, 10.12 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 …. 14.42 r 1.12 …. 18.27 r 12.1 …. 14.59 r 12.4 …. 14.60

r 14.25(1) …. 13.35 r 17.13 …. 14.31 r 17.14 …. 14.31 r 25.17(1) …. 14.25 r 25.24(1) …. 14.25 r 20.26(2) …. 13.10, 13.57 r 20.26(2)–(4) …. 13.5 r 20.26(6)–(8) …. 13.5 r 20.26(6) …. 13.31 r 20.26(7) …. 13.30, 13.31 r 20.26(9) …. 13.5 r 20.26(11) …. 13.5 r 20.30(1) …. 13.5 r 20.30(2) …. 13.5 r 20.30(3) …. 13.5 r 20.27 …. 13.5 r 36.7(1) …. 19.14 r 36.17 …. 6.21 r 42 …. 7.32 r 42.1 …. 7.4, 9.4 r 42.2 …. 16.6, 16.43 r 42.3 …. 22.9, 22.68 r 42.4(1) …. 7.42 r 42.4(2) …. 7.47 r 42.4(4) …. 7.47 r 42.5(a) …. 16.33

r 42.5(b) …. 16.6, 16.23 r 42.6 …. 14.36 r 42.7 …. 14.28 r 42.7(1) …. 1.20 r 42.7(2) …. 14.45 r 42.8 …. 14.31 r 42.9 …. 14.31 r 42.10 …. 8.49 r 42.11(1) …. 14.25 r 42.13A …. 14.72 r 42.14 …. 13.14, 13.90 r 42.14(2)(b) …. 13.14 r 42.15 …. 13.19 r 42.15A …. 13.7, 13.23 r 42.16(1) …. 13.13 r 42.16(2) …. 13.13 r 42.17(1) …. 13.13, 13.19 r 42.17(4) …. 13.14, 13.19 r 42.19(2) …. 14.59 r 42.20(1) …. 14.59, 14.63 r 42.21 …. 28.6 r 42.21(1) …. 28.12, 28.27 r 42.21(1)(a) …. 29.66, 29.70 r 42.21(1)(b) …. 29.80 r 42.21(1)(c) …. 29.80 r 42.21(1)(d) …. 29.18

r 42.21(1)(e) …. 29.32 r 42.21(2) …. 28.31 r 42.21(3) …. 28.29 r 42.21(4) …. 28.12, 28.16 r 42.22 …. 13.35 r 42.24 …. 22.68 r 42.25(2) …. 10.1, 10.4 r 42.30(1) …. 12.6 r 42.30(2) …. 12.6 r 42.30(3) …. 12.6 r 42.31(1) …. 18.32, 18.46 r 42.34 …. 12.6 r 42.35 …. 12.6 r 50.2 …. 18.74 r 50.3(1)(a) …. 18.74 r 50.3(1)(c) …. 18.74 r 50.8 …. 29.107 r 50.12(1)(a) …. 18.74 r 50.12(1)(c) …. 18.74 r 51.48 …. 13.87 r 51.49 …. 13.90 r 51.50 …. 29.107 Pt 7 Div 4 …. 22.68 Pt 43 …. 10.2 Sch 5 …. 19.14 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 16) 2007 …. 13.87,

13.90 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 32) 2010 …. 22.9 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 36) 2010 …. 12.6 Workers’ Compensation Act 1926 s 56(2) …. 26.29, 27.30 Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 s 112 …. 20.2 s 112(5) …. 20.2

NORTHERN TERRITORY Barristers’ Conduct Rules r 74 …. 4.57 r 75 …. 4.57 r 80 …. 4.57 Criminal Code s 424 …. 24.8, 24.61 Crown Proceedings Act 1993 s 5 …. 24.4 De Facto Relationships Act 1991 …. 8.79 Defamation Act 2006 s 37 …. 8.40 s 37(2) …. 13.48 Electronic Transactions (Northern Territory) Act 2000 s 9 …. 4.19 Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 s 131(1) …. 13.64

s 131(2)(h) …. 13.64 s 131(5)(b) …. 13.2 Family Provision Act 1970 …. 10.31 Interpretation Act 1978 s 25 …. 4.20 Juries Act 1962 s 6A …. 8.40, 12.22 Justices Act 1928 s 77 …. 24.61 s 77(1) …. 24.28, 24.52 s 77(2) …. 24.28 s 77A …. 24.28 s 77B …. 24.28 s 77C …. 24.28, 24.52, 24.54 s 177(2)(e) …. 24.61 Lands, Planning and Mining Tribunal Act 1998 s 11(1) …. 7.26 s 18 …. 7.26 Legal Aid Act 1990 s 33 …. 8.69, 22.65, 23.38 Legal Practitioners Act 1974 s 22(4) …. 17.19 s 68 …. 4.32 s 118B(1) …. 2.21 s 118B(2) …. 2.21 s 118B(3) …. 2.26

s 118B(5) …. 2.30 s 119(1) …. 4.5 s 119(2) …. 4.5 s 119(4) …. 4.5 s 119(5)(b) …. 4.5 s 119(5)(c) …. 4.8 s 119(6) …. 4.7 s 120 …. 5.8 s 120(2) …. 5.13 s 120(3) …. 5.13 s 123(2) …. 5.20 s 123(4) …. 5.57 s 124 …. 5.46 s 126 …. 5.62 s 127 …. 5.14 s 129(1) …. 5.18 s 129(2) …. 3.7 s 129(3) …. 3.8 s 129(4) …. 3.8 s 130 …. 3.19 s 130(1) …. 3.16 s 134G …. 17.19 s 140 …. 4.20 Legal Profession Act 2006 s 4 …. 3.6, 4.4, 5.3, 5.41 s 80 …. 17.19

s 235(1) …. 4.31 s 254(1)(b) …. 4.32 s 254(2) …. 4.32 s 295(1) …. 1.5, 3.2, 3.51, 3.54, 3.57, 4.13, 4.16, 4.42, 5.7, 5.12, 5.18, 5.20 s 296(1) …. 2.23, 3.7, 5.9 s 296(1)(a) …. 5.9 s 303 …. 2.21 s 304 …. 2.22 s 305 …. 2.25 s 306 …. 2.30 s 307 …. 2.29 s 308 …. 2.21, 3.53 s 309 …. 2.24 s 310 …. 2.26 s 311 …. 2.31 s 312(1) …. 2.28 s 312(3) …. 2.28 s 313(1) …. 2.23 s 313(2) …. 2.25 s 314 …. 2.1, 3.2, 4.42 s 315 …. 4.33 s 316(1) …. 4.60 s 316(2) …. 4.60 s 316(3) …. 4.60 s 316(4) …. 4.60

s 317(1) …. 3.7 s 317(1)(a) …. 4.58 s 317(1)(b) …. 4.58 s 317(1)(c) …. 4.58 s 317(2) …. 3.8 s 317(3) …. 3.11 s 317(4) …. 3.11 s 317(5) …. 5.18 s 318(1) …. 3.51 s 318(2) …. 3.52 s 318(2)(c) …. 3.52 s 318(3)(a) …. 3.51 s 318(3)(b) …. 3.51 s 318(3)(c)–(e) …. 3.51 s 318(4) …. 3.51 s 318(5) …. 3.51 s 318(6) …. 3.51 s 319(1) …. 3.53 s 319(2) …. 3.53 s 319(3) …. 3.53 s 319(4) …. 3.53 s 320 …. 3.54 s 321 …. 3.6, 4.58 s 322(1) …. 3.8, 3.57 s 322(2) …. 3.57 s 322(3) …. 3.58

s 322(4) …. 3.58 s 322(5) …. 3.58 s 322(6) …. 3.60 s 323(2) …. 3.16 s 323(4) …. 3.19 s 323(5) …. 3.19 s 323(6) …. 3.19 s 323(7) …. 3.19 s 323(8) …. 3.16 s 323(10) …. 3.20 s 324(1) …. 4.5, 4.21 s 324(2) …. 4.7 s 324(3) …. 4.8 s 324(4) …. 4.6 s 325(1) …. 4.12 s 325(2) …. 4.18 s 325(3) …. 4.18 s 325(4) …. 4.18 s 325(5) …. 4.20 s 325(7) …. 4.20 s 325(8) …. 4.20 s 326(1) …. 4.16 s 327(1) …. 4.12 s 327(2) …. 4.12 s 327(4) …. 4.5 s 327(5) …. 4.5

s 327(6) …. 4.29 s 328(1) …. 4.50 s 330(1) …. 5.5 s 330(3) …. 5.5 s 330(5) …. 5.5 s 332(1) …. 5.8 s 332(2) …. 5.8 s 332(3) …. 5.13 s 332(4) …. 5.13 s 332(5) …. 5.10 s 332(6) …. 5.12 s 333(1) …. 5.8 s 333(2) …. 5.13 s 333(3) …. 5.13 s 333(4) …. 5.10 s 333(5) …. 5.10 s 334(1)–(3) …. 5.8 s 334(4) …. 5.10 s 336(b) …. 4.1, 5.14 s 339(1) …. 5.18 s 339(2) …. 5.18 s 340 …. 5.20 s 341(1) …. 5.16 s 341(2) …. 5.16 s 343 …. 5.7 s 368(3) …. 18.32

s 344(1) …. 5.15 s 344(1A) …. 5.15 s 350(3) …. 5.46 ss 351–361 …. 5.62 s 352(1) …. 5.62 s 352(1)(a) …. 3.21 s 352(2) …. 5.62 s 354(1) …. 5.62 s 354(3) …. 5.62 s 354(4) …. 5.62 s 358(4) …. 5.62 s 362 …. 5.62 s 363 …. 5.62 s 366 …. 5.2 s 366(8) …. 5.2 s 370(1) …. 5.23 s 370(2) …. 5.23 s 534(2) …. 4.1 Pt 3.3 Div 5 …. 3.57 Pt 3.3 Div 8 Subdiv 5 …. 5.62 Pt 7.5 …. 5.5 Legal Profession Regulation 2007 reg 80C …. 2.30 reg 80D …. 4.60 reg 80F …. 3.52 Limitation Act 1981

s 12(1)(a) …. 3.18 s 14 …. 3.18 Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 s 18 …. 7.57 s 20(1)–(4) …. 7.57 s 20(4) …. 7.57 s 20(7) …. 7.58 Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice r 5.1 …. 4.46 r 5.2 …. 4.48 r 5.3 …. 4.48 r 9.1 …. 2.36 r 30.3 …. 4.56 r 30.5 …. 4.56 Supreme Court Act 1979 s 9(1) …. 19.15 s 85 …. 19.15 Supreme Court Rules 1987 r 3.02 …. 18.27 r 9(1) …. 2.36 r 11.01 …. 11.32 r 13.01(1) …. 18.83 r 13.14 …. 12.7 rr 18.01–18.04 …. 11.59 r 25.05 …. 14.59 r 25.07 …. 14.60

r 26.02 …. 13.5, 13.16 r 26.03(1)–(3) …. 13.5 r 26.03(1) …. 13.30 r 26.03(3) …. 13.31 r 26.03(4) …. 13.5 r 26.03(5) …. 13.5 r 26.03(6) …. 13.5 r 26.03(7) …. 14.72 r 26.03(8) …. 13.10, 14.72 r 26.04 …. 13.5 r 26.05(1) …. 13.5 r 26.05(2) …. 13.5 r 26.05(3) …. 13.5 r 26.08(2) …. 13.16 r 26.08(3) …. 13.19 r 26.08(4) …. 13.19 r 26.08(5) …. 13.13 r 26.08(6) …. 13.13 r 26.08(7) …. 13.13, 13.19 r 26.10(1) …. 11.10 r 26.10(2) …. 11.10 r 26.11(1) …. 13.16 r 26.11(2) …. 13.16 r 26.11(3) …. 13.16 r 26.12 …. 13.34 r 26.25(1) …. 13.34

r 26.25(2) …. 13.34 r 26.26(1) …. 14.73 r 26.26(3) …. 14.73 r 26.26(5) …. 13.35 r 26.26(6) …. 13.35 r 35.03(2) …. 14.31 r 36.07 …. 6.21 r 37A.08(1) …. 14.25 r 37B.07(1) …. 14.25 r 48.13 …. 8.51 r 59.02 …. 19.15 r 59.02(1) …. 19.15 r 59.02(3) …. 19.15 r 59.02(5) …. 19.15 r 63.01(1) …. 1.6, 16.33, 23.43 r 63.01(2)(a) …. 16.33 r 63.02(2) …. 1.16, 1.23, 1.24, 1.25, 14.24, 15.9, 20.12 r 63.03(1) …. 6.7, 10.32, 24.8 r 63.03(2) …. 6.7, 12.7, 15.30 r 63.04(1) …. 14.2 r 63.04(2) …. 14.45 r 63.04(3) …. 14.52 r 63.04(4) …. 14.52 r 63.04(5) …. 20.12 r 63.05 …. 8.12 r 63.06 …. 15.27

r 63.07 …. 15.9 r 63.09 …. 14.32, 20.12 r 63.10 …. 15.12 r 63.11 …. 19.15 r 63.11(1) …. 14.36 r 63.11(5) …. 14.42 r 63.11(6) …. 14.59 r 63.11(7) …. 14.36 r 63.11(8) …. 14.38 r 63.11(9) …. 14.42, 14.59 r 63.12(1) …. 15.12 r 63.12(2) …. 15.12 r 63.14 …. 14.1 r 63.16 …. 14.31 r 63.17 …. 14.25 r 63.18 …. 14.53, 14.29 r 63.19 …. 10.46 r 63.20(1) …. 1.17, 14.30 r 63.20(2) …. 1.17, 14.30 r 63.21(1) …. 23.7, 23.44, 23.58, 23.65 r 63.21(1)(a) …. 23.43 r 63.21(1)(b) …. 23.43 r 63.21(1)(c) …. 23.43 r 63.21(1)(d) …. 23.43 r 63.21(2) …. 23.48 r 63.21(3) …. 23.68

r 63.21(4) …. 23.66 r 63.21(5) …. 23.66 r 63.21(6) …. 23.68 r 63.22(1) …. 12.7 r 63.22(2) …. 12.7 r 63.25 …. 16.8 r 63.26 …. 10.44, 16.8 r 63.27 …. 16.8, 16.23 r 63.28 …. 16.8, 16.43 r 63.29(1) …. 16.45 r 63.29(2) …. 16.33 r 63.30 …. 16.33 r 63.32(1) …. 15.65 r 63.32(3) …. 17.28, 17.29, 17.40 r 63.33 …. 15.30 r 63.34(2) …. 18.47 r 63.34(3) …. 18.47 r 63.34(4) …. 18.47 r 63.34(5) …. 18.50 r 63.34(6) …. 18.47 r 63.34(7) …. 18.47 r 63.35(2) …. 5.16, 5.58, 5.62 r 63.36(1) …. 18.16 r 63.36(2) …. 18.16 r 63.36(3) …. 18.16 r 63.36(4) …. 18.16

r 63.37(1) …. 18.16 r 63.38 …. 18.16, 18.47 r 63.39 …. 18.16 r 63.40 …. 18.16 r 63.40(2) …. 18.83 r 63.40(6) …. 18.83 r 63.40(7) …. 18.83 r 63.40(8) …. 18.83 r 63.41(1) …. 18.84 r 63.41(2) …. 18.84 r 63.42 …. 18.84 r 63.42(1) …. 17.18, 18.82 r 63.42(1)(b) …. 17.20 r 63.43 …. 5.58, 18.90 r 63.44(a) …. 18.16 r 63.45(1) …. 18.16 r 63.45(2) …. 18.16 r 63.45(3) …. 18.16 r 63.45(4) …. 18.16 r 63.45(5) …. 18.16 r 63.45(6) …. 18.16 r 63.45(7) …. 18.16 r 63.45(8) …. 18.47 r 63.45(9) …. 18.47 r 63.46(2) …. 15.59 r 63.47 …. 18.16

r 63.49 …. 15.31 r 63.51(1) …. 18.25 r 63.51(2) …. 18.25 r 63.52(1) …. 18.26 r 63.52(2) …. 18.26 r 63.53(1) …. 8.14 r 63.54(1) …. 18.33 r 63.54(2) …. 18.33 r 63.54(3) …. 15.12, 18.33 r 63.54(5) …. 18.33 r 63.54(6) …. 18.39 r 63.54(7) …. 18.33 r 63.55(1)–(3) …. 18.60 r 63.55(4) …. 18.60 r 63.55(5) …. 18.60 r 63.55(6) …. 18.60 r 63.55(7) …. 18.60 r 63.55(8) …. 18.60, 18.64 r 63.55(9) …. 18.60 r 63.55(11)–(13) …. 18.73 r 63.55(14) …. 18.60 r 63.55(15) …. 18.73 r 63.55(16) …. 18.73 r 63.55(17) …. 18.73 r 63.55(17)(c) …. 18.69 r 63.55(18) …. 18.73

r 63.59(2) …. 5.26 r 63.60 …. 5.20 r 63.65 …. 19.15 r 63.66 …. 15.65 r 63.68 …. 18.82, 18.84 r 63.70 …. 17.37 r 63.71 …. 17.8 r 63.72(1) …. 17.52 r 63.72(3) …. 17.57, 17.70 r 63.72(4) …. 17.61 r 63.72(5) …. 17.63 r 63.72(8) …. 17.53 r 63.72(9)(b) …. 17.74 r 63.72(10) …. 17.15 r 63.73(1) …. 17.57 r 63.73(2) …. 17.57 r 63.73(3) …. 17.57 r 63.73(4) …. 17.57 r 63.73(5) …. 17.58 r 63.74 …. 19.15 r 63.74(1) …. 19.15 r 63.74(2) …. 19.15 r 75.14 …. 8.67, 16.68 r 84.15 …. 14.61 Form 63A …. 18.16 O 15 …. 22.68

O 50 …. 23.66 O 63 …. 6.7, 15.30 Appendix to O 63, Pt 1 …. 15.65 Appendix to O 63, Pt 1 item 2 …. 15.65 Appendix to O 63, Pt 2 …. 15.65 Appendix to O 63, Pt 2 items 1–3 …. 15.65 Appendix to O 63, Pt 2 item 5 …. 15.65 Appendix to O 63, Pt 2 rr 4, 5 …. 15.81 Appendix to O 63, Pt 3 …. 15.65 Appendix to O 63, Pt 3 items 1–6 …. 15.65 Appendix to O 63, Pt 3 item 2 …. 15.65 Appendix to O 63, Pt 3 item 3 …. 15.65 Appendix to O 63, Pt 3 item 4 …. 15.65 Appendix to O 63, Pt 3 item 6 …. 17.27 Appendix to O 63, Pt 3 items 7–13 …. 15.65 Appendix to O 63, Pt 4 …. 15.65 Trustee Act 1893 s 41 …. 10.12 Wills Act 2000 ss 19–26 …. 10.30

QUEENSLAND Acts Interpretation Act 1954 s 39(1) …. 4.20 s 39(2) …. 4.20 s 39A …. 4.20

Appeal Costs Fund Act 1973 …. 21.1 s 4 …. 21.17, 21.20, 21.21, 21.23, 21.37, 21.40 s 6 …. 21.23 ss 7–9 …. 21.23 s 15 …. 21.46 s 15(1) …. 21.21 s 15(2) …. 21.21 s 16(1) …. 21.23 s 16(1)(a) …. 21.23 s 16(2) …. 21.25 s 16(3) …. 21.25, 21.26 s 17 …. 21.37 s 18(1) …. 21.37 s 18(2) …. 21.37 s 19 …. 21.27, 21.40 s 20(1) …. 21.28 s 20(2) …. 21.40 s 20(3) …. 21.28 s 20(4) …. 21.28 s 20(5) …. 21.37 s 21(1) …. 21.50 s 21(3) …. 21.60 s 22(1)(a) …. 21.29 s 22(1)(b) …. 21.29 s 22(1)(c) …. 21.29 s 22(2) …. 21.33, 21.60

s 22(3) …. 21.29 s 22A …. 21.46 s 23(1) …. 21.35 s 23(1)(a)–(c) …. 21.38 s 23(2) …. 21.38 s 23(2)(a) …. 21.36 s 23(2)(b) …. 21.36 s 23(2)(c) …. 21.36 s 23(3) …. 21.38 s 23(4) …. 21.60 s 24(1) …. 21.41 s 24(2)(a) …. 21.42 s 24(2)(b) …. 21.42 s 24(2)(c) …. 21.42 Appeal Costs Fund Regulation 2010 s 14(1) …. 21.25, 21.26 s 14(2) …. 21.37 s 14(3) …. 21.47 s 14(4) …. 21.47 s 14(5) …. 21.36 s 14(6) …. 21.42 s 20E(2) …. 21.47 Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules r 12.4.1 …. 2.36 r 13.1 …. 4.46 r 13.2 …. 4.48

r 13.3 …. 4.48 r 14.1 …. 26.14 Barristers’ Rules r 15 …. 4.57 r 17 …. 4.57 r 121 …. 3.53 Civil Proceedings Act 2011 s 5 …. 6.7 s 15 …. 6.7, 24.8 s 19 …. 10.2 s 43 …. 8.51 s 58 …. 19.16 s 58(1) …. 19.16 s 58(3) …. 19.16 s 58 …. 19.16 s 59(1) …. 19.16 s 59(3) …. 19.16 s 59(4) …. 19.16 s 59(4)(b) …. 19.16 s 77(1) …. 15.28 Common Law Practice Act 1867 s 73 …. 19.16 Criminal Code …. 24.8 s 304A …. 24.71 s 660(1) …. 24.19 s 660(3) …. 24.19

s 660(4) …. 24.19 s 662(1) …. 24.19 s 662(2) …. 24.19 s 669A(2)(b) …. 21.46 s 671F(1) …. 24.62 s 687 …. 24.20 s 694 …. 24.20 Criminal Code and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2011 …. 21.47 s 20B …. 21.47 s 20C …. 21.47 s 20C(2) …. 21.47 s 20D …. 21.47 s 20E …. 21.47 Crown Proceedings Act 1980 s 9 …. 24.4 Defamation Act 2005 s 21(1) …. 8.40 s 22(3) …. 12.22 s 40 …. 8.40 s 40(2) …. 13.48 District Court of Queensland Act 1967 s 118B(1) …. 20.36, 20.37, 20.45 s 118B(2) …. 20.40 Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001 s 14 …. 4.19 s 15 …. 4.19

Integrated Planning Act 1997 s 4.1.23(1) …. 8.69 s 4.1.23(2) …. 8.69 s 4.1.23(2)(b) …. 8.69 Judicature Act 1876 …. 11.13, 22.7 s 9 …. 20.36 Judicial Review Act 1991 s 49 …. 9.34 s 51(1) …. 11.40 s 51(2) …. 11.42 Justices Act 1886 s 4 …. 24.29 s 88(1) …. 6.9 s 88(3) …. 6.9 s 157 …. 24.29, 24.52 s 158 …. 24.52 s 158(1) …. 24.29 s 158(2) …. 24.30 s 158A …. 24.29, 24.39 s 158A(1) …. 24.29 s 158A …. 24.54 s 158A(2) …. 24.29 s 158A(3) …. 24.30 s 158A(4) …. 24.30 s 158A(5) …. 24.30 s 158A(6) …. 24.30

s 158B …. 24.31 s 158B(1) …. 24.31 s 158B(2) …. 24.31 s 159 …. 24.52 s 226 …. 24.62 s 232(4) …. 24.62 Legal Aid Queensland Act 1997 s 32 …. 8.69, 22.65, 23.38 Legal Practitioners Act 1995 s 13 …. 21.17 Legal Profession Act 2007 s 75 …. 17.19 s 209(3) …. 17.19 s 237(1) …. 4.31 s 258(1)(b) …. 4.32 s 258(2) …. 4.32 s 300 …. 2.28, 3.51, 4.13, 4.16, 5.2, 5.7, 5.12, 5.18 s 301(1) …. 2.23, 3.7, 5.8 s 308 …. 2.21 s 309 …. 2.22 s 310 …. 2.25 s 311 …. 2.30 s 312 …. 2.29 s 313 …. 2.21, 3.53 s 314 …. 2.24 s 315 …. 2.26

s 316 …. 2.31 s 317(1) …. 2.28 s 317(3) …. 2.28 s 317(5) …. 2.28 s 318(1) …. 2.23 s 318(2) …. 2.25 s 319 …. 2.1, 3.2 s 320 …. 4.33 s 321(1)(a) …. 4.60 s 321(1)(b) …. 4.60 s 321(3) …. 4.60 s 322(1) …. 3.7 s 322(1)(a) …. 4.58 s 322(1)(b) …. 4.58 s 322(1)(c) …. 4.58 s 322(2) …. 3.8 s 322(3) …. 3.11 s 322(4) …. 3.11 s 322(5) …. 5.18 s 323(1) …. 3.51 s 323(2) …. 3.52 s 323(3)(a) …. 3.51 s 323(3)(b) …. 3.51 s 323(3)(c)–(e) …. 3.51 s 323(4) …. 3.51 s 323(5) …. 3.51

s 324(1) …. 3.53 s 324(2) …. 3.53 s 324(3) …. 3.53 s 324(4) …. 3.53, 3.59 s 324(5) …. 3.59 s 325 …. 3.54 s 326 …. 3.6, 4.58 s 327(1) …. 3.8, 3.57 s 327(2) …. 3.57 s 327(3) …. 3.58 s 327(4) …. 3.58 s 327(5) …. 3.58 s 327(6) …. 3.60 s 328(1) …. 3.16 s 328(2) …. 3.16 s 328(4) …. 3.19 s 328(5) …. 3.19 s 328(5)(a) …. 3.19 s 328(5)(b) …. 3.19 s 328(6) …. 3.19 s 328(7) …. 3.19 s 328(8) …. 3.16 s 329(1) …. 4.5, 4.21 s 329(2) …. 4.7 s 329(3) …. 4.8 s 329(4) …. 4.6

s 330(1) …. 4.12 s 330(2) …. 4.18 s 330(3) …. 4.18 s 330(4) …. 4.18 s 330(5) …. 4.20 s 330(7) …. 4.20 s 330(8) …. 4.20 s 331(1) …. 4.16 s 332(1) …. 4.12 s 332(2) …. 4.12 s 332(4) …. 4.5 s 332(5) …. 4.5 s 332(6) …. 4.29 s 333(1) …. 4.17, 4.50 s 333(2) …. 5.11 s 335(1) …. 5.8 s 335(2) …. 5.8 s 335(3) …. 5.13 s 335(4) …. 5.13 s 335(5) …. 5.10, 5.11 s 335(6) …. 5.12 s 336(1) …. 5.8 s 336(2) …. 5.13 s 336(3) …. 5.13 s 336(4) …. 5.10 s 336(5) …. 5.10

s 337(4) …. 5.10 s 337(1)–(3) …. 5.8 s 338(b) …. 4.1, 5.14 s 340(1) …. 5.18 s 340(2) …. 5.18 s 341(1) …. 5.16 s 341(2) …. 5.16 s 342(2) …. 5.46 s 343(2) …. 5.23 s 343(3) …. 5.23 s 344 …. 5.7 ss 345–347 …. 3.49, 4.43 s 346 …. 3.6, 4.43 s 347 …. 1.8 s 347(1) …. 4.43 s 347(2)–(4) …. 4.43 s 464 …. 4.1 s 440 …. 5.6 Pt 3.4 Div 5 …. 3.57 Pt 3.4 Div 8 …. 3.49, 4.43 Pt 4. 5 …. 5.6 Legal Profession Regulation 2007 s 58 …. 4.32 s 738 …. 5.21 s 743I …. 5.21 Limitation of Actions Act 1974

s 10 …. 3.18 Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 s 41(7) …. 15.37 s 55F …. 7.55 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 s 15AA …. 21.47 Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 …. 7.56 s 39 …. 7.55 s 56(1) …. 7.55 s 56(2) …. 7.55 s 56(3) …. 7.55 s 56(6) …. 7.58 Property Law Act 1974 s 341 …. 8.79 Pt 19 …. 8.79 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 s 100 …. 8.89 ss 102–107 …. 8.89 Queensland Law Society Act 1948 s 48IC …. 1.8 Queensland Law Society Act 1952 s 6ZA …. 5.8, 5.18 s 6ZB …. 5.43 s 6ZD …. 5.46 s 6ZF …. 5.61 s 48 …. 2.4, 2.21

s 48(1) …. 2.4 s 48(2) …. 3.7, 3.8 s 48(2)(a) …. 2.4 s 48B …. 3.8 s 48D …. 3.54 s 48E …. 3.54 s 48F …. 3.57 s 48F(1) …. 2.4, 3.8 s 481A …. 4.43 ss 48IA–48IC …. 4.43 s 48IC(1) …. 4.43 s 48IC(2)–(4) …. 4.43 s 48J …. 4.5 s 48J(1) …. 4.20 s 48K …. 5.8 Pt 4B Div 2A …. 4.43 Queensland Law Society Rules 1987 s 84 …. 4.8 Succession Act 1981 ss 21–28 …. 10.30 Pt 4 …. 10.31 Supreme Court Act 1995 s 48 …. 19.16 s 48(2)(b) …. 19.16 s 209(2) …. 17.19 s 221 …. 6.7

s 253 …. 20.36 Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 r 13(1) …. 4.46 r 13(2) …. 4.48 r 13(3) …. 4.48 Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 …. 19.16 s 64(1) …. 20.36, 20.37, 20.45 s 64(2) …. 20.40 Supreme Court Rules 1900 O 26 r 2(1) …. 13.5 O 26 r 9(1) …. 13.91 O 26 r 9(2) …. 13.91 O 91 r 1 …. 8.22, 22.7 O 91 r 2 …. 12.8 O 91 r 3 …. 8.11 O 91 r 11 …. 8.17 O 91 r 89 …. 18.12 O 91 r 117 …. 18.71 Trusts Act 1973 s 100 …. 10.9, 10.12 s 101(1) …. 10.10 Uniform Civil Procedure Amendment Rule (No 4) 2007 …. 15.27, 18.56 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 r 5 …. 7.48, 8.51, 10.31, 10.39, 11.52, 14.47, 15.15, 15.85, 16.55, 16.66 r 7 …. 18.27 r 12.4.1 …. 2.36

r 75 …. 11.59 rr 93–99 …. 22.68 r 192 …. 11.32 r 260G(1) …. 14.25 r 261F(1) …. 14.25 r 307 …. 14.59 r 312 …. 14.60 r 353 …. 13.5 r 353(1) …. 13.5 r 354 …. 13.5 r 354(1) …. 13.30 r 355 …. 13.5 r 355(1) …. 13.5, 13.31 r 356 …. 13.5 r 357(1) …. 13.5 r 357(3) …. 13.5 r 358 …. 13.5 r 358(5) …. 13.10 r 360 …. 13.18, 13.91 r 360(1) …. 13.16 r 360(1)(b) …. 13.13 r 360(2) …. 13.16 r 361 …. 13.18, 13.91 r 361(1) …. 13.19 r 361(1)(b) …. 13.19 r 361(2) …. 13.19

r 361(3) …. 13.19 r 361(4) …. 13.19 r 362 …. 13.13 r 364(1) …. 11.10 r 364(2) …. 11.10 r 364(3) …. 11.10 r 386 …. 14.36 r 388 …. 6.21 r 429D …. 17.36 r 679 …. 1.6, 14.29, 16.33, 18.85, 23.43 r 680(1) …. 14.2 r 680(2) …. 14.58 r 681 …. 8.22 r 681(1) …. 6.7, 6.14, 7.4, 8.12, 10.32, 22.7, 24.8 r 682(1) …. 8.12, 14.2 r 682(2) …. 8.12, 14.58 r 683 …. 14.71 r 684 …. 8.12 r 684(1) …. 8.12 r 684(2) …. 8.12, 15.12 r 685 …. 14.71 r 685(1) …. 15.9 r 685(2) …. 15.9 r 686 …. 15.12 r 686(1) …. 14.32 r 686(2) …. 14.32

r 686(3) …. 14.32 r 687(1) …. 15.9 r 688(1) …. 14.32 r 688(2) …. 14.32 r 688(3) …. 14.32 r 689 …. 6.14 r 689(1) …. 6.7, 7.4, 8.12, 22.7 r 690 …. 23.7, 23.43, 23.44, 23.58 r 690(1) …. 15.63 r 690(2) …. 15.63 r 690(3) …. 15.63 r 690(4) …. 15.63 r 690(5) …. 15.64 r 690(6) …. 15.64 r 691(1) …. 15.63 r 691(2) …. 15.63 r 691(3) …. 15.63 r 691(4) …. 15.63 r 691(5) …. 15.64 r 691(6) …. 15.64 r 692(1) …. 14.36 r 692(2) …. 14.36 r 693 …. 14.29 r 693(1) …. 14.29 r 695 …. 14.42 r 696 …. 10.46, 14.42

r 697(1) …. 12.8, 12.20 r 697(2) …. 12.8 r 697(3) …. 12.8 r 697(4) …. 12.8 r 698 …. 1.17, 14.30 r 698(1) …. 12.8, 12.20 r 698(2) …. 12.8 r 698(3) …. 12.8 r 699 …. 1.17, 14.30 r 702(1) …. 16.9, 16.43 r 702(2) …. 16.9, 17.61 r 703(1) …. 16.9, 16.43 r 703(2) …. 16.9, 16.33, 16.45, 17.61 r 703(2)(c) …. 16.66 r 703(3) …. 16.9, 16.23 r 703(3)(b) …. 15.59, 16.26, 17.55 r 704 …. 16.33 r 704(2) …. 16.33 r 704(2)(c) …. 16.45, 16.66 r 704(3) …. 16.9, 16.23 r 704(3)(b) …. 15.59, 16.26 r 705 …. 16.33, 18.10 r 706 …. 15.30, 18.45 r 706(1) …. 18.11 r 706(2) …. 18.11 r 706(3) …. 15.31, 18.11

r 706(d) …. 18.27 r 707 …. 15.40, 15.59 r 708 …. 23.7, 23.43, 23.44, 23.58 r 708(1)–(3) …. 18.11 r 708(4)(a) …. 18.45 r 708(4)(b) …. 18.11, 18.39 r 709 …. 15.12 r 709(1) …. 18.38 r 709(2) …. 18.38 r 709A …. 18.10 r 710(1) …. 18.10, 18.85 r 710(1A) …. 18.10 r 710(2) …. 15.12 r 711 …. 18.10 r 713(1) …. 18.10, 18.85 r 713(2) …. 18.10, 18.85 r 713(3) …. 18.85 r 714 …. 15.30, 17.18, 18.85 r 714(d) …. 18.27 r 714(1) …. 18.82 r 714(2) …. 18.82 r 714(3) …. 18.82 r 714(4) …. 17.20, 18.82 r 717(1) …. 18.11 r 717(2) …. 15.31, 18.11 r 717(3) …. 18.11

r 718 …. 18.11 r 719 …. 18.11 r 719(1) …. 15.29 r 720(1) …. 18.14, 18.38 r 720(2) …. 18.14, 18.38 r 720(4) …. 18.14 r 721 …. 15.59 r 721(1) …. 18.12 r 721(2) …. 18.12 r 721(3) …. 18.12 r 721(4) …. 18.12 r 722 …. 18.11 r 722(1) …. 18.12 r 722(2) …. 18.12 r 722(3) …. 18.45 r 722(4) …. 18.45 r 722(5) …. 18.45 r 723 …. 18.13 r 723(1) …. 18.85 r 723(2) …. 18.85 r 723(3) …. 18.85 r 724 …. 17.18, 18.85 r 724(1) …. 18.82 r 724(2) …. 18.82 r 724(3) …. 18.82 r 724(4) …. 17.20, 18.82

r 726 …. 17.61 r 727(1) …. 17.28 r 727(2) …. 17.37 r 728(1) …. 17.61 r 728(2) …. 17.64 r 729 …. 17.53 r 729(1) …. 17.28 r 729(2) …. 17.37 r 730 …. 17.52, 17.57 r 731 …. 17.53 r 731(1) …. 17.59 r 731(2) …. 17.59 r 732 …. 17.52, 18.45 r 733(1) …. 17.59, 18.12 r 733(2) …. 17.59, 18.12 r 733(3) …. 18.12 r 733(4) …. 18.12 r 734(1) …. 8.14, 18.12 r 734(2) …. 18.12 r 734(3) …. 18.45 r 734(4) …. 18.45 r 734(5) …. 18.45 r 735 …. 18.50 r 736 …. 18.13, 18.34 r 737(1) …. 18.34 r 737(2) …. 18.34

rr 738–741 …. 18.56 r 738(1) …. 18.66 r 738(2)(a) …. 18.66 r 738(3) …. 18.66 r 739 …. 18.45 r 740 …. 14.45 r 740(1) …. 18.34 r 740(2) …. 18.28, 18.34 r 740(3) …. 18.34 r 740(4) …. 18.45 r 741(1) …. 8.14 r 742 …. 5.61 r 742(1) …. 18.73 r 742(2) …. 18.73 r 742(3) …. 18.73 r 742(4) …. 18.73 r 742(4)(b) …. 18.69 r 742(5) …. 18.73 r 742(5)(c) …. 18.69 r 742(6)(d) …. 18.69 r 742(6) …. 18.73 r 742(7) …. 18.73 r 743A …. 5.8 rr 743J–743R …. 5.2 r 743E …. 5.8 r 743F …. 5.8

r 743I …. 5.61 r 743J …. 15.27 r 743L(1) …. 15.27 r 762 …. 14.61 r 766(1)(d) …. 20.2 r 932 …. 8.67, 16.68 Sch 1 …. 15.63 Sch 1 cl 2 …. 15.64 Sch 1 item 1 …. 15.64 Sch 1 item 7 …. 17.27 Sch 1 item 10 …. 15.64 Sch 1 item 14 …. 17.46 Sch 1 item 17(3) …. 15.64 Sch 2 …. 15.63 Sch 2 cl 2 …. 15.64 Sch 2 item 1 …. 15.64 Sch 2 item 7 …. 17.27 Sch 2 item 14 …. 17.46 Sch 3 …. 15.63

SOUTH AUSTRALIA Acts Interpretation Act 1915 s 33 …. 4.20 Administration and Probate Act 1919 s 70(1) …. 10.10 Appeal Costs Fund Act 1979 …. 21.1

Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules r 12.4.1 …. 2.36 r 13.1 …. 4.48 r 13.2 …. 4.48 r 13.3 …. 4.48 r 14.1 …. 26.14 r 16A …. 2.37 r 16B.2 …. 2.34 rr 16B.2.1–16B.2.3 …. 2.34 r 16B.3 …. 2.34 r 16C(2) …. 3.22 r 16C.2.9 …. 3.55 r 16C.3.3–16C.3.5 …. 3.55 r 16C.3.6 …. 3.56 r 16C.3.8 …. 3.55, 3.56 Barristers’ Rules r 15 …. 4.57 r 17 …. 4.57 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 351B(1) …. 24.63 s 363(1) …. 24.63 Sch 11 …. 3.44 Crown Proceedings Act 1972 s 5 …. 24.4 Defamation Act 2005 s 38 …. 8.40

s 38(2) …. 13.48 District Court Act 1991 s 42 …. 22.16 s 42(1) …. 22.16 s 42(2) …. 12.9 s 42(3) …. 22.16 s 42(5) …. 22.16 s 42G(2) …. 9.34 s 43(1) …. 22.16 s 43(4) …. 22.16 District Court Civil Rules 2006 s 263(2)(f)–(h) …. 12.9 District Court Rules 1992 r 41.04 …. 13.18 r 33 …. 13.17 r 101.02A …. 12.9 Domestic Partners Property Act 1996 …. 8.79 Electronic Transactions Act 2000 s 9 …. 4.19 Evidence Act 1929 s 67C(2)(d) …. 13.64 Expiation of Offences Act 1996 s 13 …. 24.32 Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 …. 10.31 s 9(8) …. 10.32 Juries Act 1927

s 5 …. 8.40, 12.22 Justices Act 1921 s 77 …. 24.61 s 127 …. 24.4 s 177(2)(e) …. 24.61 Legal Practitioners Act 1981 s 5(1) …. 1.5, 4.4, 4.31, 5.3, 5.41 s 23A …. 17.19 s 23B …. 17.19 s 31(3)(b) …. 4.32 s 41(1) …. 4.9, 4.20 s 41(2) …. 4.12, 5.10 s 41(3) …. 4.12 s 41(4) …. 4.12 s 42(1) …. 5.2, 5.8 s 42(1a) …. 5.2, 5.8 s 42(1b) …. 5.61 s 42(2) …. 5.14 s 42(5) …. 4.9, 5.8 s 42(6) …. 3.12 s 42(6)(c) …. 3.55 s 42(7) …. 3.22, 3.55, 5.19 s 77A …. 3.55 Legal Practitioners Regulations 2009 reg 17(1) …. 4.32 Limitation of Actions Act 1936

s 35 …. 3.18 Magistrates Court Act 1991 s 42(1) …. 24.63 s 42(1a) …. 24.63 Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 1992 rr 52–54 …. 12.9 Magistrates Court (Criminal) Rules 1992 r 51.01 …. 24.33 r 51.02 …. 24.33 r 51.03 …. 24.34, 24.52, 24.54 r 52.03 …. 24.34 Statute Amendment (New Rules of Civil Procedure) Act 2006 …. 20.36 Summary Procedure Act 1921 s 57A …. 24.32 s 107(4) …. 24.34 s 189 …. 24.32, 24.33, 24.39, 24.46, 24.52, 24.63 s 189(1) …. 24.34 s 189(2) …. 24.32 s 189(2a) …. 24.32 s 189(3) …. 24.5 s 189(7) …. 24.63 s 189A(1) …. 24.32 s 189A(2) …. 24.32 s 189A(3) …. 24.32 s 189B …. 24.32 s 189C …. 24.32

s 189D …. 24.32, 24.63 Supreme Court Act 1935 s 40 …. 22.15 s 40(1) …. 6.7, 6.14, 8.22, 14.16, 14.20, 22.6, 24.8 s 40(2) …. 12.9 s 50(1a)(b)(ii) …. 20.36 s 65 …. 8.51 s 114(1) …. 19.17 s 114(2)(a) …. 19.17 s 114(2)(b) …. 19.17, 19.19 Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 r 4 …. 8.49, 15.10, 15.83, 18.18, 23.44, 23.48 r 13(1) …. 4.46, 8.49 r 13(2) …. 4.48, 23.7, 23.44, 23.48, 23.58 r 13(2)(a) …. 23.43 r 13(2)(b) …. 23.43 r 13(2)(c) …. 23.43 r 13(3) …. 4.48 r 13(3)(a) …. 23.68 r 13(3)(b) …. 23.68 r 19(1)(a) …. 15.28 r 28(2) …. 13.17 r 33 …. 13.17 r 33(1) …. 13.17 r 33(2) …. 13.17 r 33(4) …. 13.17

r 33(7) …. 13.17 r 36 …. 11.32 r 78 …. 22.68 r 79 …. 22.68 r 80 …. 11.59 r 89 …. 11.40 r 107(4) …. 14.59 r 117(3) …. 18.27 r 148(7)(a) …. 14.25 r 156(10) …. 14.31 r 156(11) …. 14.31 s 187 …. 13.5 r 187(1) …. 13.5, 13.30, 13.31, 18.48 r 187(2) …. 13.5, 13.30 r 187(2)(a) …. 13.31 r 187(2)(b) …. 18.48 r 187(3) …. 13.5 r 187(3)(c) …. 13.10 r 187(4) …. 13.5 r 187(5) …. 13.34 r 187(7) …. 13.5 r 188(1) …. 13.5, 13.31, 18.48 r 188(2) …. 13.5 r 187(2)(a) …. 13.31 r 188(2)(b) …. 18.48 r 188(3) …. 13.5

r 188(6) …. 13.16, 13.21 r 188(6)(a) …. 14.72 r 188(6A) …. 13.21 r 188(7) …. 13.21 r 188(8) …. 18.48 r 202 …. 10.2 r 202(3)(f) …. 10.2 r 242(1) …. 6.21 r 247(8)(a) …. 14.25 r 261 …. 19.17 r 263(1) …. 7.4, 8.22 r 263(2) …. 7.4, 8.22 r 263(2)(a) …. 8.22 r 263(2)(b) …. 8.22, 14.42 r 263(2)(d) …. 8.22 r 263(2)(e) …. 8.22, 14.31 r 263(2)(f) …. 8.22, 12.9 r 263(2)(g) …. 8.22, 8.40, 12.9 r 263(2)(h) …. 8.22, 12.9 r 263(3) …. 13.57 r 263(2)(a) …. 14.36 r 263(2)(d) …. 14.38 r 263(4) …. 17.70 r 263(5) …. 14.32 r 264(1) …. 16.10 r 264(2) …. 15.66, 16.10, 16.43

r 264(3) …. 15.66, 16.10 r 264(3A)-(3E) …. 15.66 r 264(3A) …. 16.10 r 264(4) …. 15.66 r 264(5) …. 15.10, 16.10 r 264(5)(a) …. 16.10 r 264(5)(b) …. 16.10, 16.23 r 264(6) …. 16.45 r 264(7) …. 19.17 r 265(1) …. 14.2 r 265(2)(a) …. 14.54 r 265(2)(b) …. 14.45 r 266(1) …. 8.14, 8.17 r 266(2) …. 11.12 r 266(3) …. 11.33 r 267(1) …. 11.61 r 267(2) …. 22.68 r 268 …. 1.17, 14.30 r 269 …. 11.52 r 270(2) …. 15.28 r 271 …. 18.86 r 271(1) …. 15.10, 18.18 r 271(2) …. 15.10, 18.18 r 271(3) …. 15.10, 18.18 r 271(4) …. 18.18 r 271(5) …. 15.10, 15.40, 18.18

r 271(6) …. 15.10, 18.19 r 272 …. 5.8 r 273(1) …. 18.19, 18.86 r 273(2) …. 18.19 r 273(3) …. 18.19 r 274 …. 15.30 r 274(3)(a) …. 15.83 r 274(3)(b) …. 17.28 r 274(3)(d) …. 14.38, 23.48 r 275 …. 18.25 r 276 …. 18.35 r 277(1) …. 18.35 r 277(2) …. 15.30 r 277(4) …. 18.35 r 278 …. 18.61 r 278(1) …. 18.61 r 278(2) …. 18.61 r 278(3) …. 18.61 r 278(4) …. 18.61, 18.75 r 278(5) …. 18.75 r 278(6) …. 18.75 r 279 …. 18.28, 18.35 r 288(1)(b) …. 20.36, 20.37 r 292(3)(d) …. 20.2 r 293(4) …. 14.61 r 306(3) …. 8.67, 16.68

r 312(12) …. 7.48 r 312(12)(b) …. 7.48 r 312(12)(c) …. 7.48 r 312(12)(d) …. 7.48 r 312(13) …. 7.48 Sch 1 …. 15.66, 16.10 Sch 2 item 6, note H …. 17.27 Supreme Court Rules 1987 r 37.01 …. 11.32 r 39.05 …. 13.34 r 39.06 …. 13.34 r 41.01 …. 13.5 r 41.02(1) …. 13.5 r 41.03 …. 13.5 r 41.04 …. 13.16, 13.18 r 41.05 …. 13.18, 13.26 r 52.03 …. 14.59 r 53.10 …. 6.21 r 53.11(1) …. 14.36 r 54.06 …. 14.31 r 54.07 …. 14.31 r 95.07(3) …. 14.61 r 101.01(1)(c) …. 8.14, 8.17 r 101.01(1)(d) …. 11.12 r 101.01(1)(e) …. 11.33 r 101.01(4) …. 14.2

r 101.01(5) …. 14.32 r 101.01(7) …. 14.54 r 101.02(1) …. 7.4 r 101.02(2)(a) …. 14.36 r 101.02(2)(b) …. 14.42 r 101.02(2)(d) …. 14.38 r 101.02A …. 12.9 r 101.04 …. 11.52 r 101.05 …. 23.44 r 101.06(1)(a) …. 23.7, 23.44, 23.68 r 101.06(1)(a)(i) …. 23.43 r 101.06(1)(a)(ii) …. 23.43 r 101.06(1)(a)(iii) …. 23.43 r 101.06(4) …. 23.68 r 101.07(2)(c) …. 17.70 r 101.07(5) …. 15.12 r 101.07(6)(a) …. 16.10 r 101.07(6)(c) …. 16.10 r 101.07(6)(e) …. 16.10, 16.23 r 101.13(c) …. 18.18 r 101.16(1)(d) …. 17.28 r 101.19 …. 18.61 r 101A.01 …. 15.66 r 101A.02 …. 18.86 r 101A.02(1a) …. 18.18 r 101A.04 …. 5.46

O 33 …. 11.40 O 34 …. 11.59 O 35 …. 22.68 O 41 …. 13.58, 13.83 Sch 7 …. 15.66 Trustee Act 1936 s 44 …. 10.12 Wills Act 1936 s 7 …. 10.30

TASMANIA Acts Interpretation Act 1931 s 29AB(1) …. 4.20 s 30 …. 4.20 Administration and Probate Act 1935 s 64 …. 10.46 Adoption Act 1988 …. 3.52 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2001 s 5 …. 8.51 Appeal Costs Fund Act 1968 …. 21.1 s 2 …. 21.21, 21.23, 21.25, 21.37 s 7A …. 21.26, 21.33 s 8(1) …. 21.18, 21.21 s 8(1)(a)(ii) …. 21.20 s 9(1) …. 21.23 s 9(1)(a)(i) …. 21.23

s 9(2) …. 21.25 s 9(3) …. 21.25 s 10 …. 21.37 s 11(1) …. 21.37 s 11(2) …. 21.37 s 12(1) …. 21.27 s 12(2) …. 21.40 s 13(1) …. 21.28 s 13(2) …. 21.40 s 13(3) …. 21.28 s 13(4) …. 21.37 s 13(5) …. 21.28 s 14(1) …. 21.50 s 14(3) …. 21.50 s 14(4) …. 21.50 s 15 …. 25.17 s 15(1)(a) …. 21.29 s 15(1)(b) …. 21.29 s 15(1)(c) …. 21.29, 21.33 s 15(1A) …. 21.29 s 15(3) …. 21.29 s 15(4) …. 21.29 s 16(1) …. 21.35 s 16(2)(a) …. 21.36 s 16(2)(b) …. 21.36 s 17(1) …. 21.41

s 17(2)(a) …. 21.42 s 17(2)(b) …. 21.42 s 19(2) …. 21.33, 21.60 Appeal Costs Fund Regulations 1987 reg 6 …. 21.26, 21.33 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1997 …. 3.52 Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1976 …. 24.35, 24.38, 25.15 s 2 …. 25.16 s 4 …. 24.64, 25.17, 25.20, 25.23 s 4(1) …. 24.65, 25.16, 25.17 s 4(2) …. 24.39, 25.18, 25.20, 25.23 s 4(2)(a)–(d) …. 25.18 s 4(2)(e) …. 25.18, 25.23 s 4(3) …. 25.19, 25.20 s 4(4) …. 25.19, 25.20 s 4(5) …. 25.19 s 5 …. 25.24 s 5A …. 25.25 s 5A(1) …. 25.25 s 5A(2) …. 25.25 s 5A(3) …. 25.25 s 5A(4) …. 25.25 Criminal Code s 388AA(1) …. 21.48 s 388AA(5) …. 21.48 s 388AA(6)(c) …. 21.48

s 388AA(7) …. 21.48 s 414(1) …. 24.64, 24.65, 25.17 s 414(2) …. 24.64 s 425 …. 24.64 s 425(1) …. 24.21 s 425(2)(a) …. 24.21 Crown Proceedings Act 1993 s 5 …. 24.4 Defamation Act 1957 …. 13.34 Defamation Act 2005 …. 13.34 s 21(1) …. 8.40 s 22(3) …. 12.22 s 40 …. 8.40 s 40(2) …. 13.48 Electronic Transactions Act 2000 s 7 …. 4.19 Evidence Act 2001 s 131(1) …. 13.64 s 131(2)(h) …. 13.64 s 131(5)(b) …. 13.2 Justices Act 1959 s 3(1) …. 24.35 s 77(1) …. 24.35, 24.52 s 77(2) …. 24.35, 24.52 s 77(2A) …. 24.35 s 77(3) …. 24.55, 25.25

s 77(3A) …. 24.55 s 77(4) …. 25.25 s 77(7) …. 24.35 s 77(8) …. 24.35, 25.25 s 77A(1) …. 24.55 s 77A(4) …. 24.55 s 125 …. 24.64 Legal Aid Commission Act 1990 …. 24.64 s 21 …. 8.69, 23.38 s 25(1) …. 25.16 s 26 …. 22.65 Legal Profession Act 1993 s 55A …. 17.19 s 127 …. 3.7 s 129(1) …. 3.7, 3.8 s 129(2) …. 3.16, 5.18 s 129(3) …. 3.19 s 130(2) …. 4.20 s 132(1) …. 4.5 s 132(1A) …. 4.5 s 133 …. 4.5 s 135(1) …. 5.8 s 135(2) …. 5.10, 5.13 s 135(3) …. 5.14 s 136A …. 3.21, 5.63 s 138 …. 4.33

s 143A …. 2.21 s 143B …. 2.22 s 143C …. 2.24 s 143D …. 2.26 s 143E …. 2.30 s 143F …. 2.31 s 143G …. 2.28 Legal Profession Act 2007 s 4(1) …. 3.6, 4.4, 5.3, 5.41 s 80 …. 17.19 s 231(1) …. 4.31 s 252(1)(b) …. 4.32 s 252(2) …. 4.32 s 283 …. 3.51, 4.13, 4.16, 5.2, 5.7, 5.12, 5.18 s 284(1) …. 2.23, 3.7, 5.9 s 284(1)(a) …. 5.9 s 291 …. 2.21 s 293 …. 2.22 s 294 …. 2.25 s 295 …. 2.30 s 296 …. 2.29 s 297 …. 2.21, 3.53 s 298 …. 2.24 s 299 …. 2.26 s 300 …. 2.31 s 301(1) …. 2.28

s 301(3) …. 2.28 s 302(1) …. 2.23 s 302(2) …. 2.25 s 303 …. 2.1, 3.2 s 304 …. 4.33 s 305(1) …. 4.60 s 305(2) …. 4.60 s 305(3) …. 4.60 s 305(4) …. 4.60 s 306(1) …. 3.7 s 306(1)(a) …. 4.58 s 306(1)(b) …. 4.58 s 306(1)(c) …. 4.58 s 306(2) …. 3.8 s 306(3) …. 3.11 s 306(4) …. 3.11 s 306(5) …. 5.18 s 307(1) …. 3.51 s 307(2) …. 3.52 s 307(3)(a) …. 3.51 s 307(3)(b) …. 3.51 s 307(3)(c)–(e) …. 3.51 s 307(4) …. 3.51 s 307(5) …. 3.51 s 307(6) …. 3.51 s 308(1) …. 3.53

s 308(2) …. 3.53 s 308(3) …. 3.53 s 308(4)(a) …. 3.53 s 308(4)(b) …. 3.53 s 309 …. 3.54 s 310 …. 3.6 s 310(1) …. 4.58 s 311(1) …. 3.8, 3.57 s 311(2) …. 3.57 s 311(3) …. 3.58 s 311(4) …. 3.58 s 311(5) …. 3.58 s 311(6) …. 3.60 s 312(1) …. 3.16 s 312(2) …. 3.16 s 312(4) …. 3.19 s 312(5) …. 3.19 s 312(6) …. 3.19 s 312(7) …. 3.19 s 312(8) …. 3.16 s 312(10) …. 3.20 s 312(11) …. 3.21 s 313(1) …. 4.5, 4.21 s 313(2) …. 4.7 s 313(3) …. 4.8 s 313(4) …. 4.6

s 314(1) …. 4.12 s 314(2) …. 4.18 s 314(3) …. 4.18 s 314(4) …. 4.18 s 314(5) …. 4.20 s 314(5)(f) …. 4.20 s 314(7) …. 4.20 s 315(1) …. 4.16 s 316(1) …. 4.12 s 316(2) …. 4.12 s 316(4) …. 4.5 s 316(5) …. 4.5 s 317(1) …. 4.17, 4.50 s 319(1) …. 5.8 s 319(2) …. 5.8 s 319(3) …. 5.13 s 319(4) …. 5.13 s 319(5) …. 5.10 s 319(6) …. 5.12 s 320(1) …. 5.8 s 320(2) …. 5.13 s 320(3) …. 5.13 s 320(4) …. 5.10 s 320(5) …. 5.10 s 321(1)–(3) …. 5.8 s 321(4) …. 5.10

s 323(b) …. 4.1, 5.14 s 325(2) …. 5.57 s 327(1) …. 5.16 s 327(2) …. 5.16 s 328(1) …. 5.18 s 328(2) …. 5.18 s 329 …. 5.20 s 331(2) …. 5.46 s 332(1) …. 5.23 s 332(2) …. 5.23 s 333 …. 5.63 s 334(1) …. 5.63 s 334(3) …. 5.63 s 334(4) …. 5.63 s 338 …. 5.7 s 491(2) …. 4.1 Pt 3.3 Div 5 …. 3.57 Legal Practitioners Regulations 2008 reg 53 …. 4.32 Limitation Act 1974 s 4 …. 3.18 Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Rules 1998 r 32(2) …. 6.5 Sch 1 Pt 1 …. 17.59 Relationships Act 2003 …. 3.52, 8.79 s 68 …. 8.79

Rules of Practice 1994 …. 4.49 r 3 …. 4.41 r 14 …. 2.29 r 15 …. 2.37 r 81 …. 4.41 r 83 …. 4.49 r 85(1) …. 4.49 r 89A …. 4.57 r 93 …. 4.57 Supreme Court Act 1959 s 10 …. 5.2, 15.27 Supreme Court Amendment Rules 2010 …. 22.70 Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 s 9(2) …. 24.64 s 12(1) …. 6.7, 6.13 s 12(2) …. 6.7, 6.14, 22.6 s 12(3) …. 16.3 s 13(1) …. 12.10 s 13(2) …. 12.10 s 13(2)(b) …. 12.10 s 13(2)(c) …. 12.10 s 13(2A) …. 12.10, 12.15 s 13(6) …. 12.10 s 13(7) …. 12.10 s 44 …. 12.10 s 44(1) …. 20.31, 20.41

s 44(1)(a) …. 20.36 s 164(1) …. 19.20 s 165 …. 19.20 Supreme Court Rules 1965 O 24 r 6(b) …. 13.89 O 80 r 78 …. 18.49 Appendix M, ‘Allowances to Interpreters and Translators’, cl 2 …. 17.29 Appendix M, ‘Allowances to Witnesses’, cl 1 …. 17.28 Appendix M, ‘Allowances to Witnesses’, cl 2 …. 17.28 Appendix M, ‘Allowances to Witnesses’, cl 3 …. 17.29 Appendix M, ‘Allowances to Witnesses’, cl 5 …. 17.37 Appendix M, ‘Allowances to Witnesses’, cl 6 …. 18.87 Supreme Court Rules 2000 r 52 …. 18.27 r 57(1) …. 6.7 r 59 …. 14.32 r 60 …. 23.48 r 61(1) …. 23.44, 23.58, 23.68 r 61(1)(b) …. 23.43 r 61(2) …. 23.7, 23.66 r 61(3) …. 23.68 r 62(1) …. 22.68 r 62A …. 22.70 r 63 …. 10.1 r 64 …. 10.46 r 65 …. 14.28, 14.45

r 66 …. 14.33 r 67 …. 1.17, 14.30 r 68 …. 14.67 r 69 …. 8.23 r 80(1) …. 2.36 r 80(3) …. 2.36 rr 189–191 …. 11.40 r 201 …. 11.32 r 202 …. 11.32 r 268 …. 13.34 r 269(1) …. 14.73 r 269(6) …. 14.73 r 272(9) …. 14.73 r 275(1) …. 13.34 r 275(2) …. 13.35 r 280(1)–(5) …. 13.5 r 280(3) …. 13.5 r 280(4) …. 13.5 r 280(6) …. 13.5, 13.30 r 280(7) …. 13.5, 13.31 r 281 …. 13.5 r 281(c) …. 13.10 r 284(1) …. 14.72 r 284(3) …. 13.10, 14.72 r 285 …. 13.5 r 286(1) …. 13.5

r 286(2) …. 13.5 r 286(3) …. 13.5 r 289(1) …. 13.16 r 289(2) …. 13.19 r 289(3) …. 13.13, 13.19 r 289(4) …. 13.13 r 289(5) …. 13.13 r 291(1) …. 11.10 r 291(2) …. 11.10 rr 292–301 …. 22.68 r 335 …. 11.59 r 336 …. 11.59 r 376(1) …. 14.62 r 376(2) …. 14.62 r 376(3) …. 14.59, 14.62 r 377(1) …. 14.62 r 377(2) …. 14.59, 14.62 r 378(1) …. 14.59 r 378(2) …. 14.62 r 380 …. 14.60 r 431 …. 14.36 r 435 …. 6.21 r 518 …. 8.51 r 528(3) …. 8.23 r 675(3) …. 14.61 r 807 …. 19.20

r 836 …. 1.6 r 837(1) …. 15.67 r 837(2) …. 15.67 r 837(3) …. 15.67 r 837(4) …. 15.67 r 837(5) …. 15.67 r 838 …. 15.68 r 839(a) …. 15.8 r 839(b) …. 15.8 r 839(d) …. 6.14 r 840(1) …. 23.48 r 840(2) …. 23.48 r 841(1) …. 8.23 r 841(2) …. 8.23 r 842 …. 15.12 r 844 …. 15.12 r 845 …. 15.27 r 846 …. 15.30 r 847 …. 18.87 r 849(1) …. 18.20 r 849(2) …. 18.20 r 849(3) …. 18.20 r 849(4) …. 18.20 r 849(5) …. 18.20 r 850(1) …. 18.20 r 850(2) …. 18.20

r 850(3) …. 18.20 r 850(4) …. 18.20, 18.49 r 851 …. 18.21 r 852 …. 18.27, 18.36, 18.53 r 853 …. 18.21 r 855(1) …. 18.20 r 855(2) …. 18.25 r 856 …. 18.26 r 857(1) …. 8.14 r 857(2) …. 18.26 r 857(3) …. 8.14 r 857(4) …. 8.14 r 858 …. 15.59 r 859 …. 16.3, 16.43 r 860(2) …. 14.36 r 860(3) …. 17.53 r 860(5) …. 11.58 r 860(6) …. 17.8 r 860(7) …. 14.31 r 860(8) …. 14.31 r 860(9) …. 11.42 r 862(1) …. 15.83 r 862(2)(b) …. 15.83 r 862(2)(c) …. 15.83 r 862(2)(d) …. 15.83 r 863(1) …. 17.70

r 863(3) …. 17.13 r 863(4) …. 17.74 r 863(5) …. 17.74 r 863(6) …. 17.59 r 863(7) …. 17.59 r 863(8) …. 17.52 r 863(9) …. 17.63 r 863(10) …. 17.63 r 863(11) …. 17.57 r 863(12) …. 17.22 r 865 …. 18.49 r 866(1) …. 18.36 r 866(2) …. 18.36, 18.53 r 866(3) …. 18.36 r 867 …. 18.53 r 867(3) …. 18.53 r 867(4) …. 18.53 r 867(5)(a) …. 18.54 r 867(5)(b) …. 18.54 r 867(5)(c) …. 18.54, 18.64 r 867(5)(d) …. 18.55 r 867(6) …. 18.39, 18.55 r 868 …. 5.63 r 868(1) …. 18.76 r 868(2) …. 18.76 r 868(3) …. 18.76

r 868(4) …. 18.69, 18.76 r 937H(1) …. 14.25 r 937O(1) …. 14.25 Pt 17 div 16 …. 10.2 Sch 1 …. 15.67 Sch 1 Pt 1 …. 15.67 Sch 1 Pt 1 item 16 …. 17.27 Sch 1 Pt 2 …. 15.67, 17.59, 17.70 Sch 5 …. 17.28, 17.29, 17.37, 18.87 Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 …. 10.31 s 3(1) …. 10.32 Trustee Act 1898 s 44 …. 10.9, 10.12 s 58 …. 10.10 s 63 …. 10.12 Wills Act 2008 ss 21–28 …. 10.30 ss 39–41 …. 10.30 Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 s 59(1) …. 7.25 Youth Justice Act 1997 …. 3.52

VICTORIA Administration and Probate Act 1958 s 97(6) …. 10.32 s 97(7) …. 10.33

Pt IV …. 10.31 Appeal Costs Act 1998 …. 21.1 s 3(1) …. 21.17, 21.20, 21.23, 21.34, 21.37 s 3(2)(a) …. 21.25 s 3(2)(b) …. 21.21 s 4(1) …. 21.21 s 4(2) …. 21.21 s 5(1) …. 21.23 s 5(2) …. 21.26 s 6(1) …. 21.25 s 6(3) …. 21.25 s 7(1) …. 21.37 s 7(2) …. 21.37 s 7(3) …. 21.37 s 8(1) …. 21.38 s 8(2) …. 21.38 s 8(3) …. 21.38 s 9(1) …. 21.38 s 9(3) …. 21.38 s 10(1) …. 21.34 s 10(2) …. 21.34 s 10(3) …. 21.34 s 11 …. 21.41 s 12(1) …. 21.41 s 12(2) …. 21.41 s 13(1) …. 21.42

s 13(3) …. 21.42 s 14(1) …. 21.43 s 14(1)(b) …. 21.23 s 14(2) …. 21.43 s 14(3) …. 21.43 s 14(4) …. 21.43 s 15(1) …. 21.45 s 15(2) …. 21.45 s 15A …. 21.45 s 15B …. 21.45 s 15C …. 21.49 s 16(1) …. 21.34 s 16(1)(a) …. 21.23 s 16(2) …. 21.34 s 16(4) …. 21.34 s 17 …. 21.34 s 17(1) …. 21.34 s 17(2)(a) …. 21.34 s 17(3) …. 21.34 s 17(4) …. 21.34 s 17(5) …. 21.34 s 18 …. 21.34 s 19(1) …. 21.49 s 19(2) …. 21.49 s 19(3) …. 21.49 s 32(1) …. 21.27

s 32(2) …. 21.40 s 32(3) …. 21.28 s 33 …. 21.28 s 34 …. 21.28 s 34(2) …. 21.40 s 34(3) …. 21.28 s 34(4) …. 21.40 s 35A(1) …. 21.60 s 35B …. 21.34, 21.43, 21.45, 21.49 s 37 …. 21.50 s 38 …. 21.60 s 39 …. 21.59 Pt 5 …. 21.23 Appeal Costs Fund Act 1964 s 14(1)(b) …. 21.23 Barristers’ Practice Rules r 165 …. 4.57 rr 168–172 …. 4.57 r 175 …. 4.57 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 s 295 …. 21.45 s 427 …. 21.45 Civil Procedure Act 2010 …. 9.6, 23.42 s 7 …. 10.31 s 7(1) …. 7.48, 8.10, 11.52, 15.15, 16.55 s 9(2)(g) …. 9.6

s 17 …. 23.42 s 18 …. 23.42 s 19 …. 23.42 s 20 …. 23.42 s 21 …. 23.42 s 22 …. 23.42 s 23 …. 23.42 s 24 …. 7.48, 15.85, 23.42 s 25 …. 23.42 s 26 …. 23.42 s 28(2) …. 7.48, 15.85, 23.42 s 29 …. 16.66, 23.42, 23.61 s 29(1) …. 23.42 s 29(2) …. 23.61 s 49(3)(k) …. 8.10 s 65A(1) …. 2.38 s 65A(2) …. 2.38 s 65B(1) …. 2.38 s 65B(2) …. 2.38 s 65C(1) …. 6.14 s 65C(2) …. 15.9 s 65C(2)(a) …. 8.10 s 65C(2)(b) …. 8.10 s 65C(2)(d) …. 7.42 s 65C(3) …. 14.2 Ch 2 …. 10.39

Civil Procedure Amendment Act 2012 …. 2.38, 7.42, 8.10 Confiscation Act 1997 s 133A …. 6.5 s 133A(1) …. 6.5 s 133A(2) …. 6.5 s 133A(3) …. 6.5 County Court Act 1958 …. 24.66 s 78A …. 24.8 s 78A(1) …. 24.8 County Court Civil Procedure Rules 2008 s 63A.24 …. 12.11 s 63A.25 …. 12.11 Courts and Tribunals Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act 2000 …. 11.60 Courts (Case Transfer) Act 1991 …. 12.11 Courts Legislation Amendment (Costs Court and Other Matters) Act 2008 …. 5.2, 24.55 Crimes Act 1958 s 545 …. 24.8, 24.21 s 578(1) …. 24.66 Crimes (Criminal Trials) Act 1999 s 24 …. 24.21 Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 …. 21.34 s 17(1)(c) …. 21.34, 21.43 s 14A …. 21.34 s 24AA …. 21.34

Pt 2 …. 21.34 Pt 3 …. 21.34 Criminal Appeals and Procedure Rules 1998 r 4.08(2) …. 23.1 Criminal Justice Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2002 Pt 6 …. 21.34 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 …. 24.36 s 257 …. 21.45 s 260 …. 21.45 s 287 …. 21.45 s 291 …. 21.45 s 302 …. 21.49 s 302A …. 21.49 s 304 …. 21.49 s 400(1) …. 24.36 s 401(1) …. 24.41, 24.52 s 401(2) …. 24.36, 24.41 s 401(4) …. 24.36 s 401(5) …. 24.36 s 404(1) …. 24.21, 24.36 s 406(1) …. 24.66 s 406(2) …. 24.66 s 407(1) …. 24.66 s 407(3) …. 24.66 s 408 …. 24.66 s 409 …. 24.66

s 410 …. 23.1 Crown Proceedings Act 1958 s 25 …. 24.4 Defamation Act 2005 s 21(1) …. 8.40 s 22(3) …. 12.22 s 40 …. 8.40 s 40(2) …. 13.48 Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000 s 9 …. 4.19 Equal Opportunity Act 1984 s 47(2) …. 15.39 s 138(3) …. 15.39 Evidence Act 2008 s 131(1) …. 13.64 s 131(2)(h) …. 13.64 s 131(5)(b) …. 13.2 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 …. 21.21, 21.25 Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 s 49 …. 4.20 Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 s 91 …. 8.85, 13.1 s 91(1) …. 8.85 Legal Aid Act 1978 …. 21.59 s 39 …. 21.61

s 48 …. 8.69, 22.65 Legal Practice Act 1996 …. 4.57 s 54 …. 17.19 s 55 …. 17.19 s 66(1) …. 4.57 s 86 …. 2.21 s 87 …. 2.22 s 88 …. 2.24 s 89 …. 2.26 s 90 …. 2.30 s 91 …. 2.31 s 92 …. 2.28 s 94 …. 4.33 s 96(1) …. 3.7 s 96(1)(a) …. 4.58 s 96(1)(b) …. 4.58 s 96(1)(c) …. 4.58 s 96(2) …. 3.8 s 96(3) …. 3.11 s 97(1) …. 3.51 s 97(3) …. 3.52 s 97(4) …. 3.51 s 97(5) …. 3.53 s 97(7) …. 10.39 s 98 …. 3.53 s 99 …. 3.54

s 101(2) …. 5.18 s 101(3) …. 5.18 s 102(2) …. 3.57 s 102(3) …. 3.57, 3.59 s 103(1) …. 3.16 s 103(3) …. 3.19 s 106(1) …. 4.5 s 106(2) …. 4.7 s 106(3) …. 4.8 s 107(1) …. 4.5 s 107(2) …. 4.18 s 107(3) …. 4.20 s 108(1)–(3) …. 4.5 s 115(1) …. 5.8 s 115(2) …. 5.10, 5.12 s 115(3) …. 5.14 s 116(1) …. 5.8 s 116(1)(b) …. 5.14 s 116(2) …. 5.14 s 116(3) …. 5.10 s 116(5) …. 5.13 s 118(2) …. 5.57 s 118(3) …. 5.20 s 119(2) …. 5.46 s 120 …. 5.61 s 122 …. 5.6

Legal Profession Act 2004 s 1.2.1(1) …. 3.6, 4.4, 5.3, 5.41 s 2.4.32 …. 17.19 s 3.2.3(1) …. 4.57 s 3.2.3(2) …. 4.57 s 3.3.2(1) …. 4.31 s 3.3.20(1)(b) …. 4.32 s 3.3.20(3) …. 4.32 s 3.4.2 …. 3.51, 4.13, 4.16, 5.7, 5.12, 5.18 s 3.4.2A …. 2.23, 3.7, 5.9 s 3.4.2A(1)(a) …. 5.9 s 3.4.9 …. 2.21 s 3.4.10 …. 2.22 s 3.4.11 …. 2.25 s 3.4.12 …. 2.30 s 3.4.13 …. 2.29 s 3.4.14 …. 2.21, 3.53 s 3.4.15 …. 2.24 s 3.4.16 …. 2.26 s 3.4.17 …. 2.31 s 3.4.18(1) …. 2.28 s 3.4.18(3) …. 2.28 s 3.4.18A(1) …. 2.23 s 3.4.18A(2) …. 2.25 s 3.4.19 …. 2.1, 3.2 s 3.4.20 …. 4.33

s 3.4.21(1) …. 4.60 s 3.4.21(2) …. 4.60 s 3.4.21(3) …. 4.60 s 3.4.21(4) …. 4.60 s 3.4.26(1) …. 3.7 s 3.4.26(1)(a) …. 4.58 s 3.4.26(1)(b) …. 4.58 s 3.4.26(1)(c) …. 4.58 s 3.4.26(2) …. 3.8 s 3.4.26(3) …. 3.11 s 3.4.26(4) …. 3.11 s 3.4.26(5) …. 5.18 s 3.4.27(1) …. 3.51 s 3.4.27(2) …. 3.52 s 3.4.27(3)(a) …. 3.51 s 3.4.27(3)(b) …. 3.51 s 3.4.27(3)(c)–(e) …. 3.51 s 3.4.27(4) …. 3.51 s 3.4.27(4A) …. 3.51 s 3.4.27(5) …. 3.51 s 3.4.28(1) …. 3.53 s 3.4.28(2) …. 3.53 s 3.4.28(3) …. 3.53 s 3.4.28(4)(a) …. 3.53 s 3.4.28(4)(b) …. 3.53 s 3.4.29 …. 3.54

s 3.4.30 …. 3.6 s 3.4.30(1) …. 4.58 s 3.4.31(1) …. 3.8, 3.57 s 3.4.31(2) …. 3.57 s 3.4.31(3) …. 3.58 s 3.4.31(4) …. 3.58 s 3.4.31(5) …. 3.58 s 3.4.31(6) …. 3.60 s 3.4.32(1) …. 3.16 s 3.4.32(2) …. 3.16 s 3.4.32(4) …. 3.19 s 3.4.32(5) …. 3.19 s 3.4.32(6) …. 3.19 s 3.4.32(7) …. 3.19 s 3.4.32(8) …. 3.16 s 3.4.33(1) …. 4.5, 4.21 s 3.4.33(2) …. 4.7 s 3.4.33(3) …. 4.8 s 3.4.33(4) …. 4.6 s 3.4.34(1) …. 4.12 s 3.4.34(2) …. 4.18 s 3.4.34(2A) …. 4.18 s 3.4.34(3) …. 4.18 s 3.4.34(4) …. 4.20 s 3.4.34(5A) …. 4.20 s 3.4.34(6) …. 4.20

s 3.4.35(1) …. 4.16 s 3.4.36(1) …. 4.12 s 3.4.36(2) …. 4.12 s 3.4.36(4) …. 4.5 s 3.4.36(5) …. 4.29 s 3.4.37(1) …. 4.17, 4.50 s 3.4.38(1) …. 5.8 s 3.4.38(2) …. 5.8 s 3.4.38(3) …. 5.13 s 3.4.38(4) …. 5.13 s 3.4.38(5) …. 5.10 s 3.4.38(6) …. 5.12 s 3.4.39(1) …. 5.8 s 3.4.39(2) …. 5.13 s 3.4.39(2A) …. 5.13 s 3.4.39(3) …. 5.10 s 3.4.39(4) …. 5.10 s 3.4.40(1) …. 5.8 s 3.4.40(2) …. 5.8 s 3.4.40(2A) …. 5.8 s 3.4.40(3) …. 5.10 s 3.4.41(1)(b) …. 4.1, 5.14 s 3.4.43(2) …. 5.57 s 3.4.44(1) …. 5.16 s 3.4.44(2) …. 5.16 s 3.4.44A(1) …. 5.18

s 3.4.44A(2) …. 5.18 s 3.4.44B …. 5.20 s 3.4.45(2) …. 5.46 s 3.4.45(2A) …. 5.46 s 3.4.46(1) …. 5.23 s 3.4.46(2) …. 5.23 s 3.4.47 …. 5.61 s 3.4.48A …. 5.7 s 4.2.2(a) …. 5.6 s 4.3.17(1)(b) …. 4.1 Pt 3.4 Div 5 …. 3.57 Pt 4.3 Div 3 …. 5.6 Legal Profession Practice Act 1891 s 5 …. 4.57 Legal Profession Practice Act 1958 s 10(1) …. 4.57 Legal Profession Regulations 2005 s 3.4.2 …. 2.30 s 3.4.3 …. 4.60 s 3.3.34 …. 4.32 Limitation of Actions Act 1958 s 5 …. 3.18 Magistrates (Summary Proceedings) Act 1975 s 97 …. 24.36 s 97(b) …. 24.41, 24.42 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989

s 88AA(1) …. 24.66 s 88AA(2) …. 24.66 s 131(1) …. 24.41, 24.52 s 131(2A) …. 24.36, 24.41 s 131(2B) …. 24.36 s 131(2C) …. 24.36 s 131(4) …. 24.36 s 131A …. 24.55 Mental Health Act 1986 s 10 …. 21.60 Migration Act 1958 …. 13.28 Penalty Interest Rates Act 1983 s 2 …. 19.21 Port Bellarine Tourist Resort (Repeal) Act 2012 s 10(1) …. 6.5 Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 2005 r 6.1 …. 4.46 r 6.2 …. 4.48 r 6.3 …. 4.48 r 10.1 …. 2.36 r 38.2 …. 4.8 r 38.3 …. 4.8 r 39.2(c) …. 2.37 Relationships Act 2008 …. 8.79 Supreme Court Act 1958 s 39 …. 20.39

Supreme Court Act 1986 …. 23.43 s 17A(1)(b) …. 20.36, 20.39 s 17C(1) …. 5.2 s 17C(2) …. 5.2 s 17D(1) …. 5.2 s 17F …. 5.2 s 17G …. 5.2 s 17GA …. 5.2 s 17H …. 18.73 s 17H(2) …. 18.73 s 17H(5) …. 18.73 s 17H(6) …. 18.73 s 17HA …. 18.73 s 17HA(2) …. 18.73 s 17HA(5) …. 18.73 s 17HA(6) …. 18.73 s 17I …. 18.73 s 24(1) …. 6.5, 6.7, 6.14, 22.6, 24.8, 24.11 s 24(2) …. 24.11, 24.15 s 24A …. 13.64 s 33ZD …. 11.60 s 33ZJ …. 11.61 s 76 …. 4.24 s 101(1) …. 19.21 s 101(2) …. 19.21 Pt 2 Div 2B …. 5.2

Pt 4A …. 11.60 Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 r 3.02 …. 18.27 r 11.01 …. 11.32 r 13.14 …. 12.11 rr 18.01–18.04…. 11.59 r 25.05 …. 14.59 r 25.07 …. 14.60 r 26.02 …. 13.5 r 26.02(1) …. 13.5 r 26.03(1) …. 13.5, 13.30 r 26.03(2) …. 13.5 r 26.03(3) …. 13.5, 13.31, 14.72, 18.47 r 26.03(4) …. 12.11, 13.5, 18.47 r 26.03(5) …. 13.5 r 26.03(6) …. 13.5 r 26.03(7) …. 14.72 r 26.03(8) …. 13.10, 14.72 r 26.04 …. 13.5 r 26.05(1) …. 13.5 r 26.05(2) …. 13.5 r 26.05(3) …. 13.5 r 26.07(1) …. 13.58 r 26.08 …. 13.1, 13.87 r 26.08(2)(a) …. 13.16 r 26.08(2)(b) …. 13.16

r 26.08(3) …. 13.19 r 26.08(4) …. 13.19 r 26.08(5) …. 13.13 r 26.08(6) …. 13.13 r 26.08(7) …. 13.13, 13.19 r 26.10(1) …. 11.10 r 26.10(2) …. 11.10 r 26.12(3) …. 13.87 r 35.03(2) …. 14.31 r 36.07 …. 6.21 r 37A.08(1) …. 14.25 r 37B.07(1) …. 14.25 r 50.07 …. 8.51 r 63.01(1) …. 1.6, 16.33, 23.43 r 63.01(2)(b) …. 16.33 r 63.02 …. 6.7 r 63.03(1) …. 14.2 r 63.03(2) …. 14.45, 14.56 r 63.03(2.1) …. 14.45, 14.56 r 63.03(3) …. 14.45 r 63.04(1) …. 8.12 r 63.04(2) …. 8.12 r 63.05 …. 15.27 r 63.07(1) …. 14.56, 15.9 r 63.07(2) …. 15.9 r 63.09 …. 14.32, 20.12

r 63.10 …. 14.56, 15.12 r 63.11(1) …. 15.12 r 63.11(2) …. 15.12 r 63.13 …. 14.1 r 63.14 …. 14.42 r 63.15 …. 14.59 r 63.17 …. 14.36 r 63.18 …. 14.31 r 63.19 …. 14.25 r 63.20 …. 14.28, 14.29 r 63.20.1 …. 14.56 r 63.21 …. 10.46 r 63.22 …. 1.17, 14.30 r 63.23 …. 23.43 r 63.23(1) …. 23.7, 23.44, 23.58, 23.65 r 63.23(1)(a) …. 23.43 r 63.23(1)(b) …. 23.43 r 63.23(1)(c) …. 23.43 r 63.23(1)(d) …. 23.43 r 63.23(2) …. 23.48 r 63.23(3) …. 23.68 r 63.23(4) …. 23.66 r 63.23(6) …. 23.68 r 63.24(1) …. 12.11, 12.15 r 63.24(1.1) …. 12.12 r 63.24(3) …. 12.11

r 63.24(4) …. 12.11 r 63.25 …. 12.11 r 63.28 …. 16.11 r 63.29 …. 16.11 r 63.30 …. 15.49, 16.11 r 63.30.1 …. 16.11 r 63.30.1(1) …. 16.23 r 63.31 …. 16.11, 16.43 r 63.32(1) …. 16.45 r 63.32(2) …. 16.33 r 63.33 …. 16.33 r 63.34(1) …. 15.69 r 63.34(2) …. 17.28 r 63.34(3) …. 15.69 r 63.34(4) …. 15.69 r 63.35 …. 15.30 r 63.36(2) …. 18.47 r 63.36(3) …. 18.47 r 63.36(4) …. 18.47 r 63.37(2) …. 5.16, 5.58, 5.61 r 63.38(1) …. 18.16 r 63.38(2) …. 18.16 r 63.38(3) …. 18.16 r 63.38(4) …. 18.16 r 63.39(1) …. 18.16 r 63.40 …. 18.16

r 63.41 …. 18.16 r 63.42 …. 18.16 r 63.42(1) …. 18.88 r 63.42(2) …. 18.88 r 63.42(3) …. 18.88 r 63.42(4) …. 18.88 r 63.43 …. 18.88 r 63.43(1) …. 18.84 r 63.43(2) …. 18.84 r 63.44 …. 17.18, 18.88 r 63.44(a) …. 17.20, 18.82 r 63.44(b) …. 17.20, 18.82 r 63.45 …. 5.58, 18.90 r 63.46(a) …. 18.16 r 63.47(1) …. 18.16 r 63.47(2) …. 18.16 r 63.47(3) …. 18.16 r 63.48 …. 18.88 r 63.48(2) …. 15.59, 15.70 r 63.49 …. 18.16 r 63.51 …. 15.31 r 63.53(1) …. 18.25 r 63.53(2) …. 18.25 r 63.54(1) …. 18.26 r 63.54(2) …. 18.26 r 63.55(1) …. 8.14

r 63.55(8) …. 18.60 r 63.55(9) …. 18.60 r 63.56 …. 5.50, 15.12 r 63.56(1) …. 18.33 r 63.56(2) …. 18.33 r 63.56(3) …. 18.33 r 63.56(4) …. 18.33 r 63.56(5) …. 18.39 r 63.56(6) …. 18.33 r 63.56.1(4) …. 18.62 r 63.56.1(5) …. 18.62 r 63.56.1(6) …. 18.62 r 63.56.1(7) …. 18.58 r 63.56.1(8) …. 18.62, 18.64 r 63.56.2 …. 18.63 r 63.56.2(8) …. 18.64 r 63.56.4(1) …. 18.63 r 63.56.4(2) …. 18.63 r 63.56.4(3)-(5) …. 18.63 r 63.56.4(6) …. 18.63 r 63.56.4(8) …. 18.64 r 63.56.4(9) …. 18.63 r 63.57 …. 5.61 r 63.57(1)-(3) …. 18.73 r 63.57(2) …. 18.73 r 63.57(4) …. 18.73

r 63.57(5) …. 18.73 r 63.57(6) …. 18.69, 18.73 r 63.57(7) …. 18.73 r 63.57(7)(c) …. 18.69 r 63.57(8) …. 18.73 r 63.59 …. 5.16 r 63.60 …. 5.26 r 63.61 …. 5.26, 16.38 r 63.62 …. 5.20 r 63.70(1) …. 8.24, 15.84 r 63.70(2) …. 8.24, 15.84 r 63.70(3) …. 8.24, 15.84 r 63.71(1) …. 15.83 r 63.71(2) …. 15.83 r 63.72 …. 15.69 r 63.73 …. 17.25 r 63.77(1) …. 17.28 r 63.77(2) …. 17.37 r 63.78 …. 17.8 r 63.79 …. 17.13 r 63.80 …. 17.52 r 63.81(1) …. 17.61 r 63.81(1)(c) …. 17.64, 17.65 r 63.81(2) …. 17.63 r 63.82(1) …. 17.48 r 63.82(2) …. 17.59

r 63.82(3) …. 17.59 r 63.83 …. 17.53 r 63.84 …. 17.57 r 63.85 …. 18.50 r 63.86 …. 18.17 r 63.87 …. 18.17 r 63.88(1) …. 18.17 r 63.88(2) …. 18.17 r 63.88(3) …. 18.17 r 63.88(4) …. 18.17 r 64.14 …. 14.61 r 64.15 …. 14.61 r 64.24(1) …. 20.2 r 75.14 …. 8.67, 16.68 Form 63A …. 18.16 O 12 …. 10.2 O 15 …. 22.68 O 26 …. 18.47 Appendix A …. 15.69, 18.88 Appendix A, item 1(e) …. 17.46 Appendix A, item 4 …. 17.27 Appendix A, item 17 …. 15.70, 17.70 Appendix A, item 19 …. 17.72 Appendix A, item 19(a)-(i) …. 17.70 Appendix A, item 19(j) …. 17.70 Appendix A, item 19(k) …. 17.70

Appendix A, item 22(a) …. 17.27 Appendix A, item 24 …. 17.27 Appendix A, item 38 …. 17.46 Appendix B …. 17.28, 17.29, 17.33, 17.37, 17.40 Supreme Court (Chapter I Amendment No 18) Rules 2001 r 9 …. 18.84 Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 …. 1.17, 14.30, 14.36, 14.56, 15.59, 15.69, 15.70, 16.11, 16.33, 17.2, 17.27, 17.46, 17.57, 17.59, 17.70, 18.88 Supreme Court (Cost Court Amendments) Rules 2009 …. 18.17 Transfer of Land Act 1958 s 110(5) …. 15.38 Trustee Act 1958 s 66 …. 10.12 s 77 …. 10.10 Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 s 62 …. 7.26 s 109 …. 6.17 s 109(1) …. 7.26, 8.89 s 109(3) …. 8.89 s 112(2) …. 15.38 s 117 …. 3.20 s 148 …. 3.21 Wills Act 2007 ss 21–30 …. 10.30 Wrongs Act 1958 s 32(2) …. 3.44

WESTERN AUSTRALIA Children and Community Services Act 2004 …. 3.52 Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 s 3 …. 19.22 s 8 …. 19.22 s 15(3) …. 20.13 Criminal Appeal Rules 2004 r 72(4) …. 14.61 Criminal Appeals Act 2004 s 14(1)(h) …. 24.67 s 20(2) …. 24.68 s 20(3) …. 24.68 s 24(2)(da) …. 24.69 s 25(3)(aa) …. 24.69 s 35(2) …. 24.69 s 35A …. 24.69 s 113(1) …. 24.69 Pt 3 …. 21.17 Criminal Code …. 24.22 s 5 …. 25.28 s 17 …. 25.28 s 678 …. 24.20 Criminal Code Act 1913 s 4 …. 25.28 Criminal Law and Evidence Amendment Act 2008 …. 24.69 Criminal Procedure Act 2004

s 67(1) …. 24.37 s 67(2) …. 24.37, 24.52 s 67(3) …. 24.37, 24.52 s 67(4) …. 24.37 s 123(2) …. 24.22 s 128(2) …. 25.28 s 128(3) …. 25.28 s 166(2) …. 24.22 Criminal Procedure and Appeals (Consequential and Other Provisions) Act 2004 …. 25.26 Crown Suits Act 1947 s 5 …. 24.4 Defamation Act 2005 s 21(1) …. 8.40 s 22(3) …. 12.22 s 40(2) …. 13.48 District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 s 87 …. 12.13 Electronic Transactions Act 2003 s 9 …. 4.19 Fair Trading Act 1987 s 4(1) …. 2.33 Family Court Act 1997 s 237 …. 8.70, 8.79 s 237A …. 8.59 Pt 5A …. 8.79

Family Provision Act 1972 …. 10.31 Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 Pt 6 …. 21.41 Inheritance (Family and Dependants Provision) Act 1972 s 14(6) …. 7.49, 10.32 Interpretation Act 1984 s 75(1) …. 4.20 Justices Act 1902 s 151 …. 24.37, 24.52 s 152 …. 24.37, 24.39, 24.52 s 199(1)(g) …. 24.67 s 219 …. 24.68 Legal Aid Commission Act 1976 s 14 …. 15.71 s 45 …. 8.69, 22.65, 23.38 Legal Practice Act 2003 s 90 …. 17.19 s 210 …. 24.37, 25.32 s 215 …. 24.37, 24.52 s 215(1) …. 5.20, 17.55 s 215(2) …. 5.20, 15.72, 16.31 s 215(2)(d) …. 16.31 s 215(3) …. 15.71 s 215(4) …. 15.71 s 221(1) …. 3.7, 3.8, 15.71, 15.75, 16.26 s 222(2) …. 3.16, 3.19

s 224 …. 4.49 s 225 …. 4.33 s 226 …. 7.19, 17.24 s 227(1)(b) …. 3.54 s 229(a) …. 5.12 s 230 …. 4.5 s 231 …. 4.5, 4.13 s 232(3) …. 5.8, 5.10 s 235 …. 5.18 s 236 …. 5.14 s 237(2) …. 5.57 s 237(3) …. 5.57 s 239 …. 5.46 s 241 …. 15.71 s 242 …. 5.61 Sch 4 Div 1 …. 15.71 Legal Practitioners Act 1893 s 58M …. 15.71 s 58ZB(1) …. 5.20, 15.71, 15.75, 16.26 s 58ZB(2) …. 15.71 s 58ZB(3) …. 15.71 s 59(1) …. 3.7, 3.8 s 59(5) …. 3.16, 3.19 s 61 …. 4.49 s 61(1) …. 4.49 s 61(2) …. 4.49

s 62 …. 4.33 s 62A(2) …. 7.19 s 63(1) …. 3.54 s 66(1) …. 5.8, 5.10 s 66A …. 5.18 s 66B …. 5.14 s 67(2) …. 5.57 s 68A(c) …. 4.20 s 68A(d) …. 5.12 s 69 …. 5.46 s 70(2) …. 15.71 s 71 …. 5.61 Legal Practitioners (Official Determination 2006

Prosecutions)

(Accused’s

Costs)

cl 7(1) …. 25.32 Legal Practitioners (Supreme Determination 2012

Court)

Sch, Table B item 20 …. 17.70 Sch, Table B item 20(a) …. 17.48 Sch, Table B item 20(b) …. 17.48 Sch, Table B item 20(c) …. 17.59 Sch, Table B item 20(d) …. 17.59 Sch, Table B item 30 …. 4.29, 17.27 Legal Profession Act 2008 …. 4.49, 7.19, 17.24 s 3 …. 3.6, 4.4, 5.2, 5.3, 5.41 s 69 …. 17.19 s 205(1) …. 4.31

(Contentious

Business)

s 225(1)(b) …. 4.32 s 225(2) …. 4.32 s 225(3) …. 4.32 s 251 …. 3.51, 4.13, 4.16, 5.7, 5.12, 5.18 s 252 …. 15.71 s 253(1) …. 2.23, 3.7, 5.9 s 253(1)(a) …. 5.9 s 260 …. 2.21 s 261 …. 2.22 s 262 …. 2.25 s 263 …. 2.30 s 264 …. 2.29 s 265 …. 2.21, 3.53 s 266 …. 2.24 s 267 …. 2.26 s 268 …. 2.31 s 269(1) …. 2.28 s 269(3) …. 2.28 s 270(1) …. 2.23 s 270(2) …. 2.25 s 271 …. 2.1, 3.2 s 272 …. 4.33 s 273(1) …. 4.60 s 273(2) …. 4.60 s 273(3) …. 4.60 s 273(4) …. 4.60

s 275 …. 24.37 s 275(1) …. 15.71, 16.26 s 280 …. 6.28, 24.37, 24.52 s 280(1) …. 15.75 s 280(2) …. 5.20, 15.72, 15.73, 15.74, 16.31 s 280(2)(d) …. 16.23, 16.31 s 280(3) …. 15.71 s 280(4) …. 15.71 s 282(1) …. 3.7 s 282(1)(a) …. 4.58 s 282(1)(b) …. 4.58 s 282(1)(c) …. 4.58 s 282(2) …. 3.8 s 282(3) …. 3.11 s 282(4) …. 3.11 s 282(5) …. 5.18 s 283(1) …. 3.51 s 283(2) …. 3.52 s 283(3)(a) …. 3.51 s 283(3)(b) …. 3.51 s 283(3)(c)–(e) …. 3.51 s 283(4) …. 3.51 s 283(5) …. 3.51 s 284(1) …. 3.53 s 284(2) …. 3.53 s 284(3) …. 3.53

s 284(4)(a) …. 3.53 s 284(4)(b) …. 3.53 s 285 …. 3.54 s 286 …. 3.6, 4.58 s 287(1) …. 3.8, 3.57 s 287(2) …. 3.57 s 287(3) …. 3.58 s 287(4) …. 3.58 s 287(5) …. 3.58 s 287(6) …. 3.60 s 288(2) …. 3.16 s 288(3) …. 3.16 s 288(5) …. 3.19 s 288(6) …. 3.19 s 288(7) …. 3.19 s 288(8) …. 3.19 s 288(9) …. 3.16 s 289(1) …. 4.5, 4.21 s 289(2) …. 4.7 s 289(3) …. 4.8 s 289(4) …. 4.6 s 290(1) …. 4.20 s 290(2) …. 4.12 s 290(3) …. 4.18 s 290(4) …. 4.18 s 290(5) …. 4.18

s 290(6) …. 4.20 s 290(6)(d) …. 4.20 s 291(1) …. 4.16 s 292(1) …. 4.12 s 292(2) …. 4.12 s 292(4) …. 4.5 s 292(5) …. 4.5 s 292(6) …. 4.29 s 293(1) …. 4.17, 4.50 s 295(2) …. 5.8 s 295(3) …. 5.8 s 295(4) …. 5.13 s 295(5) …. 5.13 s 295(6) …. 5.10 s 295(7) …. 5.12 s 296(1) …. 5.8 s 296(2) …. 5.13 s 296(3) …. 5.13 s 296(4) …. 5.10 s 296(5) …. 5.10 s 297(1)–(3) …. 5.8 s 297(4) …. 5.10 s 298(b) …. 4.1, 5.14 s 301(1) …. 5.16 s 301(2) …. 5.16 s 302(1) …. 5.18

s 302(2) …. 5.18 s 303 …. 5.20, 17.55 s 304(2) …. 5.46 s 306 …. 15.71 s 307(1) …. 5.23 s 307(2) …. 5.23 s 308 …. 5.61 s 309 …. 5.7 s 448(2) …. 4.1 Pt 10 Div 6 …. 3.57 Pt 10 Div 9 …. 15.71 Legal Practitioners Regulations 2009 reg 65 …. 4.32 Legal Practitioners Rules 2010 r 27(1) …. 4.46 r 27(1)(a) …. 4.48 r 27(1)(c) …. 4.48 r 27(1)(d) …. 4.48 r 27(1)(e) …. 4.48 r 27(1)(f) …. 4.48 r 27(2) …. 4.48 r 27(3) …. 4.48 r 27(4) …. 4.48 Limitation Act 2005 s 13 …. 3.18 Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004

s 25(9) …. 7.26 Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1943 s 27A …. 4.42 Official Prosecutions (Accused’s Costs) Act 1973 …. 24.37, 24.39, 24.53, 25.3, 25.26 s 3(1) …. 24.70 s 3(2) …. 24.70 s 4(1) …. 25.26, 25.27, 25.28, 25.29 s 4(2) …. 24.68 s 4(2)(a) …. 25.28 s 4(2)(b) …. 25.31 s 4(2)(c) …. 25.28 s 5 …. 24.68 s 5(1) …. 25.26 s 5(2) …. 25.29 s 5(2)–(5) …. 25.31 s 5(3) …. 24.70, 25.29 s 5(4) …. 24.70, 25.29 s 5(5) …. 25.32 s 6 …. 25.30 s 7(1) …. 25.31 s 7(2) …. 25.31 s 7(3) …. 25.31 Official Prosecutions (Defendants’ Costs) Act 1973 …. 25.26 Professional Conduct Rules r 10.1 …. 2.21, 2.36

r 11.1 …. 2.37 r 15(5)(a)(iii) …. 2.36 r 16A(1)–(5) …. 2.21 r 16A(6) …. 2.30 Restraining Orders Act 1997 s 69(1) …. 6.20 Road Traffic Act 1974 …. 25.30 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 s 87(1) …. 8.89 s 87(2)–(4) …. 8.89 Suitors’ Fund Act 1964 …. 21.1 s 3 …. 21.17, 21.23 s 8 …. 21.23 s 9 …. 21.23 s 10(1) …. 21.21 s 10(2) …. 21.21 s 11(1) …. 21.23 s 11(1)(a) …. 21.23 s 11(2) …. 21.25 s 11(3)(a) …. 21.25 s 11(3)(b) …. 21.26 s 12(1) …. 21.27 s 12(2) …. 21.28 s 12(3) …. 21.28 s 12(4)(a) …. 21.28 s 12A(1) …. 21.44

s 12A(2) …. 21.39 s 12A(4)(a) …. 21.44 s 12A(4)(b) …. 21.39 s 12A(5) …. 21.44 s 13(1) …. 21.50 s 13(3) …. 21.60 s 14(1)(a) …. 21.29 s 14(1)(b) …. 21.29 s 14(1)(ba) …. 21.29 s 14(1)(c) …. 21.29, 21.30 s 14(1)(d) …. 21.29, 21.30, 21.31 s 14(1a) …. 21.29 s 14(1b) …. 21.29 s 14(2) …. 21.33, 21.60 s 14A …. 21.21 s 14A(2) …. 21.26 s 14B(1) …. 21.40 s 14B(2) …. 21.41 s 14B(3) …. 21.41 s 14B(4) …. 21.42 s 15(1) …. 21.35 s 15(1)(a) …. 21.36 s 15(2)(a) …. 21.36 s 15(2)(b) …. 21.36 s 15(3) …. 21.60 s 15A …. 21.60

Suitors’ Fund Regulations 1965 reg 14 …. 21.26 Supreme Court Act 1935 s 4 …. 24.15 s 37(1) …. 6.7, 6.14, 22.6, 24.11 s 37(2) …. 24.11, 24.15 s 60(1)(e) …. 20.36 s 142 …. 19.22 Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 r 49(1) …. 13.87 r 59(4) …. 14.61 Supreme Court Rules 1971 O 1 r 4 …. 1.6, 15.27 O 1 r 4B …. 8.51, 10.39, 14.47, 16.66 O 1 r 4B(1)(a)-(d) …. 7.48, 10.31, 11.52, 15.15, 16.55 O 1 r 4B(1)(e) …. 7.48, 15.85 O 3 r 5 …. 15.74, 18.27 O 17 …. 10.2 O 17 r 15 …. 10.2 O 18 r 12 …. 11.59 O 19 r 1 …. 11.32 O 19 r 12 …. 11.33 O 21 r 10 …. 6.21 O 23 r 2(1) …. 14.59, 14.62 O 23 r 2(2) …. 14.62 O 23 r 2(3) …. 14.59, 14.62

O 23 r 3 …. 14.62 O 23 r 4 …. 14.60 O 24A …. 13.58 O 24A r 1(1) …. 13.5 O 24A r 1(2) …. 13.5 O 24A r 3(1) …. 13.5, 13.30 O 24A r 3(3) …. 13.31 O 24A r 3(5) …. 13.5 O 24A r 3(6) …. 13.5 O 24A r 3(8) …. 13.5, 13.30 O 24A r 6 …. 13.5 O 24A r 7(1) …. 13.5 O 24A r 7(2) …. 13.5 O 24A r 7(3) …. 13.5 O 24A r 10(1) …. 14.72 O 24A r 10(2) …. 13.10, 14.72 O 24A r 10(4) …. 13.14 O 24A r 10(4a) …. 13.14 O 24A r 10(5) …. 13.19 O 24A r 10(6) …. 13.19 O 24A r 10(7) …. 13.13 O 24A r 10(8) …. 13.13 O 24A r 10(9) …. 13.13, 13.19 O 26 …. 14.31 O 29 r 3 …. 8.51 O 30 r 2 …. 14.31

O 30 r 4(2) …. 14.31 O 30 r 5 …. 14.31 O 30 r 5(2) …. 14.31 O 42 r 2 …. 19.22 O 52A r 8(1) …. 14.25 O 52B r 7(1) …. 14.25 O 66 …. 14.45, 16.12, 18.64 O 66 r 1 …. 7.42 O 66 r 1(1) …. 6.7, 7.4 O 66 r 1(2) …. 8.27, 8.47, 8.65, 16.12 O 66 r 1(3) …. 8.11 O 66 r 2(a) …. 8.11 O 66 r 2(d) …. 11.52 O 66 r 2(e) …. 11.2, 11.5 O 66 r 2(f) …. 11.59 O 66 r 3(1) …. 14.36 O 66 r 3(2) …. 14.31 O 66 r 3(3) …. 14.31 O 66 r 4(1) …. 10.1 O 66 r 4(3) …. 10.46 O 66 r 4B(e) …. 7.42 O 66 r 4B(f) …. 7.42 O 66 r 5 …. 23.58, 23.61 O 66 r 5(1) …. 23.7, 23.44, 23.49, 23.58, 23.65 O 66 r 5(1)(a) …. 23.43 O 66 r 5(1)(b) …. 23.43

O 66 r 5(1)(c) …. 23.43 O 66 r 5(2) …. 23.68 O 66 r 5(3) …. 23.66 O 66 r 5(4) …. 23.68 O 66 r 6 …. 22.68 O 66 r 7 …. 8.17 O 66 r 8 …. 17.22 O 66 r 8A(1) …. 7.15 O 66 r 9(1) …. 10.23 O 66 r 9(2) …. 10.1, 10.4 O 66 r 10(1) …. 14.2, 14.45 O 66 r 10(2) …. 20.12 O 66 r 10(3) …. 14.32, 20.12 O 66 r 11(1) …. 15.71 O 66 r 11(2) …. 15.71 O 66 r 11(3) …. 5.26, 15.59, 16.12, 16.26, 16.30, 17.55 O 66 r 11(4) …. 15.71 O 66 r 11(5) …. 17.28 O 66 r 12(1) …. 5.20, 6.28, 15.72, 15.73 O 66 r 13 …. 15.11 O 66 r 14(1) …. 15.11 O 66 r 14(2) …. 15.11 O 66 r 17 …. 12.13 O 66 r 17(1) …. 12.13, 12.15 O 66 r 17(2) …. 12.13 O 66 r 18(1) …. 15.77

O 66 r 18(2) …. 15.77 O 66 r 19(a) …. 16.12 O 66 r 21 …. 14.71 O 66 r 23 …. 15.72 O 66 r 32(1) …. 15.7, 15.27, 18.22 O 66 r 32(2) …. 15.12 O 66 r 34 …. 18.22 O 66 r 35(1) …. 18.22 O 66 r 35(2) …. 18.22 O 66 r 36 …. 18.89 O 66 r 37 …. 18.26 O 66 r 38 …. 18.22 O 66 r 39 …. 18.22 O 66 r 40 …. 18.25 O 66 r 42(1) …. 18.89 O 66 r 42(2) …. 18.89 O 66 r 43 …. 18.53 O 66 r 44 …. 15.30 O 66 r 45 …. 15.31 O 66 r 48 …. 14.28 O 66 r 49 …. 14.33 O 66 r 50 …. 1.17, 14.30 O 66 r 51(1) …. 15.11 O 66 r 53 …. 18.53 O 66 r 53(1) …. 18.53 O 66 r 53(2) …. 18.53

O 66 r 54(1) …. 18.54 O 66 r 54(2) …. 18.54, 18.64 O 66 r 54(3) …. 18.55 O 66 r 54(4) …. 18.39, 18.55 O 66 r 54(5) …. 18.55 O 66 r 55 …. 5.61 O 66 r 55(1) …. 18.70 O 66 r 55(2) …. 18.70 O 66 r 55(3) …. 18.69 O 66 r 56 …. 5.61, 18.70 O 66 r 57 …. 18.28, 18.37 O 66 r 58 …. 18.54 O 66 r 59 …. 8.14 O 70 …. 22.68 O 73 r 15 …. 10.23 Trustees Act 1962 s 97 …. 10.9, 10.12 s 98 …. 10.10 Wills Act 1970 ss 39–48 …. 10.30

UNITED KINGDOM Attorneys’ and Solicitors’ Act 1870 …. 3.4 s 4 …. 3.4 s 9 …. 3.3 Civil Procedure Rules 1998

r 40.8(1) …. 19.6 r 40.8(2) …. 19.6 r 44.4 …. 16.19 r 48.6(2) …. 7.36 Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1952 …. 25.15 Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 s 58 …. 3.48 s 58A …. 3.48 s 58B …. 3.48 Judgments Act 1838 s 17 …. 19.5 Judicature Act 1890 s 4 …. 24.7, 24.8, 24.11, 24.16, 24.17 s 5 …. 6.3, 22.4, 22.5, 24.7, 24.8, 24.11, 24.16, 24.17 Judicature Acts 1873–75 …. 6.3, 16.3, 19.6 Litigants in Person (Costs and Expenses) Act 1975 s 1(1) …. 7.36 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 Pt II …. 25.15 Senior Courts Act 1981 s 51(7) …. 23.10 s 51(7)(a) …. 23.50 Statute of Frauds …. 4.19 Statute of Gloucester of 1278 (6 Edw I c 1) …. 6.2, 7.27 Statute of Marlborough 1267 (52 Henry III c 6) …. 6.2 Supreme Court Act 1981

s 51(1) …. 6.3, 22.5 s 51(3) …. 22.5 s 51(7) …. 23.10 s 51(7)(a) …. 23.50 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1925 …. 6.3 Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 s 31(1)(h) …. 20.38 Supreme Court Rules …. 19.6 O 62 r 8 …. 23.60 O 62 r 11 …. 23.50 O 62 r 28(3) …. 16.19 O 62 r 28(4) …. 16.19

CANADA Charter of Rights and Freedoms …. 9.37

NEW ZEALAND Code of Civil Procedure r 565 …. 8.11 Companies Act 1993 s 166 …. 14.10 Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 …. 25.15 s 2 …. 25.26 s 5(2) …. 25.18, 25.20 s 5(2)(a) …. 25.18 s 13(3) …. 25.32

High Court Rules r 11.27(1) …. 19.15

Abbreviations Texts and reports ALRC IP13

ALRC 46

ALRC 75 ALRC 89

Cairns Carter Colbran Dal Pont Dal Pont, Equity and Trusts Delany Oliver WALRC 92

Australian Law Reform Commission, Who Should Pay? A Review of the Litigation Costs Rules, Issues Paper 13, 1994 Australian Law Reform Commission, Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court, Report No 46, 1988 Australian Law Reform Commission, Costs Shifting — Who Pays for Litigation?, Report No 75, 1995 Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Civil Justice System, Report No 89, 2000 B C Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure, 9th ed, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2011 J W Carter, Contract Law in Australia, 6th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2013 S E Colbran, Security for Costs, Longman Professional, Melbourne, 1993 G E Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility, 5th ed, Lawbook Co, 2013 G E Dal Pont, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 5th ed, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2011 J Delaney, Security for Costs, Law Book Co, Sydney, 1989 L L Oliver, Law of Costs, Law Book Co, Melbourne, 1960 Western Australian Law Reform Commission,

Review of the Criminal and Civil Justice System in Western Australia, Consultation Drafts, Project 92, June 1999

Legal profession legislation and regulations (mainly in Chs 2–5) ACT NSW NT Qld SA Tas Vic WA

Legal Profession Act 2006 (commenced 1 July 2006) Legal Profession Act 2004 (commenced 1 October 2005) Legal Profession Act 2006 (commenced 31 March 2007) Legal Profession Act 2007 (commenced 1 July 2007) Legal Practitioners Act 1981 Legal Profession Act 2007 (commenced 31 December 2008) Legal Profession Act 2004 (commenced 12 December 2005) Legal Profession Act 2008 (commenced 1 March 2009)

In the notes, reference is made to the previous statutory provisions in all jurisdictions except South Australia, adopting the following abbreviations: ACT 1970 NSW 1987 NT 1974 Qld 1952 Tas 1993 Vic 1996

Legal Practitioners Act 1970 Legal Profession Act 1987 Legal Practitioners Act 1974 Queensland Law Society Act 1952 Legal Profession Act 1993 Legal Practice Act 1996

WA 1893 WA 2003

Legal Practitioners Act 1893 Legal Practice Act 2003 (commenced 1 January 2004)

Reference is also made to the legal profession regulations under the legal profession legislation, abbreviated as follows: ACT 2007 NSW 2005 NSW 2002 NT 2007 Qld 2007 SA 2009 SA 2004 Tas 2008 Vic 2005 WA 2009

Legal Profession Regulation 2007 Legal Profession Regulation 2005 Legal Profession Regulation 2002 (replaced by the 2005 regulation) Legal Profession Regulations 2007 Legal Profession Regulation 2007 Legal Practitioners Regulations 2009 Legal Practitioners Regulations 2004 (replaced by the 2009 regulation) Legal Profession Regulations 2008 Legal Profession Regulations 2005 Legal Profession Regulations 2009

Court rules (mainly in Chs 6–29) HCR 2004 FCR 2011 FCCR Fam LR 2004 ACT NSW

High Court Rules 2004 (commenced 1 January 2005) Federal Court Rules 2011 (commenced 1 August 2011) Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 Family Law Rules 2004 (commenced 29 March 2004) Court Procedures Rules 2006 (commenced 1 July 2006) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (commenced

NT Qld SA Tas Vic WA RLEC DCR DCCR CPR

15 August 2005) Supreme Court Rules 1987 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999* (commenced 1 July 1999) Supreme Court Civil Rules 20061 (commenced 4 September 2006) Supreme Court Rules 2000 Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 20052 Supreme Court Rules 19713 Land and Environment Court Rules 2007 (NSW) (commenced 28 January 2008) District Court Rules (in various jurisdictions) District Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK)

*

where reference is made in parentheses to the previous Queensland rule, the reference is to the costs provisions as they read prior to 10 December 2007, being the date on which the Uniform Civil Procedure Amendment Rule (No 4) 2007 (Qld) took effect. Reference is also made to the predecessors of recently replaced rules in the following jurisdictions, namely: HCR 1952 FCR 1979 Fam LR 1984 ACT RSC NSW RSC Qld RSC SA RSC RLEC 1996

High Court Rules 1952 Federal Court Rules 1979 Family Law Rules 1984 Supreme Court Rules 1937 Supreme Court Rules 1970 (parts of which continue to have effect) Supreme Court Rules 1900 Supreme Court Rules 1987 Land and Environment Court Rules 1996 (NSW)

Professional rules LCA ASCR ACT NSW NT Qld SA Tas Vic WA 2010

Law Council of Australia, Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice (superseded) Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules (21 June 2011) Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007 Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 1995 Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice (effective 10 April 2002) Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules Rules of Practice 1994 Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 2005 Legal Profession Conduct Rules 2010

Suitors’ fund legislation (in Ch 21) Cth NSW Qld Tas Vic WA

Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 Appeal Costs Fund Act 1973 Appeal Costs Fund Act 1968 Appeal Costs Act 1998 Suitors’ Fund Act 1964

Court and jurisdiction abbreviations In addition to the above abbreviations, the following abbreviations are used: Alta

Alberta

App Div BC CA CC CCA CS(Scot) DC Div Ct Fam Ct FC FCA Fed FCC Gen Div HC HCJ HL KB LC LEC LVC Man Nfld NS Ont PC PEI QB QS

Appeal Division British Columbia Court of Appeal County Court Court of Criminal Appeal Scottish Court of Session District Court Divisional Court Family Court of Australia Full Court Federal Court of Australia Federal Federal Circuit Court General Division High Court High Court of Justice House of Lords King’s Bench Local Court New South Wales Land and Environment Court New South Wales Land and Valuation Court Manitoba Newfoundland Nova Scotia Ontario Privy Council Prince Edward Island Queen’s Bench Quarter Sessions

Sask SC SCC SCJ

Saskatchewan Supreme Court Supreme Court of Canada Superior Court of Justice

Contents Preface Table of Cases Table of Statutes Abbreviations 1.

Prologue

Part I 2. 3. 4. 5.

Retainer and Costs Disclosure Costs Agreements Restrictions on the Recovery of Lawyer-Client Costs Assessment of Lawyer and Own Client Bills

Part II 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Costs Between Lawyer and Own Client

Costs Between Party and Party

Jurisdiction and Discretion to Order Costs The Costs Indemnity Rule Ouster of General Rule that Costs Follow the Event Public Interest and Test Case Litigation Costs Out of a Fund Costs of Multiple Parties Costs Sanctions for Proceedings in Wrong Court Costs Consequences of Rejected Settlement Offers Timing of Costs Order

Part III Quantification of Party and Party Costs 15. Nature of Party-Party Costs Quantification 16. Bases of Costs Quantification

17. Allowances on Costs Quantification Between Party and Party 18. Procedure Relating to Costs Quantification 19. Interest on Party and Party Costs

Part IV Costs in Appeals 20. Appeals 21. Suitors’ and Appeal Costs Funds Legislation

Part V

Non-Party Costs Orders

22. Costs Orders and Non-Parties 23. Costs Orders Against Lawyers

Part VI Costs in Criminal Cases 24. Costs in Criminal Cases 25. Costs in Criminal Cases Legislation

Part VII Securing Costs Entitlements 26. 27. 28. 29.

The Retaining Lien The Particular Lien Nature of Security for Costs Order Discretion to Order Security for Costs

Index

[page 1]

CHAPTER 1

Prologue The Law of Costs

1.1

Definitions Meaning of ‘costs’ ‘Solicitor and client’ costs ‘Party and party’ costs Meaning of ‘costs’ in legislation Meaning of ‘disbursements’

1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8

Courts’ Concern and Control Over Quantum of Costs

1.10

Curial Discretion as to Costs Orders

1.12

Court Orders as to Costs ‘Costs in the cause’ ‘Costs in any event’ ‘Costs reserved’ Order ‘silent as to costs’ ‘Costs of action’ and ‘costs of trial’ Costs ‘of and incidental to’ the proceedings ‘Costs of the claim’ and ‘costs of the counterclaim’ ‘Whole costs’ and ‘general costs’ ‘Costs of the day’ and ‘costs thrown away’ ‘No order as to costs’ ‘Costs of appeal’ and ‘costs here and below’ Costs ‘abide the result of’ a new trial

1.14 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.19 1.20 1.21 1.22 1.23 1.24 1.25 1.26

‘Costs in the rehearing’ Overview of the Book

1.27 1.28

The Law of Costs 1.1 The issue of costs is central to essentially all forms of legal practice. Almost every retainer between lawyer and client, whether contentious or noncontentious, has costs consequences. In fact, no other area of law can lay claim to so expansive a pervasiveness to a lawyer’s practice. The issue of costs is, moreover, central to the existence of a legal profession, in the past, at present and into the future. The reason for this is that costs are the lifeblood of the legal [page 2] profession, crucial to the livelihood of the majority of lawyers. Orders for costs are, moreover, an effective way of encouraging settlements,1 discouraging inappropriate behaviour by litigants,2 and controlling standards in the profession.3 Befitting its centrality, it is unsurprising that the case law on costs is extensive. Back in 1929 an English Court of Appeal judge passed the remark that ‘a very large number of cases were reported upon costs’,4 which has done nothing but expand exponentially since. Although the majority of costs cases are not reported, many justifiably so, reference must not infrequently be made to unreported cases if a proper appreciation of the relevant (local) practice is to be gained. In any event, the huge weight of case law, coupled with the many forms of legal practice, dictate that no text — even one unrestricted by page length — can pretend to exhaustively state the law of costs as it applies to all matters in Australia. 1.2 The law of costs represents an amalgam of several areas of substantive law, the most obvious being the law of contract and the principles of equity that underscore the lawyer–client retainer. Yet by far the bulk of the law

peculiar to costs has its genesis in statute and statutory (court) rules. This dictates that, inter alia, the law of costs is primarily a matter specific to each jurisdiction. General concepts may exhibit similarities between jurisdictions, but there remain many and varied detail distinctions. Generalisations therefore run the risk of misleading, and so it is frequently necessary to address the specific statutory or rule provisions in the jurisdiction in question. 1.3 The matter is complicated by at least two further factors. First, as much of the law of costs is procedural, and matters of procedure are sometimes prone to rest upon local practice, it cannot be assumed that even similar rules between jurisdictions will be applied in the same way. Second, as costs law is sourced in many instances from rules of court, it may vary within a jurisdiction according to the court (or tribunal) in which the proceeding is brought or litigated. These two factors present additional reasons why it is unrealistic to attempt an exhaustive treatment of the law of costs.

Definitions Meaning of ‘costs’ 1.4 Although a reference to ‘costs’ most commonly refers to the price paid for legal services and advice, it is essential at the outset to understand that the law of costs refers to ‘costs’ in two principal contexts, each discussed below.

‘Solicitor and client’ costs 1.5 The term ‘costs’ can refer to ‘the remuneration of a solicitor for professional services rendered to a client’,5 known as costs ‘as between solicitor and own client’ or simply ‘solicitor–client costs’. They represent the amount a client is obliged to pay his or her lawyer as the price of professional work, the lawyer’s entitlement thereto having its genesis in the retainer agreement between lawyer and client.6 The amount of ‘costs’ in this context may include what are otherwise termed ‘disbursements’.7 [page 3]

‘Party and party’ costs 1.6 As most civil litigation conducted in Australia operates on a ‘loser pays’ basis so far as costs are concerned — that is, the unsuccessful litigant is liable for the costs of the successful litigant — the notion of costs is not limited to ‘solicitor–client costs’. Sometimes termed the ‘costs indemnity rule’,8 in this context the term ‘costs’ refers to ‘the amount which the person to whom the order is directed must pay to some party to the litigation as partial indemnity for the professional legal fees and expenses incurred by that party in the course of the litigation’.9 Costs of this kind are referred to as costs ‘as between party and party’, or more simply, ‘party and party costs’,10 and usually include disbursements11 (provided that these relate to the proceeding in which the costs order is made).12 Importantly, the duty to pay ‘party and party costs’ is ordinarily sourced not from a contract but from an order of a court or tribunal. In this respect, the term ‘costs’ relates not to the relationship between a client and his or her lawyer, but to the relationship between a client and another person who is customarily another party to the proceedings in which the costs have been awarded, that represent an indemnity against the costs the client has incurred in those proceedings.13 ‘Costs’ in this sense encompasses only the price paid for professional services rendered by a qualified lawyer in the litigation; it does not extend to compensating the client in whose favour the order is made for the disadvantage, inconvenience or time he or she has personally incurred or devoted to the proceedings. These may be seen as ‘costs’ in the ordinary use of the word, but do not fall within the description of ‘costs’ on a party and party basis.14

Meaning of ‘costs’ in legislation 1.7 Where the term ‘costs’ appears in a statute, its meaning is governed by any applicable definitional provision in the statute. If no definition is prescribed, it is the context in which it is used, in the section where it appears and more generally the subject matter of the legislation, that determines its meaning. Where the term ‘costs’ is used in the context of a power to make an order for costs, courts have ordinarily treated this as referring to ‘party and party

costs’. In Bank of New South Wales v Withers15 Sheppard J held that a court’s statutory power to award ‘costs’ in all proceedings before it,16 given the lack of any indication that the legislature was using the word ‘costs’ in other than its ordinary sense, did not cover expenses incurred in collecting documents required to be produced. The same statutory provision was held, in Wenkart v Pantzer,17 not to embrace the ‘costs’ incurred by the community in providing the forum in which the parties [page 4] have ventilated their ongoing dispute. Reference in a statute to ‘costs’ generally is, as a starting point and subject to statutory indications to the contrary, apt to embrace both costs as between party and party and costs as between one lawyer and client.18

Meaning of ‘disbursements’ 1.8 A ‘disbursement’ is a payment made on behalf of a client. The classic definition of a ‘disbursement’ is that of Lord Langdale MR in Re Remnant:19 … those payments only, which are made in pursuance of the professional duty undertaken by the solicitor, and which he is bound to perform, or which are sanctioned as professional payments, by the general and established custom and practice of the profession, ought to be entered or allowed as professional disbursements in the bill of costs.

Essentially disbursements refer to money that, for the purposes of the retainer or proceeding, has been actually paid out to others, such as witnesses,20 counsel,21 foreign lawyers not entitled to practise in the jurisdiction,22 professional advisers and so forth, to be distinguished from ‘costs’ strictly speaking, which are intended to cover remuneration for the exercise of professional legal skill by a lawyer23 (or employees under his or her supervision).24 Expressed another way, these types of disbursements (termed ‘professional disbursements’) are money paid on behalf of a client to a third party that can properly be included in the lawyer’s bill of costs.25 When the term ‘disbursement’ is used in a statute in the context of legal representation, it takes its legal meaning, subject to any provision in the

relevant statute to the contrary or a clear indication contextually that it was intended to attract a different meaning.26 1.9 Sometimes the term ‘disbursement’ is used to refer to a payment a lawyer makes as agent for the client, but is not bound to make personally. This type of payment, known as a ‘nonprofessional disbursement’, is included not in the bill of costs but in the lawyer’s statement of account (‘cash account’) to the client. The cash account may include payments of taxes and [page 5] duties27 or purchase moneys, moneys paid into court,28 and costs paid to opposing parties.29 So professional disbursements represent amounts the lawyer is bound to pay if the client does not provide funds for it, whereas for non-professional disbursements there is no such personal liability.30 This distinction is important not merely so far as the lawyer’s liability is concerned;31 it has proven important in allocating the costs of taxation,32 premised as these commonly are on the amount by which a bill of costs and professional (but not non-professional) disbursements is reduced on taxation.33 Also, unlike non-professional disbursements, professional disbursements are subject to taxation34 and may be secured by the solicitor’s retaining lien.35

Courts’ Concern and Control Over Quantum of Costs 1.10 Whether referring to ‘solicitor–client’ or ‘party and party’ costs, courts have repeatedly expressed concern as to the quantum of costs, and its impact on the community’s access to legal advice and justice. Law reform bodies have echoed this lament.36 In addition, there are curial observations that public confidence in the legal profession — essential as it is to the administration of justice — is impaired by inordinate or unreasonable claims or charges.37 A New South Wales judge, some 50 years ago, described the costs of litigation as ‘so burdensome as to cause the greatest concern’, branding them ‘a crippling load on the community’, which close ‘the doors of

the courts to the average citizen’.38 More recently, in a case that stemmed largely from a $500,000 solicitor–client legal bill for effecting a matrimonial property settlement, Kirby P observed:39 Little wonder that the legal profession, and its methods of charging, are coming under close parliamentary, media and public scrutiny. Something appears to be seriously wrong in the organisation of the provision of legal services in this community when charges of this order can be contemplated, still less made … If such costs, in what was substantially a single matrimonial property case between a married couple, are truly regarded as reasonable, there may be something seriously wrong in the assessment of reasonableness within the legal profession which this Court should resolutely correct.

1.11 Concerns expressed regarding lawyers’ costs, coupled with lawyers’ virtual monopoly on legal services and their position of knowledge, has led the law to impose safeguards on lawyer–client charging. These safeguards include the following. First, statute generally requires lawyers to give to clients, inter alia, an estimate of the costs of the matter and the manner of charging.40 Second, charging of extortionate or grossly excessive costs is capable of generating [page 6] a professional disciplinary sanction.41 Third, courts enjoy an equitable jurisdiction to set aside costs agreements resulting from undue influence or breach of fiduciary duty,42 and an inherent43 and statutory jurisdiction to set aside unreasonable and unfair costs agreements.44 Fourth, a client is statutorily entitled to have the reasonableness of a solicitor–client bill of costs subject to an independent adjudication through the process of taxation or assessment.45 Fifth, the process of taxation or assessment is commonly also ordered so as to quantify the proper indemnity to be accorded by ‘party and party’ costs.46

Curial Discretion as to Costs Orders 1.12 Statute has traditionally vested in courts an apparently unfettered discretion as to the award of party and party costs.47 Whereas in many areas of the law judges go to some lengths to disclaim the exercise of unfettered discretion,48 in the area of costs judges have relished it. The courts’ reticence

to stipulate rules for the exercise of the discretion — the fear being that rules may become a fetter on the discretion49 — dictates that matters of costs ‘are not matters which are susceptible to sustained argument unless some proposition of law is involved’.50 1.13 Yet it is precisely this discretion that generates frequent argument on costs, which a set rule would avoid. To this end, there is a tension between the courts laying down general principles or rules pursuant to which the discretion is ordinarily exercised, but preventing those principles or rules hardening into fetters. In the nineteenth century an English judge recognised this dilemma in remarking that ‘[t]o lay down principles of law is a very good thing, but it is a very dangerous thing to lay down inflexible rules of practice’.51 Over a century later Mason and Deane JJ in Norbis v Norbis expressed similar sentiments in observing that:52 [t]he point of preserving the width of the discretion which Parliament has created is that it maximizes the possibility of doing justice in every case. But the need for consistency in judicial adjudication, which is the antithesis of arbitrary and capricious decision-making, provides an important countervailing consideration supporting the giving of guidance by appellate courts, whether in the form of principles or guidelines.

Their Honours noted that frequent judicial statements of high authority that a broad discretion left largely unfettered by parliament cannot be fettered by the judicial enunciation of guidance in the form of binding rules53 do not mean that parliament intended the courts not to develop rules or guidelines affecting its exercise.54 Brennan J in the same case explained the impact of such a distinction as follows:55 [page 7] The distinction between such a guideline and a binding rule of law, though essential, may be thin in practice. But the distinction must be maintained and a failure to apply the guideline cannot be treated as an error of law: a failure to apply the guideline is no more than a factor which warrants a close scrutiny of the particular exercise of the discretion. What cannot be shut out is the discretion of a primary judge not to apply the guideline when the circumstances of the particular case show that its application would produce an unjust or inequitable result or that another approach would produce a more just and equitable result.

Mason and Deane JJ agreed that a failure to apply a guideline does not of itself amount to error, but added that the failure to do so in a situation to

which the guideline applies may throw a question mark over the decision and ease an appellant’s burden of showing that it is wrong.56

Court Orders as to Costs 1.14 As Australian courts are generally conferred a discretion to make costs orders for or against the parties to litigation before them, it follows that courts have a discretion as to the type of order that is made. Most commonly the order in contentious civil proceedings is one directing the unsuccessful party to pay the taxed or assessed costs of the successful party. This represents no more than the most basic illustration of the ‘costs indemnity rule’.57 In other circumstances, where the litigation concerns money in a fund in respect of which the litigants claim an interest, the court may order that some or all of the taxed or assessed costs of one or more of the litigants come out of that fund.58 In making certain types of costs orders, the courts will often use particular terminology, the effect of which must be understood. The main examples are discussed below.

‘Costs in the cause’ 1.15 When a court orders that costs be ‘costs in the cause’, it means that the costs are awarded according to the final award of ‘costs in the action’ (or ‘costs in the proceedings’). By definition, therefore, these target costs orders in respect of interlocutory proceedings.59 The expression ‘merely means costs not now disposed of; after the trial they have to be disposed of with the costs of the trial, which are themselves costs in the cause’.60 So a plaintiff who is successful in the cause and gets an order for costs is entitled to costs of interlocutory proceedings that have been made ‘costs in the cause’ against the defendant. If the defendant succeeds in the cause and gets an order for costs, the defendant instead gets those interlocutory costs as part of his or her costs of the action against the plaintiff.61 An order that certain costs be ‘plaintiff’s costs in the cause’ means the plaintiff is entitled to the costs of the interlocutory proceedings if he or she wins, but does not have to pay the defendant’s costs of them if he or she loses.62 An order that costs be the ‘defendant’s costs in the cause’ effects the converse outcome.

‘Costs in any event’ 1.16 In making a costs order in respect of interlocutory proceedings a court may, rather than to order that the costs be ‘costs in the cause’, order that they be ‘costs in any event’. [page 8] This dictates that, irrespective of the final outcome of the litigation, the costs of interlocutory proceedings are payable in favour of one of the litigants.63 For instance, an order that costs be ‘plaintiff’s costs in any event’ means that, no matter who ultimately wins or loses, the plaintiff is to have the costs of those interlocutory proceedings.64 The converse applies in respect of an order that costs be ‘defendant’s costs in any event’. The right of a litigant to costs ‘in any event’ is unaffected by a subsequent settlement of the action unless the parties expressly agree otherwise.65 A costs order ‘in any event’ made against a trustee ousts the trustee’s ability to be indemnified for those costs out of the trust fund.66 Where interlocutory costs are not made ‘costs in the cause’, but the court orders that those costs be those of one of the litigants, the issue arises as to whether the litigant in whose favour the order is made is entitled to enforce the order immediately or must wait until the conclusion of the proceedings to do so. This is a matter governed by court rules in some jurisdictions, and is dealt with in detail elsewhere.67

‘Costs reserved’ 1.17 The meaning of a ‘costs reserved’ order depends upon the context and jurisdiction. Traditionally, where the court reserves the costs of an interlocutory matter, those costs are not allowed to a party without a further order of the court specifically dealing with those costs,68 which remains the law in New South Wales69 and is an outcome reflected by the court rules in Western Australia.70 This has been explained at general law, in a case involving litigation over a fund,71 in the following terms:72

[W]hen costs are reserved it is necessarily implied … that there is reserved the question of the incidence of those costs, quite apart from any question whether they are to be paid by the plaintiff or the defendant. It may turn out that they are to be paid by neither, and that the costs of both ought to come out of [the fund], or be paid by a third party. In the meantime the court has pronounced no opinion whatever, not only on the question whether the plaintiff should pay the defendant or the defendant should pay the plaintiff, but as to how the costs should be borne at all.

This practice has been reversed by the High Court, Australian Capital Territory and (as from 1 April 2013) Victorian rules, which provide that costs of an interlocutory proceeding that are reserved by the court are treated as costs in the cause unless the court otherwise orders,73 and in the Federal Court, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania, where reserved costs follow the event unless the court otherwise orders.74 [page 9] In the Northern Territory, where the court orders that the costs of an application be reserved, it may direct by and to whom those costs are to be paid.75 If the court makes no such direction, a party may, within 21 days of the conclusion of the proceeding, apply to the court for a direction as to the payment of costs reserved.76 Before 1 April 2013, in Victoria, if the court did not, after directing that costs be reserved, thereafter direct by and to whom those costs are to be paid, the Costs Court could so direct unless the court that made the order otherwise ordered or determined that no further order be made with respect to those costs.77

Order ‘silent as to costs’ 1.18 If, on an interlocutory application, the court makes an order ‘silent as to costs’, the party who is successful on the motion is entitled to his or her costs as costs in the cause, but the party unsuccessfully opposing the motion is not entitled to his or her costs as costs in the cause.78 In the alternative, if the party who makes the motion is unsuccessful, he or she is not entitled, where the order is ‘silent as to costs’, to his or her costs as costs in the cause, whereas the party opposing is so entitled. If a party makes a motion

unopposed by the other, an order ‘silent as to costs’ dictates that the costs of both parties are costs in the cause.79

‘Costs of action’ and ‘costs of trial’ 1.19 An order for ‘costs of the action’ includes not only costs of the trial but also those of interlocutory proceedings80 and their preparation (such as costs relating to interrogatories, notices to produce and admit, and preparation of counsel’s brief).81 These represent the costs to which the successful party in the action is entitled on taxation or assessment82 in the absence of an order to the contrary.83 The ‘costs of the trial’ cover only the costs incurred in the conduct of the trial itself, not any interlocutory matters preceding the trial.84 In any case, as an action ends with judgment, each of these orders excludes costs incurred after final judgment.85 Costs of executing the judgment are therefore not costs of the action (or of the trial)86 but are payable out of the execution.87 [page 10]

Costs ‘of and incidental to’ the proceedings 1.20 It has been suggested that where a court makes an order not merely for costs simpliciter, but for costs ‘of and incidental to’ the proceedings, this phrase extends the ambit of the order.88 It indeed appears, adopting ordinary rules of construction, that a litigant awarded the costs ‘of and incidental to’ the proceedings should have costs ‘of’ the proceedings and also costs ‘incidental to’ those proceedings. The latter phrase cannot mean that costs ‘of’ the proceedings are to be allowed only if they are also ‘incidental to’ them. Yet in practice the courts have supplied no conclusive indication of what costs, if any, come within an order for costs ‘of and incidental to’ the proceedings that fall outside an order simpliciter for costs ‘of’ the proceedings.89 It must be queried, therefore, whether the addition of the words ‘and incidental to’ makes any real difference to the scope of the order, and there is authority that when a court makes an order for ‘costs’ in relation to a proceeding it is intended to cover matters incidental to that proceeding.90

Certainly where statute empowers the court to award costs ‘in relation to’ or ‘in respect of’ a proceeding, those words are of wide import, and so it is unlikely that the legislature intended to oust the power to award costs ‘incidental to’ the proceedings.91

‘Costs of the claim’ and ‘costs of the counterclaim’ 1.21 An order for ‘costs of the claim’ refers to the general costs of the action but not including any costs associated with a counterclaim. ‘Costs of the counterclaim’ means the amount by which the costs of the proceedings were increased by the counterclaim. This form of order is rarely made in modern times.92 [page 11]

‘Whole costs’ and ‘general costs’ 1.22 Where a litigant has succeeded on every issue in the proceedings, it may be appropriate for the court to make an order in favour of the successful party for the ‘whole costs of the action (or cause)’.93 If a litigant has been ultimately successful in the proceeding, but not necessarily on all issues, that party may receive an order for the ‘general costs of action (or cause)’, which means that he or she is entitled to whole costs of the action except those in respect of the issues on which he or she has failed.94 Where a court makes an order for the ‘costs of particular issues’, each party must bear the costs on which he or she has failed.95

‘Costs of the day’ and ‘costs thrown away’ 1.23 An order made for ‘costs of today’ or ‘costs of the day’ does not mean that work not actually done on the day in question should necessarily be disallowed on party and party taxation or assessment; instead, the taxing officer or costs assessor must dissect the work claimed for in the bill to see if it reasonably related to the hearing on that day.96 The Northern Territory court rules define ‘costs of the day’ as including all costs thrown away,97 and

an allowance for work actually done by counsel on the day but not the fee payable to counsel on brief.98 This aligns with the understanding of the phrase at general law.99 It highlights the close relationship between an order for ‘costs of the day’ and one for ‘costs thrown away’, the latter dictating that the beneficiary of the order receives the costs incurred for work done but wasted as a result of the other party’s error or failure to comply with the procedure set by the rules. A typical example is in respect of costs for seeking an indulgence from the court,100 for instance, where an adjournment application succeeds against an opposing party who was ready to proceed on the day fixed for trial.101 The likelihood or otherwise of a party being ultimately successful in the proceeding is, therefore, not a relevant consideration on the question whether an order for costs thrown away should be made.102

‘No order as to costs’ 1.24 Where in respect of a proceeding, or a step in a proceeding, the court makes ‘no order as to costs’, this means that each party must bear its own costs of that proceeding or step.103 Where such an order is made in the context of depriving a trustee of costs,104 its effect is to deny the right to his or her indemnity against the trust property as well.105 [page 12]

‘Costs of appeal’ and ‘costs here and below’ 1.25 ‘Costs of appeal’ means costs of and subsequent to the notice of appeal, and does not include costs of the action or of previous proceedings.106 Conversely, a party in whose favour an order for ‘costs here and below’ is made is entitled not only to his or her costs in respect of the proceeding in which it is made, but also to his or her costs of the same proceeding when in a lower court or tribunal.107 This represents the usual costs order upon the resolution of an appeal.108

Costs ‘abide the result of’ a new trial 1.26 The usual interpretation of an order that costs of an aborted trial ‘abide the result of’ the new trial is that the costs of the abortive first trial should be paid by the party who is eventually unsuccessful.109 The ‘result’ here means the result of the second trial so far as costs are concerned. Not all judges have adopted this standard approach, and it has been suggested that the word ‘abide’ should be read as meaning ‘await’, meaning that the judge in the second trial retains a discretion as to the costs of the first.110 However, this is not the usual interpretation, although the justification for the usual interpretation would be stronger were the order that the costs ‘abide by the decision of’ the second trial.

‘Costs in the rehearing’ 1.27 Where a court orders that proceedings be reheard, and that the costs be ‘costs in the rehearing’, this means that the costs of the first hearing are to be awarded according to the award of costs of the rehearing.111 So, for example, if the plaintiff is awarded costs in the rehearing of the matter, he or she is also entitled, where the judge in the first hearing ordered that costs be ‘costs in the rehearing’, to the costs of the first hearing.

Overview of the Book 1.28 This book is essentially divided into two parts, in line with the two meanings of ‘costs’ noted earlier:112 solicitor and client costs, and party and party costs. Part I deals with the law of costs as it operates between a lawyer and his or her own client, and so addresses the foundation for a costs entitlement — namely the lawyer–client retainer and costs agreements113 — and the means whereby lawyers may recover those costs.114 It then devotes a chapter to the quantification of costs between lawyer and client via taxation or assessment.115 Part II deals with the law of costs as it operates between party and party, the logical repercussion of the ‘loser pays’ (‘costs indemnity’) rule. The foundation, jurisdiction and nature of this rule are the subject of the first two

chapters of this part.116 The remaining chapters in the part discuss specific matters that arise out of the costs indemnity rule. The modification of its application is discussed generally in Chapter 8, and a specific application — namely public [page 13] interest and test case litigation — forms the basis of Chapter 9. Particular applications of the costs indemnity rule are the subject of Chapters 10 and 11, which respectively discuss costs orders where a fund is the subject of the litigation, and costs orders where the proceedings involve multiple parties. Costs sanctions that may arise out of actions brought in too high a court, and of unaccepted but ultimately favourable offers of settlement, form Chapters 12 and 13. Completing Part II, in Chapter 14, is a discussion of the timing of costs orders. Parts III, IV, V and VI also essentially deal with costs as between party and party. They are the subject of separate treatment not only for the purpose of providing a wieldy structure for the book, but because they each deal with a specific aspect or repercussion of the application of the indemnity rule. The very nature of that rule dictates that the quantum of the indemnity must be assessed, and this forms the subject of Part III. Chapters 15 to 18 discuss the process of quantifying the indemnity, a process known as taxation or, in some jurisdictions, assessment. Part III concludes with the subject of interest on party and party costs.117 Part IV contains the law pertaining to costs in appeals, and the statutory impact of suitors’ fund (or equivalent) legislation.118 The law governing costs orders against persons not parties to an action — divided according to non-parties generally and orders against lawyers in the proceedings — is the subject of Part V.119 Costs in criminal cases, in Part VI, completes the general treatment of the indemnity rule.120 The book concludes in Part VII with the law governing lawyers’ ability to secure their entitlement to costs. This operates at solicitor and client level, through solicitors’ liens,121 and at party and party level, via the law of security for costs.122 1.29 It is important to note that the subject matter of this book is chiefly the

law and practice pertaining to costs in superior courts: namely the High Court, the Federal Court, the Family Court and the Supreme Courts of each state and territory. Reference to the statutes and court rules applicable to those courts is consequently extensive. Some reference is, however, made to other courts, usually by way of illustration. In particular, it is a court of specific and limited jurisdiction — the New South Wales Land and Environment Court — which is frequently cited to this end. Nonetheless, given the substantial similarity between statutes and court rules in superior, intermediate and lower courts, to specifically address the latter would involve complicating the work for little real benefit. In any event, the point is mainly of significance in the party and party context — costs as between solicitor and client are principally governed by the legal profession legislation that applies to the practice of law generally, whether contentious (and in whatever court) or non-contentious.

1.

See Ch 13.

2.

See 8.44–8.61, 16.51–16.69.

3.

Hermann v Charny [1976] 1 NSWLR 261 at 268 per Hutley JA; Fong v Chan (1999) 181 DLR (4th) 614 at 623 per Sharpe JA (CA(Ont)).

4.

The Young Sid [1929] P 190 at 203 per Sankey LJ.

5.

Elders Trustee and Executor Company v Herbert (1996) 132 FLR 24 at 29; BC9601883 per Gallop J (CA(NT)).

6.

Re Dibbs and Farrell (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 249 at 251 per Jordan CJ; Richfort Pty Ltd v Baluyut (1999) 152 FLR 203 at 205; BC9905936 per Gallop P (CA(NT)).

7.

This appears from the definition of ‘costs’ or ‘legal costs’ in the legal profession legislation in some jurisdictions: NSW s 4(1) (definition of ‘legal costs’); NT s 295(1); SA s 5(1). For the meaning of ‘disbursement’ see 1.8–1.9.

8.

See Ch 7.

9.

Re JJT (1998) 195 CLR 184 at 219; BC9802630 per Hayne J. See also R v Police Magistrate at Hughenden and Reid [1915] St R Qd 147 at 155–6 per Chubb J (FC); Re Dibbs and Farrell (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 249 at 251 per Jordan CJ; Bank of New South Wales v Withers (1981) 35 ALR 21 at 25 per Sheppard J (FCA).

10. On occasion the phrase used is ‘full costs’ (see, for example, Allen v Tobias (1958) 98 CLR 367) or ‘all costs’ (see, for example, Re F Watkins Pty Ltd [1936] VLR 92; cf Aitken v Ettershank (1885) 7 ALT 16). The phrase ‘all costs’ may attract a wider meaning where the right to costs is prescribed by contract: see 15.38. 11. This is recognised both by the definition of’ ‘costs’ in some court rules (see Fam LR 2004 Dictionary (refers to ‘expenses’); NT r 63.01(1); Qld r 679 (meaning of ‘assessed costs’); Tas r 836; Vic r 63.01(1) (which, as from 1 April 2013, add ‘and reasonable costs of recording and

transcript’); WA O 1 r 4) and at general law (see, for example, Potter v Dickenson (1905) 2 CLR 668 at 678; BC0500010 per Griffith CJ). For the meaning of ‘disbursement’ see 1.8–1.9. 12. Warley Hospital Inc v Attorney-General (Vic) [2011] VSC 145; BC201102031 at [61], [62] per Habersberger J. 13. Richfort Pty Ltd v Baluyut (1999) 152 FLR 203 at 205–6; BC9905936 per Gallop P (CA(NT)). 14. See 7.24–7.36. 15. (1981) 35 ALR 21 at 25–6 (FCA). 16. In that case, under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(1). As to the courts’ statutory discretion to award costs see generally 6.14. 17. (2010) 269 ALR 641; [2010] FCA 866; BC201005885 at [147] per Flick J (reasoning, moreover, that to extend the term ‘costs’ in this fashion ‘could well have the consequence of placing yet a further obstacle in the path of litigants seeking access to justice and an impermissible incentive upon litigants to accept perhaps less than their legal entitlements’). 18. Moloney v Workers Compensation Tribunal (2010) 108 SASR 1; [2010] SASCFC 17; BC201005440 at [5] per Doyle CJ (with whom Anderson J concurred), at [58] per Layton J. 19. (1849) 11 Beav 603 at 613; 50 ER 949 at 954. See also Re Blair & Girling [1906] 2 KB 131 at 138–9 per Vaughan Williams LJ; Elders Trustee and Executor Company v Herbert (1996) 132 FLR 24 at 29; BC9601883 per Gallop J (CA(NT)); Lewis v Doran [2008] NSWSC 186; BC200801247 at [48] per Hammerschlag J. For a list of what does and does not constitute a disbursement see Oliver, pp 178–80. 20. As to witness expenses allowable as between party and party see 17.28–17.39. 21. As to counsels’ fees allowable as between party and party see 17.47–17.95. 22. Louthnan v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1897) 16 NZLR 299 at 318–19 (CA); Santos Ltd v Delhi Petroleum Pty Ltd (2005) 240 LSJS 366; [2005] SASC 242; BC200504514 at [32] per Bleby J. 23. Buckland v Watts [1970] 1 QB 27 at 37–8 per Sir Gordon Willmer; Sophiadakis v Reljic [1999] VSC 147; BC9902667 at [49]–[51] per Teague J. Sometimes the distinction between ‘costs’ and ‘disbursements’ in a bill is effected by referring to ‘costs’ as ‘profit costs’ or ‘professional fees or costs’. 24. D’Alessandro & D’Angelo v Bouloudas (1994) 10 WAR 191 at 220; BC9406781 per Malcolm CJ; Challen v Paul O’Halloran & Associates [2008] WASC 169; BC200807280 at [21]–[24] per Templeman J; Vumbaca v Sultana [2012] NSWDC 237; BC201240463 at [118] per Gibson DCJ (who, in a case involving a costs dispute in the party–party context, noted that ‘it is a wellestablished principle that ‘the work performed by paralegals may be charged for if it is done under supervision’, adding that ‘[t]he assertion that such items cannot be charged for at all (other than as part of the solicitors’ hourly rate or, in other words, the overheads loading) is contrary to the now accepted role that paralegals and skilled clerical staff play in assisting solicitors, while being under supervision in preparation of work’). 25. Kent v Ward (1894) 70 LT 612 at 613 per Lord Esher MR; Stobbart v Mocnaj [1999] WASC 252; BC9908569 at [29] per Parker J. 26. See, for example, Legal Services Commissioner v Dempsey [2007] QSC 270; BC200708140 (affd Legal Services Commissioner v Dempsey [2008] 2 Qd R 272; [2008] QCA 122; BC200803896) (in the context of the meaning of ‘disbursements’ under the Queensland Law Society Act 1948 (Qld) s 48IC (now Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 347)).

27. See, for example, Re Haigh (1849) 12 Beav 307 at 309–10; 50 ER 1079 at 1080 per Lord Langdale MR (payment of legacy duty made by a solicitor for his client); Re Blair & Girling [1906] 2 KB 131 at 138 per Vaughan Williams LJ (payment by a solicitor of stamp duty on the capital of a company upon registration of a company). 28. See, for example, Re Buckwell & Berkeley [1902] 2 Ch 596. 29. M Johnson and J Ahern, ‘Disbursements’ (May 1996) 70 LIJ 64. 30. Sophiadakis v Reljic [1999] VSC 147; BC9902667 at [38] per Teague J; M Johnson, ‘Disbursement — Inquiry Agent’s Fee’ (November 1999) 73 LIJ 86 at 87. 31. See, for example, Browne v Barber [1913] 2 KB 553. 32. See, for example, Re Blair & Girling [1906] 2 KB 131. 33. See 5.45–5.46. 34. See 5.3. 35. See 26.5. 36. See, for example, ALRC 89, Ch 4. 37. See, for example, Greenberg & Arpin v Donald Hart Ltd (1957) 8 DLR (2d) 551 at 565 per Adamson CJM (CA(Man)). 38. Rowling v Fred A Mashman (Sutherland) Pty Ltd [1964–5] NSWR 1024 at 1030 per McClements J. See also Perks v Cox [1964] NSWR 71 at 81 per Kinsella J (FC) (‘the costs of litigation in New South Wales have become a matter of serious public concern’). 39. Law Society of New South Wales v Foreman (No 2) (1994) 34 NSWLR 408 at 422; BC9404933 (CA). 40. See 2.21. 41. See Dal Pont, pp 812–15. 42. See 3.14, 3.34. 43. Re Feez Ruthning’s Bill of Costs [1989] 1 Qd R 55 at 82 per Macrossan J (FC) (‘The reason why bills for client costs are subject to court supervision although they rest in contract and other kinds of contractual obligations are not so supervised perhaps stems principally from the view that solicitors being offers of the court should be so controlled’); Richfort Pty Ltd v Baluyut (1999) 152 FLR 203 at 208; BC9905936 per Mildren J (CA(NT)) (‘this Court has inherent jurisdiction, as part of its supervisory powers over legal practitioners, to control costs charged by solicitors to their clients’). 44. See 3.16. 45. As to taxation or assessment of costs between lawyer and own client taxation see Ch 5. 46. As to party and party taxation see Chs 15–18. 47. See 6.7–6.8, 6.14. 48. See, for example, Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583 at 615–16; BC8501051 per Deane J (in the context of remedial constructive trusts). 49. See 6.16–6.18. 50. Hong v A & R Brown Ltd [1948] 1 KB 515 at 521 per Lord Greene MR. 51. Re Silver Valley Mines (1882) 21 Ch D 381 at 390 per Brett LJ.

52. (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 519; BC8601421. 53. See, for example, Gardner v Jay (1885) 29 Ch D 50 at 58 per Bowen LJ; Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473 at 488–9 per Lord Wright; Mallet v Mallet (1984) 156 CLR 605 at 621–2; BC8400526 per Mason J. 54. Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 519; BC8601421. 55. Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 537–8; BC8601421. 56. Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 520; BC8601421. 57. As to the ‘costs indemnity rule’ generally see Ch 7. 58. As to costs out of a fund see Ch 10. 59. As to costs in interlocutory proceedings see 14.23–14.58. 60. Dubbo Refrigerating & Co v Rutherford (1898) 14 WN (NSW) 180 at 182 per Darley CJ (FC). 61. Nixon v Howes (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 156 at 158 per Pring J (‘costs in the cause’ means that ‘the party who succeeds in the action is entitled to these costs’; referring to costs of the applications for discovery, by nature interlocutory applications); J T Stratford and Son Ltd v Lindley (No 2) [1969] 3 All ER 1122 at 1123 per Lord Denning MR; Harry Smith Car Sales Pty Ltd v Claycom Vegetable Supply Co Pty Ltd (1978) 29 ACTR 21 at 23–4 per Blackburn CJ. 62. J T Stratford and Son Ltd v Lindley (No 2) [1969] 3 All ER 1122 at 1123 per Lord Denning MR. 63. This is specifically recognised in NT r 63.02(2) (definition of ‘costs in any event’, which it equates with an order for ‘costs in the proceeding’ or ‘costs in the application’). 64. J T Stratford and Son Ltd v Lindley (No 2) [1969] 3 All ER 1122 at 1123 per Lord Denning MR. 65. Cf Walter v Bewicke, Moreing & Co (1904) 90 LT 409 (where several interlocutory costs orders were made ‘in any event’, the case being subsequently settled on terms of ‘[n]o costs on either side’, it was held that the terms of the settlement did not oust the court’s order as to costs ‘in any event’). 66. How v Winterton (Earl) (No 4) (1905) 91 LT 763 at 765 per Kekewich J. As to a trustee’s right to costs see 10.3–10.14. 67. See 14.45–14.46. 68. Gardner v Marshall (1845) 14 Sim 575; 60 ER 481; British Natural Premium Provident Association v Bywater [1897] 2 Ch 531 at 532–3 per Byrne J. 69. Ervin Mahrer and Partners v Strathfield Council (2002) 123 LGERA 24; [2002] NSWLEC 97; BC200203746 at [19] per Bignold J. 70. WA O 66 r 50. 71. As to costs out of a fund see Ch 10. 72. How v Winterton (Earl) (No 4) (1905) 91 LT 763 at 765 per Kekewich J. 73. HCR 2004 r 51.01 (cf the former HCR 1952 O 71 r 28); ACT r 1728; Vic r 63.22 (in its form following the commencement, on 1 April 2013, of amendments effected by the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 74. FCR 2011 r 40.03 (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 15); Qld r 698 (previously Qld r 699) (see, for example, Kingham v Yorkston [2002] QSC 69; [2002] 2 Qd R 595 at 600 per Mullins J, who refused to order otherwise); SA r 268; Tas r 67 (as substituted from 21 July 2004).

75. NT r 63.20(1). 76. NT r 63.20(2). 77. Vic r 63.22 (in its form preceding the commencement, on 1 April 2013, of amendments effected by the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 78. See, for example, Friis v Paramount Bagwash Company Ltd (No 2) [1940] 2 KB 654. As to the meaning of ‘costs in the cause’ see 1.15. 79. Lyon v Mercer (1823) 1 Sim & St 357; 57 ER 143; Mentors Ltd v Evans [1912] 3 KB 174 at 179 per Farwell LJ. 80. As to the costs of interlocutory proceedings see 14.23–14.58. 81. Nally v Walsh (1898) 24 VLR 41 at 46–8 per Madden CJ (FC); Willis v Wilson and Mackinnon [1922] VLR 453 at 462 per Cussen J; Gibbs Holdings Pty Ltd v Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Australia) Ltd [2001] QCA 481; BC200107167. This does not necessarily dictate that the same outcome applies where the phrase is used in a settlement agreement, in which case the parties’ intention must be derived from the terms of that agreement: see, for example, Novamaze Pty Ltd v Cut Price Deli Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 1421; BC9805964. 82. As to the quantification of party and party costs see Chs 15–18. 83. Thompson v Parish (1859) 5 CBNS 685 at 691; 141 ER 276 at 278 per Cockburn CJ. 84. Cf Ipex Info Tech v Department of Info Tech Services SA (No 2) (DC(SA), Lunn J, 26 March 1998, unreported). 85. Re Smith (1932) 4 ABC 187 at 190 per Lukin J. 86. Armitage v Jessop (1866) LR 2 CP 12 at 15 per Erle CJ. 87. Simmons v Storer (1880) 14 Ch D 154 at 155 per Jessel MR. 88. Re Gibson’s Settlement Trusts [1981] 1 Ch 179 at 184 per Megarry VC. See also House Property Company of London v Whiteman [1913] 2 KB 382 (costs incurred ‘in and about any action’); Council of City of South Sydney v Forte Enterprises Pty Ltd (LEC, Bignold J, 15 July 1993, unreported) BC9303760; Comcare v Labathas (1995) 61 FCR 149 at 154, 157; BC9502443 per Finn J; Contractreal Ltd v Davies [2001] EWCA Civ 928 at [41] per Arden LJ; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v MHG Plastic Industries Pty Ltd (2003) 136 FCR 1; [2003] FCA 1624; BC200308427 at [20] per Emmett J; Queensland Building Services Authority v Mahony [2012] QDC 226 at [15] per McGill SC DCJ (though noting that the words ‘still require some connection between the application and the costs’); Li v Toyota Motor Corp Australia Ltd [2012] VSC 196; BC201202983 at [25]–[28] per J Forrest J. Cf McIntyre v Perkes (1988) 15 NSWLR 417 at 426 per Samuels JA. 89. Cf the possibility that costs ‘incidental to’ the proceedings could refer to costs incurred prior to the issue of the writ: Myer v Myer [1932] VLR 322 at 327–8 per Cussen ACJ; Council of City of South Sydney v Forte Enterprises Pty Ltd (LEC, Bignold J, 15 July 1993, unreported) BC9303760; Comcare v Labathas (1995) 61 FCR 149 at 157–8; BC9502443 per Finn J; Admiral Management Services Ltd v Para-Protect Europe Ltd [2003] 2 All ER 1017; [2002] EWHC 233 (Ch) at [12]– [26] per Stanley Burnton J. See also House Property Company of London v Whiteman [1913] 2 KB 382 (dealing with the phrase ‘costs incurred in and about any action’). 90. Re Knight and Tabernacle Permanent Building Society [1892] 2 QB 613 at 620 per Bowen LJ (in the context of an arbitrator’s award); Minister for Home and Territories v Smith (1924) 35 CLR 120 at 129–30; BC2090118 per Isaacs ACJ and Starke J (in the context of an arbitrator’s award);

Re Hudson (1986) 11 FCR 141 at 144 per Pincus J; Hobart City Council v Triffett (2001) 10 Tas R 471; [2001] TASSC 139; BC200108039 at [5]–[8] per Evans J (‘For many years it has been accepted without controversy, that an order for the costs of a proceeding includes the costs of subsequent matters such as attending to receive the decision, applying for an order for costs, itemising the costs and proving or taxing the costs’: at [8]); Maule v Liporoni (No 2) (2002) 122 LGERA 216; [2002] NSWLEC 140; BC200204783 at [43] per Lloyd J (regarding costs incurred on meeting claims not pressed at the hearing); Newcastle City Council v Wieland (2009) 74 NSWLR 173; [2009] NSWCA 113; BC200904010 at [35]–[41] per Ipp JA, with whom Beazley and Hodgson JJA concurred (ruling that the costs of mediation should be included in the ‘costs of any application or other step in the proceedings’ under NSW UCPR r 42.7(1)); Fifteenth Eestin Nominees Pty Ltd v Rosenberg (No 2) (2009) 24 VR 155; [2009] VSCA 178; BC200907283 at [9] per the court (describing this as ‘the conventional understanding, and the consistent approach of the Taxing Master of this court, for many years’). 91. Hobart City Council v Triffett (2001) 10 Tas R 471; [2001] TASSC 139; BC200108039 at [10] per Evans J. 92. See 8.4. 93. An order for ‘costs of and incidental to the proceedings’ (see 1.20) has been held to equate to an order that covers the ‘whole costs of the proceeding’: Ervin Mahrer and Partners v Strathfield Council (2002) 123 LGERA 24; [2002] NSWLEC 97; BC200203746 at [11] per Bignold J. 94. Ryan v Dries (on costs) [2002] NSWCA 112; BC200201958 at [6], [7] per Sheller JA. As to the costs of issues see 8.2–8.9. 95. See generally Reschke v Hensley [1915] SALR 159 at 165 per Murray J. 96. Re Hudson (1986) 11 FCR 141 at 142–3 per Pincus J. 97. The rules provide that where an application or a proceeding, or part of it, has been ineffective or subsequently set aside, the party in whose favour an order for ‘costs thrown away’ is made is entitled to his or her costs of that proceeding or part (as the case may be) in respect of which it is made: NT r 63.02(2). 98. NT r 63.02(2). 99. See, for example, Lydall v Martinson (1877) 5 Ch D 780 (where Fry J held that where the hearing of an action is adjourned in order to allow parties to be added, the party who applies for the adjournment must pay the costs of the day, including all costs thrown away by other parties in respect of the application); Burgoine v Taylor (1878) 9 Ch D 1 at 5 per Jessel MR. 100. See 14.34–14.44. 101. Fashion Warehouse Pty Ltd v Pola [1984] 1 Qd R 251 at 254 per G N Williams J. 102. Sobey v Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCA 1621; BC200810059 at [21] per Kenny J. 103. Re Hodgkinson [1895] 2 Ch 190 at 194 per Lindley LJ, at 194 per Lopes LJ; Trikas v Rheem (Australia) Pty Ltd [1964–5] NSWR 645 at 646 per Taylor J; NT r 63.02(2). 104. As to trustees’ costs see 10.3–10.14. 105. Donnelly v Maxwell-Smith [2010] FCAFC 154; BC201009661 at [24]. 106. Agabeg v Hartwell (1842) 5 Beav 271; 49 ER 582; Kevans v Joyce [1897] 1 IR 1. 107. R v Agritraders Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 1006 at 1010–1 per Watkins LJ; NT r 63.02(2). 108. See 20.2, 20.12.

109. See 20.19–20.21. 110. Southern Star Group Pty Ltd v Byron (No 2) (SC(NSW), Young J, 3 November 1995, unreported) BC9501738 at 3–4. 111. Knudsen v Kara Kar Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) (2000) 52 NSWLR 254 at 257; [2000] NSWSC 943; BC200006493 per Austin J. 112. See 1.5–1.6. 113. See Chs 2, 3. 114. See Ch 4. 115. See Ch 5. 116. See Chs 6, 7. 117. See Ch 19. 118. See Chs 20, 21. 119. See Chs 22, 23. 120. See Chs 24, 25. 121. See Chs 26, 27. 122. See Chs 28, 29.

[page 15]

PART I

Costs Between Lawyer and Own Client The entitlement of a lawyer to charge a person for professional legal services arises out of contract, which, in the context of lawyer and client, is termed the retainer agreement. This Part discusses the retainer, and its impact upon costs that may be charged and recovered from a client, in Chapter 2. This chapter also explains the statutory costs disclosure obligations to which lawyers are subject. As the matter is one of contract, it is open for lawyers to enter into specific agreements as to their costs (‘costs agreements’). The lawyer’s ability to do so, and the statutory and inherent controls on costs agreements, are discussed in Chapter 3. The procedure and limitations pertaining to the recovery by a lawyer of costs from a client form the subject of Chapter 4. Consistent with the law’s concern to ensure that lawyers are not positioned to overcharge their clients, Chapter 5 deals with the process of independent adjudication of the fairness and reasonableness of lawyers’ bills (a process traditionally known as ‘taxation’, but more recently in several jurisdictions as ‘assessment’, of costs).

[page 17]

CHAPTER 2

Retainer and Costs Disclosure The Retainer and its Scope Proof of retainer Oral retainer agreements Implied retainer agreements Scope of retainer Identity of client Retainer by trustee Retainer by liquidator Retainer with multiple clients

2.2 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.11 2.14 2.15 2.16 2.18

Costs Disclosure Requirements Background and rationale Model Laws costs disclosure requirements — jurisdictions except South Australia Main disclosure obligations Disclosure if another law practice is retained Disclosure to an associated third party payer Form and timing of disclosure Ongoing obligation to disclose — application to costs estimates Progress reports Specific disclosure obligations in the context of settlement of litigious matters Exceptions to duty to disclose

2.19 2.19 2.21 2.21 2.22 2.23 2.24 2.26 2.28 2.29 2.30

Effect of non-disclosure South Australia Family law proceedings Other costs disclosure obligations Lawyers retained as executors Disclosure of availability of legal aid Court-imposed disclosure obligations

2.31 2.34 2.35 2.36 2.36 2.37 2.38

2.1 As the lawyer–client relationship is constituted through the vehicle of a contract, termed a ‘retainer’,1 a lawyer’s entitlement to recover costs from a person rests essentially in contract. It makes sense that, aside from specific contractual provision to the contrary, if a contract serves to create the relationship between lawyer and client, it is pursuant to contract that the [page 18] lawyer derives the entitlement to charge costs to the client. That a client has engaged a lawyer to perform legal services via a retainer gives rise to an implied undertaking on the client’s part to pay costs. The quantum of those costs is determined either by the terms of the retainer (or an associated costs agreement),2 an applicable scale,3 or otherwise according to the fair and reasonable value of the services provided4 (a quantum meruit basis) ascertained, if necessary, by an independent review of the costs (variously known as ‘taxation’ or ‘assessment’). The costs entitlement may be limited if the retainer is properly construed as an ‘entire contract’: a lawyer who without just cause terminates such a retainer prior to completing the agreed task forfeits a claim for costs.5 The foregoing dictates the need to determine the existence and scope of the retainer,6 and the client’s identity.7 Attendant to this are statutory costs disclosure requirements,8 as a failure to comply with these can restrict the lawyer’s contractual costs entitlements. Each of these matters is addressed in this chapter. Other controls over the quantum of costs chargeable under a

retainer — the court’s jurisdiction to set aside costs agreements, and the independent review of costs — are discussed in separate chapters in this Part.9 A further control, outside the scope of this text, is the threat of professional sanction for overcharging, which can generate disciplinary orders that reduce or deny the lawyer a contractual claim to outstanding costs.10

The Retainer and its Scope 2.2 It is fundamental to determine three preliminary points as to the existence and scope of a lawyer’s entitlement to recover costs from a person. First, it must be determined whether there is indeed a retainer agreement between the lawyer and that person, for if there is not, no entitlement to recover costs, at least not in contract, from that person arises. Second, assuming there is a retainer agreement, it must be determined whether the service for which the lawyer seeks to be remunerated comes within its scope. The retainer’s scope not only determines, for the most part, the contractual, tortious and equitable duties imposed upon the lawyer in respect of the client,11 but also the scope of the entitlement to recover costs from that client. Third, the person liable to meet the costs of the lawyer under the retainer in issue must be identified. Each is addressed in turn below. The court has the primary responsibility of determining whether or not a retainer agreement exists and, if so, its scope. Yet these matters may also arise before a taxing officer or costs assessor in his or her role of determining those items of costs the lawyer claims and the client denies. Case authority supports the view that it may come within the taxing officer’s or costs assessor’s duty to determine the existence or, perhaps more likely, the scope, of the retainer.12 [page 19]

Proof of retainer 2.3 As a retainer is none other than a contract,13 there can be no retainer

unless the elements of a contract are present, namely agreement between the parties, consideration, certainty and intention to enter legal relations. Consistent with the general law of contract, aside from statute to the contrary, a retainer is not required to be in writing but may be inferred or implied from the conduct of the parties.14

Oral retainer agreements 2.4 There is no statutory requirement that a retainer be written as a condition of its enforceability.15 But as a person alleging the existence of a contract bears the onus of proof, a lawyer alleging the existence of a retainer must adduce evidence, whether in the form of words and/or conduct16 (which can include subsequent conduct)17 of the parties, sufficient to satisfy a court on the balance of probabilities that the retainer alleged in fact existed.18 The lawyer must overcome four main evidential hurdles in this regard. First, evidence of conduct is rarely, in and of itself, unequivocal.19 Second, the passage of time tends to blunt the accuracy of detailed recollection of the relevant events. Third, proof of an agreement of itself does not define its scope — which may be a matter of inference and perhaps implication20 — so far as the lawyer’s duties and authority are concerned. Words and conduct rarely address the details of the representation, and a court will not substitute its view regarding these details for the unexpressed view of either party. This is particularly so where it is requested to imply a term advantageous to one party at the expense of the other.21 Fourth, in the words of Denning LJ, where the evidence consists of the lawyer’s word against that of the client, all else being equal, ‘the word of the client is to be preferred to the word of the solicitor’.22 Various other judges, in [page 20] Australia and elsewhere, have uttered similar remarks.23 Back in 1930, for instance, Irvine CJ in Gummow v Bloom stated that:24 … where a solicitor commences legal proceedings on a client’s behalf, he should have written authority to do so. The absence of written authority is not conclusive against the existence of authority, because it may be established by inference from other evidence or from conduct; but

if there is no written authority, and the dispute in substance resolves itself into one assertion against another assertion, then the solicitor is to be taken as if he had no authority or retainer.

This notion is formulated on two closely related grounds.25 The first is the special knowledge the lawyer is presumed to have — knowledge of the importance of certainty in relations with clients and of clients enjoying a similar certainty. The second is the lawyer’s position of advantage, by reason of professional knowledge, vis-à-vis clients.26 Not all find these grounds persuasive;27 some instead rationalise remarks such those of Denning LJ as ‘perhaps more reflections on matters of policy than directives to a court to favour one party over the other when such contests emerge’.28 Nonetheless, they highlight the courts’ disinclination, in the case of oral retainers, to ‘strain to resolve the ambiguities in favour of the lawyer over the client’.29 At the same time, the rider that ‘all else being equal’ serves to curb a finding against the lawyer that is contrary to the relevant evidence.30 2.5 The foregoing dictates that it is good practice always to document the retainer agreement in writing and in some detail. The increasing popularity of costs agreements, which must be in writing to be enforceable,31 and the statutory requirements for written disclosure of costs information to clients,32 combine to further motivate written retainer agreements. A valid retainer can nonetheless exist despite the absence of an agreement that statute would categorise as a costs agreement.33 2.6 The clearest way proving an agreement is to adduce evidence of a written document signed by each party setting out the terms under which the relationship is to proceed. This may be in the form of a letter of engagement, which the client is asked to sign. Once signed, it [page 21] evidences the parties’ shared understanding, and reduces the risk of a gap between the client’s expectations and the reality of the representation, and thus potentially reduces the scope for actions in negligence. Absent a written document, the lawyer must adduce evidence of conduct to support the inference as to the existence and scope of the retainer. Absent a signed document, again the lawyer must establish that the client was made aware of

its terms, and adduce evidence as to the client’s informed assent or acceptance. The same principles apply to variations of the retainer, which should be documented in writing and the subject of client assent. The retainer itself should, in any case, prescribe at the outset the circumstances in which the engagement may be varied. By simply stating that, unless the lawyer hears to the contrary from the client, the lawyer will consider the client to be bound by the suggested variation, will not ordinarily be effective aside from evidence that an objective bystander would conclude that the client had accepted the variation.34 Courts are likely to be wary of variations to the retainer (especially those relating to costs) that favour the lawyer at the client’s expense, and will closely scrutinise whether the client exercised a fully informed consent to variations of this kind.35

Implied retainer agreements 2.7 Where there is no written or other express evidence of the existence of a lawyer–client relationship, the onus rests upon the party who asserts that the relationship exists to prove a retainer can be inferred or implied from the circumstances and, if material to the claim, to also prove its terms or scope.36 The existence of a retainer is determined by inference from objective facts — it is not per se determined by the lawyer’s belief as to which client(s) he or she was acting for.37 The court is, for this purpose, more likely to consider the facts from the perspective of the alleged client because it is open to the lawyer to take steps to dissuade a person from a belief that the lawyer acts for that person.38 The lawyer’s file and diary notes, specifically regarding how he or she has referred to and dealt with the claimant, may provide useful evidence.39 Other relevant evidence may include the capacity in which the lawyer acted (a lawyer may, after [page 22] all, give advice or otherwise act other than in a legal capacity),40 who instructed the lawyer, who is liable for the lawyer’s charges, and whether a contractual relationship existed with the claimant in the past (in which case

the court may be readier to assume that the parties intended to resume that relationship).41 2.8 As proof of a retainer is a prerequisite to a lawyer’s ability to recover costs from a person, from a costs perspective the onus is likely to lie on the lawyer. The lawyer must also prove terms that entitle him or her to the quantum of remuneration sought, and that he or she has relevantly performed the retainer.42 This makes it difficult to envisage a costs agreement binding on the parties that is implied as opposed to express.43 Most of the case law involves attempts by clients to prove a retainer, chiefly to make a lawyer accountable for breaching a duty under the alleged retainer.44 These cases nonetheless serve to illustrate the type of evidence that can serve to substantiate a retainer. 2.9 A leading case is Pegrum v Fatharly.45 W wished to borrow money from the appellants. To save costs W proposed that the respondent solicitor, who was on retainer for W’s group of companies, draft the documents, to which the appellants agreed. It was understood that the respondent would be the only solicitor involved in the transaction. Both parties attended on the respondent and gave him information to be put into the documents, at which meeting the respondent sought and obtained the appellants’ confirmation that it was in order for him to prepare the documents. The respondent prepared the documents and in the loan deed inserted a clause that W would pay the appellants’ costs of preparing the deed. The respondent knew, by reason of his position, that W and his companies were a bad risk and that the securities given by them were inadequate to secure the loan, but failed to warn the appellants. When W was unable to repay the loan and the securities proved inadequate, the issue arose as to whether the respondent had acted as solicitor for the appellants. The Full Western Australian Supreme Court held that the oral exchange between the parties, coupled with the clause noted above, was evidence of an acceptance by the respondent that he acted as solicitor for the appellants.46 That he was paid a monthly fee by W, and had acted for W in the past and would do so in future, did not make the respondent W’s solicitor ‘in any exclusive sense’.47 Anderson J remarked that ‘[t]he arrangement between the parties as to who should pay for the work is seldom material to the question for whom the work is done

[page 23] and to whom the professional duties are owed’,48 adding that it is not unusual for a person to engage a lawyer on the basis that the lawyer’s fees are payable by someone else. As solicitor for the appellants, the respondent was duty bound to disclose W’s insolvency, and failing to do so made him liable for the appellants’ loss.49 2.10 Pegrum v Fatharly can be contrasted with Meerkin & Apel v Rossett Pty Ltd.50 Lawyers who acted for developers in an office development prepared leases for certain units in the development that had been sold. The developer forwarded the draft leases to the owner of the units, which in turn gave comments on the leases to the developer. The owner was exposed to fines, and had to vacate units, when it later discovered that certificates of occupancy had not been issued in respect of the units. The owner sued the lawyers alleging breach of an implied retainer. The Victorian Court of Appeal distinguished these facts from those in Pegrum, where the fact that both parties to the transaction had consulted the same lawyer together was fundamental to the finding that a retainer existed. In Meerkin, however, the evidence revealed that the owner did not consult the lawyer at all, but had consulted its own lawyer in relation to matters involving the units.51

Scope of retainer 2.11 Merely because a retainer is proven does not contractually entitle the lawyer to all costs and disbursements he or she may have incurred in carrying out that retainer. If its terms prescribe the costs and disbursements that are agreed, or a separate costs agreement does so, the lawyer is entitled as a matter of contract to recover those costs and disbursements unless the agreement is set aside pursuant to the court’s jurisdiction to deal with unfair or unreasonable costs agreements52 or, where taxation or assessment of costs agreements is allowed, the items or amounts per item are reduced thereby.53 If no express contractual provision is made for the costs, an applicable scale, or otherwise the nature and incidents of the retainer, is what determines the items of work and the amount per item that are recoverable. 2.12 The lawyer’s implied authority to incur costs and disbursements is

relevant here. Implied into every retainer is the lawyer’s duty to protect the client’s interest and to carry out by all proper means his or her instructions in the matters to which the retainer relates. Aside from express terms to the contrary, this dictates that, within the confines of the retainer, the lawyer– client relationship carries with it the implied authority to do all such things incidental to the object of the representation.54 2.13 An illustration concerns the incurrence of disbursements. A lawyer has implied authority to incur ordinary disbursements, such as service fees, photocopying, filing fees and the like.55 The client cannot object to these, though without prejudice to their quantum being reduced on taxation or assessment.56 But if the disbursement proposed is ‘unusual’ in nature, it is not ordinarily allowed on taxation or assessment as between solicitor and own client unless it has been particularly authorised by the client after full disclosure by the lawyer that it might not be recoverable on a party and party taxation or assessment.57 [page 24] For example, in Ex parte Maxwell58 the client objected to the costs of interrogatories advised and settled by counsel, arguing that he had not given the solicitors instructions to administer interrogatories in the suit. Roper CJ held that, as the solicitors had been retained to conduct this particular equity suit, they had implied authority to do ‘all things which are necessary and proper for the conduct of the suit and, in particular, the question whether interrogatories should be administered is one for the legal advisers’.59 On the other hand, to brief counsel, being an important and expensive step in the litigation process, is not ordinarily part of a solicitor’s implied authority, instead requiring express permission or approval.60

Identity of client 2.14 A lawyer who acts on instructions for a party on the record is presumed, aside from express agreement to the contrary, to be entitled to look to that party for costs, even if the instructions have come from another person (the doctrine of ‘deemed’ retainer).61 For example, in Hudgson v Endrust

(Australia) Pty Ltd62 solicitors acted on behalf of both the first and second respondents, but upon the instruction of the first respondent alone, and sent all accounts to the first respondent. Pincus J held that the taxing officer, for the purpose of taxing costs ordered in favour of the second respondent, should treat the second respondent as if he had engaged the solicitors aside from any express agreement that the solicitors would not charge him.63 Three particular scenarios require further comment in this respect: retainers with trustees, retainers with liquidators, and retainers with multiple clients. Each is discussed in turn below.

Retainer by trustee 2.15 It is common to refer to the person engaged by trustees to act as their lawyer with respect to a trust estate as a lawyer to the trust estate. Yet this is an inaccurate way of describing the lawyer’s position because he or she has no retainer from the trust estate, but rather by the trustee for the trustee’s purposes as trustee. It is the trustee who personally is liable to pay the lawyer’s costs, and so it is the trustee to whom the lawyer can look for those costs.64 The solicitor has no lien upon the trust fund for those costs. However, as the trustee is entitled to an indemnity out of the trust fund for expenses properly incurred on the trust’s behalf,65 which may include the costs of engaging the lawyer, the lawyer can secure the benefit of the charge arising as a result of that indemnity, albeit indirectly. Thus any payment the lawyer gets out of the trust fund is only through the right of the trustee, who is the client, to an indemnity out of the fund. The lawyer consequently stands in no better position as against the trust than does his or her client, the trustee. The lawyer may, though, secure a greater right if he or she has a charge on the trust fund by reason of having recovered or preserved the whole or part of that fund,66 a possessory lien on trust documents in his or her hands,67 or a right as between himself or herself and the client (trustee) to go against the client’s (trustee’s) share of the trust fund.68 [page 25]

Retainer by liquidator 2.16 A liquidator who retains a lawyer to act in the winding up is regarded as an agent for and on behalf of the company. Accordingly, he or she incurs no personal liability to the lawyer; the costs of the lawyer are instead chargeable against the assets of the company.69 Consistent with the law of agency, the company (as principal) is liable to fulfil contracts effected on its behalf within the scope of the agent’s authority.70 For this reason, it is inaccurate to speak of a ‘lawyer to the liquidator’ or ‘the liquidator’s lawyer’; the lawyer in effect is a solicitor to the company, as the lawyer can only look to the company’s assets for payment.71 2.17 A lawyer instructed by a liquidator to render a service to the company that falls outside the ordinary scope of a lawyer’s duties is entitled to accept and act on those instructions in reliance on the liquidator’s agency for the company. The reason is that ‘[i]t would be cumbersome and unreal to expect that a solicitor, on receiving instructions from a liquidator, should investigate whether or not the services he is being instructed to perform fall within the liquidator’s capacity as agent to authorise’.72 The law is otherwise if a liquidator instructs a lawyer to render a service that the lawyer either knows, or because of the nature of the service must have known, falls outside the liquidator’s agency; here agency law dictates that the lawyer is not entitled to be remunerated from company funds. The latter, though, is likely to be a rare occurrence. In Re Quality House Pty Ltd (in liq) and the Companies Act,73 for example, it was held that the rendering of professional services connected with creditors’ meetings could not be regarded as necessarily one of those rare circumstances, and also that it was within the scope of the liquidator’s agency to instruct a lawyer to apply to the court for directions of general importance in the winding up. Accordingly, no bar to the lawyer’s remuneration existed.

Retainer with multiple clients 2.18 A lawyer who acts for multiple clients under a joint retainer may look to any of those clients for the entirety of his or her costs in respect of the retainer. If the retainers are separate, each client is liable for a proportionate part of the costs common to the representation, as well as the costs incurred exclusively for his or her own benefit. The presumption adopted by the law is

that retainers with multiple clients are separate as opposed to joint, and so a retainer will be joint only if its terms reveal this as the intention of the contracting parties74 or, as in the case of trustees, the nature of the clients’ duties (namely the duty to act unanimously) indicate that the retainer is joint. [page 26]

Costs Disclosure Requirements Background and rationale 2.19 Costs disclosure requirements in Australia originated in professional rules in some jurisdictions. The first comprehensive statutory prescription for costs disclosure arose from amendments to the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) with effect on 1 July 1994.75 In 2000 the Australian Law Reform Commission recommended, inter alia, that all jurisdictions enact similar legislation to harmonise costs disclosure requirements.76 With the advent of the Model Laws other than in South Australia, this recommendation came to fruition; the Model Laws identified costs disclosure requirements as ‘core uniform’, requiring textual uniformity. In South Australia costs disclosure obligations remain sourced in the professional rules.77 Each of these disclosure schemas is discussed below, as are rule-based requirements in family law proceedings,78 and on lawyers retained to act as executors79 or to represent clients who may be entitled to legal aid.80 The chapter concludes by reference to court-ordered costs disclosure in the Federal Court and Victoria pursuant to civil procedure reforms.81 2.20 The key objective of costs disclosure is, it has been said, to ensure adequate consumer protection.82 It is designed as a vehicle to empower the client vis-à-vis the lawyer, by giving the client the opportunity to make an informed choice costs-wise whether or not to retain the lawyer or to continue with the representation. As the retainer is what attracts practically all duties and liabilities owed by lawyer to client, the disclosure obligations present lawyers with an opportunity to give proper consideration to setting the boundaries of the retainer. By clearly explaining to the client the parameters of the retainer through the disclosure regime, the lawyer can reduce the

client–lawyer expectation gap and the prospect of client dissatisfaction. Setting these parameters also serves to alert the lawyer to the circumstances that, if the matter progresses beyond or differently to that anticipated, may amount to a new retainer. This assumes importance in both managing client expectations, and in alerting the lawyer to circumstances that may attract new disclosure obligations.83

Model Laws costs disclosure requirements — jurisdictions except South Australia Main disclosure obligations 2.21 The legal profession legislation other than in South Australia requires a law practice to disclose to a client matters including the following:84 the basis on which legal costs will be calculated, including whether a scale (or equivalent)85 applies to any of the costs; [page 27] the client’s right to: (a) negotiate a costs agreement with the law practice;86 (b) receive a bill from the law practice; (c) request an itemised bill after receipt of a lump sum bill;87 (d) be notified of any substantial change to the matters required to be disclosed; if reasonably practicable, an estimate88 of the total legal costs, or otherwise a range of estimates and an explanation of the major variables that will affect their calculation; details of the intervals (if any) at which the client will be billed; the rate of interest (if any) that the law practice charges on overdue legal costs;89 if the matter is a litigious matter, an estimate of the range of costs that may be recovered if the client proves successful, and that the client may be ordered to pay if unsuccessful;90

the client’s right to progress reports;91 details of the person whom the client may contact to discuss the legal costs; the avenues (and their time limits) open to the client in the event of a dispute in relation to legal costs, such as taxation or costs assessment92 and the setting aside of a costs agreement.93 Where a costs agreement involves an uplift fee,94 the law practice is also obliged to disclose to the client in writing, before entering the agreement, the law practice’s usual fees, the uplift fee (expressed as a percentage of those fees) and reasons why the uplift fee is warranted.95

Disclosure if another law practice is retained 2.22 If a law practice intends to retain another law practice on behalf of the client, the first law practice must, in addition, disclose to the client the details specified in the first, third and fourth dot points above in relation to the other law practice.96 The latter is not required to make disclosure to the client. So, for example, a barrister who is retained by an instructing solicitor on behalf of a client must disclose to the solicitor details of the barrister’s legal costs and billing arrangements, which the solicitor must then disclose to the client, but the barrister is not required to make a disclosure directly to the client. In this instance, a ‘practical and realistic approach’, reflecting that the person to whom disclosure is made is legally qualified, is justified in assessing technical compliance with the statutory requirements.97 [page 28]

Disclosure to an associated third party payer 2.23 A law practice required to make disclosure to a client of the practice must make that same disclosure to any associated third party payer98 for the client, albeit only to the extent that the details or matters disclosed are relevant to the associated third party payer and relate to costs that are payable by the associated third party payer in respect of legal services provided to the client.99

Form and timing of disclosure 2.24 The requirement that written disclosures to a client be expressed in ‘clear plain language’ aims at preventing a written disclosure couched in terms more familiar to lawyers and that a lay person would have difficulty understanding.100 The legislation allows, though does not require, the disclosure to be in a language other than English if the client is more familiar with that language.101 If, therefore, a client is a person whose understanding of English is inadequate and the written disclosure is in English, arrangements should be made for the information in the document to be conveyed orally in a language the client understands.102 The event of an illiterate client is addressed by the legislation, which requires a law practice aware of the illiteracy to arrange for the disclosure to be conveyed orally in addition to the written disclosure.103 2.25 Where practicable, the disclosure requirements must be met before the lawyer is retained to provide legal services concerned, or otherwise as soon as practicable after being retained.104 Disclosures to associated third party payers must be made at the time the disclosure to the client is required or, if the law practice only afterwards becomes aware of the obligation of the associated third party payer to pay costs of the client, as soon as practicable after the practice became aware of the obligation.105

Ongoing obligation to disclose — application to costs estimates 2.26 Statute requires a law practice to notify the client in writing of any substantial change to anything that has been the subject of a disclosure requirement as soon as reasonably practicable after becoming aware of that change.106 ‘Substantial’ is arguably a relative concept, especially as regards costs estimates. Beyond client complaint where costs far exceed the original estimate, this may produce costs consequences.107 Any costs estimate, including an estimate of its [page 29] increase,

must

therefore

be

realistic,

requiring

due

and

detailed

consideration.108 The process of estimation forces the lawyers to address the likely steps in the matter, and what falls within and outside those steps, bearing in mind that constant (upward) revising of a costs estimate may not be conducive to good client relations; it may be appropriate, accordingly, to provide an estimate only up to a certain stage in the matter. 2.27 The foregoing does not mean that disclosure of a client’s rights must be made repeatedly. Hogarth v Gye109 makes it clear that repeated disclosure is not required for unrelated retainers for the same client, or related entities. There a costs agreement made between the law firm and one of the plaintiff companies in relation to a particular item of work contained information as to the client’s rights in respect of the recovery and assessment of costs, which information was omitted in subsequent letters provided by the firm to the plaintiff companies. Bryson J referred to the letters, which from time to time disclosed revised charge rates in respect of the long-running commercial litigation in which the plaintiffs were involved, as ‘confirmation letters’ constituting ‘evidence in writing of the terms of a series of costs agreements’.110 As the principal plaintiff was ‘the channel for instructions and the controlling mind of the companies’111 to which the bills of costs related, there was no evidence that he did not know of the matters so disclosed. This led his Honour to hold that the disclosure obligation had been met.112 The result would most likely have differed had a long period of time elapsed or there been a change in the identity of the persons managing the relevant client.113

Progress reports 2.28 A law practice must, upon a reasonable request, give to the client a written report of the progress of the matter (for which it may charge a reasonable amount) and a written report of the costs incurred by the client to date, or since the last bill (if any), in the matter (for which it cannot charge).114 No progress report requirement is imposed upon a law practice retained on behalf of a client by another law practice, although it must disclose to that other law practice any information necessary for the latter to comply with a progress report request.115

Specific disclosure obligations in the context of settlement of

litigious matters 2.29 The Model Laws prescribes a further disclosure requirement in the course of a retainer. It requires a law practice that negotiates the settlement of a litigious matter on behalf of a client to disclose to the client, before the settlement is executed, a reasonable estimate of the amount of legal costs payable by the client if the matter is settled (including any legal costs of another party that the client is to pay), and a reasonable estimate of any contributions towards those costs likely to be received from another party.116 This obligation does not apply to a law practice [page 30] retained on behalf of a client by another law practice in circumstances where the latter makes the disclosure to the client before the settlement is executed.

Exceptions to duty to disclose 2.30 The legal profession legislation recognises various circumstances where its disclosure requirements do not apply, specifically where:117 the total legal costs in the matter, excluding disbursements, are unlikely to exceed a prescribed amount (exclusive of GST),118 although a law practice that becomes aware that the costs are likely to exceed that amount must make the requisite disclosure to the client as soon as practicable; the client has received one or more of the required disclosures from the law practice in the preceding 12 months, the client has agreed in writing to waive the right to disclosure, and a principal of the practice decides on reasonable grounds that, in view of the previous disclosures and the relevant circumstances, the further disclosure is not warranted; the (prospective) client is a law practice, a public or foreign company (or its subsidiary), a registered Australian body, a prescribed partnership, a financial services licensee, a Minister of the Crown acting in his or her capacity as such, a government department or public authority; the (prospective) client is a liquidator, administrator or receiver;

the (prospective) client is a ‘proprietary company’ formed to carry out a joint venture, or is an unincorporated group of participants in a joint venture, in defined circumstances; the legal costs or the basis on which they will be calculated have or has been agreed as a result of a tender process; the (prospective) client will not be required to pay the legal costs or those costs will not otherwise be recovered by the law practice (say, where the law practice acts in the matter on a pro bono basis); or the regulations prescribe an exception to the disclosure requirements.119

Effect of non-disclosure 2.31 A failure to fulfil the costs disclosure requirements has four statutorily identified consequences.120 First, the client (which for the purposes of this paragraph includes an associated third party payer)121 need not pay the costs of the legal services, and the lawyer cannot maintain proceedings for the recovery of the costs, unless those costs have been assessed. Until that has been done, there is consequently no actionable debt upon which proceedings can be maintained.122 Second, if a law practice does not disclose to a client anything required to be disclosed, on the assessment of those costs their amount may be reduced by an amount proportionate to the seriousness of the failure to disclose. Third, if there has been non-disclosure, and the client has entered a costs agreement with the law practice, the client may, in addition to applying for the assessment of the costs, apply for the costs agreement (or a provision [page 31] in it) to be set aside.123 Fourth, non-disclosure is capable of being unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct on the part of any lawyer involved in the failure.124 These consequences are not necessarily alternatives; the legislation, it appears, ‘contemplates that there may be multiple penalties imposed for failing to make proper disclosure’.125 Failing to fulfil the disclosure requirements does not, however, render an

applicable costs agreement void.126 Nor does it mean that the costs claimed are ultimately irrecoverable (though they may be reduced),127 or deny the existence of a retainer or of the legal obligations thereunder to the client.128 Neither are the solicitor’s retaining or particular liens, if these are otherwise available, prejudiced by a failure to disclose.129 2.32 Independent of the statutorily prescribed consequences for failing to fulfil costs disclosure obligations, a failure to keep a client informed as to the costs accruing could potentially amount to a breach of contract. In Moloney v Smith,130 for example, prior to the conclusion of the trial the only indication the lawyer gave to his client about her costs was that the case would be ‘very expensive’. Judge Lunn held that even prior to mid-July 1999 the plaintiff could have given a more meaningful estimate of the likely costs, albeit not one as definitive as could have been given in and after mid-July.131 His Honour explained the duty of the lawyer in these circumstances as follows:132 [T]here was a duty on the [lawyer] to advise [the client] by at least mid July 1999 of a range within which her costs to the completion of a full trial would have fallen which would have encompassed what subsequently transpired to be her actual liability. The [lawyer] breached this duty. It was not sufficient merely for the [lawyer] to have told her that she was being charged on the Supreme Court scale under which the hourly rate was $165 per hour and to say that it would be ‘very expensive’.

The client, however, was unable to prove that the lawyer’s failure to apprise her of the likely costs had in fact caused her loss. Judge Lunn found that, on the balance of probabilities, had the lawyer fulfilled his duty to give proper advice, the client would nonetheless have proceeded to litigate. But lawyers should take little solace in this finding, as the peculiar facts and motivations of the client in this case justified causation as a hurdle;133 in other cases it may not be so. [page 32] 2.33 There is an indication at tribunal level that non-disclosure of costs as required could also fall foul of the statutory proscription against misleading or deceptive conduct, provided that the lawyer’s conduct vis-à-vis the client so far as costs disclosure is concerned can truly be misleading or deceptive.134 The tribunal did not address the (then) threshold requirement that the conduct be ‘in trade or commerce’, against a backdrop of judicial

remarks that the conduct of legal practice is not necessarily ‘in trade or commerce’ for this purpose.135 However, that under the Australian Consumer Law136 the phrase ‘trade or commerce’ is defined to include ‘any business or professional activity’137 dictates the prospect of lawyer liability in this context.

South Australia 2.34 In South Australia costs disclosure requirements saw the light with the former Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice, promulgated to take effect on 1 March 2003. These requirements now form part of the South Australian implementation of the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules, via rules specific to that jurisdiction. The rules require a lawyer to give to a client:138 as soon as practicable after first taking instructions, written advice as to the reasonably estimated range of costs and disbursements the client may incur by pursuing the legal activity and the method of calculation of those costs; as soon as practicable after taking instructions, written advice as to the basis upon which the lawyer accepts the retainer, setting out the basis upon which the lawyer intends to charge the client and the current rates applicable to such charges (except where there is an applicable prior agreement by which all work done by the lawyer for that client or all work of a certain kind is subject to an agreed charging rate); and as and when reasonably required, a review of the estimated costs and disbursements and the reasons for the review. A lawyer is excused from disclosure where it is unreasonable or inappropriate to do so, or where the written advice has previously been given to the client.139 As no specific consequences are prescribed by the rules for non-compliance, it appears that the main avenue for ensuring compliance is the professional disciplinary process.

Family law proceedings

2.35 Prior to 1 July 2008, the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) prescribed various costs disclosure obligations applicable in family law proceedings.140 As from this date, however, the Family Court no longer regulates costs as between lawyer and client; these are governed by the relevant legal profession legislation. The rules nonetheless continue to make limited provision [page 33] for costs disclosure in defined circumstances. They require a lawyer for a party,141 immediately before each court event,142 to give the party a written notice of:143 the party’s actual costs up to and including the court event; the estimated future costs of the party up to and including each future court event; and any expenses paid or payable to an expert witness or, if those expenses are not known, an estimate of the expenses. At each court event, a party’s lawyer must give to the court and each other party a copy of the said notice.144 An independent children’s lawyer must, immediately before the first day of the final stage of the trial, give to the court and each party a written statement of the actual costs incurred by the independent children’s lawyer up to and including the trial.145 Also, where an offer to settle is made during a property case, the lawyer for each party must tell the party the party’s actual costs up to the date of the offer to settle, and the estimated future costs to complete the case, to enable the party to estimate the amount he or she will receive were the case settled in accordance with the offer to settle, after taking into account costs.146

Other costs disclosure obligations Lawyers retained as executors

2.36 A lawyer who receives instructions from a person to draft a will appointing the lawyer an executor must, under the professional rules in most jurisdictions, inform that person in writing, where the lawyer has an entitlement to claim commission, that the person could appoint as executor someone who might make no claim for commission.147 This is reflected in statements at general law,148 and sits well with fiduciary law, which proscribes a lawyer–executor charging, as a lawyer, for professional services rendered to the estate absent a charging provision in the will. In Szmulewicz v Recht,149 for instance, Habersberger J found that a solicitor–executor, by including a clause in the testator’s will that entitled the solicitor to charge, in addition to professional fees, commission equal to percentages of the capital value of the estate and its income, committed a breach of fiduciary duty. In so ruling, his Honour stated the following:150 [A] solicitor putting forward a will for a client to sign, which contains a clause such as the one in this case, must explain to the client all of the pros and cons of the inclusion of the clause, even if it was the client who suggested the clause, so that it is clear that the client has given his or her

[page 34] informed consent to a clause which otherwise would give rise to an objection on the ground of conflict between fiduciary duty and personal interests. The solicitor cannot assume that the client understands all of the ramifications of including the suggested clause, no matter how sophisticated or astute the client may be with respect to financial matters.

The foregoing does not preclude a lawyer making application to the court for commission, which may be fixed in line with the professional work done.151

Disclosure of availability of legal aid 2.37 The professional rules in some jurisdictions require lawyers to draw the attention of clients whom they believe may be eligible for legal aid to the availability of legal aid.152 In any case, this represents sound practice in the remaining jurisdictions. Equivalent provision made in the (then) English professional rules has generated the following judicial admonition:153 A solicitor must be bound at the outset to consider the question whether a client might be eligible for legal aid. There are various reasons why that must be so. First, it would be quite

wrong to incur substantial expenditure chargeable privately to the client if public funding was available. Second, a client is in more difficulties changing firms of solicitors if work has been done and a relationship built up, before advice is given that a different firm could become involved.

The New South Wales rules add that lawyers who accept instructions to act for an accused who is to stand trial for a crime, subject to obtaining a grant of legal aid, must assist that person to apply for the grant as soon as practicable after receiving instructions, and not later than 30 days before the commencement of the trial.154

Court-imposed disclosure obligations 2.38 Disclosure obligations imposed by the court in the course of litigation have been implemented in the Federal Court and Victoria as part of civil procedure reforms. As from 1 January 2010,155 the Federal Court may, for the purpose of enabling a party to comply with the duty to conduct the proceeding in a way that is consistent with the overarching purpose,156 require the party’s lawyer to give the party an estimate of:157 the likely duration of the proceeding (or part thereof); and the likely amount of costs that the party will have to pay in connection with the proceeding (or part thereof), including the costs that the lawyer will charge to the party, and any other costs that the party will have to pay in the event that the party is unsuccessful. In Victoria, as from 24 December 2012,158 at any time in a civil proceeding a court may direct a lawyer acting for a party to:159 prepare a memorandum setting out the estimated length of the trial, the estimated costs and disbursements in relation to the trial and, in the case of a memorandum to be given to a party, the estimated costs that that party would have to pay to any other party if the party is unsuccessful at trial; and give the memorandum, as specified in the order, to either or both the court and any party. [page 35]

Also, a court may, again at any time in a proceeding, make an order directing a lawyer acting for a party to prepare and give to that party a memorandum setting out:160 the actual or estimated costs and disbursements incurred in relation to the proceeding (or part thereof); the estimated costs that the party would have to pay to any other party if that party is unsuccessful at trial; and the estimated length of the proceeding or any part of the proceeding.

1.

See Dal Pont, pp 68–70.

2.

Costs agreements are discussed in Ch 3.

3.

Also termed variously as fixed costs provisions (NSW and NT, which apply independently of the terms of a costs agreement), practitioner remuneration orders (Vic) and costs determinations (WA).

4.

ACT s 279; NSW s 319; NT s 314; Qld s 319; Tas s 303; Vic s 3.4.19; WA s 271. See also Way v Latilla [1937] 3 All ER 759 at 763 per Lord Atkin; Re King (1994) 54 FCR 493 at 495; BC9405938 per Northrop J; Pryles & Defteros (a firm) v Green (1999) 20 WAR 541 at 550; [1999] WASC 34; BC9902816 per Parker J; Olympic Holdings Pty Ltd v Lochel [2004] WASC 61; BC200401675 at [172] per McLure J; Kellar v Williams [2004] UKPC 30 at [18] per Lord Carswell.

5.

As the entire contract doctrine impacts upon the ability to recover costs from a client under an existing retainer, it is discussed in Ch 4: see 4.44–4.52.

6.

See 2.2–2.13.

7.

See 2.14.

8.

See 2.19–2.37.

9.

See Chs 3 (costs agreements), 5 (taxation/assessment of costs).

10. See Dal Pont, pp 812–15. 11. See Dal Pont, pp 68–9. 12. See 5.42–5.44. 13. Wong v Kelly (1999) 154 FLR 200 at 206; [1999] NSWCA 439; BC9908015 per Stein JA. 14. Blyth v Fladgate [1891] 1 Ch 337 at 355 per Stirling J; Groom v Crocker [1939] 1 KB 194 at 222 per Scott LJ; Wong v Kelly (1999) 154 FLR 200 at 206; [1999] NSWCA 439; BC9908015 per Stein JA; Simmons v Story [2001] VSCA 187; BC200106564 at [23] per Winneke P. 15. The position was previously otherwise in Queensland: Qld 1952 ss 48(2)(a), 48F(1) (which required a lawyer, within a reasonable time of starting work for a client, to make a written agreement with the client expressed in clear language specifying, inter alia, the work the lawyer is to perform, and prescribed that a client agreement that did not comply with this requirement was

void; subject to the exceptions noted in s 48(1)). See Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Atlantic 3-Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] 2 Qd R 399; [2006] QCA 540; BC200610475 at [7] per Williams JA (who remarked that ‘void’ in s 48F(1) means void, even though there are reasons supporting the view that non-compliance with s 48 should give the client the option of avoiding the client agreement). 16. Because courts endeavour to uphold commercial agreements, they are disinclined from construing a retainer (with a commercial client in particular) as unenforceable for past consideration; courts are more likely in this event to construe the consideration as executed, reflecting an understanding (though not clearly documented in writing) that the lawyers were to be remunerated on the basis of their standard fee structure: see, for example, QCoal Pty Ltd v Cliffs Australia Coal Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 479; BC201009791 at [22]–[31] per Ann Lyons J. 17. For instance, conduct in paying costs: see, for example, Piper Alderman (a firm) v Australian Medic-Care Company Ltd [2011] SASC 234; BC201109979 at [36]–[44] per Stanley J. 18. Murphy v Liesfield [1930] VLR 142 at 145 per Irvine CJ, at 146 per Macfarlan J, at 147 per Lowe J (FC); Coshott v Sakic (1998) 45 NSWLR 667 at 672; BC9804432 per Spigelman CJ; McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2005) 92 SASR 382; [2005] SASC 269; BC200505207 at [64] per Gray, Sulan and Layton JJ; Jones v Brian K Deegan & Associates [2011] SASC 44; BC201101721 at [13], [23] per Withers J; Fladgate LLP v Harrison [2012] EWHC 67 (QB) at [39] per Lang J. 19. See, for example, Comlaw (No 62) Pty Ltd v Owens [2003] VSC 35; BC200300697 at [85], [86] per Nettle J; Orio Holdings Pty Ltd v Costi & Co (No 1) [2007] SASC 403; BC200709912 at [24]– [32] per Judge Lunn (where the solicitor was unable to prove to the court’s satisfaction the alleged client had accepted the retainer agreement by conduct). 20. See, for example, Cadoks Pty Ltd v Wallace Westley & Vigar Pty Ltd (2000) 2 VR 569; [2000] VSC 167; BC200002336 at [121]–[127] per Ashley J. 21. See, for example, Coshott v Sakic (1998) 45 NSWLR 667 at 673; BC9804432 per Spigelman CJ (involving an unsuccessful claim for costs by a solicitor acting under an oral retainer); Drakos v Keskinides [2003] QCA 109; BC200301344. 22. Griffiths v Evans [1953] 1 WLR 1424 at 1428 per Denning LJ. 23. See, for example, Re Dickie (1916) 23 BCR 538 at 541 per McPhillips JA (CA(BC)) (‘There runs through all the cases, that which seems right and proper in the administration of justice, that if a solicitor will make an agreement with a client, then he must be able to shew what that agreement is, and if it is not in writing, then it seems to me that the client’s statement must be accepted’); Murphy v Liesfield [1930] VLR 142 at 144–5 per Irvine CJ, at 146 per Macfarlan J, at 147 per Lowe J (FC); Re O’Sullivan [1937] QSR 50 at 52–3 per Macrossan SPJ, at 66–7 per Henchman J (FC); Ranclaud v Cabban [1988] ANZ Conv R 134 at 138 per Young J (SC(NSW)); Catto v Hampton Australia Ltd (in liq) (2007) 251 LSJS 164; [2007] SASC 360; BC200708773 at [10] per Judge Lunn. 24. [1930] VLR 81 at 83. 25. Murphy v Liesfield [1930] VLR 142 at 146 per Macfarlan J (FC). 26. Griffiths v Evans [1953] 1 WLR 1424 at 1428 per Denning LJ (‘The reason is plain. It is because the client is ignorant and the solicitor is, or should be, learned. If the solicitor does not take the precaution of getting a written retainer, he has only himself to thank for being at variance with his client over it and must take the consequences’); Roberts v Kroll [1971] 5 WWR 133 at 141 per Darling Co Ct J (CC(BC)).

27. See, for example, May v Burcul (CA(NSW), 18 October 1982, unreported) BC8200444 (where Reynolds AP said that such a direction to a jury would constitute a ‘plain misdirection’); Meerkin & Apel v Rossett Pty Ltd [1998] 4 VR 54 at 66; BC9707344 per Charles JA; Dew v Richardson [1999] QSC 192; BC9905008 at [10] per Chesterman J (‘I cannot accept it as a principle of law that wherever a solicitor and his client disagree about the terms of a retainer … and the solicitor has not made a written note of the communication the client’s evidence must be accepted’, and so approached the critical question ‘on the basis that both client and solicitor … have an equal right to be believed’; emphasis in original); Vella v Gustafson [2009] QSC 424; BC200911669 at [27] per Martin J (citing the remarks of Chesterman J with approval); Le Serve v Great Wall Resources Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1213; BC201007862 at [22] per Hamilton AJ. 28. Adamson v Williams [2001] QCA 38; BC200100324 at [20] per the court. These sentiments were endorsed by Byrne J in Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth Field Warne (a firm) (No 3) [2004] VSC 164; BC200403876 at [61] (who declined to approach the task with a predisposition to prefer either witness). 29. Strother v 3464920 Canada Inc [2007] 2 SCR 177 at [40] per Binnie J. 30. See, for example, Fladgate LLP v Harrison [2012] EWHC 67 (QB) at [55] per Lang J. 31. See 3.8–3.9. 32. See 2.19–2.37. 33. Wentworth v Rogers [2005] NSWSC 143; BC200501387 at [31] per Patten AJ. 34. See Comlaw (No 62) Pty Ltd v Owens [2003] VSC 35; BC200300697 at [85]–[86] per Nettle J. 35. Symonds v Vass [2007] NSWSC 1274; BC200709763 at [179] per Patten AJ (appeal allowed but without casting doubt on this point: Symonds v Vass (2009) 257 ALR 689; [2009] NSWCA 139; BC200905947). 36. R v Miller [1983] 3 All ER 186 at 191 per Lloyd J; Pegrum v Fatharly (1996) 14 WAR 92 at 95 per Ipp J, at 101–2 per Anderson J; BC9601333 (FC). 37. Beach Petroleum NL v Kennedy (1999) 48 NSWLR 1 at 53; [1999] NSWCA 408; BC9907249 per the court. 38. See, for example, Simmons v Story [2001] VSCA 187; BC200106564 at [34] per Winneke P (‘where the matter at issue is whether the existence of a contract is to be inferred from the relationship between the parties and the manner in which they conducted themselves, it seems to me — at least where the conduct is equivocal — that a subsequent statement by the party asserting the existence of a contractual retainer that he “had no solicitor” acting for him and was being “advised totally” by his accountant, whilst not determinative, is nevertheless capable of being used by a court at least for the purpose of explaining the relationship at the relevant time and as bearing upon the question whether the party asserting the existence of the contractual retainer had discharged his onus of proof’). See also Stringer v Flehr and Walker (a firm) (2003) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-718; [2003] QSC 370; BC200306447 at [72]–[78] per Philippides J. 39. Compare, for example, Vella v Gustafson [2009] QSC 424; BC200911669 (where Martin J found that the defendant solicitor, in preparing documents for a money lending transaction, also acted for the lenders because, inter alia, what documentary evidence there was pointed to a solicitor–client relationship; the relevant correspondence used the terminology ‘my client’, ‘I am now instructed’, ‘I am strongly advising my client’, ‘note of initial instructions’: at [33]) with Girotto v Phillips Fox (a firm) [2011] VSC 293; BC201104679 (where Hollingworth J ruled that the defendant law firm, which had represented a client (OT) with whom the plaintiff invested moneys in a business venture, entered no implied retainer with the plaintiff because, inter alia: (1) the plaintiff was

aware that the defendant was the solicitor for OT; (2) the defendant never sent a retainer letter to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant billed only OT in respect of the work connected with the transaction; (4) the plaintiff never discussed legal fees with the defendant; (5) the plaintiff never gave instructions to the defendant or asked the defendant for advice about the proposed transaction; and (6) the defendant never gave any advice about the transaction specifically addressed to the plaintiff: at [289]). 40. Hanave Pty Ltd v LFOT Pty Ltd (1999) 168 ALR 318; [1999] FCA 1568; BC9907362 at [12], [13] per Moore J. 41. Dean v Allin and Watts (a firm) [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 249; [2001] EWCA Civ 758 at [22] per Lightman J. See, for example, Regular v Law Society of Newfoundland and Labrador (2011) 336 DLR (4th) 1; [2011] NLCA 54 at [33] per Wells JA (‘The mere fact that the actual work on a matter has been completed, or indeed that a final account has been rendered in respect of work in that matter, does not mean that because there is no specific agreement to act on a new matter, a subsequent office consultation is not in the character of a solicitor–client relationship’, especially where, as on the facts, it was in such close proximity to the prior engagement and it was in response to an invitation to the former client by the lawyer to consult him any time she had concerns). 42. See, for example, Coshott v Sakic (1998) 45 NSWLR 667 at 672; BC9804432 per Spigelman CJ (CA). 43. Eady v Berger (SC(NSW), McLaughlin M, 17 March 1995, unreported) BC9504320 at 7. Cf Holloway v B Markich Pty Ltd (SC(NSW), Grove J, 25 October 1993, unreported) BC9303894 at 5 (implication by course of dealing). See further S Pattison, ‘Is an Implied Costs Agreement a Contradiction in Terms?’ (August 1995) 33 LSJ 24. 44. Cf Shatin Bernstein (a firm) v Dickinson (SC(Vic), Harper J, 12 May 1998, unreported) BC9801756 (where the client attempted to establish an implied retainer that the solicitors would provide their services at no cost, which, in the face of a written and signed retainer prescribing costs, proved unsuccessful). 45. (1996) 14 WAR 92; BC9601333 (FC). 46. Pegrum v Fatharly (1996) 14 WAR 92 at 96–7; BC9601333 per Ipp J (FC). See also Fleeton v Fitzgerald (1998) 9 BPR 16,715 at 16,720; BC9806793 per Beazley JA (CA(NSW)) (where a solicitor who acted for the sublessor but explained the sublease to the sublessee in detail was held to be in a solicitor–client relationship with the sublessee, but was not held liable for negligence in giving that explanation because this negligence was found not to have caused the sublessee’s loss, which was caused by the sublessee surrendering her sublease when she did not have to do so). 47. Pegrum v Fatharly (1996) 14 WAR 92 at 104; BC9601333 per Anderson J (FC). 48. Pegrum v Fatharly (1996) 14 WAR 92 at 105; BC9601333 (FC). 49. Pegrum v Fatharly (1996) 14 WAR 92 at 106–8; BC9601333 per Anderson J (FC). 50. [1998] 4 VR 54; BC9707344. 51. Meerkin & Apel v Rossett Pty Ltd [1998] 4 VR 54 at 66; BC9707344 per Charles JA. 52. See 3.13–3.22. 53. See 5.17–5.19. 54. Polkinghorne v Holland (1934) 51 CLR 143 at 156; BC3400018 per Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ; Ex parte Maxwell (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 333 at 336 per Roper CJ in Eq; Forestview Nominees Pty Ltd v Perron Investments Pty Ltd (1999) 162 ALR 482 at 503; [1999]

FCA 405; BC9901615 per R D Nicholson J (FC). 55. Schiliro and Gadens Ridgeway (1995) 19 Fam LR 196 at 207 (FC). 56. In the context of photocopying costs, for instance, see 5.25. 57. See 5.26–5.34. 58. (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 333 (FC). 59. Ex parte Maxwell (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 333 at 336 (FC). 60. Schiliro and Gadens Ridgeway (1995) 19 Fam LR 196 at 209–10 (FC). 61. Hudgson v Endrust (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 152 at 154 per Pincus J; Bolton v Strange [2001] WASCA 34; BC200100368 at [7], [8] per Templeman J; Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] Ch 197; [2007] EWHC 2635 (Ch) at [21] per Warren J. 62. (1986) 11 FCR 152. 63. Note that litigants who are jointly represented are ordinarily jointly and severally liable for the costs of their lawyer: see 11.2. 64. Staniar v Evans (1886) 34 Ch D 470 at 476–7 per North J; Re J F Fitzgerald & Seymour’s Bill of Costs [1960] Qd R 430 at 434–5 per Wanstall J. 65. See 10.3–10.10. 66. As to liens of this kind see Ch 27. 67. As to liens of this kind see Ch 26. 68. Staniar v Evans (1886) 34 Ch D 470 at 477 per North J. 69. Re National Safety Council of Australia Victorian Division (in liq) (1991) 9 ACLC 675 at 678 per Vincent J (SC(Vic)). 70. Re Quality House Pty Ltd (in liq) and the Companies Act [1969] 2 NSWR 54 at 57 per McLelland CJ in Eq; Re National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian Division (in liq) (No 2) [1992] 1 VR 485 at 492 per J D Phillips J. 71. Re Trueman’s Estate (1872) LR 14 Eq 278 at 282 per Bacon VC; Re Anglo-Moravian Hungarian Junction Railway Co (1875) 1 Ch D 130 at 133 per James LJ; Re London Metallurgical Co [1897] 2 Ch 262 at 269 per Vaughan Williams J; Re Keswick Motor Company Ltd [1922] SASR 241 at 242–3 per Angas Parsons J; Re Quality House Pty Ltd (in liq) and the Companies Act [1969] 2 NSWR 54 at 55 per McLelland CJ in Eq; Niemann v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs [1985] VR 147 at 156 per Murphy J; Re National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian Division (in liq) (No 2) [1992] 1 VR 485 at 512 per J D Phillips J. 72. Re Quality House Pty Ltd (in liq) and the Companies Act [1969] 2 NSWR 54 at 57 per McLelland CJ in Eq. 73. [1969] 2 NSWR 54. 74. See generally Burridge v Bellew (1875) 32 LT 807 at 812 per Kelly CB, at 813–14 per Amphlett B; Oliver, pp 8–9. 75. Pursuant to the Legal Profession Reform Act 1993 (NSW). 76. ALRC 89, pp 267–8. 77. See 2.34. 78. See 2.35.

79. See 2.36. 80. See 2.37. 81. See 2.38. 82. J North, ‘Costs Disclosure and Review: A National Perspective’ (2004) 27 UNSWLJ 243 at 246. 83. See M Brabazon, ‘Costs Disclosure’ (June 2005) 43 LSJ 59 at 62. 84. ACT s 269 (cf the former ACT Professional Conduct Rules r 3); NSW s 309 (cf the former NSW 1987 s 175); NT s 303 (cf the former NT 1974 s 118B(1), 118B(2)); Qld s 308 (cf the former Qld 1952 s 48); Tas s 291 (cf the former Tas 1993 s 143A); Vic s 3.4.9 (cf the former Vic 1996 s 86); WA s 260 (cf the former WA Professional Conduct Rules rr 10.1, 16A(1)–(5)). 85. Also termed variously as fixed costs provisions (NSW and NT), practitioner remuneration orders (Vic) and costs determinations (WA). 86. As to costs agreements see Ch 3. 87. See 4.12. 88. See 2.26–2.27. 89. See Oliveri v P M Sulcs & Associates Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1198; BC201210316 (where Gzell J noted (at [23]) that the purpose behind the requirement of a statement as to interest in a bill of costs was to ensure that the recipient of the bill was forewarned that a claim for interest might be made at the specified rate if the bill was not paid, and (at [24]) that ‘that purpose is not achieved if a number of documents are provided to a client, and the reference to a claim for interest is only discovered by trawling through the documents’). 90. With New South Wales being a deregulated costs jurisdiction, this aspect of disclosure may prove particularly challenging (S Pattison, ‘A New Costs Regime in the Offing’ (February 2005) 43 LSJ 27), and may necessitate lawyers supplying very broad ranges to avoid later client dissatisfaction. With this in mind, on 31 March 2005 the Law Society lodged a submission with the AttorneyGeneral advocating the removal of this disclosure requirement, stressing that the only realistic estimate a lawyer is able to make to a client is the range of estimates of the lawyer’s own costs: see ‘Law Society asks Attorney General for Changes to Costs Provisions’ (May 2005) 43 LSJ 8. No statutory change has eventuated, though. Cf Casey v Quabba [2005] QSC 356; BC200510379 (a statement to the client that ‘[i]t is estimated the possible range of fees and costs recoverable will be between nil and $250,000 (approximately)’ did not meet the disclosure requirements as it was not a ‘genuine attempt to inform the client as required by the [legislation]’: at [39] per Jones J (reversed on appeal but not on this point: Casey v Quabba [2007] 1 Qd R 297; [2006] QCA 187; BC200603976)). 91. See 2.28. 92. Taxation and costs assessment is discussed in Ch 5. 93. See 3.13–3.22. 94. As to uplift fees see 3.47, 3.53. 95. ACT s 274; NSW s 314; NT s 308; Qld s 313; Tas s 297; Vic s 3.4.14; WA s 265. 96. ACT s 270; NSW s 310 (cf the former NSW 1987 ss 176, 177(2)); NT s 304; Qld s 309; Tas s 293 (cf the former Tas 1993 s 143B); Vic s 3.4.10 (cf the former Vic 1996 s 87); WA s 261. 97. Moloney v Collins [2011] NSWSC 628; BC201104690 at [39], [41], [57] per Johnson J. 98. A person is a ‘third party payer’ in relation to a client of a law practice if the person is not the

client and: (a) is under a legal obligation to pay all or any part of the legal costs for legal services provided to the client; or (b) being under that obligation, has already paid all or a part of those legal costs. On the concept of a ‘third party payer’, and the requirement that he or she be legally obliged to pay the costs in question, see the discussion in Legal Services Commissioner v Wright [2012] 2 Qd R 360; [2010] QCA 321; BC201008678 at [27]–[32] per McMurdo J; Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd v Mallesons Stephen Jaques [2013] WASC 48 at [14]–[27] per Le Miere J. A third party payer is an ‘associated third party payer’ if the legal obligation referred to in the preceding definition is owed to the law practice, whether or not it is also owed to the client or another person. See ACT s 261A(1); NSW s 302A(1); NT s 296(1); Qld s 301(1); Tas s 284(1); Vic s 3.4.2A; WA s 253(1). 99. ACT s 281A(1); NSW s 318A(1); NT s 313(1); Qld s 318(1); Tas s 302(1); Vic s 3.4.18A(1); WA s 270(1). 100. Smirnios v Byrne (No 2) [2009] VSC 86; BC200901551 at [45] per Lasry J. 101. Smirnios v Byrne (No 2) [2009] VSC 86; BC200901551 at [45] per Lasry J. 102. Smirnios v Byrne (No 2) [2009] VSC 86; BC200901551 at [47] per Lasry J. 103. ACT s 275; NSW s 315; NT s 309; Qld s 314; Tas s 298 (cf the former Tas 1993 s 143C); Vic s 3.4.15 (cf the former Vic 1996 s 88); WA s 266. 104. ACT s 271; NSW s 311 (formerly NSW 1987 s 178); NT s 305; Qld s 310; Tas s 294; Vic s 3.4.11; WA s 262. 105. ACT s 281A(2); NSW s 318A(2); NT s 313(2); Qld s 318(2); Tas s 302(2); Vic s 3.4.18A(2); WA s 270(2). 106. ACT s 276; NSW s 316 (cf the former NSW 1987 s 178(4), which required any significant increase in a costs estimate to be disclosed as soon as practicable after the lawyer becomes aware of the likely increase); NT s 310 (cf the former NT 1974 s 118B(3)); Qld s 315; Tas s 299 (cf the former Tas 1993 s 143D); Vic s 3.4.16 (cf the former Vic 1996 s 89); WA s 267. 107. See 2.31. 108. Garbutt v Edwards [2006] 1 All ER 553; [2005] EWCA Civ 1206 at [33] per the court (‘The imposition of the discipline of producing estimates is one of the strategies which has been adopted to contain legal costs, and there is no doubt as to the public interest in avoiding the incurring of unnecessary legal costs’). 109. [2002] NSWSC 32; BC200200618. 110. Hogarth v Gye [2002] NSWSC 32; BC200200618 at [20]. 111. Hogarth v Gye [2002] NSWSC 32; BC200200618 at [25]. 112. Hogarth v Gye [2002] NSWSC 32; BC200200618 at [26]. 113. See S Pattison, ‘Is a Costs Agreement Different from Disclosure?’ (July 2003) 41 LSJ 36. 114. ACT s 278(1); NSW s 318(1); NT s 312(1); Qld s 317(1) (but not applicable as regards a sophisticated client: s 317(5), as defined in s 300); Tas s 301(1) (cf the former Tas 1993 s 143G); Vic s 3.4.18(1) (cf the former Vic 1996 s 92); WA s 269(1). The New South Wales Law Society has alerted the Attorney-General to potential disputes arising out of the failure of NSW s 318(1) to explain what constitutes a reasonable request, and recommended that a client should not be able to require a progress report within three months of having received one: ‘Law Society asks Attorney General for Changes to Costs Provisions’ (May 2005) 43 LSJ 8. 115. ACT s 278(3); NSW s 318(3); NT s 312(3); Qld s 317(3); Tas s 301(3); Vic s 3.4.18(3); WA s

269(3). 116. ACT s 273; NSW s 313; NT s 307; Qld s 312; Tas s 296 (see also Rules of Practice 1994 (Tas) r 14); Vic s 3.4.13; WA s 264. This may be problematic in the context of inclusive settlements, which are often not broken up into component parts: S Pattison, ‘A New Costs Regime in the Offing’ (February 2005) 43 LSJ 27 at 28. 117. ACT s 272; NSW s 312 (cf the former NSW 1987 s 180; Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 1995 (NSW) rr 1.3, 2.1); NT s 306 (cf the former NT 1974 s 118B(5)); Qld s 311; Tas s 295 (cf the former Tas 1993 s 143E); Vic s 3.4.12 (cf the former Vic 1996 s 90); WA s 263 (cf the former WA Professional Conduct Rules r 16A(6)). 118. The prescribed amount, which is exclusive of GST, is $750 (NSW, Qld, Vic) or $1500 (ACT, NT, Tas, WA). 119. See ACT 2007 reg 83; NSW 2005 cl 110; NT 2007 reg 80C; Vic 2005 s 3.4.2. 120. ACT s 277; NSW s 317 (cf former NSW 1987 ss 182, 183); NT s 311; Qld s 316; Tas s 300 (cf the former Tas 1993 s 143F); Vic s 3.4.17 (cf the former Vic 1996 s 91); WA s 268. 121. Defined in n 98 above. 122. Baynes v Kalyk [2003] NSWSC 607; BC200303612 at [19] per Malpass M. 123. See, for example, Bariamis v Coadys [2007] VCAT 645 (costs agreement cancelled due to a failure to provide an updated costs estimate in circumstances where this was practicable; the original costs estimate was $5,000 but the costs ultimately charged were over $18,000). Cf Advanced Gaming Technologies Pty Ltd v Ahern [1999] NSWSC 45; BC9900674 at [26], [50] per Levine J (under the NSW 1987 Act). As to the setting aside of costs agreements see 3.13–3.22. 124. Such conduct of itself does not automatically constitute unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, because the legislation speaks in terms of it being ‘capable of’ constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. Whether or not it does depends upon the circumstances of each case: Reynolds v Whittens (2002) 57 NSWLR 271; [2002] NSWSC 155; BC200200797 at [41] per O’Keefe J. See, for example, Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Reyburn [2009] WASAT 86 (where the tribunal criticised the respondent solicitor for failing to formally revise a costs estimate in writing once the retainer became contentious, but stopped short of making a finding that he had engaged in misconduct because he had informed the client that the necessary court action would increase the costs beyond that specified in the retainer). 125. Paroz v Clifford Gouldson Lawyers [2012] QDC 151 at [51] per McGill DCJ. 126. Walter v Buckeridge (No 5) [2012] WASC 495; BC201210335 at [46] per Le Miere J. 127. Chakera v Kuzamanovic [2003] VSC 92; BC200301504 at [13], [21] per Nettle J. 128. Hendriks v McGeoch (2008) NSW ConvR ¶56-216; [2008] NSWCA 53; BC200802127 at [65] per Basten JA. 129. Patterson v Cohen [2005] NSWSC 635; BC200504862 at [12]–[17] per Hamilton J (particular lien) (contra Kelly v Hogan [2004] NSWSC 238; BC200401603 at [35] per Austin J, but the view stated in the text is preferable given that non-disclosure does not oust the client’s liability for pay costs, instead imposing only a precondition to recovery); Blanda v Kemp Strang Lawyers Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 48; BC200602515 at [55]–[61] per James J (retaining lien). 130. (2004) 235 LSJS 158; [2004] SADC 115. 131. Moloney v Smith (2004) 235 LSJS 158; [2004] SADC 115 at [60].

132. Moloney v Smith (2004) 235 LSJS 158; [2004] SADC 115 at [64]. 133. See Moloney v Smith (2004) 235 LSJS 158; [2004] SADC 115 at [66]–[77]. The trial judge’s ruling on causation was upheld on appeal: Smith v Moloney (2005) 92 SASR 498; [2005] SASC 305; BC200505634 per Besanko and Vanstone JJ, Debelle J dissenting. 134. See Alexander v Home Wilkinson Lowry [2007] VCAT 2297 (where costs were reduced because of the following misleading or deceptive conduct: a degree of ambiguity in the costs disclosure; a failure to communicate the scope of work to be undertaken within the ambit of the first stage of the retainer; and the description of a lawyer as a solicitor but being charged out at the rate of special counsel: at [10]–[12]). 135. See, for example, Metcash Trading Ltd v Hourigan’s IGA Umina Pty Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 21,129; [2003] NSWSC 683; BC200304169 at [54] per Young CJ in Eq; Gray v Morris [2004] 2 Qd R 118; [2004] QCA 5; BC200400179 at [53] per McMurdo J. 136. Here replicating the position formerly only in New South Wales and Western Australia: see Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) s 4(1) (repealed); Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA) s 4(1) (repealed). 137. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2, s 2(1). 138. SA r 16B.2.1–16B.2.3. 139. SA rr 16B.2, 16B.3. 140. Fam LR 2004 r 19.03 (in its form prior to 1 July 2008). 141. ‘Lawyer’ does not include counsel instructed by another lawyer: Fam LR 2004 r 19.04(7). 142. ‘Court events’ are the following: (a) conciliation conference; (b) the first day of the allocated dates mentioned in rr 16.10 and 16.13; and (c) any other court events that the court orders: Fam LR 2004 r 19.04(1). ‘Court event’ does not include an attendance with a family counsellor, a family dispute resolution practitioner or a family consultant in a parenting case: Fam LR 2004 r 19.04(7). 143. Fam LR 2004 r 19.04(2). 144. Fam LR 2004 r 19.04(3)(a). 145. Fam LR 2004 r 19.04(4). 146. Fam LR 2004 r 19.03(1). 147. ASCR r 12.4.1 (applies in Qld and SA); ACT r 9.2; NSW r 11.1; NT r 9.1; Vic r 10.1; WA 2010 r 15(5)(a)(iii). 148. See, for example, Re Chapple (1884) 27 Ch 584 at 587 per Kay J; Re Smith (deceased) (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 422 at 425 per Street J; Will of Shannon [1977] 1 NSWLR 210 at 217 per Holland J; Re McClung (deceased) [2006] VSC 209; BC200604264 at [35] per Evans M. 149. [2011] VSC 368; BC201105930. 150. Szmulewicz v Recht [2011] VSC 368; BC201105930 at [44]. See also Walker v D’Alessandro [2010] VSC 15; BC201000287 at [30] per T Forrest J; Tas r 80(1) (which prohibits a lawyer charging both profit costs and commission in relation to the same work carried out for or on behalf of a client if that lawyer is also an executor and/or trustee), 80(3) (which prohibits a lawyer executing a will or settlement for a person unless that person, before executing the will or settlement, has signed a statement showing the rate or identifying the scale of commission to be charged in addition to legal professional charges if: (a) the lawyer or another lawyer in the practice is appointed under the will or settlement as an executor and/or trustee; and (b) any one of the lawyers is entitled to a trustee’s commission); R Cook, ‘Don’t Ask for More’ (October 2011) 85

LIJ 46. 151. Re Craig (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 265. 152. SA r 16A; Rules of Practice 1994 (Tas) r 15; Vic r 39.2(c); WA 2010 r 11.1. 153. David Truex Solicitor (a firm) v Kitchin [2007] 2 FLR 1203; [2007] EWCA Civ 618 at [22] per Waller LJ. 154. NSW r 6A. 155. Being the commencement date of the relevant provisions of the Access to Justice (Civil Litigation Reforms) Amendment Act 2009 (Cth). 156. The ‘overarching purpose’ is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes: (a) according to law; and (b) as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M(1). 157. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37N(3). 158. Being the commencement date of the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Amendment Act 2012 (Vic). 159. Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 65A(1), 65A(2). 160. Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 65B(1), 65B(2).

[page 36]

CHAPTER 3

Costs Agreements Historical Background

3.3

Construing Costs Agreements

3.5

Statutory Provision for Costs Agreements The Model Laws — jurisdictions other than South Australia Parties to a costs agreement Writing requirements Costs agreement can be found in more than one document Signature South Australia

3.6 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.10 3.11 3.12

Modification and Setting Aside of Costs Agreements Jurisdiction Model Laws’ regulation — jurisdictions other than South Australia The statutory jurisdiction Onus of proof Timing of application Consequence of determination as to ‘unfairness’ or ‘unreasonableness’ Reasons for determination Appeal against determination South Australia

3.13 3.13 3.15 3.16 3.17 3.18 3.19 3.20 3.21 3.22

Concepts of Fairness and Reasonableness Fairness Failure to explain difference between costs agreement and applicable scale Failure to explain potential costs exposure Failure to explain method of charging and its consequences Impact of nature of the client Timing of explanation Reasonableness Time charging Reference points for determining reasonableness of charging rates Contracting out of fairness and reasonableness requirements

3.23 3.24

Contingency Fee Agreements — At General Law Definition Advantages and drawbacks of contingent fees Advantages Drawbacks

3.41 3.41 3.42 3.42 3.43

3.25 3.27 3.28 3.29 3.30 3.31 3.33 3.37 3.39

[page 37] Impact of maintenance and champerty Application of general law to contingency fee agreements Percentage and uplift fee agreements Speculative fee agreements Contingency Fee Agreements — Impact of Statute Model Laws’ regulation — jurisdictions other than South Australia

3.44 3.46 3.46 3.48 3.50 3.51

Validity of ‘conditional costs agreements’ Types of cases where conditional costs agreements prohibited Validity of conditional costs agreements with a premium (‘uplift’) Percentage fee agreements prohibited South Australia

3.51 3.52 3.53 3.54 3.55

Effect of Non-Compliance with Statutory Requirements on Costs Recovery

3.57

Legal Professional Privilege and Costs Agreements

3.61

3.1 Lawyer and client can reach agreement as to the manner in which the lawyer is to be remunerated for providing legal services (pursuant to a ‘costs agreement’). As ‘[c]osts necessarily can involve a direct conflict of interest’1 — the lawyer’s interest is for the greatest fee, and the client’s for the lowest fee. For this reason, courts have historically been jealous of costs agreements, and careful to ensure that a lawyer did not take advantage of his or her position, which is fiduciary and raises a presumption of undue influence, over the client to secure an excessive contractual entitlement to fees. Parliament has likewise intervened to regulate both the implementation and content of costs agreements, treading the fine line between client protection and promoting access to justice by regulating litigation financing techniques that may be suspect at general law. The general law and statutory regulation of costs agreements form the bulk of this chapter.2 The chapter concludes with mention of the impact of legal professional privilege on costs agreements.3 Falling outside the scope of this chapter are the professional disciplinary consequences of overcharging via costs agreements.4 3.2 Other than in New South Wales and the Northern Territory, the legal profession legislation states that the quantum of costs recoverable by a lawyer against his or her own client is determined, in the first instance, by the terms of any valid costs agreement between the parties. Only if there is no applicable costs agreement are those costs determined by reference to any

applicable scale, or otherwise on a quantum meruit basis (namely the fair and reasonable value of the services provided).5 In New South Wales and the Northern Territory the existence of an applicable fixed costs provision6 ousts the costs otherwise recoverable under a costs agreement; if there is no such provision, as in the other jurisdictions, costs recoverable are again determined by a costs agreement or on a quantum meruit basis.7 [page 38]

Historical Background 3.3 Reflecting freedom of contract, the general law imposed no absolute prohibition upon a solicitor contracting with a client as to the fees the solicitor would charge for representing the client. Yet the courts did not view costs agreements between solicitor and client in the same manner as other contracts. In large part this was due to the relationship of confidence between solicitor and client, triggering fiduciary duties and the presumption of undue influence. In Clare v Joseph Fletcher Moulton LJ, in remarks that an Australian judge in recent times has described to be ‘as apposite today as they were a century ago’,8 explained the courts’ approach in the following terms:9 [Costs agreements were] viewed with great jealousy by the Courts, because they were agreements between a man and his legal adviser as to the terms of the latter’s remuneration, and there was so great an opportunity for the exercise of undue influence, that the Courts were very slow to enforce such agreements where they were favourable to the solicitor unless they were satisfied that they were made under circumstances that precluded any suspicion of an improper attempt on the solicitor’s part to benefit himself at his client’s expense. But when it appeared that the agreement was favourable to the client, the Courts often held the solicitor to his bargain, for there was no ground in equity why they should be suspicious of a bargain of that kind.

Lord Alverstone CJ in the same case noted that costs agreements, when examined by the courts, ‘were not infrequently held to be binding’, the inquiry being ‘always directed to the question whether the agreement was fair and reasonable’.10 Their Lordships confirmed that, although the concepts of fairness and reasonableness in this context did not take statutory form until 1870 in the United Kingdom11 (and later in the Australian jurisdictions that enacted legislation on the point),12 the jurisdiction to set aside costs agreements on the grounds of unfairness or unreasonableness was already

recognised at general law. Australian judges have reiterated this view independent of any provision in a statute that confers such a jurisdiction.13 3.4 The 1870 date refers to the enactment of the Attorneys and Solicitors Act 1870 (UK). That Act did no more than provide a procedure for the control of costs agreements, leaving the substance of the pre-existing general law unaltered.14 Its principal operative provision, s 4, read as follows:15 An attorney or solicitor may make an agreement in writing with his client respecting the amount and manner of payment of the whole or any part of past or future services, fees, charges, or disbursements in respect of business done or to be done by such attorney or solicitor … either at the same rate or a greater or at a less rate as or than the rate at which he would otherwise be entitled to be remunerated … Provided always, that … the amount payable under the agreement shall

[page 39] not be received by the attorney or solicitor until the agreement has been examined and allowed by a taxing officer of a court having power to enforce the agreement; and if it shall appear to such taxing officer that the agreement is not fair and reasonable he may require the opinion of a court or a judge to be taken thereon by motion or petition, and such court or judge shall have power either to reduce the amount payable under the agreement or to order the agreement to be cancelled and the costs, fees, charges, and disbursements in respect of the business done to be taxed in the same manner as if no such agreement had been made.

Importantly, the Act was not required to enable persons to enter into costs agreements, nor to strengthen the hands of the courts in examining costs agreements. It prescribed the mode by which the solicitor could obtain the benefit of its provisions — avoiding problems of proving an oral agreement and the disabilities where the agreement was favourable to the solicitor — so that only where the solicitor or client desired the privileges or safeguards prescribed by the Act was there a need to comply with the requirement of an agreement in writing.16 The English Act, together with subsequent enactments in each Australian jurisdiction, therefore served to enable clients and solicitors to know where they stood and to minimise the occurrence of disputes,17 but did not purport to alter the requirement, mentioned above, that costs agreements be fair and reasonable to be enforceable.

Construing Costs Agreements

3.5 The extent to which a court should construe any ambiguity in a costs agreement contra proferentem — that is, against the lawyer who seeks to claim under it — depends in part upon the nature of the client. In Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth Field Warne (a firm) (No 3),18 for instance, Byrne J declined to construe a costs agreement contra proferentem, as the client was ‘an intelligent and experienced litigant who demonstrated himself to be well able to look after his own interests’, ‘a very experienced professional litigant’ and a ‘hands on client’. His Honour’s finding that in many respects the costs agreement operated ‘surprisingly harshly’ against the interests of the law practice in question also influenced his ruling. In these circumstances, Byrne J held, the agreement ‘is a commercial document which must be interpreted in a practical way’.19 The case of a (more) typical inexperienced client, though, may supply greater justification to apply a contra proferentem approach in addressing ambiguity. Byrne J, in a later case, accepted as much, reasoning that ‘the modern legal environment is more sensitive to the consequences of inequality of bargaining power’.20 This is because it is the lawyer who usually drafts the costs agreement; he or she is therefore positioned to ensure its terms are phrased in a manner that clearly identifies costs entitlements. In such a case, there is little justification to benefit the lawyer from any ambiguous expression.21 A prudent lawyer will, therefore, ensure that the terms of a costs agreement are sufficiently clear, so as to tell the client what he or she is letting himself or herself in for by way of costs, so that the client may, if he or she wishes, obtain outside advice as to the reasonableness of the agreement before signing it.22 The presence of [page 40] ambiguity can, in any case, be a ground upon which a costs agreement can be set aside for being not fair or reasonable.23

Statutory Provision for Costs Agreements 3.6 The legal profession legislation in all jurisdictions makes specific

provision for costs agreements. The advent of the Model Laws, enacted to date other than in South Australia, has ensued a welcome uniformity in regulation of these agreements. In no jurisdiction do the statutes oust the basic requirements of a contract in their application to costs agreements; in fact, the statutes make explicit that a costs agreement is enforced in the same way as any other contract.24 A costs agreement must meet accordingly the general law requirements of a contract. This encompasses the elements that go to substantiating agreement, proof of which is heavily assisted by statutory formality requirements,25 as well as consideration. As to the latter, however, as the legal profession legislation in most jurisdictions defines ‘costs’ to include an amount that a person ‘has been … charged’ by a law practice for the provision of legal services,26 this suggests that a costs agreement can be made after the provision of the relevant services.27 If so, past consideration is not a hindrance to enforcing an agreement of this kind, assuming informed client consent in any case. As the person most commonly seeking to enforce a costs agreement, it is the lawyer who must establish the presence of these elements.28 For example, in PM Sulcs & Associates Pty Ltd v Oliveri29 the lawyer was unable to satisfy Debelle AJ as to the existence of a true agreement. The facts involved a backdated costs agreement not signed by the client or accepted by other conduct, under which the parties had not agreed on the hourly rate chargeable under the alleged agreement, which his Honour saw as ‘obviously a fundamental term of a costs agreement’.30 [page 41]

The Model Laws — jurisdictions other than South Australia Parties to a costs agreement 3.7 An agreement as to the costs of the provision of legal services (‘costs agreement’)31 may be made:32 with a client by the lawyer retained by the client to provide the services;

by the lawyer retained on behalf of the client by another lawyer; between the lawyer providing the services and another lawyer who retained the first lawyer on behalf of the client; or between a law practice and an associated third party payer in relation to a client. A ‘third party payer’ is a non-client who is under a legal obligation33 to pay, or has paid, all or any part of the legal costs for legal services provided to the client. A third party payer is an ‘associated third party payer’ if the said legal obligation is owed to the law practice, whether or not it is also owed to the client or another person.34

Writing requirements 3.8 The legislation declares void a costs agreement that is not written or evidenced in writing.35 Barrett J explained the purpose of this requirement in Wentworth v Rogers:36 If there is to be reliance on the terms of a contract as to the quantum or manner of computation of, or other matters ‘as to’, a lawyer’s costs, that contract must either be a written contract or a contract evidenced in writing. This ensures that the terms are set down in tangible form so that any doubt about the way in which they are expressed is avoided. If, because of the lack of writing, there is room for speculation or argument about what was agreed as to costs, then the legislative policy is that any agreement should be treated as non-existent and rights and obligations on the subject of the lawyer’s remuneration should be determined without regard to the supposed agreement.

So the only effect of the statutory writing requirement is to obliterate an agreement, which is unwritten, and not evidenced in writing. Because the law regards it as non-existent, the agreement cannot be the source of rights and obligations. But the legislation does not prohibit, expressly or by implication, the making of unwritten costs agreements. No illegality flows [page 42] from an unwritten costs agreement or from the provision of legal services in the context of an unwritten agreement or without any costs agreement at all.

It is just that remuneration cannot be claimed under an unwritten agreement, as it is void from the moment of its supposed inception.37 3.9 The foregoing does not prevent the lawyer recovering costs on a quantum meruit (restitutionary) basis, quantified by taxation or assessment if necessary. Such a claim is not based upon contract (whether express or implied) — the statutory writing requirements leave no room for an implied contract for the payment of remuneration38 — but to avoid a client’s unjust enrichment.39 However, the principles of restitution do not operate if, under the actual terms of the costs agreement, the lawyer is not entitled to payment.40

Costs agreement can be found in more than one document 3.10 The statutory requirement that a costs agreement be ‘evidenced in writing’ does not mean that the agreement must be documented in a single document. An agreement in writing can be contained in letters or correspondence, provided it is clear that the client has acceded to the terms found therein.41 The safer course, though, is for lawyer and client to enter into a formal agreement, this being less likely to generate a dispute over the terms of the engagement.

Signature 3.11 The legislation envisages that the agreement can consist of a written offer that is accepted in writing or by other conduct.42 The offer must clearly state that it is an offer to enter into a costs agreement, that the client may accept it in writing or by other conduct, and the type of conduct that will constitute acceptance.43 That an agreement may be accepted by conduct other than writing dictates that it is not essential to the valid creation of a costs agreement that each party sign it (unless the terms of the offer stipulate that signature is required).44 That it is in writing, or evidenced in writing, is sufficient. However, the lawyer must establish that the client has in fact agreed to the written document, and the client’s signature is ordinarily the most effective vehicle to discharge this onus.

South Australia 3.12 The Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA), via s 42(6), simply states that a lawyer may45 make an agreement in writing with a client for payment of an amount by way of legal costs. The Full South Australian Supreme Court addressed the meaning of ‘make an agreement in writing’ in McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis.46 The appellant law firm sent the [page 43] respondent clients documents entitled ‘Terms of Engagement’ and ‘Schedule of Fees’, to which the respondents agreed orally by telephone. The appellant rendered a costs account based on Schedule of Fees provided. The issue was whether the appellant had ‘made an agreement in writing’ with the respondents within the terms of s 42(6). The court held that s 42(6) should not be construed to require a client’s acceptance of a costs agreement to be in written form, not only in view of the common law in relation to written agreements, but also given the court’s power to set aside a costs agreement for unfairness or unreasonableness.47 For this purpose, their Honours saw no distinction in substance between acceptance by way of email from a client and a telephone exchange.48 The position is clear in the remaining jurisdictions, where the statute envisages that a costs agreement can consist of a written offer accepted in writing or by other conduct.49

Modification and Setting Aside of Costs Agreements Jurisdiction 3.13 In all jurisdictions statute makes provision for costs agreements to be modified or set aside in defined circumstances. This formalises an equivalent power the courts had assumed since early times to set aside costs agreements that lacked fairness or reasonableness, and indeed the statutory formulation adopts this terminology.

3.14 The foregoing should not be read as suggesting that costs agreements may only be modified or set aside on the grounds of unfairness or unreasonableness, whether at general law or under statute. Factors that vitiate contracts may also potentially apply in this context. So a costs agreement may be set aside for misrepresentation, unconscionable dealing, undue influence or mistake, or pursuant to statutory provisions dealing with unjust or unconscionable contracts.50 With the commencement of the Australian Consumer Law on 1 January 2011,51 which empowers the court to set aside terms in standard form consumer contracts that are ‘unfair’,52 there may be scope for further statutory impact on lawyer–client agreements. Courts have displayed a tendency to uphold agreements in which uncertainty is alleged, reflecting general principles applicable to all commercial contracts rather than a distinct approach for costs agreements. Courts therefore endeavour to avoid a construction that leads to invalidity, especially if the contract has been acted upon in the meantime,53 including by [page 44] implying additional words or a term on an ad hoc basis. This is because ‘[t]he requirements of certainty do not mean that the agreement must spell out every possible permutation and combination of circumstances which may arise in the application of the agreement’.54 Yet circumstances can arise where a costs agreement is invalidated for uncertainty. In McInnes v Twigg,55 for example, Moss J held a costs agreement unenforceable on the grounds of uncertainty because its terms were so obscure and devoid of clear meaning as to be incapable of being cured by attributing any particular contractual intention to the parties. Fiduciary law proscribes conflicts of interest and duty. In negotiating a costs agreement with a prospective client the lawyer’s interest necessarily conflicts with that of the client. Yet, with limited exceptions,56 courts have not been especially proactive in using fiduciary law to reduce or deny lawyers’ contractual claims to remuneration. There is a legal and a practical reason for this; legally speaking, the law can address this conflict via the fairness and reasonableness jurisdiction;57 practically speaking, a strict application of fiduciary principle here could effectively require costs

agreements to be negotiated through an intermediary as a representative of the client, which may impede more than promote access to justice. For essentially the same reasons — as well as the fact that it is the client who ordinarily seeks out the lawyer for advice rather than the lawyer actively soliciting for this purpose — the case law reveals few occasions where a costs agreement has been set aside for undue influence exercised by lawyer over client in securing it.58

Model Laws’ regulation — jurisdictions other than South Australia 3.15 Enactment of the Model Laws again heralds a welcome convergence between jurisdictions so far as the statutory power to set aside costs agreements is concerned. The main remaining variation is that the statutory jurisdiction vests in the court only in the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and Western Australia; elsewhere it vests in a costs assessor (except in Victoria, where it vests in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT)).

The statutory jurisdiction 3.16 The legislation provides that, on application by a client,59 a costs assessor (court/VCAT) may order that a costs agreement be set aside if satisfied that it is not fair or reasonable.60 [page 45] For this purpose, the assessor (court/VCAT) can ascertain whether or not a costs agreement exists.61 In determining whether or not the agreement is fair or reasonable, regard can be had to any or all of the following matters:62 whether the client was induced to enter into the agreement by the fraud or misrepresentation of the law practice or its representatives;63 whether a lawyer acting on behalf of the law practice has been found guilty

of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct in relation to the provision of legal services to which the agreement relates;64 whether the law practice failed to make any of the required costs disclosures;65 the circumstances and the conduct of the parties before, when and after the agreement was made; whether and how the agreement addresses the effect on costs of matters and changed circumstances that might foreseeably arise and affect the extent and nature of legal services provided under the agreement; whether and how billing under the agreement addresses changed circumstances affecting the extent and nature of legal services provided under the agreement. These matters target the process of securing the agreement (procedural) ahead of the fairness of its terms (a substantive inquiry). Also, some appear superfluous, as clients are likely to pursue other avenues to address shortcomings reflected by their content; others are so open-ended as to give little concrete guidance in their application.66 That these do not exhaustively state the matters that may influence a finding of unfairness or unreasonableness — a point made explicit by the wording of the legislation other than in Victoria67 — leaves opens the door to informing the concepts of ‘fairness’ and ‘reasonableness’ by their well understood meaning developed by the general law.68 This is appropriate, as the matters listed under statute do not comprehensively reflect the concepts of ‘fairness’ and ‘reasonableness’ at general law. [page 46]

Onus of proof 3.17 As it is the client who makes an application for a costs agreement to be set aside, and such an order is premised on the costs assessor (court / VCAT) being satisfied that the agreement is not fair or unreasonable, it is the client who bears at least the evidentiary onus of casting doubt as to the fairness or

reasonableness of the agreement.69 The client must, accordingly, adduce evidence showing unfairness or unreasonableness; it is not enough simply to rely on the fiduciary nature of the lawyer and client relationship and adduce a costs agreement allowing for charges, say, exceeding the prescribed scale or determination.70 This differs from the position at general law, which casts on the lawyer the onus of proving the agreement is fair and reasonable,71 grounded in the lawyer’s position of ascendancy over the client,72 and reflecting that the nature of the proceeding was seen as a safeguard for the client.73 In any event, where a client adduces evidence that prima facie raises an inference of unfairness or unreasonableness, it behoves the lawyer to adduce evidence to the contrary.

Timing of application 3.18 The legal profession legislation does not expressly specify a time frame or set a time limit within which applications to set aside or vary costs agreements must be made. As the cause of action arises in contract, it may be subject to limitations legislation;74 the commencement of the limitation period equates to the moment when the account or bill is delivered, and payment is requested.75 The claim may alternatively be barred by laches or, if the client has with knowledge taken no steps in relation to the agreement, the client’s acquiescence.76 It also stands to reason that the timeliness of the application is a factor relevant to the exercise of the discretion to set aside a costs agreement, no doubt informed by the degree of prejudice to the lawyer caused by any delay.77

Consequence of determination as to ‘unfairness’ or ‘unreasonableness’ 3.19 A costs assessor (court/VCAT) who determines that a costs agreement is not fair or reasonable may make an order in relation to the payment of legal costs the subject of the agreement.78 The legislation directs the assessor (court/VCAT) to determine the fair and reasonable legal costs79 in relation to the work to which the agreement related,80 but prohibits an order for an amount exceeding what the lawyer would have been entitled to recover had

[page 47] the agreement (or a term in it) not been set aside.81 In determining the fair and reasonable legal costs, the assessor (court/VCAT) must take into account the seriousness of the lawyer’s conduct, whether or not it was reasonable to carry out the work, and whether or not the work was carried out in a reasonable manner.82 For this purpose, regard may be had to any of the following matters:83 whether the lawyer complied with any relevant legislation or professional rules; any costs disclosures made by the law practice, or the failure to make required costs disclosures;84 any relevant advertisement as to the lawyer’s costs or skills; the skill, labour and responsibility displayed on the part of the lawyer; the retainer and whether the work done was within the scope of the retainer; the complexity, novelty or difficulty of the matter; the quality of the work done; the place where, and circumstances in which, the work was done; the time within which the work was required to be done; any other relevant matter. It follows that where a costs agreement is set aside, it is the determination of the assessor (court/VCAT) that defines the parties’ rights and obligations, not the terms of the costs agreement.85

Reasons for determination 3.20 The legislation in New South Wales, the Northern Territory and Tasmania requires a costs assessor’s order or determination to be accompanied by a statement of reasons,86 an approach judicially encouraged aside from statutory direction.87 In any case, in the Australian Capital

Territory, Queensland and Western Australia, that the Supreme Court makes the order or determination attracts an obligation to give reasons.88 The same is required by statute in Victoria so far as final determinations by VCAT are concerned.89

Appeal against determination 3.21 In jurisdictions that vest in a costs assessor the power to set aside a costs agreement, the assessor’s order or determination can be appealed in essentially the same fashion as other orders or determinations by costs assessors.90 Determinations, where made by a court, may be the subject of the usual appeal process, and VCAT determinations are appealable to the Supreme Court.91 [page 48]

South Australia 3.22 The Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA), via s 42(7), states that the Supreme Court may rescind or vary a costs agreement if it considers that any term of the agreement is not fair and reasonable. It is unclear whether this jurisdiction is intended to replicate that at general law, given its focus on a term of an agreement being unfair or unreasonable. Yet as the factors identified by the relevant professional rules as relevant to determining this issue are not far removed from those relevant to the general law jurisdiction,92 and are in any case punctuated ‘any other relevant matter’, there are compelling reasons to conclude that general law notions remain relevant.

Concepts of Fairness and Reasonableness 3.23 As noted earlier,93 in all jurisdictions except Victoria it is clear that the matters prescribed by statute that are relevant to determining whether or not a costs agreement is fair or reasonable are not exhaustive. This leaves scope for reference to the concepts of ‘fairness’ and ‘reasonableness’ as understood at

general law, to the extent that they apply consistently with the statutory regime. At least at general law, fairness and reasonableness are distinct concepts — fairness relates to the circumstances at the point of entry into the agreement; reasonableness relates to the substantive terms of the agreement94 — and a costs agreement will be upheld only where it is both fair and reasonable; the requirements are cumulative.95

Fairness 3.24 Fairness refers to the mode of obtaining the agreement. Part and parcel of this notion is the requirement that the lawyer must not ‘take advantage of the relationship between his client and himself or receive any benefit from an agreement into which the client has been induced to enter by reason of his reliance upon the solicitor’.96 A lawyer who makes a costs agreement with a client who fully understands and appreciates that agreement satisfies the requirement as to fairness.97 The court must, to this end, be satisfied that the agreement represented on the part of the client ‘a real and genuine choice, that is, a free exercise of an independent mind’.98 The concept of fairness thus overlaps with the doctrine of undue influence, but the concepts coexist because fairness stemmed from the common law whereas (non-testamentary) undue influence derived from equity.99

Failure to explain difference between costs agreement and applicable scale 3.25 Many of the cases dealing with the notion of ‘fairness’ have involved lawyers who have omitted to explain to clients how their liability under a costs agreement differs from what would apply under an applicable scale or remuneration order. In this context Ipp J in Brown v Talbot and Olivier observed:100 [page 49] [It is important] for solicitors, when entering into agreements with their clients whereby they seek to impose a costs regime different to that which they in the ordinary course would be

entitled, to ensure that there is no suggestion of any overreaching on their part. In my opinion, any agreement which seeks to remove the limit imposed by the scale will be regarded as unreasonable if full disclosure is not made of the limits and benefits provided by the scale and the effect and consequences of the proposed agreement. The obligation to make a full and frank disclosure of this kind is an integral part of the duty owed by lawyers to their clients.

His Honour listed material circumstances, which include the following, that may influence a client in deciding whether or not to enter a costs agreement, and that therefore should be expressly disclosed to the client:101 the fact that remuneration is governed by scales that limit the amount of costs recoverable, irrespective of the time the lawyers devoted to the proceedings;102 the fact that the scales limit both the costs that the client could recover from the opposing party to the proceedings and the costs recoverable from the client by the client’s lawyers; the principles underlying the charging of fees under the scales and also the basis of the proposed charging under the contemplated agreement; and estimates of the approximate amount of lawyers’ fees recoverable under the scales and the approximate amount recoverable under those scales from the opponent were the client successful. The case law, moreover, suggests that, especially for a client lacking knowledge or experience,103 lawyers should disclose to a prospective client that other competent lawyers in the field of practice might well charge scale fees, which could be significantly less than under the costs agreement proposed.104 The position will be different, though, if there is no evidence that other lawyers are prepared to act on scale fees.105 3.26 To the extent that scales nowadays have more limited application in the lawyer–client context — especially in New South Wales, where lawyer– client costs are largely deregulated — the above assumes less relevance. It must also be seen against the backdrop of broader costs disclosure obligations,106 which address some of the ‘fairness’ aspects mentioned above.

Failure to explain potential costs exposure 3.27 A client should be told and understand his or her potential costs

exposure in the litigation. Courts have, to this end, spoken of a duty to provide an estimate, if reasonably [page 50] possible, of the amount payable under a costs agreement should the litigation prove successful, and also the amount payable should it prove unsuccessful.107 The rule in Re Blyth and Fanshawe108 — which dictates, inter alia, that an expense incurred by the lawyer that is not necessary for the proper enforcing of the client’s rights (an ‘unusual expense’) is not recoverable from the client unless prior client authority had been obtained to incur it — should be noted in this context. As a costs agreement is commonly used to secure this authority, lawyers must take care to ensure that the client is made aware and properly advised as to the costs implications of giving the authority. ‘The utility of the rule’, it has been noted, ‘is undermined if lawyers can exclude it without first properly explaining it to the client’.109 In Kasmeridis v McNamara Business & Property Law,110 for example, the costs agreement authorised the solicitors ‘to incur any unusual disbursements the solicitors considered necessary for the proper conduct of the matter’. On the facts, the solicitors said nothing to the clients about this topic. Judge Lunn found that it was unfair to the clients not to do so, adding that the clients:111 … were entitled to proper advice about the extent to which they were committing themselves financially before the lawyer accepted instructions which would authorise the incurring of unusual disbursements subjectively considered by the [solicitors] to be necessary for the proper conduct of the matter.

This finding was affirmed on appeal, Doyle CJ remarking that the clause ‘deprives a client of a significant protection that would otherwise be available, because but for that clause an unusual disbursement would not be recoverable by [the solicitors] unless prior authority was obtained to incur it’.112

Failure to explain method of charging and its consequences 3.28 Clear disclosure and explanation should be made of an unusual basis of charging via a costs agreement. The courts have fixated upon lawyers (often in personal injuries litigation) who charge a set hourly fee across the board,

for all forms of work and notwithstanding the qualifications and experience of the lawyer(s) involved. A client needs a careful explanation of the implications of an agreement using this form of charging, as explained by de Jersey CJ in Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Roche:113 The extent to which a solicitor need explain to his or her client a prima facie unusual basis of charging may depend on the extent to which that basis is unusual. Should it be proposed, for example, as in this case, and one would hope very unusually, that the time of a non-legally qualified paralegal, performing essentially secretarial or administrative tasks, be chargeable at rates approaching

[page 51] those appropriate to an employed solicitor or partner, then one would expect some compelling explanation: has, for example, the charge out rate been set appreciably lower than that which would usually apply to a partner, reflecting appropriately the mix of professional/nonprofessional work, in the interests of convenience to the client? It would be unprofessional, as happened in this case, to set a high, across-the-board rate, albeit less than a commandable partner rate, which resulted in a windfall because of the high proportion of non-qualified work to be accomplished.

His Honour added that a lawyer proposing arrangement of this kind should offer a most careful justification, not only to assure the client that he or she is not being disadvantaged, but to inform the client appropriately so the client may make a fully informed decision whether or not to agree to it.114 Agreements of this nature usually fall foul of the general law requirement of reasonableness,115 in any case, as do agreements that entitle lawyers to charge ‘at rates notified to the client from time to time’.116

Impact of nature of the client 3.29 The nature and scope of the explanation required depends on the client’s knowledge, experience and position.117 The less experienced and knowledgeable the client, the greater the need for explanation. To this end, an Australian court has gone so far as to remark that, for clients that are particularly vulnerable and reliant on the lawyer, a failure to fully and frankly advise as to the relative level of the fees proposed to be charged or to secure the client is independently advised is, where those fees are exorbitant, ‘no better than theft’.118 At the other end of the scale, it has been judicially observed, in terms not limited to costs disclosure, that ‘[a] client of limited

experience or sophistication requires more by way of explanation than a client who is experienced in business and is likely to understand the differences from a very brief explanation’.119 In Cerini v McLeods (a firm)120 the client, a man of business experience, was given the costs agreement, took it home with him, read it right through, understood he was to be charged on an hourly rate and at different hourly rates depending on who did the work, and understood that he was entitled to take independent advice before signing the agreement. Having read and understood the agreement, the client read the provision entitling the solicitor to charge $25 for a solicitor, or $20 in the case of a clerk, for a telephone attendance or a letter in lieu of the per-hour basis of charging. In these circumstances, Pullin J held that there was no requirement that the solicitor explain the terms of the agreement to the client. Cerini should not be read to dictate that clients who are knowledgeable and intelligent, and are capable of understanding the agreement, require no explanation of the nature and impact of a costs agreement. Unusual forms of charging, and potentially unrecoverable costs even in the event of victory in the matter, the prudent lawyer will bring to every client’s attention.121 At the same time, there remains a responsibility on the part of the client, especially a knowledgeable one, to find out how the charges will be rendered and what the cost of taking a particular action might be; a client is not, in this context, entitled to ‘approach [page 52] the engagement of a solicitor with his eyes closed’.122 For example, in Chan v Batemans123 an educated client experienced in business transactions, and in dealings with lawyers, who did not read the costs agreement, and ‘blundered into the arrangement without any due regard to her own interests’, was unable to establish unfairness.

Timing of explanation 3.30 The full and frank explanation of the costs agreement should be effected

prior to the client’s entry into it. Any further information pertinent to costs should be disclosed as and when the lawyer becomes aware of it. So a costs agreement entered into at a late stage of litigious business will be scrutinised with particular care if only because the client usually has no vantage ground left from which to bargain. In Stoddart & Co v Jovetic,124 for example, the lawyers had acted for three years in a litigious matter that was supposed to be ready for trial, and had received substantial moneys on trust for fees but had not furnished the client a statement of account. It was held insufficient merely to advise the client that costs calculated in accordance with the agreement ‘may exceed the statutory scale’ and that ‘another legal firm may well’ do the work for less and that the client ‘may obtain independent legal advice’ in respect of that agreement.125 The Western Australian Full Court considered that this was the sort of letter one might expect at the commencement of an engagement but not when nearing its completion, stating that:126 … [t]he idea that a wholly impecunious client might at that stage go off to ‘obtain independent legal advice’ or might be in any way warned, assisted or protected by the cursory statements that costs calculated in accordance with the agreement ‘may’ exceed the statutory scales and that another legal firm ‘may well’ do the work for less, is simply unreal.

Reasonableness 3.31 The general law requirement of reasonableness was described in early cases as arising from the inherent jurisdiction of courts to prevent exorbitant or excessive charges by attorneys and solicitors.127 Reasonableness in this context represented one of the few areas where the courts assumed a jurisdiction to vitiate a contract on the ground that its actual terms were ‘unfair’ to one of the parties, independent of any procedural irregularity in entry into the contract. The courts’ willingness to interfere with an otherwise legitimate contract, on the ground that its terms were not ‘reasonable’, arose out of the jealousy with which they viewed costs agreements. 3.32 An agreement is unreasonable if its terms or effect are unreasonable to the client.128 Reasonableness is to be determined at the time of entry into the agreement, on an objective basis and with regard to the circumstances of the case.129 The main focus of reasonableness concerns the lawyer’s rate of and approach to charging. The failure to stipulate a rate of charging carries a prima facie badge of unreasonableness because the client in such a case is unable to assess reasonableness prior to entering the agreement.130

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Time charging 3.33 Costs agreements based on time charging — an hourly rate that covers overheads of the law practice as well as the need for appropriate remuneration for profit-sharers — have gained popularity on the ground that the lawyer’s fee is presumably more closely related to the actual work done than other methods of charging, and is arguably better understood by clients. Especially in New South Wales, where most lawyer–client scales were abolished in 1994, time charging has become prevalent. It is thus unsurprising that time charging has figured prominently in inquiries into reasonableness, often involving scrutiny of the quantum and application of hourly rates. The case law reveals multiple judicial expressions questioning the appropriateness of time charging, and referring to its ‘distinct potential to result in overcharging’,131 which may be magnified where the lawyer elects to ‘round up’ the fee charged in six minute intervals,132 and ‘inherent scope for error in the number of hours charged’,133 especially when coupled with ambitious billing targets. Concerns include that time charging agreements may confer on the lawyer considerable unilateral discretion as to the charges that can be made,134 may reward the inefficient lawyer,135 may not discriminate as to the type of work done (whether or not the lawyer is engaged in a highly skilled, or a more mundane, task),136 may generate costs disproportionate to the outcome delivered,137 and may give rise to a conflict between the lawyer’s own interest and that of his or her client. As to the latter, Mahoney JA in Law Society of New South Wales v Foreman (No 2) explained the point as follows:138 [A] costs agreement which provides for charges on an hourly or similar basis is likely to involve a conflict between the solicitor’s duty and his interest. Such an agreement ordinarily involves that the solicitor may determine how much time is spent on the client’s litigation and by whom. It will therefore put the solicitor in a position in which her duty to the client (to do the work in such time that the costs will be no more than they need to be) may be in conflict with her interest (that she receive more costs rather than less). The temptation may exist to spend upon the client’s

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litigation time for which costs would not otherwise be billed or to engage on it staff whose time could or would not be used elsewhere in the firm.

3.34 The court’s jurisdiction to enforce fiduciary proscriptions,139 like that grounded in reasonableness, can thus justify the court setting aside a time charging agreement. For example, in Re Morris Fletcher & Cross’ Bill of Costs,140 a case involving a law firm retained by a Japanese national inexperienced with Australian litigation, Fryberg J ruled that the firm should, in discharging its fiduciary duty, have disclosed to the client that:141 in Queensland time charging was normal among large commercial firms but would not necessarily be used by other firms; there was a risk that time charging might result in a higher bill than a tasks performed basis; task-based charging was the conventional and traditional method of charging by Queensland solicitors; and the Federal Court scale, which applied in the litigation, was limited to the amount chargeable by reference to the tasks performed regardless of the time spent on the task. So if a time charging agreement is sought from a client, lawyers must be conscious of the extent to which it may place the lawyer in a position of conflict of interest. A lawyer who, in the event of a conflict, fails to ensure — whether by explanation, independent advice or otherwise — that the client exercises an informed judgment in entering into the agreement may have committed a breach of fiduciary duty.142 3.35 The most outrageous examples of costs agreements that can be characterised as unreasonable relate to (often high) hourly rates that differentiate neither the type of work nor the person who is carrying it out.143 Various judicial statements decry such a practice.144 It is relevant to compare the hourly rate prescribed by the costs agreement to the nature of the work performed, and the experience and standing of the person performing it. In Kasmeridis v McNamara Business & Property Law,145 for example, a $200 hourly rate for time spent by a junior solicitor familiarising himself with the law was held to be unreasonable, as ‘the time which he needed to accomplish the necessary tasks … was likely to have been significantly greater than that of a lawyer of several years more experience in such matters’. This,

moreover, highlights the potential for confusion as to what is covered by the term ‘hour’ in a costs agreement; unless otherwise expressly provided, an hourly rate should cover only the time actually spent on the matter, not time necessary for self-education.146 [page 55] 3.36 Yet it should not be assumed that other forms of charging — such as task (or project) based or fixed fee charging147 — will as a matter of course avoid the drawbacks of time charging, or necessarily be immune from challenge for being unreasonable. Nor should it be assumed that time charging does not have its merits, from both the perspective of the lawyer and the client.148

Reference points for determining reasonableness of charging rates 3.37 Charges contained in an applicable scale, though an important reference point in assessing reasonableness, are a starting point not the end point of comparison.149 So a costs agreement that reflects the appropriate scale is prima facie reasonable.150 But it cannot be assumed that an agreement that envisages costs exceeding scale prima facie carries the badges of unreasonableness.151 At the same time, that costs under a costs agreement far exceed scale costs may be evidence of unreasonableness.152 In this context, it has been judicially observed that it ‘involves no mere conclusion that it may be marginally or arguably outside a legitimate range’ but ‘a conclusion that the terms of the agreement take it outside the parameters of what could legitimately be regarded as a reasonable or appropriate charge for the work, having regard to all the circumstances of the case’.153 In each case, the court takes account of market forces, determined objectively, not on any subjective view about the level of legal costs. Evidence from experienced lawyers, independent of the parties and their lawyers, may assist.154 In a particular case it may even be appropriate to refer the determination of the reasonableness of a fee to a costs assessor.155 Factored into its determination is the seniority and expertise of the lawyer and

the nature and extent of work involved, including its novelty, difficulty and complexity. A higher charge is reasonable if the lawyer is highly experienced, or the work assumes a level of difficulty exceeding the norm.156 For example, in MG v WJG157 Benjamin J found the costs agreement to be reasonable, in part influenced by the fact that the lawyer was a very experienced family law practitioner and the work involved significant complexity, where the client sought out family law experts and agreed to pay the lawyer’s rates after making independent enquiries as to the rates of fees charged. [page 56] Conversely, charging of costs far exceeding scale for routine work, much of which could be performed by a non-lawyer or a more junior lawyer under supervision, is not reasonable.158 3.38 Potentially relevant to the court’s determination is a ‘location factor’, grounded in the notion that lawyers with offices in a certain location159 may incur higher overheads than those elsewhere.160 Though judges have by no means discounted the existence of a location factor in an appropriate case, they have not assumed that it operates in the absence of evidence justifying or explaining the reasons for higher charges in that location compared with charges for the same services in other locations.161 In addition to evidence of overheads, relevant evidence for this purpose may include evidence that the client market or expectation (say, as to a greater level of professional skill)162 differs from one location to another.163

Contracting out of fairness and reasonableness requirements 3.39 The issue arises as to whether, by the terms of the retainer or a separate costs agreement, a client may contract out of the requirements of fairness and reasonableness. Were these requirements based on an implied term, in principle it would be open to the parties by express agreement to oust them. However, the better view is that fairness and reasonableness arise not out of

contractual implication, but from public policy independent of the parties’ intentions. In any event, an alleged agreement to contract out of fairness or reasonableness would no doubt by viewed with great suspicion, as it would be unlikely that a client, fully informed as to its implications, would enter into it without his or her will being in some way overborne. It may be that a client’s subsequent conduct, in affirming the costs agreement, after being aware of all of the circumstances that comprise the requirement of fairness, may be treated as a ratification of it, or abandonment or ‘waiver’ of rights where the lawyer has proceeded to incur further costs in reliance on that explicit conduct. Yet so far as the requirement of reasonableness is concerned, public policy considerations may make such an approach more difficult. This is because for a client to agree, after costs have been incurred, to abandon or ‘waive’ any component of reasonableness of those costs is a course entirely contrary to the client’s interests.164 3.40 The foregoing should not be confused with clients who, fully advised, agree to pay a fee exceeding the scale fee. This represents no attempt to deny a client the right to curial determination of the reasonableness of the lawyer’s charges. As explained by Einfeld J in Stefanou v Fairfield Chase Pty Ltd:165 [page 57] The fact is that a client may agree to pay an otherwise apparently unreasonable fee. And provided the agreement is honourable and at arm’s length, and the fee is not so gross as to constitute what is obviously, or evidence establishes to be, an exorbitant and exploitative charge, I know of no power in the Court to reject it. If there is power, I can think of no discretionary reason for rejecting it merely because a particular Judge might think it unreasonable or entertain doubts about its reasonableness, either generally or in the particular case. Such a means of approaching the matter would introduce an altogether too whimsical and personal element into what must be approached in a completely objective way.

Contingency Fee Agreements — At General Law Definition

3.41 A contingency fee arrangement is usually defined as an agreement pursuant to which the payment of a lawyer’s fee is contingent on a specified event, usually the success of the litigation. There are three main types of contingent fee agreements: speculative (or conditional), uplift (or success) and percentage. Pursuant to a ‘speculative’ fee agreement, a lawyer takes his or her usual fee only in the event that the action is successful. An ‘uplift’ fee agreement entitles a lawyer to receive, in addition to his or her usual fee, an agreed flat amount or percentage uplift of the usual fee. Under a ‘percentage’ fee agreement, a lawyer’s fee is calculated by reference to a percentage of the quantum of damages recovered by the client in the case.

Advantages and drawbacks of contingent fees166 Advantages 3.42 The main advantage of contingency fee arrangements is access to justice, mainly for plaintiffs in civil actions pursuing meritorious monetary claims who otherwise could not afford legal representation.167 That the payment of a lawyer’s professional fees are contingent on a successful outcome provides an incentive to make an early assessment of the merits of the claim, and a weighty incentive to vigorously and innovatively pursue the case. It is also a disincentive to instituting proceedings that have a poor chance of success or are vexatious. Other arguments sometimes raised in support of contingency fee agreements are that they: (a) are simple and thus easily understood by clients; (b) provide an appropriate allocation of risk between lawyer and client; (c) provide greater public satisfaction (especially to the client if the case is lost); (d) facilitate freedom of contract between lawyer and client; and (e) assist in the deregulation of the profession.168

Drawbacks 3.43 Various drawbacks of contingency fee agreements are regularly cited. First is the fear that removing a financial impediment to litigation may prompt an epidemic of unreasonable litigation. The allegedly litigious nature of American society is cited as an example, even though other factors may contribute to this perception. The United States lacks a comprehensive medical insurance scheme and has only limited welfare and legal aid systems,

meaning that citizens may place greater reliance on obtaining compensation from the courts. Damages awards are more generous, as juries often assess damages, and statutes prescribe double and [page 58] triple damages in some cases.169 Moreover, in much litigation in the United States there is a no costs indemnity rule;170 each party instead bears its own costs. A plaintiff therefore loses nothing (except perhaps disbursements) should he or she prove unsuccessful in the claim. Second, there is the conflict of interest inherent in the concept of a contingency fee: the interest of the lawyer to settle at a time that maximises his or her own return may not be consistent with the interests of the client.171 This is heightened for percentage fees (and to a lesser extent, uplift fees), which encourage lawyers to settle as early as possible in the proceeding in order to generate the greatest return for the least work. Lawyers may pressure clients to accept settlements, and protect their interest by inserting in retainer agreements clauses that entitle them to specified fees if clients reject a fair and reasonable settlement offer. Conversely, under a speculative or uplift fee agreement, there is an incentive for lawyers to increase their costs so to increase their (success) fees, a factor that does not operate in the case of percentage fee agreements.172 Third, the purchase of a share in litigation may, it is said, tempt a lawyer to engage in unprofessional conduct in the pursuit of a successful outcome.173 Fourth, uplift and percentage fee agreements may generate fees unrelated to the value of the legal services performed174 (although this may be mitigated by statutory restriction or court control). Fifth, where the costs indemnity rule operates, contingency fee agreements do not protect a losing party from an adverse costs order unless the lawyer agrees to carry this liability or the client is insured for this purpose.175 Sixth, contingent fees usually work only one way (for a plaintiff); they do not assist a defendant who is not counterclaiming176 unless the contingency specified is a particular outcome (or range of outcomes) for the defendant.

Impact of maintenance and champerty 3.44 At common law the torts of maintenance and champerty177 may upset the legality of some contingency fee agreements. Maintenance is ‘the procurement, by direct or indirect financial assistance, of another person to institute or carry on or defend civil proceedings, without lawful justification’.178 Champerty is a form of maintenance in which a share of the proceeds of the litigation is agreed as the reward for the assistance given.179 It reflects the public interest in [page 59] seeing that ‘vulnerable litigants are protected from opportunistic exploitation’,180 a fear also being that the champertor’s financial stake in the litigation provides a temptation to suborn witnesses and pursue worthless claims.181 That statute has abolished the torts of maintenance and champerty in New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria does not prevent a contract being contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal on the grounds of champerty.182 3.45 Policy concerns underscoring champerty seem to carry less weight in the modern litigation environment than in the past. This became most evident, perhaps, in the High Court’s 2006 decision in Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd,183 which held that ‘pure’ litigating funding — where the funder has no interest in the litigation except a profit, being a percentage of the proceeds of the action — is not prima facie champertous or otherwise contrary to public policy. Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ noted the considerations proffered as founding a rule of public policy, namely the fears about adverse effects on the processes of litigation, and fears about the ‘fairness’ of the bargain struck between funder and intended litigant. But their Honours were unconvinced that these should preclude the legality of ‘pure’ funding agreements, reasoning as follows:184 Neither of these considerations, whatever may be their specific application in a particular case, warrants formulation of an overarching rule of public policy that either would, in effect, bar the prosecution of an action where any agreement has been made to provide money to a party to institute or prosecute the litigation in return for a share of the proceeds of the litigation, or would bar the prosecution of some actions according to whether the funding agreement met

some standards fixing the nature or degree of control or reward the funder may have under the agreement. To meet these fears by adopting a rule in either form would take too broad an axe to the problems that may be seen to lie behind the fears.

The case involved a representative proceeding, but their Honours’ remarks were not limited to proceedings of this kind, but were expressed more generally.185 That the funder sought out claimants, had a degree of control over the proceedings, and funded the action with a view to profit, did not, according to the court, ‘warrant condemnation as being contrary to public policy or leading to any abuse of process’.186

Application of general law to contingency fee agreements Percentage and uplift fee agreements 3.46 Percentage fee agreements are unenforceable as being champertous.187 Uplift fee agreements could be viewed as being in substance a share of the proceeds of judgment and thus possibly champertous at law.188 This draws support from the courts’ substance over form [page 60] approach in this context. It has been held, to this end, that a deduction of an arbitrary and excessive amount from the proceeds of judgment on the successful conclusion of the matter is in substance a bargain for a share of the proceeds that might be recovered.189 3.47 Yet the High Court’s reasoning in Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd,190 discussed above,191 in which the court upheld the legitimacy public policy-wise of ‘pure’ funding of litigation, challenges the view that percentage (or uplift) fee agreements are champertous at general law. The court, after all, accepted the legality of a non-lawyer funding proceedings with a view to profit calculated as part of the client’s recovery, even though it has no interest in the proceedings other than that intended profit. This, in turn, makes it difficult to sustain the view that lawyers should be prohibited in public policy from ‘funding’ an action in the expectation of

profiting as a percentage of the client’s winnings.192 As the law stands, however, statute in each jurisdiction explicitly proscribes percentage fee agreements.193 Yet the law does not preclude a law practice actually having an interest in a litigation funder, even if funding its own clients.

Speculative fee agreements 3.48 The common law’s traditional reticence to dilute the tort of champerty, and its attendant refusal to legitimise percentage and uplift fee agreements, has not prevented Australian courts upholding the legality of speculative fee agreements (sometimes termed ‘no win–no fee’ agreements). That the lawyer is paid his or her ordinary fee only — and not an uplifted fee or one calculated as a percentage of the client’s recovery — on the client’s ‘success’ does not obviate all of the drawbacks and policy concerns underscoring contingent fee agreements. But the prevailing policy to encourage access to justice has led Australian courts to allow lawyers to charge on a speculative fee basis. The leading judicial statement is that of the Full High Court in Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association:194 [I]t seems to be established that a solicitor may with perfect propriety act for a client who has no means, and expend his own money in payment of counsel’s fees and other outgoings, although he has no prospect of being paid either fees or outgoings except by virtue of a judgment or order against the other party to the proceedings. This, however, is subject to two conditions. One is that he has considered the case and believes that his client has a reasonable cause of action or

[page 61] defence as the case may be. And the other is that he must not in any case bargain with his client for an interest in the subject-matter of litigation, or (what is in substance the same thing) for remuneration proportionate to the amount which may be recovered by his client in a proceeding …

The two conditions identified by the court are directed at, respectively, avoiding the lawyer promoting vexatious litigation, and the champertous characteristics of percentage fee agreements. It has been judicially remarked that ‘[j]ustice would very often not be done if there were no professional men to take up their cases and take the chance of ultimate payment’,195 and that taking this chance is conduct ‘consistent with the highest professional honour’196 (provided it is not used to extort unreasonably high amounts of

money from clients).197 To this end, judges have queried ‘a widespread reluctance in the legal community to recognise, if not to commend the speculative action’.198 3.49 Where the representation is described as ‘no win–no fee’, aside from an express definition in the costs agreement, this phrase may be interpreted as the lawyer saying in effect: ‘you will not have to pay me any fees except out of whatever I recover from you’.199 The effect is that the client is not obliged to pay anything out of his or her own pocket. For example, in Baker Johnson Lawyers v Jorgensen200 a tort claim was settled for an amount inclusive of costs, which amount was less than the costs and disbursements incurred by the plaintiff’s solicitors.201 The solicitors had taken the case on a ‘no win–no fee’ basis, and had not defined in the retainer what was meant by ‘win’. McGill DCJ rejected the solicitors’ claim to recover the shortfall from the plaintiff on the ground that an outcome cannot properly be characterised as a ‘win’ from a plaintiff’s point of view unless he or she actually recovers something.202 Implicit in this logic is that lawyers who wish to protect their entitlement to costs should state expressly what constitutes a ‘win’ via the terms of the costs agreement,203 including if there is an appeal,204 or if the client rejects a generous settlement offer.205 Otherwise, a ‘win’ is interpreted by reference [page 62] to ‘what ordinary people in the position of the parties would have understood it to mean’.206 It should also make clear the consequences of a client electing to terminate the retainer or discontinue the proceedings, and the circumstances where the lawyer can withdraw from the retainer, as these are all likely to have costs consequences.207

Contingency Fee Agreements — Impact of Statute 3.50 Statute in each jurisdiction purports to regulate contingent fee agreements. Consistent with the position at general law, there is no

prohibition on speculative fee agreements, but no jurisdiction permits percentage fee agreements. Uplift fee agreements are envisaged now in each jurisdiction, but subject to restriction.

Model Laws’ regulation — jurisdictions other than South Australia Validity of ‘conditional costs agreements’ 3.51 The legal profession legislation entitles a lawyer to make a costs agreement under which the payment of some or all of the lawyer’s costs is conditional on the successful outcome of the matter to which those costs relate (a ‘conditional costs agreement’),208 which has been said both ‘confirmed and modified’209 the position in Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association.210 In addition to being in writing in clear plain language, and signed by the client, a conditional costs agreement must contain a statement that the client has been informed of the right to seek independent legal advice before entering into the agreement, and prescribe a cooling-off period of not less than five clear business days during which the client, by written notice, may terminate the agreement211 (although there are exceptions in relation to some clients, including sophisticated clients).212 It must also set out those circumstances that constitute the successful outcome of the matter,213 a point highlighted independent of statutory provision in [page 63] Baker Johnson Lawyers v Jorgensen,214 noted earlier.215 It is permissible for a conditional costs agreement to exclude disbursements from the costs payable only on the successful outcome of the matter, that is, to provide for disbursements to be paid irrespective of the outcome of the matter.216

Types of cases where conditional costs agreements prohibited 3.52 Conditional costs agreements are proscribed in criminal litigation and proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).217 The fear is that, were

conditional costs agreements allowed in criminal proceedings, it may encourage defence lawyers to mislead the court in order to secure an acquittal and therefore earn their fee, or to reject a favourable plea bargain.218 So far as family law proceedings are concerned, it is against public policy, it is reasoned, for lawyers to have an incentive to encourage persons to divorce or to discourage reconciliation. In the Northern Territory, Tasmania and Western Australia conditional costs agreements are prohibited in other types of proceedings chiefly associated with criminal and family law.219

Validity of conditional costs agreements with a premium (‘uplift’) 3.53 The legal profession legislation modifies the general law position by validating certain ‘uplift fee’ costs agreements. It allows a conditional costs agreement to provide for the payment of a premium on costs otherwise payable under the agreement on the successful outcome of the matter,220 which must be separately identified in the costs agreement.221 In litigious matters, the uplift fee cannot exceed 25 per cent of the legal costs (excluding disbursements) otherwise payable.222 The agreement must also contain an estimate of the uplift fee if reasonably practicable, or otherwise a range of estimates of that fee and an explanation of the major [page 64] variables that affect its calculation.223 Before entering into an uplift fee agreement, a law practice must disclose to the client (other than a sophisticated client) in writing its legal costs, the uplift fee and reasons why the uplift fee is warranted.224 In the Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia, the legislation prohibits a costs agreement making provision for an uplift fee where the law practice lacks a reasonable belief that a successful outcome of the matter is reasonably likely.225 This is no great impediment to the use of uplift fee agreements, as lawyers are in any case unlikely to risk being denied any fee by pursuing a weak case. The New South Wales legislation, however, imposes a limitation with more substantial practical implications, namely in prohibiting entry into an uplift fee agreement in

relation to a claim for damages.226 A broad interpretation of the term ‘damages’227 would dictate that few cases would qualify for an uplift fee.228

Percentage fee agreements prohibited 3.54 The legal profession legislation prohibits a law practice from entering into a costs agreement, except to the extent that it adopts an applicable scale,229 under which (any part of) the amount payable to the practice is calculated by reference to the amount of an award or settlement, or the value of property, that may be recovered in any proceedings to which the agreement relates.230

South Australia 3.55 The Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 42(6)(c) provides that a lawyer may make a costs agreement in writing for, subject to any limitations imposed by the professional rules, ‘payment of a contingency fee to be calculated on a basis set out in the agreement on fulfilment of a condition stated in the agreement’. The rules declare a ‘complying contingency costs agreement’ that entitles a lawyer to charge ‘up to double the fees to which [he or she] would otherwise be entitled if those fees were charged according to the scale contained in the current applicable schedule to the Rules of the Supreme Court’ to be prima facie fair and reasonable.231 A ‘complying contingency costs agreement’ is one under which, if the client’s action is unsuccessful, the lawyer either will not charge the client, or will charge the client only disbursements or a defined amount or proportion of disbursements.232 It must be signed by the client, who, as recorded in the agreement, had been informed of the right to receive independent legal advice, to have the agreement reviewed by the Supreme Court,233 and to [page 65] have the fees charged reviewed by the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board.234

In addition, the agreement must entitle the client to a five business day cooling-off period from the signing of the contract.235 3.56 What, however, has restricted the scope for ‘complying contingency costs agreements’ in practice is the requirement that they relate to a matter where in the lawyer’s professional judgment the client’s claim has some prospects of success but ‘where the risk of the claim failing and of the client having to meet his or her own costs is significant’.236 This does not mean that South Australian lawyers cannot enter speculative fee agreements — the general law already allows this as an option — but that uplift fee agreements must meet the statutory criteria.

Effect of Non-Compliance with Statutory Requirements on Costs Recovery 3.57 A costs agreement that contravenes, or is entered into in contravention of, any provision pertaining to the statutory regulation of costs agreements in the legal profession legislation237 is void.238 To remove doubt as to whether recovery on a quantum meruit basis can survive this provision,239 the legislation recognises that costs under a void costs agreement are recoverable either in accordance an applicable scale240 or otherwise according to the fair and reasonable value of the legal services provided (essentially a quantum meruit approach).241 3.58 There are three restrictions, however, on the recoverability of costs under a void costs agreement. First, a law practice is not entitled to recover any amount exceeding the amount that the practice would have been entitled to recover had the costs agreement not been void, and must repay any excess received.242 Second, a law practice that has entered a percentage fee agreement cannot recover any amount in respect of the provision of legal services in the matter to which the agreement related, and must repay any amount received in respect of those services.243 This ousts any possibility of recovering costs on a quantum meruit or any other restitutionary basis outside of the costs agreement itself.244 Third, where a costs agreement is [page 66]

entered into in breach of the statutory uplift fee restrictions, the law practice is disentitled from recovering the uplift fee.245 3.59 The former Victorian legislation disentitled a lawyer who entered into a costs agreement proscribed by the legislation ‘to recover any amount in respect of the provision of legal services in the matter to which the costs agreement related’.246 In Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth Field Warne (a firm) (No 4)247 a costs agreement provided that the solicitors would charge a discounted hourly rate of $66 as compared to the $400 ‘normal’ hourly rate, but that the ‘normal’ rate would be charged in the event that the client was successful in the litigation. Byrne J construed this agreement as an uplift fee agreement; as the uplift of $400 over $66 well exceeded the statutory 25 per cent limit, the solicitors could not recover any costs. Amid considerable criticism from the profession — the main concern being that Byrne J’s logic would imperil the legitimacy of all speculative fee agreements, and seriously compromise access to justice for many deserving plaintiffs — his Honour’s decision was reversed on appeal. The Victorian Court of Appeal, rather than viewing the costs agreement as involving an uplift fee, saw it is an ordinary conditional costs agreement, the normal rate being the fee payable in the event of a successful outcome. There was, according to their Honours, no provision for a premium on the costs payable in the event of successful outcomes to the various proceedings.248 What also informed the court’s conclusion were policy considerations, explained as follows:249 We consider that the access to justice issue … is also of some importance. If [the client’s] position prevailed, speculative fee agreements which provided for the payment of some costs in the event of failure would, in many instances we should think, have been rendered unlawful. The only agreements of that kind which could have survived [the relevant provision dealing with uplift fee agreements] would have been agreements in which there was a small differential in what was payable in the event of success and what was payable in the event of failure. That must have been a disincentive to solicitors to enter into speculative fee arrangements other than those under which no costs were payable in the event of failure. Access to justice would scarcely, if at all, have been increased in such circumstances.

The point is addressed explicitly in the Queensland legislation, which states that the legislation does not affect a law practice’s right to discount its fees, and that if a law practice does so, the statutory reference to a 25 per cent maximum uplift of a practice’s costs250 is to be read as a reference to the fees it would have charged had it not discounted them.251

3.60 At general law, where a costs agreement is champertous, the lawyer may be disentitled from enforcing his or her unpaid costs.252 Although there is English authority to the effect that costs already paid by the client under a champertous agreement cannot be recovered by the client, and the parties must remain where they find themselves,253 this is questionable on public policy grounds — it allows a lawyer to profit from an agreement contrary to public policy — and is in any case now clearly ousted by the legal profession legislation. The latter [page 67] provides that a person entitled to be repaid may recover the amount not repaid from the law practice as a debt in a court of competent jurisdiction.254

Legal Professional Privilege and Costs Agreements 3.61 As a general rule, a costs agreement does not attract legal professional privilege. Lindgren J explained the reasons for this in Cook v Pasminco Ltd as follows:255 [A]n agreement between solicitors and their prospective client as to the terms of retainer of the solicitors does not attract either kind of legal professional privilege mentioned: the agreement is not created for the dominant purpose of the giving or receiving of legal advice or of being used in existing or anticipated legal proceedings. A costs agreement is a bundle of mutual and reciprocal commitments between an intending solicitor and client. It is entered into by parties whose interests are, at the time, generally opposed. Generally speaking, the solicitors are entitled to negotiate the terms of the agreement in their own interests. Once it is appreciated that a costs agreement is an agreement between persons who are about to enter into the relationship of solicitor and client, there is no obvious reason why such an agreement, as a class of document, should be the subject of legal professional privilege.

This is no unyielding rule; if an agreement contains material that expressly or impliedly conveys legal advice or views about tactics or strategy, then that material may be privileged.256 For example, in Cook v Pasminco Ltd itself Lindgren J found that the costs agreement was expressed in the form of statements by the solicitors to the applicant, some of which constituted the

giving of legal advice so as to attract the privilege. This led his Honour to deny access to the clauses that conveyed legal advice.

1.

Barfield v Friedman (SC(WA), Parker J, 5 September 1997, unreported) BC9704216 at 32.

2.

See 3.6–3.60.

3.

See 3.61.

4.

As to the disciplinary consequences of overcharging generally see Dal Pont, pp 812–15.

5.

ACT s 279; Qld s 319; Tas s 303; Vic s 3.4.19; WA s 271.

6.

‘Fixed costs provision’ means a determination, scale, arrangement or other provision fixing the (maximum) costs of any legal services that is made by or under legislation: NSW s 302(1); NT s 295(1).

7.

NSW s 319; NT s 314.

8.

Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth Field Warne (a firm) (No 3) [2004] VSC 164; BC200403876 at [10] per Byrne J. His Honour repeated this observation in Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd v Burmingham [2009] VSC 20; BC200901686 at [117] (in this context also referring to fee agreements that may include provisions for uplift fees).

9.

[1907] 2 KB 369 at 376. See also at 378 per Buckley LJ; Bear v Waxman [1912] VLR 292 at 298 per Madden CJ; Pryles & Defteros (a firm) v Green (1999) 20 WAR 541 at 549; [1999] WASC 34; BC9902816 per Parker J; Harrison v Hocking [2000] WASC 188; BC200004249 at [90] per Hasluck J.

10. Clare v Joseph [1907] 2 KB 369 at 372. 11. Pursuant to the Attorneys and Solicitors Act 1870 (UK) (see s 9 in particular). 12. See 3.16. 13. See, for example, Richardson v Lander (1948) 65 WN (NSW) 74; Emeritus Pty Ltd v Mobbs (1991) NSW Conv R ¶55-588 at 59,321; BC9101842 per Studdert J; Ilic v Michael Radin & Associates (SC(NSW), Finlay J, 18 December 1991, unreported) BC9102656 at 10–16; McInnes v Twigg (1992) 16 Fam LR 185 at 193–6 per Moss J; Schiliro v Gadens Ridgeway (1995) 19 Fam LR 196 at 197–8 (FC); McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2007) 95 SASR 129; [2007] SASC 90; BC200701559 at [19]–[34] per Doyle CJ (FC). It must be noted, though, that Victorian authorities seem to be expressed in vaguer and more equivocal terms on this point: see, for example, Bear v Waxman [1912] VLR 292; Woolf v Trebilco [1933] VLR 180. As to the concepts of fairness and reasonableness of costs agreements see 3.24–3.40. 14. Clare v Joseph [1907] 2 KB 369 at 376 per Fletcher Moulton LJ. 15. Attorneys’ and Solicitors’ Act 1870 (UK) s 4 (repealed) (emphasis supplied). 16. Clare v Joseph [1907] 2 KB 369 at 372–3 per Lord Alvertsone CJ, at 377 per Fletcher Moulton LJ, at 378–9 per Buckley LJ; Gundry v Sainsbury [1910] 1 KB 645 at 649 per Cozens-Hardy MR, at 652–3 per Buckley LJ; Woolf v Trebilco [1933] VLR 180 at 192 per Lowe J; Pryles & Defteros (a firm) v Green (1999) 20 WAR 541 at 549; [1999] WASC 34; BC9902816 per Parker J; Harrison v Hocking [2000] WASC 188; BC200004249 at [90] per Hasluck J. 17. Jarena Pty Ltd v Sholl Nicholson Pty (1996) 136 ALR 427 at 430; BC9600889 per Heerey J

(FCA). 18. [2004] VSC 164; BC200403876 at [10], [11]. 19. Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth Field Warne (a firm) (No 3) [2004] VSC 164; BC200403876 at [29]. 20. Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd v Burmingham [2009] VSC 20; BC200901686 at [117]. 21. See, for example, Owners — Strata Plan No 45205 v Andreones Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1189; BC200910025 (retainer construed strictly so as to deny solicitors professional and photocopying costs incurred after its termination). 22. Chamberlain v Boodle & King (a firm) [1982] 3 All ER 188 at 191 per Lord Denning MR; McInnes v Twigg (1992) 16 Fam LR 185 at 196 per Moss J. Examples of lack of clarity in this regard are found in Baker Johnson Lawyers v Jorgensen [2002] QDC 205 (discussed at 3.49) and Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd v Burmingham [2009] VSC 20; BC200901686. 23. As to the jurisdiction to set aside a costs agreement on the grounds of unfairness or unreasonableness see 3.13–3.22. 24. ACT s 286; NSW s 326; NT s 321; Qld s 326; Tas s 310; Vic s 3.4.30; WA s 286. 25. See 3.51, 3.53. 26. ACT Dictionary; NSW s 4(1); NT s 4; Qld s 346; Tas s 4(1); Vic s 1.2.1(1); WA s 3. 27. Pentelow v Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 111; BC201301265 at [51] per Schmidt J. See also Wakim v Bowen (SC(NSW), Sully J, 12 March 1992, unreported) BC9202013 at 34 (querying the distinction between past work properly done and future work properly to be done in the context of a costs agreement). Cf D’Alessandro & D’Angelo v Cooper (SC(WA), Owen J, 9 May 1995, unreported) BC9503598 at 9–12 (ruling that a costs agreement pertaining to past services, which the client refused to sign, was not binding: at 12). 28. Tho v L Firm [2012] FamCA 384; BC201250526 at [16] per Cronin J (a case in which the agreement could not be found). 29. [2009] NSWSC 456; BC200904803. 30. PM Sulcs & Associates Pty Ltd v Oliveri [2009] NSWSC 456; BC200904803 at [191]. An English judge, in a case involving a backdated conditional fee agreement, has remarked that ‘[i]t is wrong to seek to give an agreement retrospective effect by back-dating it’, and that ‘[i]f it is agreed that a written agreement should apply to work done before it is entered into, it should be correctly dated with the date on which it is signed and expressed to have retrospective effect’: Holmes v Alfred McAlpine Homes (Yorkshire) Ltd [2006] EWHC 110 (QB) at [23] per Stanley Burnton J. Cf Paroz v Clifford Gouldson Lawyers [2012] QDC 151 at [32]–[44] per McGill DCJ (noting that the legislation does not prohibit costs agreements from operating retrospectively); Walter v Buckeridge (No 5) [2012] WASC 495; BC201210335 at [50]–[53] per Le Miere J (who envisaged that a costs agreement can operate retrospectively if it dictates so on a proper construction). 31. In Wentworth v Rogers (2006) 66 NSWLR 474; [2006] NSWCA 145; BC200604064 at [32] Santow JA, with whom Hislop J agreed on this point, held that the definition of ‘costs agreement’ in s 184(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) should be read to include a costs agreement favourable to the client. In so ruling, his Honour differed from the view of Basten JA in the same case, who (at [146]) maintained that s 184 is not directed to costs agreements generally, but only those agreements as to fees for legal services that could not lawfully have been entered into under the general law, namely agreements favourable to the solicitor. Santow JA did not consider that s 184 should be read as mandating such a result, reasoning that a criterion based on favour to the

client as opposed to the solicitor ‘would prove illusory as a basis for escaping the definition of costs agreement’, adding that ‘[t]he width of the statutory definition is emphasised by catching any agreement “as to” the costs of the provision of legal services’: at [32]. 32. ACT s 282(1) (cf the former ACT 1970 s 190(2)); NSW s 322(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 184(1)– 184(3)); NT s 317(1) (cf the former NT 1974 s 129(2)); Qld s 322(1) (cf the former Qld 1952 s 48(2)); Tas s 306(1) (cf the former Tas 1993 ss 127, 129(1)); Vic s 3.4.26(1) (formerly Vic 1996 s 96(1)); WA s 282(1) (cf the former WA 1893 s 59(1); WA 2003 s 221(1)). 33. On the concept of a ‘third party payer’, and the requirement that he or she be legally obliged to pay the costs in question, see the discussion in Legal Services Commissioner v Wright [2012] 2 Qd R 360; [2010] QCA 321; BC201008678 at [27]–[32] per McMurdo J; Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd v Mallesons Stephen Jaques [2013] WASC 48 at [14]–[27] per Le Miere J. 34. ACT s 261A(1); NSW s 302A(1); NT s 296(1); Qld s 301(1); Tas s 284(1); Vic s 3.4.2A; WA s 253(1). 35. ACT ss 282(2), 287(1) (cf the former ACT 1970 s 190(3), 190(4)); NSW ss 322(2), 327(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 184(4)); NT ss 317(2), 322(1) (cf the former NT 1974 s 129(3), 129(4)); Qld ss 322(2), 327(1) (cf the former Qld 1952 ss 48(2), 48B, 48F(1) (as to which see Casey v Quabba [2007] 1 Qd R 297; [2006] QCA 187; BC200603976 at [9] per Williams JA; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Atlantic 3-Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] 2 Qd R 399; [2006] QCA 540; BC200610475 at [7] per Williams JA)); Tas ss 306(2), 311(1) (cf the former Tas 1993 s 129(1)); Vic ss 3.4.26(2), 3.4.31(1) (formerly Vic 1996 s 96(2)); WA ss 282(2), 287(1) (cf the former WA 1893 s 59(1); WA 2003 s 221(1)). 36. [2002] NSWSC 709; BC200204532 at [19]. 37. Wentworth v Rogers [2002] NSWSC 709; BC200204532 at [29] per Barrett J. 38. Wentworth v Rogers [2002] NSWSC 709; BC200204532 at [30]–[34] per Barrett J. 39. Wentworth v Rogers [2005] NSWSC 143; BC200501387 at [38]–[45] per Patten AJ. 40. Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth Field Warne (a firm) (No 3) [2004] VSC 164; BC200403876 at [197] per Byrne J; Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth Field Warne (a firm) (2007) 18 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 280; BC200710691 at [136]–[140] per the court. 41. Fitch v Fort Frances Pulp & Paper Co [1927] 4 DLR 811 at 812 per Middleton JA (CA(Ont)); Chamberlain v Boodle & King (a firm) [1982 3 All ER 188 at 191 per Lord Denning MR. See, for example, Hogarth v Gye [2002] NSWSC 32; BC200200618; Jaha v Defteros [2012] VSC 512; BC201208256 (where a subsequent letter confirmed an earlier oral costs agreement). 42. ACT s 282(3); NSW s 322(3) (formerly NSW 1987 s 184(6)); NT s 317(3); Qld s 322(3); Tas s 306(3); Vic s 3.4.26(3) (formerly Vic 1996 s 96(3)); WA s 282(3). 43. ACT s 282(4); NSW s 322(4); NT s 317(4); Qld s 322(4); Tas s 306(4); Vic s 3.4.26(4); WA s 282(4). 44. See, for example, O’Nell v Wilson [2011] QSC 220; BC201105802; Paroz v Clifford Gouldson Lawyers [2012] QDC 151. Cf the view that, where statute refers to a costs ‘agreement in writing’, this agreement must, in order to be enforceable by the lawyer against the client, be signed by the client: Re Raven (1881) 45 LT 742 at 743 per Fry J; Re Jones 1895] 2 Ch 719 at 724 per Stirling J; Bake v French (No 2) [1907] 2 Ch 215 at 220 per Warrington J; Chamberlain v Boodle & King (a firm) [1982] 3 All ER 188 at 191 per Lord Denning MR. 45. The term ‘may’ in this context is clearly facultative rather than mandatory, meaning that there is no requirement for a costs agreement as a prerequisite to recovering costs from a client: Jones v

Litchfield [2011] SADC 102; BC201140530 at [29], [30 per Judge Tilmouth. 46. (2005) 92 SASR 382; [2005] SASC 269; BC200505207. 47. McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2005) 92 SASR 382; [2005] SASC 269; BC200505207 at [63] per the court. As to the power to set aside a costs agreement for unfairness or unreasonableness see 3.13–3.22. 48. McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2005) 92 SASR 382; [2005] SASC 269; BC200505207 at [61] per the court. 49. See 3.11. 50. See, for example, Liu v Adamson (2003) 12 BPR 22,205; [2003] NSWSC 74; BC200300579 (where a costs agreement under which the husband and de facto wife, directors of a corporate client, guaranteed the client’s costs liability to the solicitor by granting security over their home, was set aside under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) on the ground that the agreement had not been explained to the wife, and that she lacked independent advice). 51. The Australian Consumer Law is found in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2. The unfair contract terms provisions are found in Pt 2-3 of the Australian Consumer Law. 52. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2, Pt 2-3 (the term ‘unfair’ is defined in s 24). 53. Twigg and Twigg v Kung (1994) 121 FLR 227 at 231 (FC(Fam Ct)). See, for example, QCoal Pty Ltd v Cliffs Australia Coal Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 479; BC201009791 at [40]–[49] per Ann Lyons J (rejecting an argument that a costs agreement was uncertain because it stipulated that the fees were chargeable on the basis of ‘our current hourly rates from time to time’; her Honour reasoned that ‘the rate to be charged for any work done was always able to be objectively ascertained by reference to the objective criteria’, as ‘[t]he rates were not set in an arbitrary way but rather the applicable rates to be charged were set pursuant to policy of annual review and were usually fixed for a year’, and ‘[a]ll rates charged were on the basis of the firm’s usual rates at a particular time unless a different rate had been specifically negotiated’: at [47]); Costa v Murcia Pestell Hillard Pty Ltd [2013] WASC 44; BC201300658 (where Sanderson M refused to set aside a costs agreement on the grounds of uncertainty, simply because it did not specify a rate of payment for a partner in a schedule, where it was otherwise clear and certain in all its essential terms: at [5], [6]). Cf Rudstein Kron Lawyers v Pisanelli [2003] VSCA 166; BC200306489 at [21] per Phillips JA (who queried whether a costs agreement, under which costs would be calculated by hourly rates that ‘vary with the type of work and the experience of the lawyers involved’, and added that ‘in any particular matter we may adjust our charges to account for skill, care, responsibility or urgency of the matter or for unwarranted time spent on the matter’, was sufficiently certain to be enforceable). 54. Twigg and Twigg v Kung (1994) 121 FLR 227 at 233 (FC(Fam Ct)). 55. (1992) 16 Fam LR 185 at 201. 56. See, for example, Re Morris Fletcher & Cross’ Bill of Costs [1997] 2 Qd R 228 (discussed at 3.34). See also Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Roche [2004] 2 Qd R 574; [2003] QCA 469; BC200306399 at [57] per McMurdo P, at [62] per Williams JA. 57. See 3.13–3.22. 58. The cases that have adopted undue influence as a vehicle to set aside a costs agreement stem chiefly from the family law field: see, for example, Barrett v Whitten (1992) 15 Fam LR 693 (FC). Cf Tho v L Firm [2012] FamCA 384; BC201250526 at [111] per Cronin J (who envisaged the operation of the presumption of undue influence in this context but on the facts found that the respondent law practice had rebutted the presumption by proof of sufficient client understanding).

59. Accordingly, it is not competent for the opposing party to apply for a costs agreement between a client and his or its solicitors to be set aside: Walter v Buckeridge (No 5) [2012] WASC 495; BC201210335 at [42] per Le Miere J. 60. ACT s 288(1) (which also applies where a provision of the agreement is not fair or reasonable, but this does not appear to be intended to broaden its scope beyond that in other jurisdictions) (cf the former ACT 1970 s 191(1)); NSW s 328(1), s 328(1A) (which makes similar provision to the ACT) (cf the former NSW 1987 s 208D(1)); NT s 323(1) (cf the former NT 1974 s 130(1)); Qld s 328(1); Tas s 312(1) (cf the former Tas 1993 s 129(2)); Vic s 3.4.32(1) (cf the former Vic 1996 s 103(1)); WA s 288(2) (cf the former WA 1893 s 59(5); WA 2003 s 222(2), which referred only of ‘reasonableness’, but that term has been defined to include that which constitutes ‘fairness’ at general law: see, for example, Stoddart & Co v Jovetic (1993) 8 WAR 420 at 430–1; BC9301102 (FC)). 61. ACT s 288(9); NSW s 328(8); NT s 323(8); Qld s 328(8); Tas s 312(8); Vic s 3.4.32(8); WA s 288(9). 62. ACT s 288(3); NSW s 328(2) (cf the former NSW 1987 s 208D(2)–(4)); NT s 323(2); Qld s 328(2); Tas s 312(2); Vic s 3.4.32(2) (cf the former Vic 1996 s 103(1)); WA s 288(3). 63. That the lawyer made a misrepresentation in the course of effecting the costs agreement does not necessarily dictate that the costs agreement will be set aside; it will depend, inter alia, on the materiality and effect of the misrepresentation: Leong v J P Sesto & Co (Legal Practice) [2009] VCAT 99 at [165]. 64. It has been held that the only misconduct or unsatisfactory conduct that should bear upon a decision about cancellation of a costs agreement under the relevant statutory provision by reason of that conduct is misconduct or unsatisfactory conduct that in some way impeaches the costs agreement itself; conduct unrelated to the making or to the operation of the costs agreement does not impeach the costs agreement and so arguably does not give rise to an entitlement to cancel the costs agreement: Leong v J P Sesto & Co (Legal Practice) [2009] VCAT 99 at [134]. 65. As to costs disclosure requirements see 2.19–2.37. 66. See G E Dal Pont, ‘Costs Agreements and VCAT — The Challenge of St Yves’ (2008) 34 Mon ULR 262 at 268–75. 67. In New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia, the relevant provision is expressed to operate ‘without limiting the matters to which the costs assessor [court] can have regard’: NSW s 328(2); NT s 323(2), Qld s 328(2); Tas s 312(1); WA s 288(3). The same is the outcome in the Australian Capital Territory, albeit by listing as the final matter to which the court may have regard ‘any other relevant matter’: ACT s 288(3)(h). The position in Victoria awaits clarification; as it presently stands, the relevant provision appears to state exhaustively the matters that VCAT may take into account for this purpose, and so it is unclear whether reference to the concepts of ‘fairness’ or ‘reasonableness’ as understood at general law can assume any relevance: see G E Dal Pont, ‘Costs Agreements and VCAT — The Challenge of St Yves’ (2008) 34 Mon ULR 262 at 275–84. 68. See 3.23–3.60. 69. Western Australian cases support this proposition: Jovetic v Stoddart & Co (1992) 7 WAR 208 at 220 per Seaman J; Burgess v D’Alessandro & Associates [1993] ANZ Conv R 14 at 16; BC9201202 per Anderson J (SC(WA)); Harrison v Hocking [2000] WASC 188; BC200004249 at [92] per Hasluck J; Duckworth v Chopra [2001] WASC 146; BC200102978 at [49] per Templeman J. Cf Weiss v Barker Gosling (1993) 16 Fam LR 728 at 760, 769 per Fogarty J; Schiliro and Gadens Ridgeway (1995) 19 Fam LR 196 at 198 (FC); Athanasiou v Ward Keller (6)

Pty Ltd (1998) 122 NTR 22 at 30–1; BC9802157 per Mildren J. 70. Harrison v Hocking [2000] WASC 188; BC200004249 at [92] per Hasluck J. 71. Re Stuart [1893] 2 QB 201 at 205 per Bowen LJ; Re Baylis [1896] 2 Ch 107 at 119 per Kay LJ. 72. Athanasiou v Ward Keller (6) Pty Ltd (1998) 122 NTR 22 at 30–1; BC9802157 per Mildren J. 73. McInnes v Twigg (1992) 16 Fam LR 185 at 194 per Moss J. 74. Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) ss 11, 13; Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 14, 16; Limitation Act 1981 (NT) ss 12(1)(a), 14; Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 10; Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 35; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 4; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 5; Limitation Act 2005 (WA) s 13. 75. See, for example, Symonds v Raphael (1998) 148 FLR 171 at 190 per Baker and Burton JJ (FC(Fam Ct)) (who held that the trial judge’s conclusion that because a fiduciary relationship existed between the wife and her solicitor the Limitation Act did not apply was an error in law). 76. Symonds v Raphael (1998) 148 FLR 171 at 196 per Baker and Burton JJ (FC(Fam Ct)). 77. Harrison v Hocking [2000] WASC 188; BC200004249 at [79], [80] per Hasluck J; Alman v MacDonald Rudder [2001] WASC 65; BC200101011 at [18], [19] per Wheeler J; Duckworth v Chopra [2001] WASC 146; BC200102978 at [51]–[73] per Templeman J. 78. ACT s 288(5) (Supreme Court); NSW s 328(4); NT s 323(4); Qld s 328(4) (Supreme Court); Tas s 312(4); Vic s 3.4.32(4) (VCAT); WA s 288(5) (Supreme Court). 79. In Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia, by reference to an applicable scale or remuneration order; in Queensland, the court may apply an applicable scale of costs for this purpose: Qld s 328(5)(a). 80. ACT s 288(6) (cf the former ACT 1970 s 191); NSW s 328(5) (cf the former NSW 1987 s 208A(2)); NT s 323(5) (cf the former NT 1974 s 130); Qld s 328(5)(b); Tas s 312(5) (cf the former Tas 1993 s 129(3)); Vic s 3.4.32(5) (cf the former Vic 1996 s 103(3)); WA s 288(6) (cf the former WA 1893 s 59(5); WA 2003 s 222(2)). 81. ACT s 288(7); NSW s 328(6); NT s 323(6); Qld s 328(6); Tas s 312(6); Vic s 3.4.32(6); WA s 288(7). 82. ACT s 288(6); NSW s 328(5); NT s 323(5); Qld s 328(5); Tas s 312(5); Vic s 3.4.32(5) (cf the former Vic 1996 s 103(3)); WA s 288(6). 83. ACT s 288(8); NSW s 328(7); NT s 323(7); Qld s 328(7); Tas s 312(7); Vic s 3.4.32(7); WA s 288(8). 84. As to the required costs disclosures see 2.19–2.34. 85. Wentworth v Rogers [2002] NSWSC 709; BC200204532 at [26]–[27] per Barrett J. 86. NSW s 328(9A); NT s 323(10); Tas s 312(10). 87. Advanced Gaming Technologies Pty Ltd v Ahern [1999] NSWSC 45; BC9900674 at [51], [56] per Levine J; Jazairy v Malouf [2005] NSWSC 808; BC200505857 at [22]–[24] per Harrison AJ (each by reference to the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW), which prescribed no reasons requirement in this context). 88. Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at 289–90 per McHugh JA; Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud [1989] VR 8 at 18–19 per Gray J (FC); English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] 3 All ER 385; [2002] EWCA Civ 605 at [15]–[25] per Lord Phillips MR.

89. Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 117. 90. NSW s 328(10), 328(11); NT s 352(1)(a); Tas s 312(11) (cf the former Tas 1993 s 136A). See 5.61–5.63. 91. Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 148. 92. SA r 16C.2. As to the general law in this context see 3.23–3.38. 93. See 3.16. 94. Re Stuart [1893] 2 QB 201 at 204–5 per Lord Esher MR; Galbraith v Murray, Robertson & Thomas [1930] 4 DLR 1005 at 1006 per Kilgour J (KB(Man)); Weiss v Barker Gosling (1993) 16 Fam LR 728 at 758 per Fogarty J; Twigg and Twigg v Kung (1994) 17 Fam LR 391 at 392 (FC). 95. Athanasiou v Ward Keller (6) Pty Ltd (1998) 122 NTR 22 at 30–1; BC9802157 per Mildren J. 96. Emeritus Pty Ltd v Mobbs (1991) NSW Conv R ¶55-588 at 59,319; BC9101842 per Studdert J. See also New South Wales Crime Commission v Fleming (1991) 24 NSWLR 116 at 123; BC9101668 per Gleeson CJ. 97. Re Stuart [1893] 2 QB 201 at 204 per Lord Esher MR; Bear v Waxman [1912] VLR 252 at 301–2 per Cussen J; Richardson v Lander (1948) 65 WN (NSW) 74 at 76 per Walker, Deputy Prothonotary. 98. Re P’s Bill of Costs (1982) 8 Fam LR 489 at 497 per Evatt CJ and Fogarty J (FC). 99. Weiss v Barker Gosling (1993) 16 Fam LR 728 at 759–60 per Fogarty J. 100. (1993) 9 WAR 70 at 77 (paragraph break omitted). See also Re Budziszewski (1981) 7 Fam LR 284 at 290 per Baker J; Re P’s Bill of Costs (1982) 8 Fam LR 489 at 497 per Evatt CJ and Fogarty J (FC); Stoddart & Co v Jovetic (1993) 9 WAR 70 at 80 per Ipp J; McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2005) 92 SASR 382; [2005] SASC 269; BC200505207 at [54] per the court. 101. Brown v Talbot and Olivier (1993) 9 WAR 70 at 77–8. 102. See, for example, Barfield v Friedman (SC(WA), Parker J, 5 September 1997, unreported) BC9704216 at 26–34 (where the solicitor failed to disclose that scale costs might be limited to $6,000 if the case proceeded by way of originating summons); Passey v Chanaka Bandarage [2002] ACTSC 105; BC200206449 at [39]–[43] per Higgins J (where the solicitor failed to explain to the client that the flat hourly rate prescribed by the costs agreement would result in a significant overcharge relative to scale, that the costs recoverable would be significantly less than those charged to the client, and that other solicitors competent in the field of practice might well charge significantly less). 103. See 3.29. 104. Passey v Chanaka Bandarage [2002] ACTSC 105; BC200206449 at [39] per Higgins J; McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2007) 95 SASR 129; [2007] SASC 90; BC200701559 at [8], [49] per Doyle CJ. 105. See, for example, Cavallaro v FNE Lawyers [2012] SASC 189; BC201207918 at [24] per Judge Lunn (who, in the circumstances, found no basis for taking judicial notice of the fact that there are lawyers who would act for costs based on the scale (as did the court in Kasmeridis, referred to in the preceding footnote); the instructions ‘were not of a routine kind where it might be expected lawyers would be prepared to cut their charges in order to get the work’, as ‘the client was alleging fraud, and apparent perjury, by his former wife which would almost certainly be difficult to prove and require a great deal of effort and expertise from the lawyer’).

106. See 2.19–2.34. 107. See, for example, McInnes v Twigg (1992) 16 Fam LR 185 at 199 per Moss J (who held a costs agreement to be unfair because, in particular, the applicant was led to believe by the solicitors that her overall costs would not be more than $20,000, whereas the bills came to nearly $50,000); Athanasiou v Ward Keller (6) Pty Ltd (1998) 122 NTR 22 at 32–3; BC9802157 per Mildren J (who held that a failure to explain to the client that under the costs agreement he would, if successful, likely recover a far smaller proportion of his own costs under the costs agreement as compared to the applicable court rules, nor that he would thereby lose the right to have the bill taxed, was not fair). Cf Dissidomino v Mossensons (SC(WA), Parker J, 22 January 1999, unreported) BC9900105 at 17–20 (where the nature of the retainer made it not reasonably possible to provide an estimate). 108. (1882) 10 QBD 207: see 5.26–5.34. 109. Kasmeridis v McNamara Business & Property Law (2006) 245 LSJS 31; [2006] SASC 200; BC200605336 at [22] per Judge Lunn (affd McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2007) 95 SASR 129; [2007] SASC 90; BC200701559 (FC)). 110. (2006) 245 LSJS 31; [2006] SASC 200; BC200605336. 111. Kasmeridis v McNamara Business & Property Law (2006) 245 LSJS 31; [2006] SASC 200; BC200605336 at [22]. 112. McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2007) 95 SASR 129; [2007] SASC 90; BC200701559 at [57] (FC). 113. [2004] 2 Qd R 574; [2003] QCA 469; BC200306399 at [32]. See also New South Wales Crime Commission v Fleming (1991) 24 NSWLR 116 at 126; BC9101668 per Gleeson CJ; McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2005) 92 SASR 382; [2005] SASC 269; BC200505207 at [54] (FC); McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2007) 95 SASR 129; [2007] SASC 90; BC200701559 at [47]–[51], [76]–[78] per Doyle CJ (FC). 114. Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Roche [2004] 2 Qd R 574; [2003] QCA 469; BC200306399 at [32]. 115. See 3.35. 116. Catto v Hampton Australia Ltd (in liq) (2007) 251 LSJS 164; [2007] SASC 360; BC200708773 at [16] per Judge Lunn (who added that ‘[s]olicitors cannot reserve to themselves the right to increase their time charges as they see fit. If there is to be an increase, it must be by either a new agreement or a variation agreement in which all the considerations of fairness and reasonableness have to be re-visited’). 117. Barfield v Friedman (SC(WA), Parker J, 5 September 1997, unreported) BC9704216 at 32; Computer Accounting & Tax Pty Ltd v Bowen Buchbinder Vilensky [2009] WASC 171 at [96] per Murphy J. 118. Re Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory and Roche (2002) 171 FLR 138; [2002] ACTSC 104; BC200206227 at [64] (FC). 119. Cerini v McLeods (a firm) [2004] WASC 45; BC200401259 at [37] per Pullin J. 120. [2004] WASC 45; BC200401259. 121. Passey v Chanaka Bandarage [2002] ACTSC 105; BC200206449 at [39] per Higgins J. 122. Chan v Batemans [2009] WASC 177; BC200905412 at [36] per Sanderson M. 123. [2009] WASC 177; BC200905412 at [37] per Sanderson M.

124. (1993) 8 WAR 420; BC9301102. 125. Stoddart & Co v Jovetic (1993) 8 WAR 420 at 431; BC9301102. 126. Stoddart & Co v Jovetic (1993) 8 WAR 420 at 431; BC9301102. 127. See, for example, Saunderson v Glass (1742) 2 Atk 296 at 298; 26 ER 581 at 582 per Lord Hardwicke LC (‘If an attorney… prevails upon a client to agree to an exorbitant reward, the Court will either set it aside entirely, or reduce it to the standard of those fees to which he is properly entitled’). 128. Jovetic v Stoddart & Co (1992) 7 WAR 208 at 220 per Seaman J (not disapproved on appeal: Jovetic v Stoddart & Co (1993) 8 WAR 420; BC9301102); Brown v Talbot and Olivier (1993) 9 WAR 70 at 75 per Ipp J. 129. Schiliro and Gadens Ridgeway (1995) 19 Fam LR 196 at 204–5. 130. Brown v Talbot and Olivier (1993) 9 WAR 70 at 81 per Ipp J (FC) (‘the client’s position is fraught with uncertainty; he is susceptible, to a large degree, to the subjective decision of the solicitors, and he is dependant [sic] on the exigencies of the practice of the solicitors — something about which he knows nothing’). 131. Law Society of New South Wales v Foreman (No 2) (1994) 34 NSWLR 408 at 422; BC9404933 per Kirby P (in dissent but not on this point). See also Re Ladner Downs and Crowley (1987) 41 DLR (4th) 403 at 428 per Southin J (SC(BC)) (who likened the practice of getting a client to commit to pay by the hour to giving a blank cheque); McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2007) 95 SASR 129; [2007] SASC 90; BC200701559 at [51] per Doyle CJ. 132. See, for example, Legal Profession Complaints Committee v O’Halloran [2011] WASAT 95 (where the tribunal spoke disapprovingly of this practice: at [133]–[135]). 133. Re Morris Fletcher & Cross’ Bill of Costs [1997] 2 Qd R 228 at 239 per Fryberg J (referring to the practice of charging time in blocks of six minutes regardless of whether or not a block is fully utilised: cf C Boyle, ‘Have You Got a Minute?’ (June 1997) 24 Brief 13 (criticising this logic)). See also Burns Philp Investment Pty Ltd v Dickens (No 2) (1993) 31 NSWLR 280 at 284–5 per Young J; Vilensky v Banning (FC(WA), Kennedy, Rowland and Ipp JJ, 20 June 1996, unreported) BC9602641 at 6–8 per Ipp J (who upheld the magistrate’s decision to disallow any charge the lawyer had made ‘rounding up’ a six minute time unit, allowing only work actually done); S Pattison, ‘Charging by Minimum Units: Is it Enforceable?’ (November 1993) 31 LSJ 28. 134. Brown v Talbot and Olivier (1993) 9 WAR 70 at 80 per Ipp J (FC) (striking down as unreasonable an agreement entitling solicitors to charge an hourly rate from time to time as they ‘reasonably’ considered appropriate). See also L Fisher, ‘The Crude Yardstick of the Billable Hour’ (1996) 70 ALJ 160. 135. Chamberlain v Boodle & King (a firm) [1982] 3 All ER 188 at 191 per Lord Denning MR (who remarked that an hourly rate basis of charging ‘must depend upon the skill and experience of the individual partner or associate’ and queried: ‘Is the client to be charged double the rate because a slow partner has been put on the case?’); New South Wales Crime Commission v Fleming (1991) 24 NSWLR 116 at 141; BC9101668 per Kirby P; Major Projects Pty Ltd v Sibmark Pty Ltd [1992] ANZ Conv R 349 at 350; BC9202071 per McLelland J (SC(NSW)); Auspine Ltd v Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 1 at 11; [1999] FCA 673; BC9902639 per O’Loughlin J; Jemella Australia Pty Ltd v GHD Australia Direct Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 599; BC200904931 at [37] per Logan J. 136. Singleton v Macquarie Broadcasting Holdings Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 103 at 109 per Rogers CJ. 137. Kossert v Ruggi (No 3) [2012] WASC 454; BC201209230 at [3] per Kenneth Martin J.

138. (1994) 34 NSWLR 408 at 437; BC9404933. See also McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2007) 95 SASR 129; [2007] SASC 90; BC200701559 at [51] per Doyle CJ. 139. As to the fiduciary proscriptions applicable to the lawyer–client relationship see Dal Pont, Chs 6, 7. 140. [1997] 2 Qd R 228. 141. Re Morris Fletcher & Cross’ Bill of Costs [1997] 2 Qd R 228 at 243. The case has generated some commentary: see G J Cross, ‘Time Costing — What Price Professionalism?’ (March 1997) 17 Proctor 22; P Norman, ‘An Important Case on Costs Agreements and Time Charging’ (June 1997) 19 LSB 14; D Garnsworthy, ‘Time Costing: The New Challenge’ (June 1997) 24 Brief 5; S Pattison, ‘Quality Control Needed to Avoid the Pitfalls of Time Costing’ (June 1998) 36 LSJ 30. 142. Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Roche [2004] 2 Qd R 574; [2003] QCA 469; BC200306399 at [57] per McMurdo P, at [62] per Williams JA. 143. See, for example, Weiss v Barker Gosling (No 2) (1993) 118 FLR 218 at 241, 244 per Fogarty J (Fam Ct) (where the costs agreement prescribed a set hourly charge ‘for any other solicitor’, without reference to experience or specialisation, that well exceeded both scale and the rate for comparable family law specialists elsewhere in the city); Re Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory and Roche (2002) 171 FLR 138; [2002] ACTSC 104; BC200206227; McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2007) 95 SASR 129; [2007] SASC 90; BC200701559. 144. See, for example, New South Wales Crime Commission v Fleming (1991) 24 NSWLR 116 at 126; BC9101668 per Gleeson CJ; Ilic v Michael Radin and Associates (SC(NSW), Finlay J, 18 December 1991, unreported) BC9102656 at 15–17; Major Projects Pty Ltd v Sibmark Pty Ltd [1992] ANZ Conv R 349 at 350; BC9202071 per McLelland J (SC(NSW)). Cf Law Society of New South Wales v Foreman (No 2) (1994) 34 NSWLR 408; BC9404933 at 437 per Mahoney JA. 145. (2006) 245 LSJS 31; [2006] SASC 200; BC200605336 at [31] per Judge Lunn (affd McNamara Business & Property Law v Kasmeridis (2007) 95 SASR 129; [2007] SASC 90; BC200701559 at [63]–[72] per Doyle CJ). 146. Bartex Fabrics Pty Ltd v Phillips Fox (1994) 13 ACSR 667 at 679; BC9402622 per Young J (SC(NSW)). 147. See R Rotunda, ‘Moving from Billable Hours to Fixed Fees: Task-Based Fees and Legal Ethics’ (1999) 47 Kansas L Rev 819; R Benson, ‘Tracking & Billing — Keeping up with the Times’ (October 2000) 74 LIJ 57; G Ballard, ‘What to Bill or Not to Bill, That is the Question’ (December 2002) 22 Proctor 18; C Jasper, ‘Making Pricing a Winner’ (June 2003) 41 LSJ 60 (which includes a convenient table of common pricing structures (hourly rates, contingency fee, fixed fee, ongoing fixed fee retainer), and their advantages and drawbacks); D Vilensky, ‘The Benefits of Fixed Fee Pricing’ (February 2012) 39 Brief 12. Cf G McFadyen, ‘In Defence of Time Billing’ (August 2008) 28 Proctor 49; R Balachandran, ‘Realistic Time Billing: In Defence of the Billable Hour’ (June 2011) 49 LSJ 60. 148. See D Webb, ‘Killing Time: A Limited Defence of Time-Cost Billing’ (2010) 13 Legal Ethics 39. 149. Weiss v Barker Gosling (No 2) (1993) 118 FLR 218 at 235–6 per Fogarty J (Fam Ct); Schiliro and Gadens Ridgeway (1995) 19 Fam LR 196 at 204 (FC). 150. Athanasiou v Ward Keller (6) Pty Ltd (1998) 122 NTR 22 at 31; BC9802157 per Mildren J. 151. Schiliro and Gadens Ridgeway (1995) 19 Fam LR 196 at 204 (FC). 152. See, for example, Alman v MacDonald Rudder [2001] WASC 65; BC200101011 at [27] per Wheeler J (that $17,000 was the maximum payable pursuant to the scale, whereas the amount

claimed under the costs agreement was $36,000, tended to suggest that the effect of the agreement upon the client was unreasonable). 153. Weiss v Barker Gosling (No 2) (1993) 118 FLR 218 at 235 per Fogarty J (Fam Ct). See also Stefanou v Fairfield Chase Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 605; BC9305153 at [57]–[58] per Einfeld J. 154. McInnes v Twigg (1992) 16 Fam LR 185 at 198 per Moss J. 155. See, for example, Re Baylis [1896] 2 Ch 107 at 111 per Chitty J (affd [1896] 2 Ch 107); Clare v Joseph [1907] 2 KB 369 at 373 per Lord Alverstone CJ; Emeritus Pty Ltd v Mobbs (1991) NSW Conv R ¶55-588 at 59,318; BC9101842 per Studdert J (SC(NSW)); Weiss v Barker Gosling (No 2) (1993) 118 FLR 218 at 236 per Fogarty J (Fam Ct). Cf New South Wales Crime Commission v Fleming (1991) 24 NSWLR 116 at 125; BC9101668 per Gleeson CJ. 156. See, for example, Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 3) (1992) 37 FCR 492 at 500; BC9203666 per Einfeld J. 157. (2005) 34 Fam LR 612; [2005] FamCA 1381. 158. Burgess v D’Alessandro & Associates [1993] ANZ Conv R 14 at 17; BC9201202 per Anderson J (SC(WA)); Harrison v Hocking [2000] WASC 188; BC200004249 at [111] per Hasluck J. See, for example, Athanasiou v Ward Keller (6) Pty Ltd (1998) 122 NTR 22 at 33; BC9802157 per Mildren J (costs agreement held to be unreasonable because, inter alia, it set the same hourly rate regardless of the lawyer’s experience, and much of the work could have been delegated to a junior lawyer). 159. Such as, for instance, the central business district as opposed to suburbia or the country, or alternatively a large city as opposed to a smaller town. 160. McInnes v Twigg (1992) 16 Fam LR 185 at 198 per Moss J; Schiliro and Gadens Ridgeway (1995) 19 Fam LR 196 at 204–5 (FC). 161. Weiss v Barker Gosling (No 2) (1993) 118 FLR 218 at 243 per Fogarty J (Fam Ct) (where no evidence was called on the issue by the solicitors and little attempt was made to support the location factor); Schiliro and Gadens Ridgeway (1995) 19 Fam LR 196 at 204–5 (FC). 162. For instance, that the market of potential clients believes that there is a higher or more appropriate quality of service, and a corresponding higher charge expected, when the client comes from what may be described as the ‘upper end’ of the market: Weiss v Barker Gosling (No 2) (1993) 118 FLR 218 at 243 per Fogarty J (Fam Ct). 163. New South Wales Crime Commission v Fleming (1991) 24 NSWLR 116 at 124; BC9101668 per Gleeson CJ; Schiliro and Gadens Ridgeway (1995) 19 Fam LR 196 at 204–5 (FC). See, for example, Weiss v Barker Gosling (No 2) (1993) 118 FLR 218 at 243–4 per Fogarty J (Fam Ct) (who was not satisfied that on the facts the location of the firm or the market of which it was said to be part justified such a significant charge above scale and above charges routinely charged by equally competent solicitors outside that area). 164. Weiss v Barker Gosling (1993) 16 Fam LR 728 at 774 per Fogarty J. 165. [1993] FCA 605; BC9305153 at [58] (emphasis supplied). 166. See generally S Zindel, ‘The Case for Contingency Fees’ [1996] NZLJ 295; K Tokeley, ‘Taking a Chance: A Proposal for Contingency Fees’ (1998) 28 VUWLR 13 at 16–19; J Peysner, ‘What’s Wrong with Contingent Fees?’ (2001) 10 Nottingham LJ 22. 167. ALRC IP13, para 4.21. See also Re Robb (1996) 134 FLR 294 at 314; BC9602649 (FC(ACT)) (speculative fee agreements seen as an ‘unofficial and informal type of legal aid that is provided in the speculative action for personal injuries’).

168. See Submission by the Law Council of Australia, Inquiry by the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, ‘The Cost of Justice’, December 1989, pp 76–7. 169. See ALRC IP13, paras 6.7, 6.8. 170. As to the costs indemnity rule see 7.2–7.6. 171. Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373 at 402 per Buckley LJ; Trendtex Trading Corp v Crédit Suisse [1980] QB 629 at 663 per Oliver LJ; Re Robb (1996) 134 FLR 294 at 315; BC9602649 (FC(ACT)). See, for example, Re Melvey (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 289 at 297 (CA). Cf A J Cannon, ‘Legal Cost Insurance’ (2000) 9 JJA 223 at 231–4. 172. M Zander, ‘If Conditional Fees, Why Not Contingency Fees?’ (2002) 152 New LJ 797 (who also notes that the lawyer under a speculative fee ‘earns higher fees by putting in more hours regardless of whether it produces higher damages’, whereas under a percentage fee he or she ‘earns more by increasing the damages — but he will be concerned to see that the cost of doing so is not excessive’: at 797). 173. Re Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2) [1963] Ch 199 at 219–20 per Lord Denning MR; Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373 at 402 per Buckley LJ; Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142 at 153 per Lord Mustill. 174. Studies as to whether lawyers who take on a case on a percentage fee basis can expect to secure higher remuneration than they would adopting time charging do not speak with one voice: see H M Kritzer, ‘Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What does the Empirical Literature Really Say?’ (2002) 80 Tex L Rev 1943. Cf Legal Services Commissioner v Barrett [2012] VCAT 1800 at [33] (‘The mention of contingency fees can tend to evoke notions of highly entrepreneurial lawyers treating litigation as a means of siphoning disproportionate amounts from damages payouts received by vulnerable clients’). 175. As to insurance in this context see A J Cannon, ‘Legal Cost Insurance’ (2000) 9 JJA 223 (who notes that contingent fees are themselves a form of legal cost insurance: at 225). 176. See WALRC, Vol 1, p 484. 177. As to the torts of maintenance and champerty generally see R P Balkin and J L R Davis, Law of Torts, 4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2009, pp 710–16. 178. Law Commission, Proposals for Reform of the Law Relating to Maintenance and Champerty, No 7, 1966, Vol 1, para 9. 179. Ellis v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399 at 412 per Scrutton LJ. 180. Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co (No 2) [1999] 3 All ER 822 at 831 per Toulson J. 181. Magic Menu Systems Pty Ltd v AFA Facilitation Pty Ltd (1997) 72 FCR 261 at 267; BC9700030 (FC). 182. Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act 1993 (NSW) ss 4, 6; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) Sch 11; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 32(2). See Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386; [2006] HCA 41; BC200606677 at [67], [86] per Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ. 183. (2006) 229 CLR 386; [2006] HCA 41; BC200606677. See L Aitken, ‘“Litigation Lending” After Fostif: An Advance in Consumer Protection, or a Licence to “Bottomfeeders”’ (2006) 28 Syd L Rev 171; V Waye, ‘Conflicts of Interests Between Claimholders, Lawyers and Litigation Entrepreneurs’ (2007) 19 Bond L Rev 225. A similar trend has ensued in New Zealand: Saunders v Houghton [2010] 3 NZLR 331; [2009] NZCA 610; Contractors Bonding Ltd v Waterhouse [2012] 3 NZLR 826; [2012] NZCA 399.

184. Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386; [2006] HCA 41; BC200606677 at [91]. 185. Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386; [2006] HCA 41; BC200606677 at [95]. 186. Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386; [2006] HCA 41; BC200606677 at [88] per Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ, with whom Gleeson CJ (at [1]) and Kirby J (at [146]) agreed. 187. Re Attorneys and Solicitors Act 1870 (1875) 1 CPD 573 at 575 per Jessel MR; J C Scott Constructions v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 413 at 429 per McPherson J; Re Sheehan (1990) 13 Fam LR 736 at 751 per Fogarty J. See, for example, in Smits v Roach (2004) 60 NSWLR 711; [2004] NSWCA 233; BC200404415 (affd but on a different ground: Smits v Roach (2006) 227 CLR 423; [2006] HCA 36; BC200605512). 188. Re Sheehan (1990) 13 Fam LR 736 at 749–50 per Fogarty J. 189. Re Veron [1966] NSWR 511 at 519 (CA); Ex parte New South Wales Bar Association [1967] 1 NSWR 609 at 618 (CA). See also Pittman v Prudential Deposit Bank Ltd (1896) 13 TLR 110 at 111 per Lord Esher MR. 190. (2006) 229 CLR 386; [2006] HCA 41; BC200606677. 191. See 3.45. 192. Cf McIntyre Estate v Ontario (Attorney-General) (2002) 218 DLR (4th) 165 at [51]–[72] per O’Connor ACJO (CA(Ont)) (who, being informed by access to justice concerns, concluded that ‘the historic rationale for the absolute prohibition [on contingent fees] is no longer justified’, as ‘the potential abuses that provided the rationale for the per se prohibition of contingency fee agreements can be addressed by an appropriate regulatory scheme governing the conduct of lawyers and the amount of lawyers’ fees’: at [70]). 193. See 3.54. 194. (1960) 104 CLR 186 at 203; BC6000600 (FC). See also Re Sheehan (1990) 13 Fam LR 736 at 744, 748–9 per Fogarty J; Schokker v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (2000) 106 FCR 134 at 138–9; [2000] FCA 1734; BC200007314 per French J. The same is the position in New Zealand: see Sievwright v Ward [1935] NZLR 43; Kain v Wynn Williams & Co [2013] 1 NZLR 498; [2012] NZCA 563. That the position is otherwise at general law in England (Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373 at 393 per Lord Denning MR) prompted legislative intervention to legitimate (and regulate) what are termed ‘conditional fee agreements’: Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (UK) ss 58, 58A, 58B. But even at general law the position may be changing in the United Kingdom: see Kellar v Williams [2004] UKPC 30 at [21] per Lord Carswell (‘their Lordships wish to make it plain that they are not to be taken as accepting without question the traditional doctrine of the common law that all [conditional fee] agreements are unenforceable on grounds of public policy. The content of public policy can change over the years, and it may now be time to reconsider the accepted prohibition in the light of modern practising conditions’); Sibthorpe v Southwark London Borough Council [2011] 2 All ER 240; [2011] EWCA Civ 25 at [49] per Lord Neuberger MR (‘I find it hard to accept that, by shouldering the risk of an adverse order for costs against his client, a solicitor is acting contrary to public policy, which is, of course, the basis for the law of champerty. It is one thing to say, in relation to contracts with those who conduct litigation, that the reach of champerty should not be curtailed by the courts’) (see M James, ‘The End of Champerty?’ (2011) 161 New LJ 547). 195. Ladd v London Road Car Co (1900) 110 LT Jo 80 per Lord Russell CJ.

196. Sievwright v Ward [1935] NZLR 43 at 48 per Ostler J (SC). See also Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Lardner [1998] ACTSC 24; BC9801211 at [89] (FC); Re Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory and Roche (2002) 171 FLR 138; [2002] ACTSC 104; BC200206227 at [42] (FC). 197. Re Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory and Roche (2002) 171 FLR 138; [2002] ACTSC 104; BC200206227 at [43] (FC). 198. Re Robb (1996) 134 FLR 294 at 315; BC9602649 (FC(ACT)). 199. Baker Johnson Lawyers v Jorgensen [2002] QDC 205 at [18] per McGill DCJ. 200. [2002] QDC 205. 201. The point is now addressed by the legal profession legislation in Queensland: Qld Pt 3.4 Div 8 (ss 345–347) (which caps costs recoverable under a ‘no win–no fee’ costs agreement from a client in personal injury claim to the amount the client will receive ‘net’ out of the proceedings: see 4.43). 202. Baker Johnson Lawyers v Jorgensen [2002] QDC 205 at [18]. Neilson DCJ adopted the same reasoning in the factually similar case of Brady v Bale Boshev Solicitors (2009) 10 DCLR(NSW) 284; [2009] NSWDC 387; BC200940506 at [34]–[39] (discussed in M Wilson, ‘Court Caps Costs to the Amount Recovered’ (July 2010) 48 LSJ 40). 203. Spence v Gerard Malouf & Partners Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 764; BC201004939 at [110] per Bergin CJ in Eq (‘These types of retainers are fraught with difficulties if they are not drafted with exquisite clarity’). 204. See, for example, Woodgate v Keddie [2006] FCA 1728; BC200610398, where Bennett J held that a conditional costs agreement, cl 2 of which provided that ‘the successful outcome of the Work undertaken is when we obtain … a verdict in [the client’s] favour’, entitled the solicitors to retain their fee (including a 25 per cent uplift fee) even though the verdict in question was reversed on appeal. In so ruling, his Honour noted that cl 2 made no reference to ‘appeal’ or ‘final’, and that cl 1 of the agreement described ‘the Work’ by reference to which the ‘successful outcome’ related in a manner that encompassed only trial work and not work for an appeal: at [21]. This finding was affirmed on appeal: Woodgate v Keddie (2007) 242 ALR 234; [2007] FCAFC 129; BC200706758. 205. See, for example, Spence v Gerard Malouf & Partners Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 764; BC201004939 (where a ‘no win–no charge’ retainer prescribed various occasions in which the ‘no win–no charge’ policy would not operate (see at [96]), but made no mention of the prospect of the defendant law firm ceasing to act for the p aintiff client if it (or counsel) formed the view that the plaintiff could not achieve a better outcome than any offer of compromise; the law firm, one month before the trial, advised the plaintiff that it would not continue to act if Senior Counsel’s opinion was that the plaintiff would not exceed the offer of compromise, unless the plaintiff made arrangements to attend to payment of its fees within seven days, which Bergin CJ in Eq characterised as ‘a most unreasonable threat’ (at [99]), and ordered the law firm to cede its retaining lien over the file to the plaintiff’s new lawyers); Ireland v Trilby Misso Lawyers [2011] 2 Qd R 320; [2011] QSC 127; BC201103706 (where lawyers who, lacking an entitlement to do so under the terms of the retainer, terminated the retainer upon forming the view that the claim was too risky to proceed with on a ‘no win–no fee’ basis were denied their costs). 206. Baker Johnson Lawyers v Jorgensen [2002] QDC 205 at [17] per McGill DCJ. See also Pirone v Craig J Roberts (Solicitor) Pty Ltd (2006) 244 LSJS 284; [2006] SASC 134; BC200603180 at [36] per Layton J (‘Bearing in mind the description of “no win–no fee”, it would be incumbent on … a firm of solicitors who owe fiduciary obligations of disclosure, to ensure that the client was made aware of the specific terms of that condition, particularly when fees would be payable by the client’).

207. Spence v Gerard Malouf & Partners Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 764; BC201004939 at [110] per Bergin CJ in Eq. 208. ACT s 283(1); NSW s 323(1) (formerly NSW 1987 ss 186(1), (2)); NT s 318(1); Qld s 323(1); Tas s 307(1); Vic s 3.4.27(1) (formerly Vic 1996 s 97(1)); WA s 283(1). 209. Smits v Roach (2002) 55 NSWLR 166; [2002] NSWSC 241; BC200203295 at [232] per McClellan J (revd on appeal but not on this point: Smits v Roach (2004) 60 NSWLR 711; [2004] NSWCA 233; BC200404415; affd but on a different ground: Smits v Roach (2006) 227 CLR 423; [2006] HCA 36; BC200605512). 210. (1960) 104 CLR 186; BC6000600: see 3.48. 211. ACT s 283(3)(c)–(e); NSW s 323(3)(c)–(e); NT s 318(3)(c)–(e); Qld s 323(3)(c)–(e); Tas s 307(3) (c)–(e); Vic s 3.4.27(3)(c)–(e); WA s 283(3)(c)–(e). If a client terminates an agreement within the cooling-off period, the law practice may recover only those legal costs in respect of legal services performed for the client before that termination that were performed on the instructions of the client and with the client’s knowledge that the legal services would be performed during that period, and cannot recover any uplift fee: ACT s 283(6); NSW s 323(5); NT s 318(6); Qld s 323(5); Tas s 307(6); Vic s 3.4.27(5); WA s 283(5). 212. ACT s 283(4), 283(5); NSW s 323(4A), 323(4B); NT s 318(4), 318(5); Qld s 323(4); Tas s 307(4), 307(5); Vic s 3.4.27(4), 3.4.27(4A); WA s 283(4). ‘Sophisticated client’ is defined in ACT s 261; NSW s 302(1); NT s 295(1); Qld s 300; Tas s 283; Vic s 3.4.2; WA s 251. 213. ACT s 283(3)(a); NSW s 323(3)(a) (formerly NSW 1987 s 186(4)); NT s 318(3)(a); Qld s 323(3) (a); Tas s 307(3)(a); Vic s 3.4.27(3)(a) (formerly Vic 1996 s 97(4)); WA s 283(3)(a). 214. [2002] QDC 205. See also Porter v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 680; BC200104664 at [33]–[39] per O’Keefe J. 215. See 3.49. 216. ACT s 283(3)(b); NSW s 323(3)(b) (formerly NSW 1987 s 186(5)); NT s 318(3)(b); Qld s 323(3) (b); Tas s 307(3)(b); Vic s 3.4.27(3)(b); WA s 283(3)(b). 217. ACT s 283(2); NSW s 323(2) (cf the former NSW 1987 s 186(3), which did not extend to family law proceedings); NT s 318(2); Qld s 323(2); Tas s 307(2); Vic s 3.4.27(2) (formerly Vic 1996 s 97(3)); WA s 283(2). 218. British Waterways Board v Norman (1993) 26 HLR 232. Compare P Lushing, ‘The Fall and Rise of the Criminal Contingency Fee’ (1991) 82 J of Crim Law & Criminology 498 (who argues that contingency fees ought to be permitted in criminal cases). 219. NT 318(2)(c); Legal Profession Regulations 2007 (NT) reg 80F (referring to proceedings under statutes dealing with adoption, community welfare and victims of crime); Tas s 307(2) (referring to proceedings under the Adoption Act 1988 (Tas), Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1997 (Tas), Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas) or Relationships Act 2003 (Tas)); WA s 283(2) (referring to proceedings relating to child protection, custody, guardianship or adoption, and proceedings under the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA), Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth)). 220. ACT s 284(1); NSW s 324(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 187(1)); NT s 319(1); Qld s 324(1); Tas s 308(1); Vic s 3.4.28(1); WA s 284(1) (see WALRC 92, Vol 1, pp 491, 493). 221. ACT s 284(2); NSW s 324(3) (formerly NSW 1987 s 187(2)); NT s 319(2); Qld s 324(2); Tas s 308(2); Vic s 3.4.28(2); WA s 284(2). Cf McDonald Crawford v Morrow (2004) 244 DLR (4th) 144 at [17] per Berger JA (CA(Alta)) (‘a solicitor may not stipulate for, charge or accept any fee

that is not fully disclosed, fair and reasonable. In the absence of an express agreement, the solicitor’s obligation of utmost good faith precludes the reservation of a right to charge a bonus [uplift] if there is resounding success. A “premium” fee based on a favourable result in the absence of full disclosure is wholly inconsistent with the obligation of the solicitor to clearly and fairly advise a client of the terms of his or her contract’). 222. ACT s 284(4)(b); NSW s 324(5) (cf the former NSW 1987 s 187(1)–(3)); NT s 319(4) (referring to the percentage prescribed by the regulations, which do not to date prescribe a percentage); Qld s 324(4) (cf Qld: 2007 Barristers Rule, r 121, which permits barristers to enter into a speculative fee agreement where the client is impecunious or otherwise deserving, and to charge a fee that is increased above the usual fee charged, but not exceeding 50 per cent above the usual fee); Tas s 308(4)(b); Vic s 3.4.28(4)(b) (cf the former Vic 1996 s 98); WA s 284(4)(b). 223. ACT s 284(3); NSW s 324(4); NT s 319(3); Qld s 324(3); Tas s 308(3); Vic s 3.4.28(3); WA s 284(3). 224. ACT s 274; NSW s 314; NT s 308; Qld s 313; Tas s 297; Vic s 3.4.14; WA s 265. 225. ACT s 284(4)(a); Tas s 308(4)(a); Vic s 3.4.28(4)(a) (cf the former Vic 1996 s 97(5)); WA s 284(4)(a). 226. NSW s 324(1). 227. Such as appears in the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 3, which applies the term to any form of monetary compensation. 228. See ‘Law Society asks Attorney General for Changes to Costs Provisions’ (May 2005) 43 LSJ 8. 229. In New South Wales and the Northern Territory, a ‘fixed costs provision’ (as defined in NSW s 302(1); NT s 295(1)); in Victoria, an applicable practitioner remuneration order; in Western Australia, an applicable costs determination. 230. ACT s 285 (see also Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2006 (ACT) r 40.3); NSW s 325 (formerly NSW 1987 s 188); NT s 320; Qld s 325 (cf the former Qld 1952 ss 48D, 48E); Tas s 309; Vic s 3.4.29 (formerly Vic 1996 s 99); WA s 285 (cf the former WA 1893 s 63(1); WA 2003 s 227(1)(b)). See, for example, Legal Services Commissioner v Barrett [2012] VCAT 1800 (where a costs agreement under which the lawyer was to be paid, inter alia, an amount equating to ten per cent of the damages awarded to the client, was held to infringe the statutory prohibition; the lawyer was accordingly found guilty of professional misconduct, reprimanded and fined). 231. SA r 16C.2.9. 232. SA r 16C.3.3–16C.3.5. 233. Under SA s 42(7). 234. Under SA s 77A. 235. SA r 16C.3.8. 236. SA r 16C.3.6. 237. Namely ACT Div 3.2.5; NSW Pt 3.2 Div 5; NT Pt 3.3 Div 5; Qld Pt 3.4 Div 5; Tas Pt 3.3 Div 5; Vic Pt 3.4 Div 5; WA Pt 10 Div 6. 238. ACT s 287(1); NSW s 327(1) (cf the former NSW 1987 s 189(1)); NT s 322(1); Qld s 327(1) (cf the former Qld 1952 s 48F); Tas s 311(1); Vic s 3.4.31(1) (cf the former Vic 1996 s 102(3)); WA s 287(1). 239. Cf the former Vic 1996 s 102(3), which provided that a lawyer who has entered into a costs

agreement proscribed by the Act ‘is not entitled to recover any amount in respect of the provision of legal services in the matter to which the costs agreement related’. According to the court in Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth Field Warne (a firm) (No 4) (2007) 18 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 280; BC200710691 at [139], [140], s 102(3) ousted the respondent law firm’s entitlement to recover on a quantum meruit basis for the work to which the costs agreement related if that agreement contravened the Act. See also the views expressed prior to the operation of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) in Hogarth v Gye [2002] NSWSC 32; BC200200618 at [7]–[10] per Bryson J; Smits v Roach (2004) 60 NSWLR 711; [2004] NSWCA 233; BC200404415 at [69], [70] per Sheller JA (affd but on a different ground: Smits v Roach (2006) 227 CLR 423; [2006] HCA 36; BC200605512). 240. In New South Wales and the Northern Territory, a ‘fixed costs provision’ (as defined in NSW s 302(1); NT s 295(1)); in Victoria, an applicable practitioner remuneration order; in Western Australia, an applicable costs determination. 241. ACT s 287(2); NSW s 327(2); NT s 322(2); Qld s 327(2); Tas s 311(2); Vic s 3.4.31(2) (cf the former Vic s 102(2)); WA s 287(2). 242. ACT s 287(3); NSW s 327(3); NT s 322(3); Qld s 327(3); Tas s 311(3); Vic s 3.4.31(3); WA s 287(3). 243. ACT s 287(5); NSW s 327(4); NT s 322(5); Qld s 327(5); Tas s 311(5); Vic s 3.4.31(5); WA s 287(5). 244. Ventouris Enterprises Pty Ltd v Dib Group Pty Ltd (No 4) [2011] NSWSC 720; BC201105044 at [24]–[29] per Slattery J (noted S Ward, ‘Breach of Disclosure Provisions Prevents Recovery of Counsel Fees’ (November 2011) 49 LSJ 42). 245. ACT s 287(4); NSW s 327(3A); NT s 322(4); Qld s 327(4); Tas s 311(4); Vic s 3.4.31(4); WA s 287(4). 246. Vic 1996 s 102(3). 247. [2006] VSC 28; BC200600428 at [7]–[21]. 248. Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth Field Warne (a firm) (No 4) (2007) 18 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 280; BC200710691 at [130] per the court. See also Coadys (a firm) v Getzler (2007) 18 VR 288; [2007] VSCA 281; BC200710692 at [36] per the court. 249. Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth Field Warne (a firm) (No 4) (2007) 18 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 280; BC200710691 at [124] per the court. 250. In Qld 2007 s 324(4). 251. Qld s 324(5). 252. Wild v Simpson [1919] 2 KB 544 at 550 per Bankes LJ, at 565–6 per Atkin LJ; Re Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2) [1963] Ch 199 at 220–1 per Lord Denning MR, at 230–1 per Pearson LJ; Aratra Potato Co Ltd v Taylor Joynson Garrett (a firm) [1995] 4 All ER 695 at 708–10 per Garland J. 253. Aratra Potato Co Ltd v Taylor Joynson (a firm) [1995] 4 All ER 695 at 710 per Garland J. Cf Re Sheehan (1990) 13 Fam LR 736 at 749 per Fogarty J. 254. ACT s 287(6); NSW s 327(5); NT s 322(6); Qld s 327(6); Tas s 311(6); Vic s 3.4.31(6); WA s 287(6). 255. (2000) 107 FCR 44; [2000] FCA 1819; BC200007576 at [47]. See also CSR Ltd v Eddy (2008) 70 NSWLR 725; [2008] NSWCA 83; BC200803017 at [7] per Hodgson JA, at [62] per Basten JA; Lahoud v Lahoud [2011] NSWSC 994; BC201106786 at [180] per Campbell JA (who, on the

facts, found that on their face the costs agreements are ‘unexceptional commercial agreements between a solicitor and client’ that ‘give no legal advice’, and ‘contain no record of a confidential communication between the client and another person or between a lawyer acting for the client and another person, that was made for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with legal services’, and found no justification for the claim of privilege over them). Cf Hodgson v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 673 at 682–3 per Lord Woolf MR (who declined to express a concluded view on whether a conditional fee agreement is at any stage of proceedings subject to privilege, but recognised that a distinction might exist between the position in relation to any advice given to a client about the advisability of entering into the agreement and the document itself). 256. CSR Ltd v Eddy (2008) 70 NSWLR 725; [2008] NSWCA 83; BC200803017 at [7] per Hodgson JA, at [62] per Basten JA.

[page 68]

CHAPTER 4

Restrictions on the Recovery of Lawyer–Client Costs Costs Recovery Precluded Until Set Time After Bill Delivered Rationale and effect Jurisdictions except South Australia — Model Laws preconditions Basic time precondition Leave to commence proceedings before expiry of time prescription Effect of non-compliance South Australia Distinguishing claims for the recovery of costs from other claims Bills of Costs Request for ‘itemised bill’ Content and form of bills of costs ‘Lump sum bill’ compared to ‘itemised bill’ Bill to include statement setting out avenues to address costs disputes Bill can be contained in more than one document Bill to be signed Delivery of bill How delivery is to be effected

4.2 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.12 4.12 4.13 4.13 4.16 4.17 4.18 4.20 4.20

Delivery to persons jointly liable Delivery where client has died Delivery and set-off Court’s inherent jurisdiction to order delivery of a bill of costs Waiver of right to delivery of a bill Costs of drawing a bill Legal professional privilege and bills of costs

4.21 4.22 4.23 4.24 4.27 4.29 4.30

Moneys Advanced or Secured for Costs Trust moneys received for costs ‘Trust money’ Formalities for transfer of trust moneys for costs Lawyer taking security for costs from a client Irrevocable authorities and the recovery of costs Litigation loans

4.31 4.31 4.31 4.32 4.33 4.37 4.41

Statutory Limitation on Maximum Costs Recoverable

4.42

Entire Contract

4.44 [page 69]

Doctrine of ‘entire contract’ Circumstances where the ‘entire contract’ rule does not apply Termination by the client or by agreement Termination for ‘just cause’ Ouster by statute Periodic billing Convenient breaks in the proceeding

4.44 4.46 4.46 4.48 4.49 4.50 4.51

Recovery of Fees by Counsel Practice at general law Modification of general law

4.53 4.54 4.57

Interest on Lawyer and Client Costs

4.59

4.1 Assuming a valid retainer exists between lawyer and client,1 the basic principle governing the recoverability of costs by a lawyer is the prohibition against commencing proceedings for this purpose without first delivering a ‘bill of costs’ to the client, and waiting the statutorily prescribed period.2 Other restrictions on costs recovery include the setting of a maximum recovery by statute or court rules,3 the doctrine of entire contract4 and time requirements prescribed by limitations legislation.5 Recovery of fees by counsel deserves separate treatment chiefly due to the historical bar on counsel suing for this purpose.6 The chapter concludes with the recoverability of interest on solicitor–client costs.7 The independent review of lawyer–client bills of costs, generally termed ‘taxation’ or ‘assessment’, also serves to restrict costs recoverability; once an application for taxation or assessment is made, the legal profession legislation prohibits a law practice commencing any proceedings to recover the costs until the assessment has been completed.8 The taxation or assessment of costs deserves separate treatment, and is found in Chapter 5. That a court may, on certain occasions, order costs against a lawyer personally represents another potential restriction on the recovery of costs, as the jurisdiction in question can extend to disallowing costs as between the lawyer and client.9 Finally, the power in disciplinary proceedings to order a lawyer not to recover, or to repay, an amount charged to a client10 may function as a further restriction on costs recovery. [page 70]

Costs Recovery Precluded Until Set Time

After Bill Delivered 4.2 In all jurisdictions the legal profession legislation prescribes preconditions to a lawyer recovering costs from a client. Invariably these tie to the delivery of a bill of costs and, except in South Australia, prescribe a time period after delivery during which proceedings to recover the costs cannot be commenced. That these provisions fall outside the ‘uniform’ provisions in the Model Laws has not prevented each jurisdiction that has implemented the Model Laws from following the same basic schema. Consequently, the former detail variation between jurisdictions in this context is to a great degree a thing of the past.

Rationale and effect 4.3 The object of the requirement that a lawyer cannot commence proceedings to recover costs owing by a client until the expiry of a statutorily prescribed period after the delivery of a bill of costs is to give the client (or other person liable to pay the bill) an opportunity to seek advice on the bill and, if necessary, to seek its independent review (by taxation or assessment).11 Thus a client is provided with ‘the material and the time to enable him to form an opinion, with or without advice, whether the bill is excessive before he is faced with legal proceedings’.12 It is thus necessary to identify the requirements for a ‘bill’,13 and for its ‘delivery’,14 in this context. It also becomes necessary to determine whether or not the proceeding represents a claim for the recovery of costs; if it is not, the temporal restrictions on recovery do not apply.15 Each of these points is addressed below. 4.4 As a general rule, a person who performs work for another on terms that he or she is to be paid for it is, aside from a special term of the agreement to the contrary, entitled to payment as soon as the work is done, and can sue for it at that moment. Aside from statute, lawyers would stand in this position, and could sue upon completing the work they were retained to do, either without delivering a bill of costs or waiting any time after its delivery. Accordingly, although the legal profession legislation ousts a lawyer’s right to sue immediately the work is done, it does not take away his or her right to

payment for it, which is the cause of action.16 Lord Esher MR explained the point in Coburn v Colledge as follows:17 [The statute] does not provide that no solicitor shall have any cause of action in respect of his costs or any right to be paid till the expiration of a month from his delivering a signed bill of costs, but merely that he shall not commence or maintain any action for the recovery of fees, charges, or disbursements until then. It assumes that he has a right to be paid the fees, charges, and disbursements, but provides that he shall not bring an action to enforce that right until certain preliminary requirements have been satisfied. If the solicitor has any other mode of enforcing his right than by action, the section does not seem to interfere with it. For instance, if he has money of the client in his hands not entrusted to him for any specific purpose, there is nothing in the section to prevent his retaining the amount due to him out of that money. If that be the true construction of the section, it does not touch the cause of action, but only the remedy for enforcing it.

[page 71] The lawyer’s right to payment for services rests on the retainer; the client is liable for the cost of work as it is performed (if there is prior agreement to render interim accounts) or upon its completion (if the retainer is an entire contract).18 The legislation instead restricts the enforcement of that right,19 and extends to the recovery of disbursements,20 but it does not prevent the lawyer exercising an otherwise available lien.21 Nor does it apply to services performed in other than a professional legal capacity.22

Jurisdictions except South Australia — Model Laws preconditions Basic time precondition 4.5 Proceedings for the recovery of costs by a lawyer for providing legal services cannot be commenced or maintained against any person unless at least 30 days (65 days in Victoria) have passed since a bill for those costs was given to the person.23 Other than in the Australian Capital Territory, if the lawyer delivers a lump sum bill,24 and the client requests an itemised bill25 within 30 days of receiving the lump sum bill, the 30 day period (in Victoria, a 35 day period) recommences from the date the lawyer complies with that request.26 The scheme of the legislation thus dictates that in the event of

multiple bills and an application for an itemised bill being made in respect of some of them, ‘a non-compliance with that request will have the consequence of preventing the solicitor from suing on that bill’.27 In the Australian Capital Territory, a law practice must not start any proceeding to recover costs from a person who has been delivered a lump sum bill until at least 90 days after its delivery.28 The entitlement to request an itemised bill only applies where the costs exceed a threshold amount,29 and the request must be made within 90 days of the day the lump sum bill is given.30 The law practice that receives this request must comply with it as soon as practicable, and must not commence any proceeding to recover the legal costs from the person until at least 30 days after the day the person is given an itemised bill.31 4.6 The statutorily prescribed time restriction on commencing proceedings to recover costs applies whether or not the costs are the subject of a costs agreement,32 a point made clear via explicit statutory provision.33 [page 72]

Leave to commence proceedings before expiry of time prescription 4.7 Because the rationale for the temporal restriction on costs recovery is capable of abuse by a client who removes himself or herself from the jurisdiction within the time during which the lawyer cannot commence proceedings, the legislation empowers the court to allow the lawyer to commence proceedings irrespective of the non-expiry of the time frame if satisfied that the client is about to leave the jurisdiction.34

Effect of non-compliance 4.8 Failure to comply with the time requirement provides a defence to an action brought by a lawyer to recover legal costs claimed to be owing. The legislation makes this explicit by requiring a court or tribunal to stay proceedings brought before it in contravention of the time requirement, whether pursuant to an application by a party or on its own initiative.35

The Victorian professional rules add that a lawyer who fails to deliver an itemised bill within 60 days of being requested by a client must, on demand, pay or deliver to or at the direction of the client money or documents held on behalf of the client even though the lawyer might otherwise be entitled to a lien over those moneys or that document.36 That the rules refer to the former Victorian legislation, which is phrased in terms not identical to the current legislation, makes it unclear whether this outcome remains the case.37

South Australia 4.9 The Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) states that no action for the recovery of costs, or to appropriate money in or towards satisfaction of a claim for costs, can be brought unless a bill specifying the total amount of those costs, and describing the legal work to which the costs relate, has been delivered to the person liable.38 The Act prescribes no requirement to wait a set period after delivery of the bill before commencing proceedings for recovery of costs thereunder. But the court in which proceedings to recover costs have been instituted may, pursuant to an explicit statutory power, order the lawyer to apply to have the costs taxed, and may adjourn the proceedings until the taxation has been completed.39

Distinguishing claims for the recovery of costs from other claims 4.10 The statutory temporal restriction discussed above is limited in its terms to where a lawyer attempts to institute proceedings for the recovery of costs. If the proceedings in question lack this character, then the time restrictions do not apply. Hodgson JA in Koutsourais v Metledge & Associates gave some guidance as to the dividing line in this context via the following observations:40 … factors which would tend to make proceedings ultimately based, at least in part, on a lawyer’s entitlement to costs, other than proceedings for recovery of costs, would include:

[page 73]

a compromise of previous legal proceedings; a compromise involving other matters as well as costs; a compromise accepting in respect of costs a substantially lesser sum; and legal advice to the client at the time of the compromise. Each and all of these factors would in my opinion tend towards changing the character of proceedings based on the compromise from being proceedings for the recovery of costs.

According to his Honour, none of these factors was present in Koutsourais itself. The case involved a solicitor who made informal claims for costs against two clients, one a company and another an individual who was principal of the company. After disputes and service of a statutory demand on the company, the parties agreed that the company would pay all the costs by instalments, and the solicitor would not proceed with winding up. The solicitor later sued the company for the money payable under that agreement. Hodgson JA, with whom Beazley JA concurred, held that the accord and satisfaction did not preclude the proceedings to enforce from remaining, in substance, proceedings for the recovery of costs. This was because the amount to be paid was the same amount claimed for costs, and the company identified as liable for the whole was one of two entities that were together previously liable for those costs, albeit in undetermined shares.41 4.11 The ruling in Koutsourais reveals the importance courts give to the mandatory terms of the statutory restriction on costs recovery, and their unwillingness to find that proceedings that in some way involve the recovery of costs should fall outside its terms. To this end, in Burbidge v Wolf42 an attempt to circumvent the statutory restriction by claiming that the client’s liability to pay fees arose under a trust, or that the client’s refusal to pay was unconscionable, proved unsuccessful. Lawyers who wish to avoid the statutory restriction must distance the claim from one relating to a previously determined distinct claim for costs arising out of the retainer. An example is found in Cameron v Dennis.43 A barrister, having delivered invoices for fees to his instructing solicitor, acceded to the solicitor’s request, made after the completion of the matter, to defer payment of the fees until the clients had subdivided and sold land belonging to them. Once the sale had been effected, the solicitor disputed the liability to pay the barrister on the ground that the barrister’s invoices did not comply with the statutory requirements. Johnstone DCJ held that the barrister’s claim was properly characterised as one for breach of contract, not one for the recovery of costs, for two reasons. First, the barrister made no claim for interest on his fees even though part of the basis for agreeing to

defer payment for a year or more was the solicitor’s promise to pay interest. Second, the solicitor’s representation that he had a mortgage that could be registered to protect him in respect of the fees the clients owed was an acknowledgement of the barrister’s entitlement to the fees.44 His Honour’s decision was affirmed on appeal.45 [page 74]

Bills of Costs Request for ‘itemised bill’ 4.12 Except in the Australian Capital Territory and South Australia, the legal profession legislation states that a bill may be in the form of a lump sum bill or an itemised bill.46 If a lump sum bill is delivered, a person who is entitled to apply for the assessment or taxation of the relevant costs may request the lawyer to supply an itemised bill,47 with which the lawyer must comply within 21 days (in Queensland, 28 days).48 The Australian Capital Territory position differs slightly, premising the right to request an itemised bill on the delivery of a lump sum bill for costs exceeding a threshold amount,49 and requiring that the request be made within 90 days of when the lump sum bill was delivered.50 The request must be complied with as soon as practicable.51 The South Australian legislation entitles a person, within six months of receiving a bill of costs, to request the lawyer to supply a statement showing in detail the make up of those costs.52 Failure to comply with the request not only exposes the lawyer to a monetary penalty, it also justifies the court before which an action to recover the costs is brought staying the action until the request is complied with.53

Content and form of bills of costs ‘Lump sum bill’ compared to ‘itemised bill’ 4.13 The legal profession legislation generally defines a ‘lump sum bill’ as a bill that describes the legal services to which it relates and specifies the total

amount of the legal costs.54 An ‘itemised bill’, on the other hand, is defined as a bill that specifies in detail how the legal costs are made up in a way that would allow them to be assessed or taxed.55 4.14 Other than in New South Wales,56 beyond the above definition, there is no statutory or regulation-based prescription as to the contents of an itemised bill.57 However, by defining an itemised bill by reference to one that is in assessable or taxation form, provisions in the court rules governing bills on an assessment or taxation as between party and party58 give a valuable indication of the expected content of itemised bills in the lawyer and client context. In any event, the general law recognises that an itemised bill ‘must contain such details as will enable the client to make up his mind on the subject of taxation, and will enable those advising [page 75] him to advise him effectively as to whether taxation is desirable or not’.59 This requires a detailed account, showing the specific items of work done, the date the work was done and the specific charges allocated for each item.60 The following have been held insufficiently specific for this purpose: a bare claim to a lump sum for ‘professional costs’ or ‘professional fees’;61 a charge in a lawyer’s bill ‘for attending a great many times’62 or ‘for numerous attendance’;63 a bill showing services performed in an itemised manner without allocating costs to any particular action taken by the lawyers, but merely a lump sum shown for the amount charged;64 a bill not sufficiently describing the specific items of work done, for example, referring only to ‘letter’, ‘telephone’, ‘conference, ‘perusal’ or ‘drafting’;65 a bill providing some quantitative analysis of the volume of work claimed to be undertaken, but lacking any means by which the appropriateness of that work to the instructions given, and the nature of the objective sought to be achieved by the lawyer’s efforts, can be assessed; and66

a charge showing that a lawyer spent a set time perusing papers without identifying what those papers were or indicating why he or she should spend so long doing so.67 Informing the relevant inquiry is the client’s degree of business and legal sophistication, whether the client has access to other legal advice (in-house or otherwise), and also any agreement between the parties as to the basis for charging.68 In Re Walsh Halligan Douglas’ Bills of Costs,69 for instance, where the client lacked neither legal nor business experience, Dowsett J [page 76] held that bills indicating the number of hours spent in preparation for trial and the rate at which those hours were being charged both by solicitor and counsel were sufficient, as ‘anybody with reasonable experience in the field of litigation would be able to judge the reasonableness or otherwise of those hours’. 4.15 In New South Wales the legal profession regulations require the following particulars, set out in a chronological order, to be included in an itemised bill:70 short details of each item of work carried out on behalf of the client, including the method by which it was carried out (by letter, telephone, perusal, drafting, conference, teleconference or otherwise) if not otherwise apparent; the date on which each item of work was carried out; except so far as the next dot point applies, the amount charged for carrying out each item of work, and particulars: –

of the time (in minutes or other units of time) engaged for carrying out each item or work; and

–

identifying the person who carried out each item of work;

if applicable, the amount charged for carrying out each item of work on

some other basis on which work has agreed to be charged, and particulars of that agreed basis.

Bill to include statement setting out avenues to address costs disputes 4.16 All bills, except those delivered to a sophisticated client,71 must include or be accompanied by a written statement setting out the various avenues (and time limits to which they are subject) open to the client in the event of a dispute in relation to costs;72 as this will already have been disclosed pursuant to initial costs disclosure requirements,73 it serves as a client reminder.

Bill can be contained in more than one document 4.17 At general law a bill can be found in more than one document.74 No impediment exists to a bill being delivered in parts, or to the delivery of successive bills, each showing the costs due down to a certain date, or including particular groups of items, provided that it clearly appears that they are all really parts of the one bill.75 It follows that a client may already know, or be in a position to easily ascertain, the information required for a bill of costs because of [page 77] information he or she has received in a previous document.76 Without a specific statutory provision ousting this approach, the general law continues to apply. Statute envisages, in any case, that a law practice may deliver an interim bill covering part only of the services it was retained to provide.77 Where a law practice exercises this entitlement — to the extent that it is prescribed by either the terms of the retainer or costs agreement,78 or under statute — the doctrine of entire contract, so far as its potential application to deny lawyers costs recovery for premature termination without just cause,79 is ousted.

Bill to be signed 4.18 In all jurisdictions except South Australia the legal profession legislation requires a bill of costs to be signed by the lawyer, or by his or her partner or employee.80 It is sufficient compliance if a letter that is so signed is attached to, or enclosed with, the bill,81 but the mere use of letterhead for a memorandum of fees does not meet this requirement because the legislation envisages that something be added to the bill of costs that identifies it as having been adopted by the party sending it.82 In the case of an incorporated legal practice, a bill of costs is taken to have been signed if it has the corporation’s seal affixed to it, or is signed by a lawyer–director of the corporation or by an officer or employee of the corporation who is a lawyer.83 4.19 The signature requirement is designed to protect the recipient of the bill ‘by having the party claiming costs acknowledge clearly that he or she accepts responsibility for its contents’.84 To this end, early English authority indicates that an unsigned bill is invalid if so treated by the client. In a statement recently described by the New South Wales Court of Appeal to be [page 78] ‘as valid today as when it was made’,85 Sir John Romilly MR explained the point as follows in Re Gedye:86 The client who receives an unsigned bill may, if he pleases, treat it as a nullity: the attorney can bring no action upon it, and he may wholly disregard its existence. But, on the other hand, he may, if he pleases, treat it as a bill delivered under statute:– he may, in fact, waive the signature of the attorney to the bill, and treat it as if the proper formalities had been complied with; it is his privilege to do so, and the solicitor, by delivering an unsigned bill, enables his client to exercise his option on this subject. But as I apprehend that it is not in the power of the client to treat it as both, — ie to treat it first as a duly signed bill, and, if that fails his purpose, then to treat it as a nullity.

In Goodman v J Eban Ld87 a majority of the English Court of Appeal held that a rubber stamp signature met the statutory signature requirements. That Evershed MR and Romer LJ, who formed the majority, conceded the undesirability of signing a bill of costs using a rubber stamp88 — after all, a stamp may not carry the same assurance of authenticity as a manual signature — did not prevent them from ruling that the stamp provided sufficient

personal authentification of the bill. Their Lordships reasoned that a client in doubt as to the bill’s authenticity could inquire of the solicitor,89 Romer LJ adding that, as the wills legislation and the Statute of Frauds do not require manual signature, there was no reason to require it for this purpose.90 Denning LJ did not accept the majority’s view, bluntly remarking that ‘if we were to admit a rubber stamp to this extent, it would open wide the door to evasion: for no one could ever check whether the solicitor did in fact affix it with his own hand’.91 Unlike wills, his Lordship noted, a solicitor’s bill does not attract the added safeguard of two witnesses. His Lordship’s reasoning to this end is compelling:92 The virtue of a signature lies in the fact that no two persons write exactly alike, and so it carries on the face of it a guarantee that the person who signs has given his personal attention to the document. A rubber stamp carries with it no such guarantee: because it can be affixed by anyone. The affixing of it depends on the internal office arrangements with which the recipient has nothing to do. This is such common knowledge that a ‘rubber stamp’ is contemptuously used to denote the thoughtless impression of an automaton, in contrast to the reasoned attention of a sensible person.

It is prudent, therefore, to affix a manual signature to a bill of costs, although this is without prejudice to the validity under statute of electronic signatures or signatures by way of electronic communications.93

Delivery of bill How delivery is to be effected 4.20 The legal profession legislation prescribes what amounts to the ‘delivery’ or ‘service’ of a bill of costs. In South Australia the legislation speaks of delivery to the person liable either personally, or by post addressed to the person at the person’s last known place of business or [page 79] residence.94 In the other jurisdictions, which have enacted the Model Laws’ provisions, a bill may be given to a person in one of the following ways:95 by delivering it personally to the person;

by sending it by post96 to the person at his or her usual or last known business or residential address, or an address nominated for the purpose by the person; by leaving it for the person at his or her usual or last known business or residential address, or one nominated for the purpose by the person, with a person on the premises who is apparently at least 16 years old and apparently employed or residing there; or in some circumstances, by delivering the bill electronically.97 In each case, reference to a person to whom a bill is delivered includes that person’s ‘agent’, which for this purpose means an agent, law practice or Australian legal practitioner who has authority to accept service of legal process on behalf of the person.98 This obviates the difficulty that arises in South Australia (and formerly in some other jurisdictions) out of the requirement that the bill be delivered ‘personally’. The difficulty stems from the basic agency law principle that if statute expressly requires a person to do an act personally, he or she cannot appoint an agent to do that act.99 It has been judicially observed, in the context of service of a bill of costs, that ‘[s]tatutes which require personal service have been strictly construed’,100 such that delivery or service to an agent would not be sufficient.

Delivery to persons jointly liable 4.21 Where several are jointly liable to a lawyer for legal work, there is old English case authority that delivery of a copy of the bill to one of them is a delivery for the purposes of maintaining a separate action for costs against any of the others.101 The logic is that where a person is jointly liable for an amount, the person to whom the amount is owed may elect whom to enforce the entitlement against. But this approach does not sit well with the statutory [page 80] wording, which requires a law practice, as one precondition to recovering costs from a ‘person’, to give a bill to that person.102 Today, therefore, the outcome envisaged by the old English case law would arguably not ensue

without proof that the party served was the agent of the others, or that the contract between lawyer and clients so provided.

Delivery where client has died 4.22 If the client has died, delivery of the bill should be made to the legal personal representative.103 Although there is old authority that this is not required where the delivery has taken effect prior to the client’s death,104 a prudent lawyer will redeliver the bill to the legal personal representative in such a case.

Delivery and set-off 4.23 That no bill has been delivered as required by statute does not operate to prevent a lawyer from setting off a claim for costs. Williams J explained the reason for this in Brown v Tibbits:105 [T]he general understanding of the profession for very many years has been that an attorney may set off his demand for costs, notwithstanding he has not a month previously delivered a signed bill, the statute not in terms precluding him from so doing, but being confined to a prohibition against his bringing an action for his costs until he has complied with that condition, and every principle of justice and good sense being in favour of that course. I think it would be monstrous if a man who is largely indebted to his attorney, and who has a counterclaim against him, should be allowed to recover in respect of his demand merely because the attorney has not one month before setting it up as a defence delivered his bill. As to any supposed hardship of allowing the setoff, I must confess I do not see any; for, it is clear that the court has the power, and would exercise it, to prevent any injustice being done, by staying the proceedings until an opportunity has been afforded to the client to tax the bill.

His Lordship saw no reason why a lawyer should have a judgment entered against him or her, when the plaintiff may be indebted to the lawyer in an equal or a greater amount, merely because the lawyer has rendered no account, given that the client has ample means of procuring it to be taxed.106 This was endorsed in James v Bradley107 by Brinsden J, who remarked that a solicitor is not entitled to retain his or her client’s money when called upon to account unless he or she can show that he or she has a lawful set-off, and the failure to deliver a bill does not preclude a set-off of costs in an action brought by the client.

Court’s inherent jurisdiction to order delivery of a bill of costs

4.24 The court has an inherent power to order the delivery of a bill of costs in taxable or assessable form108 when the business concerned was transacted in the court and the court considers the circumstances of the case warrant it.109 It is a jurisdiction distinct from the court’s inherent jurisdiction to order the taxation of a bill,110 although a court that orders delivery of a [page 81] bill may also deem it appropriate that the bill be taxed. With an order for the delivery of a bill, the court may make an order as to documents and papers, whether by delivery up or otherwise, relating to the business transacted in the court and contained in the bill.111 The inherent jurisdiction is replicated by the legal profession legislation in New South Wales112 and appears to be assumed by statute in Victoria.113 4.25 The nature of the client and fee arrangements, the level of disclosure by lawyer to client, the extent of the delay in requesting the bill and the reason for the delay, and the level of prejudice the lawyer would suffer if ordered to deliver the bill, are all factors relevant to the court’s discretion for this purpose. A leading case is Re Morris Fletcher & Cross’ Bills of Costs,114 where Fryberg J, in ordering the solicitors to deliver a bill of costs to the applicants, was influenced by the following facts.115 First, letters and invoices given to the client generally included a charge for a lump sum for professional fees. They did not list the names of the persons who performed the work, the work was described in the most general terms, and there was no way of relating the time charged in the invoice to the work done. Second, the correspondence gave no indication as to the appropriateness of the person who did the work in each case. Third, there was inherent scope for error in the number of hours charged, as time was charged in blocks of six minutes whether or not the block was fully utilised. Fryberg J remarked that charging of this kind created potential for the inefficient use of the time charged, particularly given the absence within the firm of benchmarks or procedures for systematic quality control of the time charging system. Fourth, the client was Japanese, and suffered cultural inhibitions and linguistic problems in questioning the invoices. Fifth, although the client delayed in requesting a bill and had paid the invoices without complaint, this could be explained on the

ground that only when judgment was rendered against the client did he have cause for concern as to the costs. Sixth, the solicitors omitted to fully disclose to the client the implications of time charging or his entitlement to taxation. Though Fryberg J noted that an order for taxation does not necessarily follow an order for the delivery of a bill, in the circumstances the risk of an overcharge justified it.116 The above factors, according to his Honour, outweighed any prejudice to the solicitors from the cost of preparing the bill, the delay and the opportunity costs of the process of taxation. Conversely, in Herbertson v Kenyons Lawyers117 the client’s unexplained delay of four years before requesting a bill, the lack of evidence of overcharging, and the prejudice the respondent firm would suffer in preparing a bill without the requisite documentation, led Holmes J to decline ordering a bill of costs to be furnished. 4.26 A court may be more inclined to direct a client’s former lawyer to render a bill of costs where the client’s current lawyer has given an undertaking to preserve the former lawyer’s lien and the former lawyer has failed to date to supply a bill of costs.118

Waiver of right to delivery of a bill 4.27 The legal profession legislation, in prohibiting a law practice from commencing legal proceedings to recover legal costs from a person until, inter alia, it has given a bill to the [page 82] person, is phrased in mandatory terms. It, moreover, makes no specific provision for the ouster of this requirement by client consent or waiver, even for a sophisticated client. There is thus a basis for concluding that a lawyer cannot plead a client’s waiver of the right to receive a bill of costs as a defence to a claim that falls outside the statutory requirements, and that an estoppel in the lawyer’s favour is unlikely to lie in the face of the statute.119 4.28 Yet there is an indication in the cases, albeit in the context of a client’s request to the court to order the lawyer to deliver a bill rather than the lawyer

being precluded from enforcing a costs claim, that the court can give effect to conduct allegedly constituting a waiver,120 especially so if the client is sophisticated and experienced. In Stefanou v Fairfield Chase Pty Ltd121 the client, an experienced company, knew it was entering expensive litigation, agreed to an hourly charge, and over months paid hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees without question or a request for a detailed account, and made no complaint about even a single aspect of the lawyers’ work. This, according to Einfeld J, weighed in favour of a waiver,122 adding the following observations:123 If a client wishes to test whether the work claimed for has been done or whether the fees charged are reasonable, the client must say so at the correct or a reasonable time and assert and insist on the rights which the law confers. Obviously different considerations will apply to a client without, or with little, experience of the law or an understanding of rights than to a client such as this company in an experienced, completely informed and quite knowledgeable position. The appropriate time will often vary with the circumstances. In this case the point may have been made by agreement at the outset or during the retainer, or by later unilateral conduct, such as asking for more detail before payment of all or particular accounts and refusing to pay until it was supplied. Yet not only did the client in the present case do none of these things or anything else inconsistent with its voluntary duly advised willingness to pay as charged, it also did not attempt to enforce what it now claims to be its true position until fully nine months after being refused a detailed bill without an order of the Court. In these circumstances, there is no basis for the discretionary intervention of the Court now to protect the company from its own deliberate actions and decisions.

Stefanou should not be read as a judicial willingness to find a waiver of a client’s right. If there is credible oral or written evidence adduced to substantiate a waiver, the court will closely analyse the words used and is not willing, generally speaking, to find a waiver in equivocal language. In Ganke v Somerset,124 for example, a letter by the client stating that ‘I have not insisted on particulars at this stage, as I am more interested in results rather than spending time on calculations’ was held not to be a waiver of the right to receive an itemised bill, given the phrase ‘at this stage’ and the fact that in the same letter the client complained of lack of detail as to how the charges were determined. Conversely, in Kamay v Miss X125 lawyer and client agreed that the lawyer would continue to act for the client upon the client not pursuing a dispute as to previous costs, as to which the lawyer had rendered an unitemised account. Treyvaud J held that the client had waived the right to an itemised account in respect of those costs, having done so with full knowledge of her rights, and that in reliance thereon the lawyer

[page 83] acted in later proceedings for the wife.126 It is more difficult to establish a waiver where a third party is liable to pay the bill in question.127

Costs of drawing a bill 4.29 Although the requirements imposed on a lawyer for the preparation of a bill are more onerous than those imposed on most other professionals, at general law it is established that the preparation of a bill at his or her own expense is part of a lawyer’s duty.128 The general law position has statutory force in New South Wales;129 the position is likely to be the same elsewhere unless a scale fee is allowed for this purpose.130 Also, the legal profession legislation in most jurisdictions makes explicit that a law practice cannot charge for the preparation of an itemised bill requested by a client in place of a lump sum bill.131

Legal professional privilege and bills of costs 4.30 Whether, and to what extent, a bill of costs is privileged rests on a consideration of the circumstances in which the claim for privilege occurs and, in particular, the nature and details of the entries made in the bill in question. An itemised bill of costs may be privileged in so far as it contains a history of the nature and order of legal work carried out.132 Such a bill could, say, disclose matters pertaining to the proposed conduct of litigation, evidenced by the nature and quantum of costs to date,133 or reveal the nature and direction of the advice given.134 It is conceivable that even though none of several entries in a bill of costs might itself reveal, directly or by implication, the content or nature of legal advice given or received, ‘the entries might, when read together and in sequence, enable an inference to be drawn as to the nature or content of some privileged communication’.135 Conversely, the less detailed a bill of costs, [page 84]

the less weighty the claim to privilege will likely be.136 It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court of Canada has extended privilege to the gross amount of fees and disbursements billed by lawyer to client in a case involving a police investigation into money laundering by the lawyer’s client.137

Moneys Advanced or Secured for Costs Trust moneys received for costs Trust money’ 4.31 The trust accounting provisions of the Model Laws are chiefly ‘core uniform’, and so other than in South Australia the legal profession legislation uniformly regulates trust accounts. The legislation defines ‘trust money’ as money entrusted to a law practice in the course of or in connection with the provision of legal services by the practice, and specifically includes ‘money received by the practice on account of legal costs in advance of providing the services’.138 This, in any case, represents the general law, which recognises that payments to a lawyer in advance of the lawyer providing the service or incurring the expense in question are paid by way of security, and so are held in trust for the client.139 But moneys received in payment of costs already incurred need not be treated as trust moneys — they have been earned, and so may be paid directly into the lawyer’s office account.

Formalities for transfer of trust moneys for costs 4.32 The Model Laws prescribe that a law practice may, in relation to trust money, withdraw the money for payment to the practice’s account for costs owing to the practice if the relevant procedures are followed,140 and subject to costs disclosure and assessment prescriptions.141 In those jurisdictions that have implemented legal profession regulations pursuant to the Model Laws, broad uniformity as to those procedures has ensued.142 The regulations entitle a law practice to withdraw the trust money if the practice has given or sent to the client a request for payment, referring to the proposed withdrawal, and one of the following is satisfied:

the money is withdrawn in accordance with a valid costs agreement that authorises the withdrawal; [page 85] the money is withdrawn in accordance with client instructions, written or confirmed in writing,143 that authorise the withdrawal; or the money is owed to the practice by way of reimbursement of money already paid by the practice on behalf of the client. The regulations also prescribe an alternative to the above, entitling a law practice to withdraw the trust money if it has given the client a bill relating to the money, and: the client has not objected to withdrawal of the money within seven days after being given the bill; the client has objected within seven days of being given the bill but has not applied for a review of the legal costs (via assessment or taxation) within 60 days of being given the bill; or the money otherwise becomes legally payable. The South Australian legal profession legislation simply entitles a lawyer to withdraw money from a trust account for satisfaction of a claim for costs that he or she has against the person on behalf of whom the money is held.144 The regulations require a lawyer who becomes entitled to money held in the trust account in or towards satisfaction of his or her costs, as soon as practicable, to transfer the money to an office account.145

Lawyer taking security for costs from a client 4.33 The Model Laws contains a specific provision entitling a law practice to take reasonable security from a client for legal costs, including security for the payment of interest on unpaid legal costs.146 Except in New South Wales, it adds that a law practice may refuse to act or stop acting for a client who

does not provide reasonable security, but as there is no legal requirement on a lawyer to accept a retainer for which a reasonable fee is not available, this is necessarily the case in New South Wales independent of statutory provision. This form of security for costs should not be confused with the law pertaining to security for costs between parties to litigation, whereby a defendant seeks from a plaintiff security for costs that the latter may be liable to pay should he or she be unsuccessful in the action.147 4.34 Even in the absence of statutory provision for security for lawyer–client costs, the general law does not prevent this practice, but does regulate its potential abuse. Aside from the advance of money for costs to be held on trust — being the usual way of securing payment for fees and is regulated by statute148 — a lawyer may obtain a guarantee of payment from a third party or take a mortgage or charge over one or more of the client’s assets.149 The terms of the security must not be of an unusual or exceptionally onerous character.150 Like other transactions between lawyer and client, it may be set aside for breach of fiduciary duty or undue influence.151 In any case, a costs agreement, which includes the taking of security for costs from [page 86] the client, may be set aside for being not fair or reasonable,152 or its terms upset for being unfair under the Australian Consumer Law.153 Consequently, a lawyer should, in order to guard against any accusation that he or she has taken advantage of the client, or an allegation that the agreement is not fair or reasonable, ensure that the transaction is properly explained to the client.154 Yet there is no universally applicable rule requiring the lawyer to insist that the client obtain independent legal advice before security is given. Whether this advice is necessary may depend on, inter alia, the nature of the security, the circumstances in which it is procured, and the client’s knowledge and experience.155 4.35 The security must, in any case, be in a form appropriate to serve its intended purpose. In Re Nelson,156 for example, the solicitor’s fees were secured by a mortgage over the client’s property, although on the face of the memorandum of mortgage it appeared that the solicitor had advanced money

to the client. When the solicitor became bankrupt the solicitor’s trustee-inbankruptcy had a prima facie case supporting the demand for repayment of the sum secured. According to Higgins and Foster JJ, the proper form of transaction should have been an ‘all moneys’ mortgage up to a maximum amount expressed as being for legal costs to be incurred in the litigation and remaining unpaid as at the date an account for such work was rendered. By adopting the approach that he did, the solicitor had ‘failed effectively to safeguard his client’s interests to the detriment of that client’.157 4.36 Merely because costs are owed by a client to a lawyer is no valid ground for a caveat on the client’s land to secure those costs.158 As the lodgement of caveats is ordinarily premised on the caveator having or being able to substantiate a legal or equitable interest in the land, a caveatable interest in this context requires, in the main, a valid agreement with the client allowing the lawyer to lodge the caveat. For example, Hamilton J in La Fontaine v Manley159 allowed the solicitor to lodge a fresh caveat where his claim to a caveatable interest arose out of a handwritten agreement in general terms to pay costs, concluding with the words ‘and we confirm that this is a caveatable interest in our properties to secure such payment’. The first caveat failed due to poor drafting — the solicitor had described his interest on the caveat application form simply as ‘amounts due under costs agreement’ — not because of anything relating to the substance of the claim for an estate or interest.160 The solicitor should have, in [page 87] applying for the caveat, also made reference to the handwritten document, which was crucial to the establishment of a caveatable interest.161 A caveat can be supported where the lawyer legitimately takes a mortgage or other charge over the client’s property.162 However, if the mortgage or charge is the result of a conflict of interest and duty — such as where the lawyer, or a party associated with the lawyer, has lent the client the funds secured via the mortgage without the client’s fully informed consent arising out of being independently advised — the mortgage will be set aside,163 in which case the caveat supported by the mortgage will likewise lose its justification.164

Irrevocable authorities and the recovery of costs 4.37 An irrevocable authority to pay from an identifiable fund given for value constitutes a valid equitable assignment of that property. Hence, assignment of the right to the anticipated proceeds of litigation to a third party may threaten a lawyer’s ability to recoup his or her costs from those proceeds. As a lawyer has a lien over the proceeds of judgment for those costs incurred in obtaining the judgment, described as an equitable right or interest,165 the issue may become one of competing equitable interests: the interest of the assignee as against the interest of the lawyer. The general principle is that the first in time prevails.166 If the assignment is validly effected before the moment the lawyer’s equitable interest arises,167 the assignee’s interest prevails. For this reason, it has been suggested that lawyers should, if practicable, insist on receiving costs on account or obtain at the commencement of the retainer an irrevocable authority from the client covering taxable lawyer– client costs.168 It is important that the lawyer give value (consideration) for the irrevocable authority, such as where the retainer clearly provides that the lawyer will act, or continue to act, for the client only if the client furnishes the requisite authority.169 In securing this authority, the lawyer must ensure the client fully understands its nature and consequences, preferably by means of independent advice to obviate any claim of undue influence. In any event, clients should be warned at the outset of the effect of irrevocable authorities and urged to seek professional advice prior to executing any such authority. 4.38 Importantly, the term ‘irrevocable authority’ can be misleading, as illustrated by the New South Wales Court of Appeal’s decision in Grogan v Orr.170 The respondent acted for a client (N) in a Family Court matter. As N could pay the respondent’s fees only on receiving his share of the matrimonial property, the respondent secured from N an irrevocable authority to this effect. Implementation of the Family Court’s orders involved the sale of real estate, in respect of which the appellant acted. N revoked the aforesaid authority and instructed the appellant to pay the proceeds of sale to him. Shortly thereafter N filed for bankruptcy. Some five years later the respondent commenced court proceedings to recover his fees. [page 88]

The trial judge had reasoned that where an agent (the appellant) is directed or authorised by the principal (N) to pay to a third party (the respondent) money from a fund in the agent’s hands, and the agent expressly or impliedly promises to pay the third party or hold the money on the third party’s behalf, the agent is personally liable to pay the third party.171 This led him to rule the appellant personally liable for the respondent’s costs. The Court of Appeal rejected this conclusion, stating that although such a promise could be implied from acts or words, it could not be implied, as was so on the facts, from silence alone.172 The court also rejected the respondent’s argument that he had provided consideration for the irrevocable authority, as there was no evidence that, had N refused to sign the authority, the respondent would have ceased to act.173 Although Sheller and Meagher JJA held that the respondent possessed an equitable right via a particular lien over the proceeds of sale, as he had not given the appellant notice of this right until six years after the sale was completed, the equitable defence of laches (undue delay) barred the claim.174 It follows that, had the respondent notified the appellant that he asserted a lien upon the sale of the property, the outcome would have been different; the court here could have imposed on the appellant an equitable personal obligation to pay the respondent’s costs.175 The issue of notice in this regard also arose in Twigg v Kung,176 where it was not until the proceeds of a settlement had been disbursed by the current solicitors that the former solicitors, in whose favour the client had executed an irrevocable authority entitling them to costs out of the proceeds of the litigation, explicitly notified their claim to a particular lien for unpaid costs. Hodgson JA, with whom Stein JA and Foster AJA concurred, made the following important observations regarding the requisite notice in this context:177 [N]otice of a lien can be effectively given at a time when the interest is still inchoate, in that there has not yet been a judgment or settlement to which the lien could attach. The important matter is the actual or presumed state of mind of the person dealing with the property at the time when that dealing takes place: if the person in question has notice of the lien at the time the property is dealt with, that will be sufficient, and it will not matter that the communication occurred at a time before the lien attached to particular property … [I]t follows from this approach that the adequacy of the notice must be considered as at the time when the challenged dealing takes place; and the question whether a notice is sufficient to bring about the required actual or presumed state of mind must have regard, not only to the terms of the notice itself and the circumstances in which it was given, but also to the circumstances that have ensued in the meantime … [T]he notice must, viewed in all the circumstances occurring up to the time of the dealing with the affected property, be such as to convey to the recipient as at that time that a lien

is being asserted in respect of costs incurred in the relevant matter and unpaid. It is not sufficient that it merely raise a possibility that such is the case.

In his Honour’s view, the terms of the irrevocable authority, which had earlier been brought to the current solicitors’ attention, lacked the necessary clarity to fix them with notice of the lien, as it contained no reference to a lien and did not suggest that costs were owing to the [page 89] former solicitors to be met out of the property recovered. Moreover, at no time during the following three and a half years was any notice given to the current solicitors that there were unpaid costs that could support a lien or that a lien was still asserted, notwithstanding ample opportunities to do so.178 Consequently, the former solicitors’ claim of lien was rejected. 4.39 Yet Twigg should not be read to mean that notice to the debtor is a prerequisite for the lien to exist. Rather, it shows that the absence of notice may cause the lien to be lost. The point was clarified by Campbell J’s decision in Firth v Centrelink.179 There the Government Insurance Office (GIO), which conducted the case for the defendant, paid the balance of agreed settlement monies to the Department of Social Security in satisfaction of a garnishee notice issued under s 1233 of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth). The debt in respect of which the notice issued had arisen out of an assurance by the client to the department for the support of his migrant parents. The solicitor made no enquiry of the department before negotiating settlement, as he believed the client had received no benefit from the Commonwealth. In its defence to the solicitor’s claim, the Commonwealth argued that the solicitor had no lien, as he had not given notice of his claim to the lien to the GIO. Campbell J held that notice to the debtor is not necessary for the existence of the lien, but would be needed before the court will order the debtor to pay the relevant costs to the solicitor.180 In so ruling, his Honour rejected the submission that Grogan v Orr showed that notice to the debtor was essential for a solicitor’s lien to exist. Instead, he saw Grogan as a case where the court had determined that the appellants there ‘had been able to get an effective discharge of the obligation which they owed to the client, and

over which the lien was asserted to exist, before notice that a lien was claimed was given’.181 Campbell J determined that the solicitor ‘had a lien for his proper costs and disbursements over the obligation of GIO to pay the settlement proceeds’ even though he had not given notice of the lien to the GIO.182 The lien had arisen as soon as the settlement agreement had been reached, and therefore prior to the service of the garnishee notice. In so ruling, his Honour rejected a submission that, even if the lien existed, it did not prevail against the Commonwealth on the ground that it had received payment from the GIO as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Campbell J referred to the decision in Cole v Eley183 relating to the assignment of a judgment debt and to findings in that case that notice of the subject matter amounted to notice of a solicitor’s lien and prevented the assignee from being a purchaser for value without notice.184 The Commonwealth, his Honour found, had constructive notice of the solicitor’s lien, and so was bound by it. 4.40 The Court of Appeal’s decision in Twigg v Kung, delivered the day after Campbell J’s decision in Firth v Centrelink, led the Commonwealth to apply to Campbell J for leave to reopen argument.185 His Honour refused leave, reasoning that the structure of the equitable claim made in Twigg v Kung was ‘fundamentally different’ from that in Firth. The process of reasoning appears from the following extract from Campbell J’s judgment:186 The claim in Twigg v Kung was a claim made by a lien holder against someone who had once had, but no longer has, the property which was the subject of the lien. To fix such a person with

[page 90] an obligation to pay, again, money which he has already paid to someone else, does require there to be clarity in the notice which he has of the existence of the lien at the time of making the payment away. After all, the effect of asserting the lien against such a person is that he is treated as a wrongdoer for not having acted contrary to the instructions of the legal owner of the money. For it to be unconscionable for such a person to have paid away the money, on the instructions of the legal owner of the money, the fund-holder needs to have been given clear notice that a lien is actually claimed. That is a different situation to the situation which arises here.

As the Commonwealth still had the money it received, it was not in accordance with conscionable behaviour for the Commonwealth, now having

notice of the solicitor’s lien, to keep all the money it received.187 Campbell J conceded, though, that the result would have been different had the Commonwealth truly been a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the money subject of the claim.

Litigation loans 4.41 A litigation loan is a means of financing legal action. It can be defined as ‘an agreement between a client, a lending institution and a lawyer to provide the client with money to pay the legal costs of the lawyer in relation to the conduct of litigation for or on behalf of the client’.188 No jurisdiction prohibits litigation loans, but New South Wales and Tasmania regulate litigation loans by the professional rules. In each of these jurisdictions the litigation loan cannot be used to meet professional costs, only disbursements.189 In New South Wales the loan can be used for payment of costs due to a lawyer who previously acted for the client where this payment is required to obtain delivery of documents retained under a lien. A lawyer who is a party to an arrangement with a lending institution for the advance of funds to the lawyer on the client’s behalf is placed in a situation of a direct conflict of interest, at least when seeking to withdraw funds from the litigation loan account for costs not yet due, and may face a conflict of interest in advising the client in relation to the loan itself.190 For this reason, lawyers in other jurisdictions would be prudent in giving attention to the applicable New South Wales rules. There is no prohibition on a lawyer providing a client with the names of several lenders that may be willing to fund the litigation, as long as the lawyer is not involved, whether directly or indirectly, in the financing arrangement.191 In this event, it has been suggested that the lawyer disclose to the client that:192 other lawyers may be prepared to act for the client on a speculative basis,193 thereby obviating the need to secure a litigation loan; litigation lenders customarily charge a high rate of interest; it may prove more economical for the client to secure a conventional loan from a financial institution for this purpose;

the decision whether or not to undertake a litigation loan is that of the client, and that the lawyer has made no recommendation to the client as to whether or not the client ought to do so; and the client should obtain independent legal advice, and consider obtaining independent financial advice prior to entering into a litigation loan agreement. [page 91]

Statutory Limitation on Maximum Costs Recoverable 4.42 In some contexts, statute or statutory rules set maximum recoverable costs between lawyer and client, which apply irrespective of any costs agreement to the contrary. For example, the legal profession legislation in New South Wales and the Northern Territory provides that legal costs are recoverable in accordance with an applicable fixed costs provision, a costs agreement, or according to the fair and reasonable value of the legal services provided, if no fixed costs provision applies.194 ‘Fixed costs provision’ means a determination, scale, arrangement or other provision fixing the (maximum) costs of any legal services that is made by or under legislation.195 In New South Wales the relevant fixed costs provisions are listed in the regulations, and focus on workers compensation matters, the uncontested recovery of lump sum debts, the enforcement of judgments by judgment creditors, and certain legal services provided in respect of probate or the administration of estates.196 In Western Australia statute prohibits the making of a costs agreement that entitles the lawyer to receive, for acting on behalf of a person in an action for damages in respect of the death of or bodily injury directly caused by a motor vehicle, any greater reward than is allowed by any applicable legal costs determination. Such an agreement is void, and any money paid under it is recoverable by the payer.197 4.43 Statute in the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales

provides that if the amount recovered on a claim for personal injury damages does not exceed a set amount, the maximum costs for legal services provided to a party in connection with the claim are fixed at 20 per cent of the amount recovered or $10,000, whichever is greater. As the legislation also restricts costs recovery as between party and party, it is discussed in Chapter 7.198 An initiative directed to a similar end, albeit limited to the lawyer–client context, was enacted in Queensland with effect from 6 November 2003,199 now found in the current legal profession legislation.200 It sets the maximum payment, by reference to a statutory formula,201 for the conduct of a speculative personal injury claim.202 There is scope for the lawyer to apply to the relevant professional body for approval to recover a greater amount.203 But there is no scope for the client to contract out of or waive the benefit of this initiative, for otherwise the policy underscoring it could be frustrated.204 [page 92]

Entire Contract Doctrine of ‘entire contract’ 4.44 An ‘entire contract’ is ‘one in which the consideration for the payment of money or for the rendering of some other counter-performance is entire and indivisible’.205 The lawyer– client retainer has traditionally been viewed as an entire contract, so that once it is entered into, the lawyer undertakes to finish the business for which he or she is retained.206 This can have important ramifications costs-wise: a lawyer is not entitled to present the client with a bill of costs until the final conclusion of the matter the subject of the retainer; and a lawyer who terminates a retainer without just cause before completing what he or she was retained to carry out forfeits a claim for costs for the work done prior to termination, and cannot claim costs on a quantum meruit basis.207 Lawyers may also forfeit their associated entitlement to enforce a retaining lien over the client’s file.208 Originally the entire contract doctrine was treated as being applicable only to actions at common law, the reason for this being explained as follows:209 When one considers the nature of a common law action, it seems obvious that the law must

imply that the contract of the solicitor upon a retainer in the action is an entire contract to conduct the action to the end. When a man goes to a solicitor and instructs him for the purpose of bringing or defending such an action, he does not mean to employ the solicitor to take one step, and then give him fresh instructions to take another step, and so on; he instructs the solicitor as a skilled person to act for him in the action, to take all the necessary steps in it, and to carry it on to the end. If the meaning of the retainer is that the solicitor is to carry on the action to the end, it necessarily follows that the contract of the solicitor is an entire contract — that is, a contract to take all the steps which are necessary to bring the action to a conclusion.

Suits in equity, on the other hand, which could be protracted by reason of the number of parties involved or by reason of the proceedings comprehending a variety of independent issues that could lead to natural breaks in the suit, were traditionally seen as outside the purview of entire contract.210 Later judicial opinion, however, suggests that it is wrong to apply the doctrine of entire contract solely to common law actions, focusing on whether ‘the employment is one to which the doctrine of entire contract applies’, not on whether the suit is one at common law or in equity.211 [page 93] 4.45 The historical assumption that a lawyer–client retainer is an entire contract does not sit well with the prevailing modern view that contractual intent determines matters of construction, and specifically in drawing the entire–severable dichotomy.212 To this end, it has been judicially opined that any general rule of this kind may be ‘overstating the position’,213 and even contrary to the law in view, especially, of changes in the nature of litigation since the entire contract approach was originally propounded.214 Rather than adopt an assumption, the modern approach was accurately summarised by Hope JA in Cachia v Isaacs:215 The decisions as to what are or are not entire contracts of retainer, and in what circumstances they may be terminated, involve no more than the application to solicitor–client contracts of principles generally applicable to contracts, except to the extent that questions of public policy intrude. Whether a contract in respect of the conduct of proceedings at common law (or in any jurisdiction) is an entire contract must be determined by reference to the circumstances of the particular case, as must the question of what terms are to be implied as to the right of the solicitor or the client to terminate the retainer upon due notice or otherwise.

When coupled with the variety of circumstances where the entire contract doctrine has been held not to apply in the lawyer–client context216 — some of

which are, in any case, grounded in construction — in modern times its implications so far as costs are concerned are likely to be limited.

Circumstances where the ‘entire contract’ rule does not apply Termination by the client or by agreement 4.46 The entire contract doctrine does not imperil lawyers’ costs if the client has discharged the lawyer;217 otherwise clients could avoid liability for costs by terminating the retainer at will.218 Nor does it endanger lawyers’ costs where the retainer is terminated prematurely by mutual agreement; freedom of contract dictates that lawyer and client may agree on the termination of the retainer, including by stipulating the occasions wherein the lawyer can terminate the retainer in the document itself.219 The professional rules generally reflect the foregoing by recognising these as exceptions to the requirement to complete the services required under the terms of the retainer.220 4.47 The issue may assume particular importance for a retainer on a speculative basis (under what is termed by statute a ‘conditional costs agreement’)221 where the client decides to settle or discontinue the action. This matter should be resolved by the terms of the retainer or costs agreement, or lacking this by consensus between lawyer and client at that point, as to payment [page 94] of the lawyer’s costs. Otherwise, in terminating the retainer before it is apparent that he or she will lose, the client will have deprived the lawyer of the opportunity of completing the retainer and earning the right to charge fees. The client’s premature termination could, in the alternative, be viewed as either a prevention of performance, or a breach of implied duty to do all such things as are necessary on the client’s part to enable the lawyer to have the benefit of the contract.222 If, on the other hand, the client terminated the retainer once it became clear that he or she could not ‘win’, it has been held

that the lawyer engaged on a speculative basis would have no entitlement to fees except for outlays expressly agreed to be paid.223 The reason for this can be explained as follows:224 The client retains the power to give instructions as to the further conduct of the action, including the right to settle it or terminate it. As an action proceeds it may become increasingly clear to a client that the prospects of success are negligible and that the dangers of proceeding further outweigh the potential benefits. Ordinarily, the client (not the solicitor) is the person who will have to bear a possibly crippling burden of costs in favour of the other party if the litigation proceeds to an unsuccessful outcome.

Hence lawyers who enter into a conditional costs agreement are best advised to ensure that it addresses costs entitlements should the client terminate the retainer or discontinue the proceedings.225 It may be appropriate to specify the costs consequences of a client rejecting a reasonable (or even generous) offer of settlement, as otherwise the lawyer may be pressured to pursue a case unlikely to generate a better outcome for the client — and thus increase the costs of the proceedings — for fear of being unable to recover costs from the client as a result of terminating the retainer.

Termination for ‘just cause’ 4.48 Even if the retainer is legitimately construed as an entire contract, the lawyer who terminates for ‘just cause’ and on reasonable notice is not precluded from claiming his or her fees.226 A lawyer has ‘just cause’ to terminate a retainer in circumstances including: where the client’s acts or omissions are inconsistent with continuing representation, preventing the lawyer from properly performing his or her duties, such as where the client refuses to put the lawyer in funds to pay disbursements,227 commits a material breach of the costs agreement228 (including by delaying or refusing to pay the lawyer’s costs in breach of the agreement),229 gives a clear indication that he or she has retained (or will retain) [page 95]

another lawyer to carry out the retainer,230 casts insulting imputations on the lawyer’s character or conduct,231 makes material misrepresentations about the facts of the matter to the lawyer,232 or insists the lawyer commit a breach of the law or professional rules,233 including by insisting that the lawyer pursue unarguable points;234 the client is legally aided and the grant of legal aid is withdrawn or is otherwise terminated, and the client is unable to make any other satisfactory arrangements for payment of the lawyer’s costs that would be incurred if the retainer continued;235 where the continued representation would require the lawyer to breach professional rules,236 or renders it likely that the lawyer will be called as witness on a material question of fact;237 where a potential claim for negligence against the lawyer rests on the outcome of proceedings, in which case the lawyer may be disinclined to offer evidence inculpating himself or herself; where continuing to act in the matter is likely to have a serious adverse effect on the lawyer’s health;238 and where the client or the lawyer dies or becomes mentally incapable.239 The first dot point above must be read subject to the terms of professional rules that require a lawyer, retained to act for a client who stands trial for a serious criminal offence, not to terminate the retainer upon the client’s failure to make satisfactory arrangements for the payment of costs unless the lawyer has:240 served written notice on the client of the lawyer’s intention, a reasonable time before the date appointed for commencement of the trial or the sittings of the court in which the trial is listed, providing the client at least seven days to make satisfactory arrangements for payment of the lawyer’s costs; and given appropriate notice to the registrar of the court in which the trial is listed to commence. [page 96]

Ouster by statute 4.49 Even in the case of an entire contract, statute may alleviate the costs consequences of a premature termination by the lawyer. The Tasmanian Rules of Practice 1994, for instance, provide that in relation to noncontentious work241 not governed by a costs agreement ‘[a] practitioner may charge a reasonable fee for work done, whether or not a matter is completed’.242 These serve to oust the entire contract rule at least in so far as concerns their subject matter. And the former Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (WA), via s 61(1), made provision as follows: If after any [costs] agreement … is made and before the full performance thereof, the practitioner shall die, become incapable to act (unless such incapacity is caused by the practitioner being struck off the roll, or suspended from practice), or cease to practise in Western Australia, or the client shall die or change solicitor, the agreement shall, subject to subsection (2), cease and be void, and the practitioner, or a person who is authorized to administer the estate of any such practitioner who is deceased or insolvent, or an assignee of that practitioner, shall be entitled to charge the client, or a person who is authorized to administer the estate of any such client who is deceased or insolvent, for all services, fees, charges, or disbursements then performed, paid, or incurred, and such costs may be taxed and shall be dealt with as if such agreement had never been made.

