Language Politics in Contemporary Central Asia: National and Ethnic Identity and the Soviet Legacy 9780755611591, 9780857720856

Table of contents :
Cover
CONTENTS
List of Illustrations
List of Tables
Preface and Acknowledgements
Map of Central Asia and the Caucasus
1 Introduction
Basic issues
Language as symbol of national identity
De-Russianization as language nationalism
Turkish and other languages
Language planning and language study
Language challenges
2 Azerbaijan
Basic data
Nation-building debates
Legislation and debates
The challenge of Russian
Latinization of the alphabet
The Turkish involvement
Minorities and language
Language in education
Languages at the universities
The media
3 Uzbekistan
Basic data
Legislation
Language Uzbekization
Latinization of the alphabet
Language attitudes
The challenge of Russian
Minorities and language
Language in education
Languages at the universities
The media
4 Kazakhstan
Basic data
Nation-building debates
Legislation and programmes
The challenge of Russian
Minorities and language
Language Kazakhization
Postponing Latinization
Language in education
Languages at the universities
The media
5 Kyrgyzstan
Basic data
Legislation and debates
Language law implementation
Minorities and language
Language in education
Languages at the universities
The media
6 Turkmenistan
Basic data
Legislation without debates
Latinization of the alphabet
Language Turkmenization
Minorities and language
Language in education
Languages at the universities
The media
7 Tajikistan
Basic data
Legislation
Language Tajikization
The alphabet issue
Minorities and language
Language in education
Languages at the universities
The media
8 Conclusion. Language Reform: Success or Failure?
9 Appendices
References
Index

Citation preview

Barbara Kellner-Heinkele is retired Professor of Turkology at Freie Universität Berlin. Focusing on unpublished manuscript texts, her work deals with the cultural history of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkic world. Recent publications: Devhatu l-Mesayih (2005), (ed.) Islamic Art and Architecture in the European Periphery (2008). Jacob M. Landau is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has published numerous books and articles on the contemporary Middle East in several languages. His most recent books are The Politics of Pan-Islam (1990), Pan-Turkism (1995) and Exploring Ottoman and Turkish History (2004).

LANGUAGE POLITICS IN CONTEMPOR ARY CENTR AL ASIA National and Ethnic Identity and the Soviet Legacy

Barbara Kellner-Heinkele and Jacob M. Landau

Published in 2012 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com Distributed in the United States and Canada Exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 Copyright © 2012 Barbara Kellner-Heinkele and Jacob M. Landau The right of Barbara Kellner-Heinkele and Jacob M. Landau to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by the authors in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. International Library of Central Asian Studies 5 ISBN: 978 1 84885 820 6 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress catalog card: available Typeset by Newgen Publishers, Chennai Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham

One’s motherland starts with language Gul’sum Arinova Humankind is defined by language, but civilization is defined by writing Peter T. Daniels

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations List of Tables Preface and Acknowledgements Map of Central Asia and the Caucasus 1

Introduction Basic issues Language as symbol of national identity De-Russianization as language nationalism Turkish and other languages Language planning and language study Language challenges

2 Azerbaijan Basic data Nation-building debates Legislation and debates The challenge of Russian Latinization of the alphabet The Turkish involvement Minorities and language Language in education Languages at the universities The media

x xi xiii xv 1 1 4 9 12 14 16 19 19 22 24 27 30 33 35 37 42 43

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Uzbekistan Basic data Legislation Language Uzbekization Latinization of the alphabet Language attitudes The challenge of Russian Minorities and language Language in education Languages at the universities The media

47 47 50 51 53 58 59 63 67 74 76

4 Kazakhstan Basic data Nation-building debates Legislation and programmes The challenge of Russian Minorities and language Language Kazakhization Postponing Latinization Language in education Languages at the universities The media

79 79 82 85 90 92 94 102 105 108 112

5

Kyrgyzstan Basic data Legislation and debates Language law implementation Minorities and language Language in education Languages at the universities The media

117 117 120 126 133 135 144 148

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Turkmenistan Basic data Legislation without debates Latinization of the alphabet

151 151 154 155

CONTENTS

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Language Turkmenization Minorities and language Language in education Languages at the universities The media

157 160 163 166 169

Tajikistan Basic data Legislation Language Tajikization The alphabet issue Minorities and language Language in education Languages at the universities The media

173 173 176 179 182 184 187 192 195

8 Conclusion. Language Reform: Success or Failure?

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Appendices

References Index

215 255

ILLUSTR ATIONS

Map Map of Central Asia and the Caucasus

Plates (Following p. 116) 1 Baku 2007: A plaque at the Memorial Museum dedicated to the poet Mamed Said Ordubadi, with wording in Azerbaijani, Russian and English 2 Almaty 2007: A typical newspaper booth 3 Astana 2009: A billboard in Kazakh and Russian showing different nationalities of Kazakhstan in national costume. The slogan reads: ‘The strength of Kazakhstan lies in friendship and unity!’ 4 Dushanbe 2009: A poster at the Institute of Language and Literature of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, with the heading ‘The language is the wealth of the nation’ 5 Bishkek 2009: A bookshop displaying Kyrgyz and foreign language learning materials

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TABLES

2.1 Population of Azerbaijan by ethnic group, 1989–99 2.2 Pupils in Azerbaijan’s state and private schools by language of instruction, 1995–2009 2.3 Language teachers in Azerbaijan’s general schools, 2005–08 3.1 Population of Uzbekistan by ethnic group, 1989–99 3.2 Knowledge of Uzbek among Russians in Tashkent, 2002 (percentages) 3.3 Pupils in Uzbekistan’s primary schools by language of instruction, 2006–07 3.4 Pupils in Uzbekistan’s secondary schools by language of instruction, 2001–06 (percentages) 3.5 Timetable for general schools in Uzbekistan, 2008–09 (in hours per language per week) 3.6 Revised experimental timetable for general schools in Uzbekistan, 2008–09. Pilot stage in selected schools, Tashkent and region (in hours per week). a. Language of instruction: Uzbek. b. Language of instruction: Russian or other mother tongues 3.7 Foreign languages in Uzbekistan’s schools, 2006–07 4.1 Population of Kazakhstan by ethnic group, 1989–99 4.2 Proficiency in Kazakh and Russian among major nationalities in Kazakhstan, 1999 (percentages)

20 40 42 48 60 69 70 71

71 73 80 95

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4.3 4.4 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8

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Schools in Kazakhstan by language of instruction, 2000–03 Students in institutes of higher education in Kazakhstan by language of instruction, 2000–06 Population of Kyrgyzstan by ethnic group, 1989–2008 Pupils in Kyrgyzstan’s secondary schools by language of instruction, 1998–2003 Language of instruction in Kyrgyzstan’s secondary schools, 2005–06 Population of Turkmenistan by ethnic group, 1989–95 Population of Tajikistan by ethnic group, 1989–2000 Minority language classes in Tajik-medium secondary schools, 1999–2003 Pupils and classes in Tajikistan’s schools by language of instruction, 2003–04 Students in Tajikistan’s university institutes by language of instruction, 1999–2004 (at the beginning of the academic year) Population change in the post-Soviet Muslim states, 1989–99 Russians in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, 1989–2004 Proficiency in the titular language, 1989 (percentages) Knowledge of Russian in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, 2004 (in thousands) Language most used at home, 1993 (percentages) Foreign language the population would like to learn, 1993 (percentages) Alphabet preference, 1993 (percentages) Students in institutions of higher education by language of instruction, 2006 (percentages)

108 110 118 142 142 152 174 186 190

194 211 212 212 212 213 213 213 214

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work is in some respects a continuation of our book Politics of Language in the Ex-Soviet Muslim States, published by Hurst in London and the University of Michigan Press in Ann Arbor in 2001, and translated into Russian and published in Moscow by the Progress Press in 2004. The period covered in our first book was that of the years immediately following the independence gained in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Our current research focuses on contemporary language politics in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, post-Soviet states, all of which obtained a somewhat chaotic statehood. Language reforms, although differently conceived in each of the six states, figured conspicuously both in legislation and in the public debate aimed at creating new nation states. Implicitly, at least, many of these moves reflected a desire for de-Sovietization via de-Russianization, that is, demoting the status of Russian and minimizing its public employment. The subsequent twelve years (roughly, 1998–2010), the main period investigated in the present work – although some reference is necessarily made to earlier years for the sake of clarity of interpretation – have experienced less public debate and more direct experimentation in language reform with varying emphases in the six new states, which, accordingly, get unequal treatment here as far as length is concerned. Our research aims at examining the progress of language shift and at evaluating

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it comparatively and analytically, that is, to attempt to determine the success or failure of these reforms on several levels, by describing their course, motivation and aims. While our previous book was organized by subjects, the present is structured by country chapters intended to enable the reader to consult materials on each relevant state. As for our sources, in addition to official publications, books, scholarly articles, newspaper reports and personal interviews, we have frequently referred to the internet, a source that has changed the resources for research immensely in the last decade. Our transliteration is the generally accepted one. We distinguish between the people living in a country (‘Uzbekistanis’) and the titular ethnic community (‘Uzbeks’). The references at the end of the book can serve as bibliography. The map (p. XV) was designed by Georg Fritzenwenger and the illustrations (between pp. 116 and 117) are based on photographs taken by Barbara Kellner-Heinkele. We owe a great debt of gratitude to our research assistants, Dr. Rufat Sattarov in Berlin and Roman Kareev in Jerusalem, as well as to numerous friends and informants in Central Asia and Azerbaijan who offered us advice and materials or agreed to be interviewed, particularly Dr. Tynchtykbek Choroev. Some of them asked that their names be withheld. No less, our warm thanks are due to the GermanIsraeli Foundation for Research and Development which generously supported our research, and in particular to its director, Dr. Amnon Barak. Last, but not least, we are grateful to the I.B.Tauris Publishers and, most particularly, to Ms. Maria Marsh and Mr. Tomasz Hoskins. It was a real pleasure to work with them. Anything said below, however, remains our sole responsibility. Barbara Kellner-Heinkele Institut für Turkologie Freie Universität Berlin

Jacob M. Landau Department of Political Science The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Map of Central Asia and the Caucasus

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Basic issues This is a situational analysis, comparative wherever possible, of language problems and attempted solutions in five independent Central Asian states – Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. We have added Azerbaijan in the Caucasus, another postSoviet republic belonging to the Turkic language group. Tajikistan, by exception, uses a language very close to Persian. Our work is based on politicolinguistics, a relatively new discipline which has attracted the interest of both linguists and political scientists. Language is not merely a matter of personal communication, but an important sociopolitical phenomenon of considerable symbolic meaning as well as a powerful social instrument subject to political considerations and crucial to dominance; it closely influences and is influenced by politics (Pelinka 2007). Together with ideologically revised histories, language often defines the borders of the collectivity and is a pivotal factor in nation-building, particularly in newly established multilingual states such as the six considered in this book, all of them searching for a new sort of nationalism to shape their national identity. Language politics demonstrate that in the six independent states culture continues to be highly politicized, as is often demonstrated in ideological arguments concerning the role of public administration, education and the media in enforcing an ethnic identity. Decisions about a national language policy are usually made by politicians, not

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linguists or language teachers. Political elites are frequently divided between those who perceive language homogeneity as crucial for nation-building and those who think it is more advantageous to preserve language heterogeneity, whether this includes Russian or one of the ethnic minorities’ languages in each of the six states. The former argue that, since language is a main pillar of nationhood, assimilation into the titular language (i.e., the language appellation derived from the country’s name) is a condition for belonging. The latter maintain that national unity can also be achieved in a multiethnic and multilingual society, provided it is based on an accepted conception of state territoriality. While language politics are a matter of debate between people or groups, language policies result, so to speak, from language debates, and represent attempts by those in authority to select goals and courses of action in order to impose language ideology or practice and achieve reforms by planning massive change. Language planning is a deliberate effort to influence the functions, structure or acquisition of a language – by language dissemination, purification and modernization. This is often based on a belief that all members of the society, irrespective of their native language, should not only study but also use the dominant language in government, education, economics and the media. Language policies are generally determined by governments and legislative bodies, and are influenced by cultural, political and economic considerations; implementation is usually more difficult than decision making, so that a gap frequently exists between policy and practice. The policies often create the appearance of unity but can be a source of political cleavage. This is particularly so in the six states which concern us here, where policy is applied in the context of diverse and evolving societies. Thus, in language education, political aims might contradict pedagogical reasoning, especially when education is highly politicized. Since languages are political, cultural and social constructs, they often express political, cultural and social differences, all of which adds to the complexity of political management intended to incorporate societies composed of disparate nationalities into centralized states consolidated by external geopolitical factors.

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The indigenization of a titular language, raising its status and changing its corpus as well as ‘improving’ its terminology, vocabulary, grammar or alphabet, no matter how well-intended such reforms might be, often causes serious dislocation and raises new problems which might lead to political or cultural conflict (see Collin 2005 for examples). This is what happened in the area which in 1991 leapt from the outer regions of the Soviet empire on to the world scene (Mesbahi, ed. 1994; Gürsoy-Naskali and Şahin, eds. 2002). The process of post-Soviet transition, which challenges the Soviet legacy without abandoning it in toto, comprises many aspects, among them the restructuring of language, first in ‘modernizing’ and ‘purifying’ the vocabulary, and then its other aspects. The phenomena of change may be evaluated by basic differences of interest (and, sometimes, reciprocal cultural antipathies) on the part of titular majorities and ethnic minorities in the same state. As in many other cases, postindependence nationalism has assumed an ethnic character cloaked in the guise of civic nationalism. The titular ethnic groups in the six states see themselves as ‘core ethnies’ and frequently adopt policies based on kinship and language versus the other ethnic communities. This process has frequently meant preferential treatment for one’s own ethnic group while excluding the others. All communities use cultural-linguistic arguments to promote national revival, or ‘revitalization’, to reverse its decline. This often leads to political clashes (Khan 2005), especially when cultural communities become political ones. A central question is relevant to the commonality of language: is a political culture to be based on all citizens sharing a language, even without the society necessarily becoming monolingual? In our times, societies are becoming ever-more multilingual as several languages often coexist in the same politically demarcated region. In our case, however, all six states basically intend to become both national and monolingual. Turning the titular language into the dominant one leads to the exclusion or at least the downgrading of the others, rather than creating an environment of inclusion – even though a common medium of communication is a strict necessity. The problem in postSoviet states, particularly those examined in this book, is that the common medium is often not the titular language but Russian, which

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titular elites now wish to replace with their own national language as a move against what some of them call ‘the legacy of Soviet linguistic imperialism’. Competition, a focal issue in the language politics of the six new states, found an early ‘solution’ in the formal decision to bestow on each titular language the status of a ‘state language’. In multilingual countries, deciding the ‘state language’ and ‘official languages’, which admittedly have a secondary position to the state one, is often a choice leading to frustration. Both have a special juridical status and it is often difficult to distinguish between them in practice except for the fact that the ‘state language’ is usually perceived as more prestigious than the ‘official language’. The same difficulty applies to determining the language status of the ethnic minorities. In both respects politics dictate the sentimental and practical considerations in matters such as administrative efficiency. All these factors usually prevent an entirely plausible resolution of all demands. In the six states discussed, the titular language of each was proclaimed the ‘state language’, and arguments ensued – and still continue – regarding the language status of the ethnic minorities: whether official (as demanded by the local Russians and a few other ethnic communities) or just equal to all other non-titular ones. Solutions have differed, as we shall see.

Language as symbol of national identity Language attitudes have an important role in determining both personal and group linguistic identity (Korth 2005: 23ff.). Language reforms, particularly in the post-Soviet states, frequently reflect the desire of some of their elites for a new national identity, which has meant re-identifying their values. Their responses are driven by differing proportions of principle and pragmatism. Language has always been – and still is – central to notions of identity as a crucial element in the collective cultural perceptions of many communities. This is particularly so when the sense of identity perceives some kind of threat brought about by government policies, or economic disadvantages caused by unequal language priorities. Crucial in this regard are the language and educational policies of the state (Holt and Packer

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2001: 99ff.). All this is most relevant in the six states, liberated from what some people regard as Russian cultural aggression against indigenous tradition. Debates and decisions indicate a process of formation of national states based on nation-building by the titular nation group with only limited concern for the views and wishes of the minority ethnies. Although attitudes have differed from state to state, there are elements that see ethnic and language diversity as a possible source of instability, particularly where there are fairly large Slav communities. In other words, there is a movement in the six states to monopolize nationalism, to various degrees. The state is not always perceived as coterminous with the nation and this may lead to ethnic discomfort. In the modern world, identities are articulated within various social, political, economic, cultural or discursive contexts; language is of primary importance. In the six states discussed, an identity crisis has developed, becoming more visible after independence. It is evident not only in the titular nations but also within the ethnic identities of nontitular peoples living in other-ethnic milieus. This identity crisis is an important factor in stimulating the exodus of non-titular ethnies (Katagoshchina 2002: 26ff.). In most cases the titular nations strive to consolidate their positions and promote national cohesion based on their own conceptualization of language status and use (Djumaev 2001: 322–3). The Soviet Union had its own language policies, both general and those affecting each particular language (Fouse 2000). It was a state with very complex language problems, many of which were inherited by the new republics in 1991. Following the dismantling of the Soviet Union, the six states moved from dependence to independence via a process of decolonization by default, which Roeder (1999) called ‘incomplete national revolutions’ in a paper with that title. All six entered an era of state formation and nation-building, begun and led by the titular political elites which had emerged under the Soviet Union. These elites determined and controlled the political, economic (Akiner 2003: 433) and cultural reforms imperative in the new situation, a process characterized by the promotion of nationhood via a reinforcement of historical legends and an emphasis on patriotism. Within the Soviet Union the national elites in the Caucasus and Central Asia

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were usually office holders, or at least purveyors of patronage. The same remained true in the post-Soviet years when, in the absence of Soviet supervision and guidance, they became mostly managerial elites. These have ruled within a system of ‘command states’ where the governmental administration remains a closed network and the bureaucracy inflates itself into a self-centred group, mostly city-based. Nation-building in Central Asia has been a state-generated project (Akçalı 2003: 409–29). State-building is a formidable task and the six independent republics chose to base it on the titular nation and the titular language, ignoring (in practice, at least) other ethnies (Kreindler 1997: 91–2). All six states invested resources in various degrees towards shaping new patterns of language use, rewriting history, altering demographic balances and promoting ethnic cadres. Cultural heritage and cultural standardization were perceived as basic constituents of the state, with language holding a crucial position in establishing a Sprachnation (a languagebased nation). Language increasingly came to be seen as an important symbol of national identity, bound up with making language and state spatially congruent: a choice of language is a choice of identity. Conversely, nationalists argued, prolonged language subordination affects both individual and collective linguistic identity by diluting people’s command of their native tongue and desensitizing them to its correct usage. This has implied a planned withdrawal from Russian, a language promoted by the Soviets not merely as a lingua franca to facilitate communication but also as a primary ‘cultural integrator’ (Kreindler 1991: 219). In many respects, the Soviet patterns are now repeated in each of the six independent republics attempting to turn its titular language into a new lingua franca. We found that both titular and minority ethnicization depended greatly on language, particularly in situations of extreme language diversity. In this, as in many other matters, the policies decided upon reflected a combination of continuity and change. Change, as understood by many leaders in the newly independent states, was a process leading to nation-building and state formation; that is, establishing political, economic, social and cultural institutions, developing new identities, and elaborating alternatives to Russification and

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Communism. This is necessarily a protracted process, requiring various strategies, including language reform, which in this case has been perceived as having a remedial political role in nationalizing state formation and nation-building. This is particularly relevant to our case, where the institutionalized understanding of ‘nation’ has been applied to ‘language community’. In other words, the political leaders assumed authority for what Spolsky (2005: 257) called ‘language management’, that is, changing language policies and practice. In general, nationalism creates nations. In the case of the nations discussed here, weak in their particular nationalisms within the Soviet Union (Melvin 2001), it is the state that promotes nationalism. The processes of viable unitary state formation and nation-building were simultaneous and, in almost every case, Soviet-modelled. Superpresidentialism, frequently based on networks employing paternalism and patrimonialism, has usually been a decisive factor (Akiner 2003: 434–8). These processes have developed within authoritarian regimes in all six states, with certain democratic elements in Azerbaijan (Cornell 2001: 118ff.) and Kyrgyzstan (Marat 2008). Kinship, always an important social element in the region, has remained a focal consideration. These special circumstances have concentrated the attention of the leading elites in all six newly independent states on such matters as the titular nationality’s sovereign rights to political determination rather than on immediate integration with their ethnic minorities. In every case, the governing elites have defined their new state ethnically, implying a hegemonic standing for the titular majority (Heuer 2001: 24–30). This is not uncommon in new states (Safran 2008: 171–90). For the political elites that survived the break-up of the Soviet Union, the main way to remain in power has been to distance themselves from the previous regime. This effort shows that the elites were well aware of the reservations of many titular and other groups towards the Soviet Union and also towards their own ethnic Russian co-citizens. Although Russian rule was really a mixed bag, de-Sovietization was often associated with mistrust of ‘the other’, expressed not only in a certain shift away from dependence on the Russian Federation for communications, transportation and military cooperation, but also in strengthening the fundamentals of culture and language of the titular

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ethnie. In this context, the history (real or imagined) of the majority ethnie, impacting on public discourse and school education (Uhres 2001: 57ff.), has been crucial in determining and legitimizing group identity, while the symbolic function of language has frequently come to the fore of public debate in the post-Soviet states, particularly on the issue of national re-identification by language (no less than by territory and roots-seeking history, also closely interrelated with nationalism in the making). In all six states, in addition to the titular language and those of the ethnic minorities (of which the most active politically are Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), there is a decisive place for ‘foreign’ languages, by which we mean non-indigenous ones, of which Russian is the most widespread, followed by Turkish. Official plans to promote the titular language coincided with the expansion of instruction in English (and more rarely in German or French) as a possible alternative to Russian (Kuzio 2002). The integration of multilingual milieus has received little practical attention in the face of more urgent problems. Too often, education policies have been approached in zero-sum terms; that is, favouring either one language or the other. Each titular majority struggles against the continuing impact of an influential international language: Russian. Policies have generally been carried out in the context of a bilingual situation. Bilingualism, on both the individual and societal level, is usually beset by problems. It is a code-switching process which requires, on a personal level, a certain proficiency in each language for a successful interplay to be achieved while adhering to the lexical, syntactical, grammatical and phonetic rules of each of the languages in question. Bilingualism is frequently asymmetrical. In many cases, bilingual people are more familiar with one of the two languages, frequently the one that ensures economic success (Fiacconi 2008). In the Soviet Union bilingualism had been perceived as requiring non-Russians to acquire greater proficiency in Russian. This changed after 1991. Some elites in the six newly independent states, keen on nation-building, strived to reverse the impact of Soviet national and language policies expressed in Russianization (language Russification). De-Russianization was not

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a simple matter, however, as language shift never is. While many of the nationalist elites wished to defend their new state against an apparent Russian monolingualism, their governments understood that some special status was necessary for the Russian language, particularly as the experienced titular elites employed Russian and, also, Moscow’s foreign policy has manifested an intention of maintaining some of its hegemony in the post-Soviet states. Although this has affected mostly the fields of security, economy and energy (Bhatty 2008), Moscow’s policy towards the six states has also been cultural in orientation (Belousov and Grigoryan 1996). It has been expressed in the establishment of a Russian World Foundation in Moscow in 2007, which has initiated and supported Russian cultural-linguistic centres throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia (“Russkii Mir” Foundation 2007). Some new universities and branches of Russian academic institutions have been set up on its initiative. Steps toward some form of bilingualism, for instance in education, were considered in the six states, as well as a multilingual media system (Abazov 2007: 105–31) to promote social integration. A multilingual solution could have been the answer, instituting in all schools the proper compulsory instruction of the titular language together with an international language and the local mother tongue, if different from the titular. However, due to nationalist pressures as well as financial and administrative constraints, such a project has not yet been seriously attempted. Moreover, multilingualism is an urban phenomenon, while the population in these republics is largely rural. Indeed, with few exceptions, mostly declarative, there has been little real understanding of the importance of investing in multilingualism, cultural pluralism, ethnic coexistence and regional cooperation; all of them keys to a more viable and sustainable future.

De-Russianization as language nationalism All six states, then, have a common Soviet past in which language was a crucial element in the campaign for cultural Russification. Russian penetrated the local languages and dialects in their spoken and written forms during both the Tsarist and the Soviet periods. Sovietized versions

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of the local languages were disseminated through all means of communication and via scholarly publications, resulting in a mass infiltration of Russian loanwords in all domains. Throughout the multilingual Soviet Union, Russian was the preferred language, dominating in all public domains, chiefly in the towns, as the language of the military, politics, sciences, publishing, education, literature and administration as well as the language of public discourse and personal opportunity (Ziegler 2006: 103ff.). Thus, Russian migrants who moved into the Caucasus and Central Asia had no incentive to learn other languages. Soviet cultural values and heroes, perceived as Russian, partly supplanted local ones. A deliberate policy of Russianization had a palpable influence on other languages in the Soviet Union, in both vocabulary and syntax (Wright 1999: 86). The Soviet administration made Russian a prerequisite for urban living and entrance into higher education and modern life (Shorish 1984). However, the years of Mikhail Gorbachov’s glasnost’ (1985–91) began to reverse the flow of linguistic assimilation of the non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union (Kolstø 1995; Leprêtre 2002) and to set up, instead, a basis for bilingualism in most of the Union’s republics – a component of rising nationalist sentiments. All this had a detrimental effect on the carefully nurtured notion of a common Soviet identity. Demonstrations protested the marginalization of national languages. Every republic declared its own titular language as its state language, in most cases during 1989. Implementing such decisions, however, was not an easy project due to widespread knowledge of Russian, chiefly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It is significant that three other states with a less general knowledge of Russian (Tables 9.3 and 9.4, Appendix) – Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan – were later able to carry out more wide-ranging language reforms, including alphabet change. The six states have been – and to some extent still are – largely divided between an urban Russified and Russian-speaking indigenous group and a rural, traditional Turkic- or Persian-speaking one. In the newly independent republics the ‘Soviet syndrome’ continues to operate in many respects. Indeed, Russian is still considered ‘the Soviet language’ (Gavrilov et al. 2008: 9–10), which ought to be replaced by the titular one in all domains of life. The process of ‘replacement’

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had already started in Tajikistan and the Turkic republics during the later years of the Soviet state; it gained amplitude after independence (Crisp 1991; Akiner 1997). At that stage there was already a tendency to change terms, place and street names, as well as public signs and billboards, from Russian to others of Turkic, Persian or Arabic origins. In some cases it was decided to adopt the Latin alphabet instead of the Cyrillic employed in the Soviet Union in its last 50 years. It was difficult, however, to achieve change in a situation in which many, perhaps most, of the non-Russian elites in the six states knew Russian better than their own mother tongue. In the late years of the Soviet Union, during the collapse leading to its disintegration, almost every mass protest contained a significant language component, articulating pent-up language grievances (Kreindler 1995: 198). Language laws were formulated then, of which the most important was the ‘Law on the Languages of the Peoples of the Soviet Union’, issued on 24 April 1990 (Gavrilov et al. 2008: 19). Article 4 of this law granted each of the Soviet republics the right to define the legal status of the languages employed within its territory as well as the authority to declare its own titular language the official one. Russian remained for several years, nonetheless, a criterion for career promotion and social advancement in the independent republics, which made it difficult to displace. Most of the six states established transitional periods or delays in enforcing legal provisions concerning the Russian language (Zevelev 2001: 106–7). This policy was particularly necessary since Russians still held many top jobs and maintained a cultural distance from other ethnies with few social contacts, rare intermarriages and little proficiency in other languages (Tishkov 1995: 298). Bilingualism was accordingly considered and practised, despite the large financial and administrative costs involved. This of course referred to the titular language and Russian. Russian continues to hold first place as the most important foreign language, but with different rates of success in the six states. By 2010 it appeared to be more prominent in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (with their large Slav communities), as well as in Azerbaijan, but less so in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. The Russian Federation supports its main language as the chief factor in its cultural influence.

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Recent documents drawn up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation emphasize how much importance it accords to preserving the Russian language and providing information about Russian life and traditions. A 1999 law, already passed in the Russian Federation, titled ‘On the Support of Compatriots Living Abroad’, had recommended encouragement for the maintenance and spread of Russian culture and language. In general, the Russian Federation prefers not to finance public organizations but rather to channel funds directly for specific projects; for example, supporting the programmes of Russian communities abroad which organize events dedicated to Russian history and culture, or assisting Russian-medium schools with textbooks and teacher training, or showing Russian films. Foundations such as Naslediye Yevrazii (‘Eurasia Heritage’), have also provided funds for carrying out cultural plans. On 29 February 2008, a symposium was held in Moscow under the heading Nuzhen li russkii yazyk novym nezavisimym gosudarstvam? (‘Is the Russian Language Necessary for the Newly Independent States?’). During the symposium, A.V. Ostrovskii, chairman of the parliamentary committee for cooperation with the post-Soviet states, emphasized the interest of the Russian Federation in maintaining and improving the position of the Russian language in those states, side-by-side with the local languages (Ostrovskii 2008: 28–30).

Turkish and other languages Turkey competes with Russia in the independent states with a Turkic titular language, while Iran does so in Tajikistan and to some extent in Azerbaijan (Mesbahi 2004). Since 1991, official Turkish authorities, private firms and some NGOs have invested considerable effort in increasing Turkish influence in Azerbaijan. Spokesmen have repeatedly emphasized the common ethnic, cultural and linguistic roots of Turkey and the Turkic peoples, promoting the idea of better comprehension among them. Turkish efforts, manifested since the 1990s, as evidenced in the bibliography compiled by Laçiner (2001), continued in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Policies are aimed at introducing Turkish culture and particularly the Turkish language

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as a lingua franca (Zeybek 1996). Since 1992, the Turkish authorities have organized annual seminars on Turkish culture and language in the states discussed. Turkey’s attempts continue on a limited scale, profiting from the fact that the Turkic languages have a large vocabulary in common as well as many similar grammatical and phonetic features. Joint academic and scholarly meetings on cultural matters have been on the agenda since independence. On 27 February 2008, the parliamentary Deputy Speakers of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan met in Antalya to establish yet closer relations among these Turkic peoples, mostly in language use. This meeting seems to have prepared the ground for an even more important one, held on 2–3 October 2009 in Nahçivan, an Azerbaijani enclave near the Turkish border. The participants were the presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan’s Minister of State (Uzbekistan was not represented). This summit meeting of Turkic states, which had already convened several times before (under different compositions of members), concluded with the formal signing of the ‘Nahçivan Pact of Cooperation between the Turkic-Speaking Countries’. The text called for cooperation in foreign politics, economics and other areas, emphasizing the historical ties between the Turkic-speaking peoples in matters of culture and ‘a common language’. On the practical side, various committees and a secretariat were appointed to promote joint research projects in language and other domains. Turkey’s repeated official attempts in the early 1990s to promote uniform Latinization on the precise Turkish model ultimately failed. These attempts, however, were only a part of Turkish governmental agencies’ educational investments in the newly independent states (which, incidentally, also formed an important job market for Turkish academics). Turkey’s efforts included setting up schools, as well as universities in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, besides offering many scholarships in Turkey itself. These institutions have provided instruction mostly in the titular language, Russian, English and Turkish. Relations were also fostered by Turkish students attending courses in Central Asian institutions (Aypay 2004: 81–96). A government-sponsored, Ankara-based Turkish International

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Cooperation Agency (TICA) has regularly published research on Central Asia in its Eurasian Studies, not only in Turkish, but also in English, Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Turkmen editions. Allegations of Pan-Turkism, intended to maximize Turkey’s advantages in the political, economic and strategic domains (Pahlavi 2002: 265–6), are rather far-fetched. Pan-Turkic aspirations have changed visibly into more pragmatic considerations (Freitag-Wirminghaus 2007: 339ff.). The most that can be discerned nowadays is a form of cultural Pan-Turkism (Landau 1995; Begijanyan 2004: 326–7), since each of the new states cherishes its own individual hopes for a separate identity, while interest in Pan-Turkism remains mostly the agenda of émigré organizations that emphasize the shared linguistic background as the major intra-Turkic unifying factor. In short, although diplomatic and business relations with Turkey remain cordial, the early lustre of Turkey’s cultural image has been somewhat dimmed. Furthermore, the Turkish language faces competition. Certain non-native languages are beginning to be studied throughout the states. First and foremost is English, then German and French (less than in Soviet times), and even Korean, Japanese and Hebrew – considered useful for personal advancement in a globalizing world. Arabic is studied in many Koran schools. The interest in Chinese is visibly rising as well. During the last five years Confucius Institutes have been established at one or more state universities in all of the republics dealt with here thanks to the special efforts of the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China.

Language planning and language study Language planning is generally carried on in multilingual and multicultural settings in which planning for one language has repercussions on the use of others and on the ethnic groups employing them. Selecting the language or languages to be boosted usually reflects power relations and socio-political interests. At the core of many language-policy conflicts are identity politics, as noted, particularly in new states, where identity is typically a matter of heated debate. Controversies involving language often focus on the concepts of ‘equality’ and ‘inequality’ (Ricento 2006: 3–9). Despite differences (noted by Fierman 2009),

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much of this scenario applies to language competition within each of the six states. Difficulties arose in initiating reforms, in balancing support for the competing languages and accommodating their demands and needs, while retaining the titular language as a source of national identification. The reforms aimed at enrichment of the language, worked out by academic research, and change on all levels of education, in government use of language, in public institutions and in the media. Language planning generally focused on two languages – the titular language and Russian (Alpatov 2002: 121–4). The titular language is the state language in all six republics, while Russian is the official one in some of them and strives to have the same status as the titular language. Each government accorded a new role to the titular language, affecting the earlier status of Russian (Kirkwood 1991; Schlyter 2005: 81). This required a change in the language policy of decades of Soviet rule, which had been based on the shift to Russian, to a policy of a shift away from Russian (Rivers 2002: 161). It implied, in several cases, instituting the titular language as mandatory for obtaining employment in government service, increasing its role in education as well as in toponymy (status promotion), and modifying its vocabulary by language intervention, or, most significantly, changing the script from Cyrillic to Latin in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (Landau 2008: 188–92; Landau 2010: 27–32). Everything considered, the issue of language was probably one of the most important causes of Slav emigration from the six states (mostly to the Russian Federation). During the decade 1992–2002, about half the Russian population emigrated from Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, roughly a quarter from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, and some 20 per cent from Kazakhstan (Heleniak 2004: 106). This amounted to more than two million people in all (Ziegler 2006: 108–10). While the language laws and regulations in the independent republics are significant, perhaps it is more useful to consider what went on in day-to-day language instruction in each of the six states, when public excitement subsided following the first years of independence. To improve language knowledge, educational solutions were sought, following at first the Soviet model – four years of primary and five years of intermediate secondary school, followed by two years of higher secondary school or vocational studies. Graduates could then continue

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to study in universities, institutes or specialized colleges. These institutions, both state and private, grew considerably in number. In most of them competition continues between the titular language and Russian as the medium of instruction; more rarely, other languages are employed as well. The new situation differs fundamentally from that in the Soviet Union in one other important respect. In the Soviet Union, Moscow directed all finance and education. The six independent states placed varying emphases, over time, on language choice and study in their institutions, depending on perceived aims and available means. Thus, new language curricula were instituted at school and university, at first following Soviet models, then introducing certain changes, usually based on European and American models. Adult language instruction, however, has been rather neglected (Abdullaeva 2006). In the first years of independence, language committees had been formed to work on vocabulary intervention, mainly to translate Russian words and technical terms into the titular language, a difficult enterprise. The Turkic languages, and also Persian and Arabic, were generally used in finding equivalents. To a lesser extent English and Latin were also used for this purpose. Political terminology was a focal area for vocabulary intervention (Marat 2008: 27). However, since independence the most visible evidence of language reform has undoubtedly been alphabet change. The creation of alphabets is a very important phenomenon worldwide (Coulmas 1989), and it is central to language reform in the region under discussion (Landau 2008) although it has so far received little research attention. In 1995, when the Latin script was first introduced, all six states had a very low level of adult illiteracy: between 0.3 and 0.4 per cent, according to UNESCO’s World Education Report (1995: 123–4). It would be enlightening to know precisely to what extent illiteracy may have increased in the three states which adopted Latinization and compare the results with the three others. However, the necessary statistical data are not yet available.

Language challenges An absence of comprehensive language reforms is perhaps just as revealing as the intensive promotion of language reform. No matter

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what reforms were carried out affecting the titular language, the other numerous ethnic languages in the six states have remained almost completely outside the state’s reform activity, notwithstanding the protests of ethnic groups. Official language policies have increasingly marginalized the languages of the non-titular ethnies. There are various types of ethnic and linguistic minorities in the area discussed. First, the indigenous minorities which may or may not have preceded the present-day titular majority. Secondly, there are minorities which arrived in the area in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as the Slavs. Thirdly, there are minorities which were deported to this region before and during the Second World War, or relocated from Western Russia. The concentrated efforts invested by the titular elites in each new republic towards their own state- and nation-building apparently left little time for harnessing the other ethnies to the project, whatever the repeated official declarations about the equality of all ethnic groups. It is possible to note a characteristic cleavage between centre and periphery, with few suitable institutions available for managing ethnic conflict. As the titular language has become dominant in each state, it has partially supplanted Russian. In practical terms, the dominant language ethnie increasingly controls all authority in the areas of administration, politics, education, communications and the economy, and often gives preference to people with a command of its own language (May 2005: 322). While the language rights of the ethnic minorities in the Soviet period were generally preserved, they were hardly improved. Indeed, in certain cases they were peripheralized, with government promotion of minority languages being moderate to non-existent. This process is due, again, to the considerable emphasis laid on the titular language. For instance, their continued use of the Cyrillic alphabet was a hindrance rather than a help for readers in the minority languages who now also had to cope with the newly introduced Latin script of the titular language. Indeed, the situation might reduce minority ethnic languages lacking a protective environment to a still lower status, and even endanger the existence of certain languages with only a few remaining speakers. This situation may be examined against the background of prevalent majority–minority

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relations in the six states, in order to understand the non-extension to minority language ethnies of the language privileges that state language speakers take for granted. Language attitudes and language activities have different implications for the majority ethnie, for whom they are a matter of national revival, and for the minority ethnies, for whom the issue is one of effective survival. Language has become politicized in all six states, but to varying degrees, depending almost entirely on the perceptions of each state president and his advisers concerning the state’s priorities and official strategies (Dave, ed. 2010; Landau 2010a: 771–7). The success of language reforms, present and future, may be correctly assessed by an evaluation of the language situation and the best ways to deal with its challenges; by setting clearly defined goals and policies, based on regular assessment of problem solving; by taking into consideration social, economic and political issues; and by encouraging discussion and criticism of the steps taken. This is not an easy undertaking for a society in which, for many years, imitation was rewarded and innovation punished.

CHAPTER 2 AZER BAIJAN

Basic data Although it is located in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan is included in our discussion of the post-Soviet states of Central Asia because, like all the other states discussed here, it has a majority Muslim population. In the 1990s Azerbaijan was one of the most active agents in the politics of language reform. Independent since 18 October 1991, it covers a territory of 86,600 square kilometres; the population of 8,120,247 (2007 estimate) is approximately 90 per cent Azerbaijanis (a large number of whom are Shiites). About 1,850,000 people live in Baku, the capital. According to the 1989 Soviet census and the 1999 Azerbaijani census, the population was divided by ethnie as shown in Table 2.1. The increase in the share of ethnic Azerbaijanis can be explained by the sharp decline of the Russian and Armenian population (60 per cent) due to out-migration. The second post-Soviet census was held in Azerbaijan in April 2009. The final results of this census were set to be published in mid-2010. On the basis of preliminary census figures, the population of the republic has reached almost nine million people (8,922,200) (State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2009); in 2010, the State Statistical Committee released the figure of 8,997,400. The number of Russians declined further in the first years of the twenty-first century: in 2002 their estimated number was between 30,000 and 50,000 (Ali 2002). According to the 1999 census, 90.3 per cent of the population

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Population of Azerbaijan by ethnic group, 1989–99 1989

Azerbaijanis Lezgins Russians Armenians Talysh Avars Meskhetian Turks Tats Tatars Ukrainians Tsakhurs Georgians Kurds Jews Udins Others Total

1999

Number

%

Number

%

5,805,000 171,400 392,300 390,500 21,200 44,100 17,700 10,200 28,600 32,300 13,300 14,200 12,200 30,800 6,100 31,300 7,021,200

82.70 2.40 5.60 5.60 0.30 0.60 0.20 0.14 0.40 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.10 0.46 100.00

7,205,500 178,000 141,700 120,700 76,800 50,900 43,400 10,900 30,000 29,000 15,900 14,900 13,100 8,900 4,100 9,600 7,953,400

90.60 2.24 1.78 1.52 0.98 0.65 0.45 0.15 0.37 0.37 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.12 0.05 0.13 100.00

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan 2006: 69, Table 2.6; also Rowland 2004: 297; İsaxanlı 2006: 113.

spoke Azerbaijani, a term we use for convenience’ sake, although the constitution employs the term Azərbaican dili (‘Azerbaijanian’). About 40 per cent spoke Russian, 2.2 per cent Lezgi, 1.5 per cent Armenian, and 4.2 per cent other languages. Azerbaijani is also widely spoken in western Iran. There are speakers of Azerbaijani in Daghestan, Georgia, Iraq, Armenia and Turkey (Arik 2008: 143; Gavrilov et al. 2008: 65). It is estimated that about two million people in the state use a language other than Azerbaijani, including Azerbaijanis who speak Russian and Azerbaijani bilingually. A joint Russian–Azerbaijani Commission for Cooperation within the Commonwealth of Independent States, meeting in Baku on 26 September 2003, estimated, again, that 40 per cent of the state’s population were fluent in Russian (Ekho, 28 September 2003), thus repeating the data of the 1999 census. This estimate, too, may be rather low, because in Soviet Azerbaijan practically everybody

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had learned Russian. That is why an estimate of 70 per cent of people who know Russian in Azerbaijan is perhaps more realistic (Samsonov 2006: 69; Gavrilov et al. 2008: 65–6). Recent research among the country’s minority ethnies indicates that many of their members speak either Azerbaijani or Russian in addition to their particular language. However, according to research carried out by Zuercher (2009: 49) in 2002–03 and checked again several years later, the number of speakers of Russian had declined markedly, with substantial numbers in the centre of Baku only. The overall situation has thus changed. Due to the drive of the ruling elites and the intellectuals to increase the status of the state language, some members of the minority ethnies have expressed apprehension that they might be assimilated linguistically (Herzig 1999: 9–10; Fuller 2008). Thanks to its huge oil reserves in the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan is comparatively well off, although oil prices are prone to be volatile and economists frequently warn that the oil riches might lead to hampering broad-based sustainable development. How far the revenues from oil extraction have profited not only the top level, but also the middle and lower strata of the population, is not clear. In the countryside poverty has not been eradicated, and many men and, increasingly, women, migrate to Russia or the Ukraine as seasonal workers – more than 2 million according to some estimates. This is a phenomenon sustaining the use of the Russian language. Heydar Aliyev was a former head of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. He was elected president in 1993, and awarded the title of ‘national leader’. He was re-elected in 1998 and died on 12 December 2003. His authoritarian regime dominated the entire political system, power distribution, economic decisions, the judiciary, historical tradition, and language reform – all embedded in his conception of statebuilding (Asadov 2004: 265ff.). This is also true of his son, Ilham Heydaroğlu Aliyev, who assumed the presidency on 31 October 2003 and was re-elected on 15 October 2008; a referendum vote was held on 18 March 2009 to enable him to be re-elected when his second term ends in 2013, i.e. allowing for a life presidency. While a ‘strong hand’ may have been a stabilizing force in the first decade of war-torn Azerbaijan’s history, nowadays the autocratic rule of Ilham Aliyev and

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the power circles around him are seriously impeding any progress in democratization. Both Aliyevs, father and son, used Russian fluently and the president’s official website (http://www.president.az) functions in three languages – Azerbaijani, Russian and English.

Nation-building debates The issue of Azerbaijani national identity has been of paramount importance for the political and intellectual elites of Azerbaijan (Suny 1999: 159–62; Shaffer 2002: 159–67). The debate originated in the nineteenth century and in the time of the short-lived independent Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918–20). It continued in a more guarded style under Soviet rule, chiefly in the last years of the Soviet Union after 1977; and later in independent Azerbaijan where discussion is by no means at an end. In any event, Azerbaijan is the only country among the six which had a statehood predating Soviet times. Partly following the government and partly opposing it, Azerbaijan’s intellectual elites share new political discourses emphasizing (among other topics) cultural norms and values, many of them involving the reconstruction of cultural space (cf. Tokluoğlu 2005). The perception that a nation is defined by territorial boundaries has been particularly relevant to the Azerbaijanis due to their armed conflict over Nagornyi Karabakh and their loss of this region to Armenia. Similarly, the majority ethnie had to foster a cultural identity, with an emphasis on language, against that of other ethnic groups, chiefly the Russian and Armenian minorities. As this case demonstrates, cultural elements are deeply significant in the making of national identities which can be constructed as mutually exclusive. The cultural field, drawing on myths of common destiny and on language, is where new identities are formed and shaped. The Azerbaijan context was investigated in 1998 by Ceylan Tokluoğlu (2005: 729ff.) in a series of interviews with Azerbaijani political leaders and opinion shapers. Many of his conclusions still seem valid. There were sharply conflicting views, as well as some agreement, among the respondents on their perceptions of Azerbaijani identity. Most interviewees encapsulated the linguistic difference between the Soviet period

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and independence as follows: ‘During the Soviet period, being modern meant to speak Russian and study at Russian schools; after independence, speaking English ... started to be considered being modern’. Azerbaijan’s defeat in the war with Armenia over Nagornyi Karabakh, which ended in a ceasefire in 1994, and its economic problems (the oil industry needed huge investments) reinforced former President Heydar Aliyev’s determination and that of the elites to devote considerable attention and funds to what they called Azərbaycançılıq (‘Azerbaijanism’). This was a serious quest for a new identity (van der Leeuw 2000). By this term they apparently meant ‘patriotism’ on all levels. Heydar Aliyev is reputed to have declared that ‘the main idea of the independent Azerbaijani state is Azerbaijanism’. He explained that by the concept of Azerbaijanism he was referring to the Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan, to those living abroad as well as to the minority ethnies existing in the state (Today.az 2010). Further interpretations of the term varied during the 1990s and early 2000s, swinging between patriotic versions based on Turkism, privileging the Azerbaijani community, and the formation of a nation-state based on all the ethnic communities in Azerbaijan (see Hadjy-zadeh 1996). Culture and language held an important place in the debates on the essence of Azerbaijanism (Yürükel 1998: 260–90). Aliyev frequently declared that ‘the Azerbaijani language is the wealth of Azerbaijan’. In essence, ‘Azerbaijanism – the doctrine of national statehood’ (Ilham Aliyev’s teaching in 2010), which is associated with the preservation of the native language and culture, was the fairly successful attempt to create a new national ideology to fill the spiritual vacuum left after Communism had been discredited and rejected. As such, this concept is now elevated to the level of a ‘state ideology’ which has laid the foundations for the modern post-Soviet independent state of Azerbaijan. Heydar Aliyev is hailed as having been the only person capable of creating such a unifying new idea, and academic conferences are dedicated to his achievements in this realm. According to his son, Ilham, continuing this line, there is no alternative to this ideology, which is also expressed in the concept of a very long heroic history as taught in the schools. While in Western societies the notion of a ‘state ideology’ is regarded rather critically, in Azerbaijan the cult of

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personality around Heydar Aliyev, the fact that his son is on his way to becoming president for life, and the creation of a single ideology implying common ideas, beliefs, and goals, go hand in hand with the authoritarian nature of the regime. In the ideological vacuum left after the discreditation of Soviet Socialist ideology and in the attempt to create a new, unifying identity concept, language played a central part (Balım-Harding 2009). Through administrative and legislative acts (see below) and effective communication methods, i.e. a broad discourse, language consciousness was successfully promoted (Garibova 2009: 21). The Azerbaijani scholar Garibova has analyzed the methods of propagating the language issue and the types of political discourse centring on language as a symbol of national identity: among them are eulogies of praise, self-referential glorification, reference to celebrities, labelling, directing and legitimating discourses (Garibova 2009: 22–4). In some instances, the role of a symbolic historic actor is ascribed to language, which has ‘shared the nation’s fate, and faced the problems that the nation encountered’ (2001 presidential decree ‘On the Improvement of the Implementation of the State Language’, cited by Garibova 2009: 24).

