Latin America and the United States [6 ed.] 1355774284, 9781355774280

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
1 Pan-Americanism: Old and New
2 Cooperation by Conference
3 The Monroe Doctrine
4 Undermining the Monroe Doctrine
5 Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy
6 Colombia, the United States, and the Panama Canal
7 Mexico and the United States
8 Mexico and the United States: Recent and Contemporary Relations
9 Colonial Cuba and Its International Relations
10 Cuba: Republican and Communist
11 Puerto Rico—A Study in American Territorial Government
12 American Interests in Haiti and the Dominican Republic
13 The Dominican Republic, Haiti and the United States: Recent and Contemporary Relations
14 Interests of the United States in Central America
15 Recent Relations with Central America
16 Argentina— The Making of a Nation
17 Chile and the United States
18 The United States and Brazil
19 The Good Neighbor Policy and After: Development Diplomacy and Security Assistance
Appendices
APPENDIX A. Charter of the Organization of American States (1967)
APPENDIX B. Organization of American States
APPENDIX C. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty, 1947)
APPENDIX D. Declaration of Caracas (1954)
APPENDIX E. Act of Bogotá (1960)
APPENDIX F. Montevideo Treaty (1960)
APPENDIX G. Charter of Punta Del Este (1961)
APPENDIX H. Excerpts from the Charter of the United Nations (1945)
Index

Citation preview

Latin America and the United States SIXTH EDITION

Graham H. Stuart

S ta n fo rd U niversity

and

James L. Tigner

U niversity o f Nevada

Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey

Library o f Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Stuart, Graham Henry. Latin America and the United States. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Latin America—Foreign relations—United States. 2. United States—Foreign relations—Latin America. I. Tigner, James Lawrence, joint author. II. Title. F1418.S933 1975 327.73*08 74-23901 ISBN 0-13-5246520

© 1975 by Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 07632 Copyright renewed 1950, 1956, 1966 by Graham H. Stuart

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the publisher. Printed in the United States of America.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Prentice-Hall International, Inc., London Prentice-Hall of Australia, Pty. Ltd., Sydney Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., Toronto Prentice-Hall of India Private Limited, New Delhi Prentice-Hall of Japan, Inc., Tokyo

to A.W.S. and R. J. T.

CONTENTS Preface

CHAPTER CHAPTER CHAPTER CHAPTER CHAPTER CHAPTER CHAPTER CHAPTER

vii

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

CHAPTER 9. CHAPTER 10. CHAPTER 11. CHAPTER 12. CHAPTER 13. CHAPTER 14. CHAPTER 15. CHAPTER 16. CHAPTER 17. CHAPTER 18. CHAPTER 19.

APPENDIX A. APPENDIX B.

Pan-Americanism: Old and New Cooperation by Conference The Monroe Doctrine Undermining the Monroe Doctrine Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy Colombia, The United States, and the PanamaCanal Mexico and the United States Mexico and the United States: Recent and Contemporary Relations Colonial Cuba and Its International Relations Cuba: Republican and Communist Puerto Rico-A Study in American Territorial Government American Interests in Haiti and the Dominican Republic The Dominican Republic, Haiti and the United States: Recent and Contemporary Relations Interests of the United States in Central America Recent Relations with Central America Argentina-The Making of a Nation

1 51 118 144 184 197 229 257 317 340 389 410 423 475 494 554

Chile and the United States The United States and Brazil The Good Neighbor Policy and After: Development Diplomacy and Security Assistance

608 663 722

Charter of the Organization of American States (1967) Organization of American States

767 795 v

APPENDIX C.

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty, 1947)

APPENDIX D.

Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States against the Intervention of International Communism (Declaration of Caracas, 1954) The Act of Bogoti ( 1960) Treaty Establishing a Free-Trade Area and Instituting The Latin American Free-Trade Association (Montevideo Treaty, 1960) The Charter of Punta del Este Establishing an Alliance for Progress within the Framework of Operation Pan America ( 1961 ) Excerpts from the Charter of the United Nations (1945)

APPENDIX E. APPENDIX F.

APPENDIX G.

APPENDIX H.

798

804 806

812

826 840

L ist o f Illustrations

Map of the West Indies Map of Mexico Map of Central America Map of South America

In d e x

190 258 476 555

843

PREFACE In the years since the fifth edition of Latin America and the United States appeared in 1955, there has been both an impressive development and réévalua­ tion of Latin American-United States relations, and substantial scholarship has been published to support ideas that were largely tentative and suggestive in the mid-1950s. This revision updates the volume through the early 1970s, and at­ tempts to balance the newer scholarship against traditional interpretations. The central focus of the book is on the origin, formation, and growth of relations between the United States and the Latin American nations. Around this focus the many aspects of relations are perceived as a multidimensional explanation of the central process. Attention has been given to main currents, significant per­ sonalities, broad interpretations, and particularly to political, economic, and social developments which so commonly help to chart the direction of a nation’s foreign policy. Notable changes over previous editions include a chapter em­ bracing the full sweep of United States-Latin American relations, a section on international organization, and a chapter devoted primarily to the evolution of the United States foreign aid programs in the region. These chapters are con­ tributed by Professor Tigner, who has also extensively expanded and updated the rest of the book except Chapter 11 for which Professor Stuart assumes full re­ sponsibility. This book is intended for use as a text for courses studying United StatesLatin American diplomacy, and United States foreign policy and diplomatic history. It is hoped that it will also appeal to that part of the general public which is interested in the bases and development of American foreign policy. To make it the more useful for reference, the citation of the documentary sources of much of the material has been considered essential. In addition, supplementary reading lists have been appended to each chapter to give the student opportunity to obtain the background necessary for a complete under­ standing of the facts presented. The maps have been prepared for the volume to give the reader a clearer conception of the general features of Latin American geography, and for that reason have been made as simple as possible. For some four hundred years (1500-1900) Latin America was commonly a storm center in the backyard of European politics. However, its role throughout the colonial period and during the first century of independence was largely passive. It was not until World War I that its governments and diplomats were inclined toward active participation in world affairs. The diplomatic relations of Latin America and the United States since the early 19th century form a large portion of the history of the New World which is, in turn, linked with the expan­ sion of Europe. Since World War II, the historic triangular relationship—United States-Western Europe-Latin America-has expanded to include the Soviet Union, Africa, and East Asia as Latin America, through the progression of the cold war, became a significant factor in international politics. The interest of the United vii

States and the main focus of its diplomacy through World War II was in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, a region which felt the main thrust of our Monroe Doctrine policies. After World War II United States attention centered first on Europe, then on East Asia, the Middle East and Africa. For most of the 1950s, save for the Arbenz episode in Guatemala, the republics to the south were only a hazy image in the American public’s consciousness. The region as a whole was the object of little concern or interest. Then came Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, rural and urban terrorism, militarism and political kidnappings. These develop­ ments produced a shocked awareness of the new processes of change at work in Latin America. Within a few years many important institutions in our society became oriented towards Latin America. In an effort to forestall Cuban subver­ sion and to shore up a severely shaken Latin American community, Washington recast some of its traditional policies and developed new policies. The Alliance for Progress, a program intended to alleviate the acute Latin American social and economic ills upon which the hemisphere crisis was blamed, was inaugurated; new military assistance and military training efforts came into being; United States businessmen searched for a neW and different role; private groups and foundations launched new programs for promoting development and welfare among the other American republics. As the decade of the 1970s begins, one of the most serious problems confronting the United States in foreign affairs is the proper ordering of its relations with the other American republics. A major contribution to research on the history of United States-Latin American relations, for specialist and student alike, is a new guide: David F. Trask, Michael C. Meyer, and Roger B. Trask’s A Bibliography o f U nited StatesLatin A m erican R elations since 1810: A Selected L ist o f Eleven T housand P ub­ lished R eferences , published at Lincoln by the University of Nebraska Press in

1968. Contained in one volume, the bibliography includes published, multi­ lingual materials of great diversity. The books, articles, pamphlets and documents are in many languages, particularly English, Spanish, Portuguese, French, Ger­ man, Italian, Russian and Japanese. Another recent addition, general in scope but containing a section on international relations, is Arthur E. Gropp’s A B ib­ liography o f Latin A m erican Bibliographies (The Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, N.J., 1968). This is an updating of the second edition ( 1942) compiled by C. K. Jones, Hispanic Foundation, Library of Congress. Also offering a section on in ternational relations (since 1830) is Charles C. Griffin’s (ed.), A Guide to H istori­ cal Literature, Austin, 1971. Published for the Conference on Latin American History by the University of Texas Press, it comprises selections and comments of thirty-seven respected, scholarly contributors. The authors wish to express appreciation to Professor Martin B. Travis, Jr., State University of New York at Stony Brook, and to Professor James T. Watkins IV of Stanford University, for their criticism and advice. Our indebted­ ness to the many scholars whose research has provided the foundation on which this book was written cannot be individually acknowledged here, but attention has been called to some of their contributions in the bibliographical sections. Gratitude is also due to Mrs. Joyce Ball, Mrs. Joan Chambers, Mrs. Naoma Hainey, the late Dr. Helen Poulton, and Mr. Lamar Smith of the Noble Getchell Library, University of Nevada, Reno, for their indispensable assistance. G.H.S. J.L.T. viii

Pan-Americanism: Old and New Latin America has traditionally occupied a special place in the foreign relations of the United States, a relationship based on geographic proximity, long historic association, and many similarities in origins. But at the same time, our recognition of the importance of these relations has shown considerable fluctuations, both in the last and present century. An evaluation of our relations with the Latin Americans today hinges upon our understanding of the development of these ties during the last century and a half, a record that breaks down into four major eras: 1810-1895 (Latin American independence, the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny); 1896-1932 (Imperialism and PanAmericanism); 1933-1945 (the Good Neighbor Policy); 1946 to the present (the cold war and the Alliance for Progress). The keynote of the foreign policy of the fledgling United States was sounded by President George Washington in the memorable proclamation of neutrality of 1793; and its motif was outlined in the farewell address of 1796. The new nation must not have part in the political broils of Europe. The great ocean has isolated u s - “Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation?” 1 In the critical period which saw the beginning of the Latin American wars of independence the United States adopted the No-Transfer Resolution of 1811, the first significant step in the progression of United States policy toward Latin America. Foreshadowing the Monroe Doctrine, the resolution reflected concern that Spain might transfer Florida, which the United States desired, to Great Britain. It made clear that the United States “cannot, without serious inquietude, see any part of said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power.” These and similar policy statements emphasized the value of isolation and non-entanglement and at the same time asserted the principle of the two hemispheres, the separation of the New World from the Old.2 1James W. Gantenbein, ed., The Evolution o f our iMtin American Policy: A Documentary Record (New York, 1950), p. 5. 2Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy o f the United States (New York, 1943), pp. 29-30; Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea (Ithaca, New York, 1954).

2

LA TIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STA TES

The first era of relations, embracing most of the nineteenth century, saw an American attitude toward the Latin Americans that was compounded of indifference and contempt. To be sure, our feelings were sympathetic toward the Latin Americans as they struggled and won independence, in the years from 1810 to 1824, and were the first to recognize the new states that emerged from that struggle. There were practical reasons of national security and trade behind the desire to see the European powers weakened or ejected from the Western Hemisphere.3 Britain, more interested in commerce and investment than adding to her empire, held similar views. Thus the Latin American policy of the United States, in this era was made possible by the British navy’s control of the high seas. Meanwhile, we waged a war with Britain, starting in 1812, while our successful negotiations to purchase Florida from Spain, not achieved until 1821, made it impolitic to offend the Spaniards. The Monroe Doctrine, delivered as part of President Monroe’s message to Congress on December 2, 1823, was a strictly American statement of policy despite earlier collaboration with Great Britain.4 Its key sentence asserted: “We owe it, therefore, tö candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those (European) powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.” It served notice upon Europe that the Western Hemisphere was closed to colonization: that was the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine initially-it was a “Hands Off” warning to the Old World. This was no self-denying pledge on the part of the United States: we fought Mexico in the 1840s and took over about one-half of her territory. The Doctrine was invoked on several occasions during the nineteenth century: against Britain’s encroachments in Central America; against Spain’s attempts to regain power in Santo Domingo and in Peru; against the French occupation of Mexico. But Americans took little interest in Latin Americans in this era. We of the United States were too busy with our expansion from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and at the same time we maintained our isolation.5 For more than seventy years following the independence of Latin America Great Britain was the paramount power in the Western Hemisphere. But being chiefly interested in capitalistic expansion in the region, Britain’s only territorial acquistions in the entire period were the Falkland Islands (1833), off the southern coast of Argentina, which are still claimed by Argentina. The other British possessions in the hemisphere had been obtained before Latin American independence, including British Guiana and British Honduras (Belize) on the mainland, and certain Caribbean islands. Between 1844 and 1860 Britain exercised a protectorate over the “Mosquito Coast,” approximating the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua, but this was relinquished in 1860. Britain’s

3Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and the Independence o f Latin America (Baltimore, 1941), pp. 82-83; Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826 (Cambridge, Mass., 1927). 4For the record of the George Canning-RichardRush conversations see Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy o f Canning, 1822-1827 (London, 1925), pp. 115-117. sThe United States failed to invoke the doctrine in 1833 when Britain annexed the Falkland Islands claimed by Argentina, nor when France was engaged in the so-called Pastry Cook’s War with Mexico in 1838, nor in 1838-1840 when France blockaded the Rio de La Plata.

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

3

possession of bases and fishing rights in Latin America enabled her to dominate the sea lanes of the hemisphere and to protect and maintain her trade there. From the standpoint of strategy, British influence and power were supportive of maintaining an interest in any future interoceanic isthmian canal, and to forestall the spread of American power. From the beginning of Latin American independence the feeble United States had sought to counter British influence and power; however, it was not until the mid 1890s that the United States succeeded Britain as the regional paramount power. Despite occasional armed interventions for the collection of debts, the most serious of which led to the French intervention in Mexico, the era of British hegemony was largely successful and peaceful. British policy sought to maintain Latin America as a source of raw materials and as a major outlet for British exports and investments. While serving its self-interest, Britain, after initial unavailing efforts to seize Latin America from the weak grip of Spain and Portugal, protected the region from other European powers, perhaps sparing it the fate that befell Africa and parts of East Asia.6 For motives that were commercial rather than political, the United States initiated in 1889 the first Pan American Conference (at which all of the American states except Canada and the Dominican Republic were present), and this conference was responsible for the establishment of the International Union of American Republics. While this movement reflected the growing interest of the United States in the peaceful development of the hemisphere, it did little to promote political solidarity, and both before and after World War I, the spirit of distrust was amply evident.7 The Pan American Conference was at the threshold of the second era of inter-American relations which, starting in the 1890s, saw our first and only burst of extra-continental imperialism. It was marked by a sense of national destiny and by determination to assert national prestige. Such leaders as Henry Cabot Lodge, Albert J. Beveridge, and Theodore Roosevelt were among its leading proponents. Captain Alfred T. Mahan, the naval philosopher of the new imperialism, documented their beliefs. In Washington’s dispute with Great Britain in 1895 regarding the Venezuela-British Guiana boundary, they applauded Secretary of State Richard Olney’s provocative statement that “Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.” In this expansive mood came the war with Spain, labeled a “splendid little war” by John Hay. Theodore Roosevelt was one of its heroes. For about three decades after the war the United States, under the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, and Calvin Coolidge, assumed a police power in Latin America, focusing its attention in the Caribbean. In 1903 Washington had a role in Panama’s independence movement, Roosevelt later boasting: “ . . . I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate . ..

6J. Fred Rippy, Latin America in World Politics (New York, 1928), chapters IV-VII; and Rivalry o f the United States and Great Britain over Latin America, 1808-1830 (Baltimore, 1929), by the same author. ’Alice F. Tyler, The Foreign Policy o f James G. Blaine (Minneapolis, 1927), pp. 165-170; Gantenbein, Latin A merican Policy, pp. 49-5 9. %

4

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

while the debate goes on the Canal does also.” In 1904 Roosevelt, concerned by events in the Dominican Republic, declared that ‘‘chronic wrong-doing, or impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore this duty.” This statement of policy became known as the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States interfered repeatedly in Mexico and Panama; occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934, the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924, and Nicaragua, sporadically, from 1912 to 1933. Washington, under prerogatives of the Platt Amendment, intervened on several occasions in Cuba. The results of these policies were not salutary for the nations affected, hampered the peaceful settlement of disputes, and caused widespread antagonism and fear among Latin Americans generally.8 The rationale behind the brief imperialist phase of our history was not unreasonable. There was one basic factor of obvious and crucial importance, behind the Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries, behind the imperialist impulse, and in fact underlying every aspect of our Latin American policies: the security of the continental United States. The Caribbean in general, and the isthmus of Panama in particular, were of pivotal importance in the defense of our continental republic. And by all interpretations of strategy, the United States either had control of the isthmus, and the canal when it was built, or our Atlantic and Pacific coasts would be endangered. It followed that the approaches to the Canal had to be ours or be in friendly hands. This was a factor that led us to fight Spain over Cuba and Puerto Rico, and was appealed to in the case of the interventions in Guatemala in 1954 and the Dominican Republic in 1965. The five earlier Caribbean interventions (Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Panama) had in each instance a dual objective, apart from United States national security: to restore financial order in the country involved, and to train military forces with the hope of creating political stability. While in all five cases the immediate results seemed beneficial, the long-range results were adverse. Political power was commonly put in the hands of the military elements which made them nearly invincible. Since the bases on which to build democracy were not matured in these countries, our efforts Hed to results like the dictatorships of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Somoza in Nicaragua, and Batista in Cuba. In the course of the American fling at imperialism, prospects for strengthening friendly ties seemed to appear and then vanish in two instances. In 1905 Elihu Root became Secretary of State, and in the following year he visited South America. The sincerity and cordiality of his statements, and the friendly attitude of the United States towards closer cooperation in the Americas, seemed to open a new era in inter-American relations. However, President Roosevelt’s “big stick” and the “dollar diplomacy” of the Taft administration crushed any apparent gains. The administration of Woodrow Wilson from the outset favored closer relations with Latin America, and one of the earliest 8The development of the United States intervention policy is carefully surveyed in Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964). See also C. L. Jones, The Caribbean Since 1900 (New York, 1936); A. C. Wileus ed. The Caribbean, 17 vols. (Gainesville, 1951-1967). * *

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

5

statements of the president thus outlined his policy: “ one of the chief objects of the new administration will be to cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of Central and South America and to promote in every proper and honorable way the interests which are common to the peoples of the two continents.” But, idealist that he was, Wilson determined to bring the gospel of democracy and morality to all concerned whether they wanted it or not. The result was chaotic, especially for Mexico’s internal politics and its ties with the United States. The activities of the Wilson administration from 1913 to 1917 proved to be the least excusable and most futile examples of interventionism in the history of our relations with Larin America. World War I and the formation of the League of Nations in its aftermath brought changes that affected the relations of the United States and Latin America, and the latter’s position vis-à-vis Europe through their participation in the world organization. Although Secretary of State Robert Lansing had urged “one for all; all for one,” in his welcome to the Second Pan American Scientific Congress on December 27, 1915, the ultimate alignment of the Latin American nations disclosed a clear lack of unity on the question of wartime foreign policies. Of the twenty republics, eight eventually declared war on the Central Powers: Brazil, Cuba, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Five more broke relations with Germany: Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic. Seven remained neutral: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, El Salvador, Venezuela, and Paraguay. Of the belligerents only Brazil and Cuba took anything like an active part in the war, while Argentina, Chile, and Mexico maintained a status of official neutrality.9 Thus, three of the four major powers were non-participants; however, Mexico and Chile sold the Allied and Associated powers strategic materials. It should be noted that, with the exception of Brazil, all of the belligerents are located in the Caribbean region where the influence of the United States is paramount. While the Latin American belligerents did little to turn the tide of war in favor of the allies, the region as a whole emerged from the fringes of international life to the threshold of world affairs. Thereafter, their political connections with Europe were to be much closer, for thirteen of the Latin American states were entitled to take part in the Versailles peace conference, and ten of them became charter members of the League of Nations. At the same time, their economic axis shifted northward. The First World War gave the United States an extraordinary opportunity to seize the position long-held by Great Britain as the leading trader and source of investment capital in Latin America. A prime objective of American policy in the region since the early nineteenth century was the extension of trade and investment, an interest reflected in the convening of the first Pan American conference in 1889. Our export trade with Latin America began quite successfully in the '1820s and 1830s, but it had rarely exceeded 10 percent of our total exports from that time forward until the end of the century. Illustrating dramatically the swift pace of industrialization, the value of American trade with Latin America had surpassed the British by 1913, and in 1917, owing to the European involvement in the war, the United States Percy A. Martin, Latin America and the War (Baltimore, ! 925), pp. 1-2.

6

LA TIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STA TES

accounted for over 40 percent of both imports and exports of Latin America; the commerce of the United States with Latin America showed a gain of 400 percent between 1913 and 1920. This foreshadowed a marked change in the economic relations of Latin America, for thereafter the United States, rather than Europe, was to be the leading factor in the economic life of the southern republics. Comparable gains were made in the investment field. By 1929 U.S. investments amounted to $5,429,000,000, which exceeded the British stake by almost one billion dollars. This supremacy brought about by Europe’s misfortune and the liberal Underwood tariff of 1913 was seriously jeopardized, however, by the depression years and the super-protective Hawley-Smoot tariff act of 1930. Although after the First World War the United States had set the pace in the race towards economic nationalism, we finally learned that tariff walls keep domestic products within as well as foreign products without. Our foreign customers not only adopted equally high tariffs but invented new devices such as quotas, exchange control systems, clearing and compensation agreements, and govern­ ment monopolies to strangle import trade. The trade of the United States with Latin American countries, which had increased by leaps and bounds during the First World War and had been maintained at a high level until 1930, suffered a disastrous decline. Exports from the United States to Latin America dropped from $911,749,000 in 1929 to $215,944,000 in 1933, and the imports of the United States from Latin America fell from $1,014,127,000 in 1929 to $316,040,000 in 1933. Nor could we allege the depression as the sole cause, inasmuch as the relative share of this trade going to Great Britain, Italy, Brazil, and Japan had materially increased. The administration of Franklin Roosevelt, pledged to a policy of economic rehabilitation, was able to persuade the Congress to pass the Trade Agreements Act of June 12, 1934. The excellent results of the new liberal commercial policy were soon evident. The first of the bilateral reciprocity trade agreements was signed with Cuba on August 24, 1934, whereby mutual tariff concessions were made on a wide range of subjects. Trade statistics vividly and accurately tell the story of the beneficial results. The total trade between the two countries in the four months September to December, inclusive, of 1933, amounted to $29 million. During the same period of 1934, the first four months of the operation of the new treaty,. trade jumped to $65 million, an increase of 125 percent. The success of the Cuban agreement stimulated the speedy completion of others. During the year 1935 four more reciprocity trade agreements with Latin American republics were signed, namely, with Brazil, Haiti, Colombia, and Honduras. During 1936 similar agreements were signed with Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. In 1937 an agreement was signed with El Salvador, the following year one with Ecuador, and in 1939 one with Venezuela. In 1939 negotiations were begun with Argentina, but the agreement, the first comprehen­ sive commercial treaty between the two countries since 1855, was not signed until 1941. The war situation of 1942 encouraged even closer commercial relations in the Americas; and Peru, Uruguay, and Mexico entered into trade agreements with the United States in that year. When Paraguay signed a similar agreement in 1946, it brought the total number to sixteen. The success of the trade agreement program was so clearly manifest that

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

7

the act was renewed nine times by the Congress to continue in force until 1955. The statistical record of the total foreign trade of Latin America between the two World Wars indicated that a determined drive had been instituted on the part of Germany, Great Britain, and Japan for a greater share in these markets, but that the strong position of the United States had not been seriously undermined. The effectiveness of the reciprocal trade agreement program and the general friendliness engendered by the Good Neighbor policy were invaluable assets to the United States in maintaining its excellent trade position against ever keener competition. As a result, by 1953 the trade with Latin America amounted to about $3 billion in each direction. The administration of President Warren G. Harding with the Department of State under the able guidance of Secretary Charles Evans Hughes not only went on record as seeking to support the general Latin American policies set forth earlier by Secretary Elihu Root, but made a unique record in its efforts to settle a number of outstanding and troublesome disputes in the Caribbean area. The prompt ratification of the treaty with Colombia, affording some reparation to the latter for her loss of sovereignty over Panama, made an auspicious beginning. The withdrawal of the marines from the Dominican Republic and the promise of a better situation in Haiti gave encouragement to the anti­ imperialists. The decision to raise the legation at Havana to an embassy, and the naming of General Crowder for the post, was more than a friendly gesture, while the surrender of the Isle of Pines to Cuba was a real if belated contribution to the inviolability of treaty obligations. The appointment of an able administrator in the person of Judge Towner to the governorship of Puerto Rico, in place of the time-serving politician who had first received the post, augured well for an immediate improvement in the conditions in Puerto Rico. Even the impasse with Mexico was finally broken and the Obregón government recognized. But perhaps the outstanding achievement of the Harding administration in its Caribbean policy was the Central American Conference at Washington, which not only resurrected the Central American Court of Justice but also brought about a limitation of armament on land as well as on water among the five Central American Republics. It was in his speech of welcome to the delegates of this conference that Secretary Hughes laid down certain bases of conduct governing the United States in its relations with its Caribbean neighbors which might well serve subsequent administrations: “The government of the United States has no ambition to gratify at your expense, no policy which runs counter to your national aspirations, and no purpose save to promote the interests of peace and to assist you, in such manner as you may welcome, to solve your problems to your own proper advantage. The interest of the United States is found in the peace of this hemisphere and in the conservation of your interests.*’ The value of the statement was enhanced by the sincerity of its author. The Coolidge administration was less fortunate in the results of its dealings with Latin American neighbors. Neither by training, experience, nor tempera­ ment was Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg suited to handle the delicate problems which faced the United States in Mexico and in the Caribbean. The relations with Mexico required a finesse and tact which were wholly wanting in Washington. A policy of smug self-righteousness and thinly veiled threats bolstered up by the bogey of Bolshevism set in motion a strong current of bitter

8

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

hostility, not only below the Rio Grande but also south of Panama. The vacillating intervention in Nicaragua swelled the torrent of ill-will. The utter failure of the Tacna-Arica arbitration was an added blow to our prestige. Criticism of American policies became so pronounced that on February 22, 1927, Senator Borah introduced a resolution to empower the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “to investigate and study conditions and policies bearing upon the relationship between Central American countries, Mexico and the United States and to visit such countries.” Secretary Kellogg protested vigorously and the investigation idea was dropped: but with this change the proposal was approved by the Foreign Relations Committee. The constant criticism of American policies in the Caribbean area brought forth a remarkable speech from President Coolidge on the occasion of the meeting of the United Press Association in New York City in April 1927. After advocating the naive theory that the press should always support an administra­ tion in its dealings with foreign powers, he laid down a rather startling extension of the Wilsonian principle that recognition be accorded only to constitutionally established governments. The Coolidge policy not only accepted this respon­ sibility, but asserted that such recognition, by its evidence of approval, entailed the support of the United States. Having enunciated a frank policy of intervention, President Coolidge thereupon fixed the sphere of its operation in specific terms: “Towards the governments of countries which we have recognized this side of Panama we feel a moral responsibility that does not attach to other nations.” If this was a blunt notice of American hegemony over its weaker neighbors to the south, it at least had the merit of confining “manifest destiny” to a definite area. Nevertheless, the next principle laid down by President Coolidge allowed for no bounds or barriers: “Our government has certain rights over and certain duties toward our own citizens and their property wherever they may be located. The person and property of a citizen are a part of the general domain of the nation, even when abroad . . . Wherever he goes these duties of our government must follow him.” Such policies, if followed to their natural conclusion, would constitute a real p o litik for the Western Hemisphere which might be very difficult to reconcile with any policy qf Pan American solidarity.10 Fortunately, the well-conceived good-will trip of President-elect Hoover to various countries of the Caribbean and South America directly after his election in 1928 was an auspicious augury for a period of more friendly relations between the United States and Latin America. The excellent results of the 1929 Washington Conference on Arbitration and Conciliation which produced two conventions, providing for the settlement by arbitration of all justiciable disputes and the submission of all others to commissions of inquiry, furnished substantial proof of the cooperative attitude of the United States. The with­ drawal of marines from Nicaragua gave even more concrete evidence to our Latin

°For additional background on the period 1921-1929 see Wilfrid H. Calcott, The Western Hemisphere (Austin, 1968), chaps. VI and VII ; Max Winkler, Investments o f United States Capital in Latin America (Boston, 1929); Charles Evans Hughes, Our Relations with the Nations o f the Western Hemisphere (Princeton, 1928).

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

9

American neighbors that “Yankee imperialism” was no longer to be feared.11 United States imperialism began to fade away in the late 1920s. With victory in World War I leaving the United States so strong and Europe seriously weakened, we believed that our national security was virtually assured. Instead of imperialism, the United States turned to isolationism, disarmament, and the liquidation of commitments. The Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928, outlawing war as an instrument of national policy, seemed to preclude European intervention in Latin America and the rest of the world. This was a naive assumption, but the problem of security dictated policy. The stage was set for the Good Neighbor policy, the third phase of relations between Latin America and the United States. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was eager to continue the policy of conciliation and friendship so that the United States might enter the forthcoming Seventh Pan American Conference with a record unmarred by any word or act which might indicate a departure from a policy of sincere cooperation. The keynote of his attitude was sounded in his inaugural address when he declared that he would “Dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor-the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.” Secretary of State Cordell Hull was an able coadjutor to his chief in carrying out the Good Neighbor policy. He was able to bring about a coordinating and strengthening of inter-American peace machinery at the Montevideo Conference, and he was even more successful in his efforts to break down tariff barriers in the Americas by his program of reciprocal trade agreements. The abrogation of the Platt Amendment was another important step on the road to Pan American solidarity. The crowning achievements of the Roosevelt administration were the Buenos Aires Conference, which definitely established the principle of nonintervention among the republics of the Western Hemisphere, and the acceptance of the forward-looking Declaration of American Principles at the Lima Conference with adequate machinery to make it effective.12 The Good Neighbor policy of President Roosevelt was not wholly immune to congressional criticism, owing to the very considerable financial outlays made in Latin America. Senator Hugh Butler of Nebraska, who made a trip through the region in 1943, alleged that the Good Neighbor policy had become the policy of the rich uncle and that some six billion dollars had been expended, much of it profligately. Senator McKeller denied the allegations categorically and proved that the total expenditure for 1941-1943 amounted to less than one and one-half billion dollars, of which more than one billion had been used to 11 Alexander de Conde; Herbert Hoover's Latin American Policy (Stanford, 1951); James B. Scott, “ Pan American Conference on Conciliation,” Amer. Jour, o f Int. Law, XXIII (January, 1929), 145-148; Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs o f Herbert Hoover, 3 vols. (New York, 1951-), pp. 210-211. 12 Highly useful volumes on the Good Neighbor era include Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History o f the American People (New York, 1964), pp. 683-691; Edward O. Guerrant, Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy (Albuquerque, 1950): Cordell Hull, The Memoirs o f Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (New York, 1948); Raymond F. Mikesell, United States Economic Policy and International Relations (New York, 1952); E. E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition (New York, 1960); Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1947); Henry J. Tosca, The Reciprocal Trade Policy o f the United States: A Study in Trade and Philosophy (Philadelphia, 1938).-

10

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

purchase strategic materials and ships. In fact, the total expenditure for non-war purposes was about $178 million. During World War II and after its conclusion vigorous efforts were made to strengthen in ter-American military cooperation. Military missions were sent to all Latin American countries which requested them, and by 1946 the United States had missions in thirteen of the American republics. More than $400 million worth of combat supplies was furnished through Lend-Lease during the war. Economic and technical assistance provided by the United States through the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and predecessor agencies in support of programs of health, sanitation, agriculture, and education in the region from 1940 to 1950 totaled about $60 million. About nine hundred experts from the United States cooperated in the agricultural sector, some three hundred professors were exchanged, and other specialists helped in technical and social welfare programs. In spite of shortages of consumer goods, the United States made a strong effort to supply the Latin American market; between 1939 and 1944 the sale of civilian commodities to the region more than doubled. The Latin Americans reciprocated by speeding up the production and shipment of strategic raw materials, the importance of which to our war effort can scarcely be exaggerated.1 à The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, put the Good Neighbor policy to its severest test. It was by no means certain that the United States would win the war, nor could it insure the protection of the Americas. Yet, nine Latin-American nations promptly declared war on the Axis, and at the inter-American conference held in Rio de Janeiro in January 1942, all agreed to recommend consideration of breaking ties with the enemies of the United States. This decision was a setback for the United States which had hoped for a unanimous declaration of war, or at least a total severing of diplomatic relations, but it was nonetheless gratifying. Brazil proved to be the vital link in the Latin American defense picture. For several weeks early in 1942 her air bases offered the only route for ferrying American aircraft to Britain, the Middle East, the Far East, and Russia. Mexico despatched a squadron of fighter pilots to the Asian theater in 1945, and Brazil sent combat troops to Europe. While only Brazil and Mexico sent combat units overseas, all of the other natidns but Argentina permitted a large degree of American supervision in punishing pro-Axis business firms and in dealing with saboteurs and spies. Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru allowed the use of air and naval bases, and the small Caribbean republics cooperated generously in support of Washington’s defense policies.1314 Argentina and Chile, the only nations which failed to break relations 13 Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework o f Hemisphere Defense, the United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere (Washington, 1960); Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York, 1960); William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 (New York, 1953), pp. 600-607; J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin, 1961), chaps. VI-VIII); U.S. Dept, of State, Significance o f the Institute o f Inter-American Affairs in the Conduct o f United States Foreign Policy, publication 3239, Inter-American Series 36, Washington, 1948. 14 Conn and Fairchild, Framework o f Hemisphere Defense, chaps. I-XIII; Donald M. Dozer, Are We Good Neighbors? Three Decades o f Inter-American Relations, 1930-1960 (Gainesville, 1959), chap. 4.

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

11

immediately with the Axis, were the outstanding exceptions in the picture of harmony. Steady pressure from the outside led to Chile’s breaking off of relations in January 1943, but Argentina proved less tractable. As the fortunes of the Axis declined the Argentine leaders stubbornly and irrationally became more partisan towards the Axis. While selling meat and grain to the allied nations at high prices she stimulated anti-Americanism and encouraged the activities of Axis agents and propagandists. Subjected to growing pressure from Washington, refusal to provide Lend-Lease armaments, and the threat to freeze Argentine assets in the United States, the Perón regime finally yielded to outside coercion and to internal pressure, breaking diplomatic relations with the Axis in January 1944.1516It may be concluded that during the war the Americas achieved a high degree of unity, and that the wartime cooperation of the American republics proved substantial and vital. All of the nations, even Argentina, by March 1945 had declared themselves belligerents. In spite of these achievements, however, disturbing factors appeared. In part they could be traced to a lack of consistent and sustained leadership in the State Department’s administration of Latin American affairs. Secretary of State Hull gave reluctant support to Sumner Welles, who, first as assistant secretary and later as undersecretary, directed Latin American policy from January 1934 to August 1943. Although President Roosevelt favored his essentially noninter­ ventionist policy in the case of Argentina, Welles was forced to resign at the insistence of Secretary Hull in August 1943. The resignation of Welles coincided with the downgrading of Latin America in the mind of official Washington. Moreover, after Welles was dropped, the direction of Latin American diplomacy shifted four times in two years. With the emergence of the United States and the USSR as superpowers at war’s end, it became clear to the Latin Americans that the inter-American system had become a lesser component in the world power balance than before, and that their status vis-à-vis the United States was no more than that of a junior client. While these misgivings were being expressed, another force was making itself felt: international communism. This introduced the fourth major era in our relations with Latin America which may be labeled the cold war, or that of the preoccupied Good Neighbor, and the Alliance for Progress. Since the end of World War II the United States, under presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, has been forced to place relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuba, before all else. Washington, until the 1960s, devoted its energies to fortifying Europe and Asia against the inroads of communism while our relations with Latin America experienced a “perilous lull.” Our nation’s major funds and most of our attention and commitments have been devoted to meeting the exigencies of the cold war.1 6 As the end of World War II approached, the United States sought to tighten the unity of the American republics and to bring them into the United Nations. This was achieved in a manner satisfactory to Washington at the

15U.S. Dept, of State, Consultation Among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation (Washington, 1946). 16 William D. Rogers, The Twilight Struggle (New York, 1967, chapter I; Harvey S. Perloff, Alliance for Progress: A Social Invention in the Making (Baltimore, 1969), pp. 7-18.

12

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STA TES

Chapultepec Conference in Mexico City early in 1945. Every American nation that had declared war on the Axis would become a charter member of the world organization. Even Argentina met this qualification, though not without eliciting contempt and cynicism. Thus twenty of the original forty-six members of the United Nations organization were Latin American.17 President Harry S. Truman followed in the footsteps of his predecessor and supported the Good Neighbor policy after becoming aware of the criticism that the United States had mobilized and used Latin America during the war but was now neglecting it. He went personally to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Security held in Brazil in September 1947 and declared to the assembled delegates: “The United States seeks world peace—the peace of free men. I know that you stand with us. United we can constitute the greatest single force in the world for the good of humanity.” Washington achieved its objective by the end of the conference: the Rio Treaty, a mutual defense agreement, which stood as a monument to the Good Neighbor policy and as a tribute to wartime cooperation.18 But popular interest in the United States for Latin America lagged in the wake of the war. And Washington was preoccupied with the problems of Western Europe, the stunning defeats of the Nationalists at the hands of the Communists in China, and the emergence of India and the Middle East. At the inter-American conference held in Bogotá in 1948, Secretary of State George C. Marshall had the unpleasant task of advising the other American republics that the United States foreign assistance program, then being devised for Europe, would not be shared in a comparable manner by Latin America. This came as a painful surprise to the delegations, but progress was made nonetheless. The Bogotá conference authorized the recasting of the old Pan American apparatus into the Organization of American States, a regional grouping lodged within the United Nations. Soon afterward, the outbreak of the Korean War brought major purchases by the United States of Latin America’s raw materials and the distri­ bution of additional military equipment under the Mutual Security program of 1951.19 While campaigning for the presidency in 1952 General Dwight D. Eisenhower charged the Truman administration with neglecting the Good Neighbor program. Shortly after his inauguration the new president despatched his brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, to make a survey of the Latin American countries so as to determine the possibilities of working out programs of mutual

17 Manuel S. Canyes, “The In ter-American System and the Conference of Chapultepec,” American Journal o f International Law, XXXIX (July, 1945), pp. 504-517; The United Nations in the Making: Basic Documents (Boston, 1945); The United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, April 25 to June 26, 1945: Selected Documents, Dept, of State Publication 2490 (Washington, 1946); Manuel S. Canyes, The Organization o f American States and the United Nations, 6th edition (Washington, Pan American Union, 1963). 1“Gantenbein, Latin American Policy, pp. 822-830; U.S. Dept, of State, Report o f the Delegation o f the United States o f America, Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance o f Continental Peace and Security, Quitandinha, Brazil, August 15-September 2, 1947 (Washington, 1948). 1’ William Sanders, “ Bogotá Conference,” International Conciliation, No. 442 (June, 1948), 385-405; Gantenbein, Latin American Policy, pp. 831-872.

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

13

advantage. Accompanied by representatives of the departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce, Dr. Eisenhower visited ten countries and reported that, on the whole, political relations with the United States were quite good, and the concept of hemispheric solidarity was cherished by all. Among his recommendations were the elimination of misunderstandings, fair trade and tax policies, expanded public loans and technical cooperation, and that in crises the president be authorized to make grants of food from surplus stocks to the Latin American countries. As a “good partner” the United States would entertain complaints and requests and attempt to provide and stimulate self-help. In the 1950s, to be sure, the Eisenhower administration pushed numerous projects to increase productivity in Latin America. The United Nations made some contributions, but most were financed and guided by Washington. Financial aid through the Export-Import Bank, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund was aimed at curbing inflation. The United States Point IV program was also useful, as was technical assistance through the various OAS agencies and the International Basic Economy Corporation, a Rockefellersupported institution for stimulating selfhelp in the region. These measures proved insufficient, however, and Latin America’s basic problems multiplied. Between 1945 and 1957 only 2.5 percent of all U.S. aid went to Latin America, and of this one-fourth was military assistance. In the period 1945-1960 Yugoslavia, for example, received more funds from the United States than did all of the Latin American countries combined. From 1945 to 1957 less than 20 percent of World Bank loans were committed to Latin America.20 Only the work of the U.S.-Brazil Economic Commission stands out as a step forward in cooperative development through the early 1950s. American neglect of the region can be explained partially by the unfolding of the cold war. This period was especially critical, for Latin America was experiencing rapid political, economic, and social change. By then it was evident that the most critical need was to raise production in all economic sectors, for the population of the southern republics, which had shown a comparatively slow expansion until recent times, was rising at an unprecedented rate, among the highest in the world. On the occasion of the Tenth OAS Conference at Caracas in 1954, Latin America sought U.S. cooperation to stabilize the falling prices of raw materials, expand capital aid, and increase technical cooperation. But Washington, concerned with erecting military defenses against communism, then exemplified by the Arbenz regime in Guatemala, failed to take the initiative in supporting Latin American development and democratic aspirations. By this time most of the democratic regimes that had risen to power since 1943 had been overthrown. Thirteen of the twenty Latin American presidents were from the military. Batista in Cuba, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Venezuela’s Pérez Jiménez, and Colombia’s Rojás ranked among the worst dictators that the hemisphere had produced. Many countries suffered from an unfavorable balance of trade, and inflation was causing widespread social unrest. Anti-American feeling grew to dangerous proportions as revealed by events during Vice-President Nixon’s riot-studded “good will” trip to South America in 20United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Latin America^ XIV (New York, 1969), p. 5.

14

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

1958 when he was the object of violent demonstrations in Lima and Caracas. Soon afterward came Fidel Castro’s seizure of power in Cuba and his association with the Sino-Soviet bloc. It became clear at this time that our Latin American policy was due for reappraisal. The Eisenhower administration at first met the growing crisis with temporary measures. In 1956 the president met with the Latin American chiefs of state in Panama and proposed that his hemispheric colleagues nominate a personal representative to consider how the OAS might be made “ a more effective instrument in those fields of cooperative effort that affect the welfare of the individual . . . the economic, financial, social and technical fields which our organization might adopt.” The committee was formed and although its recommendations were later incorporated in the plans for the Alliance for Progress, Washington was not prepared to support any new major programs toward the cooperative solution of Latin America’s mounting crisis.2 1 One of the outstanding grievances of the Latin American nations was that the United States failed to appreciate the need to stabilize the price of their exports, especially coffee. Another complaint was the difficulty in securing loans for capital development. The Eisenhower administration made some concessions on these matter^ by facilitating the operation of the International Coffee Stabilization Agreement and establishing the Inter-American Development Bank capitalized at one billion dollars, half of which was contributed by the United States. It increased the amount of foreign aid granted to Latin America, but not in the quantity sought by the Latin American states. This fell far short of needs, for Washington’s policy makers had concluded that the United States had already done enough, that further aid might reduce self-reliance, and that Latin America should seek private capital rather than public assistance. And as export prices declined Washington showed no interest in proposals for the economic integration of the region. This attitude changed quickly after the Nixon tour which revealed the disintegration of our Latin American policy. By this time Europe seemed to be freed from the imminent threat of Soviet invasion, allowing the United States to give a higher priority to Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Although the Kennedy administration has received moát of the credit for the major policy shift in Latin America, it began at the close of the Eisenhower government. The initiative, however, came from Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek who, in a letter to President Eisenhower on May 28, 1958, referred to the experiences of Vice-President Nixon and suggested that “we must search our consciences to find out if we are following the right path in regard to Pan America.” What Kubitschek proposed was “Operation Pan America,” a plan for economic and political cooperation, a “policy of ardent fraternity and indestructible continental unity.” It envisioned $600 million of economic assistance a y ear. and a concerted effort to raise living standards from $300 to $500 per capita by 1980. This was followed by the Act of Bogotá of September 1960, which recommended the establishment of an inter-American program for social development orientated toward agrarian and fiscal or tax reforms, improvement in housing, community services, health, and education, and an increase in the mobilization of national resources.2 221 21 New York Times, July 23, 1956. 22Dept. of State Bulletin, XLIII (Oct. 3, I960), pp. 536-540.

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

15

The Alliance for Progress emerged from this background in a speech by President Kennedy in March 1961 to the Latin American diplomatic corps in Washington in which he invited the twenty American Republics to join in a “vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic need of the American people for homes, work, and land, health, and schools.” In response to President Kennedy’s proposal, in August 1961 the Economic Ministers of the American Republics (with the exception of Cuba) signed the Charter of Punta del Este which formulated the basic framework of a ten-year program of action for the economic and social development of Latin America. The Alliance was officially launched at Puhta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962, where a meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers adopted the Charter of Punta del Este. In the Charter the Latin American countries agreed to undertake the drastic social and institutional reforms necessary to insure that the fruits of economic development would be widely distributed. On its part the United States promised to provide a major part of “the minimum of $20 billion, principally in public funds, which Latin America will need over the next ten years from external sources to supplement its own efforts.” Thus the Alliance for Progress was to differ markedly from previous foreign assistance programs in Latin America. The sense of the Charter of Punta del Este was that external assistance, to be of permanent benefit, must be based upon basic social and institutional reforms within the region. Furthermore, the program was conceived as a regional effort rather than a collection of traditional bilateral assistance programs. The original dimensions of the Alliance program were conceived at a gross investment of $ 1 0 0 billion over a ten-year period. The Latin American countries were to provide 80 percent of the financial requirements. The remaining 20 percent was to be provided equally by foreign investments and by U.S. governmental programs, the latter amounting to about $ 1 billion a year. United States financial aid would constitute only a margin of Latin America’s wealth, an aspect of the problem not fully understood by the American public at the time, or later, when the Alliance effort fell short of expectations. Latin America earns some $10 billion annually from its exports. Thus, $1 billion of public U.S. lending would increase the region’s import capacity by approximately 10 percent. Compared with total national income, Washington’s commitment at Punta del Este projected an increase of only 1 percent in Latin America’s resources. United States aid under the Alliance obviously could not bring about a material increase in living standards directly, nor be fully supportive of Latin American reforms necessary to economic, social, and political growth. Washington’s planners hoped to achieve extraordinary development results on this slim margin by combining aid with diplomatic, technical, and political leadership.23 2 3Ibid., XLIV (April 3, 1961), pp. 471-478; Alliance for Progress. Official Documents Emanating from the Special Meeting o f the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at the Ministerial Level Held in Punta del Este, Uruguay from August 5 to 17, 1961 (Washington, 1961). The overemphasis of the United States role in the Alliance was clearly stated by Governor Nelson Rockefeller in a congressional hearing. See U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Subcommittee on West. Hem. Affairs, Comm, on For. Reis., Hearing, Rockefeller Report on Latin America (Washington, 1970) p. 30 (hereinafter referred to as Rockefeller Report). OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza pointed out that in the period 1962-1969 Latin America had invested $130 billion in its own development to the United States $6.7 billion. “Of that $6.7 billion, about 4 and some billion are loan? . . . Latin America has paid back . . . $2.7 billion and has paid an interest of over $750 million.” See Americas, 21 (Aug. 1969), p. 44.

16

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

The Peace Corps, established on March 1, 1961, was an innovation in U.S. foreign aid of the Kennedy administration. Focused on Africa in the beginning, greater emphasis had shifted to Latin America by the end of 1962. By numbers, this became the largest of the Peace Corps regions, 16,000 Volunteershaving served there in the first decade of the program. A summary of country assignments is shown in Table 1-1. Volunteers are assigned to rural and urban community development projects, agricultural extension work, health projects, the formation of cooper­ atives, and a wide variety of educational programs. The generally enthusiastic response to the Peace Corps programs in Latin America is indicated by the host countries’ requests for additional volunteers. Acceptance of the Corps was achieved by its policies of dissociation from U.S. embassy activities, and avoidance of identification with any political group. The Peace Corps concept is not entirely new, for various religious and private organizations have long performed similar services. The American Friends, as well as the Volunteer Service Overseas Movement in England, provided an example for this official venture by the United States. By mingling with people in all social levels in Latin America the volunteers have helped to dispel the widespread impression that the North Americans associate only in their own enclaves and have little contact with local inhabitants. In the minds of most Americans the Peace Corps is a concrete and creative example of the American desire to help other nations help themselves. It was designed to have a catalytic effect, stimulating self-help and community initiative in Latin America. The Peace Corps has done its job well, but it cannot be expected to solve the multitude of complex and deeply-rooted problems of the region. It is probable that the contributions of the Peace Corps must be judged ultimately not so much by its immediate results as by the extent to which it stimulated self-help movements by the Latin Americans themselves. President Kennedy made Latin America a major issue in his 1960 campaign, and after launching the Alliance for Progress in 1961 he identified himself closely with the program. In spite of a decline in United States prestige, arising from the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion effort, which took place at a time when the echoes of his speech proposing the Alliance for Piogress had hardly died down, he won the confidence and affection of Latin Americans to an extraordinary degree and sought to develop an Alliance spirit by annual visits to Latin America. In December 1961 he went to Caracas and Bogotá, where he and his wife were enthusiastically received. The president and his wife visited Mexico City in June 1962, and were given a tumultuous reception, said to surpass that given any foreign head of state. He hailed the Mexican Revolution and its ideals as an early precursor of the Alliance for Progress. His handling of the Cuban missiles crisis in 1962 repaired some of the damage to the U.S. image in the 1961 Cuban invasion. Going to Costa Rica in 1963, where he met with the presidents of the six isthmian countries, he stressed the political aspects of the Alliance national democratic government, political liberty, and social justice. Latin American statesmen were invited to the White House, each visit reflecting the president’s desire to establish a personal working relationship with leaders who 24See Peace Corps Report, published annually.

Table 1-1.

Peace Corps:

Brazil Chile Colombia El Salvador Jamaica Eastern Caribbean Islands Venezuela Bolivia British Honduras Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador Guatemala Honduras Panama Peru Uruguay Guyana Paraguay Nicaragua

Volunteers in country at end of fiscal year* 1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1971

43 63 103 25 38 15 23 35

168 99 229 21 32 14 83 112 33 26 144 156 27 27 28 285

210 106 561 49 62 17 117 126 18 65 171 236 105 46 76 293 18

458 294 544 55 77 5 265 220 49 61 85 309 83 103 133 379 4

639 397 506 51 70 45 292 266 33 107 101 211 69 107 196 301 48

601 392 522 105 101 89 352 303 42 154 140 255 140 174 171 349 65 44 35

580 254 576 119 117 124 262 219 45 98 161 247 151 167 174 283 N31 51 56

297 73 145 69 177 163 190 58 37 85 61 136 71 115 1 206 7 69 66

345

1,484

2,276

3,214

3,439

4.034

3,715

2,026

*Peace Corps Seventh Annual Report (Washington, 1968), p. 30; Peace Corps, Office of Staff Placement, Bi-Annual Statistical Summary, June 30,1971 (Washington, 1971), pp. 11-17.

18

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

were earnestly pushing democracy and reform. President Kennedy’s emphasis upon the United States commitment to democratic reform and social justice was revealed on many occasions in addresses to labor groups, business organizations, and Latin American student groups, and he rarely failed to mention Latin America in his press conferences. In one of his last major addresses at a meeting of the Inter-American Press Association in Miami, on November 18, 1963, he reaffirmed his faith in the program: “ . . . I support and believe in the Alliance for Progress more strongly than ever before . . . ” President Johnson met with the ambassadors from each of the Latin American countries on November 26, 1963, the day after President Kennedy’s funeral, to assure them that the United States would continue to honor its commitment under the Alliance. He said: “Let us make the Alliance for Progress a living memorial to President Kennedy.” He thereafter sought to reassure Latin Americans of this resolution and the firmness of U.S. support. In May 1964 he reviewed Alliance gains during the first six months of his administration and signed loan agreements for projects in thirteen countries. He emphasized his nation’s role in the Alliance through 1964-65 in meetings with the diplomatic corps in Washington and U.S. ambassadors to Latin America. The president could cite an impressive list of physical achievements made possible by the Alliance by the fifth anniversary of the program in Í966.25 It began to appear at this point, however, that the Johnson administration laid greater stress on tangible accomplishments such as buildings and roads, than on reforming the institutional structure. Doubtless the earlier optimism about political change had been blighted by military intervention in Peru and Argentina, the overthrow of Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic, and the ominous trends in Brazil. State visits to Washington by Latin American presidents declined between 1964 and 1967 and the presidential press conferences had fewer references to the region. Except for television appearances in which the president defended U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in the late spring of 1965, the period 1965-1966 showed a decline of Washington’s concern with Latin America. At the same time criticism was rapidly mounting, inside and outside Latin America, of the Alliance’s failure to attain its original objectives. 'v Secretary of State Dean Rusk led the U.S. delegation to the meeting of the Inter-American Council in Rio de Janeiro in November 1965 where it was announced that the Alliance would be extended beyond the ten-year period originally proposed by President Kennedy. In April 1966 President Johnson went to Mexico City, his first official visit to Latin America since coming to office. While there he declared himself in favor of attending a summit conference of hemispheric presidents which had been suggested by President Illia of Argentina. The Summit Conference of American Presidents at Punta del Este in April 1967 was largely planned and organized by the United States. And the personal presidential diplomacy gave promise of more direct U.S. involvement in the Latin American crisis and expanded leadership. On March 13, 1967, President Johnson dispatched a message to Congress calling for additional U.S. support for 2 sNew York Times, Aug. 18,1966.

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

19

Latin American development, especially to assist the region to move toward a common market. The president proposed a resolution for the new aid, but its defeat was engineered by Senator J. William Fulbright who contended that the Senate's traditional appropriation procedures would be undermined if Congress committed itself by accepting the resolution device. The president had sought ratification for his forthcoming pledge of U.S. assistance to Latin American integration. At the conference President Johnson remained in the background, at least publicly, and met each chief of state privately. It appeared that the president's cordiality, sincerity, and frankness did much to remove the distrust and suspicion that had arisen in connection with the "Dominican intervention. The major emphasis of the conference was on the more concrete problems of integration and international trade rather than upon reform.2 6 As the Johnson administration neared its close the record showed that in the years 1961-1968, the United States had provided S9.2 billion of assistance in accordance with its original commitment as follows: AID, S4.1 billion; Public Law 480, $1.3 billion; Export-Import Bank, $1.8 billion; and a $2 billion contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank. Other foreign invest­ ment totaled $6 billion and total gross domestic investment by the Latin American countries approximated $129 billion in the first seven years of the Alliance.2 7 The administration of President Richard M. Nixon began amid growing strains in United States and Latin American relations. While not a popular figure, having been identified with the much-criticized Eisenhower government’s aid and trade policies in the region, his public statements showed an awareness of the need for a change in hemispheric policies, particularly in the economic field. Soon after he had returned from the tour of South America in 1958 in which he and his party had narrowly escaped death at the hands of howling mobs in Caracas, he had suggested that “we develop an economic program for Latin America which is distinctly its own . . . There must be a new program for the hemisphere . . . , " and other recommendations which he carried into the election campaign of I960.26*28 Possibly in anticipation of his nomination in the presidential campaign of 1968, he kept abreast of developments by a two-week tour of South America in May 1967. Speaking in Chicago after his return, Nixon said that Latin American countries lagged badly in government, economic, educational, and agrarian reform despite the $7 billion in United States aid. Until they agree to work toward modem institutions and to discard entrenched inefficiency he said, the United States should “pour no more money” into Alliance programs. The Republican party’s platform on which Mr. Nixon was elected to the presidency in 1968 stressed the need for “closer economic and cultural cooperation of the United States and Latin American countries,” and pledged

26U.S. Dept, of State, Commitment fo r Progress: The Americas Plan for a Decade o f Urgency (Washington, 1967). 2 7U.S. Cong., Committee on Gov’t. Operations, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., U.S. A id Operations in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress (Washington, 1968), p. 3. 28 Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (New York, 1962), pp. 229-230; Los Angeles Times, The Nixons in South America (Los Angeles, 1958). ‘

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that “we will encourage in Latin America the progress of economic integration to improve opportunity for industrialization and economic diversification.” On January 21, 1969, his first day in office, the new president met with Galo Plaza Lasso, secretary-general of the OAS, and former president of Ecuador. At this meeting Galo Plaza urged the president to send a top-level, fact-finding mission to the OAS countries. When asked for suggestions, he proposed that Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York, an expert in Latin American affairs, and surely one of the most popular North Americans in the region, be asked to head the mission. Governor Rockefeller accepted the proffered assignment, but the mission did not get underway until May.2 9 The Nixon administration was criticized in Latin America, as well as in domestic circles, for the delay in naming a Latin American team. For the top post, Assistant-Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, President Nixon named Charles A. Meyer, who took over his duties shortly before April 1. Meyer moved into the position from a background as executive vice-president of Sears Roebuck and Company, and a director of United Fruit, Dow-Jones, and the Philadelphia National Bank. John H. Crimmins, a career foreign service officer with wide experience in the Caribbean area, was named Deputy AssistantSecretary for Inter-American Affairs. Virón P. Vakey, offering a similar background was appointed White House adviser on Latin American affairs. The appointment of Joseph J. Jova, also a foreign service officer, to the post of U.S. Ambassador to the OAS, filled the administration’s top positions on Latin America. Jova succeeded Sol M. Linowitz, who, postponing his resignation, remained at the post until May 1 at Mr. Nixon’s request. In what appeared to be the foundation of the new president’s Latin American policy, Governor Rockefeller and a plane-load of experts set out on a goodwill and fact-finding tour of Latin America in May 1969, “to listen, to look;” and to report to Mr. Nixon what he had found. The president called it “one of the most vitally important missions ever undertaken by an independent group on behalf of the United States.” Causing the mission to loom even more important, both Mr. Nixon and Mr. Rockefeller had downgraded the results of the Alliance for Progress. Although given a rousing send-off, the mission was soon deep in controversy. To Latin Americans the four-stage Rockefeller mission seemed to be just another of a host of study missions sent out by American presidents to determine the needs of Latin America. It seemed impossible to them that in a tour of such brevity he could come up with an adequate report on Latin America’s needs. Governor Rockefeller’s mission, which was divided into four tours beginning on May 11, took him to Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Panama. On May 27 he left for Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Trinidad-Tobago. The third leg, to Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, began June 16; and he left on June 27 to visit Argentina, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Guyana, and Barbados. Public disorders protesting his coming forced the cancellation of visits to Chile, Venezuela, and Peru, and he cut his stay in Bolivia to three hours. Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho),29 29New York Times, Aug. 5, 1968; Christian Science Monitor, June 13, 1969. For position papers of Richard M. Nixon and Hubert H. Humphrey on Latin America see New York Times, Nov. 5,1968.

PAN AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

21

chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, was outspokenly critical of the tour.30 The Rockefeller mission recalled the earlier visits to Venezuela by then Vice-President Nixon, and Senator Robert F. Kennedy. Mr. Nixon, visiting there in 1958 narrowly escaped bodily harm, and Senator Kennedy, during his Latin American tour in 1965, encountered a situation similar to that faced by Governor Rockefeller. Although the Venezuelan government recommended that he should not come, Senator Kennédy made the unofficial visit, but shortened it by two days. Governor Rockefeller called the demonstrations -the work of “subversive elements” directed in some instances from outside the hemisphere. However, when he met Mr. Galo Plaza Lasso in Trinidad the latter expressed the opinion that the student protests were not solely the work of an extremist minority, declaring that “there is a deep feeling throughout Latin America at all levels in society that relations with the United States need a change . . . Whatever interest outside groups may have, there is a genuine national resentment that doesn’t need outside influence.” Later Mr. Rockefeller indicated that the demonstrations actually “evidence the frustration that exists and the need for action.” Secretary of State William Rogers affirmed this view in June 1969, declaring “I think I should also say obviously the demonstrations show some discontent with our relationships and we have to recognize that they need to be improved.31 Before the Rockefeller tour was launched representatives of the Latin American nations, meeting at Viña del Mar, Chile, prepared the Concensus of Viña del Mar, a document calling on Washington to make basic alterations in its economic policies. It was delivered to President Nixon by Chilean Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes. The so-called Concensus of Viña del Mar proved to be the key document in the two-week session of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council held in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, in May. The situation presented the United States with a serious Latin American policy dilemma, for the document in some measure challenged Washington to do more to aid in solving Latin America’s critical economic stagnation. The main point raised in the document was that the United States had been helping itself far more in Latin America than it has been helping underdeveloped countries in the region. The Latin American nations called on the United States for greater economic assistance through easier access to the American market for their goods. They also condemned the Washington policy of “tied loans” which oblige a recipient nation to use money in the United States where it often does not go as far as elsewhere because of high American prices. The achievement of objectives of development, the document asserts, “depends in large measure upon whether all countries of the inter-American community, and especially the United States of America, recognize and assume their responsibilities and obligations.” Noting that “the economic and the scientific and technological gap between the United States and Latin America has widened and continues to widen,” the Latin Americans contend the United States shares major responsibility in correcting this situation.32 20New York Times, July 7,1969; Christian Science Monitor, June 14,1969. 31 Christian Science Monitor, June 13,1969. 32Ibid., June 20,1969\ Americas, 21 (Aug. 1969), pp. 42-43.

22

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Secretary Charles A. Meyer, who headed the U.S. delegation to the Trinidad meeting, was called upon to assuage the growing Latin American resentment. Acting on instructions from Washington, he announced the immediate discontinuance of the practice called “additionality.” This is the requirement in aid regulations—forced by the balance-of-payments problem— that for every dollar given to Latin America one has to be spent for American products from a certain list. Latin Americans have long complained about this requirement, since they could buy most goods they needed cheaper elsewhere, and because it forced them often to buy goods they did not really need thus negating the purpose of aid. This action by President Nixon was seen as a first step by Washington to meet some of the Latin American complaints about Washington’s overall policy on aid and trade. President Nixon’s long-awaited policy statement on Latin America was delivered at an Inter-American Press Association dinner in Washington on October 31, 1969. On the surface it appeared to move the United States away from open support of major economic and social change in Latin America and into what the president sees as a “ . . . new kind of partnership” in which the United States “lectures less and listehs more.” The president did not indicate that the basic U.S. commitment to the Alliance of Progress would be changed, but he made clear that he expected to develop his own Latin American program, saying that the 1970s should be a decade of “Action for Progress for the Americas.” To attain this he repeatedly called for a “partnership” between the United States and Latin America. An implied aspect of the president’s speech was the effort to scale down the silhouette of the United States in the region, perhaps because of the growing nationalistic trend in the hemisphere, aimed commonly at the United States. The theme of “partnership” was evident in a number of specific points mentioned by the president. For instance, he declared that hereafter the Latin American republics will be allowed to use Washington’s financial aid for purchases not only in the United States, “but anywhere in Latin America,” which reaffirmed the earlier policy change on “additionality.” He proposed that the Latin Americans would “jointly assume a primary role in setting priorities within the hemisphere, in developing realistic programs, an^ in keeping thenown performance under critical review.” The president also promised to see what could be done to improve the region’s serious trade imbalance. And to indicate his interest in Latin America he announced his intention of upgrading the Latin American post in the Department of State to the status of undersecretary, a proposal which, however, was not favorably considered by the Congress.33 President Nixon’s speech drew immediate criticism from many sources in Latin America: government officials, politicians, newspapers, and radio com­ mentators. Criticized in particular was the President’s implied rejection of the social and economic aims of the Alliance for Progress, and his apparent downgrading, in some respects, of Latin America as an area vital to the United States. Both concepts figured prominently in U.S. foreign policy during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Some of the sharpest criticism came 33 Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 3,1969; Ibid., Feb. 8,1970.

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

23

from nations considered the most democratic, such as Chile and Venezuela, whereas the most favorable reactions came from nations ruled by the military. The Latin Americans wanted more favorable treatment in the U.S. market for their goods as well as numerous changes in the foreign aid program: increased aid with fewer conditions attached, and the multilateralization of aid through world and hemisphere bodies. It was not surprising that some of the economic quirks of the Alliance should have come under attack. As Governor Rockefeller noted while in Brazil, that country in 1969 was paying off $500 million to the United States on debts: $300 million on the principal and $200 million in interest. This condition makes it difficult for countries to advance,.for they go only deeper into debt, the more aid they accept. By 1969 75 percent of the bank funds coming into Latin America were used to pay off old loans.34 Some critical comments arose from the President’s failure to confront Congress on aid and trade issues. The total Nixon aid package for Latin America amounted to $605 million, one million dollars less than President Johnson’s allocation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969. Expressing some general sentiments, the Mexican ambassador to Washington declared “ . . . we encounter here on a daily basis contradictory actions that show a different reality-im port quotas, high tariffs, taxes that offset incentives we offer United States investors in our countries." And more complaints were heard that American investors take out of Latin America more profits than they put in by new investments and the U.S. government’s grants in aid funds. There was some justification for this protest because by Washington’s own admission, U.S. corporations took $106 million out of Latin America than was put in by aid in 1967.35 The president said that he would “lead a vigorous effort to reduce the non-tariff barriers to trade maintained by nearly all the industrialized countries against products of particular interest to Latin America and other developing countries." But this statement did not satisfy Latin Americans who sought preferential treatment in the U.S. market and rejected the idea of equal status with other less advanced countries. On the topic of intergovernmental relationships the president’s statement of a policy to “ deal realistically with the governments as they are," drew criticism because it seemed to condone military rule. Governor Rockefeller’s report on Latin America raised further controversy on this subject, for he recommended increased military aid to Latin American countries to forestall Communist subversion, which he declared has “alarming potential." He also indicated that the military generally represents the best interest of a people in a given country “although it is not widely recognized."3 6 It had become clear by the end of the third year of the Nixon administration that Latin America did not rank high in Washington’s list of priorities, and criticism mounted both inside and outside Latin America as relations with the region deteriorated. Washington’s indifference could be

2*San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle, June 29, 1969. See also Rockefeller Report, pp. 7-8. 3 s Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 7,1969; Ibid., June 27,1969. 36Ibid., Nov. 13, 1969; Rockefeller Report, pp. 8-19; 35-37; 44-45; 85-87. President Nixon’s State of the World Message amplifies his administration’s Latin American policies. See Afew York Times, February 19,1970.

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attributed in large measure to the absence of a direct confrontation with the Communist world in Latin America, except for the continuing stand-off with Cuba. The election of a Marxist president in Chile, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, created unease in Washington, but a tangible threat from that quarter had not materialized. However, at the time that Washington was lowering its presence in the region Moscow and Peking were expanding their trade relations with South America. Except for Paraguay, the USSR had diplomatic relations with all countries on the continent by 1972. Peking, though lacking in embassies, carried on an impressive trade drive, with the expectation of establishing permanent trade missions in Peru, Chile, and Guyana.37 Prominent among the critics was Juscelino Kubitschek, former president of Brazil, whose Operation Pan America had influenced the planning for the Alliance for Progress. He declared that “Kennedy made a profound psycho­ logical error in creating the Alliance. He should have consulted the Latin Americans but, in effect, he told them: T will do this.’ Johnson forgot Latin America except the Dominican Republic. Nixon won’t even hear of it. No popular feeling exists here that the United States really wants to help this continent.” 38 Within the U.S. Congress Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho), Chairman of the Senate Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee, deplored that little, if anything, had been accomplished by the Alliance for Progress, saying “progress, though visible, is illusory.” Church, who had voted against the foreign aid bill when it was soundly defeated in the Senate, contended that private U.S.-owned companies operating in Latin America withdrew “ $2 in dividends for every dollar they invest. . . Latin Americans have become convinced that they are the victims of a virulent new imperialism.” 39 With a view toward halting the drift in relations with the southern republics presidential adviser Robert H. Finch completed a fourteen-day tour of six Latin American nations on behalf of President Nixon in November 1971. The mission included stops in Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, and Mexico. During his travels he told audiences that the “purpose of his visit was to “build bridges of understanding” and to open roads of friendship.” With U.S. foreign aid programs in a “state of flux” he said the trip^ would provide “a unique opportunity for us to get inputs from Latin America.” He also made a point of saying that President Nixon understood their problems.40 While these statements were intended to be reassuring they must have been outweighed by at least two events in 1971 : the U.S. Senate’s stunning reduction of foreign aid and the Nixon administration’s protectionist policy, notably the 10 percent surcharge on imports. The latter was particularly resented since the United States then enjoyed a $900 million advantage in its balance of trade with Latin America. U.S. policies were denounced at the Lima meeting of the “Group of 77,” actually ninety-five nations, representing an informal association of 3 nNew York Times, Jan. 28, 1972. 36Ibid., Apr. 16,1971. 39 Times o f the A mericas, Nov. 17,1971. 40New York Times, Dec. 2, 1971 ; lim es o f the Americas, Nov. 24, 1971.

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25

“third world” countries, as well as by the 12th extraordinary meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (CIES), which ended January 20, 1972.41 In defense of Washington’s position, Secretary Meyer declared that Washington had worked toward a policy of “mature partnership” with the Latin American countries; “we now deal with the Latin American governments as they are which is what Latin America wants.” He described the Nixon policy as a living policy: “ . . . it has been completely misunderstood because it is not a pyrotechnic policy, but a sound policy for now and for the future, responsive to the nations of Latin America.” But in the area of “Latin America’s highest priority,” a system of general trade preferences, Meyer said “we have not fulfilled our commitment.” Further light was cast on the administration’s policies by Peter G. Peterson, President Nixon’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs, who said that Washington’s relations with Latin America are under continuing stress . . as these countries develop and their political structures evolve with wider participation in economic and political decisions.” Contending that some of the problems in inter-American relations are traceable to misunderstandings about the U.S. role in Latin America he said “it is is our own interest as well as that of Latin America to multilateralize the economic relations of Latin America with the world in order to bring more aid and investment from other developed countries, as well as the U.S. and open markets in other countries for the products of Latin America.” 4 2 With the abolition of the 10 percent surtax on December 21, 1971, it seemed that U.S.-Latin American ties might improve in 1972, and further optimism was raised by the announcement that Washington would advocate generalized trade preferences for developing nations. This was quickly dashed, however, when President Nixon requested S224.5 million in economic and development assistance for Latin America for fiscal year 1973, which meant that Latin America stood to share less than 10 percent of the $3.2 billion in foreign aid requested of Congress by the Nixon administration. Designed to finance Alliance for Progress development loans, the figure of $224.5 million did not include military and internal security assistance for the región. Compensating for the Alliance for Progress reduction, the request included a four-fold increase in funds requested for the Inter-American Development Bank, up from $262 million requested in 1972 to $837 million in 1973. This request and the one for the previous year were taken to indicate that the President was determined to make the IDB the chief vehicle for U.S. aid in Latin America. Such an approach was consistent with his policies in Asia and elsewhere, where aid was being channelled into regional development banks. After an eight month delay Congress on March 2, 1972, approved $2.6 billion in foreign aid for fiscal 1972. The Alliance for Progress received $230 million ($80 million in technical aid and $150 million for development loans), and the Inter-American Development Bank was allocated $211,760,000. Meanwhile, prior to delivering his State of the Union address, President Nixon "Ibid.;Ibid., Feb. 2, 1972. 42Ibid., Jan. 12,1972.

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gave harsh warning that thereafter his administration would retaliate against any nation which took over a U.S. firm without paying “prompt, adequate and effective compensation.” Under such circumstances the United States would terminate all bilateral aid programs and withhold approval of loans being considered at international financing institutions, for example, the World Bank, and the Inter-American and Asian development banks. It seemed that the new policy had particular relevance in Latin America. While assuming a strong posture on this question, the Nixon administration had earlier announced a pragmatic policy on the allocation of foreign aid. Secretary Meyer, speaking before the House Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee, said that the United States “will deal with governments as they are . . . we should not seek to burden our assistance programs with the task of molding the hemisphere’s political choices to our images or moral preconceptions.”4 3 Other sources of irritation in inter-American relations faced by the Nixon administration included territorial waters claims, the nationalization of property owned by American citizens, the kidnapping and murder of diplomats, and the hijacking of aircraft. Because President Nixon’s Latin American policies were slow in appearing, some of these difficulties took on greater urgency as the decade of the 1970s began. The first problem mentioned dated from 1947 when Peru and Chile laid claim to seas adjacent to their coasts for 200 nautical miles. They were joined by Ecuador in 1952 when all three countries signed the Santiago Declaration on the Maritime Zone. This was essentially a claim to resources, but it was later interpreted as both a resource claim and as a territorial sea claim. The United States recognizes a three-mile territorial sea and, in addition, claims a nine-mile contiguous zone of exclusive jurisdiction over fisheries. Two international law-of-the-sea conferences, one in 1958 and one in 1960, had failed to resolve the basic issues on territorial seas and resource jurisdiction. Another such conference was planned for 1973. Almost one-hundred boats of the California-based tuna fleet were seized and fined by Ecuador and Peru in a fifteen-year period for fishing within the 200-mile limit. In 1971 the Ecuadorean navy made fifty-one seizures of American fishing vessels. The vessel owners paid a total of ÎÇ.4 million for the forced purchase of licenses and fines to pay their release. The amount was to be reimbursed under the terms of the Fisherman’s Protective Act. In January 1971 Washington announced the suspension of military sales and credits to Ecuador in accordance with the Foreign Military Sales Act. Ecuador quickly responsed by appealing to the OAS to consider charges of economic aggression and by ordering the expulsion of the U.S. Military Group. The United States, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru had met in the first session of the Quadripartite Fisheries Conference at Buenos Aires in 1969 and 1970; it was to have reconvened no later than July 31, 1971. However, negotiations for the Conference were not resumed because Ecuador insisted that the measures applied by Washington in January 1971 must be lifted. By 1972 ten Latin American countries claimed a 200-mile territorial limit. 4 3Congressional Quarterly, XXX (Mar. 4, 1972), pp. 462469; Times o f the Americas, Feb. 2,1972.

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27

In addition to Chile, Ecuador, and Peru there were El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil; Costa Rica had a 200-mile conservation zone. Of all these states, the disputes which concerned the United States involved only Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Brazil. At stake is the traditional doctrine of freedom of the high seas, which has been in force since the early nineteenth century.44 Washington, after deciding that aid to Ecuador was vital to the U.S. national interest, refused to recognize a prohibition against economic assistance to Ecuador, which had been added to the fiscal 1972 foreign aid bill by Congress. United States interests to be considered were the NASA tracking station near Quito, the emergence of Ecuador as an oil producer, the consolidation of the Andean Regional Trade Pact, and the maintenance of cooperation with Ecuador both bilaterally and within the inter-American system.45 Evidence of a mounting nationalist surge in Latin America could be seen when the governments of Peru, Chile, and Bolivia took definite action against foreign-owned properties. Peru’s military government headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado in October 1968 seized the International Petroleum Company (IPC), the Peruvian subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey; the government also “intervened” in all the sugar-growing areas of the nation, including the holdings of W. R. Grace and Company. Peru’s expropriation of IPC was based on the charge that the United States had committed “economic aggression” against Latin America. Under the circumstances Peru became subject to action under the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 which requires that the U.S. terminate aid to any country that confiscates American-owned property without paying fair compensation. Besides the suspension of aid and the suspension of the sugar quota, Peru faced another possible action: since the United States does not recognize Peru’s claim to two-hundred miles of coastal waters and American fishing vessels have been seized, fined, and fired upon, U.S. law calls for the recall of our military ships on loan to Peru. The assets of the Bolivia Gulf Oil Company, a U.S.-owned concern, were nationalized in October 1969 shortly after General Alfredo Ovando Candia seized power. Bolivia agreed to pay indemnities, but the Gulf Oil Company declared that the amount fell short of the property’s value, and pressed for application of the Hickenlooper Amendment. Colonel Hugo Banzer, who seized control in 1971, stood firm against returning the Gulf properties expropriated by his leftist predecessor; however, he indicated that nationalization would cease under his government, and continued negotiations with Gulf on the questions of a financial settlement and the marketing of crude oil.4 6 Although differing from the situation in Peru and Bolivia because of a negotiated settlement with compensation, Chile’s reformist government headed by Eduardo Frei Montalva moved another step toward the “Chileanization” of

4 4Dept, of State Bulletin, LXVI (Feb. 28, 1972), pp. 284-287. 4 s Times o f the Americas, Mar. 22,1972. 4 bIbid.y Mar. 29,1972.

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the nation’s copper industry with the purchase of 51 percent ownership of the vast Anaconda Copper Company mines and other facilities. Under the agreement of June 1969 Chile would acquire Anaconda properties for about $1 billion over a period of several years. The Frei government made such an agreement with the Kennecott Copper Company in 1967 obtaining a 51 percent control of the El Teniente mine. Anaconda sought to avoid a similar arrangement, but domestic pressures compelled the Frei government to act against Anaconda, which was forced into an agreement on Chileanization. The election of the Marxist, Dr. Salvadore Allende Gossens, to the presidency in 1970 led to a rapid acceleration of the nationalization of the American-owned copper firms. Although pledged to fair compensation, the Allende regime announced that “excess profits” would be withheld from compensation to be paid to the copper companies, which was interpreted to mean that the two firms, the Kennecott and Anaconda companies, would receive little or perhaps nothing for their Chilean holdings. The struggle between Latin American governments and terrorists entered a new phase with the assassination or kidnapping of foreign diplomats. Such incidents, involving both United States and foreign personnel, represent a dangerous technique that is hard to combat, and one which could have a serious impact on international relations. A growing concern for the lives of foreign diplomatic staff members has led to demands for police protection and restrictions on the movement of such personnel. Washington urged its staffs throughout the Western Hemisphere to redouble their protective measures. The incidents of kidnapping for ransom have largely been directed at U.S. personnel, although a West German ambassador to Guatemala was murdered, and a Japanese Consul-General in S£o Paulo, Brazil, and a Paraguayan consul in Argentina have been held. U.S. Ambassador John G. Mein was killed in Guatemala when terrorists ambushed him in August 1968; two U.S. officers, Colonel John Weber and Lt. Cmdr. Ernest A. Munro, advisers to the Guatemalan armed forces, were also slain. The slaying of Count Karl von Spreti, the West German Ambassador, in April 1970 was thus the second such foreign official to be killed in Guatemala in two years. The West German government had offered to pay the $700,000 ransom money demanded by the terrorists, but Guatemala refused to accede to the terrorist demand that twenty-three political prisoners be released. Previously the Guatemalan government had met terrorists’ demands in the kidnappings of U.S. labor attache, Sean M. Holly, and of its own foreign minister, Alberto Fuentes Mohr. In each case imprisoned guerrillas had been freed. The same technique was repeated by a Brazilian extremist group in S3o Paulo, which kidnapped the Japanese Consul-General, Nobuo Okuchi, and obtained the release of five prisoners. West German Ambassador E. von Holleben, kidnapped in Brazil, was released after forty prisoners were freed. In the case of the Paraguayan consul, the Argentine government refused to yield to the demands of the terrorists, who released their captive. U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, C. Burke Elbrick, was abducted in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in September 1969, and released after ransom was paid. Lt. Colonel Donald Crowley was kidnapped in the Dominican Republic in March 1970; and in the following month John C. Cutter, U.S. Consul in Porto Alegre, Brazil, outran a roadblock that his would-be abductors had set up. In Uruguay

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29

two U.S. diplomats and a Brazilian consul were seized by leftist terrorists, who named ten political prisoners as ransom. One of the U.S. officials, Dan Mitrione, was slain. Reflecting the gravity of the situation, the political kidnapping problem was a major item on the agenda at a two-week meeting of the OAS foreign ministers in Washington in June and July 1970. There was willingness to condemn terrorism, political kidnappings, and extortion but disagreement on the use of hemispheric mechanisms to curb them. The OAS, unable to resolve the question, agreed to establish an eleven-nation committee to explore the possibilities of hemisphere-wide action on the issue. This was followed by a Special Session of the OAS General Assembly, held in Washington in January-February 1971. A unanimous vote of the Assembly established the principle that acts of terrorism against foreign officials, irrespective of pretext, constitute serious common crimes rather than political offenses. The adoption of this principle deprives persons responsible for such acts of the shelter of political asylum and subjects them to extradition and prosecution. The Convention had not been ratified by any of the thirteen signatory nations by early 1972, but nine had indicated their intention to begin the ratification procedure. It was submitted to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent.4 7 In December 1969 Washington was host to representatives of thirteen nations to discuss the problem of aerial hijacking. Since May 1961 there had been 131 cases of hijacking or attempted hijacking, of which 102 occurred in 1968-1969. The United States, which suffered the m ost-from hijackings to Cuba—seeks an international agreement to prevent hijackers from claiming political asylum. The Convention on Certain Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo in September 1963 by the United States and forty-four other nations, proved ineffectual. Meeting at the Hague in December 1970 under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization a seventy-seven nation conference on air law approved a Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking Convention). This was ratified by the United States in September 1971, completing the number of ratifications required to bring the Convention into force. The Convention provides that hijacking will be subject to severe penalties in all states and, in short, deprives hijackers of asylum from prosecution. A hijacker will either be extradited or prosecuted where found. Cuba had announced that it would support international action against hijacking, but no action had been taken by Cuba, including the ratification of this Convention. Most needed from Washington’s standpoint was a U.S.-Cuba agreement for the return of hijackers to the United States to stand trial. Hopes were raised about the possibility of such an accord after Dr. Castro expressed an interest in discussing the problem in a radio broadcast on November 15, 1972. The U.S. Department of State welcomed the announce­ ment, and talks were subsequently conducted through the Swiss Embassy in Havana, which represents U.S. interests on the island. No definite committments were reported by year’s end, but it appeared that the talks would continue. 4 7Dept, of State Bulletin, LXIV (Feb. 22, 1971), pp. 228-234; Ibid.y (Sept. 13, 1971), p. 286.

