Latin America In Crisis
 081333540X, 9780813335407, 9781429490559

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Latin America in Crisis

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John W; Sherman Wright State University

E A Menlber o f rhe Persetrs Rooks Group

All rights resenied. Printecl in die Cnitcci States of ~lunerica.R'o part of this put~fcatioii rnay be reproduced or wansxnitted in any for111or by any rrxeans, electronic or xncchanicai, inctudir~gphotocopy, recording, or any informatio~lstorage and retrieval sgrfcerrr, witl~onr permission in writing from the l)ritt~tisher. Copj~hghrO 2000 by Xresniiew Press, A &Iex~rl>er of the Persetrs Books Croup Publisheel in 2000 in the t'iiitecl States of hnerica by bVesrview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in die United Engdorn by Weswie~vPress, I 2 1lid's Copse Road, Cuxnnvr Efill, Oxford C3X2 9JJ

1 , i b r a ~of Congress Camtogir~g-irz-X"ub1icati011!)am Sllerma~~, Jo1111 L%rwhatever reasons, omiaed from alxnost all academic textbooks on Latin hzlerica. They are not, however, omitted here, and make this an especially provocadve text. But if the topic nzatter or presentation of novel material (especially in the final chapters) suggests any pardcular moral agenda, let me dispel such a notion quickl~r.Who has the authoriy to say what constitutes "right" and "wr~ng''t rSlle presumpdon of ;l;.bitt?i~~por-rr~~t is here, hut the rn~eal[i-r.sfi-rim is not (and I encourage anyone to challenge me on passages they find to the contrary). I do not evoke moral terminology in this book. I avoid words such as good and bglnd (as used in a moral sense, though they map be used to sugges; an econornic or political advantage), or ~aightand ii.m~zg.I do not presume to say that the world should change, or even that I personally dislike i t &laybe I like the way tlrings are, But 1 do believe that it is high time for scholars to really embrace what has been dubbed "valueneutt-al education," and allow ourselves, and our students, to think freelyeven in what a majorit-~r might regard as amoral terns. This book is wrinen primarily for North h e r i c a n university smdents talang introductory courses on Latin Lh~erica. I have opted to use some politically incomect terns for purposes of clarity: I~tdig,z(or Nathpe) refers to the nadve inhahiants of the western hemisphere, and Iqme~~z'~-n~r xzleans of, or related to, the United States, I have deliberatek avoided other terms, especially those with ideological definitions commonly used in pcditical science, such as lfft and right (though so~netimesI use them inside quotation marks). These labels, in my evaluation, are useful because they simpiie-llut that is also their weakness. I have edited out countless adverbs and phrases of conditionality, like general(?/ and fir. the most part, which appeared all over the place in earlier editions of the manuscript. my peers in scholarship: I am only too aware that T have had to generalize, especially with regard to some early historical phenomena, theories, and wends. That is the downside of a skeletal text, and competent teachers will surely want to delve into other topics of interest, in part to show st~dentsjust how horribly co~nplicatedthe world really is. Yet I stand by my overarching conclusions and believe that this hook represents a solid spthesis. The hook is divided into four parts. Chapter I introduces the intellectual problem of Ladn hnerican poverr.y; and discusses some of the mplanations scholars have traditionally used to account for it. It is a short chapter, with a very basic overview of theory, yet some readers might wish to skip it, and some instructors night prefer to explain these paradigins themselves. The narrative proper, beginning in (:hapter 2 , is divided into t h e e subsections of three chapters each. Chapters 2 h o u g h 4 [Part I)

sweep broadly across the contours of histoly, from its early beginnings to the xnid-mentieth century. The purpose of these chapters is not to overview histt~ryfor its own sake but rather to lay the groundwork necessary b r unclerstanding p~sent-dayLadn An~erica,Chapters 5 throrrgh 7 [Part IIJ extend the narradvs into the 1980s, focusing on the political and military dimensions of revolution and counterrevolution in the postwar era. Chapters 8 through 10 [Part Ill] discuss Latin An~ericatoday. Chapter 8 exarnines the rise of what If call medz'scracy, or media-drivtsn "¯acy"; Chapter !,traces the rise of International Financial Institurions; and Chapter 10 explores trends in human rights. This final chapter also pulls the broader the~nesof the book together in its analysis of Ladn hmerica9s new syrnhiotic relationship with the United States. An optional Epilogue, m r e inkrmal than the body of the text, addresses vestions of sources and of ixlallectrual discernment. If the book accomplistles its task, readers will want to learn more about Latin h e r i c a and their relationship to it. Hence, a few suggestions for further readi~lgappear at its conclusion,

Joh~zFit':S l e f ~ ~ a n

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Introduction: Why I s Latin America Poor?

Latin h e r i c a n s on the whole are poor, although the region also is home to some of the wealthiest indi.c.iduals in the world. hlexico, for example, had twent-y-four billionaires in D94, prior to its 1995 economic meltdown-more than Britain, Frmce, and Icaly combined. But comparatively spealang, Latin Anerica is an econo~nicallydisadvantaged land. If you were randomly born into a family in the United States or western Europe, the odds are overwhelming that you would not go 'hungv or lack a solid roof over your head. If you had been born into a Latin hnerican family, howevel; odds are about 50-50 t h a t yctu wt~uldsuffer malnutrition and pour 'health due to insufficient and unsanitary living conditions, Why is t h s so? 'Why is there such inequity arnong the different areas of the globe! Social scientists have long acknowledged the economic disparities betuveen large sections of our world, After all, such difkrences are conspicuous. In the early stages of the Cold War---that is, the arrns race and political rivalry between the East (led by the Soviet Union) and the West (led by the United Smtes)-people labeted regions iaccording t r ~their economic s ~ e n y hand polidcal orientations. The industrialized and wealthy countries of the West were known as the F z m m~*ld, which was joined evenrilally by rehilt, pos~varJapan. The Soviet Union a d its eastern Eurc3pean even though their economic Inussatellites were terrned the Second W~F-U, cle lagged badly behind that of the West. Most of the remainder of the globe was designated the Tbk?l Wop-Id-a term that surived the end of the Cold War in 1991 and is still commonly used today. Such labels have pmven remarkably long-lived, although they are not particularly apt: F& Wwld and TI+t Ww-kd would be far more creadve-and more meaningful---descriptions of these higMp unequal regions. The Third Wcjrld consists of nations that lack econr~micGtalit~.;financial independence, and broadly sllared prospel-iv, When the tern was first

P~n-o~i~tction: Why Ps Lrrli~Apzericrf I2~or.l

3

coined, mangr also demarcated the region by its lack of industv. Today, as we shall see, some pockets of the Third Wc~rldare heavily industrialized, yet still not prosperous. The Third World includes China, parts of southeast Asia, southern Asia, sections of the Middle East @.g*,Jordan and Ilrrkei), all of Mrica, and all of Latin ilirnerica. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, most of the Eastern bloc has joined its ranks. Four-fifths of hum n i y jives in the Third World, which geographically dominates southern portions of the globe, pro~nptingsoIne to speak of a rich Xorth and a poor South- Third World nations also, for the most part, are located m the outskirts of the histtlrical core of Western civilization (Eulwpe), and thus cunsf_inxrewhat some refer to as a periphcfy. By the late 1950s people had h e y n to use another terrn to idendi): the Third World: They called it the developing world. This description is still widely used by the media and even by many academics. In the 1980s and 1 9 9 0 ~a ~number of business interests, including major banks and investmen t firms, supplemented this designation with a new phrase: t.~~wgir?g markets. Both terms, with the adjectives developing and cmergk~zg,implicitly reflect a popular interpretation of why Latin America and other parts of the Third World are pour. That is, many (especially in the First World) believe they are poor simply because they are behind on the road of time. These regions are in the process of rising to First World status: They are just now emerging and developing* Someday they will he wealthy and comfortable like us, But is &at idea, which has endured in various forrns for nearly m o generations, well-grorrnded in fact? Pc>ndefir?gquestions of poverv and calculating future global trends are formidable tasks. Yet such activities are essential to any realistic understanding of our world, since, after all, most of humaniv is still poor. By iltendfyilzg the origins of the notion that the Third World is developing, and bp observing soIne basic econornic evidence, we can draw a few ra~onalconclzrsions. Those conclusions, in turn, \Nil1 set us on our way to discovering whj~Latin An~el-icais pour.

Thinking About Latin America Bepnd. the realm of hard econo~nicdata and fact-based arpmentation lies theory. Theories are bn~admodels, or consuucts, that attempt to explain the macroeconomic and political realities of our wodd. Academics use theories in order to answer the "big questions," such as why there are such enonnous inequities in global resource allocation and consumption. Although they are built upon arplments and facts, dleories are by nature ahsrract, and they are usually engaged at such a level of intellecmal sophistication (and verbalized by means of such unique vocabularies) as to remove them horn the realm of po~3ulardiscussion. They are one xason why-

some night arpe--academics are ~narginalplayers in public policy debates. Yet because Latin h e r i c a has been an imporant case smdy for theorericians, a very rudimentary understanding of some theory, even for the inn-oductov student, is hetphl. It enables one to discern the intellectual orientatrion of prokssors and books, and explains the mollivadon behind much scholarship. Social scientists and just about eveqone else who wrestles with the question of Third Vlrorld poverty can be grossly divided into two camps: So~ne believe that poverty is destined to disappear over time, and others do not. Son~ethink that in the fcrture, Latin h e r i c a n s can live just as well as those of us in the First S17orld; some think they cannot. The first of these two viewpoints is frequently presented in the mainstream media. Polidcal commentators like Irving KristoL, f;,r example, haue long prophesied that hnerican-scy.Ie capitalism will solve all of the worldhmajor problems, This interpretadon had its beginnings, however, in the early pears of the (:old war* Before the ascent of the United States to superpower status following Wc~rldWar 11, Lberieans-even intellectuals-were relatively unconcerned about questions of poverty in the rest of the world. In the 1%5f)s, nodons concerning develop~nentarose in the context of the new U.S. rivalry with Soviet Russia. m&funding from government agencies, acadenzics began t-r? examine the economic and political realities of Latin An~erica. Both the level csf interest and that of financial support rose meteorically in the early 1 9 6 0 ~ when ~ it seemed that the region might succumb to communism and threaten the securiv of the Clnited Statcs, Mthou$ such studies were interdiscipli~~ary in namre--involving a range of political, social, and economic issues-sociologists and political scienrists dominated the nascent fields of theoretical inquiry. These thinkers saw in Latin h e r i c a a plethora of ""bilck\vardwvqwaltides that, they assumed, needed to change. First, the region relied heavily on agriculmr-e and had experienced little in the way of industrialization. Second, the namre of the rural sector bothered them: It: was traditional, sube had relatively sistence-oriented agriculture, based on a peasant c u l ~ r that few hilt-in market incentives. Third, those peasants lived in a hierarchical world, where stams and deference were accorded to the elite owners of large estates-a society almost feudal in its demeanor, with patron-client relations instead of compet.ifive and individualistic egalitarlatlism, This feudal order was reflected also in archaic polidcal instimtions: strong executive branches; little in the way of hznctioning legisladve democracy; and lc3tj7alties that rest& more on pelsonaiism, or political connections and allegiances, than on parties and ideas. These and other social feamres contrasted markedly with conditjons in the United States. One of the presumptions of early dlecrreticians was that Latin h e l - i c a had to undelgo a

transformation in its political mlmre-or values and ideas as they relate to politics-in order to join the modern world. A second, important assumption was that this evolutionary process was unavoidable. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the debate over whether or not the Third World was developing was, in facc, not much of a debate. Nearly everyone agreed that the whole world was moving forward (withthe possible exception of the Soviets) and that the future for all humanity was bright. At the core of this general assessment emerged a schooGa group of scholars united around a central idea. And this school, in turn, articulated modernization theory. Although modernization theory featured various facets and twists of meaning, at its most rudimentary level it simply held that the Third World was already on the road to modernity. Time alone assured the development of tradition-laden, simple societies. The process was unavoidable, argued scholars like Walt Rostow, who compared the process to a train rolling down a track* Modernization theorists linked economic evolution to political change. If economic problems and political instability went hand in hand, then the opposite proposition must be true: Economic growth and well-being would fuel tolerance and a healthy exchange of ideas. In this evolution, John Johnson of Stanford Universiy, among other academics, emphasized the role of what he termed the 'middle sectors." He foresaw that prosperity would fuel the rise of an urban middle class comprised of small businessmen, bankers, professionals, lawyers, and salesmen. Entrepreneurial and profit-oriented, these citizens, in turn,would embrace First World political values, insisting on rights similar to those found in the U.S. Constitution. The long pattern of authoritarian and often arbitrary government in Latin America would end as political institutions matured in harmony with economic and social advances. The element of harmony was also important. Modemizationists drew on long-standing anthropological notions about society, including what is known asfi~iora1;1lim.Adherents of this notion believed that complex social structures, like interlocking gears, moved together in natural unison. Change in one area made change probable-even certain-in others. Thus, not surprisingly, theorists also linked economic and political transformation with culture. Indeed, they believed that much of the backwardness of the Third World was cultural. They held that modem man, in contrast to his intellectual and social predecessor (and Third World counterpart), was individualistic, efficient, resourceful, confident, and achievement-oriented. Traditional man, in contrast, was a slave to superstition, hierarchy, obedience, and fate. Latin Americans were destined to become sophisticated, modern people. These notions of intellectual and social evolution were drawn from earlier, nineteenth-century ideologies, including positivism and social Dar-