Legislation and debates In Azerbaijan, as in several other Soviet republics, the titular language had previously received formal recognition. In 1978, the constitution of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic was amended (Art. 151) to declare that ‘the state language of Azerbaijan should be Azerbaijani’ (Garibova 2009: 15). Later, the August 1989 language decree, issued under Soviet rule, praised the Azerbaijani language and pronounced it the state language; the declaration of sovereignty on 30 August 1991 and of independence on 5 October 1991 confirmed this. These documents emphasize the cultural element of what would later become ‘Azerbaijanism’, highlighting the titular community’s language. The statements on language were reaffirmed in a decree of 16 September 1992 which focused on measures for implementing these pronouncements in all spheres of life, as did the revised edition of the Law on

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the State Language of 22 December 1992 and, later, the 12 November 1995 constitution (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 2001: 114–5). These decrees and other pronouncements proclaimed equal rights for the majority and minority ethnies in matters of language – in education, employment and the development of their culture (Garibova 2009: 27). In practice, these principles were implemented in part only, with public use of Azerbaijani growing at the expense of other languages in parliament, official publications and the military forces. Before the 1995 constitution was drawn up, a lively public debate took place among intellectuals as to what the approved name of the state language should be – Azerbaijanian/Azeri (Azərbaican dili) or Turkish (Türkçe). The two languages are very similar in many respects, with a common patrimony, although modern Azerbaijani has preserved many Persian and Arabic words and added numerous Russian terms, while modern Turkish has eliminated many Persian and Arabic influences. The 1992 language law consistently called the language ‘Turkish’, but the 1995 constitution (Art. 23) proclaimed it as ‘Azerbaijanian’ (in line with the 1978 constitution of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic) and this appellation has prevailed. But a heated debate continued for some time, as the name of the language was relevant to the identity of the newly independent republic (Kellner-Heinkele 2001: 20–4; Nərimanoglu 2006: 48–58). After a decade of independence, progress in the transition to Azerbaijani as the state language had been made in many fields, but was seen as not yet satisfactory. A decree by President Heydar Aliyev, ‘On the Official Use of Azerbaijani’, dated 18 June 2001, aimed at better and fuller implementation of the law on the state language (Balayev 2005: 301–13) and insisted on the use of the Latin alphabet in state and public affairs. The decree outlines a short history of the Azerbaijan language from the earliest times (fourth to fifth centuries A.D.) to the present situation in independent Azerbaijan, and achievements during the ten years of independence. However, it also describes shortcomings and delays in the implementation of Azerbaijani as the state language and in the transition to the Latin script. It sums up urgent problems and tasks in the field of the state language and all in all presents a rather critical and outspoken assessment. Finally, the decree sets out

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nine measures to be implemented in the near future, among them the creation of a State Commission on Language under the president and the preparation of a project to design a new law: ‘On the State Language of the Republic of Azerbaijan’ (Balayev 2005: 311ff.). The pronouncements of the 2001 decree concerning the state language, intended to limit the continuing role of Russian in public use and to elevate the status of the state language in practice, were elucidated in a new law passed by parliament and signed by President Heydar Aliyev in September 2002, coming into force on 1 January 2003 (Zakon Azerbaydzhanskoi Respubliki ot 30 sentyabrya 2002 goda 2002; Bakinskii Rabochii, 16 January 2003; Balayev 2005: 313–24). Unlike the earlier law, the new version does not contain a section on the ‘Right of the citizens to choose a language’ – it is much more stateoriented in its wording. While the previous law had mentioned the ‘languages of the peoples who live in the territory of the Republic’ or the ‘nationalities and ethnic groups that live in compact settlements in the territory’, the 2002 law makes no mention of ethnic minorities. As such it is not in line with European minority policies and conventions. Knowledge of Azerbaijani is obligatory for all citizens of the country. Section II of the 2002 law deals with the ‘Use, Protection and Development of the State Language’. Almost all of the 15 articles, covering different spheres of public life, have the heading ‘The use of the state language in ...’. The section starts with Art. 4 on ceremonies: all official ceremonies and events at all levels of the state are to be conducted in the state language. Article 5, dealing with the language of instruction, allows for instruction in ‘other languages’. All radio and television channels, including private ones, have to broadcast in the state language. Procedures and services in state institutions, law enforcement organs and legal procedures must be carried out in the state language or with the help of translators, if ‘the persons concerned do not know the state language’. In court, ‘other languages’ can be used. The state language has to be written and printed in the Azerbaijani alphabet with Latin characters. Cyrillic can be used in special cases (dictionaries, bibliographies). The new language law contains a special article (18) on the protection and development of the Azerbaijani language: ‘It is forbidden to carry out hidden or open propaganda against

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the state language, to obstruct its use or to try to curtail its historically determined rights’ (Art. 18.1); a provision open to interpretation and therefore useful to slander possible political opponents or reject demands for the greater language autonomy of minor ethnic groups. Art. 18.2 stresses that all mass media and all other print and editorial business have to adhere to the norms of the Azerbaijani language. There was some opposition to the new Language Law on various grounds, such as the fear among ethnic Russians that their language rights might be infringed. Ethnic Russians now comprise a very small minority. Their spokesmen claimed that the Russian language had lost some force in recent years. The drive to enforce Azerbaijani would obviously have had consequences for the entire Russophone community of about two million, including ethnic Azerbaijanis, i.e., about 25 per cent of the population. Parliamentarians and others, like the poet and politician Sabir Rustamkhanly, tried to soothe such fears, stressing that the aim was to encourage people to learn the language of the country of which they were citizens. The Democratic Congress of Azerbaijan (DCA), an alliance of right-wing national groups, also objected, because in their view the new law was not radical enough. In the first years of independence, there was considerable sympathy for Turkey and its culture among Azerbaijani intellectuals, many of whom preferred them to Russia and Russian culture. Soon after independence, some people recommended the adoption of Turkish as a state language for reasons of rapprochement. Although this failed, a few continued to promote the issue. As late as 2009, no less a person than Nizami Jafarov, chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Cultural Affairs and director of the Atatürk Centre (Atatürk Merkezi) in Baku, called for the adoption of Turkish as the common language of all Turkic states (Kasybekov 2009). But all in all, the strong emotional attachment to Turkey or a Turkey-dominated Turkish world has lost its vigour.

The challenge of Russian In the early years of independence, some Azerbaijanis feared that the Russian language would dominate their independent culture as in the days of Soviet rule. This seems rather ironic today, as Russian is

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mainly needed by Azerbaijanis who are seeking work in the Russian Federation or have jobs at home that require knowledge of the language. For the large number of workers who migrate seasonally to Russia, knowing the Russian language is a great asset. Thus, the active use of Russian language skills is continuously renewed among older migrant workers, while younger ones are strongly motivated to acquire such skills. A move in June 2003 by certain Russian parliamentarians to designate Russian as an ‘official language’ in all CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries was categorically rejected by Azerbaijan’s foreign minister two months later. He was quoted as saying ‘We are not against the use of the Russian language in our country, but acceptance of the proposal is out of the question’ (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline 2003). In independent Azerbaijan, according to recent evidence, since the late 1990s more and more translations into Azerbaijani have been made and published directly from English, French and other languages, not via Russian as had often been the case earlier. As a part of cultural indigenization, Russian loanwords are increasingly being replaced by neologisms imported mostly from Turkic sources, although Russianisms are still preserved in many official and personal turns of phrase. Russian bureaucrats are increasingly being replaced by a new generation of Azerbaijanis who like to emphasize their pride in their identity. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation observed, in a report issued in 2003, that Azerbaijanis fluent in Russian were replacing some ethnic Russians in public jobs (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rossiyskoi Federatsii 2003). At the start of the 1990s, the Russian community in Azerbaijan was already complaining about the speed of the transition to Azerbaijani and the lack of better facilities for Russian language instruction. Since the 1990s, many people have been showing support for de-Russification by dropping the Russian suffixes -‘ov’ and -‘ev’ (-‘ova’, -‘eva’) from their family names. Azerbaijani is used in all official documents and at official meetings. Names of localities and streets and other external signs such as shop-signs have been

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changed. Members of the ethnic Russian community worried that their Russian-medium schools might be closed or otherwise discriminated against. Despite massive out-migration, the Russians are still vocal. Some argue that one does not have to master the country’s language in order to be considered a patriot (Useynov 2002). Others voice some complaints, but nonetheless seem fairly well adjusted to the new situation, including language education at school (Aliyeva 2007). All things considered, the Russian language continues to maintain its public standing (Pavlenko 2008: 293, 295), although opinions on the matter vary. At a symposium held in Moscow on 29 February 2008, N. Akhundova, a representative of the Azerbaijan Embassy to the Russian Federation, maintained that the study of Russian and in Russian at Azerbaijan schools and universities had not diminished in any way (Akhundova 2008). However, Sara Winter (2009), who examined the data meticulously, concluded that there was some decrease in the number of those studying Russian. All things considered, a change from the early years of independence is visible. The pro-Turkish Popular Front followed an adverse policy towards the Russian language, while the policy of the Aliyevs is more cautious and in recent years has changed to recognition of the value of Russian as offering access to information and as a lingua franca in the post-Soviet cultural space. Among the elites, which accord great importance to the state language as a symbol of national identity and pride, Russian nevertheless still enjoys considerable prestige and they even hire private Russian language tutors for their children to compensate for the drop in Russian lessons at school (Garibova 2009: 24–6). A survey carried out in 2007 found that there was less interest in acquiring and using Russian among the population of Azerbaijan than in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan (Zadorin 2008: 17–27). In any event, in the last few years the dispute as to whether Azerbaijani culture ought to be Russian-oriented or Turkish-oriented has subsided somewhat. More Azerbaijanis insist on an identity based on their own culture and language, incorporating various ancient symbols and myths.

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Latinization of the alphabet Azerbaijan re-introduced the Latin alphabet, which had first been used in the country in the 1920s. The Azerbaijanis’ interest in alphabet change was an established fact, and their first such attempt preceded that of Turkey by seven years (Strauss 2010: 349). At independence the president appointed commissions to examine and suggest ways to work out the new characters and the transition to the Latin script. The new government’s choice of and determined support for the state’s new Latin alphabet, affirmed by parliament on 25 December 1991, is perhaps the best indication of the search for an Azerbaijani identity. The issue was widely discussed in the press in subsequent years. It was the first of the six republics to decide on Latinization and its first law on language introduced a rather speedy programme (Alpatov 2002: 122; Ergun 2010: 44–8). The new Latin alphabet designed for the Azerbaijani language is a linguistically viable version of the Azerbaijani Latin script of the 1920s, adapted to the special phonetic needs of the Azerbaijani language. The pro-Turkish cultural trend of the 1990s was strong, but Azerbaijan refused to adopt the so-called Common Turkish Alphabet in toto. According to research by Behar, carried out in 1993, 89.6 per cent of the population supported Latinization (Behar 1995: 51; see also Table 9.7, Appendix). Some complaints were voiced by the older generation, educated in the Cyrillic script, although Fouse claims that there was no real opposition to Latinization (Fouse 2000: 190–1; Thomson 2005: 74). Garibova (2009: 17) says that there was some opposition to this new alphabet from the very start and the dispute ended only after the new script had been fully implemented at the official level. Still, there was apparently stronger popular support for it in Azerbaijan than in any of the other states discussed. For the older generation the transition to the new script was fraught with practical everyday difficulties once most of the press, shop signs, etc., had switched to the unfamiliar alphabet in August 2001. Ultimately, Turkey failed to ‘sell’ the Common Turkish Alphabet in full (Heyet 2004), and it enjoyed only mixed success in its educational and economic assistance activities (Robins 1998; Landau and

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Kellner-Heinkele 2001: 127ff.; Vaner 2005: 517–20). Even nowadays, there are still Azerbaijanis who would like to see the Turkish alphabet as such accepted in their state (and, for that matter, in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan as well). A prominent advocate of such a cultural symbiosis is Nizami Jafarov who in January 2008 warmly recommended it, referring to a decision of the 11th Congress of Turkic-speaking nations, held in Baku on 19 November 2007 (AKIpress 2008). Opponents of this idea were equally vociferous in their opposition. An early sign of the trend towards Latinization was the standardization of the Azerbaijani Latin computer font in UNICODE, which enabled both IBM and Mac computers to reproduce the Azerbaijani Latin alphabet. This move solved editors’ and printers’ difficulties with the new alphabet’s additional signs, such as the inverted ‘e’ (ə), which is sometimes transliterated into other languages as ‘ä’ (Blair 1993: 36–40). Despite difficulties, Latinization was systematically introduced in schools, starting in 1992–93 with the first grade; each succeeding year another grade using it intensively, at considerable expense to the government, largely in new textbooks, designed also to showcase Azerbaijan’s history and culture (Winter 2009). With the addition of new textbooks in Latin characters each year since 1992, the entire school system now has an Azərbaican Dili (‘Azerbaijani Language’) series of attractive textbooks, as well as manuals of instruction for teachers of Azerbaijani. All other disciplines, too, except the Russian language, now use school books in Latin script. Few works in Latinized Azerbaijani – school books excepted – were published until the early years of the twenty-first century. On 18 June 2001 a presidential decree ordained that after 1 August that year, ‘no official or commercial document should contain a single character in the Cyrillic alphabet’ (Hatcher 2008). According to Sebba (2003: 6), rather than comply fully with this decree, one newspaper switched to Russian, another tried to continue to publish in Cyrillic (but was prevented from appearing and ceased publication altogether), while yet others used the Latin script only for their headings, or migrated on to the internet. Of course, since then the situation has changed

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and the entire press in Azerbaijani has now been Latinized. Websites and newspapers are in Azerbaijani (Latin script), Russian and English. Also, a fairly large number of Azerbaijani books and magazines in Latin script are available in the bookstores (personal observation, April 2007). Various public institutions were mobilized to help the drive for Latinization. Their efforts were synchronized by a state language commission set up according to the 2001 decree and supervised by President Heydar Aliyev himself. The National Academy of Sciences was given the task of preparing a list of books that ought to be translated into Azerbaijani. A special effort was made by the National Academy of Sciences, the Hydrometeorology Committee, several parliamentary agencies, the State Committee of Land Resources and Cartography and others towards the systematic standardizing of the country’s geographical names in the new script. A gazetteer of geographical names was compiled, as well as lists of the place names of Azerbaijan. Atlases and maps on various scales, all in Latin lettering, were prepared (Boginsky 2009: 3). Dictionaries, of course, are essential for immersion in a new script. The Writers’ Union, for example, was instructed to publish in the Latin script only and to compile new dictionaries (Rahmati 2001: 304–5), like the Azerbaijani-English Dictionary in the New Latin Alphabet, compiled in 1998 by Oruj Musayev. Another dictionary was published in Istanbul in the following year: Azerbaycan Türkçesi’nden Türkiye Türkçesi’ne büyük sözlük (‘Large Dictionary from Azerbaijan Turkish to the Turkish of Turkey’), compiled by Yaşar Akdoğan. A new orthographic dictionary of Latinized Azerbaijani came out in 2004. A New Azerbaijani Thesaurus of 15,000 words, modelled on Roget’s Thesaurus of synonyms and antonyms, was prepared in 2005 by Shaig Jabiroghlu in an effort at corpus development. He has also attempted to introduce new Azerbaijani words to replace Russian ones (Jabiroghlu 2005). Finally, a new four-language dictionary of medical terms was published in 2010, in a joint Turkish-Azerbaijani effort. Edited by Murat Yurdakök, Nasib Guliyev and Naila Rahimova, it was titled in English Turkish-English-Azerbaijani-Russian Dictionary of Medical Terms. It contained 2,956 terms (Türk Dili 705, September

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2010: 285). More dictionaries are being prepared at the Institute of Linguistics of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences. Various online bilingual and trilingual dictionaries are also available, as well as specialized dictionaries, e.g. for use in the oil industry, but neither complete, nor user-friendly. Gradually, more books are being published in the new Latin alphabet, such as an interesting 92-page booklet by Afaq Rüstəmova (2001), an overview of post-Soviet ethnolinguistic processes in Azerbaijan, compared to Soviet days. The chancellor of the Khazar University in Baku, Hamlet İsaxanlı (2006: 82) has reported that the book situation continues to improve, thanks to support for the Azerbaijani publishing industry by United States and European organizations, which donated funds for the shift to the new Azerbaijani script and the publication of works on the social sciences, law, education, journalism, economics and business. To further increase access to books in Azerbaijani in the Latin script, on the order of the president, Azerbaijani literature and world classics, dictionaries and encyclopaedias were published in spring and winter 2004 in numerous copies, and distributed to libraries. A special focus was on literature for young people, as the transition to the Latin alphabet had reduced the availability of reading material for schoolchildren, posing a serious threat to literacy. In addition, in 2007 the 150-volume World Literature Library was to be published. In 2007–08, in an effort to overcome the difficulties caused by the re-introduction of the Latin script, the ‘Treasury of the Azerbaijani Language’ project was initiated with UNESCO support, aiming at setting up a database of full texts of Azerbaijani writings as well as translations from world classics, entitled The Samples of World Literature in Azerbaijani Language and The Treasury of the Azerbaijani Language. The literary periodicals Khazar and Dünya Edebiyyatı are also devoted to spreading Azerbaijani and international literature among the local readership.

The Turkish involvement Government and public opinion in Turkey have been very interested in Azerbaijan’s situation; first, because of the close kinship of language and culture, and secondly because of Turkey’s wish to become

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a regional power and to counter Russian involvement. Turkey has invested considerable efforts in Azerbaijan’s economy, technology, communications and foreign relations (Gültekin 2003; Aydın 2007). The new rapport also highlights education, probably in the hope of creating elites favourable to Turkey. Scholarships have been granted for study at universities in Turkey; Turkish schools and other educational institutions have been opened in Azerbaijan. In 2001–02 there were reportedly two Turkish schools with 452 students and a Turkish Language Centre with 40 students in Baku, established by the Turkish Ministry of National Education to spread Turkish language and culture. Many Turkish private schools have also been set up since 1992 by NGOs such as the Turkish World Research Foundation (Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı), which had by 2001 established a business administration institute in Baku as well as several secondary schools, both offering instruction in Azerbaijani and Turkish by Azerbaijani and Turkish teachers (Yanık 2004). The Gülen movement, a religious organization based in Turkey, spreads a moderate Islamic and Pan-Turkic discourse in Azerbaijan and other Muslim and some non-Muslim countries. Under the leadership of Fethullah Gülen, it aims to re-Islamize Turkey and other Muslim countries from below, using inter-connected, informal networks. This means that it is a social organization as much as a religious and educational one. Since 1992, Gülen has been putting out a newspaper, Zaman, in Turkish and Azerbaijani, issued in Baku first as a weekly and then, since 2004, as a daily. The newspaper is also available on the internet. The organization’s activities are diverse and, while claiming to be apolitical, have political implications (Park 2008). In Azerbaijan and several other Central Asian states, it focuses on education; its schools offer superior teaching, including instruction in Turkish, English and the titular language (Yavuz and Esposito, eds. 2003: 39–40). In February 1997 the movement could boast of 16 primary and secondary schools with 397 teachers and 2,653 pupils in Azerbaijan. In 2002–03 it had 12 schools with 338 teachers and 3,023 pupils (Balçı 2003: 156; Balçı 2003a). In July 2009, the movement was still supporting 12 schools (four of them in Baku): one primary and 11 secondary. It also established the Qafqaz University with an

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academic staff of 102 and a student body of 1,407 (see http://www. qafqaz.edu.az). Inaugurated in 1993 and officially registered two years later, the institution is financed by the Turkish company Çağ Öğretim İşletmeleri (Besson 2004: 171–84; Balçı 2007).

Minorities and language The ethnic minorities living in Azerbaijan, comprising approximately 8 per cent of the population in total (Russians and Ukrainians included), belong to different language groups and religious affiliations. The Caucasian language branch is represented by a variety of small groups (some inhabiting only one valley or a single village) which are typical of the linguistic diversity of the Caucasus: Lezgins (Lezgis) – the largest group – Avars, Tsakhurs, Ingiloys, Udins, Budugs, Kryzs, and Khinaligs (the last three groups are also known as Shakhdags). Tats, Kurds and Talysh belong to the Iranian group; Tatars and Meskhetian Turks (also called Akhyska or Akhiska Turks) are speakers of Turkic languages. The fate of the smaller minorities, their language rights and their integration in Azerbaijani society has not attracted sufficient attention and in-depth studies from researchers (for the different groups, see Clifton 2005–2005i; Kotecha 2006: 33ff.; Yunusov 2006; Gerber 2007). Among the larger groups of the wider South Caucasus region are the Armenians and Georgians (Mamedov 1998). As noted above, the new edition of the language law (2002) does not recognize the existence of minorities, or minority languages, in the territory of Azerbaijan. The 2002 law has thus adversely affected the rights of the ethnic minorities. Representatives of ethnic minorities may employ their own languages in court, but otherwise they do not have equal language rights in practice, as discussed in more detail below. The law prescribed the use of Azerbaijani in public, including the media, with limited possibilities of employing Avar, Lezgin or Tat in the home regions of these ethnies, which were still using the Cyrillic alphabet. All personal names (surnames, patronymic and family names) of the citizens of Azerbaijan have to be written in the state language (Art. 8). Since the law came into force, all radio and TV

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channels have to broadcast in the state language – with no leeway for broadcasting in the minority languages. Among the Caucasian language group, the Lezgins constitute the largest and most prominent community. Their official number in the 1999 national census (where, according to official statements, individuals defined their nationality themselves, without documentary proof) was 178,000 people, but the Lezgins claim that the actual figure is two to three times higher. Ethnographic research (Yunusov 2006: 486) partially supports their claim, arriving at 250,000–260,000 Lezgins, mostly living in compact settlements in the north-eastern district of Gusar. More than 250,000 Lezgins live in neighbouring Daghestan (The Russian Federation). The Lezgins are aware of their political identity and culturally active. Lezgin nationalists formed a political representation, ‘Sadval’, in 1989 and for a time propagated separatist goals, demanding the unification of Daghestani and Azerbaijani Lezgins, or, at least, more autonomy. The movement was partly supported by Russia in the 1990s, allegedly to instigate separatism in Azerbaijan. But all in all, Lezgins seem well integrated and many intermarry with ethnic Azerbaijanis (Shafee 2008). They maintain a Lezgin National Drama Theatre, study the Lezgin culture in a branch of the Baku Teachers’ Training College and publish a Lezgin-language newspaper, Samur. Two lessons a week of Lezgin are taught in areas of Lezgin concentration, but knowledge of the language is receding (Kotecha 2006: 42). A smaller Caucasian group, the Avars, try not to be overlooked, but their cultural activities seem rather meagre. The Talysh in the south of Azerbaijan speak a north-western Iranian language. There are also Talysh settlements in Western Iran. As in the case of the Lezgins, nationalist leaders maintain that their numbers (officially 76,800 in 1999) are grossly underreported. Like the Lezgins, the Talysh do not show much support for separatist propaganda, but they seem to have some grievances concerning social issues and expressions of ethnic identity (Kotecha 2006: 33–6; Shafee 2008). Some complain that the Talysh language is being suppressed and endangered. One instance is their complaint to the Council of Europe that in the summer of 2008 a Talysh philologist was sentenced, for no apparent reason, to a prison term of ten years. Actually, the Talysh

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publish little books of poems for children, nursery rhymes and poems by local poets – but not much else (Kotecha 2006: 35). In 2007, the telecommunication ministries of Azerbaijan and Iran signed a memorandum, and since then broadcasting from Iran into the Talysh regions of Azerbaijan has been permitted (Shafee 2008). Due to the war with Armenia and the ensuing wave of refugees in both directions, the number of Armenians in Azerbaijan shrank by more than two-thirds between 1989 and 1999, when 120,700 were counted, and has diminished further since then. The Azerbaijani scholar Jala Garibova has evaluated the language policy concerning minorities. She refers to the legal guarantees laid out in the 1992 presidential decree ‘On Protection of the Rights and Liberties and Development of Languages and Cultures of Ethnic Minorities Living in the Territory of the Azerbaijan Republic’, which aimed at ‘maintenance and encouragement of linguistic diversity’ (Garibova 2009: 27). While she noticed a shift from ‘tolerance-orientated’ to ‘promotion-orientated’ language policy in Azerbaijan, she also observed a lack of supportive measures for implementing such a policy, like legal instruments, research, specialist training and methods to preserve and develop minority languages, for example corpus planning; that is, elaborating and standardizing the language.

Language in education The issue of language instruction at school is often brought up in Azerbaijan. An example is the round table on International MotherLanguage Day, celebrated for the first time on 21 February 2007. Speakers from parliament, the ministries and the National Academy of Sciences discussed the merits of employing the mother language versus multilingualism. They all agreed on the merits of Azerbaijani as a mother tongue, but it was also generally accepted that the minority languages ought to be protected, in a spirit of multilingualism, and that the language textbooks in the minority schools ought to be improved (BayBak 2007). These suggestions have been made repeatedly since the 1990s, which illustrates the magnitude of problems not yet resolved.

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It cannot be denied that Soviet ways of acting and thinking persist in some measure, although they are under pressure. This can be observed in the educational system that is currently being developed, albeit in an Azerbaijani patriotic atmosphere. Like all the post-Soviet republics, Azerbaijan inherited from the Soviet period mass education at all levels and a broad network of educational institutions, but also many problems in this sector. Since independence, the republic has ‘implemented large-scale activities in creating a national education system, and carried out reform programmes in an intensive manner’, with the aim of integrating with the global education system (Ministry of Education of the Azerbaijan Republic 2008: 2). During the early years of independence the switch to the Latin alphabet was especially costly in the educational sector, requiring the printing of new syllabuses, textbooks, reading materials, teacher manuals and so on. In addition, the direction of the syllabuses and the content of textbooks had to be adapted to a new ideological outlook. This reform strategy was laid down in 1999 in the ‘Reform Programme of the Education Sector in the Azerbaijan Republic’ (Ministry of Education of the Azerbaijan Republic 2008: 55); its realization was partly supported by the World Bank (1999–2004). The government usually apportions about 2.1 per cent of GDP to education. As in the other new republics, there is a shortage of trained teaching staff in general education schools. The shortages are especially noticeable in remote villages. Many school facilities are in need of repair. According to the Ministry of Education, 85 per cent of schools do not have a heating system (Ministry of Education of the Azerbaijan Republic 2008: 23); many schools have to accommodate far more students than their capacities allow. In 1992, the National Assembly passed an Education Law, in which a major change in comparison to Soviet times concerned the decentralization of educational management, allowing for the establishment of private education. The law was amended in 1995 and compulsory education was increased from nine to eleven years. It guaranteed for all citizens the right to education, irrespective of ethnicity or language. Article 6 dealt with the language of instruction and laid down that Azerbaijani is the language of instruction in the educational

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establishments of Azerbaijan. Education could also be provided in the ‘languages of the small peoples’ (malochislennyye narody) as well as in foreign languages, but teaching the state language and the history, literature and geography of Azerbaijan is compulsory. A new law on education was passed in June 2009, after almost 15 years of discussions and repeated delays. The provisions cited above were repeated in the law, such as the basic right to education independently of language and ethnicity. Azerbaijani remains the predominant language of instruction but teaching can also be provided in ‘other languages’ (‘Təhsil haqqında’ 2009). This law gives more leeway to the establishment of private educational institutions. One provision may have repercussions: foreign educational institutions will be limited to a three-year renewable licence. According to an official, this provision is ‘to protect the country’s education system from foreign and negative influences’. The new law was also openly criticized by some NGOs as being too centralistic and a step backwards, even compared with Soviet times (Petrova 2009). For the overwhelming majority of pupils at school level, the state language is the language of instruction, as Table 2.2 shows. Although the number of Russian-medium schools has been more than halved, the number of pupils having Russian as the language of instruction has not receded proportionally. In the school year 2006–07, almost 92.8 per cent of pupils received education with Azerbaijani as language of instruction and about 7 per cent of the pupils got their education in the Russian language, compared to a share of 1.8 per cent Russians in the 1999 census. Georgian was the language of instruction for 0.1 per cent of pupils. The government has laid considerable emphasis on instruction in Azerbaijani at school; in 2008–09, almost 93 per cent of pupils countrywide had Azerbaijani as their language of instruction. By contrast, only 7.1 per cent of the student population attended schools with the majority of instruction in Russian. This is partly explicable by emigration, which left only an estimated 180,000 Russians in Azerbaijan by 2007, not counting children of mixed marriages (Aliyeva 2007). Not content with foreign textbooks for teaching Russian and English, a new series was prepared for grades 1–11 and is generally

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Table 2.2 Pupils in Azerbaijan’s state and private schools by language of instruction, 1995–2009 1995–96 Number of institutions (total)

4,460

Languages of instruction Azerbaijani 4,008 Russian 44 Georgian 6 English – Azerbaijani and 398 Russian 4 Azerbaijani and Georgian – Azerbaijani, Russian and Georgian Number of pupils 1,483,500 (total) Educated by language: Azerbaijani 1,359,000 (91.6 %) Russian 121,900 (8.2 %) Georgian 2,600 (0.2 %) English –

2000–01

2004–05

2006–07 2008–09

4,526

4,523

4,508

4,531

4,117 31 6 – 368

4,138 22 6 2 349

4,138 20 6 1 337

4,161 21 6 2 335

5

5

5

5

1

1

1

1

1,648,540

1,624,881

1,537,702 (93.3 %) 108,240 (6.6 %) 2,598 (0.1 %) –

1,512,931 1,416,880 1,318,798 (93.1 %) (92.8 %) (92.7 %) 109,060 108,257 101,209 (6.7 %) (7.1 %) (7.1 %) 2,197 1,887 1,666 (0.1 %) (0.1 %) (0.1 %) 693 563 738

1,527,591 1,422,411

Source: The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2009 (http://www.azstat. org/statinfo/education/en/013.shtml).

used, with some success. Schools offer some courses in minority languages (for instance, in Georgian), although these often suffer from antiquated textbooks (Popjanevski 2006: 68). The ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan generally conform in their curricula to those implemented in the Azerbaijani-medium schools. Georgians have Georgian-medium schools, both primary and secondary, in Azerbaijan – in parallel to Azerbaijani-medium schools in Georgia. The Talysh, Lezgins, Avars, Tsakhurs, Udins (all speakers of Caucasian languages), Jews and a few others (İsaxanlı 2006: 125–54)

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had, between them, about 400 schools in 2007, instructing in the minority languages (BayBak 2007). The officially announced principle is that all ethnic groups may be educated in their respective mother tongues. This applies to Azerbaijanis and ethnic Russians, but is not put into practice to the same extent with other minorities. The objective reason offered for the paucity of minority classes is the scarcity of textbooks and of qualified teachers. Thus, the declared policy that ethnic minority pupils should get two hours a week of lessons in their mother tongue is often bypassed. Moreover, minority pupils studying in Azerbaijani-medium or Russian-medium schools do not get special textbooks based on a methodology for teaching Azerbaijani as a second language but use the regular textbooks of all other Azerbaijani pupils. The principle applies also to Azerbaijani-medium schools which offer lessons in Russian, usually based on imported textbooks intended for first-language instruction with hardly any specific methodology for Azerbaijani pupils who study Russian as a second language (Gerber 2007: 30). The instruction of English as a foreign language has made some progress. The Azerbaijan English Teachers’ Association, a non-governmental organization, is active in this direction. Registered in 1996 and centred in Baku but active in other regions as well, it provides support for the professional development of teachers of English. Its focus is on teacher training, and the development of materials, workshops and conferences. These strategies have created networks of teachers for secondary schools and universities and promoted the acquisition of English by modern methods of teaching it as a foreign language. The British Council in Azerbaijan cooperates in projects intended to foster English instruction in the country (Padwad et al. 2005: 119–20). This is advancing fairly well, as evidenced by the increase in the use of English not only among the young but also in scholarly publications such as Caucasus and Globalization: Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, a quarterly in English and Russian, issued in Baku by the Institute of Strategic Studies in Transcaucasia since September 2006. Table 2.3 shows the distribution of language teachers among the major foreign languages taught in schools.

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Language teachers in Azerbaijan’s general schools, 2005–08 October 2005

Russian in Russian-medium schools Russian in non-Russian-medium schools English Other foreign languages

1,995 11,579 11,142 1,424

October 2008 1,801 9,223 13,308 1,404

Source: The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2006: Table 4.10 and 2009: Table 1.4.23.

The decline in the number of teachers of Russian is striking, especially when compared with the increase in the number of teachers of English.

Languages at the universities The status of the state language and the claim that every citizen has to know it is underlined in the academic sphere as well. As provided for in the new Language Law (2002), all applicants for higher education have to pass an entrance examination in Azerbaijani. The downgrading of Russian has created some difficulties for academic achievement. Insufficient knowledge of Russian means that students might not be equipped to use resources in the language, while Azerbaijani language resources have not yet been provided on a sufficient scale (Garibova 2009: 26); a problem also encountered in the Central Asian republics. In 2006–07, student enrolment reached 122,770 (Zulfugarov et al. 2007), rising to 136,587 in 2008–09 (The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2009, Table 1.1.1 of Education, Science and Culture). According to Hamlet İsaxanlı (2006: 28), in 2005 there were 32 public and 15 private universities (including Khazar). This number changed little in the following years, reaching 48 institutions in 2008, divided into 34 public and 14 private ones. The private ones offered instruction mostly in English while other instruction was generally in Azerbaijani and Russian, with Azerbaijani showing an increase at the expense of Russian. This was the case during 2008 at the Baku State University, the Nasreddin Tusi Azerbaijan State Pedagogical University, the Azerbaijan Technical University and such institutions

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as the Azerbaijan Academy for Physical Training and Sports, the Azerbaijan Medical University, the Baku Islamic University, and the Azerbaijan State Marine Academy (Europa World of Learning 2009 2008: Vol. I, 195–6). As for private universities, Qafqaz University offers much of its instruction in Turkish (but also in English and Azerbaijani), since this institution was founded with Turkish assistance. It is the first and only educational institution authorized by the Azerbaijan Ministry of Education to have a ‘Distinguished Status’ in drawing up its own curriculum. Accordingly, the university’s programme of studies is based on both Turkish and Western models. The Azerbaijan University of Languages in Baku had, in 2007–08, centres for the study of English, German, Italian, Spanish, Korean, French and the Scandinavian languages (). The university runs a Translation Centre in association with UNESCO, which trains translators and interpreters, and also does some work on terminological issues (). The Institute of Russian Language and Literature, renamed Baku Slavic University in 2000, had a 2,000-strong student body in 2000– 01. It is this university that trains most school teachers of Russian. It is now multi-disciplinary and sees as one of its major missions to teach other Slavic languages as well. The languages offered are Ukrainian, Polish, Czech, Bulgarian and Slovak, together with the literature of these languages. The university insists that whatever language students specialize in, they should also have a good knowledge of Russian, Azerbaijani and either English, German or French (Abdullayev 2001: 66–9).

The media A local bookstore owner, Nigar Kocharli, reported in 2009 that there were only ten bookshops in Baku and none outside the capital. About 80 to 90 per cent of books sold in bookshops are in Russian, imported from the Russian Federation, while just 7 to 8 per cent are in Azerbaijani (with the rest in Turkish or English). The local output of books is about 2,000 annually, with a print run of about 500 copies per volume. This represents a serious decline compared with Soviet times

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(Kocharli 2010: 5) – a common feature in other post-Soviet republics as well. This contrasts with the situation in the Soviet period, when tens of thousands of books were published and distributed all over the Union. There is a wide range of general press publications, although the press is not as lively as it was in the 1990s. According to a report by Ismailov (2009: 81–90), military censorship was imposed during the years 1990–93. Since 1993, with Aliyev’s accession to the presidency and the official abolition of censorship in 1996, government controls have continued but in more subtle ways. More than 100 newspapers and periodicals appeared in 2008, of which about half were published in Russian (Gavrilov et al. 2008: 67). This includes several opposition newspapers. Dailies and weeklies appear in other languages as well. The Baku Sun appears in English, Zerkalo in Russian and English (and also Azerbaijani under the title Ayna), while Ekho, Azerbaydzhanskiye Izvestiya, Nash Vek and Bakinskii Rabochii are published in Russian, and Zaman in Turkish and Azerbaijani. Most newspapers have an internet edition. According to the 2010 report by the Paris-based organization Reporters Without Borders, the press is under frequent government pressure, despite constitutional guarantees of the freedom of the press. Scholarly journals, often connected with the academic institutions mentioned above, have practised bilingualism, or sometimes multilingualism. For example, the Journal of Turcology appears annually in Azerbaijani and Russian, while the Journal of Problems of Eastern Philosophy is published twice a year in Azerbaijani, Arabic, Farsi, Turkish, English, German and French (Europa World of Learning 2009 2008, Vol. I: 193). In general, state television can be seen everywhere in Azerbaijan, while private television channels, also state controlled, can generally be seen only in Baku (Ismailov 2009: 88–9). However, many private channels can be watched via satellite and the internet. The Ministry of Culture has worked at dubbing foreign television films into Azerbaijani (they had earlier been dubbed into Russian alone). A special State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting was appointed to supervise these activities. At first, the State Commission

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was responsible only for dubbing foreign movies into Azerbaijani. This was the situation until 2008, when many Turkish and Russian films began to be shown without translation. Then its responsibilities were expanded and it started to ban all programmes broadcast on Azerbaijan television unless they were presented in Azerbaijani. Some Russian-language programmes resisted this Azerbaijanization, but in 2008 these programmes were also banned on official Azerbaijani television and radio frequencies. Some nationalists have even argued that the government ought to revoke the three public networks allotted to Russian television and use them for local broadcasts, so that viewers would have to buy their own satellite dishes to receive broadcasts from the Russian Federation. Both official and private radio and television are active in Azerbaijan, but according to the government decision of late December 2008, foreign radio and television broadcasts were severely limited as from 1 January 2009 (BBC Russian 2008). Local relays of the BBC, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the Voice of America and Europa Plus were taken off the air by the broadcasting regulator on 30 December 2008 (a decision condemned by the opposition Azerbaijan Democratic Party and criticized by the Council of Europe). However, the programmes can be captured via the internet in Azerbaijani, Russian and English. Turkey’s state-run TRT television channel is rebroadcast in Azerbaijani, while Russian and Persian channels can be picked up in border areas (BBC Country Profile: Azerbaijan 2009). The number of internet users was estimated at 1,500,000 in 2008 and at 3,689,000 in 2010, a healthy increase, if these figures are true. Most subscribers are in Baku, which has numerous internet cafés. Internet use is still largely in Russian, since there is so much more information available in that language than in the titular language. It appears that Delta Telecom has been granted a monopoly on all websites in Azerbaijan. Many users have complained that this move has enabled the government, with Delta Telecom’s compliance, to control the entire network system in Azerbaijan, impose censorship, and block access whenever it wishes (Zeynalov 2009). Delta Telecom has, however, denied these allegations. However, blogging offers a means of expressing opinions, even political, although social networking seems

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to be the main interest of young people in Azerbaijan. In August 2010, the number of Facebook users reached 198,340. To sum up, the rapid and early Latinization of the alphabet seems to have achieved its planned goals at school and university; the Latin alphabet is now in general use. Azerbaijan’s language reform can be considered the most successful and complete of those carried out in the region. Transition to the state language as the language used in public and business, in culture and in education has been more rapid than in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan, for example, because the starting conditions for this ambitious aim were much more favourable in Azerbaijan. The small Russian community adapted and succeeded in holding its own, partly due to the high status of Russian culture and partly due to the political relations with Russia where approximately two million Azerbaijanis work and send money home. The government has failed to give the necessary attention to other ethnic groups; for instance it has not effectively promoted their mother tongue study at school (Swietochowski and Collins 1999).

CHAPTER 3 UZBEKISTAN

Basic data Uzbekistan declared its sovereignty on 20 June 1990 and independence on 31 August 1991. It is 447,400 square kilometres in area and the population was estimated at 27,300,000 in 2007 (Library of Congress 2007) of whom roughly 78 per cent were Uzbeks. An estimate for January 2009 is 27,555,000, of whom about 80 per cent are Uzbeks (Department of National Security Affairs 2009c). There has been no census of the population since the 1989 Soviet census, so that all later data are estimates. Al’manakh Uzbekistana 2008 (2009: 13) gives the following figures for 1 January 2008: Total population 27,072,000, of which the Uzbeks make up 80 per cent, Tajiks 4.9 per cent, Russians 3.8 per cent, Kazakhs 3.6 per cent, Karakalpaks 2.2 per cent, Tatars one per cent, Kyrgyz 0.9 per cent, Koreans 0.6 per cent, and others 3 per cent. Many members of the Russian-speaking community and other non-indigenous ethnies left the country during the 1990s because of language difficulties and alleged discrimination in employment, or simply because of loss of their privileged status. Reportedly, about 170,000 ethnic Russians and some 500,000 others – Germans, Koreans, Tatars, Bashkirs and Jews – emigrated (Lee 2004: 101). As a result of the state borders drawn in Central Asia in 1924, a characteristic feature of Uzbekistan is the fact that large numbers of ethnic Uzbeks live in neighbouring

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Table 3.1 Population of Uzbekistan by ethnic group, 1989–99

Uzbeks Russians Tajiks Kazakhs Tatars Crimean Tatars Karakalpaks Koreans Kyrgyz Ukrainians Turkmens Meskhetian Turks Jews Armenians Azerbaijanis Uighurs Bashkirs Persians Greeks Gypsies Moldovians Others Total

1989 (census)

1989 (%)

1999 (estimates)

1999 (%)

14,142,475 1,653,478 933,560 808,227 467,829 188,772 411,878 183,140 174,907 153,197 121,578 106,302 65,493 50,537 44,410 35,762 34,771 24,779 10,453 16,397 5,955

71.0 8.3 4.7 4.1 2.4 0.9 2.1 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0

19,905,000

100.0

19,014,293 810,596 1,253,840 940,583 130,379 55,222 531,323 147,519 227,460 76,239 151,686 57,562 15,419 40,756 1,765 45,900 31,294 28,006 1,625 19,676 4,343 211,874 23,797,496

79.9 3.4 5.3 4.0 0.5 0.2 2.2 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 100.0

Source: Aman 2000. Estimates based on interpolation of data on migration, calculated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

states. This diaspora is larger than any other in the states discussed (Fumagalli 2007: 105ff.). Labour migration, chiefly to Russia, but also to Kazakhstan and other CIS states and beyond, has in recent years gained momentum due to widespread poverty and about 65 per cent unemployment in rural areas, although the government is reluctant to acknowledge the existence of the phenomenon. More than 2 million Uzbek men and women are trying to make a living abroad (Heuer 2010: 2). Data published by the Library of Congress (2007) states that the largest language groups in Uzbekistan in 2007 were as follows: 74.3

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per cent of the population spoke Uzbek, 14.2 per cent Russian and 4.4 per cent Tajik. The Uzbek language is also spoken in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, the Russian Federation and Xinjiang (Arik 2008: 142). The elites in independent Uzbekistan (Adams 2004) have been quite successful in marking out a national heritage, particularly a history, emphasizing its glory and traditions by means of the official version of rule over much of Central Asia (Ilkhamov 2006: 26ff.). The use of the titular language is also a means toward the creation of identitybuilding symbols, such as the national anthem or the popular saying ‘Mother Language is the Soul of the People’ (Ismatova 2008). Since independence, Islam Abduganiyevich Karimov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbekistan Communist Party in 1989, has governed the country with a strong hand, his regime becoming more and more dictatorial and therefore partly isolated from other countries. He was elected president on 20 December 1991, re-elected on 9 January 2000 and again on 23 December 2007. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) states that the last two elections did not adhere to even the most basic democratic procedures. Language policies are also influenced by the international relations of the republic. The general language situation has reportedly changed somewhat since 2001. In 2003, President Karimov embarked on a policy of strategic cooperation with the United States, expressed by allowing American military forces to use the Karshi-Khanabad base in southern Uzbekistan. However, there was strong criticism in the United States of the government’s human rights record and its repression of dissident political opinion. As a result in 2003 the regime decided to forge closer ties with Russia. Karimov’s heavy-handed reprisals against demonstrations in Andijan in May 2005 increased Western criticism. This, in turn, brought about the decision to expel United States forces from the Karshi-Khanabad base. In November 2005, an agreement was signed that improved military cooperation between Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation (BBC Country Profile: Uzbekistan 2008). This seems to have affected the language issue, too, as discussed below.

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Legislation A Law on Language was passed on 21 October 1989 (Gitlin 1998: 401–17), before the demise of the Soviet Union, asserting that Uzbek is the state language and requiring all government employees to have a good knowledge of it. This paragraph was repealed by parliament in 1998 (Medvedev 2007: 9), as it was considered premature. Russian remained acceptable in legal documents. A revised version of the Law on Language, passed on 5 December 1995, re-emphasized the status of Uzbek as the state language (Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan 1995). The law encouraged the use of Uzbek in all domains, particularly education. It also declared that all citizens had the right to choose their language of communication and that the use of other languages was permitted in official correspondence with institutions whose staff did not know Uzbek. Again, some routine usage remained in Russian, and it was still possible to obtain notarized documents in this language (Mesamed 2004: 236), in view of the fact that many Russians and Russophones were still living in the capital as well as in the industrial cities of the Tashkent district and the mining cities of Navoiy and Zarafshon (Aman 2000 (annex): 103–17). The 1995 revised Law on Language stirred considerable debate (Smith et al. 1998: 197–204). In June 1996, six months after the adoption of the revised law, Graham Smith and others (1998: 214ff.) conducted interviews with 600 Uzbeks, Russians and Tajiks about language legislation. Not surprisingly, a majority of the Uzbek interviewees supported the new law, while Russians and Russophones thought that Russian should have a special status, and many Tajiks wanted a law which would confirm their language as one of three languages with a special status in the country. Uzbekistan was the only state in post-Soviet Central Asia which, neither in its 1992 constitution nor in the revised Law on Language, nominated Russian as an official language or a language of interethnic communication. The revised law focused on the central role of Uzbek. The Karakalpak Autonomous Republic, as part of Uzbekistan, declared in 1990 that the Karakalpak language was the state language of their entity and Uzbek the official language.

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Language Uzbekization After independence, the struggle for ‘Uzbekness’ intensified, prompted by the language situation. Post-Soviet nationalism in Uzbekistan is largely expressed in a process of ‘Uzbekization’, an attempt to get rid of Russocentrism in the study of history (Samari et al. 2002; Fierman 2006a: 84–5), literature (Micaleff 1998) and language. The regime has initiated and followed a policy of nation-building by setting new criteria for these cultural fields, by emphasizing the ancient roots of Uzbek civilization and by implementing a firm Uzbek language policy (Ziegler 2006: 113). In general the use of the Uzbek language spread during the early years of independence, due to government incentives (Khanazarov 2007: 36–7). In parliament, simultaneous Uzbek and Russian interpreting was introduced after the general election of 1994 (Dollerup 1998: 146). Laws and official documents were generally published in both Uzbek and Russian (Gavrilov et al. 2008: 57; personal communication). Government activities aimed at language promotion included free courses in Uzbek, changes in the school language curricula, the printing of new primers, the introduction of television and radio broadcasts entitled ‘Let us study Uzbek’, running lessons in Uzbek in the press and annual festivals in October in honour of the Uzbek language (Asatova 2004: 20–1). In almost all Uzbek institutions, such as the school system, the bureaucracy, official committees, scientific and other public bodies, the composition of official documents and government communications, many activities are now (2010) conducted in Uzbek, although Russian is still occasionally employed. The language nationalism drive has had very limited success among Russians in the independent republic; estimates are that fewer than 5 per cent speak Uzbek (Schlyter 1997: 13; Kurzman 1999: 86). The situation is not very different, apparently, among other non-indigenous Russophone ethnies in Uzbekistan, such as the Armenians and Koreans. Armenians often prefer to speak both their mother tongue and Russian rather than Uzbek, and Koreans are strongly russified linguistically. In Tashkent, many street names and as well as the names of public spaces were changed in the first 19 years of independence (examples are

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given in Ferghana.ru 2008b; Volosevich 2008). This process was evident in major cities such as Ferghana, where Karl Marx Street was changed to Ferghana, Communist to Samarkand, Kirov to Constitution, and Pushkin to Navoiy Street. The government appointed a Terminology Committee, attached to the Cabinet of Ministers, to initiate and supervise these changes, as well as efforts to expunge Russian vocabulary from Uzbek. The Cabinet and the Committee were concerned with the state language, ignoring the languages of the ethnic minorities (Yalçin 2002: 108). These minorities are becoming less vocal in politics, presumably due to the authoritarian character of the government. The 1989 Law on Language and its revision in 1995 stated in general terms the need for vocabulary intervention. The Lexical Research Committee, established soon after the adoption of the 1989 Law, has issued a number of word lists in various domains. Most of these are bilingual – Uzbek and Russian. The general rules concerning vocabulary intervention are roughly as follows: Russian or international words integrated in Uzbek are to be retained, while other Russian words must be replaced with old Uzbek or Turkic stems wherever possible. This is yet another instance of centralized language planning (Schlyter 1997: 36–40). Lexical work is proceeding, for instance, on the terms employed in legal documents (The Times of Central Asia, 8 May 2008). Although serious work has already been done on terminology, linguists and others insist that ongoing intensive work in this area is still necessary (Madvaliyev 2008: 54ff.). Lexical work is paralleled by the preparation of dictionaries – another step in the developing and enriching of the Uzbek language. A few examples are the Russko-uzbekskii slovar’ voyennykh terminov (‘RussianUzbek Dictionary of Military Terms’, 1989); Slovar’ geograficheskikh terminov (‘Dictionary of Geographical Terms’, 1992); Kratkii russko-uzbekskii tolkovyi slovar’ vidov i raznovidnostei arkhivnykh dokumentov (‘Short Russian-Uzbek Explanatory Dictionary of the Kinds and Varieties of Archival Documents’, 1993); and others. The Terminological Dictionary of Industrial Automation (Uzbek-English-Russian), a work authored by Kh. Mansurov, was published by the Lexical Research Committee, Tashkent, in 2002.

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Government commissions charged with the execution of the Law on Language reported in 1998 and 1999 that many ministries continued to produce documents in Russian, a practice which continues to this day (personal experience, November 2009). Interest in language reform seems to have decreased during the first decade of the twentyfirst century. Even President Islam Karimov’s programmatic book, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century, first published in 1997, devoted only three lines to language (p. 39) out of 200 pages. Reports emphasized that implementation of language reform was generally too slow and unsystematic, frequently ignoring government deadlines (Baykova and Ivzhenko 2004). The use of Uzbek has been increasing among Uzbeks, chiefly in administration. The by-laws of the Uzbekistan Lawyers’ Association, the state’s first independent association, were already written in Uzbek in 1997. Members were aware that steps were being taken to introduce the exclusive use of Uzbek in courts of law. The use of Uzbek is still limited, however, among adults, particularly intellectuals, who often prefer Russian when discussing professional subjects while frequently using Uzbek in day-to-day matters. Akhtam Shaymardanov (2005) has called the emphasis on Uzbek ‘a language ghetto’. Some Uzbek nationalists are well aware of this dualism and strive to change it, complaining that language ‘Uzbekization’ has been too sluggish in practical terms.