30

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

Washington was chiefly concerned with ending aerial piracy whereas the Cuban position was more complex. Havana also wanted to end sea piracy, which involved Cuban vessels taken by Cuban refugees to the United States, and to consider the total question of Cubans going into exile there.48 As the foregoing commentary indicates, there were a number of pressing issues in relations between Latin America and the United States confronting the Nixon administration in 1973. Aside from demands for increased and unfettered financial aid, there were problems of intergovernmental relations with military rulers, and the volatile issues of tariffs and trade and private investment. Because of their seeming priority, these topics warrant further consideration. Campaigning for the presidency in September 1960, Senator John F. Kennedy said: “Seven years ago there were fifteen strong men in Latin America dominating the life of their countries. Today, there are only five. Three years from now there won’t be any.”49 This prophesy seemed plausible through 1961 when General Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay was the only military chief of state. However, a surge of militarism beginning in March 1962, which, carried forward through mid-1969, resulted in thirteen military coups, eleven causing the overthrow of democratically-elected governments. Altogether, by 1972, close to half of the 290 million people in nine countries of Latin America were ruled by imposed or elected military governments. In view of the Alliance for Progress goal of improving and strengthening democratic institutions, but at the same time needing staunch anti-Communist allies so as to cope with the stepped-up Communist offensive emanating from the Sino-Soviet bloc and its Cuban base, Washington’s policy planners were faced with a hard decision. Previous administrations had usually extended de facto recognition and military assistance without regard for the nature of the governments, whether democratic or undemocratic, provided they were anti-Communist and upheld U.S. cold war policies. After a military coup occurred in Peru in 1962 the Kennedy administra­ tion, seeking to implement the Alliance goal, broke off diplomatic relations, suspended military assistance, and stopped economic aid. Other nations did not boycott the military regime and Washington recognized it, restoring military and economic assistance on the condition that elections would be held. The Kennedy administration was forced to make further compromises on its principle of supporting only democratic governments when military elements overthrew civilian governments in Guatemala and Ecuador in 1963. But later in the year, when the military seized power in the Dominican Republic and Honduras, Washington again cut diplomatic ties and suspended the aid programs. In spite of these actions President Kennedy concluded “that the military often represented more competence in administration and more sympathy with the United States than any other group in the country. To halt work on the Alliance in every

" Ib id ., (Jan. 11, 1971), pp. 50-54; Ibid., LXV (Oct. 4, 1971), p. 371; New York Times, Dec. 12, 1968; Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 10, 1970; Ibid., Nov. 22,1972; Ibid., Dec. 14,1972; Times o f the Americas, Jan. 5, 1972. 4 9Simon G. Hanson, Five Years o f the Alliance for Progress: An Appraisal (Washington, 1967), p. 23.

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

31

nation not ruled by genuine democracy would have paralyzed the whole program.” 50 The Johnson administration ceased using non-recognition and the suspen­ sion of aid as a means to foster civilian, representative government. Although avowedly opposed to military seizures of power, it recognized with little delay new regimes in Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia and attached no promise of early elections as a condition for such action. Summing up his views on the question President Johnsôn declared: “The United States has no mandate to interfere whenever a government falls short of our expectations,” but he added “In the Latin American countries we are on the side of those who want constitutional governments.” President Nixon, describing his administration’s essentially pragmatic policy, declared: “The United States has a strong political interest in maintaining cooperation with our neighbors regardless of their domestic viewpoints. We have a clear preference for free and democratic processes . . . Our relations depend not on their internal structures or social systems, but on actions which affect us and the in ter-American system.”51 A fundamental responsibility of the United States is the defense of the OAS community of nations from hostile attack, direct or indirect. This requires not only conventional military preparedness but also positive measures to forestall Communist infiltration and subversion. As Sino-Soviet bloc expansion mounted in the years following World War II, diplomatic efforts to secure an inter-American agreement for hemispheric defense won the general support of Latin Americans. The Rio Treaty of 1947 was aimed at building an inter-American line of defense against extrahemispheric military attack. But United States attention to the security needs of the relatively secure region of Latin America was nominal until the late 1950s. The United States Military Assistance Program (USMAP) in Latin America, designed to thwart extrahemispheric military attacks, was revised to meet the challenge of indirect Communist conflict techniques. This was prompted by the Communist efforts to seize Guatemala, the Castro takeover in Cuba, and the FALN (Fuerzas Armadas de la Liberación Nacional) campaign of terror in Venezuela, which gave substance to the threat of internal subversion. USMAP expenditure grew from $200,000 in 1952 to $67 million in 1959. The total U.S. military assistance commitment to Latin America in the 1950s was approximately $317 million, whereas in the first seven years of the Alliance for Progress it amounted to $685.5 million, within a total of $9.2 billion of economic aid. When it was proposed to increase military assistance in the region a change in the Foreign Assistance Act imposed a ceiling of $75 million on the total of grants and sales to Latin America, other than training. In 1968 grant military assistance amounted to more than $17 million for material and services and $10 million for training, for a total of over $27 million. Cash sales of under $12 million and credit assistance of óver $35 million brought the total of grants and sales for fiscal 1968 to $75 million.52 5 0Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York, 1965), p. 535. 51 Dept, of State Bulletin, LXIV (Mar. 22, 1971), p. 361; New York Times, Aug. 22,1966. 52 The Foreign Assistance Program, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1968, pp. 40-41; Committee on Government Operations, U.S. A id Operations in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress, p. 1.

32

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

In 1971 President Nixon waived the congressionally-imposed $75 million ceiling on arms sales to Latin America and asked Congress to raise it to $150 million in order for the U.S. to compete with other world arms salesmen. In the preceding five years Britain, France, Canada, Italy, West Germany, and Spain had sold nearly $ 1 billion worth of aircraft, naval vessels, and other items in the Western Hemisphere. The president’s decision was consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, which envisaged less involvement in the defense of foreign countries and more self-defense, partly through purchases of U.S. equipment financed by the U.S. Treasury. Secretary of State Rogers declared that “Such responsiveness is an important element in maintaining our traditional security relationship with these countries, and diminishes the prospects of any powers unfriendly to the United States advancing their influence and objectives in this hemisphere.” In line with this policy also was a decline in the number of defense personnel assigned to training missions, which fell from nine hundred to three hundred between 1969 and 1971.5 3 When viewed in relation to total budgetary expenditures, the Latin American record on armaments has not been unfavorable. Military expenditures of the six major South American nations-Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezpela-totaled about the equivalent of U.S. $1.8 billion in 1970. This quadrupled the total in 1940, when defense outlays of the six countries approximated U.S. $400 million. At the same time, military spending took about the same proportion of the gross domestic product in 1970 as in 1940 and generally absorbed a smaller share of the national government expenditures. Of the three branches of the armed services, the air force reflected the sharpest growth in expenditures. In 1940 its share was negligible, while in 1970 its expenditures exceeded or rivaled those of the navy in all countries except Chile. Navy expenditures almost quadrupled, whereas army expenditures approxi­ mately tripled. Expenditures for the three branches in 1970 were divided as follows: army, 46 percent; navy, 28 percent; air force, 26 percent.54 United States military assistance to Latin America continues to emphasize strengthening of the capabilities of selected Latin American nations to maintain the internal security needed to realize the goals of the Alliance for Progress. Military assistance was an important contributing factor iq containing insur­ gencies in Guatemala, Colombia, and Venezuela and in overcoming the insurgency headed by Dr. Ernesto “Che” Guevara in Boliva. It is in support of counter-insurgency that the U.S. aid is most effective, for the Latin American military establishments can contribute little to the collective defense of the hemisphere against external attack. The programs for Latin America emphasize multilateral cooperation through assistance in support of joint or combined military exercise and multinational communications. U.S. policy seeks to eliminate unnecessary defense expenditures and to avoid the pitfall of an arms race in the region. While encouraging a reduction of Latin America’s armed forces and their budgets the s 3New York Times, May 19,1971; Times o f the Americas, Dec. 8,1971. S4U.S. Dept, of State, Trends in Latin American Military Expenditures, 1940-1970 (Washington, 1972), pp. 1-8. Total military expenditures for all Latin America, excluding Cuba, stood at $2-$3 billion a year in 1971. See New York Times, Apr. 20,1971.

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

33

United States cannot encourage total disarmament there without assuming the responsibility of policing the entire Western Hemisphere. In general, however, it is the policy of the United States to reduce armaments by international agree­ ment rather than to encourage their growth. The United States military assistance program has won the political collaboration of most of Latin America’s armed forces but possibly at the price of sacrificing the democratic objectives of the Alliance for Progress, as shown by the recent series of military political coups. Even more disquieting is the fact that most of the Latin American military leaders involved had received U.S. training. The Latin American people who are opposed, to military regimes hold the U.S. responsible because of the aid programs, even though that might not be the effect of the aid. In other words, the United States is held responsible for the unrepresentative, and commonly repressive, kind of government that prevails in a large number of countries. This raises the difficult question of whether to furnish internal security assistance to non-representative governments, because in the long run the suppression of non-Marxist populist movements may pose the greatest threat to the stability and progress of the area.5 5 Latin America’s economic problems have increasingly extended into the area of trade relations, and their complaints have been most commonly lodged against the United States. It is widely believed, erroneously except for sugar and petroleum in a qualified sense, that this country fixes the prices of their raw materials exports, and not the free play of competition in the world markets, of which the United States is only a part. Underlying the problem has been Latin America’s shrinking share of world trade, which dropped from 11 percent to 8 percent in the years 1928-1959. If the important trading countries of Cuba and Venezuela are omitted, the drop is even more critical: from 7.3 percent in 1928 to 4.2 percent in 1959. In 1965 Latin America accounted for 4.97 percent of the world’s exports and 6.03 percent of its imports. The value of Latin American exports rose by 5.2 percent a year in 1966-1969. But this rate was significantly below that of 10 percent recorded on a world-wide basis. It also fell short of the 7.2 percent export expansion level attained by developing countries in general. The contraction of the region’s share in world trade has forced many Latin American nations to accelerate the substitution of imports, by means of industrialization, to compensate for the lack of dynamism in the exports.5 6 While the region’s trading position had suffered, its dependence on exports has remained high. But at the same time, in most countries, the total export receipts have been dependent on the sale of two or three export commodities which are vulnerable to price fluctuations in the world market. It is clear that the features of concepts and techniques in the use of the classical international s s U.S. Senate, Comm, of For. Reis., 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., Hearings Before the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs (Washington, 1968), pp. 59-97; U.S. Senate, Comm, on For. Reis., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Survey o f the Alliance for Progress-The Latin American Military (Washington, 1967); George C. Lodge, Engines o f Change: United States Interests and Revolution in Latin America (New York, 1970), pp. 175-187. 56 Latin American Center, Univ. of Calif, at Los Angeles, Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1965 (Los Angeles, 1965), p. 37; Current History, 43 (July, 1962), pp. 1-2; Inter-American Development Bank, Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America (Social Progress Trust Fund Tenth Annual Report, 1970) (Washington, 1971), p. 5.

34

LA TIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STA TES

trade policy instruments within the reach of the Latin American countries—such as bilateral treaties, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) multilateral tariff agreement, the traditional type of agreement to establish basic product prices, and the regional cooperation mechanisms of the inter-American system, as well as those of worldwide coverage in general-have proved to be of little value in improving international trade tendencies unfavorable to Latin America.5 7 A striking fact in the trade picture is that for many of the Latin American countries the principal market and chief supplier is the United States. The existence of this trade connection cleariy suggests the need for close, friendly political relations. It is also a potential source of weakness because dependence on the U.S. can and has produced grievances, real and imaginary, between the two regions. Related to the problem has been the rise of regional preference arrangements, particularly in Western Europe, which threaten Latin America’s export position there. As a consequence, Latin America has sought relief through regional economic integration, exemplified by the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Andean Common Market, and the Caribbean Free Trade Association. While the U.S. government has recognized that the overall development of Latin America is heavily dependent on a satisfactory growth and development of the region’s foreign trade, it opposed in principle and practice, until recently, stabilization agreements and stood aloof on the question of regional economic integration. However, compromises were made: Congress ratified the International Coffee agreement in 1963; and regarding sugar imports Washington allocated among several supply areas, strongly represented by Latin America, specific portions of the U.S. market at reduced tariff rates. The Cuban quota, the largest of all, was in 1960 distributed among other countries because of the actions of the Castro regime. By the late 1950s Washington had become reconciled to regional economic integration and a decade later was giving it vigorous support. Pressures mounted in Latin America in the 1960s for additional tariff concessions by the United States. Tariff restrictions and quotas imposed on non-ferrous metals were especially resented and labeled inimical to interAmerican goodwill and solidarity. As the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), on August 10, 1965, in its reports to the presidents of the American republics observed: “It is inequitable for the products of some of the developing countries to enjoy preferences outside the hemisphere plus non-discriminatory access to the United States market.”58 Most tropical products and all the important ones such as coffee, bananas, and cocoa now enter the U.S. market duty free. The proposal indicated that the United States should impose customs duties where none existed and apply lower rates to, or exempt, imports of these products from Latin America. The adoption of such a policy could conceivably harm other underdeveloped nations, provoke retalia-

57Pan American Union, Latin America's Foreign Trade, Problems and Policies (Washington, 1966), p. 1. 58 U.S. Cong., Joint Econ. Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Latin American Development and Western Hemisphere Trade (Washington, 1965), pp. 53-54.

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

35

tion, and place an obstacle in the path of reducing trade barriers on a multilateral basis. The crux of the multilateral system that the United States has fostered is not the elimination of moderate protectionism whereby a nation favors domestic producers; rather, it is the elimination of discrimination among foreign markets. This is the basis of the most-favored-nation clause, in its unconstitutional form, which has governed our trade relations with most countries for over forty years and which has been endorsed by the principal trading nations of the world. The reconciliation of these traditional trade policies with the requests of Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and the U.S. trading position vis-à-vis the rest of the world had become a problem of great magnitude by the 1960s.59 It should also be noted that, apart from typical tropical products, there is a wide range of temperate zone agricultural commodities in which the developing countries face an array of protective tariff and quota barriers which limit their access to the markets of the developed countries, and of subsidized exports from the rich countries, that compete against them in third markets. The developing countries are pressing for trade liberalization in these products, but the prospects for substantial liberalization are not promising. In most of the developed countries domestic agriculture is insulated in varying degrees from the free play of supply and demand by price supports, direct subsidies, and import controls. The average income of the farm sector in these countries tends to be lower than that of the other sectors of their economies, and the array of protective barriers is intended to maintain and raise the income of this group as a matter of equity.60 Fewer problems exist in regard to tariffs on manufactured goods, since little of Latin America’s exports are in this category. However, it is clear that the region must become competitive in this field if it is to close its trade gap. United States tariffs on most manufactures that might come from Latin America average about 15 percent, which would indicate that this has not been a factor in depressing the area’s manufacturing activity. (See Table 1-2). Under recent tariff schedules there is a wide range of products which Latin America could sell at competitive prices on U.S. markets. But for a variety of reasons, which include cultural values, habits, and customs, temperament, inefficiency, low value and high cost, and a disinterest in searching out new markets either at home or abroad, industrial development has been seriously inhibited. International developments in the area of trade policy may have a significant effect on Latin America’s future trade position. As a result of the Declaration of Viña del Mar adopted by the Latin American nations in May 1969, and discussions held later at the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, the latter appointed a special committee to negotiate new trade policies proposed to the United States by the Latin American countries. At the committee’s 1970 nieetings, the Latin American republics presented a list of56 59For detailed analyses of Latin America’s foreign trade problems and strategy, the growth of the new trade policy in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) see Pan American Union, Latin America’s Foreign Trade, Problems and Policies, Chaps. I and III;Rockefeller Report, pp. 134-139. 60Dept, of State Bulletin, LVII (Aug. 7,1967). p. 183. 1

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

36

Table 1-2. United States trade with Latin America* (in millions of dollars) EXPOR TS

IM POR TS

Country

I960

1965

1970

1960

1965

1970

GRAND TOTAL

3667

3957

6021

3637

3946

5210

359 6 25 464 203 253 45 225 42 57 43 64 25 35 48 831 30 90 9 147 36 63 567

268 9 42 348 237 198 61 Z 76 80 61 96 21 54 87 1106 69 125 16 282 75 20 626

441 22 46 841 300 395 95 Z 143 127 64 100 34 89 219 1704 77 208 18 214 84 41 759

98 1 9 570 193 299 35 357 110 65 32 59 18 34 54 443 21 24 8 183 55 21 948

122 5 31 512 209 277 57 Z 111 106 48 67 20 72 125 638 36 60 13 241 142 36 1018

172 9 25 669 154 269 116 184 109 48 87 32 102 186 1222 61 76 11 341 236 19 1082

Argentina Barbados Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Trinidad & Tobago Uruguay Venezuela

\

♦Represented are the twenty-four members of the Organization of American States; includes the U.S.; Cuba was excluded from participation in OAS in 1962. Z less than S500,000. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract o f the United States, 1971 (Washington, 1971), pp. 768-769.

eight-hundred export products for which they requested U.S. elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Washington’s inaction on the problem of general trade preferences, the 10 percent surcharge on imports in the last half of 1971, although President Nixon had exempted Latin America from the 10 percent reduction in foreign economic assistance expenditures called for under the new economic policy, and Latin America’s unfavorable balance of trade with the U.S. were denounced at the Lima meeting of the “Group of 77” ( “third-world” countries) in 1971 and by the 12th Extraordinary Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (CIES) in January 1972.

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

37

It should be noted that whereas Latin American economic relationships with the United States in the 1960s focused on financial aid and technical assistance, the nations in the region had become more concerned with the economic development role of the export sector by the early 1970s. This concern reflected several considerations. While Latin America accounted for only 14 percent of total U.S. foreign sales and about 15 percent of total U.S. imports, the U.S. absorbed about 34 percent of Latin American exports and supplied some 40 percent of Latin American imports. Exports accounted for 10 percent of the total Latin American gross national product in 1971. But for more than half of the Latin American countries, the contribution of exports was higher than 10 percent (for the U.S. exports accounted for only 4 percent of the GNP). Moreover, the overall rate of export growth for Latin America has been only about half that for developed countries, and as a group Latin American countries depend upon exports to meet more than three-fourths of their foreign exchange requirements. Underlying all aspects of the economic axis is the fact that whereas to the United States trade with Latin American is important, to the latter trade with the U.S. is paramount, if not dominant.61 Charles A. Meyer, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, admitted that the Nixon administration had not fulfilled an earlier commitment to set in motion a system of generalized tariff preference for the developing countries, acknowledging that the preferences were the primary objectives of Latin America in its relations with the United States. He pointed out the generalized preferences would eliminate tariffs of the major developed countries on a large number of manufactured and semi-manufactured products from all less developed countries. Thus they would stimulate developing countries to diversify their exports and lessen their traditional dependence for foreign exchange earnings on raw materials and commodities and would reduce the high cost of import substitution. Mr. Meyer declared that the Nixon administration had delayed in presenting such legislation to the Congress because the U.S. trade and balance of payments position was weakening and that these problems together with a sluggish domestic economy created a strong protectionist feeling in Congress. It was therefore judged unwise to submit a preference bill at that time. However, the administration restated its intention to push the preference bill in 1972. In reviewing developments in U.S.-Latin American relations in the preceding two years Secretary Meyer indicated that restrictions had been eased, allowing Latin American nations to spend their aid dollars within the region and elsewhere in the developing world, that U.S. economic policies were being submitted for annual review to the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, an unprecedented concession by a donor nation, and that Washington had consulted whenever possible with Latin American nations prior to taking actions which might affect their economies. Washington had participated consistently in the inter-American organizations that had initiated programs for expanding capital markets, tourism, and export promotion, as well as having supported the regional development banks. Agreements were signed with Colombia and Panama whereby the U.S. agreed to finance its share for 'Ibid., LXV (Aug. 30,1971), p. 239.

38

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

completion of the Darien Gap section of the Pan American highway. Congress passed new sugar legislation, which was generally favorable to Latin American suppliers. Negotiations with Panama were pushed to modernize the basic treaty of 1903, the Bryan-Chamorro treaty was abrogated, and a settlement was made with Mexico which resolved all questions concerning the changing course of the Rio Grande. Despite these and other achievements credited to the Nixon administra­ tion in inter-American relations, Secretary of State William Rogers, in a report to Congress, amplified Secretary Meyer’s earlier statement, declaring that U.S. relations with the other American republics “suffered some impairment during 1971 . . . The principal and immediate problem in Latin American eyes was the U.S.’ inability to meet some of our commitments and (live up to) Latin American expectations and desires in the field of trade and economic assistance.” He said that in 1972 “we will be making special efforts to respond to the concerns of the peoples of the Western Hemisphere.” Little was done in 1972, however, to check the drift in U.S. relations with its hemisphere neighbors. The apparent indifference could be explained in part by the fact that it was an election year, and because the war in Southeast Asia continued to grip/the nation’s attention. Although Latin America did not figure prominently in the presidential campaign, the platforms of the two major parties showed a wide divergence of opinion on policies toward the region, particularly as concerned Cuba. The Republican Party promised to “foster a more mature partnership” with Latin American countries, while maintaining that Cuba was “ineligible for readmission to the community of American states.” In thenplatform the Democrats pledged a sharp reduction in military aid to Latin American governments. And they sought better relations with Cuba, contending that “after thirteen years of boycott, crisis and hostility, the time has come to reexamine our relations with Cuba . . . ” In what could be regarded as a preview of Washington’s policies during the second Nixon term, Secretary Rogers, in a speech given in Philadelphia to the Permanent Council of the OAS, commemorating the 150th anniversary of U.S.-Latin American relations, declared: “President Nixon has asked me to tell you that during his second term we will remain committed to the interests of the hemisphere and determined to make a substantial contribution to its social and economic progress.” He indicated that the United States would pursue four major goals: 1. “We will pursue a policy of cooperation with Latin America in a relationship of greater equality, shared initiatives, and mutual responsibilities. 2. We will work to ensure that the legitimate interests of all the nations of Latin America are represented in the new international monetary and trade systems to be negotiated. 3. We will cooperate with you directly in this hemisphere to strengthen and diversify our trade, investment, and assistance ties. 4. And we will seek to resolve the issues between us over fisheries, over territorial seas, over investment, and all others, in the spirit of friendship and mutual respect which is the essence of our inter-American system.”

Latin American reaction to Mr. Rogers speech was restrained because the Secretary had not commented specifically on the administration's plans for

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

39

resolving the region’s main problems with the United States. Clearly, the need for a broad policy review was indicated.6263 The importance of the role of private investment in fulfilling the aims of the Alliance for Progress was not understood by the Latin Americans generally. The misconceptions arose in part from the brief reference to it in the Charter of Punta del Este, a ten-word phrase found in the statement of purpose to accelerate the process of national industrialization by “taking full advantage of the talents and energies of both public and private sectors.” Private investment and private enterprise are not otherwise mentioned except by implication. The “Declaration to the Peoples of America” establishing the Alliance for Progress, among it twelve paragraphs on goals, includes one beginning: “To stimulate private enterprise.” 6'* Such light treatment gave rise to a common belief, particularly in Latin America, that large amounts of U.S. government financial aid carried out on a government-to-govemment basis subordinated private investment. Such a view fails to appreciate American faith in private investment which had such a large role in the development of the United States and other Western nations. While it can be argued that free economic choice is not completely excluded by, or incompatible with, undemocratic political institu­ tions, historical evidence indicates that reliance on a centralized governmental machinery for allocating economic resources jeopardizes both individual freedom and political democracy. Owing to urgency for positive action, a massive program of government effort was believed necessary if the challenge of progress was to be met in time. However, it was not intended to displace private investment, but instead to vigorously support it. Obviously there continues to be a need for massive government effort to supplement private enterprise in advancing Latin America’s development; but the nations of the region need to find means for improving the climate for private initiative. Failure to provide this climate, in the wake of Cuban seizures of foreign property, produced the Hickenlooper Amendment, first enacted in 1962 during the struggle between ITT and American Foreign Power Company on the one hand and several state governments of Brazil on the other. By 1967 it required the President to suspend assistance to any government which nationalized the property of a U.S. investor, or repudiated a contract or imposed a “discriminatory” tax or “restrictive maintenance or operation conditions,” unless the country took steps to discharge its international legal obligations to pay for the property. Senator Thomas H. Kuchel of California succeeded in adding a provision with respect to the fishermen from his state who used the fishing ground off Peru and Ecuador. Although it has a deterrent value, the Hickenlooper Amendment will not dissaude such nations as Cuba, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile, which have been bent on expropriating without compensation. Since the flow of private capital in Latin America can be neither “driven nor cajoled,” removing some of the risks of investment were undertaken by the

62Ibid., pp. 239-245; Ibid., (Nov. 15, 1971), pp. 561-562; San Franciso Examiner and Chronicle, Mar. 26,1972; Times o f the Americas, Nov. 22,1972; Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 22,1972; Congressional Quarterly, XXX (Aug. 26,1972), p. 2147. 63U.S. Cong., Joint Econ. Comm., 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., Private Investments in Latin America (Washington, 1964), pp. 4-5.

40

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

investment guarantee program. It was not a new departure, for the protection of merchants, industrialists, and investors operating overseas has traditionally been a keystone of U.S. foreign policy. This policy received a special type of emphasis in Latin America in the form of the Agency for International Development’s specific risk investment guarantee program. This program, which began in 1948, insures investors against the inability to convert foreign currencies received as earnings and against losses attributable to expropriation or confiscation, war or revolution. To obtain this insurance a firm must be substantially “beneficially” owned by U.S. citizens (ordinarily 50 percent or more) and both AID and the government of the nation in which the investment is being made must give their approval. Because the program’s goal is to facilitate and increase private participation in the development of the less developed lands, guarantees are not available for existing investments but only for new enterprises or additions, expansion, or major changes in existing facilities. The agreements reflect a willingness to allow domestic actions tending to injure foreign investors to be tested by the principles of international law rather than limited to domestic “plaintiff, judge, and jury” proceedings. As of March 31, 1969, political risk insurance in Latin America totaled $3,936,908,543.64 Throughout the 1950s the United States encouraged private capital investment and placed governmental assistance to Latin America on a restricted public loan basis. President Kennedy, while recognizing the need for government initiative, declared: “It is impossible for us to supply all the funds that are necessary for the development of Latin America. They must come from private sources. If local capital and American capital dry up, then all our hopes of a decade of development in Latin America will be gone.” It became apparent that political instability, losses by expropriation, currency instability, confiscatory taxes, frozen utility rates, and other problems suffered by foreign investors slowed the flow of private external financing into Latin America. The capital outflow in the form of direct U.S. investments into the southern republics in the decade 1950-1960 which had averaged about $325 million per year ($219 million if oil investments in Venezuela during the critical Suez years, 1956-57, are excluded) fell to $173 million in 1961, and became a net withdrawal of $32 million in 1962. In 1969 U.S. private direct investment in Latin America totaled more than $12 billion, which represented about one-fourth of the world total. Meanwhile Europe, to a large extent, turned away from Latin America, with the European capital outflow to the whole of Latin America estimated at less than $80 million in recent years. (See Table 1-3.) The most casual study of the relations between the United States and the Latin American republics will indicate that the great republic in the north has until recently made little effort either to understand the difficulties that have sorely tried her less powerful neighbors or to study their racial characteristics and customs with the friendly appreciation necessary to good relations between states. Nor is it sufficient in a democracy where public opinion plays an importánt part in foreign affairs to confine knowledge of foreign policies and6 64U.S. Cong., Joint Econ. Comm., 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., Private Investment in Ixitin America, Hearings (Washington, 1964), pp. 237-270; U.S. Cong., Comm, on For. Affairs, House of Reps., Hearings on HR 11792 (Washington, 1969), p. 708; Hanson, Alliance for Progress, p. 10; Rockefeller Report, pp. 22; 29-30; 148-154.

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

41

Table 1-3. Private investment in Latin America 1897-196865 (in millions of dollars) 1897

1929

1946

1958

1968

United States (direct investment) Portfolio (direct investment)

308

3,705 1,724

3,000 672

8,730 1,039

12,989

Total

308

5,429

"3,672

9,769

Great Britain France Germany

2,060 628

4,500* 3,575 454** 307 700***

2,547**** N.A. 160

*1929 figures not available. $4,865 in 1913 and $4,542 in 1940. **1929 not available. $454 in 1940. ***1929 not available. $677 in 1918 and $969 in 1940. ****1958 not available. $2,547 in 1950.

peoples to the select few who make up the government. Such understanding should be widespread among the people themselves, so that public opinion, based upon an intelligent comprehension of facts, can act as a lever toward more friendly cooperation, rather than as a spur to jealous and rival aspirations. To bring about this better relationship, which can be accomplished only by better mutual understanding, every possible point of contact and every avenue of approach should be utilized. There was little general interest by Americans in Latin American history, institutions, literature, and language until World War I. During the war a significant expansion in the teaching of Spanish occurred, and in 1918 the Hispanic American Historical Review, destined to become the main organ of professional historians in the field, began publication. By the close of the following decade courses in Latin American history were offered in more than one hundred universities and colleges, and numerous other institutions of higher learning. Supported by the Carnegie Endowment, the American Institute of International Law was founded in 1912; subsequently the Endowment devel­ oped most of the fields that came under the heading of cultural cooperation: cooperating with binational cultural centers, financing visiting professors from the United States and Latin America, granting travel fellowships, furnishing books and distributing publications in Spanish, and sponsoring group projects. It was also in this period that the Guggenheim Foundation began awarding fellowships to Latin Americans for study in the United States. The Rockefeller Foundation supported Latin American studies through the American Council of Learned Societies which organized the Committee on Latin American studies. 6 5U.S. Cong., Private Investment in Latin America, p. 7; U.S. Senate, United States Business and Labor in Latin America (Washington, 1960); U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, Survey o f Current Business, 49 (Oct. 1969), p. 30.

42

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

The League of Nations and the Pan American Union also contributed to international culture cooperation during the inter-war years. In 1929 the Division of Intellectual Cooperation was established within the Union and the Scientific Congresses, begun in 1908, were continued. Under the auspices of the League, most Latin American nations founded National Committees of Intellectual and Cultural Cooperation. An official in ter-American program for the exchange of students and faculty was introduced at the Conference for the Maintenance of Peace held at Buenos Aires in 1936 at which a Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations was negotiated. Prior to this time the United States government had not regarded the promotion of cultural relations as a government function; doubtless its acceptance of the role was prompted in some measure by fascist propaganda which was aimed at weakening the Good Neighbor policy. It was not until 1940 that the Cultural Relations Convention was implemented by the exchange of professors and students. In 1938 the Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the other American Republics was set up with Sumner Welles as chairman. This was a major turning point in our cultural relations with Latin America because it indicated governmental acceptance of a large scale program supported by public funds under official direction and a plan for the interchange of persons. Following the enactment of Public Law 63 (76th Cong.) the Department of State created a Division of Cultural Relations which administered grants to students and professors under the Buenos Aires Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations. In 1939 Congress enacted Public Law 355 (76th Cong.) which authorized the president to employ the services of government departments in carrying out cooperative programs signed by the American nations at the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936 and the Eighth In ter-American Conference held at Lima in 1938. This cooperative program was continued during the war years by the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, headed by Nelson Rockefeller. Since the war there has been a significant expansion and strengthening of Latin American studies in the United States. Notable contributions have been made by the Hispanic Foundation, library of Congress, The Conference on Latin American History, and the Latin American Studies Association. Concurrently, there has been a growing interest in bringing Latin Americans to the United States for study, a movement made possible by federal and state legislation, and grants from universities, foundations, professional groups and business firms. During the academic years 1965-66, there were 82,709 foreign students in U.S. universities and colleges. Of these 13,998 (17 percent) were from Latin America. As compared with the academic year 1958-59, the number of Latin American students had increased by about 3,700 (36 percent) whereas the number of all other foreign students had increased by about 31,700 (86 percent). Of the Latin American students enrolled in 1965-66, only 40 percent were graduate students as compared with 56 percent from other areas. The lower enrollment rate of the Latin American students is particularly attributable to the requirement that applicants must be proficient in the English language; this is a more serious barrier to the entry of these students than most other foreign stu­ dents. It is also explained by the fact that our universities have been less generous in granting financial support to the Latin American students than other foreign

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

43

students. In 1966, the universities gave full financial support for 17 percent of their foreign students. But only 9 percent of the Latin Americans received this support, as compared with 19 percent of the students from other areas.60 Few opportunities existed for U.S. students to study in Latin America before the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations was approved at the Buenos Aires Conference in 1936. After its ratification the United States government enacted several measures under which expanded programs of student-professor exchanges have been carried out: the Fulbright Act (Public Law 584, 79th Cong.), the Smith-Mundt Act (Public Law 402, 80th Cong.), the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480, 83rd Cong.), and the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-256, 87th Cong.). Together with the Buenos Aires Convention, this legislation has provided for a two-way exchange between the United States and Latin American countries, when funds are available. However, the number of students and faculty going to Latin America from the United States has been much less than the movement northward. In the academic year 1969- 1970, 52 percent of U.S. students reported abroad were in Europe, 17 percent in Canada, 16 percent in Latin America, 7 percent in the Far East, 6 percent in the Near and Middle East, 1 percent in Africa, and 1 percent in Oceania. More than half—55 percent—of U.S. faculty members reported abroad (1970-1971) were in Europe, 11 percent in the Far East, 11 percent in Latin America, 5 percent in the Near and Middle East, 5 percent in Africa, 2 percent in Oceania, and 2 percent in Canada. The period 1969-1970 found 5,219 U.S. students and 712 (1970-1971) faculty in Latin America, whereas the latter in 1970- 1971 sent to the United States 29,300 students and 869 faculty.67 The United States Information Agency (USIA), known abroad as the United States Information Service (USIS), attempts to strengthen the cultural ties between the Americas, to overcome the psychological barriers that disrupt inter-American harmony, and to help speed the modernization of Latin America by transmitting the knowledge and techniques of the more industrially-advanced West. USIS is active in seven media: radio, television, motion pictures, press, book publishing, exhibits, and the arts. One of the most effective activities of the agency is the Binational Center Program, which is conducted with the close collaboration and support of the Latin Americans. By the mid-1960s USIS maintained 113 binational centers and binational societies in Latin America, teaching English to more than 117,000 persons annually. USIS libraries hold more than 225,000 books. Lectures and the distribution of books and pamphlets and other forms of cultural exchange are also carried out by the binational centers.6* 6 6Herbert K. May, Problems and Prospects o f the Alliance for Progress (New York, 1968), pp. 87-90. 6 7Institute of International Education, Open Doors (New York, 1971). Steps have been taken to establish an Inter-American Council for Education, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation. It has also been proposed that a Western Hemisphere Institute for Education, Science and culture be created as an operating arm of a suggested Economic and Social Development Agency. Ste Rockefeller Report, pp. 110; 171; 197-199. For survey of programs of direct cooperation between individual universities or consortia in the United States and those in Latin America see Pan American Union, Inter-American University Cooperation (Washington, 1968).

44

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

The Voice of America (VOA), which transmits short-wave broadcasts to Latin America is another important part of USIA’s program, but it has suffered from budgetary limitations imposed by Congress. In 1953, the first year of the Eisenhower administration, the president voluntarily reduced President Truman’s USIA budget request from $114,516,000 to $87,900,000, a cut of $26,616,000. The VOA services cut at that time included its Latin American service. Thus, USIA’s Spanish language broadcasts ceased in 1953 and were not restored until March, 1960. USIA faced mounting criticism and reduced budgets in the early 1970s thanks to congressional skepticism and economy measures in government. Chairman J.W. Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Com­ mittee labeled the agency an “anachronism of the cold war.” Being restricted by inadequate budgets USIS continues to be severely handicapped in reaching its potential. It appears that the U.S. Congress remains unconvinced that the U.S. information and cultural exchange program requires further expansion. Yet one of the obvious weaknesses of the $20 billion Alliance for Progress program has been the failure to communicate an understanding of the scope and causes of Latin America’s problems, the need for sacrifices and self-help in solving them, and the creation of a mystique to impart the needed dynamism. In general, USIA’s programs of information and cultural exchange are commendable but, owing to limited funds, they fall short of meeting Alliance requirements or in matching the propaganda offensive of the Com­ munist countries. Inherent in the development of each nation’s foreign policy is a set of basic premises which determines its relations with other countries. These basic premises are generally enunciated in policy statements, but often they remain concealed as unstated principles. The fundamental premise in the foreign policy of every nation and the source of all policy is national self-interest. The first concern of the leaders of each nation must be the preservation of territorial integrity and national sovereignty, the protection of the general interests of the nation, and to a lesser extent the protection of the interests and welfare of individual citizens. The effectiveness of a nation’s foreign policy can be judged, most appropriately, by determining whether it successfully protects the national interest as defined by the country’s leaders. The needs and preferences of other nations, even allies of neighbors, are not material except where the fundamental interests of the two nations coincide. Evaluation of the means employed to promote and protect the national interest must be tempered by the knowledge that the moral judgements which are normally applied in individual human relations are not relevant in international relations. In this context another point should be made in regard to the evaluation of a nation’s foreign policy. Often the basic premise of self-interest is described, justified, and propagated in highly moral language employing phrases such as “ the older brother in a family of independent American nations,” the “sisterhood of the Americas,” and the “Good Neighbor” policy. If the underlying reality of these words is not sought out and evaluated then the fundamental nature of the relations between all nations—between any two nations-is not revealed. Against this background U.S. objectives in Latin America may be properly understood. While numerous and often interrelated, these objectives have three

PAN-AMERICANISM: OLD AND NEW

45

general and related purposes: first, to prevent the establishment within the Western Hemisphere of a hostile power capable of endangering the security of the region; second, to support the development of an inter-American system effective in resolving regional issues and helpful in coordinating political, economic, and other affairs of mutual interest; third, to apply its public and private resources and skills to foster Latin America’s modernization through evolutionary and democratic channels. With the advent of the cold war after World War II U.S. policy toward Latin America became clouded by ambiguity and seeming inconsistency, particularly so to the peoples of that region. The main source of the ambiguity lay in the emergence of the new globalism with the United States assuming responsibilities beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere, and on the other hand the historic American regionalism which binds the United States and Latin America together in a special relationship, the “Western Hemisphere Idea.” After Fidel Castro’s seizure of power in Cuba and his alignment with the Sino-Soviet bloc, the United States insisted that the problem be dealt with in hemispheric terms. However, when pressures arose from its assumption of global commit­ ments, the United States tended to disregard the special relationship when the other American republics made unwelcome claims upon it. Under these circumstances Washington applied the same criteria to Latin America as to the rest of the world. This is clearly shown in the allocation of economic aid. So long as it appeared that Latin America was not a critical area in the cold war, the region’s share of U.S. economic aid remained negligible, and little heed was paid to the Latin Americans’ complaints and aspirations. Concluding that the special relationship with the United States was illusory, they grew more reluctant to defer to the United States in deciding what problems called for hemispheric action; the case of Cuba in particular, and communism in general are outstanding examples. While the social ferment compounded by the population explosion developed apace, Washington continued to take the Latin Americans for granted and did little more than provide military defense against a threat which most Latin Americans believed was economic and social, not military. Brought out of its complacency by the anti-Nixon South American demonstrations in 1958, the Eisenhower administration belatedly introduced new departures in Latin American policy. The Kennedy administration continued and expanded these measures under the Alliance for Progress. Unfortunately, their impact was weakened at the outset by the abortive invasion of Cuba. The United States is seriously handicapped in dealing with the new interrelated problems arising from global and hemispheric responsibilities. The matter is complicated by Latin American grievances of long standing, preceding the rise of Communism and Fidelismo, which were redressed only temporarily, or partially, by the Franklin Roosevelt administration. The Latin American policy of the United States from the close of World War II until the early 1960s was, in the opinion of many Latin Americans, a compound of a negative political policy of anti-communism and a self-interested policy of free capitalistic enterprise that approached intervention. This policy, it is believed, slowed the rate of economic development and fostered the growth of military dictatorship and oligarchy which the reformers in Latin America were opposing.

46

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

Further doubts and ambiguities surrounding United States policy were related to the question of nonintervention. It took the Latin American nations a generation of persistent agitation to get the principle of nonintervention accepted by the United States. Its clearest expression is found in Article 15 of the Charter of Bogotá, a basic document of hemispheric policy: “No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.” Obviously, in the cases of Guatemala, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic the United States violated this treaty agreement. Because of the special nature of the Cuban case, which was dramatized so dangerously in the Cuban missiles crisis, the Latin American nations did not insist on literal adherence to Article 15. But the Dominican Republic was another matter. Deciding that the failure to intervene would result in the Dominican Republic becoming “another Cuba,” Washington intervened militarily and politically there without adequately advising or consulting the OAS. The reason for the precipitate U.S. action was to block the threat of a possible Communist takeover, which was consistent with the primary respon­ sibility of U.S. foreign policy. Concerted action with the OAS initially was ruled out by the apparent urgency of the crisis; this was unfortunate because the extent of the Communist menace could not be clearly determined. The aim of the “standby forces” would presumably be not only anti-Communist but also inevitably anti-revolutionary inasmuch as any revolution in a Latin American country, as distinct from a simple coup d 'é ta t , would be likely to get immediate Communist or Castroite support. The United States’ action to Latin Americans implied opposition to revolution simply on the basis that Communists join revolutions, which was bitterly resented. A continuation of this policy would, it was believed, promote right-wing counter-revolutions. Unfortunately this trend has taken place, though it began before the Dominican intervention. This episode exposes the core of the American dilemma. On the one hand, Washington wants to promote democratic development as a functional alter­ native to communism or Fidelismo among the oppressed masses. But on the other, it fears such development since inexperienced democratic regimes may prove less resistant to Communist infiltration than the rightist military regimes. The policy of alignment with autocratic regimes is further encouraged by the tendency of democrats to assume a more independent and nationalist attitude than the dictators who, lacking popular support, must often depend upon U.S. backing to stay in power. The political stability achieved under military or extreme rightist civilian rule might well be a temporary illusion that could eventually burst with the buildup of social revolutionary pressures, and possibly produce the very communism that the anti-Communist strongmen are supposed to suppress, as Cuba so tragically illustrates.68 Finding a prescription for U.S. policy in Latin America is complicated enormously by the rapidity of change there. In this last half of the twentieth century Latin America finds itself in a process of transition from traditional to modem societies. The great challenge presented to the United States is how to influence this process. Under the circumstances it appears that Washington must 6 8See Lodge, Engines o f Change, Chap. I, for additional background.

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retain flexibility as to the means by which certain goals are to be achieved. In practice this means pressing for evolutionary change but at the same time reserving the option of reinforcing democratically-based revolutionary efforts when it is clear that immobilism hinders more desirable evolutionary processes. It must be emphasized, however, that much anti-American sentiment will continue no matter what policies are pursued by the United States. Given the frustrations of Latin Americans as members of developing nations and the great disparity in wealth and power, and differing cultural values, between the nations of the region and our own, a certain amount of resentment and misunderstanding seems inevitable. This is part of the-price a powerful nation must pay for its position of importance and leadership in world affairs. Latin America has become a region of global significance, and the loss of United States prestige and hegemony there could result in a weakening of our nation’s position in international politics. Military security is a first considera­ tion, for the experience of World War II revealed that Latin America could be the Achilles’ heel of our defense system. United States military installations for the defense of Latin America are situated at two points in the Caribbean: the Canal Zone and Puerto Rico. The Navy has, in addition, bases at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Chaguaramos, Trinidad. Beyond doubt the most important naval facility in the Latin American region is the huge Roosevelt Roads base on the eastern end of the island of Puerto Rico. The National Aeronautic and Space Administration of the United States through treaty agreements with several Latin American nations has established missile tracking facilities for earth satellites, a deep-space network, and a manned space flight network for the Gemini and Apollo programs; twelve of the stations are located on Latin American territory. Although the Latin American nations cannot wield significant military influence in the age of nuclear capability, the one million men making up the region’s armed forces are more of a force to be reckoned with than at any time in the past. It seems improbable, however, that these nations will have in the foreseeable future the economic and technological capacity to develop military establishments with sufficient strength beyond defense against other Latin American states and in suppressing internal strife, such as rural guerrilla activity and urban terrorism. Nevertheless, while Latin America can neither aid nor threaten the United States significantly during a global war, and long range missiles may have lessened the strategic importance of the Caribbean region and those portions of the mainland which stand on the approaches to the United States and the Panama Canal, the existence of bases held in those regions by a hostile power would imperil the security of the continental United States. It follows that, given the current nuclear stalemate which has helped to promote guerrilla warfare, the military- forces of friendly Latin American nations can help to forestall powers hostile to the United States from gaining bases in the Western Hemisphere. In wartime the Latin American countries can provide garrisons, and naval units for coastal patrol, activities which would otherwise require the deployment of United States forces. The armed forces of Latin America might also join in forming an inter-American peacekeeping force to prevent the subversion and political domination of a hemispheric nation by an extra-

48

LA TIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STA TES

continental power. The United States military and naval installations at Guantanamo in Cuba and Puerto Rico, while less important than in the past, are still useful. And although the Panama Canal is virtually indefensible in the nuclear-warhead, ballistic-missile age, it has proved of value to the United States and its allies in the continuing cold war. Latin America also has a military value in connection with its reserves of strategic minerals whose availability to the United States, with some thirty-five strategic materials, are especially vital in wartime. These include Chilean copper, Bolivian tin, Brazilian quartz crystals, Venezuelan petroleum and iron ore, Jamaican bauxite, and others. Deposits of fissionable material in Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile are also potentially important. The economic stake of the United States in Latin America has become progressively important. The region purchases some 14 percent of U.S. exports, furnishes about 15 percent of its imports, and contains more than $12 billion, or one-fourth, of all direct U.S. foreign investment. Although the United States has the greatest internal market in the world and foreign trade is less important to its economy than to most nations, it must continually expand its production in order to remain competitive with the other great industrial powers. It seems likely that, despite the slow progress of modernization in the region, Latin America, with the world’s fastest growing population, offers a potential for larger markets that cannot be overlooked by U.S. economic policy planners and manufacturers. In terms of international politics and hemispheric security, and on the diplomatic front, the political support of the Latin American countries is of vital importance. The twenty-four votes of the Latin American republics in the United Nations General Assembly enable them to strengthen or weaken materially the position of the United States and its allies in debates on conflicting issues with their adversaries. The effectiveness of the United States in asserting just and wise leadership in the in ter-American system has international implications. Success by the United States in helping to overcome the problems of the hemisphere’s economically underdeveloped nations may win the support of neutralist or uncommitted nations of similar condition which otherwise might become satellites of the Communist powers. The political posture of the numerous weaker nations might ultimately contribute to the global balance of power. This factor must be taken into account because the global and Latin American policies of the United States have become closely related.cy 69For a sharply-focused analysis of the problem see Edwin Lieuwen, The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin America (Columbus, Ohio, 1966).

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SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS Ashabranner, Brent. A Moment in History: The First Ten Years o f the Peace Corps. New York, 1971. Bailey, Norman A., ed. Latin America: Politics, Economics, and Hemispheric Security. New Y o rk ,1965. ---------- . Latin America in World Politics. New York, 1967. Bailey, Thomas A. .4 Diplomatic History o f the American People. New York, 1955. Bemis, Samuel F. The Latin American Policy o f the United States. New York, 1943. Berle, Jr., Adolph A. Latin America: Diplomacy and Reality. New York, 1962. Burns, E. Bradford. Latin America: A Concise Interpretive History. Englewood Cliffs, 1972. Burr, Robert N., and Roland D. Hussey, eds. Documents on Inter-American Cooperation. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1955. Caicedo Castilla, José Joaquín. El Panamericanismo. Buenos Aires, 1961. Callcott, Wilfrid H. The Western Hemisphere: Its Influence on United States Policies to the End o f World War II. Austin, 1968. Conn, Stetson, and Byron Fairchild. The Framework o f Hemisphere Defense, The United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere. Washington, 1960. De Conde, Alexander. Herbert Hoover’s Latin American Policy. Stanford, 1951. Dozer, Donald M. Are We Good Neighbors? Three Decades o f Inter-American Relations, 1930-1960. Gainesville, 1959. Duggan, Lawrence. The Americas, the Search for Hemisphere Security. New York, 1949. Duncan, W. Raymond and James Nelson Goodsell, eds. The Quest for Change in Latin America. Sources fo ra Twentieth Century Analysis. New York, 1970. Fagen, Richard R. and Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., eds. Political Power in Latin America. Seven Confrontations. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970. Gantenbein, J. W. The Evolution o f our Latin American Policy: A Documentary Record. New York, 1950. Johnson, John J., ed. Continuity and Change in Latin America. Stanford, 1964. -------------. The Military and Society in Latin America. Stanford, 1964. -------------. Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence o f the Middle Sectors. Stanford, 1958. Kane, William E. Civil Strife in Latin America. Baltimore, 1972. Kaufman, W. W. British Policy and the Independence o f Latin America. New Haven, 1951. Lieuwen, Edwin. Arms and Politics in Latin America. New York, 1961. Mac Eoin, Gary, Revolution N ext Door: Latin America in the Nineteen Seventies. New York, 1971. May, Herbert K. Problems and Prospects o f the Alliance for Progress: A Critical Examination. New York, 1968. Mecham, J. Lloyd. A Survey o f United States-Latin American Relations. Boston, 1965. ------------ . The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960. Austin, 1961. Munro, Dana G. Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921. Princeton, 1964. Needier, Martin C. Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence and Evolutionary Change. New York, 1968.

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------------ ; The United States and the Latin American Revolution. Boston, 1972. Palmer, Jr., Thomas W. Search for a Latin American Policy. Gainesville, 1957. Pan American Union. The Alliance for Progress and Latin American Development Prospects: A Five Year Review, 1961-1965. Baltimore, 1967. Perkins, Dexter. The United States and Latin America. Baton Rouge, 1961. ------------ . Hands Off: A History o f the Monroe Doctrine. Boston, 1945. Plaza Lasso, Galo. Latin America Today and Tomorrow. Washington, 1971. Reidy, Joseph W. Strategy for the Americas. New York, 1966. Rippy, J. F. Latin America in World Politics. New York, 1938. ------------ . Globe and Hemisphere. Chicago, 1958. ------------ . Rivalry o f the United States and Great Britain over Latin America, 1808-1830. Baltimore, 1929. Ronning, C. Neale, ed. Intervention in Latin America. New York, 1970. Whitaker, A. P. The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline. Ithaca, 1954. ------------ . The United States and the Independence o f Latin America. Baltimore, 1941. ------------ ; The United States and South America: The Northetn Republics. Cambridge, Mass., 1948. ------------ . The United States and Argentina. Cambridge, Mass., 1954. ------------ . Nationalism in Latin America. Gainesville, 1962. Wood, Bryce. The Making o f the Good Neighbor Policy. New York, 1961. ------------ . The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932-1942. New York, 1966. Wythe, George. The United States and Inter-American Relations. Gainesville, 1964. U.S. Cong., Joint Economic Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. Latin American Development and Western Hemisphere Trade, Washington, 1965. U.S. Dept, of State. The Story o f Inter-American Cooperation. Our Southern Partners. Dept, of State Pub. 7404, Inter-American Series 78. Washington, 1962. U.S. Dept, of State. United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970. Dept, of State Pub. 8575. General Foreign Policy Series 254. Washington, 1971. U.S. House of Rep., Committee of Government Operations, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., U.S. Aid Operations under the Alliance for Progress. Washington, 1968. U.S. House o f Rep., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. A Review o f Alliance for Progress Goals. Washington, 1969. U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., Survey o f the AUiance for Progress. Washington, 1968. U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee of Foreign Affairs, Rockefeller Report on Latin America. Washington, 1970. \

2 Cooperation by Conference Many methods and agencies have been employed to bring about mutual sympathy and understanding and the furthering of foreign policy goals among the independent republics of the Western Hemisphere. One of the most effective has been a series of Pan American conferences and congresses. The idea underlying these conferences was put forth by Simón Bolívar, liberator of northern South America, in 1824, the year ending the wars for independence in Latin America when he called the Congress of Panama into session. His object was to establish “certain fixed principles for securing the preservation of peace between the nations of America, and the concurrence of all those nations in defense of their own rights.1 ” The conference took place two years later, but only four governments participated: Peru, New Granada (Colombia), Central America, and Mexico. Both the United States and Great Britain were invited to send delegates. Owing to the cordial support of the idea by Henry Clay, then Secretary of State, President John Quincy Adams appointed two plenipotent­ iaries for the United States. Strong opposition developed in Congress, however, and the necessary appropriations were not made in time to enable our delegates to take part.2 The British delegate was present, having been instructed by British Foreign Minister George Canning to remind the Latin American delegates that “ any project for putting the U.S. of North America at the head of an American confederacy . . . would be highly displeasing to your government.” Although a number of worthy agreements and proposals were signed, the times were not yet ripe for employing arbitration and mediation in the settlement of international disputes, and the conference had no tangible results. None of the treaties were ratified by the contracting parties. 1International American Conference, Senate Executive Document No. 232, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., Part IV, p. 155. 2Opposition in the U.S. Congress arose from noninterventionist sentiment, and because the question of abolishing the African slave trade was an item on the conference agenda, the latter arousing the tears of the slave states. For details see J. B. Lockey,Pan Americanism: Its Beginnings (New York, 1920), pp. 313-316, chap. X; J.B. Moore, Principles o f American Diplomacy (New York, 1918), pp. 370-375. k.

51

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Nevertheless when, one hundred years later, the Republic of Panama invited representatives of the states of the Western Hemisphere to join with her in the Panama Congress of 1926 to further the ideals fostered by the great Liberator, one of the most interesting items on the agenda was the consideration of Bolivar’s project of a league of nations for the states of the New World. Bolivar clearly saw how advantageous it would be if the nations could get together in conference at regular intervals, not only to become better acquain­ ted, but also to settle the various disputes that were bound to arise between them. He therefore suggested an amphictyonie assembly of plenipotentiaries empowered to use good offices, mediation or arbitration. It was to negotiate treaties for the preservation of peace and interpret treaties when difficulties arose. In fact it had many elements of likeness to the Council and Assembly which were to function later at Geneva. But not only did Bolivar see the need for providing machinery to settle disputes. He believed that it was even more important to eliminate causes of friction. Therefore he constantly urged the guarantees of territorial integrity upon the basis of the status quo. He also realized the dangers of secret alliances with foreign powers and urged that they be forbidden except when accepted by all members of the confederation. Friendly intercourse and the elimination of economic and political barriers were regarded as prerequisites of effective cooperation. Even social problems were not overlooked, and the provision was made for the complete extirpation of the African slave trade. Finally, the sanction of force was made available as a last resort, and careful consideration was given to effecting the best possible cooperation in times of emergency. Looking back today, we are compelled to admire the sheer audacity of Bolivar in attempting to give the states of the Western Hemisphere an international law for their mutual relations almost simultaneously with the establishment of their internal governmental organizations.3 The second conference met in Lima, Peru, from December 1847 to March 1848, but this was attended only by representatives of South American countries: Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, New Granada, and Peru. It was convened mainly to forestall a possible invasion of Ecuador by a former president who was believed to be recruiting an invasion force in Spain and England. Although the United States was invited to send representatives to the conference President Polk did not believe that it was sufficiently vital to the United States to do so. A Treaty of Confederation, the main product of the conference, provided for mutual assistance if the contracting powers were attacked by a foreign power; however, neither this treaty nor others were ratified by the governments involved.4 The third conference of Spanish American origin, convened in Santiago, Chile, in 1856, saw the adoption of a Treaty of Alliance and Confederation, called the “Continental Treaty.” Among its provisions was a pledge to prevent the organizing of hostile expeditions by political émigrés within any of the allied states; it also called for the formation of a union. As before, the treaty failed because of filibustering expeditions in Central America and Mexico, and the 3Graham H. Stuart, “ Simon Bolivar’s Project for a League of Nations,” Southwest Polit, and Soc. Sei. Quar., vol. VII (Dec., 1926), p. 238. 4William R. Manning, ed .t Diplomatic Correspondence o f the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860. 12 vols. (Washington, 1938), X, 551.

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implications of Manifest Destiny as revealed by the war with Mexico. It is not surprising that the United States was not invited to participate. The fourth and last in the series of Latin American conferences took place in Lima in 1865. Being restricted to republics that had formerly been under Spanish rule, the United States was not approached. A Treaty of Union and Defensive Alliance was signed pledging the signatories to mutual defense against aggression, but neither this nor other treaties signed were ratified. Only seven Spanish American nations, those fearing France and Spain, attended. Prompting this meeting was French intervention in Mexico, and Spain’s seizure of Peru’s Chincha Islands and its reoccupation of Santo Domingo. This ended efforts toward union and collective action on the part of the Latin American states; thereafter the initiative for the Pan American movement came from the United States.5 In November, 1881 James G. Blaine, Secretary of State under President James Garfield invited the governments of all the independent states of the two continents to send representatives to a general conference to be held in Washington. Blaine’s objectives were summarized in the following way: The foreign policy of President Garfield’s administration has two principal objects in view: first to bring about peace, and prevent future wars in North and South America; second, to cultivate such friendly commercial relations with all American countries as would lead to a large increase in the export trade of the United States by supplying those fabrics in which we are abundantly able to compete with the manufacturing nations of Europe.6

A far-sighted statesman, Blaine stood for pushing the expansion of American foreign trade and challenging Britain’s commercial supremacy in Latin America. He believed that trade expansion could be achieved only under conditions of peace and stability; moreover, this would avert pretexts for European inter­ vention in the region. The second War of the Pacific between Chile on the one side, and Peru and Bolivia on the other was then in progress which gave a reason for holding a conference to negotiate a hemispheric arbitration system. A number of Latin American states accepted the invitations, but soon after they had been extended President Garfield was assassinated. Vice President Chester A. Arthur who succeeded him was a political opponent of Blaine, and as quickly as Blaine was removed from the Cabinet, the invitations were withdrawn. The project had wide support in Congress, however, and when Grover Cleveland became president in March, 1885, another resolution was passed in the House of Representatives requesting the president to invite delegates to a general Inter-American confer­ ence. The invitations were sent out by Secretary of State Bayard in July 1888, but owing to the Republican party’s victory in that year, President Harrison had the honor of inaugurating the First International American Conference. All the independent republics except the Dominican Republic were represented, and Mr. Blaine, who once more held the office of Secretary of State, was chosen to preside. The program outlined for consideration was an extensive one, and 5For details on the Spanish-American conferences see Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies, The Inter-American System: Its Development and Strengthen­ ing OÑíew York, 1966), xv-xx. 6James G. Blaine, Political Discussions (Norwich, Conn., 1887), p. 411 ; Senate Exec. Doc. no. 232, p. 256. *

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included measures tending to promote peace and prosperity, the establishment of uniform customs regulations, a uniform system of weights and measures, laws for the protection of patents, copyrights, and trademarks, and the formulation of a definite plan of arbitration for the settlement of all disputes among the American nations. The project for international arbitration proved to be the most contro­ versial on the conference agenda, and a stalemate occurred. Chile was especially sensitive on the matter of compulsory arbitration because of its recent seizures of territory in the War of the Pacific. Secretary Blaine offered a compromise arbitration plan providing that: (1) arbitration should be adopted by the American nations “as a principle of American international law” for the solution of disputes among themselves or between them and other powers; (2) arbitration should be obligatory in all controversies except those which, in the judgement of one of the states involved in the controversy, compromised her independence; (3) the court of arbitration should consist of one or more persons selected by each of the disputants and an umpire who should decide all questions upon which the arbitrators might disagree.7 The project of a treaty of arbitration was to become effective as a treaty only when it has been ratified by fifteen states. Only eleven nations, including the United States, signed, and ultimately not one state ratified the document. This established the precedent for a practice that was to occur frequently in inter-American conferences: governments were not prepared to go as far as their representatives by implementing or ratifying treaty agreements signed at confer­ ences. Aside from its significance as the first of a series of Pan American conferences, the principal achievement of the Washington Conference was the establishment of an International Union of American Republics, its sole organ being a Commercial Bureau of the American Republics, which was given the task of collecting and disseminating information relating to tariffs and commercial laws in the member states. The Commercial Bureau was established in Washing­ ton under the administration of a Director. Since encouraging gains were made at the First International American Conference, it was to be expected that other conferences \yould be called to enlarge upon and follow up its work. The second conference was summoned in October 1901 after President Me Kinley had suggested to President Porfirio Díaz that he invite the delegations to meet in Mexico City. The delegates agreed to several conventions relating to copyrights, trademarks, extradition, and the codification of international law, but perhaps the most important result was that seventeen Latin American nations became parties to the Hague Convention of 1899 for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Several delegations favoring compulsory arbitration, which was opposed by the United States, drafted such a treaty but it was ratified later by only six nations. A treaty providing for the arbitration of pecuniary claims, signed by seventeen countries, was ratified later by ten, including the United States.8 At the Second International Conference the Commercial Bureau was 7First Int. Conf., Amer. States, Minutes, pp. 813-814. 8Second Int. Amer. Conf., Senate Doc. No. 330,57th Cong., 1st Sess.

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reorganized, being placed under the supervision of a Governing Board composed of the diplomatic representatives of the American governments in Washington, and the secretary of state of the United States as Chairman of the Board. The conference also voted to regularize its meetings and to hold them every five years. The Third International Conference of American States met in Rio de Janeiro in 1906, and Elihu Root, who as secretary of state of the United States was making an official tour of South America, represented the United States. His speech at this conference remains one of the greatest expositions of the vital need of a mutual and sympathetic understanding amoné the American nations. The following sentences indicate his message: No nation can live unto itself alone and continue to live. Each nation’s growth is part of the development of the race . . . There is not one of all our countries that can not benefit the others; there is not one that will not gain by the prosperity, the peace, the happiness of all . . . We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignity except the sovereignity over ourselves.9

The conference took place in an atmosphere of cynicism and distrust because of the role of the United States in the Panama revolution, making protectorates of Cuba and Panama, and the assumption of customs control in the Dominican Republic in accordance with the so-called Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. Secretary Root’s sincerity helped to repair the image of the United States, and since care had been taken to avoid controversial issues on the agenda the conference proved to be more harmonious than might have been expected. However, a resolution was proposed recommending that the Hague Conference be asked “to consider whether and if at all, to what extent, the use of force for the collection of public debts is admissible.” This immediately brought into focus, and called for conference endorsement, two doctrines that the Latin Americans regarded as a shield against intervention by more powerful predatory nations, and which by definition included the United States: the Calvo and Drago doctrines. Carlos Calvo, the eminent Argentine international lawyer, had declared that a nation’s sovereignty is inviolable and under no circumstances does the resident alien enjoy the right to have his government intervene on his behalf. The doctrine attributed to the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis Maria Drago, held that because public debts are contracted by the sovereign power of the state, they constitute a special kind of obligation, and armed force should be ruled out as a means of collecting them. The United States delegation at the conference wished to avoid a commitment on the forcible collection of debts fearing that it would alarm European capitalists and perhaps damage the credit standing of some hemi­ spheric states. A resolution, sanctioned by the United States, was adopted which invited the Latin American countries to pursue the question of the compulsory collection of public debts at the Second Hague Conference. But to the great dismay of the Latin Americans a U.S.-backed decision outlawing the collection of contract debts was adopted there. It provided further that the debtor state accept arbitration and the arbitral award. This did not conform with the 9 Third Int. Amer. Conf., Senate Doc. No. 365, 59th Cong., 2nd Sess.; Elihu Root, Latin America and the United States (Cambridge, Mass., 1917), p. 6.

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doctrines of either Calvo or Drago which would not admit intervention under any circumstances.1 0 The Fourth International American Conference assembled at Buenos Aires on July 21, 1910. All the American republics were represented except Bolivia, and although Philander C. Knox, secretary of state of the United States was elected honorary president, his “dollar diplomacy” had not endeared him to the Latin Americans. The conference took up and debated an extensive list of subjects, and adopted a number of important conventions and resolutions. In preparing the agenda Washington took care to exclude topics of a controversial political nature as had arisen previously. Among the most noteworthy issues considered were resolutions concerning patents, trademarks, and copyrights; extending the existence and powers of the Panama Railroad Committee; providing for the encouragement of steamship communication between the republics of the American continent; the exchange of professors and students between the universities of the Americas; recommending the uniformity of consular documents and custom house regulations; and extending the pecuniary claims convention for an indefinite period. Another reorganization was made, adopting the name of Union of American Republics and changing the name of its secretariat from Bureau to Pan American Union. The name Pan American Union was used for the first time at this conference, but in reality it was merely a continuation of what had been established in 1890 in a more restricted form, and by 1910 had grown and acquired a definite standing in the hemisphere. The Union was given broader functions than before. Its supervision remained in charge of the Governing Board, and while the administration was still entrusted to a Director, this official was thereafter to be called the Director General. In addition, the post of Assistant Director was created whose duty, among others, was to act as Secretary of the Governing Board.1011 Between the Fourth and Fifth International American Conferences many vital changes had occurred affecting the relations both between the United States and Latin America, and between the latter and Europe; most related to World War 1 and the newly-formed League of Nations. In their four conferences preceding the outbreak of the war in 1914 the American nations had not prepared themselves for the problems that a world war would bring, with the result that they were without a plan for cooperative effort. While the Latin American nations failed to implement by collective action the principle of continental solidarity during the war, the fact that most of them supported the United States position indicated an awareness of a hemispheric community of interest. 10 Carlos Calvo, Le Droit international, 4 vols. (Paris, 1896); Alejandro Alvarez, The Monroe Doctrine (New York,’ 1924), pp. 244-257; E.M. Borchard, “Calvo and Drago Doctrines,” Encyclopedia o f the Social Sciences, III (1930), 155. After the turn of the century the United States took the part of European powers by assuming responsibility for the redress of European grievances in connection with defaulted financial obligations in the Western Hemisphere. Difficulties arising from this source helped to create Latin-American solidarity against both the U.S. and Europe. Until the adoption of the nonintervention policy by the U.S. in the 1930s, the first six inter-American conferences may be regarded as Pan American bloc actions against the United States. 11 Fourth Int. Amer. Conf, Senate Doc. No. 744, 61st Cong., 3rd Sess.; Manuel Canyes, The Organization o f American States and the United Nations (Washington, 1963), p. 4.

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All of the nations of Latin America signed the Versailles Treaty as well as the Covenant of the League of Nations. Ten of these states became charter members of the League, and eventually all the republics became members, for varying periods at least. Their early attraction to the League was compounded of idealism and the desire for national prestige, but also its value as a counterweight to United States power and influence. When the United States failed to join the League, and its weakness was revealed, regionalism was turned to as the option for dealing with the “Northern Colossus.” When the Fifth International American Conference was convened in 1923, “Yankeephobia” was at a high level. Much had occurred since the Buenos Aires Conference in 1910 to create this feeling: the Taft administration's “dollar diplomacy” in Central America and the Caribbean, and the bitterly-resented interventions during the Wilsonian era. Against this background, together with their frustration by the League of Nations, it is not surprising that the Latin Americans viewed the Fifth Conference as a means of reinforcing the regional concept. Where formerly the conferences had limited their discussions almost entirely to problems of a social and economic character, the agenda of the Fifth Conference included certain rather delicate political questions. In addition to problems of agriculture, commerce, transportation, and health, one noted such subjects as the codification of international law, the reduction of military and naval armament, measures tending to bring about a closer association of the American republics, and questions arising out of the encroachment by a non-American power on the rights of an American nation.1213 When the conference opened in Santiago, Chile, on March 25, 1923, Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia were found to be unrepresented, Mexico because of her failure to obtain the recognition of the United States, and Peru and Bolivia because of the failure to settle the Tacna-Arica dispute. The American delegation headed by Henry P. Fletcher and including Senator Kellogg, who subsequently became secretary of state, and Dr. L. S. Rowe, Director General of the Pan American Union, found itself entrusted with the rather difficult task of averting drastic action on the part of the smaller Latin American states in regard to the reorganization of the Pan American Union and a clarification of the Monroe Doctrine. As regards the reorganization of the governing board of the Pan American Union, a separate organization was proposed to consist of representatives other than the regularly accredited diplomatic agents of the American republics at Washington, a body which might ultimately become the council of an American League of Nations. The United States opposed this idea but conceded that states not possessing diplomatic representatives at Washington should be represented on the governing body of the Union by special representatives.1 3 It was also agreed that henceforth instead of the secretary of state of the United States acting ex officio as chairman of the governing board, the latter would elect its president and vice-president. The conference sidestepped action on a specific interpretation or a joint 12Report o f Delegates o f U.S.A. to Fifth Int. Conf o f Amer. States (Washington, 1924), Appendix I. 13 This change was incorporated in Article V of the Resolution on the Organization of the Pan American Union adopted by the Conference. *

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sanction of the Monroe Doctrine, to neither of which the United States would subscribe, by adopting an innocuous resolution entrusting to the governing board of the Pan American Union “the task of studying the bases . . . relative to the manner of making effective the solidarity of the collective interests of the American continent.14 Although the committee on the limitation of armament recommended the limitations of the Washington Conference of 1922 as to tonnage of capital ships and airplane carriers and caliber of guns thereon, of greater importance was the work of the committee in securing the adoption of a convention generally known as the Gondra Treaty for the investigation of disputes between American states by a commission of inquiry modeled upon those set up by the Hague Conventions and the Bryan treaties. Señor Augustin Edwards, president of the conference, has been quoted as regarding this treaty as “the most important ever signed on the American continent for the promotion of peace.” 415 1 Opinion seems to differ radically as to the real success of the conference. Certainly as regards cooperation along nonpolitical lines, as much if not more progress was made than in any of the previous conferences. Conventions for the protection of trademarks, the publicity of customs documents, and on uniform­ ity of nomenclature for the classification of merchandise were adopted. The Hague Convention for the suppression of the drug traffic was approved, simplification of passports and visas and their ultimate elimination recom­ mended, and closer cooperation for stamping out disease resolved upon. But whenever political issues were discussed there was noticeable throughout the conference a marked antagonism toward the United States, particularly on the part of the smaller states in the Caribbean area. For the first time in such a gathering the long smoldering fears of American imperialism were given free expression. Nevertheless, although the United States did not escape open criticism, the very fact that frankness prevailed relieved the tension to a considerable extent and made for results of a more lasting character. The Sixth International American Conference met from January 16 to February 20, 1928, in Havana, Cuba. It came at a time when the United States was being harshly criticized throughout Latin America fo^ its intervention in Nicaragua. President Coolidge, as a special honor to Cuba on the thirtieth anniversary of her independence, as well as to placate Latin America, made a hasty trip to Havana, in order to proclaim in person the friendliness of the United States towards all Latin America. Delegates from all the Latin American countries were present. To make the gesture of friendship the more emphatic the most eminent delegation ever sent by the United States to an international conference was chosen to represent us. Headed by former Secretary of State Hughes, it included Henry P. Fletcher, former ambassador to Chile,Mexico, and Belgium, and at the time to Italy, ex-senator Oscar W. Underwood, Dwight W. Morrow, ambassador to Mexico, Dr. James Brown Scott of the Carnegie Endowment, President Ray Lyman Wilbur of Stanford University, and Dr. L.S. Rowe, director general of the Pan American Union. 14Report o f Delegates o f U S A . to Fifth Int. Conf o f Amer. States, Appendix XII. ,5 G.H. Blakeslee, The Recent Foreign Policy o f the United States (New York, 1925),

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Although on the surface the agenda of the Sixth Conference1 6 seemed to have avoided all contentious political subjects, the proposal to establish the Pan American Union upon a conventional basis instead of the hitherto less formal basis of successive resolutions offered the Latin American delegates an opportun­ ity to try to curb the over-preponderant influence which it was claimed the United States exerted both on the governing board and in the administration of the Union. Projects for the codification of international law for the American continent placed the United States on the defensive in regard to such questions as intervention, recognition, and the equality of states. While a felicitous speech of generalities by Presidént Coolidge indicated a keen desire on the part of the United States to inspire confidence and good will, an address made by Mr. Hughes before the United States Chamber of Commerce in Havana made an even more favorable impression, owing to its frank reference to Nicaragua and Haiti. Asserting that the first pillar of Pan Americanism was independence, Mr. Hughes declared it to be the firm policy of the United States to respect the territorial integrity of the American republics. But the second pillar was stability and the United States desired to encourage stability in the interest of independ­ ence. Her entrance into Santo Domingo and withdrawal upon the establishment of a stable government proved it. “We would leave Haiti at any time that we had reasonable expectations of stability . . . . We are at this moment in Nicaragua; but what we are doing there and the commitments we have made are at the request of both parties and in the interest of peace and order and a fair election. We have no desire to stay. We entered to meet an imperative but temporary exigency; and we shall retire as soon as possible.” The conference decided that all sessions, both plenary and full committee, should be open to the public—an innovation. The United States accepted the Mexican-Peruvian proposal for governmental reorganization of the Pan American Union to permit each nation to decide whether a special delegate or its diplomatic representative should be employed. An additional proposal for the regular rotation of the Chairman, Vice Chairman and Director General was defeated, however, the conference agreeing that the Director General should attend the conference as an e x o ffic io member instead of as a member of one delegation, and his expenses should be paid pro rata by all the member states. A cause of serious disagreement came when the committee on codification of international law discussed the third article of the project concerning the existence, equality, and recognition of states. This article declared that “no state may intervene in the internal affairs of another.” 1617 With the American marines actively engaged in the pursuit of Sandino in Nicaragua the subject was of more than academic interest. The United States disputed the correctness of the rule, making a distinction between political intervention for permanent possession, and temporary interposition for humanitarian or other limited purposes. Furthermore its inclusion in a code would be futile since it was contrary to the accepted practice of international law. The sixth conference agreed to adopt 16Sixth Int. Conf o f Amer. States Special Handbook for the Use o f Delegates (Pan

American Union, Washington. 1927). 17International Commission o f Jurists-Public International Law•Projects (Pan American

Union, Washington, 1927), p. 8.

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obligatory arbitration for the settlement of justiciable disputes, and provided for an arbitration and conciliation conference to be held at Washington within the next year to draw up a collective Pan American arbitration convention which should outlaw aggressive warfare in the Western Hemisphere. In the questions of a less political nature the conference was able to make a signal progress. The excellently drawn code of private international law prepared by Dr. Bustamente was approved, an aviation convention for the regulation of aircraft communication between the American republics was accepted, with a reservation to the effect that special arrangements between any two states for reciprocal convenience might be permitted provided it impaired in no respect the rights of other parties to the convention. The amendment permitted the United States to make special arrangements for the protection of the Panama Canal. The treaty on the rights and duties of neutrals in the event of war which placed belligerent submarines under the same rules as other vessels of war in visit and search, and subjected armed merchant vessels to the rules of neutrality in respect to the time for remaining in port, coaling, and provisioning, was approved. Treaties placing aliens abroad on the same footing as nationals and establishing the right of asylum were signed although the United States entered a formal reservation to the latter. The copyright convention was revised and recommendations made for an inter-American automobile highway extending from Canada to Patagonia, for a Pan American railway, better river navigation and improved cable, telegraph, and radio communications. A Pan American pedagogical congress was agreed upon, as well as the creation of a Pan American institute of geography and history. The Havana Conference from many points of view was unique. Political questions which hitherto had been completely eliminated from the agenda were brought up and discussed frankly without fear or favor. The United States made every effort to explain its position of primus inter pares and owing to the excellent choice of its representatives was remarkably successful. Every Latin American state was represented, and at the conclusion of the conference their representatives could leave with the assurance that they had at last come into their own as equal participants in the fraternity of American nations. Supplementing the Havana Conference by which it w\s authorized, the Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration met at Washington on December 10, 1928. With the exception of Argentina, all the independent American states were represented. Secretary of State Kellogg and ex-Secretary of State Hughes acted as delegates for the United States. Two treaties were signed at this conference, one on arbitration and the other on conciliation. The General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration has been called one of the most advanced multilateral arbitration pacts ever concluded. It followed the Kellogg-Briand Pact in its general form, condemned war as an instrument of national policy, and provided for settlements of all justiciable questions by arbitration. Only two subjects were excluded—domestic questions and questions concerning third states. Any existing international tribunal might be used or a special one set up. The General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation was based upon

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the Gondra Treaty of 1923. It retained the commissions of inquiry of that treaty, but gave them also the character of commissions of conciliation. It covered all controversies between states not settled by diplomacy, it defined the procedure to be used and made it arbitary, it set up permanent bodies at Washington and at Montevideo to bring about conciliation, and it approved the right of any state to offer mediation. These two treaties, which seemed to provide for the settlement of any dispute which might arise between the states of the Western Hemisphere, were signed by all the states present. Before the seventh international conference met in Montevideo in 1933 a large majority of the twenty-*>ne republics had ratified one or the other of these conventions, and ten states, including the United States, had ratified both. Despite the tragic failure of the Geneva Disarmament Conference and the London Economic Conference of 1933, the republics of the Western Hemisphere were unwilling to postpone the meeting of the Seventh Pan American Confer­ ence scheduled to convene at Montevideo December 3, 1933. Not only were all American republics represented, half of them by their ministers of foreign affairs, but also, for the first time, it was proposed to admit official observers from Spain, Portugal, and the League of Nations. Action on this radical change in the organization of the conference was postponed to the eighth meeting, however. An eminent delegation from the United States, headed by Secretary of State Hull, included J. Reuben Clark, former ambassador to Mexico, Alexander W. Weddell, ambassador to Argentina, and J. Butler Wright, minister to Uruguay, all outstanding authorities on Latin-American affairs. In his address of welcome President Terra of Uruguay declared that “the American ideal of peace must not be buried in the swamps of the Chaco.” Yet thousands of Bolivian and Paraguayan soldiers had already been slaughtered and buried in the swamps of the Chaco and thousands of others faced the same fate. The problem was complicated by the fact that since a Commission of American Neutrals and an ABC Peru Commission had both failed to bring about a settlement, a League of Nations Commission was now engaged in trying to work out a solution. For this reason, the United States and Brazil,18 both non-League powers, were unwilling to bring the Chaco dispute, which was not on the agenda, into the conference. But, when it could not be avoided, the conference prevailed upon Bolivia and Paraguay to declare a truce for the period of the conference. It also passed a resolution submitted by Secretary Hull urging both peoples to accept judicial processes for the settlement of their dispute, as recommended by the League of Nations Commission. As a concrete suggestion the conference adopted an Argentine proposal that, contingent upon approval of the League Commission, a conference be held at Buenos Aires including the ABCP powers, as well as the two disputants, to settle the Chaco question by considering the economic and geographic problems of Bolivia and Paraguay. The principal achievement of the conference was the coordinating and strengthening of inter-American peace machinery. Before the Montevideo confer­ ence opened, all of the Latin American states except Argentina and Bolivia had 18 Brazil had withdrawn from the League in 1928.