winism. Positivism exuded great confidence in the rationality of hu~nankiildand in its ability to scientifically solve social ills. Social Dawinism adopted Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory (survival of the fittest) to humans and civilizations, Both positivism and social Il>al.winisn~ had influenced the works of iMax W b e r , whch in turn inspired the moderxlizationists. Weber had argued, a t the turn of the twentieth century, that Western progress was attribuwhle to a collection of traits ernhedded in the ""Protestant work ethic," L i b e r a d horn irrationalit;v and famlism (such as that supl~osedlyfound in Catholicism and Eastern religions), Western man had obtained the correct mind-set for advancement, Weber-influenced books, such as Edward C. Banfield's The ~Mor-nlBgsis of a B U C ~ ? L .rJ10ciep RF~~ (195S), paved the way to modernization theory. Building on Weber's faith in Western man's rationalirq: An~er-icanscholars anticipated the rise of new cultural values in underdeveluped lands. One mrld.inhabitants coalesced. Around the second century B.c., one such populadon center emerged at Teodhuacain. The naIne of this now fa~nousarchaeologcal site coInes from the Lktecs,who referred to its ruins as a "Place of the Gods." Indeed, in some ways even to the modem eye it almtrst seems that a suyerhun~anrace must have concei-ved and built Ter>tihuac6rs,p ~ u l a r l yh o w n to &$&cans today as igspy~*tl-nmides. At the center of the grand city stood two enormous pyramids, evenmally given the inaccurate hut poetic names of the Sun and the Moon. The larger of the two, the Pyraxnid of the Sun, rises 2 15 feet from a base that is larger than that of its famous Emtian counterpart, the ~ramidfof Cbeoys. In 1908, amateur archaeolcrgists who were intrimed by the possibility of imer chambers blew up a quarter of it with dynaxnite. Others dug a tunnel through the dirt-filled strucmre in the 1030s, only to he disilppointed. Despiff; the damage wrought hy these and other misaifvenmres, the Pyra~nidof the Sun, in recent times illu~ninatedby giant floodlights, has remained a mecca for tourists. Stretching abvay from the pyramids is a sel-ies of plazas that form somet h n g alan to a great boulevard---again dra~naticallybut inaccurately christened the Avenue of the Dead. These plazas, situated on a gradual incline toward the Pyamid of the Moon, form a line that diverges slightly horn due north. Given that other major archaeological sites in central Mexico have the same orientadon, some scholars have hypothesized that various stars and const-ellaGonsdictased the initial outlay of this gridlike meeopoIis. Both the avenue and the two ~ r a m i d were s completed around the dxzle of Christ, and during subsequent centuries Teotihuac;in continued to spread ouward. Palaces and temples in the heart of the city housed a nobility that gu-verned a tiered society of art-isans, craksmen, and farmers. Apartment-like structures sprawled out in nearly all directions. Today, their stone foundations are nearly all that remain, Despite the fact that Teodhuachn is one of the most thoroughly and methodically analyzed archaeological sites in the world, we still know relatively little about its builders and inhabitants. No \vrittenlanpage has survived to tell us the names and exploits of its great kings. If royal to~nbs exist, we have not found them. In its heyday the city was plastered with colorhl mmals, and these drawings have provided many clues abtrut life in Teodhuacain. Other answers have been garnered from the archaeological record. By studying the ruins themselves, as well as factors such as the surrounding timber, food, and water resources, we can safely speculate that when Rome was a t its height, this urban center may well have been the largest city on the face of the earth. Pcjttery shards tell us that the Teodhuacanese traded widely It appeus that their sociegi was governed, at least

for a tirne, by a fairly benign and farsighted leadership that ~naintained peace with distant peoples. But after centuries of glorl~,the city declined. Evidence of a crude eighth-centruv wall suggests fears of invasion, and radiocarbon datillg shows that much of Teotihruacgn was at one dxne sacked and burned. The culpri~,presumably (though some fires may have been initiated by the inhabitants themselves), were waves of wild tribes migrating in from the north. These diverse peoples, collectively ter~nedthe Toltec, ~ningledwith the more civilized inhabitants that they conquered, and apparently absorbed the practices of some sophisticated Indians from the southeast, A Toltec empire eventually emerged, s~nallerand less cenaalized than that of Teotihuaciin, but still vibrant, and in places, urbanized. Tula, a Toltec city , still inthat was home to some 50,000 persons in the eleventh c e n m ~was habited by modest nu~nbersat the dme of the arrival of Europeans in Mexico in 15 19. The 'Ibltlrcs floundered in a fashion similar to that of their predecessors, as new bands of violent invaders swept into their domains. 't%rious nomadic hunting tribes, collectively called the tzdies,and we became desperate tfirottgh sueering and fatig~e.. . . The only food we had during the voyage was corn soaked and t)oiled. %VCsuffered very xnuck for want of water, but trtias denied afl we needed. A pint a day was all &at was aUowett, and no more; and a great r t l a q sfaves died upon tfie passage." Z t s horrors,

lliiloriTrated by profit, slave traders calculated that it was xnore cost effective to fill their ships with humans and let soIne die than to sacrifice cargo space to sug3plies of food and freshwater. The best evidence indicates tbat about 10 percens of African slaves perished in transit. Those who amived in the New World were badly ~nalnourishedand depleted, prompting Portuguese sugar planters in Brazilian markeq3laces to probe, jab, and thoroughly inspect new arrivals in order to gauge their remaining stl-ength and durability. Plantation life was predictably harsh. Slaves worked in the cane fields from dawn to dusk. Planters routinely failed to supply adeyuatt; food, insisdng instead that Africans grow their own vegetables on small plots of marginal land, which they were permitted to work on Sundays. This practice, which infuriat-ed lnaflfipriests (urho wanted slaves to aaend mass instead of laboring on the Sabbath), rarely yielded sufficient harvests. Malnutridon, coupled with physical abuse, produced a high mortality rate, with an average life expeetanq of about twelve years for newly arrived Africans in Brazil, Death was so hequent, and cl-Iurclz burials so expensive and inconvenient, that many whites disposed of slave bodies by discarding them in nearby forestri or unmarked common graves.

Most of the Africans imported into Brazil (75 percent) were young ~nales.But a smaller, fe~naleslave population took hold in the colony's port cities, where many LUricanwomen were put to work as domesdc servants. For quite some time, histrrl.-iansassumed that their lives contrastlrd greatly with the brevity and bmtaliy of those of their Inale counterparts. Newer scholarshp counters this assumpdon. Under the supervision of rich white lvomen, female slaves were subjected to kequent abuse. The plalvl/rtwz'n,a paddle-like device with holes, was applied to all parts of the slave's body, including her breasts. Legal documents reveal that even kjlling female slaves was not uncommon; one enraged and imaginative mistress chained her slave's face to a stove and cooked her alive, Given the severiy of a slave's life, it comes as little surprise that many risked death in an att.empt t i r regain freedom. In nt1rther-n Brazil, colonial planters had an ongoing proble~nwith runaways. Fleeing into nearby jungles, blacks congregated in small villages, or gailombos-an African word for a war canzp-whert; they reinvented African ways of fik and fought tenaciously with slave-rewieving expeditions. Excavadons were undertaken a t the site of the most farnous quilcjmho, Palmares, in the mid-19Ws. At its height, in the seventeenth centctry, Palmares was home to nearly ten thousand inhabitants. It was so powerful that it negotiated treaties with surrc~undingplantadons, in which both parties agreed to foregc, raiding and mumally coexist. Despite their occasionally effeccivr: resistmce, h i c a n s made the Portupese rich. They turned Brazil (more properly, isolated sections of its most of the refined cane, hownorthern coast) into a grand wgar ~01011~~ ever, was sold to foreigners, as the wealth, population, and power of Pmtestant northern Europe rose during the colonial period. Evenmally, some sugar-importing nations entertained ideas of growing the wonder crop thernselves. T h e Dutch, whose enormous xnerchant xnarirte ptied most of the world's oceans during the seventeenth centur): coveted the cane fields of northeastern Brazil 2nd eventually toc~kthem bj7 force. From 1630 to 1654, Holland occupied Pernambuco, with its port of Reeife. Though they were eventually driven out by planters loyal to the Portupese crown, h t c h entrepreneurs ieamed from the experience of occupation, and took their know led^ about sugar planting with them as they m~jvedelsewhere in search of wealth. Where could northwest Europeans grcllv their own crops? A number of Protestant nations eyed the Caribbean in the seventeenth century, where Spanish naval and colonial authoriy had badly deeriorated. Their navies seized small islands in the Lesser h t i l l e s , where sugar planters found near-perfect conditions. But the depopulated islands lacked a worHarce. Insl~iredby the Iberian examl3le and already heavily involved in the slave trade, the Dutch 2nd other nurth Eumpeans continued to sub,iect Mi.jcans

to the whip. Slavery under the French and the north Europeans was as brutal as that under the Portuguese and Spanish. Savage working conditions and an acute lack of sustenance marked the treament of slaves in the as Caribbean, many of whom perished or resisted. Runawq~s,or WE~D-CIOI~~C, they were called (fro~na Spanish word rneaning "people of the hlls"), had few options on the small islands, and they were often recaptured. Many French masers employed three tiers of punishment: The first captrure rssulted in the loss of an ear; the second, in the severing of a foot; and the thrd, in death-by creadve methods such as bur9ng the African up to his neck, covering his head in cane sap, a d alto\ving fire ants to gnaw a t him until I-reexpired, Despite their ruthlessness, French planters lost c o n ~ o of l their largest slave colony, Saint Dominpe, located on the western third of Hispaniola. The s~nallerislands of the Lesser htilles had been great for sugar, but some were too mountainous, and many of those under cultivation suffered from soil depletion within a few decades. Hence, north Europeans sl-rifted their operadons to the Greater hndlles. In 1655, Oliver Cromwell engineered the English capture of Jamaica, and large plantations that met Uritainhugar denzands were eventuaily Jevef tjyed there. l"he French, in coneast, only gradually absorbed western Hispaniola, decades after its pihad explored its inlets and used them as hideoutq. rates, called bucr~z~ec~-s, Dul-ing the eighteend7 centur;ti Saint Dc~mingueblosson~ed.as sugarcane flourished in its central valley. But by 1790, the colony's white populadon was outnumbered eleven to one, and harried by a sizable manlon population hiding in remote mountains. The political instatlilit). of the French Kewlutiurz dit-ided dolrists and compounded their vulnerabiliq~,and in Aupst 1791 the heart of Saint Domingue erupted in race war. One thousand whites, or about 3.2 percent of the bench population, were killed in short order, and others fled frorn the interior to the ports, where many boarded ships for Louisiana or France. Napoleon, the French Emperor, attempted to pacify the Africans with a portion of his Europe-conquering army But the determined former slaves would have none of it; they offered a relentless resistance. French warriors were stupefied. In one early battle, the French field commander men waved a Nag of truce so that he could cross the battle lines and corn~nendhis worthy opponents. Prolonged fighting sapped French morale and turned the insurrection into a bitter contest marked by atrocities; but er;entualiy, it culminated in freedom for the wrl& first black: republic, Haiti, in 180.1. Today, Haiti is the most visible reminder of the ct~lonialinsri~tionof African slavery After hreaking free, it lapsed into poverty and isolation, with sugar production plu~nrnetingby mro-thirds and only no~ninaltrade and contact with the outside world during much of the nineteenth century Europeans shunned it, and southerners in the h i t e d States feared

the ra~nificationsof even recognizing its sovereignty. h e r i c a did appreciate Haiti's strategic importance, however, in the age of stearn and steel. The U.S. Xavy, which dominated the Caribbean at the outset of the twentieth cent-ury, transported an occupation force of ~Var-inesinto Haiti during World War I. Black Haitians and mostly southern-bred, white Marines did not get along well. Insurgents resisted the occupation, and only the fear of swift punishment yuellect the Haitians. C:harlensagne Pkralte, the fore~nostHaitian guerrilla leader, was betrayed into the hands of h e r i c a n s by a corrupt associate and was executed. His body was ded to a door and defaced with a Haitian Bag and a large aucilix. A famtrus painting of his corpse helped turn him into a legendary figure--one that inspired Haitians decades later, when Haiti again posed difficuldes for the United States. Haiti's ruling elite are light-slanned, reflecting a blend of white French and black &frican ethniciv (commonly called m~itrtto). H4lthough in Haiti this pigmentation is rare-less than 3 percent of the population have it-in Brazil, since the colonial era, a large mulatto populadon has emerged. In coastal areas arclund Recife and Salvador live millions of mr~lattoesand hl acks-the descendants of slaves. In fact, roughly half of Brazil's massive population can claim some degree of Mrican heritage. h d although most Africans were shipped primarily into Brazil and the Caribbean, tens of thousands, especially during the sixteenth century, ended up in colonial Spanish ports. Some African communities thoroughly assimilated into the general population over rime, so that in Buenos Aires, for example, there is almost no black presence left today. But others were peq~etuaad-fi)r exarnde, in Venezuela and PanamB, where the descendancs of Aft-ican slaves have contributed unique qualities to the nadonal cultures, in music, dance, and cuisir~e. Their most noticeable contribution is no doubt in religion: Africanbased spiritualism has not only sur.rrlved but has won many new adherents. In norheastern Brazil, Candomhik and t'mbanda are major religions; and almost all Haitians, even though they consider themselves Christians, continue to practice voodoo. These African religions involve a pantheon of gods, or spirit-beings; fernre highly emotional services and ""yussessions'" by spirits; and have a mystical element that often strikes outsiders as bizarre. Honrjr is accorded to ancestors, such as Zumbi-the warlord of Palmares, who is now venerated in the Umbanda faith, Haitians pay homage a t the t o ~ n bof Baron Sa~nedi,a Lord of the Dead who is believed to possess his sdll-living followers. In contrast to caricatures fueled by ima g a in film and on television, voodoo practitioners do not spend their nights sticking pain pins into dolls and chopping off chicken heads. h in Brazilian spiritualism, they prirnarily anend fesdve ceremonies that feamre lt~uddmm beating, distinctive music, and emotionaii excitement. S p i r i ~ a l

possessions, if they come, are not ~nuchmore ~anscendentthan the "slaying by the spirit" experienced by soIne U.S. Pentecostals. hnd a1thoug.h supersddons such as the Haitian belief in zombies (the enslaved dead) persist, they rarely tire] practices more dangert~usthan, for example, the poisonous snake handling pracdced by funda~nentalistChristian sects today in sclrne areas of rural Ag3palachia. The Golortial Church