Latinization of the alphabet Like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, independent Uzbekistan changed its alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin. A law introduced Latinization on 2 September 1993, setting 1 September 2000 as the date for completing the enterprise (Zakon Respubliki Uzbekistan ot 2 sentyabrya 1993 goda 1995). A new version, of 6 May 1995, revised the Latin letters selected earlier (Uzman 2010: 56–9; Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 2001: 146–7). The adjusted set of letters was published in the Uzbek press on 7 June 1995. It was originally intended that the new alphabet be introduced into general public use by 2000. This was later changed to 2005, but even this extended deadline was not met (although this was not officially acknowledged) due to the relatively large proportion

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of adults having to learn the new alphabet from scratch, the absence of expertise, an inefficient bureaucracy and the lack of modern technology. A new date of 2010 was therefore set for complete alphabet change, but this deadline was not met either. The introduction of Latinization in schools was proposed for September 1995 (in practice, it started on 1 September 1996, with new textbooks). The 1993–94 school year had been earmarked for preparing teachers for Latinization (Uhres 2000: 313–15). Some educators complained that the whole thing had started without adequate previous research (Kosmarskii 2003: 68). It was introduced in the first grade of primary schools on 1 September 1996 for the 1996–97 school year, followed by the second grade for the next year. The Latinization process is now complete in all Uzbek and Karakalpak schools. In the very early stages of discussing alphabet change, it seems that the Arabic alphabet also had considerable support – 61.4 per cent of the population, if Behar’s (1995: 51) investigation is correct – more than in all the other states discussed (see also Table 9.7 in the Appendix). This would demonstrate the strength of sentiment for the Islamic heritage in Uzbekistan on the popular level, which is evident in other areas as well as language change. In 1999, the Uzbek press reported that a committee of linguists was still discussing improvements in the Latinized script. In essence, the introduction of the new alphabet represents a shift to modernity, a more Western style, de-Russianization, and withdrawal from Soviet monoculturalism – all leading to the consolidation of a new Uzbek identity and the restoration of national pride. With these principles in mind, this and other committees insisted throughout their work on maintaining certain signs in the new Uzbek alphabet that would distinguish it from that of contemporary Turkish. Nonetheless, bilingual school books, in Turkish and Latinized Uzbek, published in Istanbul, were rather prematurely issued for the Turkish-Uzbek secondary schools which existed at the time (Uhres 2000: 304). The present Uzbek alphabet has no special letters and can therefore be considered easy to use, even though it does not reflect the whole range of phonemes of the Uzbek language. Mukhammad Solikh (2007), poet, writer and the exiled head of the opposition political party Erk, strongly criticized the

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selection of the signs for the new Uzbek script. The Latinized Uzbek alphabet has come under criticism from various other groups as well. Several Uzbek linguists saw no essential improvement on the Cyrillic (Schlyter 2001). In an open letter to President Karimov, Professor Fayzulla Iskhakov (2003) protested against the Latinization of the Uzbek script as a Russophobic act distancing the Uzbeks from their cultural wealth. It had not yet been mastered even by those who had to teach it, and was creating difficulties at school. It felt alien to the general population, and made the Uzbek diaspora more isolated. Sabit Madaliyev, poet-philosopher and former chief editor of the Tashkent literary journal Zvezda Vostoka from 1991–95, criticized Latinization even more harshly. Writing in Zvezda Vostoka on 29 February 2004, he listed the following objections to the Latinization of Uzbek: 1. Latinization has cut cultural relations with many people who speak Turkic languages; the nationalists are to blame for this. 2. Too many vowel signs were included and subsequent changes carried out. 3. Mistakes had been made in the Latinization process. 4. Adults who could not master the new alphabet would live and die illiterate; Uzbeks have again become an illiterate nation. 5. Even the wish to withdraw from Russia and to Westernize is no justification for spending millions of dollars, encumbering studies at school, distancing oneself from the numerous Uzbeks living in the ‘Near Abroad’ (that is, in the post-Soviet space), hinder integration processes in the region, lower the cultural level and draw away not only from Russia but from Turkey as well (Madaliyev 2004). In May 2007, a group of Uzbek scholars offered varying views on the Latinization of the Uzbek alphabet, 14 years after the introduction of the new alphabet had been decided (Yuldashev et al. 2007). The group comprised a linguist, a historian and two political scientists. Among their comments were the following: 1. Latinizing the script was a political act; an expensive adventure undertaken from an anti-Russian position.

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2. Most adults, including the state leaders, still preferred to read and write in Cyrillic. 3. All Uzbek phonemes can be well expressed in Cyrillic. 4. The proportion of school graduates has dropped since Latinization. 5. The Uzbek diaspora cannot communicate with its home country. 6. Public opinion was never consulted about Latinization, which delegitimizes its introduction. 7. Graphically, the use of two components for one sound (e.g., ch, sh, ts) is confusing. 8. An entire body of literature has become inaccessible to readers. 9. Most documents, letterheads, newspapers and other printed materials are still in Cyrillic. 10. Literacy has declined and public libraries are almost empty. 11. The 1995 partial reform of the new Latin alphabet has added to the confusion and to the expense of printing new textbooks and other literature. 12. Some teachers still use Cyrillic at school, at least occasionally. 13. Works of Turkish literature cannot be read in Uzbekistan because Latinized Turkish differs from Latinized Uzbek, a fact which isolates the latter from other Turkic scripts as well. Indeed, the only compliment (and a very back-handed one) which these critics paid to the Latinization of the Uzbek script was that this decision prevented the adoption of the Arabic alphabet, which they considered even more unsuitable for Uzbek and, moreover, impregnated with Islamic connotations. These are courageous comments, considering the strong censorship in Uzbekistan and the dangers connected with voicing dissident opinions. Almost the only books published in Latin script until 1998 were school primers and readers as well as materials intended to assist the change to the Latin alphabet. An example is a 32-page booklet, written in 2003 by O‘tkir Hoshimov, one of Uzbekistan’s best-known writers, titled Shohruhning topishmoqlari: alifboni o‘rganamiz (‘The Riddles of Shohruh: Learning the Alphabet’). This is intended for pre-school children. A more scholarly publication is an orthographic dictionary

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of 432 pages, published in 2004 by To‘lqin Tog‘ayev and others, titled O‘zbek tilining kirill va lotin alifbolaridagi imlo lug‘ati (‘Orthographic Cyrillic-Latin Dictionary of the Uzbek Language’). This work contains more than 14,000 words in alphabetical order. Many other books and newspapers are still published in the Cyrillic script. A striking instance is O‘zbek Tili va Adabiyoti (‘Uzbek Language and Literature’), the scholarly periodical of Uzbekistan’s National Academy of Sciences, focusing on Uzbek language and literature. This used Latin characters, beside Cyrillic ones, in its table of contents, for one year (from the third issue in 1998 to the third issue in 1999). Otherwise, it was – and still is – published in the Cyrillic script. Although it is still such a controversial subject, over the years the Latin alphabet has been increasingly introduced into public life, while the Cyrillic is still in use. In the central parts of Tashkent, Uzbek in Latin characters is becoming more common, while in the more traditional residential areas (the mahalla) half-Cyrillic and half-Latin lettering is in evidence (personal communication, November 2009). In the rural areas Uzbek, in Cyrillic letters, is used side-by-side with Russian. There is apparently not enough money available to change the script everywhere. Nowadays, both scripts are often in evidence in street signs, bookshops, newspapers, advertisements and captions in television and cinema (Ilkhamov 2006: 32; Sharifov 2007; personal observation May 2007, December 2008 and November 2009). Moreover, the Cyrillic script persists in some official publications, such as the education statistics issued in 2006 by the Ministry of People’s Education. In the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic, Latinization of the script was carried out, too, by law on 26 February 1994 (amended on 10 June 1995) (Schlyter 1997: 15; Asatova 2004: 20). The legislators did not adopt all the principles of the new Uzbek script, preferring those of a common Turkic script resembling the Turkish of Turkey. However, in August and December 1995, the Karakalpak Latin alphabet adopted more or less the orthographical changes introduced in the official Latinized Uzbek script a few months earlier (Jacquesson 2002: 95–9; Schlyter 2005). The Cyrillic scripts of the minority languages, like Tajik, Kazakh, Turkmen and others remained unchanged.

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It seems that Latinization has been more successful in the schools than elsewhere, and few adults have taken courses in Latinization. But the danger of illiteracy that some experts warned about has apparently been avoided, although the argument that Russian literature would be a closed book for many of the new generation is not easy to refute (Lyaganov 2003; Kosmarskii 2007: 71–2). Insofar as classical Uzbek literature is concerned, the works of Alishir Nava’i and other classical authors have been transliterated from the Cyrillic to the Latin script for use in schools and elsewhere.

Language attitudes An interesting research project about language attitudes was carried out in Tashkent, Samarkand and Bukhara in 2001–02. Some 3,000 people, aged 18 to 65 and comprising students, teachers, officials at educational institutions and technologists, were asked a series of questions about language use. Among the students, 72 per cent claimed to be proficient in Uzbek, 93 per cent in Russian, and 17 per cent in English (the latter studied in faculties of foreign languages). The other interviewees – teachers, education staff and technologists – were asked about the language they used at work. Their replies: 12 per cent Uzbek, 40 per cent Uzbek and Russian, 1 per cent English, 8 per cent Russian and English, and 39 per cent Russian only. A mere 4 per cent read newspapers in Uzbek only, 6 per cent in Uzbek and Tajik, 45 per cent in Uzbek and Russian, 43 per cent in Russian only, 0.3 per cent in Uzbek and English, 1 per cent in Russian and English, and only 0.7 per cent in Tajik. Asked about the language they employed in addressing the authorities, 32 per cent of the respondents answered Uzbek only, 36 per cent Uzbek and Russian, and 32 per cent Russian only. Asked about communication with colleagues and friends, 22 per cent replied in Uzbek, 27 per cent in Uzbek and Russian, 16 per cent in Tajik and Russian, 14 per cent in Tajik, and 21 per cent in Russian. As to the language they used in international circumstances, 96 per cent said Russian, 3.8 per cent Russian and English, 0.2 per cent English only. About the use of language at home, not surprisingly, many used Tajik in Samarkand and Bukhara. A repetition of the same investigation in

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2006 showed an increase in the use of Russian (Nazar’yan 2007), probably due to the rapid increase in labour migration to Russia after 2000. It is estimated that about 70 per cent of the entire population still know Russian (Samsonov 2006: 70), which is widely employed by the urban political and business elites. This percentage, though, seems rather high – other sources in the same period put it at 57 per cent (Khalikov 2006). The complaints of ethnic Russians and other Russophones have continued nonetheless. Their dissatisfaction was summarized in a paper on the status of Russian. Authored by Yevgenii Abdullayev (2009), a Tashkent-based sociologist, it was aptly titled ‘Russkii yazyk: zhizn’ posle smerti’ (‘The Russian Language: Life after Death’).

The challenge of Russian Many Russians in Uzbekistan, as elsewhere in the post-Soviet republics, felt that their former status was being seriously eroded. One of their main worries was that their language was now occupying a second-rate position, since Uzbek enjoyed official preference (Kobil 2007). Very few Russians had studied Uzbek in Soviet times or during independence, explaining that there was no real motivation at their place of work to learn what they considered ‘a poorer language’ whose adoption was ‘politically motivated’ (Flynn 2007: 273–4). Interviews conducted in 1996 found that 70 per cent of Russians with poor or no Uzbek skills had no intention of studying that language (Smith et al. 1998: 223). Some Russian-speakers have realized that knowing Uzbek was now necessary for employment and promotion, yet do not acquire it except for rare exceptions (Balfour 2000). Table 3.2 shows the low level of competence in Uzbek among Russians living in Tashkent, the main centre of Russian population in Uzbekistan. Many Russians emigrated, chiefly in the 1990s, to the Russian Federation or to other states with large Slav communities (such as Eastern and Northern Kazakhstan), mainly for economic reasons, but also for cultural ones (Flynn 2007: 275–6). Some of the Russians undoubtedly felt that they could not participate in the euphoria of developing an Uzbek identity and sensed that they were being economically disadvantaged by the increased use of Uzbek and the preference

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Table 3.2 Knowledge of Uzbek among Russians in Tashkent, 2002 (percentages) Completely fluent Age Group 18–29 30–49 50– Social Group Workers Intellectuals

Do not know it at all

6 8 8

54 55 6

3 9

67 50

Source: Based on Arutyunyan 2003.

for Uzbeks in the higher echelons of employment (Chinn and Kaiser 1996: 128; Radnitz 2006: 672). This emigration was much regretted by the state, which lost many highly qualified scientists and experts in managerial, educational, technical and fiscal skills. Some ethnic Russians do perceive the need for adaptation; they point out that Uzbek is a requisite for admission to the universities, even though Russian is still employed frequently in certain disciplines of higher education, such as the sciences. This is a matter of some importance, because a sizeable proportion of school graduates go on to universities and vocational schools: 51 per cent in 2004 (Dadabaev 2004: 151). Primers in Uzbek have been prepared for Russians and Russophones studying in vocational schools and colleges. One example is the primer developed under the auspices of the Centre for Special Vocational Education in the Ministry of Higher and Special Secondary Education (Rafiyev et al. 2008). Countrywide seminars for teachers of Russian who remained in Uzbekistan were held in Tashkent, Samarkand, Khorezm and Nukus (capital of the Republic of Karakalpakstan), some of them initiated by the Russian Cultural Centres (Naumov 2008). A Russian Cultural Centre was set up in Nukus in 1994 (Kalachëva 2006) and another in Tashkent on 26 May 1995, when both centres initiated a programme of spreading Russian literature, music and art (MacFadyen 2006: 100). In a parallel move, the Russian consulate donated 300,000 Russianlanguage textbooks to local schools (Pavlenko 2008a: 73).

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This pedagogical activity has intensified since 2003. Meetings on Russian education and culture were held in May 2003, May 2004, December 2004, May 2005, September 2006, and May 2008 (Zinin 2003; Novosti Uzbekistana, 30 May 2008). The reports of these meetings give a picture of Russian-language education and plans to improve it. Some of the points that arose were: 1. Participants in these meetings demanded more hours per week for the study of Russian, both in Russian-medium schools and in others. 2. They criticized the choice of subject matter in the textbooks used in the study of Russian, and requested that textbooks be imported from the Russian Federation, to emphasize the wealth of Russian literature and culture. 3. They demanded the raising of the level of Russian instruction in both Uzbek-medium and mixed schools, chiefly in the rural areas, and an increase in the numbers of students who were studying in Russian-language classes at the universities and of those enrolling in Russian philology courses. 4. They recommended improvements in the methodology of teaching Russian at all levels, both as a mother tongue and as a foreign language. 5. They wished to see special attention devoted to those using Russian and Russian terminology professionally, for example in vocational schools. 6. They argued that the universities did not offer enough Russianlanguage tuition – only four hours a week in the first year and two hours a week in the second year, according to these complaints. These demands were serious attempts to promote and improve the instruction of Russian and to arrest its decline. It seems, however, that this could not be achieved without serious government intervention – which was not forthcoming. Many Uzbeks started to study Russian in the early years of the twenty-first century, seeking employment opportunities in the Russian Federation and at home. Employment offers, whether at home or further

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afield, frequently emphasize the need for both languages: Uzbek and Russian. According to informal estimates, the demand for Russian is about the same nowadays as the demand for English. Many Uzbek parents continue to send their children to Russian-medium schools, while others hire private tutors to teach their children the language. Sunday schools, charging 80,000 sums (about US$53 at the time) per month, offer young Uzbek schoolchildren lessons in Russian to give them, supposedly, a better start in life (personal communication by an Uzbek mother, Berlin, 8 August 2008). Russian-medium schools are known for the better quality of education which they provide. Russian textbooks are still used in many courses at the universities, due to terminological problems and the shortage of textbooks in Uzbek. Russian is still employed, together with Uzbek, on some signboards, e.g. in underground stations. Also, President Karimov ordered the restoration of some Russian street signs in Tashkent, but many are still in Latinscript Uzbek. Most books for adult readers still appear in Russian, or in Uzbek in the Cyrillic script; children’s books are almost the only ones in Latin characters (personal observation, May 2007, October 2008 and November 2009). This did not prevent representatives of the ethnic Russians from complaining, as recently as 2008, that Russian had disappeared from rural areas and was used less in urban areas, spoken with numerous errors and disregarded in education – in their view all part of the government’s basic de-Russification policies (Ferghana.ru 2008). Insofar as the countryside is concerned, this process can probably be explained by Russian emigration (including that of teachers). After 2005, Uzbekistan distanced itself somewhat from the West. A certain rapprochement with the Russian Federation was noted as a result, and the study of Russian is again being encouraged (Weitz 2008). There is anecdotal evidence that the Ministry of Education urged schools to increase the number of lessons devoted to Russian (not an easy task because teachers of Russian are in short supply), while reducing the number of hours reserved for other foreign languages, as well as promoting improved relations between Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation (Gulomov 2006). The very recent thawing of relations with the West (see below) does not seem to have materially affected the study of Russian.

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Minorities and language Uzbekistan is a multiethnic state with more than 130 nationalities. Approximately 20 per cent of the population belong to non-titular ethnies. The right to mother tongue education of minorities is spelled out in the new Law on Education (1997): ‘Everyone is guaranteed to obtain the right to education without distinction as to sex, language ... nationality, social origin ... social status, place of residence’ (Fazylov and Smirnova 2008: 9). According to this provision, education is provided in the state language and in the languages of the largest minority groups. The situation regarding textbooks in minority languages has improved since the start of the new millennium, in an attempt to provide all language tracks in general schools with the necessary materials to achieve a unified educational standard. In 2006, 92 titles were published in Turkmen, 72 in Kyrgyz, 70 in Tajik and 70 in Kazakh (Ferrando 2008: 10). Many of these were translated from Uzbek, while others were written in those languages with a view to propagating the titular nationalism of independent Uzbekistan. An attempt was also made to promote the acquisition of the state language in minority-language schools, by adding some school hours for learning Uzbek, while reducing the workload for all pupils by cutting the number of school hours allotted to their mother tongue (personal communication, Tashkent, December 2008). These plans were worked out in late 2008 and have presumably come into force since. The new timetables provide that pupils instructed in Russian or in other non-Uzbek mother tongues will get nine to twelve more hours per week of language instruction in Uzbek throughout their school careers than their peers in Uzbek-language schools. Obviously, more stress is placed on teaching the state language to non-Uzbek students. These hours are taken away from those that the schools can use on discretionary subjects, such as theatre studies and drama. From now the teaching of foreign languages, such as English, will start in the second grade; formerly, it started in the fifth grade. The main ethnic minorities in Uzbekistan are considered below by order of size.

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The Tajiks, mostly Sunni Muslims, who form the largest minority ethnie, are estimated officially to number between one and two million. Some Tajiks claim the figure is much higher, up to 25 per cent of the entire population, but this cannot be proved or disproved because no recent census exists. Also, due to intermarriage, widespread knowledge of both the Tajik and Uzbek languages, and other factors, it is almost impossible to arrive at precise numbers. Generally, relations between the two communities are fairly cordial on a personal level. Many Tajiks are bilingual, as are Uzbeks living in regions of compact Tajik settlement, such as Bukhara and Samarkand (Abramson 2001; Fatih 2005: 130–2). This bilingualism arises from hundreds of years of co-habitation and the cultural predominance of the Persianspeakers. Many are even trilingual, adding Russian as the lingua franca of the Soviet Union, where it was long the dominant language and is still widely employed as a language of interethnic communication in Uzbekistan. Since 1991, the post-Soviet Central Asian states have adopted different development paths, ideological orientations and educational policies. Insofar as the Tajiks in Uzbekistan are concerned, a controversial picture emerges. They have claimed that between 1998 and 2001 many books in Tajik were destroyed, following an ordinance issued by the government of Uzbekistan to the effect that textbooks printed before 1993 and ‘not adhering to the national ideology’ have to be scrapped. Anecdotal evidence says that even the classics and translations of world-known classical poets and writers were destroyed in one library (Ergashev 2001). Tajik intellectuals cling to language as an important source of identity and community; they worry about what they sometimes label ‘the Threat of Turkicization’ and the inherent danger to Tajik culture, particularly the language (Subtelny 1994: 55–6). By 1997, over 240 Tajik-medium schools were operating with about 130,000 pupils, chiefly in the two cities and provinces where most Tajiks live: Samarkand and Bukhara (Yalçin 2002: 113). A research project carried out in 1999 found that the number of teachers in Tajikmedium schools was insufficient and their training was inadequate (Huttova et al. 2002). In 2006 the figure rose to 282 Tajik-medium schools, but the overall number of pupils seems to have declined to

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96,505 (O‘zbekiston Respublikasi Xalq Ta’limi Vazirligi 2006: 29, Table 13(5)). The faculties of philology at Samarkand State University and Bukhara State University are active centres for the study of the Tajik language and classical Persian literature. Their scholars publish research articles and the universities occasionally organize conferences (Foltz 1996: 214–15; personal information, July 2010). While Tajik newspapers are published regularly, few books are printed in this language; in 1998 there were just 13 published, including school textbooks (Mesamed 2004: 241). Visitors have remarked on the low visibility of Tajik publications in bookshops, even in Tajik-populated areas. These offer only a few books published by Tajik authors in Uzbekistan and some imported from Tajikistan (Foltz 1996: 213–15). Almost all Tajik publications are still in Cyrillic script. The status of Tajiks in Uzbekistan is further affected by the tense relations between that republic and Tajikistan. In addition, Uzbek government circles suspect radical groups in Tajikistan of encouraging radical Islamists in Uzbekistan. As a result, air travel between the two states was discontinued (personally noted in 2007), but was restored in March 2009, when Uzbekistan also renewed electricity deliveries to Tajikistan (Zentralasien-Analysen 15, 27 March 2009: 22–3). The tensions between the two states continue over several issues, including water disputes. The Tajiks in Uzbekistan have been articulating certain demands since the 1990s. While some Tajik leaders looked for a greater role in Uzbekistan politics, most are concerned with their own culture and, in particular, their language, mostly spoken in the towns and regions of Samarkand and Bukhara (Djumaev 2001: 338–9). Their demands in the 1990s comprised: 1. Comprehensive use of Tajik from pre-school to university education; 2. An independent Tajik language publishing house for educational materials; 3. Wider use of Tajik in mass communication, focusing on a twofold increase in Tajik-language radio broadcasting; 4. Recognition of Tajik culture and turning Tajik into the second language in Uzbekistan, a demand firmly rejected by the authorities (Smith et al. 1998: 211–13). While the government has initiated a response to some Tajik demands, the fact that they continue to be expressed is an indication that they are not yet being satisfied (Horsman 1999: 202–3; Everett-Heath 2003: 190–1).

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The Kazakh minority, numbering about 900,000 people in 2008, benefits from a cultural cooperation agreement between Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan relative to the reciprocal providing of education in their respective languages. In 1995–96 there were 605 Kazakh-medium schools in Uzbekistan (Thomas 1999: 36), but their number declined to 581 in 2003–04, to 521 in 2006–07, and to 515 in 2008 (The Times of Central Asia, 8 May 2008). A main cause of this decrease was the emigration of many Kazakhs to Kazakhstan. Those who remain complain that their children, who study in Kazakhmedium schools, have to sit for examinations in Uzbek and Russian (Amanzhol 2002). Karakalpak is the official language of the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan and the usual language of instruction there (Pavlenko 2008: 297). It seems that many people in this republic know not only Karakalpak, but Uzbek and also Russian, while some of the young have acquired English (interview with a Karakalpak professor in Ankara, 8 October 2009). In practice, the authorities of Karakalpakstan generally follow directives in education from the central government of Uzbekistan. In 1999–2000 there were 345 schools in which 125,000 pupils were enrolled, preferring to study in the Karakalpak language (Hanks 2000: 943), while in 2003–04 there were 376 schools and in 2006–07 372 schools. A persistent problem has been the lack of Russian-language textbooks in Karakalpak schools, even though some were printed anew in Nukus, the capital of Karakalpakstan (Uzturk 2004). An unregistered political party, the Free Karakalpakstan National Revival Party, led by Yernazar Koniratov, has recently been proclaiming the Karakalpaks’ separate identity and calling for a referendum to secede from Uzbekistan (The Times of Central Asia, 12 March 2008), but secession is not a realistic option at all. Among the non-indigenous ethnies are Koreans who were deported from the Soviet Far East to Central Asia in 1937. The Koreans in Uzbekistan number almost 200,000 (the largest Korean population in Central Asia), of whom about a quarter live in Tashkent and its district. Perhaps due to urbanization, many have taken Russian names and most of them speak Russian. While the older people are fluent in Korean, the middle-aged have only a passive knowledge and the young

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do not know it at all. Korean cultural centres, set up in Tashkent in May 1992 and elsewhere later, attempt to promote the Korean language and culture among members of this community. The subject is regularly taught as a foreign language in more than 100 schools and at two academic establishments in Tashkent, the Institute of Oriental Studies and the Uzbek State University of World Languages (Yalçin 1999; Shin 2003; Kim 2005). The Korean cultural centre in Tashkent performs most of the Korean educational work. During the spring semester of 2009, the centre offered courses to 1,370 students studying the Korean language and 170 attending teacher training (there is a shortage of teachers) and computer classes. The centre also presents plays and shows films in Korean (Kang 2009). Moreover, Korean programmes are broadcast regularly on the government television services. The South Korean government supports these activities (Khi 2004). The Turkmens, numbering about 150,000 in 2003, reportedly had 64 Turkmen-medium schools in that year (Kholmuradov 2003) and 50 in 2006–07, but complain that they have to study in Uzbek-medium schools and get only one hour per week to learn the Turkmen language, even in villages where the Turkmens form a majority. Although relations between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have become increasingly cordial during Berdimuhammedov’s presidency, the situation of the Turkmens is not improving visibly. The national cultural centres have had an important role in encouraging the study and preservation of the local traditions as well as of languages and dialects employed by the smaller ethnies in Uzbekistan.

Language in education Even if in some ways politics and society have not changed much in Uzbekistan since 1991, the societal upheaval and transitions following the demise of the Soviet Union demanded restructuring and modernization, not least in the educational sector (Coleman et al., eds. 2005). The main principles of educational reform are spelled out in the 1997 ‘National Programme on Training of Specialists’. In this programme, development of the private educational sector and non-budgetary, i.e.,

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private financing for educational facilities is seen as part of the educational reforms. The basic principles of education in Uzbekistan were laid down in the 1997 ‘Law on Education’, guaranteeing all citizens equal access to education, be it in state or in private institutions. Much has been done since independence to keep up the high standard of the Soviet educational system, but, all in all, a decline of educational standards is noticeable and criticized by the citizens of Uzbekistan, albeit not too openly (Teichmann 2008: 2–3). International donors such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank have been active in the educational sector of Uzbekistan since the beginning of the twenty-first century, with mixed results. National experts, teacher educators and the teachers themselves are eager to get acquainted with new ideas, concepts and methods, but implementation is somewhat hampered by the slowness of the bureaucracy and also by corruption. Projects have focused, inter alia, on the improvement of basic education in the rural sector, textbook development and a rental scheme for textbooks, reform of educational standards and curricula. Language education policy has also been discussed. Uzbekistan spends about 8 per cent of its gross domestic product on education (Medvedev 2007: 27). Due to high population growth, the number of pupils has increased in recent years, according to the official data of the Ministry of People’s Education (O‘zbekiston Respublikasi Xalq Ta’limi Vazirligi 2006: 8–14, Tables 2(1) to 2(7); and pp. 25–31, Tables 13(1) to 13(7)). Education is conducted in seven languages: Uzbek, Russian, and five minority languages – Karakalpak, Tajik, Kazakh, Turkmen and Kyrgyz. The breakdown by language for the state primary schools in the 2006–07 school year is given in Table 3.3. Considering the sizeable Tajik population, it seems that few pupils, proportionately, get instruction in Tajik. Over the years, the Ministry of People’s Education made sure that both Uzbek and Russian were taught in the first primary cycle (grades 1 to 4) and the two secondary cycles (grades 5 to 9 and 10 to 11). The 10 to 11 cycle has meanwhile been converted into either lycées and colleges or into vocational schools, but the Ministry is considering a possible return to the former situation. English, together with some French and Arabic, has meanwhile been added. Naturally, the use of

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Table 3.3 Pupils in Uzbekistan’s primary schools by language of instruction, 2006–07 Number Uzbek Karakalpak Russian Kazakh Tajik Kyrgyz Turkmen All of Uzbekistan

5,067,096 16,074 282,197 102,472 96,505 12,036 11,478 5,687,858

per cent 89.00 2.04 4.96 2.04 1.80 0.21 0.20 100.00

Source: O‘zbekiston Respublikasi Xalq Ta’limi Vazirligi 2006: 16, Table 4.

these languages for instruction in other subjects varied in the different language-tracks, while in the first years of independence emphasis was laid on the promotion of Uzbek. On independence, the two largest ethnies, after the titular nation, were the Russians and the Tajiks. Parents of these and other minority ethnies were granted the legal right to choose the language their children would be educated in. In practice, this did not prove feasible in many cases, mostly due to administrative foot-dragging. The rise in Uzbek as language of instruction at the expense of Russian in just four years is remarkable. There were complaints that fewer teaching hours were devoted to the Russian language in Uzbekmedium schools, whereas there was an increase of Uzbek in Russianmedium schools (Thomas 1999: 35). This can be added to reports from 2002 that the overall number of schools with Russian-medium instruction had dropped by 47 per cent (Conant 2002). Earlier, the number of Russian-medium or mixed Russian-Uzbek schools had dropped from 1,147 in 1991–92 to 813 in 1999–2000 and 762 in 2003–04. Also, repeated complaints were voiced concerning the study of Russian, objecting that it was not methodical enough (Bashatova 2007) and that too little time was allotted to Russian literature and history.

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Table 3.4 Pupils in Uzbekistan’s secondary schools by language of instruction, 2001–06 (percentages)

Total Uzbek Russian Karakalpak Kazakh Tajik Turkmen English Other languages

2001–02

2005–06

100.0 74.0 20.1 3.4 0.5 0.1 0.1 – 1.8

100.0 81.4 14.1 3.6 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0

Source: State Statistics Committee of Uzbekistan, reproduced in Brunner and Tillett 2007: 164.

Despite renewed interest in Russian, various unofficial sources inform us that instruction in Russian has declined in many schools and academic institutions, probably due to Slav emigration and to official emphasis on the study of Uzbek. A survey conducted in 2006 among 1,200 Uzbekistanis of different ethnic groups by O. B. Ata-Mirzayev, deputy director of the Centre of Social Research on Public Opinion (Tsentr Sotsial’nykh Issledovanii Ijtimoiy Fikr), found that the younger people were much less proficient in Russian than their elders (AtaMirzayev 2008: 59–61). This fits in with the apparently lower level of recent instruction in Russian. An attempt was recently made to promote the acquisition of the state language in minority language schools by adding extra school hours for learning Uzbek, while easing students’ workload by reducing the number of school hours allotted to the mother tongue – be it Russian or a minority language. These plans were worked out in late 2008 and have presumably come into force. With the new timetable coming into force, pupils instructed in Russian or in other non-Uzbek mother tongues will eventually get, throughout their school attendance, 12 hours more of language instruction than their peers in Uzbek-medium schools.

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Table 3.5 Timetable for general schools in Uzbekistan, 2008–09 (in hours per language per week) Grade

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Mother tongue, Language and Literature Russian or Uzbek A foreign language

8

8

10

10

9

7

6

5

5

– –

2 –

2 –

2 –

2 2

2 2

2 3

2 3

2 3

Source: O‘zbekiston Respublikasi Xalq Ta’limi Vazirligi 2008.

Table 3.6 Revised experimental timetable for general schools in Uzbekistan, 2008–09. Pilot stage in selected schools, Tashkent and region (in hours per week) a. Language of instruction: Uzbek Grade

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Mother tongue, Language and Literature Russian A foreign language

10

8

8

8

7

7

5

5

5

– –

2 2

2 2

2 2

2 2

2 2

2 2

2 2

2 2

Source: O‘zbekiston Respublikasi Xalq Ta’limi Vazirligi 2008.

b. Language of instruction: Russian or other mother tongues Grade

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Mother tongue, Language and Literature Uzbek A foreign language (Russian or English)

10

8

8

8

7

7

5

5

5

– –

2 2

3 2

3 2

4 2

4 2

4 2

4 2

4 2

Source: O‘zbekiston Respublikasi Xalq Ta’limi Vazirligi 2008.

Special interest attaches to the study of foreign languages. Secondary schools and many primary schools, particularly in urban centres, offer foreign languages. These are, in addition to Russian (which is a special case), English, Turkish, German, French and Spanish, as well as

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some others (Hasanova 2007: 4). The teaching of certain languages is supported by foreign cultural centres. There is some progress in the study of English, which the government considers important for the development of an independent Uzbekistan. English courses have been offered periodically on the radio (Dollerup 1998: 149). At first, President Karimov made special efforts to encourage school instruction in English, and the educational administration hired new teachers (Megoran 1997: 353). In general, English instruction started in the fifth grade, but has recently been introduced into the lower grades, starting with the second and, in theory, comprises four hours a week. There has also been growing public interest in learning the language (Nazar’yan 2007). This applies both to schools and to universities and is fostered by the Uzbekistan Teachers of English Association, which has branches in different regions of the country. A research project on the subject, carried out at Ferghana State University (Megoran 1997), indicated that much depended on the presence of foreign teachers of English and on improving the training of local teachers. Another research project, carried out in the Kokand region in the early 2000s, reached similar conclusions (Duff and Dickens 2005), emphasizing the need for English teacher training, chiefly in the rural areas. As a result of the project and with the help of the British Council, a Teachers’ Companion is published quarterly and distributed directly to teachers of English. The British Council has provided advice and teachers’ resources such as cassette players. In the autumn of 2009, it signed a memorandum on behalf of the United Kingdom, presented to the Government of Uzbekistan, with the purpose of strengthening cultural cooperation, including assistance in the area of methodology in language instruction. A study carried out in 2004 in Bukhara may provide another indication of the increased interest in and study of English in Uzbekistan (Hasanova 2007: 3–9). It was the only foreign language taught at some kindergartens. At the time, 38 schools in the city of Bukhara offered Russian, while 32 offered English as well, three German, two French and one Hebrew. Turkish, too, has penetrated the education system in Uzbekistan, as it did in the other newly independent states, through scholarships

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Table 3.7 Foreign languages in Uzbekistan’s schools, 2006–07

All of Uzbekistan English French German Other Languages

Schools

Classes

Pupils

9,773 6,326 1,473 2,283 141

217,337 92,104 18,609 27,714 1,637

5,867,858 2,342,409 427,681 639,572 40,648

Source: O‘zbekiston Respublikasi Xalq Ta’limi Vazirligi 2006: 45, Table 20.

at universities in Turkey and the founding of Turkish schools in Uzbekistan which have offered instruction in Turkish (Michel 2003) and other languages. However, soon after the victory of the Welfare Party in the parliamentary elections of 1996 in Turkey, Uzbekistan authorities accused Turkey of trying to turn Uzbek students into ‘Islamic Fundamentalists’ and ordered most of these students to return from Turkey. The tension between Turkey and Uzbekistan spilled over into Turkish educational institutions; only one Turkish school, with 98 students, remained in Uzbekistan in the 2001–02 school year. However, the private schools of the Fethullah Gülen movement continued some of their work (Yanık 2004), under close supervision by the authorities. In 2002–03, these establishments comprised 18 schools with 3,334 pupils and 210 teachers from Turkey (Balçı 2003: 155–6). The numbers reportedly remained unchanged in the 2007–08 school year (Zentralasien-Analysen 19–20, 28 August 2009: 20, based on Balçı’s research). The authorities have closed the movement’s newspaper, the Uzbek version of the Turkish daily Zaman (Park 2008). It continues publication in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), Almaty (Kazakhstan), and Ashgabat (Turkmenistan), where the paper can be bought at any news-stand, and is distributed in most Gülen schools. The Goethe-Institut, set up in Tashkent in 1998, does its best to spread German language and literature by means of seminars, concerts, art exhibitions, plays, film festivals and grants for study in Germany (Rasmus 2008). Its library and office contain printed materials and

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equipment aimed at assisting teachers of German. The institute organizes German courses for adults and has published primers for the study of the language in Uzbek schools. Together with the German Embassy, it organizes an annual meeting of teachers of German (Goethe-Institut 2008). The French Cultural Centre in Tashkent, attached to the French Embassy, has adopted similar strategies, and some extra ones, to promote the study of French. In 1997 it initiated a local school whose curriculum follows very closely that used in France, including the study of English, Russian or Spanish. Another innovation was a competition between Uzbek speakers in writing short stories in French. The best were published by the Centre in a 204-page book titled La Route des mots en Ouzbékistan (2008). Observers have noted that the study of Arabic has increased in small medresehs and private religious schools (Thubron 1995: 70, 73, 195, 209), although the government continues to monitor religious activity, particularly Islamic activity, very closely. Foreign embassies have established their own cultural centres. The first one was founded in 1989, and the overall number of the centres rose to 10 in 1992, 72 in 1995 and 138 in 2004. These cultural centres cooperate with the representatives of various nationalities and government offices as well as the schools, colleges and mass media. They include the Tajik, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Russian, Tatar, Korean, Ukrainian, Turkish, Hebrew, Azerbaijani, Armenian, German, Uighur, Bashkir, Belorussian, Greek, Georgian, Polish, Bulgarian, Arab, Dungan, Lithuanian and Chinese centres (Nazarov et al. 2004). The government presents the activities of the cultural centres as one indication of its presumed liberal approach to all foreign cultures (Ochildiyev et al. 2007). However, it is known that foreign cultural centres encounter certain problems in dealing with the Uzbek authorities.

Languages at the universities In addition to a Ministry of People’s Education, the government includes a Ministry of Higher and Secondary Special Education. In the

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2007–08 school year, Uzbekistan had 62 universities and institutes of higher education, with a total of between 280,000 and 296,600 students (Ferghana.ru 2008a; Al’manakh Uzbekistana 2008 2009: 100). The oldest university, the Uzbek National University in Tashkent, was established as early as 1918 and is the largest in the country. It has set up a faculty of Uzbek studies, focusing on the language (Dollerup 1998: 146–7). Both Uzbek and Russian are used in most of the universities. Exceptions are the University of Samarkand, where Uzbek, Russian and Tajik are used, and the Tashkent Islamic University, whose languages of instruction are Uzbek and Arabic (Europa World of Learning 2009 2008: Vol. II, 2723–5). The last-mentioned university was established by a decree of President Karimov in order to give the government greater control of Islamic education in the country. At Uzbekistan’s universities students are usually required to take two to four hours per week of a foreign language. Most opt to learn English, while those from wealthy families prefer all-English paying instruction, for instance at the Westminster International University in Tashkent, set up in 2002 on Western, chiefly British academic models, and affiliated to Westminster University in London (Abdullayev 2007). Some departments at the Bukhara State University, the Uzbek State University of World Languages in Tashkent and several others provide English-language instruction (Hasanova 2007: 7). Instruction at Ferghana State University – and probably some others – is carried out in both Uzbek-medium and Russian-medium classes with English an elective subject, along with other languages, such as German, French or Arabic (see the university homepage: http://www.fdu.). The more specialized study of the language in the English department requires Latin to be studied in the first year and German in the second. Dictation, memorization and recitation are still frequently employed in language teaching, at school and university alike – due to the lack of up-to-date teaching methodologies and resources and of qualified teachers – although more recently there has been some emphasis on communicative skills (Megoran 1997; Hasanova 2007: 4).

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The media Although the law guarantees the freedom of the media, the government controls the infrastructure; thus, state media have better access to information and distribution. Both printing and broadcasting are under tight supervision. The number of books published in Uzbek has grown annually (Asatova 2004: 21). In 2007, 1,913 books were published, 1,310 of them in Uzbek (Al’manakh Uzbekistana 2008 2009: 107). In the following year, the Uzbegim Dasturlari publishing house issued the largest English-Russian-Uzbek dictionary ever printed. This softwarebased dictionary includes more than 50,000 words. Other dictionaries are being planned. According to OSCE and other sources, in 2002 there were 557 newspapers, at least 80 per cent in government hands, published by various state agencies, ministries and departments, with few remaining in private ownership (for a list of the main newspapers in 2003, see Roux 2004: 324–6). At the time there were also 165 magazines and four news agencies. Several newspapers and magazines can be consulted online. They employ Uzbek (often in Cyrillic script), Russian, Tajik, English, Kazakh, Karakalpak or Korean – with an emphasis on Uzbek or Russian (sometimes in both languages). Those with the largest circulation in 2002 were Narodnoye Slovo/Xalq So‘zi (in Russian and Uzbek, 50,000 copies), Pravda Vostoka (Russian, 20,000), and Golos Uzbekistana/O‘zbekiston Ovozi (Russian and Uzbek, 40,000). Another Russian-language periodical, Vremya i My, closed down due to financial difficulties (Safargaliyeva 2003; Medvedev 2007: 28). The Englishlanguage newspapers include Uzbekistan Today (English and Russian), Good Morning, Uzbekistan Ovozi Times, Business Partner and Business Review (SarDesai 2007). The Turkish newspaper Zaman Özbekistan, first published in 1993, was closed down by the Uzbek government in 1995. Due to strict government control, many journalists are forced to be conformist and their newspapers – even the private ones – support government policies and their texts usually reflect the official perspectives. In 2009 there were four national television and radio channels, operated by the government and broadcasting mainly in Uzbek,

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and several private regional television companies, controlled by the national television and radio company. Several of them rebroadcast Russian programmes by pirating Russian movies and programmes, occasionally dubbing them in Uzbek. Some private FM radio stations provide entertainment rather than news, broadcasting in Uzbek and Russian (OSCE 2002: 118–22). There have been complaints that the authorities are reducing the time of Russian-language broadcasts on both television and radio (Nazar’yan 2007). Representatives of Western European television stations are often pressured to interrupt their work in Uzbekistan (Bensmann 2007: 541–2). We have already noted complaints by the Tajiks about what they see as discrimination against their language in the media. A research project in 2002 found that the official television channels broadcast mainly in Uzbek, so that 60 to 70 per cent of television airtime was allocated to Uzbek and 30 to 40 per cent to Russian. Another channel gave about 50 per cent of airtime to Russian, the rest being divided between Tajik, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and other languages (Abdullaeva and Ikromov 2002). For some time the International Channel of Uzbek television broadcast a useful series on instruction in English. The programme, run in conjunction with the Uzbekistan Teachers of English Association and the United States Information Agency, consisted of 26 episodes of 23 minutes each, and was intended to be functional, communicative and interactive. This and other English television programmes have aimed at improving listening and oral fluency (Khaitova 2000). Uzbek officials maintain that there were 165,000 subscribers to the internet in 2008, and estimate that the number of users reached 2,469,000 in November 2009 (IREX 2008: 268). Most of these subscribers are in Tashkent. Many regional media cannot access the internet because of financial constraints. There are internet cafés, but they are mostly used by young people who are often more interested in entertainment and social sites than in politics. A national survey conducted by Wei (2004: 393–6) indicates that internet users claimed excellent knowledge of Russian (95 per cent), Uzbek (over 75 per cent), Tajik (more than 25 per cent) or English (almost 25 per cent). Almost 80 per cent claimed proficiency in two or more languages. Some 98 per cent of internet use was carried out in Russian, 70 per cent in English, but only

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13 per cent in Uzbek and less than 5 per cent in Tajik. Language use was conditioned by the availability of websites and, no less, by the state monopoly on access to the internet (OSCE 2002: 123), based on a Law on Media which insisted on ‘objectivity’ from all public media (including the internet). The increase in the use of English is remarkable. In concluding, it is probably fair to say that the government’s efforts to raise the status of the titular language have been quite successful. The new Latin script is employed in education but less so in society at large, as Cyrillic is still very visible in the countryside. Language issues have been more effectively dealt with in urban than in rural areas. Language policy has succeeded in not antagonizing the ethnic Russian community too much, but seems to have failed to increase substantially the level of mother tongue use in the education of Tajiks and other ethnic minorities. For the time being, it seems that Uzbek and Russian have parallel, although not equivalent, roles in interethnic communication in Uzbekistan (Dzhusupov 2005: 12–13), to the detriment of the smaller languages.

CHAPTER 4 K AZAKHSTAN

Basic data Kazakhstan had a population of 16,530,000 at the end of the Soviet era, which dropped to 14,950,000 in the 1999 census (Zimovina 2003: Table 1) and rose again to 16,000,000 according to the preliminary results of the 2009 census (Agentstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po statistike 2010). The country has an area of 2,717,300 square kilometres, making it the ninth-largest country in the world. Kazakhstan declared its sovereignty on 25 October 1990 and independence on 16 December 1991, the last of the republics of the Soviet Union to do so. The first capital was Almaty, in the south of the country, but the seat of government was moved to Akmola, renamed Astana, in a government decision of June 1994, carried out in 1997. The population of Astana was about 720,000 in 2010. The newly independent state included more than 100 ethnic groups (130 according to Samsonov 2006: 69), most of them with a particular language or dialect. The largest group is now formed by the Kazakhs, most of whom are Sunni Muslims. When the country gained independence it was considered necessary to develop the poorer northern and eastern regions and move more Kazakhs to those areas heavily inhabited by ethnic Russians who might conceivably foster irredentistseparatist sentiments and bring about the partition of Kazakhstan (Department of National Security Affairs 2009). This fear is now probably obsolete, however.

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Population of Kazakhstan by ethnic group, 1989–99

Kazakhs Russians Ukrainians Uzbeks Germans Tatars Uighurs Belorussians Koreans Azerbaijanis Poles Dungans Kurds Chechens Tajiks Bashkirs Moldovians Ingushes Mordvins Armenians Greeks Kyrgyz Bulgarians Lezgins Turkmens Other ethnic groups No ethnic group indicated Total

1989

1999

1999 as Ethnic group percentage of as percentage 1989 of total population in 1999

6,534,616 6,227,549 896,240 332,017 957,518 327,982 185,301 182,601 103,315 90,083 59,956 30,165 25,425 49,507 25,514 41,847 33,098 19,914 30,036 19,119 46,746 14,112 10,426 13,905 3,846 203,626 119

7,985,039 4,479,618 547,052 370,663 353,441 248,952 210,339 111,926 99,657 78,295 47,297 36,945 32,764 31,799 25,657 23,224 19,458 16,893 16,147 14,758 12,703 10,896 6,915 4,616 1,729 166,342 1

122.19 71.93 61.03 111.63 36.91 75.90 113.51 61.29 96.25 86.91 78.88 122.47 128.86 64.23 100.56 55.49 58.78 84.82 53.75 77.19 27.17 77.21 66.32 33.19 44.95 81.68 0.84

16,464,464

14,953,126

90.82

53.40 29.95 3.65 2.47 2.36 1.66 1.40 0.74 0.66 0.52 0.31 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.01 1.11 0.000006 100.00

Source: 1999 census data, Agentstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po statistike 2000: 6–8, reproduced in Oka 2006: 361, reported with slight differences by Masanov 2002: 19; Dave 2004a: 442; Suleymenova, ed. 2007: 15–16; Smagulova 2008.

According to the information provided by Vdovina (2008), in early 2007 there were 8,900,000 Kazakhs (58.6 per cent of the total population), 4,560,000 Slavs, i.e. Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians (30.2 per cent) and 1,640,000 others (11.2 per cent) within a total

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population of 15,100,000. The number of Koreans in Kazakhstan has more recently been estimated at 105,000 (see Wikipedia entry ‘Koryo-saram’) and that of Uighurs at 300,000 (Arik 2008: 145). Since independence, a growing number of Chinese, both Han-Chinese and Uighurs with Chinese passports, have come to Kazakhstan (their precise numbers are unknown). According to recent estimates (Arik 2008: 144), about 9.5 million people speak Kazakh in Kazakhstan, along with approximately another 6 million in Uzbekistan, Xinjiang (China), the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey. Many Kazakhs and other inhabitants of Kazakhstan had a good command of Russian, chiefly among the well-educated classes and in the cities. According to the 1989 census, the percentage of the Kazakh population fluent in Russian reached 62.8 per cent (Smagulova 2008). During the early years of independence the ratio remained at about two-thirds of Russophone Kazakhs, chiefly in the cities (Dave 1996: 52). At independence the Kazakhs made up only about 40 per cent of the total population because of high population loss in the famines of the early years of Sovietization and the influx of Slavic settlers. This situation implied a more immediate need than in the other states discussed to decide on and popularize state symbols which would foster the supremacy of the Kazakh nation and its new national identity (Gali 2003a). As examined by Aydıngün (2008), such symbols are the flag, emblem and anthem, all drawn from the Kazakh past. At the same time, the government launched a campaign to attract as many as possible of the diaspora Kazakhs (King and Melvin 1999–2000: 127ff.). According to the Declaration of Sovereignty and the 1995 constitution, the state promised support for Kazakhs living abroad. Their repatriation enhances the legitimacy of the Kazakh government by increasing the proportion of the titular group within the state. Some Kazakh scholars maintain that this was essential in the post-Soviet period (Gali 2004). A Law on Immigration was passed in 1996, granting every returning ethnic Kazakh refugee status (Mendikulova 2004: 79–81). The government called on diaspora Kazakhs to join their ethnic kinsmen in Kazakhstan and this call was supported by intensive newspaper propaganda (Seydin 2002). On 20 March 2000 the

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Turkish daily Zaman reported that the Kazakh government had called on Kazakhs living in Turkey to return to their homeland, promising to provide them with accommodation and funds. During the 1990s some 500,000 Kazakhs living abroad did come to Kazakhstan (Diener 2005: 327), but the number of those arriving declined in the following decade. The total number of Kazakh ‘returnees’ between independence and mid-2008 stood at about 600,000 (Zentralasien-Analysen 7, 31 July 2008: 13). A World Association of Kazakhs is involved in forming Kazakhstan’s diaspora policies; it emphasizes primordial bonds but has had little success at resolving cultural and linguistic incompatibilities (Diener 2005: 339–40). Thanks to government policy as well as considerable Slav and German emigration (Burke 1998), as well as a higher Kazakh birthrate, in 2008 the titular nation reportedly made up 57.19 per cent of the population, the Russians 27.24 per cent and all other ethnies together 15.57 per cent (Smagulova 2008). Demographic superiority has remained a constant, although unacknowledged, aim of Kazakh ruling circles (Kolstø 1998). The danger of ethnic conflict, even secession (Chinn and Kaiser 1996: 191), has been present for some years, because of political differences as well as the cultural divide, largely in the domain of language (Kurganskaya 1999; Savin 2002). Nursultan Nazarbayev was elected president on 1 December 1991. Born in 1940, he was a former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan between 1989 and 1991. An April 1995 referendum extended his term of office until 2000; he was re-elected on 10 January 1999, 4 December 2005 and 3 April 2011, since the constitution was changed to enable him to be re-elected as many times as he wished. Parliament subsequently honoured him in June 2010 with the title of ‘Leader of the Nation’.