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ratified the Gondra Conciliation Treaty concluded at the Santiago conference in 1923. Less than half of the states had ratified the arbitration and conciliation treaties of 1929. All but five had accepted the Kellogg-Briand Pact and all but four had joined the League of Nations. In an effort to establish a standard method of procedure for the settlement of disputes in the Western Hemisphere, Foreign Minister of Argentina, Saavedra Lamas, had drafted a Latin American anti-war pact, modeled upon the Pact of Paris. In addition to outlawing wars of aggression and compelling a settlement of disputes by legal means, it outlawed aggression in settling territorial questions and followed the Hoover-Stimson doctrine of nonrecognition of territorial changes brought about by force. As a sanction the signatory powers agreed to exercise the political, judicial, and economic means authorized by international law, as well as the influence of public opinion, “but in no case shall they resort to intervention, either diplomatic or armed.” Although the United States had previously refused to adhere, at the conference Secretary Hull agreed to sign the Argentina anti-war pact and also supported the proposal of Argentina and Chile to consolidate the peace machinery by having non-signatory powers sign the five peace pacts available to Latin American states. As'conclusive evidence of its good neighborly intentions before the conference ended, the United States delegation accepted with explanatory reservations a convention on the rights and duties of states wherein it was agreed “no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.” 19 In regard to tariffs and currency stabilization, Secretary Hull took the lead in recommending a plan for reducing tariffs through the negotiation of bilateral or multilateral reciprocity treaties. As proof of its earnest intent the United States signed a reciprocity treaty with Colombia on December 15, the first of its kind since 1902. The conference voted to hold a Pan American financial conference at Santiago, Chile, in 1934, when stabilization of currency and all other thorny financial problems might be placed on the agenda. With these political subjects out of the way, the conference had little difficulty in obtaining agreement upon questions of a technical, social, or cultural nature. A general extradition treaty was signed, binding for the first time all American countries and standardizing procedures. In a con^prehensive resolu­ tion, the conference established the procedure for carrying on the future work of codifying international law and provided for a juridical section of a purely administrative character in the Pan American Union. A general convention on nationality clarified the allegiance of the individual as to nation of origin, status of inhabitants in the case of transferred territory, and the effects of matrimony or its dissolution upon the nationality of husband, wife, or children. To sum up the achievements of the Montevideo Conference: it effected an armistice in the Chagco, strengthened and correlated the peace machinery of the Americas, took a practical step towards better trade relations, and enhanced the standing of the United States as a good neighbor. In his opening speech to the United States Congress on January 3, 1936, 1’ Article 8 of Convention on Rights and Duties of States, ratified by the U.S. June 29,

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President Roosevelt declared that “at no time in the four and a half centuries of modern civilization in the Americas had there existed, in any year, any decade or any generation, in all that time, a greater spirit of mutual understanding, of common helpfulness and of devotion to the ideals of self-government than exist today in the twenty-one Republics .. . This policy of the ‘good neighbor’ among the Americas is no longer a hope—it is a fact, active, present, pertinent and effective.” To give further concrete illustration of his intention to continue this policy, President Roosevelt on January 30 sent personal letters to the presidents of the other American republics proposing that an extraordinary in ter-American conference be summoned to meet in Buenos Aires to determine how the maintenance of peace among the Americas might best be safeguarded. As a tentative suggestion to this end he proposed that the conference give attention to: the prompt ratification of existing peace agreements, their amendment in accordance with experience, and the creation of new instruments of accord. It should be noted that one of the weaknesses of existing machinery for the maintenance of peace had been the failure of certain states to ratify the agreements already signed; for example, neither of the belligerents in the destructive war in the Chaco had ratified the Inter-American Conciliation and Arbitration Treaties of 1929. A vital need to organize peace was recognized to be the consideration of measures to secure the prompt ratification of existing treaties and conventions for the maintenance of peace. It should further be noted that the republics of the Western Hemisphere were for the most part parties not only to five different treaties of a purely continental character, but to four instruments of a universal character, all designed for the maintenance of peace as well as to some half dozen declarations against war and the forcible acquisition of territory. The conference proposed to consider the possibility of coordinating these instruments and incorporating them in a single instrument. Under the heading of economic problems, an elaborate agenda was prepared. It was proposed to consider every phase of trade restriction which might hinder closer economic relations and if possible inaugurate substantial reforms. Every type of trade agreement was to be taken up, the question of the most favored nation clause, exchange control, and a tariff truce. An important subsidiary subject was the improvement of means of communication in the Western Hemisphere. It was noted that substantial progress had been made towards the carrying out of the proposed Pan American Highway system; for example, on July 1, 1936, the highway from Mexico City to Laredo, Texas, was formally dedicated after having been in use for several months. This magnificent road runs for over 750 miles from the United States border through dry plains, a subtropical jungle, and towering mountain peaks to Mexico City. The paved roadway is twenty-one and a half feet w ide-it required the construction of over three thousand bridges and culverts, and although it runs from practically sea level to over eight thousand feet, the whole trip can be made in high gear. Steamship accommodations had also been improved considerably. In addition to the long-established Grace Line on the west coast, the MooreMcCormack Line on the east, and the Great White Fleet of the United Fruit Co. in the Caribbean, Lykes Brothers Steamship Co. inaugurated a service between

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Mobile and the west coast of South America. The Alcoa Steamship Company offered improved service in the Caribbean and to the east coast ports, and the Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. and the Shephard Steamship Co. carried freight to the west and east coasts of South America. With the advent of commercial aviation the communication problem changed to such an extent that the United States became more accessible to Latin America than was Europe. Pan American Airways established a commuting service to all Latin American capitals. Panagra, Braniff, American, Chicago and Southern, Colonial, Eastern, National, and Western Air Lines established flights between the Americas. Colombian Air Lines connected Bogotá and Barranquilla with Miami,and Venezuela Airlines joined New York with Caracas via Havana. The delegation from the United States to the Buenos Aires Conference, a large and representative one, was headed by Secretary of State Hull and included Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles and Alexander Weddell, ambassador to Argentina. President Franklin D. Roosevelt showed his intense interest by being present and giving the opening address of the Conference. He urged the necessity of striving to prevent war in the Western Hemisphere by every honorable means and to avoid the création of conditions giving rise to conflict. Although he did not mention the Monroe Doctrine he indicated that the United States was willing to participate in a multilateral agreement providing for mutual consultation in case of external aggression. He concluded his address by emphasizing the importance of satisfactory commercial relations as a funda­ mental bulwark of permanent peace. Three concrete peace proposals were introduced and unanimously agreed upon. The first was a convention for the maintenance of peace. It provided that should the peace of the American republics be threatened by any source either at home or abroad, the signatory powers should consult with each other immediately with a view to cooperative action to preserve the peace of the American continent. According to Secretary of State Cordell Hull “this proposal represents the strongest assurance of peace which this continent has ever had.” It should be noted, however, that a very important part of the United States proposal, namely, a permanent body consisting of foreign ministers of each state to carry out the provisions, does not appear in the convention^ accepted. The second convention coordinated existing treaties for the maintenance of peace. It repeated the obligations and pledges under the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Inter-American Conciliation and Arbitration Treaties of 1929, and the Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Treaty. To carry out these principles the more effectively, provision was made for individual or joint offers of good offices or mediation and a reminder to the parties to a controversy of their obligations under existing treaties. Upon threat of war the parties concerned agreed to a delay of six months for consultation before beginning hostilities. Upon the outbreak of war the signatory powers agreed to adopt a common attitude of neutrality, and in order to prevent the spread of hostilities they might impose restrictions upon the sale or shipment of munitions and upon any sort of financial assistance to the belligerents. The third proposal was a protocol of nonintervention. According to its terms, the internal affairs of any of the parties was inadmissible of intervention

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by any one of them and violations should give rise to mutual consultation. The protocol reaffirmed the nonintervention doctrine adopted in Montevideo in 1933. The Buenos Aires Conference had as its aim the maintenance of peace in the Western Hemisphere through mutual consultation and cooperative action. Consultation was the keynote of the Conference, and the conventions were pitched accordingly. The United States, by definitely giving up the right of intervention, had finally agreed to the position of equality in the commonwealth of nations of the Western Hemisphere. The conference marked the completion of another important link on the good neighbor highway. As the world’s political conditions became ever more critical the desire for still closer cooperation for peace in the Americas was strengthened. The eighth Pan American Conference which met in Lima, Peru, December 9, 1938, afforded this opportunity. The agenda included plans both for an American League of Nations and a Pan American Court of Justice. “Hemisphere defense” was the keynote of the Conference. The United States delegation of twelve was headed by Secretary of State Hull and included Assistant Secretary of State Berle, Ambassador to Peru Steinhardt, Minister to the Dominican Republic Norweb, and Chief Justice Cuevas of the Puerto Rican Supreme Court. In spite of the opposition of Argentina it was quickly evident that the American republics were determined to take further steps toward strengthening the machinery for continental defense. Although the idea of an American League of Nations was discarded, the twenty-one states finally agreed to support a project of American cooperation which was designated by the conference as the Declaration of Lima. This Declaration reaffirmed the principle of continental solidarity and the decision to defend it against all foreign intervention. In case the peace, security or territorial integrity of any American republic should be threatened it was agreed to make effective this solidarity by consultations as established by conventions in force. To facilitate such consultative action the Declaration provided that “the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American republics, when deemed desirable and at the initiative of any one of them, will meet in their several capitals by rotation . . . . ” By this Declaration a definite procedure of consultation was established which could be quickly utilized in an emergency. It was signal success for Secretary Hull in his efforts to obtain unanimous action against a threat of autocratic aggression. Perhaps the next most important result of the Conference of Lima was a Declaration of American Principles which the governments of the American republics proclaimed as essential to the preservation of world order under law. The substance of these principles had been presented by Secretary Hull in a statement released on July 16, 1937. Summarized, the Declaration established the following canons of international conduct: intervention and the use of force as instruments of national or international policy are proscribed; international differences must be settled by peaceful means and international law must govern relations between states; the faithful observance of treaties is an indispensable rule of international conduct and revision must be obtained by agreement of the

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signatory powers; intellectual and economic cooperation are essential to national and international well being and world peace can only be achieved by international cooperation based upon these principles. The Lima Conference established a precedent by not signing a single treaty or convention. All of its projects were formulated as resolutions, declarations, or recommendations, of which 112 were accepted. As in previous conferences the majority of resolutions pertained to nonpolitical subjects. Resolutions were approved committing the Americas to establish liberal trade practices and equality of treatment, to improve transportation and communication, to increase the exchange of professors and students, to protect Indian art, literature, language, and culture, and to cooperate in various ways conducive to better relations and understandings. Although no alliance for defense was established and no new machinery for the elimination of war was set up the twenty-one republics of the Western Hemisphere agreed unanimously to consult and if necessary to act for their mutual defense. In the words of Secretary Hull “the American Republics have made it clear to the world that they stand united to maintain and defend the peace of this hemisphere, their territorial integrity, their principles of inter­ national relations* their own institutions and policies.** The nations who subscribed to the Declaration of Lima little expected that in less than a year they would be called upon to give effect to its basic principles. Yet when on September 1, 1939, Herr Hitler loosed the Nazi hordes upon Poland, the repercussion in the New World was such that the American republics unanimously agreed to consult as to a joint policy of hemisphere defense. On September 23, 1939, the representatives of the twenty-one republics assembled at Panama City in the First In ter-American Consultative Conference of Foreign Ministers. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles who headed the delegation of the United States well expressed the sentiments of the Conference when he characterized it as “ a meeting of American neighbors to consider in a moment of grave emergency the peaceful measures which they may feel it wise to adopt . . . so as best to insure their national interests and the collective interests of the nations of the New World.” The most important problem was the security of the gestern Hemisphere and the Conference faced it resolutely. A general declaration of neutrality of the American republics was adopted which not only included the generally accepted canons of conduct as to neutral rights and duties, but added several of special application to the Western Hemisphere. The American republics might bring together and place in a single port under guard belligerent merchant vessels which had sought refuge in their waters. Bona fide transfers of flags of American merchant vessels in American waters were permitted. Defensive armament on merchant vessels was conceded, but belligerent submarines could be excluded from the territorial waters of a state. The most original and drastic action of the Conference was a joint resolution entitled the Declaration of Panama whereby the American republics declared that, so long as they were neutral, they were, as of inherent right, entitled to have those waters adjacent to the American continents free from the commission of any hostile act by a non-American belligerent. A remarkable feature of the resolution was the promulgation of a protective zone approxi-

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mately 300 miles wide encircling the continents south of Canadian territorial waters. The resolution contemplated no extension of the three-mile marginal sea but rather an extension of the adjacent waters as a zone free from belligerent activities as an essential means of self-protection. As might have been expected, violations were not long in materializing. The scuttling of the Graf von Spee by the Nazi captain in Uruguayan territorial waters, December 13, 1939, and various sinkings by the British within the protective zone brought about a joint protest through the President of Panama on December 23, 1939. Great Britain, France, and Germany were advised that consultations were being carried out looking towards penalizing future violations by forbidding access to supplies or repairing of damages in American ports to belligerents guilty of the commission of warlike acts within the security zone.2 0 With a view to studying further the problems of neutrality, the Conference authorized the governing board of the Pan American Union to set up an Inter-American Neutrality Committee of seven experts for the duration of the war. This committee met at Rio de Janeiro and, on April 27, 1940, set forth a lengthy recommendation which in substance favored the maintenance of the security zone as an open sea for the commercial traffic of every state but prohibited any sort of belligerent act within the zone.2 1 Another important result of the Panama Conference was the setting up in Washington on November 15, 1939 of the In ter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee consisting of one expert representing each of the American republics. The Committee’s function was to establish a program of cooperation between the American republics to protect their economic and financial structures, maintain their fiscal equilibrium, safeguard the stability of their currencies, and develop their industries and commerce. The second meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the American republics convened in Havana, Cuba, from July 21 to 30, 1940. The meeting was called to meet the threat of Nazi aggression in the Western Hemisphere through the possible seizure of Dutch, Danish, and French colonies following the subjugation of the mother countries. Agreement was quickly obtained to cover any such possible contingency. Condemning violence in every form and refusing to recognize force as a basis of rights, the American republics refused to accept any transfer or attempt to transfer any interest or right in the Western Hemisphere. In the case of such an attempt thus threatening the peace of the continent, provision was made for the taking over and the provisional admini­ stration of such a region by an Inter-American Commission of Territorial Administration. A supplementary declaration known as the Act of Havana authorized the creation of an emergency committee to cover situations arising prior to the promulgation of the convention. The declaration further permitted any state in an emergency to act singly or jointly with others in any manner required by its own defense or in defense of the continent. This action was the first unanimous recognition by Latin America of the value of the principle of the Monroe Doctrine for the defense of the Americas. A number of resolutions were aimed 20Dept, of State Bulletin, I (Dec. 23,1939), p. 723. 21 Pan American Union, Decrees and Regulations on Neutrality, Supp. x. No. 2 (Law and Treaty Series No. 14), pp. 38-48.

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at subversive activities, and attempted their control by restricting the political activities of foreign diplomatic and consular representatives, regulating more closely the issuance of passports, and coordinating police and judicial measures for mutual defense. The American republics were getting prepared to stand together against the totalitarian menace. The Third Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American republics held at Rio de Janeiro from January 15 to 28, 1942, was convened as a result of the arrival of the war in the Western Hemisphere. The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor was a flagrant act of aggression which gave the two Americas an opportunity to prove that promised cooperation meant more than high sounding declarations. The Caribbean republics did not wait for the conference to indicate their whole-hearted support of the United States. The day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, and El Salvador declared war upon Japan and followed this within a few days with similar declarations of war against Germany and Italy. Cuba declared war on Japan on December 9, and on Germany and Italy on December 11. Nicaragua declared war on all thfee of the Axis powers on December 11. Thus, within four days after the United States became a belligerent, nine of the Latin American republics had joined her in the conflict. On December 8, Mexico condemned Japanese aggression, severing diplomatic relations the same day, and with Germany and Italy three days later. Colombia broke relations with Japan December 8, and Venezuela with the three axis powers December 31. The other Latin American republics promised to honor their obligations, refrained from regarding the United States as a belligerent, and put into effect various measures to restrain Axis activities-an auspicious background for the forthcoming conference. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, who headed the American delega­ tion, expressed the appreciation of the United States government at the declarations of solidarity and support, but he also made it clear that the only certain method of stamping out the Axis methods of poisoning inter-American intercourse was by the severance of diplomatic relations. Mr. Welles’ address was well received, but it was the eloquence and idealism of Mexicali Foreign Minister Padilla and the obstinacy and diplomatic acumen of Brazilian Foreign Minister Arañha which prevented the conference from foundering upon the rocks of Axis subversive activities. A resolution sponsored by Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela declaring that the American republics “ cannot continue diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany and Italy’’ appeared to have unanimous support. However the Argentinian representative at first vacillated then balked, and he was supported by the representative from Chile. As a compromise, the wording of the resolution as finally voted merely “recommended rupture of diplomatic rela­ tions” as each country should determine. The sentiments of the Conference were shown when Peru, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador, and Brazil broke off relations with the Axis powers before the Conference closed. The final act of the Rio Conference comprised forty-one declarations and resolutions. In addition to recommending severance of diplomatic relations they urged the production and exchange of strategic materials essential to hemisphere

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defense and the formulation of a coordinated plan for economic mobilization. Complete coordination of transportation facilities was recommended and the improvement of all inter-American communications by land, water, and air, including the construction of the unfinished sections of the Pan American Highway. An economic boycott of the Axis powers was approved, with reservations by Argentina and Chile, and several resolutions were aimed at the combatting of subversive activities and the control of dangerous aliens. It was recommended that an Inter-American Joint Defense Board composed of military and naval technicians appointed by each government should be set up in Washington to study and recommend measures for the^ defense of this continent. The Board met for the first time March 20, 1942 and functioned effectively for hemisphere defense. The Rio Conference, although based upon idealistic principles, was realistic in its methods and its proposals. The United States needed freedom of action, bases, and strategic materials; the Latin American republics needed protection, financial assistance, and supplies. The Conference provided for a mutually advantageous exchange. During the course of World War II the overfriendly attitude of Argentina to the Axis powers provoked retaliatory measures on the part of the United States, resulting finally in a formal request upon the part of Argentina that an Inter-American Conference of Foreign Ministers be held to consider her relations with the other American republics. The United States countered by suggesting a conference of the American states cooperating in the war and post-war problems. The proposal of the United States was accepted with the under­ standing that the Argentine situation be placed upon the agenda. The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace met in Mexico City during February-March, 1945. All the republics except Argentina, which had not declared war upon the Axis, were represented. The United States delegation was headed by Secretary of State Stettinius and included Senators Connally and Austin. Foreign Minister Padilla of Mexico was elected President of the Conference. After various resolutions had been passed for closer collaboration in the war effort, such as establishing the Inter-American Defense Board upon a permanent basis and strengthening the cooperation against subversive Axis propaganda, the Conference took up the problem of post-war international organization. The Latin American states desired a strong regional agreement against aggression, whereas the United States was concerned lest regional agreements should interfere with the new world organization which was to be established.2 2 The resulting compromise known as the Act of Chapultepec placed aggression against an American state either by a non-American state or an American state on a parity. In either case the signatory states would consult as to what action should be taken. Aggression was defined as armed trespass and various measures such as severing diplomatic relations, imposing an economic boycott, and using armed force were to be utilized. A treaty of such character was to be concluded after the war to constitute a regional arrangement for the 22The American delegation itself was divided on this issue to such an extent that the Mexican representative suggested an adjournment until the American delegation made up its collective mind.

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security of the Western Hemisphere but consistent with the purposes and principles of the general international organization. A very important resolution was passed to reorganize and strengthen the inter-American system by having the International Conferences of American States meet every four years and Foreign Ministers meet annually. The governing board of the Pan American Union was to be composed of ad hoc representatives with the rank of Ambassador and they were given broader powers. The Chairman of the Board was to be elected annually and not be eligible for immediate re-election. The Director General was to be chosen for a ten-year term and not be eligible for re-election. A draft charter including these and other changes was to be prepared and presented at the next Conference of the American States.2 J At the end of the Conference a resolution was passed deploring Argen­ tinian policy and expressing the wish that Argentina would change its policy so that it might adhere to the Final Act of the Conference and be incorporated into the United Nations. An understanding was reached at the Conference that if Argentina would declare war on the Axis and curtail futher Axis activities in Argentina, the United States would sùpport the admission of Argentina in the forthcoming conference at San Francisco to draw up a charter for the United Nations. Although it was expected that a Conference of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics would meet in 1946 to formalize the provisions of the Act of Chapultepec by concluding a treaty of mutual assistance, it was not until August 15, 1947, that such a conference met in Rio de Janeiro.24 All of the Latin American republics except Nicaragua were represented and the Conference completed its work in less than three weeks. The Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, condemned war and provided for peaceful procedure for the settlement of all disputes in the Inter-American System. An attack against one American state was an attack against all and each undertook to assist the state attacked, individually and collectively, until the Security Council of the United Nations should take measures to maintain security. The states were to consult when the peace of the Americas was theatened and sanctions might be employed beginning with ^the suspension of diplomatic relations and ending with the use of force. Aggression was defined as unprovoked attacks or armed invasion. This regional agreement looking towards the maintenance of security in the Western Hemisphere which became operative in 1948 when Costa Rica, the fourteenth republic, deposited its ratification, was the successful culmination of the continuous efforts of almost a half century to achieve cooperation for mutual defense. The fact that action could be taken by a two-thirds vote made the procedure the more effective. It was up to the next conference to perfect the organization of American states. As previously noted, a draft charter for the organization of the American

1945)^ ^ Ct

^

^nier~^mer*can C°nf erencc on Problems o f War and Peace (Washington,

24The United States had delayed the conference because of Argentina’s failure to comply with the obligations assumed after the conference at Mexico City.

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republics had been prepared and was the principal item on the agenda of the Ninth International Conference of American States which met in the spring of 1948 in Bogotá. In spite of a bloody revolution which cost over a thousand lives and destroyed many of the fine public buildings in Bogotá, the Conference carried out the program contemplated. The United States had noted a gradually mounting antagonism in the Latin American countries as a result of its inability to carry out the European Recovery Program and at the same time meet the economic and financial needs of its neighbors to the south. To reverse this trend the American delegation headed by Secretary of State Marshall not only included such diplomatic experts in Latin American affairs as Assistant Secretary of State Norman Armour, Director of the Office of American Republics Paul C. Daniels, and Ambassador Willard L. Beaulac, but also Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder, Secretary of Commerce W. Averell Harriman, and Head of the World Bank John J. McCloy. The Charter of Organization of the American States as finally adopted at Bogotá not only put the Organization upon a permanent treaty basis, but made a number of important changes long considered necessary. The Inter-American Conference was made the supreme organ for the formulation of policy ; it would meet at least once every five years; each state would be represented and have one vote. The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was retained to consider problems of an urgent nature and it could be convened upon the request of any state. The former governing board of the Pan American Union was now established as the Council of the Organization of the American States with each state having a representative possessing the status of ambassador. It was given authority to consider all matters submitted by the International Conference or the Organ of Consultation and it might serve provisionally as the Organ of Consultation. It could draft and submit proposals to the governments or to the Conferences of the American States. As aids, three agencies were established: the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, the InterAmerican Council of Jurists, and the Inter-American Cultural Council. The Pan American Union under the Charter became the permanent organ of secretariat of the Organization. Perhaps the next most important achievement of the Ninth Conference was the American Treaty on Pacific Settleement, also known as the “Pact of Bogotá.” By the terms of this treaty the American Republics accepted the obligation to “settle” all disputes by peaceable means. The procedures provided are good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation, judicial settlement, and arbitration. This treaty was the successful culmination of the sustained effort to bring about obligatory peaceful settlement of disputes in the Western Hemisphere. On the economic side Secretary Marshall stated that President Truman had requested an increase of $500 million in the Export-Import Bank allocation for Latin-American loans. It was also promised that the Economic Cooperation Administration would finance a part of Latin-American exports to Europe in United States dollars. That the allocation did not reach the amount expected was due to the policy of Argentina fixing a price for her cereals, meats, and hides far above the world market price. An elaborate Economic Agreement was signed which provided for financial and technical cooperation, for the approval and

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safeguarding of private investment, and the improvement of transportation facilities in the Western Hemisphere. Inasmuch as individual rights were being eliminated in all countries behind the Iron curtain, the Ninth International Conference adopted an American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man far more inclusive than the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution. Also, in order to go on record as regards the threat of Soviet Communism, the Conference approved a declaration and resolution stating that “by its anti-democratic character and its intervention­ ist tendency the political activity of international communism or any totalitarian doctrine is incompatible with the concept of American freedom . . . .”25 The Ninth International Conference at Bogotá, by setting up an improved organization of the American states upon a treaty basis, pointed the way for the establishment of regional organizations for the maintenance of peace in other parts of the world as envisaged by the Charter of the United Nations. 2 6 The Charter of the Organization of the American States went into effect December 13, 1951, when Colombia was the fourteenth state to complete ratification. The Senate of the United States approved the ratification of the Charter of the Organization of American States on August 28, 1950. A world crisis had occurred three months earlier when the Communist forces in North Korea had violated the 38th Parallel and marched south. The Security Council of the United Nations immediately voted that a breach of the peace had occurred and called upon all members of the United Nations to render assistance. One day later, June 28, the Organization of American States unanimously adopted a resolution declaring its firm adherence to the actions of the Security Council and reaffirming the pledge of continental solidarity. Within a month seventeen of the republics had promised at least token assistance. When it was seen that the Communist aggression threatened the security of the entire world the United States felt that a meeting of the American Ministers of Foreign Affairs was required to consider the situation. The date set was March 1951, the place, Washington, and the agenda covered political,military, and economic cooperation for the defense of the Americas abroad and their security at home. The United States felt that greater aid to the United Nations forces in Korea was needed and that the Latin American Republics should tighten their internal controls against communism. All twenty-one republics of the Western Hemisphere were represented; President Truman welcomed the delegates and Secretary of State Dean Acheson was elected president of the conference. Both President Truman and Secretary Acheson stressed the immediate dangers of Communist imperialism to the democratic countries of the Western Hemisphere and the need to combat them effectively. On the whole the Conference was successful in its aims. The principles of the United Nations were sustained and specific efforts to strengthen the Inter-American Defense Board and to provide strategic materials and to aid with troops where possible were agreed upon. Resolution VIII of the Final Act recommended adequate legislation be adopted in every American republic to 2'Final Act, XXXII. 26For texts of treaties, conventions, resolutions, and commentary thereon see Ninth Int. Conf o f Amer. States, Dept, o f State Pub. 3263 (Washington, 1948). For Charter of the Organization of American States (1967) see Appendix.

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prevent and punish subversive acts of international Communism and no state made any reservations to this resolution. The Tenth International Conference of American States scheduled to meet at Caracas, Venezuela, March 1, 1954 was the first to be held under the Charter signed at Bogotá in 1948. The United States was particularly desirous of including in the agenda consideration of “the intervention of international Communism in the American republics.” The Latin American states were for the most part less interested in Communism than in economic questions, but Guatemala alone opposed its inclusion. The Eisenhower administration had promised that the Republicans would not neglect Latin America, but except for Dr. Milton Eisenhower’s visit, no concrete evidence for change in policy was visible. The Latin American states were in a mood to demand action. All the twenty one republics were present except Costa Rica who, by refus­ ing to attend, showed her disapproval of the military dictatorship in Venezuela. The United States delegation headed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles included former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs John M. Cabot, his successor Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Samuel C. Waugh, Legal Advisor Herman Phleger, United States Ambassador to Venezuela, Fletcher Warren and the United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States, John C. Dreier. Secretary Dulles, supported vigorously by the delegates of Cuba, Peru and the Dominican Republic, was determined to obtain priority for discussion of the Communist menace. Foreign Minister Toriello of Guatemala, supported by Argentina, was equally insistent against it. The United States won out and its draft resolution condemned International Communist activity directed against the political system of the Western Hemisphere as a threat to its peace and security, and recommended positive measures be taken for its extermination. The vote was 17 to 1 in favor, with only Guatemala voting in the negative and Argentina and Mexico abstaining. Secretary Dulles pledged the intention of the United States to obtain better economic relations and it was agreed to hold an economic conference in Rio de Janeirio in 1955. The Conference voted a resolution requesting that industrialized states refrain from any restrictions on the imports of raw materials which was clearly aimed at the United States. It also by a vote of 19 to 1-only the United States refraining—passed a resolution calling for the elimination of colonialism and “foreign occupation” of territory in the Western Hemisphere. A resolution favoring the guarantee of human rights and freedoms to all persons received the support of all the states except Guatemala which abstained. In all, the conference passed some 117 resolutions, declarations, recommendations, agreements, and approved motions. The U.S. had succeeded in impressing its neighbors with the danger of communism, or so it seemed, and obtained their support in combatting it. We recognized the need for closer economic cooperation and would have the opportunity to prove it at Rio. On the other hand the enthusiastic support of the United States by a Trujillo-dominated Dominican Republic and the failure of Washington to support the position taken by democratic Uruguay led one delegate to declare

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that the United States preferred “docile dictators to difficult democracies.’5 7 After the adoption of the Caracas Declaration and the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala Washington made no serious effort to forestall the Communist offensive in Latin America until Fidel Castro’s seizure of power in Cuba in 1959. From 1959 to 1972 U.S. response to the Soviet or Chinese Communist threat in Latin America was chiefly in the economic, political, and military fields. The diplomatic and political offensive against Cuba and its supporters was carried out principally through the OAS where Washington sought to mobilize support to meet the Communist challenge. This proved difficult, for Latin Americans generally could not take seriously our charges that Cuba was a menace to hemisphere security. Washington also found it hard to base a case on violation of human rights and democratic institutions because of its cooperation with notorious violators of such rights, particularly Trujillo, Pérez Jiménez, and the Bastista regime in Cuba. In fact there was a widespread conviction in Latin America that the United States was in large measure responsible for the developments in Cuba. As time passed, however, many of the countries, especially those in the Caribbean, began to show growing concern over the trends in Cuba, culminating in Castro’s assertion of his Marxist-Leninist affiliations. In addition to dealing with the Communist threat, OAS agencies were called upon to consider the question of dictatorship in the Caribbean. In early 1959 the Council of the OAS, in the role of provisional organ of consultation, reviewed complaints by Nicaragua and Panama of invasions by Cuban-backed exiles. After a similar complaint was registered by the Dominican Republic the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers was convened in Santiago, Chile, to deal with the broad question of unrest in the Caribbean. The main issue hinged on the question of whether the notorious dictatorships in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Paraguay should remain protected behind the principle of nonintervention or if they should be subject to OAS action aimed at their overthrow. The delegations reaffirmed the principle of nonintervention, condemned dictatorship, as urged by Secretary of State Christian Herter, and authorized the Inter-American Peace Committee to investigate the entire Caribbean situation on its own initiative o^ at the request of the member states. As tensions mounted in the Caribbean the United States sought to bring both the Dominican Republic and Cuba into the spotlight of inter-American public opinion for violation of human rights and democratic principles. After it had become clear that the Trujillo regime had supported an assassination attempt on the life of President Betancourt of Venezuela, the OAS Council voted that a Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers be held in San José, Costa Rica, in August 1960. In this case Venezuela had asked for and obtained the convocation of the Organ of Consultation, in accord with Article 6 of the Rio Pact, which adopted a resolution condemning the government of the Dominican Republic for its acts of aggression and intervention against 2 7Dept, of State Bulletin, XXXI (March 22, 1954), pp. 422-423; Resol. XCIII, Tenth Inter-American Conf., Caracas, Venezuela, Mar. 1-28, 1954, Report o f the Pan American Union on the Conference, Annals o f the Organization o f American States, VI (1954),

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Venezuela. The importance of the Sixth Meeting lies in the decision to impose sanctions for the first time in inter-American history; however, the governments were not inclined to approve any action that would involve actual intervention within the country. Washington supported the Latin American countries demands for sanctions against Trujillo since it hoped to gain their support for corresponding action against Castro. It had become evident by June 1960 that he had made the decision to transform Cuba into a totalitarian state in close collaboration with the Soviet bloc.2 8 With this threat to hemispheric security disclosed the United States called the Seventh Meeting of Consultation, on the same site as the Sixth Meeting a few days earlier, to enlist hemispheric support against the threat of extra-continental intervention in hemispheric affairs. Secretary Herter sought to gain a collective denunciation by the foreign ministers of Sino-Soviet Communist intervention, and also of Cuba for its collaboration. However, it proved impossible to pass a resolution condemning the Cuban action, and, finally, the United States had to accept a declaration which condemned communism but not Cuba: “. .. the attempt of the Sino-Soviet powers to make use of the political, economic, or social situation of any American state . . .” It reiterated nonintervention and reaffirmed that the Inter-American System is “ .. . incompatible with any form of totalitarianism . . . ” The declaration was approved 19-0, the Dominican Republic and Cuba having walked out of the meeting. Mexico and Cuba approved the statement with great reluctance, while Venezuelan and Peruvian foreign ministers refused to sign and were replaced by other delegation members. At this point in time the Latin American states viewed the Cuban revolution as an effort of a small nation seeking to combat economic imperialism and the political domination by the United States. Moreover, it was widely believed that Washington was using the threat of communism as a pretext to forestall the social revolution in Cuba and to restore the status quo there. It was also clear that the Latin Americans remained unconvinced that a regional security problem existed.2 9 On December 4, 1961 the OAS Council convoked a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to consider the threats to peace and to determine what measures should be taken. Cuba was not specifically cited in the convocation. By an affirmative vote of fourteen countries, with two negative votes (Cuba and Mexico) and five absentations (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador), the decision was made to call into session the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, acting as Oigan of Consultation under the Rio Pact, at Punta del Este, Uruguay, from January 22 to 31, 1962.28*30 Warning that the Castro regime had supplied communism with a bridgehead in the Americas, Secretary of State Dean Rusk urged sanctions in the form of a collective break in diplomatic relations and an embargo on all trade 28 Dept, of State, Inter-American Efforts to Relieve International Tensions in the Western Hemisphere, 1959-1960. (Washington, 1962), pp. 54-64; 71-89. 2’ Pan American Union, Final Act, Seventh Meeting o f Consultation of Ministers o f Foreign Affairs, San José Costa Rica, Aug. 22-29,1960 (Washington, 1960). 30This was the ninth application of the Rio Treaty, but only the second case to be taken up by a meeting of the foreign ministers acting as the organ of consultation under the Rio Treaty.

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with Cuba. The rebuffs suffered by the American delegation on these and other measures reflected the divergence of opinion that had arisen within the inter-American system and a lessening of United States prestige as a result of the Bay of Pigs invasion. By a scant two-thirds majority the meeting voted to bar participation of the Castro government in the OAS, eliminate Cuban participation in the Inter-American Defense Board, embargo arms traffic with Cuba, and recommend interruption of other commerce. Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, and Cuba voted against the anti-Cuban measures, and it was only with extreme difficulty and economic inducements that the affirmative votes of Haiti and Uruguay were obtained. The meeting declared that the doctrine of legitimate self-defense applied to threats to peace and security arising from subversive activities and, to police such threats, established the Special Committee of Consultation on Security. The main resolution adopted at Punta del Este providing for the exclusion of the Cuban government for participation in the inter-American system had four executive clauses: 1. That adherence by any member of the ÖAS to Marxism-Leninism is incompatible with the inter-American system and the alignment of such a government with the Communist bloc breaks the unity and solidarity of the hemisphere. 2. That the present government of Cuba, which has officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist government, is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system. 3. That this incompatibility excludes the present government of Cuba from participation in the inter-American system. 4. That the Council of the OAS and other organs and organizations of the interAmerican system adopt without delay the means necessary to carry out the resolution.

All of the countries except Cuba were prepared to accept the first two points in the initial voting, but six republics (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico) abstained on the last two clauses and therefore in voting on the adoption of the resolution as a whole. This irregularity clouded the significance of the vote. The assertion of incompatibility in the first clause did not extend beyond the Declaration of San José which reaffirmed that the inter-Aiqerican system “is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism,” but did not refer to Cuba. In specifying the incompatibility of the “present government of Cuba,” the second clause of the resolutions above did bring the question into clearer focus. But it was the abstention of six countries on the exclusion of Cuba that aroused serious concern, for this group accounted for two-thirds of the population and three-fourths of the area of Latin America. It was also disturbing to Washington that Brazil, generally a reliable ally of the United States in its hemispheric policies, opposed the United States proposals for the adoption of economic and diplomatic sanctions against Cuba.31 The measures taken at Punta del Este proved ineffectual in resolving the Cuban question as the United States-Soviet Union confrontation in the missiles crisis of October 1962 demonstrated. But in dealing with this crisis Washington 31 Pan American Union, Final Act, Eighth Meeting o f Consultation o f Ministers o f Foreign Affairs, Punta del Este, Uruguay, Jan. 22-31, 1962 (Washington, 1962).

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showed itself capable of moving swiftly and decisively to counter a direct military threat to the hemisphere, and the OAS Council voted unanimously to support U.S. action in the Caribbean to ensure the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. After President Kennedy had formally proclaimed a blockade against the shipment of all offensive weapons into Cuba on October 24, several Latin American nations made cooperative defense gestures. Argentina sent two destroyers to join the blockade; Honduras and Peru offered to send troops. Venezuela, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti offered Washington the use of bases in the Caribbean, and Colombia and Venezuela mobilized their armed forces. However, five'Latin American republics (Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile) continued to maintain diplomatic ties with Havana. Castroite involvement in subversive activities brought charges against Cuba before the OAS claiming that Cuba had covertly supplied arms to Venezuelan terrorists and guerrillas. After an OAS investigating team had found clear evidence that the arms had come from Castro’s Cuba, the Ninth Consultative meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS was called into session in Washington during July 1964. By a 15-4 vote, Cuba was declared guilty of aggression and intervention. Diplomatic ties were to be broken off, and economic and commerical relations interrupted, as well as transport and communication links. By the end of 1964, the OAS community of states, except Mexico, which resisted for legal and internal political reasons, had complied with the recommendations. The next test of cooperation in the regional body occurred in May 1965 when the United States dispatched armed forces into the Dominican Republic to avert a possible Communist seizure of power. The Johnson administration, fearing “another Cuba,” and finding that the OAS could not be mobilized in time to move effectively, took unilateral action; however, every effort was then made to turn the problem over to OAS jurisdiction. The Tenth Meeting of Consultation of the OAS met in May 1965, and it was only by exerting diplomatic pressure that a two-thirds majority was obtained to establish an inter-American police force for the purpose of intervening in the Dominican crisis. (U.S. troops were already there.) Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Uruguay voted against the resolution, and Venezuela abstained. To secure passage of the measure, Washington was forced to rely on the vote of a Dominican representative who was then without a government. Soon after intervention began Washington sponsored the dispatch of an OAS peace mission to the Dominican Republic to achieve a truce, and took steps to render the military action collective by establishing an OAS peace-keeping force. Eventually two thousand Latin-American troops from five countries (Brazil, Paraguay, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica) joined nine thousand U.S. troops in the inter-American force, with Brazil supplying the largest Latin American contingent. It is significant that, for the first time, an OAS mission commanding a military force was authorized to intervene in what was largely a domestic affair of a member state.32 At the Second Special Inter-American Conference assembled at Rio de 3 2Inter-American Institute, The Inter-American System , pp. 171-180.

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Janeiro in November 1965 the United States, interested in making the in ter-American police force a permanent body, included it as one of the proposed changes in the inter-American system to be reviewed at the conference. This proposal was rejected by the Latin Americans, but a number of resolutions were passed recommending that changes be made in the OAS Charter. By the mid-1960s it was generally agreed that the Constitution of the OAS, the Bogotá Charter of 1948, should be amended. It was clear that the organization’s structure should be modernized and strengthened to cope with new problems, and to act effectively in the interest of hemispheric cooperation and solidarity. Much had happened since 1948 to bring this need into focus. There had been the attempted Communist takeover in Guatemala, the Cuban revolution, the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, the Alliance for Progress, the Cuban missiles crisis, the Castroite revolutionary movement on the continent. United States intervention in the Dominican Republic, and countless other economic and political changes. Problems arising from the cold war were not major factors in this hemisphere until Fidel Castro took over Cuba and projected Latin America into international power politics. How to amend the Charter proved to be a much disputed question. The United States wished to strengthen the Council of the OAS which, like the United Nations Security Council, is in permanent session. But many Latin American countries are more interested in economic issues than in collective action against communism or the threat of communism. Changing the Bogotá Charter is a big undertaking. It is a treaty and amendments must be ratified by the U.S. Congress. Other countries with constitutions like that of the U.S. must also obtain legislative approval. Moreover, resolutions for amending it require a two-thirds vote at the inter-American conferences established to deal with the matter. Following in general the guidelines prepared by the Second Special Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro in November 1965, and the draft amendments prepared by the OAS Special Committee which met in Panama in March 1966, and by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council which met in Washington in June 1966, the protocol of amendment to the Charter of the OAS—the “Protocol of Buenos Aires” —was signed at {he Third Special Inter-American Conference at Buenos Aires on February 27, 1967.3 3 In the discussions carried on at Panama by the OAS Special Committee, differences arose between the U.S. and Latin-American delegations over economic and social policies. The latter had insisted that Washington agree not only to describe in detail what type of aid it would supply, but also to make trade concessions that would inevitably have created conflicts with other areas of the world and with domestic producers. After U.S. delegate Robert Woodward had pointed out that such commitments would not be approved by either the State Department or Congress, a compromise was reached. A key charter amendment was revised to read that the member states “agree to cooperate in the broadest spirit to strengthen their economic structures.” The original Latin-American draft declared that member nations had an “obligation” to assist one another.343* 33Dept. of State Bulletin, LVIII (July 17,1967), pp. 78-79;/Z>/d., LVI (Mar. 20,1967), pp. 474-476. 34New York Times, Mar. 26,1 9 6 6 ;Ibid., June 20,1966.

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President Johnson recommended ratification of the Protocol of Buenos Aires to the U.S. Senate in June 1967, and on April 23, 1968, at a White House ceremony, the President signed the U.S. instrument of ratification of the Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of OAS. The amendment entered into force February 28, 1970, after the needed two-thirds, or sixteen, ratifications had been o b ta in e d /3*5* The charter amendments, which are the first to be adopted since the Charter was signed in 1948, grant certain fuller responsibilities, as in the field of peaceful settlement. They also incorporate the principles of the Alliance for Progress in the charter. Among the more significant ^changes called for by the amendments are: ( 1) Replacement of the Inter-American Conference, which meets every five years, by a General Assembly, which will meet annually. (2) Redesignation of the OAS Council as the Permanent Council, and the granting of additional responsibilities to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and the Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture. The Economic and Cultural Councils become directly responsible to the General Assembly, as is the Permanent Council. These changes are designed to augment the importance given in the OAS structure to economic, social, educational, and scientific activities. (3) Elimination of the Inter-American Council of Jurists and the upgrading of the Inter-American Juridical Committee. (4) Assignment to the Permanent Council and its subsidiary body (the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement) a role in assisting member states in resolving disputes between them. (5) Incorporation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the OAS Charter. (6) Inclusion of a procedure for the admission of new members. (7) Election of the OAS Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General by the General Assembly for five-year terms, rather than by the Council for ten-year terms, as presently provided. (8) Incorporation in the Charter of the principles of the Alliance for Progress in the form of expanded economic and social standards covering self-help efforts and goals, cooperation and assistance in economic development, improvement of trade conditions for basic Latin American exports, economic integration, and the principles of social justice and equal opportunity.3 6 The Third Special Inter-American Conference and the Eleventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics were held at Buenos Aires February 15-27 and February 16-26, respectively. The principal work of the Third Special In ter-American Conference, as was mentioned, was to consider and approve the Protocol of Amendment to the OAS Charter. At the concurrent Eleventh Meeting of Consultation a resolution was adopted recommending that the American chiefs of state meet at Punta del Este April 12-14, 1967.37 35Dept, of State Bulletin, LVII (July 17,1967), pp. 78-79;Æ«f., LVIII (May 13,1968), pp. 614-616; Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 3, 1970; Galo Plaza Lasso, a former president of Ecuador and United Nations mediator, was installed as secretary-general of the OAS on May 18, 1968, for a five year term; he succeeded Dr. José Antonio Mora of Uruguay. Dr. William Sanders, a United States career diplomat, was succeeded as asst, sec.-gen. by Dr. Miguel Rafael Urquia, of El Salvador. 36Ibid. For a critical analysis of the amendments see William Manger, “ Reform of the OAS, The 1967 Buenos Aires Protocol of Amendment to the 1948 Charter of Bogota: An Appraisal,” Journal o f Inter-American Studies, X (Jan., 1968), 1-14. 3 '•Ibid., LVI (Mar. 20,1967), p. 472.

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The chiefs of state of twenty member nations of the OAS met at Punta del Este on the scheduled date, and at the close of the conference the Declaration of the Presidents of America was signed by seventeen chiefs of state, the prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, and the representative of the president of Haiti. President Johnson, heading the United States delegation, was accompanied by Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary Gordon, Mr. Linowitz, and others. Contained with the Action Program of the Declaration of the Presidents of America were the following objectives: (1) Latin American economic integration and industrial development; (2) multi-national action for infrastructure projects; (3) measures to improve international trade conditions in Latin America; (4) modernization of rural life and increase of agricultural productivity, especially of food; (5) educational, technological, and scientific development and intensification of health programs; (6) elimination of unnecessary military expenditures/8 Fresh evidence of continuing Castroite-backed subversion, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare in several Latin American states brought into session the Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS. Held in Washington, September 19-24, 1967, the meeting was convoked in accordance with Articles 39 and 40 of the OAS Charter, at the request of Venezuela. The Final Act of the meeting affirmed the imposition of further diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Castro government.3839 The first major military conflict between American states in more than a generation—an undeclared war between the Central American republics of El Salvador and Honduras-was responsible for the Thirteenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The invasion of Honduras by El Salvador’s military forces brought the OAS into action. By a resolution adopted on July 23, 1969, the Council of the OAS, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, convoked a meeting of Consultation in accordance with the In ter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the pertinent articles of the OAS Charter. The Council, in this capacity, voted “to call upon the governments of El Salvador and Honduras to suspend hostilities, to restore matters to the status quo ante bellum, and to take the necessary measures to reestablish and maintain in ter-American peace and security, and for the solution of the conflict by peaceful means.” A cease fire was quickly achieved, and Salvadorian troops were withdrawn from Honduran territory by August 3, 1969.40 Since the Rio Treaty came into force in 1948 it has been invoked on several occasions to resolve breaches of or threats to peace. The majority of the 38U.S. Dept, of State, Commitment for Progress: The Americas Plan for a Decade o f Urgency. Inter-American Series 93 (Washington, 1967); Dept, of State Bulletin, LVI (May 8, 1967), pp. 706-721. In 1969 Jamaica became the 24th member of the OAS, and its fourth English-speaking member. Its admission into the OAS came two years after Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados joined. All three of the new members, the first new additions to the OAS community in fifty years, were once part of the British Caribbean empire. See Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 30,1969. 39Dept, of State Bulletin, LVII (Oct. 16, 1967), pp. 493-498. A special session of the OAS Council was called in March, 1968 to consider Bolivian charges that Chile had permitted the extradition of five guerrillas, remnants of Dr. Guevara’s band, who had escaped from Bolivia into Chile. New York Times, Mar. 6,1968. 40 Dept, of State Bulletin, LXI (Aug. 18, 1969), pp. 132-134; Americas, 21 (Sept. 1969), pp. 42-45.

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cases have involved disputes among the smaller nations of the Caribbean area and the west coast republics of South America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia). Many of the difficulties arose from the existence of large numbers of refugees from oppressive regimes, augmented by Communists, adventurers, and mercenaries at times, and the efforts of the expatriates-aided in some instances by the government of the nation in which they had found refuge-to overthrow their opponents. All of these cases were settled by the apparatus of the inter-American system except those related to some aspect of the cold war. In the case of Guatemala the government was overthrown by an invasion from Honduras in 1954 which was backed by material and moral support from the United States. Otherwise, however, these disputes and charges of aggression have been worked out by the OAS Council through committees of investigation, aided by advisers, which visited the countries involved in the dispute. 1 Another component of the inter-American system for the maintenance of peace and security is the Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC). Established in 1940 by a resolution of the Second Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Havana, it was not installed until July 1948. The Peace Committee is composed of five members elected by the Council of the OAS for five-year terms; except for the election of its members the agency is almost autonomous, being responsible only to the Meetings of Consultation. The committee has its own statutes, according to which its purpose is the preservation of peace between states where a controversy has appeared. It cannot interfere in a dispute, and the scope of its action is determined by the parties involved. When, in 1956, statutes limiting its flexibility and autonomy were imposed, the committee could no longer function as in the past. However, at the Fifth Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Santiago (1959) the restrictions were lifted. Under the broadened statutes the committee is a body designed to foster the pacific settlement of disputes and controversies that exist or may arise between the states, suggesting to them “measures and steps” to facilitate such settlement. The committee itself is not a procedure or method of pacific settlement such as investigation, mediation, and conciliation, but rather a vehicle by which such approaches are suggested to the parties in a dispute. As an institution of the inter-American system for the maintenance of peace and security, the committee’s history is a very significant one. So long as no great restraints were imposed and it was not called upon to deal with cold war problems, it has proved to be an effective agency in the peaceful settlement of minor disputes among the hemispheric nations. 2 The promotion of respect for human rights and the basic freedoms are growing concerns of the in ter-American system. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) was established by the Fifth Meeting of Consultation4 4 ‘ Inter-American Institute, The Inter-American System, pp. 122-171: Organización de los Estados Americanos, Applications del Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca, 1948-1960, 3rd ed. (Washington, Pan American Union, 1960); Ibid., Suplemento 1960-61 (Washington, Pan American Union, 1962). 4 2Inter American Institute, The Inter-American System, pp. 82-104.

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of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and is guided by statutes approved by the OAS Council in 1960. According to Article I of the statute the Commission “is an autonomous entity of the Organization of American States, the function of which is to promote respect for human rights.” It is composed of seven members, nationals of the member states of the OAS, elected from a list made up of panels of three persons proposed by the governments. The activity of the inter-American system in the area of human rights, together with representative democracy, is clearly based in the OAS Charter. Article 13 indicates that “each state has the right to develop its cultural, political, and economic life freely and naturally. In this free development, the State shall respect the rights of the individual and the principles of universal morality.” On representative democracy the Charter states that, “The solidarity of the American states and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those states on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy.” 43 In the decade of the 1960s the Commission was occupied with violations of human rights mainly in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Paraguay.' The Commission has, in several instances, carried out productive and effective work, but it is limited by its authority only to call attention to certain conditions, and its inability to intervene. Although the ideal of representative democracy is a principle subscribed to by the Latin American republics and is incorporated in the legal structure of the interAmerican system, the wave of militarism, in part a reaction to Communist activity, has virtually nullified its attainment in the foreseeable future. The Commission was incorporated into the new Charter structure as a full-fledged organ of the OAS in accordance with the Protocol of Buenos Aires, adopted in 1970, and subsequently issued reports on the human rights of political prisoners and their relatives in Cuba, and reports on El Salvador and Honduras. However, by 1971 only Costa Rica had ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, and no countries in addition to the twelve original signatories had signed. The Convention was under study in Washington, which had not signed or ratified. In addition to the general periodic international conferences of American states numerous special conferences have been held when technical matters are being reviewed or when special aspects of inter-American cooperation are to be discussed. There were a number of in ter-American organizations in existence before the OAS Charter was signed, official, semi-official, and private. The Bogotá Conference requested the Council of the OAS to study these organizations of the OAS in accordance with the provision of the Charter. The Council has concluded agreements with the following organizations and has listed them in the Register of Specialized Inter-American Organizations: the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO); the Inter-American Children’s Institute (IACI); the Inter-American Commission of Women (IACW); the Pan American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH); the Inter-American Indian Institute (IAll); and the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences (IAIAS). 43/6zd., p. 39.

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While it is not possible to describe here the history and activities of these specialized agencies, it is clear that in an unheralded fashion, they have made lasting and tangible contributions to the welfare of the peoples of the developing countries in the Western Hemisphere. They have grown organically at varying rates, and doubtless will continue to expand and assume a larger role, given the myriad of problems which await solution in Latin America. The United States has long given appreciable economic and technical support to these organizations which, in the decade of the 1960s, have come to reinforce the Alliance for Progress. The inaugural session of the new OAS General Assembly met in Washington June 25-July 8, 1970 (technically the First Special Session of the Assembly, and originally scheduled to be held in Santo Domingo, the meeting was transferred to Washington because of violence in the Dominican Republic). Much of its effort was devoted to setting in motion certain regulatory provisions relating to the new structure, in addition to carrying out its more routine responsibilities, and the critical issue of kidnapping and terrorism. Held in Washington August 24-25, 1970, the Second Special Session of the Assembly was limited to filling a vacancy in the Inter-American juridical Committee. The Third Special Session of the Assembly, convened in Washington on January 25, 1971, considered the earlier resolution on kidnapping and terrorism. The General Assembly held its first annual regular session under a revised Charter April 10-23, 1971, in San José, Costa Rica. Attending were foreign ministers or their representatives of the twenty-three member states of the OAS. With a thirty-seven item agenda, this session touched on political, economic, and organizational issues of considerable importance. The Assembly approved the holding of five new specialized conferences, considered a Colombian initiative in area limitation and military expenditures in Latin America, and considered the problem of trade of the developing countries. The resolution on trade urged Washington to adopt a number of measures to promote the trade of the developing countries. Progress toward harmonizing relations between El Salvador and Honduras was made with the signing of statements by the foreign ministers of those countries declaring their intention to put an end to the “anomolous situation” that prevailed in their countries’ relationship. U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers told the Assembly that the Nixon administration was seeking to preserve the historically close mutual relationship that the United States had enjoyed with its hemispheric neighbors, but in the form of “a more balanced and reinvigorated partnership.” He promised easier access for Latin American goods in the U.S. market and continuing development assistance in the foreseeable future. It was also announced that the U.S. mission to the OAS had been designated the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the Organization of American States. Previously, it was simply a delegation to the old OAS Council. While progress toward the solution of the Honduras-El Salvador problem seemed to have been advanced, collective security under the Rio Treaty was weakened in another area. This was the reestablishment of diplomatic and commercial ties with Cuba by the Allende administration of Chile in November 1970. The Chilean government, in taking this step, disregarded the fact that the OAS in 1964 had adopted a “binding” decision under the Rio Treaty that in

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view of Cuba’s interventionist and aggressive acts, member states should have no diplomatic or consular relations, shipping, or trade with the island nation until the OAS itself, by a two-thirds vote, decided that Cuba had ceased to be a threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. Since Cuba had not abandoned its policy of intervention and subversion, Chile’s action did violence to the inter-American system. The Third Special Session of the OAS General Assembly, held in Washington in January-February 1971, focused its attention on a draft international convention on terrorism and kidnapping drawn up at the Assembly’s request by the Inter-American Juridical Committee. Brazil and Argentina, supported by four other countries, held that no convention would be effective unless it embraced all aspects of terrorism. A larger group argued that such a broad approach would endanger the principle of political asylum. The U.S., seeking a narrower convention, was unable to reconcile the opposing points of view. However, by declaring acts of terrorism against foreign officials and their dependents to be common crimes rather than political offenses, the convention deprives persons responsible for such acts of the shelter of political asylum and subjects them to extradition and prosecution. Further action on the convention was expected in 1972. In January 1971 Ecuador charged the United States with violating Article 19 of the OAS Charter, which prohibits “use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another state.” This dispute arose over the right of U.S.-owned vessels to fish off the coast of Ecuador in waters which it claims are within its maritime sovereignty, but which the United States contends are high seas. After Ecuador had seized several California-based tuna boats, Washington applied section 3(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, halting such sales to that country. Contending that the U.S. government had violated Article 19, Ecuador called for a Meeting of Consultation of the OAS Foreign Ministers who coincidentally were in Washington for the special General Assembly session. The outcome was a resolution, supported by both countries, stating the positions of the two contending parties and calling upon them to resolve their differences in accordance with Charter principles and to “abstain from the^use of any kind of measure that may affect the sovereignty” of any state. Although the basic issue remained unresolved, it reflected constructive effort by both parties to quiet the situation. The OAS General Assembly considered a proposal by the President of Colombia in April 1971 to study the feasibility of an arms limitation agreement among the Latin American countries. This initiative was based on Chapter VI of the 1967 Declaration of American Presidents, in which the Latin American heads of state proposed to limit military expenditures in proportion to the actual demands of national security and international commitments to insure that maximum resources would be devoted to economic and social development. Owing to disagreement, mainly over the meaning of the presidents’ declaration and the scope of the Assembly’s mandate, no progress was made save to instruct the OAS Permanent Council to study the intent and scope of Chapter VI. The United States was not a participant, for it was concluded that any eventual agreement on arms limitation would probably not include this country.

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In the field of assistance the OAS, including its specialized organizations, has continued to provide vehicles of multilateral coordination and has carried out an increasing portion of technical assistance provided in the hemisphere. This role was supportive of the Nixon administration’s belief, outlined by the president on October 31, 1969, that the main future patterns of U.S. assistance for hemisphere development must be United States support for Latin American initiatives and “that this can be best achieved on a multilateral basis within the inter-American system.” The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), an important component of the inter-American system, though not connected with the OAS, is chiefly involved in development lending. The OAS itself has no lending function, but it does carry out significant technical assistance programs. Three OAS agencies administer most of the technical assistance: PAHO, IAIAS, and the OAS General Secretariat. Although the IDB provides technical assistance, it is mainly for project development in connection with potential loan applications or as a supplement to loans made. In 1971 technical assistance provided by the specialized agencies totaled $66 million, which was almost equal to the $70 to $75 million which AID provided for bilateral technical assistance Early in 1970, partly in response to the Concensus of Viña del Mar, the United States agreed to establish a continuing Special Committee on Consultation and Negotiation as a permanent committee of the IA-ECOSOC (Inter-American Economic and Social Council) to deal with problems of trade assistance, investment, technology, and related subjects. Secretary of State William Rogers, addressing the Permanent Council of the OAS, convened in Philadelphia in November 1972, spoke about the second Nixon term, outlining the administration’s Latin American policy: “President Nixon has asked me to tell you that during his second term we will remain committed to the interests of the hemisphere and determined to make a substantial contribution to its social and economic progress.” Four United States goals were cited: 1. We will pursue a policy of cooperation with Latin America in a relationship of greater equality, shared initiatives, and mutual responsibilities. 2. We will work to ensure that the legitimate interests of all the nations of Latin America are represented in the new international monetary and trade systems to be negotiated. 3. We will cooperate with you directly in this hemisphere to strengthen and diversify our trade, investment and assistance ties. 4. And we will seek to resolve the issues between us over fisheries, over territorial seas, over investment, and all others, in the spirit of friendship and mutual respect which is the essence of our inter-American system.

Reaffirming Washington’s faith in the regional organization, he emphasized that the OAS is the “linchpin” of the inter-American system.44 The inter-American system, after eight decades, is not only the oldest functioning regional organization, but also the one that has both expanded and strengthened its numerous spheres of activity. From the beginning of the modem era the Western Hemisphere seemed to offer unique conditions favorable 44Ibid., pp. 16-21; O. Carlos Stoetzer, The Organization o f American States (New York, 1965), pp. 64-75; Dept of State Bulletin, LXIV (June 14,1971), p. 784 ;Ibid.t LXV (Sept. 13,1971), pp. 2 8 4 - 2 9 3 ; LXVII (Dec. 4,1972), pp. 655-656.

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to cooperation and solidarity among peoples and their governments. These included a similar origin and historical evolution, geographic proximity, and similarity of political conditions. A natural corollary was the concept of Pan Americanism, or the Western Hemisphere idea: the view that the peoples and the nations of the hemisphere have a special kinship which sets them apart from the rest of the world. These factors provided a foundation for regionalism as an integrative force in the inter-American system. At the same time there exist forces, both inherent and external, which tend toward fragmentation and disunity. The American republics reflect great diversity in size, natural resources, ethnic character of their populations, political institutions, rates and degrees of economic development, and social structure. Cultural and linguistic barriers present obstacles to cooperation and integration. The Americas are religiously divided, the north being Protestant, whereas Roman Catholicism predominates in Latin America. The legal systems are also dissimilar, common law prevailing in the north, and Roman law south of the Rio Grande. In general, the Latin American states are not natural trading partners, but instead compete in world markets for the sale of a restricted list of export commodities. The United States trades with all of them, dominating the economies of many in this way, and exerting a powerful influence through public and private investment. Geographic barriers inhibit land communications in most areas of Latin America, and both the United States and Canada are separated from their hemispheric neighbors, other than Mexico, by considerable distance. To these divisive and obstructive factors must be added the impact of nationalism and the insistence on sovereignty of the member states of the OAS. The legacy of the struggle for independence tends to reinforce these lines of nationalism. The solidarity of the inter-American system is also subject to extrahemispheric forces. The influence of historic Latin American ties to the mother countries of Spain and Portugal have weakened appreciably; however, the Guianas, British Honduras (Belize), and the West Indies retain closer ties to their home countries thaii to the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Canada's link with the British Commonwealth is a major cause of its reluctance to accept membership in the OAS. And the United States, as the Regional paramount nation, has been drawn irresistably toward extrahemispheric concerns, partic­ ularly since World War II.45 In dealing with economic and social problems the OAS has generally proved to be ineffective; while some progress has been made in the decade of the 1960s, the magnitude of Latin American problems has tended to minimize the gains. Two important goals of the Alliance for Progress-economic development and social improvement-added to the problems of OAS, which it has not been able to solve. At the same time, the failure of the Alliance to attain projected socio-economic goals has worked to unify the Latin Americans in the OAS against the United States.4

4 s Canada, a member of the Pan American Institute of Geography and History and the Inter-American Statistical Institute, was in the process of becoming a full member of the Pan American Health Organization, in 1971; it had also expressed interest in joining the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences.

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Agencies of the United Nations have generally done more effective work on economic and social problems in Latin America than the OAS. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) has produced valuable reports and special studies, and it took the initiative in suggesting plans for the Central American Common Market (CACM) and the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). Many Latin American nations profited from association in the International Monetary Fund. Other UN agencies, particularly the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNESCO, the Children’s Emergency Fund, and the Program of Technical Cooperation, granted aid to Latin America in quantities commonly exceeding that of the OAS. It was the inadequacy of the OAS machinery, and the need for a new and more radical approach to inter-American economic and social cooperation, that led President Juscelino Kubitschek of Brazil to propose Operation Pan America which became a preliminary blueprint for the Alliance for Progress. Anti-Americanism or “Yankeephobia,” emanating from growing leftist and nationalistic forces, continues to rise in Latin America. Aside from the causes mentioned, the overwhelming power of the United States is offensive, particularly when it is used forcibly such as in Guatemala, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. Moreover, the United States is widely regarded as the main prop to right-wing dictatorships, both civilian and military, and the perpetuation of traditional, aristocratic regimes. The reluctance of the United States until the 1960s to grant large scale economic assistance, to participate in price stabilization agreements, and to lower tariff barriers on Latin American exports, has been bitterly resented. Latin American political instability also corrodes the OAS. In the period 1948-1964 every Latin American nation except Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico had at least one illegal change of administration and since then military regimes have been on the rise. This has brought to the fore ideological conflicts between dictatorships and democracies, and radical movements opposed to conservative oligarchies. Rising nationalism and assertions of sovereignty, reflected in the continuing stress on nonintervention, have limited the political competence of the OAS to minimal requirements for maintaining peace; except for the case of the Dominican Republic, the OAS has generally been kept out of the settlement of internal Latin American conflicts and has only a minor role in resolving interstate conflicts arising from subversion, guerrilla warfare, and propaganda. It is commonly believed that the relative position of the weak Latin American states arrayed against a world superpower renders the United States immune to collective pressures exerted through the OAS. In practice the United States has sought to align itself with the majority view, particularly after the adoption of the nonintervention policy in the 1930s, and has done so except where national and hemispheric security interests have dictated unilateral action in response to the cold war. However, it is evident that the Latin American nations are reluctant to enlarge the scope of OAS political authority for fear of increased United States influence in their domestic affairs. It is also clear that the Latin American nations have refrained from giving tangible support to the United States in the global anti-Communist conflict unless the Western Hemisphere has been in obvious danger. Viewing their position as one detached

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from the cold war, they resent being drawn into the conflict as appendages of the United States, and also resent that the greater proportion of United States military and economic aid is diverted elsewhere. Meanwhile, the Latin American states have gained through association in the OAS: the protection of territorial integrity and political independence from external danger, especially from the real and potential threat of fascism and communism. And as a collective security system it has helped to forestall conflicts among the Latin American states. Moreover, because of its commit­ ments to the inter-American system, and its interest in gaining hemispheric solidarity in pursuit of national security goals, the OAS tie has, perhaps, compelled Washington to exercise restraint in dealing with Latin America. The United States has profited from OAS support when the organization has validated what were largely unilateral actions by Washington. These include the OAS symbolic support of the Korean War, its sanctioning of the Cuban missiles crisis blockade, and trade and diplomatic embargoes of the Castro regime. The organization was also useful as an anti-dictator front in its support of Washington’s efforts to eliminate Trujilloism. The OAS has also contributed materially to United States success in coping with the numerous minor conflicts in the Caribbean in the 1950s, as well as during our intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1961 and 1965. When the contributions of the OAS are evaluated it becomes evident that in performance of its role of containing inter-state conflicts and in preserving the territorial integrity of the members states it has been quite effective, for the Western Hemisphere has had no major conflicts in several decades. While the OAS seldom solves the basic causes of a conflict it has helped to arrive at solutions by peaceful means. As in the case of the conflict involving El Salvador and Honduras in 1969, it has served as an impartial fact-finding agency, a communication link between the disputants, and a forum for conciliation and negotiation of the critical issues in a dispute. Owing to its military and economic power the United States inevitably has the major role in most situations requiring OAS action. When economic and military sanctions are called for the United States necessarily carries the burden, but OAS endorsement conveys the desired impression of multilateral action. Despite significant accomplishments by the OAS in the years since World War II, there has been an attendant weakening of hemispheric solidarity and growing evidence of antagonism towards the United States, as the response to the Rockefeller mission in 1969 so amply demonstrated. Administrative and structural problems within the OAS are involved, and it is expected that the changes in the OAS charter, previously mentioned, will help to resolve them. But more profound forces have been at work: the overwhelming economic, political, and social problems which confront Latin America, the preoccupation of the United States with global commitments and its own domestic problems, Marxist propaganda and subversion, technological progress which has broken down the isolation of the hemisphere, the proliferation of military regimes among the American republics, and disillusionment with the Alliance for Progress. As the decade of the 1970s begins the Western Hemisphere idea, the OAS, and inter-American diplomacy face an unprecedented challenge. How successfully this is met will depend in large measure upon the coincidence of foreign policy

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objectives of the United States and its southern neighbors, for this is the pillar on which inter-American solidarity rests. Latin America’s participation in world organization began about one century after independence had been won.4 6 In the aftermath of the wars of independence the new states were preoccupied with solving their own problems and, fearing the designs of most of the great powers, commonly took an isolationist stand. In general, they agreed with the United States in opposing European interference in the political affairs of the New World and were not concerned with world problems except insofar as they affected their trade. Europe regarded the new states as marginal factors in international affairs and showed no disposition to seek their participation until the outbreak of World War I. On occasion the Latin American states requested the mediation of Europe, as well as of the United States, in resolving their boundary disputes, and they sought European capital, trade, immigrants, and cultural contact. Pan-Americanism made some headway, but many Latin American states lacked enthusiasm for the movement since the Pan American Union, with its headquarters in Washington, and its director-general from the United States, seemed to them too much dominated by their big northern neighbor. They were not invited to attend the first peace conference at the Hague but, owing to United States influence, the larger nations were asked to send representatives to the assembly in 1907. As weak nations they appreciated any legal bulwarks that such a conference might develop to protect them. The Latin American delegations at the conference supported the progressive ideas of the time, including Red Cross rules in the conduct of warfare. Except for Haiti, they favored accepting obligatory arbitration in principle, and unanimously approved a proposal for voluntary arbitration. During World War I Latin Americans were attracted to President Woodrow Wilson’s idealism, as expressed in his well-turned phrases about liberty, free­ dom, and democracy, and showed much interest in his plan for a League of Nations which would provide strong measures against aggressors and guarantee peace through its international organization. All of the nations of Latin America signed the Versailles Treaty, including the Covenant of the League of Nations, or were invited to sign the Covenant soon thereafter. Ten of these states became charter members of the League of Nations, and at the first meeting of the League Assembly fifteen delegations were present. At the last meeting of the organization in 1945 there were ten Latin American members. From 1920 to 1945 all of the hemispheric nations were, at various times, members of the League, but at no single time was their membership complete. It is clear that the refusal of the United States to join the organization, which President Wilson had been so influential in founding, was a bitter blow to Latin American hopes. Their critics explained by citing the occasions on which4 46 For additional background on Latin America’s role in international organizations see: Manuel S. Canyes, The Organization o f American States and the United Nations (Washington, Pan American Union, 1963), 6th ed.; Inis L. Claude Jr., “The OAS, the UN and the United States,” International Conciliation, No. 547 (Mar. 1964); Edgar S. Fumiss, Jr., “The United States, the Inter-American System and the United Nations,” Political Science Quarterly, LXV, No. 3 (Sept. 1950), 415-430; John A. Houston, Latin America and the United Nations (New York, 1956); Warren H. Kelchner, Latin American Relations with the League o f Nations (Boston, 1929).

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the United States had been guilty of interference in, and aggression against, their countries and by saying that our talk of freedom and liberty had been nothing more than talk. Most Latin American nations, particularly those which had a feeling of inferiority because of their meager resources and small territory, looked to the League to give them political equality with the more powerful and wealthy states. More specifically, these nations viewed the League as a counterpoise to United States dominance in the region. Because of its military intervention in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, its role in taking the Panama Canal zone, and the use of its armed forces against Mexico, the United States was regarded as an aggressor in Latin America. Thus, when the League turned out to be a relatively impotent organization, the Latin American states suffered considerable disappointment. Later, many of them became disillusioned by the dominance of Great Britain and France, and by the failure of efforts to build an effective security system within the League framework. Some of the larger states resented what they considered to be their inadequate representation on the League Council, although the president of the Assembly was quite often a Latin American. Others, finding that the main activities of the League touched their direct interests only slightly, drifted away from it, and some were jealous of League involvement in strictly American disputes. In practice the League came to be increasingly divorced from New World questions because of the attitude of the United States. To guard its hemispheric interest the latter had insisted upon the inclusion in the League Covenant of reference to the Monroe Doctrine in Article 21 : “Nothing in the Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.” The League shared in the solution of the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia (1928-1938), but its rulings were not accepted by the states involved. It also was the vehicle for final settlement of the Leticia dispute between Colombia and Peru (1932-1935), but only because of a virtual settlement that had been achieved by the good offices of American states outside the League. Throughout the period of Latin American participation in the League of Nations the latter’s actions reflected a deference toward the United States on all inter-American questions and a desire not to antagonize American public opinion. It may be concluded that at the same time that the League was discrediting itself in Latin America by revealing its weakness, the United States was abandoning interventionist policies in favor of the Good Neighbor policy. When the smaller hemispheric countries saw that the United States was no longer likely to institute aggressive action in their territories, their fear of the United States declined and their interest in the League waned. This state of affairs continued until the final collapse of the League of Nations. In general, the Latin American states failed in their aims of using the League to further their regional and individual economic interests, and to use the organization as a counter­ weight against United States influence. The scheme for a United Nations organization was devised during the years 1943-1945 by the great anti-Axis powers through a series of discussions which culminated in the United Nations Conference in San Francisco (April-June 1945); however, as early as 1942, the Juridical Committee of the Pan American

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Union proposed recommendations concerning the establishment of a universal organization to replace the League. Included was one suggestion that any projected organization must be harmonized with local regional groupings. Thereafter the Latin Americans played an important part in conferences which established the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. They were not invited to participate in the Dumbarton Oaks discussion in 1944, which they keenly resented. And they were antagonized by the secrecy of the meetings, fearing that the United States was shifting its position from regionalism to universalism. If this were the case, it might prove to be prejudicial to the interests of the smaller states, and possibly jeopardize the future of the inter-American system. The belief was well founded, for the Dumbarton Oaks draft recognized the usefulness of regional agencies, but considered that they might be dangerous if not effectively subordinated to the Security Council. Moreover, President Roosevelt, supported by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, adhered to the universalist position, assuming that United States-Soviet cooperation would continue into the postwar era. Support for the regional concept came, at first, from Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, and later from Assistant Secretary of State Nelson Rockefeller and Senator Arthur Vandenburg. When the Dumbarton Oaks conference was in progress the Latin Americans showed such obvious displeasure that Secretary of State Edward Stettinius invited them to attend a series of conferences at the White House to reassure them that everything possible was being done to preserve the inter-American system. In a critical report rendered later by Carlos Martins, Brazilian ambassador to the United States, on behalf of the coordinating com­ mittee set up by the Latin American state, great concern was shown about the relationship between the general and the regional organization, and the status accorded the smaller states within the former. They feared the great powers’ use of the veto and stressed the priority of inter-American procedures vis-à-vis the Security Council. It was partially a result of Latin American dissatisfaction that the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace met in Chapultepec Palace, in Mexico City, in February 1945. Argentina, alone of the Latin American states, was not invited on the grounds that only countries aiding the war effort should attend (the United States was angered at Argentina’s policy of neutrality in World War II, which aided the Nazis). The other Latin American nations were not pleased with this exclusion which the United States had insisted upon even though seventeen American states did not recognize the government of President Edelmiro Farrell (and Perón) which had come into being in 1943. Standing clearly in opposition to the universalist oriented Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the Latin American delegations affirmed their faith in the inter-American system going so far as to propose the adoption of a treaty of mutual assistance in the event of aggression by any state (American or non-American) against an American republic. This was a very surprising move: since military assistance would have to come from the United States, which alone was capable of providing it in any degree, the proposed treaty was, in effect, a request by the Latin American nations from the United States of

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military protection against aggression. Only a few years before, the United States had, itself, been charged with aggression in the region. The fact that such a treaty was proposed showed how greatly the situation in the Americas had altered in a few years. In broad outline the proposed treaty affirmed the relevance of the Monroe Doctrine, which had not specifically referred to the use of armed force, nor had it provided for the attack by one country of the Western Hemisphere on another. However, Washington found the terms of the treaty unacceptable, for (1 ) it was deemed inadvisable to make any commitment which might conflict with agreements it might be compelled to make to the United Nations incident to the latter’s establishment at the forthcoming session, and (2) it had already entered into agreements with its major anti-Axis allies, and it was reluctant to become a signatory to any further agreement which might be inconsistent with its existing obligations. The U.S. refusal to become a party to the treaty proved displeasing to the Latin American republics. The United Nations Conference on International Organization convened on April 25, 1945 in San Francisco with the attendance of representatives of fifty nations. The Conference ended on June 26 with the signing of the Charter and the Statute of the new International Court of Justice ; the Charter came into force on October 24, 1945. All twenty Latin American states sent delegations to the Conference, and since the principle of equality prevails in the U.N. Assembly, it followed that the Latin American nations had a more significant role in writing the Charter than their global political significance would suggest that they should. It is probable that the Latin American representatives exerted considerable influence on the content of the Charter, but it would be an exaggeration to say that the Charter was framed to conform with the ideas of the Latin American nations. When the text of the Charter of the United Nations was being drafted at San Francisco, the Latin American states gave enthusiastic support to the concept of world organization. But at the same time they were determined to insure a significant degree of autonomy and independence for their own regional organization, the Union of American Republics which had been in operation for fifty-five years. Their firmness on this point was strengthened by the fact that the veto privilege had been provided for the so-called great powers; this meant that in practice regional action could be overruled. Latin American statesmen therefore opposed putting final authority in the hands of an untried world organization and sought, through resolutions and motions, to weaken the world organization, and to strengthen the regional body. The problem of integrating the Pan American Union into the U.N. structure was complicated by the fact that there was no general agreement on the relative significance of world and regional organization. The proposal was made that subjects of exclusively American concern be assigned to the Pan American Union, and matters of world concern to the U.N. But this solution evaded the question by failing to explain how the two spheres of interest could be distinguished. It was clear, however, that in the event of jurisdictional conflict, one organization would inevitably have to give way to the other. The U.N. Charter gave its answer in favor of the supremacy of world organization. Article 52 of the Charter provided as follows: “ Nothing in the

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present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriated for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the organization.” The Charter adds that regional agencies shall be utilized in an attempt to settle local disputes before they are referred to the Security Council of the U.N. and states that the Security Council itself, “shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.” It continues, “But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. . . ” This theoretical statement of the relation of the Pan American Union and the U.N. was opposed at the San Francisco Conference by most of the Latin American states, and it is not surprising that an early solution to the problem was sought. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty of 1947) insured the victory of the Latin American nations and the advocates of regionalism over universalism within the U.S. government. Article 3 of the Rio Treaty authorizing collective resistance to an armed attack was consistent with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The Rio Treaty turned the regional association into a regional security organization, with security questions to be handled by an Otgan of Consultation tentatively designated as the Meeting of Foreign Ministers; the Ninth Conference confirmed that the Meetings of Foreign Ministers should exercise the functions of the Organ of Consultation referred to in the Rio Treaty. The role of Latin America in the United Nations has differed markedly from that in the League, for all the states have been participating members from the beginning, and a Latin American bloc has existed since the United Nations was established. Moreover, the region had two seats on the Security Council from the outset, and the General Assembly frequently has a Latin American president and always a Latin American vice-president. In the U.N. the Latin American delegates have seldom voted as a solid bloc on any issue; however, the majority has shown opposition to colonialism, aggression, intervention, and racial discrimination. On issues involving the status of dependent peoples Latin Americans have tended to be more lenient and understanding toward France, Italy, and Portugal than toward the remnants of other colonial empires. Greater unanimity is shown on economic and social matters than those relating to U.N. financing and international law. On hemispheric security problems involving the cold war the Latin American bloc has generally supported the United States. Brazil has followed the United States initiative quite consistently, as has Argentina since 1954. Guatemala showed intransigence prior to 1954, and Mexico has frequently taken an independent position. Cuba has been a member of the Soviet bloc in the United Nations since 1960. In matters concerning international trade and economic development the Latin Americans have been more successful in furthering their interests through the United Nations than in its predecessor. The first test of the U.N. Charter provisions concerning regional organizations arose in June 1954 when the Arbenz government of Guatemala charged that U.S.-supported attacks were being launched from Nicaragua and Honduras. Guatemala appealed simultaneously to the United Nations and the

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Inter-American Peace Committee but requested suspension of consideration of its complaint by the latter, an OAS agency. This was quickly followed by a request for complete withdrawal of the case. Guatemala took this position because it recognized that the OAS, under the leadership of the United States, would be more disposed to seek its overthrow than to prevent it. This assumption was substantiated by the action of the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas, in March 1954. Although the Caracas Declaration fell short of the United States draft, Washington viewed it as a collective commitment to condone or support the ousting of the Arbenz goverment. The Guatemala crisis set the pattern for other crises which would follow: the Cuban crises of 1961 and 1962, and the Dominican crisis of 1965. In the debates which arose in the Guatemalan case it became evident that, “whereas at San Francisco the great Latin American concern had been that an appeal to the regional enforcement machinery might be paralyzed by a Security Council veto, in the Guatemala case the plaintiff sought most urgently to avert any regional action whatsoever and restrict consideration of the case to the United Nations.” The United States, which clearly supported the anti-Arbenz invasion force, insisted that the case be referred to the OAS instead of the Security Council in order to forestall the raising of any barrier to the success of the invasion. The Soviet Union wished to keep the case before the Security Council as a means of protecting its beachhead in the Western Hemisphere. Obviously, the Guatemalan case was not merely a problem confined to the Western Hemisphere, but another episode in the global cold war. The principle of regional jurisdiction was adopted in this instance, but the United States did not secure Latin American acceptance of the “OAS-first” priority concept precluding the right of an American state to appeal to the Security Council when it is threatened. This became clear at the Ninth General Assembly late in 1954 when several Latin American governments contended that their membership in the OAS did not imply any restriction on their right to appeal to the United Nations. In July 1960 the Cuban government requested that the Security Council meet to consider charges of interventionist policy and conspiracy to commit aggression, which it leveled against the United States. Like the Guatemala affair it involved a collision between the United States and a Communist-backed regime. Cuba chose the Council rather than the OAS, but both organizations were convened to consider the case. Ultimately the Council referred the matter to the OAS, but it neither disclaimed its own jurisdiction nor denied Cuba’s right of appeal to the United Nations. Although the United States managed to assert the primacy of regional jurisdiction, it did not gain full Latin American endorsement of this principle. In April 1961, the two precedents were repeated when Cuba appealed to the Security Council for action against the United States and other states in regard to the Bay of Pigs invasion attempt. This was an abortive effort to overthrow the Castro regime, by then a client state of the Soviet Union, in which the United States at first denied, and later admitted, complicity. It was a re-run of the Guatemala case with Washington supporting OAS jurisdiction and the Soviet Union insisting upon U.N. action, but with significant differences: the Soviet-backed regime was not toppled and the U.N. did not refer the matter to the OAS. However, the Security Council proved unwilling to act before or

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during the invasion and failed ultimately to take any action. In a modified joint draft, adopted as a General Assembly Resolution, the pro-OAS content was virtually removed. The U.N. action attenuated the principle that the OAS has jurisdiction over hemispheric problems that its members are obliged to accept and U.N. agencies to honor. The Latin American nations, which had previously supported this position, reacted against it in this Cuban case. In May 1963, the Security Council was asked to consider the dispute involving Haiti and the Dominican Republic, at the former’s request. No jurisdictional problem arose on this occasion as Haiti agreed to refer the matter to the OAS. Similarly, complaints were brought before the Security Council by Panama against the United States as a result of the anti-American outbreaks in January 1964. The jurisdictional problem did not arise, for both nations agreed to the validity of OAS authority. In both of these cases (Haiti and Panama), however, the complainants agreed to deal with the OAS on the condition that their right to appeal to the Security Council was not inhibited. In October 1962, the United States responded to the covert installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba by demanding their immediate removal and by carrying out a naval blockade to prevent a continuation of the Soviet Union’s military build up on the island. President Kennedy secured the prompt endorsement of these unilateral measures by a resolution of the OAS Council requesting all members of the organization, in accordance with articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Pact, to “take measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force,’* in support of the United States actions. On this occasion Washington took the initiative in bringing the Security Council, as well as the OAS, into the case since this time it was alleging aggression. UN Secretary-General U Thant went to Havana, but the Castro government refused to allow international inspection of the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba (releasing the United States from its promise not to attempt the overthrow of the Castro regime in return for removal). While the UN action was ineffectual in this crisis, a precedent was established for the personal intervention of the secretary-general in Latin American affairs. Another precedent was established by the OAS decreeing the application of military sanctions, but it is clear that the United States did not regard their validity as being contingent upon the approval of the Security Council under Article 53. Rather, the United States stood on the principle that the OAS is an independent organization whose function it is to protect the Western Hemisphere without interference from the UN. In the Dominican Republic crisis of April 1965, the United States intervened unilaterally to prevent a Communist seizure of power and then called upon the OAS to endorse and support its action. Up to that time the Latin American members of the Security Council had given the United States consistent support of security matters, but in this instance Uruguay supported the principle of UN intervention which weakened the United States stand that hemispheric matters were within the jurisdiction of the OAS. This enabled Secretary-General U Thant to send his representatives to the Dominican Republic, but their role was negligible for the occupation was carried out by the United States through the OAS. Despite the intent of its framers, the paramount, universalist character of the United Nations has given way to regional jurisdiction in the Western

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Hemisphere, as well as in other parts of the world where regional organizations must deal with political and security problems. The principle set forth in Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, that regional agencies should not take enforcement action without the approval of the Security Council, has been superseded by the exceptions found in that article and in Article 51. In practice, member states of the United Nations have come to rely upon regional alliance systems, established to operate autonomously, for the maintenance of inter­ national peace and security instead of the Security Council. Such alteration of the relationship between regional agencies and the United Nations was a product of cold war power politics. Fundamentally, it is related to the continuing attempts by the United States to thwart the Soviet Union’s veto power and the Soviet Union’s effort to preserve that power. Thus the United States, which resisted the attempts by other members of the inter-American system to achieve regional autonomy in the early stages of the United Nations, has shifted to a position in support of it. As a result of the cases involving the threat of communism in the hemisphere the United States has commonly found itself cast in the role as an opponent of a strong and efficient world organization, whereas the Soviet Union has presented the image of a champion of the integrity and competence of the United Nations. A seemingly anomalous situation was created in which the United States continued to support the primacy of the United Nations in the global system, but with the reservation that it retain freedom of action in combating Communist activity in the Western Hemisphere. Although the OAS has not gained a monopolistic authority over disputes in the hemisphere, the security Council of the United Nations has been deprived of effective authority to restrict or regulate the enforcement procedures of the OAS. Renewed Chinese interest in Latin America appeared in 1971, and by early 1972 six Western Hemisphere nations were in diplomatic contact with the People’s Republic of China. An important corollary of the moves toward diplomatic relations was the Latin American support for Peking’s entry into the United Nations, a move accompanied in some instances by votes to unseat Taiwan’s Nationalist Chinese government. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, or Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, represents a concerted move by fcatin Americans, in collaboration with the United Nations, to achieve the military denuclearization of their portion of the Western Hemisphere.4 7 Brazil first introduced the idea to the 17th U.N. General Assembly in 1962. On April 29, 1963, five Latin American presidents drafted a joint declaration in which they announced that their governments were prepared to sign a multilateral Latin American agreement whereby they would undertake “not to manufacture, receive, store, or test nuclear weapons or nuclear launching devices.” On November 27, 1963, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved resolution 1911 (XVIII), entitled “Denuclearization of Latin 4 4 7Tlatelolco is the Aztec name of the historic district of Mexico City in which the treaty

was approved on Feb. 12, 1967. For background see Alfonso Garcia Robles, The Denuclearization of Latin America (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1967); El Tratado de Tlatelolco: Genesis, Alcance y Propósitos de la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la America Latina (El Colegio de Mexico, 1967); Rutgers University, Disarmament in the Western World, Occasional Papers No. 1 (June 1969).

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America,” in which the Assembly praised the initiative embodied in the declaration. After the 18 th session of the Assembly had ended the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated consultations with the ministries of foreign affairs of the other Latin American republics on measures likely to be most effective for carrying out the recommendations of the above resolution. The outcome of these consultations was the Preliminary Meeting on the Denuclearization of Latin America, which took place in Mexico from November 23-27, 1964. At this meeting two basic resolutions were adopted: The first defined the term “denuclearization,” specifying that it should mean solely “the absence of nuclear weapons,” and not the prohibition of the peaceful use of the atom, which should, on the contrary, be encouraged, especially for the benefit of the developing countries. The second resolution established the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America and instructed the Commission to prepare a draft treaty of the subject. This was completed early in 1967 with the adoption and opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The treaty was later endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly during its 22nd session with the adoption of resolution 2286 (XXII). At the same time, a series of urgent appeals were addressed by the Assembly to all states which might become signatories to the treaty, and the powers possessing nuclear weapons, to sign and ratify as soon as possible. The Treaty of Tlatelolco consists of thirty-one articles, one transitional article, and two additional protocols. With the aim of facilitating, ensuring, and verifying compliance with the obligations contracted by the parties, the treaty contains in Article 5 an objective definition of what, for the purposes of the treaty, is to be understood by “nuclear weapon;” it sets up an Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the principal organs of which will be a General Conference, a Council, and a Secretariat; it also establishes a Control System which is described in Articles 12 to 16, and 18, paragraphs two and three. The United States government conveyed its full support to the Commis­ sion, regarding the initiative of the Latin American countries as an outstanding example of regional activity to limit and control armaments. However, Washington’s endorsement of the establishment of nuclear-free zones is given only under certain specified conditions: where the initiative for such zones originates within the area concerned; where the zone includes all states in the area whose participation is deemed important; where the creation of a zone would not disturb necessary security arrangements; and where provisions are included for following up alleged violations in order to give reasonable assurance of compliance within the zone. Under these criteria the United States could not accept the proposal to make Central Europe a nuclear-free zone, but for such areas as Latin America and Africa, the idea met with Washington’s complete approval.4 8 Protocol II of the treaty, which calls upon the powers possessing nuclear weapons to respect the status of denuclearization in Latin America, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Latin American states party to the treaty, was signed by Vice President Hubert Humphrey for the United States4 4 8Dept of State Bulletin, LVI (Apr. 3,1967), pp. 575-576.