At the same dme as millions of Haidans and Brazilians en~braceAfrican spirimalis~n,Inost also profess Christianity. This Inay at first seem conwadica~ry;the mixing of diverse traditions, however, is central to Latin h e f i c a n religious experience. For the majority of the populatitsn, the descendan~of whites and Indians, it is a process borne uf the era of conquest. Wlien Colurnbus sailed the Atlan~cin search of the spice islands, he was dr-iven by a desire both to enrich 'himself and to promote his religion, Similarly, a foot soldier in Cartis's army wrote that Spaniards came to "serve God and get rich." Nthtlugh the history of early encounters, especially the harsh abuse of Indians, suggesfs that greed ultjmately predominated in the range of motives, Spaniards of all backgrounds understood and often jusdfied their actions through their faith. Religion was an integral part of the C:onquest. As in the Caribbean, mendicants (vow-taking clerics) followed their countrpien onto the mainland of the h e r i c a s and soon were in~racring directly wish their new Indian charges. VVho were these milllcjns of natives, they pondered, and why had God put them in a world of their own, apart from the saving message [of the Gospel? Questions about the discovery of the New World and its peoyles pel-plexed many thinkers and provided fodder for decades of discussion back in Spain, To &as Casas, the Dominican heir of h t o n i o de ~Mrontesinosand tireless ""defender of the Indians," the anwer was simple: Indians were fully human and capable of saving faith, although in the short term, at least, they warranted veatment as childlike junior brothers in Christ. To others, most notably a lawyer named Juan de SepGlveda, who opposed Las Casas in a series of famous mid-sixtwnthcentury debates, they were namrally reprobate: evil, homosexual, smpid brutes, inherently lazy and best enslaved for their own good. Sep~lveda's position enjoyd considerable popular support; but much of the Church hierarchy favored Las Casas9sview--a view that sanctioned clerical expansion, and in time, helped make the Catholic church a major institudon in colonial societ-)r. In the sixteenth century, after Spaniards conquered Indians with the sword, priests bent on a conquest of their own arrived with the cross. In ~Mexicoa Franciscan friar, Toribit? de Benavente, walked barefoot with

eleven brothers from Veracruz to Mexico City. This open embrace of hardship was telling: a missionary zeal, Spanish priests had resolved to win this vast new world to the Christian faith. Their passion for st.>uls was compounded by a sense of urgency: Surely the discovery of the h e r icas was apocalypdc, portending the imminent remrn of Christ! The rapid sgxead of fatal diseases among the Indians signaled impending judgment, makit~gthe work of salvation vitally importmt. Ft3r manj: Indians, postConquest change also evoked a special spiritual longing. Many lncan peoples, for example, anticipated remming deities and new epochs in a manner that enabled them to accept the idea of universal f r n a l i ~ .Such coInrnon theological threads facilitated the fusion of native and Catholic religious practices. This mixing, or syncretism, greatly aided the church in its spiritual conquest of the New WorZd. (;etring Indians to fully abandon their polytheis~n,however, was difficult. In venerating myriad saints, h d i ans retained a theological mmmonaliry with their ancestors even while accepting basic Czhristian dcjgma, Syncretism was both a calculated and an informal process. In an example of i a most swategized form, the Church hierarchy encouraged devodon to the reputed appearance of Mary; the mother of God, in central Mexico in I53 l. A Christianized Indian na~nedJuan Diego, so the story goes, encountered the Vrgin on a hill north of Mexico City. Knowing that there WCIU~CI be skegticsl she gave him a bunrile of tltnvers, which he carefi~Xty wrapped in his serape (cloak). Upon conferring with the archbishop, 'Juan Diego unfolded the cloth--and discovered inside it an image of the Mrgin with significantly dark skin. Tr-re spcretic cult of the Mrgin of Gadalupe that was founded on &is myth has since flourished, particularly in the seventeenth century, wooing many narives to the who bmmes n whorclfkrpgy, of*he, who pr{y.f tu w21"2 kmF

Sor Juana, like many women of wealthy backgrounds, found refuge in the convent, which provided the only Ineans by which she could achieve an intellectual life. mmti3r making important decisions, and usualiy involved on1y the town's elite. Gtllollial government favored the rich, and its administrarion of justice was pardsh. Spain did not p r o d e its colonies with clean or efficient governxnent. One reason for this was the overlapping nature of offices and functions. Each tier issued decrees and heard appeals-there was no separation of powers-making for a mess of laws a d v * n gbureaucratic interests. In one sense this worked to the benefit of the crown, which frequently stepped in as the final arbiwator in disputes. It was not, however, a system conducive to smooth administration. Furthermtrre, dul-ing the breadtll of

the colonial era, the q u a l i ~ of ofificeholders deteriorated. The New Rbrld became less ixzlportant and less ateactive to the Spanish m r time, and &c best and brightest preferred to pursue careers at home. Even more darnaging was the crc~\vn'sgpractice of selling colonial offices to the highest bidder as a means of raising money. By the eighteenth century, even viceregal posts were up for sale. Bureaucrats who bought their oftices for high prices did so with the intent of recouping the expense by graft and by doting sut political favors. Over time, predictabl~elites burn and raised in the New Wc~rldhad or colomore t i r gain by holding office than did Spaniards. These c;~-iokIo~~~ nial~born of white-skimed, Spanish-descend& parent.s, caxne to do~ninate offices by the middle of the colonial era. For nearly tuio hundred years, little about the s&ucmre or style of ccrionial government changed (though its quality declined); but in time, the Spanish crown realized that an overhaul of the system could revitalize it. Criollos were very disappointed with this reorganization when it came, under a new Spanish dpast;v, in the eighteenth cenmrJi, The House of Bourbon acquired the Spanish throne at the outqet of the 1700s and determined to initiatc reforms to reinGgorate the empire and replenish royal coffers. Both political connections and aade b e ~ e e nthe mother countr-y and its colonies had slackened, LMindful of new ideas about nzertantilism and enlightened mle, Buudon kings set out to try and restore Spain's wealth and glory. The Bourbon reforms saetched over decades, though the most meaninghl restl-ucturing took place in the 1760s and X 770s. Economically, the Bourbon crown attempted to revive Spain's moribund economy by increasing nade with its colonies. Since the mid-sixteenth cenrur): when pirates frequently raided imperial ships on the open seas, the monarchy had closely controlled shipping by organizing large fleets--more easily protected by naval escort-and routing its merchant marine into specific ports, This tightly managed sptem f'acilitated trade monopolies, and in each ~najorentrepet a powerful group of ~nerchantshad arisen. By the eighteenth century, however, Spain's naval might had withered, and smuggliing was so widespread that the old resu.ictit>tlsno longer made sense. 7 b e Bourbons opened new ports, lowered duties, and shelved monopolistic restrictions. Shipping costs declined, more ships visited ports legally, and tax revenues rose, m e n it came to crade, the Spallisfi Bourbons were especlalfy ixlrerested in importing more silver. A second area of reform thus involved New Wc>ddmines. Once tremendously productive, the silver mining operasions of Peru and Mexico had lapsed illto disrepair over tirne. Bourbon kings sought to reinvigcjrate them. They opened a mining school in Mexico City, sent teams of n~ostlpCkrn~antechnicians to solve drainage problems, and

adjusted the tax code to encourage new exploration and production. Mercury (or "quicksilver"), used during the colonial era to process silver ore, became more readily available and served the crown as a lucrative monopoly, ld1 of these eRcjrts on behalf of silver mining helped account t i ~ pror duction increases, though Ladn America's mines never returned to their sensational mid-sixreenth- and early-seventeenth-century levels that had funded European wars and had made Spain rich. Beyond economic reforms, the Bourbons reorganized colonial government. In addition t-o the two new viceroyalties, they created new uudlencias and consolidated lower bureaucratic offices into powerful refSional posts called Intendances. Intendants received extensive tax-collecting, auditing, and adrninistradve a u t h o r i ~most ; significantly, to the chagrin of criollos who had become accusttlmed tr, purchasing offices, they were ovemlhelmingly peni~zst~ig~-es, or Spaniards (literally, those from the peninsula), appointed by the king. A n d even worse for colonials, the Bourbons increased taxes. Duties on a range of local p r o d u c ~and inlports rose sharply, generadng resentment and even sparking occasional riots and rebellions. A bloody Indian uprising in Peru in 1780 was, in part, inspired by new taxation and mine labor drafts; and new duties on alcoholic beverages triggered riots in New Granada. Cc~lonialmismst of SpainGntentions increased as tfiose tax reventres began to be used to firlance standi~lgamlies in the h e r i c a s , Spain's priInary concern was the expansion of French and Endish holdings in North Arnerica and the Caribbean. The crown recognized that its empire was vcrlnerablc, and it had new fr}rtresses consmcted at major ports and on the fronder of northern Mexico in order to deter encroach~nent.By the 1790s, more than half of Spain's expenditures on behalf of its colonies went for defense. But the presence of troops under the command of peninsulares spawned new suspicions among colonials and heightened criollo distrust of Spaniards. With a mind toward consotidating its rule and raising revenue, the Bourbons also expelled the powerful Jesuit order fi-om the New World in 1767. The Jesuits, who answered directly to the Pope, had been materially successful in the colonies, amassing property, managing lucrative missions, and educating sons of the criollo elite in prestigious schools. The expulsion enriched the crown and weakened a potentially disloyal wing of the Church; but it further annoyed the wealthy crioltos, who appreciated the Jesuits' work. Many of the twelve hundred priests expelled were criollos themselves, and some became outspoken critics of the Bourbons. In a second sense, too, the cro\vn may have lveakened its position with the expulsion: The Jesuits and the Church were bulwarks against new ideas filtering in from northern Europe. Enlightenment notions of limited monarchy, conszritrrti~naIism~ and natural rights, which inspired revolutions in France

and (hyorth) America, also found their way into criollo heads, primarily thou$ books ~nadeInore available thou$ the weakening of the Church. All told, then, the Bourh~nrefc~nnseffecdvely dmve a wedge between lvhites horn in the hTewWorld and those from Spain. After nearly three hundred years of colonialissn, elites in the late eighteenth cenmly had little loyalty to the Spanish king. The arrival of Bourbon bureaucrats made them receptive to new ideas-ideas of governing thert~seilvesand creating their own national idenddes.