Under s 61(2), where a costs agreement provided for payment after the completion, or partial completion, of any of the services to which the agreement related, and any payment became due under that agreement prior to the time at which that agreement would otherwise have become void under s 61(1), then, in so far as the services to which the agreement related had been performed and payment had become due in accordance with the agreement, the agreement was enforceable. An equivalent (though not identical) provision found in the Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA), namely s 224, was not replicated in the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA). According to Pidgeon J in O’Halloran v Stephen,243 when s 61(1) of the 1893 Act referred specifically to ‘the full performance’ of the agreement, it referred to entire agreements, and aimed to make provision as to what was to occur if such agreements were not fully performed. To this end, if the agreement was an entire one, whereby remuneration could not be claimed until performance, the remuneration could be claimed on the basis of a quantum meruit if any of the events referred to in s 61 arose. Yet s 61 may not have been quite so limited. In the same case, Franklyn J was not convinced that s 61 applied only to an entire contract of such a nature that an agreed sum fee was payable only on completion of the agreed services,

opining that the section also contemplated at least agreements for the completion of a specific task by the lawyer, the remuneration for which was to be paid by instalments.244 His Honour preferred to state the test of the application of s 61 not as whether the contract was ‘entire’ but whether, on the occurrence of any of the events in the section provided for, it was not fully performed. This appears to be in line with the statutory language in the section.

Periodic billing 4.50 It is common for retainer agreements to expressly provide for periodic billing, entitling the lawyer to charge, and recover fees, for work completed up to the most recent periodic [page 97] interval before termination.245 This represents what is in effect an ouster of the entire contract by means of the terms of the retainer itself. For example, in Lewis Blyth and Hooper v Dennis,246 involving a retainer that entitled the law firm to charge from time to time for the work done to that date, and required the client to pay for that work within 14 days of each invoice being rendered, Newnes J held that it was not an entire contract, as it provided for separate and distinct bills, each bill creating a separate and final liability of the client for the work to which it related. Nothing in law or principle prevents a lawyer from asking for money on account of fees during the course of an entire contract. Lawyers commonly do this by requesting payment in advance to cover disbursements and workin-progress in the expectation of ultimate settlement of an action or its determination by judgment.247 This money is ordinarily held in trust prior to its disbursement.248 To the extent that this practice is not agreed in advance under the retainer, however, courts give effect to any such request only if satisfied that it precludes suspicion of an improper attempt by the lawyer to benefit at the client’s expense.249 At the same time, payment of periodic bills can, especially where the client is sophisticated, undermine its subsequent

attempt to sustain an entire contract even in the absence of an explicit term allowing periodic billing.250

Convenient breaks in the proceeding 4.51 Even the general law exhibited some backlash against the costs implications of the doctrine of entire contract. Jessel MR in Re Hall & Barker expressed the concern as follows:251 I cannot see any reason for assuming that a solicitor undertaking a business of this complicated nature, such as the administration, whether of a dead man’s estate or an insolvent man’s estate, which may give rise to a score of suits, and may occupy a score of years before it is finally wound up, should be held to do a single and entire thing and not be entitled to be paid any remuneration until the single and entire thing is done. I think it is reasonable that a solicitor should not be held to have entered into such a contract … It is not reasonable that a solicitor should engage to act on for an indefinite number of years, winding up estates, without receiving any payment on which he can maintain himself.

According to his Lordship, even if the entire contract doctrine applied, ‘there must be a break somewhere’ in the representation or proceedings at which the solicitor could properly render a bill.252 He reasoned that ‘a series of services which, though nominally in relation to one matter, in reality in relation to a succession of matters’ are not within the doctrine of entire contract.253 Subsequently Kay LJ in Re Romer & Haslam254 interpreted this to mean that [page 98] in complicated and lengthy litigation, the entire contract rule ‘must be applied differently, and that the solicitor may send in his bill at a reasonable break in the proceedings, and demand payment of it’. This can be rationalised on the ground that, in those types of case, the court may treat the transaction as ‘entire’ (or complete) at each such break.255 4.52 Stated more generally, if the retainer involves the lawyer performing multiple services over a period of time, the court is more likely to construe it as severable rather than entire, entitling the lawyer to recover costs in respect of the severable acts performed.256 To this end, reflecting the notion that whether or not a contract is an entire contract depends on its construction,257

a retainer for work of a general nature is unlikely to be an entire contract.258 This is explainable on the grounds that implied into a retainer of a general nature, or inferred from the terms of the agreement itself,259 is a term entitling the lawyer to request and recover his or her costs upon a convenient break in the proceedings. A leading modern statement in this context is that of Walters J in Caldwell v Treloar:260 [S]olicitors who undertake business of a general nature, or business involving a variety of matters, such as an investigation into the administration of the estate of a deceased person, should not be held to do a single and entire thing and to be disentitled to be paid any remuneration until the whole business has been brought to finality. In matters of that kind, it would not be reasonable that solicitors should engage themselves for an indefinite time without payment … And so where there is a convenient break in the business being undertaken, the solicitors have a right to send a bill of costs for work done up to that point, and in default of payment, they are entitled, upon reasonable notice to the client, to put an end to the retainer … and sue for their costs.

In Caldwell v Treloar the appellant instructed the respondent law firm to act on her behalf in matters affecting her rights as a beneficiary in an estate. The respondent advised that counsel’s opinion should be obtained, but on obtaining that opinion the appellant refused to pay for it. The respondent corresponded with the appellant, the ultimate result of which was that it would not act any further for her, and so it rendered its bill of costs for services to that date (including counsel’s fee), and upon the appellant failing to pay the bill, sued her in the Local Court for non-payment. Walters J did not think that the evidence compelled the conclusion that the respondent was bound by an entire contract to undertake litigation on behalf of the appellant, or that the relationship of solicitor and client continued, until the whole of the business for which the respondent had been engaged was brought to final resolution. The true position, according to his Honour, was that there was a general employment of the respondent to do whatever was necessary in the investigation of the several different matters on which the appellant had instructed it, and that on concluding any one of them the respondent could claim its costs in respect of work done in that matter. It was a contract of complete generality and bore no fair relation to the doctrine of entire contract.261 [page 99]

Recovery of Fees by Counsel 4.53 Counsel’s fees were traditionally determined either by the acceptance of a brief upon which a fee is marked by the instructing solicitor (or counsel with the latter’s consent) or by another means of agreement. In the absence of this agreement, counsel could render a fee that is proper and reasonable in the circumstances, one calculated on a quantum meruit basis. As Model Laws’ costs disclosure obligations extend to the costs of another law practice retained on the client’s behalf,262 which includes counsel, there is a corresponding need to ascertain the parameters of counsel’s fee.

Practice at general law 4.54 Historically no rule of law precluded a litigant instructing counsel directly. A practice nonetheless developing at the Bar whereby counsel should take instructions only from solicitors,263 a practice ‘directed to ensuring the benefits which flow to clients and the community from legal representation which is independent of extraneous influence and has the benefits of objective detachment’.264 Although the solicitor–client relation at general law was one of contract — the retainer agreement, whether express or implied265 — no contractual relationship arose between client and counsel.266 As a result, counsel could not look to the client for payment of his or her fees, even if the client (or the instructing solicitor) promised to pay the fee.267 An instructing solicitor who paid counsel’s fee could, however, recover that payment from the client, provided that the briefing of counsel was within the solicitor’s authority.268 4.55 Instead of looking to the client to recover his or her fees, counsel looked to the instructing solicitor.269 But counsel’s fee was treated by the general law as a mere gratuity, the right to the fee being one of honour, not one of legal entitlement, whether in contract or otherwise.270 For example, in Re Neville271 it was held that where a solicitor had received moneys from a client for the purpose of paying counsel’s fees, but had failed to pay that money to counsel and then became bankrupt, proof in the bankruptcy by counsel for the fees should not be admitted. Counsels’ remedy was to secure payment of his or her fee upon delivery of the brief,272 so that they ‘should be rendered independent of the event of the cause in order that no temptation

may induce them to get a verdict which in their conscience they think they are not entitled to have’.273 The fear was that were barristers’ emoluments to rest on the outcome of the [page 100] cause, this could threaten their independence. The position is different where the same lawyer acts as both solicitor and advocate; here the lawyer can sue the client in his or her capacity as a solicitor for work carried out as counsel.274 4.56 At general law, as counsel had no contractual ability to enforce a claim for fees, whether against the client or the instructing solicitor, there was a need for a practical means to enforce payment. Traditionally this has been effected by collective action of the Bar, which would ‘list’ (that is, ‘blacklist’) solicitors who had not paid counsels’ fees, and in so doing not accept briefs from those solicitors. In some jurisdictions, dispute resolution measures have been implemented between law society and bar association.275 And there is always the spectre of professional discipline, it having been judicially observed that ‘[a] solicitor having undertaken to pay fees to counsel and then refusing to pay them, would be guilty of misconduct’.276 Wilful or persistent delay in paying counsel’s fees can also generate a disciplinary consequence,277 which is almost assured if the delay operates in tandem with a concurrent breach of fiduciary duty.278

Modification of general law 4.57 The ostensible legal incapacity of counsel to contract with either client or instructing solicitor is little more than, arguably, an historical anachronism. It represents, it has been said, ‘perhaps the last inheritor of the classical Roman law’s exclusion of jurists from the law of contract’.279 Various grounds, in both law and policy, justify querying the continued operation of the incapacity.280 New South Wales has pursued an explicit statutory response, its legal profession legislation providing that a barrister ‘may enter into a contract for

the provision of services with a client or with another legal practitioner’, and ‘may accordingly sue and be sued in relation to the contract’.281 Direct access to counsel is also envisaged by the Victorian legal profession [page 101] legislation; it allows a law practice to accept instructions in a matter from a client whether or not the client has retained any other law practice in that matter.282 Neither provision establishes a statutory contract between barrister and solicitor, or between barrister and client; the identity of the contracting parties and the terms of the contract depend upon the circumstances.283 Nor does either require barristers to contract.284 It should not be assumed that when a solicitor briefs counsel on a client’s behalf, the contract is between solicitor and client; each case instead depends on the contractual relationship established by the facts, and the court will give effect to the contractual intention.285 Consistent with the above, the New South Wales and Victorian Barristers’ Rules state that, subject to specified limitations in relation to ‘barristers’; work’,286 a barrister may accept instructions directly from a lay client,287 as do the Australian Capital Territory Barristers’ Rules.288 That equivalent rules in the Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania prescribe like limitations in relation to ‘barristers’ work’289 indicates that there is scope in these jurisdictions for the relationship between counsel and client to give rise to an enforceable claim for fees. This is clearly so in Tasmania, where a specific rule entitles counsel to sue his or her instructing solicitor and the client for fees.290 4.58 Beyond the foregoing, all jurisdictions except South Australia have enacted legislation to reflect the Model Laws, which in this context uniformly provides that a costs agreement may be made with a client by the barrister retained by the client to provide the services, or by the barrister retained on behalf of the client by another lawyer.291 It also envisages the making of a costs agreement between the lawyer providing the services and another lawyer who retained the former to act on behalf of the client.292 That the legislation states that a costs agreement may be enforced in the same way as any other contract293 appears to put pay to any lingering suggestion that

counsel cannot recover their fees in contract, provided of course a valid costs agreement exists.294 [page 102]

Interest on Lawyer and Client Costs 4.59 The general law recognises no inherent entitlement in a lawyer to interest arising out of the lawyer–client relationship.295 A lawyer may charge interest on costs for services performed for which the client has yet to pay if this is permitted by the express terms of a costs agreement or is allowed by statute. The enforceability of such a term in a costs agreement rests upon the requirements for the enforceability of costs agreements generally.296 The point had been recognised since early times. In 1859 Turner LJ in Lyddon v Moss remarked that the claim for interest:297 … is founded upon, and gives effect to, an agreement by a client, to allow his solicitor interest … upon his bills of costs. Every such agreement is a bargain between the solicitor and the client, and can be supported only under the same circumstances as would support any other bargain between them. It is the bounden duty of a solicitor, before he enters into any such bargain with his client, to inform the client that the law allows of no such charge of interest, and that although he may decline to conduct the client’s business without such an allowance, others, of equal ability, may be found who will conduct it upon the scale of allowances which is sanctioned by the law.

4.60 The legal profession legislation now addresses the issue explicitly and, following the Model Laws, uniformly. While reiterating the general law by entitling a lawyer to charge interest on unpaid legal costs in accordance with a costs agreement,298 it goes further by allowing a law practice to charge interest on unpaid legal costs if the costs are unpaid for 30 days or longer after the day the practice gave a bill for the costs.299 However, it premises the legitimacy of an interest charge on the bill for the costs stating that interest is payable on unpaid costs and the rate of interest,300 and restricts the rate of interest chargeable.301

1.

See 2.2–2.10.

2.

See 4.2–4.11.

3.

See 4.42–4.43.

4.

See 4.44–4.52.

5.

Time begins to run for limitation purposes from the completion of the lawyer’s work, not from when the bill of costs was served or an application for assessment is made: Coburn v College [1897] 1 QB 702; Coshott v Barry [2012] NSWSC 850; BC201206340 at [41]–[43] per McCallum J (as to which see K Hardman, ‘The Clock is Ticking on Recovery of Unpaid Solicitor’s Fees’ (April 2013) 51 LSJ 32).

6.

See 4.53–4.58.

7.

See 4.59–4.60.

8.

ACT s 298(b); NSW s 355(b); NT s 336(b); Qld s 338(b); Tas s 323(b); Vic s 3.4.41(1)(b); WA s 298(b).

9.

See 23.43.

10. See the definition of ‘compensation order’ in the following provisions in the legal profession legislation: ACT s 442; NSW s 571(2); NT s 534(2); Qld s 464; Tas s 491(2); WA s 448(2). See also Vic s 4.3.17(1)(b). 11. Liati v Fitzsimons (1996) 68 FCR 402 at 405; BC9606441 (FC); Re Robb (1996) 134 FLR 294 at 327; BC9602649 (FC(ACT)); Mastercigars Direct Ltd v Withers LLP [2008] 3 All ER 417; [2007] EWHC 2733 (Ch) at [144] per Morgan J. As to the independent review of lawyer–client bills by taxation or assessment see Ch 5. 12. Zizza v Seymour [1976] 2 NSWLR 135 at 139 per Moffitt P (CA). 13. See 4.13–4.19. 14. See 4.20–4.28. 15. See 4.10–4.11. 16. Re Devy (1996) 67 FCR 355 at 357–8; BC9603045 per Hill J; Liati v Fitzsimons (1996) 68 FCR 402 at 405; BC9606441 (FC) (the mere fact that a calculation may be incorrect does not prevent the bill bringing into existence an enforceable debt). 17. [1897] 1 QB 702 at 706. 18. As to the doctrine of entire contract see 4.44–4.52. 19. Re Beckwith (1993) 43 FCR 256 at 266; BC9304916 per Cooper J; FAI Traders Insurance Co Ltd v Ferrara (1996) 41 NSWLR 91 at 97–8; BC9603596 per Handley JA. 20. See the definition of ‘legal costs’ in the following jurisdictions: ACT Dictionary; NSW s 4(1); NT s 4; SA s 5(1); Vic s 1.2.1(1); Tas s 4(1); WA s 3. For the meaning of ‘disbursement’ see 1.8–1.9. 21. Mastercigars Direct Ltd v Withers LLP [2008] 3 All ER 417; [2007] EWHC 2733 (Ch) at [144] per Morgan J. As to solicitors’ liens see Chs 26–27. 22. As to non-professional work see 5.40–5.41. 23. ACT s 289(1); NSW s 331(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 192(1)); NT s 324(1) (cf the former NT 1974 s 119(1), 119(2), 119(4)); Qld s 329(1) (cf the former Qld 1952 s 48J: see Jackson v Creswick Middleton (2000) 21 Qld Lawyer Reps 66 at 68; [2000] QDC 46 per Judge McGill SC); Tas s 313(1) (formerly Tas 1993 s 133); Vic s 3.4.33(1) (cf the former Vic 1996 ss 106(1), 107(1)); WA s 289(1) (cf the former WA 2003 ss 230, 231). 24. For the meaning of ‘lump sum bill’ see 4.13.

25. For the meaning of ‘itemised bill’ see 4.13. As to requests for itemised bills see 4.12. 26. NSW s 332A(4), 332A(5); NT s 327(4), 327(5) (formerly NT 1974 s 119(5)(b)); Qld s 332(4), 332(5); Tas s 316(4), 316(5) (cf the former Tas s 132(1), 132(1A)); Vic s 3.4.36(4) (cf the former Vic 1996 s 108(1)–(3)); WA s 292(4), 292(5). 27. Hardy v Gadens Lawyers (a firm) [2008] VSC 603; BC200811360 at [8] per Byrne J. 28. ACT s 292(6). The entitlement to request an itemised bill only applies where the costs exceed a threshold amount, 29. Being $1,500 (excluding GST and disbursements) or a higher amount prescribed by the regulations. 30. ACT s 292(1)–(3), 292(10) (cf the former ACT 1970 s 179(1), 179(1A)). 31. ACT s 292(7) (cf the former ACT 1970 s 178(1)). 32. As to costs agreements see Ch 3. 33. ACT s 289(4); NSW s 331(4); NT s 324(4); Qld s 329(4); Tas s 313(4); Vic s 3.4.33(4); WA s 289(4). 34. ACT s 289(2) (formerly ACT 1970 s 178(2)); NSW s 331(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 192(2)); NT s 324(2) (formerly NT 1974 s 119(6)); Qld s 329(2); Tas s 313(2); Vic s 3.4.33(2) (formerly Vic 1996 s 106(2)); WA s 289(2). 35. ACT s 289(3); NSW s 331(3); NT s 324(3) (cf the former NT 1974 s 119(5)(c)); Qld s 329(3); Tas s 313(3); Vic s 3.4.33(3) (formerly Vic 1996 s 106(3)); WA s 289(3). 36. Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 2005 (Vic) r 38(2). The foregoing does not apply where the lawyer has a sufficient and satisfactory reason for not complying with that request: r 38(3). 37. Superseded statutory rules in Queensland, which have no current counterpart, made similar (although not identical) provision: Queensland Law Society Rules 1987 (Qld) s 84, as to which see Atlantic 3-Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd v Marler [2004] 1 Qd R 579; [2003] QCA 529; BC200307197 at [2] per Jerrard JA, at [19]–[28] per Jones J. 38. SA s 41(1). 39. SA s 42(5). As to taxation of costs in this context see 5.8. 40. [2004] NSWCA 313; BC200408094 at [11]. Although Beazley JA concurred generally with Hodgson JA’s ruling, her Honour expressed no opinion on this specific point. 41. Koutsourais v Metledge & Associates [2004] NSWCA 313; BC200408094 at [9] (contra at [52] per Bryson JA in dissent, who considered that a new array of obligations, considerations, advantages and burdens came into existence in substitution for the previous claims for costs, which changes were so extensive that the claim did not have the character of proceedings for the recovery of costs). The presence of these two factors led Brereton J on the facts in Amirbeaggi v Business in Focus (Australia) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 421; BC200803506 at [41]–[43] to rule that the proceedings in question were proceedings for the recovery of costs for the purposes of the legislation. 42. [2008] NSWSC 60; BC200800449 at [40] per Nicholas J. 43. (2006) 3 DCLR(NSW) 392; [2006] NSWDC 32; BC200640261. 44. Cameron v Dennis (2006) 3 DCLR(NSW) 392; [2006] NSWDC 32; BC200640261 at [19]–[24]. 45. Dennis v Cameron [2007] NSWCA 228; BC200707568.

ACT s 290(1); NSW s 332(1); NT s 325(1); Qld s 330(1); Tas s 314(1); Vic s 3.4.34(1); WA s 46. 290(2). As to what is meant by an ‘itemised bill’ see 4.13. 47. NT s 327(1); NSW s 332A(1); Qld s 332(1); Tas s 316(1); Vic s 3.4.36(1) (within 30 days); WA s 292(1). 48. NT s 327(2); NSW s 332A(2); Qld s 332(2); Tas s 316(2); Vic s 3.4.36(2); WA s 292(2). 49. ACT s 292(1), 292(2). The threshold amount is $1,500 (excluding disbursements) or a higher amount prescribed by the regulations: ACT s 292(10). 50. ACT s 292(3). 51. ACT s 292(4). 52. SA s 41(2). This does not necessarily require ‘each individual item of work contained in the bill delivered to be costed’: 4WD Systems Pty Ltd v McNamara [2009] SASC 166; BC200905199 at [13] per Judge Lunn. 53. SA s 41(3), 41(4). 54. ACT s 261; NSW s 302(1); NT s 295(1); Qld s 300; Tas s 283; Vic s 3.4.2; WA s 251 (formerly WA 2003 s 231). See also Stevens v Keogh (SC(Vic), McDonald J, 3 December 1996, unreported) BC9606098 at 11 (a lump sum bill ‘must contain sufficient details to inform the client of the work performed, the subject of the bill, sufficient to enable those acting for him to advise him whether a bill drawn in taxable form should be requested’). 55. ACT s 261; NSW s 302(1); NT s 295(1); Qld s 300; Tas s 283; Vic s 3.4.2; WA s 251 (see Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Gandini [2010] WASAT 166 at [58]–[60]). 56. See 4.15. 57. Cf Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice Directions, 2009, 4.7.3 cll 2–7 (uses of schedules in bills of costs): see 18.89. 58. As to which see 18.77–18.89. 59. Malleson, Stewart, Stawell & Nankivell v Williams [1930] VLR 410 at 411 per Mann J. See also Philby v Nazle (1860) 8 CBNS 647 at 653; 141 ER 1320 at 1322 per Williams J; Re Beckwith (1993) 43 FCR 256 at 266; BC9304916 per Cooper J; Bartex Fabrics Pty Ltd v Phillips Fox (1994) 13 ACSR 667 at 678; BC9402622 per Young J (SC(NSW)); Re Morris Fletcher & Cross’ Bills of Costs [1997] 2 Qd R 228 at 234 per Fryberg J. See further Oliver, pp 23–5. 60. Ex parte Farmers’ Fertilizers Corporation Ltd (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 645 at 649 per Cullen CJ (FC); Morgan v Meissner [1975] 1 NSWLR 614 at 616 per Taylor CJ at CL; Florence Investments Pty Ltd v H G Slater & Co [1975] 2 NSWLR 398 at 401 per Bowen CJ in Eq; Jackson v Creswick Middleton (2000) 21 Qld Lawyer Reps 66 at 69; [2000] QDC 46 per Judge McGill SC. See also T Kidney, ‘Itemised Statements’ (March 2000) Ethos 8 at 9 (stating that at the very least the bill should contain: (a) the date of each item claimed by the lawyer; (b) sufficient details of the nature of the work undertaken; (c) a value assigned to each item; (d) if time costing is the basis for the account, the time assigned to each item; (e) where units of time are set out, an indication of the basis of the hourly charge out rate of both lawyers and employees; (f) details of disbursements; and (g) the requisite signature). 61. Re Beckwith (1993) 43 FCR 256 at 266; BC9304916 per Cooper J. 62. Re Pender (1847) 10 Beav 390 at 393; 50 ER 632 at 633 per Lord Langdale MR. Cf Ralph Hume Garry (a firm) v Gwillim [2003] 1 All ER 1038; [2002] EWCA Civ 1500 at [69] per Ward LJ (who opined that an item in a bill of the kind submitted in Re Pender ‘might be allowed today if it

could be satisfactorily explained’). 63. Nokes v Warton (1842) 5 Beav 448 at 459–60; 49 ER 651 at 656 per Lord Langdale MR. 64. Currie v Robinson [1968] QWN 25. See also Malleson, Stewart, Stawell & Nankivell v Williams [1930] VLR 410 at 411 per Mann J; Re Beckwith (1993) 43 FCR 256 at 266; BC9304916 per Cooper J. 65. Moray v Lane (SC(NSW), Allen J, 26 February 1993, unreported) BC9303682 at 4–5; Henchman v Hannes (SC(NSW), Cohen J, 22 October 1993, unreported) BC9302176 at 14–15; McGrath v Roe (SC(NSW), Macready M, 22 March 1996, unreported) BC9601315 at 4–7. 66. Jackson v Creswick Middleton (2000) 21 Qld Lawyer Reps 66 at 70; [2000] QDC 46 per Judge McGill SC. 67. Bartex Fabrics Pty Ltd v Phillips Fox (1994) 13 ACSR 667 at 678; BC9402622 per Young J (SC(NSW)). 68. Re Walsh Halligan Douglas’ Bills of Costs [1990] 1 Qd R 288 at 294 per Dowsett J; Currie v Johnson (SC(NSW), Greenwood M, 3 June 1992, unreported) BC9201839 at 4; Ralph Hume Garry (a firm) v Gwillim [2003] 1 All ER 1038; [2002] EWCA Civ 1500 at [64] per Ward LJ (‘The sufficiency of the narrative and the sufficiency of [the client’s] knowledge will vary from case to case, and the more he knows, the less the bill may need to spell it out for him. The interests of justice require that the balance be struck between protection of the client’s right to seek taxation and of the solicitor’s right to recover not being defeated by opportunistic resort to technicality’). 69. [1990] 1 Qd R 288 at 295. 70. NSW 2005 cl 111B (cf the former NSW 2002 cl 45). 71. ‘Sophisticated client’ is defined in ACT s 261; NSW s 302(1); NT s 295(1); Qld s 300; Tas s 283; Vic s 3.4.2; WA s 251. 72. ACT s 291(1), 291(2); NSW s 333(1) (but see the exceptions noted in s 333(2)); NT s 326(1); Qld s 331(1); Tas s 315(1); Vic s 3.4.35(1); WA s 291(1). 73. See 2.21–2.23. 74. Re Morris Fletcher & Cross’ Bills of Costs [1997] 2 Qd R 228 at 237 per Fryberg J; Eversheds v Osman (2000) 1 Cost LR 54. 75. Cobbett v Wood [1908] 2 KB 420 at 428 per Fletcher Moulton LJ. See, for example, Oliveri v P M Sulcs & Associates Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1198; BC201210316 (in the context of the (repealed) Legal Profession Regulation 2002 (NSW) cl 45(3) (repealed), which stated that a bill of costs may comprise more than one document, Gzell J remarked (at [25]) that ‘what is implied is that the documents in combination constitute a bill of costs’, which in turn ‘suggests that additional documents must complement a primary document that has the function of conveying the amount of costs billed and which contains the required statement’ so that ‘[c]ollectively the documents must contain all the elements of a bill of costs’; on the facts, four disparate documents were served, of which only one answered the description of a bill of costs; taken collectively, therefore, they ‘each retained their individual identities’ and so ‘did not form a combined identity and they did not complement the bill of costs or constitute it’: at [26]) (affd Oliveri v P M Sulcs & Associates Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] NSWCA 84; BC201301951). 76. Florence Investments Pty Ltd v H G Slater & Co [1975] 2 NSWLR 398 at 402 per Bowen CJ in Eq; Re Morris Fletcher & Cross’ Bills of Costs [1997] 2 Qd R 228 at 237 per Fryberg J; Ralph Hume Garry (a firm) v Gwillim [2003] 1 All ER 1038; [2002] EWCA Civ 1500 at [64] per Ward LJ (‘there must be something in the written bill to indicate the ambit of the work but …

inadequacies of description of the work done may be redressed by accompanying documents … or by other information already in the possession of the client’), at [79] per Mance LJ (‘any solicitor’s bill is to be read in the light of all the information that the client may himself have’); Tabtill No 2 Pty Ltd v DLA Phillips Fox (a firm) [2012] QSC 115; BC201202498 at [92]–[96] per Applegarth J. 77. ACT s 293(1); NT s 328(1); NSW s 334(1); Qld s 333(1); Tas s 317(1); Vic s 3.4.37(1); WA s 293(1). 78. Turner v Mitchells Solicitors and Business Advisers Qld (2013) 33 Qld Lawyer Reps 96; [2011] QDC 61; BC201140054 at [14] per McGill DCJ (‘an interim bill is one that could not be given at common law unless there was an express provision to that effect in the contract of retainer. It follows that it was not necessary for there to be legislation to permit a lawyer to charge an interim bill, that is to say a bill for part only of the legal services the lawyer was retained to provide; that could be achieved by an express agreement to that effect’). 79. See 4.44–4.45. 80. ACT s 290(2); NSW s 332(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 194(1)); NT s 325(2); Qld s 330(2); Tas s 314(2); Vic s 3.4.34(2) (formerly Vic 1996 s 107(2): see Chakera v Kuzamanovic [2003] VSC 92; BC200301504 at [26] per Nettle J); WA s 290(3). 81. ACT s 290(3); NSW s 332(3) (formerly NSW 1987 s 194(1)); Qld s 330(3); NT s 325(3); Tas s 314(3); Vic s 3.4.34(2A); WA s 290(4). This arguably reflects the existing general law position: Re Bush (1844) 8 Beav 66; 50 ER 26; Pinna v Kuek [1999] VSC 204; BC9903251 at [22]–[25] per O’Bryan J; cf Re R G Kilner & Black’s Bills of Costs [1997] 1 Qd R 188 at 198; BC9502205 per White J. See, for example, Cameron v Dennis (2006) 3 DCLR(NSW) 392; [2006] NSWDC 32; BC200640261 at [33] per Johnstone DCJ (who held that unsigned amended replacement invoices for a barrister’s fees sent to the instructing solicitor sufficiently complied with the statutory requirement where they are accompanied by signed letters from the barrister to the solicitor) (affd Dennis v Cameron [2007] NSWCA 228; BC200707568 at [34], [35] per Hoeben J). 82. Dennis v Cameron [2007] NSWCA 228; BC200707568 at [42] per Hoeben J. 83. ACT 290(4); NSW s 332(4) (formerly NSW 1987 s 194(2)); NT s 325(4); Qld s 330(4); Tas s 314(4); Vic s 3.4.34(3); WA s 290(5). 84. Dennis v Cameron [2007] NSWCA 228; BC200707568 at [35] per Hoeben J. 85. Dennis v Cameron [2007] NSWCA 228; BC200707568 at [40] per Hoeben J. 86. (1851) 14 Beav 56 at 60; 51 ER 208 at 209–10. See also Re Pender (1846) 8 Beav 299; 41 ER 868; Re Pender (1847) 10 Beav 390 at 392; 50 ER 632 at 633 per Lord Langdale MR (‘a solicitor cannot deliver an unsigned bill for payment, without subjecting it to taxation’). 87. [1954] 1 QB 550. 88. Goodman v J Eban Ld [1954] 1 QB 550 at 554–5, 559 per Evershed MR, at 564–5 per Romer LJ. 89. Goodman v J Eban Ld [1954] 1 QB 550 at 559 per Evershed MR, at 564 per Romer LJ. 90. Goodman v J Eban Ld [1954] 1 QB 550 at 564. 91. Goodman v J Eban Ld [1954] 1 QB 550 at 562. 92. Goodman v J Eban Ld [1954] 1 QB 550 at 561. 93. See Electronic Transactions Act 2001 (ACT) s 9; Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (NSW) s 9; Electronic Transactions (Northern Territory) Act 2000 (NT) s 9; Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001 (Qld) ss 14, 15; Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (SA) s 9; Electronic

Transactions Act 2000 (Tas) s 7; Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000 (Vic) s 9; Electronic Transactions Act 2003 (WA) s 9. 94. SA s 41(1). 95. ACT s 290(5); NSW s 332(5) (formerly NSW 1987 s 195); NT s 325(5) (cf the former NT 1974 s 140); Qld s 330(5) (cf the former Qld 1952 s 48J(1), read in tandem with the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) ss 39(1), 39(2)); Tas s 314(5) (cf the former Tas 1993 s 130(2); see also Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas) s 29AB(1)); Vic s 3.4.34(4) (formerly Vic 1996 s 107(3)); WA s 290(6) (cf the former WA 1893 s 68A(c)). 96. Delivery of a properly addressed and posted letter containing the bill is deemed to be effected — that is, the client is deemed to have received the bill — at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of the post. This stems from both the acts interpretation legislation in each jurisdiction (Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 29; Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) s 250(1); Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 76; Interpretation Act 1978 (NT) s 25; Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 39A; Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 33; Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas) s 30; Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) s 49; Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) s 75(1)) and the general law (see, for example, Browne v Black [1912] 1 KB 316 at 320–1 per Vaughan Williams LJ). 97. ACT s 290(7) (‘a bill may be given to a client electronically if the client asks for the bill to be given electronically’); NSW s 332(6A) (a bill may be given to a sophisticated client electronically if the client has requested the bill to be given electronically; see also Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW) cl 111 (by email)); NT s 325(7) (same as ACT); Qld s 330(7) (‘a bill may be given to a client electronically: (a) if the client is a sophisticated client and requested the bill to be given electronically; or (b) in other circumstances prescribed under a regulation’); Tas s 314(5)(f) (upon client request); Vic s 3.4.34(5A) (like NSW); WA s 290(6)(d). 98. ACT s 290(8); NSW s 332(7); NT s 325(8); Qld s 330(8); Tas s 314(7); Vic s 3.4.34(6); WA s 290(1), 290(6). 99. See G E Dal Pont, Law of Agency, 2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2008, p 77. 100. Tasmania v Bennett [2004] TASSC 15; BC200401036 at [16] per Slicer J. 101. Crowder v Shee (1808) 1 Camp 437; 170 ER 1013; Eggington v Cumberledge (1847) 1 Ex 271 at 272; 154 ER 114 at 115 per Pollock CB (‘Here the bill came into the possession of parties who might have been sued jointly with the defendant. It was, therefore, a sufficient delivery to the defendant’); Daubney v Phipps (1849) 16 QB 504; 117 ER 972; Mant v Smith (1859) 4 H & N 324 at 326; 157 ER 864 at 865 per Watson B. Cf Edwards v Lawless (1848) 6 CB 329; 136 ER 1278 (delivery of a signed bill to a former member of a company board for work done at the request of a present member of that board held not to be a sufficient delivery). 102. ACT s 289(1); NSW s 331(1); NT s 324(1); Qld s 329(1); Tas s 313(1); Vic s 3.4.33(1); WA s 289(1). 103. Re McMurdo [1897] 1 Ch 119. 104. Reynolds v Caswell (1811) 4 Taunt 193; 128 ER 303. 105. (1862) 11 CBNS 855 at 865; 142 ER 1031 at 1035. 106. Brown v Tibbits (1862) 11 CBNS 855 at 866; 142 ER 1031 at 1036. 107. [1980] WAR 11 at 19–20 (citing Harrison v Turner (1847) 10 QB 482; 116 ER 184). 108. As to what constitutes a bill in taxable or assessable form see 4.13–4.19.

109. Clarkson v Parker (1838) 4 M & W 532; 150 ER 1540; Re Foljambe (1846) 9 Beav 402; 50 ER 398; Re West, King & Adams [1892] 2 QB 102 at 108 per Cave J; Ex parte Campbell (1969) 91 WN (NSW) 691 at 697–9 per O’Brien J; James v Bradley [1980] WAR 11 at 19 per Brinsden J; Algama v Wainwright Ryan [1993] ANZ Conv R 79 at 81; BC9200803 per Gobbo J (SC(Vic)); Stefanou v Fairfield Chase Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 605; BC9305153 at [16] per Einfeld J; Touzell v Cawthorn (1995) 18 ACSR 328; BC9505517 at 331 per Young J (SC(NSW)); Re Morris Fletcher & Cross’ Bills of Costs [1997] 2 Qd R 228 at 233 per Fryberg J; Gilbert v Kozicki [2007] QSC 268; BC200708144 at [52] per Lyons J; Estate of Allwood v Benjafield [2009] NSWSC 1383; BC200911170 at [29]–[38] per Mathews AJ. 110. As to which see 5.51–5.53. 111. See, for example, Ex parte Jarman (1877) 4 Ch D 835. 112. NSW s 728(1)(a) (formerly NSW 1987 s 209C(1)(a)) (see Estate of Allwood v Benjafield [2009] NSWSC 1383; BC200911170 at [61] per Mathews AJ, who noted that although the terms of NSW s 728(1)(a) are discretionary, and provide no guidance as to what factors may influence the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction in this context, the jurisdiction must be seen against the backdrop of any statutory time frame applicable to applications for assessment: see 5.10–5.12). 113. Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 76. 114. [1997] 2 Qd R 228. 115. Re Morris Fletcher & Cross’ Bills of Costs [1997] 2 Qd R 228 at 238–43. 116. Re Morris Fletcher & Cross’ Bills of Costs [1997] 2 Qd R 228 at 251. 117. [2000] QSC 209; BC200004632. 118. As occurred in Samaha v El-Hawache [2005] NSWSC 967; BC200507266 (where Palmer J remarked as to the former lawyer’s ‘unprofessional dilatoriness and recalcitrance in dealing with this matter’: at [10]). 119. Cf Amirbeaggi v Business in Focus (Australia) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 421; BC200803506 at [32] per Brereton J (in the related context of waiving the right to assessment of the bill, which is addressed by specific provision: see 5.7). 120. Sharp v Dane [1903] ALR 155 at 156 per Holroyd J (SC(Vic)); Kamay v Miss X (1986) FLC ¶91754 at 75,502 per Treyvaud J; Dodd v Gillis (1989) 16 NSWLR 623 at 626–7 per Yeldham J; Conder v Silkbard Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 459; BC9908057 at [44] per Fitzgerald JA (remarking that the court retains a discretion to order the lawyer to furnish a bill even if the client has waived its entitlement to a bill, or is otherwise estopped from insisting on a bill, but that it would be an exceptional case that the court would exercise its discretion to do so). Cf Parramatta River Lodge Pty Ltd v Sunman (1991) 5 BPR 12,038 at 12,042–4; BC9101975 per Young J. See ‘Can a Client Waive Rights to a Detailed Bill?’ (September 1990) 28 LSJ 18. 121. [1993] FCA 605; BC9305153. 122. [1993] FCA 605; BC9305153 at [63]. 123. [1993] FCA 605; BC9305153 at [71]. 124. (SC(NSW), Dunford J, 2 March 1995, unreported) BC9504273 at 10. 125. (1986) FLC ¶91-754. 126. Kamay v Miss X (1986) FLC ¶91-754 at 75,502. 127. See, for example, Swane v Marsh [1979] ANZ Conv R 132 (CA(NSW)).

128.

Re McCook (1887) 3 WN (NSW) 86; Parramatta River Lodge Pty Ltd v Sunman (1991) 5 BPR 12,038 at 12,046–8; BC9101975 per Young J; Re National Safety Council of Australia Victorian Division (in liq) (1991) 9 ACLC 675 at 677 per Vincent J (SC(Vic)); Re Carter Newell’s Bill of Costs [1996] 2 Qd R 13 at 19; BC9404358 per Dowsett J. It follows that any purported charge for preparing a bill is not allowable on assessment or taxation: Re National Bank of Wales [1902] 2 Ch 412 at 414 per Buckley J; Re J F Fitzgerald & Seymour’s Bill of Costs [1960] Qd R 430 at 432 per Wanstall J; Re Moore (SC(Qld), Thomas J, 1 November 1996, unreported) BC9605364 at 7–8.

129. NSW s 319(2)(a). 130. See, for example, Legal Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) Determination 2012 (WA) Sch, Table B, item 30 (which vests a discretion in the taxing officer to allow a lawyer to charge for the preparation of a bill of costs) (see Challen v Paul O’Halloran & Associates [2008] WASC 169; BC200807280 at [29]–[35] per Templeman J, upholding the taxing officer’s refusal to allow the solicitor a fee for preparing a bill of costs). 131. ACT s 292(8); NT s 327(6); NSW s 332A(6); Qld s 332(6); Vic s 3.4.36(5) (which, however, allows a law practice to charge a non-associated third party payer); WA s 292(6). As to requests for itemised bills see 4.12. 132. Chant v Brown (1852) 9 Hare 790; 68 ER 735; Ainsworth v Wilding [1900] Ch 322; ‘Daily Express’ (1908) Ltd v Mountain (1916) 32 TLR 592 at 593 per Swinfen-Eady LJ. 133. Municipal Insurance Associations of British Columbia v British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1996) 143 DLR (4th) 134 at 143 per Holmes J (SC(BC)); Legal Services Society v British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1997) 140 DLR (4th) 372 at 378 per Lowry J (SC(BC)); Stevens v Canada (Privy Council) (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 85 at 100 per Linden JA (CA(Fed)). 134. Aveling v UBS Capital Markets Australia Holdings Ltd (No 3) [2005] FCA 1320; BC200507323 at [14] per Lindgren J. 135. Carey v Korda [2012] WASCA 228; BC201208726 at [68] per Murphy JA, with whom Martin CJ and Newnes JA concurred. 136. Geraghty v Woodforth and Stewart (No 2) [1957] QWN 42; Packer v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) [1985] 1 Qd R 275 at 282 per Andrews SPJ; Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (t/as Uncle Ben’s of Australia) (1994) 126 ALR 58 at 67–8; BC9400006 per Tamberlin J (who held that the disclosure of memoranda of fees, backsheets to counsel and counsel’s fee slips did not amount to an implied waiver of privilege in the underlying documents because they did not disclose the nature and content of privileged material); Bennett v Chief Executive Officer, Customs (2003) 77 ALD 375; [2003] FCA 53; BC200301497 at [44]–[46] per Madgwick J; Aveling v UBS Capital Markets Australia Holdings Ltd (No 3) [2005] FCA 1320; BC200507323 at [12] per Lindgren J; Lashansky v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2005] WASCA 217; BC200509734 at [240] per the court; Actew Corporation Ltd v Mihaljevic [2007] ACTSC 39; BC200704765 at [42] per Harper M (memorandum of fees held not to be privileged). Cf Kupe Group Ltd v Seamar Holdings Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 209 at 212–13 per Kennedy-Grant M. 137. Maranda v Richer [2003] 3 SCR 193; [2003] SCC 67 (see at [32]–[33] per LeBel J, with whom McLachlin CJC, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie and Arbour JJ concurred; but cf the dissent of Deschamps J). 138. ACT Dictionary; NSW s 243(1); NT s 235(1); Qld s 237(1); Tas s 231(1); Vic s 3.3.2(1); WA s 205(1) (emphasis supplied). Cf SA s 5(1) (‘money received by a legal practitioner to which the practitioner is not wholly entitled both at law and in equity’).

139. Kirk v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1988) 19 FCR 530 at 554 per Davies J. 140. ACT s 229(1)(b); NSW s 261(1)(b); NT s 254(1)(b); Qld s 258(1)(b); Tas s 252(1)(b); Vic s 3.3.20(1)(b); WA s 225(1)(b) (which does not apply in relation to trust money that is held by the person under another trust when it is paid into the trust account: s 225(3)). 141. ACT s 229(2); NSW s 261(2); NT s 254(2); Qld s 258(2); Tas s 252(2); Vic s 3.3.20(3); WA s 225(2). 142. ACT 2007 reg 62; NSW 2005 cl 88; NT 2007 s 68; Qld 2007 s 58; Tas 2008 reg 53; Vic 2005 s 3.3.34; WA 2009 reg 65. 143. Even without an express prescription for written authority, there were various judicial statements emphasising the importance of securing written authority in this context: Re a Barrister and Solicitor (1979) 40 FLR 26 at 40 (FC(FCA)); Re Nelson (1991) 106 ACTR 1 at 4 per Miles CJ, at 10–11 per Higgins and Foster JJ. 144. SA s 31(3)(b). 145. SA 2009 reg 17(1). 146. ACT s 280; NSW s 320 (formerly NSW 1987 s 191); NT s 315; Qld s 320; Tas s 304 (formerly Tas 1993 s 138); Vic s 3.4.20 (formerly Vic 1996 s 94); WA s 272 (formerly WA 1893 s 62; WA 2003 s 225). 147. See Chs 28–29. 148. See 4.31–4.32. 149. Re Nelson (1991) 106 ACTR 1 at 17 per Higgins and Foster JJ (FC). 150. Prees v Coke (1871) 6 Ch App 645; Eyre v Hughes (1876) 2 Ch D 148; Cockburn v Edwards (1881) 18 Ch D 449; Jones v Linton (1881) 44 LT 601; Biggs v Hoddinott [1898] 2 Ch 307. 151. See, for example, Watson v Rodwell (1879) 11 Ch D 150. 152. See 3.13–3.22. 153. See Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2, Pt 2-3 (which contains provisions directed to unfair contract terms). In New South Wales, moreover, there is case authority that a court may, under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW), set aside a security that is ‘unjust’ under that Act: see, for example, Liu v Adamson (2003) 12 BPR 22,205; [2003] NSWSC 74; BC200300579 (where a costs agreement under which the husband and de facto wife directors of a corporate client guaranteed the client’s costs liability to the solicitor by granting security over their home, was set aside under the Contracts Review Act 1980 on the ground that the agreement had not been explained to the wife, and that she lacked independent advice). 154. Weston v Connor (CA(Vic), 9 February 1998, unreported) BC9800118 at 15–17 per Batt JA; Jones v Baker (2002) 10 BPR 19,115 at 19,123–4; [2002] NSWSC 89; BC200200482 per Young CJ in Eq. 155. Aaronisle Pty Ltd v Thorpe [2005] WASC 87; BC200503454 at [49] per Commissioner McKerracher QC. 156. (1991) 106 ACTR 1 (FC). 157. Re Nelson (1991) 106 ACTR 1 at 18 (FC). 158. Rose v Nikolaidis [2004] NSWSC 1011; BC200408257 at [2], [3] per Hamilton J; Legal Services Commissioner v Mercader [2011] VCAT 2062. See also V Shirvington, ‘Think Before you Lodge a Caveat for Debt Collection’ (August 2001) 39 LSJ 36. Compare Thorpe v Sizer Developments

Pty Ltd [2006] WASC 151; BC200605836 (where Jenkins J found a serious issue to be tried between the parties as to whether a deed of charge created an equitable interest in the caveated land in favour of the plaintiff solicitor to secure payment to him of moneys for legal work done by him for the client, as well as a serious issue to be tried between the parties as to whether that interest exists even though the plaintiff is presently suspended from practice: at [73]). 159. [2000] NSWSC 1252; BC200008452. 160. La Fontaine v Manley [2000] NSWSC 1252; BC200008452 at [10]. 161. La Fontaine v Manley [2000] NSWSC 1252; BC200008452 at [6]. 162. See, for example, Moloney v Coppola [2012] NSWSC 728; BC201205111 (equitable charge over client property sufficient to lodge a caveat). 163. See Dal Pont, p 218. 164. See, for example, Country Law Services Pty Ltd v Duff (2007) 13 BPR 24,953; [2007] NSWSC 1509; BC200711718. 165. As to this form of lien see Ch 27. 166. See Dal Pont, Equity and Trusts, pp 55–7. 167. There remains some uncertainty regarding the time at which the solicitor’s equitable interest arises under a particular lien: see 27.20–27.25. 168. See J J Doyle and P A J Herriman, ‘Irrevocable Authorities and Undertakings’ (September 1991) 13 LSB 13 at 14–15 (comments of Mr Herriman). 169. See A Harland, ‘Is There Such a Thing as an Irrevocable Authority for Securing Costs?’ (May 2002) 40 LSJ 48 at 50. 170. [2001] NSWCA 114; BC200104437. 171. Orr v Grogan (2000) NSW Conv R ¶55-931 at 57,388; [1999] NSWSC 665; BC9903744 per Sperling J. 172. Grogan v Orr [2001] NSWCA 114; BC200104437 at [51] per Sheller JA, with whom Meagher JA concurred. 173. Grogan v Orr [2001] NSWCA 114; BC200104437 at [55] per Sheller JA, Meagher JA concurring. 174. Grogan v Orr [2001] NSWCA 114; BC200104437 at [69], [70] per Sheller JA, Meagher JA concurring. Cf at [79] per Powell JA (who rejected the respondent’s claim to a lien, reasoning that the property in question was not, in his Honour’s opinion, recovered or preserved by the exertions of the respondent, since N’s wife had never attempted to claim the property in question); Firth v Centrelink (2002) 55 NSWLR 451; [2002] NSWSC 564; BC200203753 at [105]–[111] per Campbell J (no detrimental reliance or alteration of position sufficient to justify defence of laches). 175. Firth v Centrelink (2002) 55 NSWLR 451; [2002] NSWSC 564; BC200203753 at [54] per Campbell J (‘If the debtor, having received notice of the solicitor’s security, chooses to pay the debt, equity will regard the debtor as having the same obligation to the solicitor as he would have had if payment had not been made’), [69]. 176. (2002) 55 NSWLR 485; [2002] NSWCA 220; BC200203801. 177. Twigg v Kung (2002) 55 NSWLR 485; [2002] NSWCA 220; BC200203801 at [32]–[33], [35] (paragraph breaks omitted). 178. Twigg v Kung (2002) 55 NSWLR 485; [2002] NSWCA 220; BC20020380 at [36] (noting that this delay could well have amounted to laches, and even though that defence was not raised, it was

also a circumstance very relevant to the question whether notice of the irrevocable authority was sufficient to fix the current solicitors with notice of a lien some three and a half years later: at [38]). 179. (2002) 55 NSWLR 451; [2002] NSWSC 564; BC200203753. 180. Firth v Centrelink (2002) 55 NSWLR 451; [2002] NSWSC 564; BC200203753 at [54]. 181. Firth v Centrelink (2002) 55 NSWLR 451; [2002] NSWSC 564; BC200203753 at [64]. 182. Firth v Centrelink (2002) 55 NSWLR 451; [2002] NSWSC 564; BC200203753 at [70]. 183. [1894] 2 QB 180. 184. Firth v Centrelink (2002) 55 NSWLR 451; [2002] NSWSC 564; BC200203753 at [94]. 185. Firth v Centrelink (No 2) (2002) 55 NSWLR 494; [2002] NSWSC 850; BC200205434. 186. Firth v Centrelink (No 2) (2002) 55 NSWLR 494; [2002] NSWSC 850; BC200205434 at [9] (emphasis supplied). 187. Firth v Centrelink (No 2) (2002) 55 NSWLR 494; [2002] NSWSC 850; BC200205434 at [10]– [11]. 188. Rules of Practice 1994 (Tas) r 3. 189. Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 1995 (NSW) r 7; Rules of Practice 1994 (Tas) r 81. 190. Re Legal Practitioners Act 1970 (1991) 103 ACTR 1 at 7–8 per Miles CJ. 191. See S Westgarth, ‘Put Clients’ Interests First in Litigation Funding’ (July 2008) 46 LSJ 38 (notes of the Law Society’s Ethics Committee) (noting that a conflict of interest could arise where the lawyer is a member of the board of the litigation lending company). 192. See ‘Guidelines for Litigation Loans’ (February 2011) 31 Proctor 13. 193. See 3.48–3.49, 3.51. 194. NSW s 316(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 196); NT s 314. 195. NSW s 302(1); NT s 295(1). 196. NSW 2005 cll 112–115. No equivalent provision is made to date in the Northern Territory. 197. Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1943 (WA) s 27A. 198. See 7.51–7.54. 199. Qld 1952 Pt 4B Div 2A (ss 48IA–48IC). This followed a like attempt by the Queensland Law Society by way of a ruling (see the now superseded Qld: Solicitors Handbook, para 8.06 (with intended effect from 22 August 2002)), which the Supreme Court ruled unenforceable as a coercive ‘ruling’ lacking the character of a rule or by-law made pursuant to the processes set out in statute: Holland v Queensland Law Society Inc [2003] QSC 327; BC200305631. 200. Qld Pt 3.4 Div 8 (ss 345–347). 201. The formula is prescribed by Qld s 347(1) (formerly Qld 1952 s 48IC(1)), and essentially dictates that a lawyer acting for a client in a speculative personal injury claim cannot charge in legal fees more than half of the client’s damages once statutory refunds and disbursements were deducted. As to the meaning of ‘disbursement’ in this context see 1.8 (and the discussion in Legal Services Commissioner v Dempsey [2007] QSC 270; BC200708140 (affd Legal Services Commissioner v Dempsey [2008] QCA 122; BC200803896), emphasising the ordinary meaning of the term is intended).

202. ‘Speculative personal injury claim’ means a claim for, or substantially for, damages for personal injury if the right of the lawyer to charge and recover from a client for work done is made dependent on the client’s success in pursuing the claim: Qld s 346 (formerly Qld 1952 s 48IA). 203. Qld ss 347(2)–347(4) (formerly Qld 1952 ss 48IC(2)–48IC(4)). 204. Legal Services Commissioner v Dempsey [2009] LPT 20 at [86] per Atkinson J. 205. Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344 at 350; BC9303547 per Mason CJ. 206. Re Romer & Haslam [1893] 2 QB 286 at 298 per Bowen LJ; Rakusen v Ellis, Munday and Clarke [1912] 1 Ch 831 at 837 per Cozens-Hardy MR; Caldwell v Treloar (1982) 30 SASR 202 at 208– 10 per Walters J; Chisholm v State Transport Authority (1986) 41 SASR 317 at 318–19 per Legoe J; O’Halloran v Stephen (1991) 7 WAR 477 at 483–4 per Pidgeon J (FC); McGowan v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [2002] 2 Qd R 499; [2001] QCA 236; BC200103217 at [9], [10] per McPherson JA; Trustees of the Legal Contribution Trust v Bailey [2004] WASC 175; BC200405105 at [60] per Le Miere J; Baker v Legal Services Commissioner [2006] 2 Qd R 249; [2006] QCA 145; BC200602974 at [3] per McPherson JA. 207. Wild v Simpson [1919] 2 KB 544 at 565–6 per Atkin LJ; Trustees of the Legal Contribution Trust v Bailey [2004] WASC 175; BC200405105 at [64] per Le Miere J; Smits v Roach (2004) 60 NSWLR 711; [2004] NSWCA 233; BC200404415 at [78]–[85] per Sheller JA (affd on a different ground: Smits v Roach (2006) 227 CLR 423; [2006] HCA 36; BC200605512); Baker v Legal Services Commissioner [2006] 2 Qd R 249; [2006] QCA 145; BC200602974 at [3] per McPherson JA. 208. See, for example, Spence v Gerard Malouf & Partners Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 764; BC201004939 (discussed at 26.24); Ireland v Trilby Misso Lawyers [2011] 2 Qd R 320; [2011] QSC 127; BC201103706. As to the retaining lien see Ch 26. 209. Underwood, Son & Piper v Lewis [1894] 2 QB 306 at 309–10 per Lord Esher MR. The background to the rule appears through the following line of authority: Cresswell v Byron (1807) 14 Ves 271 at 273; 33 ER 525 at 526 per Lord Eldon LC; Harris v Osbourn (1834) 2 Cr & M 629 at 632; 149 ER 912 at 913 per Lord Lyndhurst CB; Whitehead v Lord (1852) 7 Ex 691 at 694; 155 ER 1126 at 1127–8 per Parke B. 210. Re Hall & Barker (1879) 9 Ch D 538 at 542 per Jessel MR; Re Romer & Haslam [1893] 2 QB 286 at 298 per Bowen LJ. 211. Warmingtons v McMurray (1936) 52 TLR 381 at 383 per Goddard J (affd Warmingtons v McMurray (1937) 52 TLR 395). See also Re Romer & Haslam [1893] 2 QB 286 at 293 per Lord Esher MR; Davidsons v Jones-Fenleigh [1980] Costs LR (Core Vol) 70 at 73–4 per Roskill LJ. 212. Trustees of the Legal Contribution Trust v Bailey [2004] WASC 175; BC200405105 at [60] per Le Miere J. 213. Del Borrello v Friedman and Lurie (a firm) [2001] WASCA 348; BC200106989 at [68] per Kennedy J. 214. Clairs Keeley (a firm) v Treacy [2005] WASCA 86; BC200502959 at [41] per the court; Lewis Blyth and Hooper v Dennis [2007] WASC 177; BC200706266 at [52], [53] per Newnes J. 215. (1985) 3 NSWLR 366 at 377–8, with whom Kirby P agreed. 216. See 4.46–4.52. 217. For a client to be regarded as having terminated the retainer, a clear indication of the client’s intention in that regard is required: Re Wingfield & Blew (Solicitors) [1904] 2 Ch 665 at 684 per Cozens-Hardy LJ. In the event of doubt, a prudent lawyer should take steps to clarify the client’s

intention: see, for example, Stark v Dennett [2008] 2 Qd R 72; [2008] QCA 050; BC200801302 at [45]–[48] per Keane JA (where the client gave conflicting indications of his intention, and the solicitor failed to clarify the client’s intention but instead withdrew from the representation, the court held that the solicitor’s retaining lien could not be maintained). 218. Adamson v Williams [2001] QCA 38; BC200100324 at [10] per the court (remarking that, in such a case, the lawyer is entitled remuneration on the basis of a quantum meruit in respect of the services rendered up to the moment when the client terminated the retainer). 219. See, for example, the retainer agreement in Ireland v Trilby Misso Lawyers [2011] 2 Qd R 320; [2011] QSC 127; BC201103706. 220. ASCR r 13.1 (applies in Qld and SA); ACT r 5.1; NSW r 5.1; NT r 5.1; Vic r 6.1; WA 2010 r 27(1). See also Cachia v Isaacs (1985) 3 NSWLR 366 at 377 per Hope JA. 221. As to conditional costs agreements see 3.51–3.56. 222. Adamson v Williams [2001] QCA 38; BC200100324 at [10]. 223. Adamson v Williams [2001] QCA 38; BC200100324 at [21]. 224. Adamson v Williams [2001] QCA 38; BC200100324 at [9]. 225. See S Del Popolo, ‘“No Win, No Fee” Arrangements — When are Fees Payable?’ (April 2001) 21 Proctor 25. 226. Ex parte Maxwell (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 333 at 337 per Herron J; Caldwell v Treloar (1982) 30 SASR 202 at 209 per Walters J (FC); Cachia v Isaacs (1985) 3 NSWLR 366 at 377 per Hope JA. 227. Underwood, Son and Piper v Lewis [1894] 2 QB 306 at 311 per Lord Esher MR (since a solicitor cannot reasonably be asked to pay disbursements out of his or her own pocket, the contract implied a provision that he or she may withdraw if the client refuses to supply him or her with moneys for disbursements ‘because every person of sense would come to the conclusion that the parties had contracted with the knowledge of such an implication’); Warmingtons v McMurray (1936) 52 TLR 381 at 382 per Goddard J (affd Warmingtons v McMurray (1937) 52 TLR 395) (‘the solicitor … does not undertake to finance his client’); Caldwell v Treloar (1982) 30 SASR 202 at 209 per Walters J (FC). However, a lawyer cannot refuse to proceed on the ground of nonpayment of disbursements if he or she has undertaken the action on the understanding that the client has no money to pay costs: Harrington v Binns (1863) 3 F & F 942; 176 ER 429. 228. WA 2010 r 27(1)(a). 229. See, for example, Super 1000 Pty Ltd v Pacific General Securities Ltd [2007] NSWSC 171; BC200701277 at [14]–[15] per Gzell J (involving an application for leave to withdraw arising out of client’s inability or unwillingness to pay the lawyer’s costs); Heslop v Cousins [2007] 3 NZLR 679 at [146] per Chisholm J (but in this case his Honour held that the solicitor, by writing to the clients that ‘[t]he only impediments to settlement are rates and costs’, had not given the clients ‘reasonable notice’ that he would terminate the retainer unless outstanding fees were paid: at [161]–[163]). 230. See, for example, Rigoli Lawyers v Arman (2009) 40 Fam LR 676; [2009] FamCA 42; BC200950095 at [39], [40] per Cronin J. 231. See, for example, French v Carter Lemon LLP [2011] EWHC 3252 (QB) (involving what the judge, John Bowers QC, described as ‘a wholesale breakdown in confidence’ between lawyer and client as a result of complaints made by the client against the lawyers: at [19]); WA 2010 r 27(1) (f) (‘the mutual trust and confidence between the practitioner and the client has irretrievably broken down’).

232. WA 2010 r 27(1)(d). 233. WA 2010 r 27(1)(c). 234. See, for example, Richard Buxton (a firm) v Mills-Owen [2010] 1 WLR 1997; [2010] EWCA Civ 122. 235. ASCR r 13.3 (applies in Qld and SA); ACT r 5.3; NSW r 5.3; NT r 5.3; Vic r 6.3; WA 2010 r 27(4). Although there is authority to the effect that the bankruptcy of a client automatically serves to terminate the retainer (Re Moss (1866) LR 2 Eq 345 at 348 per Lord Romilly MR), this may not always be so: see Nelson v Nelson [1997] 1 All ER 970 at 974–5 per Peter Gibson LJ. 236. Such as where it places the lawyer in a position of conflict between his or her own interests and those of the client, or between his or her duties to other (current or former) clients. On conflicts of this nature generally see Dal Pont, Chs 6–8. 237. As to the rules surrounding lawyer–witnesses see Dal Pont, pp 542–5. 238. Forney v Bushe (1954) 104 LJ 604; WA 2010 r 27(1)(e). 239. See, for example, Whitehead v Lord (1852) 7 Ex 691; 155 ER 1126 (death of the client enabled the solicitor to recover his costs before the action was terminated). 240. ASCR r 13.2 (applies in Qld and SA); ACT r 5.2; NSW r 5.2; NT r 5.2; Vic r 6.2; WA 2010 r 27(3) (which is more detailed than its counterparts, and operates against the backdrop of r 27(2), pursuant to which ‘[a] practitioner who is engaged to represent a client charged with a serious offence must not terminate the engagement or otherwise cease to act for the client unless: (a) there are exceptional circumstances for termination of the engagement or ceasing to act; and (b) there is sufficient time for another practitioner to be engaged by the client and for that practitioner to master the case’). 241. Specifically, in relation to: (a) any transaction in respect of land; (b) business connected with a sale, purchase, lease, mortgage, settlement or other conveyancing matter; and (c) any other business which is not an action, transacted in a court or in the chambers of a judge, or other contentious business: Rules of Practice 1994 (Tas) r 83. 242. Rules of Practice 1994 (Tas) r 85(1) (emphasis supplied). 243. (1991) 7 WAR 477 at 484 (FC). 244. O’Halloran v Stephen (1991) 7 WAR 477 at 491 (FC). 245. Re Ladner Downs and Crowley (1987) 41 DLR (4th) 403 at 421 per Southin J (SC(BC)); Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co v Shapiro, Cohen, Andrews, Finlayson (1998) 157 DLR (4th) 322 at 328 per Labrosse JA (CA(Ont)). The legal profession legislation generally provides that a law practice may give a person an interim bill covering part only of the legal services the law practice was retained to provide: ACT s 293(1); NSW s 334(1); NT s 328(1); Qld s 333(1); Tas s 317(1); Vic s 3.4.37(1); WA s 293(1). It is unclear whether, by way of this statutory entitlement, it is intended to oust the entire contract doctrine. Yet as the surrounding provisions are aimed at client information and protection, it is unlikely that this was the legislative intention, as the relevant section does not entitle the lawyer to recover costs upon an interim bill (unless the retainer or costs agreement provides otherwise) but simply speaks of supplying an interim bill, presumably for the client’s information. 246. [2007] WASC 177; BC200706266 at [55]. 247. McGowan v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [2002] 2 Qd R 499; [2001] QCA 236; BC200103217 at [9] per McPherson JA.

248. See 4.31. 249. Re Ladner Downs and Crowley (1987) 41 DLR (4th) 403 at 423 per Southin J (SC(BC)). 250. See, for example, QCoal Pty Ltd v Cliffs Australia Coal Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 479; BC201009791 at [34] per Ann Lyons J. 251. (1878) 9 Ch D 538 at 544, 545. 252. Re Hall & Barker (1878) 9 Ch D 538 at 545 (involving a winding up suit, in which his Lordship found ‘all sorts of breaks’). 253. Re Hall & Barker (1878) 9 Ch D 538 at 545. 254. [1893] 2 QB 286 at 301. 255. Re Romer & Haslam [1893] 2 QB 286 at 293 per Lord Esher MR, at 298 per Bowen LJ (‘As to business which is not a common law action, but which may be a suit in equity, lengthy either by reason of the number of the parties or by reason of its comprehending a variety of really independent litigation, there may be natural breaks’). 256. J H Milner and Son v Percy Bilton Ltd [1966] 2 All ER 894 at 899 per Fenton Akinson J; Trustees of the Legal Contribution Trust v Bailey [2004] WASC 175 at [60] per Le Miere J. 257. Purcell v Bacon (1914) 19 CLR 241 at 249; BC1490117 per Griffith CJ (revd on other grounds: Bacon v Purcell (1916) 22 CLR 307 (PC)). 258. Cachia v Isaacs (1985) 3 NSWLR 366 at 377–8 per Hope JA (whether a contract in respect of conduct of proceedings is an entire contract ‘must be determined by reference to the circumstances of the particular case’). 259. See, for example, Abedi v Penningtons (a firm) [2000] 2 Costs LR 205. 260. (1982) 30 SASR 202 at 210 (FC). 261. Caldwell v Treloar (1982) 30 SASR 202 at 209 (FC). 262. See 2.22. 263. Doe d Bennett v Hale (1850) 15 QB 171; 117 ER 423. 264. New South Wales Bar Association v Livesey [1982] 2 NSWLR 231 at 233 per Moffitt P. 265. As to implied retainers see 2.7–2.10. 266. Kennedy v Broun (1863) 13 CBNS 677 at 727; 143 ER 268 at 287 per Erle CJ; Re Le Brasseur and Oakley [1896] 2 Ch 487 at 493 per Lindley LJ, at 496 per Lopes LJ; New South Wales Crime Commission v Fleming (1991) 24 NSWLR 116 at 122; BC9101668 per Gleeson CJ (CA); Atkinson v Pengelly [1995] 3 NZLR 104 at 110–11 per Tipping J (HC). 267. Mostyn v Mostyn (1870) 5 Ch App 457 at 459 per Sir G M Giffard LJ. 268. See, for example, Medlicott v Emery [1933] All ER Rep 655 (where a solicitor was held to be entitled to recover fees paid to counsel even though the payment was made by the solicitor after the client had stated that he did not propose to pay the fees). 269. New South Wales Crime Commission v Fleming (1991) 24 NSWLR 116 at 122 per Gleeson CJ, at 140 per Kirby P; BC9101668; Re Robb (1996) 134 FLR 294 at 307–8; BC9602649 (FC(ACT)). See generally A I Tonking, ‘Solicitors’ Obligations to Pay Counsel’ (2004) 25 Aust Bar Rev 161. 270. Moore v Roe (1629) 1 Rep Ch 38; 21 ER 501; Re Neville (1896) LR 17 (NSW) (B & P) 24 at 26 per Manning J; Re Le Brasseur and Oakley [1896] 2 Ch 487 at 493–4 per Lindley LJ, at 495 per Lopes LJ; Sadd v Griffin [1908] 2 KB 510 at 512 per Farwell LJ; Wells v Wells [1914] P 157 at

162–3 per Swinfen Eady LJ; Re Robb (1996) 134 FLR 294 at 310; BC9602649 (FC(ACT)); Royds v Sumner Potts [2005] QSC 15; BC200500231 at [9] per Mackenzie J. 271. (1896) LR 17 (NSW) (B & P) 24 at 26 per Manning J. 272. Morris v Hunt (1819) 1 Chit 544 at 550–1 per Bayley J; Re Le Brasseur and Oakley [1896] 2 Ch 487 at 493–4 per Lindley LJ, at 495 per Lopes LJ. 273. Morris v Hunt (1819) 1 Chit 544 at 554 per Best J. See also at 550 per Bayley J. 274. O’Donoghue v Downer & Co Ltd [1953] NZLR 758 at 760–1 per Fair J (SC); Robinson and Morgan-Coakle v Behan [1964] NZLR 650 at 658–63 per Perry J (SC); Shand v Doyle [1997] ANZ Conv R 134 at 138; BC9604501 per Rowland J (FC(WA)). 275. See, for example, NSW Law Society and Bar Association, Counsel’s Fees — Memorandum to Members of the New South Wales Bar Association and the Law Society of New South Wales — Revised Joint Statement (which establishes a Joint Tribunal on Fees); Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice (NT), rr 30.3, 30.5 (procedure for reporting the matter to the Law Society; recognising a professional obligation to pay counsel’s fees within one month of counsel’s bill being rendered, subject to contrary agreement: r 30.4). 276. Rhodes v Fielder, Jones and Harrison [1918–19] All ER Rep 846 at 847 per Lush J. See, for example, Carver v Legal Profession Disciplinary Tribunal (1991) 7 LPDR 8 (CA(NSW)). 277. See, for example, Law Society of New South Wales v Davidson [2007] NSWADT 264; Donaghy v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (No 2) [2012] NSWADT 170. Cf Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Beazley [2012] NSWADT 153. It is open to the tribunal (or court), in disciplinary proceedings, to make a compensation order in favour of an unpaid barrister in this context: see, for example, Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Mee Ling [2012] NSWADT 146. 278. See, for example, Re Robb (1996) 134 FLR 294 at 320–1; BC9602649 (FC(ACT)). 279. International Association of Legal Science, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol VIII, Ch 9, p 14. 280. These are explained in G E Dal Pont, ‘The Recovery of Counsel’s Fees’ (2004) 23 UQLJ 380. See also Shand v Doyle [1997] ANZ Conv R 134 at 134–5 per Kennedy ACJ, at 138 per Rowland J; BC9604501 (FC(WA)) (who queried whether the rule that counsel cannot sue for fees remained relevant in modern times). 281. NSW s 83(3) (formerly NSW 1987 s 38I(3)). Victoria was in fact the first Australian jurisdiction to oust the professional prohibition against counsel recovering fees from a client or instructing solicitor, when in 1891 it legislated to entitle every barrister ‘to maintain an action for and recover from the solicitor or client respectively by whom he has been employed his fees costs and charges for any professional work done by him’: Legal Profession Practice Act 1891 (Vic) s 5 (repealed) (see Levy v Union Bank of Australia Ltd (1896) 21 VLR 683 at 685 per Hodges J; Hayes v Jones [1926] VLR 459 at 461 per Macfarlan J; Re Melbourne Parking Station Ltd [1929] VLR 5 at 9 per Mann J; Re National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian Division (in liq) (No 2) [1992] 1 VR 485 at 524 per J D Phillips J). Although this provision was replicated in the legislation that superseded the 1891 Act in 1958 (Legal Profession Practice Act 1958 (Vic) s 10(1) (repealed)), no equivalent provision was included in the Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic) (repealed) or the current Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic). 282. Vic s 3.2.3(1) (formerly Vic 1996 s 66(1)) (albeit subject to the Barristers’ Practice Rules (see rr 168–172): s 3.2.3(2)). 283. Dimos v Hanos [2001] VSC 173; BC200102765 at [70], [71] per Gillard J; Mednis v Chand

[2003] NSWSC 680; BC200304266 at [51] per Gzell J; Ofria v Cameron [2008] NSWCA 159; BC200805339; Keesing v Adams [2010] NSWSC 336; BC201002421 at [36]–[53] per Brereton J (noting that a costs agreement is a strong indication, though perhaps not an absolute one, of an intention that the barrister is to render services on a contractual basis: at [30]); Paramount Lawyers Pty Ltd v Maneschi [2012] NSWSC 877; BC201205777 at [57]–[71] per Rothman J. 284. Pentelow v Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 111; BC201301265 at [26]–[31] per Schmidt J. It follows, for instance, that a barrister who chooses to enter into a contract for legal services can, via the statute, recover his or her fees at law pursuant to that contract, whereas a barrister who elects to render services on the conventional non-contractual basis is not entitled to recover fees at law and is left to the traditional extra-curial remedies: Keesing v Adams [2010] NSWSC 336; BC201002421 at [23] per Brereton J. 285. Dimos v Hanos [2001] VSC 173; BC200102765 at [77]–[80] per Gillard J. 286. NSW rr 15, 17; Vic r 175. 287. NSW rr 24A, 24B; Vic r 165. 288. ACT r 115. 289. Namely in the Barristers’ Rules in the Northern Territory (rr 74, 75, 80), Queensland (rr 15, 17) and South Australia (rr 15, 17), and in the Rules of Practice 1994 (Tas) r 89A. 290. Rules of Practice 1994 (Tas) r 93. 291. ACT s 282(1)(a), 282(1)(b); NSW s 322(1)(a), 322(1)(b) (formerly NSW 1987 s 184(1)); NT s 317(1) (a), 317(1)(b); Qld s 322(1)(a), 322(1)(b); Tas s 306(1)(a), 306(1)(b); Vic s 3.4.26(1)(a), 3.4.26(1)(b) (formerly Vic 1996 s 96(1)(a), 96(1)(b)); WA s 282(1)(a), 282(1)(b). 292. ACT s 282(1)(c); NSW s 322(1)(c) (formerly NSW 1987 s 184(2)); NT s 317(1)(c); Qld s 322(1) (c); Tas s 306(1)(c); Vic s 3.4.26(1)(c) (formerly Vic 1996 s 96(1)(c)); WA s 282(1)(c). 293. ACT s 286(1); NSW s 326; NT s 321; Qld s 326; Tas s 310(1); Vic s 3.4.30(1); WA s 286. 294. Dimos v Hanos [2001] VSC 173; BC200102765 at [70] per Gillard J; Pentelow v Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 111; BC201301265 at [32]–[57] per Schmidt J. 295. Clifford Harris & Co v Solland International Ltd [2005] 2 All ER 334; [2005] EWHC 141 (Ch) at [47] per Christopher Nugee QC. 296. As to these requirements generally see Ch 3. 297. (1859) 4 De G & J 104 at 130; 45 ER 41 at 51. 298. ACT s 281(2); NSW s 321(2); NT s 316(2); Qld s 321(1)(a); Tas s 305(2); Vic s 3.4.21(2); WA s 273(2). 299. ACT s 281(1); NSW s 321(1); NT s 316(1); Qld s 321(1)(b); Tas s 305(1); Vic s 3.4.21(1); WA s 273(1). 300. ACT s 281(3) (which adds that, for interest payable in accordance with a costs agreement, the bill must state that the interest is payable under the agreement); NSW s 321(3); NT s 316(3); Tas s 305(3); Vic s 3.4.21(3); WA s 273(3). 301. ACT s 281(4); NSW s 321(4); NT s 316(4) (and see Legal Profession Regulations 2007 (NT) reg 80D); Qld s 321(3); Tas s 305(4); Vic s 3.4.21(4) (and see Legal Profession Regulations 2005 (Vic) s 3.4.3); WA s 273(4).

[page 103]

CHAPTER 5

Assessment of Lawyer and Own Client Bills Nature of Assessment of Lawyer–Client Bills Terminology Purpose Alternatives to lawyer and own client costs assessment Assessment Pursuant to the Legal Profession Legislation Application for assessment Classes of applicants Meaning of ‘third party payers’ Timing of application Applicable time frames Time frame in the context of interim bills Enlarging time to apply Impact of payment of bill Effect of application on proceedings for the recovery of costs What must a costs assessor determine? Where there is no valid costs agreement or applicable scale Where there is a valid costs agreement Where a scale (or equivalent) applies Giving of reasons Referral for disciplinary action

5.1 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16 5.17 5.20 5.21 5.23

Useless, unnecessary or excessive costs disallowed Unusual expenses without client authorisation disallowed The need for client warning Timing and terms of warning Ouster of warning rule ‘Unusual’ expenses Illustration — counsel’s cancellation fees Costs arising out of the lawyer’s negligence Jurisdiction to assess limited to ‘professional’ costs and disbursements Can a costs assessor determine existence of a retainer? Application by client Application by lawyer

5.24 5.26 5.26 5.28 5.30 5.32 5.33 5.35 5.40 5.42 5.43 5.44

[page 104] Costs of assessment The traditional ‘one-sixth rule’ Statutory provision for costs of assessment

5.45 5.45 5.46

Lawyer–Client Taxation in the Federal Court

5.47

Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction to Order Taxation Scope of the inherent jurisdiction Circumstances where the inherent jurisdiction invoked

5.51 5.51 5.53

Alteration and Substitution of Delivered Bills Prohibition at general law New South Wales position Qualifications to the general law prohibition

5.54 5.54 5.55 5.56

Statute — Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania and Victoria Leave of the court Bill delivered subject to a condition that it may be changed Review of Costs Assessment Statutory provision for review Curial reticence to interfere with discretion

5.57 5.58 5.60 5.61 5.61 5.64

Nature of Assessment of Lawyer–Client Bills Terminology 5.1 There is a process of independent review of a lawyer’s bill, historically termed ‘taxation’ or, specifically in this context ‘solicitor and (own) client taxation’.1 The South Australian legislation continues to speak in terms of ‘taxation’. Elsewhere, pursuant upon the enactment of the Model Laws, it is now termed ‘assessment’, except in Victoria, where the term used is ‘review’. The Western Australian Act nonetheless identifies the person charged to conduct this process as a ‘taxing officer’; in the remaining jurisdictions he or she is termed a ‘costs assessor’, except in the Australian Capital Territory where the Supreme Court conducts costs assessments, and in Victoria where a dedicated Costs Court has been established for this purpose.2 Given the common statutory use of the terms ‘assessment’ and ‘costs assessor’, these are adopted in this chapter where general reference to that concept and person are made. [page 105] On occasions where the case law refers to ‘taxation’, however, reference continues to be made to that concept.

5.2 In New South Wales, the Northern Territory and Queensland, costs assessors are appointed from the practising profession for a set period, who conduct assessments on a parttime basis.3 The legislation in New South Wales and the Northern Territory adds that costs assessors are not officers of the court when acting in that capacity.4 The foregoing shifts from the traditional approach, pursuant to which public servants attached to the court (commonly the registrars) conducted taxations. Although the Tasmanian legislation now refers to costs assessment and costs assessors, the latter means a person who is a taxing officer of the Supreme Court,5 namely a registrar of the court.6 As noted above, the Western Australian statute refers to a ‘taxing officer’, who is clearly a court official.7 Similarly, power to assess or tax a lawyer–client bill is vested in the Supreme Court in the Australian Capital Territory and South Australia, and in the Costs Court in Victoria, but in each case a registrar can exercise the court’s powers for this purpose.8

Purpose 5.3 The shift, other than in South Australia to date, from ‘taxation’ to ‘assessment’, aside from moving away from terminology prone to confuse, is intended to reflect a more global rather than the traditional item-by-item approach inherent in a ‘taxation’, which means ‘to deal seriatim with each item by way of allowance or disallowance’.9 The move to costs assessment aimed to replace what has been branded an ‘overly formal, legalistic and complex’ process with a faster and easier one.10 Merely because statutes refer to assessment, though, does not mean that all jurisdictions have shied from the item-by-item approach.11 However described, though, the object of and rationale for the process remains the same, namely to investigate the fairness and reasonableness of the charges — being ‘professional’12 costs and disbursements13 — made by a lawyer to a client.14 It is most commonly the client who seeks an assessment of a lawyer’s bill,15 and this serves as a counter-weight to lawyers’ monopoly [page 106]

on legal work and as an assurance against abuse and exploitation.16 Tadgell J explained the point, by reference to taxation, in Redfern v Mineral Engineers Pty Ltd as follows:17 The courts’ surveillance over costs as between solicitor and client is assumed with a view to preventing any unfair advantage by solicitors in their charges to their clients. It stems, it seems, from the notion that ordinarily a solicitor is presumed to be in a position of dominance in relation to his client as a result of his presumed knowledge of the law and of what may and may not be properly charged by way of fees. Were a strict view not taken it might be open to a solicitor to overreach his client or otherwise act oppressively towards him on the matter of costs. Considerations of public policy and undue influence combined to shape the attitude of the Courts of Equity, by which the general rules in relation to taxation of costs were formulated …

Alternatives to lawyer and own client costs assessment 5.4 There is no need for costs assessment (or taxation) as between lawyer and own client if lawyer and client agree on the quantum of fees and disbursements to be paid. In Western Australia, to encourage parties to agree in this context, taxing officers may, with the consent of the parties, make provisional assessments in the parties’ absence.18 Aside from assessment or taxation, provision for alternative dispute resolution of costs disputes is made by the legal profession legislation in some jurisdictions. 5.5 In New South Wales and the Northern Territory statute entitles a client who disputes a bill of costs (a ‘costs dispute’), including an amount claimed to be payable under a costs agreement, to refer the dispute to the Legal Services Commissioner19 or the relevant council20 (in the Northern Territory, the Statutory Supervisor)21 for mediation if the amount in dispute is less than $10,000.22 Also, the relevant person23 may by written notice require the parties to enter a process of mediation if the amount in dispute is less than $5,000.24 For this purpose ‘mediation’ includes preliminary assistance in dispute resolution, such as the giving of informal advice designed to ensure that the parties are fully aware of their rights and duties, and that there is full and open communication between them concerning the dispute.25 5.6 Statute in Queensland makes provision for mediation of ‘consumer disputes’,26 which, being defined to include a dispute about a lawyer’s conduct to the extent it does not involve an issue of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct,27 can encompass costs

disputes. Legislation in Victoria is more explicit on the point by prescribing a procedure for mediation of ‘civil disputes’,28 which are defined to include disputes in relation to costs not exceeding $25,000 in respect of any one matter.29

Assessment Pursuant to the Legal Profession Legislation 5.7 The legal profession legislation in each jurisdiction makes specific provision for the review, whether via taxation or assessment, of lawyer–client bills of costs. The enactment of the [page 107] Model Laws (other than in South Australia) has heralded welcome increase uniformity in the relevant process, and so it is possible to collapse the discussion pertaining to these jurisdictions. The legislation adds that lawyer and client (except a sophisticated client)30 cannot contract out of the otherwise available right to assessment.31 The courts’ inherent jurisdiction to order the taxation of solicitor and own client bills, discussed separately,32 retains a residuary operation unless ousted by clear statutory provision.

Application for assessment Classes of applicants 5.8 The most common applicant for assessment is a client who has been given a bill of costs.33 However, the legislation envisages that a third party payer34 may apply for an assessment of the costs payable by the third party payer,35 and that a law practice that retains another law practice to act on behalf of a client can apply for an assessment of the costs to which a bill given by the other law practice applies.36 It also envisages that a law practice that has given a bill of costs can apply for an assessment of those whole costs, even if the costs have been (partly) paid, whether or not pursuant to a

bill.37 A law practice may be inclined to do so, for instance, as an alternative to commencing proceedings against the client to recover unpaid costs.38 In each case, the application may be made in respect of all or only part of legal costs. In South Australia the legislation states that, on the application of a person claiming to be entitled to costs, or of a person who is liable to pay, or who has paid, any costs, the court or registrar may tax and settle the bill for those costs.39 It also envisages that a court in which proceedings for the recovery of costs have been instituted can order the plaintiff to apply to have those costs taxed, and adjourn the proceedings until the taxation has been completed.40 [page 108]

Meaning of ‘third party payers’ 5.9 The Model Laws introduces the concept of a ‘third party payer’, in relation to a client of a law practice, being a person who, though not the client, is under a legal obligation to pay, or has paid, all or any part of the legal costs for legal services provided to the client.41 It then distinguishes ‘associated third party payers’ from ‘non-associated third party payers’. A third party payer falls into the former category if the legal obligation is owed to the law practice, whether or not it is also owed to the client or another person. A third party payer is a ‘nonassociated third party payer’ if the said legal obligation is owed to the client or another person but not the law practice.42 The legislation therefore envisages that a non-associated third party payer may require a costs assessment notwithstanding that he or she is not obliged to pay the costs in issue to the law practice.43 The costs liability of a nonassociated third party payer ordinarily arises out of a contract between it and the client of the law practice, for instance, a lease or a mortgage in which it is the lessee or mortgagor. The non-associated third party payer provisions are, it has been said, directed to consumer protection; they protect persons who agree, in effect, to indemnify other parties — such as lessors and mortgagees — as regards legal costs for services rendered to those other parties.44 Though there may be cases where the burden of a lawyer’s bill will fall to

a substantial extent upon someone other than the client and who therefore has more than an academic interest in having the costs assessed, the line drawn in defining who apart from the client is entitled to an assessment is determined by the existence or otherwise of a legal obligation to pay the costs, namely one enforceable by way of court order or otherwise.45

Timing of application Applicable time frames 5.10 Other than in South Australia, the legal profession legislation requires an application for assessment by a client or third party payer46 to be made within 12 months (in Tasmania, 60 days) after: (a) the bill was given, or the request for payment was made, to the client or third party payer; or (b) if neither a bill was given nor a request was made, the costs were paid.47 Being expressed in the alternative, time begins to run for this purpose either when the bill is given or the request is made.48 The South Australian legislation sets no time limit within which a client or lawyer application must apply for taxation, although it does require that any request for a detailed bill of costs be made within six months of the delivery of the original bill.49 Excepting South Australia, the legislation requires that, if a law practice retains another law practice to act on behalf of a client, an application for assessment of the costs in a bill delivered by the other law practice be made within 60 days after the bill is given or the [page 109] request for payment is made.50 In New South Wales, the Manager, Costs Assessment, can extend time in this context;51 elsewhere no provision for extension is made. No application for assessment can be made, though, if there is a costs agreement between the client and the other law practice.52 Again excepting South Australia, a law practice that has given a bill of costs cannot apply for an assessment until: (a) at least 30 days have passed since the bill was given, or the request for payment was made; (b) if no bill was given or a request made, the costs were paid; or (c) another person has

applied for assessment in respect of the costs.53 No provision for the enlargement of time is made in this regard.

Time frame in the context of interim bills 5.11 The legal profession legislation, excepting South Australia, states that legal costs the subject of an interim bill may be assessed ‘either at the time of the interim bill or at the time of the final bill,54 whether or not the interim bill has been paid’.55 This wording is amenable to at least two interpretations. One is that all interim bills may be assessed at the time of the final bill, so that provided that the application for an assessment is within the time limit by reference to the final bill, the legal costs covered by interim bills could also be assessed. A second, opposing, interpretation is that the time limit applies likewise to interim bills, as from when the interim bill was delivered. Against a single Victorian case favoured the latter interpretation,56 the case law otherwise uniformly favours the former interpretation.57 It is favoured as a matter of statutory construction,58 as well as a matter of policy, as explained by the Queensland Court of Appeal:59 There is good reason … for conferring the opportunity for the client to have the interim bill assessed after the retainer has ended and the final bill has issued, as that avoids prejudice to the relationship of the client and the solicitor during the course of the retainer. It also enables consideration of the reasonableness of the work that is the subject of the interim bill, the way in which that work was carried out and the costs for that work to be undertaken in the context of the completed work and the costs claimed by the solicitor for the whole retainer.

The alternative view would otherwise essentially compel clients to request assessment of interim bills in the course of a continuing retainer — and thereby risk an otherwise harmonious [page 110] relationship with their lawyer — and at the same time potentially subject lawyers to multiple assessments in respect of bills delivered at various stages of the retainer.60

Enlarging time to apply

5.12 Other than in South Australia, statute envisages that an application for assessment by a client (other than a sophisticated client)61 or third party payer can be dealt with outside of the statutory period if the court allows.62 The judicial attitude to extension of time has been contextualised in the following terms:63 Generally speaking there are good reasons why compliance with time limits of the type relevant here should be adhered to. Legal practitioners are entitled to assume that in circumstances where the client was aware of their rights to seek an assessment and more than 12 months has elapsed since the date of the bill an assessment will not be sought. It may well be that they will arrange their businesses on the basis of such an assumption. It is also possible that a delay in seeking an assessment may prejudice a legal practice because memories may fade and the relevant legal personnel may move on to other positions … The purpose of the provision permitting a client to apply for an assessment of costs is to protect clients against excessive charges by a practitioner, and to enable a client to be satisfied that a bill of costs is not excessive. The Act imposes time limits to prevent a client from unfairly taking advantage of the assessment provisions to delay the obligation to pay proper costs, and to avoid frivolous objections.

The legislation premises extension of time upon the court being satisfied that it is just and fair, having regard to the delay and the reasons for it. As the jurisdiction is couched in ‘just and fair’ terms, considerations that inform its exercise are not confined to the delay and the reasons for it. The case law has identified factors,64 none decisive by themselves, that may influence the court in its discretion to enlarge time, namely:65 [page 111] the length of the delay, attached to which is the nature and degree of prejudice to the lawyer in allowing time to be enlarged, compared to the prejudice to the client in denying the application to extend time;66 the reasons for the delay, specifically whether it is properly explicable;67 whether the client was aware of the right to seek costs assessment68 — which now in any case comes within costs disclosure obligations69 — and in this context, whether or not the client was represented is a relevant consideration;70 whether there is evidence suggesting that the bill might be excessive;71 whether the client had paid the bill without demur;72 or

[page 112] the lawyer’s reasons for opposing the enlargement, it being important that, as an officer of the court, the lawyer is seen to act honestly, ethically and with proper motives, not merely to prevent the assessment of a bill taking place.73 Yet it has been noted that ‘it would be a mistake to approach such an application on the basis that it should be allowed as a matter of course unless the practitioner can show that substantial prejudice will be caused by an extension of time’.74 The legislation, after all, imposes time limits, and generous ones at that (other than in Tasmania), which should presumably incline the court against allowing an extension of time in the absence of compelling reasons. The onus therefore clearly lies on the applicant for an extension to satisfy the court that it is in the interests of justice that the time limit should be extended.

Impact of payment of bill 5.13 The legal profession legislation other than in South Australia envisages that a client or third party payer75 may apply for assessment even if the costs in issue have been wholly or partly paid,76 including vis-à-vis costs paid without a bill.77 The same applies to an application for assessment of the costs in a bill delivered by another law practice retained to act on behalf of a client.78 Hence, any statutory time period within which an application for assessment must be made is independent of whether or not the bill sought to be assessed has been paid. This represents a welcome shift from the previous statutory position in New South Wales, Tasmania and Victoria, which temporally varied the availability of taxation according to whether or not the bill had been paid,79 and in Victoria (and arguably also Tasmania) premised any extension of time upon proof of ‘special circumstances’.80

Effect of application on proceedings for the recovery of costs

5.14 If an application for costs assessment is made as prescribed by the legislation, the law practice cannot commence any proceedings to recover the costs until the assessment has been completed.81 In South Australia, as formerly in most other Australian jurisdictions,82 there is a discretion to stay proceedings for the recovery of costs once an application for taxation of those [page 113] costs is made.83 It is likely that the order staying or restraining proceedings would, in the usual case, be made as a matter of course, given that the process of assessment determines the legally recoverable quantum of costs.

What must a costs assessor determine? 5.15 Though only the New South Wales and Northern Territory legislation makes it explicit that a costs assessor is to determine an application for a costs assessment by confirming the bill or, if satisfied that the disputed costs are unfair or unreasonable, by substituting for the amount of the costs as fair and reasonable,84 the whole object of costs assessment dictates that the same is necessarily implied elsewhere. The parameters of a costs assessor’s task for this purpose is determined by whether the legal work in question is subject to a costs agreement, a scale or neither. Each is discussed in turn below.

Where there is no valid costs agreement or applicable scale 5.16 When considering an application for assessment, the legal profession legislation (other than in South Australia) requires an assessor (in Victoria, the Costs Court) to consider: whether it was reasonable to carry out the work to which the costs relate; whether the work was carried out in a reasonable manner; and, except to the extent that a valid costs agreement85 or a scale or its equivalent86 applies to the costs, the fairness and reasonableness of the amount of the costs in relation to that work.87 In assessing fairness and reasonableness for this purpose, the legislation states that a costs assessor (Costs Court) may88 have regard to any or all of the following matters:89

whether the lawyer complied with any relevant regulation or professional rules; whether the lawyer has made the requisite disclosure;90 any relevant advertisement as to the lawyer’s costs or skills; the skill, labour and responsibility displayed by the lawyer responsible for the matter; the retainer, and whether the work done was within its scope; the complexity, novelty or difficulty of the matter; the quality of the work done; [page 114] the place where and circumstances in which the legal services were provided;91 the time within which the work was required to be done; and any other relevant matter. It stands to reason that useless, unnecessary or excessive costs will be disallowed. Also, courts have long recognised that ‘unusual expenses’ should not be allowed unless authorised by a fully informed client. There remains, though, a question whether a costs assessor can disallow costs incurred against the backdrop of a lawyer’s negligence. Each of these points is elaborated separately later in the chapter.92

Where there is a valid costs agreement 5.17 As legal work is nowadays often performed under a costs agreement93 — which purports to prescribe an agreed basis of charging for the retainer — it is necessary to address how the process of costs assessment relates to contractually agreed remuneration. Prima facie, if A and B have agreed on B’s remuneration for a service performed for A, the law is reticent to interfere

with the terms of that bargain unless it is vitiated by a legally recognised factor, say, undue influence, fraud or mistake. 5.18 The foregoing explains why the legal profession legislation restricts assessment of costs agreements. Excepting South Australia, the relevant provisions require assessment of the amount of disputed costs under a costs agreement ‘by reference to the provisions of the costs agreement’ if a relevant provision of the agreement specifies the amount, or a rate or other means for calculating the amount, of the costs, and the agreement has not been set aside.94 This does not apply if the parties otherwise agree, the costs assessor (in Victoria, the Costs Court) is satisfied that the agreement does not comply in a material respect with an applicable disclosure requirement,95 or the law practice is precluded from recovering the costs by provisions regulating costs agreements.96 Other than for a sophisticated client,97 a costs agreement cannot [page 115] provide that the legal costs to which it relates are not subject to assessment.98 So while a costs agreement has contractual force between its parties, its effect may be varied or overridden by the assessment process and, in the latter event the result of the assessment, not the agreement, is what defines the parties’ rights and obligations.99 A costs agreement does not, in any case, oust a costs assessor’s jurisdiction in respect of chargeable work that falls outside its scope. The above presupposes that an assessor is vested with the power to determine whether a costs agreement exists, and its terms, which in New South Wales is acknowledged by statutory specific provision.100 This necessarily includes determining whether the agreement comes within the statutory definition of a ‘costs agreement’,101 and whether it is rendered void by statute.102 It also includes, it has been held, determining disputes as to the terms of the costs agreement, except where the existence of those terms are in dispute in a way that would require the hearing of evidence to resolve.103 The latter aligns with case law indicating that costs assessors (or taxing officers) lack the power to determine the existence of a retainer where this is in dispute.104

5.19 In South Australia the legal profession legislation empowers the Supreme Court to tax a bill of costs on the application of either a client or his or her lawyer, and in these proceedings rescind or vary a costs agreement if its terms are not fair and reasonable.105 The terms of a costs agreement cannot, therefore, oust the court’s jurisdiction in this regard. Consistent with the position elsewhere, though, the taxing officer must tax costs by reference to the schedule of fees provided in the agreement.106

Where a scale (or equivalent) applies 5.20 Where a scale, or its equivalent,107 applies to the legal work conducted as part of the retainer, and no valid or applicable costs agreement ousts the scale, the legal profession legislation in New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia requires a costs assessor (in Victoria, the Costs Court) to assess the amount of disputed costs that are subject to a scale by reference to the scale108 (although in Western Australia a [page 116] higher amount may be allowed by the court if the ‘unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the matter’ renders the scale amount inadequate).109 In the Australian Capital Territory, costs assessment may be made by reference to anything the court considers appropriate, and this includes a scale of costs.110

Giving of reasons 5.21 The legal profession legislation in New South Wales requires that a statement of the reasons, given in accordance with the regulations, accompany costs assessors’ determinations.111 The regulations require the statement of reasons to contain the following:112 the total amount of costs for providing legal services determined to be fair and reasonable; the total amount of disbursements determined to be fair and reasonable;

each disbursement varied by the determination; in respect of any disputed costs, explanation of both the basis on which the costs were assessed and how the submissions made by the parties were dealt with; if the costs assessor declines to assess a bill, the basis for doing so; a statement of any determination that interest is not payable on the amount of costs assessed or, if payable, of the rate of interest payable. The statement may be accompanied by such further information as the assessor considers is necessary to clarify the determination of the application.113 The requirement to give reasons was inserted to give effect to the New South Wales Court of Appeal’s decision in Attorney-General v Kennedy Miller Television Pty Ltd,114 which reasoned that an appeal to the Supreme Court115 would be rendered illusory without the assessor’s reasons. Although it has been observed that, because a costs assessor is not a judicial officer, his or her disclosure of reasoning need not meet that expected of a court in a judgment,116 the statement of reasons must nonetheless involve ‘the adoption of, at the least, a minimum standard which places the parties in a position to understand why the decision was made sufficiently to allow them to exercise any right of appeal’.117 A requirement for a costs assessor to disclose reasons is now also prescribed in Queensland, albeit by the court rules.118 5.22 Even though the remaining jurisdictions make no explicit prescription for reasons in this context, case authority in the party and party context holds that taxing officers and costs assessors should give reasons for their decisions when requested to review them.119 Moreover, where the legislation speaks of judicial review of an assessor’s determination,120 which by its [page 117] nature is limited to questions of law rather than being a review on the merits,121 it can be argued that assessors should also provide reasons.122

Referral for disciplinary action 5.23 Statute other than in South Australia requires a costs assessor (in Victoria, the Costs Court) who, in the course of assessment, considers that the costs charged by a law practice are grossly excessive, or that another matter is raised that may amount to misconduct on the part of a lawyer involved in the matter, to refer the matter for consideration as to whether disciplinary action should be taken against the lawyer.123

Useless, unnecessary or excessive costs disallowed 5.24 In assessing costs between lawyer and client, a costs assessor will not allow to a lawyer a fee for work that is useless, unnecessary or excessive for accomplishing the object the client had in view.124 This does not mean that a lawyer is disentitled to recover costs on every occasion when his or her advice is found by the court to be wrong. If there was an arguable or reasonable chance of the proceeding being successful, the client must pay. Even if the prospects of success were only minimal, the client must pay if, having received appropriate advice, express instructions were given to proceed.125 Whether the work in question was useless or unnecessary may rest not only upon the outcome and nature of the case, but upon whether the lawyer can convince the assessor that what appears prima facie to have been useless or unnecessary did serve a useful or necessary purpose in the representation. It has been judicially observed that although ‘when a client calls and takes up the time of a solicitor about the client’s business, an attendance should be allowed’, sometimes ‘a client may need protection against himself or herself’; this may accordingly be reflected in allowances on assessment.126 If, for example, a lawyer shows only that there were a number of attendances in the course of preparing for the hearing, and can give no information as to the specific advice given, it is open to an assessor to conclude that some attendances charged for were unnecessary, and disallow them.127 5.25 A costs assessor may inquire into whether the lawyer could have achieved the same objective at a lower cost. That does require the adoption of the stringent ‘necessary or proper’ test traditionally applied in party and party taxations.128 In circumstances where it was clearly open to the lawyer to

achieve the same outcome or secure the same service by a less expensive means but the lawyer elects not to do so, though, the assessor may disallow the additional costs. This may well constitute evidence of overcharging. [page 118] An illustration of excessive costs concerns copying costs.129 In Re Central Queensland Developments Pty Ltd130 de Jersey J remarked that if a lawyer, faced with the task of copying copious documentation, fails to draw the client’s attention to the availability of a commercial copying operation — the use of which would cost a small proportion of the amount payable to the lawyer under the applicable scale were the lawyer to do the copying — but does the copying ‘in house’ at the higher scale charge, this is an instance of overcharging. In these circumstances, it is fair to assume that the client would have utilised the commercial operation. His Honour then added:131 In the course of the hearing I expressed surprise that a solicitor should himself copy this extremely large quantity of documentation and charge for it at one dollar per page without such prior consultation concerning the use of a substantially less expensive commercial operator. One assumes that one dollar per page set out in the scale was set with much smaller copying in mind. Copying of this extreme magnitude must net the solicitor a very large profit if he does it himself at the scale charge. Ordinary prudence must surely dictate consultation with the client about such a cost before such copying is undertaken. I emphasise that it is the magnitude of the copying which raises problems in this particular case. Ordinarily, with only a small amount to be done, no doubt a solicitor could prudently do it himself, if he saw fit, and levy the scale charge. The position must be different however with copying of these proportions.

Unusual expenses without client authorisation disallowed The need for client warning 5.26 Generally speaking, costs of an unusual sum or nature (an ‘unusual expense’)132 are not allowed as between lawyer and client unless they have been authorised by the client after full prior disclosure, including the fact that they might not be allowed as between party and party. The leading case is Re Blyth and Fanshawe.133 It involved a solicitor who claimed from his client

charges of a shorthand writer employed to take notes on a reference of an action to arbitration. Bagallay LJ stated the relevant principle as follows:134 [I]f an unusual expense is about to be incurred in the course of an action it is the duty of the solicitor to inform his client fully of it and not to be satisfied simply by taking his authority to incur the additional expense, but to point out to him that such expense will or may not be allowed on taxation between party and party whatever may be the result of the trial.

[page 119] As the court concluded that the charges for a shorthand writer were an unusual expense, and the solicitor had not notified the client that the costs of the shorthand notes might not be allowed as between party and party, the solicitors could not charge the client for them. 5.27 So the consequence at general law of characterising an expense as ‘unusual’ is that a lawyer cannot charge for it even when the client knew that it was being incurred and authorised the lawyer to incur it unless the lawyer explained to the client that, irrespective of the result of the action, the client would have to bear that unusual expense and might not recover it from the opponent.135 The rationale for the rule in Re Blyth and Fanshawe has been explained as follows:136 The essence of the rule is that the client must be protected; he is embarking upon a field which — it can invariably be assumed — is completely strange to him, and which is or must be taken to be familiar to the solicitor. It is therefore the duty of the solicitor to place his client in a position where he can so far as possible be able fully to appreciate the nature and extent of his financial liabilities in the course of litigation. The use of the words ‘unusual expense’ would in many cases be meaningless and of no value in warning the client; a full explanation of the possibility that part or the whole of a contemplated expense might not be recovered from an unsuccessful opponent would be a complete protection to the client — without describing it as ‘unusual’. In other words, if a client is to be asked to authorise expenditure he must be placed in a position properly to exercise his own judgment in authorising it. There is, therefore, no magic in any form of words, and I apprehend the precaution or warning will vary with the client, with the relations between the solicitor and the client, with the particular litigation, and with the particular expense. It needs hardly to be added that it is proper to examine the caution in the light of the position at the time the warning should be given. Whilst the prime object of the rule is the protection of the client, it is manifestly as well available as a protection to the solicitor; the measure of such latter protection is the extent to which the rule is complied with by him if the expense is authorised by the client.

Timing and terms of warning

5.28 In order to provide the requisite client protection, the warning must be given prior to the expenditure; a warning given after the expenditure, and especially after verdict, is insufficient.137 The court also carefully scrutinises the terms of the warning to ensure the client is adequately protected. In Re Windeyer, Fawl & Co,138 for example, although the solicitor warned his client that the cost of his personal attendance for the issue of a commission to take evidence in Java might be disallowed on taxation, he also wrongly advised her that it was necessary that he should attend personally. Street CJ held that the warning given by the solicitor was vitiated by the latter advice, reasoning as follows:139 It was [the solicitor’s] duty to give his client advice and protection against unnecessary expense. If he had contented himself with warning her of the risk and had left it to her to decide, the position might have been different; but it is apparent that she looked to him for advice and guidance in the matter, and I think that by advising her that his personal attendance on the commission was necessary he neutralized the effect of the warning that he gave her, and that he cannot now rely upon it as a justification for the expenditure. His right to recover the amount in question must depend upon whether the expenditure was reasonably incurred for the purposes of the prosecution of her petition for divorce. From that point of view it is immaterial whether counsel advised the expenditure or not. The only question is, was it reasonable. In my opinion it was not.

[page 120] 5.29 Moreover, the terms of the warning must be sufficiently specific to cover each of the items of expense it is claimed to cover. In Bald v N G Green & Co,140 for example, Taylor CJ held that an authority to retain senior counsel acknowledging that not all its cost would be recoverable was too general in form to constitute an express warning, especially as the case did not justify the engagement of senior counsel.141

Ouster of warning rule 5.30 There may be circumstances where no express warning is given to the client as to an unusual expense but the expense is nonetheless allowed. In Re Duke’s Will,142 for example, Cussen J found that as the client, due to his experience rather than any express disclosure from the solicitor, knew that the expense in question was unusual, the absence of a warning did not oust the solicitor’s entitlement to recover that expense. Even though, according to Re

Duke’s Will, that knowledge need not emanate directly from the solicitor, prudent solicitors will not take the chance that the client lacks the requisite knowledge or understanding. 5.31 There is the further issue whether the terms of a costs agreement can oust the need to give a warning in respect of unusual expenses generally. If the agreement prescribes a lump sum fee for the solicitor’s services, and does not fall foul of the reasonableness requirement,143 there seems no need for the protection afforded to the client by the Blyth warning. Aside from this situation, as the aim of the warning is to bring to the client’s attention the prospect that, even if successful, he or she may be personally liable for a particular expenditure, it must be queried whether a clause in a costs agreement purporting to govern all expenses, or even a specific clause as to unusual expenses, adequately addresses the rationale for the warning.144 In any event, that statute now requires the disclosure to a client of an estimate of the range of costs that may be recovered if the client is successful in the litigation, and that the client may be ordered to pay if unsuccessful,145 coupled with supervening requirements of fairness in costs agreements146 and the costs consequences of failing to fulfil disclosure obligations,147 means that the absence of a Blyth warning can be addressed in other ways.

‘Unusual’ expenses 5.32 An expense can be ‘unusual’ either because it is not ordinarily incurred, or due to its amount.148 An example of an expense made unusual for its quantum is counsel’s fee that well exceeds the understood or recommended scale of counsel’s fees applicable in the circumstances.149 An illustration of the former may be the employment of two or more counsel. [page 121] In Re Broad and Broad,150 for example, Lord Esher MR branded the employment of a third counsel as ‘unusual in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred’, and so it is not enough for a solicitor to tell the client that he or she proposes to retain a third counsel and to obtain the client’s sanction, but must tell the client that ‘the expense of employing a third counsel will probably not

be allowed as between party and party, and, therefore, whether you win or lose your appeal, you may have to pay the expense yourself’. Another illustration may be the charging by counsel of a reading fee.151 Given that, for instance, the engagement of multiple counsel, or charging of a reading fee, may be necessary or proper in certain cases,152 that an expense is unusual so as to require a Blyth warning in one case does not mean that it attracts the same obligation in another.153 For instance, even though in Blyth itself charges of a shorthand writer were held to be unusual,154 in Osmond v Mutual Cycle and Manufacturing Supply Company Ltd155 the English Court of Appeal held that patent cases commonly exhibit complicated and scientific details in conflict, which make shorthand notes essential. In such a case, the taking of shorthand writers’ notes is a usual expense, thereby attracting no duty to give a Blyth warning. Presence or absence of a scale fee for the item in question is relevant but not conclusive, the court inquiring into ‘the nature of the act done, or on the fact that the amount charged is in excess of the amount fixed by the scale or usually charged’.156

Illustration — counsels’ cancellation fees 5.33 Although there is no professional prohibition on counsel charging a cancellation fee in respect of the time originally expected to be needed for a case but not in fact required, this practice has been disapproved. In Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Razzi (No 2) Wilcox J remarked:157 Very often [barristers] would have to refuse other work because of the case and its estimated duration. But … barristers generally accepted that any financial loss caused by such circumstances was to be borne by them. Any disadvantage had to be balanced against the advantage conferred by the rule which permits barristers to charge a full fee on a matter settled after delivery of the brief but before any hearing. This approach was fair. The unexpected time out of court was rarely the personal fault of the barrister’s client, or even of the opposing party. Moreover, it was right in principle. The practice of demanding ‘cancellation fees’ can rest only on the premise that, if a case does not proceed or finishes early, the barrister will be left without remunerative work. But, except perhaps for beginners at the Bar who are unlikely in any event to be able to command a ‘cancellation fee’, the premise is rarely well-founded in point of fact. Most established barristers find that their problem is over-employment, not under-employment. For most, some unexpected time out of court is a welcome opportunity to catch up with chamber work. At a time when legal fees are so onerous as to exclude from significant litigation all but the wealthy and the legally-aided, any new practice which further increases costs requires meticulous justification.

Einfeld J in Stefanou v Fairfeld Chase Pty Ltd158 later confessed to ‘serious concerns and reservations about the principle of cancellation fees’, adding that a requirement to pay counsel anything for work not done ‘is or ought to be as unconscionable in the law as anywhere else’. Yet largely unchallenged evidence from three solicitors that cancellation fees were normal and common, and necessary to secure the counsel of choice, and evidence of the client’s informed [page 122] agreement to pay the fees and its payment of them without protest, led his Honour to rule that the costs agreement in issue was enforceable.159 And more recently, Rothman J in Levy v Bergseng160 noted that ‘much has changed in the conduct of a barrister’s practice from the period ending in the first half of the 1980’s on which [Wilcox J’s] experience was based’, and on the facts held that, as the cancellation fee was part of the agreed costs arrangements and was reasonable, it did not undermine the validity of the costs agreement. 5.34 Although Levy v Bergseng dealt with the issue of ‘reasonableness’ of a costs agreement161 rather than allowances on assessment, as a costs assessor must assess the amount of disputed costs under a costs agreement by reference to the provisions of the agreement,162 the judgment assumes direct relevance to costs assessment. The client’s understanding of the fee, and that it is unlikely to be recoverable as between party and party,163 the amount of the fee, and the events by reference to which it is payable, rather than the concept of a cancellation fee itself, therefore seem to be the relevant considerations.164 Yet Levy v Bergseng should not be viewed as an attempt to introduce an open entitlement to recover cancellation fees in a costs agreement. Rothman J cautioned that ‘[i]n most cases, and for most counsel, cancellation fees would be unjustifiable’.165 The facts in Levy v Bergseng were unusual, dealing with senior counsel engaged ‘on spec’ in very specialised work for which the lead time was lengthy and during which he had, in fact, foregone other paid court work. In any event, it stands to reason that a cancellation fee remains an unusual expense, requiring a detailed Blyth warning, especially to an inexperienced client.

Costs arising out of the lawyer’s negligence 5.35 A lawyer whom a court has found negligent can recover from the client costs that relate to matters distinct from those upon the negligence relates.166 For example, a lawyer who acts both in a damages action and in the conveyance of property is not disentitled to fees in respect of the latter by reason of proven negligence in the former. 5.36 But no fee recovery in respect of the very proceedings in which the lawyer has been found negligent is allowed, unless the lawyer can show that, despite the negligence, some real advantage accrued to the client from those services, or some of them, that would render it unjust for the client to escape liability for those fees or part of them.167 In this context Kirby P in Cachia v Isaacs made the following remark:168 But where the whole point of the retention of the solicitors has been the conduct of a particular legal proceeding, the mere fact that the solicitor has acted courteously and correctly will not entitle him to fees in respect of that proceeding if he fundamentally misadvises the client or overlooks a limitation period or is otherwise negligent, thereby making his courtesy and attendances entirely futile from the point of view of his client’s relevant interests.

So far as costs assessment is concerned, the above assumes that the court has made a determination as to the scope of the lawyer’s negligence, to which the assessor has given effect in the assessment. Commonly, though, the assessor will have no such determination before him or her, but may be asked to disallow certain costs on the ground that they were incurred [page 123] negligently. In this event, there is authority that the assessor may disallow those costs occasioned by the lawyer’s negligence or ignorance.169 The logic is that, as the assessor must decide whether any particular items charged are proper, and to disallow them if they are improper, no item can be proper that is due to the lawyer’s negligence or ignorance. 5.37 Where, on the other hand, a lawyer’s negligence has allegedly occasioned the loss of the whole action, English authority indicates that the question is properly to be decided in a curial action by the client for

negligence. Bowen LJ in Re Massey & Carey explained the point, in the context of taxation of costs, as follows:170 The Taxing Master when taxing a bill of costs relating to proceedings in an action is not bound to allow the costs of proceedings which are apparently unnecessary, and which could only be held to be proper if it were shewn that they were caused by the act of the client, not by the act of the solicitor … It is true that at Common Law the Taxing Master has not the power to decide the question of negligence in all cases. If the negligence goes to the loss of the whole action he cannot entertain the question; but if it relates only to certain proceedings in the action he can. Otherwise the unfortunate result would be that if there was a question as to the propriety of a particular step in the action, as to which no man is better able to decide than the Taxing Master, you place the client in the position that he would have to pay the charge and then bring an action to get it back from the solicitor. It seems to me that the Taxing Master has the power to decide, and that he ought to decide such questions without prejudice to the right of the client to bring an action.

There is Australian authority supportive of this approach. In Abrahams v Wainwright Ryan171 the Victorian Court of Appeal held that although the question of a lawyer’s negligence might be determined on a taxation of costs in relation to particular steps taken in the course of the proceeding, on the facts the nature and extent of the negligence allegations were such that they could not be so determined, but be pursued in a separate action. Two years earlier the Queensland Supreme Court in Re Hallett’s Bill of Costs172 held that the taxing officer was justified in not dealing with the client’s allegations of negligence, for otherwise he would have had to embark on, if not determine, the issues in the respondent’s as yet undecided court negligence action in order to decide whether the work was useless or that charges were not proper. Moynihan J found it difficult to see how that could be done independently of the negligence action.173 The matter, therefore, appears to be one of degree — there is no sharp line of distinction — the number, nature, variety and extent of the allegations made by the client in objecting to the bill are relevant considerations. 5.38 In Re Baker Johnson’s Bill of Costs174 Williams J was unwilling to wholly endorse a rule that a taxing officer cannot disallow costs where a lawyer’s negligence has resulted in the loss of the whole action, opining that this rule, if it exists, applies only where specific questions raised [page 124]

on the taxation equate to those that would arise in a negligence action. His Honour’s concern is apparent from the following extract from his judgment:175 If the objections to the bill can be determined by considering whether or not the steps taken in incurring the costs were entirely useless to the client, or whether or not the work charged for was proper in the sense in which that word is used in the authorities … then the costs may be disallowed notwithstanding that it is also arguable that the reason for the work being useless was that the solicitor was negligent and that such negligence resulted in the loss of the whole action. There is an obvious injustice in concluding that the solicitor was negligent resulting in the whole action being lost, but nevertheless holding that in the first instance the client should pay the costs; the proviso being that he could seek to recover such costs in a separate action in negligence against the solicitor.

In the same vein, Bell J in Minerals Corporation Ltd v Abbot176 held that a costs assessor has the power to carry out an assessment even if ‘there is a major disputed question of negligence in respect of a solicitor’s work’. Her Honour rejected the submission that an assessor lacks power to complete an assessment just because negligence proceedings are pending in the court, and include a claim for damages that unnecessary costs were incurred.177 The court retained a discretion, according to Bell J, in the matter, influenced by factors including:178 whether the client commenced proceedings for negligence before the commencement of the assessment; the extent to which the subject matter of the negligence claim and the assessment are the same; and the quality of the client’s evidence to support the alleged negligence. 5.39 It may be, therefore, that if a costs assessor considers that the lawyer’s negligence goes to the core of the proceeding, such as to be the cause of the client’s loss, all costs incurred have been useless to the client and should be disallowed. As the assessor is dealing only with the quantum of costs, not damages for negligence,179 there is arguably no infringement of the court’s function.180 Yet if the court finds that negligence is not (fully) proven, this has costs consequences, as the lawyer will have been unjustifiably denied some costs. Unless the court orders the bill to be reassessed, the lawyer cannot remedy this injustice. This problem is not unique to cases where the alleged negligence goes to the whole action; an assessor may have disallowed an item due to what he or she considers a negligent act or omission but which

a court then rules is not negligent. There is no reason, though, why the court’s inherent jurisdiction to order taxation181 — grounded as it is in the justice of the matter — should not be available to deal with the issue. [page 125]

Jurisdiction to assess limited to ‘professional’ costs and disbursements 5.40 Aside from disbursements, the only charges of a lawyer that are subject to assessment (or taxation), whether pursuant to the legal profession legislation or the court’s inherent jurisdiction, are those properly called costs of professional work. Remuneration for nonprofessional work is not ‘costs’ — for which a lawyer is not obliged to deliver a bill — and is not subject to assessment (or taxation).182 Lord Langdale MR made the point as far back as 1844 in Allen v Aldridge as follows:183 The statute does not authorise the taxation of every pecuniary demand or bill which may be made or delivered by a person who is a solicitor, for every species of employment in which he may happen to be engaged. The business contained in a taxable bill may be business of which no part was transacted in any Court of Law or Equity; but I am of opinion that it must be business connected with the profession of an attorney or solicitor — business in which the attorney or solicitor was employed, because he was an attorney or solicitor, or in which he would not have been employed, if he had not been an attorney or solicitor, or if the relation of attorney or solicitor and client had not subsisted between him and his employer.

The point was reiterated early last century by Hodges J, who remarked that taxing officers are appointed to tax bills of costs rendered as practitioners of the court, of which they are officers, but ‘[w]hen matters get outside that he cannot tax them — he must run his pen through them and refuse to tax them’.184 So a costs assessor (or taxing officer) who forms an opinion that items in a bill are for consultations and advice on matters involving no element of legal knowledge or expertise must disallow them unless the client, upon full disclosure by the lawyer that those items were unnecessary for the matter, agreed to pay them.185 5.41 Although referred to as assessment of ‘costs’, it includes disbursements. Indeed, the legal profession legislation generally defines ‘costs’ to include disbursements.186 Costs assessors must therefore assess not only the

reasonableness of professional costs charged by lawyers, but also whether or not disbursements have been reasonably incurred and are of reasonable amount. Consistent with the foregoing, though, only professional (as opposed to non-professional) disbursements are subject to assessment.187

Can a costs assessor determine existence of a retainer? 5.42 The extent to which a costs assessor has power to determine the existence of a retainer on an assessment between lawyer and client depends chiefly on who — the client or the lawyer — is seeking to have the bill assessed. [page 126]

Application by client 5.43 As the jurisdiction to assess a bill ordinarily rests upon the applicant being a person who is liable to pay or has paid the bill, where the applicant is the alleged client the invoking of the jurisdiction must ostensibly involve a concession that he or she had retained the lawyer, which is inconsistent with an attempt to dispute the retainer in relation to the whole of the bill.188 This stems from the old English practice that all taxations between solicitor and client were by reference under order of a judge or master, and the form of petition and order required the client to admit the retainer, thus estopping him or her from disputing the whole of the retainer on the taxation. Kekewich J explained the point in Re Battams & Hutchinson as follows:189 It is established practice that where the application is by the client an order for taxation is never made without his submission to pay. That of course rests upon the relation of solicitor and client. The client admits the retainer for the purpose of the business under consideration: he admits the relation, and therefore the liability to pay what is properly due; and if he puts the solicitor to the expense and trouble of taxation, he is bound to pay what is eventually found to be due. That is perfectly right.

The client may nonetheless admit a retainer but object to particular items on the ground of lack of retainer in respect of these items, and the costs assessor may make a determination on the point.190 This convenient practice

of allowing an assessor to decide questions of agreement arising incidentally in the course of an assessment — to thus determine the parameters of an existing retainer — cannot be extrapolated to a general jurisdiction to determine whether or not a retainer exists.191 Moreover, in cases, say, of an oral agreement or one gathered from a long correspondence, difficulty as to its meaning should ideally be determined by the court.192 In any event, a costs assessor’s determination as to the terms of the retainer is reviewable by the court.193

Application by lawyer 5.44 Where it is the lawyer who applies for assessment, which itself alleges the existence of a retainer, the client is not bound by that allegation, and cannot be charged with inconsistency [page 127] if he or she disputes it. In such a case, therefore, the client may object to every item on the ground of want of retainer.194

Costs of assessment The traditional ‘one-sixth rule’ 5.45 The traditional approach to the costs of taxation is known as the ‘onesixth rule’: burdening the client with the costs of taxation if the amount taxed off the bill is less than one-sixth of the bill, and burdening the lawyer if it is one-sixth or more. The rule was instituted to prevent lawyers from overcharging clients; a lawyer who takes the risk of inflating a bill by the improper inclusion of items that ought not to be there takes the risk of having to pay the costs of taxation if these items are disallowed.195

Statutory provision for costs of assessment 5.46 The essence of the one-sixth rule continues to be reflected in the legal

profession legislation. Other than in South Australia, it imposes the costs of the assessment on the law practice if the legal costs are reduced by at least 15 per cent on the assessment.196 It prescribes the same outcome where a costs assessor is satisfied that the law practice has failed to comply with costs disclosure obligations.197 In each case, though, the assessor retains the power to ‘otherwise order’, and so the onus rests on the law practice to establish grounds on which it should be relieved, in whole or in part, of the costs of the assessment. Outside of these scenarios, the costs of the assessment are payable by the other party to the assessment. The South Australian legislation contains no specific provision directed to the costs of taxation, and the previous provisions in the Supreme Court Rules198 have been superseded. The current rules address the issue in the context of settlement offers pertaining to costs disputes,199 but make no further provision.

Lawyer–Client Taxation in the Federal Court 5.47 Unlike the legal profession legislation, the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) contains no provision that deals explicitly with the taxation (or assessment) of costs as between lawyer and own client. This does not mean that the Federal Court lacks jurisdiction to order the taxation of a lawyer–client bill by the taxing officer of the Federal Court (who conducts of taxations as between party and party).200 The jurisdiction stems from s 23 of the Act,201 which [page 128] empowers the court ‘in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders’ as it thinks appropriate. As this section may be invoked to facilitate the judicial process for various purposes — including ensuring the convenient, expeditious and fair conduct

of legal proceedings and giving full force and effect to the court’s orders — it encompasses the power to direct the taxation of a lawyer–client bill relating to costs incurred in connection with a proceeding in the court.202 In exercising its powers under s 23, the court can control the amount a lawyer appearing before it may charge a client, which would be incomplete unless it encompassed the power to order a client to pay the lawyer what was properly due for work done for the client in the court.203 Yet even in the absence of a provision such as s 23, the Federal Court, as a superior court of record, presumably has the inherent power to order taxation of a bill.204 5.48 Rules could be made dealing with lawyer and own client taxation,205 as the Act empowers rules to be made in relation to ‘the costs of proceedings in the Court’206 and ‘the fees to be charged by practitioners practising in the Court for the work done by them in relation to proceedings in the Court and the taxation of their bills of costs, either as between party and party or as between solicitor and client’.207 However, no rules specifically dealing with lawyer and own client taxation have been made. Perhaps O 62 r 8 of the former Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth), which stated that ‘bills of costs and fees which are payable to barristers and solicitors … in respect of business transacted by them in the Court … are liable to be taxed’, could extend to the taxation of costs between lawyer and client. But read in the context of the other rules in O 62, it could not fairly be so construed,208 as the thrust of O 62 was to provide for the quantification of costs ordered by the court to be paid by one party to another. 5.49 The issue is therefore not one of jurisdiction, but of determining when it is appropriate that the Federal Court exercise this power. The existence of state legislation that governs disputes over costs between lawyers and their own clients provides powerful reasons against the Federal Court usurping this jurisdiction except in rare cases.209 Hence, taxation of costs between lawyer and client in respect of work performed under a retainer entered into in a state or territory is ordinarily determined under the relevant state or territory legislation, not in the Federal Court. The power to order a lawyer and own client taxation in the Federal Court is exercised only if necessary to ensure the convenient, expeditious and fair conduct of legal proceedings, and to give full force to the court’s orders.210 5.50 In ordering taxation as between lawyer and own client in the Federal Court, Cooper J in Ccom Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd,211 for example, was

influenced by the following factors. First, it was highly inconvenient that the costs should be separately taxed in the Federal Court and in [page 129] the Queensland Supreme Court, as this would cause the parties to incur substantial additional costs.212 Second, there was a real prospect of inconsistency between the two taxations, and the prospect of separate appeals in each court from the decisions of the two taxing officers was a matter of serious concern.213 Third, the involvement of the Federal Court in the dealings between the former solicitors and the respondents had been substantial. Therefore, a taxation in the Federal Court of both bills of costs ensured consistency and convenience in the determination of common items and avoided substantial additional cost, inconvenience and delay in having the lawyer and client bill taxed separately in the Supreme Court.

Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction to Order Taxation Scope of the inherent jurisdiction 5.51 From the earliest times, courts of law and equity exercised control over solicitors who practised in them, and although in time the profession came to be regulated by statute, the court’s inherent jurisdiction over its officers continues to exist as a supplement to the statutory regulation.214 As to the taxation of costs, aside from the statutory jurisdiction conferred by the legal profession legislation,215 the court’s jurisdiction to order taxation of costs is manifested in the two ways noted below: There is a jurisdiction (commonly called the ‘inherent’ jurisdiction) founded upon the relation to the court of attorneys and solicitors considered as officers of the court, which enables the court to regulate the charges made for work done by those attorneys and solicitors in that capacity, and to prevent exorbitant demands.216 This jurisdiction was historically

exercised both by the Court of Chancery217 and the courts of law,218 and after the Judicature Acts its existence was ‘completely established’.219 To this end, all superior courts220 retain a jurisdiction to ascertain, whether by taxation or fixation, the costs and disbursements claimed by a solicitor from a client.221 [page 130] Where a client sued by his or her solicitor for the latter’s costs challenges the reasonableness of the sum claimed, the court has the jurisdiction (known as the ‘ordinary’ jurisdiction) to determine the amount of costs by taxation or analogous proceedings — including referring the matter to a taxing officer — even though taxation or assessment is not available under statute (usually due to the expiry of time).222 Although emanating from a time when lawyers’ retainers said nothing specific about fees, unlike today, as the modern statutory regimes do not purport to exclusively state the means whereby the reasonableness of legal costs can be ascertained, the ordinary jurisdiction remains.223 5.52 As statute in each jurisdiction makes express provision for assessment of a lawyer’s bill of costs under certain specified conditions, the statutory jurisdiction must be taken into account when considering whether the inherent jurisdiction should be exercised. This dictates that the inherent jurisdiction is chiefly a residual jurisdiction invoked in circumstances where, although an order for assessment cannot be made under the statute, justice requires that it should be made.224 As such, the court’s inherent power to order the taxation of a bill rests upon the exercise of judicial discretion.

Circumstances where the inherent jurisdiction invoked 5.53 Judges have remarked that the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised ‘in the way it might think fit’,225 ‘if circumstances make it right to do so’,226 ‘in a proper case … taking care to impose such terms as will prevent any injustice being done’,227 and where it is ‘just and equitable’ so as to do justice

between the parties by ensuring ‘that the solicitor, as an officer of the court, is remunerated properly and no more, for the work he does as a solicitor’.228 In practice, the two main types of cases where the inherent jurisdiction could retain some utility were where statute did not provide for the taxation of part of a bill of costs229 and where the time within which a bill may be taxed under statute had expired. But as the legal profession legislation now makes general provision for the assessment of part of a bill,230 and to extend (an already generous) time frame for applying for assessment,231 the inherent jurisdiction has an almost negligible role in the modern law.232 [page 131]

Alteration and Substitution of Delivered Bills Prohibition at general law 5.54 At general law, it has repeatedly been held that a lawyer who delivers a bill of costs without reserving the right to withdraw or alter it upon a valid condition233 is, for the purposes of the taxation, bound by it. Unlike the case of a party and party bill,234 the lawyer cannot alter it except with leave of the court.235 Two reasons are commonly cited for this prohibition. First, it prevents a lawyer who has sent a bill he or she fears will be drastically pruned on taxation from seeking to substitute something more moderate upon learning that taxation is threatened, and that the one-sixth rule236 puts him or her in jeopardy of being liable to pay the costs of taxation.237 Second, if a lawyer can withdraw a bill a client wishes to have taxed and submit another bill for a higher amount for taxation, the client may be reticent to request taxation for fear of having to pay more than he or she was charged in the first instance.238 More generally, the lawyer is treated strictly because the matter is one in which he or she is an expert and the client is not.239 Were it not for such a rule, ‘it might well be open to solicitors to act oppressively in particular circumstances’.240

New South Wales position 5.55 Case authority in New South Wales since 1884,241 though not always consistent, favours the view that a lawyer who delivers a bill that is disputed by the client is entitled to recover the full and proper remuneration for his or her services after taxation.242 Lawyers are therefore not limited to the amount shown on that original bill. Bowen CJ endorsed these early authorities in Florence Investments Pty Ltd v H G Slater & Co,243 querying whether prohibition on the alteration of the bill was consistent with natural justice.244 His Honour held that on taxation of an itemised bill, an earlier lump sum bill for a lesser amount does not limit the amount [page 132] allowable, but that weight should be given to that earlier bill.245 Although decided under the former taxation of costs regime, the same approach has been held to apply under the present costs assessment regime,246 and there are cases where a judge has found error in a costs assessor’s failure to give sufficient, or any, weight to a later bill.247 Each item in a bill must be considered according to the circumstances that apply to it, one of which may be an earlier bill.

Qualifications to the general law prohibition 5.56 There are three main qualifications to the general law prohibition on the alteration or substitution of bills of costs that have been delivered, which ultimately highlight that there is no absolute prohibition.248 These stem from statute in some jurisdictions, leave of the court, or the delivery of a bill on condition that it may be changed.

Statute — Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania and Victoria 5.57 The legal profession legislation in the Australian Capital Territory empowers the Supreme Court, if a law practice gives lump sum bill for legal services and later gives an itemised bill for those services, to deny the law

practice costs exceeding the amount of the lump sum bill.249 Conversely, in Tasmania and Victoria the legislation provides that if, before giving an itemised bill, the law practice had previously given a lump sum bill, the law practice is not bound on assessment by the amount and matters stated in the lump sum bill.250

Leave of the court 5.58 The court may grant a lawyer leave to amend a bill that has been delivered.251 In deciding whether or not to grant leave, the court must inquire whether allowing the amendment is consistent with the safeguards the rule is intended to foster.252 There is the additional protection that, even if leave is granted, the amendment does not affect the traditional ‘one-sixth rule’253 for determining who is liable for the costs of taxing the bill.254 Generally speaking, before granting leave the court looks for special circumstances, such as fraud, accident or mistake.255 The case law refers to the discretion being exercised to guard [page 133] against genuine mistakes256 (not an underhanded means of securing an advantage) and to prevent a client’s unjust enrichment.257 The court may allow the withdrawal and substitution of the bill if it is satisfied that the lawyer has acted honestly and merits assistance,258 and the ambit of the amendment can be confined so as to avoid prejudicing the client’s legitimate interests.259 The lawyer is treated strictly due to his or her expertise over the client, and so if the circumstances do not exhibit this relative inequality, the rationale for the rule fades. 5.59 As the court, in allowing an amendment, seeks to protect the client’s legitimate interests, it may grant leave subject to conditions or limitations. In fact, Tadgell J in Redfern v Mineral Engineers Pty Ltd260 remarked that he was unaware any case in which a lawyer had been given blanket leave to withdraw an original taxable bill and to substitute a fresh bill that had been redrawn to take account of objections raised or threatened or otherwise

apprehended upon a taxation. To grant blanket leave would, according to his Honour, ‘deny the general rule altogether and deprive the client of the protection it is designed to provide’.261 In Redfern a lump sum bill for $12,219 was delivered, and the client sought an itemised bill. Although the latter totalled $14,106, the solicitor sought to recover only $12,219 on taxation. After receiving objections to the bill, the solicitor referred the itemised bill to a costs consultant, who advised that the bill had not been drawn adequately to represent the work done, noting that some items were omitted but others not sustainable. Tadgell J granted the solicitor limited relief, stating:262 [T]he client is entitled to a taxation of all of the items included in the existing itemized bill and to have those items submitted for taxation at the rates at which and the amounts for which they are respectively charged in that bill. In the circumstances, however, the solicitor is entitled to justify his lump sum bills by reference to the existing itemized bill and by reference also to items not the subject of a charge on that bill. The integrity of the general rule will be preserved, and the client will have the benefit of it, if the solicitor is allowed within a limited time to submit a second itemized bill no different in any material particular from his original itemized bill save for (a) the addition of any item not the subject of any charge on the first bill; and (b) any increase of the charge for any item included in the first bill otherwise than by virtue of an increase in the rate at which the charge made by the first bill was calculated.

His Honour was influenced by the fact that the solicitor prepared the itemised bill with a view to justifying only the amount of the lump sum bill, and that there was no suggestion [page 134] of dishonest conduct on his part. The court’s assistance enabled the solicitor to avoid losing charges to which he was entitled but had overlooked.

Bill delivered subject to a condition that it may be changed 5.60 It is permissible for a lawyer, when delivering a bill, to reserve the right to withdraw or alter it upon a condition, provided the condition is fully and clearly stated to the client, and is lawful.263 The leading case is Re Thompson.264 There a firm of solicitors, being pressed by a client to deliver a bill of costs, did so attaching a letter stating that, because of the haste in which the bill was prepared, certain charges had not been included in the bill,

but that the firm was willing to accept a stated sum in full discharge of the bill, although if this sum was not paid within eight days, the firm reserved the right to withdraw the bill and deliver another one. The clients insisted on further particulars of the charges on the bill, in response to which the solicitors purported to withdraw the bill. Cotton LJ held that as the clients took the bill on the condition stated, if the condition was a lawful one, it could not be said that the clients ‘took it otherwise than subject to the consequences of that condition’.265 On the issue of what constitutes a lawful condition, his Lordship explained:266 If a solicitor were to send a bill to his client and to say, ‘Here is a bill which contains charges which I cannot sustain on taxation, or which it is probable I should not be able to maintain on taxation; they are sums for work done which are not allowed on taxation’; or if in any other way he were fairly to state to his client that there were charges in that bill which the client could not be forced to pay, and was not bound to pay, but which represented work fairly done; and if, therefore, the solicitor sent his bill, with a suggestion that these charges should be paid, and said, ‘If you do not like to adopt this bill after what I have told you, then I will send in a bill which will include those charges which will bear taxation and which I can enforce against you’ — if a condition were expressed in those terms it would … be in no way contrary to the rules which the decisions of this Court have imposed on solicitors in their dealings with their clients: and if a client were to take the bill under those circumstances, he must take it subject to that condition. If the client took the bill but refused to assent to the condition, then the solicitor, having fairly stated the condition to the client, would be at liberty to say, ‘That was a condition which I might lawfully make; the client took the bill on that condition, and that condition not having been assented to, I am entitled to send in another bill’. But that assumes that the solicitor has stated that to his client which will prevent such a condition being made use of for fraud.

Cotton LJ held the condition in question to be invalid, as the solicitors had ‘tried to impose a condition in such terms as not fairly to state to the client what they desired to do, or what the effect of that bill and of the charges in it was’.267 Lindley LJ agreed, remarking that underlying any condition is that ‘a solicitor must deal fairly with his client’.268 His Lordship held the condition to be ‘a catching and not a fair condition’, the reason being that the bill was not one by which the solicitors were prepared to stand. It was not a bill to which they could safely or fairly say to their client: ‘This is our bill made up to the best of our ability; it contains charges which you may pay if you are disposed, but which we tell you frankly we are not prepared to maintain’.269 Any honest disclosure of this sort would, said his Lordship, have made all the difference, but the facts revealed the contrary. The bill they first sent therefore bound the solicitors. The condition in Re Thompson can be contrasted with that upheld in Re Lippiatt & Co’s Bill of Costs.270 There the respondent solicitors delivered a

bill of costs on condition that if the applicant insisted on taxation, the bill would be withdrawn and a second bill in taxable form [page 135] delivered. The client rejected the bill and demanded one in taxable form, and the respondent delivered a second bill in a higher amount. The client sought to refer the first bill to taxation. This Muir J rejected, reasoning that there was nothing unfair, unjust or unconscionable in the condition imposed in respect of the first bill or, in the alternative, that the first bill was rendered on a provisional basis only, rejected and replaced by a new bill expressly requested by the client.271 Other factors that influenced his Honour’s decision were that the client rejected the first bill and the second was presented at the client’s request, the client’s considerable delay in making the request prejudiced the respondent, the client was experienced in relation to bills of costs, and there was little if any evidence of overcharging. Also, the disparity between the amounts of each bill was explicable. Solely from the point of view of the construction of the respective conditions in the above two cases, there is arguably little in substance to differentiate them. True, in Re Thompson the solicitors admitted that some charges had not been included in the bill, but this is hardly sufficient to justify a different outcome. Rather, the validity of the condition seems to rest not only on its terms, but also on the nature and conduct of the client, and the conduct of the lawyer. This approach is consistent with the courts’ general discretion in this area, a discretion that rests upon an analysis of all the circumstances of the case.

Review of Costs Assessment Statutory provision for review 5.61 In each jurisdiction the legal profession legislation makes specific provision for the review of a costs assessor’s determination. In New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia the same process as

applies to the review of assessment as between party and party applies to reviewing assessments between lawyer and own client.272 To avoid repetition, the review process for these jurisdictions is therefore discussed in the context of party and party assessments in Chapter 18. In the Australian Capital Territory, the Supreme Court conducts the assessment, and so it follows that, given the absence of specific provision in the legal profession legislation on the review of assessment,273 the court’s determination can be appealed to the Court of Appeal.274 The South Australian legislation simply states that, subject to the court rules, a determination on taxation can be appealed to a judge.275 5.62 The legal profession legislation in the Northern Territory prescribes a procedure specific to the review of lawyer–client costs assessment.276 A party to the assessment may apply to a [page 136] reviewer277 for a review of the costs assessor’s determination.278 The reviewer may affirm the assessor’s determination, or set aside that determination and substitute the determination that, in the reviewer’s opinion, and on the evidence received by the assessor unless the reviewer decides otherwise, should have been made by the assessor.279 The applicant is to pay the costs of the review if the reviewer affirms the costs assessor’s determination, or the reviewer makes a determination in favour of the applicant that increases or decreases the total costs payable by an amount that is less than 15 per cent of the total costs payable as assessed by the assessor.280 A reviewer’s determination of an application for review can be appealed to the court, either on a matter of law281 or with leave of the court.282 The provisions relating to appeals are equivalent to those applicable in New South Wales, which also apply in the party and party context, and so are discussed in Chapter 18.283 5.63 The equivalent Tasmanian legislation also makes specific provision for review of assessment.284 It envisages that a party dissatisfied with the outcome of an assessment may, in the first instance, make a written objection to the costs assessor, who must reconsider and review the assessment of the

items that are the subject of the objection.285 A party who makes an objection, but remains dissatisfied with the assessor’s determination as to any item (or part of an item) may apply to the court to review the assessment as to that item (or part).286 The court may, on this application, and on the evidence before the costs assessor unless it otherwise directs, make any order as may be just.287

Curial reticence to interfere with discretion 5.64 Taxing officers historically, and costs assessors in modern times, enjoy a wide discretion as to items allowable on a taxation or assessment as between lawyer and own client.288 Courts are, accordingly, reticent to interfere with their determinations.289 This reflects no more than the reticence any appellate or review tribunal exercises in altering the decision of a person in whom a discretionary judgment is vested. Assuming that it is legitimate to dispute a taxation or assessment before a court, the relevant principles applicable to the court’s review in the party and party context290 apply similarly in respect of lawyer and own client taxation or assessment.291

1.

The terminology ‘solicitor and own client’ taxation is appropriate to distinguish this form of taxation from the ‘solicitor and client’ basis of taxation of costs as between party and party: see 16.18–16.22.

2.

The Costs Court was established pursuant to amendments to the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) (see new Pt 2, Div 2B) occasioned by the Courts Legislation Amendment (Costs Court and Other Matters) Act 2008 (Vic), with effect from 31 December 2009. The Costs Court is established within the Trial Division of the Supreme Court (s 17C(1)), and consists of such Associate Judges as are from time to time allocated to the Costs Court by the Chief Justice (s 17C(2)). It has jurisdiction, inter alia, to hear and determine the assessment, settling, taxation or review of costs in all proceedings in the Supreme Court, the County Court, the Magistrates’ Court and the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT): s 17D(1). For this purpose, the rules states that costs in proceedings in the County Court, the Magistrates’ Court and VCAT are to be taxed in the Costs Court, save to the extent that the rules, or any order or decision, of those courts and tribunal, provides to the contrary: Vic r 63.01.1 (inserted as from 1 April 2013). Before the establishment of the Costs Court, costs review was conducted by the ‘taxing master’.

3.

NSW s 390(1), Sch 5 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208S(1), Sch 7) (appointed by the Chief Justice); NT s 366 (appointed by the Chief Justice, Chief Magistrate or the Law Society); Qld s 300 (‘costs assessor’ means a person appointed under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules as a cost assessor: see Qld rr 743J–743R (appointed by the Brisbane registrar of the Supreme Court)).

4.

NSW s 390(4) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208S(4)); NT s 366(8).

5.

Tas s 283.

6.

Supreme Court Act 1959 (Tas) s 10.

7.

WA s 3 (‘taxing officer’ means a taxing officer of the Supreme Court).

8.

Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 10; ACT rr 1760, 1761; SA s 42(1), 42(1a); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) ss 17F (Costs Judge may direct judicial registrars and costs registrars), 17G (powers and functions of costs registrar), 17GA (Powers and functions of judicial registrar).

9.

Re Grant, Bulcraig & Co [1906] 1 Ch 124 at 128 per Farwell J.

10. J P Hannaford, Attorney-General (NSW), Legal Profession Reform Bill 1993, Second Reading Speech, Hansard, 16 September 1993, p 3277. 11. See, for instance, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice Directions, 2009, 4.7.3, cl 9 (which states that bills are taxed ‘by each and every item in the bill being considered in turn and an allowance being made in respect of each’ but at the same time encourages parties, prior to the taxation, to ‘consider whether there may be a more efficient means of conducting the taxation’, and makes suggestions to this end). 12. As to the distinction between professional and ‘non-professional’ costs and disbursements see 5.40–5.41. 13. For the purposes of the legal profession legislation, costs are, in any case, generally defined to include disbursements: ACT Dictionary; NSW s 4(1); NT s 4; SA s 5(1); Vic s 1.2.1(1); Tas s 4(1); WA s 3. For the meaning of ‘disbursement’ see 1.8–1.9. 14. Re Ladner Downs and Thauberger (1983) 149 DLR (3d) 21 at 32 per Wallace J (SC(BC)); Cortex, Investments Ltd v Olphert & Collins [1984] 2 NZLR 434 at 437 per Woodhouse P (CA); New South Wales Crime Commission v Fleming (1991) 24 NSWLR 116 at 122; BC9101668 per Gleeson CJ (CA). 15. Others, though, including the lawyer, may do so: see 5.8. 16. Re Solicitor [1972] 1 OR 684 at 697 per Wright J (HCJ(Ont)). 17. [1987] VR 518 at 523. 18. Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice Directions, 2009, 4.7.2, cl 12, discussed at 18.23 in the context of party and party bills. 19. The Legal Services Commissioner is appointed under NSW Pt 7.3 (formerly NSW 1987 Pt 10 Div 2). 20. Either the Law Society Council or the Bar Council. 21. The office of the Statutory Supervisor is established pursuant to NT Pt 7.5. 22. NSW s 336(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 198B(1), where the threshold was $2,500); NT s 330(1). 23. In New South Wales, the Manager, Costs Assessment; in the Northern Territory, a registrar. 24. NSW s 336(3); NT s 330(3). 25. NSW s 336(5) (formerly NSW 1987 s 198B(4)); NT s 330(5). 26. Qld Pt 4.5. 27. Qld s 440. 28. Vic Pt 4.3 Div 3. 29. Vic s 4.2.2(a) (cf the former Vic 1996 s 122).

30. ‘Sophisticated client’ is defined in ACT s 261; NSW s 302(1); NT s 295(1); Qld s 300; Tas s 283; Vic s 3.4.2; WA s 251. This includes, for this purpose, an associated third party payer who would be a sophisticated client were he or she a client, but by the terms of the legislation does not extend to a non-associated third party payer, who can waive its right to costs review: Gadens Lawyers v Beba Enterprises Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 519; BC201208528 at [47], [48] per Emerton J (affd Beba Enterprises Pty Ltd v Gadens Lawyers [2013] VSCA 136; BC201310083). As to the meaning of ‘associated third party payer’ and ‘non-associated third party payer’ see 5.9. 31. ACT s 304A; NSW s 395A; NT s 343; Qld s 344; Tas s 338; Vic s 3.4.48A; WA s 309. 32. See 5.51–5.53. 33. ACT s 294A(1) (to the Supreme Court) (cf the former ACT 1970 s 180); NSW s 350(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 199(1)) (to the Manager, Costs Assessment); NT s 332(1) (to a costs assessor) (cf the former NT 1974 s 120); Qld s 335(1) (application to the relevant court: Qld UCPR r 743A; the rules make provision for the parties to agree on a costs assessor to conduct the assessment (r 743E) and, lacking agreement, for application to the registrar to appoint a costs assessor (r 743F)) (cf the former Qld 1952 s 6ZA); Tas s 319(1) (to a costs assessor) (cf the former Tas 1993 s 135(1)); Vic s 3.4.38(1) (to the Costs Court) (cf the former Vic 1996 ss 115(1) (to the taxing master), 116(1) (to the court: see Cave v Efron & Associates (a firm) [2000] VSC 38; BC200000712 at [6] per Beach J)); WA s 295(2) (to a taxing officer) (cf the former WA 1893 s 66(1); WA 2003 s 232(3)). 34. As to the meaning of ‘third party payer’ see 5.9. 35. ACT s 294A(2); NSW s 350(2); NT s 332(2); Qld s 335(2); Tas s 319(2); Vic s 3.4.38(2) (to the Costs Court) (cf the former Vic 1996 ss 115(1) (to the taxing master), 116(1) (to the court: see Cave v Efron & Associates (a firm) [2000] VSC 38; BC200000712 at [6] per Beach J)); WA s 295(3). 36. ACT s 295(1); NSW s 351(1) (formerly NSW s 200(1)); NT s 333(1); Qld s 336(1); Tas s 320(1); Vic s 3.4.39(1); WA s 296(1). 37. ACT s 296(1)–(3); NSW s 352(1)–(3) (formerly NSW 1987 s 201); NT s 334(1)–(3); Qld s 337(1)–(3) (cf the former Qld 1952 s 48K, which envisaged that, in a proceeding to recover legal fees or costs, the court could appoint a costs assessor or another person to assess the account); Tas s 321(1)–(3); Vic s 3.4.40(1), 3.4.40(2), 3.4.40(2A); WA s 297(1)–(3). 38. As to proceedings to prerequisites to a lawyer proceeding to recover unpaid costs see Ch 4. 39. SA s 42(1), 42(1a) (and see SA r 272). 40. SA s 42(5). 41. ACT s 261A(1)(a); NSW s 302A(1)(a); NT s 296(1)(a); Qld s 301(1); Tas s 284(1)(a); Vic s 3.4.2A(1)(a); WA s 253(1)(a). 42. ACT s 261A(1); NSW s 302A(1); NT s 296(1); Qld s 301(1); Tas s 284(1); Vic s 3.4.2A; WA s 253(1). 43. Boyce v McIntyre (2009) 78 NSWLR 152; [2009] NSWCA 185; BC200906235 at [19]–[21] per Ipp JA, with whom Macfarlan JA and Hoeben J concurred. 44. Boyce v McIntyre (2009) 78 NSWLR 152; [2009] NSWCA 185; BC200906235 at [22] per Ipp JA, with whom Macfarlan JA and Hoeben J concurred. 45. Legal Services Commissioner v Wright [2012] 2 Qd R 360; [2010] QCA 321; BC201008678 at [28] per McMurdo J. 46. As to the meaning of ‘third party payer’ see 5.9.

47. ACT s 294A(5); NSW s 350(4) (cf the former NSW 1987 s 199(2)); NT s 332(5); Qld s 335(5); Tas s 319(5) (cf the former Tas 1993 s 135(2)); Vic s 3.4.38(5) (cf the former Vic 1996 ss 115(2), 116(3)); WA s 295(6) (cf the former WA 1893 s 66(1); WA 2003 s 232(3)). 48. Viscariello v Oakley Thompson & Co Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 351; BC201206167 at [12]–[21], [30] per Ferguson J. 49. SA s 41(2). 50. ACT s 295(4); NSW s 351(3) (cf the former NSW 1987 s 200(3)); NT s 333(4); Qld s 336(4); Tas s 320(4); Vic s 3.4.39(3); WA s 296(4). 51. NSW s 351(3) (cf the former NSW 1987 s 200(4)). 52. ACT s 295(4); NSW s 351(4) (formerly NSW 1987 s 200(2)); NT s 333(5); Qld s 336(5); Tas s 320(5); Vic s 3.4.39(4); WA s 296(5). 53. ACT s 296(4); NSW s 352(4) (formerly NSW 1987 s 201(2)); NT s 334(4); Qld s 337(4); Tas s 321(4); Vic s 3.4.40(3); WA s 297(4). 54. The legislation does not define ‘final bill’, but it has been judicially defined as ‘the last bill rendered by the law practice for the legal services the law practice was retained to provide’: Challen v Golder Associates Pty Ltd [2012] QCA 307; BC201208543 at [45] per Mullins J, with whom Margaret McMurdo P and Fraser JA concurred. 55. ACT s 293(2); NT s 328(2); NSW s 334(2); Qld s 333(2); Tas s 317(2); Vic s 3.4.37(2); WA s 293(2). 56. Dromana Estate Ltd v Wilmoth Field Warne [2010] VSC 308; BC201005046. 57. Retemu Pty Ltd v Ryan (DC(NSW), Coorey DCJ, 16 April 2010, unreported); Turner v Mitchells Solicitors and Business Advisers Qld (2013) 33 Qld Lawyer Reps 96; [2011] QDC 61; BC201140054; Tabtill No 2 Pty Ltd v DLA Phillips Fox (a firm) [2012] QSC 115; BC201202498 at [45]–[69] per Applegarth J; Challen v Golder Associates Pty Ltd [2012] QCA 307; BC201208543 at [40]–[42] per Mullins J, with whom Margaret McMurdo P and Fraser JA concurred. 58. See Challen v Golder Associates Pty Ltd [2012] QCA 307; BC201208543 at [40] per Mullins J, with whom Margaret McMurdo P and Fraser JA concurred (noting that if Qld s 333(2) does confer an additional time limit for the assessment of an interim bill, it is anomalous that it is found in a division concerned with billing rather than one concerned with costs assessment where the time period for a costs assessment application is otherwise specified in Qld s 335(5): see 5.10). 59. Challen v Golder Associates Pty Ltd [2012] QCA 307; BC201208543 at [41] per Mullins J, with whom Margaret McMurdo P and Fraser JA concurred. 60. See R Walton, ‘Interim Bill Balancing Act’ (August 2010) 84 LIJ 77. 61. ‘Sophisticated client’ is defined in ACT s 261; NSW s 302(1); NT s 295(1); Qld s 300; Tas s 283; Vic s 3.4.2; WA s 251. 62. ACT s 294A(6), 294A(7); NSW s 350(5); NT s 332(6); Qld s 335(6); Tas s 319(6); Vic s 3.4.38(6) (cf the former Vic 1996 s 115(2)); WA s 295(7) (see Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice Directions, 2009, 4.7.5, which prescribes a procedure for applications to enlarge time). This arguably reflects the approach adopted to the interaction between the previous New South Wales provision (NSW 1987 s 199(2)) — which applied where the costs had been paid — and the inherent jurisdiction (as to which see 5.51–5.53): see Tsekouras v Xenos (SC(NSW), Barr J, 5 August 1997, unreported) BC9703799 (identifying relevant factors in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction in this context as including the level of detail in, and amount of, the bill; any

evidence that the client was unaware of his or her rights to seek assessment; and why the client failed to exercise those rights within the prescribed time frame). Yet it may be queried whether the inherent jurisdiction should oust a clear statutory time limit: Ryan v Whitten [1999] NSWSC 865; BC9905489 at [23] per Malpass M. 63. Frigger v Murfett Legal Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 447; BC201209338 at [26], [31] per Hall J (paragraph break omitted). 64. Some of the relevant case law derives from Western Australia (and the Family Court) dealing with a taxing officer’s power, under former legislation (WA 1893 s 68A(d); WA 2003 s 229(a)), to enlarge time in this context. As this power was conferred so as to ensure that justice was done as between the parties (Monopak Pty Ltd v Maxim Litigation Consultants [2007] WASC 112; BC200704096 at [102] per Newnes J), it aligns with ‘just and fair’ in the current statutory scheme. 65. Webb v Malcolm J Bateman & Co (SC(WA), Franklyn J, 27 May 1986, unreported); Monopak Pty Ltd v Maxim Litigation Consultants [2007] WASC 112; BC200704096 at [101], [102] per Newnes J; Pullinger Readhead Lucas v Golden West Resources Ltd [2009] WASC 140; BC200904248 at [61] per Jenkins J; Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice Directions, 2009, 4.7.4. 66. See, for example, Monopak Pty Ltd v Maxim Litigation Consultants [2007] WASC 112; BC200704096 (where the client’s delay of some 12 months was held to deny an extension of time in view of the prejudice to the solicitors in having to prepare detailed bills of costs pertaining to events occurring some time in the past: at [114]–[115] per Newnes J). Cf Collins v Young & Young (2006) 35 Fam LR 456; [2006] FamCA 610 (FC) (even though the wife delayed applying for assessment for over three years from when first interim costs account rendered, the court found that the prejudice to her in refusing to extend time outweighed any prejudice to solicitors, which was minimal: at [92]); Mustafa v Velos [2012] VSC 133; BC201202226 (where Whelan J extended time because, inter alia, it was arguable that there had been inadequate costs disclosure, the delay was not substantial, there was no suggestion of prejudice to the lawyer, the client was ignorant of his rights, and the sum involved was relatively modest: at [25]). 67. See, for example, Retail Equity Pty Ltd v Murie & Edward (SC(WA), White J, 31 March 1994, unreported) BC9401605 at 5 (where an enlargement of time was approved because the delay was explicable on the ground that the solicitor, by his conduct, could be said to have entered into a tacit agreement with the client to arrange taxation of the bills after the proceedings were over when such a step was no longer prejudicial to the client); Dye v Fisher Cartwright Berriman Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 895; BC201005700 (where Studdert AJ granted an application to extend time in view of the reasons advanced for the minimal delay that had occurred). Cf Harvey v Goodman Law Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 340; BC201103370 (where Harrison J refused an application to extend time because he found the reasons for the delay unconvincing); Frigger v Murfett Legal Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 447; BC201209338 (where Hall J viewed the delay of nine months as significant and not satisfactorily explained, especially as the client was aware of the right to seek an assessment, and therefore declined to extend time). 68. Compare, for example, Lawecki v Marcel Kalfus & Co (1985) 10 Fam LR 464 (FC) (where it was held that, as the client had taken no steps for some six months after becoming aware of her right to seek taxation of the bill, her conduct smacked of approbation so as to deny an extension of time for taxation) with Harrison v Hocking [2000] WASC 188; BC200004249 at [77]–[78] per Hasluck J (where the client did not receive the requisite notice letters, and there was no discernible prejudice to the solicitors, a time extension was granted). 69. See 2.21. 70. Re Maher and Messrs Stedman, Cameron, Meares and Hall (1980) FLC ¶90-889 at 75,611 per

Asche CJ (‘The Court should be as fair minded and lenient as possible in allowing litigants some extension of time where they are unrepresented’); Bosco v Solomon Brothers [2006] WASC 307; BC200610859 at [23] per Sanderson M (extension of time denied because there is no explanation for the delay on the part of the parties charged, who were at all times advised by independent solicitors, even in the absence of prejudice to the lawyer). 71. Monopak Pty Ltd v Maxim Litigation Consultants [2007] WASC 112 at [116] per Newnes J. See, for example, Mantova Holdings Pty Ltd v Rajlaw Pty Ltd [2010] WASC 128; BC201003891 (where Sanderson M noted that while (at [10]) ‘the plaintiff’s reasons for the delay in making this application are not entirely convincing’ and ‘[t]here is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the plaintiff was not aware of its rights; nor is there any explanation as to why these rights were not exercised’ (at [10]), as ‘it is plain that the amount charged would exceed the scale’, ‘there is evidence of overcharging’, and ‘a refusal to allow the extension of time may cause an injustice to the plaintiff’ (at [13]), when coupled with ‘no evidence that extending time would cause prejudice to the practitioner’ (at [15]), there were grounds to extend time). Cf Blyth and Hooper v Dennis [2007] WASC 177; BC200706266 at [68] per Newnes J (who held that even against the backdrop of some evidence that the costs might be excessive, a delay of four years or more in applying for taxation would prejudice the law firm by requiring it to itemise bills of costs in respect of invoices rendered so long ago). 72. See, for example, Blyth and Hooper v Dennis [2007] WASC 177; BC200706266 (where the respondent, over a period of more than four years, had received and paid almost 30 separate invoices on which the time limit was endorsed, and at no stage during that time complained about the amount or reasonableness of the invoices, Newnes J refused to extend time, noting that the respondent’s explanation for the delay was ‘far from satisfactory’, and that there was real prejudice to the law firm in allowing an extension of time: at [59]). 73. Retail Equity Pty Ltd v Murie & Edward (SC(WA), White J, 31 March 1994, unreported) BC9401605 at 5; Harrison v Hocking [2000] WASC 188; BC200004249 at [78] per Hasluck J. 74. Monopak Pty Ltd v Maxim Litigation Consultants [2007] WASC 112; BC200704096 at [113] per Newnes J. See also Frigger v Murfett Legal Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 447; BC201209338 at [30] per Hall J (‘While I am likewise not satisfied that there would be a specific prejudice to the respondent other than the general prejudice flowing from delay itself, that is only one factor that must be born in mind and in this case is not enough to persuade me that an extension would be appropriate’). To the extent that the remark of Studdert AJ in Dye v Fisher Cartwright Berriman Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 895; BC201005700 at [18] that ‘[t]here must be some prejudice to a practitioner attendant upon the postponement of the resolution of what if anything is owed by his client pursuant to a bill of costs’ suggests that an absence of prejudice to the lawyer, independent of other factors entirely, can justify extending time, the remark is inconsistent with the multi-faceted approach required of an inquiry grounded in justice and fairness. 75. As to the meaning of ‘third party payer’ see 5.9. 76. ACT s 294A(3) (cf the former ACT 1970 s 180(2), 180(3)); NSW s 350(3); NT s 332(3) (cf the former NT 1974 s 120(2), 120(3)); Qld s 335(3); Tas s 319(3); Vic s 3.4.38(3) (cf the former Vic 1996 s 116(5)); WA s 295(4). 77. ACT s 294A(4); NSW s 350(3A) (cf the former NSW 1987 s 199(3): see Parramatta River Lodge Pty Ltd v Sunman (1991) 5 BPR 12,038 at 12,040–1; BC9101975 per Young J); NT s 332(4); Qld s 335(4); Tas s 319(4); Vic s 3.4.38(4); WA s 295(5). 78. ACT s 295(2), 295(3); NSW s 351(2), 351(2A) (cf the former NSW 1987 s 200(3)); NT s 333(2), 333(3); Qld s 336(2), 336(3); Tas s 320(2), 320(3); Vic s 3.4.39(2), 3.4.39(2A); WA s 296(2), 296(3).

79. NSW 1987 s 199(2); Tas 1993 s 135(2); Vic 1996 s 116(5), as to which see the first edition of this work, 4.49. 80. As to the meaning of ‘special circumstances’ in this context, see the first edition of this work, 4.50–4.55. 81. ACT s 298(b) (cf the former ACT 1970 s 187); NSW s 355(b); NT s 336(b) (cf the former NT 1974 s 127); Qld s 338(b); Tas s 323(b) (formerly Tas 1993 s 135(3)); Vic s 3.4.41(1)(b) (cf the former Vic ss 115(3), 116(1)(b), 116(2)); WA s 298(b) (cf the former WA 1893 s 66B; WA 2003 s 236). 82. See the first edition of this work, 4.47. 83. SA s 42(2). 84. NSW s 367(1); NT s 344(1), 344(1A). 85. See 5.17–5.19. 86. See 5.20. 87. ACT s 300(1) (and also whether any uplift fee was justified in the circumstances); NSW s 363(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208A(1)); NT s 341(1) (see also NT r 63.35(2)); Qld s 341(1); Tas s 327(1); Vic s 3.4.44(1) (see also Vic rr 63.37(2), 63.59); WA s 301(1). 88. The term ‘may’ in this context takes its ordinary meaning, namely a permissive as opposed to mandatory meaning: Reynolds v Whittens (2002) 57 NSWLR 271; [2002] NSWSC 155; BC200200797 at [35] per O’Keefe J. 89. ACT s 300(2); NSW s 363(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208B); NT s 341(2); Qld s 341(2); Tas s 327(2); Vic s 3.4.44(2); WA s 301(2). 90. As to costs disclosure obligations see 2.21–2.34. 91. This appears to envisage a ‘location factor’, grounded in the notion that lawyers with offices in a certain location (such as, for instance, the central business district as opposed to suburbia or the country, or a large city as opposed to a smaller town) are likely to incur higher overheads than those not similarly located. Yet Malpass M in Crooke v David Crooke Pty Ltd (SC(NSW), Malpass M, 12 April 1996, unreported) BC9601195 ruled that the costs assessor was in error in taking into account a ‘location factor’. In a letter accompanying his certificate of determination, the assessor, in notifying the matters he had taken into account in his assessment, made the following statement: ‘The applicant’s solicitors have their main office in Wagga. It is not as small as Cooma but nor is it as large as Sydney with the attendant costs of practice in the Sydney CBD.’ Malpass M said that he understood that the costs assessor had accepted for the purpose of his assessment that the costs of running a practice in Wagga Wagga were less than those in the Sydney CBD, and had taken account of ‘overhead’ expenses in determining appropriate hourly rates of charge. The master said that in his opinion the costs assessor’s approach was not ‘justified by the statute’ although, he conceded, that the language of the factor cited in the text might lead to that result and the perceived approach had the potential to discriminate between legal practitioners by taking into account ‘matters of size and overheads’. He did not consider that result was intended by the parliament. Yet as it is unclear what parliament may have had in mind other than a location factor (or the like), and the recognition that location factors may influence the reasonableness of costs agreements (see 3.38), the master’s conclusion seems odd. 92. See 5.24–5.39. 93. Costs agreements are discussed in Ch 3. 94. As to the setting aside of costs agreements see 3.13–3.22.

95. As to disclosure requirements see 2.21–2.34. 96. ACT s 300A(1) (cf the former ACT 1970 s 190(1)); NSW s 361(1) (cf the former NSW 1987 s 208C); NT s 339(1) (cf the former NT 1974 s 129(1)); Qld s 340(1) (cf the former Qld 1952 s 6ZA); Tas s 328(1) (cf the former Tas 1993 s 129(2)); Vic s 3.4.44A(1) (cf the former Vic 1996 s 101(2), 101(3)); WA s 302(1) (cf the former WA 1893 s 66A; WA 2003 s 235: see Cerini v McLeods (a firm) [2004] WASC 45; BC200401259 at [44], [45] per Pullin J). The assessor (in Victoria, the Costs Court) is not required to initiate an examination of the two latter matters stated in the text: ACT s 300A(2); NT s 339(2); NSW s 361(2); Qld s 340(2); Tas s 328(2); Vic s 3.4.44A(2); WA s 302(2). 97. ‘Sophisticated client’ is defined in ACT s 261; NSW s 302(1); NT s 295(1); Qld s 300; Tas s 283; Vic s 3.4.2; WA s 251. 98. ACT s 282(5); NSW s 322(5) (cf the former NSW 1987 s 189(2), as to which see Goldsmith v Villanueva [2000] NSWSC 1181; BC200007611 at [7]–[8] per Adams J); NT s 317(5); Qld s 322(5); Tas s 306(5); Vic s 3.4.26(5); WA s 282(5). 99. Wentworth v Rogers [2002] NSWSC 709; BC200204532 at [25], [26] per Barrett J. Cf Wentworth v Rogers (2006) 66 NSWLR 474; [2006] NSWCA 145; BC200604064 at [19] per Santow JA (who opined that the statutory structure reveals ‘a legislative policy that the private agreement of the client and legal representative which complies with the Act is normally the final determinant of the costs payable on assessment, unless something in the nature of unconscionable conduct has been practised by the legal representative on the client’); Keesing v Adams [2010] NSWSC 336; BC201002421 at [26], [30] per Brereton J. 100. NSW s 359(3)(b) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208(3)(b)). 101. As to which see 3.7–3.12. 102. Wentworth v Rogers (2006) 66 NSWLR 474; [2006] NSWCA 145; BC200604064 at [41] per Santow JA. As to the circumstances where a costs agreement is rendered void by statute see 3.19, 3.54. 103. Doyle v Hall Chadwick [2007] NSWCA 159; BC200705261 at [61] per Hodgson JA (affirming the decision of Rothman J at first instance in Hall Chadwick Pty Ltd v Doyle [2006] NSWSC 1195; BC200609205 at [74]–[80], who ruled that a costs assessor’s determination of the proper construction of a conditional costs agreement as to whether or not ‘success’ had been achieved, and therefore whether costs were payable under the contract, was not an exercise within the jurisdiction of a costs assessor); Nassour v Malouf [2011] NSWSC 356; BC201104016 at [97]– [98] per Harrison AsJ; Yohana v Barclay Benson Lawyers [2012] NSWSC 159; BC201201269 at [48]–[53] per Harrison AsJ. See P Solomon, ‘The Power of a Costs Assessor to Interpret a Costs Agreement’ (2007) 83 Precedent 48. 104. See 5.42–5.44. 105. SA s 42(7): see 3.22. 106. Renton Resources Pty Ltd v Johnson Winter & Slattery (2005) 240 LSJS 434; [2005] SASC 231; BC200504836 at [49], [56] per Anderson J, at [61] per Layton J. 107. In New South Wales and the Northern Territory, a ‘fixed costs provision’ (as defined in NSW s 302(1); NT s 295(1)); in Victoria, an applicable practitioner remuneration order; in Western Australia, an applicable costs determination. 108. NSW s 362; NT s 340 (see also NT r 63.60) (cf the former NT 1974 s 123(2)); Tas s 329; Vic s 3.4.44B (see also Vic 63.62) (formerly Vic 1996 s 118(3)); WA s 303 (formerly WA 1893 s 58ZB(1); WA 2003 s 215(1)).

109. WA s 280(2) (formerly WA 2003 s 215(2); cf the former WA O 66 r 12(1)): see 15.71–15.77. 110. ACT s 300B. 111. NSW s 370 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208JAA). This requirement applies only at the end of the assessment process, and not for assessors’ decisions at its threshold (such as a decision to allow a bill not in assessable to be withdrawn, for instance): Gorczynski v Beilby [2005] NSWSC 884; BC200506604 at [95]–[97] per Kirby J. 112. NSW 2005 cl 128(1) (formerly NSW 2002 cl 61(2)). 113. NSW 2005 cl 128(2) (formerly NSW 2002 cl 61(3)). 114. (1998) 43 NSWLR 729 at 735 per Priestley JA, at 739 per Handley JA; BC9802854 (decided in the context of party and party assessment of costs: see 18.67). 115. As to which see 5.61–5.63. 116. Freeman v McNally [2003] NSWSC 780; BC200304818 at [18] per Malpass M. 117. Frumar v Owners of Strata Plan 36957 (2006) 67 NSWLR 321; [2006] NSWCA 278; BC200608291 at [45] per Giles JA. 118. Qld r 738 (see 18.66), which applies to lawyer and client assessment: r 743I. 119. See 18.64–18.67. 120. As to the review of assessment see 5.61–5.63. 121. Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 627–9; BC5300020 per Kitto J; Re Crouch & Lyndon’s Bill of Costs [1998] 2 Qd R 228; BC9705115. Cf Kawarindrasingh v White [1997] 1 All ER 714. 122. See, for example, Brott v Estate of Abeles (2007) 36 Fam LR 543; [2007] FamCA 28 at [61] (FC). 123. ACT s 303(1), 303(2); NSW s 393(1), 393(2) (cf the former NSW 1987 s 208Q); NT s 370(1), 370(2); Qld s 343(3) (see also s 343(2): a costs assessor or court that reduces the legal costs payable by 15 per cent or more may refer the matter for disciplinary action); Tas s 332(1), 332(2); Vic s 3.4.46(1), 3.4.46(2); WA s 307(1), 307(2). 124. Hill v Featherstonehaugh (1831) 7 Bing 569 at 571–2; 131 ER 220 at 221 per Tindal CJ, at 572–3; 221 per Gaselee J, at 573; 221 per Bosanquet J; Re Windeyer, Fawl & Co (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 145 at 149 per Street CJ (FC); Ryan v Hansen (2000) 49 NSWLR 184; [2000] NSWSC 354; BC200002113 at 199 per Kirby J. 125. Re Baker Johnson’s Bill of Costs [1995] 2 Qd R 234 at 239 per Williams J (where, on the facts, however, the lawyers had advised the client to take a course of action which was doomed to be useless from the start). 126. Matter of the Bill of Costs of Lamrock, Brown & Hall [1908] VLR 238 at 248 per Cussen J. 127. Matter of the Bill of Costs of Lamrock, Brown & Hall [1908] VLR 238 at 248 per Cussen J. 128. As to which see 16.14–16.17. 129. As to copying costs in the party and party context see 17.25–17.27. 130. [1988] 2 Qd R 476 at 478. 131. Re Central Queensland Developments Pty Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 476 at 479. See also Touzell v Cawthorn (1995) 18 ACSR 328 at 331; BC9505517 per Young J (SC(NSW)) (‘The court is always on the look-out for corruption with photocopying bills where solicitors or accountants have made “sweetheart agreements” with their service companies to charge inflated fees for

photocopying without disclosing to the client or to the person who pays the bill the interest of the solicitor or the accountant in the service company or trust which benefits from the photocopying fee’). 132. See 5.32. 133. (1882) 10 QBD 207. Though cited as the leading case, prior to Re Blyth and Fanshawe the courts had applied the principle for which that case is cited: see, for example, Re Smith (1844) 13 M & W 477 at 480; 153 ER 199 at 200 per Pollock CB. 134. Re Blyth and Fanshawe (1882) 10 QBD 207 at 210. See also at 212 per Lindley LJ; Re Broad and Broad (1885) 15 QBD 420 at 421, 422 per Lord Esher MR (who stated that ‘[a] more wholesome rule than that which was laid down in Re Blyth & Fanshawe, I never heard of’, and branded it as a rule not requiring ‘any authority to support it’, and as ‘an exceedingly good rule’); Re Duke’s Will [1907] VLR 632 at 634–5 per Cussen J; Matter of the Bill of Costs of Lamrock, Brown & Hall [1908] VLR 238 at 255 per Cussen J; Re Windeyer, Fawl & Co (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 145 at 151 per Street CJ; Re Felton (1943) 60 WN (NSW) 16 at 20 per Maxwell J; NT r 63.59(2); Vic r 63.60 (before 1 April 2013, Vic r 63.61); WA O 66 r 11(3). The rule has been held to apply in Family Court proceedings even though orders inter partes are made less frequently in such proceedings than in other civil litigation (see 8.70–8.80): Weiss v Barker Gosling (No 2) (1993) 118 FLR 218 at 245 per Fogarty J (Fam Ct); B & Associates (a firm of solicitors) v Bloomfield (2003) 31 Fam LR 1; [2003] FamCA 420 at [12]–[17] (FC) (referring to the former Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 10). 135. Re Roney & Co, Solicitors [1914] 2 KB 529 at 541 per Buckley LJ. 136. Re Felton (1943) 60 WN (NSW) 16 at 21 per Maxwell J. See also Re Crouch & Lyndon’s Bill of Costs [1998] 2 Qd R 228 at 247; BC9705115 per White J. 137. See, for example, Re Abigail (1904) 21 WN (NSW) 16, where the client had been informed after verdict but before the payment of counsel’s fees that the costs of a third counsel might not be allowed on taxation as between party and party, and gave authority to pay third counsel’s fees. Pring J disallowed those costs, reasoning that ‘the solicitor must often have very great influence over the client’ and that ‘[i]t may happen that the client in the full blush of victory may give an authority of that kind which he would not have given if his position had been fully and clearly explained to him before the costs were incurred’: at 17. 138. (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 145. 139. Re Windeyer, Fawl & Co (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 145 at 151–2. 140. (SC(NSW), Taylor CJ at CL, 17 July 1975, unreported). 141. As to the types of case that justify the engagement of senior counsel see 17.73–17.92. 142. [1907] VLR 632 at 634–5. 143. As to the reasonableness criterion for costs agreements see 3.31–3.38. 144. See, for example, Weiss v Barker Gosling (No 2) (1993) 118 FLR 218 (Fam Ct) (where Fogarty J held that a costs agreement that left all decisions about the retention of counsel except briefing of Queen’s Counsel to the discretion of the solicitor, and required the client to pay counsel’s fees ‘actually incurred, whether for preparation time, perusal, conference or otherwise I will leave it to you to negotiate counsel’s fees’, was unreasonable: at 245–6); Schiliro v Gadens Ridgeway (1995) 19 Fam LR 196 at 209–11 (FC) (where a similar clause in a costs agreement was also held to be unreasonable). 145. See 2.21. 146. See 3.13–3.40.

147. See 2.31–2.33. 148. Re Felton (1943) 60 WN (NSW) 16 at 20–1 per Maxwell J. 149. Marriage of Stanistreet (1987) 89 FLR 419 at 422 per Treyvaud J (Fam Ct) (adding that it is good practice for counsel who propose to charge more than the recommended fee to disclose this to the instructing solicitor, including the proposed fee or basis of charge, and obtain the solicitor’s consent thereto, thus making the solicitor liable for the fee: at 424–5); Gyopar v Cohens Frenkel Berkovitch Kerford & New (1987) FLC ¶91-839 at 76,326 per Barblett J; Weiss v Barker Gosling (No 2) (1993) 118 FLR 218 at 245 per Fogarty J (Fam Ct). 150. (1885) 15 QBD 420 at 421–2. See also Re Skinner & Smith’s Bills of Costs (No 2) [1990] 1 Qd R 180 at 181 per Connolly J (FC) (who noted that although the clients had not objected to the proposal to retain a second junior counsel, they were not given any Blyth warning). 151. See, for example, Marriage of Stanistreet (1987) 89 FLR 419 at 424 per Treyvaud J (Fam Ct). 152. Regarding multiple counsel see 17.73–17.92. As to reading fees see 17.49. 153. Re Felton (1943) 60 WN (NSW) 16 at 20 per Maxwell J. 154. See 5.26. 155. [1899] 2 QB 488 at 495 per A L Smith LJ, at 496 per Vaughan Williams LJ. 156. Matter of the Bill of Costs of Lamrock, Brown & Hall [1908] VLR 238 at 251 per Cussen J. 157. (1991) 30 FCR 64 at 67; BC9103238. 158. [1993] FCA 605; BC9305153 at [55]. 159. Stefanou v Fairfeld Chase Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 605; BC9305153 at [57]–[59]. 160. (2008) 72 NSWLR 178; [2008] NSWSC 294; BC200802263 at [95]. See also Lawrence v Hannaford (SC(NSW), Malpass M, 26 March 1997, unreported) BC9700915 at 4–5 (cancellation fee allowed in respect of a solicitor–client bill). 161. As to reasonableness in this context see 3.31–3.38. 162. See 5.17. 163. See 17.54. 164. Wilkie v Gordian Runoff Ltd [2005] NSWSC 873; BC200506431 at [17] per McDougall J. 165. Levy v Bergseng (2008) 72 NSWLR 178; [2008] NSWSC 294; BC200802263 at [111]. 166. Cachia v Isaacs (1985) 3 NSWLR 366 at 371 per Kirby P (CA). 167. Cachia v Isaacs (1985) 3 NSWLR 366 at 371 per Kirby P (CA). 168. (1985) 3 NSWLR 366 at 371 (CA). 169. Re Massey & Carey (1884) 26 Ch D 459 at 464 per Fry LJ; Mason-Jones v Jones (1987) 11 NSWLR 583 at 589 per Yeldham J; Ryan v Hansen (2000) 49 NSWLR 184 at 199; [2000] NSWSC 354; BC200002113 per Kirby J. 170. (1884) 26 Ch D 459 at 463–4. See also at 461–2 per Cotton LJ. 171. [1999] 1 VR 102 at 119 per Brooking JA, at 119–20 per Phillips JA. See also McGregor v Clancy and Triado Pty (1991) 14 Fam LR 690 at 693 per Einfeld J (FCA) (‘I cannot see how the taxation of a solicitor and client bill of costs would permit the client to litigate any matter in issue between him and the solicitor as to whether the amount certified should in fact be payable, especially as here an alleged substantial counter claim for negligence in the conduct of the very case where the

costs were incurred’); Marriage of Cooke (1992) 16 Fam LR 400 at 405–6 per Murray J; Winn v Garland Hawthorn & Brahe [2006] VSC 476; BC200610439 at [18] per Kaye J. 172. [1997] 1 Qd R 164 at 167. 173. His Honour had made similar statements in Re Irvine (SC(Qld), Moynihan J, 5 August 1996, unreported) BC9603454 at 5. Cf Re Hill & Taylor Bill of Costs (SC(Qld), Ryan J, 1 February 1993, unreported) BC9303426. 174. [1995] 2 Qd R 234 at 240–1. 175. Re Baker Johnson’s Bill of Costs [1995] 2 Qd R 234 at 241 (paragraph break omitted). See also Re Roberts (SC(Qld), Williams J, 16 December 1994, unreported) BC9407006. Cf McGregor v Clancy and Triado Pty (1991) 14 Fam LR 690 at 693 per Einfeld J (FCA) (‘If … a client wished to allege a total failure of consideration in that what he undertook to pay for was not in fact delivered, it would seem unjust that he could be subject to enforcement proceedings … whilst that claim remained outstanding and undetermined’). 176. [2004] NSWSC 246; BC200401608 at [34]. 177. Minerals Corporation Ltd v Abbot [2004] NSWSC 246; BC200401608 at [36]. 178. Minerals Corporation Ltd v Abbot [2004] NSWSC 246; BC200401608 at [49]–[52]. See S Pattison, ‘Negligence and Costs Assessors’ (June 2004) 42 LSJ 48. 179. Ryan v Hansen (2000) 49 NSWLR 184 at 199; [2000] NSWSC 354; BC200002113 per Kirby J; Bell v McConnel (2012) 272 FLR 1; BC201207087 at [39]–[47] per Barr J. 180. Bell J added that res judicata with respect to the determination becoming a judgment could be resolved by the giving of an undertaking by the defendant lawyers that precludes them from relying on issue estoppel, Anshun estoppel or res judicata arising out of any judgment obtained as a result of filing the certificate of determination: Minerals Corporation Ltd v Abbot [2004] NSWSC 246; BC200401608 at [47]–[48]. 181. As to the inherent jurisdiction of the court to order taxation of a bill of costs see 5.51–5.53. 182. Thompson v Eugenia Mitrakis & Co [1993] ANZ Conv R 77 at 78; BC9200676 per Tadgell J (SC(Vic)). 183. (1844) 5 Beav 401 at 405; 49 ER 633 at 635 (paragraph break omitted) (where a claim to tax the costs of a solicitor for acting as steward of a manor failed). See also Marano v Quagliero [2006] NSWSC 1364; BC200610353 at [31] per Harrison AJ (in the context of a solicitor performing translation work in the course of a retainer). Cf Re Osborne (1858) 25 Beav 353 at 359–60; 53 ER 671 at 674 per Romilly MR (who held that the solicitors in question, having acted as election agents, had been employed as solicitors because their duties required legal knowledge); Pine v Law Society [2002] 2 All ER 658; [2002] EWCA Civ 175 at [14]–[23] per Sir Andrew Morritt VC (who held that the work of a solicitor nominated to act as agent for the Law Society in an intervention by the Society in another solicitor’s practice was clearly business connected with the profession of a solicitor, even though the Society was not obliged to appoint a practising solicitor for this purpose, and so the intervening solicitor’s bill was amenable to taxation). See further Oliver, p 52. 184. Re Ridgeway & Irwin (1903) 29 VLR 130 at 134. 185. D M Wright & Associates v Archer [2000] QCA 296; BC200004238 at [10]–[12] per McPherson JA. 186. ACT Dictionary; NSW s 4(1); NT s 4; SA s 5(1); Vic s 1.2.1(1); Tas s 4(1); WA s 3. For the meaning of ‘disbursement’ see 1.8–1.9.

187. As to the distinction between professional and non-professional disbursements see 1.9. 188. Re Jones (1887) 36 Ch D 105 at 110 per Stirling J; Ex parte McLaughlin (1908) 8 SR (NSW) 158; King William Law Chambers and Williamson & Co v Mobitel (International) Pty Ltd (1981) 29 SASR 316 at 317–18, 320 per King CJ (FC); Baalman v Dare Reed (1984) 68 FLR 458 at 471 per Gallop J (SC(ACT)); Qld 1952 s 6ZB (repealed) (a client who requests the appointment of a costs assessor is taken to dispute only the amount payable under the client agreement, and cannot then challenge the validity or enforceability of that agreement; in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Atlantic 3 Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd [2007] 2 Qd R 399; [2006] QCA 540; BC200610475 at [14] Williams J remarked that s 6ZB was intended to restate the existing law, namely that a client who submitted a bill for taxation or assessment could not challenge the retainer). Cf Spiers v Lane (SC(NSW), McLaughlin M, 7 September 1989, unreported) at 6. 189. [1897] 1 Ch 699 at 703. 190. Re Herbert (1887) 34 Ch D 504 at 504–5 per North J; Re Jones (1887) 36 Ch D 105 at 109 per Stirling J; Re Frape (No 2) [1894] 2 Ch 290 at 295–6 per North J; Re Hirst & Capes [1908] 1 KB 982 at 997 per Kennedy LJ (cf at 982 per Vaughan Williams J); Re John Barry & Cos Bill of Costs [1979] Qd R 15 at 17 per Dunn J; King William Law Chambers and Williamson & Co v Mobitel (International) Pty Ltd (1981) 29 SASR 316 at 318 per King CJ (FC); Baalman v Dare Reed (1984) 68 FLR 458 at 471 per Gallop J (SC(ACT)); Re Bain Gasteen & Co’s Bill of Costs [1990] 1 Qd R 412 at 413 per Thomas J; Rapoff v MacDonald Rudder (SC(WA), Franklyn J, 6 July 1990, unreported) BC9001236 at 12–13. Cf Cachia v Wallbank (SC(NSW), Greenwood M, 7 May 1992, unreported) BC9201892 at 6 (who concluded that a taxing officer ought not proceed to taxation where a number of questions concerning the retainer are outstanding, if the answer to these questions would determine on which of several bases the bill should be taxed). 191. Woolf v Trebilco [1933] VLR 180 at 188 per Mann J (FC); Silverstone Holdings Pty Ltd v Edward [2000] WASC 290; BC200007317 at [21]–[44] per Steytler J. 192. Re Hirst & Capes [1908] 1 KB 982 at 997 per Kennedy LJ; Re John Barry & Co’s Bill of Costs [1979] Qd R 15 at 17 per Dunn J (who remarked that a taxing officer ‘should stay his hand if there is real difficulty in establishing the terms and meaning of an agreement, leaving it to one or other party to ask the judge what the terms of the agreement are, if they are disputed, and/or to construe the agreement’). 193. Re Power & Power’s Bills of Costs [1996] 2 Qd R 202 at 204; BC9404063 per Thomas J. As to the review of assessment by the court see 5.61–5.63. 194. Re Jones (1887) 36 Ch D 105 at 110 per Stirling J; Re Newton and a Solicitor (1983) FLC ¶91348 at 78,344 per Mr C J Judges DR. 195. Re Dibbs and Farrell (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 249 at 255 per Jordan CJ (FC); Richardson v Lander (No 2) (1948) 65 WN (NSW) 81 at 86 per Herron J. For this reason, it has been held that in calculating the one-sixth, the total of the bill is taken without any credits or deductions: Re Carthew (1884) 27 Ch D 485 (where the total of the bill was shown as £83 followed by the words ‘say £78’, the one-sixth was calculated on the £83); Re Passenger (1900) 26 VLR 194 (where the bill amounted to £39 2s 4d and contained an offer to reduce it by £5, the order for taxation was held to apply to the full and not the reduced amount). 196. ACT s 302(2) (cf the former ACT 1970 s 184, which prescribed a one-sixth rule); NSW s 369(3) (a), 369(3)(c) (cf the former NSW 1987 s 182(3)); NT s 350(3) (cf the former NT 1974 s 124, which prescribed a one-sixth rule); Qld s 342(2) (formerly Qld 1952 s 6ZD); Tas s 331(2); Vic s 3.4.45(2), 3.4.45(2A) (formerly Vic 1996 s 119(2)); WA s 304(2) (see also Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice Directions, 2009, 4.7.4, cll 16, 17 (costs in provisional

assessments) (cf the former WA 1893 s 69 and WA 2003 s 239, which placed the costs of taxation within the taxing officer’s discretion). 197. As to costs disclosure obligations see 2.21–2.34. 198. Namely SA RSC r 101A.04, as to which see the first edition of this work, 4.75. 199. See 18.48. 200. Keith Hercules & Sons v Steedman (1987) 17 FCR 290; BC8702233 (FC); Re Weedman (1998) 83 FCR 366 at 370; BC9802171 per Spender J. 201. Keith Hercules & Sons v Steedman (1987) 17 FCR 290 at 294 per Sweeney J, at 300 per Lockhart J, at 303 per Sheppard J; BC8702233 (FC). 202. Keith Hercules & Sons v Steedman (1987) 17 FCR 290 at 300; BC8702233 per Lockhart J (FC). 203. Keith Hercules & Sons v Steedman (1987) 17 FCR 290 at 303; BC8702233 per Sheppard J (FC). 204. As to the inherent jurisdiction to order taxation see 5.51–5.53. 205. Keith Hercules & Sons v Steedman (1987) 17 FCR 290 at 294 per Sweeney J, at 298 per Lockhart J, at 302 per Sheppard J; BC8702233 (FC). 206. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 59(2)(o). 207. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 59(2)(t). 208. Keith Hercules & Sons v Steedman (1987) 17 FCR 290 at 297 per Lockhart J, at 302 per Sheppard J; BC8702233 (FC). Contra at 293 per Sweeney J, who considered the words of O 62 r 8 wide enough to empower the making of an order that its taxing officer should determine the amount proper to be recovered from the clients by their former solicitors on a solicitor and client basis, reasoning that ‘[i]f general words are used, one should not shrink from applying their ordinary and natural meaning because there are provisions in State law prescribing the steps which are to be taken by practitioners in relation to the costs they charge their clients in respect of professional work whether litigious or non-litigious’. His Honour conceded, however, that the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23 could also provide such a jurisdiction: at 294. Cf Bank of New South Wales v Withers (1981) 35 ALR 21 at 27–8 per Sheppard J (FCA). 209. Keith Hercules & Sons v Steedman (1987) 17 FCR 290 at 301–2 per Lockhart J, at 303 per Sheppard J; BC8702233 (FC). 210. Ccom Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 902; BC9405757 at [11] per Cooper J. 211. [1994] FCA 902; BC9405757 at [15]–[16]. 212. At general law, the courts have aimed to eschew a multiplicity of taxations: see, for example, Re Salaman [1894] 2 Ch 201 at 204 per Lindley LJ, at 204–5 per Kay LJ (where it was held that where several persons give separate retainers to a solicitor to take proceedings on behalf of all, though each of them has the strict right to have the solicitor’s bill taxed without serving any person other than the solicitor, in order to prevent multiplicity of taxations, the court will to the extent possible direct a single taxation in the presence of all parties interested). 213. Similar concerns influenced Sweeney J in Keith Hercules & Sons v Steedman (1987) 17 FCR 290 at 294; BC8702233 (noting that two separate taxations would require separate attendances and additional expense, and would involve the risk that inconsistent rulings might be given and the real likelihood, given the history of the litigation, of separate appeals to different courts arising out of the two taxations, that from the taxing officer of the court to a judge of the court (FCR 1979 O 62 r 44 (now FCR 2011 r 40.34): see 18.71) and that from the taxing master (now the Costs Court) to a judge of the Supreme Court (see Vic r 63.56: see 18.33)).

214. Re a Solicitor [1961] Ch 491 at 502 per Cross J. 215. See 5.7–5.46. 216. Electrical Trades Union v Tarlo [1964] 2 WLR 1041 at 1050 per Wilberforce J. 217. See, for example, Bignol v Bignol (1805) 11 Ves 328; 32 ER 1114; Re Barker (1834) 6 Sim 476; 58 ER 573. 218. See, for example, Ex parte Bearcroft (1767) 1 Doug 200n; R v Bach (1821) 9 Price 349; 147 ER 115; Wilson v Gutteridge (1824) 3 B & C 157; 107 ER 693. Cf Dagley v Kentish (1831) 2 B & Ad 411; 109 ER 1195. 219. Woolf v Snipe (1933) 48 CLR 677 at 678–9; BC3300028 per Dixon J. 220. This includes the Family Court of Australia: McInnes v Twigg (1992) 16 Fam LR 185 at 193 per Moss J. No such jurisdiction vests in an inferior court, a registrar or taxing officer: Re Ladner Downs and Thauberger (1983) 149 DLR (3d) 21 at 29–30 per Wallace J (SC(BC)). 221. Ex parte Arrowsmith (1806) 13 Ves 124; 33 ER 241; Re Foster [1920] 3 KB 306 at 314 per Scrutton LJ; Re Kong (1974) 45 DLR (3d) 293 at 305 per Bouck J (SC(BC)); James v Bradley [1980] WAR 11 at 19 per Brinsden J; Baalman v Dare Reed (1984) 68 FLR 458 at 471 per Gallop J (SC(ACT)); Steedman v Golden Fleece Petroleum Ltd (1987) 73 ALR 317 at 319 per Woodward J (FCA); Re Flower & Hart’s Bill of Costs [1991] 2 Qd R 20 at 24 per Ryan J; Matter of Bills of Costs of Murrell Stephenson [1992] ANZ Conv R 338 at 339 per White M (SC(Qld)); Re Morris Fletcher & Cross’ Bills of Costs [1997] 2 Qd R 228 at 250 per Fryberg J; Re Freehill Hollingdale & Page’s Bill of Costs [1998] 1 Qd R 616 at 622 per Lee J; Merrin v Cairns Port Authority [2004] 1 Qd R 271; [2002] QCA 290; BC200204475 at [24] per McPherson JA, at [28]–[30] per Williams JA. 222. Re Park (1889) 41 Ch D 326; Jones & Son v Whitehouse [1918] 2 KB 61 at 64 per Pickford LJ, at 66 per Warrington LJ; King William Law Chambers and Williamson & Co v Mobitel (International) Pty Ltd (1981) 29 SASR 316 at 318–19 per King CJ (FC); Harrison v Tew [1990] 2 AC 523 at 536 per Lord Lowry; Thomas Watts & Co (a firm) v Smith [1998] 2 Costs LR 59 at 73–4 per Sir Richard Scott VC; Turner & Co (a firm) v O Palomo SA [1999] 4 All ER 353 at 363– 6; [1999] EWCA Civ 2007 per Evans LJ. As to applications to extend time for assessment see 5.12. 223. Branson v Tucker [2012] NSWCA 310; BC201207385 at [83], [84] per Campbell JA, at [124]– [125] per Barrett JA. 224. Symbol Park Lane Ltd v Steggles Palmer (a firm) [1985] 2 All ER 167 at 172 per Goff LJ. See also Pryles & Defteros (a firm) v Green (1999) 20 WAR 541 at 547; [1999] WASC 34; BC9902816 per Parker J (the statutory scheme for the taxation of costs is not entirely distinct from the inherent jurisdiction of the court with respect to the remuneration of practitioners, and indeed the statutory scheme ‘may be seen to be very much complementary to the inherent jurisdiction’). 225. Storer & Co v Johnson (1890) 15 App Cas 203 at 206 per Lord Halsbury LC. 226. Re Johnson and Weatherall (1888) 37 Ch D 433 at 443 per Bowen LJ. 227. Re Johnson and Weatherall (1888) 37 Ch D 433 at 442–443 per Cotton LJ. 228. Sutton v Sears [1960] 2 QB 97 at 102 per McNair J. See also Symbol Park Lane Ltd v Steggles Palmer (a firm) [1985] 2 All ER 167 at 172 per Goff LJ. 229. Re Johnson and Weatherall (1888) 37 Ch D 433; Storer & Co v Johnson (1890) 15 App Cas 203 at 206 per Lord Halsbury LC, at 208 per Lord Watson; Re Osborn & Osborn [1913] 3 KB 862 at 868 per Buckley LJ; Re Morris Fletcher & Cross’ Bills of Costs [1997] 2 Qd R 228 at 251 per

Fryberg J. 230. See 5.8. 231. See 5.12. 232. But see 5.39. 233. As to the delivery of a bill coupled with a reservation of the right to withdraw or alter it see 5.60. 234. As to the alteration of a party and party bill see 18.90–18.91. 235. Loveridge v Botham (1797) 1 Bos 49; 126 ER 772; Re Carven (1845) 8 Beav 436 at 438; 50 ER 171 at 172 per Lord Langdale MR; Re Holroyde and Smith (1881) 43 LT 722 at 723 per Jessel MR; Parker v Blenkhorn (1888) 59 LT 906 at 907 per Lord Halsbury LC (HL); Re Hopkins (1891) 17 VLR 85 at 87 per A’Beckett J; Re A D Michie (1898) 24 VLR 440 at 441 per Hood J; Grant, Bulcraig & Co [1906] 1 Ch 124 at 127 per Farwell J; Sadd v Griffin [1908] 2 KB 510 at 512 per Farwell LJ; Re Sullivan Brothers (1915) 32 WN (NSW) 127; Re Edwin Sutherland & Co’s Bill of Costs [1971] Qd R 318 at 324 per Hoare J (affd [1971] Qd R 318 at 330 per Hanger CJ (FC)); Chappell v Mehta [1981] 1 All ER 349 at 351 per Lawton LJ; Re Legal Aid Commission of Victoria (1983) FLC ¶91-363 at 78,435 per Treyvaud J; Re Carter Newel’s Bill of Costs [1993] 2 Qd R 593 at 598 per Ryan J. 236. As to the so-called ‘one sixth rule’ see 5.45. 237. Re Heather (1870) 5 Ch App 694 at 697 per Sir W M James LJ; Re Thompson (1885) 30 Ch D 441 at 448 per Cotton LJ; Re Robertson (a Solicitor) (1889) 42 Ch D 553 at 558–9 per Chitty J; Re Grant, Bulcraig & Co [1906] 1 Ch 124 at 128–9 per Farwell J; Re Louch [1930] 2 Ch 63 at 65 per Luxmoore J; Re Dibbs and Farrell (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 249 at 255 per Jordan CJ (FC). 238. Fairway Construction Ltd v McGuire (1969) 71 WWR 396 at 397–8 per Davey CJBC (CA(BC)); Chappell v Mehta [1981] 1 All ER 349 at 351 per Lawton LJ. 239. Grant, Bulcraig & Co [1906] 1 Ch 124 at 128 per Farwell J. 240. Re Edwin Sutherland & Co’s Bill of Costs [1971] Qd R 318 at 322 per Hoare J. See also Re Thompson (1885) 30 Ch D 441 at 450 per Cotton LJ (fearing that allowing the amendment of bills ‘would open a door to fraud’). 241. Re Macnamara’s Costs (1884) 5 LR (NSW) L 342; Re Collins and Fox (1894) 11 WN (NSW) 93; Ex parte Steel (1898) 15 WN (NSW) 96 at 98 per Cohen J (who would have adopted the strict approach had it not been for the two earlier New South Wales authorities to the contrary); Langdon v Pearce (1899) 20 LR (NSW) L 329; Re Gregg (1914) 31 WN (NSW) 180. The New South Wales approach has been expressly rejected by Queensland courts: Re Edwin Sutherland & Co’s Bill of Costs [1971] Qd R 318 at 324 per Hoare J (affd [1971] Qd R 318 at 330 per Hanger CJ (FC)); Re Carter Newell’s Bill of Costs [1993] 2 Qd R 593 at 598 per Ryan J. 242. Ex parte Cameron (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 393 at 395 per Maguire J. 243. [1975] 2 NSWLR 398 at 404. 244. His Honour referred to Re Taxation of Costs [1943] KB 69, but did not note that the validity of this concern was itself queried by Hoare J in Re Edwin Sutherland & Co’s Bill of Costs [1971] Qd R 318 at 324. 245. Florence Investments Pty Ltd v H G Slater & Co [1975] 2 NSWLR 398 at 407. See also Re Macnamara’s Costs (1884) 5 LR (NSW) L 342 at 350 per Martin CJ (who stated that the fact that the earlier bill was for a smaller amount is a strong circumstance to be considered by the taxing officer on taxing a later bill).

246. Gorczynski v AWM Dickinson & Son [2005] NSWSC 277; BC200501852 at [19] per Harrison M. 247. See, for example, Bowen v Campbell (SC(NSW), Malpass M, 2 December 1997, unreported) (where the assessor appeared to have had no regard to the fact that the revised bill purported to charge for matters falling outside the scope of the original account); G H Healey & Company — Bondi v Grasso [1999] NSWSC 147; BC9904345 at [35]–[39] per Harrison M (who held that the earlier ‘narrative’ bill of costs had been ‘unduly taken into account by the costs assessor’: at [38]). See also S Pattison, ‘Does a Lump Sum Bill act as an Estoppel?’ (September 1999) 37 LSJ 31. 248. Re Lippiatt & Co’s Bill of Costs [1998] 1 Qd R 69 at 73; BC9701536 per Muir J. 249. ACT s 301. 250. Tas s 325(2); Vic s 3.4.43(2) (formerly Vic 1996 s 118(2)). Similar provision was found in the former NT 1974 s 123(4). See also the former WA 1893 s 67(2); WA 2003 s 237(2), 237(3) (entitling a lawyer, within one month after a person charged gave notice of intention to have the bill taxed, to serve upon that person an amended bill of costs, which is then treated as, and in lieu of, the original and is subject to taxation; it was held that the lawyer could amend the bill only once after notice: Carson v Bunning [1965] WAR 213 at 217 per Wolff CJ (FC)). 251. This is expressly recognised in the Northern Territory and Victorian rules, which empower the court or taxing master (in Victoria, the Costs Court), at any stage, to give leave to a party to amend or withdraw a bill, or order that a party file another bill: NT r 63.43; Vic r 63.45 (which apply to lawyer and own client taxation pursuant to NT r 63.35(2); Vic r 63.37(2)). 252. Redfern v Mineral Engineers Pty Ltd [1987] VR 518 at 524 per Tadgell J. 253. As to the so-called ‘one-sixth rule’ see 5.45. 254. Re Whalley (1855) 20 Beav 576 at 578; 52 ER 726 at 727 per Sir John Romilly MR; Grant, Bulcraig & Co [1906] 1 Ch 124 at 127 per Farwell J. 255. Re Holroyde and Smith (1881) 43 LT 722 at 723 per Jessel MR; Bilkus v Stockler Brunton (a firm) [2010] 3 All ER 64; [2010] EWCA Civ 101 at [59] per Stanley Burnton LJ, with whom Longmore and Ward LJJ agreed. 256. Such as the case law involving the inadvertent omission of counsel’s fees: see, for example, Re Taxation of Costs [1943] Ch 48 at 49–50 per Uthwatt J; Chappell v Mehta [1981] 1 All ER 349 at 352 per Lawton LJ. 257. See, for example, Re Grant, Bulcraig & Co [1906] 1 Ch 124 at 128 per Farwell J; Re Sullivan Brothers (1915) 32 WN (NSW) 127 at 129 per Ferguson J; Richardson v Lander (No 2) (1948) 65 WN (NSW) 81 at 84 per Herron J; Polak v Winchester (Marchioness) [1956] 2 All ER 660 at 666– 8 per Jenkins LJ, at 668–9 per Hodson LJ; Re Edwin Sutherland & Co’s Bill of Costs [1971] Qd R 318 at 322 per Hoare J; Woodward v Moon [1991] Tas R 93 at 104 per Cox J (FC); Zuliani v Viera [1994] 1 WLR 1149 at 1154 per Lord Nolan (PC). 258. For example, if the accuracy of details in a bill is of a kind the client is as well able to test as the lawyer, it is open to the court (and exceptionally the taxing officer) to allow the lawyer to correct blunders if it is proper to do so: Grant, Bulcraig & Co [1906] 1 Ch 124 at 128 per Farwell J; Re Richards [1912] 1 Ch 49 at 54 per Parker J (where it was held to be inequitable to allow the clients to take advantage of a blunder apparent on the face of the bill). The outcome is different where the evidence reveals that the client has not agreed to the additional charge, under the terms of either the retainer or a costs agreement: Bilkus v Stockler Brunton (a firm) [2010] 3 All ER 64; [2010] EWCA Civ 101. 259. Matter of a Bill of Costs of Grant & Associates [1995] ANZ Conv R 323 at 324 per Mackenzie J (SC(Qld)).

260. [1987] VR 518 at 525. 261. Redfern v Mineral Engineers Pty Ltd [1987] VR 518 at 525. 262. Redfern v Mineral Engineers Pty Ltd [1987] VR 518 at 527. See also Matter of a Bill of Costs of Grant & Associates [1995] ANZ Conv R 323 (SC(Qld)), where the solicitors orally applied for leave to amend a bill referred for taxation in three respects, which amendment related to the deletion of three items of expenditure. Mackenzie J found that the inclusion of the three items was plainly due to inadvertence and without any intent to contravene the fundamental principle upon which the discretion is based. His Honour therefore granted leave to withdraw the bill and substitute an amended bill, but only to the extent that the new bill deleted the said items and made consequential necessary reductions to the total of outlays, the total of the bill and the sequential numbering: at 325. 263. Re Edwin Sutherland & Co’s Bill of Costs [1971] Qd R 318 at 324 per Hoare J. 264. (1885) 30 Ch D 441. 265. Re Thompson (1885) 30 Ch D 441 at 449. 266. Re Thompson (1885) 30 Ch D 441 at 450–1. 267. Re Thompson (1885) 30 Ch D 441 at 451. 268. Re Thompson (1885) 30 Ch D 441 at 452. 269. Re Thompson (1885) 30 Ch D 441 at 453. 270. [1998] 1 Qd R 69; BC9701536. 271. Re Lippiatt & Co’s Bill of Costs [1998] 1 Qd R 69 at 74; BC9701536. 272. NSW 2004 Pt 3.2 Div 11 Subdiv 5 (review by panel: see 18.57–18.59), 6 (appeals: see 18.74) (formerly NSW 1987 Pt 11 Div 6 Subdivs 4A, 4B); Qld r 743I (referring to r 742: see 18.73) (cf the former Qld 1952 s 6ZF); Vic s 3.4.47 (formerly Vic 1996 s 120); Vic rr 63.37(2), 63.57 (review by the court conducted in accordance with the rules of court: see 18.73); WA 2008 s 308 (formerly WA 1893 s 71; WA 2003 s 242); WA O 66 rr 55, 56 (review by the court conducted in accordance with the rules of court: see 18.70). 273. Cf the former ACT 1970 s 186. 274. Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 37E. 275. SA s 42(1b). 276. Cf the former NT 1974 s 126. Also, the procedure set by the court rules in respect of the review of party and party taxation previously applied: NT r 63.35(2), which is ousted by the express provisions of NT Pt 3.3 Div 8 Subdiv 5 (ss 351–361). 277. ‘Reviewer’ includes: (a) if the costs assessor is the master or is appointed by the Law Society — the Supreme Court; or (b) if the costs assessor (other than the master) is appointed by the Chief Justice — the master or a registrar: NT s 351. 278. NT s 352(1). The time limit applicable in this context, namely 28 days from the relevant determination, may be extended by the reviewer: NT s 352(2); Bell v McConnel (2012) 272 FLR 1; BC201207087 (where Barr J noted (at [18]–[19]) that the broad principles established by the general case law in relation to extension of time applications apply in this context (see 5.12), but that on the facts refused an extension on the ground that there was no merit in the application for review: at [53]–[54]). 279. NT s 354(1), 354(3), 354(4).

280. NT s 358(4). 281. NT s 362. 282. NT s 363. 283. See 18.74 (discussing the New South Wales provisions). 284. Previously lawyer and client taxations were subject to the same review process as applied to party and party taxations: Tas 1993 s 136A (and see Tas r 868, discussed at 18.76). 285. Tas s 333. 286. Tas s 334(1). 287. Tas s 334(3), 334(4). 288. Matter of the Bill of Costs of Lamrock, Brown & Hall [1908] VLR 238 at 248–9 per Cussen J; Ex parte Maxwell (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 333 at 336 per Roper CJ in Eq. 289. Re Melbourne Parking Station Ltd (in liq) [1929] VLR 5 at 8 per Mann J (the court is always desirous of ‘giving the greatest weight’ to the opinion of the taxing officer). 290. As to which see 15.32–15.36. 291. Re Catlin (1854) 18 Beav 508 at 509; 52 ER 200 at 200 per Sir John Romilly MR; Re Melbourne Parking Station Ltd (in liq) [1929] VLR 5 at 8–9 per Mann J; McWilliam v McWilliam [1969] 1 NSWR 159 at 161 per Allen J; Re National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian Division (in liq) (No 2) [1992] 1 VR 485 at 493–4 per J D Phillips J; Re Crouch & Lyndon’s Bill of Costs [1998] 2 Qd R 228 at 232–3; BC9705115 per White J. As to which see 16.14–16.17.

[page 137]

PART II

Costs Between Party and Party ‘Costs’ can refer to court orders for costs as a result of contentious proceedings before the court. The principles governing the award of costs in this context are the subject of Part II. The Part commences with a discussion of the jurisdiction and discretion to make such an award (Chapter 6), before moving on to the usual exercise of that discretion: the rule that costs ‘follow the event’ (known as the ‘costs indemnity rule’: Chapter 7). Chapters 8 and 9 discuss scenarios where the operation of that rule may be ousted, whereas Chapter 10 focuses on the particular application of the costs indemnity rule for litigation over the proceeds of a fund, and Chapter 11 in the case of multiple parties. Costs sanctions for commencing proceedings in too high a court, and for rejecting ultimately favourable settlement offers, dealt with respectively in Chapters 12 and 13, represent a further modification of the usual indemnity rule. The Part concludes in Chapter 14, which addresses the timing of costs orders.

[page 139]

CHAPTER 6

Jurisdiction and Discretion to Order Costs Historical Background

6.2

Jurisdiction to Award Costs Nature of decision-making body Superior courts Inferior courts Tribunals Implied and inherent jurisdiction Jurisdiction to order costs where court lacks jurisdiction to deal with the matter

6.4 6.7 6.7 6.9 6.10 6.11

Discretion to Award Costs Nature of the discretion Restrictions on the discretion Legitimacy of guidelines as compared to rules Legitimacy of costs practice directions or practice notes Discretion to be exercised consistently with purposes of tribunal or type of proceeding

6.14 6.14 6.15 6.16 6.18

Slip Rule Jurisdiction Curial approach to rectifying errors under the slip rule Application of the slip rule to costs orders

6.21 6.21 6.22 6.23

6.13

6.19

Matters requiring exercise of an independent discretion or resolution of a controversy Slip must be ‘accidental’ Order by agreement of the parties Discretion and timing of application

6.24 6.26 6.27 6.28

6.1 The jurisdiction to award costs is sourced from statute, not from any inherent jurisdiction of a court, whether superior or otherwise. Assuming a court possesses the jurisdiction to award costs, the issue centres on how that jurisdiction is to be exercised. When a power to award costs is given, it is usually in terms of a general discretion, and so it must be determined what the proper exercise of such a discretion requires. This chapter deals with the twin issues of jurisdiction and discretion,1 and concludes with the court’s power to correct accidental slips and omissions in costs (and other) orders.2 [page 140]

Historical Background3 6.2 In equity from early times there was the fullest power to order a defeated party to pay costs, but only gradually, and by statute, did such a power translate to the common law. In England costs at law were ‘entirely and absolutely creatures of statute’;4 Common Law Courts were obliged to ‘go back to a legislative enactment in order to arrive at their power, or rather their duty, for power they had none, of dealing with costs’.5 The foundation for the common law jurisdiction as to costs is the Statute of Gloucester of 1278.6 In this context Blackstone noted:7 In reality costs were always considered and included in the quantum of damages, in such actions where damages are given; and, even now, costs for the plaintiff are always entered on the roll as increase of damages by the court. But, because those damages were frequently inadequate to the plaintiff’s expenses, the Statute of Gloucester orders costs to be also added; and farther directs, that the same rule shall hold place in all cases where the party is to recover damages. And therefore in such actions where no damages were then recoverable … no costs are allowed; unless they have been expressly given by some subsequent statute.

Conversely, the Court of Chancery had always claimed power to deal with costs at its discretion; its jurisdiction was inherent and not derived from statute. This highlights the fundamental nature of the equity jurisdiction as flexible and discretionary, ordering costs not from any authority but from conscience.8 As explained by Lord Hardwicke in 1742: ‘[t]he giving of costs in equity is entirely discretionary, and is not at all comfortable to the rule at law’.9 The discretion extended not only to the circumstances under which costs were to be awarded, but to their quantum.10 The need to confer upon common law courts statutory power to award costs evolved as a response to perceived injustice. In their first report the Judicature Commissioners stated:11 We think that the absence of this power in the Courts of Common Law often occasions injustice, and leads to unnecessary litigation. We therefore recommend that in all the Divisions of the Supreme Court the costs of the suit and of all proceedings in it should be in the discretion of the Court.

6.3 An aim of the resultant Judicature Acts of 1873–5, which fused the administration of law and equity, was to simplify the regulation of the exercise of the jurisdiction of the newly-created Supreme Court of Judicature to award costs. Lord O’Hagan explained the point in Garnett v Bradley as follows:12 The purpose of the Judicature Act was to establish one great tribunal, with consistent and homogeneous action in all its parts, and, as far as possible, an assimilation of practice and procedure. The matter of costs was one of the most important with which the Legislature had to deal in carrying out this purpose: and, in entire harmony with it, the Order we are considering … declares that ‘the costs of and incident to all proceedings in the High Court shall be in the discretion of the Court’. The operation of that rule is as large as words can make it, and it was apparently designed to extend to all proceedings the discretionary power which had before governed only those in Equity.

[page 141] Yet the Judicature Acts failed to entirely address all the anomalies and confusions as to the court’s powers in relation to costs, largely by reason of judicial restrictiveness in their interpretation. In Re Mills’ Estate13 it was held that the Acts did not give a new jurisdiction, but only regulated the way in which costs were to be dealt with where the court had jurisdiction before their enactment. Put another way, the Acts merely reflected the way in which costs

were to be dealt with in proceedings in which there was existing jurisdiction as to costs. This prompted the English Parliament to enact s 5 of the Judicature Act 1890, which provided that, inter alia: … subject to the … Acts and the Rules … and as to the express provisions of any statute … the costs of and incidental to all proceedings in the Supreme Court … shall be at the discretion of the Court or Judge and the Court or Judge shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent such costs are to be paid.

This provision clearly gave a new jurisdiction, and formed the foundation for statutory conferral of jurisdiction to award costs for both subsequent English14 and Australia legislation.15

Jurisdiction to Award Costs 6.4 The historical legacy dictates a starting point that, statute apart, a court lacks power to order costs; authority to do so must always be traced to a statutory provision.16 To this end, the court’s primary task when the issue of jurisdiction arises is to determine — on a process of construction — whether the provisions of the relevant Act sustain the order. In the words of Kirby J in Re JJT:17 Although the word ‘costs’ may import notions of a general kind from the forms of orders which have been made in courts of law for centuries, such preconceptions must not distract the Court from the task of construction which each statutory provision for costs invokes. As with any other legislative measure, the law in question must be construed to achieve its identified purposes. A section empowering orders for costs will be construed in the context of any peculiarities of the legislation in which it appears.

6.5 This process of construction may involve the court determining whether a specific costs provision in legislation dealing with a particular topic ousts the court’s jurisdiction under a general costs provision. If the specific costs provision explicitly states that the general costs jurisdiction is ousted, it clearly prevails over the latter. If there is no explicit ouster, the court must assess whether the statutory language adopted in the specific provision is inconsistent with a continuing general costs jurisdiction or otherwise leaves it untouched. A case illustration of the judicial approach is found in Director of Public Prosecutions v Le (No 2).18 The issue was whether the Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic) — which states that ‘[c]osts may only be awarded in accordance with this section’ (s 133A(1)) and lists specific circumstances where costs can be

ordered (s 133A(2), 133A(3)) — precluded the court awarding costs to a successful applicant arising out of an event falling outside those circumstances (being an appeal from the making of an order excluding property from forfeiture). Specifically, the court was asked to determine whether s 133A ousted the general costs provision, s 24(1) of [page 142] the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), which gives the court ‘full power’ to order costs ‘unless otherwise expressly provided by … any other Act’. Since s 133A did explicitly limit the scope of s 24(1), the question was whether the language of s 133A evinced a parliamentary intention to replace the general power to order costs with a limited power to order costs only in the types of proceeding listed in s 133A. The Victorian Court of Appeal held that ‘on its proper construction s 133A leaves untouched the general costs power as it applies to types of proceeding not mentioned in s 133A(2) and s 133A(3)’.19 Two main considerations led to this conclusion. First, s 133A omitted various types of proceedings in respect of which the general costs power would ordinarily be expected to be exercisable. Second, s 133A conferred a power to order the payment of ‘all costs incurred …’, revealing a parliamentary intention to enable a costs order to be made on a basis more generous than the party–party basis usually made under s 24(1).20 Their Honours reasoned, to this end, that ‘[i]t would seem paradoxical if Parliament had, on the one hand, enlarged the costs power in relation to the types of proceedings mentioned in s 133A while, on the other, removing the costs power altogether in relation to all other confiscationrelated proceedings’.21 On at least two other occasions the same court has endorsed this conclusion.22 In one instance it stated the relevant principle as follows:23 In order to exclude the court’s general power to award costs, as conferred by s 24(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1986, clear and unequivocal language would be required. Section 24(1) provides a general discretion to the court to determine costs ‘[u]nless otherwise expressly provided’. Section 133A does not so provide. The purpose of s 133A is not to exclude the Director from obtaining an award for costs; it is to govern the circumstances under which an order for costs may be made against the Director. If the intention is to exclude the Director from being awarded costs, the language of the provision must expressly provide for that to be the case.

And on the other instance it noted that provisions such as s 133A, that operate to exclude the ordinary rights of parties to litigation, including the ability to recover costs if successful, ‘should if possible, be given a restrictive, rather than broad interpretation’.24 The case law, moreover, contains other occasions in which the courts have refused to read expansively an ostensible statutory restriction on the award of costs in the face of a general statutory jurisdiction to award costs.25 6.6 If a court or tribunal is found to have jurisdiction to order costs, that the litigants have agreed as to the allocation of costs26 or their quantification27 does not itself oust the [page 143] court’s jurisdiction to order an alternative allocation or quantification. However, as courts are rarely inclined to act inconsistently with the agreement of litigants,28 circumstances must be exceptional for a court to make any such order.29

Nature of decision-making body Superior courts 6.7 The statutes creating the High Court, Federal Court and Tasmanian Supreme Court specifically confer upon those courts the jurisdiction to award costs in all matters brought before them.30 In Queensland statute declares that ‘[a] court may award costs in all proceedings unless otherwise provided’,31 encompassing thereby the Supreme Court, the District Court or Magistrates Court.32 In any case, in all superior courts this power is necessarily implied from statutory provisions and court rules that confer upon the courts discretion to award costs.33 6.8 A grant of jurisdiction to order costs will not, in the absence of a legislative indication to the contrary, be construed narrowly, principally because ‘it is implied from the character of the donee of the power that the power will be exercised judicially and in accordance with established legal principles’.34 This dictates that where, for instance, the power is vested in a

superior court, ‘it would be contrary to principle for the power to be given anything other than [page 144] the most liberal and ample construction’.35 So in Clyne v Wrigley36 Moffitt P held that a statute which confers upon a superior court the power to make ‘such order … as it thinks fit’37 is wide enough to encompass an order for costs. His Honour remarked that ‘courts should be slow to read down powers conferred on them in wide and general terms, so as to deprive themselves of a power to exercise a discretion to do that which is fit or just’.38

Inferior courts 6.9 Courts have been less inclined to adopt a similarly broad interpretation of powers conferred on inferior courts,39 although many of the cases in this context involve criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, which operate against a presumption that the Crown neither pays nor receives costs.40 In Queensland Fish Board v Bunney41 the Full Queensland Supreme Court held a statutory provision empowering the Magistrates Court to make an order it considers just ‘does not in terms refer to costs at all and it contains no clear indication of an intention to confer the power’. Crowe v Bennett42 provides another illustration. It involved s 88(3) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld), which provides that ‘[u]pon an adjournment the justices … may order that costs of and occasioned by the adjournment be paid by any party to any other party as to the justices … may appear just’. Under s 88(1) a magistrate could ‘adjourn a hearing’ in any case of a charge of ‘a simple offence or breach of duty’. The Queensland Court of Appeal held, by majority, that s 88(3) did not empower a magistrate to order costs upon the adjournment of an examination of witnesses in relation to an indictable offence, interpreting s 88(3) as limited by s 88(1) to simple offences.43 Macrossan CJ reasoned as follows:44 The fact that specific but limited provision is made in the Justices Act for the awarding of costs means that if the statutory provisions which are included are not wide enough to carry a relevant power to award costs then none should be implied to supplement those expressly conferred.

His Honour held that decisions to the contrary, in particular Darcey v Pre-

term Foundation Clinic,45 should not be followed. In Darcey Hunt J had held that where a subpoena is set aside by a magistrate on the application of the person to which it is directed, the magistrate has an inherent jurisdiction to grant that person his or her costs of the application. Yet Darcey does not arguably suggest that courts possess an unfettered inherent jurisdiction to order costs lacking any express or implied statutory jurisdiction, but that a court’s power to control abuse of its own process as part of its inherent jurisdiction may carry a power to award costs ancillary [page 145] to that power.46 The later New South Wales decision in Wilson v McDougall,47 where Newman J noted inferior courts’ inherent power to make orders relating to procedure so that justice may be done, appears to confirm this interpretation.48 His Honour held that although the statute in issue49 lacked a provision empowering a magistrate to award costs, such a power arose in the circumstances to prevent an abuse of process. The very limited scope of that power appears from the following statement in the judgment:50 In so holding I wish to make it clear that I do not believe that the inherent power vested in the Children’s Court does in an ordinary sense provide jurisdiction in a magistrate to make an order for costs. Indeed, even in a case where the proceedings brought were misconceived but not mischievous it would be difficult to see how the court’s inherent power would extend so far. However, in this case the proceedings and their conduct were, as his Worship found, not only misconceived but also mischievous. It is this latter element which I believe creates a vehicle which enables the court to use its inherent jurisdiction and award costs.

But where the award of costs is not necessary to prevent the abuse of the court’s process, or otherwise is not required for the effective exercise of its jurisdiction, the court lacks jurisdiction to award costs except, and to the extent that, it is expressly conferred by statute.51

Tribunals 6.10 The curial interpretation of the scope of tribunals’ costs jurisdiction has been more restrained again. For a tribunal to have jurisdiction to order costs, it must be clearly conferred by statute.52 For example, in Appellants v

Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory53 Refshauge ACJ concluded that a power conferred on the relevant tribunal54 to ‘make any order it considers appropriate on the appeal’55 did not encompass a power to make an order for costs. His Honour reasoned as follows:56 … when a statute permits a body to make ‘any orders it considers appropriate’, such a provision does not confer any jurisdiction on the body that it does not already possess either expressly or by such implication that the law may permit. That is to say, such a provision gives the body the discretion to make any order that it otherwise has power to make and that whether it can make such an order must be determined by the jurisdiction or power otherwise given to the body by any legislation or other law.

Accordingly, as a statutory tribunal, its powers must be found in the relevant statutes,57 but these gave no power, express or implied, to order costs in a case such as the one in issue. [page 146] Moreover, it appears that courts will adopt a narrow interpretation of, or otherwise read down, even a broad discretion in a tribunal where its exercise is inconsistent with the purposes of the tribunal in question.58 In practice, though, the legislative trend is to prescribe those circumstances, if any, in which a tribunal may make a costs order rather than vest the tribunal with a general costs discretion.59

Implied and inherent jurisdiction 6.11 The foregoing does not mean that the jurisdiction to award costs must be conferred in express terms;60 it can be conferred expressly or by necessary implication.61 The broad construction placed upon statutory powers conferred upon superior courts dictates that it is more likely that a power to award costs will be implied in a superior court than an inferior court or tribunal. So far as any inherent jurisdiction of a court is concerned — not derived expressly or by implication from statutory provisions conferring particular jurisdiction62 — such a jurisdiction derives, as noted above,63 only ancillary to the prevention of an abuse of a court’s processes or as necessary for the effective exercise of its jurisdiction.64 As explained by Lee J in Ward v Western Australia:65

In some circumstances the power to make an order sounding in costs may be essential for the due administration of justice and, therefore, an integral part of a judicial power. Such an order is not calculated to provide compensation to a party for expense incurred in the litigation, but to protect the integrity of the processes and function of the court by imposing appropriate sanctions where the conduct of a person is inimical to those objects. Such a sanction may be an order directing a person … to pay costs … Such circumstances may arise where there has been use of the process of the court for an ulterior purpose, for example, commencement of litigation, issue of a witness summons or drafting if a pleading to embarrass, harass or oppress a party to the litigation or other person.

6.12 There is case authority that the Family Court has, by virtue of its power to control the orderly and proper conduct of suits before it, an inherent power to make costs orders where it is appropriate to do so.66 Yet given that common law courts, let alone specialist courts, lack jurisdiction to award costs aside from statutory conferral, it must be queried whether the Family Court has any inherent jurisdiction to this end. In any case, the terms of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117 contain a jurisdiction in terms sufficiently broad to encompass the award of costs without reference to any inherent jurisdiction. Also, the case law propounding an [page 147] inherent jurisdiction pre-dated the enactment of s 117(2A), which directs the court to have regard, in exercising its discretion, to ‘such other matters as the court considers relevant’.

Jurisdiction to order costs where court lacks jurisdiction to deal with the matter 6.13 Even if a court lacks jurisdiction to determine a matter (sought to be) litigated before it, it has at least jurisdiction to determine, finally or provisionally, whether or not it has jurisdiction, and therefore power to deal with the costs of the proceeding.67 The same applies on appeal.68 Were the position otherwise, a defendant (or respondent) would be exposed to an unrecoverable costs liability to his or her own lawyer(s) in defending a proceeding commenced in the wrong forum. Although it may be within the power of the court that ultimately hears the matter to make an order for costs

of the earlier proceeding,69 this assumes both that the plaintiff chooses to proceed with the action and that the matter is justiciable in that other forum. Statutory effect is given to this general law principle in several jurisdictions, expressed to confer jurisdiction on a court to award costs in all matters brought before it ‘including matters dismissed for want of jurisdiction’.70 Three riders must be made to this, however. First, in the absence of a power vested in it by statute, there is no power in an inferior court or tribunal to award costs where it decides it lacks jurisdiction in a matter.71 Second, neither the general law nor statute empowers the court to award costs in proceedings where it has purported to exercise a non-existent jurisdiction.72 Third, the terms of a statute may oust the court’s jurisdiction to award costs in matters dismissed for want of jurisdiction. For instance, where a statute provides that, in certain types of decisions by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal determined favourably to the claimant, the tribunal may ‘order that the costs of those proceedings incurred by the claimant, or part of those costs, shall be paid by the determining authority’,73 it has been held that until such a decision was made, the tribunal’s jurisdiction [page 148] to award costs against the determining authority did not arise, such that the Federal Court’s jurisdiction to award costs of the review before the tribunal could not be enlivened.74

Discretion to Award Costs Nature of the discretion 6.14 Statute or court rules in each jurisdiction explicitly state that costs of proceedings are in the discretion of the court,75 and in most jurisdictions also provide that the court may determine by whom and to what extent such costs are to be paid.76 Even in those jurisdictions that make no specific provision to the latter effect, the discretion to order costs inherently carries the power to control their quantum and determine liability.77 It has been said, to this end,

that superior courts’ statutory jurisdiction to award costs is aimed at giving ‘the widest possible power and discretion in the allocation of costs’,78 and so is not amenable to a narrow interpretation.79 It has been held, for instance, to entitle a court to make an interim order for costs,80 or to order costs even where the notice of motion did not seek the court’s exercise of that power.81

Restrictions on the discretion 6.15 It should not be assumed that a discretion to award costs has no boundaries, even in the face of its description as ‘absolute and unfettered’,82 ‘unqualified’,83 ‘uncontrolled’84 or ‘unconfined’.85 Beyond any specific statutory or rule-based limitation on the discretion, that it vests in a judicial officer carries a restriction on its exercise, namely that it must be exercised judicially.86 To exercise a discretion judicially is inconsistent with its exercise in an arbitrary or [page 149] capricious sense,87 and translates into a positive obligation to exercise it ‘on fixed principles’, ‘according to rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion … benevolence … or sympathy’.88 The central and overriding principle is that of doing justice to the parties in each particular case, it being judicially remarked that there is ‘no better test than the test of what is fair and just between the parties’.89 This clearly involves a heavily contextual assessment — focusing on the conduct of the litigation itself — for a discretion exercised on grounds unconnected with the litigation, or on no grounds at all, far from constituting a judicial exercise of that discretion, is arbitrary or capricious.90

Legitimacy of guidelines as compared to rules 6.16 The challenge arising out of enveloping the exercise of discretion within nebulous concepts of fairness and justice is to ensure consistency in its application. The common law, grounded as it is in precedent, places a premium on uniformity of practice. It is unsurprising, therefore, that judges

have sought to base the exercise of a costs discretion in a principle more concrete than mere fairness and justice. Courts have repeatedly stated, to this end, that ‘established principle’91 converges with justice and fairness in requiring that, other than in special cases, a wholly successful party should receive his or her costs, for to deny such a party costs is to deny justice.92 Of the principles developed by the courts to guide the proper exercise of the costs discretion, the ultimate result of the litigation (‘the event’) has been viewed as ‘[b]y far the most important factor’.93 This principle (‘costs follow the event’), replicated in statute or court rules in several jurisdictions,94 is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7. Here it is sufficient to note that this principle carries such weight that it has been viewed as ‘the usual rule’.95 Indeed, courts have gone so far as to say that a judge who proceeds as if there were an open discretion on costs unhindered by this principle ‘would almost certainly be regarded as erring in law’,96 and be acting arbitrarily [page 150] or capriciously.97 It follows that a judge who plans to order costs other than in line with the usual rule98 should give the litigants an opportunity to make submissions on the point99 and give reasons for deciding to make an exceptional costs order.100 Conversely, it is not necessary in every case for a court to explain its reasons for applying the usual rule; an order that ‘costs follow the event’ may, if otherwise unexplained, be ‘taken to reflect the fact that there is already an established jurisprudence as to the basis upon which the court’s discretion should be exercised in a given circumstance’.101 Importantly, making a costs order in accordance with a ‘usual rule’ does not involve any fettering of discretion provided the judge applies the rule in the exercise of its discretion, and not as a matter of course. The uncritical application of a rule — including the ‘usual rule’ — to determine the costs outcome is inconsistent with the exercise of a judicial discretion.102 As a result, without a clear statutory direction to this effect, any concept of an absolute binding or unyielding rule is per se inconsistent with a judicial (or any) discretion,103 and the purported rigid application of judge-made rules represent a non-statutory and unjustified fetter on the discretion. This

explains statements in the case law that one judge’s discretion cannot be controlled by the way another judge exercised the discretion in circumstances more or less similar.104 6.17 The foregoing does not deny the legitimacy, justified in the pursuit of consistency, of judges indicating factors that may guide the exercise of a discretion, and of practices that may emerge from repeated exercise of a costs discretion in a particular way, though not so as to constitute a hard and fast rule.105 And beyond the usual rule, it is impermissible to adopt a principle or guideline ‘entitled to presumptive, let alone determinative, weight’, to be contrasted with a principle or guideline ‘accepted to be indicative only’.106 As explained by McGarvie J, referring to the exercise of judicial discretion generally:107 Decisions of judges in the exercise of a discretion are often useful to a judge later exercising the discretion. Earlier decisions may show what considerations are, and what are not, relevant to the exercise of the discretion. They may indicate what considerations are usually considered and what

[page 151] weights are usually accorded to particular considerations. They may indicate the approach which is appropriate in the usual case. However, they cannot create either a formula to be followed or conditions precedent to be satisfied before the discretion can be exercised in a particular way. That would involve an impermissible fettering of the discretion. In that way judicial decision would destroy the flexible discretion which the law had conferred on the judge. Judges cannot transfer to a formula, treated as created by earlier decisions, their personal responsibility to exercise the discretion.

An example of fettering discretion in this context is found in Vero Insurance Ltd v Gombac Group Pty Ltd,108 which came before the Supreme Court of Victoria due to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal’s refusal to award the applicant costs, stemming from the tribunal’s application of a guideline that costs are less likely to be awarded in an administrative review than in an inter partes commercial dispute.109 Aside from being unsupported by authority, Gillard J found such a guideline to be contrary to s 109 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic),110 being the source of the tribunal’s discretion to award costs.111 As s 109 drew no distinction between the two forms of proceeding, laying down a guideline ‘based purely and simply on whether it is an administrative review

proceeding or an original jurisdiction proceeding’ fettered the statutory discretion illegitimately.112 In a case where the costs discretion required the court to determine what is ‘fair and reasonable … in the circumstances of the particular case’113 the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Port Stephens Council v Sansom114 adopted a similar approach, ruling that any general characterisation of the proceedings, such as ‘merits review’, cannot be determinative or even entitled to presumptive weight.

Legitimacy of costs practice directions or practice notes 6.18 It is common for the Chief Judge of a court to issue practice directions (or practice notes), including directions as to the award of costs. Consistent with the preceding discussion, these directions are legitimate provided they do not purport to fetter a statutorily conferred costs discretion, but instead prompt consistency in its exercise.115 So if a practice direction gives no more than an indication of the course the court may follow in deciding whether to award costs on the facts of the particular case,116 it cannot be impugned. Where, on the other hand, the terms of a practice direction ostensibly create an inflexible or presumptive rule not otherwise justified under the terms of the statutory discretion, the practice direction represents an illegitimate fetter on that discretion. The same is the case where a practice direction does not accurately represent the relevant practice. In Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue117 the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that a practice direction issued by the Land and Environment Court, pursuant to which ‘no order for costs is made in valuation appeals … unless the circumstances are exceptional’,118 purported to impose a rigid fetter on the broad statutory costs discretion119 [page 152] because it was not declaratory of the court’s practice in respect of valuation appeals.120 The same court later signalled a willingness to interfere with a practice that has developed other than in accordance with the law. Their Honours saw it as no answer to the proposition that a statutory discretion has

been impermissibly fettered to say that the fetter is based on a principle; the impermissible fetter arises out of giving that principle determinative, or even presumptive, operation.121

Discretion to be exercised consistently with purposes of tribunal or type of proceeding 6.19 Even a broad discretion as to costs will be read down where it is inconsistent with the purposes of the tribunal in question. In Duke Eastern Gas Pipeline Pty Ltd,122 for example, dealing with a law empowering the making of ‘such orders (if any) as to costs in respect of a proceeding as it thinks fit’,123 the Australian Competition Tribunal remarked that a general ‘costs follow the event’ approach would not be conducive to the effective discharge by the tribunal of its statutory functions. It reasoned as follows:124 Costs orders should only be made in proceedings before the Tribunal where there are circumstances which justify the making of an order. The fact that a particular outcome of proceedings before the Tribunal may be seen as conducive (or not conducive) to the commercial interests of a party, would not ordinarily provide, of itself, a sufficient reason for making a costs order for (or against) that party. In principle, the power to order costs should be exercised sparingly, and not so as to discourage participation in the review process. Generally the power to award costs should be reserved for cases where a party’s participation in the proceedings before the Tribunal materially and unnecessarily increases what would otherwise have been the costs of those proceedings.

6.20 Like principles apply where the proceedings do not sit comfortably with the ‘costs follow the event’ application of the costs discretion. This may be because, say, the exercise of the costs discretion in this way could discourage proceedings that it is inconsistent with public policy to discourage,125 or the nature of the jurisdiction is one that otherwise makes costs following the event potentially unjust.126 Specific instances where the courts are regularly presented with arguments that the type of action should confer some immunity from the usual costs order are test cases, public interest litigation, and cases pertaining to moneys in a fund in respect of which the claimant alleges an interest. Each is discussed elsewhere,127 but again [page 153] any set rule, or even presumptive approach, as to the exercise of a costs

discretion fetters that discretion,128 and so should be viewed as merely an indicative guideline capable of yielding to the relevant circumstances.

Slip Rule Jurisdiction 6.21 Courts rules empower a court at any time to correct a clerical mistake, or an error arising from an accidental slip or omission, in a judgment or order (known as the ‘slip rule’).129 The rules in this regard reflect an existing inherent jurisdiction,130 at least for superior courts.131 The case law establishing what may be done to correct orders under the slip rule is thus indicative of what a court may do in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.132 It has been suggested, to this end, that the inherent jurisdiction is effectively replaced by the rules of court,133 although the modern judicial view appears otherwise.134 In either case, though, it is injustice to litigants that the court’s intervention is aimed at rectifying.135

Curial approach to rectifying errors under the slip rule 6.22 The slip rule qualifies the rule — grounded in the desirability of finality in litigation — that a court may not vary a duly passed and entered order that brings a proceeding to an end.136 The weightiness of this policy dictates that the jurisdiction should be exercised [page 154] sparingly.137 The onus consequently rests on the party seeking the correction of the alleged error or slip. The slip rule is commonly used either to correct the court’s order to give expression to its intention at the time it pronounced the decision, or to correct its order so as to include in it an order on an ancillary matter that by

inadvertence was not addressed at the hearing.138 It does not apply, as there is no accidental slip or omission, in four main circumstances: first, where the proposed amendment requires the exercise of an independent discretion or is a matter upon which a real difference of opinion might exist;139 second, where the judge’s attention has been directed to a particular point, and the judge decides the point applying his or her mind to it;140 third, where the error is the consequence of a deliberate decision;141 and fourth, where the error is a result of a deliberate misrepresentation.142

Application of the slip rule to costs orders 6.23 Costs orders are prime candidates for the operation of the slip rule (assuming that the alleged slip is ‘an accidental slip or omission’) because they are ancillary in nature.143 A common scenario is where the slip or omission impacting upon the appropriate costs order was that of a party’s legal representatives. For example, a court may amend its order by including in it an order for costs that through inadvertence of counsel was not made at the hearing,144 or may include in an order for costs an item overlooked in the costs order originally pronounced.145 The case to rectify an error may be stronger again in the event of an unrepresented litigant.146 Yet the jurisdiction is not limited to cases of this kind; it may extend to correcting an error in [page 155] a court order as to the quantum of costs allowable,147 and more generally to addressing a defect in the order itself due to judicial oversight,148 misunderstanding149 or ambiguity.150

Matters requiring exercise of an independent discretion or resolution of a controversy 6.24 To activate the slip rule, the court must be satisfied that the judge in question would have made the order, as rectified, in the circumstances. This simply recognises that a court will not use the slip rule in a matter upon which a real difference of opinion might exist.151 In Re Inchcape (Earl of),152

for example, after hearing an adjourned summons, the judge ordered that costs be taxed as between solicitor and client, and paid out of the estate. The judge was not asked to provide that certain costs incurred before the issue of the summons also be met from the estate. An application under the slip rule proved successful because the error arose from an omission of counsel to direct the judge’s attention to these costs, which would have been included had the judge’s attention been so directed. In Symes v Commonwealth of Australia153 the plaintiff succeeded as to only part of his claim in the Supreme Court, and was as a result entitled to costs on the Magistrates Court scale unless the judge made an order to the contrary.154 The trial judge made no such order because counsel did not ask for one. Gallop J exercised his discretion to vary the order under the slip rule, so that the plaintiff would have his costs on the scale applicable to the Supreme Court, because he was satisfied that in the circumstances the court would have made such an order except for the plaintiff’s failure to apply for it.155 6.25 Where the proposed amendment requires the exercise of an independent discretion by the judge, it is ordinarily a matter upon which a real difference of opinion might exist. Cases involving attempts to vary costs orders resulting from offers of compromise highlight this point.156 Court rules generally provide that a litigant who has made an offer of compromise in an amount exceeding that ultimately recovered by his or her opponent may be treated favourably in costs.157 In Sands & McDougall Wholesale Pty Ltd (in liq) v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (No 2),158 for example, judgment for the plaintiff on appeal was more favourable than the defendant’s offer of compromise — a factor relevant to the court’s discretion to grant the plaintiff solicitor–client costs — but the court made its final order for costs without knowledge of the offer. The Victorian Court of Appeal held that this could not be ‘corrected’ under the slip rule so as to give to the plaintiff an entitlement to solicitor–client costs. This was because [page 156] the court was unable to conclude, with the necessary degree of conviction, that an award of solicitor–client costs would have been made had the matter been drawn to the trial judge’s attention. The court opined that even though it

may well be that the trial judge would have done so, it was not a matter over which it could be said that there could be no real difference of opinion or controversy.159

Slip must be ‘accidental’ 6.26 The requirement that the slip or omission be ‘accidental’ dictates that the slip rule will not be utilised where the case involves afterthought rather than oversight.160 The concern is that parties should not be able to ‘continually come back to court to amend orders to include something they have thought of subsequently which would make the order more to their advantage’.161 This would threaten the policy that there must be a point where litigation comes to an end. Ordinarily, however, an omission to seek costs is viewed as a true example of oversight; a costs order is usually a necessary part of the proceedings, and the omission can almost invariably be explained in only one way. This can be contrasted with attempts to add provisos to substantive (as opposed to ancillary) orders.162

Order by agreement of the parties 6.27 A court will be reticent to ‘correct’ an order that has been the subject of agreement between the parties. The assumption is that where the parties have had an opportunity to reach agreement as to the content of an order, it is difficult to see how an attempt to modify that agreement will be a matter upon which no real difference of opinion might exist. For example, in Concrete Industries (Monier) Ltd v Whitelaw163 there was a judgment by consent for an order for taxation of costs ‘as between solicitor and client’. The plaintiffs argued that taxation should be on the basis of solicitor and own client,164 and sought an amendment of the order. Norris J expressed ‘very grave doubts’ as to whether it was competent for the court, under the slip rule, to rectify an agreement entered into by the parties, and so refused to go beyond what the parties had expressed in their written agreement.165

Discretion and timing of application 6.28 There is no entitlement to an order under the slip rule, whether under the

inherent jurisdiction or the court rules. The wording of the rules, which provide that the court ‘may’ correct an error, slip or omission, highlights this. There is consequently discretion in the court to refuse an order of this kind if something has intervened that would render it inexpedient or inequitable that the order be made. That the rules entitle the court to make an order ‘at any time’ does not mean that the court will disregard undue delay in seeking the correction. As such, there is judicial recognition of ‘the importance of prompt action under the slip rule’.166 An order under the slip rule here may, therefore, be refused for delay. In Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd167 judgment on an action for specific performance was delivered in 1989, and counsel for the defendant moved successfully for orders that the claim be dismissed with [page 157] costs. Over three years later, the defendant applied under the slip rule for a ‘special order’ as to costs.168 Malcolm CJ held that to accede to the application after such an inordinate period of delay would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, elaborating on the point as follows:169 There must come a point where the interests of finality of litigation militate against the exercise of discretion in favour of a party whose solicitors or counsel have failed by inadvertence to make an appropriate application at the appropriate time. It has been urged upon me by counsel for the defendant that the court should be reluctant to visit upon the litigant the consequences of inadvertence by his solicitors or counsel. So much may be accepted, but there must be in the interests of the administration of justice and finality in litigation some limit to the exercise of that discretion which is by way of an indulgence of the court. If a litigant suffers loss or damage as a result of inadvertence amounting to negligence, he has a remedy.170

His Honour did not consider it necessary to show delay coupled with prejudice before the court would decline to exercise its discretion. Even were proof of prejudice necessary, he found sufficient prejudice in the fact that the state of affairs created by the original judgment had been left to stand for so long.171 6.29 Delay will not automatically deny an order under the slip rule. Notwithstanding Malcolm CJ’s remarks, the presence or absence of prejudice may indeed be a relevant, though perhaps not a decisive, consideration in this respect. In Cappuccio v Chrysler Australia (Sales) Pty Ltd172 the plaintiff had

applied to a Federal Court judge in chambers for leave to amend his statement of claim in September 1978, on which application the defendant was represented by both junior and senior counsel. By accident, counsel made no request to the judge to certify that the application was a proper one for the attendance of counsel, and so the order contained no such certificate. Under the relevant rules, the cost of counsel’s attendance at chambers was not allowed unless the judge certified it to be a proper case for counsel to attend.173 In March 1980 the defendant applied under the slip rule for a certificate. Davies J held this to be an appropriate case to exercise the court’s power — it being an accidental mistake by counsel that should be corrected — and though the delay had been great, no one had been disadvantaged thereby.174 His Honour reasoned that the grant of a certificate would not alter the substance of the original order — it was ancillary to that order — but would give proper effect to what was then in mind by the order for costs thereby made.

1.

See 6.4–6.13 (jurisdiction), 6.14–6.20 (discretion).

2.

See 6.21–6.29.

3.

See further R W Quick, ‘Costs: The Historical Perspective’ (1983) 13 QLSJ 169 (Pt I), 277 (Pt II).

4.

Garnett v Bradley (1878) 3 App Cas 944 at 962 per Lord Blackburn.

5.

Garnett v Bradley (1878) 3 App Cas 944 at 953–4 per Lord Hatherley.

6.

6 Edw I c 1. See also Statute of Marlborough 1267 (UK), 52 Henry III c 6.

7.

W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, Vol 3, 1st ed, Sweet Maxwell & Stevens, London, 1768, p 399 (footnote omitted).

8.

Corporation of Burford v Lenthall (1743) 2 Atk 551 at 553; 26 ER 731 at 732 per Lord Hardwicke.

9.

Jones v Coxeter (1742) 2 Atk 400 at 400; 26 ER 642 at 642.

10. Andrews v Barnes (1888) 39 Ch D 133 at 138 per Fry LJ. 11. First Report of the Judicature Commissioners (1868–9), vol 25, p 15, in IUP Series of British Parliamentary Papers, vol 13, p 23. 12. (1878) 3 App Cas 944 at 958. 13. (1886) 34 Ch D 24 at 33 per Cotton LJ, at 42–3 per Fry LJ. 14. Namely the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1925 (UK), and now Senior Courts Act 1981 (UK) s 51(1). 15. As to the Australian legislation see 6.14. 16. Re Birkman (1860) 1 QSCR 14; Garnett v Bradley (1878) 3 App Cas 944 at 962 per Lord

Blackburn; Service v Flatau (1900) 16 WN (NSW) 248 at 249 per Cohen J; R v Justices of South Brisbane (1901) 11 QLJ 81 at 83 per Griffith CJ (FC); Queensland Fish Board v Bunney [1979] Qd R 301 at 303 per Connolly J (FC); Martin v Wiggins [1984] Tas R 188 at 190 per Cox J; Wyatt v Albert Shire Council [1987] 1 Qd R 486 at 488 (FC); Re Feez Ruthning’s Bill of Costs [1989] 1 Qd R 55 at 90 per McPherson J (FC); Besgrove v Larson (2001) 22 Qld Lawyer Reps 82 at 83; [2001] QDC 144 per Judge McGill. 17. (1998) 195 CLR 184 at 200; BC9802630 (footnote omitted). 18. [2007] VSCA 57; BC200702308. 19. Director of Public Prosecutions v Le (No 2) [2007] VSCA 57; BC200702308 at [5]. 20. As to the party and party basis see 16.14–16.17. 21. Director of Public Prosecutions v Le (No 2) [2007] VSCA 57; BC200702308 at [10]. 22. Director of Public Prosecutions v Ali (No 2) (2009) 25 VR 656; [2009] VSCA 243; BC200909513; Bow Ye Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) [2009] VSCA 278; BC200910947. 23. Bow Ye Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) [2009] VSCA 278; BC200910947 at [18] per the court. 24. Director of Public Prosecutions v Ali (No 2) (2009) 25 VR 656; [2009] VSCA 243; BC200909513 at [30] per Weinberg JA. 25. See, for example, Anthony v Maxam Australia Pty Ltd [2012] TASSC 42; BC201205197 (where Wood J ruled that r 32(2) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Rules 1998 (Tas) — which states that ‘[u]nless the parties agree otherwise, costs of the action are to be paid by the party discontinuing the action’ — did not oust the court’s broader statutory jurisdiction to make costs orders in the event of a discontinuance, including on a solicitor and client basis); State of Victoria v Grawin Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 157; BC201202471 (where Croft J held that s 10(1) of the Port Bellarine Tourist Resort (Repeal) Act 2012 (Vic) — which states that ‘[n]o amount is payable by the Crown (as compensation, damages or otherwise) to any person for any loss or damage arising out of or in connection with the enactment of this Act’ — did not remove the powers and jurisdiction of the court to grant costs against the state). 26. See, for example, Yunupingu v Goodsell (SC(NT), Martin J, 24 December 1998, unreported) BC9807337 at [6]–[8] (who ruled that an agreement that neither party in criminal proceedings would seek an order for costs did not divest the court of its jurisdiction to order costs according to the justice of the case); Blackley v Rigby [2013] NTSC 12; BC201309096 at [26] per Blokland J. 27. See 15.40–15.57. 28. Re Safetycare Australia Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 321; BC9905559 at [12] per Byrne J (‘I will not make an order which flies in the face of the parties’ agreement that each bear its own costs of the Federal Court proceeding’); Gorman v Gorman [2004] NSWSC 741; BC200405181 at [105] per Barrett J (‘the duty to act judicially in relation to costs must mean that if the court is told that, as a result of an agreement between them, one particular party does not seek costs against another party, it is not open to the court to make, with respect to those two parties, the very order they both wish to avoid’). 29. Cf Geoform Design Pty Ltd v Randwick City Council (1995) 87 LGERA 140 at 147, 152; BC9504743 per Pearlman J (LEC) (the court must exercise its own statutorily conferred discretion as to costs, although any agreement of the parties is clearly a factor to take into account in so doing).

30. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 26 (High Court); Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(1) (see also Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 32; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1335(2) (which is not the court’s source of jurisdiction to make costs orders in corporations matters, but rather ‘a supplemental grant of jurisdiction in addition to all such costs powers as courts invested with jurisdiction under the Corporations Act 2001 already have’: J & M Jankar Pty Ltd v Dellmain Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 766; BC200908098 at [152] per Slattery J; see further Re Hughes (2010) 183 FCR 150; [2010] FCA 141; BC201000853 at [15]–[18] per Siopis J; 22.12–22.14); Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 12(1)). 31. Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) s 15. The former provision, s 221 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) (repealed), was expressed in terms that ‘[t]he Supreme Court shall have power to award costs in all cases brought before it and not provided for otherwise than by this section’. It has been suggested that Qld UCPR r 681(1), which states that costs of a proceeding ‘are in the discretion of the court but follow the event, unless the court orders otherwise’, is a provision ‘otherwise than by’ for the purposes of s 221, and was therefore the source of the Supreme Court’s power to make costs orders for costs rather than s 221: 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd v United Petroleum Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 85; BC201102264 at [13] Peter Lyons J. It is difficult to construe the current s 15 in the same fashion, for it appears that the phrase ‘unless otherwise provided’ is directed to an ouster or qualification of the power to order costs rather than an alternative parallel rule-based provision. 32. Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) s 5 (definition of ‘court’). 33. HCR 2004 r 50.01 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 1(1)); Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(2); ACT r 1721(1) (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 1(1)); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98(1) (a) (formerly Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 76(1)(a)); NT r 63.03(1) (see also r 63.03(2), which provides that where in the opinion of the court the strict application of O 63 would result in an anomaly, it may make such order in relation to costs as it thinks equitable in the circumstances); Qld r 681(1) (formerly Qld r 689(1)); Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 40(1); Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 12(2); Tas r 57(1); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 24(1); Vic r 63.02; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 37(1); WA O 66 r 1(1). 34. Re JJT (1998) 195 CLR 184 at 201; BC9802630 per Kirby J. As to the characteristics of a judicial exercise of power see 6.15. 35. Re JJT (1998) 195 CLR 184 at 201; BC9802630 per Kirby J. 36. [1980] 1 NSWLR 599 at 601 (CCA). See also at 603 per Begg J; Proust v Blake (1989) 17 NSWLR 267 at 271 per Samuels JA (CCA); Environmental Protection Authority v Cooke (1996) 90 LGERA 61 at 62; BC9600602 per Hunt CJ at CL (CCA(NSW)); Re Magarey Farlam Lawyers Trust Accounts (2007) 99 SASR 40; [2007] SASC 307; BC200706859 at [66] per White J (FC); Appellants v Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory (2011) 252 FLR 209; [2011] ACTSC 133; BC201106410 at [89] per Refshauge ACJ. 37. Namely the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) s 5B(1): see 24.60. 38. Clyne v Wrigley [1980] 1 NSWLR 599 at 601 (CCA). 39. Phillips v Morris [1999] 1 Qd R 89 at 90–1; BC9800983 (CA). 40. As to this presumption see 24.2–24.5. 41. [1979] Qd R 301 at 303 per Connolly J (FC). See also Booker v Gill (1898) 15 WN (NSW) 158 (FC) (which held that a court had no power to award costs under a provision that empowered it to make ‘all such other orders as the circumstances of the case require’). 42. [1993] 1 Qd R 57.

43. Crowe v Bennett [1993] 1 Qd R 57 at 60 per Macrossan CJ, at 68–9 per Davies JA (CA). Contra per McPherson JA in dissent, who stated that ‘there is nothing in s 88(3) to suggest that the power of ordering payment of the costs occasioned by an adjournment is limited in any way’, and concluded that ‘s 88(3) ought not to be interpreted so as by implication to confine its application to proceedings of a kind expressly designated in s 88(1)’: at 62, 66. 44. Crowe v Bennett [1993] 1 Qd R 57 at 61 (CA). 45. [1983] 2 NSWLR 497 at 504 per Hunt J. 46. R v Barbaro (1992) 108 ACTR 1 at 4 per Miles CJ. See also Director General, Department of Community Services v Houdek [1999] NSWSC 1031; BC9906577 at [44] per Bell J (ruling that an unexplained failure to obey the directions of the Children’s Court may in an appropriate case justify the making of an order for costs, even though that court had no specific statutory power to order costs, but only a general power to make ‘such orders … as it thinks appropriate’). 47. (1987) 11 NSWLR 241. 48. Referring to O’Toole v Scott [1965] AC 939; Ceissman v Donovan [1983] 2 NSWLR 491; K Mason, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court’ (1983) 57 ALJ 449. 49. Namely the Child Welfare Act 1939 (NSW) (repealed). 50. Wilson v McDougall (1987) 11 NSWLR 241 at 245. 51. See, for example, Director of Public Prosecutions v Donaczy [2007] NSWSC 923; BC200707529. 52. Re Verus Capital Ltd and Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2001) 39 ACSR 430 at 442 (AAT) (also noting that the presence of a limited power to award costs in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 69B indicates an intention that no such power be conferred in other contexts: at 441). 53. (2011) 252 FLR 209; [2011] ACTSC 133; BC201106410 at [136]. 54. Namely the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal. 55. Under s 416(3) of the Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT). 56. Appellants v Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory (2011) 252 FLR 209; [2011] ACTSC 133; BC201106410 at [137]–[138] (paragraph break omitted). 57. Namely the Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) and the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT). 58. See 6.19–6.20. 59. See, for example, 8.89–8.94. 60. As had been held in Victorian Phillip-Stephan Photo Litho Co v Davis (1890) 11 LR (NSW) L 257; Service v Flatau (1900) 16 WN (NSW) 248. 61. Queensland Fish Board v Bunney [1979] Qd R 301 at 303 per Connolly J (FC) (referring to Spicer v Carmody (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 348). 62. R v Forbes (1972) 127 CLR 1 at 7; BC7200520 per Menzies J; Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84 at 136; BC9102648 per Toohey J. 63. See 6.9. 64. Cf the argument that the power to award costs in respect of litigation conducted in a superior court may arise under an inherent power of a superior court of record, under a power incidental and necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction conferred on the court or, in the case of a federal court,

under a power reposed in the court by s 71 of the Constitution as part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth: Ward v Western Australia (1999) 163 ALR 149 at 151; BC9902172 per Lee J (FCA). As to the inherent jurisdiction of superior courts generally see I H Jacob, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court’ [1970] CLP 23; K Mason, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court’ (1983) 57 ALJ 449; P de Jersey, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court’ (1985) 13 QLSJ 325. Cf M S Dockray, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction to Regulate Civil Proceedings’ (1997) 113 LQR 120. 65. (1999) 163 ALR 149 at 151–2; BC9902172 (FCA). See also Gittins v W H C Stacy & Son Pty Ltd (1964) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 157 at 158 per Brereton J (FC) (ruling that the Supreme Court has power to impose sanctions involving the payment of costs upon failure to adhere to procedures laid down by the court). 66. Marriage of Dowdeswell (1983) 8 Fam LR 868 at 869 per Fogarty J. 67. Carr v Stringer (1858) El Bl & El 123; 120 ER 454; Morse v Australian Steam Navigation Company (1870) 9 SCR 81; Re Bombay Civil Fund Act (1882) 40 Ch D 288 at 289–90 per Bowen LJ; Stevens v Barnett (1900) 17 WN (NSW) 38 at 39 per Stephen J; Re J H Robertson’s Application for Letters Patent [1930] 1 Ch 186 at 193 per Luxmoore J; Dennis v Malcolm [1934] Ch 244 at 253 per Clauson J; Commissioner of Taxes v Rooney [1936] SASR 289 at 297 per Richards J (FC); Re Crittendon [1958] VR 101 at 103 per Lowe J (FC); Pezet v Pezet (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 45 at 51 per Jordan CJ; Re Avonbank Dairy Co Pty Ltd [1962] Tas SR 121; Proust v Blake (1989) 17 NSWLR 267 at 272 per Samuels JA; Markisic v Vizza [2002] NSWCCA 53; BC200207794 at [30]–[31] per Stein JA; Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Roslyndale Shipping Company Pty Ltd (2004) 148 A Crim R 341; [2004] NSWCCA 262; BC200404828 at [12]–[13] per Studdert J; Kowalski v Repatriation Commission (2009) 259 ALR 444; [2009] FCAFC 107; BC200907866 at [24]–[25] per the court. 68. See, for example, White v White (No 2) [1923] St R Qd 69 (FC); Wentworth v Rares (CA(NSW), 20 December 1991, unreported) BC9101301 at 3–8 per Priestley JA. 69. See 20.19–20.27. 70. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 26 (High Court); Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(1) (see also Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 32); Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 12(1). Also, the expression ‘proceedings under [the] Act’ in s 117(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) has been held to include proceedings brought to determine if there is jurisdiction in respect of proceedings under the Act: Esdale v Schenk (2012) 46 Fam LR 547; [2012] FamCA 111; BC201250169 at [23] per Murphy J. 71. Ex parte Asher (1865) 4 SCR (NSW) 71; Ex parte Lawry (1868) 7 SCR (NSW) 183; Ex parte Charlton (1869) 8 SCR (NSW) 158; Dowd v President of Violet Town Shire (1899) 6 ALR (CN) 1; Horne v Frank [2001] QDC 29 at [26]–[31] per McGill DCJ (referring to A J Snelling (1935) 8 ALJ 404); Brett Wolinski Building Pty Ltd v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2003) ANZ Ins Cas ¶61-575; [2003] NSWSC 475; BC200302908 at [31] per Harrison M (who on the facts held (at [45]) that such a power arose out of a statutory power in the Fair Trading Tribunal to award ‘costs of, or incidental to proceedings’ or ‘costs of or incidental to the application’ (Fair Trading Tribunal Act 1998 (NSW) s 48(6) (repealed)) and to determine ‘by whom and to what extent costs are to be paid’ (s 48(5)); equivalent provisions are now located in the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001 (NSW) s 52(2), 52(3)(a), 52(4)). 72. Khatri v Price (1999) 95 FCR 287 at 290; [1999] FCA 1289; BC9905891 per Katz J; Murcia & Associates (a firm) v Grey (2001) 25 WAR 209; [2001] WASCA 240; BC200104876 at [27] per Steytler J.

Commonwealth Employees’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 67(8) (now 73. Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 67(8)). 74. Plumb v Comcare (1992) 39 FCR 236 at 240; BC9203846 per Lockhart J, with whom Black CJ and Gummow J concurred. This case is therefore not authority, as was held in Duncan v Moore (2000) 107 LGERA 430 at 459; [2000] NSWLEC 64; BC200001577 by Sheahan J, for the proposition that if there is no jurisdiction to hear the claim in question, there is no jurisdiction to make orders for costs in regard thereto. 75. HCR 2004 r 50.01 (formerly HCR 1952 O 70 r 1(1)); ACT r 1721 (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 1(1)); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98(1)(a) (formerly Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 76(1)(a)); Qld r 681(1) (formerly Qld r 689); Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 40(1); Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 12(2); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 24(1) (see also Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 65C(1)); Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 37(1). 76. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98(1)(b) (formerly Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 76(1) (b)); Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 40(1); Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 12(2) (see also Tas r 839(d)); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 24(1); Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 37(1). See also the former HCR 1952 O 71 r 9(1)(c); ACT RSC O 65 r 20(1). 77. Re Cooke [1997] 1 Qd R 15 at 21; BC9506004 per White J. 78. McWilliams Wines Pty Ltd v Liaweena (NSW) Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 190 at 192; BC9303918 per Rogers CJ. 79. Wentworth v Attorney-General (NSW) (1984) 154 CLR 518 at 527; BC8400554 per the court. 80. M v W (2006) 96 SASR 105; [2006] SASC 347; BC200609574 at [2] per Bleby J. As to interim costs orders see 14.3–14.22. 81. McWilliams Wines Pty Ltd v Liaweena (NSW) Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 190 at 193; BC9303918 per Rogers CJ. Cf Marriage of Collins (1985) 75 FLR 84 at 90 (FC(Fam Ct)) which said that ‘[w]hile the discretion as to costs is broad, it does not … follow that the court has an unfettered discretion to act of its own motion in initiating proceedings for costs where none is sought by the party concerned’. Yet in that the courts’ broad discretion as to costs is not premised, whether under statute or the court rules, upon an application by a litigant, but upon the justice of the case, there seems no reason in principle to deny the court the jurisdiction to make an order as to costs even though one has not been sought by the litigant(s). 82. Donald Campbell & Co Ltd v Pollak [1927] AC 732 at 811 per Viscount Cave LC. 83. Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 558; BC9002896 per Dawson J. 84. Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 568; BC9002896 per McHugh J. 85. Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 540; BC9002896 per Mason CJ. 86. Overton Investments Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (2001) 113 LGERA 439 at 447; [2001] NSWCA 137; BC200102232 per Stein JA. 87. Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 81; BC9800310 per Gaudron and Gummow JJ. 88. Williams v Lewer [1974] 2 NSWLR 91 at 95 per Rath J. See also R v Thomas [1948] 4 DLR 492 at 508 per Coyne JA (CA(Man)); Auckland Bulk Gas Users Group v Commerce Commission [1990] 1 NZLR 448 at 471 per Greig J, W J Shaw and E J Neilson (HC); South Melbourne City Council v Hallam (No 2) (1994) 83 LGERA 307 at 312 per Ormiston J (SC(Vic)); Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd v Maritime Services Board of New South Wales (1995) 36 NSWLR 552 at 564; BC9504766

per Sully J, with whom Studdert and Grove JJ concurred (CCA) (requiring a ‘clear, and sufficiently exposed, process of reasoning’ and not ‘[a] result which is, in truth, nothing more than an infinitive stab in the dark’); Kazar v Kargarian (2011) 197 FCR 113; [2011] FCAFC 136; BC201108412 at [5] per Greenwood and Rares JJ. 89. Earnshaw v Loy (No 2) [1959] VR 252 at 253 per Sholl J. See also Howitt v W Alexander & Sons Ltd [1948] SC 154 at 159 per Lord Russell (CS(Scot)). 90. Peters v Peters (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 398 at 399 per Street J; Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 at 11 per Bray CJ; Scherer v Counting Instruments Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 615 at 621 per Buckley LJ. 91. Baillieu Knight Frank (NSW) Pty Ltd v Ted Manny Real Estate Pty Ltd (1992) 30 NSWLR 359 at 362 per Powell J. 92. Redden v Chapman (1949) 50 SR (NSW) 24 at 25 per Roper CJ in Eq; Laguillo v Haden Engineering Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 306 at 309 per Reynolds JA; Jones v North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc (1985) 82 FLR 264 at 265 per Kearney J (SC(NT)); R v Racing, Gaming and Liquor Commission (1988) 91 FLR 62 at 64 per Kearney J (SC(NT)); Auckland Bulk Gas Users Group v Commerce Commission [1990] 1 NZLR 448 at 471 per Greig J, W J Shaw and E J Neilson (HC); Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 97; BC9800310 per McHugh J; Director of Family Services v Campione (1998) 83 FCR 63 at 68; BC9801262 (FC) (noting that this practice may be ‘incidental to a system adversary in nature in which the spoils of victory include reparations for the price of fighting a war’); Hofer v Howell (No 2) (2001) 113 LGERA 391 at 395; [2001] NSWLEC 42; BC200101288 per Lloyd J; Hunter Development Brokerage Pty Ltd v Cessnock City Council (No 2) (2006) 68 NSWLR 177; [2006] NSWCA 292; BC200608774 at [50] per Basten JA. 93. Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 96; BC9800310 per McHugh J. See generally Ch 7. 94. See 7.4. 95. Petar v Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 142; BC200704622 at [28] per the court. See also Forest Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) v Keen Bay Pty Ltd (1991) 4 ACSR 107 at 120 per Dowsett J (FC(Qld)) (referring to ‘the normal order in litigation’). 96. Mann v Carnell (2001) 159 FLR 466 at 467; [2001] ACTSC 18; BC200100973 per Miles CJ. 97. Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant (No 2) [1968] VR 533 at 534 per Gillard J; Laguillo v Haden Engineering Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 306 at 308 per Reynolds JA. See further 6.15. 98. The circumstances in which this may be legitimate are discussed at 8.25–8.68. 99. Durham v Collins [1999] SASC 163; BC9901923 at [16] per Debelle J; Gorman v Gorman [2004] NSWSC 741; BC200405181 at [105] per Barrett J. 100. Pepys v London Transport Executive [1975] 1 WLR 234 at 237–8 per Lord Denning MR, at 239 per Roskill LJ, at 241 per Sir John Pennycuick; Hunt v McKay (FC(WA), Malcolm CJ, Rowland and Seaman JJ, 7 November 1991, unreported) BC9100912 at 6 per Seaman J, with whom Malcolm CJ and Rowland J concurred. 101. Petar v Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 142; BC200704622 at [28] per the court. See also Luxmore Pty Ltd v Hydedale Pty Ltd (2008) 20 VR 481; [2008] VSCA 212; BC200809499 at [12] per Maxwell P and Kellam JA (‘This Court will set its face against any proposition which would require judges disposing of questions of costs to give elaborate reasons’).

102. The Freideberg (1885) 10 PD 112 at 113 per Lord Esher; Peters v Peters (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 398 at 399 per Street J; Schaftenaar v Samuels (1975) 11 SASR 266 at 274 per Wells J; Kazar v Kargarian (2011) 197 FCR 113; [2011] FCAFC 136; BC201108412 at [5], [6] per Greenwood and Rares JJ. 103. Elders Trustee & Executor Co Ltd v Eastoe [1963] WAR 36 at 40 per Hale J. 104. Potter Drug & Chemical Corporation v Malouf (1900) 17 WN (NSW) 140 at 141 per Walker J. See also The Young Sid [1929] P 190 at 194 per Scrutton LJ, at 201 per Sankey LJ. 105. The Young Sid [1929] P 190 at 196 per Scrutton LJ, at 199–200 per Greer LJ, at 201, 203 per Sankey LJ; Australian Postal Commission v Dao (No 2) (1986) 6 NSWLR 497 at 503 per Kirby P; Bolton Metropolitan District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1996] 1 All ER 184 at 186 per Lord Lloyd; Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 121; BC9800310 per Kirby J; Vero Insurance Ltd v Gombac Group Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 117; BC200703206 at [28]–[29] per Gillard J. 106. Port Stephens Council v Sansom (2007) 156 LGERA 125; [2007] NSWCA 299; BC200709106 at [54], [55] per Spigelman CJ, with whom Mason P, Beazley, Giles and Ipp JJA concurred. 107. McKenna v McKenna [1984] VR 665 at 674. See also Gardner v Jay (1885) 29 Ch D 50 at 58 per Bowen LJ; Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473 at 480 per Lord Atkin, at 488–9 per Lord Wright; Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306 at 326 per Devlin LJ; Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 519–20 per Mason and Deane JJ, at 537–8 per Brennan J; BC8601421 (see 1.13). 108. [2007] VSC 117; BC200703206. 109. In so deciding, the tribunal followed its earlier decision in Kaldawi v Housing Guarantee Fund Ltd [2004] VCAT 2024. 110. Vero Insurance Ltd v Gombac Group Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 117; BC200703206 at [53]. 111. As to Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 109 see 8.89. 112. Vero Insurance Ltd v Gombac Group Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 117; BC200703206 at [54]. 113. NSW RLEC 1996 Pt 16 r 4(2) (repealed). As to the current RLEC on costs see 8.91–8.94. 114. (2007) 156 LGERA 125; [2007] NSWCA 299; BC200709106 at [60] per Spigelman CJ, with whom Mason P, Beazley, Giles and Ipp JJA concurred. 115. Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 541 per Mason CJ, at 558 per Dawson J; BC9002896; R & W Realty Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2000) 112 LGERA 351 at 356; [2000] NSWLEC 167; BC200004706 per Sheahan J. 116. Outdoor Australia Pty Ltd v Auburn Council (1996) 89 LGERA 365 at 367–8 per Pearlman J (LEC). 117. (2001) 51 NSWLR 673 at 684; [2001] NSWCA 78; BC200103188 per Handley JA (revd but not on this point: Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2003) 212 CLR 111; [2003] HCA 8; BC200300217). 118. Namely Practice Direction No 10A. 119. Under Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) s 69(2) (repealed with effect from 28 January 2008). As to the costs discretion currently vested in the Land and Environment Court see 8.91–8.94. 120. The court noted that the reported cases reflected a difference of views, and therefore no clear

practice. 121. Thaina Town (on Goulburn) Pty Ltd v City of Sydney Council (2007) 71 NSWLR 230; [2007] NSWCA 300; BC200709105 at [45] per Spigelman CJ. 122. (2001) ATPR ¶41-827; [2001] ACompT 3. 123. Gas Pipelines Access Law (Cth) s 38(1). 124. Duke Eastern Gas Pipeline Pty Ltd (2001) ATPR ¶41-827 at 43,196; [2001] ACompT 3. The tribunal was unpersuaded that cause had been shown for the making of a costs order: at 43,196. Nor was the same tribunal in Re East Australian Pipeline Ltd (2005) ATPR ¶42-047; [2005] ACompT 1. See also MGV Pty Ltd v Phonographic Performance Co of Australia Ltd [2000] ACopyT 8 (where Burchett P noted that although the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 174 empowers the Copyright Tribunal to make costs orders in relation to proceedings before it, its ordinary practice is not to make orders for costs, chiefly because its decisions often affect interests wider than those arising between the litigants). As to the costs jurisdiction of tribunals generally see 6.10–6.11, 8.89. 125. See, for example, Kaycliff Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1989) 19 ALD 315 at 317; BC8908561 per Morling J (FCA) (who opined that a court should be astute not to make costs orders that may deter a person seeking relief under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)). 126. See, for example, Papas v Papas [2004] WASCA 6; BC200400144 at [12] per Johnson J (who held that the general discretion conferred on the court ‘to make such orders as to costs as it considers appropriate’ by s 69(1) of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) ‘should not … be approached as if the proceedings are analogous with civil proceedings [but] should be exercised by giving consideration to the protective nature of the jurisdiction’); Kardos v Sarbutt (No 2) (2006) DFC ¶95-337; [2006] NSWCA 206; BC200605726 (as to the exercise of the costs discretion in proceedings involving the breakdown of de facto or domestic relationships: see 8.79–8.80). 127. As to test cases and public interest litigation see Ch 9. As to costs out of a fund see Ch 10. 128. See 6.16–6.17. 129. HCR 2004 r 3.01.2 (formerly HCR 1952 O 29 r 11); FCR 2011 r 39.05(g), (h) (formerly FCR 1979 O 35 r 7(3)); ACT r 6906 (formerly ACT RSC O 32 r 14) (on application by a party or on its own initiative); NSW r 36.17 (formerly NSW RSC Pt 20 r 10(1)) (on the application of any party or of its own motion); NT r 36.07; Qld r 388 (on application by a party or on its own initiative); SA r 242(1) (formerly SA RSC r 53.10) (on application of a party or of its own motion); Tas r 435 (on its own motion or on application or consent memorandum to the registrar); Vic r 36.07; WA O 21 r 10 (on motion or summons without an appeal). See also Fam LR 2004 r 17.02 (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 31 r 6(2)–6(4)); FCCR r 16.05(2). 130. Ainsworth v Wilding [1896] 1 Ch 673 at 677 per Romer J; Milson v Carter [1893] AC 638 at 640 per Lord Hobhouse (PC); Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529 at 540; BC7100470 per Gibbs J; R v Cripps [1984] QB 686 at 695 per Sir John Donaldson MR; Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385 at 390; BC9501558 per Lockhart J (FC); Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Healy (2003) 52 ATR 330; [2003] WASC 38; BC200301167 at [24] per Hasluck J. In Westsub Discounts Pty Ltd v Idaps Australia Ltd (No 2) (1990) 94 ALR 310 at 314; BC9003389 Woodward J remarked that in the case of the Federal Court, it is more appropriate to speak of the implied rather than the inherent jurisdiction of the court, in that as the court is a creature of statute, any such power as may be inherent in the Supreme Courts of the states must be found in the statute establishing the court (see Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23).

131. See Skipworth v State of Western Australia (No 2) (2008) 218 FLR 16; [2008] FMCA 544; BC200803315 at [50] per Lucev FM (noting that the Federal Magistrates Court (now the Federal Circuit Court) has no inherent jurisdiction to reopen this matter and vary the costs order as sought by the first respondent). 132. Coppins v Helmers & Brambles Constructions Pty Ltd [1969] 2 NSWR 279 at 282 (CA). 133. DJL v Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226 at 263–4; [2000] HCA 17; BC200001746 per Kirby J. 134. In Newmont Yandal Operations Pty Ltd v J Aron Corp (2007) 70 NSWLR 411; [2007] NSWCA 195; BC200706351 Spigelman CJ, with whom Santow JA and Handley AJA agreed, stated that although the applicable slip rule may reflect the court’s inherent jurisdiction to vary, modify or extend its own orders, the exercise of such jurisdiction should not be confined to the terminology of that rule, reasoning as follows (at [18]): ‘There is no reason why the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court should be so confined [by the statutory slip rule]. The Rules of Court do not constitute some type of a mini-code replacing inherent jurisdiction. It may well be that the Court’s inherent jurisdiction calls for a variation of orders in circumstances falling outside the slip rule’. See also Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (No 8) [2012] VSC 162; BC201202439 at [21]–[25] per Vickery J (who expressed agreement with the Newmont approach). 135. Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 400 at 407 per Malcolm CJ; Monaco v Arnedo Pty Ltd (1994) 13 WAR 522 at 524 per Malcolm CJ. 136. Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529 at 539–40; BC7100470 per Gibbs J; Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385 at 390; BC9501558 per Lockhart J (FC). 137. Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215 at 275; BC8501055 per Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ. 138. Coppins v Helmers & Brambles Constructions Pty Ltd [1969] 2 NSWR 279 at 282 (CA); L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 2) (1982) 151 CLR 590 at 594–5; BC8200124 per Mason ACJ, Wilson and Deane JJ; DJL v Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226 at 263–4; [2000] HCA 17; BC200001746 per Kirby J; Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (No 8) [2012] VSC 162; BC201202439 at [30] per Vickery J. 139. Brew v Whitlock (No 3) [1968] VR 504 at 506 (FC); Storey & Keers Pty Ltd v Johnstone (1987) 9 NSWLR 446 at 453 per McHugh JA; Marriage of Milham and Stanford (2001) 27 Fam LR 556 at 563; [2001] FamCA 294 (FC); Brown v DML Resources Pty Ltd (in liq) (2001) 165 FLR 390 at 402; [2001] NSWSC 947; BC200106731 per Austin J. See 6.24. 140. Re Inchcape (Earl of) [1942] Ch 394 at 397 per Morton J. 141. Arnett v Holloway [1960] VR 22 at 35–6 (FC); Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385 at 390; BC9501558 per Lockhart J (FC). See 6.26. 142. Preston Banking Co v William Allsup & Sons [1895] 1 Ch 141; MacCarthy v Agard [1933] 2 KB 417 at 421–2 per Scrutton LJ. 143. Westsub Discounts Pty Ltd v Idaps Australia Ltd (No 2) (1990) 94 ALR 310 at 315; BC9003389 per Woodward J (FCA). 144. See, for example, Barrell Insurances Pty Ltd v Pennant Hills Restaurants Pty Ltd (1983) 49 ALR 384; BC8300113 (HC); Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) v Palmer (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 140; BC200502986 at [26] per Giles JA, with whom Spigelman CJ and Handley JA concurred. Another illustration is where there is an omission to ask for an order in respect of costs that have been reserved: see 14.26.

145. See, for example, Chessum & Sons v Gordon [1901] 1 KB 694 at 698–9 per A L Smith LJ; Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners v Cuming, Smith and Co Pty Ltd [1906] VLR 192 at 195 per Hood J; Kral v Hydro-Electric Commission [1977] Tas SR NC 11 (slip rule activated where counsel for the successful party accidentally omitted to ask the judge to certify for counsel); Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Tectran Corporation Pty Ltd (1988) 77 ALR 190; BC8802659 (HCA). 146. See, for example, Frigger v Nigam (2007) 53 SR(WA) 308; [2007] WADC 138; BC200740137 at [6] per Fenbury DCJ (who remarked that an unrepresented party to an action who out of ignorance omits to request an order relating to a special or discrete issue on costs, the order being likely to be made if sought, would be entitled to seek relief under the slip rule). 147. See, for example, Armitage v Parsons [1908] 2 KB 410 at 417 per Sir Gorell Barnes P, at 419–20 per Farwell LJ (where, because of an error arising from an accidental slip, the amount included in the judgment for costs exceeded by a few shillings the amount properly allowable, the judgment was amended by reducing it to the proper amount). 148. See, for example, Quality Corporation (Aust) Pty Ltd v Millford Builders (Vic) Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 137; BC200503500; Australian Capital Holdings Pty Ltd v Mackay City Council [2008] QCA 188; BC200806626. 149. See, for example, MAV v ABA [2007] QCA 380; BC200709602 (where the State of Queensland drew the court’s attention to the fact that it did not seek to intervene on the appeal but rather appeared as amicus curiae; as such, there was no basis upon which a cost order could be made against it; the court held that this error could be rectified under the slip rule). 150. See, for example, Gagarimabu v BHP Billiton Ltd [2003] VSC 416; BC200306630 (where Bongiorno J corrected a costs order that was ambiguous in that it might not have included the costs of earlier interlocutory proceedings). 151. Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales [2000] NSWSC 232; BC200001561 at [51] per Einstein J (‘Matters particularly apt for correction under the slip rule include matters about which there can be no real disagreement or controversy; where an officious bystander would reply when asked if the amendment was appropriate: “Of course”’). 152. [1942] Ch 394. 153. (1987) 89 FLR 356 (SC(ACT)). 154. As to costs orders made where the proceeding is brought in too high a court see Ch 12. 155. Symes v Commonwealth of Australia (1987) 89 FLR 356 at 358–9 (SC(ACT)). 156. They are not, however, the only such illustration: see, for example, Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales [2000] NSWSC 232; BC200001561 at [52], [53] per Einstein J; Mandurah Enterprises Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2008] WASCA 211 (S); BC200900897 at [6]–[9] per McLure JA, with whom Buss JA and Murray AJA concurred. 157. As to the costs consequences of offers of compromise and payments into court see Ch 13. 158. [1999] 2 VR 114; [1999] VSCA 36; BC9901597. 159. Sands & McDougall Wholesale Pty Ltd (in liq) v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (No 2) [1999] 2 VR 114 at 121; [1999] VSCA 36; BC9901597 per Brooking JA. See also Westsub Discounts Pty Ltd v Idaps Australia Ltd (No 2) (1990) 94 ALR 310 at 316; BC9003389 per Woodward J (FCA) (who held that altering the costs consequence of a payment into court was not an appropriate case for the application of the slip rule, in that the order to be substituted for the order said to be in error required both argument and deliberation). 160. Snell v Pryce (No 2) (1992) 109 FLR 328 at 332–3 per Angel J (SC(NT)).

161. Strand Nominees Pty Ltd v Pennywise Smart Shopping Australia Pty Ltd (1991) 1 NTLR 17 at 22 per Asche CJ. 162. Strand Nominees Pty Ltd v Pennywise Smart Shopping Australia Pty Ltd (1991) 1 NTLR 17 at 22 per Asche CJ. 163. [1975] VR 485. 164. As to the difference between ‘solicitor and client’ and ‘solicitor and own client’ bases of taxation see 16.19. 165. Concrete Industries (Monier) Ltd v Whitelaw [1975] VR 485 at 486–7. 166. L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 2) (1982) 151 CLR 590 at 597; BC8200124 per Mason ACJ, Wilson and Deane JJ. 167. (1992) 8 WAR 400; BC9201030. 168. Under the former WA O 66 r 12(1): see 15.72–15.73 of the first edition of this work. The relevant provision is now the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 280: see 15.71–15.75. 169. Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 400 at 409; BC9201030 (footnote supplied). See also Rapid Roofing Pty Ltd v Natalise Pty Ltd [2008] QCA 237; BC200807241 (where Keane JA refused to make an order under the slip rule to allow the applicants the costs of the appeal in addition to those at trial, being was unconvinced that the costs order ‘was not made on the basis of a deliberate and conscious decision’ and, in any event, the delay of 18 months in making the application was too long: at [20]). 170. As to this remedy see 5.35–5.39. 171. Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 400 at 409; BC9201030. His Honour also remarked that the fact that the plaintiff was a substantial company well able to afford to pay any additional costs was not a relevant consideration, and even if it was relevant, it was outweighed by the delay in question: at 409. 172. (1980) 42 FLR 274 (FCA). 173. Namely the former HCR 1952 O 71 r 62(1) (there being no equivalent in the current HCR) (although the case was heard in the Federal Court, the action had been commenced at a date prior to the commencement of the FCR, and so the HCR applied: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 38(2)). 174. Cappuccio v Chrysler Australia (Sales) Pty Ltd (1980) 42 FLR 274 at 277 (FCA).

[page 158]

CHAPTER 7

The Costs Indemnity Rule Costs Follow the Event General rule Relationship of general rule to statutory provisions The indemnity rule

7.2 7.2 7.4 7.5

Impact of the Indemnity Rule ‘Indemnity’ rarely a complete indemnity Incidents of the plaintiff’s success No liability of successful party to own lawyer for costs General rule Prospect of payment is remote Where lawyer acts on a speculative fee, reduced fee or pro bono Successful litigant indemnified or funded by a third party Nominal plaintiffs Costs of litigants represented by salaried practitioners Costs distinguishable from damages

7.7 7.7 7.8 7.10 7.10 7.11

Costs of Lay Litigants General rule Justifications for general rule Meaning of term ‘costs’ in court rules History of costs indemnity rule Inefficiency in litigation by lay litigants

7.24 7.24 7.25 7.25 7.27 7.28

7.15 7.16 7.17 7.18 7.21

Quantification or extent of the indemnity (as compared to ‘out of pocket expenses’) Impact upon cost of litigation Criticism of general rule and law reform Australian courts and law reform bodies Counterpoint — Canadian position Counterpoint — statutory intervention in England

7.29 7.30 7.31 7.31 7.34 7.36

Costs of Lawyer–Litigants Entitlement of lawyer–litigants to costs Limitations on scope of costs entitlement of lawyer–litigant Reassessment of lawyer–litigant exception

7.37 7.37 7.38 7.39

Capping of Costs Indemnity Court’s power to cap costs prospectively Source of power Exercise of court’s discretion

7.41 7.42 7.42 7.44 [page 159]

Exclusions from the statutory cap Court’s power to fix costs retrospectively Cap on costs recoverable in personal injury matters Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales Queensland (and the Northern Territory)

7.47 7.48 7.50 7.51 7.55

7.1 This chapter discusses the general costs rule whereby, in the proper exercise of the judicial discretion to award costs, the unsuccessful party in litigation is ordered to pay the costs of the successful party. This rule (known as the ‘costs indemnity rule’) has important implications, which include its

operation to enable recovery of the costs of salaried lawyers1 and solicitor– litigants,2 but not recoupment by a lay litigant for work done in preparing his or her case.3 To this must now be added statutory limitations on costs recoverable in some jurisdictions (a ‘capping’ of costs).4

Costs Follow the Event General rule 7.2 As noted in Chapter 6,5 even though superior courts (and most other courts) are statutorily given an apparently unfettered discretion to make what order as to costs they consider the justice of the case requires, a judicial exercise of that discretion involves applying, though not uncritically, the ‘usual rule’ that ‘costs follow the event’. What this means, generally speaking, is that the successful party is entitled to receive his or her costs from the unsuccessful party. This is ordinarily a just outcome because the party who turns out to have unjustifiably either brought another party before the court, or given another party cause to have recourse to the court to obtain his or her rights, should be required to recompense that other party in costs.6 For this reason, courts speak of a successful litigant having a reasonable expectation of obtaining an order for costs.7 This represents the simplest case scenario, namely where a party has been wholly successful and the other wholly failed. As the ‘event’ is seen as the ultimate outcome of the case, the rule may need modifying where each litigant has enjoyed some success, in which case, for reasons of justice and fairness, the courts have been willing to make costs orders that reflect the litigants’ relative success (and failure).8 Moreover, being grounded in justice, the courts have on occasion [page 160] made orders inconsistent with the ‘costs follow the event’ rule where the justice of the case has required an successful litigant to bear his or her own

costs9 or, in some more restricted circumstances, even pay the unsuccessful litigant’s costs.10 7.3 The usual ‘costs follow the event’ rule explains the need for security for costs, which aims to ensure that plaintiffs cannot abuse the process of the court by commencing suit where they will be unable to satisfy a potential costs order against them should they be unsuccessful.11 Were the usual costs rule instead that each party bears his or her own costs, no need for security for costs would arise.

Relationship of general rule to statutory provisions 7.4 The ‘costs follow the event’ rule is reflected in superior court rules in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia even though the rules themselves or the statutes underpinning them confer an unfettered discretion as to costs.12 This does not amount to a fetter on the court’s discretion because in each case the rules envisage that the court may, in its discretion, make a costs order other than one following the event.13 Yet where the court rules do not explicitly acknowledge the ‘costs follow the event’ rule, it has been queried whether adopting such an approach may itself fetter that discretion. In Re Sanchez, for instance, referring to the general costs discretion vested in the Federal Court by statute, Einfeld J remarked:14 I must confess some unease at the concept of a ‘usual rule’ in the light of provisions such as s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The ‘usual rule’ that the successful party will receive an order for costs arose when no such legislative intention had appeared. It seems to me that this rule has been replaced by a statutory regime which leaves the matter in the unfettered discretion of each Court to be exercised judicially in light of all the circumstances of the particular case. On the other hand, I agree that if there is nothing else remarkable about the case, successful parties should expect to have their costs paid, at least on a party/party basis, by unsuccessful parties.

In a later case,15 his Honour preferred to start with no usual rule or preconceptions as to the costs issue, but to leave the question of costs, like other aspects of the case, to fall to be [page 161] determined on its merits. It is difficult to argue with this approach if for no

other reason that it gives full weight to the unambiguous statutory language conferring the discretion. Yet, as noted in Chapter 6,16 it is accepted that adopting a ‘costs follow the event’ approach other than as an unyielding rule, but capable of yielding to the justice of each case, is consistent with the judicial exercise of the costs discretion rather than fettering it. In any case, that Einfeld J conceded that in the ordinary case costs should in fact follow the event suggests that the arguments balancing rule and discretion are likely to involve sophistry more than matters of fundamental divergence.

The indemnity rule 7.5 When a court makes a costs order against a party — most commonly an unsuccessful litigant pursuant to the ‘costs follow the event’ principle — it aims to provide the opposing (successful) party some indemnity (but no more)17 for the legal costs the latter has been required to incur in vindicating or upholding his or her rights in court (hence often termed the ‘indemnity rule’). A leading statement of the theory behind the indemnity rule is found in the judgment of Branwell B in Harold v Smith, who said:18 Costs as between party and party are given by the law as an indemnity to the person entitled to them; they are not imposed as a punishment on the party who pays them, nor given as a bonus to the party who receives them. Therefore, if the extent of the damnification can be found out, the extent to which costs ought to be allowed is also ascertained. Of course, I do not say that there are not exceptional cases in which certain arbitrary rules of taxation have been laid down, but as a general rule costs are an indemnity, and the principle is this, find out the damnification, and then you find out the costs which should be allowed.

It follows that the aim of awarding costs as between the parties to litigation (thus termed ‘party and party’ costs) is not punitive, but to compensate the successful party for the legal costs incurred by reason of the proceedings.19 A remaining substantial burden of costs in a successful party could, as remarked by the High Court, ‘otherwise render its success nugatory’.20 The likely exposure of an unsuccessful party to a double costs liability — to pay his or her own lawyers’ costs as well as indemnify the successful party for the latter’s costs — moreover serves to ‘instil in a party contemplating commencing, or defending, litigation a sober realisation of the potential financial expense involved’.21 [page 162]

7.6 The converse of the indemnity rule is a rule that each party bears its own costs, which has traditionally been the usual costs rule applicable to civil litigation in the United States. This is justified principally on an access to justice platform, that the possibility that paying costs will inhibit citizens resorting to the courts.22 In Australia, too, certain forms of litigation adopt a ‘no costs’ approach, whether as a starting point prescribed by statute (for instance, in family law litigation)23 or because of an absence of power to award costs (as was traditionally the case in criminal proceedings).24

Impact of the Indemnity Rule ‘Indemnity’ rarely a complete indemnity 7.7 The term ‘indemnity’ in the context of the indemnity rule is something of a misnomer, as an award of costs in favour of a successful party is rarely a complete indemnity for the liability to his or her lawyer. The law recognises in most cases no more than a partial indemnity, grounded in the notion that an unsuccessful party should not be required to indemnify the successful party beyond the latter’s ‘necessary or proper’ costs (the test traditionally adopted).25 Hence the need for a process to quantify costs as between party and party — known as taxation (or assessment, review or adjudication in some jurisdictions) — which is discussed in Part III of this book.26 The indemnity rule also generates other important implications, which form the remainder of this chapter.

Incidents of the plaintiff’s success 7.8 The compensatory function of the indemnity rule dictates that an unsuccessful party will not, in the usual case, avoid liability for costs merely because he or she nearly succeeded, acted reasonably in commencing the proceedings or failed through no fault of his or her own.27 Nor is a finding that the conduct of an unsuccessful defendant that led to the action was innocent or on a small scale by itself a ground to oust the usual costs rule. In Potter Drug & Chemical Corporation v Malouf,28 involving the defendant’s innocent infringement of the plaintiff’s trademark over a small quantity of goods, Walker J could not see on what principle a plaintiff ‘merely because

his injury turns out to have been slight, is to be told that he ought to have foregone his remedy by injunction … or have obtained it at his own expense’.29 His Honour observed that although it was hard on an innocent infringer to have to pay costs, ‘hard cases must not be allowed to make bad law’, and indeed the hardship would be at least as great if a successful litigant were to be deprived of costs for no fault of his or her own. This led him to conclude that ‘[o]f two innocent parties the hardship must fall on the one who, though innocent of any intention to do so, has nevertheless done it’.30 7.9 The aforesaid is without prejudice to the court’s discretion to make a costs order reflective of the respective success enjoyed by each party,31 or to deprive a successful party of costs (or [page 163] even order costs against that party) because of, inter alia, his or her conduct connected with the litigation.32

No liability of successful party to own lawyer for costs General rule 7.10 The indemnity rule, it is said, dictates that ‘the existence and scope of the successful litigant’s duty to pay his or her own solicitors is central to the ability to recover costs’.33 If a successful party is not liable to meet his or her own lawyer’s costs, there is no basis upon which the indemnity rule is to operate. The compensatory objective of the indemnity rule has no function to play in such a case; a costs order against the unsuccessful party would enrich the successful party by the amount of any such payment, which is inconsistent with the basis of the indemnity rule.34 So an agreement under which a litigant is absolved from paying lawyer–client costs ousts the litigant’s ability to recover costs from an adversary against whom a costs order is made.35 The same is the outcome where due to the operation of a statutory prohibition — for instance, the prohibition on non-legally qualified

persons charging for legal services — the successful party is not liable to pay his or her own lawyers any costs.36 A litigant, when absolved for any reason from paying those costs to his or her lawyer, therefore has no costs to recover. Put in the converse, where a lawyer cannot recover costs from his or her client, that client cannot recover costs from his or her opponent.37 Yet the application of the indemnity rule to generate this result has, in practice, not been especially strict. The courts have been willing to make a costs order even where the prospect of its beneficiary having to pay his or her lawyer is remote, where the beneficiary will him or herself be indemnified for that liability, and where the litigant’s lawyers are employed at a salary. These scenarios are discussed in turn below.

Prospect of payment is remote 7.11 The indemnity rule has been applied where, although a liability exists between lawyer and client in respect of costs, the prospect of the client discharging that liability is remote. The leading case is Adams v London Improved Motor Coach Builders Ltd,38 where the plaintiff was represented by solicitors retained by his trade union in an action for wrongful dismissal. The plaintiff had no written retainer with the solicitors, though there was no agreement ousting his liability to the solicitors for costs. The plaintiff was held entitled to an order for costs upon succeeding on the merits, Bankes LJ reasoning as follows:39 When once it is established that the solicitors were acting for the plaintiff with his knowledge and assent … he became liable to the solicitors for costs, and that liability would not be excluded merely because the Union also undertook to pay the costs. It is necessary to go a step further and prove that there was a bargain, either between the Union and the solicitors, or between the plaintiff and the solicitors, that under no circumstances was the plaintiff to be liable for costs.

[page 164] Atkin LJ agreed, observing that although the solicitors might have had a personal claim against the union there was nothing inconsistent with that coexisting with an obligation of the plaintiff to the solicitors. That, as a matter of business, the solicitors would apply first to the union did not, according to

his Lordship, exclude the plaintiff’s liability, and not in the least affected ‘the position that the client may be liable although there may be a third person to indemnify the client’.40 7.12 This outcome can be justified on the basis that although the trade union funded the litigation on the plaintiff’s behalf, the solicitors were representing the plaintiff as the party on the record. Hence there was no doubt that a retainer, even if only implied,41 existed between the solicitors and the plaintiff. Even in the absence of an agreement between the plaintiff and the solicitors as to the calculation of costs, or a scale applicable to the matter, the plaintiff’s liability for costs to the solicitors was derived from a term implied into the retainer that the solicitors could make reasonable charges for work reasonably undertaken.42 Only if the retainer agreement expressly ousted such a liability in any event would the position have been different. A representative body, such as a trade union, would be most unlikely to envisage such an ouster of liability for fear of forfeiting any costs indemnity. In order to protect plaintiffs in such cases the usual approach is to retain the plaintiff’s liability for costs but to expressly or impliedly vest in the plaintiff a right to a costs indemnity from the representative body.43 7.13 An equivalent scenario in this context involves a defendant insured represented by a solicitor engaged by an insurer. Romer LJ explained the position in R v Archbishop of Canterbury as follows:44 [T]he insurance company defends on behalf of the defendant, and generally employs its own solicitor; but although that solicitor would primarily not look to the defendant personally for costs, yet, so far as the plaintiff in that action is concerned, that solicitor is, for all purposes, as between plaintiff and defendant, the solicitor for the defendant. In such a case, if the defendant is awarded costs, those costs would be recoverable by him, and, in estimating what the amount of those costs are, he would naturally and properly include among his costs those of the solicitor who acted for him in that case, although, as between him and the insurance company, the solicitor was the solicitor for the insurance company, and the insurance company had to see that the costs were provided by them if the defendant did not succeed.

R v Archbishop of Canterbury involved an application for mandamus against the Archbishop, for whom the Treasury solicitor appeared by direction of the Crown. The rule nisi for mandamus was discharged and costs were allowed to the Archbishop. The judgment ‘proceeded on the assumption that the Archbishop was under a liability to the solicitor, even though he never might be called upon to make that liability good’.45 Romer LJ saw little difference between this scenario and that of the insurer noted above.46 In

Adams v London Improved Motor Coach Builders Ltd Younger LJ compared that case with the facts of R v Archbishop of Canterbury, and remarked:47 I can see no distinction … between this case and R v Archbishop of Canterbury; and if it was possible for the Court of Appeal in that case to come to the conclusion that in some event it was arranged between the parties that the Archbishop should be liable to the Treasury Solicitor for costs, then it appears to me that it is not difficult to conclude that in the present case there must have been some way in which this member of this trade union was to be liable to the solicitors of the Union for his costs … I think … that the view of the Court of Appeal in R v Archbishop of

[page 165] Canterbury was that it must have been assumed on all sides that there was some remote liability on the part of the Archbishop which remained; and if that was a proper assumption in that case, it is undoubtedly a proper assumption in this; all the more so because there are the facts … which make this case stronger.

7.14 Adams has been followed in Australian courts, even though it may place form over substance. The cases show, Australian appellate courts have remarked, ‘that the rule that costs cannot be recovered by a party not liable to the solicitors on the record is not applied with excessive vigour’48 and that ‘the indemnity rule has been treated as permitting recovery of costs from the party against whom the order is made, although a third party has indemnified the successful party or paid their costs’.49 Within three years of the decision in Adams, the South Australian Supreme Court in Backhouse v Judd50 confirmed its application in Australian law. There the respondent, who was an officer of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA), laid a complaint resulting in the appellant being convicted and ordered to pay for costs. Although the RSCPA agreed to pay the respondent’s solicitor’s costs, there was no express or implied agreement that the respondent should not be liable to the solicitor for costs. Poole ACJ, whose finding was affirmed on appeal, held that the respondent was liable to pay costs to his own solicitors, and lacking proof of a term of the retainer ousting this liability, the principle in Adams applied.51 A much more recent Australian application of the Adams principle surfaced in the judgment of E M Heenan J in Noye v Robbins (No 6).52 There the evidence revealed that the costs of the (successful) first applicant (R), a police inspector, had been paid progressively by the state under arrangements

approved and recommended by the Police Commissioner and the State Solicitor. His Honour held that this payment did not extinguish the R’s costs liability, and therefore the indemnity principle applied, concluding that:53 … notwithstanding that there once was a liability by the client to pay his solicitors’ costs, if that liability has been discharged by a third person, then the entitlement by the client to an order for party and party costs would depend on the continuation of some potential by the party to meet that liability to the solicitors, even if only remote, or indirectly when there is a potential liability to the party making the payment under some form of restitutionary claim. The State did not in this present case attempt to assert a claim for costs itself in the name of [R] by right of subrogation but may have been entitled to do so.

The decision was affirmed on appeal,54 where Owen JA, with whom Pullin and Buss JJA concurred, stated that even if the liability has been discharged prior to the award of costs, a successful party can still recover costs under the principle in Adams. That the cases do not, in this context, differentiate situations in which the liability exists and has not been discharged from those where the liability existed but has been discharged, influenced this conclusion. [page 166] Moreover, as ‘the indemnity principle is a flexible principle designed to allow for a just and fair result’,55 fairness dictated that R should be allowed to recover his costs. This was not a case in which the successful party would receive a bonus, Owen JA noted, as R had given an undertaking to pay any costs awarded to the state.56

Where lawyer acts on a speculative fee, reduced fee or pro bono 7.15 Where a lawyer represents a client pro bono, there is prima facie no costs liability, and consequently no need for a costs indemnity in the event that the client secures a favourable costs order. Yet this may not be the outcome in all cases of pro bono representation. Court rules may, for example, provide that if a litigant assisted under a scheme for the provision of legal assistance57 is awarded costs, the lawyer who provided that assistance may recover the costs that another party is required to pay under the order,58 or that the taxing officer may, if counsel acts without fee, allow such sum as

counsel’s fee as he or she considers reasonable,59 or more generally that a party represented pro bono is entitled to recover costs in the same manner and to the same extent as if the services were provided for reward.60 Outside of these scenarios, the terms of the retainer or costs agreement may provide for the client to assume a costs liability only if the client proves successful in the proceeding (‘no win, no fee’),61 in which case there is a subject matter over which the costs indemnity may apply in the event of a costs order in favour of the client on a successful claim.62 The indemnity principle also operates where the lawyer has agreed to appear at a reduced fee, below that which might, in the ordinary course, be recoverable.63 The desirability of encouraging pro bono representation has even led a Canadian court to rule that the costs indemnity rule applies in a pure pro bono scenario, Feldman JA reasoning as follows:64 [A]llowing pro bono parties to be subject to the ordinary costs consequences that apply to other parties has two positive consequences: (1) it ensures that both the non-pro bono party and the pro bono party know that they are not free to abuse the system without fear of the sanction of an award of costs; and (2) it promotes access to justice by enabling and encouraging more lawyers to volunteer to work pro bono in deserving cases

While not denying the force of these public policy grounds, to allow a costs indemnity in these circumstances is arguably to almost entirely deprive the indemnity rule of its true character. A preferable approach is for statute or court rules to prescribe a vehicle for costs recovery in pure pro bono representation.

Successful litigant indemnified or funded by a third party 7.16 That a successful party to civil proceedings is indemnified, whether by insurance or some other express or implied agreement with a third party, against liability to pay costs to his or her [page 167] own lawyer is not inconsistent with the operation of the indemnity rule.65 The same applies where a party’s litigation is funded by a third party who is contractually entitled to recoup its costs in the event that the party is awarded

costs.66 The critical point is that the successful party in cases of this kind remains liable as principal for the costs, and so there is subject matter over which a costs order in his or her favour can operate. An interesting case, illustrating this principle albeit in a parallel context, is Johnson v Santa Teresa Housing Association.67 There, in litigation arising out of a motor accident, the plaintiff accepted an offer of compromise by the second defendant, to which the first defendant agreed. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff against each defendant, the first defendant being ordered to indemnify the second defendant against any amount the latter was required to pay to the plaintiff. Mildren J explained the reason for this:68 [T]he mere fact that a party to litigation is entitled to indemnity from a person not a party to the proceedings does not disentitle that person to an order for costs. It could not therefore be argued that the second defendant is not entitled to his costs against the first defendant on the indemnity notice, and indeed the first defendant does not argue to the contrary. But if that is so, there is no reason in principle why the second defendant ought not to be able to obtain an indemnity for costs ordered to be paid by him to the plaintiff, merely because the second defendant is entitled to be indemnified by [the Territory Insurance Office].

Nominal plaintiffs 7.17 Cases involving ‘nominal’ plaintiffs present a further qualification to the indemnity principle. They envisage that, where a nominal party participates in proceedings on behalf of the real party who incurs the costs of the proceedings,69 a costs order may be made in favour of the nominal party for the benefit of the real party. For example, in Dyktynski v BHP Titanium Minerals Pty Ltd70 the appellant succeeded in securing compensation with costs against his employer at first instance. The employer paid the costs 11 months after the costs order but the court refused interest on costs. The employee’s solicitors, wishing to determine the point of principle of no direct benefit to the employee, appealed the refusal of interest on costs, under a costs agreement pursuant to which they brought the appeal in the employee’s name but on the basis that the employee would ‘not have to pay any costs or disbursements to [the solicitors] in relation to the proceedings’. The appeal succeeded, but the costs assessor determined that the appellant was precluded by the indemnity principle from recovering the costs of the appeal. The New South Wales Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the costs assessor’s determination on this point, Mason P ruling that if the ‘real’ party incurs the costs of proceedings brought on his or her behalf by the ‘nominal’ plaintiff,

recovery of costs awarded to the nominal plaintiff is not defeated by the indemnity principle.71 His Honour agreed with McColl JA in favouring a substance over form approach in identifying the real party to the proceedings, where a ‘costs [page 168] indemnity’ is understood as an indemnity to the real party bringing the action without regard to the liability of the nominal party, whose name necessarily appears on the record.72 McColl JA saw such a result as ‘just and sensible’,73 for otherwise the respondent would have profited from its erroneous decision to withhold interest on the costs awarded in the compensation proceedings.74

Costs of litigants represented by salaried practitioners 7.18 A successful litigant may recover costs from an opponent even though he or she was represented in the proceedings by a lawyer employed at a salary. In one sense this represents an exception to the principle discussed earlier — if a party is not liable to pay any costs to his or her own lawyer no costs can be recovered from the other side75 — for the engagement of the lawyer at a salary means that a direct relationship between the legal costs incurred in the litigation and the salary so paid is unlikely. Yet the successful litigant has clearly incurred legal costs in the proceedings. The issue is less one of determining whether or not an entitlement to an indemnity arises than one of quantifying the extent of the indemnity so as to ensure that the successful litigant is not enriched by a costs order, an outcome inconsistent with the indemnity rule. 7.19 Much of the case law in this context concerns lawyers employed by the Crown, being a legacy of the fact that historically such lawyers were the most common form of employed lawyer. It has long been the rule that ‘a successful party who is represented by the Crown Solicitor in litigation in which the Crown has an interest is not disentitled to costs from an unsuccessful party merely because he is not under a personal liability to the

Crown Solicitor for costs’.76 So, for example, a successful party is not denied costs for being represented by a salaried officer of the Australian Government Solicitor.77 It is the notional incurrence of costs that justifies the application of the indemnity principle, a point judicially explained as follows:78 So long as the fees proposed to be charged are reasonable in amount … there is no reason why he should escape part of the consequences of his unrighteous litigation merely because of this arrangement between the Crown and its officers. In one sense, no doubt, he does not cause any additional expense to the Crown; because the salaries would have to be paid whether he litigated or not. But it is to be presumed that the salaries have been calculated on the footing of there being an average amount of litigation, and each salary therefore may be said to contain the equivalent of each separate fee; if so, there is no injustice in the Crown being recouped to that extent by the losing party.

The point was reiterated by the Tasmanian Supreme Court in The Bengarin,79 where Nicholls CJ reasoned that the principle in question does not infringe the rule that costs are [page 169] an indemnity because ‘the Crown is not in any way getting its cases conducted free of cost’, but instead pays salaries ‘which must be taken to be merely the mode in which it remunerates its officers who conduct its cases for it’. The same applies, by analogy, in respect of salaries paid to salaried lawyers employed by legal aid bodies,80 and to lawyers employed by public bodies and authorities.81 To this end, it has been judicially observed that the notion of costs as an indemnity should not be applied so narrowly as to defeat ‘the purpose for which it was elaborated and to result in a manifest injustice or absurdity in any given case’, but in a fashion ‘which takes into account the judicial discretion to award those costs which are reasonable and just in the circumstances’.82 7.20 There is nothing so unique about salaried lawyers employed by a government or its instrumentalities that prevents the same principle applying to employed lawyers generally. So it has been said that ‘the fact that an employed practitioner has acted for the successful party is not a sufficient reason for denying that party an award of party and party costs: after all, the time of a salaried employee has been occupied’.83

Costs distinguishable from damages 7.21 From early times the court drew a distinction between damages and costs.84 As a matter of principle, what this dictates is that a successful plaintiff cannot recover its costs of the proceedings from the defendant as damages, even though the defendant’s wrongful act caused the plaintiff to incur those costs.85 A plaintiff’s ability to recover its costs of the proceedings from a defendant rests instead upon the exercise of a judicial costs discretion.86 And the quantum of costs recoverable, if any, by a (successful) plaintiff is not assessed in the same way as damages; it is ‘taxed’ or ‘assessed’ according to the applicable rules of court.87 The leading case is the English Court of Appeal’s 1881 decision in Cockburn v Edwards.88 The defendant, a solicitor, was found in breach of duty to the plaintiff, giving rise to a question over the defendant’s damages liability. Among the heads of claim was the difference between [page 170] the ‘party and party’ costs recoverable in the action and the ‘solicitor and client’ costs that had been disallowed.89 The court rejected this head, Jessel MR remarking:90 I am of opinion that it is not according to law to give to a party by way of damages the costs as between solicitor and client of the litigation in which the damages are recovered. The law gives a successful litigant his costs as between party and party, and he cannot be said to sustain damage by not getting them as between solicitor and client.

7.22 Consistent with the foregoing principle, neither may a successful party recover the difference between the legal costs awarded in its favour (or withheld) in one civil proceeding and the costs it actually incurred in that proceeding as damages in a subsequent civil action against the same opponent.91 Whether and the extent to which a party may recover its costs from the opponent is regarded as having been finally determined in the first proceeding. Otherwise most successful plaintiffs could bring a second action against the defendant to recover the costs they failed to obtain upon taxation as damages flowing from the original wrong. The leading case, decided two years after Cockburn v Edwards, is Quartz

Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre.92 The defendant presented a petition to wind up the plaintiff company, but it was never served on the company as the defendant gave notice that he intended to withdraw it. The company nonetheless appeared to ask for its dismissal, and the petition was dismissed without costs. The company then sued for malicious prosecution, claiming as damages the costs it incurred in opposing the petition. The Court of Appeal refused the claim, Bowen LJ reasoning as follows:93 The bringing of an ordinary action does not as a natural or necessary consequence involve any injury to a man’s property, for this reason, that the only costs which the law recognises, and for which it will compensate him, are the costs properly incurred in the action itself. For those the successful defendant will have been already compensated, so far as the law chooses to compensate him. If the judge refuses to give him costs, it is because he does not deserve them: if he deserves them, he will get them in the original action: if he does not deserve them, he ought not to get them in a subsequent action.

7.23 The general principle noted above does not, however, preclude the recovery of a defendant’s costs of an action as damages against a third party in separate proceedings.94 The reason for this is that, as the third party did not participate in the prior litigation, the court had no opportunity to adjudicate on the issue of costs as between the third party and the now plaintiff. More generally, nor does the general principle impinge upon a claimant whose freestanding cause of action exists independently of the proceedings in which the costs sought to be recovered as damages have been incurred. This may be so in the event of costs irrecoverable in a foreign proceeding, as explained by Colman J in National Westminster Bank Plc v Rabobank Netherland:95 [page 171] If the winning party can formulate a claim for the whole or part of such costs [the costs of proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction with a costs regime under which the winning party was unable to recover all such costs] in the English Courts as a claim for damages for breach of a separate cause of action (such as breach of a jurisdiction or anti-suit clause as here) there is, in my judgment, no reason as a matter of public policy or otherwise, why he may not recover them subject to ordinary damages rules. Under those rules the burden of proof of failure to mitigate rests on the party in breach.

The aforesaid makes sense where the costs arise in foreign proceedings without a possibility of having them awarded in the claimants’ favour in the foreign proceedings. The position necessarily is different where those costs could have been recovered had the request been made for costs and the trial

judge so ordered;96 here the Cockburn v Edwards principle operates to preclude recovery in any subsequent proceeding.

Costs of Lay Litigants97 General rule 7.24 A substantial line of case authority holds that the costs indemnity rule does not operate to recompense a successful litigant who is not represented by a lawyer for work done in preparing his or her case.98 Instead, a successful unrepresented (or ‘lay’) litigant can recover only out-of-pocket expenses,99 which do not include the value of time spent in preparing the case, including by supporters, without clear evidence of a service contracted and charged for on a commercial or quasi-commercial basis.100 The leading Australian case is Cachia v Hanes.101 The respondents sought orders against the appellant requiring him to restore structural support to their land. At the hearing the respondents were legally represented but the appellant was not. The action was dismissed and the appellant was awarded costs. On taxation, many items claimed by the appellant in his bill of costs were disallowed, his appeal being dismissed by the New South Wales Court of [page 172] Appeal.102 The High Court granted the appellant special leave to appeal on the limited issue of whether his claim for compensation for the loss of time spent in the preparation and conduct of his case and for associated out-ofpocket expenses (namely travelling expenses) should have been disallowed. A majority of the court, Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ, dismissed the appeal. Their Honours gave three reasons why no costs indemnity ought to apply in favour of a successful lay litigant for work done in preparing his or her case. Other cases have identified two further reasons in support of this outcome. These are discussed in turn below.

Justifications for general rule Meaning of term ‘costs’ in court rules 7.25 The majority in Cachia held that the term ‘costs’ when used in the court rules does not include time spent by a lay litigant in preparing and conducting his or her case, but is confined to money paid or liabilities incurred for professional legal services.103 Referring to the list of factors to which a taxing officer must have regard specified in the rules,104 their Honours noted that the list assumes that the costs in the taxing officer’s discretion are for work done by a lawyer. Although some of those factors could be applied to work done by a lay litigant, the majority found ‘no mention of the considerations which might be thought to be central to the taxation of the costs of a litigant in person such as the nature of the work done, the time taken to do it, and the skill with which it was performed’.105 To use the rules to compensate a litigant in person for time lost would therefore cut across their clear intent, such that costs, within the meaning of the rules, ‘are reimbursement for work done or expenses incurred by a practitioner or practitioner’s employee’.106 Compensation for loss of time of a litigant in person could not therefore constitute costs within the meaning of the rules. 7.26 The foregoing does not justify the conclusion that, for this purpose, the term ‘costs’ or its equivalent in statute or court rules can never encompass other than legal costs. Whether or not it does so depends on, inter alia, the language used construed in its context, and the function and characteristics of the court or tribunal in question, including whether it allows representation by other than lawyers. In Northern Territory of Australia v Lands and Mining Tribunal,107 for example, Bailey J held that s 18 of the Lands and Mining Tribunal Act 1998 (NT)108 — which states that ‘[e]ach party to a proceeding is to bear its own costs unless the Tribunal orders otherwise’ — was not limited to the legal concept of ‘costs’. His Honour reasoned as follows:109 [T]he similarities between some functions and procedures of the Tribunal to those performed by courts are not sufficient to conclude that the Legislature intended that the power to award ‘costs’ in s 18 … should be restricted to only costs of a kind which would be recoverable in a court of law governed by rules of the type found in Order 62 of the Supreme Court Rules. The Legislature

[page 173]

could have restricted the Tribunal’s power to award costs. The Legislature could have created or cross-referenced to an appropriate rule structure to limit the power to award costs. It did neither. On the other hand, the Legislature did provide for a party to be represented by an agent … [I]t would be absurd that a party could recover fees paid to an agent, such as a town planner, only if a lawyer was engaged to present the agent’s work. Such an approach ignores the specialist nature of the Tribunal and the possibility, if not probability, that an appropriate specialist agent may be better equipped to present a party’s case than a legal practitioner. It also ignores s 11(1) of the [Act] which provides: ‘(1) A proceeding is to be conducted with as little formality and technicality, and with as much expedition, as a proper consideration of the matter before the Tribunal permits.’

Equivalent logic led Morris J in Aussie Invest Corporation Pty Ltd v Hobsons Bay City Council110 to construe a similarly worded costs power in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal111 as empowering the tribunal to indemnify an unrepresented party for lost wages and travelling expenses incurred in attending a hearing. His Honour was influenced, as was Bailey J, by the relevant legislation allowing a party to appear in person or be represented by a professional non-lawyer advocate in certain circumstances,112 which suggested that parliament was unlikely to have intended that the term ‘costs’ be confined to money paid to, or a liability incurred for, professional legal services.113 In so ruling, Morris J distinguished Cachia, remarking that ‘costs are ultimately a matter that turns on the interpretation of a statute’, and that as ‘[t]he circumstances of the tribunal are clearly much different … it is necessary to consider the matter by reference to the constitution, purpose and practices of the tribunal’.114 Importantly, this does not mean that the tribunal’s power to award ‘costs’ is unconstrained by the indemnity principle. The latter remains, but its subject matter is extended, as appears from the conclusion reached by Morris J in Aussie Invest:115 It remains true that an order as to costs is an order in the nature of an indemnity (or partial indemnity). Hence there is no power for the tribunal to make an award of costs in favour of an unrepresented person in relation to expenses which would have been incurred if the person engaged professional services, but were not in fact incurred. Further, there is no power for the tribunal to make an order as to costs in favour of an unrepresented person based upon the time spent by that person in relation to the proceeding. However where an unrepresented person loses wages or incurs travelling expenses in order to attend the hearing of the proceeding, this is an outgoing directly related to the proceeding which can be indemnified. Thus, in my opinion, having regard to the special circumstances of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the tribunal has power to make an order for costs in favour of an unrepresented person to compensate the person for wages lost and travelling expenses incurred in attending a hearing of a proceeding.

The position is clearer where the relevant statutory provision uses a term ostensibly more expansive than ‘costs’. For example, a provision that

empowers the court to order that ‘the whole or a part of the expenses or losses incurred by the self-represented party in or in connection with conducting the case be included in the costs’116 has been interpreted as encompasses more than out of pocket expenses.117

History of costs indemnity rule 7.27 That the costs indemnity rule does not extend to time spent by a lay litigant in preparing and conducting his or her case was, according to the majority in Cachia, an outcome consistent [page 174] with the history of that rule. Their Honours remarked that it has not been doubted since 1278, when the English Statute of Gloucester118 introduced the notion of costs to the common law, that costs are awarded by way of indemnity for professional legal costs actually incurred in the conduct of litigation.119 These ‘costs’ were not intended to be comprehensive compensation for any loss suffered by a litigant,120 their Honours reasoning as follows:121 Whilst the restricted basis upon which party and party costs are awarded may be debated as a matter of policy, it is to be borne in mind that party and party costs have never been regarded as a total indemnity to a successful litigant for costs incurred, let alone total recompense for work done and time lost. Putting to one side the question posed by the relatively rare exception of a solicitor acting in person, there is no inequality involved: all litigants are treated in the same manner. And if only litigants in person were recompensed for lost time and trouble, there would be real inequality between litigants in person and litigants who were represented, many of whom would have suffered considerable loss of time and trouble in addition to incurring professional costs.

In similar vein Handley JA in the Court of Appeal in Cachia122 stated that the right to be self represented was never intended as a means by which such litigants could earn ‘fees, charges or remuneration’; it is ‘a practice which enables them to save money, not to make money’. His Honour added that the existing law thus causes no greater injustice to lay litigants than to represented litigants, and that any change must be effected by parliament.123

Inefficiency in litigation by lay litigants 7.28 The majority of the High Court in Cachia expressed concern with matters of practicality in awarding ‘costs’ to lay litigants. Their Honours opined that, whilst litigants’ right to appear in person is fundamental, their presence in increasing numbers creates problems for the courts. They observed that work done by most lay litigants in the preparation and conduct of their cases was rarely the equivalent of work done by qualified lawyers, the upshot being that all too frequently the burden of ensuring that the necessary work of a lay litigant is done falls on the court administration or the court itself. Even so, the majority remarked, litigation involving lay litigants is usually less efficiently conducted and tends to be prolonged, adding cost to the opponents’ legal representation, and draining court resources.124

Quantification or extent of the indemnity (as compared to ‘out of pocket expenses’) 7.29 Though not developed by the majority in the High Court in Cachia, a fourth justification for denying successful lay litigants ‘costs’ is difficulties in quantifying the indemnity. Handley JA, in the majority in the Court of Appeal in Cachia, explained it this way:125 Remuneration for the exercise of professional legal skill can be quantified by the court and its officers on a taxation of costs. A taxing officer is expected to know from experience how long a competent solicitor should take to perform particular work and the degree of professional skill required. The procedures for taxing costs are not, and were never intended to be, suitable for the quantification of the time properly spent by an unqualified litigant on his or her own case, and the value of such time to that litigant. Such claims in the nature of a quantum meruit would

[page 175] frequently involve disputed questions of fact, and could require the taxing officer to decide issues of credibility.

His Honour added that although the total amount recoverable by a lay litigant cannot exceed what would have been recoverable had lawyers been retained, there is no principle that requires a lay litigant’s out-of-pocket expenses to be restricted to the amounts recoverable by lawyers. A lay

litigant may therefore employ agents to perform necessary work and recover reasonable out-of-pocket expenses thus incurred, and so avoid loss of time and mitigate the effect of the rule that denies recovery for such loss.126 More generally, ‘out-of-pocket’ expenses can include court fees,127 transcript costs,128 expenses for serving documents,129 freedom of information fees,130 fees for searching registers,131 costs of appeal book binding,132 and incidental expenses in relation to photocopying, postage and telephone and facsimile transmissions.133 They may also include compensation for attendance at trial by way of witness fee,134 namely a reasonable fee for time actually spent giving evidence in court.135 Excluded are a lay litigant’s costs for travelling,136 parking137 and meals.138 Nor is a lay litigant entitled to compensation for time spent in collating material in preparation for giving instructions or evidence, refreshing recollection or making notes for this purpose, preparing the litigant’s own affidavit, reading affidavits of other witnesses, or attendances in court for other witnesses’ evidence.139 It follows that the costs of a lay litigant properly recoverable are likely to be much less than those recoverable had lawyers been retained.140 [page 176]

Impact upon cost of litigation 7.30 A further justification proffered for the approach of the majority in Cachia v Hanes, again not adverted to by their Honours in that case, is the concern that to allow lay litigants their ‘costs’ would unjustifiably increase the cost of litigation, and thereby be inconsistent with the prevailing idiom of access to justice. This point was the focus of the King CJ’s comments in Kelly v Noumenon Pty Ltd:141 Costs can be a crushing burden upon an unsuccessful litigant and the fear of an order for costs may operate to deprive a person of ordinary means, for practical reasons, of access to justice for the purpose of redressing a wrong or defending himself against an unjust claim. In these days of ever increasing complexity in litigation employees of large organizations engaged in litigation may spend much time in tasks associated with the litigation. If the cost of the time so spent is to be added to the costs recoverable from the unsuccessful party, the burden upon that party will become even more crushing and even more of a deterrent against resorting to courts of justice … The law has always been conservative in its approach to the quantum of costs to be borne by an unsuccessful party.

Criticism of general rule and law reform Australian courts and law reform bodies 7.31 In 1972 a South Australian judge conceded that denying a successful lay litigant an allowance for work in preparing his or her case ‘may appear unjust and anomalous’ to that litigant, but that ‘as an anomaly it is not the only one in the law and we are powerless to change the law in this respect’.142 In the Court of Appeal in Cachia,143 Kirby P in his dissent remarked that, as the courts allow costs to solicitor–litigants,144 to deny lay litigants like entitlements was illogical, unfair and discriminatory. In a later case Kirby P, though obliged to give effect to the majority judgment in Cachia v Hanes, branded it ‘completely unacceptable to afford a litigant in person no costs (save as a witness) of attending at court whilst permitting a litigant to recover who could afford, or had, legal representation to do so’, and that ‘[w]hat applies to one must apply to the other unless some differing principle, grounded in the objection of professional lawyers to litigants in person, is to be expounded’.145 His Honour viewed the Cachia rule as a ‘stern rule … not apparently required by the breadth of the legislative language (costs)’, but rather ‘one imposed upon that language by judicial presumption upheld by this country’s highest court’.146 7.32 The minority in Cachia v Hanes,147 Toohey and Gaudron JJ, though recognising the difficulties in quantifying a lay litigant’s ‘costs’, especially given the absence of a directly applicable scale of costs, argued that these difficulties should not obscure any principle reflected in statute or subordinate legislation. As the relevant court rules provided that ‘there shall be allowed all such costs as were necessary or proper’,148 and the empowering Act defined ‘costs’ to include ‘fees, charges, disbursements, expenses and remuneration’,149 their Honours found no [page 177] justification for a rule denying an unrepresented litigant recovery of more than out-of-pocket expenses.150 Hence, for Toohey and Gaudron JJ the issue was to define what, in the

context of a lay litigant, was meant by ‘necessary or proper’ costs. Foreshadowing difficulties that could arise on taxation, their Honours emphasised the importance of a guiding method, and referred to reports by law reform bodies to this end.151 The Law Reform Committee of South Australia had recommended that a successful lay litigant be entitled to reimbursement for money lost in taking off time from work in the necessary preparation of a case, provided that ‘the total cost involved does not exceed the alternative expense of employing a solicitor to act in the matter’.152 The Law Reform Commission of British Columbia rejected this approach as turning too much on the employment position of the litigant at the time, instead recommending the application of the scale of costs applicable to the litigation and awarding ‘whatever the tariff allows for those activities covered by the tariff upon proof that the activities were actually undertaken’.153 Toohey and Gaudron JJ opined that either approach could be accommodated within the principle expressed in the rules that there be allowed ‘all such costs as were necessary or proper’ but, subject to one qualification, were persuaded by the views of the Law Reform Commission of British Columbia.154 The qualification was that the total costs awarded should not exceed the total detriment involved in consequence of the various steps and actions necessarily and properly involved in the preparation and conduct of the trial. According to their Honours, it remained the duty of the taxing officer to determine by what means that qualification should be given effect in the particular case.155 7.33 Following Cachia v Hanes the Australian Law Reform Commission recommended that a lay litigant be able to recover disbursements and ‘his or her own costs for work reasonably necessary to prepare and conduct his or her case’, subject to three conditions.156 First, the party’s own costs should be limited to those allowed under a schedule setting out lump sum amounts according to the type and complexity of the matter, which should not exceed the reasonable costs of a lawyer performing the same work. Second, a lay litigant should not be able to recover any costs in relation to litigation that would not be recoverable by a represented litigant. Third, the court should have discretion to allow a lay litigant to recover costs exceeding the relevant lump sum in appropriate circumstances provided that it does not exceed the amount of costs actually incurred by the litigant.

[page 178]

Counterpoint — Canadian position 7.34 The tide of modern Canadian case law accepts the courts’ jurisdiction to make a ‘costs’ order in favour of a lay litigant. The traditional justifications for denying costs to a lay litigant — difficulty in quantification, the risk of over-compensation and inconsistency with the indemnity principle — have not stood in the way of this development. Canadian courts seek to avoid the difficulty in quantifying a lay litigant’s ‘costs’ simply by making an order that costs be assessed by the registrar, who can then determine what those costs ought to be, as is done where the successful litigant is legally represented.157 In fact, the prevailing judicial view in Canada is that to allow a judge discretion to award a lay litigant an indemnity for ‘costs’ fosters rather than undermines the fundamental purposes of modern costs rules, as explained by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal:158 It is now generally accepted that an award of costs may perform more than one function. Costs under modern rules may serve to regulate, indemnify and deter. They regulate by promoting early settlements and restraint. They deter impetuous, frivolous and abusive behaviour and litigation. They seek to compensate, at least in part, the successful party who has incurred, sometimes, large expenses to vindicate its rights. These three legitimate purposes are compromised by a stern rule that self-represented litigants are not entitled to costs. A claimant is not adequately compensated for the time and effort devoted to prepare for the conduct of his litigation. Nor is he compensated for the cost of soliciting a lawyer’s advice at the early stage or during the course of the proceedings. His opponent is not inclined to settle since he not only incurs no costs in case of a loss or a refusal of a reasonable settlement, but he recovers his full costs if he is successful.

7.35 This does not mean that in Canada a lay litigant has an automatic right to recover costs; the matter remains in the discretion of the trial judge in order to secure ‘an equitable result between the parties while balancing the various policy objectives of costs’.159 Nor does it mean that lay litigants are entitled to costs calculated on the same basis as those of a litigant who retains legal representation. The limitation envisaged in this respect is that a lay litigant should not recover costs for the time and effort that any litigant would have to devote to the case. To this end, Sharpe JA in Fong v Chan160 remarked that costs should only be awarded to those lay litigants who can demonstrate they devoted time and effort to do the work ordinarily done by a lawyer retained to conduct the litigation, and as a result ‘incurred an opportunity cost by foregoing remunerative activity’. The minority in Cachia v Hanes161

appeared to countenance a similar approach in endorsing the view of the Full Federal Court in an earlier decision, which had decided the following:162 We can find nothing in the cases which obliges this court to hold that a litigant in person who has had to have time away from his or her employment or business in order to prepare a case or to attend court to present it should not recover an indemnity for any loss of earnings suffered in consequence. That is not to permit a litigant in person to charge a sum in the nature of professional costs; rather it is to provide an appropriate indemnity against loss of earnings incurred whether in the preparation of a case or in actual attendance at court. Of course the touchstone is that of

[page 179] what was necessary and reasonable in all the circumstances. So long as this is the approach, no injustice can result.

Upon this approach, which the majority in Cachia v Hanes163 rejected, if a lay litigant is unemployed the fee portion of costs attributable to lost opportunity may not exist or, at a minimum, would be significantly less than that of a person who has suffered a loss of income due to employment absences.164 Relevant inquiries by a court for this purpose may include the following:165 Was the matter complicated? Was the work performed of good quality? Did the self-representation result in unnecessary delays? Did the lay litigant take up an unreasonable amount of time of opposing parties or the court? Did the lay litigant lose time from work? What would the lay litigant have earned if not required to prepare his or her own case? Did the other side take advantage of the fact that it was facing a lay litigant by taking frivolous and unnecessary steps to thwart the litigant? Did the other side refuse to entertain reasonable requests to discuss settlement? What is an appropriate amount for the issues involved?

For example, in Sherman v Minister of National Revenue166 an unrepresented litigant was allowed $6,000 plus disbursements in view of findings that: first, the litigant, who was a reputable tax expert, raised new issues of public interest as regards the interpretation of tax treaty and the right to access the information obtained and exchanged pursuant to that treaty; second, the litigant’s work submitted was of good quality, his submissions to the court being documented and helpful; third, his attendance at the hearing at first instance and on appeal was necessary and caused him to lose time from work; and fourth, the litigant behaved with propriety throughout the litigation.

Counterpoint — statutory intervention in England 7.36 In England the issue has been addressed by statute. The Litigants in Person (Costs and Expenses) Act 1975 (UK) s 1(1) reads as follows: Where, in any proceedings to which this subsection applies, any costs of a litigant in person167 are ordered to be paid by any other party to the proceedings or in any other way, there may, subject to rules of court, be allowed on the taxation or other determination of those costs sums in respect of any work done, and any expenses and losses incurred, by the litigant in or in connection with the proceedings to which the order relates.

The costs so allowed to a litigant in person (other than for disbursements) are limited to two-thirds of the amount that would have been allowed had the litigant been legally represented.168 [page 180] This represented a legislative response to the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Buckland v Watts,169 a case involving a lay litigant, which had simply assumed that the leading English case entitling a solicitor–litigant to costs170 operated to deny lay litigants that same entitlement. Yet the cases were distinguishable and any statement in the earlier case dealing with the issue of lay litigants was clearly obiter.171 In any event, the majority in Cachia v Hanes172 characterised the English Act as ‘a straightforward approach to the problem, in contrast to the approach adopted in some cases where courts have treated the loss in earnings of a litigant incurred in the course of the presentation or conduct of his case as a disbursement’.173

Costs of Lawyer–Litigants Entitlement of lawyer–litigants to costs 7.37 The rule denying a lay litigant compensation for work done in preparing his or her case has not traditionally been applied to a lawyer acting for himself or herself (a ‘lawyer–litigant’).174 The seminal case is the English Court of Appeal’s decision in London Scottish Benefit Society v Chorley,175 which held that a solicitor who successfully acted for himself in litigation was entitled to the same costs as if he had engaged legal representation, except for items such as obtaining instructions or attendances, which were unnecessary because he was his own client. This has become known as the ‘Chorley rule’ or the ‘Chorley exception’, and enjoys the support of considerable Australian case law.176 Bowen LJ justified this outcome according to the ability to quantify the ‘costs’ in question, reasoning that:177 … only legal costs which the Court can measure are to be allowed, and … such legal costs are to be treated as expenses necessarily arising from the litigation and necessarily caused by the course which it takes. Professional skill and labour are recognised and can be measured by the law; private expenditure of labour and trouble by a layman cannot be measured. It depends on

[page 181] the zeal, the assiduity, or the nervousness of the individual. Professional skill … is accordingly allowed for in taxing a bill of costs; and it would be absurd to permit a solicitor to charge for the same work when it is done by another solicitor, and not to permit him to charge for it when it is done by his own clerk.

So a key element in justifying this approach is that only costs the court can measure should be allowed; a court can reliably measure a lawyer’s costs but not those of a lay litigant. Bowen LJ, as well as the other judges, Brett MR and Fry LJ,178 disclaimed any privilege vesting in lawyers as a result. In fact, Fry LJ opined that this approach would be beneficial to the public, because otherwise a lawyer–litigant would always employ another lawyer and if successful would recover full costs,179 whereas under the rule of practice laid down a successful lawyer–litigant is entitled to full costs, subject to certain deductions,180 of which the unsuccessful opponent will get the benefit.181 It has also been justified on the ground that lawyers who have spent time representing themselves will have lost the opportunity of using that time

doing professional work for other clients and being remunerated accordingly.182

Limitations on scope of costs entitlement of lawyer– litigant 7.38 Four important points must be noted regarding the Chorley case. First, their Lordships made it clear that the principle they espoused did not mean that the costs recoverable should be equated to those the lawyer could have recovered had he or she been separately represented. The court will not award costs to a lawyer in respect of items that are unnecessary because the lawyer is self-represented, such as obtaining instructions from, or attendances on, him or herself,183 to observe and/or superintend the conduct of the case, and other ‘things of a kind which would involve a duplication of himself as client and as solicitor’.184 Second, there are various judicial statements noting the anomaly of allowing costs to lawyer–litigants but not lay litigants,185 leading a New South Wales appellate judge to remark that the Chorley exception ‘should be applied carefully rather than loosely’.186 An illustration of a court maintaining the Chorley exception within strict boundaries is found in Hartford (Holdings) Pty Ltd v CP (Adelaide) Pty Ltd,187 where the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court denied a solicitor–litigant an indemnity for his costs to the extent that these represented costs of appearing as counsel. Doyle CJ, with whom Gray and Besanko JJ [page 182] concurred, reasoned that even in a jurisdiction, like South Australia, where practitioners are admitted as solicitors and barristers, and can practice in both capacities, or in one only, a distinction remains as a matter of law and practice between the role of solicitor and that of counsel, and between the position of solicitor and that of counsel.188 His Honour added that the role of counsel ‘requires a degree of independence between counsel and client, and the recognition and performance of duties to the court of a substantial

nature’.189 Accordingly, it was inappropriate to adopt a broad characterisation of a solicitor–litigant’s role for the purposes of the Chorley exception. Third, it stands to reason that the Chorley exception should have no application in circumstances where there is no legal entitlement of the lawyer–litigant to recover legal costs. In effect, this dictates that without a current practising certificate entitling the lawyer to charge for the relevant legal services, the justification for applying the Chorley exception evaporates. A legally qualified person lacking that right is, for this purpose, arguably in a position no different to a lay litigant. Accordingly, there is no warrant for making an exception for a litigant in person merely because he or she is a paralegal, a solicitor’s clerk,190 an accredited mediator191 or conducts litigation services other than as a lawyer.192 Fourth, the rule pronounced in Chorley was identified, at least by Fry LJ, as one of practice rather than one of law. Some judges have interpreted this as freedom to circumvent its effect. In Dobree v Hoffman193 Ipp J ruled that ‘solicitors who represent themselves in litigation should be regarded no differently to lay persons who represent themselves in litigation’. His Honour’s ruling was affirmed on appeal,194 where Parker J, with whom Rowland and Steytler JJ agreed, stated that as the Chorley exception was a rule of practice as opposed to a rule of law, there remains scope for the court, subject to any statutory prescription, to establish rules of practice that best suit the circumstances and practice within the court’s jurisdiction. Parker J branded the Chorley exception a court-created privilege for solicitors that generated unfairness, querying why solicitors who initiate litigation on their own behalf should be allowed costs whereas, say, chartered accountants who do likewise should not.195 He also queried why the court’s ability to ‘measure’ costs should distinguish one class of unrepresented litigant from others.196 Parker J added that nothing in the court rules expressly or impliedly supported the Chorley exception.197 This led the court on the facts in question to [page 183] deny profit costs to a firm of solicitors that acted for one of its partners in litigation in which the partner was a litigant.198

Reassessment of lawyer–litigant exception 7.39 In essence the Western Australian decisions discussed above prompt inquiry as to the extent to which Chorley remains part of Australian law. The Full Court in Dobree v Hoffman199 queried the foundation for any such exception, and so the case cannot be seen as an attempt to distinguish Chorley. The reasoning is that if a lay litigant cannot be awarded ‘costs’, nor should a self-represented lawyer. Statements by the majority of the High Court in Cachia v Hanes200 support such an approach, opining that if the reasons for allowing a lawyer–litigant costs are unconvincing, ‘the logical answer may be to abandon the exception in favour of the general principle rather than the other way round’. These statements were dicta, and so should not be seen as a total rejection of the alternative approach to addressing the Chorley anomaly: to allow costs both to lay and lawyer–litigants who are successful where this outcome is in accordance with the proper exercise of judicial discretion. After all, this is consistent with Canadian201 (and also some New Zealand)202 case authority allowing ‘costs’ to lay litigants, an approach that enjoys the support of some Australian judges and law reform bodies.203 7.40 Indeed, more than one Australian judge has, were the question untrammelled by case authority, given an indication that the Chorley exception would not have been applied.204 The case authority in question is the High Court’s 1976 decision in Guss v Veenhuizen (No 2),205 which the New South Wales Court of Appeal in 2001 treated as binding and not overruled in Cachia v Hanes.206 Yet in Guss no general submission was advanced to the effect that a successful lawyer–litigant is not entitled to recover ‘costs’. The argument instead focused on whether a lawyer–litigant could recover ‘costs’ in respect of his own time and services in relation to an appeal to the court by reason of the fact that he was not on the court’s Register of [page 184] Practitioners.207 The issue therefore awaits definitive High Court authority, but obiter remarks in Cachia v Hanes, coupled with the tenor of judicial

statements to date, suggest that the Chorley exception is likely to have a limited lifespan.

Capping of Costs Indemnity 7.41 That the costs indemnity provided under the costs indemnity rule is rarely a complete indemnity208 of itself represents a de facto method of capping the costs liability of a party against whom costs are ordered. The legislature in some jurisdictions has, however, seen fit to impose an explicit cap on party and party costs in some forms of proceeding, and in others to explicitly vest in the court a power to cap costs.

Court’s power to cap costs prospectively Source of power 7.42 The Federal Court, Federal Circuit Court and New South Wales rules empower the respective courts to set the maximum costs that may be recovered as between party and party.209 As from 24 December 2012,210 statute declares that Victorian courts can likewise ‘fix or cap recoverable costs in advance’.211 And in Western Australia the rule-based costs discretion,212 coupled with a recently amended rule requiring courts to casemanage to ensure that costs ‘are proportionate to the value, importance and complexity of the subject matter in dispute’213 and ‘proportionate to the financial position of each party’,214 has prompted the issue of a practice direction that envisages the advance capping of costs, at least in family provision proceedings.215 Although some of the earlier authority on the exercise of powers of this kind emphasised the need for it to be exercised for the benefit of both parties, not only for the benefit of the party bringing the application,216 the terms in which it is expressed do not mandate a ‘bidirectional’ (or ‘multidirectional’) order, whereby each party may only recover from any other party costs [page 185]

up to the cap specified. They are equally amenable to a one-sided (‘unidirectional’) order, as explained by Preston CJ in Caroona Coal Action Group Inc v Coal Miners Australia Pty Ltd:217 A unidirectional order would be where the court specifies that only one party is protected by a maximum costs order, most commonly the applicant in the substantive proceedings. The consequence would be that the respondent, if a costs order subsequently were to be made by the court in its favour, would only be able to recover costs from the applicant up to the maximum amount specified in the order. Such an order is unidirectional, in that it only operates to cap costs in one direction, capping the costs the respondent can claim from the applicant. The cap does not operate in the other direction. Hence, if a costs order is made in favour of the party who is protected by a maximum costs order, such as the applicant, that party can still recover costs from the other party or parties without limitation by the maximum costs order.

The foregoing is not to suggest that unidirectional orders are to be the norm. It will depend on the type of the case in question, including the relative (financial) position of the litigants.218 7.43 Superior courts have, in any case, have the power to award costs at any stage of a proceeding, which is reiterated by statute or court rules in most jurisdictions.219 On its face, this power could encompass a costs order in advance of the proceeding that caps the costs ultimately recoverable. It has not traditionally been a power utilised for this purpose, though, targeting instead costs orders in interlocutory proceedings.220 Having said that, there is developing case authority, especially in public interest and test case litigation,221 wherein the power has been utilised to make ‘pre-emptive’ or ‘prospective’ costs orders.222 Yet the extent to which, at least in Australia, this power is sourced instead by the dedicated rules mentioned in the preceding paragraph, as opposed to the broader costs discretion, remains to be conclusively determined. Hence the mention in this chapter of the application of the dedicated rules in the public interest context.223

Exercise of court’s discretion 7.44 As the relevant provisions furnish no indication as to the process or standard the court should adopt in prescribing the maximum costs, the matter rests on the proper exercise of judicial discretion. That a related object of the power is to arm the court with power to limit the exposure to costs of parties engaged in litigation that involves less complex issues and the recovery of moderate amounts of money224 suggests that proportionality has a role to play in quantifying the cap. The rules, it has been judicially observed, ‘were

designed to put into the court’s hands a brake on intemperate and disproportionately expensive conduct of proceedings’.225 Family provision cases are particularly amenable to a statutory cap, in part because the costs usually come out of a fund in which each litigant is interested, and in part because they are prone to generating litigation with costs disproportionate to the value of the relevant fund. There is a judicial admonition, to this end, that the court ‘should not be reluctant’ to impose a cap to prevent extravagant expenditure of costs in these cases, and that its use should be early [page 186] in case management, ‘whenever it appears that the parties’ litigious fervour may be leading them to excessive expenditure of costs’.226 In this context the issue of proportionality lies at the core of the relevant inquiry because the parties are disputing over a fund, which in many instances will be the source of any costs order. A ‘bidirectional’ (or ‘multidirectional’) order is accordingly suitable here. 7.45 In other scenarios prospective costs capping may be justified less by concerns over proportionality than by affording access to justice. It has been judicially observed that the underlying rationale of the (New South Wales) rule concerns access to justice, in that while ensuring proportionality of costs is one means of facilitating access to justice, ‘alleviating the potentially stultifying effect on the proceedings if the capping order is not made is another means’.227 Access to justice arguably has greatest significance in the context of a plaintiff whose financial resources are minimal compared to the defendant, and whose claim has an element of public interest228 but may be stultified by the risk of an adverse costs order.229 In this instance it may well be that a unidirectional capping order is more suitable.230 For example, in Haraksin v Murrays Australia Ltd231 the applicant, a disabled woman, suing the respondent coach operator successfully sought orders capping maximum recoverable costs in disability discrimination proceedings at $25,000, in the face of realistic costs estimates of between $50,000 and $75,000. Nicholas J was influenced, in so ruling, by evidence

that the applicant would not proceed with the claim unless the order was made, and a public interest element to the case, namely that it was brought ‘in good faith for the purpose of obtaining orders enforcing a legislative instrument which is expressly intended “as far as possible” to eliminate discrimination against people with disabilities in the field of public transport’.232 [page 187] 7.46 There is nothing in the relevant source of power to prospectively cap costs that limits its application to proceedings at first instance. It can equally be applied in the appellate context. However, when summoned in an appeal, clearly relevant to the court’s discretion is the fact that a trial has taken place and its outcome is known. Just as courts are less inclined to absolve an appellant who has lost at trial from a security for costs order,233 and for similar reasons, the fact the appellant has already had its day in court, and lost, may incline an appellate court against capping (the appellant’s) costs on appeal. This is especially so where the appeal concerns a dispute over a fund. Family provision cases again supply a useful illustration, as courts have made clear that any tendency to order costs from the fund at first instance is (much) more confined on appeal.234 Perhaps there is greater leeway for capping appellate costs where the appeal raises genuine matters of public interest (although again it cannot be assumed, in litigation of this kind, that any capping order at trial will be replicated on appeal). For example, in King v Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd235 the trial judge found the applicant (K) to have suffered discrimination at the hands of the respondent airline on the grounds of her disability but dismissed the claim on the basis that the respondent would suffer unjustifiable hardship.236 K appealed this decision, seeking at the outset an order to cap the appellate costs liability of each party to $10,000. Perram J, in approaching the issue, made the following observations:237 What is presented therefore is a finely balanced discretionary debate. One cannot help but feel that the public interest aspects of [K’s] claim warrant some protection so that her appeal may be pursued and, in that regard, the existence of a grant of legal aid lends strength to the argument. So too, the harm to [K] seems greater to her if the order is not made than it is to [the respondent] if it is. On the other hand, it is true that the making of such an order can operate with unfairness

on the opposing party. Nevertheless, that is an unfairness, in part, that [FCR 2011] r 40.51 is premised upon.

Not without some hesitation, his Honour capped costs at $10,000, even though the respondent’s costs for the entire appeal would likely exceed $100,000, principally due to K’s (poor) financial position and the fact that K stood to make no personal gain from proceedings. The $10,000 amount, moreover, bore a relativity to the costs-capping order made at first instance of $20,000. Perram J noted, to this end, that ‘the point of this cost-capping order is to avoid the stifling of what is potentially an important appeal’.238

Exclusions from the statutory cap 7.47 An order capping costs may operate unfairly where the ultimately unsuccessful party has acted in a way that has unjustifiably increased the costs incurred by the ultimately successful party. For this reason, the court rules in the Federal Court, Federal Circuit Court and New South Wales provide that a maximum amount must not include an amount a party is ordered to pay because the party has:239 failed to comply with an order or any of the rules; sought leave to amend its pleadings or particulars; sought an extension of time for complying with an order or any of the rules; or [page 188] otherwise caused another party to incur costs unnecessary for the just, quick and cheap progress of the proceedings to trial or hearing of the action.240 If, in the court’s opinion, there are special reasons, and it is in the interests of justice to do so, it may vary the specification of maximum recoverable costs ordered.241 This recognises the risks inherent in capping costs at a time when the course of the dispute is uncertain, especially in cases not involving a dispute over a (sometimes relatively small) fund. The cautionary words of

Mann J in Knight v Beyond Properties Pty Ltd, referring to the equivalent English costs capping provisions, ought to be borne in mind to this end:242 Capping costs in advance does indeed involve a degree of speculation which, though it can be carried out when necessary (just as the courts have to assess proper sums for the purposes of security for costs applications)243 is not easy and has its dangers. The consequences of getting it wrong are in fact more serious that getting the sum wrong in a security application because costs outside the cap are irrecoverable. Costs outside the amount of the security remain recoverable. It is only a partial answer to say that insufficiencies can be dealt with under a liberty to apply. It is possible to remedy insufficiencies at that stage, but it is likely to increase costs if it has to happen … and to require a party to explain and justify its future conduct in the litigation to the counter-party, which it would not normally wish or be required to do. If such matters can properly, fairly and reliably be left to detailed assessment post-trial then, on the whole, they should be. Retrospective judgments about such things are likely to be more reliable than prospective judgments.

Court’s power to fix costs retrospectively 7.48 The terms in which the power to cap costs prospectively is expressed are wide enough to encompass the capping of costs retrospectively, at least in the Federal Court, Federal Circuit Court and New South Wales.244 There is, however, arguably little need for its utilisation in the retrospective context because courts have the power, in lieu of taxation or assessment, to fix an amount of recoverable party–party costs (a ‘gross sum’) by way of a costs order.245 Although this vehicle was not traditionally used to cap costs, but chiefly to avoid the expense and delay of a taxation or assessment,246 in 2003 and 2004 saw more than one New South Wales trial judge retrospectively fix costs to achieve the proportionality in family provision (and domestic property) disputes.247 The New South Wales Court of Appeal subsequently sought to constrain [page 189] the scope of this practice to the rare case — fearing that courts are rarely positioned to know whether or not costs to or in excess of a suggested cap were reasonably incurred248 — but the broader statutory imperative directed at proportionality enacted as s 60 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)249 reinvigorated New South Wales trial judges in utilising their power to fix costs as a vehicle to secure proportionality in family provision disputes.250

This must be read in tandem with a 2009 Supreme Court practice note in terms that ‘[o]rders may be made capping the costs that may be recovered by a party in circumstances including, but not limited to, cases in which the value of the estate is less than $500,000’.251 It is possible that South Australian courts could adopt a similar approach for estates of less than $250,000 in view of specific rule-based provisions.252 Outside of the family provision environment (but still within litigation over deceased estates) Pembroke J in Ireland v Retallack (No 2) made the following pertinent observations:253 I regard the power [to fix costs] as a helpful addition to the arsenal available to the court. Its use will only serve to enhance the interests of justice and further the overriding purpose in an appropriate case. After all, in exercising that power, the court is engaged, as a matter of principle, in a similar exercise to that which an assessor would undertake — designed to achieve the same objective but with broader powers, a wider discretion and at any earlier point in time. The court, just like an assessor, is seeking to determine what is a fair and reasonable amount for a party’s costs. In a real and practical sense, the party whose costs are capped under [the costs fixing power] is not

[page 190] being disadvantaged. All that is happening is that the court is arriving at an appropriate result — faster and in a gross amount.

Concepts of proportionality have since statutorily translated to the Federal Court and Victorian courts. Both statutes require the respective courts, in making costs orders, to take into account a failure to comply with the relevant overarching obligations, one of which is the resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.254 And both the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) and the Western Australian rules speak to the same objective.255 These arguably provide a thrust for using retrospective costs capping orders, although as noted above the relevant power to fix costs already existed. The fixing of costs, moreover, beyond operating as a de facto cap, has the benefit of avoiding the need for those costs to be quantified by way of taxation or assessment,256 and thereby promotes cheaper and quicker dispute resolution in line with civil procedure reforms.257 7.49 In any case, a broad statutory conferral of power to make any costs order the court thinks fit is wide enough to include the power to cap costs

retrospectively,258 especially as courts are loathe to read down powers of this kind.259 The foregoing does not mean that retrospective costs capping, whether sourced from the power to fix costs or pursuant to the general costs discretion, should ensue as a matter of course. There is inherent unfairness (and potential prejudice) in the notion of capping costs after the event, and it assumes, moreover, that a judge is well positioned to properly determine the appropriate quantum.260 An alternative is for the court to reduce the costs recoverable by making a partial costs order.261

Cap on costs recoverable in personal injury matters 7.50 As part of the civil liability law reforms that heralded the twenty-first century, some jurisdictions made statutory provision for the capping of party and party costs recoverable in personal injury matters in circumstances where the damages recovered do not exceed a set threshold.

Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales 7.51 The Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales reforms follow a similar schema, although the relevant New South Wales provisions are located in its legal profession [page 191] legislation. The main operative section in each case prescribes that if the amount recovered262 on a claim for personal injury damages263 (other than a claim that is expressly excluded)264 does not exceed a set amount,265 the maximum costs266 for legal services provided to a party267 in connection with268 the claim are fixed at 20 per cent of the amount recovered269 or $10,000, whichever is greater.270 If the maximum costs for legal services are so fixed, a court or tribunal cannot order the payment by another party to the claim of costs in respect of those services exceeding those maximum costs,271 and nor may a taxing officer or costs assessor determine an amount exceeding that maximum.272 In New South Wales, provision is made for the

maximum costs recoverable to be increased in the event of an appeal from the District Court.273 7.52 The Australian Capital Territory legislation defines ‘personal injury damages’ to mean damages that relate to the death of, or injury to, a person caused by someone else’s wrongful act or omission (whether or not an offence).274 In New South Wales it is given the same meaning as in Pt 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW).275 For the purposes of Pt 2, the latter Act defines ‘personal injury damages’ as damages that relate to the death of or injury to a person.276 [page 192] As this definition ‘draws no distinction between damages awarded in claims for negligence and damages awarded in claims for an intentional tort’, costs incurred in proceedings for damages arising from intentional acts come within the statutory regime.277 7.53 The statutory objective is to ensure that the lawyers representing both plaintiff and defendant in small personal injury claims know from the outset that recoverable fees as between the parties would be capped if the amount ultimately recovered does not exceed the set amount. It also brings a greater level of certainty to parties anxious to know their maximum exposure in the event of losing the proceedings, and is informed by the notion that ‘costs should be proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subjectmatter in dispute’.278 7.54 Recognising that personal injury claims are various in their complexity, and that one party’s capacity to contain costs may be affected by the conduct of the other side and its lawyers, the statutory cap may be overridden, offering ‘relief from the blunt operation of the central capping provision’.279 First, the court may order that costs be excluded from the cap for services provided in response to any action by the other party that was not reasonably necessary to advance the latter’s case or was intended or reasonably likely to unnecessarily delay or complicate determination of the claim.280 Second, the cap does not prevent the court awarding costs against another party, assessed on an indemnity basis,281 in respect of legal services provided after the

making of an offer of compromise where the court makes an award in terms no less favourable to that party than the terms of the offer.282 It follows that indemnity costs are, in this event, excluded from the statutory cap.283 Third, the Australian Capital Territory legislation allows a court or taxing officer to raise the maximum costs allowable in relation to a claim for personal injury damages because of the complexity of the claim or the behaviour of one or more of the litigants.284

Queensland (and the Northern Territory) 7.55 The Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) follows a schema premised on the requirement that parties to personal injury proceedings exchange mandatory final offers if the [page 193] claim is not settled.285 The Act restricts costs recovery where a court awards $50,000 or less in damages but does not apply to the costs of an appellate proceeding.286 The costs consequences differ according to whether the award is $30,000 or less, or between $30,000 and $50,000. In the former case, the following applies:287 if the amount awarded is less than the claimant’s offer but more than the respondent’s offer — no costs are to be awarded; if the amount awarded is equal to or exceeds the claimant’s offer — costs are awarded to the claimant on an indemnity basis as from the day on which the proceeding started, but no award is to be made for costs up to that date; if the amount awarded is less than or equal to the respondent’s offer — costs are awarded to the respondent on a standard basis as from the day on which the proceeding started, but no award is to be made for costs up to that date. For damages awards between $30,000 and $50,000, provision is made for a specific monetary costs cap. The following principles apply in this context:288

if the amount awarded is less than the claimant’s offer but more than the respondent’s offer — costs are awarded to the claimant on a standard basis up to a maximum of $2,500; if the amount awarded is equal to or exceeds the claimant’s offer — costs up to the date on which the proceeding started are awarded on a standard basis up to a limit of $2,500, and costs on or after the date on which the proceeding started are awarded on an indemnity basis; if the amount awarded is less than or equal to the respondent’s offer — costs up to the day on which the proceeding started are awarded to the claimant on a standard basis up to a limit of $2,500, and costs on or after the day on which the proceeding started are awarded to the respondent on a standard basis. 7.56 The costs provisions in the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) do not create a code for all personal injury litigation in Queensland.289 It follows that, as the Act is silent about costs in cases where there is no award of damages or where an award exceeds $50,000, costs in these cases are determined according to the ordinary costs rules. 7.57 Although the Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT) is in force, its costs provisions have yet to take effect. These provisions are modelled on the Queensland legislation, and so invite a comparison between claimants’ and respondents’ final offers, and prescribe consequences according to the quantum of the award of damages.290 Unlike its Queensland counterpart, though, the Act prescribes costs consequences in the event of a damages award equal to or more than the maximum amount prescribed291 and where the claim is resolved at the resolution conference or during the period the final offers remain open.292 Also, instead of [page 194] a set monetary cap, the Northern Territory legislation fixes costs according to a proportion of the applicable scale of costs. 7.58 Both the Northern Territory and Queensland legislation states that if an award of damages is affected by factors that were not reasonably foreseeable

by a party at the time his or her offer was made, the court may, if satisfied that it is just to do so, make an order for costs under the above provisions by treating the reference to an offer as to a later offer made in the light of the factors that became apparent after the parties completed the exchange of offers.293

1.

See 7.18–7.20.

2.

See 7.37–7.40.

3.

See 7.24–7.36.

4.

See 7.41–7.58.

5.

See 6.16.

6.

Cates v Glass [1920] NZLR 37 at 53 per Chapman J, at 59 per Edwards J (CA); Milne v AttorneyGeneral (Tas) (1956) 95 CLR 460 at 477; BC5600450 (FC); Vucadinovic v Lombardi [1967] VR 81 at 87 per Pape J; Lauchlan v Hartley [1979] Qd R 305 at 309 per Connolly J; Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 422 at 423 per Miles CJ (SC(ACT)); Holden & Co v Crown Prosecution Service (No 2) [1994] 1 AC 22 at 39–40 per Lord Bridge; Russell v Adwan Pty Ltd (2000) 144 ACTR 1 at 14; [2000] ACTSC 90; BC200006188 per Miles CJ; Mann v Carnell (2001) 159 FLR 466 at 467; [2001] ACTSC 18 per Miles CJ; Multistar Pty Ltd v Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning (No 3) (2001) 114 LGERA 106 at 109; [2001] NSWLEC 101; BC200102842 per Lloyd J; Kazar v Kargarian (2011) 197 FCR 113; [2011] FCAFC 136; BC201108412 at [9] per Greenwood and Rares JJ.

7.

Donald Campbell & Co Ltd v Pollak [1927] AC 732 at 811 per Viscount Cave LC; Voyce v Lawrie [1952] NZLR 984 at 987 per F B Adams J (SC); Scherer v Counting Instruments Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 615 at 621 per Buckley LJ; Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 120; BC9800310 per Kirby J.

8.

See 8.2–8.13.

9.

See 8.25–8.61.

10. See 8.62–8.68. 11. As to the doctrine of security for costs see Chs 28–29. 12. NSW r 42.1 (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 11) (‘if the court makes any order as to costs, the court is to order that the costs follow the event unless it appears to the court that some other order should be made as to the whole or any part of the costs’); Qld r 681(1) (formerly Qld r 689(1)) (‘Costs of a proceeding are in the discretion of the court but follow the event, unless the court considers another order is more appropriate’); SA r 263(1) (formerly SA RSC r 101.02(1)) (‘As a general rule, costs follow the event’; although the general rule is stated to be subject to exceptions, whether in rules to the contrary or in the cases identified in r 263(2)); WA O 66 r 1(1) (‘the Court will generally order that the successful party to any action or matter recover his costs’). As to the statutory costs discretion see 6.14. 13. Barameda Enterprises Pty Ltd v O’Connor [1988] 1 Qd R 359 at 391 per McPherson J (FC); Copping v ANZ McCaughan Ltd (1995) 63 SASR 523 at 527–8 per King CJ (FC); Kingscote District Council v Kangaroo Island Eco Action Inc (No 2) (1996) 67 SASR 422 at 425;

BC9605560 per Doyle CJ (FC); Gwinnett v Day (No 2) [2012] SASC 61; BC201202333 at [14] per Stanley J. 14. (1994) 49 FCR 326 at 326; BC9406813. See also Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306 at 327 per Devlin LJ (who warned that any legal presumptions such as ‘costs follow the event’ ‘ought to be used only where their use is strictly necessary for the ends of justice’, characterising them as ‘inherently undesirable … because they prevent the court from ascertaining the truth, which should be the prime object of a judicial investigation, and because if they are allowed to multiply to excess, the law will become divorced from reality and will live among fantasies of its own’); Barradine Pty Ltd v Westworld Holdings Pty Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 498 at 503 per Andrews CJ (‘One must be careful to avoid so circumscribing the discretion with rules as to render it not a discretion at all’). 15. Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128 at 133; BC9602187. His Honour made similar observations in Green Line Investor Services Ltd v Cresvale Securities Ltd [1999] FCA 68; BC9900271 at [7] and SVI Systems Pty Ltd v Best & Less Pty Ltd (2001) 187 ALR 302; [2001] FCA 279; BC200101071 at [153]. 16. See 6.16. 17. A litigant who is awarded costs cannot recover more than he or she has paid or is liable to pay to his or her own lawyer: General of Berne Insurance Co v Jardine Reinsurance Management Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 301 at 308 per May LJ, at 312 per Sir Brian Neill (‘The receiving party is not entitled to a bonus’); Stobbart v Mocnaj [1999] WASC 252; BC9908569 at [8]–[9] per Parker J; Seal v Malaugh Holdings (No 2) Pty Ltd [2008] SASC 223; BC200807794 at [36] per Judge Withers (who opined that there may be cases where it is appropriate to consider more closely the invoices issued by the solicitor, say, where the charges are for amounts or at rates that appear to be unreasonably high such that any agreement pursuant to which they are charged might well falter on a challenge by the client, in which case the indemnity cap might be reduced). 18. (1860) 5 H & N 381 at 385; 157 ER 1229 at 1231. 19. Clarke & Chapman v Hart (1858) 6 HLC 633 at 667; 10 ER 1443 at 1457 per Lord Cranworth (‘[Costs are] but merely a necessary consequence of a party having created a litigation in which he has failed’); Re J (an applicant) (1928) 29 SR (NSW) 20 at 22 per Long Innes J; Anstee v Jennings [1935] VLR 144 at 148 per Mann J (FC); Puddy v Borg [1973] VR 626 at 629 per Winneke CJ (FC); Barton v Berman [1980] 1 NSWLR 63 at 74 per Hope JA; Cilli v Abbott (1981) 53 FLR 108 at 111 (FC(FCA)); Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 543 per Mason CJ, at 563 per Toohey J, at 567 per McHugh J; BC9002896; Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 97; BC9800310 per McHugh J; Griffiths & Beerens Pty Ltd v Duggan (No 3) [2008] VSC 462; BC200809771 at [9] per Pagone J; Ahmadi v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1191; BC201008197 at [7] per Rothman J; Kazar v Kargarian (2011) 197 FCR 113; [2011] FCAFC 136; BC201108412 at [9] per Greenwood and Rares JJ. 20. De L v Director-General Department of Community Services (No 2) (1997) 190 CLR 207 at 221; BC9701054 per Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ. 21. Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 97; BC9800310 per McHugh J. See also ALRC 75, pp 51–6. 22. Fleischmann Distilling Corp v Maier Brewing Co (1967) 87 Sup Ct 1404 at 1406 per Warren CJ. 23. As to costs in family law proceedings see 8.70–8.80. 24. As to costs in criminal proceedings see Chs 24–25. 25. See 16.14–16.17.

26. See Chs 15–18. 27. Scherer v Counting Instruments Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 615 at 619 per Buckley LJ; Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 567; BC9002896 per McHugh J; Hollier v Australian Maritime Safety Authority (No 2) [1998] FCA 975; BC9804016 (FC) BC9804016. 28. (1900) 17 WN (NSW) 140 (affd (1900) 17 WN (NSW) 140 (FC)). 29. Potter Drug & Chemical Corporation v Malouf (1900) 17 WN (NSW) 140 at 142. 30. Potter Drug & Chemical Corporation v Malouf (1900) 17 WN (NSW) 140 at 142. See also Re Swiftcrete Pty Ltd (1977) 2 ACLR 411 at 413 per Needham J (SC(NSW)). 31. As to which see 8.2–8.13. 32. As to a successful party being deprived of costs see 8.25–8.61. As to the award of costs against a successful party see 8.62–8.68. 33. Shaw v Yarranova Pty Ltd [2011] VSCA 55; BC201100801 at [8] per Redlich and Mandie JJA. 34. Willmott v Barber (1881) 17 Ch D 772 at 773 per Jessel MR. 35. Carson v Pickersgill & Sons (1885) 14 QBD 859; Richardson v Richardson [1895] P 346; Gundry v Sainsbury [1910] 1 KB 645 at 651 per Fletcher Moulton LJ; McCullum v Ifield [1969] 2 NSWR 329 at 330 per Taylor J; TNT Bulkships Ltd v Hopkins (1989) 65 NTR 1 at 7 per Kearney J; Joyce v Kammac (1988) Ltd [1996] 1 All ER 923 at 928 per Morland J. It follows that an unsuccessful party may wish to investigate the scope of the successful party’s obligation to pay its lawyers’ costs by reference to the retainer of the latters’ lawyers. See, for example, Kuek v Devflan Pty Ltd (2011) 31 VR 264; [2011] VSCA 25; BC201100364. As the retainer agreement is likely to be privileged, however, this can give rise to some difficulties in this context: see 18.24. 36. Irving v Gagliardi (1895) 6 QLJ 155 at 200 per Griffith CJ (FC). 37. Re Sweeting [1898] 1 Ch 268 at 272–3 per North J; Browne v Barber [1913] 2 KB 553 at 580 per Kennedy LJ; TNT Bulkships Ltd v Hopkins (1989) 65 NTR 1 at 7 per Kearney J. 38. [1921] 1 KB 495. 39. Adams v London Improved Motor Coach Builders Ltd [1921] 1 KB 495 at 501 (emphasis supplied). 40. Adams v London Improved Motor Coach Builders Ltd [1921] 1 KB 495 at 504. 41. As to implied retainers see 2.7–2.10. 42. Pryles & Defteros (a firm) v Green (1999) 20 WAR 541 at 550; [1999] WASC 34; BC9902816 per Parker J. 43. See 7.16. 44. [1903] 1 KB 289 at 295. 45. Adams v London Improved Motor Coach Builders Ltd [1921] 1 KB 495 at 501 per Bankes LJ. 46. R v Archbishop of Canterbury [1903] 1 KB 289 at 295. 47. [1921] 1 KB 495 at 507, 508. Cf Angor Pty Ltd v Ilich Motor Company Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 65 at 72; BC9203632 per French J. 48. Grundmann v Georgeson [2000] QCA 394; BC200005790 at [7]. 49. Shaw v Yarranova Pty Ltd [2011] VSCA 55; BC201100801 at [22] per Redlich and Mandie JJA. 50. [1925] SASR 395.

51. Backhouse v Judd [1925] SASR 395 at 400. See also Angor Pty Ltd v Ilich Motor Company Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 65; BC9203632 (where a company liable to meet a costs order was wound up, and the issue was whether the company’s liability for the costs was extinguished by its winding up, French J held that the company’s liability to its solicitor was undisputed and that its winding up did not extinguish that liability, even though the prospect of the solicitors looking to the company for their costs was remote: at 74); Coogi Australia Pty Ltd v Hysport International Pty Ltd (FCA, Drummond J, 22 October 1998, unreported) BC9805610; Grundmann v Georgeson [2000] QCA 394; BC200005790 at [7]–[9] (respondent’s solicitors engaged by an association; held that the respondent was liable to pay the solicitors’ costs); Trevorrow v State of South Australia (No 7) (2008) 251 LSJS 91; [2008] SASC 5; BC200800253 at [17]–[22] per Gray J (where, lacking an express costs agreement between the plaintiff and his lawyer, an implication that the plaintiff would be liable to meet his lawyer’s reasonable professional charges arose from the plaintiff instructing the lawyer to act, and the government’s assistance with funding the proceedings did not release the plaintiff from his obligations to his lawyer because the funding arrangements required repayment). 52. [2008] WASC 266; BC200810214. 53. Noye v Robbins (No 6) [2008] WASC 266; BC200810214 at [100]. 54. Noye v Robbins [2010] WASCA 83; BC201002738 at [313]. 55. Noye v Robbins [2010] WASCA 83; BC201002738 at [313]. 56. Noye v Robbins [2010] WASCA 83; BC201002738 at [336]. 57. See FCR 2011 Div 4.2 (formerly FCR 1979 O 80). 58. FCR 2011 r 4.19(3), 4.19(4) (formerly FCR 1979 O 80 r 9(2)). 59. HCR 2004 r 56.09.5. 60. WA O 66 r 8A(1) (with effect on 22 February 2008) (as to which see Stone v Registrar of Titles [2012] WASC 21 (S); BC201202673 at [61]–[66] per Simmonds J). 61. As ‘no win, no fee’ (‘speculative’) costs agreements see 3.41, 3.50–3.56. 62. Noye v Robbins (No 6) [2008] WASC 266; BC200810214 at [86] per E M Heenan J (affd Noye v Robbins [2010] WASCA 83; BC201002738). 63. Wentworth v Rogers (2006) 66 NSWLR 474; [2006] NSWCA 145; BC200604064 at [103] per Basten JA. Cf Kuek v Devflan Pty Ltd (2011) 31 VR 264; [2011] VSCA 25; BC201100364 at [59]–[70] per Hansen JA, with whom Neave and Harper JJA concurred. 64. 1465778 Ontario Inc v 1122077 Ontario Ltd (2006) 82 OR (3d) 757 at [35] (CA(Ont)). 65. New Pinnacle Group Silver Mining Co v Luhrig Coal and Ore Dressing Appliances Co (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 50 at 56–7 per Walker J; McCullum v Ifield [1969] 2 NSWR 329 at 330 per Taylor J; R v Miller [1983] 3 All ER 186 at 190 per Lloyd J; Johnson v Santa Teresa Housing Association (1992) 83 NTR 14 at 20 per Mildren J; Wilson v Richmond River Shire Council [2000] NSWSC 71; BC200000483 at [15] per Harrison M; Howard v Mechtler [2000] NSWSC 455; BC200003261 at [11] per Malpass M; North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (No 2) [2002] FCA 564; BC200202158 at [102]–[104] per Weinberg J; Coshott v Woollahra Municipal Council [2008] NSWCA 176; BC200806951 at [11] per Handley AJA. See also S Pattison, ‘The Indemnity Principle: Still Some Quandaries’ (October 2000) 38 LSJ 33. 66. See, for example, Altorfer & Stow (a firm) v Lindsay [2005] WASCA 73; BC200502039 at [61]– [62] per McLure JA; Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Ltd v Redrock Co Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 114; BC200800779 at [8], [32] per Austin J.

67. (1992) 83 NTR 14. 68. Johnson v Santa Teresa Housing Association (1992) 83 NTR 14 at 20. 69. For this purpose, it cannot be assumed that a corporate litigant is a nominal plaintiff (or mere agent) for its incorporators or officers, or an empty shell, in the absence of special facts of the kind that might warrant disregarding the separate corporate entity: Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Ltd v Redrock Co Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 114; BC200800779 at [8] per Austin J. 70. (2004) 60 NSWLR 203; [2004] NSWCA 154; BC200402706. 71. Dyktynski v BHP Titanium Minerals Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 203; [2004] NSWCA 154; BC200402706 at [23]. 72. Dyktynski v BHP Titanium Minerals Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 203; [2004] NSWCA 154; BC200402706 at [93] per McColl JA. 73. Dyktynski v BHP Titanium Minerals Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 203; [2004] NSWCA 154; BC200402706 at [109]. 74. Dyktynski v BHP Titanium Minerals Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 203; [2004] NSWCA 154; BC200402706 at [108]. 75. See 7.10. 76. Inglis v Moore (No 2) (1979) 46 FLR 470 at 472 per St John and Brennan JJ (FC(FCA)). See also at 482 per Davies J; Attorney-General v Shillibeer (1849) 4 Ex 606; 154 ER 1356; Ex parte Slack (1884) 6 ALT 23; Irving v Gagliardi (1895) 6 QLJ 155; Henderson v Merthyr Tydfil Urban District Council [1900] 1 QB 434; MacLaurin v Hall (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 114; Lenthall v Hillson [1933] SASR 31 (overruling Ames v Richardson [1921] SASR 224); Ex parte W A Grubb Pty Ltd (1949) 66 WN (NSW) 224; Nolan v George [1959] Qd R 315; Blackall v Trotter (No 1) [1969] VR 939 at 941 (FC); Whitbread v Vellaris [1969] SASR 291 at 292 per Chamberlain J. The rule was given statutory effect in Western Australia under earlier iterations of its legal profession legislation (Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (WA) s 62A(2); Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA) s 226), but has not translated to the current Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA). 77. R v Barbaro (1992) 108 ACTR 1 at 7 per Miles CJ. 78. Lord Advocate v Stewart (1899) 36 Sc LR 945 at 945 per Lord Stormonth Darling. See also Ditton v Gallagher (1992) 110 ACTR 12 at 15 per Gallop J. 79. (1916) 12 Tas LR 26 at 26, 27. See also at 28–9 per Crisp J (the costs recovered by the Crown in such proceedings assist it ‘to maintain its officers in the discharge of the duties necessary to the proper assertion of Crown claims’). 80. Lyris v Hatziantoniou (1998) 24 Fam LR 391 at 394–5; [1998] FamCA 1311 per Steele J (see (1999) 5 CFL 222). 81. See, for example, Environment Protection Authority v Taylor Woodrow (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1997) 97 LGERA 368 at 380–5; BC9705360 per Lloyd J (LEC) (rejecting the analogy, proffered by Talbot J in Environment Protection Authority v Alkem Drums Pty Ltd (1996) 93 LGERA 83 at 89–90; BC9606960 (LEC), between the Environment Protection Authority appearing as a litigant represented by its own employee and a lay litigant — whose time is not regarded as ‘costs’ for which he or she may be compensated: see 7.24); Environment Protection Authority v Iron Gates Pty Ltd (LEC, Pearlman J, 26 September 1997, unreported) BC9705336. 82. Environment Protection Authority v Taylor Woodrow (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1997) 97 LGERA 368 at 384; BC9705360 per Lloyd J (LEC).

83. Henderson Borough Council v Auckland Regional Authority [1984] 1 NZLR 16 at 23 per Cooke J (CA). See also Law Society of New South Wales v Kurland (SC(NSW), Greenwood M, 1 April 1992, unreported) BC9201968 at 12–15 (who held that the Law Society was entitled to its full costs of proceedings regardless of the fact that it had been represented by one of its in-house legal officers, and accepted that in bringing proceedings, an organisation that utilises the services of its own legal staff incurs an ‘actual cost … in pursuing [the] matter’: at 12); Bank of Western Australia Ltd v O’Neill (SC(WA), White J, 22 January 1999, unreported) BC9900058; Maher v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2008] VSCA 122; BC200804917 at [92]–[105] per DoddsStreeton JA. 84. See generally L Merrett, ‘Costs as Damages’ (2009) 125 LQR 468. 85. Cockburn v Edwards (1881) 18 Ch D 449 at 459 per Jessel MR, at 462 per Brett LJ, at 463 per Cotton LJ; Ross v Caunters [1980] Ch 297 at 324 per Megarry VC; Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd v Union Insurance Co Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 358 at 365–6 per Giles J; Seavision Investments SA v Evennett & Clarkson Puckle Ltd (The ‘Tiburon’) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 26 at 33 per Parker LJ, at 34 per Scott LJ; Queanbeyan Leagues Club Ltd v Poldune Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1100; BC200007463 at [45], [46] per Hamilton J; Gray v Sirtex Medical Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 1; [2011] FCAFC 40; BC201101296 at [15] per the court; Johnstone, McGee & Gandy Pty Ltd v Hockey Tasmania Inc [2012] TASSC 12; BC201201607 at [20] per Blow J. 86. As to the judicial costs discretion see 6.14–6.20. 87. As to the taxation or assessment of costs as between party and party see Chs 15–18. 88. (1881) 18 Ch D 449. 89. As to the distinction between costs as between ‘party and party’ and costs as between ‘solicitor and client’ see 16.21–16.22. 90. Cockburn v Edwards (1881) 18 Ch D 449 at 459. See also at 462 per Brett LJ. 91. Barnett v Corporation of Eccles [1900] 2 QB 423; Anderson v Bowles (1951) 84 CLR 310 at 323– 4; BC5100370 per Dixon, Williams, Fullagar and Kitto JJ; Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306 at 317 per Ormerod LJ, at 319–23, 328–30 per Devlin LJ, at 336 per Danckwerts LJ; Lonrho plc v Fayed (No 5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489 at 1497 per Dillon LJ, at 1505 per StuartSmith LJ, at 1510 per Evans LJ; Penn v Bristol & West Building Society [1997] 1 WLR 1356 at 1364 per Waller LJ; Avenhouse v Hornsby Shire Council (1998) 44 NSWLR l at 36–7; BC9801812 per Sheller JA, with whom Mason P and Priestley JA concurred; Grainger v Williams [2009] WASCA 60; BC200901575 at [203] per McLure JA; Gray v Sirtex Medical Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 1; [2011] FCAFC 40; BC201101296 at [16] per the court. 92. (1883) 11 QBD 674. 93. Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre (1883) 11 QBD 674 at 690. 94. Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306 at 321 per Devlin LJ; Seavision Investments SA v Evennett & Clarkson Puckle Ltd (The ‘Tiburon’) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 26 at 28 per Parker LJ, at 35 per Scott LJ; Lonrho plc v Fayed (No 5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489 at 1510 per Evans LJ. See, for example, Gray v Sirtex Medical Ltd (2011) 193 FCR 1; [2011] FCAFC 40; BC201101296 at [30]–[42] per the court. See also 11.63. 95. [2008] 1 All ER (Comm) 266; [2007] EWHC 3163 (Comm) at [25]. See also Union Discount Co Ltd v Zoller [2002] 1 WLR 157; [2001] EWCA Civ 1755. 96. Carroll v Kynaston [2011] 2 WLR 1346; [2010] EWCA Civ 1404 at [30]–[31] per Ward LJ, with whom Patten and Elias LJJ concurred (noting that ‘[i]f the claimant did not ask for the costs, then he failed to mitigate his loss and cannot recover them as damages in a subsequent action on that

ground’ and that ‘[h]is difficulty is compounded by the fact that the judge did deal with costs: he made no order as to the costs’: at [30]). 97. As to the phenomenon of the self-represented (lay) litigant see WALRC 92, Vol 1, Ch 2.10. 98. Willing v Hollobone (1972) 3 SASR 532 at 533–5 per Bray CJ (FC); Kelly v Noumenon Pty Ltd (1988) 47 SASR 182 at 184–5; BC8800384 per King CJ (FC); Dalgety Australia Operations Ltd v F F Seeley Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 75 at 88–92 per Bollen J; Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 410–15; BC9404608 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ; Morton v Official Receiver for the Bankruptcy Division of the State of Victoria (1996) 68 FCR 360 at 364; BC9603344 per Olney J; Wollongong City Council v Smith [1999] NSWSC 473; BC9902602 at [12] per Malpass M; Kowal v Zoccoli (2002) 4 VR 399; [2002] VSCA 100; BC200203494 (loss of income by lay litigant attending to instruct held not to be ‘costs’); Scott v Northern Territory of Australia (2005) 15 NTLR 158; [2005] NTCA 4; BC200504732 at [5] per the court; Deva v University of Western Sydney (2008) 175 IR 89; [2008] NSWCA 137; BC200804540 at [82] per Tobias JA; Australian Super Pty Ltd v Woodward (2009) 262 ALR 402; [2009] FCAFC 168; BC200910789 at [60], [61] per the court; Wellington v Police (2009) 105 SASR 215; [2009] SASC 294; BC200908762 at [61]–[63] per Kourakis J; Merrin v Commissioner of Police [2012] QCA 181; BC201204684 at [39] per North J, with whom Margaret McMurdo P and Henry J concurred. See generally P Lynch, ‘Cachia v Hanes: The Resurgence of the Indemnity Principle in Australia’ (1995) 13 Aust Bar Rev 177. 99. As to what constitute ‘out of pocket expenses’ for this purpose see 7.29. 100. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v IMB Group Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] FCA 1592; BC200408250 at [11] per Kiefel J (‘The rule in Cachia v Hanes is not avoided by a respondent employing someone else to do the same work, if they too are unqualified’). See, for example, Rowan v Cornwall (No 6) (2002) 220 LSJS 187; [2002] SASC 234; BC200204140 at [16] per Debelle J (denying any allowance for the cost of clerical assistance voluntarily provided by the plaintiff’s friends and relatives); Step v Northern Territory of Australia (2007) 20 NTLR 141; [2007] NTCA 6; BC200709089 at [12]–[26] per Riley J (father disallowed any allowance for his time in acting as lay advocate for his daughter, but allowed motor vehicle costs for travelling to the court, as the court found an agreement between them that the daughter would repay these expenses to the father: at [24]). 101. (1994) 179 CLR 403; BC9404608. 102. Cachia v Hanes (1991) 23 NSWLR 304 per Clarke and Handley JJA, Kirby P dissenting. 103. Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 409; BC9404608. 104. Namely the former NSW RSC Pt 52 r 67: now see 15.59. 105. Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 410; BC9404608. 106. Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 410; BC9404608. See, for example, Hussain v Canberra Taxi Industry Association Ltd [2007] ACTSC 79; BC200708225 (where Crispin J held that ACT r 3781(3) — pursuant to which the court ‘may make an order for costs (other than the costs of representation by a lawyer) in favour of a party to a proceeding (the first party) against another party to the proceeding (the second party) for expenses unnecessarily incurred by the first party because of any act or omission of the second party’ — ‘does not seem to me … was intended to enable the Small Claims Court to ensure that a respondent was paid for his, her or its time or for the time of its employees’, which ‘would have involved a quite radical departure from the position that pertains in all other courts’: at [11]); Orr v State of Tasmania [2010] TASSC 28; BC201004313 (where Blow J noted that s 59(1) of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas), which empowers the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal to

‘make such order as to costs as it considers appropriate in any proceedings before it’, referred to ‘costs’ in the legal sense: at [4]). 107. (2002) 12 NTLR 139; [2002] NTSC 57; BC200205783. 108. The Act has subsequently been renamed as the Lands, Planning and Mining Tribunal Act 1998 (NT). 109. Northern Territory of Australia v Lands and Mining Tribunal (2002) 12 NTLR 139; [2002] NTSC 57; BC200205783 at [40]. 110. (2004) 22 VAR 212; [2004] VCAT 2188. 111. Namely Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 109(1). 112. Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 62. 113. Aussie Invest Corporation Pty Ltd v Hobsons Bay City Council (2004) 22 VAR 212; [2004] VCAT 2188 at [16]. See also Re Cardinia Shire Council v Stoiljkovic (2002) 12 VPR 61. 114. Aussie Invest Corporation Pty Ltd v Hobsons Bay City Council (2004) 22 VAR 212; [2004] VCAT 2188 at [16]–[17]. 115. Aussie Invest Corporation Pty Ltd v Hobsons Bay City Council (2004) 22 VAR 212; [2004] VCAT 2188 at [16], [18]–[19]. 116. Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) s 25(9). 117. Re Bertini (No 2) [2010] WASC 86; BC201002653 at [31] per Mazza J. 118. 6 Edw I c 1. 119. See 6.2. 120. Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 410–11; BC9404608. 121. Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 414–15; BC9404608. 122. (1991) 23 NSWLR 304 at 317. 123. Cachia v Hanes (1991) 23 NSWLR 304 at 318. 124. Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 415; BC9404608. See also Cachia v Hanes (1991) 23 NSWLR 304 at 317 per Handley JA (who remarked that the rule that a litigant in person who succeeds can only recover out of pocket expenses is the only protection and redress a represented litigant has against additional expense caused by a lay litigant opponent); Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd [2001] NSWSC 854; BC200106186 at [20] per Bryson J (‘it is a recurring experience that unrepresented litigants do not use the time of themselves or of the Court or of their opponents well and have difficulty in perceiving what is under debate and what is relevant’). 125. (1991) 23 NSWLR 304 at 317. This is the principal justification for allowing costs to a solicitor– litigant but not a lay litigant: see 7.37. 126. Cachia v Hanes (1991) 23 NSWLR 304 at 321 per Handley JA. In England there is authority that in claims for wrongful use of intellectual property a corporate litigant may be entitled via an order for costs to be indemnified for the actual and direct cost (excluding overhead and profit) of its own specialist or expert (not other) employees it has engaged to provide assistance for the purposes of the litigation, the logic being that in such cases the litigant would have otherwise had to engage outside experts, the fees of whom would clearly amount to a disbursement: Re Nossen’s Letter Patent [1969] 1 WLR 638 at 643–4 per Lloyd-Jacob J; Admiral Management Services Ltd v ParaProtect Europe Ltd [2003] 2 All ER 1017; [2002] EWHC 233 (Ch) at [27]–[44] per Stanley

Burnton J; Sisu Capital Fund Ltd v Tucker [2006] 1 All ER 167; [2005] EWHC 2321 (Ch) at [42]– [48] per Warren J. Cf Cuthbert v Gair [2008] EWHC 90014 (Costs). 127. See, for example, B v P [2000] FamCA 392 at [50] (FC). 128. See, for example, W (deceased) v W [2004] FamCA 319 at [41] (FC). 129. See, for example, Winter v Fleeton [2002] WASCA 73; BC200201807 at [23] per Wallwork J. 130. See, for example, Pittwater Council v Bolitho [2007] NSWLEC 355; BC200704811 at [159] per Preston CJ. 131. See, for example, Re Sullivan and Department of Industry, Science and Technology (1998) 51 ALD 767 at [45] (ACT AAT). 132. See, for example, Winter v Fleeton [2002] WASCA 73; BC200201807 at [23] per Wallwork J. 133. See, for example, Shephard v Blueberry Farms of Australia (Corindi) Ltd (2001) 162 FLR 339; [2001] FMCA 2 at [66] per Driver FM; Cary v Owners of Strata Plan No 7241 [2002] FMCA 18; BC200200379. 134. Buckland v Watts [1970] 1 QB 27 at 37–8 per Sir Gordon Willmer; Kelly v Noumenon Pty Ltd (1988) 47 SASR 182 at 185; BC8800384 per King CJ (FC); Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 417; BC9404608 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ; Russell v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (2009) 74 ATR 760; [2009] FCA 1469; BC200911160 at [29] per Logan J (moneys expended to secure the attendance of a witness). 135. Witness fees generally may, after all, be allowable on taxation or assessment: see 17.28–17.39. 136. See, for example, W (deceased) v W [2004] FamCA 319 at [49] (FC); Farquar v Farquar (No 2) [2008] FamCA 682; BC200850533; Russell v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (2009) 74 ATR 760; [2009] FCA 1469; BC200911160 at [26]–[28] per Logan J. 137. See, for example, H v H [2006] FamCA 257 at [9] per Warnick J. 138. See, for example, Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd [2002] NSWSC 838; BC200207616 at [14] per Bryson J. 139. Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd [2002] NSWSC 838; BC200207616 at [21] per Bryson J; Lawrence v M D Nikolaidis & Co (2003) 57 NSWLR 355; [2003] NSWCA 129; BC200303669 at [48]–[50] per Hodgson JA (although envisaging that the expense of an attendance at court that is reasonably necessary to deal with unforeseeable evidence as it arises ‘may well be allowed’ but not ‘as a matter of course’; ‘[t]here must be at least a reasonable expectation of something new arising, which would require prompt instructions’: at [49]); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v IMB Group Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] FCA 1592; BC200408250 at [16] per Kiefel J. 140. Cachia v Hanes (1991) 23 NSWLR 304 at 321 per Handley JA. 141. (1988) 47 SASR 182 at 184–5; BC8800384 (FC). 142. Willing v Hollobone (1972) 3 SASR 532 at 535 per Bray CJ (FC). See also Saldanha v McAdam [2007] WASC 297 (S); BC200803672 at [25]–[30] per Templeman J (who branded it an ‘unjust’ for a successful lay litigant to denied an indemnity for loss of wages). 143. Cachia v Hanes (1991) 23 NSWLR 304 at 308, 312. 144. See 7.37. 145. Walton v McBride (1995) 36 NSWLR 440 at 453; BC9504455 (CA). 146. Walton v McBride (1995) 36 NSWLR 440 at 453; BC9504455 (CA). See also Maronis Holdings

Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd [2001] NSWSC 854; BC200106186 at [20] per Bryson J (who described the result of Cachia v Hanes as ‘an unfortunate weakness in the state of the law’, in the context of a lay litigant who, though not legally qualified, was nonetheless a professional person who displayed considerable ability in the presentation of his or her own case). 147. (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 424; BC9404608. To the same effect see also Cachia v Hanes (1991) 23 NSWLR 304 at 313 per Kirby P (in dissent). 148. NSW RSC Pt 52 r 23(2) (repealed). Now see 16.6. 149. Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 19(1). 150. Kirby P had expressed essentially the same view in his dissent in the Court of Appeal in Cachia v Hanes (1991) 23 NSWLR 304 at 308. See also Walton v McBride (1995) 36 NSWLR 440 at 474; BC9504455 per Cole JA (in dissent) (who reasoned that whilst Cachia is definitive of the law regarding recovery of ‘costs’ as defined in statutes and rules similar to those of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 76 (now Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98) and in NSW RSC Pt 52A (now NSW UCPR r 42), it should not be extended to determine the meaning attributable to ‘costs’ where that word is used by the legislature unconstrained by the restrictions imposed by the definition in s 76 or Pt 52A). 151. Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 424–5; BC9404608. 152. Law Reform Committee of South Australia, Report Relating to the Award of Costs to a Litigant Appearing in Person, Report No 29, 1974, p 5. 153. British Columbia Law Reform Commission, Report on Civil Procedure (Part 1 — Costs of Successful Unassisted Lay Litigants), 1975, p 19. 154. Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 425; BC9404608. Kirby P dissenting in the Court of Appeal likewise endorsed this approach: Cachia v Hanes (1991) 23 NSWLR 304 at 313–14. 155. Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 425; BC9404608. See also Cachia v Hanes (1991) 23 NSWLR 304 at 314–15 per Kirby P (in dissent) (who remarked that as the scale in question was addressed to the costs of solicitors, it could not of itself determine whether costs actually incurred by a lay litigant in person were ‘necessary or proper’, the latter involving a decision to be made, where necessary on the evidence, in each case of a disputed claim). 156. ALRC 75, p 177. 157. See, for example, Skidmore v Blackmore (1995) 122 DLR (4th) 330 at 340 per Cumming JA (CA(BC)); C(LL) v C(AR) (1999) 180 DLR (4th) 361 at 369 per Marceau J (QB(Alta)). See also Sandtara Pty Ltd v Australian European Finance Corporation Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 82 at 93 per Cole J (who could see no reason why the law cannot make a proper assessment of costs properly or reasonably incurred by lay litigants). 158. Sherman v Minister of National Revenue (2003) 226 DLR (4th) 546 at [46] per Létourneau JA, who delivered the judgment of the court. See also Fong v Chan (1999) 181 DLR (4th) 614 at 623– 4 per Sharpe JA (CA(Ont)). 159. Dechant v Law Society of Alberta (2001) 203 DLR (4th) 157 at [18] per Côté JA (CA(Alta)). 160. (1999) 181 DLR (4th) 614 at 624 (CA(Ont)). 161. (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 423; BC9404608 per Toohey and Gaudron JJ. 162. Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade v Boswell (No 2) (1992) 39 FCR 288 at 292; BC9203911 (FC). See also Kerridge v Foley (SC(NSW), Street J, 19 August 1970, unreported) (who held that a party, whether represented or not, who has a real need to be present in court

throughout the hearing, is entitled to recover at least the out-of-pocket expenses, including loss of earnings, incurred as a consequence of that attendance). 163. (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 417; BC9404608 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ (remarking that the approach in Boswell ‘is merely an indirect way of recompensing a litigant for time spent in the preparation or conduct of his case which, if it is not contemplated by the relevant legislation or rules, is not permissible’). See also Morton v Official Receiver for the Bankruptcy Division of the State of Victoria (1996) 68 FCR 360 at 365 per Olney J; Kowal v Zoccoli (2002) 4 VR 399; [2002] VSCA 100; BC200203494 at [9]–[11] per Phillips JA; Lawrence v M D Nikolaidis & Co (2003) 57 NSWLR 355; [2003] NSWCA 129; BC200303669 at [37] per Hodgson JA. 164. Dechant v Law Society of Alberta (2001) 203 DLR (4th) 157 at [19] per Côté JA (CA(Alta)). 165. Dechant v Law Society of Alberta (2001) 203 DLR (4th) 157 at [21] per Côté JA (CA(Alta)). 166. (2004) 236 DLR (4th) 546 (CA(Fed)). 167. A ‘litigant in person’ for this purpose does not include a company that is unrepresented: Jonathan Alexander Ltd v Proctor [1996] 1 WLR 518 at 523 per Hirst LJ, at 525–6 per Peter Gibson LJ, at 527–8 per Buxton J. 168. UK CPR r 48.6(2). 169. [1970] 1 QB 27. 170. Namely London Scottish Benefit Society v Chorley (1884) 13 QBD 872, as to which see 7.37. 171. Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 421; BC9404608 per Toohey and Gaudron JJ. See also British Columbia Law Reform Commission, Report on Civil Procedure (Part 1 — Costs of Successful Unassisted Lay Litigants), 1975, p 11 (‘Buckland v Watts was the first case in which the point had been squarely presented [but] the English Court of Appeal … somewhat strangely concluded that it was bound by the earlier decision’). 172. (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 416–17; BC9404608 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ. 173. Referring to Kerridge v Foley (SC(NSW), Street J, 19 August 1970, unreported) and Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade v Boswell (No 2) (1992) 39 FCR 288; BC9203911, noted above at 7.35. 174. See generally P Lynch, ‘Cachia v Hanes: The Resurgence of the Indemnity Principle in Australia’ (1995) 13 Aust Bar Rev 177 at 194–200. 175. (1884) 13 QBD 872. 176. See, for example, Umphelby v Grey (1898) 24 VLR 979 (allowing a successful solicitor–trustee costs as solicitor because in so doing he had avoided the expense of employing outside solicitors); Ogier v Norton (1904) 29 VLR 536 at 538–9 per Madden CJ (FC); Guss v Veenhuizen (No 2) (1976) 136 CLR 47 at 51; BC7600103 per Gibbs ACJ, Jacobs and Aickin JJ; Hawthorn Cuppaidge & Badgery v Channell [1992] 2 Qd R 488 at 491 per Ambrose J; GBT Corporation Pty Ltd v Scott (1994) 116 FLR 266 at 268 per Higgins J (SC(ACT)); Cashman & Partners v Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health (1995) 61 FCR 301 at 312–13 per Beazley J; Brott v Almatrah [1998] 2 VR 83 at 86–7; BC9701589 per Batt J; S v A Solicitor (1998) 23 Fam LR 641 at 657; [1998] FamCA 130 (FC); Strachan Thomas v Clough [1999] SASC 298; BC9904444 at [16] per Williams J; Atlas Corporation Pty Ltd v Kalyk [2001] NSWCA 10; BC200100339 at [9]–[12] per Handley JA, with whom Meagher and Sheller JJA concurred; Khera v Jones [2006] NSWCA 85; BC200602698 at [6] per Mason P and Ipp JA; A & D Douglas Pty

Ltd v Lawyers Private Mortgages Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 690; BC200604091 at [10] per Dowsett J; Winn v Garland Hawthorn Brahe (a firm) [2007] VSC 360; BC200708066 at [4]–[9] per Kaye J; McIlraith v Ilkin [2008] NSWCA 11; BC200800782 at [16], [17] per Basten and Bell JJA; Worchild v Petersen [2008] QCA 26; BC200800774. It also enjoys support in New Zealand: Brownie Wills v Shrimpton [1998] 2 NZLR 320 at 327 per Blanchard and Gault JJ (CA). 177. London Scottish Benefit Society v Chorley (1884) 13 QBD 872 at 877. See also Buckland v Watts [1970] 1 QB 27 at 37–8 per Sir Gordon Willmer. 178. See London Scottish Benefit Society v Chorley (1884) 13 QBD 872 at 875 per Brett MR, at 877 per Fry LJ. 179. ‘Full costs’ should be interpreted as referring to costs quantified on a party and party basis (as to which see 16.14–16.17): Tobias v Allen [1956] VLR 683 at 684 per Lowe J. 180. As to these deductions see 7.38. 181. London Scottish Benefit Society v Chorley (1884) 13 QBD 872 at 877–8. 182. Atlas Corporation Pty Ltd v Kalyk [2001] NSWCA 10; BC200100339 at [9] per Handley JA, with whom Meagher and Sheller JJA concurred. 183. London Scottish Benefit Society v Chorley (1884) 13 QBD 872 at 875–6 per Brett MR; Dash v Leeper (1900) 9 QLJ (NC) 146 (costs for instructions and attendances by a solicitor–trustee on himself disallowed); Buckland v Watts [1970] 1 QB 27 at 35 per Danckwerts LJ; Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 411; BC9404608 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ; S v A Solicitor (1998) 23 Fam LR 641 at 656–7; [1998] FamCA 130 (FC); Brownie Wills v Shrimpton [1998] 2 NZLR 320 at 327 per Blanchard and Gault JJ (CA); Lawrence v M D Nikolaidis & Co (2003) 57 NSWLR 355; [2003] NSWCA 129; BC200303669 at [52] per Hodgson JA. 184. Ogier v Norton (1904) 29 VLR 536 at 538 per Madden CJ (FC). 185. Ogier v Norton (1904) 29 VLR 536 at 541 per Hodges J (FC) (‘upon reason only’ a solicitor– litigant should be in the same position as any other litigant); Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 411, 413; BC9404608 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ (who, though, describing the Chorley exception as ‘somewhat anomalous’ and ‘limited and questionable’, fell short of abandoning it); Cashman & Partners v Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health (1995) 61 FCR 301 at 313 per Beazley J; Brott v Almatrah [1998] 2 VR 83 at 86–7; BC9701589 per Batt J. 186. Lawrence v M D Nikolaidis & Co (2003) 57 NSWLR 355; [2003] NSWCA 129; BC200303669 at [58] per Hodgson JA. 187. (2004) 234 LSJS 66; [2004] SASC 161; BC200403332. 188. Hartford (Holdings) Pty Ltd v CP (Adelaide) Pty Ltd (2004) 234 LSJS 66; [2004] SASC 161; BC200403332 at [131]. 189. Hartford (Holdings) Pty Ltd v CP (Adelaide) Pty Ltd (2004) 234 LSJS 66; [2004] SASC 161; BC200403332 at [132]. In McIlraith v Ilkin [2007] NSWSC 1052; BC200708523 at [25] Brereton J took this logic one step further, questioning the basis for the Chorley exception for lawyers’ work generally on the ground that ‘[w]here a solicitor acts for himself or herself there cannot be independent and impartial advice’, which his Honour saw in principle as ‘a strong reason for holding that a solicitor litigant should not be entitled to costs of acting for him or herself’. These remarks were strictly obiter, as Brereton J held that the High Court’s decision in Guss v Veenhuizen (No 2) (1976) 136 CLR 47; BC7600103 (as to which see 7.40) precluded this course of action.

190. See, for example, Croker v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 124 FCR 286; [2002] FCA 1432; BC200206965 at [8] per Madgwick J. 191. See, for example, George v Fletcher (Trustee) (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 71; BC201004076 at [14]– [15] per the court. 192. See, for example, von Reisner v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) (2009) 262 ALR 430; [2009] FCAFC 172; BC200911025 (where the court held that ‘whether or not [the applicant] has any qualifications as a paralegal, and whether she did the clerical and paralegal work in preparing and presenting her case directly, or indirectly, through her registered business, Litigation Services, there is no basis for concluding that either circumstance provides an exception to the High Court’s ruling in Cachia’: at [13]). 193. (1995) 14 WAR 408 at 414; BC9502706. 194. Dobree v Hoffman (1996) 18 WAR 36 at 44; BC9606034. 195. Dobree v Hoffman (1996) 18 WAR 36 at 41; BC9606034. 196. Dobree v Hoffman (1996) 18 WAR 36 at 42; BC9606034. 197. Dobree v Hoffman (1996) 18 WAR 36 at 49; BC9606034. 198. Dobree v Hoffman (1996) 18 WAR 36 at 53; BC9606034. See also Fitzpatrick v Waterstreet (1995) 18 ACSR 694 at 700–1; BC9505525 per Cohen J (SC(NSW)) (who doubted whether a solicitor–litigant who is a partner in a firm that acts for him or her in circumstances where he or she would share in the profits could recover costs on a profit basis); Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) v Corrs Chambers Westgarth [2011] WASC 44; BC201100907 at [20]–[28] per Le Miere J (who, being bound by the Full Court’s decision in Dobree, followed it notwithstanding alternative views in other Australian jurisdictions). Cf Malkinson v Trim [2003] 2 All ER 356; [2002] EWCA Civ 356 at [14] per Chadwick LJ (who held that as a solicitor can charge for his or her own time, and for the time of those he or she employs, the position should be no different if some or all of the work is carried out by one or more of the solicitor’s partners). 199. (1996) 18 WAR 36; BC9606034. 200. (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 412; BC9404608 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ. 201. See 7.34–7.35. 202. See, for example, Re Collier (a bankrupt) [1996] 2 NZLR 438 at 441 per Temm J (CA); Re Inspiration Homes Ltd [1997] 3 NZLR 169; Re Bruns (HC(NZ), Giles J, 16 March 1998, unreported). Contra Lysnar v National Bank of New Zealand Ltd [1935] NZLR 557 at 562 (CA); Re G J Mannix Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 309; Jagwar Holdings Ltd v Julian (1992) 6 PRNZ 496 (each following the Cachia v Hanes approach). 203. See 7.31–7.33. 204. See, for example, Khera v Jones [2006] NSWCA 85; BC200602698 at [3]–[6] per Mason P and Ipp JA; McIlraith v Ilkin [2007] NSWSC 1052; BC200708523 at [25] per Brereton J (leave to appeal refused on the costs point: McIlraith v Ilkin [2008] NSWCA 11; BC200800782); Freehills, in the matter of New Tel Ltd (in liq) (No 4) [2008] FCA 108; BC200806704 at [9] per McKerracher J (repeating these observations in Boase v Sullivan Commercial Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 195; BC201300961 at [52]). 205. (1976) 136 CLR 47 at 51–2; BC7600103 per Gibbs ACJ, Jacobs and Aickin JJ. 206. Atlas Corporation Pty Ltd v Kalyk [2001] NSWCA 10; BC200100339 at [10]–[12] per Handley

JA, with whom Meagher and Sheller JJA concurred. 207. In Guss v Veenhuizen (No 2) (1976) 136 CLR 47; BC7600103 a solicitor whose name was not entered on the court’s register was nonetheless allowed his professional costs, but the majority made it clear that this was wholly because the absence of the solicitor’s name from the register was due to an error on the part of an officer of the court when the solicitor had attempted to enrol himself: at 52 per Gibbs ACJ, Jacobs and Aickin JJ. Cf Rambaldi v Woodward (No 2) [2013] FCA 104; BC201300615 where Jessup J refused a self-represented respondent, who was admitted as a lawyer but not entitled to represent private litigants in the Federal Court, her costs incurred in successfully resisting an application by the applicants, as there was no suggestion that the absence of the respondent’s name from the relevant register was attended by any such special circumstance as obtained in Guss v Veenhuizen: at [5]. 208. See 7.7. 209. FCR 2011 r 40.51(1) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62A r 1; see J Shulman (2007) 32 Alt LJ 75); FCCR r 21.03(1) (including on its own motion); NSW r 42.4(1) (including on its own motion) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 35A(1)). This has been recommended as a course to be available to all courts and tribunals: ALRC 75, p 129; WALRC 92, Vol 1, p 529. 210. Being the commencement date of the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Amendment Act 2012 (Vic). 211. Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 65C(2)(d). 212. WA O 66 r 1: see 6.7. 213. WA O 66 r 4B(e). 214. WA O 66 r 4B(f). 215. Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice Directions, 2009, 9.2.2, cl 15. See also Sergi v Sergi [2012] WASC 18; BC201200107 at [50]–[52] per E M Heenan J. As to costs capping in family provision matters see 7.44. 216. Sacks v Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd (1993) 45 FCR 509 at 513; BC9305065 per Beazley J; Muller v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (FCA, Moore J, 17 July 1997, unreported) BC9703101 at 5–7. 217. (2009) 170 LGERA 22; [2009] NSWLEC 165; BC200908713 at [12]. 218. See 7.44. 219. See 14.2. 220. See 14.23–14.58. 221. As to the costs principles in public interest and test case litigation generally see Ch 9. 222. See 14.3–14.22. 223. See 7.45. 224. Hanisch v Strive Pty Ltd (1997) 74 FCR 384 at 387; BC9701520 per Drummond J (who held that the fact that the case in question did not involve issues of any particular complexity, and was brought to obtain monetary compensation quite limited in amount, were powerful factors justifying the making of an order under FCR 1979 O 62A (now FCR 2011 r 40.51): at 388). 225. Re Sherborne Estate (No 2) (2005) 65 NSWLR 268; [2005] NSWSC 1003; BC200507645 at [29] per Palmer J. See also Sacks v Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd (1993) 45 FCR 509 at 511; BC9305065 per Beazley J; Corcoran v Virgin Blue Airlines Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 864;

BC200804570 at [53] per Bennett J. 226. Re Sherborne Estate (No 2) (2005) 65 NSWLR 268; [2005] NSWSC 1003; BC200507645 at [30] per Palmer J. See, for example, Dalton v Paull (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 803; BC200705720. 227. Caroona Coal Action Group Inc v Coal Miners Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 170 LGERA 22; [2009] NSWLEC 165; BC200908713 at [55] per Preston CJ. 228. The principles surrounding costs in the context of public interest litigation are discussed in detail in Ch 9. 229. Caroona Coal Action Group Inc v Coal Miners Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 170 LGERA 22; [2009] NSWLEC 165; BC200908713 at [21]–[25], [56]–[59] per Preston CJ. 230. Caroona Coal Action Group Inc v Coal Miners Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 170 LGERA 22; [2009] NSWLEC 165; BC200908713 at [30] per Preston CJ (noting that bidirectional or multidirectional capping orders may disadvantage a public interest litigant because, inter alia: first, the public interest litigant ‘may be deprived of access to lawyers and experts that might otherwise have been prepared to act on a contingency basis’; second, ‘[r]estricting the nature and extent of legal representation may also deprive the public interest litigant of the benefit of experienced and able senior counsel and give rise to an unjust disparity in the quality of legal representation between the plaintiff (who is restricted in its legal representation) and the defendants (who are unrestricted in their legal representation)’; and third, the public interest litigant who is ultimately successful in the proceedings also suffers ‘because the costs cap may prevent full recovery of legal costs, causing either the public interest litigant or their lawyers and experts to subsidise access to justice. For non-governmental organisations, lawyers and experts, who act in the public interest, such subsidisation is not sustainable’). 231. (2010) 275 ALR 520; [2010] FCA 1133; BC201007735. 232. Haraksin v Murrays Australia Ltd (2010) 275 ALR 520; [2010] FCA 1133; BC201007735 at [26]. See, for example, Corcoran v Virgin Blue Airlines Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 864; BC200804570 (where Bennett J made an order fixing maximum costs in a claim for disability discrimination against the respondent airline, in part influenced by the public interest in the subject matter of the proceedings: at [54]–[57]); Delta Electricity v Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc (2010) 176 LGERA 424; [2010] NSWCA 263; BC201007625) (upholding a decision to cap costs at $20,000 in a public interest case brought by the respondent against the appellant concerning the latter’s alleged pollution of a river; while the court accepted that appellant’s estimated costs would greatly exceed $20,000, it reasoned that a person’s capacity to bring proceedings to prevent a (threatened) breach of environmental protection laws would be seriously undermined should some protection against large costs bills not be available). Cf Caroona Coal Action Group Inc v Coal Miners Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 170 LGERA 22; [2009] NSWLEC 165; BC200908713 (where Preston CJ did not make a prospective capping order because the evidence revealed that the applicant’s claim could be pursued whether or not the cap was imposed: at [62]–[64]). 233. See 29.104. 234. See, for example, Re McIntyre [1993] 2 Qd R 383 at 388 per Thomas J (where the appeal was ‘adventurous’ at best and not based on any apparent error of fact or law by the trial judge); Coombes v Ward [2004] VSCA 51; BC200401682 (where the appeal had no prospects of success). 235. [2012] FCA 413; BC201202370. 236. See King v Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd (2012) 286 ALR 149; [2012] FCA 8; BC201200037. 237. King v Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 413; BC201202370 at [20]. 238. King v Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 413; BC201202370 at [21].

239. FCR 2011 r 40.51(2) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62A r 2); FCCR r 21.03(2); NSW UCPR r 42.4(2) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 35A(2)). See, for example, Woodlands v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 139 at 149; BC9507948 per Wilcox J. 240. The last dot point reflects the wording of the New South Wales rule. In the Federal Court the relevant dot point reads ‘not conducted the proceeding in a manner to facilitate a just resolution as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible, and another party has been caused to incur costs as a result’. In the Federal Circuit Court it reads ‘otherwise caused another party to incur costs that were not necessary for the economic and efficient progress of the proceeding or hearing of the proceeding’. 241. FCR 1979 O 62A r 4 (although no equivalent appears in the FCR 2011, this is encompassed within the Federal Court’s power to vary its interlocutory orders: see FCR 2011 r 39.05(c)); FCCR r 21.03(3); NSW UCPR r 42.4(4) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 35A(4)). See Flew v Mirvac Parking Pty Ltd [2006] FMCA 1818; BC200610908 at [41]–[59] per Barnes FM. 242. [2007] 1 All ER 91; [2006] EWHC 1242 (Ch) at [23] (footnote supplied). 243. See 28.33. 244. Nudd v Mannix [2009] NSWCA 327; BC200909764. See 7.42. 245. See 15.14–15.26. 246. See 15.15–15.18. 247. See, for example, Carroll v Cowburn [2003] NSWSC 248; BC200301482 at [36] per Young CJ in Eq (who suggested that a guideline to apply concerning costs in family provision claims was that the plaintiff’s costs be capped at an amount equal to the amount of extra provision that the court ordered be made to the plaintiff); Deves v Porter [2003] NSWSC 878; BC200305677 (where Campbell J suggested that in proceedings under the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW), a useful rule of thumb in such proceedings was that the costs awarded ought not exceed the amount recovered; but in Van Zonneveld v Seaton (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 175; BC200501291 his Honour recognised that any such rule must be applied with caution and having regard to the circumstances of the individual case); Moore v Moore [2004] NSWSC 587; BC200404111 at [43]–[47] per Young CJ in Eq (who said that ordinarily some special justification would be needed to warrant an order for more than $35,000 for costs of a successful claimant in a family provisions application). 248. Jvancich v Kennedy (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 397; BC200407396 at [6] per Giles JA. See also Re Sherborne Estate (No 2) (2005) 65 NSWLR 268; [2005] NSWSC 1003; BC200507645 at [39]– [43] per Palmer J (who added that ‘[t]here is a high risk that readily allowing an unsuccessful party to make a costs capping application under [the power to fix a gross sum costs order] will prolong the battle between the litigants at greater expense and with longer delay than if the successful party’s reasonable costs were estimated by an assessor’: at [43]). 249. Section 60 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) reads: ‘In any proceedings, the practice and procedure of the court should be implemented with the object of resolving the issues between the parties in such a way that the cost to the parties is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject matter in dispute’. 250. See, for example, Blanchfield v Johnston [2007] NSWSC 143; BC200701284 at [60]–[62] per Macready AsJ (small estate of $70,000; costs capped at $25,000); Dalton v Paull (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 803; BC200705720 at [11]–[13] per Macready AsJ (costs capped at $25,000 ‘to prevent a small estate being burdened by substantial orders for costs where the plaintiff has only achieved a very modest result’: at [13]); Zappia v Parelli [2007] NSWSC 972; BC200707409 (where Windeyer J capped costs at $100,000, remarking that ‘the parties and their solicitors seem to have

lost all sense of proportion in this matter’: at [26]); Wright v Public Trustee [2007] NSWSC 1069; BC200708190 (where McLaughlin AsJ capped the plaintiff’s costs at $50,000, which equated to the quantum of what the plaintiff was awarded out of the estate: at [12]–[14]); Abrego v Simpson [2008] NSWSC 215; BC200801583 (where Windeyer J capped costs at $50,000 for an estate valued at $619,000); Mannix v Mannix [2008] NSWSC 1228; BC200810255 (costs recoverable from estate capped at amount of order for provision made (see at [66] per McLaughlin AsJ), which order was not disturbed on appeal even though the provision allowed was increased: Nudd v Mannix [2009] NSWCA 327; BC200909764); Carragher v Crook [2009] NSWSC 191; BC200901978 (same order as in Mannix: see at [83] per Macready AsJ); Moon v Abrahams [2010] NSWSC 69; BC201000593 (where, in an estate less than $500,000 in size, Macready AsJ fixed the applicant’s costs at $60,000, equating to the legacy he ordered in her favour: at [86]); Geoghegan v Szelid [2011] NSWSC 1440; BC201111017 (where Hallen AsJ considered that the briefing of senior counsel, in an estate of a small size, was unnecessary and extravagant, and considered limiting the fees recovered out of the estate for senior counsel to an amount reasonably attributable to the rate charged by junior counsel: at [25]). 251. Practice Note SC Eq 7, 14 May 2009 (commenced 1 June 2009), cl 24. This was preceded by Practice Note SC Eq 1 (17 August 2005), cl 58 (which warned that in family provision disputes ‘[p]ractitioners in cases where the estate is under $500,000 should take particular care to minimise costs as it may be that costs of a successful claim will be capped’). 252. These provide for the court to summarily determine family provision claims for estates of $250,000 or less, and empower the court may make any order, or give any direction, that may be necessary or desirable in the circumstances: SA r 312(12)(b), 312(12)(c). The rules add that in exercising these powers and discretions, a primary object of the court will be to minimise costs of the proceedings: r 312(12)(d). The breadth of this language suggests that the court may fix or cap costs in this context. If an action should have been, but was not, dealt with under r 312(12), the court may order the plaintiff to bear any costs that might have been avoided if r 312(12) had been complied with: r 312(13). 253. [2011] NSWSC 1096; BC201107238 at [43]. 254. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M(2)(e), 37M(3), 37N(1), 37N(4); Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) ss 24, 28(2). 255. Fam LR 2004 r 1.07(c); WA O 1 r 4B(1)(e). 256. Baychek v Baychek [2010] NSWSC 987; BC201006441 at [25], [35] per Ball J. 257. See Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M(1); Fam LR 2004 r 1.04; ACT r 21; Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 56(1); Qld r 5; Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 7(1); WA O 1 r 4B(1)(a)–(d). 258. See, for example, Kossert v Ruggi (No 3) [2012] WASC 454; BC201209230 (where Kenneth Martin J made capping order pursuant to s 14(6) of the (then) Inheritance (Family and Dependants Provision) Act 1972 (WA), which empowered the court to ‘make such order as to costs of any proceeding under this Act as it deems just’). See also the remarks of E M Heenan J in Sergi v Sergi [2012] WASC 18; BC201200107 at [52] (expressing a hope for ‘a greater recognition of the powers of the court to regulate costs in these and other forms of litigation will become appreciated by the legal profession and the public so that real effect is given to the concept of “proportionality”‘). 259. See 6.14. 260. More generally, a court will not fix costs unless it has the requisite degree of confidence that doing so can do justice between the parties: see 15.17.