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on April 1, 1968, at Mexico City. President Johnson expressed the “hope that all nuclear powers will respect this great achievement of Latin American diplom­ acy.” The Soviet Union and France delayed signing Protocol II, and the People’s Republic of China rejected it. By October 1967 the last of the twenty-one states that were members of the Preparatory Commission had signed the treaty. And Mexico’s announcement in May 1969 was that, eleven nations having deposited instruments of ratification, a permanent agency would be set up to administer the treaty.4 9 As an engagement entered into voluntarily among neighboring states, the treaty sets a pattern for arms control and verification that points the way for other regions and for the world as a whole, if the nuclear danger that threatens mankind is ever to be brought under control. 49Ibid., LIX (Aug. 5,1968), p. 138;New York Times, Oct. 2,1 9 6 6 ;Ibid., May 7,1969.

\

T ab le 2 -1 .

Spanish-A m erican C ongresses, 1 8 2 6 -8 8 *

Major Agenda Items

Name

Date

Location

Countries A ttending

Panama Congress

1826

Panama City, Panama

Central America, Gran Colombia, Mexico, Peru

Peace and Security; federal union for Latin America; suppression of slavery

Several agreements signed; none ratified by all signatories

Congress o f Lima (or "American Congress")

1847-48

Lima, Peru

Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, New Granada (Colombia), Peru

Consideration of defen­ sive measures to be taken to prevent Spanish reconquest of west-coast states of South America.

Three treaties signed; none ratified

Continental Congress

1856

Santiago, Chile,

Chile, Ecuador, Peru

Consideration of collective measures to be taken in event of U.S. incursions

A treaty of mutual assistance, stating that if signatories were attacked by the U.S., all would unite against the U.S.

Congress o f Lima

1864-65

Lima, Peru

Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, Venezuela

Consideration of possible responses to presence of Spanish in Santo Domingo and French in Mexico

Treaty of “Union and “Alliance** signed; not ratified

Outcome

♦Forerunners of Pan American Conferences. 5

Source: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States-Latin American Relations. The Organization of American States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 16. 6

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Pan A m erican C on feren ces, 1 8 8 9 -1 9 6 7

Name

Date

Location

Countries A ttending

Major Agenda Items

First International Conference o f American States

Oct. 2, 1889-April 19,1890

Washington, D.C., United States

All the American republics then in existence, except the Dominican Republic (18)

Discussion of problems of mutual interest, principally questions of peace, trade, and communications.

Formation of the International Union of American Republics and the “ Bureau of American Republics.”

Second International Conference of American States

Oct. 22, 1901-Jan. 22,1902

Mexico City, Mexico

All the American republics then in existence (19)

Discussion of international legal questions; procedures for arbitration of disputes; problems of hemispheric peace

Protocol of adherence to Hague Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Treaty of Arbitration for Pecuniary Claims.

Third International Conference of American States

July 21Aug. 26, 1906

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

All the American republics except Haiti and Venezuela (19)

Consideration of problem of forcible collection of debts; discussion of Drago and Calvo doctrines.

Conference decided to take question of forcible collection of debts to Second Hague Conference. Convention on International Law.

All the American republics except Bolivia (20)

Consideration of various economic and cultural matters.

Decision to change name of International Bureau of American Republics to Pan American Union.

s'

Fourth International Conference of American States

July 12Aug. 30, 1910

Buenos Aires, Argentina

Outcome

Fifth International Conference of American States

March 25May 3, 1923

Santiago, Chile,

All the American republics except Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru (18)

Discussion of reorganization of Pan American Union (PAU) for purpose of reduc­ ing U.S. dominance; discussion of possible modification of Monroe Doctrine.

Treaty To Avoid or Prevent Conflicts Between American States (Gondra Treaty). Decision to make chairman­ ship of PAU elective.

Sixth International Conference of American States

Jan. 16Feb. 29, 1928

Havana, Cuba

AU the American republics (21)

Latin American delegates anxious to secure condemnation of U.S. intervention in the Caribbean

Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife (designed to prevent use of other American countries as bases for launching revolutionary activity).

Dec. 10, International Conference o f American 1928-Jan. 5,1929 States on Conciliation and Arbitration

Washington, D.C., United States

All the American repubUcs except Argentina (20)

Problem of arbitration and conciliation of disputes.

General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation. General Treaty of InterAmerican Arbitration.

Seventh International Conference of American States

Dec. 326, 1933

Montevideo, Uruguay

AU the American republics except Costa Rica (20)

Problem of U.S. dominancè and intervention

Convention on Rights and Duties of States; concerned with the principle of nonintervention.

Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance o f Peace

Dec. 1-23, 1936

Buenos Aires, Argentina

AU the American repubUcs (21)

Security of hemisphere in event of war in Europe or Far East; principle of nonintervention.

Declaration of Principles of Inter-American SoUdarity and Cooperation; additional protocol relative to nonintervention.

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( “Control of the Panama Canal: An Obsolete Shibboleth? , Foreign Affairs, 37 (Apr., 1959), pp. 407-418.

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Treasury under President Eisenhower, and John N. Irwin; representing Panama were Ambassador Ricardo Arias, Diogenes de la Rosa and Roberto Alemán. The negotiators, working within the neutral-grounds confines of the United Nations, had by June, 1967, reached agreement on new treaties governing control of the Panama Canal, and possible construction of a sea-level canal. The treaties’ provisions could be interpreted as creating a partnership between the two nations in the administration of the present or future waterways, for the United States would surrender its historic sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone, and Panamanians would help run the existing Canal, as well as any sea-level canal in their territory. It would have returned to Panama a large portion of the land then in the Canal Zone, and assured her of at least $17 million in canal tolls. Washington insisted that the revocation of the 1903 treaty be made contingent on the negotiation of two additional treaties, the first describing conditions for the continuing presence of United States military bases in Panama, and the other relating to conditions under which a sea-level canal might be built across Panama. As in the past, the new treaties specified that the present Canal and any new sea-level canal be open at all times to vessels of all nations.6 8 When the treaties were concluded it appeared that the negotiators had found a formula satisfactory to both countries. Being aware, however, that objections were bound to arise, the Johnson and Robles governments decided to resolve the problem in secret, by negotiations carried on without exposure to the public. It was believed that a concensus could be reached more readily in this manner than by making public the texts of the treaties, explaining them to their people, and urging ratification. The plan miscarried, for in Panama the opponents of any compromise divulged portions of the texts, along with their own denunciations. The resulting display of popular disapproval compelled President Robles to delay any attempt at ratification.6 9 Popular opinion in the United States, at first almost wholly favorable towards the treaties, was stirred by protests from Representive Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania, Representative H. R. Gross of Iowa and Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, who were outraged at Washington’s willingness to acknowledge Panama’s sovereignty over the Canal Zone. These individuals supported the American Emergency Committee on the Panama Canal, which sought to block ratifications of the new treaties. The status of the treaties in Panama was further confused by events occurring in Panama’s electoral campaign of 1968. With the presidential election of May 12 approaching, the opposition assembly deputies, who favored the candidacy of Dr. Amulfo Arias, voted to impeach President Robles for his alleged tampering with the electoral process in favor of Dr. Arias’s rival, David Samudio. Dr. Arias, who had repudiated the unsigned drafts of the three canal treaties during his campaign, calling them a “sell out,” was officially declared president-elect on May 30, 1968, amid a bitter anti-United States atmosphere. Newspapers and radio stations which had backed Samudio charged Washington with open intervention through agents of the Central Intelligence Agency and Panama’s National Guard in imposing the candidacy of Dr. Arias. Both * * Wall Street' Journal, Sept. 6,1967. 6 9Carl T. Rowan, “New Peril to the Panama Canal,” Reader’s Digest, 92 (Mar., 1968), p. 182.

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candidates agreed, for different reasons, that the election had been “one of the most shameful in the history of the country,” as Dr. Arias put it. The destruction, theft or seizure of ballot boxes, the altering of results on official tally sheets and the various pressures applied to voters were widespread. Dr. Arias, a graduate of Harvard Medical School, and a member of the traditional ruling elite, assumed the presidency on October 11, 1968. He held office for eleven days at which point his efforts to control the country’s military caused the National Guard to force him out. Seeking refuge in the Canal Zone, Arias* presence constituted an embarassment for the U.S. Embassy. A military junta headed by Brigadier General Omar Torrijos Herrera, and including colonels Boris Martínez, José Pinilla and Bolivar Urrutia, seized control of the nation and quickly suspended all constitutional guarantees and civil liberties. Commonly regarded as nonpolitical, few Latin American military units have received more training and assistance from the United States armed services than those of Panama.70 Behind the Arias candidacy was a strange coalition. After years of denouncing the Panamanian oligarchy, of which he is an unorthodox member, Dr. Arias, a “man of the people/’ who had enjoyed the support of the masses, accepted the oligarchy’s support, as had his opponent. He contended that the union was made to further economic progress. However, in a country where for several decades both the government and the economy had been dominated by hardly more than thirty families, his motives were questioned by foreign observers. Beyond the power elite are more than 1.3 million Pan­ amanians most of whom live in obscurity in the slums of the capital, or in rural hovels. They function as a political force to the degree that they emerge to vote in elections. But their contribution and involvement is open to question, since the political process in Panama has so often suffered from intimidation and questionable practices.71 The Panamanian population is composed chiefly of mixed racial elements, the majority, 50-65 percent, being the mulatto-mestizo segment. Pure Indians make up 10 per cent while Caucasians and Negroes each approximate 10-15 percent. The whites rank first on the social scale followed by mestizos, mulattoes and Negroes. Deep social rifts are found between these groups. Although the average annual per capita income was fixed at $487 in the late 1960s, placing Panama fifth among the Latin American nations, the population was generally impoverished. One of the most serious obstacles to economic development was the land tenure system. It was estimated that 1.5 percent of the population owned 50 percent of the arable land, and that only 3 percent of the land was being utilized. The lack of capital, or failure to invest available capital, inadequate transportation facilities, antiquated farming methods, and the prevalence of graft, corruption and nepotism helped to retard economic growth.72 Panama’s economy has been characterized by an apparent unfavorable balance of trade, but this has been compensated in recent years by income from 20

20N¡ 9 1 0 ° rk TÍmeS' May 31’ 1968i íbÍdy ° Ct* 12’ 1968; Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 71 New York Times, Mar. 27,1968. 2See Louis K. Harris, “Panama,” in Ben G. Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson, eds Political Forces m Latin America, Dimensions p f the Quest for Stability (Belmont, Calif., 1968), pp.

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the Canal. The Canal and all operations connected with it produced $115 million in 1967, or one-sixth of the gross national product. Bananas, the production of which is largely controlled by the United Fruit Company, represented 35 percent of the total exports by value in 1963. Petroleum exports accounted for 32.5 percent followed by shrimp, cacao, meat and sugar. In spite of the Panamanians* restiveness in the 1960s, and a commonly high level of unemploy­ ment, the republic’s economy showed a remarkable expansion in that period. From 1961-1967 Panama's yearly average increase in gross national product was 8.4 percent, the highest in Latin America. Panama profited from a number of factors which were helping to make it a commercial crossroads of the world. Its dollar-based economy was attractive to foreign investors, more income was gained from record use of the Canal by ocean-going ships, and trade with other isthmian countries was stimulated by the Central American Common Market. Washington's desire to maintain a friendly and stable political climate was translated into large amounts of aid funds, and while the canal treaties had not been ratified, their existence established the principle of greater direct financial benefit to the government and private business sectors, and this prospect helped to create optimism. A highly promising service industry was banking. Panama had thirteen wholly or partly-owned foreign banks in 1967, making her an important regional financial center. Agriculture lagged behind manufacturing in growth, and the government prepared to start a new phase of its rural development program.73 The momentum of economic growth continued with an 8.6 percent gain in gross national product in 1970, which was believed to have carried through 1971. Government expenditures in the construction industry may have helped to sustain this growth. The regime expropriated some large estates, implementing land reform promises, and gave support to increased credit and investment in agriculture. Describing itself ambiguously as “revolutionary” and neither Communist nor capitalist, the regime, headed by “Supreme Leader,” General Omar Torrijos Herrera, indicated that “with a well-defined economic policy, the private sector will develop the economy, and the state will develop opportunities for betterment with the people’s full participation.” 74 Economic assistance from Washington had made substantial contributions to Panama's advance, a fact acknowledge by rural Panamanians who had not been disturbed by the Canal controversy. Economic assistance committed to Panama by the United States in the period 1948-1970 amounted to $156.5 million; indirect assistance channeled through regional and international organ­ izations totaled more than $20 million. To this was added the services rendered by technical experts and more than one hundred Peace Corps Volunteers. Economically, the country has been closely tied to the United States: U.S. exports to Panama reached $208 million, and imports from Panama totaled $76 million, in 1970.75 Wishing to resolve what had become one of the most bitter and enduring bilateral disputes in hemispheric relations, the Nixon administration moved7 7 3Dept, of State, la tin America Growth Trends- Seven Years o f the Alliance for Progress, April, 1968, p. 54; New York Times, January 22, 1968. The discovery of copper deposits in 1968 offered new hope for the mining industry. See Wall Street Journal, February 26, 1969. 74New York Times, January 28,1972. 75Statistical Abstract o f the United States 1971, p. 763; p. 768.

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cautiously toward further negotiations on the Canal treaty. After the military coup in 1968, followed by the closing of Congress, Washington hesitated to negotiate with a regime whose signature might not be honored by future Panamanian administrations. When it had become reasonably clear the Torrijos was not a transitory figure and his popularity was sufficient to gain broad national acceptance for a Canal treaty, Washington pushed negotiations. A Panamanian negotiating team headed by José Antonio de la Ossa, Ambassador to the United States, and a U.S. delegation led by Robert B. Anderson, had reached only tentative agreement on some aspects of the treaties in late 1971 after four months of negotiation.76 The Department of State summarized the U.S. position as follows: Primary U.S. objectives under the Nixon administration are continued U.S. control and defense of the existing canal. The rights (without obligation) to expand the existing canal or to build a sea-level canal are essential to U.S. agreement to a new treaty, with the exact conditions to accompany these rights to be determined by negotiation. The U.S. is willing to provide greater economic benefits from the canal for Panama and release unneeded land areas, again with exact terms to be developed by negotiation. Negotiations between the United States and Panama began June 29,1971. Important issues such as duration, jurisdiction, land and water requirements, expansion of canal capacity and compensation are now being explored, but no agreements have been reached. September 1971.77

The largely government-controlled press in Panama continued to publish frequent reports critical of U.S. activities in the Canal Zone. General Torrijos, celebrating his third year as Panama’s ruler, declared that if necessary Panamanians would die to regain sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone, and that “no people would like to see a foreign flag flying in the heart of their country.” On another occasion he said: “in negotiations with the United States over the Canal General Torrijos will end up standing or dead, but never on his knees.” A long standing foe of any concessions to Panama on the treaty question, congressman Daniel J. Flood, viewed the negotiations and news stories as a “studied propaganda campaign by the executive branch to sway people to agree to the monstrous proposal.” 78 The negotiations were continued, but as of January 197^ progress toward agreement on basic issues seemed negligible. At that point Panama held that a new canal treaty should run only until 1994; that the Republic’s jurisdiction over the Zone be declared immediately; that U.S. police functions in the Zone terminate within five years; that the Canal acquire political neutrality instead of continuing as a wholly American waterway; and that the U.S. Military Southern command be removed from its territory. Moreover, Panama categorically rejected Washington’s proposal for a “system of canals.” Thus, after about nine years of negotiations Washington and Panama found themselves almost as far apart on their views concerning a new treaty as at the time of the crisis of 1964.797 76Times o f the Americas, November 3, 1971. 77“The State Department Position Paper on Negotiations Concerning a Revised Panama Canal Treaty, Inter-American Economic Affairs (Winter, 1971), 25 ; 92-96. 197imeS tke Americas' November 24, 1971; Christian Science Monitor, October 12, 7’ New York Times, December 24,1972; Times o f the Americas, January 3,1973.

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The United States* assumption of credit for the emergence of Panama as one of the most literate, healthy, developing countries of Latin America rather than a disease-ridden backward nation, is based on a solid foundation of evidence. However, with the advance of modem communications, increasing literacy, and the spread of communism, the Panamanians, like their counterparts in other developing countries, have become discontented and more easily manipulated by demagogues, various alienated groups, and Communists. Playing on the theme of inequality of United States policies in the Canal Zone, the reigning oligarchy has been able to divert the masses* attention from political and economic inefficiency, corruption and injustice, for which it is responsible, to the Americans. Thus, the United States became a ready-made scapegoat for Panama’s own failures. Panamanian politicians have found it easy to cast the northern colossus in this role because of problems relating to the Canal Zone, its position as the world’s most powerful and prosperous nation, and the invidious contrast in the level of living in the Zone with other parts of Panama. In view of these circumstances it seems likely that the presence of the United States in the Zone has helped to perpetuate the status quo in Panama. Whatever the outcome of negotiations on the new canal treaties, there will be a continuing need to study Panamanian politics within the context of problems related to the existing and any future canal.80 As we have noted, Panama has always had special military and commercial significance for the United States. The present Canal shortens by 7,873 miles the sea distance between New York and San Francisco; and in recent years 82 percent of the commercial caigo transiting the Canal originates in or is destined for the United States. It has served as a supply line for the United States and its allies in two world wars, and during the so-called cold war. In World War II 5,300 combat vessels and 8,500 craft carrying troops and cargo crossed the waterway. Prior to World War II the United States had essentially a one-ocean navy and the Canal was vital in order that the fleets in either ocean could be quickly reinforced. The United States built a many-ocean fleet during and after that war, and with large fleets in both the Atlantic and Pacific the need for reinforcing either is less critical than in the past. Moreover, since the development of nuclear weapons and missiles the present lock-canal is virtually indefensible. One nuclear explosion could block the Canal, therefore it can no longer be counted upon in war time. United States Defense Department officials contend, however, that in a strategic sense an isthmian canal is more important than ever before, and that in the future its purely military significance may increase. In the Navy, for instance, the missile-firing nuclear-power submarine is becoming the capital ship of the fleet, and anti-submarine warfare vessels, “killer” submarines and missile-firing surface ships are supplanting and may eventually displace the aircraft carriers; these ships are small enough to use a sea-level canal, or even the existing one. From an economic point of view an isthmian waterway is of vital defense interest to industry in the United States. Strategic raw materials essential to the 80J. Fred Rippy, “The United States and Panama: The High Cost of Appeasement/’ Inter-American Economic Affairs, 17 (Spring, 1964), 87-88; Larry L. Pippin, “The Challenge of Panama,” Current History, 50 (January, 1966), pp. 6-7; 53.

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economy of the United States in peace and war pass through the Canal from the West Coast of South America, and millions of tons of oil are carried from coast to coast each year. With the growth of industrialization and cooperative marketing arrangements among the Latin American countries its logistical importance will doubtless increase. The isthmian waterway may well become a keystone of Hemispheric industrial security in the future.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS Abbott, Willis J. Panama and the Canal. New York, 1944. Arce, Enrique J., and Ernesto J. Castillero. Guía Histórica de Panama. Panama, 1942. Biesanz, John and Mavis. The People o f Panama. New York, 1964. Bishop, J. B. The Panama Gateway. New York, 1913. Bunau-Varilla, Philippe. Panama: The Creation, Destruction, and Resurrection. New York, 1914. Calcott, W. H. The Caribbean Policy o f the United States, 1890-1920. Baltimore, 1942. Castillero Reyes, Ernesto J. Episodios de la Independencia de Panama. Panama, 1957. Colombia, Cámara de Represantes de Colombia. Investigación sobre la rebelión del Istmo de Panama. Bogota, 1915. Colombia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Libro Azul de Colombia. Documentos diplomáticos sobre el Canal y la rebelión del Istmo de Panama. Bogotá, 1904. Dean, Arthur H. William Nelson Cromwell. New York, 1957. Dennet, Tyler. John Hay. New York, 1933. Dennis, A. L. P. Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906. New York, 1928. Du Val, Miles P., Jr. A nd the Mountains will Move. Stanford, 1947. -------------. Cadiz to Cathay. Stanford, 1947. Ealy, Lawrence O. The Republic o f Panama in World Affairs, 1903-1950. Philadelphia, 1951. Favell, T. R. The Antecedents o f Panama's Separation from Colombia. Ph.D. dissertation. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Harding, Earl. The Untold Story o f Panama. New York, 1959. Hebard, R. W. The Panama Railroad: The First Transcontinental, 1855-1955. New York, N.D. Howarth, David. Panama: Four Hundred Years o f Dreams and Cruelty. New York, 1966. Jones, Chester L. The Caribbean Since 1900. New York, 1936. Lopez, Georgina Jiménez de. Panama in Transition. Period, 1849-1940. Ph.D. dissertation. Columbia University. Mack, Gerstle. The Land Divided, A History o f the Panama Canal and other Isthmian Canal Projects. New York, 1944. Martz, John D. Central America: The Crisis and the Challenge. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1959. McCain, William D. The United States and the Republic o f Panama. Durham, N.C., 1937. Mecham, J. Lloyd. A Survey o f United States-Latin American Relations. New York, 1965. ________ . The United States and inter-American Security, 1889-1960. Austin, Texas, 1961. Mellander, G. The United States in Panamanian Politics, the Intriguing, Formative Years. Danville, 111., 1971. Miner, Dwight C. The Fight for the Panama Route. New York, 1940. Munro, Dana G. Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921. Princeton, 1964. Niemeier, Jean G. The Panama Story. Portland, Ore., 1968. Padelford, Norman J. The Panama Canal in Peace and War. New York, 1942. Panama, Junta Nacional del Cincuentenario, ed. Panama: 50 Años de República Panama. Panama, 1953.

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Parks, E. T. Colombia and the United States, 1765-1934. Durham, N.C., 1935. Pippin, Larry L. The Remón Era; An Analysis o f a Decade o f Events in Panama, 1947-1957. Stanford, 1964. Rippy, J. Fred. The Capitalists and Colombia. New York, 1931. ------------ . The Caribbean Danger Zone. New York, 1940. Roosevelt, Theodore. Theodore Roosevelt: Autobiography. New York, 1919. Sands, William F., and Joseph M. Lalley. Our Jungle Diplomacy. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1944. Uribe, Antonio José. Colombia y los Estados Unidos de América. Bogotá, 1931. United States Congress. Diplomatic History o f the Panama Canal, Sen. Doc. No. 474, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. United States Congress. The Story o f Panama : Hearings on the Rainey Resolution before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. Washington, D.C., 1913. United States Congress. Thompson, Hon. Clark W. “Isthmian Canal Policy of the United States-Documentation.” Congressional Record, March 23, 1955.

\

Mexico and the United States M exico is a nation o f rem arkable geographical, cultural, and hum an diversity, and it has som e features w hich m ake it distinct from the o th e r L atin Am erican countries. Most im p o rta n t is its proxim ity to the U nited States w ith w hich it shares a com m on boundary. Secondly, Mexico was established by Spain in the colonial period as a separate e n tity from the viceroyalties in S outh A m erica, and it had m ore direct c o n ta ct w ith East Asia, via the M anila-Acapulco trade, than o th er regions o f the Spanish E m pire in the New W orld. D istance and lack of c om m unications un til the age o f the airplane have tended to perp etu ate the separation o f the tw o regions. In com m on w ith C entral Am erica, M exico has coasts on the C aribbean and the Pacific, in terio r m ountains and scattered clusters o f p o p u latio n ; how ever, it is larger, show s greater physical contrasts and is m ore diversified econom ically. W ith an area o f 7 5 9 ,5 3 0 square m iles, M exico is the fo u rth largest c o untry am ong th e A m erican nations, only A rgentina, Brazil and the U nited States being larger, and n in th largest in the w orld. M exico’s mesa central, a great plateau from 500 0 to 8000 feet above sea level, accounts fo r a b o u t 14 p ercent of the land area, is th e site of the n a tio n ’s capital, and the hom e of the bulk o f the p o p u latio n . Stretching n o rth w ard from the plateau is a sloping, sparsely po p u lated and generally arid region ex tending to the U nited States. T he Pacific coast, lying to the w est and cut o ff by high m ountains, rem ains lightly p o p u lated . While easier of access from the central plateau, the G ulf of Mexico slope, being tro p ical and m ore subject to health problem s, is relatively undeveloped. S o u th o f the mesa central is a m oun tain o u s area where p opulation clusters are fo u n d in m any pockets and valleys. T he southeastern peninsula was n o t c onnected w ith the rest o f the co u n try by road until 1960. M exico includes the arid peninsula of Baja C alifornia, w hich, except fo r a small strip around Tia Juana and M exicali, is virtually u n p o p u late d and offers few passable roads. M exico lies on the T ropic o f C ancer roughly in the latitu d e o f the Sudan and E gypt. B ut th e clim ate is com plicated b y the great variety of relief features and th e presence o f tw o seas w ith som ew hat differen t tem perature conditions at th e same latitudes. T em p eratu res decrease w ith altitu d e and bring tem perate 229

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climatic conditions into the higher central basins. Three zones are recognized. The belt of high temperatures extends from sea-level to about 2000 feet. And the temperate zone, where most of the population is found, ranges from 2000 to 8000 feet. Above that level temperatures are quite cool. Much of the area of modern Mexico had been the home of a relatively advanced civilization before the arrival of the Spaniards in the early sixteenth century. After defeating the Aztecs the Spaniards quickly seized control of the densely populated high basins and brought the Indians into their labor scheme. As few Spanish women came to New Spain (Mexico) in the colonial period there was an extensive mingling of races. This factor, coupled with the comparatively small influx of outsiders, led to the rise of the mestizo as a distinct population element. Reflecting one of the world’s fastest rates of increase, Mexico’s population surged from 5,500,000 in 1805, to 15,150,000 in 1910, to almost forty-eight million in 1970. Of the total population some 10 percent are white, 60 percent mestizo, and 30 percent Indian, but this is only a rough estimate based on cultural features rather than physiological characteristics. Negroes, introduced as slaves in the colonial period, have been largely assimilated into the Mexican race. According to the 1950 Census the rural population was 57 percent of the total, but in 1960 it had declined to 49 percent. Mexico’s economy has traditionally been based on agricultural products and mineral raw materials; however, industrialization has become progressively important in recent times, attaining 27 percent of the gross national product in the late 1960s. Rich in mineral resources, Mexico ranks first in the world’s production of silver, third in lead, cadmium and antimony, fifth in zinc and seventh in copper. Iron ore, petroleum and coal remain important, especially for domestic use. While the traditional farming sector has lagged in production, an increasing proportion of agriculture, aided by irrigation programs, has reached a commercial level sufficient to permit Mexico, once an importer of many foodstuffs, to become self-sufficient in most items and even to export such grains as wheat. Mexico is, nevertheless, a comparatively poor nation suffering from a shortage of arable land and steeply rising population pressure. Only 10 percent of Mexico’s total land is arable, and of this about half is so dry it cannot be utilized. ^ Relations between Mexico and the United States since the early nineteenth century have shown the irregularity and unpredictability of a geological fault line, producing at times diplomatic upheavals followed by subsidence and apparent calm. The period 1820-1910 reflected undulations in the attitude of the United States toward Mexico moving from cautious friendship in the beginning to open hostility and back to friendship and encouragement. The Mexican Revolution and its impact on American interests in Mexico led to intervention, the exercise of diplomatic pressure and general estrangement. The reciprocal attitude of Mexico was one of hope, anxiety, fear, and suspicion. It has only been in the era of the “Good Neighbor” policy, approaching mid-century, that the relationship has been mutually satisfactory. Mexico and the United States share 1,935 miles of common frontier, a fact of inestimable importance in their relationship. This propinquity has done much to help form the attitudes and psychology of our peoples. History as well as geography has made the two nations continuously important to each other, for

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they were both a product of European settlement and shared a colonial status. Historical parallels, however, soon gave way to divergences in the evolution of the neighboring countries, which emphasized a growing disparity in the elements of national power and prestige. In the half-century following Mexico’s independence from Spain in 1821 the United States underwent great expansion in population, territory and industrial development, whereas Mexico emerged as a weak “client” state, characterized by arrested economic growth and political instability. Territorial expansion was justified by Americans in terms of a “Manifest Destiny,” which envisioned the United States as a continental republic, and a world power. Mexico felt insecure in this period, and with good reason, for by the revolt and annexation of Texas, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the Gadsden Purchase, she lost nearly a million square miles of territory to her more powerful northern neighbor. When our diplomatic relations with Mexico began, they promised to be cordial. Many Americans were sympathetic towards the Mexicans in their efforts to overthrow Spanish domination. The United States extended de fa c to recognition in 1822, at the same time urging this action by Spain;1 however, formal diplomatic relations were not established until 1825, incident to the arrival of the first United States minister. The proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 had slight impact in Mexico. The Mexicans regarded British recognition as more vital, and they also perceived correctly that the Monroe Doctrine was virtually meaningless without the active support of British naval power.2 The period 1825-1836 brought unfortunate developments in relations which were accented by differences in historical background, race, temperament and religion. In 1826 Joel Poinsett of South Carolina was appointed first minister to Mexico by President John Quincy Adams. Poinsett’s appointment proved to be ill-advised, for in an extra-official capacity he undiplomatically aided in the formation of York rite Masons to oppose monarchical tendencies exerted through the Scottish rite Masonic Lodges. This antagonized the Mexican conservatives and his recall was demanded.3 Further suspicion and distrust was aroused by the activities of Colonel Anthony Butler, our second minister to Mexico. Commissioned by President Andrew Jackson to purchase a portion or all of Texas, Butler remained insistent after the offer had been rejected by the Mexican government, and was ordered out of the country after it was revealed that he was organizing an insurrection in Texas, where he owned land. It has been suggested, on good evidence, that his sole qualifications for the post were “an acquaintance with Texas and a strong desire to see the United States obtain it.”4 In spite of these two unfortunate ministerial appointments, a treaty was signed in 1828 confirming the boundary fixed by the United States and Spain in 1819, and a treaty of amity and commerce was concluded three years later. W illiam S. Robertson, “The Recognition o f the Hispanic American Nations by the United States,” Hispanic American Historical Review, I (1918), 261. 2David Y. Thomas, One Hundred Years o f the Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1923 (New York, 1923), p. 43. 3William R. Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico (Baltimore, 1916), p. 191. 4J. H. Smith, The War with Mexico (New York, 1919), I, 62.

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Because the United States government had instructed both Poinsett and Butler to renegotiate the Texas boundary, or to acquire the territory by purchase, each effort failing in its purpose, the Mexicans grew increasingly suspicious that its northern neighbor would incite the Texans to rebellion. Since 1819 the eastern boundary of the United States and Mexico was formed by the Sabine River, but the former wished to extend it to the Rio Grande or Colorado river. Faced with the possibility of an independence movement in Texas, the Mexican Congress in 1830 closed the area to immigration from the United States, suspended land grants to colonists, and abolished the powers of various states of the Republic, a measure that the Texans took to be aimed specifically at them.5 In 1836 the Americans living in Texas proclaimed their independence, but it was soon evident that Mexico was not willing to let Texas go. A Texas garrison at the Alamo mission in San Antonio was exterminated, and another at Goliad suffered about the same fate. General Sam Houston, emerging as the national hero of Texas, kept a small army together, and at the Battle of San Jacinto (April 21, 1836, near present-day Houston), he defeated the Mexican army and took the dictator, General Antonio López de Santa Anna, prisoner. Although the Mexican government refused to recognize the captured dictator’s vague promises to withdraw Mexican authority from Texas, and sent armed bands into the area on two occasions in 1842, it made no further major attempts to subdue the province. The United States government was not responsible for the independence movement in Texas; however, many Americans rendered unneutral assistance to the Texans.6 The Mexicans had legitimate grievances on the weak enforcement of the neutrality policy, and were particularly resentful when President Jackson extended recognition to Texas in March 1837, just before leaving office.7 Not satisfied with independence and recognition, the new Republic sought annexation by the United States. Sound reasons dictated the decision of the Texas leaders. Texas lacked the human and natural resources to support the expenses of a national government, and there remained the ever-present threat that Mexico would try to reconquer the state. But fundamentally, Texas wanted annexation because the great majority of its people were Americans who wished to be part of their country. The Texan’s overtures for annexation were rebuffed by the administra­ tions of Jackson and Martin Van Buren because of the problems of Democratic party unity, and the growing sectional conflict over the expansion of slavery. Finding the United States unreceptive, Texas sought recognition, support and money in Europe. Her leaders talked about creating a vast southwestern nation, The Mexican government encouraged American immigration in the early 1820s by offering land grants to individuals like Stephen Austin who would agree to colonize families on their concessions. The great majority came from the Southern states, often bringing slaves, although slavery was forbidden in Mexico after 1829. By 1835 about thirty-five thousand Americans were living in Texas. 6U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster denied the complicity of his government in the Texas independence movement. See British and Foreign State Papers, XXXI, 801, and House Ex. Doc. No. 226, 27th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 7-15. 7 John H. Latan é, A History o f American Foreign Policy (New York, 1927), p. 241.

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stretching to the Pacific, which would rival the United States. England and France moved quickly to recognize Texas and to conclude trade treaties with her. An independent Texas would be a counterbalance to further American expansion; it would supply cotton for European industry and provide a market for European exports. The English and French went so far in their fishing in troubled waters to suggest a treaty whereby Mexico would recognize the independence of Texas in return of the assurance that the latter would never annex itself to a foreign power. News of the Franco-British interest in Texas reached the United States in 1843-1844 when expansionism was beginning to seize the imagination of a large segment of the American people. Sensing the changing attitude of public opinion, Secretary of State John C. Calhoun submitted an annexation treaty to the Senate in April 1844. Unfortunately for Texas, Calhoun presented annexation as if its only purpose was to extend slavery. Put forward on a sectional basis and offered by an unpopular president, John Tyler, the treaty was soundly defeated. Following the election of James K. Polk, an avowed expansionist, in 1844, Tyler proposed that Texas be annexed by a joint resolution of both houses. Thus circumventing the need for a two-thirds majority in the Senate, the treaty was passed. In December 1845, after Tyler had left office, his successor, Polk, signed a resolution of the Congress under which Texas was admitted as a state. This prolonged era of strained relations culminated in the Mexican War of 1846-1848, the immediate cause of which was the annexation of Texas. The more remote causes were the events noted above, claims of American citizens against the Mexican government which had never been able to maintain law and order and thereby prevent damage to foreign property interests; claims arising out of seizures by customs officials; the sale of firearms and ammunition to Texan insurrectionists, and the pursuit of Indians by American forces across the Sabine River.8 Within a few days after Congress passed the annexation resolution the Mexican minister to Washington was recalled, and a deaf ear was turned to all efforts of the United States to restore diplomatic relations. President Polk, although elected on a platform that called for “the re-annexation of Texas and the re-occupation of Oregon,” made a last serious effort to avert the impending crisis. After obtaining Mexican approval on October 15, 1845 for the dispatch of a new envoy to Mexico City, the President appointed John Slidell of Louisiana as the American emissary. The Mexican government’s approval had been predicated on the condition that the representative be only a commissioner authorized to negotiate on the Texas boundary question. Polk, however, made Slidell a minister plenipotentiary with authority to discuss claims and to make cash offers for Mexican territory. Slidell’s instructions, though confidential, were soon compromised, and the Mexican officials would not negotiate with him.9 With public opinion smarting from the loss of Texas, any government would 8J. B. Moore, History and Digest o f International Arbitration to which the United States has been a Party. (Washington, D. C., 1898), II, 1209. 9For the correspondence of John Slidell see Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 337, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 18-67.

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have been overturned had it even considered the American proposals. As it was, a military faction seized control, forestalling the possibility of any negotiations. Following Slidell’s report on the failure of his mission, on January 13, 1846, Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor’s army to move to the Rio Grande, where it would occupy a position in disputed territory. It has been charged that the president sent troops into this region, between the Rio Grande and Nueces rivers, with the intention of provoking Mexico to start a war. It should be noted that in Polk’s opinion the area was not in dispute but was American territory, and he had a right to occupy it. Whatever his intent, the Mexican forces did not attack, and for a month contented themselves with observing the American army, which had taken a position threatening the Mexican town of Matamoros. The Americans provocatively built a fort there and blockaded the Rio Grande. After Slidell had returned to Washington, his mission a failure, Polk decided to ask Congress to declare war on the grounds that Mexico had defaulted on its financial obligations, and had insulted the United States by rejecting the Slidell mission. While Polk was preparing his war message word arrived from General Taylor that Mexican troops had crossed the Rio Grande and attacked a unit of American soldiers, several of whom were killed. Polk immediately revised his war message, demanding force to defend the nation against invasion instead of asking for war to redress past grievances. Disregarding some salient facts in the situation he declared that “Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States . .. and shed American blood on American soil,” and that “war exists by the act of Mexico herself.” Congress accepted Polk’s interpretation and on May 13, 1846, declared war by vote of 40 to 2 in the Senate, and 174 to 14 in the House. Although the country accepted the war with apparent enthusiasm there was more opposition than appeared on the surface. The war was most popular in the Mississippi Valley states, which furnished most of the troops to fight it. In the northeast it was received with coolness, if not disapproval, particularly by Whigs and anti-slavery groups. Even in the older southern states there was a feeling that expansion might be going too far, that the acquisition of too much territory would provoke sectional controversy. The Whigs in Coq^ress supported the war appropriation bills, but became bolder in denouncing “Mr. Polk’s war” and its aggressive origins and objectives.10 The capacity to wage war was so heavily weighted in favor of the United States that it proved to be a short-term conflict. With the capture of Mexico City by the army of General Winfield Scott on September 14, 1847, following the capture of the heights of Chapultepec, and the successful offensive in New Mexico and California, the fighting was virtually over. Peace was concluded by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed February 2, 1848. The United States commissioner, Nicholas P. Trist, chief clerk of the State Department, having already been recalled by the president, was without power to negotiate the treaty. Trist ignored this technicality, however, afer concluding that his country

' l ? or authoritative treatment of this period see G. L. Rives, The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848,2 vols. (New York, 1913).

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was anxious to end the war, as well as the fact that the treaty embodied the essence of Polk’s original instructions.11 The treaty’s terms, increasing the territory of the United States by more than half a million square miles, included New Mexico and Upper California. Mexico also acknowledged the Rio Grande boundary of Texas. In return, the United States contracted to assume the claims of its citizens against Mexico, and to pay $15 million to Mexico. Polk, although displeased with Trist, decided to submit the treaty to the Senate. After all, it secured what the United States had gone to war to obtain, and it was probably the only agreement that Mexico would accept. Moreover, the slavery expansion conflict had taken on new dimensions. Some expansionists in both sections were demanding that the United States hold out for the annexation of all of Mexico, and this allowed the anti-slavery leaders to charge that the southern slave-holders were running the government for their own ends. Approval of the treaty Polk thought, would silence the extremists on both sides, and he accordingly recommended its ratification. By a vote of thirty-eight to fourteen, with a majority of both Democrats and Whigs supporting the treaty, it was approved. The boundaries established by the treaty did not prove satisfactory to the United States, particularly the southern boundary of New Mexico and the line of the Gila River. In 1853 a convention was signed whereby the United States paid $10 million for the territory, afterwards known as the Gadsden Purchase, with a boundary based on parallels of latitudes. The United States had not occupied the area prior to the purchase of Gadsden, but afterwards believed it expedient to concentrate troops on the border. This action was resented by Mexico.12 The decade following the war was a period of internal conflict and anarchy in Mexico, as the pro-clerical conservative elements were challenged by anti-clerical liberals.13 A short-lived liberal interregnum produced the demo­ cratic constitution of 1857, but to put its principles into practice required an electorate more experienced in democratic government than Mexico then possessed.14 The internal conflict led to a multiplication of claims and complaints and Washington was besieged by American investors in Mexico to intervene. By 1858 United States claims against Mexico totaled about $10 million. Meanwhile, Mexico was unable to make regular payments on loans obtained from Great Britain, France and Spain. President James Buchanan suggested that this country should assume a protectorate over northern Mexico, and in 1859 he went so far as to propose that the United States “employ a sufficient military force to enter Mexico for the purpose of obtaining indemnity for the past and security for the future.” 15 This proposal was not carried out 11 J. B. Moore, Digest o f Int. Law, V, 780. For text of treaty see W. M. Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc. (Washington, D. C., 1910), 1 ,1107. 12 Ibid., p. 1121; J. Fred Rippy “The Boundary of Mexico and the Gadsden Treaty,” Hispanic American Historical Review, IV (1921), 732; See also Paul N. Garber, The Gadsden Treaty (Philadelphia, 1923). 13 Five successive revolutionary governments had been recognized by the United States in the course of a few months. See special messaee of President Franklin Pearce of May 15, 1856. In James D. Richardson, com., A compilation o f Messages and Papers o f the Presidents (Washington, 1897), V, 368. 14 For the text of this document see House Ex. Doc. No. 100, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 140. 15 Richardson, Messages and Papers, V, 568.

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because the northern majority in Congress was fearful of the implications of the slavery-expansion question at that time. President Buchanan nevertheless vigorously pushed to conclusion the McLane-0campo Treaty in December 1859, whereby the United States was to be granted a right-of-way across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in perpetuity, two railroad routes across Mexico to the Gulf of California, the right to protect these routes with military forces, and the option to intervene in emergencies without consultation. The treaty was rejected by the United States Senate thus sparing the then embattled Juárez regime the ignominy its acceptance would have brought. The Buchanan policies naturally sharpened Mexico’s distrust of its northern neighbor. When Abraham Lincoln became president, American diplomacy changed abruptly. Lincoln sought to inspire confidence in the Mexicans toward us, and to overcome the ill will that had been generated in the past.16 Unfortunately, the continuing disturbances in Mexico, foreign intervention there, and the outbreak of the Civil War in the United States precluded the success of his well-inten­ tioned policy. In 1858 the full-blooded Zapotee Indian, Benito Juárez, ex-officio vice-president, became president de jure through an uprising against the constitutional president; the United States, unable to maintain diplomatic relations with the faction in control, withdrew its minister. In the following year President Buchanan, relying upon the ultimate success of the Juárez regime, located at Vera Cruz, had sent a minister, thereby recognizing Juarez as the “only existing government.” The forecast proved correct, and in December 1860, the Juárez faction overcame the conservative opposition and occupied the capital. The Juaristas, finding the treasury empty, were forced to order a suspension of payments for two years on the country’s national and foreign obligations.17 This decision brought a strong protest from the British and French ministers, who demanded its immediate repeal. When the Mexican government failed to comply, diplomatic relations were severed. As the Spanish representa­ tive had already been given his passport, because of his open support of the clerical-oriented party, Spain was prepared to act. A convention for joint action was signed in London, providing for the seizure of the ports ^nd customs as guarantees of payment, and the United States was invited to participate.18 With the Civil War already begun, our government was unable to protest effectively;19 nor did Secretary of State William H. Seward feel that we should depart from our traditional policy of abstaining from alliances with foreign nations. The three powers then moved to send fleets and seize Vera Cruz. It was soon evident, however, that the French were possessed of ulterior motives. Napoleon III at this point felt the need of accomplishing some spectacular exploit which might enhance the image of his lack-luster and weakening regime. Intervention in Mexico was to provide the opportunity. The leader of the French expedition was directed to advance upon Mexico City and establish a stable 16 Jay Monaghan, Diplomat in Carpet Slippers (New York, 1945), p. 65 17 British and Foreign State Papers, LII, 294. 16Ibid., LI, 63; or House Ex. Doc. No. 100, p. 134. 19 Seward did, however, protest; see Ibid., p. 217, for his notice to France whose Emperor supported the Southern cause.

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government there, if the situation so warranted. The British and Spanish governments refused to follow the French lead, and the plan for joint action came to an end. Soon afterwards these two powers withdrew, while the French pressed on and occupied the capital. In order to conceal the imperialistic design of Napoleon III, together with the Mexican conservatives involved in the conspiracy, a junta of Mexican citizens was formed which, after deliberation, adopted a limited monarchy as the new form of government. A sovereign bearing the title of Emperor of Mexico was to be chief of state. The imperial crown was offered to Archduke Maximilian of Austria, brother of the Emperor Franz Josef. If he should not accept, Napoleon III was to name another Catholic prince. Maximilian, to his great misfortune, was induced to accept the offer, and with much pomp and ceremony he entered the Mexican capital with his Empress, Carlota, on June 12, 1864. In order to maintain the costly panoply of an imperial court, to satisfy the more pressing claims of the nation's creditors, and to keep in the field an army strong enough to sustain the government against Juárez and his followers, new loans were floated in France, plunging the country still more hopelessly in debt.20 Another serious difficulty confronting Maximilian was the American attitude. While bending all efforts to maintain the Union, the United States could do little more than look askance at French intervention. Yet its hostility was very apparent, and at no time would it consider the recognition of the imperial government. On April 7, 1864, it was resolved by the House of Representatives that “the Congress of the United States are unwilling by silence to have the nations of the world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now transpiring in the Republic of Mexico, and that they think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchical government erected on the ruins of any republican government in America under the auspicies of any European power.”21 Although Secretary Seward did not think it expedient at the time to accept this as a statement of the government’s policy, he conceded that it was the unanimous sentiment of the American people. With the end of the Civil War the United States firmly but courteously demanded that the French forces be withdrawn, and Napoleon III, already concerned about his position in Europe, thought it best to comply.2223 Maximilian was unable to resist for long after the French army was withdrawn, and on May 16, 1867 he was compelled to surrender to the republican forces of Juárez. In spite of protests and entreaties from around the world, he was court-martialed and shot. With his demise went Napoleon’s dream of a great western empire dominated by France, and the assertion by the United States of the Monroe Doctrine.2 3 In view of the fact that the United States did not recognize Maximilian, our minister had been recalled from Mexico City; however, Washington 20 Documentation regarding the European intervention may be found in Sen. Doc. No. 11, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 21 Moore, Digest o fln t. Law, VI, 496. 2 2Ibid., pp. 498-503. See also House Ex. Doc. No. 73, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., and Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 6, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 For a concise well-documented account of French intervention in Mexico see J. H. Latané, The United States and Latin America (New York, 1920), chap. V.

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definitely recognized the government of President Juárez in May 1866, and accredited a minister to his headquarters. In 1868, with French intervention ended, and in an atmosphere of relative cordiality, the United States negotiated a claims convention with Mexico. The joint claims commission awarded $4,125,622.20 to Americans who had suffered losses of property, or injury to persons while in Mexico. Mexicans were recompensed in the amount of $150,498,412.24 Juárez once more reestablished himself, and although he was forced to maintain a constant struggle against sectional uprisings, he retained control until his untimely death in 1871. He is still regarded as the father of constitutional government in Mexico, for it was due principally to his efforts that the liberal Constitution of 1857 was framed and adopted. In 1872, after the death of Juárez and the succession of Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, President Ulysses S. Grant in his fourth annual message to Congress, December 2, 1872, spoke of the continuing disturbances along the Mexican border and the many complaints lodged by American citizens against the Mexican government. In his Seventh Annual Message on December 7, 1875, he spoke of further depredations on American citizens, particularly in Texas, where post offices and mail trains were being attacked.25 Smuggling from the so-called Mexican “Free Zone” across the border into Texas added to the problem. In the Free Zone, a belt six miles wide, the Mexican government had authorized the importation of foreign goods free of customs duties into the towns along the Rio Grande. This had presented to smugglers an opportunity to convey duty-free goods across the border at the expense of the Texas merchants and the United States treasury. In March 1877, a band of Indians from Mexico crossed the border, killed seventeen men, and drove large herds of cattle and horses into Mexico. General Ord, who was in command at the border, was directed by Washington to cross the border and apprehend the outlaws. This action was carried out and caused bitter protests in Mexico. In August of the same year, Mexicans retaliated by raiding a settlement in Texas and retreating across the border.26 When viewed in historical perspective it is evident that in the fifty-four year period following the establishment of the Mexican Republic, the relations between the United States and Mexico left a bitter legacy. The continuing weakness of Mexico, and its inability to cope with internally divisive and externally aggressive forces, were basically responsible for the unhappy sequence of events. The second period into which relations between the countries seems to fall naturally, is marked by the accession of Porfirio Díaz to the position of Provisional President of Mexico in May, 1877. Diaz, a mestizo with stronglymarked Indian traits, and a hero in the war against the French, ruled Mexico in a thoroughly autocratic manner, save for a single term, for the next thirty-four years. From his accession in 1877 to his over-throw in 1911, relations on the whole were greatly improved. In this period the United States checked its 24Moore,/«/. A rb., II, 1287-1358. 2s Richardson, Messages and Papers, VII, 189, 341. 2 6Robert D. Gregg, The Influence o f Border Troubles on Relations between the United States and Mexico, 18761910 (Baltimore, 1937), p. 63.

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continental expansion, and Diaz was willing to take a calculated risk in offering concessions, for he encouraged foreign investors, and established law and order, which made business enterprises practicable.2 7 The Diaz government was granted de facto recognition by the United States in May, 1873, but Diaz insisted that the resumption of normal relations be conditioned on the repeal of the “Ord order.” In July 1882, an agreement providing for the reciprocal crossings of the Rio Grande River in pursuit of Indians and outlaws was entered into by the two countries. This agreement was subsequently renewed and from this time onward there was little trouble caused by raiders, at least in the arena of foreign relations, prior to the Mexican Revolution. With the exception of the Chamizal tract, an area of six hundred acres, near El Paso, Texas, which still remained under the jurisdiction of the United States at the fall of the Diaz regime, the boundary question was largely settled. In 1884 a treaty established the International (water) Boundary Commission, which was charged with adjudicating on matters relating to the riverine and land boundaries of the two countries.2 8 In other areas of diplomacy relations continued to improve. Further extradition treaties were signed and four Pan-American conferences were held which contributed toward a better understanding and good will between the two countries. As the self-appointed mentor of Latin American nations, the United States had also used its influence to promote the use of arbitration in the settlement of disputes. In the Diaz era it acted as a mediator in the Mexican-Guatemalan controversy and, together with Mexico, in the Central American War of 1906.29 In 1908 the influence exerted by the United States by its participation in the Hague Conference led to the signing of a convention by the Diaz government, which provided for the submission of questions of a legal nature, and those relating to treaties which could not be settled by diplomacy for a period of five years, to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague.30 A great amount of correspondence between the two countries at this time concerned claims. One of the most controversial subjects was the longstanding California Pious Fund Case. This dispute arose over the disposition of funds of the Jesuits which had been placed in the national treasury in 1842. The properties of the society had been sold and the Mexican government had agreed to pay 6 percent interest annually on the proceeds, but when California was ceded to the United States, Mexico stopped payment to all the northern church officials. The commission appointed to adjust the affair had failed, and in 1876 the matter was arbitrated with a decision in favor of the American contenders. Mexico soon afterward stopped payment again, and in 1902 the matter was referred to the Hague where the American claims were once more upheld.3 1 2 7Ibid.y p. 152. 2 8Charles A. Timm, The International Boundary Commission, United States and Mexico (Austin, 1941), p. 23. 2 9Morgan to Frelinghuysen, May 9, 1883, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations o f the Unoted States, 1883, pp. 648*651. (hereinafter cited as Foreign Relations); Ibid., 1907, Root to Godoy, Nov. 11,1907, Part II, 659. 30Proclamation of the President of the United States, June 29, 1908, For. Rel., 1908, p. 626. 31 Translation of the Sentence of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the matter of the Pious Fund of the Californias, For. Rel., 1902, Appendix II, pp. 15-18.

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Throughout the Theodore Roosevelt administration, relations between the two nations continued to be satisfactory on a diplomatic level. This is reflected in President Roosevelt’s message to Congress in Í907 in which he stated that “relations between the two countries are a just cause for gratification.” 3 2 In this same year, Elihu Root, Secretary of State, during a good will tour of Mexico declared, “I look to Porfirio Díaz, the President of Mexico, as one of the great men to be held up to hero worship of mankind.” Root later expressed the opinion that “the people of Mexico have joined forever the ranks of the great, orderly, self-controlled, self-governing republics of the world.” 3 3 In making these statements, President Roosevelt and Secretary Root apparently had failed to grasp the full import of incidents which had occurred in Mexico during the preceding year. In June 1906, the American ambassador in Mexico, David E. Thompson, had sent to Washington reports of a strike in the Cananae mines involving Mexican workers, which had resulted in the destruction of American property and loss of several lives. The next few months saw further expressions of anti-American feeling. American consular officials stationed throughout Mexico reported to Ambassador Thompson evidence of deep-seated hatred and dislike of Americans. Diaz attributed this situation to a small group of revolutionists, rather than popular sentiment, and urged that the American side of the border be patrolled carefully so as to apprehend any of the offending individuals should they attempt to enter the United States.34 From evidence submitted by the American consular offices in Mexico at this time, it appears that the root of the trouble lay in a different direction from that suggested by President Diaz. The consular reports stressed the enmity existing among the Mexican labor class as against the same class of American workers in Mexico; this feeling was even more pronounced among skilled workers. The hostility was the outgrowth of alleged preferential treatment given by American employers to American workmen in respect of wages, position, and advancement, particularly in the mining industry and the railroads.35 With the main features of Mexican-United States relations prior to 1909 reviewed, it is of interest to consider an important adjunct of that relationship: the extension of American industrial and economic interests into Mexico. Since the influence of these forces reached a culmination in the Madejo revolution of 1910, it is inseparable from the revolution itself. One Mexican writer, Francisco Bulnes, cites American economic influence as the determining cause of the Revolution.36 American writers, while recognizing its great significance, point out other equally fundamental causes. The role of American investments, which predominated over all other foreign powers, took the form of railroad construction, mining, stockraising, manufacturing and exploitation of oil resources. This economic penetration evolved rather slowly, however, because of Mexican fear of American domina3 2President’s Message to Congress, December 3, 1907, For. R el, 1907, Part I, p. LXV1I1. 3 3Robert Bacon and James B. Scott, eds., Latin America and the United States (Cambridge, 1917), p. 168; James M. Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York, 1932), p.451. 34/6fd., p. 522. 3 sIbid., p. 525. 3 6Francisco Bulnes, The Whole Truth about Mexico (New York, 1916), p. 103.

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tion aroused by the political developments already noted. Nevertheless, Mexico, after 1821, proved more liberal to foreigners than the Spanish colonial government had previously been. This is exemplified by the Constitution of February 24, 1822, which gave foreigners the same civil rights as Mexicans. In 1823 Mexico permitted foreigners to develop mines in Mexico. Beginning in 1824 resident foreigners were allowed to acquire land in Mexico, but not within twenty leagues, or nearly sixty miles, of the border, and ten leagues from the sea. This concession was modified in 1828 to limit ownership of land, other than mines, to Mexican citizens. The Constitution of 1857 contained substantially the same legislation, precluding foreign ownership within designated zones bordering on foreign nations, or upon the sea.3 7 It may be concluded that anti-foreign legislation was liberalized following Mexican independence, but that it was none the less restrictive. The stipulation that the acquisition of property entailed conversion to Mexican citizenship, and the demand that foreign property owners reside within the country, together with subsoil limitations, were not conducive to the introduction of foreign enterprise. The Diaz era, 1877-1911, brought about a reversal of the policies which operated against the introduction of foreign capital and ushered in the phase of favorable relations with the United States mentioned earlier. The foreigner was urged to come and was assured protection for his investments. Under Diaz, the prohibition upon limited zones remained in force, but it was possible in many cases for a foreigner to obtain a special permit to acquire property in prohibited zones. Subsoil legislation was also modified so as to encourage foreign development of mining and the petroleum industry.3 8 In granting concessions, Diaz and his clique showed no partiality to Americans, the government offering virtually the same advantages to all capitalists, whatever their nationality.39 The first group to lead the economic advance into Mexico were the railway promoters and railway builders. As early as 1853 Americans tried to obtain a concession to build a railroad from the American southwest border to the Gulf of California, but without success.40 Many attempts were made in subsequent years, notably in 1864, 1873 and 1877, and they also were foredoomed to failure because of Mexico’s fear of absorption by its more powerful neighbor. Although two American railroads had reached the Mexican frontier by 1877, the Southern Pacific and the Denver and Rio Grande, the total increase in Mexican mileage between 1876 and 1880 was slight, from 416 to 647 miles. This increase was achieved largely by two foreign corporations other than American, the combination represented by F. S. Pearson of Canada and London, and another, distinct from the first, S. Pearson and Son, Limited, of London.4 1 The first actual American railway construction was begun in 1880, under new concessions stimulated in no small measure by American recognition of the Diaz government. From this point on construction accelerated rapidly through the efforts, principally, of the Southern Pacific, Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe,34 3 7Frank Tannebaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution (New York, 1926), p. 375. “ Ibid., p. 376. 39J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New York, 1926), p. 311. 4 0Callahan, American Policy in Mexico, p. 476. 4 lIbid.y p. 485; John K. Turner, Barbarous Mexico (Chicago, 1910), p. 135.

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Denver and Rio Grande, Great Northern and Mexican Central railroad companies. By 1884, Mexican railway mileage increased to 3,862 miles, chiefly American. In 1902 American holdings in Mexican railways were valued at well over $300 million; this amount had reached $560 million in 1911.42 The Mexican government by April, 1908 had secured control over 13,191 of the 22,822 kilometers of railway in the country, but for capital it continued to depend upon foreign investors. The direction of its main system, the Mexican National Railways, was under American supervision until 1914.43 Following, if not accompanying railway development, came the mining interests, land companies and ranchers. To encourage mining, Mexico revised its mining code in 1884 by granting the owners of the surface the right to work coal deposits under their land without government concession. In 1892, due to the fall of silver valuation and consequent decline in mining operations, the Mexican government further modified its mining legislation so as to insure that the rights of those who engaged in mining operations would be secure and inviolate so long as specified fees were paid.44 By 1902 American mining properties were valued at $95 million and nine years later they had reached $250 million, including the smelting industry. Notable among the interests represented in the mining field were the Hearst Estate, the American Smelting and Refining Company (the Guggenheims), the Batopilas Company of New York, the Anaconda group, the Greene-Cananae interests, and the United States Steel Company.4 5 The railroad men and miners were followed by those interested in acquiring land: ranchmen and small farmers. By 1912, according to a report of the Fall Committee, there were an estimated fifteen thousand Americans, farming small plots, who were residing permanently in Mexico. More important, however, were the large land development, irrigation and colonization com­ panies, represented by the Hearst Estate, Sonora Land and Cattle Company, and the United Sugar Company. In 1910, 25.2 percent of the total land area was in foreign hands, constituting 29 percent of all privately held lands.46 It is estimated that American holdings in farm, ranches and timberlands reached $50 million to $80 million by 1912. In manufacturing, American capitalists were less aggressive than in other fields mentioned because of strong competition from European business houses which, through greater experience in foreign lands, were better prepared to cope with problems existing in Mexico.47 The total American investment in manufacturing did not exceed $25 million by 1910; this was emphasized in meat packing, soap, and tobacco manufacturing. In banking activities, the British, French and German syndicates far overshadowed the American until after the Revolution of 1910.48 The oil industry, largely Financed by American capital, experienced the most spectacular growth. Although a few wells were drilled in Mexico by a4 4 2Rippy, United States and Mexico, p. 312. 4^Charles P. Howland, Survey o f American Foreign Relations (New Haven, 1931), p. 36. Ibid., p. 37. * 4 s Rippy, United States and Mexico, p. 313. 46Howland, ,4mer/cflfl Foreign Relations, p. 38. 41Monthly Consular and Trade Reports, June, 1906, p. 58. 48Howland, American Foreign Relations, p. 39.

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British company financed by Cecil Rhodes in 1888, the oil industry did not get a real start until 1900. In that year Edward L. Doheny and associates of Los Angeles brought in their first well, and thereafter production quickly soared. In 1907 oil production in the Doheny lands alone was one million barrels, and in 1922 reached sixty million. By 1912, American citizens had invested an estimated $ 15 million in Mexican oil.4 9 A summary of American economic penetration of Mexico shows that by 1913 the investments of United States* capital totaled between $700 million and $1,057,770,000, while the investments of British subjects, second to those of the Americans, amounted to approximately $300 million.so The American invest­ ment included 78 percent of the mines, 72 percent of the smelters, 58 percent of the oil, 68 percent of the rubber industry, and exceeded the total investments of all other foreigners in Mexico. Further American influence was reflected in the extent of trade relations. Commerce between the two countries, which had totaled $7 million in 1860, reached $177 million in 1910.51 By encouraging the introduction of foreign capital, of which a prepon­ derance was American, Diaz attempted to improve the economic well being of his country. In so doing he ignored the development of political evolution which should have been a concurrent process.52 He had seen Europeans come to the United States and become quickly assimilated, and expected that this would occur in Mexico. Diaz lived to see a widespread economic advance in Mexico, but he also belatedly saw that his country gained only in national credit and a reputation for stability. The only money remaining in circulation was through the media of taxes and higher wages, because the foreign investors took their surplus earnings with them to their own countries. In the words of Carlo de Fornaro, “The Porfirian regime was excellent for the pockets of a few Mexicans and a great many Americans and Europeans, but it was a poisonous virus inoculated into the very life of Mexico.”53 His policies served to accentuate the fast growing dislike of Americans in the Mexican citizen who saw himself as the economic slave of the United States, and thought he perceived the vast wealth of his country being absorbed by the hated “gringo” with no benefit to himself or to his country. The administration of William Howard Taft, beginning in 1909, was committed to the protection and extension of American economic interests abroad, including Mexico. Consequently, diplomatic relations between the two countries during his term of office must be interpreted in this light. Although President Taft’s policy toward Mexico was ostensibly one of neutrality, it cannot be gainsaid that he was interested in the perpetuation of Diaz and his advisors, the intellectual elite, called the C ientíficos. Taft, in correspondence with his wife in 1909, mentioned that, “ . . . we have two billions of American capital in Mexico that will be greatly endangered if Diaz were to die and his government go to pieces . . . I can only hope that his demise does not come until I am out of45 49 Rippy, United States and Mexico, p. 318. s °R. W. Dunn, American Foreign Investments (New York, 1926), p. 90. 51Callahan, A merican Policy in Mexico, p . 519. 52Alfonso Teja Zabre, Historia de México, Una Moderna Interpretación (Mexico, D. F.,

1935), p. 362. s 3Cario de Fornaro, “The Great Mexican Revolution,” Forum, LIV, (1915), 534.

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office.”S4 As an indication of his esteem for the Mexican president, and to strengthen the latter’s position with his own people, Taft met Diaz in a colorful setting at Juárez in October 1909. In his message of acceptance to Diaz, Taft said “it would gratify me very much to meet one in the flesh who has done so much to establish order and create prosperity in his own country, and in so doing has won the admiration of the world.”55 President Taft’s administration was the first to be identified with the odious term “dollar diplomacy,” through intervention in the affairs of the Caribbean republics. This policy proved detrimental to the fostering of good will in Mexico even though Taft called it “international philanthropy.”56 One severe critic, Salvadore R. Merlos, a Central American writer, even referred to Taft as the “Attila of modem times.”57 Taft’s indiscreet statement of February 22, 1906, that “the frontiers of the United States extend virtually to Tierra del Fuego,” was prima facie evidence of his diabolical intentions to other Latin Americans.58 Philander C. Knox of Pennsylvania was the secretary of state under President Taft. His appointment largely nullified what had been accomplished by Elihu Root, his predecessor, in improving relations with Mexico and Latin America in general. Knox appeared not to understand the Latin American temperament and thought, and made it evident that he considered them to be inferior to the Anglo-Saxons.5 9 Illustrative of Knox’s unpopularity in Nicaragua was the revelation of a plot to dynamite a train on which he was to ride while traveling through that country.60 It was his conviction that the elimination of the European powers from Latin America imposed a heavy responsibility on the United States, a principle he derived from the Monroe Doctrine. In view of the political instability in that area Knox believed that this country should assist them “to meet their just obligations and keep out of trouble.”6 1 As early as May 1909, President Taft had indicated that he was considering Henry Lane Wilson, then minister in Belgium, and former minister in Chile, for the post of ambassador in Mexico City. The ambassador who held the office at this time, David E. Thompson, had become closely identified with American business interests in Mexico, and his retention was no longer desupble.6 2 Wilson’s appointment was confirmed in October 1909, and he reached Mexico City on

Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times o f William Howard Taft (New York, 1939), 1,462. Alfonso Taracena, En el Vértigo de la Revolución Mexicana (Mexico, D. F., 1935, p. 48; Tait to Diaz, June 25,1909, For. Rel., 1909, p. 425. F 5 6Parker T. Moon, The United States and the Caribbean (Chicago, 1929), p. 144. 57J. Fred Rippy, “Literary Yankeephobia in Hispanic America,” Journal o f International Relations, XII (1922), 530. Roberto Domenech, Méjico e el Imperialismo Norte Americano (Buenos Aires, 1914), p. 59 Wilfrid H. Calcott, The Caribbean Policy o f the United States, 1890-1920 (Baltimore 1942), p.367. 60New York Times, Mar. 21, 1912.

61 Dexter Perkins, Hands Off: A History o f the Monroe Doctrine (Boston, 1941), p. 248; Samuel F. Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries o f State and their Diplomacy (New York’ 1929), IX, 335. 62Edward I. Bell, The Political Shame o f Mexico (New York, 1914), p. 123.

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February 28, 1910.63 His arrival coincided with a general increase in anti-American sentiment among the rank and file of the Mexican population; however, no incidents of a serious nature took place until the following October. In the summer of 1910 further action was taken toward the settlement of the problem of the Chamizal tract. The tract consisted of about six hundred acres of land which lay between the old bank of the Rio Grande, as it was surveyed in 1852, and the existing bed of the river. Its position was the result of changes which had taken place through the action of the water upon the banks of the river causing it to move southward into Mexican territory. With the progressive movement of the river to the south, the American city of El Paso had been expanding in area at the expense of the Mexican City of Juárez to the south. Since the controversy over the settlement of the Chamizal tract remained unsettled, the two nations effected a convention on June 24, 1910, agreeing that the question as to international title of the tract should again be referred to the International Boundary Commission, just enlarged by the addition of a third member. The Honorable Eugene La Fleur of Montreal, Canada, was invited to act as the third Commissioner. Both governments then presented their cases to the Commission and negotiations continued to the summer of 1911.64 The Mexican government’s representative contended that the Chamizal tract had been formed by a sudden change of the Rio Grande and, accordingly, the boundary line should follow the abandoned bed of the river. The American representative, on the other hand, claimed that the formation of the tract had resulted from slow and gradual erosion and deposit, and as such, any question of sovereignty would be determined by the provisions of the convention of 1884. Furthermore, the United States government claimed that it had held undisputed possession of the territory since 1848. Mexico refused to admit the validity of these arguments.65 On June 5, 1911, the award was made: . . . the international title of the portion of the Chamizal tract lying between the middle of the bed of the Rio Grande, as surveyed by Emory and Salazar in 1852, and the middle of the bed of the said river as it existed before the flood of 1864, is in the United States of America, and the international title to the balance of said Chamizal tract is in the United States of Mexico.”66

This award evoked great enthusiasm in Mexico as it was believed that the transfer of a large portion of El Paso to that country would redound greatly to the interests of Mexico, economically more than geographically.6 7 These hopes were quickly dashed because the American commissioner, Anson Mills, denounced the award as vague, indeterminate, uncertain in its6 6 3Henry Lane Wilson, prior to entering the diplomatic service, was a real estate speculator in the state of Washington.His brother, the former Senator John Wilson of Seattle, owner of the Seattle, Post Intelligencer, was the Republican party boss in Washington. See Robert H. Murray, “Huerta and the Two Wilsons,” Harpers Weekly Magazine, Mar. 25, 1916, p. 341, and Geoige Creel, The People N ext Door (New York, 1926), P. 293. 64H. Wilson to James Bryce, Dec. 24,1910, For. Rel., 1910, p. 571. bS Award by International Boundary Commission, June 10, 1911 ,Ibid., p. 575. 6 6Ibid., p. 587. 6 7El Manana Periódico Político, Junio 15 de 1911 a Fevrero 28 de 1913, p. 5.

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terms, and impossible of execution. He also declared that the Commission had no authority to divide the tract, because the instructions in the convention had stated specifically that “the Commission shall decide solely and exclusively as to whether the international title to the Chamizal tract is in the United States of America or Mexico . . .”68 Efforts were then made to persuade the Mexican government to sign a new convention authorizing a reopening of the case, but owing to the disturbed conditions existing in Mexico, no further steps were taken at the time. If we could leave the Diaz regime with a mere statement of the many material benefits which it conferred upon Mexico, Porfirio Díaz would rank as one of the world’s great statesmen. But unfortunately there is a reverse side to the picture. A “scientific” form of government which functioned very effec­ tively, which kept peace at home and friendship abroad, had been established, but almost wholly in the interest of the científicos who controlled it. The financiers, foreign investors, large landowners, and the government officials found the system most satisfactory. But how did it meet the needs of the great mass of Indians who constituted about three fourths of the population? It must be conceded that it did nothing for the peon except to exploit him. The land was held in great estates, some containing as much as half a million acres. By 1910 some 3,103,402 individuals had lost their freedom and were listed as “peones de campo” , or agricultural laborers held in debt service. These 'with their families, conservatively estimated, numbered between nine and ten million people, or from three-fifths to two-thirds of the total population of Mexico.69 The Diaz government must be held responsible for encouraging, rather than frowning upon, the peonage system. A darker blot upon it was the inhuman treatment of the Yaqui Indians. With full cognizance of the government, these unfortunates, among the highest type of Indians found in Western Hemisphere, were unjustly dispossessed of their lands and then sold into virtual slavery to labor on the henequen plantations in Yucatan. Therefore, even if we conceded that Diaz was “the master builder of a great commonwealth,” as one of his biographers has called him,70 in the last analysis his building could not endure because the foundation was laid on special privilege. He was a great administrator, and he raised Mexico to a higher level, politically and economic­ ally, than it had ever attained before. But he accomplished this result as a tyrant rather than a democratic ruler, and at the expense of the most numerous class of the Mexican people. The very fact that the whole Mexican political system depended upon the vigor of the man in control was the cause of its utter collapse when that prop was withdrawn. The system of “Diazpotism” was highly centralized, analogous to that of France under Napoleon I. The executive power counted for everything in the state, and that rested in the president’s hands. The governors in the various states were nominated by the president and responsible to him, although the formalities of popular elections in accordance with constitutional formulas were6 68Award by International Boundary Commission, June 10,1911, For. R el ., p. 587. 6’ Charles W. Hackett, “The Mexican Revolution and the United States, 1910-1926 ” World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, IX, (1926), p. 341 70 José F. Godoy, Porfirio Díaz, The Master Builder o f a Great Commonwealth (New York

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regularly carried out. Although on paper the legislative bodies, both federal and state, appeared quite as representative as the corresponding bodies in the United States, they were, in reality, wholly dominated by the executive. As long as Diaz was vigorous enough to direct the state in person, the system worked. But gradually he was forced, through weakness arising from advanced age, to allow his subordinates increasing power. The result, as has been described, was the sacrifice of Mexican natural resources of every sort through the científicos to various foreign interests, particularly American and English. The revolutionary movement which led to the downfall of the Diaz regime began on November 18, 1910, at Puebla in northern Mexico. The initial revolt was quickly suppressed and its leader, Aquiles Serdán, who is regarded today in Mexico as one of the country’s greatest heroes, was executed.71 The national leader, and the guiding spirit of the Revolution, was Francisco I. Madero. The Madero family who owned banks, smelting plants, cotton and rubber plantations and breweries, were wealthy Creoles in the state of Coahuila. As capitalists they had protested against the favoritism displayed by Diaz toward their American competitors, but nevertheless the family as a whole had given him loyal support. Francisco proved to be the exception. Educated in the United States at the University of California, and in France, he had acquired liberal ideas, and engaged in philanthropic practices. In 1900 he became interested in politics, and by 1905 was recognized as leader of the independent voters. La sucesión presidencial de 1910, which he published in 1908, was critical of the Diaz administration. Prior to the publication of Madero’s book in 1908, President Diaz had made the startling announcement that since Mexico was now ready for democracy, he would welcome the formation of an opposition party and would relinquish his presidential power to a legally elected candidate. This statement was made to the American journalist, James J. Creelm an, and appeared in an article in Pearson's Magazine in March 1908. The sincerity of this declaration was soon disproved, for plans were already being laid for the successor to Diaz by the governmental clique, which had no intention of countenancing a fair election.72 After the publication of his book regarding presidential succession in 1910, and stimulated by the Diaz announcement to Creelman, Madero began campaigning for the election of 1910. After being nominated as candidate for the presidency by the National Democratic, or anti-reelectionist party, he carried on a campaign throughout the country. However, Diaz, in direct contradiction to his statement to Creelman, was nominated and retained in the presidential office after a farcical election in 1910. Madero was accused of sedition for his political activities and imprisoned. While in prison, he wrote the “Plan of San Luis Potosí,” which contained two main principles: effective suffrage and no re-election. It also provided for agrarian reform, liberation of political prisoners,7 7‘Colonel Francisco Lazcano. “Conmemoranda la Revolución Mexicana,” Revista de Ejército, (1938), p. 626. 72Herbert I. Priestly, The Mexican Nation, A History (New York, 1924), p. 394; James Creelman, Diaz, Master o f Mexico (New York, 1912), p. 413.

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and freedom of speech and press. The plan also set the time for a general uprising, which was scheduled to take place on November 20, 1910.73 The premature, ill-fated revolt led by Serdán on November 18, set the program in motion. Madero meanwhile, in October, had forfeited bail and escaped from prison, with the aid of friends, disguised as a mechanic. A few days later he appeared in Laredo, Texas. At the time, the Revolutionary Junta in the United States, headed by his brother Gustavo Madero, was located in San Antonio, Texas.74 After a sojourn of forty days in the United States, Madero returned to Mexico, and soon the movement gained momentum. Emiliano Zapata, a peasant leader in the state of Morelos, Pancho Villa, a bandit, and Pascual Orozco, a former storekeeper from Chihuahua, formed bodies of cavalry and became the mainstay of Madero’s forces. Diaz, in his message to Congress on April 1, 1911, belatedly promised to adopt the following measures: (1) safeguard suffrage; (2) reform of federal judiciary; (3) removal of abuses on the part of local officials; (4) division of large estates; (5) provision that the president should not succeed himself. And Vice President Ramón Corral, a highly unpopular figure, was induced to resign. In the spring of 1911, the revolutionists defeated the government forces in two major engagements, at Juárez and Agua Prieta, the latter taking place in May. Realizing the futility of further resistance, Diaz resigned in May 25, 1911, and on May 26 he left for Paris under an escort commanded by General Victoriano Huerta as far as Vera Cruz. Francisco de la Barra was made provisional president until an election was held.75 Madero entered Mexico City in triumph on June 8. In the election held in October 1911, he was elected president by an overwhelming majority and his government was recognized by the Taft administration a month later. Madero had gained the leadership of a revolutionary movement which was primarily a protest against the continuation of the Diaz government, but a complex combination of factors promoted its growth and made it possible. These factors in brief were: (1) The industrialization of Mexico was accompanied by a rapid increase in the cost of living without a corresponding rise in the wages of the masses; this was aggravated by a heavy protective tariff; (2) thç rising prices and absence of wage increases lowered the subsistence level of the Mexican wage earners; (3) the effects of industrialization were augmented by the Diaz policy of breaking up village lands which increased the strength of the hacienda as opposed to the communal village groups, and reduced the peon to serfdom.76 Madero, once he had assumed the presidency of Mexico, found himself committed to more reforms than he could possibly undertake, and it became increasingly evident as time passed that he was operating under severe handicaps. "Mexico Political Affairs, 1911, For. R e í, 1911, p. 351; Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero: Apostle o f Mexican Democracy (New York, 1955). 74Taracena, Vertigo de la Revolución, p. 69; José Vasconselos, Ulises Criollo (Mexico,

1936), p.420. 7 3 Wilson to Knox, April 3, 1911, For Rel., 1911, p. 444; Christian Science Monitor, April 3, 1911 ¡Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Personas que han tenido a su Cargo la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores desde 1821 hasta 1924 (Mexico, D. F.), p. 31. Tannenbaum, Mexican Agrarian Revolution, pp. 134-155.

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The Mexican Church opposed his program, and business and banking circles were solidly against him. He was also confronted by syndicalists, socialists, and the “hacendados,” the great land owners, who would most naturally resist land reform.77 He was frail physically, and was not an effective speaker. His plans were not well analyzed, as was demonstrated by his inability to execute them, and were approached from a theoretical rather than a practical point of view. Madero’s political mistakes were numerous and devastating. One of his first official acts was repayment of advances made by members of his own family which he replaced by funds taken out of the National Treasury. His policy of retaining in positions of trust former key personnel of the Diaz administration was the cause of much dissatisfaction. The rank and file of the revolutionary movement also proved too thoroughly imbued with the lust for spoils to be content with his moderation. Madero's practice of appointing several members of his family to responsible positions in the government gave his opponents of all kinds another source for criticism. By forcing unpopular officials, notably Pino Suárez the vice president, into governmental positions, he provoked the formation of new factions among the discontented elements. But Madero's fatal error was his denial that he had promised to distribute lands to the people, the one issue upon which all the peons were in agreement.78 Disillusioned by Madero’s failure to carry out his proclaimed revolutionary objectives, Zapata and Orozco declared against him, and formed a counter­ revolutionary movement.79 The disorder which soon prevailed in the capital and throughout the countryside caused friction to develop between the Madero government and the United States. This inevitably extended to American cities near the border which were often the centers of conspiracy.80 Henry Lane Wilson, who by January 1912, had become identified with a “big business” clique in Mexico City, was obviously hostile toward Madero. Wilson was also beginning to interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico, a practice which had already stigmatized American diplomacy there. In a dispatch to the secretary of state in February the ambassador said: “I have most discreetly and carefully . . . endeavored to induce leading members of the Catholic party, of the old regime, and of conservative elements in the city, to make some demonstra­ tion of a public character, coupled with a tender of service and support as might have a moral effect of the country at large.” 81 Upon receiving a request from the State Department for advice as to the action to be taken by Americans in Mexico, Wilson recommended their withdrawal from dangerous areas. President Taft, not wishing to alarm American residents, and to take precaution against the necessity for military intervention, issued a proclamation on March 2,1912. After describing the state of disorder in Mexico, he spoke of the force and effect of the neutrality laws of the United States, and gave notice that “all persons owing allegiance to the United States, who may take part in the disturbances now existing in Mexico, unless in defense7 7’ Teja Zabre, Historia de Mexico, p. 364. , 78Francisco Vásquez Gómez, Memorias Políticas, 1909-1913 (Mexico, 1933), p. 518; Hubert Howe Bancroft, History o f Mexico (San Francisco, 1914), p. 533. 79Taracena, Vértigo de la Revolución, pp. 121-125. %0La Gaceta de Guadalajara, Nov. 19,1911. 81 Wilson to Knox, Jan. 20,1912, For. R eí, 1912, p. 723.

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of their persons and property . . . will do so at their own peril, and they can in no wise obtain protection from the government of the United States . . . ” 82 This pronouncement was interpreted by many Americans as being a warning to leave Mexico, and soon a general exodus began. The presidential order placed participants or conspirators in the same class as the insurrectionists whom they aided. It denied them the protection of the United States government, provided they were treated in accordance with the standards of treatment established internationally as proper for the particular group they had assisted, and would, in addition, incur all the penalties of the violations of a national law.83 In recognition of the growing danger to Americans in Mexico, as reflected by anti-Yankee propaganda, and the spread of the conflict, Congress passed a joint resolution on March 14, which gave the President power to prohibit at his discretion the export of material used in war. On the same day, President Taft utilized this new power to prohibit the export of munitions of war from any place in the United States to the warring factions in Mexico, any violations of which would be vigorously prosecuted.84 Two weeks later the order was modified so as to apply only to the insurgents, which was in accord with our principle of supporting the constituted authority against rebellion.85 Madero quickly expressed his gratitude for this measure and interpreted the proclama­ tion as evidence of the good intentions of the United States, that is, not to intervene in Mexican affairs. President Taft’s reluctance to adopt an aggressive militaristic policy toward Mexico began to evoke much unfavorable comment in some foreign newspapers. British, French and German mining interests in the states of Sonora and Chihuahua, by this time the scene of much destruction, were believed to have the right to anticipate intervention from the Taft administration. The major European powers maintained war vessels almost continuously in Gulf waters in this troubled period.86 It was at this time a matter of international character arose which involved the United States and Mexico, but the latter only as an innocent bystander. This was the reappearance of the “yellow peril” in the form of Japan, which some propagandists alleged was trying to obtain control of property at Magdalena Bay in Lower California for strategic purposes. The Bay is locate^ in the southerly third of the west coast of Lower California, approximately three thousand miles from Panama and offers excellent facilities for large naval vessels. In fact, the United States Navy had in past years used the area extensively for target practice. An American company had secured here from Mexico a large tract of land, consisting of several million acres, which bordered the Bay. This company found the investment unprofitable, and its chief creditor, a New Hampshire lumber­ man, had taken it over and tried to dispose of it to Japanese subjects. Before 82 H. Wilson to H. L. Wilson, March 2,1912, Ibid., p. 732. 7 6 9 ^ ^ M Borchard’ The Diplomatic Protection o f Citizens Abroad (New York, 1915), p. * \£ 0n8' ReC‘ 62nd Cong*’ 2nd Sess*’ p* 3258; American Journal on Int. Law, VI (1912), 8 5 86

H. L. Wilson to Martinez, March 26, 1912, For. R e l, 1912 p 765 Current Literature, II (1912), 389.

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concluding the sale, however, his agent very properly consulted the United States Department of State to learn its attitude. Its reaction was adverse since the establishment of a Japanese coaling station, fishery or colony on our side of the Pacific inevitably would not be approved by the American public.87 These developments took place late in 1911 and rumors soon emerged that the Japanese government was directing the purchase with the intent to use the site for a naval base. This was disproved by communications between the Americans concerned and the Department of State, which revealed that the Japanese company would not invest in the concession without the approval of its own government, which in turn would not countenance it unless sanctioned by the United States government. The Japanese concern then lost interest in the project.88 In spite of this revelation, and the Mexican government’s protestations that it was not in league with Japan, apprehension still persisted in many quarters in the United States that the Japanese government was veiling its true intentions. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who led the skeptics in Congress, declared on February 29th that the occupation of Magdalena Bay by an Eastern Power was not a matter that could be brought before an arbitral tribunal. Lodge’s concern over the matter seemed to stem from the idea that the Japanese government was behind the negotiations because of the fact that the property was of little value except for naval purposes, but was of the utmost value for that purpose.8 9 A prolonged discussion of the Magdalena Bay question then took place in Congress and finally led to a resolution, presented by Senator Lodge, being passed by the Senate on August 2, 1912. In the arguments that led up to and followed this resolution, it appeared that its chief proponents based their contentions on the law or right of self-defense. The Lodge Resolution provided: . . . that any harbor or other place in the American continents, is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such relation to another government, not American, as to give that government practical power of control for military or naval purposes.90

In Mexico the Lodge Resolution was interpreted by many persons to be just another pretext employed by the Americans to encroach further at a later date on Mexican territory, under the guise of legitimacy.91 In the United States the resolution became known as the Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, or as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine applied for the first time to foreign companies and an Eastern power, with a view toward safeguarding American interests in the Panama Canal. After the imposition of the arms embargo in March 1912, relations were increasingly alienated by the mounting destruction of American property. 81American Journal o fln t. Law, VI (1912), 937. 88Thomas A. Bailey, “The Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine-,” Political Science Quarterly, 48 (1933), 221. *9New York Times, Apr. 5,1912. 9 0 American Journal o f Int. Lawt VI (1912), 938. 91 El Maftana Periódico Politico June 15 de 1911 aFebrero 28 de 1913,p. 215.