Indepenrdercree and Its Aftermath Ladn America's wars of independence were triggered by events in Europe. After the French Revolrrticjn of -t789?a series of conflicts ensued that weakened links b e ~ e e nthe colonies and the motherland, and den~onsrrated Spain's second-rate military status. In 1796 the British warred against Spain and blockaded its ports, ehctively sllattering the Bourbon sptem of xnercantilist: trade, In 1806, without: authorization, British Adxniral Sir Home Popham seized the viceregal capital of Buenos Ares, again causing chaos and reveaiing the vulnerability of the Spanish empire. Athougb ousted by Spanish colonials, the British had unwittingly helped set in motion forces for independence. fil-encomt7assing chaos ensued in 1807-1808, when Napoleon sent an army into Spain in order to attack Portugal, which had refused to abide by his continental system prohibiting trade with Britain. The French invasion put thdt~rtuguesecrolvn to flight: Boarding British naval ships, the royal house and thousands of subjects sailed to Rio de 'Janeiro and made it their temporary imperial capital. Napoleon, meanwhile, refused to \Nithdraw his troops from Spain itself. He ren~ovedthe new Borrrban king, Ferdisland \ill, and placed his own brother on the throne. CascileS; religious peasantry soon rebelled, bogging French troops down in a protracted and difficult war, Throughout Latin Anerica, Spaniards deterxnined to rule in the nasne of Ferdinand. But the uncertainty of political events in Spain caused peninsular and cr-iol'lo divisions to explode. In aln~ostevev important colonial city, rival cabildos and juntas, or governing bodies, formed. Each claimed authority to rule in the name of the king. Xowhere was this divisiveness more acute than in Buenos Ares, where the cioJlo-dclmix~atedmilitia that had ousted the Bridsh reasse~nbledto usurp Spanish authority. Backed by rich merchant5 who wanted to liberalize aade policies, the militia soon hecame an army of independence, and in 1810 a new ""IJnited Provinces of La Plata" was formed. Buenos Atres sent its arlny inland to clear other areas of Spanish rule (and to exert its own control), Yet although Latin h e r i c a n s could drive

the Spaniards away without ~nuchdifficulty, criollo unity proved elusive. Regional interests predominated, and it was soon apparent that an independent South America would feature many nadons. Inland elites wanted nothing tc1 do with the new leaders in Buentls fires. 337 raised their own army and soon declared Paraguayan independence (1811). Uruguay, too, broke away, and even the area that today is known as Lbgendnawas not fully integrated until the mid-nineteenth centur_v;Bspitt: this, Argentinians played a prominent role in liberadng the southern half of the continent from Spain. Jose de San Martin, a criollo who had studied in Spain and fought the French until 1812, =turned home, organized a tightly disciplined arlny, and Inarched it across the steep h d e s into Chile and Peru. He helped found these new nations with the aid of local insurgents, although elites, especially in Peru, were badly divided and suspicious of his inten~ons, San Martin is recognized as one of two great independence heroes in South An~erica,He met the othel; his nort-hern cuuntevart, in Gtlaj7aquil, Ecuador, in I 822. Sirnon Btjlivar was the criolfo son uf a well-to-do merchant. During much of the 1810s he waged relentless and bloody warfare agGimlst Spaniards in ??e\v Granada (areas that vr.ould become Chlon~hia and Venezuela). At the Battle of Boyacg, in Auwst 181%his forces finally turned the dde, mopping up remaining resistance with the help of foreign mercenaries dur-ing the next couple of Fars. At their 1822 mee.ting, San lliilaruln deferred to Bolivar for the final operation inland----to an area &at: adopted the Lihemtor"r;ame, Bolivia, Although sometimes compared with revolutionaries and other national heroes, such as i\n,erica9s George Washington, neither San Martin nor Bolivar were visionaries or sons of the Enlightenment. Although they were certainly cognizant of Enlightenmem ideas, hoth men hv01"~tl. Inonarchism and re~nainedstaunchly conservative. As criollos, they viewed whites as superior, and Indians and mesrizos as incapable of selfmle. Lldeed, they and others who waged she wars of independence [email protected] for equality a t the top--be~een Spaniards and criollos, not for all citizms. And even though San Martin decreed changes in the status of Indians in Peru and elsewhere (decrees unifr3rmly ignored by local etlltes), he spent the re~nainderof lus life where he felt must comfortable: Europe. Independence movements in South Arnerica brought no meaningful social change. In fact, for most mestizos and Indians, it NFasas though nothing had happened. In Mexico, however, a genuine social revolution briefly exploded. In 1810 a criclillo priest, jealous of peninsular Spmniwds and longing for criollo equaliry, inadvertently launched a race war. Miguel Hidalgo, as every Mexican schoolchild lrows, rang the bells at his church in the small town of Delores on September 16, and rallied his Indian parishioners with

a moving speech. Under the banner of the Virgin of Gadalupe he led an "army" (it was more like a mob) in sacking a nearby city and killing its Spanish inhabitants (including an intendant), who had barricaded themselves in a grrrnary. In October his rebel forces, now sevenq thousand strong, approached Mexico City. illthou$ he could have easily defeated the small Spanish force that stood in his path, Hidalgo inexplicably ordered a retreat at the Battle of ~Msntede las Cruces, and his insurrection disintegrated as quickly as it had coalesced. He was hunted down, tried, and executed by the Inq-Lrisition. Hiddgo5 revolt is e ~ d e n c of e the deep r i b &at defined colonial societl;: m i t e s could not conceiw of darb-shtzned peoples either as ciciaens or as equals. To the educated, wealthy "people of reason," the Indian-blooded nzajoriv was brutish, irrational, and dangerous. It was tr? be feared and conaolled, not liberated. 'When Hidalgo's dark-slanned legions began to kill both peninsulares and criollos, all whites united in order to suplxess the rebellion, Mexico5 long stx-uggle for independence subseyuendy mutated. New, small perrilla forces were mustered under mestizos, and continued to face the opposition of both local and Spanish whites. In 1820, when Spaink government did a volte-face and embraced liberal constitrrtionalism, a criollo arIny officer, Apstin de imrbide, switched sides and marched his troops into Mexico City to establish a new empire. Ittrrbide'f break with Spain, unlike that attempted by Xllidallgo, was antirevolutionary. He issued a pronouncelnent, called the Plan of Iguala, in which he paranteed the legal privileges and status of the rich, his army, and the church. In an elaborate coronation he was named A ~ ~ s t I,i nEmperor of Mexico. Criollos supported him in large part because of his fiscal policies, which favored them. They displaced their peninsular rivals, who a few years later were thrown out of the countrq., Like independence in South hnerica, then, Mexico's independence brought change only at the top, Brazil obwined independence from krtugal in a similarly consernative fashion, and +&out bloodshed. Cbernxnent in the plantation-dominated colony had always been weak, and late-eighteenth-century reforms under the h'faryuis de Pombal were a faint echo of the Borrrban restx-uctrrringin Spanish domains. WiscoveI-ies uf- gold and diamonds in the suutfi-central region of Minas where disenchanted university youth thought about the possibiliries of remaking their country whiXe reading the lvritings of JosC iMaru". A few of them, including Fidel Castro, recMessly attacked an army base in an attempt to spark a revolt on July 26, 1953, in honor of the hlmdredh amiversary of ~Mard"sirtch, Easily captured, these sons of the middle class were amnestied by Batista two years later. Casao, a gifted athlete who night have xnade Inoney playing baseball, ended up in Mexico, where he recruited buddies for a return to his homeland. h o n g his new friends was Ernesto "'Che" Guevara, an idealistic ex-medical sntdent from Argentina. With Guevara and eighty others, Castro returned to invade Cuba by boat. Only a few of the men survived the ir~itiallanding and made it into the mountains away from the coast, Castrt~iathleticism, charisma, and knack for srrategy helped this very small band of guerrillas stave off the remarhbly inept secur-ityforces of the Batista dictatorship. The Cuban authorities in Havana had seemingly litde to fear in 1956, though they openly promulgated the lie that ose'\wasan extensive covert operation out of south FIorida in the early 1%Os that involved thousands of raids by small boatloads of saboteurs. Targeting infrastructure, including power stations, communications facilities, and bridges, these raiders caused new hardships for rural Cubans, who had overwhel~ninglpsupported the revolution. However, sabotage also failed to destabilize the regime. Gastrobgt,-c.em-rentpubficized US, attemp.ts to desac3j7 it, and in the early 1960s it continued to enjoy the ovenvhel~ningsupport of the Cuban people. Where invasions, assassination plots, and raids fdiled, an economic embargo introduced an exceedingly slow recipe ti)r success, A July 1960 sugar embargo was gradually expanded to a total embargo by 1964, including a navel ban (though circumvented by other nations, such was akle to monitor h e r i c a n traffic in as hfexico, where the U.S, errsbass~~. and out of the forbidden counuy). Only massive infusions of cash and material aid from the Soviet Union averted economic depression; when those infusions ahmpdp ended after the So7riet collapse in 1091, the C:ukan economy foundered. Soviet aid to the scow"secisit>nto wihdraw. Soviet econan~ic aid continued, and as a result, extensix health care and education prograins kept a majority of Cubans faithful to their governlnent over the next quarter centuq. In the post-Soviet worXc3 of the 199Os, however, Cuka has nearly heen brou$t to its knees. ?he 1992 Cuban Democracy Act, supported by elderly southern senators like jesse Helms, who still rcmember Castro's desegregaGon, was designed by i t s Demtrcr-atic autlizors ""to make tile C:uhan economy scream." Yet the results were disappoindng. ?Be act's call for the punishment of countries ~ a d i n g with Cuba was a violation of international l a y and enkjrcement proved nearly impossible, Penalties imposed on foreign businesses that had acquired properties in Cuba once owned by Americans (prior to seizure by the rninatethe poor in a paternalistic fashion, liberation Christiaxrs approached them as equals, shared in their sufferings, and sought to empower them to effect social change. Small groups of peasan6 organized under the rubric of consciousness-raising and welco~nedthe aid of liberation Christians in learning to read. These groups, known as rwas it? As with the death squad operarians, &ere was no serivus attempt to hide the slaughter. The point of the big massacres, in fact, was to instill fear in the pecrple and get &ern to submit. But it? the wake of these ~nassivekillings, Inany peasants joined the FMLN. The perrillas issued largely accurate reports of these operations, and people learned to hate the a m y and government all the m r e . The massacre at El Mozote did another type of damage to the pacification efforts. Two h e r i c a n reporters made their way to the massacre site and revealed the incident to the world. Mma Guillermoprietr?of the msbing"~ Poe had been dpped off by Raymond Bonner of the Nm?YOrk Times, and both hiked into the intetrior with the help of FLMLN contacts. Field photographem snapped phoms of partially decayed and mutilated corpses. In January 1981, the two major newspapers ran stories about El Mozote, stating emphatically that a massacre had occurred. lUthough the stories generated little political hllout (only Ted Kennedy andJerr;tr Smdds raised the issue in Congress), the Reagan ad~ninisaationsuffered a public relations sethack. In the shadow of El Momte, the snategy of wholesale massacre showed its fundamental flaws: Killings of this size could alienate Inore peasants than they frightened, and they also aroused ~nediaexposure. The military and their supporters therefcjre began to change their snategy in 1982.

Amerjica" Secret War: Lessons Learned The civil war in El Salvador is profoundly significant because it became a laboratorq. for testing modern counterinsurgency techniques. After E1 ~ l o zote, h e r i c a n militaly advisers arrived in large numbers and took direct conaol of the war. Over the next decade, the U.S. militav establishment used El Salvador as a m d e l for perfecting the means by which popular-

based rural insurrections could be defeated. The lessons of El Salvador assme us that successful revolurions in Latin hrnerica are a thing of the past. In this small and impoverished land, h e r i c a n strategists mastered counterinsurgency warfare and produced one of historq.5 most astounding military victories. To appreciate the meaning of what happened in El Salvador, one must undersand its rnilitarq.context. The atmafs of histort; are replete with variations on guerrilla-style warfare, but populnr insurgency-in which the people are overwhel~ninglyunited behind a rebellion-had long pmven impossible to suppress*Nthorrgh isolaad and poorly supported perrillas can be aacked down and defeated, how can an arIny pacify an endre people, except by killing them! The question perplexed Pentagon planners during the Memam waq where, according to CIA analysfs in 1%5,95 percent of the populace supported the Met Cong rebels and opposed the Arnerican presence. Strategic hamlets had failed, and political assassinations under the pathbreaking Phoenix program were no more effective, Despite a half million men, t e c h n o l o ~light years ahead of the opposition, a bombing campaign that dropped more tonnage than that in all of World War II, and a kill ratio of 50 to 1, the f i i t e d Smtes failed to pacify MetnaEn. The war in El Salvador was designed and prosecuted h o ~ nthe vantage point of that difficult experience. There is no way to defeat a truly popular rebelllion except by making it unpopular. In El Salvador, the U.S. military overtly engaged in a political war where a major portion of the battlefield rested in people's minds. Propaganda has been widl us, of course, for as long as warfare, hut not on this level. The coordination b e ~ e e nthings ~nilitaryand things political became explicit. Psychological operations, or psy ops, underwent a massive revision and enhancement at the Pentagon in the mid- 1980s. h process was perfected whereby simple people could be subtly indoctrinated to view the army as their friend. Psy ops have since become the centerpiece of countel-insurgenq campaigns (""low-intensit):conflicts," or LICs, in the military's lexicon), for the first dme in histoy. American Alilitary Group (M1C;roup) advisers, numherillg on average four hundred at a time (congressional 3iznitations were circumvented by very long rotadon cycles), implemented a Pentagon-coordinated war in El Salvador beginning in 1982. They ended the large-scale massacres in favor of selective repression based on sound intelligence, Fmn~the start, they swessed the need to politzicallq. recaptnrre the '"hearts and xninds" of a majority of the populadon--a nuly fc~rmidabletask in the wake of what had @anspired. Instead of meeti~agpeasants and killing them, the Salvadoran k m y began to peet them and hand out g i b and food. ?Be officer in co~nrnand at El Momte, Domingo Mnnerrosa, was rersained as a PR man. He helicoptered into scores of villages and dis~ibutedaid, asking sick chilcfren to