Nation-building debates One of the state’s foremost problems has been the nurturing of an allKazakhstani nation-state identity within a population lacking national cohesion; reserving a special place for the ‘re-awakening’ of the identity of the titular nation while allowing other ethnies to develop their

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specific identities (Suny 2001; Cummings 2006) within the overarching Kazakhstani identity. The relevance of linguistic policies, particularly in social and political terms, has perhaps been somewhat more appreciated in Kazakhstan than in several of its neighbouring states. The same may be true of the urgency of language planning (Gökdağ 2002: 71–3). An examination of the Kazakh press (chiefly in Russian) by Sarybai (2007) reveals the interest of the public in such topics as monolingualism, bilingualism, multilingualism, revitalizing languages, government linguistic intervention, language functions, ethnolinguistics, language policies and planning, and language conflict. This interest implies the revival and dissemination of the Kazakh language within Kazakhstan and among Kazakhs abroad, as well as the use and desirable predominance of Kazakh in all functions where Russian formerly predominated; i.e., a language shift reversing previous language loss (Smagulova 2005, 2006). President Nazarbayev’s attitude to the language issue has been cautious and can be exemplified, perhaps, by his traditionally addressing the population in his annual message to the nation and on many other occasions, first in Kazakh and then in Russian (Baykova and Ivzhenko 2004; Pavlenko 2008a: 71). Although affirming that knowledge of the titular language was essential to national consolidation, he has adopted ‘soft’ official moves which have granted the Russian language almost the same standing as Kazakh. A number of laws and decrees illustrate this (Vdovina 2008). Some intellectual Kazakhs are opposed to Nazarbayev’s leniency regarding the Kazakh language and its future; they have campaigned repeatedly for a special legal status for Kazakh (Nysanbayeva 2002). Debate has also focused on a 1998 constitutional demand that both the state president and the speaker of parliament should be fluent in Kazakh. In 2005 nationalists demanded that all members of parliament should be subject to this demand, but the motion failed to pass. A prominent opponent of such ideas was one of Kazakhstan’s best-known writers and poets, Olzhas Suleimenov (born in 1936) (on whom see Akhmedzhanov 2008: 116–39), a dedicated Russophone and head of the Writers’ Union in Kazakhstan since the 1980s. Suleimenov joined the language debate in 1994, labelling Kazakh-language nationalists

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‘village teachers who have no awareness of the movements and ideas of the world outside of the Kazakh village’ (Sarsembayev 1999: 327). Suleimenov also declared: ‘We cannot demand that people speak only Kazakh in the Majlis. We should not choose “either/or” but “both”. Proportion comes from experience. Kazakh needs the help of Russian’ (quoted in Medvedev 2007: 15). Other views were expressed in a round table on ‘The Problems of the Development of the State Language’. This was convened in Almaty on 21 January 1998 and came up with a manifesto addressed to the authorities, calling on them to consider the national language as ‘a support for spiritual freedom and state independence’ (Shekei 2004). The manifesto was published in the local press in Kazakh and in Russian. The main message it contained supported those parts of Nazarbayev’s policy which promoted Kazakh as the state language. It expressed regret that not everybody understood the role of Kazakh in strengthening the new state; and it accused some officials of trampling Kazakhstan’s historical past and future by their language policies. However, the round table also expressed a wish to honour other languages. Commenting on the language situation six years later, Shekei (2004) opined that nothing had changed. As she perceived it, the political establishment had not granted the Kazakh language the high status promised by the constitution, because its officials could not sustain the competition with Russian. Similarly, parliament debated a proposal requiring the state’s representatives abroad to know Kazakh and imposing the same demand on parliamentary candidates, but this was voted down and only the state president was required to be fluent in Kazakh. Shekei labels such manoeuvres anti-patriotic. The fact that Kazakhskaya Pravda published this report in Russian may indicate a certain support for her pro-Kazakh language views among Russophone Kazakhs and possibly some others. The cautious response of the government to the difficult issue of language change has been aimed, at least officially, at maintaining the integration of all communities with their own particular culture (Makashev 2002; Mustafayev 2002). President Nazarbayev has oscillated in his language policies over the years, adopting what may be called a gradualist approach. He has been quoted as saying that he

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sees Kazakhstan as a melting-pot of peoples, cultures and languages and insisting that the country is a Eurasian state of Slav and other ethnic groups (O’Callaghan 2004–05: 208). In a controversial speech, as early as May 1993, Nazarbayev declared himself against overly rapid Kazakhization, though his critics thought his pace was too slow (George 2001: 130–1). On that occasion and others he emphasized his impartiality, particularly in the domain of Kazakh language policies, even though he admitted that even this cautious approach had alarmed not only the Russophone population but also many Kazakhs. He then denounced any discrimination against the Russian language and criticized the mass changing of Russian names of streets and towns. Another of his criticisms was that the Language Committee comprised 30 Kazakhs as against only three Russians, two Uighurs and one Azerbaijani, although the mandate of the Committee was the development of all languages spoken in Kazakhstan (Kolstø 1998: 57–8). These arguments did not quite satisfy Kazakh nationalists. A survey of opinion leaders, carried out by Natsuko Oka (2002) in 2000–01, reached some interesting conclusions regarding the implementation of language policies. While Kazakh nationalists criticized the inadequacy of government support for the Kazakh language and culture, members of other ethnies complained about what they perceived as monopolization of power (in language preferences as well as other areas) by Kazakhs. Russian interviewees recommended that to prevent conflict Russian should be made a state language and discrimination be ended. Many Kazakh intellectuals alleged that the government’s cultural and language policies were mere slogans and nothing had been put into practice. Intellectuals from the ethnic minorities countered that, to the contrary, a monoethnic Kazakh state was being established with the intention of culturally assimilating other nationalities. The stark differences in interpretation of what was taking place did not bode well for future harmony over language policy.

Legislation and programmes The Law on Language of 1989 declared Kazakh the ‘state language’, but also defined Russian as ‘the language of interethnic communication’.

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A year later, the ‘State Programme on the Development of the Kazakh Language and Other Nationalities’ Languages in the Kazakh SSR until 2000’ was adopted, with more detailed provisions for implementation of the language law. The constitution, adopted on 28 January 1993, repeated the clause about Kazakh being the state language and Russian the language of interethnic communication, but insisted that the state president ought to have a full command of Kazakh (this injunction was adhered to in later presidential elections). Two years later, on 30 August 1995, a new constitution made Russian an ‘official language’ and declared that ‘in all governmental organizations and in the organs of local administration the Russian language is employed de facto on equal terms with Kazakh’ (Art. 7). This was followed by a number of laws and decrees relating to language (Vdovina 2008; for a selection of the main legislation from 1995 to 2001, see Osnovnyye zakonodatel’nyye akty o yazykakh 2009). On 4 November 1996, an official ‘Conception for Language Policy in the Republic of Kazakhstan’, based on sociolinguistic research, proposed goals for both short- and long-term language policies: mastery of the state language, preferences in its use, and its place in educational institutions. The document, worked out under the guidance of Nazarbayev himself, was the source of subsequent legislation. It asserted that only in Kazakhstan could the Kazakhs own a statehood concerned with the preservation of the Kazakhs as an ethnie with its own language and culture (Kolstø 1998: 58). The president recommended Kazakh for all official work and correspondence. The emphasis was definitely on developing and promoting Kazakh, but the document confirmed that Russian would ‘remain the main source of information in many fields of science and technology, and a means of communication’. In the same year, a decree was issued on the naming and renaming of institutions, organizations, geographical locations, railway stations and airports. The new Law on Languages of 11 July 1997 formulated in legal terms some of the principles of the above ‘Conception’. It is an explicit and detailed language law. Its preamble declares that it ‘regulates the legal basis for the functioning of languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan, the obligation of the state to create conditions for their

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acquisition and development, and guarantees an equal respectful attitude towards all languages used in the Republic of Kazakhstan, without exception’ (Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 11 iyulya 1997 goda 1997). It declared that everybody should know Kazakh (‘It is the duty of every citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan to master the state language’) and guaranteed every citizen’s right to study Kazakh. Russian was now titled ‘one of the national languages of Kazakhstan’ instead of ‘an official language’, but was given a special status, nonetheless. It might function on a par with Kazakh in all state and regional bodies, as well as in the military and security forces – but it was to be used in the courts of law only when one party did not know Kazakh. The law also declared that Russian could be employed on an equal footing with Kazakh in both state and local administration, as well as in education, business, documents and statistics – when the majority of members involved were not proficient in Kazakh. A proviso was added that each mass medium should devote as much time or space to Kazakh as it does to all other languages combined. The new law also set a 15-year term (ending in 2012) for all state cadres to be proficient in Kazakh. A senior official explained the intention of the law as follows: ‘What we are talking about is the revival of Kazakh culture, not the diminution of Russian culture’ (Burke 1998: 59; Hallez 2003: 303; Boranbayeva 2004: 29–30; Dzhusupov 2005: 13–14). On 5 October 1998 a presidential decree (officially published in March 1999) elaborated on the principles laid down in the 1996 ‘Conception’ and listed the measures to enforce the 1997 Law on Languages, in a document titled ‘The Government Programme for the Functioning and Development of Languages’. The Programme started with a pronouncement on the importance of the issue for harmonizing interethnic relations in Kazakhstan. It then set up four main goals to be attained between 1998 and 2000: 1. Create the necessary conditions, financial and organizational, for all citizens to master the state language. 2. Develop the state language by preparing all necessary conditions for its active use in the domains of science, education, culture, mass information, and government administration.

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3. Establish a real basis for steps to translate all official work into the state language. 4. Introduce measures to enable all citizens to choose freely their language for socialization and education. All government support would be provided for these aims, including mass information, activity of the State Terminology Commission and other means (Nazarbayev 1998). Two years later, replying to journalists’ questions, Nazarbayev declared that developing the state language was not merely a government affair. Rather, all educated persons ought to participate by using Kazakh daily within their families (Nazarbayev 2000). A further programmatic document, issued on 7 February 2001 under Nazarbayev’s sponsorship and titled ‘The State Programme of Development of Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan until the Year 2010’, set out again plans for language development. It specified goals and devised means to promote the use of Kazakh in many public capacities, including the media, and to promote the teaching of Kazakh at all levels (both as a first and second language). Recommendations were also spelled out for the development of other languages of the republic (Boranbayeva 2004: 30). In subsequent years, additional government instructions were issued on the functioning and development of languages as well as on extending the use of Kazakh, such as the 2002 Media decree. The government’s language policies may be further understood from a decree issued by the Ministry of Culture and Information on 7 August 2007. Discussing interethnic relations in the state, the Ministry formulated suggestions regarding language as an instrument of integration and stability. After asserting that the government had already provided computer programmes and multilingual electronic assistance for language learning, the document continued: Learning the state language and also languages of the nations of Kazakhstan is being done on Sunday courses as well. For today more than 7,000 children and adults learn the native language in 196 ... courses for learning the state language run by members of the republican and regional national-cultural centres.

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In 2007, instructions were published to the effect that, as of 1 January 2009, ‘all official documents in Russian ought to have a Kazakh translation’ (Guzhvenko 2007a). Lastly, a lengthy and detailed draft of the ‘State Programme for the Functioning and Development of Language in the Years 2010– 2020’ was approved by the Government on 26 June 2010 and presented to the press by the Minister of Culture three days later (Proyekt Gosudarstvennoi programmy 2011–2020 2010). The programme declared that its main aim was to formulate a harmonious language policy to foster the state language so that it was recognized by everybody as a factor of national unity, while promoting all other languages of the country’s inhabitants as well. This would be done by: • improving and standardizing the methodology of instruction in the state language; • increasing its prestige and integration into all spheres of life throughout the country; • systematizing its lexicon; • maintaining the role of Russian as a language of communication; • promoting all other indigenous languages by increasing the number of schools teaching in the languages of the ethnies and publishing in those languages; • encouraging the study of English and other foreign languages by increasing the number of schools offering instruction in these languages, and setting up special courses for this purpose. The programme not only promised the allocation of suitable budgets to ensure that these aims were met, but it also drew up detailed plans for achieving its ambitions. The main element was a systematic examination of the standards of language in general use as well as in the different types of schools and language centres. It was intended to review language research; develop Kazakh terminology in all fields; introduce Kazakh into personal and place names; promote the publication of large numbers of texts; encourage teacher training, curriculum improvement, free language circles and summer camps; and increase the use of electronic mass media, chiefly television and the internet.

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The challenge of Russian Of the non-titular ethnies the most important has been the Russian, which according to some Kazakhs presents a problem on account of the sheer numbers of Russians and their concentration in the north and north-east (Zardykhan 2004: 67ff.; Peyrouse 2007: 481–501; Peyrouse 2008: 110ff.). This ethnie was previously much larger in proportion to the overall population than in the other post-Soviet Muslim states. In 1989 Russians and other Slavs were a majority in the north of the country and in the capital, Almaty, in the south, as well as in several other urban centres. Their sizeable number, memories of their privileged status during Soviet rule, active organization and considerable influence, raised some doubt among Kazakh nationalists whether the ethnic Russians could integrate into the nation of independent Kazakhstan (Chernova 2007). This is probably why the Kazakhstan authorities did not accede to the demands of ethnic Russians to hold double citizenship (McLaren-Miller 2003; Laruelle and Peyrouse n.d.: 95ff.). The Russians in Kazakhstan, well aware of their numerical strength and of backing by the Russian Federation, have not easily given up their claim to a special status for their language. The Cossacks, descendants of military communities in the Ukraine and southern Russia, organized protests, allegedly rallying many thousands, who demanded the status of a state language for Russian. They lacked cohesion, however, and acted in rival groups. The various Associations of Russians in Kazakhstan took some political action, too. The largest and most vocally active was Lad (‘Harmony’), an organization established in 1992 on the basis of Russian cultural centres in the north and east (Melvin 2001: 175) and registered officially two years later. Its first director was Aleksandra V. Dokuchayeva, a lecturer at the Institute of Chemistry of the Kazakh National University in Almaty. The association publishes a journal named Lad, founded in 1994 and reportedly printed in 5,000 copies. Lad grew into a political movement with interests of a cultural nature, focusing on the defence and promotion of the Russian language. Because of the authoritarian, centralized character of the regime, which has generally opposed such political aims, Lad has remained moderate in its activities.

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Various associations of Russians protested against what they saw as the Kazakhization of education and the media, printed and electronic (which they interpreted as anti-Russian moves). Since the mid1990s, the bulletins of these associations, chiefly Lad, maintained that Kazakh was not yet fully developed as a language and was not widely used; to favour the Kazakh language was contrary to the constitution; teachers and school textbooks in Kazakh were inadequate; and Russians should not be compelled to study a language that even most Kazakhs did not know. In the face of demands by Kazakh nationalists for the state language, Kazakh, to be mandatory for use among state employees, Russian representatives have protested vigorously. Some Russians insist that, while they consider Kazakhstan to be their home, they simply do not see the need to master Kazakh (Bissenova 2004: 5–6; Abdurasulov 2007a). Concerning the ‘Russian problem’, the government’s assumption seems to have been that the emigration of ethnic Russians, together with the promotion of Kazakh-language education and employment would, over time, take care of the conflict over language – an assumption which has proved only partly correct. At the start of the new millennium, some Russians still maintained that language policies had divided Kazakhstani society into ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Karin and Chebotarev 2002: 21; Katagoshchina 2002: 37ff.) and that they felt discriminated in education and appointments to the higher echelons of government administration. Conciliatory language policy was expressed not only officially, as explained above, by granting Russian the status of ‘language of interethnic and cross-national communication’, but also by trying to find a balance between the respective demands of Kazakh nationalists and ethnic Russians concerning employment and education (Zubarev 2002; more on education below). It is very difficult indeed to impose a language from above. Russian remains the language most frequently employed not only by ethnic Russians, but also by numerous Kazakhs and other ethnies in Kazakhstan. This is, also, a matter of class and education. A 2007 survey directed by G. T. Ileuova (2008), president of the Strategiya Centre

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for Social and Political Research, found no real signs of narrowing of proficiency in, and use of, Russian. Other findings, however, indicate that the use of Russian is receding, especially among the younger generation and the rural population, but most professionals of the older generation know and employ Russian.

Minorities and language Nazarbayev’s approach to the sensitive issue of the numerous minorities in Kazakhstan has been wary. Thus, in 1995 a 300-member Assembly of Peoples was created, appointed and chaired by the president, representing the most numerous of the country’s ethnies. In 2008 the Assembly was renamed the ‘Assembly of the People’, to underline the national unity and ethnic harmony of all Kazakhstani citizens. Its motto was ‘Unity through diversity’ (Yedinstvo cherez mnogoobraziye) (interview with the vice-chairman of the Assembly and head of its secretariat, Yerali Tugzhanov, Astana, 24 April 2009). This body has very limited powers and engages chiefly in cultural activities, such as those of the national cultural associations of various ethnies listed on the homepage of the Assembly. In 2008 Kazakhstan had 365 of these national cultural centres, using various languages and promoting their specific traditions. Almost every ethnie now has a cultural centre. The multilingual situation is reflected in the media and in the educational system. There are theatres offering performances in Kazakh, Russian, German, Uighur, Korean and Uzbek. The 1997 Law on Languages specified that the state should promote the welfare of languages in Kazakhstan, and guaranteed citizens the right to use their mother tongue and to choose the language they wish to use for general communication, education and creative activity. The state has the responsibility to foster conditions for acquisition and development of the languages of the people of Kazakhstan (Art. 6, Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 11 iyulya 1997 goda 1997). Article 16 deals with language in education and guarantees, ‘when necessary’, education in languages other than the state language and Russian at all levels of the educational system, from pre-school to postgraduate level. In 2007, about 3.3 per cent of Kazakhstan’s schoolchildren

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attended 119 minority language-medium schools (Pavlenko 2008: 296), in which they were expected, also, to study Kazakh, or Russian, or both. Special interest attaches to the German minority, descendants of the Volga Germans deported by the Soviet regime to Kazakhstan during the Second World War. They numbered 957,518 in 1989 but only 353,441 ten years later (according to the two official censuses). The total continues to shrink, though at a slower pace, and is slightly affected by a trickle of people returning from Germany, where many had emigrated after the dismantling of the Soviet Union (Brown 2005: 625ff.). Early in 2009, the Kazakhstan ambassador to Berlin, Dr Nurlan Onzhanov, estimated the total number of Germans in Kazakhstan at only 220,000 (Eschment 2009: 12). In the same year it was estimated that just 7,500 Germans were living in Almaty (interview with Anna Seifert, First Secretary of the German Consulate-General in Almaty, 28 April 2009). Some of the remaining Germans belong to an association called Vozrozhdeniye (‘Renaissance’), which has attempted to foster some German culture in the theatre, local television and schools, as well as assisting the needy (George 2001: 139; Seifert interview 2009). Since Kazakhstan’s independence the community has shown an increasing sense of unease with Kazakh nation-building and the decline of German-language institutions. As Table 4.2 indicates, most Germans speak not Kazakh but Russian, while knowledge of German has also declined in recent years, especially among the young. One reason for this is that after the end of the war with Nazi Germany, there was no question for many years of using German socially (George 2001: 144). Another reason is the decline in the number and quality of German-medium schools (Dederer et al. 2002; Brown 2005) and the preference of schoolchildren and their parents for learning English. By means of the PASCH (Partnership with Secondary Schools) programme, which started in late 2008, the Goethe-Institut in Almaty, which is co-ordinating five language-learning centres in Kazakhstan’s main cities, is doing its best to spread the study of German language and culture (Eschment 2009: 13). Several other minority ethnies in Kazakhstan use their national languages even less than the Germans do. One example is the Korean

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minority, mostly descendants of those deported by Stalin in 1937. They number about 100,000 people and seem to prefer employing Russian; even their bulletin, Newsletter of Korean Studies in Central Asia, published by the Centre for Korean Studies at the al-Farabi Kazakh National University, appears mostly in Russian. A study carried out in 1999 found that of all Koreans interviewed in Kazakhstan, between 91 and 98 per cent spoke Russian, but none spoke Kazakh! (Dederer et al. 2002; Oh 2006: 122). The Korean Association is this minority’s cultural organization. Among other activities it tries to foster the Korean language among the local Koreans. Few of them can now speak Korean, but they nevertheless support their cultural centre, as does the government of South Korea (Seifert interview 2009). This ethnic minority maintains that it has yet another problem – its frustrated desire to get quality education in its own language (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 27 February 2008). The Uighur community, which numbers about 300,000 people (most of them refugees from neighbouring China), now living mainly in the region of Almaty, has its own cultural centre and modest school network (Besson 1998: 165, 173).

Language Kazakhization The Russian cultural legacy was particularly strong in Kazakhstan – one of the effects of early Russianization. In independent Kazakhstan, language Kazakhization is an important means for Kazakh-language elites to counter asymmetrical bilingualism and reverse the marginalization of Kazakh by Russian. This, rather than outright de-Russianization, has been the core of official language policy, as emphasized repeatedly by the president. Nazarbayev has acted slowly, but surely, to Kazakhize the language situation in the bureaucracy, education and communications, so that the Russian language is gradually losing some of its previously dominant position in education, science and administration. Thus, in all parliamentary elections Kazakhs gained a heavy majority of seats in both houses; considerably more than their share in the overall population. In the state bureaucracy the general trend has been

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to replace high-ranking Russians with Kazakhs and to promote and subsidize the Kazakh language, at first chiefly among ethnic Kazakhs, and since 1998 among non-Kazakhs as well (Haghayeghi 1995: 190; Schatz 2000: 494–5). Azimbai Gali (2003), a Kazakh political scientist, has argued for Kazakh ‘language loyalty’ in no uncertain terms. The pragmatic, officially depoliticized, gradual language changes express the policies of official Kazakhstan (Kolstø 2004: 165ff.). The advance of the Kazakh language has continued, despite opposition in the areas where Kazakhs formed a minority. In general the official language policy has been fairly conciliatory (Lee 2004), which on the whole has served to defuse ethnic conflict. Vice-Premier N. Shaikenov has declared publicly that Kazakhstan is distinguished by its pluralist society – a notion widely held in Kazakh society. Thus, the government has successfully avoided the danger of separatism by ethnic Russians. In any event, the 1999 census indicated remarkable language proficiency among both Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs; in other words, it offered proof that Kazakhization in demography and language was proceeding.

Table 4.2 Proficiency in Kazakh and Russian among major nationalities in Kazakhstan, 1999 (percentages) Nationality

Proficiency in language Of own nationality

Kazakh Russian Ukrainian Belorussian German Uzbek Tatar Uighur Korean

99.4 100.0 16.1 13.5 21.8 97.0 37.1 81.3 25.8

Of other nationalities Kazakh

Russian

– 14.9 12.6 9.0 15.4 80.0 63.6 80.5 28.8

75.0 – 99.5 99.4 99.3 59.2 96.9 76.1 97.7

Source: The 1999 Census – Agentstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po statistike 2000, Vol. I: 33 and 181–3v, reproduced in Dave 2004a: 443.

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Some of the reported results of the 1999 census (see Table 4.2) are surprising and do not seem entirely trustworthy. It is unlikely that almost all Kazakhs became ‘proficient’ (and what is ‘proficiency’?) in their own language less than a decade after independence and that among the Russians in Kazakhstan, of whom fewer than 1 per cent spoke Kazakh ten years earlier, 14.9 per cent succeeded in becoming fluent. (For an evaluation of the 1999 census, see Sinnott 2003: 112– 15.) Figures for 2003 indicate that 85 per cent of Kazakhs know the Kazakh language (Laruelle and Peyrouse n.d.: 102); this again appears somewhat inflated. In the same year, apparently about 39 per cent of all Kazakh townspeople were speaking Russian in the family (Poppe and Hagendoorn 2003: 777). A 2009 estimate, based on the provisional results of that year’s census, was 67 per cent Kazakhophones versus 30 per cent Russophones (interview with Yerbol Sh. Shaimerden, Chairman of the Department of Language Development at the Ministry of Culture, Information and Social Harmony, Astana, 23 April 2009). This estimate, which refers to first language, appears inflated in favour of the Kazakhophones. Even some ethnic Kazakhs were uncomfortable with the various language laws and decrees setting dates for proficiency in Kazakh, probably because they themselves had not yet mastered the language and, in any event, a commitment to Russian is still noticeable among the young urban elite (Rivers 2002: 160; Cummings 2005: 87–8). In fact, the progress of Kazakhization in both government and business has been slow. Even the launching of 2007 as ‘The Year of the Kazakh Language’, directed by the Language Development Department in the Ministry of Culture, Information and Social Harmony, accompanied by a local public campaign and fortified by sizeable funds, did not seem to bring far-reaching results. Legal demands to compel Kazakhs (and later, others) to learn Kazakh as a condition for employment were watered down and seldom enforced. Smagulova (2006: 303ff.) has noted that some pressure was still being put on Kazakhs, more than on others, to become fluent in the state language and that, in any event, applicants for posts in the government bureaucracy were expected to know Kazakh. This policy was influenced by the government’s awareness that many

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Kazakhs spoke only Russian, and that Russophones dominated in the administrative, economic, services and technology sectors (Lee 2004). A definite increase of reported proficiency in Kazakh, paralleled by a decrease of proficiency in Russian, is however noted among younger respondents, particularly in the south, as observed by a German student in Almaty during 2008–09 (Jäger 2009). There also appears to be an overall tendency towards monolingualism among the Kazakh respondents, who employ Kazakh increasingly at work or in daily life. Thus, while Russian remains dominant in the public domain, Kazakh is increasingly challenging it in the private domain (personal experience, April 2009). Further, a recent survey shows that more Kazakhs tend to have their children educated in Kazakh than formerly. Over the years, the Kazakhs seem to have become more confident that their own language can hold its own. All considered, the support of ethnic Kazakhs for the state language has increased visibly, although certain nationalist Kazakhs and discontented Russians continue occasionally to protest against the government’s language policies, each ethnie from its own standpoint (Kudabayeva 2007). Efforts to promote and develop Kazakh as the state language have continued in recent years and several agencies have been involved in the process of language Kazakhization. The principal agency is the Department of Language Development attached to the Ministry of Culture and Information. Its main aim is to encourage the spread of the Kazakh language. It works through state language departments in each district and branches in each town. Second is the State Terminology Commission, composed of 22 members, who are linguists, journalists, writers, and people representing the cabinet and the president’s apparat. The Commission has more than 100 sub-commissions dealing with the terminology of academic disciplines. Most of these sub-commissions are located in Almaty with a minority in Astana, the new capital. The Commission’s duty is to translate so-called ‘internationalisms’, adopted directly or through Russian into Kazakh, and to find substitute terms. It is also active in publishing dictionaries and other terminological references, as described below.

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Third is the Language Committee (Til Komiteti), which is headed by the Prime Minister himself. Its task is a practical one – to develop language planning and language programmes. It holds four meetings a year at which the heads of the districts make their reports on language use in their respective areas. This body has sub-committees for different disciplines, which develop materials to be discussed (interview with Kobe Sh. Khusain, Head of the Department of Language and Literature at Kazakhstan’s National Academy of Sciences, Almaty, 30 April 2009). A semi-official, state-funded Society for the Kazakh Language, Qazaq Tili (‘The Kazakh Language’), headed by Abduali Qaidarov, has been active since 1992 in language Kazakhization, which the society calls ‘language revival’. The society has prepared and published textbooks and dictionaries, devising new methods for teaching Kazakh at school, standardizing a native methodology, and replacing Russian place names with others of Kazakh origin. In addition, its staff provides translations into Kazakh of public signs and product labels (Dave 1996: 54–5). The society has also been very active in publishing an eponymous journal and otherwise campaigning for the spread of Kazakh until the entire population has mastered it. It has also encouraged the study of Kazakh in schools, as in its proposal to introduce compulsory Kazakh culture lessons in Russian-medium schools. Finally, a new presidential Foundation for the Promotion of the State Language held its first meeting on 3 September 2008 (ZentralasienAnalysen 9, 30 September 2008: 20). Of these institutions, the Language Committee seems to have been the most active. Established in 1989, its tasks were enlarged in 1992. Its duties are mainly as follows: 1. Help the organs of the republic and relevant associations to promote the Kazakh language. 2. Find ways to teach Kazakh to those wishing to study it, in Kazakhstan and abroad. 3. Devise methods for learning Kazakh by such media as radio, television and printed materials. 4. Insist on simultaneous translation at all symposia in order to overcome language difficulties.

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5. Increase the use of Kazakh at home, at school and in all organizations. 6. Promote the use of Kazakh in serial publications, the media, translation, onomastics and official documents. 7. Encourage the use of Kazakh in scholarly publications and initiate congresses and competitions to promote love of the language. 8. Model language laws and the constitution on those employed in other societies. 9. Publish a periodical titled Ana Tili (‘Mother Tongue’) on language. 10. Encourage the preparation of scholarly books on grammar and new dictionaries (Karin and Chebotarev 2002; Boranbayeva 2004: 28–9). The State Terminology Commission has prepared a series of 31 terminological dictionaries, by subject, besides being involved in the preparation of textbooks and instructions for translators (Guzhvenko 2007). Its members have been engaged since 1994 in the task of introducing new terms into the Kazakh lexicon. The purpose was to increase the vocabulary and to change administrative, technical and scientific terms borrowed from Russian (and some international items) into others with Kazakh literary or dialectical sources, or, if unavailable, Turkish and Turkic ones. When borrowing from other languages was not feasible, new words were coined. Some Russian and international words were retained but altered for phonetic reasons; thus ‘tovar’ became ‘tavar’ (‘commodity’). By 2002, 610 new terms had been coined (İsina 2002; Masanov 2002: 39). This work is intended to allow Kazakh, instead of Russian, to become the preferred language of all Kazakhstanis at some future time (Fierman 2005). Many such new technical terms are heard in elite circles rather than among the general population, which still prefers the Russian terminology for daily use, according to the above mentioned research of Guzhvenko (2007a). New personal names have been invented and adopted. Regions, cities and streets continue to be given new names (examples are provided in Pesnev 2002; Toyekin 2008). For instance, in 2002 the Onomastic Commission of Kazakhstan initiated a new wave of naming in the

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Karaganda district and also renamed 17 villages inhabited by Russian speakers (Pesnev 2002). Many places received new names in the course of the 1990s (Gökdağ 2002: 80; Olcott 2005: 284), and the process is continuing. The views of the population were sounded out in many cases; for instance during 2008 in the search for a new name for ‘Pavlodar’, when ‘Kereku’ was the leading choice (Abdurasulov 2008), despite the opposition of ethnic Russians. Some citizens argued in the press and other media against toponymic changes, which they correctly interpreted as an act of de-Russianization (Shustov 2008). Such changes are usually published in the press and included in the Kazakh encyclopaedic dictionary (Kuzhabekova 2003: 170–1). In an effort to modernize the standard of dictionaries and adapt them to the changes arising in post-Soviet life, as well as to changes of terminology and language use, several new Kazakh-Russian and Russian-Kazakh dictionaries have been published (Kadyrov 2004). A scholarly dictionary was launched in 1998 under the sponsorship of the Institute of Linguistics of the Kazakhstan National Academy of Sciences. Ten volumes are planned in all, and several have appeared. The dictionary, edited by R.G. Syzdykova and Kobe Sh. Khusain, aims at the codification and standardization of the corpus of the Kazakh language, thus increasing the suitability of the language for all spheres of use. It is intended, first of all, to display the richness of contemporary literary Kazakh, including regional variants and archaic terms. The new dictionary, planned in only 2,500 copies, was, in the words of the authors, designed to enable the state to attain its aims in language policies and modify the perceptions of non-Kazakhophones towards them (Hallez 2003: 303–5). The figure of 2,500 copies is very modest, considering the number of potential users, and may indicate a distribution aimed more at public bodies than at individual buyers. Nowadays, when dictionaries are increasingly available on the internet, printing dictionaries has lost some of its importance. A dictionary intended for schools and universities was published in Almaty in 2001. It was titled (in Russian) Slovar’ kazakhskorusskii i russko-kazakhskii dlya shkol’nikov i studentov (‘Kazakh-Russian and Russian-Kazakh Dictionary for Pupils and Students’). A pair of more popular dictionaries, each containing 50,000 words, has been

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published more recently. The first, edited by Garifolla Anes, is titled Russko-kazakhskii slovar’ (Almaty 2007). The second, again edited by R.G. Syzdykova and Kobe Sh. Khusain, is titled Kazakhsko-russkii slovar’ (Almaty 2008). Yet another Kazakh-Russian dictionary, specializing in the translation of sociolinguistic terms, has the Kazakh linguist E.D. Suleymenova as its chief editor and is titled Slovar’ sotsiolingvisticheskikh terminov (Astana 2007). Implementation of pro-Kazakh language policies remains difficult, because of legal problems and personnel changes. Also, the rather pragmatic attitude of the authorities has meant that the language laws and regulations are not strictly enforced (Kolstø 2003: 127). For example, the Directorate for the Development of Language in the Karaganda region in central Kazakhstan has somehow avoided confrontation, using mostly persuasion to enforce language regulations in this predominantly ethnic Russian area. By 2007, 40 per cent of official paperwork in the region was being done in Kazakh. The inflow of Kazakhs into Karaganda (their number rose from 17 per cent in 1991 to 43 per cent in 2007) did not really alter the position, as many of them knew very little Kazakh anyway. Whatever progress the Kazakh language has made in Kazakhstan has chiefly been due to various techniques of instruction introduced for teaching Kazakh to civil servants, the foundation of a Kazakh-language centre, and the allocation of additional budgets for Kazakh-language instruction at school (Lillis 2007). To sum up: due to the complex ethnic makeup of Kazakhstan and the fear of ethnic strife, the government has been inclined to tread cautiously in implementing its language policies and to display awareness of the inherent difficulties in the Kazakhization of language. These difficulties, summarized by Fierman (2006: 101ff.), have mainly been the following: 1. Russian had a special place in the linguistic repertoire of the Kazakhs (a majority were proficient in Russian rather than in Kazakh). 2. Many Kazakhs – certainly the urban classes – had been Russified not merely linguistically, but also culturally. 3. Many parents and pupils preferred Russian-medium schools or mixed Kazakh/Russian-medium schools rather than Kazakh-medium ones.

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4. The Kazakh-medium schools often had less capable teachers and less suitable textbooks. The introduction of mandatory proficiency tests in Kazakh for certain jobs in the state administration has been rejected. Nysanbayeva (2002) noted that among government employees in 2000, 75 per cent used Russian and only 25 per cent Kazakh. To correct this situation, measures were taken in 2006 for the Kazakhization of paperwork in the civil service and state-controlled institutions as well as in private enterprises, which were required to correspond with government bodies and submit reports in Kazakh only (Smagulova 2006). A certain lack of realism can be detected in the decision that all foreign embassies had to correspond with the Government of Kazakhstan in Kazakh only (Seifert interview 2009).

Postponing Latinization The issue of Latinizing the alphabet has been considered in independent Kazakhstan, as in other places. Postponing the decision on whether or not to adopt the Latin script is very likely a part of the ‘soft’ official policy towards Russophones. The issue is not yet finally resolved and is debated constantly in the press and among intellectuals. Discussions weigh the advantages and disadvantages for Kazakhstan, its relations with other Turkic communities and with the Kazakhs living abroad, and also the consequences of Latinization in the contexts of globalization and computerization (personal experience 2007, 2009). At the state president’s request, the National Academy of Sciences has several times investigated the option of Latinizing the script. Of course, much has depended on the president’s views in the matter (details in Gökdağ 2002: 85–8). In 2006 it seemed that the issue of alphabet Latinization had become more pressing. In the summer of that year, a commission was set up to prepare a feasibility study by examining the effects of Latinization in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The allocation of 7.5 million tenge (US$60,000 at the time) to the commission indicates that not only was the matter perceived as important, but increasing economic prosperity in Kazakhstan

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had made the Latinization project more feasible (Bartlett 2006). In the commission’s view, prepared during the summer of 2006, Latinization could be carried out over a 15- to 20-year period. Nazarbayev then asked the Ministry of Education and Science to study the experience of Latinization in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The Ministry’s report proposed a six-step programme, estimating the cost at US$300 million (some commentators thought that the actual outlay would be higher). An important argument for Latinization in the report was that it would bolster those Kazakhs who see the Cyrillic script as a major hindrance to their national identity (this point seems exaggerated). Finally, the report outlined a preparatory stage of working out the practicalities, followed by a stage for transliterating various works into the Latin script as well as printing Latinized texts to be used alongside the Cyrillic and, eventually, teaching materials to be introduced into the school system (Bartlett 2007; Yadukha 2007). During an official visit to Turkey in the summer of 2006, President Nazarbayev made further inquiries about the Latinization of the Turkish alphabet. His trip stirred up the debate over Latinization anew, with some earlier arguments being repeated. Supporters argued that Latinization would break down language barriers, diminish Russian influence and strengthen Kazakh identity. Opponents warned against playing games with language, sinning against the nation’s history, and aggravating the problems relating to education and literature (Nurmakov 2007). One of the strongest critics of Latinization, Aleksandr Shustov (2006, 2007) argued that: 1. It would not suit Kazakhstan, the most Russified republic in Central Asia. 2. The Russian language was, and still is, the basis of study in Kazakhstan schools. 3. The Kazakh elites, mostly Russophone, opposed the project. 4. Kazakh works of science and literature published during the past 50 years would be lost to schoolchildren. 5. Cyrillic was still the common alphabet of all ethnic groups in the republic.

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6. Latinization appeared to be a plot against the status of the Russian language. The president raised the issue again in a speech on 24 October 2006 at a session of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, the consultative body chaired by himself, in which most ethnies living in Kazakhstan are represented. He pointed out that Kazakhs worldwide were using three alphabets – Cyrillic, Latin and Arabic. He observed that the Latin script dominated all means of global communication. Thus, he added, many states, including three of the post-Soviet Turkic states, had moved to Latin alphabets (Panfilova and Salimov 2006). The matter ought to be considered by Kazakhstan, ‘but with no haste’. He even offered the interesting suggestion that both Cyrillic and Latin could co-exist for some time in Kazakhstan. A serious public debate followed, in which supporters of change maintained that the Latin alphabet could be a factor for modernization and of the unity of the Turkic peoples, whereas Cyrillic could be seen as a symbol of powerful cultural pressure by the Russian establishment; the move to a Latin script could contribute to forging a more cohesive national identity (Bartlett 2006). Opponents argued that Latinization was very costly, would isolate generations of Kazakhs from one another, cut youngsters off from their cultural heritage, and complicate the study of Kazakh by other ethnies (Prokudin 2006; Tajibaeva and Kozyrev 2007: 144–52). The Ministry of Education and Science developed a plan to start Latinization in 2008 (and complete the process by 2014). In this connection, a high-level delegation, headed by the leaders of the Kazakh Language Committee at the Ministry of Culture, Information and Social Harmony, met leading linguists in Ankara from 11 to 15 June 2007 to discuss the Latinization of Kazakh (Öner 2007: 142–50) in what seemed a promising dialogue. However, in November 2007 the plan was apparently abandoned (Smagulova 2008) or, at least, postponed. Still, Kazinform, the state news agency, issues its Kazakh bulletins in both Cyrillic and Latin scripts. A journalist belonging to an ethnic minority (interviewed in Almaty on 29 April 2009) argued that the government of the Russian Federation and many people in

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Kazakhstan opposed Latinization, which anyway would be a very expensive undertaking, particularly considering the economic crisis. The issue of alphabet change had yet another dimension. Members of the Kazakh diaspora in the Russian Federation, most of whom used Cyrillic, would find it difficult to switch to a Latinized script. There is also the added complication of Kazakh diasporas worldwide. In Germany, for instance, there were in 2008 about 200 Kazakh families who had arrived as labour migrants from Turkey. Most knew no Kazakh at all, having been educated in Turkish – in the Latinized script. The Kazakh Embassy in Berlin tried to procure manuals to enable them to study Kazakh in the Latin alphabet; no easy matter since no generally accepted transliteration is as yet available (personal experience at a symposium in the Kazakh Embassy in Berlin, 12 September 2008).

Language in education The Law on Languages allows for a free choice at various levels of education for both major languages and for several minor ones – ‘if necessary’, with the state language and the Russian language being compulsory subjects in all educational bodies (Art. 16, Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 11 iyulya 1997 goda 1997). Regulations issued in 2002 stated that all schools in Kazakhstan should insist on an obligatory examination in the Kazakh language at the end of the eighth grade and another at the end of the eleventh (and final) grade (Temirkhanova 2002). Since 1999, a new law on education has required all schools, including private ones, to promote not only the study of Kazakh but also of Russian and a foreign language. The legislation merely speeded up a process already initiated and encouraged by the state authorities, although in both primary and secondary education traces of the Soviet system are still noticeable. According to official statistics, between 1988–89 and 2006–07 the enrolment in Kazakh-medium schools increased from 30.2 per cent to 54.8 per cent and the number of Kazakh-medium schools rose by 781 in comparison with 1991. In Almaty itself, however, there were only

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42 Kazakh-medium schools in the 2006–07 school year as opposed to 88 Russian-medium (besides some mixed schools). Whereas in 1991 only 34.4 per cent of Kazakh children had attended Kazakh-medium schools, 80 per cent did so in 2007 – mostly in rural areas. Overall, the number of students in Kazakh-medium schools has now surpassed that in Russian-medium schools (Gavrilov et al. 2008: 33–4; for earlier years see Conant 2002; Shekei 2003; Tishkov 2007; Pavlenko 2008a; Laruelle and Peyrouse n.d.: 124). This reflects various developments: the demographic change due to higher Kazakh fertility rates, the ‘return’ of Kazakhs to their homeland (Seydin 2002; Diener 2005a: 465ff.), and the emigration of Slavs and others (Taranova et al. 2003; Diener 2006: 201), and, last but not least, the results of promoting the Kazakh language as the state language and a rising commitment of the members of the titular ethnie itself to use that language and have their children educated in it. The career opportunities associated with knowledge of Kazakh, especially in the public sector, likewise play a role. Russian schools are always polyethnic (although the number of their Kazakh students has declined), while Kazakh-medium ones are usually monoethnic, with only about 20,000 non-Kazakhs enrolled in them throughout Kazakhstan (Fierman 2006: 107; Smagulova 2008). In Kazakh-medium primary schools (that is, grades 1 to 4), Russian is introduced in grade 1, while in similar Russian-medium schools Kazakh is also taught from grade 1 but for more hours a week, at least in theory, since 2007 – despite a shortage of teachers for both languages. The curriculum subjects in these schools are identical, and only the language of instruction differs. This holds true also for schools with Uzbek, Uighur or Tajik as the language of instruction. In July 2007 Nazarbayev declared his support for a ‘Trilingual Project’ (Triyedinstvo yazykov) – Kazakh, Russian and English. According to this plan, a majority of the population would eventually speak these three languages (Smagulova 2008). Several experimental trilingual schools have already begun to implement the proposal. This recalls a similar notion in Turkmenistan, relating to Turkmen, Russian and English. It remains to be seen how the project will develop in Kazakhstan. Trilingualism has become an oft-repeated slogan. In the course of several interviews in Astana and Almaty in April 2009,

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respondents emphasized their support for this language policy. For instance, in an interview conducted in Astana on 24 April 2009, Yerali Tugzhanov, jurist and Vice-Chairman of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, explained the policy as follows: the majority of school subjects are taught in Kazakh, but where there is another compact group, teaching is in Russian (or in the language of that ethnic group). Generally, however, Kazakh is the language of instruction in Kazakhmedium and Russian in Russian-medium schools. Thus, he argued, a trilingual policy becomes a quadrilingual one in minority schools, ensuring unity through plurality (he saw no problem in learning four languages!). The President’s Trilingual Project was widely understood as a strong recommendation for English and the renunciation of other foreign languages. The efforts of the Ministry of Education and Science undertook to encourage English-language instruction. Zhanseit Tuimebayev, Minister of Education and Science, declared in an interview in June 2008 that in that year 2,500 language laboratories had been established in the schools (Suleimenov 2009: 14). Much of this was for English instruction, starting with the second grade in primary schools (Lillis 2007a; Kozhkenov 2008). Almaty has been experimenting with trilingual education since the 2007–08 school year. In that year, some schools started using Kazakh for instruction in Kazakh language, literature and history, English for the English language and for biology or mathematics, and Russian for Russian language and literature. Other subjects were taught in Kazakh or in Russian depending on the language track. Official statistics state that in 2007 pupils in general primary schools were studying in the following languages: Kazakh 1,553,400; Russian 957,200; Uzbek 80,300; Uighur 15,400; and other languages 4,900 (Agentstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po statistike 2008). Laruelle and Peyrouse (n.d.: 124–5) cite slightly different figures which also show the numerical rise of Kazakh-medium schools at the expense of Russian-medium ones. The same emerges from the governmental State-Run Education Development Programme, issued in 2004, and reporting 3,687 Kazakh-medium as against 2,069 Russian-medium schools.

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Table 4.3 Schools in Kazakhstan by language of instruction, 2000–03 Year 2000 2001 2002 2003

Kazakh Russian Uighur Uzbek Tajik Ukrainian Two or More Languages 3,545 3,648 3,632 3,636

2,356 2,321 2,199 2,122

13 14 14 14

81 82 78 80

3 3 3 3

1 1 1 1

2,008 1,999 2,062 2,069

Source: Suleymenova, ed. 2007: 27, based on data of the Ministry of Education and Science.

Besides Kazakh and Russian, minority schools taught in other languages instead of English, such as Uzbek, Uighur, Tajik, Azerbaijani, Korean, German, Polish, Turkish, Tatar, Ukrainian, Dungan, Kurdish, Chechen, Greek, Armenian or others (Dederer et al. 2002; Pavlenko 2008: 290; Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 16 August 2007). There are also Turkish-medium schools supported by the government of Turkey and some Turkish educational societies. The Turkish government has set up two Turkish-language teaching centres in Kazakhstan with 101 students, while the educational organization led by Fethullah Gülen established 31 schools which, in 1997, had 85 teachers and 5,885 students, and two universities with 96 academic staff and 171 students. In the 2007–08 school year these schools numbered 29, comprising 570 teachers and 5,539 students (ZentralasienAnalysen 19–20, 28 August 2009: 20). They have a more religious orientation, including the study of the Koran, Islamic history and the Arabic language (Balçı 2003: 160). While emphasizing the study of Turkish, these schools have introduced English as their main language of instruction (Turam 2003: 194–5), as have other Gülen schools in Kyrgyzstan and in Turkmenistan. The Turkish World Research Foundation (Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı) has also established secondary schools (Yanık 2004: 293ff.).

Languages at the universities Competition between Kazakh and Russian as language of instruction continues in higher education, in both state and private universities.

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English, considered an attractive and prestigious discipline, has been added as a language of instruction mostly at newly founded universities, usually with Kazakh and Russian as alternatives. The Ministry of Education and Science supervises higher education. There were an estimated 181 state and private higher education institutions in Kazakhstan, with 747,104 students in 2004–05 (Library of Congress 2006). As government statistics indicate, in the academic year 2009–10, the number of institutions decreased to 148 and the number of students to 610,264. These included Kazakh-foreign institutions of higher education (including five Russian). Examples are the University of Central Asia, the International Academy of Business, the Kazakh-British Technical University, the Kazakh-American University (Daly 2008: 40–2), the Kazakh-German University, all of them in Almaty; the L. N. Gumilev Eurasian National University in Astana; the Kazakh-Russian International University in Aqtöbe; and the Kazakh-American Free University in Öskemen (see entry ‘List of Universities in Kazakhstan’, Wikipedia). As in pre-independence days, it is possible to obtain a university education in either Kazakh or Russian, although knowledge of both languages is now required. Several universities have additional language requirements. Among Kazakhstan’s foreign universities, the Kazakh-German University in Almaty (founded in 1999 and run by the non-profit Fund for German-Kazakh Cooperation in Education) requires a knowledge of English and German, as well as Kazakh and Russian. The Süleyman Demirel University (founded in Almaty in 1996) and the Ahmet Yesevi International Kazakh-Turkish University (established in 1992 in the city of Türkistan) demand a knowledge of Turkish (Franke 2005). The Zhezkazgan University (in the Karaganda district) requires Kazakh, Russian and English (Europa World of Learning 2009 2008: Vol. I, 1291–2). On 28 June 2010, a university named after President Nazarbayev was inaugurated in Astana and would operate in 2010–11 with 500 gifted students. The university planned to recruit 56 foreign lecturers, chiefly from the United Kingdom and the United States, who would teach in English. The university intended to develop study programmes with the University College, London, and some United States universities.

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Table 4.4 Students in institutes of higher education in Kazakhstan by language of instruction, 2000–06 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 Total Kazakh Russian English Other languages (mainly Uzbek)

440,715 132,698 305,237 2,043 737

514,738 162,166 348,731 2,444 1,397

597,489 216,559 375,863 3,223 1,844

658,106 254,084 397,928 3,937 2,157

747,104 298,798 439,119 5,660 3,527

2005–06 775,762 330,199 438,032 7,139 3,920

Source: Brunner and Tillett 2007: 81.

An Islamic Institute in Almaty became an Islamic University in 1997; instruction is in Kazakh, but Arabic is studied in order to read the classical texts of Islam. The four-year course prepares imams for the mosques and is open to men only (Rorlich 2003: 163–4). The overall rise in student numbers in higher education is evident from Table 4.4, with Russian remaining the dominant language and English advancing slowly as a means of higher education instruction. The table also indicates a slow but constant rise in the number of students studying in Kazakh. The number of doctoral dissertations submitted in Kazakh has also increased, reaching 174 out of a total of 1,267 in 1999. Ethnic Russian organizations in Kazakhstan have complained – but not conclusively proved – that the authorities have discriminated against Russians and made it easier for Kazakh students to register at the universities, as a means of Kazakhization (Laruelle and Peyrouse n.d.: 125–8). In some university disciplines, Kazakh-speaking students outnumber Russian-speakers, and their numbers are increasing with government encouragement (Gökdağ 2002: 78–9). It is possible to get a university education in Kazakh not only in the humanities but also in law, economics, business, and administration (Katagoshchina 2002: 35; Rivers 2002, 2005; Fierman 2005: 407). To encourage the study of Russian, in 2000 Lomonosov Moscow State University set up a branch

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at the L. N. Gumilev Eurasian National University in Astana. Some other universities of the Russian Federation have opened extension faculties in Kazakhstan. Graduates of these faculties have priority in continuing their studies at universities in the Russian Federation (Laruelle and Peyrouse n.d.: 131). The L. N. Gumilev Eurasian National University in Astana is the largest university in the capital. It was established in 1996 by a merger of the State Pedagogical Institute and the State Engineering Institute. Languages are taught, with the best language-learning facilities, in the Department of Foreign Philology and in the Faculty of International Relations. In the former, one can study English, German, French and Spanish; English is spreading at the expense of German and French. In the latter, Arabic, Chinese, Turkish, Italian and Korean are offered. Students are expected to be fluent in both Kazakh and Russian; instruction is 50 per cent in Kazakh and 50 per cent in Russian. Students are expected to study two foreign languages for a BA degree in Foreign Philology, which takes four years of study. BA graduates may teach languages in schools, but few wish to do so, as they aspire to more prestigious and better paid jobs (interview at the L.N. Gumilev Eurasian National University, Astana, 21 April 2009). The Academy of Public Administration in Astana offers advanced studies for employees of the civil service. The course of study is one year, with students studying 30 hours a week in Kazakh and Russian. Those admitted are supposed to know a foreign language (usually they choose English, which has resulted in a decline in the study of German and French). However, it often turns out that many of them have only a rudimentary knowledge of the foreign language. Graduates are expected to use exchange programmes and continue their studies in the United States or Europe, e.g. at the Austrian Diplomatic Academy in Vienna (interview with Professor Aigul Bizhkenova, head of the Department of Foreign Languages at the Academy of Public Administration, Astana, 21 April 2009). Kazakhization in education has meant promoting the idea of an independent Kazakhstan in every area of study. This is most evident in the use of new textbooks at school and university, prepared in line

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with state ideology. The Russian-language textbooks, too, use extensive excerpts from Kazakh authors writing in Russian or translated into Russian, containing ideological texts of a patriotic and interethnic nature (Smagulova 2006). Students are constantly encouraged to learn foreign languages. Japanese is one of these: the number of students of Japanese has increased visibly and has reached 1,569, taught by 51 teachers at 13 universities and other institutions. In 2005, the People’s Republic of China granted to the university a Confucius Institute for the study of the Chinese language and culture. Italian is taught at a college in Astana by an Italian, Edoardo Canetta, who has published a 144-page Corso di Lingua e Cultura Italiana (Almaty 2008). Notably, this primer is written in Italian and Russian, not Kazakh. On another level, the Kazakh Language Centres provide free instruction in both Kazakh and English to government employees seeking promotion. This may be seen as a move towards further deRussianization in higher education, in a shift towards Kazakh (interview with a representative of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Astana, 20 April 2009). Of special significance is the Bolashaq (‘Future’) Programme, set up in 1993 by the president and aimed at sending gifted young people abroad to train in business-related and other subjects at the best foreign universities in order to serve afterwards as leaders. Originally the state intended to send 3,000 students annually, but because of a lack of foreign language proficiency only a few hundred now go abroad every year, most of whom return afterwards to Kazakhstan. Many grantees go to the United States and Great Britain, but some choose Germany or East Asia (Abazov 2006: 5–7). The Bolashaq Programme has recently been extended to help young university lecturers carry out research abroad.