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President Taft sent a warning to Madero in April through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pedro Lascurain, advising that the United States government held the Mexican government responsible for the protection of American life and property.92 The Mexican government replied that it could not recognize the right of the United States to give such a warning, since it was not based on any action imputable to the Mexican government signifying that it had departed from the observance of the principles of international law. Responsibility for the actions of the rebel leader Orozco was also denied by Mexico City.93 Less than two weeks later, Secretary Knox notified Ambassador Wilson that it would be necessary for additional French, German and American warships to visit both the east and west coasts of Mexico for the protection and relief of their respective nationals. This would be accomplished under the right of a friendly nation to dispatch war vessels to the waters of a nation with whom they are at peace. Accordingly the United States sent the B u rfo rd to the west coast ports to receive refugees from the interior. Soon there-after, the cruiser Vicksburg was sent to Guaymas and another cruiser, the D es M o in es , to the east 9 4 coast. On December 3, 1912, in his annual message to Congress, President Taft pointed out the trying circumstances which had characterized United StatesMexican relations in the preceding two years and reiterated that American policy had been one of patient non-intervention and continued recognition of constituted authority. He emphasized that every effort had been made to safeguard American lives and interests in Mexico, a most difficult task in view of the extensive American holdings there.9 5 After a brief leave of absence Ambassador Wilson returned to the Embassy in Mexico City on January 5, 1913, and resumed correspondence with the State Department in the same pessimistic spirit as was found in his earlier reports. His initial communication on January 7, described the situation as gloomy, if not hopeless, and carried a general indictment against the Madero government.96 A brief period of respite was obtained by Madero through the recapture, with little difficulty, of Vera Cruz, which Feliz Díaz, nephew of the former president, had seized. But the day of settlement was merely postponed. On February 9, 1913, a group of conspirators instituted a revol^ in Mexico City which ended in tragedy for Madero and his government. This group was led by members of the old conservative party, namely General Felix Dfaz and General Bernardo Reyes, who had been liberated from prison by fellow conspirators, and General Manuel Mondragon, former chief of artillery of the Diaz army. Failing to seize the National Palace they retired to the Arsenal, where they maintained headquarters for the succeeding “tragic ten days.”In this period machine gun and artillery fire sprayed the densely populated city at random with heavy loss of life to the civilian population, and much property damage.9 7 President Madero had been forewarned of the plot by his brother Gustavo9 9 2H. Wilson to H. L. Wilson, April 14,1912,For. R el, 1912, p. 787. 9 3Wilson to Knox, Apr. 17, 1912,Ibid., pp. 792-793. 9'Ibid., Apr. 26, 1912, pp. 803-804. 9 s Cong. Rec., 62nd Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 8. 9 6Wilson to Knox January 7,1913, For. Rel., 1913, p. 692. 9 ’Manuel Calero, Un Decenio de Política Mexicana (New York, 1920), p. 114.

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Madero as early as February 4, but he had not taken it seriously. It did not occur to him that he was viewed as an intruder by the Porfirista army officers, the group which framed the conspiracy. Although General Victoriano Huerta’s name had also appeared on the list of conspirators obtained previously by Gustavo Madero, President Madero placed him in command of all Federal troops on February 9. This move seemed foolish in the extreme, as Huerta had been relieved of command of the army, after the northern campaign, for misappro­ priation of public funds, and might have been expected to seek vindication.98 As Huerta’s forces numbered upwards of seven thousand men, and those of Díaz about five hundred, with the former possessing much heavy artillery and the latter a negligible amount, it was obvious that the Arsenal could have been taken at any time by a determined onslaught. During the seige, Huerta convinced Madero that a maximum effort was being made to defeat the rebels, but at the same time he was awaiting the propitious moment when he could seize control of the government for himself.99 During the decena trágica it was widely believed both in Mexico and the United States that the latter would intervene with military forces momentarily. That Ambassador Wilson continued to be inimical to Madero was exemplified by his action on February 15, in the latter half of the “tragic ten days” of persuading the British, German and French ministers to join in an effort to induce Madero to resign. Madero responded indignantly, saying that it was not a diplomat’s right to intervene in a domestic question, and that he would die defending his office.100 Wilson then approached the anti-Madero senators to mobilize sentiment against him. On February 16, Madero told Robert H. Murray that “the American ambassador is our greatest enemy,” and adding that Wilson had threatened that American troops would be sent to Mexico unless he resigned.101 Ambassador Wilson advised the Department of State at noon February 18: “ . . . the supposition now is that the federal generals are now in control of the President.” As a matter of fact. Madero was not seized until approximately two hours after the message was transmitted.102 This sequence of events culminated in the arrest on February 18 of Madero and Pino Suárez, the vice president, on orders of General Huerta, and their detention in the Palace. Once their resignations had been obtained, their offices were declared vacant. Thereupon the minister of foreign affairs, Pedro Lascurain, constitutionally became president. His term lasted about fifteen minutes, and his only acts were to appoint Huerta to a cabinet office and then resign. Huerta, as holder of the highest cabinet office, became provisional president.103 Ambassador Wilson soon thereafter announced to an assembly of the diplomatic corps that he had known for three days of the plan to imprison Madero.9 98 Rafael de Zayas Enriquez, The Case o f Mexico and the Policy o f President Wilson (New York, 1914), p. 99. "M urray, “Huerta and the two Wilsons,” p. 365; Alfredo Breceda, Mexico Revolucionario, 1913-1917 (Madñd, 1920), p. 60. 100For. Rel., 1913, p. 711. 101 Murray, “ Huerta and the two Wilsons,” Apr. 15, 1916, p. 403. 102 Ernest Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage (New York, 1928), p. 567. 10 3Albert Bushnell Hart, “Postulates of the Mexican Situation,” American Academy o f Political and Social Science Annals, LIV (1914), 139.

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Gustavo Madero was brutally murdered on February 19, his death foreshadowing another tragedy closely following. Huerta then asked the American Ambassador for advice as to the disposition of Francisco Madero. Wilson replied that he “ought to do what was best for the peace of the country.” 104 On February 20 and 21 the American ambassador was called upon to make vigorous protestations for the safety of the imprisioned officials. The Cuban Minister warned Wilson of the danger and offered the use of a Cuban cruiser at Vera Cruz to take them to safety.105 Ex-President Madero’s parents wrote to the diplomatic corps pleading for its intercession in the matter, and Madero’s wife interviewed Wilson with that object. On the evening of February 22 Madero and Suárez were killed while being transferred from the Palace to the penitentiary. The official government account of the affair claimed that a rescue of the prisoners was attempted, the vehicles were fired on, and the prisoners were shot in the melee while attempting to escape. The concensus of evidence is that it was an act of deliberate murder carried out in the Mexican tradition of ley de fuga (law of flight). Though no positive proof exists as to Ambassador Wilson’s complicity in or influence surrounding this tragedy, the most pointed indictment is found in the report of John Lind, a lawyer who served as President Wilson’s personal emissary to Mexico in 1913 and 1914. After Lind’s return from Mexico, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan requested him to analyze Wilson’s dispatches to the Department of State. This analysis convinced Lind that “a jury would be justified in finding Henry Lane Wilson guilty of aiding and abetting, if not instigating the Huerta rebellion, and also that he is guilty as an accessory before the fact of the assassination of Madero.” 106 Ambassador Wilson was satisfied with the government’s explanation, and urged the State Department to accept it as final and reliable. He sought to minimize the occurrence by saying that it had a negligible effect on the public, and that the nation, in the main, was favorably disposed toward the new regime. However, reports from American consuls in Mexico directed to the Secretary of State reflected the opposite reaction.107 On February 18, Huerta had sent a telegram to Washington stating “1 have the honor to inform you that I have overthrown the government. The forces are with me, and from now on peace and order will reign.” 108 Subsequently, Wilson bent his efforts towards securing American recognition for Huerta. The State Department replied on February 25, indicating that although the Department saw the advantages of showing a disposition toward recognizing the Provisional Government, the president had directed that no formal recognition be accorded except upon specific instructions from the State Department. This position is reaffirmed and clarified somewhat by Knox’s message of February 28, which explained that the United States government was in de facto relations with Huerta because he was the only effective authority in evidence. A distinction

104Wilson to Knox, Feb. 2 0 ,1 9 1 3 ,For. R el, 1913, p. 724. ! o!**' Márquez Sterling, Los Últimos Dias del Presidente Madero (Havana, 1917) p 491 George M. Stephenson, John Lind o f Minnesota (Minneapolis, 1935), p 307 Wilson to Knox, Feb. 24,1913, For. R el, 1913, pp. 734-736. 108 Huerta to Taft, Feb. 28,1913, Ibid., p. 721.

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was drawn between de facto relations with a de facto government and formal recognition of such government.109 The European countries and most Latin American republics answered Huerta's telegram at once, and by that act accorded him virtual recognition. But Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba followed the United States example in withholding recognition. The position taken by the United States was based on several considerations. President Taft had declined to recognize Huerta partly because the tragic circumstances of his accession seemed to deserve some rebuke by a delay in recognition. Furthermore it was not yet clear that Mexico herself desired Huerta, and lastly, but not the least important, Taft’s own term of office was nearing its close. A courteous consideration for his successor demanded that so important a decision be left to him, rather than have the new president committed to a recognition which might not be in harmony with his policies. ' 09 Knox to Wilson Jbid., pp. 747-748.

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SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS Bancroft, Hubert R. History o f Mexico, 6 vols. San Francisco, 1883-1888. --------- . History o f the North Mexican States and Texas, 2 vols. San Francisco, 18841889. Burke, U. R. A Life o f Benito Juárez. London, 1894. Callcott, Wilfrid H. Santa Anna: The Story o f an Enigma Who Once Was Mexico. Norman, 1946. Cline, Howard F. The United States and Mexico. Cambridge, Mass., 1963. Rev. ed. Cornyn, J. H. Diaz y Mexico, 2 vols. Mexico, 1910. Corti, Egon. Maximilian and Charlotte o f Mexico, 2 vols. New York, 1947. Cosio Villegas, Daniel. Estados Unidos contra Porfirio Diáz. Mexico, 1956. Cotner, Thomas E., ed. Essays in Mexican History. Austin, 1958. Cumberland, Charles C. Mexican Revolution: Genesis under Madero. Austin, 1952. Flandrau, Charles Viva Mexico. New York, 1937. Godoy, José F., Porfirio Diaz, The Master Builder o f a Great Commonwealth. New York, 1910. Gruening, Ernest. Mexico and Its Heritage. New York, 1928. Hannay, David. Diaz. New York, 1917. Manning, W. R. Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico. Baltimore, 1916. Piet cher, David. Rails, Mines and Progress: Seven American Promoters in Mexico, 18671911. Ithaca, 1958. Priestley, H. I. The Mexican Nation. New York, 1923. Quirk, Robert E. The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915. Bloomington, Ind., 1960. Ramirez, J. F. México durante su guerra con los Estados Unidos. Mexico, 1905. Rippy, J. Fred. The United States and Mexico. New York, 1926. Rebolledo, Miguel. Mexico y los Estados Unidos. Mexico, 1917. Robertson, W. S. Iturbide o f Mexico. Durham, 1952. Rives, G. L. The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848, 2 vols. New York, 1913. Roeder, Ralph. Juárez and His Mexico, 2 vols. New York, 1947^ Romero, Matías. Mexico and the United States. New York, 1898. Ross, Stanley R. Francisco I. Madero, Apostle o f Mexican Democracy. New York, 1955. Scholes, Walter V. Mexican Politics During the Juarez Regime, 1855-1872. Columbia, Mo., 1957. Simpson, Lesley B. Many Mexicos, 3rd ed. Berkeley, 1952. Tannenbaum, Frank. The Mexican Agrarian Revolution. New York, 1929. Tischendorf, Alfred. Great Britain and Mexico in the Era o f Profirió Diaz. Durham, 1961.

Mexico and the United States: Recent and Contemporary Relations When Woodrow Wilson was inducted into the presidency in March 1913, he had made no previous explicit pronouncements respecting foreign policy. The first indication of the general position that he would take on the matter was contained in a prepared statement issued November 2, 1912. After recapitulating the domestic problems with which his administration would deal, he declared that the next four years were going to determine “the firm establishment of a foreign policy based upon justice and good will rather than upon mere commercial exploitation and the selfish interests of a narrow circle of financiers extending their enterprises to the ends of the earth . . . ”l From this statement the conclusion could immediately be drawn that the ideals and values of the new president were in opposition to the “dollar diplomacy” of the Taft administra­ tion, which had stressed the material interests of United States citizens abroad. With the change of administration, Philander C. Knox was replaced as secretary of state by William Jennings Bryan, who had previously rendered public service as a member of Congress from 1891 to 1895, and as a Colonel during the Spanish-American War. He had three times been the Democratic candidate for the presidency, and in the Democratic convention of 1912 his influence was critical in determining the nomination of Wilson. As Bryan had little experience in diplomatic practice and international law, the formulation of foreign policy devolved upon the president.2 Bryan’s avowed pacifist and anti-imperialist views harmonized well with those of Wilson. ' Harley Notter, The Origins o f the Foreign Policy o f Woodrow Wilson (Baltimore, 1937), p. 2 Samuel F. Bemis, The American Secretaries o f State and their Diplomacy (New York, 1929), X, 10. 257

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The chaotic situation in Mexico was one of the most pressing problems inherited from the Taft regime by the new administration. Specifically, this involved the question of recognition of the usurper, General Huerta. President Wilson responded promptly and decisively. In a statement circularized to American diplomatic officers of Latin America in March 1913, the president declared that the favor of American recognition was to be made contingent upon “the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. . . . We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition.” 3 This statement, which was aimed at Mexico in particular, revealed his intention not to recognize Huerta, and his desire to promote constitutional government. Another facet of his policy, the attitude he would take toward economic imperialism, was also clarified: ‘T he United States has nothing to seek in Central and South America except the lasting interest of the people of the two continents, the security of governments intended for the people and for no special group or interest . . . ” This reaffirmed his statement of November 2, 1912, thereby indicating the abandonment of “dollar diplomacy.” 4 From this point onward, two considerations motivated the President in the development of his Mexican policy and compelled his adherence to it throughout his administration, namely: “The firm conviction that all nations, weak and powerful, have the inviolable right to control their own affairs,” and the belief, determined from the history of the world, “that Mexico will never become a peaceful, law abiding neighbor of the United States until she has been permitted to achieve a permanent and basic settlement of her troubles without outside interference,” 5 Of extreme importance to President Wilson in the execution of his Mexican policy was the cooperation of Great Britain. Early in his administration, before making a definite stand on nonrecognition, he had instructed the American chargé d’affaires in London, Irvin Laughlin, to determine the British policy regarding Mexico. The British Foreign Office had declared unequivocally that there would be no recognition of Huerta, formal or tacit. Wilson then proceeded to make it known that this country would never recognize him.6 Soon thereafter, Cecil Spring Rice was directed to say that England had changed her mind and on March 31 Secretary Bryan was informed that his Majesty’s Government was recognizing the “president ad interim of the Republic of Mexico.” 7 Thus in the months of April and May, 1913, England, and then France and Germany accorded recognition to Huerta. This was a logical step from the standpoint of European governments as trade and protection of their citizens* investments were of vital importance. Wilson, angered by this turn of events, was most bitter toward the business interests in those countries for he held them responsible. 3Edgar E. Robinson and Victor J. West, The Foreign Policy o f Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1918), pp. 179-180.

4Ibid., p. 180. 5Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I Knew Him (New York, 1921), p. 145. 6Burton J. Hendrick, ed.. The Life and Letters o f Walter Hines Page (New York, 1926), 1, 180-181.

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Meanwhile, Britain further antagonized the president by appointing Sir Lionel Carden as Minister to Mexico in July 1913. Carden had gained a reputation of being anti-American during a diplomatic sojourn in Cuba, and Secretary Knox had twice asked indirectly for his removal. Carden made matters worse by giving several highly undiplomatic interviews critical of the American president. Washington interpreted his appointment as reaffirmation of British recognition of Huerta.8 The status quo was maintained on the matter of British recognition for the next three months. At the end of this period the situation changed in favor of the United States. In Mexico, following the change of administration, conditions were steadily becoming more critical. The American consul at Juárez in reporting to Bryan on March 10, declared that the disorders were growing worse in the west and south and he feared a real war might occur.9 Ambassador Wilson all the while continued to press for recognition of Huerta using as an argument the rising anti-American feeling and the decline of trade. His message to Bryan of March 12, revealing that his views were diametrically opposed to those of the president, stated: “Mexico cannot'remain peaceful unless the same type of government as that of Diaz is again established.” 10 The ambassador’s views are even more distinct in a remark made somewhat later in which he said, “In the conduct of foreign relations idealism is a dangerous element and morals and expediency are nearly identical*11“The president, feeling that he could not rely on the Ambassador’s reports, sent William Bayard Hale, the eminent journalist, to Mexico as his personal observer. The Huerta government, with the continued support of Ambassador Wilson, pressed for recognition. On July 9, 1913, the latter submitted to the State Department for consideration two possible courses which he deemed the only solution to the situation: (1) official recognition with demand for guarantees; (2) withdrawal of the ambassador as a protest against existing conditions.12 By this time Hale’s reports informed the president of the friendly relations between the ambassador and Huerta, and Embassy reports continued to show, the divergence of the ambassador’s views from those of the administration in Washington. On July 3, the president notified Bryan that he thought the ambassador should be recalled, leaving Nelson O’ Shaughnessy in charge on Hale’s recommendation.13 This plan was carried\)ut, and on August 4, after an interview by the president on July 28, Henry Lane WilsoQ resigned. The explanation he gave for this was that his views were at such variance with the present administration that he could no longer represent it.14 A stalemate had now been reached and it became imperative for the president to take steps to resolve it. The absence of policy and reports of intensification of the strife in Mexico had already encouraged undesirable suggestions from members of Congress. These ranged from proposals which

8Hendrick, Life and Letters, pp. 192-198. 9Edwards to Bryan, Mar. 10,1913, For. Rei, 1913, p. 762. ' 0Wilson to Bryan, Mar. 1 2 ,1913,/ftid., p. 769. 11Independent, Nov. 13,1913, p. 289. 12 Wilson to Bryan, July 9,1913, For. Rel., 1913, p. 809. 13 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (New York, 1931), IV, 255-256. ' 4James M. Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York, 1932), p.

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amounted to outright intervention to recognition of the Constitutionalists’ belligerency.15 Accordingly, the president decided to volunteer good offices as a means of remedying the situation. Taking this course, the president, on Bryan’s recommendation, sent John Lind, an ex-governor of Minnesota, as a personal emissary to Huerta. The appointment of this crusader against imperialism and “big business” from Bryan’s section of the country was apparently, in part, an effort to reassure the country of the president’s good intentions and allay the incipient revolt in Congress.16 Prior to Lind’s appointment the president had reached the decision that Huerta must go; and Huerta had publicly announced that he would not resign. There was consequently a widespread belief in the United States that Lind’s mission was futile. This was affirmed by Huerta’s statement to reporters in Mexico City: “I have said publicly and Minister Urrutia has said the same, that I will accept neither mediation nor intervention of any kind in our internal struggles . . . I have also declared that in no account will I accept compromises with the revolution, and still less if a hint of such involves a flagrant violation of our sovereignty.” 17 Venustiano Carranza, Huerta’s chief opponent, added further doubts for Lind’s success by announcing that he would not accept any United States proposals for a truce or mediation.18 The president’s instructions to Lind made it clear that a settlement was conditioned upon (1) an immediate cessation of fighting; (2) an early and free election; (3) General Huerta’s consent not to be a candidate for president; (4) an agreement by all parties to abide by the results of the election. Although the envoy was received courteously enough by the Mexican government, it categorically refused to treat with him on the basis outlined,19 and the only result of his mission was to inspire in Huerta and his party a more bitter hatred towards the United States. The first phase of Lind’s mission thus ended in failure. Subsequently, until April 1914, stationed in this interval at Vera Cruz, he was the chief watchman under Wilson’s “watchful waiting” policy.20 In analyzing the Mexican attitude toward the Lind mission Manuel Calero points out that when it became known that President Wilson was trying to dictate to Mexico the type of government it must have, a wave of indignation swept across the country. When Lind arrived, Calero said, there was much discontent against Huerta and a combined movement might have overthrown him. This was frustrated by the intrusion of Wilson. “Huerta, right or wrong,” said everybody, “rather than accept a foreign imposition.”2 1 Aside from these opinions and the universal criticism in Mexico as to the undiplomatic character of the Lind mission some saw, or thought they saw, a hidden motive in Wilson’s suggestions. Zayas Enriquez who once said, “Machiavelli would have been clay in Wilson’s hands, and what is more, Machiavelli would never have known it,” declared that if Huerta had resigned in compliance with Lind’s instructions Mexico would have lost its autonomy.22 15 Notter, Foreign Policy o f Woodrow Wilson, p. 254. 16George M. Stephenson, John Lind o f Minnesota (Minneapolis, 1935), p. 214. 17 Mexican Herald, Aug. 6, 1913; Review o f Reviews, Sep., 1913, p. 283. 18 Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 2,1913. 19Stephenson, John Lind, p. 217. 20Mexican Herald, Aug. 28, 1913. 21 Manuel Calero, President Wilson ’s Mexican Policy as it Appears to a Mexican (New York, 1916), pp. 17-18. 2 2Rafael de Zayas Enriquez, The Case o f Mexico and the Policy o f President Wilson (New York. 1914), p. 136. •

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“After this not only would the United States have exacted a direct suzerainty, which is the object of its ambition, but Mexico would have virtually become an American colony.”2 3 Another Latin American writer termed Lind’s proposals as ridiculous, erroneous and if accepted would have been a violation of Mexico’s sovereignty.24 President Wilson’s message to Congress on August 27 also outlined some practical steps. All Americans would be urged and assisted to leave Mexico because, although this government wished to give protection, it was mandatory that the hazards be reduced. The arms embargo was to be extended so as to prohibit the export of arms to all factions in Mexico. This was considered necessary, for to permit arms to go freely into Mexico would increase disorder, encourage border clashes, and might lead to an intervention in which the arms we had supplied would be used against us.25 The rebel forces that were in arms against Huerta were naturally favorably disposed toward the American non-recognition policy but were bitter over the arms ban which had affected them though not Huerta, the original Taft proclamation of March 14, 1912, having remained unaltered. In an effort to obtain the same privileges as Huerta, the Constitutionalists had sent a representative to Washington, Eduardo Hay, who appealed to the Committee on Foreign Relations to revoke the discriminatory practice.26 The principal leader of the insurrection against Huerta was Venustiano Carranza, mentioned earlier as having repudiated Huerta’s authority, a con­ servative who had been a senator under Diaz for sixteen years, but had joined the opposition when Diaz failed to back him for the governorship of Coahuila. Under the “Plan of Guadalupe” promulgated on March 26, 1913, Carranza, with a large segment of the population of northern Mexico and several military leaders, notably Alvaro Obregón and Pancho Villa supporting him, set out to reestablish constitutional government. Carranza supplemented this plan on May 13 with a decree that committed the Constitutional government to the principle of international arbitration of claims following his accession to power.27 These avowed intentions brought Carranza into the favor of Washington which maintained liaison with his headquarters through a special agent, G. C. Carothers. In November 1913, William Bayard Hale was sent as a special envoy by the president to the Constitutionalist’s temporary capital in Sonora. His mission was the first overt indication that the United States was interested in the Constitutionalist movement, and Carranza as Huerta’s possible successor.28 These forces in the north, together with those of Zapata in the south, maintained an unrelenting struggle against the Federal troops. Huerta, facing rising opposition in the Mexican Congress, had two senators and one hundred and ten members of the Chamber of Deputies arrested and sent recognition. To circumvent this situation and to put the Constitutionalists on

2'Ibid., p. 168. 2 4 Roberto Domenech. Méjico y el imperialismo Norte A mericano(B ue no s Aires, 1914), p. 56. 2 s Cong. Rec., 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3802. 2 bMexican Herald, Aug. 4,1913. 2 7Cong. Rec., 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3133. 2SNew York Times, Nov. 13, 1913.

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to prison. He then issued a decree ordering the Congress dissolved and assumed dictatorial powers. President Wilson reacted to these events by declaring that he regarded them as an act of bad faith toward the United States and stressed that any elections held under these conditions would not be regarded as valid by his government.29 Undaunted by the admonition Huerta, after asserting that he would not be a candidate, was elected President in a peaceful but farcical election on October 26. President Wilson responded to these events by delivering an address to the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile, Alabama, pn October 27, 1913, in which he examined the more basic aspects of our relationships with the Latin American republics. He spoke of a spiritual union between North and South America saying: “In the future the nations to the south of us will draw closer and closer to u s . . . . We must prove ourselves their friends and champions in terms of equality and honor . . . . The development of constitutional liberty and world human rights, the maintenance of national integrity, as against material interests . . . . that is our creed. . . . The United States will not again seek to secure one additional foot of territory by conquest.. . . ”3 0 The speech appears to show Wilson’s determination that this country was dedicated to making itself an interested friend, seeking no advantages in the southern republics. As another stalemate had been reached by the end of October, Wilson was confronted with the necessity of taking more drastic steps to eliminate Huerta. On November 1, the president sent Huerta an ultimatum virtually demanding his resignation upon a threat to employ any means necessary to accomplish it. This brought no reaction, whereupon Wilson invited foreign cooperation to obtain Huerta’s voluntary retirement. Another statement made soon thereafter indicated that U.S. policy would be to isolate Huerta, and if he did not retire by the force of circumstances it would be the duty of the United States to use less peaceful methods.3 1 This new approach to the problem seems to have been made possible, or at least aided, by the attitude of the British, who by this time were giving moral support to Wilson’s policies. Since July 1913, when Sir Lionel Carden was appointed Minister to Mexico, an act seeming to confirm British recognition of Huerta, although temporary, the position of the British government in the affair caused Wilson much consternation. In November 1913, Sir William Tyrrell, a member of the British Foreign Office came to this country, unofficially, and succeeded in convincing Wilson that the business interests were not dictating his country’s foreign policy, and since Britain recognized the predominant character of American interests in Mexico they would be willing to follow our lead, once English life and property were assured protection.3 2 Tyrrell was able to obtain only one statement from the president concerning his policy. He said, “I am going to teach the South American republics to elect good men.’’33 The23 2’ Bryan to O’Shaughnessy, Oct. 13,1913,For. R e l, 1913, p. 838 30 David F. Houston, Eight Years with Wilson ’s Cabinet (New York, 1926), I, 77. 31 Notter, Foreign Policy o f Woodrow Wilson, p.273; Bryan to Diplomatic Officers of U.S., Nov. 7, 1913, For. R el, 1913, p. 856; Bryan to O’Shaughnessy. Nov. 24, 1913, Ibid.x p. 443. 32 Albert BushneU Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, An Interpretation (Boston, 1916), p. 334. 33Hendrick, Life and Letters, I, pp. 204-205.

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principle value of this interview lay in the fact that Wilson revealed his opposition to the Panama Canal Tolls Act, which did a good deal toward clearing the way for an understanding regarding Huerta.34 Dissension over the matter of canal tolls arose in 1912 when an act was passed by the United States exempting coastwise shipping from tolls. The British held the act to be a violation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, which provided that the tolls levied should apply to the shipping of all nations equally and without discrimination. No agreement had been reached when Wilson took office, and Washington failed to comply with the British proposal that the question be submitted to arbitration. Therefore, in March 1914, subsequent to the Tyrrell-Wilson interview, the president urged Congress to cancel the exemption provisions. A bill to this effect was signed by Wilson in June 1914.35 In November, a few days after Wilson’s interview with Tyrrell, Sir Lionel Carden was instructed by his government to yield to Wilson’s demands. Huerta was told that inasmuch as Carden’s government was supporting Washington he could no longer depend on British backing.36 With the feelings of the British assuaged on the subject of canal tolls and their position against Huerta established, Wilson was left free of European pressure for the time being. In his annual message to Congress on December 2, he said that little by little Huerta was being isolated, his power and prestige were crumbling, and that his total collapse was not far away. “We shall not, I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of watchful waiting.” 3 7 Meanwhile, in the fall of 1913, the struggle between the warring factions grew more intense and widespread. On October 1, Villa occupied Torreón after a battle which cost almost one thousand lives, and Zapata was rapidly gaining more recruits for his army which operated in Morelos and Guerrero. General Obregón, who had been appointed chief of the Army Corps of the Northeast by Carranza, won a series of battles against the federal troops in Sinaloa in this period.38 But in spite of the arms embargo, Huerta was able to keep supplied with munitions and military equipment from Japan and Germany.39 On January 31, 1914, Secretary Bryan announced that his government was convinced that there would be “a more hopeful prospect of peace, of security of property, and of early payment of foreign obligations,” if tûe Constitutionalists were victorious; and the president no longer felt justified in staying neutral. He therefore was about to lift the embargo on arms to Mexico.40 By his action on August 27, 1913, President Wilson had attempted to enforce neutrality by prohibiting the shipment of arms to all contestants. However, by this time it was evident that the Provisional Government was obtaining war materiel from other sources . . . . from nations that had extended 34

3AIbid., p. 209. 35H. Wilson Harris, President Wilson from an English Point o f View (New York, 1917), pp. 144-146. 36Hendrick, Life and Letters, I, 209. 3 7James B. Scott, cd., President Wilson's Foreign Policy, Messages, Addresses, Papers (New York, 1918), pp. 27-30. 38 Alfonso Taracena,M vida en el vértigo de la revolución mexicana (Mexico, 1936), p. 232. 39Wilfred H. Calcott, Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929 (Stanford, 1931), p. 238. 4 ° Bryan to all diplomatie missions of the United States, Jan. 31, 1914, For. Reí., 1914, p.

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equal footing with Huerta, the arms embargo was raised on February 4, 1914.4 1 As the Carrancistas occupied a large area along the border they now had access to material needed to overthrow Huerta. Villa and Carranza were elated, but in Mexico City much bitterness was expressed. The Mexican newspapers vilified Wilson to such an extent that O’Shaughnessy was forced to register several protests with Huerta.4 2 While Huerta was able to obtain military equipment from certain powers, the United States employed a powerful weapon against him when it held up European credit. A French banker, for example, was advised by his government that any loan to Mexico would embarrass French foreign policies. Mexico was refused the proposed loan owing to pressure exerted from Washington.41*43 Foreign investors were given to understand that obligations incurred by Huerta would not be recognized and must inevitably become worthless. Since the provisional president was in imminent danger of bankruptcy, having defaulted on the semi-annual interest payments on the Mexican foreign bonds on January 1, 1914, this failure to obtain loans would obviously bring about the downfall of his government before much time would elapse.44 In later years Huerta admitted that financial pressure exerted by the United States was the most potent force which was used against him.45 By March 1914, it was apparent that the Constitutionalists were deriving little benefit from the arms which had been made available to them by this country lifting the arms ban, for their military operations had slowed down. There arose criticism in the United States as to the efficacy of Wilson’s “watchful waiting” policy. Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico was especially vocal in urging United States intervention. It was with this clamor in mind that the President said, “I have to pause and remind myself that I am President of the United States and not of a small group of Americans with vested interests in Mexico.”46 Before the lifting of the arms embargo could demonstrate any substantial effects, relations between the United States and Mexico were markedly altered by developments in the next few weeks. On April 9 an officer and boat’s crew from the U.S.S. Dolphin, in the course of obtaining supplies in Tampico were arrested by Mexican authorities for landing in a prohibited area. Although the men were released almost immediately, and the local Mexican commander apologized for the incident, Admiral Mayo, the American naval officer commanding the squadron, felt the offense sufficiently grave to demand a further apology, including a twenty-one gun salute to the American flag.47 4 1New York Times, Feb. 4,1914. 4 2Ibid., Feb. 11, 1914. 4 3Henry G. Hodges, The Doctrine o f Intervention (Princeton, 1915), p . I l l , 125. 4 4Ernest Gruening,Mexico and its Heritage (New York, 1928), p. 578. 4 5Victoriano Huerta, Memorias del General Victoriano Huerta (Mexico, 1916), p. 84. 4 6Tumulty, Wilson as I Knew Him, p. 146. 4 7Mayo to Zaragoza, Apr. 8, 1914, For. Rel., 1914, p. 449. For details of the Vera Cruz episode see Robert E. Quirk, An Affair o f Honor, Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation o f Vera Cruz (Lexington, Kentucky, 1962); also, Tumulty, Wilson as I Knew Him. What appears most significant concerning intervention at Vera Cruz is that an American naval officer possessed sufficient diplomatic powers to demand a salute from a government whose existence had not been recognized by this country. Admiral Mayo should have left the matter to the State Department where it logically belonged. If this procedure had been followed, intervention would probably have not occurred, for Wilson was displeased by the Admiral’s action. *

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Huerta sent an apology to Washington but refused to meet the demand for a twenty-one gun salute; unless the United States, by protocol, would return the salute.48 This offer was flatly rejected by Washington. The general belief in Mexico at this time was that if President Wilson accepted the protocol requested by Huerta it would be tantamount to recognition.4 9 Secretary Bryan felt that Huerta’s apology alone was sufficient, but the president felt obliged to back up Mayo’s demand even though the latter’s actions caused him some irritation.50 On April 16, President Wilson made a public statement of the situation in which he enumerated the offenses by which Mexico had offended the dignity of this country. In view of these grievances the President contemplated the following measures be taken: (1) no war with Mexico, but seizure and occupation of Vera Cruz, Tampico and certain ports on the west coast, the others to be blockaded; (2) the occupation and blockade to continue until the officers responsible for the various offenses were punished; (3) Admiral Badger to be given the authority to act on his own discretion should an emergency arise; (4) no time limit would be stipulated for the occupation.5 1 On this basis the president laid his plan before Congress, and on the following day the House of Representatives passed a resolution, by a vote of 337 to 37, giving him the Authority to take the necessary action.5 2 This vote is illustrative of the temper of the American public at this time. The execution of the president’s plan was hastened by an unexpected development. During the night of April 20-21, Secretary Bryan was advised that a German transport, the Ypiranga, carrying two hundred machine guns and fifteen million cartridges for Huerta, would arrive at Vera Cruz the next day.53 With the concurrence of the president. Admiral Fletcher was instructed to seize the customs house at Vera Cruz and intercept the arms.54 After rather sharp fighting the American forces took the city; the occupation continued until November 23, 1914. The Mexican public, Carrancistas and Huertistas alike, remonstrated against American intervention. It had been evident from an earlier date that the Mexican people did not understand Wilson’s moral attitude and many of their newspapers held his ideals up to derision and sarcasm. The Correo de la Tarde, a newspaper published in Mazatlan, for instance, had mkde the following comments on his Mobile speech: “Eloquence, simplicity, and apparent sincerity dwell in Mr. Wilson’s words, but throughout them is apparent the doctrinairism with which he is imbued, and which has already cost Mexico and her Brothers in Latin America so dear. . . . It is a pity he belongs in the United States, a rich nation, but one which loves the liberty of all Latin America.” 5*

" *New York Times, Apr. 20,1914. 4’ Ciro de la Garza Treviffo, Wilson y Huerta (Mexico, 1933), p. 29. 50 Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era, Years o f Peace, 1910-1917 (Chapel Hill, 1944), p. 191. s 'New York Times, Apr. 16,1914. 52Cong. Rec., 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 7006. ^Canada to Bryan, Apr. 20, 1914, For. Rel., 1914, p. 477. The arms and munitions shipment, originating m New York, was permitted to reach its destination in Mexico City by the American authorities. 5 4Tumulty, Wilson as I Knew Him, pp. 151-15 2. s sReview o f Reviews, XLIX (1914), 600.

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Another source, expressing common sentiment, said: “President Wilson denied that he had other than altruistic intentions toward Mexico and through intervention in Vera Cruz has applied the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. However, it is obvious that his theories are anachronisms and his procedures contradictory. He offered an olive branch in one hand, and at the same time humiliated Mexico by intervening in her affairs.”5 6 The United States actions at Vera Cruz were severely criticized by many newspapers in Europe, though in Great Britain they were generally commended.5 7 Mexico severed diplomatic relations and it was believed, both in the United States and Mexico, that wider intervention was at haiid. At this critical juncture Argentina, Brazil and Chile tendered their good offices to effect a settlement of the difficulties; the offer was accepted.5 8 General Huerta, now almost at the end of his financial resources, and worried about the continued successes of the Constitutionalists under Carranza and Villa, could hardly afford to refuse. While Carranza agreed to mediation in principle he refused to allow any aspect of Mexico's internal problems to be made an issue at the forthcoming conference. Neither would he consent to a suspension of hostilities as the mediators requested. Throughout the negotiations at Niagara Falls which followed, Carranza remained adamant on these points, and as a consequence his representatives never participated. The deliberations lasted six weeks, but with no practical results other than allaying Latin American fears in regard to the Mexican policy of the United States.5 9 In the meantime the Constitutionalists had been advancing steadily toward Mexico City. Torreón, Tuxpam and Saltillo had fallen into their hands, and with General Obregón’s victory at Guadalajara early in July, Huerta's capitulation became inevitable. At this juncture dissension arose between Villa and Carranza which threatened to bring about a complete break. The basis of the trouble appeared to be Villa’s jealousy of his colleague’s increasing prestige with the United States. Prompt action by the special agent, Carothers, effected a reconciliation;60 however, as later events proved, this was to be short lived. On July 8, the Niagara Protocol, which issued from the conference, was presented to the Congress at Mexico City and the initial step toward the formation of an interim government was taken. This was the appointment of Chief Justice Carbajal to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position through which he would become provisional president automatically in the event a vacancy occurred. Huerta, conscious of the futility of resistance, and having the opportunity to retire in a dignified manner, resigned on July 15, 1914.61 Soon thereafter, he and his family left for Kingston, Jamaica, on the German cruiser D resden. s 6Ramón Guzmán, El intervencionismo de Mr. Wilson en Mexico (New Orleans, 1915), p. 2. 5 7Outlook, May 2, 1914,pp. 17-18. 5 *New YorkTimes, Apr. 30,1914. 59For details on the Niagara Protocol see Frank H. Severance, Peace Episodes on the Niagara (Buffalo, 1914), pp. 12-13. 60Carothers to Bryan, July 9 ,1 9 1 4 ,For. R e l, 1914, p.559. 6 'Oliveira to Bryan, July 15, 1914, Ibid.t p. 563. The German government made an unsuccessful attempt to help Huerta regain power in Mexico, expecting that his presence there would prevent or delay the entry of the United States in the European war. See George J. Rauch Jr., “The Exile and Death of Victoriano Huerta,’’ Hispanic American Historical Review, XLII (May, 1962), 133-151.

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Carbajal, a man who had maintained an independent attitude throughout the struggle, succeeded Huerta and immediately entered into negotiations with Carranza toward a disposition of the government. A plan acceptable to both was formulated by the Brazilian Minister, and on August 26, 1914, General Carranza made a truimpha entry into Mexico; Acting President Carbajal resigned and left the country. President Wilson has been much criticized for his policy of witholding recognition from General Huerta. A study of previous policy of the United States States in regard to the question of recognition shows that the principle followed has been to recognize governments as soon as they have proved their ability to exist and perform international obligations.62 In general the United States has recognized de fa c to governments without considering their legality, or the method by which they came to power. This practice rested on the Jeffersonian doctrine which was developed to offset the European theory of Divine Right, and was a natural outgrowth of the idea that all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.63 The test which Wilson applied to Huerta’s administration was not the expediency of recognition, or the existence of the de fa c to government, but rather the institutional morality of the government officials. The president felt that the illegal usurpation of executive authority, exemplified by Huerta, would by discouraged by the refusal of the two great Anglo-Saxon powers to recognize such a government. He said, “My ideal is an orderly and righteous government in Mexico, but my passion is for the submerged eight-five percent of the people of that Republic who are struggling toward liberty.” 64 The president’s policy has been ably defended by Albert Bushnell Hart, who said in brief that, in the first place, Huerta, geographically was not president of all Mexico. At least one-third of the area remained outside his jurisdiction at all times. Military he was not head of the Mexican republic because his forced were defeated by the rebels on more occasions than they won battles. Constitutionally he was not president because he was not supported by a Congress chosen in a free election. Huerta was not entitled to recognition as supreme authority since he was afraid to leave the capital to defend his government against armed enemies. His statement that all he needed to make his position secure was recognition, is proof that his power was weak and temporary.65 A more searching analysis of the problem, however, reveals the existence of a dangerous inconsistency in the course which the President followed. Traditional American policy had not contemplated the prevention of domestic disturbances in Latin America, and now Wilson would attempt to use the power of recognition as a moral weapon to secure permanent reform. The fallacy of this concept lay in the fact that moral coercion gravitated toward physical6 6 2Charles E. Martin, The Policy o f the United States as Regards Intervention (New York, 1921,p.209. 6 3Stuart A. McCorkle, American Policy o f Recognition Towards Mexico (Baltimore, 1933), p. 19. 6 4Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 245. 6 5Albert Bushnell Hart,“ Postulates of the Mexican Situation,” American Academy o f Political and Social Science Annals, LIV (1914), 140.

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coercion. Thus the president stood on two divergent lines of action, that of a friend and champion of the Mexican masses, and that of a strong benefactor employing his strength, by threat, to make a sovereign people conform to his wishes. This inconsistency was destructive of one of his major objectives—the friendship of the'Mexican people. As events proved, Wilson attached more im p o r­ tance to the attainment of constitutional government than the matter of friend­ ship, apparently believing that the latter was impossible without the former.66 Whatever may be said for or against the policy of "watchful waiting” , it soon became decidedly unpopular in the United States. Hardly had Carranza entered Mexico City before Villa raised a new revolt in the north, while Zapata continued his depredations in the south. The government was finally compelled to take refuge at Vera Cruz, and Mexico City became a trophy of all the factions, the Constitutionalists occupying and reoccupying the city four different times. On June 2, 1915, President Wilson addressed a strong plea to the leaders of the various factions to act together for the relief of their prostrate country, declaring that, while the United States did not desire or claim the right to settle the affairs of Mexico for her, yet she could not stand indifferently by and do nothing to serve her neighbor. When this produced no results, our government held a conference with the six ranking Latin American representatives, and a joint note, signed by the United States and the ministers from Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Guatemala, was despatched, August 11, 1915, to Carranza and Villa. The two leaders were asked to meet at some neutral place to exchange ideas on the creation of a provisional government which should take the first steps necessary to the constitutional reconstruction of the country.67 General Villa accepted forthwith, but General Carranza declared that he could not consent to the discussion of the domestic affarts of the republic by mediation or on the initiative of any foreign government. Nevertheless, when Carranza gave pledges that his government would guarantee that the lives and property of foreigners in Mexico would be respected, and that damages caused by the revolution would be settled, President Wilson, on October 19, 1915, authorized his de fa c to government to be recognized by the United States. Enraged by this triumph of his rival, Villa swore vengeance upon the United States, and on January 10, 1916, eighteen Americans holding passports of safe conduct issued by the de fa cto government were taken from a train at Santa Ysabel and shot in cold blood. On March 9 Villa raided the little town of Columbus, New Mexico, killing seventeen Americans and carrying away horses. The American government thereupon ordered General John J. Pershing to pursue the bandits across the border, with orders to capture them or destroy their band. Instead of cooperating, the Carranza government seemed desirous of thwarting the purpose of the expedition and, as American troops continued their vain quest farther and farther inland, it showed itself openly hostile. Finally General Jacinto Trevino issued a p ronunciam iento informing General Pershing that if he moved his troops farther south, east, or west, he would be attacked.6 6 6Notter, Foreign Policy o f Woodrow Wilson, p. 278. 6 7Amer. Jour, o f Int. Law. X (Apr., 1916), 364.

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President Wilson had been patient, but his forbearance had a limit, and he immediately ordered 150,000 militia under arms and despatched them to the border. In a long message to the Mexican government, dated June 20, 1916, Secretary of State Robert Lansing reviewed the whole situation and made it clear that the American troops were in Mexico to accomplish a duty that had been forced upon it through the impotence of the Mexican authorities. Therefore the demand of the Mexican government for “the immediate withdrawal of the American troops” could not be entertained.68 The day after the despatch of this note the situation was rendered still more grave by an attack upon the American troops at Carrizal, in which some soldiers on each side were killed and seventeen American soldiers were taken captive. The United States government notified American citizens to leave Mexico and, with American troops massed on the border, war seemed inevitable. A demand for the immediate release of the prisoners and a definite statement of the Mexican government’s purposes finally aroused Carranza to the danger of his position. The captives were released, and Carranza proposed that an offer of mediation on the part of Spain and several Latin American countries be accepted. The United States thereupon suggested a joint conference, with three commissioners from each side, to arrange a settlement. This solution was accepted by the Mexican government, which named as its delegates Luis Cabrera, Minister of Finance, Alberto Pani, president of the Mexican International Railways, and Ignacio Bonillas. The United States was represented by Franklin K. Lane, Judge George Gray, and John R. Mott. The conference convened September 6 at New London, Connecticut, and continued, with several recesses, until November 24. The Americans were especially insistent on the protection of foreigners and their interests in Mexico, while the Mexicans urged the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Mexican soil. A protocol was finally signed providing for the withdrawal of General Pershing’s army within forty days, provided no new raids should occur in the meantime, with the United States reserving the right to send an army into Mexico to capture bandits who might invade American territory. Claims for damages and plans for economic development were left to future negotiations.6 9 Although the Carranza government did not rátify the protocol in accordance with the recommendation of the American commissioners, the American troops were ordered withdrawn, and on January 2, 1917, diplomatic relations were resumed with the appointment of Henry P. Fletcher as United States ambassador to Mexico. Villa remained at large, and Carranza gained added prestige for his successful baiting of the United States; but President Wilson had the satisfaction of preventing intervention from becoming war at a time when there was greater need for American troops and resources in Europe than in Mexico. On March 1, 1917, the United States Department of State released a report of a German plot to dismember the Union. Conveyed by the British6 6 8This correspondence may be found in Ibid., Supp., pp. 179-225. Secretary Bryan resigned in June 1915, fearing that President Wilson’s policies would carry the United States into the European war. Robert Lansing succeeded him as Secretary of State. 69 Text of protocol, Ibid., XI (Apr., 1917), 403.

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Secret Service to Washington, it revealed that Alfred Zimmerman, the German foreign minister, had offered Mexico the states of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, together with generous financial aid, if Mexico would join Germany should war break out between the United States and Germany. Further, the president of Mexico was to urge Japan to shift to the side of the Central Powers, presumably in return for what spoils Japan might gain at the expense of the United States. Carranza rejected the offer, but he adopted a neutralist policy, mildly sympathetic to Germany, which created a security risk for the United States and the Allies during World War 1. An important domestic problem that the Mexicans had to solve was the devising of some means whereby the dictatorship could be transformed, with the least possible friction, into a constitutional regime. To this end a constitutional convention was called to adopt a new constitution in place of the one of 1857, and the delegates assembled at Queretero in February, 1917. As it was hoped in 1857 to make Mexico a democratic state by giving her a democratic constitution modeled upon the constitution of the United States, so now, sixty years later, it was hoped to solve the various social and economic problems by incorporating their remedies in a constitutional formula.70 In the framework of government the new constitution followed the constitution of 1857, and as amended provides for a president elected for a single six-year term, with duties very similar to the duties of the president of the United States, and a bicameral congress, the senate consisting of two members from each state and two from the federal district, chosen directly for a six-year term, and the house elected directly for a three-year term. The federal system was maintained, such powers as were not granted to the national government being reserved to the states. The constitution began with a very elaborate bill of rights and ended with a series of temporary articles regulating the procedure in the first election to be held under it. The new provisions of most interest to the United States were those concerning the ownership of land and natural resources. Article XXVII declared the ownership of lands and waters to be vested originally in the nation, which has the right to transmit title thereof to private persons. Necessary measures were to be taken to divide large landed estates and to develop small holdings. The ownership of all minerals, phosphates, petroleum, and hydrocarbons is vested directly in the state, is inalienable, and may not be lost by prescription. As to the legal capacity to acquire ownership of lands, it was provided that “only Mexicans by birth or naturalization, and Mexican companies, have the right to acquire ownership in lands, waters, and their appurtenances, or to obtain concessions to develop mines, waters, or mineral fuels in the Republic of Mexico. The nation may grant the same right to foreigners, provided they agree before the department of foreign affairs to be considered Mexicans in respect to such property, and accordingly not to invoke the protection of their governments in respect to the same, under penalty in case of breach, of forfeiture to the nation of property so acquired. Within a zone of 100 kilometers

70 The text of the Constitution of 1917 may be found in Investigation o f Mexican Affairs, Sen. Doc., No. 285, 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. II, p. }123.

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from the frontiers and 50 kilometers from the seacoast, no foreigner shall under any conditions acquire direct ownership of lands and waters.” It can be easily seen that the provisions of this article, especially when it is realized that most of the oil-producing property lies within the 50 kilometer zone, are almost completely prohibitive of further foreign exploitation of Mexican oil resources. However, the more immediate question was in regard to the effect it would have on property already acquired. Article XIV of the constitution seemed to answer this in declaring: “No law shall be given retroactive effect to the injury of any person whatsoever.” But another provision in Article XXVII (Sec. IV) declared that commercial stock companies may not acquire, hold, or administer rural properties, but only lands in an area absolutely necessary for their establishments, which the executive of the union or of the state in each case shall determine. This seemed like a dangerous exercise of the executive power, and even before the constitution was signed and promulgated, Secretary Lansing, in a despatch to Charles Parker, representing American interests at Queretaro, protested against this paragraph, pointing out that “the objection to a provision so capabale of capricious application appears evident. The precise conditions under which the power vested in the executive may be exercised are not defined. No safeguards are afforded against unwise or arbitary executive acts.” 71 After considerable correspondence on the subject, it was apparent that, while the new constitution did not interfere with any wells already drilled, it did prevent foreign companies from sinking new wells unless they waived their nationality and organized as Mexican corporations. The opposition to Article XXVII upon the part of the American oil interests, particularly as to the interpretation placed upon it by Carranza in a series of executive decrees promulgated at different times during the year 1918, formed the bone of diplomatic contention during the remaining part of the Carranza régime. A decree of February 19, 1918, imposing certain taxes on the surface of oil lands, as well as on the rents and royalties derived from their exploitation, seemed to indicate an intention to separate the ownership of the surface from that of the mineral deposits of the sub-surface, thereby confiscating private property under the guise of taxation without just compensation. Both the American government72 and the oil companies protected, but with little apparent effect upon the intentions of the Mexican government. The Mexican authorities contended that the decrees were merely fiscal legislation, which operated similarly upon its own citizens and upon foreigners, and that therefore Mexico, in the exercise of its sovereign rights, could not admit the interference of foreign governments in the matter. If the foreigners felt themselves prejudiced by the decree, the Mexican courts were open to afford them legal remedies.73 Mr. Frank L. Polk summed up the American case in an emphatic but friendly fashion in a long note to Fletcher, the American ambassador, on December 13, 1918. He pointed out that the Mexican attitude regarding the decrees—namely, that merely because they applied equally to Mexican citizens and foreigners 71 Ibid. 72 See note of Ambassador Fletcher dated April 2, 1918, Ibid., p. 3157. 7 3For a full statement of the Mexican case see the note of E. Graza Pérez, August 17, 1918, to Henry P. Fletcher, Ibid., p. 3161.

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the question was one of internal sovereignty, and afforded no rightful basis for interposition by the governments of interested foreigners whose property rights were jeopardized—was not in accordance with international law. “While the Mexican government may see fit to confiscate vested property rights of its own citizens, such action is in equity no justification for the confiscation of such rights of American citizens, and does not stop the government of the United States from protesting on behalf of its citizens against confiscation of their property.” Polk then went on to show that Mexican citizens had, by their participation in molding governmental policies, a weapon in addition to judicial remedies which foreigners did not possess; therefore, he argued, friendly representations were not out of place.74 President Carranza finally turned the matter over to the Mexican congress; but no “organic act” on the subject was passed until some years later. It is impossible to find an absolutely impartial account of the oil question under the Carranza régime, but a few statements on both sides will afford a basis for a fair approximation. Frederic R. Kellogg, general counsel of the PanAmerican Petroleum and Transport Company, sums up the complaints of the oil interests somewhat as follows: many regulations of a harassing nature to prevent development were adopted; the government allowed the filing of claims against the oil properties by persons claiming to be entitled to acquire them under the Carranza decrees; concessions to drill upon lands comprised within titles held by petroleum companies were granted to Carranza’s favorites; no company was allowed to drill on its own land unless it had a drilling permit, and no permit would be granted unless the company agreed to abide by the terms of any petroleum law that might be enacted in the future; Carranza sent his armed forces into the oil regions, resulting in a series of murders and assaults upon the employees of the companies; finally, a campaign of vilification against the companies was conducted in Mexico and the United States, accusing them of being tax-dodgers, fomenting rebellion against the Carranza administration, and even seeking to bring about armed intervention by the United States to subserve their own greed and financial ambitions.7 5 On the other side, Joseph F. Guffey, president of the Atlantic Gulf Oil Corporation, declared that the chief offenders in respect to propaganda were the so-called associations ostensibly formed for the protection of American rights in Mexico. As to confiscation, he asserted that . . . the Mexican government is not attempting to confiscate oil properties developed and operated by American companies. If such were its purpose, it could easily double or treble the export tax of eleven cents per barrel which was collected on all oil exported from Mexico in 1919 . . . . All these companies have to do to conform to Mexican requirements is to recognize the constitution, renounce all oil concessions and leases obtained prior to its promulgation, and take out new permits. This process does not invalidate the occupancy of these properties by oil companies, but simply recognizes the government’s right to levy taxes or collect a royal ty on oil production . . . . President Carranza I regard as an intelligent, constructive, and honest statesman; he has done more for Mexico and the Mexican people than any other president in its history.76 " Ib id ., p.3163. 7 5Ibid., p. 3270. 70New York Times, Feb. 26, 1920.

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But without question one of the best sources of information upon Mexican conditions during the Carranza régime is the voluminous testimony offered before the subcommittee on the investigation of Mexican affairs headed by Senator Albert B. Fall, which lasted from August 8, 1919, until May 28, 1920.7 7 Hearings were held in Washington, New York, and in various cities and towns along the border, and, in all, more than two hundred and fifty witnesses were examined. Edward L. Doheny’s account of his long struggle against climatic conditions, governmental interference, and discouragement on the part of stockholders is a story of success against odds which rivals the epic tales of the forty-niners. Incidentally, Doheny brought out the fact that the oil companies, instead of hiring Palaez to protect them against the Carranza régime, were paying him under duress with the connivance of the Carranza authorities, who themselves were wholly unable to give adequate protection. The payments had also been advised by the American State Department.7 8 Whether or not one is in favor of intervention, an unbiased perusal of this report indicates clearly that Mexico under the Carranza régime was not a safe place for an American citizen, whether he was mine-owner, oil-producer, or the proprietor of a ranch. The report further made it clear not only that there was a vast amount of American capital in Mexico,79 but that it went there under the protection of, and in many cases at the urgent solicitation of, the Mexican government. Finally, despite a good deal of popular suspicion of Senator Fall’s Mexican policy, it must be conceded that every effort was made to get at the entire truth of the situation, and that the attempts to prove that a plot existed in the United States to force armed intervention in Mexico failed because no substantial facts were brought forth to substantiate the assertions. While the Fall sub-committee was at work, a new revolution was started which carried Carranza out of power and down to his death. Like Díaz, Carranza was unable to resign himself to letting the supreme power slip from his fingers. Inasmuch as the constitution prevented a second term, his only chance of retaining control lay in the procuring the election of someone who would be subservient to h im . The two strongest candidates, General Alvaro Obregón and General Pablo Gonzalez, were not men of this sort. Hence Señor Bonillas, the Mexican ambassador to the United States, was picked; the poiht was pressed that the country ought to have a civilian president; and Bonillas was pledged the support of a civilian party. Whatever may have been his qualifications, Señor Bonillas was handicapped by his long absence from the country and by his lack of a strong personal following. President Carranza had signified his intention to allow the elections to be held without any governmental interference. Nevertheless, it was not long before Candido Aguilar, the president’s son-in-law, came out for Bonillas, and soon it was manifest that government dictation was again to be reckoned with. The7 7 7By a Senate resolution the committee was directed to investigate the matter of damages and outrages suffered by United States citizens in Mexico, the proper indemnities, and what measures should be taken to prevent a recurrence of such outrages. 78Investigation o f Mexican Affairs, I, 285. 79The report gives $1,057,770,000 as the exact figure, p. 3322.

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power of the government to bring about the election of its own candidate in Mexico is notorious. The only hope for Obregón and Gonzalez was a revolution, and on April 23, 1920, General Obregón and a number of influential leaders raised a revolt in the state of Sonora. The so-called Agua Prieta plan had been adopted, which declared that the sovereignty of Mexico rested in the people; Carranza, it was contended, had violated it; therefore he must give over his power to a provisional president, namely, Governor Adolfo de la Huerta of Sonora, who should be supreme commander of the state until the elections were to be held. The plan further decreed that the constitution of 1917 should continue to be the fundamental law of the republic. The revolution spread very rapidly, particularly after leaders like Generals Alvarado, Gomez, and Palaez went over to Obregón, and Gonzalez withdrew his candidacy in Obregón’s favor. Early in May, Carranza was forced to flee from the capital, and the revolutionists entered it the same day. Unfortunately for Carranza, he fell in with a small band supposed to be a part of the forces of Palaez, but under the command of Carrera. These men offered to act as guides. But during the night an attack was made upon the sleeping-quarters of General Carranza, and he was shot, presumably by the pretended escort. In the meantime, Congress had chosen Adolfo de la Huerta provisional president, and he postponed the elections from July to September, in order that the provisional government might have time to pacify the country. The delay was necessary, for Gonzalez, apparently repenting his self-effacement, had started a new revolution. But even Mexico was war weary; the revolt was speedily put down, and Gonzalez captured and tried for treason. He was acquitted with the understanding that he would leave the country. Pancho Villa, who also had promised to be good, soon grew tired of inaction and raised a revolt. Realizing the difficulty of capturing him, the government finally got an agreement under which he was to lay down his arms, provided each of his eight hundred followers should receive a tract of land and Pancho himself be given a large estate, with the privilege of keeping fifty retainers at government expense. On September 5, 1920, Alvaro Obregón was elected president; and his party, the Liberal Constitutionalists, gained control of both houses of congress. Before taking office, he made a tour of the Mexican states, in the course of which he crossed the boundary and spent some ten days on the American side. He was enthusiastically received, and at El Paso he declared that he felt sure that Mexico was already recognized by the American people, if not by their government. In a speech at Dallas, October 17, he assured his hearers that Mexico would recognize all legal foreign debts and all legal rights of Mexicans and foreigners alike. On December 1, 1920, he was inaugurated. But, although the new government was recognized the same month by Japan, Brazil, Holland, and Germany, the Wilson administration, whose term was soon to expire, thought it .best to allow the question of recognition on our own part to be handled by the incoming administration. President Obregon called a special session of congress to meet February 7, 1921, and in his address to the body he stressed the need of legislation to institute a modern banking system, the estab­ lishment of an agrarian policy that would encourage the restoration of the land

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to the people, and the solution of the problem arising from the application of Article XXVII to the nation’s petroleum resources.80 With men like Elias Plutarco Calles as secretary of interior and premier, and Adolfo de la Huerta as secretary of treasury to assist him, President Obregón was enabled in a very short time to establish peace and order in Mexico. His attitude towards American investors was firm in maintaining the rights of the Mexican nation, but fair in respecting rights honestly acquired. However, the Harding administration refused to consider the question of recognition until certain preliminary questions were settled. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes outlined his policy in a general way on June 7, 1921. He insisted that the fundamental question was the safeguarding of American property rights against confiscation. “This question is vital,” he declared, “because of the provisions inserted in the Mexican Constitution promulgated in 1917. If these provisions are to be put into effect retroactively, the properties of American citizens will be confiscated on a great scale. This would constitute an international wrong of the gravest character, and this government could not submit to its accomplishment. If it be said that this wrong is not intended, and that the Constitution of 1917 will not be construed to permit, or enforced so as to effect, confiscation, then it is important that this should be made clear by guaranties in proper form.” According to Secretary Hughes, the best way to obtain such guaranties was for the two governments to sign a treaty of amity and commerce in which Mexico would agree to safeguard the rights of property which attached before the Constitution of 1917 was promulgated.81 Such a treaty of some eighteen articles was presented by United States chargé d’affaires Summerlin to the Mexican government on May 27, 1921,82 but President Obregón had already rejected recognition upon such a basis, declaring that “the acceptance and signing of a convention to obtain recognition would be equal to placing in doubt the rights that Mexico has to all the privileges international law establishes.8 3 A series of notes between the two governments now followed which culminated with Secretary Hughes’ note of instruction dated July 28, 1922, in which he stated that if the Mexican authorities were not willing to sign a treaty binding Mexico to respect the valid titles acquired under Mexican laws prior to the Constitution of 1917, then the question remained in what manner such assurances should be given.84 On March 31, 1923, Minister Pani made a lengthy response, claiming that the accomplished acts of the Mexican government since the correspondence began were such as to affect advantageously the solution of the diplomatic problem. He then cited among other “acts” the signing of the Lamont-Huerta agreement, on June 16, 1922, for the adjustment of the Mexican debt; the negotiations already begun between the secretary of the treasury and the representatives of the principal oil companies; and the five amparo (injunction)8 8 0Text may be found in tne Mexican Review, IV (Mar., 1921), 4. 81 New York Times, June 8,1921. 82For text see United States Daily, May 15, 1926. 8 3 New York Times, May 21,1921. 84 United States Daily, May 19, 1926.

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decisions of the Mexican Supreme Court, which had defined in an unmistakable manner the non-retroactive character of Article XXVII.8 5 He also justified the agrarian policy as being humane and economic, and insisted that the damages to American agricultural properties were insignificant in comparison with the vital advantages to the Mexican people.86 Apparently moved by this plea, President Warren G. Harding on May 2, 1923, appointed Charles Beecher Warren, former ambassador to Japan, and John Barton Payne, former secretary of the interior, as American commissioners to meet two Mexican commissioners for the purpose of exchanging impressions. The conference convened in Mexico City on May 15, 1923, and lasted till August 15 of the same year.8 7 The two outstanding issues were the questions arising from the confiscation of American agricultural lands to provide ejidos or communal lands to villages who had never had them or had been deprived of them, and the dispute regarding the nationalization of the sub-soil deposits whereby rights possessed by American owners of the property were con­ fiscated.88 In the case of the agricultural lands the United States insisted that the indemnity should be paid in cash and according to their just value, and that payment by bonds not convertible into money on the basis of their par value could not be considered as indemnification under the rules of international law.89 Nevertheless, realizing that an urgent social emergency existed, the United States’ commissioners agreed that if the Mexican government would make a statement that its claim to expropriate lands of American citizens for ejidos did not constitute a precedent for the expropriation of any other kind of property except for due compensation made in cash, the United States government would consider whether under the circumstances it would be willing to accept for its citizens federal bonds of Mexico in payment for the lands taken, providing that the ejidos did not exceed a specified area of 1755 hectares (4335 acres). Furthermore such action was contingent upon the conclusion of a general claims convention between the two governments under which those dispossessed might present their claims for loss or damage. The Mexican commissioners accepted this formula.90 In the case of sub-soil deposits, the Mexican commissioners conceded that those owners of the surface prior to May 1, 1917, who had performed “some positive act” indicating their intention to exploit the sub-soil deposits were protected against nationalization, but insisted that all who had not, had forfeited their rights.9 1 Here also, however, a compromise was obtained whereby to those owners who had not performed a “positive act” were given preferential rights to 8

8 5 For the Mexican embassy’s official statement regarding the Supreme Court’s ruling see New York Times, July 8, 1922; for the decisions,/¿¿rf., Aug. 9,1922. 8 6 United States Daily, May 19,1926. 8 7Proceedings o f the United States-Mexican Commission, Convened, May 14, 1923 (Washington, 1925). 8 8For a careful and on the whole, impartial presentation of the legalistic point of view see Antonio Gómez Robledo, T ie Jucareli Agreements and International Law (Mexico, 1940). 8 9Proceedings o f the United State s-Mexican Commission, p . 29. 90Ibid., pp. 37-44.

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the sub-soil as against third parties. Here again the United States’ right to make reservations in behalf of its citizens was recognized.92 With these understandings approved by the chief executives of both countries, the government of President Obregón was formally recognized by the United States on August 31, 1923. Shortly afterwards two claims conventions were signed, a general one at Washington on September 8, 1923, covering claims arising since July 4, 1868, the date of the former claims convention,9 3 and a special convention signed at Mexico City on September 10, 1923, covering claims arising from losses occurring during the revolutionary activities lasting from November 20, 1910, to May 31, 1920.94 President Obregón had at last won his long fight for recognition, but too late to profit greatly by it, for his term of office was almost ended and the constitution forbade his immediate reelection. Nevertheless he was now able to support openly and effectively the candidacy of General Plutarco Calles, his secretary of the interior and a leader of the socialist and labor groups. When a revolution broke out, engineered by Adolfo de la Huerta, former minister of finance and chief candidate of the* opposition, the United States showed its friendliness to the newly recognized government by sending a large consignment of arms to the Obregón forces, and placing an embargo on all shipments of arms to the revolutionists. A little later the Navy Department ordered a division of six destroyers to Tampico where de la Huerta was attempting to maintain a blockade, and the State Department requested the governor of Texas to permit 2000 Mexican federal troops en route from Sonora to cross Texas territory to enter Mexico by El Paso. This seemed to be stretching the bonds of friendly neutrality and the question of our benevolent attitude was raised in Congress. Congressman Fairchild asked that the Harding doctrine against the sale of arms to any foreign power be made the official doctrine of the United States and he was supported by Senators King, William Borah, and Hiram Johnson in the Senate.95 Senator Robinson introduced an even more drastic bill in the Senate which would prevent any officer, agent, citizen, or corporation of the United States from selling arms and munitions to any foreign government or its agents.96 But the Mexican government had the arms,and the revolution was soon put down. ^ During the year 1924 the relations between the two countries were exceedingly cordial. The appointment of Charles Beecher Warren as ambassador to Mexico indicated the intention of the United States to support the understandings recently arrived at. When for personal reasons he was forced to resign a few months later, he declared that never since the Díaz régime had relations between the two countries been on a more friendly basis. General Calles, who had been elected by a large majority, paid a visit to the United States before his inauguration and was received, both officially and unofficially, in a most cordial fashion.9

9 2Ibid., pp. 47-49. 9 *U.S. Treaty Series, No. 678. 9*Ibid., No. 676. 9sNew York Times, Jan. 1, 1924. 9bIbid., Jan. 9,1924.

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Unfortunately for the continuance of amicable relations, on March 4, 1925, Secretary Hughes resigned and former Senator Frank B. Kellogg took over the affairs of the State Department. One of his first official acts was to ask Ambassador Sheffield, who had taken Warren’s post, to report to Washington. After conferring with him. Secretary Kellogg on June 12, 1925, gave to the press what one of his former colleagues termed “an unmannerly and unjustifiable” statement. Noting that conditions in Mexico were not entirely satisfactory, Secretary Kellogg declared that we were looking to the Mexican government to restore properties illegally taken and to indemnify American citizens. He understood from the press that another revolutionary movement might be impending. If so, Secretary Kellogg concluded, “it is now the policy of this government to use its influence and its support in behalf of stability and orderly constitutional procedure, but it should be made clear that this government will continue to support the government in Mexico only so long as it protects American lives and American rights and complies with its international engagements and obligations. The government of Mexico is now on trial before the world . . . . We have been patient and realize, of course, that it takes time to bring about a stable government, but we cannot countenance violation of her obligations and failure to protect American citizens.” 97 President Calles resented the implications of this statement and regretted that Kellogg showed the interest of the United States in the maintenance of order in Mexico by suggesting that revolutionary movements were said to be impending. As for the government of Mexico being on trial before the world, such was also the case with that of the United States, as well as those of other countries, “but if it is to be understood that Mexico is on trial in the guise of defendant my government absolutely rejects with energy such imputation which in essence would only mean an insult.” 98 However, this diplomatic flurry was merely an ominous portent of a much more serious situation to follow. Although there had been constant recrimina­ tions between the two powers in regard to the provisions of Article XXVII of the Constitution of 1917, concerning agrarian reform and the nationalization of the sub-soil deposits, no action had as yet been taken by the Mexican Congress to put these provisions into effect. But in December, 1925, the Mexican Congress passed two laws to remedy this situation-laws generally known as the land law and the petroleum law.99 The petroleum law repeated the provision of the Constitution asserting inalienable ownership of sub-soil deposits by the nation; it required foreigners to comply with the constitutional provisions regarding the waiving of nationality and the right to invoke diplomatic protection in so far as Mexican owned property was concerned; it also enforced the clause prohibiting ownership of lands or waters within fifty kilometers from the sea coast and one hundred kilometers from the frontiers. A new feature of the law required all holdings to *

* 7Ibid., June 13, 1925. ' 6Ibid., June 15, 1925. y 9For the text of the land law see C. W. Hackett, “The Mexican Revolution and the United States, 1910-1926,” World Peace Foundation Pamphlet, Vol. IX, No. 5, p. 414; for petroleum law ,/tad., p. 425.

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be confirmed by concessions to be granted for a period of not more than fifty years from the time when exploitation was begun. Furthermore, the concessions to be confirmed must have arisen in lands where exploitation was begun or the contract made prior to May 1, 1917. Detailed regulations for the concessions were also included. The land law also repeated the constitutional restrictions, and included foreigners participating in Mexican corporations. It was further provided that Mexican companies owning rural property for agricultural purposes would not be granted a permit if there remained in the hands of aliens 50 percent or more of the total interests of the company. Foreign persons holding 50 percent or more of total interests could hold the amount in excess of 50 percent till their death, and their heirs were given five years to dispose of their holdings with an extension if considered necessary. Corporations were granted ten years to dispose of excess holdings. Even before the passage of these laws, Secretary Kellogg, through the American ambassador, submitted certain inquiries regarding them, and on November 17, 1925, he sent an aide-mémoire or personal message to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs in the hope “that the clouds which I perceive on the horizon of friendship between the United States and Mexico may be removed.” 100 President Calles replied directly through his Minister of Foreign Affairs that there was “absolutely no cause for perceiving clouds, and that the legislation was merely aimed at dispelling the vagueness of the constitutional provisions and would in no way violate the obligations of Mexico under international law.” The ensuing correspondence which began with the aide-mémoire of November 17, 1925, ended exactly a year later with the final reply of the Mexican government dated November 17, 1926. Inasmuch as it amounts to some 50,000 words and much of it is repetitious, perhaps the simplest method of approach would be to note the issues involved and the attitude of both parties in regard to them. The issues in dispute pertained to a difference in interpretation in regard to the four following subjects: (1) the alleged retroactive features of the land law; (2) the alleged retroactivity of the petroleum law; (3) the insistence on the part of the Mexican government that foreigners owning property agree to submit themselves to Mexican jurisdiction in all disputes concerning their property, on penalty that their property be forfeited if they should invoke the protection of their government; (4) the nature of the agreements* formulated at the Conference in Mexico City by the four commisioners in May, 1923.

As to the engagements of 1923, President Calles insisted that they were merely an “exchange of views” and “did not result in any formal agreement other than that of the claims conventions which were signed after the resumption of diplomatic relations.” 101 Furthermore, although Mexico recog­ nized the declarations made by its commissioners, the conferences of 1923 were not a condition for the recognition of the government of Mexico and could10 10 “This correspondence has been published as Sen. Doc. No. 96, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 1Reply of the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nov. 27, 1925, Ibid., p. 5.

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never be given that character.102*104 Finally, the Mexican government refused to recognize the binding force equivalent to a treaty or a constitutional precept in the outlines of policy presented at the conference, since the declarations of neither side took the form of a synallagmatic agreement.10 3 Secretary Kellogg’s stand on the binding nature of the oral agreements of the conference is clearly and succinctly stated in his last note of October 30, 1926: “The declarations of the Mexican and American commissioners on that occasion, subsequently ratified by an exchange of notes between the two governments, constituted, in the" view of my government, solemn and binding undertakings which formed the basis and moving consideration for the recognition of the Mexican government by this government.” 10 4 However, inasmuch as the appointment of the two American commis­ sioners was not approved by the Senate, nor was the agreement itself submitted to the Senate for its approval, it could hardly be considered as of the same binding force as a formal treaty. Furthermore, in the minutes of the meeting of the commision on August 2, it is stated that the policy of the present president of Mexico is conditioned within the limitations of his constitutional power and “is not intended to constitute an obligation for an unlimited time on the part of the Mexican government to grant preferential rights to such owners of the surface or persons entitled to exercise their rights to the oil in the sub-soil.105 Under these circumstances, the legislative branch or a subsequent executive would hardly appear to bè legally bound. In regard to the disagreement due to the Mexican government’s insistence that foreign property owners bind themselves not to invoke the diplomatic protection of their government, but agree to submit themselves as Mexicans to Mexican laws in disputes over property under penalty of forfeiture of their property if such protection is sought, a compromise seems to have been reached in the correspondence. In his note of October 7, 1926, Foreign Minister Saénz declares: “The Mexican government therefore does not deny that the American government is at liberty to intervene for its nationals; but that does not stand in the way of carrying out an agreement under which the alien agrees not to be the party asking for the diplomatic protection of his government. In case of infringement of any international duty such as a denial of justice would be, the right of the American government to take with the Mexican government appropriate action to seek atonement for injustice or injury which may have been done to its nationals would stand unimpaired. Under these conditions neither would the American government have failed to protect its nationals nor the Mexican government to comply with its laws.” 106 It might be noted, however, that this so-called Calvo clause seems to have been interpreted to some extent in favor of the position taken by the United States in the decision rendered by the General Claims Commission on March 31, 1926, in the case of the North American Dredging Company of Texas v. United 102 Ibid., p. 34. 10 3U.S. Dept, of State, American Property Rights in Mexico (Washington, 1926), p. 11. 104Ibid., p. 26. 10 5Proceedings o f the United States-Mexican Commission, 1923. 10 6American Property Rights in Mexico, p. 14.

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Mexican States, even though the Commission dismissed this case and thus sus­ tained the position of the Mexican agent, the Commission found the Calvo clause neither upheld unanimously nor universally rejected by authorities on inter­ national law, but it did reject as unsound the right of Mexico or any other nation “lawfully to bind all foreigners by contract to relinquish all rights of protection by their governments. . . . This provision did not and could not deprive the claimant of his American citizenship and all that that implies. It did not take from him his undoubted right to apply to his own government for protection if his resort to the Mexican tribunals or other authorities available to him resulted in a denial or delay of justice as that term is used in international law.” 10 7 The third point under dispute was the alleged retroactivity of the land law, which required foreign persons and corporations to divest themselves of majority control of corporations owning rural properties for agricultural purposes. According to the terms of this law, corporations were required to dispose of their stock in excess of 50 percent within ten years, while individuals were allowed to retain such majority stock till their death and their heirs were given five years to dispose of it. Secretary Kellogg insisted that this provision of the law was “manifestly retroactive,” since it required the alien owner of rural properties legally acquired under the laws of Mexico “to divest himself of the ownership, control and management of his property.” 108 Minister Saenz maintained that the law in the case of individuals was not retroactive nor confiscatory, since it permitted possession till the death of the owner and therefore was merely a limitation upon the right of inheritance, which is in strict conformity with international law.109 In the case of alien moral persons (corporations) Minister Saenz declared that “in all legislation it is admitted that the law is free to amplify, modify, or restrict the capacity of that class of persons,” and since the article referred to future rights, that is those arising from the period of time subsequent to ten years, “its effects cannot be regarded as retroactive, since there was no acquired right but merely expectation of a right.” 110 The final point in dispute covered the parts of the petroleum law which were claimed to be retroactive. Under the mining codes of 1884, 1892 and 1909, owners of the surface were given right to exploit sub-soil deposits of petroleum without special concession of the Mexican government. Ôut Article XXVII of the Constitution of 1917 vested direct ownership of all minerals and petroleum in the nation. According to the minutes of the proceedings of the United States Mexican Commission of 1923, the Mexican executive agreed to enforce the principles of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the five amparo cases, which held that Article XXVII of the Constitution was not retroactive in respect to all persons who previous to May 1, 1917, had performed some positive act manifesting the intention of the owner of the surface to exercise his rights. The executive further agreed to grant preferential rights to those owners who had not performed any positive act.111 However the petroleum law of 1925 changed10 10 7Amer. Jour. Int. Law, XX (Oct., 1926), p. 800. l0 *Sen. Doc. No. 96, p. 23. 109Ibid., p. 11. 11 °Ibid., p. 30. 111 Proceedings o f the United States-Mexican Commission, p. 47.

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these vested titles into concessions of fifty years’ duration and made no provision for granting preferential rights to those owners who had not performed some positive act. Secretary Kellogg insisted that the provisions of the petroleum law and the regulations issued thereunder which required the owners to apply for confirmation of their titles within one year, and to accept concessions for not more than fifty years from the time when exploitation began “would be nothing but a forced exchange of a greater for a lesser estate . . . a statute so construed and enforced is retroactive and confiscatory, because it converts exclusive ownership under positive Mexican law into a mere authorization to exercise rights for a limited period of tim e.. . . ” 12*Furthermore, not only did Secretary Kellogg object to the fact that no preferential treatment seemed to be accorded to owners who had failed to perform some positive act, but he rejected the entire Mexican doctrine that no vested right was acquired until some positive act had been performed. The Mexican government claimed that a concession of fifty years’ duration which might be renewed for another thirty years protected the working of any property discovered up to date, and that such a system founded upon concessions was even more secure that the system of private ownership. Therefore, although it might seem that the exchange of a title for a concession lessened the right, it was not so in practice. The Mexican case closed with an invitation to the United States to point out any specific case which violated international law, and if the Mexican government should fail to correct such violations it would be disposed to accept in justice the resulting claims of the American government.114 Indeed, when we come to the facts of the situation it would seem as though the foreign oil companies for the most part accepted the new legislation. The oil laws went into effect on January 1, 1927, and according to a statement issued by Minister of Labor Luis Morones, 125 out of the 147 oil companies operating in Mexico agreed to accept them. 5 According to figures submitted by W. W. Liggett to the Senate Sub-Committee on Foreign Relations, out of 28,493,914 acres under development for oil, only 1,660,579 remained for which concessions had not been asked, and of this latter acreage 87 percent was owned or controlled by Edward Doheny, Harry F. Sinclair, and Andrew Mellon.11 6 Apparently the peak of the difficulties had been passed, and four events occurred in the fall of 1927 which presaged an era of better relations. The first was the appointment of Dwight W. Morrow as ambassador to Mexico to succeed Sheffield, who had resigned in June. Although a representative of the financial interests, Morrow was noted for his broad-minded outlook and outstanding ability, and when in presenting his letter of credence he declared that “we shall not fail to adjust outstanding questions with that dignity and mutual respect which should mark the ‘international relationship of the two sovereign and independent states’ ” it was indicated that a policy of compromise and 112American Property Rights in Mexico, p. 4. 113Ibid., p. 5. " 'I b i d ., p. 21, 25. 115New York Times, Feb. 20,1927. 116 Cong. Rec. 68 (Mar. 3 1927), 5580.

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cooperation on the part of the United States could now be anticipated.11 7 The second was the repeal by President Calles on October 27 of the decree prohibiting the purchase of goods in the United States by Mexican departments. The third was the unanimous decision of the Mexican Supreme Court rendered on November 17, 1927, granting an appeal restraining the Department of Industry, Commerce, and Labor from cancelling certain drilling permits of the Mexican Petroleum Company, an American concern which had not applied for a concession. The decision declared Articles XIV and XV of the petroleum law, which required companies to exchange their titles for fifty-year concessions within one year, unconstitutional in so far as they applied to the case at bar. 8 As a direct result of this decision President Calles recommended to the Mexican Congress the passage of a law amending these two articles so as to confirm all rights derived from lands where exploitation or contracts for exploitation had been entered into previous to May 1, 1917, by issuance of concessions without limit of time. The Mexican Congress passed such a law on December 27, 1927,117*119 and on March 27, 1928, regulations were signed by President Calles validating in perpetuity all oil titles obtained before May 1,1917. 2 The fourth was the non-stop flight of Colonel Lindbergh on December 14, 1927, from Washington to / Mexico City. This event had an immediate and remarkable repercussion on public opinion both in Mexico and in the United States, and made for a very considerable improvement in the mutual friendliness and appreciation of the two peoples. Although Ambassador Morrow had little difficulty in settling the oil controversy, he found the agrarian problem far more complex. He was able by personal efforts to obtain the reversal of some flagrant seizures of Americanowned properties and he gave encouragement to American claimants to bring action in the Mexican courts, but the problem itself remained unsolved. Apparently he hoped that the Mexican government would soon abandon its policy of seizing lands and devote itself to improving land already taken.121 The religious! problem engaged Ambassador Morrow’s attention partic­ ularly. 22 In February 1926, a series of orders was issued for the arrest and deportation of foreign priests, for the nationalization of all church property not yet held by the state, and for the closing of all schools, convents and orphan asylums giving religious instruction in violation of the religious articles of the Constitution. Although there was considerable outcry in church circles in the United States, and the House of Representatives asked Secretary Kellogg for information, the State Department contented itself with a request that American churchmen should not be made to suffer unduly in the enforcement of the law. President Calvin Coolidge on September 8, 1926, declared that he regarded the church and state conflict in Mexico as purely an internal question in which the

117 Harold Nicolson, Dwight Morrow (New York, 1935), p. 316. 118 United States Daily, Nov. 19, 1927. 119 Text in Ibid., Jan. 6, 1928. 120 For an authoritative discussion of the settlement see J. Reuben Clark, “Oil Settlement with Mexico,*’ Foreign Affairs, VI (July, 1928), 600. 121 Nicolson, Dwight Morrow, p. 335. 12 2Calcott, Liberalism in Mexico, chap. XV, for a brief "survey.