step fomard in order to receive xnedical care. Enlisted soldiers dressed up in cosmrnes and entertained kids, handing out toys and candy. Backed by the wealth of the United States, the military and government had the resources with which tt, lvoo the poor into their ranks-and show them that the FMLX, in conwast, could deliver only stmggle and hardshp. A seminal feature of the psychological war was the relegidmizadon of the Sislvadoran grlvernment. U.S. aid bought g2rinting presses, polidcal propaganda blared from army trucks, and leaflets fell fro~nhelicopters. The most powerful tool of reeducation were the mass media, especially television, In time, oft-repeated ideas in the media began to take hold in the general populadon. The death squad terror of security forces, for example, was attributed a, a clandestine "far right" that Duarte and the heficans, try as they might, could not control. (Jn fact, there were pl-ivate death squads tried to the elite; but their links with securiv Forces, especialb with the Treasury Police, are certain.) The freewheeling mastermind of the deatih squads, Roberto D'Aubuisson, rather convenientlj~was caught in an overseas airport with documen~on him that linked him to the assassination of hchbishop Romero. US,-sponsored plans to relegitimize the grlvemnzent were repeatedly tlatnpered by the independent spirit of the Salvadoran elires, who bdked at working with Duarte and favored their own political organizadon, the National Republican Alialzce (mENI11). Elections were crucial to con.vincing the poor that the political process was becoming fair. The probletn was, with the popular organizations gone and the FDR unable to pardcipate, voters did not believe that they had genuine electoral choices. Duarte9sadrninistradon, highly corrupt, was despised (its postal service raided incoming mail from abmad, much of which included small amount5 of money sent by Salvadorans working overseas to their families). ?'he eiections themselves were manipulative. Voting was rnade mandatory, and the poor had to show their sramped vodng cards at arrny check~~oints after the election or face arrest for subversion, In the X984 contest for the Salvadoran presidency, only the influx of catnpaign Inoney from the CM saved Duarte from a humiliadng defeat. Eventually, when MENA won power in 1989, the elite celebrated in the sweets, chanting "h~el-ica,eat shit,'" Pdidcal and psychological efforts to recapture the hearts and xninds of El Salvador's people did not, of course, bring an immediate end to the fighting, Under the mtelage of heficans, Salvadoran securitry forces tirelessly gathered intelligence, hired informants, tortured capmred guerrillas, and pinpointed ardent FMLN supporters for eliminadon. The war was not to be won hy ail-enplfing public tenor hut thrortgh information and control. The tide turned against the rebels gradually, and by the late 1980s they were reduced to rank terrorism-blocking roads, blowing up power stations, and tllreatening the hq.ctroelcctric sptem, The a m y mushroomed

to well aver 50,000, as the nutnber of hll-time perrillas dwindled. Kandom machine-gunning from helicopters stopped, and laser-visionequipped American pilots, operating out of Panama, picked off rebels in the dead of night-a phenomenon that must have mys.ti.fiedthe tcchnologically unsophisticated. By Novexnber 1989, when h5llalobos aurhorized another " h a 1 ctffensive," he did so more out ctf desperation than with any hope of victolyl The rebels tried to take the war into the city during this offensive, with fighters even briefly occupying the streets of Escalbn, to the horror of tlle rich, The greatest success of this strateLq was to evoke a reaction from the Atlacad Battalion, which in the xniddfe of the crisis, reverted to its old ways. Sc~ldierseliminated six Jesuit priests at the (:atholic University, and their tracks were not well covered, The sensational murders attracted media atten.cjun and raised questions about whetrtler or not conditions in El Salvador, ten years after Oscar Romeroi murder, had really ckanged. Athcjugh U.S. senatorJohn NlcCain tried to hlarne the FhfLN for "provoking" the killings, and U.S. Army Major Mark BucWand (adviser to the Atlacatl) defended the need to reniove the ""intellectual authors of revolution," the jesuit sla;virzgs undermined the achievements of U.S. psy ops and helped force a negotiated peace settlement that ended the civil war in 1992. Ueqite this, the greatest success of psy ops in EI Salvador was the US, ~nilitary'sabilitp to prosecute operadons without the presence of the nosy investigarive news media. When conducting psy ops, the Pentagon actively discourages unconmolled media coveragmf events in the field. As militav consultant Carnes Lord, Ph-D., has explained, gaphic footage is bad because "images of death and destruction . . . so common in television coverage of war, inellitably encourage the feding &at b a r ] is futile, i m o r a i , or absurd."2 rls rlmerican media coverage ctf the Cenaal h e r i c a scene diminished after 1985, public sul,lx~tfor U.S. policy in the region rose significantly, as ellidenced in polling data. In the wake of his reports of the massacre at El RiEo~ote~ Ncz Timm reporter Raymond Bonner was dismissed from his post. He had been roundly stacked by U.S. government officials and consernatives as a liar, The mll Smet y~a~-nul edirorialized on his pllibility, and think tanks like the Xevv York-based Freedom House bemoaned the "liberal" nnredia's portrayal of the Salvadoran regime as repressive. Bonneh removal had a chilling effect on independent-minded correspondents who remained in El Salvador, and they increasingly echoed the official line-that the United Smtes was helping t r ~plant heedons and democraq in the tiny republic. The U.S. xnilitarp discouraged media coverage generally, but pressed for favorahle reportage whenever possible. It cultivated direct ties with the press, both +rough on-the-ground relations with comespondents and via

contacts with news outlets. In 1988, military analysts wrote, "Relations with the ilrnerican rnedia consdtute a major success t'or US. xnilitary palicy in El Salvador, . . . [since] more favorahle reporting helped take the edge off domestic opposition to U.S. policy."' Military planners were corning to realize that the news media could be used to shape public opinion rather than to inform it. In contrast, opposition groups in the United Smtes corrld not wen get some of their paid advertisements about El Salvador aired. One ad, which showed an ilrnerican wridng a check to El Salvador's army as the paper mmed to blood, was dismissed by television execut-ives as ""to viuiilot,as a front, again failed to appease the people. Massive demonsuadans finally led to avtbentic elections. A demoralized a m y and its elite allies watched a triumphant Ari:sti.desweep to .c;ictt?ryin DeceIIsber 1990, in Haiti3 first-ever clean vote. Rrinning 67 percent to Marc Bazin's 16 percent, hisride assumed office on Februav 17, 1991, exactly Eve years after Baby Doe had left the corrnn-yeHaiti had hecon~ea democracy, histide's presidency threatened the funda~nentalsof econoxnic power in Haiti, despite the fact that he respected private property. Even after his inaupration, instead of throwing a dinner for the diplomatic corps, he entertained five thousand sweet children as his "personal pests." New laws increasing the minirnurn wage to about US$.3 J an hour were ignored by h e f i c a n coporasions, but the spirit of governance had changed. histide cut the size of the governxnent bureaucracy and began to efficiently manage Teleco, the state-owned phone mmpan)j whlch had long been milked of its profits hy Duvalierists. Confident and loved by the vast majoriw of his people, he stood up to the United States, claiming in a September 23 speech before the United Nations that h e r i c a n s rhemselves were at the center of the wodctj: drug trade. The very next week, following his remrn to Haiti, histide was overthrown by a military coup. The Haidan army, firmly under the contrt~lof C;eneral Raiil Gedras, unleashed a bloodbath of unprecedemd proportions, as xnachine-pn-ec~uippedsoldiers mowed down masses of wotlld-be protesters (probably about a thousand persons died in Port-au-Prince atone within two days, although reliable statistics are difficult to come by). Sylvio Claude and other popular leaders were assassinated. histide, brought before Cedras in handcuffs, was saved only by the interventic~nof foreigfli embassies and was fTowrrr out of the countt-)., His fi>llowcrswere hunted down by a new paraxnilitaly force, the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FKUH), led by Emmanuel ("Tea,") rld residenrs, Different lenders have different arnotm6 of clout, comxnensurate with their financial contributions. Thus, although the United States directfy contr.01~only 18 percent of the LVFWbr~ard,it hol Js the largest share of power and can easily win cooperation from compliant west Europeans. There is a macroeconomic consensus between Europe and the Clnifrrd States on what the XFIs should do. Traditionally, the IMF has been headed by a European, and the Wcrld Bank by an hnerican (its current head, james Wc~lfensohn,is an Az~s~alian-barn U.S. citizen). U e q i n mild differences in goals and rhetc~ric-ibr~th claim to be assisting the world's poor--at the close of the ~ e n t i e t hcentury the tasks of the IhW and the World Bank were similar. Since 1%8, when they creaed a joint stlvctural adjustment frtcility to coordinate their- plans for the 'I'hird World, the two enddes have worked closely together. Though the LMF has upstaged the Bank and enjoyed a rnore public pmfile, both IFIs macromanage economic affairs and facilitate wealth extraction from the Third World. Although since 1983 they have taken several hundred billion dollars rnore out of the Third World (in debt servicing papents) than what they have put into it (in new loans), the primary avenue of extracting wealth is not through debt InanageInent but through the macro-~nanagement of poor nations' economies in ways that benefit First World investors*This task is continuing under the leadership of Carndessus"ssuccessor a t the ME';Horst Koehler. These developments are not the product of any shadowy First World conspiracy, On the contrary; hoth IFfs have long a r p ~ e dthat their fi~nda~nentalpolicies are designed to benefit poorer nations and set them on the road to development (though rational observation of subsequent economic trends belies t h i s rhetoric), The ideas proffered by the IFIs are based on ~~eolibertldl eronmics-tl contempora7 revival of classic economic rbeory as articulated by Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and other eighteenth- and nixleteensh-cenmr?y' thinliers who expressed faith in the "invisible hand" of the marketplace. 'The architec~of neoliberal policies are often referred to as technoc.rats. (Generally young, bilinpal, educated at U.S. or Eun~pean universities, and an~hi.cious,technocra~accumulate massive bodies of eco-

nomic data and scrurinize global aends, expecdng to usher in worldwide prosperitp or at least steady growth. There is no orcheswated plan behind global economic management-no secret council of plotting brains meeting clandestinely somewhert;, It would also be erroneous to deeply question h e aanscendent faith in neoliberal economics evident at the IFIs and among technocrat$. The only truly weird phenomenon here is that this faith continues. Since neoliberal economics has taken hold in Latin hnenca and elsewhere, wealth has increasingly concentrated upward. Today 57 percent of the world5 population tries to survivr: on only G percent of the worXd9sincome. The poor ace getdng poorer; the rich are gaining ground. Latin hecica's debt, at an alltime high, is mlw over $700 billion. Neoliberalis~nis a boon for Americans and has b e p ~ ntr, deIIver a golden era of new wealth, power, a d comhrt for the Zl~~ited S~tes. Mthough they operate without an overarching design at the global level, IFIs do very directly dictate macroeconor77i(:cpolicies to Third World countries and have effrctively divested them of anything resembling macroeconomic choice. IFls asserted contrrol in Latin ,hlerica in the mid1980s, when the reinvigorated 13lF began t r ~implement and clcrsely monitor saucmral adjusnnent prograxns, or SAPS. SllPs were required of nations seelang debt relief; refusal to suhmit to a S A P meant the withdrawal of IF1 support, a-edit pn~hlems,and an inevitable sequence of investor nervousness and capital flight. Some govemInents have agreed to these terms only reluctantly and with much protest; but none have risked economic meltdo\vn by a full-scale refusal to cooperatre, The first step in establishng a SAP is to draw up a "letter of intent" (the IFIs have developed their own lexicon). This agreement, signed by the host government with the IhIE has waditionally been sealed and unavailaMe to the pubtic or pess. It outfines the duties and exfleaacions of the country in order for it to receive disbursements, or new bridge loans and funds facilinting continued financing of its debt. The IMF then places what it calls a Residential Representative (ResRep) in the country. The presence of the ResRep assures First World investors that the LMF is on the scene, mcrnitle,cast the company only $.l9 each yet sell in the United States for more than $12. The Walt Disney Company, which conwacted its various children's clothing ~nanufacturingoperations out to sweatshops located in Haiti during the 1990s, was able to reduce worker wages even further, to less than s.30 an hour, meaning that pajamas selling a t Wal-Mart for $10.97 were made for but a few cents---almost pure pmfit! Not surprisingly, the glohalizarion of the U.S. economy has brought soaring corporate profia, and the U.S, stock market nearly tr-ipled in value b e ~ e e n1994 and 2000. U.S. consuxners are big winners, too. Nearly half of h e r i c a k households are now vested in the stock market, and retail infiation for consumer items has heen almost nonexistent in recent years, The pursuit of cheap labor by US. corpora'cions has been both a formal and an infc~rmalprocess: IFIs promote policies in keeping with the creation of discount Iabor ecc~nomies,and the invisible hand of the marketplace does the rest. As businessmen seek our the lowest possible labsr