The media The government controls all the mass media: print, broadcast and electronic. A Law on Mass Media, passed in March 2001, laid down that, as of 1 January 2002, at least 50 per cent of all electronic media

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broadcasts had to be in Kazakh (Miroglov 2002; OSCE 2002: 13; Fierman 2005: 407–9). The Media Decree of 24 September 2002 aimed at extending the use of Kazakh to the press, ordering that Kazakh-language newspapers must account for at least 22 per cent of all newspapers (Boranbayeva 2004: 37; Smagulova 2008). The most recent law concerning the media was drafted on 6 February 2009, but the matter was still pending in the Senate in June (according to Zentralasien-Analysen 18, 26 June 2009: 17). The number of books published is impressive. According to the 1999 census, 1,301 titles were released in that year, of which 867, or two-thirds, were in Russian (Smagulova 2005: 34–5). Personal experience in 2009 indicates that the bookshops in the large cities are well stocked with a great number of new, attractively produced books on all topics in both Kazakh and Russian. According to information provided by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE 2002: 9), based on data from the Ministry of Culture and Information, on 1 December 2001 Kazakhstan had 991 newspapers, 366 magazines, 125 electronic media and 14 news agencies. Many languages were represented (Savin and Narkulov 2002), including minority languages. At the time, most newspapers had an average circulation of 10,000 to 25,000 copies, with the single exception of Zhas Alash, published in Kazakh in Almaty four times a week, which was reported to reach 71,000 copies in 2002 (Kuanov 2002). Later information about the press is available, although the sources do not always agree about the figures. The latest are, for 2008, 467 Kazakh and 874 Russian newspapers, with another 879 using both languages, together with 328 in other languages (Zentralasien-Analysen 5, 30 May 2008: 16; different figures in Vdovina 2008). Recent reports claim that newspapers appear in 111 languages. In 2009, a great variety of newspapers and magazines in Kazakh and Russian were being sold at ubiquitous news-stands. Popular magazines in particular are well printed on good paper and cover a wide range of topics (personal observation). For 2010, an overall number of 2,970 registered print media are available (200 of which appear in electronic form). They are mostly published in the capital Astana, the intellectual centre Almaty, and in such regional centres as Karaganda and Shymkent (Brauer 2010: 2).

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Newspapers, many of them state-funded, are generally strongly biased in favour of the ruling Nur Otan (‘Light of the Fatherland’) Party, while some others support the opposition. There are dailies and weeklies in 40 languages: Kazakh, Russian, German, Korean, Uighur, Ukrainian, Uzbek, Turkish, Polish, Dungan and others (BBC Country Profile: Kazakhstan 2008; Pavlenko 2008a: 72). In 2010 the main three newspapers read nation-wide were the official Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (in Russian, published in about 100,000 copies) with its Kazakh-language version Egemen Qazaqstan (about 160,000 copies) and Ekspress-K (in Russian); all three appear five times a week. Svoboda Slova (90,000 copies) and the Respublika (19,000 copies), both weeklies in Russian, express opposition views – a sign that the press in Kazakhstan, as in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, has more freedom than in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (Brauer 2010: 6). The regions and large towns also have their own regional press, which consists mostly of political or popular weeklies and monthlies. Several tabloids appear in Russian; the best-known among these in 2010 were Vremya (168,000 copies) and Karavan (220,000 copies) (Bensmann 2007: 536–8; Brauer 2010: 6). On 23 January 2009, Mukhtar Kul-Muhammed, Minister of Culture and Information, announced the forthcoming publication of an English-language weekly, based on the official Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (Zentralasien-Analysen 14, 27 February 2009: 14), but the main English-language newspaper remains the Almaty Herald. ZamanKazakhstan is the Kazakh version of the Turkish Zaman. Some newspapers have only an electronic version, like Kazakhstan News (in English) or Eurasia (Russian and English). Numerous newspapers have onlineeditions, too (see http://www.onlinenewspapers.com/kazakhst.htm). The government has curtailed the freedom of the press (Sharipzhan 2000: 13–15; BBC Country Profile: Kazakhstan 2008). Censorship and self-censorship are noticeable and certain limitations are imposed on political expressions, like refraining from attacking the dignity of the state president and his family. Radio and television stations (Abazov 2007: 117) broadcast in several languages besides Kazakh and Russian. The licensing of television and radio broadcasting is controlled by two ministries: the Ministry of Culture, Information and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Transport

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and Communications. Russian has dominated in the media for some time. But in April 2008, according to official data published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Kazakh share of the media had steadily increased. According to Pavlenko (2008a: 72), in 2008 only 34 per cent of the television and radio programmes were in the Russian language. The main television channels of the Russian Federation can still be received via cable and satellite. Various channels from Turkey have been broadcasting to Kazakhstan since the early 1990s. TRT, Turkey’s state radio and television, started broadcasting a full programme (TRT Avaz) to Kazakhstan on 23 March 2009. The government website is in Kazakh (Cyrillic), Kazakh (Latinized), Russian and English, but the versions differ in completeness. Most people prefer to use the internet in Russian (Gavrilov et al. 2008: 37). There were about 70,000 users in 2000, 2,300,000 in 2008 and 5,300,000 in summer 2010 (Internet World Stats 2010a). The matter was considered important enough to be debated in the Kazakhstan Senate on 11 June 2009 (Zentralasien-Analysen 18, 26 June 2009: 17). An intellectual (interviewed in Almaty on 29 April 2009), together with some friends, opened a school which teaches students how to write for the media. Called ‘Media Net’, the school is an NGO supported by the Soros Foundation, the British Embassy and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Students on the six months’ course are divided into two groups by language – Kazakh and Russian. Of about 50 students, 30 come from Almaty, which remains the centre of the media in Kazakhstan. In conclusion, it is apparent that the government is moving cautiously towards language Kazakhization. Its policies can be summed up as ‘all languages are equal, but Kazakh is more equal’ (Dokuchayeva 2000). A 2007 investigation seems to confirm this. Only 32 per cent of the respondents believed that Russian ought to be expanded in Kazakhstan, with 53 per cent preferring to ‘leave it as it is’ and 7 per cent saying that it should be ‘cut back’ (Morozov 2009: 147). Insofar as other languages are concerned, a popular saying is that ‘if you want to leave the country, learn English; if you wish to stay, study Chinese’ (Der Spiegel, 4 October 2010: 136). Meanwhile, public debate on language policies continues. The emphasis is on political and social

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stability and ‘soft policy’, a leitmotiv in President Nazarbayev’s actions and speeches, often delivered in both Kazakh and Russian. This policy derives from a fear of too sudden a change in a multiethnic society where Russians and Russian speakers are still a large and important element, in spite of their decreasing numbers (Vdovina 2008). This prudence somewhat hampers the success of language policies in Kazakhstan. Another impediment has been the gap between legislation and implementation, largely due to the lack of administrative coordination and sometimes to a lack of competent staff (Dave 2007: 96–117). Nonetheless, the government’s policies have prevented language conflict in an ethnic situation potentially more volatile than in the other five states. A modified bilingual situation prevails, in which public life is apportioned in a relatively balanced way between Kazakh and Russian.

Baku 2007: A plaque at the Memorial Museum dedicated to the poet Mamed Said Ordubadi, with wording in Azerbaijani, Russian and English.

Almaty 2007: A typical newspaper booth.

Astana 2009: A billboard in Kazakh and Russian showing different nationalities of Kazakhstan in national costume. The slogan reads: ‘The strength of Kazakhstan lies in friendship and unity!’

Dushanbe 2009: A poster at the Institute of Language and Literature of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, with the heading ‘The language is the wealth of the nation’.

Bishkek 2009: A bookshop displaying Kyrgyz and foreign language learning materials.

CHAPTER 5 K YRGYZSTAN

Basic data Kyrgyzstan has an area of 199,900 square kilometres and a population of 5,107,700 according to the 2009 census (Free Library 2010). It comprises more than 90 ethnic groups (Chotaeva 2004: 180; Orusbaev et al. 2008: 479). Most of the Kyrgyz (and the Uzbeks in south Kyrgyzstan) are Sunni Muslims. Kyrgyz is also spoken by the Kyrgyz minorities in Xinjiang (China), Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Russia and Pakistan (Arik 2008: 150). Among the ‘Others’, there were in 2009 about 39,133 Turks and 17,299 Koreans, while 9,487 Germans still lived in the republic (Natsional’nyi Statisticheskii Komitet Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki 2011). It appears that the post-1999 statistical data are not always consistent, and various authors report different data. All in all, the share of the titular ethnie in the population of Kyrgyzstan has risen from 52 per cent to 69 per cent since the early 1990s, while that of the Russians has decreased from 21 per cent to less than 9 per cent by 2008. The change in percentages is due mainly to the continuing emigration of Russian speakers from Kyrgyzstan (Commercio 2004), but also to a higher birthrate among the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks and other indigenous ethnies in comparison with the Slavs. There are some doubts about the results of the 2009 census: the figures seem overstated, as between 300,000 and half a million members of the able-bodied population are migrant workers abroad. The de facto

2,229,663 916,558 550,096 108,027 101,309 70,068 37,318 36,928 36,779 33,518 137,491 4,257,755

52.4 21.5 12.9 2.5 2.4 1.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 3.2 100.0

1989 % 3,128,144 603,198 664,953 50,441 21,472 45,439 46,733 42,657 51,766 42,636 125,499 4,822,938

1999 Number 64.9 12.5 13.8 1.0 0.4 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.9 2.6 100.0

1999 % 3,396,300 516,700 715,600 35,400 14,100 39,500 49,200 41,400 56,900 45,700 126,500 5,037,300

2004 Number 67.4 10.3 14.2 0.7 0.3 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.9 2.5 100.0

2004 %

3,616,500 456,400 754,500 25,300 11,500 35,000 51,200 38,900 60,300 48,000 126,700 5,224,300

2008 Number

69.2 8.7 14.5 0.5 0.2 0.7 1.0 0.7 1.2 0.9 2.4 100.0

2008 %

Source: Official censuses for 1989 and 1999 and later estimates. For 2004 and 2008 (beginning of the year), estimates by Kyrgyzstan’s Committee of Statistics (Uluttuk Statistika Komiteti, Kyrgyzstan Tsifralarda: 38, Table 3.7).

Kyrgyz Russians Uzbeks Ukrainians Germans Tatars Uighurs Kazakhs Dungans Tajiks Others Total

1989 Number

Table 5.1 Population of Kyrgyzstan by ethnic group, 1989–2008

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population should therefore be lower than indicated by the 2009 census results (Abdrakhmanova 2009). The capital, Bishkek, has increased in population, mostly because of Kyrgyz in-migration from the rural areas, from 750,327 in 1999 (Rowland 2002: 539) to more than 800,000 now, which has added to the Kyrgyz-speaking element in the capital. The capital had the highest population growth in the state (9.8 per cent) according to the 1999 and 2009 censuses. Kyrgyzstan is still a predominantly rural country, however: 35 per cent of the population lives in towns and cities, 65 per cent in villages. The age composition of the population is very youthful; one-third are children and teenagers. There is a north–south divide in the population, reflected in basic differences of language use. Most of the population in the north speaks Russian, the southern inhabitants speak Kyrgyz and Uzbek, and people in the southeast speak Kyrgyz (Jumaeva 2006: 96). An investigation in 1996 found that almost all Russians declared they did not know any Kyrgyz or listen to the radio in Kyrgyz (Alpatov 2000: 171). The Centre for Social Studies at the National Academy of Sciences of Kyrgyzstan conducted a poll in spring and summer 2003 concerning knowledge and proficiency in the three main languages of the country (Kyrgyz, Russian and Uzbek) and the use of languages in various spheres of life. According to the Centre’s findings, 57.3 per cent of the respondents used Kyrgyz at home, 28 per cent Russian, 11.8 per cent Uzbek, and less than 3 per cent used other languages (Chotaeva 2004: 182–3). Estimates are that in 2008, 64.7 per cent of the population spoke Kyrgyz, 13.6 per cent Uzbek, and 12.5 per cent Russian (IREX 2008: 224; interview with Tashboo R. Jumagulov, chairman of the National Commission on the State Language, Bishkek, 6 May 2009). Kyrgyzstan declared sovereignty on 14 December 1990 and state independence on 31 August 1991. Poverty and unemployment are widespread. Labour migration, chiefly to the Russian Federation, is endemic – officially about 300,000, unofficially up to half a million or even more each year (Schmidt and Sagynbekova 2008; Heuer 2010). When a law was passed ordering schoolchildren to wear standard uniforms as of 1 September 2009, many parents could not afford to buy

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them. Limited resources (except for water) have also restricted economic development and many activities in education and language reform (Abazov, ed. 2004). Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian state to have experienced several recent changes of leadership. Askar Akayev (who made his career as a physicist in academia and not in the Soviet nomenklatura) was elected president on 12 October 1991, re-elected on 24 December 1995 and again on 29 October 2000 but ousted in the ‘Tulip revolution’ after mass protests against his regime on 24 March 2005. His successor was Kurmanbek Bakiyev (prime minister 2000–02, elected president on 10 July 2005, re-elected on 23 July 2009, but resigned on 15 April 2010). He promised reforms and an end to corruption and state capture by the ruling elite, but the people of Kyrgyzstan waited in vain for reforms and better living conditions. His policies mostly continued those of Akayev (Juraev 2008: 258ff.; Wolters 2008: 2–6). Corruption became even more widespread, the president’s family members were appointed to key state positions, overall conditions worsened and the human rights situation deteriorated. Bakiyev was ousted after mass protests, this time involving the death of at least 80 people, on 7 April 2010. Subsequently, Roza Otunbayeva, the foreign minister and a former ally of Bakiyev, has been acting as interim president. Parliamentary elections to the 120-member parliament were held on 10 October 2010.

Legislation and debates As in all non-Russian Soviet republics at the end of the 1980s, the language, culture and history of the titular nations began to enjoy a revival and were more widely discussed. A central issue was the status of the titular language in legislation and in daily life. In line with Soviet theory on national development, the titular language was assigned a central place in nation-building and in preserving national identity (Schulter 2003: 20–7; Marat 2006: 3–4; Sitnyanskii 2007). The popular saying til tagdyr – el tagdyr (‘the fate of the language is the fate of the nation’) encapsulated the mood (Heuer 2001: 24–5). Loss of the titular language was perceived by nationalists as a loss of

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self; akin to being without memory, roots and kin, and doomed to extinction. Another issue was the standing of the Russian language which, as in all non-Russian republics, had become the language of the political, administrative and economic elites. Apart from that, at the time of the declaration of independence, the Russian element was demographically strong; more than 20 per cent of the population of Kyrgyzstan was of Russian origin, not including people belonging to other Slavic ethnies. Language legislation in Kyrgyzstan is a mirror of the contested status of the Russian language and is characterized by many changes, the pendulum swinging to one side and then to the other. Before the demise of the Soviet Union, the Supreme Council (i.e. the former Soviet parliament) of the republic adopted on 23 September 1989 a Law on the State Language which declared Kyrgyz the state language and Russian the language of interethnic communication (Heuer 2001: 27). This law, elevating the Kyrgyz language to the status of state language and intended to heighten its status also in practice, set 1997 as the year when the transition to universal use of Kyrgyz in government, administration and official business would be completed. In 1991, the Cabinet of Ministers issued a directive on implementation of the language law (‘Measures for Guaranteeing the Functioning of the State Language on the Territory of Kyrgyzstan’), but throughout 1992 it was clear that, due to the difficult political situation, implementation was lagging (Huskey 1995: 558–9). In May 1993 the constitution declared (Article 5) that ‘the Kyrgyz Republic guarantees the preservation of equal rights and the free development and functioning of Russian and all other languages used by the people of the Republic’ (Heuer 2001: 27; Leprêtre 2002: 23). President Akayev, careful not to antagonize the ethnic Russian community in Kyrgyzstan, or their supporters in the Russian Federation, decided in the same year to put off the full transition to the state language to the year 2000 (Huskey 1995: 559; Wright 1999: 89–90). Worried by continuous out-migration of the Russian-speaking population which resulted in a brain drain, in June 1994 the president issued a decree ‘On Additional Measures to Regulate the Migration Process’. As well as aiming to reduce the

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emigration of the Russian speakers, the decree was intended to preserve the standing of the Russian language by making it an official language, together with Kyrgyz, in areas with a compact Slav population, so that all official correspondence could be conducted in both languages (Heuer 2001: 27). Following this, representatives of the Russian-speaking population strived to consolidate the status of Russian as an official language in Kyrgyzstan in the constitution as well. In June 1996, only one chamber of parliament voted positively on this issue. Some parliamentarians then turned to the constitutional court, which – contrary to the expectations of opponents of the amendment – in principle found no fault with elevating the status of Russian. But as the second chamber had not agreed to the change, it did not actually come into force (Koenig 1999: 78; Heuer 2001: 27). Finally, however, after long disputes and delays, on 29 May 2000 a Law on the Official Language of the Kyrgyz Republic, and later the second constitution of 2001, formalized Russian as official language, an act which stirred angry criticism in nationalist-minded circles. Nationalist language politicians have insistently demanded that all citizens of the republic must know the state language, Kyrgyz, and that proficiency exams in the language should be compulsory for all state employees, or at least for senior officials and parliamentarians. Some argue that this should not be an administrative but rather an educational measure. Meanwhile, in 2001 parliament rejected the draft law on the proficiency test, except in the case of the state presidency, where candidates for this office have to take exams in the Kyrgyz language. Indeed, on 21 May 2009, before the presidential elections on 23 July of the same year, two candidates had to withdraw due to a lack of proficiency in Kyrgyz (ZentralasienAnalysen 18, 26 June 2009: 18). Opponents of the draft law maintained that it would discriminate against Russian speakers and other ethnic minorities (Carlson 2004; Kimmage 2004). Some of these opponents defended the need for the Russian language and consequently called for bilingualism and expounded its advantages for Kyrgyzstan. This latter stand was more in line with the views of President Akayev himself.

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On 20 January 2001 another presidential decree had laid down steps for the graded development of the Kyrgyz language. The ‘Programme for the Development of the State Language of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan in 2000–10’, listed the government’s plans for the Kyrgyz language. The main aim was to develop and enrich the language as a suitable vehicle for all walks of life. This was to be achieved in two stages lasting five years each. During the first stage, 2000 to 2005, new school textbooks should render Kyrgyz a suitable means of communication in all spheres throughout the state. During the second, 2006 to 2010, measures should be taken to develop the language professionally and propagate it further, including in the domain of modern technology (Omuraliyev 2007). At the start of the new millennium the results of the implementation of the 1989 language law and the impact of the decrees that followed were considered unsatisfactory by the presidential office and other government circles and among nationalist groups. According to State Secretary Osmonakun Ibraimov, Russian was still the de facto language for meetings and for documents in the upper echelons of government (Khamidov 2004; Kimmage 2004). In late 2002, the president proposed to parliament a new Law on the State Language, which caused heated debates in parliament and among the public during 2003. The intention of the authors of the new law was to give greater support to the promotion of the state language and to its full implementation in state administration, education and the media (Chotaeva 2004). The new law was passed by parliament on 12 February 2004. This new Law on Language (Zakon Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki ot 12 fevralya 2004 goda 2004) opened with a declaration that Kyrgyz was the state language and emphasized its function in all governmental and municipal activities, as well as in the final preparation of official documents; but it acknowledged that Russian was an ‘official language’ which could be used in certain regions and that official documents should also appear in Russian when necessary. It guaranteed the use and development of the languages of all national groups in Kyrgyzstan, insisting at the same time that everybody should know Kyrgyz as well as their own mother tongue, and that ensuring this was the joint responsibility of parents and the state. The legislators

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insisted that all those working for the government or connected with it should have a knowledge of Kyrgyz, although private establishments might use either Kyrgyz or Russian. Responsible officials in government service were instructed to see to it that their employees improved their knowledge of Kyrgyz. The legislators also laid down that Kyrgyz should be the basic language of instruction in all stages of education from kindergarten to university. A choice of language was allowed in research work, although reports were expected to be delivered in the state or the official language. Kyrgyz was considered the language of culture, art and all mass media – television, radio, publishing and the press – as well as of the military forces. Kyrgyz was also to be used in naming territorial units as well as streets and squares. Postal correspondence within Kyrgyzstan’s territory should be in Kyrgyz and only in unavoidable cases in Russian; the same was required of labels on local merchandise. Since all future official business was supposed to be conducted in Kyrgyz, a consequence of this legislation as perceived at the time could be that all foreign states (the Commonwealth of Independent States excepted) might have to train translators from the Kyrgyz language (Otorbayeva 2004). This clause of the 2004 Law on Language revived complaints that Russian, supposedly equal in status to Kyrgyz, was in fact equal merely ‘on paper’ (Amelina 2004). The law passed only after several months of lengthy and heated debates in and out of parliament. Its critics feared that it could lead to discrimination against Russian speakers and members of other language communities, that it was premature and could heighten ethnic tensions and that it divided the citizens into ‘Kyrgyz’ (persons speaking Kyrgyz) and ‘Kirgiz’ (Russophone Kyrgyz) (Carlson 2004; Khamidov 2004; Mamataipov 2004; Otorbayeva 2004). At the ceremony celebrating this law, on 2 April 2004, President Akayev delivered a speech (Akayev 2004) in which he warmly recommended Kyrgyz-Russian bilingualism for his country. However, the debates about the role of the state language and the other languages in Kyrgyzstan continued in the press and in public, then and later.

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The new constitution, drafted after the ouster of President Akayev and approved on 23 October 2006, confirmed the status of Russian as an official language (Orusbaev et al. 2008: 484). However, this constitution was rejected by the Constitutional Court because it had a provision giving parliament the right to pass certain laws without the Court having the right to intervene, and, above all, because in the opinion of the Court, constitutional changes should be carried out only through a referendum (Marat 2007). A modified version of this post-Akayev constitution was finally approved by referendum on 23 October 2007 (Kachkeev 2008: 58–67). Article 5 of the 2007 constitution deals with language (Zakon Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki ot 23 oktyabrya 2007 goda 2007): 1. The state language of the Kyrgyz Republic is the Kyrgyz language. 2. In the Kyrgyz Republic the Russian language is used as an official language. 3. The Kyrgyz Republic guarantees all nationalities which constitute the people of Kyrgyzstan the right to preserve their mother tongue and create the conditions for learning and developing it. 4. Lack of knowledge and command of the state or the official language shall not lead to infringement of the citizens’ freedoms and rights in law. The same principles were repeated in Articles 10 and 16 of the constitution approved by referendum on 27 June 2010, coming into force on 2 July 2010. The draft of this constitution had been disseminated among the population in Kyrgyz, Russian and Uzbek. Significantly, several Kyrgyz youth organizations protested the issuing of the Uzbek version, on the grounds that Uzbek was not an official language. The language policy attempting to upgrade the status of the state language continued to be upheld, as expressed in a law on citizenship passed in March 2007, making knowledge of Kyrgyz a condition for obtaining citizenship. The Ministry of Interior Affairs issued orders for all military personnel and hospital staff to learn Kyrgyz. However, to conciliate the Russophones and meet the cultural demands of

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some ethnic Russian political groups (Knyazev 2008), the Ministry of Education and Science simultaneously announced its intention to encourage the teaching of Russian over the next two years (The Times of Central Asia, 8 May 2008). On 22 September 2009, i.e., on the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the first Law on the State Language, President Bakiyev signed a decree making 23 September the Day of the State Language in Kyrgyzstan, to be celebrated annually. An amendment to the 2004 Law on the State Language of Kyrgyzstan stipulated the use of the state language in the activities of Kyrgyz diplomatic and consular establishments abroad, as well as of Kyrgyz representatives at international organizations. In special cases, the use of the official language, Russian, was conceded as in the previous version of the law, but it was no longer on a par with the state language in relations with the CIS. Some opposition lawmakers expressed scepticism. The law was signed by President Bakiyev on 21 January 2010 and was slated to come into force after six months (Ofitsial’nyi portal Prezidenta Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki, 21 yanvarya 2010 goda 2010).

Language law implementation Implementation of language legislation is often hampered by lack of funds, and by inefficiencies in organization and operation (DeYoung 2004: 202–6). Britta Korth (2005: 116ff.), who has investigated the language situation in Kyrgyzstan, concludes that there was a fairly general belief that legislation was necessary, without anybody seriously considering the problems of effectively implementing the language laws, which have often remained a dead letter. Language was perceived as a primary marker in assisting the formation of the new state’s national identity, a particularly difficult task in a multiethnic state potentially open to conflict between the Kyrgyz majority and the Russian and Uzbek minorities. In general, Kyrgyzstan – like Kazakhstan – has been governed by a somewhat more tolerant regime than the other post-Soviet Central Asian states, and this has been reflected in matters of language accommodation, although there are some differences between the language policies of

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these two states (Dave 2004: 120ff.). As in Kazakhstan, knowledge of Russian was widespread among urban and educated strata. Among the elites, Russian was the language of the professions, academia, administration and politics, while Kyrgyz remained for less formal use. Full implementation of the Law on Language had to be postponed time and time again. Even the Department for Carrying out the Law on the State Language did not adhere to the letter of the law. Indeed, Kyrgyz did not immediately become the language of official proceedings. During the 1990s and later, parliamentary sessions were conducted in both Kyrgyz and Russian; sessions of the president’s cabinet continued to be held in Russian; and so did the meetings of the Academy of Sciences. Consequently, government statistics declaring that the number of speakers of fluent Kyrgyz had risen from 53 per cent in 1989 to 70 per cent in 2007, while the number of speakers of fluent Russian had visibly declined, were received with some skepticism, although the general trend is certainly correct. Many Kyrgyz are well aware of the advantages of knowing Russian, as ascertained recently by G.D. Ibragimova, President of the Union of Kyrgyzstan’s Education Organizations (Ibragimova 2008: 68–71). The decline is mostly due to problems in the educational sector and the emigration of many Russian language teachers. The issue is not merely a matter of percentages. The Kyrgyz elites, chiefly town-dwellers, however Russified, see themselves as decision makers and perceive their state language as an important mobilizing factor, implying the reshaping of education and career opportunities at the expense of those without knowledge of Kyrgyz. Others have maintained that every state, and definitely Kyrgyzstan, ought to have in practice one state language only. They found it irritating that a section of their elites – especially the urban elites – were steeped in Russian. Even the greatest contemporary Kyrgyz writer, Chingiz Aitmatov (1928–2008), wrote mostly in Russian in order to reach a wider readership and free himself from the local Communist elite’s biased criticism. The language issue continues to divide the country, not least within the Kyrgyz community itself.

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Still, the implementation of the language laws in different branches of social and political life depended on the managers and leaders of particular spheres. For instance, General Ismail Isakov, the Kyrgyz Defence Minister (2005–09), made greater efforts than his predecessors. The above Jumagulov awarded Defence Minister Isakov a ‘Kyrgyz Language’ decoration in January 2008. The minister was given this decoration in recognition of such important activities as developing the state language among troops, units and organizations under his ministry, having all military plans of the armed forces translated into Kyrgyz, initiating the publication of a Russian-Kyrgyz dictionary of military terms, and enforcing the use of the state language in orders, statements and official correspondence (Agym, Bishkek, 22 January 2008: 5). The numerous supporters of the primacy of Kyrgyz demanded preferential treatment for the titular language. A typical example was the row that broke out in the parliamentary group of the majority party, Ak Jol (‘Best Path’), at a session on 1 April 2009, when a parliamentarian loudly asked the Minister of Labour to speak in Kyrgyz and the ensuing dispute broke up the session (Zentralasien-Analysen 16, 24 April 2009: 27). At the start of the twenty-first century, some experts maintained that nation-building had slowed down due to the special standing of the Russian language in Kyrgyzstan. The large numbers of non-Kyrgyz inhabitants in urban areas and the concentration of Kyrgyz speakers in rural districts have placed the Kyrgyz language well below Russian in the eyes of many inhabitants. This view is also held by groups occupied with official and cultural life, particularly in urban areas where Russian remains the preferred and main language. Accommodating language policies and cautious government encouragement benefited the Kyrgyz language in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In more recent years, the language has been increasingly recognized as necessary for personal advancement and it seems that the government has used language policy instrumentally as a tool of political struggle, via a language barrier and examinations for candidates to public office (Portnova 2002: 80). Thus, in demonstrations for constitutional reforms, organized in Bishkek during April 2007 by the opposit-

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ion against the government of President Bakiyev, only Kyrgyz was heard and newspapers and manifestoes in this language were passed around (Abdurasulov 2007). This might be an indication of the changing social composition of the capital, Bishkek. Demography helps to spread the use of Kyrgyz; after independence, many Kyrgyz migrated from the rural areas to Bishkek. Bakiyev was well aware of Kyrgyz-Russian rivalry in many domains, including language. After taking the Kyrgyz language examination necessary to be a candidate for the state presidency (2009), he expressed himself on the language issue. As he saw it, there was an equal place for Kyrgyz as a national language and Russian as a language for communication with the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. He briefly recommended the study of other languages as well (Argumenty i Fakty v Kyrgystane, 23, 3 June 2009). In November 2007, a large meeting of Russians living in Central Asia met in Kyrgyzstan to air their grievances, which focused on what they saw as the downgrading of their language and culture. As a result, early in 2008 the Ministry of Education and Science reported that a special programme had been elaborated, aiming at promoting KyrgyzRussian bilingualism, acting both ways – promoting the teaching and study of Kyrgyz in Russian-medium schools while strengthening the position of Russian in the development of scientific research and in inter-state relationships (The Times of Central Asia, 28 March 2008). In May 2008, the National Library of Kyrgyzstan obtained from the State Library of the Russian Federation a present of 5,000 books in Russian (The Times of Central Asia, 8 May 2008). Popular appreciation of Russian is shown, also, in the growing interest in learning Russian as well as the unenthusiastic public response to some suggestions of Latinizing the Kyrgyz alphabet. Although there has been a certain amount of discussion on this issue, including a debate in parliament in March 2008, no official action has yet been taken. Kyrgyzstan is too close to Russia and in any case cannot afford to take on the financial burden of alphabet change. For Kyrgyzstan, with its diverse population, it has been especially difficult ‘to build a national identity from scratch’ (Huskey 2003). The lengthy language debates in Kyrgyzstan’s parliament (many of them

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held in Russian) and in public and the frequent changes in legislation are indicative of the difficulties facing the government in its attempt to forge an inclusive civic national identity. It has been hampered in this attempt and particularly in carrying out its language policies by intra-elite struggles and the opposition of Russian speakers and the Uzbek minority, also affected by clan or regional divisions. Moreover, the continuing divide between urban Russified Kyrgyz and Kyrgyzspeaking rural inhabitants has contributed to the politicization of the language issue. To promote the development of the Kyrgyz language as the national language and the implementation of the government’s language policy, the National Commission on the State Language was set up by President Akayev in 1998. Its task was to coordinate the activities of all state structures and organizations engaged in developing the Kyrgyz language, to foster the study of Kyrgyz in Russian-medium schools, to propose experimentation with new methodologies and textbooks and to emphasize the ability to speak Kyrgyz. Another aim was to spread knowledge of the Kyrgyz language among the Kyrgyz diaspora (Karimova 2004). One of the first important acts of the National Commission on the State Language was to devise some changes in the spelling rules for Kyrgyz in Cyrillic. The results were approved by the Upper House of parliament in June 2002 and became effective on 1 January 2003 (until revised by the new government after the ‘Tulip revolution’). The new system was intended to simplify the spelling of loanwords from other languages and improve their consistency – the principle being to conform to customary pronunciation (Carlson 2003). The Commission distributed 10,000 copies of a booklet explaining the new rules and prepared another edition for schools and universities. The assumption was that during 2003–04 the Ministry of Transport and Communications would bring all names of rivers, places and districts, as well as road signs, in line with the new orthographic rules. Publishers and newspapers in Kyrgyz were expected to abide by the new rules. The National Commission on the State Language was briefly headed by the famous author Kazat Akmatov, the former deputy chairman of

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the Commission, who declared that the lack of a clear terminology and of a precisely codified standard was an impediment to the proper use of Kyrgyz in official documents. He also proposed the formation of a central translation office (Korth 2005: 128–9). Later the commission was headed by the Secretary of State Osmonakun Ibraimov. It worked through the Til-Dil, an association that aims at providing multilingual education in the state, the Language Committee and other institutions, such as 17 language centres in Bishkek and another seven in other regions. It published dictionaries and organized competitions to stimulate the spread of Kyrgyz. In 2009, the Commission, headed by Jumagulov was working on some amendments to the language law, concerning the language of diplomatic relations (Jumagulov interview 2009) which came into force in autumn 2009. The members of the committee and its staff also scrutinized all newspapers and magazines issued in Kyrgyz to assess the level and correctness of the use of the state language. Earlier, in January 2008, on the tenth anniversary of the appointment of the National Commission on the State Language, the chairman surveyed the commission’s achievements, a major one being the preparation of a new electronic dictionary whose disc is to comprise 55,000 words in the Russian-Kyrgyz section and 50,000 words in the Kyrgyz-Russian section (Abdurasulov 2007b). The Commission planned to subsidize the compilation of more dictionaries and new textbooks for secondary schools. It intended to publish a magazine to popularize the Kyrgyz language and books in Kyrgyz for children; also, it was taking steps to contact other Turkic countries concerning language development (The Times of Central Asia, 23 January 2008, 13 March 2008). In autumn 2009 the Kyrgyz parliament, dominated by members of the ruling Ak Jol party, endorsed certain administrative reforms proposed by President Bakiyev. As a result the National Commission for the State Language, which had formerly been headed by the president, was transformed into a smaller commission under the newly established State Agency for Cultural Affairs. Another official body dealing with language and linguistic questions, the Terminological Committee, has 25 members, all scholars

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experienced in various disciplines. They meet monthly to discuss 70 or 80 words with the aim to publish a Dictionary of New Terms (Jumagulov interview 2009). Another dictionary, not sponsored by the Committee, is the new Kyrgyz-Russian dictionary which includes more than 15,000 words. Edited by U. A. Asanov, it is entitled Russkokyrgyzskii slovar’ (Bishkek 2004). There has been much debate about how to replace Russian terms. Some experts prefer European and American alternatives, while others argue that Arabisms and Iranisms are no less acceptable in Kyrgyz than the Greek and Latin derivations in European languages. After independence, the Kyrgyz Tili (‘Kyrgyz Language’ Society) and other organizations started corpus planning; that is, elaborating and standardizing the language. Some urban Kyrgyz have changed their names to give them a new sound or a new meaning. Since name changes are carried out in order to make Kyrgyzstan more Kyrgyz, thus contributing to the national identity, these changes, in a small way, are political statements (Hvoslef 2001: 85–95). A minor orthographic change was adopted by parliament on 26 June 2008 and published officially on 19 August the same year. This recommended the use of hyphens in place names: Lake ‘Issyk Kul’ thus became ‘Issyk-Kul’. Changes in place names, including the republic’s name from ‘Kirgizia’ to ‘Kyrgyzstan’, were moderate. Personal names have been increasingly ‘Kyrgyzified’ since the 1990s (Turdubaev 2002; Lowe 2003: 106ff.), when many Kyrgyz citizens started to drop the Russianform endings of their family names -‘ov’, -‘ev’, -‘ova’ and -‘eva’. Since 2004, people have been legally permitted to Kyrgyzify their family names by dropping the Russian-form endings. However, more recently increasing numbers of Kyrgyz have been officially changing their family names back into Russian-sounding versions (particularly the endings) – 2,000 such cases were noted in Jalalabad in the course of only one year (Abdurasulov 2009) – as this improves their prospects of getting work in the Russian Federation, where many go to search for a livelihood and, perhaps, obtain Russian nationality. More than 190,000 people changed names annually between 2004 and 2008 (ZentralasienAnalysen 19–20, 28 August 2009: 44–5). Officially, 400,000 people left in 2008 and 2009, but by popular reckoning the number may

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have been closer to half a million (Schmidt and Sagynbekova 2008; Abdurasulov 2009). Labour migration is also an incentive to study Russian and is one of the reasons why Kyrgyz has not yet gained much ground in the cities. With the support of parliament and the National Commission on the State Language, in 2009 Khusayn Karatayev published the Orthographical Dictionary of the Kyrgyz Language. It contains 80,000 words, of which 20,000 are new. Based on the Kyrgyz orthographical dictionary of 1983, it was published in 10,000 copies. This new work is intended to do away with discrepancies in the orthographical rules instituted by parliament in 2002.

Minorities and language The constitution and language legislation guarantee the rights of the ethnic minorities. In practice, the implementation – or, rather, nonimplementation – of the laws on language worries the ethnic minorities even more (Faranda and Noble 2003; Fumagalli 2007a). Successive governments have tried to encourage the use of Kyrgyz as the state language, but have not sufficiently protected the language rights of the minority ethnies. Uzbeks, the largest minority group, Slavs and other Russian speakers have reacted angrily to their under-representation in parliament and bureaucracy but even more against the proposed and actual marginalization of their respective languages. Both groups were skeptical of the proposition to make Kyrgyz ‘the language of opportunity’ for themselves and their children. They were afraid of being marginalized in political, economic and cultural life. Although mass media and newspapers are available in various local languages (Mamedov 2005: 29), these ethnies are well aware that promotion of the Kyrgyz majority’s cultural values had become a focal aim in the state’s political agenda. Language reform thus posed a serious threat to ethnic harmony. The danger of interethnic conflict has exploded, especially between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks (Megoran 2007). The memory of the ‘Osh events’, in 1990 – bloody clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz – survives; the Uzbeks have reportedly even organized their own militias (Neue Zürcher Zeitung,

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19 April 2010: 3). In March 2007, Uzbeks demonstrated in Jalalabad, in southern Kyrgyzstan, demanding official status for their language. Kyrgyz-Uzbek territorial rivalry in the south, i.e. in the Ferghana Valley, is recorded since at least the 17th century and it intensified under Tsarist and Soviet rule. Most Uzbeks live in the south of the country in compact neighbourhoods, chiefly in the districts of Osh, Jalalabad and Batken which border Uzbekistan in the Ferghana Valley. Politicians of Uzbek origin, part of the large Uzbek community, angered by official concessions to the Russians, formed a National Cultural Centre and voiced demands, among them the recognition of Uzbek as an official language and giving it its due in television programming and other cultural activities such as theatre productions and schooling (Omuraliyev 2007). These were some of the main contentions listed by the Uzbek National Cultural Centre in a programme drawn up in Jalalabad on 20 June 2002 (EurasiaNet 2002). The proposal to make Uzbek an official language was raised time and again, although it appears that basic Uzbek loyalty to Kyrgyzstan was unshaken by such issues (Fumagalli 2004: 12–16) and there were no immediate irredentist threats. Thus, on 27 May 2006, peaceful Uzbek rallies in Jalalabad and Bishkek (Mamaraimov 2008) repeated demands for official recognition of their language. The issue was taken up again by the Uzbek National Cultural Centre under the leadership of Kadyrzhan Batyrov, an Uzbek parliamentarian. In response, on 7 June 2006 President Bakiyev announced that he was rejecting the proposal to make Uzbek an official language, as he considered it potentially a destabilizing move (Osmonov 2006: 13–14). Some politically mobilized Uzbeks continued their political and cultural protest activities. Violent clashes in the south of the country in June 2010, in which many Uzbeks were killed and others fled to Uzbekistan, provide the strongest evidence yet of the tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. After those clashes, Uzbeks whose personal papers had been burnt complained that they were asked by the authorities to fill in the application forms for new ones in Kyrgyz, although they did not know that language (Der Spiegel, 29 September 2010: 136). The Slav communities, singly and collectively, felt threatened insofar as their cultural and linguistic status was concerned, especially after

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so many of their members had emigrated to the Russian Federation (Chinn and Kaiser 1996: 222–3; Mambetaliyev 2002). Their spokesmen insisted on the immediate implementation of the language laws affecting their communities. They made special efforts to celebrate ‘Days of Slav Culture and Language’ (Razgulyayev 2002), and warned against machinations to deprive Russian of its official status (Zakharova 2006) or downgrade it in any way (Pyatibratova 2006). They devoted special attention to the activities of Russian-medium schools, and the compulsory teaching of Russian in all Kyrgyzmedium, Uzbek-medium and Tajik-medium schools, as well as in higher education (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rossiyskoi Federatsii 2003), and propagated their ideas through the media, particularly the Russian-language press (Lee 2004: 101ff.). They thus hoped to parallel the compulsory teaching of Kyrgyz in Russian-medium schools. Many Russians remain unhappy about the language situation in independent Kyrgyzstan. In November 2007, delegates of Russian organizations in the five Central Asian post-Soviet states held a congress in Bishkek to discuss their dissatisfaction, which focused on what they saw as the downgrading of the Russian language and culture (Orusbayev, ed. 2003; Orusbaev et al. 2008).

Language in education As in all post-Soviet republics, new priorities in education policy arose after the demise of the Soviet system. The transition to a market economy and development of democratic institutions gave rise to reformulated educational goals and required new methods and a restructuring of the educational system. With this in mind, a new Law on Education was adopted in 1992 and amended in 1997 and 2003. The goals of educational reform were reformulated by the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth Policy in the ‘Education Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic (2007–10)’, designed in the context of the ‘Country Development Strategy 2006–10’. Financially speaking, overall government expenditure on education decreased annually in the first decade of independence: it comprised 7.5 per cent of GDP in 1990, but only 6.6 per cent in 1995, 4.9 per

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cent in 1997 and 3.7 per cent in 2000 (Huttova et al. 2002; Karabekov 2004), rising again to 4.69 per cent in 2005. Teachers’ salaries, availability of textbooks, investments and personnel have suffered due to economic problems. According to President Bakiyev in 2007, 80 per cent of the country’s infrastructure, including school facilities, was run down (Toursunov 2008). The majority of schools have to operate in two shifts. Rural–urban and regional imbalances in the educational sector are worse in the south than in the north (Rahmetov 2009: 12–14). But the situation is very patchy; some energetic principals manage to access foreign funds, bring learning materials and voluntary language teachers from abroad, and send their staff for retraining. In many communities parents help with urgent school repair work and make contributions – a practice officially banned in 2006 but still continuing. The international donor community has been very active in Kyrgyzstan and, among other institutions, the Asian Development Bank has carried out several development programmes in the education sector, albeit not always suited to local education needs (DeYoung et al. 2006: 215–25). In view of the great shortage of school books in Kyrgyzstan, in August 2009 the German Ministry of Developmental Cooperation donated €57,000 to help alleviate the situation (Zentralasien-Analysen 21, 30 September 2009: 33). An ongoing problem is a dire lack of teachers in both primary and secondary schools. According to the Ministry of Education, 3,000 more teachers were needed in 2008. Senior students from teacher training colleges are sometimes hired to fill the gaps. But the low pay and especially the prospect of working in rural schools dissuade graduates (Toursunov 2008). In the course of their field research in four different schools in the 2004–05 school year, DeYoung and his associates found that many teachers, particularly those of English, had little training in the subjects they were expected to teach (DeYoung et al. 2006: 21, 90). Also, in the four schools they investigated, there were not enough teachers of Russian to meet the increasing demand (DeYoung et al. 2006: 21, 90, 114). All in all, the number of teachers of Russian, especially in rural areas, seems to be inadequate, resulting in fewer hours being taught than required by the weekly timetable.

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The government has been making efforts to overcome the lack of textbooks: between 1991 and 2003 almost 460 new titles of textbooks in all subjects were published in the four languages of instruction, with an overall circulation of 15.8 million copies. An analysis of the situation concerning textbook supply showed that in 2005 Kyrgyzmedium schools had 83 per cent of the textbooks they needed, in Russian schools average provision was 87.9 per cent, and in Uzbek schools only 75.2 per cent, while in Tajik-medium schools this indicator was a low 63.7 per cent (Ministry of Education of the Kyrgyz Republic 2005: 5). Compared with the situation in 1999 there has been progress, but much is still to be done, especially in the remote rural areas. This is also true of adult courses in Kyrgyz, which have been given since 1993. Some were operated by the Kyrgyz Tili (‘Kyrgyz Language’) Society with branches throughout the country. In Bishkek these courses were operated by the State Cultural-Aesthetic Learning Centre and by the Centre for the Study of the Kyrgyz Language, financed by a parliamentary grant. A regular column entitled ‘Let Us Learn Kyrgyz’ appeared in a leading Russian newspaper (Huskey 1995: 563). In all, the use of Kyrgyz in schools and higher education has progressed over the years. The 1989 Law on Language guaranteed choice of language of instruction and Art. 2 of the Law on Education of 1992 affirmed the right of all citizens to education, regardless of sex, nationality, language, social status, political or religious belief (as later written in the constitution). Accordingly, the general education institutions have to provide children with an education in their mother tongue. In independent Kyrgyzstan, all pupils have to receive a bilingual or even multilingual education. If Kyrgyz is the language of instruction, pupils are to learn Russian and a foreign language as well. In schools with Russian as the basic language, they also acquire the state language, Kyrgyz, plus a foreign language. In schools where teaching is carried out in other mother tongues, the state language and the official language plus a foreign language are to be acquired. All this seems a heavy load for children, but it must be borne in mind that many of

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them grow up in a bilingual or multilingual context in any event, and bilingualism is generally approved of. Multilingual education in Kyrgyzstan schools was initiated in 2000 by a local Kyrgyz association and has been supported since June 2003 by CIMERA, a Swiss organization dedicated to improving education in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere. The basic approach in a pilot experiment was to teach pupils of various ethnies in the same class, using their mother tongues bilingually (Kyrgyz and Russian in the north), or even trilingually (Kyrgyz, Russian and Uzbek in the south) (Yesembayeva 2003; Jumaeva 2006). Britta Korth (2001), a CIMERA representative, has argued persuasively for the merits of bilingual instruction. The project continues, in a modest way, directed by the organization TilDil (Jumaeva 2006: 103). According to official reports and other documents from the Ministry of Education, teaching is currently provided in four languages: Kyrgyz, Russian, Uzbek and Tajik. Kyrgyz still dominates the rural areas, while Russian is very common in the cities and towns. Russian-medium schools are frequently perceived as more prestigious, despite the shortage of teachers, and are in greater demand as providing ‘the language of the future’, despite nationalist encouragement for Kyrgyz (DeYoung et al. 2006). Observers have remarked that interest in the study of Russian has increased visibly among the Kyrgyz population recently (Abdurasulov 2009), probably because it increases the chances of finding work in the Russian Federation. There are also schools for the children of smaller ethnic groups, e.g. German, Dungan, Kurdish and Uighur, who are mainly instructed in Kyrgyz and Russian but whose mother tongue is included as a subject in the curriculum, in addition to Kyrgyz and one other foreign language. The official school system provides for schools with intensive teaching of the German language, a mother tongue in multiethnic Kyrgyzstan, and intensive teaching of foreign languages such as English, French or even Chinese. Detailed information on the different types of schools and the respective official timetables imposed by the Ministry of Education for the school year 2009/10 were published in the educational newspaper Kutbilim (31 July 2009; see Uchebnyye plany 2009).

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The basic curriculum was confirmed in 1992, continuing Soviet educational traditions, and is basically still in force today. Research and comparisons with European countries, including Russia, and also with Japan, have shown that Kyrgyz pupils have far more teaching hours than their peers in other countries. For the school year 2009–10 timetables were somewhat reduced, mainly by cutting off some hours in the mother tongue and second language and also in the foreign language (Uchebnyye plany 2009). The Academy of Education, affiliated to the Ministry of Education, is responsible for the development of curricula, textbooks and other learning materials in the four languages of instruction and others. In Soviet times Russian was a compulsory subject in all Kyrgyzmedium schools, but Kyrgyz was not compulsory in Russian-medium ones. This changed after independence. Also, education and language planners replaced Soviet and Russian ideology with Kyrgyz ideology as the focus of language teaching. However, the basic division into different language-medium schools and the teaching methodology have not changed perceptibly since Soviet times. In the country as a whole, about 25 per cent of schoolchildren were studying in Russian-medium schools in 2007 (Tishkov 2007), while Russians made up no more than 9 per cent of the population. This shows that Russian language proficiency is still perceived as a sign of a good education and higher social status, Kyrgyz being seen as the language of the periphery; most higher education is still dominated by Russian (Marat 2008: 28; Jumagulov interview 2009). In most schools, especially in the rural areas, the teaching of Kyrgyz has suffered from inadequate textbooks and at times from a shortage of properly trained teachers. Britta Korth (2004), who spent three years teaching in Kyrgyzstan and doing field research, thinks that another factor hampering the teaching of Kyrgyz is the continuing use of the Soviet methodology of language teaching, which is predominantly teacher-oriented, emphasizing knowledge of grammar and memorization rather than communication skills. At about the same time other researchers criticized the level of language instruction and thought that it did not sufficiently articulate a Kyrgyzstani identity – with Russian still considered more useful (DeYoung et al.