261. See, for example, Barescape Pty Ltd v Bacchus Holdings Pty Ltd (No 12) [2012] NSWSC 1591; BC201210768 at [38] per Black J (‘where … the volume of evidence, the length of the hearing and the time spent in submissions was significantly increased because compensation was sought to be proved by [the defendant] in a manner that was unduly complex and unduly time-consuming for the amount of the claim … it is proper to have regard to the fact that … the amount recovered by [the defendant] in the Cross-Claim fell well short of the amount initially claimed and this exacerbated the disproportion between the time and costs incurred in respect of quantification of the Cross-Claim and the amounts in issue’). As to partial costs orders generally see 8.4–8.13. 262. ‘Amount recovered’ includes any amount paid under a compromise or settlement of the claim, whether or not legal proceedings have been instituted: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 181(6); Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 343(1) (formerly Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 198I(1)). In determining that amount, no regard is to be had to any part of it that is attributable to costs or to the addition of interest: ACT s 181(6); NSW s 343(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 198I(2)). In circumstances where a plaintiff is unsuccessful in a claim for personal injury damages, there is no ‘amount recoverable’ for this purpose: Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd v Williams Refrigeration Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 65 NSWLR 717; [2006] NSWCA 100; BC200603845 at [72] per Tobias JA, at [107] per Basten JA. 263. The meaning of ‘personal injury damages’ is discussed at 7.52. 264. Only the New South Wales legislation makes provisions for the exclusion of certain claims: see Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 337(2) (formerly Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 198C(2)). The most likely explanation for these exclusions, it has been suggested, ‘is that they identified existing legislative costs regimes so as to avoid any doubt about whether those regimes would continue to have effect following the introduction of [the relevant provisions]’: Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross (2012) 293 ALR 412; [2012] HCA 56; BC201209680 at [92] per Kiefel J. 265. Namely $50,000 in the Australian Capital Territory and $100,000 in New South Wales. 266. In the Australian Capital Territory, ‘costs’ in this context do not include: (a) disbursements that are charges for services other than legal services; (b) disbursements that are counsel’s fees on a brief to appear in an action; or (c) any other disbursements: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 180. In New South Wales ‘costs’ are expressed not to include costs charged as disbursements for services provided by any other person or other disbursements: Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 338(5)(b) (formerly Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 198D(5)). 267. If more than one law practice provides legal services, the maximum costs so fixed are to be apportioned between them or (failing agreement) as ordered by the court hearing the proceedings: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 185; Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 342(1) (formerly Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 198H(1)). 268. The phrase ‘in connection with’ does not extend to cover costs of legal services supplied to a person other than against whom an injured person had in fact made a claim for personal injury damages: Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd v Williams Refrigeration Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 65 NSWLR 717; [2006] NSWCA 100; BC200603845 at [63]–[65] per Tobias JA. That the Australian Capital Territory legislation uses the phrase ‘in relation to’ in place of ‘in connection with’ is unlikely to represent a difference in substance. 269. In the case of legal services provided to a defendant, the amount sought to be recovered. 270. Any such figure can be modified by regulation: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 181(6); Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 338(2) (formerly Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 198D(2)).

271. This does not limit the court’s power to make a general order for unspecified costs on delivering judgment; the actual quantum of the costs recoverable subject to the statutory cap is, however, to be determined by agreement between the parties or via assessment/taxation: Shellharbour City Council v Johnson (No 2) (2006) 67 NSWLR 308; [2006] NSWCA 114; BC200605024 at [11]– [14] per Hunt AJA. 272. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 181(2); Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 338(4) (formerly Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 198D(4)(b), 198D(4)(c)). 273. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 338A. 274. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 180. 275. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 337(1) (formerly Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 198C(1)). 276. Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 11. 277. State of New South Wales v Williamson (2012) 293 ALR 440; [2012] HCA 57; BC201209681 at [18] per French CJ and Hayne J. See also at [44] per Kiefel J. Contra at [39] per Crennan and Bell JJ; Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross (2012) 293 ALR 412; [2012] HCA 56; BC201209680 at [73] per Crennan and Bell JJ (dissenting) (heard together with Williamson). The court in Williamson held the respondent’s claim for false imprisonment was not necessarily a claim for damages on account of the deprivation of liberty with any accompanying loss of dignity and harm to reputation, as the deprivation of liberty (loss of dignity and harm to reputation) is not an ‘impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition’ or otherwise a form of ‘injury’ within s 11 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). Accordingly, the claim for false imprisonment, at least to the extent that it sought damages for deprivation of liberty, was not a ‘claim for personal injury damages’. See at [34] per French CJ and Hayne J, at [45] per Kiefel J. 278. Newcastle City Council v McShane (No 3) (2005) 65 NSWLR 155; [2005] NSWCA 437; BC200511168 at [26] per Mason P. 279. Newcastle City Council v McShane (No 3) (2005) 65 NSWLR 155; [2005] NSWCA 437; BC200511168 at [15] per Mason P. 280. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 183; Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 341 (formerly Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 198G). See Port Stephens Council v Theodorakakis (No 2) (2006) 67 NSWLR 299; [2006] NSWCA 143; BC200604520 at [30]–[32] per Bryson JA. 281. As to assessment on the indemnity basis see 16.23–16.31. 282. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 182(1), 182(2); Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 340 (formerly Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 198F(1), 198F(2)). See Herbert v Tamworth City Council (No 4) (2004) 60 NSWLR 476; [2004] NSWSC 394; BC200402656 at [19]–[22] per Sperling J; Shellharbour City Council v Johnson (No 2) (2006) 67 NSWLR 308; [2006] NSWCA 114; BC200605024 at [8] per Hunt AJA. 283. Penrith City Council v Parks (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 381; BC200407208; Shellharbour City Council v Johnson (No 2) (2006) 67 NSWLR 308; [2006] NSWCA 114; BC200605024 at [36], [37] per Hunt AJA. 284. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 184. 285. This requirement is prescribed by Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) s 39. A similar schema is prescribed by the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) s 55F (which applies where a court awards $50,000 or less in damages in a proceeding based on a motor vehicle accident

claim). 286. Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) s 56(1). 287. Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) s 56(2). 288. Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) s 56(3). 289. Amos v Brisbane City Council [2006] 1 Qd R 300; [2005] QCA 433; BC200510069 at [17]–[20] per Muir J (remarking that ‘[t]he fact that Parliament has chosen to prescribe the way in which costs must be disposed of in proceedings in which there are awards of damages for $50,000 or less hardly gives rise to the implication that the courts’ longstanding statutorily conferred powers to award costs is otherwise removed’: at [20]). 290. Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT) s 20(1)–20(4). 291. Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT) s 20(4). The relevant amount is to be prescribed by regulation, but as the relevant statutory provisions have not commenced at the time of writing, no regulation was in force. 292. Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT) s 18. 293. Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT) s 20(7); Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) s 56(6).

[page 195]

CHAPTER 8

Ouster of General Rule that Costs Follow the Event 8.2 8.2 8.4

Costs of Issues ‘Issue’ and ‘event’ — relationship to indemnity rule General principle: ‘costs follow the event’ Not receiving costs on an issue as opposed to paying costs on that issue Court’s wariness to make a precise apportionment Differential approach to plaintiff as opposed to defendant Statute and court rules Set-off of costs Party entitled to costs liable also to pay costs Set-off of costs against moneys in judgment

8.5 8.7 8.9 8.10 8.14 8.14 8.17

Disallowance of Costs in Certain Cases General law Court rules High Court and Federal Court Australian Capital Territory South Australia Tasmania Victoria

8.18 8.18 8.19 8.20 8.21 8.22 8.23 8.24

Successful Party Bearing Own Costs

8.25

Circumstances that do not justify depriving a successful party of costs Where the conduct in issue lacks a requisite connection with the litigation That the unsuccessful party is impecunious The parties’ relative financial positions That the unsuccessful party is a voluntary or charitable association That the unsuccessful party is unrepresented That the unsuccessful party is a member of a disadvantaged class of persons That the unsuccessful party came close to succeeding That the unsuccessful party acted reasonably Circumstances that may justify depriving a successful party of costs Award of nominal damages Successful party obtains relief no better than already offered in settlement of the dispute Party successful but on no merits of his or her own Conduct of successful defendant led plaintiff to sue Conduct occasioning unnecessary litigation, expense or delay

8.26 8.27 8.29 8.32 8.33 8.34 8.35 8.36 8.37 8.38 8.39 8.42 8.43 8.44 8.47

[page 196] Refusal to mediate or negotiate Success dependent upon involvement in fraud Misconduct by successful party Unjustified or false allegations Failure to act as a ‘model litigant’

8.51 8.55 8.57 8.58 8.60

Costs Orders Against Successful Parties Jurisdiction Exercise of discretion Differential approach as between plaintiff and defendant? Relevant factors Illustration — contempt proceedings

8.62 8.62 8.63 8.64 8.65 8.67

Ouster of General Rule by Statute Family court costs orders Generally Effect of s 117(2A) Dishonesty or lack of candour Fraudulent or unwarranted claims or allegations Level of success or failure Financial circumstances of the parties Counterpoint — approach to costs in de facto/domestic relationships cases New South Wales Land and Environment Court costs orders Background to the current rule No costs unless it is, in the circumstances of the particular case, fair and reasonable Relevant factors to the assessment of what is ‘fair and reasonable’ Illustration of costs discretion — cases involving the compulsory acquisition of property New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal costs orders Costs orders in tribunals generally Former requirement of ‘special circumstances’ in New South Wales Current provision grounded in ‘fairness’ in New South

8.69 8.70 8.70 8.71 8.75 8.76 8.77 8.78 8.79 8.81 8.81 8.82 8.84 8.85 8.89 8.89 8.90

Wales

8.91

Ouster of General Costs Rule by Agreement

8.95

8.1 As discussed in Chapter 7,1 the court’s discretion to order costs is, in civil matters, ordinarily exercised in favour of the successful party pursuant to the rule that ‘costs follow the event’. However, as the discretion in question is unfettered, and must be exercised judicially according to what justice demands in a given case,2 there are circumstances in which the party ultimately successful may be deprived of some or all of his or her costs,3 or even be ordered to pay costs to the unsuccessful party,4 whether generally or regarding certain steps in the action. [page 197] The general costs rule may also be ousted by statute5 or by agreement.6 As a course of litigation may not wholly favour one party or another, costs orders do not in all cases go the one way; there is scope for the apportionment of costs according to the merits of individual causes of action or issues.7 The foregoing is the subject of the present chapter. Other circumstances where a court may be inclined to oust the usual costs rule form separate chapters. In some types of litigation, courts have displayed greater willingness to deprive a successful litigant of costs (such as public interest and test case litigation)8 and less willingness to order costs against an unsuccessful litigant (chiefly cases where a suit is reasonably instituted over disputed moneys held in a fund).9 The making of a settlement offer, which is rejected but proves to have been favourable, can cause the court to oust the usual costs rule, at least from a set date, and can impact on the quantification of costs recoverable.10 Finally, proceedings that are brought in too high a court may also lead a court to reduce costs otherwise recoverable.11

Costs of Issues

‘Issue’ and ‘event’ — relationship to indemnity rule 8.2 The phrase ‘costs follow the event’, whether pursuant to court rules or expressive of the general law ‘rule’ as to the award of costs in civil litigation, means that the party who on the whole succeeds in the action receives the general costs of the action.12 It may also potentially dictate that, where the action involves separate issues, whether arising under different causes of action or one cause of action, the costs of an issue are awarded to the party who succeeds on it. An issue, in this sense, need not go to the entire cause of action, but ‘includes any issue which has a direct and definite event in defeating the claim to judgment in whole or in part’.13 So when referring to ‘costs follow the event’, the ‘event’ need not be limited to the final result of the proceedings, but may include the fate of the individual issues litigated in the course of the proceedings.14 Stated another way, the word ‘event’ is to be approached ‘distributively’,15 ‘with the consequence that it refers to the event of an issue or of each separate issue, if there is more than one, in the action’.16 8.3 In this context, the term ‘issue’ is not to be construed as a precise issue in the technical pleading sense, but as any disputed question of fact or law.17 To this end, an ‘issue’ has been defined as ‘that which, if decided in favour of the plaintiff, will in itself give a right to relief, or would, but for some other consideration, in itself give a right to relief; and if decided in favour of the defendant will in itself be a defence’.18 This should not, however, be treated as assimilating an ‘issue’ to a ‘cause of action’, for a cause of action may involve more than one issue. ‘To constitute separate issues’, explained Lord Finlay LC, ‘it is not necessary that there [page 198] should be separate causes of action’.19 This is appropriate not merely as a matter of terminology, but because the court is loathe to adopt a construction of its powers that could infringe its ability to frame costs orders to meet the justice of each particular case.20

General principle: ‘costs follow the event’ 8.4 Consistent with the foregoing, authority supports the proposition that, pursuant to the ‘rule’ that ‘costs follow the event’, ‘prima facie the costs of the proceedings should follow the verdicts on the issues’.21 Costs may therefore be awarded in the same manner as if separate actions had been brought in respect of each cause of action or issue.22 So a party may be entitled to the costs of an issue on which he or she has succeeded, even though the general costs of the cause may follow the judgment.23 Indeed, it has been judicially remarked that ‘[t]he days when a plaintiff could, with impunity, mount an attack on several fronts, some with little prospect of victory, in the hope of a direct hit and the recovery of all costs must be put behind us’.24 Where a court rules that the party ultimately successful has not succeeded on all the issues, and considers that this should be reflected in the costs order, it may frame the costs order in one of three ways: it may make an order according to success or failure on the particular issues; it may make a percentage order, entitling the successful litigant to a percentage of his or her costs; or it may, where the proceedings involve claim and counterclaim that both succeed (or both fail), make an order that the claimant receive the costs of the action except those costs relating to the counterclaim. The first two, as the most common form of costs order in this context, are discussed in more detail below. As to the third, if a claim and cross-claim raise distinct issues and a plaintiff succeeds in the claim and the defendant on the cross-claim, ordinarily separate judgments on the claim and the cross-claim ensue, with the plaintiff having the costs of the claim and the defendant having the costs of the cross-claim, although a special (combined) order may be made if the issues are interlocked.25 [page 199]

Not receiving costs on an issue as opposed to paying costs on that issue 8.5 In giving effect to the relative success of each party on the various issues between them, a court may opt to tally the ‘wins and losses’ on issues, and

make an award of costs both for and against each party to this end. This may be a realistic option if a party has simply failed or succeeded on one or more severable issues.26 As explained by Middleton J in BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v National Competition Council (No 2):27 It seems appropriate when considering separate and distinct issues or inquiries, where there is no element of unreasonableness or inappropriate behaviour on behalf of the successful litigant, to consider appropriate case management principles, the relative merits or strengths of the lost issue or inquiry, whether the length of the proceedings had been greatly increased by the lost issue or inquiry on which the successful party failed, and whether the issue or inquiry on which the successful party failed otherwise was of sufficient significance in proportion to the whole case to warrant a special order to deprive that party of the costs of that issue.

Yet outside of the discrete or several issue scenario, such an approach has an air of potential artificiality28 — which explains at least in part why many judges have expressed reticence to do so29 — and is unlikely to be conducive to simplicity in framing a costs order. Moreover, as explained by the Western Australian Court of Appeal:30 To embark as a general practice upon an analysis of which party was successful on each issue, or necessarily to deprive a successful party of some portion of its costs if it has lost on a particular issue, would be likely to add further uncertainty and complexity to the outcome of litigation, derogate from the prospect of settlement, and oblige the court to hear lengthy and frequent arguments in relation to costs as an additional burden on its resources and the costs of the parties … Litigation is time-consuming, expensive and burdensome enough already. In addition, while parties should be encouraged to consider carefully what matters they put in issue, justice may not be served if by too ready a resort to deciding questions of costs according to success on particular issues, parties are dissuaded by the risks of costs from canvassing all issues which might be material to the decision in the case …

[page 200] The more usual approach, described as ‘a pragmatic approach’,31 is to order a proportion of costs in favour of one of the parties32 (or, if the court finds the issues are evenly balanced, make no order as to costs). Although imprecise, an intelligently made apportionment of costs may generate an outcome no less fair than an issue-by-issue approach.33 Yet judicial reticence to pursue an issue-by-issue costs allocation cannot be a cloak for injustice; as fairness underscores costs orders, if an issue-by-issue approach will produce a result that is fairer than an alternative, it will be applied.34 8.6 This does not, however, address whether a party who has failed on an

issue should, in accordance with the general costs rule, be ordered to pay the costs of his or her opponent on that issue, or merely be deprived of his or her own costs in respect of it (thus leaving the opponent to bear his or her own costs on that issue). Again the matter is governed by the court’s discretion, its exercise directed to ensuring, as much as possible, that the outcome accords with the justice of the case. Yet, at least where the party who proves ultimately successful neither improperly nor unreasonably raised the issues nor made the allegations on which he or she has failed, he or she will not, as a general rule, be ordered to pay any part of the unsuccessful party’s costs.35 Similarly, as a general principle and starting point, ‘an applicant who relies on different legal rules in pursuit of a single outcome, and who achieves that outcome, should not have his or her entitlement to costs qualified by reference to the rules under which his or her case was not successful’.36 At the same time, Jacobs J’s disinclination, in 1975, to encourage ‘any suggestion that a party against whom the judgment goes ought nevertheless to anticipate a favourable exercise of the judicial discretion as to costs in respect of issues upon which he may have succeeded, based merely on his success in those particular issues’37 has been judicially declared on more than one occasion to carry less weight in today’s environment of congested lists and demands for greater court efficiency.38 An ultimately successful party is more likely to be ordered to pay costs on issues on which he or she has failed if those issues (or allegations pertaining to them) were improperly or unreasonably raised, or if the successful party’s conduct of the litigation unnecessarily otherwise [page 201] increased an opponent’s costs.39 As to the latter, it is open to a court to order costs pertaining to an issue against an ultimately successful party if that party has failed in respect of that issue and the court is satisfied that in pursuing it that party has increased the duration of the trial at an opponent’s expense. In Mok v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (No 2),40 for example, Keely J found that how the ultimately successful applicant presented the case increased the length of the hearing by two days, and in respect of that period fairness required that the applicant pay the respondents’

costs. This his Honour effected by awarding the applicant 90 per cent of her costs, the 10 per cent reduction intended to both deprive her of part of her costs and to give the respondents in substance the same result as if they had been awarded the costs of two days. The same may be the case where it is the defendant or respondent who, though ultimately successful, fails in a defence that should not have been raised, and has in so doing caused the trial duration and cost to blow out.41

Court’s wariness to make a precise apportionment 8.7 In approaching apportionment of costs, a court must strike a balance between not discouraging litigants from canvassing all material issues and not rewarding them for unreasonable conduct in the pursuit of issues.42 Consistent with this balancing act, there is no fixed rule, only discretion; the court in each case seeks to achieve the outcome most consonant with the justice of each case.43 In particular, courts have warned of the difficulty of revisiting each issue and tallying ‘wins and losses’,44 a concern being that a just and equitable decision on [page 202] the question of costs is not ‘reached simply as a matter of arithmetic’.45 Judges have remarked, to this end, that ‘[t]he judgment as to apportionment is in the end an evaluative one’,46 and the exercise of discretion is one ‘based largely on impression’.47 There is the further concern that to embark on detailed inquiries as to success or failure on issues would likely add further uncertainty and complexity to the outcome of litigation, derogating from the prospect of settlement and obliging the court to hear lengthy and frequent arguments as to costs, as an additional burden on its resources and the costs of the parties.48 Thus it has been branded ‘unwise to be too technical about what is an “event” or “issue” in this context’, and that ‘one does not look at issues as if they were pleaders’ issues, but approaches the matter with a broad brush’.49 In Sanders v Snell (No 2)50 Kirby J went so far as to opine that ‘unless there are good and exceptional reasons in the particular case to do so’, a court will

not ordinarily ‘specify that costs will only be payable in respect of particular issues’. This was because ‘[t]he marginal expense of calculating the costs of arguing particular issues, themes, ideas, facts, cases or arguments will ordinarily be outweighed by the inutility of doing so’.51 This is especially so where there is considerable overlap between the issues that have been the subject of conflicting outcomes.52 8.8 An issue-by-issue approach may also fail to account for the varying time taken up by each issue or give weight to the monetary value of each contention.53 In Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd,54 for example, Heerey J considered it ‘a little simplistic’ to say that because the applicants succeeded on one of the nine allegations of negligence they should get only one-ninth of their costs, as this did not take into account that the applicant had succeeded on the main allegation, and had spent little extra time on the allegations that failed. The challenges are heightened in a case involving several distinct claims, each based on alternative grounds, and multiple issues, some going to all the claims and others to one or some only of them, and the court finds mixed success. More challenging again is where the litigation involves multiple parties. Identifying the ‘event’ in proceedings of this kind is by no means easy, and so the award [page 203] of costs is better approached by way of a ‘rough’ or ‘impressionistic’ apportionment than by an attempt to identify and quantify issues.55

Differential approach to plaintiff as opposed to defendant 8.9 It has been judicially remarked that ‘[i]f a plaintiff makes unnecessary and unfounded claims, they can well be segregated and he may be penalised in costs; but a greater latitude is given to a defendant’.56 The reason is that a defendant has little choice, short of settlement, but to defend the plaintiff’s claim, and so a defendant who proves substantially successful in defending the suit should not be penalised in costs on issues upon which he or she failed to the same extent as the plaintiff, who elected to sue. This consideration should not be seen as an arbitrary rule fettering the costs discretion; it simply

recognises that ‘the position and behaviour of the person brought to court unwillingly may need to be judged in that light’.57 Yet in Byrns v Davie58 Gobbo J denied a practice of treating successful defendants as in a ‘wholly different position’ to plaintiffs in deciding on an award of costs in cases where a party has only been partly successful. Although ostensibly at odds with the foregoing, his Honour should not be understood as propounding any different an approach. The words ‘wholly different position’ highlight what Gobbo J had in mind; he sought to dispel the view that the approach where successful plaintiffs fail on certain issues (a proportionate costs award) should differ entirely to that where successful defendants fail on certain issues (no costs sanction).59 That this is what his Honour had in mind appears from his subsequent statement that the law did not support the argument that no apportionment according to the issues can be made against an ultimately successful defendant, even though he or she fails on particular issues in the proceedings.60 Gobbo J did not dispute that a court may be slightly more generous to a partly successful defendant than to a similar positioned plaintiff. This is evident from the order he made in the proceedings. He found that 70 per cent of the hearing time was taken up with matters in respect of which the plaintiffs succeeded, but held that substantial justice would be done by an order that the defendants recover 40 per cent of their taxed costs.61 [page 204]

Statute and court rules 8.10 As from 1 January 2010,62 the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) was amended to make explicit that, without limiting its discretion in relation to costs, the court may ‘make different awards of costs in relation to different parts of the proceeding’63 or ‘order the parties to bear costs in specified proportions’.64 Although this reflects an existing power in the court, which it had used on multiple occasions, it alerts both litigants and the court to issues-based and proportional costs orders, and ostensibly encourages courts to give consideration to making costs orders of this kind if the justice of the case so requires.65

Directed to the same objective is a provision in the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic), which commenced on 1 January 2011, whereunder the court, as part of its case management powers, may make any order it considers appropriate with respect to costs, ‘including the proportions in which the parties are to bear any costs’.66 The Act was amended, as from 24 December 2012,67 to add that, in making a costs order it considers appropriate to further the overarching purpose of the Act,68 the court may, inter alia, ‘make different awards of costs in relation to different parts of a proceeding or up to or from a specified stage of the proceeding’ or ‘order that parties bear costs as specified proportions of costs’.69 8.11 The court rules in some jurisdictions make specific provision for the costs of issues, although only the rules in Western Australia attempt to replicate the general law to any degree. The relevant rules read as follows:70 Where a party though generally successful in an action has, by the introduction of some issue or issues on which he has failed, increased the costs the Court may order such party to pay the costs of such issue or issues. In the absence of any special order … where the statement of claim contains more than one cause of action and the plaintiff succeeds on one or more causes of action and the defendant succeeds on another or others, costs shall be allowed to the plaintiff on the cause or causes of action on which he succeeds and to the defendant on that or those on which he succeeds, in the same manner as if separate actions had been brought.

As the latter rule is prefaced by the words ‘in the absence of any special order’, it creates no more than a prima facie rule.71 In Permanent Building Society v Wheeler (No 2)72 Anderson J interpreted the rule to mean that ‘once it is seen that separate causes of action are involved, and that the plaintiff has succeeded on only one or some, the defendant is prima facie entitled to his costs on the other or others’. Yet his Honour added that, consistent with the general law and the nature of the court’s costs discretion, it will not make such an order as of course but will look at the realities of the case and attempt to do substantial justice. Anderson J illustrated the point by the following example:73 [I]t may be said that, although it is strictly correct to say that different causes of action are involved, there may have been only one contest in substance. This will often be so when all causes of action arise out of the one course of dealings, the one transaction or the same facts. Where that is the

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situation there will usually be one order for the general costs of the action, moulded as necessary to ensure that, however rough and ready it may be, substantial justice is done … However, even in such cases it may be shown that the successful party has in some relevant way misconducted himself or that the issues or causes of action on which the successful party has failed were unreasonably raised by that party. This would bring into operation different principles.

What this reveals is that a court will not interpret the words of a court rule so strictly as to impinge upon its discretion. It is thus open to the court to decline to make costs orders according to success or failure on respective causes of action if required by the justice of the case. The Western Australian rules, at most, seem to oust the need for special circumstances, which surfaces in some of the cases,74 to assess costs according to issues, adopting in its place the converse prima facie rule. This approach aligns with that adopted in respect of the previous corresponding Queensland rule, which provided that ‘[w]hen several issues, whether of fact or law are raised upon a claim … the costs of the several issues respectively, both in law and fact, shall, unless otherwise ordered, follow the event’.75 It also accords with New Zealand authority dealing with the equivalent (now superseded) rule in that jurisdiction.76 8.12 The previous Queensland rule represented an attempt to statutorily express the applicable general law, and so, consistent with the general law, the word ‘event’ was approached ‘distributively’,77 referring to ‘the event of an issue or of each separate issue, if there is more than one, in the action’.78 Its interplay with the general costs discretion evidenced ‘a predilection in favour of distributing costs according to the outcome or “event” of particular issues in the action’.79 This is illustrated by the Full Queensland Supreme Court’s decision in Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 5),80 a case involving three discrete areas of dispute. The plaintiff wholly succeeded on the third, wholly failed on the second, and was largely unsuccessful on the first. The court considered that the first and second matters represented the ‘real core’ of the litigation,81 leading it to conclude, largely as a matter of ‘impression’,82 as follows:83 A more realistic reflection of the outcome of the litigation would be to require each party to pay the costs of the other to the extent of the latter’s success in the action. Approached in this way, we think it a fair assessment of the relative victories of each party to say that the plaintiff succeeded as to one-third of his claims for defamation, whereas the defendant was successful in establishing a defence to the remaining two-thirds. The net result of such an approach would be to oblige the plaintiff to pay one-third of the costs to the defendant … Approximate though this may be, it seems to us preferable to the alternative of apportioning costs according to the

success of either party in relation to particular issues, which would produce a process of taxation that seems to be almost universally deplored.

Yet the current Queensland rules do, in common with their counterparts in the territories and Victoria, provide that the court may make an order for costs in relation to a particular question in, or a particular part of, a proceeding,84 which seems to encompass the costs of issues (although in Queensland this must be seen against the backdrop of the costs follow [page 206] the event ‘general rule’ found in the rules).85 The Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and Victorian rules add that, for this purpose, the court may declare what percentage of the costs of the proceeding is attributable to the question or part of the proceeding to which the order relates.86 8.13 In any case, any gap in the court rules to comprehensively deal with the award of costs according to success on issues is filled by the general law, in its interpretation of the costs discretion, discussed earlier in this chapter.87 The current Queensland rules, for instance, make no such specific provision, but this has been held not to oust the court’s jurisdiction to order costs on the basis of the outcome of separate issues.88 Its omission from the current rules merely suggests ‘a reflection of the general caution which has been accorded to that approach to costs’.89 Similarly, the Federal Court has heralded no need to await a change in the rules to adopt an issue-by-issue approach where it will produce a fairer result than the traditional approach.90

Set-off of costs Party entitled to costs liable also to pay costs 8.14 The general rule as to set-off is that all costs in the same matter or proceeding and between the same parties can be set off against each other.91 The court rules in most jurisdictions reflect this general rule. The Tasmanian rules state that where, under the rules or by court order or direction, a party entitled to receive costs is liable to pay costs to another party, the taxing officer may tax the costs that party is liable to pay, and adjust the costs by

way of deduction or set-off, delay the allowance of the costs the party is entitled to receive until payment or tender of costs he or she is liable to pay, or certify the costs to be paid and direct their payment.92 The rules in the territories, Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia provide that where a party entitled to be paid costs is also liable to pay costs, once these costs have been taxed93 the taxing master94 may (in Western Australia, subject to any curial direction):95 [page 207] set off the amount allowed against the amount the party is entitled to be paid and, by order, state the amount of the balance and the parties by and to whom the balance is payable; or decline to make an order as to the costs the party is entitled to be paid until the party has paid or (except in the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland) tendered the amount he or she is liable to pay. The South Australian rules simply provide that the court may order that costs be set off against a countervailing liability’.96 8.15 At one time the general rule did not extend to costs in different proceedings even though their subject matter was the same; costs could be set off only between parties in the same action and in their character as parties to that action.97 Yet the court rules recognise no such limitation. Even at general law the courts queried this limitation. In the leading case espousing the modern view, Reid v Cupper,98 the English Court of Appeal assumed a discretion to allow a set-off and as to its terms. That proceedings are distinct and independent of each other is, therefore, no bar to a set-off;99 the matter remains within the court’s discretion. Accordingly, it is impacted by factors relevant to the exercise of a judicial discretion,100 which are directed to making an order if it is just to do so.101 As the discretion is a broad one, the court is entitled to have regard to factors including the public interest, the efficient administration of justice, and the conduct of the parties.102 Delay, for instance, may make it unjust to allow set-off.103 A common reason for ordering set-off is that, due to insolvency or impecuniosity, an unfair result will prevail unless the order is made.104 There is also considerable case law

dealing with the relationship between the set-off of costs and the solicitor’s particular lien.105 8.16 It now appears clear that the jurisdiction to allow set-off in this context does not rest on the Statutes of Set-Off, or any general jurisdiction sourced from equity,106 but on the court’s [page 208] inherent power in relation to costs as part of the control it exercises over its own proceedings.107 That the discretion is sometimes expressed as one exercised according to what is equitable does not mean that the jurisdiction in question stems from equity.

Set-off of costs against moneys in judgment 8.17 The court not only has the discretion to set off costs against costs, but also, in a proper case, to set off debt or damages against costs.108 At least as far back as 1879, in Pringle v Gloag, Jessel MR stated:109 If A is ordered to pay costs to B, and B is ordered to pay costs to A, the rule is that the Taxing Master may allow a set-off of the one set of costs against the other. But here A is ordered to pay a sum of money to B, and B is ordered to pay costs to A, the result being that, on balancing the payments one against the other, there is a balance payable from B to A. But A absconds and cannot pay what he is ordered to pay to B, and B says, ‘Let there be a set-off of the one payment against the other and I will pay the balance which then remains due from the balance which then remains due from me’. I should have thought set-off in such a case was a matter of common sense — a matter of course.

This inherent jurisdiction is replicated by court rules in South Australia and Western Australia.110 The case law reveals that, so far as set-off is concerned, the distinction between costs and damages is by the way. This rests on an understanding of the idea of ‘judgment’. A judgment is ordinarily made up of the verdict of damages and costs, and, unless specified by the court, costs remain indeterminate until the taxing officer’s or costs assessor’s certificate, when the amount of judgment, damages and costs becomes a certain sum. So ‘[t]he set-off is better regarded as a set-off between judgments’.111 As in the case of set-off between costs, the question whether set-off should be allowed

can be determined upon application to the court, which is free to make an order ‘as will best do justice to the parties’.112 For example, in D Galambos & Son Pty Ltd v McIntyre113 the defendants did not dispute the quantum of the plaintiff’s claim for the balance due under a building contract, but counterclaimed an amount exceeding the balance as damages for breach of contract. Woodward [page 209] J gave judgment for costs to the defendants for the excess of the damages on the counterclaim over the plaintiff’s claim.114 In Sommerville v Brennan,115 where the plaintiff obtained a verdict for £25 on the count of false imprisonment, and the defendant obtained a verdict on the count of slander, the defendant’s costs were taxed at £37. The defendant was held entitled to set off the amount due to him for costs against the amount due to the plaintiff on the verdict.

Disallowance of Costs in Certain Cases General law 8.18 The court’s general costs discretion116 dictates that, where in accordance with its proper exercise, a court deems that costs should be disallowed to a litigant, even if he or she is ultimately successful, it may make an order to this effect. What costs should be disallowed depend on the circumstances of each particular case. For instance, courts have disallowed costs incurred: in seeking to use an affidavit that is inadmissible or otherwise not in conformity with the rules;117 that might fairly have been rendered unnecessary by a little forethought;118 as a result of an unnecessary application;119 where a less expensive course of effecting the same outcome was readily available;120

due to separate proceedings being instituted where, in the circumstances, expense could have been saved by commencing a single set of proceedings;121 and unnecessarily by reason an act or omission of a party.122

Court rules 8.19 Court rules in several jurisdictions, noted below, make provision for the disallowance of costs to a party in defined circumstances. These neither fetter the scope of the costs discretion, nor are they exhaustive of the circumstances in which the discretion to disallow costs can be exercised.123 They are indicative of what the rule drafters considered as appropriate circumstances in which this discretion may or should be exercised.

High Court and Federal Court 8.20 The High Court Rules empower the court to direct that any costs that have been improperly, unreasonably or negligently incurred be disallowed, or direct a taxing officer to examine the costs incurred and disallow costs he or she finds to have been improperly, unreasonably or negligently incurred.124 The court may also direct a party whose costs are so [page 210] disallowed to pay to the other parties the costs incurred by those parties in relation to the proceeding in respect of which those costs have been disallowed.125 Whereas the former Federal Court Rules were phrased in essentially identical terms,126 the current rules, against statutory provision empowering the court to ‘award costs in favour of or against a party whether or not the party is successful in the proceeding’,127 state that a party may apply to the court for an order:128 that any costs that have been improperly, unreasonably or negligently

incurred be disallowed; or directing an inquiry whether any costs have been improperly, unreasonably or negligently incurred and providing for the costs of such inquiry.

Australian Capital Territory 8.21 The Australian Capital Territory rules state that the court may direct the costs of anything done in a proceeding be disallowed completely or partly if it considers that it was improper, vexatious or unreasonable, done because of misconduct or negligence, or that its doing caused unnecessary expense.129 Similar provision is made in respect of documents prepared or used in the proceeding, but in place of unnecessary expense reference is made to a document that is unnecessarily lengthy or substantially departs from the approved form.130 Alternatively, the court may direct the registrar to look into the same and disallow all or part of the costs as he or she finds to exhibit these characteristics.131

South Australia 8.22 The South Australian rules state that the general rule that costs follow the event132 is subject both to specific rules to the contrary and to eight listed exceptions.133 As the relevant statute conferring upon the court a general discretion as to costs is expressed, inter alia, to be ‘[s]ubject to … the rules of court’,134 it could be reasoned that the rules are intended to exhaustively state the circumstances where the court has jurisdiction to oust the usual costs rule. This, however, has not been the prevailing interpretation. Instead courts have held that because the relevant rule is expressed to ‘apply subject to the Court’s order to the contrary’, this reflects the unfettered discretion of a judge to fashion a costs order as he or she sees fit in the interests of justice.135 Such an interpretation is informed by a view that, as the legislative object was to confer on courts an unfettered discretion as to costs, a construction of the rules of court that practically negated the statutory provision ought ‘not lightly to be adopted’.136 [page 211]

Tasmania 8.23 Under the Tasmanian rules, if in any proceeding a party (A) improperly or unnecessarily does any act or makes any omission, the court may direct that A not be allowed costs in respect of that act or omission, and that any costs incurred by another party (B) as a result be paid by A.137 For this purpose the court must take into account:138 the omission to do anything the doing of which would have been calculated to save costs; the doing of anything calculated to cause, or in a manner or at a time calculated to cause, unnecessary costs; and any unnecessary delay in the proceeding. The rules also empower the court to order A to pay costs unnecessarily incurred by B, although A is otherwise entitled to the costs of the proceeding.139 A further provision denies costs to a party of attendance before a judge on an application for a consent order unless the judge has required the attendance or for other special reason allows the costs.140

Victoria 8.24 Pursuant to the Victorian rules, the court (or the Costs Court on a taxation) may by order disallow the costs of any work that is not necessary141 or is done without due care.142 A party whose costs for work is so disallowed must, unless the court (or the Costs Court) otherwise orders, pay costs for any work by another party occasioned by the work for which the costs were disallowed.143

Successful Party Bearing Own Costs 8.25 The breadth of the courts’ ‘unfettered’ discretion to award costs dictates that the courts may, in a case outside the ordinary, deprive a successful party of its costs, or even order a successful party to pay the costs of its opponent.144 The strength of the ‘costs follow the event’ ‘rule’ is highlighted by case authority that a judge who proceeds as if there were an open

discretion on costs unhindered by the rule ‘would almost certainly be regarded as erring in law’,145 and acting arbitrarily rather than judicially.146 It is emphasised by judicial remarks branding a departure from the rule as ‘extremely rare’147 and as an ‘exceptional measure’,148 justified only by ‘special circumstances’,149 ‘substantial grounds’,150 ‘some definite principle’151 or for ‘good reason’.152 English courts, in large part due to the wording of the (then) English rules, frequently expressed the need for ‘good cause’ to deprive a successful party of costs. Yet whether expressed in terms of ‘good cause’, ‘good reason’, ‘substantial grounds’, ‘special circumstances’ or other equivalent terminology, the inquiry should not be viewed as fettering the general costs [page 212] discretion, especially as Australian rules have not historically used terminology of this kind.153 These phrases, rather, should be viewed as a judicial expression of the notion that a costs order that does not follow the event does not represent the usual exercise of the costs discretion, and so there must be something out of the ordinary in the circumstances of the case to justify such an order. In line with the proper exercise of the judicial discretion, the relevant test has been stated in terms of ‘whether or not it would be more fair as between the parties that some exception should be made to the general rule’.154 There is accordingly no justification for a restrictive interpretation of the phrase ‘good cause’ or its equivalent.155

Circumstances that do not justify depriving a successful party of costs 8.26 Merely because the circumstances in which a successful party may be denied costs are not, by virtue of the nature of the judicial costs discretion, amenable to being catalogued exhaustively does mean that all aspects pertaining to the parties and their litigation necessarily carry weight or are otherwise relevant to the exercise of the costs discretion. Those that may be are discussed later in this chapter. Below are mentioned various aspects that

are not, generally speaking, relevant to the question of whether the usual costs rule should be ousted. These should not be seen as exhaustive,156 but at the same time it may prove optimistic to be too categorical to discount their relevance in every case.

Where the conduct in issue lacks a requisite connection with the litigation 8.27 Conduct that relates to subject matter wholly unconnected with the action is not relevant to the exercise of the costs discretion.157 Nor are circumstances surrounding the proceedings that do not emerge from the court record or from the evidence in the trial.158 As explained by a New South Wales judge:159 [page 213] The principled approach to dealing with costs requires the Court to focus upon and only upon, the conduct of the actual proceedings which have taken place. Conduct anterior to the commencement of the proceedings may be remediable if that conduct exposes a cause of action, in which event success on that cause of action is in general, the mode and the only mode, by which the innocent party receives redress from the Court.

So if a trial judge deprives a successful party of costs on a ground unconnected with the litigation, an appellate court will interfere.160 In F King & Co v Gillard & Co161 the defendant successfully defended a suit for passing off, but the trial judge nonetheless deprived him of costs by reference to misleading and untrue statements in the advertisements that were calculated to deceive the public, although these had no bearing on the question of passing off. The English Court of Appeal upheld the defendant’s appeal on the costs issue, Vaughan Williams LJ stating that even if the statements were untrue ‘it would not have been right to deprive successful defendants of their costs by reason of such a wrong to the public, unless that wrong has been in some way connected with the wrong done to the plaintiffs as individual litigants’.162 His Lordship added that, to deprive the defendant of costs, he must have done some wrongful act in the course of that litigation, not to the public generally. Romer LJ expressed similar thoughts:163 Is the fact that there was upon the defendants’ goods a statement as to a purely collateral matter

which might be taken to be inaccurate qua the public at large, but which in no way concerned the plaintiffs or the rights in respect of which they are suing, a ground upon which a judge, in the exercise of his judicial discretion, can deprive the defendants of their costs, it being a matter no way affecting the subject of the action or the plaintiffs’ rights? In my opinion it is not.

8.28 A person’s conduct in earlier proceedings may lack sufficient connection with later proceedings to have a legitimate impact on the costs order in the later proceedings. The point is illustrated by B v J.164 A lawyer had represented a client in property proceedings, in which the trial judge found the lawyer to have acted in concert with the client in misleading the court. The client’s subsequent application to set aside a costs agreement with the lawyer was dismissed, but the trial judge awarded the lawyer only part of his costs of this proceeding because of the finding against the lawyer in the property proceedings. The Full Family Court was unconvinced of any sufficient nexus between the finding in the property proceedings and the costs of the later proceedings. Their Honours concluded that ‘the [lawyer’s] involvement in the conspiracy during the period in which he acted for the client in her property settlement proceedings was too remote from the substantive issues in the proceedings to set aside the costs agreement to be relevant to the issue of the costs of those proceedings’.165 The lawyer was therefore awarded his costs of the proceeding to set aside the costs agreement, albeit reduced by 20 per cent due to his conduct in the course of that proceeding.

That the unsuccessful party is impecunious 8.29 Merely because a party against whom costs are to be ordered lacks the financial resources to pay those costs (say, due to bankruptcy),166 or would otherwise find it financially onerous to [page 214] do so, is not by itself a ground for the court not to make the order.167 In fact, it has been judicially remarked that ‘[t]he notion that a litigant should be accorded special consideration in relation to costs on the grounds of poverty or financial disadvantage has nothing to commend it’.168 There are at least four reasons for this. First, a litigant’s financial ability to

satisfy a costs order, and any stress to which he or she may be subjected as a result of such an order, is not usually a matter connected with the conduct of the proceedings. It is, accordingly, irrelevant to the proper exercise of the costs discretion.169 Second, a successful party has a reasonable expectation of recovering its proper costs, as the losing party has precipitated (the continuation of) the action in which the successful party has incurred costs.170 The losing party’s financial position is irrelevant to this expectation,171 even though the victor’s ability to recover those costs may prove illusory.172 Third, building on the second reason, were impecuniosity to preclude a costs order, ‘a litigant without funds could conduct proceedings in such a way that other parties to the proceedings unnecessarily incur costs’.173 This in turn explains why merely because the victor may be indemnified from other sources for costs it cannot recover from the loser is not a good reason to depart from the usual order.174 Fourth, it would require the court to determine the difficult question as to the level of impecuniosity or wealth of a party that would justify it having regard to that factor in the exercise of the costs discretion.175 8.30 The foregoing does not mean that the law is entirely oblivious to the challenges faces impoverished litigants. There are avenues whereby impecuniosity can be at least partly accommodated. For instance, a court that orders costs against an impecunious party may allow time to pay the costs,176 or payment via instalments,177 although this should not be assumed to be the usual order. In proceedings that may expose an impecunious party to a fine, the court [page 215] may take into account the costs liability in setting the quantum of the fine.178 There is also recognition in the case law that ‘exceptional circumstances’ may make a particular party’s financial position relevant to the exercise of the costs discretion,179 although this is ordinarily tied to other factors potentially relevant to the exercise of that discretion, such as the public interest nature of the litigation.180 8.31 There is likely to be greater scope to take into account an unsuccessful party’s poor financial position in the event of multiple parties. For example,

in litigation where one defendant is successful whereas another is not, a choice is often presented between an order directing the unsuccessful defendant pay the successful defendant’s costs (a Sanderson order) and orders that the plaintiff pay the costs of the successful defendant but that the unsuccessful defendant indemnify the plaintiff as to those costs (a Bullock order).181 Should the unsuccessful defendant be insolvent, a Sanderson order would frustrate the successful defendant’s prospects of recovering any costs. Accordingly, the insolvency of an unsuccessful defendant may justify an order in the Bullock form.182

The parties’ relative financial positions 8.32 Consistent with an unsuccessful party’s impecuniosity being largely irrelevant to the exercise of the costs discretion,183 simply because a successful party is financially well resourced relative to the losing party is no ground for it to bear its own costs.184 The parties’ relative financial positions are therefore irrelevant to an inquiry into whether the usual costs rule should be displaced.185 So, for instance, that the respondent is represented on a speculative basis,186 or even pro bono, makes no difference by itself to the appropriate costs order.187 Nor are [page 216] financial comparisons of this kind relevant to the discretion to order that costs be quantified on an indemnity basis.188 The position is, however, modified in family law proceedings. In determining whether or not to make a costs order, the Family Court is statutorily directed to take into account ‘the financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings’.189 In the family law environment, there may, accordingly, be grounds to refuse a costs order where the party in question cannot meet it.190

That the unsuccessful party is a voluntary or charitable association

8.33 For essentially the same reasons that deny relevance to the financial position of an unsuccessful party in exercising the costs discretion,191 the identity of that party as a charitable or voluntary association is not by itself a ground to oust the usual rule as to costs.192 Voluntary associations established to pursue litigation in the public interest, though, may receive a more welcoming costs treatment if the court is convinced that the public interest motivation, inter alia justifies a (partial) immunity from an adverse costs order.193

That the unsuccessful party is unrepresented 8.34 That an unsuccessful party is unrepresented in the proceeding is irrelevant to the exercise of the costs discretion. Certainly an unrepresented person receives no immunity from an adverse costs order because he or she is unrepresented,194 a point with especial force where a party refuses available legal representation.195 This must be seen against the backdrop that litigants in person frequently cause costs incurred by the opposing party to be increased. On various occasions, this has inclined the court to order costs against an unrepresented person to be quantified on an indemnity basis.196 The costs outcome may be otherwise if other factors, including the nature of the action, the availability of legal advice and any public interest the action has served, serve to trump the compensatory aim of a costs order. This occurred in Xiros v Fortis Life Assurance Ltd,197 where the plaintiff proved unsuccessful in a disability discrimination action against an insurance company. That the plaintiff was unrepresented and thus unable to properly assess the strength or weakness of his case, coupled with the fact that the proceedings generated a decision of [page 217] precedent value on a section of an Act with implications for a considerable number of insurance policies, led Driver FM to make no order as to costs.198 The public interest in the judgment generated by the litigation should, on principle, be understood as the chief justification for ousting the usual costs rule in this case.

That the unsuccessful party is a member of a disadvantaged class of persons 8.35 Nor do members of a disadvantaged class within the community receive favourable treatment in the exercise of the costs discretion, at least not on the basis of that disadvantage alone. Again, and for the reasons noted above in relation to impecunious litigants,199 there is no basis in principle for ousting the usual costs rule in this context.200 To meaningfully recognise or accommodate social or other disadvantage in the exercise of the court’s costs discretion would be tantamount to conferring upon those so disadvantaged an immunity from adverse costs orders. This would be inconsistent with the purpose of costs orders, which are aimed chiefly at indemnifying a party whose position has been vindicated.201 Disadvantage is properly ameliorated by specific statutory decree, whether by reference to the costs discretion or more generally. Again, however, it may not be possible to be categorical. Circumstances may arise where social disadvantage in an unsuccessful party, when coupled with other factors, may incline the court against a costs order. For example, in Aldridge v Victims Compensation Fund Corporation (No 2)202 the issue concerned whether an impoverished Indigenous woman, who had likely been the victim of significant domestic violence, should pay the costs of a tribunal established with public moneys for the purpose of compensating victims of crime. Rothman J ruled that the combination of factors — impecuniosity, aboriginality, likelihood of having (on subsequent information) the qualifying factors for compensation from the tribunal, the public nature of the tribunal, and the futility of the orders — were sufficient to overcome the general rule.203

That the unsuccessful party came close to succeeding 8.36 How close an unsuccessful party came to succeeding is not, as a general rule, relevant to the costs order that is appropriate in the circumstances. It follows that merely because an unsuccessful party almost succeeded in the proceedings is not a reason to reduce or deny costs to the party who proved successful.204 To envisage otherwise is to threaten the principal compensatory function of costs orders.205 There is, however, for costs purposes some potential relevance as to the strength of the ultimately

unsuccessful party’s case. There is, for instance, scope for a proportionate costs order if that party has nonetheless succeeded on some issue or part of the proceeding,206 or has otherwise been caused to incur additional costs as a result of the exaggerated nature of an opponent’s claim.207 Also, the usual costs order may be ousted and/or quantified on an indemnity basis where the ‘unsuccessful’ party has made a settlement [page 218] offer that proves to be more favourable to the ‘successful’ party than the ultimate outcome of the litigation.208

That the unsuccessful party acted reasonably 8.37 That a losing party has behaved reasonably, in bringing the litigation and during its course, does not for this reason alone justify depriving the successful party of an order for costs.209 In considering whether a departure from the usual order is appropriate, the focus is ordinarily on the conduct of the successful party.210 Nor is it appropriate to make no order as to costs simply because both sides are innocent of wrongdoing.211

Circumstances that may justify depriving a successful party of costs 8.38 Below are discussed various grounds, most focusing on the conduct of the successful party, that may potentially justify a successful litigant being deprived, wholly or partly, of an award of costs in his or her favour. The discussion is not intended to be exhaustive. It seeks to convey a flavour of circumstances that might justify an ouster of the usual costs rule. Yet, consistent with the judicial nature of the costs discretion, the courts have emphasised that the presence or absence of the factors discussed below, though potentially (very) persuasive, cannot be seen as decisive in every case.

Award of nominal damages

8.39 As costs usually follow the event, and the event equates to ‘success’ in the suit,212 in determining how to exercise the costs discretion, the courts must first decide whether a party has in fact been successful. It was once said that the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff are ‘a mere peg on which to hang costs’.213 In other words, for costs purposes, a plaintiff awarded nominal damages is treated as having succeeded. In more recent times, however, courts have doubted whether a plaintiff who recovered only nominal damages should, for the purposes of exercising the costs discretion, be regarded as successful.214 In fact, the modern view seems to be the converse of the historical one, such that ‘the event will be regarded as going against a party who recovers nominal damages only’.215 [page 219] The matter ultimately rests on the facts of each case. The award of nominal damages will not necessarily deny success for costs purpose if some other right is vindicated by the judgment. For instance, if the aim of the suit is to establish a legal right, wholly irrespective of whether any substantial remedy is obtained, a plaintiff who recovers nominal damages may, to that extent, properly be regarded as a successful plaintiff.216 But in other circumstances, especially if the aim of the suit is to secure a substantial award of damages, an award of nominal damages may be seen as a failure by the plaintiff to establish the claim.217 For example, in Walsh v Kerr218 the plaintiffs established that the defendants’ misrepresentation induced them to enter into a contract to purchase a hotel but did not establish any legally recognisable loss. Tipping J entered judgment for the plaintiffs for the $10, but let costs lie where they fell on the basis that the plaintiffs in substance had failed. If a court considers a plaintiff has in substance lost the case, it may even be appropriate to require him or her to pay the defendant’s costs.219 8.40 As the issue of whether the usual costs rule ought to be displaced is one of law, no view or opinion expressed by a jury can govern the decision.220 However, an award of nominal damages by a jury may incline a judge to treat it as indicative of the jury’s opinion that the claim ought not have been brought,221 sufficient to justify depriving the plaintiff of costs. The converse

may be the appropriate judicial inference where a jury has awarded substantial damages. A common scenario in which the interplay between a jury award of damages and the exercise of a court’s costs discretion has arisen involves defamation claims.222 A leading case is Connolly v ‘Sunday Times’ Publishing Co Ltd,223 where the defence of truth was pleaded. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff of one shilling, and the High Court unanimously ruled that the facts justified the plaintiff being deprived of costs.224 O’Connor J best expressed the legal position:225 If [the trial judge] allowed the law to take its course without interference the whole of those costs would have to be paid by the defendants to the person who, after causing all this expensive litigation, had only succeeded in establishing that, in respect of this crushing indictment of his

[page 220] racing conduct grossly libellous if untrue, he was entitled to no more than one shilling damages. If there was ever a case in which a Judge ought to exercise his discretion under the Rule to prevent injustice being done, it was in a case such as this … [I]t would be unjust to leave the ordinary rule of costs to operate, and thus to allow the plaintiff, to whom a jury had given a verdict for contemptuous damages for a most serious libel on his character, to obtain the whole of the costs from the defendants.

Connolly should not be read as propounding an inflexible rule that jury awards of nominal damages in defamation cases can never carry costs; the smallness of damages is not per se conclusive.226 In British Dominion Films Ltd v Dent,227 for example, Irvine CJ held that a plaintiff ought not be deprived of costs merely on the ground of nominal damages ‘unless there is conveyed by that verdict some definite implication that there was no good cause for bringing the action’. It nonetheless remains uncertain the extent to which it can be concluded that an award of nominal damages carries that implication, as cases on either side of the line exhibit few distinguishing factors.228 Perhaps a preferable approach, aligned with the modern costs approach to judicial awards of nominal damages,229 is to adopt a rebuttable prima facie rule that jury awards of nominal damages do not attract costs. Although the court cannot inquire of the jury the reasons for its award, it may legitimately surmise that they related to the strength or weakness of the plaintiff’s case or his or her conduct in instituting or pursuing the litigation.230

It follows that the quantum of damages awarded by a jury, though it may not be conclusive as to grounds to displace the usual costs rule, properly forms an element for consideration.231 Perhaps the most difficult case in this context is where the jury awards damages that, though not nominal, are significantly less than may be expected in the circumstances. The judge may, by reason of his or her exposure to the litigation, be able to glean what influenced the jury, which may in turn be reflected in the costs order. Difficulties of this kind are largely obviated where the judge is charged with assessing the damages; he or she may, consistent with the general costs provision in defamation legislation in most jurisdictions,232 take into account the nature and result of the litigation, coupled with the conduct of the successful party, in exercising the costs discretion. The position is clearer in South Australia, where the court rules state that unless the court orders to the contrary, in an action founded on a claim for defamation, general costs of action are not to be awarded in favour of the successful plaintiff unless the damages exceed $25,000.233 8.41 The notion that an award of nominal damages is no longer a peg upon which to hang costs aligns with modern case management trends. The Western Australian Court of Appeal has observed, to this end, that ‘[i]t would be contrary to modern notions of the efficient and cost-effective use of judicial resources to enable a party to recover its costs for a pyrrhic [page 221] victory, having substantively failed in the action’.234 The increasingly pervasive concept of proportionality in costs,235 moreover, has seen judges reduce the costs that a ‘successful’ party may recover to reflect the proportion, as compared to the amount claimed, it secured in damages upon adjudication, also taking into account the disproportion between the damages award and the costs incurred in pursuing the claim.236 There is New South Wales case authority to the same effect in the defamation context, even against the backdrop of dedicated costs provisions in defamation legislation.237

Successful party obtains relief no better than already offered in settlement of the dispute 8.42 A court may properly depart from the usual order as to costs if the successful party obtains relief no more substantial than already offered by the unsuccessful party to settle the dispute. In Jenkins v Hope,238 for example, involving the alleged infringement of a patent, the defendant, upon being served with the writ, offered to undertake not to infringe, to give the other relief claimed by the writ, and to pay the plaintiff’s costs. The plaintiff nonetheless sued, but the court refused an injunction in view of the defendant’s undertaking. North J awarded the plaintiff costs down to the date of the defendant’s offer, and the defendant costs subsequent to the offer.239 Considerable case law, pursuant to court rules and under the court’s general costs discretion, has developed governing settlement offers and the related issue of the manner in which such costs should be quantified. In view of the complexity, both rule wise and case wise, of this topic, it is addressed in a separate chapter.240

Party successful but on no merits of his or her own 8.43 Where a litigant succeeds in a case not on any merits of his or her own but, say, on a technicality, it is open to the court to make no costs order in his or her favour.241 In Voyce v Lawrie242 the defendant succeeded by pleading a technical statutory defence, its agent having led the plaintiff to suppose that the plaintiff did not need to take any action in the matter. F B Adams J denied the defendant costs on the grounds, inter alia, that ‘the defence was statutory and one that might be thought unmeritorious’.243 Conversely, the fact that an [page 222] unsuccessful party has nearly but not quite made out his or her case, or acted reasonably in the proceedings, is no ground by itself to deny the successful party costs.244

Conduct of successful defendant led plaintiff to sue 8.44 A court may refuse costs to a successful defendant who has, by inducing the plaintiff to believe that he or she had a good cause of action against the defendant, or by some other act or omission, led the plaintiff to bring the action, where aside from the defendant’s inducing conduct, the action would in all likelihood not have been brought.245 The leading case is Ritter v Godfrey.246 It involved an action for medical negligence, where the trial judge, though finding in favour of the defendant, refused the defendant costs principally because of the levity and insulting terms in which the defendant had corresponded with the plaintiff. The English Court of Appeal upheld the defendant’s appeal on the issue of costs, the most extensive treatment of the relevant law being found in the judgment of Eve J:247 [I]n determining whether a good ground exists for the exercise of the judicial discretion, the judge must eliminate from consideration the conduct constituting the alleged cause of action, and must then inquire whether the defendant has so conducted himself ante litem motum (1) as to induce in the plaintiff’s mind the reasonable belief that there is no valid defence to the claim, or (2) has so misconducted himself as to have goaded the plaintiff into a litigation on which he would never have embarked but for such misconduct. A persistent refusal on the part of an agent or trustee to answer inquiries,248 to give reasonable explanations, to impart information, or to render adequate accounts might well amount to conduct sufficient to induce a reasonable belief that a claim to recover moneys from him was maintainable, and provocative conduct or event truculent language might readily be shown to have compelled proceedings by a plaintiff who otherwise would never have gone to the extreme limit of instituting an action. In such circumstances there would exist ground for the exercise of the discretion, but in my opinion there must be something more than a repudiation, and even a forcible repudiation, of liability, something more than a display of bad taste, or even bad temper, some actual misconduct on the defendant’s part before a foundation is laid for the exercise of the discretion. The judge, however much he may disapprove of the defendant’s behaviour, is not entitled to refuse him his costs unless he has materials upon which he is prepared to hold judicially that the defendant has thereby created a mistaken belief in the plaintiff’s mind or that his misconduct was the real cause of the action being brought.

[page 223] Atkin LJ countenanced that a bitter letter or verbal taunt may, in some circumstances, be seen as bringing about litigation, but did not consider that ‘a plaintiff so provoked to bring unfounded litigation is entitled to have his feelings salvaged by escaping costs’.249 On the facts, the court found nothing in the correspondence calculated to create in the plaintiff’s mind a reasonable belief that an action would succeed. The correspondence contained an

emphatic repudiation of liability for negligence, and a full and honest attempt to convince the plaintiff that there was no foundation for his aspersions. Rather than fostering the litigation, a competent appreciation by the plaintiff of the terms of the correspondence ought to have prevented it.250 As a consequence, it could not be said that the defendant had brought the litigation upon himself. 8.45 If an ultimately successful defendant makes a misstatement, which in turn renders an action against him or her reasonable, this may justify the defendant being partly or wholly denied costs.251 For example, in Murray v Kingston City Council252 a notice issued by the defendant council contained misleading information as to the valuation appeal process, which prompted the plaintiff to commence and continue proceeding in question. This inclined the Victorian Court of Appeal to order each side to pay its own costs of the hearing, even though the plaintiff proved unsuccessful at trial.253 Murray highlights that a successful party may be deprived of costs even though its conduct was inadvertent and lacked any intention to deceive or obstruct. It also highlights that a court will not be so yielding on appeal. With the benefit of the trial judge’s detailed decision, it was more difficult, according to their Honours, for the plaintiff to contend that his lack of success on appeal was primarily a product of the failings of the council’s notice. Costs of the appeal therefore followed the event, albeit reduced in proportion to the extent that the council had failed on certain issues.254 The extent to which the plaintiff reasonably relied upon the defendant’s misstatement in this context is relevant. For instance, where a court finds no proof that the applicant was misled by anything said by the opponent, costs will likely follow the event.255 Even partial reliance on an opponent’s misstatement may not by itself avoid an adverse costs order. As the matter is one of fact and degree, it may impact upon the quantum of the costs order. In Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3)256 Fisher J found the misstatement in issue not so significant to warrant depriving the successful defendant entirely of its costs because the plaintiff did not rely exclusively on the statement to justify the proceedings. However, the misstatement did, inter alia, impact upon the proportion of the defendant’s costs allowed.257 8.46 As it is good practice for a party, before commencing proceedings, to invite its opponent to consent to what is sought without costs being incurred,

there is case authority that if proceedings are taken without such a warning, and it is demonstrated that the opponent would [page 224] have consented, the party taking proceedings may be deprived of costs.258 This principle has been judicially described as ‘axiomatic’, ‘important and current’.259

Conduct occasioning unnecessary litigation, expense or delay 8.47 A court may deny costs to a successful party, whether wholly or partly, who has ‘done something connected with the institution or the conduct of the suit calculated to occasion unnecessary litigation and expense’,260 or has otherwise placed upon the unsuccessful party an unjustified costs burden.261 If, say, a party’s success in proceedings stems from a late amendment of its case,262 or if a successful party delayed raising a decisive point until the last minute263 or failed to bring an obvious mistake to its opponent’s attention,264 the costs incurred by the opponent are likely to have been increased (and indeed wasted) by those omissions. Cases of this kind are thus candidates to deprive the successful party of at least some of its costs. If a considerable part of a trial is devoted to determining issues on which a defendant fails, it is proper to reduce the costs allowed to that defendant.265 In Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3),266 although the plaintiff was substantially successful, court time was wasted due to its attitude to the defendants and its ‘bull terrier approach’ to litigation. Given the ‘issues’ in which the plaintiff had been unsuccessful, and that the net result was much less than sought, Young J ordered that the defendants pay only 50 per cent of the plaintiff’s costs.267 This highlights that departing from the usual costs rule may be appropriate where the successful party has propounded a substantially exaggerated claim and succeeds only to a limited extent, and that exaggeration has resulted in the incurring of additional costs.268 8.48 A similar approach may ensue where an ultimately successful litigant has taken unnecessary technical points or otherwise inappropriately

prolonged the proceedings. It has been judicially remarked, to this end, that ‘[a]s the consequential burden of costs to all parties is increasing exponentially, it behoves trial judges to be conscious of the principle that a losing [page 225] litigant ought not to be required to bear that portion of the successful party’s costs which is attributable to conduct of the successful party which has unduly protracted the length of the trial’.269 In Capolingua v Phylum Pty Ltd270 the way the defendants had pleaded their case, their conduct at a mediation conference and their counsel’s failure to comply with the usual orders before the case commenced, caused the issues to be obscured, unnecessary evidence to be led and loss of the opportunity to dispose of the case expeditiously. A trial that should have lasted two days thus lasted four. This dictated that until the opening of the defendants’ case on the afternoon of the second day, and arguably until the defence was amended on the fourth day, the plaintiffs were entitled to believe that they would likely succeed. The defendants proved ultimately successful, although the plaintiff was successful on certain issues that occupied the court for between one and two days of the trial. Ipp J held that justice required there should be no order as to costs.271 Consistent with the foregoing, ‘[a] successful defendant may … be deprived of some or all of his costs if the grounds of defence upon which he succeeds are raised late’.272 For example, in Harrington v Greenwood Grove Estate Pty Ltd (No 2)273 the defendant’s success in defending the plaintiffs’ application for injunctive relief stemmed from amendments made in late stages of proceedings. The plaintiffs incurred substantial costs in earlier stages of the proceedings, and argued that they should not be required to pay the applicant’s costs because they would have succeeded had the amendments not been made. Slattery J accepted the plaintiffs’ contention, making no order as to costs, for reasons including the absence of any compelling explanation for the defendant’s delay, and that the plaintiffs may well have taken a different view had the amendment been made earlier.274 8.49 Under this heading also come cases where the ultimately successful party has hindered court processes in the litigation by filing deficient

documents or otherwise committing some procedural irregularity. In Doval v Anka Builders Pty Ltd275 Clarke JA, with whom Handley JA concurred, held that even though the appeal succeeded, the appellant should be denied the costs of preparing and filing written submissions as well as part of the costs of preparing the appeal book. His Honour found it would be ‘quite wrong’ to order the respondent to pay for the preparation and filing of the written submissions as these neither provided an outline of the arguments nor reflected serious thought about the issues confronting the court in the appeal. He also allowed the appellant recovery of only one-third of the costs of the preparation of the appeal book because two-thirds of it had nothing to do with the appeal. The South Australian court rules state that if a party commits a procedural irregularity,276 the court may limit the party’s right to costs or order the party to pay costs resulting from the irregularity.277 The New South Wales rules state that if a party fails to comply with a requirement of the rules, the court may order the party to pay such of the other parties’ costs as [page 226] are occasioned by the failure.278 And it has been judicially observed that ‘the failure by a party to comply with the court’s directions results in an adverse costs result for the other party then it is appropriate for the disadvantaged party to be compensated by a cost order’.279 8.50 More generally, if lawyers do not make economic use of court time, the courts will take steps to require them to do so.280 The court’s jurisdiction to order costs against lawyers personally is useful to this end,281 as is its discretion to deny costs to a party guilty of excessive delay.282 Where it is a plaintiff who delays the prosecution of a suit, the defendant may apply to have the matter dismissed for want of prosecution. However, if the detriment caused to the defendant by the plaintiff’s want of prosecution can be rectified by a less drastic order, such as an order for costs,283 the court will not ordinarily make an order for dismissal.284

Refusal to mediate or negotiate

8.51 With the push to negotiated settlements of disputes, and the public policy discouraging the full litigation of disputes through the courts, alternative dispute resolution has assumed considerable importance. It is common, therefore, for disputants to pursue, say, mediation, as a vehicle designed to settle the dispute before it escalates into full-blown court proceedings, or at least to sharpen the areas of remaining dispute. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that courts encourage alternative dispute resolution techniques as part of their case management function.285 Nor is it surprising, therefore, that unreasonable refusals to mediate a dispute, whether or not pursuant to a court direction, may generate costs consequences. The main judicial airing of the issue from a costs perspective has, to date, been the English Court of Appeal’s judgment in Halsey v Milton Keynes NHS Trust.286 Dicta in Australian courts align with Halsey,287 and more broadly with Australian judges’ willingness to utilise costs sanctions to encourage settlement of disputes.288 They also sit well with accelerating Australian [page 227] civil procedure reforms directed to facilitating the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.289 In Halsey Dyson LJ stated that to oust the usual costs rule, the unsuccessful party must show that the successful party acted unreasonably in refusing to agree to mediation, in which case the court may make a costs order reflective of that refusal.290 This is informed by inquiry into whether or not that party had reasonable belief that he or she had a strong case; otherwise the fear of cost sanctions may be used to extract unmerited settlements.291 But if the case is evenly balanced, a party’s belief that he or she would win carries little or no weight in considering whether a refusal was reasonable.292 Also relevant to, albeit not conclusive of, this inquiry is whether the mediation had a reasonable prospect of success,293 and whether the refusal to mediate was contrary to a recommendation (or direction) of the court.294 A useful case illustration, and one that highlights circumstances where it was not unreasonable for the party ultimately successful to refuse to

participate in mediation, is found in ADS Aerospace Ltd v EMS Global Tracking Ltd.295 Akenhead J ruled that the unsuccessful plaintiff, which sought a substantial reduction in the defendant’s costs entitlement (of at least 50 per cent) to reflect the latter’s unwillingness to enter into mediation to seek to resolve the issues between the parties, had not discharged the onus of proving that the defendant had, in these circumstances, acted unreasonably. His Lordship was influenced in so ruling by considerations that included the following.296 First, the plaintiff had shown no willingness to engage even in a without prejudice discussion until shortly before trial, notwithstanding multiple attempts by the defendant to this end. Second, the plaintiff’s strong belief of it being entitled to substantial compensation was clear from its offer to settle, which revealed that it was not interested in a nuisance payment. Third, there was also the lateness of the mediation suggestion, less than 20 working days before the trial, coming from the plaintiff, when doubtless great efforts were being made to prepare for the trial. Fourth, the defendant’s belief that it had a very strong case both on liability, causation and quantum was not unreasonable. Accordingly, Akenhead J ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs without any reduction. ADS Aerospace highlights, moreover, that although the conduct of the party who has refused to [page 228] mediate is, in line with Halsey, a core inquiry, the conduct of the opposing (unsuccessful) party in the circumstances may be equally probative. 8.52 Consistent with the foregoing, it stands to reason that a party who agrees to mediation but then acts so as to cause the mediation to fail (say, by maintaining an unreasonable position) should be in the same position costswise as a party who refuses to mediate.297 Behaviour of this kind may therefore be relevant to what costs order is appropriate in the circumstances. As may, exceptionally, that a successful party unreasonably delayed in consenting to the mediation, so that the optimum time for success in the mediation has passed.298 8.53 There is Queensland authority, albeit to date in the limited context of litigation arising out of de facto relationship breakdowns, suggesting that even a refusal to negotiate may impact the exercise of the costs discretion.299

More generally, an English appellate judge has remarked that ‘[n]egotiation is supposed to be a two-way street, and a claimant who makes no attempt to negotiate can expect, and should expect, the courts to take that into account when making the appropriate order as to costs’.300 After all, if a failure to mediate a dispute, whether via formal or informal dispute resolution measures, is capable of (partly) ousting the usual costs rule, there is sense in the view that unreasonably refusing to negotiate a dispute could produce a similar outcome. Such an approach encourages litigants to settle rather than litigate their dispute to the end, and aligns to that applied in the context of settlement (‘Calderbank’) offers aimed at negotiating a pre-judgment resolution of the dispute.301 As with a failure to mediate, the behaviour of the party who refuses to negotiate, or obstructs the negotiation process, should be viewed against the strength of that party’s case and, informed by the closeness or divergence between each party’s position, the prospects of negotiation succeeding in settlement. Compared to a failure to mediate, though, the latter may prove challenging to ascertain with any confidence, which may make it difficult for a court to exercise its costs discretion, outside of the usual rule, judicially. As explained by a Federal Court judge:302 To decline to negotiate in relation to an informal offer when it might have been reasonable to have done so might also have adverse costs consequences to the successful party. The discretion in s 43 [of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)] is not confined. It is, however, likely to be a rare case that such a consequence might arise. It will obviously be very difficult for a court to know whether negotiations which ought reasonably to have been undertaken would have come to fruition, and if so whether the outcome would have been more or less favourable than the judicial determination. Moreover, that might require a further hearing, perhaps even a protracted hearing, to resolve such issues.

[page 229] 8.54 The principles discussed above have been given some statutory impetus at federal level. Under the Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth), in provisions that commenced on 1 August 2011, in exercising its discretion to award costs in a civil proceeding, the Federal Court and the Federal Circuit Court may take account of whether a person who was required to file a genuine steps statement filed such a statement,303 and ‘whether such a person took genuine steps to resolve the dispute’.304 Equivalent provision is made

vis-à-vis costs against lawyers who fail to advise their client of the requirement to file a genuine steps statement, or do not assist the client to comply with the requirement.305

Success dependent upon involvement in fraud 8.55 There are case examples where costs have not been awarded to a defendant who has been successful on a discreditable defence or on one founded upon illegality. For instance, in Jones v Merionethshire Permanent Benefit Building Society306 the plaintiffs gave promissory notes to the defendant in return for the defendant stifling a criminal prosecution for embezzlement of the defendant’s funds. In response to the defendant’s suit to enforce promissory notes against the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs sought to set aside the notes on the ground that they were given for an illegal consideration. Although the plaintiffs succeeded both at first instance and on appeal, they were denied their costs. Lindley LJ, with whom the other members of the English Court of Appeal agreed, reasoned as follows in reaching this conclusion:307 We are very much struck with the character of the defence [to the action to enforce the notes] and the circumstances under which it was raised. It is an extremely discreditable defence, to which we are compelled to give effect upon grounds of public policy. Upon these grounds, therefore, the appeal is dismissed without costs.

8.56 As the courts eschew any involvement in condoning conduct clearly in contravention of tax laws, they will not make a costs order that could be perceived as rewarding a litigant that has engaged in tax avoidance or evasion. In Igaki Australia Pty Ltd v Coastmine Pty Ltd,308 for example, the applicants claimed that the respondents had by their misrepresentation induced them to acquire shares in a company. The respondents succeeded because the court found that the representations in question were that the company’s business would be carried on such that the applicants would receive large sums of money that would not be disclosed for tax purposes. However, as to award costs to the respondents would be seen as condoning a breach of taxation laws, Drummond J declined to make such an order. Another illustration to this end is Zelino v Budai.309 The plaintiffs, who were former clients of the defendant tax adviser, implemented the adviser’s scheme knowing that the figures were concocted with a view to reducing tax liability. They sued the defendant because another tax adviser later showed

them that they could have avoided paying any tax on the dealings. The action proved unsuccessful, but Palmer J considered it contrary to public policy to award the defendant the costs of an issue upon which he had succeeded by demonstrating his involvement [page 230] with the plaintiffs in a flagrant and deliberate contravention of tax laws.310 However, as the defendant successfully defended two of the three claims against him on grounds that did not depend upon his illegal conduct, Palmer J held that there was no reason why he should be deprived of costs on those issues.311 The defendant was therefore deprived of one-third of his costs against the plaintiffs.

Misconduct by successful party 8.57 A successful litigant who has been guilty of misconduct or a wrongful act relating to the litigation or the circumstances leading up to it may be deprived of costs.312 The latter can cover a defendant falsely inducing a plaintiff to believe that the action has merit.313 Misconduct or wrongful conduct in this context should not be viewed in restrictive terms; it may extend to conduct that is morally (albeit not legally) wrong. In Monier Ltd v Metalwork Tiling Company of Australia Ltd (No 2)314 the plaintiff established the defendant’s infringement of its design, but the court upheld the defendant’s counterclaim that the design was invalid, thus dismissing the plaintiff’s claim. Jacobs J branded the defendant’s conduct in copying the plaintiff’s design as so blatant as almost to invite litigation, and did not believe that the court should close its eyes to the defendant’s conduct, ‘viewed in terms of commercial morality’, in exercising its costs discretion.315 The defendant had introduced the issue of validity as an afterthought and in contradiction of assurances given in interlocutory proceedings, and had not made full disclosure when pursuing that issue. His Honour ordered the plaintiff to pay one-third of the defendant’s costs incurred after the adjournment prompted by the defendant raising the issue of validity on the date of the trial.

Unjustified or false allegations 8.58 An allegation of fraud is serious; even if not proven, it may be recounted in the community and through the media, and thus may potentially greatly harm a litigant’s reputation before any evidence has been offered and submitted to the scrutiny of cross-examination or rebuttal. Allegations of this kind should thus not be made lightly.316 From a costs perspective, this is reflected in the ‘rule’ that a party alleging but failing to prove fraud is deprived of costs even if successful in the action generally.317 This statement is arguably too broad, as a court is more likely (unless the allegation goes to the crux of the case) to deprive an ultimately successful party unable to substantiate the fraud of the costs pertaining to that issue rather than those of the entire action.318 The proper exercise of the costs discretion rests on ‘the character [page 231] of the allegations and the circumstances of each case’.319 In Boyne v NonMarine Underwriters at Lloyd’s,320 for example, Tucker J declined to fully apply the ‘rule’ in a case where the claim of fraud was abandoned early in the trial, ruling that the unsuccessful plaintiff should recover costs up to the moment the fraud claim was abandoned. 8.59 The same should apply more generally to the making of what prove to be false allegations. With effect on 1 July 2006, statutory effect was given to this in family court proceedings. The statutory response, rather than an exercise of discretion, was phrased in mandatory terms, presumably to actively discourage the illegitimate making of serious allegations in proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). It directed the court, if satisfied that a party knowingly321 made a false allegation or statement322 in those proceedings, to ‘order that party to pay some or all of the costs of another party, or other parties, to the proceedings’.323 The mandatory tenor of the section dictated, for instance, that the costs consequences did not diminish by the fact that the lie and its attendant actions were ham-fisted in their execution or effect, or that nothing flowed from it in terms of financial consequences with respect to the case.324 The section was inserted, it was

observed, ‘clearly for deterrence purposes’,325 although the parallel suggestion that it exhibited a ‘punitive element’326 has been queried.327 The section was repealed on 7 June 2012,328 as research revealed it operated as a disincentive to disclosing family violence, the concern being that ‘[v]ulnerable parents may choose to not raise legitimate safety concerns for themselves and their children due to fear they will be subject to a costs order if they cannot substantiate the claims’.329 But the repeal does not preclude the [page 232] court, in its discretion, making a costs order to reflect false statements or allegations.330 And in its wake, a Family Court judge has foreshadowed that a finding that deliberate lies were told may generate an indemnity costs order, ‘because of the trouble to which the untruthful litigant has put the other where the answer is clear’ and the ‘waste of the court’s time which in turn incurs costs for the other litigant’.331

Failure to act as a ‘model litigant’ 8.60 A litigant who is an officer of government is expected to behave as a ‘model litigant’.332 Griffith CJ captured the spirit of this responsibility back in 1912 in referring to the ‘standard of fair play to be observed by the Crown in dealing with its subjects’.333 It includes a duty ‘to deal with claims promptly, not to cause unnecessary delay, to endeavour to avoid litigation wherever possible, not to resist relief which it believes to be appropriate and not to decline to provide appropriate assistance to the court or tribunal whether expressly sought or not’.334 It stands to reason that a failure to act as a model litigant, where that standard applies, may be a ground to reduce (or even deny) costs to a successful party.335 For example, in Slaveski v State of Victoria336 Kyrou J remarked that the court is entitled to expect that the state, being well-resourced and aspiring to act as a model litigant, will have a detailed understanding of its discovery and document retention obligations, and that it will comply with those obligations

in a timely manner. In this proceeding, that expectation was not fulfilled. On the facts, although the deficiencies in the state’s discovery and document retention caused only short-term inconvenience to the plaintiff and the court, and did not result in any substantive prejudice or unfairness, ‘those deficiencies were sufficiently serious that the court ought to take them into account in exercising its discretion in relation to costs’.337 This prompted his Honour to reduce the costs awarded to the state by 10 per cent ‘to reflect the court’s displeasure’.338 8.61 Unlike a private litigant, who is not usually mulcted in costs as a result of not actively opposing an appeal by the opponent, a model litigant, especially when invited to assist the court on the appeal, may secure no such immunity from costs. This appears from the judgment of Basten JA, with whom Giles and Bell JJA agreed, in Mahenthirarasa v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (No 2).339 His Honour found it just to expect the respondent rail authority to pay the appellant’s costs, notwithstanding that it did not actively oppose the orders he sought, because the respondent, as a statutory body representing the Crown, ‘should conduct itself, in [page 233] the conduct of litigation, in the manner expected of the executive government’.340 The point was explained in more detail in the following extract from the judgment:341 When proceedings were commenced in the Common Law Division in the present case, challenging the refusal of the Registrar to allow the appeal to go ahead in the [Workers Compensation] Commission, the State Rail Authority, as the beneficiary of the ruling in the Commission, should, and no doubt did, give proper consideration to whether the proceedings had merit and whether it should defend the order which it had obtained in the Commission. If it had been of the view that the order could not fairly be defended, it should have advised the Court of that fact and its reasons for reaching that conclusion. It was inappropriate for the State Rail Authority as a statutory corporation to stand by and in effect require the appellant to persuade the Court of the correctness of his position. On the appeal, this Court expressly invited the State Rail Authority to reconsider its position and provide assistance to the Court. It declined to do so. Again, it should be assumed that, upon the institution of the appeal, the State Rail Authority gave consideration to whether it should actively defend the benefit it had obtained in the lower Court or concede that the judgment should fairly be set aside. Whatever view was formed, on appropriate advice, this Court did not have the assistance which might have been offered consistently with the view adopted by the State Rail Authority.

Costs Orders Against Successful Parties Jurisdiction 8.62 An order that a successful party pay the costs of an unsuccessful opponent, it has been said, ‘can rarely, if ever, be justified’.342 Judges have, to this end, branded the jurisdiction to make such an order as restricted to cases variously described as ‘strong and exceptional’,343 ‘most exceptional’344 and ‘very exceptional’.345 In fact, so exceptional was such an order that the courts historically disclaimed any jurisdiction to make costs orders against wholly successful defendants, only against successful plaintiffs.346 The reason was that it is the plaintiff, not the defendant, who elects to commence the proceedings.347 This dichotomy of approach no longer applies; the matter now goes not to jurisdiction — court rules in most jurisdictions specifically confer upon the court the power to determine ‘by whom’ costs are to be paid348 — but to discretion.349 The courts have jurisdiction to order a successful party, whether plaintiff or defendant, to pay an opponent’s costs in part or in whole, and judicial remarks that premise its exercise on proof of ‘exceptional’ circumstances should not be viewed as an attempt to alter the discretionary character of such decisions.350 [page 234]

Exercise of discretion 8.63 The circumstances in which a court may deprive a successful party of costs351 supply an indication of those in which a successful party may be ordered to actually pay the whole or a part of an unsuccessful party’s costs. The reason is that both involve a departure from the usual ‘costs follow the event rule’ grounded in the justice of the case, and so it would be odd were the grounds for this departure to vary according to whether or not the successful party is, in addition to being deprived of costs, to bear the additional burden of paying costs. It is therefore unsurprising to find statements in the case law to the effect that ‘the borderline between the cases where a court may order that a wholly

successful defendant is not to be paid any costs and those where it may order him to pay the plaintiff’s costs may prove difficult to define — if indeed it exists’.352 Yet this borderline must exist because the consequences of ordering a successful party to pay costs are more onerous than merely being deprived of costs.353 The point may well simply depend on the weight to be given to the relevant facts, though it cannot be doubted that the circumstances where a successful party will legitimately be ordered to pay costs will be more confined than those where it is proper to merely deprive him or her of costs.

Differential approach as between plaintiff and defendant? 8.64 The plaintiff–defendant dichotomy retains its relevance to the matter of discretion. More compelling circumstances are required for the exercise of discretion as a result of which a successful defendant is not only denied costs but also ordered to pay the some or all of the plaintiff’s costs, again because the plaintiff initiated the proceedings and failed to gain the relief sought.354 Hence, a court, if it finds grounds to oust the usual costs rule, is less likely to order a successful defendant to pay costs than a successful plaintiff. So ordinarily, where the defendant has been wholly successful ‘it is not a proper judicial exercise of the discretion to order such a defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs’, but ‘[t]hat the judge may deprive the successful defendant of the costs which prima facie he would expect to recover is another matter’.355

Relevant factors 8.65 Though impossible as well as undesirable to attempt to define what constitutes a strong or exceptional case for this purpose, the courts have made various suggestions in this regard. In Knight v Clifton356 Sachs LJ surmised that a strong or exceptional case could include where the successful defendant’s conduct has triggered the suit or caused its continuance,357 or where the defendant escaped the normal consequences of blameworthy conduct ‘by reason of some unexpected matter which he knew but which the plaintiff could not know’. Also, that a party raises issues or makes allegations improperly or unreasonably, or in some other way lengthens the proceedings unnecessarily, or otherwise unreasonably causes the costs of the litigation to

be increased, may incline the court to order it to pay the whole or a part of the unsuccessful [page 235] party’s costs.358 That this behaviour stems from that party’s status as an unrepresented litigant may dissuade the court from ordering costs against him or her in the event of (partial) success, though this is by no means assured, especially if the court has already afforded the litigant tolerance and assistance in conducting the case.359 A case illustration is Verna Trading Pty Ltd v New India Assurance Co Ltd.360 The defendant insurer, by failing over a long period to respond adequately or at all, induced a reasonable belief that it lacked a valid defence to the plaintiff’s claim. Not until the first day of the hearing did the insurer disclose its reasons for not settling the claim and its defences to the action, and did not seek to actually rely on the defences until the second day of the trial. Although this caused the plaintiff to lose the case, Kaye J, with whom McGarvie J concurred on this point, found the combination of these circumstances ‘very exceptional’, which could have been avoided had the insurer, acting responsibly, made proper and frank responses to the plaintiff’s request for settlement.361 This led his Honour to uphold the trial judge’s order that the insurer should pay the insured’s costs up to and including the first day of the trial (which lasted for two days) taxed on a solicitor/own client basis.362 The third judge, Ormiston J, was ‘by no means comfortable’ with this order, noting that the insurer, though it had won on the merits, suffered three costs penalties in being, first, deprived of costs of successfully defending the action; second, ordered to pay the unsuccessful plaintiff’s costs; and third, ordered to pay those costs on a solicitor/own client basis.363 His Honour conceded that the defendant had acted badly after the claim was made and during the early course of the litigation, but considered it undesirable that a successful litigant, who was, on the merits, wrongly vexed with litigation, should be required to pay the said three penalties without receiving a cent by way of costs in respect of its successful defence.364

On the face of Kaye J’s judgment, little can be gleaned to understand what distinguished this case from similar cases in which defendants were merely deprived of costs. It may lie in the parties’ relative position and identity. Insurance companies, as a general rule, have considerable resources at their disposal, and ought be discouraged from engaging in sharp tactics in litigation, including deliberate delaying tactics. The ruling in Verna Trading may represent an attempt to discourage powerful litigants to yield to any temptation to abuse court processes. 8.66 Facts involving a combination of two or more of the factors that influence a court to deny a successful party costs may, again depending upon matters of degree, also lead a court to order the successful party to pay costs. In Earnshaw v Loy (No 2),365 for example, the plaintiff sued for assault and malicious prosecution, and the jury awarded him as little as they thought they properly could in damages consistent with a finding in his favour in view of his reprehensible behaviour in relation to the defendant. Moreover, the plaintiff had sued in the Supreme Court when he could have sued in the County Court, and as a result had increased the defendant’s costs. Sholl J noted that although the plaintiff had vindicated his rights, by making a claim on an exaggerated and rash estimate of his own conduct in relation to the matters leading up to the litigation, he put the defendant to the ‘very great expense’ of a five or six day trial in the [page 236] Supreme Court for a very modest sum. These circumstances, according to his Honour, dictated that the unsuccessful defendant should not be ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs, but that the successful plaintiff pay half the defendant’s taxed costs.366

Illustration — contempt proceedings 8.67 The court rules in several jurisdictions state that the costs of a proceeding for punishment for contempt are in the court’s discretion whether or not a specific punishment is imposed.367 The exercise of this discretion, in the usual case, aligns with the ‘costs follow the event’ principle.368

8.68 Contempt proceedings, though, furnish examples of circumstances sufficiently exceptional to attract the court’s discretion to order the successful party to pay costs. Foley v Herald-Sun TV Pty Ltd369 is a case in point. The plaintiff, who secured an injunction restraining the defendants from publishing a film but was unsuccessful in making contact with the defendants until after the program had aired, sought orders for contempt against the defendants, which included the presenter of the program. McGarvie J held that no costs order as between the presenter and the plaintiff should be made because, lacking notice of the injunction, the presenter committed no contempt of court. As to the other defendants, the absence of a responsible officer to receive notification that the injunction had been granted, according to his Honour, made the case sufficiently exceptional to order the defendants to pay part of the plaintiff’s costs even though, without notice of the injunction, no defendant was guilty of contempt of court. His Honour explained the matter as follows:370 The course of events could not fail to give the impression to the plaintiff and his legal advisers that steps had been taken to prevent either company [defendant] receiving notice of the injunction until it was too late to stop the film. These circumstances rendered it highly likely that the plaintiff would launch proceedings for contempt. The evidence which has resulted in my finding that no [defendant] committed contempt of court could not have been known to the plaintiff when he commenced these proceedings.

Foley can be contrasted with Knight v Clifton,371 which involved an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendants from doing anything that hindered or obstructed the plaintiffs in the free use of their alleged right-ofway over the defendants’ field. The third defendant ploughed a stretch of the right-of-way, and the plaintiffs sought by notice of motion to commit him for contempt of that order. The trial judge found no contempt but nonetheless ordered the third defendant to pay the plaintiffs’ costs taxed on a common fund basis.372 Russell LJ, although conceding that in a ‘most exceptional case’ it would have been open to the trial judge to make such an order, found no grounds for doing so on the facts. His Lordship remarked, to this end:373 To say of the third defendant that he should not get his costs because he acted rashly, or steered rather close to the wind, is one thing; as has often been said a successful defendant has no right to his costs. But to order him to pay the costs incurred by the plaintiffs in launching a motion to commit which in the event proved unjustified is quite another matter.

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This was particularly so, according to his Lordship, in a view of the fact that a finding of contempt could have led to the third defendant’s imprisonment, observing that it would be unfortunate ‘if plaintiffs were encouraged to think that where a defendant has acted rashly and foolishly, their threat to his liberty may, with luck, be made at his expense when they fail to establish a case of contempt’.374 Sachs LJ, though having ‘great sympathy’ with the way in which the trial judge dealt with the issue of costs, considered that the fact that the liberty of the defendant was at stake was of such importance as to outweigh any other factor.375

Ouster of General Rule by Statute 8.69 Statute may displace the general rule that costs are to follow the event. For instance, various statutes provide that each party must bear its own costs,376 a particular party is entitled to receive but is not required to bear costs,377 that costs are to be ordered against an unsuccessful applicant only for proceedings were instituted vexatiously or without reasonable cause,378 or that envisage that a costs order may be made only in exceptional circumstances.379 These hardly exhaust existing statutory permutations. In each case, the statutory ouster of the usual costs rule reflects a legislative judgment that litigants should not be dissuaded from using the auspices of the relevant court or tribunal by the prospect of being ordered to pay an opponent’s costs in the event that they prove unsuccessful. Commonly, though, the court or tribunal is vested with a discretion to make a costs order in defined circumstances, generally those (well) outside the norm. Below are discussed three instances of a statutory ouster of the usual costs rule, by reference to three different types of court or tribunal, the Family Court, the New South Wales Land and Environment Court, and the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal.380 These [page 238] have been chosen by way of general illustration chiefly because they premise

an award of costs on varying thresholds and their interpretation and application is well served by case law.

Family court costs orders Generally 8.70 The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117(1) states that, subject to s 117(2) and various other provisions,381 each party to proceedings382 under the Act ‘shall bear his or her own costs’.383 This is aimed so as not to deter spouses ‘from approaching the court in proper circumstances for fear of the imposition of an intolerable burden as to costs’.384 At the same time, it has been said that s 117(1) is ‘principally intended to ensure the level of conflict between ex-spouses is not exacerbated by costs order’, given that ‘[a] costs order, rather than refusal of a costs order, is likely to increase the level of conflict between ex-spouses’.385 Sub-section 117(2) adds that if the court is of the opinion that the circumstances justify it doing so, it may, subject to s 117(2A), two other provisions386 and the applicable rules of court, make a costs order as it considers just. In considering what (if any) order it should make, the court must, pursuant to s 117(2A), have regard to the following: (a) the financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings; (b) whether any party to the proceedings is in receipt of assistance by way of legal aid and, if so, the terms of the grant of that assistance to that party; (c) the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in relation to the proceedings … (d) whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to the proceedings to comply with previous orders of the court; (e) whether any party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings; (f) whether either party to the proceedings has made an offer in writing to the other party to the proceedings to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such offer;387 and (g) such other matters as the court considers relevant.

In Penfold v Penfold,388 decided before the enactment of s 117(2A), Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ remarked that s 117(1) expresses a general rule, ‘provided that it is firmly understood that the sub-section is not paramount to s 117(2)’, and that as s 117(1) is expressed as subject to s 117(2), the former must yield whenever the judge finds circumstances that justify making a costs order. Their Honours added that s 117(2) requires a finding of justifying circumstances preliminary to making an order, but beyond this nothing in the subject matter or interrelationship of the two sub-

sections imposes any additional or special onus on an applicant for a costs order. This led the court to reject the notion that a costs order could be made only in ‘a clear case’. It also remarked that as s 117(2) does not require a judge to specify the [page 239] circumstances that justify the making of an order, an absence of reasons or findings does not in itself indicate that a judge has erroneously exercised the discretion to award costs.389 Yet their Honours conceded that a lack of reasons ‘will place an appellate court in the position of examining the circumstances and of determining for itself whether the circumstances show that the discretion was erroneously exercised’.390

Effect of s 117(2A) 8.71 The extent, if any, to which the enactment of s 117(2A) in 1983 modified the above position has been queried. In Marriage of Kublins391 the Full Family Court held that s 117(2A) requires a judge, in considering an application for costs, not only to consider the various subparagraphs of s 117(2A), but to make specific findings in relation to each, and a failure to do so represents an error of law. This view is problematic, not only in appearing to reverse Penfold, but in requiring a judge to inquire into matters not placed before the court or relied upon by counsel in their submissions as to costs, the decision ostensibly departs from the fundamental proposition that the court’s function is judicial and not inquisitorial.392 That the Full Court subsequently held that s 117(2A) contains no requirement that more than one factor be present before a costs order is made, and so nothing prevents a factor being the sole foundation for a costs order,393 provides a persuasive indication that the Kublins approach has been superseded. 8.72 There is also debate as to how, if at all, s 117(2A) should influence the s 117(1) ‘general rule’ that each party bears his or her own costs. In Marriage of Collins394 the Full Family Court stated that the costs discretion conferred by s 117 must be exercised with regard to the primary rule that each party bears his or her own costs, thus negating any principle that costs should

follow the event, but in deciding whether a costs order is justified, a broad discretion remains having regard to the factors set out in s 117(2A). Yet in Marriage of McAlpin395 a majority of the same but differently constituted court held that s 117(2A) broadens and modifies the original legislative policy as stated in s 117(1), to the point where the decision as to costs ‘is virtually at large’ provided that the order is just. It must be queried why a sub-section that directs the court to have regard to certain matters in exercising a pre-existing discretion should oust the ‘general rule’ stated in s 117(1) and recognised as such in Penfold.396 If the Family Court was intended to exercise the same discretion in the same way as other superior courts, it would have been simple enough to statutorily prescribe a general costs discretion in terms identical to that applicable to those other courts.397 As it is s 117(1) that sets the Family Court costs provisions apart from costs provisions applying to other superior courts, the McAlpin approach gives insufficient weight to s 117(1).398 This is a matter of practical importance; if s 117(1) espouses a ‘general rule’, it creates a reasonable expectation in litigants that the discretion will ordinarily be exercised in a particular way (though this does not mean that s 117(2A) requires that the judge be [page 240] satisfied that the circumstances are extraordinary or exceptional, as s 117(2A) contains no such prescription).399 This may have important ramifications on an appeal from a costs order.400 It also explains Full Family Court authority that, on grounds of procedural fairness, the court ought not make costs orders without giving the parties a chance to be heard, except in very unusual circumstances.401 By specifying relevant matters for the court’s attention, s 117(2A) may envisage the possibility that even if the court ‘is of opinion that there are circumstances’ justifying a costs order, it may nonetheless not make a costs order after having regard to the matters in s 117(2A).402 In that s 117(2), prior to the enactment of s 117(2A), already carried its own discretion, it is unclear, however, why s 117(2A) should have this effect, especially in view of the catch-all s 117(2A)(g), which directs the court to have regard to ‘such other

matters as the court considers relevant’. This furnishes an independent source of discretion;403 the particular matters set out in the previous paragraphs do not limit its effect.404 8.73 The costs discretion is thus a broad one. Yet the cases show that the Family Court’s inclination to make a costs order is greatest where a party has acted in a dishonest or less than candid manner in the litigation, has made fraudulent or unwarranted claims or allegations, has pursued a weak or hopeless case, or has a great financial disparity with the other. Each point is elaborated below,405 revealing that it is usually a combination of more than one of these factors (and perhaps others) that substantiates a costs order. 8.74 The case law also reveals that some disinclination to oust the s 117(1) general rule in proceedings involving parenting matters. In proceedings of this kind, it is reasoned, it is proper that parents be able to put their case in seeking orders that they believe to be in the best interests of their children, and to make a costs order could frustrate this ability.406 The nature of family court litigation in relation to children is, after all, quite different to a commercial dispute in the state or federal courts. But any reticence to order costs in parenting cases is not grounded in statutory provision, as s 117 makes not distinction between parenting and financial cases. It follows that, where a proper exercise of the costs discretion justifies an order that costs be payable by one of the parties, that the case involves parenting is by the way. As explained by May and Ainslie-Wallace JJ in Hawkins v Roe:407 Whilst the categories of occasions when costs may be ordered is not limited, the occasions on which such an order should be made in a parenting dispute should have some particular features. Where there is a complete absence of preparedness to compromise in the face of unambiguous expert evidence, where false allegations are made, or where one party is clearly motivated by self

[page 241] interest rather than the best interests of a child, then a judge may well conclude that there are circumstances justifying an order for costs.

For example, in Knowles v Green (No 2)408 Mushin J observed that a wholly unsuccessful party, as was the husband on the facts, cannot proceed with impunity, ignoring the weight of the evidence and adhering to the proposition that his is the only proposal that is in the best interests of the

children. In these circumstances, an ‘extremely persuasive reason’ existed, ruled his Honour, to make a costs order in the wife’s favour.409

Dishonesty or lack of candour 8.75 In Penfold v Penfold410 Murphy J remarked that the fact that a litigant has presented a false statement of financial circumstances, which has put the opponent to the expense of disproving it, may justify a costs order. Other judges have remarked that ‘[t]he failure of a party to be completely open and forthcoming as to his or her financial position, should always place that party at risk in relation to an order for costs’.411 The case law is, to this end, littered with examples of litigants who have misled their opponents (and the court) as to financial matters, or otherwise sought to conceal assets and sources of income, and have as a result been subjected to a costs order, its quantum being influenced mainly by the parties’ relative conduct and success.412

Fraudulent or unwarranted claims or allegations 8.76 Costs orders present a vehicle to compensate litigants who have been put to additional expense by the behaviour of an opponent that amounts to an abuse of process or otherwise tends to undermine the integrity of the proceedings. For instance, a party who conducts proceedings in a wasteful, extravagant or excessive fashion may be ordered to pay part or all of the opponent’s costs.413 Also, the costs incurred by a litigant in defending unwarranted and fraudulent claims may be ordered against the party making those claims.414 That a dedicated costs provision directed against a party who knowingly made a false allegation or statement in the family law proceedings415 has since been repealed does not deny the prospect of this matter being relevant to the court’s costs discretion.416

Level of success or failure 8.77 That a litigant has proven wholly unsuccessful in his or her contentions, especially where that litigant is in a stronger financial position than the successful opponent417 or has misconducted himself or herself in the litigation,418 may justify the litigant bearing some

[page 242] or all of the opponent’s costs.419 The case for a costs order in this context is stronger again where an appeal is unsuccessful.420 For example, in Wright v Barry421 the father was ordered to pay two-thirds of the mother’s costs of appeal proceedings because he had been substantially unsuccessful in the proceedings, had adopted an unreasonable attitude that almost obliged the mother to pursue her appeal to the bitter end and was, in any case, in a far stronger financial position. If the case is misconceived, that the applicant is in strained financial circumstances will not of itself immunise him or her from an adverse costs order.422 It may even justify a costs order on other than a party and party basis.423 It is open to the court in this respect to fix the costs recoverable,424 or make a percentage order.

Financial circumstances of the parties 8.78 Whether or not a party is funded by the public purse is relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion, being expressly prescribed by s 117(2A)(b). However, the Full Family Court in Marriage of McAlpin queried the relevance of this factor, remarking as follows:425 [I]t has … always been the policy of Legal Aid Commissions to require legally assisted persons to seek costs where they have been successful in litigation. It is thus extremely difficult to determine what the present relevance of a person being legally aided otherwise has in determining the question as to whether costs should be awarded. It may be that it is legitimate to take the fact that costs have been incurred which fall on to the community in the form of Legal Aid Commissions … as a relevant factor. Again however it seems to us that if a litigant is entitled to costs, then he or she should receive them regardless of whether the litigant or the Legal Aid Commission has incurred them.

This criterion dovetails into s 117(2A)(a), namely the financial circumstances of the parties, which involves a broader concept than assets and income, or even financial resources.426 That one party’s financial resources far exceed the other’s may lead the court to order the [page 243] former to meet some or all of the costs of the proceedings,427 although this is

unlikely to be decisive of itself,428 especially if the party seeking to avoid a costs order has proved wholly or substantially unsuccessful in the litigation. In Browne v Green,429 for example, that the husband’s assets substantially exceeded the wife’s did not shield the wife from being ordered to pay costs in circumstances where the husband had been wholly successful in defending the wife’s application, had earlier made a favourable settlement offer the acceptance of which would have avoided the proceedings, and the wife was wealthy in her own right. To this end, the considerable value of each party’s financial resources may incline the court to make a costs order to reflect the relative successes in the litigation.430 Conversely, in Hitch v Hitch431 the husband was ordered to pay costs not just because he was in better financial circumstances than the wife, but because he had been entirely unsuccessful, had engaged in delay and was found to have been untruthful.

Counterpoint — approach to costs in de facto/domestic relationships cases 8.79 Legislation in each state and territory is directed to, inter alia, allocating the property entitlements of parties to failed de facto or domestic relationships432 (though all jurisdictions except Western Australia have referred to the Commonwealth power under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) in this regard for relationships having a geographical connection with the jurisdiction). So far as costs are concerned, the Queensland Act contains a provision modelled closely on s 117 of the Family Law Act,433 and so the costs consequences of litigation of this kind align with the approach to costs propounded by the Family Court.434 The same is the position in Western Australia, where the equivalent costs provision to s 117 applies to proceedings involving both parties to a marriage and to a de facto relationship.435 In the [page 244] remaining jurisdictions, the general costs discretion vested in the relevant court436 applies to the breakdown of de facto or domestic relationships.437 8.80 The foregoing does not mean that, other than in Queensland and

Western Australia, the usual costs follow the event ‘rule’ routinely applies in these types of proceedings. In fact, it has been judicially observed that the usual rule ‘must be treated with caution’ in an application for a property adjustment under the relevant legislation.438 In this regard, the courts have recognised that proceedings for property adjustment in a failed de facto or domestic relationship can be analogised to matrimonial proceedings (in which the starting point is that each party bear his and her own costs) or to partnership disputes (such that the costs of adjusting property interests upon the failure of a domestic relationship are viewed as an incident of the failure of a joint relationship, often without attributable fault).439 Whatever analogy is adopted, though, there is no presumption that each party bears his or her own costs.440 Nor is there a ‘usual rule’ that any award of costs should reflect the proportion of interests in property that the court adjusted in comparison to the claim.441 Both would illegitimately fetter the costs discretion. In any case, judges have on various occasions made no order as to costs442 (albeit adjusted to reflect the extent, if any, to which the conduct of one of the parties has caused the other to incur unnecessary expense)443 except where convinced that a litigant has enjoyed ‘substantial success’.444 Importantly, the notion of ‘success’ in this context [page 245] may not align with that in ordinary adversary litigation, as explained by Brereton J, with whom Basten JA and Hunt AJA concurred, in Kardos v Sarbutt (No 2):445 For this purpose, ‘substantial success’ is not to be judged merely by the circumstance that a plaintiff obtains an adjustment in his or her favour. It involves an evaluation of the outcome, in the light of the forensic and negotiating positions of the parties, such that it can be said that one party has been clearly more successful than the other, to the extent that the costs of the proceedings can be seen to be attributable to the unsuccessful party’s opposition, rather than to … in particular, the necessity for both parties that their property interests be separated, and the failure of both parties to adopt a realistic position.

For example, where there has been a de facto or domestic relationship of significant duration, the bulk of assets were throughout owned by the defendant and the plaintiff has made domestic or homemaker contributions, that the plaintiff could be expected to achieve, and indeed is awarded, an

allocation of property under the legislation cannot be assumed to be an indication of ‘success’ for costs purposes.446

New South Wales Land and Environment Court costs orders Background to the current rule 8.81 The New South Wales Land and Environment Court is statutorily conferred an unfettered discretion as to costs in terms no different to that vested in superior courts generally. Prior to 28 January 2008, this jurisdiction was found in a specific provision in the statute creating the court;447 it is now sourced from the general costs discretion found in the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).448 In an effort ‘to seek some consistency of underlying principle’,449 the court propounded two practice directions regarding the exercise of its costs discretion in certain contexts. The first of these identified the court’s practice as that ‘no order for costs is made in planning and building appeals unless the circumstances are exceptional’.450 The second one provided that ‘no order for costs is made in valuation appeals, farmland rating appeals (and other rating appeals) and subdivision appeals in class 3 of the Court’s jurisdiction, unless the circumstances are exceptional’.451 The New South Wales Court of Appeal held that, at least so far as valuation appeals are concerned, the second practice direction was not declaratory of the prior practice, branding it an inappropriate fetter upon the court’s discretion.452 Subsequent authority, though not without detractors, suggested that the same could be said of the first practice note.453 [page 246]

No costs unless it is, in the circumstances of the particular case, fair and reasonable 8.82 The need for a clear statement of the court’s costs practice led to an amendment of its 1996 rules, with effect from 19 December 2003, to make specific provision for costs. The relevant rule, replicated in the current 2007

rules, states that no costs order is made in proceedings to which the rule applies ‘unless the court considers that the making of a costs order is, in the circumstances of the particular case, fair and reasonable’.454 With this amendment to the rules, there was ‘a new beginning’, such that earlier practices, case law and the practice directions have no influence on the application of the rules.455 The current rule applies, generally speaking, to administrative (merits) review litigation, concerned with merits appeals from public bodies,456 but not to conventional inter partes litigation.457 The latter is more likely to be amenable to the usual ‘costs follow the event’ order. Aside from eschewing a criterion based on exceptional circumstances, the rule differs from the practice direction in two ways: it expressly requires the court to have regard to ‘the circumstances of the particular case’ — which has been said to exclude ‘generalised approaches’458 — and it requires the court to form a judgment as to whether the making of a costs order is ‘fair and reasonable’ in the circumstances of that case.459 This is a lower hurdle for departure from the general rule than the ‘exceptional circumstances’ qualification in the practice direction.460 8.83 Following the enactment of the ‘fair and reasonable … in the circumstances of the particular case’ rule in 2003, what specific factors might influence a court to make a costs order remained unclear. A tendency to approach the issue by way of general analogy — the most common being an attempt to analogise the matter to an administrative review proceeding, which traditionally does not carry costs, as opposed to an adversarial one, to which costs consequences commonly apply461 — had logic in view of the combination of functions imposed upon the court, which render it, simultaneously, both a court of law and an administrative tribunal. Yet the New South Wales Court of Appeal rejected any such analogical reasoning on the grounds that, inter alia, it fetters the discretion or evaluative judgment required by the rule-based test, and it is not directed at the circumstances ‘of the particular case’.462 The court opined that this analogical reasoning ‘diverts attention’ from the power in issue; rather, the focus should [page 247]

‘be on the principles that underlie the practice in, respectively, administrative tribunals and courts’.463 It perceived no restriction, other than rationality, on the considerations relevant to the formulation of a judgment as to what ‘fair and reasonable … in the particular circumstances’, but that those considerations be of sufficient weight to overcome the presumptive rule that there will be no order as to costs.464

Relevant factors to the assessment of what is ‘fair and reasonable’ 8.84 Unfortunately, this did little to assist trial judges in making an assessment of whether or not a costs order was, in the circumstances, fair and reasonable. Judicial observations that, although the considerations that arose in earlier case law and their treatment465 could provide an insight when similar factors arise, ‘the previous cases must be approached in a different manner to the way they have been applied in the past’,466 arguably did not assist. Also, the wide variety of enactments under which appeals to the court can be made,467 and that for costs purposes ‘[e]ach statutory regime must be considered separately in this respect’,468 complicated the point. The need for guidance led to the prescription in the 2007 court rules, with effect from 28 January 2008, of the following non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which the court might consider the making of a costs order to be fair and reasonable:469 (a) a central issue in the proceedings involved a question of law, a question of fact or a question of mixed fact and law, the determination of which: (i) was (potentially) determinative of the proceedings; and (ii) was preliminary to, or otherwise did not involve, an evaluation of the merits of any application the subject of the proceedings;470 (b) a party failed to provide, or unreasonably delayed in providing, information or documents: (i) required by law to be provided in relation to any application the subject of the proceedings; or (ii) necessary to enable a consent authority to gain a proper understanding of, and give proper consideration to, the application; (c) a party acted unreasonably in circumstances leading up to the commencement of the proceedings;

(d) a party acted unreasonably in the conduct of the proceedings; (e) a party commenced or defended the proceedings for an improper purpose; (f)

a party commenced or continued a claim in the proceedings, or maintained a defence, where: (i) the claim or defence lacked reasonable prospects of success; or (ii) to do so was otherwise unreasonable. [page 248]

The above list of circumstances is similar to indicative guidelines formulated by the Chief Justice of the Land and Environment Court under the previous rule.471 Importantly, the rules espouse no presumptive entitlement to costs in defined circumstances,472 but at least give an indication of factors that may incline the court to oust the presumptive ‘no costs’ rule.

Illustration of costs discretion — cases involving the compulsory acquisition of property 8.85 An area that has challenged the exercise of the costs discretion is the compulsory acquisition or resumption of land for public purposes. The New South Wales Land and Environment Court hears and determines disputes of this kind under ‘Class 3’ of its jurisdiction.473 Although the case law has, in the main, preceded the rule-based specification of relevant factors in the exercise of the court’s costs discretion, and indeed also the ‘fair and reasonable’ prescription, it nonetheless supplies useful illustrations of occasions that are amenable to the ‘no costs’ rule, as well as occasions where it is justifiable to depart from that rule. At the outset, it should be noted that the exercise of discretion will necessarily be informed by the terms of any statute that expressly deal with costs orders in this context, which statutory provision exists in some jurisdictions.474 In any event, however, ‘[t]he cases show that there are no hard and fast rules leaning to any automatic results’.475 8.86 Claims for compensation arising out of compulsory acquisition of property differ from ordinary civil claims. It has been judicially observed, in this regard, that:476

… [t]he interference with the rights of the individual, the confiscatory nature of compulsory acquisition and the statutory entitlement to just compensation have led to the development of different principles in determining costs in cases concerned with compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land compared with ordinary litigation.

Of particular relevance is the fact that the claimant, unlike an ordinary plaintiff, ordinarily has an entitlement to compensation, and if dissatisfied with the relevant authority’s offer, is entitled to have that compensation determined by the court. The entitlement to compensation may make it inappropriate to speak of a claimant who receives compensation by court order as necessarily having been ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’ for costs purposes.477 Hence the remark that a judge should ‘look realistically at the litigation, the issues, the way it was conducted and [page 249] the result, in order to assess who really succeeded and to what extent’.478 It serves also to explain why some judges view the discretion to award costs in compensation cases as one ‘uniquely applied to tilt the discretion in favour of the dispossessed owner’.479 It is an overstatement, though, to say that there is a special costs rule for compensation cases; it is better characterised as a particular application of the usual ‘costs follow the event’ rule.480 This application has, in the minds of some judges, dictated a broad principle, which has been encapsulated as follows:481 [A] person who has had their land taken by way of compulsory acquisition should not bear their own costs, but rather should be allowed to access the court to present an arguable and well organised case without being deterred by the prospect of being ordered to pay costs if the case proves unpersuasive …

Although not all judges have endorsed this ‘general principle’,482 it has received the recent imprimatur of the New South Wales Court of Appeal on more than one occasion.483 8.87 One important indicium in this context is whether the claimant secured, via the court order, a greater quantum of compensation than offered by the relevant authority. The claimant here could be viewed as ‘successful’ in the proceeding, and therefore ‘entitled’ to an order for costs, except to the extent that his or her conduct has led the authority to incur unnecessary costs.484 For example, in Constantino v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales

(No 2),485 where the amount of compensation determined by the court was more than double the amount offered to the applicant, Bignold J held that ‘it is obvious that the applicant was the successful litigant’, which result was not affected by the fact that the amount of compensation determined by the court was only about one-third of the amount claimed by the applicant. Costs therefore followed the event. [page 250] 8.88 For the reasons as noted above, a claimant awarded less than the quantum offered by the relevant authority should not necessarily be branded as ‘unsuccessful’ for costs purposes. Reasonableness, so far as the claimant’s conduct is concerned, is an important inquiry in this context, as appears from the following remarks by Basten JA in Dillon v Gosford City Council:486 Whether steps taken in maintaining proceedings are reasonable will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. These may include a comparison between the positions adopted by the parties at the commencement of proceedings and the final outcome. To the extent that a claimant obtains less than the valuation provided by the Valuer-General, the claimant has been unsuccessful in the litigation. That will be a factor to be taken into account, but the weight given to that factor may depend upon the extent of the failure. The court may also take into account the time and expense incurred in relation to specific items. Beyond such general statements, it is unhelpful to go, lest the very generality of the discretion be thought to be fettered in some way. In short, the purpose of an award of costs must be taken into account, namely to compensate the party for expenditure incurred in the course of litigation; the nature of the litigation and the reasonableness of the conduct of the litigation are central considerations.

The decision of Tobias JA, with whom Beazley and Meagher JJA concurred, in Brock v Roads and Maritime Services (formerly Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW)487 is instructive. His Honour conceded that the appellant would have been better off had she accepted the statutory offer, or either of the settlement offers, made by the respondent, and may have had unrealistic hopes or expectations for her litigation. Yet neither of these factors, ruled Tobias JA, brought the case outside the general principle noted above, as in relying on the advice of her advisers (a valuer and her lawyers), the appellant was not acting unreasonably.488 Moreover, while in one sense she was unsuccessful in the litigation, on the other hand at trial she obtained an award of compensation that, with respect to market value, exceeded the amount contended for by the respondent by over $100,000. To that extent, she had a victory at trial.489

Ultimately, though, a claimant who succeeds on only some of the issues raised, and as a result secures an award well below the amount it sought, may be denied (at least some) of its costs. In Serbian Cultural Club ‘St Sava Inc v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (No 2),490 the applicant obtained an award of compensation only slightly exceeding that determined by the Valuer-General, and failed on most of the issues argued. In particular, the applicant failed on its flooding claim, being a discrete issue that generated significant preparation in terms of expert evidence and use of court time. Jagot J noted that the way the applicant dealt with the flooding issue led to unnecessary costs being incurred and a considerable burden being imposed upon the respondent. As a result, the respondent was ordered to pay only onehalf of the applicant’s costs. That the applicant has put forth a grossly exaggerated claim is also ground to deprive it of costs, at least to the extent that ‘the exaggeration gave rise to an obvious [page 251] and substantial escalation in the costs over and above those which it was reasonable for the claimant to incur’.491

New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal costs orders Costs orders in tribunals generally 8.89 A singular feature of legal process in Australia (and elsewhere) is the trend to establishing tribunals as a first point of call in place of a court. That the procedure in tribunals is ordinarily less formal than in courts, and is directed at a more expeditious and inexpensive access to dispute resolution than court proceedings, has been reflected by most tribunals adopting, pursuant to statutory direction, a ‘no costs’ rule, at least as a starting point. In recognition that occasions arise where an award of costs in tribunal proceedings may be justified, the ‘no costs’ starting point is, however, ordinarily qualified by reference to circumstances in which a costs order may be made.492 It has been observed, generally speaking, that:493

… as a general principle, tribunals exercising jurisdiction where parties are by statute protected from the usual costs consequences of litigating must be careful to ensure that parties do not abuse this statutory privilege by acting unreasonably, unfairly or oppressively towards their opponents.

Of course, this must yield to the specific terms in which the costs jurisdiction is phrased. The award of costs in the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal494 is targeted in the following discussion, as its parameters have in recent times been altered, in line with a parallel provision in Victorian legislation.495

Former requirement of ‘special circumstances’ in New South Wales 8.90 In its form before 1 January 2009,496 s 88(1) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) empowered the tribunal to award costs ‘only if it is satisfied that there are special circumstances warranting an award of costs’. To obtain a cost order, therefore, an applicant needed to satisfy the tribunal of ‘special circumstances’ and that these circumstances warranted an award of costs. The tribunal (and courts) sought to give colour to the concept of ‘special circumstances’ by way of definition, by reference to ‘circumstances that are out of the [page 252] ordinary, but without having to be extraordinary or exceptional’.497 On 9 October 2006, the tribunal issued Practice Note No 12, containing a nonexhaustive list of examples of special circumstances that could justify a costs order, including: where a party conducted the proceeding in a way that disadvantaged another party;498 where a party unreasonably prolonged the time taken to complete the proceeding; where a party made a claim that lacked a tenable basis in fact or law; in matters under the Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW), where a party lodged

an unconscionable conduct claim and no basis was found for that claim; and where an appeal was lodged any real prospect of success.499 Consistent with the tenor of these examples, mere success in a review application did not amount to special circumstances.500 Nor, given the focus of special circumstances on the parties’ conduct in the course of the litigation as opposed to the events leading up to it, was the power to order costs to be used as ‘some kind of sanction to punish agencies for poor administration’; as such, the tribunal should not, it was said, embark on ‘a general enquiry into the way in which the agency dealt with the Applicant’.501 On the other hand, special circumstances existed where a party caused another to incur costs ‘because of unreasonable delays, or by making misconceived, frivolous, vexatious or insubstantial procedural or substantive applications’.502

Current provision grounded in ‘fairness’ in New South Wales 8.91 The current s 88(1) adopts, as a starting point, the proposition that each party is to bear their own costs in proceedings before the tribunal. It has jettisoned the requirement for ‘special circumstances’, in part it appears because it had been interpreted too restrictively by the tribunal, and in its place introduced a concept of fairness. Under s 88(1A), the tribunal ‘may award costs in relation to proceedings before it, but only if it is satisfied that it is fair to do so’, having regard to a number of specified factors. This fairness test has been described as ‘a much more just test’,503 and its backdrop explained in the following terms:504 It is important to remember that this Tribunal, like all Courts and Tribunals, deals with disputes between parties. Over hundreds of years courts have endeavoured to protect the interests of the party who is successful in the litigation on the basis that the successful party would not have had to travel down the litigious path and incur legal costs had it not been for the actions of the unsuccessful party. In other words, there are two sides (at least) to every argument and courts have been at pains to protect the interests of the successful party. There is good reason for this: not every successful party can afford litigation and afford to throw away, without recovery, its costs incurred in litigation where it is successful. There are plenty of people, ordinary people, who become involved in litigation in the various Divisions of this Tribunal, often through no fault of their own, and who are entitled … in appropriate circumstances, to recover their costs when they are successful. It is also important to remember that all successful litigants are not necessarily economically well heeled — many are not — and the Parliament has, in my opinion, recognised that and sought to create a wider and fairer test for awards for costs. What the Parliament has done, in its 1 January 2009 amendments, is recognise

[page 253] that there is a need for this Tribunal to be more flexible and widen the scope of a litigant’s entitlement to costs.

It has been similarly observed that, because the criterion is now one of ‘fairness’, there are good grounds for believing that costs orders should be more readily obtainable.505 Although an order varying the general ‘no costs’ rule may be made ‘only if’ the relevant factor is satisfied in a particular way, this has been judicially described, consistent with the foregoing, as ‘a relatively low hurdle for an applicant seeking an order’.506 The criterion of ‘fairness’, moreover, is amenable to taking into account (albeit not governed by)507 the compensatory purpose of an award of costs,508 which informs the usual ‘rule’ that costs follow the event.509 8.92 The factors listed in s 88(1A) are five-fold. First, the tribunal must consider ‘whether a party has conducted the proceedings in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged another party to the proceedings’.510 By way of illustration it cites, inter alia, failing to comply with an order or direction of the tribunal without reasonable excuse, failing to comply with a relevant statute or rule, causing an adjournment, attempting to deceive another party or the tribunal, or vexatiously conducting the proceedings. Second, the tribunal must inquire into ‘whether a party has been responsible for prolonging unreasonably the time taken to complete the proceedings’.511 Third, ‘the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties, including whether a party has made a claim that has no tenable basis in fact or law’512 form the next inquiry. Fourth, ‘the nature and complexity of the proceedings’ must be considered.513 Fifth, there is the usual catch-all provision, ‘any other matter that the Tribunal considers relevant’.514 Whereas the first and second factors, it seems, set out various aspects of litigation that would generally have fallen into the former concept of ‘special circumstances’,515 the remaining factors are fresh. As to the third factor, the appeal tribunal has noted that while succeeding on appeal would not by itself ordinarily make it fair to award costs against the unsuccessful party, the strength of the appeal is relevant.516 Even if a claim is not ‘unarguable, unreasonable or untenable’ it may still prove fair to award costs.517 Yet it may be that there needs to be a ‘high level’ of relative weakness of a party’s case to justify making a costs award.518 It is, in any case, more likely to be

fair to award costs against a party who brings a weak appeal than against a party who brings a weak case to the tribunal at first instance, especially where the tribunal’s decisions on the point at first instance have been consistent.519 8.93 The fourth factor, at least via its reference to ‘the nature … of the proceedings’, envisages that there may be a differential attitude to awarding costs depending on the nature of the case. In this respect, there is no great shift in the jurisprudence. Commercial-type cases had already been disproportionately represented in costs awards under the former s 88, especially [page 254] in the Retail Leases Division of the tribunal.520 The position was, and remains, different when dealing with, say, litigation before the Equal Opportunity Division. In the latter context, the President of the tribunal has made the following observation:521 The equal opportunity jurisdiction serves the important social purpose of providing a facility for the resolution of grievances over perceived unlawful discrimination against individuals on the basis of irrelevant personal characteristics or attributes, such as gender, race and marital status. The making of costs orders may discourage people from airing their grievances. The primary rule reinforces these public interest objectives. The exception is not lightly to be applied.

Consistent with this observation, both under the former and the current s 88, there are decisions evincing a disinclination to make costs orders against (unsuccessful) applicants in anti-discrimination matters.522 8.94 It has been suggested by the tribunal that the ‘real key’ to understanding the new s 88 amendments is the fifth catch-all factor.523 The words ‘any other matter that the Tribunal considers relevant’ have been branded as:524 … very, very wide words, quite deliberately chosen by the Parliament, which quite clearly enjoin this Tribunal to look very carefully at the concept/principle of fairness and to widen the scope, without restriction, of the various aspects of the litigation — indeed, all the aspects of the litigation — that may result in a finding that the Tribunal is satisfied that it is fair to award costs.

It stands to reason that this final factor should not be restricted by any ejusdem generis interpretation.525 It is, though, as a matter of principle confined in its targeting of matters in relation to the proceedings.526

Ouster of General Costs Rule by Agreement 8.95 A court order imposes an independent obligation of payment on an unsuccessful party. It does not affect any other rights of the parties in relation to the costs of the proceedings.527 As a consequence, it is possible that a person may be answerable for legal costs as the result of contractual obligations as well as by court order. Mansfield v Robinson528 provides an illustration. Parties to an arbitration agreed in advance that the successful party would be entitled to costs on the High Court scale. The arbitrator, unaware of the agreement, ordered that each party pay its own costs. The court held the agreement was enforceable. Salter J distinguished ‘between an [page 255] agreement which tends to divert the course of justice and prevent it reaching its proper goal, and an agreement which merely regulates the rights of the parties after the course of justice has reached its proper goal’,529 concluding that ‘it is quite consistent with the judge’s order directing that the costs to be paid by the parties that one party shall agree to pay the other party his costs, and pay them out of what fund he pleases’.530 More generally, aside from specifying costs consequences as between parties to transactions, the main issue is often how costs are to be quantified, which in turn heavily rests on matters of construction of the words used.531 Again, contract in this context can supply a claim independent from a court order.532 8.96 Agreements of these kinds, like any other contract, may be vitiated by the undue influence, mistake, fraud or unconscionable conduct, whether at general law or pursuant to statute.

1.

See 7.2–7.6.

2.

See 6.15.

3.

See 8.25–8.61.

4.

See 8.62–8.68.

5.

See 8.69–8.94.

6.

See 8.95–8.96.

7.

See 8.2–8.13.

8.

Public interest and test case litigation is dealt with separately in Ch 9.

9.

The issue of costs out of a fund is dealt with separately in Ch 10.

10. See Ch 13. 11. See Ch 12. 12. As to the meaning of the phrase ‘general costs of the action’ see 1.22. 13. Wheeler v Riverside Coal Transport Co Pty Ltd [1964] Qd R 113 at 117 per Wanstall J. 14. Fuller v Municipal Tramways Trust [1921] SASR 109 at 111 per Poole J; Shercliff v Engadine Acceptance Corp Pty Ltd (No 2) (1982) 3 BPR 9207 at 9208 per Powell J (SC(NSW)). 15. Myers v Defries (No 2) (1880) 5 Ex D 5 at 17 per Pollock B (affd Myers v Defries (No 2) (1880) 5 Ex D 180); O’Sullivan v Morton [1911] VLR 249 at 261 per Hodges J; Reid, Hewitt & Co v Joseph [1918] AC 717 at 733 per Lord Finlay LC; Commissioner of Main Roads v Sherry [1964] Qd R 388 at 394 per Wanstall J; Van Essen v Lee [1971] Tas SR 324 at 326 per Neasey J; Interchase Corporation Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2003] 1 Qd R 26 at 60–1; [2001] QCA 191; BC200102580 per McPherson JA. 16. Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 5) [1994] 1 Qd R 156 at 208 (FC). 17. Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 at 12 per Bray CJ. 18. Howell v Dering [1915] 1 KB 54 at 62–3 per Buckley LJ. 19. Reid, Hewitt & Co v Joseph [1918] AC 717 at 738. See also Jelbarts Pty Ltd v McDonald [1919] VLR 478 at 479–80 per Irvine CJ; Fuller v Municipal Tramways Trust [1921] SASR 109 at 111 per Poole J (referring to, inter alia, ‘some separate cause of action included in the action, or to some portion of a separate cause of action’); Windsurfing International Inc v Petit (1987) AIPC ¶90-441 at 37,861–2 per Waddell J (SC(NSW)). 20. Colburt v Beard [1992] 2 Qd R 67 at 70 per Thomas J. 21. Keith Bray Pty Ltd v Hamburg-Amerikanische [1970] 3 NSWR 226 at 227 per Macfarlan J. See also Armstrong v Landmark Corporation Ltd [1967] 1 NSWR 13 at 15 per Street J. 22. Permanent Building Society v Wheeler (No 2) (1993) 10 WAR 569 at 574 per Anderson J. 23. Dubbo Refrigerating & Co v Rutherford (1898) 14 WN (NSW) 180 at 182 per Darley CJ (FC); Glasson v Barry (1912) 12 SR (NSW) 716 at 731 per Pring J, at 735 per Gordon J (FC); Laguillo v Haden Engineering Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 306 at 308 per Reynolds JA; Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association Inc (1986) ATPR ¶40-748 at 48,136 per Toohey J (FCA); Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 568; BC9002896 per McHugh J; Sheehy v Mitchell Crane Hire Pty Ltd (1991) 104 FLR 96 at 106 per Higgins J (SC(ACT)). 24. Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd v Qantas Airways Ltd [2003] FCA 325; BC200301632 at [4] per Finkelstein J. See also Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 261 at 272; BC9304823 (FC(FCA)) (‘the demands of the community for greater economy and efficiency in the conduct of litigation may properly be reflected in a qualification of the presumption that a successful party is entitled to all its costs’); Evans Deakin Pty Ltd v Sebel Furniture Ltd [2003] FCA 282; BC200301395 at [13] per Allsop J. 25. Barescape Pty Ltd v Bacchus Holdings Pty Ltd (No 12) [2012] NSWSC 1591; BC201210768 at

[6] per Black J, referring to Chell Engineering Ltd v Unit Tool & Engineering Co Ltd [1950] 1 All ER 378 at 380 per Singleton LJ, at 383 per Denning LJ; Godden v Alford [1960] WAR 235 at 236–7 per Hale J. Compare, for example, Visible Results Properties Inc v Sushi Train (Australia) Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 514; BC200703107 (where Allsop J ordered that an unsuccessful applicant/cross-respondent (‘Visible Results’) pay the costs of the respondent/cross-claimant (‘Sushi Train’) of the application and that Sushi Train pay Visible Results’ costs of the crossclaim) with Polwood Pty Ltd v Foxworth (No 2) (2008) 79 IPR 168; [2008] FCAFC 168; BC200808846 at [12], [13] per the court (where the result of an appeal and cross-appeal were aggregated in view of the overlap between them, their Honours pointing to the undesirability of potentially separate taxation of the costs of an appeal and cross-appeal giving rise to disputes as to whether a particular attendance was a cost in one or the other). 26. Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (SC(NSW), Hodgson CJ, 3 June 1998, unreported) BC9802305 at 13. See, for example, Wenpac Pty Ltd v Allied Westralian Finance Ltd (1994) 123 FLR 1 at 70; BC9401476 per Malcolm CJ (SC(WA)) (where the plaintiff succeeded on one technical point that lacked intrinsic merit, the justice of the case requiring a limited order for costs in favour of the plaintiff as against the defendant but otherwise that the plaintiff should pay the defendant’s costs of the action). 27. [2007] FCA 557; BC200702800 at [23]. See also Orrong Strategies Pty Ltd v Village Roadshow Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSC 205; BC200704581 at [14] per Habersberger J (an issue by issue approach ‘would only be appropriate in the clearest of cases, where the successful party has wholly failed in a separate and discrete issue or issues’); Mickelberg v State of Western Australia [2007] WASC 140 (S); BC200705917 at [43], [44] per Newnes J; Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell [2007] WASCA 158 (S); BC200801646 at [7] per the court (‘the power to adjust an order for costs by reference to particular issues upon which the generally successful party has failed, is properly exercised only where there are discrete and severable issues upon which the generally successful party has failed, and which have added to the cost of the proceedings in a significant and readily discernible way’); GT Corporation Pty Ltd v Amare Safety Pty Ltd (No 3) [2008] VSC 296; BC200807227 at [59]–[64] per Robson J. 28. Mickelberg v State of Western Australia [2007] WASC 140 (S); BC200705917 at [46] per Newnes J (‘Where the Court does take the course of disallowing costs by reference to a particular issue or issues, the exercise of discretion that is involved in doing so will often be more a matter of art than science’); Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal (No 2) [2009] FCAFC 34; BC200901762 at [15] per the court (noting that an issues approach can involve ‘a nit-picking exercise which would obscure and ignore the ultimate result’). 29. See 8.7–8.8. However, in the Federal Court in particular, there remain judges who favour a more widespread application of an issue-by-issue approach: see, for example, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v IMB Group Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 886; BC200204952 at [29], [30] per Drummond J; Griffiths v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd (No 2) (2006) 157 FCR 112; [2006] FCAFC 196; BC200610875 at [4] per Dowsett J; Bowen Investments Pty Ltd v Tabcorp Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCAFC 107; BC200804480 at [3]–[5] per Finkelstein and Gordon JJ. 30. Bowen v Alsanto Nominees Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 39 (S); BC201105691 at [6]–[7] per the court (paragraph break omitted). 31. Spotless Group Ltd v Premier Building and Consulting Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 115; BC200804692 at [15] per Redlich JA. 32. Cinema Press Ltd v Pictures & Pleasures Ltd [1945] KB 356 at 363–4 per Lord Goddard (CA); Re Carter Newell’s Bill of Costs [1996] 2 Qd R 13 at 19; BC9404358 per Dowsett J; Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) (1998) 30 ACSR 20 at 24–5; BC9806555 per Young J

(SC(NSW)); Roberts v Rodier [2006] NSWSC 1084; BC200608337 at [33] per Campbell J; BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v National Competition Council (No 2) [2007] FCA 557; BC200702800 at [27] per Middleton J; Territory Sheet Metal Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 3) [2010] NTSC 13; BC201002014 at [58] per Olsson AJ (speaking in terms of a ‘percentage abatement’, based on an overall impression). 33. Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 261 at 272; BC9304823 (FC(FCA)). 34. Bowen Investments Pty Ltd v Tabcorp Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCAFC 107; BC200804480 at [3]–[5] per Finkelstein and Gordon JJ (noting that ‘the award of costs on an issue by issue basis has only been accepted in limited cases and then only when the circumstances are exceptional’, but that ‘[t]his approach is … quite unfair’, as its effect can be that a winner is entitled to all of his costs even if he raises a plethora of issues on which he is unsuccessful: at [3]–[4]). 35. Re Elgindata Ltd (No 2) [1992] 1 WLR 1207 at 1214 per Nourse LJ; Mizzi v Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 37; BC200701663 at [96] per Brereton J; State of Victoria v Sportsbet Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 174; BC201209565 at [8] per the court (‘The mere fact that a court does not accept all of a successful party’s arguments does not make it appropriate to deal with costs on an issue by issue basis’). 36. Peterson v Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 5) (2010) 87 IPR 234; [2010] FCA 605; BC201004085 at [44] per Jessup J. 37. Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 at 16. 38. Victoria v Master Builders Association of Victoria (FC(Vic), 15 December 1994, Tadgell, Ormiston and Eames JJ, unreported) BC9406430 at 6–7 per Ormiston J; GT Corporation Pty Ltd v Amare Safety Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 296; BC200807227 at [59] per Robson J; Pharmos Nominees Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Taxation (No 2) [2012] SASC 34; BC201201360 at [9] per Gray J. 39. Mok v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1993) 47 FCR 81 at 84; BC9305172 per Keely J; Rediffusion Simulation Ltd v Link-Miles Ltd [1993] FSR 369 at 410 per Aldous J; Patent Gesellschaft AG v Saudi Livestock Transport and Trading Company (1996) 33 IPR 461 at 464; BC9607070 per Olney J (FCA); AMP Services Ltd v Manning (No 3) [2007] FCA 510; BC200702466 at [4], [5] per Finkelstein J. Cf Windsurfing International Inc v Petit (1987) AIPC ¶90-441 at 37,863 per Waddell J (SC(NSW)). 40. (1993) 47 FCR 81 at 89; BC9305172. 41. Compare, for example, Todrell Pty Ltd v Finch [2008] 2 Qd R 95; [2007] QSC 386; BC200710945 at [24]–[26] per Chesterman J (where the defendants failed on a defence that took up three days of a four day trial, which defence was both baseless and separable from the questions of law on which the case turned; as a result, the defendants put the plaintiff to the costs of proving an issue, ‘expensive as it turned out, on which the justice of the case was against them’ (at [24]), and so were allowed their costs for a one day trial but were ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs for three days of the trial) with Emirates v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (No 2) [2009] FCA 492; BC200904147 at [11] per Middleton J (where fairness did not dictate an ‘issues’ approach, as the canvassing of the issues were said not to have been successfully argued by the respondents and did not involve appreciably extra court time or expense than otherwise would have been necessary to have properly considered the many arguments put by the applicants). 42. Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 at 16 per Jacobs J; Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Razzi (No 2) (1991) 30 FCR 64 at 69; BC9103238 per Wilcox J; F & D Bonaccorso Pty

Ltd v City of Canada Bay Council (No 3) [2007] NSWLEC 569; BC200707726 at [16] per Biscoe J; Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Public Transport Authority of Western Australia (No 7) [2009] WASC 218; BC200907127 at [19] per Le Miere J; Territory Sheet Metal Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 3) [2010] NTSC 13; BC201002014 at [32] per Olsson AJ (the judges in the last two cases citing the first edition of this work, at 8.9, with approval to this end). Cf Leading Edge Events Australia Pty Ltd v Te Kanawa (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 568; BC200704399 at [10]–[11] per Bergin J (noting that in New South Wales the approach to raising issues is impacted upon by the requirement that, in an action for damages, a lawyer provide a certificate under s 347 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) certifying that reasonable grounds existed for believing, on the basis of provable facts and a reasonably arguable view of the law, that the claim had reasonable prospects of success). 43. Kaycliff Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1989) 19 ALD 315 at 316–17 per Morling J (FCA); Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Holloway (2000) 35 ACSR 276; [2000] FCA 1245; BC200005264 at [52] per Mansfield J. 44. Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 at 16 per Jacobs J (who sounded ‘a note of cautious disapproval of applications … to apportion costs according only to the success or failure of one party or other on the various issues of fact or law’); Mond v Berger (2005) 21 BCL 125; [2004] VSC 150; BC200402294 at [54] per Dodds-Streeton J (‘issue apportionment should be sparingly exercised’); Roluke Pty Ltd v Lamaro Consultants Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 671; BC200705050 at [29] per Nicholas J (who in the circumstances found it inappropriate ‘to adopt a scoreboard approach’); Mickelberg v State of Western Australia [2007] WASC 140 (S); BC200705917 at [35] per Newnes J. 45. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Holloway (2000) 35 ACSR 276; [2000] FCA 1245; BC200005264 at [52] per Mansfield J. See also BHP Coal Pty Ltd v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG (No 2) [2009] QSC 64; BC200902338 at [17] per McMurdo J (‘Any such exercise is not merely arithmetical but involves some judgment and approximation’). 46. Australian Trade Commission v Disktravel [2000] FCA 62; BC200000251 at [5] (FC). 47. Beagle Holdings Pty Ltd v Equus Financial Services Ltd [2000] WASC 128; BC200002638 at [32] per Templeman J. See also Rosselli v Rosselli (No 2) [2007] VSC 438; BC200709781 at [10] per Forrest J (‘necessarily impressionistic, judgmental and, to an extent, intuitive’); HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v Dierickx (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1430; BC201210601 at [32] per White J (‘necessarily impressionistic and intuitive’, and requiring the ‘weighing of incommensurables’). 48. MacKinnon v Petersen (SC(NSW), Cole J, 19 April 1989, unreported) BC8902277; Westgold Resources NL v St George Bank Ltd (SC(WA), Anderson J, 9 December 1998, unreported) BC9806689; Nigel Witham Ltd v Smith [2008] TCLR 3; [2008] EWHC 12 (TCC) at [6] per Peter Coulson QC. 49. Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) (1998) 30 ACSR 20 at 22; BC9806555 per Young J (SC(NSW)). See also Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v Peninsula Balmain Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] NSWSC 1016; BC200106971 at [40] per Barrett J. 50. (2000) 174 ALR 53 at 57; BC200004453 (HCA). See also Inn Leisure Industries Pty Ltd v D F McCloy Pty Ltd (No 2) (1991) 28 FCR 172 at 174 per French J. 51. Sanders v Snell (No 2) (2000) 174 ALR 53 at 57; BC200004453 per Kirby J (HC). See also Yorke v Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd [1918] 1 KB 662 at 673 per McCardie J; Waters v P C Henderson (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 254 ALR 328 at 331; BC9404952 per Mahoney JA (who remarked that it was contrary to the trend of case authority to attempt to determine which issues were won by the parties, and to what extent they were won and what was the amount of time spent on each of those

issues so as to apportion the costs); Slack-Smith v Director-General of the Department of Land and Water Conservation (No 2) (2003) 129 LGERA 340; [2003] NSWLEC 266; BC200306615 at [6] per Talbot J. 52. See, for example, Re Madden as Official Liquidator of Aquanaut Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) [2001] NSWSC 1051; BC200107586 at [4] per Hamilton J. 53. Re Elgindata Ltd (No 2) [1992] 1 WLR 1207 at 1216 per Nourse LJ; Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v Peninsula Balmain Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] NSWSC 1016; BC200106971 at [39]–[40] per Barrett J. 54. [1996] FCA 1341; BC9600947 at [33] per Heerey J. 55. See, for example, Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1989) AIPC ¶90-567 at 38,940–1 per McLelland J (SC(NSW)); Leading Edge Events Australia Pty Ltd v Te Kanawa (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 568; BC200704399 at [25]–[26] per Bergin J; Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCAFC 172; BC200709927 at [9] per the court (in the context of complex patent litigation); McFadzean v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (2007) 20 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 289; BC200710889 at [158] per the court. 56. Gold v Patman and Fotheringham Ltd [1958] 2 All ER 497 at 503 per Sellers LJ. See also Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 at 53 per Lord Sterndale MR; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (No 3) (2002) ATPR ¶41-901; [2002] FCA 1294; BC200206240 at [55] per Goldberg J; Emanuel Management Pty Ltd (in liq) v Fosters Brewing Group Ltd [2003] QSC 299; BC200305315 at [85] per Chesterman J; Todrell Pty Ltd v Finch [2008] 2 Qd R 95; [2007] QSC 386; BC200710945 at [19]–[21] per Chesterman J; Hennessy v Lynch (No 4) (2008) 7 DCLR(NSW) 24; [2008] NSWDC 15; BC200840124 at [6] per Gibson DCJ; Griffith v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 145; BC201103885 at [19] per Hodgson JA, with whom McClellan CJ at CL agreed, and with whom Basten JA also agreed on this point; Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney South West Area Health Service (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 171; BC201104714 at [10] per Hodgson JA, with whom Allsop P and Macfarlan JA concurred; BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corp Pty Ltd v Steuler Industriewerke GmbH (No 3) [2012] VSC 414; BC201206949 at [42] per Habersberger J. 57. Evans Deakin Pty Ltd v Sebel Furniture Ltd [2003] FCA 282; BC200301395 at [7] per Allsop J. 58. [1991] 2 VR 568 at 569. 59. Cf HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v Dierickx (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1430; BC201210601 at [20] per White J (who opined that ‘it is not clear why a successful plaintiff who fails on particular severable issues that were nonetheless reasonably raised could not equally say that his claim should have been satisfied without recourse to litigation, that is, should never have been defended, and he should not have been put in the position of having to raise separate issues on which he did not succeed’). 60. Byrns v Davie [1991] 2 VR 568 at 569. 61. Byrns v Davie [1991] 2 VR 568 at 571. 62. Pursuant to the Access to Justice (Civil Litigation Reforms) Amendment Act 2009 (Cth). 63. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(3)(b). 64. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(3)(c). 65. PGA Group Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 789) Ltd [2011] VSC 420; BC201106666 at [16]–[18] per Davies J (in the context of the Victorian provision, discussed in the text). 66. Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 49(3)(k).

67. Pursuant to the Civil Procedure Amendment Act 2012 (Vic). 68. The overarching purpose of the Act is ‘to facilitate the just, efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of the real issues in dispute’: Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 7(1). 69. Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 65C(2)(a), 65C(2)(b). 70. WA O 66 rr 1(3), 2(a). 71. Kimpura Pty Ltd v JWH Group Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 134; BC200403774 at [12]–[15] per Pullin J; Keet v Ward [2011] WASCA 139; BC201104765 at [24] per the court. 72. (1993) 10 WAR 569 at 574. 73. Permanent Building Society v Wheeler (No 2) (1993) 10 WAR 569 at 574–5. 74. See 8.25. 75. Qld RSC O 91 r 3. 76. Namely Code of Civil Procedure (NZ) r 565, as to which see Jamieson v Burgess (1912) 15 GLR 393; MacDonald v Pottinger [1953] NZLR 196 at 212 per North J (SC); Dunford Publicity Studios Ltd v News Media Ownership Ltd [1971] NZLR 961 at 969 per Macarthur J (SC). 77. See 8.3. 78. Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 5) [1994] 1 Qd R 156 at 208 (FC). 79. Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 5) [1994] 1 Qd R 156 at 208 (FC). 80. [1994] 1 Qd R 156 (FC). 81. Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 5) [1994] 1 Qd R 156 at 208–9 (FC). 82. Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 5) [1994] 1 Qd R 156 at 209 (FC). 83. Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 5) [1994] 1 Qd R 156 at 209–10 (FC). 84. ACT r 1705(1); NT r 63.05; Qld r 684(1) (formerly r 682(1)); Vic r 63.04(1). 85. Namely Qld r 681(1) (formerly r 689(1)) (as to which see 7.4); BHP Coal Pty Ltd v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG (No 2) [2009] QSC 64; BC200902338 at [7] per McMurdo J (who noted that Qld r 684 provides an exception to the general rule that ‘costs should follow the event’, and surmised that ‘the circumstances which would engage r 684 are exceptional circumstances’; yet it appears that the use of the phrase ‘exceptional circumstances’ in this context is directed to identifying circumstances falling outside the ordinary that make it fair as between the parties to oust the usual rule, as opposed to identifying circumstances that are truly exceptional as a legal threshold; see the remarks, albeit in a different context, of Porter J in Gunns Ltd v Alishah (No 3) (2009) 19 Tas R 401; [2009] TASSC 103; BC200910329 at [32]). 86. ACT r 1705(2); Qld r 684(2) (formerly r 682(2)); Vic r 63.04(2). 87. See 8.2–8.9. 88. Interchase Corporation Ltd v ACN 010 087 573 Pty Ltd (2000) 45 ATR 445; [2000] QSC 13; BC200000188 at [35] per White J. 89. Interchase Corporation Ltd v ACN 010 087 573 Pty Ltd (2000) 45 ATR 445; [2000] QSC 13; BC200000188 at [35] per White J. 90. Bowen Investments Pty Ltd v Tabcorp Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCAFC 107; BC200804480 at [5] per Finkelstein and Gordon JJ. 91. Pringle v Gloag (1879) 10 Ch D 676 at 679 per Jessel MR.

92. Tas r 857(1) (which adds that on any adjustment being made, the registrar must draw up and sign an order to that effect, which may be enforced in the same manner as an order for costs made by the court: r 857(3), 857(4)). 93. In the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland, assessed. 94. In the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland, the registrar; in Victoria, the Costs Court; in Western Australia, the taxing officer. 95. ACT r 1833(1) (cf former ACT RSC O 65 r 44); NT r 63.53(1); Qld r 741(1) (formerly Qld r 734(1)); Vic r 63.55(1); WA O 66 r 59. 96. SA r 266(1) (cf former SA RSC r 101.01(1)(c)). 97. Barker & Co v Hemming (1880) 5 QBD 609 at 611 per James LJ (‘It cannot be supposed that the rule would apply to costs incurred by them in a distinct action in a different branch of the court, and it can just as little apply to the costs incurred in this interpleader, which is a proceeding distinct from the action’), at 612 per Brett LJ, at 612 per Cotton LJ; David v Rees [1904] 2 KB 435; Matter of Scott, Sibbald and Company Pty Ltd (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 634 at 636 per Street J. 98. [1915] 2 KB 147 at 152 per Buckley LJ, at 154 per Phillimore LJ, at 155–6 per Pickford LJ. 99. Butcher v Colonial Wholesale Meat Co Ltd (1921) 38 WN (NSW) 24 at 25 per the Prothonotary (referring to Goodfellow v Gray [1899] 2 QB 498 and Reid v Cupper [1915] 2 KB 147); Wentworth v Wentworth (SC(NSW), Young J, 12 December 1994, unreported) BC9403409; Miller v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 249; BC200405423 at [23]–[25] per Young CJ in Eq (who considered that the scope of power to order set-off of costs orders certainly extends to the situation where there have been two sets of proceedings based on the same factual matrix: at [25]); Evans and Tate Premium Wines Pty Ltd v Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Ltd (2006) 230 ALR 184; [2006] NSWSC 560; BC200404222 at [68] per White J (appeal allowed in part but without casting doubt on this statement of principle: Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Ltd v Evans and Tate Premium Wines Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 374; [2007] NSWCA 57; BC200701811). 100. See 6.14–6.15. 101. Wentworth v Wentworth (SC(NSW), Young J, 12 December 1994, unreported) BC9403409 at 3–4. 102. Miller v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 249; BC200405423 at [13] per Beazley JA (dissenting but not on this point). 103. See, for example, Miller v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 249; BC200405423 per Young CJ in Eq and Sheller JA. 104. See, for example, Slaveski v State of Victoria [2013] VSC 76; BC201300831 at [23]–[27] per McMillan J (albeit in the context of damages set off against costs). 105. See 27.26–27.29. 106. As to the Statutes of Set-Off and equitable set-off see Dal Pont, Equity and Trusts, pp 912–19. 107. Evans and Tate Premium Wines Pty Ltd v Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Ltd (2006) 230 ALR 184; [2006] NSWSC 560; BC200404222 at [68] per White J (appeal allowed in part but without casting doubt on this statement of principle: Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Ltd v Evans and Tate Premium Wines Pty Ltd (2007) 69 NSWLR 374; [2007] NSWCA 57; BC200701811) (noting that although in Edwards v Hope (1885) 14 QBD 922 (see at 926 per Brett MR, at 927 per Bowen LJ) the jurisdiction was described as an equitable jurisdiction, it was not a creature of the Court of Chancery, but was applied by all courts, and indeed was applied more liberally in the courts of law than in the Court of Chancery owing to Lord Eldon’s care that

solicitors should not be deprived of liens for their costs); Team Dynamik Racing Pty Ltd v Longhurst Racing Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 36; BC200801227 at [14] per Fryberg J (rejecting the obiter remarks of Dutney J in Elphick v Elliott [2003] 1 Qd R 362; [2002] QSC 285; BC200205503 at [13]–[16] that the court’s power to order set-off was one based on an equitable right of set-off arising from the close connection between claims in an action); Sivritas v Sivritas (No 2) (2008) 23 VR 349; [2008] VSC 580; BC200811374 at [20]–[22] per Kyrou J; Lahoud v Lahoud [2012] NSWSC 284; BC201201634 at [72]–[79] per Ward J; Slaveski v State of Victoria [2013] VSC 76; BC201300831 at [16] per McMillan J. Cf Lockley v National Blood Transfusion Service [1992] 1 WLR 492. 108. Edwards v Hope (1884) 14 QBD 922 at 926 per Brett MR; Reid v Cupper [1915] 2 KB 147 at 149 per Buckley LJ; Puddephatt v Leith (No 2) [1916] 2 Ch 168 at 173–4 per Younger J; Elphick v MMI General Insurance Ltd [2002] QCA 347; BC200205205 at [7] per Jerrard JA. 109. (1879) 10 Ch D 676 at 679. 110. SA r 266(1) (cf former SA RSC r 101.01(1)(c), as to which see McGregor-Dey v South Australian College of Advanced Education (1993) 171 LSJS 290; Settlement Wine Co Pty Ltd v National & General Insurance Co (No 2) (1994) 175 LSJS 282; BC9400551; see also Gertig v Davies (2003) 85 SASR 226; [2003] SASC 86; BC200301269 at [23] per Doyle CJ); WA O 66 r 7. Although the equivalent provision in the previous Queensland rules (namely Qld RSC O 91 r 11) has not been replicated in the current rules, the court’s inherent jurisdiction in this respect continues to apply: Elphick v MMI General Insurance Ltd [2002] QCA 347; BC200205205 at [7] per Jerrard JA. The same can be said of the former High Court and Australian Capital Territory rules (see HCR 1952 O 71 r 12(1); ACT RSC O 65 r 10). 111. Watkins Ltd v Ranger Uranium Mines Pty Ltd (1985) 35 NTR 27 at 42 per Nader J. 112. Watkins Ltd v Ranger Uranium Mines Pty Ltd (1985) 35 NTR 27 at 42 per Nader J. 113. (1974) 5 ACTR 10. 114. D Galambos & Son Pty Ltd v McIntyre (1974) 5 ACTR 10 at 26. 115. (1902) 18 WN (NSW) 287. See also O’Sullivan v Morton [1911] VLR 249 at 260 per Madden CJ (FC). 116. As to this discretion see 6.14–6.20. 117. See, for example, Seward v Quigley (1901) 18 WN (NSW) 35; Re Gardner’s Trusts (1902) 19 WN (NSW) 106. 118. See, for example, Re Commissioners for Railways (1902) 18 WN (NSW) 296 at 297 per A H Simpson CJ. 119. See, for example, Re Ewer (1903) 4 SR (NSW) 240. 120. See, for example, Dore v Gormley (1962) 9 LGRA 187 at 190 per Gibbs J (SC(Qld)); Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Edmunds [1989] 1 Qd R 271 at 273 per Matthews J (FC). 121. See, for example, Venning v Chin (1974) 8 SASR 397 at 417 per Hogarth J. 122. See, for example, Russell v Adwan Pty Ltd (2000) 144 ACTR 1; [2000] ACTSC 90; BC200006188 at [76]–[81] per Miles CJ. 123. Although the South Australian rules appear, on one reading, to exhaustively state the exceptions to the ‘costs follow the event’ rule, the rules have not been interpreted as having that effect: see 8.22. 124. HCR 2004 r 56.12.1 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 65(1)).

125. HCR 2004 r 56.12.2 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 65(2)). 126. FCR 1979 O 62 r 36(1). 127. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(3)(e), enacted with effect on 1 January 2010 pursuant to the Access to Justice (Civil Litigation Reforms) Amendment Act 2009 (Cth). 128. FCR 2011 r 40.06. 129. ACT r 1754(1)(a) (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 43, which used the words ‘improper’, ‘vexatious’ and ‘unnecessary’: see The Edison (No 2) [1934] P 115 at 131–2 per Maugham LJ; Biernacki v Klenka (1988) 80 ACTR 1 at 7 per Kelly J). 130. ACT r 1754(1)(b) (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 43). 131. ACT r 1754(2) (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 43). 132. As prescribed by SA r 263(1). 133. These exceptions are listed in SA r 263(2), and most are discussed variously throughout this text: see 14.36 (r 263(2)(a)), 14.42 (r 263(2)(b)), 14.38 (r 263(2)(d)), 14.31 (r 263(2)(e)), 12.9 (r 263(2) (f)), 12.9 (r 263(2)(g)), 12.9 (r 263(2)(h)). 134. Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 40(1). 135. Copping v ANZ McCaughan Ltd (1995) 63 SASR 523 at 527–8; BC9503036 per King CJ (FC); Kingscote District Council v Kangaroo Island Eco Action Inc (No 2) (1996) 67 SASR 422 at 425; BC9605560 per Doyle CJ (FC). See also Barameda Enterprises Pty Ltd v O’Connor [1988] 1 Qd R 359 at 391 per McPherson J (FC) (to the same effect dealing with the former Qld RSC O 91 r 1, which is similar to the present Qld r 681). 136. Copping v ANZ McCaughan Ltd (1995) 63 SASR 523 at 527; BC9503036 per King CJ (FC). 137. Tas r 841(1). 138. Tas r 841(2). 139. Tas r 69. 140. Tas r 528(3). 141. Where a document is of unnecessary length, work that is not necessary is to include work for that part of the document that is not necessary: Vic r 63.70(2). 142. Vic r 63.70(1). 143. Vic r 63.70(3). 144. As to orders that successful litigants pay costs see 8.62–8.68. 145. Mann v Carnell (2001) 159 FLR 466; [2001] ACTSC 18; BC200100973 at [8] per Miles CJ. 146. Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant (No 2) [1968] VR 533 at 534 per Gillard J; Laguillo v Haden Engineering Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 306 at 308 per Reynolds JA. 147. Austen v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 403; BC9304959 at [58] per Burchett J. 148. Smeaton Hanscomb & Co Ltd v Sassoon I Setty, Son & Co (No 2) [1953] 2 All ER 1588 at 1590 per Devlin J. 149. Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 at 52 per Lord Sterndale MR. 150. Voyce v Lawrie [1952] NZLR 984 at 987 per F B Adams J (SC).

151. Cates v Glass [1920] NZLR 37 at 54 per Chapman J (CA). 152. Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306 at 338 per Danckwerts LJ. 153. Forlyle Pty Ltd v Tiver [2007] SADC 55; BC200740702 at [13]–[18] per Judge Tilmouth. 154. Cates v Glass [1920] NZLR 37 at 68 per Edwards J (CA) (emphasis in original). See also Gunns Ltd v Alishah (No 3) (2009) 19 Tas R 401; [2009] TASSC 103; BC200910329 at [29] per Porter J (‘It is not the law, however, that there is a threshold test of exceptional or special circumstances, or any like requirement, to be satisfied before the general rule is departed from. The touchstone is that which is required to do justice between the parties’). 155. Jones v Curling (1884) 13 QBD 262 at 272 per Bowen LJ; Foster v Farquhar [1893] 1 QB 564 at 567–8 per Bowen LJ; Bostock v Ramsey Urban District Council [1900] 2 QB 616 at 622 per A L Smith LJ, at 625 per Vaughan Williams LJ; Cates v Glass [1920] NZLR 37 at 54 per Chapman J (CA). 156. For example, in Levy v Watt (No 2) [2012] VSC 580; BC201209281 at [14] Habersberger J noted that it is not relevant to the question of costs that the proceeding turned on legal not factual issues, reasoning that ‘litigants lose cases on questions of law every day of the week but that is no basis to deprive successful defendants of any of their costs’. 157. Huxley v West London Extension Railway Co (1889) 14 App Cas 26 at 33–4 per Lord Watson; Bostock v Ramsey Urban District Council [1900] 2 QB 616 at 622 per A L Smith LJ, at 627 per Romer LJ; Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 at 66 per Eve J; Petera Pty Ltd v EAJ Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 375 at 380–1 per Wilcox J; Durham v Collins [1999] SASC 163; BC9901923 at [18] per Debelle J (ruling that a litigant’s motives in pursuing the litigation are irrelevant for this purpose); Total & Universal Pty Ltd v Kingsway Property Investments (No 2) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 581; BC200710196 at [30] per Campbell JA. That WA O 66 r 1(2) provides that, if the court is of opinion that the conduct of a party ‘either before or after the commencement of the litigation’ (emphasis supplied) has resulted in costs being unnecessarily or unreasonably incurred, it may deprive that party of costs, should not be interpreted as ousting the requirement that the conduct exhibit a connection with the suit. This is due to the link between the conduct, even though before the commencement of the suit, and costs being unnecessarily or unreasonably incurred in the suit. 158. Hunt v McKay (FC(WA), Malcolm CJ, Rowland and Seaman JJ, 7 November 1991, unreported) BC9100912 at 6 per Seaman J (in taking into account certain ‘background’ circumstances in making an exceptional costs order (namely the fact that the unsuccessful respondent was not legally represented and believed that she had been defrauded by the appellant, and the lack of proper legal assistance available to litigants in commercial matters), the trial judge’s discretion had miscarried). 159. Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (in liq) v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1176; BC200609151 at [12] per Einstein J (emphasis in original). See also Edmund v Martell (1907) 24 TLR 25 at 26 per Buckley LJ; Charteris v General Manager, Leichhardt Municipal Council (No 2) [2001] NSWADTAP 39 at [22] (‘caution must be observed in allowing costs applications to become a vehicle for the general scrutiny of the conduct of one of the parties prior to the commencement of the litigation’). 160. Donald Campbell & Co Ltd v Pollak [1927] AC 732 at 741–2 per Viscount Cave LC; Hobbs v Marlowe [1978] AC 16 at 39 per Lord Diplock; Petera Pty Ltd v EAJ Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 375 at 380–1 per Wilcox J. 161. [1905] 2 Ch 7. 162. F King & Co v Gillard & Co [1905] 2 Ch 7 at 11. Cf Instant Colour Pty Ltd v Canon Australia Pty

Ltd (FCA, Nicholson J, 13 December 1996, unreported) BC9606113 at 5–8. 163. F King & Co v Gillard & Co [1905] 2 Ch 7 at 12–13. Stirling LJ, the third member of the court, opined that the case was very near the line, and that had the trial judge exercised his discretion on the ground taken by him combined with other facts of the case, it would have been difficult to interfere with. However, as the judge had singled out this one fact, which it was not open to do, as a ground for depriving the defendants of their costs, there were grounds for an appellate court to intervene: at 14. 164. (2006) 198 FLR 354; [2006] FamCA 256. 165. B v J (2006) 198 FLR 354; [2006] FamCA 256 at [43]. See also Braithwaite v Braithwaite [2007] FamCA 468 at [105] (FC). 166. See, for example, Fitzpatrick v Keelty (No 2) [2008] FCA 742; BC200803832. 167. Selliah v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (FCA, R D Nicholson J, 5 May 1998, unreported) BC9801672 at 4; Hollier v Australian Maritime Safety Authority (No 2) [1998] FCA 975; BC9804016 at 3 (FC); Yilan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1212; BC9905568 at [5] (FC); Tzavellas v Canterbury City Council (1999) 105 LGERA 262 at 264 per Bignold J; Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security (No 2) [2000] FCA 1450; BC200006175 at [4] per Beaumont and French JJ (FC); ACT Fire Brigade v Nester [2004] ACTSC 125; BC200408509 at [41] per Bennett J; Lababidi v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] FCA 1568; BC200708813 at [6] per Kenny J; Lawyers for Forests Inc v Minister for Environment, Heritage and Arts (No 2) [2009] FCA 466; BC200903611 at [17] per Tracey J; Adamson v Liu (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 864; BC200907992 at [25] per Forster J; Edwards v Stocks (2009) 17 Tas R 454; [2009] TASSC 11; BC200901137 at [12] per Blow J, with whom Crawford CJ and Slicer J concurred; Farland v Farland (Costs) [2010] FamCAFC 28; BC201050138; Fay v Moramba Services Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 725; BC201004657 at [3] per Brereton J; Lenova v Lenova (Costs) [2011] FamCAFC 141; BC201150394 at [12] per Murphy J. 168. Board of Examiners v XY (2006) 25 VAR 193; [2006] VSCA 190; BC200607419 at [41] per Nettle JA. 169. Director-General Department of Land and Water Conservation v Ramke [1999] NSWLEC 22; BC9901366 at [44] per Talbot J; WAEY v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1314; BC200306900 at [41] per Lander J. 170. See 7.2. 171. Board of Examiners v XY (2006) 25 VAR 193; [2006] VSCA 190; BC200607419 at [34] per Chernov JA. 172. That it cannot be assumed that a successful party will necessarily seek to enforce the costs order — after all, there is no point incurring further costs if the opponent is impecunious — does not absolve the court from the ‘exemplary’ exercise of its costs jurisdiction: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Seal-A-Fridge Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 681; BC201004485 at [47] per Logan J. Having said that, there are instances in the case law of judges declining to make a costs order against an unsuccessful party by reference to its futility in view of the unsuccessful party’s financial position: see, for example, Evans v Rochford (2003) 30 Fam LR 336; [2003] FamCA 314 (in the family law context); Klement v Randles (No 2) [2010] VSCA 336; BC201009672 (in the probate environment: see at [22]–[25] per Maxwell P and Emerton AJA). 173. Kaufman v Kaufman [2010] FamCA 254; BC201050279 at [42] per Bennett J. See also Rose v Barwon (No 2) [2010] FamCA 738; BC201050816 at [8] per Barry J (‘an impecunious litigant

cannot litigate with impunity and then hide behind the fact of no assets and no income’). 174. Fay v Moramba Services Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 725; BC201004657 at [3] per Brereton J. 175. Board of Examiners v XY (2006) 25 VAR 193; [2006] VSCA 190; BC200607419 at [33] per Chernov JA. 176. See, for example, Tzavellas v Canterbury City Council (1999) 105 LGERA 262 at 265 per Bignold J; CRW v CML (No 2) [2003] FMCAfam 446; BC200306278 at [37] per Walters FM. 177. Underdown v Secretary, Dept of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (No 2) [2009] FCA 1223; BC200909746 at [9] per McKerracher J. 178. See, for example, Director-General Department of Land And Water Conservation v Ramke [1999] NSWLEC 22; BC9901366 at [44]–[51] per Talbot J. Cf R v Gaston [1971] 1 All ER 128n (in the context of legislation that empowers the court to make a costs order in criminal proceedings (see generally Ch 25), it was held that it was not appropriate to make an order for costs when giving a convicted person a considerable sentence unless he or she has private capital). 179. See, for example, Board of Examiners v XY (2006) 25 VAR 193; [2006] VSCA 190; BC200607419 at [34] per Chernov JA. 180. As to the impact of public interest litigation on costs orders see 9.2–9.34. Cf WAFU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FMCA 325; BC200208382 at [37]– [48] per McInnis FM. 181. As to Bullock orders and Sanderson orders generally see 11.12–11.31. 182. See 11.14. 183. See 8.29. 184. Chessels v British Telecommunications plc [2002] PLR 141 at [42] per Laddie J; Harris v Bennett (No 2) [2002] VSC 163; BC200202244 at [16] per McDonald J; Director-General, Department of Education and Training v MT (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 320; BC200609508 at [18] per Spigelman CJ (‘there is no principle that the costs discretion will be exercised in such a way as to ensure that orders are not made against persons who are not in as good a position to bear the legal costs as the party in whose favour they are made’); Board of Examiners v XY (2006) 25 VAR 193; [2006] VSCA 190; BC200607419 at [33] per Chernov JA. 185. Williams v Barrick Australia Ltd [2004] NSWLEC 306; BC200403762 at [76] per Bignold J; State of Tasmania v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (2008) 17 Tas R 227; [2008] TASSC 23; BC200803676 at [25] per Evans J. 186. As to speculative actions see 3.41–3.56. 187. Microsoft Corporation v Marks (No 2) (1996) 69 FCR 144; BC9604154 (FC). Cf occasions in which courts have refused to order costs in circumstances where a lawyer was acting pro bono on behalf of persons lacking capacity (to which the capacity as tutor would ordinarily attract costs consequences): see 22.70): see, for example, Jaffari v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 10; [2001] FCA 985; BC200104371 (where French J permitted a proceeding to be brought by two unaccompanied minors who were asylum seekers, without the appointment of a tutor, on the basis that they were legally represented pro bono, adding ‘[c]ertainly no representative of the applicants should be exposed to any risk of costs on the basis that they lack capacity to instruct counsel. I am prepared to make an order to secure that result’: at [21]); Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 5) (2008) 107 ALD 568; [2008] FCA 1953; BC200811402 (in the case of a court-appointed barrister to act as tutor to the applicant on the grounds of the applicant’s mental incapacity, Siopis J referred to the ‘important policy

considerations in favour of ensuring that persons who provide their services to assist the Court and the community voluntarily are, save in exceptional circumstances, not subjected to personal costs orders’: at [11]). 188. See 16.49. 189. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117(2A)(a): see 8.32. 190. See, for example, Pisani v Rodgers [2009] FamCA 346; BC200950218 at [54] per Rose J (who dismissed the independent children’s lawyer’s application for costs in view of the father’s poor financial position that was unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future); McDermott v Bond (Costs) [2010] FamCA 81; BC201050082 (where Austin J dismissed the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s application for costs against the mother, as she was in receipt of legal aid, and also against the father, who would suffer financial hardship were costs ordered against him: at [8]–[9]). 191. See 8.29. 192. See, for example, Guide Dog Owners’ and Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dog Association of New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory (FCA, Sackville J, 17 July 1998, unreported) BC9803260 at 3 (who noted that the fact that an organisation enjoys charitable status does not mean that its controllers are immune from self-interest); Rose v Boxing NSW Inc (Costs) [2007] NSWSC 256; BC200701773 at [7] per Brereton J. 193. See generally 9.18–9.27. 194. Bhagat v Royal & Sun Alliance Life Assurance Australia Ltd [2000] NSWSC 159; BC200001012 at [13] per Hodgson CJ in Eq; Garnaut v Child Support Registrar [2004] FCA 1303; BC200406658 at [5] per Spender J; Monazeh v Wheaton [2008] QDC 189 at [8] per Kingham DCJ; Fitzpatrick v Keelty (No 2) [2008] FCA 742; BC200803832 at [13] per Moore J. The position may be otherwise where the relevant tribunal encourages self-representation and operates against a statutory or rule-based backdrop of each party bearing its own costs unless the tribunal orders otherwise. In such a case, whether or not an unsuccessful party is unrepresented may potentially be relevant to an award of costs: see, for example, New South Wales AttorneyGeneral’s Department v Cianfrano [2007] NSWADTAP 71; BC200755188 at [20]–[21]. 195. Steele-Smith v Liberty Financial Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 487; BC200503391 at [11] per Palmer J. 196. See 16.50. 197. (2001) 162 FLR 433; [2001] FMCA 15. 198. Xiros v Fortis Life Assurance Ltd (2001) 162 FLR 433 at 441; [2001] FMCA 15. 199. See 8.29. 200. See, for example, Williams v Barrick Australia Ltd [2004] NSWLEC 306; BC200403762 at [79] per Bignold J (who accepted that ‘the social and economic disadvantages afflicting Aboriginal persons as a class has become in Australia a judicially noticeable fact’, but held that to accommodate this, without specific statutory directive, within the costs discretion ‘is far beyond the scope or capacity of any principled judicial development of the law’). 201. See 7.5–7.6. 202. [2008] NSWSC 1040; BC200808822. 203. Aldridge v Victims Compensation Fund Corporation (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 1040; BC200808822 at [8]. 204. Wentworth v Rogers [2003] NSWSC 944; BC200306248 at [39] per Howie J; Lansen v Minister

for the Environment and Heritage (No 3) (2008) 162 LGERA 258; [2008] FCA 1367; BC200807903 at [41] per Mansfield J. 205. Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 567; BC9002896 per McHugh J. 206. See 8.5. 207. Blakes Estates Ltd v Government of Montserrat [2006] 1 WLR 297; [2005] UKPC 46 at [25] per Lord Carswell (in the context of a claim for compensation for compulsory acquisition of land); O’Neill v Williams (Costs) [2007] NSWSC 51; BC200700492 at [5] per Brereton J. 208. See Ch 13. 209. Metsikas v Quirk [2010] NSWSC 756; BC201004761 at [7] per Brereton J; Ritchie v Styles (No 2) [2011] TASSC 60; BC201108792 at [16] per Holt AsJ. See also Lend Lease GPT (Rouse Hill) Pty Ltd v Hills Shire Council (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 26; BC201102660 at [32] per Sheahan J (noting that refusal to order costs against a party is not a decision to be made to somehow reward a party for ‘good’ conduct; otherwise a professed ‘model litigant’ would win all its costs disputes, regardless of merit). 210. See 8.44–8.61. 211. Levy v Watt (No 2) [2012] VSC 580; BC201209281 at [10] per Habersberger J. 212. See 7.2–7.6. 213. Beaumont v Greathead (1846) 2 CB 494 at 499; 135 ER 1039 at 1041 per Maule J. 214. See, for example, Anglo-Cyprian Trade Agencies Ltd v Paphos Wine Industries Ltd [1951] 1 All ER 873 at 874 per Devlin J; Alltrans Express Ltd v CVA Holdings Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 685; MLW Technology Pty Ltd v May (No 4) [2003] VSC 293; BC200304423. Cf Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 98; BC9800310 per McHugh J. 215. Ng v Chong [2005] NSWSC 385; BC200502550 at [8] per Hamilton J (emphasis supplied). See also Nexus Minerals NL v Brutus Constructions Pty Ltd (FC(FCA), 10 September 1997, Spender, Nicholson and Finn JJ, unreported) BC9704267 at 12 per the court; Grant v Brewarrina Shire Council (No 3) (2003) 125 LGERA 348; [2003] NSWLEC 108; BC200302709 at [5] per Lloyd J; Mid-City Skin Cancer and Laser Centre Pty Ltd v Zahedi-Anarak [2006] NSWSC 1149; BC200608956 at [49]–[52] per Campbell J; Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 603; [2009] NSWCA 407; BC200911627 at [684] per Campbell JA, with whom Giles JA agreed; Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney South West Area Health Service (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 171; BC201104714 at [14] per Hodgson JA, with whom Allsop P and Macfarlan JA concurred; SWM Financial Services Pty Ltd v Lloyd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 202; BC201201247 at [26] per Ball J; ACN 074 971 109 Pty Ltd (as Trustee for Argot Unit Trust) v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia [2012] VSC 177; BC201202714 at [27]–[28] per Croft J. 216. Anglo-Cyprian Trade Agencies Ltd v Paphos Wine Industries Ltd [1951] 1 All ER 873 at 874 per Devlin J; Ng v Chong [2005] NSWSC 385; BC200502550 at [8] per Hamilton J. See, for example, Danidale Pty Ltd v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 552; BC200711346 (where the defendant, in its counterclaim, was entitled to seek to establish that the plaintiff had breached a contract in respect of the important issue of safety and so should not, said Habersberger J, ‘be penalised on the question of costs simply because it sensibly sought to save time by not leading evidence about the quantum of loss and contented itself with an award of nominal damages’: at [44]); Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 166; BC200102752 at [9] per Steytler and Wheeler JJ. 217. Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1919] 1 KB 520 at 537 per Warrington LJ (affd Weld-Blundell v

Stephens [1920] AC 956); Motium Pty Ltd v Arrow Electronics Australia Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 65 (S); BC201106049 at [10]–[11] per the court. 218. [1987] 2 NZLR 166 at 183 (HC). 219. See, for example, Grant v Brewarrina Shire Council (No 3) (2003) 125 LGERA 348; [2003] NSWLEC 108; BC200302709 at [20] per Lloyd J (although the applicant had been successful in securing a declaration pertaining to the invalidity of the council’s actions, the award of $1 damages dictated that the applicant should pay the council’s costs). 220. Martin v Benson [1927] 1 KB 771; British Dominion Films Ltd v Dent [1935] VLR 157 at 158 per Irvine CJ. 221. Roberts v Jones [1891] 2 QB 194 at 198 per Hawkins J. 222. As the territories and South Australia have abandoned jury trial on all civil issues (Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 22; Juries Act 1962 (NT) s 6A; Juries Act 1927 (SA) s 5), this is no longer an issue in these jurisdictions. As the remaining jurisdictions entitle a plaintiff or defendant in a defamation action to elect for the proceedings to be tried by jury, unless the court otherwise orders (Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 21(1); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 21(1); Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) s 21(1); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 21(1); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 21(1)), this remains a potentially live issue in these jurisdictions. 223. (1908) 7 CLR 263; BC0800009. 224. Connolly v ‘Sunday Times’ Publishing Co Ltd (1908) 7 CLR 263 at 270 per Griffith CJ, at 272–3 per Barton J, at 275–6 per O’Connor J; BC0800009. See also in Gannon v White (1886) 12 VLR 589 at 596 (FC) (‘We think also that a verdict of a farthing only in an action for libel constitutes a good cause for which the judge may in his discretion deprive the plaintiff of his costs’). 225. Connolly v ‘Sunday Times’ Publishing Co Ltd (1908) 7 CLR 263 at 275, 276; BC0800009 (paragraph break omitted). 226. O’Connor v Star Newspaper Co Ltd (1893) 68 LT 146 at 148 per Bowen LJ. 227. [1935] VLR 157 at 159. 228. Compare, for example, Connolly v ‘Sunday Times’ Publishing Co Ltd (1908) 7 CLR 263 at 272; BC0800009 per Barton J (who remarked that, as the jury had cut down the damages to the lowest point of contempt short of the extreme, it was the court’s duty to arrive at some probable explanation for this) with Lathlain v Simons (1920) 23 WALR 15 at 17 per McMillan CJ (who, unable to determine the reason why the jury assessed damages at one farthing in a libel case, applied the usual rule that costs should be awarded to the ‘successful’ plaintiff). 229. See 8.39. 230. O’Connor v Star Newspaper Co Ltd (1893) 68 LT 146 at 148 per Bowen LJ. 231. Roberts v Jones [1891] 2 QB 194 at 197–8 per Hawkins J. 232. The relevant provision states that in awarding costs in defamation proceedings, the court may have regard to: (a) the way in which the parties to the proceedings conducted their cases (including any misuse of a party’s superior financial position to hinder the early resolution of the proceedings), and (b) any other matters that the court considers relevant: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 40(1); Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 37; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 40; Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 38; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) s 40; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 40. 233. SA r 263(2)(g). 234. Motium Pty Ltd v Arrow Electronics Australia Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 65 (S); BC201106049 at

[10] per the court. 235. See 7.42–7.45, 7.48. 236. See, for example, CJD Equipment Pty Ltd v A & C Constructions Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 502; BC201003563 (where the amount recovered was minimal in comparison to the total extent of the claim, such that (at [11]) ‘considerations of proportionality alone would make it entirely unjust for [the plaintiff] to recover anything beyond a relatively small fraction of its costs [being 10 per cent] for the period with which I am presently concerned’: at [11] per McDougall J); Jireh International Pty Ltd v Western Export Services Inc (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 294; BC201107168 at [12], [13] per Macfarlan JA, with whom Young JA and Tobias AJA concurred (who noted that notwithstanding that the judgment that the respondent obtained represented only a small proportion of its claim, it should be regarded as having been successful for the purposes of the rule that prima facie ‘the costs follow the event’, but nonetheless reduced the respondent’s entitlement to costs to reflect that its limited recovery, allowing it 65 per cent of its costs); Re Cheal Industries Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 932; BC201206355 at [190] per Ward J (‘where there is a large gap between the amount recovered and the cost of the proceedings, that seems to me to be a factor to take into account’). Cf Witcombe v Talbot & Olivier (No 2) [2009] WASC 173 (S); BC200906554 (partial costs order made in favour of plaintiff who, though seeking substantial damages, was awarded only nominal damages, because Beech J considered that the plaintiff had enjoyed ‘some measure of success’: at [25]). 237. Holt v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 82 NSWLR 293; BC201206979 at [16]–[25] per Adamson J (discerning from s 40 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) no parliamentary intention to displace the provisions of s 60 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), directed to proportionality: at [25]). 238. [1896] 1 Ch 278. 239. Jenkins v Hope [1896] 1 Ch 278 at 280. 240. See Ch 13. 241. Williamson v Bors (1900) 21 LR (NSW) Eq 302. 242. [1952] NZLR 984. 243. Voyce v Lawrie [1952] NZLR 984 at 988 (SC). 244. See 8.36–8.37. 245. Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 at 53 per Lord Sterndale MR; Redden v Chapman (1949) 50 SR (NSW) 24 at 25 per Roper CJ in Eq; Holden v Cronulla Golf Club Ltd (SC(NSW), Young J, 24 June 1986, unreported) BC8600900 at 6 (speaking in terms of a party whose conduct ‘has to a great degree contributed to the necessity for the litigation’). See, for example, Bostock v Ramsey Urban District Council [1900] 2 QB 616 at 622 per A L Smith LJ, at 625 per Vaughan Williams LJ, at 627 per Romer LJ; Scottish Gympie Gold Mines Ltd v Carroll [1902] St R Qd 311 at 316 per Griffith CJ; Rowland v Portus (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 74 at 76 per Walker J (costs allowed to unsuccessful plaintiffs because ‘the defendant should have “shown his hand” earlier’); Pratten v Warringah Shire Council (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 134 at 144 per Street J; Mitropoulos v Greek Orthodox Church and Community of Marrickville & District Ltd (1993) 10 ACSR 134 at 139; BC9302040 per McLelland J (SC(NSW)); Coogi Australia Pty Ltd v Hysport International Pty Ltd (FCA, Drummond J, 22 October 1998, unreported) BC9805610 at 3; Bathurst City Council v Stamatopoulos (No 2) (Costs) (2002) 121 LGERA 152 at 154; [2002] NSWLEC 118; BC200204094 per Cowdroy J; Coombes v Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations (No 2) [2008] FCA 1078; BC200806730 at [28]–[35] per Mansfield J (applicants’ decision to sue informed by

the respondents’ limited response to the requests for information); Jones v Apps (No 2) [2009] VSC 366; BC200907793 at [17] per Hansen J (‘The devastation suffered by the plaintiff by these wholly imprudent investments into which he was led by the defendant with a lack of proper care or sense of responsibility for the plaintiff’s interest, is loss enough without rubbing in the salt of the defendant’s costs of the litigation’); Wood v Crawford (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 252; BC201001889. Cf Evans v Johnston [1908] St R Qd 150 at 157–8 per Real J, at 159 per Power J (FC). 246. [1920] 2 KB 47. 247. Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 at 66 (footnote supplied). See also at 54 per Lord Sterndale MR, at 63 per Atkin LJ. 248. See, for example, TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Scotney (FCA, Tamberlin J, 17 November 1994, unreported) BC9400018 at 10 (where a defendant’s failure to respond to an inquiry from the plaintiff served as a catalyst for the plaintiff to commence proceedings, the court declined to make an order for costs). 249. Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 at 63. 250. Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 at 66–7 per Eve J. 251. Sutcliffe v Smith (1886) 2 TLR 881 at 883 per Fry LJ. 252. (2004) 9 VR 261; [2004] VSCA 249; BC200409419. 253. Murray v Kingston City Council (2004) 9 VR 261; [2004] VSCA 249; BC200409419 at [15]–[18] per Eames JA, with whom Buchanan JA and Coldrey AJA concurred. See also Ex parte Hall (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 374 (FC) (where the plaintiff, though ultimately unsuccessful, was misled by the terms of the council clerk’s letter regarding the grounds upon which the council had refused approval for erection of housing; Pring J held that it was ‘quite possible’ that, but for that mistake, the plaintiff would not have sued, and thus made no order as to costs: at 378); Pratten v Warringah Shire Council (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 134 at 144 per Street J (unsuccessful plaintiff required to pay only one-half of the successful defendant’s costs where the defendant had earlier disclaimed an interest it later successfully asserted). 254. Murray v Kingston City Council (2004) 9 VR 261; [2004] VSCA 249; BC200409419 at [20] per Eames JA, with whom Buchanan JA and Coldrey AJA concurred. 255. See, for example, Ex parte Voge (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 345 at 350 per Cullen CJ (FC). 256. (1979) 42 FLR 213 (FCA). 257. Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3) (1979) 42 FLR 213 at 221 (FCA). 258. Robertson and Son v Perkins and Co Ltd (1886) 2 QLJ 173; Kinsela v Metropolitan Mutual Provident Building and Investment Association (1887) LR 8 NSW 277; Moore v Gannon (1915) 32 WN (NSW) 60 Harvey J; Glandon Pty Ltd v Strata Consolidated Pty Ltd (CA(NSW), Kirby P, 29 December 1988, unreported) BC8802270. 259. Bates v Lloyd [2005] NSWSC 1253; BC200511044 at [12] per Hamilton J (who, however, declined to apply the principle on the facts in issue because the evidence revealed that the defendant would not have consented: at [16]). 260. Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 at 60 per Atkin LJ. See also Marriage of J and P (1985) 80 FLR 126 at 141 per Treyvaud J (Fam Ct) (although the wife was successful in defending the action, her refusal to consent to paternity tests caused the husband unnecessary and unreasonable expense, and so costs were ordered against her on a solicitor and client basis, the court also being

influenced by the wife’s considerable wealth); Jones v North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc (1985) 82 FLR 264 at 268 per Kearney J (SC(NT)); Schindler Lifts Australia Pty Ltd v Debelak (1989) 89 ALR 275 at 319–20 per Pincus J (FCA). 261. Huxley v West London Extension Railway Co (1889) 14 App Cas 26 at 32 per Lord Halsbury; Dann v Curzon (1910) 104 LT 66 at 70 per Horridge J; Keddie v Foxall [1955] VR 320 at 323–4 (FC); WA O 66 r 1(2) (which empowers the court to deprive a party of costs whose conduct either before or after the commencement of the litigation ‘has resulted in costs being unnecessarily or unreasonably incurred’, or whose claim for an unreasonably excessive amount has resulted in costs being unnecessarily or unreasonably incurred). 262. See, for example, Faraday v Rappaport [2007] NSWSC 253; BC200701771 at [28]–[30] per White J. 263. See, for example, Rhodes v Tower Australia Superannuation Ltd [2004] FCA 812; BC200403850 at [19]–[20] per French J; Harrem Pty Ltd v Tebb [2008] NSWSC 510; BC200803888 at [19] per Palmer J (decrying a ‘trial by ambush’, and adding that ‘significant points of law, particularly those going to jurisdiction, should be brought to the attention of the opponent as soon as possible. If the point is a good one, wasteful litigation might be avoided’). 264. Green v Schneller [2003] NSWSC 202; BC200301480 at [32] per Simpson J (‘where legal representatives keep to themselves an obvious and deadly point, they run the risk that costs will not be awarded in their favour’). 265. Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3) (1979) 42 FLR 213 at 221 per Fisher J (FCA). As to the costs of issues see further 8.2–8.13. 266. (1998) 30 ACSR 20; BC9806555 (SC(NSW)). 267. Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) (1998) 30 ACSR 20 at 25; BC9806555 (SC(NSW)). 268. O’Neill v Williams (Costs) [2007] NSWSC 51; BC200700492 at [5] per Brereton J. 269. Lollis v Loulatzis (No 2) [2008] VSC 35; BC200800654 at [29] per Kaye J. 270. (1991) 5 WAR 137. 271. Capolingua v Phylum Pty Ltd (1991) 5 WAR 137 at 142. See also Day v Trustees of the Estate of George Adams (deceased) (SC(Tas), Slicer J, 17 March 1997, unreported) BC9701284 at 2 (where the matter was prolonged by the conduct of both parties, each party ordered to pay its own costs); Lollis v Loulatzis (No 2) [2008] VSC 35; BC200800654 at [35] per Kaye J (who held that because conduct on the plaintiff’s side contributed to the trial lasting at least 50 per cent longer than it should have, the (successful) plaintiff should only be awarded a proportion of the costs of the trial). 272. Bonic v Pacific General Securities Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1221; BC200910272 at [14] per White J. 273. [2011] NSWSC 1598; BC201110441. 274. Harrington v Greenwood Grove Estate Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1598; BC201110441 at [9]–[14]. 275. (1992) 28 NSWLR 1 at 15 (CA). 276. ‘Procedural irregularity’ includes: (a) failure to comply with a procedural obligation; (b) unnecessary delay; (c) prolixity in the statement of the party’s case; (d) the unnecessary, vexatious or otherwise improper commencement of, or an unnecessary, vexatious or otherwise improper step in, a proceeding; (e) unreadiness to proceed with the hearing of a proceeding, or the taking of any

other step in a proceeding, at the time fixed by or under the rules: SA r 4. 277. SA r 13(1). 278. NSW r 42.10 (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 25). 279. Gales Holdings Pty Ltd v Valuer General [2007] NSWLEC 14; BC200700051 at [12] per Talbot J. 280. Markovic v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [1998] 1 VR 235 at 240; BC9606063 per Tadgell JA. 281. As to this jurisdiction in the context of delay see 23.31, 23.46. 282. Scherer v Counting Instruments Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 615 at 622 per Buckley LJ. See, for example, Council of the Shire of Lachlan v Towers (1935) 52 WN (NSW) 164 (where the defendant’s delay in successfully applying to have a judgment set aside led Stephen J to make no order as to costs). 283. See, for example, Alginates (Australia) Pty Ltd v Thomson & Carroll Pty Ltd [1970] VR 570 at 575 per Smith J (where the plaintiffs were, by their failure to prosecute that claim with due diligence, primarily responsible for the additional costs incurred by the defendant for the due presentation of its defence; it was held that the defendant should be protected from this unnecessary expenditure by an appropriate costs order). 284. Shepperdson v Lewis [1966] VR 418 at 419 per O’Bryan J. 285. Indeed, statute or court rules empower courts to refer a proceeding to alternative dispute resolution even over the objection of one or more of the disputants: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 53A; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 195; Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 26; NT r 48.13; Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) s 43; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 65; Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2001 (Tas) s 5; Tas r 518; Vic r 50.07; WA O 29 r 3. 286. [2004] 4 All ER 920; [2004] EWCA Civ 576. See also Burchell v Bullard [2005] BLR 330; [2005] EWCA Civ 358 at [43] per Ward LJ. 287. See, for example, Hopeshore Pty Ltd v Melroad Equipment Pty Ltd (2004) 212 ALR 66; [2004] FCA 1445; BC200407452 (where the respondent’s solicitors took the view that an early mediation ordered by the court would not be in their client’s best interests and acted in a way calculated to defer the mediation, Branson J took this into account in determining whether the application in question (being one for security for costs) should be granted: at [38]); ET Petroleum Holdings Pty Ltd v Clarenden Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 562; BC200504614 at [21] per White J (who, after citing Halsey, accepted that an unreasonable refusal to mediate may have adverse costs consequences); Bond v Pearcy (Costs) [2010] FamCA 1217; BC201051357 (where Ryan J took into account, as a factor in the costs discretion, that the mother refused to participate in mediation requested by the father); Ezekiel-Hart v Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory (No 2) [2012] ACTSC 135; BC201205857 at [30]–[35] per Refshauge ACJ (who found the approach and analysis in Halsey compelling). 288. See generally Ch 13. 289. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M(1); Fam LR 2004 r 1.07; ACT r 21; Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 56(1); Qld r 5; WA O 1 r 4B. 290. Halsey v Milton Keynes NHS Trust [2004] 4 All ER 920; [2004] EWCA Civ 576 at [13]. 291. Halsey v Milton Keynes NHS Trust [2004] 4 All ER 920; [2004] EWCA Civ 576 at [18]. See also Swain Mason v Mills & Reeve (a firm) [2012] STC 1760; [2012] EWCA Civ 498 (where Davis LJ, with whom Richards LJ and Lord Neuberger MR concurred, noting that ‘[a] reasonable refusal to mediate does not become unreasonable simply by being steadfastly, and for cause, maintained’

and that ‘where a party reasonably believes that he has a watertight case that may well be a sufficient justification for a refusal to mediate’: at [75]–[76]). 292. Halsey v Milton Keynes NHS Trust [2004] 4 All ER 920; [2004] EWCA Civ 576 at [19]. 293. Halsey v Milton Keynes NHS Trust [2004] 4 All ER 920; [2004] EWCA Civ 576 at [25]–[28]. See, for example, ET Petroleum Holdings Pty Ltd v Clarenden Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 562; BC200504614 at [21] per White J (who applied the usual costs rule because he did not consider there were reasonable prospects that a mediation would have resolved the whole of the proceedings); Hickman v Blake Lapthorn [2006] EWHC 12 (QB) (where Jack J applied the usual costs rule where, given the difference between the claimant and the second defendant as to the value of the claim (the claim was for £600,000 as against a £50,000 offer to settle), it had not been demonstrated that the second defendant’s refusal to mediate was unreasonable: at [30]); PGF II SA v OMFS Company [2012] EWHC 83 (TCC) at [42]–[48] per Mr Recorder Furst QC. 294. Halsey v Milton Keynes NHS Trust [2004] 4 All ER 920; [2004] EWCA Civ 576 at [29]. Cf Blue Cross Properties (Toorak) Pty Ltd v Mackie & Staff Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 304; BC200707077 at [16]–[18] per Habersberger J (where ‘in the unusual circumstances’ of the case, involving multiple parties, his Honour held that the absence of a party (E) at court-ordered mediation did not dictate that E should be ordered to pay the costs of the mediation; what influenced this conclusion was that the mediation proceeded, and the parties present proceeded with it in the knowledge that neither a representative of E nor its solicitor would be attending, which, when combined with the absence of any defence by E, ‘must have given the other parties a pretty clear indication of [E’s] attitude to the litigation’: at [17]). 295. (2012) 145 Con LR 29; [2012] EWHC 2904 (TCC). 296. ADS Aerospace Ltd v EMS Global Tracking Ltd (2012) 145 Con LR 29; [2012] EWHC 2904 (TCC) at [8]. 297. Carleton v Strutt & Parker (a partnership) [2008] EWHC 424 (QB) (noted J Sorabji (2008) 27 CJQ 288). 298. Nigel Witham Ltd v Smith [2008] TCLR 3; [2008] EWHC 12 (TCC) at [36] per Peter Coulson QC (although on the facts his Lordship considered that the critical moment had been missed by both sides, and so the defendants’ delay in acceding to mediation was not held against them costswise). 299. WDD v SMI [2007] QSC 283; BC200708608 (where Mullins J held that, because of the respondent’s lack of cooperation and her failure to participate in negotiating a settlement, the applicant’s costs were aggravated, and justified an order that the respondent pay one-half of the applicant’s costs of the proceedings: at [36]); AHP v MP [2008] QSC 217; BC200809075 (where the respondent’s failure to cooperate in negotiating a settlement, or in responding to the proceeding, caused the applicant to incur greater costs, led White J to make a partial costs order against the respondent: at [45]–[46]). Cf Baulkham Hills Shire Council v Ko-veda Holiday Park Estate Ltd (No 4) [2010] NSWLEC 239; BC201008969 (where Pain J noted that although ‘[t]he court encourages parties to negotiate and resolve their differences where that is appropriate’, this did not mean that lack of preparedness (to be contrasted with failure) to negotiate alone is a relevant consideration when determining costs in civil enforcement proceedings for an alleged breach of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) by virtue of a failure to comply with important consent conditions: at [54]). 300. Painting v University of Oxford [2005] 3 Costs LR 394; [2005] EWCA Civ 161 at [27] per Longmore LJ. 301. As to Calderbank offers see 13.55–13.86.

302. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Harris Scarfe Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 433; BC200903669 at [33] per Mansfield J. 303. As required by the Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) ss 6 (applicant; the genuine steps statement must specify: (a) the steps that have been taken to try to resolve the issues in dispute between the applicant and the respondent in the proceedings; or (b) the reasons why no such steps were taken, which may relate to, inter alia: (i) the urgency of the proceedings; (ii) whether, and the extent to which, the safety or security of any person or property would have been compromised by taking such steps: s 6(2)), 7 (respondent; the genuine steps statement must: (a) state that the respondent agrees with the genuine steps statement filed by the applicant; or (b) if the respondent disagrees in whole or part with the genuine steps statement filed by the applicant — specify the respect in which, and reasons why, the respondent disagrees: s 7(2)). 304. Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) s 12(1). 305. Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) s 12(2), 12(3). 306. [1892] 1 Ch 173. 307. Jones v Merionethshire Permanent Benefit Building Society [1892] 1 Ch 173 at 188. See also Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (No 10) [2012] VSC 294; BC201205199 at [94] per Vickery J. 308. (FCA, Drummond J, 10 November 1994, unreported) BC9406611 (affd Igaki Australia Pty Ltd & Gaykuen v Coastmine Pty Ltd (1996) 34 IPR 37 at 51–2; BC9600981 (FC(FCA)). 309. (2001) 47 ATR 488; [2001] NSWSC 501; BC200104181. 310. Zelino v Budai (2001) 47 ATR 488 at 523; [2001] NSWSC 501; BC200104181. 311. Zelino v Budai (2001) 47 ATR 488 at 524; [2001] NSWSC 501; BC200104181. 312. Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 at 60–1 per Atkin LJ; Anglo-Cyprian Trade Agencies Ltd v Paphos Wine Industries Ltd [1951] 1 All ER 873 at 874 per Devlin J. See, for example, Tubby Trout Pty Ltd v Sailbay Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 894; BC9406542 at [90] per Drummond J (procuring another to give false evidence); Youssef v Victoria University of Technology (No 2) [2005] VSC 385; BC200507291 at [20] per Whelan J (where plaintiff was successful but the costs order in his favour was discounted by 50 per cent to reflect his role in the creation of a misleading documentary record and his wrongful conduct in backdating documents); Giller v Procopets (No 2) (2009) 24 VR 1; [2009] VSCA 72; BC200902384 (costs awarded to successful party reduced because of findings that she lied in giving evidence and induced others to lie, which in turn complicated and lengthened the trial: at [20] per the court). 313. See 8.44 314. (1987) 43 SASR 588. See also Piddington v Philip (1893) 14 LR (NSW) Eq 159 at 165 per Owen CJ in Eq. 315. Monier Ltd v Metalwork Tiling Company of Australia Ltd (No 2) (1987) 43 SASR 588 at 592. 316. Saltoon v Lake [1978] 1 NSWLR 52 at 58 (CA); Y v M [1994] 3 NZLR 581 at 586 per Temm J (HC). For this reason, lawyers must take care to have specific instructions and an appropriate evidentiary foundation prior to alleging and pleading fraud: see Dal Pont, pp 574–8. 317. Ex parte Cooper (1878) 10 Ch D 313 at 322 (CA) (where an appellant who had failed in proving allegations of fraud, as to which he had adduced considerable evidence, was denied costs even though he had succeeded on a point of law); Chambers and Campbell v Merchants Bank of Canada (1922) 68 DLR 381 at 385 per Beck JA, at 392 per Hyndman JA (App Div(Alta)). 318. See, for example, Toronto General Trusts Corp v Maryfield Rural Municipality [1946] 1 DLR 90.

319. Toronto General Trusts Corp v Maryfield Rural Municipality [1946] 1 DLR 90 at 100 per Martin CJS (CA(Sask)). See also Chambers and Campbell v Merchants Bank of Canada (1922) 68 DLR 381 at 385 per Beck JA (App Div(Alta)) (the ‘rule’ that a party who alleges but fails to prove fraud, but is successful nevertheless, should be deprived of costs, ‘ought not to be given effect to, unless the fraud alleged is glaring and likely to injure the reputation of the party against whom it is alleged’). 320. (1973) 32 DLR (3d) 343 at 355–6 (QB(Sask)). 321. The term ‘knowingly’, it has been judicially observed, imports a serious subjective element into the question; ‘[f]or a court to be satisfied that a person knowingly made a false allegation or statement in the proceedings must mean that a court can be comfortable in finding that the person lied’, such that ‘[i]t would not simply then be a balancing act between two versions’ but satisfaction that a lie has been told, which requires a careful analysis of two things: ‘that the proffered version of fact is untrue’ and that ‘it is put knowing it to be untrue’: Charles v Charles [2007] FamCA 276 at [24] per Cronin J. See further Child Support Registrar v Kanavos (2010) 44 Fam LR 422; [2010] FamCAFC 244 at [83]–[84] per Boland J; Somers v Somers (2011) 45 Fam LR 123; [2011] FamCA 103; BC201150147 at [11] per Cronin J (noting that ‘there does not necessarily need to be a specific finding that someone lied. All that is required is that the only inference from the finding that is open is that the evidence was untrue. That is distinctly different from a finding that one version is preferred over the other. It also means that the inference cannot support a conclusion that the statements were mistakenly or recklessly made’); Hackshaw v Hackshaw (Costs) [2011] FamCA 570; BC201150652 at [27]–[30] per Murphy J; Finch v Finch (Costs) [2012] FamCA 543; BC201250770 at [15]–[19] per Forrest J. 322. See Hackshaw v Hackshaw (Costs) [2011] FamCA 570; BC201150652 at [32] per Murphy J (who could see no reason to ‘read down’ or restrict the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘allegation or statement’, which his Honour saw ‘as inclusive and broad as that contemplated by the decision to which reference has just been made’, before adding that ‘there seems to me to be a clear legislative intention to have mandatory costs orders apply to a wide category of knowingly false words and conduct’). 323. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117AB. In Western Australia see Family Court Act 1997 (WA) s 237A. 324. See, for example, Hackshaw v Hackshaw (Costs) [2011] FamCA 570; BC201150652 at [39] per Murphy J. 325. Finch v Finch (Costs) [2012] FamCA 543; BC201250770 at [21] per Forrest J. 326. Krach v Krach (No 2) [2009] FamCA 886 at [32] per Bennett J. 327. Prantage v Prantage [2012] FamCA 661; BC201250891 at [27] per Cronin J (who rejected the submission that costs awarded under s 117AB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) have a punitive characteristic, reasoning that ‘[c]osts are not to be awarded as a form of punishment but rather, to compensate the person required to litigate’). 328. Pursuant to the Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Act 2011 (Cth). Its equivalent, however, remains in force in Western Australia: Family Court Act 1997 (WA) s 237A. 329. Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Bill 2011 (Cth), at [79]. 330. Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Bill 2011 (Cth), at [79] (‘Section 117 of the Act will allow family courts to make cost

orders in response to false statements in appropriate cases’). 331. Prantage v Prantage [2012] FamCA 661; BC201250891 at [51] per Cronin J. As to indemnity costs in this context see 16.67. 332. See Dal Pont, pp 442–4. 333. Melbourne Steamship Co v Moorehead (1912) 15 CLR 333 at 342; BC1200025. 334. Mahenthirarasa v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (No 2) (2008) 72 NSWLR 273; [2008] NSWCA 201; BC200807693 at [22] per Basten JA, with whom Giles and Bell JJA agreed. 335. AT v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 131; BC201003728 at [32] per Basten JA; Cunliffe v Darkinjung Local Aboriginal Land Council (No 2) [2010] NSWADT 185; BC201055189 at [30]; Kiernan v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police (No 3) [2010] NSWADTAP 32; BC201055117 at [8]. Cf C Peadon, ‘What Cost to the Crown a Failure to Act as a Model Litigant?’ (2010) 33 Aust Bar Rev 239 (who, after a review of the case law, argues that the Crown’s failure to act as a model litigant should be irrelevant to the issue of costs, and that the Crown’s conduct in litigation should make it no more susceptible to a less favourable costs order than other litigants; but accepts that the relevant inquiry, as for all litigants, is the Crown’s conduct in the course of the litigation). 336. [2010] VSC 569; BC201009380 at [93]. 337. Slaveski v State of Victoria [2010] VSC 569; BC201009380 at [94]. 338. Slaveski v State of Victoria [2010] VSC 569; BC201009380 at [95]. See also Nelipa v Robertson [2009] ACTSC 16; BC200901251 at [97] per Refshauge J (another case where costs consequences follows the respondents (including the Commonwealth) for failure to properly discharge discovery obligations). 339. (2008) 72 NSWLR 273; [2008] NSWCA 201; BC200807693. 340. Mahenthirarasa v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (No 2) (2008) 72 NSWLR 273; [2008] NSWCA 201; BC200807693 at [15]. 341. Mahenthirarasa v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (No 2) (2008) 72 NSWLR 273; [2008] NSWCA 201; BC200807693 at [21]–[22]. 342. Scherer v Counting Instruments Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 615 at 622 per Buckley LJ. 343. Ottway v Jones [1955] 1 WLR 706 at 713 per Evershed MR. 344. Knight v Clifton [1971] Ch 700 at 713 per Russell LJ; Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3) (1979) 42 FLR 213 at 220 per Fisher J (FCA). 345. Verna Trading Pty Ltd v New India Assurance Co Ltd [1991] 1 VR 129 at 156 per Kaye J (App Div(Vic)). 346. Dicks v Yates (1881) 18 Ch D 76; Foster v Great Western Railway Co (1882) 8 QBD 515; Eberlein v Eberlein (1887) 8 LR (NSW) Eq 1; Hodgkins v District Council of Burnside (1892) 25 SALR 37 at 38 per Way CJ; Ex parte Permanent Trustee Co (1897) 14 WN (NSW) 61 at 61 per Owen J; London Welsh Estates Ltd v Phillip (1931) 144 LT 643; Ottway v Jones [1955] 1 WLR 706 at 715 per Parker LJ. 347. Dicks v Yates (1881) 18 Ch D 76 at 85 per James LJ (‘A plaintiff may succeed in getting a decree and still have to pay all the costs of the action, but the defendant is dragged into Court, and cannot be made liable to pay the whole costs of the action if the plaintiff had no title to bring him there’). 348. See 6.14.

349.

Re Fisher [1894] 1 Ch 450; Knight v Clifton [1971] Ch 700 at 710 per Russell LJ, at 715–16 per Sachs LJ, at 724 per Buckley LJ; Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 at 12 per Bray CJ.

350. G R Vaughan (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Vogt [2006] NSWCA 263; BC200607700 at [20] per Bryson JA. 351. As to which see 8.38–8.61. 352. Knight v Clifton [1971] Ch 700 at 718 per Sachs LJ. 353. Verna Trading Pty Ltd v New India Assurance Co Ltd [1991] 1 VR 129 at 152 per Kaye J (App Div(Vic)). 354. Verna Trading Pty Ltd v New India Assurance Co Ltd [1991] 1 VR 129 at 154 per Kaye J (App Div(Vic)). 355. Ottway v Jones [1955] 1 WLR 706 at 708 per Evershed MR. Cf Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 at 53 per Lord Sterndale MR (‘considerations sufficient to justify a refusal of costs to a plaintiff are not necessarily sufficient in the case of a defendant, for the former initiates the litigation while the latter is brought into it against his will’). 356. [1971] Ch 700 at 718. 357. See, for example, Jarrad v Santamaria (No 2) [2007] SADC 31; BC200740679 (where Judge Nicholson found that, but for the defendant’s untruthful evidence in the Magistrates Court proceedings, it was unlikely that the plaintiff, properly advised, would have continued with the relevant allegation much less brought the District Court proceedings; as ‘the plaintiff was misled in a significantly material respect, that is, into believing that he had a viable cause of action against the plaintiff’ (at [20]), the circumstances were sufficiently exceptional to justify a costs order in favour of the unsuccessful plaintiff, on a party and party basis, with respect to the period prior to the actual trial of the plaintiff’s claim: at [21]). 358. Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (1979) 28 ALR 201 at 208 per Fisher J (FCA); Re Elgindata Ltd (No 2) [1993] 1 All ER 232 at 237 per Nourse LJ; Popovic v Murray (SC(Tas), Green CJ, 15 March 1991, unreported); Arian v Nguyen (2001) 33 MVR 37 at 47; [2001] NSWCA 5; BC200100266 per Ipp AJA. See also WA O 66 r 1(2) (which provides that if the court is of the opinion that the conduct of a party either before or after the commencement of the litigation or that a claim by a party for an unreasonably excessive amount has resulted in costs being unnecessarily or unreasonably incurred it may, inter alia, order that party to pay the costs of an unsuccessful party either wholly or in part). 359. Heperu Pty Ltd v Morgan Brooks Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 80; BC200800557 at [16]–[18] per Palmer J. 360. [1991] 1 VR 129. 361. Verna Trading Pty Ltd v New India Assurance Co Ltd [1991] 1 VR 129 at 156 (App Div(Vic)). 362. As to taxation on a solicitor/own client basis see 16.24–16.26. 363. Verna Trading Pty Ltd v New India Assurance Co Ltd [1991] 1 VR 129 at 174–5 (App Div(Vic)). 364. Verna Trading Pty Ltd v New India Assurance Co Ltd [1991] 1 VR 129 at 175 (App Div(Vic)). 365. [1959] VR 252. 366. Earnshaw v Loy (No 2) [1959] VR 252 at 256–7. 367. HCR 2004 r 11.05; ACT r 2507; NT r 75.14; Qld r 932; Vic r 75.14. Cf SA r 306(3) (‘The Court may order a person who has been found guilty of a contempt to pay the costs of the proceedings

for contempt’). 368. See, for example, Tovehead v Freeman [2003] NTCA 12; BC200303652 (involving an unsuccessful allegation of contempt). Cf Hinch v Attorney-General (Victoria) (1987) 164 CLR 15 at 89–90; BC8701810 (FC); Allbeury v Corruption and Crime Commission [2012] WASCA 84 (S); BC201208946. 369. [1981] VR 315. 370. Foley v Herald-Sun TV Pty Ltd [1981] VR 315 at 324. 371. [1971] Ch 700. 372. As to taxation of costs in contempt proceedings see 16.68–16.69. 373. Knight v Clifton [1971] Ch 700 at 713 (emphasis in original). See also at 725 per Buckley LJ (who remarked that the trial judge’s finding that the third defendant was not guilty of contempt established that the plaintiff’s motion to commit was misconceived, and that in circumstances of this kind it would require ‘very exceptional facts’ to justify the trial judge’s costs order). 374. Knight v Clifton [1971] Ch 700 at 714. 375. Knight v Clifton [1971] Ch 700 at 722. 376. See, for example, Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117(1) (discussed at 8.70); Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 85A(1) (but note that under s 85A(2), ‘if the Federal Court is satisfied that a party to a proceeding has, by any unreasonable act or omission, caused another party to incur costs in connection with the institution or conduct of the proceeding, the Court may order the firstmentioned party to pay some or all of those costs’; see Ward v Western Australia (1999) 93 FCR 305; [1999] FCA 580; BC9902172; De Rose v State of South Australia (No 2) [2005] FCAFC 137; BC200505350; Reid v State of South Australia [2007] FCA 1479; BC200708106; Fesl v Delegate of the Native Title Registrar (No 2) (2008) 173 FCR 176; [2008] FCA 1479; BC200808638; Cheedy v State of Western Australia (No 2) (2011) 199 FCR 23; [2011] FCAFC 163; BC201110544); Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) s 4.1.23(1) (but note that s 4.1.23(2) states that the court may order costs for the proceeding as it considers appropriate in the listed circumstances, which include that ‘the court considers the proceeding (or part of it) to have been frivolous or vexatious’: s 4.1.23(2)(b); see Mudie v Gainriver Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] 2 Qd R 271; [2002] QCA 546; BC200207639 at [34]–[42] per McMurdo P and Atkinson J (dealing with an earlier equivalent enactment); Noosa Shire Council v Johns (2007) 1 PDQR 252; [2007] QPEC 68; Stevenson Group Investments Pty Ltd v Nunn [2012] QCA 351; BC201209678 at [84]–[85] per Margaret McMurdo P, with whom Fraser JA and Mullins J concurred). 377. See, for example, legal aid legislation, which exempts legally aided persons from liability to pay adverse costs orders in certain circumstances: Legal Aid Act 1977 (ACT) s 34; Legal Aid Commission Act 1979 (NSW) s 47(1); Legal Aid Act 1990 (NT) s 33; Legal Aid Queensland Act 1997 (Qld) s 32; Legal Aid Commission Act 1990 (Tas) s 21; Legal Aid Act 1978 (Vic) s 48; Legal Aid Commission Act 1976 (WA) s 45. 378. See, for example, Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 570(2)(a), as to which see Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 4) [2012] FCA 1411; BC201209686 at [200]–[202] per Rares J. 379. See, for example, Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) s 88 (see Department of Community Services v SP (2006) 4 DCLR(NSW) 113; [2006] NSWDC 168; BC200640246; Department of Community Services v SM (2008) 6 DCLR(NSW) 384; [2008] NSWDC 68; BC200840116; XX v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2010) 11 DCLR(NSW) 123; [2010] NSWDC 147; BC201040233). 380. The latter is to be collapsed into a ‘mega-tribunal’, titled the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of

New South Wales (NCAT), upon the commencement of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (which is to commence on 1 January 2014 or such later date as may be fixed by proclamation: s 7(2)). 381. Namely Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 70NFB(1) (which deals with the powers of the court in the event of a contravention without reasonable excuse of an order of the court that affects children: see s 70NFB(2)(g) for costs consequences), 117AA (which deals with costs in proceedings relating to overseas enforcement and international conventions; see, for example, DirectorGeneral, NSW Department of Community Services v JLM (2001) 28 Fam LR 243; [2001] FamCA 1338; BC200108628 (FC); A v GS (2005) 193 FLR 416; [2005] FamCA 785; Director-General, Dept of Communities (Child Safety Services) v Rolfston (Costs) (2011) 44 Fam LR 476; [2011] FamCAFC 23; BC201150054), 117AC (which proscribes the court making an order for security for costs in a proceeding involving a Convention country that is listed in the Family Law Regulations 1984 (Cth) Sch 4A: see 28.17) and 118 (which deals with frivolous or vexatious proceedings). 382. ‘Proceedings’ in this context refer both to matters at first instance and on appeal: Marriage of Dickson (No 2) (1999) 25 Fam LR 79; [1999] FamCA 768. 383. Equivalent provision to s 117 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) is made in s 237 of the Family Court Act 1997 (WA), and so the same judicial approach applies to that section: see, for example, T v L [2006] WASCA 46; BC200601730. 384. Marriage of Kohn (1977) 30 FLR 175 at 177 per Frederico J (Fam Ct), endorsed by Bennett J in Bale-Sutch v Bale-Sutch [2007] FamCA 463 at [13]. 385. Gometto v A Firm (No 2) [2010] FamCA 849; BC201050952 at [3] per Cohen J. 386. Namely Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117(4), 117(5): see 22.71. 387. See 13.40–13.47. 388. (1980) 144 CLR 311 at 315; BC8000063. See also at 317 per Murphy J; Re JJT (1998) 195 CLR 184; BC9802630 at 191 per Gummow J. 389. Cf 20.33. 390. Penfold v Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311 at 315–16; BC8000063. 391. (FC(Fam Ct), 27 July 1993, unreported). 392. Marriage of Wilson (No 2) (1994) 123 FLR 159 at 172 per Moss J (Fam Ct). 393. Fitzgerald v Fish (2005) 33 Fam LR 123; [2005] FamCA 158 at [41] per the court. 394. (1985) 75 FLR 84 at 89–90 (FC(Fam Ct)). See also Marriage of Doherty (1996) FLC ¶92-652 at 82,684 per Baker J, at 82,685 per Fogarty J (FC) (who focused on the discretionary nature of costs orders); Lyris v Hatziantoniou (1998) 24 Fam LR 391 at 395; [1998] FamCA 1311 per Steele J (describing the ‘primary position’ fixed by s 117 as that each party should pay his or her own costs). 395. (1993) 16 Fam LR 888 at 893 per Nicholson CJ and Maxwell J (FC). 396. Cf Marriage of Wilson (No 2) (1994) 123 FLR 159 at 169–70 per Moss J (Fam Ct). 397. As to which see 6.14. 398. Esdale v Schenk (2012) 46 Fam LR 547; [2012] FamCA 111; BC201250169 (where Murphy J remarked that the exercise of the costs power does not merely involve a consideration of the s 117(2A) matters, but also involves paying proper regard to s 117(1), which ‘remains, as it were, an

obstacle that must be overcome’: at [68]). Cf Marriage of Wilson (No 2) (1994) 123 FLR 159 at 170 per Moss J (Fam Ct). 399. Billington v Billington [2008] FamCA 348; BC200850627 at [20] per Cronin J; Firmer v Britton [2012] FamCA 576; BC201250812 at [13] per Kent J. 400. See 20.29–20.33. 401. Eure v Tidwell (1995) 121 FLR 369 at 376 per Nicholson CJ, with Lindenmayer and Joske JJ concurred (FC). 402. Marriage of Wilson (No 2) (1994) 123 FLR 159 at 165–6 per Moss J (Fam Ct). 403. The remark of Cronin J in Billington v Billington [2008] FamCA 348; BC200850627 at [19] that the list of factors contained in s 117(2A) is ‘not exclusive or exhaustive’ was arguably informed by the presence of s 117(2A)(g), given that s 117(2A) is not otherwise framed in terms that envisage an inclusive non-exhaustive list. 404. Marriage of McDonald (1994) 18 Fam LR 265 at 272 per Mushin J (‘I do not see paragraphs (a) to (f) [of s 117(2A)] as limiting the exercise of the discretion under paragraph (g) in any way’); Marriage of Telfer (1996) 20 Fam LR 619 at 621 per Lindenmayer J. See, for example, G v N (No 2) [2002] FMCAfam 68; BC200204653 at [17], [18] per Driver FM (taking into account the husband’s poor health in declining to order costs against him). 405. See 8.75–8.78. 406. McDonald v McDonald (1994) FLC ¶92-508 at 81,271 per Mushin J; Knowles v Green (No 2) [2009] FamCA 541; BC200950445 at [44] per Mushin J (noting that an order for costs in a parenting case is unusual); Hawkins v Roe (2012) 47 Fam LR 526; [2012] FamCAFC 77; BC201250322 at [14] per May and Ainslie-Wallace JJ, at [162] per Thackray J (dissenting but not on this point of principle). Marriage of I (No 2) (1995) 22 Fam LR 557 at 558 (FC). 407. (2012) 47 Fam LR 526; [2012] FamCAFC 77; BC201250322 at [147]. 408. [2009] FamCA 541; BC200950445. 409. Knowles v Green (No 2) [2009] FamCA 541; BC200950445 at [44]. 410. (1980) 144 CLR 311 at 318; BC8000063. See also at 316–17 per Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ. Cf Marriage of Jensen (1982) FLC ¶91-263 at 77,472 per Nygh J. 411. Marriage of Nemeth (1987) FLC ¶91-844 at 76,385 (FC). See also Eleninovska v Patronis (No 2) [2007] FMCAfam 906; BC200709702 at [29] per Sexton FM. 412. See, for example, Marriage of Howard (1982) FLC ¶91-279 at 77,594 (FC) (husband who misled the wife and the court, and who concealed relevant matters, ordered to pay costs); Marriage of Marinko (1983) FLC ¶91-307 at 78,100 (FC) (costs ordered against husband who had unduly prolonged the proceedings and been evasive as to his financial circumstances); Marriage of Briese (1986) FLC ¶91-713 at 75,182 per Smithers J (husband’s failure to make full disclosure of his financial position justified ordering him to pay two-thirds of the wife’s costs); Marriage of Weir (1992) 110 FLR 403 at 409 (FC(Fam Ct)) (wife awarded half of her costs because, although she had not been completely successful in her application, the husband had made a deliberate nondisclosure of income). 413. See, for example, Marriage of Ensabella (1980) FLC ¶90-867 at 75,504–5 per Fogarty J (where the wife, who had filed an affidavit that dealt in exhausting detail with matters not relevant to the ultimate issue between the parties, was ordered to pay one-half of the husband’s costs of preparing his affidavit in reply).

414. See, for example, Marriage of Macura (1982) FLC ¶91-252 at 77,395 per Fogarty J (FC). 415. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117AB. 416. See 8.59. 417. See 8.78. 418. See 8.75–8.76. 419. See, for example, Scott v Scott (2003) 31 Fam LR 257; [2003] FamCA 1129 at [60] per Rose J (husband ordered to pay the wife’s costs because his application was both wholly unsuccessful and failed to address a fundamental plank of the case that was being brought on his behalf). 420. Limousin v Limousin (Costs) (2007) 38 Fam LR 478; [2007] FamCA 1178; BC200750689 at [60] (FC) (‘the fact that the appeal was wholly unsuccessful looms as a significant matter within the context of s 117(2A)’); Whipp v Richards (Costs) [2012] FamCAFC 91; BC201250377 at [27] per the court. 421. (1992) 110 FLR 67 at 79–80 (FC(Fam Ct)). See also S v A Solicitor (1998) 23 Fam LR 641 at 658; [1998] FamCA 130 (FC) (costs ordered in favour of the respondent due to the appellant’s ‘total absence of success’ at first instance and on appeal). 422. See, for example, KT v KJ and TH (2000) FLC ¶93-032 at 87,510 per Kay J, at 87,510 per Holden J; [2000] FamCA 831 (FC). Cf Limousin v Limousin (Costs) (2007) 38 Fam LR 478; [2007] FamCA 1178; BC200750689 at [61] (FC). See 8.29–8.31. 423. See, for example, Blue Seas Investments Pty Ltd v Mitchell and McGillivray (1999) 25 Fam LR 65 at 78; [1999] FamCA 745 (FC). As to costs orders on other than a party and party basis see 16.18–16.31. 424. See, for example, Marriage of Vaughan (1990) 99 FLR 69 (Fam Ct) (husband ordered to pay $1,000 towards the wife’s costs as he had been wholly unsuccessful). As to the fixing of costs by the court generally see 15.14–15.26. 425. (1993) 16 Fam LR 888 at 893 per Nicholson CJ and Maxwell J (FC). 426. Marriage of McAlpin (1993) 16 Fam LR 888 at 893 per Nicholson CJ and Maxwell J (FC). While s 117(2A) (a) targets the financial circumstances ‘of each of the parties to the proceedings’, not those of any insurers who might stand behind the parties, evidence that an insurer does in fact stand behind a party may be a relevant matter to the exercise of the discretion generally under s 117(2A)(g): Ruane v Bachmann-Ruane (No 2) [2012] FamCA 751; BC201250975 at [20] per Murphy J. 427. See, for example, Marriage of Kelly (No 2) (1981) 7 Fam LR 762 at 778 (FC); Marriage of J and P (1985) 80 FLR 126 at 141 per Treyvaud J (Fam Ct); Whelan v Rizzo (1995) FLC ¶92-567 at 81,642–3 per Nicholson CJ; Marriage of I (No 2) (1995) 22 Fam LR 557 at 558 (FC); Marriage of Stein (2000) 25 Fam LR 727 at 745; [2000] FamCA 102 (FC); Pope v Pope (Costs) [2012] FamCA 655; BC201250506 at [89] per Ryan J (‘the husband’s materially superior financial circumstances have a significantly moderating influence on the magnitude of order which I am satisfied should be made against the wife’). This does not, however, mean that the costs application is an appropriate time for conducting a wholesale examination into every aspect of the parties’ financial circumstances; in the ordinary case the court will be satisfied with a broad comparison of the parties’ financial positions available to it: Browne v Green (2002) 29 Fam LR 428 at 433; [2002] FamCA 791 (FC). 428. Albertinni v Podopoulos [2010] FamCA 405; BC201050467 at [30] per Dawe J (who noted that the reference to the financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings ‘is not a

reference to any suggestion that the person with the superior financial position should have less chance of obtaining an order for cost than a person with the inferior comparative position in relation to the parties’ but rather that ‘[t]he financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings which has to be taken into account’). 429. (2002) 29 Fam LR 428; [2002] FamCA 791 (FC). See also Whipp v Richards (Costs) [2012] FamCAFC 91; BC201250377 (where the court noted that ‘[w]hilst the court is obliged to have regard to the “modest” financial circumstances of the mother in this case, so doing would not militate against making an order for costs if the court were otherwise of the opinion that the circumstances justified doing so’ (at [26]), and that in the circumstances, had the mother’s appeal been wholly unsuccessful, ‘we would have had little difficulty in forming the opinion that a costs order was appropriate’ (at [27])). Cf Marriage of Jensen (1982) FLC ¶91-263 at 77,473 per Nygh J; Limousin v Limousin (Costs) (2007) 38 Fam LR 478; [2007] FamCA 1178; BC200750689 at [61] (FC). 430. See, for example, JEL v DDF (2001) 28 Fam LR 119 at 126; [2001] FamCA 907 (FC). 431. (2012) 47 Fam LR 603; [2012] FamCAFC 124; BC201250505. 432. Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT); Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW); De Facto Relationships Act 1991 (NT); Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) Pt 19; Domestic Partners Property Act 1996 (SA); Relationships Act 2003 (Tas); Relationships Act 2008 (Vic); Family Court Act 1997 (WA) Pt 5A. 433. Namely Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 341. 434. See, for example, Grace v Jeneka (2004) DFC ¶95-289; [2002] QCA 335; BC200205487; CJL v JMG [2007] QSC 179; BC200705671; H v M [2007] QSC 321; BC200709346. 435. Family Court Act 1997 (WA) s 237. 436. As to which see 6.14. 437. Ferris v Winslade [1998] ACTSC 38; BC9802610 at [6]–[10] per Cooper J; Bosworth v Firkins [2013] FamCA 7; BC201350042 at [15] per Faulks DCJ. Although the Tasmanian legislation, like that in Queensland and Western Australia, contains a specific costs provision, it simply states that ‘[a] court may make any order for costs it considers appropriate’: Relationships Act 2003 (Tas) s 68. It therefore aligns with the general costs discretion vested by statute in the Supreme Court: Bellchambers v Jackson (2009) 19 Tas R 338; [2009] TASSC 113; BC200911679 at [3], [4] per Blow J. 438. Kilby v O’Brien (No 2) [2006] ACTSC 90; BC200607165 at [2] per Connolly J. 439. Kardos v Sarbutt (No 2) (2006) DFC ¶95-337; [2006] NSWCA 206; BC200605726 at [27]–[28] per Brereton J, with whom Basten JA and Hunt AJA concurred; Paino v Paino [2006] NSWSC 886; BC200606957 at [39]–[41] per Barrett J. 440. The New South Wales Court of Appeal’s decision in Kardoos v Sarbutt (No 2) (2006) DFC ¶95337; [2006] NSWCA 206; BC200605726, in so far as it stated that in cases under the Act ‘the starting position should be that each party should bear its own costs’ (at [35] per Brereton J, with whom Basten JA and Hunt AJA concurred), has been rejected: see Dunstan v Rickwood (No 2) (2007) 38 Fam LR 491; [2007] NSWCA 266; BC200708317 at [35]–[40] per McColl JA, with whom Beazley and Ipp JJA concurred; Hayes v Marquis [2008] NSWCA 10; BC200800783 at [14] per Beazley JA, at [145] per McColl JA; Baker v Towle (2008) 39 Fam LR 323; [2008] NSWCA 73; BC200802889 at [12] per Beazley JA, at [82] per Basten JA; Bellchambers v Jackson (2009) 19 Tas R 338; [2009] TASSC 113; BC200911679 at [20] per Blow J. 441. Baker v Towle (2008) 39 Fam LR 323; [2008] NSWCA 73; BC200802889 at [9] per Beazley JA;

Lawler v Ewington (2009) 19 Tas R 250; [2009] TASSC 7; BC200900692 at [10] per Holt AsJ. 442. See, for example, Kardos v Sarbutt (No 2) (2006) DFC ¶95-337; [2006] NSWCA 206; BC200605726 (although an order for costs was made on the appeal: at [41] per Brereton J, with whom Basten JA and Hunt AJA concurred); Kilby v O’Brien (No 2) [2006] ACTSC 90; BC200607165; Vollmer v Hauber Davidson (2007) DFC ¶95-400; [2006] NSWCA 79; BC200602235. 443. See, for example, Paino v Paino [2006] NSWSC 886; BC200606957 at [38] per Barrett J (order adjusted by reference to considerations including the following: (1) ‘[t]here was an element of unreasonableness in the lengths to which the plaintiff went to bring out a multitude of small details of fact many of which were of no real assistance in determining questions of her alleged contributions in various areas’; (2) the course taken by the plaintiff in and about the matter of valuation of the land in issue was productive of an unwarranted burden of expense on the defendant; and (3) the increment in costs on either side attributable to the plaintiff’s changes of solicitors). 444. See, for example, Chanter v Catts (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 179; BC200605062 (costs awarded to a plaintiff who obtained a result that bettered the defendant’s offer by $60,000; Hodgson JA remarked that ‘although the proceedings achieved less than the appellant claimed, the result is substantially better than the appellant could have obtained without court proceedings and counts as substantial success’: at [6]); Baker v Towle (2008) 39 Fam LR 323; [2008] NSWCA 73; BC200802889 (where the defendant was ordered to pay two-thirds of the plaintiff’s costs at trial because this approximated the extent of the parties’ relative successes; but note that the case is not authority for the proposition that costs in applications for the adjustment of property interests between de facto partners must invariably reflect the ‘proportionate success’ of the parties: Apostolidis v Kalenik (No 2) [2011] VSCA 329; BC201108296 at [35], [40] per the court). 445. (2006) DFC ¶95-337; [2006] NSWCA 206; BC200605726 at [31]. See also Baker v Towle (2008) 39 Fam LR 323; [2008] NSWCA 73; BC200802889 at [20]–[24] per Beazley JA. Brereton J’s observations have been endorsed in the Northern Territory on more than one occasion: Rowston v Dunstan [2011] NTSC 30; BC201102708 at [16] per Luppino M; Fernon v Lawton (2012) 31 NTLR 71; [2012] NTSC 7; BC201200342 at [19] per Luppino M. 446. Paino v Paino [2006] NSWSC 886; BC200606957 at [8] per Barrett J. 447. Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) s 69(2) (‘costs are in the discretion of the Court’). 448. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98: see 6.7. 449. R & W Realty Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2000) 112 LGERA 351 at 356; [2000] NSWLEC 167; BC200004706 per Sheahan J. 450. Practice Direction No 10. 451. Practice Direction No 10A. 452. Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2001) 51 NSWLR 673; [2001] NSWCA 78; BC200103188 (revd but not on this point: Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2003) 212 CLR 111; [2003] HCA 8; BC200300217), discussed at 6.18. 453. Gibson v Mosman Municipal Council (2001) 116 LGERA 397 at 400; [2001] NSWLEC 201; BC200105410 per Talbot J. Contra Wilson v Bourke Shire Council (2001) 116 LGERA 287 at 290; [2001] NSWLEC 200; BC200105409 per Pearlman J; CSR Ltd v Fairfield City Council (2001) 117 LGERA 77 at 85; [2001] NSWLEC 221; BC200105780 per Pearlman J. 454. RLEC 1996 Pt 16 r 4(2); as from 28 January 2008, RLEC r 3.7(2).

455. Hunter Development Brokerage Pty Ltd v Cessnock City Council (No 2) (2006) 68 NSWLR 177; [2006] NSWCA 292; BC200608774 at [3] per Bryson JA; Port Stephens Council v Samson (2007) 156 LGERA 125; [2007] NSWCA 299; BC200709106 at [19] per Spigelman CJ; Thaina Town (on Goulburn) Pty Ltd v City of Sydney Council (2007) 71 NSWLR 230; [2007] NSWCA 300; BC200709105 at [32] per Spigelman CJ. 456. Specifically, the rule applies to proceedings in Class 1 (‘environmental planning and protection appeals’), Class 2 (‘local government and miscellaneous appeals and applications’) and various aspects of Class 3 (‘land tenure, valuation, rating and compensation matters’) of the court’s jurisdiction: RLEC r 3.7(1) (formerly RLEC 1996 Pt 16 r 4(1)). 457. Namely Class 4 of the court’s jurisdiction (‘environmental planning and protection and development contract civil enforcement’). 458. Hunter Development Brokerage Pty Ltd v Cessnock City Council (No 2) (2006) 68 NSWLR 177; [2006] NSWCA 292; BC200608774 at [4] per Bryson JA. 459. Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (No 8) (2007) 155 LGERA 115; [2007] NSWLEC 37; BC200700308 at [46] per Biscoe J. 460. Hunter Development Brokerage Pty Ltd v Cessnock City Council (No 2) (2006) 68 NSWLR 177; [2006] NSWCA 292; BC200608774 at [39] per Basten JA. As to what constituted ‘exceptional circumstances’ under the former practice direction, see the first edition of this work, 8.63–8.66. 461. See, for example, Gee v Port Stephens Council (2003) 131 LGERA 325; [2003] NSWLEC 260; BC200306515 at [40] per McClellan CJ at CL; Residents Against Improper Development Inc v Chase Property Investments Pty Ltd (2006) 149 LGERA 360; [2006] NSWCA 323; BC200609559 at [231] per McClellan CJ at CL (phrased in terms of a ‘no discouragement’ principle). See further 9.31–9.34. 462. Hunter Development Brokerage Pty Ltd v Cessnock City Council (No 2) (2006) 68 NSWLR 177; [2006] NSWCA 292; BC200608774 at [5] per Bryson JA; Port Stephens Council v Samson (2007) 156 LGERA 125; [2007] NSWCA 299; BC200709106 at [21]–[97] per Spigelman CJ; Thaina Town (on Goulburn) Pty Ltd v City of Sydney Council (2007) 71 NSWLR 230; [2007] NSWCA 300; BC200709105 at [68] per Spigelman CJ. 463. Port Stephens Council v Samson (2007) 156 LGERA 125; [2007] NSWCA 299; BC200709106 at [47] per Spigelman CJ. 464. Port Stephens Council v Samson (2007) 156 LGERA 125; [2007] NSWCA 299; BC200709106 at [48] per Spigelman CJ. 465. On this point see the discussion in the first edition of this work, 8.59–8.67. 466. Port Stephens Council v Samson (2007) 156 LGERA 125; [2007] NSWCA 299; BC200709106 at [20] per Spigelman CJ. 467. See Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) ss 17–19. 468. Port Stephens Council v Samson (2007) 156 LGERA 125; [2007] NSWCA 299; BC200709106 at [69] per Spigelman CJ. 469. RLEC r 3.7(3). 470. This factor has parallels with the approach propounded by the case law pursuant to the former practice directions, to the effect that where a preliminary question of law has been raised, an order for costs was made in favour of the party who had succeeded in the determination of that question: see the first edition of this work, 8.67. As this case law, however, dovetailed into the superseded concept of ‘exceptional circumstances’ prescribed by the practice directions, its application to the

current rules must be viewed with caution. 471. Grant v Kiama Municipal Council [2006] NSWLEC 70; BC200600828 at [15] per Preston CJ, approved by the Court of Appeal in Port Stephens Council v Sansom (2007) 156 LGERA 125; [2007] NSWCA 299; BC200709106 at [56] per Spigelman CJ. 472. Arden Anglican School v Hornsby Shire Council (2008) 158 LGERA 224; [2008] NSWLEC 103; BC200801439 at [9] per Biscoe J. 473. Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) s 19. 474. See, for example, Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (Vic) s 91(1), which provides that in proceedings for compulsory acquisition, the court (or tribunal) may award such costs as it thinks proper but in making an order for costs must, if appropriate to do so, take into consideration: (a) the amount of compensation awarded as compared with the amount (if any) offered by the relevant authority; (b) the extent to which the proceedings have arisen from, or been affected by: (i) unreasonable conduct on the part of the claimant or the relevant authority; (ii) the failure of the claimant to give adequate particulars of the claim or supply supporting material when required to do so; (iii) an excessive claim by the claimant; or (iv) an unduly depressed offer by the relevant authority; and (c) any other matters that under the Act must be taken into account in determining the allocation of costs. As to s 91 see Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd v Roads Corporation (2007) 155 LGERA 13; [2007] VSC 175; BC200704110 at [23]–[26] per Osborn J; Love v Roads Corporation [2011] VSCA 434; BC201110012 at [155] per the court. 475. Serbian Cultural Club ‘St Sava’ Inc v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (No 2) [2008] NSWLEC 78; BC200800831 at [16] per Jagot J. 476. Taylor v Port Macquarie-Hastings Council (2010) 175 LGERA 189; [2010] NSWLEC 153; BC201005769 at [19] per Biscoe J. See also Al Amanah College Inc v Minister for Education and Training (No 4) [2012] NSWLEC 26; BC201201945 at [13] per Biscoe J. 477. Minister for the Environment v Florence (1979) 21 SASR 108 at 134–5 per Wells J, cited with approval by Beech J in McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads (No 7) (2011) 185 LGERA 118; [2011] WASC 223 (S); BC201111031 at [59]–[60]. 478. Overton Investments Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (2001) 113 LGERA 439 at 448–9; [2001] NSWCA 137; BC200102232 per Stein JA, endorsed by Jenkins J in Mercer v Western Australian Planning Commission [2008] WASC 124 (S); BC200900896 at [34]. 479. Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority [2010] NSWLEC 27; BC201001087 at [34] per Biscoe J. See also Nasser v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 149 LGERA 289; [2006] NSWLEC 562; BC200607577 at [32] per Pain J; Simpson v Bagnall [2008] NSWLEC 79; BC200800830 at [10] per Jagot J; Love v Roads Corporation [2011] VSCA 434; BC201110012 at [173] per the court (accepting that ‘the position of a claimant in [compulsory acquisition] proceedings … is not that of an ordinary litigant and that the starting point for the exercise of the court’s discretion as to costs is that the dispossessed owner should recover the costs of making the claim’). Cf McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads (No 7) (2011) 185 LGERA 118; [2011] WASC 223 (S); BC201111031 at [77] per Beech J (who did not ‘consider that this statement is a helpful framework for the exercise of the costs discretion’). 480. McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads (No 7) (2011) 185 LGERA 118; [2011] WASC 223 (S); BC201111031 at [43], [85] per Beech J. 481. Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority [2010] NSWLEC 27; BC201001087 at [35] per Biscoe J, referring to Banno v Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 45

FCR 32 at 53; BC9304996 per Wilcox J; Pastrello v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2000) 110 LGERA 223; [2000] NSWLEC 209; BC200006026 at [17] per Talbot J; AMP Capital Investors v Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation (No 3) [2007] NSWLEC 724; BC200709470 at [18]–[21] per Pain J; AMP Capital Investors v Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation (2008) 163 LGERA 245; [2008] NSWCA 325; BC200810501 at [102] per Hodgson JA, with whom Bell JA and Gyles AJA concurred. 482. See, for example, Halley v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (No 3) [2011] NSWLEC 94; BC201103802 at [40]–[64] per Pepper J. 483. See Dillon v Gosford City Council (2011) 284 ALR 619; [2011] NSWCA 328; BC201108747 at [70]–[72] per Basten JA, with whom Macfarlan JA and Handley AJA concurred; Brock v Roads and Maritime Services (formerly Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW) (2012) 191 LGERA 267; [2012] NSWCA 404; BC201209828 at [94] per Tobias JA, with whom Beazley and Meagher JJA concurred. 484. North Albury Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Albury Municipal Council (1983) 49 LGRA 215; Banno v Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 45 FCR 32; BC9304996; Pastrello v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2000) 110 LGERA 223; [2000] NSWLEC 209; BC200006026; Ashfield Municipal Council v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2001) 112 LGERA 389; [2001] NSWLEC 10; BC200100837; Wollong Pty Ltd v Shoalhaven City Council (2002) 122 LGERA 331; [2002] NSWLEC 164; BC200205964; Cassidy v Sydney Water Corporation (No 2) [2008] NSWLEC 246; BC200807574; Mercer v Western Australian Planning Commission [2008] WASC 124 (S); BC200900896. 485. (2005) 144 LGERA 224; [2005] NSWLEC 209; BC200502699 at [28]. 486. (2011) 284 ALR 619; [2011] NSWCA 328; BC201108747 at [72], with whom Macfarlan JA and Handley AJA concurred. See also Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (No 1) (1973) 32 LGRA 170 at 206 per Wells J; Pastrello v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2000) 110 LGERA 223; [2000] NSWLEC 209; BC200006026 at [17] per Talbot J. 487. (2012) 191 LGERA 267; [2012] NSWCA 404; BC201209828. 488. Brock v Roads and Maritime Services (formerly Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW) (2012) 191 LGERA 267; [2012] NSWCA 404; BC201209828 at [93]–[94]. 489. Brock v Roads and Maritime Services (formerly Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW) (2012) 191 LGERA 267; [2012] NSWCA 404; BC201209828 at [95]. 490. [2008] NSWLEC 78; BC200800831. See also State of Tasmania v Effingham Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] TASSC 32; BC200603008 at [28] per Blow J (where the compensation awarded was only $3,500 more than the state had offered, and tens of thousands of dollars less than the respondent was seeking, the state was ordered to pay 85 per cent of the claimant’s costs). Cf Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission (2006) 157 LGERA 1; [2006] WASC 82 (S); BC200704683 at [75] per Templeman J (where costs were ordered against the claimant, being a property developer who was awarded far less than it claimed, had prolonged the hearing by seeking to prove that the land would have been re-zoned, and had otherwise adopted an ‘extreme position’ in the proceedings). 491. Blakes Estates Ltd v Government of Montserrat [2006] 1 WLR 297; [2005] UKPC 46 at [25] per Lord Carswell. See also Purfleet Farms Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions [2003] 1 P & CR 20; [2002] EWCA Civ 1430 at [29]–[38] per Potter LJ, at [43] per Chadwick LJ. 492. See, for example, ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) s 48(1) (‘no costs’

starting point), 48(2) (which lists occasions where costs can be ordered); Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) s 88(1) (‘no costs’ starting point), 88(1A) (factors relevant to making a costs order: see 8.92–8.94); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) ss 100 (‘no costs’ starting point), 102–107 (listing occasions where costs can be ordered); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 109(1) (‘no costs’ starting point), 109(3) (which lists the circumstances where an award of costs can be made); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) s 87(1) (‘no costs’ starting point), 87(2)–87(4) (which prescribe a non-exhaustive catalogue of circumstances where costs can be awarded) (see J Hockley, ‘Obtaining Costs Orders from the State Administrative Tribunal’ (October 2006) Brief 12; Motor Vehicle Industry Board v Dawson (2006) 41 SR (WA) 343; [2006] WASAT 8 at [43]–[48] per Barker J; Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board (2007) 33 WAR 361; [2007] WASCA 97; BC200703452 at [36] per Buss JA, with whom Wheeler and Pullin JJA concurred; Lourey v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2012] WASCA 112; BC201203765 at [81], [82] per Murphy JA, with whom Pullin and Buss JJA concurred on this point; Quinlivan v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2012] WASCA 263 (S) at [9]–[12] per the court). 493. Murtough v New South Wales Bar Association [2008] NSWADT 166; BC200855242 at [29]. 494. The New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal is to be collapsed into a ‘mega-tribunal’, titled the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales (NCAT), upon the commencement of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (which is to commence on 1 January 2014 or such later date as may be fixed by proclamation: s 7(2)). 495. Namely Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 109(1), 109(3). 496. Being the commencement date of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Amendment Act 2008 (NSW), which replaced the former s 88. 497. Gizah Pty Ltd v AXA Trustees Ltd (No 2) [2001] NSWADT 164 at [29], endorsed in Cripps v G & M Dawson Pty Ltd [2006] ANZ ConvR 350; [2006] NSWCA 81; BC200602234 at [60] per Santow JA. 498. For instance, by: (a) failing to comply with an order or direction of the tribunal without reasonable excuse; (b) failing to comply with the Act, the regulations, the rules or an enabling enactment; (c) asking for an adjournment as a result of (a) or (b); (d) causing an adjournment; (e) attempting to deceive another party or the tribunal; (f) vexatiously conducting the proceeding. 499. See, for example, Dykes v Heatherway Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWADTAP 46; BC200755088 at [28]–[29]. 500. Hutchings Electrical v Director-General, Department of Fair Trading (No 2) [2002] NSWADT 255 at [18]. 501. Raethel v Director-General, Department of Education and Training [2000] NSWADT 56 at [57]– [58]. 502. Brooks Maher v Cheung [2001] NSWADT 18 at [14]. 503. Salon Today Pty Ltd v MMIR Pty Ltd [2009] NSWADT 71; BC200955195 at [69]. 504. Salon Today Pty Ltd v MMIR Pty Ltd [2009] NSWADT 71; BC200955195 at [70]–[72] (second paragraph break omitted). 505. Meriton Properties Pty Ltd v DCM Leases-Five Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWADT 11; BC201055018 at [18]. 506. AT v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 131; BC201003728 at [33] per Basten JA, with whom Beazley and Macfarlan JJA concurred.

507. Kyriacou v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2009] NSWADT 175 at [38] (‘it must be borne in mind that the primary principle stated in section 88(1) is that each party to proceedings before the Tribunal should bear that party’s own costs. An award of costs is an exception to this general principle. It therefore remains the normal expectation that the parties in Tribunal proceedings should bear their own costs’). 508. AT v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 131; BC201003728 at [33] per Basten JA, with whom Beazley and Macfarlan JJA concurred. 509. See 7.5. 510. Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) s 88(1A)(a). 511. Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) s 88(1A)(b). 512. Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) s 88(1A)(c). 513. Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) s 88(1A)(d). 514. Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) s 88(1A)(e). 515. Salon Today Pty Ltd v MMIR Pty Ltd [2009] NSWADT 71; BC200955195 at [73], [74]. 516. Department of Human Services v RA (No 2) [2010] NSWADTAP 37; BC201055128 at [5]. 517. Jonamill Pty Ltd v Alramon Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWADTAP 3; BC201055025 at [43]. 518. Corrigan and Gibson v Watson [2009] NSWADT 110; BC200955038 at [29]. 519. Department of Human Services v RA (No 2) [2010] NSWADTAP 37; BC201055128 at [11]–[12]. 520. O’Sullivan v New South Wales Medical Board (No 2) [2010] NSWADT 188; BC201055179 at [51] (noting that ‘it is well recognised in the Tribunal that the application of s 88, in both its earlier and its “new” form, differs as between different Divisions’, and that ‘[i]n the Retail Leases Division, in particular, it is acknowledged that due to the “commerciality” of the cases decided in it, there should be a greater readiness to award costs than in other Divisions’). 521. Rae v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force (GD) [2011] NSWADTAP 30; BC201155191 at [7] per Judge K P O’Connor. 522. See, for example, Dowsett v Fitness First Australia Pty Ltd [2008] NSWADT 226; BC200855113 at [15] (noting that, under the former s 88, costs orders are ‘rarely made against unsuccessful applicants in antidiscrimination matters’); Burns v Cunningham (No 2) [2012] NSWADT 53; BC201255020 at [34] (‘if it became a general practice to award costs against unsuccessful applicants in [Anti Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW)] matters, this might well inhibit potential complainants from seeking to invoke the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under the [Act] and constitute at least a partial barrier to legitimate access’). Cf Tu v University of Sydney (No 2) [2002] NSWADT 22 at [42] (‘the sanction of a full costs order against the complainant tends to be reserved for cases where an abuse of process is seen as having been involved’). 523. Salon Today Pty Ltd v MMIR Pty Ltd [2009] NSWADT 71; BC200955195 at [77]. 524. Salon Today Pty Ltd v MMIR Pty Ltd [2009] NSWADT 71; BC200955195 at [77]. 525. Salon Today Pty Ltd v MMIR Pty Ltd [2009] NSWADT 71; BC200955195 at [77]; Alramon Pty Ltd v Lifuli Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWADT 49 at [17] (‘to attempt to restrict [s 88(1A)(e)] would do violence to the section itself and would be contrary to its precise terms’). 526. Australian Aqua Air Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2009] NSWADT 239 at [17]. 527. Maher v Network Finance Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 694 at 697–8 per McHugh JA.

528. [1928] 2 KB 353. 529. Citing from Lawrance J in Prince v Haworth [1905] 2 KB 768 at 770. 530. Mansfield v Robinson [1928] 2 KB 353 at 359–60. See also at 362–3 per Talbot J (who noted that merely because the arbitrator was not informed was irrelevant to the validity and enforceability of the agreement). 531. See 15.40–15.57. 532. See 15.41.

[page 256]

CHAPTER 9

Public Interest and Test Case Litigation Costs in Public Interest Litigation General rule Rationale for the general rule Imprecision of term ‘public interest litigation’ Compensatory character of costs orders Absence of correlation between standing provisions and costs discretion Inhibition or deterrence of proceedings — nature of the ‘public interest’ Relevance of private interests Relevance of nature of the respondent Forms of litigation in which the public interest may be a factor costs-wise Environmental litigation Cases impacting upon human rights Judicial review

9.2 9.2 9.7 9.8 9.11

Costs in Test Cases

9.35

9.13 9.14 9.15 9.18 9.22 9.23 9.28 9.31

9.1 By devoting a separate chapter to public interest and test case litigation, it is not intended to suggest that the relevant costs rules here are unique. To the contrary, the courts have gone to some length to state that merely because

litigation is marked as ‘public interest’ or ‘test case’ litigation by itself is no licence to oust the usual exercise of the costs discretion in favour of the successful party. The reasons, rather, for segregating such litigation are fivefold. First, especially in the case of alleged public interest litigation, there is considerable case law, coupled with growing academic1 and law reform body2 analysis. Second, public interest and test case litigation is factually distinct from ordinary litigation, the focus of which is the private interests of the parties, not any broader interest.3 Third, notwithstanding the courts’ reluctance [page 257] to propound special costs rules for public interest and test case litigation, there appears to be a greater curial willingness to oust the usual costs rule in litigation of this kind than in most other forms of litigation. Fourth, a successful litigant in a public interest or test case may, in certain contexts, receive a costs order quantified on a more generous basis than may otherwise have been the case.4 Fifth, it may be that the courts display a greater willingness to make pre-trial costs orders,5 or prospective capping costs orders,6 in public interest or test case litigation than in private interest litigation.

Costs in Public Interest Litigation General rule 9.2 Courts have repeatedly rejected the notion that public interest litigants are subject to costs regimes any different to other litigants. They have emphasised that litigants espousing the public interest are not thereby granted immunity from costs or a ‘free kick’ in litigation.7 Like other forms of adversarial litigation, the usual costs order in alleged ‘public interest litigation’ is that costs follow the event.8 The point applies with greater force to an unsuccessful appeal from an adverse decision in the court below on an alleged public interest matter.9 It follows that there is no need, for this

purpose, to attempt a definition of ‘public interest litigation’,10 except to the extent that statute or court rules adopt it in a costs context.11 [page 258] 9.3 The relevant inquiry instead focuses on identifying those factors that may justify the court making a costs order other than that ‘costs follow the event’, which include the following:12 the extent to which the plaintiff and defendant were successful in the action; where the plaintiff is an individual, whether he or she had any personal, private or financial gain to make from the litigation;13 where the plaintiff is an association, whether its objects have a public character, and whether the litigation was pursued in accordance with those objects and for the purpose of fulfilling them; whether there was widespread public interest in the litigation and its outcome, or the case was otherwise designed to effectuate important public policies; whether, had the plaintiff succeeded, numerous people would have benefited from the action, whether through a clarification of the law or otherwise; whether the plaintiff would have had sufficient economic incentive to file suit even had the action involved only narrow issues lacking general importance. A decision that the presence or absence of one or more of these factors generates a particular costs result is an illegitimate fetter on the courts’ costs discretion.14 The costs order that reflects the justice and fairness inherent in the indemnity principle yields to the facts of each individual case.15 That is not to deny that cumulatively the presence or absence of these factors can influence the fairness and justice in applying the usual costs rule. As explained by Marshall J in Wilderness Society Inc v Turnbull:16

[page 259] The ‘public interest’ is a legitimate basis for departing from the usual order if it can be shown that, upon further examination, there are sufficient reasons connected with or leading up to the case or special circumstances that would warrant a departure from the usual order. Each case must turn on its facts and the relevant considerations through which it may be found appropriate to depart from the usual order are not closed. The real issue is not what is considered to be in the public interest or whether public interest considerations are a recognised exception to the usual rule, but rather, whether it can be said that there are sufficient public interest related reasons connected with or leading up to the litigation that warrant a departure from or outweigh the important consideration that a wholly successful respondent would ordinarily be awarded its costs.

This means that whilst the public interest nature of litigation may be a relevant consideration on the question of costs, there must ordinarily be some additional or special circumstance(s) before the court departs from the usual order as to costs by making no order.17 It has been judicially observed, to this end, that the use of an expression such as ‘special circumstances’ in this context, as in others, emphasises ‘the rare and exceptional character of those occasions’.18 9.4 The first edition of this work19 queried judicial remarks highlighting a gradual shift in the New South Wales Land and Environment Court, in exercising its broad costs discretion, away from the usual costs rule in litigation exhibiting a substantial public interest element.20 The commencement of the court’s 2007 rules on 28 January 2008, however, presents a greater justification for this shift. Rule 4.2(1) states that the Land and Environment Court21 may decide not to make an order for the payment of costs against an unsuccessful applicant in any proceedings ‘if it is satisfied that the proceedings have been brought in the public interest’. The rule in question, it has been suggested, does three things:22 First, it removes any argument that the bringing of proceedings in the public interest might be an extraneous factor which could not influence an order as to costs … Secondly, satisfaction of the court that the proceedings have been brought in the public interest provides an affirmative reason for not making an order against an unsuccessful applicant, and thus qualifies the operation of [NSW] UCPR r 42.1 [whereby ‘costs follow the event unless it appears to the court that some other order should be made as to the whole or any part of the costs’], which would otherwise be applicable. Thirdly, and consequentially, r 4.2 qualifies any expectation that [the opponent] may have that it would receive its costs if successful.

The foregoing does not mean that the public interest exhibited will as a

matter of course justify a departure from the usual costs rule; in most cases it remains necessary to establish [page 260] special circumstances additional to the public interest to enliven the discretion.23 Preston CJ explained the reason for this as follows:24 Characterisation of litigation as being brought in the public interest is too crude a criterion to enable the court to differentiate between the potentially large pool of matters that could be characterised as being brought in the public interest and identify those special matters where departure from the usual costs rule is justified.

9.5 The Land and Environment Court has, to this end, propounded a ‘three step’ approach under r 4.2(1) in determining whether to depart from the usual costs rule.25 The first step involves the ‘threshold’26 inquiry into whether the litigation be characterised as brought in the public interest. As the rule does not identify the criteria that inform this inquiry, the factors identified in the case law in identifying ‘public interest litigation’ assume direct relevance.27 Only once the threshold inquiry is answered in the affirmative is there any justification to move to the second and third steps. Pursuant to the second step, the court inquires as to whether there is ‘something more’ than the mere characterisation of the litigation as being brought in the public interest. The third step investigates whether any countervailing circumstances, including in relation to the conduct of the applicant, speak against departure from the usual costs rule. The ruling in Lester v Ashton Coal Pty Ltd (No 2)28 illustrates the operation of the ‘three step’ approach. It involved unsuccessful civil enforcement proceedings by the applicant, an Aboriginal elder, to remedy and restrain activities by the respondents, which he alleged may have harmed or be harming Aboriginal objects in breach of a statutory prohibition. As to the first step, Preston CJ found that as the proceedings sought to uphold and enforce important obligations in a public welfare statute aimed at protecting Aboriginal cultural heritage and the environment, they exhibited a public interest of a sufficient kind.29 Also, while the applicant may have had a special interest in protecting Aboriginal cultural heritage at the relevant locations, his Honour viewed the protection of that heritage, including at

these locations, as ‘of broader interest to both the Aboriginal community and the non-Aboriginal community’.30 Accordingly, Preston CJ moved to the second step. In this context, his Honour branded the nature, extent and other features of the public interest involved in the litigation as ‘significant’, being ‘something more than the mere characterisation of the proceedings as being brought in the public interest’.31 That the issues ventilated were ‘live and topical’,32 and that the outcome of the litigation ‘has or could have contributed, in a material way, to the proper understanding [page 261] and administration of the law regarding harm to Aboriginal objects’,33 were cited as matters that offered further support to this conclusion.34 As to the third step, Preston CJ found force in the respondents’ submissions that the applicant’s conduct of some of the litigation unreasonably was a countervailing consideration. The unreasonable conduct included a failure to adequately particularise his claims, unreasonably raising and pursuing, but then abandoning, points which had little or no merit, the making of numerous applications for interlocutory relief that wasted time and cost, and the provision of notices to produce that were unclear in their terms. His Honour remarked that although the public interest character of the litigation justified departure from the usual costs rule, it was not fair and reasonable for any dispensation to apply to these respects of unreasonable conduct.35 Accordingly, he ordered the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs in relation to those respects in which the litigation was conducted unreasonably, but not otherwise. 9.6 The Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) envisages that a court, in making an order or giving any direction in a civil proceeding, may have regard to, inter alia, ‘the public importance of the issues in dispute and the desirability of a judicial determination of those issues’.36 The reference to ‘public importance’ serves to give statutory recognition to a factor that the courts have, in appropriate cases, taken into account with respect to the discretion bearing on costs. But consistent with the approach at common law, and with that under r

4.2(1) in the New South Wales Land and Environment Court, it is not sufficient simply to characterise proceedings with public importance in order to avoid the normal rule as to costs.37 It follows that, whether in Victoria or in the Land and Environment Court, the law discussed in the remainder of this chapter retains relevance.

Rationale for the general rule 9.7 There are valid reasons why characterising litigation as ‘public interest litigation’ should not, by itself or as a matter of course, oust the usual costs rule, which are discussed below. Most derive from McHugh J’s judgment in Oshlack v Richmond River Council.38 Though McHugh J dissented as to the outcome on the facts,39 there is little if anything in the majority judgments contrary to the points his Honour made.

Imprecision of term ‘public interest litigation’ 9.8 That the term ‘public interest litigation’ has not proven amenable to a precise, sufficiently encompassing definition makes reference to the ‘usual’ exercise of the costs discretion in such cases problematic. McHugh J in Oshlack v Richmond River Council40 remarked that if costs discretions are to be exercised consistently and rationally, courts must ‘formulate principles and guidelines that can be applied with precision in most cases’, and so if characterisation as [page 262] ‘public interest litigation’ is relevant to making costs orders, ‘courts must be able to define the term with precision’. This led his Honour to make the following statement:41 Without an organising principle to apply or a set of criteria to guide, there is a real danger that, by invoking the ‘public interest litigation’ factor in cases that affect the public interest or involve a public authority, an award of costs will depend on nothing more than the social preferences of the judge, a dependence that will be masked by reliance on the protean concept of public interest litigation.

Accordingly, if the ‘public interest’ is to impact upon the court’s costs discretion, public interest cases must be distinguishable from administrative and constitutional law matters, each of which invariably affect or involve the public interest.42 Yet there are cases where courts have not applied the usual costs rule in administrative and constitutional law matters;43 the matter goes to discretion, not to the characterisation of such a matter (or any other matter) as one of a public interest nature. 9.9 What can be said is that the ‘public interest’ for the purposes of costs (and indeed in other contexts)44 is not the same as what the public may find interesting.45 Nor is it solely a numerical inquiry; it is more qualitative than quantitative, it appears. So demonstrating that some members of the public have or display a particular interest in the case, and express their support for the litigant, does not per se substantiate a ‘public interest’ in the context of litigation.46 9.10 A further challenge in defining so-called ‘public interest litigation’ is the fact that legal proceedings may raise competing public interests. An obvious scenario is where the opposing litigants are each public officers or governmental bodies, who in pursuing and defending the litigation are (constitutionally) required to act in the public interest. In this event it is generally inappropriate for a court to resolve which of the two ‘public interests’ should prevail in order to determine the appropriate exercise of the costs discretion.47 Similarly, the litigation may involve opposing private parties, each purporting to pursue the public interest. For example, in [page 263] Starkey v State of South Australia (No 2),48 involving a dispute over land between two groups of Aboriginal people, each claiming a specific interest in the land, Sulan J refused to favour one alleged public interest over the other in approaching the issue of costs. Even in environmental litigation, in which arguments over the public interest are not uncommon when costs are in issue,49 it cannot always be assumed that those claiming the (alleged) environment high ground have some monopoly over the public interest. There may well be a public interest

in environmental protection but there is also a public interest in social and economic development. It follows that, in environmental cases, it may be that the opposing litigants represent different aspects of the public interest. This multifaceted nature of the public interest may accordingly make the use of a generic ‘public interest’ category as a core criterion for justifying a departure from the usual costs rule unhelpful.50 More fundamentally, there is a public interest generally in persons being able to enforce their legal rights in the courts, and be indemnified for the costs of doing so. By propounding a ‘costs follow the event’ general rule, courts and rule-makers have, after all, presumably aimed to foster a public interest.

Compensatory character of costs orders 9.11 The compensatory object of the indemnity rule51 undermines a claim that the nature of the litigation should serve to deny a successful defendant that compensation.52 If suits that advance the public interest justify such an outcome, certain persons or bodies, in the public interest, will forego compensation for expenses reasonably incurred.53 A practice of not ordering a class of litigants to pay the costs of other parties would, moreover, remove the incentive of those litigants to ‘examine rigorously whether they have seriously arguable cases and whether they have taken all reasonable steps available to limit the issues’, and ‘could result in other parties having to incur greater costs than otherwise’.54 9.12 On the other hand, courts have not always applied the compensatory principle in an unyielding fashion, and have on occasion sacrificed the compensatory aim, to a greater or a lesser extent, to more pressing factors. Yet this has most commonly been the case where the conduct of the successful party, usually in the course of the litigation, renders it unjust to compensate that party via an award of costs.55 On principle, it should be more difficult to find that injustice merely due to the nature of the litigation, although this has not precluded courts [page 264]

doing so, albeit with the recognition that such an order ‘could not be supported if the sole criterion for the exercise of the costs discretion were compensation to the successful party’.56

Absence of correlation between standing provisions and costs discretion 9.13 Statutorily conferred wider standing entitlements57 do not by themselves justify the courts construing the costs discretion to undermine the usual order as to costs.58 After all, the general rule that the losing party pays the winner’s costs necessarily assumes that the former has standing. The court would otherwise assume the role of the legislature, which has not taken the further step of expressly altering the usual costs discretion. Moreover, standing entitlements are not of the same character, nor do they serve the same purpose, as costs rules. To allow standing entitlements, which do not financially prejudice a respondent, to dictate the exercise of the costs discretion is to allow them to conflate with a rule that does engender such prejudice.59 Yet to the extent that open standing provisions can assist in substantiating a public interest,60 and accordingly be seen as opening the door to public participation, it has been viewed as a factor that, together with others, is supportive of an exemption from (or reduction of) costs liability.61

Inhibition or deterrence of proceedings — nature of the ‘public interest’ 9.14 That the fear of an adverse costs order may inhibit persons from pursuing cases that challenge aspects of public law does not explain why the law should insulate these challenges from such costs orders.62 Nor should the fact that the issue raised by the litigation is novel and there is a public benefit from a decision on the point, if only in clarifying the law, by itself deny costs to a successful defendant.63 Whilst the public may benefit from the law being clarified, say, [page 265]

by testing the adequacy of the procedures adopted by a public officer, that feature is inherent in much litigation and provides, on its own, no basis to depart from the usual costs rule.64 The foregoing is not to deny that, for proceedings of a nature that society encourages, the court may take into account, together with other factors, the deterrent effect of adverse costs orders in exercising its discretion. Yet in such scenarios it is not uncommon to find the usual costs rule to have been statutorily ousted.65

Relevance of private interests 9.15 The term ‘public interest litigation’, though imprecise, carries with it the notion that the public, whether as a whole or a section of the public, have an interest in the litigation being pursued by an individual or a group. It invites the distinction between the public interest and interests of a private nature. It therefore stands to reason that a relevant inquiry is whether the unsuccessful litigant did indeed pursue the interests of the public, as opposed to his or her own (private) interests, in bringing the litigation. Yet the line between the public interest and private interests may not always be easy to draw, and litigation may exhibit characteristics of both. It follows that just as the absence of a private interest is no guarantee of immunity from costs immunity for the losing party, that there is some private interest in the litigation does not always preclude a finding that it is driven by public interest considerations. Ultimately, the extent to which public interests predominate over private interests, or are subservient to them, is a factor that informs the costs discretion.66 Courts are, in any case, alert to attempts by unsuccessful litigants to couch their own private interest under the public umbrella in an attempt to escape adverse costs consequences.67 9.16 Particularly in matters such as proposed property developments, which may have environmental or heritage implications, the issue has arisen as to whether the fact that the applicant (or objector) has or may have a pecuniary interest of the outcome of the proceeding should, assuming the matter truly also involves the public interest, affect the court’s costs discretion.68 The lack of a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings may sway a court, if

coupled with other factors, against ordering costs. The leading case, Oshlack v Richmond [page 266] River Council,69 and others,70 illustrate the point. But the fact that an applicant has no private financial gain to make from the litigation is insufficient to justify such a result — ‘[t]he absence of the prospect of monetary gain is not to be equated with the presence of a motive confined to altruism’71 — especially if an association is incorporated precisely for the purpose of pursuing the litigation in question.72 9.17 Conversely, that a plaintiff has a financial stake in the litigation does not per se disqualify it from being brought in the public interest. Other factors pertaining to the litigation may incline the court not to make a costs order, or to make a partial order. In Darlinghurst Residents’ Association v Elarosa Investments Pty Ltd (No 3),73 for example, Stein J held that private amenity interests of some resident members of the applicant, which objected to the development consent for a building in the locality, did not disqualify the proceedings from being properly characterised as public interest litigation. The objections, according to his Honour, were ‘far wider’ than narrow private amenity of residents living in close proximity to the proposal, and that a wider public purpose ‘was served by the litigation than solely that of some of the members of the applicant’.74 Even though the challenge was dismissed, Stein J declined to make an order as to costs. Lindgren and Lehane JJ in Qantas Airways Ltd v Cameron (No 3),75 a case involving a claim against airlines as to the effects of smoking in flight, made a partial costs order. Their Honours held that some weight should be given to the applicant’s submission that the litigation served the public purpose of elucidating the duty owed by airlines to those peculiarly vulnerable to environmental tobacco smoke.76 But because the applicant, who failed in the claim, had sought damages under statute and in tort in addition to injunctive and declaratory relief, the proceedings could not be characterised as pursued purely in the public interest. This led their Honours to order that, although ‘the public interest purpose and nature of a proceeding launched by an

individual or individuals is not necessarily irrelevant to the issue of costs’,77 the applicant pay three-quarters of the respondent’s costs.

Relevance of nature of the respondent 9.18 To adopt a rule that denies respondents in public interest litigation the ability to recover costs incurred in successfully defending a proceeding they did not instigate, and so had [page 267] little choice but to defend, is to single out certain types of respondents for unfavourable costs treatment. Lacking a principled basis on which to do so imperils the maxim that ‘all stand equal before the law’. Tadgell J dealt with this matter in South Melbourne City Council v Hallam (No 2) as follows:78 A failure by the courts to take a stand which preserves an even-handedness so that (in the absence of special circumstances) a successful party has a reasonable expectation of receiving an award for costs would tend to mischief. This approach is at least as valid in litigation to which the government or its agencies are parties as in cases between citizens. Fair legal challenge to bureaucratic or other government regulation of society should not be deterred by a reluctance on the part of the courts to award a reasonable costs indemnity if the challenge succeeds … Concomitantly, those who make an unsuccessful challenge must ordinarily expect to give a reasonable costs indemnity to the other side. A principle which recognises this is necessary both to discourage indiscriminate challenges and as a justification for an award of costs to challengers who succeed.

It follows, for instance, that a respondent’s status as a public authority does not of itself serve to oust the usual costs rule because the law judges persons ‘by their conduct not their identity’.79 Status as a public authority is not irrelevant, though, as public authorities owe many obligations that lack a counterpart in private relationships, and a suspected or apparent breach of one or more of them may fairly have invited litigation with the result that a court will refuse to make a costs order in its favour.80 But the latter represents the application of no more than established principle in allocating costs liability81 rather than a special rule for public authorities. 9.19 The fact that a respondent is a public authority does not dictate that its interest in resolving by litigation any legal uncertainty vis-à-vis its powers

should be any more relevant to the exercise of the costs discretion than the resolution of such points to litigants — such as corporations, traders, taxpayers and other citizens — who frequently have an interest in the interpretation of a law that goes beyond the outcome of a particular case. So merely because a party is naturally interested in the outcome of litigation cannot be a factor affecting the exercise of the costs discretion.82 9.20 There are judicial remarks that the inequality in resources that often applies in litigation commenced in the public interest between an objector and the public or private body resisting the objector’s demands may influence the court against making a costs order (or in making only a partial costs order) against an unsuccessful objector.83 In Kent v Cavanagh, for instance, in the context of governmental defendants, Fox J opined:84 It seems to me undesirable that responsible citizens with a reasonable grievance who wish to challenge Government action should only be able to do so at risk of paying costs to the Government if they fail. They find themselves opposed to parties who are not personally at risk as to costs and have available to them almost unlimited public funds. The inhibiting effect of the risk of paying costs is excessive and not in the public interest. Once, not so long ago, litigation was more of a luxury than it now is and for the most part only wealthy people could engage in it. To them was usually left any action necessary to vindicate rights of the public. This is not now regarded as an acceptable solution.

[page 268] Yet the prevailing judicial view — and one that aligns with the compensatory object of the indemnity rule — is that the relative position of the litigants (whether by reference to size, status or financial position) is not, generally speaking, relevant to the exercise of the costs discretion85 unless statute makes express provision to the contrary.86 It is a matter for political decision, it has been said, ‘whether unequal capacity to engage in litigation is to be assuaged by legal aid and if so, to what extent’.87 In particular, to place a governmental (or quasi-governmental) respondent in a unique position as to costs casts on society, which funds governmental expenditure, the burden of unmeritorious claims against the government.88 Also, in any case, to say that governments have ‘almost unlimited funds’ available is inaccurate.89 9.21 That the status of a respondent as a (quasi) government body is no reason per se to deprive it of a costs order in its favour if it proves successful

dictates that it should secure no immunity from a costs order against it in the event that it fails.90 So, for instance, civil penalty proceedings brought unsuccessfully by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission or the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission will, in the usual case, generate an order that costs follow the event.91 The position is different where the relevant body, as a statutorily appointed regulator, appears not as a contradictor but to impartially assist the court in its determination; here there may be grounds to deny or reduce its costs exposure.92 The same may be said of statutory tribunals that submit to the jurisdiction of the court in appeals against their decisions.93

Forms of litigation in which the public interest may be a factor costs-wise 9.22 There is no closed category of litigation that can raise matters relevant to the public interest. The case law, however, highlights certain types of proceedings that are prone to generating the bulk of arguments in the interplay between the public interest and costs orders. These, grouped under broad headings — environmental litigation, human rights litigation and administrative appeals — are discussed below. [page 269]

Environmental litigation 9.23 The focus in modern society on the protection and preservation of the environment, coupled with the tension between development and environmental objectives, has led to litigation, often supported by statutorily prescribed broad standing provisions, aimed to preventing or restricting development(s). Much of this litigation has a public focus (although this is not to deny a potential overlap with private interests).94 It is no surprise that, as a result, environmental activists who prove unsuccessful often maintain that they should not be mulcted in costs because their motivation in pursuing the litigation was in the public interest. Especially in the usual case where the opponent is a public body or officer, the argument is that the public interest

nature of the proceedings justifies that the public purse rather than the activist should meet the costs indemnify. 9.24 Yet consistent with the compensatory aim of the indemnity rule, unsuccessful environmental activists must point to more than the public interest nature of the proceedings to avoid a costs liability. As no fixed rules restrict the exercise of a costs discretion, comparing cases on either side of the line is instructive in ascertaining what elements influence costs orders in this context. In the leading case, Oshlack v Richmond River Council,95 the plaintiff brought proceedings against a local council and a land developer with the object of impugning the consent granted by the council to a proposed development. He did so in a desire to preserve the habitat of endangered fauna on and around the proposed development site. Stein J in the Land and Environment Court dismissed the action but made no order as to costs. On appeal by the plaintiff, the New South Wales Court of Appeal ordered him to pay the council’s costs at first instance and on appeal.96 The High Court, by a three–two majority,97 upheld Stein J’s original order. In a joint judgment, Gaudron and Gummow JJ noted that Stein J had isolated the following factors on the facts as sufficient special circumstances to justify not making a costs order against the plaintiff:98 the plaintiff’s pursuit of the litigation was motivated by his desire to ensure obedience to environmental law and to preserve the habitat of the endangered koala on and around the site, having nothing to gain from the litigation other than the said worthy motive. a significant number of members of the public shared the plaintiff’s stance as to the development to take place on the site, the preservation of its natural features and flora, and the impact on endangered fauna; in that sense there was a ‘public interest’ in the outcome of the litigation. the basis of the challenge was arguable and had raised and resolved ‘significant issues’ as to the interpretation and future administration of statutory provisions relating to the protection of endangered fauna and to the ambit and future administration of the subject development consent, which issues had ‘implications’ for the council, the developer and the public.

[page 270] The majority ruled that in so exercising his costs discretion, Stein J did not take into account considerations that were extraneous to any objects the legislature could have had in view in conferring that discretion.99 9.25 Thus the decision in Oshlack involved no more than an upholding of the exercise of a trial judge’s discretion. It does not mean that the court would have exercised the discretion in precisely the same way had it been called upon to do so.100 The High Court subsequently stated that nothing in Oshlack ‘requires that every time an individual or body brings proceedings asserting a defence of the public interest and protection of the environment, a new costs regime is to apply exempting that individual or body from the conventional rule’.101 This has done little to stem costs arguments by unsuccessful environmental activists, and the case law reveals a reasonable rate of success in these arguments where the court accepts that there is a genuine public interest in the matter coming before it. For example, in Blue Wedges Inc v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts102 the applicant — an incorporated association representing over 65 community and environment groups, that had for years campaigned to raise public awareness of threats to the environment of Port Phillip Bay — proved unsuccessful in blocking a project for deepening shipping channels in the bay. Heerey J made no costs order against the applicant, viewing the litigation as a clear case for the application of the Oshlack approach. In particular, what influenced his Honour was that the condition of the bay was a matter of high public concern, the project has attracted much controversy, there was a public interest in the approval decision (including whether it has been reached according to law), and the application raised novel questions of general importance as to the approval process under the relevant Act.103 Nor could it be said that, at the outset, the applicant’s case was hopeless and without merit. 9.26 That the proceedings are pursued with altruistic motives to protect the environment, and to promote the proper administration of the relevant legislation, is not ordinarily sufficient, however, to justify absolving an unsuccessful applicant from costs. Characteristics of this kind, it has been observed, ‘could be common to many other proceedings challenging matters … concerning the protection of the environment’, and so do not by

themselves displace successful respondents’ legitimate expectations that they would be awarded their costs.104 In Wilderness Society Inc v Turnbull,105 a case with those characteristics, Marshall J ordered that the respondent minister receive his costs because the applicant’s case did not raise difficult legal issues of general importance. His Honour added that broader standing provisions do not alter the ambit of the costs discretion, reasoning that ‘[i]n the context of encouraging access to the courts, it is equally valid to say that a respondent should not be discouraged from mounting its defence in an appropriate fashion’.106 [page 271] Similarly, in Drake-Brockman v Minister for Planning (No 2)107 Jagot J remarked that although the applicant in judicial review proceedings had nothing to gain from the proceedings personally but wished to vindicate his view of what the relevant legislation ought to have provided about climate change and ecologically sustainable development, the circumstances were not analogous to those in Oshlack. On the facts, the evidence of public scrutiny and interest in the dispute was equivocal, and ‘[i]t would be wrong to equate a general and pressing public interest in ensuring that climate change and water conservation are addressed in environmental planning decisions with any widespread and pressing interest in the outcome of this particular matter’.108 Moreover, the case turned on the application of well-known and undisputed principles of construction and fact finding in the particular circumstances. While this may have been of interest, and provided clarity in a general sense, the case broke no new ground as a matter of legal principle.109 9.27 The court’s approach to exercising the costs discretion need not be an ‘all or nothing’ affair. As the weight to be accorded to the relevant public interest varies from case to case, it is open to the court, as it does in other contexts,110 to make a partial costs order.111

Cases impacting upon human rights 9.28 There are various judicial observations that most, if not all, human rights claims involve an element of public interest,112 even though the claimant will

ordinarily be motivated by his or her own interests. However, consistent with the courts’ approach to exercising a broad costs discretion generally, any suggestion that human rights matters are normally to be considered as ‘no costs matters’ has been described as ‘misconceived’.113 That a court may have sympathy for the unsuccessful applicant — say, because of geographical displacement or due to a disability — does not make this a relevant, let alone decisive, consideration in the exercise of a costs discretion. The point was explained by Driver FM In Hollingdale v North Coast Area Health Service (No 2) as follows:114 [G]enerally in human rights proceedings an applicant is pursuing a personal action for damages and that frequently there will be an insufficient public interest component in the proceedings to merit a departure from the general principle that costs will follow the event. That is the case here. Any case involving allegations of disability discrimination are likely to raise important and potentially sensitive issues. While one may be sympathetic to a disabled litigant seeking to pursue what they see as their rights in litigation, they are making a personal choice to pursue an action in a jurisdiction where they are exposed to a costs order. Respondents are often put to considerable expense in dealing with such actions. A departure from the general principle that costs follow the event should be based upon recognised exceptions, rather than general considerations of sympathy for a disabled party.

[page 272] In cases of this kind,115 as well as in unsuccessful claims for refugee status,116 the private interest of the applicant outweighs, for costs purposes, that the proceedings involved an element of public (domestic or international) law. For example, in Selliah v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs117 the Federal Court rejected the argument that merely because the issues raised by the applicant involved the obligation of a minister under a treaty gives rise to a public interest sufficient to oust the usual costs rule, noting that the proceeding ‘was not brought by the applicant for the benefit of the public or to enforce a public duty [but] to enable him to remain in Australia’. 9.29 The foregoing should not be read as denying scope for courts to alter the usual costs rule where there is a genuine broader public interest pursued or raised in the application. Yet as the private interests of applicant(s) drive the majority of human rights litigation, it may be little more than fortuitous as to whether the issues raised have a broader focus in an individual case. Perhaps

for this reason, it appears that unsuccessful applicants in cases involving human rights cases will avoid a costs order only in special cases. One such case was Ruddock v Vadarlis,118 where the respondents119 succeeded at first instance in securing orders of habeas corpus and mandamus to compel the delivery into Australia of asylum seekers detained by the Commonwealth on a vessel off the Australian coast. The Commonwealth’s appeal was upheld, but the Full Federal Court refused to order costs against the unsuccessful respondents. Their Honours viewed the case as most unusual, raising matters of public importance and questions of the liberty of individuals who were at the time unable to take action on their own behalf. The court was also influenced by the fact that the case broached important questions of law over individual liberty concerning which judicial opinion was divided, that the proceedings brought no financial gain to the respondents, and that the Commonwealth had later enacted laws purporting to exclude the respondents (and others) from further pursuing the matter. More recently, in Aurukun Shire Council v Chief Executive Officer, Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing in the Department of Treasury120 the Queensland Court of Appeal absolved the appellant Indigenous councils from an adverse costs order on appeal. Margaret McMurdo P, with whom Philippides J agreed, characterised the appeals as ‘extraordinary’, raising human rights legal issues ‘of considerable public interest, and in a new and developing area of jurisprudence in Australia’.121 9.30 Where the court is convinced of a genuine ‘public’ element in the unsuccessful application — that the litigation serves purposes more general than those of the unsuccessful litigant — it is more common for a partial costs order to be made. For example, in Nacika [page 273] v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs122 Merkel J ordered the unsuccessful applicant in a migration case to pay only one-half of the respondent’s costs because the case was the first of its kind, and the successful respondent would be able to use the contentions of fact and law as the basis for submissions in subsequent cases.

Judicial review 9.31 A perhaps more yielding approach appears to prevail in administrative law matters.123 As explained by Burchett J in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs:124 It seems to me that the discretion of the court in respect of costs in administrative law matters raises problems going beyond those in ordinary private litigation. Governmental authorities always have a particular interest in the due making of administrative decisions. Indeed, the administration of the Commonwealth, if our democratic institutions are to remain healthy and acceptable, must be capable of having its errors corrected and of being kept within the bounds of the law. For this reason, one must look carefully at an application that costs should be borne by an individual who exercises a right given to him by the law to have an administrative decision reviewed by the court.

In Shelton v Repatriation Commission125 the Full Federal Court dismissed an appeal from a tribunal decision upholding the respondent’s refusal to grant the applicant a war widow’s pension, but made no costs order because the appeal was not unreasonable and clarified the law in an interest wider than that of the applicant. Their Honours remarked that persons affected by administrative decisions should not ‘be overmuch deterred by the threat of costs orders in such cases, and the very wide discretion given to the court by the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) should not be automatically exercised adversely to the losing party’.126 The courts also appear influenced by the fact that many tribunals from which applications for review arise either lack power to award costs or ordinarily make no order for costs.127 [page 274] 9.32 Having said that, it cannot be presumed that applications for review of administrative decisions automatically attract a special rule as to costs;128 each case must depend on its own facts and the justice of the costs outcome as perceived by the judge. In particular, where the applicant’s pecuniary interests drive an ultimately unsuccessful application for review, whether or not he or she is absolved from an adverse costs order may again be influenced by fortuity, specifically whether (or not) the complaint raises matters that have a broader compass than his or her own concern(s). If a (new) statutory provision or scheme is unclear, it may be that pursuing the matter is not only reasonable from the applicant’s perspective, but that its

resolution may be of interest to others in the applicant’s position, and indeed for the respondent in its administration. For example, Dodds-Streeton J in Smalley v Department of Health and Ageing (No 2),129 finding nothing to suggest that the application was brought other than for the applicant’s personal or financial gain, nonetheless absolved the applicant from paying costs because, although her claim failed, matters of statutory construction and practice going to the core of the proceeding were not without difficulty, had not previously been curially considered, and the court’s determination was of general application. In Sluggett v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission,130 conversely, Drummond J rejected the idea that applications to review decisions by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission call for a special rule as to costs, especially as the applicant in question was seeking to foster her own private pecuniary interests in bringing the application. In Fisse v Secretary, Department of the Treasury (No 2),131 where the appellant unsuccessfully challenged a tribunal decision upholding the respondent’s refusal to supply documents pursuant to freedom of information legislation, the Full Federal Court ordered costs against the appellant because, though the relevant statutory provision had not received prior judicial consideration, the appeal in respect to that provision was dismissed upon the basis of the finding of fact made by the tribunal and ‘[n]o issue of any general importance arose out of the manner in which the Tribunal resolved that question of fact’. 9.33 Constitutional litigation in the High Court, costs-wise, receives a treatment no different from other civil litigation — that the costs indemnity rule applies — and that exceptions have been branded as ‘few and unpredictable’ and ‘narrowly fact-specific’.132 In sentiments that inform some judges’ approaches to appeals of an administrative nature, noted above,133 it has been suggested that the foundations for the indemnity rule are unpersuasive in the constitutional arena, for at least two reasons.134 First, the ‘indemnity’ rationale, while relevant to private law disputes, is arguably irrelevant to most constitutional cases. So long as constitutional arguments [page 275] advanced by a person are not doomed to failure, it may be queried why

exposing a government to the discipline of judicial review of its legislation is something in respect of which a government should be compensated. Second, the indemnity rule affects governments in a different way to most ordinary litigants, as governments have much less to lose than litigants. 9.34 Statute in certain contexts reflects the judicial approach. For instance, s 49 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) provides that, in respect of costs of an application for judicial review, the Supreme Court may order another party to indemnify the applicant, or order that a party to the application bear only that party’s own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceeding, and in considering the costs application, must have regard to, inter alia, ‘whether the proceeding involves an issue that affects, or may affect, the public interest, in addition to any personal right or interest of the relevant applicant’.135 More directly, s 42G(2) of the District Court Act 1991 (SA) states that ‘no order for costs is to be made unless the Court considers such an order to be necessary in the interests of justice’ in the court’s appellate jurisdiction in its Administrative and Disciplinary Division.

Costs in Test Cases 9.35 As in the case of public interest litigation, the characterisation of a case as a ‘test case’ may impact both on the exercise of the costs discretion in respect of an unsuccessful litigant and on the quantum of a costs order made in favour of a successful litigant.136 So far as the former is concerned, the case law appears to indicate that, unlike in the case of ‘public interest litigation’, characterising a suit as a ‘test case’ works to oust the general costs rule, if not as a matter of course, then as a matter of practice.137 The complicating factor in this respect is that it may not always be easy to distinguish public interest cases from test cases.138 9.36 A ‘test case’ has been defined as ‘a case where the parties seek primarily to settle a point of law, and where the impact of that rule on those parties is of secondary importance to the settlement of the rule itself’.139 What therefore supposedly distinguishes the test case from public interest litigation, or perhaps more accurately renders public interest litigation a test case, is that a test case focuses on the curial interpretation of a law that, upon the court

pronouncing on it, is likely to benefit a considerable number of others who are consequently [page 276] left in less doubt as to their legal position,140 as well as usually benefiting the opponent in the administration or application of that law. 9.37 Frequently, to this end, test cases involve a governmental or quasigovernmental defendant/respondent (or at least a case where the government has an interest), thus justifying the court in not ordering costs against an unsuccessful plaintiff/applicant but allowing those costs to be borne by the public purse.141 A concern in this respect is that citizens should not freely be used as ‘guinea pigs’ before the courts to fashion social and economic policy.142 A useful case illustration is Vriend v Alberta,143 involving a challenge to the omission of sexual orientation from the human rights code under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Though successful at first instance, this finding was reversed on appeal. The Crown sought party and party costs of the appeal, which the dissenting judge in the Alberta Court of Appeal, Hunt JA, declined to order on the ground that the case could truly be described as a test case. Responding to the argument that the plaintiff had a direct economic interest in the outcome of the litigation because he had been dismissed from employment on the grounds of homosexuality, Hunt JA stated that ‘the legal issue did not merely concern individuals who have been fired because they are homosexual’, but ‘concerned the rights of anyone who is in a group that can claim [the Charter’s] protection’.144 This finding was upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, which allowed the plaintiff’s appeal.145 9.38 The government may on occasion agree to fund test case litigation, in recognition that the resolution of an issue by the courts is a matter of general public interest, and of particular interest to itself in the administration of the law in question. An example is the Test Case Litigation Program administered by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), under which the ATO

selects and funds appropriate cases as test cases.146 Stated criteria assist in determining whether or not a case merits this treatment.

1.

See, for example, L Friedlander, ‘Costs and the Public Interest Litigant’ (1995) 40 McGill LJ 55, who argues for a ‘no-way’ costs rule — each side paying its own costs — in concert with a statutory scheme to fund public interest litigants. A similar approach was suggested in BarrettPeacock v State of Tasmania (SC(Tas), Slicer J, 21 December 1995, unreported) BC9506699 at 5. Generally speaking, Australian courts’ reticence to oust the usual rule in public interest cases has been the subject of lament: see, for example, G Cazalet, ‘Unresolved Issues – Costs in Public Interest Litigation in Australia’ (2010) 29 CJQ 108; M D Kirby, ‘Deconstructing the Law’s Hostility to Public Interest Litigation’ (2011) 127 LQR 537.

2.

See, for example, ALRC 75, Ch 13; WALRC 92, Vol 1, pp 522–6.

3.

It has been suggested that because, where the public interest is involved, it may not be appropriate to view the outcome in terms of winners and losers, such that the idea that ‘costs follow the event’ might not be applicable: Director of Family Services v Campione (1998) 83 FCR 63 at 68; BC9801262 (FC).

4.

See 16.72–16.74.

5.

See 14.18–14.22.

6.

See 7.42–7.47.

7.

Re Southbourne Sheet Metal Co Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 244 at 254 per Beldam LJ; South Melbourne City Council v Hallam (No 2) (1994) 83 LGERA 307 at 308–11 per Tadgell J (App Div(Vic)); Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 123; BC9800310 per Kirby J; Hudson v Entsch [2005] FCA 557; BC200502835 at [6] per Dowsett J.

8.

Qantas Airways Ltd v Cameron (No 3) (1996) 68 FCR 387 at 389 per Lindgren and Lehane JJ (FC); Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc v Minister for the Environment (No 5) (1998) 84 FCR 186 at 188–9; BC9801443 (FC); Booth v Bosworth [2001] FCA 1718; BC200107623 at [19], [25]–[29] per Branson J.

9.

South-West Forests Defence Foundation (Inc) v Lands and Forest Commission (No 2) (1995) 86 LGERA 382 at 384; BC9503570 (FC(WA)); Kindimindi Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Cove Council (2007) 150 LGERA 333; [2007] NSWCA 38; BC200701281 at [52] per Hodgson JA; Hastings Point Progress Association Inc v Tweed Shire Council (No 3) (2010) 172 LGERA 157; [2010] NSWCA 39; BC201001448 at [21] per Young JA; Bat Advocacy NSW Inc v Minister for Environment Protection, Heritage and the Arts (No 2) (2011) 280 ALR 91; [2011] FCAFC 84; BC201104896 at [23] per the court (noting that ‘[i]t would be a significant burden on scarce public resources if every “public interest” body were open to run unconvincing appeals free of any costs risk’). But see Arnold v Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 (No 4) [2009] NSWLEC 87; BC200904913 at [25] per Biscoe J (‘If public interest considerations are a sound reason for making no order as to costs (or for apportioning costs) of the proceedings at first instance, they would seem to be an equally sound reason for making no order as to the costs of the appeal’). Cf Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; BC9800310 (discussed at 9.24, involving the court making no order as to costs on an appeal).

10. Hence the judicial statements describing ‘public interest litigation’ as a ‘nebulous concept’ (South Melbourne City Council v Hallam (No 2) (1994) 83 LGERA 307 at 311 per Tadgell J (App

Div(Vic)) that is difficult to define with precision (Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 98 per McHugh J, at 124 per Kirby J; BC9800310; Lawyers for Forests Inc v Minister for Environment, Heritage and Arts (No 2) [2009] FCA 466; BC200903611 at [11] per Tracey J). 11. Hastings Point Progress Association Inc v Tweed Shire Council (No 3) (2010) 172 LGERA 157; [2010] NSWCA 39; BC201001448 at [6] per Basten JA. See, for example, RLEC r 4.2, discussed at 9.4–9.5. 12. Kenai Lumber Co Inc v LeResche (1982) 646 P 2d 215 at 222–3 per Matthews J (SC(Alaska)); Darlinghurst Residents’ Association v Elarosa Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1992) 75 LGRA 214 at 215 per Stein J (LEC); Engadine Area Traffic Action Group Inc v Sutherland Shire Council (No 2) (2004) 136 LGERA 365; [2004] NSWLEC 434; BC200405380 at [15] per Lloyd J; St James’ Preservation Society v Toronto (City) (2006) 272 DLR (4th) 149 at [17]–[33] per T Ducharme J (SCJ(Ont)). See also ALRC 75, p 147, recommending that a court or tribunal should be able to make a public interest costs order if it is satisfied that the proceedings: (a) will determine, enforce or clarify an important right or obligation affecting the community or a significant sector of the community; (b) will affect the development of the law generally and may reduce the need for further litigation; or (c) have the character of public interest or test case proceedings. These recommendations were endorsed by the WALRC 92, Vol 1, p 526. For commentary on the ALRC’s recommendation see E Campbell, ‘Public Interest Costs Orders’ (1998) 20 Adel LR 245 (who favours an approach specific to particular contexts, such as planning and environment legislation establishing a special procedure for challenging, say, the validity of subordinate legislation, rather than the sweeping approach suggested by the ALRC: at 262–3). 13. See 9.15–9.17. 14. Caroona Coal Action Group Inc v Coal Mines Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) (2010) 173 LGERA 280; [2010] NSWLEC 59; BC201002532 at [41] per Preston CJ (who warned that ‘the considerations should not be seen or applied as a code for characterisation of litigation as being brought in the public interest’). See, for example, Construction Forestry Mining & Energy Union v Queensland Coal and Oil Shale Mining Industry (Superannuation) Ltd (2003) 132 FCR 516; [2003] FCA 1174; BC200306210 at [6] per Wilcox J (who noted that even though the litigation raised important and difficult questions of law affecting many people, ‘standing alone, that circumstance has not generally been considered a sufficient basis upon which to refrain from making the conventional costs order’); Northern Territory of Australia v Doepel (No 2) [2004] FCA 46; BC200400132 at [14] per Mansfield J (‘The construction of a provision of legislation does not, in every instance, attract the description as being of significant public importance’). Cf Saga Holidays Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2006] FCA 128; BC200601404 (where Conti J made no order as to costs, even though the commissioner had been substantially successful, because the litigation raised important and difficult fiscal issues on the construction of the legislation, and the evidence showed that at least 100 foreign tour operators were potentially affected by the outcome to the proceedings) (affd Saga Holidays Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 156 FCR 256; [2006] FCAFC 191; BC200610703). As to fettering the costs discretion see 6.15–6.20. 15. South Melbourne City Council v Hallam (No 2) (1994) 83 LGERA 307 at 309–10 per Tadgell J (App Div(Vic)) (describing the circumstances where the usual costs rule may be ousted as ‘so various that no pattern is distinctly discernible’, making it ‘profitless to attempt any classification’ or to lay down ‘any definite rules’: at 309). 16. (2007) 98 ALD 651; [2007] FCA 1863; BC200710387 at [30]. 17. Engadine Area Traffic Action Group Inc v Sutherland Shire Council (No 2) (2004) 136 LGERA 365; [2004] NSWLEC 434; BC200405380 at [19] per Lloyd J. 18. Roe v Director General, Department of Environment and Conservation (WA) [2011] WASCA 57

(S); BC201105690 at [13] per Martin CJ and Murphy JA. Their Honours added (at [13]) that this observation ‘is borne out by the fact that the applicant has been unable to point to any instance before this court where no order as to costs has been made in public interest litigation’. On the facts, though, their Honours found ‘special circumstances’ in the combination of the following factors: (1) being proceedings for the protection of the environment, they were brought in the public interest (at [15]); (2) the proceedings assisted to clarify legal issues of importance under an Act, which involved ‘relative complexity’ in the process of statutory interpretation (at [20]); (3) the applicant had an arguable case (at [21]); (4) the applicant was asserting a public interest, without prospect of personal gain or advantage (at [22], [23]); (5) the special relationship between Aboriginal people and their land (at [24]). Contra at [97]–[117] per Buss JA in dissent. 19. See first edition, 9.14. 20. See, for example, Woodlands v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 139 at 147, 148; BC9507948 per Wilcox J; Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 122; BC9800310 per Kirby J. 21. The relevant rule is confined in its application to proceedings before the Land and Environment Court; it does not apply on appeal in the New South Wales Court of Appeal: Sharples v Minister for Local Government (2010) 174 LGERA 129; [2010] NSWCA 36; BC201006292 at [125] per Tobias JA, with whom Beazley and McColl JJA concurred; Hastings Point Progress Association Inc v Tweed Shire Council (No 3) (2010) 172 LGERA 157; [2010] NSWCA 39; BC201001448 at [9] per Basten JA, at [21] per Young JA. 22. Delta Electricity v Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc (2010) 176 LGERA 424; [2010] NSWCA 263; BC201007625 at [203] per Basten JA, with whom Macfarlan JA concurred (emphasis supplied). 23. Anderson v New South Wales Minister for Planning (No 2) (2008) 163 LGERA 132; [2008] NSWLEC 272; BC200808873 at [11] per Biscoe J; Anderson v Director-General, Department of Environment and Climate Change [2008] NSWLEC 299; BC200809581 at [12] per Lloyd J. 24. Caroona Coal Action Group Inc v Coal Mines Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) (2010) 173 LGERA 280; [2010] NSWLEC 59; BC201002532 at [16]. 25. Caroona Coal Action Group Inc v Coal Mines Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) (2010) 173 LGERA 280; [2010] NSWLEC 59; BC201002532 at [13]–[19] per Preston CJ. This ‘three step’ approach has been followed and applied on multiple occasions: see, for example, Hill Top Residents Action Group Inc v Minister for Planning (No 3) (2010) 176 LGERA 20; [2010] NSWLEC 155; BC201006052; Oshlack v Rous Water (No 3) [2012] NSWLEC 132; BC201204204; Lester v Ashton Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 193 LGERA 293; BC201208859. 26. Using the language of Preston CJ in Caroona Coal Action Group Inc v Coal Mines Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) (2010) 173 LGERA 280; [2010] NSWLEC 59; BC201002532 at [15]. 27. Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2012] NSWLEC 96 at [10] per Craig J. As to these factors see 9.3. 28. (2012) 193 LGERA 293; BC201208859. 29. Lester v Ashton Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWLEC 254; BC201208859 at [8] (adding that the proceedings did not lose that character because the Office of Environment and Heritage, the governmental agency with responsibility for administering the Act in question, elected not to bring the proceedings: at [9]). 30. Lester v Ashton Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWLEC 254; BC201208859 at [10]. 31. Lester v Ashton Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWLEC 254; BC201208859 at [13].

32. Lester v Ashton Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWLEC 254; BC201208859 at [14]. 33. Lester v Ashton Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWLEC 254; BC201208859 at [16]. 34. Cf Friends of Turramurra Inc v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 170; BC201107802 (where Craig J noted that while the evidence was voluminous and the issues factually complex, ‘no novel issues of general importance were agitated’, and so there was not that ‘something more’ required in the second step: at [34]). But note Biscoe J’s legitimate lament in Anderson v New South Wales Minister for Planning (No 2) (2008) 163 LGERA 132; [2008] NSWLEC 272; BC200808873 that ‘the costs outcome may depend on whether the applicant had the good fortune to find such a novel legal issue or the misfortune to have to rely on conventional legal arguments’ (at [8]), which ‘is a matter of chance and is entirely irrelevant to a public interest litigant’s motivation for bringing the proceedings’ (at [9]). 35. Lester v Ashton Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 193 LGERA 293; BC201208859 at [35]. 36. Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 9(2)(g). 37. MyEnvironment Inc v VicForests [2012] VSC 111; BC201201609 at [13], [14] per Osborn JA. 38. (1998) 193 CLR 72; BC9800310. 39. See 9.24. 40. (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 99; BC9800310. 41. Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 100; BC9800310. See also South Melbourne City Council v Hallam (No 2) (1994) 83 LGERA 307 at 310–11 per Tadgell J (App Div(Vic)) (referring to ‘an unwarranted tendency to give undue weight, upon a determination of the incidence of costs, to the nebulous concept of ‘public interest’’); Buddhist Society of Western Australia (Inc) v Shire of Serpentine-Jarrahdale [1999] WASCA 55; BC9903248 at [11] per the court (‘great care must be taken with the concept of public interest litigation that it does not become an umbrella for the exercise of discretion with respect to costs in an unprincipled, haphazard and unjudicial manner’, sentiments endorsed by Young JA in Hastings Point Progress Association Inc v Tweed Shire Council (No 3) (2010) 172 LGERA 157; [2010] NSWCA 39; BC201001448 at [48]). 42. Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 75 per Brennan CJ, at 98–9 per McHugh J (each in dissent); BC9800310. 43. See, for example, Shelton v Repatriation Commission (1999) 85 FCR 587; [1999] FCA 181; BC9901816 (FC) (administrative law); Ahnee v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] 2 WLR 1305 (constitutional law). See 9.31–9.34. 44. See, for example, Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1985] QB 526 at 553 per Griffiths LJ (in the context of the public interest defence to a breach of confidence, remarking that ‘there is a world of difference between what is in the public interest and what is of interest to the public’). 45. Wide Bay Conservation Council Inc v Burnett Water Pty Ltd (No 9) (2011) 194 FCR 250; [2011] FCA 661; BC201103877 at [9] per Logan J; Noone v Mericka (No 2) [2012] VSC 2; BC201202425 at [28] per Sifris J (‘The fact that litigation may be of some interest or relevance to the general community and to the government or any statutory body does not make it public interest litigation of the kind referred to in the cases as constituting special circumstances justifying a departure from the usual orders as to costs’). 46. Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 3) (2009) 167 LGERA 432; [2009] NSWLEC 121; BC200906843 at [127] per Sheahan J. 47. See, for example, Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2012] NSWLEC 96

at [22] per Craig J (where the applicant, as a public body exercising planning functions under the relevant Act, was assumed to be acting in the public interest when it acted to protect the current planning regime, and equally the respondent minister, as the repository of planning powers under the Act, was assumed to have acted in the public interest when exercising those powers to determine that a different planning regime). 48. (2011) 274 LSJS 636; [2011] SASC 64; BC201102235 at [15]. See also Anderson v New South Wales Minister for Planning (No 2) (2008) 163 LGERA 132; [2008] NSWLEC 272; BC200808873 (where Biscoe J declined to oust the usual costs rule — where the applicant, on behalf of an Aboriginal clan, unsuccessfully challenged validity of a development consent for a housing subdivision issued by the respondent council — because, inter alia, ‘the weight of the public interest is diluted by the disagreement within the local Aboriginal community’: at [30]). 49. See 9.23–9.27. 50. Caroona Coal Action Group Inc v Coal Mines Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) (2010) 173 LGERA 280; [2010] NSWLEC 59; BC201002532 at [22]–[26] per Preston CJ (although his Honour proceeded to explain why, in certain circumstances, the public interest favouring environmental protection, could impact on the appropriate costs order more so than its competing public interest, specifically by reference to cost inhibitions to secure access to justice: at [34]–[36]). 51. See 7.2–7.6. 52. Kingscote District Council v Kangaroo Island Eco Action Inc (No 2) (1996) 67 SASR 422 at 425– 6; BC9605560 per Doyle CJ (FC); Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 75; BC9800310 per Brennan CJ (in dissent); Booth v Bosworth [2001] FCA 1718; BC200107623 at [20] per Branson J. 53. Hastings Point Progress Association Inc v Tweed Shire Council (No 3) (2010) 172 LGERA 157; [2010] NSWCA 39; BC201001448 at [50] per Young JA (who noted that it must be remembered that ‘once costs are incurred, they do not just vanish into the ether if a court declines to make an order that a party pay them. If a successful party does not obtain an order for costs, that party has to pay those costs itself. If a developer, that really means that the extra costs are passed on to purchasers of lots in the development, in some cases meaning that the lots are beyond the means of possible local purchasers’). 54. Peninsula Watchdog Group (Inc) v Couer Gold New Zealand Ltd [1997] 3 NZLR 463 at 473 per Salmon J (HC). 55. See, for example, 8.44–8.61. 56. Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 124; BC9800310 per Kirby J (emphasis in original). 57. See, for example, Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) s 123 (which authorises any person to bring proceedings in the Land and Environment Court for an order to remedy or restrain a breach of that Act, whether or not any right of that person had been or might be infringed by that breach). 58. See, for example, Prineas v Forestry Commission of New South Wales (1983) 49 LGRA 403 at 419 per Cripps J (LEC) (affd Prineas v Forestry Commission of New South Wales (1984) 53 LGRA 160 (CA(NSW))); Booth v Bosworth [2001] FCA 1718; BC200107623 at [27] per Branson J; Lawyers for Forests Inc v Minister for Environment, Heritage and Arts (No 2) [2009] FCA 466; BC200903611 at [8] per Tracey J (who did not see the expanded standing provisions in s 487 of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) as carrying any particular significance on the issue of costs, as ‘[t]he standing provision is not designed to

encourage litigation and, in any event, the issue would not arise unless the unsuccessful applicant had standing in the first place’). 59. Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 105–6 per McHugh J (in dissent), at 126–7 per Kirby J; BC9800310; K Edwards, ‘Costs and Public Interest Litigation After Oshlack v Richmond River Council’ (1999) 21 Syd L Rev 680 at 686–90. 60. Hastings Point Progress Association Inc v Tweed Shire Council (No 3) (2010) 172 LGERA 157; [2010] NSWCA 39; BC201001448 at [7] per Basten JA (who, in the specific context before him, observed that, in conformity with the purpose of a statutory open standing provision, ‘any attempt to ensure that the statute is not breached with impunity will constitute a public interest of a sufficient kind’). 61. Friends of King Edward Park Inc v Newcastle City Council [2012] NSWLEC 113; BC201204394 at [47] per Biscoe J (who, in the context of open standing provisions that enable and encourage members of the public to police environmental legislation in the public interest by bringing responsible litigation to protect the environment, made the perhaps exaggerated remark that ‘[t]here is little point in the legislature opening the door to public participation in this way if the doorway is then blocked by a menacing costs hound which threatens to savage the responsible public interest litigant who dares to enter and loses’). 62. Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 106; BC9800310 per McHugh J (in dissent). 63. Sierra Club of Western Canada v British Columbia (Chief Forester) (1994) 117 DLR (4th) 395 at 400–1 per Smith J (SC(BC)); Parker v Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities (No 2) [2012] FCA 263; BC201201485 at [6] per Bromberg J (noting that whilst the litigation prompted the court to address a part of an environmental statute that had not been judicially considered and could be regarded as novel in that respect, none of the questions raised could be described as difficult, or as raising questions of general importance of the kind that supported the existence of special circumstances). 64. Hollier v Australian Maritime Safety Authority (No 2) [1998] FCA 975; BC9804016 (FC) at 5 per the court (‘In a common law jurisdiction decisions of the courts, in private as well as public law, often clarify the law or lay down new law for the benefit of citizens, taxpayers, traders, patentees, insurers and insureds, landlords and tenants, etc etc. To that extent, much litigation has a public interest going beyond the interests of the parties. But this feature is inherent in common law litigation and provides no ground for departure from the usual rule as to costs’); Parker v Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities (No 2) [2012] FCA 263; BC201201485 at [8] per Bromberg J. 65. Such as, for example, in family law proceedings: see 8.69–8.80. 66. Hastings Point Progress Association Inc v Tweed Shire Council (No 3) (2010) 172 LGERA 157; [2010] NSWCA 39; BC201001448 at [8] per Basten JA. 67. See, for example, Geeveekay Pty Ltd v Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria (No 2) [2008] VSC 152; BC200803205 (where even though Bell J accepted that the legal question raised in the proceedings had national importance, that its resolution was in the public interest, that the appeal became a virtual test case on the question and that, subject to any decision of a higher court, the decision is likely to have application beyond the immediate parties to the appeal, his Honour did not consider this justified ousting the usual costs rule, chiefly because it was an appeal ‘of a private nature’, which the appellant brought ‘in the (legitimate) pursuit of its own commercial interests’: at [6]); Noone v Mericka (No 2) [2012] VSC 2; BC201202425 (noting that as the litigation in this case was not commenced or run as a proceeding in the public interest and was

defended for private reasons, and the defendants had a very real personal and private interest in the matters the subject of the litigation, ‘[t]he fact that the court’s decision on the relevant legislation has implications beyond the immediate parties is … a consequence of the role of the court in interpreting legislation’ and ‘[a]s such it does not mean the litigation was public interest litigation’: at [34] per Sifris J). 68. In Davey v Aylesbury Vale District Council [2008] 2 All ER 178; [2007] EWCA Civ 1166 at [15] Sedley LJ remarked that planning cases tend to ‘lie on or near the boundary between private or commercial judicial review and public interest litigation’. 69. (1998) 193 CLR 72; BC9800310, discussed at 9.24. 70. See, for example, Friends of Hay Street Inc v Hastings Council (1995) 87 LGERA 45 at 47; BC9504756 per Pearlman J (LEC) (no costs order made where the unsuccessful applicant sought to challenge the heritage implications of a proposed development, but had no pecuniary interest in the proceedings, raised matters involving the interpretation of a significant clause of the local environmental plan with ongoing implications for the council in fulfilling its public duties, and where the basis for the challenge was arguable and not specious). 71. Williams v Minister for Environment and Heritage (2004) 132 LGERA 368; [2004] FCAFC 58; BC200401141 at [23] per Gray J. 72. See, for example, Save the Showground for Sydney Inc v Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning (1998) 105 LGERA 254 at 260 per Pearlman J (LEC) (applicant was incorporated with the aim of securing the preservation of at least two-thirds of a showground site for public use, but failed on all grounds of its challenge); Lawyers for Forests Inc v Minister for Environment, Heritage and Arts (No 2) [2009] FCA 466; BC200903611 at [14] per Tracey J (opining that the fact that the applicant was an incorporated association, with objects directed to the public rather than private interests, did not weigh strongly in favour of it being immunised from an adverse costs order); Bat Advocacy NSW Inc v Minister for Environment Protection, Heritage and the Arts (No 2) (2011) 280 ALR 91; [2011] FCAFC 84; BC201104896 at [14] per the court (noting that merely because the appellant was a non-profit organisation with no financial or personal interest in the outcome of the proceeding did not mean that it was a proceeding that could clearly be characterised as being in the public interest). 73. (1992) 75 LGRA 214. 74. Darlinghurst Residents’ Association v Elarosa Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1992) 75 LGRA 214 at 216 (LEC). 75. (1996) 68 FCR 387. See also PPCS Ltd v Richmond Ltd [2005] 1 NZLR 201; [2004] NZCA 219. 76. Qantas Airways Ltd v Cameron (No 3) (1996) 68 FCR 387 at 389 (FC). 77. Qantas Airways Ltd v Cameron (No 3) (1996) 68 FCR 387 at 390 (FC). 78. (1994) 83 LGERA 307 at 311 (App Div (Vic)). 79. Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 107; BC9800310 per McHugh J. See also CF v State of New South Wales [2003] NSWSC 620; BC200303685 at [14] per O’Keefe J. 80. Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 107–8; BC9800310 per McHugh J. 81. See 8.45. 82. Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 107; BC9800310 per McHugh J. 83. Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 125–6; BC9800310 per Kirby J; St James’ Preservation Society v Toronto (City) (2006) 272 DLR (4th) 149 at [33] per T Ducharme J

(SCJ(Ont)). See, for example, Mann v Carnell (2001) 159 FLR 466; [2001] ACTSC 18; BC200100973, where the applicant had unsuccessfully appealed to the High Court in respect of protracted public interest litigation, Miles CJ made no order as to costs because, inter alia, in defending the action in her capacity as Chief Minister of the Australian Capital Territory, the respondent would be indemnified by the territory for those costs: at [16]. 84. (1973) 1 ACTR 43 at 55 (paragraph break omitted). 85. See 8.32–8.35. 86. As it does, for instance, in family law litigation pursuant to s 117(2A)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (albeit in the context of deciding whether to make (as opposed to withhold) a costs order): see 8.78. 87. Physical Disability Council of New South Wales v Sydney City Council [1999] FCA 815; BC9903263 at [12] per Madgwick J. 88. Ontario (Attorney-General) v Dieleman (1995) 123 DLR (4th) 757 at 764–5 per Adams J (Gen Div(Ont)); Kingscote District Council v Kangaroo Island Eco Action Inc (No 2) (1996) 67 SASR 422 at 426; BC9605560 per Doyle CJ (FC); Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 107; BC9800310 per McHugh J. 89. In any case, the extract from Kent v Cavanagh (1973) 1 ACTR 43 at 55 in the text cannot be viewed in isolation. Fox J’s decision to make no costs order was influenced both by the fact that the (successful) defendant was the government, and that the plaintiffs had succeeded on one point, thereby bringing to notice a serious defect in compliance with statutory procedures. 90. Sports Café Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 42 IPR 552 at 559–60; BC9806807 (FC). 91. In the context of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission see, for example, Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Plymin (No 2) (2003) 21 ACLC 1237; [2003] VSC 230; BC200303372 at [116] per Mandie J; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edwards [2006] NSWSC 498; BC200603664 at [3] per Barrett J. In the context of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission see, for example, Hurley v McDonalds Australia Ltd [1999] FCA 466; BC9906945; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Amcor Printing Papers Group Ltd [1999] FCA 533; BC9902748; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy Paper Pty Ltd (2000) 186 ALR 731; [2000] FCA 1640; BC200006997. 92. For example, in the context of proceedings involving the Registrar of Trade Marks, compare Advantage Rent-A-Car Inc v Advantage Car Rental Pty Ltd (2001) 52 IPR 24; [2001] FCA 683; BC200103001 at [31]–[32] per Madgwick J and Philmac Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks (No 2) (2003) 57 IPR 526; [2003] FCA 207; BC200301041 at [13]–[15] per Mansfield J (where no costs order was made) with Kenman Kandy Australia Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks (2002) 122 FCR 494; [2002] FCAFC 273; BC200204949 (where costs were ordered against the registrar). 93. See 22.62–22.64. 94. As to this overlap, and its impact on costs orders, see 9.15–9.17. 95. (1998) 193 CLR 72; BC9800310. For commentary see R Baird, ‘Public Interest Groups and Costs — Have the Floodgates Been Opened?’ (1998) 15 EPLJ 294; K Edwards, ‘Costs and Public Interest Litigation After Oshlack v Richmond River Council’ (1999) 21 Syd L Rev 680. 96. Richmond River Council v Oshlack (1996) 39 NSWLR 622; BC9602789 (see G Bates, ‘Costs of Litigation in Public Interest Environmental Cases’ (1996) 13 EPLJ 335). 97. Per Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ, Brennan CJ and McHugh J dissenting.

98. Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1994) 82 LGERA 236 at 244–6; BC9402433 (LEC). See also Darlinghurst Residents’ Association v Elarosa Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1992) 75 LGRA 214 at 216–17; BC9203019 per Stein J (LEC) (no order as to costs in an unsuccessful challenge to the development consent for an apartment tower, in view of the nature of the development and its wide environmental impact, the seriousness of the challenger’s arguments, and the evident public interest in the development and its fate); Friends of Hay Street Inc v Hastings Council (1995) 87 LGERA 45 at 47; BC9504756 per Pearlman J (LEC). 99. Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 91 per Gaudron and Gummow JJ, at 127 per Kirby J; BC9800310. 100. On this point see 20.32. 101. South-West Forest Defence Foundation Inc v Executive Director of Department of Conservation and Land Management (No 2) (1998) 154 ALR 411 at 412; BC9801851 per Kirby J (involving an unsuccessful application for special leave to the High Court, the court ruling that the cost of the applications should follow the event notwithstanding that the proceedings were alleged to be of a ‘public interest character’; see also at 412 per Gaudron, McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 102. (2008) 165 FCR 211; [2008] FCA 8; BC200800040. 103. Blue Wedges Inc v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts (2008) 165 FCR 211; [2008] FCA 8; BC200800040 at [73]–[74]. For other case illustrations where the public interest in environmental litigation has justified ousting the usual costs rule see Donnelly v Delta Gold Pty Ltd [2002] NSWLEC 44; BC200201332 at [53]–[56] per Bignold J; Plumb v Penrith City Council (2003) 126 LGERA 109; [2003] NSWLEC 161; BC200303734 at [28] per Pearlman J; Engadine Area Traffic Action Group Inc v Sutherland Shire Council (No 2) (2004) 136 LGERA 365; [2004] NSWLEC 434; BC200405380 at [16]–[21] per Lloyd J. 104. Wilderness Society Inc v Turnbull (2007) 98 ALD 651; [2007] FCA 1863; BC200710387 at [31] per Marshall J. 105. (2007) 98 ALD 651; [2007] FCA 1863; BC200710387 at [31]. 106. Wilderness Society Inc v Turnbull (2007) 98 ALD 651; [2007] FCA 1863; BC200710387 at [31] per Marshall J. 107. [2007] NSWLEC 777; BC200710303 at [9]. 108. Drake-Brockman v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2007] NSWLEC 777; BC200710303 at [11]. 109. Drake-Brockman v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2007] NSWLEC 777; BC200710303 at [12]. 110. See 8.2–8.13. 111. See, for example, Mees v Kemp (No 2) [2004] FCA 549; BC200402290 at [20]–[24] per Weinberg J; Wilderness Society Inc v Minister for Environment and Water Resources (2008) 101 ALD 1; [2008] FCAFC 19; BC200801494; Duncan v Chief Executive Officer, Centrelink (No 2) [2008] FCA 667; BC200803462 at [9] per Finn J. 112. See, for example, Xiros v Fortis Life Assurance Ltd (2001) 162 FLR 433; [2001] FMCA 15 at [24] per Driver FM; Wiggins v Department of Defence — Navy (No 3) [2006] FMCA 970; BC200605193 at [37] per McInnis FM. 113. Ball v Morgan [2001] FMCA 127; BC200108534 at [93] per McInnis FM. 114. [2006] FMCA 585; BC200602847 at [11]. 115. See, for example, Fetherston v Peninsula Health (No 2) (2004) 137 FCR 262; [2004] FCA 594; BC200402589 (where Heerey J remarked that while the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)

is beneficial legislation, its characterisation as such does not mean that this court is to apply any different approach as to costs: at [9]). 116. See, for example, Alwar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 57 ALD 343 at 345; [1999] FCA 1111; BC9904937 per Burchett J (costs awarded to the successful respondent). 117. (FCA, Nicholson J, 5 May 1998, unreported) BC9801672 at 3. 118. (2001) 115 FCR 229; [2001] FCA 1865; BC200108231. See also Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v ‘X’ [2002] FCAFC 93; BC200201392 at [6]–[9] per Lee and Merkel JJ. 119. Which included the Victorian Council for Civil Liberties, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and Amnesty International. 120. [2012] 1 Qd R 1; [2010] QCA 37; BC201001015. 121. Aurukun Shire Council v Chief Executive Officer, Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing in the Department of Treasury [2012] 1 Qd R 1; [2010] QCA 37; BC201001015 at [99]. Contra at [217] per Keane JA, dissenting on the costs issue (who accepted that the issues agitated in the case were of interest to the public, but favoured the application of the usual costs rule because, first, it could not be said that the arguments advanced by the appellants had sufficient prospects of ultimate success that the agitation of these arguments was a matter of public interest, and second, the immediate interest which the appellants sought to vindicate in the proceedings was their interest in maintaining a commercial entitlement). 122. [2001] FCA 269; BC200104129 at [3]. See also Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651; [2007] HCA 14; BC200702595 at [78] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ. 123. See generally ALRC 75, Ch 5; P Bayne, ‘Costs Orders on Review of Administrative Action’ (1994) 68 ALJ 816; E Campbell and M Groves, ‘Award of Costs in Administrative Proceedings’ (2004) 11 Aust J Admin L 121. 124. (FCA, Burchett J, 20 July 1998, unreported) BC9803721 at 3. 125. (1999) 85 FCR 587; [1999] FCA 181; BC9901816. See also Gray v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 38 FCR 351 at 355; BC9203763 per Burchett J (having regard to the importance to the respondent of having the position clarified, no order for costs was made against the unsuccessful applicant); Brown v Members of the Classification Review Board of the Office of Film & Literature Classification (FCA, Merkel J, 6 June 1997, unreported) BC9702310 (where Merkel J made no order for costs because: (1) the applicants, who proved unsuccessful, had acted reasonably in bringing the proceedings; (2) the matter was one of importance to the administration of aspects of the uniform censorship scheme; and (3) the matter had clarified the position in relation to some important aspects of the relevant law); Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241; [2008] FCAFC 128; BC200805498 at [178]– [183] per the court (where no order for costs was made against an applicant unsuccessful in an appeal from a tribunal decision affirming a decision to cancel a passport and issuing an adverse security assessment, their Honours being influenced by the fact that the relevant statutory provisions were new and represented a significant departure from procedures normally followed before the tribunal, there was a wider public interest in having the question of their validity determined, and the applicant’s challenge to these provisions, though ultimately unsuccessful, was reasonable in view of their restriction on the applicant’s freedom to travel). 126. Shelton v Repatriation Commission (1999) 85 FCR 587; [1999] FCA 181; BC9901816 at [10]. See also Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (No 8) (2007) 155 LGERA 115; [2007]

NSWLEC 37; BC200700308 at [78] per Biscoe J. 127. Tadawan v State of South Australia [2001] FMCA 25 at [62] per Raphael FM; Thaina Town (on Goulburn) Pty Ltd v City of Sydney Council (2007) 156 LGERA 150; [2007] NSWCA 300; BC200709105 at [79] per Spigelman CJ. Cf Fisse v Secretary, Department of the Treasury (No 2) (2008) 253 ALR 52; [2008] FCAFC 200; BC200811598 at [19] per the court. 128. Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2012] NSWLEC 96 at [13] per Craig J (who noted that merely because proceedings in the nature of judicial review are brought to uphold and enforce public law obligations does not mean that they are brought in the public interest). 129. [2011] FCA 374; BC201102055. 130. [2002] FCA 1060; BC200204871 at [7]–[12]. See also McCullough v Australian Human Rights Commission [2012] FCA 1470 (where the applicant, having made ample use of the facilities provided to lodge complaints about the conduct of government agencies, made an unsuccessful application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) to review two decisions of the Australian Human Rights Commission; Buchanan J held that costs should follow the event, reasoning that ‘[a]lthough the Court will be astute to ensure that unnecessary practical injustice is not visited upon a litigant with a justifiable sense of grievance, and a respectable case against the Executive Government, that does not mean that the Court is available at the unrestricted instance of litigants so that their grievances may simply be pursued to the bitter end’: at [41]). 131. (2008) 253 ALR 52; [2008] FCAFC 200; BC200811598 at [16]. Cf other instances involving unsuccessful applications under freedom of information legislation where the usual costs rule has been ousted: see, for example, Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; BC9103089; Davis v City North Infrastructure Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] QSC 312; BC201108131. 132. P Keyzer, ‘A Battle and a Gamble: The Spectre of an Adverse Costs Order in Constitutional Litigation’ (2010) 22 Bond L Rev 82 at 83, 85. 133. See 9.31–9.32. 134. P Keyzer, ‘A Battle and a Gamble: The Spectre of an Adverse Costs Order in Constitutional Litigation’ (2010) 22 Bond L Rev 82 at 87–8. 135. As to s 49 see Anghel v Minister for Transport (No 2) [1995] 2 Qd R 454; BC9404344; Sharples v Crime and Misconduct Commission [2004] QSC 306; BC200406081; Alliance to Save Hinchinbrook Inc v Cook [2005] QSC 355; BC200510378; Chapman v Richards [2008] QSC 164; BC200806943; P Bayne, ‘Costs Orders on Review of Administrative Action’ (1994) 68 ALJ 816 at 820–3. 136. As to the impact upon the quantum of costs see 16.72–16.74. 137. A Goninan & Co Ltd v Gill (2001) 51 NSWLR 441; [2001] NSWCA 77; BC200101568 at [60] per Heydon JA. Cf Booth v Bosworth [2001] FCA 1718; BC200107623 at [26] per Branson J. 138. Challenger Property Asset Management Pty Ltd v Stonnington City Council [2012] VSC 67; BC201200806 at [54] per Croft J (who remarked that ‘[c]learly it cannot be the position that every case that sheds light on the interpretation of important statutory provisions — and is thereby in a sense of general public interest and application — should be regarded as a “test case”’). 139. Vriend v Alberta (1996) 141 DLR (4th) 44 at 53 per Hunt JA (CA(Alta)). See also South Melbourne City Council v Hallam (No 2) (1994) 83 LGERA 307 at 309 per Tadgell J (App Div(Vic)).

140. Director of Public Prosecutions v Ali (No 2) (2009) 25 VR 656; [2009] VSCA 243; BC200909513 at [19] per Maxwell P (‘The point at issue must be capable of being viewed as of wide general importance before it can be regarded as a test case’), at [44] per Kyrou AJA (inquiring into the question ‘was either of the significance or general application that would be expected of a proceeding in the nature of a test case’). See, for example, A Goninan & Co Ltd v Gill (2001) 51 NSWLR 441; [2001] NSWCA 77; BC200101568 at [60] per Heydon JA (involving a case designed to test the correctness of a line of authority, being of general importance to employers and insurers, but of no significance to the worker); Director of Public Prosecutions v Nguyen [2009] VSCA 147; BC200905485 (where the appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions raised significant questions of general application and was conducted in the public interest, such that the respondents could rightly be characterised as having been parties to an appeal conducted in the public interest; the court accordingly made no order as to costs, either of the proceeding in the trial division or of the appeal). 141. See, for example, Federal Commissioner of Taxation v B & G Plant Hire Pty Ltd (1994) 123 ALR 699 at 709 per Gummow J (FCA); Securities Commission v Kiwi Co-operative Dairies Ltd [1995] 3 NZLR 26 at 36 (CA); Attrill v Richmond River Shire Council (1995) 38 NSWLR 545 at 556; BC9501777 per Kirby P (issue raised was one of importance to local government, and in respect of which there had been a division of opinion within the Supreme Court). Cf Kordister Pty Ltd v Director of Liquor Licensing (No 2) [2013] VSCA 30; BC201300730 (characterisation as a test case prompted the court to make only a partial costs order against the (largely) unsuccessful appellant). 142. Ontario (Attorney-General) v Dieleman (1995) 123 DLR (4th) 757 at 764 per Adams J (Gen Div(Ont)). 143. (1996) 141 DLR (4th) 44. 144. Vriend v Alberta (1996) 141 DLR (4th) 44 at 53. 145. Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493. 146. See the document entitled ‘Test Case Litigation Program’, available at .

[page 277]

CHAPTER 10

Costs Out of a Fund 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.4

Proceedings Involving Trust Estates Costs of trustees in adversarial proceedings Trustee successful Trustee unsuccessful Application to the court for sanction of proceedings — ‘Beddoe order’ Trustee’s costs where rival claimants to beneficial interest Extent of costs indemnity Costs of trustees in non-adversarial proceedings Applications for advice and directions Applications where the trustee has a personal interest Costs attendant to changes in trusteeship Appointment and removal Disclaimer and retirement Beneficiaries’ costs

10.5 10.7 10.8 10.9 10.9 10.10 10.12 10.13 10.14 10.15

Proceedings Involving Deceased Estates General rules Litigation caused by the testator Intentional conduct of testator State of testamentary papers Poor drafting Bona fide belief that good ground exists for impeaching the will

10.17 10.17 10.18 10.19 10.20 10.21 10.22

Evidence of incapacity Evidence of undue influence Costs of executor in probate proceedings Costs orders in statutory wills applications Costs orders in family provision matters Judicial concern as to costs Costs discretion Costs of successful applicant/unsuccessful defendant Costs of unsuccessful applicant Multiple applicants with similar interests Impact of settlement offers Costs in determining beneficiaries Costs of inquiry into beneficiaries Claims upon intestacy

10.22 10.25 10.27 10.30 10.31 10.31 10.32 10.35 10.38 10.42 10.43 10.46 10.46 10.47 [page 278]

Insolvent Estates Costs of trustees-in-bankruptcy Costs of liquidators Proceedings in the name of the company Proceedings instituted in the liquidator’s own name Proceedings defended in the liquidator’s own name Indemnity for costs liability Costs on application for directions by a liquidator Costs of receivers Costs of administrators

10.48 10.48 10.51 10.52 10.53 10.54 10.56 10.57 10.58 10.59

10.1 Aside from an agreement between the parties, costs are payable out a fund only pursuant to a court order.1 Generally speaking, two requisites justify such an order: that the expenditure resulted in a benefit to the common property represented by the fund; and that the expenditure has been reasonably incurred.2 Expressed another way, if proceedings properly instituted by persons interested in a fund result in a benefit to the fund, or its owners, the costs of the persons instituting those proceedings are, generally speaking, payable out of the fund. This principle is illustrated in its application to proceedings involving trusts,3 deceased estates4 and insolvent estates5 in this chapter. Although these represent what are perhaps the main scenarios where costs may be ordered out of a fund, they are not exhaustive. The principle is broader in scope; it may apply, for instance, in the context of claims over a fund by partners,6 creditors or debenture holders. 10.2 In the broader context of costs payable from a fund, mention should be made at the outset of what is known as an ‘interpleader proceeding’. Interpleader is a civil procedure that allows a plaintiff to initiate an action designed to compel two or more other parties to litigate a dispute.7 It has particular application where a plaintiff holds a fund, including property, on behalf of others, but is uncertain as to whom the fund belongs. As to the plaintiff’s costs in [page 279] bringing an interpleader proceeding, though within the courts’ costs discretion,8 the case law suggests the following:9 … the rule to be deduced from these cases in regard to costs is that, where the applicant on an interpleader summons has come promptly to the Court when faced with conflicting claims, and has been guilty of no conduct which has increased costs, prima facie he should have a complete indemnity so far as the fund will permit for his costs; that is to say, he is prima facie entitled in such circumstances to his costs as between solicitor and client. In most cases of interpleader, however, the proceedings on the part of the applicant are of the simplest nature, and his costs should not be required to be taxed in order that he should have a full indemnity. In such cases — and these, I think, will be the general rule — the Judge on the hearing will fix the costs of the applicant at an amount which will give that indemnity.

The authorities, to this end, contain various instances of solicitor-trustees who, having reasonably instituted interpleader proceedings, have received an indemnity for their costs.10

Proceedings Involving Trust Estates Costs of trustees in adversarial proceedings Trustee successful 10.3 A trustee, who in this capacity, successfully prosecutes or defends a proceeding is, like any other successful litigant, generally entitled to a costs order in his or her favour.11 If the trustee has used trust funds to incur those costs — pursuant to the trustee’s right of exoneration — the costs order will operate so as to indemnify the trust fund.

Trustee unsuccessful 10.4 A trustee who unsuccessfully prosecutes or defends a suit on behalf of the trust will not necessarily be ordered to pay costs from his or her own pocket. It is open to the court to order that the costs be paid directly from the trust fund, or otherwise that the trustee’s liability be indemnified from the trust fund pursuant to the trustee’s right of indemnity.12 Courts do not always make this distinction in a costs order, for two reasons: first, the outcome in each case is the same — the trust fund meets the costs; and second, the occasions in which a court is inclined to refuse an order that costs be paid directly from the trust fund correlate with those in which the trustee’s right of indemnity would otherwise be denied. The court may make such an order if it determines that the trustee, in commencing or defending the suit, acted reasonably, and not in substance for his or her own personal benefit, such that the costs were properly incurred or at least not improperly incurred. But a trustee will remain personally liable to meet the relevant costs order13 if he or she has, in the course of the [page 280] litigation, acted unreasonably, or for his or her own benefit rather than for that of the trust.14 It has been observed, to this end, that to deprive a trustee of costs ‘there must be something in the nature either of an active violation of,

or some culpable or gross neglect of, duty’.15 For instance, the costs of proceedings occasioned by the trustee’s own misconduct16 or breach or neglect of duty,17 an attempt by the trustee to repudiate the trust and prevent it from being carried out,18 or an application by a trustee exhibiting little or no merit,19 are unlikely to be recoverable from the trust fund. The position may be otherwise where the trustee sought and properly acted upon professional legal advice in bringing or defending the proceeding20 — although a trustee is not entitled merely to say that he or she has acted upon the advice of a solicitor or counsel ‘if that advice is wrong headed and perverse’21 — or where the default is technical or minor22 or an innocent, understandable mistake.23

Application to the court for sanction of proceedings — ‘Beddoe order’ 10.5 Trustees may guard against the possibility of being found to have acted unreasonably or in their own interests — and being ordered to personally pay costs should they prove unsuccessful — by applying to the court for directions as to whether to bring or defend the proceedings.24 The costs of the application come out of the fund, provided the trustees fully disclose the strengths and weaknesses of their case.25 Importantly, acting in accordance with the court’s direction assures trustees of avoiding personal liability for an adverse costs order. This type of court order is, therefore, in the nature of a pre-emptive order26 (in this context, known as a ‘Beddoe order’).27 As explained by the High Court:28 [P]rovision is made for a trustee to obtain judicial advice about the prosecution or defence of litigation in recognition of both the fact that the office of trustee is ordinarily a gratuitous office and the fact that a trustee is entitled to an indemnity for all costs and expenses properly incurred in performance of the trustee’s duties. Obtaining judicial advice resolves doubt about whether it is proper for a trustee to incur the costs and expenses of prosecuting or defending litigation. No less importantly, however, resolving those doubts means that the interests of the trust will be protected; the interests of the trust will not be subordinated to the trustee’s fear of personal liability for costs.

[page 281] The foregoing does not, however, dictate that a failure to seek curial advice

prophylactically itself disentitles a trustee from resorting to the trust funds if such resort is otherwise proper.29 10.6 Beddoe applications are usually made separately from the litigation in which the trustee is engaged, before a different judge, and are usually supported by advice from a lawyer as to the prospects of success as well as a costs estimate and evidence as to the value of the estate.30 On the hearing of the application, the court acts essentially in an ‘administrative capacity’,31 to determine whether or not the proceedings should be taken. It is not the court’s function to investigate the evidence and make a finding whether or not the trustees will be successful in the litigation. A Beddoe order accordingly represents no predetermination of the issue of costs as between the trustee and the other party to the main action.32

Trustee’s costs where rival claimants to beneficial interest 10.7 In a case involving a dispute between claimants to a beneficial interest in the trust property, whether concerning the construction of the trust deed or their respective rights in the trust estate, the duty of the trustee as the trustee for all beneficiaries is to treat the beneficiaries impartially and remain neutral.33 If a neutral stance is adopted, costs necessarily and properly incurred (for example, in agreeing to submit to the court’s direction and in making discovery) by the trustee will come out of the fund. But where the trustee breaches the duty to act impartially — by actively defending the trust in an unsuccessful effort to prefer one class of beneficiaries over another — the trustee faces the prospect of a costs order against him or her.

Extent of costs indemnity 10.8 If a court makes an order entitling the trustee to costs out of the trust fund, it will commonly order that the costs be quantified on an indemnity (sometimes termed ‘trustee’ or ‘common fund’) basis, that is, an indemnity for all expenses properly incurred.34 This reflects the policy that persons engaged in proceedings in a representative capacity should not, if a costs order is made in their favour, be out of pocket because of the litigation. The same outcome can be achieved pursuant to the exercise of the trustee’s right

of indemnity, which by definition extends to all expenses properly incurred in the course of trusteeship. It should not be assumed, though, that a trustee always secures a full indemnity for costs out of the trust fund. The court’s order, or the general law limits on the exercise of the right of indemnity, may restrict the extent of any such indemnity. A court will not by a costs order penalise the trust fund for costs incurred by a trustee that are not reasonable in the circumstances. A trustee must, in the capacity of a litigant, do all reasonably within his or her power to contain costs,35 and will be deprived of costs that are excessive or unnecessarily incurred, and may be required to pay costs to the extent they are excessive or unnecessary.36 [page 282]

Costs of trustees in non-adversarial proceedings Applications for advice and directions 10.9 Where a trustee, as he or she is entitled to do,37 seeks the court’s advice on a question of construction of the trust instrument because they desire to know how to administer the trust, the general rule is that, if the trustee acted reasonably and in good faith in making the application, the trust fund bears the cost, whether directly or under the trustee’s indemnity.38 The trustee legislation in several jurisdictions replicates this general rule.39 That the court decides an applicant is not entitled to answers to the questions raised, or determines that the view put forth by the trustee is wrong, does not of itself preclude an award of costs out of the trust fund.40 This is especially so if the trustee in so doing acted reasonably on the advice of counsel, assuming of course that the trustee has properly instructed counsel and there are no (subsequent) relevant events that are likely to alter the validity of that advice.41 Conversely, if the application is found to be unnecessary for the purpose of administering the trust — thus rendering the application superfluous — the fund should not bear its costs.42 This does not necessarily preclude a trustee who has sought the advice of counsel from testing its accuracy by seeking the advice of the court, and recovering the

costs of that application from the trust fund. The latter may be an appropriate course, for instance, if a beneficiary (or other claimant) maintains a position inconsistent with counsel’s advice, or other grounds for uncertainty as to the correct legal position exist.43

Applications where the trustee has a personal interest 10.10 The general rule that prima facie entitles a trustee to costs out of the fund only relates to matters that are properly described as concerning an incident of the trust’s administration. These costs are distinguishable from those incurred by a trustee in furthering his or her personal interests, which are dealt with in accordance with the general principles concerning inter partes costs awards. Various illustrations of curial applications prompted by a trustee’s personal interest — which can be construed as applications for the court’s indulgence, the costs of which are usually ordered to be paid by the applicant44 — are found in the case law. For example, as the general law proscribes trustees’ entitlement to remuneration for their services, there is case authority that an application the sole purpose of which is to seek remuneration is for the trustee’s own benefit, and so he or she should bear its costs.45 However, as statute in several jurisdictions confers upon a court the jurisdiction, upon an application to the court, to authorise remuneration to trustees,46 and in any case the court retains an [page 283] inherent jurisdiction to so order,47 it may be queried why a trustee who successfully applies for remuneration out of the trust fund should be denied the costs of that application.48 On the other hand, if the application is unsuccessful, the trustee should in justice be liable in costs, because he or she has sought that to which he or she was not entitled. If the trustee is awarded remuneration in a quantum far less than sought, the court may, in its discretion, allow the trustee his or her costs, in part or in full, or can view the trustee as having been in substance unsuccessful, and therefore deny costs out of the trust.

10.11 In other circumstances where a trustee seeks curial approval to overcome a disability imposed by the general law, case law indicates that the costs of the application are to be borne by the trustee. Hordern v Bull,49 for instance, supports the proposition that where it is necessary for the court to the sanction a trustee’s purchase of trust property, the trustee must, as a general rule, pay the costs of the application. The general rule can yield to circumstances where the trustee establishes it to be beneficial to the trust that the property in question be sold and that he or she is willing to offer more than any other prospective purchaser.50 A further illustration is found in Plimsoll v Drake (No 2),51 where Zeeman J held that the trustee, who was unsuccessful in establishing an entitlement to a release from the beneficiaries, should not receive the costs of the application. His Honour considered that the stance taken by the trustee — that he would not distribute the estate unless and until provided with a release — ‘was one taken by him solely so that he might obtain for his personal benefit the protection which might be afforded by such release’. In seeking the release, the trustee was not therefore representing or supporting the interests of the trust, but his own interests.

Costs attendant to changes in trusteeship 10.12 The trustee legislation other than in the Australian Capital Territory confers a general discretion on the court to award costs on any application or order made under that legislation,52 a useful illustration of which are applications or orders for changes in trusteeship. The costs consequences of a change in trusteeship depend on both the source of the power to make the change, and the reason for it. Where the terms of the trust deed, or the trustee legislation, make provision for the appointment, retirement or removal of a trustee, any need to incur costs via an application to the court is largely obviated. Where, however, a change in trusteeship, though it may be arguably necessary for the proper administration of the trust, cannot be effected pursuant to the terms of the trust deed or statute, an application to the court may be unavoidable.

Appointment and removal

10.13 As a general principle, the costs of an application to appoint a trustee are met by the trust fund, and this is not necessarily denied because the court ultimately determines not to [page 284] make an appointment, or to appoint a person other than the person put forth as an appointee.53 The position may differ in proceedings for the appointment of a new trustee that are the necessary corollary of an application for removal of a trustee. In such a case, the trustee who is removed will, as a general rule, be ordered to pay the costs attributable to the application for the removal,54 particularly if the removal is due to misconduct.55 The court retains a discretion as to costs, though, and may allow costs from the trust fund to a trustee whose conduct has been honest albeit mistaken,56 or may require that trustee to bear his or her own costs where there have been breaches of trust but there are other mitigating circumstances that explain (if only partly) his or her conduct.57

Disclaimer and retirement 10.14 Because a person cannot be compelled to accept the role of trustee of an express trust, a person who validly disclaims trusteeship is entitled to his or her costs of disclaiming out of the trust fund.58 However, the court would not allow costs to a trustee who, after having accepted the role of trustee and thus lost the ability to disclaim, declined to perform the trust, and thereby made an application for the appointment of another trustee necessary.59 This general rule aims to ‘prevent persons from accepting trusts and then expecting to be relieved of them out of caprice at the expense of the trust estate, a process which might go on indefinitely’.60 So, for instance, in Trimble v Kirkland61 a trustee was allowed to retire from the trust only on terms of paying the costs of the appointment of new trustees. The general rule may be ousted where the court is satisfied that the trustee’s retirement accrues for the benefit of the trust, such as where, as in Re Medway’s Will,62 the replacement trustee was a trustee company, which assured the trust a permanence in trusteeship.

Beneficiaries’ costs 10.15 In certain circumstances courts have shown a willingness to extend to other parties to trust litigation an entitlement to costs by analogy to that accorded to trustees. In this regard trust litigation can be divided into three categories,63 it has been said, although no [page 285] clear dividing line between each category should be assumed.64 In any case, the same basic inquiry — whether the litigation is adversarial or directed at the due administration of the trust — appears to underscore each category: Where beneficiaries are represented on an application brought by a trustee for directions of the court as to the construction of the trust deed or some question arising in the course of administration, and it is in the circumstances reasonable for the beneficiaries to be represented, the costs of all parties are ordinarily viewed as necessarily incurred for the benefit of the trust, and so ordered to be paid out of the fund. Where a (potential) beneficiary institutes a hostile claim against the trustees or another beneficiary, costs usually follow the event. For example, in Re Cunningham,65 a case where there an issue arose between the beneficiaries of a trust, Simpson CJ in Eq remarked that as the parties were in the position of hostile litigants, and the defendants were unsuccessful, the usual costs rule should apply. For a successful claim against a trustee, whether for breach of trust and/or for removal, the claimant will be allowed costs out of the fund.66 Such an outcome may eventuate even in the event of an ultimately unsuccessful claim, at least if there were reasonable grounds for bringing the claim or it brought to light matters of relevance of the administration of the trust. Aside from this, an unsuccessful claimant will ordinarily bear costs.67 Where an application is made other than by the trustee, but raises the same kind of point as in the first category and would have justified an application by the trustee, the costs usually come out of the fund.68 A reason for this is that, where a fund is set up for the benefit of beneficiaries, the law

encourages them to assert an interest in its proper administration. Just as a trustee is indemnified from the fund, if the beneficiaries act reasonably in a proceeding relating to the administration of the fund, it is appropriate that its cost be shared amongst all interested parties by being met from the fund.69 In CASAW Local 1 v Alcan Smelters and Chemicals Ltd,70 for example, the court refused pension fund members a declaration that their employer’s amendment to fund rules, which excluded overtime pay from the calculation of pensionable earnings, was unlawful. Levine JA saw the action as one relating to the administration of the fund — it involved no dispute between beneficiaries — as the appellants’ success or failure did not affect the benefits other members of the fund, who did not earn overtime pay, would receive.71 It was therefore held that the costs of the unsuccessful appellants should be paid out of the fund. [page 286] 10.16 Just as a trustee may seek a pre-emptive costs order regarding prospective litigation,72 beneficiaries may also seek such an order, although the courts appear less inclined to accede to such applications.73

Proceedings Involving Deceased Estates General rules 10.17 Litigation involving deceased estates can raise considerations that are capable of more readily affecting the application of the ‘costs follow the event’ rule than in other forms of civil litigation. The law seeks to strike a balance to ensure that ‘doubtful wills should not pass easily to proof by reason of the cost of opposing them’ while at the same time ensuring that parties will ‘not be tempted into fruitless litigation by the knowledge that the costs will be defrayed by the estate of the testator’.74 Bearing in mind the need to eschew hard and fast rules because circumstances vary in each case,75 three general rules — which are ‘neither exhaustive nor rigidly prescriptive’76 — reflect this balance:77

1.

Where the opposition to a will was made without proper inquiry into the facts, or without reasonable ground so as to make it unjustifiable opposition, a costs order lies against the party opposing the will.78

2.

Where the testator has, by his or her own conduct, in effect caused the litigation, the costs of the unsuccessful party are to be paid out of the testator’s estate.

3.

If the facts reveal that neither the testator, the executor or persons interested in the residue have been to blame, but that the opponents of the will have taken proper steps to acquaint themselves of the facts and have been led reasonably to the bona fide belief that good ground existed for impeaching the will, either no order as to costs will be made79 or costs will be allowed, whether wholly or partly, out of the estate.80

The second and third general rules deserve more extended treatment, which appears below. More generally, it should be noted that, notwithstanding the ostensibly less rigid application of the ‘costs follow the event’ rule in probate litigation, more than one judge has disclaimed the assumption, held by some, that the general outcome in probate litigation is that costs are necessarily borne by the estate.81 That assumption has also been disclaimed, although perhaps not to the same degree, in the context of family provision litigation, the costs principles in which deserve separate treatment.82 At the same time, in the wills context the application of the ‘costs follow the event’ rule must be tailored to reflect ‘a public interest in keeping faith [page 287] with the wishes of a capable will-maker that requires an investigation into the validity of the propounded wills’, which in turn attracts ‘a public interest in the incurring of some level of costs in cases where there is genuine doubt about the validity of a will’.83

Litigation caused by the testator

10.18 The court will inquire, if so directed, as to whether the testator is ‘by reason of his conduct, to be considered the cause of the reasonable litigation which has occurred after his death as to the validity of his will’.84 Though sometimes expressed by reference to the litigation being the ‘fault’ of the testator, this does not necessarily mean moral fault or culpability; the touchstone is whether the testator’s own conduct led to the will ‘being surrounded with confusion or uncertainty in law or fact’.85 Fear that litigation could be encouraged, and the settlement of doubtful claims discouraged, if costs are allowed out of the estate to an unsuccessful party, has led an English judge to remark that courts ‘narrow rather than extend’ the circumstances in which the usual costs should be displaced in this context.86

Intentional conduct of testator 10.19 An example is where the testator, when executing the will, behaved in a way designed to create in the minds of persons with an interest in the estate a belief that he or she lacked the requisite mental capacity to execute the will. The case law reveals various examples of testators who, for whatever reason, induce such a belief, in which case the costs of the resultant opposition to the will have been met out of the estate.87 The same result does not follow simply because a testator by his or her words, either written or spoken, has inspired false hopes in other persons that they may benefit after his or her death.88

State of testamentary papers 10.20 As a testator who has left multiple contradictory wills, or otherwise left his or her testamentary papers in a state of confusion or disarray, thus requiring the matter to be brought to court, can be seen to have caused the litigation, the estate should bear its cost. For example, in Lippe v Hedderwick89 the testatrix had made a will she later purported to revoke by an ineffectual new will. Upon her death the first will could not be found. As ‘the cause of the litigation was really due to the acts of the testatrix, which reasonably required investigation’,90 the High Court held that it was justifiable for the appellant to contest probate, and so allowed costs out of the estate.91 Murray J made the same order in Dolan v Dolan,92 where the issue was

[page 288] whether a will that was filled out but not executed by the testator was intended to constitute his will.

Poor drafting 10.21 From time to time it has been held that a person responsible for the drafting of a document should bear the costs of litigation that poor drafting has encouraged another to commence or contest.93 This has been most often exemplified in proceedings relating to the construction of wills and trusts. So if ‘the testator and his draftsman have drawn up a document of such a character that no one could … be quite sure of its meaning’,94 the costs of all parties in establishing its meaning and effect come out of the estate.95 The reason for this is that the costs are costs of administration.96 The court may need to apportion costs in this respect where only some of the costs of the suit are attributable to the issue of construction.97 Even costs of an appeal may come out of the residuary estate where ambiguity in the will has caused a divergence of judicial opinion in the lower court(s). In Watson v Ralph,98 for instance, Gibbs CJ noted that, as the difficulties in construction arose from the fact that the will was badly drawn, and since the appellants were encouraged to appeal by the acceptance of their arguments at first instance, the ‘rather exceptional course’ of allowing the costs of all parties out of the estate was justified. Likewise in Dunne v Byrne99 Lord Macnaghten held that the divergence of judicial opinion in the lower courts as to the charitable status of the gift in issue, coupled with the fact that the difficulty was occasioned by terminology chosen by the testator, meant that the costs of both parties should be paid out of the estate.

Bona fide belief that good ground exists for impeaching the will Evidence of incapacity 10.22 Courts are alert to suits motivated by personal spite or vindictiveness,

and so do not readily presume lack of mental capacity in a testator for the purposes of the costs discretion.100 The evidence must be sufficient to convince the court of force to the allegation of incapacity, and of its direct relationship to the testator’s capacity. An obvious conflict in the evidence as to the testator’s capacity may justify an investigation of the will, in which case costs are ordinarily borne by the estate. In Middlebrook v Middlebrook,101 for example, a medical doctor testified that on the day prior to making his will the testator was sedated and semi-comatose, whereas the solicitor attending to the will testified that, on the day it was executed, the testator appeared of full mental capacity. The High Court found adequate reasons justifying an investigation of the will, and for raising doubt as to its validity. As only via this investigation did the reasons for an affirmative finding as to the testator’s capacity distinctly appear, it ordered that costs of the parties be paid from the estate.102 [page 289] 10.23 The same costs outcome may ensue in other scenarios where the evidence raises legitimate grounds to query a testator’s capacity. In Brown v McEncroe103 the testator’s addiction to intemperate habits, and evidence of his sustained physical and mental deterioration, was held to justify a full investigation into his state of mind to ascertain whether his will was genuine. This served to bring the case within the category of litigation caused by the testator’s conduct, and so costs of all parties were allowed out of the estate.104 Yet the court will not simply assume that evidence of occasional mental incapacity or eccentricity justifies a claim against the will without any costs liability. As explained by Walker J in Clarke v Clarke:105 There is no doubt that the rule which prevails in ordinary cases is … that where the difficulty has been caused by the acts or known condition of the testator that will justify the opposition, though unsuccessful, and the caveators will obtain costs out of the estate. But the basis of that rule is that the Court shall be satisfied by the evidence in the particular case that the acts or conduct of the testator misled the caveators into at least an honest doubt whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind. If it were not so, the result would be disastrous. If the mere fact of a testator being known to be subject to a particular delusion, however irrelevant to the testamentary act, was sufficient to entitle the caveators to oppose the grant of probate and to obtain their costs out of the estate in any event, I think a considerable number of caveats would be lodged, and produce a crop of vexatious litigation most decidedly to be discountenanced.

In Re O’Donnell106 the defendants, not content to insist on the will being proved in solemn form107 and only to cross-examine witnesses produced in support of the will,108 raised defences that fully contested testamentary capacity. The only evidence of incapacity, which in any case was admitted — that the testatrix sometimes made mistakes as to the names of her children and was duller in the afternoons than in the mornings — provided insufficient grounds, according to Angas Parsons J, for the defendants to contest her capacity.109 Having failed in so doing, the defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiffs’ costs of the suit. The same outcome ensued in Thomas v Nash (No 2),110 where the defendant’s persistence in challenging the will on the grounds of alleged incapacity, despite compelling evidence to the contrary by relevant physicians and the solicitor who drafted the will, dictated that he should pay the successful plaintiffs’ costs. 10.24 Some, albeit equivocal evidence of incapacity, will not prevail against clear evidence of reasons why a testator chose not to benefit an opponent of the will. In Will of Elizabeth O’Driscoll111 the testatrix’s daughter lodged a caveat against the granting of probate of the will. The daughter knew before filing the caveat that she would need to establish that her mother intended her to benefit, and yet the correspondence between them showed clearly that her mother cut her out of the will due to ill feeling.112 The evidence also unmistakably pointed to the mother being fully possessed of her faculties when making her will. The daughter sought to rely on medical evidence to the contrary whilst ignoring cohesive evidence that her mother had recovered from the alleged incapacity. Harvey CJ in Eq ordered that the caveat be removed and that the daughter pay costs. [page 290] This does not mean that an unsuccessful caveator is never allowed costs out of the estate. Costs may be allowed ‘where strong evidence is given and a case is made out involving the testator or some beneficiary in misconduct contributing to the litigation’.113 Even where the court does not find suspicious circumstances surrounding the making of the will, or that the litigation was brought about by any conduct of the testator, if there is sufficient in the case to excuse some investigation, it may, instead of

allowing the caveator costs out of the estate, order the caveator to bear his or her own costs.114

Evidence of undue influence 10.25 A similar approach to costs applies where undue influence is alleged.115 If the allegation proves unsuccessful, the costs of that issue are ordinarily borne by the party who raised it,116 unless the evidence would have led a reasonable person to inquire whether a testamentary disposition represented a free and independent exercise of the testator’s will. In the latter event, the costs of that inquiry may well be met out of the estate.117 A clear case is where the presumption of undue influence — here referring to the equitable doctrine of undue influence, not its common law testamentary counterpart — arises between the person seeking to uphold the will and the testator. In Nock v Austin118 the plaintiffs, one of whom was a solicitor, sought probate of a will they had prepared for the testator under which both were to receive large benefits. In the case of the solicitor–plaintiff, this raised the presumption of undue influence in respect of the gift.119 These circumstances, according to the High Court, led reasonably to an investigation as to the propounded document, and therefore allowed the defendant costs out of the residue even though the will was upheld. Isaacs J stated the general legal principle as follows:120 [W]here a party having created suspicion in relation to a will under which he benefits is under the burden of clearing away that suspicion, then, as justice requires him to do so in the presence of any person interested should the suspicion be justified, he must, though eventually successful, ordinarily pay the costs of the person whose presence he has made necessary so far as his benefit extends.

10.26 If a beneficiary has behaved in a way that calls into question whether the bequest was a product of the testator’s free and independent will, it is open to the court to order that costs be paid out of that particular bequest even though any undue influence claim is not sustained. It is just and equitable, it is reasoned, that ‘the party who has knowingly caused the costs of litigation to be incurred should pay for that litigation rather than that burden of its cost be cast on parties who have done no wrong’.121 In Trust Company of Australia Ltd v Daulizio (No 2)122 Mandie J found that the conduct of the defendant, in obtaining instructions and preparing a will under which she received a substantial

[page 291] and ostensibly remarkable benefit, doing so in circumstances where no independent solicitor was involved to check the instructions or the will, created the suspicious circumstances that gave rise to the litigation. These circumstances made it reasonable for the plaintiff to obtain an order that the will be proved in solemn form.123 Even though the defendant proved substantially successful in upholding the will, his Honour declined to allow her costs out of the residuary estate. Instead, he ordered that the plaintiff’s costs be paid out of the appellant’s legacy and then, if the legacy was insufficient, out of the residuary estate. On appeal, the court accepted that the order may appear harsh from the defendant’s perspective — after all, the costs order served to at least partially deprive her of her success in the litigation — but found this to be no ground to interfere with the trial judge’s discretion.124 It was not a sufficient reason to impeach a costs order against a party responsible for suspicious circumstances, in the court’s view, that the order will reduce and even annihilate the benefit of his or her legacy.

Costs of executor in probate proceedings 10.27 An executor (or administrator cum testamento annexo) who proves a will is ordinarily entitled to his or her costs out of the estate,125 and may do so without a court order. This stems from the ancient rule that expenses incidental to proving a will are a charge upon the testator’s estate, from which the person who takes probate may recoup the costs so incurred. 10.28 Where an executor has no reason to suspect any irregularity in the testator’s capacity, or other grounds that may impugn the legitimacy of the will, but it is proven that the will cannot stand, the executor’s costs still come out of the estate. So an executor who has secured probate of an instrument he or she reasonably and bona fide believed to be a valid will, but which is later revoked for lack of capacity, will be allowed costs out of the estate, including costs of propounding the will and of opposing the application for revocation of probate.126 The logic is that ‘if a person unsuccessfully opposing a will can get costs, then a fortiori a person who is an executor, and who propounds the

will, would be entitled to his costs if he reasonably and bona fide believed in his case’.127 On the other hand, an executor who, it appears, must have known he or she was attempting to obtain the court’s sanction to a document that could not be supported is liable for the costs of the proceeding.128 ‘Knowledge’ for this purpose is not limited to actual knowledge, but includes knowledge the executor would have acquired had he or she not been reckless. In Cooke v Watson129 Walker J remarked that an executor who ‘wilfully shut his eyes and ears to the sources of information which were readily available … cannot claim any advantage from the fact, if it be a fact, that he did not know what was said then’. His Honour found the executor in that case had the opportunity to ascertain the testator’s incapacity from the available evidence, but failed to do so, and so should be denied costs of an attempt to propound the will. In view of an executor’s legal duty to prove the will, it makes sense in principle that constructive knowledge — knowledge the executor would have acquired had he or she made proper inquiries — of incapacity should be likewise sufficient to deny an entitlement to costs.130 [page 292] 10.29 Where an executor propounds for probate what he or she believes, according to information available from proper inquiries, is the testator’s last will and testament, but later acquires information of the testator’s incapacity, the costs of an application for leave to bring this evidence before the court and to have the grant of probate revoked legitimately come out of the estate.131 But where the executor persists in propounding the will at a time when he or she knew or should have known of real concerns over its validity, it is open to the court to allow the executor costs out of the estate only up until that time, but not thereafter.132

Costs orders in statutory wills applications 10.30 In determining the costs consequences of applications for statutory wills,133 courts have generally distinguished between ‘lost capacity’ cases and ‘nil capacity’ cases.134 In the former, if a will already exists, the

contending parties are either seeking a benefit from the estate or are seeking to protect a benefit under the existing will. The application is therefore likely to be adversary in nature and so, in line with the usual ‘rule’ for costs, costs will ordinarily follow the event.135 It should not be presumed, in cases of this kind, that the estate will meet the costs of the proceeding merely because there is ‘a fair case of dispute’.136 In any case, in determining whether it is appropriate to exercise the discretion to order costs from the estate of a living but incapacitated person, the avoidance of any potentially adverse impact on that vulnerable person’s long-term security and welfare is invariably an important consideration.137 In a ‘nil capacity’ case, it is desirable that all relevant interests be before the court. Were courts to routinely make costs orders against participants in these cases, it would dissuade those persons from assisting the court for fear of carrying the costs liability for doing so.138 As a result, it may be apt for the court here to order costs of all parties legitimately before the court come from the estate, although this should not be assumed to be an automatic outcome. ‘Nil capacity’ cases can also raise individual interests, and courts in this context, as in other testamentary litigation (and civil litigation generally), are wary of allowing a fund to meet the costs of those who unsuccessfully pursue their own individual interests. The nature of the interests in question, the purpose of the fund, as well as its size, may impact in this regard. As explained by Debelle J:139 In my view, there is a strong argument that, since parties are seeking to advance individual interests, each party should bear his own costs … That consideration must be weighed against the fact that there is a public interest in a person being able to make a will so as to enable the orderly disposition of his assets on death. So, where the applicant is the guardian of the person who lacks testamentary capacity, there might be good reason to allow the applicant to recover his costs out of the estate of the person who lacked testamentary capacity. Another relevant factor is that the

[page 293] estate might be small or, as in this case, be intended to provide for the maintenance, well-being and support of the person who lacks testamentary capacity. In either case, it would be entirely inappropriate for the estate to be depleted by the costs of an application under [the statutory wills regime] … The order as to costs will depend upon the individual facts and circumstances of each case.

Costs orders in family provision matters Judicial concern as to costs 10.31 Family provision legislation140 empowers the court to alter the operation of a testator’s will or the intestacy rules in favour of a person who, as a result of the will or those rules, lacks adequate and proper provision for his or her maintenance and advancement. In 2010 the New South Wales Court of Appeal advised that family provision proceedings ‘should always be run by the parties and their legal practitioners with a keen eye to the minimisation of costs at all stages’.141 Although against the backdrop of 2005 New South Wales legislation that emphasises the need to ‘facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings’142 and to resolving issues ‘in such a way that the cost to the parties is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject-matter in dispute’143 — which initiatives have subsequently seen replication in some other jurisdictions144 — these remarks were not unheralded, especially for litigation over small estates. Over 20 years earlier Cohen J expressed the following admonition in relation to family provision litigation in small estates:145 In my opinion the legal profession in both branches has an obligation to reduce the costs of litigation as much as possible when the amounts in dispute are so small. If the parties cannot reach a compromise then it seems to me that by consultation their legal advisers, both solicitors and counsel, should seek to find all means of defining the real issues and confining the evidence in relation to them. Where cross-examination will be unlikely to alter the substance of a witnesses’ evidence it should be dispensed with. The heavy expense of bringing those witnesses from distant places should be actively avoided … it requires everyone in all cases to look somewhat further than [fighting for one’s client’s interests] and to look at what the final issue will be. Because everybody has stood by their respective clients so well there is practically nothing to be argued about. The plaintiff and the principal beneficiary will have to bear the heavy expense of the litigation with little left for them at the end. It is most regrettable and I think it shows up the need for early consultation and early advice to clients as to what at the end they will be facing.

More recently Young J referred to the duty to compromise claims in relation to small estates and to retain ‘a due sense of proportionality’.146 Remarks of this kind are often made in cases [page 294] where the costs incurred in the litigation are disproportionate to the amount(s)

in dispute,147 an outcome most likely where a small estate is in dispute. In cases of this kind, in particular, judges have expressed the concern that the amount available for distribution amongst the competing beneficiaries is significantly reduced by legal costs.148 This in turn explains why family provision cases have become the chief exemplars in the exercise of courts’ jurisdiction to cap costs, whether prospectively or retrospectively.149

Costs discretion 10.32 At the same time, the breadth of the court’s discretion, and the absence of fixed rules, in this context, when coupled with the fact that disputes are often driven by deep-seated emotions, have often prompted plaintiffs to pursue litigation to judgment, and led to defendants’ reticence to compromise. To the extent that the costs of the proceedings are ordered to be payable out of the estate — a result in years past almost assumed even in the case of unsuccessful plaintiffs — costs practice gave little spur by itself to compromise. The discretion as to costs — to make such an order as the court considers ‘fit’ or ‘just’ — located in the New South Wales, South Australian, Tasmanian, Victorian and Western Australian family provision legislation150 does little to assist in this regard. Nor do the court rules in the remaining jurisdictions that likewise vest in the court a discretion as to costs, with the possible exception of Queensland where the rules state that, although costs are within the court’s discretion, they follow the event unless the court orders otherwise.151 10.33 To date the only statutory or rule-based costs initiative targeted directly at family provision cases is found in the Victorian legislation. It states that, if the court is satisfied that an application for a family provision order has been made ‘frivolously, vexatiously or with no reasonable prospect of success’, the court may order the costs of the application to be made against the applicant.152 This change was designed to counterbalance the ostensible expansion of eligible applicants for provision effected by the 1998 statutory amendments.153 The use of the term ‘may’ in this context, though, leaves open a discretion not to order costs against an unsuccessful applicant even in the face of a finding that he or she has acted ‘frivolously, vexatiously or with no reasonable prospect of success’.154 At the same time, it serves, it has been

said, as ‘a disincentive to would-be applicants whose claims to a moral entitlement are tenuous’.155 Were the usual costs practice in civil litigation — that costs ‘follow the event’ — to be applied in the family provision context, an unsuccessful applicant would generally be ordered to pay the defendant’s costs, and would be unable to recoup his or her own costs from the estate. If, on [page 295] the other hand, the applicant proved successful, the defendant would be required to meet the applicant’s costs. Yet neither outcome, in the exercise of the court’s discretion in family provision matters, is commonly encountered. The case law reveals that even unsuccessful applicants may receive costs out of the estate, or at least avoid being ordered to pay the defendant’s costs from their own pocket. At the same time, unsuccessful defendants almost invariably receive their costs, and those of the applicant, out of the estate. The reasons for this ‘special treatment’ of family provision cases appear below, by reference to the relevant scenarios. 10.34 So far as the costs of unsuccessful applicants are concerned, though, the cases do reveal a swelling curial reticence to burden the estate. An applicant nowadays cannot, the Victorian Court of Appeal observed in 2010, ‘assume that litigation can be pursued safe in the belief that costs will always be paid out of the estate’.156 And the year before the New South Wales Court of Appeal warned that in family provision claims ‘[t]he estate does not automatically bankroll the legal costs of every party who wishes to be heard’.157 More generally, it has been suggested that it better promotes the prudent settlement of family provision claims to limit the awards of costs of beneficiaries and claimants, including where successful, made out of the estate to costs assessed on a ‘party and party’ basis.158

Costs of successful applicant/unsuccessful defendant 10.35 Consistent with the usual approach to the exercise of the costs discretion, an applicant who succeeds in an action to secure (further)

provision from the deceased’s estate is, in the ordinary case, entitled to have his or her own costs paid, commonly on an indemnity basis,159 from the estate.160 That the applicant’s costs are to be borne by the estate dictates that, unlike the costs outcome in most inter partes litigation, those costs are not payable by the unsuccessful party (the defendant) out of his or her own pocket. There are two reasons for this. The first, more general, one arises out of the notion that proceedings properly instituted by persons interested in a fund result in a benefit to the fund, or at least to claimant(s) to the fund. Costs of the persons instituting those proceedings are, accordingly, payable out of the fund. The second reason is that family provision claims are ordinarily made against the executor as defendant,161 who is legally obliged to uphold the terms of the will. As an order for provision is premised on the deceased’s failure to make adequate testamentary provision for the applicant, it is reasoned that it ‘would not be fair to an executor in carrying out the executor’s obligation to uphold the terms of the will, if the executor were to be held personally liable for an error or oversight on [page 296] the part of the person who made that will’.162 It follows that the defendant’s costs are normally paid out of the estate, irrespective of the outcome of the proceedings, on an indemnity basis.163 10.36 Being grounded in the court’s discretion, which is in turn governed by considerations of justice, the above do not represent inevitable outcomes. There are occasions where successful applicants may be deprived of some (or even all) of their costs. For instance, extravagant or wasteful incurrence of costs by the applicant will not be subsidised by the estate, especially where the defendant is entitled to the residue of the estate (as an order for costs out of the estate is effectively an order that the defendant pay them).164 A settlement offer that, had the applicant accepted it, would have bettered the outcome he or she has secured at trial, is likewise a factor that may incline the court to reduce a costs order in the applicant’s favour.165 The degree of success enjoyed by the applicant, against the backdrop of the size of the estate, is a further relevant consideration. In Jeffery v Guider,166 for example,

Ball J restricted the costs the successful applicant could recover out of the estate, as her degree of success was small and the costs incurred were disproportionate to that success.167 10.37 Nor can an unsuccessful defendant necessarily be assured of receiving his or her costs out of the estate. If, say, ultimately unsuccessful beneficiaries choose to be separately represented, but the court determines that the executor could have effectively represented the beneficiaries’ interests, the court may be disinclined to burden the estate with their costs. Misconduct, or incurrence of excessive costs, by an executor–defendant in the course of the litigation, may deprive the executor of some of his or her costs out of the estate.168 After all, executors must, like trustees, act properly and reasonably in the conduct of litigation over the relevant estate. More generally as regards the consequences of unreasonable behaviour by a party to family provision proceedings, Jones J in Underwood v Underwood made the following observations:169 One obvious feature which results from costs being paid out of the estate is that the entitlement of a beneficiary can vary quite markedly during the course of the proceeding. Every step taken in pursuit of, or in resistance to, a claim diminishes the value of the estate and leads to uncertainty as to the level of entitlement. A rash claim by one applicant can sometimes spark a defensive response by other applicants. An ill considered challenge to a valuation of an asset might necessitate the seeking of formal (and expensive) valuations. Similarly, over zealous responses by the executors or their legal representatives can seriously consume estate funds in ways not apparent to the applicants. Consequently, for every action and reaction in a proceeding of this kind some part of the costs is borne by the estate and its value is thereby diminished. That cost is often paid by beneficiaries who played no part in the cost generating activity. There is consequently a need to ensure that unreasonable behaviour on the part of any party, or the pursuit of claims which have no reasonable prospects of success, makes that party liable to some costs sanction.

In Wang v D’Ambrosio,170 for example, where the executor incurred costs disproportionate to the size of the estate and the issues, and conducted the case with some animus against the [page 297] applicant, Hodgson CJ in Eq ordered that the executor’s costs be paid from the estate on a party and party basis, rather than an indemnity basis. In more recent times, with a heightened focus on proportionality, it is likely that an executor behaving similarly may not be treated quite so leniently, but be

denied an indemnity for costs unreasonably or improperly incurred. In Tapp v Public Trustee (No 2),171 for instance, Tennent J ordered the respondent executors to pay their own costs where, in a case involving a small estate, they actively sought to prevent the applicant, who ultimately proved wholly successful, from applying for provision.

Costs of unsuccessful applicant 10.38 It was once the view, even if at the time not always supported by the case law,172 that costs of all parties in family provision disputes would be met from the estate. Whereas it remains true, to a substantial degree, that costs of an unsuccessful executor–defendant will come from the estate, for the reasons noted above,173 there is no longer any guarantee that unsuccessful applicants will be indemnified for their costs from the estate. It is more common nowadays for unsuccessful applicants to be refused costs out of the estate — that is, to have to meet their own costs.174 It has been suggested that this modern practice:175 … may have been seen as having some justification from a perceived desirability of minimising post-litigation conflict in family disputes, the availability in some cases of a significant fund the use of which could alleviate hardship on a losing party, and the circumstance that in some cases the decision was a marginal discretionary decision on which reasonable minds could differ.

10.39 The New South Wales and Victorian practice is less accommodating to an unsuccessful applicant, as it starts from the assumption that an unsuccessful applicant will be liable to meet the defendant’s costs. In New South Wales this is a matter of practice,176 ostensibly driven by a policy to discourage litigation that lacks merit.177 In Victoria it has been largely generated by 1998 statutory amendments that explicitly empower the court, if satisfied that an application was made ‘frivolously, vexatiously or with no reasonable prospect of success’, to make a costs order against the applicant.178 This has led a judge to opine that ‘the legislature has made it clear that … some of the old cases must now be approached with care’, so that the former practice [page 298] not to award costs against an applicant who failed ‘can no longer be accepted

as a general proposition’.179 In any case, the Victorian legislation does not preclude the court making a costs order against an applicant even if the claim was not made frivolously, vexatiously or with no reasonable prospect of success.180 10.40 Yet as costs remain in the discretion of the court, the foregoing cannot represent unyielding rules. Other than in New South Wales and Victoria, there remains scope for the court to order an unsuccessful applicant to pay the costs of the defendant, or alternatively to have his or her costs paid out of the estate. The latter may be an appropriate response where, in the circumstances, the court determines that the applicant acted reasonably in bringing the action and in the course of the proceedings, especially where the estate is sufficiently large and the applicant’s financial position is poor.181 But if the claim was weak, there may well be good reason why the estate should not have to bear the defendant’s costs, especially where the estate is not substantial.182 And in New South Wales and Victoria the reasonableness of an applicant’s claim may dissuade a court from making a costs order against him or her (especially where any such order would have a serious detrimental effect on the applicant’s financial position).183 This takes into account that, as noted by a New South Wales judge, ‘[a] decision whether a Family Provision Act claim fails or succeeds produces a black and white result which often belies the fact that the case was borderline and could have gone either way’.184 For example, in Lillis v Lillis,185 which Hamilton AJ described as a case ‘where along a large part of the way I felt it was a [page 299] case that could go either way’, the applicant escaped being ordered to pay costs, his Honour seeing it as ‘by no means unreasonable for the [applicant] or the [applicant’s] legal advisers to have believed that the claim, particularly as moderately and sensibly put … in this case, had reasonable prospects of success’. And as the applicant in Bartkus v Bartkus186 failed not because she failed to establish a need, but because of the size of the estate and the competing claim of the first defendant, the same costs order ensued.

10.41 So while New South Wales courts have ostensibly propounded a general principle that makes an unsuccessful applicant for provision liable to pay the defendant’s costs, as the court must, in the exercise of its costs discretion, pay regard to the overall justice of the case, it may be more willing to depart from the general principle in family provision cases than in other types of cases.187 The weight accorded to the ‘general principle’, or its general applicability, may therefore be queried. It may be that the New South Wales position, even without a statutory provision to this effect, is not too dissimilar to the Victorian one, where statute makes an applicant a candidate for an adverse costs order — that is, falling within the ‘general principle’ — if the court considers that the application was made ‘frivolously, vexatiously or with no reasonable prospect of success’. Powell JA in 1995 remarked, to this end, that it is not the function of family provision legislation ‘to provide to an applicant funds to enable that applicant to pursue hopeless litigation and still less to provide funds to protect an applicant from the consequences of pursuing such litigation’.188 A New South Wales claim that came within the latter description, and that generated an adverse costs order, was that in Carey v Robson (No 2).189 The applicant was unsuccessful in obtaining greater provision out of the estate of her late father because, inter alia, she was already in comfortable financial circumstances even without provision from the estate and had been left $470,000 by the will, and her brother’s moral claim, ‘as she must reasonably have acknowledged’, far exceeded her own as he was extremely ‘income poor’.190 The applicant’s claim was not ‘borderline’,191 according to Palmer J, who ordered that she pay costs. This order was also influenced by his Honour’s criticism of the moneys that had been spent and the manner in which the case had been conducted, particularly on the applicant’s side. Conversely, that unsuccessful applicants have reasonably sought to minimise their costs, say by instructing the one solicitor, is not a reason by itself to oust the general principle.192

Multiple applicants with similar interests 10.42 That an unsuccessful party may avoid a costs order or receive costs out of the estate does not mean that the same should apply to multiple applications by parties with similar interests. It cannot be assumed that, even

if all are successful, each will receive own costs out of the estate.193 It has been observed that ‘[n]othing is more important in [family provision applications] than that the costs should be reduced to a minimum’,194 and so the court will aim to secure that result. This should not be seen as translating to an inflexible rule requiring [page 300] multiple applicants to join together in instituting proceedings. In Re C White (deceased)195 Harvey CJ in Eq, though allowing multiple applications on one motion even in the face of legislation that contemplated a separate application by each person seeking relief, cautioned:196 If the practice is abused, as by members of one household severing unreasonably or by a person, who has no real chance at all of getting [provision], joining in with someone who has a good chance of success on the application, there must be made a suitable order for costs by which the additional expense, which has been incurred by the severance or by the joinder of a party who had no reasonable hope of succeeding on an application, should be disallowed out of the estate. I think that if the Court moulds its order for costs carefully in order to prevent the abuse of the process no objection can be found to the joinder of applications.

Impact of settlement offers 10.43 The law encourages prospective litigants to settle their disputes without proceeding to adjudication. One spur to settlement is the general rule that ‘costs follow the event’. As noted earlier,197 family provision disputes frequently culminate in a hearing because, inter alia, historically the courts have not consistently applied this general costs rule. The increasing recognition that unsuccessful applicants receive no ‘free pass’ as to costs, and may indeed be ordered to pay costs,198 may have positive side effects in motivating settlement. The taking into account of settlement offers in the exercise of the costs discretion may do likewise. Beyond specific court rules governing the costs consequences of offers of compromise199 — which in any case may not necessarily override the statutory costs discretion specifically conferred by family provision legislation other than in the territories and Queensland200 — the general law accepts that less formal settlement offers (‘Calderbank

offers’) can generate costs consequences.201 Generally speaking, if the offer is rejected, and it transpires that upon adjudication the offeree obtains an outcome no more favourable than the offer, the court may in its discretion deprive the offeree of costs, or even order the offeree to pay the offeror’s costs, incurred after the date on which the offer was rejected (including on an indemnity basis).202 10.44 The above applies generally in civil litigation, and so can impact on the costs consequences of litigation over a deceased estate. But it is discussed under the family provision heading because of arguments commonly arising in this context.203 It is not always straightforward to properly evaluate the worth of an offer in family provision claims, which are in any case rarely quantifiable by the parties’ lawyers prior to judgment ‘with anything like the prescience possible’ in a claim for a liquidated sum or even one for unliquidated damages for personal injury or for future economic loss.204 But this has not prevented the courts from taking into account Calderbank offers in the exercise of their costs discretion where this evaluation is realistic. To this end, the New South Wales Court of Appeal has remarked as follows:205 Both plaintiffs and defendants should be encouraged to make open offers as early as practicable in the litigation. The plaintiff who fails to do so promptly may find that none or only part of his or her costs will be ordered to be paid out of the estate. Of course a defendant is also well placed

[page 301] to make open offers and should do so in cases … where only the quantum of the plaintiffs claim is seriously in issue.

But there is no automatic rule that offerees who fail to better the offer will be chargeable with costs incurred after the date the offer was rejected. Not only would such a rule be inconsistent with the nature of the costs discretion, it would overlook the special nature of family provision litigation that has spawned a more lenient approach to costs generally. So in Edgar v Public Trustee for the Northern Territory206 the applicant refused an offer of $100,000 (plus his costs) on 19 August 2010, and thereby forced the matter on to trial expecting about $200,000 to be paid out in costs, and then for him to receive more than $100,000 from what was left out of an estate of less than $500,000. Kelly J remarked that, given the very modest size of the estate, this

was ‘a wholly unreasonable position to have adopted’.207 His Honour added that had this been other than a family provision matter, he would have ordered, pursuant to the relevant court rules, indemnity costs against the applicant for the period after 19 August. Being a family provision matter, though, it was relevant to consider the effect of that order on the applicant’s financial position. As an indemnity costs order would have an ‘unduly onerous detrimental effect’ on the applicant’s modest financial position, Kelly J ordered him to pay the defendant’s costs, assessed on the less encompassing standard basis,208 from 20 August 2010. 10.45 As foreshadowed in the above quote from the New South Wales Court of Appeal, defendants also cannot in the main refuse ultimately favourable offers without some costs consequence. The point is illustrated by the ruling of Blow J in Woolnough v Public Trustee (No 2),209 where the applicant made settlement offers to the testamentary beneficiaries, which proved more generous than the outcome secured by the beneficiaries. The estate was a small one. His Honour remarked that ‘[i]n an estate of this size, when the burden of a costs order would fall on the successful applicant, a person with limited financial resources, and thereby deplete the estate’, refusing a reasonable settlement offer ‘should be regarded as a very significant consideration’.210 The beneficiaries were ordered to pay 90 per cent of the applicant’s costs from the date the offer was rejected.

Costs in determining beneficiaries Costs of inquiry into beneficiaries 10.46 The court rules in most jurisdictions provide that the costs of inquiries to ascertain the person entitled to a legacy, money or share are payable out of such legacy, money or share unless the court otherwise orders.211 In otherwise ordering, the court’s chief inquiry is the testator’s intention.212 The Australian Capital Territory rules add that, if two or more people are entitled to share in a fund, the court may make an order allowing immediate payment to any of those people of the person’s share without reserving any part of the share to meet the later costs of finding out any other of those people.213 [page 302]

Claims upon intestacy 10.47 Next of kin who succeed in establishing their claims on an intestacy are entitled to be paid their costs out of the estate of the intestate.214 Conversely, an unsuccessful claimant in an inquiry as to an intestate’s next of kin will not receive costs out of the estate unless its investigation benefited the estate.215 If, for instance, the claim does no more than delay, as opposed to expedite, the final distribution, there is no requisite benefit, and costs lie with the unsuccessful claimant. Where, however, even though the plaintiffs fail to prove themselves as next of kin, the result of the proceedings satisfies the court that there are no next of kin, this benefits the estate as it enables its final distribution to be effected. Hence, the plaintiffs in such a case should be allowed costs out of the estate. In Johnston v Todd,216 for example, the plaintiffs were allowed their costs although their claim as next of kin was displaced, as on the facts ‘[i]t was so doubtful who was right, and so impossible to decide the matter without careful investigation, that if they had not brought forward their claims there could have been no adjudication’.

Insolvent Estates Costs of trustees-in-bankruptcy 10.48 The general rule that costs follow the event applies to the costs of proceedings instituted or defended by a trustee-in-bankruptcy.217 Like other trustees, a trustee-in-bankruptcy is personally liable for the costs of an unsuccessful action,218 but may be entitled to be indemnified out of the assets of the bankrupt for those costs if the action was properly brought, the expenditure was properly incurred and there has been no misconduct on his or her behalf.219 For instance, expenditure in litigation that is obviously misconceived or extravagant in quantum is not proper even though the trustee may have acted honestly throughout.220 As any costs not covered by the bankrupt’s estate fall upon the trustee personally, he or she will not ordinarily sue unless the estate is sufficient to cover a costs order, or he or she has secured an indemnity as to costs from interested creditors.221 The above should not be seen as dictating that the ‘costs follow the event’ rule applies as a matter of course in this context, particularly as trustees-in-

bankruptcy perform a statutory function. The Full Federal Court explained the balancing of competing interests in this context as follows:222 The contention that a trustee in bankruptcy, under a statutory duty to take steps that are necessary and reasonable to obtain possession of property or declarations of entitlement to the property of a bankrupt, should not readily be subjected to an order for costs, has some force. It cannot be in the interest of creditors, or in the public interest, to dissuade a trustee from approaching the Court for orders necessary to allow the trustee properly to administer the estate of a bankrupt. On the other

[page 303] hand, it will not be in the interest of creditors, nor in the public interest, to have the meagre funds of an estate squandered on the costs of the trustee and other parties, in a proceeding that has little chance of success or may reasonably be compromised. If the trustee is in doubt as to the course to be followed he or she would be expected to obtain adequate advice in that regard.

For example, if the bankrupt has ostensibly engaged in fraudulent transactions, and the trustee-in-bankruptcy believes he or she has a good cause of action or defence against the bankrupt, the court may decide not to order the trustee, even though unsuccessful, to pay the bankrupt’s costs.223 10.49 Statute excludes a trustee-in-bankruptcy’s personal liability for costs of proceedings in respect of the mistaken seizure or disposal of property belonging to a person other than the bankrupt (such as property in the bankrupt’s possession or on the bankrupt’s premises) unless the trustee is found to have been negligent.224 10.50 An illustration where the court has awarded costs against a trustee-inbankruptcy involves cases where a Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 139ZQ notice has been set aside. Under that section, if a person has received any money or property as a result of a transaction that is void against the trustee of a bankrupt, the Official Receiver may, on the application of the trustee, ‘require the person, by written notice given to the person, to pay the trustee an amount equal to the money or the value of the property received’. For example, in Citibank Ltd v Parker225 the Official Receiver, on the request of a trustee-in-bankruptcy, issued a s 139ZQ notice against an applicant, who in turn applied to have it set aside. The Official Receiver entered an appearance and informed the court that she submitted to any order save as to costs. The representative of the trustee then informed the court that he proposed not to

file evidence to support the notice because there was insufficient evidence to proceed with the matter, and so the Official Receiver, at the trustee’s request, revoked the notice. Tamberlin J held that the applicant should be awarded costs against the trustee because the trustee was the ‘real party’ with an interest in the issue of the notice, which was issued on behalf of the trustee, and required payment to the trustee.

Costs of liquidators 10.51 The general rule that costs follow the event applies to the costs of liquidators who institute or defend legal proceedings on behalf of the company.226 Yet the liability of the liquidator for costs depends on whether he or she acts in the proceedings in the name of the company, or does so in his or her own name.227

Proceedings in the name of the company 10.52 If the liquidator acts in the name of the company, as a general rule no personal liability attaches to the liquidator in respect of an adverse costs order; the costs liability is [page 304] that of the company and so is met from the company’s assets.228 The general rule is informed by the fact that the liquidator is not a party to the action, and performs a public function on behalf of all creditors and contributories.229 In such a case the defendant will most likely have applied for security for costs.230 The court may, however, under its exceptional jurisdiction to order costs against a non-party, order a liquidator to pay costs personally.231 Given the types of circumstances in which a liquidator as a non-party is likely to be made to pay costs, it is unlikely that the liquidator would in these circumstances be entitled to be indemnified out of company assets for the costs.

Proceedings instituted in the liquidator’s own name 10.53 In some types of suits, principally those alleging voidable transactions, the liquidator must institute proceedings in his or her own name.232 In these cases the liquidator is personally liable for any adverse costs order, but is not ordinarily required to provide security for costs.233 Oliver J in Re Wilson Lovatt & Sons Ltd explained the point this way:234 I cannot … see why it should be contended that a liquidator who takes it on himself to institute proceedings, to bring parties before the court, to subject them to costs, and as against whom it is quite clearly established that no order for security can be made, should then be entitled to plead that he is not responsible beyond the extent of the assets in his hands. I can see no reason at all why a liquidator should be entitled to an immunity which is not conferred on other litigants.

In this context, a liquidator’s position is no different to that of a trustee who, if he or she litigates, does so at his or her own risk. Of course, as with trustees, a liquidator is entitled to an indemnity out of unsecured assets of the company for costs if the litigation was properly brought, and involved no obvious mistake or misconduct.235 Liquidators’ costs incurred as a result of ‘blunder’ and lack of reasonable amount of skill are not properly incurred, and so fall outside the indemnity.236 [page 305] That a liquidator is also entitled to an indemnity for costs from another source (such as creditors) does not deny the indemnity from company assets.237 However, as the costs order is made without inquiry into whether or not there are assets in the company,238 if those assets are insufficient to cover the costs order (including where other costs enjoy statutory priority),239 the liquidator cannot be indemnified for the excess.240 For this reason, liquidators will usually not sue unless they have either sufficient funds to discharge their obligations in the suit, or an indemnity as to costs from interested creditors.241

Proceedings defended in the liquidator’s own name 10.54 The position is different where the liquidator defends proceedings in

his or her own name. Oliver J in Re Wilson Lovatt & Sons Ltd explained the reason for this:242 [T]here may be very powerful reasons of policy for a rule that a liquidator, when carrying out his functions and thus subjecting himself to the possibility of proceedings against him by parties who are discontented with the way in which he has carried out those functions, must be entitled to defend himself without being subjected to the risk of having costs awarded against him personally, because of course he cannot protect himself against claims being made. Unless there were some such rule it might be very difficult to get persons to take on the heavy responsibility of the liquidation of companies. It seems to me that it is quite a different matter where the liquidator himself takes it on himself to institute proceedings, whether they be proceedings in the winding-up or otherwise.

Because the liquidator has not taken the initiative to institute the proceedings, it is unfair that he or she should be ultimately personally liable for an adverse costs order if company assets are insufficient to meet that order. As a result, a costs order will generally be made in such a way that the liquidator does not incur any personal liability. This may be achieved by ordering costs against an unsuccessful liquidator as defendant limited to the assets of the company;243 any shortfall falls on the successful party. But if the liquidator behaved unreasonably or improperly in the litigation, the position may be otherwise. For example, in Re Network Welding (in liq) (No 2) 244 costs were ordered against a liquidator personally, where Young CJ in Eq had set aside [page 306] an examination order for failure by the liquidator to disclose material matters in applying for ex parte orders for examination. His Honour considered that the liquidator wasted the court’s time in opposing the application. 10.55 It is therefore important in any suit involving a liquidator in his or her own name to determine whether he or she acts as plaintiff or defendant. For instance, although a liquidator may be the defendant on the record, if he or she makes a counterclaim, in respect of that counterclaim the liquidator acts in the role of a plaintiff. So a liquidator who fails on the counterclaim may be personally liable for costs attributable to the counterclaim.245

Indemnity for costs liability

10.56 The separate question of whether a liquidator is entitled to be indemnified for those costs out of what assets remain in the company is determined according to similar principles as those applicable to trustees-inbankruptcy.246 The relevant inquiry thus focuses on the propriety of the liquidator’s conduct and on whether he or she was advancing a personal interest, as distinct from the interest of the company, in bringing or defending proceedings.247 For example, absent misconduct, it is proper for a liquidator to oppose an application for his or her removal on the ground of a bona fide reasonable view that it is in the interests of the company for there to be no removal order. In such a case, the liquidator will be entitled to an indemnity out of company assets even if he or she is removed if that view has been found to be erroneous as a matter of law.248 Conversely, a liquidator who chooses to defend his or her conduct on a factual basis that is successfully challenged by the applicant for removal should not do so at the expense of the insolvent company (or more correctly, its creditors).249 Certainly no indemnity exists where the removal is triggered by maladministration or corruption,250 although this outcome is not confined to cases of this kind.

Costs on application for directions by a liquidator 10.57 Where a liquidator’s application for curial directions is necessitated only by the stand taken by one particular creditor, or a group of creditors acting only in their own interests, and the question involved is not a complex one, costs should generally follow the event. Therefore, if the position the liquidator always intended to adopt is vindicated, and the submission of opposing creditors is rejected, then those creditors should be liable for the liquidator’s costs of the application.251 For example, in Re Masureik & Allan Pty Ltd252 the liquidator and the company’s [page 307] largest creditor, in accordance with established case law, agreed that the liquidator should treat the recovery of a preferential payment as ensuing to the benefit of the general body of creditors. A director of the company argued

otherwise, his interest as a guarantor of the company’s debt to the creditor being in the sum recovered going to the reduction of that debt. The director insisted that the liquidator seek directions on that issue, despite the liquidator informing him that an application would be made for costs if a directions hearing was necessary. Needham J upheld the liquidator’s submissions and ordered the director to pay the liquidator’s costs. Conversely, if the issue is complex, or involves a relatively novel proposition in law, the starting point is that the costs of all necessary parties are to be paid out of company assets as costs in the liquidation. For example, Australian Securities Commission v Melbourne Asset Management Nominees Pty Ltd (receiver and manager appointed)253 involved multiple defendants and complex questions of fact and law. Even though the court rejected some of the parties’ submissions, Northrop J held that the costs of all parties should be paid as part of the liquidator’s costs in the liquidation.254 Where, however, the nature of the complexity is due not to the directions sought but to the determined opposition of the unsuccessful respondents, the liquidator ‘holding the ring between two contesting parties’, it is appropriate that costs should follow the event.255

Costs of receivers 10.58 The general law requires that litigation instigated by a receiver on behalf of the company be brought in the company’s name, meaning that the receiver is not a party on the record.256 Nor is a receiver likely to be a party to proceedings against the company. Thus costs orders are not made against receivers as parties to proceedings in this context. Costs orders can, however, be made against a receiver as a non-party to the suit where the court considers that in justice the receiver should be made liable for costs.257 Conversely, a receiver who is successfully sued for breach of duty in carrying out the receivership is in a position similar to a trustee,258 and may be ordered to pay costs with no guarantee of an indemnity from company funds for those costs. Where no breach of duty is proven, the receiver is entitled to costs as against the opponent.259

Costs of administrators

10.59 Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides for the administration of companies in financial difficulties and confers on an administrator the power to bring or defend proceedings in the name of the company and on its behalf.260 As trustees, trustees-in-bankruptcy, liquidators and administrators occupy similar offices — each control assets that do not belong to them, and are under fiduciary and other duties to administer those assets for the benefit of others — there is in principle no reason for applying differing costs principles [page 308] to each office.261 Similar principles also apply in the context of the administrator’s right to be indemnified for costs out of company assets.262 10.60 As such, the first inquiry in this regard is whether the administrator brings proceedings in the name of the company. If this is so, a successful action means that, as a general rule, the company is entitled to costs. If the action proves unsuccessful, the company, not the administrator, is liable for costs. This does not oust the court’s jurisdiction to make an order against the administrator personally where this is justified.263 Where the administrator is the plaintiff in the proceedings, the court may award costs against the administrator if the proceedings prove unsuccessful, for which the administrator is personally liable. Like a liquidator or trustee, the administrator may nonetheless be entitled to be indemnified out of company assets for this liability, and on similar grounds. Where the administrator is a defendant, in view of the fact that he or she will have had a greater opportunity to obtain contractual protection under the deed, there is less justification than in the case of a liquidator to limit his or her costs liability where the company assets are insufficient to cover that liability. To this end, it has been held that the normal costs order against an administrator as unsuccessful defendant will be the same as that against an administrator as unsuccessful plaintiff, namely an order to pay the successful party’s costs without limitation to the company’s assets.264

1.

This point is reflected in the court rules in some jurisdictions: ACT r 1732(3) (formerly ACT RSC

O 65 r 11); Tas r 63; WA O 66 r 4(1). 2.

Permanent Trustee Co v Redman (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 353 at 360 per Harvey J; NSW r 42.25(2) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 42(2)); WA O 66 r 9(2) (see Public Trustee (WA) v Brumar Nominees Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] WASC 6 at [20] per Pritchard J, who opined that the sub-rule operates as a complete code in relation to the circumstances in which costs will be awarded to trustees, personal representatives and mortgagees).

3.

See 10.3–10.16.

4.

See 10.17–10.47.

5.

See 10.48–10.60.

6.

For example, the costs of each party of an action for dissolution of a partnership are, as a general rule, paid out of the partnership assets (Hamer v Giles (1879) 11 Ch D 942 at 944–5 per Jessel MR; Kraft v Kupferwasser (1991) 23 NSWLR 236 at 244 per Powell J; Kardos v Sarbutt (No 2) (2006) DFC ¶95-337; [2006] NSWCA 206; BC200605726 at [28] per Brereton J, with whom Basten JA and Hunt AJA agreed); Slim v Kabra [2006] NSWSC 837; BC200606400 at [9] per Palmer J; Old v Hodgkinson [2010] NSWSC 1335; BC201008767), as are the costs of taking accounts (Butcher v Pooler (1883) 24 Ch D 273), unless there is some good reason to the contrary. The latter may be the case where the action is not in respect of the administration of a partnership but to obtain an adjudication on a disputed claim between the partners, in which case costs will ordinarily follow the event: see, for example, Meekin Enterprises v Gersbach (SC(NSW), McLelland CJ in Eq, 6 August 1997, unreported) BC9703425; Leisure Investments Pty Ltd v Bilioara Pty Ltd [2001] NTSC 3; BC200100257; Kerr v J P & M Kerr (Billabidgee) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1044; BC200607962; Rahman v Ahmed [2009] NSWSC 1028; BC200908925.

7.

See FCR 2011 Pt 18; ACT Pt 2.19; NSW Pt 43; NT O 12; Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) s 19; Qld Ch 21; SA r 202; Tas Pt 17 Div 16; Vic O 12; WA O 17. See generally Cairns, pp 338–40.

8.

SA r 202(3)(f) and WA O 17 r 15 make this explicit.

9.

McPherson, Thom & Co v Sandhurst and Northern District Trustees, Executors and Agency Co Ltd [1929] VLR 295 at 301 per Lowe J, cited with approval by Gzell J in Kennett v Charlton [2007] NSWSC 190; BC200701447 at [11].

10. See, for example, Kennett v Charlton [2007] NSWSC 190; BC200701447; Riabkoff v Abenergy Properties Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 724; BC201205110. 11. This is not a fixed or unyielding rule. A court may make a costs order against a successful trustee. For example, in Collins v AMP Superannuation Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 565; BC9703146 Merkel J ordered the ultimately successful superannuation trustee to pay the costs of other parties to the appeal because it had permitted the use of inaccurate forms, which contributed to the proceeding. His Honour’s remark (at 582) that ‘there is nothing normal about the present case’, though, highlights that such an outcome is highly unusual. It is unlikely outside of the professional trustee scenario. 12. As to the trustee’s right of indemnity generally see Dal Pont, Equity and Trusts, pp 677–84. 13. The effect of making ‘no order as to costs’ in a case of this kind, where the order deprives a trustee of the costs, is to deny the right to his or her indemnity as well: Donnelly v Maxwell-Smith [2010] FCAFC 154; BC201009661 at [24] per the court. 14. Geffen v Goodman Estate (1991) 81 DLR (4th) 211 at 237–8 per Wilson J (SCC); McDonald v Horn [1995] 1 All ER 961 at 970 per Hoffmann LJ. The court rules in New South Wales and Western Australia reflect this general proposition: NSW r 42.25(2) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 42(2)); WA O 66 r 9(2). See generally Cf J V Ormsby, ‘Trustees’ Indemnity: Litigation Costs’

[2008] NZLJ 468. 15. O’Brien v Tracy (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 44 at 44 per Street J. 16. Barnett v Rogers [1914] SALR 138 at 139–40 per Gordon J; Love v Love (1914) 16 WALR 131 at 135–6 per Rooth J (FC); Re Spurling’s Will Trusts [1966] 1 All ER 745 at 755, 758 per UngoedThomas J. 17. Cotterell v Stratton (1872) 8 Ch App 295 at 302 per Lord Selborne; Barnett v Rogers [1914] SALR 138 at 139–40 per Gordon J; Hagan v Waterhouse (No 2) (1992) 34 NSWLR 400 at 405–6 per Kearney J. See, for example, Parkes-Linnegar v Watson (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 181; BC201104913 at [11]–[12] per Pembroke J. 18. West v Public Trustee [1942] SASR 109 at 122 per Mayo J. 19. See, for example, Drummond v Drummond [1999] NSWSC 923; BC9905742 at [52]–[57] per Austin J. 20. Dagnell v J L Freedman & Co (a firm) [1993] 2 All ER 161 at 169 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson (HL). See, for example, Rouse v IOOF Australia Trustees Ltd (No 3) [1999] SASC 208; BC9902623 at [45]–[70] per Lander J. 21. Rouse v IOOF Australia Trustees Ltd (No 3) [1999] SASC 208; BC9902623 at [45] per Lander J. See also Re Beddoe [1893] 1 Ch 547 at 557 per Lindley LJ. 22. Re Evans (1884) 26 Ch D 58 at 65 per Cotton LJ; Love v Love (1914) 16 WALR 131 at 134 per Burnside ACJ (FC). 23. See, for example, O’Brien v Tracy (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 44 (where the trustees’ mistake arose from an honest desire to give effect to the testatrix’s somewhat peculiar direction). 24. Re Atkinson (deceased) [1971] VR 612 at 615–16 per Gillard J; Alsop Wilkinson (a firm) v Neary [1995] 1 All ER 431 at 434–5 per Lightman J; McDonald v Horn [1995] 1 All ER 961 at 970 per Hoffmann LJ. 25. Alsop Wilkinson (a firm) v Neary [1995] 1 All ER 432 at 435 per Lightman J. 26. As to pre-emptive costs orders generally see 14.3–14.22. 27. After Re Beddoe [1893] 1 Ch 547 (see at 557 per Lindley LJ, at 562 per Bowen LJ). 28. Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Incorporated v His Eminence Petar the Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Diocese of Australia and New Zealand (2008) 237 CLR 66; [2008] HCA 42; BC200807738 at [71] per Gummow ACJ, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ (emphasis in original). 29. Grizonic v Suttor [2011] NSWSC 471; BC201103427 at [60] per Brereton J. 30. Salmi v Sinivuori [2008] QSC 321; BC200810933 at [14] per Lyons J. 31. Re Eaton (deceased) [1964] 1 WLR 1269 at 1270 per Wilberforce J. 32. Salmi v Sinivuori [2008] QSC 321; BC200810933 at [13]–[14] per Lyons J. 33. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd (1977) 137 CLR 252 at 264–5, 270; BC7700065 per Jacobs J; Alsop Wilkinson (a firm) v Neary [1995] 1 All ER 431 at 435–6 per Lightman J; Sons of Gwalia Ltd (subject to deed of company arrangement) v Margaretic (2006) 232 ALR 119; [2006] FCAFC 92; BC200604308 at [9] per Finkelstein J. 34. Re Beddoe [1893] 1 Ch 547 at 558 per Lindley LJ; Adsett v Berlouis (1992) 37 FCR 201 at 210; BC9203637 (FC); McDonald v Horn [1995] 1 All ER 961 at 970 per Hoffmann LJ. See further 16.32–16.38.

35. Application of Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2) (2005) 63 NSWLR 441; [2005] NSWSC 558; BC200504122 at [72] per Palmer J. 36. Patterson v Wooler (1876) 2 Ch D 586; Re Cabburn (1882) 46 LT 848; Re Knight’s Will (1884) 26 Ch D 82; Re Chapman (1894) 72 LT 66; Re Holton’s Settlement Trusts (1918) 119 LT 304; Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd v Jope (1902) 27 VLR 706 at 709–10 per A’Beckett J; Cape v Redarb Pty Ltd (receiver and manager appointed) (1992) 107 FLR 362 at 385 per Higgins J (SC(ACT)). 37. As to trustees’ right to seek advice and directions from the court see Dal Pont, Equity and Trusts, pp 685–90. 38. Robertson v Graham (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 676 at 679 per Harvey J; Gleeson v Fitzpatrick (1920) 29 CLR 29 at 35 per Knox CJ, at 38 per Rich J; BC2090126; Re Evans (deceased) [1957] St R Qd 345 at 353 per Mack J. 39. Trustee Act 1925 (NSW) s 93; Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) s 100; Trustee Act 1898 (Tas) s 44; Trustees Act 1962 (WA) s 97. 40. Harrison v Mills [1976] 1 NSWLR 42 at 46–7 per Needham J; McKnight v Ice Skating Queensland (Inc) [2007] QSC 279; BC200708433 at [4] per Chesterman J. 41. Parkes-Linnegar v Watson (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 181; BC201104913 at [8] per Pembroke J. 42. Trimble v Kirkland (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 417 at 421 per A H Simpson CJ; Robertson v Graham (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 676 at 680 per Harvey J; Dunwoody v Jefferson [2000] FCA 456; BC200001647 at [23] per Cooper J. 43. See, for example, McKnight v Ice Skating Queensland (Inc) [2007] QSC 279; BC200708433. 44. See 14.34. 45. Strauss v Wykes [1916] VLR 200 at 209 per Madden CJ; MacBean v Trustees Executors and Agency Company Ltd [1916] VLR 425 at 440–1 per Hood J; Re McMichael (deceased) [1917] VLR 251 at 253 per Hodges J; Will of Cameron [1918] VLR 346 at 349 per Hood J (FC). 46. Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) s 101(1); Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA) s 70(1); Trustee Act 1898 (Tas) s 58; Trustee Act 1958 (Vic) s 77; Trustees Act 1962 (WA) s 98. 47. The inherent jurisdiction may be exercised where the trustee’s work is time consuming and the remuneration is required to ensure proper services are obtained, its basis being that it is inequitable for a person who devotes time and effort to producing an income that others receive free of trouble not be paid for those services: see Re Campbell (1892) 11 NZLR 514 at 517 per Williams J (SC); Will of Moore (deceased) (1896) 17 LR (NSW) B & P 78 at 79 per Manning J; Guazzini v Pateson (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 275 at 286 per Street CJ; Re Duke of Norfolk’s Settlement Trusts [1982] Ch 61 at 75 per Fox LJ. 48. Re McMichael (deceased) [1917] VLR 251 at 254 per Hodges J; Will of Cameron [1918] VLR 346 at 349 per Hood J, at 349 per Cussen J (FC) (each case involving an application for commission by executors under statute). 49. (1905) 5 SR (NSW) 518. See also Waine v King (SC(NSW), Hodgson J, 5 October 1994, unreported) BC9403131 at 12–13. 50. See G W Hinde, ‘Purchase of Trust Property by a Trustee with the Approval of the Court’ (1961– 62) 3 MULR 15 at 28; Patros v Patros (2007) 16 VR 182; [2007] VSC 83; BC200701996 at [23] per Cavanough J. 51. (SC(Tas), Zeeman J, 1 August 1995, unreported) BC9503804.

52. Trustee Act 1925 (NSW) s 93; Trustee Act 1893 (NT) s 41; Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) s 100; Trustee Act 1936 (SA) s 44; Trustee Act 1898 (Tas) ss 44, 63; Trustee Act 1958 (Vic) s 66; Trustees Act 1962 (WA) s 97. 53. Harvey v Olliver (1887) 42 LT 239 at 240–1 per Kay J; Re Harrison’s Settlement Trusts [1965] 3 All ER 795 at 800 per Cross J; Re Roberts (1983) 20 NTR 13 at 19 per O’Leary J. 54. Attorney-General v Murdoch (1856) 2 K & J 571 at 573; 69 ER 910 at 911 per Page Wood VC. See, for example, cases where a trustee unreasonably defended an action for removal: Gava v Grljusich (SC(WA), Kennedy J, 22 February 1996, unreported) BC960082 at 4; Killen v Leigo (SC(NSW), Young J, 10 March 1997, unreported) BC9700736. 55. Swanson v Dungey (1892) 25 SALR 87; Miller v Cameron (1936) 54 CLR 572 at 579 per Latham CJ; Hunter v Hunter [1938] NZLR 520 at 538–9 per Myers CJ (CA); Garrett v Yiasemides [2004] NSWSC 828 at [31]–[33] per Campbell J. 56. Guazzini v Pateson (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 275 at 295 per Street CJ; Miller v Cameron (1938) 54 CLR 572 at 578; BC3600025 per Latham CJ. 57. See, for example, Titterton v Oates (1998) 143 FLR 467 at 484; BC9800951 per Crispin J (SC(ACT)) (where the trustee who was removed had committed several breaches of trust, involving an element of wilfulness, which could, however, be explained albeit only partly, by episodes of longstanding depressive illness). 58. Re Tryon (1844) 7 Beav 496; 49 ER 1158; Benbow v Davies (1848) 11 Beav 369; 50 ER 859; Legg v Mackrell (1860) 2 De GF & J 551; 45 ER 735. 59. Howard v Rhodes (1837) 1 Keen 581; 48 ER 431; Re Medway’s Will (1897) 14 WN (NSW) 29 at 30 per Manning CJ in Eq (trustees who, after taking remuneration for duties, ‘come without rhyme or reason and ask to be relieved from their trust they must still pay the costs of their application’). 60. Re Medway’s Will (1897) 14 WN (NSW) 29 at 30 per Manning CJ in Eq. 61. (1913) 13 SR (NSW) 417 at 421 per A H Simpson CJ in Eq. 62. (1897) 14 WN (NSW) 29. 63. Re Buckton [1907] 2 Ch 406 at 413–15 per Kekewich J. 64. See, for example, Re Buckton [1907] 2 Ch 406 at 415 per Kekewich J (who saw it as often difficult to distinguish the second from the third category); McDonald v Horn [1995] 1 All ER 961 at 971 per Hoffmann LJ (who saw it as sometimes difficult to distinguish the first from the third category); Kerry (Canada) Inc v Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2007) 282 DLR (4th) 625 at [8] per Gillese JA (CA(Ont)) (who noted ‘significant overlap’ in the first two categories). 65. (1914) 31 WN (NSW) 44. 66. Titterton v Oates (1998) 143 FLR 467 at 483–4; BC9800951 per Crispin J (SC(ACT)). Cf Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Incorporated v His Eminence Petar the Diocesan Bishop of the Macedonian Orthodox Diocese of Australia and New Zealand (2008) 237 CLR 66; [2008] HCA 42; BC200807738 at [148]–[151] per Gummow ACJ, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ. 67. In the context of an unsuccessful application for removal of a trustee, see, for example, Tuohey v Tuohey (No 2) [2002] VSC 181; BC200202772 at [23] per McDonald J. 68. This principle has a particular application in respect of beneficiaries of, or persons who otherwise make a claim regarding, a deceased estate: see 10.17–10.26.

69. Sheehy v Mitchell Crane Hire Pty Ltd (1991) 104 FLR 96 at 106 per Higgins J (SC(ACT)). 70. (2001) 198 DLR (4th) 504. 71. CASAW Local 1 v Alcan Smelters and Chemicals Ltd (2001) 198 DLR (4th) 504 at 518–19 (CA(BC)). Cf Nolan v Kerry (Canada) [2009] 2 SCR 678; [2009] SCC 39 (dealing with costs in pension fund litigation in Canada, and on the facts ultimately ruling that, as adversarial litigation, costs should follow the event). 72. See 10.5. 73. See 14.13–14.15. 74. Mitchell v Gard (1863) 3 Sw & Tr 275 at 279; 164 ER 1280 at 1282 per Sir J P Wilde. 75. Will of Elizabeth O’Driscoll (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 559 at 559 per Harvey CJ in Eq; Williamson v Spelleken [1977] Qd R 152 at 155–6 per Williams J (FC). 76. Kostic v Chaplin [2008] WTLR 655; [2007] EWHC 2909 (Ch) at [6] per Henderson J. 77. Horsley v Dunlop (1894) 5 QLJ 85 at 87 per Griffith CJ; Twist v Tye [1902] P 92 at 94 per Gorell Barnes J; Re O’Donnell [1929] SASR 256 at 259–60 per Angas Parsons J; Johnston v Public Trustee (1929) 24 Tas LR 71 at 72–3 per Clark J. 78. Wilson v Jones (1911) 12 CLR 394 at 397–8; BC1190127 per Griffith CJ; Re Egel [1939] SASR 477 at 481 per Angas Parsons J; Middlebrook v Middlebrook (1962) 36 ALJR 216 at 217 per Dixon CJ. 79. Spiers v English [1907] P 122 at 123 per Sir Gorell Barnes P (‘if the circumstances lead reasonably to an investigation of the matter, then the costs may be left to be borne by those who have incurred them’). 80. Rowland v Portus (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 74 at 76 per Walker J (unsuccessful plaintiffs allowed costs out of estate where ‘the defendant should have “shown his hand” earlier’). 81. See, for example, Wild v Plant [1926] P 139 at 152 per Scrutton LJ (‘I should be reluctant to do anything to create the idea that unsuccessful litigants might get their costs out of the estate, without making a very strong case on facts’); Re Estate of Fogarty (No 2) [2007] ACTSC 40; BC200704730 at [16] per Connolly J (‘Persons wishing to contest probate type matters should be on notice that it does not inevitably follow that this will be a cost free exercise’). 82. See 10.31–10.45. 83. Gray v Hart (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1562; BC201209989 at [5] per White J. 84. Davies v Gregory (1873) LR 3 P & D at 31 per Sir J Hannen. 85. Mitchell v Gard (1863) 3 Sw & Tr 275 at 277; 164 ER 1280 at 1281 per Sir J P Wilde. See also Oreski v Ikac [2007] WASC 195 (S); BC200708581 at [9] per Barker J (who remarked that the ‘fault’ of the testator has now been more closely defined as including situations where the conduct, habits and mode of life of the testator give grounds to question the purported will (referring to Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Baker [1999] NSWCA 244; BC9904032 at [14] per Giles JA and Brownie AJA)) (affd Oreski v Ikac [2008] WASCA 220; BC200809666). 86. Kostic v Chaplin [2008] WTLR 655; [2007] EWHC 2909 (Ch) at [21] per Henderson J. 87. See, for example, Ryan v Petherbridge [1902] St R Qd 193 at 195 per Real J; Davis v Wangenheim (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 453 at 459 per A H Simpson CJ in Eq; Kenny v Wilson (1911) 11 SR(NSW) 460 at 472 per Rich AJ; Johnston v Public Trustee (1929) 24 Tas LR 71 at 74 per Clark J; Gray v Hart (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1562; BC201209989 at [28] per White J (who

concluded that the deceased was the cause of the litigation, because the way she went about making her wills and keeping their terms secret was likely to lead to a later challenge). 88. Re Cutcliffe’s Estate [1959] P 6 at 19–20 per Hodson LJ. 89. (1922) 31 CLR 148; BC2290103. 90. Lippe v Hedderwick (1922) 31 CLR 148 at 155; BC2290103 per Starke J. See also at 154–5 per Knox CJ; Estate of Dunn [2002] NSWSC 900; BC200206252 at [54] per Campbell J. 91. This did not, however, extend to the costs of the appeal: see 20.14. 92. [2007] WASC 249; BC200709256. 93. South Melbourne City Council v Hallam (No 2) (1994) 83 LGERA 307 at 312 per Ormiston J (App Div(Vic)). 94. Macartney v Macartney [1908] VLR 649 at 673 per Cussen J (FC). See also at 665 per Hood J. 95. See, for example, Muller v Marriott (1921) 22 SR (NSW) 100. 96. Re Reeve’s Trusts (1877) 4 Ch D 841; Re Maley [1944] SASR 99 at 102 per Richards J. 97. Davis v Wangenheim (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 453 at 459 per A H Simpson CJ in Eq. 98. (1982) 148 CLR 646 at 654; BC8200081. See also Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v Baker [1999] NSWCA 244; BC9904032 at [13]–[15] per Giles JA and Brownie AJA. 99. (1912) 16 CLR 500 at 503 (PC). See also Gray v Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd (1928) 40 CLR 558 at 566 (PC). 100. See, for example, McLennan v Fisher (1889) 10 LR (NSW) Eq 246 at 248 per Owen J (where an opponent of a will, who unsuccessfully raised issues of incapacity and undue influence, was ordered to pay the costs of the suit, as the litigation ‘was wholly unjustifiable and merely the outcome of personal spite’, there being nothing in the circumstances connected with the execution of the will that could reasonably excite suspicion). 101. (1962) 36 ALJR 216. 102. Middlebrook v Middlebrook (1962) 36 ALJR 216 at 217 per Dixon CJ, at 218 per Menzies J. 103. (1890) LR 11 (NSW) Eq 134. 104. Brown v McEncroe (1890) LR 11 (NSW) Eq 134 at 147 per Owen CJ in Eq. 105. (1901) 1 SR (NSW) (B & P) 25 at 30. 106. [1929] SASR 256. 107. As to proof of wills in solemn form see G E Dal Pont and K F Mackie, Law of Succession, LexisNexis Butterworths, Australia, 2013, pp 326–9. 108. Cf WA O 66 r 9(1) (which provides that, in a probate action to which WA O 73 r 15 applies, ‘a party who only cross-examines the witnesses produced to support the will shall not be liable to pay the costs of the party propounding the will unless the Court considers that there was no reasonable ground for opposing the will’). 109. Re O’Donnell [1929] SASR 256 at 261. 110. (2010) 107 SASR 338; [2010] SASC 171; BC201003969. 111. (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 559. 112. Will of Elizabeth O’Driscoll (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 559 at 560.