cos&, they effectively aigger a kind of "bidding war" aInong the world's poorer countries. That war has thus far been won by China, which has set the swength of its authoritarian comthe standard for cheap labor thr~~ugh munist gmemnlent, assuring invesmrs strike-free workers at wages of less than $2 a day. Under the Clinton administration, China replarly received Most Favored Nation trading status. For highly mobile industries with limited capital evipment, the Chinese bid is highly attractive, Latin hnerican nations, with low-skill wages still hovering around $1 an hour, have difficulty compedng with China. F't~rmalnlecllanisms that preserve the low wage marketpiace include the powerkl World 3 a d e Organiza the C;AZ"T and headquartered in teriai meeting in 1996, memher to bar labor rights from the organizadon9sagenda. Obviously, standardized lahor rights are inilnical to U.S. interests, since exploitation o Wc)rld labor corrld come under attack, C:or.rversel.~.;when the banned child labor at its 1999 rneedng in Seatde, it did so only on paper, with m fare but no meaninRful mechanisms of enforcement. The exercises tren~erzdouspower over tra de decisions, with which signatory n (nearly every c o u n q in the world) must co~nply. In its decisions the O promotes access heafjest possible Third Wc>ddwages and CB. The n~ostfamous C ) case involving Latin ilmerica, thus far, has been that of bananas. ?Be European Union, looking out fttr small landholding farmers and motivated by a dnge of postcolonial guilt, had instimed preferential quotas for Czarikkean fruit over the cheap produce grown on corporate-owned banana plantadons in Central h e r ica. At the behest of Chiquita Brands, the Clinton adlnini ent of Ghiyrrita campaign contributions) sued before the ruling that struck down west Eun~peanpreferences---a devastadng blow to a number of small island economies, though beneficial to Ah~erica. "sublic Clitizen organization, as well as o t h m , have ar3 decisions like the banana ruling are deuimental to the (and that this particular ruling will destabilize the Garihbean), Such contentions assume much, and ignore the undeniakle keeping Third Wc~rldwages in the basement. The vast majority 0's early decisions have helped First World residents, positionfurther exploit poor nations and enhance already established patterns of wealth concentration. VVTO measures to unifur~nlydefine and protect intellectual rights, including corporate patents, scientific knowledge, and artistic co13vights (under. its so-called TRIPS prouisions), are also ghly to the advantage of the First World. This is no surprise: Tl~e is, after all, an entit)i beholden to moneyed interests and created by powerful political forces.

Yet critiques of the 0 by dksdent First World elements are not co~npletelyunfounded. ?Bey are founded, first, on the conviction that exploitarion of the poor by the wealthy is morally wnlng; moral convictions, atas, are not facts, and to this belief the rarional scholar cannot resi~ond. Second, cridcs argue that in dizing trade-related pracdces, international organizations like the hreaten, at sclme levels, the labor and ke the h e r i c a n waq. of life safe and environmental pnotections cu~nfortahle.Writh h e sup oxripanies, for example, Brazil and 0 to strike down provisions of the Venezuela bn,ught suit he U.S. Clean Air Act that prohibit certain gasoline contaminants, These contaxninants, filtered out: only at expensive, state-of-the-art refineries, cause respiratory irritation and can damage lungs. The vor of the plaintiffs, forcing the U.S. EnvironmentaI Protection Agency to weaken its controls. Kinks like this aroused perceptrive Clinton administrration officials, as well as other influential policymakers, long hefare the 0's Seatde meeting in November 1999. It was hoped by some that cooperative, peaceful protests by ad~ninisaatio like big labor could help facilitate needed adjustments within the In &is context, cornisterial summit and porate-owned media c~utletspublicized hoth the prospect of some large prates Fmm the perspective of the C> and the Clinton administration, however, several trhings in Seatde assuzned a xnosal stance that called for its limited modification. Second, the forcekcllness of th greater than anyone had anticipated. Using carefully planned nonviolent tactics, rings of citizens locked arIns and effectively shut down the WTO convocarion by physically preventing its delegates from entering the auditol-ium,Third, Seattlcbpuiice, peq~lexedand fmstrated, unleashed a wave of violence that mrned the heart of the port city into the likes of a war zone. Unable to move the nt~nviolentprotesters, police opened fire with tear gas and mbber bulletri. Close-range discharges injured targets and bystanders alike, enraging xnany and triggering anger and violent unrest. Seattle's mayor, disregarding the U.S. Constimtion, issued a decree forbidding public assembly within a Sjfq-Mock radius and aufhorized the pofiee and National Guard to xnake eds of arrests (even a few shoppers and a politician on his way to the were picked up). Despite the resulting inAa n of emotions surrounding the polidcal fallout from the Seattle debacle was more favorable for Unand the U.S. government than one might have exp otesters, most hmtericans had not a clue what the was about, much less about the nuances of its agenda or the effects of its policies. Television footage of angry protesters breaking windows enraged the great ""silent majority," and condemnation bllowed, filling radio talk

shows and Letters to newspapers across the land (most hnericans have a strong disdain for protest, even though their nation was conceived through disobedient acts like the Boston Tea Partjr). T h e corporateowned media weighed in: Newsuieek assured its readers that the antiactivities were rooted in ignorance and "bad for workers every." Xlevision network5 focused rln a minority of fanatical demonstrat-r~rs:" " W o were those uioleszt protesters in Seattle?" asked a CBS GO ~ W ~ P Ztelecast. U ~ F S"harchisrcs," came the answer; bent on ""revolution against the United States!" Most importantly, neither t the broadcast media told the general puhiic much about the ing h e r i c a n s in the dark. When 1300 protesters were arrested at antiIF1 demonseations in Washington, D.C., in April 2000, corporate-owned m d i a again p o r t r a ~ dthem as ili-informed. "They don't men know what they're protesting," charged Rush Li~nbaugh,a radio coInInentator often attuned to popular political sentiments. T h e small portion of the An3ericaa-t populace that is moraXIy critical of world institutions and attexnpts to change governxnent policies poses a genuine threat to vested interests and the general prosperity of the narion. Lrnlike the opposition, which resor-G to the self-serving and flawed a r p Inent that globalization is not in the U.S. interest, the Inoral "left" will pmbahly not be blcnvn away by future circumstances. It is and has been, however, exceedingly small. Realistically speaking, perhaps less than .001 percent of h e r i c a n s accept the validity of a moral cridque of U.S. economic policy in the Third World and attempt to do something about it. In the 1%80s, these individuals would have opg3osed aid to the Cctctt_ras.Some have embraced other I h i r d World causes, such as support for the antiapartheid movement in South a i c a . Since the 1991 Chtlf War, such grrrssrocjts opposition has sharply declined. Older acti~sts,m a q of whom were first polideized by even& in the 1960~ have ~ died or have given up, and younger h e r i c a n s are mostly disinterested, With regard to Latin America, however, a small movement frourished even in the Late 1990s: Louisiana-born Cat-holic priest Roy Bc~urgeoisspearheaded a campaibm to close the U.S. hmy's School of the h e f i c a s at Fort Uenning, C;eorgia. T h e school, which trains Latin An~erican militav personnel in counterinsurgen~techiques, is just one of nearly two dozen direct security-related programs. Singled out by activisu;, it has came under public pressure, and it was brced to acknowledge, in September 1996, that it has been involved in training and working with tomrers. Bourgeois and his organization, the School of the h e r i c a s Watch, have only been able to force cosxnetic changes in the prograln, and it re~nainsto be seen whether or not they can shut it down. New "human rightc instruction" and a pending name change have more than appeased a supportive

Congress. President Clinton also stood by the School of the Americas against its moral critics. But most important of all has been the inability of acrivists to access the news media. Despite enorlnous acts of nonviolent civil disobedience each Nc~vernher(on the anniversav of the 1989 Jesuit slayings in El Salvador), Bourgeois's campaign re~nainshidden from the general public. In 1997, when he and about six hundred persons were arrested for wespassing (one of the largest acts of civil disobedience in the history of the South), not a sinde ~najorco~nmercialn e ~ o r ktelevision newscast even mentioned the event; 2,100 Qespassers in 1998, and 4,400 in 199%also were completely ignored. Media silence, like low-intensiy cunflict, is the best line of defense for ~nitigadngpassroots involve~nentin i ~ n portant polidcal decisions. In Latin America people like Bourgeois and his follo\vers are qrrietly eliminated. M y are they tolerated in the United States! Certainly there is evidence to suggest that intelligence and security agencies closely monitor their behavior, Xor is there any apparent lack of will on the part of the U.S. governxnent to eradicate subversives; after all, the United States is deeply imrolved in doing exacdy that in the Third World. The primary reason why dissent is toferated within An~ericais that it is rare and isutaad, and thus irrelevant. There is no reason to pursue an othemise risky policy of direct repression when the polidcal opposition is so weak that it can accomplish next to nothing. The Fort Benning protests, in fact, border alInost on a ritual of disobedience, where compliant protesters willingly board buses and cooperate with the police. They have acmally been helpful to the economy of Columhus, Georgia. And even in the government's worst-case scenario----shouldCongess respond to puhlic pressure and cut funding-cc~untless clher, more clandestine operarions would fill the void. Political opposition in the United Sates is ignored because, for all practical purposes, it does not exist. But if domesric dissent poses such a modest threat to the h ~ e r i c a nway of life, there is another danger dlat looms far larger: unbridled immigration. "3'ens of millions of impoverished Latin hnericans would undoubtedly flood into the United States if our borders were open and they were allowed to do so; and the consequences would be cataclysmic, But i m i gration, of course, is strictly ~nonitored,and the U.S. governlnent grants visas almost exclusively to the well-ttl-do. The high seas insulate much of the counn-y from the unwanted, though poor Haitians, C:ubans, and other Caribbean people risk their lives in rickety crafts almost daily to reach U.S. shores. The greatest influxes of unauthorized immigrants are those consisting of hfexicans and Central Americans who enter the United States along its massive border with Mexico and conceal themselves in nearby transnational urban centers and loosely guarded stretches of open desert.

U.S. repladon of ~nig~radon has fluctuated, historically, with the needs and economic formnes of Americans. During the prosperous 19ZOs, relatively few worried about the rising number of "illegals"; but the hard dmes of the (great Depression heled an anti-immigrant fernor that led tt, i"v3exicans' being rounded up wholesale and shipped south by train. During Wc~rldWar 11, an acute shortage of agricultural wt~rkersjustified the Uracerc3 Program-a joint U,S,-Mexican governmental inisiative authorjzing ~nigrationthat was extended in the posmrar boom years until 1964. Most illegals stayed in the United States only during harvest season, preferling tr, penodicall~iremm c-t~famifia and fi.iends hack home,'I'he advantage of their labor was obvious: California cims powers, among others, found in Me.uicans a hardy and largely docile workiorce, willing to lahor for ltnv wages and under condiGons unaccepthle to most U.S. citizens. ail1 the 1VOs, as LMexico's post-cvar eeonornic expansion slowed and development along the border lured Mexicans northward, illegal e n q into the CTnifrrd Smtes soared. Border Patrol apprehensions, which had n u d e r e d only 55,000 in 1965, reached 680,000 a decade later. Efforts to conwol the influx sputtered, and public anger festered in the early 1080s, as Lh~erica again enared a brief recession. "X"heImmigration Reform and eco~~t>mic analysis of h e endre region, based in part czn intemiews, that finds some business-oriented elites fat~orirzgpcditicat change and new-syle democracy over feudalistic repression. jMartha 1 Toney, Hostile Acts: US. Pokic:y i t z C'o.r;c~Rica i t z the 198Us (Cainesviifc: Uniwrsity Press czf Flanda, 1994)."IharoufSkaccount czf CM and Conaa operations in Costa Rica by- an investigative journalist, who also addresses U.S. ecoxlomic ~xnetratic~n of tlte small ctzttntv. At .Elmes poorjy organized, the l>oukalso too often insinuates that Costa Ricarls opposed U.S. policies when, in fact, the popula ce remailzed ovewhelmingly disinterested. Rrtbert iM.Carn~ack,H~~rzle~? l?f'[email protected]: TheiZ/9ayn ladians and I.he C z ~ ~ t r ~ tGis1;s~ ~Ian (Xor~tlan:Unit~ersiwof OMahoma Press, 1988). h n o n g a range of essays are several by anthropologists with direct contacts czn the gromd, "These reveal some of the rluarlces oh localized acts of rriotence and divisiorls among Indiarsr coxllmttnities in the heyday of the pressi ion.