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2006: 207–15). The teaching of Russian, although supported by the Russian Federation with a supply of textbooks, has suffered from the emigration of many Russian teachers (DeYoung 2006). Since there is some pressure in favour of the Kyrgyz-medium schools, there is also a decline in proficiency in Russian as a second language among the younger Kyrgyz, chiefly in rural regions (Orusbaev et al. 2008: 476–7). The teaching of languages in Kyrgyzstan schools is impacted by both politics and economics. An example is Kyrgyzstan’s rapprochement with the Russian Federation in early February 2009, when Kyrgyzstan closed the Manas air base to United States planes on their way to Afghanistan in exchange for an agreement with the Russian Federation for considerable financial support. This was expected to improve the position regarding the teaching of Russian language and culture. It has had only a limited immediate effect, however, and the complaints of ethnic Russians about the marginalization of their language have continued. Perhaps the subsequent re-opening of the air base to US planes had an influence on the lack of progress in Russian teaching, but most likely it remains a matter of general policy. Uzbek-medium schools have suffered the most from the lack of school textbooks. In the Soviet Union such schools had been accustomed to getting textbooks from Uzbekistan, while the Kyrgyzstan authorities would send textbooks to Kyrgyz-medium schools in Uzbekistan. This ceased with Latinization in Uzbekistan. Textbooks on the history of Kyrgyzstan history were translated for Uzbek-medium secondary schools and published in Jalalabad with the help of sponsorship by leading ethnic Uzbek politicians and businessmen, such as parliamentarian Alisher Sabirov, in 1998–2000. The dire shortage of Uzbek-language textbooks in Cyrillic prompted the Uzbek community in southern Kyrgyzstan to get Uzbek-language textbooks from the Russian Federation (4,500 were obtained in 2004), but the main problems remained unsolved (AKIpress 2004). The Kyrgyz-Uzbek University in Osh resolved to develop textbooks, but nothing much came of this promise. The lack of government funds meant that the first official Uzbek textbook was only introduced in the 2006–07 school year. In view of the shortage of books and after complaints by

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the teachers in their schools, in March 2007 a rally of Uzbeks in the southern town of Jalalabad decided to ask for contributions to help improve the schools. Uzbek dissatisfaction was felt in the area of general culture as well as education. The Uzbeks maintained that too much time was spent on Kyrgyz in the minority schools, and that the Kyrgyz (and the Russians) discriminated against Uzbeks in terms of the airtime allocated to them on television shows and other media (Mamaraimov 2007). The perceived Kyrgyz discrimination was one reason why many Uzbeks switched to Russian-medium schools, for instance in Osh, a city inhabited mostly by Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. In 2007, of the city’s 54 schools, 9 were Russian-only, 12 offered instruction in Kyrgyz and Russian, and another 12 in Uzbek and Russian. The city also had 28 Russian-medium kindergartens (Satkanbaev 2007). The Kyrgyz language has become a compulsory subject in all Russian-medium primary schools (that is, from grades 1 to 4) throughout the country, with three to four lessons per week. The number of hours reserved for Russian in Kyrgyz-medium schools has decreased over the years and is now the same as the number of Kyrgyz study hours in Russian-medium schools. Curriculum changes determined that a foreign language (English, French or German) should be studied from the first grade, but beginning with the school year 2009–10 the start of learning a foreign language was postponed to grade 3, with the aim of reducing pupils’ study load (Prilozheniye k prikazu Ministerstva obrazovaniya i nauki Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki 2009). In the south of the country, in Uzbek-medium and Tajik-medium schools, pupils get four to six hours per week of Kyrgyz (Korth 2005: 132–3, 200ff.). According to a later poll, 53.7 per cent of pupils attended primary Kyrgyz-medium schools, 35.4 per cent Russian-medium, 11.4 per cent Uzbek-medium, and 1.5 per cent studied in other languages (Chotaeva 2004: 182–3). Some additional data about the division of secondary education students by language of instruction are shown in Table 5.2. In 2004 Dr Irfan Tosuncuoğlu, a lecturer at the Kyrgyz–Turkish Manas University in Bishkek, investigated the general language situation in Kyrgyzstan schools (Tosuncuoğlu 2006: 275–81). Table 5.3 presents some of his findings.

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Table 5.2 Pupils in Kyrgyzstan’s secondary schools by language of instruction, 1998–2003 1998–99 Kyrgyz Russian Uzbek Kazakh English Turkish Tajik Russian/English

39,980 87,544 2,092 n.a. 96 n.a. n.a. n.a.

1999–2000 2000–01 50,378 104,408 3,231 n.a. 58 237 17 880

61,382 123,769 3,361 n.a. 308 n.a. n.a. n.a.

2001–02

2002–03

61,450 140,050 5,563 n.a. 375 n.a. n.a. n.a.

59,718 135,149 2,574 186 1,290 1,470 n.a. n.a.

Source: Kyrgyz official statistics (n.a.= not ascertainable).

Table 5.3 Language of instruction in Kyrgyzstan’s secondary schools, 2005–06 Contents

Schools with one language of instruction Kyrgyz Russian Uzbek Tajik Schools with two or more language tracks Kyrgyz-Russian Kyrgyz-Uzbek Kyrgyz-Tajik Uzbek-Russian Uzbek-Tajik Kyrgyz-Uzbek-Tajik Kyrgyz-Tajik-Russian Kyrgyz-Uzbek-Russian Source: Tosuncuoğlu 2006.

Total no. of schools

Total no. of pupils from preparatory class to 11th grade

1,605 1,324 148 132 1 423 314 56 2 34 2 0 1 14

762,296 550,042 121,257 90,472 525 384,271 279,217 38,368 1,609 45,934 1,022 0 1,105 17,016

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Somewhat divergent figures are given by Orusbaev et al. (2008: 490). Altogether 73,000 teachers are employed in these schools. The very small ethnic groups experience special difficulties in schooling for their children. An example is the Lyuli community (also called Roma), which is poor and rather isolated due to discrimination and language problems. Most members of the community are illiterate and do not know their rights, e.g., the right of their children to basic education. But educated members of the Lyuli community see education, especially acquisition of the state language, as the key to a better future for the young generation. In four experimental classes in a village near the southern town of Osh, for example, Lyuli children are taught in the Kyrgyz language. Foreign languages were, of course, taught also in Soviet times. But with the demise of the Soviet Union and the opening up to the rest of the world where English is becoming the global language, the foreign languages offered in school and the patterns of demand by parents and pupils have changed. English occupies a much stronger position today than in the past, while German and French have receded. As some prestigious universities and higher education institutions, especially in business administration and management, offer programmes with English as language of instruction, there is already a stronger demand for English at school level. Instruction in a foreign language often starts in the third grade of primary school with one hour per week and then two hours, continuing in secondary school. There are schools with a special focus on foreign languages, teaching – besides Kyrgyz or Russian as mother tongue and Russian or Kyrgyz as a second language – two instead of one foreign language and also schools with a specialization in German (for timetables and school hours allotted to the respective languages, see: Uchebnyye plany 2009). Teachers of English are in high demand, but it seems that only very few of them can teach English well. The lack of qualified English teachers means that classes are too large for quick and effective acquisition of a foreign language (Tosuncuoğlu 2001: 299ff.). In view of the demand for English, the United States Embassy in Bishkek, jointly with the English Teachers’ Association Forum in Kyrgyzstan, undertook to offer free English lessons by well-trained teachers to 60 14–16-year-

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old pupils from low-income families during the 2008–09 school year (The Times of Central Asia, 28 February 2008). According to Mamedov (2005: 29), 13 Turkish secondary schools were active in Kyrgyzstan. In the 2001–02 school year, Turkey’s Ministry of Education opened three schools in Bishkek with 698 students, as well as a Turkish Language Teaching Centre, with 480 students, in the same year. Secondary schools for boys and for girls were opened in Bishkek in 1992 by the government of Turkey and financed by it in subsequent years, while other schools were established in smaller localities such as Osh, Jalalabad and others (Mokeev and Dor 2000: 445–9). Fethullah Gülen’s moderate Islamic organization, whose schools are operated by ‘Sebat Educational Institutions’ in Kyrgyzstan, inaugurated 11 private schools in February 1997, with 291 teachers and 2,093 students, and supported two universities with 31 academic staff and 378 students (Yanık 2004: 293ff.). All offered instruction in Turkish and other languages. In the 2002–03 school year, the organization had 13 schools in Kyrgyzstan with 3,100 pupils and 323 teachers from Turkey (Balçı 2003: 156). In the 2007–08 school year, the number dropped to 12 schools (ZentralasienAnalysen 19–20, 28 August 2009: 20, based on Balçı’s research). The pupils were from all ethnic groups and graduates were expected to become fluent in Kyrgyz, English, Russian and Turkish. German has enjoyed considerable prestige since Soviet times, but its instruction in schools has declined in independent Kyrgyzstan: In the 2004–05 school year, only 7 per cent of pupils in grades 1–4 studied German; out of the country’s total of 2,080 schools, in that year only 339 offered some German (Franke 2005: 23). It was reported at the time that some teachers of German had to switch to teaching English.

Languages at the universities Before 1991, universities and other academic institutions were very active; the most prestigious was the Kyrgyz State University – which it still is today. Between 1991 and 2009, the overall number of academic institutions and universities rose from nine to 55, more than 30 of them in Bishkek alone (Department of National Security Affairs

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2009a). This is due, partly, to an upgrading of former Pedagogical Institutes and Technical Institutes to the status of universities, and to the founding of new private universities. Examples are the Medical School and the Bishkek International School of Management and Business – both offering instruction in Russian. Independent Kyrgyzstan tries to uphold the high level of academic standards achieved in the Soviet Union. But as in other realms of the public sphere in the Kyrgyz republic, corruption is rampant, and many students are said to buy their university admission tests and also their diploma. In the words of Erkaiym Mambetalieva, former director of Bishkek’s Anticorruption Agency, only 5–10 per cent of graduates can be regarded as qualified. The government has recently started to combat the problem more vigorously, focusing on a new standardized aptitude test (Ahiyam 2009). Knowledge of Russian has declined somewhat at university level, even though the language is still often used for instruction. However, there are some important innovations. Since the 1990s, applicants have been able to take university entrance examinations in Kyrgyz and an increasing number of departments teach in Kyrgyz. This is expected to benefit Kyrgyz young people from the rural areas as it will make it easier for them to join the civil service, the largest employer in the state. Many still consider Russian the most appropriate language for school and university instruction. In all the institutions of higher education taken together, in 2006 Russian was the language of instruction for 67.9 per cent of the students, Kyrgyz for 30 per cent, and Uzbek for 1.3 per cent (Brunner and Tillett 2007: 34). Instruction in the few remaining institutions is mainly in other languages such as Turkish or English. A 2007 investigation found that 61 per cent wished to expand the use of Russian, against 28 per cent preferring to ‘leave it as it is’ and merely four per cent to ‘cut it back’ (Morozov 2009: 147). Similar language preferences were often the case in the Kyrgyz-Uzbek University in Osh or Turkish at the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University established in Bishkek in 1998 with the support of the government of Turkey (Yanık 2004: 298). In the universities, Russian still predominates, sometimes alongside Kyrgyz in parallel courses. One of the main reasons for this is the unavailability of suitable Kyrgyz-language

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textbooks. In the north of the country, some faculties offer instruction in Kyrgyz (as in the humanities), and others in Russian (as in computer science and communications). Arabayev Kyrgyz State University in Bishkek is meant to be Kyrgyz-medium, but in reality each subject is taught according to the language proficiency of the majority of students registered in the department. At present, most instruction is offered in Kyrgyz. There is also a department for training interpreters and translators in English, German, Chinese, Korean, Turkish, and Arabic; the German section was closed because of a lack of students (interview with Myrzabek Jumayev, professor of Kyrgyz literature and Director of the Institute of State Language which translates official documents from Russian into Kyrgyz and vice versa, Bishkek, 7 May 2009). Some universities offer instruction in Russian only, such as the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University and the International University of Kyrgyzstan, both in Bishkek, or the Issyk-Kul State University in Karakol. In the south, some universities teach in Kyrgyz, Russian and Uzbek, such as the Kyrgyz-Uzbek University in Osh. Active since 1994, this is a purely Kyrgyz institution (not subsidized by Uzbekistan). Arabic is taught at the Islamic University of Kyrgyzstan, the KyrgyzKuwait University and several religious institutions (Europa World of Learning 2009 2008: Vol. I, 1338–40; Orusbaev et al. 2008: 492). A special place is held by the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, which was inaugurated on 9 September 1993. The university, established jointly by the Kyrgyzstani and Russian governments, gave rise to some agitated polemics, with some Kyrgyz nationalists vehemently against its foundation. They were unhappy with the added emphasis on Russian language and culture at university level, including a new centre to train teachers of Russian (Bogdanov 2003) – all of which seems to have mattered more to them than the opportunity for Kyrgyzstan students to undertake studies much needed by the republic (Kolstø 1995: 241–2). Opponents also noted that this university’s agenda focused on the promotion of the study of Russian in Kyrgyzstan, as exemplified at a large international congress sponsored by the university on 28–29 October 2002, and more generally by its dedicated support of Russian cultural activities throughout the country (Samsonov

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2006: 69). Some other Kyrgyzstan universities use English, such as the American University of Central Asia (see below). At the institutions established by the Gülen movement, the International Atatürk Alatoo University and the Silk Road International School, Kyrgyz, Turkish, Russian and English are studied. When it comes to the study of foreign languages, English is the most popular. It is the dominant language of instruction at the Academy of Management in Bishkek, the International Atatürk Alatau University, the University of Central Asia, established by the Aga Khan Foundation, which has been functioning since the 2005–06 school year (Franke 2005), and the American University of Central Asia (Koenig 1999: 79; Reeves 2004: 365–85; Mamedov 2005: 29; DeYoung et al. 2006: 118). The last-mentioned university, founded in Bishkek in 1993 as the Kyrgyz-American School (with 43 students) at the Arabayev Kyrgyz State University, was expanded in 1997 and given its present name in 2002. It is a specialized institution devoted to Westernization and the education of a new type of citizen, ready for changes in independent Kyrgyzstan. The emphasis has been on training experts in business administration, law and journalism; linguistic competence in English is required for enrolment (Franke 2005: 20–1) and has a central place in the curriculum. The staff includes some of the country’s leading instructors of English, while the student body comprises many students returning from exchange programmes in the United States, eager to maintain their fluency in English (Reeves 2004: 369–70). Instruction in English and Russian is offered at the Kyrgyz International University in Bishkek, which includes a faculty of foreign languages. Created in 1993, it has an academic agreement with the University of Kentucky, which means that some American professors come to teach there in English (DeYoung 2008: 645ff.). Another partner in the language competition for students is Turkey, co-sponsor of the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University in Bishkek, where instruction is in Kyrgyz and Turkish (except, of course, in such departments as Russian language and literature). The university started teaching in the academic year 1997–98 and charges no tuition fees. The government of Turkey and some Turkish NGOs have promoted the spread of Turkish culture and language in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz

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students have been offered scholarships at universities in Turkey; there were 804 in 1997, but the number declined to 699 in 2002. A German-language centre in Bishkek, affiliated to the GoetheInstitut in Almaty, has offered courses in German to young people and adults, while the DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) has offered grants for study in Germany – based on a 1993 cultural agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Germany. DAAD has given financial support to departments of German at several local institutions, such as the Kyrgyz National University, the Osh State University, the American University of Central Asia and several others (Franke 2005). In several institutions of higher education courses in English, German, and more rarely French, are offered to interested students, whatever their field of study.

The media The media are regulated by the Mass Media Law and supervised by the Ministry of Culture and Information. Since President Bakiyev took office controls on the media have been tightened. The president and his family directly controlled certain media outlets via the presidential secretariat. There have been cases of intimidation of independent media outlets and the murder of several journalists, while others sought refuge in the West in 2007–09. On 1 May 2009, when the Ukrainian businessman Jevhen Hoibovisky asked permission to visit Kyrgyzstan in order to negotiate the establishment of a branch of his media consulting business, he was refused entry (Zentralasien-Analysen 17, 29 May 2009: 38). Despite the repressive climate of the late Bakiyev era and the violence in 2010, the media in Kyrgyzstan are still characterized by a certain pluralism of information and views, and by the professional education and attitude of journalists, editors and broadcasters. The media situation reflects the co-existence of several languages. A few mass media – chiefly local ones – use Kyrgyz. The majority of publications and other outlets employ Russian, although advertisements are supposed to be published in both Kyrgyz and Russian. A few publish in the minority languages. English is rarely used; the English-language Bishkek-based Times of Central Asia, with printed

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and internet versions, appears to be the exception. About 92 per cent of the books in Bishkek’s national library are in Russian, mostly from the Soviet period, 6 per cent in Kyrgyz and 2 per cent in other languages (Orusbaev et al. 2008: 487). The main bookshops in Bishkek are well stocked with Russian books on every subject, mostly imported and of a high quality, while the centrally located bookstore that sells mainly Kyrgyz books has a rather modest selection (personal experience, May 2009). The press, although controlled, is mostly free in its criticism. Among the most popular newspapers that support the government are Vechernii Bishkek and Moya Stolitsa, while Delo NR often criticizes the authorities (Bensmann 2007: 539–40). Those which support the official line receive state subsidies; these include Slovo Kyrgyzstana, Kyrgyz Tuusu and Erkin Too (IREX 2008: 206). Audiences prefer Russian-language radio and television broadcasts (chiefly from the Russian Federation) which, they say, are also more entertaining. The government controls most of the local radio and television broadcasts in various languages and is the agency that licenses both radio and television. Many privately produced Kyrgyz films are in Russian, too, even when they offer a medium of preservation and transmission of Kyrgyz culture (Cummings 2009: 636ff.). Nationalists insist on Kyrgyz translations of all broadcasts. On 4 June 2008 the president signed a law on radio and television, saying that henceforth a majority of broadcasts ought to be in Kyrgyz and produced in Kyrgyzstan. The law does not seem to have been enforced because, on 21 April 2009, more than 30 media organizations as well as representatives of the television and radio petitioned president Bakiyev to enforce it, especially the point about 50 per cent broadcasts being in Kyrgyz and produced in Kyrgyzstan (Zentralasien-Analysen 17, 29 May 2009: 37). Radio and television stations, mainly in Kyrgyz or Russian, are still governmentcontrolled, although a number of private ones are active in several towns such as Bishkek, Osh, Karakol, Talas and Tokmok (BBC Country Profile: Kyrgyzstan 2009). In 2006, Kyrgyzstan had 14 independent or privately owned television stations and 11 radio stations (Abazov 2007: 117). Some private broadcasters, such as Piramida, earn substantial amounts of money through advertising. Turkey has maintained the

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TRT Avaz television broadcasts to Kyrgyzstan since the early 1990s, and so has Azattyk Ünalgysy, the Kyrgyz-language service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, with 33.6 per cent of annual reach (personal communication by Dr Tyntchtykbek Choroev, former director of the service). The Kyrgyz are increasingly using Chinese-made satellite dishes, which provide more foreign channels even in remote places. The number of internet subscribers in Kyrgyzstan is low – about one per cent of the population – but it was estimated that the country had about 300,000 internet users in 2006 (IREX 2008: 224), about 850,000 by November 2009 and 2,194,400 in summer 2010 (Internet World Stats 2010b). Two-thirds of internet-cafés are in Bishkek. This is one of the highest ratios of users in the five Central Asian states, and it is perhaps surprising because Kyrgyzstan has frequent power cuts which hamper access to information. Most internet users prefer to employ the Russian language (Gavrilov et al. 2008: 45), while English is penetrating as well. In the internet and in the SMS messages a sizeable number of young people use Latin characters in their Kyrgyzlanguage texts and sometimes even in Russian-language ones. Kyrgyzstan is a bilingual republic by law, the only state in Central Asia that grants official status to Russian. In effect it is trilingual, because the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan’s south represents an important part of society and is the second-largest community in the country. Language rivalry between the three groups: the titular nation, the Russians and the Uzbeks has caused harm to society and contributed to the violence between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks that erupted in spring 2010. Promises of institutional support for the languages of the smaller minorities have not yet been put into effect.

CHAPTER 6 TUR K MENISTAN

Basic data Turkmenistan has an area of 488,100 square kilometres and a population estimated in July 2010 at 4,940,916 (CIA World Factbook 2010), the lowest among the Central Asian states. The number of ethnic Russians in Turkmenistan was estimated at about 150,000 in 2009 (Pisarev 2009). This is the most ethnically homogeneous of the Central Asian states discussed here, with Turkmens, mostly Sunni Muslims, forming a strong majority. Turkmenistan has traditionally been a very isolated country, and it still is. Western scholarly publications on the country are scarce, as is any media coverage of Turkmenistan in the Western press, while official sources of information from within Turkmenistan uniformly adhere to the officially prescribed picture of wellbeing and harmony. It is also a country where there is no ascertainable statistical data after the 1995 census whose data are difficult to obtain. Further, the results of the 2001 census (if indeed there was one) are not available (Tyson 2009: 56 and 72 n. 150). Consequently statistical information about Turkmenistan is of questionable accuracy and generally out of date. The information given below is based on the latest known official data. The ethnic distribution in 2003 was supposedly as follows: the titular nation made up 85.5 per cent of the population, Uzbeks 5 per cent, Russians 4 per cent and other ethnic groups 6 per cent. 72 per cent of

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Table 6.1 Population of Turkmenistan by ethnic group, 1989–95 1989 No. (%) Turkmens Russians Uzbeks Kazakhs Tatars Ukrainians Armenians Baluchis Others Total

2,536,600 (72.0) 333,800 (9.4) 317,300 (9.0) 87,800 (2.5) 39,200 (1.1) 35,500 (1.0) 31,800 (0.9) 28,200 (0.8) n.a. 3,552,700 (100)

1995 No. (%) 3,449,600 (77) 300,100 (6.7) 412,100 (9.2) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4,483,200 (100)

Source: Official statistics, published in Abazov, ed. 2005: 195. n.a.= not ascertainable

the inhabitants of the republic speak Turkmen (Arik 2008: 147), 12 per cent Russian, 9 per cent Uzbek and 7 per cent other languages. The capital, Ashgabat, numbered about 773,400 inhabitants in January 2004 and 871,500 in 2009 (Wikipedia on Turkmenistan). Turkmenistan declared sovereignty on 22 August 1990 and independence on 27 October 1991. A new constitution was adopted in May 1992, defining the country as a secular and presidential democracy (Konstitutsiya Turkmenistana 2007). But in reality power was strongly concentrated in the hands of the president, who established an authoritarian regime with a single party, imitating the Soviet Union’s rigid political system (Rashid 1994; Alaolmolki 2001).

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Saparmurat Niyazov, earlier first secretary of the Communist Party in Turkmenistan, was elected president on 21 June 1992; on 15 January 1994 his term of duty was prolonged to 2002; he was declared ‘president for life’ on 28 December 1999. He died on 20 December 2006. His dictatorial rule, dubbed ‘a Central Asian Sultanate’ by Gleason (1997: 110), permitted no opposition or political debate in what was essentially ‘a one-man state’, developing with time into a bizarre personality cult. There was no open opposition, though clandestine political opposition existed (Gleason 1997: 117; Vilmer 2009: 60–4). Dissidents have left the country, others are dead or imprisoned, among them some former ministers. The Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, the successor of the Helsinki Group of Turkmenistan, was founded in 2004 in Vienna and is active in monitoring the human rights situation, education and minority issues. It was the president’s vision of nation-building that was decisive, as it was in all matters. He used the term ‘national revival’ instead of ‘nation-building’. For Niyazov this meant maintaining national solidarity by promoting the unity of the tribes (the Teke, Ersari and Yomut are the largest), on the one hand; and achieving gradual sociocultural de-Russification, on the other. Religious extremism has not been a problem, since the government keeps all religious activity under its control. Emphasis on Turkmen language and culture has played a key role in the country’s Turkmenization (Kuru 2002: 71ff.; Vilmer 2009: 91–2). The policies of Turkmenization apply also to President Niyazov’s successor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov, who was elected on 11 February 2007. The new president introduced some moderate reforms soon after his election (Matthei 2008: 2–7), such as abolishing the legislative body introduced under Niyazov, the People’s Council, which had consisted of 2,500 delegates. The new president granted limited power to an elected parliament, expanded from 65 members to 125, but just as subservient as the former representative body. This and other political reforms, such as the acknowledgement of property rights and of the principles of a market economy, were expressed in later constitutional amendments initiated in September 2008 (World Bulletin 2008). There were also symbolic innovations; for example in December 2008

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in a line of the national anthem the word Türkmenbaşy (‘leader of the nation’, the name adopted by Niyazov) was replaced with Halk (‘people’) (Zentralasien-Analysen 13, 20 January 2009: 22) and Niyazov’s slogan Altyn Asyr (‘Golden Age’) was changed by Berdimuhammedov to Beyik Galkynyş (‘Great Revival’) to refer to Turkmenistan’s contemporary period (Vilmer 2009: 54–60). But insofar as human rights are concerned, such as freedom of information and the press, of speech and association, the international community is still waiting for more of the new president’s initial promises to be fulfilled.

Legislation without debates The Law on Language of 24 May 1990 proclaimed Turkmen the state language and Russian the language of interethnic communication. However, Turkmenization was Niyazov’s grand ideal, so soon after independence the functions of Russian were curtailed in practice. In 1996, the articles in the language law referring to the status and functioning of the Russian language were discarded (Demidov 2002: 168). The 1990 law was quite ambitious in conception and insisted that all officials in government service, social organizations, law enforcement, education and health services should know both Turkmen and Russian. It also stipulated that in areas inhabited by other ethnies, officials should know the local language as well. An article in the constitution of May 1992 confirmed Turkmen as the state language, also guaranteeing to all citizens of Turkmenistan the right to use their mother tongue. The constitution does not specifically mention Russian. In line with these developments, the government ordered that Turkmen be taught in all primary schools and that its study should also be compulsory in all secondary schools giving instruction in other languages. School graduates were expected to pass proficiency tests in Turkmen. In areas inhabited by compact ethnic groups other than Turkmen, however, their language could be the language of instruction through secondary school. Despite a 1993 decree instituting a trilingual education (Turkmen, Russian and English), the strategic policy has been one of gradual linguistic and cultural de-Russianization. Niyazov prohibited the use of

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Russian on public signs and in advertising, as well as the publication of Russian literature (Baykova and Ivzhenko 2004). Other measures reduced the amount of instruction permitted in Russian and other minority languages such as Uzbek and Kazakh (see below). Niyazov closed Russian theatres, except for one in Ashgabat, named after Pushkin, and several amateur groups in the provinces. The requirement of proficiency in Turkmen is taken to an extreme for state employees. It was decreed that those who had not acquired the Turkmen language would be dismissed as of 1 April 2000 (GürsoyNaskali 2002: 58). While it is unlikely that this decree was fully implemented, other ethnic groups started to study Turkmen because of the preference shown to people fluent in Turkmen when applying for jobs. Their efforts to learn the language were hampered by the lack of suitable primers and experienced teachers, which are constant problems faced by the country’s education system. A reorganization of teaching staff was carried out in 2002, but it did not help the situation much as it takes time to train suitable teachers (Taganova 2003). Thus, attaining proficiency in Turkmen was delayed. In the strictly authoritarian regime of Turkmenistan there have been no public debates on language issues or demands from opposing circles. For this reason, and also because of the much more monoethnic starting point after independence, one does not encounter the new programmes, decrees and laws on language and related issues that are so common in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Latinization of the alphabet As in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, at independence Turkmenistan was determined to set out on the road to modernization and to draw away from the Soviet past through Latinization of the alphabet. Most of the process of Latinization took place during the 1990s. On 21 January 1993 the government appointed a high-level committee for this purpose, chaired by the president himself and led by the head of the Turkmen Language Institute in the Academy of Sciences. The committee began its work by selecting Latin characters generally used in computer programmes, although several of the special signs eventually

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chosen are not easily found in word processing programmes. Soon afterwards, a presidential decree, dated 12 April 1993, confirmed the same day by parliament, announced the adoption of the Latin alphabet and set 1 January 1996 as the day of overall employment. The committee drew up a 30-letter Latin alphabet and recommended that it be publicized via the press. The committee also actively proposed that street signs and newspaper mastheads use the Latin script. While in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan Latinization at school was carried out on the basis of one grade each year, Turkmenistan planned to introduce the Latin script at once into several consecutive grades, in order to shorten the overall time required (Behar 1994: 198). The overall process was planned to start in 1995–96 and be completed in the year 2000 (Demidov 2002; Şahin 2002: 65). This was to be synchronized with the introduction of new Latinized school books. The speed of the programme was remarkable: Latinization was decreed on 12 April 1993 and the 1993–94 school year was to be devoted to preparing teachers for the script change. Some philologists suggested the option of exchanging the Cyrillic for the Arabic script, but this was ignored (Demidov 2002: 168). Intensive efforts were invested in the writing and publication of textbooks for all grades (Uhres 2000: 311–12), but the number of textbooks produced was not sufficient (Vilmer 2009: 185). Government offices, too, had to switch to the new script. Press and television were recruited to the Latinization campaign. Niyazov had explained in parliament the importance of alphabet Latinization, emphasizing the use of information technology such as computers. The first book in Latin script was published early in 1995; it was a description of the state president’s activities (Alpatov 2002: 123). In 1995 and 1996, changes were introduced in the alphabet for the sake of simplification, but the new letters complicated it even more. For instance, the ‘zh’ sound, first rendered as ‘£f’ was changed into ‘ž’. These and other delays were expensive, but this was not the main problem, then or later, in gas-rich Turkmenistan, with a per capita GDP estimated at US$5,439 in April 2010. Despite their gas revenues, the authorities were unable to produce enough textbooks in the Latin script in the required time frame, because in 2009 they were still using Soviet textbooks dated 1988 for

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geometry, biology, chemistry and algebra – at least in the countryside (Vilmer 2009: 185). To speed up introduction of the Latinized script in state administration and public life, in late December 1999 the People’s Council, the Council of Elders and the National Movement Galkynyş (‘Revival’) adopted a resolution on the ‘Eternal confirmation of the Turkmen Language and the Turkmen National Alphabet in the activities of the state organs and in all spheres of life of independent Turkmenistan’, coming into force on 1 January 2000. A 23-person committee was appointed to supervise the implementation of this resolution (Demidov 2002: 169). Indeed, starting on 2 January 2000, newspapers duly published articles in Latinized Turkmen – a striking indication of Niyazov’s authoritarian rule. Since the end of December 1999 all textbooks and materials for Turkmen language tracks have used Latin characters (Clement 2007). During a personal visit to Ashgabat, in May 2008, we noted that Latinized Turkmen was in use almost everywhere, although the number of books published and available seemed rather low. Horák (2005: 312) and other observers noted that the alphabet change had brought about a high ratio of illiteracy among adults.

Language Turkmenization Niyazov presented himself as champion of a new Turkmen national identity and culture, a move that reportedly gained him much support among Turkmen elites (Akbarzadeh 1999: 271–2). Ambitious plans, not always strictly implemented, aimed to increase the use of Turkmen in the state bureaucracy, in schools and higher education as well as in academic publishing. Establishing and strengthening Turkmen patriotism via an emphasis on Turkmen history and culture was, indeed, one of Niyazov’s aims, and his authoritarian top-down policies enabled him to put it into effect (Demidov 2002: 82ff.). The Turkmen language gained a monopoly in all domains of life, including the civil service and education (Kirchanov 2010: 54). Besides giving ideological lectures on radio and television channels (Niyazov appeared in person almost every afternoon and evening on television), considerable use was made of the print media. Indoctrination

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centred on Niyazov’s ideological Ruhnama (‘Spiritual Guidance’), the first volume of which was published in 2001 and the second in 2004. This work was later translated into over 32 languages and made available on the internet in these languages (Niyazov 2005). Promoted by Niyazov as the second holy book after the Koran, it assumed the function of a spiritual guide in every citizen’s life. A model for all political and cultural activity, the work became compulsory reading and quoting not merely at school and in the universities, but also in the instruction of foreign languages (personal information by a young Turkmen researcher, May 2008). Moreover, it was found in every bookshop and almost every household and was recommended to all tourists as well (Chivers 2007: 2). The book presented Niyazov’s views on Turkmen history and civilization, asserting that Turkmen was the core of Turkism. It was intended to justify and emphasize Turkmen values and culture, and to act as an important instrument for intellectual Turkmenization. One of its basic aims was to emphasize the unity of Turkmen ethnicity and identity in both ancient and modern times. A resolution adopted in May 1992 to Turkmenize Russian geographical names and administrative terms was carried out, and over the years new names were allotted to many streets, institutions, collective farms and buildings, which were renamed for Turkmen heroes and cultural phenomena. The names of six cities and a region, and the spellings of other subdivisions’ names were changed, some of them more than once (Statoids 2007). Many names of districts and towns have been modified to make them more Turkmen-sounding (list in Abazov, ed. 2005: 197–8). Toponymic Turkmenization was already intense in the 1990s and other names were added in the 2000s. Some examples of Turkmenized names of towns are the following: Tashauz became Daşoguz; Nebit-Dag Balkanabat; Chardzhou/Çärjew Türkmenabat; and Krasnovodsk Türkmenbaşy after the honorific title which Niyazov had assumed (Olcott 2005: 284–5). An obvious sign of nationalist self-assertion has been the assiduous replacement of Russian terms and names by Turkmen ones. These changes spread nationwide. Government-related and technological terminology was changed from Russian to Turkmen. For example, the term for train, ‘poyezd’, borrowed from Russian, was changed

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into ‘otly’ (literally ‘firebelcher’). In the process of de-Russianization, Arabic and Persian words, quite frequent in Turkmen, were often used. Special efforts were invested in language intervention by experts who strived to introduce local terms and words instead of Russian ones. A weekly, Türkmen Dili (‘The Turkmen Language’) was launched, with a circulation of 5,000 copies, to spread information about new words (Demidov 2002: 170). The 1992 constitution was an occasion to introduce the rephrasing of administrative and political terms based on Turkmen (or Turkic) sources. After the publication of the constitution, this process continued. The Supreme Soviet was renamed ‘Mejlis’ and the People’s Assembly ‘Halk Maslahaty’. ‘Oblast’ (province) became ‘welaýat’; ‘rayon’ (district) ‘etrap’; and ‘kolkhoz’ (collective farm) ‘dayhan’. Administrative organs have been given Turkmen names of Arabic derivation such as ‘häkimiýat’ (administration) and ‘häkim’ (local administrator). Ideological terms are ubiquitous: ‘garaşsyzlyk’ (independence); ‘bitaraplyk’ (neutrality); ‘agzybirlik’ (solidarity); and ‘galkynyş’ (revival) (Akbarzadeh 1999: 275–6; Kuru 2002: 74–5; Mamedov 2005: 40). Niyazov was rather cautious concerning Turkmenistan’s relations with the Russian Federation, in all domains, chiefly for political and economic reasons. Many elderly and middle-aged Turkmens preferred to express themselves in Russian, the language they were educated in (Fouse 2000: 303–5; personal observation, Ashgabat 2008). These people also argued that the imposition of Turkmen as sole language of instruction would turn out to be too hasty and too comprehensive a measure (Mamedov 2002; Abazov 2008: 7). Consequently, Russian has held its ground to a certain extent in the bureaucracy; it can still be seen in official documents, government efforts at substituting Turkmen notwithstanding (Mesamed 2004: 236–7). However, its role in public life is gradually diminishing (Mamedov 2005: 39). The Russian language has practically disappeared from walls and posters; and the Cyrillic no longer figures on the paper money. No Russian-language newspapers or radio broadcasts have been permitted for some time. Baykova and Ivzhenko (2004) report that a year earlier two Russian readers had complained, in a newspaper article, that many ethnic Russians felt compelled to conceal their proficiency

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in that language. Nevertheless, spoken Russian has continued to be used in some spheres – in hotels, restaurants, shops and other public establishments. To foster relations with Turkmens abroad and include them in the process of revitalization of the nation, as early as 1991 Niyazov set up a Humanitarian Association of the Turkmens of the World, which was still active in 2009 when it organized a congress in St Petersburg (18 April 2009). It defines itself as an association of patriotic Turkmens, worldwide, dedicated to promoting Turkmen culture. Branches are mostly found in the Russian Federation, but there are also some in the Ukraine, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the other republics of Central Asia – some 30 branches in all (Pisarev 2009). Members of the worldwide Turkmen diaspora gather every year in Ashgabat at the end of October, on Independence Day. The late president’s successor, Berdimuhammedov, continues the policies of Turkmenization and is gradually replacing the personality cult of Niyazov with his own brand of personality cult; some changes have been initiated under his presidency. For instance, in April 2008 he restored the names of days and months (changed by Niyazov to Turkmen terms) to former usage and reintroduced the study of foreign languages into the school curricula (Keating 2008). He also reversed his predecessor’s ban on cinema, opera and circus (The Times of Central Asia, 24 January 2008). He seems to have moderated the campaign against Russian and has restored some of the rights of Russian speakers, probably for political or economic reasons. The Russian language was reintroduced, at least to some extent, into educational establishments (Weitz 2008), with the expectation of receiving textbooks from the Russian Federation and initiating exchange programmes. One aim was to enable Turkmen students to continue their studies at universities in the Russian Federation (Golovkin 2008).

Minorities and language Turkmenistan has come under serious criticism over the situation of non-Turkmen ethnic groups. The news service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated in 2005 that ‘the plight

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of the ethnic minorities in Turkmenistan remains bleak’. Niyazov’s Turkmenization project, declaring Turkmenistan the ‘home of ethnic Turkmen’, left little room for the development of the other ethnies and their languages (IRIN 2005). Although unbiased information from Turkmenistan is scarce and independent scholarly research is impossible, there are indications that forced Turkmenization was taking place under Niyazov. In its 2005 report to the UN Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Turkmen government claimed the following ethnic composition of the country: Turkmens 94.6 per cent and minorities 5.4 per cent, meaning a steep increase in the share of the titular nation of more than 13 per cent in ten years, compared to the 1995 data cited above. The number of Uzbeks, for example would thus, according to the government, have declined from 9.2 per cent in 1995 to 5 per cent in 2003, to a mere 2 per cent in 2005. Forced assimilation and resettlement are tools of Turkmenization (International Crisis Group 2007: 12). Discrimination in employment and education (Seidov 2002), diminished prospects and fear of job loss led non-Turkmens to various forms of adaptation forced on them by circumstances: adoption of Turkmen-sounding name endings or fictitious marriages with members of the titular ethnie. There is anecdotal evidence that applicants for government jobs were asked to prove their Turkmen ethnicity, going back three generations (US Department of State 2010). The general situation of the ethnic minorities has not changed substantially under Berdimuhammedov (Nazarov 2008; Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights 2008). For example, the Kazakhs, faced with the alternative ‘emigrate or become Turkmen’, have been leaving in large numbers, thanks to a programme of repatriation by the Republic of Kazakhstan (Vilmer 2009: 102). In the 1990s, Uzbeks (after the exodus of the Russians, the largest minority in Turkmenistan) living along the border of Uzbekistan used to get their school books from that country, while Turkmens in Uzbekistan used to get theirs from Turkmenistan, but this has come to an end. The exchange was based on a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two states, signed in 1996, which covered culture and education. Although the two new alphabets differ in some letters, the transition to Latin script may have helped

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with the temporary exchange of textbooks. A similar arrangement existed between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for some years but does not seem to have been very successful (Ochs 1997: 336–8). The chance of obtaining a mother tongue education fell even further in the minority schools as the enrolment in them was curtailed in 2000. By 2002 all such schools appear to have been closed (Horák and Šír 2009: 70). The relations between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan had become even more strained than before the assassination attempt on Niyazov in November 2002 – but in recent years relations improved. A 1993 agreement granted Russians residing in Turkmenistan dual citizenship (Russian and Turkmen), although later there were many complaints that pressure had been exerted to make people renounce one of the two citizenships (Anurova-Shabunts 2009). This was followed by a 1995 Treaty of Cooperation, which formalized the special status of those who were also permitted to send their children to study in the Russian Federation. Nonetheless, Russians tend to worry about Turkmenization (Ishaniyazov 2002) and about losing their formerly privileged status (Petrov 2002; Smirnov 2002; Amelina 2003). This is partly because of their reluctance to learn Turkmen. Characteristically, their bulletins and reporting continue to call the new state ‘Turkmeniya’, as in Soviet times, and not ‘Turkmenistan’. They express their displeasure at the receding status of Russian, a language that is used and studied less and less (Razumov 2002; Shakuri 2002; Khaydarov 2003), with English slowly catching up. Concrete instances are the state radio discontinuation of broadcasts in Russian in October 1999 and the shrinking number of Russianmedium schools – only 55 in the entire state in the 1998–99 school year (Kuru 2002: 74, 81; Abdurasulov 2007c; accurate information for later years is not readily available). Other Russians have been anxious about their own future prospects in the country, especially after the Russian Federation agreed to the cancellation of the dual citizenship agreement in exchange for a strategic treaty providing gas to Russia in 2001. Some 10,000 Russians were cut off from Russia. In the course of two months, they had to decide whether to take Turkmen or Russian citizenship, knowing that if they opted for the latter they would be

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vulnerable to harassment and the loss of jobs, apartments, and social services (Pisarev 2009). Although Niyazov’s successor as president, Berdimuhammedov, initiated reforms in the educational sector, this did not affect the minority issue. As of 2007, schooling in the indigenous minority languages had not been resumed, and there were no schools with Uzbek, Kazakh or Baluchi as language of instruction for primary or secondary education (Aman 2007). Information provided by Horák and Šír (2009: 70) and confirmed by the 2010 Freedom House Report on Turkmenistan, shows that the situation remains unchanged: ‘There are no Uzbek- or Kazakh-language schools in the country’ (Bohr 2010: 545). Regardless of ethnicity, pupils and students as well as female teachers have to wear traditional Turkmen dress in all educational facilities and at all official functions. The politics of Turkmenization is continuing.

Language in education The process of Turkmenization took place in almost all schools (Laruelle and Peyrouse n.d.: 123). An exception was the Turkmen-Russian school established in Ashgabat on the initiative of Presidents Niyazov and Putin. During the rule of President Niyazov, the educational system underwent dramatic changes. In 2000, the overall number of teachers was reduced, leading to much larger classes, and in 2002, the president decreed that schools ought to comprise only nine grades (instead of eleven) and that the universities should offer instruction for a shorter number of years (Vinogradov 2008). However, he displayed considerable interest in the study of languages, from kindergarten to university level. Although on various occasions the head of state underlined the importance of a triadic approach in language learning – Turkmen, Russian and English (Demidov 2002: 72) – the government’s emphasis on the study of Turkmen throughout the educational system has meant a remarkably low maintenance of Russian, apparently the lowest in the former Soviet Union’s 15 republics. Although Niyazov prided himself on introducing the study of English, various reports attest to shortcomings, due to the emigration of many competent teachers, and to Niyazov’s 2003 decree invalidating all academic degrees

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earned abroad. Altogether, progress in education is still hampered by a shortage of qualified teachers and modern textbooks (The Economist, 28 June–4 July 2008: 66). The number of Russian-medium schools was halved between 1995 and 2009 (Conant 2002; Medvedev 2007: 29), although there is considerable demand for them since they are considered superior to Turkmen-medium ones. According to a report published in 2003 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the Russian language worldwide, the existence of Russian-medium schools in Turkmenistan has been curtailed to the extent that instruction in Russian is no longer accessible to the majority of Russian families. By 2009 only one Russian school, the Pushkin school in Ashgabat, remained (Baykova and Ivzhenko 2004; Lewis 2008; Vilmer 2009: 93). Official data give various figures, but as explained earlier their reliability is questionable. Other data confirm unofficial reports that the study of foreign languages has been discontinued in many schools (Tracz 2004), a part of Niyazov’s intentional lowering of standards in the entire educational system. The situation has changed somewhat since Berdimuhammedov’s accession to the presidency, as he seems intent on raising educational standards in general. Berdimuhammedov proclaimed an ‘Era of New Renaissance’ and has been introducing some changes, both symbolic and practical. Innovations were introduced in public education as well. According to various reports, on his accession the new president found a serious decline in education. Many children in the rural areas did not go to school at all and few of those who did could read and write properly in any language. Niyazov’s Ruhnama was removed almost totally from the curriculum in the 2008–09 school year, although some extracts still appear in older textbooks, most of which have not yet been rewritten (Berdyyeva 2008). It appears that the Ruhnama is still taught ‘to instil patriotism’ and cannot as yet be criticized. Gradually, however, Berdimuhammedov’s own works are being introduced into schools (Vilmer 2009: 183). School education has been upgraded from nine to ten years and university education from two to five, with a sizeable increase in the number of pupils, from kindergarten to university, slated for September

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2007 (News Central Asia, 15 July 2007). Nevertheless, quotas exist and in 2009 only 4 per cent of secondary school graduates were allowed to go on to higher education (Vilmer 2009: 186). The triad of languages has been upgraded in education and in officialdom, although in differing ratios. The ambitious goal remains that on graduation from school, students will know Turkmen, Russian and English quite well. This is achieved only in some of the better schools in Ashgabat. The new president aims to introduce the compulsory study of Russian in all schools and colleges, whatever their character (Kurtov 2007). He has issued a decree to this effect, which will however take some time to carry out. In the meantime, several Russian-medium schools have re-opened and are in high demand (Horák and Šír 2009: 76). Another innovation has been the setting up of a language centre in Ashgabat in 2008 (TDH, State News Agency of Turkmenistan 2008). Another important player competing for political, economic and cultural influence is Turkey, some of whose citizens have strong economic ties with the Turkmens. Niyazov welcomed help from Turkey, perhaps as a counterweight to Russian involvement, and said of Turkey: ‘We are one nation, two states’ (Mamedov 2005: 56). Turkish and Turkmen are fairly closely related, as are their two Latin alphabets. As early as 1993, Turkey supplied Turkmenistan with a large number of Latinized-script books for secondary schools (Mamedov 2005: 57). Turkish primary schools were reportedly the only foreign ones allowed to function in Turkmenistan. There were 14 of these in 2004, and they enjoyed a good reputation (Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights 2004: 3). The Turkish government has opened a language centre and a secondary school in Ashgabat. Established in the mid-1990s, this Turkmen-Turkish school was named after Turkey’s then president, Turgut Özal. The school accepted some non-Turkmen pupils, too, serving as a model for similar schools in Ashgabat and other towns of Central Asia (Demidov 2002: 73–4). In 1997, 2,226 Turkmen students received scholarships to study at Turkish universities, but the number shrank to 822 in 2002 (Yanık 2004: 296) and just 563 in 2007. In addition, the Bashkent Education Corporation, led by Fethullah Gülen, coordinates the Gülen movement’s schools in Turkmenistan.

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The curriculum follows the one employed in Turkey; studying is compulsory in Turkish, English (the two main languages of instruction), Turkmen and Russian. In the 1998–99 school year, 242 teachers taught 3,328 students in these private schools. In the 2002–03 school year, there were 13 schools with 3,294 pupils and 353 teachers from Turkey. The numbers hardly changed, reportedly, in the 2007–08 school year (Zentralasien-Analysen 19–20, 28 August 2009: 20, based on Balçı’s research). The movement also runs an International Turkmen-Turkish University. One explanation for this institution’s success is that President Niyazov’s Minister of Education was reportedly a member of Gülen’s organization (Balçı 2003: 156–7). However, it appears that even this movement’s educational activities were somewhat curtailed by Niyazov (Park 2008), who ordered the schools to charge tuition fees, thus making them accessible only to very few pupils from wealthy families (Horák and Šír 2009: 70). Turkey’s impact is felt also in the general cultural domain. According to a recent lecture by a Turkmen writer and poet, Orazdurdi Yagmurov (2009), Turkish influence in Turkmenistan has increased in many domains since its independence. These include the adoption of styles of interior decoration, preparation of food, fashions in clothing, but above all cultural communication, often expressed in translations from Turkish into Turkmen.

Languages at the universities During his presidency Niyazov imposed harsh rules on the universities. He closed down some institutions and considerably reduced the overall number of students in higher education by telescoping the average university course from five years to two. The total number of institutions of higher education, however, grew from 10 to 15 by 2002 (Demidov 2002: 83ff.), reaching 18 by 2009 (Vilmer 2009: 186–7). Public institutions having university status insist on students’ proficiency in Turkmen when registering at these institutions. Admission is controlled by a Central Admission Committee, and examination is mostly by oral interview. Since 2000, interviewees have also been expected to know a foreign language, usually English, and are tested

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for proficiency in comprehension, grammar and speech. Increasingly, university courses have been taught in Turkmen (Balaeva-Sawyer 2000: 19–20; Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rossiyskoi Federatsii 2003). As of 2010, higher education establishments are to have only Turkmen as language of instruction (Bohr 2010: 545). On 2 September 2007 Berdimuhammedov announced his intention to expand the universities. Starting with the 2007–08 academic year, the number of students enrolled was increased, years of study were added to degrees, postgraduate and doctoral degrees were introduced, and a decision was made to recognize foreign academic degrees. Another innovation is that a number of scholarships is granted for study abroad (Kirchanov 2010: 62). The result is that many students are now applying to study abroad, chiefly in the Russian Federation and in the United States, whose embassy has been sponsoring a number of two-year study grants since 2008. Nevertheless, the government of Turkmenistan still seems to have certain reservations about allowing its citizens to study abroad. Selection interviews are conducted entirely in Turkmen, which means that candidates from minority ethnies are effectively ruled out (Horák and Šír 2009: 79). Further, in 2009 the government banned students from attending the American University of Central Asia, located in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and the American University in Bulgaria (Zentralasien-Analysen 21, 30 September 2009: 36; 22, 30 October 2009: 19). In some universities, such as the S. Seidi Turkmen State Pedagogical Institute, a department of English language and literature has been set up, while the Azadi Institute of World Languages has introduced a course in Japanese (with ten students registering for the 2007–08 year). Chinese courses have been introduced as well. In June 2008, a faculty of foreign languages and literature was inaugurated at the Magtymguly Turkmen State University in Ashgabat. The faculty of foreign languages offers courses in English, German, French, Turkish, Arabic, Persian and Japanese, with some emphasis on preparing interpreters and translators (Vinogradov 2008). The study of English at Turkmen schools and universities is frequently underproductive. An alternative is offered by small private teaching organizations all over the country, which offer supplementary

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study, usually at US$50 for a ten-week course (International Crisis Group 2007: 8). A language centre, sponsored in part by the British Embassy and well supplied with technological equipment, was set up in June 2008 to improve the English proficiency of students, chiefly those wishing to study abroad. It was intended mostly for specialists in scholarly research institutes and higher education establishments as well as for postgraduate and doctoral degree students. The embassy’s assistance consisted mainly of equipping the library and teaching departments with the aim of improving the English language skills of Turkmen specialists in compliance with international standards. The British Embassy in Turkmenistan also provided financial help and materials suitable for English teaching of young people in the city of Balkanabat. It helped to set up a Community Information and Resource Centre, equipping it with computers, television desks and language resources, including a library of works in English. The programmes include after-school activities, a typing class and English lessons, with seminars involving teachers of English. Only a few foreign universities are permitted to function in Turkmenistan. As mentioned above, in August 1994 the Gülen organization opened its International Turkmen-Turkish University in Ashgabat, the first with an internet connection and a language and computer centre. Turkmen, Turkish and English are the media of instruction; some courses in Russian are also offered (Demir et al. 2000: 144ff.; Kuru 2002: 83–4; Clement 2007a). The I.M. Gubkin Oil and Gas University, affiliated to the I.M. Gubkin Russian State University of Oil and Gas in Moscow, was inaugurated in Ashgabat, in September 2008, following a special decree issued by Berdimuhammedov (Golovkin 2008; News Central Asia 2008). On 30 January 2009 Berdimuhammedov elaborated on his intention to set up a Turkmen-German university (Zentralasien-Analysen 14, 27 February 2009: 20). He has also come to an understanding with the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) to appoint a German lecturer to teach German at the medical school in Ashgabat. The new president has strived, as he puts it, ‘to improve the efficiency of scientific research and technological development aimed at addressing issues of society and state’. To promote this, on 12 June

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2009 he raised the status and increased the state budget and the functions of the Academy of Sciences, dissolved by his predecessor and re-opened by his order in 2007, transferring to its supervision various institutions of research, including the Institute of Languages and Literatures (Zentralasien-Analysen 15, 23 March 2009: 22; communication by a researcher from Turkmenistan, Berlin, 10 August 2009).