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United States could have no interest save in the protection of American rights.123 However, Ambassador Morrow, although recognizing the inadvisability of intervening in the struggle between Church and state, was intrigued by the problem, and when Father Burke at the Havana Conference in January 1928, suggested that Morrow arrange an interview for him with President Calles, the Ambassador agreed to take the matter under consideration. He finally arranged a secret meeting on April 4 at which he was present and during which a temporary compromise was drafted. The following month Morrow persuaded Calles to receive Monsignor Ruiz y Flores, the senior prelate of the Mexican bishops who had sought refuge in Texas. The previous agreement was confirmed and the situation looked quite hopeful when General Obregón, who had been slated to replace President Calles, was murdered July 17, 1928, by a young Catholic. Public opinion was so aroused that hostility flamed anew and the proposed compromise was dropped for the time being. The next year Morrow again took up the question and persuaded President Emilio Portes Gil to receive as emissaries of the Pope, Monsignor Ruiz and Archbishop Diaz. A new agreement was reached on June 19, 1929, which was approved two days later by the Vatican. Although the Church question was by no means settled, a working agreement had been reached which permitted the Church once more to carry on religious services. 2 Exactly one day before President Herbert Hoover’s inauguration in 1929 a revolt broke out in Mexico and the new administration decided to utilize its 12S power under the Arms Embargo Resolution of 1922, and while supplying arms and munitions to the government it placed an embaigo on all shipments to the rebels. When Secretary of State Kellogg refused to recognize the rebels as belligerents and his successor Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, refused to receive the revolutionary agent sent to Washington, the insurrection collapsed. Throughout the Hoover administration the relations between the United States and Mexico were exceedingly friendly. J. Reuben Clark, who had been Ambassador Morrow’s right-hand man, was appointed as Ambassador when Morrow resigned to enter the Senate, and he ably carried on the Morrow policies. The newly elected Mexican president, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, following the precedent set by President Hoover, made a good-will visit to the United States before entering upon his official duties. His cordial reception strengthened the desire for closer cooperation on both sides of the Rio Grande. It was during this era of good feeling that Genaro Estrada, Mexican Foreign Minister, in a statement to the press on September 30, 1930, gave utterance to a doctrine subsequently called the “Estrada Doctrine” or “Doctrina Mexicana.” It was to the effect that recognition of a government should be granted automatically, regardless of the origin of the government. “The Mexican government,” he declared, “does not grant recognition which implies judgment; it confines itself to the maintenance or withdrawal, as it may seem advisable, of its diplomatic agents.. . .” 120 This doctrine was erroneously stated to be a* *23 New York Times, Sept. 9,1926. 12 4 Arnold Toynbee called this achievement Mr. Morrow’s “greatest diplomatic triumph.” 12 5 U.S. Stat. at Large, 361. 12 6Bulletin o f the Pan American Union, 58, (Mar., 1934), 161.

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repudiation of the Monroe Doctrine, but Estrada, himself, publicly disclaimed any such intention. It was somewhat of a paradox that although President Franklin D. Roosevelt inaugurated his administration with the Good Neighbor Policy the Mexican government was a little dubious regarding the new representative of the United States sent to Mexico City to interpret it. The appointment of Josephus Daniels to supplant J. Reuben Clark seemed a rather inauspicious beginning. Mexico had not forgotten that Daniels had been Secretary of the Navy when Vera Cruz had been shelled and occupied.127 But since Franklin D. Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy at the same time, to have declared Daniels persona non grata would have been highly inadvisable. Fortunately, Daniels manifested such an earnest desire to carry on the sympathetic and friendly policy of his predecessors that he quickly overcome the initial feelings of misgiving. Another potential cause of trouble which had failed of satisfactory settlement over a long period of time was the question of claims. We have already mentioned the ratification o f the two claims conventions of 1923. 28 The first or General Claims Convention covered claims dating back to 1868, and the other, a Spécial Convention, covered all claims arising during the revolutionary period 1910-1920. A third group known as the agrarian claims arose from the expropriation of American lands subsequent to August 29, 1927, under the Mexican agrarian program. At the advent of the Roosevelt administration out of some 6,500 claims filed under the General and Special Conventions only a few hundred had been settled.129 All agrarian claims had been excluded pending informal diplomatic discussion between the two governments. A final settlement was first obtained in the case of the revolutionary claims. Since by 1931 the Special Claims Commission had made awards on none of the 3,176 filed, it was finally decided to make a settlement en bloc. By a treaty signed April 24, 1934, the revolutionary claims were to be settled by the payment of a sum proportionate to the final settlement of similar European claims.1 0 The total sum was fixed at $5,448, 020.14, payable with interest by annual sums of $500,000 which were to be deposited to the credit of the United States government in January of each year. The ninth of thèse annual payments was made by Mexico on January 2, 1943, and payment for the revolutionary claims was made by 1945. A new Special Claims Commission to allocate these awards was set up in 1935 and it completed its work by May, 1938. The Commission considered 2833 claims, of which 1475 were disallowed, and 1358 were allowed wholly or in part. The total amount of the awards allowed before reduction on a percentage basis was $9,135,041.79, thus giving each approved claimant 57 percent of the original amount allowed.1 31 It might be noted that the claims12 12 7The story is told that President Roosevelt and Mr. Daniels had completely forgotten the incident when the appointment was made. 12 8Bulletin o f the Pan American Union, 58 (Mar., 1934), 171. 129 A.H. Feller, The Mexican Claims Commission, 1923-1934 (New York, 1935), p. 60,68. 130 US. Treaty Series, No. 883. 131 Special Mexican Claims Commission-Report to the Secretary o f State (Washington, 1940).

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from the Santa Ysabel massacre which the previous commission had disallowed were awarded 592,91o.1 32 In the question of recompense for the seizure of agricultural lands a spirited correspondence between the two governments ensued during the year 1938. Secretary of State Cordell Hull pointed out that between 1915 and 1927 one hundred sixty-one moderate-sized properties of American citizens had been taken, and subsequent to 1927 additional properties valued at more than $10 million had been expropriated. After considerable argument the Mexican government proposed that each side appoint a commissioner who should jointly determine the value of the confiscated properties by May 31, 1939, and as proof of its good intentions, the Mexican government agreed to a first payment of $ 1 million in May, 1939.1 33 After three payments totaling $3 million had been made under this agreement, a convention was signed in Washington on November 19, 1941, providing for a global settlement of both the agricultural claims and all claims filed by the two governments with the General Claims Commission. Under the terms of this convention Mexico agreed to pay a total sum of $40 million, $3 million at the date of ratification and the balance of $34 million by payments of $2Vi million annually. It was further provided that other claims would be subject to agreements to be concluded as soon as possible.1 34 As we shall see later, this convention was merely one of a series of agreements covering the solution of a number of problems including the confiscation of the petroleum properties all of which were signed at this same time. The armistice in the struggle between Church and state which Ambassador Morrow had obtained in 1929 had by no means settled this question. The Church was not reconciled to the drastic limitations imposed upon its representatives and their work and it sought assistance in the United States. Early in 1935 the Knights of Columbus were persuaded to work towards obtaining American intervention. Failing to interest Secretary Hull in such a policy, appeal was made to both houses of Congress where less discretion obtains. Representative Higgins wished to withdraw recognition, and recall Ambassador Daniels, while the resolution which Senator Borah introduced, although not so extreme, protested the anti-religious campaign and practices of the Mexican government, and authorized the Committee on Foreign Relations to conduct an investigation into the situation.1 35 When nothing came of this effort some 242 members of the House of Representatives petitioned President Roosevelt to take some action. When the Knights of Columbus continued the campaign to involve the United States, President Roosevelt wrote a personal letter to the Supreme Knight declaring that no American citizen in Mexico had complained during the year that his religious freedom had been interfered with and as regards Mexican citizens the United States intended to continue its policy of nonintervention.132*14136 Cardinal Mundelein a fortnight later eulogized President 132Ibid., p. 104. 133S.S. Jones and D.P. Myers, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1938-1939, (Boston, 1939), pp. 87-121. 134 For text of the conversations see Cong. Rec., 88 (January 29,1942), 861. 13 5For text of Borah resolution see New York Times, February 1,1935. 13 6 For text of letter see Ibid., Nov. 18,1935. L

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Roosevelt’s foreign policy and decried self-appointed spokesmen for the Catholics in America, whereupon the agitation for intervention died down. A more serious threat to friendly relations arose in 1937, when the Mexican government once again threatened to confíscate foreign concessions in order to nationalize the oil industry. The Mexican workers in the oil fields staged many strikes during the year 1937 demanding a substantial increase in pay. On December 18, 1937, the Mexican Federal Board of Conciliation and Arbitration ruled that foreign-owned oil companies must increase wages one-third and improve the pension and welfare system. Claiming that such changes meant an annual increase of operating costs of about $7,200,000, the companies sought a permanent injunction. However, the Mexican Supreme Court upheld the award and the Federal Labor Board declared the new wage scale became effective on March 7, 1938. When the companies refused to comply, President Lazaro Cárdenas by a decree dated March 18 announced that the oil properties would be nationalized and indemnification made within ten years. Claiming a “manifest denial of justice,” the oil companies appealed to their respective governments.137 Secretary of State Hull issued a statement March 30 conceding the right of the Mexican government to expropriate properties within its jurisdiction but questioning the ability of the Mexican government to make adequate compensa­ tion for the large number of properties confiscated. He did hope, however, that a fair and equitable solution might be found.138 President Cárdenas replied immediately to Ambassador Daniels that “Mexico will know how to honor its obligations of today and its obligations of yesterday.” 1 39 Nevertheless in spite of this rather vague assurance of compensation, the expropriation of the oil properties soon became a cause célebre in the diplomatic relations of the two countries. There was no question about the popularity of confiscation among the Mexican people. A celebration staged in Mexico City on March 26 brough out a quarter of a million people, and President Cárdenas received wide popular support in his effort to float an internal loan to pay for the seizure. But even with payment conceded there was a wide difference of opinion as to the value of the oil properties. The American oil companies placed their minimum value at $262 million, whereas Mexico estimated that after paying back taxes and back compensation to workers, the companies would have about $10 million coming to them. If the expropriation was stimulating to Mexico politically it was exceedingly detrimental economically. The peso dropped from 3.60 to 6 to the dollar, capital took flight, production of oil diminished, while prices received were lower. Distribution was a serious^problem and no considerable market was available except in the Axis powers.1 1 Skilled technicians were difficult to ' 37Seelbid., Dec. 31,1937; March 4, 8,19,1938. 13 8Ibid., Mar. 31,1938. 139Ibid., Apr. 2, 1938. 140For the Mexican case see United States of Mexico, The True Facts A bout the Expropriation o f the Oil Companies' Properties in Mexico (Mexico, 1940). For the oil companies’ side see Standard Oil Co., The Reply to Mexico (New York, 1940). 141 It has been claimed that Mexico sold about ten million barrels to the three totalitarian powers. See A.W. MacMahon and W.R. Dittmar, “The Mexican Oil Industry Since Expropriation,” Pol. Sel Quar., LVII (June, 1942), 164.

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obtain and replacements of outworn equipment was a serious problem due to the hostile influence of the dispossessed companies. But above all, the situation was dangerous to the new development of cordial relations. The Roosevelt administration was unwilling to see the well established structure of the Good Neighbor Policy jeopardized, and it was willing and anxious to make every effort towards obtaining a fair settlement. As a first step the United States government encouraged the companies to enter into direct negotiations with the Mexican government. Donald R. Richberg, representing the companies, had numerous conferences with President Cárdenas, and at first a compromise seemed possible.142 When a deadlock ensued, Under Secretary Sumner Welles, on August 14, 1939, made a compromise proposal while at the same time reiterating the necessity for “ adequate, effective, and prompt payment forthe properties seized.“ 143 No action was taken on his suggestion, and on December 2, 1939, the Mexican Superior Court unanimously upheld the expropriation as constitutional both as regards movable and immovable property.1HH The matter was reopened in 1940 by an informal memorandum delivered by Ambassador Nájera on March 16 which failed completely to meet the question at issue. In his reply of April 3, Secretary Hull again stressed the requirement of adequate and prompt compensation and pointed out that the Mexican government had been somewhat remiss hitherto in the payment of claims. He then proposed arbitration for all the questions involved by a tribunal clothed with authority not only to determine the amount to be paid but also the means to make the payment effective.145 In the reply of May 1, the Mexican government ruled out arbitration as incompatible in this case since the matter in dispute was domestic in nature and already nearing solution. It was also noted that a private and direct settlement had been made with the Sinclair interests which it was claimed represented approximately 40 percent of the investment of American nationals in the oil industry.14 6 This settlement was for $8V6 million plus the delivery of 20 million barrels of oil over a four-year period at a determined price. Incidentally, the asking price of the Sinclair interests had been $32 million. Inasmuch as a presidential election was in the offing, and President Cárdenas was not up for reelection, the principal oil companies preferred to wait and to hope for a more friendly attitude on the part of the new administration. Various events now clearly foreshadowed a settlement. Early in November 1940, President Cárdenas placed an embargo on oil and scrap iron going to Japan and declared that he expected an early, definite, and satisfactory settlement of all pending questions. The visit of Vice-president Henry A. Wallace as President Roosevelt’s special representative at the inauguration of General Manuel Avila Camacho on December 1, 1940, was more than a friendly gesture. The fact that President Cárdenas had to ask the congress for $12,000,000 to bolster the 14 14 2 Donald R. Richberg, The Mexican Oil Seizure (New York, n. d.). 14 3S.S. Jones and D.P. Myers, Documents on American Foreign Relations (Boston, 1940), p. 217. 14 4 See Roscoe B. Gaither, Expropriation in Mexico (New York, 1940), chap. VIII. 14 5Jones and Myers, Documents, pp. 234-238. 14 6 Dept, of State Bulletin, XI (May 4, 1940), 465-470.

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operating deficit of the oil industry was undoubtedly a persuasive element. Finally the success of the Axis powers in overwhelming Europe and the Far East tended to cement the republics of the New World more closely together. An understanding satisfactory to Mexico and the United States covering not only the oil question but also claims, trade, stabilization of currency, credits, and purchase of silver was announced on November 19, 1941. As regards the expropriation of petroleum properties it was agreed that each government would appoint an expert to determine the just compensation to be paid American owners whose rights and interests in the petroleum industry had been jeopardized by the acts of expropriation. Five months were allowed to fix the amount, and the Mexican government agreed to make an immediate deposit of $9 million cash on account.147 The two experts Morris L. Cooke, representing the United States, and Manuel J. Zevada, representing Mexico, began their work in Mexico City in January 1942, and on April 17, 1942, they reported that the valuation of the American-owned oil companies was $23,995,991. The com­ panies were released from all claims present and future except for unpaid taxes and duties and private claims now pending.148 Apparently the settlement was based upon a physical valuation of the properties without giving consideration to the value of the'subsoil rights. According to valuations set by the companies, the payment amounted to only seven cents on the dollar, and at first they refused to accept it. However since the United States government declared the evaluation to be final, the manner and conditions of payment were agreed upon by an exchange of notes on September 29, 1943. Mexico had made the $9 million cash deposit at the time of settlement and now agreed to pay the remaining $20,137,700.84 including interest, in five paym ents-the last on September 30, 1949. The oil companies, with no support from the government, accepted the settlement. As to the other agreements announced on November 19, 1941, we have already discussed that of claims. The third concerned the negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement, and this was signed December 23, 1942, the fifteenth of its kind with an American republic. The other agreements were to assist Mexico in its financial position by the stabilization of the Mexican peso in terms of the dollar by the purchase of pesos, to aid silver nfining by purchasing newly mined silver at thirty-five cents an ounce up to six million ounces monthly, 5 and to help finance the highway construction program in Mexico by requesting the Export-Import Bank to accept certain of these highway bonds as security for credits.15 1 Long before the United States entered the war, Mexico had given this country her whole-hearted support. At the Conferences of Panama and Havana her representatives took the lead in supporting continental solidarity and all-out measures for American defense, and even before Pearl Harbor, Mexico had agreed14 14 7 L.M. Goodrich, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1941-1942 (Boston, 1942), IV, 421. 14 *Ibid., p. 425. 149Ibid., p. 175. 1S0This was the most criticized agreement in the Senate because of the vast amount of unused silver already stored in the treasury vaults of the United States. *51 Goodrich, Documents on American Foreign Relations, p. 359.

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to reciprocal use of strategic airports and bases.1s 2 Before going to the Rio Conference, Mexico severed diplomatic relations with the Axis and at the Conference Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla thrilled the delegates with his impassioned plea for support of the men who fell on Wake and in the Philippines “to defend human liberties and the common destiny of America.” Early in April 1942, Foreign Minister Padilla visited the United States and on April 8 he and Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, issued a joint statement covering a program of close economic cooperation. Through funds obtained from the Mexican government and Export-Import Bank, certain basic industries such as a steel and tin plate rolling mills were to be established to meet Mexican consumers* needs and to supply goods required by the war efforts of the United States. Arrangements were made for the survey of the Mexican railway transportation system; experts were commissioned to explore the feasibility of constructing small cargo vessels in Mexico, and it was agreed that a high-octane gasoline plant should be constructed as soon as the necessary equipment might be spared.15 With the declaration of war upon the Axis powers by Mexico on May 22, 1942, the two governments entered into still closer military relationships. The 1941 agreement for the reciprocal use of air bases was enlarged in scope while United States warships were permitted to use Mexican bases and territorial waters, and United States troops and planes could cross Mexican territory. Lend-Lease arrangements authorized Mexico to purchase war equipment to the value of approximately thirty million dollars. Through a Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission, close liasion was established for protection of the long and exposed coast line. All Axis nationals were removed from coastal areas; financial transactions of Axis enterprises were subjected to full governmental control; and the United States black list was more rigidly enforced. In 1945 a Mexican air force unit saw action in the Far East under General Douglas MacArthur’s command. The two neighbors were as one against the common foe. As an earnest of the intention of the United States to cooperate loyally, President Franklin D. Roosevelt met President Avila Camacho in Monterrey, Mexico, in April 1943, and the two agreed to an increased exchange of goods. During 1944 a plan of economic cooperation known as the “Mexico Plan’*was developed whereby the two governments worked out jointly a unified industrial program in a single pattern rather than giving consideration to unrelated individual requests for industrial goods. One of the most important developments towards better relations between the two countries occurred during the war period when on February 3, 1944, Mexico and the United States signed a water treaty relating to the utilization of the waters of the Colorado and Tijuana rivers and the Rio Grande. The rapid expansion of agricultural areas along the common boundary increased the need for more water for irrigation. The treaty, proposed by engineers and diplomats upon the principles of the Good Neighbor policy, settled a problem which had long vexed the two governments. It provided for flood control and increased materially the amount of water available to each country for agricultural and1 1 s 2 U.S. Treaty Series, No. 971. 15 3Dept. of State Bulletin, VI (Apr. 11,1942), 325.

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industrial uses. Both the American and Mexican senates approved the treaty with large majorities, and ratifications were exchanged in Washington November 8, 1945, with the treaty becoming effective immediately. World War II proved to be a major turning point in Mexico’s historical development, both domestically and in international affairs. As a result of wartime prosperity many changes occurred in the nation’s economy. Great strides were made toward self-sufficiency as industrialization was vigorously pushed, the labor force expanded and the middle class broadened. The general standard of living also showed improvement. 5 During the presidency of Avila Camacho (1940-1946) the political ferment of earlier years subsided, and orderly democratic processes, accompanied by a large measure of democratic freedom, became possible. Mexico gained prestige and favorable publicity as one of the victorious allies, as host of the extraordinary, important Inter-American Conference of 1945, and as a charter member of the United Nations. The post-war years have witnessed a continuation of the “Era of Good Feeling” begun by President Roosevelt’s judicious handling of the petroleum question in 1938. Issues which disturbed the relations of the two republics through the 1930s, chiefly the protection of American lives and property, and the perennial question of diplomatic recognition, gave way to such problems as Mexican migratory labor, racial discrimination, water rights and boundary questions, violations of Mexican waters by American fishermen, tariffs on lead and zinc, commodity prices on sugar, cotton, and coffee; cooperation in public health, the development of hydro-electric and irrigation projects, narcotics control, and military cooperation. Contributing to the success of the new diplomacy have been the regular meetings of the two nation’s chief executives, Mexican-United States conferences as members of the Interparliamentary Union, economic and technical assistance supplied by the United States, the growth of tourism and broadened cultural exchanges. However, in spite of the consonance of views attending the resolution of bilateral issues, traditional Mexican foreign policy, notably in . connection with cold war power politics, has led to a divergence of policies on certain regional and international questions. Avila Camacho was succeeded in the presidency by Miguel Alemán in 1946, a civilian, and the first chief executive in thirty-fivetyears who had not taken part in the Revolution. During the campaign Alemán gave hints of anti-Yankee sentiment, but it was soon evident that such remarks were of no significance. He was keenly aware of the importance of the United States to his country’s progress, and when in office took steps to insure that the wartime cordiality would be continued. President Harry S. Truman, similarly intent on strengthening bonds of friendship, in March, 1947 made the first official visit to Mexico City ever made by an American president. He endeared himself to the Mexicans by placing a wreath on the monument of the niños heroes, the cadets killed in 1847 when the Americans invested the hill of Chapultepec. A month later President Alemán, the first Mexican President to visit Washington while in office, returned the visit. In addressing the special joint session of the Congress the Mexican president1* 1s 4 Howard F. Cline, Mexico, Revolution to Evolution: 1940-1960 (New York, 1963), pp. 231-232, 253-262.

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pledged an effective continuation of the Good Neighbor Policy on both sides of the border. One concrete example of the desire to cement the “Era of Good Feelings” was shown by the decision of the two governments in 1950 to restore battle flags captured by each other in the war of 1847. Liberal loans from the United States continued to flow into Mexico through the Export-Import Bank, American investors were welcomed in spite of the restrictive statutes, and American tourism boomed. The Mexicans sent almost nine-tenths of their exports to the United States, as well as thousands of migrant workers, and imported impressive quantities of American goods. It was in this period that a problem arose which was a product of World War II. The need for workers to harvest crops and help in the maintenance of railroads in the Western states during the war was met by annual agreements for the temporary immigration of Mexican workers Çbraceros ) into the United States. Elaborate guarantees as to wages and conditions of labor were embodied in the agreements, and the results were mutually satisfactory. However, after the war a large number of Mexican laborers, known as “wetbacks” (for having swum the Rio Grande) illegally entered the United States, where some were ex­ ploited by farm interests. It was alleged that many thousands of these laborers came in annually and produced a situation unfair to American labor. A diplomatic incident occurred in 1948 when the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent a note to Washington protesting the action of the American Immigration Service in allowing some four thousand braceros to cross the border illegally to be employed by American farmers. The United States claimed that Mexico had failed to send the number of braceros agreed upon, and Mexico replied that workers were forbidden to go to the United States because of discriminatory practices which were being permitted. The United States government sent a formal apology and the incident was considered closed. In 1951-1952 an effort was made by a mixed commission representing the United States and Mexico to prepare in treaty form an acceptable accord covering the temporary immigration of Mexican workers. A compromise was worked out to run, however, only through 1952. Meanwhile, the United States Congress in 1952 passed legislation strengthening control over the “wetbacks,” while fairer and more effective regulation of the braceros was instituted. Another problem which faced the two countries in the immediate aftermath of the war was the control of a fto sa , or hoof and mouth disease. When this disease attacked Mexican cattle and sheep in 1947, it threatened the cattle industry in the United States. At first it was proposed to shoot the diseased animals and recompense their owners. The United States furnished technical experts and financial assistance, but the Mexicans resented the procedure. Quarantine and vaccination were then applied. This was a mammoth task, but by the fall of 1952 after some seventeen million animals were vaccinated, with the United States contributing over $125 million to the cost, the disease was eradicated. 5S In December 1950, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1943 was terminated by mutual consent. Mexico had sought its abolition since 1945 in order to encourage its budding industries. Mexico proved unyielding, however,* *5 5Dept, of State Bulletin, XXVI (Mar. 31, 1952), 459.

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on proposals for cooperative military measures. Beginning in 1952 the United States concluded bilateral military assistance agreements with twelve Latin American countries, but President Alemán refused to do the same. The pact, from the Mexican standpoint, would restrict its freedom of unilateral decision­ making, and create an undesirable dependence on the United States. A minor but persistent source of contention developed in that year when Mexico began enforcing Mexican claims to sovereignty out to nine miles against United States fishermen in the Gulf of Mexico. Several American shrimp boats were apprehended, and others fired on by Mexican patrol craft on the grounds that they were violating the nine mile perimeter. The United States Department of State directed the fishermen not to fish in Mexican waters, but did not acknowledge the existence of Mexican sovereignty beyond the three mile limit.15 6 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, convinced of the efficacy of top-level personal diplomacy in strengthening the Good Neighbor Policy, met with Mexican presidents on five different occasions during his administrations: first, with Adolfo Ruiz Cortines at the. dedication of the Falcon Dam on the Texas-Mexico border in October 1953; a second time with Ruiz Cortines, a meeting also attended by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker of Canada, at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, in March 1956; three meetings with Adolfo López Mateos: at Acapulco, Guerrero, February, 1959, at Washington in October, and at Ciudad Acuña, Coahuila, October 1959. The continuation and frequency of these meetings indicate that both governments regarded them as useful vehicles in the conduct of their respective foreign and domestic policies. As mentioned, the initial Ruiz Cortines-Eisenhower meeting in 1953 was the inauguration of the Falcon Dam, located on the Rio Grande, seventy-five miles from Laredo. This vast structure, five miles long, and built at a cost of $47 million, of which the United States contributed 58.6 percent, is mutually advantageous in regard to irrigation, flood control and the generation of power. President Eisenhower declared that the project had given the world “a lesson in the way neighbor nations can and should live—in peace, mutual respect, in common prosperity.” President Ruiz Cortines called the project “the tangible result of that friently spirit which it is our duty to maintain and to make universal.” The migratory labor problem mounted in the early 1950s, when in 1952 it was estimated that 1.5 million Mexicans crossed the border illegally; some six hundred thousand were apprehended and returned that year, and in 1953 the figure rose to one million. The problem was mitigated by an agreement signed on March 10, 1954, which renewed the Migratory Labor Agreement of 1951, and was scheduled to run until December 31, 1955. This not only clarified the 1951 agreement, but also changed it to prevent the flow of illegal workers into the United States. President Eisenhower declared that the basic purpose of the agreement was to enable the United States to give Mexican migratory labor the protection of its laws. 5 7 However, many thousands of “wetbacks” remained in the United States, and it was to be a continuing problem.15 15 6 Frank Brandenburg, The Making o f Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs, 1964), p. 336. 15 7Dept, of State Bulletin, XXX (Mar. 29, 1954), 467-468.

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Vice President Richard M. Nixon, on a good-will tour of the Caribbean, stopped in Mexico City in February 1955. He pledged United States cooperation in working out common problems, and declared: “We will welcome the opportunity, too, to meet people in all walks of life so that by our actions we can show them the feeling of the United States people for those of our sister republics.” He paid an official call on President Ruiz Cortines and laid a wreath at the foot of Mexico’s Column of Independence. Later in the year the Mexican government paid the eighth installment of $8,689,257 to the Mexican Eagle Oil Company through the company’s banker in New York. This came under an agreement of 1947 whereby Mexico agreed to pay fifteen equal installments in compensation for the properties, rights and interests of the companies affected by the expropriation decree of 1938. 8 It was at the Tenth Inter-American Conference held at Caracas, Venezuela, in 1954, that the cleavage of the United States and Mexican policies on hemispheric problems related to the cold war began to appear. The most significant and disruptive topic on the agenda concerned Communist penetration in the New World. The threat of communism in Guatemala led the United States to present a strong resolution asserting that the domination or control of an American state by communism was a threat to all American states; this resolution called for action being taken under existing treaties, notably the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947. Fearing that self-determination was being endangered, and that collective intervention, although verbal, might lead to physical intervention, Mexico opposed the United States resolution condemn­ ing Guatemala. The Mexican delegation, however, signed the recommendation condemning the extension of communism in the Americas.15 9 In assuming this posture at Caracas, and at subsequent inter-American conferences, the Mexicans were adhering to principles of foreign policy carried on by successive administrations since the time of President Cárdenas in the 1930s: the sanctity of national sovereignty, national self-determination, the juridical equality of nations, non-intervention in the internal affairs of another nation, collective security, the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the protection of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, regionalism and universalism. Foreign investments commanded much of Mexico’s attention in 1955. President Ruiz Cortines in his September message to Congress and the nation said: “We will continue to employ foreign investment as required by our development, provided it is used for projects of immediate welfare . .. foreign capital can be beneficial only when it fits this need and subjects itself to our laws without injuring Mexican enterprise.” 160 The peso was devalued in April 1954, and two years later the Mexican domestic and global economic position reflected a sustained and spectacular advance. Tourism Was an important factor in the growth, for the tourist receipts in 1954 and 1955 added $337 million and $350 million respectively to foreign exchange receipts, compared with $315 million in 1953. The advance was15 15 9New York Times, Feb. 10, 1955; Sept. 16,1955. 1s ’ Cline, Mexico ypp. 313-314. 1*°New York Times, Jan. 5, 1956.

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mainly attributable to the decline in Mexican prices, in terms of dollars, following devaluation. It was estimated that 95 percent of the tourist expenditures were made by Americans, and the expansion of income from this source was held to reflect the sustained prosperity of the United States. Additional income came from the growth of exports, chiefly coffee and .. 161 cotton. On the occasion of the meeting of presidents Eisenhower and Ruiz Cortines at White Sulphur Springs, in March 1956, the main topics discussed concerned: (1) the release of United States cotton on the international market (the U.S. agreed not to do so in any way damaging to Mexico); (2) United States commercial fishing boats in Mexican waters; (3) the lack of a bilateral treaty governing air traffic; (4) the United States pledge to continue economic aid through the Export-Import Bank. Dr. Milton Eisenhower and Dr. Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, later went to Mexico as^quests of the Mexican government to discuss further matters of mutual interest. 2 While unfettered loans from the United States were sought, by 1957 certain types of technical assistance, begun as part of the Point IV program, had outlived their Usefulness. Senator Mike Mansfield, reporting to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in November, recommended its termination, saying: “Mexico as a proud country, has wanted and . . . to a great extent . . . has succeeded in solving its problems.” The program has deteriorated, having little impact outside Mexico City. The senator continued “ . .. The United States and Mexico have it within their power to eradicate the festering memories of a former unhappy association by building a new and enduring foundation for cooperation in a spirit of equality, mutuality and respect.” 163 On December 1, 1958, Adolfo López Mateos, former minister of labor, was inaugurated for a six-year term as president of Mexico, and without the accompaniment of anti-United States demonstrations as had been forecast. Secretary of State J[ohn Foster Dulles, who headed the American delegation, conveyed the following message from President Eisenhower to the new president: “Our two countries share an extensive border. They present to the world a proud example of how frontiers can be used as gateways to promote the peaceful interchange of persons, culture and goods essential to our mutual welfare.” López Mateos responded saying: . . In this new era of mutual respect and growing mutual understanding . . . ” there existed real friendship. For some time, he said, relations have been “free of onerous distrust and bitterness of the past . . . providing an atmosphere to plan mutually satisfying and beneficial arrangements for the future . . .” However, in his First Annual Message to Congress he reaffirmed his country’s traditional policy declaring: “The principles of our nation’s foreign policy emanate from our historical experience. We were forced to defend our territory, our sovereignty, and our integrity.” 1 6416 16‘Walter ^ J. Sedwitz, “Mexico’s 1954 Devaluation in Retrospect,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, X (Autumn, 1956), 22, 32. 162New York Times, Mar. 30, 1956; Aug. 7,1957. ' 6 3New York Times, Nov. 17, 1957. ‘ 6 4Cline, Mexico, p. 300, 305; New York Times, Dec. 2, 1958. Treatment of the formulation and administration of Mexican foreign policy may be found in the chapters by Luis Quintanilla in Philip W. Buck and Martin Travis, Jr., eds., Control o f Foreign Relations in Modern Nations (New York, 1957).

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United States private capital entered Mexico in rapidly increasing quantities beginning in 1950, and by 1958 investments of American companies totaled some $700 million. The production of these companies in goods and services there was estimated at over $600 million a year. Of all direct investments those of the United States came to 78.4 percent of the total. The appointment of Robert C. Hill, former vice president of W. R. Grace and Company, as United States ambassador to Mexico, brought an experienced businessman to the post.1 65 Mexico’s reaction to the Caracas meeting in 1954 foreshadowed the position it would take at later anti-communist conferences; however, it was the success of the Cuban 26th of July Movement, led by Fidel Castro Ruz, resulting in the overthrow of the dictator Fulgencio Batista, in January 1959, that brought into focus the divergent views of Mexico and the United States on policies toward communism in both the regional and international framework. Recalling that Fidel Castro and his brother Raúl were given refuge in Mexico after their first abortive attempt to invade Cuba on July 26, 1953 (for which the 26th of July Movement is named), and that the revolutionaries had again embarked for Cuba from Mexico on November 26, 1956, in the invasion effort that ultimately proved successful, many Mexicans were sympathetic toward the movement and its leaders from the outset. As the Castro regime began to reveal its true authoritarian, alien and brutal character, the Mexicans became progressively disenchanted with it, but at the same time retained a kindly and sympathetic disposition towards the Cuban people. It should be understood in this connection that Mexico has condemned, and forcibly suppressed when necessary, Communists within its own frontiers. At the Fifth Consultative Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Santiago, Chile, in 1959, problems raised by the new regime in Cuba and the Trujillo dictatorship were considered. Mexico affirmed its support of continental solidarity against extra-continental interference in hemispheric affairs on that occasion, but stood firm on the principle of non-intervention. Personalized presidential diplomacy in the conduct of United StatesMexican relations was carried on throughout 1959. President Eisenhower met López Mateos at Acapulco in February, and in October the latter came to the United States. At this second meeting the two presidents chose the name Amistad Dam to designate the dam proposed to be constructed near Del Rio, Texas, and Villa Acuña, Coahuila, for flood control, conservation and storage of the waters of the Rio Grande, and possible power generation. The following year they met on the International Bridge connecting the two towns and reaffirmed plans for the dam. In response to Mexican concern about minerals export markets and prices, chiefly lead and zinc, the American president said: “Maintenance of the productive capacity of the Mexican mining industry is essential to Mexico’s economic prosperity, and to the security of the United States.” In an address before the United Nations President López Mateos, after referring to the poverty of Latin America and suggested remedies, declared “In practical terms this16 16 5New York Times, Jan. 6, 1958. 16 6Cline, Mexico, p. 314. 167Dept. of State Bulletin, XLIII (Dec. 5,1960), 851;

York Times, Oct. 25, 1959.

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means increased trade, primarily greater imports of Latin American raw materials by the United States at better p r ic e s ....” 168 These and other proposals about the positive role that the United States should take in supporting Latin American development helped influence the United States to sponsor the Inter-American Development Bank in 1959, and the Alliance for Progress two years later. In the summer of 1959 the relations of the two countries were slightly jarred incident to Mexico’s 150th independence anniversary celebration. The United States delegation sent to Mexico City, comprising three Senators, issued a protest and boycotted official parties after hearing a Mexican congressman praise Fidel Castro of Cuba and condemn the United States. But Secretary of State Christian Herter, who came with the delegates, pointedly ignored the incident.169 The Sixth Consulation of Foreign Ministers was convened at the request of Venezuela in San José, Costa Rica, in August 1960, to discuss acts of aggression by the Dominican Republic. While Mexico found the Trujillo regime repugnant, its representative led the opposition tp a proposal by Secretary Herter that steps be taken to end the dictatorship. Mexico, which agreed only to the imposition of sanctions, feared that supervised free elections would establish a dangerous precedent for collective intervention. The Seventh Consulation was convened at San José, after a day’s recess from the Sixth, following a request from Peru that the threat to Latin American states posed by the Cuban-exported revolution be discussed. The Declaration of San José condemned intervention by extra-continental powers after Secretary Herter had stressed that Cuba was a point from which international communism was invading the Western Hemisphere. Mexico once again upheld its traditional principles of non-intervention and the self-determination of peoples. Although confirming its opposition to interference by non-continental powers, Mexico made it clear that it was similarly opposed to interference by one state within the inter-American system in the affairs of another.170 Mexico also opposed holding any special meetings regarding Cuba and, when outvoted by a majority of the OAS members who convoked the meetings at Punta del Este in early 1962, Mexico abstained from voting on a resolution calling for the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS, and the immediate suspension of commerce in armaments with that country. The Mexican foreign minister did acknowledge, however, that the ideology of Marxism-Leninism was incompatible with membership in the inter-American system. Mexico’s disapproval of the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS was based on its dogmatic policy of non-intervention, and on the ground that inadequate juridical provisions existed in the inter-American system to allow expulsion.171 In the perilous confronta­ tion between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding Cuba in October 1962, Mexico voted with the United States. The goals of the Alliance for Progress program of President John F. Kennedy, announced at Punta del Este in 1961, envisioning the attainment of 167 16*New York Times, Oct. 15,1959. 169Ibid., Aug. 26, 1959. 17 0Cline, Mexico, pp. 316-319. 171 Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 338.

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prosperity, progress and social justice, through evolutionary means, were received enthusiastically by the Mexicans. At the outset of his administration the president pledged increasing cooperation with Mexico. To contribute toward improving relations, the first of a series of Interparliamentary United StatesMexican conferences was held. The twenty-three member United States delegation, headed by Senator Mike Mansfield, met the Mexican congressman at Guadalajara, Mexico in February, 1961. Discussed were possible solutions for border problertis, foreign trade and commerce inadequacies, and cultural exchanges. At the Second Interparliamentary group meeting in Washington, in 1962, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stressed the importance of disarmament, an objective which the Mexicans strongly supported.172 In July 1962 President Kennedy, accompanied by his wife, visited Mexico at the invitation of President López Mateos. The tumultuous reception was said to have been the largest and most enthusiastic ever given to a visiting chief-of-state in Mexico’s history. Relations had been impaired by differences over Cuba, especially the role of the United States in the invasion effort, and the American president hoped to restore them to a more harmonious footing. The Cuban issue was not raised, however, and agreements were reached on several questions of a bilateral character. President Kennedy pledged that the danger of saline waters in Mexico from the Colorado River would be lessened immediately. Aside from the conflicting anti-communism foreign policies of the two countries, this problem had been described as the basis of the most serious deterioration in United States-Mexican relations in many years. Under a treaty of 1944, Mexico is allowed 1,500,000 acre feet of irrigation water from the Colorado each year. As the result of an irrigation project in Arizona, saline water was poured into the Gila River, and had reached the Colorado. An estimated five thousand tons of salt was being discharged into the river waters every twenty-four hours, and had caused a crop loss of $16 million in the Mexicali Valley, in 1961. It was agreed that the United States would “flush out” the Colorado, and introduce enough low-saline content water to minimize the damage until a permanent solution could be found.173 The two presidents reaffirmed their support of the Alliance for Progress throughout Latin America, and declared that they “propose to respect and maintain the principles of non-intervention, whether this intervention may come from a continental or extra-continental state, and of self-determination of peoples.” The president struck a responsive chord in announcing that the United States was wrong in refusing to accept the decision of the 1911 arbitration commission on the Chamizal question, and at the same time expressed a “strong desire” to reach an accord which would take into account the interests of the people involved. A $20 millioh agricultural loan agreement between the United States and Mexico was signed. On this occasion President Kennedy said: The agricultural agreement we sign here today is an historic step forward in cooperation between our two countries under the Alianza para el Progreso . . . here in Mexico you have 172New York Times, Feb. 12, 1961; May 15, 1962. 17 3Ibid., July 1,1962.

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LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

carried forward the largest and most impressive land reform program in the history of the hemisphere . . . never before has this program been more vigorously administered than during the last three years when the government of President López Mateos distributed twenty-four million acres to hundreds of thousands of campesinos. The tangible results of your land reform can be witnessed in the 223 percent rise in agricultural output over the last two decades, a rise which has made Mexico virtually self-sufficient in food stuffs and a major exporter . . . 174

Amplifying the president’s statements concerning Mexico’s extraordinary achievements in the post-war years, Secretary Rusk commented: ‘T he Alliance for Progress has a great deal to offer, but it has also a great deal to borrow from the Mexican experience.” Eager to contribute to the Alliance, Mexico joined the United States in a training program for technicians from other Latin American countries. In 1963 some three hundred technicians received their training in Mexico.175 The long-standing controversy over the El Chamizal area of El Paso, Texas was settled in August 1963, when the two nations signed an agreement transferring the disputed territory tQ Mexico. Ambassador Thomas Mann, who signed for the United States, hailed the agreement as an example of how neighboring countries can settle their differences in a “cordial and diplomatic manner.” Manuel Tello, Mexico’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, after signing for his country, said that it was “one of the most important agreements in the diplomatic history of the United States and Mexico.176 This was not overstating its significance because, starting as a minor controversy over a relatively small piece of ground transferred by erosion from the southern to the northern side of the Rio Grande at El Paso, the dispute had come to symbolize in Mexico, with the passage of years, several of the most vital elements in the law of nations: sovereignty over national territory, the sanctity of treaties, and the juridical equality of states. President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Chamizal Treaty on December 20, 1963, and subsequently the House of Representatives authorized the appropriation of $44.9 million for the cost of moving 4,500 United States citizens out of the El Chamizal area of El Paso, Texas, straightening the Rio Grande, building new bridges and making other public improvements. The terms of the agreement provided that of the 437 acres estimated to have been awarded to Mexico in 1911, Mexico agreed to accept 71 acres from an area of El Paso slightly downstream from the Chamizal Zone. Mexico would receive the remaining 366 acres from the actual Chamizal tract. The United States and Mexico also agreed to relocate the Rio Grande at El Paso in order to maintain the river as a boundary. The settlement eliminates a Mexican enclave north of the Rio Grande known as Cordova Island. Mexico approved the transfer of the northern half of the island, consisting of 193 acres, to the United States in return for an equivalent acreage from the United States territory to the east of Cordova Island. Mexico, perhaps waiting for American approval to avoid a repetition of the 1911 settlement, ratified the treaty on January 7, 1964. ‘ 74Ibid. 17 5Dept, of State Bulletin, XLVI (June 4, 1962), 920; Ibid., L (Mar. 23,1964), 449-450. 116 New York Times, Aug. 30, 1963.

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Presidents Johnson and Diaz Ordaz met at Chamizal on October 28, 1967, amid festive ceremonies, and formally acknowledged an end to the long-standing controversy. 77 Presidents Johnson and López Mateos, meeting at Palm Springs, California, on February 21-22, 1964, noted with satisfaction the high degree of understand­ ing and cooperation established in recent years between the two countries, and announced their decision to keep working toward the goals set forth in the joint communique of June 30, 1962, issued following the López Mateos-Kennedy conversations in Mexico City. Both agreed to support the principle of self-determination of all peoples and of its corollary non-intervention; they expressed their faith in representative democracy, and their devotion to the ideals of human liberty and the dignity of the individual. At the same time the two leaders reviewed a wide range of topics which included the Alliance for Progress, the OAS, bilateral trade relations between the two countries, the International Coffee Agreement, and the United Nations.178 Although not mentioned in the official dispatch, two problems existed which demanded attention: the braceros , and the Colorado River salinity question. Congress had agreed in December 1963 that the program under which Mexican migrant laborers enter the United States not be allowed to continue beyond December 31, 1964. These workers’ wages had added upwards of $35 million a year to Mexico’s dollar earnings. The United States had been persuaded to end the program largely by the argument of labor unions that it tended to depress wages and working conditions, and increase domestic unemployment. President López Mateos said that from Mexico’s viewpoint the program was beneficial but not mandatory, and that Mexico was willing to do away with it whenever the United States wished to end the treaty.179 While these statements were relevant in most areas of bilateral relations, Mexico had meanwhile refused to conform with the decision of the Ninth Meeting of Foreign Ministers, in July 1964, to suspend diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba in spite of its commitment under the terms of the Rio Treaty. Its representatives contended that withdrawal of recognition or severing relations would be tantamount to intervention.17 17 7Dept, of State Bulletin, L (January 13, 1964), 49.\ New York Times, Mar. 12, 1964; Ibid., Oct. 29, 1967. See also U.S. Dept, of State, Hands Across the Border: The Story o f Chamizal (Washington, n.d.), p. 13. A dissenting voice, Senator John G. Tower of Texas, recommended that the Texas legislature be given an opportunity to approve or reject the treaty before implementation, otherwise Texas would be dismembered without its consent. Not objecting to the treaty itself, Tower strongly believed a precedent should be established whereby a state must concur before the national government ceded part of that state’s domain to another nation. The objection was overruled on the ground that when Texas joined the Union it became subject to the Federal government’s right to delineate international boundaries of states. See Cong. R ec., CIX, Part 19, 24851-56. 178 New York Times, Feb. 23, 1964. President Johnson had previously pledged to further the Alliance for Progress program with the same energy and devotion as shown by President Kennedy; he also proposed that the Alliance be made a “living monument** to the late President. See New York Times, Nov. 27, 1963. 17 9Ibid.; The U.S. Supreme Court in 1971 upheld the Government’s right to grant informal permits of admission to 50,000 Mexicans entering the United States for daily or seasonal employment. The court refused to hear an appeal sought by a group of resident farmers to bar the issuing of permits by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. See Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 30,1971.

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Gustavo Díaz Ordaz was elected to the presidency of Mexico in July 1964, and prior to his inauguration on December 1st, President Johnson welcomed the president-elect and his wife at the LBJ ranch. Bilateral questions were discussed on such topics as the Colorado salinity problem, Mexican sugar-export quotas to the United States, and the International Coffee Agreement. President Johnson said: “There are many problems between the two nations, but in the days ahead we will resolve them with peace, reason and justice to each other.” Diaz Ordaz replied that, “we have shown to the people of the world how differences can be solved by mutual respect, by sharing common ideals, and on the basis of justice.” 180 In the spring of 1965 the Mexicans hailed the beginning of a “new diplomacy” in their relations with the United States. This change was initiated by the settlement of the Chamizal dispute, which President López Mateos said was the most important achievement of his administration, and the prospect of solving the riverine salinity problem mentioned above. 8 Then late in October 1965, the United States Congress passed a bill reducing Mexico’s minimum quota for sugar exports to the United States in 1966. An outburst of anti-Yankee agitation led Ambassador Fulton Freeman to call a news conference in Mexico City.' Deemphasizing the decrease, he said that the 362,350 tons assigned to Mexico in 1966 as a minimum quota was the largest in the Western Hemisphere and second in the world to the Philippine Islands. He pointed out that sugar exports to the United States would earn Mexico $42 million in 1966 whereas she would be able to earn only a third of that sum if she had to sell her sugar in world markets, where prices were then very low.182 The subject had international implications, for the Mexicans interpreted the readjusted quota as punishment for Mexico’s refusal to break relations with Cuba, criticism of United States intervention in the Dominican Republic, and opposition to a United States-sponsored inter-American military force. These charges were made by the Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Hugo B. Margain, and quickly, a wave of anti-American nationalism, always at least latent, began to sweep the capital. Compounding the problem, Foreign Minister Antonio Carrillo Flores, who had been representing Mexico at the conference of the OAS in Rio de Janeiro, rejected proposed changes in the Charter of the OAS that might endanger the sovereignty of its members or weaken the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of any state. The implications of the sugar quota question and Carrillo’s speech in Rio de Janeiro gave the impression that Mexico was defending the rest of the Americas against the United States.1®3 The incident, however, produced no apparent reverberations, and in April 1966, President Johnson traveled to Mexico City for the unveiling of a statue of Abraham Lincoln, a reproduction of Augustus Saint-Gauden’s work in the Washington Lincoln Memorial, which the United States had presented as a gift to Mexico. In a joint statement the two presidents reaffirmed their committments 180New York Times, Nov. 13,1964. 181 Ibid., Apr. 3,1965. 182 Ibid., Nov. 27,1965. 18 3Ibid.

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to the fundamental axioms of Mexico's traditional foreign policy, and both agreed to the need for maintaining constantly open the doors of dialogue. On bilateral matters it was noted that the Joint Trade Committee, established in 1965, was a major step in expanding commercial exchange. They expressed deep concern regarding the international market for cotton, which was then the leading Mexican export product, and a matter of considerable importance to the United States. It was obvious that the two leaders skirted two major political differences: Mexico’s refusal to support United States intervention in the Dominican Republic, and her refusal to break relations with Cuba.184 The occasion was accompanied by a major statement by President Johnson of his country’s policy toward Latin America. He expressed continued all-out support for the Alliance for Progress and for “social revolution’’ in both North and South America. The president gave his blessing to an Argentine proposal for a meeting of the Western Hemisphere heads of state “to examine our common problems and to give the Alliance for Progress increased momentum.” 185 At a news conference in June, President Johnson declared that he had recently visited Mexico and spent the week end with the foreign minister who “toldJ og me never in the history of the two countries did we have a better relationship.” When addressing the Sixth Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Conference in Washington, D.C., in February 1966, Secretary Rusk declared: “The United States believes the project of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America is constructive statesmanship in the best tradition of the Hemisphere. We welcome the effort and would be glad to see it reach a successful conclusion.” His remarks concerned the efforts of Mexico, supported by several hemispheric nations, to draft a treaty aimed at keeping Latin America free of nuclear weapons. The Mexico-sponsored draft would prohibit any signatory nation from building or storing nuclear weapons, and from allowing its territory to be used for experiments, or for installations capable of delivering atomic weapons. A Latin American Denuclearization Center would be established to supervise the execution of the agreement, but its jurisdiction would be limited to the signatory powers.187 The final text of the treaty was unanimously approved by twenty-one Latin American nations at Mexico City in February 1967. Although doubt was expressed that all would ratify it, or that the five nuclear powers would agree to respect the ban, it was regarded as a diplomatic victory for Mexico. Mexico became the first country to ratify the treaty, when the Senate approved the document in September, 1967.188 Meanwhile President Johnson and Díaz Ordaz made a joint inspection of the Amistad Dam construction site near Del Rio, Texas, and Ciudad Acuña, Mexico, which was scheduled for completion in 1969. The American President declared that “ . . . Amistad Dam is another link in the mutual trust, friendship and progress which unite our two peoples.” Similar cordiality attended the18 18 *Ibid., Apr. 16, 1966. 18 %Ibid. 186Ibid. 18 7 Dept, of State Bulletin, LIV (Mar. 7, 1966), 366; New York Times, Apr. 17,1966. ' 8 6New York Times, Sept. 14, 1967. Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco was signed by Vice President Hubert Humphrey for the United States on Apr. 1,1968, at Mexico City.

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Second Annual Meeting of the Joint Mexico-United States Trade Committee, held in Mexico City December 15-17, 1966. The Committee considered general trade trends and specific commercial problems of mutual interest. Progress in^the reduction of obstacles to freer trade was confirmed since the initial meeting. President Diaz Ordaz when addressing the Mexican Congress in September 1967, reiterated his support for Latin American economic integration as outlined at the Punta del Este Conference of American chiefs of state in April. But he warned that this integration must be carried out fundamentally by Latin Americans with cooperation from the United States, and that the results must be for the benefit of Latin America: “ . . . we do not mean to create, in the face of a great agricultural and industrial power, another that might struggle with u s . . . ” 190 Matters of bilateral character in Mexican-United States relations in the late 1960s included an agreement for the development of a flood control project on the Tijuana River in California, a cotton textile agreement, and a protocol concerning radio broadcasting. Of a more complex nature were the conferences held in Washington and Mexico City concerning the use of territorial fishing grounds. The motives for the talks were recent changes by both countries relating to maritime fisheries within the contiguous zones off their territorial seas. In 1966 Mexico and the United States had extended their jurisdiction over fisheries in adjacent waters to a distance of twelve nautical miles from shore. The laws of both countries provide for a continuation of traditional fishing within their respective zones as may be recognized by the government having jurisdiction; an agreement was reached by the delegations to permit such fishing.191 The administration of President Richard M. Nixon maintained the spirit of friendly cooperation with Mexico, and the two nations were brought even closer by joint efforts to halt narcotics smuggling from Mexico into the United States. Alarmed by the illegal drug flow from Mexico the Nixon administration in 1969 launched Operation. Intercept in which travelers to the United States from Mexico were subjected to intensive search at the border. The experiment itself proved ineffective, but it served to prod Mexico into action. Operation Intercept was succeeded by Operation Cooperation in which the governments agreed on a bilateral program to curtail the drug traffic. It appeared, however, that the magnitude of the problem would prevent any substantial cutback in the flow of drugs across the border in the forseeable future, despite Mexican coopera­ tion.192 Evidence that Mexico’s stability was suffering erosion from social unrest appeared in 1968 when student protest movements shook the nation. At the height of the crisis, from July through November, some 150,000 students, teachers and sympathizers in Mexico City, and thousands in the provinces, were involved. The movement collapsed after at least thirty-nine persons were killed in a clash with police in October, just ten days before the Olympic Games 18 9 Dept, of State Bulletin, LVI (Jan. 2,1967), 12-13; Ibid., (Jan. 9,1967), 70. 190New York Times, Sept. 2,1967. 191 Dept, of State Bulletin, LVI (Feb. 6,1967), 224; Ibid., (June 9,1967), 919; Ibid., (June 26, 1967),64; Ibid., LVII (July 31,1967), 147;Ibid., (Oct. 9,1967), 475. 19 2Christian Science Monitor, June 26,1970.

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opened. One of the main frustrations that the students tried to express was the futility of trying to influence government policy through the existing electoral process. The government, having turned back the student challenge through the massive deployment of police and army troops, made conciliatory gestures to the dissidents. Many agitators arrested during the disturbances were released, and the voting age was reduced from 21 to 18. Congress also passed legislation facilitating the release of persons, mainly leftists, who were held in prison, often for long periods of time, for offenses of a political nature. Consistent with its records of not having lost a presiden rial election since its founding^ the PRI’s (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) candidate, Luis Echeverría Alvarez, won 86 percent of the vote in the election of July 5, 1970. His only opponent, Efrain Gonzalez Morfin, represented the National Action Party. Mr. Echeverría Alvarez carried on a strenuous campaign, visiting all of the nation's twenty-nine states and two territories, covering more than 100,000 miles. In so doing he reached thousands of persons who had never before seen a presi­ dential candidate. Both President Diaz Ordaz and the President-elect were minis­ ters of the interior, which since it controls the police force, tends to produce politicians of a conservative nature. However, Mr. Echeverría Alvarez declared his intention to relieve the causes of social discontent, saying “We in Mexico have a good deal of unfinished business in order to fulfill the promises of the Revolution of 1910.194 Social discontent showed no signs of diminishing, however, as student rioting broke out in Mexico City in June 1971, leaving thirteen students dead and 160 injured. The riots on June 10 involved fighting between anti-govern­ ment students and armed right-wing youths. The former were carrying placards accusing President Echeverría of the responsibility for killing students in the 1968 riots when he was interior minister. What began as a peaceful demonstra­ tion became vicious fighting when the armed right-wing groups charged into the ranks of the protestors. In the belief that the PRI had not responded to the students, the president placed a number of young university graduates on his staff in key positions and gave his support to the 18 year old vote. To this degree he was more responsive to student interests than any of his predecessors. 95 Another aspect of social unrest which had appeared in Mexico by the early 1970s was a guerrilla movement. Its existence was revealed in the kidnap-ransom of Mexico's civil aviation head, and a series of bank and payroll robberies, which were linked to Communist-trained terrorists. Some of those apprehended admitted their connection with the Revolutionary Action Movement (MAR),the group that was organized and trained by Mexican graduates of the Patrice Lumumba University*in Moscow. Pointing up the significance of the problem, Mexico in March 1971 expelled five Soviet diplomats accused of supporting the guerrilla training of Mexican citizens. The foreign policy of a country is determined by a complex of forces,19 19 3New York Times, Dec. 25,1968. 19 4 Christian Science Monitor, July 11,1970. 19 5Ibid.y June 14,1971; Ibid., Sept. 7,1971. 19 6Ibid.. June 12,1971; Times o f the Americas, Sept. 29,1971.

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permanent and changing, internal and external. The constants of geography and history have profoundly influenced the foreign policy of Mexico with respect to the United States. And differences in paths followed, in physical and human resources, and the international aims of the two countries have impressed on Mexico, as the weaker nation, certain characteristics and permanent features. Continuity and change in the internal development of both countries are also clearly manifested in the relationship. Trends in the economic process of Mexico, particularly those affecting its modernization and living standards, are of fundamental importance in illuminating its past and continuing relationship with the United States. Mexico’s record of economic growth in recent times has been impressive by any standards. It should be recalled, however, that by its historical evolution the country was better prepared than many of the so-called economically under-developed countries to take advantage of opportunities presented. National economic growth had been a studied aim of official policy since the Porfirian era, 1876-1910. The Diaz dictatorship had created the foundation for a modem economy once the feudal structure, perpetuated by Diaz, had been destroyed by the Revolution. Although revolutionary strife continued into the 1920s, and extensive agrarian reform did not come until the 1930s, Mexico was prepared to respond to the opportunities for industrial development offered by shortages and market growth accompanying World War II. Mexico developed its own brand of “one party” democracy, providing political stability accompanied by a significant measure of political freedom, the subordination of the military elements, its own formula for stimulating private enterprise within a statedirected economy, and an entrepeneurial class which, supported and exhorted by the state, was capable of exploiting the favorable international market that developed during the war, and continued in its aftermath. Between 1939 and 1954 the average annual growth rate of the gross national product was 5.7 percent, and in the period 1949-1964 it was about 6 percent; the increase, in 1965 was 5.1 percent. This growth was accompanied by conditions of relative monetary stability with less inflationary pressure than was found generally in Latin America. President Díaz Ordaz reported to Congress in 1967 that the gross national product had registered a 7.5 pôrcent increase, but made it clear that anything greater would cause inflation and force the government to put the brakes on the economy, declaring: “We are sacrificing spectacular advance and accomplishment in exchange for achieving real progress.” With one of the fastest growing populations in the world, about 3 percent annually, the per capita income increased by some 3 percent annually, but this was still higher than the level set for the United Nations Development Decade.197 Industry has led the way, for virtually the whole range of durable and non-durable consumer goods was being produced domestically. A forceful system of import licensing and high tariffs was instituted to keep out most foreign goods that would compete with local manufacturers. But under the Law for the Encouragement of New and Necessary Industries, new ventures were allowed very generous tax treatment. Foreign investors encouraged to participate in these19 19 '’New York Times, Sept. 2, 1967.

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ventures, provided they obtained the approval of the Mexican government. A usual requirement for gaining approval was that the new venture should be a joint one with Mexican partners, the latter having 51 percent of the investment.198 Agriculture lagged behind industry, but was well ahead of Latin America as a whole. By 1960 food imports had been reduced to 2.8 percent of total imports, making the country almost self-sufficient in food production. While food productioh had kept ahead of population growth, the greatest vigor was found in the area of commercial crops. The cultivated area under irrigation doubled between 1950 and 1963. The rising trend df exports meant that the agricultural sector was susceptible to fluctuation in world markets; however, Mexico was in a better position than many primary exporters because her agricultural exports were more diversified.199 Changes in the economic structure are reflected in the foreign trade pattern. Exports had been diversified to the point that in the 1960s about one-fifth represented manufactured or semi-manufactured products, including refined sugar, and also such commodities as steel sheets and pipe, railroad equipment, and plywood. Imports, strictly controlled, consisted of industrial raw materials and capital goods. A factor in Mexico’s economic success which deserves special emphasis has been the availability of foreign exchange, made possible in large part by its propinquity to the United States. The major consequences have been the tourist boom, which provided the vital and growing extra third of Mexico’s export earnings, the income of migrant workers, and the low transport costs of labor-intensive manufactured goods shipped across the United States frontier. The absence of exchange controls, allowing complete freedom for capital and interest payments to flow out of the country, has also had a measurable impact. The United States, for several decades, has been the outlet for about three quarters of Mexico’s exports, and has supplied that nation with three quarters, or more, of its imports. Mexican trade with Latin America has not been significant, but has shown an increase in recent times. Another feature of Mexico’s post-war growth has been the extraordinary extent to which it was financed by domestic resources. Foreign direct investment was more than compensated by the outflow of earnings from such investments, a condition which is likely to persist, though by the 1960s a trend towards increased reinvestment of profits by foreign enterprises was evident. Mexico’s foreign lenders include the World Bank, the Inter-American Develop­ ment Bank, and the Export-Import Bank, as well as private bankers in' the United States, Western Europe and Japan. Mexico’s attractiveness to the international business community and her excellent credit standing have been aided by her unfailing repayment of old debts, such as the indemnification payments aiising from the 1938 oil nationalization, which were completed in 1962. Illustrative of Mexico’s capacity for self-help was its early phasing out of * *98Economist, CCXVI (Sept. 25,1965), XII; XIX; Afew York Times, July 25,1965. '" R ic h a rd W. Parks, “The Role of Agriculture in Mexico’s Economic Development,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, 18 (Summer, 1964), 23.

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the Alliance for Progress loan program. Two thirds of the assistance given Mexico over the first four years consisted of commercial-type loans on which service was fully maintained, and by the fourth year over 80 percent constituted regular commercial-type loans. Mexico was notified that it would be excluded from participation in the Alliance except with respect of commercial-type borrowing. At this point it was concluded that only two countries, Mexico and Venezuela, had a capability great enough to require “soft loan” projects, where the return to the economy was likely to be long delayed.200 By 1966 Secretary Rusk was able to substantiate his earlier optimism declaring that Mexico has often been cited as an example for the rest of Latin America, and a “show window” for the Alliance for Progress. One year later he commented that Mexico was in a position to help its neighbors speed their development. This meant that Mexico had met the requirement for self-help better than any of the more favored nations, and that it must go it alone without benefit of easy financing. Thus, in the first five years of the Alliance one-third of the increase in gross national product* in Latin America came into Mexico which contained about one-sixth of the population and had received comparatively meager assistance from the A lianza program. A critical analysis of the problem revealed that: "“Only 3.2 percent of the disbursement of donations and concealed donations in the five years (1962-1966) went to Mexico although it had some 17.4 percent of the population, and although half of its population with a per capita income under $150 (per year) was living far below the average level of the Latin American countries.” 201 Mexico’s share in Alliance for Progress aid and the proportion of disbursements are shown below: Disbursement of Aid2 0 2 (millions of dollars) Mexico

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

129.5

40.3

29.6

79.5

60.3

Proportion of Disbursements2 0 3 Proportion of disbursements of donations and concealed donations given certain countries compared with their proportion of the Latin American population affected. Share o f Mexico

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

population

1.3%

2.8%

3.7%

4.8%

2.6%

17.4%

The official Mexican evaluation of the Alliance was expressed by President Díaz Ordaz in 1965: “In the case of our country, we can affirm that the Alliance 200Simon G. Hanson, “The Alliance for Progress-The Fourth Year,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, 20 (Autumn, 1966), 27; Joseph A. Hasson, “ Latin American Develop­ ment: The Role of the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress,” Orbis, IX (Winter, 1966), 1063. 201 Simon G. Hanson, Five Years o f the Alliance for Progress (Washington, 1967), pp. 79-80. 20 2Ibid., p. 4. 20 3Ibid., p. 80.

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has operated satisfactorily. Its favorable evolution has been made possible by the manner in which the principal organization for promoting it, the Agency for International Development, has operated, enabling us directly or indirectly to obtain loans for such important areas as agriculture, the training of technicians, housing, small irrigation projects.. . ” 204 Mexico’s sustained growth in domestic production in the decade of the 1960’s was interrupted by a severe economic slowdown in 1971. The Echeverría government was confronted with mounting inflationary pressure, growing maldistribution of income, a large external debt and a trade deficit in excess of $1 billion in 1970. The nation’s annual average growtlvrate of about 6.5 percent following World War II fell to 3.7 percent in 1971, but reached 5.5 percent in 1972. The annual per capita income attained $700; however, it represented the great wealth of the industrial sector rather than a rise in the overall standard of living. At base, the problem was the low productivity of Mexican industry and a drop in the primary exports (sugar, coffee, cotton and fish).2 0 5 Agriculture, supporting more than 40 percent of the population and accounting for 10 percent of the gross national product suffered from a lack of credit, irrigation development and investment in machinery, fertilizers and fresh crop strains. President Echeverría traveled by jet aircraft on week ends to remote rural areas, hearing complaints and observing conditions. His answer to peasant dissatisfaction was the promulgation of a new Agrarian Reform Law, designed to strengthen the ejidos to stimulate production, build peasant income and regulate the administation of rural credit. The conservative elements within the PRI, notably those with rural financial interests, found the new law disturbing. With the population expected to double to one hundred million by 1990,increased food production is imperative. Improved living conditions for the rural population might be expected to reduce the swelling migration to the cities; 400,000 cam pesinos migrate each year to Mexico City alone. Although Mexico has outdistanced most Latin American countries in achieving balanced economic growth, the potentially large market has been stifled by mass poverty. The purchasing power of urban workers has risen in recent years, but they constituted a relatively small sector of the population, and their bargaining position had been weakened by a competitive labor market. However, the fundamental failure had been raising the living standards of the rural masses. Low purchasing power and inequalities of income coexisted with a depression in high cost industries which lacked consumer outlets. This problem had to be overcome before Mexico could achieve its goals and potentialities. Mexico’s trade with the United States was first among the developing nations. Worldwide, Mexico was the fifth-ranking client and sixth supplier of the United States. But in 1971 trade with the U.S. produced an unfavorable balance of $481.3 million, which was partially attributable to Washington’s protectionist policy. Income from tourism in 1971 surpassed the value of exports ($1,373 billion) by $84.8 million. Some 2.3 million tourists, most of them Americans, 20 4Latin American Times, Oct 12,1965. 20 5New York Times, Jan. 28, 1972; Inter-American Development Bank, Socio-Economic Progress in Latín American (Social Progress Trust Fund Tenth Annual Report, 1970) (Washington, 1971), pp. 272-286; Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 14,1972.

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visited Mexico. With a view to expanding tourism, Mexico budgeted $60 million, part of which was to support projects in two remote areas of the country: a one thousand mile highway in the desert peninsula of Baja California, to be completed in 1973; and a major seashore resort in the Caribbean tropics in the southeast. With threats to American-owned properties and investments in Latin America on the rise, President Echeverría clarified his government’s position saying: “We do not have an expropriating mentality, there will be no restrictions on convertibility, nor will there be modifications in the rate of exchange. This will be a regime of guarantees.. . ” Mexico’s relative position in the politico-economic spectrum was brought clearly into focus on the occasion of Chilean President Allende’s visit in December 1972. Dr. Allende was enthusiastically and warmly welcomed, but President Echeverría and many civic and professional groups pointedly rejected his Marxist leanings. The Mexican president declared publicly that “In Mexico we want economic security, but we want also the unrestricted exercise of democracy . . . We reject all social patterns that reduce human dimensions to mercantile values in the same way that we repudiate all forms of totalitarian­ ism.” He said, in short, that Mexico has a political philosophy distinct from that of Chile. On the question of the troubled relations between Washington and Santiago, however, President Echeverría openly supported Dr. Allende in his efforts to expose what he called an “invisible blockade” allegedly waged by the United States against Chile.206

Conclusion Mexico’s international conduct has tended to bewilder, if not antagonize, the people of the United States, especially so with the deepening crisis of the global cold war, ancj the rise of Communist power in the Western Hemisphere: When Mexico’s experience with foreign powers is considered in the light of historical perspective, however, it is possible to interpret her international posture, often at variance with The United States, with greater understanding. As noted in the preceding chapter, the first fifty years of Mexico’s independent life witnessed a sequence of foreign onslaughts. She emerged as an independent nation with a weak economic structure, lacking in social and racial integration, and with the ruling classes ideologically divided. The domestic upheavals weakened the country in the face of United States expansion, and gave rise to a multitude of international claims that would persist for decades. Mexico was compelled to sign agreements with the United States for payment of claims for damages to American citizens which were often excessive, unjust, and even fraudulent. Claims provided one of the pretexts for the wars of 1836 and 1847 with the United States; they provoked a war with France in 1837; they

2U6M?w York Times, Jan. 28, 1972; Times o f the Americas, Nov. 10,1971; Ibid., Dec. 20, 1972; Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 4, 1972.

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gave rise to the long-term French intervention starting in 1862, and delayed Mexico’s development. It is not surprising that the nation's attitude toward foreign powers became defensive, distrustful and, nationalistic. International relations became stabilized during the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, for the order achieved by Diaz removed the major causes ad pretexts for foreign intervention. The generosity of Díaz toward foreigners had international repercussions later, and accented the hostile reaction of the Mexican people toward the outside world. The submissive international policy adopted by the Diaz government also left its mark. Mexico's international conduct varied with ' the progression of the Revolution, reacting to domestic policies and external forces. The pursuit of political aims of the Revolution provoked crucial international incidents, for the civil strife among the contesting factions led to the occupation of Vera Cruz, General Pershing’s expedition, the United States efforts to end the civil war by bringing together representatives of the rival factions, the withholding of recognition as a means of exerting pressure, and the claims for damages suffered by foreigners during the Revolution. The United States punitive expeditions induced Mexico to emphasize the principle of territorial integrity of nations. Although the American armed interventions could have benefited Carranza, and the United States contended they were not hostile acts toward the Mexican people, Carranza insisted on unconditional withdrawal. His stand foreshadowed Mexican resistance to the setting up of foreign military bases on Mexican territory even though it had the consent of the Mexican government and seemingly served the nation’s welfare. Carranza took a similarly dim view of the Niagara Falls Conference, and efforts by the United States and Latin American countries to act collectively in pacifying the factions fighting in Mexico. Carranza contended that collective international action, though only discussion of the matters, would establish the precedent of foreign interference in the settlement of Mexico’s domestic affairs. The application of this principle helps to illuminate Mexico’s stand at the several Western Hemisphere anti-communist conferences since 1954. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 contained two revolution­ ary goals which were at the same time of international applicability: notably agrarian reform, and the recovery of the country’s natural resources. Although pressure exerted by the United States in its non-recognition of President Obregon’s government forced Mexico to postpone in the 1920s agrarian reform and the reclaiming of the nation’s oil deposits, these actions were carried out vigorously in the 1930s. Mexico joined the League of Nations in 1931, expressly repudiating the Monroe Doctrine which was named in Article 21 of the Covenant. Mexico’s efforts proved decisive in obtaining inter-American acceptance of the principle of non-intervention at the conferences of Montevideo (1933), and Buenos Aires (1936). As a member of the League, Mexico condemned fascist aggression and provided refuge for thousands of Spanish refugees. Mexico’s expropriation of foreign-held oil interests reinforced the nation’s confidence in its ability to overcome foreign pressure, and to attain a national goal at the expense of the major powers. Mexico adhered to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and supported

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the United Nations in the belief that it would contribute toward disarmament and peace. A document entitled “Views of the Foreign Ministry of Mexico on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals” was submitted by Mexico during the San Francisco Conference. Designed to enhance the role of the smaller nations, it was defeated by a strong surge of nationalism, which emerged at the Conference. With the growth of tensions attending the cold war Mexico returned to its traditional position of applying the principles of non-intervention and respect for the domestic jurisdiction of states. These principles were made the keystone of Mexican foreign policy in the post-war era. Adhering to these principles, in the context of cold war power politics, Mexico has assumed a quasi-neutralist position, neither pro-Moscow, Peking or Havana, nor anti-United States. From a practical standpoint, Mexican policy stresses foreign trade, aid and capital investment. The focus of its policies, historically, ahs been on contiguous or nearby countries: the United States, Guatemala and Cuba. Mexico is strongly identified with regionalism through its membership in the inter-American system, the OAS. Its participation in the Latin America Free Trade Area, and its approval of the Central American program of economic integration give .further evidence of this attitude. Universalism, as a feature of Mexican foreign policy was demonstrated by its role in the League of Nations, and subsequently in the United Nations, UNESCO, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, the Inter­ national Labor Organization, and other United Nation's agencies. In spite of its identification with regionalism and universalism, however, the post-war attitude of Mexico toward the world has been one of mistrust and partial apathy, and its foreign policy mainly defensive and non-interventionist. But this is inconsistent with the country's dynamic economic and social development, which requires that she join more actively in international life. On general international questions, where Mexican interests were not directly affected, its contributions have not been significant. Until recently, Mexico has done little to collaborate with other Latin American states or states in Asia and Africa.2 0 7 Suggestions of the possibility that Mexico might be initiating a restrained and gradual departure from its peculiar type of neutralism, and its rather defensive isolationism* were reflected in the actions and statements of former President López Mateos and President Díaz Ordaz. López Mateos intensified the nation's international activities by his visits to the United States and Canada, as well as a number of Latin American countries . . . the first in history for a Mexican president.. . revealing a new aim in foreign policy: the strengthening of political and economic ties with Latin America. The visits of parliamentary missions to Europe and Asia, and the dispatching of trade missions to many countries seemed to highlight the importance that Mexico attached to international affairs. International assistance required for the economic develop­ ment of the country had also carried Mexico farther afield than previously.207

207 Jorge Castaneda, “ Revolution and Foreign Policy: Mexico's Experience,” Political Science Quarterly, LXXVIII (Sept., 1963), pp. 391-417.

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In his 1965 state of the union message President Diaz Ordaz spoke of the need for a policy of “independence within interdependence and solidarity with the rest of the nations/’ a formula not mentioned by his recent predecessors. In that same connection, he said “one notices something else, too, having once established our national being we are beginning to develop externally.” Moreover, he left no doubt about Mexico’s cordial attitude toward the United States: “ . . . friendship with our immediate neighbors must be closer, warmer,” and he pledged “to make that friendship an example of cordial and constructive coexistence,” which went further than his predecessors in friendly expressions toward the United States.208 He later toured the five Central American countries and Panama, and participated in the Punta del Este Conference of Hemispheric Chiefs of State. His successor. President Echeverría, also pushed vigorously to strengthen economic relations with the Central American nations. In a series of meetings with Central American presidents, Mexico promised to lend technical assistance in the possible development of a regional merchant marine fleet aimed at lowering the countries’ export and imports costs. Central Americans were receptive to prospects of a trade agreement with Mexico, which appeared to be mutually beneficial, especially for the former because of the slowdown of the Common Market. Ranging farther abroad than his predecessors, President Echeverría visited Japan in March 1972. His object was to transfer part of the commerce with the United States to Japan, and to reduce the volume of “triangular operations” which, mainly connected with the United States, had resulted in several typical Mexican exports reaching their buyers by way of third countries. Several hundred Mexican representatives of business, banking, industry and agriculture joined in the effort, in Tokyo, to help stimulate trade between the two countries. Like the United States, Mexico was faced with a rising balance of trade deficit, which reached an estimated $860 million in 1970.209 Mexican interest in Asia also extended to mainland China, which was confirmed by President Echeverria’s decision that his government would recognize the People’s Republic of China; however, trade between Mexico and mainland China began in 1963. This was followed in 1965 by the formation of a commission for economic development, and reciprocal participation in trade fairs in Mexico City and Canton. Mexico expected to sell an estimated $40 million in cotton and similar products to Peking in a two-year period.2 10 Mexican-United States relations through 1971 reflected the cordiality and warmth expressed by the Mexican President, as equitable solutions to problems of a bilateral nature, previously mentioned, were arrived at. But on the question of Cuba, Mexican policy remained fixed and seemingly irreversible. Cuba was condemned anew in the court of hemispheric opinion, the OAS Council, formally a consultation of OAS foreign ministers, in September, 1967. Convoked to consider Venezuela’s new charges of Cuban subversion, the OAS voted to “forcefully” condemn the government of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro 20 8Latin American Times, Sept. 3, 1965, 20 9 Times o f the Americas, Feb. 23, 1972. 210 Times o f the Americas, Mar. 1, 1972; Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 9,1972.

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and impose afresh, new sanctions on non-Communist trading with Havana. Yet, the condemnation was less vigorous than either the United States or Venezuela, backers of a strong line against Cuba, wanted. The final vote on the most critical resolution was 20-to-0, with Mexico, faithful to its non-intervention principle, abstaining. It was evident that the hemisphere was still split between the “hard liners” on Premier Castro—the United States, Venezuela, Bolivia—and the “soft liners” -Mexico, Chile and Ecuador. While maintaining this benign posture toward Cuba in regional councils Mexico’s bilateral ties with the Castro regime were eroded in 1969. This stemmed from issues concerning the hijacking of aircraft, asylum policies and spy charges. On July 26, the anniversary of the Cuban revolutionary movement, a commercial aircraft was hijacked to Havana by two Mexican nationals identified as youths who had participated in the 1968 student revolt. Mexico requested their extradition, but the Cuban government granted them political asylum, declaring that “the motives that led them to enter Cuba are of a political nature.” Mexico denied any accusations of political crimes. Shortly afterward G ranm a , the official organ of the Cuban Communist Party, charged that the Mexican Embassy in Havana had harbored common criminals and had protected Cubans using government boats to flee the island. The Cuban government then accused an official of the Mexican Embassy in Havana of spying for the United States Central Intelligence Agency, charging that he had sent photographs of military objectives to the intelligence agency through his Embassy’s diplomatic pouch. In the face of these incidents Mexico exercised restraint and gave no indication of altering its basic policies toward Cuba. By 1970 Mexico, alone, among the members of the OAS, had not broken diplomatic and economic ties with Havana. Why the latter had chosen such a provocative course to needlessly antagonize its staunchest benefactor in the Western Hemisphere remained unclear. In evaluating United States-Mexican relations we should consider the totality of the relationship. If a balance sheet were drawn up, the credit side of the ledger would show a marked advantage over the debit side. The history of the relationship shows how two nations once divided by the deepest antagonisms that the differences of race, religion, culture, and the stages of economic development can bring about have, over the years, step by step, settled their outstanding differences, in recent times, through peaceful and amiable arrange­ ments. Mexico has come to understand the “Yankee” perhaps better than any of her sister republics. That understanding is far from synonymous with submission for, as noted, Mexico adheres to an independent foreign policy. But when Mexico takes issue with her neighbor it does not do so in the role of a chronic critic. Each nation has come to recognize the other’s foibles and strengths, thus making it possible to coexist on a plane of equality and cordiality rarely enjoyed by contiguous countries. While Mexico may never attain the status of nations comprising the “power belt” of the North Atlantic, it does have a potential that is not usually understood. Mexico is the most populous Spanish-speaking country in the world, and it is the fourth largest of the American republics, exceeded in area only by Brazil, Argentina and the United States. With a population of about forty-eight

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million (estimated, 1970), it is the third largest American republic in population. According to United Nation’s projections, Mexico’s population will reach 110 million by the end of the century. Size, strategic location, progressiveness, and extensive resources, both material and cultural, have given Mexico international status and significance. It is possible that Mexico will challenge Spain for the leadership of the Spanish-speaking world, and rival Brazil for leadership in Latin America. For many years the bilateral relations of the United States and Mexico have been good, with activity in diplomatic channels becoming almost routine in the 1960s. On broader hemispheric questions, however, there has been less concord. If recent events may be projected, it appears that the conduct of the United States, not only concerning Mexico, but also toward the other countries of Latin America, will have a significant bearing on Mexican foreign policy. Latin American problems have inevitably become essential elements in Mexican foreign affairs. Cuba’s experience and evidence of continuing revolutionary ferment elsewhere in Latin America indicate a growing pressure for wide-reaching social change in many countries. The United States position vis-a-vis these movements will doubtless color Mexico’s relations with it. If the United States should follow a policy that lacks understanding of Latin America, it could result in grave domestic and international consequences for Mexico, and abrade the cord of the “Era of Good Feelings,” so painstakingly woven by the United States and Mexico over several decades.

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SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS Bemis, Samuel F. The Latin American Policy o f the United States. New York, 1943. Blakeslee, G. H., ed. Mexico and the Caribbean. New York, 1920 Calero, Manuel. Un decenio de política Mexicana. Mexico, 1920. Callahan, James M. American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations. New York, 1932. Callcott, W. H. Liberalism in Mexico. Stanford, 1931. Calvert, Peter. The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914: The Diplomacy o f Anglo-American Conflict. Cambridge, Mass., 1968. Castaneda, Jorge. Mexico and the United Nations. New York, 1958. -------- . “Pan Americanism and Regionalism: A Mexican View,” International Organization, X (Aug., 1956), 373-389. Clendenen, Clarence C. The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy. Ithaca, 1961.

Cline, Howard F. The United States and Mexico. Cambridge, Mass., 1963. Rev. ed. --------- . Mexico, Revolution to Evolutiôn, 1940-1960. New York, 1963. Cosío Villegas, Daniel, ed. Historia moderna de México, 6 vols. Mexico, 1955-1963. Cronon, E. David. Josephus Daniels in Mexico. Madison, 1960. Cumberland, Charles C. Mexican Revolution: The Constitutionalist Years. Austin, 1972. Daniels, Josephus. Shirtsleeve Diplomat. Chapel Hill, 1947. Dillon, E. J. Mexico on the Verge. New York, 1921. Dunn, Frederick S. The Diplomatic Protection o f Americans in Mexico. New York, 1933. Feller, A. H., The Mexican Claims Commissions, 1923-1934. New York, 1934. Gibbon, T. E. Mexico under Carranza. New York, 1919. Glade, W. P., Jr., and C. W. Anderson. The Political Economy o f Mexico. Madison, 1963. Gordon, Wendell C. The Expropriation o f Foreign-Owned Property in Mexico. Washington, 1941. Gruening, Ernest. Mexico and its Heritage. New York, 1928. Hackett, Charles W. The Mexican Revolution and the United States, 1910-1926. Boston, 1926. Howland, Charles P., ed. Survey o f American Foreign Relations. New York, 1931. Inman, Samuel G. Intervention in Mexico. New York, 1919. Jones, C. Lloyd. Mexico and its Reconstruction. New York, 1921. Merrill, John C. “Gringo”: The American as seen by Mexican Journalists. Gainesville, 1963. Nicolson, Harold. Dwight Morrow. New York, 1935. Obregón, T. Esquivel. México y los Estados Unidos ante el Derecho Internacional Mexico, 1926. Priestley, H. I. The Mexican Nation. New York, 1923. Quirk, Robert E. The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915. Bloomington, Ind., 1960. Rippy, J. Fred. The United States and Mexico. New York, 1926. Rives, G. L. The United States and Mexico, 1821-1828. 2 vols. New York, 1913. Rojas, J. Fernández. De Porfirio Diaz a Victoriano Huerta. Mexico, 1913. Ross, Stanley R. Francisco I. Madero, Apostle o f Mexican Democracy. New York, 1955. Scott, Robert E. Mexican Government in Transition. Urbana, HL, 1959. Tannenbaum, Frank. Mexico: The Struggle o f Peace and Bread. New York, 1950. Timm, Charles A. The International Boundary Commission, United States and Mexico. Austin, 1941. Townsend, William C. Lázaro Cárdenas, Mexican Democrat. Ann Arbor, Mich., 1952. Wood, Bryce. The Making o f the Good Neighbor Policy. New York, 1961.