Chapter 7

Christianity and Counterinsutgency

jMark Danner, The iWassgcr.e ~ktEI i%foz~ttl(Sew York: Vintage Rooks, 1994). Though not without its hist~zri~i~l Aaws, this ~corastructiuraczf a major Illassacre in EI Salvador in 198I captuws the brutaliv of the militaqi's policy, and the cffieiency of U.S. oMieials in cowering it up, Wlliam Staniejr, The Proreczi;ol.r Rrztker Stgre: Elite Politics9 iWikZtgry E ' v t o ~ ~and k~, CiviL W ~ T ZTZ' E! Sglvgclor- (13hiladefplzia:'Pemple t i n i v e r s i ~Press, 1996). Ilrawn from sensitive U.S. governnlellt dt.ltcurrrenrcf and i~stemiewsin E1 Salvador, this l>tzokreconstructs the systematic elirninatitzn of the civil opposition after 1977, paying particular attention to riks within the n~llitaryand police forces that co~llprisedthe infamous ""dattt squads." Javier C;iratdo, C"[email protected]:The Cenocidgt [email protected] &at toppied Uuvajierism, told by a your~gjournalist who witnessed the drarllatic process ksthand. WGientz atso shares her understanrfing of Irfaitian sociev religion, anrI the idealistic leader of the poor, Jean Bcrtraad k s t i d e . h d r e s Clppenheimer, Buf-ller-itigon Chwos: Guor'iligs; Stc1ctrh;r-okn=c,I)olirZ'cit~~~-> r-lrrcl 1kfexZco5-Woad to X>ru.fper-it~), (Dostctra: Litde, XZrown and Companj~,191996). A. mainstream journalist with connections, Oppcnheimer stays cantiid and objective through much of this chronology czf jarring recent derrelopn~entsin LMexico's body politic. 1 Tis smdy of the f 99helectior1 includes incisive media analysis, Mex Depuy? Hgz'tI' zn the IVew IVor-kl(rIrde: The Limits qf Democr-/&g&Kevollltz'un (Boulder: Wesblie~r,11997). Examines the rise, removal, 2nd returrl of ,histide, and the severe limits placed on him anrI lzis stxl>porterst3-y intermationat l>olitic;s and finance,

Chapter 9

Big Mottey: Debt and Wealth Extraction

Kobert Ilevlin, Delsr alird Cf-ii'sli.2 Laditl Amer&: The Szrpp(y Side ~ 8 t +Stu~;y h ~ ((Brirzceton: Princetoxl Universiy Press, 1989). S o t easily digested by the lay reader, this is still an i~rrportantsource. Ke~~eals how big banks witlhlly fed the bczrrnial era, 4347 after independersce, 56-5 7 liberation theolog)i in, 114-1 16, 129-121 and rwolutimay &lelLico, 67-68 See also CIhristianity; Popes; .rp~iJ;:ccImicul wdel-S CIA [(U.S.) Central Intelligence Agency], 82, "a, 111,194 and Contras, 99-101, 104-1 05 Cie~rtjl:fZcos, 64 Citibank Czorporation (and Citigroup), 155, 171 Ciudad Juirez, 66, 167 Claude, Sylvio, 143-144 Czlinton, B131 (and adminisfrt-atic~n), 84, -112, 164, 169?189-191, 194 and glcthal economics, 166-1 67, 169, 171, 187

ColGm, Nvaro, 112 Colombia, 130-1 3 1, 176-178, 181 CI:olanial era, 37-5 l Colosio, Luis Donaldo, 140 Colurnbus, Christopher, 2 8-2 9 CI:olun~bus,Xew Nlexico, 67 Comxnodi.ties, 11,61-62,64 Communism, 8,70-71,88,108, 116 definitions of, 77-78 See also hlarxism; Soviet U ~ ~ i o n Comte, h p s t e , 61 GncientizaciGll, 116 Canfederacibn (General de Trabajadores [C;eneral WorkersTonfederation (of hgtfntrina)l, 72 CI:onservatives and conservadsn~, 56-58 Consant, Ernmantle1 "x>to"", 145-146 Cons~tutions,50, 59-6O,65 Consumerism, 176-1 7 7 CI:ontras. See FDN Conven~,46 Covoradons, 11,87, 117-1 18, 139, 145, 171, 177, 194 and global economy, 154, 161-162,165-168 cc~ntrolof media, 195-1 97 and stcochnarkets Comprion, 12, 1-56, 162 CIzortbs, HernBn, 3 1-3 3 Costa Rica, I)"),103(map), 104-106 Comterinsurgency, 86, 107-1 08 in Peru, 138, 140 as U.S.-pided strategy, 125-126, 130 co*yorcs, 19l Crime, 178-181 Criallos, 49, 52-54,60 CIzristero Rebellion, 6 L 6 8 Cuauktdmoc, 32

Cuba, 7,31, lOj(map) rwoludon, 78-82 and U.S., 82-85 Guba Democra~yAct, 84 CUC [Coxnrnittee uf Peasant I,Tnitl;l, 116-117 CI:urrencies, 162, 165 and devalualrions, 168, 174-1 76 n h specz& .~rrgj~r ild~r*~";~~~-ics Cuzeo, 24,26(maI>) L " ; ~ ~

DXubuisson, Roberto, 127 Dean, W2rren, 12 Death penal% 180 Death squads, 108-109, 119, 123, 127, 130, 138 Debt? 11, 154160, 162-163, 184 campaigns for relief of, 163-1 64 Dechc~uk~~, l43 Defense patrols, 110, 139 Ddjoie, Louis, 143 de la Rua, Fernando, 175-176 Democracy, 65,69, 115-136, 142, 144 false namre of, 151-153 See R ~ S O~Wedz'acracy Dependency theory, 10-1 2,3 7,115, 173 Desnpnrecid~s~ 93 Desegregation (racial), 8 1 Devaluations, 168-1 70, 174-176 Developxnent (Lem), 3, %IO0, 1SS Dias, Bartolomeu, 2 8 Diaz, Ordaz, Gustavo, 147 Diaz, Porfirio, 64-65 Diez~~zo, 47 Disease, 15 in cconquest, 3 2-3 3 Docaine of Nadonal Security, 89-90 Dof lar (I2.S. currency), 1% 156, 158, 168, 174 Dominicans, 45 Drugs and dnfg made, 181, 131, 139, 145, 148, 168, 181

Duarte, Jos6 Napoleitn, 11X, fT"2, 127 Duhalde, Eduardo, 179 Duvatier dicta~f~rship, 142, 166 ECLA [(United Xations) Economic Coxnrnission for Latin i3LMlerica), 10 Economic nationalisn~,68, ";al, 161-1612 in Cuba, 81-82,86 Economics, 14-1 5,61-63 global policies, 154-17 1 Ecr>nomistsancl econr>mics (discipline), 10, 1.1. Ecuador, 157, 164-165,176 Edrrca~on,50, 59, 70, W, 137, 163 EGP [Guerrilla h ~ n of y the Poor (of CX;uatemala)l,110 El CM, 27 El Rlozote, 12+7125 El Salvador, [email protected]@, 117-1 29, 132, 135 Elec~ons,72, 79, 87-88,99, 135-136,151,174 in E X Salvador, 118, 12'7, 131-1 32 in Haiti, 143-146 in LMexico, 65-66, 70, 147-1 50 Embargt~s,83, I02 Emphyteusis, Law of (Argentina), S4 E~~cumitmda, 29-3 0 England. See Great Britain English (language), 17 1, 177 Enlightenment, 50-52,61 Environxnent, 167, 187 Estado XGvo, 7 1 Europe, 99, lj9, t64 Evangelicalism, 47, 101, 107, 109-110,141 Expura, 6253,163,168, 175

Falettc?,Enzo, X0 FARC (RevolutionaryArmed Fc~rcesof Colombia], 130-1 31 Fast-3ack authority, 167, 17 1 FBI [(U.S.) Federal Bureau (of fnvestigariod, 6% 141, 181 FUN [Nicarapan Democratic Force], or conhas, 95, 98-102,105-106 F"DR [Democraeic Revolutionaly Front (of El Salvador)], 122-123,127 F"F,(I;CAS [Federation of Chr-istian Peasan6 ((ofEl Salvador)], 11"i" Federal Judicial Police (AMexico), 181 Federal Reserve, 79, 17l Ferdinand, 2 7-29 Ferdinand WT, 5 1 Fernindez de Cevallos, Diego, /-F0 Fifzctgs, 108 First Wi,rld (term), 1 Fisclter, S~nley,175 Flares Maghn, Rlcardo, 65 Florida, 82, 177 FL%LN [Farabundu h%artiFront for Xarional Liberarion], 123-125, 127-128, 131-132 Ford Mator Campany; 9.3 Fort Bragg, Xolth Carolina, 129 Fox, Rcente, 1SO France,41, 51,60,66, W, 171 Franciscans, 45 Frank, h d r k C;mder, I 1 FILQH [Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti], 145-1461 Freire, Paulo, 116, 193 FSLN [Sandinista National Liberatic~nFront], 96 fijirnr~ri,Mbertct, 139-14 Functionalism, 5

Cdrda, Man, 139, 158 Cdtes, Bill, 143 C 2 i X T ' [General Agreement on TaR , s and Trade], 171 G B P [Gross Domestic Product], 169-170,176,193 Generation of 1837, 59 Gerardi, Juan, 112 C;emany, 6%'X, 166 Globalization. See Econclmics Goadwin, John, 82 Goulart, Jojo '7mgoV,87-88 Gc~vernn~ents cc~lonial,47-50, 54 See niso qeczJjf, abftjOm Great Brieain, 41951,92-93,99, 166 as model for development, 6, 11 Geenspacr, Atan, 175 Guadalupe-Hidalgo, Treaty of, 59 C;uatemala, 35-1 6, 103(main), 107-1 X3 &errilia warfare, 80,t)O,93, 148 in El Salvador, 123-1 24, 128 in Guaen~ala,103-109 See [email protected] gj-o~ips C;uevara, Ernesto ""Che">0,82, 84 Gutikrrez, Guseavo, 11S, 12 1 Goldman-f achs Gampany? 166, 169 C;ourpe, Gerard, 143 Gurria, Jost. Angel, 170 C;uzmBn, Abimael, 137-1 30 Haciendas, 54, 64 Haig, Alexander, 123 Haiti, 4 1 4 3 , 103(maI,),142-146, 163 Harhurp, Jennifer, 111-1 12 Harrison, Labvrence, 15 Hamna, ;fd(ntap), 31 , s1, 85 Heavily Indebted Poor C=oun&es [EllPG], 164-

Hernix~cfez,Roherto, 149, 15X, 169-170 Hidalgc), Miy e l , 52-5 3 HispanioIa, 29 Historians and history (discipline), 9-10, 16,57,93, 144, 196145 and theory, 12-13 Holland, 40 Holy Office of the Inquisition, 46, 53 Honduras, 103(map), 106-107 Huerra, \?cta;t-iianc~,66 Hull, John, 105 Huxnan rights, 8%93, 177-183 See lirL70 hfassacres; Prisc~ns; Torture Hzmtingtrsn, Samuel, 9

C [Inter-herican Befense College], 86 Iberia, 2 5-27 IFIS LinternarcJonaI financial instimtions], 159-161, 163-1 65 See n h spect;fi;c2"t.r~~im~io~rs I M F [International Monetary Fl~nd],157-1165, 168, 1'70-171, 174-176 Imnligration, 62, 146, 171, 189-19 1 Import substitution indus&ies, 7 1, 161-162 Inca, 23-25,33 Independence, 51-54 Indians, 19, 130, 165 before encounte and christiani.t): conquest of, 3 1-3 5 Spanish treament of, 30 today, 3 5-36 See n h spec$c ~t*ibes a d caItw*es Indus~alization,3 4 , 10-11, 15, 68,71, 184

linfla~on,92, 102, 1S 7' , 140, 148, 156, 162, 169, 1174 Intendanks, 50 Iner-An~ericanDevctopment: Bank, 155 Internet, 130, 177, 197 [email protected],5cl, 56, ";a(), 8'7,91, 159-161, IG+165 in 'age of progess', 62-64 and debt crisis, 154-1 56 and economic crises, 169, 174-175 See tirL70 Banks; &M Iran-Cone2 Scandal, 101 IRCX [Immigration and Conrrcrl hct (of 1")86)], 100 Isabella, 2 7-29 Israel, 110 Itrubide, Apstin de, 53 Jamaica, 41, 103(may>),180 Japan, 9% 140, 170-171,Ili.t Jesuits, 45, 50 slayings of in El Salvador, 128, 189 Jews and J-udaism, 164 Jtrgo, 53 John Paul I, 120 John Paul H, 92, 120-121 JuBrez, Benito, 5%60 Jubilee 200, 163-1 64 Judicial-tes, 140, 180-1 81 Jgsticeim, 178, 180 Kemed~ John F., ? , U , 135 Keynes, John Mapard, 158 Khmshchev, Xikita, 82 Kc~ehler,Horst, 159 la C:mz, Sor Juana Inks de, 46 La P~*erzsl;r,96 Labor, 65,87, 90, 11%161,185, 193 and populism, 68,71-72

repression of, 513, 14i: 157 See n h Sweatshups Ladinos, 108, 11l Lagos, Rieardo, 152 Land reform, 69,81, 88,99, 108, 122 Las ) Limbaugh, Rush, 188 Low Intensiv CzonSfict, 126, 130-131 Machu Picchn, 24,26(map) hladeira Islands, 38 LMadero, It;ranciscr>I., 65-66 NIahuad, Jamil, 165 MAI [,Multilateral Agree~nenton Investr~lent] , 171 &lalinclhe, 3 1 hIafnutrirution, 1, 14, 3% 10.2 ~Manigat,Leslie, 144 Nlapiripin, 13 1 &laroons, 41 ~Marti,Josk, 78, 80 Nlartinez, Gustavo Alvarez, 107 hlarxism, 13 ~Massacres,33, 109, "3,130-131, 138, 147-1 48 in El Salvador, 119, 124-1 2 5 in Haiti, 143-145 &lays, 22-23,145 conquest of-;34 ~Mazorca,5 7 Medellin Bishops Conference, 115