The media Since the government monopolizes the media, the policy of Turkmenization has been propagated by the entire state machine (Horák 2005: 312). Thanks to the encouragement of language education in Turkmen and to official pressure in favour of Latinization, more books and articles in Turkmen are appearing in the Latinized script. This has meant a corresponding decrease in the number of Russian works, as discussed above, not only as a result of Turkmenization but also of Slav emigration and the decline in Russian participation in public life since independence (Pavlenko 2008a: 73). Although on paper Turkmenistan’s laws protect freedom of expression and of the press, the media have been very closely supervised by the governments of both Niyazov and Berdimuhammedov. According to the Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders in 2009, Turkmenistan is at number 172 in a list of 175 states when measured in terms of freedom of the press. In practice, all media outlets are owned by the state and tightly controlled, as the only official media permitted in Turkmenistan are domestic ones. Under Berdimuhammedov as well as his predecessor Niyazov, certain subjects (political and social) have been considered taboo. The country’s ethnic minorities are not allowed any public media in their mother tongues, in line with the policy of reinforcing exclusive use of the titular culture and language. Most Russian public libraries were closed during Niyazov’s rule. The importing of Russian periodicals and books was forbidden and Russian bookshops were closed (Samsonov 2006: 67). Later, on 1 April 2010, libraries were however re-opened by the president. In 2010, about 40 newspapers and magazines are published. The country’s newspapers and many government publications, in

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Turkmen, Russian and English, have been compelled to follow the president’s agenda or else risk closure. One Russian daily remained, Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan (‘Neutral Turkmenistan’), published six times a week, and one arts periodical, Vozrozhdeniye (‘Renaissance’) – both under government control. Otherwise, newspapers and magazines appear in Turkmen only, except for the above-mentioned Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, the Turkmen/Russian Habarlar (‘News’), the Turkmen/Turkish weekly Zaman Türkmenistan, and the Turkmenistan News Weekly, published in Russian, English and Turkmen (Kuru 2002: 81–3; Kiepenheur-Drechsler 2006: 131–3). The Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Turkmenistan started publication of their organ, published in Turkmen/Russian, entitled Rysgal (‘Prosperity’) on 18 September 2010 (Zentralasien-Analysen 34, 29 October 2010: 28). Common to all of them was the unconditional praise of the president (Demidov 2002: 173–9). All information is distributed by one press agency, controlled by the president’s office or state organs such as the Türkmen Döwlet Habarlary. The state also has the monopoly of printing presses. Individuals are not allowed to subscribe to foreign newspapers or periodicals, and all public institutions have to subscribe to the Turkmen press (Vilmer 2009: 16–38). Turkmen radio and television (Abazov 2007: 173–9) are exclusively state-owned and state-controlled. There are no private or commercial radio or television stations. Certain foreign radio broadcasts may be received, however, with limitations. Since October 1999, the state radio has discontinued its Russian news broadcasts. Russian radio stations were jammed in 2004, but can now be accessed. Their programmes and the Turkmen service from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Prague are practically the only ones offering the Turkmens a wider view of world affairs (Kuru 2002: 74–6; Horák and Šír 2009: 88). The five channels of Turkmenistan’s national television, broadcasting 16 to 17 hours a day, are virtually identical. Programmes from Russian television stations are censored before being rebroadcast. Satellite television is available for the few who can afford it, chiefly in urban environments; the numerous satellite dishes in both urban and rural areas indicate that its popularity is very high. Both radio and

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television largely ignore the country’s ethnic minorities and their languages (except for the Russians). Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Koreans, Baluchis and others are rarely mentioned (OSCE 2002: 91–7; Bukhari-zade 2007; BBC Country Profile: Turkmenistan 2008; IREX 2008: 256–61). Access to internet services is provided solely by Turkmentelekom, the government’s only company in this field of the media. The services are regulated and censored by the Ministry of Communications. Originally, only carefully screened officials of government agencies were permitted to use the internet, mainly in urban areas. Consequently, in 2002 UNESCO estimated that there were just 0.1 users per thousand people, or about 7,000 people in all (Tabyshalieva 2006: 45). By 2008 this figure had risen tenfold to between 65,000 and 70,000 users, according to official reports, and 75,000 in November 2009 (Shodon 2010). These figures do not include most of the rather small international community. During the presidential election campaign, Berdimuhammedov pledged to provide internet access to every citizen (International Crisis Group 2007: 5), a rather unrealistic promise. In 2007 he permitted the opening of the first internet café in Ashgabat (Bensmann 2007: 542) and dozens were opened since. These are supervised by government agents. The persistently low number of internet users reflects the fact that the government strictly controls access to free information from critical websites and does not wish its citizens to communicate with the outside world, by blocking, for instance, Facebook and YouTube. Moreover, the subscription fees for internet access are prohibitively high for many Turkmen (Horák and Šír 2009: 89–93). All things considered, Turkmenistan is still the most centralized and authoritarian of the six states discussed, although President Berdimuhammedov has taken some steps to ease this situation. However, the personality cult does not seem to have changed materially. The government has successfully imposed Turkmenization in the bureaucracy and education systems. It has narrowed Russian-language activities in education and the media, but has encouraged, since September 2007, displays like the celebration of Days of the Russian Language (Vinogradov 2008). Other minority languages have largely been neglected and their speakers put under considerable pressure to

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Turkmenize or leave the country. The Latinization of the alphabet has been achieved without any visible opposition and is now an established fact of life. On the other hand, 20 years of independence and Turkmenization have lowered the quality of education – a fact that does not bode well for Turkmenistan’s future.

CHAPTER 7 TAJIKISTAN

Basic data Tajikistan is a relatively small country of 143,100 square kilometres, of which 93 per cent is mountainous terrain. The population according to the 2000 census was 6,127,493 inhabitants (Rowland 2005: 204); it was estimated at 6,920,300 in 2005 and approximately 7,200,000 in 2008. The next general population census was held in September 2010. A large majority of the Tajiks are Sunni Muslims, while the inhabitants of the Autonomous Province of Mountainous Badakhshan are Shiites (Ismailis). The capital is Dushanbe, with an estimated 700,000 population in 2009 (Department of National Security Affairs 2009b). There are numerous ethnic groups (Alaolmolki 2001: 93), of which the most important are listed in Table 7.1. Due to the demise of the Soviet Union and the civil war in the 1990s, many non-Tajik ethnies have left the country, which accounts for the very low growth rate reported in the 2000 population census. These ethnies include the Kyrgyz and the Turkmens, who fled armed conflict to Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, respectively. The number of Uzbeks, too, has diminished considerably; some left the country for Uzbekistan and others may have registered in 2000 under ethnic groups not mentioned in the 1989 Soviet census, e.g., tribal ethnies such as Lak and Kungrat (Fumagalli 2007a: 567ff.). According to the Tajik journalist and media researcher Dubovitskaya (2009: 11),

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Table 7.1 Population of Tajikistan by ethnic group, 1989–2000 Total population

Tajiks Uzbeks Russians Kyrgyz Laks Turkmens Tatars Kungrats Arabs Ukrainians Koreans Germans Kazakhs Total

Per cent change

Per cent of total Per cent population urban

1989

2000

1989–2000

1989

3,172,420 1,197,841 388,481 63,832 – 20,487 72,228 – 276 41,375 13,431 32,671 11,376 5,092,603

4,898,382 936,703 68,171 65,515 51,001 20,270 18,939 15,102 14,450 3,787 1,686 1,136 936 6,127,493

54.4 –21.8 –82.5 2.6 – –1.1 –73.8 – 5,135.5 –90.8 –87.4 –96.5 –91.8 20.3

62.3 23.5 7.6 1.3 – 0.4 1.4 – 0.0 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.2 –

2000 79.9 15.3 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 –

2000 27.8 16.7 90.0 8.9 6.1 7.3 76.4 10.8 4.6 91.9 92.9 92.3 – 26.5

Source: 1989 Soviet census and the 2000 Tajikistan census (Rowland 2005: 208). The results of the 21–30 September 2010 census have not yet been published.

the number of Russians has declined further since 2000 to 64,500 in 2008. Tajikistan declared independence on 9 September 1991. As a primarily Persian state in Central Asia (the others are preponderantly Turkic), Tajikistan is close, culturally and linguistically, to Iran and Afghanistan, where Iranian languages prevail, as in the Samarkand and Bukhara areas of Uzbekistan. The Pamiri peoples of Tajikistan use languages which belong to the Eastern Iranian branch of languages. Islamic influence has been more of a challenge for Tajikistan and its government than for the other states discussed, particularly during a devastating five-year civil war, which broke out in May 1992 and came to an end in June 1997 with a peace agreement, and increasingly during the ‘War on Terrorism’ (Akiner 2003: 443–4). The civil war inaugurated a politics of chaos where nationalist, communist and Islamist militias fought one another – and are still bickering in a sort of uneasy co-existence in the government. The present government

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does not have full control of the country as can be seen in the attacks on government forces in the Rasht Valley during the second half of September 2010. Tajikistan is the poorest of the six states discussed and the population struggles daily with rising inflation. Its serious economic situation is reflected in the fact that, in mid-2008, 53 per cent of the people were poor, with a monthly income of less than US$40, while 17 per cent were very poor, earning even less, or nothing at all (State Committee of Statistics, quoted in Zentralasien-Analysen 7, 31 July 2008: 16). Half the population of working age has no job. It is estimated that between 600,000 and a million people migrated in 2008 to seek temporary employment abroad, chiefly in the Russian Federation, as manual labourers (International Crisis Group 2009: 9–13). The economic situation has worsened recently. During the world financial crisis in 2008–09, Tajik guest labourers in the Russian Federation sent home approximately 30 per cent less money to their families (Heuer 2010: 3). Emomali Rahmonov has been president since independence. He was elected on 24 November 1991, and re-elected 6 November 1994, 6 November 1999 and again on 6 November 2006. In March 2007 he changed his family name to Rahmon. The president’s main interests were to foster secularism and stem the tide of rising Islamism, but also to retain power for himself and his family clan, his rule becoming increasingly authoritarian. His book (Rahmonov 1997) Tadzhikistan na poroge budushchego (‘Tajikistan on the Threshold of the Future’) does not touch on language issues and says nothing about the complicated minority problem, which is significant in itself. As in the case of other post-Soviet states, the intellectual elites of Tajikistan started to re-think and reconstruct national identity in terms of history and language by attempting to shape an unbroken link with the past – glorifying the Samanid empire of the tenth and eleventh centuries – and by establishing Tajik as the state language, while declaring their intention to preserve the rights of the non-Tajik minorities. Tajikistan is frequently praised as the ‘proto-motherland of the Indo-European languages’, allegedly superior to the Turkic ones surrounding it (cited in Laruelle 2007: 60–1). Nonetheless, because of the civil war and the bitter ideological cleavage within the population,

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Tajikistan’s rulers have found it difficult to shape its new national identity (Akbarzadeh 1996: 1105ff.; Bergne 2005). There is sharp competition in Tajikistan between Iran and the Russian Federation for cultural and linguistic influence. The former state seems to be gaining the upper hand, as its impact is greater on the national identity of the Tajik population, whatever the denominational Sunni–Shiite divide. The main reason seems to be the great affinity between Tajik and Persian (Atkin 1994: 127ff.); some scholars consider it to be the same language.

Legislation One of the primary tools of nation-building is the Law on Language of 22 July 1989, which established ‘Tajik (Farsi)’ as the official language. This law was the result of pressure from intellectuals and the politicized masses as well as the anti-communist, democratic opposition. In the spirit of rediscovery of the past, intellectuals wished to emphasize their close connection with the Persian cultural heritage. One sign of this was that the lawmakers included possibilities for teaching the Arab script: ‘The Tajik SSR had created the necessary conditions for learning the Tajik script, based on the Arab script, and publication of literature in this script’ (Art. 27). The law was considered discriminatory by non-Tajik speakers in Dushanbe, despite the guarantee that national minorities would have the right to communicate in their own language and their children would receive an education in their mother tongue. This was meant to ensure that the ethnic minorities would not be completely left out of the nationbuilding process; the largest minorities, Russians and Uzbeks, were promised that all state documents would be issued in their languages as well (Wennberg 2002: 404–5; Hickson 2003: 365–7). The Law on Language came into effect in its entirety on 1 January 1990, when implementation began (Schlyter 2001: 131). In later years, some Tajik intellectuals claimed that this language law had saved Tajik from extinction and ensured a renaissance, laying the basis for further grammatical, lexical and orthographic development (Shokirov et al. 2003).

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While the 1989 Law on Language had spelled out that ‘Tajik (Farsi)’ should be the state language, the amended version of 1992 called the language ‘Farsi (Tajik)’. This version left Russian and Uzbek as languages of interethnic communication but eliminated their use in official business. The first draft of the 1992 constitution specified that education should be conducted in Tajik, Russian and Uzbek but that, by 1994, all government business should be in Tajik alone (Fouse 2000: 319; Abdullaev and Akbarzadeh 2002: 235–58). On 20 July 1994, parliament rejected a motion to make Russian an official language. The post-Soviet constitution, adopted finally on 6 November 1994, emphasized everybody’s right to take part in general cultural life and to get an education in their own language, but specified that Tajik was the state language while Russian was the language of interethnic communication. Both the 22 July 1989 Law on Language and the 6 November 1994 constitution were published in Tajik, Russian and Uzbek (Konstitutsiyai (sarqonuni) Jumhurii Tojikiston 1995; Dodikhudoeva 2004: 283). This practice was followed for several years in the case of official documents. The resolution ‘On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan on Development of the State Language and of Other Languages in the Territory of the Republic of Tajikistan’ was passed on 21 October 1997. The Programme critically analyzed all legislation concerning language drawn up during the years 1989–97. The first part outlined measures for a fuller development of Tajik, such as organizing courses and introducing the language into business, executive and judicial documentation. The second part gave directives ensuring a harmonious development of all other languages, including the provision of courses in educational institutions, and languages to be used in television and radio broadcasts. In 2004, plans for implementing the Law on Language were developed more thoroughly but, again, were not very effective. Occupied with pressing economic matters, the government devoted only limited attention to the dissemination and development of the Tajik language and to language issues in general. The president’s decree of 26 July 2007, declaring 2008 ‘The Year of the Tajik Language’, does not

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seem to have had much impact, either. However, President Rahmon returned to the issue in a speech before circles of the intelligentsia, delivered on 20 March 2009, on the eve of the feast of Navruz (New Year). Here he emphasized the importance of cultural values and, most particularly, that of language as reflecting the identity of the nation and strengthening national authenticity. He called for the development of the state language into a modern scientific instrument. With all this in view, a working group was set up to prepare the draft of a new law on language. President Rahmon spoke once again about the proposed new Law on Language before parliament, on 15 April 2009 and then on television on 21 July the same year (Rahmon 2009a), when he declared emotionally that ‘the destiny of the nation depends on the destiny of its language’. The chief aim of this speech was to announce that the proposed law would end the use of Russian as a language of interethnic communication in Tajikistan. The new law ‘On the State Language of the Republic of Tajikistan’ laid down the principle that only Tajik would be employed in all state documents and official correspondence (Kasybekov 2009), instead of its being used along with Russian. The main implication, however, was that a policy change was needed to bolster Tajik national identity (Parshin 2009). Gaffor Dzhurayev, Head of the Government Commission preparing the law, considered this essential (ASIA-Plus 2009). The law’s opponents maintained that it would be unfair to the country’s minorities. Government spokesmen replied that, in their private life, all minority members may continue to use their own languages. The debate about language policies and language use in practice continues among Tajikistan’s citizens (Kurbanova 2009). Despite the constitution guaranteeing to Russian the status of the language of interethnic communication, the new law was widely interpreted as abandoning this special status. This raised angry comments in the press of the Russian Federation, claiming that the Russian language was non grata in Tajikistan, or even that it had been outlawed (Rasov 2009; Shustov 2009; Zentralasien-Analysen 19–20, 28 August 2009: 47). Some commentators threatened economic reprisals, the main argument being that Tajikistan guest workers would find no

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employment in the Russian Federation unless they knew Russian well. The efforts of the Tajikistan Embassy in Moscow to defuse the issue had little effect (Parshin 2009). Finally, the draft law was passed in parliament, with no changes, and was signed by the president on 5 October 2009. It confirmed Tajik as the state language and the only language to be used officially in the courts of law, in administration, and in the economy (Zentralasien-Analysen 22, 30 October 2009: 18). Subsequently, on 21 July 2010, 5 October was proclaimed as ‘Day of the State Language’. During the first celebration, the president emphasized the importance of the state language and demanded that the language knowledge of the state officials be checked. He also confirmed that citizens had the right to choose freely their language of instruction and asserted the need of knowing several languages (ZentralasienAnalysen 34, 29 October 2010: 27).

Language Tajikization Since 2002 the process of introducing Tajik as a working language in state institutions has intensified, but at a slow pace. The number of officials fluent in Tajik is rather limited, while Russian has retained a hold in officialdom, higher education and the media, both printed and electronic, despite Slav emigration (Siddikzoda 2002). However, due to this emigration, the general use of Russian as well as the number of Russian-medium schools has declined in recent years (Baykova and Ivzhenko 2004). The number of people having a good knowledge of Russian among the general population remains limited (chiefly to Dushanbe and Khujand), although some people study the language in order to improve their chances of employment in the Russian Federation (Marat 2008: 28–9). In some Russian media, Tajik migrant workers have been characterized as speaking bad Russian; the accusation caused angry reactions in Tajikistan (International Crisis Group 2010: 12, and n. 125). Cultural Tajikization has been carried out slowly, including such public actions as the removal of Soviet statues and their replacement by monuments celebrating the history of the Tajik nation. Many place and street names were already Tajikisized in the 1990s (Olcott 2005:

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284). The process was accompanied by the de-Russification of Tajik family names, which included President Rahmonov himself dropping the -‘ov’ ending and becoming ‘Rahmon’. A law allowing people to change their surnames had been in existence since 1989, but few actually did this. Some even started to return to surnames with Russian endings (Sarkorova 2007), since Russian-sounding names were a concrete help to the numerous Tajiks seeking employment in the Russian Federation. Tajik ‘guest workers’ interviewed by International Crisis Group collaborators reported that some Russian migration authorities had put them under pressure to add or restore the -‘ov’ ending to their surnames (International Crisis Group 2010: 12). The number of Tajik ‘guest workers’ is estimated at about 40 per cent or more of Tajikistan’s working population (Arman 2007; Heuer 2010: 2). A special Russian-language textbook has been prepared for Tajikistan citizens employed in the Russian Federation (Dubinina 2007). In this context, it is interesting to note that the government, unhappy about the naming situation, decreed that newborn babies should be registered under a Tajik-sounding, rather than a Russian-sounding, first name (Ganieva 2007). A Commission for the Implementation of the Law on Language has periodically examined, among other matters, the coining of new technical terms (for instance, in the domains of health and agriculture). Many of the new terms were adapted from Persian and Dari (Dodikhudoeva 2004: 283). A more general Iranization of the Tajik vocabulary is also taking place (Roy 2000: 170–1). It appears that the government has been aware of the need for Tajik cultural and linguistic reform – including much-needed teacher training and new textbooks – but lacks the financial means to carry this out effectively (Hickson 2003: 375–9; Bahry 2005). A number of intellectuals have called repeatedly for the ‘revival’ of the Tajik language, emphasizing the need for developing terminology and preparing Tajik-Russian dictionaries (Mukhabbatsho 2004). Circles interested in closer cooperation with Iran, economically and culturally, have suggested the establishment of a Persian-Speaking Union between Tajikistan, Iran and Afghanistan. The foreign ministers of the three states met in Dushanbe on 24–25 March 2008 to

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discuss the project and consider cooperation on various levels, particularly the idea of jointly launching a Persian television network – not an easy undertaking (Medrea 2008: 15–16). It would appear rather difficult for them to agree on the ideological contents of such a Persian Central Asia television channel. Support for Tajikization in the domain of the Tajik language is also evident in the preparation and publication by the Committee on Terminology of the National Academy of Sciences of a large TajikTajik dictionary, in two volumes, each holding more than 87,000 entries in 950 pages. Edited by Professor Sayfiddin Nazarzoda, director of the Rudaki Institute of Language and Literature at the National Academy of Sciences, it is titled Farhangi tafsirii zaboni tajiki (‘Dictionary of the Tajik Language’) (Dushanbe 2008). It was printed in 1,000 copies. In his speech of 20 March 2009, President Rahmon informed his audience that he had instructed the Rudaki Institute to prepare a new scholarly dictionary to be published in six volumes within five years. He also said that he had asked the National Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Finance to start publication, in 2009, of a scholarly linguistic periodical (Rahmon 2009). A new English-Tajik dictionary came out early in May 2008. It was compiled by a well-known Tajik translator and linguist, Abdusalom Mamadnazarov, who teaches English at the Tajik National University and had already compiled an English-Tajik Dictionary for University Students, published in 2003. The new dictionary was prepared in the university’s English Department on the order of President Rahmon, as part of his project to improve familiarity with English and Russian in Tajikistan (Mannonov 2008). The fact that it was printed in only 2,000 copies may be due to the known inability of prospective users to acquire such an expensive work. The dictionary, consisting of 1,090 pages with more than 25,000 words and expressions, is the largest English-Tajik dictionary yet published. It is intended for teachers, students, and translators (The Times of Central Asia, 8 May 2008). One aim of the new dictionary was to improve the qualifications of teachers of English. A sign-language Tajik dictionary was also published in 2008 (Sharipova 2008).

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A sociolinguistic survey in Tajikistan, carried out in 2007 by Kh. Idiyev, deputy director of the Centre of Social and Political Research ‘Korshinos’, reached some interesting conclusions concerning the use of languages and the interest in different languages in Tajikistan. Among them are the following: studying Russian is quite popular, although the government encourages the use of Tajik in school; special courses have been organized among adults for learning Russian. Russian is frequently employed at work, but other languages are spoken at home. The young show a preference for English, the middle-aged for Russian, but many others prefer Tajik or even Arabic. Since employment opportunities have become available in the Arab states, the study of Arabic has increased (Idiyev 2008: 65–7).

The alphabet issue The issue of an alphabet suitable for Tajik has figured only moderately in public debate since 1992. The Cyrillic alphabet in the form used for Tajik in the Soviet Union since 1940 was adapted to Tajik phonetics. Some nationalists demanded a change to what they considered the more appropriate Persian (Arabic-based) script (Fouse 2000: 319). The issue is still being discussed. The main argument of supporters is that this would give readers access to the rich Persian literature; also, that Iran was helping with book donations and financial support. Opponents maintain that the Persian (Arabic-based) script is too difficult to master comfortably, and that the country’s economy could not afford a change of alphabet. Over the years, although Cyrillic continues to dominate in Tajikistan, there are signs that support for the Persian script is growing, perhaps as result of the encouragement of Islamic circles, which are more vocal in Tajikistan than in most other post-Soviet states, and in response to the inducements offered by Pakistan and even more by Iran. Iran is a powerful neighbour and Tajikistan’s leaders may be not so much pious as rather cautious not to alienate that state, which provides much needed material support. The Arabic alphabet is already being introduced in a fair number of schools as a means for studying Persian. Newspapers and television

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stations have been offering courses in Persian; some billboards and street signs have been removed and replaced with others in the Arabic script (Siddikzoda 2002; Dodikhudoeva 2004: 283). An article by Daler Ghufronov (2008) shows how topical the alphabet issue remains in public opinion. Nurmuhammad Amirshohi, too, a researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies and the Written Heritage at the National Academy of Sciences and author of the book Collapse or Revival, published in Tajik in 2007, sent a letter to the state president concerning the alphabet issue. Amirshohi maintained that the Cyrillic script cuts Tajikistan off from modern scientific-cultural developments, while the Arabic script would enable it to get all this information via the publications of the Persian-speaking world. He observed that without the Persian script, Tajikistan would not be able to enjoy complete independence and, moreover, would be cut off from its heritage. Even more recently, and on a more official level, on 1 May 2008 the Deputy Minister of Culture, Farkhad Rakhimov, announced that the government would support the use of the Persian alphabet by introducing books in Persian into primary schools as a test to make pupils familiar with this alphabet (PressTV 2008). A somewhat similar approach was suggested at about the same time by the abovementioned Professor Sayfiddin Nazarzoda. In an interview on 15 May 2008, he said he felt that Tajik should continue to use the Cyrillic script, but pupils at school should acquire some knowledge of the Persian one as well (Kayumzod 2008). President Rahmon is aware of the ongoing alphabet debate but has not given an unequivocal opinion. In a speech on 20 March 2009 he did declare, however, that ‘We should revive the studying of our forefathers’ alphabet ... Higher schools of the country should undertake efficient measures for the development of teaching the old characters of our ancestors’. At present, however, the Arabic-based Persian script has only a slim chance of being introduced officially into Tajikistan soon. There is a close relationship between the approach to the Persian of Iran, regarded by many Tajiks as a prestige language, and the wish to switch to the Persian script. This is just one aspect of the drive towards

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an Aryan ideology, propagated by the Tajikistan government (Laruelle 2007: 51ff.). This may partly be a reaction to what is perceived as a threat of Turkicization (or Uzbekization). An International Foundation for the Tajik-Persian Language, active since the days of perestroika, campaigns for returning to Persian culture and promoting the Persian script which, in its written form, unlike the Cyrillic, cancels out the differences of pronunciation between Persian and Tajik. Language affinity is a main factor and Tajik nationalists have been pushing for Tajik/Persian to supplant Russian. Some nationalists have condemned the Soviet Union for having imposed the Cyrillic alphabet on them, which they feel was intended to distance them from Persian culture. Iran promotes cultural relations with Tajikistan, sending books and magazines as well as Iranian films and television programmes. Mutual cultural visits have been arranged and Tajikistanis have gone to Iran for specialized training. An increasing number are studying the Persian alphabet in order to read Persian literature and magazines (interview with a representative of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) in Dushanbe, 13 May 2009).

Minorities and language The population of Tajikistan, as noted, is rather diverse. The Russian community appears to have adopted a somewhat defensive stand in cultural relations since the Russian Federation does not pursue a sustained cultural agenda in Tajikistan. As in some other post-Soviet republics, ethnic Russians here communicate easily with the Russophone Tajiks in the cities and towns, but less so in the rural areas, where the inhabitants are less fluent in Russian, but partly bilingual in Tajik-Uzbek. The ethnic Russians tend not to know the regional languages and, since 1991, have felt threatened in their careers by the official emphasis on mastering Tajik (Atkin 1997: 296). As elsewhere, urban Russian emigration has caused a decline in the overall number of Russians in Tajikistan (see Table 7.1), so that Russians now make up less than one per cent of the total population. Despite their diminishing numbers (or perhaps because of this), the ethnic Russians organized a two-day conference in Dushanbe in November 2005, titled ‘Russian Language

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and Literature in the States of Central Asia’ (Akhmedova 2005). Since 2007 they have also held ‘Days of Russian Language and Literature’. These included, in addition to folklore and theatre, scholarly lectures on Russian philology and on pedagogical methodology (Salimov and Guseynova 2009: 121–2). In addition, the Russian Federation has awarded study grants in Russia to the Tajiks – 80 in 2007–08 and 160 in 2008–09 (Zentralasien-Analysen 19–20, 28 August 2009: 46). The number of Tajikistan-born Russians may have been diminishing but their language has remained attractive in Tajikistan. A parallel example is that of the Association of the Koreans of Tajikistan, a cultural centre in Dushanbe, which has Russian as its official language. Due to the ‘national delimitation’ of the 1920s, when the borders of the new republics were drawn up, a sizeable Uzbek population lives in Tajikistan, mainly in the Tajik part of the Ferghana Valley (province of Sughd, formerly Leninobod) and in other western regions bordering on Uzbekistan. Mixed marriages between Tajiks and Uzbeks are not uncommon. The Pamiri peoples (in Soviet parlance, ‘Mountain Tajiks’) in the steep mountains of remote Western Badakhshan, are settled in villages which are difficult to reach. The Eastern Pamir is also home to small groups of formerly nomadic cattle-breeding Kyrgyz. The various languages of the Pamir subgroup of Eastern Iranian languages, which they speak, have no written tradition. Some of these are already extinct or only spoken by small groups. Use of these languages is limited to the domestic sphere today and they are under pressure from the Tajik language, used in administration and education (Dodikhudoeva 2004; Dodykhudoeva 2004; Bahry 2005, 2005a.). Thus, these languages are regarded as endangered. Recently, there has been renewed interest in them among Pamiris and among researchers (Dodykhudoeva 2007: 69–79). The 1993 Law on Language guaranteed free choice of language of instruction to every minority language group, in compact settlements speaking such languages, provided enough pupils were forthcoming. According to this law, the necessary conditions for securing the freedom of choice of language of instruction are to be worked out by the responsible authorities. In practice, this meant instruction in Tajik,

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Russian, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, or Turkmen and also elementary instruction in the Pamiri languages, which was still very fragmentary when Bozrikova (2003) researched minority relations in Tajikistan. Instruction in the minority languages has not been very successful, for instance in the Sughd province, particularly in Uzbek-medium schools, at least partly due to tensions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Jonson 2006: 170–1). Uzbeks in Tajikistan number about one million – according to official data – forming the largest minority ethnie in the state. Their political leaders argue that the Uzbeks are being marginalized in education and other areas of life within a Tajik identity construct that perceives them as aliens (Laruelle 2007: 65). As in all schools in Tajikistan, there is a lack of textbooks, aggravated by the fact that new textbooks are not imported from Uzbekistan and would be useless anyway, since they are printed in Latin script and contain the official ideology of the republic of Uzbekistan. Schools outside the larger towns have serious problems with instruction in minority languages. For example, recent research has demonstrated that a special situation of language education exists in the Autonomous Province of Mountainous Badakhshan (Bozrikova 2003; Dodikhudoeva 2004: 281–8; Bahry 2005a: 46ff.) and in the entire Pamir region. In an area of considerable language diversity, the local minority languages are not taught at all, except in pre-school to some extent. The schools take a submersion approach to language instruction, with all instruction in Tajik. Tajik thus becomes the first language, along with the mother tongue, of all schoolgoers,

Table 7.2 Minority language classes in Tajik-medium secondary schools, 1999–2003 Language

1999–2000

2000–01

Uzbek Russian Kyrgyz Turkmen

17,543 1,240 810 153

18,047 1,282 913 156

Source: Official data, summed up in Nagzibekova 2008: 504.

2001–02

2002–03

18,609 1,424 902 155

18,897 1,478 899 137

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while knowledge of Russian is declining in the younger generation (Dubovitskaya 2009) and becomes the third language; sometimes English assumes this place.

Language in education The disruption of education in Tajikistan, due to the civil war, is evident throughout the country. The severely reduced capacity of the central government compelled it to limit its expenditure on education: it amounted to 8.9 per cent of the GDP in 1991, but only 2.4 per cent in 1995, 2.5 per cent in 1997, 2.3 per cent in 1998 and 2.07 per cent in 1999 (Huttova et al. 2002, Annex 1, Table 19; Waljee 2008: 90). The long-term effect of the armed conflict is still noticeable, as school enrolment in Tajikistan is even today lower than before the civil war. As there has been, also, a re-traditionalization of parts of Tajik society, girls suffer especially from these developments. Only 70 per cent of the girls have completed their basic education. In many schools, the absence or poor quality of textbooks is significant and has hampered the study of all subjects. Also, many unemployed parents are forced to send their children to work due to dire poverty. Teachers’ salaries remain quite inadequate (Bahry 2005a; personal enquiries). Many teachers have left the profession to provide for their families. To this day, many graduates take up other, better-paid jobs. About half of the teachers that graduate each year do not go into the teaching profession. They are especially reluctant to work in rural areas, which consequently lack mathematics, science and also foreign language teachers (Briller 2007: 7). The president increased teachers’ salaries by 15 to 30 per cent on 20 June 2009 and later proclaimed 2010 as ‘the Year of Education’, but it remains to be seen whether these steps will improve the education system much (Zentralasien-Analysen 19–20, 28 August 2009: 46–7; 21, 20 September 2009: 35). Article 41 of the 1994 Constitution stated the universal right to education and, like in the former Soviet Union, basic education is compulsory. The 27 December 1993 Law on Education (last amended in May 2004) specified that, in general, Tajik was the language of education.

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It prescribed the teaching of the state language also to pupils with other languages of instruction from grade one to eleven, applying to all Russian-medium schools and those of other ethnies. As of 2007, teaching in the general schools was conducted in six languages: of the total numbers of pupils 73.6 per cent were instructed in Tajik, 23.1 per cent in Uzbek, 2.1 per cent in Russian, 0.9 per cent in Kyrgyz, 0.25 in Turkmen and 0.03 per cent in English (Briller 2007: 4). An important measure to promote the acquisition of foreign languages was a decree issued by the president in December 2003, titled ‘The State Programme on the Improvement of the Teaching and Learning of the Russian and English Languages’ (Gosudarstvennaya programma 2003), to be implemented over the next ten years. The political, military and economic competition between the Russian Federation and the United States has apparently had little effect on the relative status of the two languages in Tajikistan. The emphasis, however, remains on Russian rather than on English. The decree insisted on the training of adequate teachers and appropriate instruction materials (Nagzibekova 2008: 506). The idea was to introduce the teaching of Russian in grades 2–11 of Tajik-medium and Uzbek-medium schools. The formal opening of a Russian military base (considerably reduced in size since) in Dushanbe in October 2004 temporarily boosted efforts to encourage instruction in Russian. In 2005, the Ministry of Public Education of the Republic of Tajikistan published the ‘National Strategy for Education Development (2006–15)’. This strategy was drafted with the purpose of reforming and modernizing the education system in light of worldwide UN programmes such as ‘Education for All’ and the Millennium Development Goals, with the support of international donors. ‘The need for formulating the National Strategy was determined by the rapid changes taking place in the social and economic sphere of Tajikistan, and the strong political commitment of building and strengthening the sovereignty and independence of Tajikistan’ (Ministry of Education of the Republic of Tajikistan 2005: 2). To improve the quality of the educational services plans were drawn up to publish new textbooks, teaching manuals and new methodologies. According to the educational reform specialist Briller (2007: 12), Tajikistan has not yet developed

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its own methodological and teaching philosophy, with the exception of Tajik Language and Literature courses. In the opinion of foreign experts curricula are still overloaded. Lack of textbooks remains a severe problem, especially in the Tajik, Russian, Uzbek and Turkmen languages (Briller 2007: 10–12). At a symposium held in Dushanbe in March 2009, called ‘Days of Russian Language and Literature’, the Minister of Education declared that interest in Russian had increased and that the study of Russian would be further encouraged. The traditional ‘Days of Russian Language and Literature’ remain a feature of both Russian and official cultural events. This was yet another indication of the widespread desire in Tajikistan to study Russian; the strongest in all six states at no less than 96 per cent of those surveyed. Due to the shortage of competent teachers, the Ministry of Education’s plans to promote both Russian and English in the schools have not been fulfilled. The Minister’s hopes were dashed by Rahmon’s above-mentioned speech of 15 April 2009, which recommended changes in cultural orientation and policies. Parents complain that, in practice, only two to three hours of study per week are devoted to the Russian language in Tajik-medium secondary schools, chiefly because of the shortage of teachers of Russian. Russian teachers are considered to be better trained and they use, at least partly, textbooks printed in the Russian Federation. Russianmedium schools are thought to be better than other schools and are mainly situated in the cities of Dushanbe and Khujand. There are Russian-medium secondary schools in Dushanbe, whose graduates are automatically admitted to universities in the Russian Federation (Dubovitskaya 2009). Russian lessons are popular among pupils as well as their parents, who believe they will widen the opportunities available to their children. According to a report published in 2003 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the Russian language worldwide, Russian-medium schools and institutions of higher education in Tajikistan have often had four applicants for every student place (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rossiyskoi Federatsii 2003). In theory, Russian-medium pupils could also learn English, French, German, or Italian (Huttova et al. 2002), but this has rarely been achieved, again due to the shortage of teachers.

191

119,193 138,149 132,981 118,301 122,371 125,075 123,390 113,297 107,883 59,594 44,308 1,207,464

9

6,008 6,625 6,447 5,917 5,597 5,682 5,594 5,227 4,956 2,911 2,355 57,548

First forms in preschool institutions Grade I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI All

2,731

All

57,038 66,181 62,855 56,228 57,780 58,461 55,937 51,458 48,026 22,238 16,115 553,822

79

1,426

Girls

Number of Pupils

220

Number of classes

Tajik

Kindergarten

Classes

170 179 167 132 129 132 132 123 130 106 95 1,499

1

3

Number of classes

4,383 4,773 3,965 3,267 3,023 3,088 3,001 2,795 2,800 2,125 1,618 35,014

11

165

All

1,727 1,974 1,609 1,333 1,236 1,116 1,317 1,212 1,165 899 744 14,370

4

34

Girls

Number of Pupils

Russian

1,962 2,031 2,040 1,949 1,798 1,819 1,800 1,752 1,663 988 739 18,551

2

8

Number of classes

Table 7.3 Pupils and classes in Tajikistan’s schools by language of instruction, 2003–04

35,417 40,610 40,038 37,896 38,300 38,722 39,585 37,690 35,707 20,000 13,597 377,755

42

151

All

17,568 20,353 19,982 18,868 18,959 19,098 19,205 18,360 17,548 9,396 6,393 185,831

10

91

Girls

Number of Pupils

Uzbek

91 97 95 92 80 79 81 77 79 57 48 876

Number of classes

(continued)

1,399 1,566 1,443 1,458 1,403 1,488 1,417 1,302 1,348 961 602 14,387

All

665 758 744 746 612 702 665 661 626 508 335 7,022

Girls

Number of Pupils

Kyrgyz

Source: ‘Pulse’ Educational Reform Support Unit 2004.

First forms in Preschool institutions Grade I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI All

Kindergarten

Classes

Table 7.3

2 2 2 1 2 2 4 4 3 3 2 29

Number of classes

54 52 48 8 48 42 96 67 64 57 26 562

All

23 31 24 3 25 20 28 17 14 14 8 307

Girls

Number of Pupils

English

18 19 17 20 16 13 3 15 15 15 12 163

Number of classes

336 353 364 361 316 248 41 310 293 258 256 3,136

All

121 177 186 179 165 128 19 144 152 142 131 1,544

Girls

Number of Pupils

Turkmen

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By contrast, instruction in and of the languages of indigenous ethnic minorities – such as the Pamiri peoples, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Turkmens and others – is often inadequate. According to plans drawn up in 2009, the Open Society Institute in Dushanbe will provide comprehensive schooling for Pamiri children. The study of foreign languages at school is generally subsidized by foreign institutions, including embassies, cultural centres and NGOs, by donations of books and grants, language instruction and the organizing of conferences. Such activities are carried out by the DAAD, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Open Society Institute. The last-mentioned offers in its education advising centre tests of English as a foreign language, and English teacher training for secondary and higher education. It also develops textbooks and English programmes. Although Tajikistan is not a Turkic country, the Turkish Ministry of National Education financed a Turkish Language Training Centre, which had 97 students in the 2001–02 school year. Fethullah Gülen’s moderate Islamic organization had five Turkish-medium schools with 107 teachers and 694 students in 1997 (Balçı 2003: 156; Yanık 2004: 298–9). The numbers had hardly changed by the 2007–08 school year (Zentralasien-Analysen 19–20, 28 August 2009: 20, based on Balçı’s research). The authorities are somewhat uneasy about the possible spread of pan-Turkic ideas and the promotion of Turkic influence in the country, just as they worry about the spread of Islamic education via religious centres. All in all, education and language instruction remain problematic in a country with such limited means as Tajikistan, where schooling is almost non-existent in certain remote mountain villages, as reported in some detail by Rasul-zade (2009).

Languages at the universities In the academic year 2007–08 institutions of higher learning and universities numbered more than 30 (Department of National Security Affairs 2009b), which are in Dushanbe, Khujand, Khorog, Kulob and Qurghonteppa. Most of them, even those specializing in medicine,

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technology, agriculture, law or business, have a department of Tajik philology and foreign languages. For instance, the S. Aini Tajik State Pedagogical University in Dushanbe offers in its School of Philology Tajik and Uzbek linguistics. It also has a School of Russian Language and Literature and a school of foreign languages, where teachers of English, French and German are trained. The most important Russian-medium institute of higher education is undoubtedly the Russian-Tajik (Slavonic) University in Dushanbe. Its establishment was decided in 1993, in the 22nd article of a Friendship Treaty between Tajikistan and the Russian Federation. It opened in 1996 to both Russian and Tajik citizens. According to a 2003 interview with the rector, Abduzhabor Satorov (Medvedev 2003), the main plan was to offer higher education, mainly in Russian, but also in Tajik or Uzbek, according to standards set by the Russian Federation. The Faculty of Philology had sections for foreign languages – English, French and German – and was planning at the time to set up a Chinese section as well. It was the only university in Tajikistan with a Faculty of Journalism and with a Russian cultural centre. The latter was inaugurated on 18 September 2008 by the Russian cultural foundation called Russkii Mir (‘Russian World’). The director of this foundation explained at the opening ceremony that this would be an institution aiming at the preservation of Russian culture and language, similar to those in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and some other countries (Davlat 2008). The Centre has supplied numerous textbooks for studying Russian language and literature, and maintains a large library of Russian literature. Separately, since 2007, the government of the Russian Federation has provided many grants to students to learn Russian and study in the Russian Federation (Dubovitskii 2007). President Rahmon has announced plans for setting up a branch of the Lomonosov Moscow State University in Dushanbe, where instruction would be in Russian (Ryabikina 2009), with English offered as well. The University of Central Asia, established in 2000 with a campus in Khorog in the Pamirs, offers instruction in English as well, thanks to the financial support of the Agha Khan, leader of the Ismaili community worldwide, as well as German, since the Agha Khan’s wife was German

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(interview with Nurali Seidov, chairman of the ‘Society for Friendship of Peoples’, Dushanbe, 14 May 2009). Most universities offer tuition in Tajik, Russian and Uzbek. Russian has apparently been more than holding its own in academic institutions. One of the main reasons is the scarcity of university textbooks in Tajik, especially in the natural and technical sciences. Without knowledge of Russian, acquisition of higher education in these subjects, as well as in the humanities, is severely hampered (personal communication by a Tajik Russian-language teacher, Hissor, 14 May 2009). Before 2005 dissertations could be written in Tajik, with summaries in Russian; since then, both dissertations and summaries have had to be written in Russian (Europa World of Learning 2009 2008: Vol. II, 1990–1; Nagzibekova 2008: 506), which seems rather unusual in a country set on making the state language compulsory in all spheres of life, especially prestigious ones such as academia. Table 7.4 shows some data about the division of overall student numbers, by language of instruction, in institutions of higher education. It is noteworthy that the enrolment in Uzbek-medium classes was much lower than in Tajik-medium and Russian-medium classes. The reasons may have been that fewer classes were offered and that Uzbek students preferred to study in Tajik or Russian.

Table 7.4 Students in Tajikistan’s university institutes by language of instruction, 1999–2004 (start of academic year) Year

1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004

Total

79,168 77,701 84,360 96,583 107,570

Language of Instruction Tajik

Russian

Uzbek

49,284 51,280 58,033 65,047 73,308

25,840 23,593 23,632 28,188 31,903

4,044 2,828 2,695 3,348 2,359

Source: Education in the Republic of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2004: 71.

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The media The media landscape has developed and diversified since the civil war and, with the introduction of the internet, new possibilities have opened up. Today, there are nine different media laws – including the Law on the Press and Other Mass Media and the Law on Television and Radio broadcasting – which make life rather difficult for journalists, publishers and broadcasters. Media, printing and book production still suffer from the impact of the civil war. The ongoing dire economic situation has been aggravated by the global economic crisis. It seems that few books are currently published in Tajikistan (personal impression, Dushanbe, May 2009). According to the Registrar of the Tajik Ministry of Culture, reporting on 1 February 2002, 217 periodicals (mostly weeklies) were published in the country, in Tajik, Russian, Uzbek, other minority languages, or English. In 2006, some 300 dailies and periodicals were appearing. Popular newspapers, like ASIA-Plus or Vechernii Dushanbe (both in Russian), continue to appear, although no longer daily. Most newspapers are tabloids, but some offer in-depth information and interesting commentaries, like the weekly Narodnaya Gazeta, or Biznes & Politika which in 2002 was selling about 2,000 copies, the most at that time for a Russian daily in Tajikistan (Dubovitskaya 2009: 12). According to several informants, by spring 2009, due to the economic problems of publishers and the lack of money among potential buyers of media production, there were no dailies in the country; only weeklies with a fairly low circulation. A number of newspapers, mostly with derivative information and popular contents, have appeared over the last few years, and quietly disappeared. The main reason seems to be that the newspaper market is very limited. Some weeklies are privately owned, but most are put out by the government or political parties, including a Tajik-language weekly, Najot, published by the Islamic Renaissance Party. All newspapers and periodicals have to register with the Ministry of Justice before starting publication. At present, state-run print media have some special privileges, including preferred access to significant information, obtainable from Khovar, the official news agency of Tajikistan.

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Independent newspapers in Tajik, Russian, or English, such as Avesta, Millat, Farazh, Imruz News, Ozodagon and others grapple with government pressures, the availability of printing facilities and the irregularity of the postal services. Scholarly journals have been published by various sections of the National Academy of Sciences or other agencies, including the Russianlanguage organ of the Ministry of Education, Russkii Yazyk i Literatura v Shkole and the quarterly of the Writers Union of the Republic of Tajikistan, Pamir, published in about 500 copies. State television and radio are also largely under government control (Abazov 2007: 117), with the Ministry of Culture supervising the level (and sometimes the contents) of broadcasts, which have declined in number. By 2008, state television had four channels, covering Dushanbe and 80 per cent of the country. Non-state television stations were also competing, largely focusing their broadcasting on regions outside Dushanbe. High-powered Uzbek stations in Uzbekistan broadcast in Uzbek and were reported to have Uzbek audiences in Tajikistan. Television broadcasts from Iran continue to be popular. Two Russian television stations have been very active in Russian, bringing news from all over the world and a variety of films which reportedly have many viewers. In 2002 there were four national radio broadcasting stations and a private one, all working in Dushanbe and in outlying areas (OSCE 2002: 57–65; BBC Country Profile: Tajikistan 2008; Nagzibekova 2008: 504–5). News bulletins were broadcast regularly in Tajik, Russian and Uzbek. According to Russian sources, out of 693 hours of radio broadcasting per month, only 20 hours (or about 3 per cent) were in Russian in 2008. Even these were criticized by some ethnic Russians for their low standards and ‘pidgin Russian’. The relatively modest number of hours allotted to radio and television in Russian is officially explained by the absence of suitable broadcasters in the language, following the large Slav emigration, but this may rather be a part of government policy to promote the Tajik language as enough broadcasters could be found among Russophone Tajiks (Vechernii Dushanbe, 1 July 2005; ASIA-Plus, 8 December 2005 and 6 September 2006). The BBC, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Deutsche Welle have their own

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channels, although the government recently removed the BBC’s right to broadcast (Bensmann 2007: 540–41). Poverty, technological problems and frequent electricity shortages impair the use of modern information technology. The internet arrived in Tajikistan in 1994 and is under the control of the Ministry of Communications. Introduced by ‘Telecomm-Technology’, it progressed slowly, even though competing companies have now entered Tajikistan. The first internet café was opened on 19 June 2000 in Dushanbe. The overall number of internet subscribers was estimated at the time at a mere one per cent of the population, while that of internet users (chiefly in Russian) was estimated by UNESCO in 2002 at only 7,000 people (Tabyshalieva 2006: 45), rising to about 11,000 in 2003 and about 19,500 in 2005 (Digest Press, 7 March 2003; CIA World Factbook, quoted in IREX 2008: 242). Since then, internet use has soared, and the numbers of internet users reportedly reached 440,000 in 2008 and 700,000 in 2010, while the number of providers rose to ten (Shodon 2010; Internet World Stats 2010c). The first internet periodical publication was issued in Tajik and Russian in March 2005. By 2006 a number of newspapers, in Tajik or Russian, could be consulted on the internet, although several sites critical of the president and the government were banned and websites of independent media in Tajikistan and abroad have frequently been blocked. Tajikistan, small in size and embroiled in economic difficulties, actively promotes the state language, Tajik, despite numerous problems. The coalition governments that rule the country waver in their linguistic decisions, however, while Tajik economic and educational considerations impel it towards a moderate promotion of Russian. Consequently, while education, official correspondence and street signs increasingly use Tajik, Russian maintains some of its hold, while minority languages are quite neglected.

CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION. L ANGUAGE R EFOR M: SUCCESS OR FAILUR E?

Twenty years have passed since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have been grappling with independence. We know from numerous sources how the six are functioning in general and have tried to evaluate how successfully they have been coping with their language problems within their respective contexts of political, economic and cultural issues. The evaluation largely depends on which language changes and reforms have been attempted and with what results. All six states are in a serious predicament, characteristic of numerous post-colonial newly independent societies. Regardless of their social, economic and religious differences, the most serious problem facing them all is probably their multiplicity of subnational and transnational identities at a time of global change. As Phillips and James (2001) suggest, this situation hampers attempts by titular ethnies to reclaim tradition and combine it with modernization in a strategy forming a new nation. The response of the leading elites of each titular ethnie, instead of opening up to the international community (even when they claimed to be doing so) was to immerse themselves in local ethnic patriotism with its characteristic values and symbols. Their main argument has usually been that they were creating a new national identity.