Colonial Cuba and Its International Relations The Caribbean is still, as it was in the past, one of the great maritime highways of the world for both commercial and strategic purposes. The mainland bordering its shores—Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica on the south, and Nicaragua, the Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico on the west—was known in the sixteenth century as the Spanish Main. Its city fortresses were the great centers of Spanish colonial trade. Through them and across the Caribbean passed the plunder gained from the Conquista on the mainland. Aptly called the “cockpit of international rivalry,’* the Caribbean witnessed the power struggle involving the Spanish Empire and its European challengers, the English, the French, and the Dutch. In terms of United States foreign policy the Caribbean has been the focus of the Monroe Doctrine idea, and Cuba, because of its singularly strategic location, has always figured prominently in the questions of national and hemispheric defense. The trade winds and the Gulf Stream facilitated communication with Europe in the days of sailing ships; from the Caribbean islands easy access could be had to North America (via Florida and Louisiana), to Mexico, and to western South America (via the Isthmus of Panama). Early in the sixteenth century Spain occupied the four laigest islands, the Greater Antilles-Cuba, Jamaica, Hispaniola (comprising Haiti and the Dominican Republic), and Puerto Rico-which separate the Caribbean from the Atlantic Ocean. In the seventeenth century the English, French, and Dutch established bases on the smaller islands, the Lesser Antilles, in the southeast Caribbean. Spain lost territory to her rivals when England took Jamaica in 1655, and France occupied one-half of Hispaniola (Haiti), in 1697. In the eighteenth century, England got possession of most of the Lesser Antilles, France being reduced to the colonies of Martinique, Guadaloupe, and a few smaller islands. The Dutch retained possession of the small islands of Aruba, Curacao, Bonaire, St. Eustatius, Saba, and half of Saint Martin. After exhausting the meager gold deposits on the islands, the Spanish established large plantations which produced chiefly sugar cane; later, tobacco, 317

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cacao, and other tropical products were cultivated. On the Spanish islands, as well as those acquired by other European countries, the economy was based upon the production of very few commodities, for export only; little effort was made to achieve self-sufficiency. The laborers suffered from malnutrition, and from endemic tropical diseases. The Indians on the islands were almost exterminated by the ruthless exploitation of the Europeans, and by European diseases. To maintain the plantation economy, which required great numbers of laborers, Negro slaves, and relatively small numbers of East Indians and Asiatics were introduced into the European colonies in the Caribbean. Scarcely any middle class developed between the wealthy plantation owners and the slaves largely because of the failure to initiate commerce and industry outside the plantations. More than one-half of the land area of the West Indies is in Cuba. The 44,000 square miles of territory extend for 785 miles in an east-west direction with a width varying from twenty-five to 120 miles. Of great significance in modem times is the fact that at least half of the area is level enough to be suitable for machine agriculture. Not more than a quarter of Cubais mountainous. The soils are adapted to a wide variety of crops, of which sugar is only one, and significant deposits of iron ore, manganese, and copper are found there. The island is well drained, and has a uniform, dependable rainfall. Its climate is far more temperate than that of Jamaica, Hispaniola, and the Lesser Antilles, making it more attractive to the Spanish immigrant. To attain an understanding of early United States attitudes and policies towards Cuba, the problem must be viewed against the background of events occurring in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The fledgling United States had found itself threatened by Spain and Great Britain on its western ramparts after independence had been won, but owing to the crises arising from the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars and their aftermath, it was able to fulfill its “manifest destiny,” to become a continental republic. Diplomatic milestones were Jay’s Treaty of 1794 with Great Britain, and Pinckney’s Treaty of 1795 with Spain, which identified boundaries and gave a measure of security to United States territory. However, the possibility that Louisiana or Florida might come under the domination of militant and powerful France caused great anxiety in the new republic. This occurred in 1800 when France, under the termstof the secret Treaty of San Ildefonso, regained Louisiana from Spain. Bonaparte had then decided to build a French colonial Empire in the Mississippi Valley of North America, using the island of Hispaniola as his Caribbean staging area.1 In 1802 President Jefferson declared that the day France takes possession of New Orleans “we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation.”2 Again Europe’s distress proved advantageous to the United States. After the disastrous campaign of General Le Clerc in Haiti, and confronted with a resumption of war with Great Britain, Bonaparte sold the United States the entire province of Louisiana.

1Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy o f the United States (New York, 1943), d p . 16-23. 2P. L. Ford, ed., The Writings o f Thomas Jefferson, 10 vols. (New York, 1892-1899), VIII,

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The Floridas were regarded as of even greater importance to the United States than the Louisiana territory, and it was with the purpose of obtaining the Floridas that Richard Livingston had set out on his memorable mission in 1801. After Louisiana was obtained, including West Florida, according to the interpretation of its purchasers, it was merely a question of time before East Florida would fall into the orbit of the new republic. In fact, in 1811 Congress authorized President James Madison to use the army and navy to seize and occupy all or any part of East Florida.3 But the need was hardly sufficient to proceed to this extremity, and in 1819 Spain was finally persuaded to cede the Floridas and all title to lands that the United States claimed as an integral part of the Louisiana Purchase. A mere glance at a map of the Caribbean shows the strategic importance of Cuba to the country that possesses New Orleans and Florida. It also reveals the interest which a nation possessing the Bahamas and Jamaica would have in seeing to it that Cuba should not fall into the hands of a dangerous rival. Therefore, from the beginning of the nineteenth century the United States and Great Britain remained watchful lest the “Pearl of the Antilles” should slip from the ever-weakening grasp of Spain into the possession of the other or of a powerful rival. The importance of the island of Cuba to the United States in the formative period of American foreign policy is perhaps best expressed by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams in a note dated April 28, 1823, to the American minister in Spain: These islands (Cuba and Puerto Rico) from their local position are natural appendages to the North American continent, and one of them (Cuba) almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations has become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indian Seas; the character of its population; its situation midway between our southern coast and the island of St. Domingo; its safe and capacious harbor of Havana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same advantage; the nature of its productions and its wants furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial, give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no other country can be compared. Such indeed are between the interests of that island and of this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations, . . . that in looking foward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself.4

In the same dispatch Secretary Adams pointed out that if the control of Spain was terminated, Cuba must look either to the United States or Great Britain. The government of the United States had been confidentially informed that Great Britain was so eager to obtain Cuba that she had offered Gibraltar in exchange. Whether or not this was true, “ the transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpropitious to the interests of the Union.”5 That Great Britain was not unaware of the American attitude is shown by a statement in the diary of Lord Ellenborough, a member of Wellington’s cabinet, dated February 8, 1830: ‘The

3Amer. State Papers, For. Rel., vol. Ill, p. 571. 4J. B. Moore, Digest o fln t. Law, vol. VI, p. 380. 5Ibid., p. 383.

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Americans declared that they could not see with indifference any state other than Spain in possession of Cuba.”6 In fact, as early as 1819, when the possibility of Britain taking Cuba was considered, Richard Rush, the American Minister, asked Lord Castlereagh about these reports. The latter denied any knowledge of such developments.7 In 1823, when George Canning was especially interested in obtaining the cooperation of the United States, he denied emphatically that England desired Cuba.8 He by no means implied, however, that his government would look with equanimity upon such a desire on the part of the United States. France also had a continuing interest in the Caribbean region. Although Guadaloupe and Martinique were very small relics of her once glorious trans-Atlantic empire, the nation that so recently had disposed of Louisiana, and that, during her long occupation of Haiti, had been Cuba's nearest island neighbor, could not be expected to lose all interest in this region of buried hopes. The London Times in 1825 accurately characterized Cuba as “the Turkey of trans-Atlantic politics, tottering to its fall, and kept from falling only by the struggles of those who are contending for the right of catching her in her descent.” Although the United States* real interest in Cuba dates from its possession of Florida, the earlier history of the island was associated with that of the mainland closely enough 'to warrant a brief review of Cuban history. Discovered by Columbus on his first voyage in 1492, the island was claimed by the Spanish Crown. Undecided whether “Juana,” as he named it in honor of the heir of the Catholic Kings, Ferdinand and Isabella, or “Cuba,” as the natives called it, was an island or a peninsula, he was certain that it lay off the coast of East Asia. The name West Indies testifies to this belief. On his second voyage, before leaving Cuba, he had his men swear that it was a peninsula, not an island, thereby hoping to convince the Spanish monarchs that he had reached the Asian mainland. Diego de Velásquez conquered Cuba in 1511, and in the process of pacification a chieftain named Hatuey was burned at the stake. ‘T his first of Cuba’s heroes declared that he did not wish to be converted and sent to Heaven, because Christians njight be there.” After the conquest there followed a brief period of prosperity, for the mines did yield some gold, and it was believed that much more remained. However, the discovery of vast wealth on the mainland quickly depopulated it of men, money, and horses. As happened-elsewhere in the islands, the native race virtually disappeared in a short time. Cuba's value for Spain then centered on the port of Havana where silver fleets and convoys could assemble. Time proved it to be a security problem owing to its use as a rendezvous by pirates, and the great difficulty that Spain found in protecting it from the predatory English, French, and Dutch. A French fleet occupied Havana in 1538, in 1554 “Peg Leg” Leclerc took Santiago, and in 1555 another pirate, Jacques de Sores, a Lutheran, sacked Havana. The English navigator Drake threatened the island in 1585 with a force of thirty ships, but did not risk an attack. In the following year the French looted Santiago. Philip II at length concluded that Cuba was of greater significance than merely a strategic base for operations on the mainland, and he constructed the great forts of Punta and Morro to protect his 6Ibid., p. 56. 7J. M. Callahan, Cuba and International Relations (Baltimore, 1899), p. 196.

*Ibid., p.199.

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“bulwark of the Indies, key to the New World,” against the “corsair-caked Caribbean.”9 Havana was also, in Spain’s view, the base of the African slave trade. But Cuba, being chiefly occupied with cattle raising, had little need for slaves. Until the eighteenth century its main commerce was in hides and meat. Some copper was exported, and tobacco found a place in the market by the seventeenth century. The tobacco industry was so hampered by trade monopolies that two uprisings in protest occurred, in 1717 and 1723. Havana also served as a ship building center, but Spain curtailed the industry because of a conflict of interests. The cultivation of sugar cane spread rather slowly, compared with its development on other Caribbean islands, but it could be grown most successfully because of favorable natural conditions found there. By the end of the seventeenth century some one hundred mills were functioning, and Negro slaves were being imported in rising numbers. Indicative of the limited growth of plantation agriculture, however, was the fact that the island contained only 32,000 slaves when the British captured Havana in 1762. The economy had been allowed to decline, strife persisted among the administrative hierarchy, and much of what prosperity existed came from illegal traffic with privateers. Moreover, the island was subjected to continuing assaults by foreigners and pirates. Even the massive fortification of Morro Castle could not save Cuba from the British in the Seven Years War. In 1762 the Earl of Albemarle with 10,000 troops from England and 4,000 from the North American colonies, laid siege to the stronghold, and after more than a month of mining and sapping took it by assault. Although the capture came in the “sun-setting time of the age of plunder,” it was estimated that treasure and property to the value of about $16 million were obtained. It was of even greater importance to Great Britain since she now held the key to both Mexico and Louisiana. Yet, in spite of Cuba’s obvious value, by the Peace of Paris, signed February 10, 1763, England returned the island to Spain and received in exchange Florida, which, as William Pitt declared at tne time, was certainly no equivalent. As one imaginative writer put it, “But for that, Washington and his associates might have failed—the French Revolution might have been postponed—and the House of Hanover at this moment have been ruling over the present United States.” If Spain made a good bargain with her enemy England, she made an even better one with her ally France, whose king unconditionally ceded to Spain the Louisiana territory. Cuba was now of the greatest strategic and economic importance to Spain, and Havana, which during the brief British occupation was opened to the trade routes of the world, was once more closed. Nevertheless, in the short period of English control, Cuba had tasted the forbidden fruit of free trade, and the experience was never forgotten. The British occupation was also to have a profound influence on the future economic life of Cuba. Many members of the British and colonial armed forces stationed there acquired a taste for Cuban cigars and snuff, and, after their return home, helped to popularize the tobacco habit in northern Europe and North America. Tobacco, by then the main export crop of Cuba, was grown on small yJohn E. Fagg, Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic (Englewood Cliffs, 1965), pp. 11-19.

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plots, whereas the large slave-powered sugar plantation was still uncommon. British traders, expecting that their country would retain the island, introduced ten thousand slaves, most of whom were destined for work on sugar plantations. Slaves continued to be imported after the peace, and the sugar industry was placed on firmer foundations than previously. Of significance also was the declining emphasis on Havana as a military bastion, and a greater increase in that of Puerto Rico; ultimately the fortresses of San Cristobal and San Felipe del Morro became Spain’s major strongholds in the New World.10 The Seven Years’ War and the dislocation of trade channels caused by the French Revolution were instrumental in opening the United States as a market for Cuban sugar because Santo Domingo, formerly its chief source, was precluded from competition by revolution. For Cuba this unsettled period produced a boom in sugar and a decline in tobacco. The first steam-powered mills were established in 1819, and with the progressive adoption of other technological improvements, and the formation of the great centrales, Cuba soon led all other sugar-producing areas in modern, efficient equipment and refining techniques. In so doing Cuba assumed the calculated risks inherent in an exporting monoculture. Thus, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, steps were taken which would ultimately make the island the greatest sugar producer in the world, and economically dependent on the United States market. “The consequences of dependence were to follow as the century progressed; dealer would dictate to producer, foreign capital would replace native capital, absentee control would replace local ownership.” 11 During the American war of independence Spain was drawn in by France against England, but her interest in the American colonies was purely selfish, as is shown in the instructions given by the governor general of Cuba to an agent, urging upon Congress the capture of St. Augustine, Florida, in order that it might be restored to Spain.12 Later, when Jay appeared at Madrid seeking a treaty granting free navigation of the Mississippi, he was not even granted official recognition. However, before peace was signed, in 1783, Spain showed herself more liberal towards her West Indian possessions than Great Britain, for both Havana and Santiago were opened to foreign commerce. In fact, the commercial code of 1778, which opened nine ports of entry in Spain and twenty-four in her colonies, was a model of liberality for the time. \ The French Revolution made the trade between the West Indies and the American colonies exceedingly brisk, but Cuba was not to pass unscathed through the period that followed. A French squadron blockaded the island in 1794 and caused much hardship to the inhabitants. During the Napoleonic era Cuba was threatened alternately by Great Britain and France, and when by the treaty of San Ildefonso, signed October 1, 1800, Napoleon recovered Louisiana and then sent an expedition to Santo Domingo, well might Jefferson feel that France could no longer remain our “natural friend.” Spain had equal cause for alarm. Napoleon could hardly confine his operations to Santo Domingo, with Cuba at his mercy, nor be content with Louisiana, when the wealth of Mexico 10 J. H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (New York, 1966), pp. 304-305. 11 J. H. Parry and P. M. Sherlock, A Short History o f the West Indies (New York, 1963), pp. 223-224. 12 Francis Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence o f the American Revolution (Washington, 1899), III, 412-415.

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lay at his feet. Both the United States and Spain had reason to feel thankful over his forced change in plans, for the failure of the expedition against Santo Domingo, and the prospect of an immediate rupture with England, gave Louisiana to the United States and gave Spain a new lease on her colonies. But, as Mr. Slidell declared in 1859, “From the day we acquired Louisiana the attention of our able statesmen was fixed on Cuba. What the possession of the mouth of the Mississippi had been to the people of the west, that of Cuba became to the nation.” 13 We have noted the increasing interest that the United States felt in Cuba after being assured of the possession of the Floridas, as shown by the instructions given by John Quincy Adams to our minister in Spain. Jefferson also, in a note to President Monroe dated October 24, 1823, indicated his feeling on the subject: “I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states. The control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico, and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, would fill up the measure of our political well being.” 14 Therefore at this period, when the Spanish colonies in Mexico and South America had virtually established their independence, and when the United States had received trustworthy information that Cuba also was planning a revolt with the purpose of seeking admission to the Union, American statesmen saw the need of great diplomatic caution. When Calhoun urged the acceptance of the Cuban proposal, Adams wisely opposed on the ground that it might mean war with England. It would be wiser, he thought, to say “that our relations with Spain would not allow us to encourage such a proposal.”15 In fact, at a cabinet meeting March 17, 1823, when President Monroe proposed to offer to Great Britain a mutual promise not to take Cuba, both Adams and Calhoun opposed.16 The European situation soon worked itself out in such a way that both Great Britain and France were forced to declare themselves in regard to Spanish possessions in America. Although by the fall of 1823 French armies were in full control of Spain, Canning had already notified them “that, as England disclaimed all intention of appropriating to herself the smallest portion of the late Spanish possessions in America, she also felt satisfied that no attempt would be made by France to bring any of them under her dominion either by conquest or by cession from Spain.” 17 Great Britain was apparently as anxious concerning the ultimate fate of the Spanish colonies as was the United States. In August of the same year Canning made his famous proposal to the American minister concerning a joint declaration looking towards recognition, to include a definite statement that neither nation aimed at the acquisition of any portion of the Spanish possessions itself, and that neither could see any portion of those possessions transferred to any other power with indifference. Although Adams was unwilling to join with Great Britain in exactly the manner specified, the message of President Monroe, dated December 2, 1823, showed clearly enough our stand in regard to European 13Sen. Rep. No. 351, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 1. 1 4Ford, Jefferson, X, 278. 1 sCallahan, Cuba, p. 125. 16Memoirs o f John Quincy Adams (Philadelphia, 1874-1877), VI, 138. 17F. E. Chadwick, The Relations o f the United States and Spain, Diplomacy (New York, 1909), p.178.

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intervention. Cuba and Puerto Rico were saved to Spain, but, by the same token, her other possessions were irretrievably lost. That Cuba earned the title of the “ever-faithful island” for remaining loyal to King Ferdinand Vll and not joining its sister colonies in the Latin American wars of independence was due to several factors, one being demographic. The first Cuban census, that of 1817, revealed a population of 630,000, comprising 291,000 whites, 224,000 slaves, and 115,000 mixed bloods; the whites were therefore a minority. The continuing rise of the slave population and the fear of a slave uprising, intensified by events in Haiti, helped to suppress an independence movement. Further, being an island, and the central base for Spain’s military and naval operations against the mainland colonies, an independence movement would have faced enormous odds. It is also evident that the spirit of revolt was lacking. The creoles in Cuba were just becoming affluent, owing to Negro slavery and the sugar industry, and were less antagonistic toward the peninsular Spaniards than elsewhere in the colonies. Few Cubans were sufficiently educated or imbued with liberal ideas to have joined their counterparts in the mainland colonies. A number of conspiracies came to light, but most,of them sought annexation by Colombia or the United States, not independence.18 External circumstances also continued to favor Cuba’s retention by Spain. When, in 1825, Mexico and Colombia proposed a joint action against Cuba, the United States stood firm on its position of trying to save the island for Spain. Henry Gay gave Joel Poinsett, United States minister to Mexico, instructions indicating clearly that, while the United States was not looking to the acquisition of Cuba, yet if the island was to become a dependency of any one of the American states, its geographical position proclaimed that it should be attached to the United States.1920 Mr. Everett, the new minister to Spain, was also instructed to point out to the government at Madrid the danger of continuing a hopeless war against the revolted colonies if it desired to keep possession of Cuba and Puerto Rico2 0 Clay even went so far as to instruct Mr. Middleton, our minister to Russia, to urge the Czar to use his influence with Ferdinand VII to the end that Spain might sacrifice her pride and make peace, thereby saving these valuable islands. A large French fleet touched at Havana in August 1825, and caused much anxiety among the powers, which were particularly interested in maintaining the status quo in the West Indies. Canning wrote to the British minister at Paris that “as to Cuba you cannot too soon, or too amicably, of course, represent to Villèle the impossibility of our allowing France (or France us, I presume) to meddle in the internal affairs of that colony. We sincerely wish it to remain with the mother country. . .. The Americans (Y ankees, I mean) think of this matter just as I do.”2 1 Clay wrote in a similar vein to Mr. Brown, the American minister at Paris, that the United States “could not consent to the occupation of those islands by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever.”22 Canning once 18Fagg, Cuba, pp. 128-129; Parry and Sherlock, West Indies, pp. 224-225. 19W. R. Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico (Baltimore, 1916), p. 105. 20Ibid., p. 108. 21E. J. Stapleton, Official Correspondence o f George Canning (London, 1887), vol. I, p. 275. 2 2Amer. State Papers, For. R el.,v ol. V, p. 855.

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more tried to inveigle the United States into cooperating with Europe by proposing a tripartite agreement between Great Britain, France, and the United States, disclaiming any intention of occupying Cuba. But Clay felt that the proposal might encourage Spain to continue her hopeless struggle.2 3 Inasmuch as France also refused to participate, the matter was dropped. It was during this same year (1825) that the question arose of the participation of the United States in the Congress of Panama. President Adams and Secretary Clay heartily supported the project, although the Senate was not so enthusiastic. Among other objections raised was the possibility that a discussion of the probable destiny of the islands of Cuba and PuertorRico might be forced upon the United States. As long as the war between Spain and the colonies continued, the United States must preserve its independence of action ; the mere participation in such a congress would interfere with the influence that the United States now possessed as an interested but impartial third party.2 4 In fact, one of the objects of the Congress as indicated by the government of Colombia was: ‘T o consider the conditions of the island of Puerto Rico and Cuba; the expediency of a combined force to free them from the Spanish yoke; and the proportion of troops which each state should contribute for that purpose; and to determine whether the islands shall be united to either of the confederated states or be left at liberty to choose their own government.”2 s The slavery question also entered prominently into the discussion, for if Cuba and Puerto Rico were freed, slavery would be abolished there, as it had been in the other liberated colonies, and such a prospect was unendurable to representatives from the southern states. In fact, during the next twenty-five years the American policy of maintaining the status quo in the West Indies, and of guaranteeing the sovereignty of Spain over the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, was based upon the fear of independence for the islands-including, as it would, the freeing of the slaves-almost as much as upon the fear of aggression on the part of Great Britain or France. The annexation of Texas in 1845 increased the interest of the United States in Cuba, and in December of that year, a resolution was introduced in the Senate, authorizing the President to negotiate with Spain for the cession of Cuba to the United States. Early in the following year a similar resolution came up in the House. The war with Mexico and the resulting increase of territory to the United States kindled Polk’s ardor for expansion, and Cuba offered an excellent outlet. In a long dispatch (June 17, 1848) to Mr. Saunders, our minister to Spain, Secretary Buchanan enumerated the manifest advantages that would accrue to the United States from the possession of Cuba: possession of a naval station at Havana would enable us to command the Gulf of Mexico; under American control the island would become exceedingly prosperous and serve as a most profitable market; it would increase the strength and security of the Union, and it would give the United States “a free trade on a more extended scale than any which the world had ever witnessed.” Nor would the advantages accrue solely to the United States. Cuba, 2 3A. G. Stapleton, Political Life o f Canning (London, 1831), vol. Ill, p. 154. 2 4See Report o f the Sen. Com. on For. Affairs. This report, with other diplomatic documents may be found in the Historical Appendix, International American Conference, Se. Ex. Doc. No. 232, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., vol. IV, pp. 53 ff. 2 s British and Foreign State Papers, vol. XII, p. 894. l

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appreciating the advantage of annexation, was ready to rush into our arms. Spain must realize the distracted condition of the island and the danger of a successful revolution; else the island might be wrested from her by Great Britain. Under these circumstances, “the president has arrived at the conclusion that Spain might be willing to transfer the island to the United States for a fair and full consideration.” The maximum price stipulated was $100 million.26 Mr. Saunders was, however, given to understand that Spain, “sooner than see the island transferred to any power, would prefer to see it sunk in the ocean.” Failing to acquire the Pearl of the Antilles by peaceful means, certain ardent spirits in the United States were willing to compass it by a mode less justifiable. The discovery of gold in California showed the value of the isthmus in giving an almost all-water route to the west. But the ultimate possession of such a route made the possession of Cuba all the more necessary to protect it. The slave states were more than ever desirous of securing additional territory open to slavery. Therefore it is not surprising that when a Cuban patriot, Narciso López, attempted to recruit an expedition on American soil to free Cuba, he found much assistance in high quarters. A Venezuelan by birth, López had served in the Spanish army, had played a considerable part in Spanish politics, and had finally been made governor of Trinidad. Losing office through a turn of the political wheel, he engaged in business in Cuba, but with little success. In 1848 he attempted to stage a revolt near Cienfuegos, but the plot was disclosed and López was forced to flee the country. He went to New York and started the preparation of an expedition which should have the prestige of a great name at the head. Both Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee were approached, and when they refused López decided to lead the expedition himself. He had little difficulty in collecting the nucleus of a force, but a proclamation by President Taylor, issued August 11,1849, warning all American citizens against participation in such enterprises, had a deterrent effect. The two vessels in which the expedition planned to leave New York were seized by the authorities, though the filibusters themselves were not held. López* next expedition was in the beginning somewhat more successful. Some 750 men were collected, and in the spring of 1850 they succeeded in sailing from New Orleans in three vessels, making a landing at Cardenas. Failing to receive the assistance expected from the natives, and faced with an openly mutinous crew, López was forced to return to Key West. Upon information lodged by a Spanish war-ship which had followed the expedition, the boat was seized and López was arrested. Sufficient evidence to convict the leader of violating the neutrality laws was not forthcoming. A third (and last) expedition, which left New Orleans the following year, was even less fortunate, and its results were far more serious. A proclamation by President Fillmore cm April 25, 1851, stating that persons who violated our neutrality laws not only would be subject to the penalties of our own laws, but would forfeit all claims to protection,had no effect.2 7 The expedition, consisting of about 400 eager adventurers, sailed from New Orleans without clearance, August 3, 1851. A landing was made at Bahia Honda, whence López, with most of the troops, advanced to Las Pozas, where it was hoped an uprising would take 2 6Moore,op. cit., vol. I, pp. 584-587. 21Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 788.

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place. Meanwhile, Colonel Crittenden, a former American army officer who had served creditably in the Mexican War, was left with a small force in command of the baggage. Attacked by an overwhelming force, Crittenden attempted to escape by sea, but, with fifty of his followers, he was captured by the Spanish and carried to Havana. Here the unfortunate filibusters were given a quick military trial and shot as pirates. López and his force withstood several serious attacks, but, obtaining no assistance from the natives, they were finally routed and dispersed. Some were shot on the spot, others were taken prisoners; López himself was publicly garro ted. It was apparent enough that Cuba was not yet prepared to fight for independence. Nevertheless, the execution of Crittenden and his men aroused such a wave of hostility towards Spain and Spanish rule in Cuba that riots broke out in New Orleans and Key West, and throughout the United States the feeling was bom that Cuba must be freed, even though it should take all the forces of the United States to accomplish it.28 Expeditions of this sort were looked upon with warm disapproval by Great Britain and France, as well as Spain, and there were rumors, in the autumn of 1851, that a treaty had been entered into between France, Spain, and Great Britain to guarantee Cuba to Spain.29 On April 23, 1852, at the request of Spain, Great Britain and France again invited the United States to enter into a triple agreement disclaiming all intentions of obtaining possession of Cuba.30 Webster replied that not only did the United States have no designs upon Cuba itself, but it was willing to assist Spain in preserving it. At the same time, the United States could not acquiesce in its cession to a European power.3 1 In July, the matter was again brought forward by the British and French governments, but Webster’s death intervened, and the duty of answering fell to Edward Everett, the new secretary of state. He replied in an able fashion. He pointed out that Cuba was mainly an American question. It commanded the approach to the Gulf of Mexico; it barred the entrance to the Mississippi; and it stood at the doorway to our intercourse with California by the isthmian route. The United States could not bind herself indefinitely as to her future relations with the island—“it would be as easy fo throw a dam from Cape Florida to Cuba in the hope of stopping the flow of the Gulf Stream as to attempt by a compact like this to fix the fortunes of Cuba now and hereafter.3 2 The invitation was respectfully declined. Such an answer did not mean that the United States looked favorably upon filibustering expeditions. In fact, the note stated that the president had thrown the whole force of his constitutional power against all illegal attacks upon the island. But were there not justifiable means? The Pierce administration, which came into office in 1853, was expected to find and use them. It was “our manifest destiny to move on with the world of progress,” and if Cuba impeded our march, acquisition presented no terrors. The appointment as our minister to Spain of Pierre Soulé- a man who had openly lauded López, and had urged the government not to delay

28For an authoritative and detailed account of the López expedition see Robert G. Caldwell, The López Expedition to Cuba (Princeton, N.J., 1915). 2’ Moore, op. cit. , vol. VI, p. 458. 30 Sen. Ex. Doc.t No. 13, 32nd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 7. 3lIbid.,p. 8. 32Moore, op. cit. , vol. VI, p. 469.

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too long in plucking the Cuban fruit from the Spanish tree—showed that not even diplomatic amenities were to be preserved in our methods. Hardly had Soulé arrived at his post before he was forced to demand redress for the unfriendly treatment accorded the B lack Warrior , an American steamship calling at Havana. Spanish-American relations had been strained by the López filibustering expeditions, and by the hostile methods employed by the Spanish authorities of Cuba towards American merchant vessels. Then, in 1854, the entire cargo of cotton aboard the B lack Warrior was confiscated in Havana on the flimsy excuse that the ship’s manifest had the cotton entered as “ballast”—a technicality which not only accorded with the instructions of the customs collector, but also had met with no previous objection the thirty odd times the vessel had visited Havana. The Pierce administration authorized Soulé to demand $300,000 for damages done to the owners, and a prompt disavowal of the act. When several days passed without an answer, the hot-headed Soulé, not indisposed to provoke a war which would culminate in the American possession of Cuba, exceeded his earlier instructions by issuing a forty-eight hour ultimatum to the Spanish government. The Spanish foreign minister wisely ignored the American representative in his subsequent negotiations, and proceeded directly to Washington where he impressed the Pierce cabinet in his defense of Spain’s position. With the helpful support of secretary of state, William L. Marcy, a direct settlement, totaling $53,000 for losses sustained, was made to the owners of the vessel by the Cuban authorities.3 3 In the United States the whole affair was closely connected with the question of slavery. The southern states were anxious to obtain Cuba and were willing to go so far, if necessary, as to make the incident a pretext for war with Spain. Although Pierce was not disposed to proceed to extremities, Secretary Marcy directed Soulé, in April 1854, to negotiate the purchase of Cuba for $130 million. Should this fail, Soulé was then to direct his efforts toward “detaching” Cuba from the Spanish dominion, presumably so that it would become eligible for annexation by the Urçited States. As the best means of making such arrangements, Marcy suggested that Soulé confer with the American representatives in Paris and London, John Y. Mason and James Buchanan respectively.34 The three ministers met at Ostend, Belgium and embodied the results of their deliberations in the famous “Ostend Manifesto” on October 18,1854. This document was not, as its name might suggest, an official ultimatum to Spain, but rather a confidential dispatch to the Secretary of State. In essence, it recommended that the purchase price for Cuba not exceed $ 120 million, But if Spain, dead to the voice of her own interests, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States,. . . then by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power.35

When the contents of the memorandum leaked to the press, northern opinion, already antagonized by the efforts of the Pierce administration to ram the Kansas-Nebraska bill through Congress, was further inflamed by this next step on 3 3For the correspondence concerning the Black Warrior affair see House Ex. Doc. No. 93, 33rd Cong., 2nd Sess., vol. 10, pp. 30-120. 34Ibid., p. 123. 3sIbid., pp. 127-132.

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behalf of slavery. Marcy accordingly rejected the proposals, however similar they were to his own earlier instructions. Thus repudiated by the administration, and chastized by an important segment of the press, Soulé resigned his position in disgust. Despite the fact that Buchanan, one of the participants in the “Ostend Manifesto,*’ succeeded to the presidency, the slavery question was now too closely tied up with the Cuban problem to permit the island’s purchase, even though Spain might have proved willing. “Manifest Destiny” was shackled by the growing opposition to slavery. In the following decade, as Cuba became less important in American affairs, its relations with the mother country steadily deteriorated. It has been noted that the Cubans in general were loyal to their legitimate sovereign, Ferdinand VII, after Napoleon’s forces had occupied Spain, and remained aloof from the wars of independence fought on the mainland. Then, inexplicably, instead of rewarding the “ever-faithful island” for its fidelity, the restored Bourbons issued a decree in 1825 conferring on the captain-general “todo el lleno de las facultades que por los reales ordenanzas se concedian a los governadores de plazas sitiadas.” This meant that virtually absolute power was given to the ranking Spanish official, power over persons, property, and administration of the island. Few men could be entrusted with such despotic authority without abusing it, and the captains-general of Cuba were no exception. The decree of 1825 accelerated the growth of ill feeling between the Cuban creoles and the peninsular Spaniards resident on the island. The creoles resented the absolutism of the decree, whereas it was welcomed by the peninsulares as a means of subordinating the creoles and implementing policies advantageous to Spanish trade. The slave trade, for example, was controlled by peninsular Spaniards, and the creoles, fearful of the steadily rising Negro population, wanted it checked. Therefore, despite the fact that Cuba remained, after the Latin American wars of independence, almost the sole relic of Spain’s once vast trans-Atlantic empire, the desire for independence was not completely dormant on the island. As mentioned, a number of revolutionary schemes were hatched between 1823 and 1830, but none succeeded.36 In the 1830s and early 1840s, as the sugar industry expanded, there was a commensurate growth of the slave population which gave the Cubans good cause for alarm. Although the treaty of 1817 with Great Britain had made the Cuban slave trade illegal, it was carried on by unscrupulous Spaniards until 1865. By 1840 the law entitled a slave to freedom if he could furnish proof of having been brought to Cuba after 1820. The failure of the proprietors to honor their obligation, and the slaves’ awareness of emancipation in the British West Indies, accentuated the possibility of servile revolts. In 1843 a number of revolts occurred among disappointed and enraged slaves in the Matanzas area of Cuba. The insurrection was suppressed in a savage fashion, but the problem of slavery remained. To some? Cubans annexation to the United States seemed attractive, hence the expectation of the López expedition, the failure of which has been described. It was not until 1868 that the first serious revolt on the island took

3 6Parry and Sherlock, West Indies, pp. 226-227. "Ib id ., p. 228.

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The causes of the Ten Years’ War, so named because it spanned roughly that period of time, are not hard to discover. Aside from the basic grievances mentioned, Spain, adhering to the time-worn and anachronistic principles of mercantilism, regarded the island merely as an exploitable source of revenue. In 1868 the revenue from the island approximated $26 million, and virtually none of it was used for Cuba’s benefit. The public offices commanded good salaries, but all were filled by peninsular Spaniards. The corruption among officials was notorious, the “perquisites” in some cases reaching as high as 70 percent of the total receipts. Secondly, Spain monopolized not only Cuba’s exports, but also its imports, and the duties were levied with the same severity on necessities as upon luxury items. Flour was taxed so heavily that wheat bread almost ceased to be an article of food for the common people. Finally, representation in the Cortes, which at one time had been granted, only to be withdrawn later, was felt to be essential to any permanent improvement in the government of the island. When Isabella II was driven from the throne of Spain by the revolution of 1868, the Cubans seized the opportunity to declare their independence and to organize to maintain it. Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, a wealthy planter and an ardent patriot, raised a body of some 15,000 men, and at the outset the patriots were generally successful. A constitution was promulgated April 10, 1869, and the legislature, which met in accordance with its provisions, elected Céspedes president. But without assistance the patriots could not hope to withstand the well equipped troops that Spain continued to send against them; and finally, upon promises of a general amnesty, representation in the Spanish Cortes, and a few other reforms, peace was brought about by the treaty of El Zanjón, February 10, 1878.38 From the beginning, the United States took a keen interest in the war. On March 27 the captain-general of the island, Domingo Dolce, issued a procla­ mation declaring that any vessels carrying men, arms, or ammunition found in the waters near the island, whatever their destination, should be seized, and persons on board immediately executed.39 The United States protested immediately and emphatically. On April 4 the Count of Valmaseda, in command at Bayamo, issued a proclamation to the effect that every man above fifteen found away from his home without a reason would be shot and that unoccupied habitations and those not floating a white flag would be burned.40 Mr. Fish, secretary of state under President Grant, wrote the Spanish plenipotentiary: “In the interest of Christian civilization and common humanity, I hope that this document is a forgery. If it be indeed genuine, the President instructs me in the most forcible manner to protest against such mode of warfare.”41 President Grant, who from the beginning of his term of office showed a decided friendliness to the Cubans, authorized General Sickles, the American minister to Spain, to tender the good offices of the United States to bring to a close the civil war ravaging the island. The bases suggested were: the independence of Cuba, an indemnity to Spain, the abolition of slavery in the 38Text may be found in Sen. Doc. No. 79,45th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 16. 39Sen. Doc. No. 7 ,41st Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 12. 40Ibid., p. 20. Bayamo itself was burned to the ground and its inhabitants dispersed or slaughtered. 41 Ibid., p. 21.

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island, an armistice pending the negotiations for the settlement.4 2 Although some of the leaders of thé Spanish government were willing to accept, public opinion opposed and the proffer was withdrawn. The affair, however, which most aroused the United States against Spain, bringing the two nations to the brink of war, was the seizure of the steamer Virginius and the execution of her captain and crew. The Virginius was a merchant-vessel sailing under the American flag and registered in New York as an American-owned vessel. However, her cargoes consisted principally of contra­ band of war destined for Cuba; and for several years she had been successful in landing them, despite the vigilance of the Spanish cruisers. On October 23, 1873, she cleared from Kingston, Jamaica, for Puerto Limón, Costa Rica, though her actual intention was to land men and arms in Cuba. On October 31 she was captured on the high seas by a Spanish cruiser and taken into Santiago de Cuba. The Spanish commandant, General Burriel, summoned a court-martial, and within a week’s time fifty-three of the passengers and crew were summarily condemned and shot, despite strong protests upon the part of the American and British consuls. Such a performance was not merely “a dreadful, a savage act,” but it was directly contrary to international law, because the vessel was a neutral lawfully provided with papers; even if she were engaged in blockade-running or in carrying contraband, the maximum penalty should have been confiscation of the ship and cargo. General Sickles, the American minister at Madrid, was instructed to demand the restoration of the Virginius with the survivors, a salute to the flag of the United States, and punishment of the guilty officials. At first Spain seemed inclined to support the United States in its stand, but later Castilian pride came to the front, and a curt and most unsatisfactory reply was returned. Spain could not consent to be thus addressed by the representatives of a foreign nation, and if reparations were to be made it would be only after a thorough investigation had been carried out by her representatives.4 3 Recriminations became mutual, and it was only after General Sickles had asked for his passports that Spain agreed to consider the American demands. Owing either to the uncompromising attitude of General Sickles, or to the Spanish government’s fear of a popular uprising, the negotiations were transferred to Washington. A protocol was finally reached, whereby Spain agreed to restore the Virginius, together with the surviving passengers and crew, and to salute the flag of the United States, unless she could prove before December 25, 1873, that the Virginius was not entitled to carry the American flag. The Madrid government actually succeeded in furnishing proof that the vessel was both owned and controlled by Cubans; therefore the salute was waived. The vessel and survivors were turned over to the United States. But on its way north, under convoy, the ship foundered off Cape Hatteras. Spain also admitted the illegality of the capture and the summary execution of the crew, and finally paid an indemnity of $80,000 to the families of those executed. But the Spanish commandant guilty of the execution not only escaped punishment, but was later promoted to a higher grade.444 4 2House Ex. Doc. No. 160, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 13-16. 4 3The complete diplomatic correspondence regarding this incident may be found in the For. Rel. o f the U.S., 1874, pp. 922-1117; Ibid., 1875, Part II, pp. 1144-1256. 44For the trial of General Burriel see Ibid., 1876, pp.^486-535.

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Meanwhile the Cuban insurrection dragged along, and the United States continued to look for means of putting an end to the devastating struggle. The whole situation, as far as the United States was concerned, was summed up in a long, carefully worded dispatch from Secretary Fish to Caleb Cushing, the new American representative at Madrid, on November 5, 1875. In this state paper Mr. Fish enumerated the cases of arbitrary seizure, confiscation of American property, and arrest and execution of American citizens without trial, and protested vigorously against the continuance of a struggle on the very borders of the United States, disturbing to its tranquillity and commerce and conducted in a most barbarous fashion. “It will be apparent that such a state of things cannot continue. . . . In the opinion of the president, the time has arrived when the interests of this country, the preservation of its commerce, and the instincts of humanity alike demand that some speedy and satisfactory ending be made of the strife that is devastating Cuba. . . . The president hopes that Spain may spontaneously adopt measures looking to a reconciliation and to the speedy restoration of peace and the organization of a stable and satisfactory system of government in the island of Cuba.. In the absence of any prospect of a termination of war or of any change in the manner in which it has been conducted on either side, he feels that the time is at hand when it may be the duty of other governments to intervene, solely with a view of bringing to an end a disastrous conflict, and of restoring peace in the island of Cuba.”4 5 A copy of this note was sent to the American representatives in Europe, and when its contents became known it provoked considerable discussion, which was increased by President Grant’s message of December 7, 1875. Great Britain, whose cooperation was particularly desired, decided, in the words of Lord Derby, that “if nothing were contemplated beyond an amicable interposition having peace for its object, the time was ill chosen and the move premature.”4 6 The other powers were no more willing to intervene than Great Britain, particularly at a time when the young Alfonso was struggling manfully against the revolution of Don Carlos. Owing to the superlative ability of Mr. Cushing and the high esteem in which he was held, Mr. Fish’s communication was received by Spain in the friendly spirit in which it was sent, and in his reply Señor Calderon, the Spanish foreign minister, emphasized the decent satisfactory progress in putting down the revolution, and promised the abolition of slavery and the introduction of administrative reforms leading to representation of the inhabitants in the Spanish cortes. In conclusion, he asked for a frank statement concerning the precise things which the United States would wish Spain to do.4 7 After emphatically disclaiming any intention on the part of the govern­ ment of the United States to annex Cuba, Mr. Fish summed up the president’s desires under four heads: first, mutual and reciprocal observance of the treaty obligations, with a friendly interpretation of the doubtful provisions; second, the establishment of peace, order, and a liberal government in Cuba; third, gradual but effectual emancipation of the slaves; fourth, improvement of commercial sReport o f Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Relative to Affairs in Cuba, No. 885, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 44-52. “ Ibid., p. 162.

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facilities and the removal of the obstructions now existing in the way of trade and commerce.48 Spain’s acceptance of these proposals eliminated, for the time being, any further discussion of intervention. However, the Madrid government urged that before there could be any hope of improvement the revolution must be put down, and a new general and additional troops were forthwith dispatched to the island. In October 1877, the Ten Years* War came to an end. The terms of peace gave promise of a real improvement in the situation of the Cubans. Yet the habits of centuries cannot be broken up by the good intentions of a day. The Spanish system of exploitation had become part and parcel of the island’s administration, and Spanish officials were stiU employed to look out for Spanish interests. But two results of the revolution were manifest to the world: the seed of independence had taken firm root in the island of Cuba, and the United States could not remain an impartial witness to any attempts to prevent its growth. As a result of the Ten Years’ War, there was some improvement in the attitude of Spain towards Cuba, but little change in the actual conditions. The island was granted representation in the Spanish Cortes, but, owing to the limited suffrage, the majority of the delegates represented the peninsulares , or Spanish element. Even when, in 1892, the tax qualification for the suffrage was reduced from twenty-five dollars to five dollars, the Spanish authorities who controlled the elections saw to it that the results were virtually the same. Seventeen years of comparative peace followed; yet it was the apathy of exhaustion rather than the tranquillity of satisfied hopes. In fact, the promises held out by the Spanish government were never realized. The sole noteworthy reform was the gradual abolition of slavery. In summing up the situation, Estrada Palma declared that the parliamentary representation was illusory, all officials of the island were Spaniards, taxes were levied upon everything conceivable, and about 95 percent of the amount collected was devoted to the maintenance of the army and navy in Cuba, to the interest on the public debt, and to the salaries of the Spanish officeholders. The Cubans had no security of person or property; nor was there freedom of speech, press, or religion.49 These were the underlying causes of the outbreak of the revolution in 1895. The passage of the Abarzuza law in February, 1895, by the Spanish cortes , creating a farcical council of administration, seemed to bring matters to a head.50 The economic crisis engendered by the termination of reciprocity relations with the United States in 1894, thus closing Cuba’s principal market for sugar, undoubtedly aided materially in strengthening the discontent. After the tragic death of the patriot, José Marti, in the beginning of the insurrection, the revolutionists were under the general command of Máximo Gómez, and they were financially supported by the juntas organized in the United States. The revolution spread rapidly, and from the outset the insurgents ruthlessly destroyed all property and plantations that might be useful to the enemy. Spain spared no effort to check the revolution, and when Governor-General Campos45 46Ibid. t pp. 102-106. 49Sen. Rep. No. 885, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. Iff. 5°Hannis Taylor, “A Review of the Cuban Question,” North Amer. R ev.,vol. CLXV (Nov., 1897), pp. 610-635.

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failed to put down the insurgents, General Weyler was placed in command. The struggle on the Cubans’ part soon degenerated into guerrilla warfare. They gave notice that they would destroy all the resources of the island rather than surrender. General Weyler retaliated by forcing all the inhabitants of certain provinces to concentrate in the towns held by the Spanish troops or be considered rebels.5 1 Great numbers of noncombatants were thus brought together, and, as no provision for feeding and housing them had been made, the brutal nature of the decree was soon apparent. The innocent women and children were forced to starve in the towns, while the able-bodied men remained at large and joined revolutionary bands. On June 12, 1895, President Cleveland issued a proclamation recognizing that a state of insurgency existed in Cuba, and insisted upon the maintenance of American neutrality.5 2 However, as the horrors of the struggle increased and the American press took up the campaign in Cuba’s behalf, Congress was also drawn into the affair, and early in 1896 a resolution passed both houses urging that the president recognize Cuban belligerency. This, Cleveland refused to do. But public opinion steadily grew more hostile toward Spain; and the destruction of American property on the island, together with the great falling off of American trade, added fuel to the flames. Although the president refused to recognize Cuban belligerency, he authorized secretary of state, Richard Olney, to offer the Spanish ambassador the mediating services of the United States. ‘T he United States,” it was specifically asserted, “has no designs upon Cuba and no design against the sovereignty of Spain.” 5 3 The Spanish reply was a courteous refusal of the offer. Meanwhile, most American newspapers took up the cause of Cuban independence. Few, however, were able to approach the extremes of jingoism reflected in New York’s “yellow journals” —Joseph Pulitzer’s World and William Randolph Hearst’s Journal. Both papers, engaged in a circulation war, colored the news in favor of the insurgents, playing on the traditional American sympathy for the underdog fighting for his liberty against European despotism. Examples of Spanish cruelty, which the Journal compared to the “Spanish Inquisition of the sixteenth century,” were described in purple prose and lurid illustrations. The reports of Fitzhugh Lee, American consul-general at Havana, and of Senator Redfield Proctor, who made a personal investigation, also helped to reinforce the public’s martial spirit. Hardly had the McKinley administration assumed office before it was compelled to take action; for the situation was growing steadily worse. In May 1897, the President asked Congress to appropriate $50,000 for the relief of destitute Americans in Cuba, and in December he issued a public appeal for funds to aid in combating the Cuban famine. A slight gleam of hope for better conditions appeared when the new Sagasta ministry recalled General Weyler and promised Cuba a new constitution, with a local parliament and a fair share of autonomy. In his annual message of December 1897, McKinley noted the new policy of Spain, and declared that it was honestly due to Spain that she should

s 1Text of decree in Sen. Rep. No. 8851p. 549. 5 2For. Rel. o f the U.S., 1895, p. 1195 s 3Ibid., p. 540.

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be given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations. Unfortunately for Spain, her policy of reform was given no opportunity to materialize. General Blanco could not undo the terrible results of the reconcentration policy of General Weyler, although he made very earnest efforts to do so. Not only were the insurgents wholly averse to acceptance of semi-autonomy in the place of independence, but the Spanish party in Cuba was equally indignant at the liberality of the new program. Rioting against the newspapers backing autonomy became so serious that on January 13, 1898, the American consul-general, Mr. Lee, telegraphed that he was uncertain whether Blanco could control the situation, and that if it should be demonstrated that Americans were in danger, ships should be promptly sent.54 The next day all was quiet; but the idea of sending a war-ship struck root, and on January 24 the president ordered the M aine sent to Havana on a “friendly visit.” The American consul-general realized that the times were not propitious for a friendly visit and advised that the step be postponed six or seven days. But the battleship was already on its way, and on January 25 it anchored in Havana harbor. The struggle between the Cuban insurgents and the Spaniards was soon to be merged in a direct conflict between Spain and the United States. On February 9, 1898, a New York newspaper published a private letter written by Señor Dupuy de 'Lome, the Spanish minister, to a friend in Cuba, in which he characterized President McKinley as a “weak . . . would-be politician who tries to leave a door open behind himself while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party.” 55 Although it was a questionable piece of journalism to publish a letter of this character that had been purloined from the mails, the Spanish minister showed an inexcusable lack of diplomatic discretion in expressing his opinions so frankly. The United States immediately demanded his recall-although not until after the discredited diplomat, realizing that his position had become untenable at Washington, had sent in his resignation. But public opinion, already aroused against Spain through her dilatory attitude in ameliorating the condition of Cuba, became increasingly hostile. And, as if other circumstances were not sufficiently irritating in the relations between the two countries, on the night of February 15 the M aine was blown up at its anchorage in Havana harbor, with the loss of two hundred and sixty men, including two officers. A wave of indignation swept over the United States, and the demand for war was virtually unanimous. The few who counseled delay until a court of inquiry could fix the blame were scarcely heard in the popular clamor. Fortunately, democratic governments are so constituted that they function slowly; and the utter unpreparedness of the United States for war was an added incentive to move with deliberation. An American court of inquiry, consisting of hardly objective United States naval officers concluded after twenty-three days that the M aine was destroyed by a submarine mine. No evidence could be obtained to fix the responsibility on any person. A Spanish board of inquiry, making a separate investigation, reported that the explosion was due to internal causes.56 Although the real5 5 *Ibid., 1898, p. 1025. See also Gerald G. Eggert, “Our Man in Havana: Fitzhugh Lee,” Hispanic American Historical Review, XLVII (Nov., 1967), pp. 463-485. 5 s For the full content of the letter see Moore, DigestInt. Law, vol. VI, pp. 176-177. s 6For American report see Sen. Doc. No. 207, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess. The Spanish report is in Sen. Rep. No. 885, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 566ff. >

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cause will probably never be known,5 7 the least likely culprit was the Madrid government which was desperately trying to avert war. The sinking of the Maine aroused the American martial spirit as no other single incident. The jingoistic press and such warmongers in the administration as the Assistant Secretary of Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, were least prepared to permit a diplomatic settlement. Their mood smothered the voices of conciliation represented by the American investors of $50 million in Cuba, and commercial groups engaged in the $100 million annual trade with the island. President McKinley was the willing servant of these business interests, and he did make a determined effort to secure peace. On March 27, 1898, the United States minister at Madrid, General Woodford, was instructed to inquire whether Spain would consent to the following terms: (1) an armistice for six months, during which negotiations for peace between Spain and the insurgents might be undertaken through the friendly offices of the United States; (2) immediate revocation of the reconcentrado order; (3) agreement that, if peace were not arranged by October 1, the president of the United States should be accepted as final arbitrator between Spain and the insurgents.58 The report on the Maine made to Congress, March 28, was bound to bring speedy action. Therefore, if the President was to succeed in obtaining a peaceful settlement, Spain must give him an immediate assurance that his offer was accepted. Madrid’s reply, on March 31, was not satisfactory, in that, instead of granting an immediate armistice, its offer conditioned a truce upon the insurgents asking for it, a proposal that they were most unlikely to make. However, on April 3, through the intervention of the Pope, the Queen conceded an unconditional suspension of hostilities for six months. Within the next week, the Spanish government further instructed the Governor-General of Cuba to revoke reconcentration, and the commander of the army was directed to grant an armistice for such a time as he felt prudent in order to facilitate peace. In his message delivered to Congress on April 11, 1898, President McKinley capitulated to the war mood of the public. In a formidable indictment, he declared that only forcible intervention was left, and he justified this course of action upon four grounds: first, in the cause of humanity, i.e., it would put an end to the bloodshed and misery at our doos¿ second, it would protect American citizens and their property in Cuba; third, it would put an end to the wanton destruction and devastation of the island; fourth, and most important, “the present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace.” The destruction of the Marne was mentioned merely as impressive proof of the intolerable state of things in the island.5 9 Congress was only too willing to grant the president the powers that he asked for. Though there were stormy debates in both houses, a joint resolution was passed, recognizing the independence of Cuba, demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Spanish forces from the island, granting the president power5 5 7A later investigation upon the raising of the Maine in 1911 strengthened the view that an outside explosion caused the sinking. See Report o f the U.S. Naval Board in 1911, House Doc. No. 310, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. s 8For. Rel. of the U.S., 1898, p. 750. 59J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. X, p. 47; or For. Rel. o f the U.S., 1898,p. ISO.

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to use the entire land and naval forces to carry the resolution into effect, and, finally, disclaiming any intention on the part of the United States to exercise sovereignty over the island except to establish peace, and, that accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people. (Teller Amendment.)60 As soon as the president signed the resolution, the Spanish minister at Washington asked for his passport, and his action was approved by the Spanish foreign minister. On April 25, 1898, Congress passed the declaration of war, dating the outbreak as of April 21. Admiral Sampson had already received orders to blockade Cuba with the South Atlantic Squadron, and Commodore Dewey had left Hong Kong to engage the Spanish squadron at Manila. Foreseeing the outcome, the Navy Department had more than a month earlier ordered the battle-ship Oregon, lying at Puget Sound, to join the Atlantic Squadron. Her 15,000-mile journey around Cape Horn dramatically demonstrated to the United States the need strategically of an isthmian canal. Both sides realized that the issue lay upon the sea; and it was fortunate for the United States that such was the case. But there is no necessity to tell the story of the conflict here. Dewey’s overwhelming victory at Manila Bay, followed by the complete destruction of Cervera’s fleet at Santiago, virtually sealed the defeat of Spain. The mechanistic era of warfare had come, and America had made the greater progress. “Spanish dominion in America, in which there had been much both of glory and shame, with splendid episodes of heroic endeavor, noble self-abnegation, and great attainment, was to end in the final sacrifice, nobly met, on the sea which through generations witnessed so many conflicts of the two races.” 61 On July 22, 1898, through M. Jules Cambon, the French ambassador at Washington, Spain asked of the president upon what basis the conflict could be ended and a satisfactory political status in Cuba established. President McKinley outlined his terms, which were later incorporated in the protocol of August 12. In brief, the agreement provided: (1) the relinquishment by Spain of all sovereignty over Cuba; (2) the cession of Puerto Rico and other Spanish West Indies, together with an island in the Ladrones, to the United States; (3) the occupation by the United States of Manila pending the signing of a treaty of peace which should determine the disposition of the Philippines; (4) the immediate evacuation by Spain of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the other islands of the West Indies under her sovereignty; (5) the appointment by Spain and the United States of not more than five commissioners each, to meet in Paris not later than October 1, 1898, to negotiate a treaty of peace; (6) the suspension of hostilities upon the signing of the protocol.6 2 In the peace negotiations which followed, Spain made every effort to turn over the Cuban debt, either to the Cubans or to the United States, along with the sovereignty of the island. But the American commissioners stood fast against the proposal on the ground that the debt was created by Spain for its own purposes and through its own agents and not for the benefit of Cuba. The Treaty6 60U.S. Stat. at Large, vol. XXX, p. 738. 61 Chadwick, United States and Spain, p. 587. 62For. Rel. o f the US., 1898, p. 828.

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of Paris, signed December 10, 1898, was almost identical with the terms of the protocol, except for the clauses regarding the Philippines.63 The United States at last had the opportunity to pacify Cuba and then withdraw as it had promised-a quixotic proceeding highly incredible to a skeptical world. 6'Ibid., p.831.

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SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS Atkins, Edwin F. Sixty Years in Cuba. Cambridge, Mass., 1926. Brooke, John R. Final Report o f Major General John R. Brooke. Havana, 1899. Cabrera, R. Cuba and the Cubans. Philadelphia, 1896. Caldwell, Robert G. The López Expeditions to Cuba, 1848-1851. Princeton, 1915. Calcott, Wilfrid H. The Caribbean Policy o f the United States, 1890-1920. Baltimore, 1942. Callahan, J. M. Cuba and International Relations. Baltimore, 1899. Canini, I. E. Four Centuries o f Spanish Rule in Cuba. Chicago, 1898. Chadwick, F. E. The Relations o f the United States and Spain, Diplomacy. New York, 1909. Draper, A. S. The Rescue o f Cuba. Boston, 1910. Ettinger, A. A. Mission to Spain o f Pierre Soule 1853-1855. New Haven, 1932. Flack, H. E. Spanish American Diplomatic Relations Preceding the War o f 1898. Baltimore, 1906. Freidel, Frank. The Splendid Little War. Boston, 1958. Friedlander, H. E. Historia económica de Cuba. Havana, 1944. Foner, Philip S. A History o f Cuba and its Relations with the United States. 2 vols. New York, 1962-1963., Gray, Richard B. Jose Marti Cuban Patriot. Gainesville, 1962. Halstead, Murat. The Story o f Cuba. New York, 1896. Healy, David F. The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902. Madison, 1963. Hill, R. T. Cuba and Porto Rico. New York, 1899. Humboldt, Alexander von. The Island o f Cuba. New York, 1856. Infiesta, Ramón. Historia Constitucional de Cuba. Havana, 1942. Johnson, Willis F. The History o f Cuba. 5 vols. New York, 1920. Kimball, R. H. Cuba and the Cubans. New York, 1880. Lee, Fitzhugh. Cuba’s Struggle Against Spain. New York, 1899. Mahan, Alfred T. Lessons o f the War with Spain. Boston, 1899. Marquez-Sterling, Carlos. Historia de Cuba desde Colón hasta Castro. New York, 1963. Millis, Walter. The Martial Spirit. Boston, 1931. Morris, Charles. Our Island Empire. Philadelphia, 1899. Ortiz, Fernando. Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar. New York, 1947. Pirala y Criado, Antonio. Anales de la guerra de Cuba. 3 vols. Madrid, 1895-1898. Portell Vila, Herminio. Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos y España. 4 vols. Havana, 1938-1941. Portunondo del Prado, Fernando. Historia de Cuba. 5th ed. Havana, 1953. Pratt, J. W. Expansionists o f 1898. Baltimore, 1936. Rauch, Basil. American Interests in Cuba, 1848-1855. New York, 1948. Robinson, A. G. Cuba and the Intervention. New York, 1905. Rubens, Horatio. Liberty: The Story o f Cuba. New York, 1932. Santovenia, Emeterio S. Historia de Cuba. 2 vols. Havana, 1939-1953. Smith, Robert F. ed. What Happened in Cuba? A Documentary History. New York, 1963. Varona, Enrique J. De la colonia a la república. Havana, 1919. Verrill, A. H. Cuba, Past and Present. New York, 1914. Wood, Leonard. Annual Reports. 33 vols. Washington, 1900-1902. Wright, Irene A. The Early History o f Cuba, 1492-1486. New York, 1916. Zaragoza, Z. Las insurreciones en Cuba. 2 vols. Madridt 1872. 339

10 Cuba: Republican and Communist The official transfer of the island took place January 1, 1899, and thereupon the trusteeship of the United States began. The task assumed was truly stupendous. Disease and starvation were prevalent; civil government had disappeared; even the public buildings were unfit for occupancy. Major-General John R. Brooke, the first military governor, began a general program of rehabilitation, including the distribution of more than 5,000,000 rations, the supplying of medicine, the reorganization of civil government, particularly in the cities-all with the avowed purpose, as announced in a proclamation of January 1, 1899, “to give protection to the people, security to persons and property, to restore confidence, to build up waste plantations, to resume commercial traffic, and to afford full protection in the exercise of all civil and religious rights.” 1 Major-General Leonard Wood took over the work in 1899, and in his three years as governor-general made a record of administrative efficiency which still sheds luster upon his name.2 Undoubtedly his methods were at times autocratic, and necessarily he made some enemies; but when, on May 20, 1902, the government was transferred to the duly elected president and congress of Cuba, with a system of civil government established and successfully functioning, with a public-school system completely reorganized, with sanitary conditions thoroughly regulated and controlled, and with the plague of yellow fever virtually stamped out, well might President Estrada Palma declare to the retiring governor-general, in accept­ ing the transfer: “ I take this solemn occasion, which marks the fulfilment of the honored promise of the government and people of the United States in regard to the island of Cuba, and in which our country is made a ruling nation, to express to you, the worthy representative of that grand people, the immense gratitude 1House Doc. No. 2, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p.7. 2Even as harsh a critic as Carleton Beals concedes that “our first intervention in Cuba stands as a model of fine trusteeship,” The Crime o f Cuba (New York, 1934), p. 172. Elihu Root declared that Wood had done “one of the most conspicuous pieces of work ever done by an American.” Philip C. Jessup, Elihu R oot (New York, 1938), vol. l ,p . 287. 340

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which the people feel towards the American nation, towards its illustrious President, Theodore Roosevelt, and towards you for the efforts you have put forth for the successful accomplishment of such an ideal.” 3 From the outset of the intervention, the United States had not forgotten that by the terms of the joint resolution of April 20, 1898, the government and control of the island were to be left to its people as soon as pacification was accomplished. As an evidence of good faith, on July 25, 1900, the military governor ordered that a general election be held on September 15 to put into effect the following program: (1) to elect delegates to a convention to frame and adopt a constitution; (2) as a part thereof, to provide for and agree with the government of the United States upon the relations to exist between Cuba and the United States; and (3) to provide for the election by the people of officers under this constitution and the transfer of the government to these officers.45As an indication of what the United States considered essential under the second heading, on February 9, 1901, while the convention was in session, instructions were sent to Major-General Wood by the secretary of war, Mr. Root, outlining the following provisions: (1) no government organized under the constitution should make any treaty impairing the independence of Cuba or grant any right to any foreign power without the consent of the United States; (2) no such government should contract any debt in excess of the capacity of the ordinary revenues to pay the interest; (3) the government should consent that the United States reserve the right of intervention in order to preserve independence and a stable government; (4) the acts of the military government should be validated and maintained; and (5) the United States should be given the right to acquire and maintain a naval station.s While appreciating the decisive help rendered by the United States, and grateful for it, the delegates to the convention would not concede the right of the United States to impose conditions clearly violating that independence which it had guaranteed to maintain. They realized that the United States had some claims to special consideration, and they made counter-proposals to this effect.6 But undoubtedly they also feared too close a relationship with a powerful neighbor whose appetite had just been whetted by conquest. L 'appétit vient en mangeant, and Cuba was a particularly toothsome morsel. Therefore the convention drew up a constitution which completely ignored the question of relations between the two countries. However, Senator Platt, chairman of the Senate Committee on Relations with Cuba, while conceding that Cuba was privileged to establish her own government without let or hindrance, held that the United States, by virtue of its intervention, had certain rights in the island which ought to be safeguarded. The result was the Platt Amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill, which passed both houses and received the president’s signature.7 The terms of this amendment became such an important factor

3House Doc. No. 2, 57th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 124. 4For text of the order see For. Rel. o f the U. S.t 1902, p. 358. 5House Doc. No. 2, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., pp.43-47. 6For. Rel. o f the U. S., 1902, p. 360. ’ Secretary of War Root prepared the original draft; see Jessup, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 310.

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in the relations between the two countries that the most salient clauses deserve quotation in full: (1) That the Government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign Power or Powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign Power or Powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes, or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said Island. (2) That said Government shall not assume or contract any public debt to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking-fund provision for discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the Island, after defraying the current expenses of the Government, shall be inadequate. (3) That the Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba. (4) That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupation thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful right acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected. (5) That thç Government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the Island to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be prevented, thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the Southern ports of the United States and the people residing therein. (6) That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto left to future adjustments by treaty. (7) That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States. (8) That by way of further assurance the Government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States.8

Needless to say, this benevolent protectorate thrust in so unceremonious a fashion upon the Cubans was welcomed neither by the convention nor by the people. A delegation of five members of the convention was tent to Washington to protest. But, although they were received in a most friendly fashion by President McKinley and Secretary Root, they were given to understand that the Platt Amendment could not be modified. After considerable discussion, the convention finally accepted the Platt Amendment on June 12, 1901, and it became an appendix to the constitution.9 The assurance of Secretary Root that intervention was not synonymous with intermeddling or interference with the Cuban government, but a formal action based upon just grounds for the 8 U. S. Stat. at Large, vol. XXXI, p. 897, or House Doc. No. 2, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 47. The treaty embodying these provisions was ratified July 1, 1904; sce For. Rel. o f the U. S., 1940, p. 243. Naval stations were at first leased at Bahia Honda and Guantánamo, but since 1912 only the latter has been retained. Political pressure exerted by American landowners on the Isle of Pines delayed until 1925 the ratification of the Hay^Quesada Treaty of 1904 relinquishing all American claim to the Isle. 9For a full treatment of the Cuban attitude during this period see A. G. Robinson, Cuba and the Intervention (New York, 1905), pp. 207-277.

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preservation of Cuban independence or the maintenance of an adequate government, gave the Cubans somewhat more confidence in the attitude of this country.10 As provided for by the constitution, the elections were held in December of the same year. Tomás Estrada Palma was elected president, and on May 20, 1902, Governor-General Wood turned over the government of the island to him. With a cash balance of more than $600,000 in her treasury, with her independence guaranteed, and assured of the good wishes of the government and the people of the United States, Cuba was ushered into the family of nations.11 The United States had given the insular republic an excellent start, but there remained the problem of the country’s economic rehabilitation. This was dependent principally upon the immediate recovery of two industries, sugar and tobacco, and in the case of sugar it was vitally necessary that the United States make a reduction in her tariff. General Wood, Secretary Root, and President Roosevelt recognized the need, and the President, in his message to Congress, December 3, 1901, declared that “in the case of Cuba, however, there are weighty reasons of morality and national interest why the policyl[of reciprocity] should be held to have a peculiar application, and I must earnestly ask your attention to the wisdom, indeed to the vital need, of providing for a substantial reduction in the tariff duties on Cuban imports into the United States.” 12 Congress, however, seemed more inclined to listen to the selfish arguments of the beet-sugar growers’ lobby, and not until two years later did President Roosevelt force his reciprocity measure through. This commercial convention, proclaimed December 17, 1903, gave Cuba the advantage of a 20 percent reduction on sugar, and on other products of the soil imported into the United States, over the tariff act of 1897 or any tariff law that might subsequently be enacted.13 The advantage to Cuba was speedily shown. The trade of the United States with Cuba during the fiscal year 1905 (the first full year under the reciprocity treaty) showed an increase of approximately $10,000,000 worth of Cuban imports into the United States, namely, $86,304,259 in 1905 as against $76,983,418 in 1904.14 The percentage of increase in our exports to Cuba was even greater, showing that fair commercial treatment of our island neighbor was a very profitable investment. These early figures, however, gave no indication of the tremendous increase that was to come when Cuba should be completely rehabilitated. In 1910 the value of our imports from Cuba was $122,528,037, and our exports were valued at $52,858,758.15 In 1920 our imports from Cuba amounted to the remarkable figure of $721,693,880, while our exports had increased to $515,208,731-a ,to ta l trade value of approximately $1,250,000,000, or almost one-tenth of our total world trade.16 These figures were abnormal, however, 10House Doc., No. 2, 57th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 48; text of the Cuban constitution. Ibid., p. 102. 11 For an account of the turning over of the government see House Doc. No. 2, 57th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 69 et seq. 12Ibid., 1901,p.xxxi. 13Ibid., 1903, p. 375. 14Foreign Commerce and Navigation o f the United States, 1905, p. 33. } 5Ibid., 1910, p. 30. ' 6Ibid., 1920, p .x .

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owing to the excessive cost of sugar and the huge crop marketed, but the figures of 1925 show Cuba to have had the largest trade with the United States of all the Latin American countries. In 1925 Cuba imported from the United States goods to the value of $185,617,496, while her exports to the United States amounted to $262,613,978 making a total value of $448,231,474, which was almost 5 percent of our total world trade.17 The political relations between the two governments remained uneventful until 1906. The election of 1905 produced a bitter struggle between the Liberals and the Moderates, and President Estrada Palma, reelected by the Moderates, was accused by the Liberals of resorting to violence, intimidation, and bribery to retain his position. Early in 1906 an armed uprising against the government started in the provinces of Pinar del Río and Havana. On August 27 President Palma issued a proclamation granting amnesty to all insurgents who would lay down their arms,1718 but when this failed of its purpose he secretly requested the American consul-general at Havana to ask President Roosevelt to dispatch two vessels at once, since the government forces were unable to quell the rebellion.19 The American government was loath to intervene and pointed out the dangers of this course. But when President Palma threatened to resign, President Roosevelt sent the secretary of war, Mr. Taft, and the assistant secretary of state, Mr. Bacon, to Havana to attempt to reconcile the difficulties. Upon the arrival of the commissioners in Havana, September 19, 1906, they interviewed the leaders of the various factions, and finally urged as a solution that President Palma remain in office with a coalition cabinet, while the members of Congress stand for reelection. When the Moderates refused and the President insisted upon resigning, the commissioners established a provisional government under the authority of the president of the United States, and issued a proclamation to the Cuban people setting forth the causes for this action and defining afresh the position of the United States towards Cuba.2 0 On October 10, Governor Taft announced that active organized hostilities had ceased, and issued a proclamation of full and complete amnesty to all who had participated in the uprising. Three days later he turned the government over to Charles Magoon, who was, as events proved, to act as provisional governor for the next three years. \ Although Governor Magoon has been subjected to almost scurrilous abuse by many Cuban writers, it is by no means justified by the facts. His policies may not always have been the wisest ones, but it must be remembered that for the most part he merely executed the orders emanating from the War Department. His methods of administration may not have been as rigorous as could be desired, but there are but few administrators with the force and personality of a Governor Wood. Perhaps a more suitable appointment might have been made; nevertheless, Mr. Magoon was an outstanding authority on Cuban law, and had had successful administrative experience in the Canal Zone. And in spite of the 17Pan American Union, Latin American Foreign Trade in 1925 (Washington, D. C., 1927). For. Rel. o f the U.S., 1906, Part I, p. 459. 19Ibid, p. 473.

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many accusations of his loose handling of funds, no proof has ever been presented which reflects upon the inherent honesty of the man.21 One of the most useful acts of the provisional government was the taking of a complete census as the basis for the new electoral lists, and the returns showed the total population of Cuba in 1908 to be 2,048,980, an increase of 25 percent as compared with the returns of the census of 1899. A new electoral law was promulgated on April 1, 1908, the provincial and municipal elections were held on August 1 in an orderly fashion, and the results were quietly accepted. The general elections were equally peaceful, and the Liberal candidate, General José Miguel Gómez, defeated the Conservative candidate, General Mario Menocal, by a majority of more than 70,000 votes. The provisional government thereupon convoked Congress, and President Gómez was inaugurated, on January 28, 1909, at which time Governor Magoon relinquished the administra­ tion to the duly elected representatives of the Cuban people. A number of much-needed public improvements, particularly in the matter of sanitation, had been carried out; necessary legislative decrees had been promulgated, among the most noteworthy being the new electoral law (decree 899 of 1908); and after paying all contracts and other obligations as far as practicable, $2,860,000 in cash was turned over to the new government.2 2 Once more the people of Cuba were put in full command of their ship of state, with the best wishes of the United States for a long and prosperous voyage. General Gómez proved himself a strong-minded leader, and he appeased the more restless spirits by appointing them to political office, thus materially strengthening his position. However, before his term of office expired, serious charges of corruption were brought against his government. It was claimed that the public offices were being sold to the highest bidder, that concession-hunters were finding lucrative opportunities at the people’s expense, and that the government was even going so far as to buy off the newspapers to avoid unpleasant publicity. The government was also threatened by the veterans of the war of independence, who proscribed all office-holders of Spanish sympathies and forced the suspension of the civil service rules. Fearing that with the elections approaching the disorder might get beyond control, the American secretary of state, Mr. Knox, sent a warning to the Cuban government, early in 1912, that intervention might be forced upon the United States if the disorders were allowed to develop.23 For a time, the warning had a tranquilizing effect. But when, in the summer, a Negro revolt broke out in the eastern end of the island, the United States felt it necessary to land marines and to concentrate a number of naval vessels at Key West. The government now rose to the occasion and put down the revolt, and the American troops were forthwith withdrawn. President Gómez had agreed not to stand for reelection, and the two 2‘For a detailed study of the Magoon Administration, see D. A. Lockmiller, Magoon in Cuba (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1938). „ 2 2For an excellent summary or the period of the American occupation see Republic of Cuba, Reports o f Provisional Administration, vol. II (Havana, Í 908-1909). For more critical surveys see Leland H. Jenks, Our Cuban Colony (New York, 1928), chap. VI, and Russell H. Fitzgibbon, Cuba and die United States (Menasha, Wis., 1935), chap. V. 2 3For. Rel. of the U. S., 1912, p. 240.

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leading candidates were Vice-President Zayas, the principal Liberal candidate, and General Menocal, the choice of the Conservatives. The election proved to be unexpectedly peaceful, and, owing to the split in the Liberal ranks, General Menocal was elected. The new president was a native Cuban and a veteran of the war with Spain. A civil engineer by profession (he had studied at Cornell University), he was, at the time of his election, the managing director of the Cuban American Sugar Company. He had already shown remarkable administra­ tive ability and was reputed to be one of the wealthiest planters on the island. Financially disinterested, he made a valiant effort to eliminate graft in the administration, and under his leadership the island made substantial economic progress. Imports, valued at approximately $120,000,000 in 1912, rose to over $200,000,000 in 1916; while exports increased from $146,000,000 to $336,000,000. During his administration the production of sugar increased from 1,750.000 tons to more than 3,000,000 tons. Notwithstanding the excellent results of his administration, Menocal was strongly opposed when he sought reelection in 1916. The Liberal factions united on Dr. Zayas, and the results were so close that both sides claimed the victory. In certain cases second elections were ordered; but the Liberals, with ex-President Gómez as their leader, revolted before they were held. On February 10, 1917, Secretary Lansing appealed to the Cubans not to plunge the country into civil war,24 and on February 13 he warned them that the United States would not recognize any government set up by violence.25 The rebels, however, refused to lay down their arms, and early in March, American marines were landed. At the same time, the American government promised its aid to the Cuban government to reestablish order and put down the rebellion. The revolution subsided as quickly as it had flared up, and in May 1917, President Menocal again took the oath of office.2 6 Despite the fact that Cuba now entered the World War as the ally of the United States, the second Menocal administration began even more successfully than the first. In fact, by depriving the world of German beet-sugar the war stimulated to an extraordinary degree the production of Cuban cane-sugar. The crop for 1918 amounted to somewhat more than 4,000,000 tons, or about a million tons increase over the production for the preceding ypar, while the 1919 crop was even greater. As an indication of the tremendous wave of prosperity that had suddenly engulfed the island, President Menocal, in an interview with an American press correspondent in December 1919, pointed out that the volume of deposits in banks and savings institutions had increased 1000 percent in the preceding six years, land values had increased 500 percent, and the volume of foreign commerce for 1919 would pass the billion-dollar mark.27 Unfor­ tunately, these values were considerably inflated, and towards the close of 1920, when the whole world began to experience the troubles of financial readjust­ ment, the situation became very critical. A moratorium declared in October 2*New York Times, Feb. 13,1917. See also Raimundo Cabrera,Mis malos tiempos (Habana, 1920), pp. 116-117.

2SNew York Times, Feb. 15, 1917; Cabrera, op. cit., p. 124. 2 6For a sprightly account of the American intervention see the article by George Marvin, “Keeping Cuba Libre,” World's Work, vol. XXXIV (Sept., 1917), p p .553-567. 27L. J. de Bekker, “Cuba and Her President,” The Nation, vol. CX (Feb. 21, 1920), p. 230.

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1920, was extended to June 15, 1921. A foreign loan seemed essential, and at the request of the Cuban government, the State Department of the United States sent a financial adviser to consider the possibilities of a loan by American bankers. When this solution failed, a bill was put through the insular congress providing for a sliding scale of liquidation of obligations, and this measure went into effect on February 1, 1921. For several reasons, the elections of 1920 were particularly important. They were to be held under the 1919 census and the electoral laws, as newly revised by General Crowder; President Menocal was ineligible for a third term and had promised that the elections would be 'conducted with absolute impartiality; and General Gómez, the former Liberal leader, was now opposed by Dr. Zayas, whom he had supported against Menocal. When the results came in, Dr. Zayas was found to be elected by a considerable majority. But the Gómez faction, alleging fraud and intimidation, refused to accept the results. General Crowder was again sent for, and finally he persuaded the opponents to abide by secondary elections in the districts where fraud was charged. These were held on March 15, 1921, and, as the Gómez adherents remained away, Zayas was again declared elected. The Liberals made a final protest through the abstention of their representatives when Congress convened on April 3. At the same time, General Gómez appealed personally to President Harding to set up a provisional government. But when the United States formally recognized Dr. Zayas as the duly elected president, General Gómez gave up the contest. Owing to the government’s economic difficulties, General Crowder remained in Havana to investigate the financial situation and if possible to suggest reforms. The Cuban government was anxious to float a $50,000,000 loan in the United States, but as this was impossible under the Platt Amendment unless the revenue were sufficient to meet amortization and interest, a new tax measure had to be passed and the approval of Washington obtained. At the request of the Cuban government, Albert Rattibone, former assistant secretary of the treasury, was sent by the State Department to act as financial adviser to consider possibilities of a loan by American banking interests. An investigation showed that the second Menocal administration had been extremely wasteful of public funds; many illegal contracts had been awarded, some at exorbitant rates, piling up obligations far in excess of the government’s ability to pay.28 It was essential that a program of domestic economies be instituted immediately, with a strong and honest administration to put it into effect. General Crowder persuaded President Zayas to appoint a new cabinet, which was henceforth known as the Honest Cabinet. This cabinet, formed on June 16, 1922, included Dr. Céspedes, former Cuban minister to Washington, Colonel Despaigne, administrator of customs under Estrada Palma, and Captain Pokomy, a graduate of West Point and aide to General Crowder. A program of reform covering a revision of contracts, a drastic curtailment of expenditures, and the elimination of graft as far as possible was immediately instituted.29 On September 15, 1922, a law was passed for the establishment of

2*C. E. Chapman, A History o f the Cuban Republic (New York, 1927), p. 426. 2 9IbiAmer. Jour, of Int. Law, vol. IX (Oct., 1915), p. 958. 26 For. Rel. o f the U.S., 1911, p. 670.

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Díaz government with a view to seizing the executive power. Failing in his original attempt, he left the capital and organized an open rebellion against the government. Fearing that he would be unable to protect the property and lives of American citizens, President Diaz asked that “the United States guarantee with its forces security for the property of American citizens in Nicaragua and that it extend its protection to all the inhabitants of the republic.”27 President Taft thereupon ordered a small detachment of marines to be landed at Managua. When the president of El Salvador expressed the fear of serious complications if American troops should enter Nicaraguan territory, the State Department, in a note to the American minister at Managua, dated September 4, 1912, laid down the American policy in no uncertain language. “The policy of the government of the United States in the present Nicaraguan disturbances is to take the necessary measures for an adequate legation guard, at Managua, to keep open communications, and to protect American life and property. In discoun­ tenancing Zelaya, whose régime of barbarity and corruption was ended by the Nicaraguan nation after a bloody war, the government of the United States opposed not only the individual but the system, and this government could not countenance any movement to restbre the same destructive régime. The government of the United States will, therefore, discountenance any revival of Zelayaism, and will lend its strong moral support to the cause of legally constituted good government for the benefit of the people of Nicaragua, whom it has long sought to aid in their just aspiration towards peace and prosperity under constitutional and orderly government.”2 8 The revolution that followed proved more serious than was at first expected, owing to the uprising of the Liberals of León, who threw in their fortunes with General Mena. The United States, however, could not afford to allow the Zelaya faction to triumph, and American marines were landed at Corinto, Granada, and León; they even went so far as to storm the position overlooking Masaya. The revolutionists could hardly hope to hold out against the government thus aided by the United States, and with the seizure of General Mena, and his internment in Panama, the uprising collapsed. President Diaz was reelected for a four-year term to begin January 1, 1913. Although order had been completely restored and the Diaz government was i^i full control, a detachment of one hundred American marines was left in Managua, at the urgent request of the American minister, to act as a stabilizing influence. On account of the U.S. Senate’s failure to approve the loan convention, the financial situation was in even worse shape than before. American bankers had made a loan of $1,500,000 for the establishment of the National Bank of Nicaragua, the reform of the currency, and the establishment of the claims commission; but the hoped-for loan of $15,000,000 was dependent upon the ratification of the convention.29 As a solution of the difficulty, Nicaragua proposed, in December 1912, to sell to the United States, for the sum of $3,000,000, the sole right to construct a canal through her territory. As an Ibid., 1912, p. 1032. “ Ibid., p.1043. See the memorandum on Nicaraguan finances prepared for the Secretary of State, Ibid., 1913, p. 1040.