113. Howell v Marsh (1906) 23 WN (NSW) 17 at 18 per Walker J. 114. Will of Millar [1908] VLR 682 at 684–5 per Hood J. Cf Peters v Peters (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 398 at 399 per Street J. 115. As to undue influence in the context of wills see G E Dal Pont and K F Mackie, Law of Succession, LexisNexis Butterworths, Australia, 2013, pp 53–8. 116. Kenny v Wilson (1911) 11 SR (NSW) 460 at 472 per Rich AJ; Wild v Plant [1926] P 139 at 151–2 per Scrutton LJ; Re Cutcliffe’s Estate [1959] P 6 at 21 per Hodson LJ; Becker v Public Trustee of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 1146; BC200608858 at [42]–[47] per Nicholas J; Wharton v Bancroft [2012] EWHC 91 (Ch) (indemnity costs awarded where the claim for undue influence was legally and factually weak). 117. Goodacre v Smith (1867) LR 1 P & D 359 at 362 per Wilde B; Estate of Osment [1914] P 129 at 133 per Evans P; Bool v Bool [1941] St R Qd 26 at 42 per Macrossan CJ (FC); Re Herbert Brothers (deceased) (1990) 101 FLR 279 at 303 per Gallop J, at 316 per Kearney J, at 320 per Martin J (CA(NT)); Roebuck v Smoje [2001] WASC 95; BC200101625 at [57]–[59] per Hasluck J. 118. (1918) 25 CLR 519; BC1800001. 119. See Dal Pont, pp 231–2. 120. Nock v Austin (1918) 25 CLR 519 at 529; BC1800001. 121. Daulizio v Trust Company of Australia [2005] VSCA 215; BC200506376 at [23] per Nettle JA. 122. [2003] VSC 381; BC200306780. 123. Trust Company of Australia Ltd v Daulizio (No 2) [2003] VSC 381; BC200306780 at [11]. 124. Daulizio v Trust Company of Australia [2005] VSCA 215; BC200506376 at [22] per Nettle JA. 125. Headington v Holloway (1830) 3 Hag Ecc 280 at 282; 162 ER 1158 at 1159 per Sir John Nicholl. 126. Re Keane (deceased) [1909] VLR 231 at 234 per Hodges J. 127. Re Keane (deceased) [1909] VLR 231 at 232 per Hodges J. 128. Boughton v Knight (1873) LR 3 P & D 64 at 77 per Sir J Hannen. See, for example, Rennie v Massie (1866) LR 1 P & D 118; Brown v Sandhurst Trustees Ltd (No 2) [2009] VSC 406; BC200908438 at [23]–[26] per Mandie J (executor ordered to pay costs because, at the time the proceeding challenging testamentary capacity was commenced, he should have realised the strength of the plaintiffs’ case). 129. (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 36 at 47. 130. Obiter in both Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v Watson (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 13 at 29 per Owen J and Cooke v Watson (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 36 at 46 per Walker J can be used to support this conclusion. 131. Will of Sabelberg (deceased) [1911] VLR 157 at 158 per Hodges J. 132. See, for example, Smith v Springford [2009] WTLR 705; [2007] EWHC 3446 (Ch). 133. Statutory wills refers to the statutory regime empowering a court to make wills for persons who lack testamentary capacity: Wills Act 1968 (ACT) ss 16A–16I; Succession Act 2006 (NSW) ss 18–26; Wills Act 2000 (NT) ss 19–26; Succession Act 1981 (Qld) ss 21–28; Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 7; Wills Act 2008 (Tas) ss 21–28, 39–41; Wills Act 2007 (Vic) ss 21–30; Wills Act 1970 (WA) ss 39–48.

‘Nil capacity’ cases are those where the person on whose behalf the application is made has lacked 134. mental capacity, either from birth or from an early age. ‘Lost capacity’ cases are those where the person in question once had testamentary capacity, but has, whether by reason of accident or medical condition, subsequently lost that capacity. See further G E Dal Pont and K F Mackie, Law of Succession, LexisNexis Butterworths, Australia, 2013, Ch 3. 135. See, for example, Hill v Hill [2001] VSC 135; BC200102509; Boulton v Sanders (No 2) [2003] VSC 409; BC200306152 (affd Boulton v Sanders (2004) 9 VR 495; [2004] VSCA 112; BC200403477). 136. Boulton v Sanders (2004) 9 VR 495; [2004] VSCA 112; BC200403477 at [153] per DoddsStreeton JA. 137. Boulton v Sanders (2004) 9 VR 495; [2004] SCA 112; BC200403477 at [154] per Dodds-Streeton JA. 138. Hill v Hill [2001] VSC 135; BC200102509 at [10] per Byrne J; Hoffmann v Walters (2007) 98 SASR 500; [2007] SASC 273; BC200705857 at [22]–[24] per Debelle J. 139. Hoffmann v Walters (2007) 98 SASR 500; [2007] SASC 273; BC200705857 at [25]. See also Re Will of Jane [2011] NSWSC 624; BC201105369 at [100] per Hallen AsJ. 140. See Family Provision Act 1969 (ACT); Succession Act 2006 (NSW) Pt 3.2; Family Provision Act 1970 (NT); Succession Act 1981 (Qld) Pt 4; Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA); Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 (Tas); Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) Pt IV; Family Provision Act 1972 (WA). As to law governing family provision generally see G E Dal Pont and K F Mackie, Law of Succession, LexisNexis Butterworths, Australia, 2013, Chs 15–20. 141. Tchadovitch v Tchadovitch [2010] NSWCA 316; BC201008883 at [3] per Allsop P. 142. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 56(1). 143. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 60. 144. See, for example, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M; Fam LR 2004 Pt 1.2; ACT r 21; Qld r 5; Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 7; WA O 1 r 4B(1)(a)–(d). 145. Jackson v Riley (SC(NSW), Cohen J, 24 February 1989, unreported) BC8902497 at 2. McMeekin J in Collett v Knox [2010] QSC 132; BC201003226 at [171] expressed his concurrence with these remarks. 146. Szlazko v Travini [2004] NSWSC 610; BC200404329 at [11]. See also Whitington v Whitington (No 2) [2009] SASC 178; BC200905646 at [33] per White J (‘It is especially important that those engaged in disputation about relatively small estates take a practical and reasonable approach to the resolution of their disputes’); Smith v Smith (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1105; BC201110923 at [77] per Hallen AsJ (‘I commend to parties involved in proceedings in which a family provision order is sought, that every effort, particularly in a relatively small estate, as this one is, to conduct negotiations frankly and openly, to try to resolve the proceedings, and if there are issues or concerns about an offer that has been made, to raise any issues at the first convenient opportunity with the offeror’s solicitors, so that any ambiguities, or other concerns, can be resolved’); Geoghegan v Szelid [2011] NSWSC 1440; BC201111017 at [21]–[26] per Hallen AsJ (lamenting the retention of senior counsel in litigation over a small estate). 147. See, for example, Collett v Knox [2010] QSC 132; BC201003226 at [171] per McMeekin J (who described as ‘worrying’ the way in which the litigation was conducted, in that, despite a modest estate being involved, a three-day trial was undertaken, principally on the issue of the plaintiff’s status to apply). See also P Vines, Bleak House Revisited? Disproportionality in Family Provision Estate Litigation in New South Wales and Victoria, AIJA, Melbourne, 2011 (finding that a high

level of disproportion remains in New South Wales and Victorian family provision litigation). 148. See, for example, Forsyth v Sinclair (No 2) (2010) 28 VR 635; [2010] VSCA 195; BC201005509 at [27] per the court. 149. See 7.42–7.47 (prospective), 7.48–7.49 (retrospective). 150. Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 99(1); Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA) s 9(8); Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 (Tas) s 3(1); Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) s 97(6); Family Provision Act 1972 (WA) s 14(6). 151. ACT r 1721; NT r 63.03(1); Qld r 681(1). 152. Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) s 97(7). 153. J Wade (Attorney-General), Second Reading Speech on the Wills Bill, Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 9 October 1997, p 436 (explained by reference to the need ‘[t]o ensure that only genuine applications are made’). See further G E Dal Pont and K F Mackie, Law of Succession, LexisNexis Butterworths, Australia, 2013, pp 526–9. 154. Coombes v Ward (No 2) [2002] VSC 84; BC200201249 at [13] per McDonald J; Bentley v Brennan (No 2) [2006] VSC 226; BC200604911 at [7] per Byrne J. 155. Bentley v Brennan (No 2) [2006] VSC 226; BC200604911 at [7] per Byrne J. 156. Forsyth v Sinclair (No 2) (2010) 28 VR 635; [2010] VSCA 195; BC201005509 at [27] per the court. 157. Milillo v Konnecke (2009) 2 ASTLR 235; [2009] NSWCA 109; BC200903916 at [127] per Ipp JA, with whom Macfarlan JA and Sackville AJA concurred. 158. Pizimolas v Pizimolas (No 2) [2010] SASC 209; BC201004890 at [17] per Kourakis J. As to the meaning of costs assessed on a ‘party and party’ basis see 16.14–16.17. 159. As to the meaning of the ‘indemnity basis’ see 16.23–16.31. 160. In the Will of Mailes [1908] VLR 269 at 270 per A’Beckett J; Re Bennett [1909] VLR 205 at 207 per A’Beckett J; In the Will and Codicils of Read (deceased) [1910] VLR 68 at 72 per A’Beckett J; Fiorentini v O’Neill (CA(NSW), Mason P, Handley JA and Fitzgerald AJA, 4 December 1998, unreported) BC9806451 at 19 per the court; Re Will of Sitch (deceased) (No 2) [2005] VSC 383; BC200507079 at [2] per Gillard J; Adkins v Adkins [2009] TASSC 32; BC200904245 at [6] per Tennent J. 161. The executor, as propounder of the will, is seen as representing the beneficiaries of the will, thereby obviating the need for the beneficiaries to be separately represented: Re Young [1968] NZLR 1178 at 1179 per Wilson J. Having said that, there is nothing to preclude one or more beneficiaries engaging separate representation, but in these circumstances it cannot be assumed that, should they prove unsuccessful, their entire costs will be borne by the estate. The reasonableness of engaging separate representation, in view of the role and position of the executor in the circumstances, will impact on whether (and to what extent) the beneficiaries’ costs may be payable from the estate. See 11.58. 162. Ray v Greenwell [2009] NSWSC 1197; BC200910027 at [16] per McLaughlin AsJ. See also Diver v Neal (2009) 2 ASTLR 89; [2009] NSWCA 54; BC200901634 at [80] per Basten JA, with whom Allsop P and Ipp JA concurred. 163. See, for example, Re McGoun [1910] VLR 153; Re Sharp [1923] St R Qd 102; Re Nielsen [1968] Qd R 221; Krause v Sinclair [1983] 1 VR 73. 164. Fiorentini v O’Neill (CA(NSW), Mason P, Handley JA and Fitzgerald AJA, 4 December 1998,

unreported) BC9806451 at 20 per the court. 165. See 10.43–10.45. 166. [2010] NSWSC 705; BC201004577 at [32]–[35]. 167. The applicant had filed affidavits from a number of other witnesses going to her relationship with her mother (the deceased), which were of marginal relevance. Ball J remarked that, having regard to the (small) size of the estate and the strength of the applicant’s claim, the costs of obtaining them are not costs for which the estate should be liable: Jeffery v Guider [2010] NSWSC 705; BC201004577 at [33]. 168. Fiorentini v O’Neill (CA(NSW), Mason P, Handley JA and Fitzgerald AJA, 4 December 1998, unreported) BC9806451 at 20 per the court; Diver v Neal (2009) 2 ASTLR 89; [2009] NSWCA 54; BC200901634 at [80] per Basten JA, with whom Allsop P and Ipp JA concurred. 169. (2009) 4 ASTLR 150; [2009] QSC 107; BC200903633 at [33]. 170. [1999] NSWSC 227; BC9901163 at [76]. 171. [2009] TASSC 62; BC200907215 at [23]. 172. See, for example, the following older cases where unsuccessful applicants were refused costs out of the estate: Re Maslin [1908] VLR 641; Re Testator’s Family Maintenance Acts (1916) 12 Tas LR 11; Re Chapman [1918] St R Qd 226; Re Roberts [1919] VLR 125; Re Kennedy [1920] VLR 513; Re Richardson [1920] SALR 24; Re McCreedy [1938] St R Qd 293. The shift has ostensibly been more recent in the United Kingdom, where in 1981 Ormrod LJ noted that, where the estate is small, the onus on an applicant ‘is very heavy indeed and these applications ought not to be launched unless there is (or there appears to be) a real chance of success, because the result of these proceedings simply diminishes the estate and is a great hardship on the beneficiaries if they are ultimately successful in litigation’, and for that reason ‘judges should reconsider the practice of ordering the costs of both sides in these cases to be paid out of the estate’: Re Fullard (deceased) [1982] Fam 42 at 46. 173. See 10.35–10.37. 174. See the discussion in Bowyer v Wood (2007) 99 SASR 190; [2007] SASC 327; BC200707701 at [64]–[68] per Debelle J, with whom Nyland and Anderson JJ concurred. See, for example, Kimberley v Butcher [2001] WASC 118; BC200102523; Lacey v Public Trustee [2010] NTSC 1; BC201000006; Bowditch v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2012] NSWSC 702; BC201204623. 175. Nicholls v Hall (2009) 2 ASTLR 419; [2007] NSWCA 356; BC200710898 at [57] per the court. 176. Nicholls v Hall (2009) 2 ASTLR 419; [2007] NSWCA 356; BC200710898 at [57] per the court (although not endorsing or disendorsing the apparent change of practice, as the point did not arise for consideration before the court). 177. In Carey v Robson (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 1199; BC200910083 at [20] Palmer J opined that the New South Wales practice reflects the policy embodied in s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) that ‘litigation must be conducted responsibly and should only be commenced by a plaintiff after careful evaluation of the costs consequences likely to attend failure’. His Honour added (at [21]) that the view that ‘there was little risk, and probably a lot to be gained, in making a claim, however tenuous, because even if the claim failed, the claimant would very likely get his or her costs out of the estate’ is one that ‘should be recognised, once and for all, as thoroughly discredited’. Now see also Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt VB; Fam LR 2004 Pt 1.2; ACT r 21; Qld r 5; Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) Ch 2; WA O 1 r 4B. 178. Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) s 97(7).

179. Re Will of Sitch (deceased) (No 2) [2005] VSC 383; BC200507079 at [4] per Gillard J. Even without a statutory provision to this effect, in South Australia it has been observed that ‘the court may in its discretion order an unsuccessful applicant to pay costs where the claim was frivolous or vexatious or made with no reasonable prospects of success or where the applicant has been guilty of some improper conduct in the course of the proceedings’: Bowyer v Wood (2007) 99 SASR 190; [2007] SASC 327; BC200707701 at [68] per Debelle J, with whom Nyland and Anderson JJ concurred. See also Jones v Jones [2012] QSC 342; BC201209439 at [36] per McMeekin J (who noted that Debelle J’s analysis in Bowyer, albeit in obiter, reflects the approach in Queensland over a long period, except that there is now more weight given to the expectation that parties will endeavour to resolve disputes exemplified by the philosophy in Qld r 5). 180. Re Carn [2011] VSC 275; BC201102601 at [29] per Gardiner AsJ; Webb v Ryan (No 2) [2012] VSC 431; BC201207161 at [38] per Whelan J. 181. See, for example, Re Bodman [1972] Qd R 281 (where Hoare J remarked that, although the application failed, ‘in the particular circumstances of this case especially having regard to the strong moral obligation of the deceased towards [the applicant], I order that his costs, including reserved costs, be taxed as between solicitor and client and paid out of the residuary estate of the deceased’: at 288); Re Klease [1972] QWN 44 (where Hoare J again ordered that unsuccessful applicants have their costs paid out of the estate because ‘there was this moral obligation in their favour and the applicants could not be said to be unreasonable’). 182. See, for example, Carey v Robson (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 1199; BC200910083 (discussed at 10.41); Dawson v Joyner (No 2) [2012] QSC 24; BC201200602. 183. See, for example, Coombes v Ward (No 2) [2002] VSC 84; BC200201249 (where McDonald J found that ‘there were real questions of fact and law to be determined’, so that ‘[i]t cannot be said … that the application of the plaintiff was so untenable that it could not possibly succeed or that it was groundless and bound to fail’ (at [17]), and that ‘if an order for costs was made against the [unsuccessful] plaintiff it would have an extremely detrimental effect on his financial position’ (at [19]); but as the plaintiff was unsuccessful, when coupled to the (small) nature and size of the estate, ‘justice does not require or dictate that the estate of the deceased should bear the plaintiff’s costs of the proceedings’ (at [20])); Bentley v Brennan (No 2) [2006] VSC 226; BC200604911 at [9]–[12] per Byrne J (who described the case as ‘not a case of which it can be confidently be [sic] said, that it ought not to have been brought’ (at [9]), where the applicant was impecunious); Harkness v Harkness (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 35; BC201203038 (where the plaintiff’s case failed on eligibility but otherwise had merit, Hallen AsJ made no order for costs against her in view of the fact that she was unemployed and suffering bipolar affective disorder: at [21]–[23]). 184. Re Sherborne Estate (No 2) (2005) 65 NSWLR 268; [2005] NSWSC 1003; BC200507645 at [64] per Palmer J. See also Jvancich v Kennedy (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 397; BC200407396 at [11] per Giles JA, with whom Handley JA and McColl JA concurred (noting that ‘proceedings of this kind involve elements of judgment and discretion beyond those at work in most inter partes litigation’); Webb v Ryan (No 2) [2012] VSC 431; BC201207161 at [37] per Whelan J (‘Family provision cases are different to other civil cases in some respects. By their nature, they can be more difficult to predict’). 185. [2010] NSWSC 359; BC201002556 at [26]. 186. [2010] NSWSC 889; BC201005697 at [24] per Ball J. Cf Savic v Kim [2010] NSWSC 1401; BC201009735 at [169]–[170] per Hallen AsJ (who, ‘with some hesitation’, made no order for costs against the applicants, the reason for hesitation being that the applicants should have been aware, or should have been made aware, of the nature and value of the deceased’s estate at the time the proceedings were commenced, and of the very significant obligation owed by the

deceased to the defendant; what ultimately swayed his Honour was that, had the estate been larger, the applicants’ claims might well have succeeded). 187. A point recognised by Ball J in Bartkus v Bartkus [2010] NSWSC 889; BC201005697 at [24]. 188. Wentworth v Wentworth (1995) 37 NSWLR 703 at 729; BC9505254. 189. [2009] NSWSC 1199; BC200910083. 190. Carey v Robson (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 1199; BC200910083 at [10] per Palmer J. 191. Carey v Robson (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 1199; BC200910083 at [11]. See also Re Carn [2011] VSC 275; BC201102601 at [48] per Gardiner AsJ (who, in making a costs order against the unsuccessful applicant, remarked that the claim when considered objectively had no reasonable prospects of success). 192. Koorneef v Lewkowicz [2001] ACTSC 81; BC200104647 at [10]–[11] per Miles CJ. 193. See 11.52–11.58. 194. Re C White (deceased) (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 178 at 178 per Harvey CJ in Eq. 195. (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 178. 196. Re C White (deceased) (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 178 at 179. 197. See 10.32. 198. See 10.33–10.41. 199. As to these court rules generally see 13.3–13.39. 200. See Kimberley v Butcher [2001] WASC 118; BC200102523 at [7] per Sanderson M. As to the relevant statutory provisions see 10.32. 201. As to Calderbank offers generally see 13.55–13.86. 202. See, for example, Dawson v Joyner (No 2) [2012] QSC 24; BC201200602. 203. Outside of the family provision scenario see, for example, Re Estate of Gray (No 2) [2010] VSC 269; BC201004093 at [21] per Daly AsJ (in the context of executors’ costs of an application for commission). 204. Re Sherborne Estate (No 2) (2005) 65 NSWLR 268; [2005] NSWSC 1003; BC200507645 at [56] per Palmer J. 205. Fiorentini v O’Neill (CA(NSW), Mason P, Handley JA and Fitzgerald AJA, 4 December 1998, unreported) BC9806451 at 20 per the court. 206. [2011] NTSC 21; BC201101283. See also Re Will of Sitch (deceased) (No 2) [2005] VSC 383; BC200507079 (as the terms of the offer proved more favourable than the outcome secured by the successful applicant, Gillard J directed the latter to pay part of the estate’s costs: at [17]). Cf Koorneef v Lewkowicz [2001] ACTSC 81; BC200104647 (where Miles CJ made an indemnity costs order against the plaintiffs regarding costs incurred after the date of the rejection of the Calderbank offer: at [15]). 207. Edgar v Public Trustee for the Northern Territory [2011] NTSC 21; BC201101283 at [20]. 208. Pursuant to NT r 63.26. 209. [2005] TASSC 102; BC200507799. 210. Woolnough v Public Trustee (No 2) [2005] TASSC 102; BC200507799 at [13].

211. ACT r 1730; NT r 63.19; Qld r 696; Tas r 64; Vic r 63.21; WA O 66 r 4(3). 212. See, for example, Re Vincent [1909] 1 Ch 810 at 814 per Parker J (giving effect to the testator’s wishes dictated that the costs of the inquiry should come out of the residue). 213. ACT r 709. 214. Perkins v Williams (1905) 22 WN (NSW) 107; Re Grazebrook [1928] VLR 212 at 213 per Lowe J. 215. Sheil v Doneley (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 60 at 64 per A H Simpson CJ in Eq. 216. (1845) 8 Beav 489 at 493; 50 ER 192 at 194 per Lord Langdale MR. 217. Ex parte Angerstein (1874) LR 9 Ch App 479 at 479–80 per Mellish LJ; Re Staffordshire Gas and Coke Co [1893] 3 Ch 523 at 526–7 per Kekewich J; Re London Metallurgical Co [1895] 1 Ch 758 at 768 per Vaughan Williams J; Trustees of the Property of Sandor (a bankrupt) v Ramirez [1999] NSWCA 261; BC9905624 at [72], [73] per Sheller JA; Citibank Ltd v Parker (2000) 181 ALR 115; [2000] FCA 1914; BC200008055 at [6], [7] per Tamberlin J; Sheikholeslami v Tolcher (No 2) [2012] FCA 199; BC201201083 at [11] per Yates J. 218. See, for example, Scott Fell v Lloyd (1911) 13 CLR 230 at 244; BC1100001 per Griffith CJ; Hunter v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy of the Southern District of the State of Queensland (1980) 50 FLR 168 at 174–6 (FC(FCA)) (both cases involving the Official Receiver). 219. Adsett v Berlouis (1992) 37 FCR 201 at 210–12; BC9203637 (FC); R E Cooper, ‘Duties of Trustees in Bankruptcy: Their Right to Indemnity and Remuneration’ (1993) 11 Aust Bar Rev 54 at 56–7. 220. Adsett v Berlouis (1992) 37 FCR 201 at 212; BC9203637 (FC). 221. Re London Metallurgical Co [1895] 1 Ch 758 at 768 per Vaughan Williams J. 222. Donnelly v Edelsten (1994) 49 FCR 384 at 395; BC9405840. 223. Trustees of the Property of Sandor (a bankrupt) v Ramirez [1999] NSWCA 261; BC9905624 at [74] per Sheller JA, with whom Meagher and Beazley JJA agreed. 224. Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 139(1). 225. (2000) 181 ALR 115; [2000] FCA 1914; BC200008055. See also Re Wedgwood (1993) 116 ALR 153 at 161–2; BC9304932 per Cooper J; Re Pearson (1993) 46 FCR 55; BC9305096 (trustee ordered to pay costs of notice set aside upon a finding that the transfer challenged was not void as against the trustee); Norton v Halse (trustee of bankrupt estate of Payne) (1996) 137 ALR 593; BC9602149; Terry v Official Receiver (FCA, Cooper J, 18 September 1998, unreported) BC9805649 (Official Receiver ordered to pay costs of a notice set aside on the ground of formal defects). 226. The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 477(2)(a) specifically empowers a liquidator to ‘bring or defend any legal proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company’. 227. See generally G J Hamilton, ‘Aspects of Official Liquidators’ Personal Liability for Costs of Litigation’ (1989) 7 CSLJ 262 (Pt I), 301 (Pt II). 228. Re Buena Vista Motors Pty Ltd (in liq) [1971] 1 NSWLR 72 at 75 per Street J; Re Wilson Lovatt & Sons Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 274 at 278–9 per Oliver J; Irons v Merchant Capital Ltd (1994) 116 FLR 204 at 209–10 per Young J (SC(NSW)); Healy Airconditioning Pty Ltd v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 21 ACLC 866; [2003] WASC 78; BC200301659 at [8] per Sanderson M. 229. Re Tokenhouse Investments [1934] St R Qd 189 at 198 per Blair CJ, at 198 per Webb J (FC).

230. See 29.53–29.55. 231. See 22.40–22.42. 232. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588FF(1), which empowers the court to make orders about voidable transactions ‘on the application of a company’s liquidator’. This has been interpreted to mean that the liquidator is the plaintiff: Olsen v Nodcad Pty Ltd (1999) 32 ACSR 118; [1999] NSWSC 364; BC9901896. See further G J Hamilton, ‘Aspects of Official Liquidators’ Personal Liability for Costs of Litigation’ (Pt I) (1989) 7 CSLJ 262 at 263–8. 233. See 29.53–29.55. 234. [1977] 1 All ER 274 at 285. See also Re Staffordshire Gas & Coke Co [1893] 3 Ch 523 at 526 per Kekewich J; Re Tokenhouse Investments [1934] St R Qd 189 at 199 per Webb J (FC); Re Buena Vista Motors Pty Ltd (in liq) [1971] 1 NSWLR 72 at 75 per Street J; Re Speedfix Building Products Pty Ltd (in liq) (1987) 11 ACLR 863 at 864 per Weld M (SC(Qld)); Ferrier v Civil Aviation Authority (FCA, Lockhart J, 24 March 1994, unreported) BC9405882 at 6–8; Metalloy Supplies Ltd (in liq) v MA (UK) Ltd [1997] 1 All ER 418 at 425 per Millett LJ; Bell Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1998) 16 ACLC 65 at 68; BC9706463 per Templeman J (SC(WA)). 235. Re Silver Valley Mines (1882) 21 Ch D 381 at 392 per Cotton LJ; Re Buena Vista Motors Pty Ltd (in liq) [1971] 1 NSWLR 72 at 76 per Street J; Re Speedfix Building Products Pty Ltd (in liq) (1987) 11 ACLR 863 at 864 per Weld M (SC(Qld)); Adsett v Berlouis (1992) 37 FCR 201 at 211; BC9203637 (FC); Metalloy Supplies Ltd (in liq) v MA (UK) Ltd [1997] 1 All ER 418 at 425 per Millett LJ; Bell Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1998) 16 ACLC 65 at 69; BC9706463 per Templeman J (SC(WA)); Jenkins v Jonkay Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 858; BC200705915 at [9] per Finkelstein J. In Queensland the practice is to allow relevant stakeholders in the company to challenge the liquidator’s claim to the indemnity: Re Newark Pty Ltd (in liq) [1993] 1 Qd R 409 at 420 per Thomas J (FC); Belar Pty Ltd (in liq) v Mahaffey [2000] 1 Qd R 477; [1999] QCA 2; BC9900153 at [36] per the court. 236. See, for example, Kassem v Zhang [2008] NSWSC 1287; BC200810789 at [25]–[28] per Barrett J. 237. Bell Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1998) 16 ACLC 65 at 70–1; BC9706463 per Templeman J (SC(WA)). 238. Re Staffordshire Gas and Coke Co [1893] 3 Ch 523 at 526 per Kekewich J; Re Speedfix Building Products Pty Ltd (in liq) (1987) 11 ACLR 863 at 864 per Weld M (SC(Qld)). 239. The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 556(1) prescribes the relevant order of priority. 240. Ex parte Angerstein (1874) 9 Ch App 479; Ramirez v Sandor’s Trustee (No 2) (SC(NSW), Young J, 23 October 1997, unreported) BC9705824 at 3 (affd Trustees of the Property of Sandor (a bankrupt) v Ramirez [1999] NSWCA 261; BC9905624 at [71]–[76] per Sheller JA). 241. Re London Metallurgical Co [1895] 1 Ch 758 at 768 per Vaughan Williams J; Star v Silvia (No 2) (SC(NSW), Young J, 14 September 1994, unreported) at 5. As to indemnities from creditors in this context see G J Hamilton, ‘Aspects of Official Liquidators’ Personal Liability for Costs of Litigation’ (Pt II) (1989) 7 C&SLJ 301 at 301–3. 242. [1977] 1 All ER 274 at 285. See also Re Tokenhouse Investments [1934] St R Qd 189 at 198 per Webb J (FC); Cuthbertson & Richards Sawmills Pty Ltd v Thomas (No 2) [1999] FCA 1789; BC9908479 at [9] (FC); Silvia v Brodyn Pty Ltd (2007) 25 ACLC 385; [2007] NSWCA 55; BC200702048 at [52] per Hodgson JA. 243. Fugen Industrial Co Ltd v Melsom (1994) 12 ACSR 749 at 755–6 per Bredmeyer M (SC(WA)); Hypec Electronics Pty Ltd (in liq) v Mead (2004) 61 NSWLR 169; [2004] NSWSC 731;

BC200405114 at [86]–[90] per Campbell J; Silvia v Brodyn Pty Ltd (2007) 25 ACLC 385; [2007] NSWCA 55; BC200702048 at [53] per Hodgson JA; Re Mendarma Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) (2007) 61 ACSR 601; [2007] NSWSC 99; BC200701685 at [23]–[32] per White J (remarking that this practice ‘is a sound one which should be followed in a case where the liquidator is joined as defendant and has acted appropriately’: at [32]). Although case authority suggests that the court may, in the alternative, order that costs of the successful applicant be paid by the company, which is not a party to the proceedings (Re Bonang Gold Mining Co Ltd (1893) 14 LR (NSW) Eq 262 at 278 per Manning J; Hypec Electronics Pty Ltd (in liq) v Mead (2004) 61 NSWLR 169; [2004] NSWSC 731 at [88] per Campbell J), this presupposes that the case is one amenable to a non-party costs order (as to which see Ch 22). 244. [2001] NSWSC 809. See also Mead v Watson (2005) 23 ACLC 718; [2005] NSWCA 133; Silvia v Brodyn Pty Ltd (2007) 25 ACLC 385; [2007] NSWCA 55; BC200702048 at [78], [79] per Hodgson JA (in the context of an administrator who had acted unreasonably in dealing with the respondent’s proof of debt: see 10.59–10.60). 245. Fugen Industrial Co Ltd v Melsom (1994) 12 ACSR 749 at 756–7 per Bredmeyer M (SC(WA)). 246. City & Suburban Pty Ltd v Smith (FCA, Merkel J, 31 July 1998, unreported) BC9803676 at 3–5, applying the principles from Adsett v Berlouis (1992) 37 FCR 201; BC9203637 (FC) applicable to trustees-in-bankruptcy. 247. Re Biposo Pty Ltd (No 3) (1995) 17 ACSR 730 at 739; BC9505186 per Young J (SC(NSW)); Kirwan v Cresvale Far East Ltd (in liq) (2002) 44 ACSR 21; [2002] NSWCA 395; BC200207448 at [259] per Giles JA, [430]–[434], [445] per Young CJ in Eq. 248. See, for example, Re Biposo Pty Ltd (No 3) (1995) 17 ACSR 730; BC9505186 (SC(NSW)) (where Young J held that, although the conduct of the liquidation was somewhat amateurish and not to be commended, the liquidators had not behaved in a fashion sufficiently ‘odious’ to justify denying them an indemnity for their costs of the action for removal: at 740); SingTel Optus Pty Ltd v Weston [2012] NSWSC 1002; BC201206877 (where, although the defendant’s conduct during the liquidation amounted to serious errors of judgment, Bergin CJ in Eq was ‘not satisfied that the way in which the defendant conducted the defence to the removal proceedings was improper or unreasonable such that he should be refused access to the indemnity in respect of the agreed costs orders’: at [31]; note also her Honour’s remarks (at [12]–[14]) regarding the relevant threshold for denying an indemnity to a liquidator). 249. City & Suburban Pty Ltd v Smith (FCA, Merkel J, 31 July 1998, unreported) BC9803676 at 5. 250. Re Biposo Pty Ltd (No 3) (1995) 17 ACSR 730 at 739–40; BC9505186 per Young J (SC(NSW)). 251. Farrow Finance Co Ltd (in liq) v ANZ Executors and Trustee Co Ltd (1997) 23 ACSR 521 at 526; BC9700163 per Hansen J (SC(Vic)). The same has been held to apply in respect of administrators (see 10.59–10.60): Re Ansett Australia Ltd (all admins apptd) (2002) 41 ACSR 598 at 603; [2002] VSC 114; BC200201750 per Warren J. Cf BE Australia WD Pty Ltd v Sutton (2011) 285 ALR 532; [2011] NSWCA 414; BC201110353 at [214] per Campbell JA, with whom McColl JA concurred. 252. (1981) 6 ACLR 39 (SC(NSW)). 253. (1994) 49 FCR 334; BC9405684. 254. Australian Securities Commission v Melbourne Asset Management Nominees Pty Ltd (receiver and manager appointed) (1994) 49 FCR 334 at 366; BC9405684. See also Farrow Finance Co Ltd (in liq) v ANZ Executors and Trustee Co Ltd (1997) 23 ACSR 521 at 527–8; BC9700163 per Hansen J (SC(Vic)) (in a case where no party raised a multitude of unsuccessful issues that

required detailed evidence and considerable time, and each party was a ‘proper contradictor’ to the liquidator’s stated position, costs were ordered out of company funds); Gothard v Davey (No 2) (2011) 277 ALR 172; [2011] FCA 59; BC201100358 at [21] per Edmonds J; Re Sullivans Cove IXL Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] TASSC 53; BC201107675 at [15] per Crawford CJ. 255. See, for example, Re New Cap Reinsurance Corporation Holdings Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1001; BC200106853 at [12]–[13] per Santow J. 256. Robertson v Oskar [1984] WAR 376 at 378 per Kennedy J. 257. See 22.43–22.45. 258. As to which see 10.3–10.7. 259. See, for example, Cape v Redarb Pty Ltd (receiver and manager appointed) (1992) 107 FLR 362 at 388 per Higgins J (SC(ACT)). 260. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 442A(c). 261. Silvia v Brodyn Pty Ltd (2007) 25 ACLC 385; [2007] NSWCA 55; BC200702048 at [55] per Hodgson JA. 262. See, for example, Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 41 ACSR 58 at 63–4; [2002] NSWSC 127; BC200200790 per Austin J (affd Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 328; BC200205647 at [262] per Heydon JA) (where administrators were denied the right of indemnity from company assets for costs incurred in the litigation where it was established that the administrators knew that they had been appointed by the directors of the company for an improper purpose, but were ultimately indemnified by a costs order made against the directors of the company in favour of the administrators). 263. See generally in respect of liquidators and receivers 22.40–22.42. 264. Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 41 ACSR 58 at 62; [2002] NSWSC 127; BC200200790 per Austin J (affd Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 328; BC200205647 at [262] per Heydon JA).

[page 309]

CHAPTER 11

Costs of Multiple Parties Joint and Several Liability for Costs of Multiple Parties General rule Exceptions to general rule Discretion to make apportionment Separate defences and claims Plaintiff not successful against all defendants Offers to contribute to costs by co-defendants

11.2 11.2 11.3 11.3 11.5 11.8 11.10

Bullock and Sanderson Orders Definition Choice between Bullock and Sanderson order Terminology Jurisdiction Rationale Discretion to make order Reasonableness of joinder Conduct of defendants Application to independent and separate causes of action Extent of recovery from unsuccessful defendant

11.12 11.12 11.13 11.16 11.17 11.18 11.20 11.21 11.23 11.28 11.29

Third Party Procedure Costs in third party procedure Jurisdiction

11.32 11.33 11.33

Plaintiff successful Plaintiff unsuccessful

11.34 11.35

Interveners Intervention Costs of intervener General costs principles Probate cases Admiralty actions Intervention by Attorney-General Family law cases

11.40 11.40 11.42 11.42 11.44 11.45 11.46 11.49

Parties with Parallel Interests Separate representation Concurrent conflict of interest Only one set of costs allowed

11.51 11.52 11.53 11.55 [page 310]

Multiple sets of costs allowed Application in the context of attempts to propound or upset testamentary documents Representative proceedings Federal Court, New South Wales and Victorian statutory initiatives Lawyer-client costs agreements in representative proceedings Costs as damages from cross-defendants and third parties Separate sets of proceedings heard together

11.57 11.58 11.59 11.60 11.62 11.63 11.64

11.1 This chapter brings together the costs consequences of proceedings where multiple parties are involved. It commences with a discussion of the basic tenet that persons ordered to pay costs are jointly and severally liable for those costs, and identifies exceptions to this rule.1 An exception that merits separate and lengthier treatment is the court’s power to oust the general rule that a plaintiff successful against one defendant but not against another must pay the costs of the successful defendant (via what are known as Bullock and Sanderson orders).2 What follows is the treatment of costs stemming from the third party procedure,3 and the costs consequences of interveners in proceedings.4 The chapter concludes by focusing on costs allowable in proceedings involving litigants with the same or similar interests to pursue or defend.5

Joint and Several Liability for Costs of Multiple Parties General rule 11.2 As a general rule, where a court orders that costs be paid by two or more persons (whether defendants or plaintiffs, or even third parties or nonparties), the costs liability is joint and several.6 It follows that the costs order can be enforced against those persons jointly or against any of them separately. For example, if one of two parties made jointly liable for costs absconds, dies or becomes insolvent, the costs order may be enforced against the other [page 311] party.7 Were the law otherwise, it would imperil a basic principle of the law of costs, the costs indemnity rule.8 As the successful litigant is prima facie entitled to its costs of the action, he or she should not, it is reasoned, lose out if one of the parties against whom the costs order is made cannot or will not meet its share of the costs burden.9 A consequence of joint and several liability for costs is that a person who

discharges a costs liability can seek contribution from others who are jointly liable to meet that liability. The issue of contribution — that of determining the relative responsibility for costs between those against whom the order is made — is a matter to be dealt with as between them rather than one that rests in the party who is awarded costs.10

Exceptions to general rule Discretion to make apportionment 11.3 It should not be assumed, however, that courts slavishly apply the general rule. In various instances, the chief ones being discussed below, the court may apportion costs as between the persons liable rather than expect them to apportion inter se. This reflects no more than the courts’ general costs discretion,11 which is not to be fettered by inflexible (or even general) rules.12 In this context, the relevant inquiry is whether it is just in the circumstances to order that particular defendant(s) pay a set proportion of the costs of a successful plaintiff.13 For instance, where the defendants’ liability ‘depends on a common substratum of fact’, it [page 312] may well be just to exercise the costs discretion in line with the general (joint and several liability) rule.14 If, conversely, justice dictates that one of several defendants should pay the costs of all parties, the court may order that defendant to pay direct to the codefendants.15 But such an order is unusual,16 and is not made in a case where the defendants are equally liable to the plaintiff.17 The following remarks of Pagone J are useful in understanding the judicial approach to apportionment:18 A pragmatic, albeit inexact, measure for apportioning costs between parties on the basis of the number of parties may not always be appropriate or fair, but in many cases it may well be appropriate and fair in the interest of producing finality of dispute between the parties. The discretionary nature of costs orders may permit a less rigorous apportionment of costs as between different parties than might be required when determining the apportionment of liability to reflect fault or causation. The apportionment of costs between parties should bear

some relationship to the part played by the parties in the overall proceeding however imprecise that relationship must be in any given case. A measure based upon the number of parties (with appropriate adjustments where two or more parties should be considered as in effect one) may be inexact but is rational. Similarly, a measure that apportions the costs against the quantum recovered from each contributor to the overall settlement proceeds (if the costs component can be excised from the settlement figures) would also be appropriate where the facts allow and would also be rational, albeit imprecise.

11.4 A court may, where in separate actions two or more plaintiffs sue the one defendant, or the one plaintiff sues multiple defendants, leave it to the taxing officer or costs assessor to apportion the costs between the various actions.19 In this event, and also where the court itself apportions by reference to time or specific tasks, it is desirable that sufficient directions be given to enable the apportionment.20

Separate defences and claims 11.5 The courts acknowledge scope for a joint and several liability for costs to be disturbed to the extent that a defendant conducts a separate and distinct defence that incurs costs not attributable to the joint conduct in defending the action.21 So if one of two (or more) defendants delivers a separate defence, and this causes the ultimately successful plaintiff to [page 313] incur additional costs, it is open to the court to order that that defendant alone be liable for those extra costs. This occurred in Stumm v Dixon & Co,22 which involved an action in tort against two defendants, who jointly pleaded payment into court only. The plaintiff, in his reply, denied the sufficiency of the payment. Then one of the defendants obtained leave to add a separate defence that denied liability to the plaintiff completely. At trial a verdict was given against both defendants for an amount exceeding the sum paid into court. Lord Esher MR held that to cast on the defendant who did not lodge a separate defence joint liability for the costs of that separate defence would, in the circumstances, ‘be absolutely contrary to natural justice’.23 As a result, his Lordship held that the defendant who had delivered the separate defence was alone liable for the costs occasioned to the plaintiff by and in consequence of the separate pleading.

11.6 Yet it should not be assumed that the above reveals an inflexible or even general rule,24 notwithstanding the ostensibly unyielding terms in which Lord Esher MR expressed his opinion.25 The other judge in Stumm v Dixon & Co, Fry LJ, dissented, identifying the general as ‘that at law all the defendants to an action are jointly and severally liable for all costs awarded against the defendants, even though one defendant may have severed his defence’.26 The true rule may lie somewhere in between the two. The unfettered costs discretion conferred by statute on superior courts militates against the prescription of a set rule in the Lord Esher mould. At the same time, considerations of justice dictate that the fact that one of two unsuccessful defendants puts forward a separate defence is hardly irrelevant to the proper exercise of that discretion. This balances legitimate interests of a successful plaintiff to secure an indemnity for costs against those of a defendant who, in justice, should not be liable for those costs incurred to address a defence to which he or she was not a party. It is, moreover, consistent with the impact the law accords for costs purposes to success or failure on various issues in a case.27 In Probiotec Ltd v University of Melbourne,28 for instance, the Full Federal Court preferred to eschew any ‘rule of law’ in this context, Rares J outright denying any rule of the kind asserted by Lord Esher MR. Besanko J opined that Lord Esher’s observations ‘should not be taken to limit the matters which may be considered to whether or not one of the unsuccessful [defendants] has filed a separate defence’.29 As it transpired on the facts, the court did oust the joint and several liability of defendants. It ruled that a party (‘Probiotec’) that filed a defence denying infringement of a patent and also its validity, but took no other steps except to comply with orders for discovery, should not bear the full costs incurred by the successful plaintiff when the proceedings were actively defended by other parties (the ‘NSI parties’). Rares J, with whom Finn J concurred, noted the marked difference between the positions of the NSI parties, as active protagonists, and Probiotec, which had taken no active part in argument or in the conduct of the proceeding. The costs that the plaintiff incurred were due largely to its contest with the NSI parties in which Probiotec took no part. As a result, Probiotec should not, in [page 314]

justice, bear the whole burden of costs.30 The court ordered Probiotec to pay 10 per cent of the plaintiff’s costs. 11.7 An equivalent approach applies to claims by a successful defendant against a specific plaintiff where multiple plaintiffs initiated the proceedings. In Gove v Black,31 for example, Templeman J accepted that where a successful defendant has incurred costs in relation to a specific plaintiff (that is, costs that have not been duplicated), it is unfair to burden the other plaintiffs with the payment of those additional costs. This occurred on the facts, which led his Honour to order that the plaintiffs be jointly and severally liable for costs that were common to their actions, but liable individually for costs relating specifically to individual actions. Again, no unyielding rule applies, but the exercise of a judicial discretion informed by the justice of each case.

Plaintiff not successful against all defendants 11.8 The general rule assumes that a plaintiff has been successful against all defendants, and so can enforce a costs order against those defendants jointly or severally. But where the plaintiff does not succeed against each defendant, costs usually follow the event; the plaintiff pays the successful defendant’s costs, but receives an order for costs incurred in suing the unsuccessful defendant.32 A defendant, it is reasoned, should not be required to pay more than one set of costs merely because he or she proves unsuccessful. The partially successful plaintiff cannot look to each of the unsuccessful defendants for more than an equal proportionate share of the costs not solely referable to his or her claim against one or other of the defendants individually, in addition to the costs that are so referable.33 The position is arguably different where multiple plaintiffs sue by the one lawyer, and not all succeed. In this case, a successful plaintiff may recover all his or her costs from the defendant, whereas unsuccessful plaintiffs must pay the defendant’s costs as occasioned by their having been joined unless the court otherwise orders.34 11.9 The ‘costs follow the event’ general rule has been subjected to two qualifications in this context. The first remains part of the modern law — ‘Bullock’ and ‘Sanderson’ orders — and is discussed separately in view of its relevance and importance.35 The second reflects the previous Chancery

practice, and retains only historical significance. It is known as the rule in Kelly’s Directories,36 which has been cited as authority for the following proposition:37 Where one defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs and the action is dismissed against the other defendant, the unsuccessful defendant must, in the absence of a special order, pay the

[page 315] whole of the plaintiff’s costs, and is not entitled to any deduction on account of the joinder of the successful defendant …

In Dimos v Willetts38 Ormiston JA branded the above proposition as too wide, stating that at most Byrne J in Kelly’s Directories determined no more than that a plaintiff who succeeds in a Chancery suit against one defendant, but not against another who receives no order for payment of its costs, is ordinarily entitled to an order for the costs of the proceeding comprehending all costs necessarily and properly incurred in bringing the proceedings against both defendants. His Honour added that even if the practice so described could be seen to extend to cases where the successful defendant obtained an order for costs, it should be seen as confined to proceedings in the Chancery Division. In the courts of law the ‘costs follow the event’ rule applied, which practice on this issue was accepted as prevailing over the Chancery practice. Ormiston JA explained the point as follows:39 It would be wrong to adapt a decision in the Chancery Division based on very particular circumstances to all litigation with more than one defendant. It was, in the first place, a decision where the successful defendant on the merits, in the sense that no order was obtained against it, did not obtain an order for its own costs. More importantly it was decided at the time when Chancery orders as to costs were spelled out in detail as a matter of practice seemingly derived from the Chancery rule that all costs were in the discretion of the Court. Although that became and remains the general rule both in England and Victoria, the common law practice of ordinarily ordering costs to follow the event underlies the exercise of the discretion in most cases. All orders of this Court should be read accordingly.

Thus Ormiston JA treated the so-called rule in Kelly’s Directories as obsolete, whatever its original justification.40 His Honour added that it would be preferable in cases where no order for costs in favour of a successful defendant is made41 to precisely state the ambit of any costs orders made whenever other defendants are separately represented (or are unrepresented).42 The ruling in Dimos v Willetts should not, however, be

interpreted as denying a judge the power to grant the plaintiff all its costs against the unsuccessful defendant, including those relating solely to suing the successful defendant, for such a power remains in the form of a Bullock or Sanderson order.43

Offers to contribute to costs by co-defendants 11.10 Court rules in the Northern Territory, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria provide that where a defendant makes a claim (‘a contribution claim’) to recover contribution or indemnity against a person, whether or not a defendant to the proceeding, in respect of a claim for a debt or damages made by the plaintiff in the proceeding, a party to the contribution claim may serve on any other party an offer to contribute toward a compromise of the claim made by the plaintiff on the terms specified in the offer.44 The court may, pursuant to the rules, take [page 316] an offer to contribute into account in determining whether to order that the offeree pay the whole or part of the costs of the offeror, or any costs the offeree is liable to pay to the plaintiff.45 These rules provide a vehicle through which a defendant can protect itself against incurring costs occasioned by the unreasonable conduct of a fellow defendant.46 At the same time, they encourage ‘unreasonable defendants to see reason, by accepting what turns out later to have been a sensible offer, thereby avoiding the incurring of unnecessary costs by the defendant making the offer’.47 The manifold scenarios that can arise in this context dictate that the rules provide no more than an indication of the way in which the costs discretion is likely to be exercised in most cases where one defendant makes a comprehensive offer to the others.48 The courts, it has been said, aim to give effect to the spirit of the rules, rather than slavishly applying their words as a code within the precise terms of which an applicant must bring himself or herself before becoming entitled to a favourable exercise of the court’s costs discretion.49 So, for instance, even if the notices of contribution do not

comply with the rules, the giving of the notices may nonetheless be a factor relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion. 11.11 A case illustration is Lend Lease Retail Projects Pty Ltd v Construction Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd,50 where a defendant made an offer to the other two defendants to contribute 51 per cent towards the judgment or settlement sum and costs, on condition of an admission of liability and proceedings continuing thereafter with one counsel only. That defendant was ultimately held to be 40 per cent liable. Callaway JA, with whom Phillips and Charles JJA concurred, considered that merely because it was improbable that the offer would have been accepted, given the gulf in opinions between the defendants, was not of importance. Their Honours ruled that the defendant who made the offer should have had the benefit of the offer because he did better than the offer — thus demonstrating that his assessment was reasonable — and had his offer been accepted the case would have been reduced in length and cost.51 The outcome is likely to differ if the court is unconvinced of correlation between the offer and the reduction in costs. For example, in Henderson v Simon Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd52 the plaintiff sued three defendants as joint tortfeasors. The case commenced on 5 October, and the verdict was returned on 20 October. At 10.30 am on 12 October the third defendant served on each of the other defendants an offer to contribute ‘35 per cent of any verdict or settlement obtained by the plaintiff’. Murphy J held that this offer would have shortened the litigation or reduced its costs only if it ousted the need as between defendants of being separately represented, or the adducing of evidence from witnesses blaming the third defendant, or exculpating the third defendant and inculpating the first or second defendant. In the circumstances, however, the acceptance of the offer would not have materially lessened the costs incurred, and so the third defendant was not entitled to an order that the first defendant pay or contribute to its costs or to its proportionate liability to pay the plaintiff’s costs after the date of the offer. The offer was, in his Honour’s view, made too late in the piece to allow any practical steps to be taken to minimise the costs thereafter necessarily incurred.53 [page 317]

Bullock and Sanderson Orders Definition 11.12 Actions with a multiplicity of defendants can give rise to special problems. Costs of a defended action can increase significantly where there are multiple defendants or additional parties. Also, the fruits of a victory by a plaintiff against one defendant can be diminished if he or she loses against other defendants and is ordered to pay their costs. To meet the latter problem, the courts have exercised their costs discretion, where it is just to do so, to oust the general rule that a plaintiff who succeeds against one defendant but fails against the other must pay the costs of the successful defendant. The court may order the unsuccessful defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for the costs of the successful defendant (a ‘Bullock order’), or order the unsuccessful defendant to pay direct to the successful defendant the plaintiff’s costs of proceedings against the latter (a ‘Sanderson order’).54

Choice between Bullock and Sanderson order 11.13 In most circumstances, whether an indirect (Bullock) or a direct (Sanderson) order is made will not, so far as the ultimate outcome is concerned, make any difference.55 Yet as a Sanderson order is direct and therefore ‘less circuitous’,56 it has been described as ‘the modern form of order’,57 representing a practice that should be adhered to wherever practicable to do so.58 The court nonetheless retains a discretion to make a Bullock order if it thinks fit to do so.59 11.14 The most common situation in which the court may choose a Bullock order in place of a Sanderson order is where the latter would cast upon the successful defendant the burden of the unsuccessful defendant’s insolvency. A Sanderson order made where the unsuccessful defendant is insolvent would in effect deny the successful defendant an indemnity for its costs.60 As a general rule, the courts have cast the burden of an unsuccessful defendant’s insolvency, so far as costs are concerned, upon the plaintiff; a Bullock order gives effect to this practice.61 The logic appears to be that a successful defendant has a stronger moral claim to an indemnity for costs than a plaintiff who, having initiated the litigation, has proven only partly successful.

[page 318] Another scenario that may suit a Bullock-type order is where there is a likelihood of an appeal between a plaintiff and an unsuccessful defendant without either party contemplating or wishing to appeal in respect of a successful defendant. A Bullock order avoids the need for the unsuccessful defendant to bring a co-defendant before the appellate court to rid himself or herself of a direct liability for the costs of that defendant.62 The foregoing should not be understood as limiting court’s discretion; there is no inflexible rule that a judge must, where an unsuccessful defendant is insolvent, make a Bullock order (or conversely, that a Sanderson order must be made where an unsuccessful defendant is solvent). To so conclude would be inconsistent with the nature of judicial discretion.63 A judge may make a Sanderson order even in the case of an unsuccessful defendant if, for instance, he or she considers it just in the circumstances to spread the hardship caused by the unsuccessful defendant’s insolvency more fairly between the plaintiff and the successful defendant.64 The same can be said regarding the exercise of discretion where an appeal by an unsuccessful defendant against the plaintiff is likely. 11.15 A Sanderson order is appropriate where the plaintiff has a limited liability for costs. This may be so if the plaintiff is otherwise insolvent,65 or is legally aided and statute limits the amount recoverable against legal aid plaintiffs. The latter was the case in Brown v Heathcote County Council (No 2).66 Hardie Boys J remarked that a Bullock-type order would greatly disadvantage the successful defendant, for whatever the unsuccessful defendant may be ordered to pay to the plaintiff, the successful defendant could recover from the plaintiff only the limited sum permissible under statute. For this reason, his Honour ruled that a Sanderson-type order is usually preferable where the plaintiff is legally aided.67 There may also be reason to make a Sanderson order where there is the prospect that the costs order against the plaintiff may be made on an indemnity basis68 whereas the costs order against the unsuccessful defendant is made on a less extensive basis.69

Terminology

11.16 Notwithstanding the difference between Bullock and Sanderson orders, judges not uncommonly use ‘Bullock order’ as a generic term to encompass both Bullock and Sanderson orders. The case law reveals frequent reference to a direct order against an unsuccessful defendant to pay the costs of a successful defendant described as a Bullock order. Hence, this practice is adopted in the discussion that follows, except where specific judicial reference is made to the Sanderson order.

Jurisdiction 11.17 The court’s jurisdiction to make a Bullock order is derived from statute; no inherent jurisdiction to make this kind of order vests in a court.70 So whether or not a court possesses this jurisdiction rests on a process of statutory construction. It is established that a statutorily conferred general discretion as to costs — which invariably exists in the context of superior [page 319] courts71 — encompasses a jurisdiction to make Bullock orders.72 In respect of courts that enjoy no equivalent statutory discretion, only in the face of a clear statutory provision to this effect can the court make a Bullock order.73 That the power to make a Bullock order derives from the court’s statutory discretion as to costs74 has certain implications. First, there is no right in a litigant to an order of this kind.75 Second, being a judicial discretion, it must be exercised judicially, that is, according to the justice of the case.76 The court must not, therefore, place non-statutory fetters on the discretion.77 Third, as in the case of any exercise of judicial discretion, an appellate court will be reticent to interfere with it.78

Rationale 11.18 At a basic level, the rationale for a Bullock order is that in some circumstances it will be just for a successful plaintiff who has sued two (or more) defendants to be indemnified by the unsuccessful defendant for the

costs he or she incurred in proceeding against the successful defendant. This may be a just outcome where the allocation of responsibility between potential defendants is uncertain, making it a reasonable course for the plaintiff to proceed through to trial against more than one defendant.79 It is reasoned that a plaintiff should be indemnified for all expenditure he or she has reasonably and properly incurred in procuring judgment, which may include the costs of suing one of the defendants unsuccessfully.80 The point was explained as follows by King CJ in Fennell v Supervision and Engineering Services Holdings Pty Ltd:81 [page 320] The unsuccessful defendant has caused the litigation by his wrongful act and by disputing liability for it. He therefore ought to pay all costs reasonably incurred by the plaintiff in connection with the litigation. If it was reasonable, as between the plaintiff and the unsuccessful defendant, for the plaintiff to sue the successful defendant, the unsuccessful defendant ought therefore in justice be liable to indemnity the plaintiff against the costs of so doing, including those which he is ordered to pay to the successful defendant.

11.19 There is also the practical point that the law discourages a multiplicity of actions. If, out of the same facts, the plaintiff is uncertain as to which of two or more potential defendants to sue, it makes sense from the perspective of avoiding unnecessary use of court time and resources for the plaintiff to be encouraged to join each of the defendants in the one action. A Bullock order is a procedural vehicle directed to this end.82 That is not to say that the same outcome cannot be achieved through multiple proceedings. The law dictates that if A sues C and fails and then, in a separate action, successfully sues B, assuming that suing C was a reasonable and foreseeable consequence of B’s wrongful act, A may recover from B, as part of the damages for which B is liable, costs not improperly or unreasonably incurred in the unsuccessful action against C.83

Discretion to make order 11.20 Though termed a ‘Bullock’ or ‘Sanderson’ order after the respective cases in which the English Court of Appeal made such orders,84 neither case actually represented the judicial genesis of this jurisdiction.85 Nor did those

cases, and Bullock in particular, contain an especially detailed analysis of the circumstances in which orders of this kind may be justified. Arguably the first case to do so was the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Besterman v British Motor Cab Company Ltd.86 The court emphasised that there is no rule in this context, but a discretion, and so each case must turn upon its own circumstances.87 As in other situations involving a fact-specific outcome, though, courts have identified more specific inquiries that assist in the exercise of the discretion. The main ones are discussed below. The discretion, importantly, goes not only to the type of order in the circumstances, but also to its quantum; the court may craft a Bullock order or a Sanderson order in respect of a proportion of costs if that is fair and just in all the circumstances.88 [page 321]

Reasonableness of joinder 11.21 The court in Besterman directed the basic inquiry at whether the plaintiff had acted reasonably in joining both defendants. Vaughan Williams LJ stated the relevant inquiry in the following terms:89 [W]as it a reasonable thing for the plaintiff in his action against a man who ultimately turns out to be in fact the wrong-doer to join the other defendant in order that the matter might be thoroughly threshed out? If, in the circumstances of the case, it was a reasonable thing to do, then he is entitled to add as part of the costs in bringing this reasonable action in which he reasonably joined this other person the costs of that other person who is found out not to be at fault … [I]f the facts are such that it is reasonable to be in a state of uncertainty as to which of the two is the really guilty one, then it is part of the reasonable costs of the action that the costs of the action which you have launched against one of those defendants, and who has succeeded in defending himself, should be borne by the man who is to blame.

Although much of the subsequent authority has refused to construe Besterman as conferring any right to a Bullock order merely because joinder was proper and reasonable90 — and this is correct as the court retains a discretion — in determining how to exercise their discretion judges repeatedly refer to the reasonableness or propriety of effecting the joinder, or at least matters relating to that point. Importantly, though, the inquiry as to reasonableness here can be seen not only as a threshold inquiry,91 but as one triggering a broader inquiry into both the conduct of the defendants92 and the

closeness of the connection between the causes of action against the defendants.93 11.22 An assertion that it was reasonable to join a particular party in a case may be understood in at least two ways.94 It may mean that those choosing to join the party did so because, on the information available to them, there was a reasonable prospect of success against that party. If no more is meant than this, those electing to join the party must be taken to realise that if the case made against that party fails, costs are likely to follow the event. The same applies where a defendant is joined because of doubt regarding the applicable law,95 a mistake of law96 or a desire to have a wealthy defendant in court.97 Alternatively, it may mean that those choosing to join the party were reasonably in a state of uncertainty as to whom, including the party so joined, was liable, and so were reasonably constrained to join all those possibly liable if justice was to be obtained. [page 322] The justification for joinder in the latter scenario differs from that in the former.98 Reasonableness in the former has virtually no relevance to the question of costs that, unless the circumstances are unusual, may be expected to abide the event. The latter kind of reasonableness is determined upon a consideration, not of the result of the hearing, but of the information possessed by those who joined the (now) successful party. Thus a reasonable prospect of success against a party joined differs from the reasonable resolution of a state of uncertainty as to where, as between two or more potential defendants, liability will ultimately be held, by the court, to lie.

Conduct of defendants 11.23 Whether it was reasonable and proper for the plaintiff to have joined the successful defendant is, in the first instance, to be judged upon the material that was or ought to have been available to the plaintiff’s lawyers at the time the writ was issued.99 That at that time the plaintiff did not know whether the case could be proven against each defendant, thus making it reasonable to sue both defendants, does not by itself entitle the plaintiff to a

Bullock order.100 After all, what is reasonably started may be unnecessarily persisted in.101 The circumstances of the case may, to this end, require that the plaintiff’s decision as to joinder be adjudged by the conduct of the defendants after the joinder and even until judgment.102 The relevant conduct may occur by the terms of the defence,103 during interlocutory proceedings in aid of proof prior to trial,104 or arise at trial.105 The defendants’ conduct must be something more than a denial of liability, as this would hardly distinguish the case from every case brought against two or more defendants. That something more, it has been said, will ‘typically involve a positive assertion, express or implied, that the relevant defendant is not liable because the other is’.106 In other words, the defendants’ conduct in inculpating one another, at the outset and during the trial, may indeed reasonably leave in a plaintiff’s mind uncertainty as to which of the defendants will or should be held responsible. At the same time, inquiry into the defendants’ conduct does not translate to any requirement that the defendant(s) engage in misconduct; the question remains whether, given the conduct in question, it is fair to make a Bullock order.107 In Altamura v Victorian Railways Commissioners108 Kaye J noted that a plaintiff who at the commencement of an action in tort has, because of his injuries, no or limited knowledge of the fact situation, may be unable to make an informed judgment as to the party liable. To avoid multiplicity of actions and the risk of a claim being subsequently barred by limitation, it may be proper and reasonable for the plaintiff to join in one action all parties who owed him or her a duty of care and whose breach of duty could have been a cause of the injury. His Honour added that the verdict should not be seen as the sole criterion of the reasonableness of the joinder of [page 323] the successful defendant, because otherwise a plaintiff would be required to prognosticate at a time when both the facts of the accident and the defences were unknown to him or her. On the facts Kaye J observed that the conduct of the defendants at the trial of the action, each striving to inculpate the other for the plaintiff’s injuries, provided evidence of the reasonableness of the joinder in the circumstances.109

11.24 Although the court’s principal inquiry is not whether one defendant has sought to throw the blame on the other defendant, but whether the plaintiff acted reasonably in joining both defendants,110 this should not be read as downplaying the importance of the conduct of the defendants in this context. In Gould v Vaggelas111 Gibbs CJ stated that although there is authority that the court may make a Bullock order where it is reasonable for the plaintiff to sue two or more defendants,112 the mere fact that the joinder was reasonable does not mean that the unsuccessful defendant should be ordered to pay the successful defendant’s costs. Though clearly consistent with the discretionary nature of the jurisdiction — one factor should not be the determinant of its exercise — his Honour proceeded to focus on the conduct of the unsuccessful defendant. He endorsed Blackburn CJ’s statement of principle in Steppke v National Capital Development Commission113 to the effect that as well as inquiring into the reasonableness of the joinder, the court should determine whether ‘the conduct of the unsuccessful defendant has been such as to make it fair to impose some liability on it for the costs of the successful defendant’. This led Gibbs CJ to opine that if the unsuccessful defendant has said or done nothing that led the plaintiff to sue the successful defendant, it is difficult to see why he or she should be required to pay for the plaintiff’s error or overcaution.114 Although Gibbs CJ’s formulation may suggest a two-pronged inquiry, this should not be interpreted to mean that the inquiries into reasonableness of joinder, and into the conduct of the defendants, are unrelated. To the contrary; a Victorian appellate judge has, to this end, opined that ‘[i]t is easy to think of circumstances in which the reasonableness of bringing suit might be directly related to conduct on the part of the unsuccessful defendant’, before noting that ‘[i]n truth there is a single question, namely whether it is fair, as between the plaintiff and the unsuccessful defendant, that the latter should pay the successful defendant’s costs’.115 [page 324] 11.25 That the reasonableness of joinder is not unrelated to the conduct of the unsuccessful defendant(s) was highlighted by Brennan J in Gould v Vagellas.116 His Honour remarked that a judicial discretion to make a

Bullock order can be exercised only if the conduct of the unsuccessful defendant vis-à-vis the plaintiffs’ claim against him or her showed that the joinder of the successful defendant was reasonable and proper to ensure the recovery of the damages sought. Giles J elaborated this point, after a consideration of the relevant case law, in Sved v Council of the Municipality of Woollahra:117 It is not sufficient for the making of a Bullock order that it was reasonable for the plaintiff to bring the proceedings against both defendants, although sometimes the condition for making a Bullock order is stated in that way … One statement of principle is that the order may be made where the costs have been reasonably and properly incurred by the plaintiff as between it and the unsuccessful defendant …; it has also been said that the conduct of the unsuccessful defendant must have been such as to make it fair to impose some liability on it for the costs of the successful defendant, or that the conduct of the unsuccessful defendant must show the joinder of the successful defendant was reasonable and proper to ensure recovery of the damages sought … The difference in formulations is probably more apparent than real, as reasonableness as between the plaintiff and the unsuccessful defendant will normally be demonstrated by some conduct of the unsuccessful defendant which made it proper that the successful defendant be joined or that the unsuccessful defendant should bear the costs of the successful defendant.

In Johnsons Tyne Foundry Pty Ltd v Maffra Corporation,118 for example, the plaintiff sued the council (the first defendant), and also its engineer (the second defendant) for breach of warranty of authority, for payment for repairs to the council’s steamroller. The council attempted to limit its liability to a small part of the repairs, claiming that the engineer lacked authority to order the balance of the repairs. At trial the court ruled in the plaintiff’s favour in respect of the council but not the engineer. According to the High Court, the plaintiff had taken a reasonable and proper course in joining the engineer as a defendant as it was induced to do so by the erroneous attitude adopted by the council. Accordingly, it ordered that the costs the plaintiff had been ordered to pay to the engineer should be recovered from the council.119 11.26 Conduct in the form of an inducement by a defendant, in the sense of a literal express or implied request to join another defendant, is not an essential precondition to making a Bullock order.120 It is certainly relevant and often persuasive evidence in support of such an order,121 but to treat it as conclusive would fetter the court’s discretion. To this end, when the courts speak of, or focus on, the defendants’ conduct, the term ‘conduct’ is not to be read in a restrictive fashion; it must, however, relate to the question of whether, in justice, an unsuccessful defendant should be required to meet the costs of a successful defendant.

[page 325] In Almeida v Universal Dye Works Pty Ltd (No 2)122 Priestley JA went so far as to opine that ‘any conduct by the defendant or state of affairs in which the defendant is an integral part which makes it fair and reasonable for other parties to be joined as defendants will be relevant to deciding on fair costs orders’. The italicised words may evidence an overly broad approach. Santow AJA in Almeida preferred to treat the ‘state of affairs’ as factual context rather than conduct, thus differentiating conduct from a purely passive state of affairs, the latter merely providing context for appraising any actual conduct that bears on fairness.123 His Honour nonetheless conceded that the distinction may not, in most cases, be one of substance, explaining that:124 In making that distinction, I would acknowledge that conduct can include deliberate acts of omission, so that the distinction between conduct and context is not always clear-cut. By treating context as relevant to the appraisal of conduct, going to fairness of Bullock orders, the practical result is usually likely to be the same, save where there is no overt conduct at all on the unsuccessful defendant’s part associated with the litigation that went to fairness.

11.27 On occasions, conversely, where the uncertainty that led to the plaintiff joining multiple defendants in the action was not created by the conduct of the defendants, there is a far less compelling foundation for making a Bullock order. This in turn highlights the interrelationship between the relevant inquiries. In Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) v Palmer (No 2),125 for example, where the plaintiff, who was injured in a single vehicle accident, sued the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA), the council and the council’s contractor (P). She failed against the RTA but succeeded against the two other defendants. Giles JA, with whom Spigelman CJ and Handley JA concurred, nonetheless refused a Bullock order in her favour, reasoning as follows:126 It may have been reasonable for the plaintiff in her own interests to join the RTA as a defendant, but I do not think that there was conduct which made it just that the Council, and still less [P], pay the costs payable by the plaintiff to the RTA. Neither the Council nor [P] created any circumstances of uncertainty as to who was the proper defendant. They were not obliged to concede liability or make admissions in order to remove the RTA from contention, there being a respectable argument that the RTA was liable and there is no reason to think that short of effective capitulation by the Council and [P] the plaintiff would not have maintained her claim against the RTA. In my opinion, conduct has not been shown so as to make it fair to impose on the Council and [P] liability for the costs of the RTA.

Application to independent and separate causes of action 11.28 There is authority that a Bullock order is inappropriate when an independent cause of action is alleged against each defendant (say, when one is based in contract and the other in tort) or when separate actions have been instituted against each defendant.127 The reason for this is the unfairness of throwing upon an unsuccessful defendant the costs of a defendant who has successfully defended a proceeding or cause of action distinct from that brought against [page 326] him or her by the plaintiff. But given the courts’ costs discretion, and their reticence to fetter it, this is no unyielding rule. The justice of a case may merit a Bullock order notwithstanding ostensibly separate or independent causes of action.128 Reflecting substance over form, the courts inquire whether there is a substantial connection or dependence between the causes of action against the two or more defendants, not merely how they are framed or brought.129 Importantly, this inquiry is not a discrete one, but reflects the requirement that it must have been reasonable for the plaintiff to have joined the defendants. After all, where the claim against the successful defendant and the claim against the unsuccessful defendant exhibit this said connection or dependence, it might be readily concluded that it was reasonable for the plaintiff to have joined the successful defendant. Otherwise, the plaintiff would hazard the risk of ‘falling between two stools’, depending on the ultimate findings made by the court.130 The notion of ‘substantial connection’ is illustrated by Altamura v Victorian Railways Commissioners.131 The plaintiff was injured in an accident during operations by the first defendant’s servants, though at the time he was employed by the second defendant (who was a sub-contractor) upon a building site occupied by the third defendant. The jury found against the first and third defendants, but in favour of the second defendant. Kaye J held that even though the breaches of duty alleged against each defendant arose out of different relationships, the duty each defendant owed to the plaintiff was to exercise reasonable care for his safety, and the breach by each defendant of that duty arose out of the same factual situation. As such, the

breaches of duty alleged against each defendant were not unconnected, it being not to the point that the measure of duty varied between the defendants.132 In the circumstances it was reasonable for the plaintiff to join each defendant, especially as each defendant contended that the others were legally responsible for the plaintiff’s injury. This led Kaye J to order that the second defendant’s costs be borne by the unsuccessful defendants. Another illustration is Framar Money Management Pty Ltd v Territory Insurance Office,133 involving an action by an insured against both its insurer and its insurance broker. O’Leary CJ stated that although the cause of action relied on against the broker (breach of duty as broker) differed from that relied on against the insurer (a claim under an insurance policy), the causes of action were not unconnected.134 The insured’s claims against the insurer and the broker raised common issues that, in truth, were the real issues in the case. His Honour held that it was proper and reasonable in the circumstances for the insured to have joined the insurer and broker in the action. As the insured was unsuccessful in its action against the broker but successful against the insurer, it was just that the insurer pay the costs incurred by the broker in defending the plaintiff’s action against it.

Extent of recovery from unsuccessful defendant 11.29 In exercising its costs discretion when facing an application for a Bullock order, the court may inquire whether the unsuccessful defendant was found liable for much less than the claim made against it and the successful defendant. This may be relevant to the ultimate discretion if the costs payable by the plaintiff to the successful defendant (based on the amount [page 327] claimed) exceed the costs payable by the unsuccessful defendant to the plaintiff (based on the amount recovered).135 For instance, this may be so where the amount recovered is below the threshold for matters in the court and so costs orders are made at the quantum applicable to a lower level court,136 or the court decides to reduce the costs allowed because the plaintiff has, due to its limited recovery, been only partly successful.137

11.30 The solution need not be an all or nothing one; a Bullock order may require the plaintiff to pay the successful defendant’s costs in their entirety, but allow the plaintiff to pass on to the unsuccessful defendant only a proportion of those costs.138 An example is found in Norwood v Pokaka Timber Company Ltd,139 where the plaintiff suffered personal injuries from a tractor owned by the second defendant whilst in the employ of the first defendant. The plaintiff failed against the first defendant but succeeded against the second defendant. North J thought it ‘manifest that a prudent counsel engaged in considering the question of responsibility for the accident could not safely run the risk of suing only the second defendant whose tractor-driver’s conduct was the immediate cause of the accident’.140 This led him to rule that the plaintiff was entitled to recoup costs against the unsuccessful defendant. However, as the plaintiff had sought £5,730 in damages but was awarded only £1,820, North J remarked that the injuries suffered did not make it reasonable to have sued for such a large amount. Were the plaintiff allowed his full costs it would, in his Honour’s view, encourage plaintiffs to bring claims for excessive damages.141 He therefore made the following orders: first, that the plaintiff pay costs to the successful defendant according to scale on the basis of the amount claimed; second, that the unsuccessful defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs on the basis of the amount recovered; and third, that the unsuccessful defendant pay to the plaintiff the amount that would have been payable to the successful defendant according to scale in an action in which £1,820 was recovered.142 11.31 The foregoing should not be seen as fettering the court’s discretion; there is no set rule that a plaintiff who recovers less than the amount claimed may recover from the unsuccessful defendant only a proportion of the costs to which the successful defendant is entitled.143 Each case rests on its merits. Certainly, the reasonableness of the amount claimed may indeed be relevant, and so if the plaintiff recovers a significant proportion of the amount claimed, this may work against any argument for a proportionate order.144

Third Party Procedure 11.32 Statute or court rules entitle a defendant who is sued by a plaintiff to claim from a person not a party to the proceedings (a ‘third party’), inter alia,

relief or a remedy connected with the subject matter of the plaintiff’s suit that is substantially the same relief or remedy [page 328] claimed by the plaintiff against the defendant.145 This assumes that the defendant’s claim against the third party is connected with the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant. The third party procedure is directed at avoiding multiplicity of proceedings; it does so by getting the third party bound by the decision between the litigants, and by deciding the question between the defendant and the third party as soon as possible after the decision between the litigants.146

Costs in third party procedure Jurisdiction 11.33 The court rules in South Australia and Western Australia make specific provision for the court to make a costs order as between a third party and other parties to an action.147 As statute or court rules in the remaining jurisdictions confer upon superior courts a general discretion as to costs,148 the absence of specific provision does not deny the courts in those other jurisdictions that same power. The provisions conferring the general costs discretion have been construed amply as sufficient to enable a court, in exercising that discretion, to order the plaintiff, the defendant or the third or any subsequent party(ies) to the litigation to pay the costs of any other party(ies) to the litigation as the justice of the case may require.149 Though grounded in discretion,150 the courts have, without purporting to state inflexible rules, given indications of their general approach to the costs of third parties, which are discussed below, distinguishing the scenario of a successful plaintiff from that of an unsuccessful one.

Plaintiff successful 11.34 The simplest scenarios are those where the plaintiff succeeds against

the defendant, in which case the indemnity rule ordinarily applies,151 entitling the plaintiff to a costs order in his or her favour. A defendant who fails against the third party, whether or not he or she has succeeded against the plaintiff, is ordinarily ordered to pay the third party’s costs.152 Conversely, a defendant who succeeds against the third party is usually entitled not only to its costs against the third party153 but also to an indemnity for the costs he or she is ordered to pay the plaintiff [page 329] proportionate to the contribution the third party’s acts or omissions made to the defendant’s liability.154 These principles apply equally to fourth party proceedings.155

Plaintiff unsuccessful 11.35 The matter is potentially more complex where the defendant proves successful against the plaintiff but not against the third party.156 The defendant is, pursuant to the indemnity rule, ordinarily entitled to its costs from the plaintiff. The issue is whether the plaintiff may be liable to indemnify the defendant for its liability for costs to the third party (or pay costs direct to the third party). If the facts show that the joinder of the third party by the defendant was solely for the defendant’s benefit and immaterial to the plaintiff, the unsuccessful plaintiff should not be liable for the third party’s costs.157 This is sensible, as no litigation is afoot between the plaintiff and the third party, even if the plaintiff’s claim led the defendant to institute the third party proceedings. It ordinarily follows that, as the third party should not have joined in the proceedings between the plaintiff and defendant, the party who did so — the defendant — should bear the third party’s costs.158 11.36 However, the more common order is that the defendant be entitled to recover from the plaintiff both his or her own costs and those of a third party the defendant has been ordered to pay.159 This is likely where the plaintiff’s claim is what prompted (or was a catalyst for) the third party proceedings, and it was reasonable for the defendant to join the third party in the

proceedings.160 A finding of reasonableness may be compelling where, say, the plaintiff’s claim appeared to have merit and the defendant could reasonably have concluded that any liability [page 330] it might have to the plaintiff was prima facie attributable to the conduct of the third party.161 Conversely, if the plaintiff’s claim was ostensibly manifestly hopeless, a defendant’s assertion that joinder was reasonable might be rejected. In any case, a defendant who successfully defends the plaintiff’s claim will in practice often fail against the third party. In Mifsud v ICT Pty Ltd,162 for example, the defendant was sued for damages resulting from a work accident, and joined the plaintiff’s employer as a third party for the purpose of seeking an indemnity or contribution in respect of any damages it may be ordered to pay to the plaintiff. The plaintiff failed against the defendant. The employer sought orders that the proceedings against it be dismissed and that the defendant pay its costs of and incidental to those proceedings, and the defendant sought an indemnity as against the plaintiff for costs payable by it to the employer. Slicer J held that as no liability attached to the defendant, no further proceedings would be taken against the employer, entitling it to have the third party proceedings dismissed. His Honour remarked that the employer’s claim for costs was made stronger given that it did not seek to become a party to the action and its conduct did not unnecessarily lengthen or add unwarranted cost to the trial.163 The employer was held entitled to costs from the defendant, for which the defendant was entitled to an indemnity from the plaintiff. 11.37 The nature of the costs discretion dictates that the above is no set or even ‘guiding principle’, but an indication of what may be just in a particular case.164 So, for instance, while a finding that the joinder of the third party was reasonable in the circumstances may be relevant to the exercise of discretion, it should not be viewed as a sufficient pre-condition to justify the making the above costs order.165 The matter, rather, ‘sounds in what is fair and just between the parties by reference to their conduct in connection with the litigation’.166

11.38 Consistent with the nature of the discretion, it can extend to quantum. The court is not circumscribed to an ‘all or nothing’ order. Instead, the parties’ conduct may justify an order that relates only to a proportion of the relevant costs. This is illustrated by the New South Wales Court of Appeal’s decision in Furber v Stacey167 The parties (F and S) were directors of the Royal New South Wales Canine Council (the Council). F sued S for defamation for comments published in his ‘Chairman’s Report’ of the Canine Journal. S defended the action on grounds including truth, qualified privilege, public interest and fair report of court proceedings. S also crossclaimed against the Council, alleging that as the Chairman’s report was prepared by the Council’s solicitors on the instructions of the Council’s Board, the Council was vicariously liable for the publication. The Council denied this, and also raised defences similar to those of [page 331] S against F’s claim. F’s reply to S’s defence alleged malice so as to defeat the defence of qualified privilege. At trial all of S’s defences apart from that of fair report were upheld, and F’s allegation of malice was rejected. By consent, the cross-claim was dismissed. Hodgson JA, with whom Einstein J agreed, ruled that the exercise of the costs discretion should be approached by reference to four considerations:168 first, it was reasonable for S to bring and maintain a cross-claim against the Council (as S was not the author of the report in question, which had been drafted and vetted by solicitors acting on Council’s instructions); second, this claim did not raise issues private as between S and the Council; third, it was reasonable for S and the Council to maintain separate representation; and fourth, the contesting by the Council of F’s claims was an essential part of its defence to S’s cross-claim. There was, accordingly, reason to award the Council its costs of the cross-claim, but it did not follow that the Council should receive all of its costs. As it was foreseeable that the theoretical conflict of interests (on the issue of malice) between S and the Council that justified the maintenance of separate representation might not become an actual conflict and that, even if it did, there would be an actual coincidence of interests in respect of most of the issues in the case, his Honour considered

that the Council ‘should have sought to avoid unnecessary costs by cooperating so far as possible with [S] so as to avoid duplication of effort and costs in contesting [F’s] claim’.169 As the Council did not do this — it was represented by two counsel throughout the 17 day hearing, at which it contested the same issues as were contested by S, who was himself represented by counsel — Hodgson JA did not think that F should be required to pay its costs ‘beyond what was reasonable in that respect’.170 In the absence of a strategy to avoid duplication of effort and costs, the Council was awarded one-quarter of its costs of the cross-claim. 11.39 An order that an unsuccessful plaintiff pay the third party’s costs, or indemnify the defendant for its costs liability to the third party, may be justified if the dispute is in effect between the plaintiff and the third party. In Edginton v Clark171 the plaintiff, who squatted on vacant land for 14 years to be dispossessed by the defendants as tenants of the land, sued the defendants for trespass, claiming title by adverse possession. The defendants joined the owners as third parties. The plaintiff’s action was dismissed, and the defendants were ordered to pay the costs of the third party owners, which the defendants sought to claim from the plaintiff. The English Court of Appeal held that as the real and only fight was between the plaintiff and the true owners (as third parties), the plaintiff should be ordered to pay the owners’ costs directly.172 The justification is clearer again where the plaintiff is guilty of some misconduct, such as aborting the trial and causing costs to be thrown away. In Leaver v Golsby,173 for example, the plaintiff unsuccessfully applied for an adjournment on the day of the trial because an expert witness was out of Sydney on that day, but was granted a nonsuit. Moffitt J rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to order him to pay the costs of a third party joined by the defendant, stating:174 It does seem to me … that where a plaintiff asks for a nonsuit when the case is just about to be heard, and under circumstances where it is obvious that the case will probably be litigated again, so that the taking of the nonsuit is merely a device for the equivalent of an adjournment, that it is appropriate to make an order whereby the plaintiff will bear the costs of all of the parties to the proceedings.

[page 332]

Interveners Intervention 11.40 An intervener is ‘[a] person who seeks to intervene as a party in proceedings to protect their interests where those interests are different from those of the existing parties’.175 Historically intervention was a wellestablished procedure in suits in the admiralty and probate jurisdictions but was unavailable in the common law courts; nor did the texts on Chancery practice refer to it.176 The South Australian and Tasmanian court rules make specific prescription for intervention, although in Tasmania it is limited to intervention by the state Attorney-General.177 The Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) provides for intervention of the Commonwealth or a state Attorney-General in constitutional matters,178 and the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) allows the Queensland Attorney-General, on behalf of the state, to intervene in a court proceeding under that Act.179 In family law proceedings the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) envisages intervention by the Attorney-General,180 child welfare officers181 and certain other persons,182 and in child abuse cases by certain persons.183 Statute also provides for intervention by various regulatory bodies, such as the Australian Securities and Investments Commission184 and the Australian Prudential and Regulatory Authority.185 11.41 Whether a court, aside from any statutory provision to this effect, has jurisdiction to allow intervention is unclear. Outside of cases in the probate and admiralty jurisdictions, and in certain contexts involving the AttorneyGeneral — where the general law recognised a jurisdiction to allow interveners186 — a line of New South Wales authority denies any inherent power in the court to permit intervention in proceedings by persons not named as parties.187 Yet at least one judge has questioned how such a limitation on jurisdiction can sit with the fact that the New South Wales Supreme Court is statutorily conferred ‘all jurisdiction which may be necessary for the administration of justice’.188 Moreover, in other jurisdictions some courts have simply assumed the jurisdiction to admit an intervener as a party.189 The court’s inherent power to control its own processes arguably should be seen as conferring such a jurisdiction, which in any event will rarely be exercised, for fear that participation

[page 333] by interveners will extend the issues beyond those the initial parties have defined and thus prolong the action and increase its cost.190

Costs of intervener General costs principles 11.42 An intervener becomes a party to the proceedings with all the benefits and burdens of that status,191 dictating that in the absence of any express restriction on the orders for costs that may be made concerning the intervention, the unfettered costs discretion conferred by statute applies.192 Yet there is no usual practice that an intervener will receive its costs, even if its contentions are accepted or the outcome of the proceeding otherwise accords with the arguments advanced by the intervener, as the plaintiff is entitled to choose the person(s) whom he or she wishes to sue.193 As a general rule, a successful intervener can recover costs only if the intervention was necessary to protect an interest not common with the main parties,194 but will not recover costs just because the intervention was well intentioned and proved of assistance to the court.195 As explained by the New South Wales Court of Appeal vis-à-vis participation by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission as an intervener:196 Litigation involving statutes of such public importance as the Corporations Act often calls for the participation of the regulator, who will often have a perspective on the application of the statute not as sharply perceived as by others. It is in the public interest and in the interests of the administration of justice that ASIC not be deterred from giving assistance to the court. At the same time, private litigants should not have to pay additional sums in legal fees, for the general

[page 334] good of the administration of justice and in the elucidation of a statute of particular concern to an intervener.

Moreover, where the intervener’s interest is sufficiently alike to that of another party on the record, the court considers it unfair to burden the unsuccessful litigant with a dual costs burden where the two sets of costs are

incurred to propound essentially the same successful contention.197 The court will, in this respect, consider whether there were means of protecting the intervener’s interests short of full participation in the action, such as by securing an appropriate undertaking from one of the parties.198 11.43 An unsuccessful intervener is unlikely to recover costs but is not as a general rule ordered to pay costs. The reason is that if a successful intervener is not entitled to costs where an existing party to the suit adequately protects its interests, it is inequitable for an unsuccessful intervener to be liable for costs in like circumstances.199 If, however, the intervention has substantially extended the hearing or put the successful party to unnecessary cost, the court may order that the unsuccessful intervener pay a portion of the successful party’s costs.200 This is consistent with the notion that an intervener must take the action as he or she finds it. In determining whether an intervener should be liable for costs, the court adopts a ‘broad axe’ approach, explained as follows:201 If the hearing was slightly longer than it would have been but for the intervention, it might not be appropriate to order the intervener to pay costs. It will be a question of fact and degree in every case whether the intervener’s participation has resulted in the trial being substantially longer than it would have been but for the intervention. In determining whether the intervener should be liable, it would be appropriate to have regard also to such factors as whether the interest which the intervener sought to protect was adequately protected by an existing party. Depending on the nature of the issues in the action, it might be a relevant factor that the intervener has assisted the parties and the court in identifying or elucidating the issues. It is not unrealistic to suppose that, although the intervention has prolonged the trial, the intervener’s participation has been of substantial assistance. In such a case, it might be inequitable to order the intervener to contribute to the costs of the successful party.

In City of Burnside v Attorney-General (SA),202 for example, the appellant sought an order authorising the sale of land subject to a charitable trust, and the third respondent, an interested party, was granted leave to intervene and opposed the order. The appeal was upheld, and the appellant sought costs against the third respondent to the extent that the hearing was prolonged, as well as any additional costs attributable to the intervention. Debelle J noted [page 335] that as the hearing of the appeal occupied two and a half days, and argument for counsel for the intervener occupied two hours of that time, the

intervener’s participation had not unduly prolonged the hearing of the appeal. However, had it not been for the intervention, the hearing would have concluded within two days and, moreover, although the interest the intervener sought to protect was not identical to that of the Attorney-General (who had been joined as a defendant), the submissions made by each were in large part very similar.203 This led his Honour to order that the appellant be compensated to the extent that the intervention prolonged the hearing. Avoiding a descent into minutiae for this purpose, Debelle J directed the intervener to pay the appellant a refresher for junior counsel and the cost of a solicitor attending for one-half day.204

Probate cases 11.44 As a general rule, a person whose interests may be affected by a decree of the court in a probate suit may intervene in the suit, but does so at his or her own risk as to costs.205 Consistent with the principles discussed earlier,206 interveners in probate actions are not allowed separate costs even if successful unless their interest differs from that of other parties to the action.207 This rule stems from the practice of the Probate Court to allow one set of costs; if the intervener’s interest is the same as that of another party who pleads in the action, the intervener should adopt the pleadings of that party.208 For example, in Johnston v Public Trustee209 interveners intervened in support of a will, which the court ultimately upheld. Clark J held that the interveners could have safely left their case in the hands of the executor, who was propounding the will, and so denied them costs out of the estate.210 The dearth of case law on the costs of an unsuccessful intervention in probate actions is likely a consequence of the fact that the successful party would have his or her costs paid out of the estate211 and the unsuccessful intervener would bear its own costs.212

Admiralty actions 11.45 Similar principles to probate actions apply in admiralty actions: a successful intervener is entitled to his or her costs only if the intervention was necessary to protect his or her rights, which rights do not correlate to those of the parties initially on the record.213

Intervention by Attorney-General 11.46 Under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78A(2), if the Commonwealth or a state Attorney-General intervenes in court proceedings relating to ‘a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation’,214 the court may make such order as to costs against (but not in favour of)215 the Commonwealth or the state (as the case may be) as it thinks fit. Similar provision is made in respect of appeals.216 This, of course, is not to be read as requiring an order to be made against the Attorney-General; the principles discussed above [page 336] remain relevant to this inquiry. In fact, the High Court has remarked that only in special circumstances is it appropriate for the court to make an order for costs against an intervener in this context.217 11.47 In quantifying a costs order against an Attorney-General as intervener, one of three approaches could be adopted.218 First, it may be appropriate to impose on the Attorney-General the burden of costs incurred in the litigation because the fact of intervention suggests that a judgment has been made that the case is an important one, taking it out of the class of private litigation. In such a case it may be just that all citizens, through the public purse, shoulder the cost of the litigation in view of the public interest in the curial determination of constitutional questions.219 Second, it may be appropriate to confine the order to the marginal or additional costs incurred as a result of the intervention, on the ground that the private litigant should not be at risk for that marginal cost. Third, the order may be made only where the intervention has unduly prolonged litigation, unreasonably or unnecessarily resulted in its removal or otherwise burdened private litigants, so as to justify an order in the nature of a sanction or penalty. The logic for this approach is that if private litigants have by their litigation brought the Constitution into play, it is appropriate that they bear the costs of doing so, including costs necessarily incurred by the intervention of the law officers. No clear and consistent practice appears from the case law as to which approach is the most appropriate.220 In fact, there are instances where the

interventions have been unsuccessful or have involved loss of time to the parties, and yet no costs orders against the Commonwealth and state have been made.221 What can be said is that there are strong reasons for rejecting the first alternative; that actions between private parties that incidentally raise constitutional questions do not oust the fact that it is the private litigants and the not Attorneys-General who are the initiators. The point was explained as follows by Kirby P in Australian Postal Commission v Dao (No 2):222 If a general rule were to be adopted by which it was established that intervention carried with it the price of an order to pay all of the costs of the proceedings in which the law officers intervened, the results might be undesirable. To avoid such an order, intervention might be withheld in a case that would otherwise benefit from that course. Settlement of the dispute between the litigants might be delayed in the knowledge that the public purse would be ordered to pay the costs of litigation after intervention. The sanction of avoiding protracted intervention or unnecessary removal to the High Court would be swamped in the general regime for the payment of costs by the intervenor … No such general rule appears to be warranted by the terms of the legislation …

To adopt the third alternative casts upon the unsuccessful litigant costs of a party the litigant did not sue or defend against just because the matter incidentally raised an issue of constitutional importance. As a result, in the usual case the second alternative is likely to generate the most just costs outcome. It is, moreover, consistent with the history of s 78A(2), [page 337] especially the observations of the (then) Commonwealth Attorney-General in respect of the amending legislation introducing s 78A.223 In Australian Postal Commission v Dao (No 2)224 this was the approach adopted by Kirby P, who decided that as the Attorneys-General in that case took time to present their respective cases and, as those cases were important to each of them, it was appropriate to order them to meet additional costs incurred by their intervention. In similar vein, the High Court in O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd225 said that only in special circumstances will a court order costs against an intervener that exceed the amount by which the costs of the successful party have been increased by the intervention. Yet the court found on the facts of that case — where the Commonwealth obtained the removal of the cause from the Federal Court into the High Court so that it could intervene and challenge the case in favour of the respondent, but failed — special

circumstances justified an order that the Commonwealth pay the respondent’s costs of the High Court proceedings, as well as the respondent’s costs of the Federal Court proceedings to the extent these were increased by the intervention of the Commonwealth in that court. 11.48 Under s 78B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), where a cause pending in a court involves ‘a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation’, the court must not proceed in the cause until satisfied that notice of the cause has been given to each Attorney-General, and a reasonable time has elapsed for consideration of the question of intervention or removal of the cause to the High Court. To this end, a court in which a cause is pending may adjourn the proceedings for the time as it thinks necessary and may make such order as to costs in relation to that adjournment as it thinks fit.226 Also, the Attorney-General may authorise the payment by the Commonwealth to a party of an amount in respect of costs arising out of the adjournment.227

Family law cases 11.49 Where intervention is allowed pursuant to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the intervener is ‘deemed to be a party to the proceedings with all the rights, duties and liabilities of a party’,228 which clearly includes the right to and liability for costs.229 This reflects the jurisdiction recognised at general law in matrimonial suits. If there is a substantial basis for the intervention, and it proves successful, it has been said that ‘[t]he court should be robust in exercising its discretion to make a costs order in favour of a third party’.230 Where, on the other hand, the intervention is tactical or disingenuous, the court will ‘be equally robust in exercising its discretion to make costs orders against [the intervener]’.231 It follows that the success or failure of the intervener in the suit, coupled with the reasons for the intervention, including its bona fides or otherwise, and the conduct of each of the parties in the litigation, are relevant factors on the issue of costs. These factors are also supplemented by those listed in s 117(2A) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).232 In an early English case, Wade v Wade,233 an intervener was awarded costs incurred in successfully defending her interest because a party with whom her interests were aligned chose

[page 338] not to do so. In other instances, lack of success has led courts to deny the intervener costs or to order costs against the intervener.234 In the more recent Australian case of Marriage of Wade-Ferrell,235 the appellant wife’s former mother-in-law, who was granted leave to intervene236 and successfully claimed an interest in the matrimonial property in the course of the main proceedings between the husband and wife, was awarded costs against the wife. The court was influenced in so ruling by the wife’s lack of success in her appeal against the trial judge’s order in favour of the intervener, the relative financial position of the two relevant parties, and their conduct in relation to the proceedings (the wife’s failure to respond positively to the intervener’s favourable settlement offer, in particular).237 And more recently again, Benjamin J in Woodley v Time238 ordered costs in favour of an intervener whom he found had a genuine interest in the proceedings. That interest arose out of the prospect that the main proceedings between husband and wife would, inter alia, prevent the intervener’s recovery of a civil judgment against the husband. As the wife was wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings, his Honour found it appropriate to order the wife to meet the costs incurred by the intervener. 11.50 Where it is the Attorney-General who intervenes in family law proceedings,239 it has been held that, for the purposes of determining whether an order should be made against the Attorney-General, the court should pay regard to the special status of the Attorney-General, as the first law officer of the Commonwealth, and the purpose and effect of the intervention.240 Whether or not it is the court that requested the intervention is also a matter appropriate to consider in this context. But where, as was the case in B and B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Costs),241 the Attorney-General’s submissions were not universally accepted by the court, and ‘[b]y an accident of timing, the husband and wife were drawn, by forces over which they had no control, into a test case which became extremely costly for them’, it will be appropriate for the intervening Attorney-General to pay the additional costs occasioned to the husband and wife by the intervention. In that case, the court was also influenced by the fact that the issues raised were ones of general importance to the community, going well beyond the rights and interests of the husband and wife in the particular appeal. Yet the court declined to order

costs against the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, intervening with leave of the court,242 as the commission’s presence did not add greatly to the length of the hearing.243 [page 339]

Parties with Parallel Interests 11.51 Three main costs issues arise out of proceedings involving litigants with the same or similar interests to pursue or defend. First, there is the issue of whether litigants who are separately represented are entitled, should they be successful, to separate costs, or only one set of costs. Second, there is the issue of whether a party who acts in a representative capacity in litigation (often against a large well-resourced defendant) should bear the costs burden should that action be unsuccessful. Third, in cases of public interest litigation, which by definition involves a party (often an association) pursuing litigation in the interests of the public, the issue arises as to whether, should the litigation prove unsuccessful, a costs order should be made. Each of the former is addressed below, whereas public interest litigation merits its own chapter.244

Separate representation 11.52 If there is no conflict of interest, litigants on the same side often elect to be represented by the same lawyer if for no other reason than to reduce cost. This does not mean that they must be jointly represented, even if their cases and interests are identical; litigants may choose their own lawyers, meaning that joint plaintiffs or joint defendants may elect to be represented by the same or different lawyers. If the same lawyer represents them, the usual order is that only one set of costs is allowed unless some separate work is required as a result.245 If separate representation is chosen, the litigants must not assume that, should they be successful, the court will direct the unsuccessful party(ies) to indemnify each of them for their costs.246 The policy is that a desire to be represented separately by a lawyer of one’s own choice cannot be indulged in at another’s expense without good reason.247

Therefore, the court will not normally allow more than one set of costs to successful litigants where there was no possible conflict of interest between them in the presentation of their cases.248 It follows that lawyers should, in proceedings where other litigants share the same interest, seek to reduce the costs and to arrange between themselves as to which firm should take the necessary proceedings. This carries a duty to inform multiple parties that, assuming they have the same interest, only one set of costs may be allowed rather than costs for all the lawyers.249 Against the backdrop of a statutory mandate ‘to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings’,250 the New South Wales Court of Appeal remarked that, in exercising the discretion to award costs, ‘the court should only do so in a way which accepts double representation where the requirements of justice require that to be done’, and that such cases will arise ‘rarely’.251 It added that a court should exercise the discretion to award costs ‘so as to create an incentive to ensure that only one set of legal representatives are appointed to represent an individual party who appears in a dual capacity as a plaintiff and a defendant’.252 [page 340] Equivalent statutory or rule-based admonitions since in some other jurisdictions,253 and indeed the modern trend to reduce costs of litigation, make these remarks of broader application.

Concurrent conflict of interest 11.53 To determine whether to allow costs of separate representation, the court must consider the fiduciary rule that lawyers must not concurrently represent clients with conflicting interests.254 Courts are disinclined to make a single set of costs orders unless there is clearly no such ‘duty-duty’ conflict. Otherwise successful parties would be penalised for electing to be separately represented in circumstances where concurrent representation may place the lawyer in breach of fiduciary duty to each such party. Also, because dutyduty conflicts may arise after the suit has commenced, a court is not blinded by hindsight in exercising its costs discretion in such cases.255 Courts are thus

slow to assume, particularly at a pre-trial stage, that there should be joint representation.256 Nor can apparent conflict be overlooked at an appellate stage, at which the parameters of the parties’ relevant interests are likely to be clearer.257 Yet if a conflict of interest appears possible but unlikely, defendants should inquire from the plaintiff as to the way in which the plaintiff’s case is to be put to see if this may resolve the possibility of conflict between the defendants.258 A failure to so inquire where it is evident that it would have quelled any fear of conflict may incline the court to order only one set of costs should the defendants be successful. 11.54 That defendants acted reasonably in maintaining separate representation does not, in every case, protect them from being deprived of any costs; they may still be deprived of part of their costs if they acted unreasonably by duplicating costs on a particular matter or at a particular time.259 In Wilderness Society Inc v Minister for Environment and Water Resources,260 for example, the Full Federal Court limited the costs recoverable by the second respondent (Gunns Ltd) from the appellant because, in view of the fact that the first respondent (the minister) was the more appropriate contradictor on this appeal, Gunns Ltd played a larger role in the appeal than necessary. Accepting that the extent to which the costs recoverable by Gunns Ltd should for this reason be limited was a matter of judgment or impression rather than precise calculation, the court found it appropriate to limit the costs so recoverable to 40 per cent of Gunns Ltd’s party and party costs on the appeal.

Only one set of costs allowed 11.55 The case law is littered with decisions in which only one set of costs was allowed where defendants had identical interests.261 Where the defences pleaded are identical, there being no conflict of interest between the defendants or any other circumstance that may have made [page 341] it embarrassing for counsel appearing for one defendant to appear for others, the court will allow only one set of costs between the defendants appearing at

trial.262 In R v Hutchins,263 for example, two candidates at a state election successfully defended proceedings contesting their nomination. Mayo J stated that just because each defendant was entitled to appear and dispute the grant sought did not mean each should receive full costs. As the defendants’ interests in resisting the motion were identical — had the application been successful both would have been affected — they were entitled to only one set of costs to be apportioned between them by the master.264 11.56 The representative position of a litigant may itself predispose a court against making separate orders for costs. For instance, as trustees must institute or defend proceedings jointly,265 they are usually only allowed one set of costs.266 However, trustees’ costs may be severed where there are reasonable grounds to do so,267 such as where one of several trustees has a personal interest that conflicts with his or her duty as trustee, where a trustee admits fact the others believe not to be true, or where allegations of fraud or improper conduct are made against a trustee but not others.268 Similar observations can be made as to beneficiaries; if trustees adequately represent beneficiaries’ interests — as is usually the case — were a trustee to join beneficiaries in an action two sets of costs will not be allowed.269 The position may be otherwise if there is conflict between the interests of different beneficiaries, or between the trustees and any beneficiaries, in which case the beneficiaries will likely have standing on their own account.270

Multiple sets of costs allowed 11.57 If there are differences in the facts or law relating to each defendant, if they have different interests, or if there is a reasonable difference of opinion about the conduct of the defence, then the costs of separate representation may be allowed.271 In Sunday Times Newspaper Company Ltd v Mcintosh,272 where the determination of the issue rested upon a set of circumstances varying as regards each individual defendant — their defences were distinct and dependent upon the state of mind and degree of consideration given by each defendant to the transaction in question — Long Innes J held that each defendant was entitled to appear by separate counsel and, as the suit was dismissed with costs, each was entitled to a separate set of costs. And in Kheirs Financial Services Pty Ltd v Aussie Home Loans Pty Ltd273 the Victorian Court of Appeal noted that the existence of a Notice of

Contribution between two respondents ‘is itself a strong indication that the single set of costs rule ought not be applied in the circumstances of the case’, it being apparent that their interests were not, relevantly, ‘common interests’. [page 342]

Application in the context of attempts to propound or upset testamentary documents 11.58 A specific illustration of where issues pertaining to multiple representation may arise is in attempts to propound or upset testamentary documents, in which it is frequently argued that the costs of each of party should come out of the testator’s estate.274 This adds a further dimension to the issue at stake because any order allowing separate sets of costs may deplete the estate to the detriment of the persons legally entitled to it. For this reason, the courts have adopted an approach more stringent to allowing separate sets of costs here than in the ordinary case.275 The point is illustrated by Re Price,276 which involved the separate representation of trustees of three religious charities in respect of a bequest. Long Innes CJ in Eq stated the law as follows:277 It was contended that each set of trustees was entitled to be represented by its own solicitor and counsel who would be, or were, familiar with the constitution of the particular religious institution; and I agree; but it does not follow that they were entitled to be separately represented at the cost of the estate or of the party against whom they were making common cause. Every defendant is entitled to separate representation and to select his own solicitor and counsel, if he so desire; but separate representation may be an unnecessary luxury, and neither the estate nor an unsuccessful party ought to be compelled to pay for unnecessary luxuries enjoyed by defendants.

His Honour remarked that were he to allow three sets of costs on the facts, there was no reason why in a later, not materially different, case he should not allow 5, 10, 15 or 20 separate sets of costs. This would be an unjust outcome, for it could deplete the estate completely. On the facts Long Innes J held that the fact the three named charities had a different constitution, and that one of them had a further argument not available to the others, did not justify separate representation.278 His Honour thus allowed only one set of costs out of the estate between the three trustees.

Representative proceedings 11.59 A representative proceeding involves a plaintiff suing as a representative a class of plaintiffs, where multiple persons have a common cause of action, usually against a large and well-resourced defendant. It provides a vehicle to simplify what could otherwise be a very cumbersome proceeding.279 The usual costs rule dictates that the plaintiff in a representative proceeding is entitled to costs if the action succeeds. Costswise the main drawback of representative proceedings is that the representative party, not the persons whom he or she [page 343] represents,280 assumes the risk of being ordered to pay the costs of a defendant — the quantum commonly increased by the fact that the proceeding is a representative one — without gaining any personal benefit from the representative role.281 There is, as a result, no incentive for a person to act as a representative party unless his or her potential costs are met or indemnified by another person or body.282

Federal Court, New South Wales and Victorian statutory initiatives 11.60 Pursuant to recommendations by the Australian Law Reform Commission in 1988,283 Pt IVA was inserted into the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, creating a procedure for representative proceedings akin to the United States procedure for class actions.284 A parallel scheme was implemented in Victoria on 1 January 2000,285 and in New South Wales with effect from 4 March 2011.286 Part of the federal initiative involved the enactment of s 43(1A), directed to ensuring that represented persons are ordinarily not liable for party—party costs if their representative loses at trial.287 The sub-section, which has equivalents in New South Wales and Victoria (albeit in simpler form),288 reads: In a representative proceeding commenced under Part IVA or a proceeding of a representative character commenced under any other Act that authorises the commencement of a proceeding of that character, the Court or Judge may not award costs against a person on whose behalf the

[page 344] proceeding has been commenced (other than a party to the proceeding who is representing such a person) except as authorised by: (a) in the case of a representative proceeding commenced under Part IVA — section 33Q289 or 33R;290 or (b) in the case of a proceeding of a representative character commenced under another Act — any provision in that Act.

In any such proceeding, the legislation provides that the court may, of its own motion or on application by a party or a group member, make any order it thinks appropriate or necessary to ensure that justice is done in the proceeding.291 This means that, in conjunction with the court’s broad costs discretion,292 the court may, for this purpose, make an order for costs.293 Moreover, it may, on the application of the respondent or of its own motion, order that a representative proceeding no longer continue where this is in the interests of the justice because the costs that would be incurred were the proceeding ‘to continue as a representative proceeding are likely to exceed the costs that would be incurred if each group member conducted a separate proceeding’.294 11.61 The Australian Law Reform Commission had recommended the establishment of a special fund to provide for the costs of parties involved in group proceedings to cover an approved representative party’s expenses, and to meet party and party costs ordered against the principal applicant.295 This recommendation was not implemented; the legislature simply empowered the court to allow a representative party to take reasonably incurred uncovered costs out of awarded damages.296 This does not address the problem of persons being deterred from acting as a representative party at all, because of the possibility of the proceeding failing.297 The issue is addressed by the South Australian rules, albeit via a general discretion, pursuant to which the court may order the payment of the costs of a representative party out of a fund or by persons nominated by the court.298

Lawyer-client costs agreements in representative proceedings 11.62 The Federal Court, New South Wales and Victorian statutory initiatives do not address costs agreements between lawyers acting for representative parties and group members

[page 345] in representative proceedings.299 These agreements, however, do remain subject to the court’s power of supervision, under both the legal profession legislation300 and the courts’ specific power to make any order it thinks appropriate or necessary to ensure that justice is done in the proceeding.301 For example, in Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd302 Merkel J was not satisfied that the costs agreements in question were fair and reasonable because the notice given by the applicants’ solicitors to group members had not identified the prospective costs liability of group members, and was insufficient to enable them to make an informed decision whether to opt out of the proceedings. Also, the agreements could result in unfair or unreasonable outcomes for group members, namely exposure to a substantial and unequal costs liability potentially irrecoverable from the respondents if the claim succeeded.303

Costs as damages from cross-defendants and third parties 11.63 A party to court proceedings cannot recover the costs of those proceedings from any other party except by an award of costs by the court. Costs of other proceedings stand on a different footing; a plaintiff who in other proceedings has incurred costs as a result of the defendant’s wrong may recover those costs from the defendant as damages (subject to the rules of remoteness). This principle can be explained as follows:304 The action in which the costs of other proceedings have been recovered include both actions in contract and actions in tort. The other proceedings may have been brought by or against the plaintiff. If the plaintiff was successful in his previous proceedings his claim for costs will generally be confined to his own costs incurred, less any costs recovered from his unsuccessful opponent. If he was unsuccessful his claim will probably include not only his own costs but also any costs or damages which he may have been ordered to pay to his successful opponent. These latter sums will be similarly recoverable from the defendant. The other proceedings will generally have been between the plaintiff and some person other than the defendant, but situations may arise where the other proceedings were also between the plaintiff and the defendant.

So costs reasonably incurred by a defendant in successfully claiming against a co-defendant (termed a ‘cross-defendant’) in a suit instituted by the

plaintiff may be recoverable from the cross-defendant as damages under the rule in Hadley v Baxendale305 — the rule governing remoteness of damage in contract.306 Recovery of these costs as part of the cross-claimant’s damages rests chiefly on whether the decision to defend the proceedings brought by the plaintiff was reasonable.307 Similarly, if a defendant’s claim against a third party is founded on an indemnity arising out of contract or under statute, the defendant may add to the damages for which he or she is entitled to be indemnified any costs reasonably incurred in resisting the plaintiff’s claim.308 Again these costs are recoverable as damages, upon the principle that [page 346] the defendant is expressly or impliedly entitled to be indemnified completely for costs he or she might reasonably incur in this way.309

Separate sets of proceedings heard together 11.64 If two separate sets of proceedings are heard together because they have common features, it may be a matter of pure chance whether the expense of presenting an argument or evidence relevant to a common feature falls within one or other of the sets of proceedings. It may sometimes prove difficult to attribute costs to one set of proceedings rather than the other. It is consistent with the interests of justice in such a case that the court’s jurisdiction to make a global order for costs relating to both sets of proceedings not be fettered by the imposition of any implied limitation upon that jurisdiction.310

1.

See 11.2–11.11.

2.

See 11.12–11.31.

3.

See 11.32–11.39.

4.

See 11.40–11.50.

5.

See 11.51–11.64.

6.

Michel v Bullen (1818) 6 Price 87 at 88; 146 ER 749 at 750 per Richards LCB; Sangar v Gardiner (1838) CP Cooper 262 at 265; 47 ER 497 at 498 per Lord Langdale MR; Thiess Watkins White

Construction Ltd (in liq) v Witan Nominees (1985) Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 452 at 453 per Cooper J; Mike Gaffikin Marine Pty Ltd v Princes Street Marina Pty Ltd (SC(NSW), Young J, 15 July 1996, unreported) BC9603588 (revd on appeal but not on this point: Mike Gaffikin Marine Pty Ltd v Princes Street Marina Pty Ltd (CA(NSW), 17 December 1997, unreported) BC9707668); Mond v Berger (2005) 21 BCL 125; [2004] VSC 150; BC200402294 at [122], [123] per Dodds-Streeton J; Shang v Zhang (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 1355; BC200710325 at [13], [18] per Young CJ in Eq; City of Swan v Lehman Bros Australia Ltd (No 3) [2009] FCA 1190; BC200909571 at [14] per Rares J; WA O 66 r 2(e) (which provides that ‘if there are several defendants and the plaintiff has a verdict against them, each of them shall be liable to the plaintiff for the entire costs although they defend separately’, but allows the court to make an order as between several defendants apportioning the liability as between themselves and the recovery of contribution). 7.

In the case of death or insolvency, the taxing officer or costs assessor may proceed to tax or assess the bill in the absence of the deceased or insolvent’s personal representatives or insolvency administrator, respectively: Meredyth v Hughes (1829) 3 Y & J 188 at 189; 148 ER 1146 at 1147 per Best LCB (death); Aspden v Seddon [1877] WN 207 (death); Dansk Rekylriffel Syndikat Aktieselskab v Snell [1908] 2 Ch 127 at 138 per Neville J (insolvency); Thiess Watkins White Construction Ltd (in liq) v Witan Nominees (1985) Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 452 at 453 per Cooper J (insolvency, but adding that this does not deny the personal representatives’ or insolvency administrator’s interest to be heard on the taxation).

8.

As to the costs indemnity rule see 7.2–7.6.

9.

Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3) (1979) 42 FLR 213 at 224 per Fisher J (FCA) (‘The plaintiff as the successful party is prima facie entitled by way of indemnity to its costs of the action, and if one of the defendants is unable or unwilling to meet its share of the obligation, the misfortune should be that of its “partner in crime”’; in Rushcutters Bay Smash Repairs Pty Ltd v H McKenna Netmakers Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 670; BC200304118 at [16] Gzell J remarked that the phrase ‘partners in crime’ in this context ‘has a metaphorical meaning that should apply to most unsuccessful co-defendants’, and that the only real requirement was ‘that the plaintiff has been successful against them’); Rogers v Kabriel (No 2) [1999] NSWSC 474; BC9902504 at [7], [8] per Young J; Scripture Union v Prime Industrial Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 38; BC200600465 at [28]–[30] per McDougall J; Gove v Black [2006] WASC 298 (S2); BC200705326 at [7] per Templeman J; Lonsdale Investments Pty Ltd v OM (Manganese) Ltd (No 3) [2012] WASC 185 (S2) at [23] per Corboy J.

10. Mike Gaffikin Marine Pty Ltd v Princes Street Marina Pty Ltd (SC(NSW), Young J, 15 July 1996, unreported) BC9603588 (revd but not on this point: Mike Gaffikin Marine Pty Ltd v Princes Street Marina Pty Ltd (CA(NSW), 17 December 1997, unreported) BC9707668); Scripture Union v Prime Industrial Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 38; BC200600465 at [33] per McDougall J; Flinders Diamonds Ltd v Tiger International Resources Inc [2006] SASC 139; BC200603179 at [22]–[30] per Layton J; City of Swan v Lehman Bros Australia Ltd (No 3) [2009] FCA 1190; BC200909571 at [15] per Rares J. 11. See 6.14. 12. See 6.16–6.17. 13. See, for example, Ellingsen v Det Skandinaviske Compani [1919] 2 KB 567 at 569–70 (CA); Pittman Estate v Bain (1994) 112 DLR (4th) 494 at 496 per Lang J (Gen Div(Ont)) (as the case had taken roughly equal amounts of time against each of the three defendants, the costs awarded should be shared among the three defendants); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v SIP Australia Pty Ltd (2003) ATPR ¶41–937; [2003] FCA 336; BC200301754 at [67] per Goldberg J; Shang v Zhang (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 1355; BC200710325 at [19] per Young CJ in

Eq (as the first defendant vehemently contested the proceedings and sought to conceal assets overseas, whereas the second defendant played no role in defending the case, the first defendant was ordered to pay 75 per cent of the plaintiff’s costs). 14. Tsu v Nemeth [2012] NSWCA 29; BC201201163 at [69] per Handley AJA, with whom Beazley and Whealy JJA concurred (where on the facts his Honour applied the general rule because there was a common substratum of fact; as the issues relating to the culpability and causative effect of the acts and omissions of each defendant were relevant to the claims against the others, there were in truth no separate issues: at [70]). 15. Willis v Trotter (1897) LR 18 (NSW) Eq 155 at 158 per Manning CJ in Eq. 16. Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3) (1979) 42 FLR 213 at 223–4 per Fisher J (FCA). 17. Murdoch v Greer (1900) 17 WN (NSW) 1 at 3–4 per Walker J. 18. Morris v Riverwild Management Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 439; BC200908994 at [13]. 19. Oppenshaw v Whitehead (1854) 9 Ex 383; 156 ER 163; Re Metropolitan Coal Consumers’ Association (1890) 45 Ch D 606 at 611 per Kekewich J; Carter v Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 474 at 479 per Simpson ACJ (FC); R v Hore [1969] Qd R 75 at 89 per Hoare J (FC); Meade v Queensland Ambulance Service (SC(Qld), White J, 24 April 1996, unreported) BC9601380 at 5–6; Pester v Hydro-Electric Corporation (1997) 7 Tas R 233 at 264; BC9705851 per Zeeman J (FC). Cf Boguslawski v Gdynia Ameryka Linie (No 2) [1951] 2 KB 328 at 334 per Denning LJ; Hursey v Williams (SC(Tas), Burbury CJ, 8 July 1960, unreported) at 3. See further Oliver, pp 67–8. 20. Anfrank Nominees Pty Ltd v Connell (1991) 6 WAR 271 at 287 per Malcolm CJ (FC). See, for example, Dansk Rekylriffel Syndikat Aktieselskab v Snell [1908] 2 Ch 127 (where the form of the order giving the plaintiff his costs of the action provided that ‘it be referred to the taxing master to tax such costs, and to certify how much is properly attributable to the defendants jointly, and to each separately, and that the respective defendants do pay to the plaintiff the amount so certified’). 21. Korner v H Korner & Co Ltd [1951] Ch 10 at 16–18 per Singleton LJ; Thiess Watkins White Construction Ltd (in liq) v Witan Nominees (1985) Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 452 at 454 per Cooper J; Pester v Hydro-Electric Corporation (1997) 7 Tas R 233 at 264; BC9705851 per Zeeman J (FC); Haviv Holdings Pty Ltd v Howards Storage World Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 652; BC200905779 at [29] per Jagot J (affd Howards Storage World Pty Ltd v Haviv Holdings Pty Ltd (2010) 182 FCR 84; [2010] FCAFC 5; BC201000411). Cf WA O 66 r 2(e). 22. (1889) 22 QBD 529. 23. Stumm v Dixon & Co (1889) 22 QBD 529 at 531. 24. King Network Group Pty Ltd v Club of the Clubs Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 204; BC200906236 at [25]–[27] per Young JA, with whom Hodgson and Campbell JJA concurred. 25. His Lordship remarked that defendants’ joint and several costs liability did not apply ‘as to costs caused by him by so much of the separate defence of any defendant as is … a defence for that defendant as distinguished from other defendants’, and that ‘[w]ith regard to such costs so caused to the plaintiff, he is entitled by law to recover them against that defendant alone who has caused him to incur them’: Stumm v Dixon & Co (1889) 22 QBD 529 at 533–4 (emphasis supplied). 26. Stumm v Dixon & Co (1889) 22 QBD 529 at 534. As the court was constituted by only two judges, the decision at first instance, which Lord Esher MR had affirmed, stood. 27. See, for example, Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1341; BC9600947 at [68]–[74] per

Heerey J. As to the costs of issues see 8.2–8.13. 28. (2008) 166 FCR 30; [2008] FCAFC 5; BC200800400 at [58]–[60]. 29. Probiotec Ltd v University of Melbourne (2008) 166 FCR 30; [2008] FCAFC 5; BC200800400 at [91]. 30. Probiotec Ltd v University of Melbourne (2008) 166 FCR 30; [2008] FCAFC 5; BC200800400 at [73]. What also influenced this ruling was that Probiotec had not been joined for the first year of the proceedings, in which considerable costs were incurred preparing for two hearings, each of which was vacated: at [72]. 31. [2006] WASC 298 (S2); BC200705326 at [8]–[9]. 32. Beaumont v Senior [1903] 1 KB 282 at 284 per Lord Alverstone CJ; Troupp v Caffery [1920] QWN 27; Vucadinovic v Lombardi [1967] VR 81 at 87 per Pape J; Post v Colbert (1978) 20 SASR 62 at 65 per Wells J (FC); Lackersteen v Jones (No 2) (1988) 93 FLR 442 at 449 per Asche CJ (SC(NT)); Dimos v Willetts (2000) 2 VR 170 at 180, 187; [2000] VSCA 154; BC200005177 per Ormiston JA. 33. Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales [2000] NSWSC 232; BC200001561 at [95] per Einstein J; Rasch Nominees Pty Ltd v Batholomaeus (No 3) [2013] SASC 14; BC201300646 at [11] per Kourakis CJ. 34. Duchman v Oakland Dairy Co Ltd [1930] 4 DLR 989 at 992 per Middleton JA (CA(Ont)); Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales [2000] NSWSC 232; BC200001561 at [104] per Einstein J; Spotless Group Ltd v Premier Building and Consulting Pty Ltd [2008] VSCA 115; BC200804692 at [39]–[45] per Redlich JA; Rasch Nominees Pty Ltd v Batholomaeus (No 3) [2013] SASC 14; BC201300646 at [11]–[17] per Kourakis CJ. Contra Keen v Towler (1924) 41 TLR 86 (criticised in Currabubula Holdings at [103]–[104]), whose criticism was endorsed by Kourakis CJ in Rasch Nominees Pty Ltd v Batholomaeus (No 3) at [12]). 35. See 11.12–11.31. 36. Kelly’s Directories Ltd v Gavin and Lloyds [1901] 2 Ch 763. 37. Oliver, p 69. 38. (2000) 2 VR 170 at 178–9; [2000] VSCA 154; BC200005177. 39. Dimos v Willetts (2000) 2 VR 170 at 186; [2000] VSCA 154; BC200005177 (footnote in original omitted). 40. Dimos v Willetts (2000) 2 VR 170 at 179, 187; [2000] VSCA 154; BC200005177. His Honour was also influenced by: first, the lack of clarity as to what the decision in Kelly’s Directories was taken originally, or in later years, to stand for; second, that although there had been many reported cases as to what are the appropriate orders for costs where there has been partial success against one or more of a number of defendants (especially in relation to applications for Sanderson and Bullock orders: see 11.12–11.31), reference to Kelly’s Directories was confined to a handful of occasions in England and Australia in reported judgments; and third, there had been but a few brief references to the case in the standard textbooks on costs, many of which were delphically expressed: at 178. The remarks in Dimos regarding Kelly’s Directories were endorsed by Doyle CJ in Aretzis v Larwood (2002) 223 LSJS 192; [2002] SASC 367; BC200207035 at [13]–[19]. Cf Korner v H Korner & Co Ltd [1951] Ch 10 at 18–19 per Singleton LJ. 41. As to the circumstances justifying no order for costs in favour of a successful party see 8.25–8.61. 42. Dimos v Willetts (2000) 2 VR 170 at 187; [2000] VSCA 154; BC200005177.

43. Dimos v Willetts (2000) 2 VR 170 at 179; [2000] VSCA 154; BC200005177. As to Bullock and Sanderson orders see 11.12–11.31. 44. NT r 26.10(1); Qld r 364(1), 364(2); Tas r 291(1); Vic r 26.10(1). 45. NT r 26.10(2); Qld r 364(3); Tas r 291(2); Vic r 26.10(2). 46. Henderson v Simon Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd [1988] VR 867 at 869 per Murphy J. 47. Toomey v Scolaro’s Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd (No 4) [2002] VSC 28; BC200200605 at [31] per Eames J. 48. Lend Lease Retail Projects Pty Ltd v Construction Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd [2000] VSCA 114; BC200003515 at [15] per Callaway JA. 49. Henderson v Simon Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd [1988] VR 867 at 872 per Murphy J; Shoesmith v Northern Territory [1995] NTSC 118 at [6]–[9] per Martin CJ. 50. [2000] VSCA 114; BC200003515. 51. Cf Shoesmith v Northern Territory [1995] NTSC 118 at [10]–[11] per Martin CJ (where although the second defendant’s offer of contribution made shortly before the hearing may not have shortened the trial between the plaintiff and the defendants, as it would have put an end to the issues and obviated the dispute between the defendants, the court ordered the first defendant to pay the second defendant its costs of two days of the trial on a party and party basis). 52. [1988] VR 867. 53. Henderson v Simon Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd [1988] VR 867 at 873. 54. Thorne v Doug Wade Consultants Pty Ltd [1985] VR 433 at 500 per McGarvie J (FC); Lackersteen v Jones (No 2) (1988) 93 FLR 442 at 442–3 per Asche CJ (SC(NT)); Rooney (Litigation Guardian of) v Graham (2001) 198 DLR (4th) 1 at 6 per Carthy JA (CA(Ont)). The Sanderson order is specifically recognised by SA r 266(2) (formerly SA RSC r 101.01(1)(d)). 55. Bankamerica Finance Ltd v Nock [1988] AC 1002 at 1007, 1011 per Lord Brandon. 56. Babcock v Carr (1981) 127 DLR (3d) 77 at 87 per Rutherford J (HCJ(Ont)). 57. Johnsons Tyne Foundry Pty Ltd v Maffra Corporation (1948) 77 CLR 544 at 572; BC4800490 per Williams J. See also Rudow v Great Britain Mutual Life Assurance Society (1881) 17 Ch D 600 at 608 per Jessel MR; Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] 2 KB 533 at 539 per Romer LJ. Historically the court of Chancery, pursuant to its jurisdiction to deal with the costs of litigants and to decide by whom they should be borne (see 6.2), adopted the practice, where it was of the opinion that the costs ought to be borne by a co-defendant, ‘to direct the plaintiff to pay them in the first instance, and then to add them to his own, and to have them over against the defendant who was to bear them’: Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co at 542 per Stirling LJ (citing as an example Blenkinsopp v Blenkinsopp (1850) 12 Beav 568 at 588; 50 ER 1177 at 1185 per Lord Langdale MR). After the Judicature Acts this practice was altered in Rudow, such that the proper form of order was to direct the unsuccessful defendant liable to costs to pay them direct to the successful co-defendant. 58. Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] 2 KB 533 at 543 per Stirling LJ; Vance v Cheynes Beach Whaling Co [1966] WAR 16 at 24 per D’Arcy J. 59. Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] 2 KB 533 at 539 per Romer LJ; Mayer v Harte [1960] 2 All ER 840 at 847 per Willmer LJ, at 850 per Sellers LJ; Vance v Cheynes Beach Whaling Co [1966] WAR 16 at 24 per D’Arcy J; Bankamerica Finance Ltd v Nock [1988] AC 1002 at 1011 per Lord Brandon.

60. See, for example, Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (FCA, von Doussa J, 27 May 1997, unreported) BC9702144 at 11–13. 61. See, for example, Mayer v Harte [1960] 2 All ER 840 at 848 per Willmer LJ, at 849–50 per Sellers LJ; Vucadinovic v Lombardi [1967] VR 81 at 85 per Pape J; Barradine Pty Ltd v Westworld Holdings Pty Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 498 at 504 per Andrews CJ; Quintano v B W Rose Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 626; BC200905732 at [7]–[8] per Brereton J. 62. Mayer v Harte [1960] 2 All ER 840 at 850 per Sellers LJ. 63. Bankamerica Finance Ltd v Nock [1988] AC 1002 at 1011 per Lord Brandon. 64. See, for example, Bankamerica Finance Ltd v Nock [1988] AC 1002 at 1011–12 per Lord Brandon. As to the nature of judicial discretion see 6.14. 65. See, for example, Hughes Bros v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church [1999] NSWSC 1051; BC9907002 at [58] per Foster AJ. 66. [1982] 2 NZLR 618 at 626 (HC). 67. Brown v Heathcote County Council (No 2) [1982] 2 NZLR 618 at 627 (HC). See also Mee v DWD Hotels Ltd (No 2) [1974] 2 NZLR 272 at 275–7 per Beattie J (SC). 68. As to the award of costs on an indemnity basis see 16.23–16.31. 69. See, for example, Yamacoe Pty Ltd v Michel Survey Group Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 393; BC200207291 at [50] per Fryberg J. 70. Hedges v Farrow [1979] 1 NSWLR 106 at 108–9 per Yeldham J. 71. See 6.7–6.8, 6.14. 72. Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] 2 KB 533 at 538–9 per Romer LJ; Nabour v Harris and Churruca [1963] Qd R 321 at 327 per Hart J (FC). 73. See, for example, Hedges v Farrow [1979] 1 NSWLR 106 at 108 per Yeldham J (who held that a statutory provision to the effect that ‘[w]here … the defendant defends an action commenced by the filing of an ordinary summons, the court may in its judgment order the payment of such amount as may be specified in the judgment by one party to the other for or towards the reasonable professional costs incurred by that other party in having a barrister or attorney … acting on behalf of that other party’ (Courts of Petty Sessions (Civil Claims) Act 1970 (NSW) s 35(b) (repealed)) did not empower the court to order a party to pay, in addition, the costs that other party has been ordered to pay to another person joined in the proceedings, who has been successful). 74. Hong v A R Brown Ltd [1948] 1 KB 515 at 522 per Lord Greene MR; Nabour v Harris and Churruca [1963] Qd R 321 at 327 per Hart J (FC). 75. Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215 at 247 per Wilson J, at 260 per Brennan J; BC8400486. 76. Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] 2 KB 533 at 539 per Romer LJ; Brown v Heathcote County Council (No 2) [1982] 2 NZLR 618 at 626 per Hardie Boys J (HC); Coastal Hire Pty Ltd v Ewers [2009] WASCA 36 (S); BC200904459 at [34] per Newnes JA, with whom Wheeler and Buss JJA concurred. 77. See, for example, Barradine Pty Ltd v Westworld Holdings Pty Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 498 at 503 per Andrews CJ (who considered that Priest v Whitney and Houston (No 2) [1961] QWN 4 — where Philp J had held that a Bullock order is appropriate only in jury trials where costs follow the event — limited the wide discretion given to trial judges on questions of costs, and that ‘[o]ne must be careful to avoid so circumscribing the discretion with rules as to render it not a discretion at all’). As to the nature of judicial discretion as to costs generally see 6.14–6.20.

78. See, for example, Norwest Refrigeration Services Pty Ltd v Bain Dawes (WA) Pty Ltd (1984) 157 CLR 149 at 163 per Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ, at 176 per Brennan J; BC8400481. On this point generally see 20.29–20.33. 79. Rooney (Litigation Guardian of) v Graham (2001) 198 DLR (4th) 1 at 6 per Carthy JA (CA(Ont)); Popovic v ACN 098 054 678 Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 612; BC201209693 at [22] per Kaye J. 80. Besterman v British Motor Cab Company Ltd [1914] 3 KB 181 at 186–7 per Vaughan Williams LJ; Johnsons Tyne Foundry Pty Ltd v Maffra Corporation (1948) 77 CLR 544 at 572; BC4800490 per Williams J; Altamura v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1974] VR 33 at 35 per Kaye J; Norwest Refrigeration Services Pty Ltd v Bain Dawes (WA) Pty Ltd (1984) 157 CLR 149 at 163; BC8400481 per Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ; Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215 at 229–30 per Gibbs CJ, at 247 per Wilson J; BC8400486; Fimiston Mining NL v Western Reefs Ltd (1996) 14 WAR 387 at 390; BC9600610 per Steytler J. 81. (1988) 47 SASR 6 at 7. See also Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] 2 KB 533 at 538–9 per Romer LJ; Besterman v British Motor Cab Company Ltd [1914] 3 KB 181 at 190 per Swinfen Eady LJ. 82. Besterman v British Motor Cab Company Ltd [1914] 3 KB 181 at 191–2 per Swinfen Eady LJ; Lackersteen v Jones (No 2) (1988) 93 FLR 442 at 449 per Asche CJ (SC(NT)); Mifsud v ICT Pty Ltd (1997) 7 Tas R 148 at 153; BC9705250 per Slicer J. 83. See 7.21–7.23. 84. Bullock v London General Omnibus Company [1907] 1 KB 264; Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] 2 KB 533. 85. See, for example, Child v Stenning (1879) 11 Ch D 82 at 87 per Jessel MR (Bullock-type order); Rudow v Great Britain Mutual Life Assurance Society (1881) 17 Ch D 600 (Sanderson-type order). 86. [1914] 3 KB 181. 87. Besterman v British Motor Cab Company Ltd [1914] 3 KB 181 at 187 per Vaughan Williams LJ, at 188 per Kennedy LJ, at 190 per Swinfen Eady LJ. See also Hong v A R Brown Ltd [1948] 1 KB 515 at 522 per Lord Greene MR; Norwood v Pokaka Timber Company Ltd [1955] NZLR 827 at 830 per North J (SC); Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215 at 260; BC8400486 per Brennan J; Reid v Campbell Wallis Moule & Co Pty Ltd [1990] VR 859 at 876 per Tadgell J. Curiously, in Lane Group Ltd v D I & L Paterson Ltd [2000] 1 NZLR 129 the majority of the New Zealand Court of Appeal interpreted Hong v A R Brown Ltd, not Besterman, as propounding such a general discretion: at 152 per Tipping J. This is an odd conclusion given that at least two of the judges in Besterman (namely Vaughan Williams and Kennedy LJJ) made express statements recognising a general discretion. Thomas J in Lane Group dissented but, in a judgment to be preferred, said that if Hong had indicated a different approach to Besterman, one would have expected the point to surface long ago: at 135. His Honour remarked that Hong was not intended to reverse or distinguish Besterman but to apply and endorse it: at 136. 88. Leading Edge Events Australia Pty Ltd v Te Kanawa (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 568; BC200704399 at [85] per Bergin J. 89. Besterman v British Motor Cab Company Ltd [1914] 3 KB 181 at 186–7. See also Public Trustee v Auckland Electric Power Board [1944] NZLR 782 at 833 per Myers CJ (CA); Brown v Heathcote County Council (No 2) [1982] 2 NZLR 618 at 626 per Hardie Boys J (HC). 90. See, for example, Hong v A R Brown Ltd [1948] 1 KB 515 at 523 per Lord Greene MR. 91. Victorian WorkCover Authority v Kagan Bros Consolidated Pty Ltd (2011) 31 VR 386; [2011]

VSCA 91; BC201101871 at [12] per Redlich and Bongiorno JJA (‘An assessment of whether such an order will do justice to the unsuccessful party, usually commences with an inquiry as to whether it was reasonable for the plaintiff to have joined the successful defendant’). 92. See 11.23–11.27. 93. See 11.28. 94. Post v Colbert (1978) 20 SASR 62 at 65 per Wells J (FC). 95. See, for example, Poulton v Moore [1913] WN 349. Cf Craven v South British Insurance Co Ltd [1952] VLR 260 (where there were doubts as to both fact and law, and Sholl J held that the doubts as to the facts made it reasonable for the plaintiff to join the two defendants: at 272). 96. See, for example, Donovan v Cammell Laird & Co [1949] 2 All ER 82 (where the plaintiff joined the defendants due to an incorrect interpretation of the relevant regulations, Devlin J held not reasonable to penalise the first defendants by making them bear the costs of the second and third defendants: at 90). 97. Allman v Daly (No 2) [1959] VR 614 at 624 per Pape J; Lane Group Ltd v D I & L Paterson Ltd [2000] 1 NZLR 129 at 141 per Thomas J (in dissent) (CA) (‘there may well be cases where the plaintiff should not be spared paying the costs of the successful defendant where a joinder has been undertaken solely for tactical reasons and those reasons cannot be said to be legitimately incurred in obtaining judgment against the unsuccessful defendant’). 98. Post v Colbert (1978) 20 SASR 62 at 65–6 per Wells J (FC). 99. Clarke v Avondale Transport Ltd [1969] NZLR 361 at 363 per Richmond J (SC); Altamura v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1974] VR 33 at 35 per Kaye J. 100. Hong v A R Brown Ltd [1948] 1 KB 515 at 522 per Lord Greene MR; Johnsons Tyne Foundry Pty Ltd v Maffra Corporation (1948) 77 CLR 544 at 572; BC4800490 per Williams J. 101. Atkins v Purslowe [1966] WAR 46 at 47 per Hale J. 102. Altamura v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1974] VR 33 at 35 per Kaye J; Fennell v Supervision and Engineering Services Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 47 SASR 6 at 20 per von Doussa J (FC); Lane Group Ltd v D I & L Paterson Ltd [2000] 1 NZLR 129 at 152 per Tipping J (CA); Central Goldfields Shire v Haley (No 2) [2009] VSCA 203; BC200908737 at [8] per Redlich JA, with whom Neave JA and Pagone AJA concurred. 103. As in Bullock v London General Omnibus Company [1907] 1 KB 264. 104. Post v Colbert (1978) 20 SASR 62 at 65 per Wells J (FC). 105. Fennell v Supervision and Engineering Services Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 47 SASR 6 at 20 per von Doussa J (FC); Almeida v Universal Dye Works Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] NSWCA 156; BC200107129 at [35] per Santow AJA (referring to the way the unsuccessful defendant conducted its defence). 106. Dominello v Dominello (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 257; BC200907815 at [19] per Handley AJA, with whom Beazley and Macfarlan JJA concurred. 107. Bostik Australia Pty Ltd v Liddiard (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 304; BC200908727 at [29] per the court. 108. [1974] VR 33 at 35. 109. Altamura v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1974] VR 33 at 35–6. See also Fennell v Supervision and Engineering Services Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 47 SASR 6 at 8 per King CJ, at 15

per Jacobs J (FC) (where it was held that after the first defendant implicated the second defendant, the plaintiff really had no choice but to join the latter as a defendant, and thereafter to prosecute the action to a conclusion against both defendants; to do so was entirely reasonable, thus raising a proper foundation for a Bullock order); Nella v Kingia Pty Ltd (1989) ATPR ¶40-952 at 50,406; BC8908172 per French J (FCA). 110. This has been stated as the ratio of Besterman v British Motor Cab Company Ltd [1914] 3 KB 181: Hong v A R Brown Ltd [1948] 1 KB 515 at 522 per Lord Greene MR; Vucadinovic v Lombardi [1967] VR 81 at 85 per Pape J. See also Fennell v Supervision and Engineering Services Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 47 SASR 6 at 7 per King CJ (FC); Lane Group Ltd v D I & L Paterson Ltd [2000] 1 NZLR 129 at 137 per Thomas J (in dissent) (CA). 111. (1984) 157 CLR 215 at 229; BC8400486. 112. See, for example, Johnsons Tyne Foundry Pty Ltd v Maffra Corporation (1948) 77 CLR 544 at 556; BC4800490 per Latham CJ. Cf Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215 at 247; BC8400486 per Wilson J, who stated that a Bullock order may be made where the costs in question have been reasonably and properly incurred by the plaintiff as between the plaintiff and the unsuccessful defendant. Although when stated in these general terms, it appears that Wilson J took a broader view than Gibbs CJ and Brennan J, a careful reading of his judgment does not deny the relevance of the conduct of the defendants in this context: see Fennell v Supervision and Engineering Services Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 47 SASR 6 at 8 per King CJ (cf at 14 per Jacobs J, at 19 per von Doussa J) (FC). 113. (1978) 21 ACTR 23 at 30–1. See also Lackersteen v Jones (No 2) (1988) 93 FLR 442 at 449 per Asche CJ (SC(NT)); Lane Group Ltd v D I & L Paterson Ltd [2000] 1 NZLR 129 at 152, 155–6 per Tipping J (CA); Almeida v Universal Dye Works Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] NSWCA 156; BC200107129 at [34] per Santow AJA. 114. Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215 at 229; BC8400486. See, for example, Zachariah v Ajay Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) (1983) 33 SASR 426 at 428 per Mitchell ACJ (who held that nothing the unsuccessful defendant had done caused the plaintiff to sue the successful defendant, the latter having been sued under an error of law for which the unsuccessful defendant should not be held responsible in costs). 115. McCracken & McCracken v Pippett [2000] VSCA 20; BC200000808 at [11] per Callaway JA, with whom Batt and Chernov JJA concurred. 116. (1984) 157 CLR 215 at 260; BC8400486. 117. (1998) NSW ConvR ¶55-842 at 56,605; BC9800281. See also Lane Group Ltd v DI & L Paterson Ltd [2000] 1 NZLR 129 at 152 per Tipping J, at 137 per Thomas J (in dissent) (CA); Latrobe Council v Williams (2008) 18 Tas R 138; [2008] TASSC 56; BC200808383 at [18] per Crawford CJ, at [42] per Tennent J. 118. (1948) 77 CLR 544; BC4800490. 119. Johnsons Tyne Foundry Pty Ltd v Maffra Corporation (1948) 77 CLR 544 at 566 per Dixon J, at 573 per Williams J; BC4800490. See also Lackersteen v Jones (No 2) (1988) 93 FLR 442 (SC(NT)) (where the conduct of the unsuccessful defendant in denying the authority of its agent (whereby the plaintiff joined the agent who became the successful defendant), and in the unsuccessful defendant telling the plaintiff in one way or another that it should look to the successful defendant for its remedy, was held to justify a Bullock order). 120. Sunset Pty Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd (1999) 92 FCR 1 at 3–5; [1999] FCA 702; BC9902809 (FC). See, for example, Reid v Campbell Wallis Moule & Co Pty Ltd [1990] VR 859

at 879 per Tadgell J (inducement to sue arising out of the circumstances, as opposed to any request, and stemming more from convenience than practical necessity). 121. See, for example, Legg v J J Craig Ltd [1954] NZLR 258 (SC) (where the first defendant took action itself to bring the second defendant into the controversy by issuing and serving upon it a third party notice, thus inducing the plaintiff, acting reasonably, to convert the third party into a defendant, and justifying an order that the first (unsuccessful) defendant pay the costs of the second (successful) defendant: at 259 per Stanton J). 122. [2001] NSWCA 156; BC200107129 at [8] (emphasis supplied). 123. Almeida v Universal Dye Works Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] NSWCA 156; BC200107129 at [39]. 124. Almeida v Universal Dye Works Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] NSWCA 156; BC200107129 at [39]. 125. [2005] NSWCA 140; BC200502986. 126. Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) v Palmer (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 140; BC200502986 at [35]. See also Dominello v Dominello (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 257; BC200907815 at [28] per Handley AJA, with whom Beazley and Macfarlan JJA concurred; RL & CA Woods Pty Ltd v Pacific National (Victoria) Ltd (2009) 54 MVR 307; [2009] NSWCA 298; BC200909904 at [152]–[157] per Ipp JA, with whom Allsop P and Young JA concurred (where although it was uncertain, until judgment, whether one or both of the defendants, on the one hand, and the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA), on the other, would be held liable, thereby making it reasonable for the plaintiff to join the defendants, the relevant uncertainty was not created by the conduct of the defendants but derived from the nature of all the circumstances in the case). 127. See, for example, Mulready v J H & W Bell Ltd [1953] 2 All ER 215 at 219 per Lord Goddard CJ (cf Altamura v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1974] VR 33 at 37 per Kaye J); Hall v Wilson [1954] VLR 576 at 577 per O’Bryan J; Allman v Daly (No 2) [1959] VR 614 at 623 per Pape J; Atkins v Purslowe [1966] WAR 46 at 47 per Hale J; Scarboro Golf & Country Club Ltd v City of Scarborough (No 2) (1986) 32 DLR (4th) 732 at 736 per Osler J (HCJ(Ont)). 128. Goldsworthy v Bickell [1987] Ch 378 at 418 per Parker LJ; Lackersteen v Jones (No 2) (1988) 93 FLR 442 at 448 per Asche CJ (SC(NT)); Reid v Campbell Wallis Moule & Co Pty Ltd [1990] VR 859 at 877 per Tadgell J; Mifsud v ICT Pty Ltd (1997) 7 Tas R 148 at 153; BC9705250 per Slicer J; Rooney (Litigation Guardian of) v Graham (2001) 198 DLR (4th) 1 at 6–7 per Carthy JA (CA(Ont)). 129. Lackersteen v Jones (No 2) (1988) 93 FLR 442 at 449 per Asche CJ (SC(NT)); Central Goldfields Shire v Haley (No 2) [2009] VSCA 203; BC200908737 at [11] per Redlich JA, with whom Neave JA and Pagone AJA concurred (‘in the relevant sense interdependent’); Victorian WorkCover Authority v Kagan Bros Consolidated Pty Ltd (2011) 31 VR 386; [2011] VSCA 91; BC201101871 at [20], [21] per Redlich and Bongiorno JJA. 130. Popovic v ACN 098 054 678 Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 612; BC201209693 at [14] per Kaye J. 131. [1974] VR 33. 132. Altamura v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1974] VR 33 at 37–8. 133. (1986) 87 FLR 251 (SC(NT)). 134. Framar Money Management Pty Ltd v Territory Insurance Office (1986) 87 FLR 251 at 276 (SC(NT)). 135. Brown v Heathcote County Council (No 2) [1982] 2 NZLR 618 at 626 per Hardie Boys J (HC); Lane Group Ltd v D I & L Paterson Ltd [2000] 1 NZLR 129 at 152 per Tipping J (CA).

136. See Ch 12. 137. See, for example, Lane Group Ltd v D I & L Paterson Ltd [2000] 1 NZLR 129 at 156–7 per Tipping J (CA). As to the costs of partially successful plaintiffs generally see 8.2–8.13. 138. Lane Group Ltd v D I & L Paterson Ltd [2000] 1 NZLR 129 at 156 per Tipping J (CA). 139. [1955] NZLR 827 (SC). 140. Norwood v Pokaka Timber Company Ltd [1955] NZLR 827 at 831 (SC). 141. Norwood v Pokaka Timber Company Ltd [1955] NZLR 827 at 831–2 (SC). 142. Norwood v Pokaka Timber Company Ltd [1955] NZLR 827 at 832 (SC). A similar order had been made in Ronaldson v Rankin [1948] NZLR 850 at 854 (FC(SC)) (where the amount recovered was only one-third of the amount claimed). Cf Lane Group Ltd v D I & L Paterson Ltd [2000] 1 NZLR 129 at 156–7 per Tipping J (CA). 143. Ronaldson v Rankin [1948] NZLR 850 at 854 (FC(SC)). 144. See, for example, Brown v Heathcote County Council (No 2) [1982] 2 NZLR 618 at 627 per Hardie Boys J (HC) (where the amount recovered was 78 per cent of the amount claimed, and it was held that the amount claimed was hardly unreasonable so as to reduce the amount recovered under a Bullock order). 145. FCR 2011 r 15.01 (formerly FCR 1979 O 5 r 1); ACT r 302 (formerly ACT RSC O 20 r 1); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 22 (formerly Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 78); NT r 11.01; Qld r 192; SA r 36 (formerly SA RSC r 37.01); Tas rr 201, 202; Vic r 11.01; WA O 19 r 1. See generally Cairns, pp 349–54. 146. Barclays Bank v Tom [1923] 1 KB 221 at 224 per Scrutton LJ. 147. SA r 266(3) (formerly see SA RSC r 101.01(1)(e), discussed in Skinner v Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia (SC(SA), Legoe J, 19 April 1994, unreported) BC9400618; WA O 19 r 12. See also the former HCR 1952 O 17 r 10 and ACT RSC O 20 r 11 (as to which see Giles v Pierce (1982) 44 ACTR 6 at 8 per Blackburn CJ, who held that an order for the costs of an interlocutory application relating to third party proceedings was within this rule). 148. See 6.14. 149. Hornby v Cardwell (1881) 8 QBD 329 at 336 per Jessel MR; Edginton v Clark [1964] 1 QB 367 at 379, 384 per Upjohn LJ; Thomas v Times Book Company Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 911 at 919–20 per Plowman J; Devon Downs (Administrators) Pty Ltd v Theodoropoulos (SC(Vic), Kaye J, 7 April 1982, unreported) BC8200012. 150. Gold Coast Bakeries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Heat & Control Pty Ltd [1992] 1 Qd R 162 at 175 (FC); Kheirs Financial Services Pty Ltd v Aussie Home Loans Pty Ltd (2010) 31 VR 46; [2010] VSCA 355; BC201009771 at [28] per the court. 151. As to the indemnity rule see 7.2–7.6. 152. Hoare v Frames Carrying Company Ltd [1961] NZLR 891 at 900 per Richmond J (SC); Orr v I P Shannon Ltd [1966] NZLR 479 at 480 per Tompkins J (SC); Thompson Land Ltd v Lendlease Shopping Centre Development Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 140; BC200002280 at [38] per McDonald J; Kheirs Financial Services Pty Ltd v Aussie Home Loans Pty Ltd (2010) 31 VR 46; [2010] VSCA 355; BC201009771 at [28] per the court. 153. Jerred v T Roddam Dent & Son Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 104 at 110 per Atkinson J; Sinclair v William Arnott Pty Ltd (1963) 64 SR (NSW) 88 at 97 per Walsh J (FC); Burke v Gillett [1996] 1 VR 196 at 200–1; BC9401269 per Tadgell J (App Div(Vic)).

154. See, for example, Gerson v Simpson [1903] 2 KB 197 at 203 per Collins MR; Simpson v British Industries Trust Ltd (1923) 39 TLR 286 at 287 per Salter J; Jerred v T Roddam Dent & Son Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 104 at 110 per Atkinson J; Sinclair v William Arnott Pty Ltd (1963) 64 SR (NSW) 88 at 96 per Walsh J (FC). 155. Kheirs Financial Services Pty Ltd v Aussie Home Loans Pty Ltd (2010) 31 VR 46; [2010] VSCA 355; BC201009771 at [16], [28] per the court. See, for example, Orr v I P Shannon Ltd [1966] NZLR 479 (where there were third and fourth parties joined, each separately represented, and it was held that the defendant was liable for each of their costs). That is not to say that multiple parties joined will always get their full costs if they are separately represented: see 11.51–11.58. 156. See generally GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd (2003) 201 ALR 55; [2003] FCA 688; BC200303795 at [70]–[75] per Finn J. 157. Re Salmon (1889) 42 Ch D 351 at 361 per Lord Esher MR; Gold Coast Bakeries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Heat & Control Pty Ltd [1992] 1 Qd R 175 (FC); Mifsud v ICT Pty Ltd (1997) 7 Tas R 148 at 152; BC9705250 per Slicer J. See, for example, Gladstone Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Wills (1984) 6 FCR 496 (where, in a proceeding alleging misleading conduct by the defendant owners of a shopping centre inducing entry into a lease, the owners resisted the applicant’s claim and joined their leasing agents as third parties, seeking an indemnity in the event that the applicant was successful; the owners succeeded in defeating the applicant’s claim, but failed in their claim against the agents, and were ordered to pay the agents’ costs, because, as explained by Beaumont J, with whom Northrop and Davies JJ agreed, the owners’ decision to join the agents could ‘be seen as something done with a view to advancing their own interests by seeking to secure immediate indemnity or contribution … in the event that [the applicant] should succeed in her claim’, making it ‘only just that [the owners] … should bear the costs of the attempt to secure such an advantage for their own benefit’: at 510). 158. Paron v Fry (No 2) [1990] 1 Qd R 550 at 551 per Kelly SPJ (FC). Cf Gold Coast Bakeries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Heat & Control Pty Ltd [1992] 1 Qd R 162 at 175 (FC). 159. Victoria University of Technology v Tullett and Tokyo (Victoria) Pty Ltd (SC(Vic), Beach J, 29 August 1994, unreported) BC9406133 at 4; Fertinova Australia Pty Ltd v Samardzija (SC(Qld), Mackenzie J, 10 July 1995, unreported) BC9507174 at 4; Mifsud v ICT Pty Ltd (1997) 7 Tas R 148 at 152; BC9705250 per Slicer J; Thompson Land Ltd v Lendlease Shopping Centre Development Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 140; BC200002280 at [36], [38] per McDonald J; Edwards v Stocks (2009) 17 Tas R 454; [2009] TASSC 11; BC200901137. The plaintiff may be ordered to indemnify the defendant for the third party’s costs or ordered to pay those costs direct to the third party. If the plaintiff is impecunious, the latter order will ordinarily be avoided, it being reasoned that the third party, who has been wholly successful, should not be burdened by the plaintiff’s impecuniosity. This rather should rest with the defendant, as it is the defendant who has failed against the third party. See Johnson v Ribbins [1977] 1 All ER 806 at 811 per Goff LJ; Swisstex Finance Pty Ltd v Lamb [1993] 2 Qd R 463 at 465; BC9303358 per Ryan J. 160. Thomas v Times Book Company Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 911 at 920 per Plowman J. 161. Kheirs Financial Services Pty Ltd v Aussie Home Loans Pty Ltd (2010) 31 VR 46; [2010] VSCA 355; BC201009771 at [110] per the court. 162. (1997) 7 Tas R 148; BC9705250. 163. Mifsud v ICT Pty Ltd (1997) 7 Tas R 148 at 152; BC9705250. 164. Furber v Stacey [2005] NSWCA 242; BC200505308 at [114] per Einstein J. His Honour queried the ‘guiding principle’ approach propounded by King CJ in Lombard Insurance Co (Australia) Ltd v Pastro (1994) 175 LSJS 448 at 450, who said: ‘I think that a guiding principle for the exercise of

the discretion in such cases may be formulated as follows. Where the nature of the plaintiffs claim, or allegations in support thereof, render it reasonable, having regard to the purposes of third party procedure, to bring in the third party, and the third party claim is unsuccessful solely by reason of the failure of the plaintiff to sustain its claim or the relevant allegations, the defendant should ordinarily recover from the plaintiff the costs of the third party claim including those which the defendant is ordered to pay to the third party. The emphasis is on the word “ordinarily”. The discretion is unfettered and a variety of factors may properly enter into the exercise of it’. That King CJ was careful to acknowledge the unfettered nature of the relevant discretion suggests that Einstein J’s misgivings may prove unfounded. In any event, King CJ’s remarks were endorsed by Kelly J, with whom Anderson and Stanley JJ concurred, in ACN 068 691 092 Pty Ltd v Plan 4 Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2012) 112 SASR 329; [2012] SASCFC 25; BC201201551 at [158]– [159]. 165. Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v De Jager [1984] VR 483 at 500 per Tadgell J; GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd (2003) 201 ALR 55; [2003] FCA 688; BC200303795 at [73] per Finn J. 166. Furber v Stacey [2005] NSWCA 242; BC200505308 at [115] per Einstein J. 167. [2005] NSWCA 242; BC200505308. 168. Furber v Stacey [2005] NSWCA 242; BC200505308 at [57]. 169. Furber v Stacey [2005] NSWCA 242; BC200505308 at [58]. 170. Furber v Stacey [2005] NSWCA 242; BC200505308 at [59]. See also at [135]–[137] per Einstein J. Contra at [85]–[86] per Basten JA dissenting. 171. [1964] 1 QB 367. 172. Edginton v Clark [1964] 1 QB 367 at 384. 173. [1964–5] NSWR 1833. 174. Leaver v Golsby [1964–5] NSWR 1833 at 1838. 175. P E Nygh and P Butt (eds), Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary, Butterworths, Sydney, 1997, p 629. See also Johnston v Public Trustee (1929) 24 Tas LR 71 at 74 per Clark J (defining interveners as ‘parties voluntarily entering the litigation and not parties cited to appear’). 176. Hocking v Southern Greyhound Racing Club Inc (1993) 61 SASR 213 at 215 per King CJ, at 219– 20 per Debelle J; BC9303973. Cf Rushby v Roberts [1983] 1 NSWLR 350 at 353–4 per Street CJ. 177. SA r 89 (formerly SA RSC O 33) (see Westpac v Gibbons (No 4) [2012] SASC 80; BC201204154 at [9], [10] Judge Lunn); Tas rr 189–191. 178. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78A(1). As to the costs consequences of such intervention see 11.46–11.48. 179. Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) s 51(1). 180. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 91. 181. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 91B. 182. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 92. 183. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 92A. As to the costs consequences of such intervention see 11.49–11.50. 184. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1330.

185. Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 320. 186. In the context of the probate jurisdiction see, for example, Hamilton v Hamilton (1913) 30 WN (NSW) 46; Osborne v Smith (1960) 105 CLR 153; BC6000780. Regarding the Attorney-General as an intervener at general law see Corporate Affairs Commission v Bradley [1974] 1 NSWLR 391 at 399–404 per Hutley JA. 187. Ku-ring-gai Municipal Council v Attorney-General (1954) 55 SR (NSW) 65 at 69 per Roper CJ in Eq; Corporate Affairs Commission v Bradley [1974] 1 NSWLR 391 at 397–8 per Hutley JA; Re Great Eastern Cleaning Services Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NSWLR 278 at 280 per Needham J; Rushby v Roberts [1983] 1 NSWLR 350 at 360 per Hutley JA. 188. Rushby v Roberts [1983] 1 NSWLR 350 at 353 per Street CJ (referring to the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 23). 189. See, for example, Norilya Minerals Pty Ltd v Ireland (1994) 12 WAR 485. 190. Tindle v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1990) 21 NSWLR 492 at 497 (CA); Hocking v Southern Greyhound Racing Club Inc (1993) 61 SASR 213 at 221; BC9303973 per Debelle J. 191. Attorney-General (Ontario) v Winner [1954] AC 541 (PC); Corporate Affairs Commission v Bradley [1974] 1 NSWLR 391 at 396 per Hutley J; Re Medical Assessment Panel (2003) 27 WAR 242; [2003] WASC 154; BC200304618 at [17] per E M Heenan J. Remarks of this kind do not, however, mean that interveners are treated in precisely the same way as the parties to the action. Permission to intervene, after all, only allows interveners to be heard on such matters in the action where the court considers it may be assisted by them. What role an intervener will play in the action will depend upon the circumstances of the case and the discretion of the court. This explains the observation of Judge Lunn that ‘[i]ntervention is an intermediate status between that of a party to an action and that of an amicus curiae’: Westpac v Gibbons (No 4) [2012] SASC 80; BC201204154 at [10]. 192. Marriage of Collins (1985) 75 FLR 84 at 90–1 (FC(Fam Ct)); Lawson v British Columbia (Solicitor-General) (1992) 88 DLR (4th) 533 at 559 per Goldie JA (CA(BC)); O’Keeffe Nominees Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (No 2) (1995) 55 FCR 591 at 597; BC9507763 per Spender J; P v Australian Crime Commission (No 3) (2008) 71 ATR 816; [2008] FCA 1520; BC200809371; Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) s 51(2). 193. Arnold v Queensland (1987) 73 ALR 607 at 621 per Wilcox J (FCA); Johnston v Cameron [2002] FCAFC 301; BC200205778 at [19] per Branson J. 194. See, for example, Xat Ky v Australvic Property Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1785; BC200710258 (where Middleton J held that, as the Australian Securities and Investments Commission had a special interest in supporting the order sought in view of other proceedings being heard concurrently before the court, it should receive its costs: at [22]–[23]); Motor Trades Association of Australia Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd v Rickus [2007] FCA 1878; BC200711587 (where Flick J held that, as the Australian Prudential and Regulatory Authority had a legitimate interest in intervening and assisting the court in the circumstances, and its interests in respect to the resolution of the questions it raised differed from those of the first respondent, it was entitled to its costs: at [34]–[38]). 195. Liverpool City Council v Weir (1984) 53 ALR 77 at 83; BC8400533 (HC). See, for example, Speno Rail Maintenance Australia Pty Ltd v Metals & Minerals Insurance Pte Ltd [2009] WASCA 31 (S); BC200902269 at [8]–[13] per the court; Westpac v Gibbons (No 4) [2012] SASC 80; BC201204154 at [12]–[16] per Judge Lunn (who accepted that the intervention of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission was proper in the circumstances, in view of its

broader interest in the subject matter of the proceeding, such that it should, as an intervener, participate at its own cost). The court rules in some jurisdictions provide that a party who appears upon a proceeding in which he or she is not interested or upon which, according to the practice of the court, he or she ought not to attend, will not be allowed any costs of appearance unless the court (or registrar) expressly directs the costs be allowed: FCR 1979 O 62 r 37 (no equivalent in FCR 2011); ACT r 1727 (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 46); Tas r 860(9). 196. Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 129; BC201205494 at [7] per Allsop P, with whom Bathurst CJ and Campbell JA concurred. 197. See, for example, Highstoke Pty Ltd v Hayes Knight GTO Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 36; BC200700241 (where French J held that, as the public interest dimension of the intervention by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ‘was closely related to the particular interest of other parties’, there was no reason to shield it from a (partial) costs order: at [9]). 198. Hocking v Southern Greyhound Racing Club Inc (1993) 61 SASR 213 at 222; BC9303973 per Debelle J. The same principle underlies other cases where separate representation is pursued: see 11.51–11.58. 199. City of Burnside v Attorney-General (SA) (1994) 63 SASR 65 at 67; BC9405368 per Debelle J; Xat Ky v Australvic Property Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1785; BC200710258 at [21] per Middleton J. This does not affect the court’s power to order costs against an intervener, as a non-party, in respect of proceedings taking place before the intervention: See, for example, Re Z (No 4) (FC(Fam Ct), 6 March 1997, unreported). As to costs orders against non-parties see Ch 22. 200. Minister for Community Welfare v BY and LF (1988) 93 FLR 104 at 113–14 (FC(Fam Ct)); City of Burnside v Attorney-General (SA) (1994) 63 SASR 65 at 67–8; BC9405368 per Debelle J; Construction Forestry Mining & Energy Union v Queensland Coal and Oil Shale Mining Industry (Superannuation) Ltd (2003) 132 FCR 516; [2003] FCA 1174; BC200306210 at [14] per Wilcox J; Re Arc Energy Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 1412; BC200808109 (costs ordered against intervener arising out of an (unsuccessful) application for an adjournment sought for an ulterior purpose). See also Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 30A(2) (where the Attorney-General, on behalf of the Commonwealth, intervenes in a proceeding before the AAT for review of a decision, the Attorney-General may authorise the payment to a party by the Commonwealth of such costs as he or she considers were reasonably incurred by that party in relation to the proceeding as a result of that intervention). 201. City of Burnside v Attorney-General (SA) (1994) 63 SASR 65 at 68; BC9405368 per Debelle J. 202. (1994) 63 SASR 65; BC9405368. 203. City of Burnside v Attorney-General (SA) (1994) 63 SASR 65 at 68; BC9405368. 204. City of Burnside v Attorney-General (SA) (1994) 63 SASR 65 at 68–9; BC9405368. 205. Hamilton v Hamilton (1913) 30 WN (NSW) 46 at 46–7 per Street J. 206. See 11.42–11.43. 207. Bagshaw v Pimm [1900] P 148; Twist v Tye [1902] P 92 at 98 per Gorell Barnes J. Cf Harris v Bagot’s Executor and Trustee Company Ltd [1935] SASR 355 at 357–8 per Reed AJ. 208. Colvin v Fraser (1829) 2 Hagg Ecc 266 at 368; 162 ER 856 at 891 per Sir John Nicholl. 209. (1929) 24 Tas LR 71. 210. Johnston v Public Trustee (1929) 24 Tas LR 71 at 74–5, referring to Shaw and Dickens v Marshall (1858) 1 Sw & Tr 129; 164 ER 660; Tennant v Cross (1886) 12 PD 4.

211. On this point generally see 10.17–10.26. 212. City of Burnside v Attorney-General (SA) (1994) 63 SASR 65 at 67; BC9405368 per Debelle J. 213. The Athenic [1932] WN 10. 214. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78A(1). 215. O’Keeffe Nominees Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (No 2) (1995) 55 FCR 591 at 595; BC9507763 per Spender J. 216. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78A(4). 217. O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 232 at 311; BC9102638 (FC). 218. These stem from the judgment of Kirby P in Australian Postal Commission v Dao (No 2) (1986) 6 NSWLR 497 at 506–7. 219. University of Wollongong v Metwally (1985) 1 NSWLR 722 at 729 (CA) (‘It will sometimes be just that private citizens, caught up in the elucidation of constitutional issues sufficient to warrant the intervention of Attorneys-General, be entitled to look to the public purse to indemnify them for their legal representation, necessarily incurred in defending their private interests whilst the public issues are contemporaneously resolved’). 220. University of Wollongong v Metwally (1985) 1 NSWLR 722 at 729 (CA) (noting that there is no universal rule, but that in each case the discretion conferred by the statute must be exercised); Australian Postal Commission v Dao (No 2) (1986) 6 NSWLR 497 at 507–8 per Kirby P. 221. See, for example, Clark King & Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1978) 140 CLR 120; BC7800057; Perlman v Perlman (1984) 155 CLR 474; BC8400537. 222. (1986) 6 NSWLR 497 at 508–9. See also B(R) v Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto (1995) 122 DLR (4th) 1 at 55 per La Forest J (SCC) (‘The order to award costs against an intervening Attorney-General, acting as she is statutorily authorised to, in the public interest in favour of a party who raises the constitutionality of a statute, appears highly unusual, and only in very rare cases should this be permitted’). 223. Australian Postal Commission v Dao (No 2) (1986) 6 NSWLR 497 at 507 per Kirby P. 224. (1986) 6 NSWLR 497 at 509. See also B and B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Costs) (1997) 22 Fam LR 453 at 460 per Nicholson CJ and Lindenmayer J (FC). 225. (1991) 171 CLR 232 at 311; BC9102638. 226. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B(2). 227. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B(4). 228. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 91(2) (Attorney-General), 91A(4) (Attorney-General of a State), 91B(2) (b) (child welfare officer), 92(3) (other persons, unless the court otherwise orders), 92A(3) (child abuse cases, unless the court otherwise orders). 229. B and B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Costs) (1997) 22 Fam LR 453 at 459 per Nicholson CJ and Lindenmayer J (FC). 230. Woodley v Time [2008] FamCA 162; BC200851185 at [58] per Benjamin J. 231. Woodley v Time [2008] FamCA 162; BC200851185 at [58] per Benjamin J. 232. As to s 117(2A) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) see 8.71–8.78. 233. [1903] P 16.

See, for example, Darnborough v Darnborough (1929) 45 TLR 603 (unsuccessful intervener in a 234. suit for dissolution of marriage denied costs); Gadens Ridgeway v Paroulakis (1992) 15 Fam LR 586 at 594–5 per Nygh J (where the proposed interveners had been totally unsuccessful in their application, and were ordered to bear the costs of the wife and the respondent companies). 235. (2001) 27 Fam LR 484; [2001] FamCA 138 (FC). 236. Under s 92 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). 237. Marriage of Wade-Ferrell (2001) 27 Fam LR 484 at 496; [2001] FamCA 138 (FC). 238. [2008] FamCA 162; BC200851185 at [59]. 239. Under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 91, 91A. 240. B and B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Costs) (1997) 22 Fam LR 453 at 459 per Nicholson CJ and Lindenmayer J (FC). 241. (1997) 22 Fam LR 453 at 460 per Nicholson CJ and Lindenmayer J (FC). Contra at 470–1 per Fogarty J dissenting on this point (remarking that ‘[t]his was not a case where the AttorneyGeneral intervened in private litigation in order to direct the attention of the court to and/or seek to obtain orders or rulings from the court which were unconnected with an essential aspect of litigation between the parties but which were matters in which the Attorney-General had a particular interest’, and that ‘[n]or was this a case where the intervention of the Attorney-General had the effect of altering the essential thrust of the litigation’). Cf Re K (1994) 17 Fam LR 537 (FC) (where no order for costs was made against the intervening Attorney-General). 242. Pursuant to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 92. 243. B and B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Costs) (1997) 22 Fam LR 453 at 460 per Nicholson CJ and Lindenmayer J (FC). 244. As to public interest litigation see Ch 9. 245. GBT Corporation Pty Ltd v Scott (1994) 116 FLR 266 at 269 per Higgins J (SC(ACT)). 246. Ex parte McCay (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 592 at 595 per Jordan CJ; Downs v Civil Aviation Authority (1992) 57 SASR 303 at 307 per Mullighan J. 247. Ex parte McCay (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 592 at 595 per Jordan CJ. 248. Statham v Shephard (No 2) (1974) 23 FLR 244 at 246 per Woodward J (SC(ACT)). This is reflected by a specific provision in the court rules in South Australia and Western Australia: SA r 269 (formerly SA RSC r 101.04) (see Foti v Foti [2009] SASC 177; BC200905536 at [30] per White J, who remarked that ‘[t]he court is concerned about costs being incurred unnecessarily by the over-representation of parties with a common interest’, which is reflected in SA r 269); WA O 66 r 2(d). 249. Read v Chown (1929) 46 WN (NSW) 154 at 155 per Harvey CJ in Eq. 250. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 56(1). 251. Van Eeden v Henry (2005) 62 NSWLR 301; [2005] NSWCA 14; BC200500882 at [33] per Spigelman CJ. 252. Van Eeden v Henry (2005) 62 NSWLR 301; [2005] NSWCA 14; BC200500882 at [64] per Spigelman CJ. 253. See Federal Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) s 37M(1); Fam LR 2004 Pt 1.2; ACT r 21; Qld r 5; Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 7(1); WA O 1 r 4B(1)(a)–(d). 254. As to this rule see Dal Pont, Ch 7.

255. Marnham v Grice (1896) 22 VLR 108 at 109 per Madden CJ (‘It often happens that it is only after the case has fully developed the defendants can know whether or not their interest is common’); City Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar General of the Northern Territory [2001] NTSC 103; BC200107261 at [18] per Thomas J (noting that ‘hindsight … is very different to foresight’). 256. Downs v Civil Aviation Authority (1992) 57 SASR 303 at 307 per Mullighan J. 257. See, for example, Re Octaviar Ltd (No 8) [2010] QCA 57; BC201001434 at [5]–[6] per the court. 258. Statham v Shephard (No 2) (1974) 23 FLR 244 at 246 per Woodward J (SC(ACT)). 259. Statham v Shephard (No 2) (1974) 23 FLR 244 at 246–7 per Woodward J (SC(ACT)). 260. (2008) 101 ALD 1; [2008] FCAFC 19; BC200801494 at [12]–[13]. 261. See, for example, York v Green (1903) 19 WN (NSW) 309; A G Spalding v A W Gamage Ltd [1914] 2 Ch 405; Glen v Union Trustee Company of Australia Ltd (1936) 54 CLR 463 at 465–6; BC3600045 per Rich, Dixon and McTiernan JJ; Richard Brady Franks Ltd v Price (1936) 37 SR (NSW) 37 (affd Richard Brady Franks Ltd v Price (1937) 58 CLR 112; BC3700026); Re Lyell [1941] VLR 207; R v Industrial Disputes Tribunal [1954] 2 All ER 764; Hursey v Williams (SC(Tas), Burbury CJ, 8 July 1960, unreported) at 5–6; R v Racing, Gaming and Liquor Commission (1988) 91 FLR 62 at 65 per Kearney J (SC(NT)); Moore’s (Wallisdown) Ltd v Pensions Ombudsman [2002] 1 WLR 1649 at 1660–1 per Ferris J; Van Eeden v Henry (2005) 62 NSWLR 301; [2005] NSWCA 14; BC200500882 at [67] per Spigelman CJ. 262. Richard Brady Franks Ltd v Price (1936) 37 SR (NSW) 37 at 50–1 per Long Innes CJ in Eq (affd Richard Brady Franks Ltd v Price (1937) 58 CLR 112 at 136; BC3700026 per Latham CJ). 263. [1959] SASR 189. 264. R v Hutchins [1959] SASR 189 at 207. 265. Gaunt v Taylor (1840) 2 Beav 346 at 347; 48 ER 1215 at 1215 per Lord Langdale MR; Re Spurling’s Will Trusts [1966] 1 All ER 745 at 750 per Ungoed-Thomas J. As to costs of trustees generally see 10.2–10.14. 266. Gaunt v Taylor (1840) 2 Beav 346 at 347; 48 ER 1215 at 1215 per Lord Langdale MR; Gompertz v Kensit (1872) LR 13 Eq 369 at 381 per Bacon VC; Re Isaac [1897] 1 Ch 251 at 255–6 per Lindley LJ. 267. Re Spurling’s Will Trusts [1966] 1 All ER 745 at 750–1 per Ungoed-Thomas J. 268. Brady v Edmonson [1917] 2 Ch 285 at 295 per Eve J; Re Spurling’s Will Trusts [1966] 1 All ER 745 at 750–1 per Ungoed-Thomas J. 269. Re Brown (deceased) [1948] St R Qd 280; Re Wood (deceased) [1949] St R Qd 17 at 34 per Macrossan CJ, at 35 per Mansfield SPJ (FC) (cf at 35 per Matthews J in dissent). 270. See Dal Pont, Equity and Trusts, pp 691–3. 271. Ager v Blacklock & Co (1887) 56 LT 890 at 891 per Kekewich J; Verduci v Catanzarita (1980) 53 FLR 156 at 159 per Blackburn CJ (SC(ACT)); Bolton Metropolitan District Council v Secretary or State for the Environment [1996] 1 All ER 184 at 186–7 per Lord Lloyd. 272. (1933) 33 SR (NSW) 371 at 378. 273. (2010) 31 VR 46; [2010] VSCA 355; BC201009771 at [140]–[141] per the court. 274. See generally 10.17–10.29. 275. This is reflected by a specific rule in Tasmania: see Tas r 860(5) (which provides that ‘[i]n taxing

the costs of joint executors or trustees who defend separately, the taxing officer is to allow one set of costs only that is to be apportioned among them as the taxing officer considers appropriate’). 276. (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 444. 277. Re Price (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 444 at 461. See also Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Watson (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 13 at 29 per A H Simpson CJ in Eq; Re Lyell [1941] VLR 207 at 212 per Martin J. 278. Re Price (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 444 at 462. 279. The court rules make provision for representative actions (except in New South Wales, where the provisions discussed at 11.60 apply in this context): see FCR 2011 rr 9.21, 9.22 (formerly FCR 1979 O 6 r 13); ACT r 266 (formerly ACT RSC O 19 r 10); NT rr 18.01–18.04; Qld r 75; SA r 80 (formerly SA RSC O 34); Tas rr 335, 336; Vic rr 18.01–18.04; WA O 18 r 12. As to the requirements prescribed by these rules see Carnie v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 398; BC9506432; B M Debelle, ‘Class Actions for Australia? Do They Already Exist?’ (1980) 54 ALJ 508. 280. Scott v Pascall (1847) 2 Ph 390; 41 ER 993; Markt & Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Co Ltd [1910] 2 KB 1021 at 1039 per Vaughan Williams LJ; Price v Rhondda Urban District Council [1923] All ER 679 at 680 per Eve J; Cameron v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (No 2) [1992] 1 Qd R 133 at 136 per McPherson SPJ (FC). This is not to say that the court lacks jurisdiction to make costs orders against represented persons in view of its power to do so in respect of non-parties generally (as to which see Ch 22): Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v Taylor [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 484 at 495 per Waller J; Burns Philp & Co Ltd v Bhagat [1993] 1 VR 203 at 223 per Brooking J (App Div(Vic)); King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd (2002) 121 FCR 480; [2002] FCA 872; BC200203825 at [50]–[52] per Moore J. See further D Kell, ‘The Liability of Represented Persons for Party–Party Costs in Representative Actions’ (1994) 13 CJQ 233 (arguing that any such order ought to be exceptional and limited to cases where the represented person has a close connection with the litigation). 281. WA O 66 r 2(f) in fact provides that aside from any special order, ‘a plaintiff suing in a representative character shall personally be liable to pay costs to the defendant in case of a nonsuit or of a judgment for the defendant’. 282. Woodlands v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 139 at 145; BC9507948 per Wilcox J. 283. ALRC 46. The commission rejected various options for departing in representative proceedings from the usual costs rule, including a one-way costs rule (pp 109–10), a no-costs rule (pp 110–11) and a modified no-costs rule (p 112). Parliament accepted the commission’s views on these matters. The commission (pp 113–23) discussed the possibility of special fee agreements, including contingency fee agreements (as to which see 3.41–3.49), and recommended there be statutory provision for the approval of fee agreements, but not agreements providing for the remuneration to be ascertained by reference to the amount recovered. Yet it recognised that this would not be enough, as ‘there may still be cases where a public funding solution is needed, in particular, to assist a principal applicant to meet the respondent’s costs if the case is unsuccessful’: pp 123–4. 284. Class actions differ from representative proceedings as historically understood and prescribed by the court rules in that in class actions the scope of the proceedings is typically much larger, the parties roped in far more numerous and uncertain, the relief sought is typically different, as are the costs rules and procedures: see ALRC 46, p 3. As to the different meanings accorded to the term ‘class action’ see Carnie v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 398 at 403–4; BC9506432 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ. As to class actions generally see Cairns, pp

323–37; P Cashman, Class Action Law and Practice, Federation Press, Annandale, 2007. 285. Via Pt 4A of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), inserted by the Courts and Tribunals Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act 2000 (Vic). 286. Via Pt 10 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), inserted by the Courts and Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2010 (NSW). 287. Woodhouse v McPhee (1997) 80 FCR 529 at 532–3; BC9707275 per Merkel J (noting that s 43(1A) ‘confers a specific and unilateral immunity in respect of costs orders for a particular category of persons being represented persons’). See generally V Morabito, ‘Federal Class Actions, Contingency Fees, and the Rules Governing Litigation Costs’ (1995) 21 Mon ULR 231; V Morabito, ‘Class Actions in the Federal Court of Australia — The Story So Far’ (2004) 10 Canta LR 229; P Cashman, Class Action Law and Practice, Federation Press, Annandale, 2007, Ch 7. 288. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 181; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 33ZD. 289. Section 33Q empowers the court to give directions establishing a sub-group representative party in the case of issues common to the claims of some only of the group members. Where the court appoints a person other than the representative party to be a sub-group representative party, that person, and not the representative party, is liable for costs associated with the determination of the issue(s) common to the subgroup members: s 33Q(3). Equivalent provision is made in the New South Wales and Victorian legislation: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 168; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 33Q. 290. Section 33R provides that in giving directions under s 33Q, the court may permit an individual group member to appear in the proceeding for the purpose of determining an issue that relates only to the claims of that member, in which case the individual group member, and not the representative party, is liable for costs associated with the determination of the issue. Equivalent provision is made in the New South Wales and Victorian legislation: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 169; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 33R. 291. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 33ZF(1); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 183; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 33ZF(1). 292. See 6.14. 293. Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128 at 140; BC9602187 per Einfeld J. 294. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 33N(1)(a); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 166(1) (a); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 33N(1)(a). 295. ALRC 46, pp 127–8. 296. This is pursuant to Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 33ZJ, which provides, inter alia, that if, upon application, the court is satisfied that the costs reasonably incurred in relation to the representative proceeding by the person making the application are likely to exceed the costs recoverable by the person from the respondent, the court may order that an amount equal to the whole or a part of the excess be paid to that person out of the damages awarded: s 33ZJ(2). A like provision is found in the New South Wales and Victorian legislation: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 184; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 33ZJ. These provisions are designed to ‘ensure a solicitor is covered for costs reasonably incurred, while allowing the court to ensure there is no exploitation of group members’: McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd (No 6) (FCA, Wilcox J, 27 November 1997, unreported) BC9706245 at 4. 297. Woodlands v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 139 at 146; BC9507948 per Wilcox J.

298. SA r 267(1). 299. See V Morabito, ‘Contingent Fee Agreements with Represented Persons in Class Actions — An Undesirable Australian Phenomenon’ (2005) 34 Common Law World Rev 201. 300. See 3.13–3.22. 301. Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd (1999) 94 FCR 167 at 175–6; [1999] FCA 1363; BC9906343 per Merkel J. 302. (1999) 94 FCR 167 at 174; [1999] FCA 1363; BC9906343. 303. Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd (1999) 94 FCR 167 at 174–5; [1999] FCA 1363; BC9906343. 304. Ross Ambrose Group Pty Ltd v Renkon Pty Ltd (No 2) [1999] TASSC 127; BC9907729 at [7] per Wright J. 305. (1854) 9 Ex 341; 156 ER 145. 306. Hammond & Co v Bussey (1887) 20 QBD 79 at 90, 93 per Lord Esher MR; Dein v Wentworth Gold Field Pty Co (1899) 15 WN (NSW) 280 at 281 per Stephen J; Skinner & Edwards (Builders) Pty Ltd v Australian Telecommunications Corporation (1992) 27 NSWLR 567 at 578 per Cole J. Cf Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd v Union insurance Co Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 358 at 365–6 per Giles J; Ross Ambrose Group Pty Ltd v Renkon Pty Ltd (No 2) [1999] TASSC 127; BC9907729 at [12] per Wright J (‘the costs incurred by one party in a multifaceted case involving three or more parties, cannot be recovered in those proceedings as damages by one party against another’). 307. Laws v Collins Exposed Aggregate Pty Ltd (CA(NSW), 24 March 1997, unreported) BC9700840 at 18 per Handley JA. 308. Brazendale v Kenna [1961] Tas SR 199 at 212 (FC). 309. The Millwall [1905] P 155 at 174 per Collins MR (‘costs reasonably incurred in defending an action in which there was a liability over to a third person in respect of damages [are] properly recoverable, as well as the damages against that other person’); Welch v Bank of England [1955] Ch 508 at 551 per Harman J. 310. Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd [1986] AC 965 at 980 per Lord Goff. Cf Australian Guarantee Corporation Ltd v De Jager [1984] VR 483 at 500–2 per Tadgell J who held that, in a case where two actions were heard together, the court lacked jurisdiction to order a party in one action to pay costs of a successful party in the other action in which the former was not a party. This case, however, preceded the general recognition by the courts (which had its main genesis in the Aiden Shipping case) of a jurisdiction to make costs orders against non-parties. As to the jurisdiction to make costs orders against non-parties see Ch 22.

[page 347]

CHAPTER 12

Costs Sanctions for Proceedings in Wrong Court Rationale for Costs Sanctions

12.2

Costs Sanctions in Each Jurisdiction Federal Court Australian Capital Territory New South Wales Northern Territory Queensland South Australia Tasmania Victoria Western Australia

12.4 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 12.9 12.10 12.11 12.13

Discretion to Modify Costs Sanction Curial approach Relevant factors Difficulty or simplicity of matters raised Relevance of settlement offers? Special rule in defamation cases?

12.14 12.14 12.15 12.17 12.19 12.21

12.1 In each Australian state and territory (except Tasmania) and at Federal

Court level, statute or court rules prescribe costs sanctions in respect of proceedings brought in a superior court that should have been conducted in a lower court. The sanctions, which are premised upon the plaintiff being entitled to the costs of the action, vary from the total denial of costs to the plaintiff to a reduction in the costs recoverable. Though directed to the same general objective, no two jurisdictions address the issue in identical fashion, and so each must be addressed separately.1 The Tasmanian legislation adopts in its own schema, and instead of propounding a prima facie rule denying or reducing costs, confers a general discretion.2 [page 348]

Rationale for Costs Sanctions 12.2 Rather than prohibit commencing proceedings in a higher court, the costs sanctions are designed to encourage or ‘coerce’ litigants to bring their claims in the most appropriate jurisdiction, and so direct the attention of the plaintiff and his or her lawyers to this issue.3 The point was explained by Menhennitt J in O’Dougherty v McMahon, referring to the Victorian rules:4 The object of the rule is to protect the defendant against the unnecessary expense of higher costs in a court which is not appropriate for the case. The plaintiff, however, is left free to select his court. If he fails, no protection of the defendant is necessary because he receives costs applicable in the court to which he is taken. If he succeeds, the defendant is liable for costs appropriate to the court to which he is taken, provided, however, that the plaintiff obtains more than half of the amount which the lower court has jurisdiction to award. If the plaintiff recovers less than that amount the defendant is liable only for costs applicable in the lower court, in the absence of a special order.

To this end, the case law contains remarks that these sanctions are designed ‘to avoid injustice to the defendant by inflating costs above what is reasonable in the circumstances’,5 and ‘to equalize, as far as possible, the relative rights of litigants in the interests of fair play and justice’.6 12.3 Four policy considerations explain the sanctions.7 First, as superior courts generally prescribe a higher scale of professional costs than courts lower in the hierarchy, without a sanction for unreasonably bringing proceedings in a higher court there may be a tendency (and an economic advantage) to choose the higher court. This in turn would promote

misassignment, even of minor cases, to the higher court rather than the assignment of each case to the court appropriate to it. Second, it is important to contain the costs of a small claim. In small claims, there is the greater prospect that costs may exceed the quantum of the claim, which unfairly burdens an unsuccessful defendant who will likely be liable for his or her own costs. Third, it is desirable to confine superior courts to the most important, large and complex cases, appropriate to superior courts and to the skills and experience of judges appointed to those courts. Fourth, there is recognition of the status and functions of lower and intermediate courts. If these courts could be bypassed without penalty, litigants may commence suit in a superior court and clutter that court’s list at the expense of those important, large and complex cases that are properly awaiting trial in that court. Lower and intermediate courts would moreover be deprived of the variety of cases that are properly theirs. [page 349]

Costs Sanctions in Each Jurisdiction Federal Court 12.4 Rule 40.08 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 entitles a party, other than in a proceeding under the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth),8 to apply to the court for an order that any costs and disbursements payable to another party in the proceeding be reduced by an amount to be specified by the court if that other party has claimed a money sum or damages and has been awarded a sum of less than $100,000, or the proceeding (including a cross-claim) could otherwise more suitably have been brought in another court or tribunal. The former rules, which applied before 1 August 2011, contained a provision equivalent to the latter option.9 As to the former option, though, the rules stated that any costs ordered to be paid (including disbursements) where a party received judgment for less than $100,000 on a claim (not including a cross-claim) for a money sum or damages would be reduced by one-third of the amount otherwise allowable unless the court otherwise ordered.10 Hence, here the former rules reflected in effect a presumption that costs would be

reduced in these circumstances, and thus cast the onus on the ‘successful’ party to activate the court’s discretion to ‘otherwise order’. This prompted judicial observations that the rules, unless applied with discretion and caution, could lead to harsh results, particularly for small monetary claims for which there is no other more appropriate court.11 The changes in the 2011 rules were presumably designed to address this concern, by throwing on the party liable for costs the onus of convincing the court that their reduction is justified in the circumstances. Whether in staking a claim for reduced costs (under the 2011 rules), or in seeking to persuade the court to ‘otherwise order’ (under the former rules), cases indicate that pursuing an action in the Federal Court may be appropriate where, say, the claims were of considerable complexity,12 involved a subject matter suitable for Federal Court consideration,13 or otherwise put in issue an area of law poorly served by case authority.14 The scope of relief granted is also relevant for this purpose; though an applicant may have been awarded less than $100,000 for a claim, that the more important relief secured is nonmonetary, such as an injunction, may make it proper for the [page 350] court to ‘otherwise order’ in the applicant’s favour (under the former rules)15 or serve to undermine an attempt to have costs reduced (under the 2011 rules). The relevant rule has no application, however, where the only substantive relief that is granted is declaratory and injunctive relief and where any claim for monetary relief is not pursued.16

Australian Capital Territory 12.5 Where in a proceeding brought in the Supreme Court, the Magistrates Court would (or would, but for the amount claimed) have had jurisdiction, and the plaintiff is awarded an amount (exclusive of costs) not exceeding $175,000 (the figure was $40,000 before 1 January 2012),17 the rules restrict the plaintiff’s claim to recover costs.18 They dictate that the plaintiff is entitled to the following determined fee19 and costs only:20

the amount of any Magistrates Court determined fee that the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover had the proceeding been started in the Magistrates Court; if the plaintiff is awarded an amount (excluding costs) less than $50,000 — 50 per cent of the disbursements that the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover in the Supreme Court had the judgment exceeded $250,000; if the plaintiff is awarded an amount (excluding costs) of $50,000 or more, but less than $100,000 — 50 per cent of the costs and disbursements that the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover in the Supreme Court had the judgment exceeded $250,000; if the plaintiff is awarded an amount (excluding costs) of $100,000 or more, but less than $175,000 — 75 per cent of the costs and disbursements that the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover in the Supreme Court had the judgment exceeded $250,000. Despite the foregoing, the court has a discretion to order that the plaintiff receive a different amount for the costs and disbursements (including the amount of any determined fee).21 Before 1 January 2012 the rules entitled the plaintiff to the costs (and any Magistrates Court determined fee) he or she would have been entitled to recover had the proceeding been commenced in the Magistrates Court, to be reduced by the additional costs properly incurred by the defendant because the proceeding was started in the Supreme Court instead of the Magistrates Court, and by the difference between the amount of any Supreme Court determined fee incurred by the defendant and the amount of the equivalent Magistrates Court determined fee.22 However, the plaintiff was not required to pay the defendant any amount that the latter’s costs (including determined fees but not disbursements) exceeded those payable to the plaintiff.23 The court nonetheless similarly retained a discretion to order that the plaintiff be entitled to a different amount for the costs (including the amount of any Magistrates Court determined fee).24 [page 351]

It follows that the 2012 changes to the rule, aside from increasing the relevant threshold to $175,000, placed further restrictions on a plaintiff’s entitlement to costs and introduced limits on the recovery of disbursements.

New South Wales 12.6 The superseded Supreme Court Rules made provision for a reduction in a plaintiff’s costs otherwise recoverable according to the quantum of damages recovered.25 Until 10 September 2010,26 the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules made no equivalent provision, except to replicate a specific rule targeted at Supreme Court or District Court proceedings for an order or relief under the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW). This latter rule states that where a plaintiff commences proceedings of this kind, and the court declares a right or adjusts an interest in relation to property,27 or makes an order for maintenance,28 of a value or amount that does not at the time of commencement of the proceedings exceed the amount prescribed,29 the plaintiff is not entitled to receive his or her costs unless the court otherwise orders.30 The court may, on the application of any person, order that this rule not apply in respect of any proceedings, including proceedings yet to be commenced.31 As from 10 September 2010, the rules make general provision for a reduction of costs allowed according to the quantum of damages recovered. Under r 42.34, if in Supreme Court proceedings (other than defamation proceedings)32 a plaintiff obtains a judgment33 under $500,000 and would have been entitled to a costs order against the defendant(s), an ‘order for costs may be made, but will not ordinarily be made’ unless the court is satisfied the commencement and continuation of the proceedings in the court, rather than the District Court, was warranted. Equivalent provision is made in r 42.35 in the context of proceedings in the District Court wherein a plaintiff has obtained a judgment under $40,000, by reference to proceedings in the Local Court. By stipulating that a costs order ‘will not ordinarily be made’ if the damages awarded are below two-thirds of the ordinary jurisdictional limit for the Local Court and District Court respectively,34 the rules clearly aim to encourage plaintiffs to carefully assess the appropriate court in which to commence proceedings. The onus lies on the ‘successful’ plaintiff, in the event that damages are below that threshold, to convince the court of grounds

that nonetheless justify a costs order in his or her favour. The statutory language suggests that only in a case outside the ordinary will a plaintiff have prospects of receiving costs in these circumstances. [page 352]

Northern Territory 12.7 Where in a suit before the Supreme Court a plaintiff recovers35 an amount, exceeding $2,000, which is within the jurisdiction of the Local Court, and the Supreme Court makes an order that the defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of the proceeding, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover from the defendant an amount for costs exceeding what he or she would have recovered in the Local Court, unless the Supreme Court is satisfied that he or she had good reason to commence the proceeding in the Supreme Court.36 If the amount recovered does not exceed $2,000, the plaintiff is not entitled to costs.37 Although the latter rule makes no exception, there remains a limited discretion for the court to make a costs order. The court rules provide that where in the opinion of the court the strict application of the rules would result in an anomaly, the court may make such order in relation to costs as it thinks equitable in the circumstances.38 Hence, a plaintiff who is awarded less than $2,000 may receive an award of costs if he or she can show that an anomaly would otherwise result.39

Queensland 12.8 If the relief obtained by a plaintiff in a proceeding in the Supreme Court or District Court is a judgment that, when the proceeding began, could have been given in a Magistrates Court, the costs the plaintiff may recover must be assessed as if the proceeding had been started in the Magistrates Court, unless the court otherwise orders.40 If the only relief obtained by a plaintiff in a proceeding in the Supreme Court is relief that, when the proceeding began, could have been given by the District Court but not a Magistrates Court, the costs the plaintiff may recover must be assessed as if the proceeding had been started in the District Court, again unless the court otherwise orders.41 In each

case, should the plaintiff wish to oust this outcome, he or she bears the onus of persuading the court to ‘otherwise order’.

South Australia 12.9 The Supreme Court Act 1935 s 40(2) reads as follows: If — (a) an action for the recovery of damages or any other monetary sum is brought in the court; and (b) the action might have been brought in the District Court; and (c) the plaintiff recovers less than an amount fixed by the rules for the purposes of this paragraph; no order for costs will be made in favour of the plaintiff unless the court is of the opinion that it is just, in the circumstances of the case, that the plaintiff should recover the whole or part of the costs of action.

The court rules, for this purpose, state that unless the court orders otherwise, general costs of action are not to be awarded in favour of the successful plaintiff unless the damages exceed [page 353] $25,000 (in a defamation claim), $150,000 (in a motor accident claim) or $75,000 (in any other claim for damages or any other monetary sum).42 Equivalent statutory and rule-based provision is made in respect of claims in the District Court that should have been brought in the Magistrates Court.43 South Australia is the only jurisdiction to adopt a blanket prima facie rule denying a successful plaintiff costs if he or she has brought proceedings in a court too high in the court hierarchy (although the Northern Territory rules envisage a like denial where the amount recovered does not exceed a prescribed amount).44 The aim is to ‘provide a heavy disincentive to any litigant who brings his proceedings in the wrong court’.45 Comparing the South Australian provisions to those in other jurisdictions, King J in Burton v Litton Business Systems Pty Ltd remarked:46 Our section is more drastic and cannot be explained merely as a means of protecting the defendant against being brought into a more expensive Court. The protection of the defendant requires no more than that his liability for costs be restricted to the Local Court scale. If the only purpose of the section were the protection of the defendant in that way, one would expect that that would be the provision. The more drastic South Australian provision is obviously designed to encourage plaintiffs to use the Local Court where the claim is within the monetary jurisdiction of that Court and to do that by penalizing a plaintiff who goes to the Supreme Court

unnecessarily, in costs, although the result may be a windfall for the unsuccessful defendant. Weight should be given to this legislative purpose in deciding whether the discretion to allow costs should be exercised.

Tasmania 12.10 The relevant legislation, instead of adopting a prima facie rule denying or reducing a successful plaintiff’s costs entitlements where the proceedings have wrongly been brought in the Supreme Court, start from the converse perspective. It provides that where an action which, having regard to the sum recovered, could have been properly instituted in some inferior court of civil jurisdiction is instituted in the Supreme Court, the latter may, notwithstanding that the sum recovered does not exceed the jurisdictional limit of the inferior court, allow the plaintiff (any part of) the costs of the action on any Supreme Court scale of costs, or any scale of costs in any inferior court of civil jurisdiction, as it thinks fit.47 In considering whether to make such an order, the court must take into account all the circumstances of the case, including the sum sought to be recovered, the sum recovered, and any counter-claim, set off or contributory negligence.48 In the case of an interlocutory judgment or reference to a referee, the same jurisdiction is conferred upon a judge of an inferior court of civil jurisdiction, an officer of the Supreme Court, or the referee in question.49 In the case of a final judgment by default, the registrar at the registry in which the judgment is signed or entered is likewise conferred this jurisdiction.50 [page 354] Any such order of a judge, and the refusal by a judge to make the order, is deemed to be an order ‘as to costs only’ for the purposes of appeals as to costs.51 Conversely, an order of a judge of an inferior court of civil jurisdiction, an officer of the Supreme Court or a referee, and the refusal to make such an order, is subject to appeal to a judge in the same instances in which an appeal from an order of a judge as to costs only lies to a Full Court.52

Victoria 12.11 Where in a Supreme Court proceeding for debt or damages53 the plaintiff recovers, whether by judgment or otherwise, an amount (exclusive of costs) not exceeding $100,000, the plaintiff is, unless the court otherwise orders, entitled only to the costs to which he or she would have been entitled had the proceeding been brought in the County Court.54 This is to be reduced by an amount equal to the additional costs the defendant properly incurred by reason of the proceeding having been brought in the Supreme Court instead of the County Court, but the plaintiff will not be required to pay to the defendant any amount by which the additional costs exceed the costs payable to the plaintiff.55 The foregoing does not apply where a defendant’s claim against the plaintiff for the recovery of a debt or damages is set off against the plaintiff’s claim56 and the amount for which the plaintiff would otherwise be entitled to judgment exceeds $100,000.57 Nor does it apply to a proceeding commenced in another court and transferred to the Supreme Court under the Courts (Case Transfer) Act 1991 (Vic).58 But it does apply, with necessary modification, where the plaintiff obtains (whether by judgment or the acceptance of a compromise offer)59 relief other than for the recovery of a debt or damages and any amount in dispute in the proceeding, or the value of any property to which the relief relates60 does not exceed $100,000.61 Excepting the transfer under the Courts (Case Transfer) Act 1991 (Vic), the County Court Civil Procedure [page 355] Rules 2008 make parallel provision vis-à-vis proceedings that should have been commenced in the Magistrates’ Court.62 12.12 The Victorian Supreme Court Rules make specific provision for defamation proceedings in this context. The relevant rule states that a plaintiff who, in a proceeding for libel or slander, recovers an amount (exclusive of costs) not exceeding $50,000 is, unless the court otherwise orders, entitled only to the costs to which he or she would have been entitled had the proceeding been brought in the County Court less an amount equal to the

additional costs properly incurred by the defendant by reason of the proceeding having been brought in the Supreme Court instead of the County Court, but is not required to pay the defendant any amount by which the additional costs exceed the costs payable to the plaintiff.63

Western Australia 12.13 The Supreme Court Rules provide that if an action is brought in the Supreme Court that could have been brought in the Magistrates Court without the special consent of the defendant, the plaintiff cannot recover a greater sum by way of costs than he or she could have recovered had the action been brought in the Magistrates Court, unless the Supreme Court certifies that, by reason of some important principle of law being involved or the complexity of the issues or facts, the action was properly brought in the Supreme Court.64 The same applies vis-à-vis proceedings brought in the District Court that could have been brought in the Magistrates Court.65

Discretion to Modify Costs Sanction Curial approach 12.14 Although court rules or statute may prescribe a particular costs outcome for proceedings commenced in a court too high in the court hierarchy, these outcomes are, generally speaking, expressed as being capable of yielding to the discretion of the court in a given case. Thus the issue arises as to the circumstances where a court will be inclined to exercise this discretion, and the extent to which it will be exercised. The prescription of a prima facie costs sanction (excepting Tasmania), coupled with its rationale,66 means that courts will not as a matter of course act inconsistently with it. What must be determined is whether there exists in a given case, in the judicial exercise of the discretion, adequate reason to depart from the policy behind the costs sanction.67 Although different judges appear to have brought different attitudes to the exercise of the discretion — some have premised ousting the prima facie position only on proof of special circumstances

[page 356] or for special reasons,68 whereas others see this as potentially fettering the discretion69 — any difference in this regard, as the cases discussed below reveal, is more one of form than of substance. It is best to view the court’s discretion as ‘an open one to be exercised with a view to doing justice in all the circumstances of the case’ whilst bearing in mind the purpose of the rule to target litigation to the appropriate court.70

Relevant factors 12.15 The courts have identified several factors relevant to determining whether to exercise the discretion to deny or curb the costs sanction. These include the following:71 the amount claimed, and the reasons for this;72 the amount actually recovered, and the reasons for this;73 the difficulty or otherwise of assessing the likely damages awarded;74 the complexity or otherwise of the case, factually and/or legally;75 the nature of the proceedings in question, and how this impacts, if at all, upon the need to proceed in the higher or specialist court;76 the conduct and attitude of the parties to the litigation;77 and the importance of the legal principle involved in the case as a matter of precedent.78 [page 357] Some of these factors overlap. None individually is likely to be decisive, as this would fetter the discretion.79 Each factor appears relevant in all jurisdictions except in Western Australia, where the discretion is activated only in circumstances involving an important principle of law or where the

complexity of the issues or of the facts justify bringing the action in the Supreme Court.80 12.16 The importance of, and interrelationship between, these factors is best understood by case example. In Burton v Litton Business Systems Pty Ltd,81 the award of damages was less than the jurisdictional limit of the lower court, but the South Australian Supreme Court nonetheless found that there were circumstances in favour of some costs being allowed. These circumstances were the following:82 the amount recovered, though well under the jurisdictional limit, was nonetheless substantial.83 the case, though not of extraordinary complexity, involved substantial questions of both law and fact. although the action was founded on contract — involving an allegation of wrongful dismissal — the assessment of damages was closely analogous to an assessment of damages for loss of earnings in an action in tort, exhibiting many of the uncertainties involved in such an assessment. uncertainty attended the assessment of the plaintiff’s loss partly because necessary information in the possession of the first defendant was known to the plaintiff only as a result of answers to interrogatories. the damages recovered were less than the jurisdictional limit only because of the success attending to the plaintiff’s determined efforts to mitigate his damage. That the court allowed the plaintiff costs on the Supreme Court scale only to the date of setting down, and thereafter on the appropriate Local Court scale, reveals that courts, even in a strong case for exercising the discretion, are keen not to undermine the sanction imposed by parliament. This is also illustrated by Tuohy v Blackmore,84 where the amount recovered fell short by only $80 of an amount that would have avoided any costs sanction. This, coupled with the uncertainty in the assessment of damages in that case, led Jacobs J to conclude that it would be unjust wholly to deprive the plaintiff of his costs, but, so to give weight to the sanction imposed by parliament, gave the plaintiff his costs on the Local Court scale.85

Difficulty or simplicity of matters raised 12.17 That the litigation raises issues of difficulty does not by itself justify bringing proceedings in a higher court, and thus a costs order commensurate with that court.86 After all, difficulty surrounds a great deal of law, and lower and intermediate courts constantly deal [page 358] with the legal difficulties not greatly different to those superior court judges face. Complicated or important questions are by no means the sole province of superior courts. Legal or factual difficulty, if it is to assume relevance in this context, must be such as to take the case ‘out of the track’ of the lower court, making it more fit to be tried in a superior court.87 Ordinarily legal or factual difficulty is pleaded in tandem with other factors in an attempt to activate the court’s discretion. In Scott v Municipal Tramways Trust,88 for example, Poole J held that the circumstances of the case, particularly its difficulty in point of law, the nature of the points of law, the conflict in the evidence to which the law had to be applied, and the amount of damages awarded, meant that the action was fit to be tried in the Supreme Court. And in Insurance Australia Ltd v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd (in liq) (No 2)89 the Victorian Court of Appeal, though doubting that the complexity of the suit brought by the first respondent was by itself sufficient to justify an order ousting the prima facie rule, held that as the case was so intermingled with that of the second respondent that it would not have been in the interests of justice for it to have been heard in another jurisdiction separately from that of the second respondent. Rather it was appropriate to order that the first respondent be entitled to its costs below and on appeal on the Supreme Court scale. The case law exhibits various other instances where the courts have been inclined to eschew the relevant costs sanction for fear of otherwise being complicit in splitting disputes across multiple courts.90 12.18 Relative simplicity as to the relevant facts or law may, aside from countervailing factors, justify a court declining to exercise its discretion in this context, even if the action involves allegations of fraud or other criminal

behaviour. In Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd v Rousianos91 the plaintiffs’ initial claim was well within the jurisdiction of the District Court, and did not involve difficult questions of law or anything especially complicated factually. Nor was there anything special about the facilities or lists of the Supreme Court, as distinct from the District Court, that would have enabled the Supreme Court to deal with the claim more effectively. Gleeson CJ, though unprepared to brand as irrelevant to the costs discretion that the issues in a particular case included an allegation of the commission of a serious crime, added that:92 … it must be recognised that there is nothing at all unusual about the circumstance that civil litigation, often over relatively trifling sums of money, may involve serious allegations of fraud

[page 359] or other wrong-doing by one party or another, and that, indeed, from the point of view of the individual parties, most court cases are very serious indeed. It might also be added that the great majority of crimes are tried in the District Court, not in the Supreme Court.

Where the complexity in the proceeding stems from claims on which the plaintiff has proven unsuccessful — but for which the proceeding would not have been complex or procedurally complicated — without more there is no reason to activate the court’s discretion to oust the prima facie rule.93

Relevance of settlement offers? 12.19 That the defendant has made a settlement offer that, under the rules of court, has costs consequences for the ultimately successful plaintiff94 is arguably irrelevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion not to give effect to the prima facie costs rule where proceedings have been pursued in too high a court. There is no injustice to a plaintiff in applying both provisions; the plaintiff suffers a reduction or loss of costs because he or she has instituted proceedings in a higher court when they ought to have been instituted in a lower court, and the plaintiff may be required to pay the costs of the defendant after having a reasonable opportunity to accept an offer that has proved adequate.95 These costs provisions are directed to different objectives — the former to encourage plaintiffs to litigate in the appropriate court, and the latter to encourage plaintiffs to settle the matter — and are independent of

one another. The mere fact that this ‘encouragement’ is effected in each case through costs sanctions is no ground for one to oust the other. 12.20 Where it is the plaintiff who has made what proves to have been a favourable settlement offer, there is case authority indicating that this may incline the court to ‘otherwise order’ where the action was brought in too high a court and the amount recovered was not insubstantial. In Beardmore v Franklins Management Services Pty Ltd96 the Queensland Court of Appeal court refused to interfere with the exercise of discretion by a District Court judge to award costs on the lower District Court scale although the judgment recovered was in fact within the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court. What influenced their Honours was that the plaintiff had offered to settle her action for approximately half the damages she recovered in the District Court, which offer the defendant had rejected. As the Magistrates Court scale of costs, unlike its District and Supreme Court counterparts, made no provision for the assessment of indemnity costs, the District Court judge, apparently in the spirit of encouraging acceptance of offers to settle, awarded costs on the lowest District Court Scale to be assessed rather than the Magistrates Court scale. McMurdo P saw this as ‘a proper exercise of the discretion given under [the Queensland rule]97 in circumstances where the amount recovered was less than 20 per cent below the upper jurisdictional limit of the Magistrates Court’.98

Special rule in defamation cases? 12.21 The court rules or statutes that impose costs sanctions for bringing proceedings in a court too high in the court hierarchy do not — except in South Australia99 and Victoria100 (which set a lower damages triggering threshold for this purpose) and now also in New South Wales101 [page 360] (where the rule is expressed in its terms not to apply to defamation actions) — distinguish defamation from other civil proceedings. Ostensibly unique aspects of defamation actions — the difficulty in

predicting the damages likely to be awarded, their frequent complexity and that the money sum awarded may not be a true measure of the extent of the plaintiff’s claim — have led some judges to treat defamation actions as more likely to attract the discretion to mollify the costs sanction than civil actions lacking these characteristics. For instance, Kirby P in John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Palmer,102 though conceding that it is impermissible to treat defamation cases as a special class given that the rules make no such prescription, opined that defamation suits typically raise complexities of a kind that more readily warrant proceedings in the Supreme Court than other damages actions. His Honour explained, by reference to the (then) applicable New South Wales rule:103 In a claim for debt, the amount sued upon will normally be generally known. Even in a claim for personal injuries, the range of damages will be more readily predictable. In defamation cases, where damages are at large and where the jury may be given little guidance as to the calculation it must perform,104 the policy of the rule is more difficult to enforce. For this reason, in the nature of defamation claims, the discretion to permit a higher award of costs will more readily be exercised in the plaintiff’s favour than would be the case in an action for debt or personal injury damages. This is not to elevate defamation to a special status it does not enjoy under the rules … It is simply to reflect the purposes for which the discretion is provided, in the context of rules whose overall object is to promote the correct assignment of cases to the appropriate court and to penalise error where the judgment demonstrates the assignment to have been wrong.

It has also been judicially observed that of greater significance in defamation cases than others is that the range of defences available to a defendant is extremely wide, and can (even when decided by a judge sitting alone) be of considerable complexity.105 Kirby P in John Fairfax added practical reasons that may justify the bringing of defamation proceedings in the New South Wales Supreme Court. In particular, unlike the District Court, that court has a Defamation List, which provides a specialist judge using settled procedures having the advantage of bringing the parties together, dealing with interlocutory matters expeditiously and efficiently, and guarding against delay that is especially undesirable where the cause of action may concern a person’s reputation.106 The same reasons also influenced Samuels JA in concluding that ‘it is legitimate in such cases to exercise discretion … with some liberality’.107 His Honour added that as an assessment of damages in defamation cases is intended to operate as a vindication of the plaintiff and thus has a symbolic element, ‘a plaintiff may well be justified in seeking to have his action heard in the senior court of the State whose pronouncements, naturally enough, may be regarded as carrying more weight than those of

other courts’.108 This, together with the fact that the case in question could not be described as ‘straightforward and simple’,109 led the court to allow full costs to the plaintiff even though the verdict was only $20,000. In Green v Schneller,110 another defamation case with a $20,000 verdict where costs were awarded at Supreme Court level, Simpson J reasoned that the plaintiff could, at the time of filing the proceedings, have reasonably expected a significantly larger verdict than that he actually recovered, because, inter alia: first, such cases can give rise to a large range of verdicts that would not be held to be manifestly inadequate or manifestly excessive; second, the plaintiff could not be expected to have anticipated all the defences raised in response to his claim, [page 361] which were factually and legally complex; third, the plaintiff had been defamed on national television, which could reasonably be seen as influencing the quantum of damages; and fourth, the plaintiff’s evidence was that securing a large verdict was not his principal concern. 12.22 Whether in jurisdictions that lack a separate Defamation List, or where juries do not assess damages in defamation actions (as is now the case in all Australian jurisdictions),111 the same keenness to exercise the discretion in defamation suits should prevail must be queried.112 Yet case authority outside New South Wales and indeed outside Australia can be found that likewise appears to treat defamation proceedings as a special class in this context.113 In Humphries v TWT Ltd114 Miles CJ noted that as Australian Capital Territory defamation actions, like all civil suits, are tried by judge alone, the range of damages is likely to be within the contemplation of the parties and their lawyers, rendering considerations applicable to jury trials of little relevance. While agreeing that defamation cases may present ‘issues of greater subtlety and complexity than, say, personal injury cases’, he added that ‘[e]very individual case will depend upon its own circumstances and not whether it is labelled as falling within one category or another’.115 His Honour, to this end, focused upon whether the case raised issues of sufficient factual or legal complexity to justify bringing it in the Supreme Court.116 On

the facts, although it could not have been reasonably contemplated that the likely damages recoverable would have been anywhere near the threshold specified in the rules, the matter had, by the time of hearing, become complex, making it reasonable for the plaintiff to maintain (if not have commenced) the proceedings in the Supreme Court rather than the Magistrates Court. [page 362] In Bunker v James,117 a South Australian case, Mitchell J was likewise unable to adduce from the cases118 a principle that libel actions should be treated differently from others for this purpose. In the same case Cox J remarked that the authorities laid down no rule of practice that a successful plaintiff in a defamation action in the Supreme Court should always get full costs regardless of the damages recovered.119 His Honour, though conceding that forecasting the quantum of damages for defamation may be more difficult than in a running down case, remarked that ‘[c]ertainly there is no room for the view that uncomplicated defamation actions may safely be instituted in [the Supreme Court] as a matter of course, regardless of the damages that the plaintiff may fairly expect to recover’.120 12.23 What the above cases illustrate is that it is not legitimate, absent a statutory directive, to create a special class of case that, simply by virtue of being a member of that class, justifies the court exercising its discretion to reduce or avoid otherwise applicable costs sanctions. Again independent of contrary provision, the defamation cases are explainable not for meriting special treatment, but for commonly exhibiting many of the factors that have been treated as impacting upon the discretion in this context. This is not to say that all defamation actions, whatever the procedure in the jurisdiction in question, will attract the court’s discretion, but that, as noted by Miles CJ in Humphries v T’WT Ltd,121 ‘[e]very individual case will depend upon its own circumstances and not whether it is labelled as falling within one category or another’. Accordingly, there may be other types of case where a similar approach is justified. For example, in McKeon v Myer Southern Stores Ltd122 it was held that a plaintiff who accepted $500 paid into court by the defendant as

damages in an action for false imprisonment had sufficient cause for proceeding in the Supreme Court. The master, in reaching this conclusion, was influenced by the fact that, inter alia, actions in false imprisonment are rarely before the courts, that actions involving the liberty of the subject merit serious consideration, that the plaintiff might have recovered more than $500 had she chosen to proceed with the action, and that the proceedings involved a doubtful point of law.

1.

See 12.4–12.13.

2.

See 12.10.

3.

Saywood v Cross (1884) 14 QBD 53 at 54 per Mathew J; Killalea v In Print Publishing Co Ltd [1966] NZLR 70 at 71 per Woodhouse J (SC); Ramadan v Moussa [1984] VR 713 at 721 (FC); John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Palmer (1987) 8 NSWLR 297 at 302, 305 per Kirby P; Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd v Rousianos (1989) 19 NSWLR 57 at 70 per Gleeson CJ; Collier Constructions Pty Ltd v Foskett Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 591 at 592; BC9203307 per French J; Ditton v Gallagher (1992) 110 ACTR 12 at 16 per Gallop J; Chatley v Northern Territory of Australia [2001] NTSC 89; BC200106335 at [19] per Martin CJ; El Greco (Australia) Pty Ltd v Mediterranean Shipping Company SA [2003] FCA 747; BC200303904 at [1] per Kiefel J; AMP Services Ltd v Manning (No 3) [2007] FCA 510; BC200702466 at [3] per Finkelstein J.

4.

[1971] VR 625 at 628 (FC).

5.

Ramadan v Moussa [1984] VR 713 at 721 (FC).

6.

Duncan v Hyland [1922] SASR 475 at 478 per Gordon J.

7.

John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Palmer (1987) 8 NSWLR 297 at 302–3 per Kirby P; Collier Constructions Pty Ltd v Foskett Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 591 at 592; BC9203307 per French J; Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 422 at 424 per Miles CJ (SC(ACT)); Axe Australasia Pty Ltd v Australume Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 844; BC200605071 at [4] per Finkelstein J.

8.

The rules governing proceedings in the Federal Court under the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) are the Admiralty Rules 1988 (Cth).

9.

FCR 1979 O 62 r 36A(2). See, for example, Collier Constructions Pty Ltd v Foskett Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 591 at 592–3; BC9203307 per French J. Where there is another appropriate court, the Federal Court will not ‘otherwise order’ unless there are good grounds for bringing the action before it, upon an analogy with the exercise of the court’s discretion to deprive a successful party of costs: Sailbay Pty Ltd v Tubby Trout Pty Ltd (FC(FCA), 7 November 1994, unreported) BC9400144. As to the court’s discretion to deprive a successful party of costs see 8.25–8.61.

10. FCR 1979 O 62 r 36A(1), 36A(3). 11. LED Builders Pty Ltd v Hope (1994) 53 FCR 10 at 12; BC9400291 per Tamberlin J. Cf Axe Australasia Pty Ltd v Australume Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 844; BC200605071 at [6] per Finkelstein J. 12. See, for example, Opalswan Pty Ltd v Commercial & General Acceptances Pty Ltd (FCA, Nicholson J, 19 December 1996, unreported) BC9606373; AMP Services Ltd v Manning (No 3) [2007] FCA 510; BC200702466; Bowen Investments Pty Ltd v Tabcorp Holdings Ltd (No 2)

[2007] FCA 878; BC200704428 at [12] per Tracey J. Cf Reidy’s Lures Pty Ltd v Basser Millyard Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1242; BC200306491. 13. A typical illustration in this context involves intellectual property cases: see, for example, Fasold v Roberts (FCA, Sackville J, 11 September 1997, unreported) BC9704250 (where Sackville J ruled that it is appropriate that copyright infringement cases be brought in the Federal Court, and so elected to ‘otherwise order’ even though the applicant recovered only $2,500); Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd (No 3) [2008] FCA 896; BC200804485 (copyright infringement case where no reduction in costs was made even though the recovery was little over $10,000). 14. See, for example, Tenji v Henneberry & Associates Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1259; BC9905788 (where Lee J remarked that, as the principles under the (then) Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 87 were still being developed by the Federal Court, where a claim for relief under s 87 is a substantial part of a proceeding, the Federal Court will likely be the appropriate court: at [10]). 15. See, for example, Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Metro on George Pty Ltd (2004) 64 IPR 57; [2004] FCA 1371; BC200407052 at [8]–[12] per Bennett J; Tu v Pakway Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 227 ALR 287; [2006] FCA 34; BC200600304 at [32] per Kenny J; Nokia Corporation v Liu (2009) 179 FCR 422; [2009] FCAFC 138; BC200909077 at [58] per the court. 16. Eat Media Pty Ltd v Mulready Media Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1058; BC200908594 at [30] per Flick J. 17. Being the date at which, via the Court Procedures Amendment Rules 2011 (No 4) (ACT), ACT r 1725 was replaced by a new r 1725. 18. ACT r 1725(1) (see previously ACT RSC O 65 r 7A; Ditton v Gallagher (1992) 110 ACTR 12 at 16 per Gallop J). 19. ‘Determined fee’ means the relevant determined fee under the Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT) Pt 3 (Court and tribunal fees) in relation to a proceeding in the Magistrates Court or the Supreme Court: ACT r 1725(4). 20. ACT r 1725(2). 21. ACT r 1725(3). 22. ACT r 1725(2), 1725(3) (in their form prior to 1 January 2012). ‘Magistrates Court determined fee’ and ‘Supreme Court determined fee’ were defined in ACT r 1725(7), as it read before 1 January 2012. 23. ACT r 1725(4), 1725(5) (as it read prior to 1 January 2012). 24. ACT r 1725(6) (as it read prior to 1 January 2012). 25. NSW RSC Pt 52A r 33. As to the application of this rule see the first edition of this work, at 12.6. 26. With the commencement of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 36) 2010 (NSW). 27. Under s 20 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW). 28. Under s 27 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW). 29. Namely the jurisdictional limit of a Local Court sitting in its General Division, as that limit was when the proceedings were commenced. 30. NSW r 42.30(1), (2) (previously NSW RSC Pt 52A r 34(a)–34(c)). See Kardos v Sarbutt (No 2) (2006) DFC ¶95-337; [2006] NSWCA 206; BC200605726 at [26] per Brereton J (who noted various reasons why the court might ‘otherwise order’, including that the amount of an adjustment ultimately ordered does not bear any relationship to the extent of the pool of property in issue, or

that a large pool of property nonetheless ultimately produces only a small adjustment). 31. NSW r 42.30(3) (previously NSW RSC Pt 52A r 35(1)). 32. As to defamation proceedings in this context see 12.21–12.23. 33. The requirement that a judgment have been obtained dictates that the rule has no application where the litigation is concluded by way of a settlement: Zandata Pty Ltd v Riley [2013] NSWSC 49; BC201300781 at [59]–[60] per Garling J. 34. Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) s 29(2) (being the jurisdictional limit of the court, when sitting in its General Division, in relation to a claim for damages arising from personal injury or death); District Court Act 1973 (NSW) s 44(1)(a) (referring to the jurisdictional limit of the court, which is defined in s 4(1) as $750,000). 35. Or but for a set off under NT r 13.14 against his or her claim would be entitled to recover. Rule 13.14 provides that where a defendant has a claim against a plaintiff for the recovery of a debt or damages, the claim may be relied on as a defence to the whole or part of a claim made by the plaintiff for the recovery of a debt or damages and may be included in the defence and set off against the plaintiff’s claim, whether or not the defendant also counterclaims for that debt or those damages. 36. NT r 63.22(1). 37. NT r 63.22(2). 38. NT r 63.03(2) (which also vests a like power in the taxing master upon taxation). 39. See, for example, Makryllos v George Laurens (NT) Pty Ltd (1992) 111 FLR 204 (SC(NT)) (where the plaintiffs recovered only $1,500, but Kearney J held that in view of the complexity of the legal issues involved there were good reasons for them to have instituted the action in the Supreme Court, justifying allowance of costs on the Supreme Court scale: at 216–17). 40. Qld r 697(1), 697(2) (formerly r 698(1), 698(2)). 41. Qld r 697(3), 697(4) (formerly r 698(1), 698(3)). See, for example, Hussey v Page [1973] Qd R 509 (dealing with the equivalent former rule, Qld RSC O 91 r 2, where Williams J held that the plaintiff could not have the luxury of costs on the Supreme Court scale where his damages, though reasonably expected to be assessed at a figure well above the District Court threshold, ultimately proved to be well below that threshold because, also as reasonably might have been expected, of his contributory responsibility for the accident: at 515). 42. SA r 263(2)(f)–(h) (formerly SA RSC r 101.02A). 43. District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42(2); SA DCCR r 263(2)(f)–(h) (formerly SA DCR r 101.02A). Cf Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 1992 (SA) rr 52–54, as to which see Sneaths Freightlines Pty Ltd v Pertsinidis (No 2) (2008) 253 LSJS 172; [2008] SADC 3; BC200840540 at [28]–[30] per Judge Nicholson. 44. See 12.9. 45. Silverblade v Nelson (1980) 24 SASR 310 at 313–14 per Cox J. 46. (1977) 16 SASR 162 at 171. See also Tuohy v Blackmore (1977) 20 SASR 161 at 162 per Jacobs J; Stevens v Chandler (1988) 46 SASR 541 at 543 per King CJ. 47. Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 13(1), 13(2). For cases in which the court did not allow costs on a higher scale see Roach v Grave [1979] Tas R (NC) 8; Pryor v Windsor (FC(Tas), 2 November 1993, unreported) BC9300118 at 2, 4 per Cox J. Cf McKeon v Myer Southern Stores Ltd [1979] Tas R (NC) 1.

48. Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 13(2A). 49. Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 13(2)(b). 50. Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 13(2)(c). 51. Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 13(6) (namely for the purposes of s 44, as to which see 20.41). 52. Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 13(7). 53. To determine whether a proceeding is one ‘for debt or damages’, the focus is on what is recovered. If a substantial part of the action is directed to obtaining relief other than debt or damages, the proceeding is not one ‘for debt or damages’. Conversely, a proceeding that is substantially for the recovery of debt or damages, but, say, includes a claim for declaration that might be adjudged unnecessary or superfluous, is nonetheless one for debt or damages: Bantick v Boss Properties Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] VSC 165; BC200002342 at [21]–[23] per Gillard J. In Valimi Pty Ltd v Maniotis [2003] VSC 357; BC200305406 at [25] Nettle J remarked that while the relief recovered may well be a good indicator of whether the action was one in substance for something apart from debt or damages, ‘it cannot be determinative of the nature of the action’. His Honour (at [28]–[29]) gave two examples of proceedings that generate a monetary outcome but that should not be classed as proceedings ‘for debt or damages’: (1) an action pre-eminently for relief other than debt or damages, such as specific performance of a contract, that is compromised upon the defendant paying to the plaintiff a sum certain in consideration of a release from all claims; (2) where the relief sought was a declaration of trust and an account of profits, but the proceeding is settled upon payment of a sum certain in consideration of the release of all claims. 54. Vic r 63.24(1). 55. Vic r 63.24(1). 56. Under Vic r 13.14, which provides that where a defendant has a claim against a plaintiff for the recovery of a debt or damages, the claim may be relied on as a defence to the whole or part of a claim made by the plaintiff for the recovery of a debt or damages and may be included in the defence and set off against the plaintiff’s claim, whether or not the defendant also counterclaims for that debt or damages. 57. Vic r 63.24(3). 58. Vic r 63.24(4). 59. In accordance with Vic r 26.03(4): see 13.5. 60. The ‘value of any property to which the relief relates’ means the value of the property in respect of which relief is sought and necessarily to which property the relief sought must relate: Lesiak v Foggenberger (SC(Vic), Hedigan J, 4 September 1995, unreported) BC9507196 at 7; Valimi Pty Ltd v Maniotis [2003] VSC 357; BC200305406 at [34] per Nettle J. 61. Vic r 63.25. 62. County Court Civil Procedure Rules 2008 (Vic) rr 63A.24, 63A.25. 63. Vic r 63.24(1.1). 64. WA O 66 r 17(1). In such a case, a solicitor acting for a plaintiff cannot charge his or her client any sum by way of costs exceeding that properly payable on a party and party basis in the Magistrates Court, unless the client has agreed in writing, before the proceedings are commenced, to pay on a higher scale, or the Supreme Court has certified that the action was properly brought in the Supreme Court: WA O 66 r 17(2).

65. WA O 66 r 17, it has been held, applies to the District Court of Western Australia by virtue of the combination of the rules themselves together with the rule making power in s 87 of the District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA), which provides for the application of the Supreme Court Rules in applicable circumstances to the District Court: Langham v McDonald [2009] WADC 2; BC200940014; Zurich Bay Holding Pty Ltd v ATM Enterprises Pty Ltd [2011] WADC 48; Vulich v Slater & Gordon Ltd [2011] WADC 209; BC201140443. 66. As to which see 12.2–12.3. 67. Silverblade v Nelson (1980) 24 SASR 310 at 313 per Cox J. 68. See, for example, Sherwell v Armour [1962] VR 197 at 197 per Lowe J; O’Dougherty v McMahon [1971] VR 625 at 628 per Menhennitt J (FC); Burke v Lunn [1976] VR 268 at 287 per Menhennitt J; Ramadan v Moussa [1984] VR 713 at 721 (FC); Brian Fisher Plumbing Supplies Pty Ltd v Elgas Ltd (SC(Vic), Hansen J, 19 February 1997, unreported) BC9700240 at 11–17. 69. See, for example, John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Palmer (1987) 8 NSWLR 297 at 305 per Kirby P. 70. Duncan v Hyland [1922] SASR 475 at 478 per Gordon J; Esposito v Commonwealth of Australia (1988) 80 ACTR 9 at 12 per Miles CJ. 71. See also Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 13(2A) (directing the court to take into account all the circumstances of the case, including the sum sought to be recovered, the sum recovered, and any counterclaim, set off or contributory negligence). 72. Killalea v In Print Publishing Co Ltd [1966] NZLR 70 at 72 per Woodhouse J (SC); O’Dougherty v McMahon [1971] VR 625; Symes v Commonwealth of Australia (1987) 89 FLR 356 at 358 per Gallop J (SC(ACT)). Cf Roach v Grave [1979] Tas R (NC) 8 (that the plaintiff claimed and expected to recover the amount claimed is not a sufficient reason to oust the statutory costs sanction). 73. Scott v Municipal Tramways Trust [1920] SALR 442 at 451 per Poole J; Burton v Litton Business Systems Pty Ltd (1977) 16 SASR 162 at 171 per King J; Tuohy v Blackmore (1977) 20 SASR 161 at 164 per Jacobs J; Vella v Ivanovski [1984] WAR 8 at 10 per Wickham SPJ (FC); Campbell v Jones [2003] 1 Qd R 630; [2002] QCA 332; BC200205062 at [72], [73] per Fryberg and Mullins JJ. 74. Burton v Litton Business Systems Pty Ltd (1977) 16 SASR 162 at 171 per King J; Tuohy v Blackmore (1977) 20 SASR 161 at 164 per Jacobs J. 75. Scott v Municipal Tramways Trust [1920] SALR 442 at 451 per Poole J; North Australian Haulage Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1970) 15 FLR 487 at 490 per Blackburn J (SC(NT)); O’Dougherty v McMahon [1971] VR 625 at 630 per Menhennitt J (FC); Burton v Litton Business Systems Pty Ltd (1977) 16 SASR 162 at 171 per King J; Prior v Lansdowne Press Pty Ltd [1977] VR 65 at 77 per Gowans J; Woodger v Federal Capital Press of Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 107 ACTR 1 at 40 per Miles CJ; Makryllos v George Laurens (NT) Pty Ltd (1992) 111 FLR 204 at 216–17 per Kearney J (SC(NT)). Cf Pryor v Windsor (FC(Tas), 2 November 1993, unreported) BC9300118 at 4 per Cox J (nothing particularly complex about the matter). 76. Killalea v In Print Publishing Co Ltd [1966] NZLR 70 at 72 per Woodhouse J (SC); Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd v Rousianos (1989) 19 NSWLR 57 at 70 per Gleeson CJ; Pryor v Windsor (FC(Tas), 2 November 1993, unreported), at 4 per Cox J (case did not require the pre-trial procedures adopted in the Supreme Court in an endeavour to reduce the scope of the dispute to its essentials); Arian v Nguyen (2001) 33 MVR 37 at 49–50; [2001] NSWCA 5; BC200100266 per Ipp AJA (District Court in effect is a specialist personal injuries court). 77. Killalea v In Print Publishing Co Ltd [1966] NZLR 70 at 72 per Woodhouse J (SC). See, for

example, Lesiak v Foggenberger (SC(Vic), Hedigan J, 4 September 1995, unreported) BC9507196 (who ordered ‘otherwise’ for the purposes of Vic r 63.24(1) essentially because of the reprehensible conduct of the litigation by the defendant). 78. See, for example, L’Huillier v State of Victoria [1996] 2 VR 465 at 487; BC9600593 per Callaway JA (case involving important public law issues justifying its prosecution in the Supreme Court). 79. See, for example, Scott v Municipal Tramways Trust [1920] SALR 442 at 450 per Poole J (who remarked that he would not fetter his discretion by limiting its exercise solely to cases where a question of right or some principle of general importance is involved). 80. WA O 66 r 17(1): see 12.15. 81. (1977) 16 SASR 162. 82. Burton v Litton Business Systems Pty Ltd (1977) 16 SASR 162 at 171–2 per King J. 83. Cf Brian Fisher Plumbing Supplies Pty Ltd v Elgas Ltd (SC(Vic), Hansen J, 19 February 1997, unreported) BC9700240 at 16–17 (ruling that to give weight to the fact that the settlement amount was only 20 per cent less than the relevant jurisdictional limit ‘would be to deny force to the rule itself’, although conceding that ‘one or two dollars or a very small amount below that limit could be regarded as de minimis’); Distant v Queensland Rail [2002] QSC 271; BC200205316 at [12] per Mackenzie J. 84. (1977) 20 SASR 161. 85. Tuohy v Blackmore (1977) 20 SASR 161 at 164–5. See also Chapman v Pindara Private Hospital Pty Ltd (SC(Qld), Dowsett J, 9 January 1991, unreported). Cf Vella v Ivanovski [1984] WAR 8 at 10 per Wickham SPJ (FC) (who granted the certificate in question because the settlement achieved was only $200 less than the maximum jurisdictional amount). 86. O’Keefe v Australian Trencher Company Pty Ltd (FC(SA), 26 September 1991, unreported) BC9100297 at 1–2. 87. Compare Duncan v Hyland [1922] SASR 475 at 476–7 per Gordon J (ruling that the difficulties surrounding the law of negligence were well within the track of the Local Court) with Makryllos v George Laurens (NT) Pty Ltd (1992) 111 FLR 204 at 216–17 per Kearney J (SC(NT)) (where it was held by that even though the plaintiffs recovered only $1,500, in view of the complexity of the legal issues involved there were good reasons for them to have instituted the action in the Supreme Court, justifying the allowance of costs on the Supreme Court scale). Cf Woodger v Federal Capital Press of Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 107 ACTR 1 at 40 per Miles CJ (who allowed costs on the Supreme Court scale even though the amount recovered was below the relevant threshold for that court because the issues raised by the unsuccessful defendant made the case a difficult and complicated one). 88. [1920] SALR 442 at 451. 89. [2007] VSCA 258; BC200709875 at [7]. 90. See, for example, White v State of South Australia (No 2) (2010) 270 LSJS 264; [2010] SASC 185; BC201004274 (where ten applicants commenced a claim for damages against the respondent in respect of conduct of senior police officers towards applicants during demonstrations at a uranium mine, and all proved successful to varying degrees; Anderson J rejected the respondent’s argument that the (lower) damages awarded to four of the applicants should trigger the relevant costs sanction, reasoning that it would not have been in the public interest for the actions of the ten plaintiffs to be split and brought partly in the District Court and partly in the Supreme Court, as the nature of the case justified it being brought wholly in the Supreme Court: at [17]); Amanatidis v Darmos (Costs) (No 2) [2011] VSC 216; BC201103136 (where Sifris J noted that although

‘[t]he legal issues were, so far as defamation cases are concerned, relatively straightforward’ (at [39]), the Supreme Court was nonetheless the appropriate forum because, at the time of commencement of the defamation proceeding, other proceedings in relation to the parties’ dispute had been issued in the Supreme Court or transferred to the Federal Court of Australia, making it desirable that all matters be heard and determined in the Supreme Court (at [46])). 91. (1989) 19 NSWLR 57. 92. Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd v Rousianos (1989) 19 NSWLR 57 at 70–1. 93. See, for example, Campbell v Turner (No 2) [2007] QSC 362; BC200710605. 94. See 13.17–13.21. 95. Stevens v Chandler (1988) 46 SASR 541 at 544 per King CJ. 96. [2003] 1 Qd R 1; [2002] QCA 60; BC200200904. 97. At the time, Qld r 698(1) (now Qld r 697(1): see 12.8). 98. Beardmore v Franklins Management Services Pty Ltd [2003] 1 Qd R 1; [2002] QCA 60; BC200200904 at [24] (footnote supplied). See also at [107] per Ambrose J; Neilson Investments (Qld) Pty Ltd v Spud Mulligan’s Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 295; BC200205740 at [23]–[25] per Ambrose J. Cf Campbell v Jones [2003] 1 Qd R 630; [2002] QCA 332; BC200205062 at [72]– [73] per Fryberg and Mullins JJ. 99. 99. See 12.9. 100. See 12.12. 101. See 12.6. 102. (1987) 8 NSWLR 297 at 306. See also at 309 per Samuels JA. 103. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Palmer (1987) 8 NSWLR 297 at 306 (footnote supplied). 104. In New South Wales (and also Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia) the assessment of damages in defamation actions has since been committed to the judge rather than the jury: see 12.22. 105. West v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 767; BC200304854 at [14] per Simpson J. 106. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Palmer (1987) 8 NSWLR 297 at 307. 107. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Palmer (1987) 8 NSWLR 297 at 309. 108. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Palmer (1987) 8 NSWLR 297 at 309. 109. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Palmer (1987) 8 NSWLR 297 at 307 per Kirby P. 110. [2000] NSWSC 1207; BC200007852 at [22]–[31]. 111. The uniform defamation laws state that the assessment of damages in defamation actions lies with the judge rather than the jury: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 22(3); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 22(3); Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) s 22(3); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 22(3); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 22(3). Other jurisdictions, in any event, had already abandoned jury trial on all civil issues: Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 22; Juries Act 1962 (NT) s 6A; Juries Act 1927 (SA) s 5. 112. Amanatidis v Darmos (Costs) (No 2) [2011] VSC 216; BC201103136 at [43] per Sifris J (noting that the authorities in relation to jury trials in this context, where awards are far more uncertain, are of less relevance in relation to where, as is now the case, juries no longer assess damages for defamation). Cf Glare v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 493; BC200007095 at [4] per Ashley J (who saw the observations of Samuels JA in John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Palmer

(1987) 8 NSWLR 297 at 309 (noted above at 12.24) as of relevance in Victoria even though the Victorian Supreme Court has no Defamation List). 113. See, for example, Killalea v In Print Publishing Co Ltd [1966] NZLR 70 at 72 per Woodhouse J (SC) (ruling that the plaintiff was justified in desiring to have the matter tested and vindicated by a jury as representative of the community); Court v Whyte (1980) 26 SASR 307n at 308n per Hogarth ACJ (who held that it was just that the plaintiff should recover the whole of his costs of action, as his international stature and reputation throughout Australia, and the wide publicity given by the defendants in the form of a letter published in a newspaper, made it reasonable and proper for the plaintiff to have sought vindication in the Supreme Court); Glare v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 493; BC200007095 at [4]–[5] per Ashley J (who viewed the case as one in which the ‘symbolic element’ of vindication was properly sought in a proceeding in the Supreme Court, particularly as the defamation was published in a mass medium with substantial readership and the plaintiff was a person in public life). 114. (1993) 113 FLR 422 at 424. 115. Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 422 at 425. 116. Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 422 at 426. See also Anderson v Wellington Publishing Co Ltd [1962] NZLR 1034 at 1035 per McGregor J (SC); Killalea v In Print Publishing Co Ltd [1966] NZLR 70 at 71 per Woodhouse J (SC); Woodger v Federal Capital Press of Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 107 ACTR 1 at 40 per Miles CJ. 117. (1980) 26 SASR 286 at 300. 118. Namely Potts v Moran (1976) 16 SASR 284; Scott v Prowse (SC(SA), Mohr J, 12 February 1979, unreported); Court v Whyte (1980) 26 SASR 307n (in n 113 above). Cox J in Bunker v James (at 307) viewed Potts v Moran as showing that ‘there may be circumstances, including (but hardly constituting nothing more than) a reasonable wish by a defamed plaintiff to have his reputation vindicated in this Court, in which the plaintiff may still get his full costs here even though his damages were assessed at a low figure’, but added that ‘I expect that such cases will be uncommon’. See also O’Keefe v Australian Trencher Company Pty Ltd (FC(SA), 26 September 1991, unreported) BC9100297 at 1 (where Potts v Moran was characterised as ‘a special case’, and not authority for ‘a general proposition that wherever there is complexity in litigation a plaintiff is entitled to institute his action in a higher court’). 119. Bunker v James (1980) 26 SASR 286 at 306. 120. Bunker v James (1980) 26 SASR 286 at 307. 121. (1993) 113 FLR 422 at 425. 122. [1979] Tas R (NC) 1.

[page 363]

CHAPTER 13

Costs Consequences of Rejected Settlement Offers Costs Consequences Prescribed by Statute or Court Rules Requirements for offers of compromise Formalities prescribed by the court rules Offer to be made in clear terms Offer must reflect a genuine compromise Offer must be exclusive of costs Offer cannot be a collective offer Costs consequences of unaccepted offers of compromise made by plaintiffs Federal Court, New South Wales and Western Australia Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria Costs consequences of unaccepted offers of compromise made by defendants Where the plaintiff (applicant) succeeds Where the plaintiff (applicant) fails ‘Unless the court otherwise orders’ — discretion to oust the prima facie rule Onus of proof Broad inquiry into reasonableness Timing of relevant inquiry Timing of offer

13.3 13.5 13.5 13.6 13.7 13.10 13.12 13.13 13.14 13.16 13.19 13.19 13.22 13.24 13.25 13.26 13.29 13.30

Duration of offer 13.31 Change in circumstances/case after the offer 13.33 Costs consequences of unaccepted payments in prescribed by court rules 13.34 Court rules 13.34 Interpretation of court rules 13.36 Family law cases 13.40 Interaction between ss 117(2A) and 117C 13.40 Offers under the rules 13.41 Importance of offer being expressed in clear terms 13.42 Approach to exercise of costs discretion 13.43 Effect of withdrawal of offer 13.46 Defamation cases 13.48 13.52

Payment into Court Outside of Court Rules

Settlement Offers Without Prejudice Except as to Costs — ‘Calderbank Offers’ 13.55 Background to Calderbank offers 13.55 The Calderbank case 13.56 [page 364] Modern scope of Calderbank offers Form of Calderbank offers Costs consequences of Calderbank offers Offers that may not generate costs consequences Offer expressed in terms to deny admissibility on costs Offers expressed in unclear or misleading terms Offers expressed in terms that envisage further negotiation

13.57 13.59 13.60 13.63 13.64 13.65 13.66

Offers that lack genuine element of compromise ‘Walk away’ offers? Offers inclusive of costs? Exercise of discretion — relevant factors Offer compared to judgment Stage of proceedings at which offer made Period for which offer is open Substantial compliance with requirements of rule-based offers of compromise Offeree’s attitude to the offer Warning foreshadowing, and reasoned exposition for, application for indemnity costs Effect of Settlement Offers on Appeal or Re-Trial Settlement offers on appeal Application of rule-based offers of compromise on appeal Application of Calderbank offers on appeal Relevance on appeal of settlement offers made at trial Calderbank offers at trial Rule-based offers at trial Relevance of settlement offers on re-trial

13.67 13.69 13.70 13.72 13.75 13.79 13.81 13.83 13.85 13.86 13.87 13.87 13.87 13.88 13.89 13.89 13.90 13.93

13.1 The usual exercise of the court’s costs discretion is to order the unsuccessful litigant to pay the costs of the successful litigant, known as the ‘rule’ that ‘costs follow the event’ or the ‘costs indemnity rule’.1 But in various circumstances a court may find it just to oust the usual costs rule, and require a successful litigant to meet some or all his or her own costs, or even some or all of the costs of an opponent.2 One such circumstance involves where an ultimately successful party rejects a settlement offer3 that proves, in the final analysis, as or more favourable to that party as the judgment of the court. Not to recognise any costs consequences of such an outcome is

inconsistent with the law’s aim to encourage parties to settle their dispute. The following remarks by Rogers CJ in Tickell v Trifleska Pty Ltd are apposite to this end:4 It is the primary aim of any judicial system to attempt to bring the parties to a point where, with fairness to themselves, they are able to dispose of the dispute between them by compromise. It is only in the last resort that a dispute should proceed to trial and to determination. That is for any number of reasons. It is in the interests of the community that scarce resources, such as the court,

[page 365] should not be over-taxed. It is in the interests of the community and of the parties themselves that they should not engage in the rancour which a dispute in court necessarily entails. It is in the interests of the parties themselves to save themselves the expenditure of time and energy necessarily entailed in participation in contested court proceedings.

Giving effect to this policy, courts have long recognised that it may be proper, in its costs discretion, to deprive an ultimately successful litigant of costs incurred after the date of an offer (known as a ‘Calderbank offer’), and even to require that litigant to pay an opponent’s costs after that date, possibly on other than the party and party basis.5 This approach has been formalised by court rules in all jurisdictions, although the latter do not purport to exhaust the curial discretion in circumstances outside their domain.6 What follows distinguishes the jurisdiction prescribed by rules of court7 from that stemming from the general costs discretion.8 The costs consequences of proceedings compromised as a result of the acceptance of a settlement offer are dealt with elsewhere.9 Whether under the rules or pursuant to the general costs discretion, settlement offers are especially encouraged in litigation in an area where results are not predictable, whether because of the general discretion vested in the judge10 or because it relies heavily on matters of inference.11 13.2 It is important to note at the outset that the costs consequences noted above, whether pursuant to the general costs discretion or under specific court rules, have no application to criminal proceedings.12 Unlike civil proceedings, criminal cases cannot be compromised or settled.13 The point is inferred by statute in some jurisdictions, which states that there is no exclusion of evidence of settlement negotiations in the case of ‘an attempt to

negotiate the settlement of a criminal proceeding or an anticipated criminal proceeding’.14 [page 366]

Costs Consequences Prescribed by Statute or Court Rules 13.3 Court rules envisage costs consequences for offerees who reject offers of compromise15 that, once judgment is entered, prove to have been as or more favourable than the judgment. The main consequences are two-fold: that the offeree pay the offeror’s costs incurred after the rejection of the offer, or even generally; and that those costs be quantified on a basis more generous than the party and party basis.16 The rules serve three important purposes:17 first, to encourage the saving of private costs and the avoidance of the inherent risks, delays and uncertainties of litigation by promoting early offers of compromise; second, to save the expense incurred in litigation that proves to have been unnecessary, having regard to an earlier offer of compromise; and third, to give the offeror an indemnity against the costs he or she has incurred in the action as a result of the offeree having rejected an offer that, had it been accepted, would have been avoided. The clear intention is to pressure a party who has received an offer of compromise to give serious thought to the risks inherent in the litigation, including potential costs liability. 13.4 The main route provided by court rules for offers to settle a money claim was traditionally via payment into court of an amount in purported satisfaction of the claim. Now only the territories, New South Wales and Tasmania make provision for costs consequences of payments into court.18 The modern practice, evidenced by the rules other than the Australian Capital Territory, is to prescribe costs consequences of offers of compromise made pursuant to the rules, involving a procedure more flexible than payment in. Yet even where the payment in or the offer fails to meet the formalities set by the rules, or the rules do not prescribe costs consequences for such payments

or offers, the making of the payment or offer remains relevant to the court’s costs discretion.19

Requirements for offers of compromise Formalities prescribed by the court rules 13.5 Court rules that impose costs consequences of rejected offers of compromise prescribe the broad nature and form of these offers. Generally speaking, they provide for the required content of the offer,20 the time before which it must be made,21 the mode and timing of its [page 367] acceptance,22 and (other than in South Australia)23 prohibit its withdrawal during the time it is open to be accepted unless the court otherwise orders.24 The rules generally also state that such an offer is taken to have been made without prejudice unless the notice of offer otherwise provides,25 that no statement of the fact that an offer has been made can be contained in any pleading or affidavit26 and that, if an offer is not accepted, no communication with respect to the offer can be made to the court at the trial.27 An offer may be disclosed to the court, inter alia, after all questions of liability and the relief to be granted have been determined28 or where a notice of offer provides that the offer is not made without prejudice.29 The South Australian rules follow a slightly different schema in this regard, prohibiting disclosure of a formal settlement offer to the trial judge unless, inter alia, all questions to which the offer is relevant have been determined, a defence of tender before action is raised, or a declaratory judgment determining liability has been made and the court permits the disclosure.30 Although only the Tasmanian rules expressly envisage an offer made as a percentage of the claim in question,31 the terms of the rules in the remaining jurisdictions have been held to be sufficiently broad to sustain the same outcome.32 While the nature of an offer of compromise ostensibly aligns to that of a

contractual offer, it is the court rules that govern its incidents, not the common law of offer and acceptance.33 [page 368] To the extent that those rules modify the common law concepts, the latter are necessarily displaced.34

Offer to be made in clear terms 13.6 Whilst the costs consequences prescribed by the rules35 where a settlement offer has been unreasonably rejected must be determined without undue regard for technical objections as to the form of the offer, it remains that the offer must be in ‘unambiguously clear terms’, leaving ‘no reasonable doubt as to the nature and extent of what was being offered’.36 ‘Common sense and/or the interests of justice’, it has been judicially observed, ‘dictate(s) that any serious offer to adjust financial differences should be framed in plain English terms that are easy to perceive or understand, leaving no doubt as to the terms of that offer’.37 What the foregoing requires is that an offer, to the extent possible, permit a prompt, relatively inexpensive comparison between the nature and extent of the advantages (and any drawbacks) arising from the judgment with the situation that would have been obtained had the offer been accepted.38 Difficulty in comparing offer and judgment can jeopardise the chances of showing that the former was more advantageous to the offeree than the latter, and with this the favourable costs consequences that may ensue to the offeror. An offer that is incomplete or misleading is likewise unlikely to trigger ruleprescribed costs consequences.39 As it is within the domain of the offeror to frame the terms of an offer, the offeree is under no legal obligation to clarify the terms of an offer made where it is ambiguous,40 although in practice this may be advisable.

Offer must reflect a genuine compromise 13.7 The costs consequences prescribed by the rules41 apply only where the

offer represents what the court construes as a genuine attempt at compromise. Those consequences are not, therefore, triggered by an ‘offer’ to accept the whole of the relief a party seeks in its claim or [page 369] application; an ‘offer’ in these terms is not designed to settle or compromise any issue between the parties but requires complete capitulation.42 This is so even if the offeror proves totally successful in the litigation. As the courts are concerned with matters of substance over form, an ‘offer’ that, though it does not request complete surrender, is properly viewed as merely a token compromise — made ‘more in the hope of obtaining an advantage on costs rather than for the purpose of genuinely compromising the dispute’43 — is also likely to fall outside the rules. 13.8 The foregoing cannot be taken too far, though. The cases reveal instances where invitations almost to capitulate can trigger the rule-based costs consequences. The strength of the competing case is a weighty consideration in this context. If that case can be described as frivolous or vexatious, or otherwise very weak, it may well be unreasonable to expect the offeror to make any substantial concession by way of an offer of compromise.44 The latter observation is equally pertinent when it comes to a case that is an ‘all or nothing’ in nature.45 In instances of these kinds, even a very modest concession may represent a non-token element of compromise. For example, in Prosperity Advisers Pty Ltd v Secure Enterprises Pty Ltd46 the respondent offered the appellant $10,000 plus costs in settlement of their dispute, where the respondent’s maximum potential liability was $680,000. Tobias AJA, with whom Macfarlan and Barrett JJA concurred, branded the appellant’s claim as weak and, even if successful, incapable of generating a judgment for the full amount of the claim. Indeed, on the hearing of the appeal, the appellant sought only one-half of its claim ($340,000). In making an offer equivalent to 3 per cent of the revised claim, his Honour found that the respondent, in view of ‘the strength of its case in the light of the evidence, did give something away’.47 The offer was thus ‘relevantly genuine’,48 and capable therefore of triggering the relevant costs rules. 13.9 The case law also acknowledges that a ‘walk away’ offer — typically

where the offeror expresses its willingness to settle on the ground that each party bears its own costs — can [page 370] amount to a genuine49 attempt to compromise the dispute.50 In Clark v Commissioner of Taxation Greenwood J, in this context, that:51 … the notion that the applicants are giving up nothing of substance by offering to compromise on the footing that they will absorb the recoverable costs incurred to the date of the offer misunderstands the lay community’s concerns about legal costs and therefore the concerns lay litigants hold about costs. Costs do not lie at the margins for litigants. They are real and of value.

This is the more likely where the costs incurred to date on each side are likely to be substantial, as was the case in Clark, where the offer was to abandon a claim to recoverable costs in the order of between $123,000 and $184,000. This, his Honour remarked, was ‘a real concession’.52 The point has especial resonance in the modern case-managed world of commercial litigation, as explained by the same judge in a different case:53 An offer to compromise which is framed in terms of a party’s willingness to abandon the recovery of costs so incurred along that continuum through the preparation and analysis of statements, disclosure, analysis of documents and the preparation and review of expert reports, is undoubtedly considered by the litigant as an offer that involves giving up something meaningful, real and measurable. This is particularly so after the completion of case managed preparatory steps at various phases of the litigation which may have the effect of front-end loading significant costs in order to save trial costs. In many cases although not in all cases, the notion that a party is giving up nothing by inviting another party to discontinue a claim on the footing that the offeror will not make any claim for payment of its costs incurred to the date of the offer, is a fundamentally abstracted notion from the practical perspective of the engaged litigant confronting the management of the proceeding and the appropriation of expenditure to conduct it.

The closeness of a ‘walk away’ offer to the trial, in addition to coming at a time when the parties are likely to have incurred substantial costs, is also probative because at that time the parties are well positioned to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases. In Eric Preston Pty Ltd v Euroz Securities Ltd (No 2),54 for example, the respondent’s ‘walk away’ offer was made a week before the trial, namely at a time when both parties had incurred considerable costs in preparing their respective cases, and were on the brink of incurring a further costs in conducting what would be an 11

day trial. Being a ‘walk away’ offer, the offer also envisaged that the respondent would forego a $96,000 cross-claim. Siopis J held that, [page 371] in the circumstances, the offer could be viewed as a serious attempt to compromise the litigation, made in time for the applicant to have avoided significant costs.55

Offer must be exclusive of costs 13.10 The court rules dictate that a purported offer of compromise inclusive of costs (an ‘all in’ offer) is not a valid offer for the purposes of the rules. The New South Wales rules state so explicitly, such that ‘[a]n offer must be exclusive of costs, except where it states that it is a verdict for the defendant and that the parties are to bear their own costs’.56 This aims to avoid inconsistency between an offer of compromise and the provisions of the rules with respect to costs when such an offer has been made but not accepted.57 The reference to the offer being ‘exclusive of costs’ is to it being exclusive of the costs of the proceedings in the court in respect of which the offer of compromise is made; it does not require that the offer be exclusive of costs that have already been the subject of an order of the court at first instance.58 In the Northern Territory, Victoria, Tasmania and Western Australia, by stating that an offer of compromise containing a term that purports to negative or limit the operation of the clause dealing with acceptance of offers — the accepting party must pay the offeror’s costs in respect up to and including the day the offer was served — that term is ‘of no effect’,59 the rules have been interpreted as undermining the effectiveness of ‘all in’ offers.60 The Queensland rules envisage the acceptance of an offer that ‘expressly or impliedly includes an offer to pay assessed costs’, in which case, inter alia, a court order is taken to have been made for the payment of costs in accordance with the offer.61 Although the wording is not entirely clear, this does not, in its terms, appear to be directed to legitimising ‘all in’ offers, but appears directed at the ‘plus costs’ form of offer. The same may be said of the South Australian rules, which require an offer to ‘state whether the

offer relates to costs and, if so, the amount of the offer so far as it relates to costs’,62 and the Tasmanian rules, which foreshadow that an offer ‘may include an offer to pay or accept costs on a specified scale’.63 13.11 An offer expressed as ‘in full and final settlement’ is properly construed as one inclusive of costs, and therefore outside the purview of the rules.64 It is to be distinguished from an offer [page 372] expressed to be ‘plus costs’ (as agreed or assessed), which is amenable to being interpreted as one exclusive of costs.65 As to the latter, the logic has been explained in the following terms:66 I can see no basis for a contention that an offer of compromise expressed as a sum ‘plus costs as agreed or assessed’ operates inconsistently with any relevant costs rule. On the contrary, a losing party might ordinarily expect to be ordered to pay costs, which may be agreed between or among the parties or alternatively left to the vicissitudes of the assessment procedure. The touchstone of the rules concerning offers of compromise seems to me to be one of reasonable certainty: can a party in receipt of an offer reasonably ascertain from its terms what position that party will be in following either an acceptance or rejection of the offer. It is no less certain for any party to become subject to an unassessed costs liability in litigation as the result of a settlement upon acceptance of an offer expressed in terms of a sum plus costs as agreed or assessed than the costs liability to which all parties remain potentially liable pending the determination of contested proceedings. The purpose of the rule is not frustrated or circumvented by enforcement of offers of compromise expressed in this way.

Offer cannot be a collective offer 13.12 The Full Federal Court in King v Yurisich (No 2)67 found no basis under the terms of relevant rules for the proposition that an offer made to all respondents can be accepted only by one, adding that, as one party cannot compel others, ‘it would be unacceptably harsh to insist upon acceptance in all the circumstances’. In Barwon Region Waiter Authority v AquatecMaxcon Pty Ltd68 a case where the appellant’s offer of compromise was not by its terms capable of being accepted by the respondent alone, the Victorian Court of Appeal applied these remarks. This was despite a compelling argument that, in a ‘real and practical’ sense, the respondent was well placed to bring about the acceptance of the offer, had it been minded to do so, by resolving its position with its co-respondents, and then proceeding to accept

the offer.69 As the express terms of the offer made to all seven respondents to the counterclaim were to accept a sum plus costs in settlement of specified claims, some of which could be settled by an agreement between the appellant and the respondent alone and some of which could not, acceptance of the offer by the respondent alone could not effect a settlement contract containing the terms set out in the offer.70 [page 373]

Costs consequences of unaccepted offers of compromise made by plaintiffs 13.13 Excepting the Australian Capital Territory, court rules make provision for costs consequences arising from unaccepted offers of compromise made by plaintiffs. They follow two broad schemas, and are so divided in the following discussion. Importantly, the costs jurisdiction discussed below rests on the court being satisfied that the offeror was at all material times willing and able to carry out his or her part of the offer.71 Also, in determining whether the offer is as favourable as the judgment, the court must disregard any amount of interest awarded to the plaintiff in relation to the period after the day on which the offer was served.72 For this purpose, moreover, the court is not limited to considering just money amounts.73 In Sunlec International Ltd v Carroll Australasia Pty Ltd,74 for example, involving a copyright dispute, the terms of the offer of compromise involved a monetary amount plus an injunction and delivery up. Wheeler J held that the injunctive relief was of considerable value in the action, and so was unable to form the view on the basis solely of the monetary award that the judgment was ‘not more favourable’ than the terms of the offer.75

Federal Court, New South Wales and Western Australia 13.14 In New South Wales (and under the former Federal Court Rules),76 if an offer of compromise is made by a plaintiff and not accepted by the defendant, and the plaintiff obtains judgment on the claim77 to which the offer relates no less favourable than the terms of the offer, then, unless the

court otherwise orders, the plaintiff is entitled to an order against the defendant for the plaintiff’s costs in respect of the claim from the day on which the offer was made, assessed on an indemnity basis78 in addition to his or her costs incurred before and on that day assessed on the ordinary basis.79 Before 1 March 2007 the position was similar in Western Australia. The rules in that jurisdiction now instead prescribe that all costs, whether before or after the offer, are to be [page 374] taxed on the party and party basis.80 The latter does not, however, oust the court’s discretion to make an indemnity costs order in the face of some improper or unreasonable conduct by the defendant (or his or her lawyers); for this purpose, though, it will not be sufficient for the offeror simply to show that it obtained a judgment more favourable than the terms of the offer.81 Moreover, even if conduct that would justify an indemnity costs order is made out, such an order will ordinarily be made only in circumstances where, in the absence of such an order, the successful party is unlikely to recover the full amount of his or her costs.82 The New South Wales rules add that, for an offer made on the first or a later day of the trial, unless the court otherwise orders, the plaintiff is entitled to costs in respect of the claim from 11 am on the day following the day on which the offer was made, assessed on an indemnity basis, in addition to costs incurred before that time, assessed on the ordinary basis.83 13.15 The current Federal Court rules read as follows:84 If an offer is made by an applicant and not accepted by a respondent, and the applicant obtains a judgment that is more favourable than the terms of the offer, the applicant is entitled to an order that the respondent pay the applicant’s costs: (a) before 11.00 am on the second business day after the offer was served — on a party and party basis; and (b) after the time mentioned in paragraph (a) — on an indemnity basis.

Three obvious differences between the current and former rules have been identified in this context.85 The first, and most critical, difference is that the current rule omits the words ‘unless the court otherwise orders’, whereas its predecessor clearly conferred discretion on the court to refuse to make an indemnity costs order. Second, the current rules apply a different time frame

to the entitlement to indemnity costs in respect of an offer made under the respective rule. Third, the reference to ‘a judgment that is more favourable than the terms of the offer’ clearly differs from the former ‘judgment on the claim to which the offer relates not less favourable than the terms of the offer’.

Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria 13.16 In these jurisdictions, if an offer of compromise made by a plaintiff is rejected by the defendant, and the plaintiff obtains a judgment on the claim no less favourable to him or her than the terms of the offer,86 then, unless the court otherwise orders, the plaintiff is entitled to an order against the defendant for costs in respect of the claim taxed on a solicitor and client87 (in the Northern Territory, Queensland and Victoria, on an indemnity) basis.88 [page 375] However, in the Northern Territory and Victoria the foregoing only applies to claims for damages arising out of death or bodily injury.89 For other claims, the Northern Territory rules state that if the plaintiff has made an offer to the defendant, whether or not expressed to be without prejudice, which has not been accepted, and the plaintiff obtains a judgment on the claim no less favourable than the terms of the offer, the court must take those matters into account in determining what order to make for costs in respect of the claim.90 The rules envisage that the court may, in exercising this discretion, order costs in the plaintiff’s favour, taxed on an indemnity basis, whether from the commencement of the proceeding, the day the offer was made or such other time as it thinks fit.91 The Victorian rules, for other claims, state that, unless the court otherwise orders, the plaintiff is entitled to costs up to and including the day the offer was served, taxed on a party and party basis, and thereafter taxed on an indemnity basis.92 13.17 The South Australian rules make provision for costs consequences of offers of settlement made before the action is commenced. The relevant rule aims, in this regard, to encourage and facilitate an early resolution of the

dispute and, if there can be no resolution, ‘to facilitate an efficient processing of a claim by the court through the early articulation and narrowing of issues and the focussing of the parties’ attention on matters genuinely in dispute’.93 This explains judicial remarks eschewing interpretation of the rule ‘in an unduly technical or restrictive manner’.94 The rule states that where a primary action95 is based on a monetary claim (subject to three exceptions),96 a plaintiff must, at least 90 days before commencing the action, give the defendant written notice containing or accompanied by, inter alia, an offer to settle97 the plaintiff’s claim on a basis set out in the notice, and sufficient details of the claim, and sufficient supporting material, to enable the defendant to assess the reasonableness of the offer and to make an informed response to that offer.98 The defendant must, within 60 days of receiving the notice, respond in writing by either accepting the offer, making a counter-offer, or stating that [page 376] liability is denied and the grounds on which it is denied.99 In awarding costs of the action, the court may take into account whether the parties have complied with the foregoing obligations, and the terms of any offer or counter-offer, or of any response thereto, and its reasonableness in the circumstances.100 13.18 The chief difference between the above rules (in the Northern Territory and Victoria, so far as they relate to claims for damages arising out of death or bodily injury) and those in the Federal Court, New South Wales and Western Australia is that, unlike the rules in the latter jurisdictions, the plaintiff’s entitlement to costs against the defendant on a more liberal basis is not pegged to run from the date of the offer (or close to it). Instead, a plaintiff who secures an outcome no less favourable than the terms of the offer is prima facie entitled to the entire costs of the action against the defendant — not just those incurred after the offer was made — on a solicitor and client or indemnity basis. Thus the rules affect the amount of costs payable in respect of steps in the action that precede the making of the offer. That is part of the incentive to respond to an offer — what some judges have branded a penal consequence101 — rather than to continue to litigate in the hope of achieving

a better outcome.102 There is no warrant for reading down the clear words of the rules to confine those costs to costs incurred after the offer was made.103

Costs consequences of unaccepted offers of compromise made by defendants Where the plaintiff (applicant) succeeds 13.19 Other than in the Australian Capital Territory, the rules prescribe costs consequences of unaccepted offers of compromise by defendants. As the Federal Court and South Australian rules follow their own schema, though, they are discussed separately below.104 If a defendant’s offer of compromise is not accepted by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff obtains judgment on the claim to which the offer relates not more favourable than the terms of the offer, then, unless the court otherwise orders:105 [page 377] the plaintiff is entitled to an order against the defendant for the plaintiff’s costs in respect of the claim up to and including the day the offer was made, taxed (assessed) on a party and party basis (in New South Wales, on the ordinary basis;106 in the Northern Territory and Queensland, on the standard basis);107 and the defendant is entitled to an order for the defendant’s costs in respect of the claim thereafter taxed (assessed) on a party and party (standard) basis (in New South Wales, on an indemnity basis). The foregoing is premised upon the court being satisfied that the offeror was at all material times willing and able to carry out his or her part of the offer.108 Other than in Tasmania, for this purpose, where the offer was served109 on the first or a later day of the trial of the proceedings, then, unless the court otherwise orders, the plaintiff is entitled to costs in respect of the claim to the opening of the court next after the day (in New South Wales, up to 11 am on

the day following the day) on which the offer was served, taxed (assessed) on a party and party (standard) basis, and the defendant is entitled to costs in respect of the claim thereafter, taxed (assessed) on a party and party basis (in the Northern Territory, the standard basis; in New South Wales and Queensland, the indemnity basis).110 This rule serves to apportion the costs so that the plaintiff can have his or her costs up to the day after the offer was made on a party and party basis and the defendant have his or her costs from the day after the offer was made on an indemnity basis. It does not contemplate a scenario where the plaintiff wholly fails; indeed, it assumes that the plaintiff has succeeded because it provides for the payment of the plaintiff’s costs to the day after the offer was made.111 13.20 The current Federal Court Rules declare that, in the event that an applicant obtains a judgment that is less favourable than the terms of the offer by a respondent, the applicant is not entitled to any costs after 11 am on the second business day after the offer was served, and the respondent is entitled to an order that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs after that time on an indemnity basis.112 Like its counterpart directed to unaccepted offers by applicants,113 the current rule differs from its predecessor in three main ways, most significantly in omitting explicit provision for the court to ‘otherwise order’. It also differs from the rule that applies where the applicant fails,114 in not requiring an examination as to whether the applicant unreasonably failed to accept the offer.115 13.21 In South Australia, if a defendant’s formal offer of settlement so far as it relates to principal relief is not accepted by the plaintiff, and the court determines the relevant action or claim on terms (as to principal relief) that are no more favourable to the plaintiff than the terms of the offer, then, subject to the court’s order to the contrary, the plaintiff is not entitled to costs referable to the period falling after the relevant date, and the defendant is entitled to [page 378] costs referable to the period falling after the relevant date.116 The relevant rule by its express terms therefore targets filed offers by reference to the adequacy of the offer ‘as … to principal relief’, not its adequacy as to

principal relief and costs considered together. Its terms do not address the case where the offer relates to both principal relief and costs, and the offeror has indicated that the offer may only be accepted in its entirety. But in this event, the court may, as part of its discretion to ‘order to the contrary’, effect a just outcome, as explained by Stanley J in United Petroleum Pty Ltd v Skorpos (No 2):117 The existence of the residual discretion in the court to depart from applying the provisions of [the rule] strictly, allows for circumstances where the offer only is open to be accepted in its entirety and the term of the offer, insofar as it relates to costs, is manifestly inadequate. For example, if an action had been on foot for some years and an offer as to principal relief and costs was made, but the offer of costs was for $1,000 where the actual costs were substantial, where the offer could only be accepted in its entirety, and the court determined the action on terms that were no more favourable to the offeree than the terms of the offer as to principal relief, it would be open for the court to decline to apply the costs penalty in the exercise of the residual discretion.

The rules add that if a plaintiff accepts a formal offer of settlement insofar as it relates to principal relief after the relevant date, the court may, on the application of any other party, order that the plaintiff pay the costs of action incurred by that other party during some or all of the period after the relevant date.118 For the above purposes, the ‘relevant date’ is the date falling 14 days after the date of service of the offer.119

Where the plaintiff (applicant) fails 13.22 More than one judge has noted that the above rules refer only to the event where the plaintiff recovers a judgment that is not more (or less) favourable to the plaintiff than the terms of the offer, but are silent on the question of costs where the plaintiff fails and judgment is given for the defendant.120 In this latter situation, the defendant cannot therefore rely on the express language of the rules to secure a costs order on an indemnity basis.121 This does not, however, prevent the plaintiff’s rejection of the defendant’s offer having an influence on the appropriate costs order; the rejection is a matter to be taken into account, within the court’s costs discretion, in determining whether to make an indemnity order in the defendant’s favour in place of the usual costs order.122 That this represents essentially an application of the case law governing Calderbank offers — which recognises no presumption in favour of

indemnity costs arising out of rejected favourable settlement offers, only a general discretion to make an indemnity order where the rejection was [page 379] imprudent or unreasonable123 — has been viewed as somewhat anomalous.124 The anomaly lies in the fact that a defendant whose offer of compromise is rejected is, if the plaintiff obtains a judgment that is less favourable than the terms of the offer, prima facie entitled to an order for indemnity costs from the date of the rejection of the offer, whereas if the plaintiff fails completely, the defendant must show that the plaintiff’s rejection of the offer of compromise was imprudent or unreasonable to activate the court’s discretion to make the same order. The rule thus ‘discriminates irrationally against wholly successful defendants’.125 For this reason, multiple judges have recommended that it be amended to apply where a wholly unsuccessful plaintiff does not accept an offer of compromise served by the defendant.126 13.23 To date only the Federal Court and New South Wales rule-makers have responded.127 The relevant New South Wales rule reads as follows: (1) This rule applies if the offer concerned is made by the defendant, but not accepted by the plaintiff, and the defendant obtains an order or judgment on the claim concerned as favourable to the defendant, or more favourable to the defendant, than the terms of the offer. (2) Unless the court orders otherwise: (a) the defendant is entitled to an order against the plaintiff for the defendant’s costs in respect of the claim, to be assessed on the ordinary basis, up to the time from which the defendant becomes entitled to costs under paragraph (b), and (b) the defendant is entitled to an order against the plaintiff for the defendant’s costs in respect of the claim, assessed on an indemnity basis: (i) if the offer was made before the first day of the trial, as from the beginning of the day following the day on which the offer was made, and (ii) if the offer was made on or after the first day of the trial, as from 11 am on the day following the day on which the offer was made.

The corresponding Federal Court rule is expressed more simply. It states that if an applicant unreasonably fails to accept a respondent’s offer and the applicant’s proceeding is dismissed, the respondent is entitled to an order that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs, on a party and party basis, before 11 am on the second business day after the offer was served, and on an

indemnity basis after that time. Inline with the trend of the compromise provisions in the current rules,128 there is in this rule, unlike its predecessor, no explicit provision for the court to order otherwise in the circumstances. The rules promote the policy of encouraging the negotiated resolution of disputes by exposing a plaintiff to the risk of a costs ‘penalty’, beyond an award of costs on a party and party basis, should he or she press on with litigation in the face of an offer of compromise that, if accepted, would have yielded a more favourable result than that ultimately achieved. As the indemnity costs ‘penalty’ is one imposed by the rules, it does not rest on proof of any delinquency by a party,129 which is usually necessary to trigger indemnity costs.130 Any disincentive that such a [page 380] regime might create for a plaintiff who wishes to pursue arguable claims, it has been judicially remarked, are ‘substantially outweigh[ed]’ by these benefits.131

‘Unless the court otherwise orders’ — discretion to oust the prima facie rule 13.24 The rules prescribing costs consequences for unaccepted offers of compromise, other than in the Federal Court, propound a prima facie rule, or ‘presumptive entitlement’ to costs,132 which operates ‘unless the court otherwise orders’. The rules therefore maintain an in-built curial discretion as to costs, albeit one to be exercised against the backdrop of the basic presumed outcome.133 A discretion remains necessary because, it is reasoned, ‘[l]itigation is inescapably chancy’.134 As explained by Doyle CJ in Shaw v Jarldorn:135 A defendant who does not accept an offer made by a plaintiff will, of necessity, only know after judgment if the defendant was right to fight on rather than to accept the offer. But once again, the rule operates on the premise that if an offer is made by the plaintiff, the defendant will weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of not accepting the offer. In weighing up those advantages and disadvantages, the defendant must take into account the ordinary risks of litigation, including the fact that in a damages claim in particular it is usually impossible to predict with any precision the amount of damages that will be awarded. And such a defendant

must also bear in mind that if matters of fact that will affect the amount of damages are in issue, a decision on those matters can go one way or the other. For those reasons it will not usually be to the point, in submitting that the Court should order otherwise, for the defendant to submit that there were reasons why it might not have anticipated the Court awarding as much as it did.

So while the rules aim to ‘put a premium on realistic assessment of cases’ rather than ‘demand perfect foresight which is denied even to the judges’,136 they assume that the parties ‘anticipate the ordinary risks and vicissitudes of litigation’.137 Consequently, a party who rejects an offer cannot reasonably complain if, due to those risks and vicissitudes, his or her judgment proves unsound. [page 381]

Onus of proof 13.25 It follows that the onus lies on the party wishing to displace the prima facie rule, or ‘presumptive entitlement’, as to costs to establish grounds for its displacement.138 This has been described as ‘a heavy burden’.139 Some judges have countenanced proof of ‘compelling and exceptional circumstances’;140 others have preferred limiting the court’s intervention to ‘exceptional circumstances’,141 whereas others again speak in terms of ‘special or unusual features’ of the case in question.142 None of these expressions is intended to fetter the court’s discretion in this regard — and indeed none appear in the literal wording of the rules — but instead emphasise the weight the rule-based presumption, and the need for the court to be convinced of a ‘good reason’ to oust its effect.143 Otherwise litigants might be inhibited in accepting reasonable offers due to uncertainty as to the costs consequences, thus diminishing the effectiveness of the rules in aiding settlement of litigation.

Broad inquiry into reasonableness 13.26 Judges have declined to exhaustively list the occasions that may justify displacing the rule-based entitlement,144 for fear of fettering the relevant discretion. In the past some

[page 382] rules made the reasonableness of the rejection of the offer the main criterion for ordering otherwise, but where the rule makes no reference to this criterion, it cannot be seen as central or decisive.145 Were the position otherwise, not only would this go beyond the terms of the rules, but it may give insufficient weight to the fact that litigation is risky. As explained by Blow J, with whom Evans and Porter JJ concurred, in Marlow v Walsh (No 2):146 There is nothing in [the rules] to suggest that a party wishing to rely on an offer of compromise should have to prove that the recipient acted unreasonably in not accepting it. Situations will often arise in which a recipient of a generous offer will have to make a difficult choice, and rejection or non-acceptance could not be regarded as unreasonable. In that situation, if the offer is not accepted, the case proceeds to judgment, and the judgment is less favourable to the recipient than the offer, it may still be quite appropriate for [the rules] to be applied, even if the decision not to accept the offer was not unreasonable at the time it was made. One of the purposes of the rule is to provide reasonable litigants with strong incentives to settle their cases.

There may be other factors, moreover, beyond reasonableness capable of proving probative. For instance, the increasingly pervasive concept of proportionality in civil procedure reforms147 is an illustration. A court may, in this context, refuse an indemnity costs order that would be disproportionate to the (modest) sum of money in dispute.148 The foregoing does not mean that the reasonableness or otherwise of rejecting the offer carries no weight in the exercise of the court’s discretion. It remains a weighty consideration — judges inquire into the presence or absence of ‘imprudence or unreasonableness’149 — informed by, inter alia, the strengths and weaknesses of the claim or defence.150 The presence or absence of imprudence or unreasonableness on the part of the offeree will, in some cases, be clear. For example, in Dukemaster Pty Ltd v Bluehive Pty Ltd,151 where the respondents’ offer of compromise was for an amount only approximately six per cent of the damages the applicants secured at trial (although they lost the benefit of that judgment on appeal), the Full Federal Court refused to order costs on an indemnity basis. The challenges in assessing whether the rejection was imprudent or unreasonable are magnified in litigation involving many causes of action and the advancement of alternative contentions.152 13.27 That the divergence between the offer of compromise and the ultimate

award by the court may inform the reasonableness or otherwise of rejecting the offer, as highlighted by Dukemaster, has led litigants to argue that the closeness of a rejected offer to the judgment amount should, inter alia, furnish grounds to oust the rule-based presumption. Yet judges have [page 383] displayed relatively little enthusiasm for arguments of this kind. In Connor v Hatgis (No 2), for instance, Kirby P and Priestley JA remarked as follows:153 It will often be the case that the indemnity cost rule will apply to offers close to the sum eventually recovered. The policy behind the rule is to ensure that parties give full and realistic consideration to offers to compromise litigation. Had the respondent’s offer … been accepted by the appellant a great deal of public and private cost would have been obviated, as events have demonstrated. To refuse the application of the prima facie rule would be to undermine the achievement of the objects of the rule and to send an undesirable signal as to the way in which the rule should be administered.

In Connor, that the verdict in the plaintiff’s favour exceeded the offer of compromise by only $4,000, was held insufficient to displace the prima facie rule. The same court subsequently refused to displace the prima facie rule in cases involving differences of $750,154 2.5 per cent155 and seven per cent.156 13.28 The inquiry into reasonableness in this context is informed not only by the ultimate outcome of the case, and coupled with this the timing of the inquiry and the offer itself (each addressed separately below),157 but potentially also by the nature of the litigation in question. It has been judicially observed that the fact that a proceeding raises a significant and unresolved question of law that is of public interest is not, by itself, an exceptional circumstance to oust the prima facie costs rule.158 But this does not mean that the public interest, or public, nature of the litigation is necessarily irrelevant on every occasion. For example, a regulatory body, by its very nature charged with a public duty, may not necessarily act unreasonably in refusing what proves to have been a favourable offer from the other party where the litigation is necessary to air an issue of some broader public importance, especially where the case is an ‘all or nothing’ one.159 These observations are not confined in potential application to regulatory bodies; there are instances in the case law of private litigants who have proven successful in shielding themselves from indemnity costs orders

by justifying the claim (or defence) by reference to a broader public interest.160 There may, moreover, be real doubt as to whether offers of compromise are appropriate to public law cases generally. It has been remarked that the whole notion of an offer of compromise underlying the rule-based schemas ‘is peculiarly adapted to the case of truly private litigation’, such that, for instance, an application for winding up does not easily assuming that character.161 Nor is an application for an order setting aside a bankruptcy notice a proceeding that readily lends itself to compromise for this purpose.162 Similar sentiments have been expressed regarding applications under the Migration Act 1958 (Vic).163 [page 384]

Timing of relevant inquiry 13.29 In assessing the reasonableness or otherwise of rejecting an offer of compromise, the court focuses on the parties’ position and knowledge at the time when the offer was made.164 Hindsight may reveal that the offer should not have been rejected, but the inquiry into reasonableness is not one to be viewed through the prism of hindsight.165 The point is illustrated by the judgment of Sackville J in Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd,166 where the respondent made a $10 million offer of compromise in August 2005, which was ‘very modest’ compared to the applicant’s claim. His Honour remarked that the offer plainly reflected the respondents’ collective view that the applicant’s prospects were bleak, a view vindicated at the stage of the litigation now before the court. Yet as at August 2005, Sackville J opined that the core of the applicant’s case could reasonably have been seen as having some prospects of success. Had it succeeded in establishing the liability of some or all of the respondents, the applicant might have obtained an award of damages considerably greater than $10 million, even though at that date there was no realistic chance of it obtaining the full range of remedies it sought.167 As a damages award far exceeding $10 million was no fanciful prospect as at August 2005, the onus of proving that the rejection of the offer was imprudent or unreasonable in the circumstances prevailing at the time had not been discharged.

Timing of offer 13.30 The stage in the proceedings at which the offer is made can be relevant to the discretion to ‘otherwise order’.168 When made early in the peace, the offeree may lack sufficient information to assess its reasonableness. Refusing the offer may, at that time, accordingly be reasonable, which may incline the court to ‘otherwise order’.169 After all, ‘[a]n offeree should not be obliged to consider an offer whilst ignorant of required detail of the offeror’s case’.170 The outcome may differ if sufficient information was available at the time of the offer,171 or was discoverable upon reasonable inquiry172 (unless the offeror engaged in material non-disclosure or misleading conduct of matters relevant to offeree’s consideration of the offer).173 It is against this backdrop that judicial admonitions that an offer should be made ‘as promptly [page 385] as is reasonable in the circumstances’174 should be viewed, bearing in mind that the later the offer, the greater the costs incurred to date by each litigant.175 That an offer is made late in the proceedings may disincline the court to oust the prima facie rule176 — the more advanced the proceedings, the greater the scope for the offeree to make an informed assessment of the merits, and the likely relief177 — at least where nothing material changes between the date of the offer and the trial.178 There seems no reason why the judicial approach should differ in the event of an offer made in the course of the trial,179 at least in those jurisdictions where the rules envisage that an offer of compromise may be made at any time before judgment is given.180 The position may be otherwise if the offeror’s case changes substantially after the offer is rejected;181 were the offeree ‘penalised’ for rejecting the offer in this instance, the offer to settle procedure, it is said, ‘would be open to abuse’.182 It should be borne in mind, moreover, that in jurisdictions that impose on a defendant who rejects a plaintiff’s offer the entire costs liability for the action,183 it may be unfair, where an offer is made on the eve of trial, or even during trial, that turns out to have been a good one, to visit on a defendant those costs on an indemnity basis. Depending on the circumstances

of each case, justice here may be better served by ordering indemnity costs only from the date of the offer.184

Duration of offer 13.31 The rules in the Federal Court, the Northern Territory, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia envisage that an offer may set a time frame for its acceptance, but require that time frame to be at least 14 (in Western Australia, 28) days.185 The South Australian rules set a time frame preceding trial within which offers may be made, and align this to a time frame within which an offer may be accepted; de facto, they envisage a minimum 14 day window [page 386] for offerees.186 It stands to reason that if the duration of the offer is less than the rule-based minimum, the offer does not meet the rule-based requirements; rather than assuming relevance to the ‘otherwise order’ inquiry, therefore, it cannot provide a foundation for the rule-based costs consequences. Its duration then goes to the court’s costs discretion under the Calderbank principles.187 13.32 The New South Wales rules also countenance that an offer may be expressed to be limited as to the time it is open for acceptance.188 But they require the offer to remain open for at least 28 days if made two or more months before the date set for the commencement of the trial or, if made closer to trial, that it remain open ‘for such time as is reasonable in the circumstances’.189 The shift in time frame is informed by the fact that ‘[s]hortly before trial is the season for offers, the time when the parties are generally attune to compromise and well positioned to judge the acceptability of an offer’.190 An offer made within two months of trial, if not reasonable in its duration, cannot be treated as an offer under the rules. In Craft Printing Pty Ltd v Dwyer (Costs),191 for example, an offer of compromise was left open for 67 hours over the weekend before the trial commenced. On whether its duration was reasonable in the circumstances, Johnstone DCJ stated:192 … an offer of compromise sent on a Friday afternoon and only left open till 10.00 on the

following Monday when the trial was due to commence involves an unreasonable period. It is one thing perhaps for the solicitors to have notice of the offer, but another when one considers the need for those lawyers to then consult with counsel, speak to their client, explain the offer and the consequences of non-acceptance, advise on the merits, and for the client to reach a decision under pressure. Nor is the distraction factor from preparation to be underestimated. In my view, to require this defendant to make an election in that time frame would be ungenerous, and falls foul of the principle that the rule should operate fairly as between both parties.

Reasonableness, in this context, must take into account not only the length of time for which the offer is open, but also the nature of the parties and the complexity or otherwise of the case. Unsophisticated offerees may, for instance, need longer to consider the merits (if any) of the offer, especially where what is at stake is substantial for them. In Taylor v Port MacquarieHastings Council193 Biscoe J remarked that in many, if not most, cases of ordinary litigation, an offer of compromise open for four days made shortly before trial will be open for a reasonable time in the circumstances. But on the facts, involving and an offer open for four days made shortly before trial in a compulsory acquisition case, it was not reasonable because, inter alia, not only were the applicants elderly and likely to be reliant on their lawyers and valuer for advice, but the land was a significant asset for them and the amount of compensation would have a significant effect on their financial future. As a result, it was not reasonable to expect the applicants to respond quickly to the offer.194 [page 387]

Change in circumstances/case after the offer 13.33 A circumstance likely to justify the court ordering ‘otherwise’ is where there is such a significant change in the manner in which the case is presented at trial, or the manner in which the evidence emerges at the trial, that it might fairly be said that the full dimensions of the plaintiff’s entitlement were not foreseeable before the hearing commenced.195 Also, if the plaintiff substantially amends his or her case at the trial, or at least after the expiry of the period within which the defendant might have accepted the offer, the court may be justified in ordering otherwise.196 These points cannot be taken too far, though; the court must distinguish the ordinary risks inherent in

litigation from those that are extraordinary. As explained by Perry J in Shaw v Jarldorn:197 [T]he fact that the defendant is caught by surprise by some development at the trial, standing alone, would not ordinarily be sufficient, as it is symptomatic of litigation that the course taken by a trial will often be unpredictable. It will only be in an extreme case that such considerations would avail a defendant. It is not necessary or appropriate, in the context of argument as to the application of the rule, for the Court to embark on a nice comparison between the material discovered before trial, and the evidence as it emerged at the hearing. In considering their response to an offer, defendants must allow for the fact that the course of evidence may turn significantly and unexpectedly against them at the trial. That is an ordinary hazard of litigation which no properly advised defendant should fail to allow for.

An ‘extreme’ case in this context is Syron v Newells Creek Sawmilling Pty Ltd,198 where the ‘surprisingly low’ verdict at the second trial, coupled with the short time the defendant’s offer was open and the ambiguity of its terms, and the fact that the plaintiff was a person of little education and limited intelligence, led the court to ‘otherwise order’.

Costs consequences of unaccepted payments in prescribed by court rules Court rules 13.34 The rules in the territories and Tasmania prescribe formalities for payments into court in satisfaction of a claim.199 They direct that no statement of the fact that money has been paid into court is to be inserted in the pleadings, and no communication of that fact can be made to the judge or jury at the trial of any action, until all questions of liability or amount of debt or damages have been decided.200 The Northern Territory and Tasmanian rules make specific prescription for costs consequences in respect of acceptance of a payment in, a point elaborated elsewhere.201 13.35 General provisions in respect of costs are found in the rules in the Territories, New South Wales and Tasmania, being of particular relevance where the payment in is not been accepted, especially in the Australian Capital Territory, which lacks a rule-based [page 388]

procedure for settlement offers. It is for this reason that the case law discussed below focuses on the (former) Australian Capital Territory rule; in other jurisdictions issues as to costs arising out of compromises are chiefly determined pursuant to the rules governing settlement offers. In New South Wales, the Northern Territory and Tasmania the rules state that where a party has paid money into court, the court may, in exercising its costs discretion, take into account that fact and the amount of the money so paid.202 The Northern Territory rules add that, without limiting this discretion, the court must take into account the amount an applicant recovers in respect of a claim in a proceeding as against the party paying money into court in respect of that claim.203 The Australian Capital Territory rules instead require the court, in exercising its costs discretion, to take into account the fact that an amount has been paid into court, the date of the payment and its amount, although this is expressed not to limit the matters that the judge may take into account.204 It appears, as a result, that the current Australian Capital Territory rule is not substantially different to its predecessor, which directed the court to take into account, inter alia, ‘all other relevant circumstances’.205

Interpretation of court rules 13.36 There are numerous Australian Capital Territory decisions dealing with the exercise of the court’s costs discretion where the money amount recovered is less than the amount earlier paid into court. Windbank v Bradley206 is often cited as the leading case, although this decision pre-dated the rule change in 1974, requiring the court to take into account ‘all other relevant circumstances’ (which, as noted above, is substantially similar to the current rules). Yet many of Fox J’s remarks remain relevant (including in the other jurisdictions).207 His Honour remarked that the appropriate costs order rested in the judge’s discretion, making it unwise to attempt to collect all the considerations that may be relevant to the exercise of that discretion.208 He then observed:209 It is, of course, quite apparent that the purpose of providing for payment in is to encourage the parties to avoid litigating the matter further and thus to save costs. Much of this purpose would be lost if a plaintiff could continue the action without being at serious risk as to costs if he did not recover more than the amount paid in. A main incentive which the defendant has for making an adequate payment is the risk that he will probably have gained nothing in relation to costs if

the payment is inadequate; the plaintiff is encouraged to accept the amount paid in because he may have to pay the defendant’s costs incurred after payment in if he does not recover more.

The purpose of the rule dictated, according to Fox J, that ‘[t]he reasonableness of what is done by the plaintiff is obviously an important factor, the reasonableness being judged by reference to the fact that if he does not accept an amount paid in, he may well have to pay the defendant’s costs thereafter’.210 Yet in that in many cases, particularly personal injury cases, where general damages are to be assessed, there are special difficulties both in assessing the amount to pay in and in deciding whether or not to accept that amount,211 his Honour stated [page 389] that a costs order should not be able to turn too nicely on the adequacy or otherwise of the payment into court in such cases.212 In other words, though the quantum of the payment in, relative to the quantum of the ultimate award, is an important factor influencing the costs discretion,213 it is not decisive.214 This applies with greater force following the addition of the phrase ‘all other relevant circumstances’ to the rule. On the facts in Windbank v Bradley, Fox J discerned three matters of particular relevance to the costs issue:215 first, the plaintiff was an infant, and although no special rule in this context applied to cases of infants,216 it was relevant to note that an amount paid in for an infant plaintiff cannot be taken out without leave of the court;217 second, it was found, some time after payment in, that a sinusitis condition, earlier thought to have been serious and continuing, had cleared up spontaneously; and third, the amount paid in was over twice that ultimately awarded. This led his Honour to order the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs up to the time of payment in, but make no order as to costs incurred after that date.218 13.37 Windbank v Bradley highlights that the court will not order costs against a litigant after the date of payment in only because the amount paid in ultimately proves to exceed the amount awarded by the court. Other factors can outweigh the significance of the quantum of that payment relative to the judgment. This may be so where there is little difference between the two amounts. In Mangan v Mendum,219 for example, the difference between the

amount recovered and the amount paid into court was only $400 in $3,500, and the fact that the amount awarded could not be described as generous coupled with the lateness of payment in led Smithers J to make no order for costs from the date of payment in. In Titan v Babic,220 where the proportion between the shortfall in the amount awarded and the amount paid in was $3,500 in $65,000, Hogan M made the same order. What influenced the Master was that the plaintiff had ample time to consider the payment and chose not to seek professional advice in so doing, the task of assessing a likely range of awards was a difficult one, liability was not in issue and the only contest concerned the award of general damages, and the plaintiff failed in one aspect of his claim. 13.38 Yet where the payment in well exceeds the amount awarded by the court, the court is likely, in the absence of countervailing circumstances, to award the party making the payment in his or her costs after the date of that payment. In Morrison v Cook,221 where the amount paid in by the defendant several months before the hearing exceeded the amount awarded by almost 50 per cent, Blackburn J found it unjust that the defendant bear his own costs of a hearing to [page 390] which the plaintiff, by her decision not to accept the ample sum paid into court, obliged the defendant to resort. The defendant thus received costs after the date of payment in. Even if the amount paid in only slightly exceeds the amount awarded,222 this does not automatically dictate that no order for costs after the date of payment in should be made; it is open to the court in a given case, if it finds no other countervailing circumstances, to make an order for costs post-payment favouring the party who made the payment in.223 In making such an order (or for that matter, no order for costs after payment in), the court may, in its discretion, adopt as the relevant date for the order in question some days after the date of the payment in, so as to give the recipient adequate time to consider the payment.224 13.39 That, in addition to making a payment into court, a litigant has made a settlement offer, is relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion in this context.225 For example, in Gelonese v Blanken,226 in response to the

plaintiff’s claim for $1,600.85, the defendant paid into court $500 and counterclaimed for $410. Before the issue of the writ, the defendant had written an open letter to the plaintiff contending that the balance the defendant owed was $145.85, enclosing a cheque for this amount. At the hearing, judgment for the plaintiff was given for $547.35, and for the defendant on the counterclaim, the balance of $137.35 being payable by the defendant to the plaintiff. Connor J held that the payment into court was only in respect of the plaintiff’s claim, not that claim less the defendant’s counterclaim, and so the defendant could not rely upon notice of payment into court as a ground for being awarded costs after payment in. However, as the written offer of settlement was a ‘relevant circumstance’ to be taken into account in the exercise of the court’s discretion as to costs, which had it been accepted the plaintiff would have recovered more that he did and the action would have been unnecessary, it was proper to order costs in favour of the defendant.227

Family law cases Interaction between ss 117(2A) and 117C 13.40 As discussed elsewhere,228 in proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) each party ‘shall bear his or her own costs’,229 although s 117(2) entitles the court, with regard to factors listed in s 117(2A), to make a costs order as it considers ‘just’. One such factor, found in s 117(2A)(f), is ‘whether either party to the proceedings has made an offer in writing to the other party to the proceedings to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such offer’. Beyond the writing requirement, which is replicated in the applicable court rules,230 no specific [page 391] formalities are prescribed for this purpose, and so Calderbank offers are clearly envisaged.231 Yet as s 117(2A)(g) directs the court to have regard to ‘such other matters as the court considers relevant’, the court is arguably

entitled to have regard to an oral offer, albeit against the backdrop of likely difficulties associated with the proof of the terms of oral offers.232 Section 117C(2) provides that if a party to prescribed proceedings233 under the Act makes an offer to settle the proceedings in accordance with any applicable court rules,234 the fact that the offer has been made, or its terms, must not be disclosed to the court except for the purposes of the consideration by the court of whether it should make a costs order under s 117(2) and the terms of any such order.235 A judge is not disqualified from sitting in the proceedings only because an offer is disclosed contrary to s 117C(2).236

Offers under the rules 13.41 An offer to settle made under the rules is deemed a ‘without prejudice offer’, which means that a party must not mention the fact that the offer has been made, or its terms, in any document filed or at a hearing or trial,237 except in the case of, inter alia, an application for costs.238 If, conversely, the offer stipulates that it is an open offer, any party may disclose the facts and terms of the offer to other parties and the court.239 The rules add that a party may withdraw an offer to settle by written notice on the other party at any time before either the offer is accepted or the court makes an order disposing of the application or appeal to which the offer relates.240 A second or later offer is deemed to have the effect of withdrawing an earlier offer.241 In a property case,242 the rules require each party to make a genuine offer to settle to all other parties within 28 days after the conciliation conference243 (or such further time as ordered by the court).244 A party who withdraws such an offer must, at the same time, make another genuine offer to settle.245

Importance of offer being expressed in clear terms 13.42 If the above procedure is to be effective in securing its objective of early settlement of proceedings, and a corresponding reduction in the cost of litigation to the parties and the community,246 the Family Court has emphasised, as have courts applying equivalent rules in other jurisdictions,247 the importance of an offer being expressed carefully and with precision

[page 392] so that it is readily capable of acceptance or rejection.248 Unless expressed in terms objectively capable of being clearly understood, difficulties may arise upon a purported acceptance or upon its assessment by the court on the issue of costs.249 If an offer is ambiguous or unclear, the offeree is arguably not obliged to seek to clarify it, at least in the sense that he or she may be disadvantaged on the issue of costs for failing to do so.250 The only rider to this is that if the alleged ambiguity or lack of clarity stems only from an obvious typographical error or other similar misdescription, in choosing to ignore the obvious intent of the offer, the offeree may do so at some possible risk on the broad issue of costs.

Approach to exercise of costs discretion 13.43 The Full Family Court has remarked that ‘[t]he failure to heed a reasonable offer in circumstances where there is adequate knowledge of the parties at the time the offer is made to give it a proper consideration, is something to which very significant weight indeed ought normally be given’.251 The words of s 117(2A)(f) do not, however, limit the court’s attention to offers that exceed the amount awarded, or identify consequences that flow from whether the offer is greater or lesser than the amount awarded. Indeed, s 117(2A)(f) specifies as a relevant consideration in the exercise of discretion ‘whether’ a party has made an offer, suggesting that the consideration is not confined merely to the terms of any offer. It follows that failure to make an offer to settle is as relevant a matter costs-wise as the fact of and the terms of any offer made.252 And by referring to the ‘an offer … to the other party to the proceedings to settle the proceedings’, the sub-section arguably does not encompass offers made before the commencement of the proceedings.253 As such, s 117(2A)(f) should not necessarily be construed as generating the same consequences as the costs rules dealing with settlement offers in other superior courts, or even pursuant to those courts’ general costs discretion.254 It must further be noted that s 117(2A)(f) is only one of the factors to which the court must have regard in deciding whether to make a costs order. This must, in any case, be seen against the backdrop that, unlike

the costs discretion vested in other superior courts, in family law proceedings the starting point is that each party bears his or her own costs. Consequently, that a settlement offer exceeds what the successful party ultimately secures from the judgment is not determinative of the costs order.255 Rejected settlement offers may [page 393] have costs consequences where, in addition to the offer, the facts reveal the presence of other factors listed in s 117(2A). For example, in JEL v DDF256 the wife, had she accepted the husband’s settlement offer, would have received much more in the division of matrimonial property than that ordered by the court. The Full Family Court found the wife’s failure to accept the husband’s offer, when coupled with the fact that the husband had succeeded on some issues on the appeal, to justify a costs order in the husband’s favour.257 Yet as the husband succeeded only on some issues, and was substantially but not entirely successful in achieving the result he sought on appeal, the court was not persuaded that the wife ought to pay all of the husband’s costs. Similarly, in Marriage of Rickaby258 although the wife had made an offer significantly more favourable to the husband than what the husband eventually received, the husband was ordered to pay only half of the wife’s costs because the case involved a significant legal issue that had been resolved in the husband’s favour. 13.44 Conversely, that an offer is marginally less than the amount ordered by a court does not make the offer irrelevant in determining whether costs should be awarded. The Full Family Court in Marriage of Pennisi explained the point as follows:259 We … consider that the closer the offer is to the award when the offer is under the amount awarded by the Court, the more weight that should be given to this factor in considering the question of costs. This principle must not, however, be rigidly applied. Offers must be seen in the context of the case and the extent of the offeree’s knowledge of the parties’ financial circumstances while the offer is live. In the family law jurisdiction, it is not uncommon to find relationships where one party, often the wife, has significantly less grasp of the parties’ financial arrangements, or the financial circumstances are so complex that it would be premature to accept an offer. There are also cases where the contents of the offer are in themselves the subject of disputed value and legitimate subject matter for determination. These and other features of the context of offers must be taken into account when considering whether

it was reasonable or not to accept an offer, no matter how close to the ultimate result the offer may be.

In Pennisi there was some debate as to whether or not the husband’s offer marginally exceeded what the wife was awarded by the court. In the circumstances, the court made no order as to the costs of the trial, but ordered that the husband pay the wife’s costs of the appeal because he had been wholly unsuccessful both in his cross-appeal in the substantive proceedings and in defending the costs order in his favour made by the trial judge. 13.45 Even where the court makes a costs order because, inter alia, a litigant has rejected what has proved to be a favourable settlement offer, only exceptionally will that order be made on a basis more generous than the party and party basis because of the rejected offer. The failure to accept an offer that in retrospect should have been accepted does not, without more, justify an indemnity costs order. As observed by the Full Family Court in JEL v DDF,260 ‘[t]he rejection of the offer must be at the very least imprudent’ to generate such a consequence. That court rules in some jurisdictions provide for the award of indemnity (or solicitor and client) costs where certain offers of compromise have been rejected261 does not mean the same applies in the family law jurisdiction.262 In JEL the court held as that neither party (or their legal advisers) could in advance have confidently predicted the outcome of the appeal, to that extent the refusal to accept the offer of compromise was not unreasonable or at least not so unreasonable as to attract an order for indemnity costs.263 [page 394]

Effect of withdrawal of offer 13.46 As noted above,264 the Family Law Rules make provision for the withdrawal of an offer of compromise. That s 117(2A)(f) of the Family Law Act 1975 does not by its terms exclude consideration by the court of offers that are subsequently withdrawn entitles, it has been held, the Family Court to take into account, for the purposes of s 117(2A)(f), an offer that has been withdrawn. In so concluding, Nygh J in Marriage of Murray reasoned as follows:265

If one considers the issue as a matter of policy i.e. on the basis of what the Parliament’s objective and purpose was in enacting legislation, it is clear that the Parliament wished to encourage settlements thereby reducing the cost of litigation to the parties and to the community. That must mean that a party cannot reject or ignore a reasonable offer seriously made except at his or her peril as to costs. At the same time a party cannot sit tight and postpone a decision as to acceptance until a matter is at the door of the court. By that time an offer which might have been acceptable to the offeror because of savings in time and preparation costs, may have become unattractive.

The context of the above observation is the scenario where the offer withdrawn proves more favourable than the ultimate outcome. Nygh J was suggesting that if the offer remained open for a reasonable period of time, it could continue to have costs consequences for the purposes of s 117(2A)(f) even though it was later withdrawn. 13.47 The aforesaid does not mean that in every case where a settlement offer is later withdrawn, an order for costs is appropriate. Consistent with the proper construction of s 117(2A),266 the outcome depends entirely on the circumstances of each case.267 In Marriage of Murray268 the judgment entitled the wife to considerably more than what she was prepared to accept in her settlement offer. Nygh J ordered that the husband pay the wife’s costs from a date 28 days after the filing of the wife’s offer, even though that offer had been withdrawn prior to the hearing. His Honour was influenced not only by the generosity of the offer — its acceptance would have saved the parties significant costs — but also that the offer was clear and capable of acceptance, and had remained open for over five weeks. This allowed the husband sufficient time to consider and seek legal advice upon its terms, Nygh J allowing the husband 28 days for this purpose. The latter explains why the costs order was expressed to take effect only after that 28 day period.

Defamation cases 13.48 Defamation proceedings are subject to court rules applicable to the court wherein the proceedings are litigated. The defamation legislation in each jurisdiction nonetheless contains a provision directed at costs consequences of rejected settlement offers,269 at least at first instance.270 It states that a court that orders costs in favour of a successful plaintiff in [page 395]

defamation proceedings must,271 unless the interests of justice require otherwise, order that they be taxed or assessed on an indemnity basis if satisfied that the defendant unreasonably failed to make a settlement offer or agree to a settlement offer proposed by the plaintiff. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff fails in the proceedings and is ordered to pay the defendant’s costs, the court must, again unless the interests of justice require otherwise, order costs to be taxed or assessed on an indemnity basis if satisfied that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to accept a settlement offer made by the defendant. The mischief to which the relevant provision is directed has been explained, by reference to the seminal provision in the New South Wales legislation,272 as follows:273 The special costs provisions were introduced following a concern that the costs of defamation proceedings may prohibit persons who have a legitimate claim from pursuing relief. Unless in appropriate cases costs were awarded on an indemnity basis a plaintiff may be out of pocket to such an extent that the risks in bringing proceedings were unacceptable. Furthermore, the intention of the legislation was to promote a ‘speedy and non litigious method of resolving disputes and to avoid protracted litigation wherever possible’.274

The relevant provisions are, however, to be construed as referring to offers that might be permissibly referred to in evidence, and not to offers made in the course of a mediation covered by without prejudice privilege. To allow offers made without prejudice in the course of mediation to influence the costs outcome would not align with the clear intention underscoring the provisions, namely to promote early dispute resolution.275 13.49 There are two main differences between the costs treatment of offers to settle under the defamation legislation and that under the court rules.276 First, whereas an entitlement to indemnity costs under the rules is triggered by the non-accepting offeree failing to better the offer, under the defamation legislation the contingencies upon which the entitlement depends are that the offer was a reasonable offer at the time it was made and that the offeree unreasonably failed to accept the offer. Second, while the court rules, at least in some jurisdictions, envisage a calculation of costs on an indemnity basis only from an appropriate time after an offer of compromise is made,277 the defamation legislation draws no such distinction. It is open to the interpretation that, if the plaintiff fails following an unreasonable failure to accept a settlement offer, a calculation of costs on an indemnity basis applies to the entire costs of the defendant(s). Although it has been judicially observed that the defamation legislation is,

in this context, intended not to undercut the rule-based provisions but to reinforce them,278 the aforesaid detail differences between the two makes it necessary to determine which is to take priority. Because of their specific application to defamation proceedings, there are compelling grounds [page 396] to conclude that the costs provisions in the defamation legislation ought to take precedence to the general rule-based provisions.279 13.50 The defamation legislation aims to oblige parties to the proceedings to take a reasonable approach to negotiations for their settlement. A party who unreasonably fails to make or accept a settlement offer may be ordered to pay costs on an indemnity basis. The amount of the offer is relevant to assessing whether or not a party’s conduct is reasonable. But the legislation contemplates that an order for costs on an indemnity basis may be made even if a party making an offer does not do better in the proceedings than the offer he or she has made.280 How the offer is phrased may also impact upon the inquiry into reasonableness. For instance, it may not be unreasonable for the offeree to refuse an offer phrased as an invitation to treat, as the offer by its terms is suggestive that the offeree can probably do better. But in this instance, it may well be unreasonable for the offeree to simply ignore the invitation to treat and not enter into negotiations.281 At the same time, that the offeree ultimately beat the offeror’s offer is hardly irrelevant to whether or not the offer, or its rejection, was reasonable in the circumstances.282 But it cannot be viewed in isolation, but rather in combination with other factors, in making the relevant assessment. For example, in Amanatidis v Darmos (Costs) (No 2),283 Sifris J found that the defendant did not act unreasonably in relation to the offer to compel a conclusion that indemnity costs should ensue. That the defendant beat the offer, coupled with the fact that it was made one month before the trial and sent under cover of a simple letter without any reasons as to why it should be accepted, was found sufficient to defeat a claim for indemnity costs.284 In any event, his Honour did not consider that it was in the interests of justice that the defendant pay indemnity costs, as the case ‘was part of a wider

acrimonious family dispute, publication was very limited and each side no doubt had their own agenda’.285 13.51 There is some suggestion in the case law that ‘walk away’ offers may carry potentially greater significance in defamation litigation than in most other forms of civil litigation.286 In Moses v State of New South Wales (No 4)287 Gibson DCJ opined that the special statutory regime means that offers in defamation actions should be considered in a different way to offers made in other causes of action. In her Honour’s opinion, this includes consideration of a ‘walk away’ offer because: first, the legislation does not require the offer to be an offer of compromise, and refers only to a ‘settlement offer’; second, the complexity of defamation litigation means that an offer to ‘walk away’ would involve compromising costs of substance; and third, since the offer must be made to avoid the costs penalty of not making an offer at all, concerns about the [page 397] genuineness of the offer need to take this factor into account.288 Gibson DCJ added that the making of the ‘walk away’ offer may enable the offeree to escape any obligation for indemnity costs, and entitle the offeree to favourable costs orders in relation to the defamation action.289

Payment into Court Outside of Court Rules 13.52 Historically the only general remedy available to a party who wished to protect his or her position on costs by making a reasonable offer to settle was the procedure for payment into court.290 The proper exercise of curial costs discretion in this context appears from the following quote:291 In exercising its discretion as to costs the court must, to such extent as may be appropriate in the circumstances, take into account any payment of money into court and the amount of such payment. Since this discretion must be exercised judicially, if the plaintiff recovers in the action no more than the sum paid into court, the order for costs will give the plaintiff the costs of the action down to the date of payment in and the defendant his costs after that date. The … practice is to look at the position of the parties at the end of the day to determine whether the amount paid in is more or less than the total of the plaintiff’s claim, and therefore not to make any special order with regard to the costs on the issue of liability after the date of payment. The

underlying principle of [this] practice is that the court is applying the rule that costs follow the event, so that even though he may succeed on the issue of liability or on any other issue or question in the action, if the plaintiff recovers less than the amount paid in, he has lost ‘the event’, and the defendant thereupon becomes entitled to the costs after the day of the payment in.

For example, in Westsub Discounts Pty Ltd v Idaps Australia Ltd (No 2)292 the respondent paid into court $150,000 on 20 March 1989, but after set-off the applicant was ultimately awarded only $109,000. Woodward J ordered that the respondent pay the applicant’s costs of claim and cross-claim incurred up to and including 27 March 1989 and that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs incurred on and after 28 March 1989.293 The costs consequences were set one week after the payment in as representing a reasonable time for the applicant to make an informed decision on the choice offered to it by that payment. If the payment in is, however, made without admission of liability and liability becomes an issue at the trial, the applicant [page 398] may be entitled to costs if liability is found notwithstanding that the damages suffered are less than the sum paid into court.294 13.53 In cases where an adult plaintiff recovers less than a sum paid into court, and where the defendant’s costs since the date of payment into court exceed the plaintiff’s costs prior to that date, the defendant can apply for an order that costs be set off and that the balance of costs owing by the plaintiff to the defendant be set off or charged against the plaintiff’s damages.295 Newton J explained the rationale for this practice in the following terms in Pryor v Hennessey:296 A payment into court by a defendant is an offer to the plaintiff to settle the action for the amount of the payment, and is subject to the sanction that if the plaintiff rejects the offer but recovers less than the payment into court, then the plaintiff will have to pay the defendant’s costs since the date of the payment into court. The proper implementation of this sanction, in cases where it takes effect will ordinarily justify an order that the costs owing by the plaintiff to the defendant be set off against the damages recovered by the plaintiff as well as against costs owing by the defendant to the plaintiff; the costs which the plaintiff is ordered to pay to the defendant represent in effect a price payable by the plaintiff for his judgment for the damages, and he should not be allowed to take the damages without paying that price; the money in court is under the control of the court, which can properly order that the money shall be the sole source for the payment of the plaintiff’s damages, subject to all necessary set offs or charges in respect of the defendant’s costs.

13.54 There does not appear to have been a practice to award indemnity costs297 against an applicant on the basis that he or she has failed to accept an amount paid into court and recovered ultimately less than that amount,298 although this is not to say that an order of this kind can never be made. As it is open to the court to order indemnity costs arising out of a rejected Calderbank offer,299 no reason in principle exists why, in similar circumstances, the same should not be available in respect of payment in.

Settlement Offers Without Prejudice Except as to Costs — ‘Calderbank Offers’ Background to Calderbank offers 13.55 As the procedure for payment into court was only available to a defendant faced with a money claim, it was no use to a defendant against whom a claim was made for other relief, such as an injunction or the return of property, or to a plaintiff wishing to put forward a figure it would accept. Litigants could make settlement offers expressed to be without prejudice, but such communications were privileged and so could not be referred to in any costs argument. Fear of eroding the privilege in aid of settlement (also known as ‘without prejudice privilege’)300 was the courts’ chief concern in this respect. As explained by Bowen LJ in Walker v Wilsher:301 [I]t would be a bad thing and lead to serious consequences if the courts allowed the action of litigants or letters written to them without prejudice to be given in evidence against them or to be used as material for depriving them of costs. It is most important that the door should not be

[page 399] shut against compromise as would certainly be the case if letters written without prejudice and suggesting methods of compromise were liable to be read when a question of costs arose.

Yet this restrictive approach has been queried, chiefly on the ground that the public policy encouraging offers of settlement is not infringed by admitting the offer for the purposes of costs once judgment had been given. Once the trial of the issues in the action is at an end, and costs come to be argued, the policy underlying the inadmissibility of without prejudice

correspondence logically has no further application, for there are no further issues of fact to be determined to which admissions in that correspondence could be relevant.302 Unless the parties have agreed to extend the privilege to any costs argument (which may be the case for an offer simply made ‘without prejudice’), not to admit that correspondence for the purposes of costs may operate contrary to the public policy of encouraging the settlement of disputes. ‘[I]t is hard to imagine anything more calculated to encourage obstinacy and unreasonableness’, an English appellate judge has remarked, ‘than the comfortable knowledge that a litigant can refuse with impunity whatever may be offered to him even if it is as much as or more than everything to which he is entitled in the action’.303

The Calderbank case 13.56 Informed by the public policy of encouraging the settlement of disputes, the law moved to permit the segregation of costs consequences from offers of settlement that would otherwise be privileged. It recognises that a settlement offer, though made ‘without prejudice’, but subject to a clearly expressed reservation of a right to refer to it on the issue of costs (the usual phraseology being ‘without prejudice except as to costs’), is admissible for that purpose. The seminal case is Calderbank v Calderbank,304 where, in property proceedings arising out of a divorce, the wife offered to transfer to the husband a house worth £12,000 in return for his vacating the matrimonial home. This offer the husband refused, but he was ultimately awarded only £10,000. Cairns LJ noted various types of proceedings known to the court where protection had been afforded to a party wishing to make a compromise but where payment in was not an appropriate method.305 His Lordship saw no reason why a similar practice should not be adopted in relation to the proceedings in question, where the rules as to payment in did not assist the wife. This led him to conclude that, as the wife’s offer was one that in the circumstances the husband should have accepted, and the husband persisted in the proceedings and recovered a sum less than the value of the house, the right order was that he should have the costs until four days after the offer was made, but that thereafter the wife have her costs of the proceedings.306

Modern scope of Calderbank offers 13.57 Although Calderbank offers originated in matrimonial property proceedings, there has developed a body of practice recognising the ability to admit to correspondence expressed [page 400] to be ‘without prejudice except as to costs’ in all forms of proceeding.307 The availability of the procedure for offers of compromise prescribed by court rules308 (or of a payment in procedure) does not displace the utility of a Calderbank offer (although the availability of an alternative procedure may go to the weight accorded to the offer);309 the rules, after all, do not prescribe a code for settlement offers. As explained by Hayne JA in Grbavac v Hart:310 [I]t is open to a judge exercising the discretion about the disposition of the costs of a proceeding to have regard not only to formal offers that may have been made pursuant to Rules of Court but, in appropriate circumstances, to informal offers of compromise that may have been made.

13.58 Calderbank offers may arise for the courts’ consideration in three main types of case. First, a party may make a Calderbank offer where court rules prescribe a procedure for offers of compromise that was, in the circumstances, available but not used.311 Second, a party may have sought to follow the rule-based settlement procedure, whether via payment into court or by an offer of compromise, but not followed one or more aspects of that procedure;312 a court may treat that attempt as a Calderbank offer unless the offer discloses an intention that it should take effect only if it complies with the rules.313 Third, where there are no rule-based procedures applicable for settlement offers, only Calderbank offers are available for this purpose.314 It is difficult to make a generalised statement as to whether the weight to be given to a Calderbank offer varies according to the type of case in question. Yet there is some logic for stating that where no rule-based procedure is available for settlement offers, Calderbank offers, as the only means available for this purpose, should, all else being equal, carry greater weight than

[page 401] in the first two classes of case.315 What can be said with certainty is that merely because the rule-based procedure, had it been (properly) followed in the circumstances, would have generated a presumptive entitlement to a particular costs outcome316 does not mean that the same outcome is to automatically apply in consequence of a Calderbank offer.317 The costs consequences that ultimately flow from the making of Calderbank offers rest entirely within the courts’ statutorily conferred costs discretion, which is grounded in considerations of justice.318 Discretion carries with it the notion of flexibility, a notion judges are, in this context, keen to maintain and foster.319

Form of Calderbank offers 13.59 Unlike the rule-based offers of compromise, there are no formality requirements for a Calderbank offer. It has been judicially observed, to this end, that it is simply an offer ‘expressed to be without prejudice save to the question of costs and an indication that the letter will be adduced into evidence on the question of costs’ and that there are ‘no other special features which make it a Calderbank offer’.320 So well understood is the Calderbank offer that simply by referring to an offer made ‘pursuant to the principles in Calderbank v Calderbank’ is, assuming that the offer is effective,321 ordinarily sufficient to bring the Calderbank principles into play.322 But the question ultimately targets the offeror’s intention,323 to be objectively ascertained from the perspective of the offeree, more so than form of words used, as explained by a Victorian judge:324 … it is not necessary for an offer of compromise to be accompanied by a letter expressing the intention that the offer operate as a Calderbank offer if it is incapable of operating under the Rules. In the absence of an express statement of intention in a covering letter, the intention of the offeror may be discerned by reference to the form and content of the offer itself to ascertain whether it is capable of operating as an offer more generally, and whether it was intended to be made ‘without prejudice save as to costs’ and to be adduced in evidence on the question of costs if not accepted.

The further its terms move from Calderbank (‘without prejudice except as to costs’) notions, however, the less likely that a reasonable offeree would construe it as having effect as

[page 402] a Calderbank offer.325 Moreover, on occasions where the offer, intended to operate under the rules, has not met the rule-based requirements, there is arguably a greater need for the terms of the offer, for it to function as a Calderbank offer, to be expressed in a fashion that makes it clear to the offeree that it is so intended to function. If it makes no reference to the offer being made ‘without prejudice as to costs’, or otherwise to have effect as a Calderbank offer, it may be unjust to the offeree to treat it as triggering the Calderbank consequences.326 The reason is that a recipient of an offer of compromise apparently made under the rules ‘should be entitled to decide whether or not to accept it according to the offer of compromise regime in the rules, including deciding whether or not it is an effective offer of compromise’.327 Otherwise, it has been said, ‘the whole purpose of having such a regime would be defeated’.328

Costs consequences of Calderbank offers 13.60 There are two main potential costs consequences where a Calderbank offer proves more generous than the judgment.329 The first is that the court allows the offeree costs up to the date of the offer (or shortly thereafter to allow time to consider the offer), but then may order the offeree to pay the offeror’s costs after that date. The second relates to allowing the offeror those costs quantified on an indemnity basis (a ‘special costs order’) as opposed to the usual party and party basis.330 Although these align with costs consequences prescribed by the court rules for formal offers,331 the main difference is that the rules prescribe presumptive costs entitlements in the offeror in defined instances (subject to the court’s discretion to order otherwise); for Calderbank offers, conversely, the costs consequences rest entirely on the court’s discretion.332 13.61 Although some judges have viewed a Calderbank offer as generating a presumptive entitlement to a special costs order,333 the bulk of case authority favours a discretionary [page 403]

rather than presumptive approach.334 A Calderbank offer would otherwise essentially equate, consequence-wise, to a formal offer pursuant to the rules. If a party wishes to obtain an indemnity costs order it should, it is reasoned, follow the procedure set by the rules.335 That the rule drafters made specific provision for indemnity costs in this respect suggests a belief that this was unlikely to be a prima facie outcome pursuant to the courts’ costs discretion. It therefore goes too far to say that the making of a Calderbank letter that proves to be generous is a ground, without more, for an order for costs on an indemnity basis. Notwithstanding judicial remarks that there may be little difference in substance between the two approaches,336 it is difficult to see how the same outcome will as a matter of course ensue where a person is required to positively establish an entitlement to indemnity costs as compared to where his or her opponent must establish that indemnity costs should not be ordered. Having said that, however, the usual prerequisites for an indemnity costs order — evidence of a relevant delinquency, abuse of process or ulterior purpose337 — do not circumscribe the availability of indemnity costs in the context of Calderbank offers.338 13.62 Being grounded in an exercise of curial discretion, it is the circumstances of the case that, in justice, determine the appropriate costs order. Those circumstances may provide sufficient reason for ousting the usual rule that a successful party receives costs; the rejection of what proves to be a favourable offer may, as noted above, both deprive the ‘successful’ party of costs and require him or her to pay the opponent’s costs from a certain date, possibly on an indemnity basis. Consistent with the exercise of judicial discretion, no one circumstance or factor is likely to be determinative; the issue concerns the weight to be accorded in any given case to particular factors, both individually and collectively. What can be said is that the [page 404] court, in exercising its costs discretion in this context, focuses heavily on the reasonableness or otherwise of the offeree’s rejection of the offer.339 This is another difference, albeit only in degree, between Calderbank and rule-based

offers; as to the latter, the reasonableness of the refusal to accept the offer is not sufficient, by itself, to displace the consequence of indemnity costs.340 In identifying relevant factors surrounding the inquiry into reasonableness, courts do not always clearly align one or more of them to a specific costs consequence. At least to some extent, those factors may assume relevance to both the ‘unsuccessful’ offeree’s liability for the ‘successful’ offeror’s costs and the basis on which those costs are to be quantified. For this reason, the exercise of the courts’ costs discretion arising out of Calderbank offers is collapsed under a single main heading below.341 Before considering factors that go to discretion, it is, however, necessary to distinguish offers that legitimately attract costs consequences from those that do not.

Offers that may not generate costs consequences 13.63 Not all offers described as settlement (or even Calderbank) offers necessarily justify a court exercising its discretion to oust the usual costs rule. There are various ‘jurisdictional’ requirements in this regard — albeit sometimes also viewed from the perspective of discretion — which relate chiefly to the terms of the offer.

Offers expressed in terms to deny admissibility on costs 13.64 The terms of a settlement offer are not admissible on the issue of costs unless clearly so expressed (for instance, ‘without prejudice except as to costs’, or as an ‘open offer’, or equivalent terminology).342 If the offer is simply made ‘without prejudice’, lacking any reservation of a right to use it for argument on costs, the privilege in aid of settlement ousts its admissibility on costs.343 This is statutorily modified in most jurisdictions under the uniform evidence law, under which the statutory privilege in aid of settlement344 does not apply if ‘the communication or document is relevant to determining liability for costs’.345 This has been interpreted as ousting the constraints on the admissibility of evidence concerning offers of settlement at trial (except [page 405]

to the extent that statute maintains these),346 there being no constraint on the admissibility of an offer of compromise, not expressed to be without prejudice, on the issue of costs.347

Offers expressed in unclear or misleading terms 13.65 Some judges have characterised a letter, though ostensibly directed at settlement, that is ambiguous or in some way misleading as lacking the quality required of a Calderbank letter.348 On this approach, the court will not admit a settlement offer for costs purposes unless its terms are unambiguously clear,349 so as to leave the offeree in no reasonable doubt as to the nature and extent of what is being offered.350 Yet other judges view the matter as one going to the exercise of discretion, specifically the weight to be accorded costs-wise to the offer. In the words of Crispin J in Whittle v Filaria Pty Ltd:351 … the court is not deprived of the discretion to make a more favourable than usual costs order merely because the party against whom the order is sought can point to some deficiency in the manner in which the Calderbank offer has been expressed and hence be entitled to argue that it was not ‘certain’ or that an unqualified acceptance would not have given rise, without more, to a binding contract.

The distinction between the two approaches appears more in form than substance. It is a matter of degree; an offer may be so unclear as to deny any impact costs-wise, an outcome that can also be explained by reference to reasonableness. It has been observed, to this end, that a Calderbank offer that is not clear about what is being proposed ‘is not one that it would be unreasonable for the recipient to reject’352 and that, in any case, the offeree ‘is entitled to take the benefit of any ambiguity’.353 In other instances, a deficiency in the clarity of the offer may not undermine the offeree’s capacity to assess its reasonableness, especially where seeking clarification from the offeree’s lawyers could have readily cured any ambiguity.354 If a reasonable request to clarify the offer goes unheeded, however, the offeror cannot ordinarily cite the offeree’s failure to accept it as relevant on costs.355 [page 406] Ultimately, as there is no set formula in which a Calderbank offer must be

framed,356 the question is whether the offer is made in terms that enable the offeree to give proper consideration to it.357 The case law reveals multiple instances, to this end, of offers that lack specificity so far as the costs to be covered are concerned, and for this reason have been held not to be probative so far as costs are concerned.358 It also reveals that the clarity of the offer is influenced by the position of the offeree. If the latter is unrepresented in the litigation, and there is no reason to believe that he or she would have understanding of legal concepts, the terms of the offer, in order to be probative on costs, must be phrased so as to be understandable by a person positioned as the offeree. Technical legal (costs) language may likely prove outside most laypersons’ understanding.359

Offers expressed in terms that envisage further negotiation 13.66 To produce costs consequences, a settlement offer should not envisage further negotiation between the parties prior to the compromise being effected; it must be capable of being accepted, thereby bringing into existence a binding contract.360 If the ‘offer’ is properly construed, from the perspective of a reasonable offeree, as an invitation to negotiate a settlement, it may hold little sway so far as costs are concerned361 (but it could generate adverse costs consequences for the offeree who blanket refuses to take up the invitation). In the same vein, ‘offers’ that envisage the negotiation or approval of other (or third) parties do not, as a rule, carry weight on costs. So where, in Pearson v Williams,362 an offer was stated to be conditional on agreement being reached between the defendants on certain matters, and in Mid-City Skin Cancer and Laser Centre Pty Ltd v Zahedi-Anarak,363 the defendants offered to settle the proceedings for a set sum and for the parties to ‘resolve outstanding issues associated with the business names the subject of the Proceedings’, neither offer was held to amount to a Calderbank offer but rather an invitation to negotiate. And in Apostolidis v Kalenik (No 2)364 the Victorian Court of Appeal, faced with an offer expressed as subject to approval by a third party (the Australian Taxation Office), accepted the submission that it ought not attract the Calderbank principles.

Offers that lack genuine element of compromise

13.67 The policy that informs why an invitation to surrender cast in the form of an offer of compromise under the court rules does not ordinarily alter the usual costs rule365 — there must [page 407] be a genuine compromise, not merely a token one366 — likewise applies to Calderbank offers.367 This has led some judges to conclude that an invitation for the offeree to surrender or capitulate is not a Calderbank letter.368 But as with offers that lack the requisite clarity,369 the foregoing need not operate an ‘all or nothing’ affair. In circumstances that lack any compromise, it may indeed be legitimate to ignore the offer for costs purposes. The same may be so in the case of a token offer of compromise, although here the matter may go to discretion, and thus the weight to be accorded to the offer, specifically the reasonableness of its rejection in the circumstances. In Baygol Pty Ltd v Foamex Polystyrene Pty Ltd Tamberlin J explained the point as follows:370 The weight to be given to the existence of an offer to settle prior to the conclusion of the hearing depends on the reasonableness of the failure by the relevant party to accept the offer. A distinction has been drawn in the authorities between a genuine offer of a realistic compromise, and a demand to capitulate in circumstances where the case has some prospect of success. The question posed is whether the offer advanced by the party is designed merely to trigger costs sanctions, in which case it would not be treated as a genuine offer of compromise, or whether it is an offer of a significant benefit, in which case it could be so treated. A refusal to acknowledge any substance in the opposing party’s case will usually not be sufficient of itself to warrant the making of a costs award on a solicitor client basis. The existence of a Calderbank offer, and its significance and importance, depends on the terms of the offer considered in the circumstances of each case and it is one factor to weigh and balance when exercising in a judicial manner the unfettered discretion conferred.

13.68 Whether an offer exhibiting minimal compromise should nonetheless have costs consequences cannot be assessed independently of the strength of the offeror’s case.371 An offeror whose case is strong on the merits should not be expected, it is reasoned, to offer to compromise to the same extent as one whose case is weaker in order to secure the costs benefits of a Calderbank offer. What also informs this inquiry is whether the offeror has, via the terms of the offer or otherwise, disclosed information or made arguments that might have caused the offeree to give serious consideration to dropping his or her claim or defence.372 The weight to be accorded to any such information or statements depends on the circumstances of the case, as appears from the

following remark by Redlich J in Aljade Development and Construction Sdn Bhd v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd:373 [page 408] Whether there is a need for the offeror to descend to specificity as to why the offer should be accepted must depend upon a consideration of all of the circumstances existing at the time of the offer. The extent to which the weakness of a party’s position is exposed through the pleadings, affidavits and the various communications between the parties during the course of the litigation may bear upon the significance of the absence of specificity in the informal offer.

That the offer is open for only a relatively short period of time, particularly without any explanation as to why the offeree’s action is doomed to failure, may deny a finding of unreasonableness in rejecting the offer.374

‘Walk away’ offers? 13.69 There is support in multiple cases for the view that a ‘walk away’ offer — one that envisages that, if accepted, each party will bear its own costs — is not a genuine offer for the purpose of considering the effect of a Calderbank offer on a question of costs.375 However, on the same reasoning as applies to offers under the court rules in this context,376 the trend of more recent authority envisages that a ‘walk away’ offer can, in an appropriate case exhibit the requisite element of compromise to be treated as a Calderbank offer.377 The compromise in the circumstances may be the offeror’s giving up of a claim for costs, which, if the offeree discontinued, may otherwise be payable by the offeree.378 The stronger the offeror’s case on the merits, the more compelling is the conclusion that a ‘walk away’ offer involves a real compromise;379 such a conclusion is far less compelling if the offeror’s case is weak. As explained by a Federal Court judge:380 One reason why offers are sometimes made is because a party believes that his or her opponent will cause unmeritorious litigation to drag out, at considerable cost to the offeror, as a means of

[page 409] bringing pressure on the offeror to increase what might otherwise be put on the table. If litigants

were inflexibly constrained by a principle that deprived them of an entitlement to be awarded costs on an indemnity basis, regardless of the circumstances, merely because they offered at an early stage to ‘walk away’ and not seek costs, unmeritorious and unreasonable litigants would be given a powerful weapon to use in forcing their chosen opponent to offer more in order to settle a worthless case. The law should not encourage such behaviour. In evaluating the genuineness of any offer, a court must make a careful assessment of all the circumstances, including, where appropriate, the merit of the case to which the offer is directed.

The stage of the proceedings at which the offer is made likewise informs whether or not it is reasonable to reject a ‘walk away’ offer. An offer made at a time when the parties may be understood to have been fully apprised of the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases, assuming it involves an element of genuine compromise, is more likely to generate Calderbank costs consequences than one made at a stage in the proceedings that does not permit an informed assessment of the merits.381 The same may be said of an offer that is open for a reasonable (as opposed to a short) time, and supported by compelling reasons supporting the offeror’s claim or defence. It follows from the foregoing that the issue may traverse matters of degree. Depending on the circumstances, as noted above, the extent of the ostensible compromise may ultimately influence the weight accorded, on the question of costs, to the offer. It has been judicially observed, in this regard, that ‘[b]orderline offers of compromise ought not be given the same potency as generous offers which are far more likely to encourage settlement’.382

Offers inclusive of costs? 13.70 A purported settlement offer ‘inclusive of costs’ (sometimes termed an ‘all in’ offer) is not suited to being an effective Calderbank offer, it has been said, because it usually does not allow the court to decide whether the verdict is one under which the offeree fares worse than he or she would have done had he or she accepted the offer.383 The offeree is likewise placed in a position of being unable to determine the appropriate amount to attribute to the substantive claim and the costs incurred in advancing it, making it unfair to expect a considered response to the offer.384 He or she would not know the likely party and party costs to date without a taxation or assessment of costs,385 and so allowing an offer ‘inclusive of costs’ to influence the costs outcome may fragment litigation, not promote its finality. Case authority thus recognises the need, in a Calderbank letter, to isolate the costs component in a way that is clear and

[page 410] capable of proper assessment independently of the principal claim.386 The underlying premise of this line of authority rests in the proposition that an offeree cannot, for the above reasons, be said to have acted unreasonably in not accepting the offer. 13.71 Yet the foregoing prescribes no ‘definitive rule’ that ‘all-in’ Calderbank offers can never be considered on the question of costs; the court cannot fetter its costs discretion by setting rules.387 It instead affords ‘guidance as to the exercise of the discretion’, by informing ‘the question of the reasonableness of an offeree’s refusal to accept an “all-in” offer’, and providing ‘reasons to discourage offerors from drafting Calderbank letters on an “all-in” basis’.388 It may, to this end, reduce the weight given to refusal of the offer in the exercise of the discretion. One New South Wales appellate judge, Basten JA, has gone further, and queried the premise mentioned in the previous paragraph, reasoning as follows:389 If a party in receipt of an offer wishes to know how far the sum offered will go in meeting its costs up to that time, all it has to do is ask its lawyers. In an age where lawyers are required to provide advance estimates of their fees390 and in circumstances where commercial services are billed on a monthly basis, it is unrealistic to suggest that the recipient of an inclusive offer will be confused or otherwise unable to assess the financial risk of proceeding with litigation. In any event, the offeree is likely to be liable for legal fees exceeding the costs recoverable from the other party. Most litigants, in considering offers, will want to know from their own lawyers, how much they will receive in the hand. Of course, if the offer is not left open for a reasonable time, that might itself make non-acceptance a reasonable course. However, an offeree which is genuinely seeking to assess its position, might be advised to seek more time, if it thinks that is reasonably required.

The suggestion that a Calderbank letter expressed as ‘inclusive of costs’ is insufficiently precise to qualify as a Calderbank offer is one that, according to his Honour, must yield to the particular circumstances. An offer by a defendant ‘inclusive of costs’ will not, on the above logic, cause the plaintiff embarrassment, as its value will be that amount remaining after deducting costs already incurred, which the plaintiff’s lawyer should be readily able to quantify.391 The risk lies with the defendant if the matter proceeds to judgment, and the judgment is below the offer, in which case uncertainty may ensue — which could be resolved by a form of taxation or assessment — as a result of the offer including an unquantified element for costs incurred up to the time when it lapsed or was rejected. In such a case, according to Basten

JA, if the calculation of the damages component is not clearly seen to generate a figure exceeding the judgment, the interests of justice will usually not be served by incurring further expense in taxing or assessing the costs element of an offer, and the plaintiff would be entitled to his or her costs.392 His Honour countenanced the converse scenario where the plaintiff makes [page 411] an inclusive offer, and obtains a judgment below the offer but arguably above the damages component.393

Exercise of discretion — relevant factors 13.72 As foreshadowed earlier,394 the making of a Calderbank offer is a factor, indeed a weighty factor, that a court may take into account in exercising its costs discretion, as regards both the ouster of the usual costs rule from the date of the offer and the basis on which costs thereafter may be quantified. Where the offeror does better than the offer, there is at least a persuasive burden on the offeree to show that its rejection of the offer was not unreasonable.395 This represents an objective rather than subjective inquiry, as appears from the following judicial remarks:396 Where the question to be considered is whether an offer was reasonable, or whether its rejection was unreasonable, the analysis and answer require attention to the objective rather than subjective circumstances. It is for the party asserting reasonableness to show, by reference to the relevant circumstances objectively considered, that the offer was reasonable. Equally, if there is a persuasive burden cast on an offeree to show that its rejection was not unreasonable, that must be shown by an objective analysis of the relevant circumstances.

A finding of unreasonableness is informed by inquiry into various factors; it cannot be assumed that rejection of a reasonable offer per se amounts to an unreasonable rejection.397 There is some indication, at least from Western Australian courts, that a finding of unreasonableness in rejecting an offer is that which triggers an indemnity costs order in this context.398 It stems from various judges questioning the merit of distinguishing between refusals of offers that are ‘unreasonable’ as opposed to ‘plainly’ or ‘manifestly’ unreasonable.399 The breadth of the costs discretion, it is said, is not ‘constrained by a requirement of finding unreasonable rejection as a

prerequisite to a party—party costs order based on a Calderbank offer’.400 This in turn suggests that ousting the usual costs rule consequent upon what proves a favourable (but rejected) Calderbank offer is not premised on proof of any unreasonable conduct in the offeree. If so, in this latter instance the only relevant inquiry targets a comparison between the worth of the offer as opposed to the ultimate judgment. But to say that unreasonableness, at least in a broad sense, is entirely foreign to this inquiry may pay insufficient heed to the multi-factorial nature of what impacts on costs in a Calderbank environment. [page 412] 13.73 In exercising the costs discretion in this context, as in any other, the court must take into account all relevant considerations (and ignore irrelevant ones), which it is impossible to exhaustively list. Some were discussed earlier in the context of offers that may not generate costs consequences, chiefly the extent of the compromise offered401 and the clarity with which the terms of the offer were expressed.402 Further relevant factors include the extent of disparity between the offer and the judgment amount (informed by the offeree’s prospects of success as at the date of the offer), the stage of the proceeding at which the offer was received, the time allowed to the offeree to consider the offer, how closely the offer complies with the formalities for rule-based offers of compromise,403 the offeree’s attitude to the offer and whether, if indemnity costs are sought, the offer foreshadowed an application for indemnity costs.404 If, say, the offer is a genuine attempt to compromise, is clearly expressed, is open for a sufficient time that the offeree can give it due consideration, and is made at a stage in the proceedings when the offeree has access to sufficient information to assess its merit, the court will likely order the offeree to pay the offeror’s costs after the date of the offer, probably on an indemnity basis, should the offer prove more favourable to the offeror than the judgment.405 Where the factors go both ways, the court engages in a balancing exercise, according weight to the relevant factors.406 Below are discussed, in detail under separate headings, these further relevant factors, although this should

not be construed as any indication that the courts adopt other than a holistic approach to the balancing of all relevant factors. 13.74 Before discussing these factors and their impact, it should be noted that it not unusual for a party to make more than one Calderbank offer (or indeed offers of compromise under the rules) over the course of the litigation. Where this occurs, the court will take into account the terms of each offer, and its timing, in the mix of determining the proper costs order.407

Offer compared to judgment 13.75 It has been judicially observed that ‘[i]t is obvious that the ultimate verdict is weighty consideration since it is against that amount that the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s offers and the response of the defendant should be, to a significant degree, measured’.408 Another judge, in the same vein, has gone so far as to describe it as ‘[b]y far the most important factor which [page 413] courts have viewed as guiding the exercise of the costs discretion’.409 The point is of especial significance where a wide disparity between the offer and the subsequent outcome ensues. For example, in ACN 074 971 109 Pty Ltd (as Trustee for Argot Unit Trust) v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia,410 where the relevant offer vastly exceeded the damages to which the plaintiffs were ultimately held to be entitled, when coupled with the plaintiffs’ repeated failure to quantify and justify the basis of their claims, led Croft J to find it unreasonable for the plaintiffs to reject the offer, thus triggering indemnity costs. 13.76 Though litigants take their chances upon the result, whether it was reasonable to reject the offer is determined on the facts as they were known at the time.411 This point has various implications. It dictates that in making an assessment of reasonableness, judges should not give too much weight to hindsight.412 What the offeree could, and could not, have reasonably foreseen at the time of the offer informs this assessment. Where circumstances existing

at the time of the offer change so significantly as to create a different complexion to the litigation so far as the offeree is concerned, the offeror’s success will not mean that the offeree’s rejection of the offer was unreasonable in the circumstances.413 If, for example, the law changes after the offer is rejected so as to affect the reasonableness of its rejection, a court is unlikely to oust the usual costs rule.414 Or if the plaintiff’s case was, at the time of the offer, based on a defective statement of claim, or a failure to fulfil an obligation to make full discovery, which made it reasonable for the defendant to conclude that the action, as then constituted, was weak, it is not unreasonable for the defendant to reject the plaintiff’s offer.415 Dovetailing into this inquiry is the stage of the proceedings at which the offer was made,416 and how long it remains open,417 which are likely to influence the offeree’s ability to make an informed judgment as to the reasonableness of the offer itself. The offeror’s attitude may also factor into this inquiry, and influence the ultimate costs outcome. For example, in Humphries v TWT Ltd418 the defendant made a Calderbank offer two months before the hearing date ($11,000), exceeding what the plaintiff was awarded at trial ($9,000). Miles CJ concluded that the difference between the offer and the sum recovered was sufficient to deprive the plaintiff of costs incurred from six days after the offer was made. However, as the defendant unsuccessfully [page 414] maintained its denial of liability throughout the entire proceedings, and maintained certain defences until the hearing before abandoning them, it was denied any order for costs in its favour subsequent to the date of the offer.419 13.77 The reasonableness of the offer, or the unreasonableness of its rejection, is clearly influenced by the strength of the offeror’s case or defence, as the case may be. From the perspective of an offer by the defendant, it has been remarked that ‘[r]ejection of an offer would be unreasonable if it involve[s] a disregard of serious problems confronting the plaintiff in establishing liability’.420 For example, in Hartford (Holdings) Pty Ltd v CP (Adelaide) Pty Ltd421 Doyle CJ, with whom Gray and Besanko JJ concurred, held that the offer by the second defendants was a generous one,

being about one-third of the total amount claimed by the plaintiffs, where the prospects of the plaintiff escaping liability were slender. As such, the court upheld the trial judge’s finding that the plaintiff had acted unreasonably in rejecting the offer. Another example is where, in a personal injuries claim, liability is not seriously in issue, in which case it is not reasonable to expect a plaintiff to discount his or her expectations by reference to a theoretically possible adverse finding on that issue.422 But for that same plaintiff to expect to be awarded the ‘top of the range’ on every element of damages may be unreasonable; so if a defendant made an offer ‘within the range’, a court may see it as unreasonable for the plaintiff to ignore the offer.423 In other instances the very nature of the case makes it difficult for the offeree to make anything approaching an accurate assessment of the strength of the offeror’s claim or defence. For instance, where a plaintiff’s ultimate failure turned less on legal complications than on factual questions as to the defendant’s knowledge, and those factual questions were matters of considerable difficulty and uncertainty, it may not have been unreasonable for the plaintiff to proceed with the litigation in the face of the defendant’s Calderbank offer.424 The timing of the offer(s) may also impact in this regard. At an early stage of the proceedings it may prove (much) more difficult to make an informed assessment of the strength or weaknesses of the respective cases, or to foresee the twists and turns the litigation may follow, including changes in the way the case is pleaded or defended.425 13.78 Not all litigation is, however, amenable to making comparisons between offers and judgments. In the case of non-monetary claims, in particular, such a comparison may prove illusory. In claims of this kind, it may be, at least in some circumstances, appropriate that an adjudication be pursued. For example, that a party seeks to vindicate allegations of serious fraud or dishonesty may provide a justification for a court not to exercise its costs discretion as it might otherwise have done in the face of the rejection of a Calderbank offer, if the particular issues are of such importance that it is proper to seek a judicial determination.426 The same may be said, for instance, of a proceeding seeking relief confined to a declaration, an apology and an injunction to restrain republication of material alleged to be illegitimately discriminatory.427

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Stage of proceedings at which offer made 13.79 Although there is no reason in principle precluding a Calderbank offer being made before or shortly after the proceedings are commenced, at this early stage it may be difficult for the offeree to make an informed assessment of the strength of the offeror’s claim or defence.428 If so, rejecting the offer at that stage, may not (objectively) be unreasonable, even if the course of proceedings reveals the rejection to have been mistaken.429 But the prospects of an early offer generating costs consequences are increased where it clearly explains the strength of the offeror claim or defence and/or it could be established that the offeree had sufficient information available at that stage to adequately assess the reasonableness of the offer.430 Judges have, in any case, refused any suggestion that an early Calderbank offer is never probative on costs. For instance, in Alves v Patel Adams J remarked as follows:431 When dealing with the issue of costs in the context of settlement negotiations it is important to recognise … that such negotiations often take place before the trial commences, well before the evidence is concluded and often before its detail is clear. Moreover, as the matter proceeds, the absence of settlement in the period — sometimes lengthy — before trial will often lead to further investigation and the collection of further evidence. The notion that Calderbank offers can safely be ignored without costs consequences just because the offeror’s case is not ready for trial or all pre-trial requirements as to service of reports or supply of particulars have not been complied with cannot be right: much will depend on a commonsense approach to the case and the particular circumstances at the time of the offer.

His Honour added that merely because, say, a defendant does not know the precise value of the plaintiff’s claim or the scope of the evidence to be adduced in support of it when a Calderbank offer is made does not make it reasonable to ignore the offer.432 After all, a defendant may not lack means to independently estimate the value of the plaintiff’s case, and offers are often made and accepted because the value of the claim may be difficult to estimate. Much here can also rest on the extent to which the judgment exceeds the offer433 and the strength of the plaintiff’s case. In Brymount Pty Ltd v Cummins (No 2)434 Beazley JA, with whom Ipp and McColl JJA concurred, held that as the appellants’ case was not borderline and Calderbank offers ‘were made responsibly at an early stage in the proceedings’, the respondent’s failure to accept the offers was unreasonable,

so that the appellants should have the benefit of the offers at least insofar as they related to the trial from the date on which each was made. 13.80 While the courts do not discourage early offers of settlement — an early offer, if accepted, will avoid much of the costs of proceedings — and allow these to influence costs outcomes if the offeree is sufficiently well positioned to assess the reasonableness of the offers, a Calderbank offer made on the eve of trial, or during the trial, may carry less weight in the costs equation. The court, it has been remarked, should not encourage the use of a Calderbank offer delivered shortly before trial — when the offeree might be expected to have its mind on a [page 416] number of matters and will already have incurred considerable costs435 — ‘as an indiscriminately wielded tactical weapon’.436 This may be an inference where the case is complex and has been pending for considerable time, as explained by Bryson JA in De Groot v Nominal Defendant:437 I would not say anything which would offer discouragement to litigants to make offers of settlement at any time, but, in relation to litigation of the complexity of the present case, I do not see any legitimate advantage which would flow from choosing, as the time for delivery of an offer in litigation which had been pending for over three years, the opening days of an extended hearing when there was much else to consider. It is one thing to bring settlement offers into account when exercising a discretion as to costs: it is another thing altogether to endorse a disruptive stratagem, which is how I class throwing down an offer of settlement not before but during the hearing, after years of time which could and should have been used to consider settlement had passed, and severely limiting the time available for its consideration.

But where the offer, though made late, cannot be characterised as a tactical weapon, and had it been accepted would have avoided considerable further costs (and these may include the time of the judge and potential costs of an appeal),438 it is relevant to the exercise of the costs discretion, provided it is open for a time sufficient for the offeree to assess its reasonableness. The case law, to this end, evinces various occasions in which a Calderbank offer made within days of the trial has nonetheless triggered an indemnity costs order, ordinarily where the case was not overly complex and the parties were likely apprised of the merits.439

Period for which offer is open 13.81 In most instances the terms of a Calderbank offer will stipulate the period during which the offer is to remain open for acceptance. Otherwise, by implication it is to remain open for a ‘reasonable period’.440 The length of time for which an offer remains open impacts upon the reasonableness or otherwise of the offeree’s rejection of the offer. A very brief time may deny the offeree a sufficient time to adequately assess its worth in the circumstances, [page 417] whereas the position is likely to be different if the offer is left open for a considerable time. The closeness time-wise between the offer and the judgment is capable of influencing the time for which the offer should remain open; an offer made at a relatively early stage in the proceedings should, generally speaking, remain open for a longer period to generate costs consequences than one made late in the proceedings.441 In the latter event, closeness of the trial or judgment may preclude the offer remaining open for a considerable time, and this is in any case counterbalanced by the fact that, at a later stage, the parties are more likely to be better apprised of the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases. Even so, an offer made on or slightly before the date of trial, open only for a matter of hours, or even over a weekend, is unlikely, other than most exceptionally,442 to trigger costs consequences.443 Moreover, such an offer, given its tardiness and the short period for which it is open, can be construed as being opportunistic, made chiefly with the intention of securing a costs advantage rather than a genuine attempt at settlement. 13.82 The appropriate length of time for which an offer should remain open to generate costs consequences is influenced not just by the stage of the proceedings at which the offer is made. It is informed by, inter alia, the duration of the litigation to date,444 the time frame specified in any earlier offer by the (now) offeree — that an offer open for a limited time is made in response to an offer that required acceptance within a similarly limited time may

[page 418] impact on a reasonableness assessment445 — and the applicable time frame under the rules.446 As to the latter, litigants who elect not to avail themselves of the rules governing offers of compromise should not, it has been observed, ‘be in a better position than those who do, if they radically foreshorten the period in which an offer is open for consideration’.447 But the period prescribed by the rules is no straightjacket; it is ‘no more than a guide or a yardstick’,448 ‘a period no doubt believed to provide a reasonable time for consideration’.449 As Calderbank offers are not subject to the formal requirements of the rules, what constitutes a reasonable period for the offer to be open for acceptance is more flexible, varying depending upon particular circumstances, including the complexity of the proceedings and the extent to which the offeree might reasonably be thought to have understood the claims and evidence in a proceeding and been able to assess its position in an informed and considered manner.450 In some circumstances, for instance, a shorter time frame may be justifiable, especially if the offer is made at a time sufficiently advanced that the parties are positioned to assess the respective strengths and weaknesses of the offeror’s position on the issues in dispute at trial.451

Substantial compliance with requirements of rule-based offers of compromise 13.83 It is arguable that an offeror who substantially complies with the rulebased requirements pertaining to offers of compromise452 should not be placed costs-wise in a position [page 419] markedly different than had he or she fully complied with those requirements.453 To suggest otherwise is to place form over substance. It has been said, to this end, that ‘[t]he extent to which such a letter of offer departs from the regime envisaged by the rules against the particular facts of each

case will often determine whether it is appropriate … to make an order for costs on an indemnity basis’.454 So if, for instance, the Calderbank offer is open for a very short time, especially in complex litigation, it is unlikely to justify an order for indemnity costs though it proved more favourable to the offeree than the judgment.455 13.84 However, in those jurisdictions where the court rules presumptively entitle a plaintiff to all his or her costs on an indemnity basis where the defendant rejects an offer that proves as favourable as the judgment,456 it cannot be assumed that the court will be keen to reach the same outcome where the offer does not comply with those rules. Given that this outcome is essentially penal in character, it would be odd were a court to make such an order pursuant to its general costs discretion.457

Offeree’s attitude to the offer 13.85 A finding of unreasonableness in an offeree in rejecting a Calderbank offer can be substantiated by an inference that, in the circumstances, the rejection was not supported by any process of reasoning whatsoever, or that the reasons for rejection advanced or inferred were legally and/or factually inadequate.458 As to the former, that an offer, which proves to have been more favourable to the offeree than the judgment, is rejected almost immediately may suggest that it was not actually considered.459 As to the latter, although an offeree cannot be compelled to disclose legal advice received in respect of the offer, assuming that advice is (as it would likely be) privileged, a failure to disclose it means that a circumstance that is possibly relevant to the characterisation of the rejection as reasonable or unreasonable is not available.460 [page 420]

Warning foreshadowing, and reasoned exposition for, application for indemnity costs 13.86 More than one judge has noted the potential relevance of a warning contained in a Calderbank offer of the offeror’s intention to seek indemnity

costs in the event that the offer is rejected and proves more favourable to the offeror than the judgment.461 The failure to so warn is unlikely to be decisive against an indemnity order, at least if other circumstances are such as to constitute a strong claim to indemnity costs.462 But it may be of value especially if accompanied by a reasoned exposition of the weakness of the offeree’s case.463 This is so particularly where the offeree is unsophisticated or in some other way disadvantaged,464 including by being unrepresented. The award of indemnity costs, though, ultimately rests within the court’s discretion. Hence, the court will not blindingly apply an expressed intention to seek indemnity costs found in a Calderbank offer, as an indemnity order here is premised chiefly on a conclusion of unreasonableness in rejecting the offer.

Effect of Settlement Offers on Appeal or Re-trial Settlement offers on appeal Application of rule-based offers of compromise on appeal 13.87 Although court rules in all jurisdictions except the Australian Capital Territory provide for the costs consequences of rejected offers of compromise, only in New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia do the rules make explicit provision for settlement offers on appeal. In New South Wales and Western Australia these in effect apply the rules for trial offers of compromise, with relevant terminological modifications, to proceedings before the respective Courts of Appeal.465 The Victorian appeal rules make equivalent provision to the trial rules,466 albeit with a dedicated rule for appeal, but with a small difference.467 The trial offer rules apply [page 421] only to an ‘offer of compromise’ as defined, that is, an offer that meets the requirements of the rules as to form, content and timing. The appeal rules

apply if a party has made ‘an offer in writing … to compromise the appeal’, and so the trial offer formal requirements appear to have no application. Case authority under the former Federal Court Rules468 proceeds on the assumption that the rules governing offers of compromise apply to appeals in that court.469 That those rules were phrased by reference to a ‘party’ who makes an offer to settle to another ‘party’, rather than in terms of an applicant or a respondent, coupled with the offer being made in the ‘proceeding’, which the empowering Act defines to include an appeal,470 speaks to the correctness of this view. It also translates to the same approach under the current rules, which adopt the language of ‘offeror’ and ‘offeree’.471

Application of Calderbank offers on appeal 13.88 Whether or not court rules in a jurisdiction make provision for costs consequences arising out of offers of compromise, there is nothing to prevent a court taking into account a Calderbank offer made on appeal.472 In this context the court will be informed by essentially the same considerations as at first instance,473 although the merits of the parties’ respective cases must be assessed against the backdrop of an existing determination. The making of, or failure to make, (new) offers during the appeal cannot bear on the costs order appropriate in relation to the trial.474

Relevance on appeal of settlement offers made at trial Calderbank offers at trial 13.89 New South Wales authority envisages that the Court of Appeal can take into account a Calderbank offer made at trial in the exercise of its general costs discretion on appeal, albeit ordinarily premised on the offer being renewed or varied during the pendency of the appeal proceeding.475 A Tasmanian case, albeit one dealing with payments into court at first instance rather than Calderbank offers, seems to suggest the same may be so in that jurisdiction.476 The position is unlikely to be markedly different in the remaining jurisdictions, as an appellate

[page 422] court, like a trial court, has a broad discretion as to costs, and the policy of encouraging parties to settle rather than continue litigation — a policy that informs the impact of Calderbank offers — applies in an appellate context just as in a trial context.477

Rule-based offers at trial 13.90 New South Wales case authority views a settlement offer made at first instance pursuant to the court rules as a factor the court may take into account in exercising its costs discretion on appeal (and even on re-trial),478 whether or not it is renewed.479 This has since been encapsulated via a specific rule.480 On the issue of renewal of the offer, the following has been remarked:481 Where the offer is not renewed, the failure of a successful defendant to respond to a valid offer made prior to trial, will not give rise to any clear presumption that it was unreasonable not to reconsider and offer to accept the lapsed offer when a notice of appeal is filed. Having obtained a judgment in its favour, which is not to be treated as in someway conditional or as merely a preliminary determination of the rights of the parties, albeit the appeal is by way of rehearing, it would not, absent some particular consideration, be unreasonable for the defendant to continue to rely upon the judgment.

The length of time since the initial offer was made and the time elapsed between the trial and the appeal may, however, make it appropriate for the offeror to renew the offer after the trial if it wishes to rely on it to claim the costs of appeal on an indemnity basis.482 [page 423] In the seminal case, Maitland Hospital v Fisher (No 2),483 the Court of Appeal ruled that, although the relevant rule484 was not expressed in terms applicable to appeals, it could apply on appeal in favour of the party who was the plaintiff at first instance because its rationale applied equally to appellate proceedings.485 The court in any case retains a discretion not to apply the consequences of the rule,486 as the rule contains its own discretion — from the words ‘unless the Court otherwise orders’;487 the court’s general costs

discretion arguably remains too. So in New South Wales an offer under the rules at trial remains relevant to the issue of costs on appeal.488 This approach has also seen application in the Federal Court,489 Tasmania490 and Western Australia.491 13.91 That the relevant rules are not expressed in terms applicable to appeals has led judges in Queensland to swing in the opposite direction, such that offers made at trial under the rules do not in that jurisdiction retain costs consequences on appeal.492 This approach has transpired in the Northern Territory493 and South Australia,494 and aligns with the tenor of a Victorian Court of Appeal decision.495 The seminal Queensland case is Tamwoy v Solomon,496 which dealt with a rule (then) phrased as follows:497 (1) Where the plaintiff makes an offer to settle which is not accepted by the defendant and the plaintiff obtains a judgment no less favourable than the offer to settle the Court shall order the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs fixed on a solicitor and client basis, unless the defendant shows that another order for costs is proper in the circumstances. (2) Where the defendant makes an offer to settle which is not accepted by the plaintiff and the plaintiff obtains a judgment which is not more favourable to the plaintiff than the offer to settle the Court shall order the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs fixed, on a party and party basis, up to and including the day of service of the offer to settle and order the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs, fixed on a party and party basis, after the day of service of the offer to settle, unless the plaintiff shows that another order for costs is proper in the circumstances.

[page 424] All Australian superior court rules other than those in the Australian Capital Territory make similar (though not necessarily identical) provision.498 Yet the concern expressed by the court in Tamwoy focuses not upon sub-rule (1), the New South Wales equivalent of which was in issue in Maitland Hospital, but on sub-rule (2). The concern was that if a defendant-appellant succeeds on appeal in reducing the amount of an award in favour of the plaintiff, and the terms of the defendant’s offer are more favourable to the plaintiff than the result of the appeal, there is no benefit to the appellant as nothing in sub-rule (2) improves his or her position as to costs beyond what it would ordinarily be; namely, that as a successful appellant the defendant would receive costs of the appeal on a party and party basis. So, according to the court, the rule could not be made to operate even-handedly to both

plaintiff and defendant on appeal, as it provides a sanction against futile appeals by defendants but not by plaintiffs, thus defeating the policy of the rule, which is to discourage litigation generally and to encourage settlement of claims.499 The same has been held to be the case under the current rules.500 13.92 Hence, Maitland dealt with an offer of compromise by the plaintiff at first instance, whereas Tamwoy focused on an offer by the defendant, and so the cases are distinguishable. Although the tenor and direction of each of the judgments is different, whether this makes a substantial difference in practice may be queried. If the New South Wales case law is correct, any inequity or injustice resulting from the application of the rule-based position can be avoided by the discretion expressly retained in the rules. If the Queensland approach is correct, and the rules do not apply to appeals, the appellate court is left with its general discretion to make costs orders that are just in the circumstances.501

Relevance of settlement offers on re-trial 13.93 The broad Maitland approach has been applied to offers of compromise in cases involving a re-trial. In Ettinghausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd502 Gleeson CJ and Priestley JA found nothing in principle to require that the consequences of an offer are ‘exhausted’ once the trial, prior to which the offer was made, comes to an end. This is because the offer is made not in respect of a trial but in respect of a claim, and a claim may not be finally heard and determined until after there have been a number of appeals, and even a number of trials. This led their Honours to find ‘no justification for concluding that, once the claim to which it relates has been the subject of a complete trial, an offer of compromise made before the trial has no further significance for any appeal, or subsequent re-trial’.503 Consequently, an offer of compromise made in respect of a claim, following the conclusion of the trial of that claim and a successful appeal, can be relied on in a second trial of that claim without the need to revive or renew the offer. In Ettinghausen the plaintiff made an offer of [page 425]

compromise before trial, which the defendant rejected, and at trial the plaintiff received an amount substantially exceeding the offer. On appeal the matter was sent back for a re-trial on the issue of damages. On the re-trial the plaintiff received a verdict lower than in the first trial but still exceeding his original settlement offer. Gleeson CJ and Priestley JA held that the plaintiff was entitled to indemnity costs under the court rules.504 Kirby P delivered a strong dissent, declaring that the rule in question was only intended to operate on a single trial or proceeding, and that the scheme of the rules contemplates that, at the latest, an offer will expire at the point of the conclusion of the particular trial to which the offer is directed. His Honour remarked that once a second trial is ordered ‘the litigious goal-posts have changed’, and that it would take ‘an other-worldly ignorance of the realities of litigation to pretend that an offer of settlement, made before judgment in a first trial, is unaffected by the outcome of that trial’.505 That outcome, according to Kirby P, inevitably becomes a major consideration in any settlement of the claim at or before a second trial. He further reasoned that to hold a party forever to an offer no longer available for acceptance, but that continues to hang over the party through the vicissitudes of litigation, does not promote the settlement of cases, and may indeed inhibit the making of further offers.506 13.94 Kirby P’s approach enjoys some support from the Victorian Court of Appeal’s decision in Grbavac v Hart,507 albeit under the court’s general costs discretion. The plaintiff, having rejected the defendant’s offer to settle for $27,500, was awarded $250,000 at trial. The defendant appealed, but pending the appeal made offers of $150,000 and then $175,000 purportedly pursuant to the court rules. On appeal the court ordered a re-trial, before which the defendant made a $35,000 offer. On the re-trial the plaintiff was awarded $125,000. The Court of Appeal held that an offer of compromise under the court rules could not be made in respect of a claim for damages after the claimant had obtained judgment and pending the determination of an appeal. A majority of the court508 conceded that a proceeding by way of appeal could be the subject of a settlement offer outside the rules, which if not accepted may have costs implications, but added that the influence, if any, that nonacceptance should have on the incidence of costs would depend on a range of considerations.509 This Tadgell JA explained as follows:510 It would be necessary also to consider whether the attention of the offeree had been fairly drawn

to the purpose for which, and the intention with which, the offer had been made. In particular, it would be relevant to consider whether the offer was reasonably to be understood as one made simply for the purpose of inducing a settlement of the appeal, or as one whose purpose was also to secure a costs advantage if the appeal proceeded; and, if the latter, what ultimate costs advantage the offeror had it in mind to achieve. For example, it would no doubt be relevant to consider whether the offeror was to be understood to intend, or not to intend, to rely on the offer upon the question of costs of a re-trial, if the appeal were to result in a re-trial.

On the facts the court concluded that the timing of the $175,000 offer — after verdict and pending appeal — and its terms would have led the offeree reasonably to believe that it was an offer to settle the pending appeal and was not to survive beyond the hearing and determination of that appeal. Also, the making of a much lower offer following the determination of the appeal and the order for a new trial suggested that the defendant did not intend the former offer to survive the appeal.511

1.

See 7.2–7.6.

2.

See 8.25–8.68.

3.

In this paragraph the term ‘settlement offer’ is used in a broad sense to include both formal and informal offers, as well as payments into court.

4.

(1990) 25 NSWLR 353 at 354–5.

5.

See, for example, Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 422 at 426–7 per Miles CJ (SC(ACT)). As to party and party basis see 16.14–16.17.

6.

Cf Morris v McEwen (2005) 92 SASR 281; [2005] SASC 284; BC200505379 at [4] per Debelle J (who suggested that ‘[t]here is a real question whether the time has come for a review of the interaction between a Calderbank letter and rules of court’ before opining that ‘[i]t is undesirable to have two differing régimes’).

7.

See 13.3–13.39.

8.

See 13.52–13.86.

9.

See 14.66–14.73.

10. For example, under s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth): see Moreton v Moreton (Costs) [2009] FamCA 51; BC200950079 at [60] per Murphy J (‘The breadth of the discretion inherent in applications pursuant to s 79 has been commented on by courts of the highest authority. This is a profoundly important reason why negotiation and, specifically, the making of reasonable offers, ought be pursued and pursued assiduously’). 11. For example, defamation litigation (see Manefield v Child Care NSW (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 104; BC201101826 at [61] per Kirby J (‘The hazards of litigation are perhaps greater in defamation than in most other areas. But quite apart from that, litigation is expensive, even for those who ultimately win. With these things in mind, as a matter of enlightened self interest, it was important for the parties to consider compromise and commercial reality’)) and compulsory acquisition litigation (see Taylor v Port Macquarie-Hastings Council (2010) 175 LGERA 189; [2010] NSWLEC 153; BC201005769 at [23] per Biscoe J (‘A significant risk in many cases under the

Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) is that it is difficult to predict the amount of compensation that might be awarded where, as is common, there are large differences in the valuation assessments and underlying planning assessments of the respective parties’ expert valuers and planners’)). The latter may be a reason why Osborn J in Roads Corporation v Love (No 2) (2010) 31 VR 551; [2010] VSC 154; BC201002382 at [24]–[44] (affd Love v Roads Corporation [2011] VSCA 434; BC201110012) was willing to envisage the applicability of Calderbank offers in compensation cases, against a backdrop of a statutory offer regime (under s 91 of the Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (Vic)) inconsistent with the relevant Victorian court rule governing offers of compromise (Vic r 26.08). 12. Morrison v Defence Maritime Services Pty Ltd (2007) 156 LGERA 365; [2007] NSWLEC 552; BC200707762 at [32] per Biscoe J. 13. Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 543 per Mason CJ, at 568 per McHugh J; BC9002896. 14. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 131(5)(b); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s 131(5)(b) (commenced 1 March 2012); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 131(5)(b); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) s 131(5)(b) (commenced 1 January 2013); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 131(5)(b); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 131(5)(b). 15. The phrase ‘offer of compromise’ is used in the court rules, with the exception of Queensland and South Australia where the rules use the phrase ‘offer to settle’. 16. As to the party and party basis of taxation see 16.14–16.17. 17. Maitland Hospital v Fisher (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 721 at 724; BC9201767 (CA). See also Henderson v Simon Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd [1988] VR 867 at 869 per Murphy J; Shaw v Jarldorn (1999) 76 SASR 28 at 29; [1999] SASC 529; BC9908346 per Doyle CJ (FC); Interchase Corporation Ltd v ACN 010 087 573 Pty Ltd (2000) 45 ATR 445 at 452; [2000] QSC 13; BC200000188 per White J; Cameron v Nominal Defendant [2001] 1 Qd R 476 at 478–9; [2000] QCA 137; BC200001894; Sunlec International Ltd v Carroll Australasia Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 354; BC200108258 at [14] per Wheeler J; Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd (No 4) [2009] FCA 803; BC200906875 at [1] per Finkelstein J. 18. See 13.34–13.39. 19. See 13.52–13.54. 20. FCR 2011 rr 25.01–25.04 (formerly FCR 1979 O 23 rr 2–4); NSW r 20.26(2)–(4); NT r 26.02; Qld rr 353, 355; SA r 187(3) (see Rapuano v Karydis-Frisan (No 2) [2012] SADC 177; BC201240431 at [75]–[81], [93], [94] per Judge Stretton) (cf former SA RSC r 41.01: see Flinders Diamonds Ltd v Tiger International Resources Inc (No 2) (2006) 244 LSJS 435; [2006] SASC 180; BC200604598 at [10]–[23] per Layton J); Tas rr 280(1)–280(5), 281; Vic r 26.02; WA O 24A r 1(1), 1(2). 21. FCR 2011 r 25.05 (formerly FCR 1979 O 23 r 5(1)–5(3), 5(7)); NSW r 20.26(6)–(8) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 22 r 3(1)–3(3), 3(8)) (see Kooee Communications Pty Ltd v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 85; BC200803122 at [13]–[24] per Basten JA; Pittorino v Yates [2009] NSWCA 87; BC200903190 at [29]–[39] per Tobias JA, with whom Beazley JA concurred); NT r 26.03(1)–(3), 26.03(6); Qld r 354; SA r 187(1), 187(2) (definition of ‘relevant date’) (cf former SA RSC 41.01: see Shaw v Jarldorn (1999) 76 SASR 28 at 30; [1999] SASC 529; BC9908346 per Doyle CJ (FC)); Tas r 280(6), 280(7); Vic r 26.03(1)–(3), 26.03(6); WA O 24A r 3(1), 3(8). 22. FCR 2011 r 25.08 (formerly FCR 1979 O 23 r 5(4), 5(7)); NSW r 20.27 (formerly NSW RSC Pt 22 r 3(5), 3(8)); NT r 26.03(4); Qld r 358; SA r 188(1)–188(3) (cf former SA RSC r 41.02(1)); Vic

r 26.03(4); WA O 24A r 3(5), 3(8). 23. In South Australia a formal offer of settlement may be withdrawn at any time by the filing of a notice of withdrawal and in such cases, subject to any court order to the contrary, the offer will be treated as if it had never been made: SA r 187(7). It has been judicially observed that ‘[n]o doubt this is to strongly encourage offers not to be withdrawn, by withdrawing the benefit to a party provided by a r 187 in its entirety should the offer be withdrawn’, as ‘r 187 provides that as a general rule parties should only have the benefit of a r 187 offer if the offer remains open until the time when costs are considered’: Rapuano v Karydis-Frisan (No 2) [2012] SADC 177; BC201240431 at [88] per Judge Stretton. 24. FCR 2011 r 25.07 (formerly FCR 1979 O 23 r 5(5)); NSW r 20.26(11) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 22 r 3(6)); NT r 26.03(5); Qld r 355(1); Vic r 26.03(5); WA O 24A r 3(6). These formalities explain, at least partly, why many litigants resort to the less formal Calderbank offers: see 13.55–13.86. 25. FCR 2011 r 25.05(4) (formerly FCR 1979 O 23 r 7); NSW r 20.26(9) (formerly NSW RSC 22 r 6); NT r 26.04; Qld r 356; Tas r 285; Vic r 26.04; WA O 24A r 6. So, for instance, an offer of compromise is not admissible on an application for security for costs: Macplan Logistics Systems Pty Ltd v Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 324; BC9601338. As to security for costs see Chs 28, 29. 26. FCR 2011 r 25.06(1) (formerly FCR 1979 O 23 r 8(1)); NSW r 20.30(1) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 22 r 7(1)); NT r 26.05(1); Qld r 357(1); Tas r 286(1); Vic r 26.05(1); WA O 24A r 7(1). 27. FCR 2011 r 25.06(2) (formerly FCR 1979 O 23 r 8(2)); NSW r 20.30(2) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 22 r 7(2)); NT r 26.05(2); Qld r 357(3); Tas r 286(2); Vic r 26.05(2); WA O 24A r 7(2). 28. This does not extend to the situation where in the course of trial an offer of compromise is accepted because, inter alia, ‘determination’ is the language of curial resolution of disputed issues, and ‘relief to be granted’ refers to curial determination: Langley v The Age Company Ltd [2002] VSC 243; BC200203881 at [15]–[19] per Ashley J. 29. FCR 2011 r 25.06(2), 25.06(3) (formerly FCR 1979 O 23 r 8(2), 8(3)); NSW r 20.30(3) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 22 r 7(3)); NT r 26.05(2), 26.05(3); Qld r 357(3); Tas r 286(2), 286(3); Vic r 26.05(2), 26.05(3); WA O 24A r 7(2), 7(3). 30. SA r 187(4) (cf former SA RSC r 41.03). 31. Tas r 280(3), 280(4). 32. Henderson v Simon Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd [1988] VR 867 at 870 per Murphy J (dealing with Vic r 26.02(1)); Davies v Fay [1995] 1 Qd R 509 at 510 per Mackenzie J (in a claim by a defendant to an action that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence the previous Qld RSC O 26 r 2(1) (phrased in terms similar to the current Qld r 353(1)) furnished the vehicle by which a plaintiff might secure protection as to costs on the issue of liability by offering to accept a stated percentage of any damages that the court might find that he or she was entitled to receive). 33. Berowra Holdings Pty Ltd v Gordon (2006) 225 CLR 364; [2006] HCA 32; BC200604256 at [55] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ. 34. See, for example, Rule Chambers Pty Ltd v Badge Constructions (SA) Pty Ltd (2009) 261 LSJS 434; [2009] SASC 70; BC200901540 at [23]–[24] per White J (noting that, for instance, unlike the common law position, the South Australian rules dictate that a party is not regarded as having rejected an opponent’s offer by the later filing of its own formal offer of settlement, and that nor will a party be regarded as having rejected an offer by engaging in other conduct (such as taking further interlocutory steps) that would seemingly amount to a rejection of the offer: at [24]); Rapuano v Karydis-Frisan (No 2) [2012] SADC 177; BC201240431 at [57]–[58] per Judge

Stretton. 35. See 13.9–13.23. 36. Toomey v Scolaro’s Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd (No 4) [2002] VSC 28; BC200200605 at [20] per Eames J. See also Grbavac v Hart [1997] 1 VR 154 at 155 per Winneke P, at 160 per Tadgell JA; BC9601881; Shaw v Yarranova Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSCA 48; BC200701826 at [2] per Warren CJ (referring to offers made on appeal: see 13.87); Dover Beach Pty Ltd v Geftine Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 442; [2008] VSCA 248; BC200811150 at [118] per Ashley JA, with whom Redlich JA and Coghlan AJA concurred on this point. See, for example, Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd v CCP Australian Airships Ltd (No 2) [2003] VSC 141; BC200302234 at [6] per Habersberger J (who held that, whilst it is preferable that an offer of compromise contain a figure for interest rather than the words ‘plus interest’, the latter wording did not make the offer of compromise unclear or uncertain or incapable of enforcement because ‘[a]scertaining the amount of interest was … simply a matter of multiplying the appropriate rate for the time being by the appropriate number of days between the commencement of the proceeding and the agreed date of payment’: at [8]); Preti v Conservation Land Corporation (No 2) (2007) 20 NTLR 121; [2007] NTSC 34; BC200703854 at [37]–[40] per Southwood J (an offer of compromise can be made in a currency other than in which the award of damages is made by the court, provided that it is ‘capable of being evaluated in money terms and of being compared in money terms with the judgment sum’, which is influenced by the range within which the applicable exchange rate has historically fluctuated) (affd on this point: Preti v Sahara Tours Pty Ltd (2008) 22 NTLR 215; [2008] NTCA 2; BC200802238). 37. Johnston v Johnston (2004) 32 Fam LR 308; [2004] FamCA 556 at [35] (FC). In the family law context see further 13.42. 38. Balnaves v Smith [2012] QSC 408; BC201210231 at [20], [21] per Byrne SJA. 39. Roche v Varnavides [2004] WASC 164 (S); BC200500112 at [34] per Newnes M. 40. Specsavers Pty Ltd v Optical Superstore Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 183; BC201209849 at [60] per the court. 41. See 13.13–13.23. 42. Tickell v Trifleska Pty Ltd (1990) 25 NSWLR 353 at 355 per Rogers CJ; Franks v Warringah Council [2003] FCA 1254; BC200306692 at [4]–[7] per Branson J; Mitchell v Pacific Dawn Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 179; BC200303062 at [29] per Ambrose J; Little v Saunders [2004] NSWSC 655; BC200404771 at [44] per Campbell J; Anderson Group Pty Ltd v Tynan Motors Pty Ltd (No 2) (2006) 67 NSWLR 706; [2006] NSWCA 120; BC200603504 at [8] per Basten JA, with whom Santow JA and Young CJ in Eq concurred; Regency Media Pty Ltd v AAV Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 368; BC200910207 at [28] per the court; Dean v Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 141; BC201004114 at [14] per the court. 43. See, for example, Enerka Apex Belting Pty Ltd v Vickers Systems Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] VSC 409; BC200205454 at [14]–[15] per Habersberger J (where the plaintiff’s offer of a six per cent reduction in the claim was so characterised); Commissioner of Taxation v Crown Insurance Services Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 182; BC201209936 at [34] per Lander and Foster JJ (where the offer was characterised as one ‘made simply for the purpose of trying to obtain an advantage in case the applicant’s appeal was dismissed’). See also TX Australia Pty Ltd v Broadcast Australia Pty Ltd (Costs) [2012] NSWSC 1200; BC201210671 at [8] per Brereton J (remarking, by reference to NSW r 42.15A (as to which see 13.23), that ‘[i]t was not the purpose of these rules to establish a regime that would have the practical effect of conferring on a successful party an entitlement to indemnity costs if it made an offer containing but a slight concession that did not

involve an objectively realistic endeavour to bring about a compromise of the proceedings’). 44. Robb Evans of Robb Evans & Associates v European Bank Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 170; BC200905581 at [20] per Basten JA, with whom Campbell JA concurred. 45. Regency Media Pty Ltd v AAV Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 368; BC200910207 at [31] per the court. 46. (2012) 17 ANZ Ins Cas ¶161-943; [2012] NSWCA 192; BC201204919. 47. Prosperity Advisers Pty Ltd v Secure Enterprises Pty Ltd (2012) 17 ANZ Ins Cas ¶161-943; [2012] NSWCA 192; BC201204919 at [111]. 48. Prosperity Advisers Pty Ltd v Secure Enterprises Pty Ltd (2012) 17 ANZ Ins Cas ¶161-943; [2012] NSWCA 192; BC201204919 at [111]. Cf Robb Evans of Robb Evans & Associates v European Bank Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 170; BC200905581 at [20]–[23] per Basten JA, with whom Campbell JA concurred (where the offer involved an effective amount of less than $2,000 to settle a claim in excess of $800,000, which Basten JA ‘properly characterized as trivial or contemptuous’, and as such incapable of engaging the costs consequences provided by the relevant rule: at [23]). 49. In the context of an applicant’s ‘walk away offer’, tied to which the respondent would pay onehalf of the applicant’s costs, Logan J in Granitgard Pty Ltd v Termicide Pest Control Pty Ltd (No 6) [2010] FCA 381; BC201002314 at [24] opined that ‘[t]o use the description “not genuine” in respect of that offer might be thought to carry with it a pejorative quality which sits uneasily with regarding the offer as one made in good faith and with a recognition that a party which gives up half of what would otherwise be an entitlement to all of its party and party taxed costs to date on discontinuance is truly giving up something’. Accordingly, his Honour branded the use of the adjectival description ‘not genuine’ as ‘apt to mislead’. 50. As to ‘walk away’ offers in the Calderbank context see 13.69. 51. [2010] FCA 415; BC201002597 at [90]. See also Commissioner of Taxation v Evenfont (No 2) (2009) 223 FLR 28; [2009] NSWSC 9; BC200900366 at [31] per Bell JA; Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd (No 4) [2009] FCA 803 at [13] per Finkelstein J (‘One can easily envisage circumstances where a “walk away’ offer must be regarded as a genuine offer of compromise. Take for example a case that has progressed for some time and the party’s costs are quite high. In that event an offer to walk away may, in a business sense, be a significant offer’); Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd (No 5) [2010] FCA 630; BC201004133 at [22] per Rares J (affd Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd [2011] FCAFC 53; BC201102220). Cf TX Australia Pty Ltd v Broadcast Australia Pty Ltd (Costs) [2012] NSWSC 1200; BC201210671 at [11] per Brereton J (finding that although there was an element of compromise in the defendant’s ‘walk away’ offer, as in substance it called for the plaintiff’s capitulation, ‘the offer did not involve any substantial measure of compromise in [the defendant’s] position to justify its being rewarded by a special costs order’). 52. Clark v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCA 415; BC201002597 at [90]. See also Gonzales v Owners of Strata Plan 74146 (Costs) [2010] NSWDC 50; BC201040107 at [17] per Johnstone DCJ. 53. Uniline Australia Ltd v S Briggs Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 82 IPR 56; [2009] FCA 920; BC200907642 at [38]. 54. [2010] FCA 1068; BC201007236. 55. Eric Preston Pty Ltd v Euroz Securities Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1068; BC201007236 at [16]. 56. NSW r 20.26(2).

57. Dean v Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 141; BC201004114 at [26] per the court; Rail Corporation NSW v Vero Insurance Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 926; BC201206350 at [97] per Garling J. 58. Barakat v Bazdarova [2012] NSWCA 140; BC201203248 at [40] per Tobias AJA, with whom Bathurst CJ and Whealy JA concurred. 59. NT r 26.03(8); Tas r 284(3); Vic r 26.03(8); WA O 24A r 10(2). 60. Nolan v Nolan (No 2) [2003] VSC 136; BC200302148 at [32], [47] per Dodds-Streeton J; Aquatec Max-Con Pty Ltd v Barwon Region Water Authority (No 8) [2007] VSC 363; BC200708490 at [16] per Byrne J; Dover Beach Pty Ltd v Geftine Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 442; [2008] VSCA 248; BC200811150 at [120]–[121] per Ashley JA, with whom Redlich JA and Coghlan AJA concurred; Victorian Education Foundation Ltd v AC Hall Airconditioning Contracting Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 32; BC201300731 at [24]–[25] per Priest JA, with whom Neave JA concurred. 61. Qld r 358(5). 62. SA r 187(3)(c) (emphasis supplied). 63. Tas r 281(c). 64. Victorian Education Foundation Ltd v AC Hall Airconditioning Contracting Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 32; BC201300731 at [24]–[27] per Priest JA, with whom Neave JA concurred. 65. See, for example, Enerka Apex Belting Pty Ltd v Vickers Systems Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 409; BC200205454 at [5]–[7] per Habersberger J; Principal Strategic Options Pty Ltd v Coshott (2003) 130 FCR 143; [2003] FCA 932; BC200305021 at [23] per Branson J; Simonovski v Bendigo Bank (No 2) [2003] VSC 139; BC200302181 at [5]–[8] per Ashley J; Ambulance Service of New South Wales v Worley (No 2) (2006) 67 NSWLR 719; [2006] NSWCA 236; BC200606639 at [19], [22] per Basten JA, with whom Tobias and McColl JJA concurred; Macquarie Radio Network Pty Ltd v Arthur Dent (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 339; BC200710315; San v Rumble (No 2) (2007) 48 MVR 492; [2007] NSWCA 259; BC200708156; Gretton v Commonwealth of Australia [2007] NSWSC 149; BC200701142 at [30]–[31] per Studdert J (affd Commonwealth of Australia v Gretton [2008] NSWCA 117; BC200803965); Kooee Communications Pty Ltd v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 85; BC200803122. Cf Tuheta Pty Ltd v Ehrenfeld [2010] NSWSC 799; BC201005084 at [18] per Barrett J; Old v McInnes [2011] NSWCA 410; BC201110349 at [105] per Meagher JA, with whom Giles JA concurred (offer vis-à-vis costs ‘as agreed or assessed’ held not to be ‘exclusive’ of costs). 66. Orcher v Bowcliff Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1429; BC201209135 at [11] per Harrison J. See also Ziliotto v Dr Hakim (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1079; BC201208607 at [8]–[32] per Davies J; Collins v Sydney Ports Corporation [2012] NSWSC 1316; BC201210524 at [44] per Harrison J. 67. [2007] FCAFC 51; BC200702569 at [11]. See also Fennell v Aherne (No 2) [2005] SASC 364; BC200507425 at [11] per Judge Withers (in the context of Calderbank offers); Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd (No 4) [2010] FCA 956; BC201006420 at [7], [8] per Jessup J. 68. (2007) 17 VR 480; [2007] VSCA 186; BC200707688. 69. Barwon Region Water Authority v Aquatec-Maxcon Pty Ltd (2007) 17 VR 480; [2007] VSCA 186; BC200707688 at [35] per Kaye AJA. 70. Barwon Region Water Authority v Aquatec-Maxcon Pty Ltd (2007) 17 VR 480; [2007] VSCA 186; BC200707688 at [44] per Whelan AJA. See also at [30] per Warren CJ. 71. FCR 1979 O 23 r 11(8) (superseded); NSW r 42.17(1) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 22(10)); NT r 26.08(7); Qld r 360(1)(b); Tas r 289(3); Vic r 26.08(7); WA O 24A r 10(9). There is no

equivalent provision in South Australia or in the current Federal Court Rules, but on the grounds of justice it can be inferred that the court will not make the costs order provided in the rules if it is not satisfied that the offer is capable of being carried out. 72. FCR 1979 O 23 r 11(7) (superseded) (no equivalent in FCR 2011); NSW r 42.16(1) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 22(8)); NT r 26.08(5); Qld r 362; Tas r 289(4); Vic r 26.08(5); WA O 24A r 10(7). Other than in Queensland, the rules add that for this purpose the court may be informed of the fact that the offer of compromise was served, and of the date of service, but must not be informed of its terms: NSW r 42.16(2) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 22(9)); NT r 26.08(6); Tas r 289(5); Vic r 26.08(6); WA O 24A r 10(8). As to interest on party and party costs see Ch 19. 73. Clift v Timms (CA(Qld), 25 March 1997, unreported) BC9701026 at 11–12 (the expression ‘a judgment no less favourable’ does not ‘exclude from consideration relief sought other than money claimed’). Cf Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Alirezai (No 2) [2002] QSC 205; BC200204120 at [21] per Mullins J (who noted that whilst the rules do not limit the type of proceeding to which they can apply, they are easier to apply in a proceeding where the outcome is a monetary amount). 74. [2001] WASC 354; BC200108258. 75. Sunlec International Ltd v Carroll Australasia Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 354; BC200108258 at [16] per Wheeler J. 76. FCR 1979 O 23 r 11(4) (superseded) (referring to ‘applicant’ and ‘respondent’ in place of ‘plaintiff’ and ‘defendant’; and referring to the ‘party and party’ basis in place of the ‘ordinary’ basis). 77. The relevant rule is not limited to the assessment of monetary claims, it being the substantive remedy or remedies awarded that matter: Metz Holdings Pty Ltd v Simmac Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] FCA 1450; BC201109797 at [26] per Barker J. Also, the phrase ‘obtains an order or judgment on the claim’ refers to a determination or order made after curial decision, not an order obtained by acceptance of an offer of compromise: Lynch v Sydney Ferries Corporation [2010] NSWSC 1463; BC201009722 at [13] per Rein J. 78. As to what is meant by taxation on an indemnity basis see 16.23–16.31. 79. NSW r 42.14 (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 22(4)) (see, for example, Maitland Hospital v Fisher (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 721 at 725; BC9201767 (CA), dealing with the previous equivalent rule). Unless the court otherwise orders, any application for such an order for costs must be made immediately after the judgment giving rise to the entitlement to it: NSW r 42.17(4) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 22(11)). As to the ‘ordinary’ basis of assessment see 16.6. 80. WA O 24A r 10(4) (see, for example, Parlin Pty Ltd v Choiceone Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 19 (S); BC201208941 at [14] per the court). This rule, as it was before 1 March 2007, does not apply to an offer made by a plaintiff before that date unless the plaintiff obtains judgment on the claim to which the offer relates before that date: O 24A r 10(4a). 81. Parlin Pty Ltd v Choiceone Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 19 (S); BC201208941 at [12] per the court. 82. Parlin Pty Ltd v Choiceone Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 19 (S); BC201208941 at [13] per the court. 83. NSW r 42.14(2)(b) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 22(5)). 84. FCR 2011 r 25.14(3). 85. Aqua-Marine Marketing Pty Ltd v Pacific Reef Fisheries (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 6) (2012) 207 FCR 144; [2012] FCA 1048 at [14]–[16] per Collier J. 86. The South Australian rules read ‘the proportion of the debt or damages or the relief recovered by

the plaintiff is equal to or greater than that contained in the plaintiff’s offer’. 87. As to what is meant by taxation on a ‘solicitor and client’ basis see 16.18–16.22. 88. NT r 26.08(2); Qld r 360(1) (if the plaintiff makes more than one offer satisfying r 360(1), the first of those offers is taken to be the only offer for this purpose: r 360(2)); SA r 188(6) (so far as the offer relates to principal relief) (cf former SA RSC r 41.04); Tas r 289(1); Vic r 26.08(2)(a). 89. NT r 26.02; Vic r 26.08(2)(a). It has been judicially observed, by reference to the Victorian rule, that its object is ‘to give a plaintiff … some position of standing or strength in any negotiations for settlement of his or her claim against the defendant, which in the majority of cases has a corporate body whether statutory or otherwise standing behind it’, and that it thereby ‘enables a plaintiff and a defendant in such proceedings to have some degree of equality in their bargaining or negotiating position when endeavouring to resolve the proceedings by settlement’, as well as having the effect of ‘encouraging a defendant and those who may stand behind a defendant in such proceedings as the present to not ignore a reasonable offer of compromise made by a plaintiff which may be made even during the course of the trial’: Connolly v Skratulja (SC(Vic), McDonald J, 2 March 1993, unreported) at 8, endorsed by Smith J in Broomhall v National Roads and Motoring Association Insurance Ltd (No 2) [2004] VSC 366; BC200406605 at [9]–[15], and by Dixon J in Brown v Owners Corporation SP021532U (Ruling No 2) [2013] VSC 127; BC201301307 at [9]–[11]. 90. NT r 26.11(1), 26.11(2). 91. NT r 26.11(3) (which should read ‘indemnity’ rather than ‘solicitor and client’). 92. Vic r 26.08(2)(b). 93. Public Trustee v Newman (2012) 112 SASR 299; [2012] SASCFC 18; BC201201358 at [19] per the court (in the context of SA DCCR r 33, phrased in parallel terms to SA s 33). 94. Public Trustee v Newman (2012) 112 SASR 299; [2012] SASCFC 18; BC201201358 at [20] per the court. 95. An action that is (when commenced) separate from other actions in the court is called a ‘primary action’, as compared to an action that is commenced in the context of an existing action (that is, a cross action or a third party action), which is termed ‘secondary action’: SA r 28(2). 96. The exceptions are where: (a) an action in which urgent relief is sought; (b) an action brought in circumstances where the plaintiff reasonably believes there is a risk that the defendant will take action to remove assets from the jurisdiction, and intends to seek an injunction to prevent the defendant from removing assets from the jurisdiction; or (c) an action excluded from the application of this rule by direction of the court: SA r 33(1). 97. The phrase ‘offer to settle’ contemplates an offer being made in terms that are capable of acceptance so as to finalise the claim, but need not be expressed solely by reference to a fixed dollar amount (for instance, it may, at least in part, make an offer by reference to a formula, for example, an offer to pay reasonably incurred outstanding medical expenses): Public Trustee v Newman (2012) 112 SASR 299; [2012] SASCFC 18; BC201201358 at [19], [36] per the court. 98. SA r 33(1), 33(2). 99. SA r 33(4). 100. SA r 33(7). 101. Whitehead v Maas (1991) 56 SASR 362 at 367 per King CJ (FC) (dealing with the previous SA RSC r 41.05); Mutual Community Ltd v Lorden Holdings Pty Ltd (SC(Vic), Byrne J, 28 April 1993, unreported) BC9303878 at 13 (‘The response of a litigant in receipt of an offer of settlement will always be affected by the prospect that the sum which the Court might order including party

and party costs may be less advantageous than the terms of the offer. Experience, however, shows that this prospect alone is not always sufficient to compel a litigant to face up to the offer. The further prospect of a super-added costs penalty if a reasonable offer be not accepted is a salutary inducement to an offeree to undertake this often painful task’); Pirrotta v Citibank Ltd (1998) 72 SASR 259 at 267 per Debelle J, with whom Millhouse and Olsson JJ concurred; Shaw v Jarldorn (1999) 76 SASR 28 at 29; [1999] SASC 529; BC9908346 per Doyle CJ (FC) (speaking of the former SA DCR r 41.04, being similar to the former SA RSC r 41.04); Clark v State of Tasmania (1999) 9 Tas R 54 at 60; [1999] TASSC 130; BC9907730 per Underwood J; Knope v Webster [2009] SASC 152; BC200904599 at [21] per David J; Partridge v Hobart City Council (No 2) [2013] TASFC 1; BC201300256 at [9] per Blow J, with whom Crawford CJ and Wood J concurred. 102. Shaw v Jarldorn (1999) 76 SASR 28 at 29; [1999] SASC 529; BC9908346 per Doyle CJ (FC); Brown v Owners Corporation SP021532U (Ruling No 2) [2013] VSC 127; BC201301307 at [11] per Dixon J (referring to the purpose of the rule as to exert some pressure on a defendant to give proper consideration to an offer made by a plaintiff). 103. Clark v State of Tasmania (1999) 9 Tas R 54 at 60; [1999] TASSC 130; BC9907730 per Underwood J; Cameron v Nominal Defendant [2001] 1 Qd R 476 at 479; [2000] QCA 137; BC200001894 per the court (rejecting the argument that the meaning of Qld r 361 is affected by r 360, as the words used in r 360 have not been transported into r 361 and do not affect its ordinary meaning). 104. See 13.20–13.21. 105. NSW r 42.15 (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 22(6)); NT r 26.08(3); Qld r 361(1), 361(2); Tas r 289(2); Vic r 26.08(3); WA O 24A r 10(5). The former Federal Court Rules made equivalent provision: FCR 1979 O 23 r 11(5) (superseded) (referring to ‘applicant’ and ‘respondent’ in place of ‘plaintiff’ and ‘defendant’). In New South Wales, unless the court otherwise orders, any application for such an order for costs must be made immediately after the judgment giving rise to the entitlement to it: NSW r 42.17(4) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 22(11)). 106. As to what is meant by the ‘ordinary’ basis see 16.6. 107. As to what is meant by the ‘standard’ basis see 16.8–16.9. 108. NSW r 42.17(1) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 22(10)); NT r 26.08(7); Qld r 361(1)(b); Tas r 289(3); Vic r 26.08(7); WA O 24A r 10(9). The former Federal Court Rules made equivalent provision: FCR 1979 O 23 r 11(8) (superseded). 109. In the Federal Court and New South Wales, ‘the offer was made’. 110. NSW r 42.15 (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 22(7)); NT r 26.08(4); Qld r 361(3) (if the defendant makes more than one offer the first of those offers is taken to be the only offer for this purpose: r 361(4)); Vic r 26.08(4); WA O 24A r 10(6). The former Federal Court Rules made equivalent provision: FCR 1979 O 23 r 11(5) (superseded). 111. Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2009) 182 FCR 160; [2009] FCAFC 166; BC200910812 at [1105] per the court. 112. FCR 2011 r 25.14(1). 113. Namely FCR 2011 r 25.14(3): see 13.15. 114. Namely FCR 2011 r 25.14(2): see 13.23. 115. See Commissioner of Taxation v Crown Insurance Services Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 182; BC201209936 at [32] per Lander and Foster JJ.

116. SA r 188(6). 117. [2012] SASC 215; BC201209375 at [16]. See also Rapuano v Karydis-Frisan (No 2) [2012] SADC 177; BC201240431 at [64] per Judge Stretton. 118. SA r 188(6A). 119. SA r 188(7). 120. Notaras v Hugh [2003] NSWSC 919; BC200306111 at [4] per Sperling J; Stipanov v Mier (No 2) [2006] VSC 424; BC200609465 at [8] per Hollingworth J; Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2007) 244 ALR 374; [2007] FCA 1489; BC200708209 at [32] per Sackville J; Anderson v McPherson (No 2) [2012] WASC 19 (S2); BC201208919 at [8] per Edelman J (citing from the second edition of this work, at 13.16). 121. Coshott v Learoyd [1999] FCA 276; BC9901021 at [37] per Wilcox J; Dukemaster Pty Ltd v Bluehive Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 1; BC200300033 at [6] per Sundberg and Emmett JJ. 122. Dukemaster Pty Ltd v Bluehive Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 1; BC200300033 at [6] per Sundberg and Emmett JJ; Stipanov v Mier (No 2) [2006] VSC 424; BC200609465 at [8] per Hollingworth J; Danidale Pty Ltd v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSC 552; BC200711346 at [14] per Habersberger J; Foster v Galea (No 2) [2008] VSC 331; BC200807708; Anderson v McPherson (No 2) [2012] WASC 19 (S2); BC201208919 at [9] per Edelman J. 123. See 13.60–13.62. 124. Multicon Engineering Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corporation (1996) 138 ALR 425 at 451; BC9602511 per Rolfe J (SC(NSW)) (‘[it is] anomalous that there is no provision whereby a defendant, which is totally successful, is placed in the same position as a plaintiff, which is totally successful’); Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2007) 244 ALR 374; [2007] FCA 1489; BC200708209 at [55]–[57] per Sackville J. 125. Notaras v Hugh [2003] NSWSC 919; BC200306111 at [5] per Sperling J (adding that ‘[s]uch a plaintiff should be in no better position as to costs than a plaintiff who has recovered less than the amount specified in an offer of compromise served by the defendant’). 126. Multicon Engineering Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corporation (1996) 138 ALR 425 at 451; BC9602511 per Rolfe J (SC(NSW)); Notaras v Hugh [2003] NSWSC 919; BC200306111 at [5] per Sperling J; Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2007) 244 ALR 374; [2007] FCA 1489; BC200708209 at [58] per Sackville J. 127. FCR 2011 r 25.14(2) (formerly FCR 1979 O 23 r 11(6), with effect on 1 August 2008); NSW r 42.15A (with effect on 8 December 2006). 128. See FCR 2011 r 25.14(1) (discussed at 13.20), FCR 2011 r 25.14(3) (discussed at 13.15). 129. IFTC Broking Services Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 268 ALR 1; [2010] FCAFC 31; BC201001891 at [15] per the court (in the context of the former FCR 1979 O 23 r 11(6)). 130. See 16.45–16.47. 131. Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2007) 244 ALR 374; [2007] FCA 1489; BC200708209 at [58] per Sackville J. 132. MGICA (1992) Pty Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 70 FCR 236 at 240; BC9604664 per Lindgren J; Pirrotta v Citibank Ltd (1998) 72 SASR 259 at 267 per Debelle J, with whom Millhouse and Olsson JJ concurred; Clark v State of Tasmania (1999) 9 Tas R 54 at 59; [1999] TASSC 130; BC9907730 per Underwood J; Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd (No 4) [2009] FCA 803; BC200906875 at [11] per Finkelstein J;

Granitgard Pty Ltd v Termicide Pest Control Pty Ltd (No 6) [2010] FCA 381; BC201002314 at [17] per Logan J (opining that ‘prima facie’ and ‘presumptive entitlement’ are ‘just different ways of stating the same proposition’, as is the expression ‘rebuttable presumption’); Yarra Valley Dairy Pty Ltd v Lemnos Foods Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 283; BC201101802 at [8] per Middleton J (speaking in terms of a ‘rebuttable presumption’); Dighton v Nominal Defendant (No 4) [2012] SADC 24; BC201240263 at [9] per Judge Tilmouth (‘a presumptive position’). 133. Shaw v Jarldorn (1999) 76 SASR 28 at 29; [1999] SASC 529; BC9908346 per Doyle CJ (FC). 134. Maitland Hospital v Fisher (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 721 at 725; BC9201767 (CA). 135. (1999) 76 SASR 28 at 29–30; [1999] SASC 529; BC9908346 (FC) (emphasis supplied). See also Friend v Rye [2001] QSC 12; BC200100171 at [21] per White J; Hiscox v Woods [2002] QSC 64; BC200201094 at [8] per Moynihan J. 136. Maitland Hospital v Fisher (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 721 at 725; BC9201767 (CA). 137. Shaw v Jarldorn (1999) 76 SASR 28 at 30; [1999] SASC 529; BC9908346 per Doyle CJ (FC) (‘Difficulty experienced by the defendant in assessing the plaintiff’s offer is simply a usual aspect of litigation’). See also Hillier v Sheather (1995) 36 NSWLR 414 at 422–3; BC9504564 per Kirby P. 138. Smith v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 37 ATR 314 at 316; BC9704326 per Mansfield J (FCA); Caine v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 109; BC200803845 at [35] per McColl JA, with whom Mason P and McClellan CJ at CL concurred; Yarra Valley Dairy Pty Ltd v Lemnos Foods Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 283; BC201101802 at [8] per Middleton J; Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pte Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 344; BC201108674 at [16] per Basten JA, with whom McColl and Campbell JA concurred (noting that the reference to onus of proof ‘is not intended to suggest that an application for indemnity costs be turned into a mini-trial’, and that such applications are generally dealt with on the papers, ‘a practice which should be maintained’). 139. Simonovski v Bendigo Bank Ltd (No 2) [2003] VSC 139; BC200302181 at [17] per Ashley J. 140. Wills v Bigmac Pty Ltd (FCA, Heerey J, 9 December 1994, unreported) BC9400210 at 13; Smith v 600 Machinery Australia Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1029; BC9605672; Uniline Australia Ltd v S Briggs Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 82 IPR 56; [2009] FCA 920; BC200907642 at [46] per Greenwood J; Granitgard Pty Ltd v Termicide Pest Control Pty Ltd (No 6) [2010] FCA 381; BC201002314 at [18] per Logan J. 141. Hillier v Sheather (1995) 36 NSWLR 414 at 420; BC9504564 per Kirby P (refusing to import any requirement of ‘compelling circumstances’ in the context of the (now repealed) NSW DCR Pt 19A r 9 in view of the lack of any such requirement in the wording of the rule, though conceding that ‘the case needs in some way to be exceptional’: at 422); Houatchanthara v Bednarczyk (CA(NSW), Clarke JA, Handley JA and Santow AJA, unreported) BC9604998 at 4 per Clarke JA, with whom Handley JA and Santow AJA concurred; Southeastern Sydney Area Health Service v King [2006] NSWCA 2; BC200600916 at [83] per Hunt AJA, with whom Mason P and McColl JA concurred; Shellharbour City Council v Johnson (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 114; BC200605024 at [19] per Hunt AJA, with whom Beazley and Tobias JJA concurred; Macquarie Radio Network Pty Ltd v Dent (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 339; BC200710315 at [15] per Beazley JA, with whom Mason P and Basten JA concurred; Caine v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 109; BC200803845 at [35] per McColl JA, with whom Mason P and McClellan CJ at CL concurred; Zurich Australia Insurance Ltd v Motor Accidents Authority of NSW (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 268; BC201002177 at [21] per Whealy J; Yarra Valley Dairy Pty Ltd v Lemnos Foods Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 283; BC201101802 at [9] per Middleton J; Nominal Defendant v Hawkins (2011) 58

MVR 362; [2011] NSWCA 93; BC201103692 at [56] per Hodgson JA, with whom Beazley JA agreed; Barakat v Bazdarova [2012] NSWCA 140; BC201203248 at [45] per Tobias AJA, with whom Bathurst CJ and Whealy JA concurred. Cf Regency Media Pty Ltd v AAV Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 368; BC200910207 at [15] per the court. 142. Maitland Hospital v Fisher (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 721 at 725; BC9201767 (CA); New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corporation v Reeve (1993) 42 NSWLR 100 at 102 per Gleeson CJ; Clark v State of Tasmania (1999) 9 Tas R 54 at 60; [1999] TASSC 130; BC9907730 per Underwood J. 143. Smith v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 37 ATR 314 at 316; BC9704326 per Mansfield J (FCA) (the phrase ‘compelling and exceptional circumstances’ simply indicates that the appropriate starting point is to apply the rule); Shaw v Jarldorn (1999) 76 SASR 28 at 29 per Doyle CJ, at 34 per Perry J; [1999] SASC 529; BC9908346 (FC); Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Braverus Maritime Inc (No 2) (2004) 212 ALR 281; [2004] FCA 1437; BC200407318 at [17] per Hely J (a reference to ‘compelling and exceptional circumstances’ does no more than ‘convey that the prima facie position should only be departed from for proper reasons which, in general, only arise in an exceptional case’); Dighton v Nominal Defendant (No 4) [2012] SADC 24; BC201240263 at [9] per Judge Tilmouth. 144. New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corporation v Reeve (1993) 42 NSWLR 100 at 102 per Gleeson CJ; Shaw v Jarldorn (1999) 76 SASR 28 at 31; [1999] SASC 529; BC9908346 per Doyle CJ (FC); Clark v State of Tasmania (1999) 9 Tas R 54 at 60; [1999] TASSC 130; BC9907730 per Underwood J. 145. Shaw v Jarldorn (1999) 76 SASR 28 at 34; [1999] SASC 529; BC9908346 per Perry J (FC) (referring to the former SA RSC r 41.05, as discussed in Whitehead v Maas (1991) 56 SASR 362 (FC)); Fortron Automotive Treatments Pty Ltd v Eurotime Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 384; BC200107726 at [8] per Malcolm CJ, with whom Steytler and Wheeler JJ concurred; Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) v Takacs (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 172; BC200806906 at [32]–[33] per Basten JA. 146. [2009] TASSC 40; BC200904646 at [10]. 147. See 7.42–7.49. 148. See, for example, Brava Trading Pte Ltd v Leybourne Nominees Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 23; BC201300699 at [25]–[27] per Philippides J. 149. See, for example, Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2007) 244 ALR 374; [2007] FCA 1489; BC200708209 at [64]–[67] per Sackville J. 150. Gretton v Commonwealth [2007] NSWSC 149; BC200701142 at [24] per Studdert J (affd Commonwealth of Australia v Gretton [2008] NSWCA 117; BC200803965); Equity 8 Pty Ltd v Shaw Stockbroking Ltd [2007] NSWSC 503; BC200703636 at [33] per Barrett J; Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2007) 244 ALR 374; [2007] FCA 1489; BC200708209 at [68] per Sackville J. Cf Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) v Takacs (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 172; BC200806906 at [32]–[33] per Basten JA. 151. [2003] FCAFC 1; BC200300033. 152. See, for example, Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2007) 244 ALR 374; [2007] FCA 1489; BC200708209, discussed at 13.29. 153. (CA(NSW), Kirby P, Priestley and Powell JJA, 7 December 1995, unreported) BC9501810 at 2. Cf Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) v Takacs (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 172; BC200806906 at [28] per Basten JA.