hledia, 87-88, 104, 116, 130-13 11, 138, 165, 169--170, 189 and bias, 149, 195-198 and Central h e r i c a , 1100, 111-1 12, 125, 127-129 and Cuban revolution, 80-82 influence oiF, 151-1 53 See (teIso Television; specI;f;c n m s~ztf~ces JWedigcracy, 15 1-1 53, 178 hledina, OfeIia, 15, 19 MenchG, Rigoberta, 3 5-3 6,111 Nlenem, C:ados, 175, 179 hlERCOSUR [Southern Cone Common market], 175 Nlesrcizos, 35, 52, 138 hleico, 15-16, 19-23,423, 129-130,155,190 conquests of; 30-32,34 economic clrisis, 168-1 70, 174 independence, 52-5 3 in mid-nineteenth century, 58-60 polidcal pmcesses, 146- 150 revolution, 64-70 See nlso X A m A LMexico City, 7, 3 2,&, 49, -53 Nliami, 82,85,97-98 hliddle class, S, 67, 70, 136, 147, 152,161 in Argentina, 93, 177 in Brazil, 89-90 in Centrral ihmerrica, W8,108, 118 in Chile, 91-92, 176-177 and crirne, 179-1 81 and Cuban revolution, 80-81 [(U.S.) l"t'3ilia~ Group], Nlilf.;tr~u~~ 126, 1243 LMilit~riesand militat-iism,50, 57, 59, 7 1-72,9Q, 93, 120, 130, 156,163, 179 coups, 8, 73, 80, 8% 91-92,564, 108, 122, 136

in E X Salvador, 118-1 19?121-1 28 in H a i ~ , 43-145 1 in Peru, 136-141 regimes in ~ventietlizcer-ttuv? 86-04 niso C:ounterinsurgency; United States of h ~ e r i c a , xnilitary minas (;erais, 53 Nloclhlcss, 24 hloctezuzna 11, 311-3 2 LModemizarion theory; -5-"d, 118, 173, 176 revival of, 14 Monge, Luis hlberto, 105 Nlonterrosa, Domingo, 126 hlontesinas, h t o n i o de, 30 ~Mr~ntesinrzs, Wadimiro, 146, 196 Nlontoro, Ancfrk, 178 hloors, 2 6-2 7 Mothers of the Disappeared, 93 NlRTA [ T ~ ~ pAn~arri ac , Revolutionary Move~nentj 139-141 Nluisca, 25, 34 hlulaaos, 42, 142, 146 L " ; ~ ~

Nader, Ralph, 183, 186 NMTA [North Amencan Free "Zi-adeA ~ e e m e n d149, , 16"7---168 Namphy, Henri, 143 National Guard (of Nicarapa), 96-97,99, 1105 hyadonatissn,S l, 6% 77-78, 80, 151,154,171-172,175 hTavidad,2Cif1nap1,29 Neuliberal econoxnics, 159-1 60, 166,170-171, 174 hTetzahualc4yot-f,2 1 N r f i s b o a ~(teleGsion ~ show), 130, 196 Newspapers, 125 See d s o spec$c F I L I ~ ~ J -

Ncu?srrieek,100, 188 Nezu York Tz'r~zes,80, 105, 125, 195-197 Nicaragua, 95-1 02, 103(map) Nobel Peace Prize, 3 5, 106, 111 Noche Triste, 3 2 Nopi~--is"~itl!e, 142 hTonualca,2 3 Noriega, ivanuel, 10l hTortrt?,C1Zliver, 101-102, 105 Nuclear warheads, 83-84. h7t6e.iropeso (AMeficancurrency), 162, 169 hTufiitiode Guztnin, Beltrin, 34 Obando JJ Bravo, Nlipel, 103 Obregbn, Alvaro, 67 Oil, 62, 165 See PENlEX; Petrobrhs O l p p i c Gatnes, 7, 147 Operaygo Bandeirantes, 89 Operation atekeepet; 191 Operariun &Iongoose,83 ()pm Dci, 120 Organization of h e r i c a n Smtt;s, 86,97 Orozcr~,Pascual, 66 Ortf;lga,Danief, 08 Ostiz, Biana, 110-1 11 Palxnares, 40 Pampas, 62 PAW [National Action Party (of ~Mexico)],68, 148-1 50 Pan h e r i c a n Ur-tiun, 63 Panama, 2 6(map), 3 Oi) 103(map), 172 canal, 63 Paramiliaries, 1OS), 13 0-1 3 1 &feealso Death squads; Nlilital-ies and xniliarisxn Paseo de la Refarma, 64 Pastc~ra,Eulkn, 97, 104-1 0 5

Patd, Luis, 179 Pazos, Luis, 170 PDC IChrisdan Democratic Party (of El. Salvador)], 118 Pedro I, 54,60 PEMEX [Pe.tsrcileos~Mexicans], 69-70 Pentagon. See U.S.-Milialy Pkralte, Charlemagne, 42 Percin, Eva (Evia), 72-73 Perbn, ""labetitaV"2-93 Percin, Juan, 72-74,9")2 Pershing, John J. ""Blackjack"",bT Personalism, 4 Peru, 2 3-24,33-34,48,52, 180-181 in fate ~ e n t i e t hcentury-> 136-141 Pesu Wgentine currency), 93, 175 Petrobris, 7 1 Pinochet, Augusto, 9 1-92 Pizarro, Francisco, 3 3 Pfantallions, 39 Plan: hendmenr, 79 Pledge of Resistance, 100-11) 1 Police, 64, 178-1 82, 187 Pc~liticalculture, 5, 7 Pc11Jdcal sciends~and PoliGcal Science (discipline), 9, H,16, 151, 198 Ponsbal, Nlarquis de, 53 Popes, 29, 114, 164 See ~ l John m Paul 1; John Paul 11 Population, 14, 55, 61 Popuiism, 68, 71, 73-74, 77 Pc~rfinatclr,64 Pc~rdllo,PUi fonso, 112 Pormgd, 27-29,38,53-54 Pc~sidvlsm,6,61 Pc~verf~r, 1, 7, % M ,72,Q6, 117, 161, 176 trends in, 14-1 5 See a h iMaXnutrttion

PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolrx~on],148-1 50 Prebiscb, RaG1, 10 PRI [ P a q OF the Institutionalized Revolution], 146-150, 181 P ~ s o n sIS0 , Privatization, 162-1 63, 165 Profit rezni~ance,7 1-7 3 Proposition 187, 190 Protestandsn~,47, 1Xfl See nlso Evangelicalism [email protected]:lcalOperadons (Psy Ops), X26-j129 PTB 1Brail;ifianLabor Party], 8"78So

Race, 80-8 1, X 36,142 See @/so Desegregation; specific rg.ncit2l gtvups Radio CuscstdQn,X29 Railroads, 612, 64 Reagan, Ronald (and adminstration), 12,95-96, 105, 110, 123, 156, 166 and Nicarap~anrevolution, 98-1 01 Re&/(Brazilian currency), 162,174 Recnnquest, 2 7 Regionalism, 54 Religion, 27 of &ieans, 4 2 4 3 of Indians, 2 1-24 See nlm Church; Protestandssn Residential Representarive, I60 Rio de Janeiro, 51, 53,88, 180 Ros Lqontt, Ekain, 109-1 10 R o b e ~ sCoEe, , lII Ron~ero,Oscar, X 20- 12l, X 2 7

Rundm. See Defense patrols Roosevelt (3orollarq. (to Monroe Docr-rine), 63 Rosas, Juan iManuel de, 57-5 8 Rustaw, Wilt, 6 Royal Council of the Inides,

48 Rubin, Robert, 166, 169, 171 Rurales, 64 Saint Damingut-. See Haiti Salinas de Cgclrtari, C;arlos, 148-X"19 X70 Sandmistas. See FSLhT San &tartin,jos&de, 5 2 San ~Vartin,Ramc-in Grau, 79 Sanm h n a , h t o n i o Llipez de, 57-58 Sgo Paulo, 7 f,87, X 80 SAP [Su-urturalAdjustment Program], 159-1 G5 Sarmiento, h r n i n g o E, 59 SIN fXational hrelligence Semice (of Peru)], 140 School of the h e r i c a s , 129, 1128-1 X9 Seattle, 187-1 88 Sendero Lumiz~oso,X 3 7-140 SepGlveda,Juan de, 41 Silver, 49--SO "S&?/ JWlrrtes" (television show), 111, 188 Slaver!;, 30, 3 8 4 1 Snuff tapes, X 83 Social Seienrcists. %e kadexnics Sc~moza,Anastisio, 96-97 Soviet Union (and Russia), X, 7, 82-84, 170-1711 Sovereipv ect~nclnticend oiF, 154, 160 Spain, 9,26-?7,2%43, 51,92, 194 and colonial government, 48-50 and Cuba, 78-79

Sports, 64 See irlm Olplnpic C;a~nes;World

cup Smnley, Paco, 181 Sreh, Barbara and Scadey, 3 7 Stewart, Bill, 97 Stocks and stockmarkets, 153, 169-171 Subversion, 13 5, 140 &YeenL70 Counterinsurgen~y; C;zrerrilla warfare Sztct-e (Ecaudwan currencqi), 16-5 Sugar, 3 7-38,6 1 Sweatshops, 185-1 86 Sweeney, John, 166,193 Tsngo, 62 Tariffs, 68, 161 T2xes, 163 Tecbnocrarcs, 159-1 GO, 170 Teleco, 14s" Televisa, 149-1 S0 Television, '7,47, 81-82, 101-102, 112 and crime, 178-179, 180-181 and El Salvador, 127-129 in ~Mexico,149- 150 in Peru, 140-1 41 in U.S., 188-189, 19'7 See also Media; ~l;er;lirircrav; . r p ~ t f ~teitcawks i Tenocktiid611, 2 1,26(map), 3 1-32 Teotihuacdn, 2 2 6(tnal?) Exob~~us, 169 Texas, 58,616 T~XGOCII, 21 T h e c , 3-14,54, ~ 173 Third World, 1, ?(map), 3 Tla telolco, 147-1 48 Tlaxcalans, 22 Toltecs, 2 1, 23 Tardesillas, Treaty of, 29 X,rres, f;an~iXo,115

X,rtrure, 89,93, 10610'7, 110, 119, 127, 138 in El Salvador, 124-12 5 and law and order, 179-183 Tourisxn, 85 Tautans ~Wacoute,142-1 44 Trade, 10,28, 49, 51, 56, 61, 167-168 of slaves, 3 8-3 C) See also MERC:(I>SUR, Tranches, 1610

U.S.S. "Nlaine", 78-79 Ungo, &illerrno, 118, 122-123 United Fruit Company. See Chigui ta Brands United Nations, 954 107 United States of h e r i c a , 4, 54, 56, 62-G3,7 1,74,89-90,13 1,137, 160-161, 193 congress of, OS, 100-102, 105, 123, 167, 189 and Cuban rt3volutian, 80-84 dangers to wealth of, 77, 135-136,188-191 and El Salvador, 121-123, 125-129 and gcthal economics, 155- 158, 163, 166-171, 174,183-187, 191-192 and Guatemala, 107-108, 120-112 and Haiti, 4142,142-146 and ~Mexicssnrevoludon, 6667, 69 militar): 83-84, 86, 108, 126-132,135, 150-151, 157, 188-189 scht~larshipand media in, 194198 and tormre, 182-183 See also Business; C X ; FBI; ILnvestmen ts; specific p~-esitIent~-

(of Nicaragua), 102 UKNC; [C;uatemalan National Revolurionary Union], 110 USMD [(u,S.>Agency for IntemarcJonal Developmentj , 15, 105, 193 Vargas, C;e~lio,70-72 Vargas Llosa, Mario, 165 Vatican 11, I 14-1 15 Velasco, Juan, 136 Venezuela, 152-153, 165, 176 Veracnxz, 3 f -3 2,66 Vespucci, hnerigo, 20 Xeeroyaities, 4748 Metnam war, 126 Villa, Francisco ""Panchow, 666 Xllaluhos, Joaquin, 124, 128, 132 Virgin of C:uadalupe, 44 Voodoo, 424.3, 142 Wages, 1 4 14, 145, 167, f70, 185-186, 193

ma"lEL f " ~ ~ * e e t J ~ b ~ - l ; l128, a r l , 153, 195 Wallerstein, Tmmanuel, 12 Weber, Max, 6 M i t e , Rohert, 122-123 W o l k n s a h , James, 159 Women, 4O,46, W,99,148 See 1ir1.co spec$c pfisottx World B a d , 155,158-160, 163-164 Wcjrld Cup, 93,165, 177 World Systems theory, 12-1 3 O [Wcjrld Trade Ot-ganizatictnj, t 66, 17 1, 186-187

Zapata, Emiliiano, 66 Zapatistas (of Chiapas), 129-1 30, 1TO Zedillo, Emesto, 149-1 50, 168-1";a, 181 Zombies, 43, 1142 Zumhi, 42