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additional inducement to the United States, the right was given to construct a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca and one on Com Island.30 When the Wilson administration came in, this treaty was modified so as to prevent Nicaragua from declaring war, from making treaties with foreign governments affecting her independence or territorial integrity, and from contracting public debts beyond her ability to pay ; and it was also changed so as to grant the United States the right to intervene in her affairs, with a view to maintaining her independence and protecting life and property in her domain. The Senate refused to accept this full protectorate, and a new treaty without these provisions was signed on August 5, 1914. Again the Senate raised objections; but these were met, and the treaty was ratified on February 18, 1916, and proclaimed on June 24, following. The Bryan-Chamorro treaty as finally approved makes the following provisions: (1) the government of Nicaragua grants in perpetuity to the government of the United States, free from taxation, the exclusive rights necessary for the construction and operation of a canal by way of the San Juan River and the Great Lake or by any other route; (2) to protect American interests, Nicaragua leases to the United States for ninety-nine years the Great Corn and Little Com Islands, and also grants the right to establish a naval base on such Nicaraguan territory bordering upon the Gulf of Fonseca as the United States shall select, with a right to obtain renewal of the grants for a similar period; (3) in consideration of these stipulations the United States agrees to pay the sum of $3,000,000 in gold; and (4) the following proviso is inserted: “Whereas Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras have protested against the ratification of the said convention, in the fear or belief that said convention might in some respect impair existing rights of said States; therefore it is declared by the Senate that in advising and consenting to the ratification of the said convention as amended, such advice and consent are given with the understanding, to be expressed as a part of the instrument of ratification, that nothing in said convention is intended to affect existing right of any of the said named States.31 Despite this proviso, Costa Rica and El Salvador continued to protest, and finally they attempted through the Central American Court of Justice to enjoin Nicaragua from carrying out the provisions of the treaty. Costa Rica based her case upon a treaty of limits between herself and Nicaragua, signed April 15, 1858, giving Costa Rica rights in the San Juan River and agreeing that she should be consulted before any contract should be entered into for the construction of a canal. This treaty had been held valid by President Cleveland in 1888. Costa Rica therefore argued that the present treaty would infringe her rights under the treaty of 1858.32 El Salvador claimed an equal right with Honduras and Nicaragua in the Bay of p onseca, and therefore asserted that Nicaragua had no right to alienate territory clearly jeopardizing and menacing her interests without her consent. Furthermore, the Washington conference of 1907 had proclaimed the neutrality of Honduras, including its rights in the Gulf of Fonseca; therefore, 30 Ibid., p. 1021. Mr. Weitsei, the American minister to Nicaragua, 1912-1913, and one of the signatories of this agreement, in a memorandum on the convention gives an excellent résumé of American relations with Nicaragua; see Sen. Doc. No 334, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. \ \ U.S. Stat. at Large, vol. XXXIX, Part II, p. 1661. 32 Complaint o f the Republic o f Costa Rica before the Central American Court of Justice (Washington, D.C., 1916), Appendices G and N.

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it was urged, this projected agreement for the establishment of a naval base there “is an attempt to violate, in a manner both flagrant and evident, the principle of the neutrality of Honduras, and to throw overboard the legal system instituted by the conference of Washington.”33 Nicaragua denied the court’s jurisdiction in the cases of both Costa Rica and El Salvador, but the court declared itself competent to take cognizance of them. The decision in the case of Costa Rica was handed down on September 30, 1916; that in the case of El Salvador on March 2, 1917. In both cases the court held that Nicaragua, by signing the Bryan-Chamorro treaty of August 5, 1914, had violated the rights of Costa Rica and El Salvador, that she had also violated the treaty of peace and amity signed at Washington in 1907, and that she was under obligation to reestablish and maintain the legal status existing prior to the Bryan-Chamorro treaty. In both cases, however, the court admitted that it was without competence to declare the Bryan-Chamorro treaty null and void, since its jurisdictional power extended only to establishing the legal relations among the “high parties litigant.”34 The refusal of the United States, as well as of Nicaragua, to accept the decision of the court had a very bad èffect on the standing of the United States with the other Central American countries. Since the United States refused to back the very agency for settling disputes to whose establishment it had given such hearty encouragement, simply because the decision interfered with her own selfish interests, how could the Latin American republics feel much confidence in American expressions of friendly cooperation? When the question of renewing the convention to continue the court’s existence came up, nothing could be done, owing to Nicaragua’s withdrawl; and on March 17, 1918, the court was formally dissolved.3536 The Biyan-Chamorro treaty thus indirectly caused the downfall of the Central American court, thereby weakening the trend towards a closer relationship among these states which it has been the avowed policy of the United States to foster. In fact, when another attempt at federation was made in 1920, and a “treaty of union” was signed January 19, 1921, by representatives of Guatemala. Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica, Nicaragua refused to enter because of her fears lest her rights under the Bryan-Chamorro treaty should be in some way jeopardized.3 6 ^ It will be remembered that one of the principal results of the conference of Washington in 1907 was to establish the perpetual neutrality of Honduras. But Honduras needed a strong government to maintain its neutrality, and before this could even be hoped for, its disorganized financial condition had to be remedied. By reason of a series of loans negotiated in Europe between 1867 and 1870, to the amount of about $27 million, upon which virtually no interest had 33 Complaint o f the Republic of El Salvador before the Central American Court o f Justice (Washington, D.C., 1917), Appendices A and I. 34 Opinion and Decision o f the Court-the Republic o f El Salvador Against the Republic of Nicaragua (Washington, D.C., 1917). 35 For a detailed account of the Court’s history see the scholarly article by Manley O. Hudson, “The Central American Court of Justice,” ,4mer. Jour, oflnt. Law, vol. XXVI, no. 4 (Oct., 1932). 36 See the article by Dr. Ruben Rivera on the Central American Union in the New York Times, Apr. 24,1921.

RECENT RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL AMERICA

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been paid, the state found itself indebted to the stupendous sum of $125 million. In 1908 the Council of Foreign Bondholders proposed a refunding scheme whose terms Honduras considered too onerous; accordingly, she turned towards the United States. Secretary Knox immediately sought to interest American bankers in a project for refunding the debt, and J. P. Morgan and Co. agreed to attempt it. They found that the debt could be adjusted for about 15 per cent of its face value without interest; therefore by the issuance of $10 million in 5 percent bonds Honduras could wipe out both her external and internal debt, pay all claims, acquire and extend the interoceanic railway, and still have a balance of $2lA million for future internal development. Before making such a loan, however, the bankers demanded that the United States sign a loan convention with Honduras affording the necessary security to the bondholders. Such a convention .was signed January 10, 1911, by Secretary Knox for the United States and Señor Juan Paredes for Honduras. The two governments promised to consult in case of any difficulties, with a view to the faithful execution of the provisions of the contract. The loan was to be secured upon the Honduran customs, which were not to be changed during the existence of the contract without consent of the United States. The government of Honduras further agreed to appoint a collector of customs, who should be approved by the president of the United States, from a list of names submitted by the fiscal agent of the loan.37 President Taft earnestly urged the Senate to assent to the convention, and Secretary Knox, in a statement before the foreign relations committee, May 24, 1911, laid down the basis of his policy as follows. “Shall the government of the United States make American capital an instrumentality to secure financial stability, and hence prosperity and peace, to the more back­ ward republics in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal? And in order to give that measure of security which alone would induce capital to be such an instrumentality without imposing too great a burden upon the countries con­ cerned, shall this government assume towards the customs collections a relation­ ship only great enough for this purpose-a relationship, however, the moral effect and potentialities of which result in preventing the customs revenues of such republic from being seized as the means of carrying on devastating and unprincipled revolutions?” 38 Despite this persuasive presentation of the advantages of dollar diplomacy, the Senate failed to agree to the convention, and the bankers refused to pro­ ceed farther. The Honduran congress also refused to ratify the convention, principally upon constitutional grounds. Although the original loan was un­ questionably tainted with fraud, the lien existed, and Honduras could not establish herself upon a sound financial basis until some readjustment was made. The Morgan proposal, which was approved by a neutral expert whose services were sought by the. State Department, seemed to offer an excellent opportunity for Honduras to make a new start. Yet the United States showed wisdom in

37 Text in For. Rel. o f the U.S., 1912, p. 560. 3 s Ibid., p. 589.

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refusing to urge the convention when the Honduran congress evidenced its overwhelming opposition.39 In its other diplomatic relations with Honduras during the year 1911 the United States was more successful. In January of that year General Manuel Bonilla staged a revolution against President Davila, and the latter, no longer having the assistance of Zelaya, asked the United States to intervene as arbitrator, and proinised to deliver the presidency to any third party named or approved by the United States.40 President Taft accepted the proposal and named Mr. T. C. Dawson as the special commissioner of the United States. A peace conference was held in February at Puerto Cortes on board the U. S. S. Tacoma, with Mr. Dawson presiding. A provisional government was organized, and Dr. Francisco Bertrand was named as provisional president. Peace was restored, and President Taft received a vote of thanks “for his friendly media­ tion towards the reestablishment of peace in the Republic of Honduras.”41 The entrance of the United States into the European war stirred the Central American republics to enthusiastic manifestations of cooperation. All of these states, including Panama declared war on Germany except El Salvador; and she went so far as to declare a benevolent neutrality which permitted the use of her territorial ports and waters by the warships of the United States and the Allies. In the declarations of war the United States was usually expressly mentioned: “Guatemala assumes the same belligerent attitude as the United States” ; “Nicaragua makes common cause with the United States” ; even El Salvador, in announcing its attitude, declared that “El Salvador as an American nation could not fail to recognize, in the conflict between the United States and Germany, the solidarity which binds it to the great Republic of the North,...and that its condition of neutrality could not lead it to the point of considering the United States as a belligerent subject to the ordinary rules of international law.”42 During the peace negotiations the Central American republics boldly accepted the idealistic principles of President Wilson and entered the League of Nations, fearing not at all lest they be thereby drawn into the broils of Europe. The subsequent relations between the United States and the Central American states (with the exception of Guatemala and Nicaragua, which we shall consider later) have been comparatively uneventful. When, in '! 917, Costa Rica broke her long and excellent record of domestic peace by a bloodless coup d'etat, the United States refused to recognize the Tinoco government which engineered the movement. In spite of this attitude towards President Tinoco, the United States upon several occasions protested vigorously against the raising of armed forces in Nicaragua and Honduras against this de facto government of

39An agreement with the British bondholders was approved by the Congress of Honduras in 1926 and regular service on the debt has been maintained since January, 1927. 40 For. Rel. o f the U.S., 1911, p. 297. 4* Ibid., p. 304. John Barrett, Latin America and the War (Washington, D.C., 1919), p. 28; see also P. A. Martin, Latin America and the War, League of Nations, vol. II, no. 4, and P. A. Martin Latin America and the War (Baltimore, 1925).

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Costa Rica.43 Tinoco fell from power in 1919, and the succeeding Acosta government, being legally organized, was duly recognized by the United Stated on August 2, 1920. In 1920 the Estrada Cabrera régime in Guatemala, which had originally been put in power in 1898, was overthrown. Cabrera stoutly opposed the plan of a federal union which had once again become popular, and arrested many of its chief Guatemalan adherent's. The Unionists seized Guatemala City, and, in spite of a serious bombardment by government forces in which hundreds were killed, they held out and finally deposed Cabrera. The United States asked that the de­ posed president’s life be spared, and upon receiving satisfactory assurances recog­ nized the new Herrera government. This administration worked strenuously in behalf of the new federation, and on September 15, 1921, the constitution of the Federation of Central America was signed by representatives of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. On October 10, the separate governments ceased to function and the Provisional Federal Council of the new state took over the executive powers. The dream of a century seemed at last to be fulfilled. Once more, however, hope was doomed to disappointment. The Herrera government was overthrown in December 1921, and it dragged down with it the new federation before it had been given an opportunity to prove its value. Nevertheless, hope was only deferred, and the following year brought about a new attempt at cooperation which was to have important results. In view of the differences of opinion arising regarding the status of the treaty of peace and amity of 1907, the presidents of the three republics, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, were invited to meet with the diplomatic repre­ sentatives of the United States to these republics on the U.S. warship Tacoma in the Gulf of Fonseca. The result of the meeting was incorporated in the so-called Tacoma Agreement under date of August 20, 1922. The substance of this agreement might be summarized’as follows: (1) the three participating states regarded the treaty of 1907 as still in force; (2) the clauses prohibiting political refugees from utilizing a neighbor’s territory for preparing expeditions were to be rigorously applied; (3) the three presidents agreed to summon a new conference of the five Central American states to bring about closer cooperation “which would tend to make really practicable the political unification of Central America” ; and (4) in order to make effective their purpose of maintaining peace in Central America the signatory presidents agreed to submit to arbitration all present and future disputes. The presidents of the republics of Guatemala and Costa Rica were to be invited to adhere to this convention.44 The United States was interested in the proposal for a new conference and issued an invitation to the five republics to convene in Washington on December 4, 1922, to negotiate treaties to make effective the provisions of the 1907 treaties which experience had shown to be most useful, and also to adopt measures for the limitation of armaments in Central America, and to work out a plan for setting up tribunals of inquiry for the consideration of disputes which diplomacy had failed to settle.

JJ Sen. Doc. No. 77, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 Conference on Central American Affairs (Washington, D.C., 1923), pp. 6-10.

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Under the chairmanship of Secretary of State Hughes, the delegates of the five republics worked from December 4, 1922, until February 7, 1923, upon these proposals, and the results were incorporated in some fifteen agreements which comprised a general treaty of peace and amity, eleven conventions, two protocols, and a declaration.4 5 The general treaty of peace and amity which abrogated all previous agreements formulated by Central American conferences was largely concerned with eliminating the causes of friction between and revolution within the signatory states. Constitutional changes in one were deemed to be of interest to all, consequently not only were coups d'etat and revolutionary activities frowned upon, but strict injunction was laid upon all against recognition of unconsti­ tutionally chosen governments. Intervention in civil wars, or in the internal political affairs of any other Central American Republic, was strictly prohibited, and each government agreed to adopt effective measures to prevent the fomenting or organizing of political activities within its territory against a neighboring government. The principle of non-reelection of presidents and vice-presidents was accepted, and all agreements and treaties were to be published. The treaty was to remain' in force until 1934 and then continue indefinitely until denounced with due advance notice. The treaty lasted until the end of 1933 when it was denounced by El Salvador and Costa Rica in order that the latter state might recognize the government of General Martinez who had been named president of El Salvador by a military junta in December, 1931. Early in the following year Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua followed the lead of Costa Rica in the recognition of the Martinez regime. When the Central American republics showed their intention so unanimously to accept the coup d '¿tat method of setting up governments, it was no longer the part of the United States to follow a different policy. With our recognition of the Martinez government, the General Treaty of Peace and Amity was abrogated at least as regards the policy of nonrecognition of governments established by revolution against the constitutional regime.4 6 Mention should also be made of the convention providing for the reestablishment of an International Central American Tribunal. Instead of again setting up a permanent court as established by the treaty of 1907, a panel system of judges modeled upon the Hague Court system ^as adopted. The powers agreed to submit all present or future controversies not settled by diplomatic means to the court, although it was provided that “controversies or questions which affect the sovereign and independent existence of any of the signatory republics cannot be the object of arbitration or complaint.” When in 1928 a long standing boundary dispute between Guatemala and Honduras47 flared up again, the State Department recommended that the question be referred for settlement to the International Central American Tribunal.*

* For texts see Ibid., Appendix. 6 A Treaty of Central American Fraternity was signed by the five republics at a conference in Guatemala City March 15-April 12, 1934, supplementing the 1923 treaties which outlawed war, recognized the principle of nonintervention, and upheld the ideal of a future Central American Union. 47 For a detailed statement see For. Rel. o f the U.S., 1917, pp. 760- 801.

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Honduras refused on the ground that the panel of judges was not adequate, and the case was settled in 1933 by a special arbitral tribunal under the chairmanship of Chief Justice Hughes.48 Another of the conventions recast, unified, and to a considerable extent weakened the so-called Bryan Commission of Inquiry Treaties of 1913 and 1914 between the United States and the five Central American Republics.49 In the new convention, instead of five permanent commissions of five members each, there was provided a panel or permanent list of thirty commissioners, five from each state, and a commission of inquiry was to be formed only upon request of one party directly interested in the elucidation of the facts. Such a commission of inquiry was to consist of one of the nationals of each interested country selected from the permanent list and a president chosen by them from the neutral names on the list. The machinery was undoubtedly simplified and improved, but whereas the former treaties for the advancement of peace subjected “all disputes . . . of every nature whatsoever” to a commission of inquiry, the new convention excluded questions affecting the sovereignty, independence, honor, and vital interests of the signatory states. The new convention has been in force since June 13, 1925, for Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the United States.s0 El Salvador was consistent in refusing to accept the revised convention. Although the conference did not attempt to set up a federal system, the various conventions relative to the establishment of uniform labor laws, cooperation in agricultural stations, extradition, the exchange of students, and the establishment of free trade between Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua laid a foundation for a closer union of the republics.51 On account of intervention of the United States in a boundary dispute between Panama and Costa Rica, the relations between the United States and Panama during 1921 became exceedingly strained. The trouble was of long standing, and the disputed area included sections on both the Pacific and Atlantic sides of the Cordillera. In 1900 the two states had submitted the dispute to President Loubet of France, who fixed a line running from Mona Point on the Atlantic to Burica Point on the Pacific, giving to Costa Rica the Coto region on the Pacific, which had been in Panama’s possession for many years, and giving Panama a strip of land on the Atlantic side bordering the Sixaola River.s 2 As shown by Article I of the Porras-Anderson treaty, signed through the mediation of the United States at Washington on March 17, 1910, the award on the Pacific side was accepted by both parties. But in regard to the rest there was a disagreement, and by the terms of this same treaty both parties agreed to submit the interpretation to the Chief Justice of the United States and bound themselves to abide by his decision. Article VII specifically states that4 4^Guatemala-Honduras, Special Boundary Tribunal, Opinion and Award (Washington, D.C., 1933). 49 Neither Nicaragua nor El Salvador ratified the Bryan Treaties, and Honduras failed to set up the commission provided. I® U.S. Treaty Series, No. 717. 51 For. a detailed account of the conference see “The United States and Central American Revolutions,” Foreign Policy Association Reports, vol. VII, no. 10 (July 22,1931). 52 For a complete summary of the dispute from 1825 to 1909, including the text of the Loubet award, see For. Rel. o f the U.S., 1910, pp. 785-791.

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“the boundary line between the two republics as finally fixed by the arbitrator shall be deemed the true line and his determination of the same shall be found conclusive and without appeal.53 Chief Justice White announced his award on September 12, 1914, after a commission of American engineers, chosen in accordance with the terms of the convention, had made a prolonged and careful survey. The award gave to Costa Rica a portion of the territory claimed by Panama and to Panama a portion of the territory claimed by Costa Rica.s 4 Panama, however, refused to accept the award, on the ground that the Chief Justice had exceeded his jurisdiction as arbitrator. Nothing was done to carry out the award until February 21, 1921, when Costa Rica invaded and seized the Coto region given to her by the Loubet award and conceded to her by Panama in the Porras-Anderson treaty. Panama speedily recaptured the region; but Costa Rica mustered an army and threatened war. Secretary Colby immediately protested against the use of force; and on the day after he entered office, Secretary Hughes was compelled to give con­ sideration to the question. In a reply to a note from Panama, dated March 4, 1921, and requesting a declaration of the manner in which the United States understood its obligation to maintain the independence of Panama in the light of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty, the new Secretary of State sent identic notes to Panama and Costa Rica, calling upon both countries to suspend hostilities until the United States could consider the question and propose a peaceful solution. Secretary Hughes studied the matter carefully, and on March 15, in along note to the American minister in Panama, he made clear the position of the United States. After reviewing the background of the case and the successive steps towards settlement, he reported that he could find no basis for the contention that the arbitrator had exceeded his powers; the award, therefore, by the terms of the Porras-Anderson treaty, became, he declared, “a perfect and compulsory treaty between the high contracting parties.” Under these circum­ stances, he continued, “the government of the United States feels compelled to urge upon the government of Panama, in the most friendly but most earnest manner, that it conclude without delay arrangements with the government of Costa Rica for the appointment of the Commission of Engineers provided for by the terms of Article VII of the Porras-Anderson treaty, in order that the boundary line laid down by the decision of Chief Justice White may be physically laid down in a permanent manner and in accordance with the findings of the award.’,s 5 President Porras refused to accept Secretary Hughes* decision and appealed directly to President Harding. When the latter sustained his secretary of state, President Porras called a special session of congress, which backed him in defying the United States. Costa Rica, on the other hand, expressed gratitude for the prompt and efficacious mediation on the part of the United States. Early in May, Secretary Hughes despatched another note to Panama, saying that, unless she settled the boundary dispute promptly in accordance with the White-Loubet award, the United States would take necessary steps to give effect to the I II Ibid., p. 820. Z* For text of the award see British and Foreign State Papers, 1914, Part II, pp. 429-465. 5 New York Times, Mar. 18,1921.

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physical establishment of the boundary line. The United States realized that it was bound by treaty to protect the independence and territorial integrity of Panama, but could hardly guarantee the integrity of a country whose boundary shifted according to the caprice of the government. Panama, still protesting, sent a special mission to Washington and finally proposed that the White award be submitted to the Hague Tribunal to see if it was within the terms of the arbitration. Secretary Hughes refused, and on August 18, 1921, he sent a note declaring there was no reason why Costa Rica should delay in taking possession. American marines were despatched to maintain the peace, and Panama, under protest, ordejed her civil authorities to leave. Chief Justice Taft appointed two engineers to work with those to be appointed by Costa Rica and Panama to delimit the boundaries; but Panama refused to name her member of the commission. On September 9 the State Department announced that Costa Rica had taken possession of the disputed region.s 6 Diplomatic relations between the two countries were not resumed until 1928, and no further action towards a mutually acceptable settlement was taken until 1938. A treaty signed at San José, Costa Rica, September 26, 1938, established a boundary line which followed the White award from the Atlantic to Cerro Pando and the Loubet award from Cerro Pando to the Pacific. This required concessions by both states and seemed a reasonable compromise. However, President Castro of Costa Rica, threatened by serious opposition, withdrew the treaty from Congressional consideration, and President Arosema of Panama quickly followed suit. Of all the Central American republics, Nicaragua, and Guatemala in recent years easily take first place as the administration’s principal trouble fête in the conduct of American foreign relations in the isthmus.5657 It will be remembered that after 1912a small detachment of American marines was ordered to remain in Managua as a counter-irritant to revolutionary symptoms, particularly of the Zelaya type. President Diaz, a Conservative, continued to prove himself most friendly to American interests, but the Liberals were discontented, and in 1916, nominated Dr. Iris, a close follower and a friend of Zelaya. The Conservatives chose Emiliano Chamorro, an able man who had served in a most acceptable fashion as Nicaraguan minister at Washington. Unwilling to see any one connected with Zelaya returned to power, the United States actively supported the candidacy of General Chamorro, who was consequently elected. It is almost an axiom of Latin American politics that the only certain way to win an election against a candidate supported by the party in power is by a revolution, for the party which controls the election machinery ipso facto receives the votes. When the party in power had also the moral support of a hundred American marines in the capital, its chances of success became a certainty. Such a situation to a certain extent placed the United States in the 56 A detailed critical analysis is given in W. D. McCain, The United States and the Republic of Panama (Durham, N.C., 1937), chaps. VI, X. 57 For an official account see The United States and Nicaragua-A Survey o f the Relations from 1909 to 1932, Dept, of State, Latin American Series, No. 6.

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position of supporting the administration in power. To avoid this accusation, the United States Department of State in 1920 suggested to President Chamorro that the election laws be revised; but with the elections at hand the suggestion was not regarded as appropriate, and once more the Conservatives put their candidate in office. Nevertheless the United States persisted in its efforts, and in 1922 Dr. H. W. Dodds was appointed as an expert to draft a new electoral law. Such a law was drawn and adopted by the Nicaraguan Congress, and the registrations under this law for the 1924 elections were carried on with very few charges of fraud.58 But a split now occurred among the Conservatives when General Emiliano Chamorro returned from Washington, where he had again been acting as minister, and decided to run for president against the wishes of the Conservatives in power headed by President Martinez. The latter, unable to stand for reelection, owing to the restriction of the constitution,. formed a coalition with the Liberals and supported Carlos Solorzano, a Conservative, for president, and Dr. Juan B. Sacasa, a Liberal, for vice-president. The United States was willing to supervise the election, but the administration opposed, and the coalition won by a substantial majority and in the old-style manner. The United States had already given notice of its intention to withdraw the marines on the first of January 1925, but at the earnest request of President Solorzano they were permitted to remain until a constabulary might be established under the supervision of Major Carter of the United States Army. The marines were withdrawn on August 4, 1925, and in less than a month General Chamorro had begun a revolution against the government. Gaining control over the army, and seizing the forts overlooking Managua, he expelled unfriendly members of the Assembly, had himself appointed designate for the presidency, and forced the resignation of President Solorzano.59 Inasmuch as such a coup d'etat was a flagrant violation of the Washington conventions of 1923, the United States not only refused to recognize the Chamorro regime but made representations through our chargé d'affaires expressing disapproval of the Chamorro course of action. The four Central American states followed the United States in their refusal to recognize the revolutionary government. The failure to receive recognition weakened the Chamorro government, and in October 1926, at the suggestion of Admiral Latimer, who had been sent to Bluefields with his squadron at the request of the State Department, an armistice was arranged, and a conference took place between representatives of Liberal and Conservative factions at Corinto on the U. S. S. Denver. Although no agreement was reached, owing to pressure put upon Sacasa by Mexico, General Chamorro realized his inability to remain in power, and named Senator Uriza, the second designate of the Congress, as his

58 H. W. Dodds, ‘‘The United States and Nicaragua,”Annals o f Amer. Acad, vol. CXXXI1 (July, 1927), p. 137. See also Virginia L. Greer, “State Department Policy in Regard to the Nicaraguan Election of 1924,“ Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXIV (Nov. 1954), 445-467. 59 For a succinct summary of the facts see President Coolidge’s message to Congress of Jan 10,1927, Cong. Rec., vol. 68, Pt. 2, p. 1324.

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successor. When the United States refused to grant recognition to him, he summoned an extraordinary session of the Congress to select a new designate. According to Henry L. Stimson, whom President Coolidge sent as his personal representative with full powers to investigate and suggest a solution of the Nicaraguan situation, this Congress, taking into consideration that President Solórzano had resigned, and that Vice-President Sacasa was out of the country, legally selected Adolfo Diaz as first designate.60 Señor Díaz was inaugurated on November 14, and the next day he appealed to the United States to aid him in the protection of the interests of American and other citizens, agreeing in advance to approve any means chosen by the State Department.61 Two days later he was accorded recognition by the United States. The European governments followed the lead of the United Sates in recognizing Diaz, while Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and most of the South American states withheld recognition. Supported by the United States, Diaz claimed that his election was legal in that the constitution of Nicaragua provides that if the vice-president is unavailable, the Congress is authorized to entrust the office to one of its members whom it shall designate. Vice-President Sacasa however declared that he was “ruthlessly pursued after the Chamorro-Diaz coup against the legitimate president, Solórzano," and obliged to leave Nicaragua; that, inasmuch as Diaz aided in the overthrow of the Solorzano-Sacasa régime, according to the Washington compacts he had no more right to the presidency than had Chamorro; that just as soon as it was possible after the resignation of President Solórzano he had returned to the country to assume the presidency, and had set up a government at Puerto Cabezas (Dec. 2), but that its operations were daily obstructed by the American forces.62 Incidentally, the Mexican government had recognized Sacasa as the constitutional president shortly after his inauguration by the Liberals. The Liberals now began a bitter struggle to oust Diaz, with substantial aid of arms and ammunitions from Mexican sources.63 The United States increased its squadron in Nicaraguan waters to fifteen war-ships and authorized the shipment of war materials to the Diaz government. Landings of marines were made and neutral zones established at various points, particularly in the region controlled by the Liberals. For a time even a radio censorship was established by Admiral Latimer. Criticism of the intervention of the United States now became so severe, both in the press and in Congress, that the State Department was sorely pressed to find reasons satisfactory to the public for its policy. The first landing of troops was declared to be solely for the protection of American lives and property, but there was little evidence that American lives and property were in jeopardy. A few days later our canal rights under the Bryan-Chamorro treaty were cited, but the Liberals had in no way impaired them. Two weeks later it

60 H. L. Stimson, American Policy in Nicaragua (New York, 1927), p. 26. f* Message of President Coolidge, loc. cit., p. 1325. 62 New York Times, Jan. 10,1927. 63 See speech of President Coolidge, loc. cit.

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was stated that both British and Italian governments had requested American protection for their nationals. On January 10, 1927, in a message to Congress, President Coolidge gave a clear and impartial statement both of the facts and the administration's handling of the situation. In addition to the reasons already given, he cited the shipment of arms and munitions from Mexico as especially provocative, declaring that “the United States cannot fail to view with deep concern any serious threat to stability and constitutional government in Nicaragua tending toward anarchy and jeopardizing American interests, especially if such state of affairs is contributed to or brought about by outside influence or by any foreign power.”64 The good impression made by this spèech was largely nullified by the statement given to the press by Secretary of State Kellogg on January 12, 1927, following his testimony at an executive session of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which was then holding hearings on the Mexican and Nicaraguan situation.65 The specter of Russian Bolshevist activity in Latin America was conjured but the ghost refused to walk. Resolutions of the Congress of the Red International of Trade Unions and the executive committee of the Communist International agairtst American imperialism, some of them passed several years before, had lost their potency to inspire the fears of the Mitchell Palmer period - particularly as Foreign Minister Saenz of Mexico pointed out that the Mexican Federation of Labor had protested against the alleged propaganda activities of the Soviet Minister to Mexico on the very evidence cited by Secretary Kellogg. In the language of Senator Frazier, it was a flimsy document making a fantastic charge.66 But something had to be done to assist Nicaragua, which was rapidly becoming completely demoralized by the revolutionary activities of the two factions. On March 31, 1927, at the suggestion of the State Department, President Coolidge appointed Mr. Henry L. Stimson, former secretary of war, as his personal representative to go to Nicaragua and investigate the situation with a view to working out a solution of the difficulty if possible. Mr. Stimson conferred with American Minister Eberhardt, with Admiral Latimer who commanded the naval forces, and with the responsible leaders bf both factions. He found both sides willing, and even desirous, of American^assistance to end the deadlock. President Diaz finally, on April 22, agreed to make peace with the Liberals on the following terms: (1) immediate general peace in time for the new crop, and delivery of arms simultaneously by both parties to American custody; (2) general amnesty and return of exiles and return of confiscated property ; (3) participation in the Diaz cabinet by representative Liberals: (4) organiza­ tion of a Nicaraguan constabulary on a nonpartisan basis commanded by American officers; (5) supervision of elections in 1928 and succeeding years by Americans, who will have ample police power to make such supervision

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effective; (6) continuance temporarily of a sufficient force of marines to make the foregoing effective.6 7 Mr. Stimson thereupon arranged a conference with representatives of Dr. Sacasa, who agreed to the arrangement, provided it was acceptable to General Moneada, the Liberal general in the field. A conference in Tipitapa between Mr. Stimson and General Moneada took place on May 4 and the result was an acceptance on the part of the Liberal general, provided the United States would declare in a written statement that the retention of General Diaz and a general disarmament were regarded as essential conditions of the plan. This would make it easier for him to persuade his troops that they could not hope to overthrow Diaz. Mr. Stimson immediately gave such a written assurance. Finally, in a more detailed statement dated May 11, Mr. Stimson promised a free, fair, and impartial election under American auspices in 1928, and pointed out that he had recommended changes in the Supreme Court and the Congress to the advantage of the Liberals, and the appointment of Liberal jefes politicos in the six Liberal districts. He had already received assurance that these reforms would be carried out.6768 General Moneada accepted the arrangement in a formal statement, and within a week Liberals and Conservatives had turned over some 9000 rifles, 300 machine guns, and 6,000,000 rounds of ammunition. The one source of trouble was a General Sandino, who, retreating to the north with his force, on July 16 attacked a detachment of marines and constabulary at Ocotal near the Honduran frontier. His repulse with heavy losses aroused a considerable stir in the United States, but General Moneada in a public statement disavowed Sandino as a renegade Liberal at the head of outlaw mercenaries. As a proof of the fairness of the elections held November 4, 1928, under the general supervision of General Frank R. McCoy,69 General Moneada, regarded as hostile to the United States, was elected president by a majority of almost 20,000.70 He was inaugurated on January 1, 1929, and one of his first official acts was to appoint Dr. Sacasa as Minister of Nicaragua in the United States. President Moneada also approved the agreement signed December 22, 1927, creating a Guardia Nacional in place of a national army, with the understanding that it was to be trained and under the command of an American officer subject to the sole direction of the President of Nicaragua.71 It was also understood that all American marines should be withdrawn just as soon as the Guardia should be able to police and protect the state effectively. In fact, the Department of State announced February 13, 1931, that it was hoped that all the marines except officers instructing the Guardia would be withdrawn by June of that year and the officers would leave after the 1932 elections. In fact, by April 1, 1932, the marine force had been reduced from its maximum of 5,673 to 753 marine and naval personnel, exclusive of the 205 officers in the Guardia Nacional.72 67 Stimson, op. cit., pp. 63-64. 68 Ibid., pp. 81-83. 69 General McCoy was nominated by President Coolidge at the request of President Diaz. 7: Dodds, op. cit., p. 91. 71 Ibid., p. 100. 72 Ibid., pp. 107-108.

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Unfortunately for the peaceful development of Nicaragua, General Sandino continued his policy of raiding and pillaging towns and villages in the mountainous interior. Taking advantage of the fact that the earthquake on March 31, 1931, had engaged all available Guardia and marines in relief work in Managua, he struck on the east coast and sacked the town of Cabo Gracias. During this raid, many civilians were murdered, including nine Americans. Disturbed by this situation, on April 17 Secretary Stimson informed American citizens that their government could no longer protect them in the interior of Nicaragua with American forces; therefore it urged them, if they felt themselves endangered, either to withdraw from the country or at least to the coast towns.73 This new policy, so different from that expressed by President Coolidge in 1927, was heartily commended by Senators Borah, Capper, La Follette and Norris, but bitterly denounced by Senator Johnson. Shortly afterwards Secretary Stimson explained that his new policy was primarily due to the fact that the marines were unable to penetrate the trackless jungles where the Sandinistas operated, whereas the expanded Nicaraguan gendarmerie were being trained and equipped to stamp out this banditry in the early future. In the meantime naval vessels would stand by at all threatened ports and we would “continue to be zealous in our concern for the lives of our nationals wherever they may be found.“ 74 When in April 1932, in a raid near Ocatal four American marines and an officer were killed, Senator Lewis of Illinois introduced a resolution demanding the withdrawal of all American troops from Nicaragua. However, as the American government was already pledged to supervise the 1932 elections, such a procedure was not regarded as feasible. The elections were held November 6, 1932, with the assistance of about 400 American marines under the supervision of Rear Admiral Clark H. Woodward, who served as a chairman of the board of elections. The elections provoked practically no disorders and Dr. Sacasa was elected by a majority of about 23,000 over his opponent Diaz, who was considered the “Americanista“ candidate. Almost immediately after the elections the United States commenced to withdraw the marines and on January 2, 1933, the day after President Sacasa’s inauguration, the last contingent of officers and men embarked at Corinto. ^ President Sacasa immediately began negotiations with General Sandino, who had carried on his guerrilla warfare until the marines had left. On February 2, 1933, an agreement was signed whereby the Government granted General Sandino and his followers amnesty and compensation in return for which he undertook to disarm all of his forces except one hundred men who were to be incorporated into the Guardia. He declared that he had never been animated by a spirit of ill will towards the United States, but had fought patriotically to end foreign intervention. Following clashes between his followers and the National Guard in the fall of 1933, it was demanded in January 1934, that General Sandino surrender all his arms. Invited to discuss the matter with President Sacasa at the presidential palace February 21, 1934, General Sandino 73 U.S. Dept, of State, Press Releases, Apr. 17, 1931. Ibid., Apr. 18, 1931. For appraisal of Sandino see Joseph O. Baylen, “Sandino: Patriot or Bandit,” Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXI (Aug. 1951), 394-419.

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and his brother and his two aides were seized by guardsmen as they left the palace grounds and murdered in cold blood. No serious effort was made to discover or punish those responsible for the killing. In fact, General Somoza, Commander of the Guardia Nacional, who was accused by followers of Sandino as being responsible, was able by threats and coercion, despite his constitutional disability as head of the Guard, and as being related to President Sacasa, to have himself elected to the presidency in 1936. Subsequent relations with Nicaragua have been concerned with renewed trouble between Nicaragua and Honduras over their boundary line. By a convention between Nicaragua and Honduras signed October 7, 1894, a joint commission was named to demarcate the boundary. When a dispute arose over the marking, the King of Spain was chosen to arbitrate and his award was made December 3, 1906. This settlement was accepted by Honduras but not by Nicaragua. The United States urged a settlement in 1914, and again in 1918 it offered to mediate, but it was only able to obtain a temporary acquiescence of the status quo. Finally, in 1932, a new boundary protocol was signed accepting the award of the King of Spain and appointing a commission composed of three engineers —one named by each government - and the chairman by the United States. Honduras ratified this protocol, Nicaragua did not.75 The dispute was kindled again in September 1937, when the Nicaraguan government issued a series of air-mail stamps picturing a map upon which the area in controversy was shown as Nicaraguan. When Honduras protested vigorously the United States on October 20, following the procedure outlined at the Buenos Aires Conference, tendered its good offices in association with the governments of Costa Rica and Venezuela. The offer was accepted and on December 10, 1937, a pact of reciprocal agreement was signed in San José, Costa Rica, whereby Nicaragua and Honduras agreed to withdraw their troops from the frontier, to refrain from further military preparations or purchase of arms, and to settle their differences by peaceful means in accordance with the Convention of 1929. Dr. Frank P. Corrigan, United States Minister to Panama, who served as chairman of the conciliation commission, made a valiant but vain effort to effect a settlement before the agreement expired on December 10, 1939. The critical situation of Europe in 1939 brought about an even closer relationship between the United States and the Central American Republics. Shortly after his inauguration as president in 1939. President Somozá of Nicaragua made a visit to the United States where he was cordially received by President Roosevelt and invited to address both houses of the Congress. As a result of his visit an elaborate program of cooperation for the development of Nicaragua with the assistance of the United States was worked out. In return for Nicaragua's promise to encourage the investment of American capital, to utilize American technical advisors, and to provide dollar exchange for its customs bonds of 1918, the United States agreed to send to Nicaragua army engineers to study the feasibility of a trans-Nicaraguan waterway to link the east coast with the populous interior of the Pacific. The Export-Import Bank agreed to set up credits of $2 million to purchase machinery and supplies for the construction of 75

Dodds, op. cit., pp. 109-111.

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highways and other production projects and also to make available a revolving fund to $500,000 for emergency needs.76 A very vital feature of Caribbean defense was the section of the Inter-American Highway linking the United States with the Panama Canal. This roadway from Laredo, Texas, to Panama was 3252 miles long and by the end of 1941 substantial progress had been made towards its construction.77 On December 26, 1941, the Congress of the United States passed an act authorizing the appropriation of a sum not to exceed $20 million to enable the United States to cooperate with the Central American Republics in the completion of the Inter-American Highway within their borders. Under the grant the United States was prepared to assume two-thirds of the total expenses incurred in each country for the survey and construction of the highway.78 In order to speed up construction an arrangement with the five Central American states and Panama was announced on July 28, 1942, providing for the immediate linking by a pioneer road of the already completed segments between the MexicanGuatemalan border and Panama City. This meant the immediate construction of approximately 625 miles of new all-weather pioneer road.79 Owing to the necessities of war and the need for hàste a pioneer road was constructed in a most costly and wasteful manner. Sections had to be abandoned, others rebuilt and World War II ended with the highway still uncompleted. All of the Central American republics declared war against Japan on December 8, 1941, and on Germany and Italy by December 12. At the Rio de Janeiro conference they supported the United States unanimously. All were granted essential requirements under Lend-Lease agreements, and all except Honduras requested and were granted military, naval or air missions. Although most of the countries were ruled by dictatorial regimes, they stood opposed to the totalitarian systems abroad and were willing and eager to cooperate, and even to fight, for hemispheric defense. Central America supplied the United States and its allies with foodstuffs and critical raw materials during the war which brought profits to the producers, but to the accompaniment of rising prices and inflation. Wartime conditions helped to spur the growth of light industry, as sources of manufactures were cut off, and some progress was made toward agricultural diversification. Develop­ ment continued in the first decade after the war owing to reconstruction requirements and the conditions arising from the Korean War, but in the long run Central American exports failed to keep pace with the rising level of economic activity in the major industrial countries. This condition, rising inflationary pressures, institutional deficiencies, militarism, and Communist influence, combined to create social unrest throughout the region, particularly among urban and rural labor and middle class wage earners. 76 U.S. Dept, of State, Press Releases, vol. XX (May 27, 1939), p. 439. Further supplemental arrangements were agreed upon Apr. 8, 1942-Dept, of State Bulletin, vol. YL(Apr. 25, 1942), p. 368. 77 The road was completed from Laredo to beyond Mexico City, and Mexico was building to the Guatemalan border. The Guatemalan section was passable; the Salvadoran was the first Central American section finished; and Costa Rica and Nicaragua were well along in their sections. 7®US. Stat. at Large, vol. 55, p. 860. 7y Dept, of State Bulletin, vol. VII (Aug. 1, 1942), p. 661.

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The widespread restiveness compounded one of the traditional and fundamental problems of the area, that of dictatorship. Until 1944, four of the five Central American republics —Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua —were ruled by dictators. Shortly afterward Costa Rica was for a short time controlled by a regime unwilling to relinquish power to its elected successor. With the advent of the cold war, anti-Communist military dictatorships aided by the United States came to power, prolonging the authoritarian tradition. This was accompanied by the growth of activist groups and forces, products of social and economic change, struggling for power and ascendancy. Thus, an important feature of contemporary change in each of the Central American republics lies in the importance of political power as a means to achieve social and economic goals and the emergence of formerly excluded social groups and interests as rivals for political dominance. After the war the peace of the area was threatened by an outbreak of animosities and disputes among the isthmian republics, most serious of which was the controversy between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Prominent in that affair were the activities of the so-called Caribbean Legion, spirited by President José Figueres of Costa Rica, which aimed at the overthrow of dictatorial regimes in Nicaragua, Honduras, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. The United States showed a marked interest in these disputes, but refrained from taking unilateral action to help resolve them. Instead, Washington’s policy has been to cooperate by sending highly-placed individuals as good-will emissaries, consulting with the Central American states as a group, and working through the OAS. However, the scope of Washington’s diplomatic activity in the region was considerably broadened by its efforts to thwart a Communist takeover in Guatemala, in countering invasion thrusts emanating from Castro’s Cuba, expanded economic and technical assistance under the Alliance for Progress, and the development of the Central American Common Market. A review of United States policy in the Caribbean indicates that early in the twentieth century Washington sought to promote Central American peace and stability for strategic and commerical purposes. At the same time, United States influence was projected into internal affairs of the isthmian republics. To attain its objectives the United States aided in the formation of peace machinery for the settlement of Central American disputes, and endeavored to help each nation achieve a stable and constitutional government. Acting initially as a friendly mediator, it was later forced into an interventionist role. The latter was renounced in the early 1930s with the inauguration of the Good Neighbor policy. World War II brought the United States and the Central American republics into a closer relationship, creating an economic dependence on the United States that had not existed in the same degree previously. While space does not allow detailed treatment of the internal affairs of each country, the relation between socio-economic issues and political change in some countries, particularly Guatemala, has become a critical concern of United States foreign policy planners. At stake is the nature of Central American society itself, the future course of institutional development in the region, and quite possibly hemispheric security. Guatemala, scene of the “ 1944 Revolution,” and a target of Soviet Communism in the 1950s, was hardly distinguishable from other Central

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American states in terms of either its socio-economic structure or its political process at the beginning of the 1930s. Dominated by upper class land holding elites in association with the army, high ranking ecclesiastics, and foreign corporations, Guatemala seemed to be an unlikely prospect for a fundamental social upheaval. This impression was reinforced by the dictatorship of General Jorge Ubico who, capturing the presidency in 1931, established a regime that was ruthless and reactionary even for Guatemala.80 Ubico was overthrown by the revolution of October 20, 1944, middle class in nature, and headed by young intellectuals, junior army officers, students and professionals. This revolution was to be fundamental in character, dedicated to the liquidation of feudalism, the organization of a modem (revolutionary propaganda used the term “capitalist*’) economic system, and the rearrangement and vitalization of the social structure. The program included economic planning, agrarian reform, the protection and integration of Indian communities, the defense of workers and the limitation of individual rights, particularly upper class property rights. In practice it was responsible for bringing about a high degree of integration between democratic political forms and political processes, at least until the l^ter stages of the revolutionary period. The December 1944 elections were probably the freest held in Guatemala to that time, and suffrage was extended to women in 1946. The October Revolution led to the regime of Juan José Arevalo Bermejo, of middle class origin and an educator, who assumed the presidency in 1945. His political philosophy centered on what he called “spiritual socialism,” meaning the alleviation of feudalism through the use of “ discreet measures and programs” that would socially integrate and economically improve the lot of the generally impoverished population. The Guatemalan revolution, however, lacked a party to serve as its spokesman and give it ideological and political direction. This produced confusion and seeming inertia that the Communists were able to exploit. The Communists succeeded in convincing many supporters of the revolution that they were the only true advocates of social change and of economic and political nationalism. Although Arévalo himself was not a Communist, and “their influence in his own administration never became dominant, the end result of Arévalo’s tolerance toward the Communists was that they were in a position to strike a more advantageous bargain with his successor.”81 Tension developed with the United States owing to the leftist tendencies of the Arévalo regime, and the critical attitude displayed by United States Ambassador Richard C. Patterson led to a request for his recall in April 1950. By 1951 it had become apparent that Guatemala could not be relied upon to participate in an anti-Communist Central American front. In October 1951, representatives of the five Central American states met in San Salvador and drew up a document known as the Charter of San Salvador which was promptly ratified by all of the republics and came into force December 14, 1951. The 80 See Daniel James, Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude (New York, 1954), pp. 36-37. 01 Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala: 1944-1954 (New York, 1959), p. 23.

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Charter did not establish a federal union, but proposed to strengthen the bonds shared by the five states. When it was proposed and supported by all members except Guatemala that concerted action be taken against Communist infiltration in Central American governments, Guatemala rejected the proposal and when outvoted withdrew from the organization. The meeting scheduled to convene in Guatemala May 2, 1953 failed to take place. However, representatives of the other four states held a special conference on July 10, 1953, at Managua, Nicaragua at which communism was unanimously condemned. Meanwhile, in March 1951, Colonel Arbenz Guzman, a career service officer and defense minister in the Arévalo administration, was inaugurated in the presidency. In what is generally conceded to have been a fair election, he won 65 percent of the popular vote. The chief goal of Arbenz during his three years in office was agrarian reform, with unused lands of wealthy holders being expropriated on a large scale and the property made available to landless farmers. At the time 70 percent of the land was owned by 2.2 percent of the population. The land reform program brought his government into conflict with the United Fruit Company, a United States corporation, and the largest land holder in the country. Basing its action on the Agrarian Law of June 19, 1952, the government of Guatemala in March 1953, expropriated 234,000 acres of land belonging to UFCO on the ground that this property was not being currently cultivated. In return the Guatemalan government offered compensa­ tion to the amount of $600,000 on 3 percent agrarian bonds maturing in twenty-five years. As of 1 May 392,945 acres had been expropriated leaving the company with 145,817 acres for banana production and other operations.82 In an Aide Mémoire dated August 28, 1953, the United States protested theseizure both upon the valuation and the method of payment. In evaluating the properties on the basis of their tax value there “was not the slightest resemblance to a just valuation” inasmuch as the company had put many improvements on the land and had vainly requested a new valuation. As to method of payment, the bonds of uncertain value were not considered ‘either prompt or effective payment.’ Furthermore, the allegations that the properties were not being utilized was false since they were a necessary reserve against “Panama disease” and they were being used for lumber supplies, fruit and vegetable production, and cattle raising necessary to the requirements of the company. The action of the Guatemalan government was a flagrant violation of international law and the United States government protested it as such.83 Then the Electric Company of Guatemala, called an “ American imperialist monopoly,” was taken over by the government to prevent an interruption of service threatened by a strike for higher wages by the workers. In similar fashion the International Railway of Central America, whose principal stockholder was UFCO, when threatened by a worker strike in October 1953, was temporarily placed under government control and later went into a receivership. 82 Nathan L. Whetten, Guatemala, the Land and the People (New Haven, 1961), pp. 152-166. 83 Text of Aide Mémoire is found in Dept, of State Bulletin, sol. XXIX (Sept. 14 1953). pp. 357—160. For background see Richard N. Adams, “Social Change in Guatemala and United States Policy,” in Social Change in Latin America Today (New York, 1960), pp. 231-284.

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The UFCO, aware that its position would not be upheld in Guatemalan courts, appealed to the United States Department of State to intervene on its behalf. After two representations had been made, one of which was rejected and the other ignored, the United States on April 20, 1954, officially demanded $15,854,849 as compensation for the expropriated property. Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello rejected the note calling it “another attempt to meddle in the domestic affairs of Guatemala.” In retrospect it is evident that there were two sides to the issue. The Arbenz government had a legal right to expropriate the property; however, its methods and refusal to make adequate and proper compensation were obviously wrong. UFCO on its part had provided better housing conditions, education, medical care and other facilities for its workers than other Guatemalans of the laboring class generally received. Its banana workers earned about one thousand dollars a year, three times the national annual average income. But the company would not recognize labor organizations. In its contract with the government UFCO paid less than reasonable compensation for concessions granted to it; duties and taxes amounted to one-tenth of the company’s annual profits. When President Arévalo sought to renegotiatè the contract he was rebuffed. And in its relationship with International Railways of Central America, UFCO was given preferential rates. These circumstances, intensified by Guatemalan nationalism, were skillfully exploited by the Communists in their campaign against “Yankee imperialism.”8485 Early in 1954 the Arbenz government reported that rebel forces in Honduras, allegedly aided by the United States, were preparing to invade Guatemala. A Guatemalan exile, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, leader of the anti-Communist forces, had established headquarters in the Honduran capital. He appealed to the Guatemalan people promising to overthrow the Communists. Arbenz, uncertain of his position, carried out a reign of terror in which the Communists joined. “Whereas in 1944 there were no Communists in Guatemala except for a small group who had been rotting in prison for a dozen years, less than ten years later there were perhaps 4,000 card-carrying party members and several times that number of sympathizers. By the end of 1953, the Communists held commanding positions in the labor movement, the coalition of political forces on which the government rested, and even the government itself.”8 5 In a campaign of hate, the United States was excoriated both by the Guatemalan press at home and by Foreign Minister Toriello at the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in March 1954. In April Ambassador Peurifoy was recalled to Washington for consultation and the U.S. Information Agency advised its posts abroad of the alarming increase of Soviet financing of contraband arms and training units in Latin America. The report indicated that about one thousand Latin Americans visited the Soviet Union and other satellite countries to attend Communist front meetings in 1953. May Day offered an 84 John D. Martz, Central America: The Crisis and the Challenge (Chapel Hill, 1959), pp. 47-52. 85 Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, p. 1\Cong. Rec., 83rdCong., 2nd Sess., vol. 100, p. 8194;Ibid., 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., vol. 102, Appendix A, 3012.

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opportunity for a vast Communist demonstration against “Yankee imperialism“ in Guatemala under the Red leaders Victor M. Gutiérrez and Manuel Fortuny. This was accompanied by an intensification of the terrorism against suspected opponents of the regime. When late in May the Swedish freighter A lfhem , carrying two thousand tons of Czech-made weapons and ammunition arrived at Guatemala's Puerto Barrios on the Caribbean, the United States notified the other Latin American republics and sent consignments of arms to Honduras and Nicaragua. Secretary of State John F. Dulles said “by the arms shipment a government in which Communist influence is very strong has come into a position to dominate militarily the Central American a re a.. . ”8687 The United States Congress was sufficiently impressed by the gravity of the Communist threat in Guatemala that it passed the following concurrent resolution: “ Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), that it is the sense of Congress that the United States should reaffirm its support of the Caracas Declaration of Solidarity of March 28, 1954, which is designed to prevent interference in Western Hemisphere affairs by the international Communist movement, and to take all necessary and proper steps to support the Organization of American States in taking appropriate action to prevent any interference by the international Communist movement in the affairs of the states of the Western Hemisphere.“8 7 In June Colonel Castillo Armas, anticipating an internal army revolt, launched his invasion with a heterogeneous force numbering five hundred to one thousand. Confronting him was the ten thousand-man Guatemalan regular army. However, President Arbenz quickly found that the army would no longer support him, and when the rebels were able to bomb successfully the government’s stronghold in Guatemala City he decided to resign. A military junta under Colonel Elfego Monzón, aided by Ambassador Peurifoy of the United States, worked out a compromise with Colonel Castillo Armas which finally resulted in the setting up of a junta with Castillo Armas as provisional president. The United States accorded formal recognition to the new govern­ ment on July 13, 1954, and on July 30 the new provisional president declared it to be the intention of Guatemala to rejoin the Organization of Central American States. The new regime also adopted the anti-Communist resolution of the Caracas conference and outlawed the Communist party of Guatemala. The Castillo Armas administration proved to be a “good old-fashioned military dictatorship.” Its chief was “confirmed” in office in an election without secret ballot in September. Violent revenge was taken by landowners and employers against their tenants and workers who had participated in the revolution, and Castillo Armas was not able or unwilling to prevent this. Washington quickly expressed its approval of the new administration, Secretary Dulles declaring that “ as peace and freedom are restored . . . the United States will continue to support the just aspirations of the Guatemalan people . .. The United States pledges itself. . . to help alleviate conditions in Guatemala and 86 U.S. Department of State, Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala, pub. No. 5556 (Washington, 1954), p. 13. 87 Cong. Rec., 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., vol. 100, p. 8927.

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elsewhere which might afford communism an opportunity to spread its tentacles throughout the Hemisphere . . . ”88 Much speculation existed at the time of the Castillo Armas invasion of Guatemala concerning official United States support of the movement. This was subsequently confirmed. Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, recalling the episode, said that when some of his advisers argued that this country should not send planes to help the invaders .he told them that there was no way to conceal the role played by the United States and that therefore we had “ better be a winner.” He declared the planes were sent, adding that when a country “such as ours” appealed to force it had to be successful.89 Vice President Richard M. Nixon, stopping in Guatemala on a good will tour of the Caribbean early in 1955, said: “You have won the admiration and appreciation not only of the United States but of people all over the world for the way in which you won your fight against a Communist government President Castillo Armas made a state visit to the United States later in the year, receiving a twenty-one gun salute which accorded him full military honors. Despite eariy assurances of support Washington was slow in providing financial assistance to the Castillo Armas administration. The sum of $6,425,000 was promised initially, but little more than half that amount reached Guatemala in the first eighteen months after its accession. It was not until 1956 that United States aid arrived in appreciable quantities. Representative Patrick J. Hillings of California asserted that it was “quite a paradox” that while billions of dollars had been advanced to European countries Washington was not quick to supply a small requested sum to a nation “in our own backyard” that had just repelled Communist penetration.90 The transition to the Castillo Armas regime was one from relative affluence to austerity, and much reliance was to be placed on United States assistance. In the three years of his administration Washington’s contribution amounted to about $80 million. Comprising the aid program were loans to the IBRD, grants in aid, foodstuffs, technical assistance, and funds for constructing the Inter-American Highway. Public works programs reduced unemployment, but product diversification lagged. Coffee exports continued to be between 7 5 -8 0 percent of the value of Guatemala’s exports, and cotton production declined. Bananas, largely controlled by UFCO, accounted for only lO percent of the value of total exports. The 1954 counterrevolution reoriented Guatemala back to the more traditional pattem of its history. Castillo Armas and some of his supporters advocated reform, but the power of the landowners, the army and the Church, was sufficient to largely restore the status quo. Former officials of the Ubico era were brought back into the government, the agrarian law was cancelled and expropriated property turned back to the original owners. An accomodation was reached with UFCO, the company agreeing to pay a tax of about 30 percent on

88 Martz, Central America, p. 63; Philip B. Taylor, Jr., “The Guatemalan Affair: A Critique of United States Foreign Policy,” American Political Science Review, vol. L (Sept. 1956), 787—806 r New York Times, Oct. 14,1965. 90 Ibid., Oct. 14,1954.

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its annual profit and relinquishing its claims on one hundred thousand acres in return for non-discriminatory legal treatment. Civil liberties were curtailed and labor legislation was all but eliminated. A new constitution was drawn up in 1956 by a constituent assembly composed chiefly of conservative elements. On July 25,1957 Castillo Armas was assassinated in the Presidential Palace by a member of the Presidential Guard. President Eisenhower regarded his death as a “great loss to the entire free world.” After a period of confusion and unrest General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, a high official under Ubico and a losing candidate for president against Arbenz in 1951, was sworn into office in March 1958. Backed by conservative and business interests Yd ígoras* election was patently fraudulent, and the upper class retained political control of the country. Within five years, however, Yd ígoras alienated virtually all political sectors. The economic distress that accompanied the drop in coffee prices in 1959, combined with the administration’s austerity program and rumors of governmental grafting, helped to undermine his popularity. He angered the nationalists by allowing Cuban exiles to train on Guatemalan territory in preparation for the Bay of Pigs expedition. The efforts of a group of young army officers to oust the government in November 1960, was revealing of armed forces dissatisfaction. The left, represented by labor, intellectuals and students, tended to sympathize with Fidel Castro and took an anti-United States stand. The conservatives disliked his middle-of-the-road policies and its efforts to implement Alliance for Progress reforms. Ydigoras* attempt to introduce the income tax in 1962 was violently protested by people who had never carried a burden of taxation in their country. Political reaction to Ydigoras took the form of attempts to overthrow his government. Student protests, strikes and attempted coups d'etat forced the president to suspend liberties on a number of occasions. When Juan José Arévalo returned to Guatemala City in March 1963, and announced his intention to run for the presidency in the December elections, the military, under the leadership of the War Minister, Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, forced Ydigoras out of political office and into exile. Fearing a return to the revolutionary programs of the 1944-1954 period, Peralta assumed extraordinary powers, suspended the Constitution and political rights, and dissolved the National Congress. United States relations with the Ydigoras regime from 1958 to 1963 were close and generally cordial, except at the close of his administration. Washington promptly recognized the popular and conservative general, recalling his earlier opposition to Arbenz. President Ydigoras met Secretary Dulles in Washington in February 1958, reaffirming that his country was on the side of the United States in the struggle against communism. The proved vulnerability of Guatemala to communism in the early 1950s and the nearer and more direct threat posed by Castro’s Cuba beginning in 1959, gave Guatemala a high priority in Washington’s security operations. Dr. Milton Eisenhower’s visit to Guatemala, and elsewhere in Central America, in the summer of 1958 confirmed this interest, and United States aid of all types was maintained at high level, but particularly to take up the slack resulting from lowered coffee revenues. Guatemala’s dollar loss was figured at $ 1,200,000 for each cent’s drop in the price of coffee. In November 1960, at the request of the governments of both Guatemala and Nicaragua, President Eisenhower ordered United States naval units to patrol

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Central American waters and to shoot if necessary to repel a reported Communist-led invasion attempt of those countries. The Department of State indicated that if these forces were used to prevent an invasion of Central American republics by ‘‘Communist-directed elements” they would limit their operations to areas “within the national jurisdiction of the requesting govern­ ments.”9 1 The navy patrol was withdrawn on December 8 after the threat failed to materialize. As events were soon to prove, an invasion was in the making, but it originated in Guatemala with the support of the United States, and was directed against Cuba. In January 1961, the United States press reported that a military force estimated to number two thousand was being trained by United States and Cuban instructors at a base in Guatemala’s Retalhuleu province. President Ydigoras steadfastly insisted that all activity was defensive. In April, Paul P. Kennedy, a correspondent of the New York Times, was expelled from Guatemala for reporting “something about an alleged invasion of Cuba by Guatemala.” He was invited to return the next day, April 10, and in an interview with President Ydigoras was told that if Cuba attacked, Guatemalan troops would be in Havana in a matter of hours. While admitting that foreign military personnel training Guatemalan army detachments in guerrilla warfare were members of the Únited States military mission, he said “We are not going to invade anyone; we are preparing only for our defense.”9192 A week later the tragically mis-calculated, Central Intelligence Agency-directed assault on Cuba took place, the invaders having been trained in Guatemala and launched from Nicaraguan shores. President Ydigoras was overthrown in April 1963, for reasons already noted, and was offered asylum in the United States. It should be mentioned that Ydigoras’ approval of the return of Juan José Arévalo to run as a candidate in the presidential elections scheduled for December 1963, may have prejudiced United States opinion against him. Although Arévalo denounced Castroism, his past record, and his book, The Shark and the Sardines, a strong indictment of United States policy in Latin America, naturally made him suspect to Washington and the American public. Fearing that Arévalo might win the election, President Ydigoras declared on March 21, 1963, that Arévalo was a kçown Communist and would not be allowed to cross the border. His announcement resulted in the breakdown of law and order and the imposition of a state of seige, the army acting quickly and savagely to silence Arévalo’s supporters. However, Arévalo did appear briefly in Guatemala City, providing a pretext for Colonel Peralta to seize the government.93 Washington reluctantly granted diplomatic recognition to the military government after consulting with other Central American leaders. Disturbed by military coups in South America the Kennedy administration warned that “the failure of the democratic process” in one American nation was the proper 91 Ibid., Nov. 18, 1960. For background of crisis see Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, My War With Communism (Englewood Cliffs, 1963), Chapters 8-9. II Hisp. Amer. Rep., vol. XIV (June, 1961), p. 298. Mario Rodriguez, “Guatemala in Perspective,” Current History, vol. 51 (Dec. 1966), pp.

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concern of the entire Hemisphere. Before granting recognition, Washington demanded respect for basic civil rights in the country and a promise of eventual return to civil rule. The Peralta dictatorship provided a relatively honest and efficient government, cooperated in the Central American Common Market program, and took credit for an economic upsurge that was partly brought about by United States economic assistance. A facade of constitutionalism was erected to qualify for continued Alliance for Progress support, but a free and open political system could not safely be tolerated. States of seige, accompanied by the suspension of individual guarantees, were commonplace; the need to curb terrorism, which did increase, and “ Communist conspiracies,” were used to justify these measures. The Peralta regime confounded all skeptics by holding a fair election for the presidency and Congress. The moderate left-of-center reformer, Julio Cesar Méndez Montenegro, former Dean of the University of San Carlos Law School, in Guatemala City, won 45 percent of the presidential vote, defeating the two military candidates. There being no clear majority, the decision for the presidency was left to the incoming Congress which, following the election results, voted Méndez into office. Colonel Peralta, honoring his commitment, turned the government over to his civilian successor on July 1, 1966. The election signaled an improvement in the political process, and unquestionably Guatemala was advancing economically. Industrialization had advanced since the Common Market was formed in 1960, and highway, air, and maritime facilities had been improved. Natural gas deposits were discovered at Peten, oil exploration was resumed on the Pacific coast, and mining operations were again underway. In 1966, for the first time since 1960, Guatemala enjoyed a favorable trade balance. While these developments justified some optimism for the future, data assembled by the In ter-American Development Bank and the National Economic Planning Council revealed how backward Guatemala remained twelve years after the United States engineered the overthrow of pro-Communist President Arbenz. These data indicate that 75 percent of the people had no access to modern civilization and culture. Eighty percent of the rural children received no schooling, and the illiteracy rate approached 80 percent, the highest in Latin America except for Haiti. The population was eating about a third of what was needed for a proper diet, and the life expectancy of the population, rising at the very high rate of 3.1 percent annually, was forty-five years. From 1950 to 1964 the gross national product increased, but the per capita income of the rural population, involving 66 percent of the country, dropped from $87 a year to $83. It was concluded that the rural population “is as wretched and backward as anywhere in Latin America.”94 These conditions persisted in spite of aid furnished by the United States which was increased sharply during the Castillo Armas administration. In the period 1948-1965, Guatemala received economic assistance from Washington totaling $110.9 million ($86.1 million in grants; $24.8 million in loans), plus substantial loans from the Export-Import Bank, the International Bank for 94 New York Times, Mar. 16,1966;Ibid., Nov. 14,1966.

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Reconstruction and Development and United Nations agencies. The greater part of the funds were assigned to economic and technical assistance, and road construction. Costa Rica, the second ranking recipient of United States aid in Central America, received $53.5 million in the same period. Under the Alliance for Progress, $48.3 million was disbursed to Guatemala between 1962 and 1966, as well as loans from United States-supported lending institutions. The Peace Corps, numbering close to one hundred members, was making worthwhile contributions, particularly in the rural areas. While United States economic assistance remained substantial, the large Guatemalan population reduced the per capita aid in 1965 —1966 to only $1.20 per capita, the lowest in Central America. And, owing in part to civil disorders and subversion, 10.5 percent of the country’s budget was allocated to the military establishment.9 5 A problem related to these conditions, though not clearly caused by them, was the growth of Communist insurgency. It was the most dangerous problem faced by President Méndez when he assumed office, and even though the movement suffered reverses, Guatemala was ranked first on the list of Latin American nations threatened by insurgency at the close of 1967. Remotely the movement was connected with the thwarted goals of the Revolution of 1944, and more immediately with the abortive coup of November 13, 1960, against President Ydigoras. Aside from the usual grievances of lower ranking army officers, a number of the forty-five young officers who took part in the latter uprising were incensed by the use of Guatemalan territory by the United States for training the Bay of Pigs invaders. They regarded it as a violation of their country’s national sovereignty at the hands of a United States “puppet,” President Ydigoras. One of the disaffected officers, Lt. Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, named his force the Revolutionary Movement of the 13th of November (MR-13), after the 1960 coup attempt, and began guerrilla operations in the northeast in 1962. The Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes - FAR), a Communist-influenced guerrilla force was added to his organization as well as a student group. Sosa’s campaign ended late in 1962 when most of the outnumbered rebel forces fled into Honduras. The next stage of insurgency began in 1963 under the leadership of Yon Sosa and the MR-13, and a new FAR headed by Lt. Luis Augusto Turcios Lima. Their guerrilla forces ambushed military patrols, assassinated army officers, and in 1965 the FAR carried out a number of kidnappings to terrorize the public and to raise money for the movement. Ultimately the two rebel leaders differed on ideology, Yon Sosa going into the Castroite sphere and Turcios moving into an alliance with the Communist party of Guatemala (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo - PGT), the latter becoming ascendant. The army waged an intensive campaign against both guerrillas and terrorists in the fall of 1966 with an95 95 U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1966 (Washington, 1966), p. 855; Simon G. Hanson, Five Years o f the Alliance for Progress, An Appraisal (Washington, 1967), p. 4; New York Times, Jan. 23, 1967. Unless otherwise stated, the terms “foreign assistance’’ or “economic assistance,” as hereinafter used, refer only to programs conducted under the Foreign Assistance Act and exclude the programs of the Export-Import Bank, the Peace Corps, Social Progress Trust Fund programs administered by the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Food for Peace programs carried out under Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954.

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accompanying state of seige. Government forces reported successes in 1967, having been reinforced by newly formed right wing counterterrorist groups. The FAR leader, Turcios, killed in an auto accident in 1966, was replaced by a young Communist lawyer, Cesar Montes. The guerrilla movement failed to enlist the support of either the Indian population or the Ladino peasants: “Without question, the larger portion of the guerrillas in 1965 and 1966 were students, most of whom went out only on week ends. According to an FAR leader who defected in April 1967, of four hundred active FAR guerrillas, three hundred were students and one hundred peasants.“ With events of 1954 in mind, the success of guerrilla operations in Cuba under Castro’s leadership, and the progressive involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s, the United States had a vital interest in seeing the Communist-inspired rebels in Guatemala safely immobilized. To this end the Guatemalan army, a well-equipped force of twelve thousand, was supported by the United States with more than $12 million annually and a small team of military advisers. Officers of the Guatemalan army were commonly sent to the United States for advanced training. One of them, Lt. Turcios, the former FAR leader, was sent to Fort Benning, Georgia, for training in the elite Ranger course after graduating from Guatemala’s military college. To strengthen the civil security forces in Guatemala, Washington operated a public safety program through the Public Safety Division of AID. Greater emphasis was placed on this program after it had become apparent that the four-thousand man police force was unequal to the task of preventing terrorism, whether originating on left or right.96 President Méndez had run a platform of political liberty. He denied any ties whatsoever with communism, and promised a government that would enhance the welfare of all sectors of society. Many persons saw his Popular Revolutionary Party as the heir of the popular October Revolution of 1944. Once in office he could not push a realistic reform program in keeping with the goals of the 1944 Revolution without arousing the opposition of the military and propertied classes who regarded such ideas as tantamount to communism. His proposals for tax reform and modest agrarian reform led to a flight of capital and ominous threats from these elements. President Méndez’ appeal to the guerrillas to accept an amnesty offered by Congress failed, and he was compelled to allow the army to use its own methods against the rebel forces. Continuing suppression brought reprisals from terrorist elements which included the abduction and assassination of both foreign diplomats and Guate­ malan officials. In January 1968 Colonel John Weber and Lt. Commander Ernest A. Munro, American military advisers to the Guatemalan armed forces, were killed in an attack by a terrorist group, and John Gordon Mein, U.S. ambassador to Guatemala, was slain by gunmen in Guatemala City in August. Later the Guatemalan government met terrorists’ demands in the kidnap-ransom of U.S. 96 For further details on the Guatemalan insurgency problem see u.5. congress Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Survey o f the Alliance for Progress - Insurgency in Latin America (Washington, 1968), pp. 18-24; Alan Howard, “With the Guerrillas in Guatemala,’’ New York Times Magazine, June 26,1966.

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Labor Attaché, Sean M. Holly, and of its own Foreign Minister, Alberto Fuentes Mohr. Count Karl von Spreti, the West German ambassador to Guatemala, was murdered by terrorists in April 1970 when the government refused to release twenty-three political prisoners as partial payment of his ransom. These and other incidents of urban and rural terrorism exerted a strong influence on public opinion as shown in the presidential election of March 1970. Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio, a hero of the nation’s struggle against rural guerrilla bands in the mid-1960s, won 42.9 percent of the popular vote. Defeating divided left-wing opposition, Arana ran on a two-party coalition composed of the National Liberation Movement and the Institutional Demo­ cratic Party. The Fuentes Mohr incident, occurring just two days prior to the election, apparently convinced many that the government of President Méndez Montenegro was unable to provide adequate protection for its officials or the public. Thus, Colonel Arana’s election reflected the public’s desire for an end to subversion and terrorism but at the same time showed its concern about the need for greater and economic change. The public “voted left” while electing a candidate with a strong right-wing image.9 7 Continuing domestic violence led the Arana regime to impose a state of siege from November 1970 to December 1971, which empowered the government to make arrests and search homes without a court order. Severe repression ensued, including an assault on the autonomy of the National University of San Carlos. President Arana undertook a program of economic and social development soon after taking office. The problems involved in implementing the reform program and achieving law and order concurrently proved most difficult. Rejecting the idea of redistributing land, the regime instead concentrated on modernizing and diversifying agriculture. The Agency for International Develop­ ment approved a $23 million loan in support of this effort. Economic assistance committed by Washington totaled $ 166.4 million in the years 1948-1970.98 In spite of the civil strife and the loss of the Honduran market, resulting from the El Salvadof-Honduran conflict of 1969, Guatemala in 1971 had an estimated growth of production of about 5 percent. But this had to be weighed against an annual population increase of 3.4 percent and the^fact that most of the Indians are removed from the country’s money economy. By 1972 the only prospects for domestic peace and general improvement seemed to be in a program that would reform the nation’s archaic social and economic institutions, and make possible a rapid and general redistribution of the national income. Otherwise, the nation faced a possibly more dangerous phase of the unfinished revolution of 1 9 4 4 ." El Salvador did not share the Communist threat in the same degree as neighboring Guatemala, but political instability became pronounced there after 1950. Between 1931 and 1941 El Salvador was under control of Maximiliano Hernández Martínez and the army, a ruthless dictatorship. So vigorous was his defense of the status quo that peasants agitating for a program of land reform *7 Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 17,1970;/6/d., Apr. 10,1970. * Statistical Abstract o f the United States, 1971, p. 763. 99 New York Times, Jan. 28,1972.

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were summarily shot by landlords. Forced to resign under the duress of a nation-wide strike in 1944, Hernandez Martinez was followed by a rapid succession of presidents and, finally, in 1948 a group of young officers headed by Colonel Oscar Osorio seized power, which it held during the next twelve years. This government carried out a modest program of economic development; it passed some social legislation for city workers, and reluctantly permitted the formation of a labor movement. The government also allowed more political freedom than had been customary in El Salvador. However, the regime did not dare touch the key problem: the concentration of virtually everything worth owning in the hands of an oligarchy comprising a few, score families. This group of families, already firmly anchored in the country’s basic industry, coffee, reached out to control grazing, manufacturing, banking, sugar and commerce. El Salvador remained on the periphery of United States diplomatic interest in the early post-World War II years. United States Ambassador Robert C. Hill stressed his country’s neglect of the area, and the deep impression that Vice-President Richard M. Nixon’s official call of 1955 had made on the population. A Salvadorian public official said: “ Mr. Nixon’s visit proves that you are really interested in us; it is not just words.” It was also evident that El Salvador had relied largely on its own efforts for economic development. Washington supplied grants totalling $ 1.5 million in the period 1946-1950, three million between 1951 and 1955, and about $1 million annually through 1960. Most of the funds were used in support of economic and technical assistance.100* As a market for El Salvador’s coffee exports, however, the United States was of crucial importance. Coffee constituted about 90 percent of the value of the nation’s entire export income in 1957, and the United States imported 68 percent of the total. A large part of the government revenues came from export taxes with the figure on a sliding scale depending on the New York market. Although on a cutback program, El Salvador had the largest United States quota for any country except for Brazil and Colombia. José Maria Lemus, another army officer won the election of 1956 with the support of Osorio. President Lemus visited Washington in March 1959, and in an address before a joint session of the Congress warned of the Communist threat in Central America. On his departure he issued a joint statement with President Eisenhower declaring support of Central American economic integration and the formation of a common market. Following the sharp drop in coffee prices which cost the country $12 million in export taxes in 1958, President Lemus said: “We ask no gifts from the United States, but only that you cooperate in keeping the price of our agricultural products at a reasonable level, while we have time to industrialize.” The depressed coffee market, rising middle class discontent, and student demonstrations, led to intervention by a group of army officers who forced Lemus out of office in October 1960. The rule of military civilian juntas ensued until the presidential election of April 1962, which was uncontested. Lt. Colonel Adalberto Rivera won the election in which less than 20 percent of the voters bothered to cast ballots. Washington withheld recognition of the succeeding junta fearing the ideological 100 Franklin D. Parker, The Central American Republics (New York, 1964), p. 161 ; New York Times, Feb. 7,1955.

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leanings of its members. When the public’s confidence in the regime was clearly established Ambassador Thorsten J. Kalijarvi gave notice of United States recognition. The junta had meanwhile announced its determination to hold free and democratic elections, to respect private enterprise, and to encourage the investment of foreign capital. Impressed by its sincerity, President Kennedy, in February 1961, pledged to help raise the country’s standard of living.101 Another junta, alleging that its predecessor was leftist, assumed control in January 1962, and ruled until the election of Rivera in April. Rivera’s administration managed to gain the cooperation of the financial rulers of El Salvador while appearing to be relatively progressive and reformminded. The reforms carried out by his government were designed to meet the requirements for aid under the Alliance for Progress: modest agrarian reforms and income tax laws, minimum wage laws, tenement rent reduction, a new labor code, and participation in various types of self-help programs. Industrialization was vigorously pushed and agriculture diversified to offset the problem of coffee sales. In implementing the Alliance for Progress programs, the Rivera govern­ ment had to fend off untranationalist and extreme left-wing propaganda to the effect that the Alianza was a “Trojan Horse” of “ Yankee imperialism.” 102 In the summer of 1965, Jack Hood Vaughn, assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, praised El Salvador’s achievements under the Alliance for Progress, saying that it was in the vanguard of Alliance endeavors. The country’s accomplishments were indeed extraordinary, having achieved one of the highest economic growth rates not only in Central America, but in the entire Latin American area. The gross national product advanced 12 percent in 1964 and 1965 and per capita income had risen from about $200 a year in 1960 to $275 in 1965. Industrialization, encouraged to a large extent by the Central American Common Market, was an important factor in the advance, for in 1963-64 seventy-six new industries and 112 expansion projects were in­ augurated. By 1966 it had the largest number of industries of any Central American country. El Salvador had also become one of the more favored areas for private investors, as $40 million came into the country either as direct investments or in loans to industry already established, in 1965.103 El Salvador showed a 6 percent increase in the GNP in 1966, and the Rivera administration expressed confidence in the country’s''economic future. There was, however, growing concern about population pressure, for almost three million people were jammed into the nation’s 8,061 square miles, and the annual increase was 3.2 percent. The government hoped to alleviate the problem by making the country a reservoir of trained labor for its bigger associates in the CACM. Nicaragua, for example, had 1.6 million population and seven times the area, and Honduras had two-thirds the population and was five times larger. The United States fulfilled President Kennedy’s pledge, making El Salvador the largest recipient of financial aid under the Alliance for Progress in Central America in the first five years of the program. Averaging more than $10 million a year in 1962-1965, for a total of $43.1 million, the aid disbursed in 102 York Ximes>Feb- 16,1961. 1ft, Mario Rodriguez, Central America (Englewood Cliffs, 1965), p. 40. 1UJ New York Times, Aug. 23, 1965\Ibid., Apr. 3, 1966.

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1966 rose to $20.4 million. The Peace Corps had fifty-five volunteers there in 1965. Total economic assistance furnished by the United States in the period 1948—1970 was $81.7 million. And by the mid 1960’s Washington cited El Salvador as “a model for the other Alliance countries.” 104105 In the March 1967 presidential elections the government’s candidate, Colonel Fidel Sánchez Hernández, prevailed over moderate-leftist opposition and a coalition alleged to be Communist-dominated. The nominal reforms instituted by Rivera and subsequently carried on by Sánchez Hernández were believed to have earned the animosity of the conservative elements. No basic institutions were threatened, however, so it was not surprising th^t the government party, Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN), which had dominated politics for a decade, succeeded in electing its candidate again in the presidential election of February 1972. Colonel Armando Molina, after winning a four-way contest, declared that he would tour Central America and seek to arrange a summit meeting of the region’s presidents. He also expressed a desire to find solutions to the problems involving his country and Honduras. His election was challenged by a revolt in March 1972; this was crushed with the loss of some one hundred military and civilian lives. Meanwhile, although El Salvador’s trade position had strengthened in 1971, and production growth was expected to attain 4.3 percent, most of the nation’s socio-economic problems remained. Adequate housing was still in scarce supply. Wages had not been increased appreciably, and the benefit of sustained economic growth had not filtered down equally through all segments of Salvadorean society.10 5 Honduras has felt political turbulence in recent times, but little erosion of the traditional social order has occurred. From 1932 to 1948 the nation suffered caudillo rule under General Tiburcio Carias Andino, a regime characterized by severe repression of democratic institutions, little material progress, and the continuing aggrandizement of the upper class elites. Carias Andino gave up office to Juan Manuel Galvez in 1948, and under Galvez’ direction democracy made slight gains, and mild economic reforms were instituted. Such reforms, however, did not satisfy the rising political action groups who demanded more sweeping and fundamental changes. A general labor strike occurred in 1952 directed at UFCO, which had long enjoyed the favor of the government and the upper class of Honduras. Although the strikers won wage increases, paid vacations, improved housing and other common goals of labor, the greatest significance of the strike was the fact that labor had finally gained the right to organize. Nevertheless, the traditional propertied elements still retained supremacy. In the strife-ridden election of 1955 the Liberal Ramón Villeda Morales appeared to have won the presidency. But he was denied the office, and Juan Lozano Díaz, Gálvez; vice-president, ruled by decree until removed by a military junta in 1956. A Five-Year Plan of economic development, begun in 1955 by Lozano, was abandoned by the junta. In May 1957, Honduras charged that 104 Statistical Abstract o f the United States, 1971, p. 793; Hanson, Alliance for Progress, p. 4; Agency for International Development, Proposed Economic Assistance Programs FY 1967 (Washington, 1966), pp. 91-92. , 105 Ibid.; Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 10, 1972; Times of the Americas, Apr. 4,1972.

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Nicaraguan troops had invaded a disputed area called the Mosquito Coast, a vast, sparsely settled region extending 150 miles along the Caribbean coast. Honduras’ claim was based on the territorial award made by King Alphonso XIII of Spain in 1906, but which Nicaragua did not recognize. A United States military mission was sent from Panama to aid in the surveillance of the territory after the OAS Inter-American Peace Committee had negotiated a cease-fire. Ambassador John C. Dreier was the United States representative on the committee. Nicaragua agreed to accept the decision of the International Court of Justice, which in 1960 ruled that the arbitration award of 1906 was valid.106 The presidency of Honduras was turned over to Villeda Morales by the military junta in December 1957, who proceeded to carry out a modest economic development program, and cautious educational and agrarian re­ forms.10 7 When he took office the nation’s international monetary reserves had declined for the third straight year; in the following year the floating debt was doubled. The regime crushed a revolt led by an exiled colonel, and captured a small Cuban-armed force which attempted to invade Nicaragua, in 1959. Honduras remained in the economic doldrums in 1960 in spite of more than $27 million in loans from international organizations since 1956. According to an ICA report: “The gross national product is hardly keeping ahead of population growth, and more timber is burned each year than is exported, and lumbering and farming methods in general are leading toward serious land erosion.” United States government economic assistance to Honduras amounted to $45.8 million ($24.2 million in grants; $21.6 million in loans), in the years 1948 to 1965. A high priority was placed on road building because the central location of Honduras makes it the crossroads for highway building projects to close the regional transportation gap.108 The total trade of Honduras declined 7 percent in 1959—1960, the main exports in order of importance being bananas, coffee, timber, minerals, livestock, corn and cotton. To stimulate production UFCO adopted a policy that involved abandoning sideline activities, concentrating on banana production; however, unemployment grew more critical as a result. Early in 1962 the United States-Honduras Trade Treaty of 1936 was terminated. As the treaty had given preferential treatment to U.S. exports to Honduras, especially ^n food, autos and textiles, it had been regarded as unfavorable to the latter’s interests. The treaty’s revocation had been opposed by the Chamber of Commerce, controlled by importers and distributors of United States goods. The result was to reorient commerce toward the CACM.109 President Villeda Morales made a brief state visit to Washington in December 1962. He stressed his country’s strong anti-Communist views, and took the occasion to invite President Kennedy to meet the Central American presidents at a conference of the OAS in San José, Costa Rica. The invitation was accepted. While relations on the high government level were most cordial, New York Times, May 7 ,1 9 5 7 ; Ibid., Nov. 19,1960. 7 William S. Stokes, “Honduras: Problems and Prospects,” Current History, vol. 50 (Jan 1966), pp. 23-24. !