154. Houatchanthara v Bednarczyk (CA(NSW), Clarke JA, Handley JA and Santow AJA, 14 October 1996, unreported) BC9604998. 155. Maitland Hospital v Fisher (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 721; BC9201767. 156. Macquarie Radio Network Pty Ltd v Dent (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 339; BC200710315. 157. See 13.29–13.32. 158. Clark v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCA 415; BC201002597 at [98] per Greenwood J. 159. See, for example, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Metcash Trading Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 55; BC201202182. 160. See, for example, Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd (No 4) [2009] FCA 803; BC200906875 at [15] per Finkelstein J (who refused indemnity costs under FCR 1979 O 23 r 11(6) (superseded) (as to which see 13.23) because the issue raised in the litigation — the legality of litigation funding — was ‘of some importance’ to litigation funders beyond the defendants, such that ‘far from it being unreasonable for the plaintiffs to decide to go on with their case, it was important that they did’). 161. Kapeleris v Bytenet Pty Ltd (FCA, Beaumont J, 4 September 1997, unreported) BC9704788 at 3– 4. 162. Franks v Warringah Council [2003] FCA 1254; BC200306692 at [5] per Branson J. 163. SZMJQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2009] FMCA 1137; BC200910585 at [20] per Raphael FM. 164. The remark by Wheeler J in Sunlec International Ltd v Carroll Australasia Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 354; BC200108258 at [14] that the focus is on the ‘objective reasonableness’ of the offer in the light of the judgment ultimately pronounced, rather than the subjective reasonableness of a party’s position at a particular time during the course of litigation, should not be construed as contrary to the proposition stated in the text. Wheeler J is not suggesting that the reasonableness in this context is determined as at the date of judgment; instead, the point being made is that the assessment must be made objectively rather than subjectively. 165. Freemantle’s Pastoral Pty Ltd v Hyett [1999] VSC 188; BC9903224 at [10] per Smith J; Sands v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] SASC 365; BC200910706 at [22] per Bleby J; Fernandez v Perez (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1602; BC201210542 at [20] Beech-Jones J; Candibon Pty Ltd v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2012] VSC 424; BC201207091 at [16] per Emerton J. 166. (2007) 244 ALR 374; [2007] FCA 1489; BC200708209. 167. Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2007) 244 ALR 374; [2007] FCA 1489; BC200708209 at [84]. 168. Shaw v Jarldorn (1999) 76 SASR 28 at 30; [1999] SASC 529; BC9908346 per Doyle CJ (FC). 169. See, for example, Ross v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2002] QCA 93; BC200201060 at [29]– [30] per Douglas J (where the plaintiff’s settlement offer was served with the statement of claim, at which time most of the medical reports pertinent to the litigation were unavailable to the defendant). 170. Simonovski v Bendigo Bank Ltd (No 2) [2003] VSC 139; BC200302181 at [18] per Ashley J. 171. St Clair v Timtalla Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] QSC 480; BC201010011 at [30] per Martin J (opining that ‘[a]n offerer does not have to have all relevant material available to it before it can assess an offer made’; emphasis supplied). 172. See, for example, Hiscox v Woods [2002] QSC 64; BC200201094 at [8], [10] per Moynihan J

(indemnity costs ordered). 173. Windbank v Bradley (1970) 4 ACTR 14 at 16 per Fox J; Shaw v Jarldorn (1999) 76 SASR 28 at 30 per Doyle CJ, at 34 per Perry J; [1999] SASC 529; BC9908346 (FC); Ford v GKR Construction Ltd [2000] 1 All ER 802 at 810 per Lord Woolf MR; Simonovski v Bendigo Bank Ltd (No 2) [2003] VSC 139; BC200302181 at [19] per Ashley J. 174. Duffy v Hepron Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 106; BC200704457 at [13] per Chesterman J (emphasis supplied). See also Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Braverus Maritime Inc (No 2) (2004) 212 ALR 281; [2004] FCA 1437; BC200407318 at [22] per Hely J (‘there is every reason for encouraging offers of compromise to be made as early as the circumstances reasonably permit’; emphasis supplied). 175. Jones v Sutton (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 203; BC200504148 at [55] per the court. 176. Clark v State of Tasmania (1999) 9 Tas R 54 at 60; [1999] TASSC 130; BC9907730 per Underwood J. 177. Leda v Weerden (No 3) [2006] NSWSC 220; BC200602050 at [10] per Gzell J; County Securities Pty Ltd v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 273; BC200809401 at [35] per McColl JA, with whom Spigelman CJ and Beazley JA concurred (who, responding to the argument that the offerees were too busy devoting their time to preparation for trial to consider the offer, remarked that ‘[t]he period leading up to the trial is precisely when parties are often in the best position to consider an offer’, and that ‘the further the process of preparation for trial has advanced, the better will the recipient of an offer be able to assess its prospects of success’). 178. See, for example, Clark v State of Tasmania (1999) 9 Tas R 54 at 60; [1999] TASSC 130; BC9907730 per Underwood J (offer made three months before trial, and the difference between the judgment sum ($154,014) and the offer ($130,000) was ‘quite substantial’); Preti v Conservation Land Corporation (No 2) (2007) 20 NTLR 121; [2007] NTSC 34; BC200703854 at [45]–[46] per Southwood J (affd on this point: Preti v Sahara Tours Pty Ltd (2008) 22 NTLR 215; [2008] NTCA 2; BC200802238). 179. Parish v Wu (No 2) [2010] VSC 64; BC201001222 at [17], [26] per J Forrest J; Brown v Owners Corporation SP021532U (Ruling No 2) [2013] VSC 127; BC201301307 at [12] per Dixon J (a case where the plaintiff’s offer was served during the trial, which proceeded to judgment, wherein the plaintiff obtained an award over double the amount of the offer; in these circumstances, Dixon J found no reason to ‘otherwise order’, and instead awarded the plaintiff indemnity costs of the proceeding: at [16]–[22]). 180. FCR 2011 r 25.05(1); NT r 26.03(1); Qld r 354(1); Vic r 26.03(1); WA O 24A r 3(1), 3(8). Cf NSW r 20.26(7) (which expressed in terms of offers made less ‘before the date set down for commencement of the trial’); SA r 187(1), 187(2) (which envisages offers made up to 21 days before the first, or any subsequent, date fixed for the trial to commence); Tas r 280(6) (which envisages that a party may make an offer of compromise at any time before the commencement of the trial in respect of the claim to which it relates). 181. See 13.33. 182. Castro v Hillery [2003] 1 Qd R 651; [2002] QCA 359; BC200205493 at [79] per Williams JA. 183. See 13.16–13.18. 184. Duffy v Hepron Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 106; BC200704457 at [13] per Chesterman J. 185. FCR 2011 r 25.05(3); NT r 26.03(3); Qld r 355(1); Tas r 280(7); Vic r 26.03(3); WA O 24A r 3(3). 186. SA r 187(1) provides that a party may, before the relevant date, file an offer of settlement in the

court. The ‘relevant date’ is the date falling 21 days before the first, or any subsequent, date fixed for the trial to commence: SA r 187(2)(a). Under SA r 188(1), the offeree may, before the relevant date, accept the offer. For this purpose, the ‘relevant date’ is the date falling seven days before the first, or any subsequent, date fixed for the trial to commence: r 188(2)(a). 187. See 13.81–13.82. 188. NSW r 20.26(6). 189. NSW r 20.26(7). 190. Taylor v Port Macquarie-Hastings Council (2010) 175 LGERA 189; [2010] NSWLEC 153; BC201005769 at [49] per Biscoe J. 191. (2009) 9 DCLR (NSW) 199; [2009] NSWDC 191; BC200940249. 192. Craft Printing Pty Ltd v Dwyer (Costs) (2009) 9 DCLR (NSW) 199; [2009] NSWDC 191; BC200940249 at [24]. 193. (2010) 175 LGERA 189; [2010] NSWLEC 153; BC201005769 at [49]. 194. Taylor v Port Macquarie-Hastings Council (2010) 175 LGERA 189; [2010] NSWLEC 153; BC201005769 at [50]. 195. Cf Rolls Royce Industrial Power (Pacific) Ltd v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 626 at 642; [2001] NSWCA 461; BC200108080 per Stein JA (in the context of Calderbank offers). 196. Shaw v Jarldorn (1999) 76 SASR 28 at 34; [1999] SASC 529; BC9908346 per Perry J (FC). 197. (1999) 76 SASR 28 at 34; [1999] SASC 529; BC9908346 (FC). See also Hillier v Sheather (1995) 36 NSWLR 414 at 422–3; BC9504564 per Kirby P. 198. (SC(NSW), Barr AJ, 4 August 1995, unreported) BC9505128 at 9–16. 199. ACT rr 1000–1005 (formerly ACT RSC O 26); NT r 26.12; Tas r 268. The South Australian rules simply state that if a defendant makes an offer of settlement for a specified amount, the offer may be accompanied by a payment into court of the relevant amount: SA r 187(5) (cf the former SA RSC rr 39.05, 39.06, discussed in the first edition of this work, 13.16). 200. ACT r 1011 (excepting in an action to which a defence of tender before action is pleaded, or to which r 1012 (see 26.28) applies); NT r 26.25(1) (excepting where the money has been paid into court in answer to a claim to which the defendant pleads or otherwise properly raises a defence of tender before commencement of the proceeding: r 26.25(2)); Tas r 275(1) (excepting in an action to which a defence of tender before action is pleaded, or in which a plea under the Defamation Act 1957 (Tas) (now the Defamation Act 2005 (Tas)) has been raised). 201. See 14.73. 202. NSW r 42.22 (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 18) (payments into court envisaged by the rules for proceedings on a claim for a liquidated demand: NSW r 14.25(1) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 15 r 24(1)); NT r 26.26(5); Tas r 275(2). 203. NT r 26.26(6). 204. ACT r 1011(4), 1011(5). 205. ACT RSC O 26 r 2 (repealed). 206. (1970) 4 ACTR 14. 207. In any event, that the rules in those other jurisdictions provide that the court may, in exercising its

discretion as to costs, take into account a payment into court and its quantum, does not oust the ability of the courts in those jurisdictions to take into account other relevant circumstances. 208. This reflects no more than the ordinary approach to interpreting a judicial discretion: see 6.14–6.20. 209. Windbank v Bradley (1970) 4 ACTR 14 at 15. 210. Windbank v Bradley (1970) 4 ACTR 14 at 16. See also Tanner v Marquis Jackson, Cahill and Associates (1975) 6 ACTR 9 at 11 per Connor J. 211. In particular, Fox J noted, the defendant will usually work from information supplied by the plaintiff and from relatively limited opportunities for medical examination of the plaintiff. 212. Windbank v Bradley (1970) 4 ACTR 14 at 16 (remarking that ‘[i]t is not seemly that the costs of litigation be left to determination by the soothsayer’s art’). 213. See also Mangan v Mendum (1970) 4 ACTR 44 at 45 per Smithers J (who remarked that normally a plaintiff who receives less may expect to suffer in costs, and the defendant who makes an adequate payment into court may expect to receive an advantage, but that the extent of the suffering or of the advantage will vary according to the circumstances). 214. Saarinen v Clay [1935] VLR 392 at 396 per Dean J (dealing with a rule similar to ACT RSC O 26 r 6 (now see ACT r 1011)); Mangan v Mendum (1970) 4 ACTR 44 at 45–6 per Smithers J. 215. Windbank v Bradley (1970) 4 ACTR 14 at 17. 216. See also Weeks v Bradbury (1970) 16 FLR 476 at 479 per Dunphy J (SC(ACT)) (the fact that the plaintiff was an infant was irrelevant to the costs issue, as the plaintiff had his next friend as his adviser and had competent legal assistance, and in deciding to reject the amount paid in ‘he must be presumed to have done so with the aid and advice of all concerned’); Pryor v Hennessy [1973] VR 221 at 222 per Newton J. 217. On this point see also Cau v Macauley (1976) 28 FLR 263 at 265–6 per Franki J (SC(ACT)) (as ACT RSC O 26 r 6 (now see ACT r 1011), as from 1974, requires the court to take into account ‘all other relevant circumstances’, it is an important factor in the case of an infant plaintiff that before moneys paid into court can be accepted on behalf of an infant plaintiff the settlement must be approved by the court. This led his Honour to order the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs to the date of payment in, but to make no order as to costs thereafter). 218. Windbank v Bradley (1970) 4 ACTR 14 at 18. 219. (1970) 4 ACTR 44 at 46. 220. (1991) 104 FLR 220 at 225–6 (SC(ACT)). 221. (1971) 4 ACTR 47 at 48. 222. Or even is only slightly less than the amount awarded: see Potts v Commissioner of Public Works [1939] SASR 400 at 402 per Richards J (dealing with a rule similar to ACT RSC O 26 r 6 (now see ACT r 1011), where the amount paid in by the defendant was £500, the plaintiff ultimately recovering £507, his Honour characterised the relationship that the extra £7 bore to the excess of the plaintiff’s claim over £500 as ‘a mere bagatelle’, and held it unreasonable to order the defendant to pay the costs of a long, protracted and difficult trial, such that the plaintiff should be allowed costs only down to the time of the payment in). 223. See, for example, Weeks v Bradbury (1970) 16 FLR 476 (SC(ACT)) (where the amount paid in was $14,000 and the amount recovered $13,038.90, Dunphy J ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs up to the date of payment in, and that the defendant have an order for costs to be

paid by the plaintiff thereafter: at 481). 224. See, for example, Tanner v Marquis Jackson, Cahill and Associates (1975) 6 ACTR 9 at 11–12 per Connor J (as the plaintiff was entitled to have a conference with his advisers and consider the offer without being under any undue pressure, it was held appropriate to allow the plaintiff, in addition to his costs up to and including the date of payment in, any costs he incurred for the purpose of considering payment into court between the date of payment in and three days later, being the time needed to adequately consider the offer). 225. The presence of a settlement offer would, in any event, be relevant in the exercise of the court’s general costs discretion: see 13.55–13.86. 226. (1977) 24 ACTR 30. 227. Gelonese v Blanken (1977) 24 ACTR 30 at 31–2. 228. See 8.70. 229. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117(1). 230. Fam LR 2004 r 10.01(3)(a). 231. As to Calderbank offers see 13.55–13.86. 232. Kilich v Wood (2003) 31 Fam LR 274; [2003] FamCA 629 at [25], [32] (FC). 233. Namely, proceedings others than those under Pt VI (divorce and nullity of marriage), Pt VII Divs 6, 9 or 13 (parenting orders and injunctions) or proceedings to enforce a decree or injunction made thereunder: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117C(1). 234. See Fam LR 2004 Pt 10.1. 235. The current s 117C of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) replaced, with effect on 3 August 2005, an earlier s 117C, which prescribed a procedure for filing and withdrawal of offers to settle. The relevant procedure is now found in the Fam LR 2004 Pt 10.1. 236. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117C(3) (being s 117C(4) before 3 August 2005). 237. Fam LR 2004 r 10.02(1), 10.02(2). 238. Fam LR 2004 r 10.02(4)(b). 239. Fam LR 2004 r 10.02(3). 240. Fam LR 2004 r 10.03(1), 10.03(2). 241. Fam LR 2004 r 10.03(3). 242. ‘Property case’ means a case in which orders (other than consent orders) are sought relating to: (a) the property of the parties to a marriage or of either of them; or (b) the vested bankruptcy property in relation to a bankrupt party to a marriage: Fam LR 2004 Dictionary. 243. If no conciliation conference has been held, the offer must be made within 28 days after the procedural hearing at which the case was allocated the first day before the Judge: Fam LR 2004 r 10.06(1)(b). 244. Fam LR 2004 r 10.06(1), 10.06(2). 245. Fam LR 2004 r 10.07. 246. JEL v DDF (2001) 28 Fam LR 119 at 129; [2001] FamCA 907 (FC). 247. See 13.6.

248. Johnston v Johnston (2004) 32 Fam LR 308; [2004] FamCA 556 at [35] (FC). 249. Marriage of Harris (1987) 11 Fam LR 629 at 633 (FC). In so stating, the court rejected the trial judge’s view that ‘[t]he parties may choose to use terms in the course of their offer that could be readily understood by each other, and the fact that such terms are not necessarily capable of immediate and clear understanding by persons outside the arena of the battle, ought not to inhibit the Court in properly considering the offers made on questions of costs’: Marriage of Harris (1986) FLC ¶91-763 at 75,575 per Kay J. It instead remarked that the requirement that the offer be expressed with precision would not in ordinary circumstances be achieved by the use by a party of esoteric language which that party believes the other party would understand: at 633. 250. Marriage of Harris (1987) 11 Fam LR 629 at 633 (FC). 251. Browne v Green (2002) 29 Fam LR 428 at 439; [2002] FamCA 791 (FC). See also Lenova v Lenova (Costs) [2011] FamCAFC 141; BC201150394 at [11] per Murphy J (‘A timely offer in writing genuinely made might, then, be seen as an important part of a limited armoury available to prospective litigants seeking to avoid the costs of litigation. Conversely, where, consequent upon success in an action, a litigant can point to the making of a genuine and timely offer having been made, that offer might be seen as an important (albeit not the only) matter in the exercise of the discretion as to the ordering of costs’). 252. Hackshaw v Hackshaw (Costs) [2011] FamCA 570; BC201150652 at [84] per Murphy J. 253. Babrow v Rackley (Costs) [2010] FamCA 806; BC201050905 at [24] per Faulks DCJ (reasoning that the application of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means the expression of one means the exclusion of the other, ‘would strongly suggest as a matter of statutory interpretation that if the legislature prescribes that offers of settlement made after the commencement of proceedings are to be taken into account, then offers of settlement made before the commencement of the proceedings should not be taken into account’). 254. Marriage of Pennisi (1997) 22 Fam LR 249 at 260 (FC). 255. Hackshaw v Hackshaw (Costs) [2011] FamCA 570; BC201150652 at [85] per Murphy J. 256. (2001) 28 Fam LR 119; [2001] FamCA 907 (FC). 257. JEL v DDF (2001) 28 Fam LR 119 at 127; [2001] FamCA 907 (FC). 258. (1995) 127 FLR 1 at 24 per Lindenmayer J (Fam Ct). 259. (1997) 22 Fam LR 249 at 260 (FC). These remarks were endorsed by the Full Court in Cross v Beaumont (2008) 39 Fam LR 389; [2008] FamCAFC 68; BC200851271 at [51]. 260. JEL v DDF (2001) 28 Fam LR 119 at 129; [2001] FamCA 907 (FC). 261. See 13.13–13.23. 262. JEL v DDF (2001) 28 Fam LR 119 at 128; [2001] FamCA 907 (FC). 263. JEL v DDF (2001) 28 Fam LR 119 at 129; [2001] FamCA 907 (FC). 264. See 13.41. 265. (1990) 14 Fam LR 311 at 313. 266. As to which see 8.71–8.74. 267. Marriage of Murray (1990) 14 Fam LR 311 at 312–13 per Nygh J. 268. (1990) 14 Fam LR 311. 269. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 139K(2); Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 40(2);

Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 37(2); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 40(2); Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 38(2); Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) s 40(2); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 40(2); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 40(2). 270. Case authority indicates that the relevant costs provisions in the defamation legislation in this context do not apply vis-à-vis appeals, but are ‘confined to proceedings at first instance, leaving the court with its general discretion as to costs in appellate proceedings’: Ten Group Pty Ltd v Cornes (No 2) (2012) 114 SASR 106; [2012] SASCFC 106; BC201207172 at [19] per the court (reasoning that ‘[g]iven the inherent differences between costs issues arising at first instance and on appeal and the wording of the section, if Parliament had intended to create a regime for mandatory indemnity costs in appellate proceedings, it can be expected to have addressed it explicitly and separately from proceedings at first instance’: at [18]). 271. The ‘must’ aspect has been identified as providing ‘a very strong incentive to defendants to make offers of compromise of a reasonable nature’: Hennessy v Lynch (No 4) (2008) 7 DCLR (NSW) 24; [2008] NSWDC 15; BC200840124 at [27] per Gibson DCJ. 272. Namely Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 48A(2), with effect on 17 February 2003 (pursuant to the Defamation Amendment Act 2002 (NSW)), being in terms similar to the current Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 40(2). 273. Davis v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 946; BC200808084 at [26] per McClennan CJ at CL. 274. Citing from the Second Reading Speech to the Defamation Amendment Act 2002 (NSW), Legislative Assembly, 12 November 2002. 275. Mundine v Brown (No 7) [2011] NSWSC 170; BC201101510 at [53] per Harrison J; Trkulja v Yahoo! Inc LLC and Yahoo! 7 Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 217; BC201203557 at [18]–[24] per Kaye J. 276. Haddon v Forsyth (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 693; BC201104998 at [4] per Simpson J; Hyndes v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 349; BC201208956 at [58]–[59] per Basten JA. 277. See 13.14–13.15. 278. Hennessy v Lynch (No 4) (2008) 7 DCLR (NSW) 24; [2008] NSWDC 15; BC200840124 at [41] per Gibson DCJ. See also Davis v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 946; BC200808084 at [26]–[32] per McClellan CJ at CL; Hyndes v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 349; BC201208956 at [56] per Basten JA. 279. Haddon v Forsyth (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 693; BC201104998 at [4] per Simpson J; Holt v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 82 NSWLR 293; BC201206979 at [16] per Adamson J. 280. Davis v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 946; BC200808084 at [27] per McClennan CJ at CL; Cornes v Ten Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] SASC 141; BC201106590 at [43] per Peek J (affd on the costs appeal: Ten Group Pty Ltd v Cornes (2012) 114 SASR 46; [2012] SASCFC 99 at [120]–[126] per Gray J, with whom Kourakis CJ (at [64]) and Blue J (at [220]) concurred as to costs). 281. Manefield v Association of Quality Child Care Centres of New South Wales Inc (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 104; BC201101826 at [50]–[63] per Kirby J; Cornes v Ten Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] SASC 141; BC201106590 at [46] per Peek J (affd on the costs appeal: Ten Group Pty Ltd v Cornes (2012) 114 SASR 46; [2012] SASCFC 99 at [120]–[126] per Gray J, with whom Kourakis CJ (at [64]) and Blue J (at [220]) concurred as to costs). 282. Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Mahommed (No 2) (2011) 80 NSWLR 210; [2011] NSWCA 6; BC201100839 at [43] per McColl JA, with whom Spigelman CJ, Beazley JA and Bergin CJ in Eq

concurred (who accepted the contention that the parties’ ultimate success in the proceedings is a relevant consideration when assessing a costs application in this context). 283. [2011] VSC 216; BC201103136 at [27]. 284. Amanatidis v Darmos (Costs) (No 2) [2011] VSC 216; BC201103136 at [32]. 285. Amanatidis v Darmos (Costs) (No 2) [2011] VSC 216; BC201103136 at [33]. 286. As to the impact of ‘walk away’ offers generally under the court rules see 13.9. 287. (2010) 12 DCLR(NSW) 69; [2010] NSWDC 286; BC201040423 at [14]. 288. See, for example, Sands v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] SASC 365; BC200910706 (where, on the facts, by the time the second defendant (ABC) made its offer, each of the parties had incurred significant costs, the matter had been called on in court five times, there had been substantial argument on pleadings, and the master had ordered that the plaintiff pay the ABC’s costs of the pleadings arguments; Bleby J thus accepted that the ABC’s offer to bear its own costs involved a genuine element of compromise: at [28] (although his Honour then found that because plaintiff had been given only five days to respond to the offer, it not unreasonable to reject it: at [29])). Cf Davis v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 946; BC200808084 at [30]–[33] per McClellan CJ at CL. 289. Moses v State of New South Wales (No 4) (2010) 12 DCLR(NSW) 69; [2010] NSWDC 286; BC201040423 at [15]. 290. Cf the present provisions dealing with payments into court: see 13.34–13.39. 291. Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol 37, Practice and Procedure, 4th ed, 1982, [293], cited with approval in Westsub Discounts Pty Ltd v Idaps Australia Ltd (No 2) (1990) 94 ALR 310 at 318 per Woodward J (FCA). See further Willcox v Kettell [1937] 1 All ER 222 at 226 per Clauson J; Wagman v Vare Motors Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 853 at 860–1 per Morris LJ; Hultquist v Universal Pattern and Precision Engineering Co Ltd [1960] 2 QB 467 at 481 per Sellers LJ; A Martin French v Kingswood Hill Ltd [1961] 1 QB 96 at 103–4 per Devlin LJ; Van Essen v Lee [1971] Tas SR 324 at 328–9 per Neasey J; Alltrans Express Ltd v CVA Holdings Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 685 at 693 per Griffiths LJ; Anderson v Littlemore [1985] WAR 157 at 162 per Wallace J (FC); Westsub Discounts Pty Ltd v Idaps Australia Ltd (No 2) at 319 per Woodward J (FCA); John S Hayes & Associates Pty Ltd v Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 201 at 204; BC9405929 per Hill J; Amber v Stacey [2001] 2 All ER 88; [2000] EWCA Civ 286 at [40], [41] per Simon Brown LJ. 292. (1990) 94 ALR 310 (FCA). 293. Westsub Discounts Pty Ltd v Idaps Australia Ltd (No 2) (1990) 94 ALR 310 at 320 (FCA). 294. John S Hayes & Associates Pty Ltd v Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 201 at 204; BC9405929 per Hill J. 295. Lyons v Winter (1899) 25 VLR 464 at 468 per Hood J; Spencer v Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 418 at 43940; BC0700011 per Isaacs J; Crapp v Crocker (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 146; Abrahams v Catip [1942] QWN 19; Baird v Baird [1946] QWN 37; Burke v Lunn [1976] VR 268 at 289 per Menhennitt J. 296. [1973] VR 221 at 222. 297. As to what is meant by ‘indemnity costs’ see 16.23. 298. John S Hayes & Associates Pty Ltd v Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 201 at 204; BC9405929 per Hill J.

299. As to indemnity costs in Calderbank offer cases see 13.60–13.62. 300. As to the privilege in aid of settlement generally see Dal Pont, Ch 12. 301. (1889) 23 QBD 335 at 339. See also at 336–7 per Lord Esher MR, at 337–8 per Lindley LJ. 302. Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 at 307 per Oliver LJ. 303. Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 at 306 per Oliver LJ. See also at 315 per Fox LJ. 304. [1976] Fam 93. 305. Such as the use of sealed offers in arbitration proceedings (see, for example, Tramountana Armadora SA v Atlantic Shipping Co SA [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 391 at 396 per Donaldson J; Archital Luxfer Ltd v Henry Boot Construction Ltd [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 642 at 654–5 per Gibson J), Lands Tribunal proceedings, and the practice of offers as to apportionment between shipowners in Admiralty collision cases: Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93 at 105. On this point see also Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 at 308–9 per Oliver LJ, at 315–16 per Fox LJ. 306. Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93 at 106. See also McDonnell v McDonnell [1977] 1 WLR 34 at 37–8 per Ormrod LJ; Potter v Potter [1982] 1 WLR 1255. 307. Re D(J) [1982] Ch 237; Computer Machinery Co Ltd v Drescher [1983] 1 WLR 1379 at 1382–3 per Megarry VC; Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 at 309, 311–12 per Oliver LJ, at 316 per Fox LJ; Johns Perry Industries Pty Ltd v International Rigging (Aust) Pty Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 556 at 557–8 per Ryan J. 308. As to which see 13.5–13.12. 309. See 13.83–13.84. 310. [1997] 1 VR 154 at 165; BC9601881. See also Dobb v Hacket (1993) 10 WAR 532 at 539 per Murray J; Pirrotta v Citibank Ltd (1998) 72 SASR 259 at 266–7 per Debelle J, with whom Millhouse and Olsson JJ concurred; SMEC Testing Services Pty Ltd v Campelltown City Council [2000] NSWCA 323; BC200007054 at [45] per Giles JA; Clarke v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2001] VSC 274; BC200104567 at [7] per Ashley J; Alpine Hardwoods (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hardys Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 190 ALR 121; [2002] FCA 224; BC200200734 at [18] per Weinberg J; Principal Strategic Options Pty Ltd v Coshott (2003) 130 FCR 143; [2003] FCA 932; BC200305021 at [20] per Branson J; Morris v McEwen (2005) 92 SASR 281; [2005] SASC 284; BC200505379 at [34] per Besanko J (dissenting but not on this point), at [62], [74] per White J; SA r 263(3) (‘In exercising its discretion, the Court may (subject to any other relevant rule) have regard to any offer to consent to judgment or other attempt to settle the action or an issue involved in the action’). 311. See, for example, MGICA (1992) Pty Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 70 FCR 236 at 238–9; BC9604664 per Lindgren J; MT Associates Pty Ltd v Aqua-Max Pty Ltd (No 3) [2000] VSC 163; BC200002334 at [66], [74] per Gillard J; Pearson v Williams [2002] VSC 30; BC200200650 at [18], [20] per Ashley J. 312. See, for example, Schulte-Hordelhoff v Patons Brake Replacements Pty Ltd [1965] VR 369 at 371 per Smith J (which concerned payment into court where the notice of payment in was held to be invalid). 313. Trustee for the Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust v Becker (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 194; BC200706430 at [27] per Ipp JA, with whom Mason P and McColl JA concurred; Dream Developments Pty Ltd v Whitney [2012] NSWSC 108; BC201208314 at [29] per Adams J. 314. See, for example, Smallacombe v Lockyer Investment Co Pty Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 97 at 101; BC9304865 per Spender J; Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd (FCA, Heerey J, 22 March 1996,

unreported) BC9600947 at 506–7 (noting that FCR 1979 O 23 (now FCR 2011 Pt 25) was inapt to cover an offer addressed to a number of respondents but conditional upon acceptance by all); Zisti v Ryde Joinery Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 7 BPR 15,217 at 15,230; BC9602667 per Young J (rules not intended to prescribe costs consequences of settlement offers by one of a number of defendants); Pirrotta v Citibank Ltd (1998) 72 SASR 259 at 267 per Debelle J, with whom Millhouse and Olsson JJ concurred (noting that as (the former) SA RSC O 41 is in terms addressed to litigation between one party and another, it might not always apply in multi-party litigation); Pearson v Williams [2002] VSC 30; BC200200650 at [21] per Ashley J (Vic r 26.07(1) not applicable in the case of an offer subject to a condition requiring the offeree and another person to reach agreement upon extraneous though related matters); Globaltech Pty Ltd v Pareek [2006] WASC 30 (S); BC200603520 at [12] per Johnson J (given that WA O 24A made no provision for a plaintiff to pay indemnity costs to a defendant in circumstances where a plaintiff has rejected an offer from a defendant that is more favourable to the plaintiff than the outcome of the action). 315. See, for example, Smith v Smith [1987] 2 Qd R 807 at 809–10 per Thomas J (FC) (in proceedings relating to money or property claims where no provision exists for the payment of money into court, the court may regard the making of a Calderbank offer and the result of the litigation as a powerful factor in the exercise of its discretion on costs). 316. See 13.13–13.20. 317. Messiter v Hutchinson (1987) 10 NSWLR 525 at 528 per Rogers J; WSA Online Ltd v Arms (No 2) [2006] FCAFC 108; BC200605238 at [16] per the court. See 13.61. 318. Smallacombe v Lockyer Investment Co Pty Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 97 at 101; BC9304865 per Spender J; Grbavac v Hart [1997] 1 VR 154 at 160; BC9601881 per Tadgell JA. As to the courts’ general costs discretion see 6.14–6.20. 319. See, for example, Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd (FCA, Heerey J, 22 March 1996, unreported) BC9600947 at 506–7. 320. MT Associates Pty Ltd v Aqua-Max Pty Ltd (No 3) [2000] VSC 163; BC200002334 at [125] per Gillard J, an approach endorsed in the Victorian Court of Appeal in Giller v Procopets (No 2) (2009) 24 VR 1; [2009] VSCA 72; BC200902384 at [13]. 321. As to offers that may not generate costs consequences see 13.63–13.71. 322. Farlow v Farlow [2009] FamCA 46; BC200950075 at [26] per Mushin J; Becker v Queensland Investment Corporation (No 2) [2009] ACTSC 147; BC200909964 at [12] per Refshauge J. 323. Trustee for the Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust v Becker (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 194; BC200706430 at [27] per Ipp JA, with whom Mason P and McColl JA concurred; Dean v Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 141; BC201004114 at [31] per the court; Old v McInnes [2011] NSWCA 410; BC201110349 at [106] per Meagher JA, with whom Giles JA concurred. 324. Secretary, Department of Business and Innovation v Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 586; BC201209462 at [31] per Emerton J. 325. See, for example, Alabakis v Alabakis (Costs) [2012] VSC 496; BC201208130 at [18]–[19] per MacAulay J (where the relevant letter does not contain an offer, but merely contained a warning that if the offeree failed on an issue, the offeror intended to apply for costs); Secretary, Department of Business and Innovation v Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 586; BC201209462 at [33]–[34] per Emerton J (where the offer contained no indication that it would be adduced in evidence on the question of costs and that those costs would be sought on an indemnity basis, and nor did it say nothing about the payment of costs already incurred by the parties).

326. See, for example, Old v McInnes [2011] NSWCA 410; BC201110349 at [106] per Meagher JA, with whom Giles JA concurred (contra at [26], [34] per Beazley JA dissenting); Davies v Sydney Water Corporation (No 2) (2012) 188 LGERA 451; [2012] NSWLEC 150; BC201205108 at [48]– [55] per Craig J. 327. Dean v Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 141; BC201004114 at [34] per the court. 328. Old v McInnes [2011] NSWCA 410; BC201110349 at [107] per Meagher JA, with whom Giles JA concurred. 329. Blackman v Gant (No 2) (2010) 29 VR 29; [2010] VSC 246; BC201003851 at [13]–[14] per Vickery J. 330. As to the ‘indemnity’ basis compared to the ‘party and party’ basis see 16.14–16.17, 16.23–16.29. 331. See 13.13–13.23. 332. Love v State of Victoria (No 2) [2009] VSC 531; BC200910873 at [22] per Cavanough J (‘it is necessary to treat cases involving Calderbank offers as falling within a specific category of the overall jurisprudence relating to the discretion to order that costs be paid on a solicitor-client or indemnity basis’). 333. See, for example, Multicon Engineering Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corporation (1996) 138 ALR 425 at 451; BC9602511 per Rolfe J (SC(NSW)); Naomi Marble and Granite Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Company Ltd (No 2) [1999] 1 Qd R 518 at 527–9; BC9800777 per Shepherdson J; MT Associates Pty Ltd v Aqua-Max Pty Ltd (No 3) [2000] VSC 163; BC200002334 at [71]–[80] per Gillard J; Alpine Holdings Pty Ltd v Warwick Entertainment Centre Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 53 (S); BC200304787 at [73], [74] per Roberts-Smith J (cf Townsend v Collova [2005] WASC 4 (S); BC200501571 at [40]–[42] per Le Miere J). 334. See, for example, Quirk v Bawden (1992) 112 ACTR 1 at 6 per Higgins J; John S Hayes & Associates Pty Ltd v Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 201 at 205–6; BC9405929 per Hill J; MGICA (1992) Pty Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 70 FCR 236 at 239; BC9604664 per Lindgren J; Black v Lipovac (1998) 217 ALR 386; [1998] FCA 699; BC9802571 at [218] (FC); Nobrega v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney (No 2) [1999] NSWCA 133; BC9902730 at [20], [21] per Powell JA, with whom Priestley JA and Sheppard AJA concurred; SMEC Testing Services Pty Ltd v Campelltown City Council [2000] NSWCA 323; BC200007054 at [37] per Giles JA; Interchase Corporation Ltd v ACN 010 087 573 Pty Ltd (2000) 45 ATR 445 at 452; [2000] QSC 13; BC200000188 per White J; NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 2) (2001) 109 FCR 77; [2001] FCA 480; BC200101932 at [82] per Lindgren J; Alpine Hardwoods (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hardys Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 190 ALR 121 at 127; [2002] FCA 224; BC200200734 per Weinberg J; Leichhardt Municipal Council v Green [2004] NSWCA 341; BC200406280 at [19] per Santow JA, with whom Bryson and Stein JJA concurred; Lo Presti v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (No 2) [2008] WASC 12 (S); BC200801648 at [11]–[17] per Beech J (affd Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd v Lo Presti (2009) 41 WAR 1; [2009] WASCA 115; BC200905594 at [31] per Buss JA, with whom Wheeler JA concurred); Parlin Pty Ltd v Choiceone Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 19 (S); BC201208941 at [12]– [13] per the court. 335. ANI Corporation v Unisys Pty Ltd (SC(NSW), Cole J, 26 November 1993, unreported) BC9302306 at 3; Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (SC(SA), Mullighan J, 1 June 1998, unreported) BC9802183 at 16. 336. See, for example, Pirrotta v Citibank Ltd (1998) 72 SASR 259 at 266 per Debelle J, with whom Millhouse and Olsson JJ concurred; Black v Lipovac (1998) 217 ALR 386; [1998] FCA 699;

BC9802571 at [218] (FC); Interchase Corporation Ltd v ACN 010 087 573 Pty Ltd (2000) 45 ATR 445 at 452; [2000] QSC 13; BC200000188 per White J; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 201 ALR 618; [2002] FCA 192; BC200200656 at [59] per Hill J; Jones v Bradley (No 2) [2003] NSWCA 258; BC200305520 at [9] per the court (‘It is worth pausing to note that the difference between the two lines of authority may be “more apparent than real” as in either approach the Court must consider all the circumstances of the case’). 337. See 16.39. 338. Aljade Development and Construction Sdn Bhd v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd [2004] VSC 351; BC200406915 at [93]–[95] per Redlich J; Hazeldene’s Chicken Farm Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority (No 2) (2005) 13 VR 435; [2005] VSCA 298; BC200510663 at [29] per the court. The following remarks by Santow JA, with whom Bryson and Stein JJA concurred, in Leichhardt Municipal Council v Green [2004] NSWCA 341; BC200406280 at [47] should not be construed as indicating otherwise: ‘It is preferable to consider applications for indemnity costs following unaccepted offers of compromise by defendants as being applications for a favourable exercise of the court’s general discretion to award indemnity costs. As far as Calderbank offers go there is very little difference, the costs consequences of these lying entirely within the court’s general inherent discretion on costs’. 339. Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd v Lo Presti (2009) 41 WAR 1; [2009] WASCA 115; BC200905594 at [23] per Buss JA, with whom Wheeler JA concurred. See 13.72–13.86. 340. IFTC Broking Services Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 268 ALR 1; [2010] FCAFC 31; BC201001891 at [12] per the court. See 13.26. 341. See 13.72–13.86. 342. It has been held that s 67C(2)(d) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), which renders admissible evidence of a communication made or document prepared in connection with an attempt to negotiate the settlement of a civil dispute if ‘the communication or document included a statement to the effect that it was not to be treated as confidential’, encompasses ‘a Calderbank letter or any other offer which includes a statement that it is not to be treated as confidential on the issue of costs’: Rapuano v Karydis-Frisan (No 2) [2012] SADC 177; BC201240431 at [19] per Judge Stretton. 343. Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 at 305 per Oliver LJ; AMEV Finance Ltd v Artes Studios Thoroughbreds Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 486 at 487 per Hodsgon J; Watt v Watt (1988) 12 Fam LR 589 at 604 per Powell J (SC(NSW)); Liquorland (Australia) Pty Ltd v GYG Holdings Pty Ltd (CA(NSW), Kirby P, Handley and Powell JJA, 27 March 1995, unreported) BC9505008; Reed Executive plc v Reed Business Information Ltd [2004] 4 All ER 942; [2004] EWCA Civ 887 at [21]–[37] per Jacob LJ. 344. Namely Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 131(1); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s 131(1) (commenced 1 March 2012); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 131(1); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) s 131(1) (commenced 1 January 2013); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 131(1); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 131(1). 345. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 131(2)(h); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s 131(2)(h) (commenced 1 March 2012); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 131(2)(h); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) s 131(2)(h) (commenced 1 January 2013); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 131(2)(h); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 131(2)(h). 346. See, for example, Pinot Nominees Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 181 FCR 392; [2009] FCA 1508; BC200911393 at [30] per Siopis J (in the context of s 30(4)(a) of the Civil

Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (and its equivalent at Federal Court level, namely s 53B of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)), which states that ‘evidence of anything said or of any admission made in a mediation session is not admissible in any proceedings before any court or other body’); Forsyth v Sinclair (No 2) (2010) 28 VR 635; [2010] VSCA 195; BC201005509 at [13]–[15] per the court (in the context of the Victorian equivalent, s 24A of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic)). 347. Bruinsma v Menczer (1995) 40 NSWLR 716 at 719–20; BC9501782 per Santow J; Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128 at 135; BC9602187 per Einfeld J; Nobrega v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney (No 2) [1999] NSWCA 133; BC9902730 at [7]–[8] per Powell JA, with whom Priestley JA and Sheppard AJA concurred; Garcia v Fowler [2000] NSWSC 576; BC200004427 at [28] per Dowd J; MB v Protective Commissioner [2000] NSWSC 882; BC200005206 at [2] per Hodgson CJ in Eq; Silver Fox Company Pty Ltd v Lenard’s Pty Ltd (No 3) (2004) 214 ALR 621; [2004] FCA 1570; BC200408372 at [36] per Mansfield J. See further R Benjamin, ‘Calderbank Offers are No Longer Necessary’ (November 2000) 38 LSJ 40. 348. See, for example, Perry v Comcare (2006) 150 FCR 319; [2006] FCA 33; BC200600209 at [55] per Greenwood J. 349. John Goss Projects Pty Ltd v Thiess Watkins White Constructions Ltd (in liq) [1995] 2 Qd R 591 at 595; BC9505807 per Williams J; Grbavac v Hart [1997] 1 VR 154 at 160; BC9601881 per Tadgell JA; MT Associates Pty Ltd v Aqua-Max Pty Ltd (No 3) [2000] VSC 163; BC200002334 at [56] per Gillard J; Pearson v Williams [2002] VSC 30; BC200200650 at [15] per Ashley J. 350. Duncan & Weller Pty Ltd v Mendelson [1989] VR 386 at 401 per Kaye J (FC); Grbavac v Hart [1997] 1 VR 154 at 155; BC9601881 per Winneke P. 351. [2004] ACTSC 131; BC200408767 at [24]. See also Roche v Varnavides [2004] WASC 164 (S); BC200500112 at [34] per Newnes M. 352. Roberts v Rodier [2006] NSWSC 1084; BC200608337 at [8] per Campbell J. 353. Eatock v Bolt (No 2) (2011) 284 ALR 114; [2011] FCA 1180; BC201108031 at [47] per Bromberg J. 354. See, for example, Mohamed v State of Victoria [2007] VSC 538; BC200711041 at [37] per Harper J. 355. See, for example, Mackinnon v Bluescope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 229; BC200906749 at [13] per Hoeben J, with whom Ipp and Macfarlan JJA concurred. 356. See 13.59. 357. Monie v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 15; BC200801536 at [13] per Beazley JA. 358. See, for example, Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Cipri [2009] NSWSC 335; BC200903367 at [34] per Hall J (where the offer did not state any period for which it was intended to operate or, in particular, state whether it was to operate in respect of costs that had been incurred up to the date of the letter or costs beyond that date); Secretary, Department of Business and Innovation v Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 586; BC201209462 at [33] per Emerton J (where the terms of the offer left the offeree in the dark about the treatment of costs incurred up to the date of the offer). 359. See, for example, Slaveski v State of Victoria [2010] VSC 569; BC201009380 (where Kyrou J found that it was not reasonable to expect the offeree (S), who was, to the defendants’ knowledge, not legally represented at the time that the offers were made, to understand what was meant by ‘an

order for solicitor/client or indemnity costs’ or by ‘the principles set out in Calderbank v Calderbank’: at [68]–[70]; moreover, as many of S’s claims were plausible on their face, it was not unreasonable for S to reject the offers). Cf Roads Corporation v Love [2010] VSC 581; BC201009593 (where Vickery J noted that, at the time of receiving and considering the Calderbank offer, the offeree (L) was legally represented, and ‘[t]he stark reality is that [L] has succeeded in obtaining an award for less than 50% of the amount offered to him in the Calderbank letter … had he accepted it’ (at [71]), and this made it unreasonable for L not to have accepted the offer). 360. MT Associates Pty Ltd v Aqua-Max Pty Ltd (No 3) [2000] VSC 163; BC200002334 at [56] per Gillard J. 361. Secretary, Department of Business and Innovation v Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 586; BC201209462 at [34] per Emerton J. 362. [2002] VSC 30; BC200200650 at [16] per Ashley J. 363. [2006] NSWSC 1149; BC200608956 at [13] per Campbell J. 364. [2011] VSCA 329; BC201108296 at [62]. 365. See 13.7. 366. The adjectives ‘real’ or genuine’, when prefacing the noun compromise, are designed to distinguish a compromise that may generate costs consequences from one that is no more than token. Having said that, it has been observed that to characterise an offer by reference to epithets such as ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ adds little to the requirement of compromise, and that it should not be interpreted as suggesting that the appropriate inquiry targets the subjective intentions of the offeror: Hancock v Arnold (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 19; BC200900800 at [23] per the court. 367. Igloo Homes Pty Ltd v Sammut Constructions Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 85; BC200501200 at [3] per Campbell J; Anderson Group Pty Ltd v Tynan Motors Pty Ltd (No 2) (2006) 67 NSWLR 706; [2006] NSWCA 120; BC200603504 at [8] per Basten JA, with whom Santow JA and Young CJ in Eq concurred; Ryde City Council v Tourtouras (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 262; BC200708279 at [4] per the court. 368. See, for example, Mees v Roads Corporation [2003] FCA 410; BC200302072 at [17] per Gray J (who noted that the letters in question did not amount to Calderbank offers, as they were assertions that the respondents were in a strong position to defeat the proceeding and that the applicant should capitulate); Walker v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (No 2) (2004) 234 LSJS 18; [2004] SASC 139; BC200403086 at [26] per Perry J (‘The mere denial of liability, however emphatic, coupled with a repetition of the grounds advanced by a defendant by way of defence, cannot have any effect upon the exercise of the discretion as to costs’); Total & Universal Pty Ltd v Kingsway Property Investments (No 2) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 581; BC200710196 at [22] per Campbell JA; Commissioner of State Revenue v Challenger Listed Investments Ltd (No 2) [2011] VSCA 398; BC201109257 at [17] per the court. 369. See 13.65. 370. [2005] FCA 1089; BC200505920 at [12]. 371. Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 481; BC200503634 at [38] per McDougall J. 372. See, for example, McDevitt v Irwin [2005] ACTSC 133; BC200510570 at [15] per Harper M. 373. [2004] VSC 351; BC200406915 at [87]. Cf Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission (2006) 157 LGERA 1; [2006] WASC 82 (S); BC200704683 at [94] per Templeman

J. 374. See, for example, McDevitt v Irwin [2005] ACTSC 133; BC200510570 (where the offer was open only for 14 days, which Harper M opined seemed ‘a very short period to expect a plaintiff to make a considered decision to discontinue her action, particularly in the absence of any explanation as to why it is being put to her that the action is doomed to failure’: at [16]). As to the impact on the costs discretion of the period for which the offer is open see further 13.81–13.82. 375. See, for example, McKerlie v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2000] NSWSC 1159; BC200007818 at [9]–[11] per Dunford J; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 201 ALR 618; [2002] FCA 192; BC200200656 at [59]–[64] per Hill J; Vasram v AMP Life Ltd [2002] FCA 1286; BC200206235 at [12] per Stone J; Fyna Foods Australia Pty Ltd v Cobannah Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2004] FCA 1212; BC200406043 at [10] per Kenny J; Jacomb v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical & Services Union [2004] FCA 1600; BC200408394 at [7] per Crennan J; Dresna Pty Ltd v Linknarf Management Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2006] FCA 755; BC200604791 at [20] per Weinberg J. 376. See 13.9. 377. Leichhardt Municipal Council v Green [2004] NSWCA 341; BC200406280 at [37]–[39] per Santow JA, with whom Bryson and Stein JJA concurred (referring to GlO General Ltd v ABB Installation and Service Pty Ltd (2000) 19 NSWCCR 720; [2000] NSWCA 118; BC200002307, although this case is not compelling, as the court did not interfere with the trial judge’s ruling, which itself proceeded on the basis that the offer of compromise was a valid and genuine offer of compromise, but without direct analysis on the point relating to the ‘walk away’ aspect); Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 481; BC200503634 at [39]–[47] per McDougall J; Renehan v Leeuwin Ocean Adventure Foundation Ltd (2006) 17 NTLR 124; [2006] NTSC 28; BC200601840 at [38] per Mildren J; Globaltech Pty Ltd v Pareek [2006] WASC 30 (S); BC200603520 at [15] per Johnson J; Premier Building & Consulting Pty Ltd v Spotless Group Ltd (No 13) [2007] VSC 516; BC200711357 at [17] per Byrne J; Szencorp Pty Ltd v Clean Energy Council Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 196; BC200901383 at [15] per Goldberg J; Love v State of Victoria (No 2) [2009] VSC 531; BC200910873 at [27], [28] per Cavanough J; Alexander v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority (No 3) [2010] FCA 506; BC201003460 at [31] per Bromberg J; Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd [2011] FCAFC 53; BC201102220 at [140] per the court. Cf Berrigan Shire Council v Ballerini (No 2) [2006] VSCA 65; BC200601476 at [17] per Callaway JA, at [20] per Chernov JA. 378. As to the costs consequence of discontinuance see 14.59–14.65. 379. See, for example, Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 481; BC200503634 at [40], [41] per McDougall J; Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v Gordian Runoff Ltd (No 2) (2009) 15 ANZ Ins Cas ¶61-795; [2009] NSWCA 12; BC200900573 at [19]–[22] per Allsop P, with whom Beazley and Campbell JJA concurred. 380. Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd (No 5) [2010] FCA 630; BC201004133 at [21] per Rares J (affd Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd [2011] FCAFC 53; BC201102220). 381. Compare, for example, Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 481; BC200503634 at [47] per McDougall J (where the parties were taken to have been fully apprised of the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases because of the advanced stage of preparation at the time when the offer was made, and because preparation for the mediation required each party to consider its own position both in the light of its own analysis of the relevant facts and circumstances and in the light of its analysis of the positions advanced by

the opposing parties in their mediation position papers and at the mediation) with McDevitt v Irwin [2005] ACTSC 133; BC200510570 (where the offer was made very early in the proceedings, and all that the defendant was offering to give away was his costs up to the date of the offer, Harper M remarked that ‘the element of compromise contained in the Calderbank offer seems to me to have been negligible’: at [14]). As to the relevance of the timing of the relevant offer to the costs discretion see further 13.79–13.80. 382. Alexander v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority (No 3) [2010] FCA 506; BC201003460 at [32] per Bromberg J (having earlier noted that ‘[i]t is preferable to treat such an offer as an offer of compromise, but then to evaluate the reasonableness of the conduct of the party who has rejected the offer by reference to the extent of compromise involved in the offer with all the other relevant circumstances’: at [31]). See also Rosemin Pty Ltd v Gasp Jeans Chadstone Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 406; BC201003245 at [10] per Middleton J. 383. Van Zonneveld v Seaton (2005) DFC ¶95-311; [2005] NSWSC 175; BC200501291 at [6] per Campbell J. 384. Cox v Crooks (No 2) [2000] TASSC 34; BC200001864 at [21] per Underwood J; Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v Gordian Runoff Ltd [2006] NSWSC 583; BC200604424 at [40] per Einstein J. 385. Associated Confectionery (Aust) Ltd v Mineral and Chemical Traders Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 349 at 351 per Giles J; Smallacombe v Lockyer Investment Co Pty Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 97 at 102; BC9304865 per Spender J. 386. Smallacombe v Lockyer Investment Co Pty Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 97 at 102; BC9304865 per Spender J; Hanave Pty Ltd v LFOT Pty Ltd (FCA, Moore J, 11 November 1998, unreported) BC9805973; Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 602; BC200002244 at [24] per Goldberg J. 387. DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v InterTAN Inc (2004) 51 ACSR 555; [2004] FCA 1251; BC200407049 at [12], [13] per Allsop J; Semco Developments Pty Ltd v Graham [2005] VSCA 268; BC200509891 at [28], [29] per Eames JA, with whom Chernov and Ashley JJA concurred; Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon [2007] NSWCA 322; BC200709738 at [5] per Beazley JA; University of Western Australia v Gray (No 21) (2008) 249 ALR 360; [2008] FCA 1056; BC200806572 at [35] per French J; Ying v Song [2011] NSWSC 618; BC201104498 at [70] per Ward J. As to the tension between discretion and rules in the costs environment see 6.15–6.18. 388. Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon [2007] NSWCA 322; BC200709738 at [112] per McColl JA. See also Rockcote Enterprises Pty Ltd v FS Architects Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 205; BC200807789 at [51] per Campbell JA, with whom McColl JA and Handley AJA concurred. 389. Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon [2007] NSWCA 322; BC200709738 at [143] (footnote supplied). 390. See 2.26–2.27. 391. See, for example, MT Associates Pty Ltd v Aqua-Max Pty Ltd (No 3) [2000] VSC 163; BC200002334 at [118]–[128] per Gillard J; Veetemp Australasia Pty Ltd v GRD Group NT Pty Ltd [2012] NTSC 93; BC201209197 at [35] per Riley CJ. 392. Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon [2007] NSWCA 322; BC200709738 at [144]. 393. Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon [2007] NSWCA 322; BC200709738 at [145]. 394. See 13.61. 395. Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 481;

BC200503634 at [30] per McDougall J. 396. Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 481; BC200503634 at [31] per McDougall J. 397. Gretton v Commonwealth of Australia [2007] NSWSC 149; BC200701142 at [16] per Studdert J (affd Commonwealth of Australia v Gretton [2008] NSWCA 117; BC200803965); Dais Studio Pty Ltd v Bullet Creative Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 42; BC200800244 at [11] per Jessup J; Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd v Lo Presti (2009) 41 WAR 1; [2009] WASCA 115; BC200905594 at [90], [91] per Buss JA, with whom Wheeler JA concurred; Eatock v Bolt (No 2) (2011) 284 ALR 114; [2011] FCA 1180; BC201108031 at [35] per Bromberg J. 398. McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads (No 7) (2011) 185 LGERA 118; [2011] WASC 223 (S) at [120]–[129] per Beech J. 399. Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2007) 244 ALR 374; [2007] FCA 1489; BC200708209 at [62] per Sackville J; University of Western Australia v Gray (No 21) (2008) 249 ALR 360; [2008] FCA 1056; BC200806572 at [36] per French J; Love v State of Victoria (No 2) [2009] VSC 531; BC200910873 at [22] per Cavanough J; Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd v Lo Presti (2009) 41 WAR 1; [2009] WASCA 115; BC200905594 at [27]–[28] per Buss JA, with whom Wheeler JA concurred. Cf Sanko Steamship Co Ltd v Sumitomo Australia Ltd (FCA, Sheppard J, 7 February 1996, unreported) BC9600133 at 10 (declaring that the usual order that the losing party pays the successful party’s costs on a party and party basis should be made where the losing party has rejected a more favourable Calderbank offer unless its rejection was ‘plainly unreasonable’). 400. McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads (No 7) (2011) 185 LGERA 118; [2011] WASC 223 (S) at [127] per Beech J. 401. See 13.67–13.68. 402. See 13.65. 403. As to these formalities see 13.5. 404. Hazeldene’s Chicken Farm Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority (No 2) (2005) 13 VR 435; [2005] VSCA 298; BC200510663 at [25] per the court. The so-called ‘Hazeldene factors’ have been endorsed and applied in other Australian jurisdictions: see, for example, Software AG v Racing & Wagering Western Australia (2009) 175 FCR 121; [2009] FCAFC 36; BC200901760 at [82] per the court; Becker v Queensland Investment Corporation (No 2) [2009] ACTSC 147; BC200909964 at [12] per Refshauge J; Ford Motor Co of Australia Ltd v Lo Presti (2009) 41 WAR 1; [2009] WASCA 115; BC200905594 at [16]–[22] per Buss JA, with whom Wheeler JA concurred; Clark v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCA 415; BC201002597 at [110] per Greenwood J; Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pte Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 344; BC201108674 at [12] per Basten JA, with whom McColl and Campbell JJA concurred; Re Cheal Industries Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 932; BC201206355 at [120] per Ward J; Shaddick v JDV Ltd [2012] WASC 120 (S); BC201208925 at [32] per Allanson J; Pourzand v Telstra Corp Ltd [2012] WASC 210 (S); BC201204442 at [35] per Edelman J; State of Queensland v Hayes (No 2) [2013] QSC 80 at [10], [15] per Philippides J; Roberts v Prendergast [2013] QCA 89; BC201309452 at [12] per Fraser JA. 405. See, for example, Rosselli v Rosselli (No 2) [2007] VSC 438; BC200709781 at [27]–[34] per Forrest J; Sneaths Freightlines Pty Ltd v Pertsinidis (No 2) (2008) 253 LSJS 172; [2008] SADC 3; BC200840540 at [47]–[51] per Judge Nicholson. 406. Mischel v Mischel Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2012] VSC 421; BC201207018 at [24] per Croft J.

407. See, for example, Sural SpA v Downer EDI Rail Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1292; BC200709766; Lollis v Loulatzis (No 2) [2008] VSC 35; BC200800654 at [3]–[24] per Kaye J. 408. Alves v Patel [2005] NSWSC 841; BC200507820 at [57] per Adams J. See also in Love v State of Victoria (No 2) [2009] VSC 531; BC200910873 at [30] per Cavanough J (‘a comparison between the final outcome of the case and the terms of the compromise offered would generally be a significant matter in assessing the “reasonableness” of the offer’); Pourzand v Telstra Corp Ltd [2012] WASC 210 (S); BC201204442 at [35] per Edelman J (‘I accept that the quantum of the offer, in light of prospects of success, is a very significant factor’). 409. Whitlam v Insurance Australia Group Ltd (2005) 214 ALR 703; [2005] NSWSC 200; BC200501202 at [8] per Einstein J. 410. [2012] VSC 177; BC201202714 at [36]–[37], [41]. 411. Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] FCA 1280; BC200105298 at [17] per Gray J. 412. See, for example, Stipanov v Mier (No 2) [2006] VSC 424; BC200609465 at [12] per Hollingworth J; Gretton v Commonwealth of Australia [2007] NSWSC 149; BC200701142 at [24] per Studdert J (affd Commonwealth of Australia v Gretton [2008] NSWCA 117; BC200803965); Ingot Capital Investment Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (No 7) (2008) 65 ACSR 324; [2008] NSWSC 199; BC200801581 at [90] per McDougall J; Lo Presti Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (No 2) [2008] WASC 12 (S); BC200801648 at [20] per Beech J (affd Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd v Lo Presti (2009) 41 WAR 1; [2009] WASCA 115; BC200905594); Noon v Bondi Beach Astra Retirement Village Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 285; BC201008165 at [11] per the court; Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pte Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 344; BC201108674 at [11] per Basten JA, with whom McColl and Campbell JA concurred; Mischel v Mischel Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2012] VSC 421; BC201207018 at [24] per Croft J. 413. Fowdh v Fowdh (CA(NSW), Kirby ACJ, Mahoney AP and Meagher JA, 4 November 1993, unreported) BC9302200 at 6 per Mahoney AP (‘It is one thing for a plaintiff to present her evidence, make an offer of compromise, and to succeed at the trial on that evidence … It is another thing for the plaintiff to present a case and make an offer of settlement, and then to succeed at the trial upon a relevantly different case’); Rolls Royce Industrial Power (Pacific) Ltd v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 626 at 642; [2001] NSWCA 461; BC200108080 per Stein JA, with whom Davies AJA concurred; Castro v Hillery [2003] 1 Qd R 651; [2002] QCA 359; BC200205493 at [75]–[79] per Williams JA. 414. See, for example, El-youfi v Alcazar [2001] ACTSC 1; BC200100003 at [8]–[9] per Connolly M. 415. See, for example, Morris v McEwen (2005) 92 SASR 281; [2005] SASC 284; BC200505379 at [2] per Debelle J (failure to make full discovery of documents); Shepherd v Baster [2006] WASC 176 (S); BC200702363 at [36] per Templeman J (defective statement of claim). 416. See 13.79–13.80. 417. See 13.81–13.82. 418. (1993) 113 FLR 422 (SC(ACT)). 419. Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 422 at 427 (SC(ACT)). 420. Gretton v Commonwealth of Australia [2007] NSWSC 149; BC200701142 at [17] per Studdert J (affd Commonwealth of Australia v Gretton [2008] NSWCA 117; BC200803965). 421. (2004) 234 LSJS 66; [2004] SASC 161; BC200403332 at [90], [91] (FC). 422. Quirk v Bawden (1992) 112 ACTR 1 at 8 per Higgins J (FC).

423. Quirk v Bawden (1992) 112 ACTR 1 at 8 (FC). See also Hughes Bros v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church [1999] NSWSC 1051; BC9907002 at [55] per Foster AJ; Clarke v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2001] VSC 274; BC200104567 at [19] per Ashley J. 424. See, for example, Kalls Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) v Baloglow [2006] NSWSC 1021; BC200607960 at [2] per Hamilton J. 425. See, for example, Rosemin Pty Ltd v Gasp Jeans Chadstone Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 406; BC201003245 at [11]–[15] per Middleton J; Alexander v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority (No 3) [2010] FCA 506; BC201003460 at [25]–[27] per Bromberg J). 426. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Harris Scarfe Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 433; BC200903669 at [10] per Mansfield J. 427. See, for example, Eatock v Bolt (No 2) (2011) 284 ALR 114; [2011] FCA 1180; BC201108031 at [36]–[39] per Bromberg J. 428. Cf Nu Line Construction Group Pty Ltd v Fowler [2012] NSWSC 816; BC201205379 (that the offer was made two years before the commencement of litigation, at a time when the basis of the claim was very different from that ultimately pressed, led Ward J to find it not unreasonable for the offeree to refuse the offer, especially as it was at no later time reinstated: at [51], [68]). 429. Brymount Pty Ltd v Cummins (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 69; BC200501363 at [29] per Beazley JA, with whom Ipp and McColl JJA concurred; Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon [2007] NSWCA 322; BC200709738 at [146]–[147] per Basten JA; Spagnolo v Body Corporate Strata Plan 418979Q [2007] VSC 423; BC200709258 at [99], [100] per Robson J; Secretary, Department of Business and Innovation v Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 586; BC201209462 at [38]–[44] per Emerton J. 430. Globaltech Pty Ltd v Pareek [2006] WASC 30 (S); BC200603520 at [26]–[27] per Johnson J. 431. [2005] NSWSC 841; BC200507820 at [14]. 432. Alves v Patel [2005] NSWSC 841; BC200507820 at [15]. 433. See 13.75–13.78. 434. [2005] NSWCA 69; BC200501363 at [21]. 435. See, for example, Colgate Palmolive Ltd v Markwell Finance Ltd [1990] RPC 197 at 200–1 per Falconer J (Calderbank letter discounted where sent five days before a trial in which the plaintiffs had witnesses travelling from overseas, and in its terms did not offer all the relief to which the judgment in the actions held the plaintiffs to be entitled to); University of Western Australia v Gray (No 21) (2008) 249 ALR 360; [2008] FCA 1056; BC200806572 at [40] per French J (where the offer was made as the trial commenced); Al Amanah College Inc v Minister for Education and Training (No 4) [2012] NSWLEC 26; BC201201945 (where the offer was made late on the afternoon before the hearing, less than 19 hours before the commencement of the hearing, and expired less than 21 hours after it was made, leading Biscoe J to remark that, in the context of complex proceedings relating to the resumption of land, the offer came too late to secure appropriate instructions from the client and ‘also provided an inconvenient distraction from preparation of the case for hearing’: at [25]). 436. Maclean v Rottnest Island Authority [2001] WASCA 323; BC200106541 at [36] per the court. See also McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads (No 7) (2011) 185 LGERA 118; [2011] WASC 223 (S); BC201111031 at [144] per Beech J (‘A last minute offer might be made in circumstances that support the view that it was not a genuine attempt to reach a settlement of the action by compromise, but was a tactic employed for the primary object of altering the costs orders. In those circumstances the offer would be worthy of little weight’).

437. [2005] NSWCA 61; BC200511033 at [261]. 438. Broomhall v National Roads and Motoring Association Insurance Ltd (No 2) [2004] VSC 366; BC200406605 at [17] per Smith J noted (under the court rules). 439. See, for example, Watt v Watt (1988) 12 Fam LR 589 at 604 per Powell J (SC(NSW)) (‘open offer’ by letter sent within the week before the hearing); Clarke v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2001] VSC 274; BC200104567 at [18] per Ashley J (Calderbank offer made eight days before trial scheduled to commence); Eric Preston Pty Ltd v Euroz Securities Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 1068; BC201007236 at [19] per Siopis J (offer made about one week before trial); Auswest Timbers Pty Ltd v Secretary to the Department of Sustainability & Environment (No 2) [2010] VSC 513; BC201008428 (Calderbank offer made three days prior to a trial commencing); McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads (No 7) (2011) 185 LGERA 118; [2011] WASC 223 (S); BC201111031 at [156]–[159] per Beech J (offer made ten days before trial); Mischel v Mischel Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2012] VSC 421; BC201207018 at [27]–[30] per Croft J (Calderbank Letter received approximately between two and three business days before the commencement of the hearing). 440. Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pte Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 344; BC201108674 at [18] per Basten JA, with whom McColl and Campbell JA concurred. 441. See, for example, Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon [2007] NSWCA 322; BC200709738 (where the fact that the offer was open for acceptance for only one week, at a time when there was no imminent trial, was one of the factors that led the court to rule that the offeree’s rejection of the offer was not unreasonable in the circumstances: see at [117] per McColl JA, at [149] per Basten JA); Collex Pty Ltd v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2007) 154 LGERA 95; [2007] NSWLEC 433; BC200705547 (where the offer was open for only four days at a time when the only hearing fixed was in respect of the resolution of preliminary issues that was an essential precursor to the assessment of the value of the property acquired and any consequential losses: see at [46] per Talbot J). 442. Cf Management 3 Group Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lenny’s Commercial Kitchens Pty Ltd (No 3) (2011) 278 ALR 754; [2011] FCA 725; BC201104600 at [52] per Dodds-Streeton J (who opined that a single day might afford a sufficient opportunity to consider some offers); Northwest Capital Management v Westate Capital Ltd [2012] WASC 121 (S); BC201208926 at [43] per Edelman J (‘There may be circumstances in which it is a reasonable time period for an offer which is made at 5.00 pm on a Sunday evening and left open only until noon the next day (of the trial)’). 443. See, for example, Ghunaim v Bart (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 82; BC200602685 (offer given to the plaintiff on the day of trial and open for two or three hours); Cullen v ZLB Behring LLC [2006] NSWSC 359; BC200602721 (where one offer was open for acceptance for less than a day and was served on the second last day before the trial commenced, and another offer was open for several hours only and served on the fourth day of trial); Dunstan v Rickwood (No 2) (2007) 38 Fam LR 491; [2007] NSWCA 266; BC200708317 (offer made on the day of the hearing, and open only for a number of hours); Hali Retail Stores Pty Ltd v Hafaz [2007] NSWSC 427; BC200703075 (offer made within 24 hours of the commencement of an expedited hearing); Pollard v Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 486; BC200703557 (offer dated 21 July 2006 stated to ‘expire at 10 am on 24 July 2006’, being the date and time the hearing of the proceedings was listed to commence); Nemeth v Prynew Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 511; BC200904999 (offers open for between one and two business days); Entirity Business Services v Garsoft (No 2) [2011] FCA 334; BC201101918 (offer served in the afternoon of a Friday and expressed to expire on the following Monday); Management 3 Group Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lenny’s Commercial Kitchens Pty Ltd (No 3) (2011) 278 ALR 754; [2011] FCA 725; BC201104600 (offer open only for one business day); Al Amanah College Inc v Minister for Education and Training

(No 4) [2012] NSWLEC 26; BC201201945 at [24]–[26] per Biscoe J (offer made less than 19 hours before the commencement of the hearing, to expire less than 21 hours after it was made); Northwest Capital Management v Westate Capital Ltd [2012] WASC 121 (S); BC201208926 (offer made on the evening before the trial open until midday the following day). 444. Aldag v Eistis (No 2) [2008] NSWDC 186; BC200840243 at [14] per Gibson DCJ (‘There is much to be said for giving a person who has been locked in litigation for a long period of time … time to consider his position’). 445. Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon [2007] NSWCA 322; BC200709738 at [149] per Basten JA. See, for example, Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd v CCP Australian Airships Ltd (No 2) [2003] VSC 141; BC200302234 (where, even though the offer was made once the trial was running and left open for only 24 hours, Habersberger J held that it remained relevant to the issue of costs because ‘it ill behoved the [offeree] to complain about the time allowed by the [offeror] for acceptance of its offer of settlement when its counter-offer was said to only be open for acceptance for an even shorter time, namely approximately 16 or 17 hours’, and the offeror’s time limit for acceptance was reasonable because the offeree had overnight, before court the next day and the luncheon adjournment during which to consider it: at [14]). 446. As to the time frame(s) applicable under the rules see 13.31–13.32. 447. Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon [2007] NSWCA 322; BC200709738 at [117] per McColl JA (who considered that, as the relevant rules at the time required offers of compromise to be open for a minimum of 28 days, a Calderbank offer open for only seven days in the circumstances should not generate costs consequences). See also Thomopoulos v Faulks (No 2) [2006] VSC 286; BC200605896 (where the offer was open only for one day, far less than the minimum time prescribed for offers under otherwise applicable rules of court, Cavanough J held that, when coupled with the minimal compromise in offer, made it not unreasonable for the plaintiff to reject it: at [13]); Austin v Old Paradians Football Club [2007] VCC 393 (where the plaintiff’s refusal to accept the defendant’s offer open for only seven days was held not to be unreasonable, a conclusion reinforced by the rules of court, which require offers of compromise to remain open for acceptance for at least 14 days: at [18] per Judge Anderson). 448. Thomopoulos v Faulks (No 2) [2006] VSC 286; BC200605896 at [13] per Cavanough J. 449. Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon [2007] NSWCA 322; BC200709738 at [117] per McColl JA. 450. Mischel v Mischel Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2012] VSC 421; BC201207018 at [33]–[34] per Croft J. 451. See, for example, Brymount Pty Ltd v Cummins (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 69; BC200501363 (where Beazley JA, with whom Ipp and McColl JJA concurred, noted that 14 days ‘is not a generous period to allow for consideration of an offer’, and was abbreviated when compared to the rules of court, ‘but it is not so short as to be unreasonable’: at [20]); Red Engine Group Pty Ltd v Hotel Agencies Pty Ltd [2007] VCC 398 (where the Calderbank letter was dated eight days before the date on which the trial was to commence, Judge Wodak considered this ‘as reasonable and sufficient time for [the offeree] to consider the offer’, in view of the fact that the letter was written at a time when all materials (including expert reports) on which each party may rely at trial had been provided by each party to each other party; ultimately, though, the rejection of the offer was held not to be unreasonable because its acceptance would not have brought the proceeding to an end and the letter was ambiguous: at [22]). Cf Whitaker v Paxad Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 47 (S); BC200904938 (plaintiffs’ offer open for seven days found to give the defendants insufficient time to properly consider the prospects of their case and the potential value of the damages sought, as against the likely costs should the claim fail: at [33]–[35] per Blaxell J).

452. As to which see 13.5. 453. In this respect, it has been said that the terms in which a Calderbank offer is couched should, so far as is reasonably practicable, conform to the régime in the court rules: Pirrotta v Citibank Ltd (1998) 72 SASR 259 at 267 per Debelle J, with whom Millhouse and Olsson JJ concurred (remarking that a party who seeks to use a Calderbank offer as the basis for solicitor and client costs should frame the offer in terms consistent with the spirit and intent of (the former) SA RSC O 41). 454. Interchase Corporation Ltd v ACN 010 087 573 Pty Ltd (2000) 45 ATR 445 at 452; [2000] QSC 13; BC200000188 per White J. See also Morris v McEwen (2005) 92 SASR 281; [2005] SASC 284; BC200505379 at [75] per White J. 455. See, for example, Pirrotta v Citibank Ltd (1998) 72 SASR 259 at 269–70 per Debelle J, with whom Millhouse and Olsson JJ concurred; Interchase Corporation Ltd v ACN 010 087 573 Pty Ltd (2000) 45 ATR 445 at 452–3; [2000] QSC 13; BC200000188 per White J. 456. See 13.16–13.18. 457. Clark v State of Tasmania (1999) 9 Tas R 54 at 59; [1999] TASSC 130; BC9907730 per Underwood J (noting that the weight of authority is that where there has been a Calderbank offer and the discretion is exercised in favour of the successful party on an application for costs, the order for taxation on a solicitor and client basis is confined to costs incurred after the letter was written). 458. Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 481; BC200503634 at [30] per McDougall J; Gretton v Commonwealth of Australia [2007] NSWSC 149; BC200701142 at [17] per Studdert J (affd Commonwealth of Australia v Gretton [2008] NSWCA 117; BC200803965); Mischel v Mischel Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2012] VSC 421; BC201207018 at [41]–[42] per Croft J. 459. See, for example, in Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd v CCP Australian Airships Ltd (No 2) [2003] VSC 141; BC200302234 at [8] per Habersberger J (‘the exceedingly prompt reply rejecting the offer gives no indication of any uncertainty on the part of the defendants’); Orrong Strategies Pty Ltd v Village Roadshow Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSC 205; BC200704581 at [28] per Habersberger J (‘it would not normally assist a party trying to justify its rejection of an offer if that offer has only been considered for a period as short as 38 minutes’). Cf Lo Presti v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (No 2) [2008] WASC 12 (S); BC200801648 at [29] per Beech J (affd Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd v Lo Presti (2009) 41 WAR 1; [2009] WASCA 115; BC200905594) (where the defendant rejected the plaintiff’s offer within one day of receiving it, but on the facts it was held that this did not afford any support for a conclusion that the rejection was hasty, preemptory and unreasonable). 460. Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 481; BC200503634 at [32] per McDougall J. 461. See, for example, Globaltech Pty Ltd v Pareek [2006] WASC 30 (S); BC200603520 at [28] per Johnson J; Ainger v Coffs Harbour City Council (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 212; BC200706649 at [29] per McColl JA, with whom Mason P and Hunt AJA concurred (in the context of appeals); Collex Pty Ltd v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2007) 154 LGERA 95; [2007] NSWLEC 433; BC200705547 at [47] per Talbot J; Danidale Pty Ltd v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSC 552; BC200711346 at [17] per Habersberger J. 462. Globaltech Pty Ltd v Pareek [2006] WASC 30 (S); BC200603520 at [28] per Johnson J (who added that a statement that the offeror would pursue its rights ‘to recover all permissible costs’ is ‘not a substitute for a statement that indemnity costs will be sought’, as ‘permissible costs’ may

refer to the party and party costs to be awarded to a successful litigant). 463. Dukemaster Pty Ltd v Bluehive Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 1; BC200300033 at [8] per Sundberg and Emmett JJ (‘a Calderbank offer … is unlikely to serve its purpose of attracting an indemnity award of costs if the rejecting applicant fails to recover more than what is offered, unless the offer is a reasonable one and contains a statement of the reasons the offeror maintains that the application will fail’); Collex Pty Ltd v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2007) 154 LGERA 95; [2007] NSWLEC 433; BC200705547 at [42] per Talbot J (applying the remark of Sundberg J in Waiviata Pty Ltd v New Millennium Publications Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 481; BC200201897, made in the context of indemnity costs orders generally, to indemnity costs stemming from Calderbank offers); Keays v JP Morgan Administrative Services Australia Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 547; BC201103313 at [20]–[22] per Buchanan J (where the failure of the offer to identify with sufficient particularity the reasons why the application (if filed) must fail was held to justify a refusal of indemnity costs). 464. See, for example, Porter v Bonarrigo (No 2) [2010] VSC 302; BC201005165 (where the offeree lacked command of English and was elderly, Vickery J remarked that ‘it would have been very important for [the offeror] to have clearly stated its intention in its letters of offer to seek the costs of the trial on a special basis if its offers were not accepted’, as ‘[t]his would have provided at least a reasonable opportunity for [the offeree’s] legal advisers to explain to him in simple and unequivocal terms the consequences of a special costs order being sought if the offers were refused’: at [60]; the failure by the offeror to do so led his Honour to order costs on a party and party basis rather than an indemnity basis: at [62]). 465. NSW r 51.48 (inserted by the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 16) 2007 (NSW), with effect on 1 January 2008); Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA) r 49(1). 466. Vic r 26.12(3). The trial rules are found in Vic r 26.08, as to which see 13.13–13.19. 467. Hazeldene’s Chicken Farm Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority (No 2) (2005) 13 VR 435; [2005] VSCA 298; BC200510663 at [10]–[12] per the court. 468. Namely FCR 1979 O 23. 469. Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 40; BC200901917 at [8], [9] per the court; IFTC Broking Services Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 268 ALR 1; [2010] FCAFC 31; BC201001891 at [6] per the court. 470. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 4. 471. FCR 2011 Pt 25. 472. Sloane v McDonald & Sutherland (FC(WA), 22 January 1998, unreported) BC9800098 at 3 per Kennedy J, with whom Franklyn and Walsh JJ concurred; Hendrie v Rusli [2000] WASCA 420; BC200008003 at [9] per Murray J. See, for example, Grice v State of Queensland [2005] QCA 298; BC200506020; Hughes v St Barbara Ltd [2011] WASCA 234 (S) at [14] per the court. Cf Grbavac v Hart [1997] 1 VR 154; BC9601881. 473. As to these considerations see 13.72–13.86. 474. Hughes v St Barbara Ltd [2011] WASCA 234 at [15] per the court. 475. Moore v Woodforth (No 2) [2003] NSWCA 46; BC200301140 at [15]–[17] per the court; Trustee for the Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust v Becker (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 194; BC200706430 at [8]–[9] per Ipp JA, with whom Mason P and McColl JA concurred (noting that one factor that particularly tends to disincline an appeal court from making an order for costs of an appeal because of a Calderbank offer made for trial is if the Calderbank offer was not still open for acceptance when the appeal was instituted or before significant costs had been incurred in the appeal); Monie v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 15; BC200801536 at [71]

per Campbell JA; Grace v Thomas Street Cafe Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 72; BC200802888 at [33] per the court; Amaca Pty Ltd v Novek (2009) 9 DDCR 199; [2009] NSWCA 50; BC200901583 at [107], [108] per Campbell JA, with whom Giles and Tobias JJA concurred; Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pte Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 344; BC201108674 at [22]– [23] per Basten JA, with whom McColl and Campbell JA concurred. See, for example, Brymount Pty Ltd v Cummins (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 69; BC200501363; Baresic v Slingshot Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 160; BC200503069. 476. Van Essen v Lee [1971] Tas SR 324 at 325 per Crawford J, at 328–9 per Neasey J (FC) (dealing with the former Tas RSC O 24 r 6(b), which has no equivalent in the current rules). 477. See, for example, Woodtree Pty Ltd v Zheng (No 2) [2008] FCA 2; BC200800064 at [8] per Heerey J; Preti v Sahara Tours Pty Ltd (No 2) (2008) 22 NTLR 228; [2008] NTCA 3; BC200804036 at [23] per Riley J, with whom Mildren and Thomas JJ concurred (who applied the same discretionary approach to an offer of compromise under the court rules, which was held not to apply in its terms to the appellate proceedings: see 13.91). 478. See 13.93. 479. Maitland Hospital v Fisher (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 721 at 724; BC9201767 (CA); Ettinghausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 404 at 410; BC9501648 per Gleeson CJ and Priestley JA; Fotheringham v Fotheringham (No 2) (1999) 46 NSWLR 194 at 205; [1999] NSWCA 21; BC9902029 per Stein JA, with whom Spigelman CJ, Mason P and McColl JA concurred; Patrick Stevedores (No 1) Pty Ltd v Vaughan [2002] NSWCA 422; BC200208052 at [13]–[14] per the court; Diamond v Simpson (No 2) [2003] NSWCA 78; [2003] NSWCA 78 at [12] per Stein JA. 480. NSW r 51.49 (‘The Court may have regard to any offer of compromise made (whether under these rules or otherwise) in the court below’) (inserted by the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 16) 2007 (NSW), with effect on 1 January 2008). 481. Coombes v Roads and Traffic Authority (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 70; BC200702155 at [103] per Basten JA. 482. See, for example, Estate of Virgona v De Lautour (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 323; BC200709861 at [13] per Ipp JA, with whom Hodgson JA and Young CJ in Eq concurred; Bennette v Cohen (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 162; BC200905421 (where the offer was made five years before the appeal, and no further offer was made between the date of the original judgment and the date of the appeal, Tobias JA, with whom Ipp and Campbell JJA concurred, did not accept the appellant’s submission that the costs of the appeal should be on an indemnity basis, but ruled that ‘the respondent should pay the appellant’s costs of the summons for leave to appeal and of the appeal on the ordinary basis’: at [55]); Council of the City of Liverpool v Turano (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 176; BC200905710 at [59] per the court (noting ‘a long line of authority in this case that unless a new offer is made in respect of the appeal, it is unlikely a pre-trial offer of compromise will attract the favourable exercise of the costs discretion’, and on the facts there was not only no offer of compromise made in respect of the appeal, ‘there were no different circumstances operating that would cause the court to make an order for indemnity costs of the appeal’); Rebenta Pty Ltd v Wise (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 334; BC200909365 at [14] per the court (which found three reasons why the pre-trial offer should result in an indemnity costs order in the Court of Appeal: (1) the issues arising from the claim were the same as those arising at trial and as to which the appellant was in possession of full information as to the strength of its claim; (2) by the time the appellant filed its appeal it was aware that, at trial, its failure to accept the offer had resulted in an indemnity costs order, to which there was no separate challenge on the appeal; and (3) the offer was renewed at the first reasonable opportunity on appeal, namely within about a month of receiving the

appellant’s notice of appeal with grounds). 483. (1992) 27 NSWLR 721; BC9201767. 484. Namely NSW RSC Pt 52A r 22(4) (now see NSW r 42.14): see 13.14. 485. Maitland Hospital v Fisher (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 721 at 724; BC9201767 (CA). 486. Fotheringham v Fotheringham (No 2) (1999) 46 NSWLR 194 at 204–5 per Powell JA, at 206 per Stein JA; [1999] NSWCA 21; BC9902029, with whom Spigelman CJ, Mason P and McColl JA concurred. 487. See 13.24–13.33. 488. Ettinghausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 404 at 410; BC9501648 per Gleeson CJ and Priestley JA; Fotheringham v Fotheringham (No 2) (1999) 46 NSWLR 194 at 205; [1999] NSWCA 21; BC9902029 per Stein JA, with whom Spigelman CJ, Mason P and McColl JA concurred; Evatt v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 2) [1999] NSWCA 143; BC9902713 at [8]–[9] per the court. 489. IMF (Australia) Ltd v Meadow Springs Fairway Resort Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2009] FCAFC 69; BC200904878 at [36] per the court; Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Lodestar Anstalt (No 2) (2012) 202 FCR 506; [2012] FCAFC 72; BC201203075 at [29]–[32] per the court. 490. Marlow v Walsh (No 2) [2009] TASSC 40; BC200904646 at [20] per Blow J, with whom Evans and Porter JJ concurred. 491. Elvidge Pty Ltd v BGC Construction Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 264 (S); BC200700038 at [6] per Roberts-Smith JA; Hughes v St Barbara Ltd [2011] WASCA 234 (S) at [24] per the court (though adding that ‘the existence of a pre-trial offer should be given less weight than an offer made during the appeal: at [25]); Parlin Pty Ltd v Choiceone Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 19 (S); BC201208941 at [11] per the court. Cf Sloane v McDonald & Sutherland (FC(WA), Kennedy, Franklyn and Walsh JJ, 22 January 1998, unreported) BC9800098. 492. Tamwoy v Solomon [1996] 2 Qd R 93; BC9502040; Ruff v Milton [1996] 2 Qd R 80; BC9502042 (applied to District Court appeals); Tector v FAI General Insurance Company Ltd [2001] 2 Qd R 463; [2000] QCA 426; BC200006187; Ballesteros v Chidlow [2006] QCA 368; BC200607592; Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 414; BC200608427; Lawes v Nominal Defendant [2007] QCA 437; BC200710638; Yara Nipro Pty Ltd v Interfert Australia Pty Ltd [2010] QCA 164; BC201004404 at [15] per the court. 493. Preti v Sahara Tours Pty Ltd (No 2) (2008) 22 NTLR 228; [2008] NTCA 3; BC200804036 at [22] per Riley J. 494. Rivett Agricultural & Waste Equipment Hire Pty Ltd v Evans (No 2) [2007] SASC 197; BC200704125 at [14]–[20] per Doyle CJ, with whom Duggan and Gray JJ concurred. 495. Grbavac v Hart [1997] 1 VR 154; BC9601881 (discussed at 13.94). See also Chen v Chan (No 2) [2009] VSCA 233; BC200909178 at [20] per the court. 496. [1996] 2 Qd R 93; BC9502040. See G T Reithmuller, ‘Making the Other Side Pay for the Appeal’ (1997) 17 QL 122; D O’Brien, ‘Offers to Settle in Queensland: The First Ten Years’ (1998) 19 QL 26 at 28–9. 497. Qld RSC O 26 r 9(1), 9(2). 498. See generally 13.13–13.21. 499. Tamwoy v Solomon [1996] 2 Qd R 93 at 98; BC9502040. In reaching this conclusion, the court followed the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Niagara Structural Steel (St Catherines) Ltd v W

D Laflamme Ltd (1987) 58 OR (2d) 773 at 779–80 (which added that the terms ‘plaintiff’, ‘defendant’ and ‘obtains a judgment’ in the equivalent Ontario rule were not apt to describe the roles of the parties in an appeal). 500. Namely Qld rr 360, 361 (discussed at 13.13, 13.16): see Tector v FAI General Insurance Company Ltd [2001] 2 Qd R 463 at 464; [2000] QCA 426; BC200006187 per the court; Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 414; BC200608427 at [25] per Holmes JA, with whom McPherson and Gerrard JJA concurred. 501. Tector v FAI General Insurance Company Ltd [2001] 2 Qd R 463 at 464; [2000] QCA 426; BC200006187 per the court. As to this discretion see 20.2. 502. (1995) 38 NSWLR 404 at 409; BC9501648 (CA). 503. Ettinghausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 404 at 410; BC9501648. See also Syron v Newells Creek Sawmilling Pty Ltd (SC(NSW), Barr AJ, 4 August 1995, unreported) BC9505128 at 7–8; Skalkos v Assaf (No 2) [2002] NSWCA 236; BC200204574 at [11]–[12] per the court; IMF (Australia) Ltd v Meadow Springs Fairway Resort Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2009] FCAFC 69; BC200904878 at [36] per the court. Cf Owen v Musladin (No 2) [2010] ACTCA 24; BC201007551 at [30] per Refshauge J (in the context of Calderbank offers). 504. Ettinghausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 404 at 411; BC9501648. 505. Ettinghausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 404 at 419; BC9501648. 506. Ettinghausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 404 at 420; BC9501648. 507. [1997] 1 VR 154; BC9601881 (see (October 1997) 71 LIJ 63). 508. Per Winneke P and Tadgell JA, Hayne JA dissenting. 509. Grbavac v Hart [1997] 1 VR 154 at 160; BC9601881 per Tadgell JA. 510. Grbavac v Hart [1997] 1 VR 154 at 160–1; BC9601881. 511. Grbavac v Hart [1997] 1 VR 154 at 155; BC9601881 per Winneke P. See also at 161 per Tadgell JA (who noted that the terms of the offer were not unambiguously clear, and that there was a serious question whether that offer was intended by the offeror to be relied on at a re-trial).

[page 426]

CHAPTER 14

Timing of Costs Order Pre-trial Costs Orders Minority shareholders’ actions General law Statutory intervention Proceedings for and against trustees Applications by trustees Applications by beneficiaries Disputes over matrimonial or relationship property Public interest litigation Test cases

14.3 14.5 14.5 14.10 14.11 14.11 14.13 14.16 14.18 14.22

Costs of Interlocutory Proceedings At general law ‘Costs in the cause’ compared to ‘costs in any event’ ‘Costs reserved’ Impact of court rules Costs of application or step within proceedings Reserved costs Costs where non-admission of fact or document Costs of removal from inferior court Costs of motions not disposed of Party seeking a dispensation General rule

14.23 14.23 14.24 14.26 14.27 14.28 14.30 14.31 14.32 14.33 14.34 14.34

Application to amend pleadings Application for an adjournment Application to set aside default judgment Application for relief against forfeiture Application to extend time Qualifications to general rule Timing of effect of interlocutory costs order Court rules When are costs ordered to be paid forthwith? Taxation of order for costs of interlocutory proceeding High Court and Federal Court Northern Territory South Australia Victoria

14.35 14.38 14.39 14.40 14.41 14.43 14.45 14.45 14.46 14.49 14.50 14.52 14.54 14.56 [page 427]

Practice notes — New South Wales and Western Australia 14.57 Jurisdictions without specific provision in court rules or practice notes 14.58 Proceedings Not Determined on the Merits Proceedings discontinued or withdrawn Starting point — costs follow the event Circumstances where the court may Otherwise order’ Proceedings not determined on the merits because of compromise Starting point — each party bears own costs Circumstances where a court may nonetheless make a costs order

14.59 14.59 14.59 14.63 14.66 14.66 14.67

Impact of court rules — Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and Western Australia 14.71 Impact of court rules — acceptance of offer of compromise 14.72 Impact of court rules — acceptance of payment into court 14.73

14.1 A party to litigation ordinarily has no legal right to costs until the court makes a costs order in his or her favour,1 a principle reflected by statute or court rules in some jurisdictions.2 A costs order is not, generally speaking, made until after judgment is given. It is at this time that the parties are normally heard on the issue of costs. The main reason is that as costs usually ‘follow the event’, and the ‘event’ is the outcome of the action,3 there are usually no grounds for making a costs order at a time prior to this moment. 14.2 The foregoing is subject to the courts’ jurisdiction to exercise the power to award costs at any stage of the proceeding, a power reiterated by statute or court rules in most jurisdictions.4 This raises the issue as to the circumstances in which a court may make an order for costs prior to giving judgment in the matter. This issue has arisen chiefly in the context of pretrial (‘pre-emptive’ or ‘protective’) costs orders,5 costs of interlocutory proceedings,6 and costs of proceedings that are discontinued or settled.7 Each is addressed in this chapter. In several jurisdictions provision exists for a court to ‘cap’ party and party costs ahead of judgment, which is likewise a form of pre-trial costs order, but this is chiefly addressed in Chapter 7, as it confines the scope of the costs indemnity to the successful party.8 For completeness, it should also be noted that a court may, in advance of the trial, order the plaintiff to provide security for costs to protect the defendant from the prospect of being frustrated in recovering from the plaintiff any future costs order in the defendant’s favour. Security for costs is discussed separately in Chapters 28 and 29. [page 428]

Pre-trial Costs Orders

14.3 It has been judicially observed that ‘it is wrong in principle to impose a term as to the costs of the trial in advance in a form which is unconditional and which fails to take account of the possible outcomes of the trial’.9 The reason for this is readily ascertainable. For a court to make a costs order prior to the commencement of a matter may cast on one party the duty to indemnify its opponent(s) irrespective of the outcome or conduct of the proceedings. As the outcome and conduct of proceedings heavily influence the exercise of the courts’ costs discretion, which in turn is based upon considerations of justice,10 for a court essentially to ignore these aspects is to invite a potentially unjust result. 14.4 The foregoing should not be seen as denying the court a power to make a pre-trial costs order. Such an order can take a variety of forms. It may, in its simplest form, prescribe that there will be no order as to costs in the main proceedings whatever the outcome. Or the court may make a ‘one-way’ costs order, entitling a party to recover costs if he or she succeeds, but avoid liability for the opponent’s costs — in full or (via a capping order)11 in part — in the event of failure. In each case, it is open to the court to phrase the order in revocable as opposed to final terms. A court may, if a party controls the fund over which there is dispute, even order a pre-trial payment of costs to facilitate the advance (partial) funding by that party of its opponent’s case where the latter lacks resources (which may be termed an ‘advance costs order’).12 Whatever the form of order, it will not be made other than in exceptional circumstances.13 The nature of the curial costs discretion dictates that categories of exceptional circumstances cannot properly be seen as closed.14 Yet the main occasions in which courts have countenanced pre-trial costs orders involve litigation over a fund in which each litigant is interested. Relevant scenarios include minority shareholders’ actions, proceedings for and against trustees, and disputes over matrimonial or relationship property. Outside of the fund scenario, there is scope for a pre-trial costs order in public interest and test litigation. Each is discussed in turn below.

Minority shareholders’ actions General law

14.5 A plaintiff in a minority shareholder’s action is personally liable to his or her own lawyer for costs, and is exposed to the risk of being ordered to pay the costs of any defendant. As to costs, therefore, a minority shareholder’s position is like that of other litigants, even though the plaintiff normally has no personal cause of action but sues on a cause of action vested in a defendant company.15 The proceeds of any judgment recovered belong to the company, but the expenses of recovering them, except so far as they are recoverable from another party, fall upon the plaintiff. If the action fails the plaintiff is at risk of being ordered to pay the defendant’s costs as well as his or her own. These considerations no doubt deter minority shareholders from suing a fraudulent or oppressive majority. [page 429] 14.6 An English judge has remarked that it is ‘clearly undesirable that in such a case a minority shareholder should be inhibited in this way’.16 The courts have proffered three alternatives to address this issue. First, it has been suggested that a form of legal aid be provided to support a minority shareholder, subject to a screening of the merits of the action.17 That legal aid legislation in no Australian jurisdiction so provides, coupled with financial pressures on legal aid that have seen its availability contract rather than expand, renders this option unlikely. Second, the costs inhibition facing potential minority shareholder plaintiffs may be addressed, in part, by the use of speculative fee agreements, pursuant to which the plaintiff’s lawyers agree to receive remuneration only in the event that the plaintiff succeeds. If the action succeeds, the court is likely to order costs in favour of the plaintiff out of company funds. Although a viable option in Australia, where the courts have traditionally upheld the validity of such agreements,18 it does not address a principal inhibitor facing a minority shareholder plaintiff, namely the potential liability to pay the opponent’s costs if the action proves unsuccessful. Third, the courts have suggested that, via an analogy to circumstances in which a party can embark on litigation with an expectation of being indemnified in some measure against costs,19 in a minority shareholder’s action properly and reasonably brought and prosecuted, it would normally be

right that the company be ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs that are irrecoverable from any other party. Buckley LJ explained the point in Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) as follows:20 [W]here a shareholder has in good faith and on reasonable grounds sued as plaintiff in a minority shareholder’s action, the benefit of which, if successful, will accrue to the company and only indirectly to the plaintiff as a member of the company, and which it would have been reasonable for an independent board of directors to bring in the company’s name, it would … clearly be a proper exercise of judicial discretion to order the company to pay the plaintiff’s costs. This would extend to the plaintiff’s costs down to judgment, if it would have been reasonable for an independent board exercising the standard of care which a prudent business man would exercise in his own affairs to continue the action to judgment. If, however, an independent board exercising that standard of care would have discontinued the action at an earlier stage, it is probable that the plaintiff should only be awarded his costs against the company down to that stage.

Yet this order is clearly not a pre-trial (or pre-emptive) costs order, but one within the court’s discretion after judgment. The English Court of Appeal in Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) nonetheless envisaged a jurisdiction to authorise a minority shareholder plaintiff to proceed with the action without being at risk of costs.21 It justified this by reference to trustees’ applications to the courts for directions as to whether or not to bring proceedings and the courts’ jurisdiction to make an order protecting trustees from the ordinary costs consequences of failing in the action.22 14.7 In order to secure a pre-trial indemnity, Lord Denning MR considered that the plaintiff should soon after issuing the writ apply ex parte to the master for directions, supported by counsel’s opinion as to whether or not there is a reasonable case. The master may, if he or she [page 430] thinks fit, approve the continuance of the proceeding until the close of pleadings, until after discovery or until trial. The master need not decide the application ex parte, but can require notice to be given to one or two other minority shareholders (as representatives of others) to discover if there is any reasonable objection.23 His Lordship envisaged that this application be simple and inexpensive, and not be allowed to escalate into a minor trial, requiring the master simply to inquire as to whether or not there is a reasonable case for the minority shareholder to bring at the expense

(eventually) of the company. Should the plaintiff be given permission to proceed, the result would, in the words of Buckley LJ, be as follows:24 The plaintiff, acting under the authority of such a direction, would be secure in the knowledge that, when the costs of the action should come to be dealt with, this would be upon the basis, as between himself and the company, that he has acted reasonably and ought prima facie to be treated by the trial judge as entitled to an order that the company should pay his costs, which should, I think, normally be taxed on a basis not less favourable than the common fund basis, and should indemnify him against any costs he may be ordered to pay to the defendants. Should the court not think fit to authorise the plaintiff to proceed, he would do so at his own risk as to the costs.

14.8 However, subsequent English authority has confined the making of an ex parte preemptive costs order to the extraordinary case, for fear of appeals against ex parte orders.25 There is the further concern that a plaintiff may inadvertently fail to make the disclosure required to substantiate the validity of any ex parte order, and so ultimately be denied the costs protection provided by a Wallersteiner order.26 Thus in the usual case the company is entitled to all relevant evidence other than matters covered by legal professional privilege (such as counsel’s opinion noted above).27 Yet if this procedure is followed the court may even order the actual payment of costs — its purpose being to provide funds for a plaintiff in genuine need, although clearly in such a scenario its quantum will be limited in order to spur the plaintiff to proceed with the litigation.28 14.9 The tenor of the English Court of Appeal’s approach in Wallersteiner has been approved at Supreme Court level in Australia. But Australian courts have not prescribed a procedure for pre-emptive costs orders in this context, and a perusal of the relevant cases reveals that they involve the exercise of discretion in post-judgment costs orders. A Victorian judge has remarked that ‘the court is empowered to exercise the discretion where it is satisfied that the proceeding is derivative, even though not exclusively’, the important circumstance being that ‘the relief sought is essentially for the benefit of the company’ even if the plaintiffs might obtain indirect benefit.29 The jurisdiction to so order does not rest upon proof that the plaintiff is impecunious.30 It is not, however, activated where, rather than involving a minority shareholder action, the proceeding is simply a dispute between two persons as to how a family company should be run31 or how company property should be distributed or allocated.32

[page 431]

Statutory intervention 14.10 Section 242 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sets out a procedure for minority shareholders (and others)33 to bring proceedings on behalf and in the name of the company with leave of the court,34 and empowers the court at any time to make any orders it considers appropriate about the costs of the plaintiffs,35 including the indemnification for costs.36 This goes to jurisdiction — it supersedes the jurisdiction at general law37 — rather than discretion, and so the factors that at general law influence the court’s discretion, which has been judicially described as a ‘very broad’ one,38 may presumably be relevant, albeit not determinative,39 under the statutory jurisdiction. The way the legislation is worded, though, suggests that an order in respect of the company’s costs cannot be made until the court’s leave has been obtained and the applicant has taken steps to bring those proceedings.40 It has been judicially observed that it is common for a person granted leave under s 242 to be required, in the first instance, to bear the burden of costs.41 But this is by no means an automatic outcome. After all, s 242 is a vehicle through which, according to the relevant Explanatory Memorandum, the court can protect a bona fide shareholder against liability for costs, via an indemnity out of company funds, while at the same time allowing the court a further means of discouraging unmeritorious or doubtful action.42 And the section, while it may well have been ‘deliberately drafted in a manner that denies the successful applicant the assurance that court recognition will result in the company becoming liable for the reasonable costs of litigating on its behalf’,43 does not deny that the company should meet the costs in appropriate circumstances. This may be so if, for instance, the wrongdoer is in control of the company, which explains why the company itself is not bringing the action; by granting leave here without the burden of costs, the court performs the useful task of increasing the likelihood that someone brings a claim that the company ought to have commenced.44 [page 432]

In any event, if it transpires that the claim is unmeritorious, the costs order against the company can be recalled.45

Proceedings for and against trustees Applications by trustees 14.11 A trustee doubtful as to whether and how proceedings are to be instituted on behalf of the trust may seek directions of the court. Provided full disclosure is made to the court of the strengths and weaknesses of the case, those directions, if followed by the trustee, de facto function as a pre-emptive costs order. The trustee is assured of avoiding personal liability for costs irrespective of the outcome of the suit. Any such liability falls on the trust fund, whether directly or by way of indemnity.46 A failure to seek directions in this context may expose the trustee to personal liability for costs, as between solicitor and client and/or party and party, unless it was proper to bring or defend the proceedings.47 Courts have shown less enthusiasm for making a pre-trial costs order where the trustee is a defendant in hostile litigation, which ordinarily attracts the rule that costs follow the event.48 The matter remains one of discretion, though, not of jurisdiction, which clearly exists. In determining how to exercise its discretion, the court considers the merit of the applicant’s case, the justice of the application and any special circumstances.49 Where it is unclear that the court would make an order out of the trust fund, it will be reluctant to make a pre-trial costs order.50 In fact, the position is likely to be even stricter, namely that:51 … before granting a pre-emptive application in ordinary trust litigation or proceedings concerning the ownership of a fund held by a trustee or other fiduciary, the judge must be satisfied that the judge at the trial could properly exercise his discretion only by ordering the applicant’s costs to be paid out of the fund.

The latter is not satisfied as a matter of course. In Alsop Wilkinson (a firm) v Neary,52 for example, trustees applied for a pre-trial costs order to defend a suit challenging the validity of the trust on the ground that the settlor established it to defraud creditors. Lightman J refused the application, because, first, there was strong prima facie case that the trust had been established for that purpose; second, the usual order in hostile litigation is that trustees, if unsuccessful, are denied their own costs and must pay the

opponent’s costs; third, justice required that the settlor be just before being generous, such that his assets should be available for his creditors before being available for himself; and fourth, the trust would be invalidated in any event in the likely scenario that the settlor would be declared bankrupt before a certain date. 14.12 A court may be more inclined to make a pre-emptive costs order where it considers the trustee to have reasonable prospects of success in the proceeding (usually supported by counsel’s opinion) and that the trustee cannot fund the claim or defence except out of trust property. The case for the order is stronger again where the trustee is pressed by claims of competing beneficiaries. Even so, the court can guard against the risk that its foresight could generate an injustice by phrasing the order in terms that contemplate an inconsistent costs order if the trial [page 433] judge thinks fit. This occurred in Re Dallaway,53 involving an executor of a deceased estate, to which the same principles apply as to trustees. Nine of its ten beneficiaries wished the executor to resist the remaining beneficiary’s claim to the entire estate. The executor was placed in a difficult position because, if the claimant proved successful and the other beneficiaries were unable to pay the executor’s costs (as appeared likely), there would be no fund from which the executor could indemnify itself. The executor sought directions as to whether it was justified in defending the claim and an order that, even were the claim successful, it was entitled to take its costs out of the estate. Megarry VC directed that the executor was justified in defending the claim, and made the costs order requested, but subject to the following proviso:54 I propose to include a provision that, subject to any order made by the trial judge, the [executor] will be entitled to be indemnified out of the estate for all costs for which it is liable, even if the defence or counterclaim, or both, are unsuccessful. It seems to me to be necessary to make this provision subject to any order of the trial judge because although as matters stand the [executor], on the material before me, is fully justified in defending and counterclaiming, it is possible that material may emerge subsequently which will make it unreasonable for the [executor] to continue to defend or counterclaim; and if, despite that, the [executor] continued with the litigation, no order that I make now ought to protect it in relation to subsequent costs. In view of this possibility I propose that my order should take effect only until further order,

giving all parties liberty to apply, and authorising the master to consider and deal with any such application.

Palmer J likewise made a revocable costs order in Application of Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Incorporated,55 where the trustee lacked resources to defend claims for breach of trust except by recourse to trust funds.

Applications by beneficiaries 14.13 Just as a trustee may seek a pre-trial costs order, beneficiaries may seek such an order. Generally speaking, though, courts are disinclined from making pre-trial costs orders in favour of beneficiaries, especially for claims that involve potentially hostile litigation, in respect of which costs usually follow the event.56 Beneficiaries who seek to render a trustee liable for an alleged breach of trust, for instance, may thus be placed in an invidious position; they must fund the claim, and risk being ordered to pay the trustee’s costs in the event that it proves unsuccessful. 14.14 The challenges facing beneficiaries exacerbate where they are in a position of considerable inequality vis-à-vis the trustee, especially where they are not volunteers but have contributed (part of) the trust fund. The case of superannuation (or pension) fund beneficiaries (termed ‘members’) is in point. English judges have identified pension funds as a special form of trust — exhibiting a stronger analogy to companies that ordinary trusts — that may justify applying the Wallersteiner procedure57 to them. Hoffmann LJ explained the rationale for this in McDonald v Horn:58 [T]here does seem to me a compelling analogy between a minority shareholder’s action for damages on behalf of the company and an action by a member of a pension fund to compel trustees or others to account to the fund. In both cases a person with a limited interest in a fund, whether the company’s assets or pension fund, is alleging injury to the fund as a whole and seeking restitution on behalf of the fund. And what distinguishes the shareholder and pension fund member … from the ordinary trust beneficiary … is that the former have both given consideration

[page 434] for their interests. They are not just recipients of the settlor’s bounty which he, for better or worse, has entrusted to the control of trustees of his choice. The relationship between the parties

is a commercial one and the pension fund members are entitled to be satisfied that the fund is being properly administered. Even in a non-contributory scheme, the employer’s payments are not bounty. They are part of the consideration for the services of the employee.

This led his Lordship to rule that it is reasonable for the court to have power to make an order that the costs of reasonable and bona fide proceedings be a cost of administering the fund.59 An alternative analysis is to view an application for pre-emptive costs by way of analogy to a trustee’s right of indemnity — and indeed as akin to the case law dealing with pre-trial costs orders for trustees — which depends on the applicant ‘pursuing a claim for the benefit of a fund or entity in which he has only a very small personal interest’.60 In Laws v National Grid Company plc,61 for example, involving a dispute between members and trustees over the allocation of pension fund surpluses, the members were awarded preemptive costs of up to £100,00062 out of the fund for their costs of appeal. What made the case exceptional was that: first, the Pensions Ombudsman had found in favour of the members, evidencing that they had a good arguable case on appeal; second, it involved huge sums and difficult questions of law; and third, it potentially affected many members. This made it desirable that the members be properly represented in the matter, justice being better served by granting than refusing the order.63 That not all members supported the litigation did not, according to Rimer J, tilt the balance the other way, because ‘[p]rima facie their claims are for the benefit of the scheme’.64 14.15 The foregoing should not be interpreted as judicial zeal to make preemptive costs order in all pension cases. Cases that are truly adversarial in nature, and are brought not for the benefit of the fund as a whole but for a particular class of members, are less amenable to pre-emptive orders, whether analogised to a trustee’s right to indemnity or the Wallersteiner procedure.65 In cases of this kind, courts will not ordinarily be swayed by the fact that the moneys sought to fund the member’s claim are miniscule compared to the total funds within the pension scheme.

Disputes over matrimonial or relationship property 14.16 In property disputes over the breakdown of marriage, the Family Court

has on more than one occasion acceded to an application for a pre-trial (‘advance’) costs order directing [page 435] a party to the proceedings to advance money to (partially) fund another party’s costs.66 Equivalent state Supreme Court authority exists in relation to disputes over domestic or de facto relationship property.67 In the Family Court, such an order was originally made via the court’s power to order security for costs,68 even though the purpose of security for costs orders is not to actually fund the opponent’s case. Subsequent case law has, more accurately, sourced the jurisdiction from the court’s power to award interim costs, whether under ss 80(1)(h),69 80(1)(k)70 or 117(2)71 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). So far as state Supreme Courts are concerned, the jurisdiction is sourced from the general costs discretion vested in those courts.72 The jurisdiction to make such an interim (‘advance’) costs order derived from the historical view that it was the husband’s duty to provide for his wife’s costs in divorce proceedings, which was in turn a legacy of an age when women lacked property of their own and a wife’s property belonged in law to her husband.73 Its rationale was explained, by reference to de facto spouses, by Kellam J in Giller v Procopets:74 In such cases one party to the proceeding, and more often than not the de facto husband, regularly enjoys the advantages of having ownership of the assets in dispute (together with other financial resources) and an intimate knowledge of his/her own affairs and circumstances. Unless the other party has the resources to investigate and become acquainted with such financial circumstances that party is often at a considerable disadvantage in the preparation and conduct of the litigation. Legal Aid is now rarely, if ever, available to assist parties in the conduct of such proceedings in this Court. Accordingly, the question to be asked is under what circumstances would it be just for the court to exercise its discretion to make such an order.

14.17 Notwithstanding, the power to award advance costs is one, it has been judicially said, to be exercised ‘with extreme caution in order to ensure that no injustice is caused to the party required to comply with the interim order for costs’.75 The courts have identified at least [page 436]

six factors that may be relevant to the making of an order for advance legal costs in favour of an applicant in matrimonial or relationship property cases:76 a complexity in the financial affairs of the respondent; a need for an expert investigation into the respondent’s financial affairs; a position of considerable financial strength held by the respondent; a capacity by the respondent to meet his or her own ongoing litigation costs; the applicant’s inability to meet ongoing litigation costs from his or her own income, assets or financial resources; and whether the applicant has some reasonable prospect of success in the proceeding. The latter has particular relevance, as ‘it would be unfair for orders to be made for a [respondent] to finance or partly finance the conduct of litigation against him if that litigation had little prospect of success’.77 Conversely, if on a brief consideration of the first five factors listed above, it seems likely to the court that the applicant will be likely to receive by way of property settlement a sum sufficient to cover the advance order, ‘that would seem to be sufficient to enable the order sought to be made’.78 The court can adjust the final order for the division of the property if it determines that the applicant should meet (part of) the advance costs.79

Public interest litigation 14.18 Whereas it is not uncommon in litigation over a fund, such as a trust fund or testamentary estate, for litigants to receive costs out of the fund,80 thus to some extent negating the need for a pre-emptive costs order, the same cannot be said regarding public interest litigation. Aside from the lack of a fund from which to source the payment of costs, there is certainly no judicial presumption or even inclination that public interest plaintiffs are entitled to their costs irrespective of the outcome of the litigation.81 This may undermine any willingness to make a pre-emptive costs order in such cases. Yet the very

nature of public interest litigation82 means that it is often unlikely to be pursued in the face of a potentially substantial costs liability. 14.19 There is, as a result, curial recognition that a pre-emptive costs order (in England termed ‘protective costs order’) can be made in public interest litigation, albeit only in exceptional circumstances.83 The main purpose of such an order is to enable the applicant to present its case with competent counsel without being exposed to financial risks that would [page 437] deter it from advancing a case of general public importance.84 The order protects its beneficiary from liability for the opponent’s costs, to be contrasted with a costs ‘capping’ order, which sets a ceiling on the relevant costs liability85 (though some judges use the terms interchangeably).86 A protective costs order is exceptional because rarely is it clear, before the substantive application is heard, that an issue exhibits sufficient ‘general public importance’87 to justify departure from the usual ‘costs follow the event’ rule.88 Likewise, rarely can the merits of a claim be confidently assessed at an interlocutory stage. This informs the main prerequisites for pre-emptive costs orders as espoused by English courts. Dyson J catalogued these in R v Lord Chancellor as follows:89 [T]he necessary conditions for the making of a pre-emptive costs order in public interest challenge cases are that the court is satisfied that the issues raised are truly ones of general public importance, and that it has a sufficient appreciation of the merits of the claim that it can conclude that it is in the public interest to make the order. Unless the court can be so satisfied by short argument, it is unlikely to make the order in any event. Otherwise, there is a real risk that such applications would lead, in effect, to dress rehearsals of the substantial applications, which in my view would be undesirable. These necessary conditions are not, however, sufficient for the making of an order. The court must also have regard to the financial resources of the applicant and the respondent, and the amount of costs likely to be in issue. It will be more likely to make an order where the respondent clearly has a superior capacity to bear the costs of the proceedings than the applicant, and where it is satisfied that, unless the order is made, the applicant will probably discontinue the proceedings, and will be acting reasonably in so doing.

English judges have subsequently made explicit that protective costs orders are confined to ‘public law litigation’ as opposed to private claims.90 A case illustration is New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General (NZ),91 where

the Privy Council made a pre-trial costs order where the litigation raised a point of great public importance (potentially involving the survival of [page 438] the Maori language) and it was evident, by the time the matter came before the board, that there was much to be said for the merits of the point contended by the appellants. The position is different where the court remains unconvinced as to the public interest asserted or that funding the litigation would be unduly onerous for the applicant(s),92 or it believes that the applicant would likely be indemnified for any adverse costs order.93 14.20 The Supreme Court of Canada has recognised a jurisdiction to order the opponent to actually fund an applicant’s costs in public interest litigation (an ‘advance costs order’). The English Court of Appeal, on the other hand, has disclaimed such a jurisdiction in the public interest context.94 Australian judges, though reticent to countenance such an order outside of disputes over matrimonial or relationship property,95 in the end view the matter as one going to discretion, not jurisdiction.96 The leading Canadian case, British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band,97 involved a situation subsequently described by the same court as ‘clearly out of the ordinary’.98 The bands were thrust into complex litigation against the government that they could not fund, and the case raised issues vital both to their survival and to the government’s approach to aboriginal rights. The issue was whether the bands’ inability to pay should leave their constitutional rights unenforceable and public interest issues unresolved. What made the case exceptional, and one amenable to an advance costs order, appears from the following extract from the judgment of Bastarache and LeBel JJ in Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue):99 An exceptional convergence of factors occurred in Okanagan. At the individual level, the case was of the utmost importance to the bands. They were caught in a grave predicament: the costs of the litigation were more than they could afford, especially given pressing needs like housing; yet a failure to assert their logging rights would seriously compromise those same needs. On a broader level, the case raised aboriginal rights issues of great public importance. There was evidence that the land claim advanced by the bands had prima facie merit, but the courts had yet to decide on the precise mechanism for advancing such claims — the fundamental issue of general importance had not been resolved by the courts in other litigation. However the case

was ultimately decided, it was in the public interest to have the matter resolved. For both the bands themselves and the public at large, the litigation could not, therefore, simply be abandoned. In these exceptional circumstances, this Court held that the public’s interest in the litigation justified a structured advance costs order insofar as it was necessary to have the case move forward.

In Okanagan100 the court premised an advance costs order upon three requirements being fulfilled: first, that the applicant genuinely cannot afford to fund the litigation, and no other [page 439] realistic option exists for bringing the issues to trial, so that the litigation would not proceed without the order;101 second, the claim is prima facie meritorious — it is at least of sufficient merit that it is contrary to the interests of justice for the opportunity to pursue the case to be forfeited just because the litigant lacks financial means; and third, the issues raised transcend the individual interests of the particular litigant, are of public importance, and have not been resolved in previous cases. That these requirements were prefaced by an admonition that only a ‘rare and exceptional’ case is special enough to warrant an advance costs order102 suggests that they will not be construed loosely, and that, even if they are met, there is no ‘right’ to a funding order.103 The standard, to this end, ‘was indeed intended to be a high one’,104 and such an order is granted ‘with caution, as a last resort’, in circumstances where the need for it is ‘clearly established’.105 In Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue)106 Bastarache and LeBel JJ, with whom Deschamps, Abella and Rothstein JJ concurred, made four main observations that highlight the exceptional nature of advance costs orders. First, the injustice that would ensue were the application refused must relate both to the applicant and to the public at large. Second, the applicant must have explored all other possible funding options (such as attempts to obtain funding through fundraising campaigns, loan applications, contingency fee agreements and the like), and must commit to making a costs contribution to the litigation if it is not impecunious. Third, no injustice arises if the matter at issue could be settled, or the public interest could be satisfied, without an advance costs

order. Fourth, a litigant who secures an advance costs order must relinquish some manner of control over how the litigation proceeds. Since the litigant is proceeding with the aid of funds received from another party, certain limitations are necessary. These may be financial (such as caps on spending) or may go more directly to litigation strategy (for instance, limits in the choice and number of counsel and experts). The court may thus need to establish a framework for the conduct of the planned litigation, bearing in mind that the purpose of an advance costs order ‘is to restore some balance between litigants, not to create perfect equality between the parties’.107 The British Columbia Court of Appeal, building on this point, more recently noted that:108 Quite unfortunately, financial constraints put potentially meritorious claims at risk every day. Okanagan was not intended to resolve all of these difficulties. The decision did not introduce a new financing method for self-appointed representatives of the public interest. The Court’s ratio in Okanagan applies only to those few situations where a court would be participating in an injustice — against the litigant personally and against the public generally — if it did not order advance costs to allow the litigant to proceed.

14.21 Australian law does not deny a jurisdiction to make an advance costs order in public interest, or even general civil, litigation. The trend to expansively construe statutory costs [page 440] discretions109 sits poorly with denials of jurisdiction. Consistent with the Canadian cases, though, Australian judges are most unlikely to adopt other than an exceptional approach to advance costs orders,110 especially in view of repeated judicial remarks that public interest litigation of itself confers no immunity from the costs indemnity rule.111 Even in Canada, where courts have arguably been more inclined to utilise costs orders as case management vehicles than traditionally the practice in Australian courts, in Okanagan it took a case involving indigenous constitutional rights against the government to prompt the Supreme Court to make an advance costs order. That the same court in the Little Sisters case declined to make such an order, even against the backdrop of proven infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by the government, because the issue raised lacked sufficient genuine public

interest, highlights that public interest considerations that may justify (partially) ousting the usual costs rule112 are not by themselves sufficient to sustain an advance costs order.113 The threshold for curial intervention is clearly higher; it has to be because to require a party in hostile litigation to actually fund its opponent upsets the usual adversary process. Coupled with the potential added complexity in case management required by an advance costs order, Australian law is likely to be no less circumscribed.

Test cases 14.22 Although there is no authority directly on point, the principles discussed above in relation to public interest litigation should, in principle, apply to test case litigation. A ‘test case’ is ‘a case where the parties seek primarily to settle a point of law, and where the impact of that rule on those parties is of secondary importance to the settlement of the rule itself’.114 There may even be stronger grounds to make a pre-trial costs order in a test case, which by definition is likely to raise a matter of significance to the wider community. This is so especially where the defendant is the government or a governmental body. On the other hand, any need for a pretrial costs order may be less compelling in test cases, as it is not uncommon in test cases for a court to make no order as to costs, or even to order the defendant to meet the plaintiff’s costs.115 The lack of reported case law may also be explained on the ground that test cases, particularly those involving government, are often litigated pursuant to a prior agreement between the parties,116 or a policy, as to costs.

Costs of Interlocutory Proceedings At general law 14.23 As the general rule that a successful party should have its costs is directed to a consideration of the litigation as a whole, or at least in respect of final orders, it is ordinarily going too far to say that it necessarily applies to every interlocutory step in the principal

[page 441] proceedings.117 In the case of a final order, even if made prior to the conclusion of the proceedings,118 the general principle is that the party in whose favour the order is made is entitled to the fruits of its success unless there are some particular considerations that justify postponement of their enjoyment.119 Aside from final orders, the courts’ primary aim to reflect the justice of the situation in any costs order120 dictates that a court is often unable at an interlocutory step in proceedings to determine who in justice should bear the costs of that step.121 This explains why on interlocutory questions the costs are frequently made ‘costs in the cause’ or are ‘reserved’.

‘Costs in the cause’ compared to ‘costs in any event’ 14.24 ‘Costs in the cause’ (or ‘costs in the proceeding’)122 means that costs of the interlocutory proceedings are awarded according to the final award of costs in the action. If the plaintiff wins and is awarded costs, the plaintiff receives those interlocutory costs as part of the costs of the action against the defendant; a defendant who wins and is awarded costs gets those interlocutory costs as part of the costs of the action against the plaintiff.123 A reference to the ‘plaintiff’s costs in the cause’ means that if the plaintiff wins, he or she gets the costs of the interlocutory proceedings, but does not have to pay the opponent’s costs of those proceedings if the plaintiff loses.124 The converse applies for a reference to the ‘defendant’s costs in the cause’. An order for ‘costs in the cause’ is to be contrasted with an order for ‘costs in any event’. The latter means that, irrespective of who wins or loses when the case is decided, or that the case is settled (unless the terms of the settlement provide otherwise),125 the recipient of that order is entitled to costs of the interlocutory proceedings upon the final resolution of the case.126 14.25 The above dictates that it is not necessarily just that in all (or even most) cases the costs of an interlocutory application should follow the result of that interlocutory application. Justice often requires that the party who bears the interlocutory costs be determined by the result of the principal litigation. For example, the usual order where an application for summary

judgment is dismissed is that the costs of the application be in the cause.127 The costs of an [page 442] applicant for an interlocutory injunction who raises a prima facie case128 are also usually made costs in the cause, for the following reasons given by the New South Wales Court of Appeal:129 The rationale for making an order that costs be costs in the cause is that, at the stage of granting an interlocutory injunction, the court is not in a position to adjudicate on the ultimate outcome of the proceedings. Rather, provided there is a reasonable case to be tried, the Court’s focus in deciding whether to grant the application for interlocutory relief is on other considerations and, in particular, on determining whether, on the balance of convenience, an injunction ought to be granted. Accordingly, if a plaintiff who applies for an interlocutory injunction is not ultimately successful in the proceedings, that plaintiff should not receive the costs of the application for an injunction which, when the matter is considered in overview cannot be sustained. However … each case must depend upon its own facts.

That each case must, as the court noted, be determined on its own facts dictates that in some circumstances an order other than ‘costs in the cause’ may be appropriate. The court may order that the costs be reserved130 — for instance, where there is an overlap between the work done in connection with the interlocutory application and the ultimate trial of the action131 — but even in this event the party obtaining the injunction will only in an exceptional case obtain those costs if he or she fails in the principal proceeding.132 In other circumstances, it may be just to make a costs order ‘in any event’.133 In the context of an application for an interlocutory injunction, this may be so where the application is refused for lack of a prima facie case.134 More generally, an order ‘in any event’ may lie against a party [page 443] who makes an unsuccessful motion that should not have been made135 or seeks an indulgence or relief from consequences of its own default,136 or in favour of a party who makes a successful motion based on an irregularity or default committed by the opposing party.137 It may also be appropriate where

a question of law is fully argued in an interlocutory application138 or where the hearing of the interlocutory application in effect determines the substantive application.139

‘Costs reserved’ 14.26 A court that opts to ‘reserve’ the costs of an interlocutory application may address the issue of who will bear its costs upon the determination of the matter. At general law, where the costs of an interlocutory order are reserved, those costs are not included in a general order as to the costs of the proceedings but must be made the subject of a special order upon determination of the principal proceedings.140 The main drawback of reserving the costs of a motion (or, for that matter, making them costs in the cause) is that, if there is ultimately no trial, the order functions essentially as one that there is no order as to costs. Unless a litigant, encouraged by success at the interlocutory stage, insists on a trial for the purpose of recovering his or her interlocutory costs — an unlikely course of action given its potential cost — those costs remain ‘in limbo’.141 This gives the party unsuccessful at the interlocutory stage a bargaining tool, and may provide a basis for the court inquiring whether an order ‘in any event’ would in justice be more appropriate. For this reason, the position is modified by court rules in most jurisdictions.142

Impact of court rules 14.27 Superior court rules make specific provision or at least give some direction as to the costs implications of various interlocutory proceedings.

Costs of application or step within proceedings 14.28 The High Court, New South Wales, Tasmanian and Western Australian rules deem the costs of any application or other step in proceedings, unless the court otherwise orders, to be part of the costs of the cause of the party in whose favour the application or other step is determined.143 If separate costs orders have been made at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings, the final costs order does not affect those separate orders unless the court otherwise

states. The former Federal Court Rules read similarly;144 the current rules envisage that where the court makes no order for costs on an interlocutory application, the costs of the application follow the event if an order is made in favour of any party but, if no order is made [page 444] in favour of any party, are taken to be costs in the cause of the successful party.145 The Victorian rules, as from 1 April 2013, state that where an interlocutory or other application is made in a proceeding, and either no costs order is made on the application or the order made is silent as to costs, the costs are the parties’ costs in the proceeding, unless the court otherwise orders.146 14.29 The Australian Capital Territory and Queensland rules, on the other hand, state that the costs of the proceeding147 do not include those of an application in the proceeding unless the court otherwise orders.148 The Northern Territory (and, before 1 April 2013, also the Victorian) rules envisage that each party bears its own costs of an interlocutory or other application in a proceeding unless the court otherwise orders.149 The rationale is that, as interlocutory applications usually do not conclude the proceedings, the court is often not in a position at an interlocutory stage to determine where the justice lies between the parties in any costs order.150 Moreover, as each side will likely have obtained interlocutory orders against the other during the pre-trial processes, for each to bear its own costs of those applications discourages unnecessary applications and promotes agreement.151 In TTE Pty Ltd v Ken Day Pty Ltd Martin J made the following observations in this context:152 Given the tenor of the rules, it would not be just to make interlocutory orders for costs … with a view to punishing the unsuccessful party. To do so may engender a reluctance in parties to properly ventilate their problems during the pre-trial process. What is required is an approach which seeks to have a successful party reimbursed the expense of interlocutory proceedings which, for example, would have been unnecessary if the other side had acted reasonably or which are unnecessarily burdensome or which are made at a time … when that party has been deprived of the value of the work done in preparation of his case for trial. In such instances, and the list is not intended to be definitive or complete, it may well be within the Court’s discretion to exercise the power to override the principles established by the rules. Costs in interlocutory matters no longer follow success. No order as to costs ought to be made against the unsuccessful party, in the usual run of cases, even if contested, if the grounds of the application

or resistance, as the case may be, are reasonable. However, if such application or resistance is without real merit, as if often the case, the unsuccessful party should not have to bear his own costs.

The correctness of Martin J’s further remark ‘there must be something exceptional about the circumstances of the interlocutory application under consideration to lead the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, to make an order as to costs’153 has been queried, both in the Northern Territory154 and elsewhere.155 The justice of the case must override;156 it should not be assumed that only where circumstances are exceptional will the court, on the grounds of [page 445] justice, be minded to make a costs order. In any event, the guidelines in TTE cannot be applied so as to limit the general discretion of the court.157 The merit pertaining to the interlocutory application is, no doubt, a weighty matter in the court’s discretion in this respect. In Hopkins v QBE Insurance Ltd,158 for example, the defendant failed to enter an appearance and the plaintiff thus obtained a default judgment, which the defendant successfully applied to have set aside. Yet the defendant was not successful on all grounds advanced, and as the application and resistance to it each had merit, no order for costs was made. Conversely, in Yow v Northern Territory Gymnastic Association Inc159 Kearney J branded the plaintiff’s interlocutory application as being ‘without real merit’, and so ordered that the defendant should have its costs.

Reserved costs 14.30 The Western Australian court rules provide that where the court reserves the costs of an interlocutory matter, those costs are not allowed to a party without an order of the court.160 This is consistent with the courts’ historical practice noted earlier,161 and so also represents the New South Wales position, where the rules have not ousted that practice.162 The historical practice has been reversed elsewhere, ‘because it had been found that parties often overlooked reserved costs when judgment was

delivered and had to make separate subsequent applications to deal with reserved costs, especially where a special order should be made, thereby increasing the costs burden of litigants’.163 The High Court and Australian Capital Territory rules provide that costs of an interlocutory proceeding that are reserved by the court are treated as costs in the cause unless the court otherwise orders.164 From 1 April 2013, the Victorian rules make equivalent provision.165 And in the Federal Court, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania, reserved costs follow the event unless the court otherwise orders.166 As to the latter, the ‘event’ refers to the outcome of the principal litigation and requires an order as to costs in that litigation.167 It follows that reserved costs of interlocutory proceedings are thus made costs in the cause of the party ultimately successful in the principal proceedings unless some other order is made in respect of them, and so the position is analogous to that prescribed by the High Court and Australian Capital Territory rules.168 The Northern Territory rules provide that where, by order of the court, the costs of an interlocutory or other application or of a step in a proceeding are reserved, the court may direct by and to who those costs are to be paid.169 In the absence of such a direction, a party may, within 21 days of the conclusion of the proceeding, apply to the court for a direction as to [page 446] the payment of costs reserved.170 The Victorian rules, in their form before 1 April 2013, stated that if the court orders the costs of any interlocutory or other application or of any step in a proceeding to be reserved, and does not thereafter direct by and to whom those costs are to be paid, the Costs Court may by order so direct unless the court otherwise orders or the court determines that no further order be made with respect to those costs.171

Costs where non-admission of fact or document 14.31 Court rules in most jurisdictions prescribe costs consequences of the non-admission of a fact or document in proceedings. The aim of the relevant rules is to facilitate the proper administration of justice by narrowing the issues in dispute between the parties with the desirable consequence of

shortening trials and saving costs.172 In the Federal Court, New South Wales, Northern Territory and Victoria the rules provide that a party who serves a notice disputing a fact173 or the authenticity of a document,174 where that fact or authenticity is then proved in the proceeding, must pay the costs of proof unless the court otherwise orders.175 In South Australia the costs of proving a fact or document that a party has unreasonably failed to admit are awarded against that party unless the court orders otherwise.176 The rules add that a party who unreasonably denies or fails to admit an assertion will be ordered to pay costs arising from the denial or failure unless there are good reasons for not doing so.177 The same applies in respect of a party who unreasonably asks another party for an admission as to the costs arising from the request.178 In Tasmania, where a notice to admit or produce comprises facts or documents that are not necessary for the conduct of the proceeding, the costs so occasioned must be borne by the party giving the notice.179 Similarly, the costs of any affidavit that unnecessarily sets out matters of hearsay, argumentative matter or copies of, or extracts from, documents must be paid by the party filing the affidavit.180 In Western Australia, a party on whom a notice to admit facts is served,181 and who refuses or neglects to admit the facts within seven days (or a longer time allowed by the court), must [page 447] pay the costs of proving the facts182 unless the court otherwise orders.183 If a party on whom a list of documents or a notice to admit documents is served184 gives notice of non-admission of any of them,185 he or she must pay the costs of proving that document unless the court otherwise orders.186

Costs of removal from inferior court 14.32 The High Court and Tasmanian court rules provide that if a cause is removed from an inferior court into the court, the costs in the court below will be costs in the cause.187 The Northern Territory, Victorian and Western

Australian rules state that where in a proceeding transferred to or removed into the court, the court makes an order as to the costs of a proceeding before any other court, it may specify the amount of the costs to be allowed, order that the costs be taxed, or make orders for the ascertainment of the costs by taxation or otherwise in that other court.188 The Federal Court Rules simply state that if a proceeding is transferred to the Federal Court, a party may apply to that court for an order that the costs of the proceeding in the other court be taxed in accordance with the Federal Court Rules or awarded as a lump sum in lieu of taxation.189 The current New South Wales rules, unlike their predecessors,190 make no equivalent provision, and instead place the issue squarely within the court’s discretion.191 The Australian Capital Territory and Queensland rules provide that if a proceeding is removed to the court from another court or tribunal (the ‘first court’), the court may, if the first court has not made an order for costs, make an order for the costs of the proceeding (including the costs before the removal),192 and any order for costs made by the first court may be assessed and enforced as if it were an order of the court.193 The South Australian rules simply state that if an action is transferred or removed into the court, the court will not disturb orders for costs made in the other court or tribunal unless there is good reason to do so.194

Costs of motions not disposed of 14.33 Under the Tasmanian and Western Australian rules, when a motion, application or other proceeding is ordered to stand over to the trial and no order is made at the trial as to its costs, those costs are deemed to be part of the parties’ costs of the cause.195 [page 448]

Party seeking a dispensation General rule 14.34 As a general rule, a party who seeks a dispensation, indulgence or

favour of the court is ordered to pay the other party’s costs of the application, whether or not it succeeds.196 The rule has been expressed in terms that ‘where one is seeking a boon one usually has to pay the costs even if the boon is granted’.197 Discussed below are illustrations of the principle at work,198 but consistent with the judicial exercise of the costs discretion, they should not be viewed as propounding an invariable or inflexible rule, nor any overarching ‘indulgence principle’.199 As explained by Wheeler JA, with whom Steytler P and Pullin JA concurred, in Stanley v Layne Christensen Company:200 The general rule is, and should remain, that where a party is seeking the indulgence of the court, that party will be required to pay the costs of the application, including costs thrown away, and will not normally receive the costs of the application. However, it is also a normal rule that the Court will have regard to the extent to which it might be said that costs were unnecessarily incurred by a party, and will have regard to the reasonableness of the party’s conduct in determining how costs should be awarded. In particular, where a contested application, even for an indulgence, is unnecessary because a party acting reasonably would have consented to appropriate orders, the party who has caused the costs to be unnecessarily incurred will not obtain its costs of such a proceeding merely because the application is for some indulgence.

Where the application for a dispensation, indulgence or favour has arisen out of the default of the applicant’s lawyer, the court justifiably may order that the lawyer pay the costs of the application personally.201

Application to amend pleadings 14.35 A party who seeks leave to amend a pleading should, generally speaking, either pay the costs of the application or bear his or her own costs. For example, in Mertelmeyer v Mertelmeyer (No 2)202 a defendant who by mistake entered an appearance disputing the plaintiff’s claim was allowed to amend its claim on terms of paying the plaintiff’s costs occasioned by the amendment. And in Northern Territory Fuels Pty Ltd v Hart203 O’Leary J granted leave to amend a statement of claim at a late stage on condition that costs thrown away by the amendment were paid on a solicitor and client basis. Ultimately, though, the circumstances of each case, [page 449] not any presumptive rule, dictate the issue, as appears again from the remarks

of Wheeler JA in Stanley v Layne Christensen Company:204 There are a number of factors to balance. One is that, since it would generally be possible for a party to avoid the need to seek any indulgence by accurately formulating its pleading or otherwise complying with the rules, the fact that the party is seeking an indulgence will be relevant … [T]he degree of conferral and the reasonableness of conduct of the party opposing such an indulgence will also be relevant. Where amendments are not substantial, or where they serve simply to further clarify an otherwise broadly satisfactory pleading, it may be appropriate simply to order costs in the cause. Such a course may also be appropriate where an amendment adds a substantial, different, but apparently arguable cause of action, on the basis that it is always possible for a trial Judge to make a special order in relation to the costs of such an issue, if it should ultimately be found that the party is unsuccessful in relation to that new cause. It is appropriate that the discretion in such cases should remain unfettered in the interests of efficient case management.

Shaw J in Wendt v Northwood (No 2),205 for instance, though accepting that it is a reasonable expectation of the defendant that if a plaintiff’s application to amend the statement of claim is granted, it is on the basis that the defendant will be compensated for the attendant costs thrown away, decided otherwise on the facts. This outcome was influenced by the defendant’s vigorous opposition to the plaintiff’s successful application, in an action based, before and after the amendment, on the defendant’s failure to obey his duties as an officer of the court.206 Such an alleged failure ‘should not be rewarded’, said his Honour, but added that ‘[t]here should be some costs benefit to the defendant for the amendment’.207 The costs ‘thrown away’ were therefore ordered to be the ‘defendant’s costs in the cause’.208 The same principles apply in the context of leave to amend grounds of appeal. So while these may be seen as an indulgence, and with consequent adverse costs implications for the appellant,209 the court will pay regard to the nature and extent of the amendments, together with the reasonableness of the respondent’s conduct. For example, in Scaffidi v Montevento Holdings Pty Ltd,210 where attached to an unopposed application to amend was an order that ‘the costs of the application be costs in the appeal’, that the amendments did not alter the substance of the appellant’s case but rather clarified the appellant’s arguments and thereby contributed to the efficient disposition of the appeal made the case, according to the Western Australian Court of Appeal, one where it would have been reasonable for the respondents to consent to the amendments sought when invited to do so. As the successful party in the cause, the appellant was accordingly entitled to have his costs of the application to amend included in his overall costs.

14.36 The notion that those seeking an indulgence should bear its cost is reflected in the court rules in most jurisdictions dealing with the costs consequences of pleading amendments. The rules in New South Wales and Western Australia require a party who amends a pleading without leave of the court to pay the costs of and occasioned thereby unless the court otherwise [page 450] orders.211 The same is the case irrespective of leave of the court in the territories, Queensland, South Australia and Victoria.212 In the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and Tasmania, this outcome is ousted where the amendment was necessitated by the default of another party.213 14.37 If a plaintiff makes a late amendment that substantially alters the case the defendant has to meet and without which the action will fail, case authority indicates that the defendant may be entitled to the costs of the action down to the date of the amendment.214

Application for an adjournment 14.38 If, for reasons other than amending pleadings, a party applies for an adjournment, the court may order him or her to pay the costs of the application.215 So, for example, if the hearing of an action is adjourned to allow parties to be added, the party who applied for the adjournment will ordinarily be ordered to pay the costs of the day, including costs thrown away by other parties in respect of the application.216 The court rules in the Northern Territory and South Australia reflect this general rule; they state that the costs of an adjournment arising from a party’s default are to be awarded against the party in default unless the court orders to the contrary.217 The South Australian rules add that if proceedings are adjourned because of a party’s default, costs are to be borne by the defaulting party (or the defaulting party’s lawyer if proceedings are adjourned because of the latter’s default).218

Application to set aside default judgment 14.39 An applicant will, as a general rule, be ordered to pay the respondent’s

costs of an application to set aside a default judgment, as it is the applicant’s default that has occasioned the need for the application.219

Application for relief against forfeiture 14.40 By petitioning a court for relief against forfeiture, an applicant admits a breach of contract from which he or she seeks to be relieved of the contractual consequences. It follows that, as a general principle, one of the terms imposed is the payment of all costs, often on an indemnity basis,220 for it was the applicant’s own breach of contract that made the application [page 451] necessary.221 But this is no hard and fast rule, for otherwise the respondent might always oppose the application assured of getting costs from the applicant.222 The court may, if it considers that the respondent ought not have opposed the application in toto, order the respondent to pay costs to the extent that they have been increased by his or her resistance to the claim for relief on any terms.223 And in situations where the respondent was seeking to obtain some sort of commercial or other advantage or was somehow pressurising the applicant so as to improve its position, it may well be that the usual rule that costs follow the event will apply.224

Application to extend time 14.41 In Holt v Wynter225 Sheller JA expressed the general principle in terms that ‘ordinarily a successful applicant, who has allowed him or herself to get out of time, should pay the costs of the application unless the respondent’s opposition was wholly unreasonable’. To this end, the case law targets the reasonableness or otherwise of the respondent’s opposition to the application. In Commonwealth of Australia v Smith,226 for example, the New South Wales Court of Appeal, by majority, ruled that, in view of the Commonwealth’s repeated failure in resisting applications to extend time over six years in analogous cases, the trial judge was entitled to view the Commonwealth’s opposition to an extension as unreasonable, and thus amenable to an order

that it pay the applicant’s costs. It may be, however, that the court went too far in ordering costs against the Commonwealth, as the High Court, in refusing special leave, expressed the provisional view ‘that a party, if it has an arguable basis for defending an application or a claim, is entitled to do so without the penalty of costs’.227 In circumstances where the opposition to the application cannot be characterised as unreasonable, but the court does not consider that the applicant was necessarily at fault in letting time expire (the fault may lie in his or her legal representatives), the court may balance the above considerations by ordering that the costs of a successful application to extend [page 452] time be costs in the cause.228 Alternatively, the court may order that each party pay its own costs.229 Conversely, an applicant who proves unsuccessful in having time extended will almost invariably shoulder the costs burden of the application. 14.42 The court rules in some jurisdictions require a party who applies for a modification (whether in the form of an extension or a shortening) of time under the rules, unless the court otherwise orders, to pay the costs of and occasioned by the application or any order made on or in consequence of the application.230 Consistent with the foregoing, a court may ‘otherwise order’ if the opposition to the application is unreasonable, it having been judicially remarked that the court is ‘desirous of not encouraging litigants to oppose a meritorious claim for an extension of time on a supposed basis that they will get their costs in any event’.231

Qualifications to general rule 14.43 As foreshadowed earlier, it is too simplistic to invoke a general rule in this context as some universal talisman independent of the circumstances of the case. Two further points should be noted. First, as the cases involving applications to extend time attest, an application is arguably not an indulgence if it does no more than seek the exercise of a statutory discretion

conferred on the court.232 Second, the multiplicity of cases modern courts are called on to try and the lack of resources available to courts, coupled with the pressure of complex commercial and other litigation, may mean that the prejudice caused by, say, amendment of a pleading at the last moment, is less likely to be compensable in costs.233 It cannot, as a consequence, be assumed that the court will grant an indulgence upon an applicant offering to meet the costs of the proceeding or application to date. Because justice cannot be measured solely in monetary terms, costs orders are not necessarily an adequate balm to the other party.234 As such, ‘[i]t should not be lightly assumed that the “healing medicine” of costs is always a sufficient cure for the disadvantage to the other side’.235 14.44 So a court is unlikely to allow a defence wholly different to that pleaded to be raised by amendment at the end of the trial even on terms that an adjournment is granted and that the [page 453] defendant pays the costs thrown away.236 Coupled with the public policy favouring the speedy resolution of disputes, the prejudice the plaintiff would otherwise suffer could not be rectified by a costs order in his or her favour in respect of the proceedings to date.237 An interesting illustration is the decision of Santow J in Re Australasian Memory Pty Ltd.238 There the plaintiffs, who were the administrators of the first defendant, convened a meeting of creditors of the first defendant eight days earlier than prescribed by statute,239 as a matter of urgency with the aim of selling the first defendant as a going concern. At the time of the meeting no director or creditor complained of this irregularity. Upon their subsequent appointment as liquidators, the plaintiffs sought to recover moneys from the second defendant (a director of the first defendant), who resisted the application. The plaintiffs secured remedial orders against the second defendant and sought the costs of this application. Where administrators work under tight time pressures with highly technical legislation, Santow J opined that ‘it would be undesirable for courts to be unduly pedantic or punitive’,240 noting that the slip-up, though unfortunate, was understandable. According to his Honour, this did not debar the plaintiffs from their costs of successfully resisting the

challenges brought by the second defendant. He declined to uncritically apply the general rule stated earlier, differentiating the facts before him from the situation where a creditor resists the dispensation. Had there been such resistance, the case would, according to Santow J, have been different.241

Timing of effect of interlocutory costs order Court rules 14.45 In each jurisdiction, whether pursuant to specific provision in the court rules or the costs discretion generally, superior courts can direct that an interlocutory costs order be paid immediately (‘forthwith’), so as not leave the beneficiary of the order out of pocket until the conclusion of the substantive proceedings. The term ‘forthwith’ in a costs order ordinarily does not dictate that the costs be paid at a particular time, ‘or with any special promptness’, but that the costs are payable before the conclusion of the proceedings.242 Although the superseded Federal Court Rules explicitly recognised a discretion to make such an order,243 the current rules make no equivalent provision; it thus now comes within the court’s general costs discretion.244 But as the current rules, in common with their forebear, add that a costs order in an interlocutory application245 does not, unless the court otherwise orders, entitle a party to have its bill of costs taxed until the principal proceeding is concluded [page 454] (or further order),246 the starting point is that interlocutory costs are not ordinarily payable immediately. To similar effect in New South Wales, the rules state that, again unless the court orders otherwise, the costs of any application or other step in any proceedings ‘do not become payable until the conclusion of the proceedings’.247 The South Australian rules, aimed at the same outcome, do not permit the enforcement of a costs order until after the principal proceedings have been concluded, subject to any order of the court to the contrary.248

The Tasmanian rule targeting the costs of interlocutory applications,249 in creating a default provision unless the court ‘otherwise orders’, ostensibly vests in the court a discretion to ‘otherwise order’ that costs be payable forthwith.250 It thus follows the schema in the preceding jurisdictions. The Queensland rules do not explicitly address the point, but the same ensues. When the court makes a costs order, absent an order to the contrary, the expectation is that the amount assessed and certified under the costs order will be paid once the Registrar makes the requisite order251 upon the filing of a certificate of assessment and the applicable 14-day moratorium on the enforcement of that order expires.252 Lacking any dedicated rule in the Australian Capital Territory, again the starting point is, it seems, that interlocutory costs are not payable immediately. Conversely, in Western Australia, though the rules recognise a discretion to order costs payable forthwith,253 the Supreme Court has, via a practice direction, prescribed a general rule that where a costs order is to be made against a party, the costs are ‘ordered to be paid forthwith or by a particular date’.254 This represented a shift from the previous Western Australian practice,255 aligning more closely to that in the Northern Territory and Victoria. In those jurisdictions, the rules state that the costs a party is ordered to pay under a court order are payable forthwith unless the court states otherwise.256 In Victoria, if the court makes an interlocutory order for costs, it may order that, should the party liable fail to pay the costs, the proceeding be stayed or dismissed (if that party is the plaintiff), or that the defence be struck out (if that party is a defendant).257 [page 455]

When are costs ordered to be paid forthwith? 14.46 It follows from the foregoing that in the Federal Court, New South Wales and South Australia, the main issue relates to the circumstances in which the court may elect to order that costs be payable forthwith. The same is ostensibly the case in the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and Tasmania, although the rules in these jurisdictions contain no explicit presumptive starting point. On the other hand, in the Northern Territory, Victoria and Western Australia the issue centres on the occasions in which

the court is inclined to make an order other than costs being payable forthwith. 14.47 Outside of the Northern Territory, Victoria and Western Australia, the case law reveals that a court is most inclined to order that interlocutory costs be payable forthwith in cases that exhibit one or (usually) more of the following characteristics: the proceedings giving rise to the order are sufficiently self-contained and detached (‘discrete’) from proceedings yet to be heard to make it just for an actual payment to be made in the meantime; there has been some unreasonable conduct by the party against whom the costs were ordered; a considerable time is likely to elapse before the conclusion of the proceedings; the order would not work hardship on the party liable but not making it would prejudice the party entitled to the costs. For example, in Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd258 Barrett J ordered interlocutory costs to be paid immediately as the interlocutory hearing was ‘a separate and completed phase of the proceedings’, the defendant’s costs had been abnormally increased by its opponent serving voluminous material very late, and the final hearing was some 12 months in the future. And in Hamod v State of New South Wales259 Simpson J ordered that interlocutory costs be payable forthwith because the interlocutory proceeding involved a discrete issue determined adversely to the defendant, the substantive proceedings had some time to go before they were likely to be resolved, the plaintiffs had been put to considerable expense in a matter in which they were pitted against the resources of the state, the plaintiffs’ resources were limited, and such an order would work no hardship to the defendant. The case law also reveals that an interlocutory application having the effect of entirely removing one of several causes of action may justify an order for payment of costs forthwith.260 The expanding statutory or rule-based policy directed to cash management that promotes the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings261 may, moreover, drive courts increasingly to order the payment

of interlocutory costs forthwith, where the question(s) are sufficiently discrete. Indeed, a New South Wales judge has remarked that as a matter of policy, ‘unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, orders for the costs of a separate question should be made at the time of the separate hearing and should not await the [page 456] conclusion of the proceedings’.262 In a subsequent case the same judge added that as ‘delaying costs orders in relation to a determined separate question does not assist the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings’, if a discrete aspect of the proceedings has been determined finally, ‘the consequent liability for costs should not be left in limbo’.263 14.48 But if the court considers that the immediate enforcement of an interlocutory costs order may be unduly burdensome on the party liable, it may stay recovery until the conclusion of the matter.264 If the effect of an order for payment forthwith would stultify the proceedings and there is no evidence that the receiving party would suffer prejudice from the delay in receiving costs, the court is unlikely to make the order.265 It may be, moreover, that a court may refrain from ordering interlocutory costs to be paid forthwith if the matter raises the real prospect of further interlocutory applications, informed by the concern that the separate enforcement of interlocutory costs orders, aside from adding expense, can distract from the prosecution of the substantive proceedings.266

Taxation of order for costs of interlocutory proceeding 14.49 The court rules in the High Court, Federal Court, Northern Territory, South Australia and Victoria make specific provision for the taxation of interlocutory costs. In other jurisdictions the issue depends on the terms of the court’s order, although in New South Wales and Western Australia practice notes have impacted on the relevant practice.

High Court and Federal Court 14.50 The High Court and Federal Court rules state that a costs order of an interlocutory proceeding does not, unless the court otherwise orders, entitle a party to have a bill of costs taxed until the principal proceeding is concluded or further order.267 The policy is that in the ordinary course of litigation, costs awarded in interlocutory proceedings are not paid until the [page 457] conclusion of the proceeding, when set-offs can be made in light of the ultimate orders for costs. As explained by Emmett J in Brasington v Overton Investments Pty Ltd:268 The rationale for such a provision appears … to be that, since an interlocutory proceeding does not resolve the final issue between the parties, it would, in ordinary circumstances, be inappropriate that an unsuccessful party in an interlocutory proceeding be required to pay costs immediately, as that party might ultimately be entitled to an order for costs in the substantive proceeding. The general principle appears to be that costs ought to be resolved when the proceeding has been concluded, and the rights of the parties have been finally determined.

There is also the undesirability of having taxation issues dealt with seriatim;269 avoided is ‘a plethora or endless succession of taxations’.270 Coupled with this is an access to justice aspect: that impecunious litigants who have a meritorious claim or defence ought not to forced out of court due to inability to meet interlocutory costs orders.271 It may, moreover, reveal a policy to discourage the making of interlocutory applications, which may be restricted by the absence of an entitlement to immediate recovery of the costs of a successful interlocutory application.272 The foregoing justifies a broad interpretation of the phrase ‘interlocutory proceeding’ in this respect, as explained by Drummond J:273 … ‘an interlocutory proceeding’, for the purposes of [the rule], is any proceeding in the course of an action other than that in which the entire action is concluded by a judgment or order that authoritatively determines those rights and obligations of the parties that are the subject matter of the dispute that gave rise to the litigation. It does not … matter that an order made in a proceeding occurring during the pendency of the action can be seen to finally resolve one of a number of discrete issues or causes of action: such a proceeding will, for the purposes of [the rule] still be ‘an interlocutory proceeding’ and the bar against taxation of the costs of that proceeding will apply, unless the Court otherwise orders.

14.51 A court may exercise its discretion to ‘otherwise order’ if the

interlocutory application dealt with a discrete issue, especially where the litigation is complex and final judgment will not be given for some time and the applicant has already incurred considerable costs.274 Proceedings that are final, although commenced within an umbrella of principal proceedings — contempt proceedings are a typical example — may generate a costs order to be taxed forthwith.275 Such an order may also be appropriate where, through no fault of the party [page 458] successful on the interlocutory application, there has been substantial delay in the proceedings postponing a final determination in the matter.276 This may be so, for example, if an applicant has attempted several versions of the statement of claim resulting in additional directions hearings, interlocutory applications and delays.277 Yet delay in a proceeding does not by itself dictate that an order for payment of costs, in the interim, of costs is appropriate; the relevant inquiry focuses on the relative levels of prospective prejudice to each party.278 Ultimately, though, as the rule prescribes no particular criteria to guide a court in approaching the application, the discretion to ‘otherwise order’ is exercisable in favour of a party who establishes that the demands of justice require that the general practice envisaged by the rule be ousted.279 This must be seen against the backdrop of a view expressed by some judges — and one consistent with the modern approach to case management — that the power to order that costs be taxed forthwith should be used less sparingly than in the past, particularly in lengthy and complex cases involving substantial costs thrown away as a result of ill-considered pleadings being drawn.280

Northern Territory 14.52 The rules state that costs the subject of an interlocutory order are not taxed until the conclusion of the proceeding to which they relate, but reserve in the court the discretion to order that the costs be taxed at an earlier stage.281 Again, the aim is to reduce the administrative

[page 459] burden of having to tax orders for costs made in interlocutory matters, which may prove unnecessary, as well as to obviate the need for the payment, and then repayment, of costs by one party, who may have had both favourable and unfavourable cost orders made as a result of interlocutory proceedings over the lifetime of the action.282 14.53 The foregoing does not mean that the discretion to order taxation at an earlier stage is constrained by any particular circumstances or considerations.283 Yet the general rule seems to be primarily directed towards costs orders involving relatively small sums of money, although that it not to say that an order to tax forthwith cannot be made in such a case.284 That the interlocutory application lacks any real merit may incline the court to order that its costs be taxed forthwith.285 It is also relevant to consider whether the successful party should have reasonably anticipated interlocutory proceedings of the kind in question, in which case he or she ‘should have anticipated bearing the expense, at least to the conclusion of the proceedings, and not reckoned on having it paid for by the other party’.286 If the kind of interlocutory application, or their number, could not have been so anticipated, the case for ordering that the successful party’s costs be taxed and paid earlier may be stronger. In TTE Pty Ltd v Ken Day Pty Ltd,287 for example, the defendant made several interlocutory applications on the day the action came to trial, causing the trial dates to be abandoned and requiring orders for the future conduct of the proceedings. Orders were made, by consent, that the defendant pay the plaintiffs’ costs of and incidental to the hearing of the interlocutory applications, and the costs thrown away due to the adjournment of the trial. The plaintiffs sought further orders that these costs be taxed and paid by the defendant before the conclusion of the proceedings. Martin J held that the defendant’s concession of liability for the plaintiffs’ costs revealed ‘an appreciation of the circumstances in which a party might expect to have an order made against him’.288 As the defendant’s acts and omissions caused the trial dates to be abandoned, his Honour found it not unreasonable for the plaintiffs to have anticipated the costs attendant upon the hearing of these interlocutory applications and the vacating of the trial dates.289 He therefore

ordered the costs to be taxed forthwith. And where, in Guernier v Patterson,290 the plaintiffs had made repeated interlocutory applications for relief because of the defendants’ continuing failure to comply with the orders made, and had secured seven orders for costs, Kearney J held that not only was it appropriate to make an order for the costs of the interlocutory proceedings,291 but also to order that the costs be taxed forthwith.

South Australia 14.54 The former South Australian rules were amended, with effect on 23 May 2002, to provide that ‘[a]n order for costs of an interlocutory proceeding shall not, unless the court otherwise orders, entitle a party to have a bill of costs taxed until the principal proceeding [page 460] in which the interlocutory order was made is concluded or further order’.292 Notwithstanding the absence of such a rule prior to that date, the court had assumed a power to order the payment and taxation of costs of interlocutory proceedings before the main proceedings had been determined, presumably pursuant to the court’s general statutory costs discretion.293 The current rules contain a similar provision, to the effect that subject to any court order to the contrary, a schedule of costs (the equivalent of a bill of costs) is not to be adjudicated (the equivalent of taxation) upon until after the principal proceedings have been concluded.294 14.55 Because the former and current rules align with the tenor of the High Court and Federal Court Rules (as well as those in the Northern Territory), South Australian courts have identified their rationale in similar terms.295 Like their counterparts, the exercise of the court’s discretion is informed by the interests of justice, having regard to the fact that the general rule is that costs are not payable until the conclusion of the principal proceeding. It follows that to supplement it by epithets such as ‘rare’ or ‘exceptional’ is to ‘add words to the rule in an impermissible manner, which may cause the exercise of the court’s discretion to be improperly fettered’.296 Similarly, factors that influence the Federal Court (and Northern Territory Supreme

Court) to apply the general rule, or to oust its application on the facts, have likewise influenced South Australian judges. In H Stanke & Sons Pty Ltd v Von Stanke (No 2),297 for example, even though some time would elapse until the conclusion of the litigation, White J nonetheless refused to order that interlocutory costs be taxed forthwith. His Honour was influenced by, inter alia, the lack of any suggestion of the prospect of hardship or prejudice as a result of an inability to proceed immediately to taxation, and the fact that many issues in the proceedings were being hotly contested. As to the latter, he remarked that ‘there is no reason to suppose that a taxation of costs … would be any different’, and that a taxation, were it permitted, ‘would take some time and might well be distractive of the parties’ energies’.298 Conversely, in Alstom Power Ltd v Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd (No 2), Debelle J found it to be in the interests of justice to order that the plaintiff be at liberty to have its costs taxed and paid forthwith, for the reasons contained in the following extract:299 As such an application is usually made at quite an early stage in the proceedings, the successful party may not be able to enjoy the benefit of the order for costs for a reasonably lengthy period of time. In this case the plaintiff has succeeded and it is quite unlikely that it will be able to enjoy the costs order for a very long time, especially as the issues in the counterclaim will require an examination of many aspects of a complex building contract. The order will not cause financial disadvantage or otherwise stifle the proceedings. It is the kind of order which, generally speaking, satisfies the criteria identified earlier in these reasons. It is a discrete order made at an early stage of the proceedings. There is no likelihood that the order requiring the costs of the application to be paid will disadvantage the defendants. They are all companies of financial substance. They are all liable to pay the costs, jointly as well as severally. They are in a position where each may contribute to the costs. The full burden of the order for costs will therefore not fall on any one of them.

And in S, DJ v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd300 the Full Court directed that interlocutory costs ordered in the plaintiff’s favour be paid and taxed forthwith because, inter alia, the [page 461] defendants were substantial corporations with the clear capacity to pay those costs whereas the plaintiff was in difficult financial circumstances. Debelle J reasoned that the disparity between the litigants’ financial resources had the capacity to exhaust the means of the plaintiff to prosecute the suit, and that

the interests of justice meant that this disparity ‘should not cause the plaintiff to have to abandon these proceedings because he can no longer afford to prosecute them’.301 What also led the court to so order was that the proceedings had a considerable distance to run, the issues agitated on the interlocutory orders had been resolved, and ‘[m]ore importantly, the costs orders will not be disturbed whatever the outcome of the litigation’.302

Victoria 14.56 Prior to 1 April 2013, the Victorian position derived from a combination of various court rules. The rule that a party to whom costs are awarded on an interlocutory application is entitled to be paid those costs forthwith unless the court orders otherwise,303 when coupled with the rule that an order for costs means taxed costs304 which may be taxed without an order for taxation,305 together indicated that a party who obtains such an order is entitled to tax those costs immediately unless the court otherwise orders.306 As from 1 April 2013, however, the rules address the issue explicitly, by directing that a party in whose favour a costs order is made on an interlocutory application or hearing cannot tax those costs until the proceeding in which the order is made is completed, unless the court orders that the costs may be taxed immediately.307

Practice notes — New South Wales and Western Australia 14.57 By way of practice note, the normal rule in the Commercial List and Technology and Construction List of the New South Wales Supreme Court is that, for a costs order made on an interlocutory application, the party benefiting from the order may proceed to assessment forthwith.308 In 2005 the Western Australian Supreme Court, via a practice direction, signalled a change in its previous practice, to the effect that, as a general rule, where an order for costs in interlocutory proceedings is to be made against a party, the costs are fixed (not taxed) and payable forthwith or by a particular date.309 With its consolidation of practice directions in 2009, the court reissued this direction.310 This, it has been said, is not designed to put an onus on the plaintiff, but simply to recognise a usual practice of the court in exercising a discretion that is not otherwise confined.311

Jurisdictions without specific provision in court rules or practice notes 14.58 Generally the terms of the court’s order as to interlocutory costs determine when those costs may be taxed and recovered.312 An order for costs ‘in any event’ means that its recipient is not entitled either to tax or recover its costs until the conclusion of the litigation — whether [page 462] by judgment or compromise — but may, on the happening of that event, recover those costs regardless of the ultimate outcome in the case.313 The court may make an order entitling a party to the costs of an interlocutory step in the proceedings without appending the words ‘in any event’, but prohibit its enforcement until the proceedings are concluded. This may be appropriate where a party will suffer no prejudice if it is kept out of its costs for a short time, and in which case if that party proves ultimately unsuccessful, the award of costs in its favour can be set off against those it is required to pay.314 Conversely, an interlocutory order for costs not expressed to be ‘in any event’ (such as where it simply refers to ‘defendant’s costs’ or ‘plaintiff’s costs’) is taxable and payable forthwith.315 The general rule here is that a party who receives a bare costs order is entitled without further order to have the costs taxed immediately, and the order for payment takes effect at the date of the certificate of taxation without reference to the stage the proceedings generally have reached.316

Proceedings Not Determined on the Merits Proceedings discontinued or withdrawn Starting point — costs follow the event 14.59 The general law entitles a plaintiff to discontinue or withdraw the suit on payment of the defendant’s costs.317 A defendant should not, it is

reasoned, be out of pocket in defending a proceeding the plaintiff chooses not to proceed with. This policy is reflected by the court rules in each jurisdiction. The Federal Court Rules state that, unless the terms of a consent or an order of the court provide otherwise, a party who files a notice of discontinuance is liable to pay the costs of each other party to the proceeding in relation to the claim, or part of the claim, that is discontinued.318 The rules, accordingly, envisage a prima facie entitlement on the part of the party not discontinuing to costs,319 which under former rules applied only for a discontinuance without leave.320 Yet even under the former rules the cases revealed occasions where the costs consequences in question flowed as a condition of granting leave.321 In New South Wales the rules state that where proceedings are discontinued by the plaintiff with the court’s leave or the defendant’s consent,322 unless the court orders otherwise, [page 463] ‘the plaintiff must pay such of the defendant’s costs as, at the date on which the notice of discontinuance was filed, had been incurred by the defendant in relation to each claim in respect of which the proceedings have been discontinued’.323 The High Court, Northern Territory, South Australian and Victorian rules state that, unless the court otherwise orders, a party who discontinues a proceeding or withdraws part of it must pay the opponent’s costs to the time of the discontinuance or withdrawal.324 The same is the case in the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and Tasmania where a proceeding is discontinued without the court’s leave, but if done with leave, the court may make a costs order it considers just.325 In Western Australia, the rules require a plaintiff who discontinues an action at any time before receipt of the defendant’s defence, or after its receipt but before taking any other step in the action, to pay the defendant’s costs to date.326 Otherwise, a plaintiff can only discontinue the action with leave of the court, which may be granted ‘upon such terms as to costs … as may be just’.327

14.60 The rules in most jurisdictions add that if a party ordered to pay the costs of a discontinued proceeding sues on the same, or substantially the same, cause of action, the court may stay the proceeding until those costs are paid.328 14.61 In most jurisdictions parallel provision to the above is made as to the discontinuance of appeals.329 In any case, it may be said that as the parties to an appeal have had the determination of a court, if an appeal against that determination is not prosecuted for any reason, the respondent should as a general rule be entitled to its costs.330 14.62 The court rules generally supply no indication of the basis upon which the costs of the party against whom the proceeding is discontinued are to be quantified. The Tasmanian and Western Australian rules require the costs to be taxed, but do not prescribe the applicable basis [page 464] of taxation,331 and so the ordinary party and party basis should apply.332 Where, however, leave to discontinue is sought from the court,333 it may be granted on any terms as may be just,334 and the court may grant leave on terms that the costs be taxed on a basis other than the party and party basis.335 In other jurisdictions it can be assumed that, if taxation or assessment of the costs is sought or allowed, argument can be placed before the court as to the basis of the taxation, although consistent with the usual approach to the quantification of costs the general rule is that the party and party basis applies.336

Circumstances where the court may ‘otherwise order’ 14.63 The starting point that costs follow the event once a notice of discontinuance is filed is not inflexible; it is subject to the court’s discretion to ‘otherwise order’. Importantly, the starting point prescribed by the rules does not, it has been held, confine the court’s discretion by creating any presumptive entitlement to costs in the opposing party.337 It is relevant but not determinative in the exercise of the costs discretion. After all, the

circumstances in which a party may discontinue, and thus the circumstances in which the court may be required to exercise its costs discretion, are diverse.338 Accordingly, the discretion is exercisable by reference to ‘the whole landscape comprising the course of the proceedings’,339 and to ‘otherwise order’ is not premised upon proof of special or unusual circumstances.340 What the starting point does [page 465] is to place the onus on the discontinuing party to make an application in respect of costs if it wishes to avoid paying the opponent’s costs.341 14.64 The parties’ conduct in the matter and the reasons for the discontinuance, including the circumstances surrounding its commencement and continuance, can bear heavily on the exercise of the costs discretion. For instance, a plaintiff may be allowed to discontinue the action without costs if the defendant’s acts or omissions have rendered the suit useless.342 In such a case, the defendant may even be ordered to pay costs. An example is where the plaintiff’s action for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of land is discontinued because the defendant vendor cannot make a good title. In Williams v Miller343 the plaintiff sued for specific performance of an agreement for lease. In her statement of defence the defendant alleged that she had no such title as would enable her to grant the lease. Street CJ in Eq held that, as the defendant relied by way of defence on the proven fact that she had no title to grant the lease, the plaintiff was justified in getting rid of her suit as quickly and cheaply as she could. His Honour ordered that the suit be dismissed and that the defendant pay the costs of the motion to dismiss, opining that ‘it savours … of effrontery that the defendant, after admitting that she was never in a position to do what she contracted to do, should resist the application’.344 The same may be the outcome where the defendant, by rectifying the breach that gave rise to the claim prior to trial,345 or giving an undertaking not to repeat the breach,346 nullifies the subject matter of the plaintiff’s claim. The plaintiff in such a case has achieved his or her aim in instituting the suit, and so ordinarily justice requires that the plaintiff receive costs up to the date the breach is rectified. A defendant who encouraged the plaintiff to sue by

concealing the existence of a defence, though invited prior to the action to make disclosure, may also be ordered to pay a discontinuing plaintiff’s costs.347 14.65 Where, on the other hand, the matter is discontinued because it is settled, the absence of a trial on the merits dictates, as a starting point, that each party bears its own costs.348 The circumstances where the court may, in such a case, nonetheless order a litigant to pay costs are discussed separately below.349 A court may also be inclined to make no order as to costs where proceedings are discontinued due to the subject matter of the action ceasing to exist through the lawful actions of a third party, or the proceedings have otherwise been rendered futile by [page 466] external events (sometimes termed a ‘supervening event’).350 The relevant principle in this context has been phrased in the following terms:351 … where there has been a supervening event that has so altered the subject matter of the dispute, the proper exercise of the discretion would ordinarily be to make no costs order unless: (a) one of the parties has acted so unreasonably that the other party should obtain the costs of the proceedings; or (b) even if the parties had acted reasonably, one party was almost certain to have succeeded if the subject matter of the dispute had not changed or been rendered inutile so that that party should obtain the costs of the proceedings.

Accordingly, it may prove necessary to distinguish the situation in which a proceeding has been overtaken by a ‘supervening event’, or has become futile, from one in which a proceeding might always have been futile, in the sense of being doomed to fail352 (a distinction that applies equally in the context of compromises).353 The latter falls into the paragraph (b) scenario mentioned in the quote. If the discontinuance, or failure, on an issue, has ensued only because the (governmental) opponent has altered the law to undermine the claim, costs in respect of the claim may legitimately lie in the opponent.354 This is an illustration of a paragraph (b) scenario. Conversely, a discontinuance due to the plaintiff’s death is not, in the usual case, likely to prompt a costs order, at least if the claim is non-transmissible.355

Proceedings not determined on the merits because

of compromise Starting point — each party bears own costs 14.66 Where a suit is compromised before hearing, and the parties have reached no agreement as to costs, the issue may arise as to whether, and if so how, a court can exercise its costs discretion in the absence of a full hearing on the merits. The lack of such a hearing deprives the court of the main factor that determines whether or how it will make a costs order: the ultimate outcome of the case. It is tempting as a starting point to simply say that the [page 467] appropriate course is that each party bear its own costs.356 There is, to this end, considerable case authority supportive of the view that it is rarely appropriate, without a trial on the merits, for a court to seek to determine a case on the merits for the purpose of making a costs order, particularly if such a trial would involve complex factual matters where credit could be an issue.357 A New South Wales judge has warned, to this end, that courts ‘should be careful not to raise the ogre of shadow trials of issues in cases that have not comprised a hearing on the merits’, fearing that it would otherwise discourage parties from settling their disputes.358 It follows that, at least in cases where the conduct of each party in the litigation has been reasonable, and there is no satisfactory basis upon which the court can make an assessment of the merits, each party will ordinarily be ordered to bear his or her own costs.359 In Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,360 for example, an applicant for a protection visa, who failed to oust the minister’s refusal of her application in review proceedings before the Refugee Review Tribunal, commenced proceedings in the High Court. Before this application was heard, the minister granted a protection visa to the applicant, who then applied for costs,361 up to the time the visa was granted. McHugh J opined that the application to the High Court would have likely failed, but added that it was not ordinarily the court’s function on a costs application to predict the outcome of a hypothetical case.362 As there was nothing to suggest that the applicant had acted unreasonably in bringing

the application, or that the conduct of the minister or his advisers been unreasonable,363 his Honour made no order as to the costs of the proceedings.

Circumstances where a court may nonetheless make a costs order 14.67 Even though courts may be disinclined to make costs orders in respect of compromised proceedings, the very nature of the costs discretion dictates that, where it is just to make a costs order, the court can exercise its discretion to do so.364 As in other contexts, the exercise of this discretion is not premised on proof of special circumstances or the like,365 but is informed by the conduct of the parties. Because the compromise deprives the court of the ‘event’, the discretion [page 468] here is also informed by whether, notwithstanding no final ruling on the merits, the court is, on the material available, nonetheless able to confidently assess the merits. 14.68 In Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Ltd366 Hill J remarked that, if neither party wishes to proceed with a matter, the court should be ready to facilitate its conclusion by making a costs order. In addressing the issue of costs, according to his Honour, it is appropriate for the court to assess whether or not the parties acted reasonably in commencing and defending the suit. This approach has been applied, for example, in administrative law matters where the defendant has acted unreasonably in exercising or refusing to exercise a power and the plaintiff had no reasonable alternative but to commence litigation.367 An order against the plaintiff was made in Golden City Car & Truck Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation,368 in which the suit was found to have been brought without real prospect of success but to frustrate proceedings in another court, making the respondent’s defence ‘entirely reasonable’. 14.69 What is the more likely to incline a court to make a costs order in a compromised proceeding is that, although each party has acted reasonably, it finds that one party almost certainly would have succeeded had the matter

reached judgment.369 Such a conclusion is supportable where the settlement terms essentially vindicate the case advanced by one of the parties370 — in the sense that one party has in effect capitulated to the other — although caution here may be required because terms of a settlement may not necessarily equate to the outcome as adjudicated by the court.371 It may also be justified where the proceeding is settled once the hearing is almost complete, if the judge is able to form a considered view as to its merits. In Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland372 Goldberg J formed such a view of the merits because, by the time parallel proceedings had attained judgment with the result that the Federal Court proceedings were obviated, all relevant matters had been fully argued in the latter court, and he was well advanced in the preparation of his reasons for judgment. Where the court finds not only that one party would in all likelihood have succeeded had the matter proceeded to its conclusion, but also that the other party acted unreasonably in commencing or defending the proceeding, the case for a costs order is the more compelling again.373 14.70 That the proceedings end after interlocutory relief has been granted is unlikely to be determinative of the ultimate merits for this purpose. The proceedings may have ended for a variety of reasons, not necessarily related to the relative strength of the respective cases. So, for instance, that an applicant has established a prima facie case sufficient to secure an interlocutory injunction will rarely instil in the court the confidence necessary to predict [page 469] the likely outcome of the case.374 An interlocutory application of this kind rarely involves submissions and evidence so detailed that a judge can make an informed assessment of the ultimate merits.

Impact of court rules — Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and Western Australia 14.71 In view of the foregoing, it is not surprising that court rules in some

jurisdictions eschew a general rule, instead simply prescribing a general discretion. The Australian Capital Territory and Queensland rules, for instance, provide that when for any reason it becomes unnecessary to continue a proceeding other than for the limited purpose of deciding who should pay costs, any party may apply to the court to determine that question, which may make such order as is just.375 Such a rule contemplates that ‘where proceedings continue in order that the court may decide who should pay costs the parties should present, in an orderly and comprehensive manner, sufficient evidence for the adjudication to be made’, and that ‘[u]sually, though not invariably, the party who wants an order for costs will demonstrate that, had the action proceeded to judgment, it would have been successful’.376 The same may be said regarding the equivalent Western Australian rule, which prescribes that ‘[w]here for any reason there is no substantial trial, the Judge or the Taxing Officer may make such allowance in lieu of the fees prescribed by any relevant scale as he considers to be merited in the circumstances’.377

Impact of court rules — acceptance of offer of compromise 14.72 The Federal Court Rules envisage that if the offeree accepts an offer that does not include his or her costs, ‘the offeree may tax costs on a party and party basis against the offeror up to and including 14 days after the offer was made’.378 The rules in the Northern Territory, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia provide that, upon the acceptance of an offer made under the rules,379 the defendant must, unless the court otherwise orders, pay the plaintiff’s costs up to the date of that acceptance (in the Northern Territory and Victoria, up to the date the offer was served).380 If a notice of offer contains a term that purports to negative or limit the operation of the above, that term is of no effect for this purpose.381 Similar provision is made in the New South Wales rules, except that they apply to offers made by either party.382 In South Australia the rules provide that if the plaintiff’s acceptance of a formal offer of settlement occurs after 14 days from the day on which the offer was served, the court may, on [page 470]

the application of any other party, order that the plaintiff pay the costs of action incurred by that other party during some or all of the period after the expiry of that 14 day period.383

Impact of court rules — acceptance of payment into court 14.73 Ordinarily, acceptance by a plaintiff of an amount paid into court by a defendant entitles the plaintiff to costs to the time of payment in.384 The court rules in some jurisdictions make provision in this vein, albeit not in identical terms. The Northern Territory rules state that a plaintiff who, before the trial or hearing begins, accepts money paid into court by a defendant (D) in answer to a claim, abandons that claim as against all other defendants sued on that claim jointly with D, and abandons any other claim, may after payment out tax his or her costs of the proceeding in respect of the claims for relief against D incurred before payment into court, unless the court orders otherwise.385 Where a defendant who has counterclaimed pays money into court stating that he or she takes into account the counterclaim with a view to its abandonment in case the money is accepted, and the money is accepted before the trial or hearing begins, that defendant may, unless the court otherwise orders, tax his or her costs of the counterclaim incurred before service of notice of the acceptance.386 The Tasmanian rules entitle a plaintiff who, within 14 days of the receipt of a notice of money paid into court or before the commencement of the trial (whichever is the earlier), accepts the whole or a part of the money specified in the notice in satisfaction of the claim to which the money relates, unless the court otherwise orders, to tax any costs incurred to the time of acceptance of money paid into court.387 Where there is payment into court by more than one defendant, the costs of the plaintiff as against a defendant whose payment into court was accepted are in the discretion of the court.388

1.

Donald Campbell & Co Ltd v Pollak [1927] AC 732 at 809, 811 per Viscount Cave LC; Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 121; BC9800310 per Kirby J; Boylan v Farthing (1999) 86 FCR 120 at 126; [1999] FCA 267; BC9901023 (FC).

2.

See ACT r 1720(1); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98(2) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 8); NT r 63.14; Vic r 63.13.

3.

See 7.2.

4.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(3)(a); Fam LR 2004 r 19.08(2)(a) (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 29(a)); ACT r 1701(1)(a); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98(3) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 5); NT r 63.04(1); Qld r 682(1) (formerly Qld r 680(1)); SA r 265(1) (formerly SA RSC r 101.01(4)); Vic r 63.03(1) (see also Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 65C(3)); WA O 66 r 10(1).

5.

See 14.3–14.22.

6.

See 14.23–14.58.

7.

See 14.59–14.73.

8.

See 7.42–7.47.

9.

Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Ivanoff (1991) 22 NSWLR 368 at 377 per Mahoney JA.

10. See 6.15. 11. As to capping orders see 7.42–7.47. 12. In the family law context see 14.16–14.17. 13. See ‘Pre-Emptive Costs Orders’ (2001) 20 CJQ 208. 14. Bonnyrigg Turkish Islamic Cultural Association v Abdullah [2002] NSWSC 100; BC200200517 at [24] per Young CJ in Eq; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v GDK Financial Solutions Pty Ltd (in iq) (No 4) (2008) 169 FCR 497; [2008] FCA 858; BC200804403 at [10] per Finkelstein J (who remarked that the principles that Chancery Courts developed in relation to representative parties in the trusts context (see 14.11–14.15) can be extended by analogy to receivers, liquidators and administrators; in the circumstances, his Honour made a pre-emptive order, out of the insolvent company’s assets, in favour of a liquidator to defend proceedings disputing those assets: at [22]–[25]). 15. Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 QB 373 at 399 per Buckley LJ. 16. Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 QB 373 at 399 per Buckley LJ. 17. Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 QB 373 at 400 per Buckley LJ (who rejected this option). See also A J Boyle, ‘Indemnifying the Minority Shareholder’ [1976] JBL 18 at 23–4. 18. See 3.48–3.49. Cf the English position prior to its statutory reversal (see 3.48), as discussed in Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 QB 373 at 401–3 per Buckley LJ (cf at 395 per Lord Denning MR in dissent on this point). 19. Such as, for example, a trustee who properly and reasonably prosecutes or defends an action relating to the trust property or the execution of the trust, who is entitled to be indemnified out of the trust property: see 10.3–10.6. 20. [1975] 1 QB 373 at 403–4. See also at 391–2 per Lord Denning MR; Smith v Croft [1986] 2 All ER 551 at 559 per Walton J. 21. Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 QB 373 at 404–5 per Buckley LJ, at 392 per Lord Denning MR, at 407 per Scarman LJ. 22. Re Beddoe [1893] 1 Ch 547 at 557–8 per Lindley LJ. As to this jurisdiction see 10.5–10.6. 23. Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 QB 373 at 392. See also at 404 per Buckley LJ; A J Boyle, ‘Indemnifying the Minority Shareholder’ [1976] JBL 18 at 21–3.

24. Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 QB 373 at 405. 25. Smith v Croft [1986] 2 All ER 551 at 557 per Walton J. 26. Smith v Croft [1986] 2 All ER 551 at 559 per Walton J. 27. Smith v Croft [1986] 2 All ER 551 at 557–8 per Walton J. 28. Smith v Croft [1986] 2 All ER 551 at 565 per Walton J. 29. Farrow v Registrar of Building Societies [1991] 2 VR 589 at 590 per Marks J. See also Parker v National Roads and Motorists’ Association (1993) 11 ACSR 370 at 401; BC9302091 per Clarke JA (CA(NSW)) (see R Baxt, ‘Indemnifying the Costs of a Minority Shareholder-Director: New Law or No Law’ (1994) 12 C&SLJ 112); Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd (No 4) (1993) 13 WAR 11 at 86–7; BC9301490 per Ipp J; Reale v Duncan Reale Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1099; BC200608467 at [51]–[52] per Austin J. 30. Jaybird Group Ltd v Greenwood [1986] BCLC 319 at 327 per Deputy Judge Wheeler QC; Farrow v Registrar of Building Societies [1991] 2 VR 589 at 596 per Marks J. Cf Smith v Croft [1986] 2 All ER 551 at 565 per Walton J. 31. Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnja Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) (1998) 30 ACSR 20 at 25 per Young J (SC(NSW)). 32. Reale v Duncan Reale Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1099; BC200608467 at [52] per Austin J. 33. Standing in this context extends to a person who is a member, former member, or person entitled to be registered as a member, of the company or of a related body corporate, and to an officer or former officer of the company: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 236(1). 34. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 236, 237. 35. The terms of the jurisdiction have been held to be wide enough to encompass non-party costs orders: Links Golf Tasmania Pty Ltd v Sattler (No 2) (2012) 297 ALR 724; BC201208949 at [38] per Jessup J. As to costs orders against non-parties see Ch 22. 36. Cf Companies Act 1993 (NZ) s 166, which requires the court, on the application of the shareholder or director to whom leave was granted to bring or intervene in the proceedings, to ‘order that the whole or part of the reasonable costs of bringing or intervening in the proceedings … must be met by the company unless the court considers that it would be unjust or inequitable for the company to bear those costs’. It has been said that s 166 is ‘designed to overcome the disincentive to litigate stemming from the normal rule that the losing party will pay the other side’s costs’ and ‘clearly recognises that the derivative action is a proceeding on the company’s behalf, and so ought to be paid for by the company’: L Thai and M Berkahn, ‘Statutory Derivative Actions in Australia and New Zealand: What can we Learn from Each Other?’ (2012) 25 NZULR 370 at 390 (and who maintain that s 166, whereunder the default option is for the company to meet the costs of derivative proceedings, is preferable to the more open-ended provision in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 242: at 393). 37. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 236(3). 38. Reale v Duncan Reale Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1099; BC200608467 at [46] per Austin J. 39. Foyster v Foyster Holdings Pty Ltd (prov liq apptd) (2003) 44 ACSR 705; [2003] NSWSC 135; BC200300884 at [12] per Barrett J (‘The court is free to approach matters with which [s 242] deals unconfined by statutory prescriptions and by reference to the discretions that apply in the ordinary course in deciding applications for costs’). 40. Charlton v Baber (2003) 47 ACSR 31; [2003] NSWSC 745; BC200304563 at [72] per Barrett J.

41. Roach v Winnote Pty Ltd (2006) 227 ALR 758; [2006] NSWSC 231; BC200602059 at [23]–[29] per Barrett J; Ehsman v Nutectime International Pty Ltd (2006) 58 ACSR 705; [2006] NSWSC 887; BC200606889 at [62] per Austin J; Sub Rosa Holdings Pty Ltd v Salsa Sudada Production Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 916; BC200607054 at [49] per Barrett J. 42. Explanatory Memorandum, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2004 (Cth), at 6.19. 43. K L Fletcher, ‘CLERP and Minority Shareholder Rights’ (2001) 13 AJCL 290 at 299. 44. Wood v Links Golf Tasmania Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 570; BC201003834 at [9] per Finkelstein J. 45. See, for example, Farrow v Registrar of Building Societies [1991] 2 VR 589 at 595 per Marks J. 46. Re Beddoe [1893] 1 Ch 547 at 557 per Lindley LJ. 47. Alcock v Public Trustee (1936) 53 WN (NSW) 192; Re Atkinson (deceased) [1971] VR 612 at 615–16 per Gillard J; Dagnell v J L Freedman & Co (a firm) [1993] 2 All ER 161 at 168–9 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See 10.5. 48. See 10.3–10.4. 49. Re Biddencare [1994] 2 BCLC 160; Alsop Wilkinson (a firm) v Neary [1995] 1 All ER 431 at 437 per Lightman J. 50. Re Westdock Realisations Ltd [1988] BCLC 354 at 359 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson VC. 51. McDonald v Horn [1995] 1 All ER 961 at 971–2 per Hoffmann LJ. See also Alsop Wilkinson (a firm) v Neary [1995] 1 All ER 431 at 437 per Lightman J. 52. [1995] 1 All ER 431. 53. [1982] 3 All ER 118. 54. Re Dallaway [1982] 1 WLR 756 at 761–2. 55. [2004] NSWSC 388; BC200402448 at [26]. 56. See 10.15–10.16. 57. As to which see 14.6. 58. [1995] 1 All ER 961 at 972–3. See also at 975–6 per Balcombe LJ; Laws v National Grid Company plc [1998] PLR 205 at 210–12 per Rimer J, at 217–18 per Laddie J, at 222–6 per Carnwath J; Re British Airways Pension Schemes [2000] PLR 311 at 314–17 per Park J. See generally M Blyth, ‘Pre-emptive Costs Orders in Pensions Litigation in the UK’ (2000) 12(1) SLB 1. 59. McDonald v Horn [1995] 1 All ER 961 at 974. 60. Laws v National Grid Company plc [1998] PLR 205 at 218 per Laddie J. 61. [1998] PLR 205. 62. The actual costs to be taxed on the standard basis. 63. Laws v National Grid Company plc [1998] PLR 205 at 212 per Rimer J (who added that even were the Pensions Ombudsman represented in the appeal, this should not oust this conclusion because ‘there is no certainty that he will advance all the arguments which the applicants would wish to advance’: at 213), at 226–7 per Carnwath J. 64. Laws v National Grid Company plc [1998] PLR 205 at 213 (and in any case his Lordship noted that the precise reasons for any such opposition were not dealt with in the evidence before the

court). 65. See, for example, Re UEB Industries Ltd Pension Plan [1989] 2 NZLR 252; Turner v Telecommunication Workers Pension Plan (2001) 197 DLR (4th) 533 at 541–2 per Newbury JA (CA(BC)); Trustee Corporation v Nadir [2001] BPIR 541; Chessels v British Telecommunications plc [2002] PLR 141 at [57]–[59] per Laddie J. Cf Re British Airways Pension Schemes [2000] PLR 311 (where, in a case involving a proposal to merge pensions schemes of considerable value, Park J found it was open to make a pre-emptive order as to the costs of a representative beneficiary who represented a large and material class of members). 66. This is sometimes termed a ‘Barro order’ after the decision of Strauss J in Barro v Barro (FamCA, 15 September 1980, unreported) and on appeal Barro v Barro (FamCAFC, 6 March 1981, unreported). See, for example, Marriage of Hogan (1986) 10 Fam LR 681 (FC); Marriage of Wilson (1989) 13 Fam LR 205 (FC); Marriage of Poletti (1990) 15 Fam LR 794 (FC); Marriage of Zschokke (1996) 20 Fam LR 766 (FC). See further R Sweet, ‘Making Applications for Interim Costs in Matters Under the Property (Relationships) Act’ (July 2007) 45 LSJ 65. The position may be otherwise where the order is made against a person not a party to the proceedings: see Re JJT (1998) 195 CLR 184 at 189-–0; BC9802630 per Gaudron J (who remarked that an order against a non-party who has no interest in the proceedings or their outcome and no control over them, to provide funds to another is not an order as to costs but simply a maintenance order or, where it is made against a legal aid body, an order for the provision of legal aid). 67. See, for example, Parker v Parker (1992) 16 Fam LR 458; BC9201709; Giller v Procopets [2002] VSC 305; BC200204941; M v W (2006) 96 SASR 105; [2006] SASC 347; BC200609574 (FC). 68. See, for example, Marriage of Alexander (1977) 29 FLR 239 at 243–4 per Goldstein J; Marriage of Raja Bahrin (1986) 11 Fam LR 233 at 269 per Gee J. As to the Family Court’s power to order security for costs see 28.17–28.18. 69. Which empowers the court to make ‘an order pending the disposal of proceedings … or until further order’. 70. Which empowers the court to make any order ‘which it thinks is necessary to make to do justice’. 71. Which permits the court, inter alia, to make interlocutory costs orders: see 8.70. 72. Parker v Parker (1992) 16 Fam LR 458; BC9201709; Giller v Procopets [2002] VSC 305; BC200204941 at [60]–[72] per Kellam J; M v W (2006) 96 SASR 105; [2006] SASC 347; BC200609574 at [2]–[3] per Bleby J, at [103]–[108] per Anderson J (opining that the court has, in any case, an inherent jurisdiction to award interim costs in appropriate cases: at [111]) (contra at [62]–[65], [74]–[78] per Besanko J dissenting, who construed the wording of the costs discretion in s 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) as narrower than equivalent provisions in other jurisdictions). As to costs discretion vested in superior courts see 6.7–6.8, 6.14. 73. Parker v Parker (1992) 16 Fam LR 458 at 460; BC9201709 per Bryson J. 74. [2002] VSC 305; BC200204941 at [38]. See also M v W (2006) 96 SASR 105; [2006] SASC 347; BC200609574 at [11] per Bleby J, at [108], [111] per Anderson J; Galstian v Galstaun [2010] NSWSC 1214; BC201007803 at [19] per Palmer J. 75. M v W (2006) 96 SASR 105; [2006] SASC 347; BC200609574 at [7] per Bleby J. See also Breen v Breen (1991) 65 ALJR 195; Chester v Chester (1995) FLC ¶192-612 at 82,107–8 per Moss J. 76. Giller v Procopets [2002] VSC 305; BC200204941 at [39]–[44] per Kellam J; M v W (2006) 96 SASR 105; [2006] SASC 347; BC200609574 at [102], [117] per Anderson J. 77. Giller v Procopets [2002] VSC 305; BC200204941 at [40] per Kellam J. See also Laity v Warren (1995) DFC ¶195-161 at 77,351 per McLaughlin M.

78. Marriage of Zschokke (1996) 20 Fam LR 766 at 781 (FC). See also M v W (2006) 96 SASR 105; [2006] SASC 347; BC200609574 at [11] per Bleby J (speaking in terms of ‘at least some prima facie claim to that part of the property pool held by or under the control of the other in an amount equal to or exceeding the amount of the interim order’). 79. M v W (2006) 96 SASR 105; [2006] SASC 347; BC200609574 at [11] per Bleby J; Galstian v Galstaun [2010] NSWSC 1214; BC201007803 at [21] per Palmer J. 80. See 10.17–10.29. 81. See 9.2. 82. As to the nature of public interest litigation see 9.2–9.6. 83. Moreover, the Australian Law Reform Commission has recommended that a court or tribunal should, at an early stage in public interest proceedings, ‘be able to indicate the costs order it is likely to make at the end of the proceedings subject to any change in circumstances coming to light in the course of the proceedings’: ALRC 75, p 25. For commentary see E Campbell, ‘Public Interest Costs Orders’ (1998) 20 Adel LR 245 at 259–61. 84. R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2005] 4 All ER 1; [2005] EWCA Civ 192 at [76] per the court; R (Ministry of Defence) v Wiltshire and Swindon Coroner [2005] 4 All ER 40; [2005] EWHC 880 (Admin) at [33]–[34] per Collins J. 85. Delta Electricity v Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc (2010) 176 LGERA 424; [2010] NSWCA 263; BC201007625 at [198] per Basten JA, with whom Macfarlan JA concurred. As to costs capping orders in public interest litigation see 7.45–7.46. 86. See, for example, Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc v Delta Electricity (2009) 170 LGERA 1; [2009] NSWLEC 150 at [45] per Pain J. 87. As to the concept of ‘general public importance’ see R v Wiltshire Primary Health Care Trust [2009] 1 All ER 978; [2008] EWCA Civ 749 at [59]–[63] per Buxton LJ, at [75]–[79] per Smith LJ. See further A McColgan, ‘Limiting the Costs of Litigation — Protective Costs Orders in the Court of Appeal’ (2009) 28 CJQ 169. 88. R v Lord Chancellor [1998] 2 All ER 755 at 765 per Dyson J; Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc v Delta Electricity (2009) 170 LGERA 1; [2009] NSWLEC 150 at [69] per Pain J (affd Delta Electricity v Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc (2010) 176 LGERA 424; [2010] NSWCA 263; BC201007625) (noting that a ‘protective costs order’ should not be lightly made at an early stage in proceedings given that it is occurring before all the issues are known and the result determined). 89. [1998] 2 All ER 755 at 766. Dyson J’s approach was approved by the English Court of Appeal in R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2005] 4 All ER 1; [2005] EWCA Civ 192 at [74] (adding that if those acting for the applicant are doing so pro bono, this will be likely to enhance the merits of the application for a protective costs order; see R Clayton, ‘Public Interest Litigation, Costs and the Role of Legal Aid’ [2006] PL 429); it has also received judicial endorsement in Australia: see Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc v Delta Electricity (2009) 170 LGERA 1; [2009] NSWLEC 150 at [55] per Pain J (affd Delta Electricity v Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc (2010) 176 LGERA 424; [2010] NSWCA 263; BC201007625. Similar prerequisites were identified by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Berkett v Cave [2001] 1 NZLR 667 at 670 (requiring that an applicant show, as a minimum, that, first, the case mounted is clearly arguable, second, there is a substantial public interest in obtaining a decision of the court on the point(s) at issue irrespective of the result, and third, it would be unduly onerous for the plaintiff to be expected to fund the litigation even in the interim). Cf

Bonnyrigg Turkish Islamic Cultural Association v Abdullah [2002] NSWSC 100; BC200200517 at [27] per Young CJ in Eq (who cautioned against taking the three elements in Berkett ‘as gospel’). 90. See, for example, Eweida v British Airways plc [2010] 1 Costs LR 43; [2009] EWCA Civ 1025 at [22], [38] per Lloyd LJ, with whom Moses and Maurice Kay LJJ concurred. 91. [1994] 1 AC 466 (PC). 92. See, for example, Berkett v Cave [2001] 1 NZLR 667 (CA) (involving an unsuccessful application for a pre-trial costs order in litigation brought by persons who, in purporting to represent the interests of all electricity consumers, alleged misuse of power and lack of prudence and care pertaining to the conduct of an Energy Trust). 93. See, for example, R (Ministry of Defence) v Wiltshire and Swindon Coroner [2005] 4 All ER 40; [2005] EWHC 880 (Admin) (where a coroner’s application for a protective costs order was refused because the coroner would be indemnified for costs by the county council provided he acted reasonably: at [35] per Collins J). 94. R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2005] 4 All ER 1; [2005] EWCA Civ 192 at [77] per the court. 95. See, for example, M v W (2006) 96 SASR 105; [2006] SASC 347; BC200609574 at [7] per Bleby J (‘The circumstances in which such costs will be awarded outside matrimonial and de facto property settlement cases will perhaps be rare’), at [108] per Anderson J (‘It is because of the nature of de facto property disputes that s 40(1) [of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA)] empowers the court to make interim orders. In other types of disputes that power may not be properly invoked’). 96. See, for example, M v W (2006) 96 SASR 105; [2006] SASC 347; BC200609574 at [7] per Bleby J (‘Difficulties attending the exercise of the power are not sufficient to deny the power’), at [108] per Anderson J (‘It is finally a matter in the discretion of the courts’). 97. [2003] 3 SCR 371; [2003] SCC 71. 98. Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue) [2007] 1 SCR 38; [2007] SCC 2 at [2] per Bastarache and LeBel JJ, with whom Deschamps, Abella and Rothstein JJ concurred. 99. [2007] 1 SCR 38; [2007] SCC 2 at [33], with whom Deschamps, Abella and Rothstein JJ concurred. 100. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band 2003] 3 SCR 371; [2003] SCC 71 at [40] per Le Bel J, McLachlin CJC, Gonthier, Binnie, Arbour and Deschamps JJ concurring. 101. The courts have adopted a restrictive approach to this inquiry: see, for example, Abdelrazik v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) [2008] FC 839 at [36]–[50] per Mactavish J; Attorney General of Canada v Al Telbani [2011] FC 945 at [24]–[28] per de Montigny J. 102. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band [2003] 3 SCR 371; [2003] SCC 71 at [1] per Le Bel J, McLachlin CJC, Gonthier, Binnie, Arbour and Deschamps JJ concurring. 103. R v Caron [2011] 1 SCR 78; [2011] SCC 5 at [39] per Binnie J, delivering the judgment also of McLachlin CJ, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. 104. Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue) [2007] 1 SCR 38; [2007] SCC 2 at [38] per Bastarache and LeBel JJ, with whom Deschamps, Abella and Rothstein JJ concurred.

105. Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue) [2007] 1 SCR 38; [2007] SCC 2 at [36] per Bastarache and LeBel JJ, with whom Deschamps, Abella and Rothstein JJ concurred. 106. [2007] 1 SCR 38; [2007] SCC 2 at [39]–[42]. 107. Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue) [2007] 1 SCR 38; [2007] SCC 2 at [42] per Bastarache and LeBel JJ, with whom Deschamps, Abella and Rothstein JJ concurred. 108. Dish Network LLC v Rex [2012] BCCA 161 at [55] per Levine JA, delivering the judgment of the court. 109. See 6.8. 110. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v GDK Financial Solutions Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 4) (2008) 169 FCR 497; [2008] FCA 858; BC200804403 at [21] per Finkelstein J. 111. See 9.2. 112. As to which see 9.15–9.34. 113. See Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue) [2007] 1 SCR 38; [2007] SCC 2 at [36] per Bastarache and LeBel JJ, with whom Deschamps, Abella and Rothstein JJ concurred. 114. Vriend v Alberta (1996) 141 DLR (4th) 44 at 53 per Hunt JA (CA(Alta)). 115. See 9.35–9.37. 116. See 9.38. 117. O’Keeffe Nominees Pty Ltd v BP Australia (No 2) (1995) 55 FCR 591 at 598; BC9507763 per Spender J. As to the distinction between final and interlocutory proceedings generally see Brereton v Sinclair (2000) 2 VR 424 at 425–6 per Tadgell JA, at 427–30 per Chernov JA; [2000] VSCA 211; BC200006910. However, there may be grounds for adopting a broader interpretation of ‘interlocutory proceedings’ under the court rules: see 14.50. 118. Such as, for example, an order for costs in contempt proceedings: Real Tech Systems Integration Pty Ltd v Meuross (1998) 82 FCR 150 at 151–2; BC9800915 per Lehane J. 119. Real Tech Systems Integration Pty Ltd v Meuross (1998) 82 FCR 150 at 152; BC9800915 per Lehane J. 120. See 6.15. 121. Scherer v Counting Investments Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 615 at 622 (CA); Evans v Clayhope Properties Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 359 at 363 per Nourse LJ; Dibeek Holdings Pty Ltd v Notaras (1998) 143 FLR 132 at 140; BC9800408 per Higgins J (SC(ACT)). 122. As in NT r 63.02(2) (definitions of ‘costs in the proceeding’, ‘plaintiff’s costs in the proceeding’ and ‘defendant’s costs in the proceeding’). 123. J T Stratford and Son Ltd v Lindley (No 2) [1969] 3 All ER 1122 at 1123 per Lord Denning MR; Edenmead Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1984) 4 FCR 348 at 355 per Spender J. 124. Edenmead Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1984) 4 FCR 348 at 355 per Spender J. 125. Cf Walter v Bewicke, Moreing & Co (1904) 90 LT 409 (where several interlocutory costs orders were made ‘in any event’, the case being subsequently settled on terms of ‘[n]o costs on either side’, it was held that the terms of the settlement did not oust the court’s order as to the costs ‘in any event’).

126. J T Stratford and Son Ltd v Lindley (No 2) [1969] 3 All ER 1122 at 1123 per Lord Denning MR; Allied Collection Agencies Ltd v Wood [1981] 3 All ER 176 at 181 per Neill J. See also NT r 63.02(2) (definition of ‘costs in any event’). 127. Major v Woodside Energy Ltd (No 3) [2009] WASC 246; BC200908171 at [16] per Le Miere J. See, for example, Whitehall Holdings Pty Ltd v Custom Credit Corporation Ltd (FC(WA), Ipp, Pidgeon and Owen JJ, 19 June 1992, unreported) BC9201139 at 2–4 per Ipp J. 128. The same principles have been held to apply to applications for Mareva orders: Southern Equities Corp Ltd (in liq) v Bond (No 4) [2000] SASC 358; BC200006635 at [5] per Debelle J. The court rules, in any case, now contain a general discretion to make any order about costs that the court considers appropriate in relation to a freezing (‘Mareva’) order or ancillary order: FCR 2011 r 7.38(1) (formerly FCR 1979 O 25A r 8(1)); ACT r 745(1); NSW r 25.17(1); NT r 37A.08(1); Qld r 260G(1); SA r 247(8)(a); Tas r 937H(1); Vic r 37A.08(1); WA O 52A r 8(1)), although the exercise of this discretion will no doubt be informed by the considerations noted in the text. An equivalent discretion is conferred by court rules in relation to Anton Piller (‘search’) orders: FCR 2011 r 7.47(1) (formerly FCR 1979 O 25B r 7(1)); ACT r 755(1); NSW r 25.24(1); NT r 37B.07(1); Qld r 261F(1); SA r 148(7)(a); Tas r 937O(1); Vic r 37B.07(1); WA O 52B r 7(1). 129. Petar v Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 142; BC200704622 at [21]. See also Westpoint Finance Pty Ltd v Chocolate Factory Apartments Ltd (2002) 12 BPR 22,969; [2002] NSWCA 287; BC200205071 at [66]–[67] per Young CJ in Eq; Ausino International Pty Ltd v Apex Sports Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1119; BC200608585 at [55]– [56] per Campbell J; Reed Constructions Australia Pty Ltd v DM Fabrications Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1409; BC200710569 at [6] per Barrett J. The court rules in some jurisdictions provide that if the court grants an interlocutory injunction followed by a further interlocutory injunction continuing the first injunction with or without modification, a costs order as to the further injunction includes the costs of the first injunction unless the court otherwise orders: NSW r 42.11(1) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 27); NT r 63.17; Vic r 63.19. 130. As to reserved costs see 14.30. 131. See, for example, Todd v Novotny [2001] WASC 171 (S); BC200108984 at [6]–[9] per Parker J (who ordered that the costs of an unsuccessful application for Mareva order be reserved because, inter alia, the interlocutory hearing was unusually lengthy, involved matters of legal and factual difficulty, and to a substantial degree involved in substance a rehearsal of critical issues in the action, meaning that much of the work involved in respect of the application, on both sides, was thus work which would have needed to be done in any event in the preparation for trial of the respective parties; his Honour was also influenced by a finding that the conduct of the defendants in opposing the application involved an apparent attempt to mislead the court on a material issue). 132. Re Bryce [1996] 1 Qd R 15 at 16; BC9506069 per Ambrose J. 133. Sometimes termed ‘costs follow the event’, the ‘event’ being the outcome of the interlocutory application (see, for example, Collignon Developments Pty Ltd v Wurth (1975) 1 ACLR 314 at 316 per Needham J (SC(NSW)), involving an application for security for costs: see 28.61). Although this is consistent with the approach adopted in respect of costs of issues (each ‘issue’ being treated as an ‘event’: see 8.2–8.3) it can easily be confused with an order for ‘costs in the cause’, and so should be avoided. 134. Westpoint Finance Pty Ltd v Chocolate Factory Apartments Ltd (2002) 12 BPR 22,969; [2002] NSWCA 287; BC200205071 at [66]–[67] per Young CJ in Eq, with whom Handley JA and Foster AJA concurred; Ausino International Pty Ltd v Apex Sports Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1119; BC200608585 at [55]–[56] per Campbell J. See, for example, Archbishop Petros v Biru [2006]

VSC 404; BC200609258; Topseal Concrete Services Pty Ltd v Sika Australia Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 57 (S); BC200803126. 135. See, for example, Harry Smith Car Sales Pty Ltd v Claycom Vegetable Supply Co Pty Ltd (1978) 29 ACTR 21 at 23–4 per Blackburn CJ. 136. See 14.34–14.44. 137. See, for example, Yates v Ali [2007] NSWSC 1475; BC200711120 at [15] per Palmer J (regarding the costs of proceedings arising out of an ex parte interlocutory application vitiated by the plaintiff’s lack of full and frank disclosure). 138. Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Preston [1981] 2 NSWLR 554 at 569 per Hunt J. 139. See, for example, Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd v Coopers Brewery Ltd (No 3) [2006] FCA 1023; BC200608782 at [17]–[19] per Goldberg J. 140. Gardner v Marshall (1845) 14 Sim 575; 60 ER 481; British Natural Premium Provident Association v Bywater [1897] 2 Ch 531 at 532–3 per Byrne J. Cf HCR 2004 r 51.03.1 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 25) (‘All costs to which a party is entitled under an interlocutory order made in a matter shall be included in the final judgment when it is entered, unless the costs have then been paid’). Equivalent provision was made by FCR 1979 O 62 r 14 (prior to its repeal on 4 January 2008): see Fastlane Australia Pty Ltd v Nolmont Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 492; BC200703246 at [20]– [22] per Jessup J. 141. Kickers International SA v Paul Kettle Agencies Ltd [1990] FSR 436 at 438 per Hoffmann J. 142. See 14.30. 143. HCR 2004 r 51.02 (formerly HCR 1952 r O 71 r 26); NSW r 42.7 (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 16); Tas r 65; WA O 66 r 48. 144. FCR 1979 O 62 r 29. 145. FCR 2011 r 40.04. 146. Vic r 63.20 (as replaced by the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 147. As defined in ACT r 1700; Qld r 679. 148. ACT r 1721(2); Qld r 693(1). 149. NT r 63.18 (see C Ford, ‘Interlocutory Costs: Exceptional, Special, or Neither’ (2/2005) Balance 16); Qld r 693; Vic r 63.20 (in its form prior to 1 April 2013). 150. Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v TCL Airconditioner (Zhongshan) Co Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 92; BC201301024 at [28] per Davies J. 151. TTE Pty Ltd v Ken Day Pty Ltd (1990) 2 NTLR 143 at 144 per Martin J. 152. (1990) 2 NTLR 143 at 145 (paragraph break omitted). Kearney J endorsed these observations in Milingimbi Education and Cultural Association Inc v Davies [1990] NTSC 35 at [5]. 153. TTE Pty Ltd v Ken Day Pty Ltd (1990) 2 NTLR 143 at 145. 154. See Guernier v Patterson (1992) 110 FLR 178 at 187 per Kearney J (SC(NT). 155. See, for example, Gunns Ltd v Alishah (No 3) [2009] TASSC 103; BC200910329 at [12] per Porter J; Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2012] TASSC 11; BC201201552 at [12] per Porter J. 156. Thunderdome Racetiming and Scoring Pty Ltd v Dorian Industries Pty Ltd (1992) 36 FCR 297 at

312; BC9203551 per Olney J; Spotwire Pty Ltd v Visa International Service Association (No 2) [2004] FCA 571; BC200402521 at [104] per Bennett J; S, DJ v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd (2007) 97 SASR 118; [2007] SASC 80; BC200701491 at [4] per Debelle J; Gunns Ltd v Alishah (No 3) [2009] TASSC 103; BC200910329 at [12] per Porter J; Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v TCL Airconditioner (Zhongshan) Co Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 92; BC201301024 at [28] per Davies J. 157. Yow v Northern Territory Gymnastic Association Inc (1991) 1 NTLR 180 at 181 per Kearney J. See also Otter Gold NL v Barcon (NT) Pty Ltd (2000) 10 NTLR 189 at 192–3; [2000] NTSC 100; BC200007970 per Thomas J. 158. (1992) 2 NTLR 147. 159. (1991) 1 NTLR 180 at 181–2. 160. WA O 66 r 50. 161. See 14.26. 162. Ervin Mahrer and Partners v Strathfield Council (2002) 123 LGERA 24; [2002] NSWLEC 97; BC200203746 at [19] per Bignold J. 163. Ezekiel-Hart v Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory (No 2) [2012] ACTSC 135; BC201205857 at [52] per Refshauge ACJ. 164. HCR 2004 r 51.01 (cf former HCR 1952 O 71 r 28); ACT r 1728. 165. Vic r 63.22 (in its form following the commencement, on 1 April 2013, of amendments effected by the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 166. FCR 2011 r 40.03 (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 15); Qld r 698 (previously Qld r 699) (see, for example, Kingham v Yorkston [2002] 2 Qd R 595 at 600; [2002] QSC 59; BC200200950 per Mullins J, who refused to order otherwise); SA r 268; Tas r 67 (as substituted from 21 July 2004). 167. Woods v Walsh (1989) 22 FCR 204 at 206–7 per Lee J; O’Keeffe Nominees Pty Ltd v BP Australia (No 2) (1995) 55 FCR 591 at 598; BC9507763 per Spender J. 168. Ezekiel-Hart v Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory (No 2) [2012] ACTSC 135; BC201205857 at [54] per Refshauge ACJ. 169. NT r 63.20(1). 170. NT r 63.20(2). 171. Vic r 63.22 (in its form preceding the commencement, on 1 April 2013, of amendments effected by the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 172. Meadow Gem Pty Ltd v ANZ Executors & Trustees (SC(Vic), Byrne J, 11 June 1996, unreported) BC9602422 at 4–5; Tipperary Developments Pty Ltd v State of Western Australia (2009) 38 WAR 488; [2009] WASCA 126; BC200906297 at [292] per McLure JA. 173. Under FCR 2011 r 22.02 (formerly FCR 1979 O 18 r 2); NSW r 17.3; NT r 35.03(2); Vic r 35.03(2). 174. Under FCR 2011 r 22.02 (formerly FCR 1979 O 18 r 2); NSW r 17.4; NT r 35.03(2); Vic r 35.03(2). 175. FCR 2011 r 22.03 (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 rr 24 (fact), 25 (document)); NSW rr 42.8 (fact), 42.9 (document) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A rr 19 (fact), 20 (document)) (see, for example, Toubia v Schwenke (2002) 54 NSWLR 46 at 58; [2002] NSWCA 34; BC200200540 per Handley JA, with

whom Heydon and Hodgson JJA concurred, dealing with the equivalent NSW DCR Pt 39A r 20 (repealed)); NT r 63.16; Vic r 63.18 (see, for example, Meadow Gem Pty Ltd v ANZ Executors and Trustees (SC(Vic), Byrne J, 11 June 1996, unreported) BC9602422; Morgan v Bell (No 2) [2011] VSC 393; BC201106285). 176. SA r 263(2)(e). 177. SA r 156(10) (formerly SA RSC r 54.06). 178. SA r 156(11) (formerly SA RSC r 54.07). 179. Tas r 860(7). 180. Tas r 860(8). 181. Under WA O 30 r 2. 182. In Tipperary Developments Pty Ltd v State of Western Australia (2009) 38 WAR 488; [2009] WASCA 126; BC200906297 at [298] McLure JA opined that the expression ‘proving the facts’ in this context is ambiguous, as it could mean establish the truth by evidence that has been admitted or, alternatively, establish the truth to the satisfaction of the court reflected in a finding. Having regard to the purpose of the rule, her Honour favoured the latter construction, reasoning that ‘[t]he proper administration of justice is not furthered by imposing incentives on a party to make admissions regardless of their proven “truth”’. Cf Hansen Beverage Co v Bickfords (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 601; BC200803235 at [20] per Middleton J. 183. WA O 66 r 3(2). 184. Pursuant to any provision of WA O 26 (list of documents) or O 30 r 5 (notice to admit documents). 185. In accordance with WA O 30 r 4(2) or WA O 30 r 5(2). 186. WA O 66 r 3(3). 187. HCR 2004 r 50.03 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 3); Tas r 59. 188. NT r 63.09; Vic r 63.09; WA O 66 r 10(3). See also Fam LR 2004 r 19.09 (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 33). 189. FCR 2011 r 40.05 (cf former FCR 1979 O 62 r 5, which was phrased in terms equivalent to the relevant Northern Territory, Victorian and Western Australian rule). 190. Namely the former NSW RSC Pt 52A r 7, which was phrased in terms similar to the relevant Northern Territory, Victorian and Western Australian rule. 191. This is because, for the purposes of the general costs discretion in s 98(1) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (as to which see 6.7), ‘costs’ are defined to include, ‘in the case of proceedings transferred or removed into the court, the costs of the proceedings before they were transferred or removed’: s 98(6)(c). 192. Unless the first court otherwise orders, the costs up to the time of the removal must be assessed as if the proceeding had remained in the first court: ACT r 1707(3); Qld r 688(3) (formerly Qld r 686(3)). 193. ACT r 1707(1), 1707(2); Qld r 688(1), 688(2) (formerly Qld r 686(1), 686(2)). 194. SA r 263(5) (cf the former SA RSC r 101.01(5)). 195. Tas r 66; WA O 66 r 49. Equivalent provision was made in the FCR 1979 O 62 r 30, but now see FCR 2011 r 40.04: see 14.28.

Cox v Mosman [1908] St R Qd 210 at 214 per Chubb J; Marriage of Jacenko (1986) FLC ¶191196. 776 at 75,647 per Nygh J (FC); Golski v Kirk (1987) 14 FCR 143 at 157 per Beaumont J (FC); Re Australasian Memory Pty Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 158 at 160; [2000] NSWSC 333; BC200001940 per Santow J; Nardell Coal Corporation (in liq) v Hunter Valley Coal Processing Pty Ltd (2003) 46 ACSR 467; [2003] NSWSC 642; BC200304047 at [144] per Campbell J; Chahwan v Euphoric Pty Ltd (2009) 73 ACSR 252; [2009] NSWSC 805; BC200907321 at [43] per Brereton J. 197. Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Scots Church Development Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 797; BC200705717 at [6] per Young CJ in Eq. 198. These are hardly exhaustive. Equivalent principles have, for instance, been applied in the context of applications to amend a patent: see, for example, Wimmera Industrial Minerals Pty Ltd v RGC Mineral Sands Ltd (FCA, Sundberg J, 12 November 1997, unreported) BC9706390; Gambro Pty Ltd v Fresenius Medical Care South East Asia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 407; BC200001424; Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 3) [2009] FCA 1069; BC200908662. 199. Fordham v Fordyce (2007) 154 LGERA 49; [2007] NSWCA 129; BC200704391 at [50] per Young CJ in Eq. 200. [2006] WASCA 56; BC200601844 at [52]. 201. See, for example, Interior Projects Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (SC(SA), Lander J, 19 June 1997, unreported) at [52]–[57]; Whyte v Brosch (1998) 45 NSWLR 354 at 355; BC9806315 per Spigelman CJ, with whom Mason P, Sheller and Stein JJA, Fitzgerald AJA concurred (CA) (lawyer ordered to pay costs thrown away where the matter was adjourned because of the lawyer’s failure to comply with rule-based procedural requirements). As to costs orders against lawyers personally see generally Ch 23. 202. (1904) 21 WN (NSW) 76. 203. (1985) 73 FLR 405 at 412 (SC(NT)). See also Douglass v Lawton Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 90; BC200702833 at [26]–[29] per Beazley JA, with whom Hodgson and Basten JJA concurred; Artistic Builders Pty Ltd v Nash [2007] NSWSC 1279; BC200709676 at [17] per Hoeben J; Owen v Musladin (No 2) [2010] ACTCA 24; BC201007551 at [25] per Refshauge J. 204. [2006] WASCA 56; BC200601844 at [55]. See also in Chahwan v Euphoric Pty Ltd (2009) 73 ACSR 252; [2009] NSWSC 805; BC200907321 at [43] per Brereton J; Edgen Murray Pte Ltd v Clough Projects International Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 402; BC200911880 at [16] per Kenneth Martin J (‘the court’s broad and general discretion concerning an award of costs in a context of costs thrown away exposure by reason of a pleading amendment, is not to be fettered by so-called rules of predisposition’). 205. [2003] NSWSC 871; BC200305609. 206. Wendt v Northwood (No 2) [2003] NSWSC 871; BC200305609 at [10]. 207. Wendt v Northwood (No 2) [2003] NSWSC 871; BC200305609 at [14]. 208. Cf Fibreglass Pool Works (Manufacturing) Pty Ltd v ICl Australia (Operations) Pty Ltd (SC(Qld), Moynihan J, 16 July 1997, unreported) BC9703128 (where costs of the amendment were made costs in the cause). As to the meaning of ‘defendant’s costs in the cause’ see 14.24. 209. See, for example, Director, Office of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2013] FCAFC 34; BC201301475 at [2]–[6] per the court. 210. [2011] WASCA 146 (S); BC201110748 at [28], [30] per Murphy JA, with whom Buss JA and Hall J concurred.

211. NSW r 42.6 (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 15) (amendment of a pleading or summons); WA O 66 r 3(1). 212. ACT rr 513 (formerly ACT RSC O 32 r 13), 1726(2); NT r 63.11(1), 63.11(7); Qld rr 386, 692(2); SA r 263(2)(a) (cf the former SA RSC rr 53.11(1), 101.02(2)(a)); Tas rr 431, 860(2). Up until 1 April 2013 the position was the same in Victoria: see Vic r 63.17 (superseded) (as to which see the discussion in Edelman v Badower [2010] VSC 427; BC201007050 at [29]–[35] per Mukhtar AsJ). From 1 April 2013 (pursuant to the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)), the Victorian rule was replaced with a new r 63.17, under which the costs of and occasioned the amendment of a pleading, whether with or without leave, and those of any application for leave to make the amendment, are declared to be the parties’ costs in the proceeding, unless the court otherwise orders. 213. ACT r 1726(1); Qld r 692(1); Tas r 860(2). 214. Pathak v James Nourse Ltd [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 467 at 472–3 per Sellers LJ; Beoco Ltd v Alfa Laval Co Ltd [1995] QB 137 at 154 per Stuart-Smith LJ; Faraday v Rappaport [2007] NSWSC 253; BC200701771 at [26]–[32] per White J; HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v Dierickx (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1430; BC201210601 at [23], [24] per White J. 215. Sobey v Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCA 1621; BC200810059 at [21] per Kenny J. 216. Lydall v Martinson (1877) 5 Ch D 780. See also Whyte v Brosch (1998) 45 NSWLR 354 at 355; BC9806315 per Spigelman CJ; Harith v Beale [2003] QSC 411; BC200307434 at [57]–[58] per Dutney J. 217. NT r 63.11(8); SA r 263(2)(d) (formerly SA RSC r 101.02(2)(d)). 218. SA r 274(3)(d). 219. Burgoine v Taylor (1878) 9 Ch D 1 at 5 per Jessel MR; Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 353 per Wilcox J; Wortley v Giamo (SC(WA), Bredmeyer M, 28 May 1997, unreported) BC9702400; French v McKenna (No 2) [2012] TASSC 8; BC201201469 at [14] per Holt AsJ. 220. See 16.75. 221. Re Strazdins (No 3) [2009] FCA 1410; BC200910826 at [34] per Lander J; Roses are Red Ltd v Board of Administration of the Methodist Church of New Zealand (2009) 19 PRNZ 369; [2009] NZCA 237 at [40], [41] per Ellen France J, delivering the judgment of the court; Dee-Tech Pty Ltd v Neddam Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 517; BC201203275 at [68] per White J. See, for example, Quilter v Mapleson (1882) 9 QBD 672; Bond v Freke [1884] WN 47. 222. Langley v Foster (1909) 10 SR (NSW) 54 at 62 per A H Simpson CJ in Eq; Re Strazdins (No 3) [2009] FCA 1410; BC200910826 at [34] per Lander J. 223. Humphreys v Morten [1905] 1 Ch 739; Hayes v Gunbola Pty Ltd (1986) 4 BPR 9247 at 9256 per Young J; Bland v Ingram’s Estates Ltd (No 2) [2002] 1 All ER 244; [2001] EWCA Civ 1088 at [14] per Chadwick LJ; Dee-Tech Pty Ltd v Neddam Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 517; BC201203275 at [69]–[70] per White J. 224. See, for example, Ponsonby Mall Trust Ltd v New Zealand Food Industries Ltd (HC(NZ), Asher J, 8 March 2006, unreported) at [18]. 225. (2000) 49 NSWLR 128; [2000] NSWCA 143; BC200003501 at [121], with whom Meagher and Handley JJA and Brownie AJA agreed. See also Yu v Speirs [2001] NSWCA 373; BC200106751 at [28] per Rolfe AJA, with whom Beazley JA and Ipp AJA concurred; Commonwealth v Lewis [2007] NSWCA 127; BC200704314 at [94] per Beazley JA, with whom Santow and Ipp JJA

concurred; Kertz v Kertz [2010] FamCA 975; BC201051094 at [80] per Le Poer Trench J; Dye v Fisher Cartwright Berriman Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 895; BC201005700 at [22] per Studdert AJ. In Williams v Commonwealth of Australia [2007] NSWSC 1342; BC200710956 at [5] Adams J, referring to Sheller JA’s statement in Holt v Wynter as to a successful applicant ‘who has allowed him or herself to get out of time’, opined that it would not be just to order a plaintiff who is out of time through no fault of his or her own and who is forced to make an application for an extension of time and who succeeds on the application, to pay the defendant’s costs of the application. But other New South Wales judges have not found this interpretation convincing: see, for example, Galea v Commonwealth (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 260; BC200802617 at [11] per Johnson J; Dibley v Sydney West Area Health Service [2009] NSWSC 856; BC200907825 at [76] per James J. 226. [2005] NSWCA 478; BC200511378 at [160] per Santow JA, with whom Handley JA agreed. See also Kertz v Kertz [2010] FamCA 975; BC201051094 at [83] per Le Poer Trench J. 227. Commonwealth of Australia v Smith [2006] HCA Trans 242 per Callinan J. 228. Salvation Army (South Australia Property Trust) v Rundle [2008] NSWCA 347; BC200810947 at [148]–[149] per Basten JA. See, for example, Crerar v Parkes (No 2) (2005) 15 Tas R 147; [2005] TASSC 93; BC200507170 at [11]–[12] per Crawford J; Dibley v Sydney West Area Health Service [2009] NSWSC 856; BC200907825 at [79] per James J. Cf Holt v Wynter (2000) 49 NSWLR 128; [2000] NSWCA 143; BC200003501 (where the general rule was applied even though it was the applicant’s solicitors rather than the applicant at fault). As to the meaning of ‘costs in the cause’ see 14.24. 229. See, for example, Michelotti v Roads Corporation (2009) 26 VR 609; [2009] VSC 195; BC200904026 at [39] per Cavanough J (where the resistance to the application could not be described as unreasonable, but as the defendant, in the public interest, felt that it required a ruling on a point of statutory interpretation, this was ‘a reason for departing from the approach that the plaintiff should pay the full costs of the obtaining of the indulgence of an extension of time’); Dye v Fisher Cartwright Berriman Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 895; BC201005700 at [23] per Studdert AJ (where the opposition to the application was not unreasonable, but the delay was slight and the amount involved was not large). 230. FCR 1979 O 62 r 23 (superseded, with no equivalent in FCR 2011) (limited to extension of time); ACT r 1729; NT r 63.11(5), 63.11(9); Qld r 695 (formerly Qld r 696); SA r 263(2)(b) (formerly SA RSC r 101.02(2)(b)) (limited to extension of time); Vic r 63.14. See also the former NSW RSC Pt 52A r 17 (which was limited to extension of time, and has no equivalent in the current NSW UCPR), which Santow JA in Commonwealth of Australia v Smith [2005] NSWCA 478; BC200511378 at [36] held did not govern an application for an extension of a limitation period, but only matters relating to an extension of time under the rules. 231. Bladel v Russell Allport (FC(Tas), 12 November 1964, unreported) at 1 per Gibson ACJ. 232. See, for example, Darwin Broadcasters Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 21 FCR 524 at 534; BC9003401 per Beaumont J. 233. Marriage of Tichy (1991) FLC ¶192-259 at 78,744-5 per Butler J. 234. Queensland v J L Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146 at 170; BC9700005 per Kirby J. 235. Commonwealth of Australia v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 464; BC9002931 per Toohey J. 236. Ketteman v Hansel Properties Ltd [1987] AC 189 at 220 per Lord Griffiths. Cf Black v Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of South Melbourne (1964) 38 ALJR 309 at 310 per Barwick CJ (who opined that ‘[q]uestions of surprise and disadvantage because of a change of course in proof can almost always be met by adjournment and appropriate orders as to costs’, but it should

be noted that the case involved no new cause of action in the variation in particulars in the plaintiff’s statement of claim). 237. See Marriage of Tichy (1991) FLC ¶192-259 at 78,745 per Butler J (‘Justice delayed is justice denied and so is justice postponed and of itself is not necessarily compensable by costs’). 238. (2000) 34 ACSR 158; [2000] NSWSC 333; BC200001940. 239. Under the Corporations Law s 439A (now the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 439A). 240. Re Australasian Memory Pty Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 158 at 162; [2000] NSWSC 333; BC200001940. 241. Re Australasian Memory Pty Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 158 at 163; [2000] NSWSC 333; BC200001940. 242. State of New South Wales v Hamod [2011] NSWCA 376; BC201109748 at [47] per Giles JA, with whom Beazley and Whealy JJA concurred. 243. FCR 1979 O 62 r 3(2) (superseded). 244. Under s 43(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth): see 6.7. 245. A notice of appeal is not an ‘interlocutory application’ for this purpose, even if the orders sought are interlocutory in nature or if the orders resulting from it share the same character: Director, Office of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2013] FCAFC 34; BC201301475 at 14] per the court (although their Honours ultimately applied FCR 2011 r 40.13 as if the notice of appeal were an interlocutory application, pursuant to FCR 2011 r 1.35 (which empowers the court to make an order that is inconsistent with the rules), to avoid the conduct of two taxations: at [14]–[15]). 246. FCR 2011 r 40.13 (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 3(3)), as to which see 14.50. 247. NSW r 42.7(2) (cf the former NSW RSC Pt 52A r 9). 248. SA r 265(2)(b). 249. Tas r 65 (‘Unless the Court or a judge otherwise orders: (a) the costs of an opposed application in a proceeding are part of the costs of the cause of the party in whose favour the application is determined; and (b) the costs of an unopposed application in a proceeding are part of each party’s costs of the cause’): see 14.28. 250. Gunns Ltd v Alishah (No 3) (2009) 19 Tas R 401; [2009] TASSC 103; BC200910329 at [25] per Porter J. 251. Under Qld r 740: see 18.34. 252. Virgtel Ltd v Zabusky (No 2) [2008] QSC 316; BC200810765 at [14] per Daubney J. 253. WA O 66 r 10(1). 254. Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice Directions, 2009, 4.7.1, cl 3 (formerly Practice Direction No 5 of 2005, para 1). Cf the recommendation of the Western Australian Law Reform Commission that WA O 66 be amended to provide for the circumstances in which the costs of interlocutory applications should be ordered to be taxed and paid forthwith (adding that the court should be given a discretion to order that costs be taxed and paid forthwith ‘where the application was unreasonably brought or unreasonably opposed unless the making of such a costs order would, having regard to the loser’s financial circumstances, prejudice the ability of the loser to continue the litigation’): WALRC 92, Vol 1, p 497. 255. Cf Joyce v Palassis [2006] WASC 242; BC200608918 at [12] per Sanderson M.

256. NT r 63.04(2); Vic r 63.03(2) (order of the Supreme Court), 63.03(2.1) (order of the Costs Court). 257. Vic r 63.03(3). Prior to the introduction of r 63.03(3), the court had limited power to dismiss a proceeding for failure to pay a costs order: Exell v Exell [1984] VR 1. As to r 63.03(3) see Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Parker (SC(Vic), Coldrey J, 7 March 1997, unreported) BC9701229 at 5; Towie & Woodbury Croft Pty Ltd v Medi 7 Australia Pty Ltd (SC(Vic), Chernov J, 4 June 1997, unreported) BC9703213 at 2 (the power should be exercised ‘sparingly’ and in ‘exceptional cases’); Gao v Zhang (2005) 14 VR 380; [2005] VSCA 200; BC200505785 at [17] per Ormiston JA (‘if an order of this kind is to be made, there must be seen to have been some conduct on the part of the party in default which falls for condemnation to the extent of making so draconian an order’, such as frequent litigation of minor interlocutory points that points to misuse of the court’s process in the sense of deliberately harassing the other side); Circuit Finance Pty Ltd v Gardner [2006] VSC 70; BC200601537 at [19], [42] per Hollingworth J. See also Welsh v Digilin Pty Ltd ACN 078 278 449 [2007] FCA 2064; BC200711511 at [9]–[11] per Dowsett J. 258. (2002) 55 NSWLR 1; [2002] NSWSC 432; BC200202544 at [18]. See also Motor Trades Association of Australia Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd v Rickus [2007] FCA 1878; BC200711587 at [15]–[24] per Flick J; Re Hughes (2010) 183 FCR 150; [2010] FCA 141; BC201000853 (where Siopis J held that, as the costs in question related to a specific episode, which had been finalised there was no need for the payment of costs to await the completion of the proceedings: at [27]– [28]). 259. [2007] NSWSC 707; BC200705345 at [12]. 260. See, for example, Mitanis v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd (1998) ATPR ¶141-623 at 40,831; BC9800783 per Goldberg J. 261. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M(1); Fam LR 2004 r 1.07; ACT r 21; Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 56(1); Qld r 5; WA O 1 r 4B. 262. Ajkay v Hickey & Co Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 822; BC201105837 at [21] per Pembroke J. See also at [22]–[29]; Edgen Murray Pte Ltd v Clough Projects International Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 402; BC200911880 at [22] per Kenneth Martin J. Cf Gunns Ltd v Alishah (No 3) (2009) 19 Tas R 401; [2009] TASSC 103; BC200910329 (where Porter J, in a jurisdiction not explicitly making directing cash management to the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in proceedings, noting that ‘it may in fact seldomly be the case, that the circumstances make it fair as between the parties to order that the costs be payable forthwith’ (at [33]) but at the same time accepting that there is no justification to confine such an order to ‘exceptional circumstances’: at [32]). On this latter point see also Caratti v Caratti [2012] WASC 357; BC201207497 at [32] per Allanson J (‘A requirement that there be exceptional circumstances would limit the court’s discretion unnecessarily’). 263. Conway v Critchley (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1542; BC201209838 at [11] per Pembroke J. 264. See, for example, Crockett v Roberts (No 2) [2001] TASSC 106; BC200104958 at [4] per Cox CJ. 265. See, for example, Eunson v Beaulieu United Ltd (2002) 190 ALR 110 at 119; [2002] FCA 366; BC200201213 per Kenny J; Jones v SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd (2005) 40 SR (WA) 328; [2005] WADC 101; BC200540003 at 17], [18] per Kingsley R. 266. See, for example, Bradman v Allens Arthur Robinson (No 2) [2009] SASC 180; BC200905564 at [23]–[25] per Kourakis J. 267. HCR 2004 r 51.03.2 (no equivalent in previous rules); FCR 2011 r 40.13 (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 3(3) (effective 4 June 1990)). As to the position prior to these rules, see Dalrymple Holdings

Pty Ltd v Gohl (1991) 34 FCR 397 at 399; BC9103647 per Spender J, who opined that there is no entitlement in applicants in the principal proceedings to have a bill of costs taxed in respect of the hearing of the preliminary issues prior to the conclusion of the principal proceedings. In Stack v Brisbane City Council (1996) 71 FCR 523 at 534; BC9606435 Drummond J remarked that FCR O 62 r 3(3) prevents FCR 1979 O 62 r 7(1)(a) (now see FCR 2011 r 40.14) — which provides that costs may be taxed without any order directing taxation where an order of the court directs the payment of costs: see 15.12 — operating in relation to costs of interlocutory proceedings, unless the court specifically orders that the beneficiary of the costs order is at liberty to tax the costs immediately. 268. [2001] FCA 571; BC200102374 at [13]. See also Stack v Brisbane City Council (1996) 71 FCR 523 at 535; BC9606435 per Drummond J; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chaste Corporation (No 2) (2003) 127 FCR 433; [2003] FCA 195; BC200300969 at [6] per Spender J; JP Morgan Portfolio Services Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu [2006] FCA 84; BC200600499 at [7] per Wilcox J; Rafferty v Time 2000 West Pty Ltd (No 3) (2009) 257 ALR 503; [2009] FCA 727; BC200905923 at [20] per Besanko J. 269. Murran Investments Pty Ltd v Aromatic Beauty Products Pty Ltd (2000) 191 ALR 579 at 595; [2000] FCA 1732; BC200007392 per Mansfield J. See, for example, Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 41; BC200800245 at [14] per Jessup J (who held that, in a case involving a protracted course of interlocutory stages, involving costs orders going both ways, ‘the advantages of following the normal procedure, whereby all interlocutory costs are taxed at the same time at the conclusion of the proceeding, are obvious’). ‘Seriatim’ means one by one, or in succession. 270. Bryer Merchandisers Pty Ltd v Nike Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 198; BC200400852 at [10] per Whitlam J. 271. Bailey v Beagle Management Pty Ltd (2001) 105 FCR 136 at 145; [2001] FCA 60; BC200100211 (FC); Rafferty v Time 2000 West Pty Ltd (No 3) (2009) 257 ALR 503; [2009] FCA 727; BC200905923 at [20] per Besanko J. 272. Stack v Brisbane City Council (1996) 71 FCR 523 at 534; BC9606435 per Drummond J. 273. Stack v Brisbane City Council (1996) 71 FCR 523 at 535; BC9606435. See also D’Anglers Paradise Pty Ltd v MMI General Insurance Australia Ltd (FCA, Dowsett J, 25 September 1998, unreported) BC9805204. 274. See, for example, Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 13) (FC(FCA), Lockhart, Lindgren and Tamberlin JJ, 17 August 1995, unreported) BC9501951; Australian Flight Test Services Pty Ltd v Minister for Industry, Science and Technology (FCA, O’Loughlin J, 26 April 1996, unreported) BC9601453 at 4–7; McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1639; BC9907778 at [40] per Weinberg J; Courtney v Medtel Pty Ltd (No 3) [2004] FCA 347; BC200401460 at [23] per Sackville J. Cf Stack v Brisbane City Council (1996) 71 FCR 523 at 535–6; BC9606435 per Drummond J. 275. See, for example, Nelmac Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union [1999] FCA 929; BC9904506 at [6]–[8] per Madgwick J. 276. Harris v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1995) ATPR ¶141-445 at 41,011 per Kiefel J (FCA); All Services Australia Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 330 at 333; [2000] FCA 375; BC200001251 per Kiefel J. 277. See, for example, Life Airbag Company of Australia Pty Ltd v Life Airbag Company (New Zealand) Ltd (FCA, Branson J, 22 May 1998, unreported) BC9801995 at 10-–3 (where the applicants had filed and served five different versions of a statement of claim over nine months, the first four being unsatisfactory, causing the respondents to incur the costs of instructing counsel

to attend on strike out applications); McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1639; BC9907778 at [39] per Weinberg J (where almost a year had been wasted chiefly due to the applicants’ amended statement of claim being seriously defective); A M Stevens Pty Ltd v Australian Red Cross Society [2002] FCA 91; BC200200240 at [17] per Finn J (where the applicant had been dilatory in formulating the claim); Cytel Pty Ltd v Peoplebank Recruitment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 697; BC200803749 at [13] per Bennett J (where the interlocutory costs order related to the applicant’s continual amendments to the pleadings and its omissions to act, causing the respondent to incur costs); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis [2011] FCA 796; BC201105188 (involving multiple attempts to plead the case, where the trial was some way off, costs were ordered to be paid and taxed forthwith). Cf Batten v CTMS Ltd [1999] FCA 1576; BC9907364 at [63] per Kiefel J. 278. All Services Australia Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2000) 171 ALR 330 at 333; [2000] FCA 375; BC200001251 per Kiefel J. 279. Thunderdome Racetiming and Scoring Pty Ltd v Dorian Industries Pty Ltd (1992) 36 FCR 297 at 312; BC9203551 per Olney J; Stack v Brisbane City Council (1996) 71 FCR 523 at 535; BC9606435 per Drummond J; Bryer Merchandisers Pty Ltd v Nike Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 198; BC200400852 at [3] per Whitlam J; Courtney v Medtel Pty Ltd (No 3) [2004] FCA 347; BC200401460 at [21] per Sackville J; Alstom Power Ltd v Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2006) 244 LSJS 65; [2006] SASC 87; BC200601564 at [4] per Debelle J; H Stanke & Sons Pty Ltd v Von Stanke (No 2) [2007] SASC 109; BC200701970 at [5] per White J; Barrett Property Group Ltd v Metricon Homes Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1823; BC200710263 at [29] per Gilmour J; Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Whitton (No 2) [2011] FCA 845 at [25] per Logan J (noting that ‘[t]o approach the exercise of the discretion on the basis that unreasonableness must be present would be to put an impermissible gloss on the language of the rule’; emphasis in original). 280. Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 14) (FCA, Lindgren J, 18 August 1995, unreported) BC9506840 at 11 (FCR O 62 r 3(3) is ‘possibly under utilised’); McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [1999] FCA 1639; BC9907778 at [41] per Weinberg J; Versace v Monte [2002] FCA 781; BC200203314 at [19]–[23] per Tamberlin J; Airservices Australia v Jeppesen Sanderson Inc [2006] FCA 906; BC200605370 at [31] per Graham J; Gunns Ltd v Alishah (No 3) (2009) 19 Tas R 401; [2009] TASSC 103; BC200910329 at [33] per Porter J; Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Whitton (No 2) [2011] FCA 845 at [23] per Logan J (‘it may just be that the existence of the power has been under-recognised’); Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2012] TASSC 11; BC201201552 at [18]–[23] per Porter J. Contra Vasyli v AOL International Pty Ltd (FCA, Lehane J, 2 September 1996, unreported) BC9604273 at 2 (who suggested that such orders will only be rarely made). 281. NT r 63.04(3), 63.04(4). 282. Markorp Pty Ltd v King (1992) 106 FLR 286 at 293 per Mildren J (SC(NT)). 283. Markorp Pty Ltd v King (1992) 106 FLR 286 at 293 per Mildren J (SC(NT)); Guernier v Patterson (1992) 110 FLR 178 at 187 per Kearney J (SC(NT)). Cf TTE Pty Ltd v Ken Day Pty Ltd (1990) 2 NTLR 143 at 143–5 per Martin J. 284. See, for example, Markorp Pty Ltd v King (1992) 106 FLR 286 at 293 per Mildren J (SC(NT)) (who ordered that the defendants were entitled to an order that costs be taxed forthwith even though the amounts involved were not likely to be small or set off against future cost orders that may have been made in the plaintiff’s favour on interlocutory applications); Otter Gold NL v Barcon (NT) Pty Ltd (2000) 10 NTLR 189 at 193–4; [2000] NTSC 100 per Thomas J. 285. See, for example, Yow v Northern Territory Gymnastic Association Inc (1991) 1 NTLR 180 at 181–2 per Kearney J.

286. TTE Pty Ltd v Ken Day Pty Ltd (1990) 2 NTLR 143 at 145 per Martin J. 287. (1990) 2 NTLR 143. 288. TTE Pty Ltd v Ken Day Pty Ltd (1990) 2 NTLR 143 at 145. 289. TTE Pty Ltd v Ken Day Pty Ltd (1990) 2 NTLR 143 at 146. 290. (1992) 110 FLR 178 at 187 (SC(NT)). 291. Within the ‘otherwise orders’ jurisdiction in NT r 63.18: see 14.29. 292. SA RSC r 101.01(7). 293. See, for example, Vergola Pty Ltd v Vergola Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd (2002) 217 LSJS 198; [2002] SASC 5; BC200200037. 294. SA r 265(2)(a). 295. S, DJ v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd (2007) 97 SASR 118; [2007] SASC 80; BC200701491 at [6] per Debelle J; H Stanke & Sons Pty Ltd v Von Stanke (No 2) [2007] SASC 109; BC200701970 at [6] per White J. 296. Alstom Power Ltd v Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2006) 244 LSJS 65; [2006] SASC 87; BC200601564 at [4] per Debelle J. 297. [2007] SASC 109; BC200701970. 298. H Stanke & Sons Pty Ltd v Von Stanke (No 2) [2007] SASC 109; BC200701970 at [20]. 299. (2006) 244 LSJS 65; [2006] SASC 87; BC200601564 at [11]. 300. (2007) 97 SASR 118; [2007] SASC 80; BC200701491. 301. S, DJ v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd (2007) 97 SASR 118; [2007] SASC 80; BC200701491 at [20]. See also at [40]–[42] per Anderson J. Contra at [34] per Gray J in dissent. 302. S, DJ v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd (2007) 97 SASR 118; [2007] SASC 80; BC200701491 at [16] per Debelle J. See also at [41] per Anderson J. Contra at [35] per Gray J in dissent. 303. Vic r 63.03(2), 63.03(2.1): see 14.45. 304. Vic r 63.07(1): see 15.9. 305. Vic r 63.10: see 15.12. 306. Valimi Pty Ltd v Maniotis [2001] VSC 157; BC200103016 at [24] per Bongiorno J. 307. Vic r 63.20.1 (inserted by the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 308. Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, Commercial List and Technology and Construction List, Practice Note No SC Eq 3, cl 57. 309. Supreme Court of Western Australia, Practice Direction No 5 of 2005, para 1 (superseded). 310. Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice Directions, 2009, 4.7.1, cl 3. 311. Caratti v Caratti [2012] WASC 357; BC201207497 at [29] per Allanson J. 312. In fact, the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland rules state that if the court awards the costs of an application in a proceeding, it may order that the costs not be assessed until the proceeding ends: ACT r 1701(2); Qld r 682(2) (formerly Qld r 680(2)). 313. Bull Nominees Pty Ltd v McElwee (1997) 7 Tas R 339 at 343; BC9707324 per Underwood J;

Vergola Pty Ltd v Vergola Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd (2002) 217 LSJS 198; [2002] SASC 5; BC200200037 at [21] per Perry J (this being the position even though the phrase ‘in any event’ appears to say nothing concerning when costs may be taxed and payment enforced: at [20]). 314. See, for example, Baramon Sales Pty Ltd v Goodman Fielder Mills Ltd [2001] FCA 1819; BC200108056 at [8] per Finkelstein J. As to the set-off of costs see 8.14–8.17. 315. Allied Collection Agencies Ltd v Wood [1981] 3 All ER 176 at 181 per Neill J; Bertram v Beaurepaire Tyre Service Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 685 at 687 per Allen M; Vergola Pty Ltd v Vergola Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd (2002) 217 LSJS 198; [2002] SASC 5; BC200200037 at [21], [30] per Perry J; Joyce v Palassis [2006] WASC 242; BC200608918 at [12] per Sanderson M. Cf Adam & Harvey Ltd v International Maritime Supplies Co Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 445 at 447–8 per Harman LJ; Go Exports Pty Ltd v Livestock Shipping Services Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 218; BC200205344 at [13]–[15] per Heenan J. 316. Bertram v Beaurepaire Tyre Service Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 685 at 687 per Allen M. 317. Commercial Bank of Australia v Godfrey (1893) 9 WN (NSW) 164 at 165 per Owen CJ in Eq; Williams v Miller (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 270 at 272 per Street CJ in Eq; Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 539 at 541 per Hill J (FCA); Haines v Croft (2001) 146 ACTR 59 at 61–4; [2001] ACTSC 77; BC200105827 (FC). 318. FCR 2011 r 26.12(7). 319. Travaglini v Raccuia [2012] FCA 620; BC201204134 at [36] per McKerracher J. 320. FCR 1979 O 62 r 26(1) (see also FCR 1979 O 22 r 3). Where leave was required, a default position was unnecessary as, in determining whether to grant leave, the court had the discretion to impose conditions including as to costs: Smith v Airservices Australia (2005) 146 FCR 37; [2005] FCA 997; BC200505203 at [45] per Stone J. 321. See, for example, Ahmed v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1436; BC200006094. 322. Under NSW r 12.1. 323. NSW r 42.19(2) (cf former NSW RSC Pt 52A r 21). See also NSW r 42.20(1) (cf former NSW RSC Pt 40 r 8) (‘If the Court makes an order for the dismissal of proceedings, either generally or in relation to a particular cause of action or in relation to the whole or part of any claim, then, unless the Court orders otherwise, the plaintiff must pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings to the extent to which they have been dismissed’). 324. HCR 2004 r 27.10.6 (cf former HCR 1952 O 27 r 1(2)); NT rr 25.05, 63.11(6), 63.11(9); SA r 107(4) (formerly SA RSC r 52.03); Vic rr 25.05, 63.15. 325. ACT r 1163 (formerly ACT RSC O 30 r 1(1), 1(3)) (see Filaria Pty Ltd v Kazar [2002] ACTSC 82; BC200204837; Rural & General Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2009) 231 FLR 199; [2009] ACTSC 67; BC200905250 at [74]–[76] per Penfold J); Qld r 307; Tas rr 376(3), 377(2), 378(1). 326. WA O 23 r 2(1). 327. WA O 23 r 2(3). 328. FCR 2011 r 26.15 (formerly FCR 1979 O 22 r 8); ACT r 1169 (formerly ACT RSC O 30 r 4); NSW r 12.4 (formerly NSW RSC Pt 21 r 8); NT r 25.07; Qld r 312; Tas r 380; Vic r 25.07; WA O 23 r 4. 329. HCR 2004 rr 41.12.2, 42.14.2; FCR 2011 r 36.73(4) (‘An appellant who files a notice [to

discontinue an appeal] must, unless the parties otherwise agree, pay the costs of each respondent’; although the rule makes no facility for the court to otherwise order, in Cetinkaya v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2012] FCA 611; BC201204097 at [17] Bromberg J did not consider that it was intended to foreclose the exercise of the court’s discretion as to costs, where the leave of the court to discontinue an appeal is required: see Mineralogy Pty Ltd v National Native Title Tribunal (FC(FCA), Lee, Tamberlin and RD Nicholson JJ, 23 December 1998, unreported) BC9807061 at 7 per the court; Christodoulou v Disney Enterprises Inc [2006] FCA 902; BC200605401 at [4] per Heerey J (each dealing with the equivalent provision in the former rules, FCR 1979 O 52 r 19); NT r 84.15; SA r 293(4) (formerly SA RSC r 95.07(3)); Tas r 675(3); Vic rr 64.14, 64.15 (see, for example, Pearl Hill Pty Ltd v Concorp Construction Group (Vic) Pty Ltd (2011) 32 VR 247; [2011] VSCA 99; BC201101872 at [29] per Tate JA); Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA) r 59(4) (see D’Adamo v Marchesi (2007) 215 FLR 187; [2007] WASC 282; BC200710154 at [141]–[146] per Hasluck J (addressing the former Criminal Appeal Rules 2004 (WA) r 72(4)); Beeson v Carrello [2010] WASCA 155; BC201005639 at [14] per the court). Cf Fam LR 2004 r 22.42(2) (discretion to order a discontinuing appellant to pay the costs of all other parties’); ACT r 5174(3) (various costs orders available where an appeal is dismissed by consent); Qld r 762 (parties who agree that an appeal should be dismissed by consent must file a memorandum with the court which may make provision for the allocation of costs). 330. Telstra Corporation Ltd v Corporation of the City of Marion [2001] SASC 350; BC200106584 at [15] per Debelle J (where the appeal was set down for hearing, and withdrawn at a relatively late stage). 331. Tas r 378(2); WA O 23 r 2(2). The latter rules add that any defendant may enter judgment for the costs of the action, if it is wholly discontinued against him or her, or if the action is not wholly discontinued, for the costs occasioned by the matter withdrawn, if such costs are not paid within four days after taxation: WA O 23 r 3. 332. As to the party and party basis of taxation see 16.14–16.17. 333. Application for leave may be made where the discontinuance is effected at any time after delivery of the defence and the taking of any other step in the action (Tas r 376(1), 376(2); WA O 23 r 2(1), 2(3)) or, in Tasmania, in the case of a proceeding not commenced by writ (Tas r 377(1)). 334. Tas rr 376(3), 377(2); WA O 23 r 2(3). 335. Cing International Pty Ltd v Victory Hill Pty Ltd (SC(WA), Bredmeyer M, 27 May 1998, unreported) BC9802061 at 7. 336. See, for example, Davids Holdings Pty Ltd v Coles Myer Ltd (1995) ATPR ¶141-383 at 40,303; BC9507223 per Drummond J (FCA) (refusal to order costs on an indemnity basis); Kilpatrick Green Pty Ltd v Kockums Industries Pty Ltd (SC(SA), Lander J, 3 April 1998, unreported) BC9801123 at 6–7 (who allowed indemnity costs after the date on which the plaintiff should have been aware that its case was tenuous, but party and party costs before this date); Cing International Pty Ltd v Victory Hill Pty Ltd (SC(WA), Bredmeyer M, 27 May 1998, unreported) BC9802061 at 19-–2 (indemnity costs refused); MacLaw No 469 Pty Ltd v Ilana Accessories Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 563; BC200008387 at [18], [19] per Hedigan J (similar outcome to Kilpatrick Green); Waverley Council v Refkin Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1469; BC200106323 at [48], [49] per Katz J (party and party costs ordered arising out of a discontinuance in part because no timely notice of any intention to seek indemnity costs was given); Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd v Roads Corporation (2007) 155 LGERA 13; [2007] VSC 175; BC200704110 at [33] per Osborn J (who, in a compulsory acquisition case, was not satisfied that the making of the abandoned claims was so unreasonable as to warrant solicitor-client costs, given that the assessment of loss was not straight forward); Sidameneo (No 456) Pty Ltd v Ward [2011] VSC 559; BC201108626 at [25]–

[50] per Croft J (refusal to order costs on an indemnity basis). As to the grounds upon which taxation on other than a party and party basis can be ordered see 16.39–16.75. 337. Fordyce v Fordham (2006) 67 NSWLR 497; [2006] NSWCA 274; BC200607906 at [78], [84] per McColl JA; Pentroth Pty Ltd v Kirschild Pty Ltd (2006) 96 SASR 129; [2006] SASC 356; BC200609675 at [27] per White J, with whom Duggan and Gray JJ concurred (FC); Rural & General Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2009) 231 FLR 199; [2009] ACTSC 67; BC200905250 at [54] per Penfold J. See also Australiawide Airlines Ltd v Aspirion Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 365; BC200611167 at [53] per Bryson JA, with whom McColl and Basten JJA agreed (in the context of NSW r 42.20(1)). 338. O’Neill v Mann [2000] FCA 1680; BC200007290 at [13] per Finn J; Pentroth Pty Ltd v Kirschild Pty Ltd (2006) 96 SASR 129; [2006] SASC 356; BC200609675 at [24] per White J, with whom Duggan and Gray JJ concurred (FC). 339. Fordyce v Fordham (2006) 67 NSWLR 497; [2006] NSWCA 274; BC200607906 at [79] per McColl JA. 340. Cetinkaya v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2012] FCA 611; BC201204097 at [21] per Bromberg J. 341. Fordyce v Fordham (2006) 67 NSWLR 497; [2006] NSWCA 274; BC200607906 at [3] per Santow JA; Prodromos Anastasi Foukkare v Angreb Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 335; BC200609700 at [65] per Beazley JA, with whom Giles and Ipp JJA concurred; Bitannia Pty Ltd v Parkline Constructions Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 32; BC200901045 at [53]–[54] per Hodgson JA, at [73]– [74] per Basten JA. Cf Australiawide Airlines Ltd v Aspirion Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 365; BC200611167 at [54] per Bryson JA, with whom McColl and Basten JJA agreed (in the context of NSW r 42.20(1), speaking in terms ‘some sound positive ground or good reason for departing from the ordinary course’). 342. Knox v Brown (1787) 1 Cox 359; 29 ER 1202; Van Sandau v Moore (1826) 1 Russ 441 at 469; 38 ER 171 at 181 per Lord Eldon; Commercial Bank of Australia v Godfrey (1893) 9 WN (NSW) 164 at 165 per Owen CJ in Eq. 343. (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 270. 344. Williams v Miller (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 270 at 273. 345. See, for example, Garwolin Nominees Pty Ltd v Statewide Building Society [1984] VR 469 (where a plaintiff who sued to enforce terms of a lease that had been assigned to the defendant, when shortly before trial the defendant rectified its non-compliance with the lease, secured leave to discontinue the proceedings and an order for costs up to that time); Champagne View Pty Ltd v Shearwater Resort Management Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 214; BC200003133 (where the plaintiff was awarded costs of nuisance proceedings it had instituted against the defendants but had discontinued because the defendants subsequently took steps to ameliorate the nuisance). 346. See, for example, Pinto v Kinkela [2003] WASC 126; BC200303434 (where the plaintiffs discontinued their action because of an undertaking given by the defendants that the offending conduct that prompted the litigation would not be repeated, the plaintiffs were awarded costs up to the date of the undertaking). 347. RTZ Pension Property Trust Ltd v ARC Property Developments Ltd [1999] 1 All ER 532 at 541 per Potter LJ. 348. See 14.66. 349. See 14.67–14.70.

350. See, for example, Hyder Consulting (Vic) Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd [2003] VSC 223; BC200303427 (where the counterclaim was rendered futile not by its settlement between the parties before the court, but was rendered futile by other events, namely the settlement of related claims); True Conservation Association Inc v Minister Administering the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 [2008] NSWLEC 221; BC200806967 (proceedings rendered inutile by parliament passing legislation). Cf Norris v Hamberger [2008] NSWSC 785; BC200806910. 351. Australians for Sustainable Development Inc v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 70; BC201104234 at [11] per Biscoe J. 352. Rural & General Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2009) 231 FLR 199; [2009] ACTSC 67; BC200905250 at [79]–[80] per Penfold J. 353. One.Tel Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 101 FCR 548; [2000] FCA 270; BC200000891 at [6] per Burchett J; Cassegrain v CTK Engineering Pty Ltd (2005) 54 ACSR 249; [2005] NSWSC 495; BC200503465 at [10] per White J; Kiama Council v Grant (2006) 143 LGERA 441; [2006] NSWLEC 96; BC200601135 at [80] per Preston CJ. See 14.69. 354. See, for example, Australians for Sustainable Development Inc v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 70; BC201104234 (where a supervening event — a change in the law by a minister who was a party to the proceedings and had vigorously defended the applicant’s claim — altered the subject matter of the dispute after the hearing, where, but for the minister’s conduct, the applicant would have won the case, which Biscoe J held amounted to unreasonable conduct by the minister so as to warrant the making of an order that the minister pay the applicant’s costs on the point on an indemnity basis). 355. Kalejs v Minister for Justice and Customs (2001) 111 FCR 442 at 452; [2001] FCA 1769; BC200107770 per Kenny J. See, for example, Price v Ikin [2004] NSWSC 706; BC200405453; Foley v Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd [2008] NSWSC 778; BC200807103. Cf where an order for costs is obtained but not taxed before death, or the substantive proceedings have been determined but a costs order has yet to be made: see Kelly v Kelly and Brown [1961 P 94 at 100 per Marshall J; Healey v Williams (1985) 10 FCR 254 at 258 per Bowen CJ. But see Diamond v Diamond and Elliott (1950) 51 SR (NSW) 84 at 88-–1 per Street CJ (FC). This reflects a more general principle that a court will not, if the cause of action is a personal one, permit an action to be revived for the sole purpose of an application for costs: Stead v Foster (SC(NSW), Levine J, 4 September 1998, unreported) BC9804491; Bham v Medical Board of Western Australia [2007] WASC 90; BC200702642 at [47] per Johnson J. 356. J T Stratford and Son Ltd v Lindley (No 2) [1969] 3 All ER 1122 at 1123 per Lord Denning. See, for example, Gribbles Pathology Pty Ltd v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 80 FCR 284 at 287; BC9707018 per Finkelstein J; Cassaniti v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 49 ATR 104 at 105; [2001] FCA 362; BC200101424 per Hely J. 357. See, for example, Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 194 at 201; BC9304961 per Hill J; Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 186 CLR 622 at 625; BC9700811 per McHugh J; Gribbles Pathology Pty Ltd v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 80 FCR 284 at 287; BC9707018 per Finkelstein J; Golden City Car & Truck Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 46 ATR 51 at 53; [2000] FCA 1697; BC200007145 per Cooper J. 358. Stateland Developments Pty Ltd v Princi [2007] NSWSC 709; BC200705094 at [11] per Gzell J. 359. Australian Securities Commission v Berona Investments Pty Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 772 at 777; BC9506844 per Cooper J (FCA); Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 186 CLR 622 at 625; BC9700811 per McHugh J.

360. (1997) 186 CLR 622; BC9700811. 361. Under HCR 1952 O 71 r 39. 362. Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 186 CLR 622 at 626; BC9700811. 363. Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 186 CLR 622 at 626–8; BC9700811. 364. Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 186 CLR 622 at 624; BC9700811 per McHugh J. See also Tas r 68 (if the further prosecution of proceeding becomes unnecessary, except for the purpose of determining by whom the costs of the proceeding should be paid, the court may determine that on the application of a party). 365. The reference to ‘special circumstances’ by Finkelstein J in Gribbles Pathology Pty Ltd v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 80 FCR 284 at 287; BC9707018 has subsequently been queried, and a more flexible approach favoured: Rizal v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 334; BC9901294 at [17] per Sackville J; Champagne View Pty Ltd v Shearwater Resort Management Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 214; BC200003133 at [47] per Gillard J; Hyder Consulting (Vic) Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd [2003] VSC 223; BC200303427 at [9] per Mandie J. Cf Smith v Airservices Australia (2005) 146 FCR 37; [2005] FCA 997; BC200505203 at [47] per Stone J (who did not understand Finkelstein J in Gribbles to mean other than that ‘the issue of costs in a case such as the present must be determined having regard to all of the circumstances of the case, the underlying policy in the rules and the conduct of the parties’). 366. (1993) 44 FCR 194 at 201; BC9304961. 367. See, for example, R v Gold Coast City Council [1971] QWN 13. 368. (2000) 46 ATR 51 at 55; [2000] FCA 1697; BC200007145. 369. See, for example, Thomson v Mosman Council [1999] NSWLEC 86; BC9909322 at [61] per Sheahan J (who concluded that ‘the proceedings were justifiably commenced, justifiably continued, justifiably settled and in all probability would have succeeded … had they been fully litigated’, and so made an order for costs); Tranchita v Danehill Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007 WASC 248; BC200709176 (where Martin CJ found that it was accurate to describe the defendant as having had a substantial victory and the plaintiff as having had a substantial loss, and so ordered costs in the defendant’s favour). 370. In Edwards Madigan Torzillo Briggs Pty Ltd v Stack [2003] NSWCA 302; BC200306180 at [5] Davies AJA, with whom Mason P and Meagher JA concurred, spoke in terms of the court being satisfied ‘that one party has had a substantial victory and the other a substantial loss’. 371. Cf Aussie Red Equipment Pty Ltd v Antsent Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1641; BC200107235 at [13] per Moore J (‘some recognition needs to be given to the apparent success of the applicants in the proceedings, though some allowance paid for the fact that the applicants have not established their claims in contested proceedings’). 372. (2000) 179 ALR 664 at 668; [2000] FCA 1106; BC200004474. 373. See, for example, Tsaprazis v Goldcrest Properties Pty Ltd (2000) NSW ConvR 155-953; [2000] NSWSC 765; BC200004417 at [50]–[51] per Hodgson CJ in Eq. 374. Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 194 at 201; BC9304961 per Hill J; Boscaini v Corporation of the City of Kensington [1999] SASC 327; BC9904460 at [22] per Debelle J. 375. ACT r 1706; Qld r 685 (formerly Qld r 683). 376. De Pasquale Bros Pty Ltd v NJF Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) Q ConvR 154-536 at 60,394; [2000]

QSC 4; BC200000090 per Chesterman J. 377. WA O 66 r 21. See D’Alessandro and Associates v Matthews (SC(WA), Wallwork J, 25 June 1993, unreported) BC9301334 at 7-–0 (rejecting any rule that the taxing officer should ‘prima facie take a percentage of the relevant scales in taxations where there has been no substantial trial’: at 9). 378. FCR 2011 r 25.12 (cf former FCR 1979 O 23 r 11(1), which was phrased in terms similar to those in the Northern Territory, Tasmanian, Victorian and Western Australian rules). 379. As to the formal requirements for an offer of compromise under the court rules see 13.5. 380. NT r 26.03(7); Tas r 284(1); Vic r 26.03(7); WA O 24A r 10(1). In Malliaros v Moralis [1991] 2 VR 501 the defendants argued that the rules disclosed an intention that they were entitled to delay acceptance up to the 14 days mentioned in the offer of compromise (see Vic r 26.03(3)) without being liable to be ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs incurred during that time. McGarvie J rejected this, noting that neither Vic r 26.03(7) nor any other provision by implication discloses that intention, adding that: first, it is difficult to see what considerations of justice tell in favour of leaving the defendants free of liability for the costs of the period being considered, and second, it would operate against the policy of the rules and make plaintiffs reluctant to make an offer of compromise during a trial if, in the usual case, they faced the prospect of incurring trial costs for up to 14 days before acceptance of the offer, and having ultimately to bear all those costs themselves: at 505–6. 381. NT r 26.03(8); Tas r 284(3); Vic r 26.03(8); WA O 24A r 10(2). 382. NSW r 42.13A (cf the former NSW RSC Pt 52A r 22(1)). 383. SA r 188(6A). 384. Lomer v Waters [1898] 2 QB 326; John s Hayes & Associates Pty Ltd v Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 201 at 204; BC9405929 per Hill J. 385. NT r 26.26(1). 386. NT r 26.26(3). 387. Tas r 269(1), 269(6). 388. Tas r 272(9).

[page 471]

PART III

Quantification of Party and Party Costs In view of the widespread application of the costs indemnity rule in Australian civil litigation (discussed in Chapter 7) — pursuant to which the party in whose favour costs are ordered receives a (partial) indemnity for costs he or she is liable to pay to his or her own lawyers — the law prescribes a means of quantifying the extent of that indemnity. This process has commonly been known as ‘party and party taxation’, although in several jurisdictions it is now known as costs ‘assessment’ as between party and party. The first four chapters of this Part discuss the law in this area. Chapter 15 deals with the nature of costs quantification for this purpose, and Chapter 16 with the bases upon which the indemnity may be calculated. In Chapter 17 are illustrated the types of allowances that may be made on party and party taxation or assessment. Chapter 18 outlines procedural aspects pertaining to the process of taxation or assessment. The final chapter in this Part — Chapter 19 — though similarly dealing with the quantification of the costs indemnity, is divorced from the process of taxation. Instead it discusses the entitlement of a party in whose favour costs have been ordered to interest on those costs as part of the indemnity.

[page 473]

CHAPTER 15

Nature of Party–Party Costs Quantification Relationship Between the Costs Indemnity Rule and Taxation

15.4

Order for Taxation of Party and Party Costs Jurisdiction to tax pursuant to court order for taxation High Court and Tasmania Federal Court, the Territories, New South Queensland and Victoria South Australia Western Australia Costs taxed without court order for taxation

15.7 15.7 15.8 Wales, 15.9 15.10 15.11 15.12

Fixing of Costs by the Court Circumstances meriting an order fixing costs Procedure in fixing costs Approach to estimating costs Giving of reasons Accordance of procedural fairness

15.14 15.15 15.19 15.20 15.23 15.24

Taxing Officers/Costs Assessors Identity Immunity Discretion

15.27 15.27 15.28 15.29

Powers Reference of question to a judge

15.30 15.31

Curial Reticence to Interfere with Taxing Officer’s Discretion General rule Reasons for reticence to interfere When will a court interfere with the exercise of a taxing officer’s discretion? Questions of quantum

15.32 15.32 15.33

Basis of Taxation Prescribed by Statute

15.37

15.34 15.35

Basis of Taxation Prescribed by Agreement 15.40 Mortgagees’ costs 15.43 Mortgagees’ costs at general law 15.44 Interpretation of clause in mortgage instrument 15.47 Can the parties contract to allow costs that are unreasonably incurred or unreasonable in amount? 15.52 [page 474] Lessors’ costs Agreements to indemnify

15.54 15.55

Taxation and Scales of Costs 15.58 Relationship between taxation and scales of costs 15.58 Court rules prescribing scales and circumstances where scale limits can be raised 15.60 High Court and Federal Court 15.60 Family Court 15.62 Australian Capital Territory and Queensland 15.63

Northern Territory South Australia Tasmania Victoria Western Australia ‘Care and conduct’

15.65 15.66 15.67 15.69 15.71 15.78

Disallowance of Unnecessary or Excessive Costs by a Taxing Officer 15.83

15.1 As the costs indemnity rule requires the quantification of the relevant indemnity, this Chapter introduces the process designed to effect that quantification. The process has traditionally been known as ‘taxation’; in the Family Court, Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales and Queensland it is now termed ‘costs assessment’, and in South Australia ‘adjudication’. The jurisdiction to have a bill of costs taxed stems from a court order1 or from a court rule.2 The court has the discretion to set the basis upon which the taxation is to be carried out, although this may also be prescribed by statute3 or agreement.4 It is also open to the court, instead of ordering the taxation of a party and party bill of costs, to fix the costs recoverable.5 15.2 The process of taxation ‘involves the examination of a bill of costs, and the determination of the amount, fair and reasonable in the circumstances, to which the successful party is entitled, bearing in mind the scale of costs applicable’.6 It quantifies the indemnity — the amount of recoverable costs and disbursements — to which the party awarded costs is entitled according to the terms of the costs order.7 The person appointed to ‘tax’ a bill of costs is generally known as a taxing officer or master (or costs assessor), with whose exercise of discretion the court is loath to interfere.8 In conducting a taxation, the taxing officer commonly has regard to an applicable scale of costs9 and will disallow costs he or she considers not recoverable.10 Historically the taxing officer acts as a delegate of the court, to whom the court delegates its function of quantifying costs, and is a person employed at the court.

[page 475] Taxation has both an ‘administrative’11 and a ‘quasi-judicial’ character,12 which requires taxing officers to approach their function with due regard to principle13 and that the exercise of their discretion be appealable to and reviewable by the court.14 15.3 In New South Wales and Queensland the relevant legislation and rules no longer refer to ‘taxation’ and ‘taxing officers’, but to ‘assessment’ and ‘costs assessors’. The purpose of costs assessment remains broadly the same as that of taxation; the change, rather, was designed to address the concern that the former system of taxation was too formal, legalistic, complex and adversarial.15 These concerns were addressed by modifying aspects of the process whereby bills of costs are quantified. Costs assessment is a statutory process that is neither wholly judicial, nor wholly adversarial, exhibiting strong elements of an inquisitorial nature.16 A costs assessor is independent of the court and, broadly speaking, whereas taxation is ‘to deal seriatim with each item by way of allowance or disallowance’,17 in the presence of the respective solicitors, assessment is conducted informally, usually paperbased, on a global rather than item-by-item approach. When speaking generally, however, to avoid unwieldy expression reference in this text continues to be made to ‘taxation’.

Relationship Between the Costs Indemnity Rule and Taxation 15.4 As noted in Chapter 7,18 the exercise of the courts’ costs discretion in civil litigation is governed by the ‘loser pays’ approach in the main. The ‘costs indemnity rule’ here dictates that, in the usual case, an unsuccessful litigant will be ordered to indemnify the successful litigant for the latter’s costs in bringing or defending the suit.19 It could be argued that complete indemnification is a just outcome; otherwise the party whose position has been vindicated may find, for instance, compensatory damages substantially eaten into by costs. Anything less than a complete indemnity means that true

compensation has not been achieved and the party whose position has been vindicated remains out of pocket. 15.5 Yet use of the term ‘indemnity’ does not mean that a successful litigant receives a complete indemnity in respect of, or is compensated fully for, the liability for costs to his or her lawyer. The law recognises that the ‘indemnity rule’ casts a heavy burden on the person ordered to pay costs, who is also ordinarily liable to meet his or her own lawyers’ costs. The process of taxation operates at both levels: a party can seek to have his or her own lawyers’ bill of costs taxed (a ‘solicitor and own client taxation’)20 and may, where there is a party and party costs order, have the bill of costs rendered by his or her opponent’s lawyers taxed (‘taxation as between party and party’). [page 476] The courts speak in terms of a ‘fair’,21 ‘qualified’22 or ‘reasonable’23 indemnity. This limits the costs payable by an unsuccessful litigant. That limit has historically been set by reference to the costs a taxing officer considers ‘necessary or proper’ for the attainment of justice or the protection of the rights of the party by whom they were incurred.24 A taxation so conducted is traditionally known as taxation on a ‘party and party basis’. ‘Necessary or proper’ costs rarely equate to the entire costs the successful litigant has incurred in prosecuting or defending his or her claim; almost invariably it will be less (and sometimes considerably less) than those costs. In fact, a South Australian judge in 1890 remarked that in all probability no case has ever been conducted in the court in which ‘the successful party recovered the whole of the expenses which were incurred by his legal adviser and in which some modicum of costs have had to be paid out of the pocket of the successful litigant’.25 The ‘indemnity rule’ is therefore a misnomer, as it does not purport to indemnify a successful party for all his or her own legal costs. What it aims to do is to strike ‘a proper balance as to the burden of costs which should be borne by the successful party without putting litigation beyond the reach of the unsuccessful party’.26 It may also encourage litigants to reach an out-ofcourt settlement, for even a party convinced of the strength of his or her case

may be prompted to compromise by the prospect of being partly out of pocket. 15.6 The foregoing is not to say that all taxations as between party and party are to be conducted on a ‘party and party basis’. The courts can, whether pursuant to court rules or their inherent jurisdiction, make orders for taxation on more liberal bases, usually either on the solicitor and client basis27 or the indemnity basis.28 Yet not even the indemnity basis, notwithstanding its title, necessarily provides a complete indemnity for all costs that the party in whose favour the costs order is made has incurred. Nowadays in some jurisdictions, the ‘party and party’ basis is replaced by what is termed the standard basis; others now make no reference to the solicitor and client basis. What each of these bases means, and the circumstances in which costs may be ordered on one or another of these bases, is discussed in detail in Chapter 16. In most circumstances, the court determines the basis upon which costs are to be taxed. However, statute may also state the basis upon which those costs are to be quantified, or the parties may agree on the basis. Each of these two latter sources of the basis of taxation is discussed in this chapter.29

Order for Taxation of Party and Party Costs Jurisdiction to tax pursuant to court order for taxation 15.7 Court rules make provision for the court’s jurisdiction to order the taxation or assessment of costs as between party and party, or in lieu thereof to fix a sum of costs payable by one party to another. In Western Australia the rules expressly state that unless the court in a particular case otherwise directs, bills of costs and fees payable to lawyers entitled to practise in the court in respect of business transacted in the court that have been directed by a judgment or order [page 477]

to be taxed must be taxed, allowed and certified.30 In New South Wales, a court or tribunal may direct the Manager, Costs Assessment to refer for assessment costs payable as a result of an order made by the court or tribunal.31

High Court and Tasmania 15.8 The High Court Rules state that the court may order that costs be taxed, be fixed in an amount specified in the order or by the rules, or be assessed by such other method as the court directs.32 Where the court makes an order for fixed costs, those costs are not to be taxed, and the lawyer for the party in whose favour the order is made may be allowed an amount not exceeding that fixed sum.33 The Tasmanian rules are similar. They provide that when the court orders costs in favour of a party to litigation, it may by the order direct taxation of those costs, payment of a proportion of the taxed costs, payment of the taxed costs less a specified sum, or payment of a gross sum instead of taxed costs.34

Federal Court, the Territories, New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria 15.9 The rules in the Federal Court, the Territories, Queensland and Victoria, though directed to the same end, are phrased in slightly different terms. They state that where, by or under the rules or an order of the court, costs are to be paid to a person, that person is entitled to taxed costs (in the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland, assessed costs).35 The position is the same by implication in New South Wales, where reference is also made to assessed costs.36 Other than in the Federal Court, the rules add that where a court makes a costs order, it may order that as to all or part of the costs specified in the order, instead of taxed (or assessed) costs, the person in whose favour the order is made be entitled to:37 a proportion specified in the order of the taxed (assessed) costs; the taxed (assessed) costs from, or up to, a stage of the proceedings specified in the order;

a gross sum specified in the order instead of the taxed (assessed) costs;38 other than in New South Wales and the Northern Territory, a sum in respect of costs to be ascertained in such manner as the court may direct; or in New South Wales, such proportion of the assessed costs as does not exceed a specified amount. The Federal Court Rules simply state that a party or a person who is entitled to costs may apply to the court for an order that costs be awarded in a lump sum, instead of, or in addition to, any taxed costs, or determined otherwise than by taxation.39 [page 478]

South Australia 15.10 The South Australian rules state that, in exercising its costs discretion, the court may award costs as between solicitor and client, on an indemnity basis, by way of lump sum or on any other basis the court considers appropriate.40 Different components of costs can be awarded on different bases.41 The 2006 rules saw the advent of a new procedure preliminary to the adjudication (taxation)42 of costs. The rules require a person who is awarded costs to file in the court a claim for the costs prepared in an approved form43 and, at the request of the party ordered to pay costs, produce for inspection all documents on which he or she proposes to rely if the claim proceeds to adjudication.44 To the extent that the party liable admits the claim, the court will order the payment of costs.45 If the claim is not admitted in full, either party may apply to the court for a preliminary assessment of the issues in dispute and, on such an application, the court may exercise any one or more of the following powers:46 determine the basis on which costs are to be awarded and give any directions that may be necessary or desirable to arrive at a proper award of costs on the relevant basis; resolve issues in dispute between the parties or give directions for resolving

such issues by mediation, arbitration or reference to an expert for report; make such orders for costs as may appropriately be made without proceeding to detailed adjudication of the costs; or order that the claim for costs proceed in whole or part to detailed adjudication.

Western Australia 15.11 In Western Australia, if the issue of costs is not specifically dealt with in the judgment or order of the court, there is deemed to be reserved to any interested party liberty to apply within 30 days.47 Where taxation of costs is not ordered, the court may fix the amount of costs payable.48 In a matter or case to which a relevant scale does not apply,49 the court may award a lump sum by way of costs, direct the taxing officer to tax or allow costs analogous to those allowable under the scale, or direct the taxing officer to tax and allow reasonable costs.50 Where it appears to the court making a lump sum award for costs that some item or section of costs incurred by a party may be justified, but that it cannot be substantiated in detail or in quantum without considerable delay, it may make an interim award, and reserve the item or [page 479] section in question for later consideration.51 An interim award may be enforced as a judgment of the court, and any award made on further consideration will be enforceable in like manner.52

Costs taxed without court order for taxation 15.12 The rules in the Northern Territory, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia state that costs may be taxed without an order for taxation if:53 the court makes an order or gives judgment for costs; a proceeding is dismissed with costs;

an application in a proceeding is dismissed (or refused) with costs; a party may tax costs under any of the rules; excepting Western Australia, a party becomes liable under the rules to pay the costs of another party; or again excepting Western Australia, parties have agreed in writing that costs payable by one party to another party may be taxed and the agreement has been filed. The High Court Rules simply state that, unless the court orders that costs be fixed or assessed, a party entitled to costs is entitled to tax those costs without an order for taxation.54 The Federal Court Rules state that if the rules or an order of the court entitle a party to costs, the party may have those costs taxed without an order directing taxation.55 The Queensland rules state that costs may be assessed without an order for assessment if the court orders a party to pay another party’s costs, under the rule a party must pay another party’s costs, or under a filed written agreement a party agrees to pay to another party costs under the rules.56 The application must be made in the approved form, and accompanied by a costs statement.57 In the Northern Territory and Victoria, where costs are taxed other than under a judgment or order for costs, an order of the taxing master (in Victoria, the Costs Court) for payment of an amount found to be due may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment for the payment of money.58 There are no equivalent provisions in the current Australian Capital Territory and South Australian rules, only in the superseded rules in those jurisdictions.59 15.13 The New South Wales rules make no equivalent provision because statute states that a person who has paid or is liable to pay, or who is entitled to receive or who has received, costs as a result of an order for the payment of an unspecified amount of costs made by a court or a tribunal may apply, as prescribed,60 to the Manager, Costs Assessment for an assessment of the [page 480]

whole of, or any part of, those costs,61 who must in turn refer the application to a costs assessor to assess the costs in question.62

Fixing of Costs by the Court 15.14 The primary position is that costs are taxed or assessed, from which the court will in its discretion depart, and fixed costs itself, in an appropriate case.63 Although the power to award a fixed (or ‘gross’) sum instead of taxed (or assessed) costs is expressed in statute or court rules,64 it may in any case derive from the courts’ general statutory discretion to order costs.65 A corollary of this discretion must be the quantification of the costs to be awarded. As statute or court rules in most jurisdictions provide that a court can exercise its power to award costs at any stage of the proceedings,66 the court may make a gross sum order even in the face of antecedent costs orders envisaging taxation in the ordinary way,67 including after the dismissal of any appeal.68 Factors that may impact upon the exercise of the court’s discretion in this context cannot be stated exhaustively, but no doubt include the need for finality in litigation, whether or not the costs order had in fact been entered, the length of time that expired between the order and the application to fix costs, the reasons for any delay in making the application, whether or not the parties previously advanced submissions as to the appropriate costs order, and the nature of any relevant facts or circumstances arising after the original costs order.69 Against the backdrop of costs agreed to be taxed under a compromise agreement approved by the court, however, excepting a basis for setting aside the agreement or significantly changed circumstances, a court will look unfavourably upon an application to subsequently fix the relevant costs.70

Circumstances meriting an order fixing costs 15.15 The chief purpose of the jurisdiction to award of a fixed (‘gross’) sum is to avoid the expense, delay and aggravation involved in protracted litigation arising out of taxation or the

[page 481] assessment process.71 A rising chorus of judicial voice,72 to this end, acknowledges fixing costs as a means to give effect to the just, quick and cheap resolution of issues that forms the core of modern civil procedure reforms.73 It may thus be particularly apt in a lengthy and complex case, where the process of taxation will likely be both time-consuming and expensive, to avoid the incurrence of further costs.74 In Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2),75 for example, costs exceeding $8m were fixed where the bill already drawn demonstrated that, given the size and complexity of the matter, the preparation of a bill in taxable form was ‘an unrealistic demand which would require quite unreasonable time and expense’. The fees the applicants had incurred to date for drawing the bill, and for preparing the estimates placed before the court, totalled $286,670. This led von Doussa J to remark that ‘[t]he expense of several hundred thousand dollars on an exercise that cannot be described as socially useful is most regrettable’, and that ‘[b]y exercising the power to fix a gross sum now the further expenditure of funds on drawing the balance of the bill will be saved’.76 The cases reveal various other instances of judges fixing costs in litigation involving substantial sums in an effort to avoid what would otherwise be considerable (unnecessary) delay and cost.77 The case for a fixed costs order is the more compelling where the evidence reveals that the party awarded costs is unlikely, due to the financial position of the opponent, to be able to recover all its taxed costs in due course. In such a case, the costs of taxation would add a further [page 482] burden on the successful party, who is already likely to be (potentially significantly) out of pocket costs-wise as a result of the litigation.78 15.16 The relative simplicity of the matter may, in the court’s view, make it ‘entirely appropriate to save the parties the difficulties and inconvenience, and added expense, of a taxation’.79 A court is disinclined to order that costs

be taxed where the expense (and delay) of taxation would be likely to be disproportionate to the amount of the costs recoverable.80 Concepts of proportionality also inform the exercise of the jurisdiction to fix costs as a vehicle for capping costs recoverable,81 which in turn highlights the jurisdiction’s broader purview than merely avoiding the expense, delay or aggravation of a protracted taxation.82 The fixing of a gross sum may also be appropriate where, due to the nature of the case, the court feels that any continued litigation between the parties — on the issue of costs, bearing in mind that a taxing officer’s decision is reviewable83 — is likely to be counterproductive, and that the interests of achieving finality ought prevail.84 Family law matters may be a case in point. In Summerfield v Summerfield,85 for example, O’Ryan J fixed a gross sum where the history of the litigation and the complete lack of cooperation demonstrated that an order for taxation would probably only lead to more extensive and expensive litigation. Administrative appeals in migration cases provide another illustration.86 A gross sum costs order may prove apt, in any case, where a party has wasted court time and resources, failed to properly progress the [page 483] litigation or comply with court orders, so as to avoid a further waste of time and money that may prove readily recoverable.87 15.17 However, especially in family law cases,88 if the parties cannot agree on a figure for costs or there is a marked difference in estimates, courts are reluctant to impose a figure ‘lest it appear unfair to one party or the other’.89 Alternatively, to ensure a weaker party is not disadvantaged by a gross sum costs order, the courts may adopt ‘a careful and conservative approach’ to fixing its quantum.90 Courts commonly, to this end, apply a discount to the costs claimed,91 although the extent of any discount may be more confined in the face of an indemnity costs order.92 In any case, even in the face of a complex taxation, including one that could generate irrecoverable costs, if a court is not confident that it can do justice between the parties by fixing the costs, it will not do so.93 A court

must, it has been said, ‘be confident that the material before it enables it to make a sufficiently reliable calculation or estimate of an appropriate costs sum’, which in turn rests on a large extent on reaching some kind of view of what the outcome on taxation might be.94 A court may lack the requisite confidence where, say, the information relating to costs is insufficiently detailed, and fails to clearly identify the components of the costs incurred or how these were calculated.95 The same may be the case where presented with divergent evidence from costs experts,96 unless the court is able, after hearing and testing their evidence, to express a clear preference for the reasoning of one of them. Where the latter is so, or the expert costs evidence is consistent and presents as logical, fair and reasonable in its [page 484] conclusions, a court is more inclined to make a fixed costs order assuming other grounds also support this approach.97 15.18 Via a practice direction,98 the Western Australian Supreme Court resolved that, as a general rule, where a costs order is made against a party in interlocutory proceedings, the costs are to be fixed by the court. Likewise as a general rule, where costs are ordered to be in the cause, the quantum will be fixed.

Procedure in fixing costs 15.19 It is inconsistent with the objective of a gross sum order that the costs be subjected to the detailed scrutiny normally reserved for formal taxations.99 Yet the court’s power to so order, like the exercise of any of its other powers, must be exercised judicially, by reference to principle rather than whim.100 This impacts upon the approach and procedure that the court should adopt in this context in at least three ways, each discussed in turn below.

Approach to estimating costs 15.20 The court must, before electing to fix costs, be confident that the

approach taken to estimate costs is ‘logical, fair and reasonable’.101 Expressed another way, there must be a reasonable evidentiary basis for the order the court makes.102 Especially if the matter is complex, evidence from an independent costs consultant may prove useful,103 although a judge is not bound by it, but must exercise an independent discretion. On occasion judges have, in complex cases and at the parties’ request, found it valuable to sit with a registrar.104 Evidence [page 485] of the charges rendered to the party awarded costs is also highly relevant, though again hardly determinative. This evidence must be viewed in the context of considerations that inform the determinations of a taxing officer,105 coincidentally bearing in mind that fixing costs is a process intentionally distinct from taxation.106 15.21 Especially where costs will likely be substantial, the court cannot aim for mathematical precision. Of necessity, a ‘broad-brush approach’ to fixing costs is adopted. This in turn explains the need for some caution in fixing costs, as ‘the efficiency gained by the application of the broad brush comes at the expense of the accuracy of the outcome’.107 The caution inheres in the need for the power to be exercised judicially, which at the same time obviates any scientific or formulaic approach.108 Although the broad-brush approach has witnessed the frequent application of a discount to the amounts claimed, often a substantial discount,109 the highly factual nature of the relevant inquiry, and the need to exercise the discretion judicially, means that ‘this is an area in which it is generally imprudent to endeavour to extrapolate from the circumstances of one piece of litigation to those of another’.110 Each award rests on the particular circumstances and on evidence adduced. Fixing costs should not be approached with preconceptions derived from previous cases as to the proportion of total costs recoverable.111 This is not to deny that the range of recoveries in equivalent cases can inform the proper exercise of the court’s discretion.112 15.22 In quantifying the fixed sum, the court may take into account that costs should, in accordance with the theory behind the indemnity rule,113 ‘bear

some relationship to the size of the applicant’s victory’, and should be proportionate to the nature, complexity and importance [page 486] of the case.114 The need for proportionality therefore has relevance to both whether to fix costs and, if costs are to be fixed, their quantum. This can operate at each end of the costs spectrum. Matters involving relatively small pools of funds or property — typical examples are some family provision and relationships’ property disputes — may justify ‘capping’ costs proportionate to the fund at stake by way of a gross sum order.115 On the other hand, where the litigation is complex and the stakes are (financially or otherwise) high, the court may be inclined to allow, in a fixed sum order, a more generous proportion of the costs claimed. In Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd,116 for example, Einstein J noted that the proceedings were far removed from an ordinary commercial case. Not only were the issues wide ranging and complex, and supported by substantial evidence filed by both parties, the claim had the potential, if successful, to threaten the continuing business of Australia’s largest bank and the savings of its deposit holders, making the objective importance of the matter to the bank very high. As a result, his Honour accepted that the bank was plainly entitled to defend itself with all the energy and resources at its command. Although the bank adopted a ‘Rolls-Royce approach’ in defending the claim, Einstein J considered that such an approach was, in the circumstances, ‘entirely justifiable in terms of the magnitude of the claims made and the significance of the litigation to the [bank]’.117 His Honour made a gross sum costs order of $50m. This represented a discount of 20 per cent of the amount claimed by the bank, which was very much at the lower end of the discounts allowed in commercial litigation.

Giving of reasons 15.23 Part of the exercise of judicial discretion involves the giving of reasons for decision(s) made pursuant to that discretion. The nature and extent of the reasons required depend on the circumstances of each case, and in some

circumstances the reasons may be necessarily or easily inferred from the findings of the judge. So far as the fixing of costs are concerned, it behoves a judge to disclose the process of reasoning in ascertaining the quantum of those costs. This does not deny scope for a broad brush approach to the quantification — indeed to adopt such an approach is consistent with an attempt to avoid a detailed taxation — but the parties must be able to understand what factors influenced the judge and to what extent they impacted upon the figure fixed.118

Accordance of procedural fairness 15.24 The exercise of judicial discretion carries the duty to accord procedural fairness (or natural justice) to the litigants.119 What this means in this context is, however, unclear. The leading case, Leary v Leary,120 confuses more than clarifies. Purchas LJ noted that neither statute nor rules obliged a judge to receive submissions on whether costs should be fixed, and so held that it was open to the trial judge to fix costs without notifying the party liable in advance or giving that party an opportunity to be heard on the point.121 His Lordship reasoned that ‘to allow at trial what would in effect be a preliminary taxation would be an affront to the process’.122 [page 487] Yet Purchas LJ characterised it as unjudicial for a judge to receive an estimate of the costs without making the details available to the other side, or to refuse a request to hear submissions on that estimate if the party against whom the order is to be made makes, on reasonable grounds, an application to be heard.123 It was not, however, unjudicial for a judge, as occurred on the facts, to fix costs without receiving an estimate and without indicating an intention to do so. This seems an odd conclusion, and marks Leary v Leary is one of the few cases where a judge felt sufficiently apprised of the nature and incidents of the case to be able to fix costs on his own motion. 15.25 The fact that, prior to fixing costs, a judge will ordinarily seek from the party entitled its bill of costs to date arguably carries an obligation that the bill be disclosed to the party liable, and that the latter should have an

opportunity to be heard in relation to it.124 This has led a Canadian appellate court to rule that a judge should not fix costs on his or her own motion, but should afford the parties an opportunity to heard on the matter, and that an order fixing costs should only be made when the judge, having duly heard the parties, is satisfied that he or she is in a position to do procedural and substantial justice in fixing the costs instead of directing that they be taxed.125 15.26 The Supreme Court of Queensland has prescribed a procedure designed to encourage parties to agree on the amount of costs, as a prelude to the court potentially fixing costs.126 The relevant practice note states that the party awarded costs (‘the first party’) may, within 14 days of the order, provide the party liable (‘the second party’) with a realistic estimate of the costs claimed, including an explanation of its basis sufficiently detailed to facilitate some broad examination of its reasonableness. Within seven days of receipt, the second party must provide the first party with either notice of acceptance of the amount claimed, or a reasonable estimate, coupled with an explanation for any substantial variance. The first party may then seek to re-list the matter before the court (usually before the judge(s) who made the costs order), and apply for costs fixed in a particular amount. In so doing the first party must inform the judge of each party’s estimate of the likely length of the hearing, and of the respective estimates of amount. If the court declines to fix costs, the above circumstances may be taken into account by the Registrar in determining the disposition of the costs of any subsequent assessment.

Taxing Officers/Costs Assessors Identity 15.27 In the High Court, Federal Court, Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania and Western Australia the registrar(s) of the relevant court are responsible for taxing bills of costs;127 they are identified in the rules as ‘taxing officers’. The relevant person in the Northern Territory is the taxing master,128 and in Victoria it is the Costs Court via a Costs Judge (or, if the latter directs, a judicial registrar, a Costs Registrar, a Deputy Costs Registrar, the Prothonotary or a Deputy Prothonotary, as the case requires).129

[page 488] In New South Wales and (from 10 December 2007)130 Queensland costs assessment vests in costs assessors appointed for this purpose. Importantly, costs assessors are not public servants attached to the court, as are taxing officers or registrars who formerly taxed costs, but are lawyers with relevant experience, who conduct assessments on a part time basis.131 In New South Wales the Chief Justice appoints assessors; in Queensland the appointor is the Brisbane registrar of the Supreme Court.132 In Queensland it has been judicially observed costs assessment by practitioner assessors has relieved registrars of what had become a substantial burden, as well as ‘injected into the assessment process a level of awareness drawn from day to day practice’.133 In South Australia, the registrar may, subject to the supervision of a master, ‘exercise the jurisdiction of the Court for the adjudication upon costs’.134 Also, the court may, before exercising a power or discretion relating to costs, refer the matter for inquiry and report by an adjudicating officer.135

Immunity 15.28 A taxing officer engaged in a taxation under the applicable rules enjoys the immunity of a judicial officer of a superior court rather than the qualified level of immunity of a magistrate at common law.136 This is by reason either of the taxing officer’s connection with the judicial proceedings in the court under which the relevant costs orders were made, or by virtue of the taxation process being analogous to the judicial process.137 In the latter sense, the process of taxation can be seen as replicating a judicial adjudication in which competing contentions are determined by applying the law to the facts as found. Explicit statutory provision to the above effect is made in New South Wales and Queensland regarding costs assessors.138

Discretion 15.29 Taxing officers are, generally speaking, conferred a broad discretion as

to the taxation of both items and amounts in bills of costs.139 However, as a taxing officer performs a quasi-judicial function delegated by the court140 (but the same cannot necessarily be said of a costs assessor),141 the discretion must not be based on mere whim or preference but exercised [page 489] actively and according to principle.142 Separate consideration must be given to each item or work, to which the taxing officer must apply the relevant principles. A taxing officer may pay regard to the practice of his or her predecessors, and for the purposes of consistency it is proper to do so, but should not be governed or regulated by it, for otherwise the discretion is fettered.143 The proper exercise of discretion, moreover, dictates that, aside from rules to the contrary,144 the taxing officer will not as of course allow the amount merely because it has been paid, has not been objected to, or because the other side has not produced evidence to show that the charge is excessive.145 Though reticent to review a taxing officer’s discretionary decisions, courts will do so if the taxing officer has made an error in principle or has not actually exercised the discretion.146

Powers 15.30 Court rules in most jurisdictions empower a taxing officer, for the purpose of conducting a taxation of costs, to, inter alia: summon and examine witnesses either orally or upon affidavit; administer oaths; direct or require the production of books, papers and documents; require a party to be represented by a separate solicitor; and do such other acts and direct or take all such other steps required by the rules or the court.147 The Northern Territory rules, although not expressly listing taxing masters’ powers for this purpose, state that taxing masters have, in addition to powers conferred by the Supreme Court legislation, all the powers which under that legislation or the rules a master have on a hearing of an application in a proceeding.148 The same in essence is stated by the Victorian rules, which confer on the Costs Court, in addition to any powers conferred by any Act, ‘the same powers which an Associate Judge has on the hearing of an

application in a proceeding’.149 These powers are clearly as wide as those mentioned above, and the Northern Territory rules add a taxing master who forms the opinion that the strict application of the costs rules150 would result in an anomaly may tax costs as he or she thinks equitable in the circumstances.151 In South Australia, subject to any rule to the contrary, an adjudicating officer has the same powers and discretions as to the adjudication of costs as a judicial officer of the court.152 [page 490]

Reference of question to a judge 15.31 As an officer of the court, to whom the court has delegated the task of taxing a bill, a taxing officer is entitled to ask the court’s opinion upon finding himself or herself in difficulty, such as a difficulty as to the law on a point. This practice has been judicially described as ‘eminently wise and useful’153 and as ‘a convenient and sensible procedure’,154 not dependent upon any general power of reference in statute or rules. It is grounded, rather, in the court’s exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over its officers ‘and for the better administration of justice may entertain such a reference’.155 In any event, the court rules in some jurisdictions specifically provide that a taxing officer may refer a question arising on a taxation to a court for directions.156 Where that point is of some legal significance, the judge may refer it to an appellate court, which invariably would request submissions from the parties.157 The position in New South Wales is altered by statute, which provides that a costs assessor is not an officer of the court when acting as a costs assessor.158 Consequently, a costs assessor lacks standing to approach the court for directions as would a taxing officer. This does not, however, disentitle a costs assessor from receiving the same courtesy and cooperation as formerly a taxing officer was entitled to receive.159

Curial Reticence to Interfere with Taxing

Officer’s Discretion General rule 15.32 Where statute vests a discretion in a particular person, and an appeal is made against the exercise of that discretion, a strong presumption exists in favour of the decision appealed from, which should be affirmed unless the appeal court is satisfied that it is clearly wrong.160 This principle has various applications through the law. In the context of costs, it has two principal applications: regarding orders by trial judges as to costs,161 and in the exercise of a discretion vested in taxing officers (or persons in an equivalent position). The latter is discussed in this chapter, as to which it has been observed that ‘[t]he nature of the powers exercised by the judge on a review of the decision of the taxing master is identical with that exercised by any tribunal reviewing a discretionary decision’.162 The operation of the presumption dictates that it lies upon those seeking to impeach a taxing officer’s decision to satisfy the court that he or she is wrong.163 [page 491]

Reasons for reticence to interfere 15.33 Courts are reticent to interfere with a taxing officer’s decision within the latter’s domain for three main reasons. First, that a taxing officer has been vested with a very wide discretion164 dictates ‘that there is an area within which he is the sole arbiter’.165 Second, taxing officers are specialists in the area of determining the appropriate type and quantum of costs to be allowed to a successful party, advantaged by ‘long training’166 and considerable skill in that context, which judges usually lack.167 Taxing officers are consequently better suited to develop and apply uniform and consistent rules than judges who deal with these problems far less frequently168 (although whether the same observation carries as much force for part time costs assessors in New South Wales, and now Queensland, may be queried). Moreover, for courts to evince willingness to entertain appeals from taxing officers may cause judges to assume the duties of taxing bills of costs, which

is not a judicial function in the strict sense.169 Third, courts are reticent to interfere because the taxing officer has, by virtue of his or her role, before him or her more material than is available to the judge on the issue of costs.170 This means that taxing officers ‘can go into details better than can Judges’.171

When will a court interfere with the exercise of a taxing officer’s discretion? 15.34 Courts can, notwithstanding, interfere with the decisions of taxing officers. In some contexts, a judge may, from his or her own experience in presiding at and, formerly, conducting trials, be in a better position to determine relevant questions such as, for example, whether a difficulty claimed to have been present in a case was more imaginary than real.172 On a more principled basis, two main grounds upon which a court may interfere with a taxing officer’s decision have been identified. First, and most fundamentally, a court will interfere where the decision has proceeded upon a wrong principle, is based on a failure to fully appreciate the legal complexities involved in the case or has involved an obvious mistake.173 Second, the court retains a jurisdiction to review a taxing officer’s decision even as to an exercise of discretion only, as opposed to an issue of principle, but will generally only do so where the discretion appears not to have been exercised at all, or to have been exercised in a [page 492] manifestly wrong manner.174 If, for instance, a taxing officer who, rather than exercise his or her discretion, has acted upon an arbitrary rule, or has treated such a rule as binding upon him or her, does not exercise his or her discretion.175 That the chief taxing officer may lay down guiding rules to follow in taxations176 is no licence for taxing officers to adhere to those rules so rigidly as to hinder or prevent them from properly exercising their discretion in relation to the circumstances of each case.177 If this quest for

uniformity and consistency leads a taxing officer to undue rigidity, the court will rectify any consequent error.178 The court may also interfere in this regard where the taxing officer has given weight to extraneous or irrelevant matters, or failed to give (sufficient) weight to relevant considerations, in exercising his or her discretion. Thus merely because the judge may hold a view of the situation different to that of the taxing officer is no basis for reviewing the taxing officer’s decision.179 So when a court is called to review the taxing officer’s discretion, the question is not whether it would have exercised the discretion in the same way, but whether in some way the exercise of the discretion has miscarried.180

Questions of quantum 15.35 A taxing officer’s discretion may miscarry as to whether an item should be allowed on taxation, and also in respect of the quantum allowed for an item.181 Questions of principle are more likely to arise so far as the former is concerned. Matters of mere quantum rarely give rise to principle, and so are rarely reviewed by a court. The court rules prescribe no precise standard of measurement, but have traditionally phrased the taxing officer’s duty as to allow expenditure ‘necessary or proper’ for the attainment of justice.182 This has led judges to remark that, on questions of quantum, a taxing officer’s decision is ‘generally speaking final’, and that only in an exceptional or extreme183 case should a court [page 493] review that decision.184 The court will not interfere unless the taxing officer is shown to have ‘gone wholly wrong’ so far as quantum is concerned,185 or some question of principle is otherwise involved.186 In Norton v Herald187 the High Court remarked to this end that in a case involving a mere question of sufficiency of amount, the appellant must, in order to induce the court to act, ‘make out his case very clearly, otherwise we should find out time occupied with mere re-hearings as to quantum of costs, to the disadvantage of

suitors asking for the determination of questions more properly within the intended functions of this tribunal’. 15.36 A judge may, in reviewing a taxing officer’s discretion as to quantum, set broad lower and upper limits for the item in question according to his or her own knowledge and experience, but only if the figure so adopted falls outside these limits should the judge substitute his or her own figure.188 The range must assume some considerable breadth for otherwise the judge would become a de facto taxing officer. Hence judges have been restrained from interfering unless the difference is ‘scandalously’ disproportionate189 or ‘so manifestly excessive or insufficient that the judge may infer that there has been a failure properly to exercise his discretion’.190 From the very fact that a large sum is allowed, for instance, the court may infer that the taxing officer must have acted on a wrong principle or taken into consideration something he or she ought not to have done.191

Basis of Taxation Prescribed by Statute 15.37 The terms of a statute may determine the basis upon which some or all of the costs in issue are to be quantified, to be approached according to the proper construction of the statutory provision in question. Where that provision uses the language recognised by the general law or court rules, it is presumed that parliament intended that it attract the same meaning as under the general law or court rules. For example, where a statute requires a court, [page 494] in defined circumstances, to ‘award costs in favour of the claimant on a solicitor-and-client basis’,192 costs are to be quantified according to the solicitor and client basis of taxation.193 15.38 The position is more difficult where the language adopted is at odds with any accepted terminology. Here the court must construe the language by reference to its context and the purpose of the court or tribunal in which the power is vested. For instance, statute empowers the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal to order a party who does not accept a settlement

offer to pay ‘all costs incurred’ by the offeror after the offer was made.194 As the term ‘all costs’ is not a known description of a category of costs,195 in Re Panieras and Home Owners Warranty196 the tribunal said that it must be construed in the context of the tribunal, so that decisions under other statutes are of only limited value. It held that ‘all costs’ means costs quantified on a solicitor and client basis because: first, the courts have adopted the solicitor and client basis rather than the party and party basis as appropriate where a defendant rejects a favourable settlement offer;197 second, it was consistent with the legislative scheme to encourage early settlement of proceedings, placing additional pressure on a party to accept an appropriate offer of settlement; and third, court rules impose a special costs liability where an ultimately favourable offer is not accepted.198 In Solak v Registrar of Titles (No 3)199 where the statutory language referred to payment of the ‘full costs’ of the registrar in the action,200 Davies J ruled that ‘full costs’ meant ‘ordinary costs as between party and party’. Her Honour reasoned that ‘[t]he context does not indicate that the phrase was intended to pick up on the distinction between party/party costs and indemnity costs provided for under the Supreme Court Rules’, and thus rejected the registrar’s argument that he was entitled to indemnity costs.201 While the latter may be true, to equate the statutory language to ‘party and party’ costs seems to give no weight to the word ‘full’ in prefacing the term ‘costs’. But it does align with some case authority in the context of clauses in mortgage instruments, albeit in that context against a backdrop of a contra proferentem approach to construction.202 15.39 A similarly challenging case was Spencer v Dowling,203 involving a statute requiring the Equal Opportunity Board to award ‘costs reasonably incurred’ in the absence of ‘special circumstances’.204 Winneke P remarked that those words were apt to describe costs quantified on a party and party basis, as much as they are to describe costs quantified on a solicitor–client basis, because party and party costs have always been regarded as the costs that are reasonably incurred in the attainment of justice between the parties.205 His Honour favoured interpreting the phrase ‘costs reasonably incurred’ here as meaning party and party costs, reasoning that ‘[i]t would be surprising to say the least, if Parliament was obliging the board to award (absent

[page 495] special circumstances) a higher measure of costs than are traditionally awarded in the superior courts of this State’.206 Yet in that the traditional formulation of the party and party basis focuses on costs ‘necessary or proper’ for the attainment of justice,207 whereas solicitor and client costs are those reasonably incurred and of reasonable amount,208 it may be argued that the legislature, in allowing recovery of costs ‘reasonably incurred’, meant solicitor and client costs.209 Winneke P pointed to nothing in the nature of the board, or in other provisions of its governing statute, to justify an alternative interpretation. Callaway JA’s reasoning was arguably no more convincing. His Honour noted that although the phrase ‘costs reasonably incurred’ could be construed to refer to costs quantified on other than the party and party or solicitor and client bases,210 this was not an appropriate interpretation because it would oust a settled body of costs knowledge and expertise and was, in any case, inconsistent with another provision in the statute211 phrased in the traditional language of ‘bills of costs’ that are ‘taxed or settled’ by the registrar of the tribunal. His Honour reasoned that as party and party costs must be reasonably incurred, the words ‘reasonably incurred’ could not be seen as an exclusive hallmark of solicitor and client costs. This led him to interpret the words to mean ‘properly incurred for the attainment of justice’, that is, party and party costs.212 However, it is unclear why, even if ‘reasonably incurred’ is not an exclusive hallmark of solicitor and client costs, it necessarily follows that those words should be interpreted as indicating party and party costs.

Basis of Taxation Prescribed by Agreement 15.40 The need for a taxation as between party and party is obviated if the parties agree on the quantum of costs recoverable under the costs order.213 What is discussed below is the scenario where a contract entered into between parties in advance of any litigation, rather than obviate the need for taxation, specifies the basis on which costs are to be quantified. If the agreement, though it may allocate costs liability, is silent on the basis of

taxation, the party and party basis is assumed.214 Hence, costs are fixed on a party and party basis unless the party seeking an alternative basis can show ‘either on some well-recognised principle, or under some contract plainly and unambiguously expressed’215 grounds for costs to be taxed on that other basis. 15.41 The effect of a clause purporting to entitle a litigant to costs quantified on other than the party and party basis must be understood. As superior courts are vested with a discretion to award costs,216 the parties cannot oust that discretion by contract.217 To uncritically give [page 496] effect to such a term is to fetter the court’s discretion. Yet the bulk of authority supports the proposition that, assuming the agreement in question is valid and enforceable, the court ordinarily exercises its costs discretion to give effect to the contractual right.218 It has been observed, to this end, that ‘[i]t is because contracts are concerned with the allocation of risk that it is appropriate for the court to give effect to the contractual arrangement between the parties’.219 Effect will not, however, be given to an agreement vitiated at general law by fraud, mistake, undue influence, unconscionable dealing, or vitiated or varied pursuant to statute,220 or that infringes public policy. A failure in the pleadings to rely on an (allegedly) broader contractual entitlement to costs than otherwise available may also incline the court against giving effect to that entitlement.221 Importantly, even if a court makes a costs order in terms other than those agreed, or declines to make a costs order, the antecedent agreement for the quantification of costs may be enforceable inter partes.222 This is because a curial order imposes an independent obligation to pay but does not affect other rights of the parties in relation to the costs of the proceedings.223 It assumes, however, that the ground on which the court has refused to give effect to the terms of the agreement does not likewise serve to prevent the contract from being enforceable at law. 15.42 Below are discussed three common areas in which parties prescribe the quantification of costs by contract, ordinarily arising out of default by one of

the parties: for the costs of mortgagees, the costs of lessors, and general provisions for an indemnity against costs. [page 497]

Mortgagees’ costs 15.43 Much of the case law in this context has focused on the costs of a mortgagee in the event of a mortgagor’s default in the mortgage commitments. Unfortunately, the various cases do not always present a uniform statement of principle.

Mortgagees’ costs at general law 15.44 As the courts have identified the mortgagee’s right to costs in redemption proceedings as an equity arising from the loan agreement, the question of costs is not within the usual discretion of the court as to costs.224 The classic judicial statement is that of Lord Selborne LC in Cotterell v Stratton, who said:225 The right of a mortgagee in a suit for redemption or foreclosure to his general costs of suit, unless he has forfeited them by some improper defence or other misconduct, is well established, and does not rest upon the exercise of that discretion of the court which, in litigious causes, is generally not subject to review. The contract between the mortgagor and mortgagee … makes the mortgage a security, not only for principal and interest, and such ordinary charges and expenses but also for the costs properly incident to a suit for foreclosure or redemption.

So ‘a mortgagee is entitled to his costs of a suit for redemption unless he has been guilty of misconduct or has acted unreasonably’,226 in which case the costs are in the discretion of the judge. Raising an untenable defence, or claiming a balance due after the mortgage has been fully repaid, constitutes misconduct that causes the absolute right to costs to be forfeited.227 15.45 If the right to costs is clear, the issue is then how the costs are to be quantified at general law. Here there is some divergence of authority. The bulk of authority supports the proposition that the costs are to be quantified on a party and party basis.228 Others have considered that the position is not so inflexible,229 and have pointed to case authority allowing a mortgagee solicitor and client costs.230 In fact, various statements in the case law

identify as the general equitable rule that a mortgagee is entitled to charge against the mortgaged property [page 498] or add to the secured debt ‘all proper costs charges and expenses incurred by the mortgagee in relation to the mortgage debt itself or the security’,231 ‘his costs, charges and expenses properly incurred’232 or ‘costs, charges and expenses reasonably and properly incurred in ascertaining or defending his rights, or in recovering the mortgage debt’.233 These formulations seem to point to solicitor and client costs, or costs on a common fund basis, rather than party and party costs, although again there is confusion, as there is case authority to the effect that ‘all costs reasonably and properly incurred’ in the context of a mortgagee mean only those costs that are properly payable on a party and party taxation.234 15.46 Whatever the basis of costs quantification adopted, allowable costs include costs reasonably and properly incurred in proceedings for the possession, sale, foreclosure or redemption of the mortgaged property. Also allowable are the mortgagee’s costs, reasonably and properly incurred, of proceedings against a third party where what is impugned is the title to the estate, where the mortgagee acts for the benefit of the equity of redemption as much as for that of the security. Where, however, a third party impugns the title to the mortgage, or the enforcement or exercise of a mortgagee’s right or power accruing thereunder, the mortgagee’s costs of the proceedings, even though they be reasonably and properly incurred, are not allowable against the mortgagor.235

Interpretation of clause in mortgage instrument 15.47 Irrespective of the correct basis of quantifying costs at general law, the terms of the mortgage contract can, and frequently do, make specific provision to this end. Almost invariably this provision seeks to broaden the mortgagee’s entitlements, purporting to quantify costs more generously than on the party and party basis. Unless the terms of the clause in question are contrary to public policy,236 or for some other reason grounded in principle

the court declines to give effect to them, the main inquiry is one of construction. 15.48 As a general principle, clauses in a mortgage instrument entitling a mortgagee to costs are construed contra proferentem.237 This is grounded in the notion that a weaker party should benefit from any ambiguity in the construction of the document creating its liability. As the mortgagee is, by virtue of its stronger financial position, often able unilaterally to specify many of the loan terms, should it fail to set out its entitlements with the requisite clarity, it is reasoned that the mortgagor should not be held responsible for this by the adoption of a construction contrary to the latter’s interests. The contra proferentem approach is illustrated in a leading case, Re Adelphi Hotel (Brighton) Ltd.238 There Vaisey J held that the party and party basis applied where the clause provided that ‘all costs charges and expenses incurred or paid by it in relation to the negotiation for and preparation, completion realisation and enforcement of the security’. His Lordship reasoned as follows:239 [page 499] [W]hen costs are referred to they are understood to be party and party costs, and not solicitor and client costs, and it is difficult to see in principle why a mortgagor should be called to reimburse a mortgagee for anything beyond his necessary expenditure. I think that a mortgagee is entitled, as against a mortgagor and against the mortgaged property, to his ‘full costs’, but that expression means ordinary party and party costs and not costs as between solicitor and client … apart, of course, from some special bargain.

15.49 Not all judges have given wholesale endorsement to the Adelphi approach. If the language adopted in the relevant clause can be assimilated with that found in the court rules for, say, solicitor and client costs, this may provide an indication not to confine recovery to party and party costs. For example, in Whild v GE Mortgage Solutions Ltd (No 2),240 where a mortgage contract stated, inter alia, ‘[w]hen we ask, you must pay us the reasonable expenses we reasonably incur in enforcing this mortgage after you are in default’ (cl 6.6), Croft J aligned this with the language of the ‘solicitor and client’ basis of taxation (then) set by the Victorian rules. The latter allowed, on costs taxed on this basis, ‘all costs reasonably incurred and of a reasonable amount’.241 His Honour reasoned as follows:242

Having regard to the language of cl 6.6 … and its consistency with the language of [the rule], cl 6.6 … is, in my view, clearly intended to enable a mortgagee to recover all reasonable costs and expenses incurred in relation to the enforcement of the mortgage. This permits the recovery of costs on a higher basis than a party and party basis. The reference to costs and expenses being ‘reasonably’ incurred in cl 6.6 … does, however limit the extent of the indemnity enjoyed by the mortgagee in recovering its enforcement costs to those reasonably incurred and of a reasonable amount.

Even without analogy to the phraseology adopted in court rules, it appears open to a court to construe wording such as that in Whild to encompass solicitor and client costs. Katsaounis v Belehris243 illustrates the point. The mortgage there required the mortgagor to pay ‘all costs charges and expenses reasonably incurred or paid’ by the mortgagee in or about the preparation, execution, stamping and registration of the security. Debelle J interpreted the general law right of a mortgagee as extending to costs reasonably incurred, and so construed the clause in question as expressly stating the mortgagee’s rights at general law.244 This meant digressing from Re Adelphi, which his Honour was willing to do, interpreting the clause to accord with the common fund basis of taxation.245 In his opinion, this interpretation gave full effect to the mortgagor’s covenant to pay all costs that had been reasonably incurred, for were the costs taxed on a party and party basis the mortgagee’s right to costs could have been limited in a way not contemplated by the contract. To this end, Debelle J focused on the reasonable expectations of a mortgagee in this context:246 A person who had signed a contract entitling him to recover all costs he had reasonably incurred would be surprised to learn that his entitlement to recover those costs had been circumscribed

[page 500] by being reduced to party and party costs. It is, therefore, appropriate to allow the mortgagee to recover more than party and party costs which had been reasonably incurred.

His Honour concluded, according to the terms of the mortgage, it was intended that the mortgagee should not be out of pocket in consequence of agreeing to lend money to the mortgagor. In reaching this conclusion he added that ‘[a]ll due weight must be given to the fact that the right to recover costs rests on a contract between the parties, not on an exercise of the discretion of the court’.247 15.50 There accordingly appears two broad strands of authority, the Adelphi

strand apparently driven by an attempt to redress the balance between lender and borrower by adopting a contra proferentem approach. The alternative strand focuses more on the actual wording in the relevant contract, and for this reason should arguably be preferred. A mortgagee is nonetheless well advised to identify with precision the basis on which it seeks to recover costs, or risk the court reading down any ambiguity against it. 15.51 If, in any case, the words used are wide enough on their ordinary construction, the court will not read them down unnaturally to refer to the party and party basis. The point is illustrated in Re a Solicitor’s Bill of Costs,248 where a clause in a mortgage instrument required the mortgagor to pay, in addition to all costs for which the mortgagor might be liable at law or in equity, all costs incurred by the mortgagee in consequence of any default or incurred by the mortgagee for the preservation of the security. Street J found these terms to be of ‘the widest possible nature’, and that the parties’ intention to extend the rights of the mortgagees in respect of their costs ‘is clear beyond doubt when it is seen that those words refer specifically to costs additional to the costs ordinarily payable at law’.249 His Honour interpreted the clause to involve an undertaking by the mortgagors to indemnify the mortgagees in respect of any expenditure they may incur in their capacity as mortgagees in relation to the secured debt. Thus the mortgagor was required to pay the costs that would be payable by the mortgagees on ‘a solicitor and his own client’ taxation.250 Similarly, in Citibank Savings Ltd v Nicholson251 a clause required the mortgagee’s costs ‘as between solicitor and client to be paid by the mortgagor’ was construed to evince an intention that the mortgagee should not be out of pocket in consequence of the mortgage, but should be entitled to all of its costs, charges and expenses provided it was reasonable to incur such items and that they were reasonable in amount (namely, a ‘solicitor and own client’ taxation). Certainly, reference to costs ‘on a full indemnity basis’ are difficult to construe as referring to the party and party, or even solicitor and client,252 bases of taxation.253 [page 501]

Can the parties contract to allow costs that are unreasonably

incurred or unreasonable in amount? 15.52 Whatever the basis of taxation, both at general law and pursuant to the court rules the court or taxing officer will not allow costs that are unreasonable in nature or amount unless, in the case of solicitor and own client taxation, the client has agreed to the incurrence of these costs after being fully advised in this respect.254 The issue thus arises as to whether, by the terms of a mortgage instrument, the mortgagee is able to throw upon the mortgagor costs that are unreasonable in nature or amount. The answer to this question has uniformly been held to be in the negative, whether by a process of construction or on grounds of public policy. The point is illustrated by the decision of Hodgson J in AGC (Advances) Ltd v West,255 where cl 24A of the mortgage allowed the mortgagee to recover the following: All costs, charges, expenses, disbursements and payments which may be incurred or made by the mortgagee in or about this mortgage or for the protection of the mortgage property or which in the mortgagee’s opinion may be necessary, desirable or called for to protect or safeguard or in any way assist or advantage the rights, remedies, titles, powers and interests of the mortgagee hereunder.

His Honour remarked that cl 24A did not expressly make objective necessity or reasonableness a requirement for the mortgagee’s entitlement; only the mortgagee’s opinion that the expense was necessary, desirable or called for. However, he considered that there should be some implied qualification on that clause that there be reasonableness in relation to the incurring of those costs.256 Another clause required all legal costs to be assessed on a solicitor and client basis ‘without any necessity of taxation’. The latter phrase, according to Hodgson J, should not be construed to exclude any necessity of reasonableness in the costs or to exclude the various ways in which costs charged by a lawyer may become liable to taxation.257 Importantly, his Honour added that had these conclusions not been achievable on a process of construction, he would have been inclined to modify the effect of the clauses via the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW), which provides relief from unjust contracts.258 A more targeted initiative, the National Credit Code,259 which has been implemented into all Australian jurisdictions and empowers courts relieve against unjust credit contracts,260 is now directly relevant in this context. ‘Unjust’ here is defined in the same way as under the Contracts Review Act, to include ‘unconscionable, harsh or

oppressive’.261 There may also be avenues to attack provisions of this kind via the unfair contract terms provisions of the Australian Consumer Law.262 15.53 In Gomba Holdings UK Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd263 an issue facing the English Court of Appeal was whether a clause entitling the mortgagee to ‘all costs charges and expenses howsoever incurred by the bank … in relation to this mortgage … on a full indemnity basis’, [page 502] on its true construction, entitled the mortgagee to costs, charges and expenses unreasonably incurred or unreasonable in amount. Consistent with principle, the court held that it did not,264 the reference to ‘a full indemnity basis’ being interpreted as avoiding the risk of taxation on a party and party basis.265 The court then addressed whether the position was any different in respect of the following clause: All costs charges and expenses incurred hereunder by the bank … in perfecting or otherwise in connection with this security or in respect of the property hereby charged including … all costs of all proceedings for the enforcement of the security hereby constituted or for obtaining payment of the moneys hereby secured or arising out of or in connection with the acts authorized by clause 7 hereof (whether or not such costs charges and expenses and moneys or part thereof would be allowable on a party and party or solicitor and own client taxation by this court) shall be recoverable from the companies as a debt … and shall be charged on the premises comprised herein …

The court conceded that this clause presented greater difficulty, as it appeared to exclude limitations imposed by both party and party taxation and solicitor and own client taxation, and that it would thus be possible to take the view that the clause covered all costs, charges and expenses whether or not improperly incurred. Yet it held that such an interpretation was inconsistent with both the reference in an earlier clause to ‘costs … properly incurred and payments properly made’, and the mortgagee’s duty to pay proper regard to the mortgagor’s interests.266 Although the clause entitled the mortgagee to indemnity costs, it did not entitle it to recover costs, charges and expenses unreasonably incurred or of unreasonable amount.267 The court then countenanced the consequences had the clause not been so construed, and concluded as follows:268 It is difficult to contemplate that a mortgage deed would ever be construed as entitling a

mortgagee to charge against the mortgaged property, or to require the mortgagor to pay, all costs charges and expenses even if improperly or unreasonably incurred or improper or unreasonable in amount unless the mortgage deed had expressly in terms so provided. But if a mortgage deed did expressly so provide, the enforceability of such a provision would … be open to serious question on public policy grounds.

Lessors’ costs 15.54 The case law involving the quantification of the lessors’ costs following default by lessees appears to follow the path of Re Adelphi. At general law, those costs are quantified on a party and party basis, and so for another basis to apply pursuant to the agreement of the parties, it must be clearly stated. For example, in Heaps v Addison Wesley Longman Australia Pty Ltd269 a lease provided that if the lessee defaulted in observing or performing any covenant in the lease, ‘the Lessee shall pay the Lessor all legal and other costs charges and expenses for which the Lessor shall become liable or which the Lessor shall suffer or incur in consequence of or in connection with such default’. Macready M held that this clause did not oust the application of the normal party and party basis of taxation.270 Yet where a lease provides for the payment [page 503] of costs on ‘a full indemnity basis’, or refers to an undertaking to ‘indemnify’, aside from factors that make it unfair to give effect to the ordinary meaning of these words, or other grounds upon which the agreement could be vitiated, the court will award costs on an indemnity basis.271

Agreements to indemnify 15.55 A person entitled to an indemnity, when acting within the scope of his or her authority, is generally entitled not only to recover the amount payable by him or her under a judgment recovered in respect of any matter covered by the indemnity, but also all costs properly incurred in defending the proceedings, including his or her own costs.272 So, generally speaking, where there is a contract of indemnity the costs of legal proceedings properly

incurred by the person indemnified are recoverable. And this is so even if the clause in question makes no explicit reference to costs as part of the recovery.273 The indemnity has generally been held to extend to the full costs as between solicitor and own client, namely all costs other than those unreasonably incurred or unreasonable in amount.274 For example, in Mee v DWWD Hotels Ltd (No 2)275 a deed of indemnity between the first and second defendants provided, inter alia, that the licensee (first defendant) ‘doth hereby indemnify and save harmless the [second defendant] from and against all claims and actions and costs suits or demands howsoever arising out of the use by the licensee … of the said piece of land’. Beattie J held the term ‘costs’ meant solicitor and client costs, though adding that the extent of a person’s [page 504] liability under an indemnity must depend on the nature and terms of the contract, and that each case must be governed in general by its own facts and circumstances.276 15.56 Even if the term ‘indemnity’ is not used, a court may conclude, according to the nature of the agreement and its proper construction, that indemnity costs ensue. Re Sheehan277 illustrates the point, where a maintenance agreement between husband and wife required ‘the husband pay the taxed costs and disbursements of the wife due [to her solicitors]’. That the clause identified the costs as those due by the wife to her solicitors suggested to Fogarty J that solicitor and own client costs278 were intended. His Honour added that ‘[t]he fact that those costs are to be taxed does not qualify that characteristic but provides the method for determining the amount in question and that it is proper’.279 In Talacko v Talacko280 the relevant clause read as follows: In the event that the Defendant breaches any term, condition or warranty in this agreement, then the Plaintiffs shall be entitled to enter judgment for an order that the [D]efendant pay equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of each of the Properties and interests in the Properties (as defined in the amended statement of claim) recovered or obtained by him, together with the costs of entering such judgment, and the production of these terms of

settlement shall be conclusive evidence of the [D]efendant’s irrevocable consent to the entry of such judgment.

Kyrou J interpreted this clause as requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs their costs of the proceeding since its reinstatement on an indemnity basis, reasoning that had the parties simply meant that the plaintiffs would be entitled to costs on a party and party basis, ‘there would have been no need for them to refer to the costs of entering judgment because the plaintiffs would have been entitled to those costs pursuant to the usual practice of this court’.281 But in other instances, the absence of the language of indemnity may prove fatal to a claim for other than costs as between party and party. For instance, in Chen v Kevin McNamara & Son Pty Ltd282 the issue was whether the first respondent could recover indemnity costs under a provision in a building contract which obliged the owner to pay ‘any costs and fees’ arising from proceedings relating to the contract. Redlich JA, with whom Maxwell P and Robson AJA concurred, held that, as the phrase ‘any costs and fees’ neither required the owner to ‘indemnify’ the builder, nor referred to ‘indemnity costs’, ‘solicitor/client costs’ or ‘special costs’, it contained no language that might signify that the costs contemplated other than on a party and party basis.283 15.57 The same arguably applies under a contract for indemnity insurance, provided its terms are consistent with the insured being intended to be indemnified for its costs. In Ralston v Burkinshaw,284 for example, where the policy referred to ‘costs and expenses incurred with the written consent of the insurer for the defence of any legal proceedings’, Dunford J ruled that as ‘[t]he whole concept of indemnity under an insurance policy is to avoid the insured being liable for any money arising out of a proper claim’, the defendant should be entitled to his costs against the insurer on an indemnity basis. It cannot be assumed that the same necessarily applies if the indemnity is qualified by the terms of the contract.285 [page 505]

Taxation and Scales of Costs

Relationship between taxation and scales of costs 15.58 Other than in New South Wales — where costs as between party and party are deregulated and premised on a costs assessor’s determination of what is fair and reasonable286 — court rules prescribe scales of costs. It has been judicially observed that ‘[t]he existence of scales is intended to ensure that costs remain within reasonable bounds’.287 Elaborating on the point, another judge has remarked as follows:288 [Scales] serve a number of purposes. The purposes … include the purpose of regulating the costs properly and reasonably recoverable by a successful party to litigation, and the purpose of enabling parties to litigation to make an approximate assessment of their exposure to an adverse costs order in the event they are unsuccessful. Another relevant purpose is the purpose of encouraging legal representatives to only undertake work, and incur costs that are properly and necessarily incurred in the conduct of the litigation, as considerable gaps between costs claimed on a solicitor and client, and party and party basis, may give rise to client dissatisfaction.

Scales generally set fees for, inter alia, getting instructions, commencing proceedings, drawing,289 engrossing,290 perusing,291 copying292 and serving documents, attendances293 and witnesses.294 The scale fee represents the quantum of fees for particular types of work that lawyers are entitled to charge and be allowed in court proceedings. For this reason, if on a taxation between party and party a taxing officer finds an item prescribed in the scale to be allowable, traditionally the view has been that the quantum allowed is set by the scale,295 not by the terms of any costs agreement between the successful party and his or her lawyer.296 Yet as noted below,297 at least where costs are ordered to be taxed on an indemnity basis, whether it remains appropriate to disclaim any reference to a costs agreement must be queried. [page 506] 15.59 Three points should, however, be noted in this respect. First, the rules confer upon the taxing officer a discretion as to quantum in respect of certain items, and in some jurisdictions certain items attract a prescribed range of allowable fees. In most jurisdictions the rules list factors a taxing officer must take into account in exercising this discretion. In the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and Tasmania these factors are:298 the other fees and allowances to the solicitor and counsel, if any, in respect

of the work to which such a fee or allowance applies; the nature and importance of the proceeding; the amount (and, except in Tasmania, the principle) involved; the interest of the parties; the fund, estate or persons to bear the costs; the general conduct and costs of the proceeding; and all other relevant circumstances. The current Federal Court Rules makes reference to parallel factors, albeit replacing the fourth and fifth dot points above with ‘the damages, if any, awarded’, and phrased in terms of discretion rather than direction.299 In the Northern Territory, in exercising this jurisdiction, the taxing officer is directed by the rules to have regard to the following:300 the complexity of the matter in which it arose and the difficulty or novelty of the questions involved; the nature and importance of the proceeding; the skill, specialised knowledge and responsibility involved; the number and importance of the documents prepared or perused, regardless of length; the place where and the circumstances in which the business involved was transacted; the labour involved and the time spent by the solicitor or counsel; the amount or value of money or property involved; other fees and allowances payable to the solicitor or counsel in respect of other items in the bill; and any other relevant circumstances. Equivalent provision was made in the Victorian rule prior to 1 April 2013, albeit by reference to the Costs Court as opposed to a taxing officer.301 The current Victorian rule replicates the first, third, fourth, sixth, seventh and final

dot points above, but adds ‘research and consideration of questions of law and fact’, ‘the general care and conduct of the legal practitioner’ (having regard to the instructions and all relevant circumstances), ‘and allowances otherwise made in accordance with the Scale in Appendix A’.302 Second, in most jurisdictions the rules entitle a taxing officer to increase an allowance if he or she considers the scale amount does not adequately reflect what the lawyer in question [page 507] has done.303 So it cannot be assumed that, whatever the basis of taxation, scale fees will automatically apply; considerable discretion remains in the taxing officer as to quantum. The breadth of this discretion is exemplified by the fact that taxing officers’ decisions as to quantum are the most difficult to convince a court to review.304 Third, as indemnity orders allow all costs other than those that are unreasonably incurred or unreasonable in amount,305 if taxation is ordered on an indemnity basis scale costs are of relevance only in so far as they may provide evidence that the quantum of costs claimed is unreasonable. As scale fees are often less than what many lawyers charge as between solicitor and own client, and as the indemnity basis of taxation can be equated to the solicitor and own client basis,306 scale fees alone should not determine the quantum to adopt in respect of items on an indemnity order.307 For this reason, there have been suggestions that taxing officers have regard to the terms of any costs agreement between the successful party and its lawyer, provided that it is valid and enforceable,308 to more accurately give effect to an indemnity order,309 which now find statutory or rule-based support in the Family Court, Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and (arguably) Western Australia.310

Court rules prescribing scales and circumstances where scale limits can be raised High Court and Federal Court

15.60 The High Court and Federal Court Rules provide that except when otherwise ordered by the court, in all proceedings lawyers are, subject to the rules, entitled to charge and be allowed the scale fees311 in respect of the matters referred to in the scale.312 The High Court Rules do, however, envisage that higher fees may be allowed if provided for by the rules. As to the latter, for example, the scales prescribe a fee for a ‘special letter or letter including an opinion’, but confer upon the taxing officer the discretion to allow, in respect of such a letter, such sum as he or she thinks is reasonable in the circumstances.313 [page 508] 15.61 The rules in each jurisdiction do, in any case, empower a taxing officer, where the circumstances warrant it, to allow an amount to be claimed, in addition to any item that appears in the scale, for ‘general care and conduct’.314 Recognising that ‘some matters that come before the court will be more significant and more difficult than others’,315 the High Court Rules state, to this end, that in exercising this discretion, the taxing officer may have regard to any matters he or she considers relevant, including:316 the complexity of the matter and the difficulty or novelty of the questions raised; the importance of the matter to the party and the amount involved; the skill, labour, specialised knowledge and responsibility involved therein on the part of the solicitor; the number and importance of the documents prepared or perused without regard to length; the time expended by the solicitor; and research and consideration of questions of law and fact. So even though the rules make no express provision for a taxing officer to increase a scale fee he or she considers is inadequate — as is common in other jurisdictions — provision of an allowance for ‘general care and conduct’ has the same practical effect. For any work and labour properly

performed but not provided for by the scales, and in respect of which the taxing officer considers an allowance should be made, such sum must be allowed as is just and reasonable.317 In any case, the rules add that a taxing officer who, ‘on special grounds’, considers the fee set by the scale for instructions to sue or defend, or for the preparation of briefs, is inadequate, may make such further allowance as he or she considers reasonable.318 The current Federal Court Rules speak in terms of an additional amount being allowed by a taxing officer, having regard to factors akin to the dot points listed above, as well as ‘the general care and conduct of the lawyer, having regard to the lawyer’s instructions and all relevant circumstances’.319 They make separate provision, however, for matters where the lawyer has not charged the client on a time costing basis, by listing factors to which regard should be had,320 which omit reference to ‘general care and conduct’.

Family Court 15.62 The Family Law Rules set out the maximum amount, by reference to relevant scales, of party–party costs a person may recover by a person entitled to costs under an order of the court, where the court does not fix the amount.321 For expenses that are not covered by the scales, a reasonable amount is to be allowed,322 and the rules list various factors the taxing officer may consider in this regard.323 The scale prescribes set fees for various items,324 conferring [page 509] a discretion for some of those,325 and for work outside these items sets a hourly charge.326 It also prescribes fee ranges for various forms of counsel’s work327 and basic composite amounts for undefended divorces.328 The foregoing does not oust the power of the court to order that a party is entitled to costs to be calculated in accordance with the method stated in the order (say, in accordance with the scale but with an additional percentage for complexity).329

Australian Capital Territory and Queensland 15.63 The Australian Capital Territory rules state that, for assessing costs, unless the court otherwise orders, a lawyer is entitled to charge, and be allowed, the costs under the prescribed scale of costs330 for work done for or in a proceeding in the court, multiplied by the prescribed percentage331 depending on the level of court.332 The Queensland rules provide that for assessing costs on the standard basis, a lawyer is entitled to costs under the prescribed scales of costs for work done for or in a proceeding in the court in question.333 15.64 In each jurisdiction the rules add that if the nature and importance, or the difficulty or urgency, of a proceeding and the justice of the case justify it, the person charged with taxing or assessing the costs may allow an increase not exceeding 30 per cent of the lawyer’s costs allowed on the assessment.334 The scales, moreover, state that, in addition to an amount allowed under another item in the scales, the registrar may allow for a lawyer’s ‘care and conduct’335 of a proceeding an amount he or she considers appropriate (in Queensland, reasonable) having regard to the circumstances of the case,336 by reference to the same factors as found in the High Court Rules for this purpose.337 The rules confer some discretion upon the registrar to set an amount he or she considers reasonable in place of the scale fee in respect of certain items.338 They further state that, for a matter not prescribed in the scale, the amount to be allowed is the cost the registrar considers reasonable.339 [page 510]

Northern Territory 15.65 Subject to the rules, the scales of costs apply in relation to the taxation of all costs.340 In relation to a particular taxation of costs, the taxing master may increase the amount or value of a scale allowance or expense as he or she thinks fit.341 The scale includes a basic scale that sets minimum units — which equate to one-tenth of an hour342 — for work requiring the application of legal skill, work not requiring the application of legal skill, and travelling and waiting time.343 In addition to a charge for work requiring the application

of legal skill, the taxing master may allow a further percentage of that charge for ‘general care and conduct’.344 There is also a composite scale, setting out charges for correspondence, preparing documents, telephone calls and copying.345 Where the work actually done by a lawyer is, in the taxing master’s opinion, adequately compensated by an appropriate composite fee, the taxing master must allow for that work a fee equal to that composite fee.346 The taxing master may, however, allow a larger fee, calculated according to the basic scale, if satisfied that the amount of work reasonably done and time reasonably spent warrants it.347 The composite scale also prescribes fees for the various steps in a litigious matter, such as taking instructions, making applications, seeking and providing discovery, and dealing with interrogatories.348 A lawyer who actually does work of this kind may, instead of charging in accordance with the basic scale, charge and be allowed the appropriate composite fee for that work.349 Finally, the rules contain a scale for ‘fixed costs’, divided into what are termed ‘basic costs’ (fixing set amounts for costs to be claimed on writ, and costs on judgment in default of appearance) and ‘additional costs’ (which include costs for service outside the jurisdiction, costs for substituted service and costs in default of defence).350

South Australia 15.66 The South Australian rules state that costs are, as a general rule, awarded on the basis that the party entitled will be reimbursed for costs reasonably incurred in the conduct of the litigation to an extent determined by reference to the scale of costs in force351 when the costs were incurred.352 The court may, however, depart from the scale if there is good reason to do so,353 such as where it is satisfied that the fee is justified by the difficulty of the case. The rules vest no equivalent power in an adjudicating officer.

Tasmania 15.67 The fees that a Tasmanian lawyer is allowed as between party and party are prescribed by Sch 1 to the rules,354 although the taxing officer may allow a greater or lesser fee in respect

[page 511] of an item in special circumstances.355 The fees set out in Pt 1 of Sch 1 apply356 unless the only claim made by a party is for a liquidated or unliquidated sum of money, land or a chattel where the total sum of money and value of property involved in the action does not exceed $50,000, in which case a lawyer is allowed only the fees set out in Pt 2 of Sch 1.357 The latter allows a percentage of scale costs, and sets a limit on counsels’ fees, where that money or value threshold is not reached. Yet in any proceeding, the court may order that a party recover costs on the scale provided for by a column of Pt 2 of Sch 1.358 15.68 The taxing officer may allow a special fee if of the opinion that, because of the length of an attendance or the difficulty of a case, the fee allowable under the Schedule is insufficient remuneration for the services performed, the preparation of a case has required skill and labour for which a fee has not been allowed, or the case has required and received from the lawyer extraordinary skill and labour.359 The scale itself, moreover, allows the taxing officer a range of hourly fees for proper attendances of a lawyer, having regard to the degree of difficulty of the case, and the lawyer’s experience and any particular expertise. It also allows the taxing officer a discretion as to quantum in respect of certain items.360

Victoria 15.69 The Victorian rules state that a lawyer for the party to whom costs are payable is entitled, from the opposing party, to the fees set forth in the scale, unless the Supreme Court or the Costs Court otherwise orders.361 They add that the court may, on special grounds arising out of the nature and importance or the difficulty or urgency of the case, allow an increase not exceeding 30 per cent of the lawyer’s charges allowed on the taxation of costs with respect to the proceeding or to any application, step or other matter in it.362 If the court so directs, the Costs Court has the same authority to allow such an increase.363 The Costs Court has, in any case, a general discretion to increase (or, as from 1 April 2013,364 decrease) the amount or value of any allowance or expense in the scale.365

The provision to increase the scale referred to above has been interpreted to require a case where the nature and importance, difficulty or urgency, gives rise to some special ground, over and above the importance, difficulty or urgency itself, for ordering the increase.366 So that the case was long, hard fought and involved considerable preparation is not enough; more is needed than the conduct of heavy litigation, or proof that the work was performed skilfully or efficiently.367 Smith J allowed an increase of 20 per cent in Alucraft Pty Ltd (in liq) v Grocon [page 512] Ltd,368 relying on two matters he considered as ‘amounting to … special grounds arising from the difficulty or nature of the litigation’: the complications caused by having to run six separate proceedings concurrently; and the defendant’s ‘abysmal’ performance in discovery, which placed ‘an excessive burden’ on the plaintiff’s lawyers and ‘repeatedly disrupted the proceedings and caused a loss of momentum’, which in turn ‘increased the cost of and slowed and prolonged the proceedings’. Alucraft highlights that the conduct of the litigant ordered to pay costs can factor into whether an increase in scale costs is allowed.369 15.70 As from 1 April 2013,370 the scale makes provision for the allowance of an additional amount, having regard to the circumstances of the case, under the banner of ‘skill, care and responsibility’.371 The scale contains an inclusive list of the relevant circumstances in this context, which parallel those listed in the rules themselves.372

Western Australia 15.71 The Western Australian rules provide that except when otherwise ordered, lawyers are entitled to charge the fees set forth in any relevant scale373 in respect of the matters referred to in that scale, and higher fees are not allowed except as provided for by the rules.374 Subject to the rules, a court order and the terms of any relevant scale, the fees prescribed by that scale cover all work done, whether by solicitor or counsel.375 However, the Legal Profession Act 2008 provides that except where there is a costs

agreement between lawyer and client,376 or a bill of costs payable by the Legal Aid Commission,377 the taxation of lawyers’ bills of costs, as between lawyer and client or party and party, and any other aspect of lawyers’ remuneration the subject of a costs determination made by the Legal Costs Committee,378 is regulated by the applicable costs determination.379 A determination renders any other subsidiary legislation fixing or purporting to regulate the remuneration of lawyers in respect of the kind of business covered by that determination to be of no force or effect.380 Hence, within its scope, the terms of a costs determination oust an applicable scale of costs prescribed by court rules.381 Yet the [page 513] existence of a costs determination in force does not limit or oust the power of a court or a taxing officer to determine in any particular case before that court the amount of costs allowed.382 15.72 Prior to 1 March 2007, the rules empowered the court, if of the opinion that a special order as to costs should be made ‘by reason of the unusual complexity or importance of the case or for any other good or sufficient reason’, to order that any particular allowances in a scale be raised or a limit removed.383 This rule was in effect superseded on 1 January 2004, when the Legal Practice Act 2003 came into force.384 Under s 215(2) of that Act, which was replicated as s 280(2) of the current Legal Profession Act 2008, the court’s jurisdiction to raise any allowance or remove a limit in the scale is premised on the matter being of ‘unusual difficulty, complexity or importance’. By removing the phrase ‘any other good or sufficient reason’, the new provision is narrower in scope than its predecessor. It had been held that the amount of work done could alone constitute ‘good or sufficient reason’ for this purpose.385 Under s 280(2), the amount of work done is relevant only to the extent that it substantiates ‘unusual difficulty, complexity or importance’. In giving such a direction, the court may fix a limit within which the taxing officer may allow the costs, but the taxing officer’s discretion is otherwise not impeded. It remains for the taxing officer to determine whether or not the charges should be allowed as being reasonable charges for work necessarily

or reasonably done.386 In any case, the rules envisage that the taxing officer may allow such additional sum as he or she thinks proper if, by reason of special circumstances, he or she is satisfied that a scale fee that includes the drawing or settling of a pleading or other document is inadequate.387 15.73 Sub-section 280(2) requires a two-step process. First, the court must form a view that the costs allowable in respect of a matter under a costs determination are inadequate. That opinion, it has been said, ‘will usually be formed if the applicant for an order under the section shows a fairly arguable case that a bill to be presented to a taxing officer may properly tax at an amount greater than the limit imposed by the relevant costs determination because of one or other of the unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the case’.388 Accordingly, it is not necessary for the court to find that the costs allowable under a determination are in [page 514] fact inadequate.389 Second, the court must then determine whether or not that inadequacy flows from the unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the matter.390 If both are resolved in the applicant’s favour, the court has the power to make the special order, and it must then determine whether to exercise its discretion to do so.391 The onus on an applicant is weighty, it being judicially cautioned, even under the earlier broader rule-based provision, that such a special order ‘will not be lightly made’.392 That the word ‘unusual’ in s 280(2) does not qualify the words ‘complexity’ or ‘importance’,393 only the word ‘difficulty’,394 and that the term ‘importance’ does not mean ‘public importance’,395 arguably does little to lighten this onus. The phrase ‘unusual difficulty’ suggests that a matter was more difficult than would ordinarily be expected in an application of the kind under consideration.396 The reference to ‘importance’ in s 280(2) directs the court’s attention to the question of whether the work done was appropriate to the significance of the issues in the litigation. That may stem from the significance of the issues to the parties, or the significance of the issues to other prospective parties or to the public or to the community generally.397 The foregoing may, it is said,

‘reasonably justify more work being done by more senior practitioners than might otherwise be reasonably required’.398 15.74 Although an order under s 280(2) is usually made only on the completion of the entire proceedings, the terms of the sub-section contain no limitation on whether an order can be made immediately in relation to a discrete interlocutory application. It would be an odd result, a judge has surmised, were a party otherwise entitled to an order that costs be paid immediately to lose that entitlement because those costs should be taxed under a special costs order.399 The case law accordingly reveals several occasions where orders have been made before final judgment.400 After all, ‘[t]he difficulty, complexity, or importance of a matter may be capable of assessment even at a comparatively early stage’.401 [page 515] Nor does s 280(2) prescribe a time limit within which an application for a special costs order must be made. Provision in the court rules that where ‘any special costs are … by any order reserved for consideration of the Court at trial … there shall be deemed to be reserved to any party interested liberty to apply within 30 days’ has, however, been construed to apply to special costs orders under s 280(2).402 If this is correct, it follows that upon the expiry of the 30-day period in which liberty to apply is deemed, an applicant for a special costs order must apply for an extension of time.403 Factors typically relevant to a court’s decision on an application made out of time include the delay in bringing the application, any explanation provided for the delay, the merits of the application, and any prejudice suffered by the respondent.404 15.75 Generally speaking, a special costs order may be sought in relation to three aspects of the scale.405 First, it may be that the scale items do not cover an area of work performed in conducting the litigation that has resulted in the incurring of costs. In such a case, the special order sought would describe the area of work and state the hourly rates to be applied to that area of work. Second, the successful party might contend that the time allowed by the scale for performance of the work is inadequate. Third, a special costs order may be made in relation to the hourly rates provided for an item in the scale, which might be thought to be too low for some reason. The terms of the costs

agreement between the party awarded costs and its solicitor are likely to be relevant, but not determinative, for this purpose. As explained by Pullin J in Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority:406 [T]here should be no expectation that, as a matter of course, rates in the costs agreement which are above scale will be ordered to be the rates to apply in taxation as between party and party. There would have to be evidence justifying the higher rate. The whole point of the existing scale is that the rates are struck by reference to what is being charged within the profession. It is true that the hourly rates can only be an average or mean of the upper rates determined in the survey, and there will be some cases where the unusual complexity or importance of the case warrants the special expertise of the practitioner involved and warrants an increase in the hourly rate. In some cases not involving unusual complexity or importance, the higher rates paid will not be recoverable. A party is always entitled to the luxury of retaining the highest paid practitioners in the conduct of their case, but they cannot always expect to recover these costs from the other party. If the hourly rates in the scale are thought by parties or practitioners to be too low for work which is not of unusual complexity or importance, then submissions should be made to the Legal Costs Committee to increase the rates in the scale.

What the above highlights is that although the rules state that the taxation of lawyers’ bills of costs, as between lawyer and client or party and party, are regulated by the applicable costs determination except where, inter alia, there is a costs agreement between lawyer and client,407 the latter necessarily refers to taxation as between solicitor and own client, not to a party and party taxation. That the party awarded costs has entered into a costs agreement with its solicitor does not oust the applicability of the scale in the party–party context — the absence of a valid and enforceable costs agreement in this context in any case does not affect the court’s [page 516] power to make a special costs order408 — and nor do the terms of any such agreement, as noted above, conclusively determine any allowance exceeding scale.409 15.76 The porosity and inadequacy of the evidence adduced to support an application for a special costs order is not necessarily fatal to the application because the determination of the relevant questions is to be approached as a matter of ‘impression’ rather than detailed evaluation.410 The latter is, after all, a matter for the taxing officer. This does not mean that in some cases it may be necessary to prove the criteria in s 280 by specific evidence, but an

acknowledgment that in other cases the court may be able to form a view from its knowledge of the case.411 15.77 For any costs not specifically provided for in any relevant scale, the court or taxing officer may allow costs by way of analogy according to the item in the scale most nearly analogous to it; if there is no such item, the costs are fixed at a sum as the court or taxing officer considers adequate in the circumstances.412

‘Care and conduct’ 15.78 As appears from the foregoing, the court rules in the High Court, Federal Court, the territories, Queensland and Victoria make provision in their scales for an allowance for ‘general care and conduct’. Excepting the Northern Territory, the scales prescribe an inclusive list of factors to which a taxing officer may have regard in determining whether or not to make such an allowance and, if so, its quantum. In the Northern Territory the scale follows a different schema, referring also to ‘specific care and conduct’ and, unlike elsewhere, defining this and ‘general care and conduct’. 15.79 The terms of the ‘general care and conduct’ item in the scales make it clear that the allowance is not automatic. It is discretionary and rests upon the taxing officer being satisfied that the case warrants it. The discretion must be a genuine discretion exercised on the facts of each case; taxing officers must not simply apply a standard percentage mark-up for care and conduct.413 Factors listed in the scale, though not exhaustive, are strong indicators of the matters that warrant a successful party invoking this item of charge.414 The taxing officer will, in particular, inquire as to whether the item-based scale sufficiently compensates for the degree of skill, specialised knowledge and responsibility needed to properly present the case.415 [page 517] 15.80 The factors listed in the scale are those likely to attract the degree of attention to detail and close servicing of the client that, in more straightforward litigation, would be described as over-cautious, excessive or a

luxury in litigation.416 It has been judicially observed that provision for an allowance for ‘general care and conduct’ is ‘principally intended to ensure that a scale of costs which is based overwhelmingly on specified fees or rates for items of work done does not result in solicitors who represent clients in complex or novel matters being under-rewarded in comparison with those who are involved in more routine matters’.417 For this reason, the Federal Court has ruled that there should not be any mark-up for care and conduct in cases that are properly described as non-exceptional or run-of-the-mill.418 Where the bill is based principally on time charging, it has been said that the scope for any such allowance is limited.419 The concern is that time charging, unless properly controlled, can favour incompetence in some, and excessive caution in others. Yet the flipside is that time costing can penalise efficiency, knowledge and brilliance unless adequate compensation is implemented through an item of costing such as general care and conduct.420 15.81 It is not correct to approach any mark-up for ‘general care and conduct’ on individual minor items. The mark-up ideally should be based on allowed lawyer fees, and so must bear a direct relationship to items of costing in the scale.421 This point was explained, by reference to the now superseded New South Wales scale that allowed on taxation an amount for ‘skill, care and responsibility’422 — a notion similar to ‘general care and conduct’ — by Waddell CJ as follows:423 The words ‘skill, care and responsibility’ seem to me to have an application to everything which is done by a party’s solicitor’s in the conduct of proceedings. I do not think that it is either practicable or correct to attempt to isolate particular items in respect of which profit costs have been allowed as having no relationship to the exercise of care, skill or responsibility. In a proceeding such as this the management and supervision of the work of the [successful party’s] solicitors was of great importance and I think that work done such as photocopying and filing documents was work which had a relationship to the exercise of care and skill in and the acceptance of responsibility for the conduct and management of the case. Clearly enough, the allowance made [for ‘skill, care and responsibility’] should have a relationship to the total work done. Once this is accepted there is … justification for assessing the allowance as a percentage or proportion of the other profit costs.

This approach is not far removed from the express terms of the scale in the Northern Territory, which refer to an allowance being made for either ‘specific care and conduct’ or ‘general care and conduct’ based upon a percentage of, respectively, the amount allowed for time spent requiring the application of legal skill, and the amount allowed for preparation.424 In any

case, where there is to be a mark-up for care and conduct, the percentage increase will [page 518] be influenced by extent to which the solicitors’ fees have already been discounted and will be based on the discounted amount.425 15.82 The reason the scale in the above jurisdictions makes provision for an additional allowance for care and conduct has been explained on the ground that it is an item-based scale.426 Yet in other jurisdictions, which also prescribe item-based scales, no equivalent provision is made. To this end, in jurisdictions where no provision for a mark-up for general care and conduct is made, the taxing officer arguably lacks the power to make an allowance for it. In those jurisdictions, in order to give an equivalent allowance, the taxing officer must resort to the power to increase scale fees as prescribed by the court rules427 or, in some jurisdictions, the power to set a reasonable fee where an item is not governed by the scale.428

Disallowance of Unnecessary or Excessive Costs by a Taxing Officer 15.83 Court rules in several jurisdictions make specific provision for circumstances where taxing officers are to disallow costs. The South Australian rules state that on an adjudication429 costs are allowable ‘so far as they are necessary and reasonable but not so far as they result from overcaution, negligence or mistake’.430 The Tasmanian rules provide that the taxing officer must allow only such costs as are proper and reasonable if it appears that they have been increased by unnecessary delay or by improper, vexatious, prolix or unnecessary proceedings or by other misconduct or negligence.431 The Victorian rules make similar provision in respect of costs incurred improperly or without reasonable cause or wasted by undue delay or negligence or by any other misconduct or default.432 In Tasmania the taxing officer may also disallow costs of an excessive amount, having regard to the nature of the business transacted,433 the interests and amount involved, the

money or value of property to which the costs relate, or to the other circumstances of the case.434 Equivalent provision is made in Victoria, where costs that are excessive ‘from any other cause’ are disallowed.435 For this purpose, in both Tasmania and Victoria the taxing officer (in Victoria, the Costs Court) may assess the amount of those costs at a gross sum and, where necessary, apportion the amount among the parties where more than one party is involved.436 In Tasmania, the rules also envisage that the taxing officer may report the matter to the court.437 15.84 The High Court require the taxing officer to examine the costs incurred, and to disallow such costs as he or she finds to have been improperly, unreasonably or negligently incurred.438 The Australian Capital Territory rules provide that the court may direct the [page 519] registrar to consider anything done, or any document prepared or used, in a proceeding, and to disallow, completely or partly, the costs of the thing or document, or to assess costs as a lump sum, if the registrar considers that:439 doing the thing, or the document itself, was improper, vexatious or unreasonable; the thing was done, or the document prepared, because of misconduct or negligence; doing the thing caused unnecessary expense; the document was unnecessarily lengthy; or the document substantially departs from any approved form. The Victorian rules add that the Costs Court may disallow the costs of any work that is not necessary440 or done without due care,441 and a party whose costs for work are so disallowed must, unless the Costs Court otherwise orders, pay costs for any work by another party occasioned by the work for which the costs were disallowed.442 15.85 More generally, the fact that court rules in all jurisdictions make

prescription for the bases on which a party–party bill of costs may be taxed, and that these bases are generally denominated by reference to concepts such as ‘fair’, ‘reasonable’, ‘necessary’ or ‘proper’,443 indicates that taxing officers will disallow costs that are not reasonably, necessarily or properly incurred, or are not fair or reasonable in amount. In New South Wales, moreover, informed by a statutory imperative aimed at proportionality,444 authority highlights that, to determine whether costs have been reasonably and properly incurred, a relevant inquiry is whether those costs ‘bear a reasonable relationship’ to the value and importance of the subject matter in dispute.445 The same may now be said of other Australian jurisdictions where proportionality in this context has been recognised, whether by statute or court rules,446 or under the general law. And in the vast majority of cases, it has been judicially observed, the appropriate way for proportionality to be taken into account is in the course of the assessment process.447

1.

See 15.7–15.11.

2.

Such as on filing a notice of discontinuance: see 14.59–14.62.

3.

See 15.37–15.39.

4.

See 15.40–15.57.

5.

See 15.14–15.26.

6.

Tarry v Pryce (No 2) (1987) 88 FLR 270 at 271 per Kearney J (SC(NT)).

7.

Bank of New South Wales v Withers (1981) 35 ALR 21 at 28 per Sheppard J (FCA); Gomba Holdings (UK) Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd (No 2) [1993] Ch 171 at 189 (CA).

8.

See 15.32–15.36.

9.

See 15.58–15.82.

10. See 15.83–15.85. 11. Perks v Cox [1964] NSWR 71 at 75 per Herron CJ. 12. See 15.29. 13. Perks v Cox [1964] NSWR 71 at 75 per Herron CJ. Hence, one of the grounds upon which a taxing officer’s decision can be reviewed by a court is that he or she has acted without due regard to principle: see 15.34. 14. As to the review by the court of taxing officers’ decisions see 18.68–18.76. 15. Ryan v Hansen (2000) 49 NSWLR 184 at 190–1; [2000] NSWSC 354; BC200002113 per Kirby J. 16. Bellevarde Constructions Pty Ltd v CPC Energy Pty Ltd (2011) 12 DCLR (NSW) 304; [2011] NSWDC 55; BC201140152 at [31] per Judge Peter Johnstone (later describing assessment as a ‘quasi-inquisitorial process carried out by experienced practitioners who bring to bear their experience and knowledge to evaluate what work was reasonable and what is a fair and reasonable

amount of costs for that work’: at [49]). 17. Re Grant, Bulcraig & Co [1906] 1 Ch 124 at 128 per Farwell J. 18. See 7.2–7.6. 19. Richardson v Richardson [1895] P 346 at 348 per Lopes LJ. 20. Solicitor and own client taxation is discussed in Chs 4, 5. 21. Doe v Filliter (1844) 13 M & W 47 at 51; 153 ER 20 at 21 per Pollock CB; Fitzgerald v Wilson (1917) 13 Tas LR 50 at 51 per Ewing J. 22. Reid v Robert Nettlefold Pty Ltd [1958] Tas SR 13 at 15 per Gibson J. 23. Railton-Latrobe Shale Oil Co NL v Knight (1916) 12 Tas LR 64 at 65 per Ewing J. 24. Re Windeyer, Fawl & Co (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 145 at 149 per Street CJ (FC). 25. Swan v Bank of New Zealand (1890) 24 SALR 20 at 21 per Way CJ (FC). See also ColgatePalmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 226; BC9305213 per Sheppard J. 26. Jakovljevic v Law Society of Upper Canada (1996) 129 DLR (4th) 761 at 767 per Epstein J (Gen Div(Ont Ct)). See also Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 415; BC9404608 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ. 27. See 16.18–16.22. 28. See 16.23–16.31. 29. See 15.37–15.39 (statute), 15.40–15.57 (agreement). 30. WA O 66 r 32(1). 31. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 353(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 202(2)). Such a direction cannot be made in relation to costs arising out of criminal proceedings in a court except as provided by Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 257G (as to which see 24.26, 24.53): s 353(3) (formerly NSW 1987 s 202(3)). 32. HCR 2004 r 50.02.1 (cf former HCR 1952 O 71 r 9(1)). 33. HCR 2004 r 52.01. 34. Tas r 839(a), 839(b). 35. FCR 2011 r 40.12 (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 4(1)); ACT r 1720(2); NT r 63.02(2) (definition of ‘costs’); Qld r 687(1) (formerly Qld r 685(1)); Vic r 63.07(1). 36. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98(4) (cf former NSW RSC Pt 52A r 6(1)). 37. ACT r 1720(3); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98(4) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 6(2)); NT r 63.07; Qld r 685(2); Vic r 63.07(2) (see also Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 65C(2)). Equivalent provision was made in the former Federal Court Rules: FCR 1979 O 62 r 4(2) (see Australian Federation of Consumers Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd (No 2) (1991) 30 FCR 548 at 550; BC9103330 per Morling J). 38. There is Federal Court authority that such an order can be made even though the process of taxation has commenced: Dunstan v Seymour [2006] FCA 917; BC200605652 at [8]–[11] per Mansfield J. 39. FCR 2011 r 40.02 (see also Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(3)(d) (the court may ‘award a party costs in a specified sum’)). 40. SA r 264(5). As to the meaning of ‘as between solicitor and client’ and ‘indemnity basis’ see

16.10. 41. SA r 264(5). 42. The rules define ‘adjudication’ as including ‘a taxation or assessment of costs pursuant to an order under an Act providing for costs to be taxed’: SA r 4. 43. SA r 271(1), 271(2). 44. SA r 271(3). 45. SA r 271(5). 46. SA r 271(6). 47. WA O 66 r 51(1). Western Australian courts have recognised a power to extend time beyond 30 days in this context: Snowtop Mushrooms v Powley (FC(WA), 14 May 1982, unreported) BC8291124; Geneva Finance Ltd (receiver and manager appointed) v Resource & Industry Ltd [2002] WASC 121 (S); BC200207490 at [5] per E M Heenan J. See, for example, Re City of Joondalup [2003] WASC 293 (S); BC200402551 (where Pullin J extended time because he found that the application had merit, as ‘it was a case which had complexity beyond the ordinary case that might come before the court on prerogative writ proceedings’ and ‘did attract a deal of public interest’: at [10]); Staley v Pivot Group Pty Ltd (No 4) [2010] WASC 120; BC201003596 (where Kenneth Martin J extended time ‘given the somewhat unique circumstances of the present case’, where the trial began seven months earlier but could not proceed past day two, to allow him to ‘give due consideration to the appropriateness of a special order as sought’: at [9]). 48. WA O 66 r 51(1). 49. As to scales in Western Australia see 15.71–15.77. 50. WA O 66 r 13. 51. WA O 66 r 14(1). 52. WA O 66 r 14(2). 53. NT r 63.10; Tas r 842; Vic r 63.10; WA O 66 r 32(2). Equivalent provision existed in the former Federal Court Rules: FCR 1979 O 62 r 7(1) (see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chaste Corporation Pty Ltd (2003) 127 FCR 433; [2003] FCA 195; BC200300969 at [4] per Spender J). 54. HCR 2004 r 50.02.2 (cf the former HCR 1952 O 71 r 79). 55. FCR 2011 r 40.14. 56. Qld r 686 (formerly Qld r 684(2)). 57. Qld r 710(2) (formerly Qld r 709). 58. NT r 63.12(1); Tas r 844; Vic r 63.11(1). This extends to an interim order for payment of an item in a bill of costs (made under NT r 63.54(3); Vic r 63.56: see 18.33): NT r 63.12(2); Vic r 63.11(2). 59. ACT RSC O 65 r 57; SA RSC r 101.07(5). 60. See Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 354 (formerly NSW 1987 s 203); Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW) cl 124 (formerly NSW 2002 cl 55). 61. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 353(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 202(1)). Such an application cannot be made in relation to costs arising out of criminal proceedings in a court except as provided by Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 257G (as to which see 24.26, 24.53): s 353(3)

(NSW 1987 s 202(3)). The procedure applicable to this application is prescribed by the Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW) cl 125 (formerly NSW 2002 cl 56). 62. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 357(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 206(1)). 63. Aquilina Holdings Pty Ltd v Lynndell Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] QSC 98; BC200803721 at [6] per Daubney J. But note the change in Western Australian practice in this context with regard to interlocutory costs: see 15.18. 64. See 15.7–15.13. 65. As to the general statutory discretion to make an award of costs see 6.14. 66. See 14.2. 67. Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119 at 120; BC9507552 per von Doussa J; Re Windy Dropdown Pty Ltd (subject to a Deed of Company Arrangement) [2010] NSWSC 1099; BC201007003 at [49], [50] per White J; Olivaylle Pty Ltd v Flottweg GMBH & Co KGAA (No 6) [2011] FCA 688; BC201104321 at [6]–[7] per Logan J; Eat Media Pty Ltd v Mulready Media Pty Ltd (No 2) (2010) 267 ALR 573; [2010] FCA 392; BC201002461 at [20] per Flick J. 68. See, for example, Olivaylle Pty Ltd v Flottweg GMBH & Co KGAA (No 6) [2011] FCA 688; BC201104321. 69. Eat Media Pty Ltd v Mulready Media Pty Ltd (No 2) (2010) 267 ALR 573; [2010] FCA 392; BC201002461 at [20]–[22] per Flick J. 70. See, for example, Thomas v Powercor Australia Ltd (No 9) [2012] VSC 207; BC201203141 at [7]–[15] per Beach J. 71. Willmott v Barber (1881) 17 Ch D 772 at 774 per Jessel MR; Edgar and Walker v Meade (1916) 23 CLR 29 at 46 per Isaacs J; Colburt v Beard [1992] 2 Qd R 67 at 75 per Ryan J (FC); Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119 at 120; BC9507552 per von Doussa J; Marriage of Doherty (1996) FLC ¶92 652 at 82,685 per Fogarty J (FC); Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bilgola Enterprises Ltd [1999] 3 NZLR 239 at 245 per Hammond J (HC) (describing a taxation as ‘an arduous and expensive matter which causes almost as much difficulty as the litigation itself’); Supreme Court of Queensland, Practice Direction No 3 of 2007, cl 3(a); Hamod v State of New South Wales (No 13) [2009] NSWSC 756; BC200906900 at [29] per Harrison J. 72. See, for example, Amos v Monsour Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 303; [2009] QCA 65; BC200901842 at [28] per Fraser JA, with whom McMurdo P and Douglas J concurred (noting that the process is intended to be ‘relatively speedy and inexpensive’); Playcorp Group of Companies Pty Ltd v Bodum A/S (No 2) [2010] FCA 455; BC201003279 at [6] per Middleton J; Royal Australian Naval Reserve Rifle Club Inc v New South Wales Rifle Association Inc [2010] NSWSC 351; BC201002509 at [21] per Biscoe AJ; Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd v Prudentia Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] VSC 399; BC201207016 at [86] per Croft J. 73. See Federal Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) s 37M(1); Fam LR 2004 Pt 1.2; ACT r 21; Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 56(1); Qld r 5; Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 7(1); WA O 1 r 4B(1)(a)–(d). 74. Brookfield v Davey Products Pty Ltd (FCA, Branson J, 19 December 1997, unreported) (‘the fact that any taxation of costs … is likely to be controversial and protracted tends … to favour, rather than tell against, the making of the order’); Chapman v Conservation Council of South Australia Inc (2002) 218 LSJS 295; [2002] SASC 70; BC200201355 at [6] per Williams J; Harrison v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR 738 at 742, 744; [2002] NSWCA 213; BC200203657 per Giles JA; Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 558; [2002] NSWCA 237;

BC200204907 at [95] per Handley JA. 75. (1995) 57 FCR 119 at 123; BC9507552 per von Doussa J. 76. Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119 at 123; BC9507552. Cf R D Malen, ‘To Assess or to Fix Costs: That is the Question’ (1998) 20 Adv Q 85 (who argues that, by reference to the Canadian experience, in situations involving lengthy and complicated motions, or trials, unless the fixing of costs is done in an arbitrary fashion, the saving of time is minimal; and so suggests that costs should not be fixed by judges except: (a) in certain exceptional cases where it is important that the costs be fixed immediately; (b) in straightforward and uncomplicated cases not involving significant costs; or (c) where the parties consent: at 99–100). 77. See, for example, Nine Films & Television Pty Ltd v Ninox Television Ltd [2006] FCA 1046; BC200606184 (costs fixed at $650,000); Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] NSWSC 23; BC200700370 (costs fixed at $50m in a dispute over at least $8.3b); Gallaher International Ltd v Tlais Enterprises Ltd [2008] EWHC 2046 (Comm) (where Christopher Clarke J made a summary assessment of costs in excess of £5 million, against a backdrop of a taxation that could have taken months and might have proven fruitless in terms of ultimate recovery); Olivaylle Pty Ltd v Flottweg GMBH & Co KGAA (No 6) [2011] FCA 688; BC201104321 at [7]– [8] per Logan J (costs fixed at $1.1m where taxation would entail tens of thousands of dollars in additional expense and take between 12 and 18 months to complete from the time of drawing the bill of costs in taxable form to the time of the finalisation of taxation by a registrar). 78. See, for example, Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (No 3) [2006] FCA 916; BC200605651 at [29] per Mansfield J; Nine Films & Television Pty Ltd v Ninox Television Ltd [2006] FCA 1046; BC200606184 at [6] per Tamberlin J; J H Lever & Co Pty Ltd v Maniotis [2006] FCA 1668; BC200610083 at [6]–[7] per Mansfield J; Boyapati v Rockefeller Management Corporation (No 2) (2008) 78 IPR 600; [2008] FCA 1375; BC200808100 at [42] per Kenny J; Smart Co Pty Ltd (in liq) v Clipsal Australia Pty Ltd (No 7) [2011] FCA 1359; BC201109220 at [42]–[43] per Lander J; Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 407; BC201202259 at [9]–[10] per Buchanan J. 79. Australasian Performing Rights Association Ltd v Marlin [1999] FCA 1006; BC9905295 at [4] per Burchett J. See also Felstead v Giersch (1976) 14 SASR 27 at 38 per Bray CJ; Emanuele v Dau (1996) 133 FLR 312 at 319; BC9603337 per Higgins J (SC(ACT)); ChongHerr Investments Ltd v Titan Sandstone Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 278; BC200707084 at [6] per the court (where ‘the issues in question are in short compass and concern matters of broad principle’). 80. See, for example, Ross v Ross (No 5) [2008] WASC 278; BC200810530 at [33] per Wheeler J. 81. See 7.42–7.49. 82. Ireland v Retallack (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1096; BC201107238 at [42] per Pembroke J. 83. See 18.51–18.76. 84. Keen v Telstra Corporation Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 930; BC200605548 at [6] per Rares J (referring to cases ‘in which there would be utility in the court cutting the Gordian knot of protracted fights about costs’). See, for example, Amos v Monsour Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 303; [2009] QCA 65; BC200901842. 85. [2007] FamCA 804; BC200750399 at [109]. See also Wishart v McEwan (1998) 16 FRNZ 528 at 534 per Giles J (HC); C (LL) v C (AR) (1999) 180 DLR (4th) 361 at 375 per Marceau J (QB(Alta)). 86. For instance, the power to fix costs has frequently been exercised during the course of considering an appeal in migration cases involving the refusal of protection visas: see, for example, BZAS v

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 449; BC200502200; SZCAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 779; BC200503931; SZLKH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 745; BC200803714; SZNSL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1543; BC200911567. See also Keen v Telstra Corporation Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 930; BC200605548 at [6] per Rares J (who noted that it is a commonplace for the court to fix in administrative appeals under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) an amount of costs for a successful party); Eat Media Pty Ltd v Mulready Media Pty Ltd (No 2) (2010) 267 ALR 573; [2010] FCA 392; BC201002461 at [7] per Flick J (‘The underlying premise in migration cases for exercising the power may be the appropriateness of such an order being made where a migrant appellant is frequently unrepresented … and where the quantum of the costs order sought by a respondent Minister is self-evidently justifiable’); Wide Bay Conservation Council Inc v Burnett Water Pty Ltd (No 9) (2011) 194 FCR 250; [2011] FCA 661; BC201103877 at [30] per Logan J (‘The prevalence of the practice [of fixing costs] in migration matters is referable to its convenience, efficiency in use of court resources, the repetitious, compressed nature of the legal work associated with such a proceeding and the present frequency of such proceedings, considerations which collectively lend themselves to ready estimation of the party and party legal costs entailed’). 87. Bitek Pty Ltd v IConnect Pty Ltd (2012) 290 ALR 288; [2012] FCA 506; BC201203352 at [17] per Kenny J. 88. See, for example, Marriage of Kelly (FC(Fam Ct), 16 July 1996, unreported) at [22] (where the court, though anxious not to prolong litigation between the parties, ordered that the husband’s costs be taxed if the parties could not agree as to their quantum); Claringbold v James (Costs) [2008] FamCA 57; BC200850995 at [47] per Bennett J. 89. Marriage of Doherty (1996) FLC ¶92-652 at 82,685 per Fogarty J (FC). 90. See, for example, Dunstan v Seymour [2006] FCA 917; BC200605652 at [25] per Mansfield J. 91. See 15.21. 92. As to the circumstances in which an indemnity costs order may ensue see 16.39–16.75. Indeed, one judge has suggested that the greater latitude in determining reasonableness of costs on an indemnity basis than on a party and party (or standard) basis may result in the court being more inclined to fix costs that are claimed on an indemnity basis where it is apparent the costs are not outlandish: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Atlantic 3 Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd [2008] 2 Qd R 298; [2008] QSC 9; BC200800427 at [39] per Mullins J. 93. See, for example, Wentworth v Wentworth (CA(NSW), 21 February 1996, Priestley and Clarke JJA, Grove AJA, unreported) BC9600213 at 35–6 per Clarke JA; Karacominakis v Big Country Developments Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 2; BC200100109 at [7] per the court; Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 11; BC201101168 at [56] per Barrett J; ACN 074 971 109 (as trustee for the Argo Unit Trust) v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2013] VSC 137; BC201301434 at [58]–[64] per Wood AsJ. 94. Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 11; BC201101168 at [21] per Barrett J. 95. Motor Trades Association of Australia Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd v Rickus [2007] FCA 1878; BC200711587 at [26] per Flick J. See, for example, Wenkart v Pantzer (No 3) [2010] FCA 1423; BC201009869. 96. See, for example, WM Wrigley JR Company v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1186; BC200606839 at [9] per Sundberg J (who could not with sufficient confidence arrive at an appropriate sum on a logical and reasonable basis as opposed to ‘selecting figures at random on

the basis of an arbitrary preference for one expert’s view over another’s’); LGS (NSW) Pty Ltd v Barbagallo [2013] NSWSC 68; BC201300869 at [66]–[71] per McDougall J (rejecting the suggestion that costs could be fixed somewhere in the range of the poles of the experts’ assessment, reasoning that ‘I do not think that the requirement that the discretion be exercised logically and reasonably is satisfied simply by fixing, on an arbitrary basis, a particular point along a continuum’: at [69]); ACN 074 971 109 (as trustee for the Argo Unit Trust) v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2013] VSC 137; BC201301434 at [16] per Wood AsJ (who, in the face of conflicting expert reports as to the costs and timelines that would be involved in a taxation, was unable to express a preference, without cross-examination of the experts, for one over the other). 97. See, for example, Beach Retreat Pty Ltd v Mooloolaba Marina Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 356; [2009] QSC 84; BC200903944 at [8] per Martin J (who fixed costs in the face of: (a) a joint report by expert costs assessors that agreed on all issues of quantum subject to subsidiary issues; (b) the elevated cost of, and time required for, a more detailed assessment; (c) the impecuniosity of the unsuccessful plaintiffs; and (d) the plaintiffs’ lack of objection to the costs being fixed). 98. Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice Directions, 2009, 4.7.1, cl 3 (formerly Practice Direction No 5 of 2005, para 1). 99. Leary v Leary [1987] 1 WLR 72 at 76 per Purchas LJ; Auspine Ltd v Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 1 at 21–2; [1999] FCA 673; BC9902639 per O’Loughlin J. 100. Leary v Leary [1987] 1 WLR 72 at 76 per Purchas LJ; Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (FCA, von Doussa J, 4 March 1998, unreported) BC9800513 at 5; Auspine Ltd v Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 1 at 4; [1999] FCA 673; BC9902639 per O’Loughlin J; Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] NSWSC 23; BC200700370 at [10] per Einstein J. 101. Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119 at 123; BC9507552 per von Doussa J; Harrison v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR 738 at 743; [2002] NSWCA 213; BC200203657 per Giles JA; Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note CM4 (1 August 2011) (an application for gross sum costs must be accompanied by an affidavit stating ‘the amount of the gross sum sought to be specified in the order’ and ‘how the gross sum has been arrived at and how it is justified’); Supreme Court of Queensland, Practice Direction No 3 of 2007, cl 3(a) (the court will fix costs where ‘only provided the court is confident to fix costs on a reliable basis’). 102. Baychek v Baychek [2010] NSWSC 987; BC201006441 at [11] per Ball J; Wide Bay Burnett Conservation Council Inc v Burnett Water Pty Ltd (No 9) (2011) 194 FCR 250; [2011] FCA 661; BC201103877 at [40] per Logan J. 103. J H Lever & Co Pty Ltd v Maniotis [2006] FCA 1668; BC200610083 at [11] per Mansfield J; Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] NSWSC 23; BC200700370 at [117] per Einstein J; Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2007] FCA 2059; BC200711302 at [29]–[31] per Sackville J; Ingot Capital Investment Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (No 7) (2008) 65 ACSR 324; [2008] NSWSC 199; BC200801581 at [245] per McDougall J; Salfinger v Niugini Mining (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 5) [2008] FCA 1119; BC200807005 at [18]–[20] per Heerey J; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Global Prepaid Communications Pty Ltd (in liq) [2008] FCA 874; BC200804645 at [4]–[5] per Gyles J; Wide Bay Burnett Conservation Council Inc v Burnett Water Pty Ltd (No 9) (2011) 194 FCR 250; [2011] FCA 661; BC201103877 at [40] per Logan J; Olivaylle Pty Ltd v Flottweg GMBH & Co KGAA (No 6) [2011] FCA 688; BC201104321 at [11] per Logan J. 104. Wide Bay Burnett Conservation Council Inc v Burnett Water Pty Ltd (No 9) (2011) 194 FCR 250; [2011] FCA 661; BC201103877 at [39] Logan J; Olivaylle Pty Ltd v Flottweg GMBH & Co KGAA (No 6) [2011] FCA 688; BC201104321 at [11] per Logan J (‘There is certainly much to

recommend the making of such a request in cases where costs are sought to be fixed in gross after lengthy and complex litigation’). 105. Baychek v Baychek [2010] NSWSC 987; BC201006441 at [11] per Ball J (‘the gross sum bear a reasonable relationship to the actual costs of the party making the application, and to the costs that that party might reasonably be expected to recover on assessment’). 106. Charlick Trading Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission [2001] FCA 629; BC200102744 at [10] per Mansfield J; Harrison v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR 738 at 745; [2002] NSWCA 213; BC200203657 per Giles JA; Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] NSWSC 23; BC200700370 at [117] per Einstein J; Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2007] FCA 2059; BC200711302 at [27]–[30] per Sackville J. 107. Carey v Korda and Winterbottom (No 2) [2011] WASC 220 (S) at [22] per Edelman J. 108. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] NSWSC 23; BC200700370 at [10]–[12] per Einstein J; Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2007] FCA 2059; BC200711302 at [88] per Sackville J (who did ‘not wish to create the impression that the exercise is in truth more precise than it is’, adding that the figures ‘involve matters of evaluation and judgment’). 109. See, for example, Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119; BC9507552 (65 per cent of the successful party’s total costs and disbursements allowed); Canvas Graphics Pty Ltd v Kodak (Australasia) Pty Ltd (unreported, O’Loughlin J, 23 January 1998, unreported) BC9800050 (38 per cent of the amount claimed allowed); Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (FCA, von Doussa J, 4 March 1998, unreported) BC9800513 (61 per cent allowed); Datadot Technology Ltd v Alpha Microtech Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1449; BC200307630 (59 per cent allowed); Williams Advanced Materials Inc v Target Technology Co LLC (2004) 63 IPR 645; [2004] FCA 1405; BC200407161 (65 per cent allowed); Nine Films and Television Pty Ltd v Ninox Television Ltd [2006] FCA 1046; BC200606184 (67 per cent allowed); Sony Entertainment (Australia) Ltd v Smith (2005) 215 ALR 788; [2005] FCA 228; BC200500963 at [196]–[201] per Jacobson J (41 per cent allowed); Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2007] FCA 2059; BC200711302 (63 per cent allowed); Hamod v State of New South Wales (No 13) [2009] NSWSC 756; BC200906900 (60 per cent and 80 per cent allowed respectively for each successful defendant); Royal Australian Naval Reserve Rifle Club Inc v New South Wales Rifle Association Inc [2010] NSWSC 351; BC201002509 (twothirds allowed); Telstra Corp Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1463; BC201109887 (75 per cent allowed). 110. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] NSWSC 23; BC200700370 at [14] per Einstein J. 111. Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2007] FCA 2059; BC200711302 at [34] per Sackville J; Amos v Monsour Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 303; [2009] QCA 65; BC200901842 at [8] per Fraser JA, with whom McMurdo P and Douglas J concurred; Telstra Corp Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1463; BC201109887 at [12] per Gordon J. 112. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] NSWSC 23; BC200700370 at [117] per Einstein J. 113. See 7.2–7.6. 114. Canvas Graphics Pty Ltd v Kodak (Australasia) Pty Ltd (FCA, O’Loughlin J, 23 January 1998, unreported) BC9800050 at 24–5 (who remarked that as the case involved a relatively basic cause of action, it was ‘necessary to keep a firm control’ on costs, which should not be ‘permitted to explode as they obviously have done in this case’: at 25); Bitek Pty Ltd v IConnect Pty Ltd (2012) 290 ALR 288; [2012] FCA 506; BC201203352 at [18] per Kenny J.

115. See 7.48–7.49. 116. [2007] NSWSC 23; BC200700370 at [23]. 117. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] NSWSC 23; BC200700370 at [152]. 118. See, for example, Chapman v Conservation Council of South Australia Inc (2002) 218 LSJS 295; [2002] SASC 70; BC200201355. 119. Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] NSWSC 23; BC200700370 at [10] per Einstein J. 120. [1987] 1 WLR 72. 121. Leary v Leary [1987] 1 WLR 72 at 76. 122. Leary v Leary [1987] 1 WLR 72 at 77. 123. Leary v Leary [1987] 1 WLR 72 at 76. 124. Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119 at 120; BC9507552 per von Doussa J. 125. Murano v Bank of Montreal (1998) 163 DLR (4th) 21 at 47 per Morden ACJO (CA(Ont)). 126. Supreme Court of Queensland, Practice Direction No 3 of 2007, cl 4. 127. HCR 2004 rr 53.01, 53.02 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 19); FCR 2011 Sch 1 (definition of ‘taxing officer’, which refers to a ‘Registrar’, which in turn is defined as: (a) the Registrar, a Deputy Registrar, a District Registrar, or a Deputy District Registrar, of the Court; and (b) any officer from time to time authorised to perform the duties of a Registrar mentioned in paragraph (a)) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 rr 8, 39(1)); ACT r 1800(2) (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 49); Tas r 845; Supreme Court Act 1959 (Tas) s 10; WA O 1 r 4 (definition of ‘taxing officer’ extending to any other officer of the court having power to tax costs), O 66 r 32(1). See also Fam LR 2004 Div 19.6.2 (registrars to assess costs) (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 43(1)). 128. NT r 63.06. 129. Vic r 63.05. 130. Pursuant to the Uniform Civil Procedure Amendment Rule (No 4) 2007 (Qld). 131. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 390(1), Sch 5 cl 1 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208S(1), Sch 7 cl 1); Qld r 743J (each speaking in terms of at least 5 years’ experience). 132. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 390(1), Sch 5 cl 1 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208S(1), Sch 7 cl 1); Qld r 743L(1). 133. Boral Window Systems Ltd v Rolfe [2010] QSC 246; BC201004773 at [11] per de Jersey CJ (adding that that ‘[t]here should be no need to trouble Registrars with costs assessments save in exceptional cases’, for instance, where assessment by a practitioner assessor in a regional centre may not be appropriate because of actual or perceived conflict of interest, and where the cost of having the assessment carried out by a practitioner assessor from elsewhere may not be justified (if, say, an oral hearing were exceptionally required), but that these scenarios would be highly unusual: at [12]). 134. SA r 19(1)(a). 135. SA r 270(2). 136. As to the qualified level of immunity for a magistrate at common law regarding costs see 22.58. 137. Wentworth v Wentworth (1999) 46 NSWLR 300 at 316–17; [1999] NSWSC 317; BC9901514 per Santow J (affd Wentworth v Wentworth (2000) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] NSWCA 350;

BC200007784, Fitzgerald JA remarking that taxation is ‘a judicial function carried out by the registrar in the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction and powers’: at [59]). 138. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 391 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208SA); Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) s 77(1). 139. See Oliver, pp 183–4. 140. Garrard v Email Furniture Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 662 at 680 per Mahoney AP (CA). 141. Busuttil v Holder (SC(NSW), Greenwood M, 9 August 1996, unreported) BC9603488 at 17 (‘an assessor when carrying out his or her functions under the Act falls short of exercising judicial power’ in that ‘[t]he functions are not judicial functions, the indicia of a judicial determination are not present’; ‘[t]he assessor is no more than an official who is appointed to determine a just and reasonable amount of costs’). 142. Bennett v Seaman (1993) 117 ACTR 1 at 5 per Higgins J. 143. Hickey v Clibborn [1964] Qd R 432 at 448 per Lucas J (FC). 144. See, for example, Qld r 719(1) (if a party does not file a notice of objection to a costs statement and the party liable for costs does not attend the directions hearing, the registrar may assess costs without considering each item by allowing all or part of the costs claimed). 145. Slingsby v Attorney-General [1918] P 236 at 243 per Swinfen Eady LJ; Dalrymple Holdings Pty Ltd v Gohl (1991) 34 FCR 397 at 403; BC9103647 per Spender J. 146. See 15.34. 147. HCR 2004 r 53.04.1 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 70); FCR 2011 r 40.28 (similar to the former FCR 1979 O 62 r 38); Fam LR 2004 r 19.33(1) (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 48(1)); ACT r 1760 (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 48); Qld r 714 (formerly Qld r 706); Tas r 846; WA O 66 r 44. See further Oliver, pp 170–3. The Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 358 also vests in costs assessors broad powers to require the production of documents or further particulars, but the section in question is arguably not targeted as assessments as between party and party. In any event, in New South Wales it has been judicially observed that ‘the power given to costs assessors to require production of records is one that should be exercised sparingly, and only when considered essential by them to properly conduct the assessment’: Bellevarde Constructions Pty Ltd v CPC Energy Pty Ltd (2011) 12 DCLR (NSW) 304; [2011] NSWDC 55; BC201140152 at [50] per Judge Peter Johnstone. 148. NT r 63.33. 149. Vic r 63.35. 150. Namely NT O 63. 151. NT r 63.03(2). 152. SA r 277(2), which powers for this purpose are listed in r 274. 153. Re Hancock (deceased) (1895) 17 ALT 37. 154. Re Cooke [1997] 1 Qd R 15 at 17; BC9506004 per White J. 155. Re Cooke [1997] 1 Qd R 15 at 18; BC9506004 per White J. See, for example, Glasson v Barry (1912) 12 SR (NSW) 716. 156. Fam LR 2004 r 19.33(1)(i) (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 48(2)); NT r 63.49; Qld r 717(2) (formerly Qld r 706(3)) (which Mullins J in National Australia Bank Ltd v Clanford Pty Ltd [2003] 2 Qd R 79; [2002] QSC 361; BC200206625 at [25] noted overcame any doubt that

previously existed as to whether a taxing officer had jurisdiction to refer to the court a question that arose in connection with the assessment of a bill of costs); Vic r 63.51 (reference from the Costs Court); WA O 66 r 45. 157. See, for example, D’Alessandro & D’Angelo v Bouloudas (1994) 10 WAR 191; BC9406781 (FC). 158. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 390(4) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208S(4)). 159. Legal Services Commissioner v Nikolaidis (No 3) [2005] NSWADT 200 at [83]. 160. Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 627; BC5300020 per Kitto J; Geary v Benning [1961] NSWR 646 at 646 per Richardson J. 161. See 20.30. 162. 582 St Kilda Road v Campbell (SC(Vic), Lush J, 5 September 1975, unreported). See Oliver, pp 190–2. 163. Hill v Peel (1870) LR 5 CP 172 at 181 per Bovill CJ and Brett J; Perks v Cox [1964] NSWR 71 at 74 per Herron CJ (FC). 164. See 15.29. 165. Perks v Cox [1964] NSWR 71 at 80 per Kinsella J (FC). 166. Hawkins v Angus & Coote Pty Ltd (1946) 63 WN (NSW) 2 at 3 per Herron J. 167. The Kestrel (1866) LR 1 A & E 78 at 79 per Dr Lushington; O’Rourke v Commissioner for Railways (1893) 10 WN (NSW) 49; Sydney Harbour Trust Commissioners v Warburton (1906) 23 WN (NSW) 53 at 53 per Pring J (who expressed reticence to interfere with taxing officers’ decisions as he was ‘quite willing to believe that they know more about taxation of costs than I do’); Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v Coffee (No 2) [1982] VR 97 at 103 per Fullagar J; Malaugh Holdings (No 2) Pty Ltd v Seal (No 2) (2011) 274 LSJS 504; [2011] SADC 37 at [44] per Judge David Smith (‘A judge reviewing the exercise a discretion of a taxing Master … should pay due regard to the expertise and experience of the taxing Master’). 168. Willis v Edgar [1963] NSWR 664 at 669 per Else-Mitchell J. 169. Willis v Edgar [1963] NSWR 664 at 669 per Else-Mitchell J; Perks v Cox [1964] NSWR 71 at 75 per Herron CJ (FC). 170. V M Hart v Rawlinson [1961] NSWR 39 at 42 per Maguire J. 171. Frost v Frost [1941] 1 DLR 774 at 775 per McDonald JA (CA(BC)). 172. Willis v Edgar [1963] NSWR 664 at 669 per Else-Mitchell J. 173. Turnbull v Jansen (1878) 3 CPD 264 at 270 per Lindley J; Re MacDonnell, Henchman & Hannam [1910] St R Qd 324 at 332 per Cooper CJ (FC); Mason v D Mitchell & Co Ltd (1938) 55 WN (NSW) 17 at 18–19 per Davidson J; Re a Solicitor’s Bill of Costs (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 132 at 136 per Street J; Re Price (deceased) [1941] St R Qd 205 at 207 per Macrossan SPJ; Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 627; BC5300020 per Kitto J; Perks v Cox [1964] NSWR 71 at 80 per Kinsella J (FC); Re Fuller Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (1979) 21 SASR 212 at 215 per King CJ (FC). 174. Schweppes’ Ltd v Archer (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 178 at 183 per Jordan CJ. In Ex parte Dowling (No 2) (1904) 21 WN (NSW) 52 at 52 Pring J stated that he would only interfere with a taxing officer’s discretion where the taxing officer had exercised it ‘in some ridiculous way’. However, in Mason v D Mitchell & Co Ltd (1938) 55 WN (NSW) 17 at 19 Davidson J stated that the rule cannot be so stringent, for otherwise, practically speaking, ‘there could never be a review of the

taxing officer’s decision’, in that as taxing officers are subjected to a long training and are very skilful in their work, ‘whilst they might make mistakes, they would never be ridiculous’. 175. O’Rourke v Commissioner for Railways (1893) 10 WN (NSW) 49; Atherton Tableland Maize Board v Clements & Marshall Pty Ltd [1927] St R Qd 176 at 180 per Macnaughton J (FC); Preston v Preston [1936] ALR 104. The same can be said of judges who uncritically apply rules in making costs orders: see 6.16. 176. For example, the Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW) cl 127(b) (formerly NSW 2002 cl 58(2)(b)) provides that the costs assessors’ rules committee may, to assist costs assessors, distribute information about comparative assessments of costs previously made by costs assessors. 177. Warner v Miles (1881) 19 Ch D 72 at 76 per Brett MR; Mason v D Mitchell & Co Ltd (1938) 55 WN (NSW) 17 at 18 per Davidson J. 178. Willis v Edgar [1963] NSWR 664 at 669 per Else-Mitchell J. 179. Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd v Clarke [1905] VLR 84 at 89 per Hodges J. 180. Bombala Farmers’ Flour Mills Co v Victoria Insurance (1887) 8 LR (NSW) L 85 at 92 per Faucett J (FC); Donohoe v Britz (No 2) (1904) 1 CLR 662 at 667; BC0490112 per Barton J; Tarrant v Lier (1968) 12 FLR 248 at 253 per Fox J (SC(ACT)). See, for example, in the context of applications for review of a taxing officer’s decision to disallow the fees of two counsel, McLaughlin v City Bank of Sydney (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 491 at 498 per Street J; Madden v Hemmings [1960] SR (NSW) 478 at 483 per Owen J. As to the fees of multiple counsel see 17.73–17.92. 181. Schweppes’ Ltd v Archer (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 178 at 183 per Jordan CJ. 182. See 16.14–16.17. 183. Schweppes’ Ltd v Archer (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 178 at 184 per Jordan CJ; Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v Coffee (No 2) [1982] VR 97 at 103 per Fullagar J. Contra Higgins v Nicol (No 2) (1972) 21 FLR 34 at 55 per Joske J (Cth Indus Ct), who considered that the application of the phrase ‘only in an extreme case’ is inconsistent with the terms of the court’s authority. His Honour was influenced in that case by reg 98A of the Conciliation and Arbitration Regulations (Cth) (repealed) that conferred upon the Commonwealth Industrial Court the power to ‘make such order as to the Court … thinks fit’. The concern was that this broad grant of discretion should not be confined to a very narrow area. Yet simply because a court has the power to review a taxing officer’s decision as to quantum is not to say that it should exercise it without any presumption, however it is expressed. To this end, Joske J’s statements, which in any case were not endorsed by the other members of the court, should not be seen as suggesting that courts will review quantum decisions as a matter of course. 184. See, for example, Hill v Peel (1870) LR 5 CP 172 at 181 per Bovill CJ and Brett J (‘very strong grounds’); Smith v Buller (1875) LR 19 Eq 473 at 478 per Malins VC (the court will ‘only very slowly and reluctantly go into the question of the quantum of fees allowed on taxation’); Re Ogilvie [1910] P 243 at 245 per Buckley LJ; Slingsby v Attorney-General [1918] P 236 at 239 per Swinfen Eady LJ; White v Altrincham Urban District Council [1936] 1 All ER 923 at 928 per Greene LJ; Pelster v Pelster [1936] 3 All ER 783 at 784 per Merryman P (‘the taxing master is supreme in all questions of amount’); Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 628; BC5300020 per Kitto J; Bligh v Tickle Industries Pty Ltd [1958] Qd R 121 at 124 per O’Hagan J; Hamilton v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd [1964] Tas SR 224 at 229 per Crawford J; Monitronix Ltd v Michael (1992) 7 WAR 195 at 197–8 per Murray J.

185. Hill v Peel (1870) LR 5 CP 172 at 181 per Bovill CJ and Brett J. 186. Re Ogilvie [1910] P 243 at 245 per Buckley LJ; Pelster v Pelster [1936] 3 All ER 783 at 784 per Merryman P; Willis v Edgar [1963] NSWR 664 at 669 per Else-Mitchell J. 187. (1913) 17 CLR 76 at 81; BC1400060 per Isaacs, Powers and Rich JJ. 188. Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd v Hendon Corporation [1964] 3 All ER 833 at 838 per Pennycuick J. 189. O’Rourke v Commissioner for Railways (1893) 10 WN (NSW) 49 at 49 per Stephen J. 190. Hamilton v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd [1964] Tas SR 224 at 229 per Crawford J. See, for example, Crossley v Crossley [1990] WAR 232 at 234 per Nicholson J (who, having regard to the seniority of counsel, the breadth and depth of case law involved and the evidence adduced in the matter, held that the amount allowed to counsel was ‘manifestly inadequate and that consequently thereby there is demonstrated an error in principle’). Victorian cases to the effect that a taxing officer’s decision on quantum will be corrected if a judge concludes that he or she has clearly made a mistake (Re Melbourne Parking Station Ltd [1929] VLR 5 at 9 per Mann J; House v Life Insurance Co of Australia Ltd [1930] VLR 165 at 168 per Lowe J; Dwyer v National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd (No 3) [1940] VLR 366; Carazzo v Weyman [1944] VLR 207 at 209 per Gavan Duffy J; McCoughtry v Schrick [1947] VLR 342) should be viewed in this context. 191. Slingsby v Attorney-General [1918] P 236 at 239 per Swinfen Eady LJ. 192. As in the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) s 41(7) (repealed) (see Ross v Milzewski [2000] 2 Qd R 193 at 194; BC9702484 per Williams J). 193. As to the solicitor and client basis of taxation see 16.18–16.22. 194. Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 112(2). 195. However, on occasion it has been used in court orders to refer to party and party costs: see 1.6. 196. (2000) 17 VAR 65 at 66–7; [2000] VCAT 2500. 197. See 13.60–13.62. 198. Re Panieras and Home Owners Warranty (2000) 17 VAR 65 at 67; [2000] VCAT 2500. As to court rules of this kind see 13.13–13.23. 199. [2010] VSC 235; BC201003561 at [3]. 200. Under the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 110(5) (the full text of which reads: ‘If in any action under this section judgment is given in favour of the Registrar or the plaintiff discontinues or is nonsuited the plaintiff shall be liable to pay the full costs of the Registrar in the action, but save as aforesaid a court may make such order as to costs as it thinks fit’). 201. Solak v Registrar of Titles (No 3) [2010] VSC 235; BC201003561 at [5]. 202. See 15.48. 203. [1997] 2 VR 127; BC9603333 (CA). 204. Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic) s 47(2). 205. Spencer v Dowling [1997] 2 VR 127 at 147; BC9603333 (CA). 206. Spencer v Dowling [1997] 2 VR 127 at 147; BC9603333 (CA). 207. See 16.14–16.17.

208. See 16.18–16.22. 209. In Saraceni v Jones [2012] WASCA 59 (S) at [9] the Western Australian Court of Appeal, albeit in the different context of interpreting a costs order made by consent, maintained that the criticism of Spencer v Dowling [1997] 2 VR 127; BC9603333 appearing in the second edition of this work (at the same paragraph) was ‘not persuasive’. Yet by then justifying this by stating that ‘[t]here is little if any practical difference between the standard order for indemnity costs and an order allowing costs reasonably incurred on a solicitor and client basis’, their Honours ostensibly revealed that they were addressing a point unrelated to the criticism. 210. Spencer v Dowling [1997] 2 VR 127 at 163; BC9603333 (CA). 211. Namely the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic) s 138(3) (repealed). 212. Spencer v Dowling [1997] 2 VR 127 at 164; BC9603333 (CA). 213. Specific provisions to this effect are found in the court rules in some jurisdictions: ACT r 1800(1) (b); Qld r 707; SA r 271(5). 214. Re Sheehan (1990) 13 Fam LR 736 at 740 per Fogarty J. 215. Re Adelphi Hotel (Brighton) Ltd [1953] 2 All ER 498 at 502 per Vaisey J. 216. See 6.14. 217. Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Marsh [2000] WASC 208; BC200004912 at [4] per Sanderson M; Watson Wyatt Superannuation Pty Ltd v Oberlechner (2008) ASC ¶155-091; [2008] NSWSC 272; BC200802003 at [36] per Brereton J. Cf Elders Trustee & Executor Company Ltd v E G Reeves Pty Ltd (1988) 20 FCR 164 at 174 per Sheppard and Foster JJ (FC). 218. Bank of Baroda v Panessar [1987] Ch 335 at 355 per Walton J; Gomba Holdings UK Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd [1993] Ch 171 at 194 (CA); Citibank Savings Ltd v Nicholson [1998] ANZ Conv R 443 at 444 per Williams J (FC(SA)); Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Ponga (SC(WA), Sanderson M, 2 December 1998, unreported) BC9806543 at 9; Rumball v Mortimore [2000] WASC 126; BC200002548 at [15], [25] per Owen J; Bayford v St George Bank Ltd (No 2) (2003) 229 LSJS 59; [2003] SASC 242; BC200304378; Rail Corporation New South Wales v Leduva Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 138; BC200501052 at [26]–[34] per Nicholas J; Reading Entertainment Australia Pty Ltd v Burstone Victoria Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] VSC 137; BC200502934 at [23]–[25] per Whelan J (cf Irani v St George Bank Ltd (No 3) [2005] VSC 456; BC200509992 at [18]–[22] per Whelan J) (affd Reading Entertainment Australia Pty Ltd v Whitehorse Property Group Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 309; BC200711130); Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1446; BC200608934 at [84]–[85] per Rares J; Kyabram Property Investments Pty Ltd v Murray [2006] NSWSC 54; BC200600663 at [17]–[18] per Campbell J; Boreland v Docker [2007] NSWSC 53; BC200700494 at [114]–[117] per White J; St George Bank Ltd v Irani [2008] VSC 98; BC200802081 at [33] per Whelan J (affd Boman Irani Pty Ltd v St George Bank Ltd (2008) 22 VR 135; [2008] VSCA 246; BC200810745); National Australia Bank Ltd v Chen-Conway (2008) 2 BFRA 637; [2008] NSWSC 485; BC200803850. The suggest that this is also premised on the relevant term(s) being ‘plain and unambiguous’ in their meaning as to the costs consequences intended (Taree Pty Ltd v Bob Jane Corp Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 228; BC200806537 at [47] per Vickery J) cannot be taken too far, as the court is obliged to seek to give effect to the language adopted by the parties, even in the face of ambiguity. 219. Kyabram Property Investments Pty Ltd v Murray [2006] NSWSC 54; BC200600663 at [18] per Campbell J. 220. See, for example, Money v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) ATPR ¶40-894 (FCA), where the respondent bank was held to have engaged in misleading conduct contrary to the (then) Trade

Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52 in relation to a mortgage effected by the appellant, but sought, pursuant to the terms of the mortgage, to recover its costs of the action. French J held that even though the terms of the mortgage could permit this, under s 87 of the Act the court could vary the terms of the mortgage to oust this conclusion: at 49,654. 221. See, for example, Kyabram Property Investments Pty Ltd v Murray [2005] NSWCA 87; BC200501713 at [16], [17] per Beazley JA, with whom Hodgson and Ipp JJA concurred. 222. Mansfield v Robinson [1928] 2 KB 353 (discussed at 8.95); Re a Solicitor’s Bill of Costs (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 132 at 134 per Street J; Rumball v Mortimore [2000] WASC 126; BC200002548 at [9] per Wheeler J; Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Marsh [2000] WASC 208; BC200004912 at [4] per Sanderson M; Abigroup Ltd v Sandtara Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 45; BC200200596 at [9] per Stein JA, with whom Giles JA and Young CJ in Eq concurred; Vertzayias v King [2011] NSWCA 215; BC201105658 at [111]–[116] per Giles JA, with whom Macfarlan and Whealy JJA concurred (where the court made ‘no order as to costs’). 223. Maher v Network Finance Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 694 at 697–8 per McHugh JA. 224. Road Chalets Pty Ltd v Thornton Motors Pty Ltd (1986) 47 SASR 532 at 538 per Zelling ACJ (FC); ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd v Gibson [1986] 1 NZLR 556 at 570 per Casey J (CA). For this reason, an appeal lies as of right, whereas appeals from discretionary costs orders are ordinarily premised upon leave of either the court that made the order or the appellate court: see 20.34–20.44. 225. (1872) 8 Ch App 295 at 302. In Perry v Rolfe [1948] VLR 297 at 303 Fullagar J held that because of the Torrens system, the general doctrine in equity as to the mortgagee being entitled to costs except for misconduct did not apply to Torrens system mortgages (followed in Elders Trustee & Executor Company Ltd v E G Reeves Pty Ltd (1988) 20 FCR 164 at 169–73 per Sheppard and Foster JJ (FC)). Zelling ACJ in Road Chalets Pty Ltd v Thornton Motors Pty Ltd (1986) 47 SASR 532 at 539 doubted the correctness of this decision because he could find nothing in the Torrens legislation to displace the well established equitable rules on this point. 226. Road Chalets Pty Ltd v Thornton Motors Pty Ltd (1986) 47 SASR 532 at 552 per O’Loughlin J (FC). See also Re Wallis (1890) 25 QBD 176 at 181 per Fry LJ; Project Research Pty Ltd v Permanent Trustee of Australia Ltd (1990) 5 BPR 11,225 at 11,228–31 per Hodgson J (SC(NSW)); Katsaounis v Belehris [1995] ANZ Conv R 114 at 115; BC9400882 per Debelle J (SC(SA)). 227. See, for example, Road Chalets Pty Ltd v Thornton Motors Pty Ltd (1986) 47 SASR 532 (FC). Cf Project Research Pty Ltd v Permanent Trustee of Australia Ltd (1990) 5 BPR 11,225 at 11,231 per Hodgson J (SC(NSW)) (who held that although it was unreasonable for the mortgagee to refuse to make any estimate of its anticipated costs, it was not sufficient misconduct to justify ordering it to pay the mortgagor’s costs of the proceedings, but that each party should pay its own costs); Pangas v Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd [2000] NSWSC 140; BC200000879 at [28] per Santow J. 228. See, for example, Re Queen’s Hotel Co, Cardiff, Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 792 at 794 per Cozens-Hardy J; Re Adelphi Hotel (Brighton) Ltd [1953] 2 All ER 498 (see 15.48); Jamieson v Gosigil Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 117 at 120–1 per G N Williams J; AGC (Advances) Ltd v West (1984) 5 NSWLR 301 at 304 per Hodgson J; ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd v Gibson [1986] 1 NZLR 556 at 570 per Casey J (CA); Sandtara Pty Ltd v Australian European Finance Corporation Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 82 at 97 per Cole J. 229. See, for example, Katsaounis v Belehris [1995] ANZ Conv R 114 at 116; BC9400882 per Debelle J (SC(SA)).

230. See, for example, Lomax v Hide (1690) 2 Vern 185; 23 ER 721; Ramsden v Langley (1705) 2 Vern 536; 23 ER 947; Re Griffith Jones & Co (1883) 53 LJ Ch 303; Re Donaldson (1884) 27 Ch D 544; National Provincial Bank of England v Games (1886) 31 Ch D 582 at 592–3 per Cotton LJ; Elders Trustees & Executor Co Ltd v Eagle Star Nominees Ltd (1986) 4 BPR 9205 at 9209 per McLelland J (SC(NSW)). 231. Shercliff v Engadine Acceptance Corp Pty Ltd (No 2) (1982) 2 BPR 9207 at 9209 per Powell J (SC(NSW)). 232. Gomba Holdings (UK) Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd (No 2) [1993] Ch 171 at 184 (CA). 233. Re Leighton’s Conveyance [1937] 1 Ch 149 at 152 per Lord Wright MR. See also Re a Solicitor’s Bill of Costs (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 132 at 134 per Street J. 234. Re McLaughlin (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 382 at 395 per Harvey J; Re a Solicitor’s Bill of Costs (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 132 at 135 per Street J. 235. Parker-Tweedale v Dunbar Bank plc (No 3) [1991] Ch 26 at 33 per Nourse LJ, cited with approval in Gomba Holdings (UK) Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd (No 2) [1993] Ch 171 at 185 (CA). 236. See, for example, below at 15.52–15.53. 237. Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Barker (2004) 232 LSJS 400; [2004] SASC 58; BC200400942 at [22] per Duggan J (‘The effect of clauses bestowing such rights on mortgagees will depend upon their interpretation in each case and they will not be given effect so as to place mortgagors in a less favourable position than would otherwise be the case unless they are unambiguously expressed’); Watson Wyatt Superannuation Pty Ltd v Oberlechner (2008) ASC ¶155-091; [2008] NSWSC 272; BC200802003 at [36] per Brereton J. Courts have also applied a contra proferentem approach to the scope of the relevant clause: see, for example, MSW Property Pty Ltd v Law Mortgages Queensland Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 47; BC200400561 at [4] per the court. 238. [1953] 2 All ER 498. 239. Re Adelphi Hotel (Brighton) Ltd [1953] 2 All ER 498 at 500–1. Re Adelphi has been followed by same Australian judges: see, for example, Jamieson v Gosigil Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 117 (where a clause in a bill of sale provided that ‘all costs charges and expenses’ of enforcement were to be paid by the mortgagor, G N Williams J held that these words did not oust the general law party and party rule, and so did not amount to an agreement between the parties that the mortgagee was entitled to recover costs and expenses taxed on a solicitor and own client basis: at 123); Halsted v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 2) (2012) 202 FCR 373; [2012] FCA 66; BC201200359 (where Logan J, though accepting that the authorities are not uniform as to whether breadth of language alone is sufficient to entitle a mortgagee to other than party and party costs (at [18]), nonetheless adopted the reasoning of Vaisey J in Adelphi; on the facts the language of the relevant clause in the loan agreement — referring to ‘the reasonable amount reasonably incurred or expended by [the lender] in the exercise of any right consequent upon any default’ — was not materially distinguishable from that in Adelphi). 240. [2012] VSC 322; BC201205625. 241. Vic r 63.30 (superseded): see 16.11. 242. Whild v GE Mortgage Solutions Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 322; BC201205625 at [17]. 243. [1995] ANZ Conv R 114; BC9400882 (SC(SA)). 244. Katsaounis v Belehris [1995] ANZ Conv R 114 at 116; BC9400882 (SC(SA)). 245. This his Honour interpreted to mean the recovery of all costs except those unreasonably incurred or of an unreasonable amount, which in essence equates to the indemnity basis: see 16.23.

246. Katsaounis v Belehris [1995] ANZ Conv R 114 at 117; BC9400882 (SC(SA)). 247. Katsaounis v Belehris [1995] ANZ Conv R 114 at 117; BC9400882 (SC(SA)). 248. (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 132. 249. Re a Solicitor’s Bill of Costs (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 132 at 136. To the same effect, involving similar clauses, see Shercliff v Engadine Acceptance Corp Pty Ltd (No 2) (1982) 3 BPR 9207; Sandtara Pty Ltd v Australian European Finance Corporation Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 82 at 97–8 per Cole J (held common fund basis applicable). 250. Re a Solicitor’s Bill of Costs (1941) 58 WN (NSW) 132 at 136. 251. [1998] ANZ Conv R 442 at 447; BC9801002 per Williams J (FC(SA)). See also Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Aspenview Productions Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 499; BC200108058 (where a clause entitling the mortgagee to ‘solicitor and client as well as party and party costs’ was held to entitle the mortgagee to costs quantified on a solicitor and client basis). See further G Kessell, ‘Are Cost Clauses in Mortgages Always Enforceable?’ (2002) 13 JBFLP 109 (suggesting a precedent costs clause: at 111). 252. As to the difference between indemnity and solicitor and client (as opposed to solicitor and own client) costs see 16.19–16.20. 253. See, for example, Quadrascan Graphics Pty Ltd v Crosfield Electronics ANZ Pty Ltd (FCA, Carr J, 18 May 1995, unreported) BC9507757 at 164–7; Edlin v Williams [1998] QCA 439; BC9807404 at [6]–[7] per the court; Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Marsh [2000] WASC 208; BC200004912 at [7] per Sanderson M; Kyabram Property Investments Pty Ltd v Murray [2006] NSWSC 54; BC200600663; National Australia Bank Ltd v Chen-Conway (2008) 2 BFRA 637; [2008] NSWSC 485; BC200803850; Shepparton Projects Pty Ltd v Cave Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] VSC 384; BC201106965 at [31] per Croft J (where the relevant contract defined ‘costs’ as ‘without limiting the generality thereof include solicitor and own client costs’). 254. See 5.26–5.34. 255. (1984) 5 NSWLR 301. 256. AGC (Advances) Ltd v West (1984) 5 NSWLR 301 at 305. 257. AGC (Advances) Ltd v West (1984) 5 NSWLR 301 at 306. See also Shercliff v Engadine Acceptance Corp Pty Ltd (No 2) (1982) 3 BPR 9207 at 9209 per Powell J (SC(NSW)), where a clause in a mortgage entitling a mortgagee ‘in addition to all costs and expenses which the mortgagor may be liable at law or in equity to pay in respect of this security or otherwise in relation thereto … [to] all costs and expenses including costs as between solicitor and client incurred by the mortgagee in consequence or on account of any default on the part of the mortgagor hereunder or incurred by the mortgagee for the preservation of or in any manner in reference to this security’, was held to entitle the mortgagee to costs reasonable in amount and reasonably incurred. 258. AGC (Advances) Ltd v West (1984) 5 NSWLR 301 at 305, 306. As to the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) see Carter, 537–43. 259. Found in the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) Sch 1. 260. National Credit Code s 70(1). 261. National Credit Code s 70(7). 262. Australian Consumer Law, Pt 2-3 (found in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2). ‘Unfair’ is defined for this purpose in s 24 of the Australian Consumer Law. See further Carter, pp

543–6. 263. [1993] Ch 171. 264. On this point see also the earlier case of Elders Trustees & Executor Co Ltd v Eagle Star Nominees Ltd (1986) 4 BPR 9205 at 9208 per McLelland J (SC(NSW)) (who held that a clause in a mortgage entitling the mortgagee to ‘all costs, charges, expenses and payments’ carried the necessary implied qualification that the costs, charges, expenses and payments be ‘properly incurred’) and the later decision in Pangas v Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd [2000] NSWSC 140; BC200000879 at [22] per Santow J. 265. Gomba Holdings UK Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd [1993] Ch 171 at 186 (CA). See also St George Bank Ltd v Howell [2002] NSWSC 130; BC200200635 at [8] per Cripps AJ. 266. Gomba Holdings UK Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd [1993] Ch 171 at 187 (CA). 267. Indemnity costs do not extend to costs unreasonably incurred or of unreasonable amount: see 16.23. 268. Gomba Holdings UK Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd [1993] Ch 171 at 187–8 (CA). 269. (2000) NSW Conv R ¶55-945; [2000] NSWSC 542; BC200003267. 270. Heaps v Addison Wesley Longman Australia Pty Ltd (2000) NSW Conv R ¶55-945 at 57,482; [2000] NSWSC 542; BC200003267. See also Himalaya Properties Ltd v Rodionov [1991] ANZ Conv R 37 at 38 per Williams QC M (HC(NZ)) (similarly worded clause); Carbure Pty Ltd v Brile Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] VSC 313; BC200204407 at [17] per Balmford J (where a clause requiring the lessee to pay the lessor’s ‘reasonable expenses of … any default’ by the lessee was held not to plainly and unambiguously require costs to be paid on other than a party and party basis). 271. See, for example, Leda Holdings Pty Ltd v Oraka Pty Ltd [1999] ANZ Conv R 622; [1999] FCA 444; BC9901775 at [27] per Burchett J (see S Pattison, ‘Lessor’s Costs: Contractual Rights v Court’s Discretion’ (August 1999) 37 LSJ 29); Boreland v Docker [2007] NSWSC 53; BC200700494 at [117] per White J; IBA Ltd v Stanley’s Nightclub Ltd [2007] NZCA 60; Bishop v Financial Trust Ltd [2008] NZCA 170; Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney South West Area Health Service (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 1139; BC201007454 (where indemnity costs held to stem from a clause stating, inter alia, that ‘the Tenant indemnifies the Landlord against any liability or loss arising and any reasonable cost incurred … in connection with the Tenant’s breach of this deed’). 272. Howard v Lovegrove (1870) LR 6 Ex 43 at 45 per Martin B; Barnett v Eccles Corporation [1900] 2 QB 423 at 428 per Vaughan Williams LJ; Wenpac Pty Ltd v Allied Westralian Finance Ltd (1994) 123 FLR 1 at 68; BC9401476 per Malcolm CJ (SC(WA)). 273. See, for example, Beecher v Mills [1993] MCLR 19 (where Richardson J, delivering the judgment of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, held that legal costs on an indemnity basis could be recovered under a clause requiring the vendors of shares in a company to ‘indemnify the purchasers against all such actions claims or judgments by [a defined person] against the Company’, reasoning that, even though the clause made no specific reference to costs, ‘anything less than a full indemnity for costs properly incurred must leave the indemnitee with part of the liability for which the indemnifier is prima facie responsible [and that] [i]n the absence of a contrary indication it is not to be assumed that the parties intended such a result’: at 25); Watson & Son Ltd v Active Manuka Honey Association [2009] NZCA 595 (where Randerson J, who delivered the judgment of the court, was satisfied that ‘necessarily implied as a matter of construction of the terms’ of a clause under which ‘[t]he Licensee indemnifies [the respondent] against all actions and damages that may result from the Licensee’s operations in relation to the

Products’ was an indemnity in favour of the respondent in respect of legal costs incurred by it on a solicitor-client basis in respect of actions falling within the terms of the clause: at [25]); Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt (No 3) [2010] VSC 261; BC201004092 (where J Forrest J found that (at [40]) whilst the terms of the indemnity did not refer to any specific mode of assessment of legal costs, it was sufficiently clear that it was intended to provide sufficient cover for the plaintiff’s losses and expenses properly attributable to a specified third party’s conduct, in which case party–party costs would not provide sufficient indemnity). 274. Howard v Lovegrove (1870) LR 6 Ex 43; Great Western Railway Co v Fisher [1905] 1 Ch 316 at 324 per Buckley J; Wenpac Pty Ltd v Allied Westralian Finance Ltd (1994) 123 FLR 1 at 68–9; BC9401476 per Malcolm CJ (SC(WA)); Abigroup Ltd v Sandtara Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 45; BC200200596 at [17] per Stein JA, with whom Giles JA and Young CJ in Eq concurred (who held that a provision indemnifying a guarantor of a tenant’s lease obligations for, inter alia, ‘all … costs and expenses’ referred to costs on a solicitor and client basis). See also Layzell v British Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 557 (‘common fund’ basis). 275. [1974] 2 NZLR 272 (SC). 276. Mee v DWD Hotels Ltd (No 2) [1974] 2 NZLR 272 at 277 (SC). 277. (1990) 13 Fam LR 736. 278. ‘Solicitor and own client costs’ have been viewed as synonymous with ‘indemnity costs’: see 16.24–16.26. 279. Re Sheehan (1990) 13 Fam LR 736 at 740–1. 280. [2009] VSC 579; BC200911222. 281. Talacko v Talacko [2009] VSC 579; BC200911222 at [57]. His Honour added that even should this interpretation be wrong, costs should nonetheless be ordered on an indemnity basis in view of many instances of obstruction, delay or other inappropriate conduct by the defendant: at [59]–[61]. See further 16.62–16.67. 282. [2012] VSCA 229; BC201207238. 283. Chen v Kevin McNamara & Son Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 229; BC201207238 at [20]–[21]. 284. (2002) 12 ANZ Ins Cas ¶61-531; [2002] NSWSC 542; BC200203797 at [20]. 285. Cf Pacific Indemnity Underwriting Agency Pty Ltd v Maclaw No 651 Pty Ltd (2005) 13 VR 483; [2005] VSCA 165; BC200504451 (where the court held that the terms of the respondent’s compromise with the appellant insurer, under which the latter agreed to pay the former’s ‘reasonable legal costs and expenses’, envisaged costs quantified on a party–party basis rather than an indemnity basis, even though the same phrase had been used in the relevant indemnity insurance policy). 286. See 16.7. 287. Kirwin v Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 99 (S); BC201208924 at [20] per Hall J. 288. Frank Jasper Pty Ltd v Glew (No 3) [2012] WASC 24 (S); BC201208920 at [33] per Martin CJ. 289. ‘Drawing’ means ‘the application of the mind to the preparation of the deed, not the actual writing’ (Re Marsland and Marsland’s Costs (1890) 4 QLJ 3 at 4 per Lilley CJ (FC)), and so is distinguishable from engrossing or copying: Re Flower & Hart’s Bill of Costs [1969] QWN 41; Meade v Queensland Ambulance Service (SC(Qld), White J, 24 April 1996, unreported) BC9601380 at 6–7. See also Green v Hoyle [1976] 2 All ER 633 at 638 per Lord Widgery CJ (‘the use of the intellect to compose the document, the use of the brain to select the correct words, to put

them in the correct sequence’; followed in Barristers’ Board v Palm Management Pty Ltd [1984] WAR 101 at 109 per Brinsden J), at 639 per O’Connor J (drawing involves ‘both the use of the pen and the mind that guides the pen’, although ‘[i]t is the latter element which is paramount’; ‘it is the mind that makes the document that is the true drawer … as opposed to the pen that may physically write it down’, so ‘[a] person who furnishes the material from which a document is drawn does not draw the document at all’). 290. ‘Engrossing’ means getting down on paper the material drawn or composed in the mind. 291. ‘Perusal’ means a close reading of a document requiring the application of professional skill and knowledge so as to decide what, if any steps should be taken in the client’s interest: Betts v Cleaver (1872) 7 Ch App 513 at 516 per Sir W M James LJ (comparing one document with another to see if they are identical is not perusal); Re Feez Ruthning’s Bill of Costs [1989] 1 Qd R 55 at 74 per Carter J (revd on appeal but not on this point: Re Feez Ruthning’s Bill of Costs [1989] 1 Qd R 55 (FC)); Meade v Queensland Ambulance Service (SC(Qld), White J, 24 April 1996, unreported) BC9601380 at 6. Perusal is to be contrasted with scanning, which in the scales is usually charged at a lower rate: Ralkon Agricultural Company Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Development Commission (FCA, Forster J, 11 July 1986, unreported) BC8601705 at [8]; Bunch v Victorian Workcover Authority [2008] VCC 1419 at [29] per Judge Morrow. 292. As to allowances on taxation for copying see 17.25–17.27. 293. As to allowances on taxation for attendances see 17.11–17.17. 294. As to the allowance of witnesses on taxation see 17.28–17.39. 295. Re Negus [1895] 1 Ch 73 at 76–7 per Chitty J (reasoning that ‘the Taxing Master is bound to tax according to law; he is bound to apply the general order relating to the taxing of bills in all cases where it is applicable’: at 77); Price v Clinton [1906] 2 Ch 487 at 490 per Joyce J. Cf Development Finance Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Bielby [1991] 1 NZLR 587 at 594–6 per Thomas J (HC). 296. Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Lardner [1998] ACTSC 24; BC9801211 at [77]– [81] (FC). 297. See 15.59. 298. ACT r 1761 (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 61); Qld r 721 (formerly Qld r 707); Tas r 858. 299. FCR 2011 r 40.31 (cf former FCR 1979 O 62 r 22(2) (as to which see Wodrow v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 129 FCR 182; [2003] FCA 403; BC200302096 at [14] per Stone J), which was phrased in practically identical terms to the current Australian Capital Territory and Queensland rules in this regard). 300. NT r 63.46(2). See also Fam LR 2004 r 19.35(2) (which lists similar factors). 301. Vic r 63.48(2) (in its form preceding the commencement, on 1 April 2013, of the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 302. Vic r 63.48(2) (in its form following the commencement, on 1 April 2013, of the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 303. See 15.60–15.77. 304. See 15.35–15.36. 305. See 16.23. 306. See 16.24–16.26.

307. In Prantage v Prantage [2012] FamCA 661; BC201250891 at [45] Cronin J noted that as it is ‘unusual to see a litigated case in this court where the lawyers are committed to and charging the scale costs’, the relevance of the scale as a benchmark must be questioned, and a court should ‘be less concerned about using it as the benchmark for the appropriateness of a costs order’. 308. Casey v Quabba [2007] 1 Qd R 297; [2006] QCA 187; BC200603976 at [16] per Williams JA. As to the validity and enforceability of costs agreements see 3.13–3.60. 309. Singleton v Macquarie Broadcasting Holdings Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 103 at 105 per Rogers CJ (which, however, pre-dated the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 208H (now Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 365), which provides that although a costs assessor may obtain a copy of, and have regard to, a costs agreement, he or she must not apply its terms for the purpose of determining appropriate fair and reasonable costs when assessing costs, whether or not an indemnity order is made); Marriage of Kohan (1992) 16 Fam LR 245 at 254–5 (FC); Connell v Sund & Sund [2006] VCC 1923 at [34] per Hampel J (uplift fee for counsel allowed); Prantage v Prantage [2012] FamCA 661; BC201250891 at [55]–[56] per Cronin J. 310. Fam LR 2004 rr 19.08(3) (‘A party applying for an order for costs on an indemnity basis must inform the court if the party is bound by a costs agreement in relation to those costs and, if so, the terms of the costs agreement’), 19.34(2)(b) (before 1 July 2008 numbered as r 19.34(3)(b)) (‘If the court has ordered costs on an indemnity basis, the Registrar must allow all costs reasonably incurred and of a reasonable amount, having regard to … any costs agreement between the party to whom costs are payable and the party’s lawyer’); ACT r 1752(4)(b) (which provides that in assessing costs on an ‘indemnity’ basis, the registrar ‘may have regard to any costs agreement between the party to whom the costs are payable and the party’s solicitor’); Qld 703(3)(b) (formerly Qld r 704(3)(b)) (which provides that on the indemnity basis, all costs reasonably incurred and of a reasonable amount must be allowed, having regard to, inter alia, ‘any costs agreement between the party to whom the costs are payable and his or her solicitor’); WA O 66 r 11(3) (see 16.12) (see Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority (2003) 28 WAR 95; [2003] WASC 122 (S); BC200305099 at [28] per Pullin J). 311. Found in HCR 2004 Sch 2; FCR 2011 Sch 3 (formerly FCR 1979 Sch 2). 312. HCR 2004 r 52.02 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 23); FCR 2011 r 40.29 (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 12(1)). 313. HCR 2004 Sch 2, item 28. 314. As to ‘general care and conduct’ see further 15.78–15.82. 315. APC Marine Pty Ltd v Ship ‘APC Aussie 1’ [2011] FCA 679; BC201104276 at [13] per Bromberg J. 316. HCR 2004 Sch 2, item 48. 317. HCR 2004 r 55.05 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 76) (see also HCR 2004 r 55.03, which states that ‘[w]here a step in a matter has required skill and labour in respect of which no fee has been prescribed, the Taxing Officer may allow such special fee as the Taxing Officer thinks fit’). 318. HCR 2004 r 56.01. 319. FCR 2011 Sch 3, item 11 (cf former FCR 1979 Sch 2, item 41). 320. FCR 2011 Sch 3, item 12. 321. Fam LR 2004 r 19.19 (for fees, an amount calculated in accordance with Sch 3 and 4; for an expense mentioned in Sch 4 (other than item 101), the amount specified in Sch 4 for that expense). 322. Fam LR 2004 rr 19.19(2)(c), 19.35(1) (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 53).

323. Fam LR 2004 r 19.35(2). 324. See, for example, Fam LR 2004 Sch 3, items 101–105 (provides for rates for scanning, reading and drafting documents, usually a set fee per the number of words). 325. See, for example, Fam LR 2004 Sch 3, item 106 (drafting, producing, reading or scanning a document containing more than 3,000 words). 326. See, for example, Fam LR 2004 Sch 3, item 108 (hourly rate for ‘time reasonably spent by a lawyer on work requiring the skill of a lawyer’). 327. Fam LR 2004 Sch 3, items 201–206 (varies according to whether senior or junior counsel). 328. Fam LR 2004 Sch 3, items 301–305. 329. Fam LR 2004 r 19.18(1)(c). The rules list factors to which regard may be had in making such an order: Fam LR 2004 r 19.18(3). 330. ‘Prescribed scale of costs’ is the scale of costs in Sch 4. 331. The ‘prescribed percentage’ for a proceeding in the Supreme Court is 100 per cent; for proceedings in the Magistrates Court it varies between 33 and 90 per cent depending on the amount in issue: ACT r 1722(4). 332. ACT r 1722(1) (cf former ACT RSC O 65 r 7). 333. Qld r 691(1) (formerly Qld r 690(1)). The scales of costs are found in the Schs 1–3 of the rules (Sch 1: Supreme Court; Sch 2: District Court; Sch 3: Magistrates Courts): r 691(2) (formerly r 690(2)). For an assessment in the Magistrates Courts on the standard basis, the scale in Sch 3 appropriate for the amount the plaintiff recovers applies: r 691(3) (formerly r 690(3)). For an assessment in the Magistrates Courts on the indemnity basis, the scale in Sch 3 appropriate for the amount the plaintiff claims applies: r 691(4) (formerly r 690(4)). 334. ACT Sch 4 Pt 4.1, cl 4.2(3); Qld r 691(5), 691(6) (formerly Qld r 690(5), 690(6)) (power also vests in the court). 335. As to ‘general care and conduct’ see further 15.78–15.82. 336. ACT Sch 4 Pt 4.1, cl 4.1; Qld Sch 1, item 1 (Supreme Court), Sch 2, item 1 (District Court). 337. These factors are listed at 15.61. 338. See, for example, ACT Sch 4 cl 4.2; Qld Sch 1, items 10 (service), 17(3) (correspondence). 339. ACT Sch 4 Pt 4.1, cl 4.2(2); Qld Sch 1 cl 2 (Supreme Court), Sch 2 cl 2 (District Court). 340. NT r 63.32(1). The scales of costs are contained in NT Appendix to O 63, Pts 2, 3 (together with the notes and provisions contained in Appendix, Pts 1, 3). 341. NT r 63.66. 342. NT Appendix to O 63, Pt 1 item 2. 343. NT Appendix to O 63, Pt 2 items 1–3. 344. ‘General care and conduct’ means: (a) the care and consideration given, and the conduct and skill applied, by a solicitor in the proceeding (excluding taxation); (b) the solicitor’s general supervision of, and indirect responsibility for, the conduct of the proceeding; and (c) any other relevant factors that, in the taxing master’s opinion, warrant additional reward: NT Appendix to O 63, Pt 2 item 5. See further 15.78–15.82. 345. NT Appendix to O 63, Pt 3, items 1–6.

346. NT Appendix to O 63, Pt 3 item 2. 347. NT Appendix to O 63, Pt 3 item 3. 348. NT Appendix to O 63, Pt 3, items 7–13. 349. NT Appendix to O 63, Pt 3 item 4. 350. NT Appendix to O 63, Pt 4. 351. The scale of costs is fixed by SA Sch 1 (formerly SA RSC Sch 7): SA r 264(3) (increased by a percentage on an annual basis: see SA r 264(3A)–(3E)). 352. SA r 264(2) (formerly SA RSC r 101A.01). 353. SA r 264(4). 354. Tas r 837(1). 355. Tas r 837(2). 356. Tas r 837(3). 357. Tas r 837(4). 358. Tas r 837(5). 359. Tas r 838. 360. Such as, for example, counsel’s fee on brief (see 17.47–17.58), for service out of the jurisdiction, and for any necessary postage, carriage or transmission of a document. 361. Vic r 63.34(1) (the scale being set out in Appendix A). 362. Vic r 63.34(3). 363. Vic r 63.34(4). 364. Pursuant to the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic). 365. Vic r 63.72. 366. Toomey v Scolaro’s Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd (No 3) [2001] VSC 477; BC200108059 at [6] per Eames J. 367. Assets Development Co Ltd v Close Brothers & Co [1900] 2 Ch 717 at 720–1 per Buckley J; Rivington v Garden [1901] 1 Ch 561 at 569 per Buckley J; City of Warrnambool v Tabone (FC(Vic), Fullagar, Brooking and Marks JJ, 25 August 1992, unreported) BC9203233; Jenkins v G J Coles & Co Pty Ltd [1993] 1 VR 155 at 157 per Hayne J (who found no special grounds in the case in issue being a heavy one that raised difficult questions, as this was common in Supreme Court cases); Thomas v Powercor Australia Ltd (No 9) [2012] VSC 207; BC201203141 at [26] per Beach J (who refused the order because ‘when one compares this proceeding with the range of proceedings routinely heard and determined in this court, the proceeding does not warrant being described as one of exceptional difficulty, novelty or importance’). 368. (SC(Vic), 25 May 1994, Smith J, unreported) BC9401087 at 11. 369. See also Foxeden Pty Ltd v IOOF Building Society Ltd (No 3) [2006] VSC 207; BC200604400 at [45] per Habersberger J (referring to the need for an attempt ‘to relate the terms of the order made to the actual basis for that order’, namely ‘to identify what costs were incurred by the plaintiff(s) as a result of some misconduct or failure by the defendant ordered to pay those costs’). 370. Being the commencement date of the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other

Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic), which introduced into the rules, inter alia, a new scale of costs. 371. Vic Appendix A, item 17. 372. Vic r 63.48(2), as to which see 15.59. 373. ‘Any relevant scale’ means any costs determination, as defined in the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 252 that relates to the costs that may be charged by law practices in respect of business before the court carried out by practitioners: WA O 66 r 11(1). 374. WA O 66 r 11(2). 375. WA O 66 r 11(4). 376. As to costs agreements see Ch 3. 377. Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 306 (formerly WA 2003 s 241; WA 1893 s 70(2)); Legal Aid Commission Act 1976 (WA) s 14 (which requires the Legal Aid Commission to pay to a private practitioner who has performed legal aid services a fee as prescribed and reimburse him or her in respect of disbursements). 378. The constitution of the Legal Costs Committee is prescribed by the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) Pt 10 Div 9 (formerly WA 2003 Sch 4 Div 1; WA 1893 s 58M). 379. Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 275(1) (formerly WA 2003 s 221(1); WA 1893 s 58ZB(1)). 380. Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 280(4) (formerly WA 2003 s 215(4); WA 1893 s 58ZB(2)). 381. Pryles & Defteros (a firm) v Green (1999) 20 WAR 541 at 546; [1999] WASC 34; BC9902816 per Parker J; Forbes v Frigger [2009] WASC 77; BC200902052 at [56] per Hasluck J (noting ‘a tension between those provisions which appear to allow to the court a broad discretionary power to award costs including a power to override costs scales in special or complex cases and certain other provisions which suggest that the costs recoverable are prescribed essentially by the operative scale and in the absence of any explicit order purporting to set aside the requirements of the scale any special benefit by way of indemnity costs is to be governed by the language used in the relevant costs determination and related scale’). 382. Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 280(3) (formerly WA 2003 s 215(3); WA 1893 s 58ZB(3)). 383. WA O 66 r 12(1) (repealed with effect on 21 February 2007). The jurisdiction in this context was not limited in its scope to proceedings that went to a completed hearing. The court, therefore, could grant a special costs order notwithstanding the compromise of the action: Way v Swan Television and Radio Broadcasters Ltd (1991) 5 WAR 323 at 325 per Anderson J. 384. SDS Corporation Ltd v Pasdonnay Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 26 (S2); BC200404600 at [97]–[98] per Roberts-Smith J; Delstrat Pty Ltd v Bond (2004) 36 SR(WA) 212; [2004] WADC 158; BC200440151 at [9]–[15] per Kennedy CJ; Green v Wilden Pty Ltd [2005] WASC 83; BC200502940 at [180]–[181] per Hasluck J; Tipperary Developments Pty Ltd v State of Western Australia [2006] WASC 137; BC200605339 at [45] per Murray ACJ. 385. McLean v Kerville (FC(WA), Burt CJ, Wallace and Brinsden JJ, 1 October 1986, unreported) BC8600001; Schmidt v Gilmour [1988] WAR 219 at 220 per Burt CJ; Retawil Pty Ltd v Olivetti Australia Pty Ltd (SC(WA), Wallwork J, 26 April 1991, unreported) BC9101159 at 2–8; Way v Swan Television and Radio Broadcasters Ltd (1991) 5 WAR 323 at 325 per Anderson J; Briggs v Glentham Pty Ltd (FC(WA), Malcolm CJ, Franklyn and Murray JJ, 21 April 1993, unreported) BC9301232 at 4 per Malcolm CJ; Jewel Walk Pty Ltd v Kondinin Group Inc [2001] WASC 197; BC200104311 at [43] per Roberts-Smith J. See further the first edition of this work, 15.73.

386. Jewel Walk Pty Ltd v Kondinin Group Inc [2001] WASC 197; BC200104311 at [31] per RobertsSmith J; Geneva Finance Ltd (receiver and manager appointed) v Resource & Industry Ltd [2002] WASC 121 (S); BC200207490 at [15] per E M Heenan J; Cifuentes v Fugro Spatial Solutions Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 316 (S); BC200910176 at [22] per Murray J; Walter v Buckeridge (No 5) [2012] WASC 495; BC201210335 at [70] per Le Miere J. 387. WA O 66 r 23. 388. Frank Jasper Pty Ltd v Glew (No 3) [2012] WASC 24 (S); BC201208920 at [23] per Martin CJ (emphasis supplied). 389. Frigger v Lean [2012] WASCA 66; BC201201613 at [81] per Allanson J, with whom Newnes and Murphy JJA; Walter v Buckeridge (No 5) [2012] WASC 495; BC201210335 at [60] per Le Miere J. 390. Kinder v Gross [2008] WADC 69; BC200840167 at [3] per Hewitt DR. 391. Collins v Westralian Sands Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 56 at 66–7 per Ipp J (FC). 392. City of Rockingham v Curley [2000] WASCA 202 (S); BC200104473 at [12] per the court. 393. Unlike the former WA RSC O 66 r 12(1): see 15.72. As to ‘unusual complexity’ under that rule compare, for example, Middleton v Middleton [2000] WASC 278; BC200007022 at [52]–[56] per Hasluck J (case found to lack unusual complexity, in particular because it did not proceed to a hearing) and Conway-Cook v Town of Kwinana [2001] WASC 37; BC200100293 at [20] per Scott J (where the case lacked unusual complexity or importance, and there was no good reason to make a special order because, inter alia, the plaintiff had delayed in bringing the application to the prejudice of the defendant) with Geraldton Building Company Pty Ltd v Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd (1994) 13 WAR 242 at 244–6; BC9401828 per Ng M (who found unusual complexity in a case where the proceedings were fraught with technical objections, involved serious questions of law and a large amount in dispute, and generated huge documentation produced in the course of the trial, coupled with the unusual length of the trial and the multitude of issues raised). 394. SDS Corporation Ltd v Pasdonnay Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 26 (S2); BC200404600 at [102]–[106] per Roberts-Smith J; Green v Wilden Pty Ltd [2005] WASC 83; BC200502940 at [182] per Hasluck J; Hodgkinson v Doepel & Associates Architects Pty Ltd [2006] WASC 237 (S); BC200704684 at [33] per Simmonds J; Frank Jasper Pty Ltd v Glew (No 3) [2012] WASC 24 (S); BC201208920 at [17] per Martin CJ. 395. Heartlink Ltd v Jones [2007] WASC 254 (S); BC200709441 at [17], [18] per Martin CJ. 396. O’Rourke v P & B Corporation Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 36 (S); BC200812453 at [23] per Martin CJ (‘the word “unusual” means unusual having regard to what one might describe as the usual run of civil cases’); Como v Helmers [2011] WASC 179 (S); BC201110741 at [18] per Corboy J. See, for example, Fagan v Morien [2008] WASC 54 (S); BC200808226 at [19] per Templeman J (who found that the work carried out by the defendant’s solicitors in preparing for the application to cross-examine the defendant on his affidavit was ‘much more difficult than would ordinarily be expected in an application of that kind, and therefore involved “unusual difficulty”’). 397. Heartlink Ltd v Jones [2007] WASC 254 (S); BC200709441 at [19] per Martin CJ. 398. Rehins Pty Ltd v Debin Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] WASC 168 (S) at [32] per Murray J. 399. CMA Contracting Pty Ltd v John Holland Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 249; BC201107401 at [3] per Allanson J. 400. See, for example, Neesham v 6PR Southern Cross Radio Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] WASC 72; BC200803407; Staley v Pivot Group Pty Ltd (No 4) [2010] WASC 120; BC201003596.

401. CMA Contracting Pty Ltd v John Holland Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 249; BC201107401 at [3] per Allanson J. 402. Feaver v Smith (2008) 58 SR (WA) 204; [2008] WADC 72; BC200840170 at [16]–[29] per Schoombee DCJ. 403. Under WA O 3 r 5. 404. Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 400 at 406–9; BC9201030 per Malcolm CJ (refusal to extend time where the application was made three years after judgment); Feaver v Smith (2008) 58 SR (WA) 204; [2008] WADC 72; BC200840170 at [70]–[89] per Schoombee DCJ (refusal to extend time, reasoning that ‘it would not be in the interest of justice if a defendant who had been of the understanding that he had to pay a certain amount of costs to the plaintiffs would be exposed after the passage of 2 years and 4 months to a sudden change of circumstances which would require him to pay a substantially greater amount in costs pursuant to a special costs order’: at [88]). 405. Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority (2003) 28 WAR 95; [2003] WASC 122 (S); BC200305099 at [21]–[23] per Pullin J. 406. (2003) 28 WAR 95; [2003] WASC 122 (S); BC200305099 at [22]. 407. Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 280(1) (formerly WA 2003 s 221(1); WA 1893 s 58ZB(1)). 408. Walter v Buckeridge (No 5) [2012] WASC 495; BC201210335 at [56], [57] per Le Miere J. 409. Mercer v Western Australian Planning Commission [2008] WASC 124; BC200900896 at [67] per Jenkins J (who did not accept that ‘the mere fact that a party has entered into a costs agreement with their solicitors which allows for practitioners of a certain level within the firm to charge over above the scale is justification for a court increasing the maximum hourly rate of that seniority of practitioner to that stated in the agreement. Something more would have to be shown to justify the amount claimed’). 410. Lampropoulos v Kolnik [2010] WASC 193 (S); BC201009410 at [16] per Simmonds J. See also EDWF Holding 1 Pty Ltd v EDWF Holdings 2 Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 275 (S); BC200900214 at [6], [7] per Martin CJ; CMA Contracting Pty Ltd v John Holland Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 249; BC201107401 at [6] per Allanson J. 411. See, for example, Verdell Pty Ltd v F & G Nominees Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 58 (S2); BC200208143 at [14], [15] per Wheeler J. 412. WA O 66 r 18(1). Without limiting the generality of r 18(1), the taxing officer may allow such fees as he or she considers reasonable: (a) in connection with the compromise of a claim by or against a person under a disability; or (b) for a conference or consultation where and to the extent that the conference or consultation was necessary: WA O 66 r 18(2). 413. Titan v Babic [1995] FCA 813; BC9502898 at [37] per Finn J. 414. Auspine Ltd v Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 1 at 9; [1999] FCA 673; BC9902639 per O’Loughlin J. His Honour remarked that although the English authorities on the subject may be relevant so far as the factors that may impact upon the quantum of the mark-up are concerned (see, for example, Johnson v Reed Corrugated Cases Ltd [1992] 1 All ER 169), they must be treated with caution because the English system of taxation differs in certain material ways from that in Australia: at 12–13. 415. Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (FCA, von Doussa J, 4 March 1998, unreported) BC9800513 at 9; Charlick Trading Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission [2001] FCA 629; BC200102744 at [21] per Mansfield J.

416. Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (FCA, von Doussa J, 4 March 1998, unreported) BC9800513 at 9. 417. Brookfield v Davey Products Pty Ltd (FCA, Branson J, 19 December 1997, unreported). 418. Auspine Ltd v Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 1 at 13; [1999] FCA 673; BC9902639 per O’Loughlin J. Cf Lashansky v Bruvecchis Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 793; BC200604793 at [35] per Siopis J (‘It is generally accepted that unless a matter is so routine and straightforward as to not merit a loading, an amount for care and attention is appropriate’). 419. Brookfield v Davey Products Pty Ltd (FCA, Branson J, 19 December 1997, unreported), endorsed by Logan J in Wide Bay Burnett Conservation Council Inc v Burnett Water Pty Ltd (No 9) (2011) 194 FCR 250; [2011] FCA 661; BC201103877 at [126]. 420. Auspine Ltd v Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 1 at 11; [1999] FCA 673; BC9902639 per O’Loughlin J. 421. Auspine Ltd v Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 1 at 12; [1999] FCA 673; BC9902639 per O’Loughlin J; Charlick Trading Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission [2001] FCA 629; BC200102744 at [22] per Mansfield J. 422. NSW Sch G, Table 1, Appendix A, cl 41. 423. Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd (SC(NSW), Waddell CJ, 14 April 1986, unreported) BC8601109 endorsed by O’Loughlin J in Auspine Ltd v Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 1 at 10; [1999] FCA 673; BC9902639. 424. NT Appendix to O 63, Pt 2, rr 4, 5. 425. Auspine Ltd v Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 1 at 14; [1999] FCA 673; BC9902639 per O’Loughlin J; Charlick Trading Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission [2001] FCA 629; BC200102744 at [23]–[27] per Mansfield J. 426. Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (FCA, von Doussa J, 4 March 1998, unreported) BC9800513 at 9. 427. See 15.60–15.77. 428. See 15.59. 429. The rules define ‘adjudication’ as including ‘a taxation or assessment of costs pursuant to an order under an Act providing for costs to be taxed’: SA r 4. 430. SA r 274(3)(a). 431. Tas r 862(1). 432. Vic r 63.71(1) (vis-à-vis the Costs Court). 433. ‘The nature of the business transacted’ clearly does not mean the general nature of the business transacted, but refers to all circumstances relevant to the specific cause or matter under consideration: Mitchell v Mitchell (1971) 19 FLR 100 at 110 per Neasey J (SC(Tas)). 434. Tas r 862(1). 435. Vic r 63.71(1). 436. Tas r 862(2)(b), 862(2)(c); Vic r 63.71(1), 63.71(2). 437. Tas r 862(2)(d). 438. HCR 2004 r 56.12.3 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 65(3)). Equivalent provision was made under the former FCR 1979 O 62 r 36(2); now see FCR 2011 r 40.06(b) (which entitles a party to apply to the court for an order ‘directing an inquiry whether any costs have been improperly, unreasonably or negligently incurred and providing for the costs of such inquiry’).

439. ACT r 1754(2) (similar to former ACT RSC O 65 r 43). 440. Where a document is of unnecessary length, work that is not necessary is to include work for that part of the document that is not necessary: Vic r 63.70(2). 441. Vic r 63.70(1). 442. Vic r 63.70(3). 443. See 16.14–16.17. 444. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 60 (‘In any proceedings, the practice and procedure of the court should be implemented with the object of resolving the issues between the parties in such a way that the cost to the parties is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject matter in dispute’). 445. Skalkos v T & s Recoveries Pty Ltd (2004) 65 NSWLR 151; [2004] NSWCA 281; BC200405462 at [8] per Ipp JA. For examples in this context see 7.42–7.49. 446. See Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M(2)(e), 37M(3), 37N(1), 37N(4); Fam LR 2004 r 1.07(c); Qld r 5; Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) ss 24, 28(2); WA O 1 r 4B(1)(e). 447. Roberts v Rodier [2006] NSWSC 1084; BC200608337 at [44] per Campbell J; Amos v Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd [2008] 1 Qd R 304; [2007] QCA 235; BC200705735 at [29] per the court.

[page 520]

CHAPTER 16

Bases of Costs Quantification Bases Specified by Court Rules High Court, Federal Court and Tasmania Family Court Australian Capital Territory New South Wales Northern Territory Queensland South Australia Victoria Western Australia Synthesis

16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.8 16.9 16.10 16.11 16.12 16.13

‘Party and Party’ Basis Not extend to luxuries Meaning of ‘necessary or proper’

16.14 16.15 16.16

‘Solicitor and Client’ Basis Problems with nomenclature Difference from party and party basis

16.18 16.19 16.21

‘Indemnity’ Basis Analogous to ‘solicitor and own client’ basis Compared to ‘solicitor and client’ basis Western Australian position

16.23 16.24 16.27 16.30

‘Trustee’ Basis Court rules General law — representative capacity Trustees Proceedings by director against company Costs of lawyers engaged by liquidators

16.32 16.33 16.34 16.35 16.36 16.37

Circumstances Where Special Costs Order Justified Curial attitude to ‘special’ costs orders Characteristics of circumstances justifying a special costs order Focus is chiefly on the conduct in the litigation of the party ordered to pay costs Conduct must be in connection with the litigation, not anterior to it Characteristics that are irrelevant to the issue of special costs Complexity of litigation?

16.39 16.40 16.45 16.45 16.46 16.48 16.48

[page 521] Parties’ financial position relative to one another? Status as a litigant in person? Hopeless cases Distinguishing hopeless from marginal cases Exemplary value of special costs order Relevance of warning that special costs will be sought Illustration — unjustified lodgement of caveats Ulterior purpose even if not patently hopeless Unjustified allegations Delay and prolongation of litigation

16.49 16.50 16.51 16.52 16.55 16.56 16.57 16.58 16.59 16.62

Non-compliance with court orders and procedure Fraud and deception Contempt Ex parte order affecting innocent third parties Rejected offers of compromise Public interest and test cases Special costs as a condition of relief against forfeiture (?)

16.66 16.67 16.68 16.70 16.71 16.72 16.75

Issue Estoppel and Findings Supporting Special Costs Orders

16.76

16.1 As discussed in Chapter 15,1 the costs indemnity rule requires that the extent of the indemnity allowed be quantified. When it is not fixed by the court or agreed between the parties, the process of quantification has traditionally been effected via what is known as ‘taxation’. Though termed ‘assessment’ in the Family Court, the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales and Queensland, and ‘adjudication’ in South Australia, this chapter adopts the collective term ‘taxation’ in this context in homage to the traditional terminology and approach (except where specific reference is made to one of those jurisdictions). The extent of the indemnity depends on the basis upon which taxation is to be conducted, which in turn is determined by the terms of the court’s costs order, the terms of any statute or court rules that govern the point, or the terms of any agreement between parties for this purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the bases of taxation available,2 explain their impact on the approach a taxing officer (again used a collective term in this chapter)3 is to adopt,4 and to identify the circumstances that lead a court to order that costs be taxed on a more generous basis than the usual basis.5 It concludes with a discussion of the relationship between any such order and the doctrine of issue estoppel.6

Bases Specified by Court Rules 16.2 Any sweeping statements as to approaches to taxation must yield to the

court rules in each jurisdiction, as in some jurisdictions the bases of taxation are limited by those rules. [page 522] For this reason, it is important at the outset to consider the court rules in each jurisdiction to appreciate the available bases of taxation, and their meaning, which prevail over any inherent jurisdiction and pronouncements based upon earlier rules. This is not to deny considerable commonalities across the jurisdictions, although Western Australia goes its own way.7

High Court, Federal Court and Tasmania 16.3 The High Court and Tasmanian rules (and the former Federal Court Rules) require a taxing officer, on every taxation, to allow all such costs, charges and expenses as appear to have been necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining or defending the rights of a party, but, except as against the party who incurred them, costs must not be allowed that appear to have been incurred or increased through over-caution, negligence or mistake, by payment of special fees to counsel or special charges or expenses to witnesses or others, or by other unusual expenses.8 The current Federal Court Rules retain the substance of the second part of the foregoing,9 but in a new provision add that ‘[i]f an order is made that a party or person pay costs or be paid costs, without any further description of the costs, the costs are to be costs as between party and party’.10 The phrase ‘costs as between party and party’ is defined to refer to ‘only the costs that have been fairly and reasonably incurred by the party in the conduct of the litigation’.11 The reference to ‘necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining or defending the rights of a party’ in the High Court and Tasmanian rules (and the former Federal Court Rules) accords with what has been traditionally characterised as taxation on a ‘party and party basis’.12 The High Court rules refer to no other basis of taxation (nor did the former Federal Court Rules), whereas statute in Tasmania empowers the Supreme Court to award costs as between solicitor and client in any case in which such costs could have been awarded by the court in 1932.13 At that time, the court

clearly had power to order costs against a litigant to be taxed on a solicitor and client basis.14 While the current Federal Court Rules utilise the phrase ‘costs as between party and party’ — invoking the traditional ‘party and party basis’ language — defining that phrase by eschewing the ‘necessary or proper’ terminology may suggest a loosening in approach. At the same time, that some judges have viewed the ‘necessary or proper’ inquiry through the lens of reasonableness15 may suggest simply a modernising of the relevant language. Whatever may be [page 523] the correct interpretation (and indeed whether it will make any real difference in practice), explicit statutory provision empowers the Federal Court to ‘order that costs awarded against a party are to be assessed on an indemnity basis or otherwise’.16 Aside from the ‘party and party basis’, the rules countenance no other basis that could come within the words ‘or otherwise’. It appears, therefore, that there are only two bases of costs recovery in the Federal Court under the current regime: party and party, and indemnity costs (though the court is not precluded from ordering that costs be determined by reference to a cost assessment scheme operating under a state or territory law). The rules define ‘costs on an indemnity basis’ as ‘costs as a complete indemnity against the costs incurred by the party in the proceeding, provided that they do not include any amount shown by the party liable to pay them to have been incurred unreasonably in the interests of the party incurring them’.17

Family Court 16.4 The Family Law Rules state that a registrar must, in assessing costs, not allow costs that, in his or her opinion, are not reasonably necessary for the attainment of justice, or not proportionate to the issues in the case.18 The rules add that a registrar must not allow: (a) costs incurred because of improper, unnecessary or unreasonable conduct by a party or a party’s lawyer; (b) costs for work (in type or amount) that was not reasonably required to be done for the case; and (c) unusual expenses.19 Though not

expressed in the precise terms of the usual party and party basis of taxation, the foregoing evinces similarity to that basis of taxation, which now seems to be confirmed by a dedicated sub-rule to this effect.20 The rules, though, envisage that the court may order that a party is entitled to costs assessed on a lawyer and client basis or an indemnity basis,21 and list factors that a court may consider in making such an order.22 Where costs are ordered on an indemnity basis, the rules direct the registrar to allow ‘all costs reasonably incurred and of a reasonable amount’, having regard to, inter alia, the scale of costs, any costs agreement between the party to whom costs are payable and the party’s lawyer,23 and charges ordinarily payable by a client to a lawyer for the work.24 That this conception of ‘indemnity costs’ closely aligns to what courts have traditionally viewed as ‘solicitor and client’ costs25 — not indemnity costs as ordinarily understood26 — has not precluded dicta equating the ‘lawyer and client basis’ to the ‘solicitor and client’ basis.27 This gives little weight to the ‘lawyer and client basis’ and ‘indemnity basis’ being expressed in the alternative expression in the rules, although whether the distinction makes much difference in practice may be queried. [page 524] Although family law proceedings are not subject to the usual ‘costs indemnity rule’ — whether or not a costs order is justified rests on statutorily prescribed factors28 — the circumstances that justify an award of party and party costs can, if exceptional enough, lead to an award of ‘solicitor and client’ or ‘indemnity’ costs.29

Australian Capital Territory 16.5 The Australian Capital Territory rules state that costs may be assessed on the ‘party and party’ basis, on a solicitor and client basis, on an indemnity basis or on any other basis it considers appropriate.30 Except where a statute or court order provides otherwise, the registrar is directed to assess costs on a party and party basis,31 under which all costs that are ‘fair and reasonable for the attainment of justice or for enforcing or defending the rights of the party whose costs are being assessed’ are allowed.32 Lacking a definitive judicial

pronouncement, it remains unclear whether the phrase ‘fair and reasonable’ envisages a broader allowance than the traditional ‘necessary or proper’, but the deliberate choice of different, and ostensibly broader language, may legitimately support such a conclusion. In assessing costs on a ‘solicitor and client’ basis, the registrar must allow all costs reasonably incurred and of a reasonable amount, having regard to the costs allowable under the scale, and to charges ordinarily payable by a client to a lawyer for the work.33 An assessment on an ‘indemnity’ basis allows all costs other than costs unreasonably incurred (the party paying the costs bearing the onus of proving that the costs were unreasonably incurred), and the registrar may for this purpose have regard to any costs agreement between the party to whom the costs are payable and the party’s lawyer.34

New South Wales 16.6 The New South Wales rules state that, unless the court orders otherwise or the rules otherwise provide, costs payable to a person under a court order or the rules are to be assessed on the ‘ordinary basis’.35 A costs assessor, in assessing a bill on the ordinary basis, must consider whether or not it was reasonable to carry out the item of work to which the costs relate, whether or not the work was carried out in a reasonable manner, and what is a fair and reasonable amount of costs for that item.36 Equivalent provision was made in the superseded New South Wales legislation and rules, but termed the ‘party and party’ basis.37 Statute provides that ‘the court may order that costs are to be awarded on the ordinary basis or on an indemnity basis’.38 Under the latter basis of assessment, ‘all costs (other than those [page 525] that appear to have been unreasonably incurred or appear to be of an unreasonable amount) are to be allowed’.39 This accords with the accepted general law definition of ‘indemnity costs’.40 These are the only two bases of costs assessment available in New South Wales.41

The ‘ordinary basis’ (and former ‘party and party basis’), as phrased, is a more liberal approach to quantifying costs than the ‘necessary or proper’ notion underscoring the traditional ‘party and party basis’. This was clearly the parliamentary intention, namely to reduce the previous substantial gap between costs quantified on a ‘party and party’ basis and costs quantified on an ‘indemnity basis’.42 16.7 Costs deregulation having largely obviated the need for a scale of costs, statute lists factors to which costs assessors may have regard that in assessing what is a fair and reasonable amount of costs, namely:43 the skill, labour and responsibility displayed on the part of the lawyer responsible for the matter; the complexity, novelty or difficulty of the matter; the quality of the work done and whether the level of expertise was appropriate to the nature of the work done; the place where and circumstances in which the legal services were provided; the time within which the work was required to be done; and the outcome of the matter.

Northern Territory 16.8 The Northern Territory rules provide that costs in a proceeding that are to be taxed must be taxed on the ‘standard basis’ or the ‘indemnity basis’.44 The ‘standard basis’ prescribes the allowance of a reasonable amount in respect of all costs reasonably incurred, any doubt as to whether the costs were reasonably incurred or were reasonable in amount being resolved in favour of the paying party.45 On a taxation on the ‘indemnity basis’, all costs are to be allowed except to the extent that they are of an unreasonable amount or have been unreasonably incurred, any doubts in this regard being resolved in favour of the receiving party.46 The latter reflects the general law conception of what indemnity costs represent.47 Costs are to be taxed on the standard basis, unless the rules or a court order provide otherwise.48 If the court makes a costs order without indicating the basis of taxation, or on a

basis other than the standard basis or the indemnity basis, the costs must be taxed on the standard basis.49 As in New South Wales, the ostensible aim is to extend a successful party’s costs recovery. This is achieved by defining the ‘standard basis’ in terms of ‘a reasonable amount in respect of all costs reasonably incurred’, less stringent than the traditional party and party basis, which allows costs that are ‘necessary or proper for the attainment of justice’.50 The difference between [page 526] the standard and indemnity bases is one of onus: on the standard basis it is on the receiving party; on the indemnity basis it is on the paying party.51 The standard basis arguably equates to what has traditionally been known as the ‘solicitor and client’ basis.52 In the Northern Territory, therefore, the notion of taxation on the traditional party and party basis no longer operates; costs may be taxed on either the standard basis or the indemnity basis.

Queensland 16.9 The Queensland rules, like their Northern Territory counterparts, prescribe only two bases of taxation: the ‘standard basis’ and the ‘indemnity basis’. However, the ‘standard basis’ in Queensland does not equate to that in the Northern Territory; it allows all costs necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for enforcing or defending the rights of the party whose costs are being assessed.53 It thus aligns to the traditional ‘party and party’ basis. On the ‘indemnity basis’, all costs reasonably incurred and of a reasonable amount are allowed, having regard to the scale of fees prescribed for the court, any costs agreement between the party to whom the costs are payable and his or her solicitor, and charges ordinarily payable by a client to a solicitor for the work.54 Although described as the indemnity basis, this definition is closer to that traditionally understood as the ‘solicitor and client basis’.55 Unless the rules or an order of the court otherwise provide, the registrar must assess costs on the standard basis.56

South Australia 16.10 The South Australian rules provide that the court may, in exercising its costs discretion, award costs on any basis that it considers appropriate,57 but that as a general rule costs are awarded ‘as between party and party’.58 The latter means that costs are awarded ‘on the basis that the party entitled to the costs will be reimbursed for costs reasonably incurred by the party in the conduct of the litigation to an extent determined by reference to the scale of costs in force’.59 This arguably aligns relatively closely to the traditional ‘party and party basis’, given that some judges equate costs that are ‘necessary or proper’ to costs that have been ‘reasonably and necessarily incurred’.60 The court can, alternatively, award costs ‘as between solicitor and client’, ‘on the basis of an indemnity’ or ‘on any other basis it considers appropriate’.61 It can award different components of costs on different bases. Costs ‘as between solicitor and client’ refer to the party awarded costs being ‘fully reimbursed for costs reasonably incurred by the party in the conduct of the litigation’.62 Costs ‘on the basis of an indemnity’ refer to that party being ‘fully reimbursed for costs [he or she has] incurred … in the conduct of the litigation except to the extent that the party liable for the costs shows them to have been unreasonably incurred’.63 [page 527]

Victoria 16.11 Before 1 April 2013, the Victorian rules required that costs be taxed on a party and party basis, a solicitor and client basis, an indemnity basis, or such other basis as the court may direct.64 Consistently with its traditional characterisation, on a taxation on a party and party basis, the rules allowed all costs necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for enforcing or defending the rights of the party awarded costs.65 Costs were taxed on the party and party basis unless the court or the rules of court provided otherwise.66 On a taxation on a solicitor and client basis, the rules allowed all costs reasonably incurred and of reasonable amount.67

As from 1 April 2013, the rules were amended to envisage costs taxed to a standard basis, an indemnity basis or such other basis as the court may direct.68 On a taxation on a standard basis, all costs reasonably incurred and of reasonable amount are allowed.69 Except as provided by the rules or any order of the court, costs are taxed on the standard basis.70 On a taxation on an indemnity basis, whether before or after 1 April 2013, all costs are allowable except those unreasonable in amount or unreasonably incurred, any doubt as to unreasonableness being resolved in favour of the party awarded costs.71

Western Australia 16.12 The Western Australian rules adopt a unique schema. They allow, inter alia, ‘items of costs allowable under any relevant scale’ and ‘such counsel fees as may be allowed’.72 This must be read in tandem with a rule that provides that, except where lawyer and client reach a binding costs agreement,73 ‘the fees allowed under any relevant scale shall apply both as between party and party, and solicitor and client’.74 So except for items that are not ‘allowed under any relevant scale’,75 absent a costs agreement there should be no difference between the amounts allowed for items under a taxation as between party and party and those under a taxation as between lawyer and own client.76 Although the same has been held to apply in respect of the items allowed on the respective taxations,77 the rule refers only to ‘the fees [page 528] allowed under any relevant scale’, making no express mention of actual items. It thus remains open for a taxing officer to be more stringent regarding items allowable on a party and party taxation than in a solicitor and own client taxation.78

Synthesis 16.13 In the Federal Court, New South Wales, the Northern Territory and Queensland, the rules limit to two the available bases of taxation: the

standard (in the Federal Court, party and party, in New South Wales, ordinary) basis and the indemnity basis. But these similarities in terminology do not translate to identity in definition. Although the indemnity basis in the Federal Court, New South Wales and the Northern Territory is defined in parallel terms, in Queensland (and also the Family Law Rules) it equates to what commonly was understood as the ‘solicitor and client’ basis. And the latter aligns more closely to the standard basis in the Northern Territory than any traditional ‘party and party’ basis. In Queensland, conversely, the standard basis is akin to the traditional ‘party and party’ basis. Both the standard basis in the Northern Territory and the ordinary basis in New South Wales adopt a more generous approach to taxation than that the traditional party and party basis. Whether the current Federal Court Rules dictate likewise in their definition of ‘costs as between party and party’ awaits authority. The Family Law Rules, as noted above, recognise the indemnity basis beyond the standard way of assessing costs, but also refer to the ‘lawyer and client’ basis without defining it. The Australian Capital Territory, South Australian and (before 1 April 2013) Victorian rules recognise a standard basis of taxation (in the first and last of those jurisdictions termed the ‘party and party’ basis), but envisage that the court may order costs to be taxed or assessed on a solicitor and client basis, an indemnity basis, or any other basis as the court directs, and define these bases in generally similar terms. The Victorian rules, as from 1 April 2013, in envisaging taxation on the standard basis or the indemnity basis, parallel their Northern Territory counterparts except to raise the prospect of taxation on any other basis as the court may direct. The rules in the High Court and Tasmania make reference only to what amounts to the party and party basis of taxation, but do not purport to restrict the court to only that basis. Yet the costs discretion conferred on the court by statute,79 or the inherent jurisdiction of a superior court,80 have been held to empower those courts to make an award of costs on a basis other than [page 529] the party and party basis, such as on a solicitor and client basis81 (which is in any case envisaged by statute in Tasmania) or an indemnity basis.82

‘Party and Party’ Basis 16.14 As noted above,83 court rules in all jurisdictions except New South Wales and the Northern Territory (and possibly the Australian Capital Territory and the Federal Court) prescribe, as the default basis of taxation, what can be aligned with the traditional ‘party and party basis’. The latter allows costs that are ‘necessary or proper’84 for the party awarded costs to attain justice in the case. This may equate to an inquiry as to whether that party is able to establish that the costs have been ‘reasonably and necessarily incurred’85 or ‘reasonable in all the circumstances’.86 This inquiry can alternatively be expressed as follows: ‘would it be necessary or proper for a reasonably prudent man, endeavouring to get justice, but endeavouring to get it without undue expenditure of money to incur the expense in question?’87

Not extend to luxuries 16.15 The courts have frequently sought in this context to distinguish luxuries from necessaries, it being said that, on a taxation on the party and party basis, ‘it would be wrong for the losing party to pay more than the necessaries included in the successful party’s expenses’.88 The luxuries of litigation must, as a general rule, ‘be paid for by those who indulge in them, the necessaries only are to be paid for by the losing side’.89 Luxuries here mean things that made the conduct of the litigation more convenient, rather than being necessary to enable the adverse party to conduct that litigation or establish his or her case.90 So, for instance, it has been said that where, faced with two courses that are fairly open, a lawyer does not adopt the more economical course, the taxing officer may disallow those costs to the extent that they are unnecessarily incurred.91 In Bligh v Tickle Industries Pty Ltd,92 for example, O’Hagan J held that by taking a proof of evidence when they did, the plaintiff’s solicitors obtained no evidence in relation to the issue at stake that would not have been [page 530]

available at the trial, and ascertained no facts that at a later stage might not have been ascertainable. Hence, his Honour found it difficult to see how the taking of the proof at that time served any purpose other than the convenience of the plaintiff, and so ordered the costs of taking and engrossing it be disallowed.

Meaning of ‘necessary or proper’ 16.16 The traditional ‘party and party’ basis speaks in terms of ‘necessary or proper’ costs, not ‘necessary and proper’ costs. The term ‘necessary’ is not interchangeable with the term ‘proper’.93 The words ‘or proper’ connote a wider ambit of charge than the word ‘necessary’;94 ‘proper’ may include items not strictly necessary but reasonably incurred for the purpose of the proceedings.95 As explained by Asprey J in W & A Gilbey Ltd v Continental Liqueurs Pty Ltd:96 [A] taxing officer in a party and party taxation should allow a successful litigant, in whose favour an order for costs has been made, a just and reasonable amount in respect of each item claimed in such litigant’s bill of costs where such item was, in fact, incurred on behalf of the litigant by his solicitor in respect of some step or matter in the litigation which either (1) was necessarily taken or performed for the attainment of justice or the maintaining or defending of the litigant’s rights in the circumstances of the particular case, or, (2) although not necessarily taken or performed for such purposes, would reasonably have been taken or performed for any of those purposes by a solicitor acting at the time when it was taken or performed without extravagance in conformity with the then situation of the case and not in conflict with the statutes and rules, the practice of the Court, and the usages of the legal profession appertaining to such a case.

As the term ‘proper’ imposes a less stringent threshold than the term ‘necessary’, issues at the margin on a party and party taxation will focus on whether or not an item was ‘proper’ in the circumstances. In determining this issue, the correct viewpoint to be adopted by a taxing officer ‘is that of a sensible solicitor sitting in his chair and considering what in the light of his then knowledge is reasonable in the interests of his lay client’.97 For this purpose, the client should ‘be deemed a man of means adequate to bear the expense of the litigation out of his own pocket’, the term ‘adequate’ meaning neither ‘barely adequate’ nor ‘super-abundant’.98 16.17 What is ‘proper’ (or ‘necessary’) must be judged by reference to the circumstances existing when the work was done, not in relation to the eventual state of the circumstances at the trial.99 Hindsight is not the proper

test. The point was again explained by Asprey J in W & A Gilbey Ltd v Continental Liqueurs Pty Ltd:100 No one who has had the experience of the preparation for and conduct of litigation will be unaware of the fact that the course of litigious proceedings, both before and during the trial, is frequently changed by an event, eg, an unforeseen admission volunteered by or extracted from an opponent, which will thenceforth render matter already prepared for its tender in evidence redundant. Further, the position of a defendant’s legal adviser, in this regard, is a more difficult one than that of a plaintiff’s legal adviser in the majority of cases. The plaintiff usually knows the nature of the evidence by which he intends to prove his case whereas the defendant (even when aided by particulars) usually knows only the facts in issue as disclosed by the pleadings, but not

[page 531] the evidence by which the plaintiff will attempt to prove those facts and frequently there will be several courses open to a plaintiff to seek to obtain his objective all of which the defendant must be ready to counter. Finally, a solicitor engaged in the preparation of a case for trial is not in a position, at that stage, to know the effect of any piece of evidence from the point of view of its credibility, or weight, upon the tribunal whose task will be to consider those matters at the close of all the evidence and therefore he will usually seek, and, subject always to the question of extravagance, or over-caution, will be entitled to prove a fact, particularly an essential or important fact, in more ways than one and will always be entitled, if he be acting for a defendant, to establish as many defences as are available to his client to destroy the plaintiff’s claim.

‘Solicitor and Client’ Basis 16.18 The Family Law, Australian Capital Territory, South Australian, Tasmanian and (before 1 April 2013) Victorian rules make provision for the award of costs on a ‘solicitor and client basis’, although the Family Law and Tasmanian rules do not define what is meant by this.101 Yet the Family Law and Queensland rules define the ‘indemnity basis’, and the Northern Territory rules define the ‘standard basis’, in terms closely reminiscent of what is traditionally understood as the ‘solicitor and client basis’,102 which allows all costs reasonably incurred and of reasonable amount.103 The ‘ordinary basis’ in New South Wales appears to exhibit a similar flavour, in practice if not in its actual terms.104 In the Australian Capital Territory, South Australian and (pre-1 April 2013) Victorian rules are found definitions phrased in a similar fashion. No impediment to making an order of this kind exists in the High

Court, where the rules do not, unlike those in the Federal Court, Family Court, New South Wales, the Northern Territory and Queensland, exhaustively state the available bases of taxation. Solicitor and client costs, as defined, do not extend to costs made necessary by a ‘particularly fussy, hysterical, ignorant, suspicious, and vindictive person’, or to costs incurred ‘by reason of the solicitor’s earnest zeal to try and meet and provide against or provide for a particular eccentricity of his client’.105

Problems with nomenclature 16.19 The choice of the title ‘solicitor and client’ in this context is unfortunate, as it is all too easy to confuse with the ‘solicitor and own client basis’. Although originally designed to reflect the notion that courts had a discretion to order as between party and party costs to be taxed as if between solicitor and client, courts have noted that taxation on a solicitor and client basis is not to be approached in the same way as on a solicitor and own client basis.106 The latter, according to the bulk of authority, involves an approach akin to the indemnity basis of taxation, as commonly understood, covering all costs incurred except those unreasonably incurred or unreasonable in amount. The matter is not free from doubt, as there are judges who assimilate the solicitor and client basis to the indemnity basis — not assisted by rules in Queensland that define the indemnity basis in terms equivalent to the solicitor and client basis107 — even though the indemnity basis starts from the position that all costs are allowable [page 532] on taxation.108 This may explain the trend in some court rules to move from taxation on a ‘solicitor and client’ basis to taxation on an ‘indemnity basis’, and also why the English rules were amended to replace the ‘solicitor and client’ basis with the ‘common fund’ basis.109 An English judge has, to this end, called for the disuse of the terminology ‘solicitor and client basis’ between opposing litigants, keeping it only for what it is designed for, taxation between a solicitor and his or her own client.110

16.20 What is clear is that where, whether in a judgment or statute, there is a reference to a taxation of a bill a client must pay to his or her own solicitor, the phrase ‘solicitor and client’ is synonymous with ‘solicitor and own client’.111

Difference from party and party basis 16.21 As party and party costs are those ‘necessary or proper’ for the attainment of justice, and solicitor and client costs are those costs reasonably incurred and of reasonable amount, there is likely to be greater scope for the allowance of costs on a ‘solicitor and client’ basis than on a ‘party and party’ basis. The requirement that costs be ‘necessary’ is ostensibly more onerous than that they be ‘reasonable’.112 Hence the often-repeated, but potentially misleading, statement that a solicitor and client taxation is substantially a party and party taxation ‘on a more generous scale’.113 It is not entirely clear what is meant by the phrase ‘on a more generous scale’. English authority, for instance, suggests that on the solicitor and client basis the taxing officer might properly allow not only items that would not be allowed on the party and party basis, but also items that might be properly included on the latter basis but at a higher figure.114 Yet as the relevant cases pre-dated the recognition of the indemnity basis of taxation in England115 — which clearly encompasses not just a wider scope of items but also a potentially greater quantum per item116 — they may be seen as coloured by this fact. 16.22 In Australia Griffith CJ in Re Marsland & Marsland117 opined that ‘for the same work there must be the same remuneration on whichever basis the taxation is had’. According to his Honour, the difference in the bases of taxation lay in the work that could be recognised in the costs allowed, not in the quantum allowable for the same work. An example may be the cost of preparing a witness who did not in the end have to be called, which may not be allowed on the [page 533]

party and party basis but may possibly be allowed on the solicitor and client basis.118 As Griffith CJ’s statement also preceded the recognition of the indemnity basis of taxation in Australian law, in referring to ‘whichever basis the taxation is had’, his Honour could not have intended this to include the indemnity basis. The approach propounded by Griffith CJ interprets the phrase ‘on a more generous scale’ to broaden the range of items that may be allowed on taxation, not to increase the quantum allowed for an item on a party and party taxation. Yet this is at most implicit in the rules, resting on an interpretation of the rules or case law that attributes to both the party and party basis and the solicitor and client basis the allowance of a reasonable amount in respect of an item. It does accordingly enjoy universal support as a result.119 In any case, the uncertainty attendant to the expression ‘on a more generous scale’ is in practice thus perhaps best left to be resolved by the taxing officer.120

‘Indemnity’ Basis 16.23 Other than in the High Court, Tasmania and Western Australia, statute or court rules make specific provision for taxation on an indemnity basis.121 Other than in the Family Law and Queensland rules — which define the ‘indemnity basis’ in terms akin to the traditional ‘solicitor and client basis’ — the ‘indemnity basis’ is defined in largely common terms to cover all costs incurred by the person in whose favour costs are ordered except to the extent that they are of an unreasonable amount or have been unreasonably incurred. This accords with the accepted general law concept of ‘indemnity costs’.122 The power to make such an order in the High Court and Tasmania stems from the general costs discretion vested in superior courts,123 and in Western Australia can arguably moreover be sourced from a specific statutory provision.124 Although all costs ordered as between party and party are, pursuant to the ‘costs indemnity rule’,125 indemnity costs in one sense, an order for ‘indemnity costs’, or that costs be taxed on an ‘indemnity basis’, is intended to go further.126 Yet the object in ordering indemnity costs remains compensatory and not penal.127 References in judgments to a ‘punitive’ costs order

[page 534] in this context128 must be seen against the backdrop of the reprehensible conduct that often justifies an award of indemnity costs129 rather than impinging upon the compensatory aim. Accordingly, such an order does not enable a claimant to recover more costs than he or she has incurred.130

Analogous to ‘solicitor and own client’ basis 16.24 The indemnity basis of taxation as between party and party arguably attracts the same approach to taxation as applies to a taxation between a solicitor and his or her own client.131 For instance, Lee J in Re Public Trustee of Queensland132 viewed the ‘indemnity basis’ as meaning that the party in whose favour such an order is made is to receive the greatest indemnity possible as recompense for the costs incurred in the litigation, and found it difficult to conceive of a situation ‘where a greater indemnity can be received than costs awarded on a solicitor and own client basis’. In inquiring as to whether costs as between party and party are allowable on an indemnity basis, the taxing officer may first consider whether the item would have been properly incurred as between solicitor and client, because if it would not have, it cannot properly be the subject of a bill for taxation as between party and party, whether on the indemnity or any other basis of taxation.133 16.25 This does not mean that the same items, or even the same amounts per specific item, will be allowed whether the taxation is between party and party on an indemnity basis or between solicitor and own client. This is because, as between a solicitor and own client, taxation can allow unreasonable or unnecessary expenses if the client, being fully informed, has specifically agreed these.134 An agreement of this kind cannot impact upon the items or quantum allowable on a taxation as between party and party, even if this is on an indemnity basis, but only upon the parties to the agreement, namely solicitor and client. Young J dealt with this issue in Parramatta River Lodge Pty Ltd v Sunman as follows:135 [T]here has been an increasing tendency for solicitors to agree with the clients to be remunerated other than in accordance with the appropriate scale of costs. To avoid problems on taxation when an indemnity order for costs needs to be made, I specifically direct the taxing officer not to allow any increased costs as a result of any private arrangement between the

successful party’s solicitor and that party’s client136 … This order does not … affect the general law but it protects a party

[page 535] ordered to pay costs against being the victim of the ignorance that there appears to be in the profession as to the effectiveness of a ‘sweetheart’ agreement on a third party.

16.26 A costs agreement may nonetheless serve as evidence of what represents reasonable expenditure in the circumstances, provided that the taxing officer does not blindly and uncritically simply equate costs under that agreement to indemnity costs. In Singleton v Macquarie Broadcasting Holdings Ltd137 Rogers CJ held that if the court makes a costs order on an indemnity basis, the taxing officer may tax costs so awarded according to a costs agreement between the successful party and his or her solicitor unless satisfied that it would be unreasonable to do so. In fact, in the Family Court, the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland the rules explicitly state that the registrar may (in the Family Court and Queensland, must) have regard to a costs agreement in assessing costs on an indemnity basis.138 The same is arguably so in Western Australia.139 In New South Wales statute, which is not limited to where costs are ordered on an indemnity basis, entitles a costs assessor to obtain a copy of, and have regard to, a costs agreement,140 but prohibits the assessor applying its terms for the purpose of determining appropriate fair and reasonable costs.141 However, if a costs agreement provides for rates of charges lower than those assessed as fair and reasonable, and as a result a client is liable to his or her lawyer for less than the amount otherwise assessed to be fair and reasonable, the indemnity principle requires that the assessment be for this lower amount.142

Compared to ‘solicitor and client’ basis 16.27 Whether and, if so, how the indemnity basis of taxation differs from the solicitor and client basis of taxation is not entirely clear. In the Family Law and Queensland rules, the ‘indemnity basis’ is defined in terms that essentially equate to the understood meaning of the solicitor and client basis;

in the Northern Territory it is arguably the default basis of taxation — the ‘standard basis’ — that aligns to the solicitor and client basis as usually understood. Moreover, even aside from rule-based definitions, judges sometimes speak of these types of orders interchangeably,143 although such an approach is rarely supported by analysis. Prima facie, a taxation on a solicitor and client basis allows all costs reasonably incurred and of reasonable amount; a taxation on an indemnity basis allows all costs incurred except those unreasonably incurred or unreasonable in amount. This is the approach adopted in the Australian Capital Territory, South Australian and (the pre-1 April 2013) Victorian rules (and [page 536] appears as the distinction between the ‘standard basis’ and the ‘indemnity basis’ found in the Northern Territory rules). 16.28 Where the difference, on these definitions, lies is that on a solicitor and client basis the taxing officer includes nothing unless satisfied that it is reasonably incurred and of a reasonable amount;144 on an indemnity basis ‘[e]verything is included unless it is driven out by the words of exclusion’, namely, except so far as the item is of an unreasonable amount or has been unreasonably incurred.145 The distinction is essentially a matter of onus,146 a point made explicit in the rules in the territories and South Australia. Also, on the solicitor and client basis (as well as on the party and party basis), no benefit of the doubt is given to the party awarded costs; on an indemnity basis, that party receives the benefit of any doubt, a point noted in the Northern Territory and Victorian rules. As explained by Megarry VC in EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd:147 The litigant does not have to establish that the costs were necessary or proper, or that the costs were of a reasonable amount and reasonably incurred. Provided that they are costs of and incidental to the proceedings, he is entitled to recover them, subject only to the qualification that they are liable to be reduced in respect of anything that the taxing master considers to fall within the headings ‘unreasonable amount’ or ‘unreasonably incurred’. In a word, the difference is between including only the reasonable and including everything except the unreasonable. In any taxation there must be many items or amounts that are plainly allowable, and many others which are plainly not allowable. In between, there must also be many items or amounts which do not fall clearly within either extreme. On a party and party taxation, or on a taxation on the common fund [solicitor and client] basis, many such items may fail to be allowed; on a taxation on an indemnity basis, they will all be included.

There are consequently various statements in the cases that solicitor and client taxation is not synonymous with ‘indemnity costs’,148 premised on the ground that an item that is ‘reasonable’ is not to be equated with one that is ‘not unreasonable’. In other words, an item is more likely to be allowed where the onus is on the paying party to prove its unreasonableness than it is when the party seeking it must establish its reasonableness. 16.29 As the Family Law and Queensland rules do not phrase their ‘indemnity basis’ definitions in terms of allowing all costs except those of an unreasonable amount or that have been unreasonably incurred, and purport to exhaustively state the available bases of assessing costs, it appears that the registrar cannot assess costs by adopting such an approach. Whether this should make a significant difference in practice is unclear, although the extent of any difference may be mitigated by the fact that the rules in these jurisdictions make no express reference to who bears the onus of proving reasonableness or unreasonableness. [page 537]

Western Australian position 16.30 As noted earlier,149 Western Australia differs from other jurisdictions, as the rules provide that, subject to the terms of a costs agreement, ‘the fees allowed under any relevant scale shall apply both as between party and party, and solicitor and client’.150 This appears to equate costs allowable as between party and party to the costs allowable on a solicitor and own client taxation,151 assuming that ‘solicitor and client’ is intended to refer to ‘solicitor and own client’, which is a reasonable interpretation of the rule construed in its context. If so, an indemnity costs order has less significance than in jurisdictions where the items allowed on a party and party taxation are more restricted than those allowed as solicitor and own client costs.152 16.31 Yet in Western Australia there is, in any case, less need for an indemnity costs order than elsewhere. This is because statute empowers the court to order, as between party and party, an amount exceeding the scale if it considers that scale costs are ‘inadequate because of the unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the matter’.153 Western Australian courts term

this a ‘special costs order’, and have noted that where a properly formulated special costs order is made, ‘there should be little need for an indemnity costs order to try and recover costs incurred above the scale’.154 This does not mean that Western Australian judges lack the power to make indemnity costs orders — whether under the general discretion as to costs155 or a specific statutory power to ‘make any order or give any direction for the purposes of enabling costs above those in the determination to be ordered or taxed’156 — but that indemnity costs orders ‘should not be made where a special costs order will sufficiently address inequity that the applicant might suffer’.157 That the behaviour of the party liable for costs has unjustifiably increased the costs incurred by the party awarded costs, including by pursuing a hopeless case or unreasonably refusing an offer of compromise, presents a likely scenario for an indemnity order, as it does in other jurisdictions.158 As explained by Pullin J in Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority:159 It will be appropriate in cases where there has been improper or unreasonable conduct on the part of a party or his legal advisors. An order for an indemnity costs order is a mark of disapproval on the part of the court about the improper or unreasonable conduct of litigation, even though there should not be much difference in the costs recovered under such an order compared with recovery under a properly formulated special costs order. If the conditions warrant an indemnity costs order, it is likely that the judge making the order will be more inclined to allow an increase in the hourly rates or an increase in the limits. An order detailing those increases should, in my opinion, be made even where indemnity costs orders are made.

[page 538] Accordingly, it is open to the taxing officer to conclude, against the backdrop of an indemnity costs order, that the figure contended for by the claimant may be warranted, even if it exceeds the scale rate as to hours or value, without necessarily being regarded as unreasonable.160

‘Trustee’ Basis 16.32 The issue discussed above so far as different bases of taxation are concerned arises in adversary litigation, that is, litigation as between parties at arm’s length. Both the courts and rule-makers have recognised that

different considerations may apply where parties are found to be entitled to the payment of their costs out of a fund or assets being administered by or under the control of a trustee, liquidator, receiver or person in a like position.161

Court rules 16.33 The rules in some jurisdictions make specific provision for the taxation of costs ordered to be paid to a party out of an estate or fund. In the territories, Queensland and (before 1 April 2013) Victoria the rules provide that the court may order that costs be assessed on a more generous basis162 if it orders the payment of costs out of a fund163 or to a party who sues or is sued as a trustee.164 They add that if a party who sues or is sued as a trustee is entitled to be paid costs out of a fund held by the trustee, the costs must be assessed on that more generous basis unless the court orders otherwise.165 The New South Wales rules provide that where a court orders that costs are payable on an indemnity basis, and the person to whom the costs are payable is a party in the capacity of trustee, executor, administrator, legal representative of a deceased estate or other fiduciary, and the costs are payable out of property held or controlled by that person in that capacity, all costs incurred by that person are to be allowed except to the extent they were incurred in breach of that person’s duty in that capacity.166

General law — representative capacity 16.34 The court rules reflect no more than the notion recognised by the general law that persons who are engaged in legal proceedings in a representative capacity — that is, representing the interests of others — should not, if a costs order is made in their favour,167 be out of pocket because of the litigation. Some of the main illustrations in this respect are discussed below. [page 539]

Trustees 16.35 If a costs order is made in a trustee’s favour, whether pursuant to the court rules or the general law, a trustee (or other representative such as a next friend168 or a person appointed to represent a class)169 merits a costs award on a basis more generous than the party and party basis. To this end the courts variously have made orders on solicitor and client170 or indemnity171 bases (termed ‘special costs orders’) in this context. In the words of an English judge: ‘no costs shall be disallowed, except in so far as those costs or any part of their amount should not, in accordance with the duty of the trustee or personal representative as such, have been incurred or paid, and should for that reason be borne by him personally’.172 A control on this is that a trustee, who represents the interests of others in a fund, must, unlike an individual litigant, use judgment to shield the fund against unnecessarily incurred expense. Also, there is no inflexible rule that trustees, for instance, should always receive a special costs order, a point implicit in the discretionary terms in which the court rules are expressed.173 Where, for example, the litigation is designed to define and secure a trustee’s personal rights, there may be a less compelling case for a special costs order.174 Also relevant, particularly in litigation over a deceased estate, is the size of the fund in question.175 The latter reflects the trend towards ensuring that the costs of litigation are proportionate to the fund at stake, which may more generally inform both the allocation of the costs burden and the quantum of costs allowable on taxation.176

Proceedings by director against company 16.36 There may be grounds to adopt a similarly generous approach in proceedings brought against a company by a director of that company. The circumstances where this may be the case were explained by Kirby P in his dissenting judgment in Parker v National Roads and Motorists’ Association as follows:177 Where a director, alerted to what are considered to be suspicious or dubious circumstances of payments made by a company (particularly by way of fees to directors or officers) brings such circumstances to public attention in a court, it is contrary to the public interest that such director should do so only at a substantial burden in costs which must then be privately borne. If the proceedings effectively vindicate the director’s conduct — or even if they do not procure the order sought but demonstrate the genuineness and arguability of the claim made and concern

expressed — a court may order the company to pay the director’s costs on an indemnity basis. It will do so, in proper cases, in order to uphold the effectiveness of company law and the part which directors must necessarily play in bringing suspected infractions to the notice, first, of their colleagues and (absent satisfaction) eventually to the authorities and the courts. The provision

[page 540] of indemnity costs in such cases has been described in terms analogous to the protection which courts give to trustees, who also owe fiduciary duties, in bringing proceedings in the interests of the object of the trust.

The appellant director had, according to Kirby P, been virtually forced into the action by the combative attitude and defensive strategy the respondents’ directors adopted to his expressed concerns about the payment of directors’ fees and, being substantially vindicated, was entitled to indemnity costs.178 There is considerable force in his Honour’s observations, even though in dissent, as the analysis of the majority in this context was slight to say the least.179

Costs of lawyers engaged by liquidators 16.37 Another illustration in this context concerns a lawyer engaged by a liquidator in a winding up, whose bill is taxed for the purpose of obtaining payment out of the company’s assets. Although in 1992 a Victorian judge remarked as to the ‘surprisingly little’ direct authority on the proper basis for taxing in this context,180 one thing that can be said with certainty is that, consistent with the foregoing, the costs order to be made is one more favourable than the party and party basis. Traditionally the courts applied the common fund basis of taxation in this respect, as they did in taxing the costs of a trustee-in-bankruptcy.181 Australian courts have most commonly ordered the solicitor and own client basis of taxation as appropriate.182 McLelland CJ in Eq stated a reason for this in Re Quality House Pty Ltd (in liq) and the Companies Act:183 A solicitor is placed in the position where he cannot be certain in what sum, and indeed in some cases he cannot be certain whether at all, he will be remunerated for work undertaken by him on the liquidator’s instructions. It is undesirable that this state of uncertainty should lead solicitors being reluctant to act for liquidators. It is equally undesirable that it should lead solicitors bringing to bear upon services undertaken on the instructions of a liquidator anything less than a

full measure of care, skill and attention. Nor should solicitors be made diffident or cautious about the incurring of disbursements when acting on the instructions of a liquidator … A liquidator’s instructions to his solicitor rarely contain express provision as to the quantum of the solicitor’s remuneration and the solicitor is accordingly entitled to proceed upon the basis that he will be remunerated by such sum as is fair and proper for a client to pay to his own solicitor … [A] liquidator’s solicitor is entitled to receive fair and proper remuneration, assessed on a liberal basis.

16.38 Yet whether a solicitor and own client approach to taxation is appropriate remains unclear. As far back as 1929, a Victorian judge described the correct approach, somewhat confusingly, as a solicitor and client taxation of a kind in which the burden upon the solicitor was greater than in ordinary cases between solicitor and client because of the liquidator’s duty to protect the interests of the company’s creditors.184 More recently, another Victorian judge has noted that were the company not insolvent, there would be much to be said for taxing the bill on a solicitor and own client (or indemnity) basis.185 In the final analysis, the variation between the solicitor and own client (or indemnity) basis, and any such qualified [page 541] basis of taxation designed to take account of creditors’ interests, is likely to be minimal or even illusory in practice.186

Circumstances Where Special Costs Order Justified 16.39 The circumstances in which courts have chosen to diverge from the party and party basis of taxation differ little, if at all, according to whether solicitor and client or indemnity costs are ordered.187 To separately address the various types of circumstances where such costs orders can be made would thus generate much duplication for little gain. It is better to deal with the circumstances in which an order other than on a party and party basis, whether a solicitor and client or an indemnity order, is justified (termed a ‘special order’, although not to be confused by the use of the same phrase in

the context of the Western Australian provisions that entitle the court to allow amounts exceeding the scale in defined circumstances).188

Curial attitude to ‘special’ costs orders 16.40 As the party and party basis represents the usual basis of quantifying costs ordered in contentious civil litigation, it has been judicially remarked that a court will make a special order only if the case exhibits ‘some special or unusual feature’189 or ‘special circumstances’,190 or that is in some sense ‘rare and exceptional’,191 ‘extremely unusual’192 or ‘a strong one’,193 so as to set it apart from the normal case.194 It has been judicially observed, to this end, that ‘[i]ndemnity costs are not available merely for the asking’195 and that ‘[t]he threshold for departing from the [page 542] ordinary rule in relation to costs is high’.196 This in turn dictates that courts who propose to make a special costs order must give clear reasons for it.197 The reason why courts do not, absent a court rule providing otherwise,198 lightly depart from the party and party basis have been explained as follows:199 If [the party and party basis] were departed from, other than in exceptional cases, it is not difficult to visualize the indirect harm that could well be done by inhibiting prospective litigants from bringing to the attention of the Courts matters which they have every right to have put into litigation. At the same time the existence of the jurisdiction [to make special orders] does afford a real deterrent to persons who may be disposed to make wanton, scandalous and vicious charges against persons with whom they are in conflict.

Moreover, the party and party basis serves the important curial and societal concern of imposing ‘a degree of restraint on the accumulation of costs of litigation’,200 so as not to discourage the general public accessing the courts. Prospective litigants may, after all, hesitate to bring matters on for trial should they face the prospect of incurring liability for their opponent’s full legal costs as well as their own. It is also said to be a vehicle through which settlement is promoted.201 Consequently, there are judicial statements against unduly widening the cases in which special costs orders are made.202 For this

reason, the extent of the discrepancy in the circumstances between party and party costs and those the successful party must pay to its own lawyer, though unfortunate, is not by itself a sufficient reason to make a special costs order.203 16.41 The foregoing must be seen against the backdrop that the gap between costs taxed on a party and party basis and the costs incurred by a litigant in whose favour costs are ordered is greater now than in the past.204 This is no doubt a result of a complement of factors, which may include the greater complexity of the law and litigation, and explains the greater frequency with which applications for special costs orders are made. As a consequence, some have queried whether the balance between the aim of protecting access to justice inherent in adopting the [page 543] party and party basis and that of relieving a successful litigant from the burden of some of its costs has not swung too far in favour of the former.205 16.42 In Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2)206 Einfeld J went so far as to dispute the existence of a general rule that successful litigants receive their party and party costs of the action, and indemnity costs only in the most exceptional of cases, remarking that circumstances had changed since the rule was propounded. First, his Honour referred to the explosion of litigation, such that few courts possess the resources to permit every case to be heard within a reasonable time, and that without the sanction of a special costs order fewer cases would be settled out of court.207 Second, he noted the growth of large commercial entities, both public and private, with the ability to overbear ordinary citizens and smaller enterprises in litigation unless their costs can reasonably be assured in the event of their success.208 Third, his Honour reiterated the concern that the gap between party and party costs and a party’s total costs has grown so enormously that, if limited to party and party costs, a successful party may and often will finish up out of pocket notwithstanding an award of damages.209 Einfeld J then made the following incisive remarks:210 Facing a financially powerful party even though expecting to succeed may well confront a less powerful litigant with a choice of settling a case for less than is justified by the facts, rather than

litigating successfully and then facing financial loss, even ruin. This outcome is not one the courts should ordinarily permit where another option is available … The philosophy of ‘user pays’ sweeping many aspects of the public sector is apparently not one which has a place in our legal system. It is regarded as part of a democracy that people should have access to the legal system to solve disputes, irrespective of whether they can afford it, and without regard to the cost of making available the various indicia or elements of the system to resolve the disputes. If open access to the legal system is to be preserved, it seems to me that costs have to be a sanction which the courts can use to persuade litigants to settle sensibly. It is thus possible to argue that the public interest demands that the court order indemnity costs in a wide variety of cases as a means of dissuading litigants from fighting cases which ought to be settled, especially those powerful litigants whose access to virtually unlimited funds cannot possibly be matched by their lesser resourced opponents.

This prompted him to opine that the ‘usual rule’ — the prima facie position of party and party costs unless it is rebutted by the extreme circumstances — is incorrect and that its conceptual basis should be reviewed.211 As ‘every case must be considered on its own particular facts’ in determining whether or not a special costs order is justified, any general or prima facie rule, according to his Honour, could not apply.212 16.43 The concerns raised by Einfeld J are clearly valid. Other judges also accept that whether a special costs order is justified depends entirely on the facts of each case, and specifically whether justice on those facts supports the order.213 However, his Honour’s rejection of the party and party basis as the starting point and a special costs order as the exception does not sit well with the court rules. In the Federal Court, the territories, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and Victoria the rules actually require costs to be taxed on the least generous [page 544] basis (whether termed ‘party and party’, ‘standard’ or ‘ordinary’ basis) unless the rules or a court order otherwise provide.214 Moreover, that the High Court and Tasmanian rules only make specific prescription for what amounts to the party and party basis215 suggests that it represents the starting point for determining the form of costs order to be made. This view justifiably enjoys some support in the case law.216 In any case, to adopt a usual rule that yields to the circumstances hardly fetters the court’s discretion,217 and has the benefit of avoiding the

uncertainty inherent in an entirely unbounded discretionary judgment. Were the matter not at least guided by a suitable starting point — one clearly defensible historically and upon the proper construction of the court rules — it would likely promote litigation on costs, an outcome hardly to be encouraged. Hence, if a special costs order is to become the norm rather than the exception, the matter is one that should be prescribed by the legislature or rule-makers, not the courts. 16.44 The gap between costs quantified on a party and party basis, and costs likely to have been incurred by the litigant in whose favour costs are ordered, has in any case been (partly) addressed in the New South Wales and Northern Territory, where the rules express the default basis of quantification in terms more generous than the traditional party and party basis.218 Scope to interpret the Federal Court and Australian Capital Territory rules in a similar, but perhaps not as extensive, fashion may also exist.219 And in Western Australia the issue is addressed by applying the scale, the limits of which can be raised in defined circumstances,220 to both taxations as between solicitor and client and as between party and party.221 A rule-based or statutory initiative of the above kind is preferable to allowing indemnity costs more frequently solely for the purpose of filling the gap,222 as such a practice may dilute the accepted object of indemnity costs orders.

Characteristics of circumstances justifying a special costs order Focus is chiefly on the conduct in the litigation of the party ordered to pay costs 16.45 Below are discussed some of the circumstances that have been held to justify an order for costs other than on a party and party basis. These are not exhaustive, for there is no closed or rigid category of reasons for, or circumstances that justify, a special costs order.223 [page 545]

No closed categories are possible where the issue facing the court in each case is ‘whether the particular facts and circumstances of the case in question warrant the making of an order for payment of costs other than on a party and party basis’.224 Yet ordinarily the courts, in order to justify a special costs order, look for evidence of a relevant delinquency, abuse of process, ulterior purpose or unreasonableness.225 Proof that the conduct in issue was deliberate, knowing or intended is not essential to making a special costs order, though in practice the conduct will often exhibit this flavour.226 So although the discretion to depart from the usual party and party basis is not confined to the situation of an ethically and morally delinquent party,227 courts usually require some evidence of unreasonable conduct in the course of the litigation by the person liable for costs.228 A special costs order is accordingly normally reserved for cases where the court wishes to indicate its disapproval of the conduct in the litigation of that party.229 At the same time, it is not a prerequisite for an indemnity costs order to prove that the conduct in question was conduct. The inquiry is not entirely one-sided, though; the relative conduct of the parties is relevant where each of the parties has, in the course of the litigation, behaved in a fashion meriting a costs sanction.230 Also, as the inquiry focuses on the conduct of the litigant(s), an indemnity costs order need not be ‘all or nothing’. There must, after all, be a rational connection between the reason for departing from the usual ‘party and party’ order and the extent of the departure.231 While there are cases in which the effect of the unreasonable conduct is so pervasive that, in a proper exercise of the general discretion, an indemnity costs order should extend to the entire costs of the proceedings,232 the appropriate costs order will in other instances reflect degrees of (mis)conduct and (un)reasonableness. As such, the court may make a partial indemnity [page 546] order,233 whether as a percentage of the overall costs order,234 according to a number of days of the trial,235 or as from a set date.236

Conduct must be in connection with the litigation, not anterior to it 16.46 Special costs orders are ordinarily premised upon conduct in connection with the litigation deserving of criticism.237 Conversely, just as a litigant’s conduct preceding commencement of proceedings is ordinarily irrelevant to the exercise of the court’s costs discretion,238 nor does it influence the discretion to make a special costs order.239 It is the role of damages awards, not costs orders (taxed on whatever basis), to compensate for loss caused by the acts or omissions the subject of the suit. Costs orders would otherwise illegitimately perform a punitive function.240 Special costs orders, rather, compensate a successful party that has unjustifiably been put to greater expense as a result of the opponent’s conduct of the litigation. Preston J explained the point Great Lakes Council v Lani in the context of civil enforcement proceedings arising out of a breach of statute:241 I do not consider that there is any special or unusual feature in the circumstances of this particular case justifying a departure from the usual basis for an order of costs that is on a party and party basis … [T]he nature of each of the breaches of the statues in question is not a special or unusual feature by itself. Costs are not to be used for punitive purposes. There is no rule that as between the differing bases for ordering costs — party and party, solicitor and client, and indemnity — the selection of the basis depends upon the seriousness of the breach of statute the subject of the civil enforcement proceedings. The seriousness of the breach of the statute cannot be used as an aggravating circumstance warranting departure from ordering costs on the usual basis, namely party and party basis, to another basis such as indemnity basis.

From another perspective, as special costs orders aim, inter alia, to deter abuses of court process broadly stated, irregularities in that process must be the relevant inquiry. 16.47 The foregoing is subject to certain riders. The courts have exercised their jurisdiction to order costs on other than a party and party basis on certain occasions involving public [page 547] interest and test cases,242 and in cases involving an action for contempt of court.243 A third rider arises where the defendant is the substantive aggressor and the actions compelling the defensive suit are sufficiently unreasonable.244 In Velissaris v Fitzgerald,245 for example, the Victorian Court of Appeal saw

no reason to upset the trial judge’s discretion because it was based upon action taken by the defendant (V) before the proceeding commenced. V knew that his action in illegitimately lodging a caveat was bound to provoke the liquidator — as it did — to commence proceedings for its removal. To that extent, whilst not a step in a proceeding, Maxwell P, with whom Mandie AJA concurred, ruled that the lodgement of the caveat was conduct calculated to trigger litigation and thus was properly the subject of scrutiny by a judge in the exercise of the costs discretion. Moreover, V’s conduct had to be viewed in the context of an earlier proceeding for removal of a caveat, and resultant earlier orders that restrained V in very specific terms from lodging further caveats.

Characteristics that are irrelevant to the issue of special costs Complexity of litigation? 16.48 The difficulty or otherwise of the litigation is not of itself a basis to award costs on a special basis. The courts are constantly engaged in complex litigation, and the fact that a particular piece of litigation raises difficult questions of law necessitating elaborate preparation is not a novelty.246 The complexity of a matter may, however, go to the types of item that allowable on a taxation as between party and party, for instance, the fees of two counsel as opposed to one.247 Also, statute in Western Australia empowers the court to raise costs recoverable beyond scale where the matter is of ‘unusual difficulty, complexity or importance’.248

Parties’ financial position relative to one another? 16.49 The relative wealth of the parties to litigation affords no sufficient basis for awarding special costs to the less wealthy party; litigants have the same rights before the court irrespective of their means. Whilst impecuniosity will not normally be allowed to stop a party from presenting an arguable case to the court,249 it is insufficient to entitle a party to treatment different to that of most successful litigants.250 Nor is the fact that a litigation funder supports the successful party.251 The position may be otherwise if a party exploits a

disparity in financial resources between the parties by, for example, a deliberate policy of obstruction and delay.252 [page 548]

Status as a litigant in person? 16.50 That a party is unrepresented is not by itself a bar to an indemnity costs order. If it were, it would encourage a litigant in person to engage in the type of conduct that might justify such an order were the litigant represented. The courts have, however, indicated that the unrepresented status of a party is relevant to take into account in exercising the costs discretion, a judge opining that ‘the courts have been generally more reluctant to make orders for indemnity costs against self-represented litigants than against legally represented litigants’.253 After all, many self-represented litigants suffer the limitations of a lack of knowledge of the law, unfamiliarity with court practices and the risk of lack of objectivity.254 Informed by the notion that a person’s capacity to gain curial redress for legal wrongs should not rest on the ability to pay for legal representation, to the extent that these matters, in the circumstances, reasonably impacted upon the self-represented litigant’s conduct in this regard, it may be legitimate for the court to refrain from making a special costs order that may otherwise have ensued. For example, in Fardi v Loveday (No 2)255 Judge Nicholson, being ‘mindful of a general reluctance in the Courts to order solicitor and client or indemnity costs against unrepresented litigants’ cited four matters that inclined against a special costs order against the unsuccessful self-represented plaintiff. First, the significant time taken up as a result of the fact that the plaintiff was representing himself stemmed in part from his most limited command of English and the need for a full interpreting service. Second, the plaintiff had a complete lack of understanding of the cultural imperatives that underpinned the system of civil litigation. Third, as the plaintiff could not provide himself with objective advice as to the prospects of success, ‘the characterisation of the situation as one where the plaintiff, properly advised, should have known that he had no chance of success, ha[d] an air of unreality about it’.256 Fourth, there was no evidence that the plaintiff had been put on notice that, should his claim comprehensively fail, an application for a special

costs order would be made.257 Judge Nicholson was thus unprepared to find that it was unreasonable for the plaintiff to have subjected the defendant to the undue expenditure of costs with respect to this trial, and made the usual party–party costs order.258 The position will be different where, taking into account the lack of legal representation, the conduct of an unrepresented party is such as to warrant an indemnity costs. It has been judicially observed, to this end, that ‘[l]itigants in person have the capacity to inflict a great deal of unnecessary expense and hardship on other parties and the court should not stay its hand where such censure is properly called for’.259 Where a person in the position of the unrepresented litigant, for instance, should reasonably have understood the hopelessness of his or her claim or defence, or has unreasonably otherwise displayed a lack of restraint, which in turn has caused opposing parties to incur unnecessary costs, he or she cannot, it is said, ‘be allowed forever to stand behind the shield of his own ignorance’.260 [page 549] For example, in Wilkshire v Registrar of Trade Marks (No 2)261 Finn J found that, despite the considerable latitude to be given to the unrepresented applicant (W), he had transgressed the borders of indulgence, as he had ‘without restraint over quite some period of time made allegations of impropriety’262 against all opposing parties, had ‘provided no plausible justification at all for seemingly preposterous allegations of impropriety’, and had been unprepared to honour the undertaking he had given not to initiate litigation against an opponent in respect of its use of its registered mark. An indemnity costs order ensued, as it may if the evidence reveals that the unrepresented litigant should have, whether by reason of warnings or earlier determinations, known that his or her claim or defence was entirely without merit.263 The case law evinces various other examples of special costs orders made against unrepresented litigants who, in the course of the litigation, behaved so as to cause the opponent to unnecessarily waste costs and time.264

Hopeless cases

16.51 A special costs order may ensue where it appears to the court ‘that an action has been commenced or continued in circumstances where the applicant, properly advised, should have known that he had no chance of success’, in which case the action ‘must be presumed to have been commenced or continued for some ulterior motive, or because of some wilful disregard of the known facts or the clearly established law’.265 Despite this ‘presumption’, it is not a prerequisite to the power to award special costs that a collateral purpose or a species of fraud be established. It is sufficient to enliven the discretion that, for whatever reason, a litigant, [page 550] whether as plaintiff or defendant,266 persists in what on proper consideration should be seen to be a hopeless case.267 As explained by B W Ambrose J in Re SCA Properties Pty Ltd (in liq):268 In some cases it is appropriate to make an order for indemnity costs to make it known that the court will not readily accept that its time and the successful litigant’s money can be wasted on totally frivolous and thoroughly unjustified proceeding. If it appears it is not for the bona fide purpose of protecting and enforcing a legal right but to achieve an ulterior or extraneous purpose that in itself is justification for the making of an indemnity order.

Distinguishing hopeless from marginal cases 16.52 Yet the mere fact that a case is found to lack merit cannot be a basis for a special costs order, for in litigation that comes to a concluded hearing, the claim of one of the parties will be found lacking in merit.269 Even a resounding defeat does not necessarily brand the claim as sufficiently hopeless to justify a special costs order.270 It is likewise an incident of the adversary system that a party or witness is not believed, and were indemnity costs available as a matter of course because of this, there would be a de facto shift in the ‘normal’ basis of taxing costs.271 16.53 Merely because certain arguments were abandoned is not sufficient of itself to compel a special costs order, as the court encourages parties not to advance matters that lack any prospect of success.272 The parties and their lawyers should not, it is said, ‘be deterred from making proper concessions by the fear that, in doing so, they may expose themselves, or in the

[page 551] case of legal representatives, their client, to indemnity costs orders’.273 In similar vein, it has been judicially observed that:274 … [t]here is … a certain tension between having recourse to the absence of evidence in support of a claim as a basis to infer that the claim itself never had any prospects and recognising that that very circumstance may, and usually will, reflect a prudent slimming-down, as it were, of the party’s case, such that only the claims which do have prospects are given attention at trial. The latter, of course, should never be discouraged. It would be most unfortunate if the impression were created that a party might drop its obviously weak claims only at the risk of suffering an indemnity costs order.

For example, in Lissa v Browne (No 2)275 Davies J did not consider the late abandonment of the appeal to be behaviour that justified an indemnity costs order, as ‘it would be undesirable for the court by the costs orders it makes to discourage the proper but late abandonment of unwinnable appeals or points’. But the lateness at which a claim or ground is abandoned may impact upon the court’s costs discretion. Circumstances can arise where a party who pursues a claim, a defence or a counterclaim up to the door of the court, and then without explanation withdraws that proceeding or defence, may properly be subjected to a special costs order. At the same time, there is no rule that such an order will always be consequent upon a party discontinuing a claim or abandoning a defence immediately prior to trial.276 16.54 The court inquires into whether the case is patently hopeless as opposed to marginal or difficult. However, it cannot be assumed that the distinction between the two is always easy to draw.277 Often it is ‘a matter of fine judgment’ whether the available evidence warrants a claim or defence and its continuation.278 Therefore, the court aims to strike a balance so as not to dissuade litigants from pursuing a tenuous but material claim, or from joining parties who while on the surface appear remote from the matter may be potentially liable.279 In striking this balance, judges are wary of hindsight, it being noted that ‘[i]t is easy with hindsight to make an observation that an [page 552] action has no chance of success, after the matter has been fully argued’.280 It

follows that courts are not, outside ‘pathological cases’,281 overly inclined to conclude that a case or defence was patently hopeless in this context.282 This observation applies with especial force where the appeal, claim or defence challenges a discretionary decision.283 It is also one to be informed, more generally, by how well positioned the party was to make an informed assessment of the relevant merits.284 The urgency with which an application was required,285 or the fact of being a self-represented litigant,286 may be factors calling for even greater caution in making a special costs order.

Exemplary value of special costs order 16.55 Special costs orders in this context carry some exemplary value. They send a message to litigants that they run the risk in hopeless claims of being liable for the full commercial costs of their litigious adventure. Specifically, Kirby P has opined that in modern times, where ‘enlarged attention to the efficient administration of justice’ is given,287 the court is entitled to keep in mind the consequence of a special costs order not only for the particular parties before it but for the signal it sends about the due administration of justice in like cases.288 There are consequently numerous case examples of where a litigant who has persisted in a case he or [page 553] she knew or should have known was hopeless has been ordered to pay indemnity costs so as to compensate his or her opponent who, the court reasons, should not have been put to the expense in question.289

Relevance of warning that special costs will be sought 16.56 It has been suggested that if a special order is to be made, it should ideally follow due and timely warning by the successful party to the unsuccessful party that it would be sought.290 Such a warning affords, it is said, ‘the occasion for making the special order in full knowledge that the risk has been appreciated and the party has pressed on regardless’.291 It may cause the opposing party (and his or her lawyers)292 to carefully consider

whether or not to proceed with the suit or argument. As a lawyer should, professionally speaking, avoid involving a client in prolonged litigation if the matter can be resolved suitably without going to court,293 it may well be good practice to warn an opponent who a lawyer considers is pursuing a hopeless case of this, and of the intention to seek a special costs order. The point carries especial significance where the opponent is self-represented,294 and so may otherwise find it difficult to assess the relevant merits. It also carries arguably greater significance on appeal, given existing findings on the matter(s) in dispute.295 Yet there is no basis for hinging a special costs order upon a prior warning of this kind,296 above all where the claim or defence is found to have been so patently hopeless that this should have been appreciated by its proponent.297 It may be sufficient, for this purpose, that the weaknesses of the claims are exposed through the pleadings, affidavits and other inter partes communications in the course of the litigation.298 This scenario is distinguishable from that where costs are sought against third parties, where prior warning is important299 as the person sought to be made liable is not a party to the action, and so should according to natural justice be heard on the matter. In any event, the weight to be accorded to a warning will vary [page 554] from case to case; whereas a mere statement of intention to seek indemnity costs may have little weight, a reasoned exposition of the weakness of the opponent’s case accompanied by a warning may attract greater weight.300

Illustration — unjustified lodgement of caveats 16.57 In circumstances where a person lodges a caveat without grounds to do so, the costs of proceedings to remove the caveat, which the caveator resists, are commonly (but not invariably) awarded on an indemnity basis.301 In such a case, it may be that the caveat has been lodged, and maintained, for an illegitimate purpose (for instance, a delaying, bargaining or pressuring tactic).302 The court here is concerned that the applicants have been needlessly put to the trouble of coming to the court in circumstances where

the claimed caveatable interest was insupportable. In such a case, it is reasoned, the applicant should not be out of pocket in securing the removal of the caveat.303 The foregoing is an application of a broader principle, phrased by the Full Federal Court as follows:304 [I]f a party who has no defence to a claim of right, refuses to acknowledge that right and either obstinately, or for an ulterior purpose, obliges the claimant to commence proceedings to enforce that right, that circumstance may attract the exercise of a discretion to award indemnity costs against that party.

Ulterior purpose even if not patently hopeless 16.58 Even if the case is not patently hopeless, there may be evidence to show that it was brought other than in good faith, and for an ulterior purpose, which may thus attract the special costs jurisdiction.305 In Packer v Meagher,306 for example, Hunt J found that the plaintiff brought [page 555] defamation proceedings for the ulterior and collateral purpose of investigating the conduct of a royal commission, not to vindicate his own reputation. Thus the defendant succeeded in establishing that the plaintiff’s proceedings were an abuse of process, justifying an order for costs taxed on a ‘solicitor and client’ basis.

Unjustified allegations 16.59 Special costs have been ordered in cases where a litigant makes and persists with allegations of fraud, or other allegations of improper conduct seriously prejudicial to the character or reputation of a party, which ultimately prove unfounded. This is almost an invariable outcome where the litigant knew or should have known that the allegations were false or unsupportable. It reflects the notion that a person should not allege fraud or other improper conduct without a proper evidentiary foundation,307 as such an allegation may be recounted in the community and through the media, and harm a litigant’s reputation before evidence has been offered and submitted

to the scrutiny of cross-examination or rebuttal. The court aims to deter unsupported allegations of this kind by, inter alia, costs orders, whether special orders against a litigant,308 or a costs order against his or her lawyer.309 16.60 A special costs order may also, in this context, be designed to take into account the prolonging of a hearing by deliberately false allegations of fact.310 In Degmam Pty Ltd (in liq) v Wright (No 2),311 for instance, where an unsuccessful party prolonged a trial by deliberately false allegations of fact, Holland J ordered costs on an indemnity basis. His Honour found that the allegations made as the basis of the defendant’s defences and causes of action had been deliberately concocted in an attempt to deny the plaintiff its rights and to shift legal liability to the plaintiff. The defendant’s conduct, in multiplying allegation upon allegation and prevaricating in the witness box, grossly prolonged the litigation, causing other parties to incur solicitor and client costs far beyond what they could reasonably have expected to incur in litigating genuine issues.312 16.61 Not every allegation that proves unsustainable merits a special costs order. In Wentworth v Rogers (No 5)313 the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that, although the appellant’s case had been found to lack merit, and that some of her allegations were scandalous and rested on a flimsy basis, it remained unconvinced that the appeal was brought for the [page 556] purpose of prolonging the litigation or that the appellant had made allegations she believed or knew to be false, and so ordered party and party costs.

Delay and prolongation of litigation 16.62 Mere prolongation of a matter does not, without more, ordinarily justify a special costs order.314 It is ordinarily not appropriate for the court to consider, in relation to the possible making of an indemnity costs order, whether the court processes might have been better handled, with the result that the time taken at trial might have been reduced. Nor should it be assumed

that occasional mistakes in the course of trial, or grounds upon which a party’s conduct of the proceedings might deserve criticism, attract a special costs order.315 The matter is one of degree. Occasions involving error, delay, prolongation and waste, may trigger a special costs order where they amount to an abuse of process. As explained by a Western Australian judge:316 The conduct of the trial in [an] evolving way … was wholly unnecessary and unreasonable, reflecting inadequate preparation by way of proofing of witnesses and a failure to come to grips with some in principle deficiencies in the claim at a much earlier time. The sanction of an indemnity costs order is, in those circumstances, fully appropriate to mark the court’s disapproval of what has taken place.

The better advised and resourced the parties, the greater the court’s inclination to make a special costs order where proceedings are unnecessarily prolonged. In Qantas Airways Ltd v Dillingham Corporation,317 for example, Rogers J ordered indemnity costs against defendants who failed after manifold amendments and adjournments, stating that ‘[i]t is intolerable that persons, whatever their means may be, should be exposed to legal costs in resisting claims the subject of an unending stream of amendments and which are found to be totally lacking in foundation either in law or in fact’. Conversely, the mere fact that the plaintiff’s statement of claim has been amended on several occasions is not itself sufficient to warrant a special [page 557] costs order.318 Nor does a mere general reference to a high number of directions hearings and mentions provide a proper basis for such an order.319 These, of themselves, do not substantiate an abuse of court processes. 16.63 There are occasions where inordinate delay traverses into an abuse of process, and may as a result provide grounds for a special costs order. In Re Wilcox (No 2)320 the Full Federal Court held that a lengthy delay in applying for prohibition and certiorari, whilst complex and expensive proceedings continued in the Supreme Court, justified an indemnity order. Bergin J likewise ordered indemnity costs in Crump v Equine Nutrition Systems Pty Ltd,321 where the delay in seeking the vacation of trial date — it was not sought until the eve of the trial — was totally unreasonable, her Honour

noting that many of the costs thrown away might have been avoided had the plaintiffs acted reasonably, made a proper assessment of their readiness, and notified the defendants in a reasonable fashion. Certainly, if the court finds that a step in the proceedings, or the lodging of a claim or appeal generally, was pursued only for the apparent purpose of causing delay, there are compelling grounds to charge the moving party with indemnity costs.322 The relentless pursuit of an issue (especially a procedural one) of little practical significance may in some instances be similarly viewed.323 16.64 As lawyers are professionally required to co-operate to avoid needless disputes, the court may order special costs if the use of aggressive and uncooperative behaviour leads to delay, inconvenience and needless cost.324 But merely because a party fights the proceedings fiercely and leaves no stone unturned is not per se a ground for a special costs order.325 Nor is the mere fact that the litigation is hotly contested, and presented in a vigorous (or perhaps even over-vigorous) manner.326 16.65 Creation of false issues by tactical denials or failures to admit within pleadings may attract a special costs order. It has been judicially observed that ‘the traditional requirement of honesty and candour on the part of lawyers and the modern duty to reduce unnecessary issues and costs, are inimical to the practice of denying or putting parties to proof of facts which, according to the instructions in the lawyers’ possession, should be admitted’.327 In Rouse v Shepherd (No 2),328 for example, Badgery-Parker J noted that although defendants are normally entitled to put the plaintiff to proof, on the facts the defendants’ obstinacy was based on an [page 558] ulterior motive and their refusal to admit liability was unreasonable. As this conduct put the plaintiff to the expense of investigating an issue the defendants were pursuing only tactically inter se, an indemnity costs order was made against the defendants. Conversely, that a party has made its own forensic choice to incur costs countering evidence raised by its opponent does not of itself attract a special costs award.329

Non-compliance with court orders and procedure 16.66 The modern focus on timely case management may incline courts to make special costs orders against litigants who fail to follow the proper procedure in litigation and thus cause delay and cost to other litigants.330 The case law, accordingly, reveals occasions of indemnity costs orders arising out of a party’s non-compliance with court orders.331 Explicit provision to this effect is made in the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland court rules in respect of an application brought for non-compliance with a court order or, in the Australian Capital Territory, a breach of an undertaking to the court.332 Statute in the Federal Court, New South Wales and Victoria,333 and court rules in some other jurisdictions,334 can be construed as having a similar, or even broader, impact. An indemnity order does not follow non-compliance automatically — discretion remains in the court — and although ‘[t]he Court will not adopt a Rhadamanthine approach’, ‘there is a line beyond which non-compliance becomes unacceptable’.335 The degree of non-compliance, the reasons for it, and its costs consequences, are each relevant to the discretion. The same factors may influence the prospect of indemnity costs orders where the noncompliance relates to duties in the various steps of the litigation process.336 But a government litigant’s failure to comply with its own ‘model litigant’ policy is arguably irrelevant to questions of indemnity costs.337 [page 559]

Fraud and deception 16.67 Special costs orders may be appropriate against a defendant who engages in a deliberate attempt to frustrate the proceedings by fraud and deception, or in conduct calculated to harm the plaintiff.338 In Ecrosteel Pty Ltd v Perfor Printing Pty Ltd,339 for example, the court had ordered the defendants to provide photocopies of customer history cards so as to enable the plaintiff’s business to continue, but to disadvantage the plaintiff the defendants obliterated certain details on the cards. Cowdroy AJ found the defendant’s conduct subverted the court’s order and was tantamount to

contempt of court, being a gross interference with the administration of justice, which justified a costs order against the defendants on a special basis.340 A finding that a party has fabricated evidence does not automatically justify an indemnity costs order.341 It must be recalled that an indemnity order aims to compensate an opponent for unnecessary costs incurred as a result of the misconduct in question. The ills underscoring fabrication of evidence are chiefly addressed in other ways. But where the fabrication of evidence, or other misleading conduct, has a direct correlation with unnecessarily exposing the successful party to the incurrence of costs, an indemnity costs order is appropriate. In Barrett Property Group Ltd v Metricon Homes Pty Ltd (No 2),342 for instance, the respondents made a conscious and deliberate effort to mislead the court on matters of central importance in the case, which resulted, according to Gilmour J, in very significant costs being incurred by the applicants both in preparation for and the conduct of the trial that ought never to have been required. His Honour awarded indemnity costs, reasoning as follows:343 This is not a case where merely arguments ‘attended by uncertainty’ were before the Court … It is not a case involving witnesses who gave evidence believing it to be true but as to which they were mistaken. It is not a case where judgment depended essentially upon the inherent probabilities of one version of events against another but not involving questions of credit. It is not even a case … where one witness gave fabricated evidence as to part of a case. This matter involved a concerted effort on the part of four key witnesses to present a false defence which has led to the applicants incurring very considerable costs over a long period in meeting and overcoming that defence.

[page 560]

Contempt 16.68 In EMI Records Ltd v Ian Wallace Ltd344 Megarry VC observed that special costs orders are needed in cases of contempt because ‘nothing should be done to deter a person from bringing a contempt to the notice of the court; and the risk of having to bear any of the costs will often be a real deterrent’. Contempt proceedings, it is reasoned, serve a public interest, such that a person who successfully brings these proceedings should not be left out of pocket.345 It has been judicially remarked, to this end, that it is a ‘common or

usual practice’ to order that the contemnor pay costs on an indemnity basis,346 and the case law reveals multiple illustrations.347 But there is no ‘rule’ that successful contempt proceedings necessarily attract indemnity costs orders,348 as this would be inconsistent with the exercise of the curial costs discretion.349 A relevant consideration is whether, aside from the costs order, a penalty has been imposed for the contempt. If no other penalty is imposed, the court may be more inclined to employ ‘a heavy order for costs as a means of imposing something in the nature of a sanction’.350 If, conversely, significant fines have been imposed, the ‘penal’ or ‘deterrent’ aspect of a special costs order may have less justification.351 Also relevant is the plaintiff’s conduct and level of [page 561] success. For example, in Chan v Chen (No 3)352 three factors led Kaye J not to make a special costs order where breaches of Mareva orders amounted to contempt. First, the plaintiffs had not wholly succeeded in the proceeding, as nine of the counts of contempt alleged failed and the plaintiffs abandoned four other counts of contempt. Second, throughout the proceedings, the plaintiffs made multiple and varied amendments to their summons, his Honour noting that ‘[t]he jurisdiction to commit a respondent for contempt is one in which the courts require the utmost rigour on matters of procedure and evidence’.353 Third, the plaintiffs made insufficient efforts to serve the defendants with a duly endorsed copy of the Mareva orders, which failure enlivened, at least in part, the issue as to the defendants’ knowledge of those orders. That the contemnor has subsequently purged the contempt will not by itself guard against a special costs order if the contemnor’s conduct has already caused the opponent to incur costs in bringing contempt proceedings.354 16.69 Where a contempt proceeding is brought for an ulterior purpose or for no more than trivial breaches of an order, costs may be ordered against the plaintiff, potentially on an indemnity basis. The point is illustrated by Advan Investments Pty Ltd v Dean Gleeson Motor Sales Pty Ltd,355 where Gillard J

remarked that ‘[a]s a general rule, the coercive function of the proceeding should only be employed when there are no other effective means of doing so’. His Honour ordered costs against a plaintiff who pursued contempt proceedings. What led to this order were findings that the proceeding was instituted without notice to the defendants for an explanation as to the alleged charges of contempt, the evidence relied upon was tenuous at best, the initial 13 charges were reduced to four common charges that the evidence revealed lacked substance, and a further contempt charge was trivial and easily remedied.356

Ex parte order affecting innocent third parties 16.70 If a plaintiff secures an order ex parte, such as a Mareva (‘freezing’) order357 or an Anton Piller (‘search’) order,358 that negatively impacts on the position of an innocent third party, who in turn succeeds in having the order varied, the third party is, as a general rule (but not an invariable one),359 entitled to have recover costs incurred that are not unreasonable in amount or unreasonably incurred (indemnity costs). An innocent third party, it is reasoned, should not be out of pocket as a result of an order in a suit in which he or she was not originally a party and, due to its ex parte nature, could not be heard in respect of. [page 562]

Rejected offers of compromise 16.71 Court rules in most jurisdictions impose upon a litigant who rejects an offer of compromise from an opponent that proves more favourable than the judgment not only his or her costs subsequent to the date of the offer of compromise, but may also require payment of costs incurred by the opponent after that date on a solicitor and client or indemnity basis. This has been recognised as a potential outcome within the exercise of the court’s general discretion as to costs even outside the court rules making any such prescription. In view of the complexity, both rule and case wise, in this area of law, a separate chapter is devoted to it.360

Public interest and test cases 16.72 That a plaintiff in public interest or test case litigation361 is successful may be grounds to award costs on a basis more generous than the party and party basis. The logic is that the plaintiff in a public interest case, having been prompted not by personal interest but a wider interest, and in a test case, having been embroiled in litigation that may serve to determine the state of a law that impacts upon others, should not be out of pocket as a result. The ruling in Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd,362 a case that exhibited both public interest and test case characteristics, illustrates the point. A public interest group successfully brought proceedings to restrain tobacco advertising in an effort to alert the public to the dangers posed by passive smoking. As the respondent expended a vast sum of money in seeking to demonstrate that there was no such hazard, the applicant had little alternative but to incur very considerable costs to meet the challenge to its case and rebut the respondent’s evidence. Thus an award of costs to the applicant recoverable on a party and party basis would have meant that the costs that could not be recovered would likely have been considerable. Though Morling J was unaware of any precedent for the making of a costs order on an indemnity basis in a case of this kind, he nonetheless proceeded to make such an order, reasoning as follows:363 In any case, it is not the fact that the applicant is a public-interest group which is of relevance. What is relevant is that the proceedings were brought for the purpose of restraining the respondent from making misleading or deceptive statements on important matters of public health. I would have taken the same approach to the question whether a special order for costs was justified in the present proceedings if the applicant had not been a public-interest group, but, say, a medical society whose members were concerned about the respondent’s advertising. The applicant must have incurred very considerable costs in prosecuting these proceedings. In a real sense, the costs were incurred in the public interest. It is very much in the public interest that the respondent be restrained from making statements which might mislead members of the public on matters affecting their health. I do not think it would be in the public interest for a litigant in the position of the applicant to be heavily out-of-pocket in consequence of the publicspirited action it has taken.

His Honour opined that some general support for ordering indemnity costs could be found in the contempt cases,364 where one of the reasons for making special costs orders is that the proceedings serve the public interest by ensuring that the court’s orders are obeyed. It is inappropriate in such cases that a person acting in the public interest should be left to meet part of his or

her own costs. The flipside, presumably, is that an indemnity costs order may be [page 563] less likely to be made against an unsuccessful litigant where the litigation has a public interest aspect, but not one sufficient to preclude a costs order.365 16.73 Morling J nonetheless recognised that there may well be proceedings successfully prosecuted in the public interest in which a special costs order would be inappropriate. Each case rests on its own facts and merits.366 For instance, in New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd v Crawford367 Kirby P noted that whilst there was a large public interest in what caused the proceedings to be brought, this did not of itself justify a special costs order, nor did the fact that the decision would affect others awaiting hearing. His Honour remarked that it is not uncommon that the curial resolution of a disputed question has the practical consequence of resolving proceedings between other parties, but such cases do not for this reason alone ordinarily attract indemnity costs. 16.74 A special costs order in this context is not ordinarily premised upon any abuse of process or other misconduct by the person against whom it is made. More commonly it is the very nature of the proceedings and the consequent public interest attendant to the resolution of the issues at stake. For example, the Federal Court in Australian Electoral Commission v Towney (No 2)368 ordered indemnity costs against the applicant in a suit to have certain elections nullified and new elections held, where the court had made orders that were novel in electoral law that served to obviate the need for new elections. Foster J remarked that the proceedings, though not a test case in the true sense, nevertheless had a wider effect than merely inter partes, as they introduced into electoral law the concept of using forensic scientific expertise to overcome the effects of human error in the electoral process. This Foster J branded ‘at least a path-finding or trial-blazing approach, more than a mere one-off practical solution’.369 This led him to conclude that the applicants’ role in facilitating a solution to a problem not of their own making was sufficient to constitute special circumstances to ground an indemnity costs order.370

Special costs as condition of relief against forfeiture (?) 16.75 Courts at common law have held that the price of a lessee getting relief against forfeiture of a lease is payment of the lessor’s costs.371 Although there is some indication in the case law that cases of this kind merit an award of indemnity costs as a general rule,372 any such ‘rule’ is hardly unyielding. Instead, the applicable order should be determined on a case by case basis.373 To entitle a lessor entitled to indemnity costs as a matter of course would lessen the motivation to mitigate costs and promote litigation by increasing the motivation to oppose the relief sought. For this reason, the House of Lords has opined that any practice of ordering indemnity costs as a condition for granting relief against forfeiture is ‘ripe for reconsideration’.374 An Australian judge, in the same vein, has more recently denied any such general rule.375 [page 564] There is less scope for contention, though, where the terms of the lease themselves envisage indemnity costs in this instance.376

Issue Estoppel and Findings Supporting Special Costs Orders 16.76 A court that makes a special costs order will often justify it by findings as to the conduct of the party against whom the order is made.377 If subsequent legal proceedings are instituted by the other party in respect of issues pertaining to the subject matter of those findings, the defendant is not prevented from challenging those findings on the grounds of issue estoppel.378 This is because the determination of costs questions involves a fundamentally different régime to the determination of issues necessary to establish a cause of action. The point is illustrated by the Supreme Court of Victoria’s decision in

Clancy v Santoro.379 The defendant’s challenge to his late mother’s testamentary capacity was dismissed by Nathan J, who awarded solicitor and client costs against the defendant on the ground that his belief in his mother’s lack of testamentary capacity was not honestly held, and that he pursued it in the face of certain defeat. Upon being subsequently sued for malicious prosecution and collateral abuse of process, the defendant maintained that he honestly believed in his mother’s testamentary capacity. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant should be estopped from so pleading on the ground that Nathan J’s findings in the earlier proceeding on the issue of costs dealt with precisely this issue. Ashley J rejected this argument, reasoning that those findings should not be equated with the determination of a fundamental issue at trial, this being the focus of an issue estoppel. His Honour explained the point as follows:380 In my opinion identification of the ‘same question’ does not sit easily with determination, most often following an informal hearing, of the manner in which the judicial discretion with respect to costs is to be exercised. Further, if the intent of the doctrine [of issue estoppel] is to prevent relitigation of certain questions once finally determined, it is implicit that any such question was the subject of true inter partes agitation. That was not the case in Nathan J’s disposition of the costs application. It would rarely if ever be the case in the disposition of such an application.

His Honour added that even if Nathan J’s findings were capable of founding an estoppel, they did not do so in this case as they did not address specific issues in the defendant’s original statement of claim.

1.

See 15.1.

2.

See 16.2–16.13.

3.

As to the identity and nomenclature of the relevant officers as between jurisdictions see 15.27.

4.

See 16.14–16.38.

5.

See 16.39–16.75.

6.

See 16.76.

7.

See 16.12, 16.30–16.31.

8.

HCR 2004 r 55.01 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 74); FCR 1979 O 62 r 19 (superseded); Tas r 859 (which make no reference to ‘payment of special fees to counsel or special charges or expenses to witnesses or other persons’ but as this comes within ‘other unusual expenses’, it is a difference of no substance).

9.

FCR 2011 r 40.30(b) (‘A taxing officer is not to allow costs that in the opinion of the taxing officer have been incurred or increased: (i) through impropriety, unreasonableness or negligence; (ii) through overcaution; (iii) by agreeing: (A) special fees to counsel; or (B) special charges or expenses to witnesses or other persons; or (iv) by other unnecessary expense’).

10. FCR 2011 r 40.01. 11. FCR 2011 Sch 1. 12. Pêcheries Ostendaises (Soc Anon) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co [1928] 1 KB 750 at 762 per Atkin LJ (describing this as the ‘guiding rule’ in the taxation of costs, being intended to ‘sum up generally the principles upon which costs are awarded’). 13. Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 12(3) (referring to its commencement date, 1 January 1934). 14. Before the Judicature Act 1873 (UK) the Court of Chancery had power to award costs as between solicitor and client, which power did not extend to courts of common law: Mordue v Palmer (1870) 6 Ch App 22 at 32 per Mellish LJ. Following the 1873 enactment, whilst it was not possible to claim solicitor and client costs as part of the damages in the action (see 7.21–7.23), the High Court of Justice was held to have, as the old Court of Chancery formerly had in matters of equitable jurisdiction, a general discretionary power to give costs as between solicitor and client: Andrews v Barnes (1888) 39 Ch D 133 at 140–1 (CA). This discretion stemmed from the general statutory discretion conferred on that court, which in similar terms is conferred on all Australian superior courts: see 6.14. 15. See 16.14. 16. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(3)(g). See also FCR 2011 r 40.02 note 1 (‘The Court may order that costs be paid on an indemnity basis’). 17. FCR 2011 Sch 1. 18. Fam LR 2004 r 19.34(1). 19. Fam LR 2004 r 19.34(3) (was r 19.34(4) before 1 July 2008) (cf the former Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 51(4)). 20. Fam LR 2004 r 19.18(2) (as substituted by the Family Law Amendment Rules 2008 (No 2)) (‘If costs are payable under the Act or these Rules, or the court orders that costs be paid and does not specify the method for their calculation, the costs are to be assessed on a party/party basis’). 21. Fam LR 2004 r 19.18(1)(b). 22. Fam LR 2004 r 19.18(3) (namely: (a) the importance, complexity or difficulty of the issues; (b) the reasonableness of each party’s behaviour in the case; (c) the rates ordinarily payable to lawyers in comparable cases; (d) whether a lawyer’s conduct has been improper or unreasonable; (e) the time properly spent on the case, or in complying with pre-action procedures; and (f) expenses properly paid or payable). 23. See Ewellyn v Ewellyn [2010] FamCA 526; BC201050602 at [63] per Ryan J (noting that ‘[t]he exceptional nature of indemnity costs orders means it is important for the court to be able to assess the reasonableness of the costs agreement executed by the party who has applied for indemnity costs’). 24. Fam LR 2004 r 19.34(2) (was r 19.34(3) before 1 July 2008). 25. As to the ‘solicitor and client’ basis of taxation see 16.18. 26. See 16.23. 27. Bergman v Bergman (No 3) [2009] FamCA 1172; BC200951102 at [65]–[74] per Young J. 28. See 8.70–8.78. 29. See, for example, Bele v Vaughan (Costs) [2012] FamCAFC 198; BC201250755 (where

Strickland J ordered indemnity costs against a wife because her appeal had no chance of success, she had engaged in misconduct herself in the course of the litigation and made unjustified allegations). As to the circumstances that justify an indemnity costs order generally see 16.39–16.75. 30. ACT rr 1751, 1752(2). 31. ACT r 1751(1). 32. ACT r 1751(2). 33. ACT r 1752(3). 34. ACT r 1752(4). 35. NSW r 42.2. 36. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 364(1). In making this assessment, the assessor, it has been said, ‘must ask himself or herself whether the successful party conducted the litigation so as to achieve not only a just but also a quick and cheap resolution of the real issues (Civil Procedure Act [2005 (NSW)] s 56), and also whether the procedures invoked and the work done, and hence the costs incurred, were in proportion to the importance and complexity of the subject matter of the dispute’: April Fine Paper Macao Commercial Offshore Ltd v Moore Business Systems Australia Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR 619; [2009] NSWSC 867; BC200907827 at [13] per White J. 37. NSW RSC Pt 52A r 32; Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 208F(1). 38. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98(1)(c) (formerly Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 76(1) (c)). 39. NSW r 42.5(b) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 37(b)). 40. See 16.23. 41. Heaps v Addison Wesley Longman Australia Pty Ltd (2000) NSW Conv R ¶55-945; [2000] NSWSC 542; BC200003267 at [23] per Macready M. 42. Bouras v Grandelis (2005) 65 NSWLR 214; [2005] NSWCA 463; BC200511040 at [127] per Santow JA; Kalls Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) v Baloglow [2006] NSWSC 1021; BC200607960 at [4] per Hamilton J. 43. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 364(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208G). 44. NT r 63.25. 45. NT r 63.26. 46. NT r 63.27. 47. See 16.23. 48. NT r 63.28. 49. NT r 63.28. 50. This has not stopped one judge describing the standard basis as contemplating ‘a strict ‘no frills’ approach to the conduct of litigation’: Lin v Katamon Pty Ltd [1995] NTSC 61 at [9] per Kearney J. 51. Seavision Investment SA v Evennett and Clarkson Puckle Ltd (The ‘Tiburon’) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 26 at 34 per Parker LJ. 52. Cf Apitzsch v Gayle [2003] NTSC 23; BC200300957 at [15] per Martin CJ.

53. Qld r 702(2) (formerly Qld r 703(2)). 54. Qld r 703(3) (formerly Qld r 704(3)). 55. As to the solicitor and client basis see 16.18. 56. Qld r 702(1) (formerly Qld r 703(1)). 57. SA r 264(1). 58. SA r 264(2). 59. SA r 264(2) (cf former SA RSC r 101.07(6)(a)). The scale of costs is fixed by Sch 1: r 264(3), 264(3A). There are circumstances where scale costs can be departed from: see 15.66. 60. See, for example, Pêcheries Ostendaises (Soc Anon) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co [1928] 1 KB 750 at 762 per Atkin LJ. Cf Williams v Sharpe [1949] Ch 595 at 611–12 per Lord Greene MR. 61. SA r 264(5). 62. SA r 264(5)(a) (cf former SA RSC r 101.07(6)(c)). 63. SA r 264(5)(b) (cf former SA RSC r 101.07(6)(e)). 64. Vic r 63.28 (in its form preceding the commencement, on 1 April 2013, of the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 65. Vic r 63.29 (before its repeal, on 1 April 2013, of the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 66. Vic r 63.31 (in its form preceding the commencement, on 1 April 2013, of the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 67. Vic r 63.30 (in its form preceding the commencement, on 1 April 2013, of the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 68. Vic r 63.28 (in its form following the commencement, on 1 April 2013, of the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 69. Vic r 63.30 (in its form following the commencement, on 1 April 2013, of the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 70. Vic r 63.31 (in its form following the commencement, on 1 April 2013, of the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 71. Vic r 63.30.1 (operative 1 December 2001). 72. WA O 66 r 19(a). 73. As to costs agreements see Ch 3. 74. WA O 66 r 11(3). 75. For instance, possibly counsel’s opinion on the merits of a particular cause of action. 76. Collins v Westralian Sands Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 56 at 64 per Ipp J; Gallagher v CSR Ltd (SC(WA), Ipp J, 31 March 1994, unreported) BC9401606 at 11. This is supported by the remarks of Malcolm CJ in Tenbohmer v Eden (1992) 6 WAR 366 at 370 that it is implicit in O 66 that a successful plaintiff should recover all costs reasonably incurred (which is the hallmark of solicitor and own client taxation). The Chief Justice referred to O 66 r 1(2) to highlight the point. It reads: ‘If the Court is of opinion that the conduct of a party either before or after the commencement of the litigation or that a claim by a party for an unreasonably excessive amount has resulted in costs being unnecessarily or unreasonably incurred it may deprive that party of costs wholly or in part,

and may further order him to pay the costs of an unsuccessful party either wholly or in part’. 77. Collins v Westralian Sands Ltd (1993) 9 WAR 56 at 64 per Ipp J. 78. The Western Australian Law Reform Commission has recommended that WA O 66 be amended to enshrine a principle entitling a party to recover a fair and reasonable amount for work reasonably required for the litigation (essentially the New South Wales ‘ordinary basis’: see 16.6): WALRC 92, Vol 1, p 517. 79. As to which see 6.14. 80. As to the inherent jurisdiction see 6.12. Cf Milosevic v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 31 NSWLR 323; BC9303930, where a majority of the Court of Appeal held the words ‘costs payable between party and party’ in the District Court Act 1973 (NSW) s 148A (repealed) to deny the District Court the power to award indemnity costs, in part because the District Court was not a superior court: at 333–8 per Kirby P, at 347–8 per Cripps JA. Parliament subsequently amended the District Court Act to make plain that the court is to be taken retrospectively to have been authorised to make an order for the payment of costs on an indemnity basis: s 148B(1)(c) (see the definition of ‘costs’ in s 148A) (both since repealed). Yet if the power to award costs is expressed in terms sufficiently wide to encompass indemnity costs, that the power is vested in a lower court or even a tribunal may not prevent it from exercising a jurisdiction to award indemnity costs: see, for example, Walton v McBride (1995) 36 NSWLR 440; BC9504455, where a majority of the Court of Appeal held that the Medical Tribunal of New South Wales, which is statutorily conferred the power to award ‘such costs … as the Tribunal may determine’ (Medical Practice Act 1992 (NSW) s 161, since repealed), could award costs on an indemnity basis: at 463–4 per Powell JA (noting that the tribunal’s powers were ‘strongly analogous’ to those of a court: at 463), at 474 per Cole JA; contra at 449–51 per Kirby P in dissent (focusing on the need to distinguish the costs powers of superior courts from those of inferior courts and tribunals, which in the latter case must be expressly conferred (see 6.9–6.10), and so declined to read such a power into broad language). 81. See, for example, Australian Transport Insurance Pty Ltd v Graeme Phillips Road Transport Insurance Pty Ltd (1986) 10 FCR 177 at 178 per Woodward J; Thors v Weekes (1989) 92 ALR 131 at 152 per Gummow J (FCA); Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 230; BC9305213 per Sheppard J. 82. See, for example, EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59 at 64 per Megarry VC; Quirk v Bawden (1992) 112 ACTR 1 at 2 per Miles CJ; Marriage of Kohan (1992) 16 Fam LR 245; National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Chris Poulson Insurance Agencies Pty Ltd (1998) 8 Tas r 123 at 130; BC9804906 per Slicer J. 83. See 16.2–16.13. 84. See 16.16. 85. Myer v Myer [1932] VLR 322 at 333 per Cussen ACJ; Emanuele v Hedley (SC(ACT), Higgins J, 19 December 1997, unreported) BC9707399 (revd but not on this point: Macks v Hedley (1999) 94 FCR 188; [1999] FCA 1208; BC9905645 (FC)). 86. Perks v Cox [1964] NSWR 71 at 83 per Hardie J (FC). See also Pêcheries Ostendaises (Soc Anon) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co [1928] 1 KB 750 at 762 per Atkin LJ (the ‘necessary or proper’ rule is intended to ‘give to the successful litigant a full indemnity for all costs reasonably incurred by him in relation to the action’). 87. Peel v London & North Western Railway Co [1907] 1 Ch 607 at 614 per Parker J; Prudential Finance Ltd v Davander Nominees Pty Ltd [1992] 1 VR 468 at 474 per Ashley J. Cf Willis v

Edgar [1963] NSWR 664 at 666 per Else-Mitchell J (‘the assumption must be made that the costs which the party is entitled to recover would be those which he is prepared to incur personally in vindication of his rights regardless of the outcome of the case’). 88. Fish v Huon Channel and Peninsula Steam Company Ltd (1916) 12 Tas LR 7 at 8 per Nicholls CJ. 89. Donohoe v Britz (No 2) (1904) 1 CLR 662 at 666; BC0490112 per Barton J. 90. Smith v Buller (1875) LR 19 Eq 473 at 475 per Sir Richard Malins VC; O’Rourke v Commissioners for Railways (1893) 10 WN (NSW) 49 at 49 per Stephen J; Baalman v Dare Reed (1984) 68 FLR 458 at 465 per Gallop J (SC(ACT)). Cf Ricks v White [1995] 2 Qd r 302 at 309 per Demack J. 91. Rothwell v Gadowski (SC(Tas), The Master, 28 March 1966, unreported) at 2. 92. [1958] Qd r 121 at 126. 93. Bartlett v Higgins [1901] 2 KB 230 at 240 per Stirling LJ; Re Mercury Model Aircraft Supplies Ltd [1956] 1 WLR 1153 at 1156 per Roxburgh J. 94. Francis v Francis and Dickerson [1956] P 87 at 95 per Sachs J; W & A Gilbey Ltd v Continental Liqueurs Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 527 at 534 per Asprey J. 95. Grant v Australian Knitting Mills [1937] SASR 113 at 115 per Murray CJ; Re Mercury Model Aircraft Supplies Ltd [1956] 1 WLR 1153 at 1156 per Roxburgh J; Oldaker v Currington [1987] VR 712 at 715 (FC). 96. [1964] NSWR 527 at 534. 97. Francis v Francis and Dickerson [1956] P 87 at 95 per Sachs J. See also W & A Gilbey Ltd v Continental Liqueurs Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 527 at 535 per Asprey J. 98. Francis v Francis and Dickerson [1956] P 87 at 95 per Sachs J. 99. Bartlett v Higgins [1901] 2 KB 230 at 237 per Collins LJ, at 240 per Stirling LJ; Grant v Australian Knitting Mills [1937] SASR 113 at 115 per Murray CJ. 100. [1964] NSWR 527 at 535. 101. See 16.4 (Family Court), 16.5 (Australian Capital Territory), 16.10 (South Australia), 16.3 (Tasmania), 16.11 (Victoria). 102. See 16.4 (Family Court), 16.8 (Northern Territory), 16.9 (Queensland). 103. Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Razzi (No 2) (1991) 30 FCR 64 at 67; BC9103238 per Wilcox J; Arundel Chiropractic Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 179 ALR 406 at 415; [2001] HCA 26; BC200102181 per Callinan J. 104. See 16.6. 105. Huggard v Huggard [1902] ALR 178 at 179–80 per Madden CJ (SC(Vic)). Cf Marriage of Stanistreet (1987) 89 FLR 419 at 422 per Treyvaud J (Fam Ct). 106. See, for example, Bouras v Grandelis (2005) 65 NSWLR 214; [2005] NSWCA 463; BC200511040 at [18]–[20] per Giles JA. 107. See 16.9. 108. See 16.23. There is the further complication that solicitor and client costs have also been used to refer to the costs paid out of a common fund in which the client and others are interested, such as a trust estate: Giles v Randall [1915] 1 KB 290 at 295 per Buckley LJ. 109. UK RSC O 62 r 28(3), 28(4) (repealed) (now see UK CPR r 44.4, which recognises only the

standard and the indemnity bases of assessment). See EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59 at 63–4 per Megarry VC; AGC (Advances) Ltd v West (1984) 5 NSWLR 301 at 303 per Hodgson J; Heaps v Addison Wesley Longman Australia Pty Ltd (2000) NSW Conv R ¶55-945 at 57,481; [2000] NSWSC 542; BC200003267 per Macready M. 110. EMI Records Ltd v Ian Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59 at 76 per Megarry VC. 111. Re Public Trustee of Queensland [2000] 1 Qd r 409 at 433; BC9901718 per Lee J. 112. Katsaounis v Belehris [1995] ANZ Conv R 115 at 118; BC9400882 per Debelle J (SC(SA)). 113. Giles v Randall [1915] 1 KB 290 at 295 per Buckley LJ. See also Frankenburg v Famous Lasky Film Service Ltd [1931] 1 Ch 428 at 436 per Lord Hanworth MR (noting the difference between party and party and solicitor and client costs as that ‘solicitor and client costs are intended to embrace a more generous allowance for the actual costs which have been incurred by the plaintiff’). 114. Re Osborn and Osborn [1913] 3 KB 862 at 868–9 per Buckley LJ; Reed v Gray [1952] Ch 337 at 346–7 per Roxburgh J; Gibbs v Gibbs [1952] P 332 at 363–4 per Havers J; Lyon v Lyon [1953] P 1 at 10–11 per Birkett LJ. 115. See EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59, discussed at 16.28. 116. See 16.23–16.31. 117. [1902] St r Qd 219 at 235 (FC). Although his Honour was speaking in particular of solicitor and own client taxation, the same has been applied as regards taxation between party and party: Re National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian Division (in liq) (No 2) [1992] 1 VR 485 at 501 per J D Phillips J. See also Electrona Carbide Industries Pty Ltd v Baillieu Bowring (Tas) Pty Ltd (SC(Tas), Nettlefold J, 31 March 1987, unreported) BC8700018 at 4–7. 118. Re National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian Division (in liq) (No 2) [1992] 1 VR 485 at 501 per J D Phillips J. This is not, however, to say that the cost of preparing a witness not called is never allowable on the party and party basis: see 17.37. 119. See, for example, Alstom Ltd v Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd (No 9) [2012] SASC 163; BC201207297 at [24]–[26] per Bleby J (ruling that Marsland has no application under the South Australian rules). 120. Re National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian Division (in liq) (No 2) [1992] 1 VR 485 at 501 per J D Phillips J. See also Armstrong v Boulton [1990] VR 215 at 221 (App Div(Vic)) (‘the quantum of difference between party and party costs on the scale appropriate to the amount recovered, and party and party costs taxed on a solicitor and client basis and on the same scale no doubt may rarely be predictable and may vary from case to case’). 121. Federal Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) s 43(3)(g); FCR 2011 r 40.02 note 1; Fam LR 2004 r 19.34(2) (was r 19.34(3) before 1 July 2008); ACT r 1752(4)(a); NSW r 42.5(b) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 37(b)); NT r 63.27; Qld r 703(3) (formerly Qld r 704(3)); SA r 264(5)(b) (cf former SA RSC r 101.07(6)(e)); Vic r 63.30.1(1). 122. EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59 at 72, 74 per Megarry VC; Ballato v Co-operative Bulk Handling Ltd (SC(WA), Nicholson J, 30 January 1990, unreported) BC9001524 at 3; Re Wilcox (No 2) (1996) 72 FCR 151 at 159; BC9606513 per Cooper and Merkel JJ (FC); Stobbart v Mocnaj [1999] WASC 252; BC9908569 at [6], [14] per Parker J. 123. See 6.14. 124. Namely Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 280(2)(d): see 16.31.

125. See 7.2–7.6. 126. Milosevic v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 31 NSWLR 323 at 334; BC9303930 per Kirby P. 127. Gallagher International Ltd v Tlais Enterprises Ltd [2008] EWHC 2046 (Comm) at [27] per Christopher Clarke J (‘an order for indemnity costs is not, either in intention or effect, a penalty, although it may reflect the court’s disapproval of a party’s conduct’). 128. See, for example, Grossman v Toronto General Hospital (1983) 146 DLR (3d) 280 at 291 per Reid J (HCJ(Ont))) (‘punitive award’); Lamesa Holdings BV v Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 74 FCR 416 at 419; BC9701971 per Einfeld J (likening an award of indemnity costs as ‘akin to a penalty’). 129. See 16.51–16.69. 130. Milosevic v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 31 NSWLR 323 at 348; BC9303930 per Cripps AJA; Petrotrade Inc v Texaco Ltd [2001] 4 All ER 853; [2000] EWCA Civ 512 at [63] per Lord Woolf MR; Hamod v State of New South Wales (2002) 188 ALR 659; [2002] FCAFC 97; BC200201594 at [20] per Gray J; JM Properties Pty Ltd v Strata Corporation No 13975 Inc (No 3) [2006] SADC 46; BC200640378 at [96] per Judge Simpson. As to the compensatory purpose underlying the costs indemnity rule see 7.2–7.6. 131. Felstead v Giersch (1976) 14 SASR 27 at 40 per Mitchell J (FC); EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59 at 65, 71–2 per Megarry VC; Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers and Gas Fitters Employees’ Union of Australia (No 2) (1987) 72 ALR 415 at 438–9 per Wilcox J (FCA); Australian Federation of Consumers Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd (1991) 100 ALR 568 at 569; BC9103110 per Morling J (FCA); Norton v Morphett (1995) 83 A Crim r 90 at 98; BC9502468 per Phillips JA (CA(Vic)); Lin v Katamon Pty Ltd [1995] NTSC 61 at [9] per Kearney J; Bottoms v Reser [2000] QSC 413; BC20008761; Smolle v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1967; BC200710881 at [24] per Weinberg J. As to taxation as between solicitor and own client see Chs 4 and 5. 132. [2000] 1 Qd R 409 at 434; BC9901718. 133. Hamilton v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd [1964] Tas SR 224 at 229 per Crawford J. See also Re Blyth & Fanshawe (1882) 10 QBD 207 at 212 per Lindley LJ (noting that what is reasonable between party and party must be reasonable between solicitor and client, but the converse is not true). 134. See 5.26–5.34. 135. (1991) 5 BPR 12,038 at 12,043–4; BC9101975 (footnote supplied). See also Norton v Morphett (1995) 83 A Crim R 90 at 100; BC9502468 per Phillips JA (CA(Vic)) (in the context of summary criminal proceedings). 136. See, for example, Nieborak v Piper (SC(NSW), Young J, 11 December 1990, unreported) BC9001658. 137. (1991) 24 NSWLR 103 at 105 (pre-dating the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 365 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208H)). Cf Nieborak v Piper (SC(NSW), Young J, 11 December 1990, unreported) BC9001658 at 8. 138. Fam LR 2004 r 19.34(2)(b) (before 1 July 2008 numbered as r 19.34(3)(b)); ACT r 1752(4)(b); Qld r 703(3)(b) (formerly Qld r 704(3)(b)). 139. See Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 275(1) (formerly WA s 221(1); WA 1893 s 58ZB(1)) (see 15.71) and WA O 66 r 11(3) (see 16.30): Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land

Authority (2003) 28 WAR 95; [2003] WASC 122 (S); BC200305099 at [28] per Pullin J (‘even under an indemnity costs order, costs will not be automatically taxed on the basis of the hourly rates provided for in a costs agreement, as the test of reasonableness will apply even where there is a costs agreement’). 140. This is so that costs assessors can ensure that costs as assessed do not compensate a litigant for amounts he or she is not liable to pay to his or her solicitor, or is subject to an unconditional indemnity in respect of: see S Pattison, ‘The Indemnity Principle: Still Some Quandaries’ (October 2000) 38 LSJ 33 at 34. 141. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 365 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208H). Cf where the costs are payable pursuant to the terms of a deed: see Porter v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 680; BC200104664. 142. CSR Ltd v Eddy (2008) 70 NSWLR 725; [2008] NSWCA 83; BC200803017 at [3] per Hodgson JA. 143. See, for example, Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397 at 400–1 per Woodward J (FCA); Re Smith (No 2) (1991) 6 WAR 299 at 301 per Malcolm CJ (FC); Connect.com.au Pty Ltd v Goconnect Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 178 ALR 348 at 360; [2000] FCA 1148; BC200004927 per Emmett J. Cf Naomi Marble and Granite Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Company Ltd (No 2) [1999] 1 Qd R 518 at 544; BC9800777 per Shepherdson J. 144. The same applies to taxation on a party and party basis; nothing is included unless the taxing master reaches the conclusion that it satisfies the requirement of ‘necessary or proper’: EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59 at 72 per Megarry VC. 145. EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59 at 72 per Megarry VC; Bouras v Grandelis (2005) 65 NSWLR 214; [2005] NSWCA 463; BC200511040 at [117] per Santow JA (remarking that ‘[t]his may be a fine distinction but it is a potentially significant one’). 146. Beckwith v Pedler [2000] VSCA 86; BC200002772 at [25]–[29] per the court; Alpine Shire Council v MHSC Transportation Services Pty [2002] VSC 58; BC200201052 at [22] per Balmford J; Bouras v Grandelis (2005) 65 NSWLR 214; [2005] NSWCA 463; BC200511040 at [117]– [119] per Santow JA; Gallagher International Ltd v Tlais Enterprises Ltd [2008] EWHC 2046 (Comm) at [27] per Christopher Clarke J (‘The effect of making [an indemnity costs order] is to shift the burden of establishing unreasonableness in respect of any particular costs item onto the paying party’); Bellevarde Constructions Pty Ltd v CPC Energy Pty Ltd (2011) 12 DCLR (NSW) 304; [2011] NSWDC 55; BC201140152 at [56] per Judge Peter Johnstone. 147. [1983] Ch 59 at 71. 148. See, for example, Smith v Smith [1906] VLR 78 at 80 per A’Beckett J; Thors v Weekes (1989) 92 ALR 131 at 152 per Gummow J (FCA); Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1 at 33 per Kirby P (CA); Quirk v Bawden (1992) 112 ACTR 1 at 6 per Higgins J; South Australian Superannuation Fund Investment Trust v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (1996) 66 SASR 509 at 511–12; BC9600393 per Matheson J (FC); Arundel Chiropractic Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 179 ALR 406 at 415; [2001] HCA 26; BC200102181 per Callinan J. 149. See 16.12. 150. WA O 66 r 11(3). 151. Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority (2003) 28 WAR 95; [2003] WASC 122 (S); BC200305099 at [13] per Pullin J.

152. Unioil International Pty Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (No 2) (1997) 18 WAR 190 at 191; BC9704984 per Ipp J; Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority (2003) 28 WAR 95; [2003] WASC 122 (S); BC200305099 at [13] per Pullin J. 153. Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 280(2) (formerly WA 2003 s 215(2)): see 15.72–15.75. 154. Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority (2003) 28 WAR 95; [2003] WASC 122 (S); BC200305099 at [24] per Pullin J. See also Re West Australian Metals Ltd ACN 001 666 600 [2008] WASC 279; BC200810709 at [13] per Le Miere J. See, for example, Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2008] WASCA 186; BC200807985. 155. See 6.14. 156. Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 280(2)(d) (formerly WA 2003 s 215(2)(d)). See Sansom Nominees Pty Ltd v Meade [2005] WASC 9 (S); BC200503963 at [2] per E M Heenan J. 157. Taylor-White v Taylor-Bowman [2004] WASC 281; BC200409179 at [31] per Commissioner Braddock SC. 158. See 16.51–16.69. 159. (2003) 28 WAR 95; [2003] WASC 122 (S); BC200305099 at [25]. See also Re West Australian Metals Ltd ACN 001 666 600 [2008] WASC 279; BC200810709 at [13] per Le Miere J; Forbes v Frigger [2009] WASC 77; BC200902052 at [72]–[78] per Hasluck J; Rodwell v Hutchinson [2010] WASCA 197; BC201007547 at [26] per Newnes JA. 160. Forbes v Frigger [2009] WASC 77; BC200902052 at [72] per Hasluck J. 161. Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 232; BC9305213 per Sheppard J. 162. In the Australian Capital Territory, the ‘solicitor and client basis’; in the Northern Territory, Queensland and Victoria, the ‘indemnity basis’ (although the Queensland rules define ‘indemnity basis’ in terms that equate to the understood ‘solicitor and client basis’). 163. In the Northern Territory and Victoria a reference to a ‘fund’ out of which costs are to be paid or held by a trustee is defined by the rules to include a reference to property held for the benefit of a person or class thereof, including the assets of a company in liquidation, or held on trust for any purpose: NT r 63.01(2)(a); Vic r 63.01(2)(b). 164. ACT r 1752(2); NT r 63.29(2); Qld r 703(2) (formerly Qld r 704(2)); Vic r 63.32(2) (revoked with effect on 1 April 2013 by the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). ‘Trustee’ includes a personal representative of a deceased individual: ACT r 1700; NT r 63.01(1); Qld r 679; Vic r 63.01(1). 165. ACT r 1732(2)(b); NT r 63.30; Qld r 704 (previously Qld r 705); Vic r 63.33 (revoked with effect on 1 April 2013 by the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 166. NSW r 42.5(a) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 37(a)). 167. As to costs orders out of a fund see Ch 10. 168. As to the costs of next friends generally see 22.68–22.70. 169. See, for example, NIAA Corporation Ltd (in liq), Miller v Hindmarsh (SC(NSW), McLelland CJ in Eq, 3 September 1993, unreported) BC9303640 at 2. As to costs in representative proceedings generally see 11.59–11.62. 170. See, for example, O’Brien v Tracy (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 44 at 44–5 per Street J; Layzell v British Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd [1961] 1 All ER 244 (next friend allowed costs on a common

fund basis); Stephenson v Geiss [1998] 1 Qd R 542 at 558; BC9702989 per Lee J (solicitor and client basis). 171. See, for example, EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59 at 64 per Megarry VC (referring to the solicitor and own client basis, but this is analogous to the indemnity basis: see 16.24–16.26); Re National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian Division (in liq) (No 2) [1992] 1 VR 485 at 503 per J D Phillips J. 172. EMI Records Ltd v Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59 at 64 per Megarry VC. See also Re National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian Division (in liq) (No 2) [1992] 1 VR 485 at 503 per J D Phillips J (referring to Practice Note [1953] 1 WLR 1452). 173. As to trustees’ costs generally see 10.2–10.14. 174. See, for example, Re Dargie (deceased) [1954] Ch 16 at 20 per Vaisey J. 175. Harrison v Petersen [2000] QSC 415; BC200007325 at [79] per Mullins J (small estate dictated that the unsuccessful party’s costs paid from the estate were to be assessed on the standard basis). 176. See 7.42–7.49. 177. (1993) 11 ACSR 370 at 382–3; BC9302091 (CA(NSW)). 178. Parker v National Roads and Motorists’ Association (1993) 11 ACSR 370 at 383; BC9302091 (CA(NSW)). 179. See Parker v National Roads and Motorists’ Association (1993) 11 ACSR 370 at 401; BC9302091 per Clarke JA, with whom Priestley JA agreed (CA(NSW)). 180. Re National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian Division (in liq) (No 2) [1992] 1 VR 485 at 496 per J D Phillips J. 181. Re Lavey [1921] 1 KB 344 at 353–4 per Horridge J, as applied to liquidators’ costs: see Re Quality House Pty Ltd (in liq) and the Companies Act [1969] 2 NSWR 54 at 56–7 per McLelland CJ in Eq; Re National Life Insurance Co Ltd (in liq) [1978] 1 WLR 45 at 47–8 per Templeman J. 182. As to the solicitor and own client basis of taxation see 16.24–16.26. 183. [1969] 2 NSWR 54 at 56, 57, 65. 184. Re Melbourne Parking Stating Ltd [1929] VLR 5 at 6 per Mann J. 185. Re National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian Division (in liq) (No 2) [1992] 1 VR 485 at 496 per J D Phillips J. 186. Cf Re National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian Division (in liq) (No 2) [1992] 1 VR 485 at 520 per J D Phillips J, who noted that the taxation of the bill of costs of a solicitor to a company in liquidation is governed by Vic r 63.61 (being the rule that applies to the usual case of solicitor and own client taxation when there is no question of liquidation or insolvency), and it is open to a taxing officer to recognise the differences that follow from an application of the principle (namely, to allow what is reasonable) according to the circumstances attending the taxation. Yet his Honour elaborated no further as to the practical impact that the question of insolvency may have in this regard. See further M N Connock, ‘Compulsory Taxation of Legal Costs Incurred by Victorian Court-Appointed Liquidators — Past, Present and Future’ (1993) 11 C&SLJ 153. 187. Brooklyn Lane Pty Ltd v MIC Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] VSC 49; BC200100981 at [12] per Balmford J. 188. As to the Western Australian ‘special orders’ in this context see 15.71–15.77. 189. Re Wilcox (No 2) (1996) 72 FCR 151 at 152 per Black CJ, at 156 per Cooper and Merkel JJ;

BC9606513 (FC); State Government Insurance Commission v Lane (1997) 68 SASR 257 at 265; BC9701802 per Debelle J (FC); Connect.com.au Pty Ltd v Goconnect Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 178 ALR 348 at 360; [2000] FCA 1148; BC200004927 per Emmett J. 190. Ragata Developments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1993) 217 ALR 175 at 177; BC9304345 per Davies J; Australian Electoral Commission v Towney (No 2) (1994) 54 FCR 383 at 388 per Foster J; Staley v Pivot Group Pty Ltd (No 6) [2010] WASC 228 (S); BC201009412 at [14] per Kenneth Martin J. 191. Singh v Observer Ltd [1989] 2 All ER 751 at 754 per Macpherson J; Marriage of Kohan (1992) 16 Fam LR 245 at 258 (FC); New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd v Crawford (1993) 31 NSWLR 469 at 494; BC9303940 per Kirby P (‘clearly exceptional cases’); Marriage of Munday and Bowman (1997) 22 Fam LR 321 at 323 per Holden CJ (Fam Ct(WA)); Rajendran v Tonkin (2004) 9 VR 414; [2004] VSCA 43; BC200401689 at [33] per Morris AJA; BHP Coal Pty Ltd v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG (No 2) [2009] QSC 64; BC200902338 at [30] per McMurdo J (‘exceptional’); C Pty Ltd v PGW as Liquidator of S Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] FamCAFC 230; BC201150708 at [25] per the court (‘exceptional circumstances’); Bronley v Sanderson [2012] FamCA 656; BC201250887 at [77] per O’Reilly J (‘rare circumstance’). 192. Huntsman Chemical Company Australia Ltd v International Pools Australia Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 242 at 247; BC9504308 per Kirby P. See also at 250 per Mahoney JA (‘in restricted circumstances’). 193. Mandarin International Developments Pty Ltd v Growthcorp (Australia) Pty Ltd (1998) 143 FLR 408 at 423; BC9801315 per Santow J (SC(NSW)). 194. New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd v Crawford (1993) 31 NSWLR 469 at 494; BC9303940 per Kirby P; Bass Coast Shire Council v King [1997] 2 VR 5 at 29; BC9604973 per Winneke P (CA). 195. V & V Properties Pty Ltd v CSR Building Products Ltd (No 2) [2009] QSC 240; BC200907607 at [9] per Dutney J. 196. Almond Investors Ltd v Emanouel [2012] VSC 479; BC201208019 at [14] per Sifris J. 197. Whiterod v Taylor (2006) FLC ¶93-266; [2006] FamCA 433 at [53] (FC). 198. Such as in the case of unaccepted offers of compromise: see 13.13–13.23. 199. Vanderclay Development Co Ltd v Inducon Engineering Ltd (1968) 1 DLR (3d) 337 at 344 per Keith J (HC(Ont)) (paragraph break omitted). See also J P Morgan Portfolio Services Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu [2006] FCA 84; BC200600499 at [5] per Wilcox J (remarked as to his ‘longstanding reluctance to grant indemnity costs’, the reason being that ‘this course puts the Court in the position of imposing a costs burden that may, when properly examined, turn out to be excessive, in terms of the work done, the rates charged or both’). 200. Huntsman Chemical Company Australia Ltd v International Pools Australia Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 242 at 248; BC9504308 per Kirby P. 201. Milosevic v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 31 NSWLR 323 at 348; BC9303930 per Cripps AJA; Huntsman Chemical Company Australia Ltd v International Pools Australia Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 242 at 250–1; BC9504308 per Mahoney JA; Re Wilcox (No 2) (1996) 72 FCR 151 at 156; BC9606513 per Cooper and Merkel JJ (FC). 202. See, for example, Rouse v Shepherd (No 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 277 at 279 per Badgery-Parker J. Cf Chaina v Alvaro Homes Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 353; BC200811259 at [111] per Basten JA, with whom Giles JA and Young CJ in Eq concurred (noting that ‘more recent case law generally shows a tendency to grant indemnity costs orders more readily than was the case in the past’, but

placed in the context of New South Wales legislation limiting the litigation of cases where there are no reasonable prospects of success (see 23.53–23.57) and in the presumption in favour of an order of indemnity costs where an offer of compromise in accordance with court rules has been made by one party but not accepted by the other and where the offeror has bettered the offer in the litigation (see 13.13–13.23)). 203. Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (No 2) [2000] FCA 1220; BC200005095 at [4] (FC); Saizeriya Co Ltd v Peregrine Management Group Ltd Pty [2005] FCA 1174; BC200506174 at [34] per Kenny J; BHP Coal Pty Ltd v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG (No 2) [2009] QSC 64; BC200902338 at [30] per McMurdo J. 204. Qantas Airways Ltd v Dillingham Corporation (SC(NSW), Rogers J, 14 May 1987, unreported) BC8701371 at 4. See also Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 226; BC9305213 per Sheppard J; Milosevic v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 31 NSWLR 323 at 348; BC9303930 per Cripps AJA. 205. See, for example, Qantas Airways Ltd v Dillingham Corporation (SC(NSW), Rogers J, 14 May 1987, unreported) BC8701371 at 5 (‘The effects may be financial disastrous to a party successful in the outcome of the litigation. Ironically, the successful party may finish in penury whilst the financially better off opponent who actually lost the litigation continues to flourish. In a long case … the difference in costs may spell financial ruin’). 206. (1996) 66 FCR 128 at 131; BC9602187. 207. Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128 at 131; BC9602187. 208. Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128 at 131–2; BC9602187. 209. Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128 at 132; BC9602187. 210. Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128 at 132; BC9602187 (paragraph breaks omitted). 211. Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128 at 136; BC9602187. 212. Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128 at 136–7; BC9602187. His Honour has also queried the general rule that ‘costs follow the event’: see 7.4. 213. See, for example, Re Wilcox (No 2) (1996) 72 FCR 151 at 158; BC9606513 per Cooper and Merkel JJ (FC). 214. FCR 2011 r 40.01; ACT r 1751(1); NSW r 42.2 (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 32); NT r 63.28; Qld r 702(1) (formerly Qld r 703(1)); SA r 264(2); Vic r 63.31. 215. HCR 2004 r 55.01 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 74); Tas r 859. 216. See, for example, Re Wilcox (No 2) (1996) 72 FCR 151 at 158; BC9606513 per Cooper and Merkel JJ (FC). 217. See 6.15–6.17. 218. See 16.6–16.7 (NSW), 16.8 (NT). 219. See 16.3 (FCA), 16.5 (ACT). 220. See 15.71–15.77. 221. See 16.12. 222. As suggested, for instance, by Mahoney JA in Huntsman Chemical Company Australia Ltd v International Pools Australia Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 242 at 250–1; BC9504308.

Tetijo Holdings Pty Ltd v Keeprite Australia Pty Ltd (FCA, French J, 3 May 1991, unreported) 223. BC9103657 at 8 (‘the categories in which the discretion may be exercised are not closed’); Ragata Developments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1993) 217 ALR 175 at 177; BC9304345 per Davies J; FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Burns (1997) 9 ANZ Ins Cas ¶61-384 at 77,221; BC9603600 per Mahoney P (CA(NSW)); Wishart v McEwan (1998) 16 FRNZ 528 at 535 per Giles J (HC). See also Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 233–4; BC9305213 per Sheppard J (who made a list of circumstances that have been held to warrant an indemnity costs order, but added that other categories will arise in future that may justify such an order). Consistent with this, even though the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory and Queensland court rules state certain circumstances where a special costs order may be made (ACT r 1752(2); NT r 63.29(1); Qld r 703(2) (formerly Qld r 704(2)(c))), the discretion to do so is not limited to those circumstances: Bass Coast Shire Council v King [1997] 2 VR 5 at 29; BC9604973 per Winneke P (CA) (referring to the former equivalent rule in Victoria, namely Vic r 63.32(1)). 224. Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 234; BC9305213 per Sheppard J. 225. Baillieu Knight Frank (NSW) Pty Ltd v Ted Manny Real Estate Pty Ltd (1992) 30 NSWLR 359 at 362 per Powell J; New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd v Crawford (1993) 31 NSWLR 469 at 494; BC9303940 per Kirby P; MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 70 FCR 236 at 240–1; BC9604664 per Lindgren J. 226. Cleary Bros (Parramatta) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2009] ACTSC 72; BC200905682 at [32] per Penfold J (‘The fact that in many cases it will be deliberate, knowing or intended conduct that produces an award of indemnity costs does not seem to me sufficient to establish that only such conduct can justify such a costs award’). 227. Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1 at 34 per Kirby P (CA); Botany Municipal Council v Secretary, Department of Arts, Sport, Environment, Tourism and Territories (1992) 34 FCR 412 at 415; BC9203407 per Gummow J; Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 233–4; BC9305213 per Sheppard J; Reid Minty (a firm) v Taylor [2002] 2 All ER 150 at 156; [2001] EWCA Civ 1723 per May LJ. 228. Rosniak v Government Insurance Office (1997) 41 NSWLR 608 at 616; BC9702453 per Mason P; Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (No 2) [2000] FCA 1220; BC200005095 at [13] (FC); PCRZ Investments Pty Ltd v National Golf Holdings Ltd [2002] VSCA 24; BC200201065 at [36] per Chernov JA. 229. Raja v Rubin [2000] Ch 274 at 289 per Peter Gibson LJ. 230. See, for example, Crimson SRL v Claudia Shoes Pty Ltd (No 5) [2007] FMCA 1768; BC200710422 at [31] per Riley FM (who noted that although the conduct in the litigation by the fourth, fifth and sixth respondents could be sufficient to warrant an indemnity costs order, the applicants’ conduct ‘was considerably less than ideal as well’, and so, on balance, an indemnity or other special costs order was not warranted). 231. Liverpool City Council v Estephan [2009] NSWCA 161; BC200905834 at [95] per Giles JA (adding that ‘[t]he connection goes only as far as the reason’). 232. See, for example, Adelaide Congregation Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Pegasus Leasing Ltd (SC(SA), Olsson J, 24 December 1996, unreported) BC9606550 (where the defence was described as unrealistic and uncompromising as to all issues and leading to a very protracted trial). 233. This is explicitly recognised by the South Australian rules, which state that ‘[t]he Court may award different components of costs on different bases’: SA r 264(6). 234. See, for example, King v Yurisich (No 2) [2007] FCAFC 51; BC200702569 (where the court

ordered 30 per cent of the costs of the trial on an indemnity basis, and the balance on a party–party basis, to reflect the trial judge’s view of the unreasonableness of the conduct of the defence adding unjustly and unfairly to the cost burden of the fund in the litigation: at [21] per the court). 235. See, for example, Ferizis v Nash [2007] NSWDC 109; BC200740267 (where Rein SC DCJ considered that 9 days of the 12 day hearing had been brought about by reasons of defences maintained without foundation, and so ordered the defendants to pay 9/12 of the hearing costs on an indemnity basis and the balance on the usual basis: at [21]). 236. See, for example, Ingot Capital Investment Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (No 7) (2008) 65 ACSR 324; [2008] NSWSC 199; BC200801581 (where McDougall J found that the plaintiffs, properly advised, must have realised that the evidence led by them at the trial could not prove that they had sustained any loss, and awarded indemnity costs from the date from which the plaintiffs should have realised this: at [72]). 237. Re Smith (No 2) (1991) 6 WAR 299 at 301 per Malcolm CJ (FC); NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 2) (2001) 109 FCR 77; [2001] FCA 480; BC200101932 at [56]–[65] per Lindgren J; Sande v Medsara Pty Ltd (No 2) [2004] NSWSC 262; BC200401614 at [7] per Burchett AJ; Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd v Prudentia Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] VSC 399; BC201207016 at [17], [18] per Croft J. Cf Novasource Consulting Pty Ltd v Primelife Property Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) V ConvR ¶54-671; [2002] VSC 568; BC200207581 at [148] per Ashley J (‘a party’s prior conduct with respect to the subject matter of litigation may aid an assessment of its conduct as a litigant’). 238. See 8.27–8.28. 239. See, for example, Ventouris Enterprises Pty Ltd v Dib Group Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 1479; BC201010031 (where although the defendants’ conduct contravened the statutory proscription on misleading or deceptive conduct, this was not conduct as a litigant, and so was irrelevant to the question of indemnity costs: at [15]–[19] per Slattery J). 240. References to punishment in the context of special costs orders should not be taken at face value: see 16.23. 241. (2007) 158 LGERA 1; [2007] NSWLEC 681; BC200709330 at [31]. 242. See 16.72–16.74. 243. See 16.68–16.69. 244. Porter v Australian Prudential Regulations Authority [2009] FCA 1148; BC200909253 at [12] per Perram J. 245. [2008] VSCA 152; BC200807533 at [20]. 246. Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128 at 141; BC9602187 per Einfeld J. 247. See 17.73–17.92. 248. See 15.71–15.75. 249. As to security for costs and impecunious plaintiffs see 29.13–29.30. 250. Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1341 at [58]–[59] per Heerey J; Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1996) 66 FCR 128 at 142; BC9602187 per Einfeld J; Harris v Bennett (No 2) [2002] VSC 163; BC200202244 at [18]–[19] per McDonald J (regarding costs out of a fund); Lo Presti v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (No 2) [2008] WASC 12 (S); BC200801648 at [30] per Beech J (in the context of Calderbank offers). Cf Edith Cowan University Student Guild v Edith Cowan University [2004] WASC 83; BC200402605 at [25] per McKechnie J (who, though

of the view that the case justified an indemnity costs order because of the hopelessness of the plaintiff’s application, chose not to make such an order by the fact that the plaintiff was a student guild, remarked that ‘enough money has already been wasted on this action to date and I am reluctant to burden the Guild with further costs’). 251. Kenneally v Pouras (2007) 250 LSJS 248; [2007] SASC 303; BC200706599 at [39] per White J. 252. Pacific Publications Pty Ltd v Next Publishing Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 971; BC200505045 at [19] per Tamberlin J (but on the facts, involving a dispute between two substantial publishers, there was no basis for any suggestion of exploitation of superior economic power). 253. Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 8) [2006] FCA 1537; BC200609555 at [20] per Kenny J. See also Tey v Optima Financial Group Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 192; BC201207715 at [16] per the court. 254. Roads Corporation v Love [2010] VSC 581; BC201009593 at [49] per Vickery J. 255. [2010] SADC 82 at [10]. 256. Fardi v Loveday (No 2) [2010] SADC 82 at [12]. As to circumstances where a party’s prospects of success can impact upon the making of a special costs order see 16.51–16.58. 257. As to the relevance of notification of an intention to apply for a special costs order see 16.56. 258. Fardi v Loveday (No 2) [2010] SADC 82 at [13]. See also Kowalski v Repatriation Commission (2009) 259 ALR 444; [2009] FCAFC 107; BC200907866 at [30]–[31] per the court (which declined to make an indemnity costs order against the appellant, even though he persisted in the appeal despite warnings from the opponent that it was futile, because he was self-represented and there were multiple complications relating to the appeal); Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Thompson (2009) 170 LGERA 41; [2009] VSCA 209; BC200908720. 259. Tey v Optima Financial Group Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 192; BC201207715 at [16] per the court. 260. Karam v Palmone Shoes Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 97; BC201203518 at [36] per Nettle and Osborn JJA (adding that ‘[t]here comes a point at which a self-represented litigant must be required to take responsibility for his choices’). 261. [2009] FCA 1505; BC200911392 at [12]. 262. As to the impact of unjustified allegations on the making of special costs orders see 16.59–16.61. 263. See, for example, Du Boulay v Worrell [2009] QCA 63; BC200901840 at [71] per Muir JA (remarking that the obvious lack of merit in the appellant’s arguments and the oppressive nature of his conduct justified an indemnity costs order; see also at [61]–[62] per Keane JA); Karam v Palmone Shoes Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 97; BC201203518 at [37] per Nettle and Osborn JJA (where the unrepresented appellant had the benefit of reasoned decisions of three judges at first instance, which were plainly right, and had the benefit of considerable assistance from the registry in the form of the letter, which in effect he chose to ignore if not repudiate; however, as the appellant was not given notice of any intention on the part of the respondent to apply for indemnity costs, their Honours ruled that ‘it would be unfair to make a special order as to costs without first affording the appellant an opportunity to be heard on the subject’: at [38]); Tey v Optima Financial Group Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 192; BC201207715 at [17] per the court. Cf Klement v Randles (No 2) [2010] VSCA 336; BC201009672 at [34] per Maxwell P and Emerton AJA (who were not satisfied that the unrepresented appellant’s appeal was commenced or continued in wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law, notwithstanding that it was fundamentally misconceived). 264. See, for example, Wentworth v Rogers [2003] NSWSC 944; BC200306248 at [48] per Howie J

(where the unsuccessful plaintiff was an experienced litigator); Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 8) [2006] FCA 1537; BC200609555 at [31] per Kenny J (indemnity costs ordered against unrepresented applicant in respect of the first four days of the hearing, regarding which his conduct ‘was unreasonable and led to a needless waste of hearing time’); Salfinger v Niugini Mining (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2007] FCA 1594; BC200708892 at [7] per Heerey J (where the expense, delay and difficulties caused by the applicant’s fraudulent and unreasonable behaviour overshadowed any limitations that arose from his status as unrepresented); Wildbeach Corporation Pty Ltd v Atkins [2008] WASC 29; BC200801621 at [80] per Johnson J (where ‘the respondents had access to legal advice and no evidence was placed before the court to suggest that the respondents were unable to obtain legal advice if they so chose’); Vink v Tuckwell (No 3) (2008) 67 ACSR 547; [2008] VSC 316; BC200807492 at [103]–[108] per Robson J (whose general remarks in this context were cited with approval by Redlich JA and Beach AJA in Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Thompson (2009) 170 LGERA 41; [2009] VSCA 209; BC200908720 at [17]–[18]); Shaw v Yarranova Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] VSC 125; BC201002209 (where Harper J ordered solicitor and client costs against an unrepresented litigant: at [20]). Cf Chau v Oreanda Pty Ltd [2001] FMCA 114; BC200107940 at [29] per Driver FM. 265. Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397 at 401 per Woodward J (FCA) (emphasis supplied). 266. See, for example, Sheahan v Northern Australia Land and Agency Co Ltd (SC(SA), Perry J, 4 November 1993, unreported) at [13] (ruling that the defence, including the prosecution of the counterclaim, was so unmeritorious and lacking in credibility that the defendants should be ordered to pay costs on a solicitor and client basis); Westpac Banking Corporation v Ollis [2007] NSWSC 1008; BC200707686 at [13]–[14] per Einstein J. 267. J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers, Western Australian Branch (No 2) (1993) 46 IR 301 at 303; BC9304556 per French J (FCA); Blue Seas Investments Pty Ltd v Mitchell (1999) 25 Fam LR 65 at 78; [1999] FamCA 745 (FC); Arundel Chiropractic Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 179 ALR 406 at 415; [2001] HCA 26; BC200102181 per Callinan J; Krix v Citrus Board of South Australia (2003) 87 SASR 229; [2003] SASC 387; BC200307693 (FC); De Alwis v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 77; BC200401354 at [7]–[9] per the court; Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd v Prudentia Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] VSC 399; BC201207016 at [59] per Croft J (citing this paragraph in the second edition of this work with approval). 268. (1999) 17 ACLC 1611 at 1622; [1999] QSC 180; BC9905893. 269. Hurstville Municipal Council v Connor (1991) 24 NSWLR 724 at 735 per Loveday J; Main-Road Property Group v Pelligra & Sons Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] VSC 174; BC200903520 at [37] per Bell J (affd A Team Diamond Headquarters Pty Ltd v Main Road Property Group Pty Ltd (2009) 25 VR 189; [2009] VSCA 208; BC200908735). See, for example, Monitronix Ltd v Michael (1992) 7 WAR 195 at 206–7 per Murray J (although the application in question lacked merit, it did not appear that in pursuing it the applicants were motivated by other than a genuine belief in the merit of their point of view, and so declined to make a special order for costs); Ugly Tribe Co Pty Ltd v Sikola [2001] VSC 189; BC200103454 at [18] per Harper J (who refused indemnity costs as the plaintiff had not appreciated ‘the hopelessness of its position’, adding that ‘[t]he courts are daily faced with examples of surprising ignorance’, this being as likely the reason for the proceedings as seeking to gain an illegitimate advantage from them). 270. Gallagher International Ltd v Tlais Enterprises Ltd [2008] EWHC 2046 (Comm) at [28] per Christopher Clarke J. 271. Ingot Capital Investment Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (No 7) (2008) 65 ACSR

324; [2008] NSWSC 199; BC200801581 at [37] per McDougall J. 272. Stuart Pty Ltd v Condor Commercial Insulation Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 379; BC200610813 at [14] per the court. 273. Short v Crawley (No 40) [2008] NSWSC 1302; BC200811010 at [6] per White J. 274. Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd (No 4) [2010] FCA 956; BC201006420 at [18] per Jessup J. See also Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 5) (2006) 69 IPR 273; [2006] FCA 850; BC200605165 at [13] per Heerey J; Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Thompson (2009) 170 LGERA 41; [2009] VSCA 209; BC200908720 at [25] per Redlich JA and Beach AJA (‘There is a considerable policy advantage in ensuring that a punitive costs order is not made against a party who has elected to discontinue an unmeritorious appeal’); Fick v Groves (No 2) [2010] QSC 182; BC201003608 at [6] per Applegarth J (noting that ‘[a]s a general rule, parties should be encouraged to abandon factual and legal contentions that they come to realise have poor prospects of success [and] should not be placed in peril of an award of indemnity costs against them on the basis that abandoning such contentions indicates that the claim was always known to be hopeless’); R v Central Criminal Court [2012] EWHC 3218 (Admin) at [6] per Silber J (‘The abandonment of issues ought not to be discouraged by the award of indemnity costs where a concession is made’). 275. [2009] NSWSC 1161; BC200909911 at [15] (though adding that had a warning letter been sent (see 16.56) the respondent would have had a more powerful case for an indemnity costs order: at [17]). 276. Citicorp Australia Ltd v Cirillo [2001] SASC 233; BC200104043 at [28] per Lander J. In Highfield Property Investments Pty Ltd v Commercial & Residential Developments (SA) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] SASC 191; BC201207997 at [59] Blue J opined that ‘[w]here a party abandons its case on the eve of trial, it may be inferred that, properly advised, the party realised and ought always to have realised that it had no realistic chance of success’. His Honour cited Lander J’s remarks in Cirillo in support of this proposition, but Lander J’s remarks were more guarded than Blue J’s statement suggests. 277. Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] FCA 401; BC200502073 at [2] per Finkelstein J; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (2007) ATPR ¶42-200; [2007] FCA 1844; BC200710346 at [26] per Gray J. 278. Quinlan v A & J Brady Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1533; BC200708455 at [12] per Weinberg J. 279. Pascoe v National Futrax Pty Ltd (1995) 33 IPR 43 at 48; BC9501562 per Einfeld J (FCA). 280. Re Kingsheath Club of the Clubs Ltd (in liq) [2003] FCA 1589; BC200308212 at [5] per Goldberg J. See also Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd v Darryl I Coombs Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 252; BC200501848 at [24] per Einstein J; City of Canning v Avon Capital Estates (Australia) Ltd [2009] WASCA 120 (S); BC20090948 at [5] per Wheeler JA, with whom Martin CJ and Buss JA concurred; Manderson M & F Consulting (a Firm) v Incitec Pivot Ltd (No 3) [2011] VSC 441; BC201107364 at [19] per Croft J; Civil Properties Pty Ltd v Miluc Pty Ltd (2011) 184 LGERA 150; [2011] WASCA 195; BC201107388 at [85]–[86] per Newnes JA, with whom Murphy JA and Hall J concurred on this point; Rehins Pty Ltd v Debin Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] WASC 168 (S) at [15] per Murray J. The reticence to be guided by hindsight appears evident from the remarks of Brereton J in Refina Pty Ltd v Binnie (Costs) [2009] NSWSC 1098; BC200909449 at [6], who preferred to phrase the relevant inquiry in terms of ‘whether the proceedings were obviously or manifestly hopeless at the outset, or at some earlier stage’ rather than whether the proceedings were doomed to fail, reasoning that ‘[a]ny proceedings that ultimately fail can be said

to be doomed to fail’. 281. Adopting the language of Mukhtar AsJ in Sanelli v Sanelli [2010] VSC 78; BC201001386 at [30]. 282. Quancorp Pty Ltd v MacDonald [1999] WASCA 101; BC9904546 at [7] per Wheeler J; City of Canning v Avon Capital Estates (Australia) Ltd [2009] WASCA 120 (S); BC20090948 at [4] per Wheeler JA, with whom Martin CJ and Buss JA concurred; Civil Properties Pty Ltd v Miluc Pty Ltd (2011) 184 LGERA 150; [2011] WASCA 195; BC201107388 at [84]–[86] per Newnes JA, with whom Murphy JA and Hall J concurred on this point (noting that ‘it is a considerable step to find that a case was so devoid of merit that it should lead to an order for indemnity costs’, and ‘it is a step that a court should be slow to take’, to be ‘reserved for the clearest of cases’, and ‘[t]he fact that a case is weak or marginal, or that it is unlikely to succeed, is not the same as a “hopeless” case which merits the sanction of an indemnity costs order’: at [86]). 283. City of Canning v Avon Capital Estates (Australia) Ltd [2009] WASCA 120 (S); BC20090948 at [5] per Wheeler JA, with whom Martin CJ and Buss JA concurred. 284. See, for example, Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney South West Area Health Service (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 1139; BC201007454 at [56]–[61] per Nicholas J. 285. See, for example, Re West Australian Metals Ltd ACN 001 666 600 [2008] WASC 279; BC200810709 at [12] per Le Miere J (‘I take into account that the application was brought on an urgent basis and the evidence was gathered on an urgent basis’). 286. See, for example, Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Thompson (2009) 170 LGERA 41; [2009] VSCA 209; BC200908720 (where the unrepresented appellant elected to discontinue shortly after retaining legal advice, Redlich JA and Beach AJA remarked that ‘[a] court may more readily accept that the litigant without the benefit of legal advice commenced proceedings with a genuine, although wrongheaded belief that he had a legitimate basis for the appeal’: at [26]). As to the curial attitude to special costs orders against self-represented litigants see 16.50. 287. This is given statutory effect in New South Wales by s 56(1) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, which states that the court must seek to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings when it exercises any power given to it by the Act or by the court rules of court. See also, to similar effect, Federal Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) s 37M(1); Fam LR 2004 Pt 1.2; ACT r 21; Qld r 5; Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 7(1); WA O 1 r 4B(1)(a)–(d). 288. Huntsman Chemical Company Australia Ltd v International Pools Australia Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 242 at 246; BC9504308. See also Liverpool City Council v Estephan [2009] NSWCA 161; BC200905834 at [100] per Giles JA (remarking that the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 56 ‘now adds emphasis to occasion to depart from costs on the ordinary basis where failure properly to conduct the proceedings had caused costs to be incurred unnecessarily’). 289. See, for example, J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers, Western Australian Branch (No 2) (1993) 46 IR 301 at 303; BC9304556 per French J (FCA) (where the case against the respondent was found to be ‘paper thin’); Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (No 2) (1997) 147 ALR 685 at 693–4; BC9703585 per Branson J (FCA) (affd Yates v Boland [2000] FCA 1895; BC200007991 at [65]–[85] (FC)) (where the applicant persisted with the proceeding without regard to the significant deficiencies in the evidence available to prove its case); Re SCA Properties Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 17 ACLC 1611; [1999] QSC 180; BC9905893 at [75] per B W Ambrose J (who held that the appeal ought never to have been instituted, the whole exercise being characterised as simply a waste of court time and the unnecessary incurrence of significant costs). 290. Huntsman Chemical Company Australia Ltd v International Pools Australia Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 242 at 249; BC9504308 per Kirby P.

291. Huntsman Chemical Company Australia Ltd v International Pools Australia Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 242 at 250; BC9504308 per Kirby P. See also Davids Holdings Pty Ltd v Coles Myer Ltd (1995) ATPR ¶41-383 at 40,303; BC9507223 per Drummond J (FCA); UFH Holdings Pty Ltd v Ord Minnett Corporate Finance Ltd (SC(Vic), Chernov J, 26 June 1998, unreported) BC9804134 (where the plaintiffs had, from the outset, been put on notice by both the defendants and the judge as to the gross deficiencies in their case, and proceeded nonetheless, justifying an indemnity costs order). 292. Lawyers who pursue a hopeless case may be held personally liable for costs, even indemnity costs: see 23.29–23.34, 23.53–23.57. 293. See Dal Pont, pp 127–30. 294. See, for example, Fardi v Loveday (No 2) [2010] SADC 82 (discussed at 16.50); Karam v Palmone Shoes Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 97; BC201203518 at [38] per Nettle and Osborn JJA. 295. Ainger v Coffs Harbour City Council (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 212; BC200706649 at [29] per McColl JA; Beach Retreat Pty Ltd v Mooloolaba Marina Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 356; [2009] QSC 84; BC200903944 at [101] per Martin J. 296. Mandarin International Developments Pty Ltd v Growthcorp (Australia) Pty Ltd (1998) 143 FLR 408 at 423–4; BC9801315 per Santow J (SC(NSW)); Ingot Capital Investment Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (No 7) (2008) 65 ACSR 324; [2008] NSWSC 199; BC200801581 at [78] per McDougall J. 297. See, for example, Somerville Retail Services Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority [2011] VSCA 188; BC201104607 at [5] per the court (although the failure to warn inclined their Honours to order that the costs be taxed on a solicitor and client basis rather than on an indemnity basis); Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd v Prudentia Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] VSC 399; BC201207016 at [81] per Croft J. 298. Peet Ltd v Richmond [2010] VSCA 71; BC201001807 at [34] per Nettle JA, with whom Neave JA concurred (as was so on the facts). 299. See 22.24–22.27. 300. Waiviata Pty Ltd v New Millenium Publications Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 481; BC200201897 at [6] per Sundberg J. 301. See, for example, Weingarten v Fletcher [2003] VSC 448; BC200306836; Tobin v Ezekiel [2006] NSWSC 694; BC200605243; Business Acquisitions Australia Pty Ltd v Renshall [2006] NSWSC 1399; BC200610481; Smits v Tabone [2007] QCA 337; BC200708680 at [53] per Cullinane J, with whom Muir JA and Lyons J concurred; Wu v Dardaneliotou [2008] NSWSC 1319; BC200810914 at [15] per Brereton J; McGrath v Cherry [2012] NSWSC 569; BC201203642; Ren v Shi [2012] VSC 271; BC201204427; Pearl Lingerie Australia Pty Ltd v TGY Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 451; BC201207466 (indemnity costs order made against the caveator’s lawyer). Cf occasions where an order was made on a party–party or standard basis: see, for example, Windsor v Buxton [2001] QSC 81; BC200101204 (standard basis); Bennett v Pieros Corporation Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 8 at [8] per E M Heenan J (where, as the caveat was lodged by a layman without immediate legal advice, and was a product of a mistake about the extent of entitlement of the caveator in an area of the law calling for formal knowledge and more adequate comprehension, ‘it does not seem to me to be a case where indemnity costs are justified’); Shellie v Davidson [2010] VSC 575; BC201009379 (costs ordered on a party and party basis because the foundation for the lodgement of the caveat, although weak, was not so unmeritorious as to justify an award on an indemnity basis: at [15]–[18] per Osborn J). It is open to a court to order costs on a party and party basis up to the time when the caveator should have known that the caveat had no foundation and

on an indemnity basis thereafter: see, for example, Campbell v Campbell [2012] QSC 302 at [49]– [54] per Ann Lyons J. 302. See, for example, Downie v Kenny & Kenny Pty Ltd (1986) NSW ConvR ¶55-270; BC8500545; Pacific Blue Australia Pty Ltd v Somalis [2008] NSWSC 75; BC200800526 at [9]–[13] per Palmer J; Martin v Carlisle [2008] NSWSC 1276; BC200810784; Marchesi v Vasiliou [2009] VSC 213; BC200904854; Luther v Milner [2009] VSC 595; BC200911270; Love v Kempton [2010] VSC 254; BC201003957 at [31] per J Forrest J (noting that if, as occurred on the facts, the caveat is motivated solely by an opportunistic and unprincipled desire to obtain a commercial advantage, ‘a court is entitled to take into account the added stressors of the litigation as a factor in determining whether to award indemnity costs’). 303. Weingarten v Fletcher [2003] VSC 448; BC200306836 at [5] per Habersberger J; Love v Kempton [2010] VSC 254; BC201003957 at [30] per J Forrest J. 304. Gersten v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 260; BC200100995 at [19]. See also 16.47. 305. Hawke v Limbo (SC(NT), Kearney J, 9 August 1990, unreported) BC9003880 (indemnity costs ordered against a person who issued a summons to a witness for an ulterior purpose); Lamesa Holdings BV v Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 74 FCR 416 at 419; BC9701971 per Einfeld J; Cultus Petroleum NL v OMV Australia Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 435; BC9902283 at [15] per Santow J (adding that abandonment of unwinnable appeals or points, coupled with other circumstances, may point to a weak case or an ulterior purpose, or both: at [16]; but see 16.53). 306. [1984] 3 NSWLR 486 at 500. 307. Maule v Liporoni (No 2) (2002) 122 LGERA 216; [2002] NSWLEC 140; BC200204783 at [39] per Lloyd J; NIML Ltd v MAN Financial Australia Ltd (No 2) [2004] VSC 510; BC200408704 at [6] per Harper J. 308. See, for example, Parisi v Nigro [2006] NSWCA 121; BC200603286 (where allegations of fraud were found never to have had a proper basis and caused unnecessary costs to be incurred); Rana v University of South Australia (No 2) [2007] FCA 941; BC200704910 (where the plaintiff made allegations critical to his case that he must have known were untrue); Picone v Velos [2007] FCA 1183; BC200706449 at [95] per Sundberg J (where the applicant made multiple unsubstantiated allegations of perjury against various of the respondents’ witnesses, which were ‘likely to cause distress and possibly reputation damage to those against whom they are made’; his Honour would have awarded indemnity costs against the applicant except for the fact that, as the applicant remained a bankrupt and his estate remained vested in his trustee in bankruptcy, an indemnity costs order would prejudice the interests of other his creditors); Cressy v Johnson (No 2) [2009] VSC 42; BC200900623 (where the defendant, an experienced practising solicitor appearing in person, persistently made grave and unsubstantiated allegations against other parties); Resource Equities Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v Garrett [2010] NSWSC 44; BC201000968 at [7] per McDougall J (who held that the making of a knowingly false allegation as the central plank of a claim for contribution justified an order for indemnity costs ‘because considerable time was taken up in examining the circumstances relating to the claim for contribution, an essential element of which was … fabricated’). 309. See 23.22. 310. Walton v McBride (1995) 36 NSWLR 440 at 451; BC9504455 per Kirby P (CA). 311. [1983] 2 NSWLR 354 at 358. 312. Degmam Pty Ltd (in liq) v Wright (No 2) [1983] 2 NSWLR 354 at 358.

313. (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 at 542 per Kirby P, with whom Hope and Samuels JJA concurred. See also Hurstville Municipal Council v Connor (1991) 24 NSWLR 724 at 735 per Loveday J (who declined to order indemnity costs merely because the council’s case was found to be without merit and the issuing of a third party notice had prolonged the proceedings, as there was nothing reprehensible in the conduct of the proceedings). 314. Hurstville Municipal Council v Connor (1991) 24 NSWLR 724 at 735 per Loveday J; Walton v McBride (1995) 36 NSWLR 440 at 451; BC9504455 per Kirby P. 315. Cleary Bros (Parramatta) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2009] ACTSC 72; BC200905682 at [38] per Penfold J (though adding that it is not good enough for a party to serve the wrong draft statement of claim in preparation for a hearing date, and then to fail to check that the correct draft had been served until discrepancies between the draft referred to by counsel and the draft on the courts file is raised during the hearing; her Honour held that this carelessness, albeit already dealt with in other costs orders, was sufficiently deserving of criticism to justify an award of indemnity costs for a hearing that was effectively vacated as a result); Rehins Pty Ltd v Debin Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] WASC 168 (S) at [19]–[21] per Murray J. 316. Staley v Pivot Group Pty Ltd (No 6) [2010] WASC 228 (S); BC201009412 at [18] per Kenneth Martin J. 317. (SC(NSW), Rogers J, 14 May 1987, unreported) BC8701371 at 2. See also Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1102; BC200307243 at [26] per McDougall J (late amendment of summons coupled with the absence of any acceptable reason for the delay, justified an indemnity costs order); Liberty Financial Pty Ltd v Scott (No 4) [2005] VSC 472; BC200510448 at [10]–[12] per Harper J (where the plaintiffs’ multiple attempts to plead their case clearly had failed, indemnity costs were ordered because ‘[t]he defendants should not be out of pocket because the plaintiffs have put forward a statement of claim which, had the defendants been required to draw a defence to it, would have presented them with an exercise which the Court of Appeal described as ‘confusing, almost bewildering’: at [10]); Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning & Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (Ruling No 1) [2010] VSC 495; BC201008371 at [17] per Williams J (where the plaintiff’s conduct warranted a costs order ‘showing the court’s disapproval of the fact that the trial was not ready to proceed because a significant alteration to the pleading of the claim was required and an adjournment was then necessary to enable the parties to prepare for and meet that altered claim’); Highfield Property Investments Pty Ltd v Commercial & Residential Developments (SA) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] SASC 191; BC201207997 at [66] per Blue J (costs of amendments to pleadings by the defendants — which altered their case from an exclusively misrepresentation-based case to an exclusively contract-based case, beginning during the week before trial and culminating on the third day of trial, causing substantial disruptions to the plaintiff’s preparation and conduct of the trial — ordered on an indemnity basis). 318. Paroz v Paroz [2010] QSC 157; BC201003065 at [13] per Peter Lyons J. See, for example, Neesham v 6PR Southern Cross Radio Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] WASC 72 (S); BC200909487 (where Le Miere J noted that ‘[t]he fact that a party puts forward successive versions of a statement of claim in the course of conferral does not of itself give rise to the conclusion that that party has acted improperly or unreasonably or otherwise should be the subject of an indemnity costs order’ (at [63]), and on the facts was not persuaded that the plaintiff’s conduct in reformulating his case justified an order for indemnity costs (at [65])). 319. Paroz v Paroz [2010] QSC 157; BC201003065 at [19] per Peter Lyons J. 320. (1996) 72 FCR 151 at 153–4 per Black CJ, at 159 per Cooper and Merkel JJ; BC9606513 (FC). See also Bollag v Attorney-General (Cth) (1997) 149 ALR 355 at 375–6; BC9705736 per Merkel

J (FCA). 321. [2004] NSWSC 1080; BC200407642 at [21]–[24]. 322. See, for example, Burrawong Investments Pty Ltd v Lindsay [2002] QCA 313; BC200205351 (indemnity costs ordered where it appeared, lacking any other explanation, that the appeal was filed merely for the purposes of causing delay); Cressy v Johnson (No 2) [2009] VSC 42; BC200900623 (where Kaye J characterised the defendant’s conduct in repeatedly wasting the court’s and the parties’ time with speeches and conduct entirely irrelevant to the case as ‘a calculated strategy to try to protract the hearing of this case and indeed … to derail it’: at [36]). 323. See, for example, Cristovao v John Horton & Associates [2012] WASCA 12 (S); BC201205241 at [12]–[13] per Newnes and Murphy JJA (by reference to the concept of proportionality in litigation). 324. Preston v Preston [1982] 1 All ER 41 at 58–9 per Brandon LJ; Unioil International Pty Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (No 2) (1997) 18 WAR 190 at 194; BC9704984 per Ipp J. 325. Australian Federation of Consumers Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd (1991) 100 ALR 568 at 570; BC9103110 per Morling J (FCA); Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd v Union Insurance Co Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 358 at 370 per Giles J. 326. Berkeley Administration Inc v McClelland [1990] FSR 565 at 569–70 per Wright J. 327. Unioil International Pty Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (No 2) (1997) 18 WAR 190 at 193; BC9704984 per Ipp J. 328. (1994) 35 NSWLR 277 at 282. 329. C A Henschke & Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (1999) 48 IPR 621; [1999] FCA 1813; BC9908481 at [8] per Finn J (affd C A Henschke & Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (2000) 52 IPR 42; [2000] FCA 1539; BC200006518 at [75]–[77] (FC)). 330. FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Burns (1997) 9 ANZ Ins Cas ¶61-384 at 77,220; BC9603600 per Mahoney P (CA(NSW)). See, for example, National Australia Bank v Petit-Breuilh (No 2) [1999] VSC 395; BC9906930 at [12]–[15] per Balmford J (indemnity costs awarded where there was a failure, without explanation, to discover documents until after the commencement of the trial, the timely discovery of which would have considerably shortened, and very possibly avoided, the trial); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v West (2008) 100 SASR 496; [2008] SASC 111; BC200803351 at [212]–[219] per Gray J (indemnity costs ordered arising out of incomplete discovery and production). 331. See, for example, Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 5) (2006) 69 IPR 273; [2006] FCA 850; BC200605165 at [38] per Heerey J; Cressy v Johnson (No 2) [2009] VSC 42; BC200900623 at [36] per Kaye J. 332. ACT r 1752(2)(c); Qld r 703(2)(c) (formerly r 704(2)(c)). 333. See Federal Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) s 37N(4); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 56(5) (see Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v Gordian Runoff Ltd [2006] NSWSC 583; BC200604424 at [19] per Einstein J); Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 29. 334. Fam LR 2004 r 1.07; ACT r 21; Qld r 5; WA O 1 r 4B. 335. Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 5) (2006) 69 IPR 273; [2006] FCA 850; BC200605165 at [38] per Heerey J. 336. See, for example, Masha Nominees Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] VSC 56; BC200600782 at [18]–[20] per Hargrave J (where the defendant’s non-compliance with on-going

discovery obligations was found to be not sufficiently delinquent or unmeritorious to justify an indemnity costs order, especially as it did not ultimately cause any substantial disruption to the trial or prejudice to the plaintiffs); Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 5) (2006) 69 IPR 273; [2006] FCA 850; BC200605165 at [26] per Heerey J (the applicant’s unexplained failure to comply with a practice note held not to warrant indemnity costs); Gray v Ferguson [2008] NSWSC 1066; BC200808869 at [25] per Macready AsJ. 337. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (2007) ATPR ¶42200; [2007] FCA 1844; BC200710346 at [25] per Gray J (‘To use lapses in compliance with the policy as a ground for awarding indemnity costs against Commonwealth agencies might have the result that the Commonwealth abandoned the policy. This would be detrimental to the public good’). 338. Berkeley Administration Inc v McClelland [1990] FSR 565 at 568–9 per Wright J; Gerula v Flores (1995) 126 DLR (4th) 506 at 529 per Weiler JA (CA(Ont)); Ivory v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2001] QSC 102; BC200102087 at [6]–[11] per Douglas J; Ugly Tribe Co Pty Ltd v Sikola [2001] VSC 189; BC200103454 at [12] per Harper J (remarking that where a litigant acts dishonestly in the litigation, or where the rights and privileges of a litigant are flouted or abused, ‘the rationale for refusing to order that the losing party indemnify an opposite party against that party’s costs is less compelling’). 339. (1996) 37 IPR 22; BC9606078 (SC(NSW)). 340. Ecrosteel Pty Ltd v Perfor Printing Pty Ltd (1996) 37 IPR 22 at 39; BC9606078 (SC(NSW)). 341. See, for example, Walker v Citygroup Global Markets Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1866; BC200510968 at [31]–[32] per Kenny J (where there had been a finding that a witness was unreliable, which included a finding that he had fabricated some of his evidence to support the respondents’ case, her Honour concluded that, in the context of the entire proceeding, the conduct of that witness did not take the case so far outside the ordinary range of cases as to justify an award of indemnity costs). 342. [2007] FCA 1823; BC200710263 at [13]–[15]. 343. Barrett Property Group Ltd v Metricon Homes Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 1823; BC200710263 at [16]. See also Bir v Sharma, The Times, Vinelott J, 17 December 1988 (indemnity costs order for application to discharge a Mareva injunction obtained on the basis of fabricated evidence); Sande v Medsara Pty Ltd (No 2) [2004] NSWSC 262; BC200401614 at [8] per Burchett AJ (indemnity costs ordered because, from the beginning, the defence was necessarily based on the assertion of what was known to be false); Stemson v AMP General Insurance (NZ) Ltd [2007] 1 NZLR 289; [2006] UKPC 30 at [28] per Lord Hope (indemnity costs awarded against the unsuccessful appellant whose claim ‘must be taken to have been a fraudulent one from the outset’, which ‘wrongfully put the respondent to the expense of defending it’, and subjected the respondent to a further appeal to the Privy Council as an abuse of process). 344. [1983] Ch 59 at 76. 345. McIntyre v Perkes (1988) 15 NSWLR 417 at 434–5; BC8801160 per Rogers AJA; Pico Holdings Inc v Voss [2002] VSC 319; BC200204469 at [87]–[90] per Gillard J; Universal City Studios LLLP v Hoey (2007) 73 IPR 45; [2007] FCA 806; BC200704120 at [102] per Buchanan J; Bovis Lend Lease Pty Ltd v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2009] FCA 650; BC200905309 at [45] per Tracey J. 346. NCR Australia Pty Ltd v Credit Connection Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1118; BC200509669 at [102] per Campbell J; Scott v Evia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSC 110; BC200702763 at [37] per DoddsStreeton J.

347. See, for example, Atkinson v Hastings Deering (Qld) Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 103; Adlam v Noack [1999] FCA 1606; BC9907694 at [30] per Mansfield J; National Australia Bank Ltd v Juric (No 2) [2001] VSC 398; BC200106690 at [69]–[71] per Gillard J; TS & B Retail Systems Pty Ltd v 3fold Resources Pty Ltd (No 2) [2004] FCA 1101; BC200405411 at [13] per Finkelstein J (reduced by 30 per cent to reflect the fact that the applicant was only partly successful); Rip Curl International Pty Ltd v Phone Lab Pty Ltd (2004) 63 IPR 496; [2004] FCA 1215; BC200406076; Ark Hire Pty Ltd v Barwick Event Hire Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 488; BC200703602; Scott v Evia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSC 110; BC200702763; Wildbeach Corporation Pty Ltd v Atkins [2008] WASC 29; BC200801621; Bydand Holdings Pty Ltd v Pineland Property Holdings Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 959; BC200908599; Circuit Finance Australia Ltd (recs & mgrs apptd) (in liq) v Sobbi [2010] NSWSC 912; BC201005901; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Gashi (No 3) [2011] VSC 448; BC201107118 at [20]–[21] per Dixon J; Duic v Duic [2012] NSWSC 542; BC201203396; Ronowska v Kus (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 817; BC201205605. 348. McKinnon v Adams (No 2) [2003] VSC 502; BC200308459 at [55] per Bongiorno J; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v World Netsafe Pty Ltd (2003) 133 FCR 279; [2003] FCA 1501; BC200307764 at [40] per Spender J; Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd (2003) 196 ALR 350; [2003] FCAFC 13; BC200300380 at [6] per Moore J; Rip Curl International Pty Ltd v Phone Lab Pty Ltd (2004) 63 IPR 496; [2004] FCA 1215; BC200406076 at [53] per Hely J; Bydand Holdings Pty Ltd v Pineland Property Holdings Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 959; BC200908599 at [17] per Einstein J. 349. Plating Co v Farquharson (1881) 17 Ch D 49 at 57 per Jessel MR; Morgan v Carmarthen Corporation [1957] Ch 455 at 471 per Lord Evershed MR, at 473 per Hodson LJ, at 474 per Romer LJ; McIntyre v Perkes (1988) 15 NSWLR 417 at 426–7 per Samuels JA, at 434–6 per Rogers AJA; BC8801160. The court rules in several jurisdictions, moreover, state that the costs of a proceeding for punishment for contempt are in the court’s discretion whether or not a specific punishment is imposed: HCR 2004 r 11.05; ACT r 2507; NT r 75.14; Qld r 932; Vic r 75.14. Cf SA r 306(3) (‘The Court may order a person who has been found guilty of a contempt to pay the costs of the proceedings for contempt’). As to the relationship between ‘rules’ and the costs discretion see 6.14–6.18. 350. McIntyre v Perkes (1988) 15 NSWLR 417 at 427; BC8801160 per Samuels JA. See, for example, Michigan (Great Britain) Ltd v Mathew [1966] RPC 47 at 53 per Lloyd-Jacob J; GCT (Management) Ltd v Laurie Marsh Group Ltd [1973] RPC 432 at 438 per Whitford J. 351. Bell v Bell [2007] FCA 137; BC200700683 at [50] per Gray J. See, for example, Universal City Studios LLLP v Hoey (2007) 73 IPR 45; [2007] FCA 806; BC200704120 at [103] per Buchanan J; Metcash Trading Ltd v Bunn (No 6) [2009] FCA 266; BC200901920 at [16]–[18] per Finn J. Cf Evenco Pty Ltd v Australian Building Construction Employees & Builders Labourers Federation (Qld Branch) [2001] 2 Qd R 118; [2000] QCA 108; BC200001497 (where, although the penalties imposed by the trial judge for contempt, arising out of a breach of an undertaking to the court, were heavy, the court did not consider that the indemnity costs order imposed by the trial judge was unreasonable or clearly unjust). 352. [2007] VSC 52; BC200701305 at [34]. 353. Chan v Chen (No 3) [2007] VSC 52; BC200701305 at [34]. 354. Wildbeach Corporation Pty Ltd v Atkins [2008] WASC 29; BC200801621 at [49] per Johnson J. 355. [2003] VSC 201; BC200303342 at [93]. 356. Advan Investments Pty Ltd v Dean Gleeson Motor Sales Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 201; BC200303342 at [118].

357. Project Development Co Ltd SA v KMK Securities Ltd [1982] 1 WLR 1470 at 1472 per Parker J (‘a plaintiff who resorts to the draconian remedy of a Mareva injunction should expect to pay such costs’); Norilya Minerals Pty Ltd v Ireland (1994) 12 WAR 485 at 488 per Kennedy J; Westpac Banking Corp v Hilliard [2001] VSC 198; BC200103806 at [12]–[17] per McDonald J; Sebastian v Strongwall International Ltd (Deregistered) (No 2) [2011] FCA 1105; BC201107456. 358. Lightforce Australia Pty Ltd v Culley [2012] SADC 88; BC201240302 (Anton Piller order set aside for nondisclosure, and costs ordered on indemnity basis, to be paid forthwith). 359. Sebastian v Strongwall International Ltd (Deregistered) (No 2) [2011] FCA 1105; BC201107456 at [5] per McKerracher J (who opined that ‘it appears to me that it may be too sweeping a generalisation to assert that whenever an innocent third party succeeds in setting aside a freezing order it should have all its costs on an indemnity basis rather than a party and party basis’). See, for example, Redwin Industries Pty Ltd v Feetsafe Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 448; BC200206209 at [5] per Habersberger J (party and party order made chiefly because the delay in having the Mareva order discharged had caused the matter to be brought to the Supreme Court and not the Magistrates’ Court, thus raising both complexity and costs); Sigma Chemicals (1986) Pty Ltd v Brown [2002] WASC 12; BC200200145 (indemnity costs application refused in an Anton Piller case). 360. See Ch 13. 361. As to what constitutes a ‘public interest’ case see 9.2–9.34. As to what constitutes a ‘test case’ see 9.35–9.38. 362. (1991) 100 ALR 568; BC9103110 (FCA). 363. Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd (1991) 100 ALR 568 at 571–2; BC9103110 (FCA) (paragraph break omitted). 364. See 16.65–16.66. 365. See, for example, MyEnvironment Inc v VicForests [2012] VSC 111; BC201201609 at [22]–[25] per Osborn JA. 366. Australian Federation of Consumers Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd (1991) 100 ALR 568 at 572; BC9103110 (FCA). 367. (1993) 31 NSWLR 469 at 495; BC9303940. See also Re Smith (No 2) (1991) 6 WAR 299 (FC). 368. (1994) 54 FCR 383. 369. Australian Electoral Commission v Towney (No 2) (1994) 54 FCR 383 at 391. 370. Australian Electoral Commission v Towney (No 2) (1994) 54 FCR 383 at 392. See also Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1 at 34 per Kirby P (CA). 371. Hayes v Gunbola Pty Ltd (1986) 4 BPR 9247 at 9255; BC8600926 per Young J (SC(NSW)); Sparta Nominees Pty Ltd v Orchard Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 54 (S); BC200207487 at [6]– [13] per Murray J. 372. Langley v Foster (1909) 10 SR (NSW) 54 at 62 per per A H Simpson CJ in Eq; Wynsix Hotels (Oxford St) Pty Ltd v Toomey [2004] NSWSC 236; BC200401426 at [89] per Young CJ in Eq. 373. Constantine v Sanders [2007] NSWSC 250; BC200701915 at [47] per Studdert J. 374. Billson v Residential Apartments Ltd [1992] 1 AC 494 at 541 per Lord Templeman. 375. Constantine v Sanders [2007] NSWSC 250; BC200701915 at [46] per Studdert J (and on the facts awarded costs on a party and party basis: at [43]).

376.

See, for example, IBA Ltd v Stanley’s Nightclub Ltd [2007] NZCA 60; Bishop v Financial Trust Ltd [2008] NZCA 170. See further 15.54.

377. See 16.51–16.69. 378. As to the doctrine of issue estoppel see J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence, 9th Aust ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2013, pp 236–40. 379. [1999] 3 VR 783; BC9704275. 380. Clancy v Santoro [1999] 3 VR 783 at 799; BC9704275.

[page 565]

CHAPTER 17

Allowances on Costs Quantification Between Party and Party Pre-proceedings Costs

17.3

Costs of Settlement Negotiations

17.8

Costs of Solicitors’ Attendances and Conferences Multiple solicitors attending Fees on conference in addition to fee for document Conversational attendances Solicitor attending counsel in court Recording of attendance

17.11 17.12 17.13 17.14 17.16 17.17

Costs of Lawyers Uncertified in the Jurisdiction

17.18

Costs of Salaried Lawyers

17.21

Copying Costs Copies of documents Scale fees per copy

17.25 17.25 17.27

Costs of Witnesses Expenses of ordinary witnesses Expert witnesses Experts from outside the locals Number of experts

17.28 17.29 17.33 17.34 17.35

Qualifying fees Party as witness

17.37 17.38

Travelling Expenses Witnesses Lawyers

17.40 17.40 17.43

Counsel’s Fees Scope of fee on brief Preparation fees Retaining fee Premature delivery of briefs Cancellation fees

17.47 17.47 17.48 17.52 17.53 17.54 [page 566]

Uplift fees 17.55 Where practitioner acts in capacities of both barrister and solicitor 17.56 Refresher fees 17.59 Other allowances 17.61 Fees to counsel for settling pleadings, affidavits etc and advising thereon 17.61 Conference with counsel 17.64 View by counsel 17.65 Quantum of counsel’s fees 17.67 Approach to quantifying fee allowable 17.67 Court rules 17.70 Discretion and the ‘two-thirds rule’ 17.71 Multiple counsel 17.73

Court rules Discretion Timing for appropriate consideration Relevance of type of case Importance of case General practice of litigants Level of court Duration of case Relevance of conflict of evidence Three (or more) counsel Interstate (or out of town) counsel

17.74 17.75 17.78 17.79 17.82 17.84 17.86 17.89 17.90 17.92 17.93

17.1 The object of this chapter is to convey a flavour of the items that may be allowed in quantifying costs as between party and party. The items discussed do not purport to be exhaustive.1 The focus is on items that are common or contentious in party and party bills, which include pre-proceedings costs,2 costs of settlement negotiations,3 costs of solicitors’ attendances,4 costs of lawyers uncertified in the jurisdiction,5 costs of salaried lawyers,6 copying expenses,7 expenses of witnesses,8 travelling expenses9 and counsel’s fees.10 [page 567] As discussed in Chapter 15, costs quantification for the purposes of recovery under the indemnity rule is in most jurisdictions effected via a process of taxation, whereas in the Family Court, Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales and Queensland it is now termed ‘costs assessment’, and in South Australia ‘adjudication’.11 This explains why the chapter title uses the terminology ‘quantification’, as a collective term for these processes. However, in the body of the chapter, to avoid unwieldy expression ‘taxation’ is the term used when speaking generally of the process of quantification.

17.2 This chapter refers to ‘necessary or proper’ costs under the ‘party and party’ moniker because the rules have traditionally used either this or a related phrase in defining the usual (or default) basis of costs quantification.12 The position is different in New South Wales, where costs assessors are charged with determining whether or not it is reasonable to carry out the item of work to which the costs relate, whether or not the work is carried out in a reasonable manner, and what is a fair and reasonable amount of costs for that item.13 The current Federal Court Rules, in allowing ‘the costs that have been fairly and reasonably incurred’ may likewise envisage a broader approach to quantification of costs.14 The same may be said of the Northern Territory and (as from 1 April 2013)15 Victorian rules, which direct taxing officers (in Victoria, the Costs Court) to allow a reasonable amount in respect of all costs reasonably incurred.16 In the Federal Court, New South Wales and the Northern Territory, therefore, a costs assessor or taxing officer may allow recovery for a broader range of items than in jurisdictions hamstrung by the ‘necessary or proper’ criterion, and potentially allow recovery of a higher amount per item. Accordingly, the parameters set in this chapter cannot be viewed categorically in their application in the Federal Court, New South Wales and the Northern Territory. A similar observation can be made regarding the Western Australian position, in view of its alignment of the charges allowable as between party and party with those allowable as between solicitor and client.17 What is discussed within this chapter must also yield to the basis of costs quantification ordered by the court. As the ‘solicitor and client’ basis broadens (at least) the scope of items allowable,18 and the ‘indemnity basis’ appears to increase both the items and the quantum allowable per item,19 case law premised on a ‘necessary or proper’ test mentioned in this chapter need not confine recovery under a more generous basis of quantification.

Pre-proceedings Costs 17.3 The costs of a party allowable as between party and party are not necessarily limited to costs incurred once the writ is issued. The test remains, on a ‘party and party’ basis, whether the costs are necessary or proper for the attainment of justice. Circumstances may arise where costs

[page 568] meeting this description are incurred prior to the proceedings being formally instituted.20 Costs ordered on a ‘solicitor and client’ or ‘indemnity’ basis may, depending on the circumstances, furnish further grounds for allowing such costs. Even on these bases, though, costs incurred after the litigation are not allowable.21 An early case example is Bright’s Trustee v Sellar,22 where the defendant, in response to a threat of a suit for being privy to a fraud disclosed in a previous action to which he was not a party, obtained a transcript of the speeches, evidence and judgment in that earlier action before the issue of any writ in the proposed action. That action was later dismissed for want of prosecution. Swinfen Eady J held that the defendant was entitled to the costs of so much of the transcript of the evidence and judgment as related to the issue of that action.23 In so ruling his Lordship adopted the taxing master’s view that certain expenses incurred before the action was brought should be allowed, for they had proven useful in the action, having been incurred at a time when it was right and proper that they be made in order to safeguard the position of the intending litigant. The following year the Supreme Court of Victoria, in Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd v Clarke,24 held that costs incurred in anticipation of threatened litigation, where before the issue of the originating summons, but after notice from the plaintiff of its intention to issue the same, the defendant incurred certain costs, should be allowed. Two years earlier the same court allowed pre-proceedings costs in a case where it would have been practically impossible to get the evidence necessary for the defence unless the defendant had set about it at the earliest opportunity, albeit in what was conceded to be ‘quite a special case’.25 17.4 Drawing the line between what is, and what is not, allowable in respect of pre-proceedings costs is not capable of precise determination simply by statements of principle; the matter remains based in the discretion of the taxing officer on the particular facts of each case.26 To this end, Megarry VC in Re Gibson’s Settlement Trusts27 noted the difficulty in extracting from the authorities ‘the principles which are to be applied in the case of costs incurred before action brought’. His Lordship did, however, make useful remarks

directed to honing the dividing line which, though lengthy, deserve full quotation:28 [page 569] Obviously the test cannot be simply whether the materials in question proved in fact to be of use in the action, for otherwise when a case is settled before trial29 … it would often not be possible to say with any certainty which materials had been or would have been of use in the action. Nor would it be right to penalise the successful litigant for obtaining materials which appeared likely to be of use in the action but which, in the event, were never used because the other party did not contest the point … Neither the fact that at the time when the costs were incurred no writ or originating summons had been issued, nor the fact that the immediate object in incurring the costs was to ascertain the prospective litigant’s chances of success, will per se suffice to exclude the costs from being regarded as part of the costs of the litigation that ensues. Of course, if there is no litigation there are no costs of litigation. But if the dispute ripens into litigation, the question then arises how far the ambit of the costs is affected by the shape that the litigation takes. It is obvious that the matters disputed before a writ or originating summons is issued, and the matters raised by the writ or originating summons, and by any pleadings and affidavits, may differ considerably from each other. A wide-ranging series of disputed matters may be followed by a writ or originating summons which raises only a few of the issues; or a narrow dispute may be followed by proceedings which seek to resolve wider issues as well … If the proceedings are framed narrowly, then I cannot see how antecedent disputes which bear no real relation to the subject of the litigation could be regarded as being part of the costs of the proceedings. On the other hand, if these disputes are in some degree relevant to the proceedings as ultimately constituted, and the other party’s attitude made it reasonable to apprehend that the litigation would include them, then I cannot see why the taxing master should not be able to include these costs among those which he considers to have been ‘reasonably incurred’. The converse case, that of a narrow area of dispute followed by widely-framed proceedings, seems to me to be somewhat different. If a prospective litigant goes into a number of matters outside the immediate area of dispute, but he then finds that these matters fall within the widelyframed scope of his adversary’s proceedings, it seems to be that those proceedings will almost of necessity make the costs of these matters part of the costs of the proceedings, subject always, of course, to the taxing master considering the costs to have been reasonably incurred. Even though the acts, when done, could not fairly be considered to be related in any real way to what was then in dispute, they will have subsequently been made part of the litigation; and if the costs of what was then done were costs reasonably incurred in relation to what subsequently became defined as the matters in dispute, it seems to me that the taxing master may properly allow them.

In Pêcheries Ostendaises (Soc Anon) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co30 Atkin LJ used the example of an accident happening owing to a railway bridge breaking down, which bridge had to be replaced forthwith. According to his Lordship, the taxing master could hold that the costs of an immediate

inspection by skilled witnesses of the state of the bridge, though preceding the issue of the writ, were necessary for the attainment of justice, for the actual facts to be ascertained from such an inspection could not be ascertained at a later date.31 Atkin LJ rejected the contention that costs should never be allowed until the issues have been defined — until the defendants had delivered their defence or indicated what their defence would be — because otherwise ‘a plaintiff would never be entitled to recover any costs (save the actual costs of proceedings) incurred by him before the defendant had delivered his defence, because until then the issues were not defined’.32 17.5 This reasoning was applied in the leading English case, Frankenburg v Famous Lasky Film Service Ltd.33 The plaintiff ascertained that the defendants proposed to demolish their existing premises and erect a theatre in their place. Fearing that this would interfere with the ancient lights on his premises, the plaintiff consulted his solicitor and had plans and elevations prepared of the defendants’ existing premises. When negotiations failed, the plaintiff issued a writ for an injunction to restrain the defendants interfering with his ancient lights. The action was compromised before trial on terms that an inquiry should be made into damages and that [page 570] the defendants should pay the plaintiff his costs as between solicitor and client. The District Registrar’s decision to allow the pre-writ costs on taxation was upheld by the Court of Appeal. Lord Hanworth MR noted the importance of marking a ‘wide divergence’ between expenses incurred with a view to proof at the trial and those incurred with a view to advising a plaintiff whether or not he or she should incur the expenses of litigation.34 His Lordship adhered to his own statement in Pêcheries that:35 … there is power in the Master to allow costs incurred before action brought, and that if the costs are in respect of materials ultimately proving of use and service in the action, the Master has a discretion to allow those costs, which he probably will exercise in favour of the party incurring them, because they have been made use of during the course of the action.

His Lordship, responding to an argument that these words were wider than the ‘necessary or proper for the attainment of justice’ criterion — and thus

impermissibly wide — said that in speaking of ‘ultimately proving of use and service in the action’ he meant ‘proper for the attainment of justice in that case’, as ‘[t]hey would not be of value or service in the action unless they were relevant to some of the issues which had to be tried and in respect of which justice was sought’.36 Lawrence LJ also resisted fettering the taxing officer’s discretion by any fixed rule, decrying any rule that only costs before action that could properly be allowed were costs incurred for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in the action, and that all costs incurred for the purpose of obtaining advice whether an action should be brought must be excluded.37 17.6 The position is clearer where the issue involves the incurrence of costs during a stay of proceedings. This was the principal issue in Pêcheries Ostendaises (Soc Anon) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co.38 Atkin LJ remarked that, in an order to stay ‘proceedings’, ‘proceedings’ do not include the preparations that may be made by seeing witnesses, taking proofs, carrying on correspondence, and so forth.39 His Lordship then made the following important observations in this context:40 [I]t is quite a mistake to suppose that an order to stay proceedings amounts to a direction to the parties to hold their hands from the time when the order is made and to indulge in no further activities with a view to ascertaining the facts, procuring evidence and so forth. Such a view would be quite contrary to the ordinary practice. There is no doubt that while a stay is pending until security for costs is given41 or during any other period, it is the common practice of diligent plaintiffs and defendants to use that time in making preparations for the trial of the case. They may, of course, go too far and make excessive preparations, and if they make excessive preparations it may well be that the costs will not be allowed; but it is quite plain that nobody understands the order for a stay as directing them to do nothing in the action, and I am quite clear that that is not the legal effect of it.

In the case of a stay of proceedings, as the proceedings have already been instituted there are stronger grounds for incurring expenses allowable on taxation during the stay than prior to proceedings being instituted as such. Yet the matter remains a question of fact for the taxing officer whether or not the costs were ‘necessarily and properly’ incurred during the period of the stay, bearing in mind the purpose for which the stay was granted and the nature of the costs incurred.42 [page 571]

17.7 Ultimately, though, whether or not pre-proceedings costs are recoverable as between party and party must yield to the terms of any relevant statute or rules. For this purpose, courts are not, generally speaking, inclined to construe the statutory language restrictively. For instance, in the context of the Federal Court Rules’ definition of ‘costs as between party and party’ as ‘only the costs that have been fairly and reasonably incurred by the party in the conduct of the litigation’,43 it has been judicially observed that the words ‘in the conduct of the litigation’ should not be construed as precluding the recovery of costs incurred before a party was formally joined.44 Conversely, where statute vests in a tribunal the discretion to ‘award costs in relation to proceedings before it’,45 it is more difficult to construe the language to extend to costs incurred prior to the commencement of proceedings.46

Costs of Settlement Negotiations 17.8 The court rules in the Northern Territory, Tasmania and Victoria provide that costs of and incidental to settlement negotiations that are properly incurred must be allowed on taxation whether or not the negotiations were successful.47 What is incidental to ‘negotiations for settlement’ may differ widely from matters relevant to issues raised in the litigation; other possible causes of action may be proposed for release, other past liabilities may be proposed for discharge, and some issues not capable of resolution by legal action may be raised. This led Higgins J in Bennett v Seaman to remark as follows:48 I can see no reason why the costs relevant to consideration of an issue, genuinely raised for consideration in settlement negotiations, should not be allowed pursuant to [the rules] even if that issue is not otherwise connected with the litigation. Costs of making or considering frivolous proposals can be disallowed as not ‘reasonably and properly’ incurred. However, where a proposal has been raised, discussed and accepted, the costs of that process would, prima facie, be allowable as ‘reasonable’ and ‘proper’.

On the facts of the case before him, his Honour held that the taxing officer erred in disallowing the costs of and incidental to negotiations that led to the inclusion in the settlement terms of the proposal for the defendants to forego costs otherwise due to them from the plaintiff. 17.9 The position appears to be the same in jurisdictions without a specific

rule to this effect. This is so even though traditionally, as between party and party, charges were allowed for the necessary work in and about effecting only a successful compromise.49 Modern courts find no justification for limiting the allowances in this way if the work in question, though unsuccessful, has been conducted bona fide and occurred in the ordinary course of the litigation. Joske J in Higgins v Nicol (No 2) explained the point as follows:50 I am quite unable to understand why counsel who may spend many hours of their time in a genuine effort to achieve a compromise are to do so at their own cost and are not to receive any payment for their efforts. When they have done so in the course of the hearing of the case, I see no reason why it should not be regarded as part of the course of the hearing and be allowed for on a party and party taxation just as much and in the same way as the calling and examination of witnesses is part of the course of the hearing and is allowed for on taxation.

[page 572] This approach is consistent with the public policy of encouraging settlement, as limiting costs to where the negotiations proved successful may discourage settlement. Responding to the concern that to allow the costs of unsuccessful negotiations on taxation may cause the authority to compromise to be abused, Joske J stated that if negotiations are not conducted bona fide then no payment should be allowed; the issue goes to discretion and not to jurisdiction. More recently, Mansfield J made the same point in Charlick Trading Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission, which deserves full quotation:51 There is a substantial public interest, as well as private interest, in the resolution of disputes by negotiation or by mediation. It is now a common feature of litigious claims that the parties are required to consider, and often to participate in, pre-trial mediation. The [Federal Court] Rules prescribe powers and procedures to that effect. Negotiation and mediation may resolve a dispute entirely. Apart from the benefit to the parties of such resolution, such an outcome saves the costs associated with the trial and releases judicial and court resources to deal with other matters. Negotiation and mediation often also partly resolve a dispute so as to enable the focus of the parties in litigation to be more confined, again with consequential savings of time and expense to the parties and to the benefit of the public. In my view, steps taken by the parties to confine the areas of their dispute will often be able to be categorised as necessary or proper for the attainment of justice. They will often facilitate the presentation of the case so as to enable a just result to be achieved in an expeditious and economic manner. Even if those processes do not in fact result in any consensual outcome, either totally or in relation to certain issues or matters which then do not require proof, it does not follow that the processes themselves were not necessary or proper for the purpose of O 62 r 19 of the Rules.52 Those observations are not

intended to lay down any precept that the costs of private negotiation or mediation should as a general rule be allowed on a party and party taxation. Whether they are allowed will depend upon the particular circumstances. Often, the parties agree upon the basis upon which the costs of mediation will be borne, or the agreement made at mediation will include terms as to costs.

On the facts, Mansfield J found it likely that the costs in relation to what proved unsuccessful settlement negotiations resulted in refinement of the areas of dispute and provided part of the process of refining the issues the court needed to address.53 These costs were therefore allowed. Consistent with the above remarks, the Western Australian Supreme Court has held that not only the costs of a court-ordered mediation can be the subject of a party and party costs order, but that so can costs of a private mediation between the parties.54 The latter had already been established in the Family Court.55 17.10 Consistent with the foregoing, the costs of attendance at settlement conferences should in modern times be recoverable on taxation or assessment. McGill DCJ explained the rationale for this in Henley v State of Queensland:56 Settlement conferences these days are a very serious matters. Far more matters are resolved at settlement conferences, or in connection with them, then are ever resolved at trial. It seems to me axiomatic that a solicitor attending a settlement conference should properly prepare for it, a process which I would expect in the ordinary case to take some hours. Even if only one solicitor were attending the settlement conference, obviously there should be significant and thorough preparation beforehand, the costs of which should undoubtedly be allowed, particularly on an assessment on the indemnity basis. It also seems to me quite reasonable, in a matter where there was some difficulty, for attendance at the settlement conference to be by a more senior and experienced member of the firm, who would need to be provided with an appropriate summary of the matter, and I think it also reasonable that the solicitor having the carriage of the matter, who

[page 573] would be in a better position to comment on anything unexpected which arose, and who would be the one who would be chasing up any further information which was required as a result of the settlement conference, should be present. In my opinion it was plainly reasonable for this to be done. It was certainly not something which could be disallowed … Such expenditure is by no stretch of the imagination outlandish.

His Honour’s remarks were made with respect to costs incurred in connection with a settlement conference, in the preparation of an extensive review of the file summarising the salient features of the case as to both liability and quantum, undertaken by the solicitor who had carriage of the

matter, because she was to be accompanied at the conference by a senior colleague. McGill DCJ disagreed with the registrar’s view that it was unnecessary for two solicitors to attend the conference and therefore that this preparation was also unnecessary.

Costs of Solicitors’ Attendances and Conferences 17.11 Whether or not the costs of a solicitor making an attendance57 on counsel or at a conference to discuss a client’s case are allowable on a party and party taxation depend, as is ordinarily the case, on whether or not the taxing officer (or court) considers that the attendance was necessary or proper to attain justice for the client. Attendances to retain and deliver the brief, to mark counsel’s brief for each refresher period, and so far as is necessary to prepare for giving oral evidence or to prepare an affidavit, clearly meet this criterion. In Gills v Commonwealth of Australia58 Stanley J allowed a solicitor’s fee for attending a very important conference at a critical stage of litigation, at which the plaintiff’s claim was discussed in detail, and the defendant made an admission leading to the suggestion that the matter be settled. Conversely, expenses are not allowed in relation to such matters as collation of documents or other material in preparation for giving instructions or evidence, time spent in refreshing recollection or making notes with a view to giving evidence or giving instructions, and matters of like nature.59

Multiple solicitors attending 17.12 The taxing officer (or court) will be on guard to ensure that only those necessary or proper expenses that pertain to the attendance or conference are allowed. So, for instance, the usual taxing practice is to allow the attendance of more than one solicitor representing a particular party at a conference with counsel or at an attendance with a witness only in exceptional circumstances.60 In Dalgety Australia Operations Ltd v F F Seeley Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2),61 a case characterised as moderately complex and substantial, Bollen J declined to allow the cost of two solicitors at conferences, remarking

that one solicitor can attend the conference and then direct the others to action. [page 574]

Fees on conference in addition to fee for document 17.13 Court rules in Tasmania and Victoria expressly deny on taxation fees for conferences in addition to the fee of a solicitor or counsel for drawing and settling, or perusing, or advising on any document, unless for special reason the conference was necessary or proper.62 The onus of satisfying the taxing officer that there was a special reason for holding this conference lies upon the claimant.63 Mere complexity of a sufficiently high degree may constitute a special reason for the type of conference under consideration, particularly at the stage of initiating the proceedings. For example, in Higgins v Nicol (No 2)64 a substantial conference between solicitor and counsel was found necessary for them to work together satisfactorily, as the litigation ‘involved complexities calling for the exercise of more than ordinary thought and skill in the preparation of the initiating documents and in determining the precise relief to be sought’.

Conversational attendances 17.14 Historically, both taxing officers and courts have denied to a solicitor on a party and party taxation any fee for a ‘conversational’ attendance on counsel, meaning an attendance to obtain or give some information in respect of which counsel does not charge a fee.65 The reason for this general rule of practice is that no fee for attendances can be allowed to a solicitor unless he or she can show it was necessary or proper for the conduct of the case and, if counsel charges no fee in respect of the attendance, it is usually unsafe to conclude the attendance was necessary and proper.66 17.15 However, as with other so-called ‘rules’ of taxation, it must not harden into an inflexible principle, and there are circumstances where a solicitor’s fee in such a case may indeed be allowed. In fact, the Northern Territory court rules specifically provide that a solicitor may be allowed a fee for an

attendance on counsel to obtain or give some information in respect of which counsel does not charge a fee.67 This no doubt also represents the practice in the remaining jurisdictions.68 A useful illustration in this context was provided by McLelland CJ in Eq in Re Quality House Pty Ltd (in liq) and Companies Act:69 Every case must be examined on its merits, and there may well be instances where, for some reason or another, counsel does not make a charge in circumstances where the solicitor should clearly, in a taxation on a basis applicable to a liquidator’s solicitor, be allowed remuneration out of the company’s assets. Short conferences, particularly telephone discussions, between counsel and solicitor on the instructions of a liquidator on difficulties and problems arising in a liquidation are commonplace. Counsel are not expected to observe the same precision in bookkeeping as are solicitors. In a hypothetical instance, one can envisage a liquidator telephoning his solicitor, discussing with the solicitor a problem, and asking him to ring counsel about the matter; counsel is telephoned, and is able to answer the query in a conversation lasting perhaps no more than a minute or two; the solicitor then telephones the liquidator and passes on counsel’s view, and

[page 575] perhaps discusses the matter briefly with the liquidator. Counsel would not normally be expected to charge in such circumstances, but I see no reason, either in principle or in fairness, to deny the solicitor reasonable remuneration for attending to this requirement of the liquidator.

Another situation recognised as potentially allowing a conversational attendance to an instructing solicitor is where on the ‘eve of trial’ the other side makes some communication necessary for counsel to consider without delay. However, as on the ‘eve of trial’ counsel can properly be described as being already ‘on his or her brief fee’,70 the fact that counsel charges no discrete fee in that regard does not mean that counsel is attending without fee. Hence, there are no grounds for denying to the solicitor a fee for the attendance assuming, of course, it is otherwise necessary or proper.71

Solicitor attending counsel in court 17.16 To determine whether or not a solicitor should be allowed a fee for attending counsel in court for the purposes of giving instructions, the test to be applied is the same as that applied in deciding if fees for two (or more) counsel should be allowed: would a reasonable and prudent but not overcautious litigant, in all the circumstances, engage the services of an

instructing solicitor, notwithstanding the cost?72 It should be noted, however, that in superior court proceedings the presence of an instructing solicitor might more likely be seen as necessary or proper than the engagement of multiple counsel.73 Additionally, in a superior court it may be unusual for counsel not to be attended by an instructing solicitor or clerk, this being at least ‘proper’, if not always ‘necessary’, whereas in a lower court it might well be less usual for an instructing solicitor or clerk to be present, and this will impact upon allowances on taxation.74

Recording of attendance 17.17 Where an attendance is allowed, the time taken to make a note recording the attendance may be included in the fee chargeable for the attendance.75 An example is a solicitor who claims an allowance for not only the time of the telephone attendance itself but also the time taken to write up notes recording the attendance. In the usual case, the two would be, or be close to, contemporaneous, and so the time taken at the attendance covers its recording. However, where in the circumstances it appears to the taxing officer that noting the attendance will reasonably take additional time, this may be allowed.76

Costs of Lawyers Uncertified in the Jurisdiction 17.18 An issue that has challenged the courts in the past is the entitlement of a lawyer lacking a practising certificate in the jurisdiction in which the action is brought or defended [page 576] to be the beneficiary of a party and party costs order in favour the party represented by the local solicitors on the record. If the relationship between the local lawyer and the interstate uncertificated lawyer is one of principal and agent, the latter’s fee appears as a disbursement in the formers’ party and

party bill.77 In such a case, authority supports the view that a taxing officer may tax a bill of costs even though a solicitor whose charge appears in the bill is not a solicitor on the record, and allow costs that are reasonably incurred by interstate solicitors.78 The same is not the case, however, where the uncertificated lawyer acts as principal.79 Bleby J explained the rationale for this distinction in Santos Ltd v Delhi Petroleum Pty Ltd:80 It is understandable that interstate solicitors, not registered in this State when such registration was necessary, acting as the principals of solicitors who were, should not have been entitled to claim their costs on taxation in this State. They were not legal practitioners with any standing in this State. They were not officers of the Court and were not subject to any disciplinary or other control by the Court. The interstate practitioners, so far as the law of this State were concerned, were in no better position than a lay client. On the other hand, where the South Australian solicitor was the principal and responsible to the client and to the Court for the proper conduct of the litigation, including the engagement of appropriate expertise to further the cause of the litigation in the interests of the client, then the duty to the client required that that be done, and where that necessarily involved the engagement of a legal practitioner outside the jurisdiction, the fees of that practitioner became one of the reasonable expenses of litigation chargeable on party and party taxation as an expense or disbursement.

17.19 The issue is now addressed by the legal profession legislation that implements the national practising certificate scheme. It entitles a lawyer holding a current practising certificate in one Australian jurisdiction to practise in another Australian jurisdiction under that certificate without the need to be admitted to practice or to hold a practising certificate in that other jurisdiction, albeit only in accordance with the lawyer’s entitlement to practise in his or her home jurisdiction.81 If an interstate lawyer is so entitled to practise in another jurisdiction, no impediment should exist to recovery of his or her costs on a taxation or assessment as between party and party.82 17.20 The issue then arises as to whether the costs of an interstate legal practitioner acting as principal are to be quantified according to the approach to taxation or assessment applicable in his or her home jurisdiction. In the Northern Territory, Queensland and Victoria the court [page 577] rules state that, so far as practicable, the charge of an interstate practitioner ‘shall, if allowed, be allowed in an amount appropriate to the place where the lawyer practises’.83 Courts have refused to read down the words of this

provision;84 for instance, it is not restricted to circumstances where the lawyer on the record requires the assistance of an interstate agent.85 But this does not mean that all the work performed by interstate lawyers is necessarily allowed at the interstate rate. The words ‘so far as practicable’ have, to this end, been interpreted as meaning ‘insofar as the taxing master is reasonably capable of doing so on the basis of the evidence and his or her experience’.86 In the remaining jurisdictions, which lack a court rule to the same effect, the costs of an interstate lawyer acting as principal are arguably taxed or assessed according to the rate and approach applicable in the jurisdiction where the litigation is conducted.87 The logic is that, as statute entitles an interstate lawyer to practise in the same way in relation to the litigation as a lawyer holding a local practising certificate, the interstate lawyer’s charges and fees are ‘costs’ that can be awarded in accordance with the requirements of the court rules and any applicable scale that apply to a local lawyer’s costs. The position may be different where the interstate lawyer acts not as principal in the litigation, but as an agent for the local lawyer. As noted earlier, the interstate lawyer’s costs are in these circumstances properly included as a disbursement, and it stands to reason that, at least if they relate to services carried out in the interstate jurisdiction, they are to be taxed or assessed according to the scale of costs or basis applicable in that jurisdiction.88

Costs of Salaried Lawyers 17.21 When dealing with the costs liability of persons represented by employed lawyers, the issue is not one of jurisdiction89 but of quantum. The courts’ concern is to ensure that a costs order that purports to indemnify a successful litigant for costs incurred in being represented by an employed lawyer does not in fact enrich the litigant, or punish the unsuccessful litigant.90 The remarks by Russell LJ in Re Eastwood (deceased),91 a case involving the taxation of a bill of the Attorney-General, who was represented by senior solicitor in the Treasury Solicitor’s office, provide a useful starting point in this context:92 Now, except no doubt for the purposes of internal accounting, the employed solicitor or legal department renders no bill to the employer or organization: he or it makes no professional charges. It is however quite clear on authority that it is not permissible to say that consequently the party is limited to disbursements specifically referable to the particular litigation on the ground that the

[page 578] salaries of employees and other general expenses of the department would have been incurred by the party in any event.

17.22 In that the taxation (or assessment) of a bill is the most common means of quantifying the proper charge, it is appropriate in a case involving an employed lawyer to so quantify the charge as though it were the bill of an independent solicitor.93 The court rules in some jurisdictions so provide.94 Davies AJ explained the point in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Hattersley as follows:95 [E]mployed solicitors are not to be treated as second-class professionals. Lawyers are entitled to practice in their profession in a number of ways, one of which it is to be a legal officer in a corporation which engages in commercial activities … Practitioners who choose to carry on their profession as an employee of the Crown, of a statutory authority or of a corporation are entitled to have their work assessed on the same basis as that of independent solicitors exercising comparable skills in the performance of comparable work. It is not the manner in which the practitioner carries on his or her profession which counts, it is the nature of the work, the time spent and the skill, care and responsibility involved. Assessors are chosen for their expertise in assessing a fair and reasonable reward for the work done by practitioners, not for their skill in determining the operational costs of a commercial enterprise.

The figure arrived at on this basis is presumed not to infringe the principle that taxed costs are no more than an indemnity to the party against the expense to which he or she has incurred in the litigation. In fact, in much of the case law the presumption is unspoken, the courts simply disregarding the possibility that a taxation or assessment on the usual basis might result in a profit.96 17.23 Certainly where a scale applies to the applicable services, the court may order costs in accordance with that scale, especially in view of the fact that it may be impossible to determine what proportion the expense of the particular action bears to the lawyer’s annual salary.97 Even if possible, it would likely involve a complex, and thus time consuming and expensive exercise, disproportionate to the utility derived as a result.98 Though a taxing officer or assessor may, in a given case, choose to investigate the issue of the employer’s costs so as to ensure that the indemnity principle is not infringed, this task is not one to be undertaken without a good and [page 579]

sufficient cause. For the reasons just stated, the indemnity principle should be applied ‘flexibly and reasonably’.99 17.24 Western Australia was unique in enacting a statutory provision intended to give effect to the foregoing general law principle.100 The relevant provision, the Legal Practice Act 2003 s 226 (which has no equivalent in the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA)), is noted in Chapter 7.101 It governed the measure of costs by the phrase ‘to the same extent’, suggesting the allowances that may be made under the relevant scales or rules are a reasonable allowance.102

Copying Costs Copies of documents 17.25 As with other expenses, whether the costs of a copy of a document are allowable on taxation on the party and party basis depends on whether the making of that copy was necessary or proper for the attainment of justice in the circumstances.103 In Bennett v Seaman,104 for example, the taxing officer disallowed the costs of the plaintiff’s solicitors to copy documents produced on subpoena for their own file, a decision Higgins J affirmed. His Honour held that when and if such copies are deemed necessary for supply to counsel, they can be allowed as copies for brief.105 In that event, the costs of attendance to inspect the subpoenaed documents (including procuring the copies) are allowable, but copies unnecessary for counsel’s brief (whether taken for the solicitor’s or the client’s own records) are not allowable.106 So far as the number of copies allowable, the Victorian rules add that scale fees for drawing a document cannot include more than three copies made for the use of the solicitor, agent or client, or for counsel, to settle.107 The number of copies allowed will, however, depend on the circumstances. If an outside printer is used, it may well be appropriate to allow two copies at the scale rate, one to be retained within the lawyer’s office as a ‘master’ and the other to go to the printer for duplication.108 But where the relevant documents are produced entirely ‘in-house’, a claim for two copies at the scale rate becomes less justifiable.109 17.26 Courts nowadays are, in any event, more severe on allowances for

copying, and decry indiscriminate copying of material for the purposes of litigation as inconsistent with the modern impetus aimed at reducing the cost of litigation. In Gribbles Pathology (Vic) Pty Ltd v Shandford Investments Pty Ltd,110 for instance, Heerey J suggested that the taxing officer should scrutinise closely any claim for the costs involved in the provision of photocopy authorities (as counsel for the applicant handed up two large ring binders containing photocopies of 19 authorities [page 580] totalling 748 pages, including the entire 34 page report of the very well known case of Jones v Dunkel).111 His Honour then added that:112 [t]he indiscriminate collection of Internet searched authorities is not only wasteful but risks distortion of the forensic process. Instead of analysis of the circumstances of the instant case, argument can descend into a trawl through a myriad of judgments seeking some helpful phrase or facts similar or dissimilar to those of the case in hand. I am not saying this occurred to an excessive degree in the present case, but it is a tendency which needs to be guarded against.

That ‘[m]indless copying carries its own multiplier effect, as each party may be expected to replicate it’113 is a further reason for the careful scrutiny of claims for copying. More recently, the New South Wales Court of Appeal expressed concern about the vast amount of paper generated in the preparation of this appeal and, in particular, that volumes from the litigants contained full photocopies of almost all the leading authorities. It led Young JA, with whom Hodgson and Whealy JJA concurred, to note that ‘this must have cost somebody thousands of dollars which the cost assessor will probably not allow to be passed on to the opposition if the party doing that work is successful’.114 His Honour added that ‘[t]he court requires photocopies of unreported decisions and it is sometimes helpful to have copies of a few of the leading reported cases, but not, as here, the top 50’.115 A South Australian Supreme Court Practice Direction endorses this sentiment.116

Scale fees per copy 17.27 Scales in each jurisdiction except the Federal Court and New South Wales prescribe amounts per page to be allowed for copies of documents the

taxing officer determines were necessary or proper to copy. A sliding scale applies in the Australian Capital Territory, the allowance per copy reducing according to the number of copies allowed.117 The High Court set an amount allowable per copy up to 10 copies; the sum allowed for further copies is placed at the discretion of the taxing officer.118 The South Australian scales set a fee per copy but direct a taxing officer to have regard to commercial rates for photocopying if a ‘substantial number’ of sheets are or should be copied at the same time.119 Before 1 April 2013120 the Victorian rules made equivalent provision (albeit referring to more than 10 copies of a document in place of a substantial number), but after this date simply state, as do the current Federal Court Rules, that the costs of copying documents are at the discretion of the Costs Court (in the Federal Court, the taxing officer).121 [page 581] The scales in the remaining jurisdictions set a fee per copy,122 but this does not preclude a taxing officer from disallowing an excessive profit element in multiple photocopying or otherwise discounting that fee so as to ensure that the party in whose favour the copies are allowed cannot heap upon an opponent copying costs far exceeding those chargeable by a commercial copier.123 To this end, it has been said that ‘[t]he realities of modern day technology and the savings achieved by the use of it cannot be ignored’, such that ‘[a] simple per page application of a flat fee for each copy no matter what the number to be copied or the available technology would … be unjust to any party called upon to pay on such a basis’.124 A formulaic approach to a taxing officer’s discretion whether or not to allow copying at scale rate should thus be avoided.125 Factors relevant to the exercise of this discretion include the nature of the documents copied, the size and number of pages copied, the number of copies made, how quickly the copying is required, for whom the copies were made,126 whether the documents had particular commercial or personal sensitivity to the client or others,127 and the quantum in dispute in the proceeding.128 It follows that if a commercial copier is available, whom the taxing officer determines it was appropriate to use, but the lawyer copies documents ‘in house’, the allowance should not generally exceed the rate chargeable by a

commercial copier,129 plus necessary incidental attendances, such as delivery, collection, checking and binding. If no commercial copier is conveniently available, or there is some other demonstrable need for the copying to be done ‘in-house’, it is open to the taxing officer to set a fair rate informed by the in-house facilities available to the lawyer, bearing in mind that some lawyers have high speed low cost machines, whereas others do not.130 It is also open to a taxing officer to segregate the rates allowable for [page 582] copies, that is, to allow the scale rate for one (or more copies) but the commercial copier rate for multiple further copies of the same material.131

Costs of Witnesses 17.28 Court rules in most jurisdictions make specific provision as to amounts allowable as between party and party for the costs and expenses of witnesses. These generally reflect no more than what would otherwise be so in the exercise of a taxing officer’s general discretion to allow costs necessary or proper to attain justice. The High Court, Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and Victorian rules allow expenses incurred in procuring the attendance of witnesses.132 The Federal Court Rules allow ordinary witnesses an amount, not exceeding a set daily maximum, equal to any wages or fees (less discretionary overheads) lost by reason of their attendance to give evidence.133 The Northern Territory rules allow a witness attending at court to give evidence fees that are reasonable having regard to his or her occupation.134 In Tasmania a witness is to be allowed such amount for providing evidence for proceedings or for his or her attendance as the taxing officer thinks fit having regard to all the circumstances of the case, but not exceeding the salary and wages actually lost by reason of attending.135 In Western Australia an allowance to a witness for his or her attendance at a trial or hearing is to be calculated in accordance with the applicable scale of witness fees.136 And the rules in South Australia, by making allowance for the necessary and reasonable costs of procuring evidence reasonably required

for the presentation of a party’s case,137 clearly encompass the costs of witnesses.

Expenses of ordinary witnesses 17.29 The taxing officer (or court) must determine, first, which expenses incurred by the successful party in the procuring of evidence and the attendance of witnesses should be allowed, and second, the quantum of the allowance. As to the former, the Northern Territory rules specifically allow the party the actual expenses reasonably incurred by a witness for travel to and from the place of the hearing and for accommodation and sustenance, and any other necessary expense reasonably incurred because of the attendance.138 In some other jurisdictions the rules allow such sum as the taxing officer thinks reasonable for sustenance or maintenance of a country witness.139 Though not replicated by the court rules of the remaining jurisdictions, this supplies an indication of taxing officers’ practice generally. [page 583] 17.30 As a general rule, a party may keep his or her witnesses during the whole of the trial, and the expenses of maintaining the witnesses in this regard will be costs in the cause on taxation.140 This is because a witness cannot generally depart without consent of the court and the parties, a consent that, in order to save heaping up unnecessary costs, ought to be requested and given.141 The onus lies on the unsuccessful party to show that any particular witness should not have been maintained.142 In this respect, premature attendances — that is, attendances before the time when the witnesses are reasonably required — will be disallowed.143 17.31 The foregoing does not mean that a successful party is entitled to an indemnity for the costs of all witnesses he or she has led. The taxing officer (or court) will inquire as to whether any given witness has in fact contributed to the success of that party’s case. Just as a party ultimately successful may be deprived of the costs of issues upon which he or she has failed,144 that party may be denied an indemnity for expenses of witnesses who have proven useless or detrimental to that party.145 A taxing officer (or court) may

likewise deny to a successful party an indemnity for the expenses of witnesses who do no more than replicate evidence already given; ‘a party cannot heap up costs by calling an unnecessary number to one point’.146 17.32 That a witness was not examined at trial does not per se disentitle the successful party to the costs attendant to the witness’ proof and attendance,147 as counsel conducting a case may, seeing the course it is taking, see fit not to call a witness.148 Hence, ‘the expenses of a person subpoenaed as a witness may be allowed although he is not actually called, if his attendance was reasonably necessary, having regard to the probable course of the case’.149 It rests on the party seeking the allowance of expenses of a witness not called to establish, by cogent evidence or material, that the evidence of that witness was necessary and material to the case. In Bush v Condon & Barrett Pty Ltd150 Sheppard J held that it was not extravagant or imprudent on the facts to have an expert witness available, for in a contested case one never knows what will arise in the course of an opponent’s evidence. The expert’s assistance may, for instance, be required for the purposes of crossexamination, or his or her evidence needed in reply. This led his Honour to conclude that the taxing officer erred in disallowing the fees of an expert, because had a verdict for the plaintiff not been conceded, the expert would have been a necessary witness for the plaintiff. [page 584]

Expert witnesses 17.33 Whether the fees and expenses of an expert witness are allowable to a successful party depends on whether the taxing officer determines their incurrence was necessary or proper in the circumstances.151 Court rules in some jurisdictions specifically state that the allowances in respect of expert witnesses are regulated by, or are in the discretion of, the taxing officer.152 Scales of charges set by professional bodies may indicate what is fair and reasonable quantum-wise,153 although they cannot fetter the taxing officer’s discretion.154 The High Court scale provides that in addition to the recoverable scale daily fee, an expert witness may be allowed a special fee for attendance at court when acting as an expert in assisting counsel or a

solicitor during the trial or hearing.155 In any case, an expert lacks standing in a taxation hearing as to his or her fee; the lawyer who engaged the expert must urge the merits of that fee.156

Experts from outside the locale 17.34 Just because expert evidence is appropriate in the circumstances does not mean that the party calling that evidence may select an expert from outside the city, state or country in which the litigation is on foot, and expect the fees and expenses of that person to be allowed on taxation. No hard and fast rule applies to all cases but, generally speaking, the party seeking such costs ought to demonstrate that:157 first, proper inquiries have been made within the city, state or country as to those holding the necessary qualifications and expertise in the particular field; and second, the party would have been prejudiced by being restricted to a local expert. If these inquiries reveal no local expert, or none that would be acceptable to the court in terms of knowledge, qualifications or expertise, an allowance may be made for an out-of-town,158 interstate159 or overseas expert who does not suffer those disabilities. If the above two matters cannot be shown, any fees and charges of the out-of-town, interstate or overseas expert exceeding what a local expert might have charged ought to be disallowed. Burford v Allan160 provides a useful illustration. The plaintiff succeeded in claiming substantial damages as a result of her quadriplegia. Matheson J upheld that the master’s decision to allow the costs claimed in relation to an expert from the United States because: first, proper inquiries had been made as a result of which it became clear that no person resident in Australia had sufficient expertise to inform the court on pertinent matters concerning the plaintiff’s prospects; second, the expert in question, as a physician, neurosurgeon and psychiatrist, was [page 585] uniquely placed to give that evidence; third, the plaintiff acted reasonably in the conduct of her case in the employment of the expert; and fourth, the

expert’s fees were not excessive as a world authority in his field conducting a practice in the United States.161

Number of experts 17.35 In Frankenburg v Famous Lasky Film Service Ltd162 Lord Hanworth MR remarked that only an exceptional case will justify the allowance of three expert witnesses, namely cases where ‘either because of the weight or the complexity of the matter, or for some other good reason, it is wise to give that third assistant to the one side or the other’. An exceptional case was Australian Provincial Insurance Association Ltd v Commissioner of Land Tax,163 where Starke J allowed the fees of three valuers on taxation in view of ‘the large amount … at stake and the important nature of the calculations that they had to make’. His Honour, however, added that he should not be taken as saying that three valuers should be allowed in all cases or in future even in cases like the one before him.164 In Frankenburg the court reiterated an established practice at that time of allowing only one expert opinion on issues that arise in litigation, a practice commended in relatively recent Queensland authority.165 Certainly in a relatively simple matter where the expert evidence states little more than the obvious, a taxing officer or judge, assuming he or she allows the fees of one expert on taxation, is unlikely to allow those of two experts.166 17.36 The foregoing assumes that, in the case of more than one expert, they are called to provide evidence on essentially the same point, and so should not be taken as imposing a limit for the purposes of taxation on the total number of experts that may be allowed in the entirety of a case. Different aspects of a case may require different experts to give evidence. Moreover, it should be noted that the so-called ‘one expert rule’ was propounded at a time when litigation was on the whole simpler, and so does not take into account modern complex, and sometimes transnational, commercial litigation in which it may be prudent to elicit evidence from multiple experts on related points.167

Qualifying fees

17.37 Court rules in some jurisdictions provide that the attendance of a witness includes an attendance at a conference with counsel before trial and, in the case of an expert witness, [page 586] qualifying to give evidence as an expert.168 This has in any case been recognised by courts independent of a specific provision to this effect.169 The reason is that it is not readily apparent how an expert witness ‘could be utilised by a party without recourse to preparatory work such as conferences, reports and advices’.170 At general law, however, it is not necessary for a witness to be an expert to receive a qualifying fee,171 nor apparently that the witness be called to give the evidence in court.172

Party as witness 17.38 The presence of parties as witnesses is clearly necessary and proper for maintaining or defending their own rights, and so on taxation the relevant allowances for witnesses are available likewise to parties as witnesses.173 In Australian Blue Metal Ltd v Hughes Helsham J based these allowances on a broader ground:174 I find it hard to imagine a case in which a party is not entitled to be present at his opponent’s expense where contested issues of fact concerning his own actions, knowledge and behaviour are involved. To assert that a defendant must come to and remain at court at risk as to his own expenses if he wins where the factual nature of the plaintiff’s claim is disputed and has been put in issue is a proposition which strikes me as strange. To make such an assertion where the defendants’ own documents are under subpoena and are in due course tendered and oral evidence as to alleged conversations with him and as to his actions is adduced, seems to me even stranger. I would be surprised if a real defendant brought into court at the suit of the plaintiff is not, if he wins, ordinarily entitled upon taxation to reasonable expenses incurred by his attending throughout the whole of the hearing at first instance upon the basis that his attendance is proper for the maintaining or defending of his rights; but it is unnecessary to decide this. What I do decide is

[page 587] that in the present case the three defendants were so integrally involved with the issues that had

emerged from the pleadings that they were entitled to be at court at all times whether or not they should be required as witnesses.

17.39 Although there is authority, namely Petrunic v Barnes,175 that a party may be allowed on taxation a fee for the purpose of attending the trial to observe and instruct counsel, this has fallen into disfavour because such a fee can be described neither as ‘costs’ nor as out of pocket expenses. More recently, the Victorian Court of Appeal in Kowal v Zoccoli176 rejected a claim by a doctor to be reimbursed for his loss of income in attending court as a litigant. In so ruling it rejected Petrunic v Barnes, instead giving effect to the tenor of the High Court’s ruling in Cachia v Hanes,177 which limited ‘costs’ to legal costs. In any event, the fact that parties are examined as witnesses is not by itself sufficient to establish a claim for their expenses as witnesses, and if it appears that their attendance was unnecessary, the claim ought to be rejected.178

Travelling Expenses Witnesses 17.40 A party who reasonably requires a witness, whom he or she can get to court only by paying the witness’ travelling expenses, should be able to recover those travelling expenses as, in the words of the court rules in some jurisdictions, ‘reasonable charges properly incurred in procuring the attendance of a witness’.179 In fact, the Northern Territory rules specifically allow the witness the actual expenses reasonably incurred for travel to and from the place of the hearing.180 Similarly, the High Court and Victorian rules entitle the taxing officer to allow a country witness181 a reasonable sum for the actual cost of travel.182 17.41 Similar principles apply in respect of a party in his or her capacity as a witness (as opposed to in the capacity of a party, for which travelling costs are not allowable).183 For example, in Warner v Donoghue184 the airfares of the plaintiff from England to Tasmania to attend trial were allowed because the plaintiff had planned to return to England before the accident that gave rise to the action, had sound reasons for going abroad when she did, and the action was not heard for some 20 months after her departure. The outcome would have been

[page 588] otherwise had it been held that the party had unreasonably185 travelled to a place far from the place of hearing. Sholl J developed this point in Russo v Russo as follows:186 [W]hile a party may recover from the other party the expenses which he reasonably has had to pay to a witness who has unreasonably gone to a distance before a trial, the party himself cannot claim against the other party expenses occasioned by his having himself (being a witness) unreasonably done the same thing. For it is not then an expense which the party claiming it has properly or reasonably incurred in procuring the attendance of witnesses. Suppose A has a suit pending in this Court. He intends to retire to live permanently in England. He decides, though under no necessity to do so, to go to England now. He knows he will have to come out again for the trial, and then return to England, but contemplates that the sea trip will be enjoyable, and that if his suit succeeds he will recover the cost of the return trip from his opponent. In my opinion, on those facts, he clearly should not, even if he wins, get such costs.

17.42 Also, a taxing officer (or judge) convinced that a witness has travelled to the location of the trial not to attend the trial but for an unrelated purpose may disallow travelling costs on taxation, without prejudice to the expenses for those days the witness attended upon the court.187

Lawyers 17.43 Whether the travelling expenses of a successful party’s lawyer(s) should be allowed on taxation depends on whether the attendance of those legal representatives is necessary or proper in the circumstances. The issue may arise where a matter is heard in a location distant from the location of the offices of the party’s lawyers. If the lawyers have a branch office near the location of the trial, or engage an agent in that location to pursue the matter, the costs of the lawyers in that branch or of the agent are allowable provided they meet the usual ‘necessary or proper’ standard. The issue may also surface where a client opts to be represented by lawyers based some distance from either the client or the court, in which case it may be that the additional travelling expenses are disallowed.188 17.44 If a party’s lawyers choose to conduct the matter themselves rather than appoint an agent, and this involves travelling expenses, the taxing officer (or court) must ascertain whether it is appropriate to burden the other party with those expenses should the latter prove unsuccessful. In England the

historical practice favoured the appointment of local agents, and so it was held that the expense of a country solicitor attending a court in London should be allowed only in exceptional cases.189 This no longer appears to be the legal position. Kerr J in Garthwaite v Sherwood190 opined that in modern times city firms are less willing to act as agents for country solicitors, and so there may now be more cases in which it is proper for a country solicitor to attend in London, or for a London solicitor to attend a hearing in the provinces, than to employ local agents. His Lordship held that, on the facts of the case, it was proper for the plaintiff’s solicitor to attend personally given that he had had the continuous charge of the case over a period of years, and could be of far greater assistance to the plaintiff and the court than any representative of a firm of London agents.191 Also, by personally attending the total costs were substantially lower than had he appointed London agents.192 The costs of travelling to, and accommodation in, London were thus allowed. [page 589] 17.45 In Australia, generally speaking, the question remains one of whether or not the lawyer’s personal attendance was necessary or proper in the circumstances, although the matters influencing Kerr J’s conclusion in Garthwaite — the assistance that could be provided by a lawyer knowledgeable in the matter and reduction in overall cost — no doubt would carry weight in Australia as the courts strive to promote cost effective litigation. Where instead of reducing the cost in question, the solicitor’s choice to travel, say, for the purpose of interviewing a witness, far from being cheaper than employing an agent for this purpose, increases the overall cost, the travelling expenses are unlikely to be allowed.193 17.46 Court rules in some jurisdictions make provision in this respect. The High Court Rules entitle a taxing officer to allow such amount as is reasonable, up to give a maximum daily fee, on being ‘satisfied that a solicitor’s principal place of practice is in a place other than that in which the Court is sitting, and it is necessary for the solicitor to leave that place to attend in Court or in Chambers at the hearing of an appeal, application, or cause’.194

The Australian Capital Territory rules envisage an allowance within the scale limit to a solicitor, in addition to reasonable travelling expenses, where the registrar is satisfied that the purpose of the journey could not have been satisfactorily accomplished by an agent, and that the solicitor has been necessarily absent from the place he or she carries on practice.195 The Victorian scale, in its form before 1 April 2013,196 made similar provision but added a 50 kilometre distance criterion, and was premised upon no charge being otherwise made for the time the solicitor is necessarily absent from the office.197 The current scale simply states that travel time is to be allowed at the set rate, quantified by reference to six minute intervals, where the lawyer travels in excess of one hour, for such excess.198 In Queensland if a hearing or trial is not in a city where the Supreme Court sits or in the town where the solicitor resides or carries on business, the scale sets a fee allowed for each day the solicitor is necessarily absent from his or her place of business, for time travelling to and from the hearing of the trial, and in waiting.199

Counsel’s Fees Scope of fee on brief 17.47 A brief to appear obligates counsel to attend a court or tribunal to represent the client’s interests, and the fee on brief rewards him or her for doing so. The Federal Court Rules, in this context, disallow on a party and party taxation counsel’s fee on hearing if counsel was not present at the hearing for a substantial amount of the relevant period,200 or did not give [page 590] substantial assistance in the conduct of the proceeding.201 A similar restriction applies under the Family Law Rules except in a case heard by the Full Family Court.202

Preparation fees 17.48 The traditional basis of charging counsel’s fees in respect of a court

hearing has been via a brief fee and refreshers,203 and counsel’s fees have been taxed as between party and party on this basis. As preparation for trial is incidental to the central task for which counsel’s fee is paid,204 the brief fee is ‘taken to include a good deal of time spent on reading facts or law in preparation for trial’.205 It covers preparation up to at least a substantial part of the day and night before the hearing, and for time spent before the first refresher, which usually commences after the first day of the trial.206 The extent of the allowance for preparation in the brief fee is usually reflected in the difference between it and a refresher.207 A party who seeks a departure from that traditional basis, it has been said, carries the onus of satisfying the taxing officer that the traditional method of fee marking could not reasonably have been followed in all the circumstances of the case.208 17.49 Although a taxing officer has a discretion to allow a separate fee for preparation as to facts or law or both, the exercise of this discretion was rarely regarded as necessary or proper for the attainment of justice.209 Only in matters of great complexity or voluminous documentation would it be justified, and only then when a loading of the brief fee (and thus the refreshers) for the preparation component was, at the time the fees fell or at least the preparation fee fell naturally to be marked, likely to result in overall fees substantially too high or too low.210 The [page 591] same applied to regarding reading fees, which would be reserved for cases of great complexity or of very voluminous material.211 There are clearly cases where some preparatory work for the hearing must be allowed for separately and cannot reasonably be added into the brief fee on hearing. For example, in modern patent litigation of the ‘world-wide’ kind, counsel before trial often must be educated in a particular area of an esoteric science so as to understand precisely the state prior art had reached and the true nature and identity of the alleged inventive steps. Such an educative process may take many weeks and it is often cheaper for the lay client to have counsel attend at the laboratory overseas of the client’s leading scientist in the field than have the scientist and counsel in Australia for a substantial period. Much time may also have to be spent in analysing and

utilising the judgment of foreign courts on almost identical patents. In such cases the taxing master may allow separate preparation fees on party and party taxation, subject always to matters of quantum.212 Common to cases of this kind is that the work usually must be done well in advance of the hearing and may take several weeks. There are, moreover, various types of cases in which the preparation work in counsel’s chambers alone, and in the city of the hearing, will be very lengthy leading up to the hearing. These may include, for example, a claim for significant damages by a builder of a great bridge based upon a quantum meruit where each item must be proved over a very extended hearing, or a claim involving very complicated financial dealings extending over a long period. The types of case that may attract a preparation fee cannot be listed exhaustively but, ultimately, in order for a taxing officer to allow preparation fees, usually fixed at a daily rate, the case was traditionally one that was exceptional compared to the vast numbers of cases making up the usual run of litigation.213 17.50 Yet cases in which it is proper to allow preparation fees at a daily rate on party and party taxation are likely more common, more numerous and arguably less exceptional in modern times.214 Legal practice has witnessed the emergence of new and complex work, and even established areas of practice have witnessed litigation on a scale previously unprecedented, with attendant complexity.215 The modern tendency is for counsel to charge a flat fee on a daily basis for both preparation and court work. The approach to taxation must take into account [page 592] modern practice.216 There are various instances of judges allowing hourly or flat daily fees in taxing counsel’s fees,217 and are an option identified as a basis for taxation in the National Guide to Counsel Fees promulgated by the Federal Court.218 In New South Wales counsel’s fees are assessed according to whether they are fair and reasonable,219 which in turn is related to the market for legal services, and so brief fees and refreshers have no continuing role for this purpose.

17.51 In any event, if it is determined that separate preparation fees should be allowed, the quantum allowed is governed chiefly by the complexity and extent of the matter requiring preparation, the length of preparation reasonably required in the circumstances, and the daily or hourly rate reasonably allowable to counsel having regard to his or her seniority and expertise.220 The length of preparation allowed as reasonable will likely vary with the seniority and expertise of counsel, as the appropriate hourly or daily rate for senior and experienced counsel will exceed that of junior or inexperienced counsel. But lack of seniority or inexperience of counsel is not to be visited on an unsuccessful litigant so as to create a liability for preparation fees over a long period, that period reflecting, in part, the need for counsel to become familiar with established principles.221

Retaining fee 17.52 In several jurisdictions the court rules disallow a retaining fee to counsel on a taxation.222 The former Federal Court Rules were unique in disallowing a retaining fee to more than one counsel.223

Premature delivery of briefs 17.53 The rules in several jurisdictions provide that where a proceeding is not brought on for trial or hearing, the costs of and consequent on the preparation and delivery of briefs are not allowable if the taxing officer is of the opinion that the costs were prematurely incurred.224 In [page 593] forming this opinion, the taxing officer must bear in mind that the proper conduct of litigation in the interests of a party requires a solicitor to prepare and deliver a brief to counsel in good time. What is ‘good time’ varies from case to case but is governed principally by the interests of the solicitor’s client. The relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable and prudent, but not overcautious, solicitor in the circumstances would consider that the time for doing the work had arrived.225 Where the taxing officer determines that

notwithstanding the fact that the matter is settled, the costs were not prematurely incurred, counsel’s fee on brief to be allowed on taxation is the fee that would have been reasonable had the matter gone to trial.226

Cancellation fees 17.54 As the process of taxation (or assessment) seeks to quantify the work performed by the lawyers for the party in whose favour costs are ordered, in theory at least fees for work not done should not be allowable. This would translate, in the context of counsel’s fees, to disallowance of a cancellation fee charged by counsel.227 However, it has been suggested that there may be cases where on a party and party taxation a fee to counsel for having kept a day aside for the trial of the matter may be properly allowed — though not strictly either a fee on brief or a refresher fee — assuming there was material relating to it put before the taxing officer.228 And there is authority allowing counsel’s fee for the first day of a trial, listed for a five day hearing, that was settled late on the day before trial.229 Clearly no such fee is allowable where the trial is adjourned well before hearing, at which time no briefs on trial had been delivered, and there is no material before the taxing officer vis-à-vis any work done by counsel that had been ‘thrown away’.230

Uplift fees 17.55 There appears little justification to cast on the losing party a greater burden as to the successful party’s costs simply because of the latter’s uplift fee agreement with its lawyer.231 Clearly, an uplift fee is not a party and party cost; its burden rests on the successful party, funded out of the damages recovered.232 Yet at least if an indemnity costs order is made,233 it may be that a reasonable uplift may be recoverable on taxation,234 which is an outcome impliedly countenanced in jurisdictions that entitle a taxing officer to have regard to the terms of a costs [page 594] agreement in conducting a taxation as between party and party.235 Even so,

recoverability of the uplift component of counsel’s fee is entirely exceptional, a point highlighted by recent intermediate court authority,236 for at least three reasons. First, an uplift fee is not, strictly speaking, a professional charge for services rendered by a lawyer; its sole nexus with the concept of costs lies in being a fee calculated as a proportion of the charges for those services. Second, as explained by Judge Dove in Conduit v Lisa Lodge Pty Ltd:237 [T]o treat [an uplift fee] as a costs item, where it is not, might easily lead to abuse. If the uplift premium payable under a costs agreement were said to be chargeable against an unsuccessful defendant, the client, no matter how wealthy, with a strong case, who did not desire to pay for his litigation would have a financial imperative to enter into such an agreement, knowing that the so-called premium would not be payable by him, at least in the event that the result exceeded the defendant’s offer of compromise. Further, solicitors would be encouraged to suggest such agreements to any client because of the ultimate financial advantage in the event of success in the action.

Third, the unsuccessful defendant’s costs liability under the indemnity principle should not, both in theory and in justice, be increased by the terms under which the plaintiff is funding its litigation.238

Where practitioner acts in capacities of both barrister and solicitor 17.56 In most jurisdictions, in recognition of a lawyer’s right to act either as a barrister or as a solicitor or as both, rules providing for taxation of costs have treated self-briefing and briefing a partner as justifying smaller allowances than would be justified where a stranger is briefed.239 Even in the absence of rules specifically on point, the courts have recognised this notion.240 The ideal is that a lawyer should be fairly rewarded for his or her professional efforts, but not more than once for the same work. Bridge J in Commonwealth of Australia v Magriplis explained the reason for the rules as follows:241 Where a solicitor employs himself as counsel on a brief on hearing there is … a saving of certain work which he would need to share with an outside counsel if he engaged one. Where a solicitor briefs his partner a similar saving of work may be expected, although perhaps to a smaller degree than where he briefs himself. Moreover, it should not be overlooked that in a case of self-briefing,

[page 595]

the client receives the benefit of only one legal mind on his case, whereas the briefing of a partner or a stranger adds the application of another mind to it. The combination of two minds should be better than one. For these reasons, I consider that on taxation of costs on items concerning a brief on hearing the allowances should be less generous where outside counsel is not briefed than would be justified if such counsel were briefed. Any moderation by a taxing officer on that basis should relate to work saved by the non-employment of outside counsel, and in particular any study and thought between its preparation and use in court, and, where the counsel is self-briefed, any pre-court consultation on matters already dealt with in the preparation of the brief. Accordingly, when a taxing officer is considering moderation or refusal of allowances such as those now under review the significant items for his examination are any claiming fees for brief on hearing or any associated consultation. In general, a fair examination and determination in respect of those items should satisfy proper standards, without any necessity to deal similarly with other items of negligible, if any, significance. In the absence of unusual features giving special importance to any otherwise minor item, a broad approach of this kind should meet all practical requirements of doing justice between the parties.

17.57 The High Court Rules state that where a practitioner acts as both barrister and solicitor or, as counsel, instructed by another practitioner in the same firm or other legal office acting as solicitor, the taxing officer must, in cases where a fee would have been allowed to independent counsel, allow to the practitioner such sum as a counsel’s fee as is reasonable in the circumstances.242 Before 1 April 2013, the Victorian rules provided that when a lawyer acts in the capacities of both barrister and solicitor, or appears as counsel instructed by his or her partner acting as solicitor, neither the lawyer nor the partner could make a charge for ‘instructions for brief’243 or for ‘drawing’244 or ‘engrossing’245 brief, but, in lieu of those charges, the lawyer or partner, as the case may be, was entitled to such fees as are allowed by the Costs Court for ‘preparing for trial’ and for ‘preparing brief notes for use on trial’.246 The Northern Territory rules also entitle a practitioner who appears in these capacities to an allowance for preparation.247 But the rules are unique in prescribing a formula for calculating the relevant quantum of fee allowable: the allowance for counsel’s fees is either three-quarters of what would otherwise be allowed to counsel (in the case of a practitioner who briefs him or herself as counsel) or five-sixths of that same amount (in the case where a partner, employee, fellow employee or employer is briefed).248 The rules give the master the power to allow a practitioner who appears as counsel a larger fee for so appearing and must in doing so have regard to the matters prescribed249 as far as they are applicable.250 The Australian Capital Territory and Queensland rules disallow a solicitor

or partner a fee for preparing a brief if the solicitor appears on a trial or hearing alone or instructed by a partner [page 596] or employee, but give the registrar discretion to allow one fee for preparing for the trial or hearing.251 The Tasmanian rule reflects a general discretion in the taxing officer. It provides that if a practitioner draws a document or appears as counsel, the taxing officer is to allow any counsel’s fee as may be proper even though the practitioner may also be acting as solicitor in the matter, but if the practitioner has acted both as solicitor and counsel the taxing officer in fixing the fee must have regard to that fact.252 The former Federal Court Rules, in a provision not replicated in the current rules, were likewise expressed in terms of a general discretion. They stated that when a practitioner acted in the capacities of both barrister and solicitor, or in the capacity of counsel, instructed by his or her partner acting as solicitor, a taxing officer could allow such sum as a counsel’s fee as was just and reasonable with regard to the practice of allowing such fees as permitted by the Supreme Court Rules of the state or territory concerned.253 17.58 Only the Northern Territory rules specifically prescribe that a practitioner self-briefed as counsel, or briefed by a partner, is entitled, for each refresher in a trial to a fee equal to what would have been allowed to an independent counsel in the same circumstances.254 However, this appears to be an accepted approach in the remaining jurisdictions, because refreshers relate not to the work for which counsel receives a brief fee, but to the work caused by extensions of the trial that would usually vary little as between an independent counsel and a counsel who was also a solicitor.255

Refresher fees 17.59 The court rules in several jurisdictions give the taxing officer a discretion to allow, on a party and party taxation, refresher fees to counsel where the trial or hearing extends beyond a day. The quantum of fees so

allowed is generally premised upon what the taxing officer thinks is ‘reasonable’ or ‘fit’ on the facts. The former Federal Court Rules, in a rule lacking an equivalent in the current rules, provided that where counsel was briefed to appear on a trial or hearing, and the trial or hearing occupied more than 4½ hours and costs were taxed on a party and party basis, the taxing officer could, whether or not witnesses are called, allow refresher fees in such amount as he or she thought fit for every 4½ hours occupied after the first 4½ hours and for the remaining duration of the trial or hearing.256 In Tasmania if any trial or hearing occupies more than six hours, whether on one or more days, the taxing officer may allow to counsel by way of a refresher for every subsequent six hours (or part thereof) any fee as may be proper.257 The time occupied by any lunch adjournment is to be included within the six hours for this purpose.258 The one qualification is that where the [page 597] amount involved in the suit does not exceed a certain amount, the rules limit the quantum of fees allowable as refreshers on a party and party taxation.259 The relevant Victorian rule, in its form before 1 April 2013, provides that where counsel’s fees are fixed on the basis of a brief fee and refreshers and a hearing or trial occupies more than six working hours (including a luncheon adjournment) without being concluded, the Costs Court may allow a refresher fee for every five working hours (including a luncheon adjournment)260 subsequent to the expiration of the first six hours, and the final refresher may be allowed for any period less than five hours the hearing or trial may occupy.261 Where those fees are fixed on the basis of daily fees, whether before or after 1 April 2013, the daily fee for the second or a subsequent day of the hearing or trial includes all time spent by counsel in preparation and conferences on that day of the hearing or trial as well as the actual time spent by counsel in court on that day (although the Costs Court may determine otherwise in special circumstances), and the Costs Court may allow differing amounts in respect of various days.262

The Queensland rules speak not in terms of hours but a ‘day’, and provide that if a trial or hearing occupies more than one day, when assessing costs on the standard basis the registrar may allow fees for counsel at a reasonable amount for each day or part of a day of the trial or hearing after the first day.263 The Family Law Rules provide that if the trial takes more than one day, the registrar may allow counsel a fee in accordance with the scale for each further day or part of a day.264 The relevant Western Australian scale prescribes maximum amounts (which can, however, be raised)265 for counsel fees for the second and successive days of hearing.266 In these jurisdictions, meaning must be given to the term ‘day’, determined by the number of hours that according to the custom of the court constitute a day’s sitting.267 There is no set period therefore that necessarily applies in respect of each court, but case authority refers generally to five hours268 or six hours269 as constituting a ‘day’ for this purpose. Whether a midday or other adjournment should be included within this time frame is the subject of conflicting authority.270 17.60 The fee fixed by the taxing officer as a proper charge recoverable for a refresher should indirectly take into account work of counsel outside the court, and so in some cases is loaded to allow for necessary continuing out of court work.271 In substantial commercial causes it is necessary for counsel to devote their entire working day to the case in hand, involving [page 598] hours both before and after court each day. Taxing officers have traditionally reflected the requirements of a case in this regard by increasing the amount of the brief fee and thus the amount of each refresher,272 although nowadays it is likely to be addressed by allowing a set hourly rate.

Other allowances Fees to counsel for settling pleadings, affidavits etc and advising thereon 17.61 Court rules in most jurisdictions make specific prescription for the allowance on a party and party taxation of fees to counsel for settling

pleadings, affidavits and the like. The High Court rules provide that the taxing officer shall allow such costs as he or she considers reasonable for procuring the advice of counsel, and for settling such documents as he or she thinks proper to be settled by counsel.273 The rules in the territories, Queensland and Victoria allow costs reasonably and properly incurred for counsel’s advice on the pleadings, evidence or other matter in a proceeding, for counsel to draw or settle a document in a proceeding that is proper for counsel to draw or settle, or, in Victoria, for counsel engaging in any preparation, view, conference or consultation.274 17.62 The question in each case is whether or not the retainer of counsel to perform the function in question was necessary or proper in the circumstances, such that the unsuccessful party should bear some or all of the costs. For example, in a case of some complexity, that is out of the ordinary or involves a difficult point of law, it may indeed be prudent to obtain the advice of counsel as to the merits, and the cost of this advice may in such a case be charged to the unsuccessful litigant.275 Similar observations can be made in respect of counsel being retained to settle a pleading or draw a document, the cost of which may be allowed where the taxing officer considers that special difficulty in its preparation justifies such a course.276 Certainly a solicitor is not allowed a fee for drawing a pleading or other document that is actually drawn by counsel.277 [page 599] There are also occasions where the briefing of junior counsel early is more cost effective than the solicitor, where counsel is more experienced in matters of litigation than the solicitor and charges at a lower rate. In this context it has been suggested that ‘a costs assessor should consider whether it is just and reasonable for a losing party to pay more towards a successful party’s costs than would have been incurred if the successful party made efficient use of the resources of the junior Bar’.278 17.63 The Northern Territory and Victorian rules state that where affidavits or interrogatories that are reasonable to be drawn or settled by counsel are or could have been drawn or settled at the same time, only one fee is allowed.279 The Tasmanian rules simply state that only one fee to counsel is allowed for

all affidavits that were or ought to have been filed at the same time,280 but add that if, pursuant to an order, a (draft) document is settled by conveyancing counsel, the fees of other counsel in previously or subsequently settling that document on behalf of the same party on whose behalf the draft is settled are not allowed, unless the court so directs.281

Conference with counsel 17.64 Fees reasonably and properly incurred by counsel engaging in a conference or consultation282 are allowable on a party and party taxation.283 The usual allowance is for a conference on brief in addition to any other necessary conferences, but not every discussion with counsel qualifies as a conference. The duration of the conference that may be charged depends on the nature and difficulty of the case, and on the length of time necessary for counsel to master the case at the stage of the proceedings a conference is held.284 The Australian Capital Territory rules provide that if the registrar allows costs for counsel to draw and settle a document, he or she must not allow the costs of a conference with counsel in relation to the document unless special reasons make the conference necessary.285

View by counsel 17.65 The object of a view by counsel is to enable counsel to understand the case, follow the evidence set out in the brief, and generally to obtain a more thorough grasp of the case. Not in every case is a view necessary or proper. Where, in addition to enabling counsel to put the case more clearly before the court, the taxing officer considers that a view saved time during the hearing, in that it properly equipped counsel to avoid irrelevant detail, or otherwise was an expense a prudent litigant would consider proper, counsel’s fees in respect of the view are recoverable.286 [page 600] In Minister for Home Affairs v Beale287 the issue concerned the valuation of land compulsorily acquired by government. Rich J held that the taxing

officer was wrong in disallowing a view to counsel, as it enabled counsel to see the subject matter of the case, to ascertain its nature at first hand, and so weigh the evidence of the experts and other witnesses proposed to be called. The view, according to his Honour, led the case to be considerably shortened and thus prevented a great waste of time and expense.288 Rich J added that it did not follow that just because the fee for the view is allowed on the facts that it must be allowed in every case where the value of land is in issue, as each case must be approached on its own merits. Yet his Honour found it difficult to imagine a case dealing with the valuation of a large area, involving complex classifications of elements of value, where such a fee would not be necessary and proper.289 17.66 Merely because a view may be necessary or proper in the circumstances does not mean that the same can be said of a second view290 or a view by more than one counsel.291 The taxing officer or court may properly reason in such cases that an unsuccessful litigant should not bear the cost of counsel not taking proper advantage of a first view or of multiple counsel attending the view where it would have been proper for attending counsel to inform non-attending counsel on all necessary points.292

Quantum of counsel’s fees Approach to quantifying fee allowable 17.67 The quantum of counsel’s fee that is allowable as between party and party is not determined by the mere fact that, as between counsel and the instructing solicitors, a fee has been agreed.293 So although, in order to procure counsel of choice, a party may have to pay a fee reasonable and proper as between him or her and counsel, that fee may not be necessary or proper for the purposes of party and party taxation.294 If, for instance, as a matter of fact no senior counsel can be engaged at a fee the court thinks reasonable to be allowed, the client must pay the difference from his or her own pocket.295 In fact, the more eminent the barrister and the more specialised the jurisdiction, the more likely it is that there may be a gap between the fee charged and that recoverable on a party and party basis296 (the gap may be more confined under the default bases of taxation in the Federal Court, New South Wales, the Northern Territory and (with effect on

1 April 2013) Victoria, or under the relevant costs determination in Western Australia).297 So, for example, where in complex commercial cases requiring lengthy and wide-ranging research into a large area of the law and digesting of voluminous factual information, counsel and solicitors often agree on counsel’s fees on a calendar daily basis, when it comes to party [page 601] and party taxation a taxing officer will be cautious before allowing fees on this basis. Cases where this is appropriate are exceptional — otherwise it would tend towards obliterating the distinction between party and party and solicitor and own client costs298 — in which it may be appropriate for the taxing officer (or judge) to load up the brief fee (and thus the refreshers) to reflect the recurring daily conduct of the case requiring long hours of work before and after court. 17.68 Nor will a taxing officer necessarily allow counsel’s fees upon the basis of the number of hours spent by counsel on the case. The taxing officer is concerned to determine the number of hours reasonably expended on litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate appropriate to counsel’s seniority and expertise.299 What is reasonable both in time and rate is thus not to be determined simply upon the basis of the time actually spent on the case by counsel multiplied by a fixed hourly rate charged by counsel.300 Nor should a taxing officer simply treat the fee paid by the other party as the amount reasonable in the circumstances.301 The foregoing does not prevent a taxing officer using an appropriate hourly rate as a yardstick by reference to a range. For example, in Walker v Law Society of Tasmania, involving the taxation of a Melbourne senior counsel’s fee in a Tasmanian matter, Crawford J made the following remarks:302 If the range of fees likely to be charged by an experienced Melbourne senior counsel are of a certain order, [a decision] whether it was necessary or proper to incur fees of that order must be made. If the range is considered too high, taking into account the circumstances of the case, then it could not be said on a party and party taxation that it was necessary or proper that the particular counsel be briefed. If, however, the taxing officer concludes in his discretion that it was necessary or proper to incur fees of such an order for the benefit of having the particular counsel, there would still remain his discretion … to fix a counsel’s fee which is reasonable

taking into account the circumstances of the case. The range of what would be reasonable for a particular counsel would of course be limited, and in the circumstances of this particular senior counsel the yardstick would appear to be somewhere between $300 and $500 an hour.

17.69 In determining the appropriate fee, including an hourly rate, the taxing officer takes into account the nature and importance of the cause or matter, the amount involved, the interest of the parties, the fund or persons to bear the costs, the general conduct of the proceedings and all other relevant circumstances that impact upon what fees it is reasonable and proper for an unsuccessful litigant to bear.303

Court rules 17.70 The Northern Territory and South Australian rules formalise the above somewhat by listing factors to which taxing officers must have regard in determining counsels’ fees. In the Northern Territory, the rules direct the taxing master, in assessing fees on brief and other fees of counsel, to have regard to:304 the complexity of the question of law or fact involved; the amount involved; any interlocutory application or other work which has reduced the work otherwise necessary in relation to the brief; [page 602] the possibility that counsel might be called on to argue on behalf of a party not represented at the hearing; the fees reasonably charged by counsel in matters of a similar kind; and the standing of counsel. The equivalent South Australian rule directs the attention to the importance of the case, its difficulty and to the time reasonably occupied by counsel.305 The Federal Court Rules simply provide that an amount may be allowed for counsel’s fees according to the circumstances of the case, which amount

may be assessed by reference to the National Guide to Counsel Fees.306 The Victorian scale, from 1 April 2013,307 sets maximum fees allowed for junior and senior counsel for, inter alia, appearances, preparation, conferences, views, drawing or settling documents, opinions and advices.308 It adds that, in allowing a fee to counsel, the Costs Court must have regard to, inter alia, stated criteria (pertaining to skill, care and responsibility),309 the other fees and allowances to counsel in the matter, payments made for interlocutory work that has reduced the work otherwise necessary in relation to the brief, and the standing of counsel.310 The scale also provides that where costs are taxed pursuant to an order of the Supreme Court, counsel’s fees in excess of scale are not to be allowed unless the Supreme Court otherwise orders, but in any other case the Costs Court has discretion to allow fees in excess of scale.311 The rules in some other jurisdictions refer to counsel’s fees that are ‘properly and reasonably incurred and paid’312 or ‘properly and reasonably incurred’313 as allowable. The Tasmanian rules place limits on the amount recoverable for counsel’s fee on brief and refreshers where the amount involved in the action is below a prescribed threshold, but in other contexts fees may be allowed as are reasonable in the circumstances.314 The Western Australian scale sets a range for counsel’s fees on trial and refreshers, which is increased by 50 per cent for senior counsel.315 Under the Family Law Rules, the amount payable in respect of counsel’s fees must not exceed that calculated in accordance with the applicable scale,316 and in respect of proceedings before a court of summary jurisdiction, it is limited to short attendances317 and short defended hearings.318

Discretion and the ‘two-thirds rule’ 17.71 The discretionary nature of a taxing officer’s determination as to the appropriate quantum of counsel’s fee means that courts give taxing officers a ‘liberal discretion’ in this [page 603]

context,319 which will not be reviewed unless the taxing officer has applied a wrong principle or has clearly made a mistake.320 17.72 Whereas there was once a practice adopted by taxing officers that junior counsel should be allowed two-thirds of the fee allowed to senior counsel,321 unless sanctioned by an applicable scale,322 such a practice is inconsistent with the proper exercise of a discretion,323 and has been queried by later authority.324 The correct approach is for the taxing officer to consider junior counsel’s fee independently of the senior’s fee. The taxing officer should investigate junior counsel’s role in the case, and only if junior counsel has borne a heavy burden may it be appropriate that the fee on brief allowed equate to two-thirds of senior counsel’s fee.325 Where junior counsel’s role is not significant, it may be apt to allow only scale fees.326 In any event, engaging senior counsel, who usually takes primary responsibility for making the difficult decisions and dealing with the difficult parts of the case, should lighten considerably the load junior counsel would otherwise have to bear.327 Yet merely because junior counsel was not on his or her feet, except to put in documents, throughout the hearing does not disentitle him or her to counsel’s fee, as counsel’s work is not limited to examining and cross-examining witnesses and addressing the court.328

Multiple counsel 17.73 Considerable case law deals with the issue of whether the costs of more than one counsel can be cast upon an unsuccessful party on taxation. Most commonly the cases focus on whether it is appropriate to allow the fees of both senior and junior counsel in a matter, being partly an historical legacy of the requirement that a senior should not appear unaccompanied by a junior. That this is no longer a professional requirement dictates that the issue is not so [page 604] limited. Now the issue can arise as to whether senior counsel appearing on his or her own, or two or more junior counsel, is appropriate in the matter.329

Court rules 17.74 The rules in some jurisdictions address the issue of multiple counsel. Family Law and Tasmanian rules (and the former Federal Court Rules) provide that a taxing officer may allow the costs of briefing two or more counsel, even if both are junior counsel.330 The Tasmanian rules add that where the costs of employing two or more counsel are properly allowed, the taxing officer may allow the costs of consultations between them.331 The Northern Territory rules speak in terms of restriction rather than discretion. They disallow a fee for more than one counsel unless the court certifies that the retainer of more than one counsel was warranted.332

Discretion 17.75 As the number of counsel to be allowed on a party and party taxation is a matter in the discretion of the taxing officer,333 no set or inflexible rule dictates a certain outcome in any given case, or type of case.334 Each case depends on its own circumstances,335 and the taxing officer is to allow the fees of more than one counsel ‘where he is satisfied that the nature and circumstances of the case are such that the services of two counsel are required if the case is to be presented to the court in such a manner that justice can be done between the parties’.336 For this reason, in deciding whether engaging senior counsel was justified for the adequate presentation of the case, the taxing officer or court may bear in mind decisions in other cases and the factors regarded as warranting or not warranting the retention of senior counsel, albeit as no more than guides indicating the approach of courts in other cases determined on their own facts, not as establishing a formula to be applied in later cases.337 17.76 The basic inquiry is, in the well-known words of Griffith CJ in Kroehn v Kroehn,338 ‘[w]ould a prudent person not compelled by poverty come into Court in such a case without [page 605] two counsel?’ In more compendious terms, a Victorian judge later expressed

the test as follows: ‘Would a reasonable and prudent, but not over-cautious man, in all the circumstances, seek the services of two counsel, notwithstanding the expense?’339 To make this determination, the taxing officer (or judge) places himself or herself in the position ‘of a sensible solicitor sitting in his chair and considering in what light of his then knowledge is reasonable in the interests of his lay client’.340 What is contemplated in the above inquiry is the extent to which a litigant would be prepared to commit his or her own resources to the suit even though he or she might lose, and not only fail to obtain anything from the adversary but also be required to pay the adversary’s costs in addition to his or her own. The test postulates a person of reasonable, but neither affluent nor meagre, means to whom these would be important considerations. It denotes an objective quality, and not merely the importance of the case to one or other of the parties.341 It is concerned not with what a reasonable litigant might be prepared to do in order to win but with what such a person would adjudge necessary or prudent in order to have his or her case properly presented.342 Barwick CJ explained the point as follows in Stanley v Phillips:343 The emphasis throughout is upon obtaining an adequate presentation to enable justice to be done: it is not upon the propriety of the steps takes by a litigant to ensure the maximum of success in his own cause. That of course he may do but not … at his opponent’s expense … [The question is not whether] a man in seeking his own maximum advantage would be imprudent not to engage counsel of a particular level of experience or skill. The question is whether the services of more than one counsel are reasonably necessary for the adequate presentation of the case.

Thus it is not enough to justify casting on an unsuccessful defendant the costs of the plaintiff’s senior counsel that the plaintiff’s advisers reasonably regarded the retainer of senior counsel as the best way to protect the plaintiff’s interests, or as reasonably necessary to ensure the plaintiff maximum prospects of success.344 17.77 In applying the test, courts have refrained from seeking to exhaustively list the features of a case that justify the retainer of more than one counsel.345 It has been judicially remarked that ‘[t]he facts in any particular case which should lead the Taxing Master to allow two counsel are as various as is litigation itself, and each case must depend on its own facts’.346 Yet the cases do indicate factors that influence courts in this context, which include:347 the volume of material to be handled;

the number or character of the witnesses to be examined; the nature or extent of the cross-examination required;348 the anticipated length of the case;349 the complexity or difficulty of its issues of fact or law, and of the required presentation; [page 606] the extent of the preparatory research of fact or law to be undertaken; the level of court at which the matter is heard;350 the importance of the outcome to the parties;351 the involvement of charges of fraud, or other serious imputations of personal reputation or integrity; and the general practice in matters of the kind in question.352 There is some confluence in the above factors. For instance, the higher the level of court in which a matter is heard, the greater the likelihood that it raises potentially difficult areas of law. Yet it appears possible to group most of these factors into factors relating to the work involved in the case (which goes to the need to have more than one counsel, not necessarily senior counsel, so as to share the workload) and those that relate the difficulty of the case (which goes to the need for expertise of the inner bar).353 For allowance to be made for senior counsel, it has been said, ‘the matter should possess some suitably notable degree of volume or complexity before allowance is also made for a junior, that is, there should be seen to be more than might reasonably be expected of the capacity of senior counsel to control the matter properly alone’.354 Matters such as the level of court and the importance of the case to the parties most commonly, though not invariably, fall within these two general areas.355 What is clear is that no factor alone, or even in combination with others, is necessarily decisive in any given case.

Timing for appropriate consideration

17.78 The proper time for consideration whether it is prudent to employ two counsel is usually identified as the time when the brief was delivered.356 In fact, it may be even earlier than this, given that the decision to brief two counsel is necessarily taken before briefs are delivered.357 The court should thus determine the propriety of that decision by reference to the state of affairs that obtained when it was made. Any temporal gap between that decision and the delivery of the brief is likely to be minimal. A useful question to pose is whether a reasonable and competent solicitor, advising the client at the time (or immediately before) the brief was delivered, was justified, on the state of his or her knowledge at that point, in concluding that the case required the engagement of two counsel.358 For this purpose, the taxing officer must eschew the wisdom of hindsight.359

Relevance of type of case 17.79 On occasion there has been a tendency to stereotype certain types of cases as being usually handled adequately by one counsel. A typical example is a personal injury action, usually arising out of a motor vehicle or industrial accident. In the motor accident case of [page 607] Stanley v Phillips360 Barwick CJ found the case to be devoid of any complexity that would warrant two counsel. In so ruling his Honour disclaimed any suggestion that running down or factory accident cases are in a separate class of action for the purposes of taxation, but that ‘by reason of its nature the running-down and the factory accident case will not … usually present any of those features which may render the employment of more than one counsel necessary or proper in the relevant sense’.361 Hence the reference by some judges to a case being ‘run-of-the-mill’ and so not a necessary or proper one for multiple counsel.362 17.80 The foregoing should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the relevant inquiry is not the general class of case in question — such a blinkered focus is inconsistent with the nature of the discretion vested in the taxing officer — but whether or not the individual case before the court

exhibits the characteristics that make it appropriate to retain two counsel.363 For example, in Cole v Gardner Bros (Qld) Pty Ltd364 a claim for damages for personal injury was held to justify the retention of two counsel as the case was a substantial one with real difficulties in the way of success, coupled with serious questions of contributory liability, the facts being considerably more complicated than the normal industrial accident type of case. In each case, the court balances the desirability of being assisted by senior counsel against the policy that the costs of litigation not be inflated by the allowance of two counsels’ fees.365 So even though a case may exhibit some characteristics tending to justify the retainer of two counsel, these must be balanced against the latter policy. For example, in Oldaker v Currington,366 a case arising out of a workplace injury, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria balanced the importance of the case to the plaintiff367 — as any case in which a plaintiff claims to have suffered permanent disabilities has great importance to a plaintiff — against the fact that the trial could not be foreseen as so protracted that for this reason alone two counsel were needed to divide the work of presenting the plaintiff’s case,368 and that there was little if anything in [page 608] the nature and issues of the case taking it out of the usual run of personal injury cases. That the medical evidence could not be confirmed by radiological examination was, in the court’s view, by no means unusual, nor were the many and varied symptoms and complaints suffered by the plaintiff any more than a common feature in evidence in such cases. This led the court to conclude that briefing senior counsel in cases of this kind can rarely be justified,369 and that cases in which the burden of the expense of senior counsel may fairly be imposed upon the opposite party must be out of the ordinary and present some special difficulties that require the attention of senior counsel.370 17.81 Notwithstanding the foregoing, defamation cases as a class not infrequently justify allowance for two counsel. It has been judicially observed, to this end, that the complexity of defamation litigation dictates that two junior counsel ‘are common particularly in the District court even

where damages are modest such orders are usually made’.371 The case law, to this end, reveals multiple illustrations,372 although again judges caution against inflexible (or even general) rules; rather, ‘[e]ach case must turn on its own facts’.373

Importance of case 17.82 The importance of a case, either to the general community or the parties, alone or in combination with other relevant factors, may lead a taxing officer (or court) to allow to the successful party costs of two counsel. A case may, for instance, raise a novel question of law with far ranging implications, in which case fees of both senior and junior counsel may be allowed.374 The importance of a case can also be measured by its significance to the financial position375 or reputation376 of one or all of the parties; the greater that significance, the more appropriate a prudent person may go in with two counsel. 17.83 In an action for damages, the importance of the matter may be measured both by the amount claimed and the amount recovered. The latter is usually more important because the [page 609] statement of the amount claimed in actions may be ‘no more than a pleader’s flourish with no relation to reasonable compensation’,377 meaning that what is recovered is a better guide to its importance than what was claimed.378 Whether the amount claimed or recovered can be decisive of itself is unclear. There are case examples that have involved no real complexity, lengthy duration or the need for special skill in cross-examination by senior counsel, but the amount claimed and recovered has been so substantial that, given what was at stake, a prudent plaintiff would have retained two counsel or at least senior counsel.379 Conversely, there is also case authority that the amount claimed or recovered cannot be determinative, but only indicative of the degree of likely complexity or difficulty of the matter.380 So in Humphries v TWT Ltd,381 for example, Miles CJ held that the low monetary value of the claim, coupled with the lack of particular aspects of the case

demonstrating the need for senior counsel, meant that the retainer of senior counsel was a luxury the unsuccessful defendant should not have to bear.

General practice of litigants 17.84 The general practice of litigants in engaging counsel in cases of a particular class can be weighed in conjunction with other relevant factors.382 Certainly where it is not the practice in the class of case before the court in question to brief multiple counsel, the party seeking to recover the fees of more than one counsel must prove the case to be well outside the run-of-themill. Conversely, where it is almost invariable that the practice in a class of case is that each party is represented by two counsel, the taxing officer may be inclined to treat this as weighing in favour of allowing the fees of two counsel on taxation. Also, if a particular defendant who is wealthy and powerful adopts a policy of litigating with two counsel, the taxing officer can take this into account in determining whether the plaintiff was justified in retaining two counsel.383 17.85 As general practice can change, taxing officers (and the courts) must ensure that the discretion is not exercised inconsistently with current practice. So whilst the test applied remains unchanged, its application in the contemporary scene may generate conclusions that differ from those drawn in earlier times in a different context of practice and community life.384 Owen J in Madden v Hemmings385 remarked to this end that although in the past the briefing of two counsel in a motor negligence case would have been the exception rather than the rule, in view of the vast increase in cases of this kind what was the exception almost seems to have become the rule, and the present practice of briefing two counsel was a factor to be taken into account by a taxing officer.

Level of court 17.86 The extent to which the level of court in the court hierarchy should influence the propriety of briefing multiple counsel is unclear. There is, on the one hand, the view that the appropriateness of allowing the fees of two counsel depends on the nature of the particular case

[page 610] and not on a court’s position in the hierarchy.386 On this view, that a suit is heard in a lower court is no more ground of itself to deny two counsel’s fees on taxation than a ground of itself to allow these fees in a superior court.387 17.87 Yet to the extent that the level in the court hierarchy in which a matter is heard can properly be seen to reflect its complexity or substance, the identity of the court dovetails into the weighty factors in ascertaining the appropriateness of retaining two counsel. In Smith v Madden388 Dixon J opined that in High Court proceedings taxing officers should not treat the briefing of two counsel as exceptional, but as usual and proper unless the proceedings are simple and involve no question of consequence. As proceedings in the High Court, except in relation to matters within its original jurisdiction, require special leave, which ordinarily is not granted unless the matter is of legal substance or complexity, there is good reason for his Honour’s remark. In any case, in Smith v Madden the case was anything but simple or insubstantial, but one of consequence to the parties, the trial involving a considerable body of evidence covering many matters of contested fact and disputed inferences and not a little conflict of testimony.389 In fact, it is not uncommon that cases in appellate courts exhibit complexity or importance sufficient to justify the need for the assistance of two counsel. Again it is not the level of the court per se that justifies the allowance of two counsel but the characteristics of the case in that court. For example, in Re Price (deceased),390 a case in which the construction of a will was in issue, Mansfield J held that given the substantial interest of the defendant at stake, that she was compelled to come to the court to establish that interest, and the general practice of employing two counsel in matters before the Full Court, the fees of two counsel should be allowed to her on taxation. Conversely, it may be that a matter at first instance involves a heavier workload than an appeal, as the latter may rest on a single matter of law, which may go against any justification to retain two counsel for the appeal.391 17.88 In light of the foregoing, the suggestion by Jacobs J in V M Hart v Rawlinson392 of a presumption that in the superior court of a state the costs of

senior counsel should be allowed cannot be accepted as correct. It goes against prevailing norms directed to reducing the cost of [page 611] litigation393 and is in any case inconsistent with both prior394 and subsequent395 case authority, and the test to be applied. More recently, the New South Wales Court of Appeal has, to this end, disclaimed any ‘convention’ that it was appropriate for any party to an appeal before the court to be represented by senior and junior counsel, instead emphasising that ‘each case where appropriate will be considered on its own merits so far as the allowance of two counsel is concerned’.396

Duration of case 17.89 The impact that the likely duration of a case may have on whether a prudent litigant not compelled by poverty would engage more than one counsel was explained by Else-Mitchell J in Willis v Edgar as follows:397 [T]he efficient conduct of a case often requires counsel to be able to find at short notice particular passages in the evidence or a particular exhibit and in cases where the evidence is voluminous and exhibits are numerous this cannot be done by one counsel. And what is more important the presentation of evidence from many witnesses will often be beyond the burden which one counsel should personally have to bear. No general rule can be laid down about how long a case should endure before this becomes a critical element but, in view of the proportion of time in the hearing of a jury cause which is occupied by addresses, it is difficult in my opinion to regard any case of less than two days’ duration as justifying on that ground the allowance of the fees of two counsel.

Relevance of conflict of evidence 17.90 Merely because witnesses have to be examined and cross-examined is insufficient to justify the retainer of senior counsel or multiple counsel.398 Conflict in evidence of witnesses, even expert witnesses,399 is hardly a characteristic limited to matters of real complexity, but forms the essence of most contested matters. This point was again explained by Else-Mitchell J in Willis v Edgar:400 A mere conflict of evidence in a case, no matter how wide or sharp or critical, does not

distinguish it from any other case, for every case which is litigated presumably comes to trial because there is a conflict of evidence which it is the duty of the judicial system to resolve. Nor is the fact of or necessity for long cross-examination of itself decisive of this matter because cross-examination is not always directed to the destruction of the witness’ credit or of the whole or a substantial part of his evidence, but is often used for much the same purpose as is served by evidence in chief.

17.91 Where, however, a conflict of evidence is such that success or failure of a party’s cause may be expected to depend upon the quality and effect of cross-examination, the briefing of two counsel, and especially of senior counsel with special ability in that field, may well be [page 612] justified. This may assume relevance, for instance, in actions for slander or fraud where the spoken words are denied, although the field of cases that requires careful cross-examination to resolve a critical conflict of evidence is not limited to any special category of case. Yet in actions for personal injury, or in actions where the assessment of damages only is in issue, the occasions for this are less frequent, and in such actions it is not often that the sort of conflict arises that is likely to be resolved only by careful cross-examination of the adversary’s witnesses.401

Three (or more) counsel 17.92 The basic inquiry in determining whether a successful litigant should be allowed the costs of three counsel on taxation is equivalent to that which applies in respect of two counsel: ‘would a reasonable and prudent man acting with ordinary prudence have ventured into the court without three counsel?’402 The factors that go to determining whether or not such a course is reasonable and prudent are therefore the same as those that determine the reasonableness and prudence of employing two counsel.403 However, in view of the fact to allow three counsel further increases the costs of litigation for an unsuccessful litigant, the courts have shown less willingness to allow three counsel than to allow two. To this end, it has been observed that ‘there is rarely a case in which [the employment of a third counsel] will be justified’,404 the employment of a third counsel is an unusual expense 99

cases out of 100,405 and that to justify three counsel the case must be ‘wholly special and peculiar’,406 ‘very strong’,407 and involve ‘extraordinary complication and difficulty’.408 It is therefore unsurprising manifold occasions where courts have disallowed the costs of three counsel.409 An example of a case where the costs of three counsel were allowed is Australian Blue Metal Ltd v Hughes,410 involving complicated and difficult issues, all of which had to be investigated, pursued and argued, a trial of up to six weeks’ duration, a considerable number of documents, general complexity and great commercial importance to the parties. The cases reveal various other instances of courts allowing three counsel, in cases of considerable [page 613] significance to the parties, punctuated by complication and difficulty.411 A recent example is Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd,412 where the amount in dispute was around $40 million, raising issues pertaining to the parties’ contractual relationship that would persist for several more years, and the difficulty, complexity and importance of the case from the parties’ perspective was evidenced by the legal teams each retained. Conversely, that the party ultimately burdened with costs had chosen not to engage multiple counsel may be a factor, coupled with others, disinclining a court or taxing officer to allow the successful party an allowance for multiple counsel.413 Relativity may carry some weight in this context.

Interstate (or out of town) counsel 17.93 The expense of retaining counsel from outside the locale in which the matter is heard will be allowed on taxation if the taxing officer considers that a litigant of ordinary prudence would reasonably have incurred it to ensure a proper presentation of his or her case to the court.414 The availability of counsel from within the locale with the experience and expertise necessary to adequately conduct the case is the principal inquiry of a taxing officer (or court) in this context. Where a taxing officer (or court) concludes that there is available local counsel having that experience and expertise, the extent to

which fees charged by counsel outside the locale exceed those it would be reasonable for local counsel to charge will be disallowed on taxation.415 The converse does not follow; there is no obligation on an instructing solicitor to seek out counsel from outside the locale who may charge less than local counsel for fear of the reasonable fees of the latter being disallowed on taxation. A useful illustration is Dalgety Australia Operations Ltd v F F Seeley Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2).416 There Bollen J disallowed the costs of briefing of an eminent Sydney silk to the extent that these exceeded what would have been incurred had silk in practice in Adelaide been briefed. His Honour found it unnecessary for the attainment of justice to brief counsel who resided and had chambers out of Adelaide, in that just like any other city in Australia, Adelaide had counsel who could well have handled the case.417 Conversely, in Charlick Trading Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission418 inquiries of two local silks showed that there were no suitably qualified and experienced senior counsel in Adelaide available to take the brief, [page 614] and this was not challenged. Mansfield J thus found it necessary or proper for the respondent to have engaged interstate senior counsel, and allowed proper travelling expenses to and from Adelaide and accommodation expenses.419 17.94 Where the matter is to be heard outside a capital city, or otherwise in a town or city where there are few counsel of the requisite seniority, specialty or expertise to deal adequately with it, a taxing officer or court may allow the reasonable fees of out-of-town counsel. In Atherton Tableland Maize Board v Clements & Marshall Pty Ltd,420 for instance, Macnaughton J reversed the taxing officer’s decision to deny the fee of Brisbane counsel in a matter heard in Townsville, reasoning that the large amount of money at stake coupled with the fact that the case raised an important question of law meant that a reasonable person acting with ordinary prudence would not have ventured into court without leading counsel. In the same vein, Fox J in Tarrant v Lier421 remarked that, at a time when the local bar had only eight members in active practice several of these being very junior and comparatively inexperienced, ‘[p]robably it would not be unreasonable for counsel other

than local counsel to be briefed if there were only two or three local counsel who, being sufficiently experienced, were available to accept a brief’. Yet his Honour did add that the growing size of the local bar meant a greater tendency to expect resort to be had to the local bar.422 17.95 Merely because there are no local counsel of sufficient knowledge or experience in a particular matter does not give a litigant carte blanche in engaging senior counsel or multiple counsel from outside the locale. The taxing officer (or court) in each case will consider whether the seniority or number of counsel retained was necessary or proper for the attainment of justice. For instance, it is open to the taxing officer to allow senior counsel from interstate but not the costs of interstate junior counsel to the extent that these exceed local junior counsel fees.423 It may be that only one counsel is justified. In Humphries v TWT Ltd,424 for instance, Miles CJ said that if local counsel lacked sufficient experience and expertise in defamation matters to conduct the plaintiff’s case, either junior counsel from elsewhere should have been engaged on the facts or, if senior counsel were engaged, the difficulty and complexity of the case did not justify engaging junior counsel to assist the leader. An instructing solicitor familiar with the case would have been adequate.

1.

Other items commonly referred to in scales of costs that are not specifically discussed in this chapter include getting instructions, commencing proceedings, the drawing, engrossing, perusing, copying and serving documents, and the writing of correspondence: see 15.58.

2.

See 17.3–17.7.

3.

See 17.8–17.10.

4.

See 17.11–17.17.

5.

See 17.18–17.20.

6.

See 17.21–17.24.

7.

See 17.25–17.27.

8.

See 17.28–17.39.

9.

See 17.40–17.46.

10. See 17.47–17.95. 11. See 15.1. 12. See generally 16.2–16.13. As to the meaning of ‘necessary or proper’ in this context see 16.16–16.17. 13. See 16.7.

14. See 16.3. 15. Being the commencement date of the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic). 16. See 16.8 (Northern Territory), 16.11 (Victoria). 17. See 16.12. 18. See 16.18–16.22. 19. See 16.23–16.29. 20. Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association of Australia Ltd v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Company Ltd (1903) 29 VLR 427 at 432 per Holroyd J; Pêcheries Ostendaises (Soc Anon) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co [1928] 1 KB 750 at 762–3 per Atkin LJ; British United Shoe Manufacturing Co Ltd v Holdfast Boots Ltd [1936] 3 All ER 717 at 726–7 per Bennett J (costs allowed ‘if incurred in respect of matter which proved useful in the action’); Barwick v Barwick (1937) 33 Tas LR 1 at 4 per Clark J; Bligh v Tickle Industries Pty Ltd [1958] Qd R 121 at 124 per O’Hagan J; Higgins v Nicol (No 2) (1972) 21 FLR 34 at 37–8 per Spicer CJ and Smithers J (Cth Indus Ct); Comcare v Labathas (1995) 61 FCR 149 at 158; BC9502443 per Finn J; Admiral Management Services Ltd v Para-Protect Europe Ltd [2002] 2 All ER 1017; [2002] EWHC 233 (Ch) at [21]–[26] per Stanley Burnton J; McGlinn v Waltham Contractors Ltd (No 1) [2005] 3 All ER 1126; [2005] EWHC 1419 (TCC) (where Judge Peter Coulson QC concluded that the costs incurred by a party in complying with any pre-action protocol were capable of being costs ‘incidental to’ any proceedings which were subsequently commenced: at [5]–[9]); Roach v Home Office [2010] QB 256; [2009] EWHC 312 (QB) at [48] per Davis J (who remarked that ‘[c]osts of attendance at an inquest are not incapable of being recoverable as costs incidental to subsequent civil proceedings’). 21. Thomas (Joseph) v Cunard White Star Ltd [1951] P 153 at 155–6 per Willmer J. 22. [1904] 1 Ch 369. 23. Bright’s Trustee v Sellar [1904] 1 Ch 369 at 372. See also Jones v D Davies & Sons Ltd [1914] 3 KB 549 (qualifying fee allowed to an expert witness even though qualifying occurred prior to the institution of the proceedings). 24. [1905] VLR 84 at 88–9 per Hodges J. 25. Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association of Australia Ltd v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Company Ltd (1903) 29 VLR 427 at 432 per Holroyd J. 26. Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association of Australia Ltd v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Company Ltd (1903) 29 VLR 427 at 432 per Holroyd J. 27. [1981] Ch 179 at 186. 28. Re Gibson’s Settlement Trusts [1981] Ch 179 at 187–8 (paragraph break omitted; footnote supplied). 29. As to the costs consequences of a case settling before trial see 14.66–14.73. 30. [1928] 1 KB 750. 31. Pêcheries Ostendaises (Soc Anon) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co [1928] 1 KB 750 at 763. 32. Pêcheries Ostendaises (Soc Anon) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co [1928] 1 KB 750 at 763. 33. [1931] 1 Ch 428. 34. Frankenburg v Famous Lasky Film Service Ltd [1931] 1 Ch 428 at 435–6.

35. Pêcheries Ostendaises (Soc Anon) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co [1928] 1 KB 750 at 758. 36. Frankenburg v Famous Lasky Film Service Ltd [1931] 1 Ch 428 at 436. 37. Frankenburg v Famous Lasky Film Service Ltd [1931] 1 Ch 428 at 440. 38. [1928] 1 KB 750. 39. Pêcheries Ostendaises (Soc Anon) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co [1928] 1 KB 750 at 759– 60. 40. Pêcheries Ostendaises (Soc Anon) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co [1928] 1 KB 750 at 760 (footnote supplied). See also at 758 per Lord Hanworth MR, at 765 per Lawrence LJ. 41. As to a stay pending security for costs see 28.27–28.30. 42. Pêcheries Ostendaises (Soc Anon) v Merchants’ Marine Insurance Co [1928] 1 KB 750 at 761 per Atkin LJ. 43. FCR 2011 Sch 1. 44. State of Victoria v Sportsbet Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 174; BC201209565 at [15] per the court. 45. See, for example, Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) s 88(1A). 46. Raethel v Director General, Department of Education and Training [2000] NSWADT 56 at [37]– [55]; Macdonald Contractors (Australia) Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2007] NSWADT 56 at [14]; Blanch v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2008] NSWADT 24 at [19]; Kyriacou v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2009] NSWADT 175 at [39]; Argus Industrial Group Holdings Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2010] NSWADT 136 at [40]. 47. NT r 63.71; Tas r 860(6); Vic r 63.78. 48. (1993) 117 ACTR 1 at 6. 49. See Oliver, p 80. 50. (1972) 21 FLR 34 at 57–8 (Cth Indus Ct). 51. [2001] FCA 629; BC200102744 at [92] (footnote supplied). These remarks were endorsed by Beech J in Red Hill Iron Pty Ltd v API Management Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 323 (S); BC201208939 at [38]. 52. The concept of party and party costs formerly adopted in FCR 1979 O 62 r 19 has arguably been altered by the current rules: see 16.3. 53. Charlick Trading Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission [2001] FCA 629; BC200102744 at [93]. 54. Red Hill Iron Pty Ltd v API Management Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 323 (S); BC201208939 at [36]– [42] per Beech J. 55. Suffolk v Suffolk [2010] FamCA 170; BC201050197 at [80]–[86] per O’Reilly J. 56. [2005] QDC 94 at [37]. 57. The term ‘attending’, though, traditionally a reference to the solicitor’s ‘physically going somewhere in order to meet and have some dealing with a person’, has been ‘legitimately extended to encompass attending a person who calls at a solicitor’s office, or attending a person by telephone’: Queensland Building Services Authority v Mahony [2012] QDC 226 at [36] per

McGill SC DCJ. 58. [1961] Qd R 599 at 603. 59. Lawrence v M D Nikolaidis & Co (2003) 57 NSWLR 355; [2003] NSWCA 129; BC200303669 at [50]–[51] per Hodgson JA. 60. Dalgety Australia Operations Ltd v F F Seeley Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 75 at 84–5 per Bollen J; Planet International Ltd v Turfella Pty Ltd (SC(NSW), Young J, 4 November 1991, unreported) BC9101458 at 5. 61. (1988) 49 SASR 75 at 85. 62. Tas r 863(3); Vic r 63.79. 63. Higgins v Nicol (No 2) (1972) 21 FLR 34 at 38 per Spicer CJ and Smithers J (Cth Indus Ct). 64. (1972) 21 FLR 34 at 39 per Spicer CJ and Smithers J (Cth Indus Ct). 65. Re Catlin (1854) 18 Beav 508 at 516–17; 52 ER 200 at 203 per Sir John Romilly MR; Slingsby v Attorney-General [1918] P 236 at 241–2 per Swinfen Eady LJ (noting that this has been the invariable practice of the Taxing Office: at 242). 66. Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v Coffee (No 2) [1982] VR 97 at 119 per Fullagar J. In fact in Re Catlin (1854) 18 Beav 508 at 517; 52 ER 200 at 203 Sir John Romilly MR remarked that were the solicitor permitted to charge, this might lead to dangerous results. 67. NT r 63.72(10). 68. See, for example, Re Legal Aid Commission of Victoria (1983) FLC ¶91-363 at 78,438 per Treyvaud J (who remarked that conversational-type attendances ‘are often the only and proper means of ensuring communication between counsel and solicitor enabling them together properly to prepare and conduct the litigation on which their client is engaged, especially in circumstances where counsel is not physically instructed in Court’). 69. [1969] 2 NSWR 54 at 62. 70. Traditionally a brief fee is to cover not merely the first six hours in court but some reasonable period of preparation, at the very least some time of the day and night before trial: see 17.47–17.51. 71. Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v Kevin Lindsay Coffee (No 2) [1982] VR 97 at 119 per Fullagar J. 72. GBT Corporation Pty Ltd v Scott (1994) 116 FLR 266 at 271 per Higgins J (SC(ACT)). As to the test applicable in the context of multiple counsel see 17.73–17.92. 73. Cf Taussig v Langworthy (No 2) (SC(Tas), The Master, 20 June 1966, unreported) at 2–3 (allowance of senior counsel only where the instructing solicitor acted as junior counsel, but separate fee allowed for giving instruction). 74. Planet International Ltd v Turfella Pty Ltd (SC(NSW), Young J, 4 November 1991, unreported) BC9101458 at 7 (‘In almost all matters in the Supreme Court it is necessary to have a second person in attendance because of the necessity of marshalling witnesses and making telephone calls and getting instructions from the client whilst the case is still proceeding’); GBT Corporation Pty Ltd v Scott (1994) 116 FLR 266 at 271 per Higgins J (SC(ACT)); Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Lardner [1998] ACTSC 24; BC9801211 at [48] (FC). 75. Re Duke’s Will [1907] VLR 632. 76. Bennett v Seaman (1993) 117 ACTR 1 at 5 per Higgins J.

77. This is specifically prescribed by ACT r 1805; NT r 63.42(1); Qld r 724 (formerly Qld r 714); Vic r 63.44: see 18.82. 78. Mitchell v Mitchell (1971) 19 FLR 100 at 106–7 per Neasey J (SC(Tas)); Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] 1 Qd R 183 at 187–90; [2001] QSC 78; BC200100974 per Wilson J (see R O’Sullivan, ‘Recovery of Costs of an Interstate Solicitor in Litigation’ (May 2001) 21 Proctor 24). See also M Johnson, ‘Interstate Litigation’ (January 1997) 71 LIJ 46. 79. See, for example, Minister for Works v Australian Dredging and General Works Pty Ltd [1986] WAR 235 at 242–3 per Kennedy J (FC). Cf Re O’Connor’s Bills of Costs [1993] 1 Qd R 423; James Aris & Associates v Minister for Works (1994) 11 WAR 390; BC9406787 (FC). 80. (2005) 240 LSJS 366; [2005] SASC 242; BC200504514 at [43]. 81. Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) s 73 (formerly ACT 1970 s 191D); Legal Profession Act 2004 s 100 (formerly NSW 1987 s 48Q); Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) s 80 (formerly NT 1974 s 134G); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 75; Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 23B (see also s 23A, which provides that an interstate legal practitioner who practises the profession of law in South Australia is an officer of the Supreme Court); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas) s 80 (formerly Tas 1993 s 55A); Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 2.4.32 (formerly Vic 1996 ss 54, 55); Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 69 (formerly WA 2003 s 90). 82. SDS Corporation Ltd v Pasdonnay Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 26 (S2); BC200404600 at [137]–[138] per Roberts-Smith J; Santos Ltd v Delhi Petroleum Pty Ltd (2005) 240 LSJS 366; [2005] SASC 242; BC200504514 at [57] per Bleby J. The terms of s 209(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) (now repealed) — which served to disentitle a person who is not a barrister or solicitor of the Supreme Court to claim or recover or receive directly or indirectly a sum of money or other remuneration for appearing or acting on behalf of another person in the Supreme Court — once served as an impediment to the recovery of costs by an interstate principal (Theden v Nominal Defendant [2008] 2 Qd R 367; [2008] QCA 71; BC200802172; see also TNT Bulkships Ltd v Hopkins (1989) 65 NTR 1 at 16–18 per Kearney J in the context of the former Legal Practitioners Act 1974 (NT) s 22(4)). 83. NT r 63.42(1)(b); Qld r 724(4) (formerly Qld r 714(4)); Vic r 63.44(b) (but as from 1 April 2013, Vic r 63.44(a), referring to ‘an amount appropriate to the place where the work was done’). 84. Elders Trustee and Executor Company v Herbert (1996) 132 FLR 24; BC9601883 (CA(NT)); Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] 1 Qd R 183; [2001] QSC 78; BC200100974; Base Metals Exploration NL (in liq) v Huntley Management Ltd (formerly Teys Management Ltd) [2007] QSC 194; BC200706827 at [16]–[17] per Moynihan J; Samson Capital Pty Ltd v Westpac Private Equity Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 453; BC200710919 at [13]–[22] per Hargrave J (see D Vine-Hall, ‘Recovering NSW Costs Outside the State’ (March 2008) 46 LSJ 32). 85. Samson Capital Pty Ltd v Westpac Private Equity Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 453; BC200710919 at [13] per Hargrave J. 86. Samson Capital Pty Ltd v Westpac Private Equity Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 453; BC200710919 at [24] per Hargrave J. 87. SDS Corporation Ltd v Pasdonnay Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 26 (S2); BC200404600 at [134]–[138] per Roberts-Smith J; Santos Ltd v Delhi Petroleum Pty Ltd (2005) 240 LSJS 366; [2005] SASC 242; BC200504514 at [57] per Bleby J. 88. Santos Ltd v Delhi Petroleum Pty Ltd (2005) 240 LSJS 366; [2005] SASC 242; BC200504514 at [42] per Bleby J.

89. See 7.18–7.20. 90. Registrar of Titles v Watson [1954] VLR 111 at 112 per Gavan Duffy J (FC); Environment Protection Authority v Taylor Woodrow (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1997) 97 LGERA 368 at 388 per Lloyd J (LEC). 91. [1975] 1 Ch 112. 92. Re Eastwood (deceased) [1975] 1 Ch 112 at 130. 93. Re Eastwood (deceased) [1975] 1 Ch 112 at 132 per Russell LJ; Environment Protection Authority v Taylor Woodrow (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1997) 97 LGERA 368 at 388 per Lloyd J (LEC); Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Hattersley (2001) 51 NSWLR 333 at 337; [2001] NSWSC 60; BC200100604 per Davies AJ; Ly v Jenkins (2001) 187 ALR 178 at 218; [2001] FCA 1640; BC200107326 per Kiefel J (FC). Similar principles are statutorily prescribed in Western Australia in respect of the charges of government lawyers: see 17.24. 94. FCR 1979 O 62 r 1A (now superseded); Tas r 863(12); WA O 66 r 8 (limited to government lawyers). Cf HCR 2004 r 56.09.4 (‘Where a party is represented as counsel by a Law Officer or by an employee of the Crown, and the party is unable to vouch payment of a fee to that practitioner, the Taxing Officer may, in cases where a fee would have been allowed to counsel, allow to the party such sum as counsel’s fee for drawing or settling any document or for appearing as counsel as the Taxing Officer considers reasonable in the circumstances’). 95. (2001) 51 NSWLR 333 at 339; [2001] NSWSC 60; BC200100604 (paragraph break omitted). 96. See, for example, Attorney-General v Shillibeer (1849) 4 Ex 606 at 613; 154 ER 1356 at 1359 per Parke B; Law Society of New South Wales v Kurland (SC(NSW), Greenwood M, 1 April 1992, unreported) BC9201968 at 15; Bank of Western Australia Ltd v O’Neill (SC(WA), White J, 22 January 1999, unreported) BC9900058. 97. Attorney-General v Shillibeer (1849) 4 Ex 606; 154 ER 1356. This decision has been followed in Victoria (Ex parte Slack (1884) 6 ALT 23; Registrar of Titles v Watson [1954] VLR 111 at 112– 13 per Gavan Duffy J (FC)), Queensland (Ex parte Gagliardi (No 2) (1895) 6 QLJ 200), Tasmania (The Bengarin (1916) 12 Tas LR 26 at 26–7 per Nicholls CJ, at 28–9 per Crisp J), South Australia (Lenthall v Hillson [1933] SASR 31 (FC)), Western Australia (Bank of Western Australia Ltd v O’Neill (SC(WA), White J, 22 January 1999, unreported) BC9900058) and New South Wales (Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Hattersley (2001) 51 NSWLR 333 at 338–9; [2001] NSWSC 60; BC200100604 per Davies AJ). 98. Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Hattersley (2001) 51 NSWLR 333 at 340; [2001] NSWSC 60; BC200100604 per Davies AJ. 99. Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Hattersley (2001) 51 NSWLR 333 at 340; [2001] NSWSC 60; BC200100604 per Davies AJ. 100. Bridgetown-Greenbushes Friends of the Forest Inc v Executive Director of the Department of Conservation and Land Management (SC(WA), Murray J, 16 March 1998, unreported) BC9800621 at 8. 101. See 7.19. 102. Thomas v Schwager (1997) 98 A Crim R 486 at 494; BC9707383 per Parker J (SC(WA)). 103. In particular, the High Court rules state that the taxing officer can allow only the copying of such (parts of) documents accompanying briefs as he or she considers necessary for the instruction of counsel or for use at the hearing: HCR 2004 r 56.05 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 46). 104. (1993) 117 ACTR 1 at 2.

105. See Brown v McEncroe (1891) 12 LR (NSW) Eq 93. 106. Bennett v Seaman (1993) 117 ACTR 1 at 3, referring to Commercial Bank Ltd v City of Melbourne Bank Ltd (1900) 6 ALR (CN) 17; Smith v Smith [1906] VLR 78. 107. Vic r 63.73. 108. Anglo-Italian Holdings Pty Ltd v Varallo (2005) 12 VR 257; [2005] VSCA 257; BC200509383 at [47]–[48] per Hollingworth AJA, with whom Buchanan and Nettle JJA concurred. 109. Sahinovic v McGauchie [2007] VCC 109 at [35] per Judge Murphy (‘Should it be held that it was reasonable for the copying job to be undertaken in-house it is difficult to see how rationally the second copy could be treated any differently from the third to fifth copy’), endorsed by Judge Strong in Hodson v Consolidated Transport Industries Ltd [2007] VCC 838 at [10]. 110. (2004) 51 ACSR 578; [2004] FCA 1466; BC200408164 at [21]. 111. (1959) 101 CLR 298; BC5900240. 112. Gribbles Pathology (Vic) Pty Ltd v Shandford Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 51 ACSR 578; [2004] FCA 1466; BC200408164 at [22]. 113. Kelly v Norris (2004) 41 MVR 451; [2004] NSWCA 260; BC200404971 at [32] per Santow JA. 114. Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd (2011) 81 NSWLR 47; [2011] NSWCA 109; BC201103281 at [280]. 115. Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd (2011) 81 NSWLR 47; [2011] NSWCA 109; BC201103281 at [281]. 116. Supreme Court Practice Directions 2006 (SA) Pt I, direction 5.6 (cl 5.6.6) (‘The Court discourages the handing up of photocopies of decisions readily available in the Supreme Court library or available electronically’). 117. ACT Sch 4, Pt 4.2, item 16 (set charge for copies 1–10, 11–100, 101 and above). 118. HCR 2004 Sch 2, item 22. The former FCR 1979 Sch 2, via item 16, made equivalent provision. 119. SA Sch 2, item 6, Note H. 120. Being the commencement date of the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic), which introduced, inter alia, a new scale. 121. FCR 2011 Sch 3, item 9; Vic Appendix A, item 4 (cf the former Vic Appendix A, items 22(a), 24 (superseded). 122. Fam LR 2004 Sch 3, item 107; NT Appendix to O 63, Pt 3 item 6; Qld Sch 1 item 7, Sch 2 item 7; Tas Sch 1 Pt 1 item 16; Legal Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) Determination 2012 (WA) Sch, Table B, item 31 (which, following a course established by its 2010 precursor, sets a far lower rate than previous determinations: see William Buck (WA) Pty Ltd v Faulkner (No 2) [2012] WASC 257; BC201205219 at [25] per Kenneth Martin J). 123. See, for example, Rothwell v Gadowski (SC(Tas), The Master, 28 March 1966, unreported) at 1–2 (who considered it ‘patently unjust’ for a party to be required to pay $1153 for the copying of appeal books when they could have been prepared for less than a quarter of this amount); Bennett v Seaman (1993) 117 ACTR 1 at 3 per Higgins J (claim for 2478 pages copied for inclusion in counsel’s brief disallowed); Brookfield v Davey Products Pty Ltd (FCA, Branson J, 19 December 1997, unreported) (who discounted the amount claimed for photocopying to reflect economies of scale, bearing in mind that the amount per sheet is intended to make provision for the time of the clerk involved). Cf Ralkon Agricultural Company Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Development Commission

(FCA, Forster J, 11 July 1986, unreported) BC8601705 at [27]; Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (FCA, von Doussa J, 4 March 1998, unreported) BC9800513 at 11 (who conceded that at least some of the photocopying claimed could have been effected at cheaper rates using a commercial copier, but did not reduce the amount claimed as he had no evidence before him as to what extent photocopying could have been achieved more cheaply through a commercial copier, nor could he guess what additional charges may have been incurred in making the necessary arrangements with a commercial copier). 124. Bennett v Seaman (1993) 117 ACTR 1 at 3 per Higgins J. See also Anglo-Italian Holdings Pty Ltd v Varallo (2005) 12 VR 257; [2005] VSCA 257; BC200509383 at [29] per Hollingworth AJA, with whom Buchanan and Nettle JJA concurred. Although the statement in the text refers to ‘modern day technology’, the principle underscoring the statement is longstanding. In Cayron v Russell (1899) 25 VLR 379, where carbon copies were made at the same time as the original document, Hodges J disallowed the scale costs for the copies on the basis that they were not ‘reasonable’, reasoning that if there is a cheap way of making copies, parties must not resort to the expensive mode of making copies: at 381. 125. Anglo-Italian Holdings Pty Ltd v Varallo (2005) 12 VR 257; [2005] VSCA 257; BC200509383 at [34] per Hollingworth AJA, with whom Buchanan and Nettle JJA concurred. 126. For example, greater care may be required in copying documents for filing and for service than for use by a party’s own solicitors or counsel. 127. It may be appropriate, for instance, for a lawyer to copy ‘in house’ documents that are commercially or personally sensitive, for fear that using a commercial copier could compromise the client. 128. Anglo-Italian Holdings Pty Ltd v Varallo (2005) 12 VR 257; [2005] VSCA 257; BC200509383 at [34] per Hollingworth AJA, with whom Buchanan and Nettle JJA concurred. 129. See William Buck (WA) Pty Ltd v Faulkner (No 2) [2012] WASC 257; BC201205219 at [26]–[27] per Kenneth Martin J. 130. Hodson v Consolidated Transport Industries Ltd [2007] VCC 838 at [8]–[9] per Judge Strong. 131. See, for example, Anglo-Italian Holdings Pty Ltd v Varallo (2005) 12 VR 257; [2005] VSCA 257; BC200509383 at [50] per Hollingworth AJA, with whom Buchanan and Nettle JJA concurred (who held that, as the trial judge found that it would have been reasonable to have had three of the copies of the court book made by a commercial copier, he ought to have concluded that it was only necessary and proper to allow two copies at the scale rate and the remaining copies at a commercial rate). 132. HCR 2004 r 56.03 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 54); ACT r 1736(1) (which gives two examples of costs incurred: (1) reasonable conduct money or witness expenses paid to a witness, whether or not the witness attended under subpoena; and (2) reasonable expenses of preparing and proving plans, drawings, models or photograph) (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 31); Qld r 727(1) (formerly Qld r 729(1)); Vic r 63.77(1) (but ‘witnesses’ expenses are to be fixed in accordance with the scale in Appendix B: r 63.34(2)). 133. FCR 2011 Sch 3, item 17.1. 134. NT r 63.32(3). 135. Tas RSC 1965 Appendix M (continues to apply pursuant to RSC 2000 Sch 5), ‘Allowances to Witnesses’, cll 1, 2. 136. WA O 66 r 11(5).

137. SA r 274(3)(b) (cf former SA RSC r 101.16(1)(d)). 138. NT r 63.32(3). 139. HCR 2004 Sch 2, item 52; ACT Sch 4, Pt 4.2, item 46 (formerly item 36); Tas RSC 1965 Appendix M (continues to apply pursuant to RSC 2000 Sch 5), ‘Allowances to Witnesses’, cl 3 (‘a witness residing at a distance from the place of trial’), ‘Allowances to Interpreters and Translators’, cl 2; Vic Appendix B (which also applies to interpreters). A ‘country witness’ is, for this purpose: in the High Court and Australian Capital Territory, a witness who resides more than 50 kilometres from the court; in Victoria, a witness who resides more than 100 kilometres from the court. 140. O’Rourke v Commissioner for Railways (1893) 10 WN (NSW) 49 at 52 per Stephen J. 141. McLean v Brisbane Tramways Co (1899) 9 QLJ (NC) 60. 142. O’Rourke v Commissioner for Railways (1893) 10 WN (NSW) 49 at 52 per Stephen J. 143. Kelvin v Whyte, Thomson & Co (1909) 26 RPC 731 at 736 per Lord Salvesen (CS(Scot)) (who disapproved the practice of citing witnesses for the first day of a long proof when they would not be required until later); Wright v Bennett [1948] 1 All ER 410 at 413 per Somervell LJ (witnesses ‘should not be brought to court except when it is necessary to bring them there, and certainly if they are unnecessarily brought the costs of paying them for attending are inadmissible items’). 144. See 8.2–8.13. 145. Brown v Dibbs (1874) 12 SCR (NSW) 339 at 344–5 per Martin CJ. Cf W & A Gilbey Ltd v Continental Liqueurs Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 527 at 536 per Asprey J (the fact that the evidence of the witness on another issue in the appellant’s own case did not establish the point contended does not deprive the appellant of the costs and expenses pertaining to the witness in respect of the principal issue established). 146. O’Rourke v Commissioner for Railways (1893) 10 WN (NSW) 49 at 52 per Stephen J. As to the allowance of multiple expert witnesses on taxation see 17.35–17.36. 147. Levetus v Newton (1883) 28 Sol Jo 166; London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co v South-Eastern Railway Co (1889) 60 LT 753; Gregg & Co v Gardner [1897] 2 IR 122. 148. Clark, Tait & Co v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931) 47 CLR 142 at 146; BC3190105 per Rich J. See also Delaroque v S S Oxenholme & Co [1883] WN 227; Bartlett v Higgins [1901] 2 KB 230 at 238–9 per Collins LJ. Cf Wicksteed v Biggs (1885) 52 LT 428 at 430 per Pearson J; The Lord Strathcona (No 3) [1926] WN 270 at 270 per Atkin LJ (‘It was always open to a taxing master, who had seen what had happened in the course of the trial, to say notwithstanding the general opinion expressed by counsel before the trial in fact a particular witness in the circumstances was unnecessary’). 149. Chanter v Blackwood (No 3) (1904) 1 CLR 456 at 458 per Griffith CJ. 150. [1975] 1 NSWLR 260 at 264. See also Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 9) [2008] FCA 1115; BC200806933 at [20] per Heerey J. Cf Leeds Forge Company Ltd v Deighton’s Patent Flue and Tube Company Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 475 at 479–80 per Farwell J. 151. See, for example, Schweppes’ Ltd v Archer (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 178 at 182 per Jordan CJ (who held that in a passing off action involving cordial, having regard to the difficulty of obtaining satisfactory evidence when the taste of a substance is involved, it was reasonably prudent that the plaintiff should have employed an expert having an intimate knowledge of the taste and properties of the plaintiff’s product).

152. HCR 2004 r 56.10 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 82) (see also Sch 2, item 49: set fee); Vic Appendix B (albeit subject to a cap). Cf FCR 2011 Sch 3, item 17(2) (‘An expert may be allowed an amount equal to the expert’s actual fees for preparing to give evidence and of attending to give evidence’; this ousts the former range of fees found in FCR 1979 Sch 2, item 44). 153. See, for example, St Peters Corporation v Dangerfield (1971) 1 SASR 583 at 588 per Sangster J (who allowed the costs of valuers in accordance with the appropriate Real Estate Institute Scale, even though the valuers employed by the other party had charged lesser amounts). Prevailing competition policy has seen many professional scales abolished, with a corresponding increase in the difficulty in proving what is a reasonable amount. 154. Attorney-General v Drapers Company (1869) LR 9 Eq 69; Farraday v Tamworth Union (1916) 86 LJ Ch 436. 155. HCR 2004 Sch 2, item 54. 156. Cementation Construction v James D Keaveney (a firm), The Times, 21 July 1988, Phillips J. 157. Calcagno v State Government Insurance Commission (DC(SA), Kelly J, 13 July 1992, unreported). 158. See, for example, Schweppes’ Ltd v Archer (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 178 at 182 per Jordan CJ (who held that, in the absence of evidence that an expert could be obtained in Wagga Wagga, it was not unreasonable that one should be brought from Sydney). 159. See, for example, Calcagno v State Government Insurance Commission (DC(SA), Kelly J, 13 July 1992, unreported). 160. (1997) 68 SASR 217; BC9700157. 161. Burford v Allan (1997) 68 SASR 217 at 219–21; BC9700157. 162. [1931] 1 Ch 428 at 438 (characterising the rule laid down by Tomlin J in Graigola Merthyr Co Ltd v Swansea Corporation [1927] WN 30 that he would not hear more than two expert witnesses in cases where expert evidence was required unless there were special circumstances, as an ‘admirable working rule’ but nonetheless only a general rule to be followed by each judge at his or her discretion: at 441). Cf Maxim v Godson & Sons [1916] 1 Ch 21 at 24 per Neville J (costs of third expert witness allowed without any indication that the case was exceptional). 163. [1945] ALR 500 at 501 (SC(Vic)). See also Re Will of Trautwein [1967] 1 NSWR 558 at 560 per Hardie J (allowing the fee of a second accountant to value the estate given the centrality of the valuation to the outcome of the case). 164. Australian Provincial Insurance Association Ltd v Commissioner of Land Tax [1945] ALR 500 at 501 (SC(Vic)). 165. Ricks v White [1995] 2 Qd R 302 at 309 per Demack J. 166. See, for example, Ricks v White [1995] 2 Qd R 302 at 309 per Demack J (who held that the second expert’s report was unnecessary, as the first report covered the essential issues pleaded, was given by a qualified expert, and was in respect of a motor accident ‘which in itself almost spoke of negligence without any further proof’). 167. Cf McCoombes v Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd [2001] QDC 142 at [80] per McGill DCJ (denying any Queensland practice of limiting the number of medical experts who can be called in personal injury actions, meaning that it is not appropriate to approach the matter on the basis of any fixed formula); Qld r 429D (‘When deciding the order to make about the costs of a proceeding, the court may consider, in allowing, disallowing or limiting the costs for an expert’s report prepared for a party on an issue, the extent to which the proceedings may have been

facilitated by the appointment of a person as the only expert in relation to the issue’). 168. HCR 2004 Sch 2, item 53; ACT r 1736(2); NT r 63.70; Qld r 727(2) (formerly Qld r 729(2)); Tas RSC 1965 Appendix M (continues to apply pursuant to RSC 2000 Sch 5), ‘Allowances to Witnesses’, cl 5; Vic r 63.77(2) (see also Appendix B). 169. Robinson v Malcolm & Co Ltd (1899) 5 ALR 204 at 206 per Hood J (SC(Vic)) (surveyor); Jones v D Davies & Sons Ltd [1914] 3 KB 549 (qualifying fee allowed to a doctor even though qualifying occurred prior to the institution of the proceedings); McLaughlin v City Bank of Sydney (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 491 at 496 per Street J (accountant); Cooper v Minister for Lands and Works [1954] Tas SR 57 (valuer). In England there is authority that, at least in the case of claims for wrongful use of intellectual property, a qualifying fee may be allowed for the actual and direct cost (excluding overhead and profit) of experts that are employees of a corporate litigant who have been required to provide assistance for the purposes of the litigation, the logic being that in such cases the litigant would have otherwise had to engage outside experts: Re Nossen’s Letter Patent [1969] 1 WLR 638 at 643–4 per Lloyd-Jacob J; Admiral Management Services Ltd v Para-Protect Europe Ltd [2003] 2 All ER 1017; [2002] EWHC 233 (Ch) at [27]–[44] per Stanley Burnton J; Sisu Capital Fund Ltd v Tucker [2006] 1 All ER 167; [2005] EWHC 2321 (Ch) at [42]–[48] per Warren J. Cf Cuthbert v Gair [2008] EWHC 90014 (Costs). 170. Auspine Ltd v Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 1 at 25; [1999] FCA 673; BC9902639 per O’Loughlin J. 171. Lewis v Doran [2008] NSWSC 186; BC200801247 at [48] per Hammerschlag J. See, for example, Attorney-General v Birmingham Drainage Board (1908) 52 Sol Jo 855 (non-expert witness employed by the plaintiff to watch the sewage discharged into a river by the defendant, in a proceeding for an injunction restraining the defendant from discharging sewage); Barker v Walker (1917) 13 Tas LR 109; Barwick v Barwick (1937) 33 Tas LR 1 at 4 per Clark J (private detective employed to gather evidence in a divorce proceeding before the petition was filed); Kerridge v Foley (SC(NSW), Street J, 19 August 1970, unreported). 172. Great Western Railway Company v Carpalla United China Clay Company Ltd (No 2) [1909] 2 Ch 471 at 482–3 per Eve J (expert witness allowed a qualifying fee although he was ultimately not called as a witness); Clark, Tait & Co v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931) 47 CLR 142 at 146; BC3190105 per Rich J (stock and station agent and valuer became qualified to give evidence but was not called as a witness). Cf Holden v Architectural Finishes Ltd [1997] 3 NZLR 143 at 157 per McGechan J (HC) (where a valuer prepared a report that was admitted into evidence but did not swear an affidavit or give evidence, no expenses were awarded). 173. Chanter v Blackwood (No 3) (1904) 1 CLR 456 at 458–9 per Griffith CJ; Harbin v Gordon [1914] 2 KB 577 at 586 per Buckley LJ; Fitzgerald v Wilson (1917) 13 Tas LR 50 at 51 per Ewing J; Purcell v R M [2004] VSC 78; BC200401089 at [5], [6] per Gillard J. 174. [1970] 2 NSWR 119 at 123–4. 175. [1989] VR 927. 176. (2002) 4 VR 399; [2002] VSCA 100; BC200203494. See also Walton v McBride (1995) 36 NSWLR 440; BC9504455; Pourzand v Telstra Corp Ltd [2012] WASC 210 (S); BC201204442 at [8]–[14] per Edelman J. 177. (1994) 179 CLR 403; BC9404608, discussed at 7.24. 178. Howes v Barber (1852) 18 QB 588; 118 ER 222; Harbin v Gordon [1914] 2 KB 577 at 586 per Buckley LJ. 179. Russo v Russo [1953] VLR 57 at 68 per Sholl J.

180. NT r 63.32(3). Cf Jarrett v Strempel [1911] VLR 179 at 180–1 per Hodges J (‘the plaintiffs must be allowed for the … actual number of days on which [the witness] is actually and absolutely taken away from his employment’); Railton-Latrobe Shale Oil Co NL v Knight (1916) 12 Tas LR 64 at 66 per Ewing J (‘the principle upon which an allowance should be made to witnesses coming to attend a Court is that they should be allowed their expenses from a date which will enable them to leave their residences and reach the Court at least a day prior to the opening of the proceedings’). 181. In the High Court, a witness who resides more than 50 kilometres from the court; in Victoria, a witness who resides more than 100 kilometres from the court. 182. HCR 2004 Sch 2, item 52; Vic Appendix B (which applies also to interpreters). 183. CGU Workers Compensation (Vic) Ltd v Rees (2003) 6 VR 227; [2003] VSCA 18; BC200301202 at [12] per Batt JA; Smith v Hanrahan (2007) 49 SR (WA) 37; [2007] WADC 1; BC200740000 at [7] per Harman DR. 184. (SC(Tas), The Master, 20 December 1967, unreported) at 2. See also Rowan v Cornwall (No 6) (2002) 220 LSJS 187; [2002] SASC 234; BC200204140 at [15] per Debelle J (where the plaintiff’s airfares from Victoria to South Australia were allowed because the conduct of the defendants had caused her to move to Victoria, and she had to travel to South Australia to prosecute the action). 185. Cf Jarrett v Strempel [1911] VLR 179 at 182 per Hodges J (where travelling expenses were allowed to a witness whose permanent residence was the place of trial but who was temporarily resident interstate). 186. [1953] VLR 57 at 68. 187. Harris v De Kerloy (1927) 30 WALR 58 at 60 per Burnside J (FC). Cf Jarrett v Strempel [1911] VLR 179 at 182 per Hodges J (witness’ return to place of trial for dual purpose held not to deny travelling expenses). 188. See, for example, Wentworth v Wentworth (CA(NSW), 21 February 1996, unreported) BC9600213 at 23–4 per Clarke JA. 189. See, for example, Perry & Co Ltd v I Hessin & Co (1913) 108 LT 332. 190. [1976] 2 All ER 1015 at 1017. 191. On this point see also McIver & Co Ltd v Tate Steamers Ltd [1902] 2 KB 184. 192. Garthwaite v Sherwood [1976] 2 All ER 1015 at 1019. 193. See, for example, Wick v Nominal Defendant (1983) 19 NTR 1 at 2 per Forster CJ (where the court upheld the taxing master’s decision to disallow the costs of travelling by the plaintiff’s solicitor from Darwin to Gosford for the purpose of interviewing a witness). Cf Charlick Trading Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission [2001] FCA 629; BC200102744 at [61] per Mansfield J (noting that there were a number of witnesses required to be interviewed, and given the complexity of the issues, it was necessary or proper for those persons to be interviewed at their location, or where their principal documentary resources were). 194. HCR 2004 Sch 2, item 44. 195. ACT Sch 4, Pt 4.2, item 33 (formerly item 29). 196. Being the commencement date of the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic), which introduced, inter alia, a new scale. 197. Vic Appendix A, item 38 (superseded).

198. Vic Appendix A, item 1(e). 199. Qld Sch 1, item 14, Sch 2, item 14. 200. The FCR 2011 do not define the ‘relevant period’. The term was, however, defined in the equivalent provision in the former rules, as the period of the trial or hearing or if it lasts more than 4½ hours, the first 4½ hours: FCR 1979 O 62 r 33(2). In reckoning the 4½ hour period the midday adjournment was not included unless the court otherwise ordered: FCR 1979 O 62 r 34(1). Where the commencement or resumption of a trial or hearing was delayed beyond the listed time the taxing officer could have included waiting time in reckoning the 4½ hour period: FCR 1979 O 62 r 34(2). 201. FCR 2011 r 40.30(a). Cf Re G R Newell (deceased) (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 181 (where Long Innes J held that in cases where counsel for trustees appears merely to submit, and no other respondent party is represented in the matter before the court, no costs in regard to the attendance of counsel for the trustees will be allowed). 202. Fam LR 2004 r 19.51. 203. Cf Vic r 63.82(1) which provides that, subject to the provisions of any applicable scale, the fees payable to counsel to appear at a hearing or trial are at the discretion of the Costs Court, which may fix such fees: (a) on the basis of daily fees; (b) as a lump sum fee covering the whole of the hearing or trial; or (c) on such other basis as the court considers appropriate. 204. Prudential Finance Ltd v Davander Nominees Pty Ltd [1992] 1 VR 468 at 474–5 per Ashley J. 205. Ralkon Agricultural Company Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Development Commission (FCA, Forster J, 11 July 1986, unreported) BC8601705 at [16]. For this reason, the preparation of a skeleton argument for an appellate court, though useful, is part of the preparation of the case and so should not be allowed on taxation as an item separate from the brief fee: CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc (No 2) [1988] 1 WLR 364 at 367–8 per Millett J. 206. Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v Coffee (No 2) [1982] VR 97 at 109 per Fullagar J; Wide Bay Burnett Conservation Council Inc v Burnett Water Pty Ltd (No 9) (2011) 194 FCR 250; [2011] FCA 661; BC201103877 at [57] per Logan J. See also Hamilton v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd [1964] Tas SR 224 at 232 per Crawford J; Legal Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) Determination 2012 (WA) Sch, Table B, items 20(a), 20(b) (fee on brief equates to ‘first day of trial and preparation’). 207. Macphillamy v Vizovitis [2003] ACTSC 60; BC200304187 at [36] per Higgins CJ (who suggested that there may be virtue in appropriate cases in assessing a fee for preparation as well as a daily rate, so that ‘[t]he time spent in preparation, and on what, is then revealed and is open to scrutiny’: at [40]). 208. Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v Coffee (No 2) [1982] VR 97 at 112 per Fullagar J; Dalgety Australia Operations Ltd v F F Seeley Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 75 at 86 per Bollen J. 209. Australian Blue Metal Ltd v Hughes [1970] 2 NSWR 119 at 125 per Helsham J; Fleming v Fleming (Review of Costs) (2009) 42 Fam LR 29; [2009] FamCA 552; BC200950450 at [85] per Murphy J. 210. Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v Coffee (No 2) [1982] VR 97 at 109 per Fullagar J. Although the High Court in Clark Tait and Co v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931) 47 CLR 142; BC3190105 held that time spent in the preparation of addresses may in a proper case be compensated for by way of allowance of refreshers, this has been branded a special case, and not authority that if the addresses have been prepared at night, or counsel has taken time reading the

shorthand writers’ notes, counsel is entitled to a further fee simply because of the time taken: Hamilton v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd [1964] Tas SR 224 at 231 per Crawford J. Hence in Australian Blue Metal Ltd v Hughes [1970] 2 NSWR 119 at 126 Helsham J remarked that the mere fact that an adjournment was used to prepare addresses is not the equivalent of saying that the costs of counsel during that time should be charged to the loser because such costs were necessary or proper for the attainment of justice. 211. Cohuna Sewerage Authority v Flannery (1977) 14 ALR 146 at 147; BC7700041 per Stephen J (HC) (who held that even though the notice of appeal was tediously lengthy and gave many grounds all relating to matters of evidence, and counsel had to refresh his recollection before the appeal of what the trial had been about, a reading fee was not justified because this is what every counsel has to do on an appeal, and part of the brief fee is a remuneration for that task); Fam LR 2004 r 19.52(4)(b) (the registrar must not allow a reading fee, unless ‘the case is unusually complex’ or ‘the amount of material involved is particularly large’ (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 23(3), which in any case reflected the position prior to the enactment of the rule: Marriage of Saathoff (1987) 11 Fam LR 643 at 644–5 (FC)); Fleming v Fleming (Review of Costs) (2009) 42 Fam LR 29; [2009] FamCA 552; BC200950450 at [84] per Murphy J. 212. Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v Coffee (No 2) [1982] VR 97 at 111 per Fullagar J. 213. Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v Coffee (No 2) [1982] VR 97 at 112 per Fullagar J. 214. See, for example, Wide Bay Burnett Conservation Council Inc v Burnett Water Pty Ltd (No 9) (2011) 194 FCR 250; [2011] FCA 661; BC201103877 (where Logan J accepted that on the facts it was ‘necessary and proper’ to allow time for reading and preparation for counsel briefed for the trial, given the considerable body of factual material with which to come to grips, remarking that ‘[i]t is inherently likely that, even if counsel had been retained on a fee on brief basis, the fee on brief for the first day of the trial would have been supplemented by the marking of a separate reading and preparation fee’: at [83]; his Honour also found that necessary and proper in the circumstances in respect of outlays for counsel to include an allowance for the preparation of written closing submissions, remarking that ‘[w]hile it might be said that counsel ought to be ready, immediately at the close of evidence, to make oral submissions, the circumstances of this case were such that it was neither possible nor convenient for submissions then to be made in that fashion’: at [87]). 215. Prudential Finance Ltd v Davander Nominees Pty Ltd [1992] 1 VR 468 at 473–4 per Ashley J; Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1341 at [64] per Heerey J; Hennessey Glass and Aluminium Pty Ltd v Watpac Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 69 ATR 374; [2007] QDC 57 at [81] per McGill DCJ. 216. See Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1341 at [64] per Heerey J (who stated that in major commercial litigation in Victoria for at least the past 15 years counsel charged fees on a daily basis rather than brief plus refresher, remarking that ‘[i]n fairness to successful litigants I think that reality can no longer be ignored in the taxation of costs’); Nashvying Pty Ltd v Giacomi [2009] QSC 31; BC200901296 at [10]–[13] per Jones J (noting the common modern practice of allowing preparation fees on a daily rate, though adding that anything more than one day’s preparation would be excessive on a standard basis: at [10]); Koetsveld v Whitehorse City Council [2009] VCC 545 at [10]–[13] per Judge O’Neill (who envisaged that in a case of particular complexity, or a case with the requirement for very extensive preparation, a daily fee could be awarded, but as the case before the court was ‘relatively straightforward’, awarded costs on a brief and refresher basis: at [16]–[17]). 217. See, for example, Walker v Law Society of Tasmania [1991] Tas R 121 at 140–2 per Crawford J; Brenner v First Artists’ Management Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 221 at 280 per Byrne J (who fixed daily

fees for counsel against the backdrop of a trial which ran for 33 sitting days); Van Koll v Rolling Hills Pre-School Inc (VCC, Judge Saccardo, 29 September 2010, unreported); Lever v McCormick Foods Australia Pty Ltd (VCC, Judge Saccardo, 16 March 2011, unreported) (where in each of these County Court cases the respective judges allowed daily fees because the cases involved significant complexity). Cf Koetsveld v Whitehorse City Council [2009] VCC 545 at [17] per Judge O’Neill (‘there should not be a departure from the recent and current practice of awarding fees to counsel, even in jury trials, on a brief and refresher basis, unless there is good reason to do so’); Di Petro v International Airline Services Pty Ltd [2011] VCC 499 at [26]–[27] per Judge Parrish (who, though accepting that counsel appearing for plaintiffs almost universally accept their retainers from their respective instructing solicitors on a daily fee basis, took the view that ‘the starting point is the traditional approach of awarding counsel brief fee and refreshers unless there are particular circumstances which warrant an exercise of my discretion to award counsels’ fees on a different basis’: at [27]). 218. See . 219. See 16.7. 220. Prudential Finance Ltd v Davander Nominees Pty Ltd [1992] 1 VR 468 at 475 per Ashley J. 221. Prudential Finance Ltd v Davander Nominees Pty Ltd [1992] 1 VR 468 at 475 per Ashley J. 222. Fam LR 2004 r 19.52(4)(a); ACT r 1738 (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 68); NT r 63.72(1); Qld r 730 (formerly Qld r 732); Tas r 863(8); Vic r 63.80. 223. FCR 1979 O 62 r 31(b). 224. ACT Sch 4 Pt 4.1 cl 4.11 (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 72); NT r 63.72(8); Qld r 729 (formerly Qld r 731); Tas r 860(3); Vic r 63.83. 225. Donovan v Miller [1987] VR 221 at 224 (FC). See, for example, Hancock v Tynan (CC(Vic), Waldron CJ, 8 June 1984, unreported) (‘if anything was sought to be achieved by the delivery of the brief in mid-December it was merely to increase the likelihood of counsel appearing at trial … [S]uch a purpose of not embraced in the notion of prudent and reasonable performance of work. Rather it amounts to a frank financial inducement for counsel to attend the circuit than the prudent and reasonable act of a solicitor prosecuting his client’s claim’). 226. Re Mayer (deceased) [1947] VLR 363; Klas Pty Ltd v Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd [2007] WADC 79; BC200740076 at [3] per Hewitt DR. 227. Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Razzi (No 2) (1991) 30 FCR 64 at 67; BC9103238 per Wilcox J (see (August 1992) 30 LSJ 18). See also Owners of ‘Kintail’ v Camm (SC(WA), Commissioner Pringle QC, 13 October 1995, unreported) BC9502667 at 10; R v Martiniello [2005] ACTSC 109; BC200509404 at [7]–[17] per Connolly J. 228. Fashion Warehouse Pty Ltd v Pola [1984] 1 Qd R 251 at 254–5 per G N Williams J. See, for example, Kelly v Council of the City of Lake Macquarie (SC(NSW), Malpass M, 27 May 1997, unreported) BC9702213 (who refused to upset the costs assessor’s allowance of part of a cancellation fee by counsel). 229. Chatley v Northern Territory of Australia [2002] NTSC 20; BC200206243 (denying a claim for the first three and a half days set aside for the trial). 230. Fashion Warehouse Pty Ltd v Pola [1984] 1 Qd R 251 at 255 per G N Williams J. 231. As to uplift fees see 3.46–3.47, 3.53. 232. Connell v Sund & Sund [2006] VCC 1923 at [34] per Judge Hampel.

233. As to the circumstances in which an indemnity costs order may be made see 16.39–16.75. 234. See, for example, Porter v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 680; BC200104664 (recovery of 25 per cent contingency loading on counsel’s fee allowed because, inter alia, the fee (including the loading) was reasonable, in a case where the costs were payable pursuant to the terms of a deed). 235. Fam LR 2004 r 19.34(2)(b) (before 1 July 2008 numbered as r 19.34(3)(b)); ACT r 1752(4)(b); Qld 703(3)(b); Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 303 (formerly WA 2003 s 215(1)) (see 5.20); WA O 66 r 11(3) (see 16.12) (see Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority (2003) 28 WAR 95; [2003] WASC 122 (S); BC200305099 at [28] per Pullin J). Cf Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 365 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208H), which provides that although a costs assessor may obtain a copy of, and have regard to, a costs agreement, he or she must not apply its terms for the purpose of determining appropriate fair and reasonable costs when assessing costs, whether or not an indemnity order is made. 236. Pate v Buckley [2006] VCC 1269; Conduit v Lisa Lodge Pty Ltd [2006] VCC 1832 (where an indemnity costs order was made in favour of the plaintiff, who had entered into a costs agreement with a 25 per cent uplift with his lawyer, the recovery of the uplift fee on taxation was disallowed). See also Madden v New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corporation [1999] NSWSC 196; BC9900828 (costs assessor’s refusal to allow recovery of an uplift fee upheld). 237. [2006] VCC 1832 at [11]. 238. Pate v Buckley [2006] VCC 1269 at [14] per Judge Shelton. 239. See 17.57. 240. See, for example, Planet International Ltd v Turfella Pty Ltd (SC(NSW), Young J, 4 November 1991, unreported) BC9101458. 241. (1962) 3 FLR 47 at 50–1 (SC(NT)) (paragraph break omitted) (endorsed in Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Lardner [1998] ACTSC 24; BC9801211 at [54], [64] (FC)). See also Planet International Ltd v Turfella Pty Ltd (SC(NSW), Young J, 4 November 1991, unreported) BC9101458 at 3 (‘one cannot say if one has chosen to be represented by a solicitor/advocate that one should recover costs in the same way as if there had been a solicitor and a barrister’); GBT Corporation Pty Ltd v Scott (1994) 116 FLR 266 at 269–70 per Higgins J (SC(ACT)) (who considered that the rules do no more than reflect a necessary consequence of the combination within a firm of the roles of barrister and solicitor in relation to particular litigation, and that in assessing a fee, savings by virtue of self-briefing or by a partner or other firm member briefing the solicitor appearing should be considered); Orr v State of Tasmania [2010] TASSC 28; BC201004313 at [9] per Blow J. 242. HCR 2004 r 56.09(2) (cf the former HCR 1952 O 71 r 94). 243. ‘Instructions for brief’ means the work that consists ‘in getting together all the facts and information which would enable counsel holding the brief to understand and conduct the case at the trial’, to ‘collate the facts and extract the relevant from the irrelevant’, so as to ‘get the case in a concise, logical and intelligible form’: Ogier v Norton (1904) 29 VLR 536 at 540 per Madden CJ (FC). See also Whittlesea Land Co Ltd v Gutheil (1897) 3 ALR 275 at 275 per A’Beckett J (‘work done in ascertaining the material facts of the case, sifting evidence, and reducing the case to the essential matters which have to be brought before Counsel conducting the case’). 244. As to the meaning of ‘drawing’ see 15.58. 245. As to the meaning of ‘engrossing’ see 15.58. 246. Vic r 63.84 (revoked, as of 1 April 2013, by the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and

Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic)). 247. NT r 63.73(1), 63.73(2). 248. NT r 63.73(3). Cf Commonwealth of Australia v Magriplis (1962) 3 FLR 47 at 51 per Bridge J (SC(NT)) (who, under the previous rules, which made no prescription as to quantum, held that the fee allowed on the brief on hearing should be reduced by one-fourth of the fee allowable had outside counsel been briefed). 249. Namely the matters listed in NT r 63.72(3): see 17.70. 250. NT r 63.73(4). 251. ACT r 1737 (cf former ACT RSC O 65 r 83) (see Macphillamy v Vizovitis [2003] ACTSC 60; BC200304187 at [50] per Higgins CJ); Qld r 730. 252. Tas r 863(11). 253. FCR 1979 O 62 r 35. See, for example, Re Dacey (1981) 51 FLR 389 at 391–2 per Lockhart J (FCA) (who remarked that although there are no doubt cases where solicitors who conduct cases without briefing counsel should be allowed additional amounts in preparing for the hearing, there is no automatic entitlement in this respect, it being a matter for the taxing officer in the exercise of his or her discretion). 254. NT r 63.73(5). 255. Hamilton v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd [1964] Tas SR 224 at 233 per Crawford J. 256. FCR 1979 O 62 r 32. In calculating that time frame the midday adjournment was not to be included unless the court otherwise orders: FCR 1979 O 62 r 34(1). The rules added that if the commencement or resumption of a trial or hearing was delayed beyond the listed time the taxing officer could include waiting time in calculating the said period: FCR O 62 r 34(2). 257. Tas r 863(6). See Hamilton v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd [1964] Tas SR 224 at 230 per Crawford J; Walker v Law Society of Tasmania [1991] Tas R 121 at 132–4 per Crawford J. 258. Tas r 863(7). 259. Tas r 863(6), Sch 1 Pt 2 (where the amount involved does not exceed $10,000, the limit is $750 per refresher; where the amount involved in between $10,000 and $20,000, the limit is $900 per refresher; for amounts exceeding $20,000, the limit is $1,200 per refresher: see Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Rules 1998 (Tas) Sch 1, Pt 1). 260. A luncheon adjournment was held to come within this period under previous Victorian rules that made no such express mention of that adjournment: Syme v United Victoria Permanent Building Society [1905] VLR 11 at 14 per Hodges J. 261. Vic r 63.82(3) (revoked by the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic), as from 1 April 2013). 262. Vic r 63.82(2). 263. Qld r 731(1) (formerly Qld r 733(1)). The rules add that if the start or resumption of a trial or hearing is delayed and, because of the delay, counsel or a solicitor were not able to undertake other work, the registrar may include waiting time as part of any such period: Qld r 731(2) (formerly Qld r 733(2)). 264. Fam 2004 LR r 19.52(3) (cf the former Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 23(6)). 265. See 15.71–15.75. 266. Legal Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) Determination 2012 (WA) Sch, Table

B, items 20(c), 20(d). 267. Preddis v Coombes (1931) 26 Tas LR 168 at 179 per Clark J. 268. See, for example, O’Hara, Matthews & Co v Elliott & Co [1893] 1 QB 362 at 365 per Day J (‘You cannot begin to earn refresher fees until you have made up the five hours’). 269. See, for example, Brown v Sewell (1880) 16 Ch D 517. 270. Compare Collins v Worley (1889) 60 LT 748 (the time occupied by the usual midday adjournment of the court ought not to be deducted from the five hours) with Syme v United Victoria Permanent Building Society [1905] VLR 11 at 14 per Hodges J (luncheon adjournment held to come within this period). 271. Hamilton v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd [1964] Tas SR 224 at 231 per Crawford J; Prudential Finance Ltd v Davander Nominees Pty Ltd [1992] 1 VR 468 at 475 per Ashley J. 272. Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v Coffee (No 2) [1982] VR 97 at 113 per Fullagar J. 273. HCR 2004 r 56.09.1 (cf former HCR 1952 O 71 r 60(1)). 274. ACT r 1735 (cf former ACT RSC O 65 r 37); NT r 63.72(4); Qld r 726 (formerly Qld r 728(1)); Vic r 63.81(1). The wording in the text follows the Victorian rule. The Northern Territory rule refers to costs ‘reasonably incurred’, and the drawing or settling of a document that is ‘reasonable’ (in the ACT and Qld, ‘appropriate’) to be drawn or settled by counsel, but these differences are not matters of substance. The ACT and Qld rules make no reference to costs ‘reasonably’ or ‘properly’ incurred, but this is necessarily so given that ACT r 1751(2) refers to costs that are ‘fair and reasonable’ being allowed on assessment on the ‘party and party’ basis, and Qld r 702(2) (formerly Qld r 703(2)) speaks of costs ‘necessary or proper’: see 16.5 (ACT), 16.9 (Qld). 275. See, for example, Syme v United Victoria Permanent Building Society [1905] VLR 11 at 15 per Hodges J (advice provided by counsel proved the most valuable part of the brief, as it called leading counsel’s attention to the main facts upon which the plaintiff’s case rested and the means to establish those facts); Hawkins v Angus & Coote Pty Ltd (1946) 63 WN 2 at 2–3 per Herron J; Wall v Halford [1960] QWN 36 (costs of seeking counsel’s advice allowed where the matter was ‘one of some complication and the sort of matter in which a prudent litigant might well seek counsel’s opinion before launching proceedings’). Cf Howes v Clyde Engineering Co Ltd (1940) 56 WN (NSW) 210 at 212 per Halse Rogers J (case held to be one of no complexity, and one in which any solicitor of experience in negligence actions should have no difficulty in regard to the preparation of the case, and so the costs of obtaining counsel’s advice on evidence were denied); Hursey v Williams (SC(Tas), Burbury CJ, 8 July 1960, unreported) at 6–7 (‘It is I think wrong in principle that fees paid to other Counsel … for advice at an earlier stage of the action should be allowed in addition to adequate Brief Fees’: at 7); Lucas v Simpson [1969] QWN 19. 276. Re Malleson, Stewart, Stawell & Nankivell [1931] VLR 127 at 134–5 per McArthur J (dealing with solicitor and client taxation); Mason v D Mitchell & Co Ltd (1938) 55 WN (NSW) 17 at 18 per Davidson J; Hannan v Hannan [1965] NSWR 739 at 744 per Allen J; Ralkon Agricultural Company Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Development Commission (FCA, Forster J, 11 July 1986, unreported) BC8601705 at [25]. Cf Planet International Ltd v Turfella Pty Ltd (SC(NSW), Young J, 4 November 1991, unreported) BC9101458 at 5. 277. Great Central Freehold Mines Ltd v Chapman [1905] VLR 294 at 296 per Madden CJ; Planet International Ltd v Turfella Pty Ltd (SC(NSW), Young J, 4 November 1991, unreported) BC9101458 at 5. 278. April Fine Paper Macao Commercial Offshore Ltd v Moore Business Systems Australia Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR 619; [2009] NSWSC 867; BC200907827 at [27] per White J.

279. NT r 63.72(5); Vic r 63.81(2). 280. Tas r 863(10). 281. Tas r 863(9). 282. Traditionally, a ‘conference’ is a meeting between counsel, the solicitor, witnesses and the party to the action; a ‘consultation’ is a conference between counsel without the solicitor or witnesses being present. 283. Only the Victorian court rules make specific provision for the cost of conferences in this context (Vic r 63.81(1)(c)), but as they simply apply the general discretion of the taxing officer, they do not add to the law in other jurisdictions. 284. Dalgety Australia Operations Ltd v F F Seeley Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 75 at 86 per Bollen J. See also Ralkon Agricultural Company Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Development Commission (FCA, Forster J, 11 July 1986, unreported) BC8601705 at [21] (who remarked that ‘[i]n matters of greater complexity two or perhaps even three conferences would be allowed on taxation between party and party’, and on the facts allowed for four conferences given the difficulty and complexity of the case, which involved a long time in court and voluminous documentation). 285. ACT Sch 4 Pt 4.1 cl 4.10. Similar provision was made by the former Qld r 728(2). 286. Only the Victorian court rules make specific provision for views in this context (Vic r 63.81(1) (c)), but as they simply apply the general discretion of the taxing officer, they do not add to the law in other jurisdictions. Cf Leeds Forge Company Ltd v Deighton’s Patent Flue and Tube Company Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 475 at 478 per Farwell J (who, in an unusual case, refused to interfere with the taxing officer’s allowance of the costs of a view by counsel after judgment). 287. (1916) 22 CLR 98. 288. Minister for Home Affairs v Beale (1916) 22 CLR 98 at 101. 289. Minister for Home Affairs v Beale (1916) 22 CLR 98 at 102. 290. See, for example, Howes v Clyde Engineering Co Ltd (1940) 56 WN (NSW) 210 at 212 per Halse Rogers J. 291. See, for example, Caruana v Fisher [1963] NSWR 661 at 663 per Else-Mitchell J (who refused the application for a certificate for a view by more than one counsel). 292. See, for example, Minister for Home Affairs v Beale (1916) 22 CLR 98 at 102 per Rich J. 293. Swan v Bank of New Zealand (1890) 24 SALR 20 at 21 per Way CJ (FC); Barnes v Davies (1929) 30 SR (NSW) 5 at 8 per Harvey CJ in Eq; Hamilton v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd [1964] Tas SR 224 at 231 per Crawford J; Ralkon Agricultural Company Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Development Commission (FCA, Forster J, 11 July 1986, unreported) BC8601705 at [15]; Prudential Finance Ltd v Davander Nominees Pty Ltd [1992] 1 VR 468 at 474 per Ashley J. 294. Cf Hennessey Glass and Aluminium Pty Ltd v Watpac Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 69 ATR 374; [2007] QDC 57 at [84] per McGill DCJ (‘if it is necessary or proper to brief counsel of a particular standing in a matter, then it must logically be necessary or proper to incur whatever fee has to be paid in the market place in order to engage counsel of that standing, so that a fee is only “excessive” in the relevant sense if it is more than had to be paid in order to secure counsel of that standing’). 295. Barnes v Davies (1929) 30 SR (NSW) 5 at 8 per Harvey CJ in Eq. 296. Higgins v Nicol (No 2) (1972) 21 FLR 34 at 42 per Spicer CJ and Smithers J (Cth Indus Ct).

297. See 16.3 (FCA), 16.6–16.7 (NSW), 16.8 (NT), 16.11 (Vic), 16.12 (WA). 298. Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v Coffee (No 2) [1982] VR 97 at 113 per Fullagar J; Walker v Law Society of Tasmania [1991] Tas R 121 at 134 per Crawford J. 299. Prudential Finance Ltd v Davander Nominees Pty Ltd [1992] 1 VR 468 at 476 per Ashley J. 300. Walker v Law Society of Tasmania [1991] Tas R 121 at 137–8 per Crawford J. 301. Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd v Hendon Corporation [1964] 3 All ER 833 at 839 per Pennycuick J (opining that the application of such an approach ‘would lead to obviously undesirable consequences’). 302. [1991] Tas R 121 at 142. Cf Jones v Secretary of State for Wales [1997] 1 WLR 1008 at 1012–13 per Buckley J (warning against such a yardstick not becoming a fetter on the taxing officer’s discretion). 303. Re Whitley (deceased) [1962] 3 All ER 45 at 54 per Plowman J; Higgins v Nicol (No 2) (1972) 21 FLR 34 at 41 per Spicer CJ and Smithers J (Cth Indus Ct). 304. NT r 63.72(3). 305. SA r 263(4) (formerly SA RSC r 101.07(2)(c)). 306. FCR 2011 Sch 3, item 16(1) (cf the former FCR 1979 Sch 2, item 42). The National Guide to Counsel Fees is available at . 307. Being the commencement date of the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) Rules 2012 (Vic), which introduced, inter alia, a new scale. 308. Vic Appendix A, item 19(a)–(i). 309. Vic Appendix A, item 17. 310. Vic Appendix A, item 19(j). 311. Vic Appendix A, item 19(k). 312. HCR 2004 Sch 2, item 55. 313. ACT Sch 4, Pt 4.2, item 48 (formerly item 37). 314. Tas r 863(1), Sch 1 Pt 2 (where the amount involved does not exceed $10,000, the limit is $900 for the fee on brief and $600 per refresher; where the amount involved in between $10,000 and $20,000, the limit is $1,200 for the fee on brief and $800 per refresher). 315. Legal Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) Determination 2012 (WA) Sch, Table B, item 20. 316. Fam LR 2004 r 19.52(4)(d) (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 23(4)). 317. For example, procedural hearings, summary hearings taking less than three hours. 318. Fam LR 2004 r 19.52(4)(c), Sch 3, items 203, 204 (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 23(5), Sch 2 Pt 2 (items 13, 14)) (short defended hearings take between three hours and one day). 319. Swan v Bank of New Zealand (1890) 24 SALR 20 at 22 per Way CJ (FC). 320. Turnbull v Janson (1878) 3 CPD 264 at 269 per Lopes J, at 270 per Lindley J; Brown v Sewell (1880) 16 Ch D 517 at 520 per Jessel MR; Deane v Railway Commissioners (1897) 18 LR (NSW) L 294 at 298 per Stephen J (FC) (who remarked that had the fees allowed been utterly disproportionate to the work done the court might have interfered, but on the facts this was not so); Greaves v Nabarro (1940) 56 TLR 339; Sundell v Queensland Housing Commission (1954) 94

CLR 531 at 533–4; BC5400090 per Webb J; Higgins v Nicol (No 2) (1972) 21 FLR 34 at 41 per Spicer CJ and Smithers J (Cth Indus Ct). See generally 15.32–15.36. 321. See, for example, Re Williams (deceased) [1949] QWN 43; Hursey v Williams (SC(Tas), Burbury CJ, 8 July 1960, unreported) at 6; Wide Bay Burnett Conservation Council Inc v Burnett Water Pty Ltd (No 9) (2011) 194 FCR 250; [2011] FCA 661; BC201103877 at [57] per Logan J (noted that a refresher ‘is usually two-thirds of the fee on brief for the first day of trial, though a higher amount is allowable at the discretion of a taxing officer’). Cf Grant v Australian Knitting Mills [1937] SASR 113 at 115 per Murray CJ (who stated that the two-thirds rule is not of universal application when the two counsel are briefed from the same office). 322. For example, the Victorian scale pegs maximum allowances as between junior and senior counsel according to a two-thirds approach (see Vic Appendix A, item 19), but this does not mean that the proper exercise of the Costs Court’s discretion in making the relevant allowances is tied to this proportion. 323. The uncritical application of a rule is inconsistent with the proper exercise of a discretion: see 6.14–6.17. 324. Re Trout, Bernays & Co [1955] St R Qd 398 at 404 per Townley J; Oldaker v Currington [1987] VR 712 at 719 (FC). Cf Bennett v Seaman (1993) 117 ACTR 1 at 9 per Higgins J. 325. Cf Bennett v Seaman (1993) 117 ACTR 1 at 9 per Higgins J. 326. See, for example, Smorgon Foundation Ltd v De Lucia (SC(Vic), Kaye J, 14 December 1987, unreported) BC8700420 at 13. Cf Maher v Gabriel (FC(Vic), 9 November 1988, unreported) BC8800507 at 10 per Murphy J, with whom Gobbo and Phillips JJ concurred (‘It would require some weighty consideration to warrant the awarding of a fee to a junior of two thirds senior counsel’s fee when this meant a fee which would be more than double the scale fee’). 327. Cf Maher v Gabriel (FC(Vic), 9 November 1988, unreported) BC8800507 at 10 per Murphy J, with whom Gobbo and Phillips JJ concurred (‘The fact that the briefing of senior counsel was justified in the case and that he was engaged is not decisive one way or the other. It may suggest that the case is unusually difficult or a heavy one, and junior counsel’s responsibility may still be such as to justify the awarding of a fee above the scale fee; on the other hand, it may not’). 328. Bickford v Bickford [1923] SASR 148 at 153 per Poole J; R v Municipality of Glenorchy [1958] Tas SR 32 at 33–4 per Gibson J. 329. Bush v Condon & Barrett Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 260 at 263 per Sheppard J; Re Fuller Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (1979) 21 SASR 212 at 213 per King CJ (FC) (who envisaged rare cases lacking the features of complexity and difficulty as would justify briefing senior counsel, but in which the sheer volume of evidence justifies the division of labour between two junior counsel); Charlick Trading Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission [2001] FCA 629; BC200102744 at [46] per Mansfield J (who, in a case where the fees of senior counsel were allowed, did not consider the case required a subdivision of labour to the extent of two junior counsel); Shore v Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) [2009] SADC 66; BC200940662 at [12] per Judge Tilmouth (who noted that ‘[b]ecause there is no longer any rigid requirement that senior counsel should appear with a junior, the test is no longer whether a prudent person would engage two counsel’). See, for example, Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Public Transport Authority of Western Australia (No 7) [2009] WASC 218; BC200907127 (where Le Miere J concluded that the volume of material to be handled, the nature and extent of the crossexamination required, the anticipated length of the case, the complexity and difficulty of its issues and the importance of the outcome to the parties justify the engagement of two counsel, but not two senior counsel: at [46]). Cf Bunch v Victorian Workcover Authority [2008] VCC 1419 at [24]

per Judge Morrow (noting that ‘the modern practices of briefing senior counsel without a junior, in an appropriate case, should not be discouraged by only allowing fees applicable to junior counsel’). 330. FCR 1979 O 62 r 31(a); Fam LR 2004 r 19.52(2) (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 55(1)); Tas r 863(4). 331. Tas r 863(5). 332. NT r 63.72(9)(b). 333. Friend v Solly (1847) 10 Beav 329; 50 ER 608. 334. Beasley v Marshall (No 3) (1986) 41 SASR 321 at 334 per Olsson J (FC) (‘it is patently untenable to attempt to classify generic types of cases as warranting or not warranting senior counsel’). 335. McLaughlin v City Bank of Sydney (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 491 at 498 per Street J. 336. Stanley v Phillips (1966) 115 CLR 470 at 479; BC6600570 per Barwick CJ. See also Vocisano v Vocisano (No 1) (1973) 1 ACTR 138 at 140 per Connor J. 337. Oldaker v Currington [1987] VR 712 at 717 (FC). 338. (1912) 15 CLR 137 at 141; BC1200035. See also at 144 per Barton J (whether ‘a reasonable man, acting with ordinary prudence, would have ventured into Court not so prepared’), at 147 per Isaacs J; Bickford v Bickford [1923] SASR 148 at 151 per Poole J. Cf Howes v Clyde Engineering Co Ltd (1940) 56 WN (NSW) 210 at 211 per Halse Rogers J (who phrased the relevant inquiry as whether it was a case in which a counsel of any experience was not likely to be embarrassed if acting alone). 339. Peile v Nobel (Australasia) Pty Ltd [1966] VR 433 at 437–8 per Starke J. 340. Francis v Francis and Dickerson [1956] P 87 at 95 per Sir Jocelyn Simon P. See also Bickford v Bickford [1923] SASR 148 at 151 per Poole J. 341. Willis v Edgar [1963] NSWR 664 at 666, 667 per Else-Mitchell J. 342. Beasley v Marshall (No 3) (1986) 41 SASR 321 at 331 per King CJ (FC). 343. (1966) 115 CLR 470 at 478, 479; BC6600570. 344. Oldaker v Currington [1987] VR 712 at 716 (FC). See also Stanton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1958] Qd R 155 at 158 per Kitto J (HC). 345. Stanley v Phillips (1966) 115 CLR 470 at 479; BC6600570 per Barwick CJ. 346. Peile v Nobel (Australasia) Pty Ltd [1966] VR 433 at 438 per Starke J. 347. Kroehn v Kroehn (1912) 15 CLR 137 at 141; BC1200035 per Griffith CJ; McElligott v McElligott and Kelly [1954] Tas SR 10 at 11 per Dobbie R; Stanley v Phillips (1966) 115 CLR 470 at 479–80 per Barwick CJ, at 489 per Menzies J; BC6600570; Peile v Nobel (Australasia) Pty Ltd [1966] VR 433 at 438 per Starke J; Anderson v Glen Ewin & Staff Pty Ltd (1985) 41 SASR 42 at 45 per Olsson J; Beasley v Marshall (No 3) (1986) 41 SASR 321 at 332 per King CJ (FC). 348. See 17.91. 349. See 17.90. 350. See 17.87. 351. See 17.83. 352. See 17.85.

353. See Stanley v Phillips (1966) 115 CLR 470 at 489; BC6600570 per Menzies J and Peile v Nobel (Australasia) Pty Ltd [1966] VR 433 at 438 per Starke J, who both remarked that the taxing officer (and court) must bear in mind that there is an inner and outer bar and that, as a general rule, the most skilful and experienced counsel are within the inner bar. 354. Resort Management Services Ltd v Noosa Shire Council (No 2) [1995] 1 Qd R 56 at 58 per Derrington J. 355. Anderson v Glen Ewin & Staff Pty Ltd (1985) 41 SASR 42 at 45 per Olsson J. 356. Stemm v Feigelsohn [1964] Qd R 416 at 423 per Stanley J; Beasley v Marshall (No 3) (1986) 41 SASR 321 at 331 per King CJ, at 334 per Olsson J (FC). 357. Hickey v Clibborn [1964] Qd R 432 at 445 per Lucas J, with whom Mansfield CJ and Gibbs J agreed. 358. Beasley v Marshall (No 3) (1986) 41 SASR 321 at 334 per Olsson J (FC). See also Hickey v Clibborn [1964] Qd R 432 at 445 per Lucas J, with whom Mansfield CJ and Gibbs J agreed; Stanley v Phillips (1966) 115 CLR 470 at 490; BC6600570 per Menzies J; Peile v Nobel (Australasia) Pty Ltd [1966] VR 433 at 438 per Starke J; Vocisano v Vocisano (No 1) (1973) 1 ACTR 138 at 140 per Connor J. 359. Peile v Nobel (Australasia) Pty Ltd [1966] VR 433 at 438 per Starke J; Beasley v Marshall (No 3) (1986) 41 SASR 321 at 334 per Olsson J (FC). 360. (1966) 115 CLR 470 at 480; BC6600570. See also at 486–7 per Taylor and Owen JJ, at 492 per Menzies J (contra at 481–2 per McTiernan J in dissent); Madden v Hemmings [1960] SR (NSW) 478 at 485 per Maguire J, at 486 per Else-Mitchell J (FC); May v Hutcherson and Newton [1964] Qd R 426 at 430–1 per Gibbs J (who held that as the action for damages for personal injuries did not involve any questions of complication, whether or law or fact, the case on the issue of liability was clear and short, there was no mass of technical evidence, and the medical evidence was straightforward, the costs of senior counsel were not allowable); Ricks v White [1995] 2 Qd R 302 at 308 per Demack J (who upheld the taxing officer’s decision to allow only one counsel in a motor accident case because neither the issue of negligence nor the assessment of damages was complicated). 361. Stanley v Phillips (1966) 115 CLR 470 at 480–1; BC6600570. See also Willis v Edgar [1963] NSWR 664 at 668 per Else–Mitchell J. 362. See, for example, Rowling v Fred A Mashman (Sutherland) Pty Ltd [1964–5] NSWR 1024 at 1026 per McClements J (noting that it is not the practice of the court to allow two counsel in the run-ofthe-mill accident case); Andrewartha v Andrewartha (No 2) (1987) 45 SASR 85 at 89 per O’Loughlin J (run-of-the-mill claim in consortium did not justify the retention of senior counsel for taxation purposes). 363. V M Hart v Rawlinson [1961] NSWR 39 at 43 per Jacobs J (FC); Mills v Clifford-Ames [1963] QWN 28; Peile v Nobel (Australasia) Pty Ltd [1966] VR 433 at 440–1 per Starke J. 364. [1971] QWN 32 (FC). See also Geary v Benning [1961] NSWR 646 at 647 per Richardson J (who in an industrial accident case held it reasonable and proper for the plaintiff to employ two counsel, in view of the lack of eyewitnesses that tended to increase the difficulty in preparing for trial, and a difference of opinion between the medical witnesses as to the plaintiff’s fitness in point of time to return to his pre-accident work). 365. Re W T Potts [1935] 1 Ch 334 at 340 per Farwell J; May v Hutcherson and Newton [1964] Qd R 426 at 431 per Gibbs J. 366. [1987] VR 712 at 718. See also Lucas v Simpson [1969] QWN 19 (where, in a motor accident

case, Lucas J held that although the injuries the plaintiff suffered were somewhat unusual, and there could arise certain difficulties in eliciting evidence, the case was nonetheless of a very common type, and as the injuries were not serious, the foregoing was not enough to take it outside the general run of motor accident cases); Bush v Condon & Barrett Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 260 at 263 per Sheppard J (who held that, in a claim for damages for negligence and breach of statutory duty, although the case may have caused the plaintiff’s solicitors anxiety and necessitated careful preparation and presentation, the type of case was a common one not justifying the retention of two counsel). 367. As to the relevance of the importance of the case see further 17.82–17.83. 368. It was foreseeable that the case would involve about ten witnesses and about five days. 369. See also Madden v Hemmings [1960] SR (NSW) 478 at 486–7 per Else-Mitchell J (FC) (who suggested that if in a motor accident case there was a large mass of complicated technical evidence as to matters such as a mechanical defect in a car on which conflict may be anticipated, or if several specialist medical witnesses were to be called on each side to deal with different types of injury to the plaintiff whose evidence would probably conflict, the retention of senior counsel would be proper, but that such actions and others of a like nature which justify the briefing of senior counsel seldom constitute more than a small proportion of such cases that come before the court for hearing). 370. See also Madden v Hemmings [1960] SR (NSW) 478 at 486 per Else-Mitchell J (FC) (who remarked that mere difficulties in the proof of matters of fact or elements of the damage claimed are not sufficient to justify the retainer of two counsel because these are features of every action to recover damages for personal injury); Willis v Edgar [1963] NSWR 664 at 668 per Else-Mitchell J. Cf V M Hart v Rawlinson [1961] NSWR 39 at 43 per Jacobs J (FC) (who did not concur fully in the view that in an ordinary running down case presenting no unusual difficulties the retainer of senior counsel should not be allowed at the expense of the other party, but this sentiment was not shared by the other two judges in the court, nor was it endorsed by Kinsella J in Perks v Cox [1964] NSWR 71 at 80 (FC)). 371. Webster v Coles Myer Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWDC 128; BC200940190 at [5] per Gibson DCJ. 372. See, for example, Porter v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 680; BC200104664; Cotter v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 705; BC200304388; Erglis v Buckley [2005] QSC 25; BC200500589 (order made for two senior counsel); Webster v Coles Myer Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWDC 128; BC200940190. Cf Jones v Sutton (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 203; BC200504148 (where the court disallowed the costs of senior counsel on the basis of the comparative simplicity of the claim in which a judgment in a very small sum flowed). 373. Webster v Coles Myer Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWDC 128; BC200940190 at [6] per Gibson DCJ. 374. Holding v Jennings [1979] VR 289 at 294 per Anderson J (where the matter is of some complexity and of profound importance to the community, the employment of senior counsel is justified). 375. See, for example, ChongHerr Investments Ltd v Titan Sandstone Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 278; BC200707084 at [8] per the court (where the court allowed two counsel because the case involved a commercial dispute of considerable importance to the parties, and issues of law of some difficulty relating to the interpretation of a ‘sub-lease’ of a mining lease). 376. See, for example, Gallagher v Gallagher [1965] NSWR 409 at 411 per Allen J (who remarked that a solicitor or medical practitioner would ‘almost invariably be entitled, on a party and party basis, to have senior counsel in any litigation in which serious allegations were to be maintained involving his professional conduct’).

377. Perks v Cox [1964] NSWR 71 at 77 per Kinsella J (FC). 378. May v Hutcherson and Newton [1964] Qd R 426 at 430 per Gibbs J. 379. See, for example, Perks v Cox [1964] NSWR 71 at 73 per Herron CJ (FC) (motor accident case); Stemm v Feigelsohn [1964] Qd R 416 at 424 per Stanley J (motor accident case); Grant v Pepper [1970] 3 NSWR 495 at 498 per Isaacs J. 380. Beasley v Marshall (No 3) (1986) 41 SASR 321 at 334 per Olsson J (FC). 381. (1993) 113 FLR 422 at 428 (SC(ACT)). 382. Stemm v Feigelsohn [1964] Qd R 416 at 421–2 per Stanley J; ChongHerr Investments Ltd v Titan Sandstone Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 278; BC200707084 at [8] per the court. 383. Rowling v Fred A Mashman (Sutherland) Pty Ltd [1964–5] NSWR 1024 at 1029 per McClements J. 384. Stanley v Phillips (1966) 115 CLR 470 at 477; BC6600570 per Barwick CJ. 385. [1960] SR (NSW) 478 at 483 (FC). 386. Stanley v Phillips (1966) 115 CLR 470 at 477–8 per Barwick CJ, at 490–1 per Menzies J; BC6600570; Bailey v Wallace [1970] VR 109 at 114–18 per Menhennitt J (fee of senior counsel allowed in the Court of Petty Sessions in view of the difficulty and importance of the case); Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Green [1978] VR 505 at 517 per McInerney J; Oldaker v Currington [1987] VR 712 at 715 (FC). 387. Carrazzo v Weyman [1944] VLR 207 at 209 per Gavan Duffy J (rejecting any prima facie right to employ two counsel on any appeal whether from a county court or otherwise); Stanley v Phillips (1966) 115 CLR 470 at 477; BC6600570 per Barwick CJ (rejecting any rule that it is in general proper that two counsel should be employed in cases in the superior courts); Oldaker v Currington [1987] VR 712 at 714–15 (FC) (stating that a more restrictive approach is not to be adopted to the allowance of fees to senior counsel in the County Court than in the Supreme Court, though conceding that part of the policy of the County Court is that the expense of litigating in it is to be less than that of litigating a similar case in the Supreme Court). 388. (1946) 73 CLR 129 at 132; BC4600026. 389. Smith v Madden (1946) 73 CLR 129 at 132; BC4600026 per Dixon J. See also Stanton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1958] Qd R 155 at 158 per Kitto J (HC) (who held that the preparation, and the presentation before the Full High Court, of the argument upon which the taxability of £17,500 was to be decided once and for all, was rightly regarded as requiring two counsel). 390. [1941] St R Qd 205 at 212 (FC). See also at 208–9 per Macrossan SPJ (noting that all of the parties considered the questions to be determined to be of sufficient importance and difficulty to have them decided by the Full Court in the first instance and not by a single judge). 391. See, for example, Donohoe v Britz (No 2) (1904) 1 CLR 662 at 667; BC0490112 per Barton J (there may be greater room for two or more counsel in anterior proceedings than in appeal proceedings, in that usually the points of the case are sifted before the hearing of the appeal, when the debate is narrowed to certain main questions); Carrazzo v Weyman [1944] VLR 207 at 209–10 per Gavan Duffy J (who denied the plaintiff the costs of two counsel where the time spent arguing the case was less than a day, there was no nice question of law or any special technical difficulty, the defendant was represented by single counsel, and in the court below where the difficulties of expert evidence were likely to be more acute, one counsel appeared on each side). 392. [1961] NSWR 39 at 43–4 (FC).

393. In Perks v Cox [1964] NSWR 71 at 81 Kinsella J, after noting that ‘the costs of litigation in New South Wales have become a matter of serious public concern’, remarked that the court, whilst it must preserve the rights and protect the legitimate interests of litigants, ‘should take care in the public interest not to increase those costs by charging on to the unsuccessful party the costs of senior counsel in cases where his retainer is not reasonably required by reason of the nature of the case and for its proper preparation and presentation’. 394. Namely Madden v Hemmings [1960] SR (NSW) 478. Nor did it receive any support from the other two members of the court in V M Hart v Rawlinson [1961] NSWR 39. 395. See Perks v Cox [1964] NSWR 71 at 80–1 per Kinsella J (FC); Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 422 at 428 per Miles CJ (SC(ACT)) (who held that merely because the case justified its continuance in the Supreme Court did not imply that it was reasonable to brief senior counsel). 396. Sydney City Council v Geftlick [2006] NSWCA 280; BC200608331 at [101] per Tobias JA. 397. [1963] NSWR 664 at 667. See also Taussig v Langworthy (No 2) (SC(Tas), The Master, 20 June 1966, unreported) at 2 (who did not regard three days in court as beyond the endurance of a senior counsel unaided by junior counsel in an ordinary motor vehicle collision case). 398. Re W T Potts [1935] 1 Ch 334 at 339 per Farwell J. 399. See, for example, Hickey v Clibborn [1964] Qd R 432 at 447 per Lucas J, with whom Mansfield CJ and Gibbs J agreed (where, in a motor accident case, his Honour held that just because there was a conflict of medical evidence did not mean that senior counsel was justified, as a conflict of evidence was by no means unusual in actions of this kind). 400. [1963] NSWR 664 at 667–8. 401. Willis v Edgar [1963] NSWR 664 at 668 per Else-Mitchell J. 402. Sundell v Queensland Housing Commission (1954) 94 CLR 531 at 535; BC5400090 per Webb J. See also Kirkwood v Webster (1878) 9 Ch D 239 at 242 per Fry J; Peel v London & North Western Railway Co (No 2) [1907] 1 Ch 607 at 612–13 per Parker J; Kroehn v Kroehn (1912) 15 CLR 137 at 141; BC1200035 per Griffith CJ. 403. Peel v London & North Western Railway Co (No 2) [1907] 1 Ch 607 at 613 per Parker J. As to these factors see 17.73–17.91. 404. Australian Blue Metal Ltd v Hughes [1970] 2 NSWR 119 at 125 per Helsham J. 405. Re Broad and Broad (1885) 15 QBD 420 at 421 per Lord Esher MR (in the context of a warning given by solicitor to his or her own client that the fee may not be recoverable on a party and party taxation: see 5.26–5.34). 406. Denaby & Cadeby Main Collieries (Ltd) v Yorkshire Miners’ Association (1907) 23 TLR 635 at 638 per Buckley LJ. 407. R v Burgess [1937] ALR 363 at 364 per Rich J. 408. Glamorgan County Council v Great Western Railway Co [1895] 1 QB 21 at 24 per Collins J. 409. See, for example, Betts v Cleaver (1872) 7 Ch App 513 at 516 per Sir W M James LJ; Deane v Railway Commissioners (1897) 18 LR (NSW) L 294 at 298 per Stephen J (FC) (limited to two counsel); Peel v London & North Western Railway Co (No 2) [1907] 1 Ch 607 at 613 per Parker J (limited to one counsel); Donohoe v Britz (No 2) (1904) 1 CLR 662 at 667–8 per Barton J (limited to two counsel); Sundell v Queensland Housing Commission (1954) 94 CLR 531 at 536; BC5400090 per Webb J (limited to two counsel); Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Warburton (No 2) (2011) 206 IR 450; [2011] NSWSC 386; BC201102933 at [95] per Pembroke J; Kirwin v

Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 99 (S); BC201208924 at [29]–[33] per Hall J. An extensive catalogue of cases going both ways is found in Oliver, pp 103–8. 410. [1970] 2 NSWR 119 at 125 per Helsham J. 411. See, for example, London, Chatham and Dover Railway Company v South-Eastern Railway Company (1889) 40 LT 753 at 755 per Kekewich J (‘involving large amounts, a large amount of paper, examinations and cross-examinations, a great number of witnesses, construction of elaborate arguments, and examination into a great deal of matter of detail’); Great Western Railway Company v Carpalla United China Clay Company Ltd (No 2) [1909] 2 Ch 471 at 475–8 per Eve J (a case of ‘great complication and great difficulty’, that ‘imposed a large amount of labour on those getting it ready for trial and a large amount of labour and heavy responsibility on those conducting it at the trial’: at 475–6); Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1341 at [60] per Heerey J (a case where there was a considerable volume of witnesses and documents, and a multiplicity of issues and parties); Roads Corporation v Love [2010] VSC 581; BC201009593 at [110], [111] per Vickery J (being a very complex case, involving multiple expert disciplines and a wide ambit of issues; see also Roads Corporation v Love (No 2) (2010) 31 VR 551; [2010] VSC 154; BC201002382 at [62], [63] per Osborn J (affd Love v Roads Corporation [2011] VSCA 434; BC201110012)). 412. [2011] WASC 268 (S2); BC201110857 at [11] per Le Miere J. 413. See, for example, Kirwin v Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 99 (S); BC201208924 at [32] per Hall J. 414. West Australian Bank v Royal Insurance Co (1908) 7 CLR 385; BC0800014; Norton v Herald (1913) 17 CLR 76; BC1400060; Commissioner of Income Tax (Queensland) v Bank of New South Wales (1914) 18 CLR 207; Alexander Stewart & Sons Ltd v Robinson (No 2) (1921) 29 CLR 325 at 327; BC2100025 per Starke J; Carter v Coombe (1989) 154 LSJS 3187 at 329–30; BC8900158 per Legoe J. 415. Tarrant v Lier (1968) 12 FLR 248 at 253–4 per Fox J (SC(ACT)); Dalgety Australia Operations Ltd v F F Seeley Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 75 at 87 per Bollen J; Bennett v Seaman (1993) 117 ACTR 1 at 10 per Higgins J; Town of Port Hedland v Hodder (No 2) [2012] WASCA 212 (S) at [18] per the court. Cf Walker v Law Society of Tasmania [1991] Tas R 121 at 138–9 per Crawford J. 416. (1988) 49 SASR 75. 417. Dalgety Australia Operations Ltd v F F Seeley Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 75 at 87. 418. [2001] FCA 629; BC200102744. 419. Charlick Trading Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission [2001] FCA 629; BC200102744 at [38]. See also Federal Commissioner of Land Tax v Jowett (1930) 45 CLR 115 at 118; BC3000011 per Rich J (affd (1930) 45 CLR 115 at 121 (FC)), who allowed the costs of Victorian counsel on a hearing of an appeal in Brisbane, reasoning that as the court was a federal court and the case a federal case ‘a litigant in proper circumstances is entitled to select counsel from within the Commonwealth’. Not too much can be read into this case, however, because Rich J conceded that it was not an ordinary case, but a test case on the method of valuation of Crown leaseholds. In Dalgety Australia Operations Ltd v F F Seeley Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 75 at 84 Bollen J characterised Jowett as a decision on its own facts. 420. [1927] St R Qd 176 at 182–3 (FC). 421. (1968) 12 FLR 248 at 253 (SC(ACT)). 422. Tarrant v Lier (1968) 12 FLR 248 at 253–4 (SC(ACT)).

423. See, for example, Charlick Trading Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission [2001] FCA 629; BC200102744 at [39] per Mansfield J. 424. (1993) 113 FLR 422 at 428 (SC(ACT)).

[page 615]

CHAPTER 18

Procedure Relating to Costs Quantification Procedure for Costs Quantification Filing and disputing of bills of costs High Court Federal Court Family Court Australian Capital Territory and Queensland New South Wales Northern Territory and Victoria South Australia Tasmania Western Australia Waiver of legal professional privilege on costs quantification Refusal or neglect to procure costs quantification

18.3 18.4 18.4 18.5 18.7 18.10 18.15 18.16 18.18 18.20 18.22 18.24 18.25

Certifying Costs Quantification Statute and court rules High Court Federal Court Australian Capital Territory New South Wales Northern Territory and Victoria

18.28 18.29 18.29 18.30 18.31 18.32 18.33

Queensland South Australia Tasmania Western Australia Inherent jurisdiction of court to set aside certificate of taxation Costs of Costs Quantification Jurisdiction under statute or court rules High Court Federal Court Family Court Australian Capital Territory and Queensland New South Wales Northern Territory and Victoria South Australia

18.34 18.35 18.36 18.37 18.38 18.41 18.42 18.42 18.43 18.44 18.45 18.46 18.47 18.48 [page 616]

Tasmania Costs out of a fund Review of Costs Quantification Review by taxing officer/costs assessor High Court, Tasmania and Western Australia Australian Capital Territory New South Wales — review by panel of assessors Northern Territory South Australia — review of provisional costs order Victoria The need for reasons

18.49 18.50 18.51 18.52 18.53 18.56 18.57 18.60 18.61 18.62 18.64

Review by the court High Court and Western Australia Federal Court Family Court The Territories, Queensland and Victoria New South Wales South Australia Tasmania Bills of Costs on Party and Party Costs Quantification Form of bill High Court Federal Court Family Court Australian Capital Territory Northern Territory Queensland South Australia Tasmania Victoria Western Australia Amendment of bill

18.68 18.70 18.71 18.72 18.73 18.74 18.75 18.76 18.77 18.77 18.78 18.79 18.80 18.81 18.83 18.85 18.86 18.87 18.88 18.89 18.90

18.1 Statute or court rules in each jurisdiction make provision, in varying degrees of detail, for the procedure leading to, and the conduct of, the process of costs quantification under the costs indemnity rule. The process, traditionally known as ‘taxation’, retains this descriptor in the High Court, Northern Territory, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia. In other jurisdictions the relevant term is ‘assessment’, excepting South Australia where the rules refer to ‘adjudication’. This explains why the Chapter title uses the terminology ‘quantification’ as a collective term for these processes.

However, consistent with the practice in other chapters of this work, in the body of the Chapter ‘taxation’ is the term used when speaking generally of the process of quantification so as to avoid unwieldy expression. No two jurisdictions make identical provision in this regard, although there are similarities. Whether it be the procedure that precedes taxation, or to be followed in taxing the bill, in the [page 617] absence of specific provision in the rules the adversarial nature of taxation dictates that the taxing officer must be guided, and is governed, by the principles of natural justice.1 Natural justice requires the taxing officer to act fairly between the parties, and in so doing give to persons affected by the taxation due notice of the taxation and an opportunity to be heard in respect of it,2 and allow a party to see any document relied upon by the other side.3 Statute and/or court rules, generally speaking, reflect such notions. 18.2 This Chapter addresses, in turn, the procedure prescribed for the taxation of bills of costs between party and party,4 the procedure applicable to the review of party and party taxation,5 and the nature and form of bills of costs prepared for party and party taxation.6

Procedure for Costs Quantification 18.3 Statute or court rules prescribe a procedure for quantifying bills of costs7 as between party and party. The prescribed procedures reveal an increasing tendency to discourage the full costs assessment or taxation and to encourage the parties to agree on the quantum of costs recoverable, whether via preliminary assessments or estimates, default assessments or costs sanctions arising out of offers to settle the costs liability.

Filing and disputing of bills of costs High Court

18.4 The High Court Rules state that taxation of costs is commenced by the party entitled to costs filing, and serving on the party liable, a copy of the bill of costs to be taxed not less than seven days before the time appointed for taxation.8 That party may indorse on the bill a request that a taxing officer, in the absence of the parties and without determining any individual item in the bill, estimate the approximate amount of professional charges and disbursements that, in the taxing officer’s opinion, would be allowed if the bill of costs were taxed.9 There is no taxation of the bill, and a certificate of taxation is issued for the amount of the estimate unless, within 14 days of the taxing officer notifying the estimate to each party, the party who filed the bill disputes the estimate and requires taxation of the bill, or a party interested files and serves on all other parties to the taxation a notice of objection.10 In either of the latter events, the taxing officer must appoint a time and place for the taxation of the bill,11 provided that the disputing or objecting party has paid $1,250 into the court’s suitors’ fund as security for the costs of the taxation.12 [page 618] The party liable for costs may object to any item in the bill, whether or not the party entitled has requested the taxing officer to provide an estimate of the costs recoverable; if an estimate is sought, though, the objection cannot be made until the estimate is supplied.13 A notice of objection must state each item to which the party objects, the grounds of objection and the amount (if any) the party contends should be allowed for the item, and be filed and served not less than three days before the time appointed for taxation on the party seeking taxation.14 Unless contained in the notice of objection, the party liable cannot object to any item in the bill except with leave of the taxing officer.15 Where no objection to a bill is made in accordance with the rules, the taxing officer may allow or disallow the amount of the costs in the bill in whole or in part.16

Federal Court 18.5 The Federal Court Rules 2011 require a party who wishes to have costs

taxed to file a bill for taxation,17 and to serve on each party interested in the bill, at least seven days before the date endorsed on the bill, a copy of the bill (as endorsed by the registrar) and receipts for each disbursement (or, if not paid, a copy of the relevant accounts).18 A party who wishes to object to any item of the bill must file and serve on the parties interested a notice of objection19 within 14 days before the date appointed for taxing the bill.20 The rules then make parallel provision for the filing of response(s) to the objection(s), within five days before the date appointed for taxing the bill.21 On taxation of the bill, no amount may be taxed off any item to which objection has not been taken in the notice of objection, and no amount is allowed for any item to which objection has been taken in the notice of objection but not responded to in the notice of response.22 Upon completion of the taxation, the taxing officer must issue a certificate of taxation.23 18.6 In an initiative directed to the efficient and inexpensive disposition of taxation,24 the rules require a taxing officer, before a bill is taxed, to estimate the approximate total for which, were the bill taxed, the certificate of taxation would be likely to issue.25 The estimate is made in the parties’ absence and without making any determination on the individual items in the bill.26 A written ‘notice of estimate’ is then given to each party interested in the bill and, unless a party objects thereto, the estimate is the amount for which the certificate of taxation will issue.27 A process for objecting is prescribed, including the filing of a notice of objection [page 619] and the lodgement of an amount as security for the costs of any taxation of the bill28 (unless the court dispenses this requirement),29 consequent upon which the registrar may direct the parties to attend for a confidential conference, a provisional taxation, or for the taxation of the bill proceed.30 If the parties resolve the dispute at a confidential conference, the registrar must issue a sealed certificate of taxation for the amount agreed, and pay the sum lodged as security to a party as agreed between the parties or, if there is no such agreement, to the party who objected to the estimate.31 A provisional taxation is conducted in the absence of the parties, although

the taxing officer may, before completing it, require the parties to file submissions identifying the issues in dispute in relation to the bill.32 A party interested in the bill may, within 21 days of receiving written notice from the taxing officer — as to the amount for which the bill is provisionally taxed and identifying the amounts provisionally taxed off the bill — file a notice requesting a full taxation.33 In the latter event, the registrar will give notice that a bill is to proceed to a full taxation.34 Otherwise the amount to which a bill was provisionally taxed is the amount for which the certificate of taxation will issue.35

Family Court 18.7 The Family Law Rules require a person entitled to party and party costs to serve an itemised costs account and a costs notice on the person liable to pay the costs within 28 days after the end of the case.36 A person served with an itemised costs account may dispute it by serving on the person entitled to the costs a notice disputing the account within 28 days after the account was served,37 in which case the parties disputing the costs must make a reasonable and genuine attempt to resolve the dispute.38 If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute, either party may ask the court to determine the dispute by filing in the court the costs account and the notice disputing it no later than 42 days after the latter was served.39 Where a person entitled to costs has served an itemised costs account and has not received a notice disputing it, a registrar may make a costs assessment order if the person has filed a copy of the account and an affidavit that contains the prescribed information.40 [page 620] 18.8 On the filing of an itemised costs account and a notice disputing it, the registrar must fix a date, at least 21 days after the notice disputing the account is filed, for a settlement conference, a preliminary assessment or an assessment hearing.41 At a settlement conference, the registrar must give the parties an opportunity to agree about the amount for which a costs assessment order should be made, or identify the issues in dispute, and must make

procedural orders for the future conduct of the assessment process.42 At a preliminary assessment, the registrar must, in the absence of the parties, calculate the ‘preliminary assessment amount’ — being the amount for which, were the costs assessed, the costs assessment order would be likely to be made — and notify each party in writing of that amount.43 A party may, within 21 days, object to the preliminary assessment amount by giving written notice to the registrar and the other party, and paying into court a sum equal to 5 per cent of the total amount claimed in the account as security for the cost of any assessment of the account.44 On receiving a notice and security, the registrar must fix a date for an assessment hearing for the account.45 If a registrar does not receive a notice of objection, and an amount as security for costs is not paid, the registrar may make a costs assessment order for the amount of the preliminary assessment amount.46 18.9 The registrar conducting an assessment hearing determines the amount (if any) to be deducted from each item included in the notice disputing the itemised costs account, the amount payable for the costs of the assessment (if any), and calculates the total amount payable for costs.47 At the hearing a party may only raise as an issue a disputed item included in the itemised costs account.48 The onus of proof is on the person entitled to costs, who should bring to the hearing all documents supporting the items claimed. At the end of the hearing, the registrar must make a costs assessment order.49

Australian Capital Territory and Queensland 18.10 In the Australian Capital Territory, if, following an order for costs, the parties are unable to agree on the amount, the party entitled to costs may file a bill of costs with the registrar.50 The registrar must write on the bill, and a stamped copy of the bill, the day and time when the bill is to be assessed.51 The party entitled must serve a stamped copy of the bill on each party liable to pay the costs not later than six weeks before the day the costs are to be assessed.52 In Queensland, a party entitled to be paid costs must serve a costs statement (being the equivalent of a bill) in the approved form on the party liable to pay the costs.53 Both the party entitled, and the party upon whom the costs statement is served, are entitled to apply in the approved form for a costs assessment not less than 21 days after the costs statement is served.54

Within seven days of this application, which should if practicable nominate a particular costs assessor for the assessment, the applicant must serve a copy of it on the other party.55 If the parties do not agree as to an assessor, a party may either apply to the registrar for appointment [page 621] of an assessor56 or apply to the court for directions.57 The rules add that if a party entitled to costs does not serve a costs statement within a reasonable time, the party liable to pay the costs may, by notice, require the other party to serve that statement. If the party entitled does not comply with this request within 30 days, the court may direct him or her to serve a costs statement within a stated time. If the party entitled fails to comply with the court’s direction, the court may set aside the costs order or allow costs in a fixed amount, which may be nominal. It may also order the party entitled to pay the party liable costs incurred because of the failure to comply with the direction.58 18.11 In each jurisdiction, a party on whom a bill or costs statement is served may by notice object to any item in it, which notice must number each objection, give the number of each item to which the party objects, and for each objection concisely state the reasons for it,59 identifying any issue of law or fact the objector considers the registrar must consider to make a decision in favour of the objector.60 The registrar must limit the assessment to the resolution of the matters raised in the notice of objection and otherwise assess the costs.61 If a party62 liable for costs does not file a notice of objection, the registrar (in Queensland, a costs assessor appointed by the registrar) must assess the costs without considering each item and by allowing the costs claimed in the bill of costs, and issue a certificate of assessment for the amount of the assessed costs.63 In the Australian Capital Territory, the registrar may assess the costs differently in exceptional circumstances.64 18.12 A party liable to pay costs may serve on the party entitled a written offer to settle the costs.65 It must be for all of the person’s costs liability to the offeree,66 and cannot be withdrawn without the leave of the court. It does

not lapse because the party to whom it is made rejects or fails to accept it, but expires at the earlier of the end of 14 days after the day it is made or when the assessment of the bill of costs to which it relates starts (in Queensland, when the assessment of the costs statement to which it relates starts).67 Unless the offer is accepted, a party must [page 622] not disclose to the registrar (in Queensland, to a costs assessor) the amount of an offer to settle until the registrar (costs assessor) has assessed all items in the costs statement, and decided all questions, other than the cost of the assessment.68 An acceptance of an offer to settle must be in writing.69 It must be certain and not vague, and clear as to the benefit the party receiving the offer is to obtain.70 If a party gives to the registrar a copy of the offer and its acceptance, the amount of the offer is taken to be assessed costs of the proceeding.71 Rejection of an offer has consequences as to the liability for the costs of the assessment.72 18.13 In the Australian Capital Territory, if the parties agree that the costs be set at a certain amount (the ‘agreed amount’), either party may file a written agreement to the costs being set at the agreed amount, to be signed by the parties or their solicitors.73 On being filed, the agreed amount is taken to be the assessed costs between the parties.74 Equivalent provision is made in the Queensland rules, which require the costs assessor in these circumstances, on receipt of a written consent signed by the parties or their lawyers, to certify the costs at the agreed amount.75 18.14 The Queensland rules state that, although a costs assessor must decide the procedure to be followed on the assessment, the procedure must be appropriate to the scope and nature of the dispute and the amount in dispute, consistent with the rules of natural justice, and be fair and efficient.76 The assessor may, in any case, elect to hear the costs assessment in private, carry out the costs assessment on the papers without an oral hearing, not be bound by laws of evidence or procedure applying to a proceeding in the court, be

informed of the facts in any way the costs assessor considers appropriate, and not make a record of the evidence given.77

New South Wales 18.15 The Legal Profession Act 2004 envisages that a person who has paid or is liable to pay, or who is entitled to receive or who has received, costs as a result of an order for the payment of an unspecified amount of costs made by a court78 or tribunal79 may apply, as prescribed,80 to the Manager, Costs Assessment for an assessment of the whole (or part) of those costs,81 who must in turn refer the application to a costs assessor to assess the costs in question.82 Before doing [page 623] so, the person to whom the costs are payable must complete an application in the approved form and send a copy to the person liable, advising that any objection must be lodged with the applicant in writing within 21 days. Any objection must then be attached to the application, to which the applicant may attach a response. If no objection is received, the applicant must so certify in the application.83 A corresponding procedure is set where the person liable applies for assessment.84 A costs assessor cannot determine an application for assessment unless he or she has given the applicant, and any lawyer or client or other person concerned, a reasonable opportunity to make written submissions, and given due consideration those submissions.85 In considering an application, a costs assessor is not bound by rules of evidence and may inform himself or herself on any matter in such manner as he or she thinks fit.86

Northern Territory and Victoria 18.16 In these jurisdictions an application for taxation (in Victoria, to the Costs Court) must be made by summons87 filed in the office of the taxing master (in Victoria, with the Prothonotary), and include a copy of the order or judgment under which the taxation is made and the bill of costs is to be

taxed.88 Unless the taxing master (in Victoria, the Costs Court) otherwise directs, the summons must be served at least 14 days before the day for hearing named in the summons.89 The taxing master (Costs Court) must not tax costs unless the party entitled to costs serves a copy of the bill of costs on the party liable before or at the time of service of the summons.90 A party on whom a summons for taxation and a bill is served may, by notice, object to an item in the bill.91 The notice must state by list each item objected to, state specifically and concisely the grounds of objection and, in the Northern Territory, be filed within 14 days of the service of the summons and bill.92 In the Northern Territory the notice must, on the day it is filed, be served on the party filing the bill and on all other parties to whom the summons is addressed.93 In Victoria it must be filed with the Costs Court and served on the party filing the bill and on any other party to whom the summons is addressed at least seven days before the day for hearing named in the summons.94 The Northern Territory rules provide that a party entitled to object to an item, but who fails to do so within the 14 day period (or such other time as the taxing master allows),95 is taken to have admitted that item.96 This does not oust the power of the taxing master, for good and proper reasons, to deal with an item on taxation to which no objection was so raised.97 In both [page 624] jurisdictions the rules provide that where no objection to a bill is made, the taxing master (in Victoria, the Costs Court) may allow or disallow the amount of the costs in the bill in whole or in part.98 Where the parties agree in writing that part of the costs to be taxed may be allowed at a specified amount and the agreement is subscribed to or filed with the bill, there is no need to fulfil the requirements that apply to the bill of costs99 in respect of what is agreed, unless the taxing master (in Victoria, the Costs Court) otherwise directs.100 18.17 With effect on 31 December 2009,101 the Victorian rules were amended to make provision for an ‘alternative assessment procedure’ modelled on that applicable in the Federal Court.102 It envisages that the

Costs Court may, at any time, determine to proceed to assess a bill under this procedure, upon giving written notice to the party filing the bill in writing, who must in turn notify each other party of the date when the assessment will occur.103 Under the alternative procedure, the Costs Court, in the absence of the parties and without making any determination on the individual items in the bill, may estimate the approximate total for which, were the bill to be taxed, an order on taxation would be likely to be made.104 Within 21 days of written notification of the estimate, a party may file and serve on each other party a notice of objection.105 If no notice of objection is filed, the Costs Court may make an order on taxation for the amount of the estimate.106

South Australia 18.18 The South Australian rules require a person (the ‘claimant’) who claims to be entitled to costs from another person (the ‘respondent’) that are liable to adjudication under a court order or the rules to file in the court a claim for the costs in an approved form.107 ‘Adjudication’ is defined, for this purpose, to include ‘a taxation or assessment of costs pursuant to an order under an Act providing for costs to be taxed’.108 The claim must include a notice in the approved form, and a general description of how it is made up, including a statement of all counsel fees and other disbursements.109 As the contents of a claim may not give a recipient sufficient information to be able to assess the reasonableness of the claim,110 the rules require the claimant, at the respondent’s request, to produce for inspection all documents on which the claimant proposes to rely if the claim proceeds to adjudication.111 Within 28 days after service of the claim, the respondent must respond by filing a notice admitting the claim in full, admitting it to an extent stated in the response, or rejecting it in its entirety.112 By failing to respond, a respondent is presumed to have admitted the claim in full. The court will, on [page 625] request, order the payment of the costs to the extent they are (presumed to be) admitted,113 which is a judgment of the court for this purpose.114 This ‘short form claim procedure’ is ‘meant to give parties liable to pay the

costs sufficient information to assess for themselves what is the proper amount of costs payable and to respond accordingly’, and to this end is ‘intended to draw the broad battle-lines for any disputes which need to be resolved by the court’.115 It is intended to avoid, where possible, the substantial costs and delay involved in the previous normal procedure of quantifying costs by preparing a detailed bill of costs and having it taxed by the court.116 These policy considerations, in tandem with the structure of the relevant procedure, combine to dictate that parties cannot, whether unilaterally or collectively, waive compliance with the short form claim procedure and require the court to proceed immediately to a full adjudication of the costs on an itemised schedule of costs.117 18.19 If the claim is not admitted in full, either party may apply to the court for a preliminary assessment of the issues in dispute — which logically precedes any detailed adjudication of costs118 — whereupon the court may:119 determine the basis on which costs are to be awarded and give any directions that may be necessary or desirable to arrive at a proper award of costs on the relevant basis; resolve issues in dispute between the parties or give directions for resolving such issues by mediation, arbitration or reference to an expert for report; make such orders for costs as may appropriately be made without proceeding to detailed adjudication of the costs; and/or order that the claim for costs proceed in whole or part to detailed adjudicated. The foregoing, it is said, enables the court at the appropriate time to ‘explore whether there are other options available for the quantification of costs which would be more expeditious and economic for the particular case’,120 and represents an extension of the court’s policy to manage aspects of the litigation process.121 Which of the above options is chosen lies in the court’s discretion, influenced in large part by the response to the short form claim for costs.122 If the court orders that a claim for costs proceed in whole or part to detailed adjudication, the party claiming to be entitled to the costs must prepare an

itemised schedule of the costs in an approved form,123 and file it in the registry and serve a copy on the party alleged to be liable for the costs (the ‘respondent’).124 [page 626] Within 14 days of the service of the schedule, the respondent must file in the registry a response identifying each disputed item, stating the ground of the dispute.125 The court may allow an undisputed item of costs without inquiry.126

Tasmania 18.20 The Tasmanian rules require that an order or judgment directing or authorising taxation be filed before a bill of costs is filed for taxation,127 after which the taxing officer must appoint a date and time for taxation.128 The rules prescribe two days’ notice of the time appointed for the taxation of costs, together with a copy of the bill of costs to be given by the party (or his or her lawyer) whose costs are to be taxed to the other party (or lawyer).129 In cases of urgency, though, the taxing officer may direct that only one day’s notice be given.130 If a person entitled to costs does not file a bill of costs, the taxing officer may, whether or not any application has been made by any party, give notice to all parties to file their bills of costs for taxation within a set time frame.131 Within eight days of a party claiming costs serving a bill of costs, or within any other time the taxing officer may allow, the party liable may either agree to pay the bill or signify dissent from it.132 On doing the latter he or she may offer to settle the bill of costs.133 If no offer is made, or it is refused, the taxing officer must proceed to tax the costs.134 If the taxed costs do not exceed the sum offered, the party claiming costs must bear the costs of the taxation.135 18.21 If a party to a taxation does not attend at the date and time appointed, the taxing officer may proceed to tax the bill on being satisfied that the absentee had due notice of the date and time appointed.136 However, unless

the taxing officer otherwise directs, a party who has filed a bill of costs for taxation is not required to attend the taxation of the bill if the party notifies his or her intention not to attend, an appearance has not been entered in the proceeding, or each other party has notified the taxing officer of the party’s intention not to object to any item in the bill or to attend.137

Western Australia 18.22 When an order directing the taxation of any costs in a proceeding has been made, the taxing officer must appoint a time for taxation on the application of the party entitled to costs in the matter.138 In any case, the taxing officer may of his or her own motion give notice to a party to submit his or her bills of costs for taxation within a specified time.139 The rules prescribe two days’ notice of the time appointed for the taxation of costs, together with a copy of the bill of costs to be given by the party (or his or her lawyer) whose costs are to be taxed to the other party (or lawyer).140 In cases of urgency, though, the taxing officer may direct that only one day’s notice be given.141 The appointment for taxation is peremptory, and is to [page 627] proceed ex parte on proof that ‘due notice’ was given to the opposite party, unless sufficient cause appears for postponement.142 The Supreme Court has issued a Practice Direction encouraging parties to consider more efficient means of conducting taxation, especially for bills with numerous items.143 It exhorts parties to consider whether bills may be taxed by, say, considering a sample of items in the bill and then applying the conclusions drawn in respect of those items to the balance of the bill. It also invites parties to consider whether directions should be sought from the taxing officer as to the filing and service of a notice by the paying party that sets out each item to which it objects, the grounds for the objection and what may be a reasonable allowance for each item, or for the referral of the bill to a mediation conference to be conducted by a registrar. 18.23 Via a Practice Direction is also prescribed a procedure for the

provisional assessment of bills of costs, with the consent of the parties.144 It aims to save costs for parties by reducing the number of bills that proceed to assessment. If the taxing officer, upon receiving a bill filed in the usual way, considers the bill suitable for provisional assessment, he or she may by letter ask the parties whether they consent to the bill being provisionally assessed. Alternatively, the party whose bill it is may, at the time of filing the bill and with the consent of the paying party, ask that it be provisionally assessed. In this event, the bill will proceed to a provisional assessment unless the taxing officer considers the bill unsuitable. On a provisional assessment, the parties do not appear before the taxing officer, who must assess the total amount at which the bill should be allowed, and thereupon, and without giving reasons, advise the parties of that amount. If the parties do not lodge objections to the assessment within 21 days, the taxing officer is to allow the amount of the provisional assessment without further notice. Any objection must be in writing, and served upon all other parties forthwith, but need not set out grounds of objection. On receipt of an objection, the bill is listed for taxation before the taxing officer who made the provisional assessment. A party who, being dissatisfied with a provisional assessment, requires a bill to be assessed may be required to pay all or some of the costs of the assessment should the assessment not result in that party achieving an outcome more favourable to that party than was arrived at by the provisional assessment.

Waiver of legal professional privilege on costs quantification 18.24 It is possible to waive legal professional privilege for a specific purpose and in a specific context without waiving it for any other purpose or in any other context.145 So far as costs are concerned, the typical example relates to documents disclosed on a taxation of costs for the purposes of the taxation, in which case the privilege is, absent special circumstances, only waived for the purpose for which the documents were disclosed (even though the disclosure was not ordered by the court).146 This limited waiver may be necessary for the purposes of proving the claim in question,147 and may in any event be requested by the taxing officer so that, in performing the duty to be fair to each party, he or she can strike the appropriate balance.148 In

particular, as the indemnity rule dictates that the existence and scope of the receiving party’s duty to pay his or her own lawyers is central to the ability to recover costs,149 [page 628] the paying party will be keen to investigate the scope of that duty by reference to the retainer, which may otherwise be privileged.150 Notwithstanding a request by the taxing officer, a party to taxation may assert the privilege.151 The cases show that a party to taxation should not lightly be deprived of any privilege he or she wishes to claim just because the informal circumstances of a taxation process may give rise to unintended consequences.152 A taxing officer has, to this end, no right to override a claim of privilege. An express waiver is required, such that a claimant ought not have to bear the consequences of an unintended waiver unless fairness to each party necessitates that result.153 For example, in Clay v Kurelic154 a letter was produced in the course of taxation to be used as a voucher to verify the time devoted to the matter, in respect of which no opportunity was afforded to elect whether privilege would be waived. Hasluck J held that privilege had not been waived.155 His Honour countenanced that an appropriate form of relief might be that the existing certificate of taxation be quashed and that the bill of costs be re-taxed, which would afford an opportunity to make the election.156 As the taxing officer’s reasons showed that he placed no particular reliance upon the disputed letter, though, Hasluck J considered that a further taxation would most likely generate the same outcome irrespective of whether or not the privilege was waived.157 This led his Honour to decline to grant relief in the circumstances.

Refusal or neglect to procure costs quantification 18.25 The rules in the High Court, Federal Court, Tasmania and Western Australia provide that if a party entitled to costs neglects to bring in the costs for taxation within any time set for this purpose, the taxing officer may, so to prevent another party being prejudiced by the refusal or neglect, certify the costs of the other party and of the neglect, or allow a nominal or other sum to

the party neglecting to bring in the costs.158 This requires some motion on the part of the party claiming prejudice, for otherwise the taxing officer would not be apprised of the aforesaid.159 In South Australia, with the same general aim, the rules state that if a party entitled to costs unduly delays the bringing of a claim for costs and the party liable suffers prejudice as a result, the court may assess compensation for the delay in favour of the party liable and reduce the costs awarded by the amount so assessed, reduce on any other basis the amount to which the [page 629] party entitled would have been entitled had there been no delay, or disallow the claim for costs in its entirety.160 The rules in the territories and Victoria provide that where a party who is entitled to taxed costs does not apply to have them taxed within 30 days of service of a written request to do so by a party liable, the taxing master (in the Australian Capital Territory, the registrar; in Victoria, the Costs Court) may order the party entitled to file and serve a summons (in the Australian Capital Territory, a bill of costs) and may fix a time for compliance.161 If a party in respect of whom such an order is made fails to comply with it, the taxing master (registrar; Costs Court) may disallow the costs of the party or allow a nominal or other amount for costs, or order him or her to pay the costs of any other party occasioned by the failure to comply with the order.162 18.26 A taxing officer in the Federal Court may exercise these powers also where a party has engaged in conduct that puts another party to any unnecessary expense in proceedings before the taxing officer.163 This assumes that proceedings before the taxing officer have been commenced.164 The rules in the High Court, Family Law, the territories, Tasmania and Victoria (vis-à-vis the Costs Court) make equivalent provision, and (other than in the High Court) extend this to default by the party’s lawyer(s).165 The Western Australian rules provide that a lawyer who fails to leave his or her bill with the necessary papers and vouchers within the time fixed by the taxing officer, or in any way delays or impedes the taxation, unless the taxing

officer otherwise directs, forfeits the fees to which he or she would be entitled for preparing the bill of costs and attending on taxation.166 18.27 The High Court, Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and Tasmanian rules expressly empower a taxing officer to limit or extend the time applicable in respect of a proceeding before him or her.167 In any case, the court rules generally empower the court to extend time for compliance with requirements under the rules.168

Certifying Costs Quantification 18.28 Upon completion of taxation of a bill of costs, a taxing officer traditionally issued a document that certified the amount payable (a ‘certificate of taxation’). Some jurisdictions retain this terminology; others now use different terminology, although the general purpose and objective does not differ substantially. Unless the court fixes costs,169 they remain indeterminate until the issue of the certificate, when the amount of costs becomes a certain sum.170 Unless statute or rules provide to the contrary, the certificate constitutes an authority to enforce, or commence proceedings for the enforcement of, the amount of costs allowed by the taxing officer,171 but is neither a final judgment or order nor an order for payment of a sum of money.172 [page 630] In each case liability generally depends on an existing costs order by a court or tribunal. The certificate, though rendered enforceable by the court order, is to this end an incident of that order, necessary to quantify the costs recoverable in terms of the order.173 In most jurisdictions, though, the foregoing yields to provisions in the court rules declaring a certificate (or equivalent) to be, or operate as if it was, an order or judgment of the court.174

Statute and court rules

High Court 18.29 The High Court Rules state that, at the conclusion of each taxation of costs, the taxing officer must state the total amount allowed on the taxation, but must not, unless the parties otherwise agree, sign a certificate of taxation until not less than 14 days after the conclusion of the taxation.175 The certificate of taxation, prepared by or under the direction of a taxing officer, must be in the prescribed form and certifies the total amount of the costs allowed on taxation.176

Federal Court 18.30 Under the Federal Court Rules, a taxing officer must, on completing a taxation, issue a sealed certificate of taxation, to be served within 14 days after the date it is issued, by the party who filed the bill, on the party responsible for payment of the costs.177 A certificate of taxation has the force and effect of an order of the court.178 The costs certified in the certificate accrue interest179 from the date the certificate is served.180

Australian Capital Territory 18.31 The registrar must issue a certificate of assessment181 for the amount at which a bill of costs has been assessed, but must not sign the certificate until at least 14 days after the assessment is made (unless the parties agree) other than in the case of a default assessment182 or where an offer to settle183 is accepted.184 If a party seeks reconsideration of a registrar’s decision on assessment,185 the registrar must not sign the certificate until after the reconsideration procedure ends, but otherwise the registrar must sign and file the certificate.186 The certificate is final when it is signed, sealed and filed by the registrar, and operates as if it were an order of the court.187 The registrar may issue one or more interim certificates in an assessment for a part of the assessed costs, without waiting until a certificate can be issued for the full amount of the assessed costs.188 [page 631]

New South Wales 18.32 Under the Legal Profession Act 2004, a costs assessor, having made a determination, must issue to each party a certificate setting out the determination,189 accompanied by a statement of reasons.190 In the case of an amount of costs that has been paid, any amount by which the amount paid exceeds the amount specified in the certificate may be recovered as a debt.191 For costs that have not been paid,192 the certificate is, on its filing in the office or registry of a court having jurisdiction to order the payment of that amount of money, and with no further action, taken to be a judgment of that court for the amount of unpaid costs.193 It follows that no further costs can be added once the certificate is filed.194 Until filing, however, the certificate merely has effect as a determination, namely a decision on the amount of costs payable.195

Northern Territory and Victoria 18.33 A taxing master (in Victoria, the Costs Court) who taxes a bill, or otherwise fixes or assesses an amount for costs, must state the result in the form of an order.196 In the course of the taxation the taxing master (Costs Court) may make separate and interim orders in respect of any item in a bill.197 The taxing master (Costs Court) may, after the conclusion of the taxation of a bill, make a final order in respect of the amount of costs allowed or of his or her disallowance of the costs.198 An order, whether interim or final, must be authenticated and filed in accordance with the rules.199

Queensland 18.34 In Queensland, at the end of a costs assessment, a costs assessor must certify the amount(s) payable by whom and to whom in relation to the application, having regard to the amount at which costs were assessed and the costs of the assessment.200 The costs assessor must file the certificate in the court within 14 days after the end of the assessment, and give a copy to each of the parties.201 If a certificate is so filed, the registrar of the court must make the appropriate order having regard to the certificate, which takes effect as a judgment of the court.202 The order is not enforceable, though, until at

least 14 days after it is made, and the court may stay enforcement pending review of the assessment on terms the court considers just.203 [page 632]

South Australia 18.35 If costs are adjudicated upon by a master, the master will, in the first instance, make a provisional order for the payment of costs or any other amount found to be payable on the adjudicated (a ‘provisional costs order’).204 Where costs are adjudicated by an adjudicating officer,205 on completion of adjudication the officer may make a provisional order for payment of costs or another amount found to be payable on the adjudication (also a ‘provisional costs order’).206 A provisional costs order is to be entered, at the request of the person entitled to costs, in the court’s record as a judgment of the court if no application for review of the order207 is made within 14 days after the date of the order.208

Tasmania 18.36 In Tasmania, on the conclusion of a taxation, the taxing officer must state the result of the taxation in the form of a certificate.209 A certificate must not be signed within 48 hours after the taxation is completed, or such longer time as the taxing officer may allow for the filing of any objection.210 The taxing officer may make an interim certificate in respect of a portion of a bill of costs without waiting for the completion of the taxation.211

Western Australia 18.37 In Western Australia the costs allowed by the taxing officer on any interim or final certificate of taxation are deemed to be a judgment of the court, and are recoverable accordingly.212

Inherent jurisdiction of court to set aside certificate

of taxation 18.38 The case law indicates that the court retains an inherent power to set aside a certificate of taxation in proper circumstances (which is replicated in the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland court rules),213 even in spite of the mandatory tone of court rules. There are various instances in the law where apparently final orders are capable of appeal, or are postponed or suspended,214 and so the same, by analogy, applies in respect of a certificate of taxation. The jurisdiction, nonetheless, is one to be ‘sparingly exercised’.215 In Thorne v Thorne Comyn J identified some circumstances in which the court may exercise this jurisdiction:216 [I]t is manifest that the court would have a power to do so in many circumstances … for example, if there were a situation where the certificate was obtained by fraud, or if the certificate were granted at the registry by mistake. By ‘mistake’, I mean a mistake in procedure; a mistake in any of the essential ingredients; a mistake as to date; a mistake as to amount; a mistake as to any of the vital details. It would further be a case for revoking a certificate if it had been granted in breach of the rules, or if it had been granted without jurisdiction, or if it had been granted in circumstances which were contrary to natural justice …

[page 633] For example, in Pryles & Defteros (a firm) v Green217 Parker J set aside a certificate where the taxing officer had made an error of law of a fundamental nature in his approach to the taxation. 18.39 So far as mistake is concerned, statute in New South Wales expressly provides for a costs assessor or panel to make a new determination so as to correct an inadvertent error in an existing determination,218 and in the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland the rules permit the registrar to correct an obvious error in the bill of costs (in Queensland, the costs statement).219 The rules in several other jurisdictions make provision for the rectification of clerical and like mistakes.220 18.40 Occasions calling for the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction are not confined to the heads mentioned above. It may be activated in the case of error or a delay for a short period or in any case ‘if it is proper to do so’, although the circumstances need ‘to be strong’221 and the court must be convinced that the order is not futile.222 In Re Brougham223 Napier J set aside

a certificate where the taxing master had been under a misapprehension as to the nature and course of proceedings, not due to the fault of any party, such that little opportunity was allowed for bringing in objections.224 In Thorne v Thorne,225 as an application for review of taxation was not made within the period prescribed by the rules, the taxing officer issued a certificate. The review was not filed in time because the solicitor dealing with the case had left the firm. Comyn J set aside the certificate because there had been a satisfactory explanation for the default and the delay was a very short one. And, more recently, in Bloomfield v Liebherr-Australia Pty Ltd226 the Western Australian District Court, after citing Thorne, exercised what it termed the ‘incidental jurisdiction’ to set aside a certificate of taxation on the basis that the originating summons that generated the costs order had become a nullity due to statutory changes, meaning that the certificate had been issued by the registrar without jurisdiction. [page 634]

Costs of Costs Quantification 18.41 Other than in Western Australia, statute or rules prescribe by whom the costs of the process of taxation are to be paid. This is influenced, generally speaking, by the result of the taxation — traditionally known as the ‘onesixth rule’, namely that if costs allowed on taxation were reduced by onesixth or more, the claimant paid the costs of the taxation — and in some jurisdictions compared to any offer of settlement relating to the costs. Delay or default in seeking taxation may also influence the liability for costs in this context. Where the rules make no provision for costs of taxation, the taxing officer arguably lacks the jurisdiction to order costs. The latter can be justified in that, if a court cannot exercise a jurisdiction to order costs except as conferred by statute, a taxing officer cannot exercise the same simply by inherent power. That the rules in most jurisdictions make specific provision for such a power in the taxing officer of itself suggests that this power is lacking at general law.

Jurisdiction under statute or court rules High Court 18.42 The High Court Rules require a taxing officer to fix the costs of preparing and taxing a bill of costs.227 Where a taxing officer has, at the request of the party entitled to costs, made an estimate of taxed costs,228 a party filing a notice of objection must pay the costs of the taxation unless, after taxation, the amount allowed is varied in that party’s favour by an amount of one-sixth or more of that estimate.229 Where no estimate was made by a taxing officer, and on the taxation the amount of the bill is reduced by one-sixth or more, no costs of the taxation are allowed to the party entitled to the costs, and the taxing officer may order that party to pay some or all of the costs of the taxation incurred by any opposing party.230 If, before the taxing officer certifies the total amount allowed on a taxation, the party liable to pay those costs offers in writing to pay a stated amount for the costs of the party entitled, and if the total amount certified is less than the amount offered, no costs are allowed to the party entitled for any step in the taxation taken after the date on which the offer was made, and the taxing officer may order the lawyer who prepared the bill to pay some or all of the costs of the taxation incurred by the party liable.231

Federal Court 18.43 The Federal Court Rules require a party who files an objection to a taxing officer’s estimate of costs232 to pay the costs of taxation of all parties from the date on which the taxing officer notified the parties of the estimate unless, on taxation, there is obtained in that party’s favour a variation of more than 15 per cent of the estimate of taxed costs.233 A party may apply to the taxing officer to be relieved of these consequences if the party had offered to compromise the costs on terms more favourable than the costs were taxed, or if the conduct of any other party at the taxation added significantly to the duration or cost of the taxation.234 [page 635]

Family Court 18.44 The Family Law Rules simply state that, at an assessment hearing, a registrar may order costs.235 The rules add, however, that a party objecting to a preliminary assessment236 may be ordered to pay another party’s costs of the assessment from the date of notifying the objection, unless the assessment varies the itemised costs account in the objecting party’s favour of at least 20 per cent of the preliminary assessment amount.237

Australian Capital Territory and Queensland 18.45 If the party liable for costs does not file a notice of objection to the bill of costs (in Queensland, the costs statement),238 the costs of attending the assessment of costs (in the Australian Capital Territory, other than attendances the registrar considers necessary) are not allowable.239 If a party entitled to costs does not accept an offer to settle240 by a party liable to pay the costs, the party liable to pay the costs must pay the costs of the assessment241 if the amount allowed equals or exceeds the amount of the offer, unless the registrar (the costs assessor in Queensland) otherwise orders. Conversely, if the amount allowed is less than the offer, the party entitled to the costs cannot recover the costs of the assessment, but must pay the costs of the assessment of the party liable for the costs, unless the registrar (costs assessor) otherwise orders.242 The Queensland rules, more generally, state that a costs assessor must decide the costs of a costs assessment.243 They add that if a certificate of assessment is filed in a court, unless the registrar orders otherwise, the costs assessor’s fees are payable to the cost assessor in the first instance by the party who applied for the assessment, and are to be included in that party’s costs of the assessment.244

New South Wales 18.46 The Legal Profession Act 2004 states that a costs assessor may determine by whom and to what extent the costs of the assessment (which include the costs of the assessor) are to be paid.245 In determining this, the assessor may have regard to:246

the extent to which the determination of the amount of fair and reasonable party and party costs differs from the amount of those costs claimed in the application for assessment; whether or not either or both of the parties made a genuine attempt to agree on the amount of the fair and reasonable costs; and whether or not a party unnecessarily delayed the determination of the application for assessment. [page 636] Although the Act makes provision for a 15 per cent rule vis-à-vis the costs of assessment,247 this appears confined in its application to assessment as between lawyer and client.248 A reason supporting this outcome is that the 15 per cent rule is expressed in mandatory terms, which sits poorly with the discretion noted above.249 The costs of the assessor must be paid to the Manager, Costs Assessment.250 When those costs are payable by a party to the assessment, an assessor may, on making a determination, issue to each party a certificate that sets out the costs so incurred.251 On the filing of the certificate in the office or registry of a court having jurisdiction to order the payment of that amount of money, and with no further action, the certificate is taken to be a judgment of that court for the amount of unpaid costs.252 The Manager, Costs Assessment may take action to recover his or her costs or those of an assessor.253

Northern Territory and Victoria 18.47 In the Northern Territory and Victoria costs to be taxed under a judgment include the costs of the taxation, unless the judgment otherwise provides.254 Subject to an order of the court, and what follows, the taxing master (in Victoria, the Costs Court) may make orders for the costs of a taxation.255 The Northern Territory rules provide that if on the taxation of a bill, the amount of professional charges contained in it is reduced by 20 per cent or more, the taxing master may refuse to allow to the lawyer filing the bill the

amount or any part of the amount claimed in the bill in respect of the taxation and, if the taxing master directs, the lawyer must personally pay the costs of attending the taxation incurred by a party who, in the taxing master’s opinion, had a right to appear on the taxation and so appeared.256 In making such a direction, the taxing master may have regard to any offer of compromise made by a party who had a right to appear on the taxation in respect of the amount of the costs to be taxed,257 and may take into consideration a failure by the party liable for costs to make such an offer.258 The rules add that where a lawyer indiscriminately objects259 to an item in a bill and by doing so increases the costs of the taxation, the taxing master may order the lawyer to pay the increased costs attributable to the solicitor’s action.260 The Victorian rules provide that if after service of a summons for the taxation of costs,261 the party entitled to costs and the party liable for them serve on each other an offer of compromise [page 637] in respect of the amount of the costs to be taxed,262 the rule governing the costs consequences of compromise offers applies.263

South Australia 18.48 In South Australia a party may, at least four days before the date appointed for a costs adjudication, file a settlement offer in the court in relation to costs.264 The offeree may, within two days before the adjudication, accept the offer.265 If the offer is not accepted and the adjudication is determined on terms no more favourable to the offeree than the terms of the offer, then, subject to an order to the contrary, the costs of the adjudication upon costs are to be borne on a solicitor–client basis by the offeree.266

Tasmania 18.49 The Tasmanian rules state that, on the taxation of a bill of costs, the amount of the professional charges contained in the bill is reduced by onesixth or more:267

costs are not allowed to the lawyer for preparing of the bill, attending the taxation or any matter relating to the taxation, unless the taxing officer otherwise determines; if costs are so disallowed, the taxing officer may allow to the party chargeable by the bill any costs arising from any necessary preparation for, and the attendance on, the taxation as the taxing officer thinks proper; and if the taxing officer makes such an allowance, its quantum is to be set off against any costs the party is liable to pay, which the taxing officer must certify in the certificate accordingly. The foregoing applies the one-sixth rule to ‘the amount of the professional charges contained in the bill’, which has been held to include charges for drawing and engrossing the bill and attending taxation. As the bill would normally contain an item for attending the taxation, there is no warrant for reading into the rule a rider that the amount of the professional charges contained in the bill be exclusive of the costs of the taxation.268 If this allowance is proper, but prior to taxation it is impossible to know what time the attendance will take and thus what would be the proper quantum of the charge, it is appropriate to allow an amendment, up or down, when the quantum can be determined.269 The rules also make provision for offers to settle on the issue of costs,270 and prescribe that if the taxed costs do not exceed the sum offered, the party claiming costs must bear the costs of the taxation.271 [page 638]

Costs out of a fund 18.50 The rules in the territories, Queensland and Victoria make specific provision for the disallowance of the costs of taxation (or assessment) of costs payable out of a fund. If the amount of the professional charges and disbursements contained in the bill is reduced by a prescribed proportion,272 costs are not to be allowed to the lawyer for preparing the bill or attending the taxation (in Queensland, the party with the benefit of the costs order must pay the costs of the assessment) unless, in the Australian Capital Territory,

Queensland and Victoria, the registrar (in Queensland, the costs assessor; in Victoria, the Costs Court) orders otherwise.273

Review of Costs Quantification 18.51 The rules in all jurisdictions except the Federal Court,274 Family Court and Queensland provide for applications for the review of taxation at taxing officer level, and in all jurisdictions for the review by the court.

Review by taxing officer/costs assessor 18.52 The initial review process is designed to afford the parties an informal, expeditious and inexpensive process to correct errors made by a taxing officer, namely an intermediary step designed to relieve the court of much of the workload of dealing with applications to review taxing officers’ decisions.275 It should be noted, at the outset, that general law recognised a power in a taxing officer to re-open the taxation in respect of any item in a bill at any time before signing the certificate of taxation.276 The logic is that until then the taxing officer has not completed the taxation, and so may correct any errors in his or her decision.277

High Court, Tasmania and Western Australia 18.53 The High Court, Tasmanian and Western Australian rules, reflecting the general law as noted above, entitle a party who is dissatisfied with a taxing officer’s allowance or disallowance (in Western Australia, only the ground that the taxing officer has made an error in principle),278 at any time before a certificate is signed,279 to make a written objection — listing [page 639] briefly and concisely the items objected to, and the grounds and reasons for the objections — before applying to the taxing officer to review the taxation in respect of those items.280

Before the parties or their solicitors leave the presence of the taxing officer, ideally it should be understood if there will be any objections. If objections are foreshadowed, the taxing officer should delay the issue of the certificate.281 In any event, as a party dissatisfied with the taxation must deliver the objections before the issue of the certificate, if necessary he or she must ask the taxing officer to delay the issue of the certificate to provide time to put the objections in writing.282 Any objections made orally, or otherwise without complying with the above procedure, cannot be the subject of either reconsideration by the taxing officer (except by consent, or on the taxing officer’s own motion) or review by the court.283 Pending the consideration and determination of the objection, the taxing officer may issue a certificate of taxation for any part of the bill not objected to, and such further certificate as may be necessary will be issued after deciding on the objections.284 18.54 Upon an application to review the taxation, the taxing officer must reconsider and review the taxation in relation to the objections, and may receive further evidence in respect of the objections.285 If required by a party, the taxing officer must state in the certificate of taxation, or by reference to the objection, the ground and reasons for the decision on the objection, and any special facts or circumstances relating to it.286 18.55 The rules provide that the taxing officer may tax the costs of the objections and add them to, or deduct them from, any sum payable by or to a party to the taxation.287 The taxing officer cannot, after a certificate is signed, review the taxation except to correct a clerical or manifest error before payment or process is issued for recovery of the costs.288 The Western Australian rules add that if a party fails to appear on the taxation, the taxing officer may, upon a written application made within seven days, set aside or vary the certificate of taxation on such terms as he or she thinks just.289

Australian Capital Territory 18.56 The Australian Capital Territory rules in the territory follow the schema of earlier provisions in the Queensland rules.290 They state that, except in the case of a default [page 640]

assessment291 or an interim assessment,292 a party who has made an objection,293 or who in attending an assessment objects to any decision of the registrar, may, by notice294 to the registrar filed within 14 days of the assessment, apply to have the decision reconsidered.295 The notice must contain a statement of objection listing the number of each item in the bill to which the objection relates, with reasons for each objection identifying any issues of law or fact the objector considers the registrar must consider to make a decision in his or her favour.296 The applicant must, within three days of the day the notice and statement of objection are filed, serve a copy on any other party who attended the assessment.297 An applicant who is the party liable for costs must not include in the statement of objections any objection not previously taken or sought to be taken.298 A party served with a notice and statement of objection may, within 14 days of being so served, file and serve on the applicant a reply.299 The reply must state specifically the issues of law or fact the replying party considers the registrar must consider to rule in his or her favour.300 If a party files a notice and statement as prescribed above, the registrar must reconsider a decision objected to, having regard to the statement of objection and any reply, state the reasons for the decision on reconsideration, and issue a certificate of assessment in accordance with the decision on reconsideration.301 Except pursuant to a review by the court,302 such a certificate of assessment is final.303

New South Wales — review by panel of assessors 18.57 The Legal Profession Act 2004 prescribes that no appeal or other review lies in respect of a costs assessor’s determination of an application except as provided by the Act.304 The legislation provides that a party to a costs assessment dissatisfied with a determination305 of a costs assessor may apply, within 30 days of the issue of the certificate that sets out that determination and in the prescribed form, to the Manager, Costs Assessment (‘manager’) for a review of the determination.306 Notice of the application must be given to the other parties to the assessment at least seven days before the application is made.307 The notice requirement is designed to encourage settlement of the costs dispute before an application is made.308

[page 641] 18.58 The manager must refer a duly made application to a panel, constituted by two costs assessors.309 The operation of a determination referred to a panel for review is suspended, which suspension the panel may end if it affirms that determination or in such other circumstances as it considers appropriate.310 In reviewing the determination, the panel may affirm the determination, or set it aside and substitute such determination as it considers should have been made by the assessor in question.311 The panel must determine the application in the manner that an assessor would be required to determine an application for costs assessment.312 As explained by a District Court judge:313 Ultimately, the nature and extent of the review required will depend upon the exigencies and circumstances of any particular matter and it would be inappropriate to attempt to articulate a definitive test. Nevertheless, the examination of the material that was before the Costs Assessor, and the reasons, should be critical and not perfunctory. That involves, as a minimum, an evaluation of the costs claimed, whether in bill form or otherwise, an analysis of the objections and any submissions in reply, and an independent consideration of whether the Costs Assessor adequately considered the issues that arose. That includes an examination of whether the reasons of the Costs Assessor were adequate to address those issues.

As the review is not an appeal, it is to be conducted on the evidence that was received by the costs assessor who made the determination in question and, unless it determines otherwise, the panel must not receive submissions from the parties to the assessment or any fresh evidence or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received by the costs assessor.314 If the panel is unable to agree on a determination, it must affirm the original costs assessor’s determination.315 When the panel makes a determination, it must issue to each party and the manager a certificate setting out the determination,316 accompanied by a statement of the reasons for the determination.317 If the panel sets aside the costs assessor’s determination, the amount specified in the panel’s determination becomes the amount that can legally be recovered, which can include, inter alia, any amount paid or payable for the costs of the assessor by a party to the assessment.318 The panel’s determination is binding on all parties to the assessment, and no appeal or other review lies in respect of it except as prescribed by the legislation.319 18.59 If the panel affirms the costs assessor’s determination, it must require

the applicant for the review to pay the costs of the review.320 If it sets aside that determination, and makes a determination in favour of the applicant, it must require the applicant to pay the costs of the [page 642] review if the panel’s determination increases or decreases the total costs payable (as assessed by the costs assessor) by an amount less than 15 per cent of the total costs payable as assessed by the costs assessor.321 Subject to the foregoing, the panel may require any party to the review to pay the costs of the review, or may determine that those costs be shared between the parties in any manner it considers appropriate.322 These costs are payable to the manager, who may take action to recover them.323

Northern Territory 18.60 The Northern Territory rules state that where a taxing master decides to allow or disallow, wholly or in part, an item in a bill, or to allow some amount in respect of an item, a party to the taxation who objects may apply, by notice in writing within 14 days,324 to have the taxing master reconsider the decision.325 The notice must append a statement of objections listing the items objected to and stating briefly, but specifically, the nature and grounds of each objection.326 An objector must, on filing the above notice and statement, serve it on each party interested.327 But failure to comply with this requirement does not go to the question of the validity of the application.328 A party upon whom a copy of the notice and statement is served may, within 14 days (or such longer period fixed by the taxing master), deliver to the taxing master written answers to the objections stating concisely the grounds on which the party will oppose the objections and must, at the same time serve a copy of the answers on the party applying for reconsideration and on each other interested party.329 On a notice and statement of objections being filed, the taxing master must reconsider the decision to which objection is made and, unless a judge has

otherwise ordered,330 give the parties written reasons for the decision on reconsideration.331 On this reconsideration a party must not, unless the taxing master otherwise directs, raise a ground of objection not stated in a statement of objections.332

South Australia — review of provisional costs order 18.61 In South Australia a party dissatisfied with a provisional costs order may, within 14 days of the date of the order, apply for its review to the master who made the order, specifying [page 643] in detail the objection(s) to decisions made on the adjudication.333 The review will generally be in the nature of a reconsideration,334 although another master may conduct the review if for some reason it is not possible or convenient for the same master to do so.335 On a review, the provisional order may be confirmed or varied, and the resulting order entered in the court’s record as a judgment of the court.336

Victoria 18.62 As the Victorian rules, as amended following the creation of the Costs Court, envisage that orders in respect of taxation may be made by a Costs Judge or a registrar, provision is made for the reconsideration of an order allowing or disallowing items on bills by these officers. In the case of an order by the Costs Court constituted by a Costs Judge, an application for reconsideration must be made by notice stating each item to which the party objects and the grounds for that objection.337 The notice must be filed, and a copy served on each party interested.338 The Costs Court constituted by a Costs Judge must then reconsider the taxation upon the stated objections, and make an order confirming, setting aside or varying the taxation, or such further or other order as may be necessary.339 For this purpose, the court may receive further evidence in respect of any objection.340 The court may, and if

required by any party within seven days of its order must, give written reasons for its decision.341 18.63 Parallel provision is made for reconsideration of an order of the court constituted by a judicial registrar, and for the review, by a judicial registrar, of an order of the court constituted by a Costs Registrar.342 The order made by a judicial registrar upon reconsideration or review may, upon application by an interested party, be reviewed by the Costs Court constituted by a Costs Judge.343 A similar procedure applies to applications of this kind as to those in the preceding paragraph,344 except that further evidence cannot be received and the party giving notice cannot raise any ground of objection not stated in the notice unless the court otherwise orders.345 Except so far as the court otherwise orders, the review does not operate as a stay of execution or of proceedings under the order to which the review relates.346

The need for reasons 18.64 It appears from the foregoing that, whether pursuant to an application or otherwise, a taxing officer (or equivalent) should give reasons for a determination on review or reconsideration of taxation,347 a point made explicit by the rules in most jurisdictions.348 No equivalent [page 644] duty applies at the initial taxation (other than in the Family Court, New South Wales and Queensland)349 because ‘[t]he taxing of a bill of costs is extraordinarily demanding on the time of court officers and practitioners’, making it a ‘very expensive exercise’, such that ‘efforts to streamline the process are to be supported’.350 On review, reasons enable the unsuccessful party to decide whether or not to seek further review. Also, if that party seeks a review before a judge,351 reasons assist the judge to understand why the taxing officer did what he or she did.352 In this context, it has been said that ‘a taxing officer is not entitled to take cover … under an omnibus statement that he has taken “all relevant circumstances” into account’,353 or a mere statement that he or she considers an item to be ‘reasonable’ or ‘fair and reasonable’.354

18.65 The foregoing does not require a lengthy and detailed exposition of taxing officers’ thoughts. Megarry VC in Re Gibson’s Settlement Trusts stated the relevant standard as follows:355 The question is whether their answers will fairly reveal to those who are reasonably skilled in these matters the process of reasoning whereby the objection in question was allowed or disallowed, together, where appropriate, with a statement of the matters in question that were taken into account or disregarded in the process; and in most cases it should be possible to do this with reasonable brevity, without descending into prolixity.

Australian judges have repeatedly endorsed these sentiments,356 as the court’s reluctance to interfere with taxing officers’ decisions makes it particularly important that reasons be given, even if concisely. Adequacy of the reasons will depend upon the circumstances of the case. As explained by Phillips JA in Wightman v Johnston:357 When the question is only one of the costs to be specifically fixed or allowed by the judge at the conclusion of a trial in the County Court, it will perhaps be rare that more is required in the way of reasons than a brief ruling on the competing positions adopted. Certainly, the parties should not be encouraged to create out of the dying stages of the trial a further conflict of significant proportions, particularly if they are in agreement about the award of costs in the first place. Surely, if more than a brief ruling is required, the onus will lie squarely on the parties to make that clear to the presiding judge, at least in the ordinary case.

[page 645] 18.66 The Family Law Rules provide that within 14 days of the costs assessment order, a party may ask the registrar to give reasons for the registrar’s decision about a disputed item.358 In similar vein, the Queensland rules state that, within 14 days of receiving a copy of a cost assessor’s certificate of assessment, a party may make a written request to the costs assessor for reasons for any decision included in the certificate.359 They add that the costs assessor must supply written reasons to each of the parties who participated in the assessment within 21 days.360 The rules in these jurisdictions make provision for reasons for decisions made at the initial assessment because there is no separate reconsideration or review stage prescribed. 18.67 The New South Wales position is different. In addition to making provision for reasons at the review stage by a panel of costs assessors, the legal profession legislation requires that a costs assessor to accompany the

certificate setting out the determination with a statement of reasons.361 The regulations make provision for what information must accompany a statement of reasons,362 which must in any event involve the ‘adoption of, at the least, a minimum standard which places the parties in a position to understand why the decision was made sufficiently to allow them to exercise any right of appeal’.363 This statutory initiative, with effect from 10 September 1999, gave force to the ruling in Attorney-General v Kennedy Miller Television Pty Ltd,364 where the New South Wales Court of Appeal reasoned that a right to appeal a costs assessor’s determination to the Supreme Court would be rendered illusory without the assessor’s reasons. But as reasons are required at the panel review stage, coupled with the fact that a party who seeks to short-circuit the process by appealing direct to the court will likely be referred back to a panel,365 few appellants to the court would, even without the statutory initiative, lack the reasons for the decision appealed from. In Frumar v Owners of Strata Plan 36957366 Giles JA, with whom Beazley and Ipp JJA concurred, ruled that neither the costs assessor nor the panel had given sufficient reasons for their decisions. For instance, it could not be seen from the costs assessor’s reasons what work in items in the bill of costs was thought by the costs assessor to have been unreasonably carried out. Nor could it be seen what work in the items in the bill of costs the panel thought was unreasonably carried out, or what work it thought was reasonable work to be carried out independently of the itemisation in the bill of costs and its relationship to the work in the items in the bill of costs. The panel stated a figure as the result of its assessment and asserted that it was ‘in all the circumstances’ a fair and reasonable amount of costs, but the content could not be seen. More generally, what was missing in the relevant reasoning was explained by his Honour as follows:367 [page 646] If either the claimant or the opponent wished to appeal to the Supreme Court, he or it could not do so when he or it did not know — (a) whether the panel’s assessment had been by taking the itemised bill of costs and allowing, disallowing or adjusting items, or by coming to its own view of work reasonable to be carried out; (b) if the former, what items had been allowed, disallowed or adjusted and whether as to hourly rate or reasonable times or for some other reason; or (c) if

the latter, what work the panel thought reasonable and how it costed the carrying out of the work.

Subsequent cases have indicated that ‘global’ approaches to assessing costs, including ‘global reductions’ of costs, are unlikely to meet the minimum standard contemplated in Frumar.368 At the same time, it has been judicially remarked that lengthy and elaborate reasons are not required, provided the essential ground on which the decision rests is articulated.369

Review by the court 18.68 At general law it is an incident of the nature of the taxing officer’s power that it is subject to review by a judge. As the office of taxing costs is, at general law, the business of the court itself, which it has delegated to one of its officers, the court necessarily has jurisdiction to control this delegated authority, and therefore a right to review what is done.370 The court rules, to this end, provide that a right of review by a court does not, aside from an express provision to this effect, exclude the court’s inherent right to review what its officers have done on taxation.371 So although it has been said that on a review a party is ‘strictly tied to the objections made by him to the taxing master and answered by the latter’,372 this remains subject to the circumstances of the case. In Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v Commonwealth,373 for example, where the signing of the certificate of taxation was ‘irregular’ — it having been done so soon after the completion of the taxation that the plaintiffs’ solicitor lacked the opportunity conferred by the rules to deliver and carry in objections — Kitto J felt able to consider items not dealt with in the notice of objection. 18.69 In New South Wales the court’s inherent jurisdiction here is ousted by statute, which provides that a costs assessor’s determination of an application is binding on all parties to the application, and no appeal or other review lies in respect of the determination, except as provided by statute.374 Rules in some jurisdictions, which provide that the taxing officer’s certificate is final and conclusive as to all matters not objected to in accordance with the rules,375 also appear to oust the inherent jurisdiction.376 Yet the rules are wide enough to allow a judge to remit the matter to a taxing officer for further review of the taxation in accordance with his or her reasons in upholding the application.377 The latter is expressly stated in some

[page 647] court rules.378 Also, the rules in some jurisdictions preserve the court’s power to allow a party to raise a ground of objection not stated in a statement of objection or raised before the taxing officer.379

High Court and Western Australia 18.70 In the High Court and Western Australia the rules empower a party dissatisfied with the taxing officer’s decision on one or more items on review of taxation, within 14 days of the date on the certificate of taxation (or such other time allowed by the court or taxing officer), to apply to the court to review the taxation as to that item or part of an item.380 The court may thereupon (in Western Australia, if of the opinion that the taxing officer has made an error in principle) make such order it thinks fit.381 This review is not a hearing de novo of the taxing officer’s decisions, and so the usual principles governing the review of administrative decisions and, particularly those in the nature of decisions concerning practice or procedure, apply.382 As explained by Kenneth Martin J in W J Green & Co (1984) Pty Ltd v Tace Pty Ltd (No 4):383 Fundamentally, an application to a judge seeking a review … is limited in the scope of the review undertaken. The envisaged process is not in any sense a review de novo. Rather, it is a review confined to an examination directed at ascertaining whether or not the already reconsidered decision of the taxing officer contained an error of principle. A review by a judge … is no occasion for new points of challenge to emerge, or for issues not raised to the taxing officer or for points inadequately argued before the taxing officer to be re-ventilated afresh. Obviously, taxing officer’s hold expertise in taxations about costs determinations. They deal in the day-to-day nitty-gritty of assessing the costs in litigation, by reference to scales and allowances at a level of detail that judges do not. That is one reason why any further review opportunity window that is allowed … to a judge is an extremely limited one.

In line with the foregoing, the rules add that an application to a court to review the taxation must be heard and determined by the court upon the evidence that was brought in before the taxing officer, and further evidence cannot be received unless the court otherwise directs.384

Federal Court 18.71 The Federal Court Rules entitle a party who attended a taxation to

apply to the court for a review of the taxation and any consequential orders.385 The application must state the items in the bill that are subject to challenge, and whether the party wishes the item included, deleted or varied and, if varied, the amount of the variation.386 But the party cannot thereby raise any ground of objection, or response to an objection, not taken before the taxing officer.387 The application must be filed and served on all interested parties within 28 days of the issue of the certificate of taxation.388 The court may call for a written report from the taxing officer,389 but no further evidence will be received on the review.390 The court may exercise all of the [page 648] powers of the taxing officer in relation to the items under review and may make any other orders, including altering the certificate of taxation or remitting an item to the same or any other taxing officer for taxation.391 Although an application for a review of a taxation does not operate to stay execution for costs that are the subject of a certificate of taxation, the rules envisage that a party may make application to the court to stay execution until the application is heard and determined.392

Family Court 18.72 The Family Law Rules empower a party, within 14 days of receiving the registrar’s reasons for decision(s) made at an assessment hearing,393 to apply to the court to review those decision(s).394 Filed with the application must be an affidavit that includes the number of each item in the itemised costs account to which the party objects to the registrar’s decision, the reasons for objecting to the decision, and the decision sought from the court for each objection.395 At the hearing of the application, the court must not receive any new evidence, and a party may raise an issue only if it was identified in an itemised costs account or notice disputing it.396 Otherwise, an issue can only be raised if it was identified as a disputed item,397 or concerns the costs of assessing the itemised costs account, an alleged calculation error

in or omission from the assessment of the itemised costs account, or an alleged error of law or fact by the registrar.398 At the hearing the court may exercise all the powers of the registrar, set aside or vary the registrar’s decision, and return any item to the registrar for reconsideration.399 The hearing does not operate as a stay of the decision reviewed.400

The Territories, Queensland and Victoria 18.73 In these jurisdictions a party dissatisfied with the decision on reconsideration of taxation may apply, within 14 days of the decision,401 to the court for its review.402 The application must list each item in the bill in respect of which the party objects and state [page 649] specifically and concisely the grounds of objection and the order sought in its place.403 On a review, the court may exercise the same powers and make similar orders as the Federal Court.404 Except so far as the court or taxing officer otherwise orders, this review does not operate as a stay of execution or of proceedings under the order of the taxing officer to which the review relates.405 Except in the Northern Territory, the rules add that, unless the court otherwise orders, on a review the court may not receive further evidence, and a party may not raise any ground of objection not stated in a statement of objection or raised before the taxing officer.406 In Victoria, the power to review is premised on the Costs Court having been requested to furnish reasons for his or her decision.407

New South Wales 18.74 In New South Wales a party may appeal against the decision of the review panel,408 or the decision of a costs assessor,409 in the two circumstances discussed below. The appeal must be brought within 28 days

of the date that notice of the decision is given to the appellant, although the court may extend the time for appealing.410 Where leave of the court is required to appeal,411 the requisite period for applying for leave is 28 days. If leave is granted the appeal must be instituted within 28 days or such other time as the court may fix.412 Any extension of time in these respects requires leave of the court, which the court will give only if the justice of the case requires it,413 a decision informed by factors including the length of the delay and the explanation for it, any prejudice caused to the respondent by the delay, and the merits of the appeal or leave application. A poorly explained lengthy delay, especially (though not necessarily) coupled with prejudice to the respondent, or apparent weakness in the application, will ordinarily incline the court against extending time.414 Conversely, delays that admit to a reasonable explanation, if not lengthy or attended by prejudice to the respondent, may [page 650] justify an extension of time, especially where the application has ostensible merit.415 It is not a prerequisite for the grant of an extension of time to establish that the assessment is likely to produce a reduction of the amount of costs claimed.416 On an appeal the costs assessor, or the court to which the appeal is made, may suspend the operation of the decision until the appeal is determined.417 The assessor or the court or tribunal may end a suspension made by the assessor, but only the court or tribunal may end a suspension it has made.418 Appeal to the court on a matter of law A party to an application who is dissatisfied with a decision of a costs assessor as to a matter of law arising in the proceedings to determine the application may appeal to the court419 against the decision.420 This provides what has been judicially described as a ‘narrow, limited avenue of appeal’.421 Although the phrase ‘matter of law’ is not defined, the distinction between a matter of law and one of fact in this context has been explained as follows:422 [I]n an appeal as of right … the court is not concerned with the facts except to the extent that the decision is based on the facts found. It is not the purpose of the court to ascertain whether the facts were wrongly decided, incorrect, inadequate or incomplete. The court is not concerned

with absent facts, undisclosed facts or undiscovered facts. It is not contemplated that the facts upon which the matter of law was decided will be reviewed, complemented, varied or added to. The appeal is concerned with the decision as to the matter of law.

It clearly picks up decisions involving questions of law, even if not separately identified as a matter of law, relevant to the determination of the application.423 It arguably includes going to procedural fairness.424 The mere demonstration of an error of law does not, in any case, necessarily justify an entitlement to relief; the appellant must discharge the onus of satisfying [page 651] the court that the decision itself should be disturbed.425 The appeal may be made even before the assessor’s final determination, because the right of appeal is in respect of the assessor’s decision, not his or her determination.426 After deciding the appeal the court must,427 unless it affirms the assessor’s decision, make such determination in relation to the application as in its opinion the assessor should have made, or remit the matter to the assessor428 to re-determine the application on the basis of the issue of law corrected by the court.429 On a re-determination fresh evidence, or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received at the original proceedings, may be given.430 Appeal with leave of the court A party to an application relating to costs payable as a result of a court order may seek leave of the court431 to appeal against the costs assessor’s determination.432 The court may grant leave, and hear and determine the appeal.433 In considering an application for leave, the court bears in mind that the leave requirement acts as a filter to ensure that appellate proceedings that lack prospects of success are not brought.434 Also, as no matter of law is involved, it is appropriate to consider whether some other reason in justice justifies leave to allow the matter to be re-litigated.435 It follows that leave is granted only if some error of principle works a substantial injustice to one of the parties.436 To this end, it has been judicially remarked that because the system of costs assessment ‘provides a speedy and reasonably economic way of resolving issues as to the quantum of costs by experts in that field’, the court ‘should not too readily grant leave to appeal from their determinations’.437

[page 652] An appeal is to be by way of a new hearing, and fresh evidence, or evidence in addition to or in substitution for evidence received at the original proceedings, may be given.438 After deciding the questions the subject of the appeal, the court or tribunal must,439 unless it affirms the assessor’s decision, make such determination in relation to the application as in its opinion the assessor should have made.440

South Australia 18.75 In South Australia a party dissatisfied with the decision on review may, within 14 days of that decision, apply for a further review by a judge, who may, on the further review, confirm the costs order as entered in the court’s record as a judgment of the court,441 or order that it be varied as he or she thinks appropriate.442 Importantly, the judge reviews an order made on review by the master. Without an order made on review, there is no order that may be reviewed by the court.443

Tasmania 18.76 In Tasmania a party dissatisfied with the certificate made pursuant to the taxing officer’s reconsideration may, within 14 days of the date of the certificate or at such other time as the taxing officer may allow, apply to a court for an order to review the taxation as to the item or part of an item the subject of dissatisfaction.444 Unless the court otherwise directs, the application must be heard and determined by the court upon the evidence that was brought in before the taxing officer.445 The taxing officer’s certificate is final and conclusive as to all matters that have not been objected to in accordance with the rules.446

Bills of Costs for Party and Party Costs Quantification

Form of bill 18.77 The court rules in each jurisdiction except New South Wales prescribe the form and, to a greater or lesser extent the content, of a bill of costs (in the Family Court, an ‘itemised costs account’; in Queensland, a ‘costs statement’; in South Australia, a ‘schedule of costs’) required for the purposes of costs quantification as between party and party. Equivalent provision is made in New South Wales via the legal profession regulations,447 which here apply also in the party and party context.448 The above format represents a bill in what has been known traditionally as ‘taxable form’, which at general law meant a chronological, item-by-item list of each attendance or other service disclosing its nature with sufficient particularity to enable the basis of the claim to be [page 653] ascertained and an assessment of its reasonableness undertaken.449 If the items in a bill are so inextricably mixed up one with another that it is impossible to say what is really chargeable or what fairly ought be allowed, the taxing officer should reject the bill and require the lawyer to re-state the charges sought to be allowed with details of the work and of the charge for all the various matters.450 Moreover, a properly drawn bill for this purpose should exclude items that are clearly not recoverable on a party and party basis,451 meaning that the claimed costs have already been through one sifting process by the person preparing the bill to eliminate items that are clearly solicitor and client costs only.452

High Court 18.78 The High Court Rules require that, in a bill of costs, professional charges be entered in a separate column from the disbursements,453 and show dates, items consecutively numbered, particulars of the services charged for, disbursements and professional charges.454 Every bill must contain or be accompanied by proof of payment of all disbursements claimed455 and, at its

end, contain a summary of charges and disbursements, and the totals of each column.456

Federal Court 18.79 The Federal Court Rules state that a bill, other than a short form bill, must be in accordance with the prescribed form,457 and contain particulars of the work done by the lawyer, their staff and agents, the costs claimed for the work, and the disbursements incurred. The bill must have attached to it, or be accompanied by, a copy of the receipt for each disbursement or, if not paid, a copy of the relevant accounts.458 ‘Short form bills’ are prescribed for winding up applications459 and in migration cases,460 as is a procedure regarding those bills.461

Family Court 18.80 The Family Law Rules require an itemised costs account to specify each item of costs and expense (disbursements) claimed, numbered and described in sufficient detail to enable the account to be assessed.462 The account must set out, in columns across the page, in relation to each item for which costs are payable, the date when the item occurred, a description of the item (including whether the work was done by a lawyer or an employee or agent) and the amount payable for the item. At the end of the column setting out the amount payable, the total amount payable for the items must be stated.463 For each expense claimed, the account [page 654] must include the date when the expense was incurred, the name of the person to whom it was paid, the nature of the expense, and the amount paid.464

Australian Capital Territory 18.81 In the Australian Capital Territory a bill of costs must contain the following:465

the name and address for service of the lawyer whose costs are to be assessed; each item of work consecutively;

claimed,

or disbursement made,

numbered

the date each item of work was done; the number of the item in the prescribed scale of costs for each item of work claimed; a detailed statement of the work done by the lawyer, or the lawyer’s employee or agent, for the party; a detailed statement of the disbursements made; the date each disbursement was made; and the costs claimed for each item of work done or disbursement made. If a party’s bill includes an account that has not been paid, the party may claim the amount as a disbursement, but (other than for properly incurred counsel’s fees) the registrar may allow the amount as a disbursement only if it is paid before he or she issues a certificate of assessment.466 18.82 If a bill of costs includes a charge for work done by a lawyer practising in the territory and acting as agent for a party’s lawyer, the charge must be shown as a professional charge, not as a disbursement.467 The registrar may assess and allow such a charge even though it is not paid before the assessment.468 If, on the other hand, the bill includes a charge for work done by a lawyer practising outside the territory, the charge must be shown as a disbursement.469 If the registrar allows such a charge when assessing costs, it must be allowed at an amount that is, as far as practicable, appropriate in the place where the lawyer practises.470

Northern Territory 18.83 In the Northern Territory a bill must commence with a short narrative succinctly indicating the issues involved in the proceeding,471 be signed and dated by the lawyer,472 and divided into seven columns, which:473 number consecutively each item in the bill;

set out chronologically the relevant dates on which the work was done in respect of each item in the bill; contain succinct details of each item and any claim in respect of that item for professional costs and, where claimable, for care and conduct and waiting time; contain the amount of such disbursements as are claimed in connection with an item in the bill; [page 655] contain the total amount claimed for professional costs, care and conduct and waiting time for all the items that make up each relevant part of the bill; state the amounts disallowed as disbursements claimed in the bill (headed ‘Disbursements taxed off’); and state the amounts disallowed as professional costs claimed in the bill (headed ‘Costs taxed off’). An item in a bill for which travelling time is claimed must state the actual time in respect of which the claim is made.474 18.84 A disbursement may be included in a bill, notwithstanding that it has not been paid, provided the bill states that fact.475 On taxation, the disbursement may be allowed if it is paid before its taxation takes place.476 As to charges by interstate lawyers, the position is similar to that in the Australian Capital Territory.477

Queensland 18.85 The Queensland rules require a costs statement,478 when it is filed, to attach originals or copies of receipts for disbursements or, if a disbursement has not been paid, originals or copies of all relevant accounts.479 If a costs statement includes an account in it that has not been paid, the party may claim the amount as a disbursement.480 The costs assessor may allow the amount as a disbursement only if it is paid before he or she signs the

certificate of assessment, except in the case of an amount for lawyers’ or experts’ fees.481 As to the fees of interstate lawyers, the rules make similar provision to those in the Australian Capital Territory.482

South Australia 18.86 In South Australia, if the court orders that a claim for costs proceed in whole or part to detailed adjudication, the party claiming to be entitled to the costs must prepare an itemised schedule of the costs in an approved form, and file it in the Registry and serve a copy on the party alleged to be liable for the costs.483 The approved form prescribes columns for the item, a description of the item, the date it was incurred, disbursements and the amount claimed. As noted earlier in the chapter, this is preceded by a short form claims procedure484 — designed to ‘give parties liable to pay the costs sufficient information to assess for themselves what is the proper amount of costs payable and to respond accordingly’485 — for which there is a detailed approved form (‘short form claim for costs’). [page 656]

Tasmania 18.87 The Tasmanian rules require a bill of costs for taxation to have five separate columns,486 specify the date of each item in the bill, show the total of each money column in a page of the bill at the foot of the column, and contain at the end of the bill a synopsis of the charges and disbursements showing the totals of each column.487 The practice is that counsel’s fees must be vouched, although they need not be paid. Actual payments to witnesses must be vouched for upon taxation.488 Also, agency costs practice is similar to that in the Australian Capital Territory.489

Victoria 18.88 In Victoria a bill of costs for taxation must set out charges and disbursements in separate columns, and the amounts in each column must be

totalled at the foot of each page, the total carried forward to the top of the next page.490 The bill must:491 contain items numbered in chronological order describing briefly the work done by the solicitor for the party entitled to costs, and stating beside each item the amount claimed for the work and the amount of any disbursement made;492 at the conclusion of the chronological description of the work done, contain a description, having regard to the prescribed matters,493 of work done justifying an allowance under the scale of the amount claimed beside that item;494 and as from 1 April 2013,495 directed to ensuring that the indemnity principle is not infringed, make disclosure of the actual hourly rates charged to the party. The Victorian rules make similar provision to the Australian Capital Territory rules so far as the inclusion in a bill of disbursements yet to be paid, and charges for work done by a lawyer practising outside Victoria.496

Western Australia 18.89 In Western Australia a bill of costs for taxation must be prepared so as to show clearly:497 items consecutively numbered, together with a reference to the item in the scale to which the item in the bill relates; dates of items (specifying years, months and days); where necessary, particulars of the services charged for; disbursements; and professional charges. [page 657]

Professional charges and disbursements must be entered in separate columns, which must be summed before the bill is filed.498 A party leaving a bill of costs for taxation must lodge with it vouchers for the payment of all disbursements (other than court fees) included in the bill, which, if numerous, must be marked with the corresponding number in the bill.499 Via a practice direction, provision is made for the uses of schedules in bills to assist the taxing officer and the paying party by providing additional information regarding the work carried out in respect of an item and the allowances sought.500

Amendment of bill 18.90 At general law, a bill of costs between party and party can be amended at any time prior to the conclusion of the taxation. This contrasts with solicitor and client bills, which ordinarily cannot be amended without leave of the court.501 The leading judicial statement in this respect is that of the Master of the Rolls in Davis v Earl of Dysart (No 2):502 The bill of costs, as between party and party, is always susceptible of being added to or varied after it has been brought into the office. In this respect, it is quite different from a bill of costs taxed under the statute, where an alteration cannot be made as against the client, except with his consent, after the bill has been brought in for taxation. In cases of taxation of costs, as between party and party, the bill of costs is analogous to a mere state of facts, and is a claim by one party against another party to a suit, and it may be amended, in any way and at any time, before the taxation is concluded.

That the Northern Territory and Victorian rules provide that the court or the taxing master (in Victoria, the Costs Court) may, at any stage, give leave to a party to amend or withdraw a bill, or order that a party file another bill,503 suggests that there is no entitlement in these jurisdictions as of course for a lawyer to amend a bill. The same is presumably the case in the Australian Capital Territory, where the court or the registrar may allow a party to amend or withdraw a bill of costs or order that a party file another bill,504 and in the Family Court, where the rules entitle a party to amend an itemised costs account by filing the amended document with the amendments clearly marked at least 14 days before the date fixed for the assessment hearing or after that time with the consent of the other party.505 18.91 After a bill is taxed, however, a party cannot bring in a further bill of

costs for the purposes of taxation to pick up costs overlooked, for to do so would convert a final certificate of taxation into an interim one.506

1.

Clay v Kurelic [2001] WASC 318; BC200107329 at [61] per Hasluck J.

2.

R v Winder [1900] 2 QB 666 at 676 per Bigham J; Jet Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd v Petres Pty Ltd (1985) 10 FCR 289 at 290–1; BC8501565 per Northrop J; Dalrymple Holdings Pty Ltd v Gohl (1991) 34 FCR 397 at 403; BC9103647 per Spender J; McCoombes v Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd [2001] QDC 142 at [10] per McGill DCJ.

3.

Clay v Kurelic [2001] WASC 318; BC200107329 at [61] per Hasluck J.

4.

See 18.3–18.50.

5.

See 18.51–18.76.

6.

See 18.77–18.91.

7.

As to the requirements for bills of costs as between party and party see 18.77–18.89.

8.

HCR 2004 r 54.01.

9.

HCR 2004 r 57.01.1.

10. HCR 2004 rr 57.01.3, 57.01.4. 11. HCR 2004 r 57.01.6. 12. HCR 2004 r 57.01.5(b). An amount so paid into the suitors’ fund is to be paid out, after the hearing and determination of any application for reconsideration of a taxation and any review of the taxation, or otherwise after the expiration of the time limited for the taking of those steps: (a) to the party entitled to the costs of the taxation; or (b) if no party is entitled to the costs of the taxation, to the party paying it into the suitors’ fund: HCR 2004 r 58.02.2. 13. HCR 2004 rr 57.01.5(a), 57.02.1. 14. HCR 2004 r 57.02.2. 15. HCR 2004 r 57.02.3. 16. HCR 2004 r 57.02.4. 17. FCR 2011 r 40.17. 18. FCR 2011 rr 40.18(b), 40.19 (paralleling the former FCR 1979 O 62 r 41(1), 41(2)). 19. The notice of objection must: (a) identify each item or part of an item to which objection is taken; and (b) state, briefly but specifically: (i) why the (part of the) item should be disallowed; (ii) the amount by which it is contended the item should be reduced; and (iii) any authority on which the party relies: FCR 2011 r 40.25(1). 20. FCR 2011 r 40.25 (paralleling the former FCR 1979 O 62 r 41(3)–(5)). 21. FCR 2011 r 40.26 (paralleling the former FCR 1979 O 62 r 41(6)). 22. FCR 2011 r 40.27(3) (paralleling the former FCR 1979 O 62 r 41(8), which did, however, allow the taxing officer scope for taxing outside of the objections and responses in ‘exceptional circumstances’). 23. FCR 2011 r 40.27(6).

24. Fuller v Minister for Primary Industries and Energy (FCA, French J, 15 April 1998, unreported) BC9801294 at 4; NAES v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1221; BC200205846 at [7] per Tamberlin J; Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2004] FCAFC 159; BC200403619 at [11] per the court. 25. FCR 2011 r 40.20(1) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 46(3)(a)). A similar process has been recommended in Western Australia: WALRC 92, Vol 1, p 532. 26. FCR 2011 r 40.20(2) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 46(3)(a)). 27. FCR 2011 r 40.20(3), 40.20(4) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 46(3)(b), 46(3)(c), 46(3)(ca)). In Calder v Commissioner of Taxation [2006] FCA 1299; BC200607803 at [5] Nicholson J opined that there is no reason in law why the provisions of FCR 1979 O 3 r 3 (which provided that a court or judge may by order extend or abridge any time fixed by the rules, or by any judgment or order) (now see FCR 2011 r 1.38) could not apply to the applicable time limits in these rules. 28. FCR 2011 r 40.21(1) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 46(3)(d)). The purpose of requiring security is to protect the party whose bill is challenged, and does so by providing ‘a fund against which a party who has been unsuccessfully challenged in relation to an estimate … might apply their costs of attending the resultant taxation of the bill’: Dudzinski v Kellow [2000] FCA 740; BC200002933 at [26] per Spender J. It is not in the nature of a filing fee but is the price to exercise the right to challenge: Dudzinski v Kellow at [25]–[26], [36] per Spender J; NAES v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1221; BC200205846 at [13] per Tamberlin J; Potier v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCA 520; BC200402298 at [15]–[16] per Stone J; Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2004] FCAFC 159; BC200403619 at [28] per the court. 29. Pursuant to the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 35A(1)(g); FCR 2011 r 1.34 (formerly FCR 1979 O 1 r 8): Dudzinski v Kellow [2000] FCA 740; BC200002933 at [36] per Spender J (who remarked that having regard to the purpose of the rule requiring the payment of security any reasons proposed for waiving such a payment ‘would have to be very compelling’, and found that the fact that the applicant was a recipient of a social security pension was not a ground for such a waiver: at [37]). 30. FCR 2011 r 40.21(2). 31. FCR 2011 r 40.22 (cf the former FCR 1979 O 62 r 46(6)). 32. FCR 2011 r 40.23(1), 40.23(2). 33. FCR 2011 r 40.23(3), 40.23(4) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 46(4)(c), 46(4)(d)). 34. FCR 2011 r 40.24(c). 35. FCR 2011 r 40.23(5) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 46(4)(ca)). 36. Fam LR 2004 r 19.21(1)(b), 19.21(2). 37. Fam LR 2004 r 19.23. 38. Fam LR 2004 r 19.24(1), 19.24(2). 39. Fam LR 2004 r 19.24(3). 40. Fam LR 2004 r 19.37(1), 19.37(2) (namely: (a) when the account was served on the person liable to pay the costs; (b) the amount (if any) that has been received or credited for the costs; (c) that the person liable to pay the costs has not served a notice disputing the account; and (d) that the time for serving a notice disputing the account has passed). 41. Fam LR 2004 r 19.26(1), 19.26(2).

42. Fam LR 2004 r 19.28. 43. Fam LR 2004 r 19.29(1), 19.29(2). 44. Fam LR 2004 r 19.30(1). 45. Fam LR 2004 r 19.30(2). Security here serves the same purpose as under the equivalent Federal Court rule: 46. FamLR 2004 r 19.31. 47. Fam LR 2004 r 19.32(1). 48. Fam LR 2004 r 19.32(2). 49. Fam LR 2004 r 19.32(3)(a). 50. ACT r 1800(1)–(3) (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 58(1)). 51. ACT r 1800(4) (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 58(2)). 52. ACT r 1800(5). 53. Qld r 705. 54. Qld r 710(1), 710(1A). 55. Qld r 711. 56. In Boral Window Systems Ltd v Rolfe [2010] QSC 246; BC201004773 at [10] de Jersey CJ noted that the registrar’s appointment is regularly done ‘on the papers’, adding that ‘[t]here can be no suggestion there is not a sufficient supply of assessors who may be relied on for objectivity — through lack of prior association with the parties’ and that ‘[n]o doubt in making the appointment, the Registrar has regard also to considerations of timelines and expense’. 57. Qld r 713(1), 713(2). 58. Qld r 709A. 59. The reasons for objection may be in abbreviated note form but must be understandable without further explanation: ACT r 1807(3); Qld r 706(3) (formerly Qld r 717(3)). 60. ACT r 1807(1), 1807(2); Qld r 706(1), 706(2) (formerly Qld r 717(1), 717(2)). 61. ACT r 1808; Qld r 722 (formerly Qld r 718). 62. For this purpose, ‘a party’ applies to each of however many parties are ordered to pay the costs. If one party chooses not to object to the costs statement, the party in whose favour the order was made is entitled to a default assessment against that party and can recover from that party the amount so assessed. If other parties against whom the same order was made choose to object and are successful in their objections, they become liable only for their own assessed liability. The practical effect is that all the parties liable for the same costs order would be entitled as against the party in whose favour the costs were awarded to credit for the amounts paid by each other party liable on the same order. If the party whose assessment went by default had the highest liability, as would be reasonably likely, that party would be liable for the balance after the liabilities of the other parties had been discharged. See Glenwood Homes Pty Ltd v Eberhard [2009] 1 Qd R 127; [2008] QSC 192; BC200807566 at [15]–[17] per Dutney J. 63. ACT r 1809(1), 1809(2); Qld r 708(1)–708(3) (formerly Qld r 719). 64. ACT r 1809(3)(a)(iii); Qld r 708(4)(b). 65. ACT r 1811(1) (cf former ACT RSC O 65 r 58(6)–(10), dealing with the tender of a sum for

costs); Qld r 733(1) (formerly Qld r 721(1)). 66. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that an offer, if accepted, would produce an agreement on the basis of which the costs, the assessment of which the registrar has been asked to undertake pursuant to the application, could be set pursuant to Qld r 733(2) (formerly Qld r 722(2)). It brings that assessment to an end, so as to avoid the situation where the offer, if accepted, would still leave some matters to be determined on that assessment by the registrar: McCoombes v Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd [2001] QDC 142 at [165] per McGill DCJ. 67. ACT r 1811(2), 1811(3); Qld r 733(2), 733(3) (formerly Qld r 721(2), 721(3)). 68. ACT r 1811(4); Qld r 733(4) (formerly Qld r 721(4)). 69. ACT r 1812(1); Qld r 734(1) (formerly Qld r 722(1)). 70. John Goss Projects Pty Ltd v Thiess Watkins White Constructions Ltd (in liq) [1995] 2 Qd R 591 at 595; BC9505807 per Williams J (who added that the party making the offer may make a separate offer to settle each bill, or it may, provided the position is made clear, make on offer to settle a number of specifically identified bills delivered in the action: at 596) (referring to the previous equivalent rule Qld RSC O 91 r 89); Zardo v Parisi (2007) 1 ACTLR 68; [2007] ACTSC 63; BC200706528 at [14] per Connolly J (dealing with the previous ACT RSC O 65 r 58). 71. ACT r 1812(2); Qld r 734(2) (formerly Qld r 722(2)). 72. See 18.45. 73. ACT r 1702(2). 74. ACT r 1702(3). 75. Qld r 736 (formerly Qld r 723). 76. Qld r 720(1), 720(2). 77. Qld r 720(4). 78. The reference to ‘court’ in this context is not to be construed so as to apply to an order for costs made by a court of another state or territory, but to be confined to a court in New South Wales: BHP Billiton Ltd v Registrar of The Dust Diseases Tribunal of New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 562; BC201003662 at [35] per Price J. 79. Hence, this entitlement does not apply where the judge or magistrate has fixed the amount of costs payable in the case: see Leamey v Heath [2001] NSWSC 1095; BC200107412 at [12]–[13] per Campbell J. 80. See Legal Profession Act 2004 s 354 (formerly NSW 1987 s 203); Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW) cl 124 (formerly NSW 2002 cl 55). 81. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 353(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 202(1)). Such an application cannot be made in relation to costs arising out of criminal proceedings in a court (except as provided by Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 257G: see 24.25, 24.52): NSW 2004 s 353(3) (formerly NSW 1987 s 202(3)). 82. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 357(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 206(1)). 83. Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW) cl 125(1) (formerly 2002 cl 56(1)). 84. Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW) cl 125(2) (formerly 2002 cl 56(2)). 85. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 359(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208(1)). There is no requirement for a hearing, as the rules of natural justice are met by the requirement to provide the parties with an opportunity to make submissions, and that the assessor have no interest in the

application (under NSW 2004 s 357(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 206(2)): Ryan v Hansen (2000) 49 NSWLR 184; [2000] NSWSC 354; BC200002113 at [30] per Kirby J. 86. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 359(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208(2)). 87. The summons must be in Form 63A: NT r 63.36(3); Vic r 63.38(3). 88. NT rr 63.36(1), 63.36(2), 63.37(1); Vic rr 63.38(1), 63.38(2), 63.39(1). 89. NT r 63.36(4); Vic r 63.38(4). 90. NT r 63.38; Vic r 63.40. Service on a defendant who has not filed an appearance in the proceeding the subject of the application for costs is not necessary: NT r 63.39; Vic r 63.41. 91. NT r 63.45(1); Vic r 63.47(1). 92. NT r 63.45(2); Vic r 63.47(2). 93. NT r 63.45(3). A taxation must not proceed unless the party filing the bill proves by affidavit service of a copy of the bill on all relevant parties: r 63.45(7). 94. Vic r 63.47(3). 95. An application for an extension of time may be made informally before or after the expiration of the 14 day period: NT r 63.45(6). 96. NT r 63.45(4). 97. NT r 63.45(5). 98. NT r 63.47; Vic r 63.49. 99. Under NT r 63.40 (see 18.16); Vic r 63.42 (see 18.88). 100. NT r 63.44(a); Vic r 63.46(a). 101. Pursuant to the Supreme Court (Cost Court Amendments) Rules 2009 (Vic). 102. See 18.6. 103. Vic rr 63.86, 63.87. 104. Vic r 63.88(1). 105. Vic r 63.88(2), 63.88(3). 106. Vic r 63.88(4). 107. SA r 271(1). 108. SA r 4. 109. SA r 271(2). 110. Graziano v Graziano (2010) 272 LSJS 572; [2010] SASC 320; BC201008674 at [15] per Judge Lunn. 111. SA r 271(3). In Viscariello v Macks (No 7) [2012] SASC 41; BC201201560 at [15] Judge Lunn noted that, prior to the enactment of SA r 271(3), a party claiming costs could not be required to disclose to the respondent the documents on which it relied for the quantification of its costs before the taxation. Under the former rules (SA RSC r 101.13(c)) a taxing officer power could require production of documents for a taxation, but only at the taxation itself. His Honour added (at [16]) that the words ‘if the claim proceeds to adjudication’ in SA r 271(3) impliedly mean that the right of inspection ‘does not extend to after an order has been made that the claim proceeds to adjudication’, as r 271(3) ‘was only intended to facilitate the “short form” procedure and not the

conduct of an adjudication’. 112. SA r 271(4). 113. SA r 271(5). 114. By virtue of the extended definition of ‘judgment’ in SA r 4: Graziano v Graziano (2010) 272 LSJS 572; [2010] SASC 320; BC201008674 at [7] per Judge Lunn. 115. Baronglow Pty Ltd v Thomas (No 7) (2008) 253 LSJS 251; [2008] SASC 33; BC200800668 at [6] per Judge Lunn. See also Viscariello v Macks (No 7) [2012] SASC 41; BC201201560 at [13] per Judge Lunn. 116. Viscariello v Macks (No 7) [2012] SASC 41; BC201201560 at [15] per Judge Lunn. 117. Baronglow Pty Ltd v Thomas (No 7) (2008) 253 LSJS 251; [2008] SASC 33; BC200800668 at [8] per Judge Lunn (noting that the former SA RSC r 101A.02(1a) expressly allowed all parties (but not the party liable to pay the costs unilaterally) to waive the requirement for service of a short form bill); Smart Co Pty Ltd v Yeoman Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] SASC 354; BC200811058 at [8] per Judge Lunn. 118. Catto v Hampton Australia Ltd (in liq) (2008) 257 LSJS 245; [2008] SASC 231; BC200807439 at [17] per White J, with whom Vanstone and Anderson JJ concurred. The interposition of a preliminary hearing here was a deliberate innovation in the 2006 rules ‘to enable the Court better to monitor how the adjudication process was to proceed and to control the delays and substantial expense involved in it’: Smart Co Pty Ltd v Yeoman Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] SASC 354; BC200811058 at [6] per Judge Lunn. 119. SA r 271(6). 120. Smart Co Pty Ltd v Yeoman Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] SASC 354; BC200811058 at [9] per Judge Lunn. 121. Smart Co Pty Ltd v Yeoman Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] SASC 354; BC200811058 at [9] per Judge Lunn. 122. Baronglow Pty Ltd v Thomas (No 7) (2008) 253 LSJS 251; [2008] SASC 33; BC200800668 at [7] per Judge Lunn. 123. See Supreme Court of South Australia, Practice Direction 8.2. 124. SA r 273(1). 125. SA r 273(2). 126. SA r 273(3). 127. Tas r 849(1). 128. Tas r 849(2). 129. Tas r 849(3), 849(5). 130. Tas r 849(4). 131. Tas r 855(1). 132. Tas r 850(1). 133. Tas r 850(2). 134. Tas r 850(3). 135. Tas r 850(4).

136. Tas r 851. 137. Tas r 853. 138. WA O 66 r 32(1). 139. WA O 66 r 39. 140. WA O 66 rr 34, 35(1). 141. WA O 66 r 35(2). 142. WA O 66 r 38. 143. Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice Directions, 2009, 4.7.3, cll 9, 10. 144. Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice Directions, 2009, 4.7.2. 145. As to waiver of privilege generally see R J Desiatnik, Legal Professional Privilege in Australia, 2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2005, Chs 8, 9. 146. Pamplin v Express Newspapers Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 689 at 695–6 per Hobhouse J; Bourns Inc v Raychem Corp [1999] 3 All ER 154 at 162–3, 170; [1999] EWCA Civ 1128 per Aldous LJ; South Coast Shipping Co Ltd v Havant Borough Council [2002] 3 All ER 779 at 785–6; [2001] EWHC 9017 (Costs) per Pumfrey J. 147. Giannarelli v Wraith (No 2) (1991) 171 CLR 592 at 607; BC9102632 per McHugh J. 148. Goldman v Hesper [1988] 1 WLR 1238 at 1244 per Taylor LJ. 149. See 7.2–7.6. 150. South Coast Shipping Co Ltd v Havant Borough Council [2002] 3 All ER 779 at 782; [2001] EWHC 9017 (Costs) per Pumfrey J. 151. Giannarelli v Wraith (No 2) (1991) 171 CLR 592 at 601; BC9102632 per McHugh J. 152. Clay v Kurelic [2001] WASC 318; BC200107329 at [64] per Hasluck J. 153. Clay v Kurelic [2001] WASC 318; BC200107329 at [58], [59] per Hasluck J. 154. [2001] WASC 318; BC200107329. 155. Clay v Kurelic [2001] WASC 318; BC200107329 at [60]. 156. Clay v Kurelic [2001] WASC 318; BC200107329 at [65]. 157. Clay v Kurelic [2001] WASC 318; BC200107329 at [66]. 158. HCR 2004 r 53.04.2 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 73); FCR 2011 r 40.15 (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 17) (see Wodrow v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 129 FCR 182; [2003] FCA 403; BC200302096 at [13] per Stone J, who remarked that the rule ‘is directed to resolving the uncertainty engendered when a party who has the benefit of a costs order neglects to file a bill of costs’ but that ‘[o]nce the bill of costs is filed … there is no such uncertainty and in those circumstances the rule has no further purpose’); Tas r 855(2); WA O 66 r 40. 159. Busby v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1992] FCA 78; BC9203352 at [4] per French J (who ordered that proceedings for the recovery of costs, which had been initiated nearly four years after the relevant service was provided, be stayed indefinitely because the prejudice the applicant, in view of his parlous financial position, would suffer outweighed the damage to the respondent’s interests: at [8]–[9]). Cf Wilden Pty Ltd v Greenco Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 55; BC200401618 (where McKechnie J, with E M Heenan J concurred, distinguished Busby on the ground that there was no evidence of contumelious or intentional delay (merely unexplained

delay) nor sufficient evidence of prejudice to the defendant, and so it was open to the trial judge in the exercise of discretion to refuse the stay: at [6]). 160. SA r 275. 161. ACT r 1803(1), 1803(2) (cf former ACT RSC O 65 r 52); NT r 63.51(1); Vic r 63.53(1). 162. ACT r 1803(3); NT r 63.51(2); Vic r 63.53(2). 163. FCR 2011 r 40.16 (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 18, which also referred to where a party was ‘guilty of neglect or delay’). 164. Busby v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1992] FCA 78; BC9203352 at [5] per French J. 165. HCR 2004 r 53.04.3 (cf former HCR 1952 O 71 r 32); Fam LR 2004 r 19.36 (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 56); ACT r 1832 (cf former ACT RSC O 65 r 78); NT r 63.52(1), 63.52(2); Tas rr 856, 857(2); Vic r 63.54(1), 63.54(2). 166. WA O 66 r 37. 167. HCR 2004 r 53.04.4 (cf former HCR 1952 O 71 r 105(1)); ACT r 1760(d) (cf former ACT O 65 r 80); Qld r 714(d) (formerly Qld r 706(d)); Tas r 852. 168. See FCR 2011 r 1.39; Fam LR 2004 r 1.14; ACT r 6351; NSW r 1.12; NT r 3.02; Qld r 7; SA r 117(3); Tas r 52; Vic r 3.02; WA O 3 r 5. 169. As to the fixing of costs by the court see 15.14–15.26. 170. Watkins Ltd v Ranger Uranium Mines Pty Ltd (1985) 35 NTR 27 at 42 per Nader J. 171. Garrard v Email Furniture Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 662 at 678; BC9304276 per Mahoney AP (CA); Canatan Holdings Pty Ltd v Audori Pty Ltd [1995] FCA 1081 at [13] per Einfeld J. 172. Re Cartwright [1975] 1 WLR 573; Wilmot v Buckley (1984) 2 FCR 540 at 543–5; BC8441017 per Beaumont J. 173. Wentworth v Wentworth (1999) 46 NSWLR 300 at 316; [1999] NSWSC 317; BC9901514 per Santow J (affd Wentworth v Wentworth (2000) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] NSWCA 350; BC200007784). 174. FCR 2011 r 40.32(2); ACT r 1835(6); Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 368(3); Qld r 740(2); SA r 279; WA O 66 r 57. 175. HCR 2004 r 57.04.1(a), 57.04.2 (cf former HCR 1952 O 71 r 81). 176. HCR 2004 r 57.04.3. 177. FCR 2011 r 40.32(1) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 45(1), 45(2)). 178. FCR 2011 r 40.32(2). 179. In accordance with FCR 2011 r 39.06: see 19.10. 180. FCR 2011 r 40.32(3) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 45(6)). 181. See Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) Form 2.46. 182. Under ACT r 1809: see 18.11. 183. Under ACT r 1812: see 18.12. 184. ACT r 1835(1)–(3) (cf former ACT RSC O 65 r 59). 185. Under ACT r 1852: see 18.56.

186. ACT r 1835(4), 1835(5). 187. ACT r 1835(6). 188. ACT r 1836 (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 40). 189. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 368(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208J(1)). 190. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 370 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208JAA(1)) (applies to all applications made after 10 September 1999)). As to reasons see 18.64–18.67. 191. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 368(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208J(2)). 192. For this purpose, the amount of unpaid costs does not include the costs incurred by a costs assessor in the course of a costs assessment: Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 368(5) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208J(4)). 193. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 368(3) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208J(3)). A person is not entitled to his or her costs of Supreme Court proceedings to recover payment of costs included in a costs assessor’s certificate unless: (a) at the time of filing it the amount of unpaid costs included in the certificate exceeds $150,000; or (b) it appearing to the court that the person had sufficient reason to file the certificate in the court, the court otherwise orders: NSW r 42.31(1) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 46(1)). 194. Croker v Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 145 FCR 150; [2005] FCA 127; BC200500522. 195. Advanced Management Consultancy Pty Ltd v Martin Conway Beech [2003] NSWSC 638; BC200303894 at [9] per Macready M. 196. NT r 63.54(1); Vic r 63.56(1). 197. NT r 63.54(3); Vic r 63.56(3). 198. NT r 63.54(2); Vic r 63.56(2). If there has been a taxation of a composite bill covering a number of costs orders that results in a single sum for costs that is recorded in an order by the taxing officer, there is in the end only one final order: Biritz v National Australia Bank Ltd (2002) 121 FCR 298; [2002] FCAFC 172; BC200203159 at [13] per the court. 199. NT r 63.54(5), 63.54(7); Vic r 63.56(4), 63.56(6). 200. Qld r 737(1) (cf former Qld r 736). 201. Qld r 737(2). 202. Qld r 740(1), 740(2). 203. Qld r 740(3). 204. SA r 276. 205. An adjudicating officer is not a judicial officer of the court: SA r 277(1). 206. SA r 277(4). 207. As to applications for review of provisional costs orders see 18.61. 208. SA r 279. 209. Tas r 866(1). 210. Tas rr 852, 866(2). 211. Tas r 866(3). 212. WA O 66 r 57.

213. ACT r 1810(1), 1810(2); Qld r 709(1), 709(2) (formerly Qld r 720(1), 720(2)). 214. Such as, for instance, where the court at first instance or on appeal stays a judgment that though it was expressed in absolute and mandatory terms. 215. Re Brougham [1926] SASR 423 at 424 per Napier J. 216. [1979] 3 All ER 164 at 169. 217. (1999) 20 WAR 541 at 554; [1999] WASC 34; BC9902816. 218. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) ss 371 (costs assessor), 381 (panel) (applicable in respect of determinations made from 18 December 1998) (formerly NSW 1987 ss 208JB, 208KHA). These provisions cured the difficulty identified by Harrison M in Nabatu Pty Ltd v Crawley (SC(NSW), Harrison M, 9 April 1998, unreported) BC9801175. The jurisdiction in question is not extinguished by the effluxion of time, or even by the fact that the court may have affirmed the relevant assessment by dismissing an appeal under s 384 (see 18.74) or refused leave to appeal under s 385 (see 18.74): Reynolds v Whittens (2002) 57 NSWLR 271; [2002] NSWSC 155; BC200200797 at [72] per O’Keefe J. 219. ACT r 1809(3)(a)(iii); Qld r 708(4)(b). 220. The rules in the High Court, Tasmania and Western Australia allow a taxing officer, after a certificate is signed, to correct a clerical or manifest error before payment or process is issued for recovery of the costs: HCR 2004 r 57.03.7 (formerly HCR O 71 1952 r 88(4)); Tas r 867(6); WA O 66 r 54(4). In the Northern Territory and Victoria the taxing master (in Victoria, the Costs Court) may at any time correct a clerical mistake in an order (or, in Victoria, an error arising in an order from any accidental slip or omission): NT r 63.54(6); Vic r 63.56(5). This mirrors the general ‘slip rule’ that applies to courts in respect of their orders (including costs orders): see 6.21–6.29. 221. Thorne v Thorne [1979] 3 All ER 164 at 169 per Comyn J. See also Biltoft Holdings Pty Ltd v Casselan Pty Ltd (SC(WA), Seaman J, 24 March 1993, unreported) BC9301077 at 5–7; Mossensons (a firm) v Coastline Associates (FC(WA), Pidgeon, Ipp and Templeman JJ, 2 December 1997, unreported) BC9706734 at 7–9 per Ipp J; Pryles & Defteros (a firm) v Green (1999) 20 WAR 541 at 552–3; [1999] WASC 34; BC9902816 per Parker J. 222. Mossensons (a firm) v Coastline Associates (FC(WA), Pidgeon, Ipp and Templeman JJ, 2 December 1997, unreported) BC9706734 at 9 per Ipp J. 223. [1926] SASR 423. 224. On this latter point see also Brown v Youde [1967] 1 WLR 1544 at 1545 per Chapman J (who set aside a certificate because the registrar had signed it without giving the parties any opportunity to consider the matter). 225. [1979] 3 All ER 164. 226. (2005) 39 SR (WA) 301; [2005] WADC 113; BC200540016. 227. HCR 2004 r 58.01. 228. Under HCR 2004 r 57.01: see 18.4. 229. HCR 2004 r 58.02.1. 230. HCR 2004 r 58.03. 231. HCR 2004 r 58.04 (cf the former HCR 1952 O 71 r 80(4)). 232. Under FCR 2011 r 40.21: see 18.6.

233. FCR 2011 r 40.33(1) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 46(4A)). 234. FCR 2011 r 40.33(1) (paralleling the former FCR 1979 O 62 r 46(4C)). 235. Fam LR 2004 r 19.33(1)(m). 236. See 18.8. 237. Fam LR 2004 r 19.30(3). 238. See 18.11. 239. ACT r 1809(3)(a)(ii); Qld r 708(4)(a). 240. Made under ACT r 1811; Qld r 706: see 18.12. Although expressed in the singular, there is nothing in the rules precluding their operation in circumstances where there has been more than one offer to settle; if any difficulty arises in a particular case, it can be overcome by the fact that the rules allow a residual discretion in the registrar to order otherwise: McCoombes v Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd [2001] QDC 142 at [161] per McGill DCJ. 241. In this context, ‘costs of the assessment’ are the costs that have been, or will be, incurred by the party entitled to the costs, on and from the date of service of the offer to settle, and includes any fee payable to the court for the assessment: ACT r 1813(4); Qld r 734(5) (formerly Qld r 722(5)). 242. ACT r 1813(1)–(3); Qld r 734(3), 734(4) (formerly Qld r 722(3), 722(4)). A significant disparity between the matters argued and the grounds of the notice of objection (see 18.11) may be relevant in determining whether to otherwise order in this context: McCoombes v Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd [2001] QDC 142 at [14] per McGill DCJ. 243. Qld r 732. 244. Qld rr 739, 740(4). 245. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 369(2A) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208F(4)). 246. Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW) cl 126 (formerly NSW 2002 cl 57). 247. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 369(3)(c). 248. See 5.46. 249. See generally Bellevarde Constructions Pty Ltd v CPC Energy Pty Ltd (2011) 12 DCLR (NSW) 304; [2011] NSWDC 55; BC201140152 at [69]–[70] per Judge Peter Johnstone. 250. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 369(8) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208F(5)). 251. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 369(5) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208JA(1), 208JA(2)). 252. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 369(7) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208JA(4)). A person is not entitled to his or her costs of proceedings in the Supreme Court to recover payment of costs included in this certificate unless: (a) at the time of filing the certificate the amount of unpaid costs included in the certificate exceeds $150,000; or (b) it appearing to the court that the person had sufficient reason to file the certificate in the court, the court otherwise orders: NSW r 42.31(1) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 46(1)). 253. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 369(9) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208JA(5)). 254. NT r 63.34(2); Vic r 63.36(2). 255. NT r 63.34(4); Vic r 63.36(4). 256. NT r 63.34(6). 257. Namely an offer made under NT r 63.34(3).

258. NT r 63.34(7). 259. For this purpose, without limiting the discretion of the taxing master, an objection is indiscriminate if it constitutes no more than a blanket objection to items in the bill or forms part of such an objection: NT r 63.45(9). 260. NT r 63.45(8). 261. Under NT r 63.38: see 18.16. 262. Vic r 63.36(3). 263. Namely Vic O 26, as if in r 26.03(3) and 26.03(4) ‘seven days’ were substituted for ‘14 days’ and as if the order of the taxing master on the taxation were a verdict or judgment at trial: Vic r 63.36(3). 264. SA r 187(1), 187(2)(b). 265. SA r 188(1), 188(2)(b). 266. SA r 188(8). 267. Tas r 865. 268. Woodward v Moon [1991] Tas R 93 at 102 per Cox J (FC) (dealing with the previous Tas RSC O 80 r 78 expressed in similar terms). Responding to the argument that the rule in solicitor and client taxations that a bill cannot be amended (see 5.54) should apply in this context, Cox J could see no justification for grafting onto O 80 r 78 in its application between party and party, where such bills are likely to be vetted and possibly challenged by lawyers representing the party to be charged, principles developed for the protection of clients against overcharging by their own lawyers: at 104. 269. Davis v Dysart (Earl) (No 2) (1855) 21 Beav 124; 52 ER 805; Woodward v Moon [1991] Tas R 93 at 102–3 per Cox J (FC). 270. See 18.20. 271. Tas r 850(4). 272. ACT (15 per cent or more); NT (20 per cent or more); Qld (more than 15 per cent); Vic (before 1 April 2013, one-sixth or more; after that date, 15 per cent or more). 273. ACT r 1834 (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 63) (the rules add that, unless the court otherwise orders, the amendment or withdrawal and replacement of a bill of costs (under r 1806(1): see 18.90) must be disregarded in deciding whether the bill of costs has been reduced by 15 per cent or more on assessment: r 1806(2)(a)); NT r 63.34(5); Qld r 735; Vic r 63.85. 274. Provision made in the former Federal Court Rules for review of taxation at taxing officer level (see FCR 1979 O 62 rr 42, 43, discussed in the second edition of this work at 18.56–18.58, adopting a schema similar to that in the present Northern Territory rules: see 18.60) is not replicated in the current rules. 275. Casaceli v Morgan Lewis Alter [2001] NSWSC 211; BC200101274 at [5] per Malpass M; Thurai Rajah Lawyers v Villanueva [2001] NSWSC 597; BC200103970 at [12] per Malpass M. 276. As to the certificate of taxation see 18.28–18.40. 277. Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 625; BC5300020 per Kitto J. 278. In Western Australia the taxing officer’s decision on all questions of fact is final: WA O 66 r 43.

In Western Australia, or at such earlier time as may be fixed by the taxing officer. The court, in 279. any case, has an inherent power to extend time for objections to taxation: see 18.27. The Tasmanian rules provide that a certificate must not be signed before 48 hours have expired after the taxation is completed, although time can be extended by the taxing officer: Tas rr 852, 866(2). 280. HCR 2004 r 57.03.1, 57.03.2 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 87(1)); Tas r 867; WA O 66 r 53(1) (see Altorfer & Stow (a firm) v Lindsay [2005] WASCA 73; BC200502039 at [55] per McLure JA, who proceeded on that basis that an objection can be taken under WA O 66 r 53 to the whole bill rather than to specific items, and (at [56]) rejected the approach taken by the registrar and upheld by the master that a taxing officer cannot make an error in principle for the purposes of r 53 unless the issue the subject of the objection had been raised and considered by the taxing officer at the taxation). 281. Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia v Raso (1982) 43 ACTR 3 at 5 per Blackburn CJ (dealing with the former ACT RSC O 65 r 64, which was expressed in the same terms as the rules noted in the text). 282. Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia v Raso (1982) 43 ACTR 3 at 4 per Blackburn CJ. 283. Craske v Wade (1899) 80 LT 380; Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia v Raso (1982) 43 ACTR 3 at 5 per Blackburn CJ. As to review by the court see 18.68–18.76. 284. HCR 2004 r 57.03.3 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 87(2), 87(3)); Tas r 867(3), 867(4); WA O 66 r 53(2). 285. HCR 2004 r 57.03.4 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 88(1)); Tas r 867(5)(a), 867(5)(b); WA O 66 r 54(1). 286. HCR 2004 r 57.03.5 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 88(2)); Tas r 867(5)(c); WA O 66 r 54(2). The Western Australian rules add that a party who has required the taxing officer to state the ground and reason for his or her decision on an objection for the purpose of applying to a judge to review the taxation, may request the taxing officer to grant a stay of proceedings either wholly or limited to the item or part of an item the subject of the objection and, in the event of the taxing officer refusing such stay, may apply to a judge: WA O 66 r 58. 287. HCR 2004 r 57.03.6 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 88(3)); Tas r 867(5)(d); WA O 66 r 54(3). 288. HCR 2004 r 57.03.7 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 88(4)); Tas r 867(6); WA O 66 r 54(4). 289. WA O 66 r 54(5). 290. Namely Qld rr 738–741, superseded by the rules introduced by the Uniform Civil Procedure Amendment Rule (No 4) 2007 (Qld), with effect on 10 December 2007. 291. Under ACT r 1809: see 18.11. 292. Under ACT r 1836: see 18.31. 293. Under ACT r 1807: see 18.11. 294. See Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) Form 2.47. 295. ACT r 1851(1), 1851(2), 1852(1), 1852(2). The registrar is deemed not to have made a decision on an item in a bill if no one objected to the item and the registrar allowed the item: r 1851(3). 296. ACT r 1852(4). 297. ACT r 1852(5). 298. ACT r 1852(6). 299. ACT r 1853(1), 1853(3), 1853(4); Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) Form 2.48.

300. ACT r 1853(2). 301. ACT r 1854(1). 302. See 18.73. 303. ACT r 1854(2). 304. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 372, referring to Pt 3.2 Div 11 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208K, referring to Pt 11 Div 6). 305. The term ‘determination’ here is a reference to the final disposition of an application for assessment, rather than a decision made in the course of dealing with it: Currabubula v State Bank of New South Wales [2000] NSWSC 232; BC200001561 at [76] per Einstein J; Gorczynski v Leichhardt Council [2007] NSWSC 202; BC200701455 at [19] per Hidden J. 306. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 373(1), 373(2); Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW) cll 131, 132 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KA(1), 208KA(2); NSW 2002 cll 64, 66). 307. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 373(5) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KA(5)). 308. Hewitt v Manager, Support Systems of the Supreme Court of New South Wales [2001] NSWSC 518; BC200103257 at [4] per Adams J. 309. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 374(1)(a), 374(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KB). The Chief Justice of New South Wales may compile a list of costs assessors he or she considers as suitably qualified to be members of costs review panels: Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW) cl 137(2) (formerly NSW 2002 cl 70(2)). 310. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 377 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KE). 311. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 375(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KC(1)). 312. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 375(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KC(2)). 313. Randall Pty Ltd v Willoughby City Council (2009) 9 DCLR(NSW) 31; [2009] NSWDC 118; BC200940205 at [17] per Johnstone DCJ. 314. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 375(3) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KC(3)). See, for example, Kells v Mulligan [2002] NSWSC 769; BC200204991 at [24]–[27] per Malpass M (where, as the panel did not have the solicitor’s file, the review was not conducted on the evidence that was received by the costs assessor, making the review process flawed). 315. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 375(4) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KC(4)). 316. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 378(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KF(1)). 317. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 380(1); Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW) cl 134(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KG(1); NSW 2002 cl 68(1)). 318. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 378(3), 378(4) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KF(2), 208KF(3)). 319. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 382 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KI), pursuant to NSW 2004 s 384 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208L) (see 18.74) or NSW 2004 s 385 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208M) (see 18.74). 320. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 379(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KH(2)). ‘Costs of a review’ means the costs incurred by the panel or the manager in the course of a review, including the costs related to the remuneration of the costs assessors who constitute the panel: NSW 2004 s 379(10) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KH(10)). 321. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 379(3) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KH(3)). It has been

remarked that the danger is that not only may the review delay the process for the opponent, a change of more than 15 per cent will mean that the opponent, who has taken no part in the review process, will have to pay the costs of the review because of the original assessor’s errors: D Vine Hall, ‘Present Difficulties with the Assessment System’ (2004) 27 UNSWLJ 206 at 211. 322. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 379(4) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KH(4)). 323. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 379(7), 379(8) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KH(7), 208KH(8)). 324. As to the extension of this time period by the court see Marketing Advisory Services v Tasmanian Football League Inc [2002] FCA 990; BC200204424; Fryer v Frost (2009) 236 FLR 356; [2009] NTSC 65; BC200911342 at [20]–[24] per Luppino M (who extended time because, inter alia, the late filing of the notice was by way of an error that was excusable given that ordinarily time for taking a step in the nature of review or appeal runs from the conclusion of the matter sought to be reviewed or appealed, the plaintiff’s solicitor had given notice of the intention to revisit the matters now covered by the notice at the start of the second day of the taxation, and the defendant had not shown any prejudice that would flow in the event that the extension was granted). 325. NT r 63.55(1)–63.55(3). These provisions parallel those in the superseded FCR 1979 O 62 r 42(1A), 42(2), 42(3). 326. NT r 63.55(4), 63.55(5) (paralleling the former FCR 1979 O 62 r 42(4), 42(5)). 327. NT r 63.55(6) (paralleling the former FCR 1979 O 62 r 42(6)). 328. Jet Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd v Petres Pty Ltd (1985) 10 FCR 289 at 294; BC8501565 per Northrop J. 329. NT r 63.55(7). 330. A court may at any time, by order, dispense with the need for a taxing master to give reasons: NT r 63.55(14). 331. NT r 63.55(8) (paralleling the former FCR 1979 O 62 r 43(1)(a), 43(1)(b), 43(3)). 332. NT r 63.55(9) (similar to the former FCR 1979 O 62 r 43(2)). 333. SA r 278(1), 278(2) (cf the former SA RSC r 101.19). 334. See Malaugh Holdings (No 2) Pty Ltd v Seal (No 2) (2011) 274 LSJS 504; [2011] SADC 37 at [36] per Judge David Smith (noting that the hearing of an application for further review under SA r 278 is a rehearing on the papers rather than a review de novo). 335. SA r 278(3). 336. SA r 278(4). 337. Vic r 63.56.1(4). 338. Vic r 63.56.1(5). 339. Vic r 63.56.1(6). 340. Vic r 63.56.1(7). 341. Vic r 63.56.1(8). 342. Vic r 63.56.2 (see, for example, Morgan v IT SA Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 119; BC201301228 at [18]– [32] per Digby J). 343. Vic r 63.56.4(1), 63.56.4(2). 344. See Vic r 63.56.4(3)–63.56.4(5).

345. Vic r 63.56.4(6). 346. Vic r 63.56.4(9). 347. Clay v Karlson (SC(WA), Wallwork J, 26 June 1998, unreported) BC9802953 at 12; W J Green & Co (1984) Pty Ltd v Tace Pty Ltd (No 4) [2010] WASC 363; BC201009359 at [16] per Kenneth Martin J (noting the practice in the court which establishes a need for the taxing officer’s reasons, which stems from the term ‘review’). 348. HCR 2004 r 57.03.5 (upon request); ACT r 1854(1); Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 380(1); NT r 63.55(8); Tas r 867(5)(c) (upon request); Vic rr 63.56.1(8), 63.56.2(8), 63.56.4(8) (upon request); WA O 66 r 54(2) (upon request). 349. See 18.66–18.67. 350. Titan v Romano [1998] ACTSC 129; BC9806402 at [32] per Miles CJ. In Mellos v Sheppar (2005) 37 SR (WA) 373; [2005] WADC 14; BC200540045 at [7] Harman DR remarked that WA O 66 ‘is properly characterised as a code for the recovery of costs inter partes’, and only r 54(2) makes reference to the provision of reasons for the decision of a taxing officer, and then only in relation to review of taxation. It followed that no entitlement to reasons accrued at the initial taxation. 351. See 18.68–18.76. 352. Re Gibson’s Settlement Trusts [1981] Ch 179 at 191–2 per Megarry VC; Titan v Babic [1995] FCA 1591 at [39]–[45] per Finn J. On the need for reasons in respect of judicial decisions generally see Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at 289–90 per McHugh JA; Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud [1989] VR 8 at 18–19 per Gray J (FC); English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] 3 All ER 385; [2002] EWCA Civ 605 at [15]–[25] per Lord Phillips MR. 353. Eaves v Eaves and Powell [1956] P 154 at 156–7 per Sachs J. 354. Re Gibson’s Settlement Trusts [1981] Ch 179 at 192 per Megarry VC (to say that ‘[m]y reasons for holding that the costs were ‘reasonably incurred’ are that I thought them to be fair and reasonable’ is to give no reason at all, as ‘[a] bare assertion in terms of the proposition itself is no more a reason than the once familiar: “Because I tell you to”’). 355. [1981] Ch 179 at 192. 356. Re National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian Division (in liq) (No 2) [1992] 1 VR 485 at 495 per J D Phillips J (remarking that the lack of reasons from the taxing master might in itself warrant remitting the matter for further consideration); Wightman v Johnston [1995] 2 VR 637 at 641; BC9503972 per Phillips JA. See also Smith v Dwyer [1999] NSWSC 114; BC9900633 at [28] per James J; Madden v New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corporation [1999] NSWSC 196; BC9900828 at [16]–[18] per Malpass M (each predating the statutory and rule-based prescription for taxing officers’ reasons: see 18.67); Summerville v Paul O’Halloran & Associates [2007] WASC 245; BC200709172 at [94] per Simmonds J (remarking that the standard for the reasons takes account of the context in which the reasons are given and the purposes for which the reasons are required); Cassegrain v CTK Engineering Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 457; BC200803475 at [90]– [92] per White J. 357. [1995] 2 VR 637 at 641; BC9503972. 358. Fam LR 2004 r 19.32(4). 359. Qld r 738(1). The applicant must pay the costs assessor’s reasonable costs of preparing the reasons: r 738(3).

360. Qld r 738(2)(a). 361. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 370 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208JAA(1)) (applies to all applications made after 10 September 1999)). The requirement for reasons applies only at the end of the assessment process, and not for assessors’ decisions at its threshold (such as a decision to allow a bill not in assessable to be withdrawn, for instance): Gorczynski v Beilby [2005] NSWSC 884; BC200506604 at [95]–[97] per Kirby J. 362. Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW) cl 128(1) (formerly NSW 2002 cl 61(2)). 363. Frumar v Owners of Strata Plan 36957 (2006) 67 NSWLR 321; [2006] NSWCA 278; BC200608291 at [45] per Giles JA, with whom Beazley and Ipp JJA concurred. 364. (1998) 43 NSWLR 729 at 735 per Priestley JA, at 739 per Handley JA; BC9802854 (who remarked that, in determining or at least working out the legal rights and duties of the parties under a court order, a costs assessor must therefore be exercising a judicial function, and so has a duty to give reasons as an incident of that function). 365. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 389 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208NC(1) (operative from 18 January 2002)); Croker v Commissioner of Taxation [2001] NSWSC 188; BC200101054 at [7] per Malpass M (who opined that the court might be expected to ‘be loath to entertain such application in cases where a plaintiff fails to take advantage of an effective remedy (the review process) for the challenging of a determination’); Freeman v McNally [2003] NSWSC 780; BC200304818 at [8] per Malpass M. 366. (2006) 67 NSWLR 321; [2006] NSWCA 278; BC200608291 at [59]–[61]. 367. Frumar v Owners of Strata Plan 36957 (2006) 67 NSWLR 321; [2006] NSWCA 278; BC200608291 at [62]. 368. See, for example, in Wende v Horwath (NSW) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1241; BC200810507 at [52] per James J (global approach); Randall Pty Ltd v Willoughby City Council (2009) 9 DCLR(NSW) 31; [2009] NSWDC 118; BC200940205 at [33], [34] per Johnstone DCJ (global reduction by reference to categories of items that were not differentiated). 369. Madden v New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corporation [1999] NSWSC 196; BC9900828 at [16] per Malpass M; Randall Pty Ltd v Willoughby City Council (2009) 9 DCLR(NSW) 31; [2009] NSWDC 118; BC200940205 at [56] per Johnstone DCJ. 370. Garrard v Email Furniture Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 662 at 680; BC9304276 per Mahoney AP (CA); Wentworth v Wentworth (CA(NSW), 21 February 1996, Priestley, Clarke JJA and Grove AJA, unreported) BC9600213 at 8 per Clarke JA. 371. Garrard v Email Furniture Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 662 at 680–1; BC9304276 per Mahoney AP (CA). 372. Shrapnel v Laing (1887) 20 QBD 334 at 337 per Lord Esher MR; Mentors Ltd v Evans [1912] 3 KB 174 at 178 per Fletcher Moulton LJ; Re H, a Solicitor (No 2) [1962] Qd R 1 at 3 per Gibbs J. 373. (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 624–5; BC5300020. 374. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 372 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208K). 375. HCR 2004 r 57.05.4 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 89(3)); Tas r 868(4); WA O 66 r 55(3). 376. Folk v Leda Ltd (1997) 140 FLR 331 at 332–3; BC9703592 per Crispin AJ (SC(ACT)). 377. Walker v Law Society of Tasmania [1991] Tas R 121 at 143 per Crawford J; Crowley v Willis (SC(ACT), Gallop J, 31 January 1994, unreported) BC9405511 at 7.

378. NT r 63.55(17)(c); Qld r 742(6)(d) (formerly Qld r 742(5)(c)); Vic r 63.57(7)(c) (to the Costs Court). 379. Qld r 742(4)(b); Vic r 63.57(6) (Costs Court). 380. HCR 2004 r 57.05.1 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 89(1)); WA O 66 r 55(1). 381. HCR 2004 r 57.05.3 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 89(2)); WA O 66 r 55(2) (‘thinks just’). 382. Sanders v Snell (No 2) (2000) 174 ALR 53 at 56; BC200004453 per Kirby J (HC). See 20.28–20.33. 383. [2010] WASC 363; BC201009359 at [23]. 384. HCR 2004 r 57.05.5 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 90); WA O 66 r 56. 385. FCR 2011 r 40.34(1) (cf former FCR 1979 O 62 r 44(1)). 386. FCR 2011 r 40.34(2). 387. FCR 2011 r 40.34(3). 388. FCR 2011 r 40.34(4) (paralleling the former FCR 1979 O 62 r 44(3)). As to the extension of time see Bjelke-Petersen v Warbutrton [1990] 1 Qd R 517 at 523–4 per Mackenzie J (who, under the former Qld RSC O 91 r 117, held that as the respondent’s failure to file objections within the time limit set by the taxing officer was caused by the inadvertence of an officer in the registry, the court should exercise its power to extend time for the lodging and delivering of objections). 389. FCR 2011 r 40.34(5). 390. FCR 2011 r 40.34(6) (paralleling the former FCR O 62 r 44(4)). 391. FCR 2011 r 40.34 note. In Ralkon Agricultural Company Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Development Commission (FCA, Forster J, 11 July 1986, unreported) BC8601705 at [3] Forster J rejected the argument that the court’s power to exercise all the powers and discretions of the taxing officer in relation to the subject matter of the review (under the superseded FCR 1979 O 62 r 44(5)(a)) made the review a hearing de novo, on the ground that it did not sit well with r 44(4), in that at a hearing de novo it would not be right to exclude further evidence (r 44(4)(a)) or limit the grounds of objection to those taken before the taxing officer (r 44(4)(b)). Subsequent authority does not sit well with this outcome, for it dictates that because of constitutional limitations on the exercise of federal judicial power, the review should be conducted as if the judge were the original decision maker: Titan v Babic [1995] FCA 813 at [8] per Finn J; Boys v Australian Securities Commission [2001] FCA 1440; BC200106297 at [13] per Carr J. 392. FCR 2011 r 40.35. 393. Pursuant to a request made under Fam LR 2004 r 19.32(4): see 18.66. 394. Fam LR 2004 rr 19.54(1), 19.55. 395. Fam LR 2004 r 19.54(2). 396. Fam LR 2004 r 19.56(1)(a), 19.56(1)(c)(i). 397. See 18.7–18.8. 398. Fam LR 2004 r 19.56(2) (in the latter case, only if the party has made a request under r 19.32(4): see 18.66). 399. Fam LR 2004 r 19.56(2)(b). 400. Fam LR 2004 r 19.56(3).

The court can, however, extend this time: see, for example, Kuek v Devflan Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 401. 91; BC200901667 at [9] per Beach J. 402. ACT r 1855(1), 1855(3); NT r 63.55(11)–(13), (16); Qld r 742(1), 742(2), 742(4); Vic r 63.57(1)– (3), 63.57(5) (review of order of Costs Court by judge of the Costs Court). In Victoria, the various roles of judicial registrars and costs registrars in the Costs Court dictates the need for provision for the review of a costs registrar’s determinations by a judicial registrar (Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 17H), and of a judicial registrar’s determination by a Costs Judge (Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 17HA), which are to be heard and determined in accordance with the rules: Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) ss 17H(2), 17H(5), 17HA(2), 17HA(5). Unless statute provides to the contrary, an appeal lies to the Trial Division of the Supreme Court from a determination of the Costs Court constituted by a Costs Judge: Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 17I. 403. ACT r 1855(2); NT r 63.55(15); Qld r 742(3); Vic r 63.57(4). 404. ACT r 1855(5); NT r 63.55(17); Qld r 742(6); Vic r 63.57(7). As to these powers see 18.71. 405. ACT r 1855(6); NT r 63.55(18); Qld r 742(7); Vic r 63.57(8); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) ss 17H(6), 17HA(6). 406. ACT r 1855(4); Qld r 742(5); Vic r 63.57(6). 407. Vic r 63.57(2). 408. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 382 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208KI). 409. If an appeal is made against a determination of a costs assessor and the determination to which the appeal relates has not been reviewed by a panel, the court may refer the appeal to the Manager, Costs Assessment for a review by a panel: Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 389 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208NC(1) (operative from 18 January 2002)). 410. NSW rr 50.2 (definition of ‘material date’), 50.3(1)(a), r 50.3(1)(c). 411. As it is under Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 385 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208M). 412. NSW rr 50.2 (definition of ‘material date’), 50.12(1)(a), 50.12(1)(c). 413. Lace v Yonan [1999] NSWSC 1072; BC9907179 at [4] per Harrison M; Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales [2000] NSWSC 232; BC200001561 at [87] per Einstein J; Casaceli v Morgan Lewis Alter [2001] NSWSC 211; BC200101274 at [6] per Malpass M. 414. See, for example, Xu v Liu (SC(NSW), Malpass M, 5 August 1998, unreported) BC9803602 (delay was lengthy and largely unexplained, and any merit related only to minor sums); Casaceli v Morgan Lewis Alter [2001] NSWSC 211; BC200101274 at [25] per Malpass M (no arguable case and the delay, though not lengthy, had not been adequately explained); Stojanovski v Willis & Bowring [2002] NSWSC 392; BC200202230 at [20]–[21] per Harrison M (12 month delay for no compelling reason, and the application for leave to appeal would most likely fail); DCL Constructions Pty Ltd v Di Lizio [2007] NSWSC 653; BC200705032 at [5] per Harrison AJ (affd DCL Constructions Pty Ltd v Di Lizio [2007] NSWSC 1180; BC200708922) (where: (1) the lengthy delay in bringing the application; (2) the applicant’s low chance of success; and (3) the respondent solicitor had already been forced to defend himself in relation to the same bill of costs in the District Court); Kehoe v Williams [2008] NSWSC 807; BC200807329 at [26] per Harrison AsJ (seven month delay without satisfactory explanation); Scope Data Systems Pty Ltd v Aitken (No 2) [2010] NSWDC 65; BC201040139 at [21]–[23] per Gibson DCJ (one year delay, which was largely unexplained and generated substantial prejudice to the opponent). 415. See, for example, Lace v Yonan [1999] NSWSC 1072; BC9907179 at [5] per Harrison M (the respondent did not show any prejudice caused by the delay); Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd v

State Bank of New South Wales [2000] NSWSC 232; BC200001561 at [88] per Einstein J (the delay was brief, the case was a strong one, the applicant would otherwise suffer a real adverse effect, and the respondent would not suffer significant prejudice as a consequence); Boral Timber Industries Ltd v Lindquist [2004] NSWSC 341; BC200402178 at [7] per Harrison M (the appeal was, due to an oversight, only days late and the respondent suffered no prejudice from the delay); O’Brien v Doherty [2008] NSWSC 205; BC200801428 at [20] per Brereton J (the prima facie strength of the applicant’s case held to outweigh his gross procedural defaults); Lange v Back & Schwartz [2009] NSWDC 180; BC200940236 at [24]–[25] per Norrish QC DCJ (even though no cogent or acceptable explanation had been proffered for the delay, leave granted because the case had merit and no inconvenience to the respondents would ensue). 416. Ciaglia v Beilby Poulden Costello Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 748; BC201004758 at [26] per McCallum J. 417. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 386(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208N(1)). 418. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 386(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208N(2)). 419. As from 1 September 2008, the relevant court is the District Court rather than the Supreme Court. 420. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 384(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208L(1)). 421. Bellevarde Constructions Pty Ltd v CPC Energy Pty Ltd (2011) 12 DCLR (NSW) 304; [2011] NSWDC 55; BC201140152 at [11] per Judge Peter Johnstone. See also Vumbaca v Sultana [2012] NSWDC 237; BC201240463 at [36] per Gibson DCJ (‘the court’s power … is a narrow one’). 422. Bellevarde Constructions Pty Ltd v CPC Energy Pty Ltd (2011) 12 DCLR(NSW) 304; [2011] NSWDC 55; BC201140152 at [12] per Judge Peter Johnstone (having earlier noted (at [10]) that, on an appeal as to a matter of law, it is not the court’s task ‘to decide where the truth lies as between competing versions of evidence or whether some further evidence may have lead to a different conclusion’). 423. Green v Browne [2004] NSWSC 240; BC200401605 at [10] per Malpass M; Wentworth v Rogers (2006) 66 NSWLR 474; [2006] NSWCA 145; BC200604064 at [189] per Basten JA. For example, the construction of a costs agreement is a question of law: Hall Chadwick Pty Ltd v Doyle [2006] NSWSC 1195; BC200609205 at [69] per Rothman J (affd Doyle v Hall Chadwick [2007] NSWCA 159; BC200705261). 424. Levy v Bergseng (2008) 72 NSWLR 178; [2008] NSWSC 294; BC200802263 at [49]–[50], [73]– [76] per Rothman J; Lange v Back & Schwartz [2009] NSWDC 180; BC200940236 at [27]–[30] per Norrish QC DCJ. The view expressed by Malpass M (later Malpass AJ) that ‘matter of law’ is more restrictive than the concept of ‘question of law’, and consequently does not include ‘procedural unfairness’ (see Madden v New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corporation [1999] NSWSC 196; BC9900828 at [24]; Forman v Rattray [2006] NSWSC 260; BC200602275 at [20]), is therefore arguably incorrect. 425. Firth v Kasumovic [2001] NSWSC 341; BC200102107 at [15] per Malpass M; Green v Browne [2004] NSWSC 240; BC200401605 at [29] per Malpass M. 426. Currabubula Holdings Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales [2000] NSWSC 232; BC200001561 at [80]–[82] per Einstein J. 427. The legislation reads ‘may’, as opposed to ‘must’ (or ‘shall’), but in this context it has been held that ‘may’ means ‘shall’: A Goninan & Co Ltd v Gill (2001) 51 NSWLR 441; [2001] NSWCA 77; BC200101568 at [26] per Heydon JA. 428. The matter must be remitted to the same assessor who made the assessment in the application, not to another assessor: O’Connor v Fitti [2000] NSWSC 540; BC200003316 at [32] per Malpass M.

429. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 384(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208L(2)). 430. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 384(3) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208L(3)). 431. As from 1 September 2008, the relevant court is the District Court rather than the Supreme Court. 432. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 385(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208M(2)). A costs assessor can be made a party to any appeal against his or her determination or decision only by the court: NSW 2004 s 387 (formerly NSW 1987 s 208NA). Whether it is appropriate that an assessor or the panel members be joined will depend upon the relief sought or the relief that the court considers may be granted. If that relief includes remitting the decision to the costs assessor or the panel, then the assessor or panel may be joined as a party to the appeal: Cassegrain v CTK Engineering Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 457; BC200803475 at [132] per White J. An assessor may also be joined where an allegation of impropriety against the assessor is made on reasonable grounds: Lyons v Wende [2007] NSWSC 100; BC200700693 (but Cooper AJ declined to make such an order because there was no allegation of impropriety). 433. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 385(3) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208M(3)). 434. Muriniti v Lyons [2004] NSWSC 135; BC200400840 at [51] per Dunford J. 435. Chapmans Ltd v Yandells [1999] NSWCA 361; BC9906483 at [11], [12] per Fitzgerald JA. 436. Wende v Horwath (NSW) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1241; BC200810507 at [46] per James J. Compare, for example, Montgomery v Egan Simpson Solicitors [2005] NSWSC 886; BC200506550 at [17]–[22] per Harrison AJ (who refused leave to appeal, even though a denial of procedural fairness had occurred, because the plaintiffs had not demonstrated any error of principle that worked a substantial injustice to them) with Stanizzo v Grpcevski [2005] NSWSC 1185; BC200510047 (where Harrison AJ granted leave where the costs assessor failed to give effect to the ‘without prejudice’ nature of the lawyer’s offer to the client to accept a fee less than the billed amount, which offer the client never accepted) and Lyons v Wende [2007] NSWSC 101; BC200700694 (where Cooper AJ granted leave to appeal on the issue of whether a retainer agreement existed and, if so, what were the terms of that agreement). See also Wentworth v Rogers (2006) 66 NSWLR 474; [2006] NSWCA 145; BC200604064 at [190] per Basten JA (who remarked that ‘[i]f there is disputed evidence, which in substance the costs assessor does not have power to deal with in the manner usually considered procedurally fair with respect to contractual disputes, and absent countervailing considerations, it would seem generally desirable that leave would be given … to allow those matters to be agitated in a relevant court or tribunal’). 437. Lyons v Wende [2007] NSWSC 101; BC200700694 at [34] per Cooper AJ. 438. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 385(4) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208M(4)). 439. The legislation reads ‘may’, as opposed to ‘must’ (or ‘shall’), but in this context it has been held that ‘may’ means ‘shall’: A Goninan & Co Ltd v Gill (2001) 51 NSWLR 441; [2001] NSWCA 77; BC200101568 at [26] per Heydon JA. 440. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 385(5) (formerly NSW 1987 s 208M(5)). 441. Pursuant to SA r 278(4): see 18.61. 442. SA r 278(5), 278(6). 443. Catto v Hampton Australia Ltd (in liq) (2008) 257 LSJS 245; [2008] SASC 231; BC200807439 at [21] per White J, with whom Vanstone and Anderson JJ concurred. 444. Tas r 868(1), 868(2). 445. Tas r 868(3).

446. Tas r 868(4). 447. NSW 2005 cl 111B, as to which see 4.15. 448. The reason for this is that an ‘itemised bill’ is defined as one that specifies in detail how the legal costs are made up in a way that would allow them to be assessed under Div 11 of Pt 3.2 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) (s 302(1)), and Div 11 also applies to assessment as between party and party (see ss 364–366). 449. Ex Parte Farmers’ Fertilizers Corporation Ltd (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 645 at 649 per Cullen CJ; Pickering v Smoothpool Nominees Pty Ltd (No 6) (2001) 217 LSJS 178; [2001] SASC 440; BC200108219 at [6], [30]–[31] per Gray J; Santos Ltd v Delhi Petroleum Pty Ltd (2005) 240 LSJS 366; [2005] SASC 242; BC200504514 at [53]–[55] per Bleby J. 450. Slingsby v Attorney-General [1918] P 236 at 244 per Swinfen Eady LJ. See also at 245 per Bankes LJ (the bill was made out in a way that did not present to the registrar materials upon which he could properly exercise his discretion), at 247 per Neville J (the charges made by the bill were not sufficiently precise). 451. As to costs recoverable on a party and party basis see 16.14–16.17. 452. Charlick Trading Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission [2001] FCA 629; BC200102744 at [19] per Mansfield J. 453. HCR 2004 r 54.02.2 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 33). 454. HCR 2004 r 54.02.1 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 35(1)). 455. HCR 2004 r 54.02.4. See also HCR 2004 r 56.09.3 (which states that, subject to certain exceptions, no disbursement, whether as a fee to counsel or otherwise, is allowed unless: (a) it has been paid before the filing of the bill of costs; and (b) unconditional payment of the disbursement is proved to the satisfaction of the taxing officer). 456. HCR 2004 r 54.02.3 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 35(2)). 457. Namely Form 127. 458. FCR 2011 r 40.18 (formerly FCR 1979 FCR O 62 r 40). 459. FCR 2011 rr 40.41, 40.42 (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 40A); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 466(2). 460. FCR 2011 rr 40.43, 40.44 (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 rr 40B, 40C). 461. FCR 2011 rr 40.42 (winding up), 40.44 (migration) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 rr 40A, 40D). 462. Fam LR 2004 r 19.22(1), 19.22(2). 463. Fam LR 2004 r 19.22(3). 464. Fam LR 2004 r 19.22(4). 465. ACT r 1802 (cf the former ACT RSC O 65 r 18(2)), Form 2.45. 466. ACT r 1804. 467. ACT r 1805(1). See also NT r 63.68; Qld r 724(1) (formerly Qld r 714(1)). 468. ACT r 1805(2). See also NT r 63.68; Qld r 724(2) (formerly Qld r 714(2)). 469. ACT r 1805(3). See also NT r 63.42(1); Qld r 724(3) (formerly Qld r 714(3)) (‘may be shown as a disbursement or a professional charge’); Vic r 63.44(b)). 470. ACT r 1805(4). See also NT r 63.42(1); Qld r 724(4) (formerly Qld r 714(4)); Vic r 63.44(a) (‘an

amount appropriate to the place where the work was done’). As to the meaning of the phrase ‘allowed in an amount appropriate to the place where the lawyer practises’ see 17.20. 471. NT r 63.40(2). 472. NT r 13.01(1) (applied to bills by NT r 63.40(7)). 473. NT r 63.40(6). 474. NT r 63.40(8). 475. NT r 63.41(1) (cf Vic r 63.43(1)). As to the background of this rule see Re National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian Division (in liq) (No 2) [1992] 1 VR 485 at 526–7 per J D Phillips J. 476. NT r 63.41(2) (cf Vic r 63.43(2), which adds that a disbursement may be allowed if an undertaking to the court, satisfactory to the Costs Court, is given that it will be paid within a time specified in the undertaking; the latter was inserted by the Supreme Court (Chapter I Amendment No 18) Rules 2001 (Vic) r 9 (taking effect from 1 December 2001) and was designed to overcome the problem of an impoverished party unable to pay disbursements, often counsel’s fees, prior to the taxation and so denied recovery of those fees on taxation). 477. NT rr 63.42, 63.68: see 18.82. 478. ‘Costs statement’ means a bill of costs, account or statement of charges: Qld r 679. 479. Qld r 710(1). 480. Qld r 723(1) (formerly Qld r 713(1)). 481. Qld r 723(2), 723(3) (formerly Qld r 713(2), 713(3)). 482. Qld r 724 (formerly Qld r 714): see 18.82. 483. SA r 273(1). 484. SA r 271 (cf former SA RSC r 101A.02): see 18.18. 485. Baronglow Pty Ltd v Thomas (No 7) (2008) 253 LSJS 251; [2008] SASC 33; BC200800668 at [6] per Judge Lunn. 486. The five columns must respectively be for: dates; consecutive numbers of the items; particulars of the services charged for; disbursements ruled in dollars and cents; and professional charges ruled in dollars and cents. 487. Tas r 847. 488. Tas RSC 1965 Appendix M (continues to apply pursuant to RSC 2000 Sch 5), ‘Allowances to Witnesses’, cl 6. 489. See 18.82. 490. Vic r 63.42(1). 491. Vic r 63.42(2). 492. For this purpose, work done in Victoria by a servant or agent of the solicitor is taken to have been done by the solicitor: Vic r 63.42(3). Where work for which costs are claimed was done by a clerk of the solicitor and that fact is relevant to the amount of costs allowable for it, the bill must state the name and position of the clerk: r 63.42(4). 493. Namely the matters referred to in Vic r 63.48: see 15.59. 494. The scale is found in Vic Appendix A: see 15.70.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court (Chapter I New Scale of Costs and Other Costs Amendments) 495. Rules 2012 (Vic). 496. Vic rr 63.43, 63.44: see 18.82. 497. WA O 66 r 42(1). 498. WA O 66 r 42(2). 499. WA O 66 r 36. 500. Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice Directions, 2009, 4.7.3, cll 2–7. 501. See 5.54. 502. (1855) 21 Beav 124 at 132–3; 52 ER 805 at 809. See also Sadd v Griffin [1908] 2 KB 510 at 511 per Farwell LJ; Polak v Winchester (Marchioness) [1956] 2 All ER 660 at 663 per Jenkins LJ; Woodward v Moon [1991] Tas R 93 at 102–3 per Cox J (FC). 503. NT r 63.43; Vic r 63.45. 504. ACT r 1806(1). 505. Fam LR 2004 r 19.25. 506. Estate of Segalov (deceased) [1952] P 241 at 248 per Wallington J. As to certificates of taxation generally see 18.28–18.40.

[page 658]

CHAPTER 19

Interest on Party and Party Costs Historical Background

19.3

Statutory Provisions Governing the Award of Interest on Costs High Court and Federal Court Family Court Australian Capital Territory New South Wales Northern Territory Queensland South Australia Tasmania Victoria Western Australia

19.9 19.10 19.11 19.12 19.13 19.15 19.16 19.17 19.20 19.21 19.22

General Jurisdiction to Award Interest on Costs

19.23

19.1 The object of making an order for interest on costs as between party and party is to compensate a successful party, not to penalise an unsuccessful party. The law presumes that the latter has benefited from the use of the money ultimately ordered to be paid over by way of costs; it has been able to earn interest on the money not paid over at an earlier time, has had use of the money in its own enterprise, or has not earlier been burdened by having to borrow money on which it would have been obliged to pay interest.1 19.2 The power to award a litigant interest on costs is expressly conferred by

statute upon the court (or the taxing officer) in all jurisdictions.2 To the extent that the scope of the power conferred by these provisions is limited or restricted, the issue arises as to whether a court otherwise has the power to award interest on party and party costs.3 The courts’ powers to this end form the core of this chapter. In order to place the relevant law in context, an historical background precedes it.4 [page 659]

Historical Background 19.3 What has consumed most of the courts’ energies historically regarding interest on party and party costs is debate over the date from which interest is to run. The tension has been between two approaches: the incipitur rule as opposed to the allocatur rule.5 The incipitur rule dictates that interest begins to run from the date when the costs order is first made. The Latin term ‘incipitur’ means ‘it is begun’, traditionally referring to the first word of the recital of the course of an action at common law referred to in the process of entering a judgment. Conversely, under the allocatur rule interest on costs is payable from the date of the certificate of taxation6 (or allocatur) that ascertained and specified the money to be paid. The term ‘allocatur’ means ‘it is allowed’, and refers to the allowance of costs at a certified sum by the taxing officer. 19.4 Importantly, the tension between these rules remains of relevance only to the extent that the statutory conferral of power to award interest on party and party costs either fails to specify the date from which the award of interest may be made, or specifies it in terms that lend themselves to varied interpretation. As in most Australian jurisdictions the relevant statutory provision is clear on this point,7 the account that follows is of historical interest only. It is nonetheless useful as a backdrop against which the current provisions can be viewed. 19.5 In England prior to 1838 interest on costs could not be recovered. The position changed with the enactment of the Judgments Act 1838 (UK), which provided that, inter alia, every judgment debt would carry interest at 4 per

cent per annum ‘from the time of entering up the judgment … until the same shall be satisfied’.8 It did not, however, define the phrase ‘entering up the judgment’, which in turn led to a divergence between the practice of the common law and equity; common law courts applied the incipitur principle9 whereas Chancery courts applied the allocatur principle.10 The common law approach was justified on the grounds of fairness and on the proper construction of the 1838 statute, and did not depend on the form in which the particular court entered the judgment.11 In a leading case to this end, Alderson B remarked that:12 … as to interest, there is an uncertain amount, which is in the wrong pocket, and is there bearing interest; I see no injustice in saying, that as soon as it is reduced to certainty, that interest should be paid. Whatever be the sum, it is fructifying in the wrong pocket.

The reason for the equity practice was that a decree in Chancery involving payment of money could be enforced by execution as if it were a common law judgment only when the amount to be paid was ascertained, that is, after the allocatur (a mere decree for account being insufficient). 19.6 Upon the enactment of the Judicature Act 1875 (UK) the view was at first taken that the Chancery practice applied throughout the High Court.13 A reason for this was that a form of writ of fieri facias was set out in the schedule to the rules of court, and to that form there was attached a note saying that interest on costs ran from ‘the date of the certificate of taxation’. However, that note was altered in 1883 to refer to the ‘day of the judgment or order, or day on which money directed to be paid, or day from which interest is directed by the order to [page 660] run, as the case may be’. This led courts to hold that interest on costs ran from the date of judgment.14 The landscape changed again with the removal of the latter note from the 1965 English Supreme Court Rules, the English Court of Appeal ruling that this had the result of returning to the equity allocatur approach.15 Yet in 1990 the House of Lords ultimately rejected the allocatur approach in favour of the incipitur approach,16 which is now enshrined in the court rules unless the court orders otherwise.17

19.7 Three justifications for the incipitur approach have been proffered. First, as the unsuccessful litigant has caused costs to be unnecessarily incurred, and as interest is not awarded on costs incurred and paid by the successful party before judgment, it is unjust that the successful party should suffer the added loss of interest on costs incurred and paid after judgment but before the taxing master gives his or her certificate.18 To this end, it has been said that the incipitur approach is grounded in the very nature of a costs order, namely to give the winning party ‘full justice’ and ‘compensation for delay’.19 Second, since payments of costs are commonly made to lawyers prior to taxation, the allocatur rule will ordinarily cause greater injustice than the incipitur rule. Third, the incipitur rule provides a further stimulus for payments to be made on account of costs prior to taxation, for costs to be more readily agreed, and for taxation, when necessary, to be expedited.20 What underlies the foregoing, at least in part, is the notion that ‘[b]arristers, solicitors and expert witnesses should not be expected to finance their clients’ litigation until it is completed and the taxing master’s certificate obtained’.21 If interest is not payable on costs between judgment and the completion of taxation, there is an incentive to delay payment, delay disbursements and taxation. Against this, it has been judicially remarked that there is much to be said for a rule that the party required to pay taxed costs should not be required to pay interest on those costs until he or she can calculate it, which it is not possible to do until the costs are taxed. It could also be said that it is unjust to require a debtor to pay interest on an amount he or she cannot be forced to immediately pay.22 Yet courts have, generally speaking, [page 661] not been overly concerned with these considerations, or at least not sufficiently to outweigh the justifications for the incipitur approach.23 19.8 A difficulty arises where the successful party has yet to incur some of the costs eventually taxed at the time of judgment, such as the those of preparing the bill of costs and in attending upon the taxation. To the extent that interest may be payable on the amounts of those costs, it may be said that there is an injustice worked against the unsuccessful party if required to pay

interest from the date of judgment on profit costs not actually incurred and disbursements not actually made. The courts have dealt with this potential injustice by phrasing the relevant order for payment of costs such that interest ‘is not to be payable on any profit costs not actually incurred or disbursements not actually made until such time as they are respectively incurred or made’.24 In any event, the unsuccessful party may secure protection by tendering an approximate amount,25 which even if less than the amount eventually taxed, ought to relieve him or her of the need to pay interest on its amount from the day when it is made.26 Also, if the successful party is dilatory in seeking taxation, the unsuccessful party may apply under the court rules in most jurisdictions for the taxing officer to certify the costs of the other party and of the neglect, or allow a nominal or other sum to the dilatory party.27

Statutory Provisions Governing the Award of Interest on Costs 19.9 The policy considerations favouring either the incipitur or the allocatur approach28 must give way to statutory provision that prescribes the date from which interest is to run. Below are discussed the statutory and rule-based provisions that vest in superior courts the jurisdiction to award interest on party and party costs.

High Court and Federal Court 19.10 The High Court Rules provide that every award of costs under a judgment of the court carries interest at the prescribed rate of interest applicable to judgments of the Supreme Court of the state or territory in which the proceeding is pending, from the date of the certificate of taxation quantifying same.29 Similarly, the Federal Court Rules provide that costs certified in a certificate of taxation accrue interest, to be calculated as prescribed,30 from the date the certificate of taxation is served.31 It is the allocatur approach that therefore applies in these courts.

[page 662]

Family Court 19.11 The Family Law Rules simply state that interest is payable on outstanding costs at the rate mentioned in the rules.32 Unlike the former rules,33 no specific provision is made as to the date from which interest is to run, although the rule that sets the applicable rate states, by way of note, that the date from which interest is payable is prescribed by s 117B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). That section contains no specific reference to the award of interest on ‘costs’ — only to interest payable on a court order for the payment of money in proceedings under the Act — but its relationship with the rules as noted above, that it appears together with the general provisions of the Act relating to costs, and that an order for costs is an order for the payment of money, suggests that, in the absence of any other applicable provision on the point, it applies to interest on costs. Under s 117B(1), interest is payable from the later of the date of the order and the date when it takes effect. As a costs order usually takes effect (that is, the right to take proceedings to recover costs is premised) on the taxation of costs, the allocatur rule applies. However, s 117B(2) vests a discretion in the court to order that interest be payable from some other date, as specified in the order.

Australian Capital Territory 19.12 The Australian Capital Territory rules state that, unless the court otherwise orders, interest is payable on any amount awarded for costs.34 They add, again unless the court otherwise orders, that interest is payable on an amount awarded for costs at a prescribed rate,35 and from the day the costs were assessed or another date decided by the court.36 It follows that, as a starting point and subject to the court’s discretion, the allocatur rule applies.37 This arguably represents a change in approach from the position under the former rules.38

New South Wales

19.13 Under 101(4) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), the court may order that interest is to be paid on any amount payable39 under an order for the payment of costs.40 By phrasing any order for interest on costs purely within the court’s discretion, this provision differs from its counterparts elsewhere in Australia, which confer a right to interest, whether or not subject to a contrary order by the court. In turn, this generated differing views in New South Wales courts as to what circumstances should trigger the exercise of the curial discretion to award interest on costs. One view was that interest on costs should be confined to cases outside the ordinary, usually punctuated by excessive delay. The competing, and ultimately prevailing, view denies any need [page 663] for a court to be satisfied of special or exceptional circumstances to trigger an order to pay interest on costs.41 It dictates that ordinarily a party that obtains a costs order will also obtain, should it seek one, an order for interest on those costs, in the absence of any countervailing discretionary factor. It has been judicially observed, to this end, that not much, if any, evidence is required in support of an application.42 It can be inferred from the nature of commercial litigation that parties are likely to have had to pay some amounts of costs as the litigation progresses.43 The position may be different for litigation commonly conducted on a speculative basis,44 or in other non-commercial litigation such as judicial review or public interest cases.45 Another countervailing factor arises in respect of costs for work a litigant has performed in a capacity as a legal practitioner.46 Were recovery of interest on costs premised on the costs creditor having been out of pocket for an inordinate period of time, it is reasoned, this may incentivise a party confident of success to delay the prosecution of the proceedings.47 It would thereby punish expedition and reward delay, which is hardly consistent with modern civil procedure trends. [page 664]

19.14 Under s 101(5), an award of interest on costs is to be calculated at the prescribed rate,48 or at such other rate as the court may order,49 from the date(s) when the costs were paid or such later date as the court may order. This simplifies the previous law,50 which recognised either an allocatur approach where costs are taxed51 or a modified allocatur approach in proceedings for damages on a common law claim,52 subject in each case to an overriding discretion53 to order that interest be paid from the date(s) when the costs were paid.54 The current s 101(5) therefore more closely aligns with the third of the approaches than the others — but unlike its predecessor arguably prescribes the third approach as the default approach, subject to the court ordering otherwise. It follows that the cases identifying the circumstances where a court may choose to adopt the third approach55 are of limited relevance under the current default provision.56 The rationale for pegging the interest entitlement from the date of payment of costs has been judicially explained as follows:57 In circumstances where a successful party has outlaid, from an early stage and often continuously, amounts of money, by way of payments to his legal representatives to finance the conduct of the litigation, he will, manifestly, be significantly out of pocket if he receives, by way of reimbursement of his payments, only an amount of taxed or assessed costs at a far later stage, after he has successfully prosecuted the litigation to finality. Such a financial detriment can only be compensated by the making of an appropriate award of interest to be paid in respect of those payments, providing, of course, that the relevant payments can be properly allocated to the successful outcome of the litigation in whole or in part.

The issue now is to identify circumstances in which a court may order that interest run from a date other than the date the costs were paid (as opposed to, under the previous law, establishing a reason for the court to order that interest run from the date of payment). Given the discretionary terms in which s 101(5) is phrased, there is no justification to fetter the discretion by introducing [page 665] notions of ‘special circumstances’ or the like to oust what appears the default position.58 As a matter of principle, it can be said that the judicial discretion is likely to be exercised to ensure that the successful party is properly

compensated, and following a close examination of the circumstances of the case.59 Relevant factors, to this end, may include: the amount of costs paid; the length of time the claimant has been out of pocket; whether the respondent has been relieved of the need to borrow at interest or has obtained the advantage of leaving monies invested at interest;60 the terms of the retainer between the claimant and his or her lawyer; and how the parties have behaved during the litigation.61

Northern Territory 19.15 The Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT) s 85, coupled with r 59.02(3) of the rules, dictate that a judgment debt carries interest from the date of the judgment at a rate per annum equal to the rate of interest applying to Ten Year Commonwealth Bonds on 1 July of that financial year.62 Under the court rules a judgment given or order made by the court bears the date of and takes effect on and from the day it is given or made, unless the court otherwise orders.63 Yet r 63.74(1) provides that notwithstanding r 59.02(3), the taxing master may, at the conclusion of the taxing of a bill, fix a rate of interest64 payable in respect of the taxed costs ‘and the date from which that interest shall run’.65 The latter rule has not prevented the courts applying the incipitur rule in accordance with the terms and apparent intent of s 85 and r 59.02(3).66 To achieve this outcome, r 63.74(1) has been read subject to r 59.02(3). This has been justified on the basis that s 85 applies to judgments as defined under s 9(1) of the Act,67 whereas r 63.74 applies in other situations, namely where the costs are payable other than under a judgment or order. This may be so, for example, where court rules themselves, independent of a court order, provide for the burden of costs to fall on one of the parties, such as in the case of withdrawal or discontinuance.68 It should also be noted that r 63.74 applies to all taxations in the court,69 and so also applies to taxations as between solicitor and own client.70 [page 666]

Queensland 19.16 The Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) s 58 states that, in relation to a proceeding in a court for the payment of money,71 the court ‘may order that there be included in the amount for which judgment is given interest at the rate the court considers appropriate for all or part of the amount and for all or part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of judgment’.72 Under s 59(1), interest is payable from the date of a money order on the relevant debt, unless the court otherwise orders, which under s 59(3) is payable at a prescribed rate73 again unless the court otherwise orders. Under s 59(4)(b), however, if the money order includes an amount for costs, and the costs are paid within 21 days of assessment, interest on the costs is not payable unless the court otherwise orders. Similar provisions had previously appeared as s 48 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) and, earlier still, s 73 of the Common Law Practice Act 1867 (Qld). As there is no entitlement to interest on costs if the costs are paid within 21 days of being assessed, this may be seen as propounding a modified allocatur approach.74 But as s 59(4)(b) gives no clear indication of what may ensue should the costs be paid outside the 21 day period, there is force in the view that in such a case interest falls to be determined according to the ordinary rule prescribed by s 59(1), that is, interest on costs is payable as from the date of judgment (incipitur).75 Given that s 59(4) operates as an exception to s 59(1), it makes sense that where the circumstances fall outside the exception the ordinary rule should apply.76 This interpretation may also be seen as consistent with the apparent aim of s 59(4)(b) — to encourage litigants ordered to pay costs to do so proximately. To impose interest from the date of judgment if costs are not paid within the 21 days would, in line with this aim, motivate a litigant to satisfy his or her costs obligations quickly.

South Australia 19.17 The Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 114(1) provides that all money, including costs, payable under a judgment or order bears interest at the rate prescribed by the rules of court.77 The sub-section does not appear to afford the court a discretion not to order interest, but the rules — which state that the court ‘may include in an award of costs an amount representing interest’78

— are, curiously, phrased in discretionary terms. This apparent inconsistency can be reconciled by limiting the discretion to the date at which interest is to run, not by depriving the successful litigant of an apparent right to interest.79 [page 667] Under s 114(2)(a), in the case of money other than taxed costs, interest is computed from the time specified in the judgment or order and, if no time is so specified, from the date of the judgment or order. So, for instance, if the court makes a costs order fixing the quantum of party and party costs,80 the incipitur approach applies. In the case of taxed costs, s 114(2)(b) states that interest is computed from the date of the certificate of the taxing officer (termed a ‘provisional costs order’ in the current rules) or an earlier date specified in the certificate. In such a case, the obligation to pay interest does not depend upon the party in whose favour costs are ordered having paid those costs to his or her lawyers, or having agreed to pay interest on unpaid costs. The rationale is that once the certificate is signed, that party is ‘entitled to payment of the specified amount, and is entitled to interest by way of compensation for any delay in the making of that payment’.81 19.18 Hence, in the common case where costs are taxed (termed ‘adjudicated’ under the current rules)82 it appears that the allocatur rule applies. In such a case, the starting point is not an award of interest from the date of the judgment; there must be proper grounds to exercise the discretion to order that interest be computed from a time earlier than the date of the certificate, and in particular that it be computed from the date of the relevant judgment.83 In the words of the Full Court:84 [I]t would not be appropriate for a taxing officer to proceed on the basis that interest will be payable from the date of the judgment, unless the taxing officer is persuaded otherwise. We say that because in our opinion, to approach the matter on that premise would be to ignore the words of the statutory provision. The statutory provision gives to the taxing officer a wide discretion, and that discretion is not to be exercised on the basis of any prima facie starting point which has to be displaced. If we are wrong in that and there is a starting point, then the starting point appears to be the date of the certificate of the taxing officer …

As the South Australian legislation follows a different schema to that in other jurisdictions (with the exception of Victoria),85 little guidance is

derived from case law in those other jurisdictions in exercising the discretion in question, which must rest upon the relevant circumstances of the case.86 19.19 It has been judicially suggested that if the party in whose favour costs are ordered (say, for present purposes, the plaintiff) has already paid costs or disbursements to his or her lawyer, there may be a sound basis for the exercise of the discretion to fix an earlier date from which interest is to run. In such a case the plaintiff will have met a cost for which the defendant is liable, and will have been out of pocket from the time of the payment until the costs are paid. Compensation to the plaintiff would require that an earlier date be fixed than the date [page 668] of the taxing officer’s certificate.87 The same may be so if the plaintiff has not paid costs or disbursements, but has agreed to pay interest on them if recovered from the defendant.88 If the plaintiff has not paid costs, and has not agreed to pay interest on costs, the discretion in relation to the date from which interest runs is not to be exercised on the basis of a general rule that interest on costs runs from the date of the judgment or from some earlier date at which the costs were earned.89 Applying any general rule would not be a proper exercise of the discretion, and also potentially be inconsistent with the award of costs being a partial indemnity against expense incurred.90 The logic is that ‘[a] successful plaintiff who has not paid costs is not, in any sense, out of pocket while awaiting the receipt from the defendant of those costs’.91 A further factor relevant to the discretion is whether the defendant has been guilty of delay, or of an unreasonable approach to the taxation of costs, which may lead the taxing officer to fix a date earlier than the date of the certificate from which interest is to run, though not a date earlier than the judgment.92 In view of the above, Doyle CJ in Osborne v Kelly93 warned that ‘[t]he fixing of a date from which interest is to run should not become, of itself, a substantial and complex issue’, and suggested that the only sensible way in which to exercise the discretion is to take a ‘broad axe approach’ in the fixing of a date. This led his Honour to remark that s 114(2)(b) should confer a

power on a taxing officer to award a lump sum by way of interest, in addition to the power to fix a date from which interest runs. As adjusting the date from which interest is to run may in many cases be a rather crude device, and give rise to lengthy argument, the power to award a lump sum, according to Doyle CJ, would ‘inject some flexibility into the process which would avoid artificial arguments over the choice of a date’.94

Tasmania 19.20 The Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 s 165 provides that, inter alia, every order for costs95 carries interest at the rate of five per cent per annum from the time of the trial or inquiry or, if there has been no trial or inquiry, from the time of signing or entering up judgment.96 The rules provide that unless otherwise ordered, an order of the court is to bear the [page 669] date it is given or made, and takes effect on and from that date.97 It follows that the incipitur rule applies in Tasmania.98

Victoria 19.21 The Supreme Court Act 1986 s 101(1) provides that every judgment debt carries interest at the rate for the time being fixed under the Penalty Interest Rates Act 1983 s 299 from the time the judgment was given or, in the case of costs assessable by the Costs Court, from the date of the order of the Costs Court stating the result of the assessment or such other date as the court orders.100 It follows that where taxed costs are ordered, the proper approach is the allocatur approach.101 As this follows the schema of the equivalent South Australian provision, retaining a discretion in the court to set a date before assessment is concluded, the South Australian cases on the exercise of this discretion may be relevant.102 The mere fact that the first instance decision is reversed on appeal does not by itself warrant a departure from the usual rule, although if coupled with abuse of process or significant delay in relation to taxation, the position may be otherwise.103 Again like its

counterpart in South Australia, it appears that where, for instance, the court elects to fix costs rather than order their assessment,104 the date on which interest begins to run is the date of judgment (incipitur).

Western Australia 19.22 Under the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA) s 8, interest is to be paid on the unpaid amount of a judgment sum from the date of the judgment until the date on which the judgment sum is paid, either at the rate prescribed by the regulations or that set by the court.105 That this encompasses the power to make orders for interest on costs stems from the meaning of ‘judgment sum’ in the Act.106 That this dictates an incipitur approach is established by the case law,107 and is supported by the court rules, which state that an order of the court takes effect from the day of its date, which is the day it is pronounced, given or made, unless the court otherwise orders.108 [page 670]

General Jurisdiction to Award Interest on Costs 19.23 Whether superior courts have power to award interest on party and party costs independent of the specific provisions discussed above is the subject of conflicting authority. One view is that the general statutory costs discretion conferred upon courts109 carries the power to award interest on party and party costs. Rogers CJ explained the logic for this view in McWilliams Wines Pty Ltd v Liaweena (NSW) Pty Ltd as follows:110 It does not require much commercial acuity to perceive the financial hardship that could be imposed on a litigant who is required … by its own solicitors, to pay its costs to them and remain bereft of any compensatory interest payment until, in the fullness of time, the costs are taxed and then only from that date. The problem has become more acute by reason of two facts. First, there is a much longer time lapse between the date when litigants are required to pay an amount on account of costs to their own solicitors and the time when taxed bills of costs are brought in. Second, because of the sheer size of the amount involved in the payment of costs.

The matter arose in McWilliams Wines because, at the time, the statutory jurisdiction to award interest on party and party costs was limited to claims in the Common Law Division of the New South Wales Supreme Court,111 the case having been litigated in the Commercial Division of that court.112 His Honour reasoned that the relevant statute — which provided that ‘costs shall be in the discretion of the Court’ and conferred upon it ‘full power to determine by whom and to what extent costs are to be paid’113 — ‘selfevidently intends to give the Court the widest possible power and discretion in the allocation of costs’.114 This led Rogers CJ to decide that the court had the power to award interest on party and party costs even though the notice of motion did not invite the court to exercise that power, and ordered the defendant to pay interest on the taxed costs due to the plaintiff from the respective dates on which the plaintiff had paid to its solicitors.115 Later New South Wales authority endorses McWilliams Wines, to the effect that the specific statutory power to award interest on party and party costs does not fetter the general statutory costs power, such that the latter power can operate in addition to the former.116 19.24 The converse view is that the general statutory costs discretion confers no power to award interest on party and party costs. In Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd117 the Full Federal Court opined that in McWilliams Wines Rogers CJ assumed the power rather than demonstrated it by reference to principle or authority. The court reasoned, [page 671] in line with English authority,118 that, first, it was not incidental to, or necessary for, the exercise of the grant of the general statutory costs discretion119 that there be an appended power to order interest on costs, and second, as statute made specific provision for interest,120 parliament was unlikely to have intended that the general costs discretion authorise the grant of interest on costs.121 19.25 The problem with the McWilliams Wines approach is that in no jurisdiction is the term ‘costs’, in so far as it refers to the general statutory costs discretion, expressly defined to include interest. This indeed may explain why the parliaments in each jurisdiction have enacted specific

provisions designed, inter alia, to confer a jurisdiction to award of interest on party and party costs. Also, attempts to support the New South Wales approach by reference to the breadth with which the High Court has interpreted the general statutory costs discretion122 — such as to confer a jurisdiction to award costs against non-parties123 — are not to the point unless ‘interest’ can properly be assumed to either equate to, or at least be of the same nature as, ‘costs’. The latter is not an entirely unsustainable proposition, for courts have referred to the compensatory nature of interest,124 and how it fosters the indemnity principle that underlies costs orders.125 However, neither Rogers CJ in McWilliams Wines, nor the subsequent New South Wales case law, appears to be based on such reasoning.

1.

Australian Development Corporation Pty Ltd v White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 280; BC200202286 at [29] per Einstein J; Lahoud v Lahoud [2006] NSWSC 126; BC200601167 at [81]–[83] per Campbell J; Coates v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1047; BC200909035 at [10] per Fullerton J; Fattal v Walbrook Trustees (Jersey) Ltd [2009] 4 Costs LR 591; [2009] EWHC 1674 (Ch) at [26] per Christopher Clarke J; Lahoud v Lahoud [2011] NSWSC 994; BC201106786 at [59] per Campbell JA.

2.

See 19.9–19.22.

3.

See 19.23–19.25.

4.

See 19.3–19.8.

5.

Useful historical accounts of this issue appear in Tarlinton v Hall (1981) 51 FLR 282 at 285–9 per Kelly J (SC(ACT)); Fischer v David Syme & Co Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 606 at 608–12 per Smart J; Minister Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 v Carson (1994) 35 NSWLR 342 at 355–63; BC9403133 per Young AJA.

6.

As to certificates of taxation see 18.28–18.40.

7.

See 19.9–19.22.

8.

Judgments Act 1838 (UK) s 17 (repealed).

9.

See, for example, Newton v Grand Junction Railway Company (1846) 16 M & W 139; 153 ER 1133.

10. See, for example, Attorney-General v Lord Carrington (1843) 6 Beav 454; 49 ER 901. 11. Minister Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 v Carson (1994) 35 NSWLR 342 at 361; BC9403133 per Young AJA. 12. Newton v Grand Junction Railway Company (1846) 16 M & W 139 at 141; 153 ER 1133 at 1134. 13. See, for example, Schroeder v Cleugh (1877) 46 LJQB 365. 14. See, for example, Pyman & Co v Burt and Boulton [1884] WN 100, a decision which the court in its Chancery Division followed: see Landowners West of England and South Wales Land

Drainage and Inclosure Co v Ashford (1884) 13 WR 41; Boswell v Coaks (1887) 57 LJ Ch 101. 15. K v K (Divorce Costs: Interest) [1977] Fam 39. This case influenced Allen M in T A Field Pty Ltd v Frigmobile of Australia Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NSWLR 488, whose judgment was in any event disapproved in Minister Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 v Carson (1994) 35 NSWLR 342 at 363–4; BC9403133 per Young AJA (see also at 351–2 per Kirby P). Cf Fischer v David Syme & Co Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 606 at 616 per Smart J. In Queensland and South Australia the allocatur rule was applied by courts (see, for example, Reis Bros v E W Carling & Co [1908] St R Qd 76; Weingarten Bros v G & R Wills & Co [1908] SALR 28) until the incipitur rule was reapplied by express statutory provision: see 19.16 (Qld), 19.17–19.19 (SA). 16. Hunt v R M Douglas (Roofing) Ltd [1990] 1 AC 398 (overruling K v K (Divorce Costs: Interest) [1977] Fam 39). See also Thomas v Bunn [1991] 1 AC 362 at 374–81 per Lord Ackner; Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (No 2) [1995] 1 All ER 790 at 793 per Nourse LJ. 17. UK CPR r 40.8(1) (‘Where interest is payable on a judgment … the interest shall begin to run from the date that judgment is given unless: (a) a rule in another Part or a practice direction makes different provision; or (b) the court orders otherwise’), 40.8(2) (‘The court may order that interest shall begin to run from a date before the date that judgment is given’). See Fattal v Walbrook Trustees (Jersey) Ltd [2009] 4 Costs LR 591; [2009] EWHC 1674 (Ch) at [25]–[30] per Christopher Clarke J; Simcoe v Jacuzzi UK Group plc [2012] 2 All ER 60; [2012] EWCA Civ 137 see at [35]–[48] per Lord Neuberger MR, with whom Hooper and McFarlane LJJ concurred. 18. Hunt v R M Douglas (Roofing) Ltd [1990] 1 AC 398 at 415 per Lord Ackner. See also Tarlinton v Hall (1981) 51 FLR 282 at 290 per Kelly J (SC(ACT)) (‘it seems unjust that the sum of money represented by the costs should be ‘fructifying in the wrong pocket’ of the unsuccessful party until taxation [given that] [t] axation is normally a lengthy process requiring much care and detailed work’). As to certificates of taxation see 18.28–18.40. 19. Minister Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 v Carson (1994) 35 NSWLR 342 at 352–3; BC9403133 per Kirby P. 20. Hunt v R M Douglas (Roofing) Ltd [1990] 1 AC 398 at 415 per Lord Ackner. 21. Hunt v R M Douglas (Roofing) Ltd [1990] 1 AC 398 at 415–16 per Lord Ackner. 22. Tarlinton v Hall (1981) 51 FLR 282 at 290 per Kelly J (SC(ACT)). 23. See, for example, Tarlinton v Hall (1981) 51 FLR 282 at 291 per Kelly J (SC(ACT)). 24. Tarlinton v Hall (1981) 51 FLR 282 at 291 per Kelly J (SC(ACT)). 25. If the unsuccessful party is having difficulty making an assessment, it can seek details from the successful party: Tarlinton v Hall (1981) 51 FLR 282 at 291 per Kelly J (SC(ACT)). 26. Tarlinton v Hall (1981) 51 FLR 282 at 291 per Kelly J (SC(ACT)). 27. See 18.25–18.27. 28. As to which see 19.7–19.8. 29. HCR 2004 r 8.06.2 (formerly HCR 1952 O 43A r 2). This rule modifies the position that would otherwise apply as a result of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 77N, which provides that a judgment debt under a judgment of the court carries interest from the date the judgment is entered. 30. The calculation is to be in accordance with FCR 2011 r 39.06, which states that the prescribed rate at which interest is payable is: (a) for the period from 1 January to 30 June in any year — the rate that is 6 per cent above the cash rate last published by the Reserve Bank of Australia before the

period commenced; and (b) for the period 1 July to 31 December in any year — the rate that is 6 per cent above the cash rate last published by the Reserve Bank of Australia before the period commenced. Cf the former FCR 1979 O 35 r 8. 31. FCR 2011 r 40.32(3) (cf the former FCR 1979 O 62 r 45(6)). The certificate of taxation must be served, within 14 days after the date it is issued, by the party who filed the bill, on the party responsible for payment of the costs: FCR 2011 r 40.32(1). 32. Fam LR 2004 r 19.02 (the rate being set by r 17.03). 33. Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 3 (repealed) (which stated that interest became due and payable on and from the date on the party entitled to be paid the costs became entitled to commence proceedings to recover the costs, thus indicating that the allocatur rule applied, as the right to commence proceedings to recover costs is premised upon the amount of those costs having first been quantified by taxation). 34. ACT r 1617(3). 35. Namely the rate of interest applying, from time to time, under ACT Sch 2, Pt 2.2 (‘interest after judgment’). 36. ACT r 1617(4). 37. Lewincamp v ACP Magazines Ltd (No 2) [2008] ACTSC 73; BC200807231 at [8] per Besanko J. 38. ACT RSC O 42 r 3; Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 70 (both repealed) (under which case authority favoured the incipitur approach: Tarlinton v Hall (1981) 51 FLR 282 at 292 per Kelly J (SC(ACT)); Hewitt v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd [1996] ACTSC 78; BC9603167 at [3]–[5] per Higgins J. 39. Although the term ‘payable’ is used in s 101(4), the purpose of s 101(4) read in the context of s 101(5) is to award interest on amounts that have actually been paid: Farkas v Northcity Financial Services Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1036; BC200607961 at [13] per Bergin J. 40. The sub-section does not extend in its terms to justify a claim for interest on disbursements made by the successful party to his or her lawyer, as ‘[t]he clear words of the section limit it to any amount payable under an order for the payment of costs’: Bastas v Hodes (No 3) [2009] NSWSC 1191; BC200909987 at [18] per Gzell J. 41. Grogan v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1101; BC200008015 at [10]–[12] per Barr J; Australian Development Corporation Pty Ltd v White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 280; BC200202286 at [17], [23]–[25] per Einstein J; Puntoriero v Water Administration Ministerial Corporation [2002] NSWSC 217; BC200201120 at [10] per Grove J; Lahoud v Lahoud [2006] NSWSC 126; BC200601167 at [82]–[83] per Campbell J; Hexiva Pty Ltd v Lederer [2006] NSWSC 1259; BC200609701 at [21] per Brereton J; Drummond and Rosen Pty Ltd v Easey (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 331; BC200909763 at [4] per Macfarlan JA, with whom Tobias JA agreed. An equivalent approach appears in English case law: see, for example, Fattal v Walbrook Trustees (Jersey) Ltd [2009] 4 Costs LR 591; [2009] EWHC 1674 (Ch) at [30] per Christopher Clarke J (‘Since the payment of solicitors’ costs involves the payment of money which could otherwise have been profitably employed, the overwhelming likelihood is that justice requires some recompense in the form of interest’). 42. Hexiva Pty Ltd v Lederer [2006] NSWSC 1259; BC200609701 at [21] per Brereton J. See also Drummond and Rosen Pty Ltd v Easey (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 331; BC200909763 at [3] per Macfarlan JA, with whom Tobias JA agreed (who considered that ‘it is unnecessary for there to be evidence of the date or dates on which the costs concerned were paid for an order for the payment of interest to be made under [the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 101(4)]’).

43. See, for example, Lahoud v Lahoud [2006] NSWSC 126; BC200601167 at [81]–[83] per Campbell J; Robb Evans of Robb Evans and Associates v European Bank Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 170; BC200905581 at [34] per Basten JA, with whom Campbell JA concurred. 44. See, for example, Spedding v Nobles (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 87; BC200702583. As to costs agreements on a speculative basis see 3.48–3.49. 45. See, for example, Hurstville City Council v Minister for Planning and Infrastructure (No 2) [2012] NSWLEC 196 at [35] per Pain J (involving judicial review proceedings, which were not commercial in nature, had not been on foot for a lengthy period, related to the public interest, and were not complex either in terms of the volume of documentary evidence or the range of issues for determination). Cf Amalgamated Holdings Ltd v North Sydney Council (2012) 191 LGERA 51; [2012] NSWLEC 138; BC201204709 (where Biscoe J ordered interest on costs, in a routine judicial review application pursuant to open standing rights, in circumstances where the proceedings lacked a substantial public interest aspect and were instead driven by concerns over the impact of a proposed development on the applicant’s business: at [49]–[51]). As to costs in public interest litigation see Ch 9 (and, in particular, 9.31–9.34 regarding costs in judicial review proceedings). 46. Farkas v Northcity Financial Services Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1036; BC200607961 (where Bergin J refused to order interest on costs to a plaintiff for the work he did in his capacity as a legal practitioner, as her Honour was of the view that although in doing the work himself the plaintiff saved costs, he did not pay the costs in the sense comprehended by the legislation directed to interest on costs); Viscariello v Macks (No 9) [2012] SASC 132; BC201205617 at [4] per Judge Lunn. 47. Drummond and Rosen Pty Ltd v Easey (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 331; BC200909763 at [4] per Macfarlan JA, with whom Tobias JA agreed; Wood v Inglis [2010] NSWSC 749; BC201004718 at [13] per Brereton J; Owners Strata Plan 70150 v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2010] NSWSC 759; BC201004763 at [8] per Brereton J. 48. The ‘prescribed rate’ is set by the rules: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 101(7); NSW r 36.7(1), Sch 5. In Wood v Inglis [2010] NSWSC 749; BC201004718 at [15] Brereton J noted that ‘adoption of the prescribed rate has the advantage that it discourages extensive argument about the applicable interest rate and the use of evidence as to interest rates’. His Honour added (at [16]) that the prescribed rate is ordinarily higher than commercial rates for three reasons: first, ‘investment in judgment debts is not a first-class investment and bears a substantial degree of risk’; second, ‘to encourage judgment debtors to pay rather than delay’; and third, ‘because the prescribed rate is a simple interest rate, whereas commercial institutions typically charge compound interest’. 49. In Wood v Inglis [2010] NSWSC 749; BC201004718, even though the successful party had not adduced evidence of the interest she was paying on the money borrowed to fund legal costs, Brereton J considered that the court is entitled to take judicial notice of current interest rates available from financial institutions if they are less than those currently prescribed by the rules of court (and so awarded interest at 7.5 per cent rather the rate of 9 per cent referred to in the rules): at [19]. 50. As to which see the first edition of this work, 19.13–19.17. 51. Under NSW RSC Pt 40 r 3(4), 3(5) (repealed) (see Wentworth v Rogers (No 1) [2002] NSWSC 651; BC200204702 at [12] per Howie J; Wentworth v Rogers (No 2) [2002] NSWSC 674; BC200204703 at [6] per Howie J; Gray v Guardian Trust Australia Ltd [2003] NSWSC 887; BC200305726 at [26], [27] per Austin J; Illawong Village Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales [2005] NSWSC 524; BC200503900 at [28] per Campbell J).

Under Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 95(3) (repealed) (which provided that if the court makes 52. an order for the payment of costs in proceedings for damages on a common law claim, and the costs are paid within 21 days of ascertainment of the amount of the costs by assessment, no interest on costs was payable unless the court otherwise orders) (see Lolomanaia v Roads & Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2002] NSWSC 918; BC200206012 at [16], [17] per Dunford J). 53. See Grogan v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1101; BC200008015 at [7]–[10] per Barr J. 54. Under Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 95(4) (repealed). 55. As to which see the first edition of this work, 19.15–19.17. 56. Spedding v Nobles (No 2) (2007) 69 NSWLR 100; [2007] NSWCA 87; BC200700962 at [15] per Basten JA. 57. Hughes Bros v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church [1999] NSWSC 1051; BC9907002 at [60] per Foster AJ (in the context of the previous Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 95(4)). See, for example, Lahoud v Lahoud [2006] NSWSC 126; BC200601167 at [83] per Campbell J (under s 101(5) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)). 58. Grogan v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1101; BC200008015 at [11] per Barr J; Puntoriero v Water Administration Ministerial Corporation [2002] NSWSC 217; BC200201120 at [10] per Grove J; Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 156; BC200501227 at [25] per Einstein J (each in the context of the previous s 95(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW)). 59. Davies v Kur-ring-gai Municipal Council [2003] NSWSC 1010; BC200306804 at [3] per Austin J. 60. See, for example, Woods v Woods [2001] NSWSC 1108; BC200107587 at [29] per Hamilton J (where the successful defendant’s legal representatives took the case on a speculative basis (see 3.41), which stipulated interest on fees from the moment a successful outcome was manifested, interest on costs was ordered from that moment). Cf Wentworth v Rogers (No 1) [2002] NSWSC 651; BC200204702 at [18] per Howie J (describing Woods v Woods as ‘an unusual and quite extraordinary case determined on its own facts’). 61. Grogan v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1101; BC200008015 at [11] per Barr J (in the context of the previous s 95(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW)). 62. This represents the rate advised by the Northern Territory Treasury as applying on that date: NT r 59.02(5). 63. NT r 59.02(1). 64. That rate cannot exceed the rate from time to time fixed in accordance with NT r 59.02 as interest payable on a judgment debt: NT r 63.74(2). 65. NT r 63.74(1). 66. Schimmel v Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 113 FLR 205 at 209 per Lefevre M (SC(NT)); Shaw v Commonwealth (1995) 124 FLR 190 at 205 per Kearney J (SC(NT)). The courts had also applied the incipitur rule under the previous court rules: Zabic v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1983) 72 FLR 255 at 259 per Nader J (SC(NT)). To equivalent effect in the context of a parallel New Zealand rule (NZ HCR r 11.27(1)) see Chesterfields Preschools Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2013] NZCA 44. 67. Which defines ‘judgment’ to include a decree, order, declaration, determination, finding (including a finding of guilt), conviction or sentence, and a refusal to make a decree, order, declaration,

determination or finding, whether final or otherwise: Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT) s 9(1). 68. See NT r 63.11 (as to which see 14.36). 69. NT r 63.65. 70. As to interest on costs as between solicitor and own client see 4.60. 71. Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) s 58(1). 72. Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) s 58(3). 73. Being the rate prescribed under a practice direction made under the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld). 74. There was some support for this approach under the former (more obscure) equivalent provision, namely Supreme Court Act 1995 s 48(2)(b), which referred to costs being ‘ascertained’: see Ingles v Gould [1993] 2 Qd R 250 at 262; BC9202497 per Shepherdson J (who stated, in obiter, that ‘[o]nce the costs were ascertained it seems to me at the very least, interest accrued thereafter and the only way the party liable could escape payment of such interest was to pay the costs in full within 21 days after such ascertainment’; emphasis supplied). Under the former provision, it had been held that there is no ‘ascertainment of costs’ until the relevant parties became bound with respect to the amount of the costs ordered to be paid: Ingles v Gould at 256 per Fitzgerald P and Davies JA (cf at 260–1 per Shepherdson J in dissent on this point). 75. There is some support for such a view, though under earlier legislation: Reis v Carling (1908) 5 CLR 673; BC0800052. See further the discussion in B Conrick, ‘Interest on Awards of Costs in Court and Arbitration Proceedings: The Queensland Position’ (1989) 10 QL 190 at 190–6. 76. Cf Ingles v Gould [1993] 2 Qd R 250 at 257 per Fitzgerald P and Davies JA, at 269 per Shepherdson J; BC9202497. 77. Unless some other rate is fixed by law, interest accrues at the rates prescribed in SA r 261. 78. SA r 264(7). 79. Malaugh Holdings (No 2) Pty Ltd v Seal (No 2) (2011) 274 LSJS 504; [2011] SADC 37 at [74] per Judge David Smith. 80. See 15.14–15.26. 81. Osborne v Kelly (1999) 75 SASR 392 at 400; [1999] SASC 486; BC9907380 per Doyle CJ (FC) (adding that although the Parliament may have assumed that interest so received by the party would be passed on if he or she had not yet paid the costs, the entitlement to interest does not depend upon that happening). Cf Hunt v R M Douglas (Roofing) Ltd [1990] 1 AC 398 at 416 per Lord Ackner (who remarked that there may be an ‘express agreement between the solicitor and his client that any interest recovered on costs and disbursements after judgment is pronounced but before the taxing master’s certificate is obtained, which costs and disbursements have not in fact been paid prior to taxation shall as to the interest on the costs belong to the solicitor’). 82. See 15.1, 15.10. 83. Burford v Allan (FC(SA), Doyle CJ, Millhouse and Nyland JJ, 26 May 1998, unreported) BC9802071 at 8 per Doyle CJ, with whom Millhouse and Nyland JJ concurred; Osborne v Kelly (1999) 75 SASR 392 at 393; [1999] SASC 486; BC9907380 per Doyle CJ (FC) (acknowledging the fairness of a rule requiring interest to be paid at least from the date of the judgment, but adding that to adopt such a rule to guide the exercise of the statutory discretion would be to subvert the statutory discretion: at 402). 84. Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd (1998) 201 LSJS 44 at 46–7; BC9806981 (FC).

85. See 19.21. 86. Osborne v Kelly (1999) 75 SASR 392 at 396–7; [1999] SASC 486; BC9907380 per Doyle CJ (FC). 87. Osborne v Kelly (1999) 75 SASR 392 at 400, 405; [1999] SASC 486; BC9907380 per Doyle CJ (FC); Viscariello v Macks (No 9) [2012] SASC 132; BC201205617 at [4] per Judge Lunn. 88. Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1998) 133 ACTR 1 at 6 per Miles CJ (noting that if by reason of the agreement a party and his or her solicitors, the litigant has incurred liability for interest on the costs he or she has not paid, then the litigant ‘will not receive a windfall and it is fair to award interest’). 89. See, for example, Public Trustee v Newman (2012) 112 SASR 299; [2012] SASCFC 18; BC201201358 at [51]–[55] per the court. 90. Osborne v Kelly (1999) 75 SASR 392 at 405; [1999] SASC 486; BC9907380 per Doyle CJ (FC). On this point see also Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1998) 133 ACTR 1 at 6 per Miles CJ (noting that if a litigant ‘is awarded interest on costs which he has not paid, then he will receive a windfall’). 91. Osborne v Kelly (1999) 75 SASR 392 at 403; [1999] SASC 486; BC9907380 per Doyle CJ (FC). 92. Knowles v Gutteridge, Haskins and Davey Pty Ltd (SC(Vic), Hampel J, 30 July 1993, unreported) BC9300783 at 6; Osborne v Kelly (1999) 75 SASR 392 at 405; [1999] SASC 486; BC9907380 per Doyle CJ (FC). 93. (1999) 75 SASR 392 at 400; [1999] SASC 486; BC9907380 (FC). Similar remarks have been made in England: see Simcoe v Jacuzzi UK Group plc [2012] 2 All ER 60; [2012] EWCA Civ 137 at [48] per Lord Neuberger MR, with whom Hooper and McFarlane LJJ concurred (who discouraged ‘too detailed an approach into the facts of the particular case in hand for the purpose of determining the date from which interest should run’). 94. Osborne v Kelly (1999) 75 SASR 392 at 405–6; [1999] SASC 486; BC9907380 (FC). 95. The section refers to every judgment or order mentioned in the Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 164(1), which includes all orders for costs. 96. The amount of such interest must be stated in the body of, and may be levied under, a writ of execution on such judgment: Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 165. 97. Tas r 807. 98. See, for example, Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1923] VLR 623 at 628–9 per Schutt J; Board of Management of the Agricultural Bank of Tasmania v Brown [1958] Tas SR 22. 99. The rates payable under this provision are fixed by the Attorney-General from time to time by notice published in the Government Gazette. 100. The amount of the interest must be stated in the body of, and may be levied under, a warrant of execution on the judgment: Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 101(2). 101. Knowles v Gutteridge, Haskins and Davey Pty Ltd (SC(Vic), Hampel J, 30 July 1993, unreported) BC9300783 at 6. 102. The South Australian cases are discussed at 19.17–19.19. 103. Knowles v Gutteridge, Haskins and Davey Pty Ltd (SC(Vic), Hampel J, 30 July 1993, unreported) BC9300783 at 6. 104. See 15.14–15.26.

105. The former equivalent provision was found in s 142 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA). 106. See Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA) s 3; Hamdan v Widodo (No 2) [2010] WASC 6 (S); BC201000103. 107. See State Planning Commission v Della Vedova (1992) 7 WAR 81 at 84 per Walsh J; Gallagher v CSR Ltd (SC(WA), Ipp J, 31 March 1994, unreported) BC9401606 at 19; Hamdan v Widodo (No 2) [2010] WASC 6 (S); BC201000103 at [9]–[13] per Johnson J; Lampropoulos v Kolnik [2010] WASC 193 (S); BC201009410 at [50] per Simmonds J. 108. WA O 42 r 2. 109. As to the general statutory costs discretion see 6.14. 110. (1993) 32 NSWLR 190 at 191; BC9303918 (Comm D) (paragraph break omitted). 111. Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 95(3) (repealed) (limited to a ‘common law claim’, defined in s 19(1) as ‘a claim … in proceedings in the Common Law Division’). 112. Rogers CJ characterised this as an instance where parliament had overlooked the creation of the Commercial Division in amending the relevant legislation: McWilliams Wines Pty Ltd v Liaweena (NSW) Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 190 at 192; BC9303918. 113. Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 76(1)(a), 76(1)(b) (now Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98(1)(a), 98(1)(b)). As to these provisions, and equivalent provisions in other jurisdictions see 6.14. 114. McWilliams Wines Pty Ltd v Liaweena (NSW) Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 190 at 192; BC9303918. 115. McWilliams Wines Pty Ltd v Liaweena (NSW) Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 190 at 193; BC9303918. 116. Grogan v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1101; BC200008015 at [10] per Barr J; Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v Peninsula Balmain Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] NSWSC 1016; BC200106971 at [44] per Barrett J; Woods v Woods [2001] NSWSC 1108; BC200107587 at [28] per Hamilton J; Simmons v Colly Cotton Marketing Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1092; BC200708549 at [13] per Bergin J. The matter has been raised but left open by Western Australian judges: see, for example, Western Australian Planning Commission v Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 295; BC200307431 at [115]–[116] per McLure J, with whom Anderson and Steytler JJ agreed; Lampropoulos v Kolnik [2010] WASC 193 (S); BC201009410 at [52] per Simmonds J. 117. (2001) 109 FCR 280 at 293; [2001] FCA 370; BC200102364. 118. See Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) [1997] 1 WLR 1627 at 1635–6 per Lord Nicholls (HL). 119. In that case, under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(1), as to which see 6.14. 120. Under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 51A, 52. 121. Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (2001) 109 FCR 280 at 294; [2001] FCA 370; BC200102364. 122. See, for example, Woods v Woods [2001] NSWSC 1108; BC200107587 at [26], [28] per Hamilton J. 123. See Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178; BC9202673. Non-party costs orders are discussed in Ch 22. 124. See, for example, Minister Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 v Carson (1994) 35 NSWLR 342 at 354; BC9403133 per Kirby P; Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1998) 133 ACTR 1 at 6 per Miles CJ. Cf MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991)

171 CLR 657 at 663; BC9102633 (FC) (in the context of interest on damages). 125. As to the indemnity principle see 7.2–7.6.

[page 673]

PART IV

Costs in Appeals This Part, through Chapter 20, discusses the general principles applicable to costs orders in appeals and aborted trials, and as to appeals from costs orders. The subject of Chapter 21 is the legislation that creates a fund to relieve litigants of the burden of costs that might be imposed upon them by reason of erroneous decisions by lower courts.

[page 675]

CHAPTER 20

Appeals Costs on Appeal 20.2 General rule 20.2 Ouster of general rule 20.3 Appeal upheld in part 20.4 Non-compliance with procedure 20.5 Conduct of successful party 20.6 Offers of settlement 20.7 Success on a point not argued or evidence not presented before a lower court 20.8 Appeal upheld but no change in determination 20.9 Appeals raising issues of public interest 20.10 Ouster by statute 20.11 Costs at first instance 20.12 Application for stay of costs order pending appeal 20.13 Costs payable out of an estate or fund 20.14 General approach 20.14 Costs of beneficiaries as appellants 20.15 Costs of personal representatives as appellants 20.16 Costs of personal representatives as respondents 20.18 Costs of Aborted Trial General rule Ouster of general rule

20.19 20.19 20.22

Conduct of a litigant causing first trial to be aborted Alternative order: each party bear own costs of first trial

20.23 20.25

Appeal on Issue of Costs 20.28 Review of discretionary decisions generally 20.28 Review of discretionary decisions as to costs 20.29 Reluctance of appellate tribunal to review 20.30 Grounds for review 20.31 Relevance of trial judge’s reasons 20.33 Statute requiring leave to appeal on costs 20.34 In whom is the leave requirement vested? 20.36 Appeals as to costs subject to the leave requirement 20.37 Re-exercising the discretion in the absence of leave 20.40 Exercising the discretion where leave granted or not required 20.44 Where costs order is made against a non-party 20.45

[page 676] 20.1 This chapter deals with the application of the costs indemnity rule (discussed in Chapter 7) to costs in appeals,1 re-trials2 and appeals on the issue of costs.3 It should be read in tandem with Chapter 21, which outlines suitors’ fund legislation in most jurisdictions that creates a fund to relieve litigants of the burden of costs that might be imposed upon them by reason of erroneous decisions by lower courts. Costs in the context of criminal appeals are discussed elsewhere,4 as are applications for security for costs in appeals.5

Costs on Appeal

General rule 20.2 As in the case of costs at first instance,6 an appellate court has an unfettered discretion as to the order for costs of an appeal;7 the court can make such order for the whole or any part of the costs of an appeal as it, in the circumstances, considers to be just.8 Yet, again as at first instance and for the same reason, although costs lie in the court’s discretion, the usual exercise of that discretion is that the general costs of an appeal follow the event.9 In the words of Lord Bridge: ‘[i]t is just for a successful litigant, and perhaps a fortiori for a successful appellant, to be able to recover his costs from someone’.10 The foregoing dictates that when leave to appeal is required and granted, the normal order is that the costs of making the application for special leave represent ‘costs of the appeal’,11 which are therefore ordered to be paid by the party unsuccessful in the appeal. It is open to the court to grant leave to appeal on the condition that the appellant pay some or all of the costs of the appeal in any event; for instance, in cases where the resolution of a point is desirable from the [page 677] point of view of a large and recurrent litigant but the opponent is not a recurrent litigant and is not well positioned to meet adverse costs orders on the point being tested, the High Court will commonly grant special leave conditional on the appellant paying the opponent’s costs in any event.12 If leave to appeal is refused, the normal order is that the applicant pays for the costs of the application.13

Ouster of general rule 20.3 The general rule is subject to various exceptions — usually premised upon circumstances out of the ordinary — which parallel exceptions applicable to the ouster of the general ‘costs follow the event’ rule at first instance.14 These are discussed below.

Appeal upheld in part 20.4 Consistent with the approach to the exercise of the costs discretion in the context of mixed success at first instance,15 where the appellant succeeds on some issues but fails on others, the court may order that the respondent pay only a proportion of the appellant’s costs of the appeal.16 In this regard, the extent of the ouster of the usual costs rule depends not only on the parties’ relative level of success (or failure) but also on the time taken up and costs incurred on the issues that failed.17 If neither party is completely successful in the appeal, the court may elect to make no costs order.18 Yet that a party to an appeal is successful on a very minor point does not by itself justify reducing his or her costs liability in any substantial way, at least not if the opponent was on the whole successful.19 The concern is that ‘[p]arties should not be [page 678] encouraged to think that they can vex a party, especially one who has already been successful, by an appeal on the assumption that if the appellant succeeds on one or more issues it may claim the costs of them, notwithstanding that they still fail to overturn the subject judgment’.20

Non-compliance with procedure 20.5 A court may deny a successful appellant costs who, in the course of the proceedings, has not followed procedural rules or has in some other way impinged upon the proper administration of the court process. The point assumes greater relevance in modern times in view of the push towards the efficient administration of the litigation process. Yet judges recognised the point from early times. An illustration is Glekis v Conson,21 where upon the hearing of a new trial motion, it appeared that the appeal book had not been filed and served within the time prescribed by the court rules. No satisfactory explanation was advanced for this delay, and the notice of appeal was incorrectly signed. Street CJ noted the desirability of parties being ‘made to understand that the rules cannot be disregarded with impunity’,22 and that the justice of the case mandated that the appellant should be denied both the costs

of those matters done out of due time, and those of the filing and serving of the notice of appeal.23 And in Ex parte Hancock24 the court disallowed the costs of appeal books prepared in a slovenly fashion, thus increasing the court’s difficulties in dealing with the matter, remarking that this was occurring so frequently that ‘the only way of checking it is by disallowance of costs in flagrant cases’.

Conduct of successful party 20.6 The general costs of an appeal, or the costs of particular issues, may be ordered other than in favour of the successful respondent whose conduct justified the bringing of the appeal25 or was otherwise so discreditable as warrant denial of costs.26 For example, in Freeman v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria27 the Victorian Court of Appeal ruled that the respondent, though successful, was not entitled to its full costs of the appeal, as some of those costs had been incurred after it knew that the appeal was moot, and had failed to promptly move for the appeal to be dismissed. The appellant should not, therefore, be liable to indemnify the respondent for its costs incurred after that date. Nor should an ultimately successful party expect to receive its costs incurred after the date at which it should have raised the issue that triggered its success.28 Also, a consequence of raising and then abandoning myriad grounds may be that the appellant becomes more vulnerable to a costs order even though the appeal is ultimately successful, [page 679] in part or even on the whole.29 At the same time, as courts seek to encourage appellants to prune their grounds of appeal, where possible, they are disinclined to mulct them in costs for reasonably abandoning grounds of appeal.30

Offers of settlement 20.7 The making of a settlement offer by a party that proves ultimately more

favourable than the result of the litigation for the opponent, whether on appeal or on a re-trial, may impact upon the court’s discretion. This impact is discussed in the context of settlement offers generally.31

Success on a point not argued or evidence not presented before a lower court 20.8 An appellate court may properly depart from the usual costs order where the successful party succeeds on a point not argued,32 or evidence not presented,33 before a lower court. The Victorian Supreme Court has, for instance, remarked that ‘where in a County Court appeal the case is decided on a point which has, for the first time, been noticed in this Court, the rule generally prevailing will be that no costs will be allowed’.34 The appellate court may allow no costs of either the proceedings below or of the appeal ‘because the ground upon which we decide the case does not appear to have been presented to the learned primary judge’.35 It may even go so far as to order a successful party to pay costs. In Miller v Miller,36 for example, the High Court ordered the successful appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal where the success had been on a ground added only with the court’s leave when the appeal hearing commenced.

Appeal upheld but no change in determination 20.9 Where an appellant succeeds on a question of law, upon which the appellate court opts to re-exercise the trial judge’s discretion, but the outcome of that re-exercise of discretion is that the trial judge’s orders are neither varied nor disturbed, the court may make no order as to costs of the appeal, or even order the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.37 [page 680]

Appeals raising issues of public interest 20.10 A court may, where an appeal that proves unsuccessful is brought to

vindicate rights beyond merely those of the appellant, or otherwise serves to clarify an area of law for the benefit of others, make no order as to costs or otherwise reduce the quantum of costs ordered against the unsuccessful litigant. The principles here align with those applicable to costs in public interest litigation at first instance,38 although it cannot be assumed, in litigation of this kind, that an order that each party bears its own costs at trial will be replicated should the appellant fail on appeal.39 Certainly, any notion that so-called ‘public interest litigation’ attracts an immunity from adverse costs orders, whether at first instance or on appeal, is one dispelled by the case law.40 The identity of the parties and the forum in which the matter is heard may be relevant inquiries for this purpose. If, say, a government agency successfully appeals against a decision of a tribunal favouring an individual, the court may make no order as to the costs of the appeal if the matter is of wider concern than the individual’s personal circumstances, especially where, as is usually so, no costs order is (or can be) made by the tribunal.41

Ouster by statute 20.11 Statute may prescribe that each party to an appeal must bear its own costs of the appeal. Family law appeals present a typical example, where statute adopts the presumption that each party to proceedings, which include appeals,42 under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) is to bear its own costs unless the court considers that another order is just in the circumstances.43 The circumstances that inform the court’s discretion to order costs at first instance44 likewise inform the discretion on appeal, although the parties’ relative level of success may carry greater weight on appeal than at first instance given that there has already been a judicial determination of the dispute.45 The latter dictates, also in other arenas where statute prescribes a ‘no costs’ prima facie rule, that the rationale for the ‘no costs’ rule will likely carry less weight on appeal.46 [page 681]

Costs at first instance 20.12 In the ordinary course of events, a successful appellant is awarded costs in both the appellate court and the court below47 (often expressed as an order for ‘costs here and below’).48 The reason is that, when an appeal is allowed and the trial judge’s costs order is reversed, ‘it is usually demonstrable that the party in the court below should have won, and that the order for costs should therefore have been in his favour’.49 In such a case it is ordinarily just for interest on those costs to run from the date of the first judgment,50 although this depends upon the applicable statute in the jurisdiction in question.51 However, not all successful appellants receive an order for ‘costs here and below’. Consistent with the nature of the costs discretion, informed as it is by considerations of justice, there may be occasions that justify less than a full award of costs in this context. For example, an appellant who fails on several issues that were contested at the trial but not challenged in the appeal, which were not trivial or insubstantial, may be denied the costs of the trial.52 There may also be grounds to modify the usual order if the appellant’s submissions on appeal in relation to the basis on which the appeal succeeded differed from those submissions put at trial,53 or if the evidence reveals that the trial costs have been unnecessarily increased by the (ultimately successful) appellants’ conduct of the trial.54 The Northern Territory, Victorian and Western Australian rules state that where on an appeal the court makes an order regarding the costs of a proceeding before any other court, it may specify the amount of the costs to be allowed, order that the costs be taxed, or make orders for their ascertainment by taxation or otherwise in that other court.55 Similar provision is made by the Family Law Rules, except that they empower the court to specify, in addition to the amount of costs allowed, that the whole or part of those costs is to be calculated in accordance with the rules or the rules of the other court.56 In New South Wales, for the purposes of the court’s costs discretion, ‘costs’ is statutorily defined to include, in the case of an appeal to the court, the costs of the proceedings giving rise to the appeal.57 [page 682]

Application for stay of costs order pending appeal 20.13 Courts, it is said, ‘should not be disposed to delay the enforcement of court orders’.58 That a party unsuccessful at first instance intends to appeal is, accordingly, no ground by itself to stay a costs order.59 Nor is the fact that immediate compliance with the costs order is inconvenient.60 As a starting point, prima facie, a successful party is entitled to the benefit of the judgment and to proceed on the basis that the judgment is correct.61 A costs order may, however, be stayed pending appeal where the court is satisfied that: first, there would be no reasonable probability, were the costs paid, of getting them back should the appeal succeed; and second, there are reasonably arguable grounds of appeal.62 Yet these should not be viewed as unyielding prerequisites to a successful stay application, but as part of the relevant inquiry into the fairness or otherwise of granting a stay.63 To the extent that they suggest a need for proof of special or exceptional circumstances, they are misleading64 (except in Western Australia, where statute requires proof of ‘special circumstances’).65 Nor should they be seen as exhaustive of the relevant considerations; for instance, undue delay in applying for a stay may itself operate to prejudice the applicant.66 The position differs, though, where a new trial or re-hearing of the matter is ordered on appeal; here the court commonly orders that the costs of the appeal be stayed pending the outcome of the new trial or re-hearing.67

Costs payable out of an estate or fund General approach 20.14 In cases involving a dispute concerning the allocation, distribution or ownership of an estate or fund, the courts have, for costs purposes, repeatedly noted the distinction between an [page 683] initial test on the merits and a second attempt by way of appeal. A leading statement is that of Thomas J in Re McIntyre:68

It is … essential that a distinction should be maintained in the approach to costs at first instance and on appeal. Applicants and their advisers should not think that they can bring appeals confident in the knowledge that the estate will in all probability be obliged to pay for the exercise. What I have called the indulgent attitude of judges of first instance to unsuccessful applicants has no place in the appeal process. A litigant has a right under the rules of court to test a judgment by bringing an appeal, but he has no similar right to do so at the expense of the other party or estate.

Though principally highlighted by applications in respect of trust funds and wills,69 the above approach is by no means so limited in its scope, but may apply more generally to instances involving funds over which there are multiple claimants. In a dispute over property on the breakdown of a de facto relationship,70 for instance, where no order for costs was made at first instance, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Kardos v Sarbutt (No 2) ordered against the unsuccessful respondent on appeal, reasoning as follows:71 The considerations that support the view that no order for costs will often be appropriate at first instance, apply much less forcefully in the context of an appeal. An unsuccessful appeal will almost always justify a costs order following the event. And although the position is less clear cut in the case of a successful appeal, still it will often be appropriate to make a costs order following the event. One reason for this is that it is often easier to detect ‘substantial success’ on an appeal. Appellate proceedings are not, as first instance proceedings are, an incident of the breakdown of the relationship without attributable fault. An appeal is a further proceeding, challenging by the inappropriate order made at trial, which an appellant is compelled to prosecute to achieve an ultimately just result, and in respect of which it was open to the respondent to make an offer of compromise if so advised.

Another example, in an unrelated scenario, is found in Sheehy v Mitchell Crane Hire Pty Ltd,72 where in the context of a workers’ compensation appeal involving a statutory scheme, Higgins J noted that ‘[i]t is one thing to expect the publicly exacted premium pools to bear the ordinary costs of applications for and to terminate awards’, but ‘[i]t is another matter when the costs of appeals from an initial decision fall to be considered’. On the facts, the appellant employee had almost entirely succeeded, but his Honour remarked that even had this not been so, because important issues of principle potentially affecting many claims fell to be decided on the appeal, it was the type of case in which a departure, in whole or in part, from the prima facie rule that an unsuccessful appellant should pay the costs of the appeal would have been justified.73

Costs of beneficiaries as appellants

20.15 Consistent with the foregoing, while a beneficiary unsuccessfully contesting a will may not necessarily be deprived of costs out of the estate at first instance, the reverse is the prima facie position if that beneficiary unsuccessfully appeals.74 The same applies in respect of family provision applications.75 Yet this general rule cannot fetter the court’s discretion. [page 684] If the court finds sufficient cause for bringing the appeal existed, such as where the judgment below was ambiguous, it may relieve an unsuccessful appellant of the obligation to pay the costs of the other parties.76 It may even allow an unsuccessful appellant costs out of the estate. This occurred in Fowler v Nield,77 where the ultimately successful respondent sought variations of orders on the hearing of the appeal. What led Walsh J to allow the appellant costs from the estate was that, as to what the variations should be — which were of difficulty and importance, the debate upon them occupying considerable time — the appellant’s view prevailed.78 Where the litigants have been only partially successful, each may be ordered to bear his or her own costs.79

Costs of personal representatives as appellants 20.16 Aside from special circumstances, personal representatives (and trustees) who appeal unsuccessfully suffer the usual consequences and pay the costs of the appeal.80 Judicially described as ‘a rule of very long standing’, it is said that, although personal representatives are entitled to their costs out of the estate of getting the court’s determination in cases of difficulty, ‘they appeal at their own risk’; otherwise ‘estates would very frequently be frittered away in costs’.81 In determining whether or not to apply the general rule, the court will seek to ascertain whether the appeal was justified. An appeal unsupported by legal advice, which proves unsuccessful, hardly justifies an award of costs in the appellant’s favour. So where, as in Re Bubnich,82 the appeal was, in the court’s opinion, ‘quite unjustified and a waste of time’, the personal representative will be ordered to pay the costs of the appeal personally.

The converse may be so if, due to the differing views of the judges below in respect of a substantive matter of importance to the administration of the estate or of estates generally, the personal representative acts reasonably and in the interests of the beneficiaries in appealing the lower court decision. In such a case the court may, in the event that the personal representative proves unsuccessful, nonetheless allow him or her costs out of the estate.83 Ultimately, a personal representative who, having received legal advice, remains genuinely uncertain as to whether or not to appeal may be advised to seek the advice of the court.84 20.17 Importantly, where a personal representative (or trustee) is ordered to pay his or her own costs of the appeal, or to pay the costs of other parties, prima facie those costs fall outside [page 685] the personal representative’s right of indemnity out of property forming the estate.85 The reason is that the court’s ruling is tantamount to saying that the costs were not properly incurred, the latter principle governing the parameters of those costs covered by the right of indemnity.

Costs of personal representatives as respondents 20.18 The general rule may be otherwise where the personal representative (or trustee) succeeded at first instance, but which decision is reversed on appeal. The logic is that, given the personal representative’s success at first instance, not to defend the proceedings on an appeal and instead concede the point is inconsistent with the duty as personal representative to uphold the will. So merely because in such a case the appeal is decided against the personal representative is no ground to deny him or her costs out of the estate in respect of the proceedings.86 The point is illustrated by the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Geffen v Goodman Estate.87 It involved an allegation of undue influence against the trustees of a testamentary trust. Although rejected at first instance, the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the allegation, ruling, by a majority, that its

finding that the trustees’ conduct in securing the trust was wanting dictated that they should be denied costs out of the estate, noting that the trustees ‘were defending an interest which they had been instrumental in creating for the benefit of persons nominated by them’.88 Hetherington JA dissented, finding that the trustees had acted reasonably and properly in defending the appeal. As the trustees had succeeded at first instance, they would have been acting unreasonably had they failed to respond to the appeal,89 notwithstanding the fact that one of the trustees was also a beneficiary, and so may have had a personal interest in the matter. As such, the trustees were entitled to recover from the trust property all reasonable costs incurred by them. The minority view found favour in the Supreme Court, which was clearly influenced, at least in part, by the fact that the trustees had succeeded at first instance.90

Costs of Aborted Trial General rule 20.19 Where a trial is aborted, and the court orders a new trial, it will not ordinarily make an order for the costs of the aborted trial at that stage because it does not yet know the final outcome of the dispute. The court that ultimately gives judgment in the matter retains an unfettered discretion to award costs for both the aborted and the new trial.91 In that court, the general prima facie rule is that the costs of abortive first trial abide the result of the new trial, to be paid by the party who is eventually unsuccessful (essentially ‘costs in the cause’).92 This [page 686] outcome is consistent with the basic costs indemnity rule.93 However, as with any general rule that guides the exercise of an unfettered discretion, it is no more than a rule of practice, subject to variation according to the circumstances of each case.94 To this end, the courts have supplied guidance as to circumstances in which it may be appropriate to oust the usual costs order.

20.20 Principally, the court considers the reason why the first trial was aborted, and specifically whether this can in any way be attributed to the fault of either party. An award of the costs of a mistrial is not made by way of punishment, but is an application of the principle that costs thrown away should be borne by the party responsible.95 If a trial proves abortive for a reason beyond the control of the parties and not due to their fault, courts generally view this as an accident of litigation of which litigants run the risk until the matter is decided.96 The fairest way of dealing with the costs of an aborted trial in these circumstances is, in the usual case, to cast upon the ultimate loser the liability to meet the costs of the aborted trial. Particularly where a trial is by jury, the parties are taken to assume the risk that a second trial may become necessary even if it would not have been within their contemplation that a jury should be discharged for the precise reason it was, it being within their contemplation that, in an action tried before a jury, there might be a new trial for a variety of reasons.97 Electrolytic Zinc Co of Australasia Ltd v Cieslak98 illustrates the point. The plaintiff sued his employer for injuries sustained whilst working at its mine. The employer admitted liability and the action was tried with a jury on the issue of damages only. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff on the verdict, from which the employer appealed to the Full Court, which ordered a new trial on the issue of damages and reserved the question of costs of the proceedings up to that point for further consideration. The Tasmanian Full Supreme Court, following a review of Australian and English case law, held that as the first trial proved abortive through no fault of either party, its costs should follow the event of the second trial. 20.21 Other examples of cases where the courts have ordered the costs of the first trial be costs in the cause include where a new trial was ordered because the jury’s findings in the first trial were unreasonable due to bias99 or the disagreement of the jury,100 where on appeal from a decision non-suiting a plaintiff a new trial was ordered,101 and where a new trial was ordered because of misdirection or some error by the trial judge.102 [page 687]

Ouster of general rule 20.22 The so-called general rule, it has been judicially remarked, ‘may press very harshly in some cases’,103 and for this reason the court exercises a discretion grounded in fostering a just outcome. Thus some order other than costs of the first trial following the event of the second may, where the justice of the case requires it, be made.104 Given that this order ousts the general prima facie rule, the court will make it only in cases where the circumstances are ‘special’ or ‘unusual’, although this should not be taken to mean that special or unusual cases admit of closed categories or that the court’s discretion is otherwise fettered.105 The court, to this end, focuses principally on the litigants’ conduct in respect of the first trial.106 In this context, it is open to the court to make the usual order that the costs of the first trial abide the result of the re-trial, but make allowance for special circumstances emerging at the re-trial that may make some other order appropriate.107

Conduct of a litigant causing first trial to be aborted 20.23 The court may inquire into whether the first trial was aborted due to the fault of one of the litigants. The concern is that it would be unjust to burden a litigant who loses in the second trial with costs of the first trial wasted because the party ultimately successful caused the first trial to abort.108 The inappropriateness of the conduct may itself justify an adverse costs order, as in Parker v Falkiner,109 where the trial was rendered abortive due to the defendant’s attempt to influence a prospective juror, and in Taylor v Edwards,110 where unjustified statements by plaintiff’s counsel to the jury in his opening and closing addresses prompted the trial judge to discharge the jury and order costs against the plaintiff. 20.24 Yet proof of actual misconduct by a litigant (or his or her lawyer) in respect of the first trial is not a prerequisite for the court to deprive him or her of the costs of that trial.111 Conduct that leads the trial judge into error may be sufficient. In Oswald v Australian Steamships Ltd,112 for instance, the defendant induced the trial judge to take a view of the law that led to the question of negligence being left undetermined, to which the jury’s answer might have concluded the case. According to A’Beckett J, whatever the result of the second trial, the defendant should pay the costs of the first trial. In the same vein, Hoare J in Brown v Mahony113 remarked that where a new trial is

granted because of the wrongful admission of evidence despite clear objection taken at the first trial,114 the party who led the inadmissible evidence [page 688] should pay the costs of the first (aborted) trial. And in G & J Shopfittings & Refrigeration Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lombard Insurance Company (Aust) Ltd,115 where the defendant’s application to the court, designed to secure a tactical advantage, led to discharge of the jury on day 11 of the trial, the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the application had caused the trial judge to err on the facts. Kirby P, with whom Hope and Meagher JJA concurred, ruled that, although the defendant was not thereby responsible for the error, as the appellant (who was the plaintiff at first instance) ‘is entirely innocent of the cause of the termination of the trial’, the ‘balance of fairness’ justified that, if successful, the appellant should secure an order that all his costs be paid, and if unsuccessful, he would have to pay only the respondent’s (defendant’s) costs of the second trial.116

Alternative order: each party bear own costs of first trial 20.25 A court may, in its discretion, order that each party bear its own costs of the aborted trial where it considers this to be consistent with the justice of the case. It should not be assumed that merely because a trial is aborted that its costs should abide the event. Nor should it be assumed that in each such case the court always attributes fault to one of the parties for the trial having been aborted. The trial may have aborted for reasons beyond the control or responsibility of either party.117 For example, in Tasker v Algar and Algar118 a new trial was rendered necessary by the death of the judge before delivering judgment. Even though the plaintiff succeeded on the second trial, Myers CJ made no order as to the costs of the first trial. His Honour reasoned that although ‘the disagreement of a jury and the consequent necessity for a second trial are matters which are always within the contemplation of the parties in every case which goes to a jury … [t]he death of a Judge in circumstances like the present seems to me to stand on a different footing and

to require special consideration’.119 Cases that involve the death of the trial judge are in some jurisdictions now, in any event, covered by the suitors’ fund legislation.120 20.26 The case law reveals examples where a trial was aborted because the jury could not agree, leading the trial judge to discharge the jury on his or her own motion, and the party ultimately successful is held not entitled to the costs of the first trial.121 These cases seem to be at variance with case law cited earlier to the effect that the failure of a jury to agree is a risk litigants must take,122 and might be explained on the ground that it was at the instance of the [page 689] trial judge, not the parties, that a new trial was rendered necessary.123 In any event, this case law, where it appears that the trial was aborted due to an error of the trial judge, must be read subject to the applicable suitors’ fund legislation.124 20.27 It may be appropriate to order each party to bear its own costs of the aborted trial where both are responsible for the trial being aborted. A leading case is Cutts v Buckley,125 where after an appeal to the Full Court, the High Court set aside a general verdict for damages given by a jury upon the plaintiff’s declaration in two counts, one for fraudulent misrepresentation and the other for breach of warranty. The measure of damages was not necessarily the same under each count. The High Court held that since there was no evidence of a warranty, and as the evidence did not support each count, the general verdict could not stand, and therefore ordered a new trial. On the issue of costs Rich and Starke JJ were of the opinion that ‘[t]he trial proved abortive through the failure of all parties to insist that the legal issues be dealt with as the law requires’.126 As each party was at fault in different respects, their Honours exercised their discretion by ordering each to pay their own costs of the first trial and the first appeal.127

Appeal on Issue of Costs

Review of discretionary decisions generally 20.28 Where an appellate court is requested to review a lower court’s exercise of an unfettered discretion, the appeal can only succeed on those grounds usually ascribed to House v R, namely:128 It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in

[page 690] the court at first instance. In such a case, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.

Expressed another way, where there is a decision involving discretionary judgment, an appellate tribunal will adopt a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision appealed from, which it will affirm unless satisfied that it is clearly wrong.129 A mere difference of opinion between the trial judge and the appellate tribunal is insufficient to oust the presumption, for ‘it would be wrong to determine the parties’ rights by reference to a mere preference for a different result over that favoured by the judge at first instance, in the absence of error on his part’.130 An appellate court is not entitled to substitute its own decision for that the subject of the appeal only because it prefers a different result or thinks a different result would be more just and equitable.131 As such, it has been said that ‘it is not for an appellate court even to consider whether it would have exercised the discretion differently unless it has first reached the conclusion that the judge’s exercise of his discretion is flawed’.132 As can be gleaned from the above extract, a degree of satisfaction sufficient to overcome the weight of the presumption may exist where there has been an error arising from acting upon a wrong principle, giving weight to irrelevant matters, failing to give (sufficient) weight to relevant

considerations, or making a mistake as to the facts.133 So an appellate court may interfere with a trial judge’s discretion on grounds other than grounds of law if it perceives that on such other grounds the decision will perpetuate an injustice.134 The question of injustice flowing from the order appealed from will therefore ordinarily be a relevant and necessary consideration.135

Review of discretionary decisions as to costs 20.29 The foregoing highlights a material difference between an appeal in respect of the exercise of a discretion on a final or interlocutory matter of practice or procedure, such as the issue of costs, and the exercise of discretion that determines substantive rights.136 Specifically, appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with decisions of primary judges on matters of practice and procedure that determine no substantive rights of the parties.137 Otherwise ‘[t]he disposal of cases could be delayed interminably, and costs heaped up indefinitely if a litigant with a [page 691] long purse or a litigious disposition, could, at will, in effect, transfer all exercise of discretion in interlocutory application from a judge in chambers to a court of appeal’.138

Reluctance of appellate tribunal to review 20.30 Where, as is usually the case, the order as to costs represents an exercise of a court’s discretion,139 an appeal against it can only succeed on those grounds usually ascribed to House v R,140 noted above.141 An appellate court will not as a result readily or lightly disturb the costs order of the trial judge,142 to whom is available a ‘generous margin of discretion’,143 but will presume that the discretion was exercised properly.144 This attitude can be explained, in part, from the trial judge’s greater familiarity with and better understanding of the facts involved and of the manner in which the trial was conducted.145

Grounds for review 20.31 There are settled principles on which an award of costs may be expected to proceed,146 and certain acknowledged considerations, albeit rather narrowly defined,147 that may justify appellate interference with a costs order. So while an appellate court will not normally interfere with a trial judge’s exercise of discretion except on grounds of law — such as where it finds the judge acted on a wrong principle, or failed to take into account some relevant matter or took into account some irrelevant matter — if it sees that on other grounds the decision will result in injustice being done, it has both the power and the duty to remedy it.148 This means that if the trial judge’s order is plainly unjust, or his or her discretion exercised on the wrong principle(s), the appellate tribunal is justified in interfering. This principle finds statutory expression in Tasmania.149 [page 692] 20.32 The foregoing does not mean that an appellate tribunal must alter the trial judge’s order if it finds that he or she has made an error in making it. If, notwithstanding the error, the order is sound, and the result fair and properly reflective of the litigation, such that the appellate court would have come to the same conclusion were it to re-exercise the discretion, the appellate court will not interfere with the order.150 Even if the appellate court has niggling concerns regarding the trial judge’s costs order, in the absence of ‘clear, palpable, and overriding error’ by the trial judge it is unlikely to interfere with it.151 It is thus normally necessary for a claimant to show something more than that the appeal court would, in exercising its discretion afresh, have come to a conclusion, including a conclusion as to quantum, different from that of the trial judge.152 As explained by Viscount Simon LC in Charles Osenton and Co v Johnston:153 The appellate tribunal is not at liberty merely to substitute its own exercise of discretion for the discretion already exercised by the judge. In other words, appellate authorities ought not to reverse the order merely because they would themselves have exercised the original discretion, had it attached to them, in a different way. But if the appellate tribunal reaches the clear conclusion that there has been a wrongful exercise of discretion in that no weight, or no sufficient weight, has been given to relevant considerations such as those urged before us by the appellant, then the reversal of the order may be justified.

So to take the case out of the ordinary situation in which, wherever a discretion is to be exercised, minds may differ on the result, the appellate court must discover some error of principle in the exercise of the trial judge’s discretion, a consideration of irrelevant matters or some other manifest mistake.154 Examples of circumstances where this may be so include where the trial judge lacked the jurisdiction to make an award of costs,155 took the mistaken view that he or she had no discretion as to costs,156 made an order contrary to an established rule of law or practice without justification,157 applied a rule of law or practice without giving proper consideration to the exercise of the discretion,158 took into account a matter unrelated to the institution or conduct of the suit,159 or made the order as a result of a misapprehension of the facts.160 [page 693]

Relevance of trial judge’s reasons 20.33 As is not essential for a trial judge to specify the circumstances that justify making a costs order, a lack of reasons does not of itself indicate that a judge has erroneously exercised the costs discretion.161 The reason for the trial judge’s order may, for instance, be obvious from the circumstances of the case as found by the judge. Hence that costs are ordered in favour of the successful party, without any express statement of reasons for so doing, does not ordinarily create an appealable error. In other cases, especially where a judge departs from the usual order, aside from a clear explanation in the course of argument by the judge for this outcome,162 a lack of (sufficient) reasons will require an appellate court to determine whether the discretion was erroneously exercised.163 As explained by the English Court of Appeal:164 Where no express explanation is given for a costs order, an appellate court will approach the material facts on the assumption that the judge will have had a good reason for the award made. The appellate court will seldom be as well placed as the trial judge to exercise a discretion in relation to costs. Where it is apparent that there is a perfectly rational explanation for the order made, the court is likely to draw the inference that this is what motivated the judge in making the order … Thus, in practice, it is only in those cases where an order for costs is made with neither reasons nor any obvious explanation for the order that it is likely to be appropriate to give permission to appeal on the ground of lack of reasons against an order that relates only to costs.

Yet more generally a concern is that, without the articulation of reasons, a judicial decision appears arbitrary,165 as the giving of reasons is ‘an incident of the judicial process’.166 Good practice thus dictates that a trial judge state his or her reasoning so far as the costs order is concerned because an exercise of discretion will be upheld if it appears to the appellate court that there are reasons on which the judge could rely.167

Statute requiring leave to appeal on costs 20.34 Statute in all jurisdictions except the Federal Court and the territories requires judicial leave for an appeal as to costs. In propounding this requirement, the respective legislatures sought to protect the court from vexation by cases that, on their face, need something more to warrant appellate review. As costs orders usually involve discretionary considerations, this requirement evidences a concern that they should not become a vehicle for re-litigating the substantive issues of the trial.168 It recognises that an appellate court is unlikely to be as well positioned as the trial judge in making an assessment of matters going to costs.169 This is especially so where the costs order is one that is unusual, such as an indemnity costs order, which an appellate court cannot properly review without a detailed understanding of the issues in the trial and an appreciation of how the case was conducted at trial.170 [page 694] The foregoing explains judicial remarks to the effect that the leave requirement ‘reflects Parliament’s clear intent that appeals of this kind … should be exceptional’,171 so that only ‘exceptional circumstances’ warrant leave to appeal.172 Remarks of this kind are not intended to place a gloss on the statutory language, in which the word ‘exceptional’ does not appear, but to highlight that, in view of the obvious parliamentary intention, courts will not be too readily inclined to grant leave. Otherwise, it could risk encouraging unwarranted delay in the final resolution of litigation, the incurring of costs disproportionate to the value of the original subject matter of the litigation, and the unjustified generation of other public and private

costs.173 The applicant for leave must, to this end, show both that the order is wrong or at least attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal, and that the applicant would suffer substantial injustice were the order allowed to stand.174 20.35 There are three main issues that must be addressed in this context. First, the court conferred the power to grant leave varies between jurisdictions; in some jurisdictions it is the trial judge and in others the appellate court. Second, the issue arises as to which appeals are subject to a leave requirement. Most jurisdictions speak in terms of appeals ‘only as to costs’ as mandating leave, and so what amounts to an appeal ‘only as to costs’ must be determined. Third, the courts have recognised circumstances in which an appellate court may entertain an appeal as to costs without the leave of the trial judge or lower court, notwithstanding apparently contrary statutory provisions. These circumstances must be identified and assessed. Each of these issues is addressed in turn below.

In whom is the leave requirement vested? 20.36 In Tasmania and Western Australia, and in the High Court, statute provides that no order made by a judge as to costs only which by law are left to the discretion of the judge175 is subject to appeal other than by leave of the judge making the order.176 In Queensland, an appeal only in relation to costs lies to the Court of Appeal from a judgment or order of the Supreme Court or District Court only by leave of the judge who gave the judgment or made the order or, if that judge is not available, another judge in that court.177 The rationale is that the judge who has the responsibility of hearing the proceedings is best positioned to determine the incidence of costs.178 If a party does not obtain leave to appeal the [page 695] costs order, the appeal on the issue of costs alone is incompetent.179 A Queensland court has said that a trial judge who is asked for leave to appeal ‘should not be defensive about the orders made or overly reluctant to give

leave’, at the same time saying that ‘leave should not be given unless there is an arguable case that … the discretion will be overturned on appeal’.180 To this end, whether or not leave should be granted will usually depend on the trial judge’s view as to the balance of competing arguments, specifically whether those arguments relate to matters of legal principle or disputed questions of fact, their importance and difficulty, and, on occasion, the amount of money involved.181 As explained by Dowsett J in Grundmann v Georgeson:182 Leave to appeal against an order as to costs is not given as a matter of course. A trial Judge, when asked to grant such leave, should not be expected to accede to such a request simply because his or her own order is to be attacked. Leave should not be given unless the applicant demonstrates that there is a cogent argument against the order. It will not usually be enough to assert dissatisfaction or the Judge may not have correctly applied a well-established principle.

Leave is also required in New South Wales, but it is leave of the Court of Appeal.183 Similarly, in South Australia the leave is that of the court to which the appeal is directed.184 In Victoria leave may be given either by the trial judge or the appellate court.185 In line with the approach adopted by Queensland judges above, the South Australian Supreme Court has remarked that to obtain leave to appeal usually requires ‘an important question of principle requiring resolution to be identified’.186 And more than once appellate judges have noted that a court will be slow to grant leave in respect of an appeal restricted to a challenge to an order for costs,187 although this is informed, as foreshadowed above, also by the quantum of costs in issue.188 But ultimately an appellate court will not grant leave merely because it forms the view that the trial judge erred in some way in exercising the costs discretion, unless the error(s) materially affected the correctness of the costs orders made.189

Appeals as to costs subject to the leave requirement 20.37 Other than in Victoria,190 the legislation imposes the leave requirement in respect of appeals ‘as to costs only’.191 Where an appellant lodges an appeal on the sole ground that the [page 696]

trial judge has erred in respect of the costs order, leave is clearly required.192 This includes cases involving a decision by a judge on the review of a taxation of costs, as such is ‘a decision … with respect to costs which are in the discretion of the Court’ under the legislation193 (although this must be qualified in Queensland, where the statute omits ‘which are in the discretion of the Court’).194 Conversely, leave is not required if there are other substantive grounds in the appeal — even though the appeal as to costs is a discrete ground in itself — for such an appeal is not an appeal ‘as to costs only’.195 An appeal as to whether a taxing officer or judge had the jurisdiction to (dis)allow the item in question falls outside the leave requirement, as it does not go to discretion. The same may be said of scenarios involving an appeal over whether a trustee, executor or liquidator is deprived of an indemnity for costs out of the relevant fund, not only because the focus is on the indemnity (as opposed to the costs order per se) but also because a person holding that office would ordinarily be entitled to the indemnity. The latter feature dictates that the judge’s decision is not one as to costs in the discretion of the court.196 Nor is an order staying, or refusing a stay of, a costs order in substance an order ‘as to costs only’ for this purpose.197 20.38 An issue that has challenged the courts here is whether, if the appeal on the merits is rejected, this renders any appeal as to costs as one ‘as to costs only’. If this is so, whether an appeal is ‘as to costs only’ is determined not at the commencement of the appeal but only once its merits have been decided. If the appeal on the merits proves successful, only then is the appeal as to costs not one ‘as to costs only’.198 A line of English authority is against such a proposition,199 culminating in Wheeler v Somerfield,200 which supports the view that where an appeal against costs is part of a wider appeal, an appellate court has jurisdiction to determine the appeal against costs without leave of the trial judge, even if it rejects the appeal against substantive aspects of the judgment. In Wheeler the plaintiff appealed against two rulings made by the trial judge during the course of the trial, and as to the order for costs. The English Court of Appeal rejected the appeals against the rulings but allowed the costs appeal. Harman LJ expressed his understanding of the then equivalent English legislation201 as follows:202 It cannot be right to say that the question of jurisdiction to deal with the costs depends on whether the appellant succeeds on some other issue in the action. Suppose he appeals on six points and he fails on five of them and there remains the sixth point, which is an appeal against

the order as to costs. If the points he has taken are genuine points, he can at the end appeal on the costs issue although his opponent has knocked out his other points one by one. If, of course, his appeal is as to the costs only, or if the court should be satisfied that that is all he really intended to appeal about and has put in the other issues as a kind of ‘smoke screen’, it may be that the court will refuse to entertain the real object of the appeal, which is in truth against the order as to costs only. If there

[page 697] is a genuine appeal of substance, the fact that it fails does not make it impossible for the court to go on and deal with the costs, provided of course that they are discretionary costs.

There is some support in Australian (principally New South Wales) courts for such an approach203 but the bulk of the case law goes the other way,204 although more often than not the judicial statements do little to explain what is problematic with Wheeler v Somerfield, preferring instead simply to rely upon precedent to the contrary. Although the ostensibly prevailing Australian approach can be supported from the wording of the relevant legislation,205 it is perhaps better supported for reasons of practicality and principle. Practicality-wise, it avoids a court investigating whether the appellant’s complaint concerning matters on the merits is in fact genuine. Principle-wise, for a court that has rejected an appeal on the merits to entertain altering the earlier costs order would seem not only an unlikely outcome but one also inconsistent with the tenor of the statutory leave requirement. Having said that, however, it is possible to envisage exceptional circumstances where, although the appeal has been dismissed, the appellate court may otherwise have been able to find error in the trial judge’s exercise of the costs discretion, and it is for this reason that the courts have recognised a jurisdiction to interfere with such an order notwithstanding the lack of special leave.206 20.39 In Victoria, appeals from all costs orders, whether or not the appeal is as to costs only, now require special leave,207 which serves to avoids the confusion noted above in the authorities. In Etna v Arif Batt JA explained the point as follows:208 [T]he current of authority is to the effect that leave is required to appeal against an order as to costs even though the appeal relates also to the merits, at any rate where … the challenge to the order as to costs goes beyond the mere consequence of success of an appeal on the merits. This does not, of course, derogate from the rule, applied almost daily, that leave is not necessary in order for the costs order below to be set aside when an appeal on the merits succeeds.

Re-exercising the discretion in the absence of leave 20.40 A strict reading of the relevant statutory provisions in Tasmania and Western Australia, and in respect of the High Court, premising as they do an appeal as to costs only upon leave of the judge who made the costs order, appears to oust the jurisdiction of an appellate court to assess whether or not the costs order was correct. The position is altered by statute [page 698] in Queensland, which states that if, after an appeal to the Court of Appeal is properly started, it becomes an appeal only in relation to the costs of the original proceeding, the appeal may be heard and determined only by leave of the Court of Appeal.209 No such issue arises in New South Wales, South Australia or Victoria, where the appellate court is conferred the power to grant leave, nor does it arise in the territories or at Federal Court level, which prescribe no special leave requirement. 20.41 Two points must be noted in this respect. First, the Tasmanian legislation is more extensive than its counterparts because it specifically provides that, as an alternative to securing leave from the trial judge, an appellate court may entertain an appeal ‘as to costs only’ in cases where the trial judge has declined or failed to exercise the discretion, or has proceeded on a wrong principle or otherwise contrary to law, or on irrelevant or insufficient materials, or has failed to consider any material fact.210 Second, the statutory prohibition on appealing solely as to costs without leave of the trial judge may be subject to a qualification in ‘exceptional cases’.211 Griffiths LJ explained what represent exceptional cases as follows:212 When a judge has refused leave to appeal from his order as to costs, the powers of the Court of Appeal to entertain an appeal against his order are extremely limited. Either it must be shown that the judge failed to exercise his discretion at all or alternatively, that in exercising his discretion he took account some wholly extraneous circumstance unconnected with the subject matter of the action, which is to be regarded as tantamount to a failure to exercise a judicial discretion …

To this end, there is authority, predominantly English, that an appellate court will, without leave being granted, allow a review of the trial judge’s discretion on costs if it finds that the trial judge proceeded on an erroneous

principle,213 did not exercise a judicial discretion,214 did not have before him or her materials upon which he or she could exercise a discretion in regard to costs,215 or took into consideration wholly extraneous and irrelevant matters (for instance, by being influenced by factors unconnected with the litigation).216 Yet to the extent that the foregoing may indeed be equatable to the matters that appellate courts refer to in respect of costs appeals, irrespective of any leave requirement, it must be queried what role that requirement plays. King CJ provided insight into this point in Copping v ANZ McCaughan Ltd217 by opining that an error of law of itself does not confer a right of appeal without leave unless it is ‘of such a kind as to enable the appellate court to say that there was no jurisdiction to make the order or that the discretion has not been exercised’. [page 699] 20.42 Several of the cases where an appellate court has interfered without leave have involved a costs order against a successful party, or one disentitling a successful party to costs, which order is then appealed.218 The proper exercise of judicial discretion as to costs requires that it should not be exercised against the successful party except for some reason connected with the case.219 The following illustration highlights the issue in this context:220 [I]f — to put a hypothesis which in our courts would never in fact be realised — a judge were to refuse to give a party his costs on the ground of some misconduct wholly unconnected with the cause of action or of some prejudice due to his race or religion or … to the colour of his hair, then a Court of Appeal might well feel itself compelled to intervene.

For example, in F King & Co v Gillard & Co,221 where a successful defendant, whom the trial judge had deprived of costs on the ground that he had been guilty of a misrepresentation to the public, was held entitled to appeal that costs order without leave of the trial judge because the issue of misrepresentation was not connected with the issue between himself and the plaintiffs. Where, conversely, the trial judge exercised his or her discretion against the successful party on grounds clearly connected with the case, the appellate court will not entertain an appeal from the judge’s order without leave, even though it ‘might regard his reasons as insufficient and might disagree with his conclusion’.222

20.43 Consistent with the above, an appellate court will not lightly assume that a judge has made a costs order that departs from the general rule on extraneous grounds or without relevant grounds. A party who seeks to appeal from such an order without leave therefore carries the burden of showing that no relevant grounds for the order exist, or that the judge in fact acted on extraneous grounds. If there is such a relevant ground, namely a ground connected with the case,223 and the judge exercised, or appears to have exercised, his or her discretion judicially upon it, an appellate court will not review that discretion or interfere with the order merely because it disagrees with the weight attributed to that ground or would have exercised the discretion differently.224 The remarks of Jenkins LJ in Baylis Baxter Ltd v Sabath are apposite in this context:225 [I]t is a wrong method of approach to begin by criticising the order made by the judge on the ground that it was not a proper exercise of the discretion, and, founding oneself on that, to go on to say that, because the mode in which discretion was exercised is open to criticism, therefore the case is one in which an appeal will lie without the leave of the judge notwithstanding the clear injunction to the contrary contained in the section.

Exercising the discretion where leave granted or not required 20.44 Where, in those jurisdictions where leave is required, the trial judge has granted leave to appeal on the issue of costs, the appellate court ‘is not so severely restrained’ in its review of the trial judge’s discretion as in the case where no such leave is forthcoming.226 The grant [page 700] of leave has been characterised as an invitation by the trial judge to the appellate court to reconsider his or her decision, and so in such a case the appellate court ‘enters on a review of it with less hesitation than it would otherwise do’.227 What this means in practice was stated by Griffiths LJ in Alltrans Express Ltd v CVA Holdings Ltd:228 In such cases the ordinary rules as to review of the judge’s discretion apply. This court must not be tempted to interfere with the judge’s order merely because we would have exercised his discretion differently from the way in which the judge did. Before a court can interfere it must be shown that the judge has either erred in principle in his approach, or has left out of account, or taken into account, some feature that he should, or should not, have considered, or that his

decision is wholly wrong, because the court is forced to the conclusion that he has not balanced the various factors fairly in the scale.

So once the door is opened by leave being given, the appellate court is in the same position as it is on any appeal against the exercise of a trial judge’s discretion. As such, the grant of leave by the trial judge attracts the same curial attitude as that which applies in jurisdictions that prescribe no leave requirement229 or that give the appellate court the discretion to grant leave.230 In respect of the latter, Priestley JA, speaking of the New South Wales provision in Wentworth v Rogers (No 3), explained:231 One of the purposes of this provision is to ensure that costs questions, important though they frequently are to litigants, not only cannot be further litigated by a party as of right on appeal, but also may be only allowed to be further litigated by appeal if the Court of Appeal thinks there is some good reason, over and above the Court’s own opinion of what would have been the best costs order in the particular circumstances, for doing so. In a great many cases, including the present, costs are in the discretion of the Court; they also seem to me to fall within the category of matters of practice and procedure.

Though it could be argued that a leave requirement vested in the appellate court should create a hurdle to an appellant on the issue of costs additional to those applicable where there is no such requirement, given appellate courts’ reluctance to entertain appeals as to costs aside from any statutory special leave prescription, it is difficult to imagine what difference arises in practice between the two scenarios. In fact, it has been judicially observed that a requirement of leave to appeal,232 and the cases dealing with the basis upon which appeals are to be determined,233 each show that the circumstances in which an appeal court will entertain a challenge to, still less interfere with, such an exercise of discretion are limited.234 Therefore, consistent with the principles discussed earlier regarding appeals as to costs at general law,235 an appellate court will only grant leave to appeal an order for costs, or entertain such an application, in cases of an exceptional nature.236 [page 701]

Where costs order is made against a non-party 20.45 Courts conferred a general costs discretion have the power to make an order for costs against a non-party to the proceeding, including against a legal representative of the parties.237 As the making of a costs order against a non-

party is an unusual and far reaching departure from the normal course of events to be expected in litigation, there is English Court of Appeal authority that any leave requirement for an appeal as to costs should not extend to costs orders against a non-party.238 Otherwise a non-party could be essentially denied the right to appeal unless, in some jurisdictions, the trial judge saw fit to give leave to appeal. In view of the extraordinary nature of any such order, it is arguably apt that an appellate should not be deprived of the jurisdiction to review the exercise of discretion that led to it. To this end, the court construed the leave requirement as applying only to orders made against parties to the action in which the costs were incurred, reasoning that costs orders against non-parties are not orders relating ‘only to costs’ because they necessarily relate to matters beyond merely the outcome of the proceedings.239 This reasoning has been applied in South Australia.240 Yet Queensland Court of Appeal authority is against this proposition, distinguishing the English authority to the contrary on the following overly technical ground:241 [T]he application of [the English case] analysis to [the Queensland provision] is not necessarily justified, because of difference between the language of that provision and the terms of [the English provision] which was before the English Court of Appeal. The difference rests in the inclusion in the English provision, by an amendment made in 1981, of the following underlined words: ‘appeal … from any order … relating only to costs’. The Queensland provision speaks of an ‘order … as to costs only’. The words ‘relating to’ have conventionally been regarded as of wide ambit, and in our view the Queensland prescription, ‘as to’, contemplates a somewhat narrower focus. Accordingly, the English approach is not necessarily susceptible of ready application to the Queensland provision.

That the relevant Queensland provision has subsequently been altered to refer to ‘only in relation to costs’242 undermines whatever validity this reasoning may have had. Moreover, at least in the context of costs orders against lawyers, there is consistent authority, including from Queensland, that leave to appeal is not required.243 20.46 In any event, as noted earlier,244 even if the trial judge refuses leave, an appeal court may review the exercise of his or her discretion, and this may be the type of case where an appellate court may consider it appropriate to do so. Certainly no such impediment arises where it is the appellate court that may grant leave, or where no leave is required.

1.

See 20.2–20.18.

2.

See 20.19–20.27.

3.

See 20.28–20.46.

4.

See 24.56–24.71.

5.

See 29.104–29.111.

6.

See 6.14.

7.

‘Costs of appeal’ has been defined to mean ‘extra expense incurred by reason of the appeal being taken’: Kevans v Joyce [1897] 1 IR 1 at 5 per FitzGibbon LJ (in the context of costs allowed on a party and party taxation).

8.

Van Essen v Lee [1971] Tas SR 324 at 325 per Crawford J. The court rules in some jurisdictions specifically recognise this: Qld r 766(1)(d) (Court of Appeal); SA r 292(3)(d); Vic r 64.24(1) (Court of Appeal).

9.

Solomon v Miller (1865) 2 WW & A’B (Eq) 135; Bool v Bool [1941] St R Qd 26 (FC) (costs of executor out of the estate where executor’s appeal upheld); Van Essen v Lee [1971] Tas SR 324 at 328 per Neasey J; Re Barry (deceased) [1971] VR 395 at 400 (FC) (costs borne by AttorneyGeneral when his appeal was dismissed); Jamal v Secretary, Department of Health (1988) 14 NSWLR 252 at 271 per Mahoney JA; Nikolaou v Papasavas, Phillips & Co (1989) 166 CLR 394 at 407–8 (FC) (even though the court affirmed Victorian Full Court’s judgment on slightly different grounds than those which influenced that court); Elkington v Shell Australia Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 11 at 24 per Sheller JA; Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351 at 412; [1999] HCA 53; BC9906413 (FC); Flinn v Flinn [1999] 3 VR 712; [1999] VSCA 109; BC9904617 at [133] per Brooking JA. There are also provisions in certain statutes to this effect: see, for example, Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW) s 112 (costs in or in relation to an appeal under s 112(5) to be paid by the unsuccessful party unless the court considers such a requirement to be unjust in the circumstances of the case).

10. Holden & Co v Crown Prosecution Service (No 2) [1994] 1 AC 22 at 39–40. See also Jaycar Pty Ltd v Lombardo [2011] NSWCA 284; BC201107097 at [61] per Campbell JA, with whom Young and Meagher JJA concurred (‘If the error of the judge is not one that has been brought about by one of the parties … the costs of rectifying that error should, prima facie, be treated as one of the vicissitudes of litigation. Therefore, the costs of rectifying the error should prima facie follow the event’). 11. Even aside from a specific order to this effect, appellants obtaining orders for ‘costs of the appeal’ are allowed, on taxation in the High Court, the costs of any motion for special leave to appeal unless the court has otherwise provided, the reason being that the order for special leave is a necessary step in the appeal, and is an extra expense incurred ‘by reason of the appeal being taken’ (as proceedings before the High Court, except in relation to matters within its original jurisdiction, do not start by an appeal as of right, but with an application to the court for leave to appeal): Gordon & Gotch (Australasia) Ltd v Cox (1923) 32 CLR 465 at 467; BC2300017 per Starke J. 12. CSR Ltd v Eddy (2005) 226 CLR 1; [2005] HCA 64; BC200507889 at [81] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ. See, for example, Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199; [2001] HCA 63; BC200107043 at [139] per Gummow and Hayne JJ; Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46; BC200607692 at [38] per Gleeson CJ and Crennan J. 13. Schiffahrtsagentur Hamburg Middle East Line GmbH v Virtue Shipping Corporation (The ‘Oinoussian Virtue’) [1981] 2 All ER 887 at 896 per Goff J. 14. In the context of a first instance hearing these are discussed generally in Ch 8.

15. See 8.2–8.13. 16. See, for example, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v F H Faulding & Co Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 36; [2000] FCA 902; BC200003841 at [7]–[8] (FC) (appellant ordered to pay two-thirds of the respondent’s costs of the appeal); Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] FCAFC 163; BC200304322 at [9] (the appellant, which was ‘substantially successful’ in the appeal, received its costs with a modest reduction of 20 per cent; the respondents were therefore ordered to pay 80 per cent of the appellant’s costs of the appeal); Sequel Drill & Blast Pty Ltd v Whitsunday Crushers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] QCA 239; BC200907590 (where the appellant succeeded in its appeal but only with respect to one ground, and had numerous other grounds of appeal (the pursuit of which was not unreasonable) that occupied the majority of the hearing, the respondent was ordered to pay one-half of the appellant’s costs of appeal); Partridge v Hobart City Council (No 2) [2013] TASFC 1; BC201300256 at [17]– [18] per Blow J, with whom Crawford CJ and Wood J concurred. 17. Sydney City Council v Geftlick (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 374; BC200611117 at [27] per the court. See, for example, Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 3) [2007] FCAFC 119; BC200707309 at [11]–[12] per the court; Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 373; BC200711102 at [9] per the court. 18. See, for example, Elliott v Lord Rokeby (1881) 7 App Cas 43 at 47 per Lord Blackburn; Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1989) 85 ALR 659 at 677 (FC(FCA)); Galaxidis v Galaxidis (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 387; BC200407253 at [23] per Tobias JA; Forbes Engineering (Asia) Pte Ltd v Forbes (No 5) [2009] FCA 873; BC200907360 at [20]–[21] per Collier J; Hughes v St Barbara Ltd [2011] WASCA 234 at [27]–[28] per the court. 19. Tayles v Davis (No 2) [2010] VSCA 107; BC201002778 at [16] per the court. See, for example, Elliot v Lord Rokeby (1881) 7 App Cas 43 at 47 per Lord Blackburn (where no order as to costs was made in a matter where the appellant succeeded on one point of their appeal but failed as to all other points, which were of a ‘great deal more importance’ to the appellant but that were not contended for in oral argument); Falcetta v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 56 ATR 194; [2004] FCAFC 194; BC200404829 (where the taxpayer’s appeal was successful on only a minor point, which the Commissioner had conceded was due to an arithmetical error by the trial judge, the taxpayer was ordered to pay the commissioner’s costs of the appeal); Guides Australia Inc v McMartin (2006) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-828; [2006] NSWCA 20; BC200600633 at [202] per M W Campbell AJA (where the appeal succeeded on only a minor matter, the appellant was ordered to pay 95 per cent of the respondent’s costs of the appeal). Cf Wilczak v Alpine Refrigeration & Air Conditioning Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 35; BC200500155 at [4]–[6] per Branson J (where, although the appellant’s success was of a very limited nature, the appellant advanced a ground of appeal that was found to have merit, and so was ordered to pay only 50 per cent of the respondents’ costs of the appeal). 20. Nolan v Nolan (No 2) [2004] VSCA 134; BC200405042 at [10] per the court. 21. (1933) 50 WN (NSW) 55. 22. Glekis v Conson (1933) 50 WN (NSW) 55 at 55 per Street CJ (FC). 23. Glekis v Conson (1933) 50 WN (NSW) 55 at 55–6 per Street CJ (FC). 24. (1946) 63 WN (NSW) 268 at 269 per Jordan CJ (FC). 25. Paterson v Provost etc of St Andrews (1881) 6 App Cas 833 at 845 per Lord Selborne LC; Ex parte Walton (1881) 17 Ch D 746 at 758–9 per Jessel MR. See, for example, Hooker v Gilling (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 214; BC200706650 (where the appellant principally succeeded because the court saw fit to grant leave to amend the amended statement of claim, and it was the appellant’s

conduct in relation to the drafting of the amended statement of claim that necessitated both the motion in the court below and the appeal; as the parties could have avoided the costs of the appeal had sensible steps been taken to ensure that the case the appellant sought to articulate was reflected in the pleadings, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs of the leave application and the appeal). 26. Jones v Merionethshire Permanent Benefit Building Society [1892] 1 Ch 173 at 187–8 per Lindley LJ. 27. (2004) 21 VAR 8; [2004] VSCA 4; BC200400335 (Charles and Vincent JJA ordered that the respondent was entitled to one-half of its costs of the appeal; Callaway JA preferred a two-thirds entitlement). 28. See, for example, Genovese v Homestyle Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 189; BC200708117 at [11]. 29. Marriage of Webster (1998) 24 Fam LR 198 at 208; [1998] FamCA 1517 (FC); Marriage of Johnson (1999) 26 Fam LR 485 at 495; [1999] FamCA 959 (FC). 30. Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Spencer [2008] QCA 392; BC200810763 at [12] per Muir JA and Mackenzie J (noting that ‘[i]t is of benefit to the administration of justice and, often to the parties themselves, that before the hearing of an appeal takes place, the grounds of appeal and the arguments in relation to them be reassessed with a view to ensuring the most effective and efficient presentation of the case’). On a parallel point in the context of indemnity costs orders see 16.55. 31. See 13.87–13.94. 32. Malick v Lloyd (1913) 16 CLR 483 at 492; BC1300006 (FC); NRMA Insurance Ltd v B & B Shipping and Marine Salvage Co Pty Ltd (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 273 at 282 (FC); National Australia Bank Ltd v KDS Construction Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (1987) 163 CLR 668 at 679–80; BC8701823 (FC); Armstrong v Boulton [1990] VR 215 at 223 (App Div); Centronics Systems Pty Ltd v Nintendo Co Ltd (1992) 39 FCR 147 at 192; BC9203828 per Beaumont and Burchett JJ; Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1 at 19; BC9203970 per Handley and Cripps JJA; KKL Investments Pty Ltd v Daikyo (North Queensland) Pty Ltd [1995] QCA 146; BC9505772 (partial costs order); Conder v Silkbard Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 459; BC9908057 at [37] per Beazley JA. 33. Ex parte Hauxwell (1883) 23 Ch D 626 at 643–4 per Bagallay LJ; Board of Examiners v XY [2006] VSCA 190; BC200607419 at [23] per Chernov JA. 34. Great Gulf Company v Sutherland (1873) 4 AJR 164 at 164 per Barry J. 35. See, for example, Siminton v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2006) 152 FCR 129; [2006] FCAFC 118; BC200605672 at [82] per the court (where the appellant succeeded on a point raised by the court after the hearing of the appeal commenced and he was given leave to amend his notice of appeal, but not on any of the grounds raised in his notice of appeal); Nassif v Fahd [2007] NSWCA 308; BC200709516 (where the appellants succeeded on point not taken in District Court, and a week long trial in the District Court would unlikely have taken place had point relied on there). 36. (1978) 141 CLR 269 at 276–7; BC7800076 per Barwick CJ. 37. Marriage of X and X (1999) 26 Fam LR 51 at 55; [1999] FamCA 2254 per Nicholson CJ (FC) (where the appellant husband was ordered to pay the respondent wife’s costs of and incidental to the appeal). 38. These are discussed at 9.2–9.34. 39. Kindimindi Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Cove Council (2007) 150 LGERA 333; [2007] NSWCA

38; BC200701281 at [52] per Hodgson JA. See, for example, Save the Ridge Inc v Commonwealth (2006) 230 ALR 430; [2006] FCAFC 51; BC200602305 at [12]–[13] (where an unsuccessful appeal concerned two points of statutory construction the ramifications of which were, although not unimportant, limited in their application, the court ordered that costs should follow the event); Bat Advocacy NSW Inc v Minister for Environment Protection, Heritage and the Arts (No 2) (2011) 280 ALR 91; [2011] FCAFC 84; BC201104896 at [23] per the court (where ‘[t]here was a carefully reasoned judgment at first instance’ and ‘[t]he appeal, while listed and heard urgently, was dismissed instanter’, it would be ‘a significant burden on scarce public resources if every “public interest” body were open to run unconvincing appeals free of any costs risk’). Cf Arnold v Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 (No 4) [2009] NSWLEC 87; BC200904913 at [25] per Biscoe J (‘If public interest considerations are a sound reason for making no order as to costs (or for apportioning costs) of the proceedings at first instance, they would seem to be an equally sound reason for making no order as to the costs of the appeal’). 40. See 9.2. 41. See, for example, Comcare Australia v Hill (1999) 56 ALD 487; [1999] FCA 488; BC9902339 at [19]–[21] per Spender J (the fact that the respondent was brought before the Federal Court from success in an environment that was essentially ‘costs free’ held to be ‘a telling consideration why, even if the applicant in the Federal Court is successful, it may not be appropriate to order the successful applicant to have its costs paid by the unsuccessful respondent: at [19]; and held the respondent to be entitled to a certificate under the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) s 6 (see 21.5) in respect of the costs he incurred in relation to the appeal: at [29]). 42. See the definition of ‘proceedings’ in 4(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). 43. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117(1), 117(2), as to which see 8.70–8.78. 44. As to these circumstances see 8.71–8.78. 45. D v V [2006] FamCA 918 at [22] (FC) (‘lack of success is a matter to which this Court gives considerable weight when considering applications in respect of the costs of an appeal or of a cross appeal’); Baranski v Baranski (Costs) [2012] FamCAFC 76; BC201250318 at [9]–[10] per the court. 46. Jaycar Pty Ltd v Lombardo [2011] NSWCA 284; BC201107097 at [62] per Campbell JA, with whom Young and Meagher JJA concurred. See, for example, Director-General, Department of Education and Training v MT (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 320; BC200609508 at [10] per Spigelman CJ, with whom Ipp JA and Hunt AJA concurred (who remarked that, although s 88 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) (discussed at 8.90), as then drafted, may be aimed at removing the deterrent effect of an exposure to costs awards for citizens who challenge the conduct of government agencies, ‘[t]his is not an object that has the same force on appeal’ given that, inter alia, under s 119 of the Act appeals to the Court of Appeal are limited to questions of law). 47. This is specifically prescribed by NT r 63.04(5); WA O 66 r 10(2). 48. NT r 63.02(2) specifically so states. 49. Kuwait Airlines Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (No 2) [1995] 1 All ER 790 at 792 per Leggatt LJ. 50. Kuwait Airlines Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (No 2) [1995] 1 All ER 790 at 792 per Leggatt LJ. 51. As to the statutory provisions governing interest on party and party costs see 19.9–19.22. 52. See, for example, Secure Parking (WA) Pty Ltd v Wilson (No 2) [2009] WASCA 78; BC20090623 at [34] per Buss JA, with whom Martin CJ and Murray AJA concurred.

53. See, for example, Snedden v Republic of Croatia (No 2) [2009] FCAFC 132; BC200908915; Secure Parking (WA) Pty Ltd v Wilson (No 2) [2009] WASCA 78; BC20090623 at [34] per Buss JA, with whom Martin CJ and Murray AJA concurred. 54. See, for example, Bowen v Alsanto Nominees Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 39 (S); BC201105691 at [10] per the court. 55. NT r 63.09; Vic r 63.09; WA O 66 r 10(3). The former Federal Court Rules made equivalent provision (FCR 1979 O 62 r 5) where the current rules are expressed to apply only to proceedings transferred to the Federal Court, in which case a party may apply to the court for an order that the costs of the proceeding in the other court be taxed or awarded as a lump sum in lieu of taxation: FCR 2011 r 40.05. 56. Fam LR 2004 r 19.09 (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 33). 57. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98(6)(b) (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 7). 58. Cook’s Construction Pty Ltd v Stork Food Systems Australasia Pty Ltd [2008] 2 Qd R 453; [2008] QCA 322; BC200808919 at [12] per the court. 59. See, for example, Advanced Building Systems v Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 121; BC9702855 (HCA). 60. See, for example, Rittman v Rittman (No 4) [2011] FamCA 361; BC201150434 at [49] per Barry J. 61. Re Middle Harbour Investments Ltd (in liq) (CA(NSW), 15 December 1976, unreported) BC7600129 per Mahoney JA, with whom Moffitt P and Glass JA concurred; Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporations Ltd (receivers appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 at 694 (CA); Young v Annis-Brown t/as Lincoln Smith & Co (No 3) [2011] NSWSC 1267; BC201109936; Becker v Queensland Investment Corporation (No 2) [2009] ACTSC 147; BC200909964 at [16] per Refshauge J. 62. Bridges v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (CA(NSW), 16 June 1970, unreported); Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 184 at 189 per Maxwell J; Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd (No 2) (1991) 30 FCR 548 at 551–2; BC9103330 per Morling J. See, for example, Salfinger v Niugini Mining (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2007] FCA 1594; BC200708892 at [8] per Heerey J (stay refused because the appeal had no reasonable prospects of success and no good reason had been shown to deprive the respondents of the benefits of their costs order); Remely v O’Shea [2008] QCA 119; BC200804293 (stay denied for a special leave application to the High Court because the appellant’s ultimate prospects of success were not good, and there was no evidence adduced as to the appellant’s financial disadvantage unless the stay was granted). 63. Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporations Ltd (receivers appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 at 694 (CA). 64. Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporations Ltd (receivers appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 at 694 (CA); Illawong Village Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales [2005] NSWSC 524; BC200503900 at [15]–[17] per Campbell J; Lewincamp v ACP Magazines Ltd (No 3) [2008] ACTSC 81; BC200807795 at [7] per Besanko J. 65. Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA) s 15(3), as to which see Secure Parking (WA) Pty Ltd v Wilson [2006] WASCA 135; BC200605250 at [3]–[10] per Pullin JA (who, however, seemed to align ‘special circumstances’ with the two prerequisites identified in the text). 66. See, for example, Virgtel Ltd v Zabusky (No 2) [2009] QCA 349; BC200910090 at [23] per McMurdo P, with whom Mullins and Philippides JJ concurred (who branded the lateness of the

appellants’ application ‘a telling, though not conclusive, factor against its success’). 67. Stevens v Economic House Builders Ltd [1938] 1 All ER 654 at 656 per Greer LJ. See further 20.19–20.21. 68. [1993] 2 Qd R 383 at 388, with whom McPherson ACJ and Byrne J concurred. See also Lippe v Hedderwick (1922) 31 CLR 148 at 154–5; BC2290103 per Knox CJ (‘the fact that [the appellant] was entitled to contest the will at the expense of the estate in the Supreme Court does not afford any justification for an appeal by him to this Court’); Murdocca v Murdocca (No 2) [2002] NSWSC 505; BC200203390 at [78] per Campbell J (‘the principles for costs on appeal are different, less sympathetic to payment of the costs from the estate than the principles applied at first instance’). 69. See generally 10.3–10.47. 70. As to costs principles applicable in this context generally see 8.79–8.80. 71. (2006) DFC ¶95-337; [2006] NSWCA 206; BC200605726 at [48] per Brereton J, with whom Basten JA and Hunt AJA concurred. 72. (1991) 104 FLR 96 at 108 (SC(ACT)). 73. Sheehy v Mitchell Crane Hire Pty Ltd (1991) 104 FLR 96 at 109 (SC(ACT)). 74. See, for example, Lippe v Hedderwick (1922) 31 CLR 148 at 155; BC2290103 per Starke J. 75. See, for example, Re McIntyre [1993] 2 Qd R 383 at 388 per Thomas J, with whom McPherson ACJ and Byrne J concurred (where the appeal was ‘adventurous’ at best and not based on any apparent error of fact or law by the trial judge); Coombes v Ward [2004] VSCA 51; BC200401682 (where the appeal had no prospects of success). 76. See, for example, Currie v Glen (1935) 54 CLR 445 at 451; BC3690111 per Rich J. 77. [1961] SR (NSW) 152. See also Gale v Gale (1914) 18 CLR 560; BC1400025. 78. Fowler v Nied [1961] SR (NSW) 152 at 161. 79. See, for example, Moran v House (1924) 35 CLR 60 at 67 per Isaacs ACJ and Gavan Duffy J. 80. Re Earl of Radnor’s Trusts (1890) 45 Ch D 402 at 423 per Lord Esher MR; Westminster Corporation v St George Hanover Square (Rector and Churchwardens) [1909] 1 Ch 592; Re Bubnich [1965] WAR 138 at 142–3 per Negus J (FC); Australian Incentive Plan Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (Vic) (No 2) [2012] VSCA 251; BC201207603 at [9] per Nettle JA. 81. Rosenthal v Rosenthal (1910) 11 CLR 87 at 99; BC1000037 per Higgins J (dissenting but not on this point of principle). 82. [1965] WAR 138 at 140 per Wolff CJ, at 143 per Negus J (FC). See also Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association of Australia Ltd v Wright (1917) 23 CLR 185 at 194 per Barton ACJ, at 198 per Isaacs, Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ; BC1700038 (where it was held that the appellant, a trustee, should bear the costs of the appeal personally, because it was not reasonable in the circumstances to consume the trust property in the appellate litigation). 83. See, for example, Rosenthal v Rosenthal (1910) 11 CLR 87 at 98 per Griffith CJ, at 98 per Isaacs J; BC1000037 (who considered that sufficient justification to depart from the ordinary rule inhered in the fact that the judges below had not taken a well-settled definite view of the legislation in question and had differed in their reasons); Dunne v Byrne (1912) 16 CLR 500 at 503 (PC) (where Lord Macnaughten held that, because the High Court, whose judgment their Lordships upheld, had split three to two in holding that a testamentary devise was invalid, whereas the Full Court of Queensland below them had held that it was valid, there was sufficient divergence of judicial

opinion to warrant that the costs of both parties should be paid out of the estate). 84. Lathwell v Lathwell [2008] WASCA 256 (S); BC200901111 at [11]–[13] per the court. 85. See 10.10 (in the context of trustees). 86. Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v Baker [1999] NSWCA 244; BC9904032 at [13]–[15] per Giles JA and Brownie AJA. 87. (1991) 81 DLR (4th) 211. 88. Goodman Estate v Geffen (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 765 at 766 per Stevenson and Stratton JJA. 89. Goodman Estate v Geffen (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 765 at 767–8. 90. Geffen v Goodman Estate (1991) 81 DLR (4th) 211 at 237–8 per Wilson J. 91. Field v Great Northern Railway Co (1878) 3 Ex D 261; Fairbairn v Cummins [1961] VR 105; Victorian Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Farlow [1963] VR 594; Williams v Stevens [1965] VR 3; Raper v Bertrand [1967] VR 53; Pastras v Commonwealth of Australia [1967] VR 161; Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant (No 2) [1968] VR 533 at 535 per Gillard J; Electrolytic Zinc Co of Australasia Ltd v Cieslak [1969] Tas SR 50 at 50–1 (FC). 92. Morton v Palmer (1882) 9 QBD 89 at 92 per Cave J; Malpas v Malpas (1885) 11 VLR 670 at 710 (FC); Gorman v Wills (1906) 4 CLR 764 at 780 per Griffith CJ; Macarthur & Macleod Pty Ltd v Carey [1931] VLR 269 at 273 per Cussen ACJ; King v Crowe [1942] St R Qd 288 at 294 per Webb CJ (FC); Colzato v Commissioner for Railways [1967] 2 NSWR 656; Brown v Mahony [1967] Qd R 592 at 598 per Hoare J (FC); Electrolytic Zinc Co of Australasia Ltd v Cieslak [1969] Tas SR 50 at 50–5 (FC); Monaco v Arnedo Pty Ltd (1994) 13 WAR 522 at 523; BC9402083 per Malcolm CJ (FC); Brittain v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 427; BC200408102 at [30] per McColl JA, with whom Handley and Tobias JJA concurred; Jaycar Pty Ltd v Lombardo [2011] NSWCA 284; BC201107097 at [62] per Campbell JA, with whom Young and Meagher JJA concurred. 93. See 7.2–7.6. 94. Burchall v Ballamy (1771) 5 Burr 2693; 98 ER 414; Malpas v Malpas (1885) 11 VLR 670 at 710 (FC); Electrolytic Zinc Co of Australasia Ltd v Cieslak [1969] Tas SR 50 at 50 (FC). 95. Nudrill Pty Ltd v La Rosa [2010] WASCA 158 (S); BC201009421 at [15] per Murphy JA, with whom McLure P and Buss JA concurred. 96. Electrolytic Zinc Co of Australasia Ltd v Cieslak [1969] Tas SR 50 at 55 (FC). 97. Williams v BALM (NZ) Ltd (No 4) [1951] NZLR 901 at 904 per Hutchison J (SC). 98. [1969] Tas SR 50. 99. King v Crowe [1942] St R Qd 288 at 294 per Webb CJ (FC). 100. Thompson v Mason (1910) 12 GLR 673 (SC); Petersen v R [1950] NZLR 691 at 692 per O’Leary CJ (SC). Cf Preddis v Coombes (1931) 26 Tas LR 168. 101. Warnock v McCulloch (1902) 28 VLR 117; Gorman v Wills (1906) 4 CLR 764 at 780; BC0600012 per Griffith CJ; Macarthur & Macleod Pty Ltd v Carey [1931] VLR 269 at 273 per Cussen ACJ. 102. Mander v Hutton (1870) 4 SALR 131; Stewart v McKinley (1885) 11 VLR 802 at 809 per Williams J; Jones v Richards (1899) 15 TLR 398; Morgan v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 208 at 216 per Kirby P; Smith v Retirement Benefits Fund Investment Trust (No 3) (FC(Tas), 22 December 1994, unreported) BC9400496 (trial judge’s upholding of no case to

answer submission reversed on appeal). Cf Hamilton v Seal [1904] 2 KB 262 at 263 per Vaughan Williams LJ; Hamstra (Guardian ad Litem of) v British Columbia Rugby Union (1995) 124 DLR (4th) 607 at 608 per Southin JA (CA(BC)). 103. Stewart v McKinley (1885) 11 VLR 802 at 809 per Williams J. 104. Nordstrand v Olsen (1968) 68 DLR (2d) 645 at 647 per Davey CJBC (CA(BC)). 105. Hamstra (Guardian ad Litem of) v British Columbia Rugby Union (1995) 124 DLR (4th) 607 at 608 per Southin JA (CA(BC)). 106. Keddie v Foxall [1955] VLR 320 at 324 per Martin J (FC). 107. See, for example, Smith v Retirement Benefits Fund Investment Trust (No 3) (FC(Tas), 22 December 1994, unreported) BC9400496 at 2 per Green CJ; Wardle v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 388; BC201210610 at [78] per Campbell JA, with whom Barrett JA and Sackville AJA concurred (who found it inappropriate to make the usual costs order ‘because there are some issues that were litigated at the first trial, concerning whether individual defendants had paid punctually, on which the Appellants lost, which will not be re-litigated at the second trial’). 108. Taylor v Edwards [1967] 1 NSWR 689 at 682 (CA). 109. (1889) 10 LR (NSW) L 7 at 12 per Darley CJ. 110. [1967] 1 NSWR 689. 111. Nudrill Pty Ltd v La Rosa [2010] WASCA 158 (S); BC201009421 at [15] per Murphy JA, with whom McLure P and Buss JA concurred (‘For the court to depart from the general rule, it is not necessary for there to have been an impropriety or malicious intent in the way one party ran its case’). 112. [1914] VLR 329 at 335. See also Brittain v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 427; BC200408102 at [33] per McColl JA, with whom Handley and Tobias JJA concurred. 113. [1967] Qd R 592 at 598. See also Malpas v Malpas (1885) 11 VLR 670; Hicks v Trustees Executors and Agency Company Ltd (1901) 27 VLR 389; Ryan v Caelli (1903) 25 ALT 6. Cf Piddington v Bennett & Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533; BC4090107. 114. The position may be otherwise where there was no such objection or any argument as to admissibility at the trial: see Piddington v Bennett & Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533; BC4090107 (where the party leading inadmissible evidence was not required to pay the costs of the abortive trial). 115. (1989) 16 NSWLR 363. 116. G & J Shopfittings & Refrigeration Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lombard Insurance Company (Aust) Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 363 at 376. See also Morgan v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 208 at 217 per Kirby P, at 238 per Clarke JA. Cf Smith v Retirement Benefits Fund Investment Trust (No 3) (FC(Tas), 22 December 1994, unreported) BC9400496 (where the respondent made a submission that was a recognised part of the trial process the purpose of which was to bring about a final determination of the action and that it was not unreasonable for the respondent to make, and so the ordinary rule that the costs of the first trial should abide the result of the re-trial was applied); Monie v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 15; BC200801536 at [57]– [62] per Campbell JA, with whom Mason P and Beazley JA concurred; Nudrill Pty Ltd v La Rosa [2010] WASCA 158 (S); BC201009421 (where the trial judge was, to a substantial extent, led into error by the submissions of the respondents that were rejected on appeal, resulting in this court ordering a retrial, Murphy JA, with whom McLure P and Buss JA concurred, opined that ‘the

ordinary application of the general rule would do an injustice to the appellant insofar as, if the appellant is unsuccessful at the retrial, it will be responsible for both the costs of that trial and the first trial, notwithstanding that the respondents were responsible for the miscarriage of the latter’: at [16]). 117. Cf Earp Woodcock Beveridge & Co Ltd v Gordon (1927) 44 WN (NSW) 123 (where it was held that where a hearing is adjourned owing to an act of God, no order for costs should be made). 118. [1930] NZLR 61. 119. Tasker v Algar and Algar [1930] NZLR 61 at 62 (SC). 120. As to the suitors’ fund legislation see Ch 21. 121. See, for example, Preddis v Coombes (1931) 26 Tas LR 168 at 174–6 per Clark J; Buratti v Ramsay [1962] NSWR 1217 at 1218 per Macfarlan J. 122. See 20.20. 123. Buratti v Ramsay [1962] NSWR 1217 can be explained on this ground. There the plaintiff’s counsel in the presence of the jury created an atmosphere that the trial judge’s rulings unfairly prejudiced the plaintiff. The trial judge discharged the jury of his own motion, and the defendant argued that the plaintiff should be ordered to pay the defendant’s costs rendered abortive in consequence of the discharge of the jury. Macfarlan J was unable to conclude that the creation of this atmosphere was intended by plaintiff’s counsel, noting that both plaintiff and defendant were content that the trial continue, and so held that the only just order was that each party should bear his own costs to the extent they had been thrown away by the discharge of the jury: at 1218. See also Hamstra (Guardian ad Litem of) v British Columbia Rugby Union (1995) 124 DLR (4th) 607 at 608 per Southin JA (CA(BC)). 124. As to the suitors’ fund legislation see Ch 21. 125. (1933) 49 CLR 189; BC3390116. 126. Cutts v Buckley (1933) 49 CLR 189 at 195; BC3390116 per Rich J, with whom Starke J agreed on this point. See also Bourchier v Mitchell (1891) 17 VLR 27 at 32 per Higinbotham CJ (FC); Smith v Retirement Benefits Fund Investment Trust (No 3) (FC(Tas), 22 December 1994, unreported) BC9400496 per Zeeman J. 127. This was the order that prevailed, even though Dixon J opined that he would have ordered that the costs of the first trial abide the event of the second, but that the appellant should have the costs of the appeal to the Full Court: Cutts v Buckley (1933) 49 CLR 189 at 199; BC3390116. Evatt J dissented on the proposed order as to costs, ‘and particularly from the proposal that each party should abide his own costs of the first trial’ because ‘such an order places an unfair burden upon the party who will be finally successful, and prevents him from obtaining anything approaching the indemnity for which the whole system of costs is designed’: at 203. 128. (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504–5; BC3690121. See also International Paper Co v Spicer (1906) 4 CLR 739 at 753; BC0600014 per Griffith CJ; Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473 at 486 per Lord Wright; Queensland Trustees Ltd v Fawckner [1964] St R Qd 153 at 165–6 per Skerman J; Sent v Jet Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 201 at 212–13 per Smithers J (FC). 129. Mallet v Mallet (1984) 156 CLR 605 at 634; BC8400526 per Wilson J. 130. Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 518; BC8601421 per Mason and Deane JJ. 131. Mallet v Mallet (1984) 156 CLR 605 at 634; BC8400526 per Wilson J; Johnsey Estates (1990) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [2001] 2 EGLR 128; [2001] EWCA Civ 535 at [21] per Chadwick LJ (adding that an appellate court must ‘exercise a degree of self restraint’, and

‘recognise the advantage which the trial judge enjoys as a result of his ‘feel’ for the case which he has tried’: at [22]). 132. Johnsey Estates (1990) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [2001] 2 EGLR 128; [2001] EWCA Civ 535 at [22] per Chadwick LJ. 133. Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 627; BC5300020 per Kitto J; Smiths Ltd v Middleton (No 2) [1986] 2 All ER 539 at 549–50 per O’Connor LJ; Oldaker v Currington [1987] VR 712 at 718 (FC). 134. Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473 at 480 per Lord Atkin; Griggs v Petts [1940] 1 KB 198 at 202 per Slesser LJ; Queensland Trustees Ltd v Fawckner [1964] St R Qd 153 at 166 per Skerman J; Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 at 15 per Zelling J. 135. Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 at 177; BC8100095 per Gibbs CJ, Aickin, Wilson and Brennan JJ. 136. Ellis v Leeder (1951) 82 CLR 645 at 654 per Dixon, Williams and Kitto JJ. See also Sent v Jet Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 201 at 212–13 per Smithers J, at 236 per McGregor J (FC); Bailey v Beagle Management Pty Ltd (2001) 182 ALR 264 at 272; [2001] FCA 60; BC200100211 (FC). 137. Will of Gilbert (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318 at 323 per Jordan CJ; Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 at 177; BC8100095 per Gibbs CJ, Aickin, Wilson and Brennan JJ, at 180 per Murphy J; Straker v Tudor Rose (a firm) [2007] EWCA Civ 368 at [2] per Waller LJ (the court is ‘loath to interfere with the discretion exercised by a judge in any area but so far as costs are concerned that principle has a special significance’). 138. Will of Gilbert (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318 at 323 per Jordan CJ. See also Bailey v Beagle Management Pty Ltd (2001) 182 ALR 264 at 272; [2001] FCA 60; BC200100211 (FC). 139. As to the court’s discretion as to costs see 6.14. 140. (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504–5; BC3690121. See also International Paper Co v Spicer (1906) 4 CLR 739 at 753; BC0600014 per Griffith CJ. 141. See 20.28. 142. Ottway v Jones [1955] 1 WLR 706 at 709 per Evershed MR; Hermann v Charny [1976] 1 NSWLR 261 at 267 per Hutley JA; Marriage of McAlpin (1993) 16 Fam LR 888 at 894 per Nicholson CJ and Maxwell J (FC); Thiess v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 5) [1994] 1 Qd R 156 at 207 (FC); Wilson & Horton Ltd v Attorney-General [1997] 2 NZLR 513 at 529 per Hammond J (CA); Birkdale Service Station Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 1 NZLR 293 at 311 (CA). See, for example, Hession v Century 21 South Pacific Ltd (in liq) (1992) 28 NSWLR 120 at 122 per Meagher JA; Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 459; BC9804761 per Olsson J; Palmer v Haddad (2000) 26 Fam LR 359 at 362; [2000] NSWSC 545; BC200003325 per Simpson J; Hendy v Deputy Child Support Registrar (2001) 27 Fam LR 641 at 668; [2001] FamCA 632 (FC); Daulizio v Trust Company of Australia [2005] VSCA 215; BC200506376 at [6] per Nettle JA, with whom Chernov JA and Hollingworth AJA concurred; Velissaris v Fitzgerald [2008] VSCA 152; BC200807533 at [8] per Maxwell P, with whom Mandie AJA concurred (remarking that the task of showing miscarriage of a judge’s discretion to award costs on some basis other than the usual order is an ‘extraordinarily difficult’ one). 143. Swain Mason v Mills & Reeve (a firm) [2012] STC 1760; [2012] EWCA Civ 498 at [59] per Davis LJ, with whom Richards LJ and Lord Neuberger MR concurred. 144. Bew v Bew [1899] 2 Ch 467; Talbot v Truslove (1926) 28 WALR 86; Road Chalets Pty Ltd v Thornton Motors Pty Ltd (1986) 47 SASR 532 at 552 per O’Loughlin J.

145. Hanlon v Brookes (1997) 15 ACLC 1626 at 1632; BC9705049 per Callaway JA (CA(Vic)); Pirrotta v Citibank Ltd (1998) 72 SASR 259 at 269 per Debelle J. 146. These are discussed chiefly in Chs 7 and 8. 147. Smith v Smith [1987] 2 Qd R 807 at 813 per de Jersey J (FC); Martin v Listowel Memorial Hospital (2000) 192 DLR (4th) 250 at 279 (CA(Ont)). In this context, an appellate tribunal applies principles ‘no less stringent’ than those that apply in applications before the court to review the decision of a taxing officer (see 18.68–18.76): Fremarle Acceptance Corporation Pty Ltd v Coumbis (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 183 at 187 per Meares J. 148. Re Oriental Bank Corporation (1887) 56 LT 868 at 874–5 per Cotton LJ; Federal Commissioner of Land Tax v Jowett (1930) 45 CLR 115 at 121; BC3000011 per Isaacs CJ, Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ; Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 at 15 per Zelling J; Birkdale Service Station Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 1 NZLR 293 at 311 (CA). 149. Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 44(1): see 20.41. 150. Overton Investments Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (2001) 113 LGERA 439 at 449; [2001] NSWCA 137; BC200102232 per Stein JA. 151. Reilly v Provincial Court of Alberta, Chief Judge (2000) 192 DLR (4th) 540 at 568 per Hunt JA (CA(Alta)). 152. Fremarle Acceptance Corporation Pty Ltd v Coumbis (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 183 at 189 per Meares J; Alltrans Express Ltd v CVA Holdings Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 685 at 692–3 per Griffiths LJ; John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Palmer (1987) 8 NSWLR 297 at 301 per Kirby P; Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd v Rousianos (1989) 19 NSWLR 57 at 71 per Gleeson CJ (CA); Crisp v Keng (CA(NSW), 27 September 1993, unreported) BC9302116 at 10 per Priestley and Cripps JJA; Hanlon v Brookes (1997) 15 ACLC 1626 at 1632; BC9705049 per Callaway JA (CA(Vic)) (‘The test is not whether we should have exercised the discretion in the same way as [the trial judge] did but whether there was or were a ground or grounds on which he could reasonably do so’); Daulizio v Trust Company of Australia [2005] VSCA 215; BC200506376 at [23] per Nettle JA, with whom Chernov JA and Hollingworth AJA concurred; Velissaris v Fitzgerald [2008] VSCA 152; BC200807533 at [9] per Maxwell P, with whom Mandie AJA concurred. 153. [1942] AC 130 at 138. 154. Wentworth v Rogers (No 3) (1986) 6 NSWLR 642 at 644 per Kirby P; C A Henschke & Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (2000) 52 IPR 42 at 74; [2000] FCA 1539; BC200006518 (FC). 155. See, for example, Foster v Great Western Railway Co (1881) 8 QBD 25; Re Mills’ Estate (1886) 34 Ch D 24. 156. See, for example, Bew v Bew [1899] 2 Ch 467. 157. Starkey v Salm (1895) 7 QLJ (NC) 79; Maiden v Maiden (1909) 7 CLR 727 at 739; BC0915248 per Griffith CJ; Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 at 60 per Atkin LJ (see 8.44); Queensland Trustees Ltd v Fawckner [1964] St R Qd 153 at 157 per Townley J. 158. North Phoenix Gold Mining Co Ltd v Phoenix Gold Mining Co Ltd (1896) 6 QLJ 307 at 310 per Griffith CJ. See, for example, Gorman v Wills (1906) 4 CLR 764 at 780; BC0600012 per Griffith CJ; Colburt v Beard [1992] 2 Qd R 67 at 75 per Ryan J (FC). 159. Donald Campbell & Co Ltd v Pollak [1927] AC 732 at 741–2 per Viscount Cave LC; Hobbs v Marlowe [1978] AC 16 at 39 per Lord Diplock. See, for example, F King & Co v Gillard & Co [1905] 2 Ch 7, discussed at 20.42.

160. Trivett v Hurst [1937] St R Qd 265 at 274 per Blair CJ. 161. Generally speaking, however, a court from which an appeal lies must state adequate reasons for its decision, which will depend upon the circumstances of the case, but reasons will be inadequate if the appeal court is unable to ascertain the reasoning upon which the decision is based, or justice is not seen to have been done: Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud [1989] VR 8 at 18 per Gray J (FC). 162. This assumes that the appellate court has before it a transcript of the oral argument before the trial judge, or an affidavit indicating anything the trial judge may have said in the course of argument to this end. 163. Penfold v Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311 at 315–16; BC8000063 per Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ; Morris v Hanley [2001] NSWCA 374; BC200106752 at [24] per Heydon JA; Kerr v Colley [2002] VSC 209; BC200203440 at [15]–[18] per Bongiorno J. 164. English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] 3 All ER 385; [2002] EWCA Civ 605 at [30] per Lord Phillips MR. 165. Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at 289–90 per McHugh JA. 166. Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378 at 386 per Mahoney JA. 167. Marriage of Greedy (1982) FLC ¶91-250 at 77,382 per Evatt CJ and Gibson J (FC). 168. Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1 at 32 per Kirby P (CA). 169. Hercules v Magistrates Court of Victoria [2008] VSCA 1; BC200800250 at [15] per Maxwell P and Redlich JA. 170. InterTAN Inc v DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 54; BC200502580 at [3] per the court. 171. Velissaris v Fitzgerald [2008] VSCA 152; BC200807533 at [8] per Maxwell P, with whom Mandie AJA concurred. 172. Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Department of Mines and Petroleum [2012] WASCA 167; BC201206288 at [104] per Newnes JA, with whom Martin CJ and Beech J concurred. 173. Amos v Monsour Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 303; [2009] QCA 65; BC200901842 at [11] per Fraser JA, with whom McMurdo P and Douglas J concurred. 174. Velissaris v Fitzgerald [2008] VSCA 152; BC200807533 at [9] per Maxwell P, with whom Mandie AJA concurred. 175. When the statute refers to costs left to the discretion of the judge, it includes not only a general costs discretion (see 6.14), but also provisions prescribing a general costs rule which the court is conferred a discretion to oust (such as, for example, in the case of the costs consequences of rejected favourable offers of compromise: see 13.13–13.23): Junius v Messenger Press [1999] SASC 484; BC9907559 at [7]–[9] per Duggan J, at [38]–[43] per Bleby J (contra at [11]–[14] per Debelle J in dissent). 176. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 27 (High Court); Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 44(1)(a); Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 60(1)(e) (which arguably does not apply to a decision of a registrar just in relation to costs: Brian Gardner Motors Pty Ltd v King [2007] WASC 48; BC200701167 at [4] per Sanderson M). Prior to 4 September 2006 (when the Statute Amendment (New Rules of Civil Procedure) Act 2006 (SA) came into force), the position was the same in South Australia: Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 50(1a)(b)(ii). 177. Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 64(1) (from the Supreme Court) (cf the former

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 253, and before this, the Judicature Act 1876 (Qld) s 9, both repealed) (see Beardmore v Franklins Management Services Pty Ltd [2003] 1 Qd R 1; [2002] QCA 60; BC200200904 at [15]–[19] per McMurdo P, at [43] per McPherson JA (cf at [110]– [113] per Ambrose J); Epas Ltd v James [2007] QSC 49; BC200701266); District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 118B(1) (commenced 1 September 2012) (from the District Court). 178. Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) [2002] SASC 230; BC200204306 at [34] per Perry J. 179. See, for example, KQ v HAE [2007] 2 Qd R 32; [2006] QCA 489; BC200609627. 180. Emanuel Management Pty Ltd (in liq) v Foster’s Brewing Group Ltd [2003] QSC 484; BC200308506 at [41] per Chesterman J. 181. Morrison v Hudson [2006] 2 Qd R 465; [2006] QCA 170; BC200603675 at [24] per Keane JA, with whom Williams JA and White J concurred. 182. (1996) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-396 at 63,518; BC9602561. 183. Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 101(2)(c) (see, for example, Skinner v Jeogla Pty Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 106 at 111 per Spigelman CJ, at 115 per Powell JA; [2001] NSWCA 15; BC200100356). 184. SA r 288(1)(b). 185. Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 17A(1)(b). 186. Hamilton-Smith v Bernsteen Pty Ltd (in liq) [2005] SASC 190; BC200503541 at [26] (FC). 187. Gorczynski v Annandale Services Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 71; BC200401199 at [23] per Santow JA, with whom Meagher and Ipp JJA concurred (referring to ‘[t]he principle … of frugality in granting leave’); Johnston v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2005) 62 NSWLR 309; [2005] NSWCA 17; BC200500868 at [24] per Ipp JA, with whom Spigelman CJ and Beazley JA agreed (‘there is a general reluctance on the part of the court to grant leave to appeal in respect of costs orders alone’); Gao v Zhang (2005) 14 VR 380; [2005] VSCA 200; BC200505785 at [16] per Ormiston JA, with whom Vincent JA concurred (the court ‘rarely gives leave to appeal against cost orders’); Fordham v Fordyce (2007) 154 LGERA 49; [2007] NSWCA 129; BC200704391 at [7] per Ipp JA; Dalma Formwork (Australia) Pty Ltd v Maricic (No 3) [2008] NSWCA 29; BC200801457 at [39] per Basten JA. 188. See, for example, Dalma Formwork (Australia) Pty Ltd v Maricic (No 3) [2008] NSWCA 29; BC200801457 at [40]–[42] per Basten JA (who in the circumstances granted leave on the basis that a significant amount was in issue, coupled with a clear breach of principle and a resultant injustice to the applicant). 189. McFadzean v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (2007) 20 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 289; BC200710889 at [161] per the court. 190. As to the Victorian provision see 20.39. 191. In Queensland the reference is to an appeal ‘only in relation to costs’ (see 20.36) and in South Australia it is to an appeal ‘limited to a question about costs’ (SA r 288(1)(b)), but these phrases do not appear to differ in substance from an appeal ‘as to costs only’. 192. See, for example, Skinner v Jeogla Pty Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 106 at 111; [2001] NSWCA 15; BC200100356 per Spigelman CJ, with whom Powell JA and Ipp AJA agreed. 193. Halliday v High Performance Personnel Pty Ltd (in liq) (1993) 113 ALR 637 at 638–9; BC9303570 per Mason CJ (HC); Burford v Allan (FC(SA), 26 May 1998, unreported) BC9802071 at 3 per Doyle CJ, with whom Millhouse and Nyland JJ concurred. 194. Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 64(1); District Court of Queensland Act 1967

(Qld) s 118B(1) (commenced 1 September 2012). 195. Yip v Frolich (2004) 89 SASR 467; [2004] SASC 287; BC200406054 at [93] per Bleby J, with whom Perry and Gray JJ concurred. 196. See Arena Management Pty Ltd (receiver and manager appointed) v Campbell Street Theatre Pty Ltd (2011) 80 NSWLR 652; [2011] NSWCA 128; BC201103285 at [100]–[121] per Campbell JA, with whom McColl and Macfarlan JJA concurred. 197. Virgtel Ltd v Zabusky [2009] 2 Qd R 293; [2009] QCA 92; BC200902845 at [14] per Keane JA, with whom Fraser JA and Wilson J concurred. 198. Murano v Bank of Montreal (1998) 163 DLR (4th) 21 at 43 per Morden JA (CA(Ont)). 199. See Griggs v Petts [1940] 1 KB 198 at 201 per Slesser LJ; Crystall v Crystall [1963] 1 WLR 576 at 578 per Willmer LJ, at 580 per Harman LJ. 200. [1966] 2 QB 94. 201. Namely Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 (UK) s 31(1)(h) (repealed). 202. Wheeler v Somerfield [1966] 2 QB 94 at 107. See also at 106 per Lord Denning MR. 203. See, for example, McIlwraith McEacharn Operations Ltd v C E Health Underwriting & Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 1) [1994] 2 Qd R 605 at 609 per Lee J; Tyco Australia Pty Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 333; BC200406224 at [200] per Handley JA; Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2010] NSWCA 154; BC201004639 at [61] per Allsop P, with whom Basten and Campbell JJA concurred. Cf the remarks of Basten JA in Dillon v Gosford City Council (2011) 284 ALR 619; [2011] NSWCA 328; BC201108747 at [53]–[59] (noting the differing views in the Australian legal landscape, but not expressing a preference). 204. Wolfe v Alsop (1886) 12 VLR 887 at 890 (FC); Saunders v McKenna [1961] Qd R 425 at 431 per Mack J (FC); Critchley v Australian Urban Investments Ltd [1979] VR 374 at 380 (FC); Thorne v Doug Wade Consultants Pty Ltd [1985] VR 433 at 498 per Kaye and Marks JJ (FC) (who noted that even were the order for costs reviewable, the appellants had not shown reviewable error in the trial judge’s exercise of his discretion); Road Chalets Pty Ltd v Thornton Motors Pty Ltd (1986) 47 SASR 532 at 538–9 per Zelling ACJ (FC); Thorpe Nominees Pty Ltd v Henderson & Lahey [1988] 2 Qd R 216 at 221 per Thomas J, at 227 per Derrington J (FC); Re Golden Casket Art Union Office [1995] 2 Qd R 346 at 349; BC9404182 (CA); Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Department of Mines and Petroleum [2012] WASCA 167; BC201206288 at [104]–[105] per Newnes JA, with whom Martin CJ and Beech J concurred. 205. See, for example, Re Golden Casket Art Union Office [1995] 2 Qd R 346 at 349; BC9404182 (CA). 206. See 20.40–20.43. 207. The former Supreme Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 39 used the phrase ‘as to costs only’, whereas the current provision uses the phrase ‘as to costs’: Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 17A(1)(b). 208. [1999] 2 VR 353 at 378; [1999] VSCA 99; BC9903854. His Honour had, earlier in his judgment, noted that in the context of the Victorian legislation, the phrase ‘order … as to costs’ refers to a curial command that relates to costs, the expression being apt to refer to the contents of a single paragraph of the document known as an order where that paragraph relates to costs: at 376. See, for example, Spencer v Dowling [1997] 2 VR 127 at 132–3; BC9603333 per Winneke J; Hanlon v Brookes (1997) 15 ACLC 1626 at 1632; BC9705049 per Callaway JA (CA(Vic)); Leibler v Air New Zealand Ltd [1998] 2 VR 525 at 528–9; BC9705009 per Phillips JA. 209. Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 64(2); District Court of Queensland Act 1967

(Qld) s 118B(2) (commenced 1 September 2012). See, for example, A L Powell Holdings Pty Ltd v Dick [2012] QCA 254; BC201207353 at [65] per the court. 210. Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 44(1). 211. Baylis Baxter Ltd v Sabath [1958] 1 WLR 529 at 537 per Jenkins LJ; Bankamerica Finance Ltd v Nock [1988] 1 AC 1002 at 1007 per Lord Brandon. 212. Alltrans Express Ltd v CVA Holdings Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 685 at 692. Contra Bank of Australasia v Herrick (1886) 12 VLR 832 (FC). 213. Young v Thomas [1892] 2 Ch 134 at 136–7 per Lindley LJ; Re Raynes Park Golf Club [1899] 1 QB 961; Civil Service Co-operative Society Ltd v General Steam Navigation Co [1903] 2 KB 756 at 765 per Earl of Halsbury LC; Re John Tweedle & Co [1910] 2 KB 697; Bjorninen v Mercredi (1984) 6 DLR (4th) 241 at 243 per Matas JA (CA(Man)). 214. Talbot v Truslove (1926) 28 WALR 86 at 87 per McMillan CJ; Hong v A & R Brown Ltd [1948] 1 KB 515 at 517 per Lord Greene MR; Baylis Baxter Ltd v Sabath [1958] 1 WLR 529 at 537 per Jenkins LJ; Road Chalets Pty Ltd v Thornton Motors Pty Ltd (1986) 47 SASR 532 at 552 per O’Loughlin J; Scherer v Counting Investments Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 615 at 618, 622 per Buckley LJ. 215. Civil Service Co v General Steam Navigation Co [1903] 2 KB 756 at 765 per Lord Halsbury; Gibson v Snaith (1915) 21 DLR 716 at 720 per Perdue JA (CA(Man)); Hong v A & R Brown Ltd [1948] 1 KB 515 at 528 per Lord Greene MR; Baylis Baxter Ltd v Sabath [1958] 1 WLR 529 at 537–8 per Parker LJ; Hellyer v Sheriff of Yorkshire [1975] Ch 16 at 24 per Russell LJ; Lauchlan v Hartley [1979] Qd R 305 at 309 per Connolly J (FC); Road Chalets Pty Ltd v Thornton Motors Pty Ltd (1986) 47 SASR 532 at 552 per O’Loughlin J; Scherer v Counting Investments Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 615 at 618 per Buckley LJ. 216. Jones v McKie [1964] 2 All ER 842 at 845 per Willmer LJ; Scherer v Counting Investments Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 615 at 621 per Buckley LJ; Junius v Messenger Press [1999] SASC 484; BC9907559 at [44] per Bleby J. 217. (1995) 63 SASR 523 at 529. 218. See, for example, F King & Co v Gillard & Co [1905] 2 Ch 7 (discussed in the text); Edmund v Martell (1907) 24 TLR 25; Lauchlan v Hartley [1979] Qd R 305 at 309 per Connolly J (FC). Cf Wright & Francey Pty Ltd v Corbett (CA(Qld), 19 November 1992, unreported) BC9202574. 219. See 8.25. 220. Donald Campbell & Co Ltd v Pollak [1927] AC 732 at 812 per Viscount Cave LC. 221. [1905] 2 Ch 7. 222. Baylis Baxter Ltd v Sabath [1958] 1 WLR 529 at 536 per Jenkins LJ. 223. Extending to any matter relating to the litigation and the parties’ conduct in it, and also to the circumstances leading to the litigation, but no further. 224. Donald Campbell & Co Ltd v Pollak [1927] AC 732 at 812 per Viscount Cave LC, at 813–14 per Lord Atkinson; Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215 at 230–1; BC850105 per Gibbs CJ; Scherer v Counting Investments Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 615 at 618, 622 per Buckley LJ. See also Attenborough v Kemp (1861) 14 Moo PCC 351 at 353; 15 ER 338 at 339 per Turner LJ (‘where there has been bona fide care and discretion exercised on the part of the Judge who has decided the case, their Lordships have no hesitation in stating their opinion to be, that in such a case no appeal will lie in respect of costs alone’). 225. [1958] 1 WLR 529 at 537.

226. Alltrans Express Ltd v CVA Holdings Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 685 at 692 per Griffiths LJ. 227. Findlay v Railway Executive [1950] 2 All ER 969 at 972 per Denning LJ. 228. [1984] 1 All ER 685 at 692–3. See also at 690 per Stephenson LJ. 229. See 20.29–20.33. 230. Reasons for refusal of grant of leave need not necessarily be given (at least in expansive form), because to give reasons would be tantamount to dealing with the application as if it were an appeal, which would defeat the operation of the legislation: Wentworth v Rogers (No 3) (1986) 6 NSWLR 642 at 652 per Priestley JA; Clancy v Santoro [1999] 3 VR 783 at 797; BC9704275 per Ashley J. 231. (1986) 6 NSWLR 642 at 651. See also Etna v Arif [1999] 2 VR 353 at 378; [1999] VSCA 99; BC9903854 per Batt JA. 232. See, for example, Wentworth v Rogers (No 3) (1986) 6 NSWLR 642 at 644 per Kirby P, at 651–2 per Priestley JA. 233. See, for example, Keddie v Foxall [1955] VLR 320 at 322–3 (FC). 234. Clancy v Santoro [1999] 3 VR 783 at 797; BC9704275 per Ashley J. 235. See 20.29–20.33. 236. Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] 2 KB 533 at 543–4 per Stirling LJ; Jenkins v Lanfranchi (1910) 10 CLR 595 at 597–8; BC1000046 per Griffith CJ; Golski v Kirk (1987) 14 FCR 143 at 157 per Beaumont J; Etna v Arif [1999] 2 VR 353 at 378; [1999] VSCA 99; BC9903854 per Batt JA. 237. As to costs against non-parties see Ch 22. As to costs against lawyers personally see Ch 23. 238. Re Land and Property Trust Co plc [1991] 1 WLR 601 at 604 per Nicholls LJ. 239. Re Land and Property Trust Co plc [1991] 1 WLR 601 at 605 per Nicholls LJ. 240. Oxer v Astec Paints Australia Pty Ltd (2008) 254 LSJS 57; [2008] SASC 64; BC200801568 at [5]–[8] per Debelle J. 241. Emanuel Management Pty Ltd (in liq) v Foster’s Brewing Group Ltd [2004] 2 Qd R 11; [2003] QCA 516; BC200307018 at [8] per the court. See also Martinovic v Chief Executive, Queensland Transport [2005] 1 Qd R 502; [2005] QCA 55; BC200500961. 242. Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) s 64(1); District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 118B(1) (commenced 1 September 2012). 243. Michael v Freehill Hollingdale & Page (1990) 3 WAR 223 at 227–8 per Malcolm CJ; Macteldir Pty Ltd v Dimoski (2006) 152 FCR 487; [2006] FCA 489; BC200602864 at [6]–[40] per Lindgren J; Etna v Arif [1999] 2 VR 353 at 379; [1999] VSCA 99; BC9903854 per Batt JA; Emanuel Management Pty Ltd (in liq) v Foster’s Brewing Group Ltd [2004] 2 Qd R 11; [2003] QCA 516; BC200307018 at [11], [12] per the court (obiter); Martinovic v Chief Executive, Qld Transport [2005] 1 Qd R 502; [2005] QCA 55; BC200500961 at [29] per Jerrard JA. 244. See 20.44.

[page 702]

CHAPTER 21

Suitors’ and Appeal Costs Funds Legislation Nature and Purpose of the Legislation

21.1

Federal Proceedings Application — ‘federal appeals’ Costs certificates for respondents (s 6) Costs certificates for appellants (s 7) Costs certificates — new trials (s 8) Federal appeals in family law proceedings (s 9) Incomplete proceedings (s 10) Costs certificates — Administrative Appeals Tribunal (s 10A) Quantum of payment

21.4 21.4 21.5 21.6 21.8 21.9 21.10 21.13 21.14

Other Jurisdictions Scope of application ‘Appeal’ ‘Court’ Indemnity certificate to respondent Entitlement to certificate Qualifications and riders Maximum amount payable Vacation of certificate When certificate has no effect

21.15 21.16 21.17 21.18 21.21 21.21 21.25 21.26 21.27 21.28

Incomplete proceedings New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia Victoria Costs of appeals on issue of damages Entitlement to certificate Qualifications and riders Indemnity certificate to successful appellant Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria Western Australia Vacation of certificate Entitlement to certificate on refusal of court to sanction compromise Specific provisions applicable to criminal matters Application for certificate if appeal against conviction is successful

21.29 21.29 21.34 21.35 21.35 21.36 21.37 21.37 21.39 21.40 21.41 21.43 21.43

[page 703] Application for certificate by respondent if the Crown appeals — Victoria 21.45 Entitlement where point of law in criminal matters 21.46 Discretion of the Court Discretion to grant or refuse certificate Timing of exercise of the discretion Where appeal settled by consent order without full hearing Limits on the discretion Payments not otherwise authorised by the legislation

21.50 21.50 21.57 21.58 21.60 21.62

Nature and Purpose of the Legislation 21.1 Other than in the territories and South Australia, statute makes provision for a fund to relieve litigants of the burden of costs arising out of erroneous decisions by lower courts.1 Its purpose, broadly speaking, is to ‘protect litigants from the financial consequences of miscarriages in the legal process’, and is ‘a form of risk-spreading’.2 To this end, it provides limited relief in defined occasions ‘in which imperfect functioning of the legal system results in a litigant incurring costs that would not have been incurred had the system operated perfectly’.3 A particular focus of the legislation is on the costs consequences for respondents to an appeal who have been unsuccessful because the trial judge erred in law. At general law, a respondent so positioned is ordinarily liable to pay the appellant’s costs of both the appeal and the first trial.4 It is the unfairness of casting upon a respondent who has succeeded due to the lower court’s error of law to bear the costs consequences of this error that drives the legislation, and so it gives the appeal court the power to alter this otherwise usual outcome of a successful appeal.5 In Acquilina v Dairy Farmers Cooperative Milk Co Ltd, speaking of the main provision in the New South Wales Act,6 Moffitt J explained the rationale for the legislation as follows:7 [page 704] The grant of such relief, it can be inferred, proceeds on the assumption that the law is known, so that if an error of law occurs in a court of first instance or an inferior appellate court, such error may ordinarily be attributed to a fault in the administration of justice rather than of the parties so that the costs of having the error rectified ought not ordinarily to lie on the unsuccessful respondent to the appeal but to be paid from a fund contributed to by all litigants.

Although the legislation in some jurisdictions has, with the passage of time, broadened in its scope, its main gist remains. It accordingly provides for a fund from which an unsuccessful respondent may, via what is termed an indemnity certificate, satisfy at least part of the costs of the lower court trial; the indemnity is only partial because the legislation commonly limits the amount payable out of the fund in question. 21.2 An important broadening of scope appears in the New South Wales,

Tasmanian and Victorian statutes, where the court may also order an indemnity certificate in respect of errors of fact.8 This avoids the need to make the often-troublesome distinction between questions of law and questions of fact, and recognises that it is ‘equally fair in principle to extend relief to a party forced into appeal by an error of fact in the Court below, such error not having been induced by the parties’.9 Illustrations of matters that constitute issues of law include determinations as to the admissibility of evidence,10 and ‘any question … as to any principle of law or any application of principle or as to the meaning or effect of any statutory provision’.11 Yet the courts have not interpreted the phrase ‘question of law’ narrowly or read it down in any way;12 it is not to be equated with ‘question of law alone’.13 So, if in respect of questions of mixed fact and law, the question of law plays an integral part in the decision appealed from, the question of law limitation does not deny relief.14 21.3 This chapter is broadly divided into three parts. The first deals with the federal legislation, which is sufficiently distinct from its counterparts elsewhere to merit separate treatment.15 The second groups together the legislation in the remaining jurisdictions,16 whereas the third discusses the factors that impact upon the court’s discretion whether or not to grant an indemnity certificate.17 [page 705]

Federal Proceedings Application — ‘federal appeals’ 21.4 The Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) applies in respect of ‘federal appeals’, and so its scope depends upon the meaning of that phrase. The Act defines a ‘federal appeal’ to mean:18 an appeal to the Full Court of the High Court from a judgment19 of the High Court constituted by a single Justice; an appeal to the High Court from a judgment of the Federal Court, the

Supreme Court of a territory or the Family Court; an appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court from a judgment of the Federal Court constituted by a single Judge; an appeal to the Federal Court from a judgment of: (a) a State Supreme Court; (b) the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory exercising jurisdiction conferred on the court by or under a Commonwealth law (other than jurisdiction conferred under an Act providing for the acceptance, administration or government of that Territory); (c) the Supreme Court of a Territory; or (d) the Federal Circuit Court; or (e) a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal; an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal that is (to be) heard and determined in the Federal Circuit Court; an appeal to the Supreme Court of a Territory from a judgment of another court of that Territory; an appeal to the Full Court of the Family Court from a judgment of the Family Court constituted otherwise than as a Full Court; and an appeal to the Family Court from a judgment of a court of a State, the Federal Circuit Court, a court of an internal Territory (including the Northern Territory) or a court of Norfolk Island. The legislation therefore applies to all appeals from a court to a federal court, excepting some appeals from the Northern Territory Supreme Court (which stems from the fact that the term ‘territory’ is defined to exclude the Northern Territory)20 and appeals from a single judge of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory to the Court of Appeal in that jurisdiction (which is not an ‘appeal to the Supreme Court of a Territory from a judgment of another court of that Territory’ because it is an appeal to an appellate division of the same court).21 The absence of any provision for appeals from tribunals (other than the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) or commissions, though judicially described as ‘unfortunate omission’,22 means that the legislation does not apply to appeals from these bodies.23

Costs certificates for respondents (s 6)

21.5 Where a Federal appeal succeeds on a question of law, or in relation to the amount of damages awarded by a court, the court that heard24 the appeal may, on the application of a [page 706] respondent to the appeal,25 grant the respondent a costs certificate in respect of the appeal.26 The certificate states that, in the court’s opinion, it is appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment to the respondent in respect of the costs27 incurred by the respondent in relation to the appeal, and any costs incurred28 by an appellant in relation to the appeal that have been, or are required to be, paid by the respondent to the appellant in pursuance of an order of the court (not being costs in respect of which a costs certificate is granted to the appellant).29 It follows that the one certificate can cover both the costs incurred by the respondent and those respondent has been ordered to pay to the appellant.30 But this certificate is not concerned with the costs of either the first trial or a new trial. The certificate is vacated if the respondent to whom it has been granted appeals from the judgment in that appeal and is successful in it or in a later appeal in the same sequence as the appeal from that judgment.31

Costs certificates for appellants (s 7) 21.6 Where a respondent to a federal appeal is, pursuant to an order of a court, required to pay to an appellant any costs (the ‘relevant costs’) incurred32 by the appellant in relation to the appeal, and the respondent is entitled to apply for a costs certificate in respect of the appeal,33 the court may, upon the application of the appellant, grant to the appellant a costs certificate in respect of the appeal where it is satisfied that:34 (a) the respondent is, by reason of lack of means, unable to pay the relevant costs or a part of the relevant costs; (b) the payment of (part of) the relevant costs would cause the respondent undue hardship; or (c) the whereabouts of the respondent are unknown. The certificate states that, in the court’s opinion, it is appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment to the appellant in respect of:35

where (a) above applies — the whole or part of the relevant costs that the respondent is unable to pay; [page 707] where (b) above applies — the whole or part of the relevant costs the payment of which would cause the respondent undue hardship; where (c) above applies — the relevant costs. Such a certificate is vacated if the respondent to whom it relates appeals from the judgment in that appeal, and is successful in the appeal from that judgment or in a later appeal in the same sequence as that appeal.36 21.7 Where a federal appeal succeeds on a question of law and there is no respondent, the court that heard the appeal may, on application, grant to the appellant a costs certificate in respect of the appeal.37 The certificate states that, in the court’s opinion, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment to the appellant in respect of the costs incurred38 by the appellant in relation to the appeal.39

Costs certificates — new trials (s 8) 21.8 Where, in a federal appeal that succeeds on a question of law, the court that heard the appeal grants a new trial in a cause40 of a civil nature, it may, on the application of a party, grant a costs certificate in respect of the new trial.41 Where, in a federal appeal against a conviction (or a federal appeal in a sequence of appeals42 that includes an appeal against a conviction) that succeeds on a question of law, the court that heard the federal appeal grants a new trial of an accused person, it may, on the application of the accused, grant him or her a costs certificate in respect of the new trial.43 The certificate states that, in the court’s opinion, it is appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment to that party or accused in respect of such part of any costs incurred by that party or accused in relation to the new trial as the Attorney-General considers appropriate.44 The certificate is concerned only with the costs incurred by a party on the new trial; it does not extend to costs

that a party might be ordered to pay to another party, nor to any costs order that might be substituted by a court on appeal from orders made on the new trial.45

Federal appeals in family law proceedings (s 9) 21.9 Where an appeal to or from the Family Court succeeds46 on a question of law, and each party to the appeal bears his or her own costs,47 the court that heard48 the appeal may, on the application of the appellant,49 grant to the appellant a costs certificate in respect of the [page 708] appeal.50 The legislation is drafted so as to oblige the court hearing the appeal first to decide whether either party should be required to pay the costs of the other, and only then consider, if the appeal has succeeded on a question of law, whether a certificate should be granted to either party.51 A certificate states that the court considers it is appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment to the appellant in respect of the costs incurred52 by him or her in relation to the appeal.53 Having regard to the remedial nature of the legislation and the wide interpretation usually accorded to the phrases ‘in respect of’ and ‘in relation to’, the costs covered by the certificate extend to all those reasonably incurred on the appeal, which include the costs of any application for leave to appeal that is a necessary prerequisite under the relevant legislation.54 The certificate is vacated if the respondent to the appeal appeals from the judgment in that appeal, and succeeds in the appeal from that judgment or in a later appeal in the same sequence as the appeal from that judgment.55

Incomplete proceedings (s 10) 21.10 Where any proceedings in the High Court, Federal Court, Family Court or a court of a territory,56 including proceedings by way of an appeal to that court, are rendered abortive by reason that a person before whom the

proceedings are being conducted dies, resigns, or is removed or dismissed from, his or her office, suffers a protracted illness or otherwise becomes unable to continue with, or to give judgment in, the proceedings, the court57 may, on the application of a party to the proceedings, grant to that party a costs certificate in respect of the proceedings.58 As s 10 aims ‘to address situations where a hearing is rendered abortive due to the judicial officer’s becoming physically unable or legally prevented from completion and delivery of judgment’,59 it does not apply to a case where a party has commenced an action that is beyond jurisdiction.60 21.11 Under s 10(3) of the Act, where the hearing of any proceedings is discontinued and a new hearing is ordered, but this is not attributable to the neglect,61 default or improper act [page 709] of any party to the proceedings, the court may, upon application, grant to that party62 a costs certificate. The role of this provision has been explained as follows:63 [Sub-section 10(3)] as is the case with [s 10(2)], seeks to grant relief to litigants whose liability for costs is increased by reason of the fact that a hearing on foot is aborted by circumstances not contributed to by fault or neglect of any party the proceedings. It is … an extension to the relief granted in [s 10(2)] which is more specific in setting out the circumstances. It may for instance be referable to cases where the sickness or death of counsel intervenes under circumstances which require a discontinuance of the hearing which is under way at the time — probably a rare event — but one which as a matter of justice may persuade a court in the interests of justice to recommend the hearing de novo. It may also apply to disruption of a hearing or interference with the court’s capacity to continue the hearing by external causes.

As a s 10(3) certificate is premised upon a discontinuance of the proceedings, meaning must be given to the term ‘discontinued’. The cases do not speak with one voice in this respect. There is a broad view, typified by Coulson v Gosford Meats Pty Ltd,64 involving a matter fixed for hearing but not included in the court’s list, and following inquiries by the parties put into a list for directions on a later date. Gray J held that even though the hearing had not actually begun, as it had been specially fixed for a particular date, time and place, and did not proceed at that time, date or place, the hearing was discontinued, and so granted a certificate.65 In Re Palmdale Insurance Ltd66 Higgins J also favoured a broad view, remarking that:67

[s]ection 10(3) is intended to provide compensation to a party deprived of a hearing and put to the expense of a new hearing due not to the default of any party but the failure of the court system or other adventitious cause whereby a hearing has to be aborted and recommenced. That abortion may be at the very outset of the hearing or part-way through.

To this end, his Honour concluded that proceedings can be said to be ‘discontinued’ where the matter is listed for hearing and the parties attend expecting it to proceed, but through no fault of the parties the proceeding is adjourned, whether at the outset or not, to a later date. The broad view arguably aligns with the purpose of s 10(3), and so has merit. The main difficulty with the broad view, though, is that the term ‘discontinuance’ has an established meaning in relation to an action; it envisages ‘the cessation of something that was on foot’.68 In other words, it requires that there have been a commencement of the hearing. On this narrower construction, where a party successfully applies for an adjournment on the day fixed for hearing, this is not a discontinuance because the hearing has not commenced.69 The same applies, on this approach, in respect of proceedings that do not commence because the judge becomes ill.70 The bulk of recent authority supports this narrower construction71 — such [page 710] that ‘before an event can be discontinued it must be underway, commenced or set in motion’72 — and declines to construe the term ‘discontinue’ differently from its accepted understanding. 21.12 The certificate states that, in the court’s opinion, it is appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment to that party in respect of such part as the Attorney-General considers appropriate of any costs incurred by that party in relation to those proceedings.73

Costs certificates — Administrative Appeals Tribunal (s 10A) 21.13 If a review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of a decision has to be reheard due to a member of the tribunal ceasing to be available,74 the

tribunal may, on the application of any party to the proceeding other than the person who made the decision subject to the review, grant to that party a costs certificate in respect of the application for review.75 This certificate states that, in the tribunal’s opinion, it is appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment to the person in respect of the costs incurred by the person in relation to the proceeding before the tribunal.76

Quantum of payment 21.14 The Attorney-General cannot authorise payment in respect of a costs certificate (other than a certificate granted in respect of incomplete proceedings)77 in relation to an appeal or a new trial of an amount exceeding the prescribed maximum amount78 in relation to the court or tribunal that heard that appeal or new trial, as the case may be.79 Upon an application for payment by a person who has been granted a costs certificate, the AttorneyGeneral may, having regard to the money available at the time for this purpose,80 authorise payment to that person of an amount not exceeding the amount of the costs to which the certificate relates.81 Although expressed in permissive terms, the term ‘may’ in this context has been held to have compulsory force, meaning that the Attorney-General lacks a general discretion not to act on a certificate.82 The statute, however, adds that the Attorney-General [page 711] cannot authorise such payment unless he or she is satisfied, or entitled to presume,83 that the certificate will not be vacated.84

Other Jurisdictions 21.15 The legislation in the remaining jurisdictions can be conveniently grouped because it follows a schema exhibiting various similarities, and indeed is not significantly divergent from the federal legislation.

Scope of application 21.16 The legislation generally applies in the context of ‘appeals’ from a ‘court’, and so it is necessary as a preliminary step to discuss the meaning of these words in this context.

‘Appeal’ 21.17 The New South Wales legislation defines the term ‘appeal’ to include any motion for a new trial and any proceeding in the nature of an appeal.85 In Queensland and Tasmania the term ‘appeal’ is statutorily defined to include an order to review, a case stated for the opinion or determination of a superior court on a question of law, a question of law reserved in the form of a special case for the opinion of a superior court, a motion for a new trial and any other proceeding in the nature of an appeal.86 In Victoria, ‘appeal’ includes an appeal by way of re-hearing, an application for a new trial and any proceeding in the nature of an appeal, but does not include a case stated.87 The term ‘appeal’ in Western Australia includes any proceeding by way of discharging or setting aside a judgment, a motion for a new trial, a case stated for the opinion of the Supreme Court on a question of law, an appeal under Pt 2 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA)88 and any other proceeding in the nature of an appeal.89 As can be seen from the foregoing, each jurisdiction encompasses within an appeal ‘any (other) proceeding in the nature of an appeal’. That phrase, a New South Wales judge has remarked, extends the normal notion of an appeal ‘to encompass what in some respects bears some of the elements of an appeal’.90 This broad approach to construing the term ‘appeal’ is [page 712] consistent with the remedial nature of the Act.91 To this end, the following are illustrations of what have been held to be ‘appeals’ for this purpose: proceedings by way of prerogative writ;92 a case stated by a court of Quarter Sessions to the Court of Criminal Appeal

on a question of law arising out of a conviction in a court of petty sessions;93 a ‘review’ of a registrar’s decision;94 a general reference to the court concerning whether a taxing officer had jurisdiction to tax a bill,95 an application for an order to review a taxation;96 an application by a third party for a reference for taxation;97 a case stated by an arbitrator to the court;98 a reference from the Prothonotary, exercising delegated legislation, to a judge in chambers.99

‘Court’ 21.18 The New South Wales legislation provides that the term ‘court’ includes such tribunals or other bodies that are prescribed,100 but there are no such prescriptions to date. Consistent with the remedial nature of the Act, New South Wales courts have adopted a broad construction as to what is a ‘court’.101 The case law reveals that bodies not designated as or titled ‘courts’ may be ‘courts’ for the purposes of the Act. The following negative propositions are accepted as useful in determining whether or not a body is a court:102 [page 713] 1. A tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision. 2. Nor because it hears witnesses on oath. 3. Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. 4. Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects. 5. Nor because there is an appeal to a Court. 6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred to another body.

Applying these indicia, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Australian Postal Commission v Dao (No 2)103 found the Equal Opportunity Tribunal to be a ‘court’ for the purposes of the Act. Kirby P held that all six such features were present in respect of the tribunal, but added that the question of whether the tribunal was a court was in issue only for the ‘limited

purposes’ of the Act, not for the purpose of the Constitution and federal legislation.104 Favouring a liberal approach in this respect, his Honour made the following remark:105 It would seem unlikely, given the history and the purpose of the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951, the increase since its enactment in the number and kind of statutory tribunals and the relationship established between the Tribunal and the Supreme Court, that appeals should lie on questions of law but not attract the protection of the Suitors’ Fund Act because the Tribunal is not a court.

Reiterating this approach in Reid v Sydney City Council106 Kirby P held that the Government and Related Employees’ Appeal Tribunal met the qualifications for a court for this purpose. Specifically, his Honour made reference to factors such as that the Senior Chairperson of the tribunal may be a Supreme Court Judge or a member of the Industrial Relations Commission, that the tribunal could order discovery of documents and administer an oath, and that its decisions were final except for appeals on a question of law. The Industrial Court of New South Wales referred to similar factors in concluding the (then) Industrial Relations Commission was a court for this purpose, reasoning as follows:107 [W]e have noted the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act relating to the nature and constitution of the Full Commission, the powers, authorities and functions of the Full Commission in relation to the hearing and determination of matters both at first instance and on appeal, the important role of the Full Commission in regard to industrial relations matters generally and the promotion and achievement of the objects of the Act, and the ability of the Full Commission to determine matters arising under the Act to finality, subject only to the right of appeal to the Court against a decision on a question of law. As to its constitution, the Full Commission is to consist of at least three members, at least one of whom must be a Presidential Member of the Commission. All Presidential Members presently holding office are also judges of the Court.

There is also authority marking the Appeal Panel of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal,108 the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal,109 the Medical Disciplinary Tribunal110 and the (former) Strata Titles Board111 as courts under the Act. Conversely, in Gosford Shire Council [page 714] v Anthony George Pty Ltd112 Hardie J held the Board of Subdivision Appeals not to be a ‘court’, on the ground that it functioned as an arbitral body to determine disputes between councils and landowners seeking subdivisional approval. In Owners Strata Plan 61172 v Stratabuild Pty Ltd (No 2)113

Macready AsJ held that an adjudicator’s determination under Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) was not a decision of a ‘court’. And nor is a taxing officer (or costs assessor, presumably) exercising a taxation (assessment) function culminating in certificate thereby making ‘the decision of a court’ for the purposes of the Act.114 21.19 Similar issues arise in Western Australia, where the statute does not define the term ‘court’. Yet the remedial nature of the legislation has led the courts also to adopt a broad interpretation of the term ‘court’.115 21.20 The Queensland and Victorian statutes avoid debate as to what constitutes a ‘court’ by providing that the term ‘court’ includes any board, other body or person from whose decision there is an appeal to a superior court on a question of law, or that may state a case for the opinion or determination of a superior court on a question of law or reserve any question of law in the form of a special case for the opinion of a superior court.116 The position is the same in Tasmania, albeit not via a specific definition of ‘court’.117

Indemnity certificate to respondent Entitlement to certificate 21.21 In New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia, if an appeal succeeds against the decision118 of a court to the Supreme Court on a question of law (and in New South Wales and Tasmania, or fact), or to the High Court from a decision of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court may, upon an application, grant to any respondent119 to the appeal [page 715] an indemnity certificate in respect of the appeal.120 The equivalent Victorian provision states that if an appeal121 succeeds against a decision of a court in a civil proceeding to the Trial Division of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court, a respondent122 to that appeal may apply to the Supreme Court for a certificate.123 So in New South Wales, Tasmania and

Victoria the jurisdiction to order an indemnity certificate is not limited to errors of law by a trial judge; ‘presumably it became apparent that there were some specified cases where errors other than errors of law ought to attract the relief provided by the Act’.124 In New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia, if an appeal succeeds against the decision of a court to the District Court (in New South Wales, or the Industrial Relations Commission) on a question of law, that court may, upon an application, grant to the respondent(s) an indemnity certificate in respect of the appeal.125 In New South Wales, where an appeal to the Land and Environment Court126 on a question of law succeeds, that court may, pursuant to an application, likewise grant an indemnity certificate in respect of the appeal to the respondent(s).127 In Victoria, where an appeal to the County Court against a decision of a court in a civil proceeding succeeds, a respondent to that appeal may apply to the County Court for a certificate.128 21.22 In New South Wales an indemnity certificate entitles the respondent to be paid from the Suitors’ Fund:129 (a) an amount equal to the appellant’s costs130 of the appeal in respect of which the certificate was granted, ordered to be paid and actually paid by the respondent; (b) the prescribed percentage131 of the amount payable from the Fund pursuant to (a) or, where no amount is so payable, an amount equal to the respondent’s costs of the appeal in respect [page 716] of which the certificate was granted as taxed,132 and not ordered to be paid by any other party; and (c) where the costs referred to in (b) are taxed at the instance of the respondent, an amount equal to the costs incurred by the respondent in having those costs taxed. The reference to costs being ‘taxed’ in this context is outdated, as the process of taxation has been replaced with assessment in New South

Wales.133 Presumably, therefore, the legislation is directed to costs as assessed. 21.23 In Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia the certificate entitles the respondent to be paid from the relevant fund134 (in Victoria, by the Appeal Costs Board on an application in the approved form):135 (a) an amount equal to the appellant’s costs136 (in Queensland, as assessed or agreed upon by the Appeal Costs Board,137 the respondent and the appellant)138 and paid by or on behalf of the respondent; (b) an amount equal to the respondent’s costs as taxed (in Queensland and Victoria, assessed) or agreed upon by the board139 and the respondent and not ordered to be paid by any other party;140 and (c) where the costs referred to in (b) are taxed (assessed), an amount equal to the costs incurred by the respondent in having those costs taxed (assessed) (in Victoria, in connection with the assessment). Wickham J explained the implications of the foregoing in Steel v Appeal Costs Board, in the context of the Western Australian legislation:141 [G]iven a certificate the respondent is entitled to be paid his costs as taxed or agreed. When the conditions have been satisfied this is a vested right and the Board is under an obligation to

[page 717] authorize payment, and that is so whether the respondent has paid his own costs or not. The situation is not the same in respect of the appellant’s costs. The respondent only has a vested entitlement to be paid these if he has actually paid them. The Board has no obligation, or even power, to pay the respondent the amount of the appellant’s costs unless the condition precedent is satisfied.

Where that appeal is an appeal in a sequence of appeals,142 the above entitlement applies in respect of any appeal(s) in the sequence that preceded the appeal in respect of which the certificate was granted. So once a certificate is granted where there is a sequence of appeals, that certificate covers not only costs regarding the appeal in respect of which it is granted but also costs regarding any appeal(s) in the sequence.143 21.24 The right to seek the grant of an indemnity certificate is transmissible,

and is ‘property’ for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), thus vesting in the official receiver on a debtor’s bankruptcy.144

Qualifications and riders 21.25 Three riders or qualifications must be placed on the above provisions. First, under (a) above, in New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia, where the Director-General145 (in Queensland and Western Australia, the Board; in Tasmania, the Registrar)146 is satisfied that: the respondent is unable through lack of means to pay the whole (or part) of those costs or that payment of those costs would cause the respondent undue hardship; the respondent unreasonably refuses or neglects to pay them; or in New South Wales and Western Australia, the respondent has not paid those costs and cannot be found (and, in Western Australia, the certificate of taxation is produced to the Board); the Director-General (Board/Registrar) may (in New South Wales, if requested by the appellant or the respondent), direct that an amount equal to the costs not already paid by the respondent be paid from the fund for and on behalf of the respondent to the appellant.147 Similar provision is made in Victoria, such that an appellant,148 whose costs referred to in (a) above were ordered to be paid by a respondent granted a certificate, is entitled to be paid those costs by the Board, on an application made in the approved form, if the respondent has not actually paid those costs, where the Board is satisfied that the respondent is refusing, or is unable because of lack of means, to do so, or doing so would cause undue hardship to the respondent.149 In Victoria, the legislation places a limit on the maximum amount payable for this purpose.150 [page 718] Wickham J explained the rationale for this first qualification in Steel v Appeal Costs Board as being:151

… partly to enable the respondent who cannot pay the appellant’s costs to obtain an acquittance by means of a direction from the Board that they be paid from the fund on his behalf. It is also partly for the purpose of enabling an appellant to recover his costs from the Board, acting as a kind of statutory agent for the respondent, if the respondent unreasonably refuses or neglects to pay. It is an administrative provision and confers a power upon the Board (although not a duty) to direct payment to the appellant. The appellant has no entitlement until, the conditions for the exercised having been satisfied, the direction is given. Because the respondent has an immediate vested right to be paid his own costs as soon as they are taxed or agreed, but the appellant has no immediate vested right but only a right which might arise under certain circumstances as a result of the Board exercising its discretion to make a direction, it is the case that the respondent will generally be in a preferred position in respect to his own costs and should be paid in priority. The object of the legislation primarily is to assist the respondent to meet his own costs and the appellant’s costs. It is not designed directly for the assistance of the successful appellant although that, as a matter of discretion, might be the result if the conditions set out in [the subsection] are satisfied.

Second, other than in Queensland, where the costs referred to in (b) are taxed (assessed) at the instance of the respondent, the aggregate of the amounts payable from the fund pursuant to (b) and (c) cannot exceed the amount payable from the fund pursuant to (a).152 This dictates that, in effect, the respondent’s costs cannot exceed the appellant’s costs, meaning that the Board/Registrar ought not authorise payment of the respondent’s costs before knowing what the appellant’s costs are.153 In Queensland, the amount payable from the fund to any one respondent under any one indemnity certificate cannot exceed $15,000.154 Third, in New South Wales, under (b) above, where an amount is payable from the fund pursuant to (a), but the Director-General directs that the costs of the appeal(s) incurred by the respondent and not ordered to be paid by any other party be taxed (now assessed) at the instance of the respondent, or those costs are, without such a direction, taxed (assessed) at the instance of the respondent, the amount payable from the fund is the amount equal to those costs as so taxed (assessed).155

Maximum amount payable 21.26 In New South Wales the maximum amount payable from the fund for any one appeal is $10,000, except in respect of an appeal to the High Court, where the maximum is $20,000.156 If more than one indemnity certificate has been issued in connection with the same appeal, the maximum amount payable with respect to any one indemnity certificate is: (a) an amount equal to the maximum amount payable from the fund for that appeal divided by the

number of indemnity certificates issued in connection with that appeal; or (b) such other amount as determined by the court by which the indemnity certificate is issued.157 The maximum amount payable from the fund to any one respondent pursuant to any one certificate in any case is also statutorily restricted in Queensland,158 Tasmania,159 Victoria160 [page 719] and Western Australia,161 which limits vary significantly between the jurisdictions. There have been judicial and law reform commission calls for increasing the relevant ceilings.162

Vacation of certificate 21.27 An indemnity certificate granted to the respondent in respect of an appeal that is an appeal in a sequence of appeals163 is vacated where in a later appeal in the sequence the successful party is the one to whom the certificate was granted or, except in Queensland, a certificate is granted in respect of a later appeal in the sequence and the respondent to the earlier appeal is a party to the later appeal.164

When certificate has no effect 21.28 An indemnity certificate is deprived of any force or effect during the time limited for appealing against the decision of the court that granted the certificate and, if there be an appeal, during the pendency of the appeal.165 Specifically, the legislation provides that a certificate has no force or effect:166 (a) where a time is limited for appealing against the decision in the appeal — during the time limited for appealing against that decision; (b) where an appeal lies against the decision in the appeal but no time is so limited — until an application for leave to appeal against the decision in the appeal has been determined and, if leave is granted, the appeal is

instituted, or until the respondent lodges with the Director-General (in Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia, the Board; in Tasmania, the Registrar) a written undertaking167 that he or she will not seek leave to appeal (or appeal pursuant to the leave granted) against the decision in the appeal, whichever happens first; (c) in New South Wales, notwithstanding anything contained in (b), where the respondent gives the said undertaking and thereafter seeks leave to appeal, or appeals, against the decision in the appeal — until the application for leave has been determined and, if leave is granted, the appeal is instituted; and (d) other than in Victoria, where the decision in the appeal is the subject of an appeal — during the pendency of the appeal. Where the appeal and later appeal(s) form a sequence of appeals and the indemnity certificate has not been vacated, a reference to the decision in the appeal in the above is to be construed as including a reference to the decision in any later appeal and, other than in [page 720] Victoria, a reference to the pendency of the appeal in the above is to be construed as including a reference to the pendency of any later appeal.168

Incomplete proceedings New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia 21.29 The Appeal Costs Board (in New South Wales, the Director-General; in Tasmania, the Registrar) may, upon application, authorise the payment from the fund to a party of the additional costs169 incurred by the party in the original proceedings170 by reason of a new trial because: (a) the original proceedings were rendered abortive by the death171 or protracted illness (and in Tasmania, or the retirement or resignation) of the judicial officer before whom the proceedings were heard (and other than in New South Wales, or by disagreement on the part of the jury);172

(b) in New South Wales, the original proceedings were rendered abortive because the appeal was heard by two judges173 who were divided in opinion as to the decision determining the proceedings;174 (c) an appeal on a question of law (in Tasmania, or fact) against the conviction of a person convicted on indictment is upheld and a new trial is ordered;175 (d) the hearing of the original proceedings is discontinued176 and a new trial ordered for a reason in no way attributable to: in the case of civil proceedings — the act, neglect or default of all or of any one or more of the parties or their lawyers; in the case of criminal proceedings — the act, neglect or default of the accused (or his or her lawyers); or in New South Wales, in the case of jury proceedings — disagreement on the part of the jury;177 and the presiding judicial officer grants a certificate to that effect;178 or [page 721] (e) in Western Australia, a criminal proceeding is adjourned179 by or on behalf of the prosecution and the presiding judicial officer grants a certificate upon being satisfied that by reason of the adjournment the accused has necessarily incurred180 expense and that the adjournment was in no way attributable to the act, neglect or default of the accused (or his or her lawyer).181 In Queensland and Tasmania any party to the proceedings is entitled, where there has been a new trial in the proceedings, to be paid from the fund the costs he or she has incurred in the proceedings before any of the above events occurred. There is no discretion vested in any person or body in this respect, although in Queensland the costs in question are those the board considers to have been reasonably incurred. However, the Tasmanian legislation adds that a person is only entitled to be paid these costs from the fund to the extent that, by reason of any of the said events, the work or matter

in respect of which those costs have been incurred has not been of value or assistance to that person in the new trial, and those costs have been incurred by that person uselessly (that is, they have been thrown away).182 21.30 So far as the meaning of ‘discontinued’ in (d) above is concerned, the judicial trend is, as per the federal legislation,183 towards a narrow construction.184 In Blackman v Blackman,185 for instance, where a date fixed for trial was vacated by the judge before the commencement of the trial because of exigencies of the court’s business, Hamilton J ruled that the scenario did not come within the words ‘discontinued and a new trial ordered by the presiding judge’, which he opined ‘apply only to a situation where a hearing or a trial has actually commenced and is aborted and a fresh hearing is ordered to commence de novo’. In Watts v The Crown186 a criminal trial set down for hearing on Monday was adjourned that morning, before the trial had commenced, upon the prosecutor informing the court that an essential witness was unable to attend due to a recent illness. Rackemann DCJ noted that the legislation is ‘relatively limited to circumstances in which the hearing of a criminal proceeding is discontinued and a new trial is ordered’, and rejected the argument that the term ‘discontinued’ is simply a synonym for an adjournment.187 The relevant provision, it has been said, is concerned with a situation where a trial actually commences, but for a reason other than the proceedings being ‘rendered abortive’,188 ‘is interrupted and a new trial ordered’; the phrase ‘new trial’, for this purpose, suggests an earlier trial that is discontinued or interrupted.189 So if, say, the trial commenced but the jury is discharged because the accused falls ill, this clearly involves a trial that is ‘discontinued’, and may therefore be amenable to the grant of a certificate.190 Ultimately, whether or not a [page 722] proceeding is discontinued depends upon whether it can be said that the trial has commenced. It thus rests on the meaning given to ‘commencement’. A broad meaning accorded to this term increases the chance of the trial being ‘discontinued’. In Western Australia, the existence of a unique provision directed to where a criminal proceeding is adjourned (s 14(1)(d)) has not

prevented a broad judicial interpretation of the term ‘discontinued’ (for the purposes of s 14(1)(c)), as appears from the following remarks:191 Certainly a trial commences once the accused is arraigned and the jury empanelled. However, as recognised by Miller J in Donaldson v Western Australia (2005) 31 WAR 122 at 161, it is arguable that a trial has commenced when the accused faces the court on the day of the trial. Based upon this view, the adjournment that I granted on 19 March 2012 created a situation where the criminal proceedings had been discontinued and ‘a new trial’ had been ordered. In my opinion this is the correct interpretation. This wider interpretation of the operation of the s 14(1) (c) is supported by the use of the words ‘criminal proceeding is discontinued’ rather than using the words ‘the trial is discontinued’. Although this interpretation of the subsection means that the subsection would cover an adjournment of the trial on the day of the trial, it does not mean that s 14(1)(d) becomes superfluous. An adjournment of the trial on the day of the trial for any reason (other than attributable in any way to the act, neglect or default of the accused) would be covered by s 14(1)(c). However, an application for a certificate for an adjournment prior to the trial date would not be covered by s 14(1)(c), but could still be granted under s 14(1)(d) if the application for adjournment was ‘by or on behalf of’ the prosecution … In other words, s 14(1) (d) provides an opportunity for the issue of a certificate even though the first trial has not commenced in the sense suggested by Miller J in Donaldson by the accused facing the court on the day of the trial. This interpretation is supported by the wording of s 14(1)(d) which refers to an adjournment, but does not use the wording ‘and a new trial is ordered’.

21.31 Again in the context of paragraph (d) above, it has been held that where the judge is unable to make a finding that the discontinuance and the new trial was not ‘attributable in any way to the act, neglect or default of all or of any one or more of the parties’, ‘no party can recover his costs from the fund, even though he has been entirely blameless’.192 This can be supported on the ground that the statute refers only to the ‘act, neglect or default’ of a party, and does not preface the word ‘act’ with the term ‘wrongful’, which may necessarily be implied from the words ‘neglect or default’. Else-Mitchell J explained that ‘there is no genus … neglect and default are both passive in quality and, though they may postulate non-compliance with a duty, I do not see how any element in the connotations attached to those words can be applied to the word ‘act’ which is antithetic’.193 Hence, ‘act, neglect or default’ can include a mere act of a party leading to a discharge of the jury — it need not be a wrongful act. For example, in Greaves v Blackborrow194 the judge discharged the jury because the plaintiff and one of the jurymen had engaged in conversation in a public place near the court even though no conversation about the case took place between them. Else-Michell J was not satisfied that the reason for the discontinuance of the hearing was in no way attributable to that act, remarking that ‘it may not have been solely attributable to that act, but that is

not what the section provides as the criterion’.195 This led him to grant neither party a certificate, and to make no order as to costs of the abortive trial or of the hearing that was discontinued.196 21.32 In New South Wales, where the Director-General would not be entitled to authorise such payment because the applicant incurred no costs due to being a legally assisted person, [page 723] but would have incurred costs had he or she not been a legally assisted person, the Director-General may nonetheless authorise a payment as if that person had not been a legally assisted person and as if that person had incurred such costs.197 In lieu of authorising payment of an amount to that person, however, the Director-General may authorise payment of that amount to such person(s) as in his or her opinion is or are entitled to receive payment of it.198 21.33 In New South Wales and Tasmania statute prescribes a maximum amount payable to any one person in the context of the foregoing.199 In New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia no amount is payable for this purpose to the Crown200 or, in New South Wales and Western Australia to a corporation that has a paid-up share capital of $200,000 or more.201

Victoria 21.34 The Victorian legislation makes similar provision to the above, but in simpler terms. It provides that if a new trial is ordered, a party to that proceeding may apply to the court before which the proceeding was discontinued202 for an indemnity certificate in respect of the party’s own costs of the discontinued proceeding, which the court may grant only if satisfied that the reason for the discontinuance was not attributable in any way to the act, neglect or fault of any of the parties to that proceeding or their lawyers.203 For the discontinuance to be ‘attributable’ to the act of a party (or

a lawyer), there must, it has been said, be a ‘direct relationship’ between the conduct of the party and the discontinuance.204 ‘Discontinued’, for this purpose, includes discontinued due to the death or illness of a judge or magistrate hearing the proceeding, or a disagreement on the part of the jury.205 A party granted such a certificate who pays, or is ordered to pay, any additional costs as a consequence of the order for a new trial is entitled to be paid by the board, on an application made to it by that party in the approved form, an amount equal to that party’s own costs of the discontinued proceeding that the board considers to have been reasonably incurred.206 The legislation makes like provision in respect of costs incurred by an accused as a result of the discontinuance of a criminal proceeding207 for a reason not attributable in any way to the act, neglect or fault of an accused or his or her lawyer, and a new hearing or trial is ordered.208 It also makes provision for the grant of an indemnity certificate in circumstances where the [page 724] hearing of a criminal proceeding is adjourned209 for a reason attributable in no way to the act, neglect or fault of a party accused or convicted of an offence to which the proceeding relates or that party’s lawyer.210 The court may only grant a certificate in these circumstances if satisfied that it is inappropriate to order costs against any party or other person.211 The grant of the certificate is premised on an application being made in the approved form and on proof being provided of the costs that have been incurred, in which case the applicant is entitled to be paid his or her own costs of the adjournment, up to a specified maximum,212 that the board considers to have been reasonably incurred and that have not been ordered to be paid by any other party.213

Costs of appeals on issue of damages Entitlement to certificate 21.35 In New South Wales, where an appeal to the Court of Appeal succeeds

on the ground that the damages awarded were excessive or inadequate, the Court of Appeal may, on application, grant the respondent to the appeal a certificate in respect of the appeal.214 This certificate entitles the respondent to be paid from the Suitors’ Fund:215 (a) an amount equal to the costs of the appellant in the appeal ordered to be paid and actually paid by the respondent; (b) the prescribed percentage216 of the amount payable from the fund pursuant to (a) or, where no amount is so payable, an amount equal to the costs of the appeal, as taxed (assessed), incurred by the respondent and not ordered to be paid by any other party; and (c) where the costs referred to in (b) are taxed (assessed) at the instance of the respondent, an amount equal to the costs incurred by the respondent in having those costs taxed (assessed). As the above relief is limited to the appeal costs, the principle is that ‘the error, and hence the unnecessary costs of the appeal, have resulted from an error in the administration of justice [page 725] and not of the parties’.217 The general provisions as to the vacation of a certificate218 apply likewise in this context.219 In Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia, where a new trial is ordered in an action on the ground that the damages awarded in the action were excessive or inadequate (or, in Queensland and Tasmania, the verdict of the jury was against the (weight of the) evidence), the respondent to the appeal or motion for the new trial is entitled to be paid from the fund:220 (a) an amount equal to the costs of the appellant in the appeal or motion for and upon the new trial ordered to be paid and actually paid by or on behalf of the respondent; (b) an amount equal to the respondent’s taxed (in Queensland, assessed) costs of the appeal or motion for and upon the new trial, being costs that are not ordered to be paid by any other party; and

(c) where the costs referred to in (b) are taxed (assessed) at the instance of the respondent — an amount equal to the costs incurred by or on behalf of the respondent in having those costs taxed (assessed). No equivalent provision appears in the Victorian legislation.

Qualifications and riders 21.36 Certain riders or qualifications must be placed on the above provisions. First, in respect of (a), where the Director-General (in Tasmania, the registrar; in Western Australia, the board) is satisfied that the respondent: is unable through lack of means to pay the whole or part of those costs, or that such payment would cause the respondent undue hardship; unreasonably refuses or neglects to pay those costs; or in New South Wales and Western Australia, has not paid those costs and cannot be found (and, in Western Australia, the certificate of taxation is produced to the board); the Director-General (registrar/board) may, if so requested, direct in writing that an amount equal to those costs not already paid by the respondent be paid from the fund to the appellant.221 Second, in New South Wales, in respect of (b), where an amount is payable from the fund pursuant to (a), but the Director-General directs that the costs of the appeal incurred by the respondent and not ordered to be paid by any other party be taxed at the instance of the respondent or those costs are, without such a direction, taxed (assessed) at the instance of the respondent, the amount payable from the fund under (b) is the amount equal to those costs as so taxed (assessed).222 Third, the aggregate of the amounts payable from the fund under (b) and (c) cannot exceed the amount payable from the fund under (a).223 Fourth, the amount payable from the fund in respect of the appeal cannot in any case exceed a prescribed amount.224 [page 726]

Indemnity certificate to successful appellant Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria 21.37 An appellant225 may apply to the Supreme Court (in Queensland, or the District Court) for the grant of an indemnity certificate in respect of an appeal against the decision of a lower court226 (in Queensland and Victoria, on a question of law) where the respondent appeared in neither proceeding and the appeal succeeds but the court refuses to order the respondent to pay the appellant’s costs227 of the appeal.228 Such a certificate entitles the appellant to be paid from the fund:229 an amount equal to the appellant’s costs of the appeal in respect of which the certificate was granted as taxed (assessed) or (other than in Tasmania) as agreed upon by the board and the appellant; and an amount equal to the costs incurred by the appellant in having those costs taxed (assessed). However, the amount payable from the fund to any one appellant pursuant to the certificate cannot in any case exceed a prescribed maximum.230 In Queensland and Tasmania, where money is paid to an appellant, or on the appellant’s behalf, from the fund in respect of an appeal and thereafter the appellant is a party in a successful appeal against that decision, the appellant must, upon demand, pay to the Appeal Costs Board (in Tasmania, the registrar) the amount paid to the appellant (or on his or her behalf) under the certificate.231 21.38 The Queensland legislation further provides that where upon any appeal a new trial of a cause or matter is ordered upon any ground, and upon the new trial the party who was the appellant in the appeal proceedings is ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the new trial, the appellant is entitled to be paid from the fund, subject to certain limitations,232 the prescribed amounts.233 In Victoria statute provides that if, on an appeal in a civil proceeding the court orders a new trial, and on the new trial the court orders the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of that new trial, the appellant may apply to the trial court for an indemnity certificate in respect of the costs.234 Such a certificate entitles an appellant, upon an application, to be paid by the board (up to a maximum of $50,000):235

(a) an amount equal to the respondent’s costs of the new trial that the appellant has been ordered to pay and has actually paid; (b) an amount equal to the appellant’s own costs of the new trial that have not been ordered to be paid by any other party, as assessed by the board on a party and party basis, or as agreed to by the board and the appellant; and [page 727] (c) if the costs referred to in (b) are assessed, an amount equal to the costs incurred by the appellant in connection with the assessment. A respondent, whose costs referred to in (a) above were ordered to be paid by an appellant granted an indemnity certificate is entitled to be paid those costs (or any part of them) by the board (up to a maximum of $50,000), on an application made in the approved form, if the appellant has not actually paid those costs (or that part) and the board is satisfied either that the appellant is refusing, or is unable because of lack of means, to do so, or that doing so would cause the appellant undue hardship.236

Western Australia 21.39 Where an appeal on a question of law succeeds and the court that allowed the appeal would, but for the provisions of some other Act or law,237 have ordered any costs of the appeal to be paid by the respondent:238 (a) that court must make a finding to that effect and specify the amount of costs it would have fixed, or state that it would have directed them to be taxed, or what proportion of the taxed costs it would have ordered to be paid, as the case requires; and (b) the Supreme Court may, upon application, grant a costs certificate to the appellant, in which case it must include in it the substance of (a). This certificate entitles the appellant to be paid from the fund the costs of the appeal which the court that allowed the appeal would have ordered to be paid by the respondent, or the taxed costs of the appeal (or such proportion of

the taxed costs as that court would have ordered to be paid by the respondent),239 as the case requires.240 In such a case, the board is not entitled to refuse to authorise payment out of the fund.241 The foregoing provision, by virtue of the words ‘but for the provisions of some other Act or law, have ordered any costs of the appeal to be paid by the respondent’, presupposes that there is ordinarily a legal right in the appellant to obtain an order for costs in the particular type of proceedings. In that no such right exists so far as concerns costs on appeals against convictions by juries for indictable offences, the provision should not be construed as conferring rights generally on appellants in criminal proceedings.242 Rather, the provision is to be interpreted as follows:243 [W]here the provisions of the law normally allow costs to be awarded but where some special provision of the law relieves an unsuccessful respondent from liability for costs in either civil or criminal proceedings, then the successful appellant is entitled to relief as prescribed by [the provision].

Vacation of certificate 21.40 In Queensland and Tasmania an indemnity certificate granted to an appellant in respect of an appeal has no force or effect:244 [page 728] (a) where a time is limited for appealing against a decision in the appeal — during the time so limited; (b) where an appeal lies against the decision in the appeal but no time is limited — until an application for leave to appeal against the decision in the appeal is determined, and where leave is granted, the appeal is instituted, or until the expiration of three months from the determination of the appeal, whichever first happens; and (c) notwithstanding the foregoing, where the decision in the appeal is the subject of an appeal — during the pendency of the last mentioned appeal. In Victoria the effect of an indemnity certificate granted to an appellant is

stayed until the earlier of:245 (a) if an application for leave to appeal against the decision in that appeal is made — that application being determined and, if leave is granted, the determination of the appeal; or (b) until the expiry of three months after the date of the decision in the appeal against which an appeal lies. In Tasmania and Victoria a certificate granted to an appellant in respect of an appeal to the Supreme Court is vacated if the appellant is a party to a successful appeal against the decision of the court.246 In Victoria, an appellant who is granted a certificate who is a party to a successful appeal against the decision of the Supreme Court must, on demand of the board, repay any amount paid to the appellant pursuant to the certificate.247 The Queensland legislation makes similar provision, to the effect that an indemnity certificate granted to a party, including an appellant, in respect of an appeal in a sequence of appeals248 is vacated if in a later appeal in the sequence the successful party is the one to whom the certificate is granted.249

Entitlement to certificate on refusal of court to sanction compromise 21.41 Other than in New South Wales, the legislation provides that where a court refuses to sanction the compromise250 of an action brought by an infant plaintiff 251 (in Victoria, a person under a disability or a minor; in Western Australia, a person under disability)252 and on the trial of the action the amount of the judgment obtained by the plaintiff does not exceed the amount that the defendant had agreed to pay under the compromise, and the infant plaintiff (or next friend) is ordered to pay the whole or part of the defendant’s costs of the action on any ground, the infant plaintiff (or next friend) is entitled to be paid from the fund:253 (a) an amount equal to the costs ordered to be paid by the infant plaintiff to the defendant and actually paid by or on behalf of the infant plaintiff (or next friend); (b) an amount equal to:

in Queensland and Western Australia, the infant plaintiff’s costs of the action incurred after the date on which the court refused to sanction the compromise (in Queensland [page 729] and Victoria, as taxed (assessed) or agreed upon by the board and the infant plaintiff (or next friend) or the infant plaintiff’s solicitors and not ordered to be paid by any other party); in Tasmania, the infant plaintiff’s taxed costs of the action incurred, being costs that are not ordered to be paid by any other party; and (c) in Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria, where the costs referred to (b) are taxed (in Queensland and Victoria, assessed) at the instance of the infant plaintiff (or next friend) — an amount equal to the costs incurred by the infant plaintiff or on the infant plaintiff’s behalf in having those costs taxed (assessed). In Victoria the amount payable pursuant to the above is statutorily limited.254 21.42 The Queensland, Tasmanian and Victorian statutes provide that notwithstanding the foregoing, the board (in Tasmania, the registrar) may, if satisfied that the infant plaintiff (or next friend) unreasonably refuses or neglects or is unable through lack of means to pay the whole (or any part) of the costs referred to in (a), or that payment of those costs would cause the infant plaintiff (or next friend) undue hardship, direct in writing that an amount equal to those costs be paid from the fund for and on behalf of the infant plaintiff (or next friend) to the defendant.255 The Queensland and Tasmanian legislation adds that the sum of (b) and (c) above cannot exceed the amount payable under (a).256 In Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia the amount payable in this context is statutorily capped.257

Specific provisions applicable to criminal matters Application for certificate if appeal against conviction is

successful 21.43 Victoria If an appeal to a superior court against a conviction258 for an indictable offence succeeds and the court sets aside the conviction, the appellant may, whether or not the court orders a new trial, apply to the court for, and the court may grant, an indemnity certificate in respect of costs.259 If the court does order a new trial, the appellant may apply for the inclusion in that certificate of any additional costs that he or she will pay, or will be ordered to pay, as a consequence of the order for a new trial.260 This certificate entitles an appellant to be paid by the Appeal Costs Board both his or her own costs of the appeal and any additional costs that he or she pays, or is ordered to pay, as a consequence of the order for a new trial, that the board considers to have been reasonably incurred.261 21.44 Western Australia Where on an appeal against a conviction for an indictable offence the conviction is quashed without a new trial being ordered, the Supreme Court may, upon application, grant to the appellant a costs certificate in respect of the costs of the appeal or such part of those costs as the court may determine.262 This entitles the appellant to be paid, up to a statutory limit,263 from the fund:264 [page 730] (a) an amount equal to the appellant’s costs of the appeal in respect of which the certificate was granted as taxed or agreed upon by the board and the appellant or the appellant’s solicitor, or equal to such part of those costs as the Supreme Court has determined, as the case requires; and (b) where the costs referred to in (a) are taxed, an amount equal to the costs incurred by the appellant in having those costs taxed.

Application for certificate by respondent if the Crown appeals — Victoria 21.45 If the Crown or Director of Public Prosecutions institutes265 a prescribed appeal,266 the respondent to that appeal may apply to the Court of

Appeal or the County Court (as the case requires) for an indemnity certificate in respect of the respondent’s own costs of the appeal.267 This certificate entitles the respondent to be paid by the Appeal Costs Board, on an application in the approved form, an amount equal to the respondent’s own costs of the appeal that the board considers to have been reasonably incurred.268 As a result of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), with effect on 1 January 2010, the Victorian appeal costs statute was amended to make provision for a respondent to an appeal, to the Victorian Court of Appeal, against an interlocutory decision in a proceeding for the prosecution of an indictable offence,269 to apply for, and be granted an indemnity certificate in respect of the respondent’s own costs of the appeal and, if a new trial is ordered, any additional costs that he or she will (be ordered to) pay as a consequence of the order for a new trial.270 A parallel provision addresses an application for, and grant of, an indemnity certificate where the accused succeeds in an interlocutory appeal of this kind.271

Entitlement where point of law in criminal matters 21.46 Queensland Pursuant to the Criminal Code (Qld) s 669A(2)(b), the Attorney-General may, in circumstances where the Crown has duly informed the trial court that the Crown will not further proceed upon the indictment in relation to a charge as a result of a determination of the court on that point of law, refer to the Court of Appeal that point of law for its consideration and opinion. Upon reference, the court must hear argument by the AttorneyGeneral (or by counsel on his or her own behalf) and by the acquitted person, whereupon the court will consider the points referred and furnish to the Attorney-General its opinion. Where a point of law is so referred, the accused in the trial at which the point of law arose is entitled to be paid from the fund such costs as the Appeal Costs Board considers have been reasonably incurred by the accused (or on the accused’s behalf) by reason of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal and, where a new trial is a consequence of the opinion given by the Court of Appeal on the point of law, the trial at which the point of law arose.272 This provision was inserted in 1989 to overcome the Queensland Court of

Criminal Appeal’s decision in R v Foggo,273 which held that upon the hearing of such a reference the court lacked [page 731] power to grant a certificate under the general provision governing the grant of certificates, namely s 15 of the Act.274 The court reasoned that as the reference could not affect the trial in any regard, the furnishing of an opinion to the Attorney-General by the court could not be regarded as a ‘success’ in the terms of s 15. Even if it could be seen as ‘any other proceeding in the nature of an appeal’, the reference is not an appeal against a decision of a court.275 It conceded the desirability that counsel appear on behalf of the respondent on references of this kind, remarking that the best way of encouraging adversarial representation in these references was to grant a certificate in favour of such a respondent that covers the costs of his or her appearance.276 21.47 The Queensland legislation was amended by the Criminal Code and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2011 (Qld), with effect on 4 April 2011, to make provision for grants of indemnity certificates vis-à-vis costs of applications by convicted persons to successfully review a guideline judgment277 or in appearing in a guideline proceeding.278 A ‘guideline judgment’ means is a judgment declared to be a guideline judgment by the court, which contains guidelines to be taken into account by courts in sentencing offenders.279 ‘Guideline proceeding’ means that part of a proceeding relating to the giving or review of a guideline judgment, or on an application for the giving or review of a guideline judgment.280 The amount payable from the fund to any one person under an indemnity certificate is capped at $15,000.281 21.48 Tasmania Where a person has been acquitted after his or her trial on indictment, the Attorney-General may, within 28 days after the conclusion of the trial,282 refer any question of law that has arisen at the trial to the Court of Criminal Appeal for determination by that court.283 Where such a reference is made, the Crown must pay the costs of the legal representation of any person heard before the court, being such costs as that court considers to be reasonable.284 For the purposes of determining the quantum of those costs,

the court may obtain the assistance of the registrar of that court, who may require the person providing the legal representation to lodge a bill of costs for the consideration of the court.285 21.49 Victoria If in any proceeding a case is stated for the opinion or determination of a superior court on a question of law, or a question of law is reserved in the form of a special case for the opinion of a superior court, any party to that proceeding other than a party who is or represents the Crown, may apply to the superior court for, and the court may grant, an indemnity certificate in respect of the costs that the party has incurred in respect of the proceeding on the case stated.286 The certificate entitles its recipient to receive from the Appeal Costs Board, on application in the approved form, an amount equal to that party’s own costs of the proceeding on the case stated that the board considers to have been reasonably incurred,287 up to a maximum of $50,000.288 [page 732] An additional provision was inserted, with effect from 1 January 2010, by the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), entitling an accused, if a court reserves a question of law in defined circumstances,289 to apply to the Court of Appeal for an indemnity certificate in respect of the accused’s own costs of the hearing of the question of law and, if a new trial is ordered, any additional costs that the accused will (be ordered to) pay as a consequence of the order for a new trial.290

Discretion of the Court Discretion to grant or refuse certificate 21.50 Statute provides that the grant or refusal of an indemnity certificate is within the discretion of the relevant court, and that no appeal lies against any such grant or refusal.291 The first point is in any case self-evident in that the legislation is expressed in terms that a court ‘may’ grant a certificate. Yet excepting Tasmania,292 the legislation provides no guidance as to the

circumstances in which costs certificates should or should not be granted, and so it is an essentially ‘unfettered’ discretion.293 Like any judicial discretion, though, it must be exercised judicially and on proper grounds.294 There is no presumption in favour of the grant of a certificate once the statutory prerequisites are satisfied; the applicant must convince the court that a certificate is justified.295 This stems from the fact that the legislation creates a discretion to grant, not to refuse, a certificate. So it is not the position that once facts are proved bringing the case within the statute, a certificate should be granted unless the court thinks on discretionary grounds that it should be withheld.296 [page 733] 21.51 The circumstances that influence the discretion are many and various, hence the judicial warning against any attempt to exhaustively define them.297 What underlies the discretion is that the general purpose of the legislation is to provide a remedy for unsuccessful respondents who, through no fault of their own, may otherwise be liable to meet a costs order.298 This centres the court’s inquiry on the parties’ conduct (particularly the applicant’s) in deciding how to exercise its discretion. In light of this, it is possible to see how the discretion should be exercised in some obvious cases. Where the respondent succeeded below only because the court erroneously took a view of the law or facts the respondent had not put to that court, there is no reason to withhold the certificate.299 Judicial error in the court below arising from a novel legal point, especially if generated from unclear statutory drafting, justifies a certificate.300 The same may be said where a court of appeal has reversed a line of authority on which the ultimately unsuccessful respondent has reasonably relied.301 21.52 More generally, where the arguments put to the court below could not be described as improper or baseless,302 the unsuccessful respondent cannot be said to shoulder any responsibility for raising them merely because the appellate court has ruled that the trial judge erred in accepting them. In a case of this kind, ‘it is better to treat the system as having gone wrong through the medium of the court rather than any action of [the unsuccessful respondent]’.303 In Yunghanns v Yunghanns,304 for example, the Full Family

Court considered the proceedings not to be motivated by any malice or illwill, and remarked that the respondents’ arguments found favour with the trial judge who, though she had erred, was in no way misled by the evidence or submissions advanced on behalf of the respondents. This led the court to conclude that it was a proper exercise of its discretion to grant the respondents certificates for costs.305 [page 734] 21.53 That the appeal was of value in the public interest in that, say, it generated a ruling on an unclear area of law of relevance beyond merely to the litigants, is factor capable of influencing the court, albeit not usually on its own, to exercise its discretion to grant a certificate.306 The great significance of the case to one of the parties does not by itself attract the exercise of this discretion.307 21.54 At the other end of the scale, if counsel persuaded the court below to act upon the basis of a decision that had been overruled, it could be said that it was not the system that was the main cause of the mistake, but the respondent. Discretion would then be exercised against the respondent.308 Even counsel’s misconstruing of an earlier decision in an attempt to present a novel development of the law is unlikely to merit the payment of costs from public funds.309 The same may be the outcome where counsel has acted improperly or unreasonably, whether in the conduct of the proceedings or in unduly prolonging them.310 A certificate will also be denied if the respondent was in some other way ‘responsible’ for the appeal.311 So instances where error has been solely the court’s responsibility will provide stronger claims of entitlement to a certificate than cases where responsibility for the error is shared, since then other factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion may be brought into greater prominence.312 In Bullock v Federation Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 2)313 the Full Federal Court rejected an application for a certificate where the applicant had elected not to adduce certain evidence for tactical reasons at first instance, stating: [W]e can see no good reason why the taxpayer should be asked to subsidize the legal costs of litigants who, rather than put all their cards on the table, deliberately elected to rely upon legal

[page 735] arguments which were clearly very debatable and, if successful, would be highly likely to be challenged on appeal.

Similarly, in Richards v Faulls Pty Ltd314 the Full Western Australian Supreme Court found that although the decision turned on a question of law — in the sense that whether a finding of fact is open on the evidence is said to be a question of law — this question arose out of the way in which the respondent chose to conduct his case,315 and did not involve the construction of the relevant legislation nor the formulation or application to the facts of any general principle of substantive law. This led it to refuse the certificate. 21.55 The court may consider the financial resources of the applicant, and the likely quantum of the party’s total costs of the appeal, as compared with the prescribed maximum amount payable upon a certificate.316 In Johnson v Johnson (No 2) (Costs)317 the Full Family Court held that although the husband succeeded in his appeal, it was on a question of law only in so far as the issue of the tax penalties was concerned, the other bases upon which the appeal succeeded relating to errors of fact.318 As a result, it refused to order a certificate, and remarked that even if it had the discretion to do so, it would have declined because the financial resources of the parties — some $30 million — marked the case as one in which the grant of a certificate, statutorily limited to a maximum of $4,000,319 would be inappropriate.320 21.56 Delay in applying for a certificate is likely to be a factor, not decisive by itself, against the award of a certificate. It is usual for applications for certificates to be made either at the conclusion of oral argument on appeal or when judgment is delivered allowing an appeal.321 Yet generally speaking the relevant statutes prescribe no time frame within which applications must be made, presumably because it is assumed to be in the interests of the applicant not to delay making the relevant application. The Queensland Supreme Court issued a practice direction in 2005, which required an application for a certificate and accompanying submissions to be made ‘either orally at the appeal hearing or … within seven days of judgment of the court’322 (since replaced by a practice direction that alters the time frame to 14 days).323 Keane JA explained the impact of delay in this context in Lamb v Brisbane City Council:324

[page 736] While the Court has a discretion to grant a certificate notwithstanding non-compliance with the time limits in the Practice Direction,325 and the Court’s discretion is a wide one,326 the lapse of such a long time could reasonably be expected to result in the refusal of a certificate unless there are strong grounds for granting the certificate. It is not in the interests of the due administration of justice that the Court should be required to devote time to the review of the circumstances of decisions given long ago by stale applications for indemnity certificates.

In Lamb the respondent applied for a certificate almost 12 months after the determination of the matter by the court. Keane JA, with whom Holmes JA concurred, refused the application, being influenced not just by the delay, but the lack of a satisfactory explanation for the delay and the fact that the point of law on which the appeal to the court succeeded was not one of particular difficulty.327

Timing of exercise of the discretion 21.57 The occasion for the exercise of the discretion as to granting or refusing the certificate arises after the court has decided how the appeal itself should be disposed of.328 Walsh J explained the point in Reeve v Fowler in the following terms:329 The grant of a certificate is not part of the order of the Court disposing of the appeal; it is incidental and ancillary to the order disposing of the appeal. An application for the grant of a certificate is not a matter between the parties to the appeal but is an ex parte application by one of them, that is to say, by the unsuccessful respondent in cases where the appeal succeeds, by which that party asks the Court to exercise its discretion. Of course, in practice the Court may announce its decision upon the matter of the certificate concurrently with its announcement of its order on the appeal itself, but … in my opinion it cannot begin to consider any matter relating to the grant of a certificate until it first has decided that the appeal is to be disposed of in a certain way.

Where appeal settled by consent order without full hearing 21.58 The foregoing raises the legitimate question as to whether a court may grant a certificate where the court makes an order on the appeal by consent of the parties. That the order is grounded not in a full hearing of the appeal but on the agreement or consent of the parties may appear to deny a common prerequisite for the grant of a certificate, namely that the court has ‘heard’ the appeal. There is case law, to this end, that requires adjudication by the court

before a certificate is granted.330 Yet case authority also accepts that a firm and unconditional agreement between the parties as to the manner in which the court should dispose of the appeal may suffice, to which the court then gives effect by its order.331 A case may arise, for instance, in which counsel on both sides agree that the judgment at first instance suffered an error of law; if the appellate court is, in the circumstances, confident that there has been such an error without hearing full argument on the point, it is open to it to grant a certificate.332 The [page 737] matter, of course, remains within the court’s discretion; the parties to an appeal cannot bargain between themselves and expect a certificate without exercising a judicial discretion. The issue surfaced in Cramer v Davies,333 where Kirby J sat as a single Justice of the High Court to determine an application for costs certificates under the federal Act subsequent to the Full High Court allowing an appeal by consent and without hearing any argument. His Honour favoured a broad construction of the phrase ‘the court that heard the appeal’ in the relevant legislation334 — acknowledging at the same time the arguments in favour of a narrow construction as requiring ‘a full hearing on the merits’335 — as meaning or requiring ‘no more than having the matter listed before the court so that it may dispose of the appeal in a public and formal way’.336 The following reasoning influenced his preference for a broader construction. First, a narrow construction might force or encourage parties to go through the charade of a formal hearing in a case where it was plain that the appeal would succeed, even if all parties agreed that such a hearing was futile and unnecessary. Second, his Honour referred to the object of the legislation, remarking as follows:337 The general objective of the Act is remedial. It has been expressed as one designed to ensure that where errors of law occur in courts of law, which are not the fault of the parties but by definition the fault, if of anybody, of the administration of justice, the burden of costs which is invariably substantial should not fall upon the parties but should fall upon the community generally through laws such as the Act. Given the remedial nature of the Act, a narrow construction of its language would defeat the attainment of its objectives. A broad construction of the word ‘heard’ would advance the attainment of those objectives. The latter should therefore be preferred.

Third, in Cramer the court had granted the application for special leave and had the appeal listed before it. In a sense, therefore, the court had in fact ‘heard’ the appeal. If the court had doubts as to the order being sought, it could have identified those doubts and even required the matter to proceed to a longer hearing of some kind. 21.59 For courts that prescribe no special leave procedure for appeal, the latter reason carries no weight. But this did not prevent the Full Family Court in Marriage of Brown338 from granting a certificate where the parties had filed their written summaries of argument, the appeal had been called on for hearing, and on the date it was listed for hearing the court gave an indication that the appeal would be likely to succeed, with the appeal then being allowed by consent. In Shears v Shears,339 where substantial arguments had been presented in advance, the same court saw it as ‘artificial’ to require that the court should have in fact sat and commenced hearing the proceedings to satisfy the provisions of the statute. Most recently, the court in B & B (Costs Certificates),340 where an appeal was allowed by consent without argument on its merits, the court granted certificates341 on the basis that the consent orders were made in open court, such that the appeal was ‘disposed of in a public and formal way’.342 Their Honours, in passing, noted that on several occasions single judges of the court, on an [page 738] appeal from the Federal Circuit Court allowed by consent, had granted certificates, either while judgment was reserved, or where outlines of argument had been filed, and the court was presented with minutes of consent orders when the appeal was called on for hearing.343 The foregoing is not to say that an appellate court should always grant a certificate in giving effect to consent orders. As noted above, the matter requires the exercise of a judicial discretion. Whether a court exercising appellate jurisdiction is satisfied that an appeal allowed by consent and without full argument has ‘succeeded on a question of law’ in each case depends on the material before the court. In reaching such a conclusion, what can be said is that the court ‘will always need to be conscious of the implications of its conclusion for the public purse’.344

Limits on the discretion 21.60 In addition to the fact that the discretion must be exercised judicially, and is subject to statutory quantum limits (which are mentioned throughout the chapter where relevant), various other restrictions on the court’s discretion apply. Commonly the legislation provides that an indemnity certificate cannot be granted to a corporation having a paid-up share capital of $200,000 or more345 or in favour of the Crown.346 ‘The Crown’, for this purpose, refers to the executive as distinct from the legislative branch of government, represented by the ministry and the administrative bureaucracy that attends to its business.347 It thus excludes a statutory corporation that operates with considerable independence from the executive in the performance of its function.348 But it includes the departments of government that are headed by a minister, the control of the minister providing the link to the Crown.349 Accordingly, public servants as litigants in that capacity cannot, generally speaking, receive a certificate if they can properly be viewed as agents of the Crown, who are bound to comply with instructions from the relevant minister, and whose functions are funded from consolidated revenue.350 Case authority suggests that a police officer is also a servant or officer of the Crown for this purpose.351 As a police officer’s costs would in practice be paid out of government funds, the grant of a certificate would, it is reasoned, in effect be a grant in favour of the Crown. But the legal position regarding police officers is not so ‘black and white’. There are cases where police officers have been the beneficiaries of indemnity certificates for events arising [page 739] in the course of duty.352 In 2008, moreover, a majority of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Kirkland-Veenstra v Stuart (No 2)353 envisaged functions of a police officer exercisable regardless of government direction, and thereby amenable to grants of indemnity certificates. The case involved litigation surrounding the exercise by a police officer of a power conferred by s 10 of the Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic) to apprehend a person who appears to be

mentally ill if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person has recently attempted suicide or attempted to cause serious bodily harm to herself or himself or to another person, or is likely to do the foregoing. Nettle JA, with whom Warren CJ agreed, awarded the police officer in question an indemnity certificate, reasoning as follows:354 As it appears to me, s 10 of the Mental Health Act 1986 is in terms such that it vests the power of apprehension to which it refers in a police officer as such and not in the Crown. If so, it is not to be exercised on behalf of the Crown. As with other powers of arrest and apprehension, a police officer is in the first instance responsible to the public for the proper exercise of the power vested in him or her by Parliament, and if the Crown were to interfere with the police officer in the exercise of the power, it would be no answer to a prosecution by a member of the public for neglect of duty that the police officer had been commanded by the Crown to abstain from exercise of the power.

This form of reasoning invites the court to distinguish those functions vested in a police officer as an officer of the Crown from those that are not. It is by no means self-evident as to how the power vested in s 10 of the Mental Health Act 1986 differs in substance from the bulk of powers vesting in police officers, which then makes it challenging to determine where the line is to be drawn. The dissenting view, espoused by Maxwell P, is to be preferred. His Honour characterised the officers as government respondents, as they were not sued in their capacity as private citizens ‘but in their official capacity as police officers’ and the proceedings have defended ‘on the basis that their conduct was wholly consistent with the proper discharge of their duties as police officers’.355 Viewed in this way, his Honour added, ‘a police officer while on duty is as much a public servant — a representative of the Crown — as is any other officer of the executive government when discharging the functions of his/her office’, which was presumably the basis on which the actions of police officers are treated as amenable to judicial review.356 21.61 In New South Wales, if a respondent to an appeal is a legally assisted person,357 the respondent is, for the purpose of exercising the discretion and for determining the amount he or she is entitled to be paid from the fund, deemed not to be a legally assisted person and to have incurred such costs as have been incurred by any other person in the course of acting for the respondent as a legally assisted person.358 Also, in Victoria, payments made or expenses incurred by Victoria Legal Aid in respect of the provision of legal assistance to any person in accordance with the Legal Aid Act 1978

(Vic), for the purposes of the appeal costs legislation, are to be taken to be made or incurred by that person.359 [page 740]

Payments not otherwise authorised by the legislation 21.62 New South Wales is unique in conferring upon the Director-General the discretion, with the concurrence of the Attorney-General, to pay from the fund an amount not exceeding $10,000 towards the costs of a party to an appeal or other proceedings who is not otherwise entitled to a payment from the fund in respect of the costs if the Director-General is of the opinion that a payment from the fund in respect of the costs, although not otherwise authorised by the legislation, would be within its spirit and intent.360 In the remaining jurisdictions, where circumstances arise that fall outside the express terms of the statute in question, no statutory entitlement to an indemnity certificate arises.361

1.

Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth); Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW); Appeal Costs Fund Act 1973 (Qld); Appeal Costs Fund Act 1968 (Tas); Appeal Costs Act 1998 (Vic); Suitors’ Fund Act 1964 (WA). The jurisdictional abbreviations in this chapter are to these Acts. South Australia has passed equivalent legislation, the Appeal Costs Fund Act 1979. It is modelled on the Tasmanian legislation albeit more limited in its scope, but though assented on 13 March 1979, it has never been proclaimed.

2.

Chacmol Holdings Pty Ltd v Handberg [2005] FCAFC 191; BC200507912 at [8] per the court.

3.

Jaycar Pty Ltd v Lombardo [2011] NSWCA 284; BC201107097 at [63] per Campbell JA, with whom Young and Meagher JJA concurred.

4.

See 20.2, 20.12. This is not to say that an appellate court is hamstrung in its discretion, and must award the successful appellant the costs of both the trial and the appeal: see 20.3–20.11. However, at general law the court had no fund from which to compensate an unsuccessful respondent.

5.

R v Hookham (No 2) (1993) 32 NSWLR 345 at 346; BC9302293 per Priestley JA.

6.

Namely NSW s 6, as to which see 21.21–21.22.

7.

(1965) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 531 at 533. See also Gurnett v Macquarie Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (No 2) (1956) 95 CLR 106 at 113; BC5600230 per Dixon CJ; Jansen v Dewhurst [1969] VR 421 at 429–30 per Newton J; Richards v Faulls Pty Ltd [1971] WAR 129 at 138 (FC); Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Ltd v Woodhall Ltd [1972] Tas SR 41 at 43 per Burbury CJ (FC); Re

Pennington (deceased) [1972] VR 869 at 875 (FC); Brisbane City Council v Ferro Enterprises Pty Ltd [1976] Qd R 332 at 334–5 per Hoare J (FC); Pickford v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1981] VR 583 at 585–6 per Brooking J (FC); Steel v Appeal Costs Board [1981] WAR 299 at 300 per Wickham J; Re Cooke [1997] 1 Qd R 15 at 23; BC9506004 per White J; Director of Public Prosecutions v Sher (No 2) (2000) 116 A Crim R 458 at 459; [2000] VSC 350; BC200005624 per Gillard J; Yunghanns v Yunghanns (2000) FLC ¶93-029 at 87,475; [2000] FamCA 681 per Lindenmayer and Holden JJ (FC). 8.

This has also been recommended in Western Australia: WALRC 92, Vol 1, p 538.

9.

Marriage of Kudelka (1986) FLC ¶91-719 at 75,223 per Asche J (FC) (who lamented that the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) s 9(1)(a) (see 21.9) was limited to questions of law). See also Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Ltd v Woodhall Ltd [1972] Tas SR 41 at 43 per Burbury CJ (FC) (‘A layman might be forgiven for failing to understand why he should be indemnified against costs occasioned by mistakes made by judges and magistrates on questions of law but not on questions of fact’).

10. Balenzuela v De Gail (1959) 101 CLR 226 at 235–6 per Dixon CJ, at 243–4 per Windeyer J. 11. Gurnett v Macquarie Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (No 2) (1956) 95 CLR 106 at 113; BC5600230 per Dixon CJ (in dissent, but not on this point). See, for example, Cameron v Nominal Defendant [2001] 1 Qd R 476 at 480; [2000] QCA 137; BC200001894 (where the application and appeal related to the interpretation of the new rules of court and raised a matter of some importance to litigants generally). Cf Palamore Pty Ltd v Shire of Broome (FC(WA), Malcolm CJ, Kennedy and Franklyn JJ, 23 July 1998, unreported) BC9803477 (ruling that the meaning of a phrase in a statutory provision did not involve a question of law because the issue was simply whether the facts in the case came within the terms of that provision). 12. Instrumatic Ltd v Supabrase Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 519 at 521 per Lord Denning MR; Barry v Shoobridge [1971] Tas SR 265 at 268–9 per Burbury CJ; Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Ltd v Woodhall Ltd [1972] Tas SR 41 at 44–5 per Burbury CJ, at 50 per Crawford J (FC); Marriage of Kudelka (1986) FLC ¶91-719 at 75,225 per Asche J (FC). 13. R v Jenkins [1970] Tas SR 13 at 15 per Crisp J. 14. Jenkins v Gleeson (1983) 67 FLR 469 at 470 per Blackburn J (FCA); Marriage of Kudelka (1986) FLC ¶91-719 at 75,223 per Asche J (FC); Phipson Nominees Pty Ltd v French (1989) 91 ALR 509 at 511–12 per Miles J (FCA). 15. See 21.4–21.14. 16. See 21.15–21.49. 17. See 21.50–21.61. 18. Cth s 3(1). 19. ‘Judgment’ includes any decree, order or decision, whether final or interlocutory, and a conviction or sentence: Cth s 3(1). 20. ‘Territory’ does not include the Northern Territory or Norfolk Island: Cth s 3(1). 21. Norman v Spiers [2005] ACTCA 14; BC200502003 at [6]–[7]. 22. ACT Fire Brigade v Nester [2004] ACTSC 125; BC200408509 at [42] per Bennett J. 23. See, for example, Kowalski v Domestic Violence Crisis Service Inc [2002] FCA 1227; BC200205852 at [9]–[12] per Madgwick J (appeal to the Federal Court from a decision of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission); ACT Fire Brigade v Nester [2004] ACTSC

125; BC200408509 at [42] per Bennett J (appeal from the Australian Capital Territory Discrimination Tribunal). 24. As to the meaning of ‘heard’ in this context see 21.58. 25. A certificate can only be granted on the application of the relevant party, not on the court’s own motion: Tyson v Tyson (No 2) (1993) FLC ¶92-401 at 80,111 (FC). However, where the case is one that, in the court’s opinion, there are grounds for applying for a certificate but there has been no such application, it may, in order to avoid unnecessary expense, request written submissions on this point instead of reconvening the court: Marriage of Raja Bahrin (1986) 11 Fam LR 233 at 270 per Gee J. 26. Cth s 6(1), 6(2) (see, for example, Sanders v Snell (No 2) (2000) 174 ALR 53 at 58; BC200004453 per Kirby J (HC)). 27. ‘Costs’, in relation to proceedings, includes: (a) the costs of obtaining a costs certificate in respect of the proceedings; and (b) the costs of taxing, or otherwise ascertaining, costs in respect of the proceedings: Cth s 3(1). 28. A reference in the Act to ‘costs incurred’ by a person in relation to proceedings must be read as a reference to costs ascertained as if they were costs as between party and party: Cth s 4(1). The amount of any such costs incurred (other than costs to which s 4(2)(b) applies) is: (a) an amount agreed on in respect of those costs by the Attorney-General and the person who has been granted the costs certificate in relation to those costs; or (b) where under the regulations the amount of those costs has been assessed for the purposes of the Act by an officer of a court — the amount so assessed: Cth s 4(2)(a). Where any such costs have been ordered by a court to be paid to the person by another party to the proceedings and their amount is specified in, or has been ascertained in accordance with, the order of the court — the amount of those costs is the amount so specified or ascertained, as the case may be: Cth s 4(2)(b). A reference in this context to the costs incurred by a person in relation to a federal appeal must, where the appeal is in a sequence of appeals that includes earlier federal appeal(s), be read as including a reference to the costs incurred by the person in relation to that or those appeal(s): Cth s 11. 29. Cth s 6(3). As to costs certificates granted to an appellant see 21.6. 30. Secretary, Dept of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs v Mouratidis (2012) 200 FCR 464; [2012] FCAFC 29; BC201201402 at [45] per Gray J. 31. Cth s 15(1). 32. For the meaning of ‘costs incurred’ see n 28. 33. Under Cth s 6(1), 6(2): see 21.5. 34. Cth s 7(1) (see, for example, Marriage of Wade-Ferrell (2001) 27 Fam LR 484 at 496; [2001] FamCA 138; (FC)). 35. Cth s 7(2). 36. Cth s 15(2). 37. Cth s 7A(1). 38. For the meaning of ‘costs incurred’ see n 28. 39. Cth s 7A(2). 40. The phrase ‘a new trial in a cause’ does not comprehend a hearing of an administrative process, meaning that the Federal Court has no power to grant a costs certificate when remitting a matter to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal: Kunz v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (No 2) (1996) 62

FCR 345 at 346; BC9600636 per Jenkinson J; De Domenico v Marshall (No 2) (2001) 107 FCR 11 at 13–14; [2001] FCA 135; BC200100624 (FC). 41. Cth s 8(1). 42. ‘Sequence of appeals’ means a sequence of appeals in which each appeal that follows next after another appeal in the sequence is an appeal against the judgment in that other appeal: Cth s 3(1). 43. Cth s 8(2). 44. Cth s 8(3). 45. Nilant v Macchia [2000] FCA 1414; BC200005961 at [14] (FC). 46. In Marsden v Winch (Costs) [2008] FamCAFC 32; BC200850099 at [18] the court remarked that ‘an appeal can only be said to have succeeded within the meaning of the legislation if a new trial is ordered or, alternatively, a different outcome is ordered following the re-exercise of the discretion’. 47. In accordance with the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117: see 8.70. 48. As to the meaning of ‘heard’ in this context see 21.58. 49. See n 25. 50. Cth s 9(1). See, for example, Twigg and Twigg v Kung (1994) 17 Fam LR 391 at 398–9 (FC(Fam Ct)). Cf Marriage of Wade-Ferrell (2001) 27 Fam LR 484 at 496; [2001] FamCA 138 (FC) (where s 9(1) did not apply because the appeal succeeded only on questions of fact, namely errors of the trial judge in calculating the net pool of assets available for division in the proceedings). 51. Wright v Barry (1992) 110 FLR 67 at 77 (FC(Fam Ct)) (referring to Cth ss 6(3)(b), 7(1)(a), 9(1) (b)). 52. For the meaning of ‘costs incurred’ see n 28. 53. Cth s 9(2). 54. Re Gyselman and Gyselman (1992) FLC ¶92-289 at 79,141 (FC) (adding that the same applies in respect of Cth ss 6 (see 21.5) and 8 (see 21.8)). 55. Cth s 15(3). 56. ‘Territory’ does not include the Northern Territory or Norfolk Island: Cth s 3(1). 57. The words ‘the court may’ require that the court in which the hearing was initially aborted or discontinued is the court in which the application for a certificate should be heard: Santoro v Santoro [2010] FamCA 126; BC201050324 at [9] per Watts J (adding that ‘[i]f the Parliament intended for a court other than a court where the discontinuance occurred to hear and grant such an application for a certificate it would have specifically said “a court may”’). 58. Cth s 10(1), 10(2), 10(5). See, for example, Dahler v Thor (2010) 44 Fam LR 191; [2010] FamCAFC 164; BC201050797 (certificate granted to each party arising out of the reasons never being delivered due to the Federal Magistrate’s resignation: at [32]–[34] per May J). 59. Salah v Aharat [2008] FamCA 19 at [5] per Stevenson J. 60. Foody v Horewood (2000) 96 FCR 386 at 388; [2000] FCA 37; BC200000124 per Finkelstein J. 61. The term ‘neglect’ has been held to include a failure to do some act ‘which results in the discontinuance of the hearing and a new hearing being ordered’: Marriage of Veney (1983) FLC ¶91-355 at 78,378 per Hogan J (ruling that as counsel for the wife had known of factors that when raised would have caused the judge at the first trial to disqualify himself, but did not raise the

matter until well into the hearing, the trial was discontinued because of the neglect of counsel, such that neither party was entitled to a certificate: at 78,379). 62. An independent children’s lawyer can be treated as a party for this purpose, and therefore apply and receive a certificate: Reisner v Reisner (Costs) [2010] FamCA 588; BC201050614 (where May J noted the statutory and rule-based provisions under which an independent children’s lawyer is treated as a party: at [12]–[13]). 63. Re Morris (1986) 66 ALR 699 at 700 per Muirhead J (FCA). 64. (1985) 7 FCR 106. 65. Coulson v Gosford Meats Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 106 at 107. See also Wilhelm v Marla (2009) FLC ¶93-400; [2009] FamCAFC 58 (where Coleman J granted a costs certificate where on the day of the hearing his Honour transferred the matter to a full bench). 66. (1994) 122 FLR 15 at 17 (SC(ACT)). 67. Re Palmdale Insurance Ltd (1994) 122 FLR 15 at 18–19 (SC(ACT)). 68. Re Morris (1986) 66 ALR 699 at 700 per Muirhead J (FCA). 69. Re Morris (1986) 66 ALR 699 at 700 per Muirhead J (FCA) (adding that had the legislature intended to cover adjournments, it would have inserted the words ‘or adjourned’ or ‘adjournment’ after the words ‘discontinued’ and ‘discontinuance’ respectively in s 10(3)). 70. Marriage of Redshaw (1989) 13 Fam LR 495. 71. See, for example, Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Forrest [2000] FCA 907; BC200003757 at [6] per Kiefel J; Ward v Schembri (2005) 33 Fam LR 546; [2005] FamCA 568 at [26]–[31] per Guest J (rejecting the view expressed by Purdy J in Lindner v Lindner (1985) FLC ¶91-638 that ‘a case has commenced to a state capable of discontinuance when counsel have announced their appearance on a day notified to the parties unequivocally as a date for hearing’: at 80,154); H v L [2007] FMCAfam 125; BC200701948 at [114] per Cameron FM (where the matter was simply called on before a Federal Magistrate for directions following the unexpected unavailability of the Federal Magistrate to whom the matter had been allocated for hearing); Marsh v Marsh (2009) 42 Fam LR 310; [2009] FMCAfam 1160; BC200910569 (where Pascoe CFM characterised what occurred as more akin to a postponement or adjournment of the final hearing than the discontinuance of a hearing that has already commenced: at [39]). The narrow construction has also prevailed in other jurisdictions: see 21.30. 72. Ward v Schembri (2005) 33 Fam LR 546; [2005] FamCA 568 at [26] per Guest J. 73. Cth s 10(4). 74. Under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 23. 75. Cth s 10A(1). 76. Cth s 10A(2). 77. Under Cth s 10(2), 10(3), as to which see 21.10–21.11. 78. This amount depends on court or tribunal in question: High Court ($10,000); Federal Court ($6,000); Family Court ($4,000); Supreme Court of a Territory ($6,000); other court of a territory ($2,000); Administrative Appeals Tribunal ($2,000): Cth s 18(1), Sch. 79. Cth s 18(2), 18(2A). 80. Payments under the Act are to be made out of moneys available under an appropriation made by the parliament: Cth s 19.

81. Cth s 16(1), 16(2). 82. Victoria v Australian Building Construction Employees’ and Builders Labourers’ Federation (No 2) (1982) 152 CLR 179 at 183 per Gibbs CJ, at 184 per Murphy J, at 184–5 per Wilson J; BC8200132. Cf at 186–7 per Brennan J. 83. The Attorney-General is entitled to presume that the certificate will not be vacated where: (a) there has been no appeal, or application for leave to appeal, against the judgment in the federal appeal to which the costs certificate relates by the respondent that could result in the vacation of the certificate; and (b) the Attorney-General has been given: (i) notice in writing by that respondent that he or she does not intend to appeal against that judgment; or (ii) in the case of a certificate granted to an appellant to the appeal — notice in writing by the appellant that the appellant has no reason to believe that the respondent will appeal against the judgment: Cth s 17(2). Where: (a) a notice referred to in (b) above has been given by, or in relation to, a respondent to a federal appeal; (b) an amount has been paid under the Act to a person who has been granted a costs certificate in respect of the appeal that would not have been paid but for that notice; and (c) that respondent appeals, or seeks leave to appeal, against the judgment in the appeal; the person so paid must, upon demand in writing by the Attorney-General served on the person repay that amount to the Commonwealth: Cth s 17(3). 84. Cth s 17(1). 85. NSW s 2(1). 86. Qld s 4; Tas s 2. 87. Vic s 3(1). See, for example, Aboriginal Hostels Ltd v Fisher (SC(Vic), Hedigan J, 27 November 1997, unreported) BC9706288 at 3 (ruling that a proceeding to have the order of the Residential Tenancies Tribunal set aside was at least an ‘other proceeding in the nature of an appeal’). 88. Which deals with appeals from courts of summary jurisdiction. An appeal under Pt 3 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) (‘appeals from superior courts’) is also amenable to a certificate, but under the guise of ‘any other proceedings in the nature of an appeal’: State of Western Australia v Burke (No 2) [2012] WASCA 129; BC201204644 at [41] per Buss JA. 89. WA s 3. 90. Wentworth v Wentworth (1999) 46 NSWLR 300 at 320; [1999] NSWSC 317; BC9901514 per Santow J (affd Wentworth v Wentworth (2000) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] NSWCA 350; BC200007784). 91. Australian Postal Commission v Dao (No 2) (1986) 6 NSWLR 497 at 515 per McHugh JA; R v Director of Corrective Services (2001) 10 Tas R 141 at 144; [2001] TASSC 21; BC200100810 per Blow J. 92. Ex parte Parsons (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 380; R v Marshall [1984] VR 211 at 228 per Fullagar J (reversed without reference to this point: R v Marshall [1986] VR 19); R v Webster [1987] 1 Qd R 45 at 50 per Connolly J (FC); Production Spray Painting & Panel Beating Pty Ltd v Newnham (1991) 27 NSWLR 644 at 658 per Priestley and Handley JJA; Basapa v Burton (1991) ASC ¶56049 at 56,726; BC9101178 per White AJ (SC(WA)); R v Cowling (1994) 71 A Crim R 198 at 208 per Batt J (SC(Vic)); Ex parte Juras (FC(WA), Franklyn, Murray and Owen JJ, 11 October 1996, unreported) BC9606460 at 14–15 per Murray J, with whom Franklyn and Owen JJ concurred; Director-General of Fair Trading v O’Shane (SC(NSW), Graham AJ, 22 August 1997, unreported) BC9703791; R v Watling (1998) 7 Tas R 404; BC9802015; Re Boothman [1999] WASC 102; BC9904330 at [7]–[9] per Owen J; R v Director of Corrective Services (2001) 10 Tas R 141 at 144; [2001] TASSC 21; BC200100810 per Blow J; Kirsch v Dolman (2001) 123 A Crim

R 331; [2001] VSC 234; BC200104511 at [41]–[46] per Gillard J; Re Oscar [2002] NSWSC 887; BC200205814 at [8], [9] per Hamilton J; Commissioner of Corrective Services v Government and Related Employees Appeal Tribunal (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 337; BC200406277 at [9] per Giles JA; Howlin v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (No 2) (2009) 18 Tas R 397; [2009] TASSC 20; BC200901822 at [3]–[7] per Blow J; Dawson v Bethonga Whole Foods Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 172; BC200903376 at [27] per Cavanough J. 93. Ex parte Neville (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 372. See also Castlepoint Holdings Pty Ltd v Frederici (1967) 86 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 225 at 235 per Lee J; Builders Licensing Board v Pride Constructions Pty Ltd [1979] 1 NSWLR 607 at 617–18 per Cross J (proceeding by way of case stated from court of petty sessions). Cf R v Director of Corrective Services (2001) 10 Tas R 141 at 144; [2001] TASSC 21; BC200100810 per Blow J (proceedings designed to impeach not the sentencing decision made by the magistrate but the warrant for commitment of the applicant to prison held not to be ‘in the nature of an appeal’). 94. Tisdale v Ballanday Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 56; BC200900654 at [15] per Macready AsJ. 95. Re Cooke [1997] 1 Qd R 15 at 23; BC9506004 per White J. 96. Walker v Law Society of Tasmania (No 2) (SC(Tas), Crawford J, 13 December 1991, unreported) BC9100015. As to the review of taxation by a court see 18.68–18.76. 97. Re Freehill Hollingdale & Page’s Bill of Costs [1998] 1 Qd R 616 at 627; BC9701884 per Lee J (under the Legal Practitioners Act 1995 (Qld) s 13 (repealed)). 98. Mir Bros Developments Pty Ltd v Atlantic Constructions Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 491. 99. Onions v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 270. 100. NSW s 2(1). 101. Australian Postal Commission v Dao (No 2) (1986) 6 NSWLR 497 at 516 per McHugh JA. 102. Shell Oil Co of Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1931] AC 275 at 297 per Lord Sankey LC. A not dissimilar catalogue of factors is found in Attorney General v British Broadcasting Corporation [1979] 3 All ER 45 at 55 per Eveleigh LJ. 103. (1986) 6 NSWLR 497. 104. Australian Postal Commission v Dao (No 2) (1986) 6 NSWLR 497 at 513. 105. Australian Postal Commission v Dao (No 2) (1986) 6 NSWLR 497 at 513–14. McHugh JA similarly identified the correct approach as for the court to ask itself whether, bearing in mind the general purpose of the Act, parliament must be taken to have intended that the tribunal in issue should qualify as a court: at 516. 106. (1995) 35 NSWLR 719 at 723–4, with whom Mahoney and Meagher JJA concurred. 107. Moama Bowling Club Ltd v Armstrong (No 2) (1995) 64 IR 264 at 268–9 per Cahill DCJ and Peterson J. 108. Trust Company of Australia Ltd v Skiwing Pty Ltd (2006) 68 NSWLR 366; [2006] NSWCA 387; BC200610810 at [74] per Basten JA. 109. Grygiel v Baine (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 434; BC200510758 at [23] per Basten JA. See also Hughes v Clubb (1987) 10 NSWLR 325 at 333–4 per Yeldham J (same ruling vis-à-vis the earlier Consumer Claims Tribunal); Portazon Pty Ltd v Fair Trading Tribunal [1999] NSWSC 1084; BC9907283 at [16]–[21] per Sully J (same ruling vis-à-vis the earlier Fair Trading Tribunal). 110. Qidwai v Brown [1984] 1 NSWLR 100 at 102 per Hutley JA (although the issue did not appear to

be specifically argued in that case). 111. Anderson Stuart v Treleaven [2000] NSWSC 536; BC200003435 at [10]–[16] per Santow J (influenced by the fact that, inter alia, the board: (1) was required to give reasons for its decisions; (2) had the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths and deal with contempt; (3) was constituted by a magistrate; and (4) exercised an appellate jurisdiction with respect to decisions of the Strata Titles Commissioner: at [10]). 112. (1969) 89 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 350 at 358. 113. [2011] NSWSC 1568 (being influenced by findings that: (1) it was not clear that a determination of an adjudicator is more than an interim determination; (2) the legislature intended the adjudication process to remain in parallel with the enforcement of rights in a court; (3) nomination of an adjudicator is one step removed from a nomination by an officer of the government; (4) an adjudicator has no power to punish for contempt). 114. Wentworth v Wentworth (1999) 46 NSWLR 300 at 320–1; [1999] NSWSC 317; BC9901514 per Santow J (affd Wentworth v Wentworth (2000) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] NSWCA 350; BC200007784). Cf the position in Tasmania as discussed in Walker v Law Society of Tasmania (No 2) (SC(Tas), Crawford J, 13 December 1991, unreported) BC9100015 (where an application for an order to review a taxation was held to come within the terms of Tas s 8(1)(a)(ii): see 21.20). 115. See, for example, C & M Trimboli Plasterers v Fazzolari (FC(WA), Kennedy, Owen and Scott JJ, 19 March 1997, unreported) BC9700427 at 5–6 per Scott J (ruling that the Compensation Magistrates’ Court was a ‘court’ for this purpose). Cf Harrison v Racing Penalties Appeal Tribunal of Western Australia (FC(WA), Kennedy, Ipp and Scott JJ, 30 May 1996, unreported) BC9602432 (the tribunal denied status as a ‘court’). 116. Qld s 4; Vic s 3(1). See, for example, Aboriginal Hostels Ltd v Fisher (SC(Vic), Hedigan J, 27 November 1997, unreported) BC9706288 at 2 (where the Residential Tenancies Tribunal was held to be a ‘court’ for this purpose because it was empowered to reserve a question of law in the form of a special case for the opinion of the Supreme Court); Queensland Conservation Council Inc v Xstrata Coal Queensland Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 377; BC200709354 (Land and Resources Tribunal is a court for this purpose). 117. Tas s 8(1)(a)(ii). 118. A decision of a judge (or tribunal member) not to disqualify himself or herself upon an application to do so has been held not to amount to a ‘decision of a court’ for this purpose: Commissioner of Corrective Services v Government and Related Employees Appeal Tribunal (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 337; BC200406277 at [17]–[18] per Giles JA. However, the court ruled that a determination on an application for a stay of proceedings did amount to a decision for this purpose: at [25]–[30]. 119. The Queensland and Tasmanian legislation provides that ‘respondent’ includes the next friend of an infant or person under disability or the guardian ad litem of any person: Qld s 4; Tas s 2. The Western Australian legislation devotes a specific provision entitling guardians ad litem to indemnity certificates: WA s 14A (subject to a limit of $1,000). 120. NSW s 6(1); Qld s 15(1) (see, for example, R v Llorente [2001] 2 Qd R 415; [2000] QCA 377; BC200005674); Tas s 8(1) (see, for example, Partridge v Hobart City Council (No 2) [2013] TASFC 1; BC201300256 at [19] per Blow J, with whom Crawford CJ and Wood J concurred); WA s 10(1) (see, for example, Mastrangelo v Reynolds (2001) 25 WAR 133 at 145; [2001] WASCA 347; BC200106897 per Malcolm CJ; Wilson v McDonald (2009) 193 A Crim R 80; [2009] WASCA 39 (S); BC200903987 at [20] per Martin CJ). Although the Tasmanian provision is phrased in terms slightly different to those in the other jurisdictions, the differences do not go to

matters of substance. 121. An appeal from a master to a judge is ‘an appeal’ for this purpose: Parkesinclair Chemicals (Aust) Pty Ltd v Asia Associates Inc [2000] VSC 336; BC200005192; Harris v Bennett (No 2) [2002] VSC 163; BC200202244 at [23] per McDonald J; Ginnity v Prefsure Life Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSC 293; BC200706610 at [12] per Hollingworth J. 122. If a respondent is a minor or a person under a disability, a reference to a ‘respondent’ includes a reference to his or her litigation guardian or a person who is his or her guardian within the meaning of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic): Vic s 3(2)(b). 123. Vic s 4(1) (see, for example, in Quadrant Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) v Morgan Smith Barney Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 535; BC200910673 at [6] per J Forrest J who, in granting a certificate under s 4(1), remarked that it is not necessary for an applicant for an indemnity certificate to have obtained a favourable result at first instance and then be a respondent to a successful appeal against that decision; s 4(1) focuses on the outcome of the appeal and whether the appellant ‘succeeds’). 124. Acquilina v Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd (1965) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 531 at 533 per Moffitt J. See also Director of Public Prosecutions v Sher (No 2) (2000) 116 A Crim R 458 at 459–60; [2000] VSC 350; BC200005624 per Gillard J (speaking of the Victorian legislation). For further examples see NSW ss 6A (see 21.29–21.33), 6B (see 21.35). 125. NSW s 6(1A); Qld s 15(2); WA s 10(2). 126. Under the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) s 56A (Class 1, 2 and 3 proceedings appeals to the court against decisions of Commissioners). 127. NSW s 6(1AA). 128. Vic s 4(2). 129. NSW s 6(2). 130. ‘Costs’ in this context includes: (a) the costs of the application for the indemnity certificate but, except as provided by (b), does not include costs incurred in a court of first instance; and (b) where a new trial is ordered upon the appeal, the costs of the first trial: NSW s 2(1). 131. Being 50 per cent or such other percentage as may be prescribed (at the time when the indemnity certificate is granted) by the Governor by proclamation published in the Government Gazette: NSW s 6(2)(b). 132. For the purposes of s 6, a taxing officer of a court, when acting as such a taxing officer, is deemed to exercise the jurisdiction of a court of first instance: NSW s 6(1B). If an amount is payable from the fund in relation to costs incurred in an appeal, and taxation of the costs was not contested by the other party to the appeal, the Director-General may reduce the amount payable to an amount that would, in its opinion, have been payable had the taxation been contested: s 6D. It has been held that the taxation of an applicant’s costs in this context would be on some type of ‘solicitor and client’ basis (as to which see 16.18–16.22): Acquilina v Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd (1965) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 531 at 539 per Moffitt J (ruling that on the facts it would have been ‘entirely wrong’ to make an order that would permit the applicant to receive indemnity for costs in the Full Court appeal). 133. See 15.1, 15.3. 134. In Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria, the Appeal Costs Fund; in Western Australia, the Suitors’ Fund. 135. Qld s 16(1); Tas s 9(1); Vic s 5(1); WA s 11(1).

136. The relevant costs include the appellant’s costs of the appeal in respect of which the certificate was granted, and (in Queensland and Victoria) of a new trial had in consequence of an order made upon an appeal for a new trial: Qld s 16(1)(a); Tas s 9(1)(a)(i); Vic s 16(1)(a); WA s 11(1)(a). Also, ‘costs’, in relation to an appeal, include the costs of an application for an indemnity certificate in respect of an appeal but do not include costs incurred in a court of first instance except where otherwise expressly provided: Qld s 4; Tas s 2; Vic s 3(1); WA s 3. 137. The Queensland Board is established pursuant to Qld s 6, and its constitution and operation is prescribed by ss 7–9. The Victorian Board is established pursuant to Vic Pt 5. In Western Australia, the constitution and operation of the Appeal Costs Board is prescribed by WA ss 8, 9. 138. ‘Appellant’ includes the next friend of an infant or person under disability or the guardian ad litem of any person: Qld s 4. 139. The Tasmanian provision refers simply to ‘the respondent’s taxed costs’. 140. An order for payment out of the estate, whether it expressly directed the trustees to make the payment or left that direction to implication, amounts to an order that the costs be paid by another party (within the meaning of the equivalent previous provision, Appeal Costs Fund Act 1964 (Vic) s 14(1)(b)): Re Pennington (deceased) [1972] VR 869 at 876 (FC) (which added that there was nothing in that sub-section that would justify construing it as confining the limitation on recourse to the Fund to those cases in which the order for payment is made against another party in his or her personal capacity, or to cases in which the order made is such that no part of the burden of it falls on the grantee of the certificate: at 876). 141. [1981] WAR 299 at 300. 142. ‘Sequence of appeals’ means a sequence of appeals in which each appeal that follows next after another appeal in the sequence is an appeal against the decision in that other appeal: NSW s 2(1); Qld s 4; Tas s 2; Vic s 3(1); WA s 3. 143. Acquilina v Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd (1965) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 531 at 535 per Moffitt J. 144. Jones v Skelton (1966) 9 FLR 318 at 320–1 per Sugerman JA (SC(NSW)). 145. ‘Director-General’ means the Director-General of the Attorney General’s Department, or any person employed within that Department who is authorised in writing by the Director-General to exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Director-General under the Act: NSW s 2(1). 146. ‘Registrar’ means the Registrar of the Supreme Court and includes the Deputy Registrar and the Assistant Deputy Registrar: Tas s 2. 147. NSW s 6(2)(a), proviso; Qld s 16(2); Tas s 9(2); WA s 11(2). 148. If an appellant is a minor or a person under a disability, a reference to an ‘appellant’ includes a reference to his or her litigation guardian or a person who is his or her guardian within the meaning of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic): Vic s 3(2)(a). 149. Vic s 6(1). 150. Vic s 6(3) (namely $50,000). 151. [1981] WAR 299 at 301 (paragraph break omitted). 152. NSW s 6(2), proviso; Tas s 9(3); WA s 11(3)(a). 153. Steel v Appeal Costs Board [1981] WAR 299 at 300 at 301 per Wickham J; State of Western Australia v Burke (No 2) [2012] WASCA 129; BC201204644 at [19] per Buss JA.

154. Qld s 16(3); Appeal Costs Fund Regulation 2010 (Qld) s 14(1). 155. NSW s 6(2)(b), proviso. 156. NSW s 6(2A). 157. NSW s 6(2B). 158. Qld s 16(3); Appeal Costs Fund Regulation 2010 (Qld) s 14(1) ($15,000). 159. Tas s 7A; Appeal Costs Fund Regulations 2003 (Tas) reg 6 ($11,500). 160. Vic s 5(2) ($50,000). 161. WA ss 11(3)(b), 14A(2) ($1,000 in respect of guardians ad litem); Suitors’ Fund Regulations 1965 (WA) reg 14 ($2,000). 162. See, for example, WALRC 92, Vol 1, p, 536, 537 (describing the relevant ceiling as ‘almost a joke’, and recommending that, subject to judicial discretion, the unsuccessful respondent should be entitled to have paid out of the Suitors’ Fund an amount equal to the taxed (or agreed) party and party costs recovered by the appellant); Evans v Evans [2011] NSWCA 92; BC201102303 at [144] per Campbell JA (who remarked that ‘[t]he practical value of that indemnity is severely limited in practice by there being a maximum amount of $10,000 payable from the Fund concerning any one appeal other than an appeal to the High Court’). 163. For the meaning of ‘sequence of appeals’ see n 142. This definition is general in terms and the scheme for vacating earlier certificates provided by NSW s 6(3) demonstrates that a sequence of appeals covers cases where parties alternate in being appellants: Acquilina v Dairy Farmers Cooperative Milk Co Ltd (1965) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 531 at 537 per Moffitt J. 164. NSW s 6(3); Qld s 19; Tas s 12(1); Vic s 32(1); WA s 12(1). 165. Gurnett v Macquarie Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (No 2) (1956) 95 CLR 106 at 110; BC5600230 per Dixon CJ (in dissent but not on this point). 166. NSW s 6(4)(a)(i)–(iv); Qld s 20(1); Tas s 13(1); Vic ss 33, 34; WA s 12(2). 167. Where an undertaking has been given and the respondent thereafter seeks leave to appeal, or appeals, against the decision to which the undertaking relates, the respondent must, upon demand made by the Director-General (in Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia the Board; in Tasmania, the registrar), pay to the Director-General (board/registrar) any amount paid to (or for and on behalf of) the respondent under the indemnity certificate: NSW s 6(4)(b); Qld s 20(4); Tas s 13(5); Vic s 34(3); WA s 12(4)(a). 168. NSW s 6(4)(a)(v), 6(4)(a)(vi); Qld s 20(3); Tas s 13(3); Vic s 32(3); WA s 12(3). 169. ‘Costs’ refers to legal costs, and does not include travelling time or loss of wages resulting from the incompleteness of the proceedings: Re Appeal Costs Board (2001) 120 A Crim R 361 at 363– 4; [2001] WASCA 53; BC200100549 per Kennedy J. 170. This includes any civil or criminal proceedings, which the Tasmanian legislation prescribes is to include: (a) any proceedings of a civil or criminal nature; and (b) any such proceedings before a judicial officer exercising jurisdiction pursuant to an Act of the Commonwealth: Tas s 15(4). 171. Cf Tasker v Algar and Algar [1930] NZLR 61, discussed at 20.25. 172. NSW s 6A(1)(a); Qld s 22(1)(a); Tas s 15(1)(a); WA s 14(1)(a) (see Re Suitors’ Fund Act 1964 (WA) (2002) 135 A Crim R 48; [2002] WASC 243; BC200206264 at [13] per Roberts-Smith J, who noted the reason for the distinction between proceedings rendered abortive by disagreement of the jury and those discontinued for some other reason ‘is probably quite simply that where a

trial aborts because of disagreement of the jury there can be no question of that being attributable to the fault of the accused, or of any party; whereas if a trial is discontinued for some other reason the board may direct payment of costs from the fund only if the judge certifies the discontinuance was not attributable to any act, neglect or default of the accused or his counsel or solicitor’). 173. Under the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 46A (appeal against damages may be heard by two judges) or the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) s 6AA (appeal against sentence may be heard by two judges). 174. NSW s 6A(1)(a1). 175. NSW s 6A(1)(b); Qld s 22(1)(b); Tas s 15(1)(b); WA s 14(1)(b) (see also s 14(1)(ba)). The Queensland and Tasmanian legislation provides that where in criminal proceedings a presiding judicial officer directs that the proceedings being heard be discontinued with a view to other criminal proceedings being instituted against the accused, it is deemed that a new trial is ordered: Qld s 22(3); Tas s 15(3). 176. As to the meaning of ‘discontinued’ in this context see 21.30. 177. Thus in the application of the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW) the cause of discharge assumes importance: Greaves v Blackborrow (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 517 at 518 per Else-Mitchell J. 178. NSW s 6A(1)(c); Qld s 22(1)(c); Tas s 15(1)(c); WA s 14(1)(c). 179. A criminal proceeding is deemed to have been adjourned where the prosecution has notified the accused or his or her lawyer that a date has been fixed for the hearing of the proceeding and the proceeding is, without his or her consent, not listed for hearing on that day: WA s 14(1a). 180. Costs may be taken to have been ‘incurred’ only if the costs have been paid, or if the accused has undertaken a liability to pay them: Re Appeal Costs Board (2001) 120 A Crim R 361 at 364; [2001] WASCA 53; BC200100549 per Kennedy J. 181. WA s 14(1)(d). An application for a certificate with respect to the adjournment of a criminal proceeding may be made when the proceedings comes on for hearing and a certificate may then be granted: s 14(1b). 182. Tas s 15(1A). 183. See 21.11. 184. See the discussion in State of Western Australia v Quartermaine (No 2) [2012] WASC 138; BC201202477 at [15]–[17] per Sleight C. 185. [2003] NSWSC 1200; BC200308546 at [4]. 186. [2011] QDC 194. 187. A line of Queensland District Court authority supported this conclusion: see, for example, R v Khoury [2003] QDC 235 (where Hoath DCJ interpreted the expression ‘discontinued’ as meaning something quite different from an adjournment); R v Lacey [2009] QDC 303 at [21] per Rafter SC DCJ (who concluded that ‘the provision does not apply to the adjournment of a trial’). 188. See 21.29 para (a). 189. State of Western Australia v Quartermaine (No 2) [2012] WASC 138; BC201202477 at [16]–[17] per Sleight C. 190. See, for example, Grimwade v R (1990) 51 A Crim R 470. 191. State of Western Australia v Quartermaine (No 2) [2012] WASC 138; BC201202477 at [18] per Sleight C.

192. Greaves v Blackborrow (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 517 at 518 per Else-Mitchell J. 193. Greaves v Blackborrow (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 517 at 519. 194. (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 517. 195. Greaves v Blackborrow (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 517 at 519. Cf Messade v Baires Contracting Pty Ltd (Ruling No 5) [2011] VSC 177; BC201102638 (where J Forrest J granted a certificate, even though the jury was discharged owing to interaction between a juror and the plaintiff outside of court, as that interaction involved no more than eye contact between them, which caused the juror discomfort: at [9]–[10]). 196. As to orders for costs of abortive trials see 20.19–20.27. 197. NSW s 6A(1A). 198. NSW s 6A(1A), proviso. 199. NSW s 6A(1B) ($10,000); Tas s 7A; Appeal Costs Fund Regulations 2003 (Tas) reg 6 ($11,500 in respect of a certificate referred to in s 15(1)(c)). 200. As to the meaning of ‘the Crown’ for this purpose see 21.60. 201. NSW s 6A(2); Qld s 22(2); Tas s 19(2); WA s 14(2). 202. The meaning of ‘discontinued’ in Victoria attracts the same narrow construction as in other jurisdictions with equivalent statutory wording: see 21.30. 203. Vic s 10(1), 10(2). 204. Messade v Baires Contracting Pty Ltd (Ruling No 5) [2011] VSC 177; BC201102638 at [9] per J Forrest J. 205. Vic s 3(1). 206. Vic s 10(3). The factors that the board must take into account in considering whether costs have been ‘reasonably incurred’ are listed in s 35B. 207. The following are taken to be a criminal proceeding for this purpose: (a) an appeal to the Court of Appeal against a finding under the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 s 17(1)(c) or under the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 ss 14A or 24AA; (b) an investigation into a defendant’s fitness to stand trial under the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) Pt 2; or (c) a special hearing conducted under the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) Pt 3: Vic s 18. 208. Vic s 16(1), 16(2). If in a criminal proceeding the presiding judge or magistrate directs that the proceeding be discontinued without ordering a new hearing or trial but with a view to another hearing or trial based on the same facts, or facts of a similar character, being conducted against the accused, a new hearing or trial is deemed to have been ordered: s 16(4). 209. A criminal proceeding is deemed to have been adjourned for this purpose if the court hearing the proceeding, the informant or the Director of Public Prosecutions notifies the party accused or convicted of an offence (whether that party is a defendant, appellant or respondent) to which the proceeding relates, or his or her lawyer, that a date has been fixed for the hearing, and the proceeding is not listed for hearing on that day: Vic s 17(4). This implies that absent the deeming provision in s 17(4), there would not otherwise be an adjournment within the meaning of s 17(1). The terms of s 17(4) were amended by the Criminal Justice Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2002 (Vic) Pt 6 by the inclusion of the words ‘whether that party is a defendant, appellant or respondent’ as a response to the Victorian Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Hall

(2001) 4 VR 23 at 25; [2001] VSCA 181; BC200106319. The court had held that the deeming provision did not apply to a person who had been convicted and then became an appellant or respondent in an appeal because s 17(4) referred only to ‘the accused’, whereas s 17(1) includes a person ‘convicted of an offence’ (ruling that s 17(4), unlike s 17(1), did not extend to an application for leave to appeal: at 26). 210. Vic s 17(1). See, for example, R v Lubik (No 2) [2011] VSC 270; BC201104284. 211. Vic s 17(2)(a). 212. Vic s 17(5) (which states that the Attorney-General may, by order published in the Government Gazette, specify the maximum amount payable by the board for each day in respect of which an indemnity certificate has been granted under s 17: see Government Gazette, 27 September 2007, p 2217). 213. Vic s 17(3). The factors that the board must take into account in considering whether costs have been ‘reasonably incurred’ are listed in s 35B. 214. NSW s 6B(2). 215. NSW s 6B(1). If a respondent is a legally assisted person, for the purposes of exercising the discretion determining the amount the respondent is entitled to be paid from the fund, he or she is deemed not to be a legally assisted person and is deemed to have incurred such costs as have been incurred by any other person in the course of acting for the respondent as a legally assisted person: s 6B(5A). 216. Namely 50 per cent or such other percentage as may be prescribed (at the time when the indemnity certificate is granted) by the Governor by proclamation published in the Government Gazette: Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW) s 6B(1)(b). 217. Acquilina v Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd (1965) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 531 at 534 per Moffitt J. 218. Namely under NSW s 6(4)(a)(i)–(iv), 6(4)(b), as which see 21.28. 219. NSW s 6B(4). 220. Qld s 23(1); Tas s 16(1); WA s 15(1). 221. NSW s 6B(1)(a), proviso; Qld s 23(2)(a); Tas s 16(2)(a); WA s 15(1)(a). 222. NSW s 6B(1)(b), proviso. 223. NSW s 6B(1)(i); Qld s 23(2)(b); Tas s 16(2)(b); WA s 15(2)(a). 224. NSW s 6B(1)(ii) ($10,000 or such other amount as may be fixed by the regulations); Qld s 23(2) (c); Appeal Costs Fund Regulation 2010 (Qld) s 14(5) ($15,000); WA s 15(2)(b) ($1,000 or such other amount as may be prescribed). 225. ‘Appellant’ includes the next friend of an infant or person under disability and the guardian ad litem of a person: Qld s 4; Tas s 2. 226. In Queensland, the Magistrates Court or the District Court, as the case may be; in Tasmania, a court of summary jurisdiction; in Victoria, the Magistrates’ Court. 227. ‘Costs’, in relation to an appeal, includes the costs of an application for an indemnity certificate in respect of an appeal but, except where otherwise expressly provided, does not include costs incurred in a court of first instance: Qld s 4; Tas s 2; Vic s 3(1). 228. Qld s 17; Tas s 10; Vic s 7(1). 229. Qld s 18(1); Tas s 11(1); Vic s 7(2).

230. Qld s 18(2); Appeal Costs Fund Regulation 2010 (Qld) s 14(2) ($750); Tas s 11(2) ($300); Vic s 7(3) ($2,000). 231. Qld s 20(5); Tas s 13(4). 232. Namely those contained in Qld s 23(2), as to which see 21.36. 233. Namely the amounts referred to in Qld s 23(1)(a)–23(1)(c) (as to which see 21.35), read and construed as if a reference to the respondent were a reference to the appellant and a reference to the appellant were a reference to the respondent: s 23(3). 234. Vic s 8(1). 235. Vic s 8(2), 8(3). 236. Vic s 9(1), 9(3). 237. As to the phrase ‘some other Act or law’ see Ex parte Juras (FC(WA), Franklyn, Murray and Owen JJ, 11 October 1996, unreported) BC9606460 at 16–17 per Murray J; Re Boothman [1999] WASC 102; BC9904330 at [12]–[14] per Owen J. 238. WA s 12A(2). 239. This includes the costs incurred by the appellant in having those costs taxed, or in lieu of the taxed costs or that proportion of them an amount agreed upon by the board and the appellant or the appellant’s solicitor: WA s 12A(4)(b). 240. WA s 12A(4)(b). 241. Jaszkowski v Appeal Costs Board [1986] WAR 275 at 277–8 per Olney J. 242. Perry v R [1975] WAR 33 at 35 per Virtue SPJ (CCA). 243. Perry v R [1975] WAR 33 at 35–6 per Virtue SPJ (CCA). 244. Qld s 20(2); Tas s 13(2). 245. Vic s 34(2). 246. Vic s 32(2); Tas s 12(2). 247. Vic s 34(4). 248. ‘Sequence of appeals’ means a sequence of appeals in which each appeal that follows next after another appeal in the sequence is an appeal against the decision in that other appeal: Qld s 4. 249. Qld s 19. 250. The Western Australian legislation uses the phrase ‘order approving the proposed settlement’, and defines ‘settlement’ as including a compromise of an action or of an appeal, acceptance of money paid into court and an acceptance of an offer to consent to judgment: WA s 14B(1). 251. As to the requirement that the court sanctions compromises for infants see Cairns, pp 447–50. 252. ‘Person under a disability’ means: (a) an infant; (b) a person in respect of whom an administration order is in force under the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) Pt 6; and (c) a person who, by reason of mental illness, defect or infirmity, however occasioned, is declared by the court to be incapable of managing his or her affairs in respect of any proceedings to which the declaration relates: WA s 14B(1). 253. Qld s 24(1); Tas s 17(1); Vic ss 11, 12(1); WA s 14B(2), 14B(3). 254. Vic s 12(2) ($50,000).

255. Qld s 24(2)(a); Tas s 17(2)(a); Vic s 13(1). 256. Qld s 24(2)(b); Tas s 17(2)(b). 257. Qld s 24(2)(c); Appeal Costs Fund Regulation 2010 (Qld) s 14(6) ($15,000); Vic s 13(3) ($50,000); WA s 14B(4) ($5,000). 258. In this context, ‘conviction’ includes: (a) a finding under the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) s 17(1)(c); (b) a verdict of not guilty because of mental impairment; and (c) a finding of unfitness to stand trial: Vic s 14(4). 259. Vic s 14(1). 260. Vic s 14(2). 261. Vic s 14(3). The factors that the board must take into account in considering whether costs have been ‘reasonably incurred’ are listed in s 35B. 262. WA s 12A(1). 263. The amount payable to any one appellant pursuant to a costs certificate cannot in any case exceed the sum of $1,000: WA s 12A(5). 264. WA s 12A(4)(a). 265. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Hayden (No 2) [2006] VSCA 155; BC200605898 Maxwell P and Vincent JA noted that although the term ‘instituted’ could attract a narrow interpretation — to say that, in a case where leave is required, the appeal is not instituted until leave is granted and the formal appeal document (the notice of appeal) filed and served — in view of the ‘clear beneficial purpose’ of Vic s 15(1), ‘we have no hesitation in preferring [a] broader interpretation’, namely that an appeal is ‘initiated, or begun, when the first step in the proceeding is taken’: at [7]. 266. Under the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic); under of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 257, 260, 287 or 291 or the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) s 427. 267. Vic s 15(1). 268. Vic s 15(2). The factors that the board must take into account in considering whether costs have been ‘reasonably incurred’ are listed in s 35B. 269. Such an appeal is premised upon leave of the Court of Appeal: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 295. 270. Vic s 15B. 271. Vic s 15A. 272. Appeal Costs Fund Act 1973 (Qld) s 22A. 273. [1989] 2 Qd R 49. 274. As to which see 21.21. 275. R v Foggo [1989] 2 Qd R 49 at 53 per Andrews CJ (CCA). 276. R v Foggo [1989] 2 Qd R 49 at 54 per Andrews CJ (CCA). 277. Qld ss 20B, 20C. 278. Qld ss 20D, 20E. 279. Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 15AA (being guidelines applying generally, to a particular (class of) of court, to a particular (class of) offence, to a particular (class of) penalty, or to a particular class of offender).

280. Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 15AA. 281. Qld ss 20C(2) (see Appeal Costs Fund Regulation 2010 (Qld) s 14(3)), 20E(2) (see Appeal Costs Fund Regulation 2010 (Qld) s 14(4)). 282. The time within which a question may be referred may be extended at any time by the Court of Criminal Appeal: Criminal Code (Tas) s 388AA(5). 283. Criminal Code (Tas) s 388AA(1). 284. Criminal Code (Tas) s 388AA(6)(c). 285. Criminal Code (Tas) s 388AA(7). 286. Vic s 19(1). 287. Vic s 19(2). The factors that the board must take into account in considering whether costs have been ‘reasonably incurred’ are listed in s 35B. 288. Vic s 19(3). 289. Namely those identified in Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 302 (‘reservation of question of law’), 302A (‘reservation of question of law on appeal to County Court’) and 304 (‘refusal to reserve question of law’). 290. Vic s 15C. 291. Cth ss 10A(3), 13; NSW ss 6(5), 6B(3) (see Cordell v Goodwin [1976] 1 NSWLR 417); Qld s 21(1); Tas s 14(1), 14(4); Vic s 37; WA s 13(1). 292. The Tasmanian legislation provides that a court may have regard to any matters it considers relevant and, in particular, to the conduct of the appeal or of any proceedings prior to the appeal by or on behalf of the applicant: Tas s 14(3). 293. Acquilina v Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd (1965) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 531 at 532 per Moffitt J; Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Ltd v Woodhall Ltd [1972] Tas SR 41 at 50 per Crawford J (FC); Stacey v Meagher [1978] Tas SR 56 at 72 per Neasey J; Zappulla v Perkins (No 2) [1978] Qd R 401 at 401 per Wanstall CJ (FC); Bullock v Federation Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 2) (1985) 58 ALR 373 at 374 (FC(FCA)); R v Hookham (No 2) (1993) 32 NSWLR 345 at 346; BC9302293 per Priestley JA; Yunghanns v Yunghanns (2000) FLC ¶93-029 at 87,475; [2000] FamCA 681 per Lindenmayer and Holden JJ (FC). 294. Brisbane City Council v Ferro Enterprises Pty Ltd [1976] Qd R 332 at 333 per Hoare J (FC); Zappulla v Perkins (No 2) [1978] Qd R 401 at 401 per Wanstall CJ (FC); Bullock v Federation Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 2) (1985) 58 ALR 373 at 374 (FC(FCA)). As to what is ‘judicial discretion’ see 6.14–6.15. 295. Reeve v Fowler [1965] NSWR 110 at 111 per Walsh J; McLennan v McBroom [1969] VR 566 at 573 per Winneke CJ and Newton J (FC); Di Battista v Motton [1971] VR 565 at 572 per Winneke CJ (FC); Richards v Faulls Pty Ltd [1971] WAR 129 at 138 (FC); Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Ltd v Woodhall Ltd [1972] Tas SR 41 at 50, 55 per Crawford J (FC); Vella v Larson [1982] Qd R 298 at 300–1 per Macrossan J (FC); Bullock v Federation Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 2) (1985) 58 ALR 373 at 374 (FC(FCA)); Lawson v Gault [2002] FCAFC 308; BC200206127 at [8] per Spender and Dowsett JJ. 296. Richards v Faulls Pty Ltd [1971] WAR 129 at 137–8 (FC); FAI General Insurance Company Ltd v MMI-CMI Insurance Ltd (SC(Tas), Zeeman J, 15 April 1992, unreported) BC9200109 at 2 (disapproving Re Richard Pitt & Sons Pty Ltd (1980) 4 ACLR 917 at 921–2 per Cosgrove J (FC(Tas)), who had remarked that parliament had intended that the grant of a certificate would

flow as a matter of course unless there was some circumstance that disentitled the party applying from receiving it, characterising it as a ‘discretion to refuse’: at 922); Ginnity v Prefsure Life Ltd (No 2) [2007] VSC 293; BC200706610 at [13] per Hollingworth J; Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs v Mouratidis (2012) 200 FCR 464; [2012] FCAFC 29; BC201201402 at [40], [41] per Gray J (who refused to construe remarks by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Life Therapeutics Ltd v Bell IXL Investments Ltd (No 2) (2008) 170 FCR 595; [2008] FCAFC 158 at [5] and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW (No 3) [2010] FCAFC 102; BC201006025 at [3] as indicative of any presumption in favour of a certificate, concluding that ‘[t]he better view is that, in considering whether to grant a costs certificate, the court should consider all the circumstances of a case, if necessary balancing those favouring the grant against those tending to the opposite conclusion’: at [41]; Flick and Reeves JJ concurred with the orders of Gray J). 297. See, for example, FAI General Insurance Company Ltd v MMI-CMI Insurance Ltd (SC(Tas), Zeeman J, 15 April 1992, unreported) BC9200109 at 2. 298. Acquilina v Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd (1965) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 531 at 533 per Moffitt J; Pascon Pty Ltd v San Marco in Lamis Cooperative Social Club Ltd [1991] 2 VR 227 at 234 per Kaye J (App Div); Repatriation Commission v Cornelius (2002) 69 ALD 250; [2002] FCA 930; BC200204174. 299. Vella v Larson [1982] Qd R 298 at 301 per Macrossan J (FC); R v Hookham (No 2) (1993) 32 NSWLR 345 at 346; BC9302293 per Priestley JA. 300. Queensland Building Services Authority v Proprietors of ‘The View’ (CA(Qld), Pincus and Thomas JJA, Chesterman J, 18 December 1998, unreported) BC9806827. 301. Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd v Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd (CA(Qld), Pincus and Thomas JJA, Byrne J, 18 December 1998, unreported) BC9806830 at [3] per the court (where, however, on the facts, the applicant had elected to take a point on which there was no authority other than the statute in question, and on which it failed; the court denied a certificate). 302. See, for example, Weis Restaurant Toowoomba v Gillogly [2013] QCA 49; BC201301235 (where the court refused the unsuccessful respondent an indemnity certificate in circumstances where it characterised his contentions as ‘unreasonably optimistic’: at [4]). Cf Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Ltd v Woodhall Ltd [1972] Tas SR 41 at 54 per Crawford J (FC) (who noted that an error of law by a court of first instance is usually caused by a party’s submission that should not have been made, and this mere fact was not intended by parliament to be taken into account, for otherwise very few applications would ever be granted; what is in issue is a submission that should not have been made relative to ‘the sense of responsibility or the recklessness with which the submission was made’). 303. R v Hookham (No 2) (1993) 32 NSWLR 345 at 347; BC9302293 per Priestley JA. See also FWB Pty Ltd v Robinson [1975] 1 NSWLR 85 at 89 per Moffitt P; Builders Licensing Board v Pride Constructions Pty Ltd [1979] 1 NSWLR 607 at 618–19 per Cross J; Hill Corcoran Constructions Pty Ltd v Navarro (CA(Qld), Davies and Pincus JJA, Thomas J, 10 April 1992, unreported) BC9202489 (arguable point of law raised not merely as a tactical exercise); Kawicki v Ralph (SC(NSW), Badgery-Parker J, 13 February 1997, unreported) BC9703998; Aboriginal Hostels Ltd v Fisher (SC(Vic), Hedigan J, 27 November 1997, unreported) BC9706288 at 4 (error not induced by valueless submissions but made where clear guidance was lacking). 304. (2000) FLC ¶93-029; [2000] FamCA 681. 305. Yunghanns v Yunghanns (2000) FLC ¶93-029 at 87,475; [2000] FamCA 681 per Lindenmayer and Holden JJ (FC).

306. Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Ltd v Woodhall Ltd [1972] Tas SR 41 at 56 per Crawford J (FC) (noting that this kind of factor, though not in precisely these terms, was taken into account in Gurnett v Macquarie Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (No 2) (1956) 95 CLR 106; BC5600230; Di Battista v Motton [1971] VR 565 at 572 per Winneke CJ (FC) (referring to the novelty of the case)); Howard Smith Industries Pty Ltd v Richards [1999] FCA 1310; BC9906248 at [8]–[10] per Goldberg J (case having wide general application with ramifications beyond the parties, involving the interpretation of federal statutes in a transitional situation); Langmeil v Grange (2010) FLC ¶93-427; [2010] FamCAFC 12; BC201050096 (where, although an appeal was only allowed in part, the Full Court granted a costs certificate on the basis that the issues raised by the appellant and in respect of which she had some success were matters of importance concerning the making of an order for sole parental responsibility); Corruption and Crime Commission of Western Australia v Allen [2012] WASCA 242 (S) (where the question of law involved the proper construction of a relevant provision, which ‘was one of significance and of general application’: at [6]). 307. Howard Smith Industries Pty Ltd v Richards [1999] FCA 1310; BC9906248 at [7] per Goldberg J. 308. McLennan v McBroom [1969] VR 566 at 573 per Winneke CJ and Newton J (FC); R v Hookham (No 2) (1993) 32 NSWLR 345 at 346; BC9302293 per Priestley JA. See also Zappulla v Perkins (No 2) [1978] Qd R 401 at 401–2 per Wanstall CJ (FC) (refusing a certificate where ignorance of an elementary principle of law on the part of the applicant played a part in leading the trial judge into a mistake); Makucha v Albert Shire Council (CA(Qld), Pincus and Davies JJA, Williams J, 19 June 1992, unreported) BC9202514 (where counsel for the applicant had participated in misleading the trial judge). 309. See, for example, Peden Pty Ltd v Bortolazzo [2006] QCA 405; BC200608426. 310. Steele v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 48 at 51 per Moffitt P, at 53 per Hutley JA (cf at 56, 60 per Samuels JA); Zagari v Habib (Costs) [2010] FamCAFC 192; BC201050914 at [23]– [28] per Strickland J. In such a case, however, there may be grounds to make a costs order against counsel personally: see 23.21–23.35, 23.44–23.52. 311. Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Ltd v Woodhall Ltd [1972] Tas SR 41 at 56 per Crawford J (FC) (‘If an appeal is unreasonably resisted by an applicant, he has unreasonably caused the incurring of some, if not most, of the costs in respect of which he may be indemnified’); Stacey v Meagher [1978] Tas SR 56 at 72–3 per Neasey J; Marriage of Kudelka (1986) FLC ¶91-719 at 75,226 per Asche J (FC) (‘it is a proper matter for consideration in exercising the discretion … to determine whether and to what extent the applicant has been the author of his own misfortune’). See also Pascon Pty Ltd v San Marco in Lamis Cooperative Social Club Ltd [1991] 2 VR 227 at 234 per Kaye J (App Div) (where a certificate was refused because the proceedings at first instance ‘were brought about by conduct of the respondents which was of dubious morality’); Entsch v Smith (CA(Qld), Fitzgerald P, Davies JA and Byrne J, 15 June 1992, unreported) BC9202464 (certificate refused to the respondent because, inter alia, the trial judge failed to consider questions of fact because he was led into error by evidence adduced by the respondent). 312. Vella v Larson [1982] Qd R 298 at 302 per Macrossan J (FC). 313. (1985) 58 ALR 373 at 376. 314. [1971] WAR 129 at 138–9. 315. Cf Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Ltd v Woodhall Ltd [1972] Tas SR 41 at 56 per Crawford J (FC) (whether the applicant’s conduct represented a ‘tactical move’ held relevant to whether he or she has caused costs to have been incurred unreasonably). 316. Gurnett v Macquarie Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (No 2) (1956) 95 CLR 106 at 113; BC5600230 per

Dixon CJ (who apparently took into account the means of the defendant); Marriage of Kudelka (1986) FLC ¶91-719 at 75,225 per Asche J (FC) (who countenanced occasions where an applicant may be sufficiently wealthy to make a payment from the public purse inappropriate, although this was not so in the case before him); Tyson and Tyson (No 2) (1993) FLC ¶92-401 at 80,111 (FC). Contra Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Ltd v Woodhall Ltd [1972] Tas SR 41 at 55 per Crawford J (FC) (who considered that it was not the purpose of the legislature to make the means of an applicant relevant to the exercise of the discretion). Cf Repatriation Commission v Cornelius (2002) 69 ALD 250; [2002] FCA 930; BC200204174 (where Branson J was not persuaded that the fact that the applicant for a certificate was a war veteran either compelled, or strongly suggested in favour of, the grant of the certificate). 317. (1999) 26 Fam LR 485; [1999] FamCA 959 (FC). 318. See also Acquilina v Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd (1965) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 531 at 540 per Moffitt J (who held that in the circumstances, given many of the numerous grounds of appeal did not involve questions of law, it was not proper to grant a certificate). 319. See 21.14. 320. Johnson v Johnson (No 2) (Costs) (1999) 26 Fam LR 485; [1999] FamCA 959 at [37] (FC). 321. Hometeam Constructions Pty Ltd v McCauley (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 278; BC200708673 at [9] per the court. 322. Practice Direction 1 of 2005, at [37]. 323. Practice Direction 2 of 2010, at [29]. 324. [2008] QCA 109; BC200803210 at [6] (footnotes included). See also at [14] per Wilson J (dissenting) (‘it would certainly not be conducive to the due administration of justice for this Court to condone undue delay in doing so’). 325. Kumer v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2007] QCA 175; BC200704022. 326. Jackson Nominees Pty Ltd v Hanson Building Products Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 159; BC200603190. 327. Lamb v Brisbane City Council [2008] QCA 109; BC200803210 at [5], [7]. Contra at [16] per Wilson J (who held that ‘the relative difficulty and importance of the question of law outweighs the unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of almost one year’). 328. Gurnett v Macquarie Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (No 2) (1956) 95 CLR 106; BC5600230. 329. [1965] NSWR 110 at 111 (FC). 330. See, for example, Pickford v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1981] VR 583 at 585–6 per Brooking J (FC) (who held that an appeal on a question of law cannot be said to ‘succeed’ for the purposes of the legislation if all that occurs is that the appeal is allowed by consent, and on the facts as the appeal had been compromised before hearing, and judgment entered by consent for the appellant, there was no jurisdiction to grant an indemnity certificate). 331. Reeve v Fowler [1965] NSWR 110 at 112 per Walsh J (FC). See also at 111 per Maguire J (who remarked that if the parties have not truly settled the appeal, but have only reached a sort of contingent agreement that, if a certificate is granted, they will settle the dispute on terms that the appeal be upheld for the purpose of facilitating the grant of that certificate, the court lacks jurisdiction to grant the certificate). 332. Reeve v Fowler [1965] NSWR 110 at 112 per Walsh J (FC). 333. (1997) 72 ALJR 146.

334. Found in Cth ss 6 (see 21.5), 8 (see 21.8) and 9 (see 21.9). 335. These arguments included that: (1) had the parliament meant it to be sufficient that an appellate court should merely have made the order allowing the appeal, it could have so provided; (2) parties could otherwise agree amongst themselves to dispose of appeals and thereby, in effect, burden the public purse by their agreement; and (3) a narrow interpretation protects public funds, and preserves them for cases where the justification of a certificate is manifestly demonstrated by a full hearing of the appeal: Cramer v Davies (1997) 72 ALJR 146 at 150. 336. Cramer v Davies (1997) 72 ALJR 146 at 150. 337. Cramer v Davies (1997) 72 ALJR 146 at 150. 338. (2002) 29 Fam LR 426 at 427; [2002] FamCA 389 per Kay J. 339. [2005] FamCA 852. 340. (2007) 214 FLR 284; [2007] FamCA 1177; BC200750250. To the same effect see also Yelner v Yelner (Costs Certificates) [2013] FamCAFC 18; BC201350026. 341. Under both Cth ss 6 (see 21.5) and 9 (see 21.9). 342. This was because the consent orders were made in recorded proceedings in open court with the solicitors for both parties appearing by telephone. 343. See, for example, S v S [2006] FamCA 344; W v W [2006] FamCA 860. 344. B & B (Costs Certificates) (2007) 214 FLR 284; [2007] FamCA 1177; BC200750250 at [50] (FC). 345. Cth s 14(1); NSW ss 6(7)(b), 6(7)(c), 6A(2)(b), 6A(2)(c), 6B(6)(b), 6B(6)(c); Vic s 35A(1); WA ss 13(3), 14(2), 15(3), 15A. 346. Cth s 14(1) (see Australian Postal Corporation v Harris [2000] FCA 1252; BC200005248 at [15] per Moore J); NSW ss 6(7)(a), 6A(2)(a), 6B(6)(a); Qld ss 21(3), 22(2), 23(4); Tas s 19(2); Vic s 38 (also expressed to apply to ‘any person representing the Crown’); WA ss 13(3), 14(2), 15(3) (see, for example, Mustac v Medical Board of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 128 (S); BC200706666, where the Medical Board was denied a certificate because it was a statutory instrumentality created under an Act and analogous to many instrumentalities and agencies of the Crown). 347. Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462 at 499; [1999] HCA 30; BC9903377 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ. 348. See, for example, Paul & Paul Pty Ltd v Business Licensing Authority (No 2) [2010] VSC 500; BC201008331 (where Kyrou J held that the Business Licensing Authority was not ‘the Crown’ or a ‘person representing the Crown’ for this purpose: at [12]). 349. Applicants A1 and A2 v Brouwer (No 2) [2007] VSCA 269; BC200710290 at [4] per the court. 350. R v Director of Corrective Services (2001) 10 Tas R 141 at 145; [2001] TASSC 21; BC200100810 per Blow J (ruling that (such as the Director of Corrective Services) who added that in view of this, there may be ‘some scope for debate’ as to the status of a police prosecutor for this purpose: at 147). 351. See, for example, Smith v Visser (2001) 10 Tas R 115 at 127–8; [2001] TASSC 40; BC200101578 per Crawford J; Applicants A1 and A2 v Brouwer (No 2) [2007] VSCA 269; BC200710290 at [3]– [6] per the court (ruling that Vic s 38 precludes the grant of an indemnity certificate to the Chief Commissioner of Police because the Chief Commissioner is, if not ‘the Crown’, then certainly a ‘person representing the Crown’ for the purposes of s 38).

352. See, for example, Alexander v Renney (SC(Vic), Batt J, 21 August 1995, unreported) BC9507255 at 17 (who granted an indemnity certificate to a police officer on the ground that he was not a servant of the Crown); Kirsch v Dolman (2001) 123 A Crim R 331; [2001] VSC 234; BC200104511 at [47]–[53] per Gillard J (who held that a police officer investigating a summary offence was not acting in any capacity as the Crown for this purpose). 353. (2008) 23 VR 36; [2008] VSCA 211; BC200809496. 354. Kirkland-Veenstra v Stuart (No 2) (2008) 23 VR 36; [2008] VSCA 211; BC200809496 at [33]. 355. Kirkland-Veenstra v Stuart (No 2) (2008) 23 VR 36; [2008] VSCA 211; BC200809496 at [18]. 356. Kirkland-Veenstra v Stuart (No 2) (2008) 23 VR 36; [2008] VSCA 211; BC200809496 at [22]. 357. ‘Legally assisted person’ has the meaning ascribed to it in the Legal Aid Commission Act 1979 (NSW) s 4(1): NSW s 2(1). 358. NSW s 6(5A). 359. Vic s 39. 360. NSW s 6C (see Hales v Consumer Claims Tribunal (SC(NSW), Allen J, 30 November 1990, unreported) BC9001705 at 5; R v Lilley (2000) 111 A Crim R 468 at 475; [2000] NSWCCA 57; BC200000874 per Smart AJ; R v Gilfillan (2003) 139 A Crim R 460; [2003] NSWCCA 102; BC200301672 at [90]–[92] per Smart AJ). 361. See, for example, R v Foggo [1989] 2 Qd R 49, discussed at 21.46.

[page 741]

PART V

Non-Party Costs Orders The court has jurisdiction to order costs not only against the actual litigants appearing before it in the proceedings, but also and alternatively against persons not parties to the proceedings. It stands to reason, though, that a court will not order a non-party to pay costs unless he or she has some connection with the litigation, and the court is convinced that the circumstances warrant such an order. The nature of this jurisdiction, and the circumstances in which a court is likely to exercise it, form the subject of Chapter 22. More longstanding is the courts’ jurisdiction to order a lawyer who acts for one of the parties to the proceeding to forgo costs, or to actually pay costs personally. The basis of this jurisdiction, and the circumstances in which it may be exercised, are discussed in Chapter 23.

[page 743]

CHAPTER 22

Costs Orders and Non-Parties Background

22.2

Jurisdiction 22.4 Statutory jurisdiction 22.4 England 22.5 Australian jurisdictions except the Australian Capital Territory 22.6 Australian Capital Territory 22.8 Family Court 22.11 Proceedings under the Corporations Law 22.12 Jurisdiction extends to award in favour of non-party 22.15 Context ousts jurisdiction 22.16 Approach to Exercise of Discretion Nature of discretion Factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion Non-party’s connection with the proceedings and the incurrence of costs Availability of joinder Notice or warning to non-party Financial state of non-party and applications for security for costs Conduct of non-party

22.17 22.17 22.18 22.19 22.21 22.24 22.28 22.32

Circumstances Where Non-Party Costs Orders Have Been Made Orders where non-party is the effective litigant Orders against directors Orders against liquidators Orders against receivers Orders against insurers Orders where non-party supports party Financial support — litigation funders Liability of non-party under a contract to indemnify party Non-party supports party but lacks bona fides Costs orders against public officers or bodies Orders against magistrates and magistrates’ courts Orders arising out of judicial review of court or tribunal decisions Orders against legal aid bodies Orders against governmental bodies Orders against persons acting as representatives Orders against next friends and litigation guardians

22.34 22.35 22.36 22.40 22.43 22.46 22.47 22.47 22.52 22.55 22.57 22.58 22.62 22.65 22.66 22.67 22.68

[page 744] Orders in favour of and against independent children’s lawyers 22.71 Orders against amicus curiæ 22.73 Procedural Matters Attending to Non-Party Costs Orders Opportunity to be heard Indemnity costs Order made after judgment

22.75 22.75 22.76 22.77

22.1 So far as costs orders made by a court are concerned, the prima facie general principle is that an order for costs is only made against a party to the litigation.1 There are clear reasons in justice for this, as the parties, by their involvement in the proceeding, have taken the risk of exposure to an adverse costs order. To impose a costs liability upon a non-party is potentially to expose such a person to a liability that in justice he or she should not have to bear, as he or she has not ordinarily chosen to initiate or defend the proceedings, and may lack any real interest in or connection with them.

Background 22.2 For the reason mentioned above, for many years the courts disclaimed any jurisdiction to order costs against a non-party; the jurisdiction to award costs of and incidental to proceedings conferred by statute2 was interpreted as confined to parties to the proceedings. For instance, in 1901 a judge remarked that ‘[s]ome limitation must be put upon the generality of the words’ of the statute, such that ‘[t]hey cannot enable the Court to order the costs to be paid by a stranger to the proceedings; they can only mean that the Court may order the costs to be paid by any of the parties’.3 22.3 Yet it could not be said that, even from earliest times, the courts had steadfastly refused to recognise a jurisdiction to order costs against nonparties. Although perhaps not conducive to a statement of clear principle to this end, there were exceptions to the prima facie rule, as even before the Judicature Acts the courts on occasion awarded costs against a person not a party in the strict sense.4 The main example was in actions for ejectment, described as ‘a fictitious proceeding’ in which ‘the Courts allow the action to be brought in the name of a nominal plaintiff, and allow the landlord to come in and defend, but they take notice of the real parties litigant’.5 The jurisdiction thus stemmed from the court’s power to protect its process from abuse,6 its basis being that the order was made against ‘the real party to the suit’.7 [page 745]

Other instances of the exercise of the jurisdiction against a non-party who was the real party involved cases concerning relators in a relator action by an Attorney-General,8 solicitors who instituted proceedings without authority,9 persons interested in an estate who unnecessarily attended on the taking of an account and thereby occasioned additional costs,10 unsuccessful claimants to a beneficial interest in an estate,11 and next friends who purported to institute an action on behalf of a person said to be of unsound mind when he or she was of sound mind.12 The very existence of this case law led modern courts to see it as illustrative of a more general principle. In Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd Mason CJ and Deane J remarked to this end:13 Having regard to the variety and the nature of the circumstances in which an order for costs was made against a person who was not a party according to the record, we cannot accept that there was before the Judicature Acts a general rule that there was no jurisdiction to order costs against a non-party in the strict sense. It is plain enough that the courts from time to time awarded costs against a person who, not being a party on the record, was considered to be the ‘real party’. It may be that these cases are capable of being explained on various grounds, including the ground that the non-party ordered to pay costs was guilty of abuse of process, taking a very broad view of what constitutes an abuse of process, but to say that does not deny that there was jurisdiction to make an order for costs against a non-party even if the jurisdiction was exercised in limited circumstances only.

Jurisdiction Statutory jurisdiction 22.4 The foregoing should not be assumed necessarily to be an exercise of the courts’ inherent jurisdiction,14 for there is well-established authority to the effect that the courts’ power to make costs orders must be derived from a statutory source.15 Modern courts have thus focused on whether statute confers such a power and, if so, in what terms. The breadth of the modern [page 746] costs jurisdiction, stemming from s 5 of the English Judicature Act 189016 — which provided that ‘the costs of and incidental to all proceedings in the Supreme Court … shall be at the discretion of the Court or Judge and the Court or Judge shall have full power to determine by whom … such costs are

to be paid’ — has seen modern courts recognise a jurisdiction to make a costs orders against non-parties.

England 22.5 It was not until the decision of the House of Lords in Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd17 in 1986 that it became settled in England that a provision such as the previous s 518 conferred such a jurisdiction.19 In Aiden Shipping it was contended that the statutory jurisdiction to order costs should be read subject to the implied limitation that it could not be exercised against a non-party. In the court’s opinion, however, a statutory provision conferring upon the court ‘full power to determine by whom … the costs are to be paid’ is consistent with a policy under which jurisdiction to exercise the relevant discretionary power is expressed in wide terms, thus ensuring that the court has freedom of action.20 Lord Goff, who delivered the reasons, added that had the legislature sought to limit the jurisdiction to the parties, it could easily have done so by drafting the provision as conferring upon the court ‘full power to determine by which party to the proceedings and to what extent the costs are to be paid’.21

Australian jurisdictions except the Australian Capital Territory 22.6 Aiden Shipping has been followed numerous times in Australia, including by the High Court.22 Statute in several Australian jurisdictions, like its English counterpart, empowers Supreme Courts to determine by whom costs are to be paid.23 Yet even lacking a statutory power to ‘determine by whom … costs are to be paid’, Australian courts have shown a willingness to interpret an unfettered costs discretion as attracting the jurisdiction to make costs orders against non-parties. For example, the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(1) and the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 32 respectively confer upon the Federal Court the jurisdiction ‘to award costs in all proceedings before the court’, and to ‘make such orders as to costs as it thinks fit’. The general and unfettered terms of this jurisdiction has led courts to interpret its scope as

[page 747] extending to costs orders against non-parties.24 Concerning s 32, Black CJ in Bent v Gough25 remarked that although there are obvious differences between the language of s 32 and that of the English legislation considered in Aiden Shipping — the words ‘full power to determine by whom … the costs are to be paid’ do not appear in s 32 — the ruling in Aiden Shipping did not turn on the presence of those words. His Honour concluded that ‘there is no reason to imply any general limitation upon the wide language of s 32 … so as to exclude the power to award costs against a non-party’.26 22.7 Such an approach to statutory construction was confirmed by the High Court in Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd.27 It dealt with the previous O 91 r 1 of the Queensland Supreme Court Rules, which conferred a general costs discretion but, like the above provisions, made no express mention of a power to determine by whom the costs were to be paid. Mason CJ and Deane J remarked that even though an order for costs against a non-party is extraordinary, this ‘provides no justification for the imposition by the courts, by way of implication, of an arbitrary limitation upon the general jurisdiction conferred by the rule’, because to do so would deny the court power to order costs against non-parties in cases where, in the interests of justice, such an order should be made.28 Their Honours considered the language of the rule to be ‘quite inapt to give expression to the complex course of judicial decisions at common law and in equity before the Judicature Acts’, preferring to interpret its terms according to their natural and ordinary meaning as conferring a grant of jurisdiction to order costs not limited to parties on the record.29 Gaudron J expressed the point as follows:30 [page 748] It is contrary to long-established principle and wholly inappropriate that the grant of power to a court (including the conferral of jurisdiction) should be construed as subject to a limitation not appearing in the words of that grant. Save for a qualification which I shall later mention, a grant of power should be construed in accordance with ordinary principles and, thus, the words used should be given their full meaning unless there is something to indicate to the contrary. Powers conferred on a court are powers which must be exercised judicially and in accordance with legal principle. This consideration leads to the qualification to which I earlier referred. The necessity for the power to be exercised judicially tends in favour of the most liberal construction, for it

denies the validity of considerations which might limit a grant of power to some different body, including, for example, that the power might be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or to work oppression or abuse.

The current Queensland court rules likewise simply confer an unfettered costs discretion,31 and to this end stand to be interpreted in precisely the same way as propounded in Knight for this purpose.32

Australian Capital Territory 22.8 The Australian Capital Territory rules prohibit the court, in exercising its costs discretion, making any order for costs against a non-party, except as specifically provided by the rules.33 The rules provide that this prohibition does not limit the power of the court to make an order:34 for payment by a relator in proceedings of all or part of the costs of a party to the proceedings; for payment by a person who fails to comply with an order made, or judgment given, by the court in proceedings, or breaches an undertaking given to the court in proceedings, of all or part of the costs of a party to the proceedings occasioned by that failure or breach; for payment by a person who has committed contempt of court or an abuse of process of the court of all or part of the costs of a party to proceedings occasioned by the contempt or abuse of process; against a person who purports without authority to conduct proceedings in the name of another; against a person who commences, carries on, enters an appearance in, or defends proceedings as the authorised director35 of a corporation, or purports to do so; against a person who defaults in attending in accordance with a court order for any costs occasioned by the default;36 or in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over its own officers, including legal practitioners and court-appointed liquidators or court-appointed receivers. Australian Capital Territory courts’ jurisdiction to order costs against non-

parties is thus more restricted than elsewhere. Costs orders against privately appointed receivers, insurers, lower courts, legal aid bodies and other governmental bodies, encompassed within other [page 749] jurisdictions, may not be within the province of Australian Capital Territory courts unless the matter comes within one (or more) of the above categories.37 22.9 With the exception of the reference to court-appointed receivers, the New South Wales rules made parallel provision38 until the relevant rule was repealed on 7 May 2010.39 The rule had been introduced in the wake of the High Court’s decision in Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd,40 which recognised a broad jurisdiction to order costs against non-parties, aiming to restrict the court’s power to make a non-party costs order. But its repeal was prompted by another High Court decision, Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd,41 which held that the New South Wales Supreme Court lacked power to order costs against a non-party litigation funder that, for a contingency fee, had funded an impecunious plaintiff without giving the plaintiff an indemnity for adverse costs orders. The reason for this was that the litigation funder had not committed ‘an abuse of process of the court’ under the third dot point above,42 and so the jurisdiction to make a costs order against it was not attracted. Consequential upon the repeal of the relevant rule, which has been held to operate retrospectively,43 the broad jurisdiction to make non-party costs orders, espoused in Knight and now not constrained by the rules, has been revived in New South Wales.44 22.10 A point of some confusion remains as to the meaning of ‘officer of the court’. Before 17 June 2002, when the phrase ‘including solicitors, barristers and court appointed liquidators’ was added to the (then) New South Wales rule, ‘officer of the court’ could have been construed as referring to solicitors or counsel, for in each case there was a specific provision dealing with orders for costs against them personally.45 There seems thus to be some overlap in this respect, unless the reference to an ‘officer of the court’ can be seen to include lawyers who do not actually represent any of the parties to the

proceeding but are nonetheless candidates for a personal costs order against them. The latter must be a very unlikely, albeit not impossible,46 scenario. At least the rule change clarified the status of court appointed liquidators as officers of the court for this purpose. This in any case was already recognised by the case law, both generally47 and in this context.48 This is an odd result, for more than one reason. It does not explain why court appointed liquidators may be subject to the jurisdiction in question, but not necessarily (under the New South Wales rules) receivers appointed by the court, who have at general law [page 750] have been held to be officers of the court.49 More significantly, court appointment renders liquidators’ functions more public than a private appointment; this has led courts in other jurisdictions to show greater reticence to order costs against court appointed liquidators than privately appointed ones.50 Yet in the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales the court is denied the jurisdiction to make costs orders against the latter but not the former. Conversely, it has been held that, as a deed of company arrangement is administered pursuant to Pt 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and according to its terms, an administrator of that deed is not an officer of the court and so cannot be ordered to pay costs in a proceeding brought or defended in the name of the company.51

Family Court 22.11 The Family Court has likewise been held to possess jurisdiction to order costs against non-parties even in the absence of a specific provision to this effect,52 justified on four grounds. First, although the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117(1) — which provides that, inter alia, subject to s 117(2), each party to proceedings under the Act bears his or her own costs — is in its terms confined to a ‘party’ to the proceedings, s 117(2)53 is not so confined and grants a wide, general power to make a costs order.54 Second, s 117(2) confers the power to make an order ‘as to costs’, a wider power than the bare power ‘to award costs’ discussed by the High Court in Knight v FP Special

Assets Ltd.55 Third, s 117(2) speaks not of parties but of certain orders.56 Fourth, in considering whether to make a costs order under s 117(2), the court must have regard to seven factors listed in s 117(2A).57 Whereas the first six such factors focus upon the circumstances and conduct of the parties to the proceedings, s 117(2A)(g) refers to ‘such other matters as the court considers relevant’, and so can accommodate orders as to the carriage of costs by non-parties.58 By the express terms of s 117(2), the court’s jurisdiction extends to making interlocutory costs orders against non-parties in appropriate circumstances; it is not limited to substantive proceedings but also applies to interlocutory proceedings that arise out of or are related to the substantive proceedings.59

Proceedings under the Corporations Law 22.12 An issue has arisen as to the interplay between the (former) Corporations Law s 1335(2) and the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(2). The latter provides [page 751] that ‘[e]xcept as provided by any other Act, the award of costs is in the discretion of the Court or Judge’, whereas the former stated that ‘the costs of any proceeding before a Court under this Law shall be borne by the party to the proceeding as the Court, in its discretion, directs’. In Re Wridgemont Display Homes Pty Ltd60 Jenkinson J held that in a proceeding under the Corporations Law, the Federal Court’s costs jurisdiction must be exercised in accordance with s 1335(2), which by its terms limits the persons whom the court may direct to bear costs of the proceeding. This was notwithstanding his Honour’s earlier conclusion that the reference in s 43(2) to ‘any other Act’ is a reference to another Act of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, which the Corporations Law was not. As a significant proportion of proceedings under the Corporations Law were heard before the Federal Court, it seemed strange that that court — which by s 43(1) of its Act is conferred the jurisdiction to award costs in all proceedings before it except those ‘in respect of which any other Act

provides that costs shall not be awarded’ — should be denied the jurisdiction to make a non-party costs order in this context. In that s 1335(2) simply replicated the former s 533(2) of the Companies Code, enacted prior to the courts’ recognition of a jurisdiction to order costs against non-parties, it could not have been intended to deny that jurisdiction. Certainly this has not been the approach of other judges when ordering costs against directors, receivers or liquidators of companies as litigants.61 Moreover, s 43(2) deals with the court’s discretion, not its jurisdiction, which is the province of s 43(1), and which is not expressed ‘[e]xcept as provided by any other Act’. 22.13 The fact remains that s 1335(2), as a more specific provision than either s 43(1) or 43(2), could be argued to prevail. Even so, it does not necessarily follow that s 1335(2) should be seen as ousting the operation of s 43(1) or 43(2), which provisions can arguably operate consistently with s 1335(2). To remove any degree of uncertainty, however, it would be useful had the legislature either re-worded s 1335(2) to extend to non-parties, or defined the term ‘party’ more extensively. This is more pressing following the replacement of the Corporations Law with the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which comes within the phrase ‘any other Act’ in s 43(2). 22.14 The difficulties underscoring Jenkinson J’s approach in Re Wridgemont Display Homes have not gone unnoticed by other judges. Indeed, first instance judges in both Victoria and New South Wales have declined to follow it. In UTSA Pty Ltd (in liq) v Ultra Tune Australia Pty Ltd62 Chernov J, by referring to the background to s 1335(2), concluded that the sub-section was originally intended as an enabling provision intended to give the Supreme Court in New South Wales a similar costs discretion to that which was given to English Courts in 1890 by statute, and not as a limiting provision. Brereton J in Re Struthers63 endorsed this view, under which there seems no basis to conclude that s 1335(2) limits the Federal Court’s jurisdiction to make costs orders against non-parties. More recently, the Federal Court has chimed in, remarking that:64 [i]t would be surprising if Parliament intended in enacting the Corporations Act to limit the circumstances where this court might make an order for costs to parties or parties to the particular proceeding and to exclude from the scope of an order for costs non-parties who would, if it were not for the proceeding being brought under the Corporations Law, be liable to pay the costs of a party to the proceeding.

[page 752]

Jurisdiction extends to award in favour of nonparty 22.15 Although the principal focus of non-party costs orders has been to render a non-party liable for costs, the trend of authority indicates that the costs discretion can, in an appropriate case, be exercised to award costs in favour of a non-party, whether or not the statutory discretion includes the power to determine ‘by whom’ costs are payable.65 As this line of authority is, to date, ‘not greatly developed’,66 it is difficult to say with certainty what factors are likely to influence the court’s discretion, except that such an order, like an order made against a non-party,67 will be exceptional, made cautiously, and informed by the nature of the relationship between the nonparty and the litigation.68 In the context of subpoenas to non-parties, though, it seems clear that a non-party put through the trouble of producing a document as a stranger to litigation so as to forensically aid a party to the controversy is entitled to look to the issuing party for the costs of seeking advice as to his or her obligations under the subpoena and the steps that must be undertaken to discharge these obligations.69

Context ousts jurisdiction 22.16 It cannot be assumed that a general costs discretion vested in a court always confers a jurisdiction to make costs orders against non-parties. The context of any such discretion may indicate that the parliament did not intend it to be so interpreted. A case in point is s 42(1) of the District Court Act 1991 (SA) which, prior to being amended, provided that ‘costs in any civil proceedings will be in the discretion of the Court’. Under s 43(1) of that Act ‘[a] party to an action may … appeal against any judgment given in the action’. In Vestris v Cashman70 Olsson J held that as s 43(1) confers a right of appeal only on ‘parties to an action’, if s 42(1) empowered the making of an order for costs on a non-party and such an order was made, prima facie, it

would be unappealable. His Honour found this to be strongly indicative of a statutory [page 753] intention to limit the discretion of the District Court to award costs against non-parties only in the circumstances specifically provided for in s 42.71 Lander J similarly explained:72 If there was jurisdiction to make an order for costs against a non-party it would mean that a nonparty against whom an order for costs has been made would not have any right to appeal. On the other hand a party to an action who unsuccessfully sought an order for costs against a nonparty would be entitled to appeal. That does rather suggest that Parliament did not intend that the Court would decide matters which would adversely affect a non-party. It does suggest that the Court cannot make an order for costs against a non-party.

His Honour also remarked that if s 42(1) conferred the same jurisdiction upon a District Court Judge that s 40 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) confers upon a Judge of the Supreme Court,73 there would be no need for the inclusion in s 42 of specific circumstances where the court could make a nonparty costs order.74 In any case, the court held that, even if it was wrong on the jurisdiction point, the trial judge had not properly exercised his discretion in making a non-party costs order in the circumstances.75 Yet it could be argued that the legislature did not, at the time of enacting the District Court Act 1991 (SA), specifically consider the general issue of non-party costs orders, as in 1991 there was no conclusive Australian authority directly on point. To speak of legislative intent may, therefore, be misleading. As such, it is interesting to note that, following Vestris v Cashman, the parliament amended s 42(1) to read: ‘costs in any proceedings in the Civil Division will be in the discretion of the Court and may be awarded against any person (whether a party to or a witness in the proceedings or not)’.76 It also amended s 43(4), which now extends a right of appeal to any person against whom an order under s 42 is made.

Approach to Exercise of Discretion Nature of discretion

22.17 As the court’s general statutory discretion is wide enough to confer the power to order costs against non-parties,77 the issue focuses on the circumstances that justify making such an order. Three important preliminary points must be made in this respect. First, the court will only make a nonparty costs order where the interests of justice justify a departure from the general rule that only parties to proceedings may be subject to costs orders.78 Expressed another way, a non-party costs order will be made ‘when, in the circumstances of the particular case, it is just and equitable that a non-party pay the costs of a party to the litigation’.79 Second, given that in the bulk of cases it is unjust to award costs against a non-party,80 the circumstances in which such an order will be made are necessarily confined, as a question of discretion, not of jurisdiction.81 Courts have cautioned that applications for costs orders against [page 754] non-parties should be treated ‘with considerable caution’,82 and granted only ‘sparingly’83 and ‘when exceptional circumstances make such an order reasonable and just’.84 But the ‘exceptional’ threshold should not be seen to fetter the curial discretion and may mean no more than ‘outside the ordinary run of cases where parties pursue or defend claims for their own benefit and at their own expense’.85 Third, being a discretion vested in a judge, it must be ‘exercised judicially and in accordance with general legal principles pertaining to the law of costs’.86 Like other costs orders made in the exercise of a curial discretion, the award must be made on principle, not in accordance with whim or private opinion, and usually in accordance with the outcome of the case.87 Yet the judicial nature of the discretion also requires judges to eschew fixed legal rules, and so the courts have branded it undesirable to lay down rules that would fetter that discretion.88 It inevitably comes down to a fact-specific inquiry informed by various relevant considerations. For this same reason, judges have warned against creating closed categories of cases where the costs discretion may be exercised against a nonparty,89 characterising any such attempt as ‘unhelpful’90 and inconsistent

with the exercise of a discretion founded in the interests of justice.91 In Bischof v Adams,92 for instance, Gobbo J rejected the submission that the court would only order costs against a non-party in specified types of cases, instead characterising such an approach as misleading ‘to the extent that it is founded on the proposition that a discretion that is not confined by the terms of the statute must be exercised within the confines of past decisions’. His Honour held that these decisions contain no such proposition, it being implicit in them that there is ‘a wide untrammelled discretion’.93 [page 755]

Factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion 22.18 The challenge for courts is to develop principles that ensure the jurisdiction is exercised only where justice requires it to be exercised, and not in a way as to give rise to abuse.94 To this end, the cases do furnish guidance as to the proper exercise of the discretion and, in particular, the factors to which courts have regard in so doing.95 These factors can be divided under the following headings, discussed in turn below. Given the very nature of the discretion, though, it cannot categorically be stated that any factor is necessarily decisive in all cases, nor that the presence of one or more of the factors inexorably leads to the conclusion that a costs order should be made against a non-party.96 The various types of case where courts have found it just to make non-party costs orders,97 though neither rigid nor closed, indicate the types of connection98 with the proceedings required of the nonparty for the court to entertain such a claim.99

Non-party’s connection with the proceedings and the incurrence of costs 22.19 Central to the exercise of the court’s discretion to order costs against a non-party is the non-party’s connection with the proceedings and the incurrence of the costs. This involves a two-pronged inquiry, namely the connection between the non-party and the proceedings, and the causal connection between the non-party and the costs.100 It would be unjust, and

thus contrary to the proper exercise of judicial discretion, it is reasoned, for a court to order costs against a person lacking any connection with the proceedings that generated the order, or with the costs coming within that order. 22.20 Some judges express the first inquiry — a connection between the nonparty and the proceedings — in terms that the non-party be the ‘real party’ to, or the ‘real instigator’ of, the litigation.101 In fact, some have gone so far as to remark that the principle underlying an award of costs against a non-party is that the non-party is the real party — a litigant standing behind the actual party — to the litigation.102 Though this sits well historically, in that orders for costs against non-parties in actions for ejectment were grounded in this principle,103 it may not explain all the circumstances that modern courts have found to attract the discretion to make such orders.104 In any case, pertinent to the discretion is whether the proceedings are initiated and controlled by a person who, though not a party, has a direct personal financial interest in, or derives a potential benefit from, the result.105 The cases dealing with litigation funders provide a useful illustration in this context.106 [page 756] Under the second inquiry — one of causation — if the costs would have been incurred even without the non-party’s involvement, the non-party should not ordinarily be made liable for them.107 Indeed, some English judges have described causation here as ‘often a vital factor’ leading a court to order costs against a non-party, albeit stopping short of being categorical,108 presumably for fear of inhibiting a discretion grounded in the justice of the case. What is clear is that a connection with the proceedings is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the proper exercise of the discretion.109 This connection must be real and direct, Gobbo J in Bischof v Adams110 remarked, although he nonetheless envisaged that the connection with the proceedings need not necessarily be close, as appears from the following statement:111 It is not practicable to lay down a set of parameters in advance for there may be cases where the interests of justice support an order for costs even though the connection is slender. Thus if a witness deliberately refuses to answer to a subpoena and thereby causes the case to be adjourned and so increases the costs to the parties, I would have thought that it was very much

arguable that he should bear these extra costs. There would seem to be no connection in the ordinary sense of that word between that witness and the proceedings, beyond the fact that he was a potential witness. It may be said, however, that there is a causal connection between the non-party and the incurring of the costs, a matter that bears directly on the justice of whether he should be made to pay costs that he has caused to be incurred. Again, there may be cases where the connection is significant but not material to the issue of costs. Thus a person may benefit greatly from a particular proceeding but may not have any real part in supporting the proceeding.

Indeed, some years later, in Phillips v Symes,112 the Chancery Division of the English High Court held that the immunity of witnesses should not extend to costs orders, viewing it as ‘quite wrong’ for a court to deny a power to order costs against an expert who, by his or her evidence, ‘causes significant expense to be incurred, and does so in flagrant reckless disregard of his duties to the court’. It may be that expert witnesses are in a special class for this purpose; unlike ordinary witnesses, they owe independent duties to the court. To this end, there may be stronger grounds to make a non-party costs order against an expert witness than an ordinary witness,113 although this does not arguably oust the jurisdiction to make a non-party costs order in the latter context.

Availability of joinder 22.21 A person who has been properly joined to the proceedings is a party, and so the usual costs rules apply.114 This is not to say that the party joined will necessarily be held liable for costs if he or she proves to be on the losing side. In Allman v Daly (No 2),115 where an ultimately successful defendant in an action had joined third parties, Pape J assumed the jurisdiction to order the third parties so joined to pay the costs of a successful defendant. On the facts, however, his Honour declined in his discretion to make such an order because he could not see [page 757] the justice in ordering a party brought into the action solely by way of proceedings to decide his inability to contribute ‘in a contingent event’ (in the event of the defendant being held liable), to pay the costs of the defendant who succeeds in preventing the contingency from becoming a reality.116

22.22 Historically it was common for the Court of Chancery to make orders joining persons as parties to a suit in order to make them liable for costs. In Mathias v Yetts117 Jessel MR referred to what he called ‘the three A’s rule’: that in the case of an attorney, agent or arbitrator, ‘the rule was that if he was party to a fraud from which he got no benefit, he was liable to be made a defendant with the view of making him liable to the payment of the costs in case the principal defendant was unable to pay them’. But in Chancery, like at common law, the general rule was that a costs order would be made only against parties to a suit. 22.23 In view of the modern jurisdiction to order costs against non-parties, joinder is no longer essential to an order for costs in this context.118 However, where a non-party is sought to be made liable for costs, the court will inquire into whether he or she could have been joined as a party earlier in the proceedings.119 This is grounded in the principles of natural justice, because joinder gives the person concerned all the protection conferred by the rules of court. These include the framing of the issues by pleadings, discovery of documents, the opportunity to pay into court120 or to make a Calderbank offer,121 and knowledge of the issues before giving evidence. It has been observed, to this end, that a court will only exceptionally order costs against a non-party where the applicant could have joined the non-party as a party to the original proceedings.122

Notice or warning to non-party 22.24 The court will inquire into whether the non-party had any warning that an application for costs against it would be made. A failure to warn here has its principal relevance to the question ‘whether the non-party would have behaved any differently if a warning had been given’.123 This is again grounded in natural justice, for upon being notified, it may be that the nonparty could have applied to be joined and thereby have had the capacity to influence the proceedings, or the non-party could have protected itself by making an offer of compromise124 or could have taken other steps to end the proceedings.125 This assumes that there is reason for the applicant to seek costs against a non-party, say due to the opposing party’s financial incapacity. If knowledge of this does not come to the applicant until the

conclusion of the trial, the lack of notice to the non-party is not a material consideration.126 22.25 Even if the applicant for costs can provide a good reason for not joining the non-party127 against whom he or she has a valid cause of action, the applicant should warn the non-party at the earliest opportunity of the possibility that costs may be sought against the [page 758] non-party. For example, in Forest Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) v Keen Bay Pty Ltd128 Dowsett J remarked that it would be unjust to allow a receiver to litigate in the name of the company, and thus at the company’s expense, and then at the end of the litigation to expose the receiver personally to the costs of that litigation. Accordingly, where a party intends to seek a costs order against a receiver, notice of this intention should be given at an early stage because the decision to prosecute the action will be affected by the question of the receiver’s own exposure to an order for costs, and so questions of prejudice will often arise. 22.26 The timing of the notice or warning impacts on the temporal effect of any costs order against a non-party. In National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Chris Poulson Insurance Agencies Pty Ltd,129 for instance, Slicer J noted that although the plaintiff was unlikely to have been able to join the director of the defendant as a party, it was able to put him on notice prior to trial that in the event of success on its defence to the counterclaim it would look to him for costs. His Honour held that the plaintiff’s failure to give the requisite notice until a later date meant that the plaintiff was entitled to costs against the director personally only from the date of notice, not in respect of any time before it.130 22.27 The foregoing does not mean that a warning is a prerequisite to a costs order against a non-party in all cases; ‘the question of the need for prior notice is no more than one of many relevant matters that should be considered when considering an application for costs against a stranger to a litigation’.131 This recognises that in a given case it may not emerge until the end of the proceedings that a non-party has played such a role as to expose

him or her to the risk of a costs order.132 The lack of notice may also carry little weight where the prospects of success were, objectively, minimal,133 where there is no proof of likely prejudice to the nonparty sought to be made liable for costs134 or where the judge concludes that the giving of notice would not have altered the manner in which the case was conducted.135 [page 759]

Financial state of non-party and applications for security for costs 22.28 It is not a precondition to the exercise of jurisdiction to award costs against a nonparty that the unsuccessful party be impecunious,136 although in practice applications for nonparty costs orders frequently involve this scenario. Nonetheless, relevant to the non-party costs calculus is whether the party who would otherwise be usually liable for costs can meet a costs order and, if so, the reason why that party cannot meet that order. In particular, if it was apparent at any earlier stage in the proceedings that the party could not meet a costs order, the court will inquire whether the applicant for costs should have sought an order for security for costs against the opposing party on the record.137 If the successful party who seeks a nonparty costs order has previously unsuccessfully applied for security for costs, the attempt to obtain security may (but not necessarily will)138 bolster a later application for a nonparty costs order. Conversely, the failure to seek an otherwise potentially available order for security may weaken the prospect of a subsequent costs order against a non-party.139 One of the roles of an application for security in this context is to give notice to ‘the other party and thereby the backer of that party that the moving party is keen to be protected against a failure by that other party to be able to meet costs’.140 22.29 Though it may be a strong argument for refusing to exercise a discretion to order costs against a non-party, discretion must be distinguished from jurisdiction.141 The limitations attaching to the availability of security for costs must be recalled in this context:142 it is not a remedy in all cases in which justice calls for a costs order against a non-party; it cannot ordinarily be ordered against a defendant,143 or a plaintiff who is an individual and who

resides in the jurisdiction;144 and it is unreasonable to expect a defendant to make further applications [page 760] at every stage of the proceedings when it appears that costs are escalating so as to render the amount of security previously awarded insufficient.145 So a failure to apply for security for costs is not decisive, but may be taken into account in determining whether it would later be just to order a non-party to pay the costs of a successful party. Where an application for security for costs would have been doomed to fail, a court will not insist that such an application have been made as a condition precedent to the exercise of its discretion in favour of that party in a later application for costs against a nonparty.146 Even where an application for security for costs was unlikely to succeed, a court will not penalise a party for not so applying in considering an application for costs against a non-party, as a court does not encourage parties to make any application either bound to fail or unlikely to succeed. The proper procedure in each such case is for notice to be given to the opposing party (and that party’s backers and those interested in the litigation) that a costs order against those nonparties may be sought if the applicant proves successful in the proceedings.147 22.30 The foregoing is not to suggest that it is usually appropriate, on an application for a costs order against a non-party, for the court to determine whether an application for security for costs would have been successful if brought at the appropriate time.148 Courts are wary of making judgments without the full facts and with the benefit of hindsight. Yet in types of factual scenarios that are apt for security orders, the court is justified in inquiring why, in such a case, an application for security at an earlier stage of the proceedings was not made. In any event, as noted above, it may be that the failure to make such an application can, to some extent, be cured by giving the requisite notice. What is clear, therefore, is that where the applicant for a non-party costs order was aware from an early stage that its opponent on the record would be unlikely to be able to meet the applicant’s costs in the event that the latter

succeeded, and that it could have made an application for security for costs, a failure to apply for security coupled with the lack of notice to the opponent that a non-party costs order would be sought, constitute weighty grounds for refusing the application for costs against a non-party.149 22.31 The reasoning underscoring the foregoing is that the omission to make an application for security can be an argument against exercising the discretion against a non-party, not that a successful application will prevent an order being made against a non-party. Accordingly, obtaining one or more orders for security for costs will not, if other matters warrant it, stand in the way of obtaining an order against a non-party, for the difference between the costs that have been secured and those that have been assessed. There are at least two reasons for this:150 first, it is not reasonable to expect a defendant to continue making further applications for security at every stage when it appears that costs are escalating; and second, orders for security are, in the usual case, made on a conservative basis in relation to the quantum of costs.151 At the same time, it should not be assumed that applications for security function, by themselves, to serve as a warning as to a non-party costs order.152 [page 761]

Conduct of non-party 22.32 Proof of a lack of good faith, or of improper conduct, by the non-party in issue is not, generally speaking, a prerequisite for a non-party costs order.153 However, improper conduct, such as fraud, bad faith or some improper motive, on his or her party may impact upon the exercise of a court’s discretion to order costs against that person. This factor is not decisive of itself, but may bolster a conclusion that such an order is appropriate in circumstances where the court is satisfied of the requisite connection between the non-party and the proceedings. Where a party has incurred costs as a result of conduct by a non-party that was unnecessary and unreasonable, and unnecessarily troubled the court, the court may exercise its discretion to order the non-party to pay the costs of the party incurred as a result.154 For example, in Health & Life Care Ltd v SA

Asset Management Corp155 the court ordered liquidators, who had sued in the name of the company, to pay costs personally, on the ground that they should have raised the issue in the earlier proceedings, and by delaying doing so they put the respondents to additional costs. 22.33 The circumstances may even justify an order requiring a non-party to pay the costs of both parties to the proceedings. This occurred in Bischof v Adams,156 where the trial was significantly extended by the conduct of a nonparty in destroying evidence. Gobbo J found the causal connection between the conduct of the non-party and the additional costs incurred by each of the party to be ‘real and direct’. The non-party had an interest in the proceedings in that the plaintiff’s failure in the claim could have exposed the non-party to being sued for breach of contract.157 His Honour added that, although it was unnecessary to find that the non-party should reasonably have foreseen that the extra costs would flow from its actions, were it necessary to so find, he was satisfied that the non-party could at the material time have foreseen this.158

Circumstances Where Non-Party Costs Orders Have Been Made 22.34 Courts have identified some common, but not exhaustive, circumstances where non-party costs orders may represent an appropriate exercise of the curial costs discretion. The main ones are discussed below.159 In the Australian Capital Territory, these must be read subject to the terms of the court rules, which circumscribe the occasions where the jurisdiction is available.160

Orders where non-party is the effective litigant 22.35 The court’s general power to award costs against the real promoter of litigation — the effective litigant or ‘real party’ — although unnamed as a party to it, is clearly recognised,161 [page 762]

and represents perhaps the most common illustration in the case law of the non-party costs jurisdiction. As far back as 1912 a Canadian judge remarked that ‘the Court always had the power to award costs against the real applicant when the motion was made by him in the name of a man of straw for the purpose of avoiding liability’, and that the courts ‘were never so blind as to be unable to see through the flimsy device nor so impotent as to be unable to act’.162 There are, as discussed below, various examples of costs orders made against directors, receivers and liquidators of insolvent companies who have used an impecunious company to litigate for their own interests. But the case authorities are not so limited. For example, in Flinn v Flinn163 a nephew succeeded in securing an interest in a farm belonging to his aunt on the grounds of proprietary estoppel. The evidence revealed that the aunt, though named as the defendant on the record, lacked the mental capacity to properly defend the action. The Victorian Court of Appeal found that it was the aunt’s son, who had much to lose were the nephew to succeed, who had in effect defended the action. The aunt’s son had also personally financed the defence. This left the court in little doubt that the son had played an active part in the institution and conduct of the appeal, and had been the ‘real controller’ of it.164 It therefore held the case to be one where justice required the son, as a non-party, be ordered to pay the costs of the litigation, including the costs of the appeal.165

Orders against directors 22.36 Costs orders against directors personally who use the company as the litigant on the record aim to ensure that the corporate veil is not used to frustrate a potential costs order.166 Thus it has been said that ‘[t]here is no reason why the presence of a corporate veil should preclude a costs order against a controlling director who stands to benefit from the proceedings’.167 However, a court will carefully consider whether other avenues, such as an application for security for costs,168 or procedural steps such as the giving of notice of the intention to seek a non-party costs order,169 should have been pursued instead of the application for costs against the non-party in the circumstances. As directors are the controlling mind of a company, there is usually little

difficulty in connecting them with proceedings brought or defended in the company’s name. But this does not by itself justify a non-party costs order. It is insufficient to render a director liable for costs that he or she caused the company to bring or defend proceedings that ultimately failed.170 [page 763] A costs order in such a case would hardly be ‘exceptional’.171 If the proceedings were brought bona fide for the company’s benefit, the company is the real plaintiff.172 This reflects the notion that ‘[i]t is not an abuse of process … or in any way improper or unreasonable for an impecunious plaintiff to bring proceedings which are otherwise proper and bona fide while lacking the means to pay the defendant’s costs if they should fail’.173 The opposing party in such a situation would likely (or at least should) apply for security for costs. The New South Wales Court of Appeal’s decision in FPM Constructions Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Blue Mountains174 is instructive for this purpose. Basten JA, with whom Beazley and Giles JJA concurred on this point, noted that although it is true that the sole director and secretary of the appellant company (Y) was the driving force behind the company and was its representative for the purposes of the litigation, this did not mean that the benefit of the proceedings brought by the company flowed, in law, to anyone other than the company itself, nor that the company was other than the proper defendant in the proceedings brought by the council. Were it otherwise, his Honour surmised, ‘the corporate veil would, in effect, be nullified at the very point at which it provides protection against personal liability for the shareholders and directors’.175 22.37 The relevant inquiry is what, in addition to commencing or defending, or funding, a proceeding in the name of a company that lacks the financial resources to meet a costs order, is required before a court will in justice order a director to pay costs personally. Broadly speaking, what must be shown is that the director was doing things ordinarily outside the role as director of the company.176 Otherwise, it is reasoned, there would be an invasion of the principles of limited liability under company law. Certainly, where the directors have behaved with impropriety or bad faith in conducting the

litigation, they may be seen as acting outside their intended role. Accordingly, proof of impropriety can sway the balance in favour of the [page 764] court making a costs order against the director.177 But it is not essential. A non-party director who can be described as the ‘real party’, who for his or her own benefit controls and/or funds the litigation, may be ordered to pay costs even if he or she has acted in good faith or without any impropriety.178 In Carborundum Abrasives Ltd v Bank of New Zealand (No 2) Tompkins J explained:179 In many cases a major consideration will be the reason for the non-party causing a party, normally but not always an insolvent company, to bring or defend the proceedings. If the nonparty does so for his own financial benefit, either to gain the fruits of the litigation or to preserve assets in which the person has an interest, it may, depending upon the circumstances, be appropriate to make an order for costs against that person. Relevant factors will include the financial position of the party through whom the proceedings are brought or defended and the likelihood of it being able to meet any order for costs, the degree of possible benefit to the nonparty and whether, in the circumstances, the bringing or defending of the claim — although in the end unsuccessful — was a reasonable course to adopt.

Hence, the presence of a personal interest and/or the derivation of a personal benefit from the proceedings is an important factor in favour of making a costs order against a director where the company cannot meet an order for costs against it. For example, in Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (No 2)180 where the director of a corporate litigant was in effective control of the company, and had a real and personal interest in the subject of the litigation, Branson J ordered costs against the director. Similarly, in Oz B & S Pty Ltd v Elders IXL Ltd181 the respondent successfully sought an order that the principal director and shareholder of the applicant (C) pay its costs of an unsuccessful motion brought by the applicant. Einfeld J held that C had acted alone and without regard to the cost consequences to the respondent of what he was doing. As the corporate applicant was impecunious, C had spent his own money to fund the motion and the case, and would not have done so unless he had a special personal interest in the litigation and could gain an individual benefit from its success.182 This led his Honour to order C to pay the respondent’s costs of the motion. The decision highlights the notion, expressed by an English judge, that ‘however generously a director’s duty is

interpreted, [it] does not … extend to personally funding the litigation, nor to personally conducting it’.183 Neither of the above cases involved what could be described as bad faith or fraud. [page 765] The case law reveals multiple other examples of directors who have utilised the corporate vehicle as a ‘mere shell or conduit’,184 as a ‘cypher’ or ‘a shield of limited liability’ behind which to conduct their own financial affairs,185 or as ‘no more than a persona or mask’ to carry out the litigation,186 wherein the courts have made costs orders against the directors upon the company’s failure in the claim or defence. In each instance the use of the company represented what could be viewed, in a broad sense, as an abuse of limited liability. That the director is also a majority or sole shareholder in the company may, to this end, make it difficult to divorce his or her own personal interests from those of the company.187 The matter in each case rests on points of degree, concerning both interest and motive, as well as the extent of benefit the company (or trust) may generate in the hands of other shareholders (or beneficiaries),188 and it is difficult to state the principle with any more specificity without being misleading. 22.38 The principles discussed above are not limited in their scope to corporate officers who are directors. A person who, though not being formally a director, is nonetheless an effective controller of the company in issue may likewise be amenable to a non-party costs order,189 as may another person who ‘funds, controls and directs litigation by the company in order to promote or protect his own financial interest’,190 whether as a shareholder, creditor or otherwise. 22.39 Nor are the relevant principles confined to the corporate environment. They can apply vis-à-vis relevant officers of an incorporated association. However, to the extent that incorporated associations exist other than for private profit, it may be more difficult to conclude that the litigation is conducted for the (financial) benefit of the office-holder.191 [page 766]

Orders against liquidators192 22.40 The court has power to order liquidators who commence or defend legal proceedings in the name of the company193 to pay the costs of those proceedings personally.194 The importance of this jurisdiction lies in that the company, by virtue of its liquidation, may have insufficient funds to meet the costs of the successful party. Like a director, that the liquidator caused the company to bring an application when there were no funds in the company with which to pay costs if the application fails is no automatic cue to order costs against the liquidator personally.195 Exceptional circumstances are required, such as where the liquidator is the effective litigant standing behind an actual party, or otherwise acts (well) outside of his or her role so as to engage in some relevant impropriety.196 22.41 Yet there are also various judicial remarks that, unlike a director, a liquidator holds a special position — liquidators are not aligned to particular creditors and perform a public function pursuant to statute — that is relevant to the exercise of the costs discretion.197 This explains authority to the effect that impropriety by a liquidator in the conduct of the proceedings is a precondition to a non-party costs order in this context.198 After all, liquidators (and also provisional liquidators),199 unlike directors, ordinarily lack a personal interest in the proceedings (other than their fees) and do not seek to derive personal benefit therefrom. In a leading English case, Metalloy Supplies Ltd (in liq) v MA (UK) Ltd,200 it was alleged that the liquidator, in continuing proceedings after the defendant had applied for security for costs and in resisting that application, had acted unreasonably in that he the lacked funds both to provide the security and to pursue the case to trial if security was not ordered. This Millett LJ rejected, ruling that the lack of funds to furnish security was a ground on which the court may properly refuse to order security, and the lack of funds to fully pursue the case rendered it all the more important that the liquidator defeat the application and obtain some bargaining power with a view to settlement. Although, in his Lordship’s view, it is ‘obviously risky for a plaintiff to begin proceedings which he cannot afford to finish’, this did not make it ‘unreasonable, still [page 767]

less improper, for him to do so’.201 There was therefore no justification for a costs order against the liquidator personally. 22.42 It appears that the position is likewise in the antipodes, namely that it is a prerequisite to a non-party costs order against a liquidator to prove impropriety, broadly speaking, in a liquidator’s approach to, or conduct of, proceedings in the company name. In Macks v Hedley202 the Full Federal Court remarked as to the ‘special position of official liquidators which is to be protected, absent serious delinquency on their part’. On the facts, it held that although the liquidator’s conduct was not beyond criticism, and could be described as falling below prudent conduct, this did not present a compelling case in the interests of justice to order costs against him.203 And in Mana Property Trustee Ltd v James Development Ltd204 the Supreme Court of New Zealand found no impropriety in the liquidators accepting funding from the controller of the insolvent company, as they were at all times acting on behalf of the company and its creditors, and before proceeding had taken independent legal advice. Conversely, in Mead v Watson,205 where the liquidator persisted in opposing clearly sustainable defences, the New South Wales Court of Appeal ruled that this opposition was ‘unreasonable and without justification’, and justified the liquidator being ordered to pay the costs of the action pertaining to those defences.

Orders against receivers206 22.43 There is clear High Court authority recognising that, if the interests of justice require it, a court may order costs against a receiver who institutes or defends proceedings in the company’s name.207 The court’s willingness to make such an order may depend upon whether the receiver is appointed by the court, or privately pursuant to a loan agreement with a company creditor.208 As a receiver appointed by the court is an officer of the court209 and thus performs a quasi-public function, there are valid grounds for assimilating the receiver’s legal position so far as non-party costs orders are concerned to that of a liquidator.210 22.44 On the other hand, although a receiver appointed privately is nominally an agent of the mortgagor,211 it is the mortgagee who obtains the benefit of the receiver’s appointment through the payment of the debt.212 This has

implications for the exercise of the discretion to make a non-party costs order because receivers appointed out of court may, like directors, [page 768] have a personal interest in a proceeding.213 There may thus be little difference in principle, for this purpose, between the position of a privately appointed receiver, and that of a shareholder, creditor or director.214 It cannot, in any case, be said that such a receiver lacks connection with litigation run in the name of the company.215 Case authority that proof of impropriety, fraud or bad faith by the receiver is not a prerequisite to the order supports this view.216 Yet a receiver may be in a stronger position than say, a director or shareholder, to resist a costs order by virtue of his or her statutory authority to bring the proceedings,217 the same authority conferred upon a liquidator.218 To this end, the curial willingness to make a non-party costs order against a receiver is likely to lie somewhere between that applicable to directors and to liquidators. The case law bears this out tacitly rather than in any overt statement or clear factual application. 22.45 In Forest Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) v Keen Bay Pty Ltd219 the Full Court of the Queensland Supreme Court held that it was just to order costs to be paid by receivers when it was clearly established that the receivers incurred the costs chiefly for the benefit of non-parties (the banks) and with their support. In the circumstances, the court thought it unfair to confine the applicants to costs orders against impecunious companies, even though the applicants had earlier obtained an order for security for costs.220 This ruling was affirmed by the High Court on appeal.221 Certainly a receiver who causes proceedings to ensue without the authority of the nominal moving party will usually personally bear the burden of an adverse costs order.222 These scenarios can be contrasted with that in Dolphin Quays Developments Ltd v Mills,223 where the company, by its receivers, were unsuccessful in proceedings to enforce a contractual right. Sir Andrew Morritt C refused the successful defendant’s application for costs against the receivers for the following reasons.224 First, the case was not ‘exceptional’, but an ‘entirely normal case’ of receivers seeking to enforce a contractual

right forming part of the security. Second, the receivers had obtained the advice of counsel no fewer than three times, and acted in line with that advice in bringing the proceedings. Third, no element of impropriety or unreasonableness in initiating and prosecuting the claim had been alleged. Fourth, the receivers did not fund the proceedings in any sense relevant to the exercise of this jurisdiction, nor did they benefit from them in any such sense. Fifth, under the terms of the security the receivers were branded as agents of the company. Sixth, the hardship caused to the defendant by an inability to recover his costs from the company could have been avoided had he pursued an application for security for costs from the company promptly or at all. It followed from the foregoing that the receivers [page 769] could not be characterised as a ‘real’ party to the action. His Lordship’s decision was affirmed on appeal.225

Orders against insurers 22.46 Insurers, pursuant to rights of subrogation (commonly under the insurance contract), may conduct legal proceedings in the name of the insured. Though not named as a party, insurance contracts ordinarily entitle the insurer to have carriage of the matter, or at least oblige the insured to provide the requisite assistance to (and not hinder) the insurer in this respect. In such a case the court may, where appropriate, make a costs order against the insurer instead of the insured. For example, in W J Green & Co v Cooper & Oxley Constructions Co Pty Ltd226 the insured’s own solicitors were forced to seek an adjournment of a matter because of the failure of the insurer’s solicitors to communicate their awareness of the likelihood that the plaintiff would be exposed to a substantial damages claim arising out of the defendant’s counterclaim. Seaman J held that, as the insurer had exercised its subrogated rights so to have conduct of the matter with a view to protecting its own interests, and through its solicitors had caused the adjournment, it should pay the defendant’s costs of the adjournment.227 The position differs where the facts reveal that the suit or appeal is pursued in the interests of the

insured, and no suggestion that the insurer is managing or controlling the proceedings is made, even if the insurer may benefit from the action.228

Orders where non-party supports party Financial support — litigation funders 22.47 Merely funding an action for a party is not normally sufficient to justify a non-party costs order against the funder.229 In this vein, the High Court has branded the proposition that ‘those who fund another’s litigation must put the party funded in a position to meet any adverse costs order’ as ‘too broad a proposition to be accepted’.230 But the provision of financial support by a non-party to litigation may open the door to costs liability if the court considers that the non-party supports the litigation to promote its own interest or to secure its own benefit. The strongest cases are those where the court is convinced that the non-party’s failure to appear on the record is directed to shielding itself from costs liability as a party, when it is in fact the ‘real’ litigant.231 22.48 Yet the connection between the non-party and the litigation need not be direct, and certainly not even so collusive, to attract a non-party costs order. For example, where a trade union funds unsuccessful litigation on a member’s behalf, the court may find it just to order the union to pay the successful party’s costs, should such an order be necessary, where, first, the union owes an implied obligation to its member to fund the action; second, there is an interest on the part of the union in supporting and being seen to support the member’s claim; third, [page 770] responsibility both for the decision whether the litigation is to be pursued and for its conduct lies in the union; and fourth, there is an expectation based on convention that the union will bear the costs of the successful party should the member lose.232 22.49 A non-party funder’s purely financial interest in the outcome of the litigation may in some instances attract costs liability. In Gore v Justice

Corporation Pty Ltd,233 for example, the respondent agreed to financially assist a litigant (M) in return for 8 per cent of any award of damages that M secured by the proceedings. This meant that, said the Full Federal Court, the respondent, though it did not control the litigation, had a direct financial interest in its outcome. The respondent offered no explanation for its participation in the litigation, from which the court inferred that it represented a commercial investment. This led their Honours to rule that the respondent should, in return for the chance of obtaining a percentage of the judgment debt, be expected to incur the risk of a costs order in the event that M proved unsuccessful.234 In Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty v Todd235 the Privy Council made a costs order against a litigation funder (A), which it found stood to benefit principally if not exclusively from the appeal to the Court of Appeal and then the Privy Council. Even though A played little if any role in the actual conduct of the appeals, the board was influenced by a finding that A ‘took the all-important decision to fund and thereby promote the appeal’.236 22.50 Conversely, where the interests of the party on the record alone are being advanced, financial support provides no basis for awarding costs against a non-party.237 If persons who fund litigation without a collateral interest in the proceedings (‘pure funders’)238 were regularly exposed to liability for costs, those funds could dry up at the expense of access to justice.239 This led the English Court of Appeal in Hamilton v Al Fayed (No 2)240 to recognise a rebuttable presumption against non-party costs liability in pure funding cases. Chadwick LJ in that case remarked as follows:241 … fairness to the successful defendant does not, as a general rule, require that where a pure funder provides financial support towards the litigation costs of an impecunious claimant, he should

[page 771] contribute to the costs which that defendant will (by reason of the claimant’s impecuniosity) be unable to recover under an order for costs against the claimant alone.

The presumption may be rebutted where, for instance, the litigation was oppressive, malicious or pursued for some other ulterior motive.242 The challenges in rebutting any such presumption are likely to be greater in the case of those within the family of the party who financially assist the

litigation, especially where that support is explainable by natural familial affection. For instance, the case law reveals several examples of wives who have financially supported litigation to which their husband was a party (whether personally or through the vehicle of a company) but avoided any costs liability as a non-party funder.243 The position may be different if the family member is actually controlling or intermeddling in the litigation, or in some other way has some close connection, most likely financially, with the outcome of the proceeding. 22.51 That a lawyer de facto funds a client’s case under a speculative or uplift fee agreement is no reason, by itself, to render him or her liable for costs as a non-party should the client’s claim fail. To expose a lawyer to potential costs liability in this context would be to discourage costs agreements of this kind, and with this impinge upon access to justice for many clients.244 That is not to say that lawyers are, as a matter of course, immune from costs liability as a nonparty consequent upon funding a client’s litigation, but that any such liability is premised upon the lawyer going beyond the role of legal representative; say, by pursuing some financial benefit over and above that expected under the costs agreement or exercising a level of control over the litigation (well) exceeding what be expected from a lawyer acting on a client’s behalf. It should be noted, moreover, that lawyers who act improperly or unreasonably in the course of litigation may be subjected to a personal costs order,245 as distinct from a nonparty costs order.246

Liability of non-party under a contract to indemnify party247 22.52 With the increasing popularity of legal expenses insurance in England, the issue arises as to whether, and if so when, in the case of an unsuccessful party whose legal costs were funded by legal expenses insurance, the insurer should be held liable to pay the successful party’s costs. Where those costs are funded by insurers who have provided cover against liability, which is not subject to any relevant limit, the same considerations discussed above in regard to trade union case funding248 are likely to apply in order to determine the point.249 22.53 The position is more complex where the insurer’s liability is limited to

a sum insufficient to cover both the defendant’s liability and costs. This occurred in T G A Chapman [page 772] Ltd v Christopher,250 where Judge Zucker QC, whose ruling was affirmed on appeal,251 made an order that the insurer pay the plaintiffs’ costs because: the plaintiffs’ claim from the outset was known by the insurer to exceed the limit of the indemnity; the insurer had sole conduct and direction of the defence, which it pursued in order to protect its own interest, namely its liability to pay under the insurance policy;252 the insurer knew from the outset that the insured had no means to meet any order for costs; each and every one of the defences put forward by the insurer was either abandoned or failed; by putting forward those defences the insurer caused the plaintiffs to incur costs of £250,000; and the insurer further prejudiced the plaintiffs by keeping them out of their money for three years and seven months, and in the meantime had the use of the moneys it ultimately paid out. In Murphy v Young & Co’s Brewery plc,253 however, Phillips LJ, with whom Sir John Balcombe and Butler-Sloss LJ concurred, found it unclear why an insurer would not be entitled to take account of the costs it paid in consequence of the judge’s order when calculating its residual liability under the policy, in which case the plaintiffs would be no better off at the end of the day. His Lordship then added:254 More generally, I am not persuaded that it will always be appropriate to order liability insurers to pay the plaintiffs’ costs where they have unsuccessfully defended a claim made against their insured if the result of such an order will be to render them liable beyond their contractual limit of cover. It seems to me that the appropriate order may well turn on the facts of the particular case.

In Murphy the insurer had no interest in the litigation save in so far as it affected its liability to pay costs, it did not initiate the litigation or exercise any control over its conduct, nor could it be accused of ‘wanton and officious intermeddling’ in the dispute. This led Phillips LJ to conclude that the mere fact that the insurer funded the litigation under a policy of insurance, up to the limit of the cover under that policy, did not per se make it reasonable and just that the insurer pay the costs of the adverse successful party.255 22.54 That a non-party is itself indemnified by another person for a costs order against it is irrelevant to the exercise of the discretion to order costs against the non-party. The reason for this is clear: the applicant for a nonparty costs order has no interest in disputes between the non-party and another non-party who might offer such an indemnity, nor is the applicant in a position to know enough about the relationship to enable him or her to conduct litigation in that regard. Hence, in the context of a receiver as a nonparty who may be indemnified for [page 773] costs by a secured creditor, Dowsett J in Forest Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) v Keen Bay Pty Ltd remarked:256 The receiver’s liability to an order for costs can only depend upon the circumstances which exist in the litigation in question and cannot be influenced by the question of whether or not he has an indemnity from some other person. He has either exposed himself to an order for costs by his conduct of the litigation or he has not. It may be reassuring to a judge to know that a receiver will be indemnified in the event that an order for costs is made against him, but it is not relevant to the exercise of the discretion to make such an order.

Non-party supports party but lacks bona fides 22.55 A non-party who supported an unsuccessful party in bad faith towards the other parties and the court, such as by giving false testimony, forging documents or preventing relevant documents being discovered, may be ordered to pay part or all of the successful party’s costs. For example, in Oasis Hotel Ltd v Zurich Insurance Co257 a non-party (S) and his wife were sole owners of the shares in the appellant company, and conceived a scheme to defraud the respondent insurer. S used proceedings in the British Columbia

Supreme Court as an instrument of his fraud, and attempted to deceive the court. It was held that the court had the power to order S to pay the insurer its costs of the proceedings, on the ground that ‘the individual who conceives and carries out the fraud cannot shield behind a corporation that he controls’.258 22.56 Generally speaking, though, a person who, without fee and without contravening any statute, assists a person to institute or maintain legal proceedings will not, on that account alone, ordinarily be exposed to a costs order.259 Something more is needed. As noted above, that ‘something more’ can involve fraudulent behaviour. It may also encompass an abuse of process falling short of fraud. In 2002 the Full Federal Court saw no reason in principle why the jurisdiction to award costs against a non-party could not extend to a non-lawyer who, without fee or reward, conducts legal proceedings, or takes steps in such proceedings, on behalf of a litigant that amount to an abuse of process.260 An example of an abuse of process is the institution of hopeless proceedings with the encouragement and assistance of a non-party. This occurred in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Fonua,261 where a non-party (F) who was neither a lawyer nor a migration agent, advised and prepared documentation in support of a hopeless case on behalf of an applicant. According to Madgwick J, F’s involvement in the matter went a long way beyond that of a mere interpreter or incompetent well-wisher; F actively advised the applicant to make the application and helped him to make what F knew was a worthless application. His Honour, in ordering F to pay the respondent’s costs, reasoned as follows:262 In this case the overwhelming inference is that [F’s] purpose in lodging the application was, as has been suspected of him in previous matters, simply to delay the applicant’s departure from

[page 774] Australia without any legal justification. It is not necessary to reach a conclusion about the reason for [F’s] involvement in so many legally quite meritless matters for Tongan applicants, allegedly without financial reward for his efforts. Whatever [F’s] motivations, he well knew that there was no legal basis to file such an application, yet advised the applicant to do so anyway. That is an abuse of process. It has been committed by a person who knew the implications of so proceeding. The Minister incurred unnecessary costs as the natural and probable result. In the

circumstances of probable inability to recover costs from the applicant, the Minister should have whatever additional security a costs order against [F] may afford.

The swell of hopeless migration claims supported by, inter alia, nonparties, like the Fonua case, led the federal parliament to amend the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), from 1 December 2005,263 to prohibit a person encouraging another to commence or continue migration litigation264 that has no reasonable prospect of success265 if the person does not give ‘proper consideration to the prospects of success’ of the litigation,266 or a purpose in commencing or continuing it is ‘unrelated to the objectives which the court process is designed to achieve’.267 Contravention of this prohibition may lead the court to order the person to pay a party to the litigation (other than the litigant) the costs incurred by that party because of the commencement or continuation of the litigation, or order that person to repay to the litigant any costs already paid by the litigant to another party to the litigation because of its commencement or continuation.268 The foregoing does not, however, limit any power a court may otherwise have to make costs orders against a person who is not a party to proceedings.269

Costs orders against public officers or bodies 22.57 Public officers or public bodies are not immune from costs orders against them where they are not a party to proceedings but are nonetheless sufficiently connected with them, and the incurrence of costs, as to attract the court’s jurisdiction to make a non-party costs order. The following provides examples of the types of circumstances in which certain public officers or bodies have been so ordered to pay costs.

Orders against magistrates and magistrates’ courts 22.58 Whereas judges of superior courts in Australia enjoy an absolute immunity from, inter alia, orders for costs against them in respect of matters over which they preside,270 magistrates enjoy only a qualified immunity in this respect.271 There is jurisdiction in a superior court to order costs against a magistrate personally, but only very rarely and exceptionally will it be [page 775]

appropriate to do so.272 What has challenged the courts is to properly explain the circumstances in which such an order may be justified. Although there is some degree of diversity in curial expressions in this context — which itself suggests guidelines rather than rules of law — the authorities express a considerable commonality. 22.59 Many of the cases use the term ‘perverse’ to suggest something more than error, conveying obstinacy or persistence in error.273 The idea seems to be that a magistrate is not to be ordered to pay costs for acting on an erroneous view of the law, even though it is plain that that view was wrong, unless he or she has really chosen to ignore the law.274 In Ex parte Vincent,275 for example, an appellate court, faced with what it regarded as ‘an extraordinary and astounding blunder’, was not prepared to say that the magistrate had behaved perversely. And in Cummins v Mackenzie276 Sheppard J held that where the magistrate did not intend to be obstinate or stubborn in relation to the discharge of his duties, but thought he was doing justice according to law, perversity was not established. 22.60 Reference is often made to ‘misconduct’ as attracting this jurisdiction. The term is used in a narrow sense — ‘where the magistrate has been guilty of serious misconduct, corruption, gross ignorance or has been perverse’277 — but more commonly in a generic sense, as covering all kinds of behaviour that justify an award of costs against the magistrate. In this latter use, it has been said that the court will not order costs against a magistrate ‘unless it is a clear case of misconduct’.278 There is an obvious dovetailing of this test with one based on perversity; both are directed to conduct of the magistrate that is beyond a mere mistake but represents a complete disregard for his or her judicial position and role in the matter.279 Thus an English judge has remarked that it has been the practice to grant costs against magistrates ‘only if they have acted improperly, that is to say, perversely or with some disregard for the elementary principles which every court ought to obey, and even then only if it was a flagrant instance’.280 Brooking JA fleshed this out, in an important judgment in Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Heidelberg v Robinson, as follows:281 [page 776]

[T]he notion of serious misconduct or serious impropriety may be said to underlie the award of costs against inferior courts provided that it is understood that there may be misconduct or impropriety notwithstanding the absence of any knowing departure from elementary principles. By this I mean that the person or persons constituting the court may be said to be guilty of serious misconduct or serious impropriety if they failed to observe some fundamental principle of justice notwithstanding that they were ignorant of that principle. Some principles are so fundamental that it may be regarded as misconduct or impropriety in the necessary sense for an inferior court not to observe them notwithstanding that the court is unaware of them. There is, I think, here to be drawn a distinction between rules of substantive law and the fundamental rules of natural justice. The superior court may be prepared to regard even ‘an astounding blunder’ in a matter of substantive law as not exhibiting ‘gross ignorance’ in a necessary sense and, in the absence of ‘perversity’, may decline to make an order for costs against the inferior court, although a stage might be reached at which the rule of substantive law that had, albeit through ignorance, not been applied was so fundamental as to require the case to be viewed as one of misconduct or impropriety and so as making an award of costs appropriate. But when one is concerned, not with some ‘ordinary’ rule of substantive law, but with the fundamental principles concerning procedural fairness or natural justice, the inferior court may be held not to be excused by its own ignorance. In considering the suggestion of ‘gross ignorance’, and what is to be excused, one cannot overlook the fact that the lay and honorary justice has given way to the legally qualified professional magistrate. But in saying this I do not wish to suggest that a mere blunder should attract an award of costs: the approach should still be benign, or reasonably so, where a bona fide mistake has been made.

Robinson involved a magistrate who repeatedly acted in rude and abrupt way, behaved like a bully, threatened the respondent with gaol to compel payment of compensation, refused to hear the respondent and, worst of all in a criminal proceeding, threatened the respondent’s solicitor with instant committal for contempt of court if he persisted in his application that the magistrate disqualify himself. This was held to constitute a denial of natural justice in the proceedings before the magistrate — in the words of one judge, ‘a flagrant breach of elementary principles of justice’282 — being misconduct sufficiently serious to justify a costs award against the Magistrates’ Court.283 The Victorian Court of Appeal thus upheld the trial judge’s order to this effect. It also appears from other case law that blatant or gross denials of procedural fairness are likely to figure prominently in a court’s discretion to make a costs order in this context.284 The decision in Robinson can be contrasted with that of the Full South Australian Supreme Court in El Deeb v Magistrates Court of South Australia.285 The magistrate had declined to make a decision on the applicants’ claim on the grounds of public interest immunity. The applicants were successful in an application to the Supreme Court for an order directing the magistrate to hear and determine the claim, but did not receive costs against the lower court because, even though the magistrate had erred, he had

not acted perversely in the sense that he knew he was wrong but deliberately disregarded his duty.286 22.61 The court has the option, exercised in Robinson, of ordering costs against the inferior court or tribunal itself as opposed to the magistrate, in which case the order is funded out of [page 777] the coffers of government. This course may be followed where, for instance, a magistrate enjoys statutory immunity in respect of acts performed in the exercise of his or her judicial function, including orders for costs.287 This explains why in Robinson288 Brooking JA stated that the statutory immunity conferred upon magistrates has nothing to do with the awarding of costs against an inferior court. However, it cannot be assumed in each case that costs orders come within the statutory immunity; it depends on the scope of the immunity as compared to the actions giving rise to the costs order.289

Orders arising out of judicial review of court or tribunal decisions 22.62 When an application is made for judicial review of a court or tribunal decision, convention dictates that the respondent court or tribunal should not actively oppose the application, but submit to whatever order the court conducting the review thinks fit to make except as to costs.290 Costs are not ordinarily awarded against a respondent body or its members in such a case,291 although costs will be awarded against a co-respondent who is unsuccessful. Where the tribunal is the only respondent, and the application for judicial review succeeds, this essentially burdens the applicant for his or her own lawyer’s costs. The injustice in this outcome has not passed unnoticed, leading both commentators292 and law reform bodies293 to recommend that the public purse should meet at least some of the costs of successful applicants in this context. There is even some suggestion, at least in English courts, that a judge could take this into account in exercising the costs discretion.294

22.63 The position differs where the tribunal actively participates in proceedings concerning the correctness of its own decision(s).295 An inferior court or tribunal that resists an application actively by way of argument in such a way to make itself an active party to the litigation is treated as a party, so that costs follow the event in the usual case. For example, in Fernando v Medical Complaints Tribunal296 the respondent tribunal actively and unsuccessfully opposed an appeal against its determinations. The court ruled that by choosing to actively seek to sustain its determinations on appeal, the tribunal rendered itself liable for costs in the event of defeat.297 That the court may have derived assistance from submissions by counsel for the tribunal did not, according to Crawford J, alter this outcome, as had the members of the tribunal avoided participating in the name of the tribunal in the way they did, the court could [page 778] have sought the assistance of an amicus curiæ who would not have incurred the risk of costs for providing that assistance.298 This contrasts with the scenario of an inferior court or tribunal appearing in the proceedings to assist the court neutrally on questions of jurisdiction, procedure, specialist case law and such like. The practice in such a case is to treat it as a neutral party, so as to neither pay nor receive costs.299 Essentially the same principles apply where it is the determination of a statutory regulator that is litigated;300 the more adversarial its role in the proceedings, the more likely it may be exposed to a costs order in the event its position is rejected. 22.64 The principles governing costs orders against magistrates and magistrates’ courts discussed above301 have a parallel application in respect of tribunals. It has been judicially observed, to this end, that costs ought not to be awarded against a tribunal that makes an order in excess of its powers ‘unless it can be demonstrated that the tribunal has been guilty of serious misconduct or corruption or has acted perversely’.302 It follows that a blatant or gross denial of procedural fairness may well justify a non-party costs order in this context too.303

Orders against legal aid bodies 22.65 In considering whether a costs order should be made against a legal aid body, the court will pay regard to the public interest in not having such bodies at risk of becoming liable for costs so as to diminish the funds available for the purpose for which they are established, nor to cause them to act with such caution that indigent persons involved in litigation may be prejudiced by assistance being refused. Yet this is not to say that in the exceptional case where a legal aid body has ‘clearly acted unreasonably to the financial detriment of a self-funded party, an order for costs should not be made’.304 This is because that body’s efficient performance of its statutory duties ‘is crucial to the proper and expeditious conduct of such litigation and the courts have an essential interest in seeing that those functions are performed in such a way that litigation is efficiently progressed’.305 The point is illustrated in Collins and the Victorian Legal Aid Commission.306 Fogarty J found that the Legal Aid Commission, in funding the wife’s application, acted without proper or prudent consideration of the issues, should have realised that the proceeding was doomed to failure, and that the husband, who was not legally aided, would need to incur substantial expense to defend the matter. His Honour concluded that the case was one where the husband had a strong moral claim to be indemnified for the costs he was unnecessarily forced to incur in defending litigation lacking any reasonable prospect of success, which litigation was only really made possible because the wife’s application was funded by legal aid.307 This moral claim Fogarty J gave legal effect to, on the construction of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117(2),308 and in so doing made the following important observations as to the proper curial approach in this respect:309 [page 779] [T]he development over the last decade of legal aid in Australia cannot be ignored … There is now set up throughout Australia professionally run, full-time bodies with very substantial budgets and charged with the responsibility to assist needy persons in reasonable litigation. Here, a Commission permitted litigation to go forward where it was unreasonable and where no steps were apparently taken to consider its reasonableness. It appears to me to be unjust that the other party should be left with the phyrric victory in the litigation but with a substantial bill of costs which he should never have had to incur. The intervention of legal aid into Australian litigation on such a massive scale as has occurred in the past decade is a development of the law

which in my view the Courts ought not to ignore. The law is not static. It should take cognisance of what is one of the most significant developments in practical terms in law in Australia in the last 20 years. In my view the general power under sec 117 to make an order for costs where it is just to do so is sufficiently wide to encompass this development. The section itself seems to envisage the existence of legal aid as a relevant consideration. Obviously it is a discretion which ought to be exercised with circumspection having regard to the purposes of legal aid and the impact upon public funds of such orders. The infrequency with which such orders are made in England, Western Australia and New South Wales shows that the Courts are conscious of this. But, however strict a criterion one would apply, this case seems to me to be a proper case for the exercise of the discretion once it is concluded that the power exists.

On appeal the Full Court did not rule on this point, but suggested that costs can be ordered directly against the legal aid body only where there is express statutory provision to that effect, as in some jurisdictions.310 In that the Full Court propounded a view — that costs orders against non-parties could not be ordered under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) — which has since been held to be incorrect,311 the remarks of Fogarty J at first instance arguably remain relevant to the modern law.

Orders against governmental bodies 22.66 Courts have been similarly reticent, essentially for the same reasons, to order costs against government bodies or departments as non-parties to proceedings. This is illustrated by the Family Court’s decision in Marriage of Millea and Duke.312 It involved allegations of child sexual abuse against the husband in custody proceedings, which were in part substantiated by what was found to be a strong bias against the husband by a social worker employed by the Child at Risk Assessment Unit, a government body charged with assisting in determining the truth or otherwise of such allegations. Murray J had no doubt that a substantial amount of costs related to the lengthening of the trial due to the sexual abuse allegations, and so found a causal connection between the non-party and the incurring of costs. However, his Honour found that the government through its employees played no active role in the conduct of the litigation (the husband being the instigator of the proceedings, which were in train for some months prior to the making of the allegations), and was unable to find that any of the government employees had any interest per se in the subject of the litigation.313 As a result, the court concluded that there was no sufficient nexus between the social worker (or the unit) and the proceedings as to bestow on either of them the character of the ‘real’ party; the husband and wife were the real

parties.314 The unit did not initiate the litigation, although the preliminary advice of the witness doubtless crystallised those allegations. The following also influenced his Honour:315 [page 780] [T]here is a public interest in not making orders that will diminish the funds available to institutions in the nature of the Unit for the purpose for which they are established. As in all children’s cases, the welfare of the child is paramount, and in abuse cases, Government officers or any other expert witness for that matter, should not have cause to fear possible consequences as to costs and should be able to conduct their work without that sword hanging over their heads. I keep in mind however that the Unit has a heavy obligation to ensure that its officers act properly and competently, but if they do not, that in my view is a matter for another jurisdiction.

Orders against persons acting as representatives 22.67 There are certain circumstances where a person acts in a representative capacity in litigation, whilst not at the time actually being a party to it. Two typical illustrations in this context are next friends and independent children’s lawyers in family law, both of whom may potentially be subject to a costs order.

Orders against next friends and litigation guardians 22.68 An infant (or other person under a disability) is unable to bind himself or herself or to incur liability for costs, and so at general law is incapable of bringing or defending an action without the assistance of another person, who is responsible to the court for the proper conduct of the action. Traditionally a person who assists a plaintiff is termed a ‘next friend’, and a person who assists a defendant is a ‘litigation guardian’ or ‘guardian ad litem’, although this terminological distinction is not adopted in each jurisdiction.316 The phrase ‘next friend’ is therefore used below to encompass a litigation guardian where appropriate. That a next friend is regarded as an officer of the court appointed to safeguard the infant’s interests and to conduct the proceedings does not make a next friend a party to the action.317 The next friend is on the record so that

there is a person answerable to the opposing party for the costs of the litigation in the event that a costs order is made against the infant.318 The next friend is liable for the costs incurred until the infant attains majority.319 However, the next [page 781] friend is entitled to recover those costs from the infant’s estate (if there is one),320 often on a basis more generous than the party and party basis,321 provided he or she acted bona fide and not unreasonably.322 An infant who reaches the age of majority and elects to carry on or defend the suit becomes responsible for all its costs;323 there is no apportionment in this instance.324 An infant is taken to have elected to do so if he or she does anything that could reasonably be considered to be an adoption of the proceedings.325 22.69 The application of these principles is illustrated by the Federal Court’s decision in New South Wales Ministerial Corporation v Abudfoul.326 In 1988 the respondent commenced proceedings against the applicant as his son’s next friend in the New South Wales District Court for damages for injuries to his son in a car accident. Before doing so the respondent signed an undertaking in accordance with the court rules, stating that he would be responsible for costs in the proceedings, a requirement that had in fact been abolished in 1986. Once the son turned 18 in 1989, the respondent took little, if any, further part in the proceedings. Judgment was entered in favour of the applicant in 1992, with costs. The applicant sought costs against the respondent, arguing that the respondent should have taken steps to remove himself from the proceedings as next friend or otherwise remain liable for the costs. Sackville J rejected this argument, reasoning as follows:327 This is not a case in which, at the time the final hearing was conducted and orders made, the plaintiff was an infant. He had attained his majority several years before the hearing conducted by a judge of the District Court. Nor is this a case where, at the time of the final hearing, the next friend gave instructions to the solicitor acting for the plaintiff or otherwise played a role in the proceedings. It is clear from the respondent’s uncontested evidence that he played no part in the proceedings at any time after the hearing conducted by the arbitrator. It is also an inescapable inference from that evidence that the son, at least from the time he applied for a rehearing of the arbitrated action, adopted the proceedings … It follows from these findings … that the son became liable to meet the costs order made in favour of the defendant … As far as the respondent is concerned, his authority to take steps in the proceedings terminated on the date the son attained his majority.

[page 782] His Honour conceded that, had the respondent actively participated in the proceedings after that date, he may have incurred liability to pay costs. Yet there was no compelling evidence that the respondent took an active part in the proceedings after the son attained his majority. Accordingly, the respondent could not be liable for costs incurred after that date.328 Though the respondent’s solicitor should have filed notice in the court’s registry to the effect that the plaintiff had reached majority and elected to continue the action329 — a failure having the consequence that the respondent remained nominally on the record as next friend — that failure did not, in Sackville J’s opinion, cast on the respondent responsibility for costs incurred after the date the son attained his majority given that the son had adopted the proceedings.330 As to the liability for costs incurred before the date the son attained his majority, Sackville J favoured the view that the costs order was not apportionable, so that the respondent was not liable for those costs.331 22.70 The foregoing should not be read as indicating that the costs burden of unsuccessful litigation by a next friend as a matter of course lies in the next friend. In instances where the incapacity of the plaintiff (or defendant) is ongoing rather than merely age-related, and the next friend is someone outside the family of the plaintiff (or defendant), unbridled exposure to costs liability would discourage persons from acting as next friends in what may be meritorious claims or defences. Indeed, in Adams v State of New South Wales (No 2)332 Rothman J opined that, in a case of a plaintiff under a legal incapacity represented by her tutor (the next friend equivalent under the New South Wales rules), who was not biologically related to the plaintiff and assumed the care of the plaintiff at the request of the state, it would be ‘a travesty of justice, if the State of New South Wales were to pursue the tutor for costs, separately and distinctly from the plaintiff’. His Honour elaborated the point as follows:333 That it would be a travesty of justice derives from a number of factors. Firstly, the tutor, having had the plaintiff placed in her care by the State, would necessarily feel a certain obligation to ensure that the plaintiff’s interests were fully protected and to embark upon litigation that was reasonably arguable. Secondly, from the perspective of encouragement of persons to undertake such care, it would be a disincentive, to the undertaking of a public service, for the Courts to permit a tutor, who feels obliged to act in that capacity, because of her or his position as a foster parent, to be pursued for costs. It is also true that the plaintiff is unlikely ever to have the resources to meet any costs order. These proceedings, from the tutor’s perspective, were not

unreasonably commenced and, it seems, were commenced in a ‘protective’ capacity, somewhat akin to a trustee, in the belief that the interests of the plaintiff had to be determined or protected.

Rothman J nonetheless accepted that ‘a tutor must know that, generally, if proceedings are taken on behalf of a plaintiff, who does not have, and is unlikely to have, the resources to pay the costs, the tutor will be responsible for those costs’.334 But to balance this against the injustice noted above, whilst ordering costs against the unsuccessful plaintiff,335 his Honour directed that the defendant be restrained from executing this order against the tutor except in [page 783] relation to funds or property belonging to the plaintiff. An alternative, to the same end, is to direct that the next friend be indemnified from the incapable person and, to the extent that the indemnity does not cover the costs, to be indemnified from an available fund.336 In this vein, the Tasmanian rules state that if the court orders a litigation guardian to pay costs to any other party to that proceeding, unless the court otherwise orders, the litigation guardian is not personally liable for those costs, but those costs may be set off against any costs that the court has ordered that other party to pay to that litigation guardian, and any balance is to be met from the relevant estate.337

Orders in favour of and against independent children’s lawyers 22.71 If the Family Court considers that a child’s interests in the proceedings ought to be independently represented by a lawyer, it may make an order to this end.338 In proceedings in which an independent children’s lawyer (formerly a ‘separate representative’) has been appointed, the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) empowers the court to make an order as to costs to the effect that each party to the proceedings bears, in such proportion as the court considers just, the costs of the independent children’s lawyer in respect of the proceedings.339 The logic is compelling, as explained by Fowler J in Lukes Law v Collins:340 On the one hand, in a very real sense, the community gains benefit from these appointments.

They assist often in the early resolution of matters and bring an independent voice to proceedings on behalf of a child’s interests; interests which are so often drowned or disregarded in the cacophony of emotional and non child focussed inter parental dispute. On the other hand, the child is also very often assisted by such representation of his or her best interests, and a consequential early resolution of proceedings. In a real sense the cost of the lawyer is a cost of maintaining that child’s best interests; a cost which, like protection or education or the more mundane costs of life, is a part of the child’s real needs. Like the other costs of children they are a responsibility of their progenitors and a burden which that role requires them to meet.

[page 784] However, the Act provides that no such order may be made in relation to a party in receipt of legal aid in the proceedings, or whom the court considers would suffer financial hardship341 as a result.342 Nor will an order be made in favour of an independent children’s lawyer who is simply ‘along for the ride’,343 whose submissions or participation did not assist the court,344 or whose arguments were otherwise inappropriate and unwarranted.345 22.72 Statute does not address the circumstances in which costs may be ordered against an independent children’s lawyer, but case law indicates that the circumstances of the individual case can justify such an order, albeit very much exceptionally.346 Those circumstances, consistent with the jurisdiction to order costs against non-parties generally, are logically premised on illegitimate conduct that causes the parties to incur additional costs.

Orders against amicus curiæ 22.73 As a matter of general principle, an amicus curiæ does not have any rights or interests affected by the litigation sufficient for the amicus to be joined as a party or that would justify intervention.347 The role of the amicus has been described in the following terms:348 … to assist the court by ensuring that the court is properly informed of matters which should be taken into account in reaching its decision and this may well be of assistance to the court where the litigation involves an important question of law affecting persons other than the parties, especially disadvantaged persons. It is often a convenient course to allow an address by an amicus curiæ where one of the parties to the litigation or appeal is unable or unwilling to arrange for legal representation, or where they may be no contradictor to ensure that opposing arguments are brought to the attention of the court.

However, an amicus curiæ does not become a party to the proceedings and

may not appeal. As there is no right of appearance, it is entirely for the court to decide whether or not an amicus curiæ should be heard and, if so, to what extent and on what aspects of the case.349 Broadly speaking, an amicus will be heard when the court is of the opinion that it will be significantly assisted thereby, provided that any cost to the parties or any delay consequent on agreeing to hear the amicus is not disproportionate to the assistance that is expected.350 [page 785] 22.74 As to the question of costs, the breadth of the costs jurisdiction dictates that a court is not deprived of power to order costs against, or in favour of, an amicus curiæ.351 The question is one of discretion, although in view of the traditional status and role of an amicus courts are likely to confine any costs order to an exceptional case. The usual order is that the amicus (or amici) bear their own costs.352 The position may be otherwise in the case of amici who act as more than a mere contradictor, instead actively pursuing private interests, and whose participation added to the costs of the litigation. The amici here may be susceptible to a costs order.353

Procedural Matters Attending to Non-Party Costs Orders Opportunity to be heard 22.75 A corollary of the judicial exercise of the discretion to order costs against a non-party, coupled with the fact that it represents an exceptional order, is that a person against whom costs may be awarded must be brought before the court.354 More to the point, that non-party, according to the principles of natural justice, should be afforded the opportunity for a proper hearing into the proposed order — an opportunity to put before the court the full position and to argue whether any, and if so what, order should be made — which is to include an opportunity to resist evidence already received in the proceedings.355 There may be exceptional situations, however, where the

trial judge is confident that the position of the non-party was effectively being put through one of the actual parties, where it may not be mandatory to give an opportunity to be heard.356

Indemnity costs 22.76 Costs orders against a non-party, like other costs orders, are usually made on a party and party basis.357 This is not to deny that costs may be ordered on another basis, on an indemnity [page 786] basis, for instance.358 To this end, an indemnity costs order may be made on the same principles that govern the award of indemnity costs against an unsuccessful party.359 So if indemnity costs are sought ‘the circumstances of a case justifying the making of an order must be stronger or more compelling than the circumstances applying when a party and party costs order is made against a non-party’.360 In particular, the courts look for deliberate misconduct on the part of the non-party,361 or some other clear abuse of process. An example is where the non-party plays an active part in the litigation, promoting the adoption of claims that have, and the non-party knows or had good reason to know, no prospect of success.362

Order made after judgment 22.77 The court’s jurisdiction to order costs against non-parties does not terminate when a judgment has been pronounced in the proceeding that invoked the jurisdiction.363 Costs orders against non-parties are truly supplemental and do not affect the legal impact of the earlier judgment.364 They consequently fall outside the common law rule, grounded in the need for finality of litigation, that once a judgment has been passed and entered, the court thereafter lacks power to make an order that alters or sets it aside.365 The consideration by the court of an application for costs against a non-party, even after it has given judgment on the issue of costs inter partes in the proceeding, amounts to the exercise of a new discretion, not a re-agitation of

issues previously considered. So in UTSA Pty Ltd (in liq) v Ultra Tune Australia Pty Ltd,366 where a defendant, after judgment had been entered in its favour, applied for an order that two nonparties to the action pay its costs of the action, Chernov J held that the entry of judgment did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear and determine the application. 22.78 However, merely because a court has jurisdiction to make a non-party costs order after judgment has been entered between the parties does not mean it will necessarily exercise [page 787] that jurisdiction.367 The court must in any case be convinced that the case is one sufficiently exceptional to merit such an order.368 Delay in making the application, coupled with the reasons for the delay, are relevant to the exercise of the discretion. For instance, in Peter Breese & Associates Pty Ltd v CCI Holdings Ltd,369 the plaintiff sought a costs order against the sole director and shareholder of the defendant company against which a costs order was made, years after that order. Rein DCJ saw no authority requiring an application for a nonparty costs order to be made only at the time when judgment is pronounced or the costs result is announced, but accepted that it would not be desirable for applications of this kind to be made after the conclusion of the case, and that ‘ordinarily … there will be little scope for subsequent applications’.370 However, the delay did not, on the facts, operate to prevent a costs order against the director because the evidence revealed that for nearly two years pressure had been put on the defendant company to pay the costs debt, and the plaintiff had then had the costs assessed.371

1.

Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 192; BC9202673 per Mason CJ and Deane J.

2.

As to which see 6.4–6.6.

3.

Forbes-Smith v Forbes-Smith [1901] P 258 at 271 per Collins LJ, followed in John Fairfax and Sons Pty Ltd v E C de Witt & Co (Australia) Pty Ltd [1958] 1 QB 323. Both cases were overruled by the House of Lords in Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd [1986] AC 965 at 979 per Lord Goff, as to which see 22.5.

4.

Burns Philp & Co Ltd v Bhagat [1993] 1 VR 203 at 217 per Brooking J.

5.

Hayward v Giffard (1838) 4 M & W 194 at 197; 150 ER 1399 at 1400 per Lord Abinger CB.

6.

Hutchinson v Greenwood (1854) 4 El & Bl 324 at 326; 119 ER 125 at 126 per Lord Campbell CJ.

7.

Doe d Masters v Gray (1830) 10 B & C 615 at 616; 109 ER 579 at 579 per Lord Tenterden CJ. See also Evans v Rees (1842) 2 QB 334; 114 ER 131; Mobbs v Vandenbrande (1864) 33 LJ (NS) QB 177; Ram Coomar Coondoo v Chunder Canto Mookerjee (1876) 2 App Cas 186 at 212 per Sir Montague E Smith (PC); Waldron v Mitchell (1892) 8 WN (NSW) 117; Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 202; BC9202673 per Dawson J.

8.

Attorney-General v Logan [1891] 2 QB 100 at 106 per Vaughan Williams J; Wentworth v Attorney-General (NSW) (1984) 154 CLR 518 at 527 (FC).

9.

Re Gardiner (1890) 16 VLR 641; Bullfinch Surprise Gold Mining Co NL v Butler (1913) 35 ALT 99. The situation of a solicitor was admittedly a special one, ‘probably explicable by reason of the jurisdiction the court has over its officers’: Burns Philp & Co Ltd v Bhagat [1993] 1 VR 203 at 213 per Brooking J. Costs orders against solicitors personally are discussed separately in Ch 23.

10. Sharp v Lush (1879) 10 Ch D 468. 11. Re Knight (1887) 57 LT 238. 12. Palmer v Walesby (1868) 3 Ch App 732. As to costs orders against next friends see 22.68–22.70. 13. (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 189–90; BC9202673. See also at 202 per Dawson J (‘There is no compelling reason to my mind why that principle should be confined to cases of ejectment’); Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd [1986] AC 965 at 980 per Lord Goff; Sanelli v Acee Victoria Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 190; BC20202986 at [7] per Mukhtar AsJ (the ‘principle guiding the discretion looks to those non parties that ‘abuse the legal process, or play abusively the game of legal process by hiding behind an insolvent litigant. By that I mean it is an abuse of process, in a broad sense, to put someone forward who is not really defending the action’). This is by no means limited to modern courts. For instance, in Re Sturmer and Town of Beaverton (1912) 25 OLR 566 at 572 (Div Ct(Ont)) Middleton J remarked that ‘the Court always had power to award costs against the real applicant when the motion was made by him in the name of a man of straw for the purpose of avoiding liability’. 14. Cf Carborundum Abrasives Ltd v Bank of New Zealand Ltd [1992] 3 NZLR 187 at 191, where Hansen M considered that even if the equivalent New Zealand rule conferring upon the court an unfettered costs discretion was construed narrowly so as not to confer a jurisdiction to award costs against non-parties, the court has inherent jurisdiction to award costs against a non-party, because ‘[t]o determine otherwise would be to undermine the Court’s power to control its own processes’ and to prevent any abuse of process. These statements were obiter, and reflective of an early tentative approach to the issue. On the application for review Tompkins J clearly accepted the statutory jurisdiction: see Carborundum Abrasives Ltd v Bank of New Zealand Ltd (No 2) [1992] 3 NZLR 757 at 763 (HC). Having said that, if the courts’ jurisdiction to order security for costs (which in some contexts is seen as an alternative to seeking an order against a non-party: see 22.28–22.31) reflects an inherent jurisdiction directed to preventing abuses of process (see 28.1–28.4), there may be grounds to argue that the jurisdiction to make non-party costs orders should be likewise construed. 15. Bent v Gough (1992) 36 FCR 204 at 213; BC9203543 per Northrop and Ryan JJ (FC). See further 6.4–6.5. 16. See 6.3. 17. [1986] AC 965. 18. In that case the Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK) s 51(1), 51(3) (expressed in essentially the same

terms) (now Senior Courts Act 1981 (UK) s 51(1), 51(3)). 19. This is not to say that no prior decision had alluded to this. See, for example, Re Appleton French & Scrafton Ltd [1905] 1 Ch 749. 20. Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd [1986] AC 965 at 975 per Lord Goff. 21. Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd [1986] AC 965 at 979–80. 22. Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178; BC9202673, discussed at 22.7. 23. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98(1)(b) (formerly Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 76(1) (b)); Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 40(1) (see Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 452 per Olsson J, at 462 per Lander J; BC9804761 (FC)); Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 12(2) (see National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Chris Poulson Insurance Agencies Pty Ltd (1998) 8 Tas R 123 at 126–7; BC9804906 per Slicer J); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 24(1) (see Bischof v Adams [1992] 2 VR 198 at 201 per Gobbo J; Burns Philp & Co Ltd v Bhagat [1993] 1 VR 203 at 220, 223 per Brooking J; Re Bonlac Foods Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 457 at 463; [2001] VSC 75; BC200101364 per Warren J); Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 37(1) (see Duskwood Pty Ltd v Bellara Willows Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 281; BC200106540 at [12] per Steytler J). 24. In the context of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(1) see Re Wridgemont Display Homes Pty Ltd (1992) 39 FCR 193 at 194–5; BC9203863 per Jenkinson J; Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 539 at 542 per Hill J (FCA); Australian Forest Managers Ltd (in liq) v Bramley (1996) 65 FCR 13 at 16–17; BC9600943 per Lindgren J; Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (No 2) (1997) 147 ALR 685 at 694; BC9703585 per Branson J (FCA) (affd Yates v Boland [2000] FCA 1895; BC200007991 (FC)); Gore v Justice Corporation Pty Ltd (2002) 119 FCR 429; [2002] FCAFC 83; BC200201207 at [24], [25] per the court; MG Corrosion Consultants Pty Ltd v Vinciguerra (No 2) (2011) 276 ALR 319; [2011] FCAFC 48; BC201101696 at [14]–[18] per the court; Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations (No 4) (2012) 200 FCR 154; [2012] FCAFC 50; BC201201916 at [72]–[84] per the court. In the context of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 32 see Bent v Gough (1992) 36 FCR 204; BC9203543 (FC); Re Foster (1994) 121 ALR 494 at 501 per Einfeld J (FCA). In the context of High Court proceedings see Arundel Chiropractic Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 179 ALR 406 at 414–15; [2001] HCA 26; BC200102181 per Callinan J (HC) (pursuant to the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 26, which confers jurisdiction to award costs); in the context of proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court (now the Federal Circuit Court) see Lane v McConochie [2006] FMCA 376; BC200601616 at [12] per Jarrett FM (pursuant to the Federal Magistrates Court Act 1999 (Cth) s 79(2) (now the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 79(2)), which vests jurisdiction in the court to award costs in all proceedings before it other than proceedings in respect of which any other Act provides that costs must not be awarded). 25. (1992) 36 FCR 204 at 208; BC9203543 (FC). 26. Bent v Gough (1992) 36 FCR 204 at 209; BC9203543 (FC). See also at 215–16 per Northrop and Ryan JJ. 27. (1992) 174 CLR 178; BC9202673. 28. Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 185; BC9202673. 29. Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 190; BC9202673. See also at 202–3 per Dawson J. McHugh J dissented on the grounds that: first, O 91 r 1 did not confer jurisdiction to determine ‘by whom’ costs shall be paid, nor did it expressly authorise the court to order a non-

party to an action to pay the costs of that action (at 215); second, ‘an enactment should not be construed as authorising the imposition of a legal liability on a person in the absence of clear words or a settled course of authority on an enactment in similar terms’ (at 215); third, prior to the Judicature Act 1876 (Qld) the law of Queensland did not confer power on the Supreme Court to order a non-party to pay the costs of an action in that court except under the summary jurisdiction or in an action of ejectment and that the language of O 91 r 1 did not evince an intention to change the pre-Judicature Act position (at 216); and fourth, O 91 r 1 provides no machinery for enabling a non-party to be brought before the court for the purpose of determining his or her liability for the costs of the action (at 216). According to his Honour, to hold that O 91 r 1 was confined to making orders against the parties to the action was not to read down the words of that sub-rule, but simply to give it its ordinary and natural meaning in the context of its application to proceedings brought before the Supreme Court: at 216–17. 30. Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 205; BC9202673 (footnote omitted). 31. Qld r 681(1) (formerly Qld r 689(1)) (‘Costs of a proceeding are in the discretion of the court but follow the event, unless the court considers another order is more appropriate’). 32. Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Westleigh Management Services Pty Ltd (2001) 47 ATR 327 at 330; [2001] QSC 176; BC200104587 per Mackenzie J. 33. ACT r 1703(1). 34. ACT r 1703(2). 35. As to the meaning of ‘authorised director’ see Access Services Group Pty Ltd v McLoughlin (2006) 57 ACSR 725; [2006] NSWSC 532; BC200604077 at [22], [23] per Barrett J. 36. Under ACT r 1704. 37. Leicester v Walton (CA(NSW), Priestley, Sheller and Cole JJA, 22 November 1995, unreported) BC9501770; Wentworth v Wentworth (2000) 52 NSWLR 602 at 636; [2000] NSWCA 350; BC200007784 per Heydon JA; House of Golf Chatswood Pty Ltd v McManus (2005) 225 ALR 786; [2005] NSWSC 1246; BC200510734 at [12]–[14] per White J (each dealing with the former equivalent provision in the New South Wales rules). 38. Under NSW r 42.3 (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 4). 39. The repeal was effected by the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 32) 2010 (NSW). 40. (1992) 174 CLR 178; BC9202673. 41. (2009) 239 CLR 75; [2009] HCA 43; BC200909275. 42. See Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75; [2009] HCA 43; BC200909275 at [30]–[42] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ. Contra at [113] per Heydon J, dissenting. 43. Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney South West Area Health Service (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 1139; BC201007454 at [73]–[75] per Nicholas J (informed by the fact that the repeal was a purely procedural step, which affected no vested right of any party). 44. Arena Management Pty Ltd (receiver and manager appointed) v Campbell Street Theatre Pty Ltd (2011) 80 NSWLR 652; [2011] NSWCA 128; BC201103285 at [25] per Campbell JA, with whom McColl and Macfarlan JJA concurred. 45. NSW RSC Pt 52A rr 4(5)(a) (referring to r 43) (solicitors), 43A (counsel) (repealed). 46. Cf Bagley v Pinebelt Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 655; BC200003814 at [22]–[23], [31] per Hamilton J.

47. Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Harvey [1980] VR 669 at 695 per Marks J. 48. Australian Security Estates Pty Ltd v Bluecrest Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (2002) 169 FLR 111 at 125; [2002] NSWSC 491; BC200202879 per Bergin J (who refused to order costs against a liquidator in a voluntary winding up on the ground that he was not an officer of the court: at 126); Clutha Ltd (in liq) v Millar (No 5) (2002) 43 ACSR 295; [2002] NSWSC 833; BC200206435 at [14]–[26] per Austin J. 49. Coromandel Place Pty Ltd v CL Custodians Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 30 ACSR 377 at 381; [1999] FCA 144; BC9900553 per Finkelstein J. 50. See 22.40–22.42. 51. Cresvale Far East Ltd (in liq) v Cresvale Securities Ltd (No 2) (2001) 29 ACSR 622 at 627, 629; [2001] NSWSC 791; BC200106726 per Austin J. This is notwithstanding the fact that the court has a supervisory role over administrators because it may, under statute (see Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 445D, 445G, 447A, 447E, 449B), give administrators directions, make supervisory orders, terminate or set aside the deed, and dismiss the administrator: at 627. Cf Maylord Equity Management Pty Ltd v ReelTime Media Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 1133; BC200809490 at [10]– [13] per Palmer J. 52. Separate Representative v J H E and G A W (1993) 16 Fam LR 485 at 508 per Nicholson CJ and Fogarty J (FC); Marriage of McAlpin (1993) 16 Fam LR 888 at 896–7 per Nicholson CJ and Maxwell J (FC) (cf at 909 per Baker J who dissented but on a different ground); Marriage of Pagliarella (No 3) (1994) 122 FLR 443 at 446 per Hannon J (Fam Ct); Marriage of Millea and Duke (1994) 122 FLR 449 at 450 per Murray J (Fam Ct); Marriage of S (1997) 138 FLR 361 at 372, 376–7 per Nicholson CJ (Fam Ct); Re Z (No 4) (FC(Fam Ct), 6 March 1997, unreported). Hence, earlier authority to the contrary (such as Marriage of Collins (1985) 75 FLR 84 at 90–1 (FC(Fam Ct))) no longer represents the law. 53. As to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117(2) see 8.70. 54. Separate Representative v J H E and G A W (1993) 16 Fam LR 485 at 508 per Nicholson CJ and Fogarty J (FC); Marriage of McAlpin (1993) 16 Fam LR 888 at 896–7 per Nicholson CJ and Maxwell J (FC). 55. Re JJT (1998) 195 CLR 184 at 189 per Gaudron J, at 220 per Hayne J; BC9802630. Cf at 228 per Callinan J. 56. Re JJT (1998) 195 CLR 184 at 191; BC9802630 per Gummow J. 57. As to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117(2A) see 8.71–8.78. 58. Re JJT (1998) 195 CLR 184 at 191; BC9802630 per Gummow J. 59. Marriage of Pagliarella (No 3) (1994) 122 FLR 443 at 446 per Hannon J (Fam Ct); Marriage of S (1997) 138 FLR 361 at 377 per Nicholson CJ (Fam Ct). 60. (1992) 39 FCR 193 at 195; BC9203863. This conclusion was endorsed by Lindgren J in Australian Forest Managers Ltd (in liq) v Bramley (1996) 65 FCR 13 at 19–20; BC9600943. 61. See 22.36–22.45. 62. [1999] 1 VR 204; [1998] VSC 13; BC9803725 at [17]–[32]. 63. (2005) 64 NSWLR 392; [2005] NSWSC 1113; BC200510078 at [50]–[53]. See also J & M Jankar Pty Ltd v Dellmain Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 766; BC200908098 at [152] per Slattery J. 64. Consolidated Byrnes Holdings Ltd v Hardel Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 176 FCR 348; [2009] FCA 399; BC200903353 at [313] per Lander J. See also Re Hughes (2010) 183 FCR 150; [2010]

FCA 141; BC201000853 at [15]–[18] per Siopis J. 65. King v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (2001) 116 FCR 509 at 514–15; [2001] FCA 1773; BC200107826 per Moore J; O’Keefe v Hayes Knight GTO Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1559; BC200509352 at [24] per Nicholson J; Re Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (2004) 48 ACSR 681; [2004] NSWSC 129; BC200400814 at [13]–[20] per Barrett J; Life Therapeutics Ltd v Bell IXL Investments Ltd (No 2) (2008) 170 FCR 595; [2008] FCAFC 158; BC200807590 at [17]–[24] per the court; Markoska v Markoska (Costs) (2011) 46 Fam LR 598; [2011] FamCA 833; BC201150786 at [92] per Murphy J. See, for example, O’Keeffe Nominees Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (1995) 55 FCR 591 at 597; BC9507763 per Spender J (in the context of costs awarded in favour of a non-party intervener; as to the court’s power to make costs orders in favour of interveners generally see 11.40–11.50); Geoform Design Pty Ltd v Randwick City Council (1995) 87 LGERA 140 at 152; BC9504743 per Pearlman J (LEC) (order in favour of non-party objectors to development consent for costs thrown away due to the applicant’s change of course in litigation, which caused the objections to evaporate); Petrovski v Radin [2000] NSWSC 323; BC200001998; Victoria Legal Aid v County Court of Victoria (2004) 9 VR 686; [2004] VSCA 113; BC200404494 (costs order against a lawyer in favour of a non-party: see 23.43); Naidoo v Williamson (2008) 37 WAR 516; [2008] WASCA 179; BC200807578 at [42]–[44] per Steytler P. Contra Handberg v Chacmol Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] FCA 680; BC200503546 at [18] per Heerey J (distinguished by Nicholson J in O’Keefe v Hayes Knight GTO Pty Ltd at [26]). 66. O’Keefe v Hayes Knight GTO Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1559; BC200509352 at [20] per Nicholson J. 67. See 22.17. 68. Individual Homes v Macbreams Investments (Ch D, Steinfeld QC, 23 October 2002, unreported) at 8; O’Keefe v Hayes Knight GTO Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1559; BC200509352 at [24] per Nicholson J; Naidoo v Williamson (2008) 37 WAR 516; [2008] WASCA 179; BC200807578 at [42] per Steytler P. 69. Pyramid Building Society (in liq) v Farrow Finance Corp Ltd (in liq) [1995] 1 VR 464; Akiba v Queensland [2010] FCA 321; BC201001798 at [107] per Greenwood J; Candibon Pty Ltd v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2012] VSC 424; BC201207091 at [60] per Emerton J. 70. (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 456; BC9804761. 71. Under District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42(3), the court may make a costs order against a legal practitioner in certain circumstances, and under s 42(5) there is the jurisdiction to order a witness to give an indemnity for costs. 72. Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 465–6; BC9804761 (FC). 73. See 6.7. 74. Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 464; BC9804761 (FC). 75. Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 457 per Olsson J, at 467 per Lander J; BC9804761 (FC). 76. Emphasis supplied. 77. See 22.4. 78. Naomi Marble and Granite Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Company Ltd (No 2) [1999] 1 Qd R 518 at 544; BC9800777 per Shepherdson J. 79. Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 468; BC9804761 per Lander J (FC). 80. Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd [1986] AC 965 at 980 per Lord Goff.

81. Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 203; BC9202673 per Dawson J. 82. Symphony Group plc v Hodgson [1994] QB 179 at 193 per Balcombe LJ; Metalloy Supplies Ltd (in liq) v MA (UK) Ltd [1997] 1 All ER 418 at 422 per Waller LJ. 83. Marriage of McAlpin (1993) 16 Fam LR 888 at 896 per Nicholson CJ and Maxwell J (FC); Arundel Chiropractic Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 179 ALR 406 at 413; [2001] HCA 26; BC200102181 per Callinan J (HC). See also Marriage of Pagliarella (No 3) (1994) 122 FLR 443 at 447 per Hannon J (Fam Ct) (‘The circumstances in which the discretion to award costs against a non-party should be exercised should … be confined and orders only made in very clear cases’). 84. Murphy v Young & Co’s Brewery plc [1997] 1 All ER 518 at 531 per Phillips LJ. See also Re Land and Property Trust Co plc [1991] 1 WLR 601 at 604 per Nicholls LJ; Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 203; BC9202673 per Dawson J; Carborundum Abrasives Ltd v Bank of New Zealand (No 2) [1992] 3 NZLR 757 at 764 per Tompkins J (HC); Separate Representative v J H E and G A W (1993) 16 Fam LR 485 at 508 per Nicholson CJ and Fogarty J (FC) (‘special circumstances’); O’Neill v De Leo (1993) 2 Tas R 225 at 230 per Green CJ; Metalloy Supplies Ltd (in liq) v MA (UK) Ltd [1997] 1 All ER 418 at 424 per Millett LJ (‘rarely appropriate’); Re JJT (1998) 195 CLR 184 at 189; BC9802630 per Gaudron J; Flinn v Flinn [1999] 3 VR 712 at 760; [1999] VSCA 134; BC9905824 per the court; Naomi Marble and Granite Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Company Ltd (No 2) [1999] 1 Qd R 518 at 544; BC9800777 per Shepherdson J; FPM Constructions Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Blue Mountains [2005] NSWCA 340; BC200507704 at [214] per Basten JA, with whom Beazley and Giles JJA concurred; Sanelli v Acee Victoria Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 190; BC201202986 at [5] per Mukhtar AsJ. 85. Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty v Todd [2004] 1 WLR 2807; [2004] UKPC 39 at [25] per Lord Brown. See also Globe Equities Ltd v Globe Legal Services Ltd [1999] BLR 232 at 239–40 per Morritt LJ (who considered that an exceptional case in this context ‘is one to be recognised by comparison with the ordinary run of cases not defined in advance by reference to any further characteristic’: at 240); Europeans Ltd v Revenue and Customs [2011] BCC 527; [2011] EWHC 948 (Ch) at [15] per Proudman J. 86. Knight v F P Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 192; BC9202673 per Mason CJ and Deane J. 87. See 6.14–6.15, 7.2–7.5. 88. Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 468; BC9804761 per Lander J (FC). 89. Symphony Group plc v Hodgson [1994] QB 179 at 192 per Balcombe LJ; Re Bonlac Foods Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 457 at 463; [2001] VSC 75; BC200101364 per Warren J; Gore v Justice Corporation Pty Ltd (2002) 119 FCR 429; [2002] FCAFC 83; BC200201207 at [23] per the court. 90. Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Westleigh Management Services Pty Ltd (2001) 47 ATR 327 at 330; [2001] QSC 176; BC200104587 per Mackenzie J. 91. Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 192; BC9202673 per Mason CJ and Deane J. 92. [1992] 2 VR 198 at 202. 93. Bischof v Adams [1992] 2 VR 198 at 203. 94. Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 185; BC9202673 per Mason CJ and Deane J.

95. As to these factors see 22.18–22.33. 96. Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 468; BC9804761 per Lander J (FC). 97. As to which see 22.34–22.74. 98. As to the need for the requisite connection see 22.19–22.20. 99. Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 192; BC9202673 per Mason CJ and Deane J; Symphony Group plc v Hodgson [1994] QB 179 at 192 per Balcombe LJ. 100. Bischof v Adams [1992] 2 VR 198 at 205 per Gobbo J; Marriage of Millea and Duke (1994) 122 FLR 449 at 453 per Murray J (Fam Ct); National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Chris Poulson Insurance Agencies Pty Ltd (1998) 8 Tas R 123 at 135; BC9804906 per Slicer J; Wentworth v Wentworth (1999) 46 NSWLR 300 at 310; [1999] NSWSC 317; BC9901514 per Santow J (affd Wentworth v Wentworth (2000) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] NSWCA 350; BC200007784); Re Bonlac Foods Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 457 at 463; [2001] VSC 75; BC200101364 per Warren J. 101. See, for example, Marriage of Millea and Duke (1994) 122 FLR 449 at 453 per Murray J (Fam Ct). 102. See, for example, Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Westleigh Management Services Pty Ltd (2001) 47 ATR 327 at 330; [2001] QSC 176; BC200104587 per Mackenzie J. 103. See 22.3. 104. Such as where a non-party’s conduct has increased the costs incurred by the successful party: see 22.32. 105. Symphony Group plc v Hodgson [1994] QB 179 at 192–3 per Balcombe LJ; Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 468; BC9804761 per Lander J (FC); Nordstern Allgemeine Versicherungs AG v Internav Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 139 at 156 per Waller LJ. 106. See 22.47–22.50. 107. Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd [2004] 1 WLR 2807; [2004] UKPC 39 at [20] per Lord Brown; Jackson v Thakrar [2007] EWHC 626 (TCC); [2008] 1 All ER 601 at [16] per Judge Peter Coulson QC. 108. Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2005] 3 All ER 613; [2005] EWCA Civ 655 at [24] per Lord Phillips MR; Total Spares & Supplies Ltd v Antares SRL [2006] BPIR 1330; [2006] EWHC 1537 (Ch) at [54] per David Richards J. Cf Globe Equities Ltd v Globe Legal Services Ltd [1999] BLR 232 at 241 per Morritt LJ; Goodwood Recoveries Ltd v Breen [2006] 2 All ER 533; [2005] EWCA Civ 414 at [74] per Rix LJ. 109. Carborundum Abrasives Ltd v Bank of New Zealand (No 2) [1992] 3 NZLR 757 at 764 per Tompkins J (HC); Burns Philp & Co Ltd v Bhagat [1993] 1 VR 203 at 219 per Brooking J; Wentworth v Wentworth (1999) 46 NSWLR 300 at 310; [1999] NSWSC 317; BC9901514 per Santow J (affd Wentworth v Wentworth (2000) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] NSWCA 350; BC200007784). 110. [1992] 2 VR 198 at 205. 111. Bischof v Adams [1992] 2 VR 198 at 204–5. 112. [2005] 4 All ER 519; [2004] EWHC 2330 (Ch) at [95] per Peter Smith J (noted N Andrews [2005] CLJ 566). 113. Cf Oriakhel v Vickers [2008] CP Rep 37; [2008] EWCA Civ 748 at [34]–[39] per Arden LJ.

114. As to the usual costs rules see 7.2–7.6. 115. [1959] VR 614 at 618–19. 116. Allman v Daly (No 2) [1959] VR 614 at 621. 117. (1882) 46 LJ (NS) 497 at 502. 118. Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Westleigh Management Services Pty Ltd (2001) 47 ATR 327 at 330; [2001] QSC 176; BC200104587 per Mackenzie J. 119. Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 468; BC9804761 per Lander J (FC). 120. As to the impact of payment into court on the award of costs see 13.34–13.39, 13.52–13.54. 121. As to Calderbank offers see 13.55–13.86. 122. Symphony Group plc v Hodgson [1994] QB 179 at 193 per Balcombe LJ. 123. Systemcare (UK) Ltd v Services Design Technology Ltd [2011] 4 Costs LR 666; [2011] EWCA Civ 546 at [44] per Lewison J. 124. As to the impact of offers of compromise upon costs orders see 13.13–13.23. 125. Symphony Group plc v Hodgson [1994] QB 179 at 193 per Balcombe LJ; Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 468, 472; BC9804761 per Lander J (FC); Myatt v National Coal Board (No 2) [2007] 4 All ER 1094; [2007] EWCA Civ 307 at [14] per Dyson LJ. 126. See, for example, Yates v Boland [2000] FCA 1895; BC200007991 at [39] (FC). 127. As to the circumstances where joinder is appropriate see Cairns, pp 295–317. 128. (1991) 4 ACSR 107 at 121 (FC(Qld)) (affd Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178; BC9202673). As to costs orders against receivers as non-parties see 22.43–22.45. 129. (1998) 8 Tas R 123; BC9804906. 130. National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Chris Poulson Insurance Agencies Pty Ltd (1998) 8 Tas R 123 at 137–8; BC9804906. See also Brampton Manor (Leisure) Ltd v McLean [2009] BCC 30; [2007] EWHC 3340 (Ch) (where, as the warning was not given until 15 June 2006, Lewison J considered it unfair to saddle the director (W) with a liability for costs before he was made aware that this was a possibility, and that W would have needed a short time to consider his position once the warning was given; his Lordship therefore ordered costs against W as from 1 July 2006: at [26]). 131. Gore v Justice Corporation Pty Ltd (2002) 119 FCR 429; [2002] FCAFC 83; BC200201207 at [52] per the court. See also Tsui v Westpac Banking Corporation [2002] 2 Qd R 335 at 341–2; [2001] QCA 276; BC200104011 per Mackenzie J; Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 7) [2002] FCA 1098; BC200205253 at [53] per von Doussa J; Kebaro Pty Ltd v Saunders [2003] FCFCA 5; BC200300185 at [140] per the court; Australasian Academy of Natural Medicine Pty Ltd v Walters (2003) 85 SASR 36; [2003] SASC 56; BC200300558 at [70] per Duggan J, with whom Doyle CJ and Gray J concurred (FC); Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty v Todd [2004] 1 WLR 2807; [2004] UKPC 39 at [31] per Lord Brown; Ralena Pty Ltd v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (No 3) (2007) 25 VAR 377; [2007] VSC 12; BC200700285 at [13] per Kaye J; Myatt v National Coal Board (No 2) [2007] 4 All ER 1094; [2007] EWCA Civ 307 at [13]–[14] per Dyson LJ; Europeans Ltd v Revenue and Customs [2011] BCC 527; [2011] EWHC 948 (Ch) at [30] per Proudman J. 132. Tinda Creek Spiritual & Environment Centre v Baulkham Hills Shire Council (1998) 100 LGERA 432 at 450 per Sheahan J.

133.

Tsui v Westpac Banking Corporation [2002] 2 Qd R 335 at 342; [2001] QCA 276; BC200104011 per Mackenzie J.

134. Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 7) [2002] FCA 1098; BC200205253 at [55], [56] per von Doussa J. 135. Australasian Academy of Natural Medicine Pty Ltd v Walters (2003) 85 SASR 36; [2003] SASC 56; BC200300558 at [72] per Duggan J, with whom Doyle CJ and Gray J concurred (FC). See, for example, Gatnom Capital and Finance Ltd v Sanders [2012] BPIR 299; [2011] EWHC 3716 (Ch) at [22] per Newey J (who, finding no reason to think that the sole director / shareholder would have behaved differently had a warning been given, declared that ‘the lateness of the application is not a weighty factor against granting the order sought’). 136. Systemcare (UK) Ltd v Services Design Technology Ltd [2011] 4 Costs LR 666; [2011] EWCA Civ 546 at [43] per Lewison J, at [60] per Lloyd LJ; Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations (No 4) (2012) 200 FCR 154; [2012] FCAFC 50; BC201201916 at [87]–[91] per the court (noting that ‘[a]n order for costs against a non-party where the unsuccessful party is in a position to meet an order for costs would only be made in exceptional circumstances’: at [91]). 137. Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 457 per Olsson J, at 468 per Lander J; BC9804761 (FC). 138. Cf FPM Constructions Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Blue Mountains [2005] NSWCA 340; BC200507704 at [219] per Basten JA, with whom Beazley and Giles JJA concurred on this point (‘Absent some other relevant consideration, it would be curious if, the company not being ordered to provide security, its active director could be made liable for the costs of the proceedings when it ultimately proved unsuccessful’). 139. Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (No 2) (1997) 147 ALR 685 at 695; BC9703585 per Branson J (FCA) (affd Yates v Boland [2000] FCA 1895; BC200007991 (FC)); Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 457; BC9804761 per Olsson J (FC); National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Chris Poulson Insurance Agencies Pty Ltd (1998) 8 Tas R 123 at 137; BC9804906 per Slicer J; Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras [2007] 2 Costs LR 212; [2006] EWCA Civ 1038 at [16] per Longmore LJ. 140. Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 472; BC9804761 per Lander J (FC). See also at 458 per Olsson J. 141. Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 191; BC9202673 per Mason CJ and Deane J. Cf at 217 per McHugh J in dissent, who adopted a more stringent approach, remarking that ‘[a]s a matter of policy, provision for security for costs is a better remedy for protecting persons involved in litigation with insolvent companies than ordering a receiver to pay the costs of litigation after verdict’; where an insolvent company brings or defends an action, ‘the ordinary remedy is to stay the action until security for costs is provided’, and that ‘[i]f adequate security is sought and provided, no question of ordering a third party to pay the costs ought to arise’. Waller LJ in Metalloy Supplies Ltd (in liq) v MA (UK) Ltd [1997] 1 All ER 418 at 423 also preferred ‘the approach that ordinarily in the case where a plaintiff is an insolvent company an order for security for costs should be the appropriate remedy’. It does not appear that the majority in Knight was necessarily opposed to such a view, but simply that, consistent with the broad costs discretion vested in the court, any attempt to categorically state a rule in this context was fraught with the danger of perpetuating an injustice in an exceptional case. 142. Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 190–1; BC9202673 per Mason CJ and Deane J; Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75; [2009] HCA

43; BC200909275 at [39] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ. 143. But see 28.53–28.59. 144. See 29.13–29.15. 145. See, for example, Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras [2007] 2 Costs LR 212; [2006] EWCA Civ 1038 at [16] per Longmore LJ. As to the quantum of security see 28.33–28.44. 146. Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 472; BC9804761 per Lander J (FC). 147. Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 472–3; BC9804761 per Lander J (FC). As to notice see 22.24–22.27. 148. Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 473; BC9804761 per Lander J (FC). 149. Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 473–4; BC9804761 per Lander J (FC). 150. Beach Retreat Pty Ltd v Mooloolaba Marina Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 356; [2009] QSC 84; BC200903944 at [66]–[67] per Martin J. 151. On this latter point see 28.34. 152. Morbidelli v Resourceco Pty Ltd (2010) 269 LSJS 103; [2010] SASC 107; BC201002639 at [52] per White J, with whom Bleby and Kelly JJ concurred. 153. Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 at 467; BC9804761 per Lander J (FC); Wentworth v Wentworth (1999) 46 NSWLR 300 at 310; [1999] NSWSC 317; BC9901514 per Santow J (affd Wentworth v Wentworth (2000) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] NSWCA 350; BC200007784); Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty v Todd [2004] 1 WLR 2807; [2004] UKPC 39 at [33] per Lord Brown; BE Studios Ltd v Smith & Williamson Ltd [2006] 2 All ER 811; [2005] EWHC 2730 (Ch) at [18] per Evans-Lombe J. 154. Re Bonlac Foods Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 457 at 463; [2001] VSC 75; BC200101364 per Warren J. 155. (1995) 65 SASR 48 at 57–8; BC9503755 per Doyle CJ, with whom Duggan and Nyland JJ concurred (FC). 156. [1992] 2 VR 198. 157. Bischof v Adams [1992] 2 VR 198 at 206. 158. Bischof v Adams [1992] 2 VR 198 at 205. 159. These do not purport to be exhaustive. For instance, the leading English authority, Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd [1986] AC 965, shows that where a non-party is a party to a closely related action that was heard at the same time but not consolidated, the court may order the non-party to pay the costs of the action. 160. See 22.8–22.9. 161. Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 188 per Mason CJ and Deane J, at 202 per Dawson J; BC9202673. 162. Re Sturmer and Town of Beavertown (1912) 2 DLR 501 at 506 per Middleton J (Div Ct(Ont)). See also Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 193; BC9202673 per Mason CJ and Deane J (referring to the category of case ‘where the party to the litigation is an insolvent person or man of straw, where the non-party has played an active part in the conduct of the litigation and where the non-party, or some person on whose behalf he or she is acting or by whom he or she has been appointed, has an interest in the subject of the litigation’). In Kebaro Pty Ltd v Saunders [2003] FCAFC 5; BC200300185 at [113] the court noted that although the phrase ‘played an active part in the conduct of the litigation’ was used in Knight, in the context of the role played by

the receivers in that case, ‘the phrase is not a term of art and thus can have no technical meaning’. Further, ‘it is not … necessary to demonstrate that the non-party exclusively controlled the conduct of the proceedings. It is enough to point to its role as one of the actors in the scene in important and critical respects’ (emphasis in original). 163. [1999] 3 VR 712; [1999] VSCA 134; BC9905824. 164. Flinn v Flinn [1999] 3 VR 712 at 760; [1999] VSCA 134; BC9905824 per the court. 165. Flinn v Flinn [1999] 3 VR 712 at 761; [1999] VSCA 134; BC9905824 per the court. Cf Burns v State of Queensland [2007] QCA 240; BC200705842. 166. An order for security for costs in this context has the same objective: see generally 29.18–29.28. 167. National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Chris Poulson Insurance Agencies Pty Ltd (1998) 8 Tas R 123 at 135; BC9804906 per Slicer J. 168. See 22.28–22.31. 169. See 22.24–22.27. 170. May v Christodoulou (2011) 80 NSWLR 462; [2011] NSWCA 75; BC201101949 at [89], [94] per Sackville AJA, with whom Macfarlan JA concurred; Sanelli v Acee Victoria Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 190; BC201202986 at [8] per Mukhtar AsJ (noting that, ordinarily, a director of a company does not ‘hide’ behind the company when acting as its organ, including acting instrumentally in the conduct of litigation). 171. IPEX ITG Pty Ltd (in liq) v State of Victoria (No 2) [2011] VSC 39; BC201100589 at [14] per Sifris J (who, in the context of corporate and trust structures, remarked that ‘[a]warding costs personally against an individual non-party is an exceptional remedy and should only be used in the clearest of cases’); Systemcare (UK) Ltd v Services Design Technology Ltd [2011] 4 Costs LR 666; [2011] EWCA Civ 546 at [61] per Lloyd LJ (who cautioned that ‘[i]f the party to the proceedings which cannot or does not pay its liability for costs is a company, it is also important not to allow its director or directors to be made liable too readily’); Sanelli v Acee Victoria Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 190; BC201202986 at [23] per Mukhtar AsJ (noting that the case law reveals ‘the law’s concern to ensure that exceptional circumstances be shown before nullifying the protection given by company the law to shareholders and directors against personal liability’). 172. Metalloy Supplies Ltd (in liq) v MA (UK) Ltd [1997] 1 All ER 418 at 424–5 per Millett LJ; Europeans Ltd v Revenue and Customs [2011] BCC 527; [2011] EWHC 948 (Ch) at [18] per Proudman J (‘where the director acts in good faith he ought to be free to litigate for the benefit of the company notwithstanding any risk of insolvency’). 173. Metalloy Supplies Ltd (in liq) v MA (UK) Ltd [1997] 1 All ER 418 at 424 per Millett LJ. See also Taylor v Pace Developments Ltd [1991] ECC 406 at 409 per Lloyd LJ; Carborundum Abrasives Ltd v Bank of New Zealand (No 2) [1992] 3 NZLR 757 at 764 per Tompkins J (HC); Rushton (Qld) Pty Ltd v Rushton (NSW) Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 47; BC200401109 at [12], [13] per Muir J. 174. [2005] NSWCA 340; BC200507704. 175. FPM Constructions Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Blue Mountains [2005] NSWCA 340; BC200507704 at [206]. See also Plante v James [2011] QCA 109; BC201103680 at [58] per Muir JA, with whom Margaret McMurdo P and White JA concurred; Manderson M & F Consulting (a Firm) v Incitec Pivot Ltd (No 3) [2011] VSC 441; BC201107364 at [37] per Croft J; Bob Jane Corp Pty Ltd v Barrot FT Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 113 SASR 25; [2012] SASC 89; BC201203963 at [37]–[43] per Kourakis J; Sanelli v Acee Victoria Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 190; BC201202986 at [32] per Mukhtar AsJ.

176. Sanelli v Acee Victoria Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSC 190; BC201202986 at [10] per Mukhtar AsJ. 177. See, for example, Re Talk Finance and Insurance Services Pty Ltd [1994] 1 Qd R 558 at 559–60 per Moynihan J (where directors had persisted in raising deliberately false issues as to the genuineness of their signatures and the execution of documents by the company, it was held that a costs order should be made against both the company and the directors as non-parties); Naomi Marble and Granite Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (No 2) [1999] 1 Qd R 518 at 546–7; BC9800777 per Shepherdson J where the non-party ordered to pay costs was a director of the plaintiff company who had played an active part in the litigation — being a major witness for the plaintiff and having a financial interest in the outcome — and had acted in bad faith by knowingly giving false evidence); Total Spares & Supplies Ltd v Antares SRL [2006] BPIR 1330; [2006] EWHC 1537 (Ch) (where the director/shareholder transferred assets out of the corporation into other entities controlled by him for the sole purpose of evading an anticipated costs order). 178. BE Studios Ltd v Smith & Williamson Ltd [2006] 2 All ER 811; [2005] EWHC 2730 (Ch) at [18] per Evans-Lombe J; Europeans Ltd v Revenue and Customs [2011] BCC 527; [2011] EWHC 948 (Ch) at [18] per Proudman J (‘It is not necessary to show that the director acted with impropriety: the pursuit of speculative litigation will be enough in cases where the director has caused the costs to be incurred solely or substantially for his own benefit’). 179. [1992] 3 NZLR 757 at 765 (HC). 180. (1997) 147 ALR 685 at 695; BC9703585 (FCA) (affd Yates v Boland [2000] FCA 1895; BC200007991 (FC)). 181. (1993) 117 ALR 128; BC9304936 (FCA). 182. Oz B & S Pty Ltd v Elders IXL Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 128 at 130; BC9304936 (FCA). See also Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 185 ALR 463; [2000] FCA 595; BC200008466 at [45] per Sundberg J (who compared the sole director and shareholder, who initiated and maintained the proceedings, was present in court during the proceedings and was the applicant’s material witness, with a former director who took no interest in the proceeding, and made an order for costs against the present but not the former director). 183. Brampton Manor (Leisure) Ltd v McLean [2009] BCC 30; [2007] EWHC 3340 (Ch) at [24] per Lewison J. 184. See, for example, Beach Retreat Pty Ltd v Mooloolaba Marina Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 356; [2009] QSC 84; BC200903944. 185. See, for example, Wiseline Corporation Ltd v Hockey [2007] NZHC 456; MG Corrosion Consultants Pty Ltd v Vinciguerra (No 2) (2011) 276 ALR 319; [2011] FCAFC 48; BC201101696; Europeans Ltd v Revenue and Customs [2011] BCC 527; [2011] EWHC 948 (Ch). 186. See, for example, Bateman Long and Maloney Pty Ltd v Long Beach Land Co Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1495; BC201109690. 187. Peter Breese & Associates Pty Ltd v CCI Holdings Ltd (2004) 2 DCLR(NSW) 157 at [36] per Rein DCJ (who opined that although a shareholder’s interest in a company is not accurately described as a ‘direct personal financial interest’, ‘when that person is the sole shareholder and sole director of the company the connection between the litigation and the benefit to the shareholder is of such a nature … that it beings the case within the principles identified in [Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178; BC9202673] as a person having an interest in the litigation’). 188. See, for example, Candibon Pty Ltd v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2012] VSC 424; BC201207091 at [49]–[53] per Emerton J (who was not satisfied that the plaintiff corporate trustee

could be regarded exclusively, or even predominantly, as a creature of its director (M), but was the business vehicle used by three extended families at the outset and subsequently by two extended families, being influenced in so ruling by the fact that the class of beneficiaries under the trust that stood to benefit from the litigation was ‘very large indeed’: at [50]). 189. See, for example, Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras [2007] 2 Costs LR 212; [2006] EWCA Civ 1038 (involving a beneficiary of a trust that controlled litigation conducted through its corporate trustee); Beach Retreat Pty Ltd v Mooloolaba Marina Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 356; [2009] QSC 84; BC200903944 (involving a shareholder and company secretary of the plaintiff company, who was instrumental in commencing the litigation and financially supported the plaintiff company, and would have, inter alia, been relieved of liabilities and had debts repaid had the plaintiff been successful: at [78]–[80] per Martin J). 190. CIBC Mellon Trust Company v Stolzenberg [2005] 4 Costs LR 617; [2005] EWCA Civ 628 at [25] per Chadwick LJ, with whom Jonathan Parker and Kennedy LJJ concurred. 191. See, for example, Australian Bight Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Haagmans (2010) 106 SASR 59; [2010] SASC 6; BC201000194 (where Bleby J declined to make a costs order against H, the chairman of the unsuccessful plaintiff (an incorporated association), reasoning that whilst H played an active part in the conduct of the litigation on behalf of the plaintiff, he ‘has not been shown to have had an interest in the subject of the litigation beyond that of a concerned and interested member of the plaintiff’ and ‘[t]he litigation was not commenced at his instigation, nor was it commenced on any undertaking from him that he would underwrite the cost of doing so’: at [65]). 192. See P P McQuade, ‘Jurisdiction to Award Costs Against Non-parties — Insolvency Practitioners Beware’ (1993) 1 Insolv LJ 48; A D Monaghan, ‘Awards of Costs Against Non-Party Insolvency Practitioners: The Emerging Guidelines’ (1996) 26 QLSJ 497. 193. As to the position of liquidators who sue or defend in their own name see 10.53. 194. Bent v Gough (1992) 36 FCR 204; BC9203543 (FC); Health & Life Care Ltd v SA Asset Management Corp (1995) 65 SASR 48 at 57–8; BC9503755 per Doyle CJ, with whom Duggan and Nyland JJ concurred (FC); Katherine Stores Pty Ltd (in liq) v B & D Lane Pty Ltd (1996) 5 NTLR 152 at 153 per Coulehan M; Smart Co Pty Ltd (in liq) v Clipsal Australia Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 821; BC201105352 at [6], [7] per Mansfield J. As such, the New South Wales Court of Appeal’s obiter statement in Hession v Century 21 South Pacific Ltd (in liq) (1992) 28 NSWLR 120 at 123 per Meagher JA, with whom Kirby P and Cripps JA concurred, that there is no jurisdiction in the court to order liquidators personally to pay the defendant’s costs where a company in liquidation sues and fails, can no longer be seen to be correct. 195. Egankarra Pty Ltd v Vince (1990) 2 ACSR 463 at 468 per Fullagar J (SC(Vic)) (no costs order made against the liquidator where proceedings were instituted bona fide and failed through no personal fault or neglect of his). 196. Mana Property Trustee Ltd v James Development Ltd [2011] 2 NZLR 25; [2010] NZSC 124 at [10] per Blanchard J, delivering the judgment of the court; Mischel v Mischel Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2012] VSC 421; BC201207018 at [59] per Croft J. 197. See, for example, Bent v Gough (1992) 36 FCR 204 at 210; BC9203543 per Black CJ (FC); Katherine Stores Pty Ltd (in liq) v B & D Lane Pty Ltd (1996) 5 NTLR 152 at 153 per Coulehan M (the ‘special position’ of a liquidator means that the power to award costs against him or her personally should only be ‘exercised sparingly’). 198. Metalloy Supplies Ltd (in liq) v MA (UK) Ltd [1997] 1 All ER 418 at 423 per Waller LJ; Macks v Hedley (1999) 94 FCR 188 at 217; [1999] FCA 1208; BC9905645 (FC).

199. See Apex Frozen Foods Ltd (in liq) v Ali [2007] EWHC 469 (Ch) at [47] per Warren J (who remarked that, in terms of categorisation, a provisional liquidator’s position is closer to that of a liquidator than a director, as a provisional liquidator ordinarily acts not for his or her own personal advantage but for the benefit of the company and its creditors as a whole). 200. [1997] 1 All ER 418. 201. Metalloy Supplies Ltd (in liq) v MA (UK) Ltd [1997] 1 All ER 418 at 425. 202. (1999) 94 FCR 188 at 217; [1999] FCA 1208; BC9905645 (FC). 203. Macks v Hedley (1999) 94 FCR 188 at 217; [1999] FCA 1208; BC9905645 (FC). Cf Kemp v Coastal Constructions Pty Ltd (CA(Qld), Macrossan CJ, McPherson and Pincus JJ, 17 March 1993, unreported) BC9303209, where a liquidator was ordered personally to pay costs where he had simply resisted an application for leave on the basis of previous authority. What led the court to so conclude was, inter alia, that the appellant’s claim had ‘been resisted in a rather technical way and without any great regard to minimising expense’: at 2. This decision has rightly been criticised as involving a departure from established case law, and as an unjustified move ‘towards full exposure in relation to a liquidator’s liability for costs’: R Cowen, ‘Liquidator’s Personal Liability for Costs’ (1993) 1 Insolv LJ 113 at 115. 204. [2011] 2 NZLR 25; [2010] NZSC 124 at [12]–[14] per Blanchard J, delivering the judgment of the court. 205. (2005) 23 ACLC 718; [2005] NSWCA 133; BC200502533 at [156]–[160] per the court. 206. See P P McQuade, ‘Jurisdiction to Award Costs Against Non-parties — Insolvency Practitioners Beware’ (1993) 1 Insolv LJ 48; A D Monaghan, ‘Awards of Costs Against Non-Party Insolvency Practitioners: The Emerging Guidelines’ (1996) 26 QLSJ 497. 207. Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178; BC9202673. See also Bacal Contracting Ltd v Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd [1980] 2 All ER 655 at 661 per Judge Fay QC; Kelaw Pty Ltd v Catco Developments Pty Ltd (1989) 15 NSWLR 587 at 591–2 per Browning J. 208. As to the two modes of appointment of company receivers see Dal Pont, Ch 36. 209. Gardner v London Chatham and Dover Railway Co (1867) LR 2 Ch App 201 at 211–12 per Cairns LJ; Burt, Boulton & Hayward v Bull [1895] 1 QB 276 at 279–80 per Lord Esher; Coromandel Place Pty Ltd v CL Custodians Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 30 ACSR 377 at 381; [1999] FCA 144; BC9900553 per Finkelstein J. 210. As to the position of liquidators in this context see 22.40–22.42. 211. Downsview Ltd v First City Corporation Ltd [1993] AC 295 at 312 per Lord Templeman (PC). 212. Gosling v Gaskell [1897] AC 575 at 595 per Lord Davey. 213. Cf Bacal Contracting Ltd v Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd [1980] 2 All ER 655 at 661 per Judge Fay QC. 214. Forest Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) v Keen Bay Pty Ltd (1991) 4 ACSR 107 at 122 per Dowsett J (FC(Qld)) (affd Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178; BC9202673). 215. Forest Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) v Keen Bay Pty Ltd (1991) 4 ACSR 107 at 118 per Ryan J (FC(Qld)) (affd Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178; BC9202673). 216. Carborundum Abrasives Ltd v Bank of New Zealand (No 2) [1992] 3 NZLR 757 at 765 per Tompkins J (HC). 217. Forest Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) v Keen Bay Pty Ltd (1991) 4 ACSR 107 at 122

per Dowsett J (FC(Qld)) (see Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 420(2)(k)) (affd Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178; BC9202673). 218. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 477(2)(a). 219. (1991) 4 ACSR 107 (SC(Qld)). 220. Forest Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) v Keen Bay Pty Ltd (1991) 4 ACSR 107 at 119 per Ryan J. 221. Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178; BC9202673. 222. Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 539 at 542 per Hill J (FCA) (to cause proceedings to be brought in a party’s name without authority goes beyond a mere procedural irregularity). 223. [2007] 4 All ER 503; [2007] EWHC 1180 (Ch). 224. Dolphin Quays Developments Ltd v Mills [2007] 4 All ER 503; [2007] EWHC 1180 (Ch) at [33]– [37]. 225. Dolphin Quays Developments Ltd v Mills [2008] 4 All ER 58; [2008] EWCA Civ 385 (where Lawrence Collins LJ, with whom Mummery LJ and Munby J concurred, noted (at [62]) that the availability of security is an important factor in the exercise of the discretion, and that the discretion may be exercised more readily in favour of the successful litigant if security was not available at all (see, for example, 20th Century Television & Appliances Ltd v Midnapore Property Investments Ltd (1991) 86 DLR (4th) 628 (CA(Alta)), where the costs were incurred on an ex parte application), or where adequate security is not available). 226. (1993) 10 WAR 227. 227. W J Green & Co v Cooper & Oxley Constructions Co Pty Ltd (1993) 10 WAR 227 at 232. 228. See, for example, McVicar v S & J White Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 249 LSJS 110; [2007] SASC 199; BC200704278 at [17]–[26] per Doyle CJ, with whom Debelle and Anderson JJ concurred (FC). 229. Oz B & S Pty Ltd v Elders IXL Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 128; BC9304936; Re Foster (1994) 121 ALR 494; Lansen v Minister for the Environment and Heritage (No 3) (2008) 162 LGERA 258; [2008] FCA 1367; BC200807903 at [5]–[17] per Mansfield J. 230. Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75; [2009] HCA 43; BC200909275 at [43] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ. 231. Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty v Todd [2004] 1 WLR 2807; [2004] UKPC 39 at [25] per Lord Brown. 232. Murphy v Young & Co’s Brewery plc [1997] 1 All ER 518 at 528 per Phillips LJ. 233. (2002) 119 FCR 429; [2002] FCAFC 83; BC200201207. 234. Gore v Justice Corporation Pty Ltd (2002) 119 FCR 429; [2002] FCAFC 83; BC200201207 at [64] per the court. See also Kebaro Pty Ltd v Saunders [2003] FCAFC 5; BC200300185 at [114]– [124]. 235. [2004] 1 WLR 2807; [2004] UKPC 39. 236. Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty v Todd [2004] 1 WLR 2807; [2004] UKPC 39 at [30] per Lord Brown. 237. Lawson v British Columbia (Solicitor-General) (1992) 88 DLR (4th) 533 at 559 per Goldie JA (CA(BC)); Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 7) [2002] FCA 1098; BC200205253 at [56] per von Doussa J; Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty v Todd [2004] 1 WLR 2807; [2004] UKPC 39

at [25] per Lord Brown; Jackson v Thakrar [2008] 1 All ER 601; [2007] EWHC 626 (TCC) at [21] per Judge Peter Coulson QC. 238. Historically pure funders would have been found guilty of maintenance, but both the courts and legislatures have in modern times liberalised the law of maintenance: see 3.46–3.56. 239. Hamilton v Al Fayed (No 2) [2003] QB 1175; [2002] EWCA Civ 665 at [48] per Simon Brown LJ (opining that so long as the law continues to allow impoverished parties to litigate without having to provide security for their opponent’s costs (see 29.13–29.15), ‘those sympathetic to their plight should not be discouraged from assisting them to secure representation’, which in turn promotes another benefit, namely fewer litigants in person), at [62]–[71] per Chadwick LJ (stating that where there is tension between the principle that a party who successfully defends a claim ought not to be required to bear the costs of his or her defence and the principle that a claimant should not be denied access to the courts on the grounds of impecuniosity, that tension should be resolved in favour of the latter principle: at [63]). Cf at [73]–[82] per Hale LJ (who queried any difference between pure funders and trade union funders (as to which see 22.48), and found unhelpful any comparison with lawyers who act speculatively; but reluctantly agreed with the other judges, reasoning that ‘[i]f the policy of the law is now to encourage … alternative methods of securing access to the courts, then the funders should not be discouraged by the fear of having to pay more’: at [83]). 240. [2003] QB 1175; [2002] EWCA Civ 665 at [57] per Simon Brown LJ, at [71] per Chadwick LJ, at [86] per Hale LJ (noted (2002) 21 CJQ 313). The obiter statements by Macpherson J in Singh v Observer Ltd [1989] 2 All ER 751 at 757 to the effect that the court could order a pure funder to pay costs must be reassessed in this light (cf A Beck, ‘Costs Against Non-parties’ (1990) 106 LQR 392). 241. Hamilton v Al Fayed (No 2) [2003] QB 1175; [2002] EWCA Civ 665 at [71]. 242. Hamilton v Al Fayed (No 2) [2003] QB 1175; [2002] EWCA Civ 665 at [86] per Hale LJ (adding that the fact that the litigation ‘was quite unmeritorious would be powerful evidence of ulterior motive but neither a necessary nor a sufficient criterion in itself’). 243. See, for example, Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 1) [2009] FCA 498; BC200904151 at [22]–[32] per Collier J (who remarked that ‘[i]n circumstances where financial support for litigation is provided by a spouse the proper starting point may be to regard any such support as motivated by the spouse’s natural affection for the litigant, and therefore not such a circumstance where non-party costs should be awarded in the absence of exceptional circumstances’: at [23]); Morbidelli v Resourceco Pty Ltd (2010) 269 LSJS 103; [2010] SASC 107; BC201002639 at [57]–[58] per White J, with whom Bleby and Kelly JJ concurred. 244. Tinseltime Ltd v Roberts [2012] TCLR 9; [2012] EWHC 2628 (TCC) at [56]–[58] per Judge Stephen Davies. 245. As to personal costs orders against lawyers see Ch 23. 246. Tinseltime Ltd v Roberts [2012] TCLR 9; [2012] EWHC 2628 (TCC) at [61] per Judge Stephen Davies. 247. See M Hemsworth [2001] LMCLQ 504 at 539–43. 248. See 22.48. 249. Murphy v Young & Co’s Brewery plc [1997] 1 All ER 518 at 528 per Phillips LJ, with whom Sir John Balcombe and Butler-Sloss LJ concurred. 250. (HC(UK), Judge Zucker QC, 23 May 1996, unreported).

251. See T G A Chapman Ltd v Christopher [1998] 1 WLR 12 at 20–3 per Phillips LJ, with whom Waller and Mummery LJJ concurred (noting that the insurers ‘took the decision to contest the litigation, and subsequently conducted the defence, in an attempt to avoid or reduce their liability to the plaintiffs’, which in these circumstances made it ‘a paradigm case for the exercise of the court’s discretion … to make a costs order against a non-party’). 252. On this point see also Pendennis Shipyard Ltd v Magrathea (Pendennis) Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 315; Monkton Court v Perry Prowse (Insurance Services) Ltd [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 566. Cf Cormack v Washbourne [2000] Lloyd’s Rep PN 459. 253. [1997] 1 All ER 518 at 529. 254. Murphy v Young & Co’s Brewery plc [1997] 1 All ER 518 at 529. 255. Murphy v Young & Co’s Brewery plc [1997] 1 All ER 518 at 531. See also McVicar v S & J White Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 249 LSJS 110; [2007] SASC 199; BC200704278 at [17]–[26] per Doyle CJ, with whom Debelle and Anderson JJ concurred. 256. (1991) 4 ACSR 107 at 122–3 (FC(Qld)) (affd Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178; BC9202673). See further A D Monaghan, ‘Awards of Costs Against Non-Party Insolvency Practitioners: The Emerging Guidelines’ (1996) 26 QLSJ 497 at 504–5. 257. (1981) 124 DLR (3d) 455 (CA(BC)). 258. Oasis Hotel Ltd v Zurich Insurance Co (1981) 124 DLR (3d) 455 at 463 per Lambert JA (CA(BC)). 259. Applicant NAGM of 2002 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 125 FCR 488; [2002] FCAFC 396; BC200207297 at [69] per the court; Williams v Minister for Environment and Heritage (2004) 132 LGERA 368; [2004] FCAFC 58; BC200401141 at [101] per Lander J (‘Persons who assist others to attempt to exercise their rights in the courts, even where the courts find that no rights exist, should not be too quickly mulcted in costs’). 260. Applicant NAGM of 2002 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 125 FCR 488; [2002] FCAFC 396; BC200207297 at [65] per the court. See also Applicant NAQG of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1044; BC200204831 at [22], [23] per Branson J. 261. [2004] FCA 148; BC200400862. 262. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Fonua [2004] FCA 148; BC200400862 at [12]. See also NAFL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2006] FMCA 406; BC200602842 (costs order against a former migration agent who ‘strayed beyond the proper role of a migration agent to the extent of actively encouraging the pursuit of hopeless litigation in the court’: at [16] per Driver FM). 263. By inserting Pt 8B into the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘Costs orders where proceedings have no reasonable prospect of success’), via the Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth). 264. ‘Migration litigation’ means a court proceeding in relation to a migration decision: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 486K (and ‘migration decision’ is defined in s 5(1)). 265. For this purpose, migration litigation need not be hopeless or bound to fail for it to have no reasonable prospect of success: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 486E(2). 266. The term ‘proper’ in this context invites consideration of whether, in the circumstances, there was a balanced and thoughtful assessment of the prospects of success directed to whether, objectively, the litigant had prospects of success. It follows that the subjective views of the relevant non-party are not determinative of whether ‘proper consideration’ was given to the prospects of success:

SZFDZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1366; BC200608506 at [25] per Moore J. 267. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 486E(1). 268. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 486F(1). See, for example, SZFDZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1366; BC200608506. 269. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 486J. 270. Najjar v Haines (1991) 25 NSWLR 224 at 232 per Kirby P, at 249 per Clarke JA. 271. Wentworth v Wentworth (1999) 46 NSWLR 300 at 311; [1999] NSWSC 317; BC9901514 per Santow J (affd Wentworth v Wentworth (2000) 52 NSWLR 602; [2000] NSWCA 350; BC200007784). 272. R v Dixon (1883) 9 VLR (L) 2 at 4 per Stawell CJ; R v Willesden Justices [1948] 1 KB 397 at 400 per Lord Goddard CJ; Ex parte Corbishley (1967) 67 SR (NSW) 396 at 403 per Holmes JA; City & Country Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd v Webster [2000] QSC 8; BC200000094 at [3], [5] per Helman J; Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Heidelberg v Robinson (2000) 2 VR 233 at 236–7; [2000] VSCA 198; BC200006512 per Brooking JA. 273. See, for example, Cummins v Mackenzie [1979] 2 NSWLR 803 at 810 per Sheppard J. 274. Ex parte Taylor (1924) 41 WN (NSW) 81 at 83–4 per Owen J; El Deeb v Magistrates Court of South Australia (1999) 72 SASR 596 at 598; [1999] SASC 113; BC9901081 per Doyle CJ, with whom Bleby and Martin JJ concurred (FC); Kingham v Yorkston [2002] 2 Qd R 595 at 598–9; [2002] QSC 59; BC200200950 per Mullins J. 275. (1900) 16 WN (NSW) 215 (FC). See also City of Subiaco v Minister for Planning and Heritage (FC(WA), 19 February 1997, unreported) at 10–11; City & Country Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd v Webster [2000] QSC 8; BC200000094 at [5] per Helman J (even though the magistrate made ‘a serious error’ that was ‘difficult to understand’, it was not ‘so egregious’ as to merit an award of costs against the magistrate personally). 276. [1979] 2 NSWLR 803 at 810. 277. Sankey v Whitlam [1977] 1 NSWLR 333 at 363 per Hutley JA. See also Willesee v Willesee [1974] 2 NSWLR 275 at 284 per Holland J (‘perverse or guilty of corruption or gross ignorance’); El Deeb v Magistrates Court of South Australia (1999) 72 SASR 596 at 598; [1999] SASC 113; BC9901081 per Doyle CJ, with whom Bleby and Martin JJ concurred (FC) (‘an order for costs will be made if something like misconduct, corruption or perversity is established’). 278. Ex parte Tranter (1867) 7 SCR (NSW) 213 at 214 per Faucett J. See also R v Goodall (1874) LR 9 QB 557 at 559 per Cockburn CJ (‘gross impropriety’); Ex parte Blume [1958] SR (NSW) 334 at 339 (FC); Munro v West (SC(Vic), Smith J, 7 March 1997, unreported) BC9706284 at 2 (‘clear case of serious misconduct’); Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Heidelberg v Robinson (2000) 2 VR 233 at 238, 241; [2000] VSCA 198; BC200006512 per Brooking JA. 279. See, for example, Ex parte Cox (1896) 12 WN (NSW) 172 at 172 per Cohen J (‘a flagrant violation of a principle of justice … or … a clearly defined case of misconduct … or … something … done in flat disregard of an Act of Parliament, or a decision of the Supreme Court’). 280. R v Liverpool Justices [1960] 1 WLR 585 at 586–7 per Lord Parker CJ. 281. (2000) 2 VR 233 at 239–40; [2000] VSCA 198; BC200006512 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). 282. Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Heidelberg v Robinson (2000) 2 VR 233 at 245; [2000] VSCA

198; BC200006512 per Buchanan JA. 283. Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Heidelberg v Robinson (2000) 2 VR 233 at 241 per Brooking JA, at 244 per Charles JA, at 245 per Buchanan JA; [2000] VSCA 198; BC200006512. 284. See, for example, Zukanovic v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Moorabbin (No 2) (2011) 32 VR 216; [2011] VSC 160; BC201102637 (where J Forrest J found that it was tolerably clear that, once the magistrate perceived an arguable slight on the court’s authority, he made up his mind as to how to deal with the plaintiff (Z) and chose to ignore essential aspects of procedural fairness, and in so doing had acted perversely: at [9]–[13]). 285. (1999) 72 SASR 596; [1999] SASC 113; BC9901081 (FC). 286. El Deeb v Magistrates Court of South Australia (1999) 72 SASR 596 at 599; [1999] SASC 113; BC9901081 per Doyle CJ, with whom Bleby and Martin JJ concurred (FC). See also Kingham v Yorkston [2002] 2 Qd R 595 at 599; [2002] QSC 59; BC200200950 per Mullins J (where the magistrate made orders without jurisdiction, but costs were not awarded against him because his mistake could not properly be described as perverse, or showing gross ignorance or flagrant disregard of elementary principles). 287. It is not, however, limited to such a case: see, for example, Alice Springs Commercial Broadcasters Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (FCA, O’Loughlin J, 14 October 1992, unreported) BC9203761 (where part of the costs of a proceeding were awarded against the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal because its admitted mistake had caused the applicant to incur substantial expense). 288. (2000) 2 VR 233 at 242; [2000] VSCA 198; BC200006512. 289. See, for example, Fernando v Medical Complaints Tribunal (2007) 16 Tas R 237; [2007] TASSC 44; BC200704696 at [45] per Slicer J. Contra at [48] per Evans J dissenting. 290. Merkel v Superannuation Complaints Tribunal [2010] FCA 564; BC201003717 at [66] per Gray J. See generally E Campbell, ‘Appearances of Courts and Tribunals as Respondents to Applications for Judicial Review’ (1982) 56 ALJ 293. 291. See, for example, Keogh v Medical Board of South Australia (No 2) [2007] SASC 421; BC200710329. 292. See, for example, E Campbell, ‘Award of Costs on Applications for Judicial Review’ (1983) 10 Syd LR 20 at 24 (‘Whilst it is not reasonable to expect members of tribunals who have acted in good faith to be fixed with personal liability to pay any costs awarded against them, it is just as unreasonable for the successful applicant to be left to bear his own costs or to be dependent on the readiness of Governments to organise ex gratia payments to indemnify him for his reasonable costs of litigating’). 293. See, for example, WALRC 92, Vol 1, p 522 (recommending that statute or court rules be amended to state a principle that ‘as a general rule an unsuccessful public respondent to an application for judicial review should pay the costs on the loser pays principle’). 294. R (Davies) v Birmingham Deputy Coroner [2004] 3 All ER 543; [2004] EWCA Civ 207 at [47] per Brooke LJ, with whom Longmore LJ and Sir Martin Nourse agreed. 295. Our Town FM Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 3) (1987) 77 ALR 609 at 612 per Wilcox J. 296. (2007) 16 Tas R 237; [2007] TASSC 44; BC200704696 at [21]. 297. Fernando v Medical Complaints Tribunal (2007) 16 Tas R 237; [2007] TASSC 44; BC200704696 at [21] per Crawford J, at [35] per Slicer J.

298. Fernando v Medical Complaints Tribunal (2007) 16 Tas R 237; [2007] TASSC 44; BC200704696 at [32]. As to costs orders in the context of amicus curiæ see 22.74. 299. R (Davies) v Birmingham Deputy Coroner [2004] 3 All ER 543; [2004] EWCA Civ 207 at [47] per Brooke LJ. 300. See, for example, Southern Cross Pipelines Australia Pty Ltd v Michael [2002] WASC 316; BC200208166. 301. See 22.58–22.61. 302. Psychologists’ Registration Board of Victoria v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd [2000] VSCA 118; BC200004111 at [11] per Charles JA, with whom Winneke P and Phillips JA concurred. 303. See, for example, Merkel v Superannuation Complaints Tribunal [2010] FCA 564; BC201003717 (where Gray J ordered costs against the tribunal, arising out of its failure to afford the applicant ‘even the most basic of procedural fairness’ in the circumstances: at [70]). 304. Marriage of Pagliarella (No 3) (1994) 122 FLR 443 at 447 per Hannon J (Fam Ct). 305. Kelly v South Manchester Health Authority [1997] 3 All ER 274 at 287 per Thomas J. 306. (1984) FLC ¶91-508 at 79,138. 307. Collins and the Victorian Legal Aid Commission (1984) FLC ¶91-508 at 79,146. 308. As to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117(2) see 8.70. 309. Collins and the Victorian Legal Aid Commission (1984) FLC ¶91-508 at 79,146–7. See also Kelly v South Manchester Health Authority [1997] 3 All ER 274 at 287–8 per Thomas J. 310. Marriage of Collins (1985) 75 FLR 84 at 94 (FC), referring to Legal Services Commission Act 1979 (NSW) (now Legal Aid Commission Act 1979 (NSW)) s 47 and Legal Aid Commission Act 1976 (WA) s 45. Cf Legal Aid Act 1977 (ACT) s 34; Legal Aid Act 1990 (NT) s 33; Legal Aid Queensland Act 1997 (Qld) s 32; Legal Aid Commission Act 1990 (Tas) s 26; Legal Aid Act 1978 (Vic) s 48. 311. See 22.11. 312. (1994) 122 FLR 449. 313. Marriage of Millea and Duke (1994) 122 FLR 449 at 453. 314. Marriage of Millea and Duke (1994) 122 FLR 449 at 454. 315. Marriage of Millea and Duke (1994) 122 FLR 449 at 455. 316. See generally HCR 2004 r 21.08 (litigation guardian); FCR 2011 Div 9.6 (pursuant to which a person under a legal incapacity may start, or defend, a proceeding only by the person’s ‘litigation representative’; persons who may be a litigation representative are listed in r 9.62) (cf former FCR 1979 O 43: sue by next friend, defend by litigation guardian); ACT rr 275–8 (formerly ACT RSC O 19 rr 16–22) (litigation guardian); NSW Pt 7 Div 4 (formerly NSW RSC Pt 63) (which uses the term ‘tutor’); NT O 15 (litigation guardian); Qld rr 93–99 (litigation guardian); SA rr 78, 79 (litigation guardian) (cf former SA RSC O 35 (sue by next friend, defend by litigation guardian)); Tas rr 292–301 (litigation guardian); Vic O 15 (litigation guardian); WA O 70 (sue by next friend, defend by litigation guardian). 317. Pink v J A Sharwood & Co Ltd [1913] 2 Ch 286 at 289 per Eve J. Cf Yakmor v Hamdoush (No 2) (2009) 76 NSWLR 148; [2009] NSWCA 284; BC200909126 (where Giles JA, with whom Ipp and Tobias JJA concurred, ruled that a tutor is ‘a party’ for the purposes of NSW r 42.3 (now repealed by remaining in the same form in ACT r 1703: see 22.8–22.9), reasoning that ‘it would

be astonishing that, given the established liability of a tutor for costs, it was intended by r 42.3 to exclude the power to make an order for costs against a tutor’: at [41]; his Honour then cited various parallels between the tutor’s role and that of a party: see at [45]). 318. Ex parte Davis (1901) 1 SR (NSW) 187 at 189 per Darley CJ. If an infant brings proceedings without a next friend, the defendant may enforce any costs order against the solicitor who instituted the action on the infant’s behalf: Sartori v Macleod (1897) 22 VLR 498; Fernée v Gorlitz [1915] 1 Ch 177 (solicitors held personally liable for costs even though unaware that the next friend was an infant). 319. Bligh v Tredgett (1851) 5 De G & SM 74; 64 ER 1024; Stephenson v Geiss [1998] 1 Qd R 542 at 558 per Lee J; Dissidomino v Butcher Paull & Calder (a firm) [2005] WASCA 210; BC200509914 at [20] per Wheeler JA; Farrell v Royal Kings Park Tennis Club (Incorporated) [2007] WASCA 173; BC200706670 at [17] per Buss JA; Le Brun v Joseph [2008] WASCA 205; BC200808811; Varma v Varma [2010] NSWSC 785; BC201004953 at [13] per Ward J (noting that the same principles apply in the context of a discontinuance). 320. Steeden v Walden [1910] 2 Ch 393 at 399 per Eve J; Murray v Kirkpatrick (1940) 57 WN (NSW) 162 at 163 per Williams J; Stephenson v Geiss [1998] 1 Qd R 542 at 558 per Lee J; R v Hanrahan (2006) 43 SR (WA) 16; [2006] WADC 74 at [25] per McCann DCJ; Farrell v Royal Kings Park Tennis Club (Incorporated) [2007] WASCA 173; BC200706670 at [17]–[31] per Buss JA. See also HCR 2004 rr 56.11.2, 56.11.3 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 11); ACT rr 277, 1733 (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 9); NSW r 42.24 (formerly NSW RSC Pt 52A r 41); SA r 267(2); Tas r 62(1); WA O 66 r 6. Cf Re Tyson (1906) 7 SR (NSW) 91 at 98 per Street J (indemnity only applies in respect of costs, and not payments for services). 321. See, for example, Murray v Kirkpatrick (1940) 57 WN (NSW) 162 at 163 per Williams J (characterising the right to an indemnity of a next friend against the estate of an infant plaintiff as analogous to that of a trustee against the trust estate: see generally 10.8); Layzell v British Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd [1961] 1 All ER 244 (next friend allowed costs on a common fund basis). Cf Eady v Elsdon [1901] 2 KB 460 at 467 per Collins LJ (costs of guardian ad litem allowed on party and party basis in the absence of contrary direction by the court). As to costs orders on other than a party and party basis see 16.18–16.38. 322. Pritchard v Roberts (1873) LR 17 Eq 222; Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Dzienciol [2001] WASC 30 (S) at [7]–[21] per McLure J. 323. Bligh v Tredgett (1851) 5 De G & SM 74 at 76–7; 64 ER 1024 at 1026 per Parker VC. 324. New South Wales Ministerial Corporation v Abualfoul (1999) 94 FCR 247; [1999] FCA 433; BC9901640 at [43] per Sackville J; Mousawy v Howitt-Stevens Constructions Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 1398; BC201009430 at [32] per Hoeben J. Cf Varma v Varma [2010] NSWSC 785; BC201004953 at [38] per Ward J. 325. Baile v Baile (1872) LR 13 Eq 497 at 508 per Wickens VC. Cf J v Australian Capital Territory (No 2) [2011] ACTSC 36; BC201101117 (where although the plaintiff attained his majority after the proceedings had been reserved for judgment, there was no material to suggest that he had adopted the proceedings pursued by the litigation guardian on his behalf; the litigation guardian, and not the plaintiff, was therefore potentially liable for costs; the point was obiter because the defendant did not seek costs). 326. (1999) 94 FCR 247; [1999] FCA 433; BC9901640. 327. New South Wales Ministerial Corporation v Abualfoul (1999) 94 FCR 247; [1999] FCA 433; BC9901640 at [38]–[40].

New South Wales Ministerial Corporation v Abualfoul (1999) 94 FCR 247; [1999] FCA 433; 328. BC9901640 at [41]. 329. Pursuant to the procedure stated by Philp ACJ in Feeney v Pieper [1964] QWN 23 (altering the title of the proceedings by describing the infant as plaintiff ‘late an infant but now of full age’). See also Carberry v Davies [1968] 2 All ER 817 at 818 per Harman LJ. 330. New South Wales Ministerial Corporation v Abualfoul (1999) 94 FCR 247; [1999] FCA 433; BC9901640 at [41]. 331. New South Wales Ministerial Corporation v Abualfoul (1999) 94 FCR 247; [1999] FCA 433; BC9901640 at [43]. 332. [2008] NSWSC 1394; BC200811342 at [7]. 333. Adams v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 1394; BC200811342 at [8]. 334. Adams v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 1394; BC200811342 at [9]. 335. Rothman J noted that a costs order against the plaintiff, even if it may not result in the payment of the costs to the state, was not futile because its effect include: the issue of principle associated with the determination of costs; recognition of the appropriateness of the defendant’s conduct; and, to the extent that the costs remain unpaid, consequences associated with the plaintiff’s capacity to take other proceedings of like kind: Adams v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 1394; BC200811342 at [10]. 336. See, for example, Guler v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2012] NSWSC 1369; BC201210557 (the fund being the estate of the deceased, whom the incapable person (the second defendant) had killed, but been found not guilty of murder on the grounds of mental illness; White J reasoned that, as ‘[i]t was in the interests of the administration of the estate for the NSW Trustee and Guardian to have consented to act as the second defendant’s tutor’, there was ‘no reason that the NSW Trustee and Guardian should be out of pocket’: at [6]). 337. Tas r 62A, inserted by the Supreme Court Amendment Rules 2010 (Tas), with effect on 30 June 2010. 338. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 68L(2). 339. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117(3). In considering what order, if any, should be made, s 117(5) directs the court to disregard the fact that the independent children’s lawyer is funded under a legal aid scheme or service established under a Commonwealth, state or territory law or approved by the Attorney-General. 340. [2008] FamCA 969; BC200850442 at [31]–[32] (paragraph break omitted) (concluding, on the facts, that the parents should share the balance of the costs equally: at [33]). For further examples of orders directing one or both parents to pay (at least part of) the costs of the independent children’s lawyer see, for example, Sladin v Scabel [2008] FamCA 72; BC200851033 at [89]–[93] per Carter J; Robbins v Rosemount (No 2) [2008] FamCA 494; BC200850810 at [154]–[155] per Carter J; Blgh v Blgh [2009] FamCA 1170; BC200951094 (involving a trial that could not have been conducted by the judge without the benefit of an independent children’s lawyer: at [8]); Hutchins v Blaney [2011] FamCA 25; BC201150027 (where Fowler J ruled that, as the engagement of the independent children’s lawyer was clearly in the interests of the child in this matter, and the conduct of the lawyer in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities imposed by that role had been to the benefit of the child, it was incumbent on parents, ‘to the extent that they are able to do so and in proportion to their means, that they bear those costs’: at [19]); Franchini v Moroni [2012] FamCAFC 126; BC201250512 at [40] per Coleman J (describing the independent children’s lawyer’s contribution to the appeal as ‘significant and helpful’).

341. ‘Hardship’ for this purpose means ‘financial deprivation or privation’: Robbins v Rosemount (No 2) [2008] FamCA 494; BC200850810 at [133] per Carter J (who, on the facts, held that, provided the husband was given a lengthy period to pay the costs, he would not suffer financial hardship: at [135]). See, for example, Pisani v Rodgers [2009] FamCA 346; BC200950218 (where Rose J dismissed an application for an independent children’s lawyer’s costs because the father did not have the financial capacity to pay the costs: at [54]); McDermott v Bond (Costs) [2010] FamCA 81; BC201050082 (where Austin J dismissed the application for the independent children’s lawyer’s costs against the father because the father would suffer financial hardship were he ordered to bear a proportion of those costs: at [9]). 342. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117(4). Cf the position prior to the enactment of this sub-section, as discussed in Separate Representative v J H E and G A W (1993) 16 Fam LR 485 at 508 per Nicholson CJ and Fogarty J (FC). 343. Using the terminology of Coleman J in Franchini v Moroni [2012] FamCAFC 126; BC201250512 at [40]. 344. See, for example, Mikono v Perez (Costs) [2012] FamCA 762; BC201250763. 345. See, for example, Johnson v Page (2007) FLC ¶93-344; [2007] FamCA 1235 at [127] (FC) (no costs order in favour of the independent children’s lawyer because the injunction sought by the lawyer was inappropriate and unwarranted). 346. Separate Representative v J H E and G A W (1993) 16 Fam LR 485 at 508 per Nicholson CJ and Fogarty J (FC); Marriage of Telfer (1996) 20 Fam LR 619 at 623 per Lindenmayer J. Cf ALRC 75, pp 79–81. 347. An intervener becomes a party, and thus liable to costs as a party: see 11.40. 348. Re Medical Assessment Panel (2003) 27 WAR 242; [2003] WASC 154; BC200304618 at [18] per E M Heenan J. 349. Re Medical Assessment Panel (2003) 27 WAR 242; [2003] WASC 154; BC200304618 at [18] per E M Heenan J. 350. Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579 at 604–5; BC9703254 per Brennan CJ. 351. National Australia Bank v Hokit Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 377 at 382; BC9602450 per Mahoney P (in discussing the basis upon which intervention might be permitted, in that case as an amicus curiæ); Forestry Tasmania v Ombudsman (No 2) [2010] TASSC 52; BC201008424 at [25] per Porter J. 352. See, for example, Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545; [2003] HCA 67; BC200306764 at [86] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, at [303] per Callinan J; contra at [217]–[219] per Kirby J, dissenting (who would have ordered order in favour of the amici, reasoning that the amici were ‘necessary participants’ in the proceedings, in which constitutional issues transcending the interests of private litigants were at stake, and submissions ‘helped crystallise the competing contentions’: at [219]); Forestry Tasmania v Ombudsman (No 2) [2010] TASSC 52; BC201008424 (where Porter J refused to order costs against the AttorneyGeneral as amicus, who had sought leave to appear as amicus because there was no contradictor willing or properly able to participate in the hearing, as the amicus did not go beyond what was foreshadowed before the application for leave was made, and his submissions ‘significantly greatly assisted in the crystalisation of the issues’, even though his Honour conceded that it was possible to see how the case could have been conducted without the Attorney’s participation: at [26]). 353. See, for example, QGC Pty Ltd v Bygrave [2012] FCA 309; BC201202007 at [18]–[29] per

Reeves J. See also Forestry Tasmania v Ombudsman (No 2) [2010] TASSC 52; BC201008424 at [25] per Porter J (‘if leave were granted for an amicus to make submissions other than in writing, and the conduct of the amicus became such that it appeared the role being played was more properly that of an intervener so-called, then a court would revisit the issue of leave and the conditions upon the person or body who was appearing’). 354. Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 203; BC9202673 per Dawson J. 355. Singh v Observer Ltd [1989] 2 All ER 751 at 754 per Macpherson J; Bischof v Adams [1992] 2 VR 198 at 205 per Gobbo J; Re Foster (1994) 121 ALR 494 at 501 per Einfeld J (FCA). See, for example, Western Ventures Pty Ltd v Resource Equities Ltd (2005) 53 ACSR 568; [2005] WASC 53; BC200502004 (where Commissioner Siopis SC declined to order costs against non-party company directors because they had not been given the opportunity to give evidence on the issue: at [50]–[52]). 356. Marriage of McAlpin (1993) 16 Fam LR 888 at 894 per Nicholson CJ and Maxwell J (FC). 357. Cf Waiviata Pty Ltd v New Millenium Publications Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 481; BC200201897 at [5] per Sundberg J. 358. Singh v Observer Ltd [1989] 2 All ER 751 at 754 per Macpherson J; Sweeney & Vandeleur Pty Ltd v BNY Australia Ltd (1993) 11 ACLC 1071 at 1075; BC9304087 per Cole J (SC(NSW)); Re Talk Finance and Insurance Services Pty Ltd [1994] 1 Qd R 558 at 560 per Moynihan J; Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd v Boland (No 2) (1997) 147 ALR 685 at 694; BC9703585 per Branson J (FCA) (affd Yates v Boland [2000] FCA 1895; BC200007991 (FC)). 359. As to the principles governing the award of indemnity costs against an unsuccessful party see 16.39–16.75. 360. Naomi Marble and Granite Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance Company Ltd (No 2) [1999] 1 Qd R 518 at 544; BC9800777 per Shepherdson J. 361. See, for example, Re Talk Finance and Insurance Services Pty Ltd [1994] 1 Qd R 558 at 560 per Moynihan J (indemnity costs ordered against the directors of an unsuccessful company who had deliberately raised false issues); Yamacoe Pty Ltd v Michel Survey Group Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 393; BC200207291 at [20]–[23] per Fryberg J (indemnity costs ordered against the principal officer and shareholder of plaintiff company, who purported to deceive the court). 362. Miller v Chapman (2001) 46 ATR 317 at 321–2; [2001] FCA 105; BC200100399 per Mansfield J. See also Helljay Investments Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 166 ALR 302 at 310; [1999] HCA 56; BC9906414 per Hayne J (third party played an active part in prosecuting an application to remove a judge from a case, which application was ‘untenable and obviously so’; indemnity costs were ordered); Arundel Chiropractic Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 179 ALR 406 at 414; [2001] HCA 26; BC200102181 per Callinan J (arising out of the same litigation as Helljay); Mead v Watson (2005) 23 ACLC 718; [2005] NSWCA 133; BC200502533 at [156]–[159] per the court (liquidator ordered to pay indemnity costs where maintained hopeless defences). 363. C E Heath Underwriting and Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd v Daraway Constructions Pty Ltd (SC(Vic), Batt J, 1 September 1995, unreported) BC9503967 at 4; Consolidated Byrnes Holdings Ltd v Hardel Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 176 FCR 348; [2009] FCA 399; BC200903353 at [284] per Lander J (‘the court would have jurisdiction to order costs against the non-parties in these proceedings even though orders have already been made dismissing the proceedings’). 364. Packing In Ltd (in liq) v Chilcott (2003) 16 PRNZ 958 at [13]–[14] (CA); Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd [2004] 1 WLR 2807; [2004] UKPC 39 at [17] per Lord Brown;

Peter Breese & Associates Pty Ltd v CCI Holdings Ltd (2004) 2 DCLR(NSW) 157 at [22] per Rein DCJ. 365. Caboolture Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1993) 45 FCR 224 at 235–6; BC9305024 (FC). 366. [1999] 1 VR 204 at 208; [1998] VSC 13; BC9803725. 367. UTSA Pty Ltd (in liq) v Ultra Tune Australia Pty Ltd [1999] 1 VR 204 at 207; [1998] VSC 13; BC9803725 per Chernov J. See, for example, Akedian Co Ltd v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd [1999] 1 VR 80 at 100–1; BC9800417 per Byrne J. Cf Ken Morgan Motors Pty Ltd v Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd (SC(Vic), Hayne J, 23 November 1993, unreported) BC9304156 at 11. 368. As to factors that influence the court in this determination see 22.18–22.33. 369. (2004) 2 DCLR(NSW) 157. 370. Peter Breese & Associates Pty Ltd v CCI Holdings Ltd (2004) 2 DCLR(NSW) 157 at [23]. 371. Peter Breese & Associates Pty Ltd v CCI Holdings Ltd (2004) 2 DCLR(NSW) 157 at [47].

[page 788]

CHAPTER 23

Costs Orders Against Lawyers Nature of Jurisdiction 23.2 Aim is primarily compensatory 23.2 Aim may have punitive effect 23.3 Impact upon quantum of order 23.4 Award of indemnity costs 23.5 Sparing curial attitude to making order 23.7 Seriousness of the charge 23.8 Court not privy to lawyer’s instructions 23.9 Wariness to restrict good faith conduct 23.12 Recognition of time pressures to which lawyers exposed 23.13 Concern that threats to seek costs order used as tactical device 23.14 Inherent Jurisdiction to Make Order Serious dereliction of duty or gross negligence Causation Conduct that does not attract the jurisdiction Mere error or negligence Failure on the merits Misconduct not sufficiently serious Conduct that may attract the jurisdiction Making unsupported allegations Commencement of proceedings without authority or without

23.15 23.16 23.17 23.18 23.18 23.19 23.20 23.21 23.22

instructions Failure to fulfil procedural responsibility Hopeless cases and the securing of collateral advantage Other serious derelictions of duty Relying on the advice of counsel Legally aided, pro bono and speculative actions Costs against counsel

23.23 23.26 23.29 23.35 23.36 23.38 23.40 23.42 23.43 23.44 23.45 23.46 23.47 23.48 23.50

Rule-Based Jurisdiction to Make Order Types of costs orders Conduct that attracts the jurisdiction Costs ‘improperly’ or ‘unreasonably’ incurred ‘Undue delay’ ‘Misconduct’ ‘Default’ ‘Negligence’

[page 789] New South Wales (and Australian Capital Territory) initiatives — ‘without reasonable prospects of success’ Proof of causation Costs against counsel Relationship between rule-based and inherent jurisdiction Procedure Order initiated by the court Timing of application Application in respect of the conduct of employees or agents Reference to taxing officer or costs assessor

23.53 23.58 23.59 23.60 23.61 23.61 23.62 23.65 23.66

Need for opportunity to rebut the complaint Inherent jurisdiction Rule-based jurisdiction Ancillary directions

23.67 23.67 23.68 23.69

23.1 Notwithstanding the general rule that a court will order costs only against a party to the proceedings, it has long been recognised that superior courts have, as part of their supervisory jurisdiction over their officers, an inherent jurisdiction to order costs against lawyers personally (sometimes termed ‘wasted costs orders’) in civil and criminal1 matters (although there may be policy reasons for exercising greater care in making such an order in criminal matters).2 Statute in New South Wales and court rules in other jurisdictions make like prescription (in this chapter collectively termed the ‘rule-based jurisdiction’). The rule-based jurisdiction is not necessarily coextensive with the inherent jurisdiction, although there is a considerable overlap.3 In particular, as discussed immediately below, the aim of both jurisdictions is essentially the same,4 as is the curial attitude to making the relevant order.5 Also, merely because each jurisdiction is discussed separately in this chapter should not be read as suggesting that each must be invoked separately, and indeed many judges do not clearly identify which jurisdiction they seek to invoke. [page 790]

Nature of Jurisdiction Aim is primarily compensatory 23.2 The object of the court’s jurisdiction to make a wasted costs order is primarily compensatory, that is, to indemnify or to compensate, and thus protect, the client who has suffered and to indemnify, or compensate the party who has been injured, whether it be the opposite party or the lawyer’s own client.6 It is distinct from the court’s disciplinary jurisdiction over

lawyers, although this does not deny that the conduct of a lawyer that may justify a costs order against him or her may not also merit disciplinary sanction. The court is not principally concerned with punishing the lawyer, or protecting the general community from that lawyer,7 but with ensuring a litigant is not required to pay costs caused by the lawyer’s dereliction of duty to the court. More generally, it has been judicially observed, ‘[t]he possibility of personal liability gives confidence to the courts and litigants that legal practitioners are acting in the best interests of their clients in accordance with appropriate professional standards as an officer of the court with duties they are bound to uphold to clients, the courts and to justice’.8

Aim may have punitive effect 23.3 Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is accepted that an order against a lawyer personally to pay costs is an order in the disciplinary jurisdiction of the court, but not in the sense of professional sanction.9 This stems from the fact that its trigger is a breach of duty to the court.10 That the effect of a wasted costs order in fact punishes the lawyer has led to confusion as to whether the jurisdiction also has a punitive slant.11 A lawyer is punished, for a failing to fulfil a duty to the court, by having to pay a bill otherwise payable by a litigant.12 This exhibits a deterrence aspect too, as lawyers will wish to avoid the expense and adverse publicity that the exercise of the jurisdiction entails. The jurisdiction may in fact be both punitive and compensatory, as explained by May J in Currie & Co v Law Society:13 [W]here the costs of litigation are unnecessarily increased by the substantial failure on the part of a solicitor to fulfil this duty to the court to promote in his particular sphere the cause and proper administration of justice, then the court will require him to compensate those who have incurred costs which they would not otherwise have incurred but for such failure by that solicitor, or whose costs have been similarly increased thereby; and as those costs have to be paid by the solicitor personally, and not by the party to the litigation who would otherwise have to pay them, the order is in that sense and to that extent punitive.

[page 791]

Impact upon quantum of order 23.4 The principal aim of the jurisdiction to make costs orders against

lawyers personally translates into the quantum of the order. As the aim is to compensate, the court limits the quantum of an order to the extent that the lawyer’s improper conduct has put a party to unnecessary or unreasonable costs.14 Nothing is added to mark the court’s disapproval or by way of deterrence.15 The lawyer is liable for only those costs his or her default has caused;16 the lawyer may, say, be ordered to pay costs of trial time wasted as a result of his or her dereliction.17 A court will not make a wasted costs order if that dereliction did not cause costs to be increased for a party to the suit.18 The costs liability may be shared between the lawyer and his or her client. For instance, in Vasram v AMP Life Ltd19 Stone J found that the applicant’s solicitor could not seriously have considered that the claims in question had any prospects of success. Her Honour ordered that the applicant pay the party and party costs of the whole proceeding and that the applicant’s solicitor pay the difference between this amount and the amount of costs assessed on an indemnity basis. It is open to the court, on other occasions, to order costs jointly and severally against lawyer and client.20 Yet if, for instance, a hopeless application21 is brought entirely on the initiative and advice of the applicant’s lawyer, the court is unlikely to mulct the applicant for costs, but will likely order the opponent’s costs to be paid by the applicant’s lawyer.22

Award of indemnity costs 23.5 The court may make a wasted costs order on an indemnity basis.23 As an indemnity order, when made against a party, is often premised upon his or her misconduct in the course of the litigation,24 it is not surprising to find that costs orders against lawyers, also grounded [page 792] largely in misconduct broadly defined,25 are sometimes made on an indemnity basis.26 Not all costs orders against lawyers are made on an indemnity basis. Each case requires the court to determine the extent and nature of the lawyer’s dereliction, which in turn impacts upon the level of compensation that an affected party should be awarded.

23.6 Even an indemnity order will not necessarily cover all the costs of an affected party. The court retains a discretion as to the quantum of costs payable, and in any event indemnity costs by definition do not extend to costs unreasonably incurred or unreasonable in amount.27 The court may order only part of the costs against the lawyer, consonant with the nature and extent of the lawyer’s conduct.28 In Cook v Pasminco Ltd29 Lindgren J noted that the respondent, though maintaining that the applicant’s action was hopeless, nonetheless prepared detailed submissions, senior and junior interstate counsel appeared, and at least one representative of interstate solicitors instructing counsel attended. Whilst his Honour left it to the parties to agree on costs, the tenor of his judgment suggests that he would not have ordered the applicant’s lawyer to meet all of the respondent’s costs.

Sparing curial attitude to making order 23.7 As wasted costs orders, like costs orders in the main, involve the exercise of a curial discretion, a court is not compelled to order costs against a lawyer upon a finding that his or her dereliction of duty has caused the unnecessary incurrence of costs.30 A court may decline an order where, for instance, the costs of its inquiry for this purpose, as compared with the costs claimed, make the inquiry a waste of resources, or where the order would otherwise represent a disproportionate response to the lawyer’s dereliction.31 In each case, the court must give sustainable reasons for this.32 [page 793] More generally, the courts have emphasised that the jurisdiction to order costs against a lawyer personally is exercised sparingly,33 ‘with care and discretion and only in clear cases’,34 ‘with considerable caution’,35 in a ‘very exceptional situation’36 and ‘not with the benefit of hindsight’,37 especially where indemnity costs are sought.38 There are at least five reasons for this curial reticence, each discussed below.

Seriousness of the charge

23.8 To order a lawyer to pay the costs of a litigant represents, it is said, a ‘serious charge’,39 in view of its assumption that the judge has formed an adverse view of the lawyer’s conduct. That it presents a ‘very serious sanction’, namely that a lawyer retained by a client who proves unsuccessful is nonetheless required to bear the financial burden of a costs order, dictates that the jurisdiction is one that is ‘not lightly to be invoked’.40 To this end, the court may bear in mind the repercussions of making an order of this kind,41 and will not make it solely on inference without evidence.42

Court not privy to lawyer’s instructions 23.9 A court may not be privy to the details and circumstances of the lawyer’s instructions.43 In particular, where the lawyer is alleged is to have pursued a hopeless case,44 it may be impossible for the lawyer to defend that charge — by, say, showing that the client has been advised of the improbability of success and nonetheless insisted on proceeding — without violating the client’s privilege unless the client agrees to waive it.45 For this reason, the New South Wales Supreme Court has issued a practice note that prescribes, inter alia, that:46 If a practitioner informs the Court that he has requested his or her client to waive legal professional privilege in a respect which the practitioner asserts is relevant to the Court’s consideration of the costs order, the Court will invite the client to make submissions on the matter and to indicate whether the client wishes an order to be made against the practitioner.

[page 794] The client may be reticent to do so, for this may prejudice his or her ability to avoid ultimate liability for costs. The judge must accordingly ‘make full allowance for the inability of respondent lawyers to tell the whole story’, and where there is room for doubt, the respondent lawyer is entitled to the benefit of it.47 So a court will be wary of making a costs order against a lawyer where he or she cannot give an account of the instructions received, especially where the client is sophisticated. In Re The Black Stump Enterprises and Associated Companies (No 2),48 involving an appeal by professional liquidators without reasonable prospects of success, Young CJ in Eq, with whom Santow and

Bryson JJA concurred, noted that ‘[o]ne of the difficulties for a court … is in making an assessment as to whether it is the solicitor or client that is the real cause of the problem’, adding that in the circumstances:49 … [the clients] must be taken to have had some knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the application and the appeal. It would be difficult to infer that with such clients a solicitor, to use a traditional common law expression, would go out on a frolic of his own. The truth is that the court just does not know whether the solicitor brought the appeal to justify his own advice to the client or whether the client insisted that the appeal be brought because the client thought, rightly or wrongly, that that would save the creditors’ money in the long run, or what otherwise happened …

His Honour warned, however, that if the facts show that a lawyer gave very bad advice to an unsophisticated client who accepted it without question, with the result that the client incurred substantial legal costs, that may be a case where the court would make an order that the lawyer pay the costs personally.50 For example, in Ex Christmas Islanders Association Inc v Attorney-General (Cth) (No 2),51 in ordering costs against a lawyer who failed to give proper consideration to essential elements of the (ultimately hopeless) judicial review application he presented on behalf of unsophisticated clients, French J noted that:52 … [t]here is no basis for any suggestion that the shortcomings of the application and the way in which the proceedings were conducted has anything to do with the applicants themselves. The circumstances of this case make it highly improbable that the practitioner advised his clients of the hopelessness of the application and that he was instructed to proceed with it notwithstanding … The applicants, evidently unsophisticated people entirely in his hands, should not have to bear the burden of a costs order in favour of the respondent in this case.

23.10 A court may feel less inhibited in making a personal costs order against a lawyer in more obvious cases involving failure to appear, lateness, gross repetition or extreme tardiness.53 To escape such an order, the lawyer must raise a doubt in the mind of the court that there might be privileged material that could affect its decision whether or not to make the order and, if so, [page 795] in what terms. The court will give the lawyer the benefit of the doubt in reaching its decision.54 As explained by an English judge:55 In some wasted costs cases … the court can be confident that no evidence other than that before the court could have been available to the respondent lawyers. However, in many cases, the fact that the client (or former client) of the respondent lawyers claims privilege means that the court

cannot be reasonably confident that other relevant information was not available to the respondent lawyers, and which could justify conduct which, in the absence of such evidence, could not be justified.56 In such a case, although it may result in a considerable and understandable sense of grievance on the part of the applicant, a wasted costs order must be refused. That is because the court cannot properly characterise the conduct of respondent lawyers as ‘improper, unreasonable or negligent’,57 as there could be material the court is not entitled to see, which could exonerate the lawyers. In broad terms, this outcome can be justified on the basis that the wider public interest requires litigants to be represented by lawyers who are not looking over their shoulders and worrying about potential applications for wasted costs, and that that interest also requires the strict rules of privilege to be observed.

23.11 If a costs order is made against a lawyer, and it thereafter comes to light that the lawyer’s stance that generated the order was pursuant to the client’s instructions, and perceived by the client to be for the client’s benefit, the lawyer (as an agent) may be able to secure an indemnity from the client (as the principal) for the costs the lawyer has personally been ordered to pay.58 Conversely, if no costs order is made against the lawyer because the court is not apprised of the lawyer’s instructions or role in the proceeding, but it transpires that the lawyer illegitimately pursued the proceeding,59 that is a matter of potential liability as between the client and the lawyer.60

Wariness to restrict good faith conduct 23.12 A court is careful not to restrict the lawyer who vigorously acts on behalf of a client in good faith.61 A balance must be sought between competing public interests: that lawyers should not be deterred from pursuing clients’ interests for fear of being made personally subject to orders for costs, and the principle that innocent parties should not have to pay costs, for which they would not otherwise be liable, incurred as a result of the inappropriate conduct of lawyers.62 As explained by Drummond J in Re Bendeich (No 2):63 Too ready an exposure of the lawyer for a party to personal liability for costs of his client or of the other party is likely to inhibit the way the lawyer acts in conducting the litigation. It frequently happens that a lawyer will have to make judgments as to which of a number of courses is the optimum one to follow, bearing in mind his duty to advance his client’s interests by all proper means and his duty to the Court to conduct the litigation in proper fashion. The introduction of a third consideration into everyday litigation that requires a solicitor to keep in mind the need to minimise the chances of a costs order being made against him personally, would raise a conflict between the lawyer’s duties to his client and to the Court, on the one hand, and his own interests,

[page 796]

on the other. As is understandable, such a conflict would be likely to be resolved by the solicitor concentrating on identifying and adopting the course most likely to minimise his own personal exposure at the expense of following courses best fitted to advantage his client and to bring the action to an expeditious end.

Recognition of time pressures to which lawyers exposed 23.13 Courts recognise the speed at which and stress under which lawyers carry out many of their functions, particularly in relation to litigation.64 It follows that, faced with an application to make a personal costs order against a lawyer, the pressure and urgency pertaining to the matter will influence the court’s determination.65 If, for instance, there is urgency in commencing the relevant proceedings, there may be a greater justification for the lawyer to do so without a detailed analysis of the law or an expansive investigation into the facts. Of course, this affords no immunity from a personal costs order where, in the course of the proceedings, the lawyer should have realised, say, that the proceedings lacked merit. Lawyers owe a duty, in this regard, to assess the merit or otherwise of the proceeding at the earliest practicable opportunity in the course of the retainer.

Concern that threats to seek costs order used as tactical device 23.14 Lawyers should not be encouraged to see threats to seek a personal costs order as a tactic to put pressure on the opposing lawyer,66 whether by pitting that lawyer’s interests against those of his or her client,67 or being directed at undermining the client’s trust in his or her lawyer.68 In particular, it has been observed that such an order should not become a backdoor means of recovering otherwise unrecoverable costs against an impoverished litigant, so ‘that the remedy should not grow unchecked to become more damaging than the disease’.69 Bryson JA explained the attitude of the courts to behaviour of this kind in De Groot v Nominal Defendant as follows:70 Courts should guard themselves against stratagems which include collateral attacks on the legal representatives of the opposing party, whether based on claims for costs, on professional discipline, on supposed conflicts of interest or otherwise. Overbearing the opponent’s legal representatives by threats against their personal positions is outside the range of legitimate strategies for conducting litigation. Attacks on bases like that should be made with wholehearted sincerity and on solid

[page 797] grounds or the subjects should not be raised at all. If anything is to be done, it should be done by making an application to the Court, not by uttering threats.

His Honour added, more generally, that ‘[t]he Court should be on guard against the incorporation of attacks on personal representatives of opponents into the forensic armoury’.71 That is not to say that every threat to pursue a personal costs order is illegitimate. A New South Wales judge has noted, in this context, that it is, after all, ‘an inescapable feature of legal practice that the conduct of litigation touches the personal interests of the solicitor on the record’.72 Natural justice, moreover, may require that notice that costs may be sought against the opposing lawyer be given.73 Depending on the circumstances, the pressure may not be improper, and the circumstances make it justifiable to remind the opposing lawyer of the responsibility to ensure that costs are not being improperly incurred.74 An indemnity costs order is likely to be made against a person who, in this context, makes an allegation that proves to be unfounded. For example, in Redowood Pty Ltd v Goldstein Technology Pty Ltd75 the plaintiff applied for the defendant’s solicitor to pay its costs, alleging that the defendant’s solicitor misled the court, participated in an abuse of process and prosecuted a baseless claim. The application was subsequently withdrawn. Austin J noted that these being serious allegations, one would expect a party and its legal advisers to satisfy themselves that the factual foundation for such claims was reasonably strong before they were made. His Honour made an indemnity costs order against the plaintiff, having found that the allegations had been made recklessly and had unduly prolonged the case.76 Although not willing to conclude that the claim was made for an ulterior purpose, Austin J expressed a ‘very real concern about the effect of the making of the claim at the time when it was made’,77 namely late in the proceedings. Had there been any substance to the application, it should have been made earlier.

Inherent Jurisdiction to Make Order 23.15 The court’s power to order costs against a lawyer personally — whether directly, or by directing the lawyer to repay to his or her own client

costs the client has been ordered to pay to another party, or to repay to the client costs the lawyer has charged the client — is grounded in its inherent jurisdiction over lawyers in their capacity as officers of the court, to ensure that lawyers properly perform their duty to the court to conduct litigation with propriety.78 Courts created pursuant to statute, which therefore lack inherent jurisdiction, lack the power to order costs against lawyers except where this is expressly prescribed by statute.79 [page 798]

Serious dereliction of duty or gross negligence 23.16 An important means of securing the appropriate balance between the competing interests discussed earlier80 is by setting a relatively high threshold as to the type of conduct capable of attracting the jurisdiction.81 The case law requires proof that the lawyer has, in respect of the court, exhibited a serious dereliction of duty, serious misconduct or gross negligence.82 In the leading English case, Myers v Elman,83 the House of Lords held that the exercise of the jurisdiction does not depend upon the solicitor being shown to be guilty of professional misconduct such as to justify striking off or suspension from practice,84 but that negligence on the part of the solicitor or those for whom he or she is responsible will suffice only if it is ‘of a serious character’,85 ‘gross negligence’86 or amounts to ‘a gross neglect’.87 The same notion has been expressed by Australian judges, one remarking that ‘[l]awyers should know that, so long as they are not guilty of either professional misconduct or gross, as opposed to mere, negligence in the way they conduct their client’s case, they will not be exposed to any personal liability to pay either the costs of their own client or those of the opposing litigant’.88 Others have likewise required something more than ‘mere negligence’ — a degree of blameworthiness beyond negligence simpliciter — ‘conduct which attracts the censure of the court in a serious way’.89 But Tipping J’s remark in Harley v McDonald90 that incompetence or negligence falling short of a disciplinary level will not ordinarily amount to a serious dereliction of duty to the court must, in referring to ‘disciplinary level’, be

viewed in terms of discipline in the broad sense, not merely striking off or suspension.

Causation 23.17 A wasted costs order will not be made unless it is shown that a party suffered loss as a result of the lawyer’s serious dereliction of duty or gross negligence.91 If there is a loss that cannot be said was caused by the lawyer’s default, there are no grounds to make the lawyer responsible for it; a sufficient causal connection or link between the conduct and the loss must [page 799] be shown. Judges have, in this respect, spoken in terms of whether the conduct complained of ‘is really an effective cause’ of the costs incurred.92

Conduct that does not attract the jurisdiction Mere error or negligence 23.18 A lawyer’s error of judgment, or ‘a mere slip’, will not warrant the court exercising its jurisdiction to order costs against the lawyer.93 For example, in Mauroux v Sociedade Commercial Abel Pereira Da Fonesca SARL94 Megarry J held that, as the breach of statutory duty committed by the solicitors was in the nature of a mere oversight, there being no suggestion of any deliberate or gross misconduct on their behalf, the alleged misconduct was ‘insufficiently grave’ to attract a costs order. It is, rather, errors of a duty owed to the court that attract the exercise of the jurisdiction. Accordingly, behaviour that, with the benefit of hindsight, proves to have been negligent, or in conflict of interest, is not amenable to a personal costs order if the circumstances amounting to that negligence or conflict were not appreciated at the relevant time.95

Failure on the merits

23.19 There is no cause for the jurisdiction to order costs against a lawyer to be exercised on the sole ground that the ultimate outcome on the merits of the case is unfavourable to the client.96 Nor is it activated merely because the action is struck out for lacking a cause of action.97 The foregoing is selfevident; otherwise it would be lawyers, not their unsuccessful clients, who would bear the brunt of the costs indemnity rule.98 Moreover, ‘those seeking to advance legitimate claims, or pursue legitimate defences might well be deprived of legal representation and access to justice, in consequence, would be impeded’.99 It is only where the client’s cause of action or defence entirely lacks merit, but the lawyer pursues the case for a reason unconnected with its merits, that the jurisdiction is likely to be attracted.100 Merely pursuing a hopeless case is insufficient, and certainly so where the client has misled the lawyer as to the grounds that would otherwise not have justified the action.101

Misconduct not sufficiently serious 23.20 There may be other circumstances, not necessarily involving a mistake, that may not justify a wasted costs order even though the lawyer’s conduct cannot be commended. This [page 800] follows from the fact that serious dereliction of duty to the court — not just any dereliction — is the foundation for the jurisdiction. Young v Young102 illustrates the point. There it was argued that counsel’s conduct in producing a great quantity of repetitious and irrelevant material, subjecting the court to unwarranted abuse, criticism and insult, and making excessive numbers of interlocutory applications and motions, should warrant a costs order against him. Cumming JA held that no such order should be made, for three reasons. First, as counsel had acted bona fide, the production of material not strictly necessary for the court’s decision did not warrant the order, nor did his excessive zeal.103 Second, although the court did not condone all that was said by counsel, and suggested that this was a matter for the disciplinary process, it did not consider his conduct to amount to a contempt of court, for which in any case the court could visit appropriate non-costs

consequences.104 Third, the court was not convinced that in assisting with the interlocutory steps counsel was guilty of conduct that tended to defeat justice or constituted a failure in his duty to the court.105 There are various Australian case examples where, likewise, the court has been unable to conclude that the lawyer’s conduct was sufficiently serious to merit a costs order against him or her personally.106

Conduct that may attract the jurisdiction 23.21 No exhaustive list can be made of the types of improper conduct on the part of a lawyer that attract the jurisdiction to make a wasted costs order. What follows aims to convey a flavour of what here may constitute a serious dereliction of duty to the court. Many of the examples can, speaking in broad terms, be seen as abuses of court process, which is consonant with the fact that the jurisdiction is based on the court’s ability to enforce duties owed by lawyers to the court.107 This should not be understood to require proof of bad faith on the part of the lawyer, although this may serve to turn the scale in a particular case.108 As a background comment, it should be noted that acting on a client’s instructions by itself provides no immunity from a wasted costs order if the lawyer’s conduct in so doing amounts to a serious dereliction of duty to the court.109 Lawyers are expected, it has been judicially observed in this regard, ‘to exert a moderating influence on their clients’.110

Making unsupported allegations 23.22 The making of unsupported allegations to the court by a lawyer can justify the lawyer being burdened with costs where the allegations go to the substance of the matter. Allegations [page 801] of fraud in the opposing litigant are the most likely candidates for the jurisdiction in this context. This is reflective of the courts’ decrying of allegations of fraud being made lightly, which may be recounted in the

community and through the public media and, in the process, cause great harm to the reputation of a litigant before any evidence has been offered and submitted to the scrutiny of cross-examination or rebuttal.111 The care that lawyers must exercise to ensure that any allegation of fraud has an appropriate evidentiary foundation dictates that an allegation made with no factual basis, and without giving consideration to whether there was a factual basis, of itself constitutes a serious dereliction of duty or serious misconduct sufficient to enliven the jurisdiction to order the lawyer to pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings.112 The position is otherwise where the court finds that there were at least some grounds to allege fraud in the circumstances, even though fraud was not ultimately established.113

Commencement of proceedings without authority or without instructions 23.23 A lawyer who has commenced a proceeding without the client’s authority or instructions, and knew or ought to have known that authority or instruction was lacking, may be ordered to pay costs of the proceeding if it is proven that his or her actions caused a person to incur a costs liability that would not otherwise have been incurred.114 For example, in Zimmerman Holdings Pty Ltd v Wales115 a lawyer who did not take steps to review and establish whether or not the clients had authority to give instructions and to commence proceedings on the company’s behalf, in a situation where there was known conflict and challenge to authority in this regard, was ordered to pay the costs of the unauthorised proceedings. In National Australia Bank Ltd v Larter (No 4)116 a solicitor took no steps to ensure that he was receiving a wife’s instructions rather than those of her husband while being aware that the husband wished to keep his wife in a state of ignorance. Raphael FM found that the solicitor had not been properly retained by the wife to oppose a bankruptcy petition until he actually met with her, and so ordered that the solicitor pay the costs incurred by the petitioning creditor before this date. In each case, though, there is no automatic rule; the court must exercise a judicial discretion in [page 802]

this regard.117 If, for instance, those at whose instance the lawyer has acted in good faith are themselves amenable to a costs order, and the lawyer is but a vehicle through which the dispute has been conducted, it may be preferable to make orders as between the true protagonists.118 23.24 The costs may include any costs the person for whom the solicitor purported to act has been ordered to pay to the opponent.119 In this context, the costs awarded are analogous to a liability for damages for breach of warranty of authority by the lawyer.120 This may be so even where there is no retainer between the lawyer and the person on whose behalf the lawyer purports to act. For instance, in a case where the solicitor on the record for the plaintiff companies had been retained by none of the companies, Powell J remarked as follows:121 [I]f a retainer for one or more of the companies had been established, the proper course to adopt would be to order the names of those which had not retained the solicitor be struck out and to order further that the solicitor bear so much of the defendants’ costs of the proceedings and the application as were attributable to those companies being joined as parties122 where, as here, no retainer at all is established, the appropriate course to adopt would seem to be either to stay the proceedings — which seems once to have been the practice123 — or to dismiss the proceedings — which seems to be the more modern practice124 — in each case all prior orders being discharged and the solicitor being ordered to pay the costs of both the application and the proceedings.

23.25 In cases of this kind, it is open to the court to direct that the costs be taxed on the basis more generous than the traditional party and party basis.125 In Nominal Defendant v Kisse126 [page 803] the respondent, who had been injured in a motor vehicle accident, consulted solicitors, who prepared a notice claim, which the respondent signed. Prior to the notice being sent, the respondent died. Three years later the solicitors filed a statement of claim naming the respondent’s personal representatives as plaintiffs, but did not serve the claim. The Queensland District Court held that the proceedings were commenced by the solicitors without authority — the proceedings could not be commenced simply in the name of the estate, as the appropriate person to commence a proceeding was the deceased’s personal representative — and so the solicitors were ordered to pay the nominal defendant’s costs. As the solicitors knew that the respondent was

dead, and lacked instructions from any personal representative, the assessment of those costs the court ordered to be on an indemnity basis.127

Failure to fulfil procedural responsibility 23.26 A lawyer who fails to fulfil a procedural responsibility in the course of the litigation, which causes a party to incur unnecessary costs, may be ordered to meet those costs personally. In Dempster v McAndrew,128 for instance, where the city agent’s failure to notify the principal of a hearing date caused the hearing date to be wasted, Campbell J ordered the city agent to pay the costs wasted as a result on an indemnity basis. A like fate met the lawyer in SZEKQ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs,129 who failed to attend a hearing, and failed to file, lodge and deliver the relevant documents. And in Kendirjian v Ayoub130 the inadequacy of the appellant’s lawyers submissions meant that the costs of preparing for the appeal hearing were wasted, and thus the subject of a personal costs order. A personal costs order may also be made against a lawyer who is consistently late for court proceedings.131 It should not be assumed, however, that every failure to fulfil some procedural task will sound in a personal costs order. After all, not all procedural defaults meet the threshold for such an order, especially where they are prompted by unforeseen events. At the same time, it has been judicially observed that it is now unlikely that a lawyer who, without a compelling justification, permits court rules to be breached acting in the hope that no costs will be wasted, will be shielded from a personal costs order if costs are in fact wasted and he or she has taken no steps to avoid or minimise the costs incurred.132 23.27 A lawyer’s failure to comply with an undertaking to the court, or whose client fails to comply with an undertaking through the lawyer’s fault, may trigger a personal costs order. For example, in 70 Pitt St Sydney Pty Ltd v McGurk133 court proceedings were occasioned by a failure to comply with an undertaking, and the solicitors were ordered to pay the costs of those proceedings on an indemnity basis. The same may ensue from a failure to comply with an order of the court. To ignore or otherwise fail to comply with orders of the court, and instead leave it to the court or the other parties to take

remedial or enforcement action, is unprofessional, and likely to generate a personal costs order.134 23.28 The late amendment of pleadings, or other procedural indulgences, may attract a costs order against a lawyer, a point made explicit in a New South Wales Supreme Court practice [page 804] note.135 So may a failure to make full disclosure on an ex parte application if it has led to costs being unnecessarily incurred.136

Hopeless cases and the securing of collateral advantage 23.29 As pursuing a hopeless case amounts to an abuse of court processes,137 it is unsurprising that lawyers who do so are candidates for personal costs orders. The case law indicates that a lawyer may be required to pay costs personally where the client’s case is ‘doomed to failure’,138 ‘misconceived from the outset’,139 ‘impossible to prove’,140 ‘hopeless’,141 ‘baseless’142 or has ‘no or substantially no chance of success’.143 At general law,144 this does not mean that lawyers, as opposed to their unsuccessful client, are automatically personally liable for costs in all hopeless cases. A hopeless case of itself does not attract such a result; the court’s concern is less whether a case is hopeless as such, and more as to whether proceedings commenced or defended as an abuse of process. In any event, hopeless cases must be distinguished from cases that depend on altering or adapting the law on a reasoned or logical basis, as it is legitimate for lawyers, without the spectre of personal liability for costs, ‘to pursue for their clients novel issues of law on an arguably available factual scenario’.145 23.30 At least at general law, not all hopeless cases have traditionally been viewed as abuses of process. The authorities do not support the proposition that simply instituting or maintaining a proceeding on behalf of a client that has no or substantially no prospect of success attracts the jurisdiction to order costs against the lawyer.146 A client, properly advised that the action is weak and likely to fail, may reject that advice and direct the lawyer to proceed, and

for the lawyer to do so is not ethically inappropriate.147 As such, it is ‘rarely if ever safe for a court to assume that a hopeless case is being litigated on the advice of the lawyers involved’.148 There is also the concern that a solicitor should not usurp the function of the court by prejudging a client’s case.149 Weight must be given to the fact that lawyers are required to take any point they honestly believe to be fairly arguable on behalf of their clients, and the court must hear them on the point. A Canadian judge explained the repercussions of any other approach as follows:150 [page 805] Solicitors who think that they may be mulcted in costs for advancing points which they honestly believe to be fairly arguable may not act fearlessly and in the best traditions of an independent profession. If solicitors are limited in what they think they can say or do on behalf of their clients, then the rights of those clients are also necessarily limited. The potential for a chilling effect, especially if solicitors may be exposed to orders that they pay costs as between solicitor and client, the repercussions on solicitors’ positions and consequently upon that of their clients, if adverse costs awards are made, underscore the need for judges to exercise caution in the making of such orders.

Yet the fact a client insists on pursuing a hopeless case should cause the lawyer to inquire whether the case is being pursued for an ulterior purpose.151 If the lawyer determines that this is so, or if this would be evident to a competent lawyer in the circumstances, to continue the representation is likely to make the lawyer a participant in an abuse of process, and thus open to door to potential costs liability. 23.31 The challenge for the court is to distinguish the hopeless case from one that amounts to an abuse of process.152 The latter is likely to be so where the case involves a deliberate or conscious decision of the lawyer taken by reference to circumstances unrelated to the prospects of success, either with a recognition that there is no chance of success but an intention to use the proceeding for an ulterior purpose, or with disregard of any proper consideration of the prospects of success.153 This Goldberg J explained in White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) in the following terms:154 [T]he jurisdiction to order costs against an unsuccessful party’s solicitors is enlivened when they have unreasonably initiated or continued an action when it had no or substantially no prospects of success but such unreasonableness must relate to reasons unconnected with success

in the litigation or to an otherwise ulterior purpose or to a serious dereliction of duty or serious misconduct in promoting the cause of and the proper administration of justice.

For instance, it is not legitimate to institute a proceeding aimed at postponing, delaying or putting a barrier in front of another party’s claim and the payment of an amount due in that claim. The purpose of court proceedings is to vindicate a claimed right, not as an instrument of oppression so as to frustrate the bringing and expeditious disposition of a legitimate claim.155 In White Industries Goldberg J found that the respondent law firm had initiated the proceeding, which had no prospects of success, with the object of delaying an inevitable outcome and to achieve breathing space for its client. The firm thus breached its duty to the court to conduct proceedings with propriety, not to participate in an abuse of process, and not to obstruct the [page 806] administration of justice.156 He therefore ordered it to pay the costs of the proceeding. This decision was affirmed on appeal.157 Consistent with the foregoing, it is a serious dereliction of duty for a lawyer not to give reasonable or proper attention to the relevant law and facts in circumstances where, had such attention been given, it would have been apparent that there were no worthwhile prospects of success.158 In Tran v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2),159 for example, a personal costs order was made against a solicitor who failed to properly consider the validity of a legal point. Weinberg J expressed no doubt that the solicitor ‘had no idea what he was talking about’160 in foreshadowing, at a directions hearing, that the applicant would be challenging the constitutional validity of certain statutory provisions. At that hearing, the solicitor was told that he should give careful consideration to whether that challenge could properly be maintained and that, in the event that a constitutional argument pursued proved to be spurious, Weinberg J would consider whether or not to order costs against him personally. His Honour ruled that it would be unfair to require the applicant to pay the additional costs incurred by reason of the introduction of an entirely hopeless

legal point, as the solicitor pursued this point ‘even when he knew that he was in no position to say anything sensible in support of it’.161 23.32 The swell of hopeless migration claims led the federal parliament to amend the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), as from 1 December 2005,162 to prohibit a person encouraging another person to commence or continue migration litigation that has no reasonable prospect of success if the person does not give ‘proper consideration to the prospects of success’ of the litigation, or a purpose in commencing or continuing it is ‘unrelated to the objectives which the court process is designed to achieve’.163 The foregoing has potential application to lawyers representing an applicant in migration litigation, and is expressed to apply despite any obligation that a lawyer may have to act in accordance with the instructions or wishes of the applicant.164 Migration litigation need not be hopeless or bound to fail for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.165 If a lawyer contravenes the statutory prohibition, the court may make one or more of a variety of costs orders against the lawyer.166 The Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) also contains provisions that could expose lawyers to personal costs orders. The Act makes provision for orders of this kind to be made by Fair Work Australia, in respect of conferences or appeals concerning dismissals, or arising out of applications for [page 807] unlawful termination, if the lawyer has ‘encouraged’ a person to make an application or pursue a matter in circumstances where it ‘should have been reasonably apparent that the application would have no reasonable prospect of success’.167 23.33 The case for the exercise of the jurisdiction is compelling where, like in White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm),168 the impetus for the institution of the proceeding comes from the lawyer rather than the client, as this serves to heighten the abuse.169 In Edwards v Edwards170 it should have been obvious to the wife’s solicitor after discovery that the wife’s case was bound to fail, but the solicitor was bent on pressing on with litigation regardless of this. Sachs J ordered the solicitor to pay the costs of the action

from the moment it should have become apparent that the matter had no prospect of success.171 And where, in Buckingham Gate International Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd,172 the solicitor, as the chief motivating force behind the litigation, had been required to pay costs because of groundless nature of arguments presented in respect of other analogous cases, Santow J remarked that a court’s time should not be wastefully occupied by untenable submissions, especially when ‘this had occurred with the same legal adviser on repeated occasions undeterred by indemnity cost orders against him’. Certainly, if it appears that a lawyer pursues a hopeless case partly for his or her own interests, there are strong grounds to make a wasted costs order. In Loates v Loates,173 for example, counsel was found to have utilised the parties’ time to engage in a personal debate with the court and opposing counsel, with no potential benefit for his client, and so was ordered to pay part of the costs. 23.34 It is arguably easier for the court to conclude that the lawyer has failed to give the requisite attention where there has been a determination by a court or tribunal in the matter, of which the lawyer is seeking review or appeal. In Buksh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs174 Mansfield J noted that the Migration Review Tribunal had given clear and irrefutable reasons, to which no submission to the contrary had been put. Hence, the solicitor for the applicants should have seen on a cursory examination of the tribunal’s decision that there was no basis upon which the application quashing its decision could succeed. This exposed the applicants to costs that should not have been incurred, which his Honour ordered the solicitor to pay.175

Other serious derelictions of duty 23.35 The representation of a client in a case where the lawyer’s own interests conflict with those of the client, or the continuing representation once a conflict has arisen, may justify the court ordering costs against the lawyer personally, in respect of the opponent’s costs and/or his or her own costs of the matter charged to the client. In Marriage of Anstis,176 for example, two adjournments in the matter had been caused by, inter alia, the failure of the wife’s solicitors to recognise a conflict of interest and to advise her promptly to obtain separate representation.

[page 808] Influenced also by the solicitors’ unlawful behaviour in withholding the husband’s passport, Mullane J ordered the solicitors to pay the husband’s costs.177 This shows that ordinarily a costs order against a lawyer is justified when there is a coupling of more than one form of dereliction of duty, as opposed to an isolated and minor infringement. This is illustrated by the decision of Bielby J in Markdale Ltd v Ducharme,178 who ordered costs against plaintiff’s counsel where counsel replaced preparation and procedural knowledge with aggression, advised the defendant that he had court orders he lacked, made unfounded accusations against opposing counsel, and raised myriad trivial issues that made an excessive use of the court’s time, and manifested a lack of respect for the case management process.

Relying on the advice of counsel 23.36 In general, a solicitor is entitled to rely upon the advice of counsel properly instructed. In fact, for a solicitor lacking specialist experience in a particular field to rely on counsel’s advice is to make normal and proper use of the Bar. For this reason, solicitors have generally been given generous protection — from both claims in negligence179 and for costs180 — on obtaining advice from properly instructed counsel.181 This does not, however, confer a blanket immunity, in that a solicitor is highly trained and rightly expected to be experienced in his or her particular legal fields, being under a duty at all times to exercise that degree of care to both client and the court expected of a reasonably prudent solicitor. Thus a solicitor is not entitled to rely blindly and with no mind of his or her own on the view of counsel.182 If he or she reasonably thinks counsel’s advice to be obviously or glaringly wrong, the solicitor must reject it. In seeking counsel’s advice, a solicitor does not abdicate professional responsibility, but must apply his or her mind to that advice and exercise an independent judgment.183 Solicitors need not replicate the consideration counsel has given, as this would obviate the need to instruct counsel, but ‘should at least satisfy themselves that counsel’s advice and proposed course

of action is not obviously wrong’.184 The extent to which the solicitor should do so must rest upon the nature of the advice; the more specialist the nature of the advice, the more reasonable it is for the solicitor to accept and act on it. 23.37 Yet it is clear that a solicitor cannot successful deny liability for costs merely by sheltering behind the advice given by counsel if the circumstances dictate that the solicitor should have turned his or her own mind to the advice supplied.185 For example, in [page 809] Davy-Chiesman v Davy-Chiesman186 the solicitor relied blindly and with no mind of his own on counsel’s views regarding which, according to the English Court of Appeal, it must or ought to have been apparent to him, some question should have been raised. Although honest, diligent and conscientious, the solicitor allowed his own skill and ability to be entirely subordinated to the dominant and forceful personality of counsel, who had ample experience and was properly instructed. Dillon LJ, in ordering costs against the solicitor where the proceedings arose out of counsel’s patently wrong advice, stated that ‘the solicitor’s duty is not just to pass on any views expressed by counsel; he has to consider for himself the effect of the change of circumstances, use his own common sense and form his own opinion, though obviously in doing that he will take the view expressed by counsel into account’.187 Moreover, more recently in Brown v Bennett (No 2)188 Neuberger J opined that where the solicitor is likely to know the facts more intimately than counsel, there are grounds to conclude that the solicitor should not escape liability on the ground that he or she left matters to counsel.

Legally aided, pro bono and speculative actions 23.38 That a lawyer acts in a legal aid matter makes no difference to the relevant principles pertaining to wasted costs orders.189 This is because acting in a legal aid matter does not absolve a lawyer from the duty to act with propriety in the conduct of litigation.190 So, for instance, a solicitor in legally

aided litigation who commits a serious dereliction of duty to the court may still be liable personally to pay the costs of the other party. However, English judges have voiced concern as to the potential for oppressive conduct by an opposing lawyer in a legally aided matter. The concern is that a practice may develop whereby ‘solicitors for defendants endeavour to browbeat solicitors for legally-aided plaintiffs into dropping their clients’ cases — or into procuring revocation of the relevant legal aid certificates — by threats that the defendants will seek to hold the plaintiffs’ solicitors personally liable for the costs of the litigation’.191 This is less of a concern in Australia because, unlike the English legal aid system that spawned the above remarks, Australian legal aid legislation makes specific provision for the liability of legal aid bodies for costs in respect of matters in which legally aided litigants prove unsuccessful.192 Yet the concern may remain, to a lesser extent, in that legal aid bodies may not be required to (fully) fund costs orders. 23.39 Whether a lawyer is acting for remuneration or not does not alter the existence or nature of the duty to conduct litigation with propriety. It follows that pro bono representation provides no immunity from a wasted costs order.193 The same applies to lawyers who act under a speculative fee agreement, including via an uplift fee.194 In respect of uplift fee agreements, [page 810] Lindgren J in Cook v Pasminco Ltd195 rejected the contention that lawyers pursuant to such an agreement have an interest in the litigation and stand to profit from it, and, for this reason, are more likely targets for costs orders against them personally, as are non-parties generally having such an interest.196 Cook involved a retainer on terms that, if the client lost, the solicitors would be disentitled to charge fees, but that ‘at the successful completion of the matter’ the client would pay a 25 per cent premium on all charges and expenses incurred. His Honour conceded that in one sense the solicitors did have an interest in the outcome of the litigation, but ‘the fact that they were not to be paid at all if the proceeding failed was a quid pro quo of their right to receive the 25 per cent uplift factor if they succeeded’.197 As an arrangement of this type is designed to facilitate the bringing of claims that might otherwise not be brought, Lindgren J was not persuaded that it

supported an order for costs against the solicitors, characterising the solicitors’ position as ‘far different from that of a non-party whose interest explains the bringing of a proceeding’, as the solicitors were not to be entitled to the fruits of a proceeding or even to a proportion of them.198

Costs against counsel 23.40 A steady build-up of case authority supports the proposition that the court’s inherent jurisdiction to make a costs order against a lawyer extends to counsel.199 The exercise of such a jurisdiction is not inconsistent with counsel’s immunity from suit for in-court work.200 It could be so viewed were an order for costs against counsel based on counsel’s breach of duty to a client. But because the costs order is made on account of a lawyer’s breach of duty to the court, the policy considerations underlying the immunity do not apply.201 Also, a wasted costs order is ‘both practically and conceptually a different matter from an award of damages made in proceedings instituted for the purpose by a client’.202 There is the further point that barristers, like solicitors, are officers of the court, and it would be odd if the court had power to order costs against officers of the court who are not necessarily heard in court but no such power against officers of the court who are so heard.203 The criteria for the exercise of the jurisdiction to order costs against counsel accordingly equate to those in the case of solicitors.204 So, a costs order of this kind will only be made upon a serious dereliction of duty or gross negligence.205 For example, in Re Dunstan206 counsel who failed to recognise that the application was bound to fail, and sought to invoke the procedures of the court in the criminal jurisdiction whereby the application was listed peremptorily without notice to the respondent, knowing that it was likely that the respondent would have opposed the order, was found to be have committed a serious dereliction of the duty owed to the court, and so was held personally liable for costs. [page 811] 23.41 The same principles regarding the application of the jurisdiction where a hopeless case is pursued likewise apply to counsel. In Harley v McDonald

the Privy Council declined to make an order against counsel upon the sole ground that the appeal was hopeless, explaining the point as follows:207 Then there is the proposition that a barrister who pursues a hopeless case not appreciating it to be hopeless displays such a degree of incompetence as to amount to a serious dereliction of her duty to the court. Their Lordships consider this proposition, without more, to be unsound. Without attempting to provide a precise definition of what amounts to a serious dereliction of duty, they are of the opinion that it is open to the court to penalise incompetence which leads to a waste of the court’s time or some other abuse of its process resulting in avoidable cost to litigants. But it will almost always be unwise for the court, in the exercise of this jurisdiction, to treat the pursuit of hopeless cases as a demonstration of incompetence. As a general rule litigants have a right to have their case presented to the court and to instruct legal practitioners to present them on their behalf. Although exceptional steps may have to be taken to deal with vexatious litigants, the public interest requires that the doors of the court remain open. And on the whole it is in the public interest that litigants who insist on bringing their cases to court should be represented by legal practitioners, however hopeless their cases may appear. For these reasons something more than the mere fact that the case is hopeless is required. The absence of anything more than that in this case for which [counsel] can reasonably be criticised is striking. Their Lordships have concluded that the Court of Appeal208 were wrong to hold that she was in serious breach of her duty to the court. It follows that they were also wrong to make the same finding against Glasgow Harley with regard to their conduct of the case as Mr McDonald’s solicitors.

Rule-Based Jurisdiction to Make Order 23.42 Superior court rules (in New South Wales, statute) make specific provision for costs orders against lawyers, which is not intended to supersede but to complement the inherent jurisdiction. These rules, though directed to the same end, vary in detail between jurisdictions, and so it is misleading to make a broad statement as to their specific content and effect. The following discussion is divided according to the two main points in issue under the rules: first, the type of costs order the court may make; and second, the behaviour of a lawyer that attracts the court’s power to make a personal costs order. The rules are not the only vehicle through which lawyers may be ordered to pay costs. Case authority suggests that the general costs discretion conferred by statute209 is wide enough for this purpose,210 and the Family Court has held that s 117(2A)(g) — which directs the court, in considering what costs order should be made, to have regard to ‘such other matters as the court considers relevant’ — can accommodate costs orders against lawyers.211 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), via s 43(3)(f),

explicitly states that, without limiting the court’s discretion, the court may ‘order a party’s lawyer to bear costs personally’. In a corresponding initiative also prompted by the Access to Justice (Civil Litigation Reforms) Amendment Act 2009 (Cth), with effect from 1 January 2010, the Act also envisages that a court may order a lawyer to bear costs personally for failing to comply with the duty to act consistently with the [page 812] overarching purpose,212 in which case the lawyer cannot recover the costs from the client.213 In the same vein, the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic), which commenced on 1 January 2011, empowers a court, if satisfied that a lawyer has contravened any overarching obligation,214 to order costs against the lawyer.215 Ultimately, though, the considerations that inform the exercise of the court’s power in this regard align with those applicable under the inherent jurisdiction.216 More recently again, with the enactment of the Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) with effect from 1 August 2011, in exercising its costs discretion, the Federal Court and the Federal Circuit Court may take account of any failure by a lawyer to comply with the duty to advise their client of the requirement to file a genuine steps statement,217 or to assist the client to comply with the requirement.218 The Act adds that a lawyer who is ordered to bear costs personally as a result must not recover the costs from the client.219

Types of costs orders 23.43 The rules empower the court to order that a lawyer repay to a client any costs the client may have been ordered to pay to any other party if it is satisfied that the lawyer has engaged in the conduct proscribed by the rules and that this has caused the loss in issue.220 In most jurisdictions the rules also entitle the court to order that costs be disallowed as between the lawyer and his or her client,221 and to direct the lawyer to indemnify any other party [page 813]

against costs payable by the party indemnified.222 Murray J captured the effect of the Western Australian rule in Monitronix Ltd v Michael as follows:223 Given relevant default on the part of the solicitor, he may be disentitled from recovering costs as between himself and his client. To the extent that his client is successful, then there may still be an order as between the parties which would enable his client to recover costs on a party and party basis. If his client has been unsuccessful and ordered to pay costs to another party, then the solicitor may be ordered effectively to meet that obligation by repaying his client the costs so ordered to be paid. That is an order designed to relieve his client of a liability to costs which are incurred as a result of the solicitor’s default and to the extent that that is so. And so the general proposition that emerges from the rule is that the solicitor may be ordered personally to bear or forego costs where they have been incurred in general terms by a default of the type described in the rule. So far as another party, not his client, is concerned, the rule supposes that the proceedings have resulted in that party incurring costs as a result of the solicitor’s default. Parkins v McDonald is an example of how that might arise.

The Family Law Rules go further, empowering the court to order the lawyer to repay costs found to be incurred or wasted by a non-party,224 and the Victorian rules, via a broader definition of ‘party’, may also empower the court to make wasted costs orders in favour of at least some non-parties.225 The Victorian rules, and those in the territories and Queensland, moreover define a ‘party’ to include a person by or to whom costs of the proceeding are payable,226 and in this way extend the wasted costs jurisdiction beyond parties on the record.

Conduct that attracts the jurisdiction 23.44 The conduct that attracts the rule-based jurisdiction to make costs orders against lawyers personally varies between jurisdictions. The Australian Capital Territory and Queensland rules speak of costs incurred due to ‘delay, misconduct or negligence’,227 and in the High Court, of costs incurred because of a lawyer’s ‘delay or misconduct’.228 The Federal Court Rules target additional costs incurred because of the lawyer’s ‘misconduct’,229 which it defines to include, inter alia, where the lawyer incurs costs improperly or without reasonable cause, incurs costs that are unnecessary or wasteful, or is guilty of undue delay.230 The Family Law Rules refer to costs thrown away as a result of the lawyer’s ‘improper or unreasonable conduct’ and ‘undue delay or default by the lawyer’.231 The rules in the Northern Territory speak of costs ‘incurred improperly or without reasonable cause’ or ‘wasted by undue delay or negligence or by other

misconduct or default’.232 The Victorian rules are similar except that the second phrase above refers to costs ‘wasted by a failure to act with reasonable competence and expedition’.233 In Tasmania and Western Australia the rules refer to costs ‘incurred improperly, or without any [page 814] reasonable cause’, or are wasted or thrown away due to ‘undue delay’ or ‘any other misconduct or default’.234 In New South Wales, the Civil Procedure Act 2005 confers a jurisdiction to make costs orders against a lawyer who is guilty of ‘serious neglect, serious incompetence or serious misconduct’ or who has caused costs to be incurred ‘improperly, or without reasonable cause’.235 The South Australian rules follow a different schema, and premise the jurisdiction on a lawyer being responsible for a ‘procedural irregularity’,236 which is defined to include, inter alia, ‘unnecessary delay’, ‘prolixity in the statement of the party’s case’, and also ‘the unnecessary, vexatious or otherwise improper commencement of, or an unnecessary, vexatious or otherwise improper step in, a proceeding’.237

Costs ‘improperly’ or ‘unreasonably’ incurred 23.45 The term ‘improper’ attracts the meaning attributed to it by the case law on the inherent jurisdiction, and includes conduct that would ordinarily ‘justify disbarment, striking off, suspension from practice or other serious professional penalty’, and ‘any significant breach of a substantial duty imposed by a relevant code of professional conduct’.238 It may even extend to conduct that would be regarded as improper according to the consensus of professional opinion even if it does not violate the letter of the professional rules. The term ‘unreasonable’ is synonymous with the phrases ‘not reasonable’ and ‘without reasonable cause’.239 It describes conduct that is ‘vexatious, designed to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case’, whether or not the product of ‘excessive zeal and not improper motive’,240 but is hardly limited to such conduct.241 Conduct cannot be described as unreasonable simply because it leads to an unsuccessful result or

because other more cautious lawyers would have acted differently. The acid test, it has been said, ‘is whether the conduct permits of a reasonable explanation’.242 For example, if the facts support a finding that the lawyer was party to a course of action ‘designed to achieve a collateral object, rather than to achieve the purpose for which the proceedings were ostensibly brought, that conduct might properly be described as unreasonable’.243 This is not to suggest that conduct that is ‘improper’ is mutually exclusive from ‘unreasonable’ conduct, or that that any such exclusivity exists between ‘unreasonable’ and ‘negligent’244 conduct, as there may be an overlap between these categories. As such, it has been said that ‘any sharp differentiation between these expressions’ is neither useful, necessary or intended.245 However, a finding of ‘improper’ conduct is likely to cast doubt on the lawyer’s integrity, which is not necessarily so where the finding is one of unreasonableness or negligence.246 [page 815]

‘Undue delay’ 23.46 As the word ‘undue’ means ‘improper, unjustifiable, going beyond what is appropriate, warranted or natural, excessive’, and ‘delay’ means ‘to hinder the progress of or impede’, the phrase ‘undue delay’ could be said to indicate that the lawyer has unjustifiably hindered or impeded the progress of a trial. In jurisdictions that do not preface the word ‘delay’ with ‘undue’, as ‘unjustifiably’ hindering the progress of a trial arguably differs from ‘impeding’ or ‘hindering’ its progress per se, a lesser standard of default may apply. All that is required is ‘that the facts must show that a solicitor has hindered the progress of or impeded a trial to such an extent that an order for costs should be made’.247

‘Misconduct’ 23.47 There are grounds for construing the term ‘misconduct’ as inclusive of the inherent jurisdiction, based as it is upon ‘serious misconduct’.248 The issue arises as to whether the need at general law that the misconduct be

‘serious’ attracts a higher standard of default than simply ‘misconduct’. The phrase ‘undue delay, misconduct or default’ does not appear in the case law as a representation of the inherent jurisdiction, and so there may be grounds for concluding this to be the case. In support of this conclusion, it should be noted that the inherent jurisdiction has been denied in cases where there has been ‘misconduct’ in a broad sense, but which the courts deem to be insufficiently serious.249

‘Default’ 23.48 Where a lawyer’s ‘default’ (in Victoria, ‘a failure to act with reasonable competence and expedition’) is set as a ground for making a wasted costs order, it is common for provision to be made for giving colour to the concept of ‘default’. Albeit within the umbrella of ‘misconduct’, the Federal Court Rules refer in this context to where a proceeding or application is delayed, adjourned or abandoned because of the lawyer’s failure:250 (i) to attend or make arrangements for a proper representative to attend a hearing; (ii) to file a relevant document; (iii) to provide the Court or another party with a relevant document; (iv) to be prepared for a hearing; or (v) to comply with these rules or an order of the Court.

Equivalent provision is made, though with detail variations, in the High Court, Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory and Victorian rules.251 The Family Law Rules, in addition, envisage that a lawyer may be ordered to pay costs thrown away as a result of his or her lawyer’s failure to comply with the rules, a court order or a pre-action procedure.252 In South Australia, the rules state that a failure to comply with a procedural obligation, whether arising under the rules, a practice direction or an order of the court, and an unreadiness to proceed with the hearing of a proceeding, or the taking of a step in a proceeding, at the time fixed by or under the rules, may trigger a costs order against a lawyer.253 The same outcome may eventuate in Tasmania if a matter is adjourned or a hearing is unnecessarily prolonged due to the non-attendance of a lawyer, or the lawyer’s neglect in being properly prepared.254 The [page 816]

South Australian and Tasmanian rules add that if proceedings are adjourned because of the default (in Tasmania, neglect) of a party’s lawyer, costs are to be borne by the lawyer.255 23.49 The foregoing suggests that the term ‘default’ is interpreted independent of its context; its meaning is not to be coloured by, where applicable, phrases such as ‘undue delay and ‘other misconduct’. It may envisage merely negligent conduct or an oversight,256 although it does not explain why the Northern Territory rules make specific reference to ‘negligence’ as conduct that attracts the jurisdiction,257 or South Australian case authority interpreting default as inclusive of negligence, and not necessarily gross negligence to this end.258

‘Negligence’ 23.50 Following the (then) equivalent English court rules, the rules in the territories and Queensland state that the jurisdiction to order costs against a lawyer is triggered where costs are wasted or incurred through the lawyer’s ‘negligence’. The extent to which this broadens the availability of the rulebased jurisdiction over the inherent one remains unclear. In England the jurisdiction was attracted where costs were wasted by a ‘failure to conduct proceedings with reasonable competence and expedition’259 or ‘as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission’.260 There the courts held that, by deleting the term ‘misconduct’, it was intended to broaden the court’s power obviating the need to apply the test of gross misconduct laid down in the case law.261 Instead the ordinary standard of negligence — a failure to act with the competence reasonably expected of ordinary members of the profession — not one requiring proof of gross neglect or serious dereliction of duty, applied pursuant to the statutory or rule-based jurisdiction.262 23.51 It cannot be assumed that the same is the case in the Australian jurisdictions that specifically refer to negligence in the court rules. In the context of the (then) Victorian rules, Batt JA in Etna v Arif263 opined that ‘negligence’ connotes more than ‘tortious’ negligence, but professional impropriety or ‘gross’ negligence. This followed, according to his Honour, from both historical practice and the language of the rule. As to the latter, the term ‘negligent’ appeared within a context of words denoting blameworthy

conduct, being juxtaposed to the preceding ‘undue delay’ and the succeeding ‘other misconduct or default’. The word ‘other’, his Honour added, suggested that ‘undue delay’ and ‘negligence’ should be construed as being of the same kind as ‘misconduct or default’. The cases on the inherent jurisdiction support this view, in that they refer to ‘gross negligence’,264 and it could be surmised that the rule-drafter [page 817] was seeking to give effect to the general law test.265 The position in Victoria is now arguably different, the phrase ‘wasted by undue delay or negligence or by other misconduct or default’ being replaced with ‘wasted by a failure to act with reasonable competence and expedition’.266 23.52 To date there is no case authority as to whether the same approach applies in the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland, where the rules refer to ‘delay, misconduct or negligence’, or in the Northern Territory, where reference is made to ‘undue delay or negligence or by other misconduct or default’. That the rules in the two former jurisdictions do not preface the word ‘delay’ with ‘undue’ may, consistent with Etna v Arif, suggest that the term ‘negligence’ is intended to attract its ordinary meaning.267 Nor would there be any justification for characterising ‘misconduct’ as ‘gross’ misconduct if this were correct. The result would be that the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland rules, like their English counterpart, may have been intended to alleviate the gravity of conduct that may attract the jurisdiction to make costs orders against lawyers.

New South Wales (and Australian Capital Territory) initiatives — ‘without reasonable prospects of success’ 23.53 The Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) specifically empowers a court in which proceedings are taken on a claim for damages,268 of its own motion or on the application of a party to the proceedings, to make a costs order against a lawyer who has provided legal services ‘without reasonable prospects of success’.269 This initiative first took form as Pt 11 Div 5C of the Legal Profession 1987 (NSW), which applied from 20 March 2002,270 and

has since been enacted in equivalent form as Pt 14.2 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT). A claim has ‘reasonable prospects of success’ if there are reasonable prospects of damages being recovered on the claim; similarly, a defence has ‘reasonable prospects of success’ if there are reasonable prospects of the defence defeating the claim or leading to a reduction in the damages recovered on the claim.271 The foregoing must be seen against the backdrop of a statutory proscription on a lawyer providing legal services on a claim, or defence of a claim, for damages unless he or she reasonably believes on the basis of provable facts272 and a reasonably arguable view of the law that the claim or defence has reasonable prospects of success.273 23.54 The order, which remains discretionary and to be made only if it is just in the circumstances to do so,274 can direct the lawyer to:275 repay to the party to whom the services were provided (‘the client’) some or all of the costs that he or she has been ordered to pay to any other party; or [page 818] indemnify any party other than the client against some or all of the costs payable by that party (which can include the costs payable to the party’s own lawyers, or payable by that party to another party). In the Australian Capital Territory, an application for such an order cannot be made after the court concerned, or a taxing officer, has made a final decision about the costs payable in the action.276 Similarly, in New South Wales, an application cannot be made after a costs assessor has made a final determination payable as a result of the court’s costs order.277 A lawyer is not entitled to demand, recover or accept from the client any part of the amount for which the lawyer is directed to indemnify a party pursuant to a costs order against the lawyer.278 23.55 The challenge is to distinguish claims or defences exhibiting a reasonable prospect of success from those that do not. A case has reasonable prospects if it is not hopeless or entirely without merit, as explained by Barrett J in Degiorgio v Dunn (No 2):279

[T]he Legal Profession Act should not … be presumed to intend that lawyers practising in New South Wales must boycott every claimant with a weak case. A statutory provision denying to the community legal services in a particular class of litigation cannot be intended to stifle genuine but problematic cases. Nor do I see the statutory provisions as intended to expose the lawyer to the prospect of personal liability in costs in every case in which a court, having heard all the evidence and argument, comes to a conclusion showing that his or her client’s case was not as strong as may have appeared at the outset to be. The legislation is not meant to be an instrument of intimidation, so far as lawyers are concerned.

This led his Honour to equate the phrase ‘without reasonable prospects of success’ to ‘so lacking in merit or substance as to be not fairly arguable’, a concept that well short of ‘likely to succeed’.280 McColl JA in Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd,281 with whom Hodgson and Ipp JJA concurred, endorsed this approach, adding that the question is whether the lawyer held a reasonable belief that the provable facts and a reasonably arguable view of the law meant that the prospects of recovering damages or defeating a claim or obtaining a reduction in the damages claimed were ‘fairly arguable’. As these are matters about which reasonable minds might differ, her Honour viewed the question as whether the lawyer’s belief ‘unquestionably fell outside the range of views which could reasonably be entertained’.282 So in Lemoto the court held that merely because the client’s claim failed before both the arbitrator and the primary judge did not mean that the lawyer had provided legal services without reasonable prospects of success.283 23.56 McColl JA’s views fit within the framework earlier pronounced by the District Court in Momibo Pty Ltd v Adam.284 Judge Neilson in that case noted that the use of the words ‘reasonable’ and ‘reasonably’ requires a value judgment to be made, the test being an objective one.285 His Honour then made the following points regarding the elements of the legislation: The phrase ‘reasonably believes’ applies to each of the other elements of the section, and indicates that the belief must at least be logically arguable.286 [page 819] The reasonable belief must be based on material then available, which should be ‘credible’ though not necessarily admissible evidence,287 a point endorsed by McColl JA in Lemoto.288

The material must provide a proper basis for alleging the fact; for example, first hand hearsay may be sufficient if the lawyer had no reason to doubt the provider of the information, its inherent reliability and its primary source.289 The requirement of a reasonable arguable view of the law should not be construed narrowly, as this would stultify the development of the law; ‘a reasonably arguable view of the law does … require adherence to the law as currently it might be, strictly construed, but would extend to any permissible development that might be foreseeably adopted by a court’.290 McColl JA in Lemoto likewise feared that a broader approach would generate ‘a real risk that the over-cautious will refuse to act, potentially depriving a client of an effective remedy’.291 In referring to ‘reasonable prospects of damages being recovered in the action’, the word ‘damages’ is not qualified; the legislation merely requires the recovery of some damages, and so does not affect exaggerated claims.292 Consistent with the above remarks, in Fowler, Corbett and Jessop v Toro Constructions Pty Ltd293 Basten JA, with whom McColl JA and Young CJ in Eq concurred, cautioned that the too ready imposition of the sanctions could undermine the statutory purpose to the extent that it may force litigants to proceed in person without professional assistance and deny litigants with arguable claims an ability to pursue them. His Honour added that the importance of making the relevant order only in a clear case protects against overuse of a power that, if called in aid improperly, will pit the interests of the lawyer against those of his or her client, as well as serve to curb the level of potential ‘satellite litigation’ in this context.294 23.57 Judge Neilson in Momibo added that the legislation imposes an ongoing duty on lawyers, such that they should cease to act if at any time in the course of the retainer they conclude that there are no reasonable prospects of success.295 This requires lawyers to familiarise themselves with the client’s case as early as possible, and maintain that familiarity. If material surfaces that makes the case unsustainable, the lawyer must examine and act on it at the first

[page 820] convenient opportunity.296 Considerable delay could produce costs liability, but the court will adopt a practical approach in this regard, and not one that imposes unrealistic burdens upon its officers. In Momibo Judge Neilson held that a delay of one month in assessing the lack of reasonable prospects of success did not cause the lawyers to provide legal services in breach of the statutory proscription.297

Proof of causation 23.58 The rules make it clear that the court may make a costs order against a lawyer only if it is satisfied of the requisite causal connection between the lawyer’s conduct and the costs incurred.298 They variously provide that the costs have been incurred ‘in consequence of’299 or ‘because of’300 the conduct in question, or that the lawyer ‘is responsible’301 for or ‘has caused’302 those costs. So if conduct of the nature in question is established, but it has no causal connection with the incurrence of costs, it may be a case suitable to be referred to the appropriate disciplinary body, but it is not a case for the exercise of the jurisdiction to order costs against a lawyer personally.303

Costs against counsel 23.59 Although the rules traditionally were expressed to apply to ‘solicitors’ — and thus leave costs orders against counsel the sole province of the inherent jurisdiction,304 or possibly the court’s general statutory costs discretion305 — the existence of a fused profession in most jurisdictions coupled with the more recent trend to set common regulatory regimes to all legal practitioners, whatever their form of practice, has meant that the rules are now expressed in terms, such as ‘lawyer’ and ‘legal practitioner’, that encompass those who practise solely as counsel. The Northern Territory and Victorian rules are explicit in their application to counsel.

Relationship between rule-based and inherent jurisdiction 23.60 There is no clear statement, either in the rules or in the case law, that conclusively determines the relationship between the rule-based jurisdiction and the inherent jurisdiction. This is in no way aided by the fact that the rules are phrased in similar but not identical terms as the curial formulation of the inherent jurisdiction. To the extent that the rules reflect the schema of earlier English rules,306 they may simply confirm the inherent jurisdiction, a point [page 821] gleaned from New South Wales and Western Australian authority.307 In the jurisdictions that envisage a lawyer’s negligence, or equivalent terminology, may trigger the rule-based jurisdiction, though, scope for the latter’s availability extends beyond the strictures of the inherent jurisdiction. Caution dictates, in any case, that it is safer if possible to base any order on both heads of power in the alternative.308

Procedure Order initiated by the court 23.61 In the usual case, it is the lawyer representing the successful litigant (on instruction from his or her client) who will seek an order for costs against the lawyer representing the unsuccessful litigant, and this is what brings the matter to the court’s attention. Yet neither at general law, nor pursuant to the rules, is the jurisdiction to make the order dependent on an application to the court. The court is able to make the order on its own initiative,309 which it may do in straightforward cases, such as those involving failure to appear, lateness, negligence leading to an otherwise avoidable adjournment, gross repetition or extreme tardiness.310 This is a logical corollary of the fact that the breach of duty that triggers the jurisdiction is a breach of duty to the court. As such, it would be odd if the jurisdiction could only be invoked by a

client, even in circumstances where the client was ignorant or intimidated or in some other way at a disadvantage vis-à-vis his or her lawyer.311 Generally speaking, however, a court will be slow to initiate an inquiry for this purpose, because it may unnecessarily add time and cost to the proceedings. If, for instance, the court decides not to order costs after making the inquiry, the costs of the inquiry must be borne by someone. It follows that the court may be well advised to leave the aggrieved party to make the application,312 in which case the costs will follow the event between the parties.313 Moreover, there arises potential injustice to the respondent lawyer, whose fate costs-wise is determined by a judge who may be seen as serving as ‘prosecutor, witness and judge’.314 [page 822]

Timing of application 23.62 Timing-wise, an application for a costs order against a lawyer is ordinarily made once the hearing has come to an end,315 ideally promptly upon its conclusion.316 Judges have voiced concern at applications threatened during or prior to the hearing. This is because it is often necessary to wait until the conclusion of the trial before it is possible to see whether steps taken in the matter were warranted.317 Another concern is that the lawyer’s independence may be imperilled, and his or her client’s confidence undermined, by an opponent’s threats to apply for costs against the lawyer during the proceedings.318 This may prompt unethical behaviour in opposing lawyers making threats of this kind for tactical advantage.319 Or it may otherwise cause a party’s lawyer to feel that he or she can no longer act, depriving the party of the adviser of choice.320 Yet even an application made immediately after the conclusion of the proceedings has potential to prejudice the client if the lawyer withdraws because of a perceived conflict of interest, in which case the client is left without advice as to the prospects of a successful appeal from the person most familiar with the proceedings.321 23.63 The court does not, in any case, lack the jurisdiction to entertain an

application to order costs against a lawyer, and to make that order, during the proceedings. Like other aspects of the costs jurisdiction, it retains discretion to make an interlocutory order of this kind, albeit governed by a usual rule: that applications for costs against lawyers will not be considered until the conclusion of the trial.322 A rare example of a court making an order predating the conclusion of the trial is Kelly v South Manchester Health Authority,323 where the order was made against the Legal Aid Board because its dilatory conduct had led to an adjournment after the trial had commenced. 23.64 The rules do little to address the issue. Although they do not require that the trial be completed for an order to be made, they are premised on establishing that costs have already been incurred. Only under the New South Wales legislation — vis-à-vis the jurisdiction to [page 823] order costs against a lawyer ‘whose serious neglect, serious incompetence or serious misconduct delays, or contributes to delaying, those proceedings’ — is specific provision made entitling the court to make the order ‘at any stage of any proceedings’.324 This does not alleviate the concerns raised in the preceding paragraph, and so it cannot be assumed that the court will be keen to make such an order prior to the conclusion of the hearing. Conversely, in migration litigation lacking a reasonable prospect of success, the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) empowers the court to make a wasted costs order,325 and requires the motion or application to be considered at the time the question of costs is decided.326

Application in respect of the conduct of employees or agents 23.65 The rules in some jurisdictions make explicit that a lawyer cannot avoid a costs order by alleging that the relevant misconduct or dereliction of duty was that of an employee or agent.327 As the general law of agency and vicarious liability, in any event, sheets home to an employer or principal liability for the default of employees (including employee lawyers) or

agents,328 the position is the same elsewhere, whether under the rule-based or the inherent jurisdiction.329 This does not deny that circumstances may justify making the employee lawyer personally liable in place of the employer. Brereton J did so in Grizonic v Suttor (No 2),330 where the employee was experienced and held an unrestricted practising certificate, and nothing of the employee’s actions that generated the liability came to the employer’s personal attention.

Reference to taxing officer or costs assessor 23.66 In most jurisdictions the court rules provide that, before making any costs order against a lawyer, the court may refer the matter to a taxing officer (costs assessor, taxing master, master or registrar) for inquiry and report.331 In the remaining jurisdictions, nothing prevents a court from seeking the assistance of an officer of the court, such as a taxing officer or registrar, in this context.

Need for opportunity to rebut the complaint Inherent jurisdiction 23.67 As in the case of costs orders against non-parties generally,332 natural justice dictates that a lawyer against whom a court proposes to order costs be given fair notice of the matter alleged against him or her as the dereliction of duty, and a fair opportunity to be heard on the [page 824] matter, before the order is made.333 A lawyer may seek to challenge the allegation, possibly by leading evidence and cross-examining witnesses, but the court is mindful that the summary nature of the jurisdiction not be imperilled by lengthy hearings, and is not keen to foster a new and costly form of satellite litigation.334 Bearing in mind the extra cost that an investigation of this kind may involve, and the overriding requirement of

fairness to lawyers who are at risk of being penalised, the court may conclude that an investigation is inappropriate. The client may have other remedies, in any case, like a complaint to a professional body or a damages claim for negligence.335 This should not be read as imposing upon the lawyer the burden to exculpate himself or herself, whether under the inherent jurisdiction, or under court rules that confer on the lawyer ‘a reasonable opportunity to appear and show cause why an order should not be made’. The onus remains on the applicant; the lawyer is not obliged to prove that the order should not be made. A lawyer will, however, be called on to reply if the court is satisfied of an apparently strong prima facie case, being in essence a shift in the evidential burden.336 Where the lawyer is denied notice or the opportunity to be heard, it is open to an appellate court to make its own finding, having given the lawyer the said opportunity, and if it discovers no sufficient dereliction of duty, to reverse the earlier order.337

Rule-based jurisdiction 23.68 Consistent with the general law, the rules in several jurisdictions provide that before making a costs order against a lawyer, the lawyer must be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard.338 In those jurisdictions that make no explicit provision to this effect, the requirements of procedural fairness recognised by law should likewise apply. The Western Australian rules are [page 825] unique in dispensing with the need for reasonable opportunity to be heard where a proceeding cannot conveniently proceed, and fails or is adjourned without useful progress being made because of the lawyer’s failure to attend in person or by a proper representative, or because of his or her failure to deliver a document for the use of the court that ought to have been delivered, or to be prepared with proper evidence or account, or otherwise to

proceed.339 Presumably a lawyer who defaults in this fashion may be seen to have forfeited procedural fairness protection. In several jurisdictions the rules provide that notice of the proceedings or order is to be given to the client of the lawyer in question in such manner as the court directs.340 The Family Law Rules, on the other hand, state that if a party is not present when an order for costs is against that party or that party’s lawyer, the latter must give the party written notice of the order and an explanation of the reason for the order.341

Ancillary directions 23.69 The former Federal Court Rules and statute in New South Wales entitle the court to give ancillary directions in order to give full effect to a costs order, including directing a lawyer to provide to the court or a party to the proceedings a bill of costs in assessable form.342 In any event, superior courts have an inherent power to order the delivery of a bill of costs in taxable or assessable form.343

1.

Holden & Co v Crown Prosecution Service [1990] 2 QB 261 at 271 per Lord Lane CJ; Re a Barrister (Wasted Costs Order) (No 1 of 1991) [1993] QB 293 at 301 (CA); Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 239 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR; Re Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd [1998] 1 Qd R 116 at 121; BC9701885 per Mackenzie J. See, for example, Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 410 (which states that if a lawyer representing a party in a criminal proceeding has caused costs to be incurred improperly or without reasonable cause or to be wasted by undue delay or negligence or by any other misconduct or default, the court may order costs personally against the lawyer); Criminal Appeals and Procedure Rules 1998 (Vic) r 4.08(2) (which empowers a court to order that a solicitor pay to the Director of Public Prosecutions or to any co-accused person any costs thrown away as a result of a prescribed failure).

2.

See B Pincus and L Haller, ‘Wasted Costs Orders Against Lawyers in Australia’ (2005) 79 ALJ 497 at 498–9, 505 (who suggest that family law matters deserve like care in the exercise of the court’s discretion).

3.

See 23.60.

4.

See 23.2–23.6.

5.

See 23.7–23.14.

6.

Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 at 289 per Viscount Maugham, at 319 per Lord Wright; Edwards v Edwards [1958] P 235 at 248 per Sachs J; Mauroux v Sociedade Commercial Abel Pereira Da Fonesca SARL [1972] 1 WLR 962 at 970 per Megarry J; Weston v Central Criminal Court Courts Administrator [1977] QB 32 at 45 per Stephenson LJ; Young v Young (1990) 75 DLR (4th) 46 at 104 per Cumming JA (CA(BC)); Cassidy v Murray (1995) 124 FLR 267 at 281–2 (FC(Fam Ct));

White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 229; BC9803173 per Goldberg J (FCA) (affd Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 773; (1999) 87 FCR 134; BC9903036 (FC)). 7.

The protection of the public is generally cited as the main object of the disciplinary jurisdiction: see Dal Pont, pp 742–6.

8.

Gippsreal Ltd v Kurek Investments Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 344; BC200907472 at [2] per Pagone J.

9.

Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 at 288 per Viscount Maugham; Etna v Arif [1999] 2 VR 353 at 379; [1999] VSCA 99; BC9903854 per Batt JA.

10. Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 at 303 per Lord Atkin. 11. Mauroux v Sociedade Commercial Abel Pereira Da Fonesca SARL [1972] 1 WLR 962 at 970 per Megarry J. 12. Holden & Co v Crown Prosecution Service [1990] 2 QB 261 at 269 per Lord Lane CJ. 13. [1977] QB 990 at 997–8. See also R & T Thew Ltd v Reeves (No 2) [1982] QB 1283 at 1286 per Lord Denning MR; A C J & M E Copini & Sons v Skopalj (1985) 42 SASR 100 at 104–5 per Lunn AJ; Michael v Freehill Hollingdale & Page (1990) 3 WAR 223 at 228, 231–3 per Seaman J (FC); Young v Young (1990) 75 DLR (4th) 46 at 104 per Cumming JA (CA(BC)); Etna v Arif [1999] 2 VR 353 at 379; [1999] VSCA 99; BC9903854 per Batt JA; Harley v McDonald [2001] 2 AC 678 at 703; [2001] UKPC 18; Re P (a barrister) [2002] 1 Cr App R 207 at 219–20; [2001] EWCA Crim 1728 per Kennedy LJ. 14. Blake v Norris (Solicitor Costs) [2003] NSWSC 199; BC200302272 at [20]–[23] per Hulme J; Hills v Raunio [2004] ACTSC 98; BC200406408 at [25] per Connolly J (revd on appeal but not on this point: Lucas v NRMA Insurance Ltd [2005] ACTCA 34; BC200506791). See also Supreme Court, Practice Note No SC Gen 5, para 11, 17 August 2005 (previously (2000) 47 NSWLR 629, Practice Note No 108, 31 January 2000, para 6(h)) (‘The Judge or Associate Judge may determine and order the amount of costs payable under the costs order’). 15. Holden & Co v Crown Prosecution Service [1990] 2 QB 261 at 269 per Lord Lane CJ. 16. See, for example, Farrugia v Farrugia [2000] FCA 516; BC200001987 at [8] per Madgwick J; Gersten v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 922; BC200003842 at [29] per Whitlam J (affd Gersten v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 260; BC200100995). 17. See, for example, Karwala v Skrzypczak [2007] NSWSC 931; BC200706890 (where Windeyer J, in making a costs order against a barrister, remarked that ‘so far as inadequacy of preparation and incompetence in advocacy is concerned this was the worst case which has come before me since I was appointed to the court’, and that ‘[h]ad the action been competently handled there is no doubt that it would not have taken so long’: at [27]). 18. Cassidy v Murray (1995) 124 FLR 267 at 282 (FC(Fam Ct)). 19. [2002] FCA 1286; BC200206235 at [23]. 20. See, for example, Bagshaw v Scott [2005] FCA 104; BC200500325 at [102] per Bennett J. 21. As to wasted costs orders in hopeless applications see 23.29–23.34. 22. See, for example, Campbell v Airport Transfer System Pty Ltd (2006) 18 NTLR 69; [2006] NTSC 40; BC200603862. 23. See, for example, Cassidy v Murray (1995) 124 FLR 267 at 283 (FC(Fam Ct)); White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 252–3; BC9803173 per Goldberg J

(FCA) (affd Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773; BC9903036 (FC)); Marriage of Anstis (1999) 26 Fam LR 548 at 556; [1999] FamCA 842 per Mullane J; Cook v Pasminco Ltd (2000) 107 FCR 44; [2000] FCA 1819; BC200007576 at [65]–[69] per Lindgren J; Nominal Defendant v Kisse (2001) 22 Qld Lawyer Reps 110 at 112; [2001] QDC 290 per Judge McGill; Apollo 169 Management Pty Ltd v Pinefield Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] VSC 475; BC201007817 at [57]–[61] per Emerton J; Cohen v State of Victoria (No 3) [2011] VSC 229; BC201103573. 24. See 16.51–16.69. 25. See 23.47. 26. See, for example, Campbell v Airport Transfer System Pty Ltd (2006) 18 NTLR 69; [2006] NTSC 40; BC200603862 (where Angel ACJ made an indemnity order in circumstances where the applicant’s solicitor was put on notice that the claim was without merit and nonetheless advised the client to pursue it); Campbell v Campbell [2012] QSC 302 at [55]–[74] per Ann Lyons J (costs order on an indemnity basis made against solicitor as from the date the solicitor should have realised that the caveat should had been requested to lodge had no grounds for its maintenance); Pearl Lingerie Australia Pty Ltd v TGY Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 451; BC201207466 (indemnity costs order against solicitors who lodged and defended caveats in wilful disregard of known facts and law). 27. See 16.23. 28. See, for example, Farrugia v Farrugia [2000] FCA 516; BC200001987 at [8] per Madgwick J; Gersten v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 922; BC200003842 at [29] per Whitlam J (affd Gersten v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 260; BC200100995) (costs order against both the applicant and his solicitor). 29. (2000) 107 FCR 44; [2000] FCA 1819; BC200007576 at [68]. 30. Hillig v Darkinjung Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 147; BC200804778 at [52]–[55] per McColl JA; Tarabay v Bechara [2010] NSWSC 202; BC201001571 at [38] per Windeyer AJ (affd Bechara v Campbell-Williams [2011] NSWCA 177; BC201105032). The rules, for this purpose, are phrased in permissive terms, commonly in terms that the court ‘may’ make such an order: HCR 2004 r 50.05.2 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 10); FCR 2011 r 40.07 (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 9); Fam LR 2004 r 19.10(2); ACT r 1753(2); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 99(2) (before 15 August 2005, NSW RSC Pt 52A rr 43(1) (solicitors), 43A(1) (barristers)); NT r 63.21(1); Qld r 690 (formerly Qld r 708); SA r 13(2) (formerly SA RSC r 101.06(1)(a)); Tas r 61(2); Vic r 63.23(1); WA O 66 r 5(1). 31. See, for example, R v Staffordshire County Council [2007] EWHC 2441 (Admin) (where Wyn Williams J held that, even though the lawyer in question had behaved unreasonably in bringing the proceedings, making a wasted costs order against her carry a significant risk of causing her to become bankrupt, which ‘would be a disproportionate consequence of her unreasonable and negligent conduct in this litigation’: at [12]); Harrison v Harrison [2009] 1 FLR 1434; [2009] EWHC 428 (QB) at [25]–[29] per Mackay J. 32. Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 239 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 33. Edwards v Edwards [1958] P 235 at 248 per Sachs J; Young v Young (1990) 75 DLR (4th) 46 at 101 per Cumming JA (CA(BC)). 34. Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board [1987] 1 QB 565 at 572 per Sir John Donaldson MR; De Sousa v Minister of State for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 41 FCR 544 at 547–8; BC9304772 per French J; Re Dunstan (2000) 155 FLR 189 at 194; [2000]

ACTSC 33; BC200002048 per Miles CJ. 35. Byrne v Sefton Health Authority [2002] 1 WLR 775 at 784; [2001] EWCA Civ 1284 per Peter Gibson LJ; Macteldir Pty Ltd v Dimovski (2005) 226 ALR 773; [2005] FCA 1528; BC200509237 at [3] per Allsop J (‘with great caution’). 36. Reid v Hubbard (No 2) [2004] FCA 180; BC200400733 at [18] per Heerey J. 37. Tarabay v Bechara [2010] NSWSC 202; BC201001571 at [37] per Windeyer AJ (affd Bechara v Campbell-Williams [2011] NSWCA 177; BC201105032). 38. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Levick (1999) 43 ATR 621 at 627; [1999] FCA 1580; BC9907803 per Hill J; McKewins Hairdressing and Beauty Supplies Pty Ltd (in liq) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 171 ALR 335 at 339; [2000] HCA 27; BC200002204 per Gummow J. As to indemnity costs in this context see 23.5–23.6. 39. Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board [1987] 1 QB 565 at 580 per Dillon LJ. 40. Reid v Hubbard (No 2) [2004] FCA 180; BC200400733 at [18] per Heerey J. 41. Edwards v Edwards [1958] P 235 at 248 per Sachs J. 42. Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board [1987] 1 QB 565 at 580 per Dillon LJ; Steindl Nominees Pty Ltd v Laghaifar [2003] 2 Qd R 683; [2003] QCA 157; BC200301794 at [42] per Williams JA. 43. Levick v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 102 FCR 155; [2000] FCA 674; BC200002670 at [43] (FC). 44. See 23.29–23.34. 45. Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board [1987] 1 QB 565 at 572 per Sir John Donaldson MR; R v Horsham District Council [1994] 4 All ER 681 at 703–4 per Brooke J; Kumar v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 133 FCR 582; [2004] FCA 18; BC200400124 at [36] per Mansfield J; Re The Black Stump Enterprises and Associated Companies (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 60; BC200602133 at [10] per Young CJ in Eq. 46. Supreme Court, Practice Note No SC Gen 5, para 11, 17 August 2005 (previously (2000) 47 NSWLR 629, Practice Note No 108, 31 January 2000, para 6(f)). 47. Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 237 at 482 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. See, for example, Re Fogarty (No 2) (2007) 1 ACTLR 97; [2007] ACTSC 40; BC200704730 at [14] per Connolly J (who refused a wasted costs order in a case involving the challenging of a will because ‘[w]hile the nature of the inflammatory and scandalous affidavit material inevitably added to the costs of the proceedings, the only information I have is that these were filed on express instructions’). Cf how the issue is addressed by statute in the context of migration litigation: see Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 486H (which overrides privilege for the limited purpose of a lawyer defending the prospect of a wasted costs order). 48. [2006] NSWCA 60; BC200602133. 49. Re The Black Stump Enterprises and Associated Companies (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 60; BC200602133 at [11]. 50. Re The Black Stump Enterprises and Associated Companies (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 60; BC200602133 at [14]. 51. (2006) 233 ALR 97; [2006] FCA 671; BC200603860. 52. Ex Christmas Islanders Association Inc v Attorney-General (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 233 ALR 97;

[2006] FCA 671; BC200603860 at [27], [31]. 53. These were the circumstances identified by Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 238 that justify the court making a costs order against a lawyer on its own initiative (see 23.61), but may also represent the types of situation where it is unlikely that a waiver of legal professional privilege would assist the lawyer: K Rees and E Bell, ‘Giving Lawyers a Break’ (2002) 146 Sol J 654 at 655. 54. Medcalf v Mardell [2003] 1 AC 120; [2002] UKHL 27 at [61] per Lord Hobhouse. 55. Brown v Bennett (No 2) [2002] 1 WLR 713 at 738 per Neuberger J (footnotes supplied). 56. See, for example, Medcalf v Mardell [2003] 1 AC 120; [2002] UKHL 27. 57. As prescribed by the (then) Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK) s 51(7) (now Senior Courts Act 1981 (UK) s 51(7)). See further 23.44–23.52. 58. See, for example, Kallinicos v Hunt (Costs) [2006] NSWSC 723; BC200605525 at [20]–[23] per Brereton J (where the solicitor had, on the client’s instructions, unsuccessfully resisted an application to disqualify him from representing the client against a former client of the solicitor; as to which see generally Dal Pont, Ch 8). 59. For instance, by encouraging its pursuit for an ulterior motive, or otherwise acting in a manner that led the client to pursue the matter that the client would not have done had he or she received competent and ethical advice. 60. Limousin v Limousin (Costs) (2007) 38 Fam LR 478; [2007] FamCA 1178; BC200750689 at [55] (FC). 61. Loates v Loates (2000) 185 DLR (4th) 525 at 534 per Lee J (QB(Alta)). 62. Cassidy v Murray (1995) 124 FLR 267 at 281 (FC(Fam Ct)); Bagley v Pinebelt Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 655; BC200003814 at [28] per Hamilton J. 63. (1994) 53 FCR 422 at 426–7; BC9405707. See also Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 226 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 64. Bagley v Pinebelt Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 655; BC200003814 at [30] per Hamilton J; Carpathian Resources Ltd v Hendriks (2012) 290 ALR 252; [2012] FCA 496; BC201202993 at [26] per McKerracher J. 65. SPCB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 26; BC200400122 at [11] per Mansfield J (who opined that his decision to make a personal costs order against the solicitors in question could have been different had there been a matter identified that would indicate any pressing urgency in the institution of the proceedings); Tarabay v Bechara [2010] NSWSC 202; BC201001571 at [37] per Windeyer AJ (affd Bechara v Campbell-Williams [2011] NSWCA 177; BC201105032) (remarking that ‘[w]hile in hindsight it may appear to be reasonably clear that this was not a claim which was likely to succeed, it must be remembered that the claim was brought as a matter of some urgency at a time when the plaintiff’s real claim was unlikely to produce any results’). 66. Re Bendeich (No 2) (1994) 53 FCR 422 at 427; BC9405707 per Drummond J. 67. Campbell v Airport Transfer System Pty Ltd (2006) 18 NTLR 69; [2006] NTSC 40; BC200603862 at [18] per Angel ACJ. 68. Redowood Pty Ltd v Goldstein Technology Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 515; BC200403817 at [35] per Austin J; Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153; BC200502983 at [194] per McColl JA, with whom Hodgson and Ipp JJA concurred.

69. Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 226 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. See also Settlement Wine Co Pty Ltd v National & General Insurance Co (1997) 190 LSJS 101; BC9700380 at 6 (‘I must exercise particular care in this case as the plaintiff being insolvent, there is a risk that the proceedings for recovery of costs personally against its solicitors might be regarded as a colourable attempt to recover costs otherwise irrecoverable’). 70. [2005] NSWCA 61; BC200511033 at [253]. The Council of the New South Wales Law Society has issued a statement, albeit limited to threats to seek personal costs orders against lawyers on the ground that the cause has no reasonable prospects of success under the Legal Profession Act 2004 s 348 (as to which see 23.53–23.57), addressing the issue: see (September 2004) 42 LSJ 44). 71. De Groot v Nominal Defendant [2005] NSWCA 61; BC200511033 at [289]. 72. Nuclear Utility Technology and Environmental Corporation Inc v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2009] NSWSC 78; BC200900997 at [71] per McCallum J. 73. See 23.67–23.68. 74. See, for example, Nuclear Utility Technology and Environmental Corporation Inc v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2009] NSWSC 78; BC200900997 at [62]–[77] per McCallum J. 75. [2004] NSWSC 515; BC200403817. 76. Redowood Pty Ltd v Goldstein Technology Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 515; BC200403817 at [34]. 77. Redowood Pty Ltd v Goldstein Technology Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 515; BC200403817 at [35]. 78. Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 at 290 per Viscount Maugham, at 302 per Lord Atkin, at 319 per Lord Wright; Abraham v Jutsun [1963] 2 All ER 402 at 404 per Harman LJ; Marriage of Collins (1985) 75 FLR 84 at 91 (FC(Fam Ct)); A C J & M E Copini & Sons v Skopalj (1985) 42 SASR 100 at 105 per Lunn AJ. 79. For example, the New South Wales Land and Environment Court, until its constituting Act was amended as from 15 June 2005 (Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) s 69AA, inserted by the Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2005 (NSW), but since repealed), lacked the power to make such an order because its constituting Act and rules made no reference to it: Young v King [2004] NSWLEC 93; BC200401157 at [84]–[85] per McClellan CJ. The same has been held as regards the New South Wales District Court: Knaggs v J A Westaway & Sons Pty Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 476 at 485; BC9605361 per Simos AJA. The position is, in any case, now addressed by s 99 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), which applies to each of these courts in civil proceedings: s 4, Sch 1. 80. See 23.12. 81. Cassidy v Murray (1995) 124 FLR 267 at 281 (FC(Fam Ct)). 82. Edwards v Edwards [1958] P 235 at 248 per Sachs J; R & T Thew Ltd v Reeves (No 2) [1982] QB 1283 at 1285–6 per Lord Denning MR; Davy-Chiesman v Davy-Chiesman [1984] Fam 48 at 67 per Dillon LJ; A C J & M E Copini & Sons v Skopalj (1985) 42 SASR 100 at 104 per Lunn AJ; Holden & Co v Crown Prosecution Service [1990] 2 QB 261 at 269 per Lord Lane CJ; Re A Company (No 006798 of 1995) [1996] 2 All ER 417 at 429–32 per Chadwick J; Count TolstoyMiloslavsky v Lord Aldington [1996] 2 All ER 556 at 563–7 per Rose LJ; Harley v McDonald [1999] 3 NZLR 545 at 564–6 per Tipping J (CA). 83. [1940] AC 282. 84. See also Cassidy v Murray (1995) 124 FLR 267 at 281 (FC(Fam Ct)) (court may make order against solicitor ‘without the necessity to establish that the solicitor has been guilty of serious professional misconduct’). As to misconduct that may justify such disciplinary sanction see Dal

Pont, Chs 23, 25. 85. Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 at 290 per Viscount Maugham. 86. Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 at 304 per Lord Atkin. Cf Currie & Co v Law Society [1977] QB 990 at 997 per May J (who doubted whether the addition of the words ‘a high degree of’ or ‘gross’ before ‘negligence’ helped to elucidate the underlying principle involved, in that the issue was not fundamentally the extent to which the solicitor in question had been negligent, but conceded that the existence or absence of negligence may be relevant). 87. Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 at 319 per Lord Wright. 88. Re Bendeich (No 2) (1994) 53 FCR 422 at 427; BC9405707 per Drummond J. 89. Jachimowicz v Jachimowicz (1986) 81 FLR 459 at 466 per Asche and Pawley JJ (FC(Fam Ct)). See also Re Dunstan (2000) 155 FLR 189 at 194; [2000] ACTSC 33; BC200002048 per Miles CJ. 90. [1999] 3 NZLR 545 at 566 (CA). 91. R & T Thew Ltd v Reeves (No 2) [1982] QB 1283 at 1287 per Lord Denning MR, at 1288 per O’Connor LJ; Davy-Chiesman v Davy-Chiesman [1984] Fam 48 at 62 per May LJ; Stephens v Stephens [1991] 1 NZLR 633 at 638 per Holland J (HC); Byrne v Sefton Health Authority [2002] 1 WLR 775 at 783; [2001] EWCA Civ 1284 per Chadwick LJ. 92. See, for example, Byrne v Sefton Health Authority [2002] 1 WLR 775 at 783; [2001] EWCA Civ 1284 per Chadwick LJ. 93. Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 at 319 per Lord Wright; Edwards v Edwards [1958] P 235 at 248 per Sachs J; R & T Thew Ltd v Reeves (No 2) [1982] QB 1283 at 1287 per Lord Denning MR (conduct of the articled clerk in the case was at most ‘a mere slip’); Cassidy v Murray (1995) 124 FLR 267 at 281 (FC(Fam Ct)); Harley v McDonald [1999] 3 NZLR 545 at 564–5 per Tipping J (CA) (on appeal: Harley v McDonald [2001] 2 AC 678 at 706; [2001] UKPC 18); Re P (a barrister) [2002] 1 Cr App R 207 at 220; [2001] EWCA Crim 1728 per Kennedy LJ; Macteldir Pty Ltd v Dimovski (2005) 226 ALR 773; [2005] FCA 1528; BC200509237 at [90]–[91] per Allsop J. 94. [1972] 1 WLR 962 at 971. 95. See, for example, DJZ Constructions Pty Ltd v Pritchard [2010] NSWSC 1472; BC201009746 at [75]–[97] per Schmidt J. 96. Edwards v Edwards [1958] P 235 at 248 per Sachs J; De Sousa v Minister of State for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 41 FCR 544 at 548; BC9304772 per French J. 97. Taylor-White v Taylor-Bowman [2004] WASC 281; BC200409179 at [36]–[38] per Commissioner Braddock QC. 98. As to the costs indemnity rule see 7.2–7.6. 99. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Levick (1999) 43 ATR 621 at 627; [1999] FCA 1580; BC9907803 per Hill J. See also Abraham v Jutsun [1963] 2 All ER 402 at 404 per Lord Denning MR, at 404 per Harman LJ (‘if it be misconduct to take a bad point, a new peril is added to those of the legal profession, and … it would be a very dangerous doctrine indeed to say that the advocate ought to be mulcted in the costs because he took a point which failed’). 100. See 23.29–23.34. 101. Edwards v Edwards [1958] P 235 at 248 per Sachs J.

102. (1990) 75 DLR (4th) 46 (CA(BC)) (affd Young v Young (1993) 108 DLR (4th) 193 at 284 per McLachlin J (SCC)). 103. Young v Young (1990) 75 DLR (4th) 46 at 112 (CA(BC)). 104. Young v Young (1990) 75 DLR (4th) 46 at 113–14 (CA(BC)). 105. Young v Young (1990) 75 DLR (4th) 46 at 115 (CA(BC)). 106. See, for example, Jachimowicz v Jachimowicz (1986) 81 FLR 459 at 466 per Asche and Pawley JJ (FC(Fam Ct)) (where counsel was not duly briefed but could have been with additional diligence and perseverance); Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Westleigh Management Services Pty Ltd (2001) 47 ATR 327 at 331; [2001] QSC 176; BC200104587 per Mackenzie J (although the lawyers contributed to the proceedings being brought, their conduct did not display the ‘level of obstinacy’ necessary to justify an award of costs against them). 107. Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 at 319 per Lord Wright; White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 229; BC9803173 per Goldberg J (FCA) (affd Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773; BC9903036 (FC)). 108. Edwards v Edwards [1958] P 235 at 248 per Sachs J. 109. Martin v Harris [2010] FamCA 239; BC201050276 at [34] per Fowler J. 110. Bandwill Pty Ltd v Spencer-Laitt (2000) 23 WAR 390; [2000] WASC 210; BC200005103 at [213] per Templeman J. See, for example, Wentworth v Rogers [1999] NSWCA 403; BC9907174 (where the lawyer was found to have done the client’s bidding for her, allowing the client to conduct the various applications before the court in whatever way she chose, the court held that, if what the client was doing would have, had it been done by a lawyer, amounted to a breach of the duty to the court, the lawyer must bear responsibility for what the client did, and so the prospect of the lawyer’s personal liability for costs loomed large: at [46]). 111. Saltoon v Lake [1978] 1 NSWLR 52 at 58 (CA); Y v M [1994] 3 NZLR 581 at 586 per Temm J (HC). 112. White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 242, 250; BC9803173 per Goldberg J (FCA) (affd Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773; BC9903036 (FC)); Bagshaw v Scott [2005] FCA 104; BC200500325 at [77]–[80], [97] per Bennett J; Menzies v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1161; BC201108166 (involving an unjustified allegation of contempt of court). See also Y v M [1994] 3 NZLR 581 at 589 per Temm J (HC). 113. See, for example, Monitronix Ltd v Michael (1992) 7 WAR 195 at 204 per Murray J. 114. Norton v Cooper (1856) 3 Sm & G 375; 65 ER 701; Evans v Savarin Ltd (1980) 109 DLR (3d) 510 (HCJ(Ont)); Nelson v Nelson [1997] 1 All ER 970 at 976–8 per Waller LJ; A W and L M Forrest Pty Ltd v Beamish (1998) 146 FLR 450 at 458–9; BC9804350 per Young J (SC(NSW)); Nominal Defendant v Kisse (2001) 22 Qld Lawyer Reps 110 at 112; [2001] QDC 290 per Judge McGill; Tyler v Krause [2002] QCA 544; BC200207637; NARI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2003] FMCA 510; BC200307227 at [15] per Scarlett FM (acting without instructions); Bray v Dye (No 2) (2010) 27 VR 324; [2010] VSC 152; BC201002877 at [64]–[79] per Judd J; Montevento Holdings Pty Ltd v Scaffidi Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] WASC 180; BC201005198; Cohen v State of Victoria (No 3) [2011] VSC 229; BC201103573; Gusdote Pty Ltd v Ashley (2011) 193 FCR 227; [2011] FCA 250; BC201101352 at [146]–[149] per Foster J; Doulman v ACT Electronic Solutions Pty Ltd [2011] FMCA 232; BC201102320 (sequestration order on petition brought by solicitor without authority from petitioning creditor); Ashrafinia v Ashrafinia [2012] NSWSC 500; BC201203155 at [62]–[71] per

Slattery J. On the causation point see Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd v Lambra Pty Ltd (App Div(Vic), 26 October 1993, unreported) BC9300803 at 4 per Brooking J, at 7–9 per Tadgell J; Christian Revival Crusade Inc v Milne (No 3) (2008) 255 LSJS 72; [2008] SADC 55; BC200840581 at [22]–[40] per Judge Tilmouth; Wood v Inglis [2010] NSWSC 749; BC201004718 at [2] per Brereton J. 115. [2002] NSWSC 447; BC200203018 (affd Massey v Wales (2003) 57 NSWLR 718; [2003] NSWCA 212; BC200304485). 116. [2007] FMCA 927; BC200704993. 117. Zimmerman Holdings Pty Ltd v Wales [2002] NSWSC 447; BC200203018 at [8] per Bryson J (affd Massey v Wales (2003) 57 NSWLR 718; [2003] NSWCA 212; BC200304485); Hillig v Darkinjung Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 147; BC200804778 at [52]–[56] per McColl JA. 118. See, for example, Wood v Inglis [2010] NSWSC 749; BC201004718 (where Brereton J ordered that costs be borne by the directors of a company, even though its solicitor acted without a proper retainer, because they had set in motion the solicitor’s retainer). 119. See, for example, Fricker v Van Grutten [1896] 2 Ch 649 at 659 per Lindley LJ, at 662 per Rigby LJ; Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Permewan Wright Consolidated Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 327; BC9905899 at [18] per Byrne J; National Australia Bank Ltd v Larter (No 4) [2007] FMCA 927; BC200704993 at [12] per Raphael FM; Bray v Dye (No 2) (2010) 27 VR 324; [2010] VSC 152; BC201002877 at [64]–[79] per Judd J. 120. Nominal Defendant v Kisse (2001) 22 Qld Lawyer Reps 110 at 112; [2001] QDC 290 per Judge McGill; Skylight Maritime SA v Ascot Underwriting Ltd [2005] PNLR 25; [2005] EWHC 15 (Comm) at [6]–[20] per Colman J. As to the application of the doctrine of breach of warranty of authority to solicitors see G E Dal Pont, Law of Agency, 2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2008, pp 705–6. 121. Harry S Bagg’s Liquidation Warehouse Pty Ltd v Whittaker (1982) 44 NSWLR 421 at 430–1; BC8200008 (footnotes supplied). See also McAusland v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 47 FCR 369; BC9305144 (FC) (solicitor improperly instructed to act for company by non-directors ordered to pay costs); Wilson v General Commissioners for Leek [1994] BTC 22 (solicitors acting for company which, unbeknown to them, was not in existence at the time the instructions were received, ordered to pay costs); S Newman, ‘Costs Liability of Legal Practitioners when Proceedings Commenced Without Proper Authority’ (March 1994) 17 Litigation Lawyer 7. 122. See, for example, Fricker v Van Grutten [1896] 2 Ch 649; Geilinger v Gibbs [1897] 1 Ch 479. 123. See, for example, Reynolds v Howell (1873) LR 8 QB 398. 124. See, for example, Newbiggin-by-the-Sea Gas Co v Armstrong (1879) 13 Ch D 310; Nurse v Durnford (1879) 13 Ch D 764; Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co [1916] AC 307; Ox Operations Pty Ltd v Land Mark Property Developments (Vic) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2007] FCA 1221; BC200706519 at [2] per Finkelstein J. 125. See, for example, Russian and English Bank v Baring Bros and Co Ltd [1935] Ch 120 (solicitor and client basis); Schlieske v Overseas Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1960] VR 195 at 197 per Sholl J (solicitor and client basis); A W and L M Forrest Pty Ltd v Beamish (1998) 146 FLR 450 at 460; BC9804350 per Young J (SC(NSW)) (indemnity basis); Tyler v Krause [2002] QCA 544 (indemnity basis); Christian Revival Crusade Inc v Milne (No 3) (2008) 255 LSJS 72; [2008] SADC 55; BC200840581 at [42] per Judge Tilmouth (indemnity basis after a stipulated date and party and party basis beforehand); Bray v Dye (No 2) (2010) 27 VR 324; [2010] VSC 152;

BC201002877 at [80] per Judd J (indemnity basis); Cohen v State of Victoria (No 3) [2011] VSC 229; BC201103573 (indemnity basis); Sitzler Savage Pty Ltd v Northern Mining Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 104; BC201201452 at [192]–[198] per Zammit AsJ (indemnity basis); Tara Communications Group Pty Ltd v Simons Ravden Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 862; BC201205772 (indemnity basis). Cf Fricker v Van Grutten [1896] 2 Ch 649 (party and party basis); Harry S Bagg’s Liquidation Warehouse Pty Ltd v Whittaker (1982) 44 NSWLR 421; BC8200008 (party and party basis). As to the award of indemnity costs against lawyers personally see further 23.5–23.6. As to the available bases of taxation see 16.2–16.38. 126. (2001) 22 Qld Lawyer Reps 110; [2001] QDC 290 (noted S Jackson (2002) 22 QL 122). 127. Nominal Defendant v Kisse (2001) 22 Qld Lawyer Reps 110 at 112; [2001] QDC 290 per Judge McGill. 128. [2003] NSWSC 994; BC200306534 at [7]–[8]. 129. [2006] FMCA 390; BC200603324. See also SZABF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 175 FLR 87; [2003] FMCA 141; BC200301762 at [17]–[19] per Raphael FM (who ordered costs against a solicitor on the record who did not appear at a hearing). 130. [2008] NSWCA 194; BC200807318. 131. See, for example, Re Nicol (2009) 181 ACWS (3d) 178 (SCJ(Ont)). 132. Puruse Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Sydney (2009) 169 LGERA 85; [2009] NSWLEC 163; BC200908712 at [65] per Pepper J (where on the facts the applicants’ lawyers took no real steps to avoid or minimise the looming wasted costs of the respondent stemming from the lawyers’ failure to comply with the orders of the court and their failure to attend to that non-compliance in a timely and reasonable way). 133. [2004] NSWSC 449; BC200403132 at [18]–[19] per Campbell J. 134. See, for example, Puruse Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Sydney (2009) 169 LGERA 85; [2009] NSWLEC 163; BC200908712; Willis v State of Western Australia (No 2) [2009] WASCA 205; BC200910175; Modra v Victoria (2012) 205 FCR 445 [2012] FCA 240; BC201201405. 135. Supreme Court, Practice Note No SC Gen 5, para 19, 17 August 2005 (previously (2000) 47 NSWLR 629, Practice Note No 108, 31 January 2000, para 4). As to the costs consequences of applications for indulgences generally see 14.34–14.44. 136. See, for example, Orpen v Tarantello [2009] VSC 143; BC200902664 at [46]–[52] per Beach J. 137. See Dal Pont, pp 582–6. 138. Edwards v Edwards [1958] P 235 at 254 per Sachs J. 139. Caritativo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2002] FCA 735 at [8] per French J. 140. Wilkinson v Wilkinson [1963] P 1 at 10 per Ormerod LJ. 141. Holmes v National Benzole Co Ltd (1965) 109 Sol Jo 971 at 971 per Lyell J. 142. Campbell v Airport Transfer System Pty Ltd (2006) 18 NTLR 69; [2006] NTSC 40; BC200603862 at [29] per Angel ACJ. 143. Edwards v Edwards [1958] P 235 at 248 per Sachs J; Davy-Chiesman v Davy-Chiesman [1984] Fam 48 at 67 per Dillon LJ; European Hire Cars Pty Ltd v Beilby Poulden Costello [2009] NSWSC 526; BC200905190 at [60] per Bryson AJ (noting that the jurisdiction to make personal costs orders is not directed at requiring a lawyer to give up a case if it has difficulties, even serious

difficulties, provided that the client, apprised of these difficulties, instructs the lawyer to continue). 144. Cf statutory initiatives in this regard: see 23.53–23.57. 145. RDCW Diamond (Pty) Ltd v Da Gloria [2007] NSWSC 1325; BC200710317 at [21] per Rothman J. 146. Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 233 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR; White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 236; BC9803173 per Goldberg J (FCA) (affd Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773; BC9903036 (FC)). 147. See Dal Pont, pp 582–3. 148. Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 234 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 149. Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board [1987] 1 QB 565 at 572 per Sir John Donaldson MR (‘it is not for solicitors or counsel to impose a pre-trial screen through which a litigant must pass before he can put his complaint or defence before the court’). 150. Young v Young (1990) 75 DLR (4th) 46 at 104 per Cumming JA (CA(BC)). 151. White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 237; BC9803173 per Goldberg J (FCA) (affd Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773; BC9903036 (FC)). 152. Tarabay v Bechara [2010] NSWSC 202; BC201001571 at [31] per Windeyer AJ (affd Bechara v Campbell-Williams [2011] NSWCA 177; BC201105032) (‘Litigants must be able to bring forward cases which do not appear strong but which could possibly succeed. They should not be allowed to bring forward cases which are unarguable’). 153. Re O’Brien (1895) 21 VLR 100 at 104–5 per Hood J. 154. (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 239; BC9803173 (affd Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773; BC9903036 (FC)). See also Macteldir Pty Ltd v Roskov [2007] FCAFC 49; BC200702500 at [57], [74] per the court; Apollo 169 Management Pty Ltd v Pinefield Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] VSC 475; BC201007817 at [43]–[45] per Emerton J. Cf Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Shen (2002) 70 ALD 636; [2002] FCA 899; BC200204043 at [16]–[22] per Madgwick J (applying the same principles to a migration agent who wrongfully performed legal work). 155. White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 250; BC9803173 per Goldberg J (affd Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134 at 151; [1999] FCA 773; BC9903036 (FC)). 156. White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 249; BC9803173. For commentary on this case see L Hoffman, ‘Solicitors Liable to Pay Costs of Other Party Where Acting “Unreasonably”’ (December 1998) 18 Proctor 28; T Di Lallo, ‘Personal Liability for Costs’ (March 1999) 73 LIJ 48. 157. Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773; BC9903036 (FC). 158. White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 239; BC9803173 per Goldberg J (FCA) (affd Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773; BC9903036 (FC)). 159. (2006) 228 ALR 727; [2006] FCA 199; BC200601120. 160. Tran v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2006) 228 ALR

727; [2006] FCA 199; BC200601120 at [23]. 161. Tran v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2006) 228 ALR 727; [2006] FCA 199; BC200601120 at [25]. 162. By inserting Pt 8B into the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘Costs orders where proceedings have no reasonable prospect of success’), via the Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth). 163. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 486E(1). 164. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 486E(3). 165. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 486E(2). 166. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 486F(1). Cf Uppu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2012] FMCA 157; BC201201139 (where Burchardt FM, in a ‘finely balanced’ case, elected not to make a costs order because ‘one has to make allowances for the pressure that clients in such circumstances put on their legal representatives and the fact that at the end of the day the capacity to see matters clearly will obviously vary from legal practitioner to legal practitioner’: at [52]). 167. Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 376(1)(a)(ii). 168. (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 251; BC9803173 per Goldberg J (affd Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134 at 151; [1999] FCA 773; BC9903036 (FC)). 169. Young v Young (1990) 75 DLR (4th) 46 at 111 per Cumming JA (CA(BC)) (‘An award of costs should not be made against a solicitor personally on the ground that the proceedings brought on behalf of a client lack merit unless it is beyond doubt, not only that the proceedings are devoid of merit and that the solicitor knew or ought to have known them to be so, but also that the responsibility for continuing with the proceedings despite their lack of merit lies with the solicitor, rather than the client’) (affd Young v Young (1993) 108 DLR (4th) 193 at 284 per McLachlin J (SCC)). See also Levick v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 102 FCR 155; [2000] FCA 674; BC200002670 at [43]–[46] (FC). 170. [1958] P 235 at 252–4 per Sachs J. 171. Edwards v Edwards [1958] P 235 at 259. 172. (2000) 35 ACSR 411; [2000] NSWSC 946; BC200006009 at [19]. 173. (2000) 185 DLR (4th) 525 at 536 per Lee J (QB(Alta)). 174. [2004] FCA 32; BC200400120. 175. Buksh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 32; BC200400120 at [18]. 176. (1999) 26 Fam LR 548; [1999] FamCA 842. 177. Marriage of Anstis (1999) 26 Fam LR 548 at 556; [1999] FamCA 842. See also Kooky Garments Ltd v Charlton [1994] 1 NZLR 587 at 591 per Thomas J (HC); Shtrambrandt v Brott (No 2) [2006] VSC 483; BC200610470 (respondent solicitor ordered to repay costs that his client had been ordered to pay in proceedings where the solicitor was in a conflict of interest situation through also suing the client personally out of the dealings that give rise to the proceedings); Holmes v DMS Pacific Exports Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 563; BC200704189 (costs ordered against lawyers on an indemnity basis in circumstances where the lawyers had an ‘obvious potential exposure to the [clients] for professional neglect’: at [7] per Hammerschlag J). 178. (1998) 238 AR 98 at 110–11 (QB(Alta)). 179. On this point see Dal Pont, pp 176–8.

180. See, for example, Tarabay v Bechara [2010] NSWSC 202; BC201001571 at [38] per Windeyer AJ (affd Bechara v Campbell-Williams [2011] NSWCA 177; BC201105032); Metsikas v Quirk (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 757; BC201004762. 181. Davy-Chiesman v Davy-Chiesman [1984] Fam 48 at 63–4 per May LJ, at 67 per Dillon LJ. 182. Locke v Camberwell Health Authority [1991] 2 Med LR 249; Davy-Chiesman v Davy-Chiesman [1984] Fam 48 at 64 per May LJ; Yates Property Corporation (in liq) v Boland (1998) 157 ALR 30 at 53; BC9803621 (FC(FCA)); Harley v McDonald [1999] 3 NZLR 545 at 573 per Tipping J (CA). 183. Davy-Chiesman v Davy-Chiesman [1984] Fam 48 at 67 per Dillon LJ; Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 237 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 184. Harley v McDonald [1999] 3 NZLR 545 at 574 per Tipping J (CA). 185. White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 249; BC9803173 per Goldberg J (FCA) (affd Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134 at 148; [1999] FCA 773; BC9903036 (FC)); Modra v Victoria (2012) 205 FCR 445; [2012] FCA 240; BC201201405 at [37] per Gray J. 186. [1984] Fam 48. 187. Davy-Chiesman v Davy-Chiesman [1984] Fam 48 at 68. See also Gersten v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 922; BC200003842 at [29] per Whitlam J (affd Gersten v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 260; BC200100995) (where the solicitor was found to be ‘content to act as a mere cipher and not to exercise his own professional judgment’, his conduct being characterised as ‘a serious dereliction of duty to the Court’ attracting a personal order for costs). 188. [2002] 1 WLR 713 at 770. 189. Edwards v Edwards [1958] P 235 at 248–9 per Sachs J; Kelly v London Transport Executive [1982] 2 All ER 842 at 850 per Lord Denning MR (his Lordship’s statement that a solicitor is under a duty to the opposing litigant who is unassisted should not be read literally, but be seen only in the context of a potential liability in costs to that opposing litigant); Davy-Chiesman v Davy-Chiesman [1984] Fam 48 at 67 per Dillon LJ. 190. Marriage of Collins (1985) 75 FLR 84 at 93 (FC(Fam Ct)). 191. Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board [1987] 1 QB 565 at 580 per Dillon LJ. See also Edwards v Edwards [1958] P 235 at 249 per Sachs J; Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 237–8 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 192. Legal Aid Act 1977 (ACT) s 34; Legal Aid Commission Act 1979 (NSW) s 47(1); Legal Aid Act 1990 (NT) s 33; Legal Aid Queensland Act 1997 (Qld) s 32; Legal Aid Commission Act 1990 (Tas) s 21; Legal Aid Commission Act 1976 (WA) s 45. 193. Count Tolstoy-Miloslavsky v Lord Aldington [1996] 2 All ER 556 at 565 per Rose LJ. 194. Hodgson v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 673 at 681, 683 per Lord Woolf MR. As to contingent fee agreements see 3.41–3.56. 195. (2000) 107 FCR 44; [2000] FCA 1819; BC200007576. 196. As to non-parties in this context see 22.47–22.51. 197. Cook v Pasminco Ltd (2000) 107 FCR 44; [2000] FCA 1819; BC200007576 at [53]. 198. Cook v Pasminco Ltd (2000) 107 FCR 44; [2000] FCA 1819; BC200007576 at [54].

199.

De Sonsa v Minister of State for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 41 FCR 544 at 548; BC9304772 per French J; Young v Young (1993) 108 DLR (4th) 193 at 284 per McLachlin J (SCC); Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 236 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Levick (1999) 43 ATR 621; [1999] FCA 1580; BC9907803 at [15] per Hill J; Harley v McDonald [1999] 3 NZLR 545 at 560–1 per Tipping J (CA) (on appeal: Harley v McDonald [2001] 2 AC 678 at 702; [2001] UKPC 18 per Lord Hope); Re Dunstan (2000) 155 FLR 189; [2000] ACTSC 33; BC200002048 at [12]–[14] per Miles CJ; Apollo 169 Management Pty Ltd v Pinefield Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] VSC 475; BC201007817 at [46]–[56] per Emerton J.

200. As to barristerial immunity see Dal Pont, pp 188–205. 201. Medcalf v Mardell [2003] 1 AC 120; [2002] UKHL 27 at [56] per Lord Hobhouse. 202. Harley v McDonald [1999] 3 NZLR 545 at 562 per Tipping J (CA). 203. Harley v McDonald [2001] 2 AC 678 at 702; [2001] UKPC 18 per Lord Hope. 204. Harley v McDonald [1999] 3 NZLR 545 at 564 per Tipping J (CA). 205. See 23.16. 206. (2000) 155 FLR 189 at 194; [2000] ACTSC 33; BC200002048 per Miles CJ. 207. [2001] 2 AC 678 at 708–9; [2001] UKPC 18 per Lord Hope (footnote supplied). 208. In so ruling, the board reversed the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s decision that counsel had pursued a hopeless case and in so doing had demonstrated a serious dereliction of her duty to the court: Harley v McDonald [1999] 3 NZLR 545 at 566–72 per Tipping J (CA). 209. As to the general costs discretion see 6.14–6.20. 210. National Australia Bank Ltd v Skaventos (SC(SA), Burley M, 12 December 1996, unreported); Myatt v National Coal Board (No 2) [2007] 4 All ER 1094; [2007] EWCA Civ 307 at [8]–[11] per Dyson LJ. 211. Limousin v Limousin (Costs) (2007) 38 Fam LR 478; [2007] FamCA 1178; BC200750689 at [62] (FC). See, for example, Z (A Solicitor) v Limousin (2010) FLC ¶93-433; [2010] FamCAFC 59; BC201050151. 212. The overarching purpose is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law, and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M(1). 213. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37N. 214. Overarching obligations are listed in the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) Pt 2.3 and include to act honestly (s 17), to have a proper basis for a claim or response (s 18), to only take steps to resolve or determine dispute (s 19), to cooperate in the conduct of civil proceeding (s 20), not to mislead or deceive (s 21), to use reasonable endeavours to resolve dispute (s 22), to narrow the issues in dispute (s 23), to ensure costs are reasonable and proportionate (s 24), to minimise delay (s 25) and to disclose the existence of documents (s 26). 215. Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) ss 28(2), 29(1). 216. See, for example, Norman South Pty Ltd v da Silva (No 2) [2012] VSC 622; BC201209865 (where Beach J declined to order costs under the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 29(1) for fear of being blinded by hindsight as to the position in which the solicitors found themselves in). Cf Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] VSC 14; BC201300277 at [5] per Dixon J (who made the obiter remark that s 29 may be in wider terms than the costs

jurisdiction against lawyers personally at common law, but expressed no concluded view on the point). 217. As required by the Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) ss 6 (applicant; the genuine steps statement must specify: (a) the steps that have been taken to try to resolve the issues in dispute between the applicant and the respondent in the proceedings; or (b) the reasons why no such steps were taken, which may relate to, inter alia: (i) the urgency of the proceedings; (ii) whether, and the extent to which, the safety or security of any person or property would have been compromised by taking such steps: s 6(2)), 7 (respondent; the genuine steps statement must: (a) state that the respondent agrees with the genuine steps statement filed by the applicant; or (b) if the respondent disagrees in whole or part with the genuine steps statement filed by the applicant — specify the respect in which, and reasons why, the respondent disagrees: s 7(2)). 218. Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) s 12(2) (the duty being imposed on lawyers by s 9). 219. Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) s 12(3). 220. HCR 2004 r 50.05.2 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 10); FCR 2011 r 40.07(1)(c) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 9(1)(c)); Fam LR 2004 r 19.10(2)(c) (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 35(5)(b)); ACT r 1753(2)(a) (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 8); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 99(2)(b) (formerly Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 76C(1)(b); NSW RSC NSW Pt 52A rr 43(1)(b) (solicitors), 43A(1)(b) (barristers)); NT r 63.21(1)(c); Qld r 690 (formerly Qld r 708); SA r 13(2)(b) (cf former SA RSC r 101.06(1)(a)(ii)); Tas r 61(1)(b); Vic r 63.23(1)(c); WA O 66 r 5(1)(b). 221. FCR 2011 r 40.07(1)(a) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 9(1)(a)); Fam LR 2004 r 19.10(2)(a), (b) (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 35(5)(a)); ACT r 1753(3) (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 8); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 99(2)(a) (formerly Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 76C(1)(a); NSW RSC Pt 52A rr 43(1) (a) (solicitors), 43A(1)(a) (barristers)); NT r 63.21(1)(a), (b); SA r 13(2)(a) (cf the former SA RSC r 101.06(1)(a)(i)); Tas r 61(1)(b); Vic r 63.23(1)(a), (b); WA O 66 r 5(1)(a). 222. FCR 2011 r 40.07(1)(d) (formerly FCR 1979 O 62 r 9(1)(d)); Fam LR 2004 r 19.10(2)(d) (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 35(5)(c)); ACT r 1753(2)(b); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 99(2)(c) (formerly Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 76C(1)(c); NSW RSC Pt 52A rr 43(1)(c) (solicitors), 43A(1)(c) (barristers)); NT r 63.21(1)(d); SA r 13(2)(c) (cf the former SA RSC r 101.06(1)(a)(iii)); Vic r 63.23(1) (d); WA O 66 r 5(1)(c). This gives recognition to the effect of Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282: Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 228 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 223. (1992) 7 WAR 195 at 199 (paragraph break omitted). 224. Fam LR 2004 r 19.10(2)(e). 225. See Victoria Legal Aid v County Court of Victoria (2004) 9 VR 686; [2004] VSCA 113; BC200404494 at [19] per Chernov JA (referring to the term ‘party’, as used in Vic r 63.23, attracting the same meaning as it has in the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), which states that ‘party’ includes ‘every person served with notice of or attending any proceeding, whether named on the record or not’). 226. ACT r 1700; NT r 63.01(1); Qld r 679; Vic r 63.01(1). 227. ACT r 1753(1)(b); Qld r 690 (formerly Qld r 708). 228. HCR 2004 r 50.05.2 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 10). 229. FCR 2011 r 40.07(1). 230. FCR 2011 r 40.07(2)(b).

231. Fam LR 2004 r 19.10(1)(c), (d). 232. NT r 63.21(1). 233. Vic r 63.23(1). 234. Tas r 61(1); WA O 66 r 5(1). The former FCR 1979 O 62 r 9(1) (as amended by the Federal Court Amendment Rules 2003 (No 3) (Cth), with effect on 22 August 2003) read likewise. 235. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 99(1) (before 15 August 2005, Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 76C(1)). 236. SA r 13(2) (cf the former SA RSC rr 101.05, 101.06(1)(a)). 237. SA r 4. 238. Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 232 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 239. Ireland v Retallack (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1096; BC201107238 at [48] per Pembroke J. See also Blacktown City Council v Wilkie (No 11) [2011] NSWLEC 216; BC201109269 at [51] per Pepper J. 240. Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 232 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. Cf Ireland v Retallack (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1096; BC201107238 at [52]–[54] per Pembroke J. 241. Re G [1999] 4 All ER 371 at 392 per Wall J. 242. Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 232 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 243. Re a Company (No 006798 of 1995) [1996] 2 All ER 417 at 431–2 per Chadwick J (who held that a solicitor who, in swearing an affidavit to support a winding up petition, asserts on his oath a belief that a debt is owing and that the company is insolvent, acts improperly if he does not have that belief, and acts unreasonably if there are no grounds upon which a competent solicitor could reach that view on the available material). 244. As to the meaning of ‘negligent’ in this context see 23.50–23.52. 245. Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 233 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 246. Re G [1999] 4 All ER 371 at 395–6 per Wall J. 247. Jachimowicz v Jachimowicz (1986) 61 FLR 459 at 469 per Asche and Pawley JJ (FC(Fam Ct)). 248. See 23.16. 249. See 23.20. 250. FCR 2011 r 40.07(2)(a) (similar to the former FCR 1979 O 62 r 9(2) (as amended by the Federal Court Amendment Rules 2003 (No 3) (Cth), with effect on 11 August 2003), which was phrased in similar terms to the now superseded NSW RSC Pt 52A rr 43(2) (solicitors), 43A(2) (barristers)). 251. HCR 2004 r 50.05.1 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 4); ACT r 1753(1)(a) (formerly ACT RSC O 65 r 3) (see Jachimowicz v Jachimowicz (1986) 61 FLR 459 at 466–7 per Asche and Pawley JJ (FC(Fam Ct))); NT r 63.21(2) (see, for example, Timor Transport Pty Ltd (in liq) v Murlroam Pty Ltd (1992) 110 FLR 53 at 65 per Martin J (SC(NT))); Vic r 63.23(2). 252. Fam LR 2004 r 19.10(1)(a), (b). 253. SA rr 4 (definition of ‘procedural irregularity’), 13(2). 254. Tas r 840(1). The party at fault is not allowed any costs in respect of the hearing: r 840(2). 255. SA r 274(3)(d); Tas r 60.

See, for example, Solomon Brothers (a firm) v Gibney (SC(WA), Sanderson M, 11 September 256. 1998, unreported) at 4–7 (where a lawyer, who through inadvertence failed to attend a status conference, was ordered to pay the costs thrown away as a result pursuant to WA O 66 r 5(1), the master noting that ‘[p]ractitioners must take on board responsibility for the efficient functioning of the system’, so that ‘[w]hen they default, they should be personally responsible for that default’: at 7). 257. See 23.44. 258. A C J & M E Copini & Sons v Skopalj (1985) 42 SASR 100 at 105 per Lunn AJ (dealing with previous rules that referred to ‘undue delay, misconduct or default’). This followed two English authorities (D v D [1963] 1 WLR 194 at 198–9 per Cairns J and Jakeman v Jakeman [1964] P 420 at 425 per Sir Jocelyn Simon P), which had held that the term ‘default’ means, or includes, negligence. 259. UK RSC O 62 r 11 (now repealed). 260. Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK) s 51(7)(a) (now the Senior Courts Act 1981 (UK) s 51(7)(a)). 261. Sinclair-Jones v Kay [1989] 1 WLR 114 at 121–2 per May LJ; Gupta v Comer [1991] 1 QB 629; Cassidy v Murray (1995) 124 FLR 267 at 281 (FC(Fam Ct)). Contra Holden & Co v Crown Prosecution Service [1990] QB 261 at 270–1 per Lord Lane CJ. 262. R v Horsham District Council [1994] 4 All ER 681 at 700–3 per Brooke J (‘In substituting negligence for serious misconduct as the threshold test for wasted costs orders … Parliament must have intended to provide redress for all who incurred expense … which was caused by the negligence of lawyers on either side, and been willing to tolerate any adverse consequences of this new policy with equanimity’: at 703); Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 228, 232–3 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. See also Heywood v Wellers [1976] 1 QB 446 at 457–9 per Lord Denning MR. 263. [1999] 2 VR 353 at 383; [1999] VSCA 99; BC9903854. 264. See 23.16. 265. This derives further support from the statement of Harman LJ that negligence in this context is only a negative form of misconduct: Abraham v Jutsun [1963] 2 All ER 402 at 404. 266. Guss v Geelong Building Society (in liq) [2001] VSC 288; BC200104993 at [13]–[17] per Ashley J (who doubted whether a failure to act with reasonable competence involved anything more stringent than the making out of negligence in a professional negligence claim: at [13]). 267. Cf above at 23.46 discussing the impact of the absence of the word ‘undue’ as prefacing ‘delay’. 268. The phrase ‘proceedings … taken on a claim for damages’ has been held to include every case in which an originating process claims what are designated as ‘damages’, whether or not the nature of the damages is specified: Degiorgio v Dunn (No 2) (2005) 62 NSWLR 284; [2005] NSWSC 3; BC200500375 at [15] per Barrett J. 269. NSW s 348(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 198M(1)). 270. NSW 1987 Sch 8 Pt 13 cl 73(2), 73(4). 271. ACT s 186; NSW s 345(4) (formerly NSW 1987 s 198J(4)). 272. A fact is ‘provable’ for this purpose only if the lawyer reasonably believes that the material then available to him or her provides a proper basis for alleging that fact: ACT s 186; NSW s 345(2) (formerly NSW 1987 s 198J(2)). 273. ACT s 188(1), 188(2); NSW s 345(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 198J(1)).

274. The order therefore does not flow automatically from a finding that the services have been provided without reasonable prospects of success: Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153; BC200502983 at [130], [163], [179] per McColl JA, with whom Hodgson and Ipp JJA concurred; Treadwell v Hickey [2010] NSWSC 1119; BC201007302 at [26] per Barrett J. 275. ACT s 189(1); NSW s 348(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 198M(1)). 276. ACT s 189(3). 277. NSW s 348(3) (formerly NSW 1987 s 198M(3)). 278. ACT s 189(4); NSW s 348(4) (formerly NSW 1987 s 198M(4)). 279. (2005) 62 NSWLR 284; [2005] NSWSC 3; BC200500375 at [27]. 280. Degiorgio v Dunn (No 2) (2005) 62 NSWLR 284; [2005] NSWSC 3; BC200500375 at [28]. 281. (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153; BC200502983 at [132], with whom Hodgson and Ipp JJA concurred. See M Legg and M Fai, ‘Appeal Clarifies “Reasonable Prospects of Success”’ (August 2005) 43 LSJ 55. 282. Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153; BC200502983 at [132], citing from Medcalf v Mardell [2003] 1 AC 120; [2002] UKHL 27 at [40] per Lord Steyn. 283. Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153; BC200502983 at [186]. 284. (2004) 1 DCLR (NSW) 316, discussed in R Balachandran, ‘Reasonable Prospects of Success: What are the Responsibilities Cast on the Legal Profession?’ (November 2004) 42 LSJ 61. 285. Momibo Pty Ltd v Adam (2004) 1 DCLR (NSW) 316 at [82]. 286. Momibo Pty Ltd v Adam (2004) 1 DCLR (NSW) 316 at [84]. 287. Momibo Pty Ltd v Adam (2004) 1 DCLR (NSW) 316 at [85]. 288. Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153; BC200502983 at [127]. See also Keddie v Stacks/Goudkamp Pty Ltd (2012) 293 ALR 764; [2012] NSWCA 254; BC201206228 (where Beazley JA, with whom Barrett JA and Sackville AJA concurred, remarked (at [154]) that ‘the mere incantation of a reasonable belief is not sufficient for this purpose; rather, a reasonable belief ‘must be based upon a reasonably arguable view of the law and upon provable facts’; her Honour added (at [158]) that, for this purpose, ‘[a] belief based upon a failure properly to examine the material upon which the belief is based is not … a reasonable belief’). 289. Momibo Pty Ltd v Adam (2004) 1 DCLR (NSW) 316 at [86]. 290. Momibo Pty Ltd v Adam (2004) 1 DCLR (NSW) 316 at [87]. 291. Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153; BC200502983 at [127]. 292. Momibo Pty Ltd v Adam (2004) 1 DCLR (NSW) 316 at [88]. 293. [2008] NSWCA 178; BC200807098 at [17]. 294. Fowler, Corbett and Jessop v Toro Constructions Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 178; BC200807098 at [18], [19]. 295. Momibo Pty Ltd v Adam (2004) 1 DCLR (NSW) 316 at [104]. See also Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153; BC200502983 at [127] per McColl JA; Riley v Bankstown City Council [2005] NSWSC 748; BC200505415 at [15] per Hidden J; Firth v

Latham [2007] NSWCA 40; BC200701462 at [68] per Hoeben J (noting that being mindful of the judicial restraint to be exercised when applying the legislation, ‘the Act should not be interpreted as requiring that the evidence necessary to establish an arguable case at trial be available to a party before proceedings are commenced. Implicit in the concept of a continuing obligation on the part of a legal practitioner to comply with the sections is the proposition that the conduct of litigation is a dynamic process. Whether reasonable prospects of success exist could vary depending upon the results of inquiries and the collection of evidence’; see A Combe, ‘The Ongoing Obligation to Assess Reasonable Prospects of Success’ (September 2007) 45 LSJ 60); Fowler, Corbett and Jessop v Toro Constructions Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 178; BC200807098 at [21] per Basten JA. 296. See R Balachandran, ‘Reasonable Prospects of Success: What are the Responsibilities Cast on the Legal Profession?’ (November 2004) 42 LSJ 61 at 63. 297. Momibo Pty Ltd v Adam (2004) 1 DCLR (NSW) 316 at [104]. 298. Re a Barrister (Wasted Costs Order) (No 1 of 1991) [1993] QB 293; Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 237 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 299. HCR 2004 r 50.05.2 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 10); FCR 1979 O 62 r 9 (now superseded). 300. FCR 2011 r 40.07(1); ACT r 1753(1)(b); Qld r 690 (formerly Qld r 708); Tas r 61(1). 301. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 99(1) (which refers to costs incurred ‘by’ the serious neglect etc, and to costs incurred improperly etc ‘for which a legal practitioner is responsible’) (before 15 August 2005, NSW RSC Pt 52A rr 43(1), 43A(1) (see Leicester v Walton (CA(NSW), 22 November 1995, unreported) BC9501770 at 14–16); SA r 13(2); WA O 66 r 5(1) (see O’Halloran v Stephen (1991) 7 WAR 477 at 486 per Franklyn J (FC), who, referring to O 66 r 5, stated that the misconduct ‘must be connected with the proceedings’). 302. NT r 63.21(1); Vic r 63.23(1). 303. Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 237 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 304. See 23.40–23.41. 305. See 23.42. 306. Namely UK RSC O 62 r 8 (repealed). 307. Michael v Freehill Hollingdale & Page (1990) 3 WAR 223 at 232–3 per Seaman J; O’Halloran v Stephen (1991) 7 WAR 477 at 486 per Franklyn J (FC); Monitronix Ltd v Michael (1992) 7 WAR 195 at 200 per Murray J; Wentworth v Rogers [1999] NSWCA 403; BC9907174 at [25] per the court; Dalecoast Pty Ltd v Monisse [1999] WASCA 242; BC9907487 at [15]–[17] per Templeman J. See also Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board [1987] 1 QB 565 at 569 per Sir John Donaldson MR. 308. A C J & M E Copini & Sons v Skopalj (1985) 42 SASR 100 at 105 per Lunn AJ. See, for example, Mauroux v Sociedade Commercial Abel Pereira Da Fonesca SARL [1972] 1 WLR 962 at 970–1 per Megarry J; Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board [1987] 1 QB 565 at 571 per Sir John Donaldson MR. 309. Brown v Burdett (1887) 37 Ch D 207; R & T Thew Ltd v Reeves (No 2) [1982] QB 1283; A C J & M E Copini & Sons v Skopalj (1985) 42 SASR 100 at 105 per Lunn AJ; Shire of Gisborne v King [1995] 1 VR 103 at 106 per Tadgell J (App Div); Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 486F(3); ACT r 1703(3); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 189(1); Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 348(1) (formerly NSW 1987 s 198M(1)); Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 29(2) (see Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] VSC 14; BC201300277 at [16] per Dixon J, who rejected the submission that the court should be hesitant to act on its own

motion where it is open to a party to the civil proceeding to move for appropriate relief, remarking that the terms of s 29(2) ‘are unambiguous and do not suggest that the court’s motion is a backstop or reserve procedure’). Cf Monitronix Ltd v Michael (1992) 7 WAR 195 at 202 per Murray J (who stated that WA O 66 r 5 envisages an application to be made). 310. Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 238 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 311. Reid v Hubbard (No 2) [2004] FCA 180; BC200400733 at [10] per Heerey J. 312. Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] VSC 14; BC201300277 at [18] per Dixon J (in the context of s 29 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic): see 23.42). 313. Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 238 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 314. H Evans, ‘The Wasted Costs Jurisdiction’ (2001) 64 Mod LR 51 at 56. See, for example, Shire of Gisborne v King [1995] 1 VR 103 at 106 per Tadgell J (App Div). 315. Gray v Going Places Leisure Travel Ltd [2005] 3 Costs LR 405; [2005] EWCA Civ 189 at [14]– [15] per Neuberger LJ. 316. Sharma v Hunters [2011] WTLR 259; [2011] EWHC 2546 (COP) at [29] per Henderson J. 317. Filmlab Systems International Ltd v Pennington [1994] 1 All ER 673 at 678 per Aldous J (‘What may seem to be a misconceived application could, after trial, be seen as an application which was worth trying as it would have saved considerable time and money if it had succeeded’); B v Pendlebury (2002) 152 NLJ Rep 1072 (where Turner J refused a wasted costs order in a case where there had been no adjudication of the primary facts, being resistant to ‘enquire into a state of affairs in which it had no solid foundation from which the process of analysis essential to the wasted costs procedure could proceed’). 318. Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board [1987] 1 QB 565 at 577–8 per Sir John Donaldson MR; Redowood Pty Ltd v Goldstein Technology Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 515; BC200403817 at [35] per Austin J; Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153; BC200502983 at [194] per McColl JA. 319. This concern moved the Council of the New South Wales Law Society to issue a statement, albeit limited to threats to seek personal costs orders against lawyers on the ground that the cause has no reasonable prospects of success under s 348 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) (formerly NSW 1987 s 198M) (see 23.53), addressing the issue. Under the statement, a threat to seek a personal costs order against a lawyer in any proceedings should not be made unless the lawyer making the threat: first, has material available that would clearly suggest that the proceedings have little merit and are likely to fail; second, has specific instructions from the client to make the threat after the client has been made aware of its seriousness and the possible consequences for the client if the allegation is not made out; and third, makes known to the opposing practitioner the evidentiary basis for having formed the view that the proceedings have little merit and are likely to fail. 320. Filmlab Systems International Ltd v Pennington [1994] 1 All ER 673 at 678 per Aldous J. 321. Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153; BC200502983 at [193] per McColl JA (remarks made in the context of the statutory power in New South Wales (and now the Australian Capital Territory) to order costs against lawyers who pursue cases lacking reasonable prospects of success: see 23.53–23.57). Hodgson JA added (at [6]) that ‘the possible disadvantages to the party for whom the relevant legal services were provided need to be kept steadily in mind’. 322. Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 238 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR.

323. [1997] 3 All ER 274 at 281–2 per Thomas J. As to orders against legal aid bodies generally see 22.65. 324. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98(3) (before 15 August 2005, Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 76C(1)). 325. See 23.32. 326. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 486F(4). 327. NT r 63.21(1); Vic r 63.23(1); WA O 66 r 5(1). 328. Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 at 289 per Viscount Maugham. 329. See, for example, Lemery Holdings Pty Ltd v Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd (2008) 221 FLR 241; [2008] NSWSC 1114; BC200809428 at [90], [91] per Hammerschlag J; Kelly v Jowett (2009) 76 NSWLR 405; [2009] NSWCA 278; BC200908149. See further D Garnsworthy, ‘Costs Orders Against Employed Solicitors’ (July 1997) 19 LSB 8. 330. [2011] NSWSC 812; BC201105722 at [29]–[31]. 331. HCR 2004 r 50.05.2 (formerly HCR 1952 O 71 r 10) (which, although not expressed in ostensibly mandatory terms, has been construed as permissive: De Sousa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 41 FCR 544 at 546; BC9304772 per French J); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 99(3) (before 15 August 2005, Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 76C(2) (costs assessor); NSW RSC Pt 52A rr 43(3), 43A(3) (Registrar)); NT r 63.21(4) (Master); Tas r 61(2) (taxing officer); Vic r 63.23(4) (Costs Judge); WA O 66 r 5(3) (taxing officer). In the Northern Territory O 50 (‘References out of court’), with the necessary changes, applies to such a reference: NT r 63.21(5). 332. See 22.24–22.27. 333. Abraham v Jutsun [1963] 2 All ER 402 at 403 per Lord Denning MR, at 404 per Pearson LJ; Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board [1987] 1 QB 565 at 572 per Sir John Donaldson MR; Cassidy v Murray (1995) 124 FLR 267 at 281 (FC(Fam Ct)). 334. Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 238–9 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR; Re P (a barrister) [2002] 1 Cr App R 207 at 222; [2001] EWCA Crim 1728 per Kennedy LJ (noting the importance in the public interest that the procedure be ‘swift, economical and effective’, and for this reason retain its summary form, otherwise ‘it would justifiably be said that those who default can easily escape censure by calling for a procedure so elaborate and expensive as to be unworkable’); Medcalf v Mardell [2003] 1 AC 120 at 121; [2002] UKHL 27 at [57] per Lord Hobhouse (‘The jurisdiction is discretionary and should be reserved for those cases where the unjustifiable conduct can be demonstrated without recourse to disproportionate procedures’); Hedrich v Standard Bank of London Ltd [2009] PNLR 3; [2008] EWCA Civ 905 at [78] per Ward LJ, with whom Sedley and Wall LJJ concurred (remarking that this is a summary remedy that should be capable of being dealt with in ‘hours rather than days’). Presumably for this reason the Supreme Court of New South Wales issued a practice note that, with the consent of the lawyer, the court may deal with the matter orally at the conclusion of any trial, application or appearance, although provision is also made for the lawyer to make written submissions to be dealt with at a later date: Supreme Court, Practice Note No SC Gen 5, para 11, 17 August 2005 (previously Practice Note No 108 (2000) 47 NSWLR 629, para 6(b)–6(d)). It also provides that if it will assist the court, the other parties to the proceedings may be invited to make submissions on the issue: para 6(e). Cf H Evans, ‘The Wasted Costs Jurisdiction’ (2001) 64 Mod LR 51 at 57–9 (who notes procedural difficulties in the English jurisdiction in this context). 335. Harley v McDonald [2001] 2 AC 678 at 704; [2001] UKPC 18 per Lord Hope.

336. Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 at 239 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 337. See, for example, Abraham v Jutsun [1963] 2 All ER 402 at 403 per Lord Denning MR; Utah Construction and Mining Company v Watson [1969] NZLR 1062 at 1064 per North P, at 1065 per Turner J (CA); Stephens v Stephens [1991] 1 NZLR 633 at 638 per Holland J (HC). 338. Fam LR 2004 r 19.11(1) (formerly Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 35(6)(a)); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 99(2) (before 15 August 2005, NSW RSC Pt 52A rr 43(1), 44) (see Matsen v Matsen [2008] NSWSC 226 at [24]–[25] per Hamilton J); NT r 63.21(3); SA r 13(3)(a) (cf the former SA RSC r 101.06(1)(a)); Tas r 61(1) (where, although the rules provide that the court ‘may’ call on the solicitor to show cause why the order should not be made, the term ‘may’ here is, in accordance with the law of procedural fairness, to be interpreted as directive rather than discretionary); Vic r 63.23(3) (see Shire of Gisborne v King [1995] 1 VR 103 at 106–7 per Tadgell J (App Div)); WA O 66 r 5(2). See also Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 486G; Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153; BC200502983 at [4]–[7] per Hodgson JA, at [143]–[150] per McColl JA (in the context of the statutory prohibition on lawyers acting without reasonable prospects of success: see 23.53–23.57). 339. WA O 66 r 5(2). 340. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 99(4) (before 15 August 2005, Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 76C(3); NSW RSC Pt 52A rr 43(4), 43A(4) (notice to barrister’s instructing solicitor or client)) (see also Supreme Court, Practice Note No SC Gen 5, para 11, 17 August 2005 (previously Practice Note No 108 (2000) 47 NSWLR 629, para 6(e))); NT r 63.21(6); SA r 13(3) (b) (formerly SA RSC r 101.06(4)); Tas r 61(3); Vic r 63.23(6); WA O 66 r 5(4). 341. Fam LR 2004 r 19.11(2) (cf the former Fam LR 1984 O 38 r 35(6)). 342. FCR 1979 O 62 r 9(5) (with effect on 11 August 2003) (superseded); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 99(5) (before 15 August 2005, NSW RSC Pt 52A rr 43(5) (solicitors), 43A(5) (barristers)). See also Supreme Court, Practice Note No SC Gen 5, para 11, 17 August 2005 (previously Practice Note No 108 (2000) 47 NSWLR 629, para 6(g)). 343. See 4.24.

[page 827]

PART VI

Costs in Criminal Cases Costs in criminal cases deserve treatment separate from the material that appears in Part II largely due to the fact that in criminal cases, as distinct from civil litigation, the courts have traditionally presumed that the Crown neither pays nor receives costs. Hence, aside from statute that expressly confers upon the court a power to award costs in criminal cases, no such power exists. The subject of Chapter 24 concerns the various statutory provisions that, in both indictable and summary proceedings, constitute a source of this jurisdiction, and discusses the judicial approach to the exercise of discretion thereunder. In Chapter 25 is discussed the specific and, in some senses, more expansive, New South Wales, Tasmanian and Western Australian legislation governing costs in criminal cases. Hence, so far as the law in those jurisdictions is concerned, Chapters 24 and 25 must be read in tandem.

[page 829]

CHAPTER 24

Costs in Criminal Cases Common Law Rule: Crown Neither Pays Nor Receives Costs

24.2

Costs in Proceedings for Indictable Offences 24.6 Statutory conferral of jurisdiction 24.7 The Territories, Queensland and South Australia 24.8 New South Wales (and arguably other jurisdictions) — stay of proceedings unless Crown pays costs 24.9 Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia 24.11 The ‘criminal cause or matter’ proviso 24.12 Meaning of ‘criminal cause or matter’ 24.12 Relationship to costs discretion 24.16 Specific costs provisions in crimes legislation 24.18 Queensland 24.19 Tasmania and Victoria 24.21 Western Australia 24.22 Costs in Summary Proceedings Statutory provisions Australian Capital Territory New South Wales Northern Territory Queensland South Australia Tasmania

24.23 24.24 24.24 24.25 24.28 24.29 24.32 24.35

Victoria Western Australia Exercise of costs discretion Application of principles in Latoudis v Casey Backdrop to Latoudis v Casey Facts of Latoudis v Casey Rationale for applying usual ‘costs follow the event’ rule Circumstances in which usual rule can be ousted Quantum of costs Discretion Costs fixed by the court Taxation or assessment of costs Costs in Criminal Appeals Specific statutory provisions governing costs in appeals

24.36 24.37 24.38 24.39 24.40 24.41 24.42 24.45 24.52 24.52 24.53 24.55 24.56 24.58 [page 830]

New South Wales Northern Territory Queensland South Australia Tasmania Victoria Western Australia Special leave to appeal against conviction

24.58 24.61 24.62 24.63 24.64 24.66 24.67 24.71

24.1 This chapter discusses the jurisdiction and practice of the court to make a costs order in criminal proceedings. It is divided according to the type of

proceeding, namely indictable1 as opposed to summary,2 concluding with a discussion of the jurisdiction to order costs in criminal appeals.3 It cannot be seen as comprehensive for New South Wales, Tasmania and Western Australia because of legislation in those jurisdictions enacted for the purpose of providing costs in certain criminal proceedings. This legislation is discussed in Chapter 25, which must be read in tandem with the material in this chapter.

Common Law Rule: Crown Neither Pays Nor Receives Costs 24.2 The well-established general rule at common law is that the Crown neither receives nor pays costs. This has been historically explained on the ground that ‘as it is [the King’s] prerogative not to pay them to a subject, so it is beneath his dignity to receive them’.4 Also, as the Crown acts in the public interest when conducting criminal prosecutions, it is said that ‘its discretion should not be influenced or fettered by the threat of a costs award’, and that ‘[c]osts are not usually deployed in criminal law to influence the conduct of litigation’ — the ‘threat of conviction and loss of liberty provides an adequate incentive to the accused to defend the case’.5 The notion of Crown prerogative (or Crown immunity) as a justification for the rule is frequently repeated in the case law,6 even though the rule can be ousted by statute, whether by express words or by necessary implication.7 So if it is clear that the legislature when authorising an award of costs meant to include every case, whether the Crown was interested or not, the Crown by assenting to the legislation is subject to it.8 [page 831] 24.3 Yet in that common law courts, unlike courts of equity, never assumed the inherent power to award costs, but relied upon a statutory enactment as the source of power,9 the rule that the Crown did not pay or receive costs, except as prescribed by statute, arguably reflects no more than the general position at common law, and not any special prerogative of the Crown. To

this end, Brooking J in R v Wright, Danci and Currie10 suggested that the reason why costs cannot be awarded against the Crown on, say, a prosecution for an indictable offence, is not the special position of the Crown, but the simpler and more fundamental reason that, in the absence of statute, there is no power to award costs. This led him to conclude as follows:11 Accordingly, in the absence of some statute enabling courts to order payment of costs in prosecutions for indictable offences, the fundamental operative principle was, not that the Sovereign did not pay costs, as it was her prerogative not to pay them to a subject, and did not receive costs, because that was beneath her dignity … but that, costs being the creature of statute, the court had in the absence of statute no power to order payment of costs either by or to the accused, whether the prosecution was for the Queen or a private prosecutor. The special position of the Crown arose for consideration only where the prosecution was for the Queen and some statute did provide for the payment of costs: it was then a question whether the statute authorised the making of an order for costs in favour of or against the Crown.

24.4 Statute now provides that in civil proceedings the Crown is liable to pay costs and is entitled to receive them according to the same rules as apply ‘between subject and subject’.12 But in so far as criminal proceedings are concerned, it is difficult to make a like generalisation, for statute varies between jurisdictions in its impact on the common law rule. Various statutory initiatives in all Australian jurisdictions regarding costs in summary proceedings have not always been replicated in respect of prosecutions upon indictment. In the latter context, statutory impact has been more restrained, no doubt influenced by the historical notion that the Crown, which technically brings all criminal prosecutions on indictment (as opposed to summary proceedings),13 does not pay or receive costs. Hence, the distinction is replicated in the structure of this chapter.14 24.5 The above does not affect the court’s jurisdiction to make costs orders against lawyers personally, discussed in Chapter 23, which applies in respect of both civil and criminal proceedings.15 [page 832]

Costs in Proceedings for Indictable Offences 24.6 The need to distinguish between summary and indictable proceedings stems from the fact that statute traditionally creates costs entitlements in the

former, but not the latter. Costs orders are not required in indictable proceedings, it is reasoned, because, first, the committal process is designed to prevent unmeritorious matters going to trial; second, there is greater availability of legal aid for a person accused of an indictable offence; and third, of the potential deterrent effect on the prosecution given that costs in a trial exceed those in summary proceedings.16 Although nowadays statute provides some statutory avenues for costs orders in trials for indictable offences, the remnants of this dichotomy remain, albeit not without some criticism by law reform bodies17 and others.18

Statutory conferral of jurisdiction 24.7 As discussed elsewhere,19 the power to order costs in Australian superior courts derived largely from the template of s 5 of the Judicature Act 1890 (UK), which provided that ‘the costs of and incidental to all proceedings in the Supreme Court … shall be at the discretion of the Court or Judge and the Court or Judge shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent such costs are to be paid’. All Australian jurisdictions have enacted legislation and/or court rules that confer upon their superior courts a costs discretion that reflects that in s 5.20 However, s 4 of the Judicature Act 1890 provided that nothing in the Act ‘shall alter the practice in any criminal cause or matter’.

The territories, Queensland and South Australia 24.8 In the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland the statutory conferral of a power to order costs equivalent to s 5 above is found in statute or rules expressed to apply only to civil proceedings.21 It cannot, as a result, form the basis for a power to award costs in proceedings for indictable offences. Though equivalent rules or statute in the Northern Territory and South Australia are not ostensibly so confined,22 courts have not interpreted these provisions as extending to indictable offences, essentially reading them down as insufficient to oust the common law rule that the Crown neither receives nor pays costs.23 This view draws support from the fact that in the Northern Territory (and Queensland) the Criminal Code makes limited

reference to costs orders in criminal proceedings,24 it being reasoned that there would [page 833] be no need for a provision of this kind if the court already had an unfettered power to make costs orders in such cases. The foregoing draws support from the Victorian Full Court’s judgment in R v Wright, Danci and Currie,25 where the issue was whether s 78A(1) of the County Court Act 1958 (Vic) — which confers upon that court a general discretion to award ‘the costs of and incidental to all proceedings’26 — enables orders as to costs to be made in prosecutions for indictable offences. The court remarked that the provision upon which s 78A(1) was based, namely s 5 of the Judicature Act 1890 (UK), was not enacted to confer a power to award costs in trials for indictable offences, which power was unknown at common law.27 Also, the court reasoned, it was highly unlikely that the parliament would have intended to confer on the County Court a power to award costs in criminal trials which the Supreme Court lacked, especially given that the criminal jurisdiction of the County Court is more limited than that of the Supreme Court.28 Moreover, in that s 545 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) expressly authorises the award of costs against a convicted person,29 had parliament intended s 78A to vest the County Court with a jurisdiction to award costs in such cases, one would expect to find s 545 to have been in some way affected.30 So it was held that the term ‘proceedings’ in s 5, and therefore in s 78A(1), was not intended to include the trial of an indictable offence.

New South Wales (and arguably other jurisdictions) — stay of proceedings unless Crown pays costs 24.9 New South Wales superior court legislation makes no specific reference to a special rule applying to criminal causes or matters; the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 (NSW) instead governs the issue.31 Nor does the District Court Act 1973 (NSW) empower a judge to order costs in criminal proceedings and so, in respect of criminal proceedings outside of the Costs in

Criminal Cases Act, costs can be awarded only as prescribed by another statute.32 Yet authority indicates that, although the District Court lacks power to grant an adjournment subject to an order for costs,33 the Crown’s failure to pay to the accused costs thrown away by an adjournment at the instance of the Crown can influence the court.34 As explained by James J in R v Seebag:35 If in the District Court the Crown applies for an adjournment of a trial and the application is opposed by the accused the court can … in a proper case either simply grant the adjournment or simply refuse the adjournment. The court can in a proper case ask the Crown to agree voluntarily to pay any costs of the accused which would be thrown away if the application for an adjournment is granted. If the Crown will not agree to pay those costs, that will be a factor which the District

[page 834] Court judge should take into account, along with all the other relevant factors, in deciding whether to grant the application by the Crown for an adjournment. However, there will be occasions where the requirements of justice are such that notwithstanding that the Crown is not willing voluntarily to pay the costs, the application by the Crown for an adjournment should be granted.

Although Smart J in Seebag queried whether the grant of an adjournment by a District Court judge on the basis that there will be a stay of proceedings pending payment of an accused’s costs was tantamount to an order that the Crown pay the costs of the accused,36 the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Fisher37 confirmed that the court may refuse the Crown’s application for an adjournment on this ground. The exercise of this power, according to the court, rests in avoiding unfairness to the accused arising out of the Crown’s acts or omissions in the trial(s). What influenced the court in Fisher to stay proceedings until the Crown paid costs was that the defendant’s second trial had been aborted entirely due to the fault of the Crown. Santow JA opined that ‘[w]hile it might be argued that the distinction between imposing an order for costs and staying a trial until costs are paid is a narrow one, nonetheless the distinction is real and important’, and that ‘[i]t remains a matter for the Crown as to whether it ultimately chooses to proceed and pay the wasted costs, or decline to proceed’.38 His Honour then explained his reasoning in making the stay order on the facts:39 It may nonetheless be argued that the effect of the stay ordered in the present case is, in a practical sense, to force the Crown to pay the wasted costs, while eschewing an order

compelling it to do so. The argument proceeds that the practical effect of such an order is to force the Crown to make the payment, as otherwise the Crown would be prevented from vindicating the public interest, here in holding directors to account for alleged breaches of their directorial duties. But the Crown is under no duty to conduct the prosecutions in a grossly unfair fashion. The power of granting a stay against the Crown until wasted costs are paid is to be used only for the rare and extreme case of gross unfairness on the part of the Crown. That is to say, unfairness which, exceptionally, can override the public interest in pursuing a criminal prosecution, though to be weighed against what is the urgency of bringing the case to trial. It is nonetheless certainly not against the public interest that the Crown, as a model litigant, pursue its criminal prosecutions with proper fairness. But to abort a second re-trial in the circumstances of the present prosecution by reason of the Crown’s own failure to produce a document, even accepting inadvertence, and then ignore the consequence for the defendant in further wasted costs in so proceeding to a third trial, is unjust and unfair, meriting the description of exceptional circumstances.

It follows that a stay order will not be made as a matter of course, but will remain by far the exception than the rule. It is grounded not in any express or implied costs jurisdiction, but in the court’s broader jurisdiction aimed at ensuring fairness to the accused in criminal cases. Grounded as the jurisdiction is on fault of the Crown — it may be that the Crown’s delay had caused ‘wasted costs’ or that the Crown otherwise seeks the indulgence of the court because it is not ready or in a position to proceed.40 ‘Fault’ in this context does not require proof of bad faith — its exercise will also be informed by any fault on the part of the accused.41 Any financial hardship suffered by the accused in the circumstances may also be relevant.42 No issue [page 835] arises if the Crown has offered to the court an undertaking to pay the costs as a term of the adjournment.43 24.10 There is case authority in the Australian Capital Territory and South Australia following the above approach. In R v Ulman-Naruniec44 Sulan J, with whom Bleby and Besanko JJ concurred on this point, noted that although neither of the earlier two trials had been aborted due to the Crown’s ‘flagrant breach’ of its duty of disclosure, it was clear that the Crown’s failure to make disclosure resulted in those trials being flawed. This, according to the court, created an unfairness to the accused in the present trial. The trial judge ordered a stay of the Crown proceedings until costs of the earlier trials

had been paid in order to alleviate the unfairness to the accused of having to face a third trial, which order Sulan J upheld.45 In R v Martiniello46 the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court considered that case authority did not preclude imposing a costs requirement on a stay of proceedings following an adjournment on the Crown’s application. More recently, the same court in R v Bui,47 though perhaps not without misgivings,48 ruled that ‘the court has power to make such a stay order conditional upon the prosecution paying costs if required to address substantial unfairness not otherwise able to be cured’. Refshauge J, in line with the views of Santow JA in Fisher, emphasised that a conditional stay order should be an exceptional remedy, because:49 … [t]oo frequent a use will undermine the present legislative position that in criminal proceedings the Crown neither pays nor receives costs. It also has the capacity to put at risk the current immunity from payment of costs that accused persons enjoy, though, of course, it is almost impossible to see a stay order being made against an accused person at first instance; a stay is almost always a remedy applied against the initiator of proceedings, which at first instance will always be the Crown. Nevertheless, there are instances where an accused will initiate proceedings, such as an interlocutory application in proceedings or on appeal.

There were nonetheless particular features in Bui, according to his Honour, that made the case exceptional.50 First, the accused, through his lawyers, flagged in detailed submissions at committal nearly two years earlier some of the gaps in evidence that were only recently addressed. Second, there had been unwarranted and unexplained delay in the prosecution obtaining and providing the evidentiary material to address these gaps. Third, this material was supplied too late to permit the trial to proceed fairly on the date allocated over a year previously, at which time no intimation was given that further material was to be provided. Fourth, delay ensued prior to the committal proceedings when case management hearings were adjourned because of the prosecution’s unpreparedness. Fifth, reasonable requests by the accused for information to which he was fairly entitled had been met with obstruction and [page 836] unreasonable delay. As there was proven fault on the part of the prosecution that caused the vacation of the trial date, Refshauge J ordered that the

proceedings should be temporarily stayed, and that the prosecution pay the wasted costs of the accused.

Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia 24.11 The Victorian legislation contains a provision equivalent to s 4; it states that nothing in the section that confers on the Supreme Court a general costs discretion51 — the equivalent to s 5 — ‘alters the practice in any criminal proceeding’.52 ‘Criminal proceeding’ arguably means the same as ‘criminal cause or matter’, and so meaning must be given to this terminology, and an understanding between the ss 4 and 5 equivalents must be sought. Each of these points is discussed below.53 The Western Australian legislation adopts slightly different wording, to the effect that nothing in the equivalent to s 554 ‘shall alter the practice in proceedings in relation to the prerogative and criminal jurisdiction of the Court’.55 Despite this variation is terminology, it seems directed at the same mischief as its Victorian counterpart. In each of these jurisdictions, statute dealing with indictable offences in any event contains specific costs provisions,56 as does the relevant statute in Tasmania,57 which has also enacted specific ‘costs in criminal cases’ legislation.58

The ‘criminal cause or matter’ proviso Meaning of ‘criminal cause or matter’ 24.12 The proviso that nothing in the statute ‘shall alter the practice in any criminal cause or matter’ — and its Victorian and Western Australian equivalents — requires a determination of whether a cause or matter is criminal or civil. A commonly cited test is that stated by Lord Wright in Amand v Home Secretary and Minister of Defence of Royal Netherlands Government59 that a ‘criminal cause or matter’ is one that ‘if carried to its conclusion, might result in the conviction of the person charged and in a sentence of some punishment, such as imprisonment or fine’. Hill J, following this lead in R v Scott,60 stated that at the core of a criminal cause or matter lies the question of whether there is involved a breach of public law for which punishment may be imposed. It is not, therefore, limited to crimes punishable upon indictment.61

24.13 Importantly, courts have emphasised that the words ‘criminal cause or matter’ should not be construed narrowly, but receive ‘the widest possible interpretation’.62 This has seen the [page 837] phrase apply to a judicial determination of a question raised in or with regard to proceedings the subject matter of which is criminal, at whatever stage of the proceedings the question arises.63 So provided the proceeding or matter is itself ‘a step in a criminal proceeding’, in the sense of not logically separate and distinct from the criminal proceeding, it arises as part of a criminal proceeding, cause or matter and so is a criminal proceeding or matter.64 An order upon the trial of a person on indictment is accordingly an order in a criminal cause or matter, as is the decision on an application to stay the trial, change its venue or to adjourn it, to grant bail pending re-trial, or to appeal against sentence.65 For example, in R v Scott66 the respondent was committed to trial and released on bail, but the Director of Public Prosecutions elected not to present an indictment. The respondent was discharged, and sought costs against the Crown. Consistent with the broad approach outlined above, Hill J remarked that it is not necessary that a charge has been laid against an accused person or that an indictment has been filed before the proceedings can be said to be criminal; it is sufficient if there are proceedings about to be commenced, provided those proceedings themselves otherwise qualify as criminal proceedings.67 What had occurred was thus so inextricably part of the criminal proceeding to be classified as a criminal proceeding, and it did not matter that the indictment was not in fact filed.68 24.14 Consistent with the foregoing, it is not the practice to award costs for or against an accused on a bail application.69 Public policy reasons also justify this outcome, which Goldberg J explained in Cabal v United Mexican States (No 6) as follows:70 Although an order for costs is made to compensate a successful party for the expenses incurred in responding to an application or proceeding, that principle of compensation should yield in favour of the principle that a person detained by authority of the State should not be deterred by a potential costs order from seeking his or her liberty. There is a public interest in ensuring that persons detailed against their will should not have any impediment put in their way which will inhibit them in seeking their liberty. In my view the public interest outweighs the general rule

that a successful party is to be compensated for its costs by the unsuccessful party. In particular is this so where the costs are incurred by the State under whose authority the person is detained.

24.15 So broad is the curial interpretation of the phrase ‘criminal cause or matter’ that it has been held to encompass not only a proceeding that itself is criminal, but also a proceeding not criminal in itself but adjunct to an underlying proceeding that is criminal.71 For example, an application for the prerogative writ of certiorari, if directed to a magistrate after trial of a summary offence, is properly characterised as a ‘criminal proceeding’ because the underlying proceeding is criminal.72 [page 838] In Carter v Managing Partner, Mallesons Stephen Jaques73 three subpoenas issued against the respondent by the appellant were set aside on the ground that they were oppressive. The appellant contested an application for a costs order against him following that finding on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction because the subpoenas were issued in a ‘criminal cause’. Malcolm CJ held, applying the Amand test74 to the facts,75 that the orders setting aside the subpoenas must be regarded as orders made in a criminal cause or matter because of the character of the underlying criminal proceedings.76 But this should not be read as indicating that all proceedings to set aside a subpoena are criminal in nature. In Commissioner of Police v Salasch,77 where a subpoena issued to the Commissioner of Police was returnable before the date of the trial and any indication of the plea, it was held that there was no criminal proceeding then current, thus raising no jurisdictional bar to an order for costs in favour of the Commissioner in his successful application to have the subpoena set aside.

Relationship to costs discretion 24.16 If the proceeding is a ‘criminal proceeding’, next must be addressed the effect of the proviso that it is not to ‘alter the practice in any criminal cause or matter’ (termed s 4 for this purpose, following the numbering of the original English legislation) in qualifying the operation of the general costs discretion (termed s 5 for this purpose). The relationship between ss 4 and 5 is the

subject of two varying views. There is the view that s 4 excepts ‘any criminal proceeding’ from the operation of s 5 altogether, with the result that s 5 confers no jurisdiction over costs in relation to a ‘criminal proceeding’ within the meaning of s 4. This view was taken by Cooper J in R v Scott,78 following the approach of Lord Esher MR and Fry LJ in London County Council v Churchwardens and Overseers of West Ham,79 who had held that s 4 excluded from the grant of power in s 5 those categories of cases mentioned in s 4. 24.17 The converse view is that, although the operation of s 5 to confer jurisdiction over costs is subject to s 4, s 5 does not cease to apply to a ‘criminal proceeding’ within the meaning of s 4; instead s 5 operates to vest jurisdiction over costs to be exercised conformably with any relevant practice in criminal proceedings. This view enjoys the most widespread judicial support80 because, inter alia, it puts better emphasis on the wording of s 4 that saves ‘the practice in any criminal proceeding’. On this view, s 4 does not except from the operation of s 5 ‘any criminal [page 839] proceeding’; it does no more than preserve ‘the practice in any criminal proceeding’, so that the jurisdiction conferred by s 5 can be exercised only conformably with that practice. The relevant practice, which was well recognised in 1890 when the Judicature Act was passed, was that the Crown neither gives nor receives costs.81 So on this approach, if that practice does not apply to the proceeding in issue, s 5 — the general costs discretion — operates. In Carter v Managing Partner, Mallesons Stephen Jaques,82 for example, Malcolm CJ found no relevant practice established in the Supreme Court’s criminal jurisdiction affecting the position of third parties served with subpoenas, and so the proviso could have no relevant application. The case therefore fell back into the general discretion to award costs, and so the trial judge had the power to award costs.83 In Byrnes v Barry84 the Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal held that, in a private prosecution to which the Crown was not a party (an application for leave to prosecute defamatory libel), there was no relevant practice limiting the trial judge’s power to award costs. Crispin P and

Connolly J accepted that the ‘sound public policy’ basis for the practice against awarding costs for or against the Crown in criminal proceedings, but added that:85 … there is no such rationale for a general prohibition in private prosecutions. Indeed, it may be said that it would be anomalous if a party who felt that they had been defamed would be at risk of an adverse costs order if they launched ordinary civil proceedings, but could put the publisher to considerable cost and inconvenience by seeking to launch criminal defamation proceedings with no risk of an adverse costs order, particularly in a case such as the present where … [the trial judge] formed the view that the proceedings brought by the present appellant at no stage had any reasonable prospects of success.

Specific costs provisions in crimes legislation 24.18 The Queensland, Tasmanian, Victorian and Western Australian legislation dealing with indictable offences contains specific provisions conferring jurisdiction to order costs. These modify the general rule at law that the Crown neither pays nor receives costs, and so aside from these provisions, there is no source of power to order costs.86 The Queensland and Western Australian provisions follow the same schema, as do the Tasmanian and Victorian provisions, so these jurisdictions are grouped below.

Queensland 24.19 Provision is made for costs to be awarded in favour of both the person aggrieved by the offence and the offender. As to the former, when a person is convicted on indictment of any indictable offence against the person, the court may, on the application of the person aggrieved, in addition to any sentence passed upon the offender, adjudge the offender to pay to the person aggrieved the person’s costs of prosecution, together with a sum by way of compensation for any loss of time suffered by the person by reason of the offence of which the offender is convicted.87 If any money was found on the person of the offender on the offender’s arrest, the court may order it to be applied towards the payment of any money so ordered to be paid by the offender.88 [page 840]

When an order is made for the payment of money by way of compensation to an aggrieved person, the offender is not liable to any civil proceedings for the same cause at the suit of that person.89 The proper officer of the court in which the indictment is presented must tax the costs of a prosecution90 or defence.91 24.20 The court before which the trial is had may award costs to an accused person if: first, the accused pleads to the information and is not brought to trial within a year after filing the person’s plea;92 second, a Crown Law Officer informs the court that he or she will not further proceed on the information; or third, the accused person is acquitted upon trial.93 In R v Jackson94 it was held this provision applies only to a private information and not to an ex officio indictment, so that there is no power to award costs against the Crown on an ex officio indictment.

Tasmania and Victoria 24.21 On conviction of a person for a crime (in Victoria, an indictable offence), the court may, in addition to any other sentence, condemn that person to pay the whole or part of the costs or expenses incurred in or about the prosecution and conviction for the crime of which he or she is convicted.95 The payment of such costs and expenses may be ordered out of moneys taken from the convicted person on his or her apprehension.96 There is statutory provision in Victoria, moreover, for a court to ‘make any order that it considers appropriate with respect to the costs of and incidental to’ a criminal trial in defined circumstances where a party has behaved in a fashion that is not consistent with the proper conduct of the trial.97

Western Australia 24.22 Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), the Western Australian Criminal Code made provision like its Queensland counterpart, noted above.98 The 2004 Act, via s 123(2), prohibits a superior court ordering a party to a case to pay another party’s costs of or relating to proceedings in the court that relate to a charge in an indictment, or a charge on which an accused has been committed to the court, except under s 166(2). The latter provides that, on an application by a witness, a party to the case or

a person who has a sufficient interest in a witness summons, the court may order a party to the application to pay all or some of another such party’s costs. [page 841]

Costs in Summary Proceedings 24.23 In all jurisdictions statute has displaced the common law rule that the Crown neither receives nor pays costs by vesting discretion to award costs in criminal proceedings in courts of summary jurisdiction. As the scope of the discretion conferred varies between jurisdictions, each must be considered separately.

Statutory provisions Australian Capital Territory 24.24 Where the Magistrates Court makes a conviction or order in favour of the informant,99 it may order that the defendant pay to the informant such costs as it thinks just and reasonable.100 If, on the other hand, that court dismisses the information, or makes an order in favour of the defendant, it may order that the informant pay to the defendant such costs as it thinks just and reasonable.101 In this context, the Supreme Court may, by order, exercise any power that the Magistrates Court might have exercised.102 The Magistrates Court may order the informant to pay to the accused such costs as it thinks just if it forms the opinion that the prosecution’s evidence is not capable of satisfying a jury beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed an indictable offence or that a jury would not convict the defendant of an indictable offence, or that the proceedings are discontinued for any other reason.103

New South Wales

24.25 The Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) separately prescribes the award of costs in committal proceedings,104 in trials in lower courts105 and pursuant to the Supreme Court’s summary jurisdiction.106 There were previously provisions directed to a similar purpose in the Justices Act 1902 (NSW).107 So far as committal proceedings are concerned, a magistrate may, at the end of committal proceedings, order that the prosecutor pay professional costs,108 in an amount that the magistrate considers to be just and reasonable, in favour of an accused who is discharged as to the subject matter of the offence or the matter is withdrawn, or to an accused [page 842] committed for trial or sentence for an indictable offence that is not the same as the indictable offence the subject of the court attendance notice.109 At the end of summary proceedings, the court may order the prosecutor to pay professional costs, again in an amount that is just and reasonable, in favour of the accused if the matter is dismissed or withdrawn.110 Also, a prosecutor in summary proceedings may be ordered to pay professional costs if the matter is dismissed because the prosecutor fails to appear, or the matter is withdrawn or the proceedings are for any reason invalid.111 The Act also provides for the award of costs to a prosecutor in summary proceedings. It empowers the court, at the end of summary proceedings, to order an accused who is convicted or has had an order made against him or her to pay court costs112 and such professional costs as the court considers just and reasonable.113 Within the summary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the court may order an accused to pay costs, whether as specified by the court, or otherwise determined by agreement or assessment, if the court convicts the accused of an offence or, notwithstanding a finding of guilt, dismisses the charge or conditionally discharges the accused.114 If, on the other hand, the matter is dismissed or withdrawn, or the accused is discharged as to the offence the subject of the proceedings, the court may order the prosecutor pay professional costs in favour of the accused, again as specified by the court or as determined either by agreement or assessment.115 Here the onus of satisfying the court of an entitlement to costs is on the accused,116 whereas

the prosecution carries the onus of establishing any costs order against the accused. 24.26 In the aftermath of the High Court’s decision in Latoudis v Casey,117 and for the purpose of negativing the majority view in that case,118 the (then) legislation was amended to prohibit the award of professional costs in favour of an accused unless the magistrate or court is satisfied that:119 (a) the investigation into the alleged offence was conducted in an [page 843] unreasonable or improper manner;120 (b) the proceedings were initiated without reasonable cause121 or in bad faith, or were conducted by the prosecutor in an improper manner; (c) the prosecution unreasonably failed to (properly) investigate any relevant matter of which it was aware (or ought reasonably to have been aware) and that suggested either that the accused person might not be guilty or that, for any other reason, the proceedings should not have been brought; or (d) because of other exceptional circumstances122 relating to the conduct of the proceedings by the prosecutor, it is just and reasonable123 to award costs.124 Equivalent provision is made by statute in respect of criminal appeals.125 These provisions, it has been judicially remarked, aim to ‘severely restrict the discretion to award costs against [page 844] the prosecution’.126 But the foregoing does not apply to the award of costs against a prosecutor acting in a private capacity.127 24.27 Again in each case, a magistrate or court may, on his or her motion or on the application of a party, and whatever the result of the proceedings, order that one party pay costs where the matter is adjourned if he or she is satisfied that the other party has incurred additional costs because of the unreasonable conduct or delay of the party against whom the order is made.128

Northern Territory 24.28 In the Northern Territory, if the court finds a defendant not guilty of any offence on a complaint, or a complaint is withdrawn, it may order the complainant to pay to the defendant ‘such costs as it thinks fit’.129 However, no such order can be made if the court is of the opinion that: 130 the defendant’s action or omissions in connection with the alleged offence were unreasonable in the circumstances and contributed to the institution or continuation of the proceedings; the defendant’s actions or omissions during the course of the proceedings or in the conduct of the defence were calculated to unnecessarily prolong the proceedings or cause unnecessary expense; or there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt but the defendant was entitled to an acquittal because of a minor procedural irregularity. Where the court finds a defendant guilty of an offence, it may order him or her to pay to the complainant such costs as it thinks fit.131 If a proceeding is adjourned, the court may, whether or not the defendant is later found guilty of the offence charged, order costs against the party who requested the adjournment.132 The amount that the court may order for costs cannot exceed that calculated in accordance with the prescribed scale.133

Queensland 24.29 In Queensland, in cases of summary convictions134 and orders the justices may, in their discretion, order by the conviction or order that the defendant pay to the complainant such costs as to them seem just and reasonable.135 If the justices instead dismiss the complaint, they may order the complainant to pay to the defendant such costs as to them seem just and reasonable.136 However, the justices may make a costs order against a complainant who is a police officer or public officer only if they are satisfied that it is proper that the costs order [page 845]

be made.137 In so deciding, the justices must take into account all relevant circumstances, including whether:138 the proceeding was brought and continued in good faith; there was a failure to take appropriate steps to investigate a matter coming to, or within, the knowledge of a person responsible for bringing or continuing the proceeding; the investigation into the offence was conducted in an appropriate way; the order of dismissal was made on technical grounds and not on a finding that there was insufficient evidence to convict or make an order against the defendant; the defendant brought suspicion on himself or herself by conduct engaged in after the events constituting the commission of the offence; the defendant unreasonably declined an opportunity before a charge was laid to explain his or her version of the events, or to produce evidence likely to exonerate him or her, and that explanation or evidence could have avoided a prosecution; the defendant conducted the defence in a way that prolonged the proceeding unreasonably; and the defendant was acquitted on a charge, but convicted on another. The foregoing was a response to the High Court’s decision in Latoudis v Casey,139 its aim being to replace the principles espoused in Latoudis by statutory provision amounting to a ‘virtual codification’ of the main factors to be considered in deciding whether costs should be awarded against a police officer or a public officer whose complaint is dismissed by justices.140 The listed factors are not exhaustive, though, and it is open to the court to take into account other factors relevant to costs. For example, in Power v Lewis,141 involving the prosecution of the Deputy Mayor of a council on a charge of giving to the Crime and Misconduct Commission a document containing false and misleading information, which the magistrate found not to be sustained, Samios DCJ held that the magistrate should have taken into account the seriousness of the prosecution for the accused and its potential impact on his career, his continued role in that capacity and his general public

standing. In view of this, his Honour saw it as expected that the accused would engage senior counsel and experienced lawyers to act on his behalf, which justified not only a costs order in the accused’s favour but an order at a higher amount than that prescribed by regulation.142 24.30 When a complaint is before a Magistrates Court that lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine it, the court must order it be struck out for want of jurisdiction, and may order the [page 846] complainant to pay to the defendant such costs as to the court seem just and reasonable.143 If an order for costs is made against a complainant who is a police officer or public officer,144 the clerk of the court must give to the defendant a certificate signed by the clerk showing the amount of costs awarded.145 The defendant is entitled to be paid by the state the amount shown in the certificate within two months after payment is claimed, unless that costs order is appealed, in which case the certificate is stayed until the appeal is decided.146 24.31 In deciding the costs that are just and reasonable for the above purposes, the justices may award costs only for an item allowed under a scale of costs prescribed by regulation, and only up to the amount allowed for the item under the scale.147 The justices may, however, allow a higher amount for costs if satisfied that this is just and reasonable having regard to the special difficulty, complexity or importance of the case.148

South Australia 24.32 The general statutory rule, prescribed by s 189 of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA), is that the Magistrates Court may award such costs for or against a party to proceedings as it thinks fit. However, if the court finds a defendant guilty in proceedings for an offence prosecuted by a police officer, it must make an order for costs against the defendant for the prescribed amount149 unless the prosecution agrees that a costs order should not be made, in which case the court may make some other order as to costs

(or no order as to costs).150 Costs are not awarded against a party to a preliminary examination of an indictable offence unless the court is satisfied that the party has unreasonably obstructed the proceedings.151 Nor will costs be awarded against a complainant in proceedings for a restraining order unless the court is satisfied that the complainant acted in bad faith152 or unreasonably in bringing the proceedings.153 The purpose of this latter provision is to remove the cost disincentive for people who, as a matter of policy, should not be dissuaded from using the legislation, whether or not those applications were ultimately successful.154 The Act also provides for costs orders where proceedings are delayed through the neglect or incompetence of a lawyer, or of a prosecutor who is not a lawyer, and where proceedings are unreasonably obstructed by a party or a witness, or proceedings are delayed through the failure of a party or a witness to appear before the court when required to do so.155 [page 847] 24.33 With effect from 6 May 2004, r 51.01 was inserted into the Magistrates Court (Criminal) Rules 1992, which states that, subject to the rules, the provisions of an Act or a court order, ‘a successful party in an action is entitled to costs against an unsuccessful party’. For this purpose, a ‘successful party’ includes a party who instigates proceedings that are admitted by plea of guilty, and a party who defends proceedings that are withdrawn or dismissed as a result of no evidence being tendered.156 Although it has been suggested that r 51.01 recapitulates the effect of s 189,157 the latter envisages a general discretion whereas the former speaks in terms of a presumptive starting point. In any case, as r 51.01 takes the form of a statutory rule, it cannot qualify or restrict the wide discretion invested in the court by s 189.158 24.34 Under r 51.03, subject to any court order to the contrary, the scale of costs set out in the first schedule of the rules applies. Again, r 51.03 cannot qualify the general discretion as to the costs, which includes one as to quantum, vested in a magistrate by s 189(1). Debelle J explained the relationship between the provisions as follows in Curnow v Police:159 Rule 51.03 is complementary to s 189(1). Rule 51.03 does not purport to regulate the question whether an award as to costs should be made. Instead, Rule 51.03 assumes that an order has

been made that costs are to be paid by one party to another. The purpose of Rule 51.03 is simply to provide one means by which the court may assess the amount of costs to be paid. It does so by prescribing a scale which is to operate in the absence of an order to the contrary. At the same time, a magistrate has a discretion whether to order that costs be assessed on a basis other than that in the First Schedule.

Accordingly, r 51.03 establishes what is in effect a default provision, that is, a scale that applies in those cases in which the court makes no contrary order. Although there is a judicial statement to the effect that this default position is to be departed from only in exceptional or special circumstances,160 which another judge criticised for fettering the court’s discretion,161 it has been viewed as confined to occasions that justify an indemnity costs order.162

Tasmania 24.35 In Tasmania, where justices make a conviction or order in favour of the complainant they may, in their discretion, order that the defendant pay to the complainant the whole or a specified proportion163 of his or her costs of and incidental to the complaint.164 Where justices dismiss the complaint for a breach of duty or make an order in favour of the defendant they may, in their discretion, order the complainant to pay to the defendant the whole or a specified [page 848] proportion of his or her costs of and incidental to the defence.165 When a case is adjourned, the justices may, in their discretion, order that the costs of, or occasioned by, the adjournment, be paid by any party to any other party;166 otherwise there is no power in justices to order the payment of costs of an interlocutory decision.167 The foregoing does not prejudice or affect the operation of the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1976 (Tas).168

Victoria 24.36 Sub-section 401(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) states that, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or court rules, costs of,

and incidental to, all criminal proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court are in the discretion of the court and the court has full power to determine by whom, to whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid.169 In exercising this discretion, the court may take into account any unreasonable act or omission by or on behalf of a party to the proceeding that it is satisfied prolonged the proceeding.170 The court must not, however, order costs against a party in the exercise of its discretion for this reason without giving that party a reasonable opportunity to be heard.171 If the court awards costs against an informant who is a member of the police force, the order must be made against the Chief Commissioner of Police.172 The foregoing applies to a purported proceeding in the court that is beyond the jurisdiction of the court as if it were within the court’s jurisdiction.173

Western Australia 24.37 Subject to the Official Prosecutions (Accused’s Costs) Act 1973 (WA) — which entitles a successful defendant to costs in an ‘official prosecution’174 — and to what follows, a successful party to a prosecution is entitled to the party’s costs.175 If a court convicts an accused of a charge, it may order the accused to pay all or a part of the prosecutor’s costs, and the amount of costs so [page 849] ordered may be determined in accordance with the relevant costs determination176 or greater in the event of ‘unusual difficulty, complexity or importance’.177 A court may, alternatively, reduce the costs that it would otherwise have awarded, or refuse to award costs, to a party whose act or omission (other than an act or omission that is the subject of a charge) was unreasonable in the circumstances and contributed to the institution or continuation of the case, or whose act or omission was calculated to prolong the case unnecessarily or cause unnecessary expense.178

Exercise of costs discretion

24.38 The statutory provisions discussed above179 disclose that the Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania and Western Australia legislation confers an apparently unfettered power upon a court of summary jurisdiction to order costs in criminal proceedings (which in Tasmania must be read subject to the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1976).180 Equivalent provisions in New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Queensland and Victoria that direct the court to take account of specified factors may operate to circumscribe the discretion somewhat. The South Australian statute contains a general discretion limited in defined contexts, albeit now against the backdrop of a ‘costs follow the event’ starting point prescribed by the rules.

Application of principles in Latoudis v Casey 24.39 The existence of an apparently unfettered costs discretion has led the courts to consider whether they should state guidelines for the exercise of that discretion. The High Court in Latoudis v Casey181 addressed the matter comprehensively. Yet it must be understood that the court was dealing with a statutory provision that conferred a broad discretion simpliciter. So where statute confers discretion upon a magistrate to award costs as are ‘just and reasonable’, or ‘as he or she thinks fit’, and does not purport to restrict that discretion, the principles discussed in Latoudis apply directly.182 If, conversely, the legislation fetters that discretion — by express limitation or by directing the magistrate to consider certain factors — the Latoudis principles cannot be uncritically applied, but must yield to the statutory expression.183

Backdrop to Latoudis v Casey 24.40 Prior to the decision in Latoudis v Casey, the Australian case law showed support for two distinct approaches to the exercise of the statutory discretion. In New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria the authorities favoured the view that the discretion to award the costs [page 850]

of summary criminal proceedings in favour of a defendant is unfettered and that its exercise must depend on the particular circumstances of the case.184 The courts refused to recognise any presumption that a defendant should benefit from a costs order in certain circumstances. The concern was that a presumption would be inconsistent with the statutory conferral of an unfettered discretion. Carter J explained the point in Lewis v Utting in the following terms:185 It seems to me with great respect to those who express it that a rule which states that the discretion is to be exercised in the same way as in a civil case or that an unsuccessful defendant shall have his costs unless he has disqualified himself by particular conduct will as effectively fetter the discretion as will any attempt to list the relevant criteria. That is not to say that the fact that the proceedings are of a criminal nature and that they are instituted by a police officer in the execution of his duty is the decisive consideration.

The approach in South Australia and the territories was that costs ought generally be awarded to a successful defendant. In Hamdorf v Riddle,186 for example, the South Australian Full Court held that, in awarding costs in summary proceedings terminating in favour of a defendant, courts should ‘in a general way’ exercise their discretion as they do in civil cases. With this the Full Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court in McEwen v Siely187 agreed in substance, albeit preferring to express the principle in terms that ‘generally an acquitted defendant should have his costs unless he has by his conduct brought the proceedings or their continuation upon himself or unless some other consideration is present which makes it unjust to award him costs’. Such a view was endorsed in the Northern Territory.188

Facts of Latoudis v Casey 24.41 The task of the High Court in Latoudis v Casey189 was essentially to choose between these approaches. The appellant pleaded not guilty before the Magistrates’ Court on three charges (theft of a motor car, receiving stolen goods and unlawful possession of those goods). The police prosecutor led no evidence on the charge of theft, and it was dismissed. After the close of the prosecution’s case, the magistrate dismissed the receiving charge, and at the close of the defence case, the final charge was also dismissed. The defendant’s application for costs was refused on the grounds that the informant had acted reasonably in instituting the proceedings, and that the defendant had caused suspicion to fall upon himself by not seeking proof of

ownership of the goods when he acquired them. The defendant obtained an order nisi to review [page 851] the magistrate’s refusal to order costs. Kaye J discharged the order, from which the defendant appealed to the High Court. In issue was the now repealed Magistrates (Summary Proceedings) Act 1975 (Vic) s 97(b),190 which authorised the court in dismissing an information to order the informant to pay to the defendant such costs as it thought just and reasonable.

Rationale for applying usual ‘costs follow the event’ rule 24.42 The High Court held, by a three to two majority,191 that the approach adopted in South Australia and the territories was to be preferred,192 namely that costs ought, as a general rule, follow the event. Accordingly, in focusing on the reasonableness of the informant’s conduct in instituting the proceedings, and in basing his decision solely on the defendant’s participation in the transaction that gave rise to the offence alleged, the magistrate erred in principle. The court ordered that the appellant’s costs of both the proceedings before the magistrate and the appeal be paid by the respondent. Accepting that the statutory discretion in question was ‘unconfined’, Mason CJ stated that it did not follow that any attempt to formulate a principle or guideline on which the discretion should be exercised would constitute a fetter upon the discretion not intended by the legislature. To the contrary, a refusal to do so would lead to potentially inconsistent exercises of discretion, a result that would not have been contemplated by the legislature with any degree of equanimity.193 The rationale for propounding a guideline in terms that ‘costs follow the event’ his Honour explained as follows:194 In ordinary circumstances it would not be just or reasonable to deprive a defendant who has secured the dismissal of a criminal charge brought against him or her of an order for costs. To burden a successful defendant with the entire payment of the costs of defending the proceedings is in effect to expose the defendant to a financial burden which may be substantial, perhaps crippling, by reason of the bringing of a criminal charge which, in the event, should not have been brought. It is inequitable that the defendant should be expected to bear the financial burden

of exculpating himself or herself, though the circumstances of a particular case may be such as to make it just and reasonable to refuse an order for costs or to make a qualified order for costs.

McHugh J reasoned that as the legislature had, by s 97(b), abolished the rule that the Crown and those who institute summary proceedings in the public interest neither pay nor receive costs, the various rationales of that rule could not justify exercising a discretion to refuse costs to a successful defendant in summary proceedings, as to do so would ignore the purpose of the legislature in enacting the legislation. Moreover, as the decisions on costs in summary proceedings in Queensland and Victoria showed,195 were the rationales of that rule taken into account in the exercise of the discretion to award costs, they would generate a practice consistent with the position preexisting the legislation, at least so far as informants not being liable for costs are concerned.196 Hence, his Honour endorsed the view of the South Australian [page 852] Supreme Court in Hamdorf v Riddle197 to represent the law so far as the payment of costs in summary proceedings was concerned. 24.43 From a conceptual perspective, Mason CJ and Toohey J stated that it is clear that, in civil as well as criminal proceedings, costs are not awarded by way of punishment of the unsuccessful party, but are compensatory in the sense that they are awarded to indemnify198 the successful party against the expense he or she has been put by reason of the proceedings.199 Hence, the making of a costs order against a prosecutor is no more a mark of disapproval of the prosecution than the dismissal of the proceedings.200 Mason CJ and McHugh J conceded that, in view of the substantial differences between criminal and civil proceedings,201 the analogy between the discretion to award costs in summary proceedings and the power to award costs in civil proceedings is not complete.202 McHugh J considered that, despite these differences, once the real issues in the summary proceedings are identified, no difficulty arises in applying principles akin to those applicable to making or refusing costs orders in civil cases, speaking in terms of a successful defendant’s ‘reasonable expectation’ of costs.203 Mason CJ was not prepared to state that in summary proceedings there should be a general

rule that costs follow the event, but did say that, in ordinary circumstances, an order for costs should be made in favour of a successful defendant.204 Similarly, Toohey J found it unnecessary to speak in terms of a presumption, it being enough, in his opinion, to say that ordinarily it is just and reasonable that the defendant against whom a prosecution has failed should not be out of pocket.205 24.44 It has been held that the reasoning in Latoudis applies as readily to committal proceedings as to summary proceedings if, in the event, the defendant is not committed for trial. So a defendant who successfully resists being committed to trial for an indictable offence is in the same position as a person who has succeeded in having a summary charge dismissed, and ordinarily receives costs against the informant.206 [page 853]

Circumstances in which usual rule can be trusted 24.45 As in the application of the general ‘costs follow the event’ rule to civil proceedings, if a court is conferred a general discretion in criminal proceedings, the task is for the magistrate or judge to exercise that discretion. Consistent with the nature of judicial discretion, the court must not simply apply an inflexible rule.207 Therefore, subject to contrary legislative indication, a successful defendant in summary proceedings has no right to an order for costs, but arguably only a ‘reasonable expectation’ of it.208 It is thus open to the court, in an appropriate case, to exercise the discretion against a successful defendant.209 Similarly, the costs discretion is ordinarily exercised in favour of a successful prosecutor who has incurred professional costs in the prosecution of a summary offence, but this is not invariably so.210 24.46 Although there is no automatic link between a particular finding and the exercise of the court’s costs discretion, in a particular case there may be good reasons why it would not be unjust or unreasonable that a successful defendant bear (some of) his or her own costs. The courts have cautioned that the range of matters that may be taken into consideration to determine whether or not an acquitted defendant should be awarded costs cannot be precisely defined.211 It nonetheless appears that the refusal of costs to a

successful defendant is ordinarily based upon his or her conduct in relation to the proceedings.212 For example, Toohey J in Latoudis suggested that if a defendant refuses an opportunity to explain his or her version of events before a charge is laid, which it later appears could have avoided a prosecution, it may well be just and reasonable to refuse costs.213 The same may be so where the defendant fails to tell the police of a witness or alibi who could support the [page 854] defendant’s case,214 evades police for a period of time215 or misleads the police.216 This has not been seen to impinge upon an accused’s right to silence in criminal matters,217 which, unlike the question of costs, has its primary rationale and operation in relation to the proof of guilt.218 That there remains some tension between the right to silence and an award of costs was recognised in the remark of Doyle CJ in Ling v Police219 that ‘to award costs by reference to conduct of the defence in the exercise of the right to silence might, in a sense, seem to erode that right, because it does mean that a defendant who exercises the right to the full may be penalised in costs’. His Honour proceeded, after referring to the judgment of Toohey J in Latoudis, to balance the two matters as follows:220 It follows that in the exercise of the [costs] discretion221 … a magistrate can take into account, if appropriate, the manner in which the defence conducted itself at a pre-trial conference, including a failure to disclose aspects of the defence case. It can do so although that conduct was an exercise of the right of silence. The significance of the conduct will be considered bearing that in mind. But to describe the conduct as an exercise of that right will not insulate the defence from an adverse decision … [C]onduct before the prosecution is instituted may be relevant to the discretion on costs, although it is an exercise of the right to silence … [T]he discretion has to be exercised upon the basis that the right of silence is a recognised feature of our system of criminal procedure. It would, therefore, be wrong in my opinion to approach the exercise of the discretion on the mechanical basis that in the ordinary course of events the defence should disclose its case to the prosecution and that failure to do so will in the ordinary course of events expose it to the risk of an unfavourable costs order. As I have endeavoured to explain, in my opinion there is no such obligation of disclosure on the part of the defence in our system of criminal procedure. To approach the exercise of the discretion in that mechanical manner would be to ignore the right of silence which the defence has.

Ling involved a defendant who failed to disclose to the prosecution two independent witnesses, whose evidence proved decisive in securing his

acquittal. The South Australian Full Court held that it was within the magistrate’s discretion to make a reduced costs order because of the failure to make this disclosure at a pre-trial conference.222 Nyland J stated that:223 … where it appears that information has been unreasonably withheld or the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged as a result of such a non-disclosure, it is appropriate for those matters to be taken into account in considering the issue of costs, notwithstanding that the nondisclosure was as a result of the defendant client exercising his right to silence.

[page 855] 24.47 Though the justification for denying costs in cases of this kind is that the defendant’s own actions have in a sense precipitated the prosecution,224 this cannot be taken too far. For example, in Redl v Toppin225 Brooking J remarked that the fact that a prospective defendant does not act on a suggestion by a police officer to desist from the conduct ultimately held not to be capable of supporting the charge laid, is no ground for depriving the defendant of costs. The allegedly illegal conduct of the defendant that gave rise to the charge is, moreover, arguably not relevant to the costs issue.226 In Emanuele v Dau227 the conduct of the appellant, though illegal and improper, was held not to disentitle him to an order for costs, Higgins J stating that ‘it is in no way an answer to a claim for costs that the defendant was guilty of the substantive criminal conduct, but the prosecution has failed for other reasons’. It follows that a successful defendant should not be deprived of costs merely because his or her conduct gave rise to a suspicion that he or she was guilty of the offence the subject of the prosecution.228 Otherwise it would be tantamount to saying that a successful defendant should be denied costs merely because the informant acted in good faith, which is inconsistent with the notion that a successful defendant has a reasonable expectation of costs. 24.48 In any case, it is open to a court to allow costs to a defendant in criminal proceedings, but reduce the quantum to the extent that the costs were unnecessarily incurred as a result of the way the defendant behaved in the course of the proceedings.229 If the manner in which the defence was conducted unreasonably prolonged the proceedings, via say unnecessary cross-examination or the raising of a sham or hopeless defence, or a failure to appear, the usual rule may be ousted, at least in part.230 There may also be

grounds for depriving an ultimately successful defendant of some costs where he or she has failed on certain issues, or where some [page 856] of his or her evidence has been rejected.231 In Environment Protection Authority v Shell Company of Australia Ltd232 Bignold J made a reduced costs order because the defendant unsuccessfully raised issues involving a considerable amount of the overall hearing time, particularly since those matters were wholly unconnected with the ultimate ground for the defendant’s success in defending the prosecution. However, consistent with the approach applicable in civil matters,233 the courts have cautioned against adopting an overly mathematical (and essentially simplistic) approach to the apportionment of costs according to issues.234 24.49 The point in time when the successful submission is made may also influence the costs order. In Gummer v R,235 for instance, no order for costs was made because the point on which the defendant’s appeal succeeded was raised for the first time on the eve of the hearing of the appeal, and its success was dependent on the appellant adducing additional evidence and the respondent making a factual concession. Had the point been taken in the court below, the Queensland Court of Appeal noted, the matter would most likely have proceeded no further, making it just that each party bear its own costs of the appeal and of the proceedings below.236 24.50 Conversely, a magistrate should not exercise the costs discretion against a successful defendant on grounds unconnected with the charge or the conduct of the litigation.237 So any concern, valid or otherwise, that costs orders against police officers will deter them from prosecuting cases carries little or no weight to this end.238 Nor is it, according to Mason CJ in Latoudis, relevant to consider whether a defendant is funded by legal aid, for this would be to unjustly discriminate between defendants based on receipt of legal aid.239 24.51 That is not to say that the public interest pertaining to the proceedings in question is always irrelevant to the issue of costs.240 In a sense, all criminal prosecutions vindicate the public interest, but the case law recognises that

there may be a further public interest in some cases sufficient to (partly) absolve a convicted defendant from an adverse costs order. In Walden v Hensler241 the defendant was convicted of keeping fauna without a licence. He had pleaded honest claim of right on the ground that he was engaging in traditional Aboriginal hunting practices. The court refused to order the appeal costs (both to the Full Queensland Supreme [page 857] Court and to the High Court), and significantly reduced the costs at first instance, to be paid by the defendant. Brennan J explained a reason for this as follows:242 In a case of this kind, where there is no moral blame attached to the commission of the offence, where the object of the prosecution is to educate the offender and the public in obedience to the law which has been contravened, and where the defendant is not engaged in an activity or business that is regulated by laws about which he might fairly be expected to make inquiry, it is often appropriate … that the costs of conducting the prosecution should be borne by the public purse rather than by the person who honestly and in ignorance contravenes the law.

Quantum of costs Discretion 24.52 Statute in each jurisdiction confers a discretion on the court as to the quantum of the costs it may award in the circumstances discussed above.243 In the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales and Queensland the quantum is that which the court considers just and reasonable,244 and the sum allowed must be specified in the court’s order.245 In the context of the New South Wales Supreme Court’s summary jurisdiction, it may specify the costs, or otherwise give effect to the quantum of costs as a result of costs assessment or an agreement between the prosecutor and the defendant.246 In the Northern Territory and South Australia the court may order such costs as it ‘thinks fit’,247 although in the former costs cannot exceed the amount calculated in accordance with the prescribed scale248 and in the latter the rules make provision for a scale of costs that can be departed from.249 The Tasmanian legislation speaks of the justices ordering the whole or a specified proportion of costs of and incidental to the complaint or defence.250 In

Victoria statute confers upon the Magistrates’ Court full power to determine, inter alia, ‘to what extent’ costs are to be paid.251 And in Western Australia the amount of costs may be determined in accordance with the relevant costs determination, although the court may raise the limits in the determination in the event of ‘unusual difficulty, complexity or importance’.252 [page 858] The exercise of this discretion, being judicial in character,253 requires both that there be a fair hearing on the merits of the application for the costs order, and that its terms be reasonable.254 This further entails the judge giving a clear and sufficiently exposed process of reasoning to the quantum of costs, not just an intuitive ‘stab in the dark’.255 For example, in Sobh v Children’s Court of Victoria256 Mandie J opined that the fact that an award of costs is within a magistrate’s discretion does not justify a failure to identify the items that have been disallowed or those considered to be excessive, for failing to do so denies the parties an opportunity to detect error.

Costs fixed by the court 24.53 Aside from a specific provision for costs to be taxed or assessed, or the application of a scale, a court will usually fix costs payable pursuant to its costs discretion in summary proceedings.257 In Carter v Coombe Legoe J suggested the following as a reasonable way for costs in a summary matter to be fixed:258 Courts of summary jurisdiction would normally and, in my opinion, in actual practice universally, make a general discretionary award of a lump sum by way of costs … A bill of costs … should not be taxed in the way in which a master or experienced taxing officer does so in this Court … I would go further and state that a bill of costs should not be accepted by courts of summary jurisdiction. Where a party seeks extra or special costs by way of order in such courts, then the applicant for costs should present evidence (either orally with documents, invoices and receipts or by affidavit) to establish the facts relating to the particular application, and the court can then determine the reasonableness or appropriateness of those extra or special costs. A bill of costs in the form of a solicitor and client taxation is totally inappropriate and unacceptable in such applications.

Though other judges have endorsed the approach,259 no fixed rule

applies.260 As in other instances of court fixing costs,261 any sum must be capable of being quantified in a rational way.262 In Emanuele v Dau263 Higgins J noted that the court may elect to fix a lump sum where the matter is more conveniently so dealt with whether by reason of its simplicity or, conversely, its enormity. In fixing the sum, a court may use as guidelines relevant scales of costs applicable in civil proceedings264 but these do not limit it.265 It may also inquire, when fixing costs against [page 859] a defendant, into the defendant’s means and ability to pay.266 And if the combined total of an appropriate fine and an order to make payment towards the costs of the prosecution constitutes a penalty totally out of proportion to the offence, it is appropriate for the court to scale down either the fine or the amount of the order to pay prosecution costs.267 24.54 References in the cases to costs being an indemnity to the ‘successful’ party in this context268 should not be read as judicial acceptance of a complete costs indemnity. It is within the court’s discretion to award an amount limited to what may be assimilated to ‘party and party’ costs in the civil context269 — here bearing in mind that the touchstone is reasonableness, and that while scales of costs in civil proceedings may assist in this inquiry, they do not govern criminal proceedings for this purpose270 absent express provision271 — rather than all costs and disbursements the solicitor charged (or was entitled to charge) to the client.272 The courts have, to this end, met with a frosty reception submissions that costs in criminal matters may be quantified on an indemnity basis.273 Yet the matter remains one of discretion, not jurisdiction; circumstances could prove sufficiently exceptional to justify an indemnity order.274 That in Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia there is provision for making an order exceeding scale in quantum envisages a step in the direction of an indemnity.

Taxation or assessment of costs

24.55 There is authority, not without its detractors, suggesting that a court may, in criminal proceedings, seek the advice of a taxing officer or costs assessor as to the quantum to be allowed, or even to order that the bill in question be taxed or assessed.275 The latter may be appropriate, [page 860] it has been said, should the case be one where it is impossible to fix a proper sum without a detailed consideration of what should be allowed.276 Only the New South Wales, Tasmanian and Victorian legislation makes specific provision to this end. In New South Wales the Supreme Court may, in its summary jurisdiction, order that the costs be the subject of assessment under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), but this is not mandatory.277 In Tasmania, if costs are allowed by a Justice, they are to be assessed by the Justice or, when directed by the Justice, by the clerk of petty sessions.278 In the latter event, the clerk must have regard to the same matters as justices would have regard to if the Justice were assessing the costs,279 which may be reviewed by the justices who presided in the proceedings in respect of which the costs were granted.280 In determining the quantum of costs allowed, a Justice may have regard to any scale of costs, fees or expenses prescribed or agreed upon under any enactment.281 In Victoria, in a provision that ostensibly encompasses both civil and criminal proceedings,282 the Magistrates Court may order that the costs of, and incidental to, a proceeding in the court be assessed, settled, taxed or reviewed by the Costs Court.283

Costs in Criminal Appeals 24.56 In several jurisdictions statutory provision is made in respect of costs of appeals in criminal matters. The lack of uniformity between jurisdictions, however, dictates that these must be discussed separately. In jurisdictions that make no specific provision for the award of costs in appeals, if the lower court had the power to order costs, the appellate court arguably has jurisdiction to make an order as to the costs both of the appeal and of the

court below.284 The judicial practice regarding costs of seeking special leave to appeal against a conviction is also discussed below. 24.57 It must be noted at the outset that the suitors’ fund (or appeal costs fund) legislation that exists in most jurisdictions also extends, within its scope, to providing an indemnity from some costs in certain criminal proceedings.285

Specific statutory provisions governing costs in appeals New South Wales 24.58 In so far as appeals other than to the Court of Criminal Appeal, costs are not to be awarded in favour of an appellant whose conviction is set aside286 unless the appeal court is satisfied of one or more of the matters listed in s 70(1) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) [page 861] Act 2001 (NSW).287 The foregoing does not apply to the awarding of costs against a respondent acting in a private capacity.288 24.59 The Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) deals with appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeal. It entitles a person convicted on indictment to appeal to that court, albeit with leave on questions other than questions of law.289 It also entitles a person who has been convicted of an offence, or against whom an order to pay costs is made, by the Supreme Court, the Land and Environment Court or the District Court in its summary jurisdiction, to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal against the conviction or order.290 Under s 17(1) of the Act, on the hearing or determination of any such appeal, or proceedings preliminary or incidental to an appeal under the Act, ‘no costs shall be allowed on either side’.291 Where a person ordered to pay money for costs has paid the money and is successful in an appeal, he or she is entitled to a return of the amount so paid unless the court otherwise orders.292 But the ‘no costs’ rule prescribed by s 17(1) does not apply where,

under s 5B(1), the District Court submits to the Court of Criminal Appeal a question of law arising on an appeal before it. This submission does not constitute the hearing or determination of an appeal under s 17(1), and so the power of the Court of Criminal Appeal under s 5B(1) to make any order or give any direction to the District Court as it thinks fit has been held to encompass a power to order costs.293 The same has been held in respect of application under s 5B(2),294 which deals with the submission of a question of law to the Court of Criminal Appeal for determination even though the appeal proceedings during which the question arose have been disposed of. The same can be said regarding the submission of a question of law to the Court of Criminal Appeal by the Supreme Court or Land and Environment Court in its summary jurisdiction under s 5AE, or the submission of a question of law arising on any appeal to the Land and Environment Court in its environmental offences appeals jurisdiction under s 5BA. 24.60 In any case, as the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 (NSW) provides that a court in proceedings relating to any offence may grant to the defendant a certificate if his or her conviction is quashed on appeal and either the defendant is discharged as to the indictment upon which he or she was convicted, or the information or complaint upon which the defendant was convicted is dismissed,295 there may be scope under this Act for a costs order in an appeal.

Northern Territory 24.61 The Criminal Code (NT) s 424 provides that on the hearing or determination of an appeal, application for leave to appeal, any proceedings preliminary or incidental thereto or on a Crown Law Officer’s reference, no costs are to be allowed on either side. On an appeal under the Justices Act 1928 (NT) the Supreme Court has power to make ‘such further or other order as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit’.296 So the power in s 77 of the Justices Act [page 862] to make costs orders297 may be exercised by an appellate court in relation to

both the costs of the proceedings from which the appeal was brought and of the appeal.298 The costs discretion in this context is, however, no wider than that prescribed by s 77.299 Nor is it different in the manner of its exercise, such that in the absence of special circumstances, the rule of practice as to the award of costs in appeals from penalties imposed by courts of summary jurisdiction is that the discretion to award costs is exercised in favour of the successful party.300

Queensland 24.62 The Criminal Code (Qld) s 671F(1) provides that on the hearing or determination of an appeal, or any proceedings preliminary or incidental thereto, no costs are to be allowed on either side. Under s 226 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld), the District Court may, on an appeal from a lower court, make such order as to costs to be paid by either party as the court may think just. However, no order as to costs may be made on the hearing or determination of an appeal in relation to an indictable offence that was dealt with summarily by justices, or any proceeding preliminary or incidental to such an appeal.301

South Australia 24.63 On the hearing and determination of an appeal or new trial (or proceedings preliminary or incidental thereto) under the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), no costs are to be allowed on either side.302 If, however, a question is reserved on application by the Attorney-General or the Director of Public Prosecutions on an acquittal, the Crown is liable to pay the taxed costs of the defendant in proceedings for the reservation and determination of the question.303 A party to a criminal action may appeal against any order in the criminal jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court except an interlocutory order given in summary proceedings.304 Hence, a court’s decision not to make a costs order in summary proceedings305 is appealable if it is not interlocutory in nature.306 An avenue for appeal is also provided in summary proceedings where costs orders are made against a lawyer or prosecutor who has delayed proceedings

through neglect or incompetence, or against a party or witness who has unreasonably obstructed or delayed proceedings.307

Tasmania 24.64 The Justices Act 1959 (Tas) s 125 provides that, in proceedings for an appeal or motion to review, the court may make such order as to costs, both in the Supreme Court and before the justices, as to the court or judge seems proper.308 It follows that, consistent with the principles discussed earlier,309 a defendant who succeeds on appeal should receive costs. No provision is made concerning the costs of a retrial or rehearing ordered as a result of a successful appeal. [page 863] The Criminal Code s 414(1) provides that, in any appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal or proceedings in respect of Crown cases reserved, the court may make such order as to costs as it thinks fit. No such order may, however, be made in respect of any proceedings in favour of a person who has received assistance under the Legal Aid Commission Act 1990 (Tas).310 Though the discretion in s 414(1) is in its terms unfettered, the court has required that it be ‘affirmatively persuaded’ that a positive reason, or a ‘clear case’, exists before exercising it.311 Only two instances appear in the case law where costs orders have been made in this context.312 In the remaining documented applications, the court has refused the order in question.313 Crawford J explained a reason for the court’s approach in this respect in Templar v R as follows:314 I am unpersuaded that the Court should change its practice. If there was contained in the Code a general and unfettered power in the court at first instance to make orders for costs both for and against the Crown, the practice on the hearing of criminal appeals might necessarily be different. But the power given by s 425315 to the court of first instance is restricted to the making of orders for costs in favour of the Crown. Further, if this Court had a general and unfettered power to make orders providing not only for the costs of the appeal but also for the costs of the criminal trial, the practice might need to be different. But that is not the situation either.

For example, in R v Rouse (No 2)316 the Court of Criminal Appeal found no circumstances that warranted making a costs order under s 414(1). Their

Honours noted, in particular, that the Crown’s appeal had not been shown to lack good faith or otherwise to be frivolous or lacking in merit, the offence was serious, and the matter was of sufficient public importance to make the appeal a responsible one, even though it proved ultimately to be unsuccessful. This may suggest that the court’s discretion under s 414(1) may be activated if the Crown’s appeal lacks good faith, or is otherwise frivolous or unjustified. 24.65 In any event, even if costs are ordered under s 414(1), they are by the terms of that sub-section limited to costs of the proceedings constituting the appeal. In the alternative, a person who successfully appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeal may, on a verdict of acquittal, apply for an order under the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1976 (Tas) s 4(1) for payment of costs ‘in respect of his defence’, which include both his or her costs of the trial and of the appeal.317

Victoria 24.66 Section 409 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) states that no costs are to be allowed to a party to: (a) an appeal and case stated to the Court of Appeal; (b) a new trial; or (c) a proceeding preliminary or incidental to an appeal or new trial.318 If, however, an appeal [page 864] to the County Court by a person convicted of an offence by the Magistrates’ Court is struck out or dismissed, and the County Court is satisfied that the appeal was brought vexatiously or frivolously or in abuse of process, the County Court may order that the appellant pay all or a specified portion of the respondent’s costs of the appeal.319 This does not limit any discretion as to costs of an appeal conferred on the County Court by any other provision of the Act or the County Court Act 1958 (Vic).320 The costs of, and incidental to, an appeal to the Supreme Court on a question of law are in the discretion of the Supreme Court, and the court has

full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid.321

Western Australia 24.67 The Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 14(1)(h) empowers the Supreme Court, in deciding an appeal, to make an order as to the costs of the appeal and those of the proceedings in the court of summary jurisdiction. This provision is similar to the former Justices Act 1902 (WA) s 199(1)(g),322 in respect of which the Western Australian Full Court remarked that prima facie the court will, pursuant to its discretion, exercise it in line with the principles discussed earlier,323 namely that a defendant who successfully appeals should receive costs.324 Yet more recent authority is counter to a general rule to the effect that costs should ordinarily follow the event, instead suggesting that ‘the Act should be construed as conferring a general and unconstrained discretion with respect to costs, to be exercised by reference to all relevant circumstances, including any relevant aspect of the public interest’.325 24.68 The foregoing is, in any case, qualified by s 20(2) and 20(3) of the 2004 Act, which makes similar provision to s 219 of the 1902 Act and apply to appeals from courts of summary jurisdiction, and read: If a JP or a police officer, acting in an official capacity, is a party to proceedings under this Part, the Supreme Court must not order that the JP or officer is to pay any costs. Despite subsection (2), if a police officer is an appellant in an appeal under this Part and the decision appealed against — (a) is confirmed; or (b) if not confirmed, has in the opinion of the Supreme Court involved a point of law of exceptional public importance; the Supreme Court may order that a respondent be paid costs, and in such a case: (c) the Supreme Court must give that respondent a certificate sealed with the seal of the Supreme Court showing the amount of the costs; and (d) the person may recover that amount in a court of competent jurisdiction as a debt due by the State.

The case law has, to this end, targeted the meaning of the phrase ‘exceptional public importance’. It has been said that ‘public importance’ comprises words of ‘plain and ordinary meaning’, and connotes that the point of law ‘must be of importance to the public’.326 One way in which a point of law might meet that description is through its capacity to affect a large number of people. Another may be the significance of the point to the maintenance of public order. But these are merely examples, and far from exhaustive of the circumstances in

[page 865] which a point of law might meet that description. The term ‘exceptional’ also takes its ordinary meaning, and thus describes ‘a circumstance which is such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon’; though it need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare, ‘it cannot be one that is regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered’.327 Bringing these words together, Martin CJ in Wilson v McDonald made the following observations:328 The characterisation of a particular point of law as being one of ‘exceptional public importance’ obviously involves questions of degree, in which subjective impressions are likely to be more significant than attempts at rational evaluation. However, the construction of a particular statutory provision, involving an issue with no implications beyond that particular provision could not be said to be exceptional. To the contrary, it is the ordinary course in this court. Nor could the need to reconcile previous decisions be said to be out of the ordinary or uncommon. Further, there was nothing else about the point of law raised by this case which elevates it to being of exceptional public importance. In my view, although the point of law raised by this appeal was of public importance, it should not be characterised as being of exceptional public importance.

So in Wilson v McDonald itself, the court found that although the point of law on appeal required the reconciliation of previous authority as to the construction of a statutory provision, and was of public importance, it lacked ‘exceptional’ public importance. Coupled with the fact that, inter alia, the construction of the statutory provision for which the appellant contended was not accepted by the court, and that argument with respect to construction occupied a significant proportion of the written and oral argument, this led the court to make no order for costs of the appeal, even though the appellant ultimately succeeded.329 On the other side of the line, in Mastrangelo v Reynolds330 Malcolm CJ held that the issue raised on appeal, namely the proper construction of ss 4(2) and 5 of the Official Prosecutions (Accused’s Costs) Act 1973,331 was a point of law of ‘public importance’ as it had the potential to affect a very significant number of persons who seek leave to appeal against sentences imposed in the Court of Petty Sessions (now the Magistrates Court), and was ‘exceptional’ because the point raised was out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon in that it was not regularly, routinely or normally encountered. The respondent was thus entitled to an order under s 219 of the 1902 Act for costs.

24.69 So far as appeals from superior courts are concerned, s 35(2) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) prohibits the Court of Appeal ordering a party to the appeal to pay another party’s costs of or relating to the appeal. However, under s 35A,332 in an appeal commenced by a prosecutor under s 24(2)(da)333 or 25(3)(aa),334 ‘the accused’s reasonable costs of being legally represented in the Court of Appeal are to be paid by the State’. [page 866] 24.70 In any case, the Official Prosecutions (Accused’s Costs) Act 1973 (WA) applies in respect of appeals335 and applies notwithstanding the provisions of any other Act, although to the extent of any inconsistency, the provision more favourable to the accused prevails.336

Special leave to appeal against conviction 24.71 The usual practice is that an unsuccessful applicant for special leave to appeal against a conviction is not ordered to pay the costs of the Crown, but it does not follow that the Crown will never be ordered to pay costs when it unsuccessfully applies for special leave to appeal in this context.337 The Full High Court in R v Whitworth expressed the point in the following terms:338 Although there is jurisdiction to award costs against the Crown in a criminal case, it is a longstanding practice not to award costs when a convicted person successfully applies for special leave to appeal or succeeds on an appeal. However, an application for special leave to appeal by the Crown is an exceptional proceeding and there is no reason why the jurisdiction should not be exercised in appropriate cases.

Moreover, even if the special leave application is successful, this is likely to dictate that the matter is one of considerable importance to the general administration of the criminal law, not specific to the defendant. For this reason, the cost of an application for special leave should be borne by the Crown, whether the Crown or the accused made the application.339

1.

See 24.6–24.22.

2.

See 24.23–24.55.

3.

See 24.56–24.71.

4.

W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol 3, 1st ed, Sweet Maxwell & Stevens, London, 1768, p 400.

5.

Ciarniello v Ontario (2006) 270 DLR (4th) 365 at [33] per Sharpe JA (CA(Ont)). See also R v Robinson (1999) 142 CCC (3d) 303 at [29] per McFadyen JA (CA(Alta)) (‘The reasons for limiting costs are that the Crown is not an ordinary litigant, does not win or lose criminal cases, and conducts prosecutions and makes decisions respecting prosecutions in the public interest. In the absence of proof of misconduct, an award of costs against the Crown would be a harsh penalty for Crown officer carrying out such public duties’).

6.

See, for example, Re Powell (1894) 6 QLJ 36 at 38 per Griffith CJ; Attorney-General (Queensland) v Holland (1912) 15 CLR 46 at 49; BC1200033 per Griffith CJ; Miller v Baker (1995) 5 Tas R 322 at 324; BC9506691 per Slicer J.

7.

Re Powell (1894) 6 QLJ 36 at 38 per Griffith CJ.

8.

Moore v Smith (1859) 1 E & E 597 at 600; 120 ER 1034 at 1035 per Lord Campbell CJ; AttorneyGeneral (Queensland) v Holland (1912) 15 CLR 46 at 49; BC1200033 per Griffith CJ.

9.

See 6.2–6.4.

10. (1992) 77 A Crim R 67 at 68; BC9203036 (FC(Vic)). 11. R v Wright, Danci and Currie (1992) 77 A Crim R 67 at 69; BC9203036 (FC(Vic)). See also R v S (1997) 94 A Crim R 445 at 446; BC9702831 per Olsson J (CCA(SA)); Besgrove v Larson (2001) 22 Qld Lawyer Reps 82 at 83; [2001] QDC 144 per Judge McGill; Dudzinski v Spender [2008] QSC 54; BC200801837. 12. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 64 (see Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 264; [2004] HCA 27; BC200403489 at [3] per Gummow J, opining that one effect of s 64 ‘is to make it clear there is no room in federal law for the application of the principle that at common law the Crown neither paid nor received costs, it being in the Prerogative not to pay them to a subject and beneath the dignity of the Crown to receive them’); Crown Proceedings Act 1988 (NSW) s 5(2); Crown Proceedings Act 1993 (NT) s 5; Crown Proceedings Act 1980 (Qld) s 9; Crown Proceedings Act 1972 (SA) s 5; Crown Proceedings Act 1993 (Tas) s 5; Crown Proceedings Act 1958 (Vic) s 25; Crown Suits Act 1947 (WA) s 5. 13. An offence remains indictable despite the fact that it is tried summarily: Van Velsen v Rudek (1985) 40 SASR 213 at 220 per O’Loughlin J; Holmden v Bitar (1987) 47 SASR 509 at 521–2 per Cox J; Beshara v M Ltd (1988) 52 SASR 178. Although these cases were decided in a jurisdiction which at the time had a statutory provision supportive of this conclusion (namely the now repealed Justices Act 1921 (SA) s 127), the point can also be sourced from the general law: see Ross v R (1979) 141 CLR 432. 14. As to costs of proceedings upon indictment see 24.6–24.22. As to costs in summary proceedings see 24.23–24.55. 15. See 23.1. This is specifically recognised by statute in South Australia in the context of summary offences: see Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 189(3). 16. ALRC 75, p 89. 17. See, for example, ALRC 75, p 91; WALRC 92, Vol 2, pp 967–8. 18. See, for example, A Swanwick and M van Veenendaal, ‘Police to Pay Costs of Successful Defendants’ (1991) 65 LIJ 185 at 187 (‘All of the arguments of principle which lead to the conclusion that a successful defendant should not have to bear the costs of the defence apply with

equal or greater force to the higher courts, where the costs of conducting a defence are usually much greater than in the Magistrates’ Court’); J Sartori, ‘Costs in Criminal Proceedings After Latoudis v Casey’ (1991–2) 18 Melb ULR 154 at 160–6. 19. See 6.3. 20. See 6.7, 6.14. 21. ACT r 1721 (found in Ch 2, which deals only with civil proceedings, whereas Ch 4, which addressed criminal proceedings, makes no provision vis-à-vis costs: see R v Bui (2011) 5 ACTLR 230; [2011] ACTSC 102; BC201104186 at [65]–[70] per Refshauge J); Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) s 15; Qld r 681(1). 22. NT r 63.03(1); Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 40(1). 23. See, for example, R v Scott (1993) 42 FCR 1; BC9304989 (FC) (dealing with the former equivalent provision in the Australian Capital Territory, namely s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT)). 24. As to the Northern Territory position see R v Bairstow (2011) 28 NTLR 111; [2011] NTSC 14; BC201100938 (where Reeves J noted that the only provision in the Criminal Code that mentions orders for costs (s 424: see 24.61) expressly proscribes such orders being made in any appeal, application for leave to appeal, any proceedings preliminary or incidental thereto, or on a Crown Law officer’s reference (s 424), and added that ‘[t]his proscription does not expressly extend to the trial of indictable criminal proceedings, but it was obviously considered unnecessary to do so in light of the long established common law principle that in criminal proceedings, in the absence of a statutory power to award costs, the Crown neither pays, nor receives costs’: at [8]). As to the Queensland position see 24.19–24.20; R v Foggo [1989] 2 Qd R 49 at 55 per de Jersey J (as the Criminal Code (Qld) contained no provision conferring on the court a jurisdiction to order costs upon a reference, none existed). 25. (1992) 77 A Crim R 67; BC9203036. 26. The County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 78A(1) is expressed in the same terms as the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 24(1). 27. R v Wright, Danci and Currie (1992) 77 A Crim R 67 at 72; BC9203036 per Brooking J (adding that it was unnecessary to have recourse to s 4 of the Judicature Act 1890 (UK) in order to conclude that s 5 was not concerned with criminal trials in the High Court of Justice), at 79 per Tadgell J (stating that quite apart from the proviso in s 4, s 5 could not have applied by itself to the costs of a criminal trial on indictment because s 5 did not bind the Crown in the absence of a statutory provision from which it might be inferred that it did) (FC(Vic)). 28. R v Wright, Danci and Currie (1992) 77 A Crim R 67 at 73 per Brooking J, at 80 per Tadgell J; BC9203036 (FC(Vic)). Cf J Sartori, ‘Costs in Criminal Proceedings After Latoudis v Casey’ (1991–2) 18 Melb ULR 154 at 161–3. 29. As to the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 545 see 24.21. 30. R v Wright, Danci and Currie (1992) 77 A Crim R 67 at 80–1; BC9203036 per Tadgell J (FC(Vic)). 31. See 25.2–25.14. 32. Director of Public Prosecutions v Deeks (1994) 35 NSWLR 523 at 532–3; BC9404935 per Kirby P. 33. R v Mosely (1992) 28 NSWLR 735 at 740; BC9203074 per Gleeson CJ (CA) (ruling that the District Court Act 1973 (NSW) s 6 — which provides that where under the Act or the court rules

the court may make any order or give any direction or leave or do any other thing on terms, the court may make the order or give the direction or leave to do the thing on such terms and conditions (if any) as the court thinks fit — conferred no such power). 34. R v Mosely (1992) 28 NSWLR 735 at 741; BC9203074 per Gleeson CJ (CA). 35. (CCA(NSW), 16 February 1993, unreported) BC9304325 at 9–10. Cf at 10–11 per Smart J. 36. R v Seebag (CCA(NSW), 16 February 1993, unreported) BC9304325 at 10–11. 37. (2003) 56 NSWLR 625; [2003] NSWCCA 41; BC200300810. 38. R v Fisher (2003) 56 NSWLR 625; [2003] NSWCCA 41; BC200300810 at [5]. 39. R v Fisher (2003) 56 NSWLR 625; [2003] NSWCCA 41; BC200300810 at [6]–[7]. See also at [44]–[48] per Simpson J. 40. The exercise of the power is not, however, ‘in any way dependent upon the Crown’s being in the position of seeking an indulgence’: R v Fisher (2003) 56 NSWLR 625; [2003] NSWCCA 41; BC200300810 at [44] per Simpson J. 41. R v Tran [2008] NSWDC 43; BC200840100 at [19] per Norrish QC DCJ. 42. Compare Hufnagl v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2007) 5 DCLR (NSW) 159; [2007] NSWDC 130; BC200740276 (where Norrish QC DCJ granted a stay order because of, inter alia, compelling evidence of significant financial hardship arising from the Crown’s conduct that impacted upon the accused’s capacity to properly defend himself) with R v Tran [2008] NSWDC 43; BC200840100 (where Norrish QC DCJ refused a stay order because, inter alia, there was no evidence of financial hardship). 43. As occurred in R v Bucksath (2000) 114 A Crim R 1 at 6 per Stein JA, at 7 per Dunford J; [2000] NSWCCA 135; BC200002110. Cf R v Beeby (1999) 104 A Crim R 142 at 148–9; [1999] NSWCCA 30; BC9900748 per Dunford J (where no such undertaking was sought or given, and so the trial judge’s refusal to stay the proceedings until the costs were paid was held to be correct). 44. (2003) 143 A Crim R 531; [2003] SASC 437; BC200308151 at [232]. Cf O’Connell v Short (1985) 20 A Crim R 111 at 114–15 per Zelling J (SC(SA)) (who held that although a court of summary jurisdiction has only those powers conferred by statute, and there was no specific statutory power to award costs against an informant on adjournment (on the facts the adjournment was to remedy a defect in the Crown case), costs could be awarded pursuant to either a discretion implied from the statutory power to adjourn a committal, or a discretion inherent in the exercise of the jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary examination). 45. R v Ulman-Naruniec (2003) 143 A Crim R 531; [2003] SASC 437; BC200308151 at [233]–[234]. 46. [2005] ACTSC 9; BC200500260 at [28] per Connolly J. See also R v Upton [2005] ACTSC 52; BC200504507 (another decision to the same effect by Connolly J). 47. (2011) 5 ACTLR 230; [2011] ACTSC 102; BC201104186 at [95] per Refshauge J. 48. Refshauge J expressed the concern that this approach ‘may amount in reality to a device to circumvent the fact that the court did not have power in criminal proceedings to make orders for costs’, but was swayed by the fact that as ‘in at least two jurisdictions, such conditional stays have now been accepted as consistent with a regime where costs are not payable in criminal proceedings’: R v Bui (2011) 5 ACTLR 230; [2011] ACTSC 102; BC201104186 at [79], [82]. 49. R v Bui (2011) 5 ACTLR 230; [2011] ACTSC 102; BC201104186 at [96]. 50. R v Bui (2011) 5 ACTLR 230; [2011] ACTSC 102; BC201104186 at [98].

51. Namely the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 24(1). 52. Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 24(2). Equivalent provision was previously made in Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 23(3) (repealed). 53. See 24.12–24.17. 54. Namely the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 37(1). 55. Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 37(2). 56. See 24.21 (Victoria), 24.22 (Western Australia). 57. See 24.21. 58. See 25.15–25.25. 59. [1943] AC 147 at 162. See also at 156 per Viscount Simon LC (‘If the matter is one the direct outcome of which may be trial of the applicant and his possible punishment for an alleged offence by a court claiming jurisdiction to do so, the matter is criminal’); Clifford and O’Sullivan [1921] 2 AC 570 at 580 per Viscount Cave (‘It must involve the consideration of some charge of crime, that is to say, of an offence against the public law … and that charge must have been preferred or be about to be preferred before some Court or judicial tribunal having or claiming jurisdiction to impose punishment fo