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Politically, the six new states inherited their boundaries from the Soviet Union, resulting in the incorporation of various ethnies in each state. This causes tensions, sometimes confrontational, whether with the national minorities (such as the Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan) or with neighbours (Azerbaijan with Armenia and Uzbekistan with Tajikistan). Economically, they all suffer from inadequate revenues (chiefly Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), leading to generally low personal incomes and increasing unemployment (as well as rising inflation, especially in Kazakhstan). Culturally, they grapple with different expressions of Islam (mostly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), and all of them have to deal with many ethnies, each with its own separate traditions, ambitions, languages and dialects. The fact that numerous languages are undergoing processes of change adds a new difficulty in determining language policies. In the area discussed, the existence of diasporic ethnic groups from neighbouring states (chiefly Russians, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Kazakhs, but others as well) complicates the language issues still further. Another complication is that language rivalries, chiefly between each titular language and Russian, are sometimes concurrent with other rivalries, such as the urban-rural divide, infighting within clans and regional networks, or competition between political and economic interests. One way to look at language problems in the six states is to cautiously evaluate success or failure in language reform. Assessing success is especially problematic when the period examined stretches over less than two decades: a short span of time that encompasses merely the beginning of reforms, including a progressive language shift from Russian to the titular languages, whereas cultural policy can be evaluated more profitably only in the long term. A serious difficulty is the frequent absence of uncontestable statistics, due to the paucity of general state-organized censuses; there have been none in independent Uzbekistan (Ferrando 2008a), while Turkmenistan refuses to provide any statistical data since the lone census in 1995. When available, the figures are not always reliable, as reflected by disparaging phrases on the part of researchers, such as: ‘Language and census: fabricating a new linguistic reality through statistics’ (Dave and Sinnott 2002: 8), or ‘What the state had failed

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to achieve on the ground has been attained through statistics’ (Dave 2004a: 455). Such facetious remarks may be exaggerated, but they reflect the quandary of the scholars involved. Laruelle (2009), writing on growing illiteracy in Central Asia, chiefly in the rural areas, has rightly complained of the lack of ascertainable data. Another example is provided by the inconsistent results obtained in recent counts of proficiency in the titular language and in Russian and its use at home or work (Gavrilov et al. 2008: 112–20). The non-availability or unreliability of many quantitative data sometimes compels researchers to base their work on estimates. Moreover, the profusion of sometimes contradictory information leads to confusion. Relying on such data unreservedly can be precarious. Examination of reforms shows that almost all governmental efforts at improving the situation of the titular language are not qualitative but, rather, quantitative (in administration, education, and so forth). Here the absence of unequivocal statistical data hinders solid research. The public media, which might be expected to assist in the checking of information, have been under close official control for lengthy periods in all the states discussed (Allison 2006); they continue to act under governmental constraints and are frequently of limited value. Freedom of expression in the media has declined considerably in the last years throughout the area. This conclusion can be drawn not merely from the 2010 Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders, but also from the observation of scholars, journalists and the inhabitants of the area themselves. The precarious situation of the media is set off, however, by the international electronic media which amply cover Central Asia and the Caucasus. Although cultural affairs are not their main concern, they are an indispensable source for language research in these regions. Constitutions, laws and legislative decrees in the six states have usually been fashioned on Soviet models. Language reforms were couched in laws and decrees which have shown that in authoritarian regimes there are hardly any limits to what can be legislated or decreed. The new legislation set rules which – explicitly or implicitly – treated the titular language preferentially. Although many legislative documents promised that the state would treat all languages equally,

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implementation very frequently neglected the language interests of the minority ethnies. One could say that the main issue in language policy in each of the six independent states was the shift from one dominant language, Russian, to another, the titular language. There are various degrees between the extremes of language shift and language maintenance, involving degrees of bilingualism or even multilingualism in these multiethnic societies in transition. The top-down policy of language shift by regulation is yet another historical event in a region which had already experienced such a process in Soviet times. In many post-colonial states, including those discussed here and others, such as Algeria, there has been substantial popular support for the main indigenous language as state language in place of the colonial one. Leading political elites, educated in the colonial language and with limited facility in their own national language, seek to change this situation by supporting their indigenous language with such declarations as ‘a nation cannot exist without its language!’ (Dave 2007: 100). The official shift away from the Russian language was expressed in legislation (or its absence) regarding the official status of Russian in each of the six states: in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, Russian is not mentioned in recent legislation, but in practice it has a more important role than any other minority language and often functions as a language of interethnic communication. In Kazakhstan, it is accorded this function by law. In Kyrgyzstan it is considered an official language. Proficiency in Russian and the use of the language are still common in all the states discussed, but to varying degrees. It seems that its share in public life, in descending order, is approximately as follows: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. With countryspecific nuances, it is characteristic of all six states that Russian still serves – officially or unofficially – as the language of interethnic communication, at least until the titular language is able to fulfil this role. Meanwhile, estimates (quoted in the absence of reliable statistics) inform us that, upon independence, Russophones formed about two-thirds of the total population in Kazakstan, more than 30 per cent in Kyrgyzstan, less than 30 per cent in Azerbaijan, with lower

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ratios in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan (Gavrilov et al. 2008: 156–7). Hence opposition to language shift is not uncommon; it is, for instance, encountered within the sizeable population of monolingual Russian speakers living in all six states, including titular ethnies which had been strongly Russified, as well as multiethnic groups which employed Russian as their own lingua franca. Following in some cases the examples of other states, a policy of linguistic assimilation into the titular language has been applied, in various degrees, in all six states. The gap between well-meaning legislation and the slow pace of implementation – common to all six states, again in varying degrees – has often been due to the lack of administrative coordination and to bureaucratic hesitancy, as well as to economic constraints, no less than to the innate difficulties of language reform and personal resistance to change in language habits. Political leaders had to face obvious obstacles and obstructions even though they received substantial aid in money and kind from abroad during the last twenty years. With all these givens, it becomes difficult to attempt to compare the issue in six states which, on the face of it, have marked similarities in terms of political behaviour and in the process of language reform. But the outcome of the reforms differs nonetheless and is, at least partly, conditioned by economic and other issues. Oiland gas-rich Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, for example, were able to embark on language reforms more easily and achieve greater success than Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, hampered by pervasive poverty and considerable unemployment. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have (or have had) military bases of both the United States and the Russian Federation on their territories, at times simultaneously, for financial reasons. Economic prosperity and relative population homogeneity, as well as autocratic regimes, chiefly in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, have assisted in the process of reforms, even including an ambitious alphabet change to Latin characters. All these difficulties combined have brought about a situation in which the population of the six states, busy with its own pressing economic worries, has frequently abstained from actual involvement in language issues. Taking sides in language debates has usually been the privilege of the urban elites concerned with promoting the national

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identity of their state. The local debates of politicians, intellectuals, educators and others provide useful information, as do personal interviews, but are not always instructive since they are often held in an atmosphere controlled by authoritarian and paternalistic regimes. The views and opinions of the state presidents and their immediate circles have almost always been decisive, from the centralized authoritarianism of the ‘Presidential Monarchy’ of Turkmenistan to the ‘Presidential Democracy’ of Kyrgyzstan. The presidents have also been quite successful in compelling the media to assist them in maintaining control over the political system – along with the organization of power on patrimonial lines through a patronage system distributing favours to allies and clientelist groups via well-oiled networks. In general, the rulers have been busy with the overall construction and modernization of their states (Denison 2007). Presidentialism in the six successors to the Soviet Union, even when criticized for slow progress to democratization, remains an institutional unifier and guarantor of interethnic peace, including conflict management of such identity issues as language politics. All the presidents have tried to appear infallible and thus untouchable. Exceptions were the first president of Azerbaijan, Ebülfez Elçibey and of Tajikistan, Rakhmon Nabiyev, who failed either to impose their authority or to employ strategies of accommodation skilfully enough, and thus were unable to prevent ethnic strife. Another more recent case is Kyrgyzstan, where presidential mismanagement has aggravated the serious interethnic clashes. Since independence, the six successor states have aimed at becoming national states – a complex and multidimensional process. In the cases examined, it was considered essential that all inhabitants should transfer their loyalties to the state, to forge a sense of belonging and shape a national collective identity based on a sense of cultural uniqueness in lands where several (or even many) identities flourished. The titular ethnic majority, engaged in the formation of its nation-state, took pride in its own ethnic heritage, including its language. It was to be expected, then, that it would look askance at the ‘otherness’ of the minority ethnic groups. Although not acknowledging this, each dominant ethnie was imbued with a desire to serve primarily its own interests via legal and cultural regulation, in the name of political

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solidarity and love of country. This attitude of ‘patriotism’, which presupposes a unified common culture and a distinctive language, has precluded a dynamic identification of ethnic minorities with the state’s policies. Especially in the case of the ethnic Russian communities, their possible, or even probable, identification with the Russian Federation and with Russian culture and language could originally be perceived in the 1990s as a possible danger for the future of the new states. The Russian Federation, led by Putin, has been expanding its efforts to re-establish traditional links and alignments with the former republics of the Soviet Union in the Caucasus and Central Asia as part of a pragmatic approach intended to create a strong and influential Russian presence in the former Soviet space. The lesson of Russian military involvement in Georgia in August 2008 was not lost on the other post-Soviet republics. The presidents have perceived the promotion of the titular language as crucial for their nation-building, as well as for the sovereignty and stability of the state. Presidentialism usually works via mobilization, or persuasion, or both. In the case of the presidents of the states discussed, all of whom claimed for themselves the right to shape national discourse, political and economic mobilization was the key to their actions with less attention invested in persuasion. This applies to their decisions in language reforms no less than to their revisionist pronouncements on rewriting history in the drive for autochthony and for cultural purism and revivalism. In carrying out their policies they were assisted by the titular political elites, mostly Soviet trained, who had almost overnight become ardent defenders of a new nationalism. By their tight control of all the media – the press, broadcasting and use of the internet – the presidents and their circle were, and still are, practically the sole decision-makers. A common aim of leadership circles in all six states was to promote language in ways which would help the formation of national identity. As pointed out by the Uzbek sociolinguist Khanazarov (2007: 41), language was for those leaders a matter of political and psychological import, not merely a means of communication. Knowing the crucial significance of language (in all cases, the titular language) for creating a new national identity and qualification for membership in

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the nation, political leaders adopted the titular language as the state language. What they all wished – and attempted, in various degrees – was to change a ‘step-daughter tongue’ into a widely accepted titular language. They were well aware of a cultural dissonance between the inhabitants of the rural areas, who mostly spoke the titular language or one of the languages of the other ethnic groups, and many others in the majority ethnie, chiefly the townspeople, who had neglected their own mother tongue in order to use the Russian language naturally and fluently. To impose language shift is always a very ambitious and protracted task and has proved to be so in the area discussed, too. Entrenching the titular language and simultaneously implementing the rights of ethnic minority languages is a barely feasible project, requiring as it does that non-titular nationals undergo a profound process of re-identification in nationhood. Reversing the language situation in the six newly independent states implied the downgrading of Russian in favour of the titular language – a policy resisted not only by the Slav communities in these countries, but also by many Russophones amongst the titular majority, largely town-dwellers, who included many of the urban elites residing near the centres of decision making. Indeed, in certain cases, there was even a shift towards Russian among the urban young people, some of whom consider the agitation for the titular language backward and provincial. On another level, claims by spokesmen for the titular language of an accommodationist policy towards the languages of minority ethnies rarely convinced those ethnies, particularly since related official activities – such as the construction of monuments and the renaming of places and streets – were overwhelmingly titular in character. An unofficial survey of attitudes to Russian, carried out in 2007 in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, is quite informative in this respect. It showed that sizeable sections of the populations of these four states were keen on the promotion of the use of Russian and of its place in public education. According to this survey, interest in Russian was highest in Tajikistan, closely followed by Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, while it was lowest in Azerbaijan. The reporter behind the survey, I.V. Zadorin (2008), explained this difference in

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economic terms, in the main: Tajikistanis seek work in the Russian Federation, as do the Kyrgyz, while in Kazakhstan the large Slav population affects the issue markedly. An important issue of language reform is language intervention, most notably alphabet change. Scripts have a symbolic power which transcends language itself; they readily become symbols of national identity. In the case of Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, Latinization was considered by the leadership as part of a new cultural and political order (Hatcher 2008: 112). All three have taken pains to Latinize their scripts, each with its own set of letters. Latinization was imposed from above, Soviet style, by authoritarianism rather than by persuasion. The decision was based more on political choice than on linguistic considerations. Latinization took much longer than planned and required a more substantial financial investment than anticipated. It is still hampered by difficulties such as underfunding and bureaucratic procedures. Although the Cyrillic and Latin scripts existed side-by-side for several years, wherever seriously attempted Latinization has been fairly successful for those who mastered the new script. In general, success was achieved among the younger people in the cities and less in rural areas. A sizeable part of the population has become illiterate. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, having a large Russian population, have retained the Cyrillic alphabet for Kazakh and Kyrgyz. Tajikistan, a special case, also keeps its Cyrillic script. There were obvious differences in the adoption of Latinization by the titular language and the ethnic minority languages which continued in the Cyrillic script with very few exceptions, such as among the semi-autonomous Karakalpaks in Uzbekistan and the Talysh in Azerbaijan. In one way or another, all language reforms in the six states aimed at elevating soon the status of the titular language into a national one to be used by a large majority of the inhabitants. Each state concentrated on legitimizing its freshly acquired sovereignty by promoting the titular language at the expense of those of other ethnies. The children of the latter ethnies were instructed at school to a large extent, but not always sufficiently, in the titular language, in addition to their

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mother tongues. The result was, at least in some cases, that they automatically retained the status of language minorities subject to differential treatment in education and other domains. In several cases ethnic minorities found it difficult to gain access to socioeconomic resources, compared to the titular majority. The practical exclusion of ethnic minorities from state-building may, in many cases, exact a price in the long term. While the promotion of the titular language as a national integrating factor has succeeded in varying degrees in the six states, chiefly in the titular section of the population, it has alienated the other ethnic groups, Slavs and others, who often feel downgraded and disempowered. The Slavs, in particular, resent the criticism of recent Soviet history in Central Asia, mostly portraying the Soviet Union as a colonizing state which imposed Russian on its subjects. It is not always clear how and when public attitudes towards language reform change and what impact such attitudes have on authoritarian governments which are well aware that language use is a good measurement of power. Even such governments often sound out public opinion in various matters, including attitudes to language, which, in the long run, have some influence in determining their language policies. Sometimes they fear that the use of a minority language in the public domain may indicate a shift in control. An example is the peripheralization of the Uzbek language in Kyrgyzstan – one of the means of keeping the Uzbeks away from the centres of government. Policies of de-Russianization and de-Sovietization and the parallel strengthening of each titular language into a position of dominance have, of course, affected the minority languages. Some speakers of minority languages, Russians included, have criticized what they see as an overemphasis on the titular language. They have attempted to develop their own language nationalism within a situation of cultural diversity to a degree that spilled over into ethnic conflict between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser degree between Tajiks and Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In multicultural/ multilingual societies, language cannot be depended on to serve as a social integrator – in fact, the opposite is often true. Aspects of differentiation can be studied even more clearly with reference to the minority languages. Many multilingual societies provide

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a quality of education that considers both the learners’ needs and the daily use of different languages. Getting language instruction in one’s mother tongue and learning an additional language (with the aim of becoming bilingual) is common in many advanced societies. It is symptomatic of the cultural policies of many new states that, while fostering the titular language as an important element of national solidarity, their governments and political machinery largely ignore the desire of most, or all, minorities to develop their own language rights equally with the titular one while in situations of unequal power. Differential education is the main expression of such inequality in many countries. Here again lies one of the seeds of potential ethnopolitical conflict, largely deriving from a lack of pluralism. In other words, the preference of many nationalist elites for monoculturalism (or sometimes biculturalism), instead of multiculturalism, may have consequences in the domain of language. In the six states, the frequent declarations of government spokesmen about the legitimacy of cultural and language diversity have often remained a dead letter when it comes to the practical promotion of minority languages and giving their speakers access to public goods and public office or to the media. While the languages of the ethnic minorities have been granted legitimation (i.e., formal recognition), hardly anything has been done in terms of institutionalization (i.e., establishing effective instruments for formal and informal acceptance). This does not justify, but partly explains, the attitudes of certain titular elites in striving to marginalize and denigrate the languages of other ethnies as obstacles to nation-building, or in attempting to induce those ethnies to assimilate linguistically by persuading them to switch to the titular language. As a result, many of the ethnic minorities, who are proud of their languages, feel that their language rights are disregarded. They appear to feel that the majority ethnie, whatever its official declarations, does not consider them as fully belonging to the nation-state. There are, naturally, some differences in government policies towards the ethnies, depending on their political salience and cultural-linguistic distinctiveness. However, a common factor remains: language politics have consistently favoured the majoritarian or dominant ethnie at the expense of the minoritarian or non-dominant.

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An extensive body of official and semi-official literature has appeared in recent years concerning the language rights of minorities worldwide (OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 1998; Skutnabb-Kangas 2006). Minority rights, of course, concern the area discussed although the literature rarely focuses on it. One may conclude that the lack of language rights within the minority ethnies denotes a failure of the central government and its machinery. This applies mostly to ethnic minorities too small to challenge the authority of the titular majority. The outstanding exception is the Russian ethnie, which is a minority with a majority complex, relatively large in numbers, proudly thinking of themselves as Kulturträger, and supported by a world power. Rediscovered as useful on the international scene and a chief rival to the titular language, Russian has been less affected than other minority languages by official policies. The Russians have organized themselves in political associations, albeit generally small in size, which have had only a limited impact on local politics. Nonetheless, they generally remain reluctant to make concessions to local culture. Russian speakers’ degree of cultural assimilation has been minimal. While some Russian adults have been learning the titular language, the overall number is not impressive. Over time, Central Asian policymakers have realized that the government of the Russian Federation will not give up its support of Russian diasporas. The new Russian nationalism has many faces, but one of its averred aims is to reconstruct a supra-state unity, perhaps a common space modelled on the European Union. In this effort a common language – Russian – is most desirable, and probably crucial. The failure to attend properly to the change in matters of language is due, among other causes, to a seemingly total neglect of linguistic research oriented to international models: the aim of language development, phonetics, vocabulary, grammar, script and methodology of language instruction. How well have the six states succeeded in their initiatives and support of their respective titular languages? This is not easy to evaluate. The answer may differ from state to state and in any event each state has attempted to present its language reforms as a signal success. Also,

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as noted, two decades is a rather short span of time to measure longterm policies. Perhaps it is easier to evaluate failure than success, as detailed data are frequently absent or, when they exist, are not always accessible to the researcher. The main aim of the language reforms in the six states, as far as can be ascertained, was to make the titular language the sole medium of state business and use it as a means to bolster national identity in the process of nation-building. Success in this endeavour does of course require time. ‘National identity’ has generally been understood to refer mainly – or perhaps solely – to the titular ethnie (following the patterns of the Soviet legacy). The road toward national identity was indeed pursued without irreparably alienating other ethnies. In this, language reforms appear to have been rather successful. The states have also succeeded in imposing the titular language, at the expense of the others, in most schools. By contrast, in the universities, Russian – and, sometimes, some other language – often has priority as the medium of instruction. Linguists in the six states often admit that this generation will be unable to achieve language revival and improvement in all respects. Considering the unpredictability of the region, achieving complete success in language policy remains a challenge. Much depends on whether the decision makers will allow ‘Language Problem Fatigue’ to unduly influence their judgement or actions, and whether they can continue to deal more creatively with language change and renewal in the shadow of the Soviet past.

7,038 19,905 16,185 4,290 3,534 5,109

1989

7,700 24,231 15,507 4,732 4,994 6,188

1999

Total population (in thousands)

662 4,326 –678 442 1,460 1,079

Total

1,128 5,179 1,517 836 923 1,353

Natural Increase –466 –853 –2,196 –394 536 –273

Migration

Absolute change (in thousands)

9.4 21.7 –4.2 10.3 41.3 21.1

Total

16.0 26.0 9.4 19.5 26.1 26.5

–6.6 –4.3 –13.6 –9.2 15.2 –5.4

Natural Migration increase

Per cent change

Population change in the post-Soviet Muslim states, 1989–99

Source: Official sources, calculated by Heleniak 2003: 133.

Azerbaijan Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan Tajikistan

Table 9.1

CHAPTER 9

APPENDICES

212 Table 9.2

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Russians in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, 1989–2004

State

1989 Census

Azerbaijan Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan Tajikistan

392,000 1,663,000 6,228,000 917,000 334,000 388,000

Post-Soviet Censuses 141,700 1,362,000 4,479,600 603,200 166,800 68,200

1999 Estimate 1999 1999 Estimate 2000

Loss (%) 63.9 17.6 28.1 34.2 53.1 82.4

Source: Based on Tishkov 2007 (for 2005 figures, Greenall 2005).

Table 9.3 Proficiency in the titular language, 1989 (percentages) Population (all ethnic groups) without fluency in titular language

Russians without knowledge of titular language

13.5 8.46 59.8 46.4 25.3 33.4

85.5 84.6 99.2 98.8 87.7 96.7

Azerbaijan Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan Tajikistan Source: Based on Kolstø 1995: 89.

Table 9.4 Knowledge of Russian in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, 2004 (in thousands) State

Azerbaijan Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan Tajikistan

Total Population 8,200 25,000 15,100 5,000 4,800 6,300

Source: Based on Aref’yev 2006.

Consider Russian their Mother Tongue 250 1,200 4,200 600 150 90

Active knowledge of Russian 2,000 5,000 10,000 1,500 100 1,000

Passive Know no knowledge Russian of Russian 3,500 10,000 2,300 2,000 900 2,000

2,700 10,000 2,800 1,500 3,800 3,300

A PPENDICES Table 9.5

213

Language most used at home, 1993 (percentages) Azerbaijan Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan

Azerbaijani Kazakh Uzbek Turkmen Kyrgyz Karakalpak Russian German Turkish Tajik Others Total

85.5 – – – 0.5 – 10.4 – 0.6 – 3.0 100.0

0.5 2.4 56.1 0.4 – 4.9 24.8 0.9 – 6.6 3.4 100.0

0.7 33.6 2.1 – 1.2 – 59.0 0.3 0.4 – 2.7 100.0

1.4 3.7 5.1 3.4 57.2 – 26.0 0.3 0.5 – 2.4 100.0

0.7 2.0 8.4 62.8 0.9 – 23.7 – 1.3 – 0.2 100.0

Source: Based on Behar 1995: 48.

Table 9.6 Foreign language the population would like to learn, 1993 (percentages) Azerbaijan Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan Russian Turkish English German French None Others Total

3.6 13.6 46.1 7.8 9.5 16.8 2.6 100.0

2.7 18.0 33.7 3.9 4.5 29.3 7.9 100.0

1.5 5.2 40.5 5.9 5.4 33.7 7.8 100.0

2.5 13.0 44.7 7.3 5.6 17.9 9.0 100.0

4.3 19.6 42.6 4.7 4.5 15.1 9.2 100.0

Source: Based on Behar 1995: 49.

Table 9.7

Cyrillic Latin Arabic Total

Alphabet preference, 1993 (percentages) Azerbaijan

Uzbekistan

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

8.1 89.6 2.3 100.0

21.6 17.0 61.4 100.0

20.6 30.4 49.0 100.0

33.6 38.0 29.4 100.0

Source: Based on Behar 1995: 51. The data for Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are not ascertainable.

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Table 9.8 Students in institutions of higher education by language of instruction, 2006 (percentages) Country Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan

Russian Uzbek Kazakh Kyrgyz Tajik Subtotal 14.1 58.0 67.9 29.6

81.4 0.5 1.3 2.2

0.5 39.5 0.1 –

– – 30.0 –

0.2 – – 68.0

96.2 98.0 99.2 99.8

Total Number 228,674 747,104 199,124 107,570

Source: National statistical reports. The data for Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are not ascertainable.

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INDEX

Note: States are listed alphabetically and abbreviated as follows: AZ=Azerbaijan, KA=Kazakhstan, KY=Kyrgyzstan, TA=Tajikistan, TU=Turkmenistan, UZ=Uzbekistan. Academy of Education 139 Academy of Management 147 Academy of Public Administration 111 Administration 1, 10, 17, 24, 94, 97, 99, 110, 116, 122–3, 126, 143, 147, 157–9, 179, 185, 202 Afghanistan 49, 81, 117, 174, 180 Ahmet Yesevi International KazakhTurkish University 109 S. Aini Tajik State Pedagogical University 193 Aitmatov, Chingiz 127 Ak Jol party 128, 131 Akayev, Askar 120, 122, 124–5, 130 Akdoğan, Yaşar 32 Akhundova, N. 29 Akmatov, Kazat 130 Akmola 79 Aktöbe 109 Aliyev, Heydar 21, 23–6, 32, 44 Aliyev, Ilham Heydaroğlu 21, 23 Almaty 79, 84, 90, 93–4, 97, 100, 105–7, 109, 113, 115, 147 Alphabet change 10, 11, 16, 29–32, 40–2, 44–6

AZ 10, 15, 26, 30–3, 38, 46, 53, 102ff, 202 KA 31, 102ff KY 31, 129 TA 182–4 TU 10, 15, 31, 53, 102ff, 202 UZ 10, 15, 31, 53–9, 102ff, 202 Turkey 102ff American University in Bulgaria 167 American University of Central Asia 146–8, 167 Amirshohi, Nurmuhammad 183 Andijan 49 Anes, Garifolla 101 Ankara 104 Antalya 13 Arabayev Kyrgyz State University 145, 147 Arabic language 14, 16, 25, 44, 68, 74–5, 108, 110–11, 146, 159, 182 Arabic script 54, 56, 104, 156, 176, 182–3 Arabic speakers 11 Arabs 174 Armenia 20, 22–3, 37, 199

256

L ANGUAGE POLITICS

Armenian language 29, 108 Armenians 19, 20, 22, 35, 37, 48, 51, 80, 152 Asanov, U. A. 132 Ashgabat 73, 152, 155, 157, 160, 164–5, 168, 171 Asian Development Bank 68, 136 Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan 92, 104, 107 Association of the Koreans in Tajikistan 185 Astana 79, 92, 97, 106–7, 109, 111–13 Ata-Mirzayev, O. B. 70 Austrian Diplomatic Academy 111 Autonomous Province of Mountainous Badakhshan 173, 185–6 Avars 20, 35–6, 40 Azadi Institute of World Languages 167 Azerbaijan XIII, XIV, 1, 10, 13, 19–46, 155, 193, 198–9, 201–3, 205–6, 211ff Education 23, 31, 39–44 Language reform 19ff Azerbaijan Academy for Physical Training and Sports 43 Azerbaijan Democratic Party 45 Azerbaijan Democratic Republic 22 Azerbaijan English Teachers’ Association 41 Azerbaijan Medical University 43 Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic 24–5 Azerbaijan State Marine Academy 43 Azerbaijan Technical University 42 Azerbaijan University of Languages 43 Azerbaijani language 20–2, 25, 27, 30–1, 34, 40–5, 108 Azerbaijani literature 33 Azerbaijanis 20, 27–8, 30–1, 46, 48 Azerbaijanization 45

IN

CENTR AL A SIA

Azeris 41, 80, 85 Bakiyev, Kurmanbek 120, 128–9, 131, 134, 136, 148–9 Baku 19, 20, 27, 31–4, 36, 41, 43–4 Baku Islamic University 43 Baku Slavic University 43 Baku State University 42 Baku Teachers’ Training College 36 Balkanabat 158, 168 Baluchi language 163, 171 Barak, Amnon XIV Bashkir language 74 Bashkirs 47–8, 80 Batken 134 Batyrov, Kadyrzhan 134 BBC 196–7 Belorussian language 74 Belorussians 80 Berdimuhammedov, Gurbanguly 67, 153–4, 160–1, 163–4, 167–9, 171 Berlin 105 Bilingualism 8–11, 44, 52, 64, 83, 94, 116, 122, 124, 129, 137–8, 150, 184, 201, 208 Bishkek 72, 119, 128–9, 131, 134–5, 137, 141, 143–4, 146–50, 167 Bishkek Anticorruption Agency 145 Bishkek International School of Management and Business 144 Bizhkenova, Aigul 111 Bolashaq Programme 112 Bookshops, 32, 43, 65, 113, 148–9, 158, 169 British Council 41, 72 Budugs 35 Bukhara 58, 64–5, 72, 174 Bukhara State University 65, 75 Bulgarian language 43, 74 Bulgarians 80 Canetta, Edoardo 112 Caspian Sea 21 Caucasus 1, 5, 9, 10, 19, 35, 204

INDEX Censorship 45, 56 Censuses 19, 64, 79, 93, 95–6, 119, 173, 199 Centre of Social and Political Research ‘Korshinos’ 182 Centre for Special Vocational Education 60 Centre for the Study of the Kyrgyz Language 137 Chechen language 108 Chechens 80 China 94, 112 Chinese 81 Chinese language 14, 74, 111, 115, 138, 146, 167, 193 Choroev, Tynchtykbek XIV, 149 CIMERA 138 Cinema 12, 44–5, 57, 67, 73, 77, 149, 160, 184, 196 Circus 160 Citizenship 162 Colleges, see universities Commission for the Implementation of the Law on Language (TA) 180 Common language 13 Common Turkish alphabet 30–1 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 20, 28, 48, 124 Communications 7, 17, 24, 34, 58, 64, 75, 77–8, 86, 89, 92, 94, 115, 123, 129, 139, 171, 197 Communism 23, 174 Communist Party of Azerbaijan 21 Community Information and Research Centre (TU) 168 Conception for language policy in Kazakhstan 86ff Confucius Institute 112 Congress of Turkic-speaking nations 31 Constitutions 24–5, 50, 81, 84–6, 91, 99, 121–2, 124–5, 133, 137, 152–4, 159, 177–8

257

Cossacks 90 Council of Elders (TU) 157 Council of Europe 45 Cultural Centres KA 88, 92, 94, 101 KY 134 TA 74 UZ 60, 67, 72, 74 French 74 Korean 67, 94, 185 Curricula, see language curricula Czech language 43 Çağ Öğretim İşletmeleri 35 DAAD 147–8, 168, 192 Daghestan 16 Dari language 180 Daşoguz 158 Day of the state language 126, 179 Days of the Russian language 171 Days of Russian language and literature 185, 189 Days of Slav culture and language 135 Debates XIII, 115, 120ff, 129, 153–5, 178, 182–3, 202 Democratic Congress of AZ 27 Democratization 203 De-Russianization XIII, 8, 9, 28, 54, 62, 100, 153–4, 159, 180, 207 De-Russification, see De-Russianization De-Sovietization XIII, 7, 207 Deutsche Welle 196 Dialects 79, 99, 199 Directorate for the Development of Language (KA) 101 Dokuchayeva, Alexandra V. 90 Dungan language 74, 108, 114, 138 Dungans 74, 80, 118 Dushanbe 173, 179–80, 184–5, 188–9, 192–3, 196–7 Dzhurayev, Gaffor 178

258

L ANGUAGE POLITICS

Economics 2, 17, 23, 30, 33–4, 97, 102, 110, 120, 135, 140, 153, 159, 165, 175, 178–9, 182, 188, 198, 202, 204–5 Education 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12–17, 23, 25, 30–1, 33–4, 37, 46, 51, 58, 60–1, 63, 65ff, 70ff, 76–8, 86ff, 91ff, 103, 105, 120ff, 123ff, 135ff, 142ff, 153ff, 163–72, 177ff, 182ff, 185ff, 200, 205 Elçibey, Ebülfez, 203 Elites 2, 4–9, 11, 22–3, 29, 34, 49, 59, 94, 99, 103, 121, 127, 130, 157, 175, 198, 201–2, 205 Emigration, see migration English language 8, 13–16 in AZ 22–3, 28–9, 33–4, 39, 41–5 in KA 89, 93, 106–12, 114–15 in KY 138, 141–8, 150 in TA 187–9, 192–3, 196 in TU 154, 163, 165–8 in UZ 54, 58, 62–3, 68, 70–8 English Teachers’ Association Forum 143 Encyclopaedias 33 ERK party 54 Ersani tribe 153 Ethnic co-existence 9 Ethnic conflict 17, 95, 124 Ethnic identity 1, 5 Ethnic languages 17, 40, 63ff, 79ff Ethnic minorities 3, 4, 7, 8, 26, 40ff, 52, 63–4, 93, 203–4, 207–9. See also Minorities Ethnies 17, 21–3, 26, 37, 41, 46, 51–2, 63ff, 69, 79, 82, 85–6, 89–91, 97, 104 106, 117ff, 121, 130, 133ff, 138ff, 160–1, 163, 169, 171, 173–4, 176, 186, 199, 200, 205. See also Titular ethnies Europe 111 European Union 209

IN

CENTR AL A SIA

al-Farabi Kazakh National University 94 Farsi language 44 Ferghana State University 72, 75 Ferghana Valley 52, 134, 185 Films, see cinema Folklore 185 Foundation for the Promotion of the State Language 98 France 74 Free Karakalpakstan National Revival Party 66 French language in AZ 28, 43–4 in KA 111 in KY 138, 141, 143, 148 in TA 189, 193 in UZ 68, 71–5 Friedrich Ebert Foundation 115, 192 Garibova, Jala 37 Gas revenues 156, 162, 202 Georgia 204 Georgian language 39, 40, 74 Georgians 20, 35 German language 8, 14 in AZ 43–4 in KA 92, 108–9, 111, 114 in KY 118, 141, 143–4, 146–8 in TA 189, 193 in TU 168 in UZ 71–5 Germans 47–8, 80, 82, 93, 117–8, 136, 138, 174 Germany 73, 93, 105, 112, 148, 160 Goethe-Institut 73, 93, 147 Gorbachov, Mikhail 10 Government 2 Government Programme for the Functioning and Development of Languages (KY) 87–8 Greek language 74, 108, 132 Greeks 48, 80

INDEX I. M. Gubkin Oil and Gas University 168 Guliyev, Nasib 32 L. N. Gumilev Eurasian National University 109, 111 Gülen, Fethullah 34, 73, 108, 144, 146, 165–6 Hebrew language 14, 72, 74 Hoibovisky, Jevhen 148 Hoshimov, O‘tkir 56 Hoskins, Tomasz XIV Humanitarian Association of the Turkmens of the World 160 Ibragimova, G. D. 127 Ibraimov, Osmonakun 123, 131 Identity building 49 Identity crisis 5 Identity politics 14, 25 Idiyev, Kh. 182 Ideology 23–4, 139, 159, 181, 183, 186 Illiteracy, see literacy Immigration, see migration Indigenization 28, 117 Ingiloys 35 Institute of Languages and Literatures (TU) 169 Institute of Linguistics (KA) 100 Institute of Oriental Studies (Tashkent) 67 Institute of Oriental Studies and the Written Heritage (TA) 183 Institute of Russian Language and Literature 43 Institute of Strategic Studies in Transcaucasia 41 International Academy of Business (KA) 109 International Atatürk Alatoo University 147 International Foundation for the Tajik-Persian Language 184

259

International Mother-Language Day 37 International Türkmen-Turkish University 166, 168 International University of Kyrgyzstan 146 Internet XIV, 44–6, 77–8, 150, 171, 197, 204 in AZ 12, 43–6 in KA 112ff in KY 148–50 in TA 12, 195ff in TU 168ff in UZ 76ff See also media Iran 12, 20, 36–7, 174, 176, 180, 182, 184, 196 Iranian languages 185 Iranisms 132 Iraq 20 Irredentism 134, 180 Isakov, Ismail 128 Islam 110, 174 Islamic activity 74, 174–5, 182, 192 Islamic Renaissance Party 195 Islamic University of Kyrgyzstan 110, 146 Ismailis 193 Issyk-Kul State University 146 Istanbul 32, 54 Italian language in AZ 43 in KA 111–2 in TA 189 İsaxanlı, Hamlet 33, 42 Jabiroghlu, Shaig 32 Jafarov, Nizami 27, 31 Jalalabad 132–4, 140, 144 Japan 138 Japanese language 14, 112, 167 Jews 20, 40, 47–8 Journalism, see press

260

L ANGUAGE POLITICS

Jumagulov, Tashboo R. 119, 128, 131 Karaganda 100–1, 103, 113 Karakalpak Autonomous Republic 50, 57, 60, 66 Karakalpak language 50, 54, 68–70, 76 Karakalpaks 47–8, 50–1, 54, 66, 100, 206 Karakol 146, 149 Karatayev, Khusayn 133 Kareev, Roman XIV Karimov, Islam 49, 53, 55, 62, 72, 75 Kazakh-American Free University 109 Kazakh-American University 109 Kazakh-British Technical University 109 Kazakh-German University 109 Kazakhization 85, 91, 94–5, 97–8, 101–2, 110–11, 115 Kazakh language 14, 57, 68–70, 76–7, 79ff, 94ff, 108, 142, 155, 163, 186, 206 Kazakh National University 90 Kazakhophones 96 Kazakh-Russian International University 109 Kazakhs 79ff, 96ff, 118, 152, 161, 171, 174, 199 Kazakhstan XIII, 1, 10, 13, 46, 49, 59, 66, 79–117, 126, 155, 161, 193, 198–9, 201–2, 205–6, 211ff Kazakhstan, languages in Armenian 108 Azerbaijani 108 Chechen 108 Dungan 108, 114 German 108, 114 Greek 108 Korean 108, 114 Kurdish 108 Polish 108, 114

IN

CENTR AL A SIA

Russian 10, 84, 89ff, 107ff, 114, 118 Tajik 108 Tatar 108 Turkish 108, 114 Uighur 108, 114 Ukrainian 108, 114 Uzbek 108, 114 Khazar University 33, 42 Khinaligs 35 Khorezm 60 Khorog 192–3 Khovar news agency 195 Khujand 179, 189, 192 Khusain, Kobe Sh. 100–1 Kocharli, Nigar 43 Kokand 72 Kominatov, Yernazar 66 Koran 14, 108, 158 Korean language in AZ 43 in KA 92, 94, 108, 111, 114 in KY 146 in TA 185 in UZ 66–7, 74, 76 Koreans 47–8, 51, 66–7, 80–1, 93–4, 117, 171, 174 Kryzs 35 Kul-Muhammed, Mukhtar 114 Kulob 192 Kungrat ethnic group 173–4 Kurdish language 108, 138 Kurds 20, 90 Kyrgyz 118ff, 133ff, 173–4, 185, 192, 206 Kyrgyz-American School 147 Kyrgyz International University 147 Kyrgyz-Kuwait University 146 Kyrgyz language 14, 68–9, 77, 117ff, 121ff, 125ff, 131ff,142ff, 146ff, 188, 206 Kyrgyz National University 148 Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University 146

INDEX Kyrgyz State University 144 Kyrgyz Tili 132, 137 Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University 141, 145, 147 Kyrgyz-Uzbek University 140, 145–6 Kyrgyzstan XIII, 1, 10, 13, 46, 49, 66, 81, 108, 117–50, 155, 167, 173, 193, 198, 201–3, 205, 211ff Russian language in 10, 119ff, 133ff Lad organization 90 Lak ethnic group 173–4 Language attitudes 18, 58–9, 87, 205, 207 Language challenges 16, 199 Language committees 16, 85, 98, 104, 131 Language community 7 Language competition 14, 15, 16 Language conflict 83, 91, 116, 134ff, 199 Language curricula 16, 51, 68, 89, 138–9, 141, 147, 160, 166 Language diversity 5, 6, 37, 186, 208 Language education in AZ 38–43 in KA 108ff in KY 135ff in TA 187ff in TU 154ff in UZ 64ff see also education Language festivals 51 Language grievances 11 Language of interethnic communication 85–6, 91, 121, 129, 154, 177–8, 201 Language intervention 206 Language laws and decrees 11–12, 24–7, 30–1, 35, 37–9, 42, 50–3, 63, 68, 78, 81, 83, 85ff, 92, 96, 99, 105, 110, 112–3, 120ff,

261

123–7, 133, 137, 147–50, 154–5, 176–8, 185, 187–8, 200–1. Language loyalty 95 Language maintenance 201 Language nationalism 207 Language planning 2, 15, 52, 82–3, 98 Language policies 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 12, 14–15, 17–18, 26, 29, 49, 51, 64, 78, 82, 84–6, 91, 95–6, 100–2, 106–7, 115–6, 126, 128, 130, 154, 157, 169, 178, 189, 199–202, 204, 207, 210 Language politics 14, 17–8 Language problems 1, 5 Language reforms XIII, 4, 7, 14–17, 19ff, 38, 53, 94ff, 199–120, 198–202, 204, 206–7, 209–10 in AZ 19ff, 25–6, 30ff in KA 106ff in KY 133ff in TA 180ff in TU 164ff in UZ 67ff Language rights 17, 35, 208–9 Language rivalry 150, 199 Language Russification, see Russianization Language shift 9, 15, 83, 201, 205, 207 Latin language 16, 25, 53, 57, 75, 132 Latin script 11, 15, 17, 26, 30–3, 38, 53ff, 56–8, 62, 78, 104, 115, 186, 206 Latinization 13, 16, 32, 46, 53–8 in AZ 15, 26, 30–1, 102–3, 156, 206 in KA 102–5, 115 in KY 129 in TU 15, 102–3, 155–7, 165, 169, 172, 206 in UZ 15, 53–8, 102–3, 140, 156, 206 in Turkey 56–7, 102–3 in the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic 57

262

L ANGUAGE POLITICS

Laws, see language laws and decrees Legislation, see language laws and decrees Lexical Research Committee 52 Lezgi language 20, 40 Lezgin National Drama Theatre 36 Lezgins 20, 35–6, 40, 80 Libraries 33, 56, 64, 129, 148, 168–9, 193 Linguistic assimilation 202 Linguistic identity 4 Linguistic imperialism 4 Linguistic minorities 17–18, 35–7, 133ff, 184 Literacy 33, 55–6, 58, 157, 200 Literature 10, 56–8, 60–1, 65, 69, 73, 103, 107, 155, 176, 182, 189, 193 Lithuanian language 74 Loanwords 10, 28, 130 Lomonosov Moscow State University 111, 193 Lyuli (Central Asian Roma) 48, 141, 143 Madaliyev, Sabit 55 Magtymguly Turkmen State University 167 Mamadnazarov, Abdusalom 181 Mambetalieva, Erkaiym 145 Mansurov, Kh. 52 Marsh, Maria XIV Media 1, 2, 9, 200, 203–4, 208 in AZ 32, 37, 43–6 in KA 87–8, 89, 91–2, 98–100, 112–6 in KY 123–4, 133, 141, 148ff in TA 179, 195–7 in TU 151, 169ff in UZ 76–8 see also internet, press, radio, television Meskhetian Turks 20, 35, 48 Migration 15, 19, 39, 47–8, 59, 62, 66, 81–2, 91, 105–6, 117, 119,

IN

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121, 127, 129, 132, 134, 139, 163, 169, 175, 178–80, 184, 196 Ministries Communications 171, 197 Culture and Information 88, 96–7, 104, 113, 148 Education 136, 138–9, 188–9, 196 Education and Science 103–4, 107, 109, 125, 129 Education, Science and Youth Policy 185 Finance 181 Foreign Affairs 115, 189 Higher and Special Secondary Education 60, 74 Interior Affairs 125 Justice 195 People’s Education 57, 62, 68 Transport and Communications 114–5, 130 Minority languages 17, 35–7, 40, 57, 63, 74, 113, 152ff, 160, 171, 185–6, 197, 206 See also by language Minorities 17, 21, 35–7, 47–8, 59, 63ff, 69, 78, 85, 92ff, 107, 117, 122, 130, 133–41, 152ff, 160–1, 169, 175–6, 178, 203, 208 see also ethnies Modernization 104, 155, 188, 203 Moldovians 48, 80 Mongolia 81 Monolingualism 3, 9, 14, 83, 202 Moscow 9, 12, 16, 168, 179 Mother-tongues 37, 41, 46, 61, 63, 70–1, 78, 123, 125, 137–9, 143, 154, 162, 169, 176, 207–8 Multilingualism 1, 2, 8–10, 37, 44, 83, 88, 92, 131, 137, 201, 208 Musayev, Oruj 32 Nagornyi Karabakh 22–3 Nahçivan 13 Naslediye Yevrazii 12

INDEX Nasreddin Tusi Azerbaijan State Pedagogical University 42 Nation building 1, 2, 5–8, 51, 82, 93, 128, 153, 176, 204, 208 Nation states XIII, 23, 82, 203 National Academies of Science 12 in AZ 37 in KA 100, 102 in KY 119, 127 in TA 181, 183, 196 in TU 155, 169 in UZ 57 National authenticity 178 National Commission on the State Language 119, 130–1, 133 National identification 8, 15 National identity 1, 6, 22, 24, 81, 104, 120, 126, 129, 132, 157, 176, 178, 198, 202–4, 210 National languages 4, 10 National Programme on Training of Specialists 67 National Strategy for Education Development 188 Nationalism 3, 7, 9, 10, 36, 45, 51, 55, 63, 83, 85, 90–1, 97, 121–3, 146, 149, 174, 182, 184, 204, 207–9 Nava’i, Alishir 58 Navoiy 50 Nazarbayev, Nursultan 82–6, 88, 92, 94, 103, 106, 109, 116 Nazarbayev University 109 Nazarzoda, Sayfiddin 181, 183 Networks 7, 34, 45, 94, 181, 199, 203 Newspapers, see Press Niyazov, Saparmurat 153–4, 156–161, 163–4, 166, 169 Nukus 60, 66 Nur Otan party 114 Official language 4, 28, 50, 86–7, 122–6, 134–5, 137, 150, 177, 201 Oil industry 33

263

Oil reserves 21 Onomastics 99 Onzhanov, Nurlan 93 Open Society Institute 192 Opera 160 Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) 49 Osh 133–4, 140–1, 143–6, 149 Osh State University 148 Ostrovskii, A. V. 12 Otunbayeva, Roza 120 Öskemen 109 Özal, Turgut 165 Pakistan 117, 182 Pamiri Peoples 174, 185–6, 192–3 Pan-Turkism 14, 192 Patriotism 23, 84, 112, 157, 160, 198, 204 Pavlodar (Kereku) 100 Periodicals, see Press People’s Assembly (TU) 159 People’s Council (TU) 153, 157 Persian language 1, 11, 16, 25, 45, 64, 159, 176, 180, 182–4 Persian script 182–4 Persian speakers 10, 183 Persians 48 Poles 80 Policies, see Language policies Polish language 43, 74, 108, 114 Politicolinguistics 1. See also Language politics Popular Front 29 Presidentialism 203–4 Press 33, 200, 204 in AZ 32–3, 36, 44 in KA 81–3, 90–1, 100, 1l3–4 in KY 104, 114, 124, 128, 130–1, 133, 147–9 in TA 114, 181–2, 184, 196 in TU 114, 151, 156–7, 159, 169–70 in UZ 51, 53–4, 57–8, 65, 73, 76, 114

264

L ANGUAGE POLITICS

Programme for the Development of the State Language of Kyrgyzstan 123 Programme on Development of… languages…in Tajikistan 177 Pushkin, Alexander 155, 163–4 Putin, Vladimir 163, 204 Qafqaz University 34, 43 Qaidarov, Abduali 98 Qazaq Tili 98 Quadrilingualism 107 Qurghonteppa 192 Radio 26, 35, 45, 51, 65, 72, 76–7, 89, 98, 114–5, 119, 124, 149, 157, 159, 162, 170, 177, 196, 204 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 149, 170, 196 Rahimova, Naila 32 Rahmon (Rahmonov), Emomali 175, 178, 180–1, 183, 189, 193 Rakhimov, Farkhad 183 Rasht Valley 175 Rudaki Institute of Language and Literature 181 Ruhnama 158, Figure 164 Russia 17, 21, 27, 36, 46, 48–9, 55, 90, 117, 129, 185 Russian Federation 12, 15, 28–9, 36, 43, 45, 49, 61–2, 81, 90, 104–5, 111, 119, 121, 129, 132, 134, 138, 140, 149, 159–60, 162, 164, 167, 176, 178–9, 180, 184–5, 188–9, 193, 202, 204, 206, 209 Russian language XIII, XIV, 2, 3, 6, 8–13, 15–17 in AZ 11, 20–2,25–9, 44 in KA 10, 11, 29, 81, 85ff, 90ff, 100ff, 105ff, 109ff, 114, 121, 200, 204–5, 208 in KY 10, 11, 29, 121ff, 124ff, 135ff, 140–6

IN

CENTR AL A SIA

in TA 11, 29, 174, 176–80, 182, 184–6, 189, 193–4, 196 in TU 11, 154ff, 159ff, 163ff, 168ff in UZ 11, 47ff, 51–2, 57–63, 66, 68–72, 75–6, 78 Russian-Tajik (Slavonic) University 193 Russian World Foundation (Russkii Mir) 9, 193 Russianization 8–10, 94 Russians 4, 10–12, 19, 20, 22–3, 27, 29, 35, 47–8, 50, 53, 59, 60, 69, 78, 80, 82, 90, 94, 96, 100ff, 118ff, 133ff, 151–2, 162, 174, 176, 184–5, 199 Russkii Mir, see Russian World Foundation Russophobia 55 Russophones 10, 27, 50–1, 59, 60, 81, 83–5, 96–7, 102–3, 116–7, 119, 122, 124–5, 130, 133, 184, 196, 201–2, 205, 209 Rustamkhanly, Sabir 27 Rüstəmova, Afaq 33 Sabirov, Alisher 140 Sadval 36 Samanid empire 175 Samarkand 58, 60, 64–5, 174 Samarkand University 65 Satorov, Abduzhabor 193 Sattarov, Rufat XIV Scandinavian languages in AZ 43 Second World War 17, 93 S. Seidi Turkmen State Pedagogical Institute 167 Separatism 95 Shaikenov, Nagashbai 95 Shakhdags 35 Shiites 19, 173, 176 Shymkent 113 Silk Road International School 146

INDEX Slavs 5, 11, 15, 17, 59, 80–2, 85, 90, 106, 117, 121–2, 133–4, 169, 179, 196, 205 Slovak language 43 Society for Friendship of Peoples 194 Solikh, Mukhammad 54 South Korea 94 Soviet Union XIII, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16, 22, 50, 64, 67, 79, 93, 121, 140, 143, 173, 182, 184, 187, 198–9, 204, 207 Soviets 6 Spanish language in AZ 43 in KA 111 in UZ 71, 74 St. Petersburg 160 Stalin, Joseph 94 State Agency for Cultural Affairs 131 State Commission on Language 26, 32 State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting (AZ) 44 State Cultural–Aesthetic–Learning Centre (KY) 137 State Engineering Institute (KY) 111 State formation 6, 7, 21, 207 State Language 4, 10, 15, 18, 25–7, 35, 39, 42, 46, 50, 63, 84–9, 91, 97, 105–6, 121–8, 131, 133, 137, 154, 177–9, 194, 197, 201 State Pedagogical Institute 111 State Programme of Development of Language in Kazakhstan 88–9 State Terminology Commission (KA) 88, 99 Strategic Centre for Social and Political Research (KA) 91–2 Sughd 185 Suleimenov, Olzhas 83–4 Sunnis 64, 79, 117, 151, 173, 176 Syllabuses 38

265

Tajik language 57–8, 64–5, 68–70, 75–7, 108, 138, 141–2, 176–9, 180, 182ff, 186ff, 189, 194 Tajik script 176, 182–4, 206 Tajikistan XIII, 1, 11, 15, 173–99, 201–2, 205–6, 211ff Tajikization 179–81 Tajiks 68–9, 78, 80, 118, 173ff, 180, 199 Talas 149 Talysh 20, 36, 40, 206 Tashkent 50–1, 55, 57–60, 62, 66–7, 71, 73–5, 77 Tashkent Islamic University 75 Tatar language 74, 108 Tatars 20, 47–8, 80, 118, 152, 174 Tats 20, 35 Teke tribe 153 Television 26, 35, 44–5, 51, 57, 67, 76–7, 89, 93, 98, 114–5, 124, 134, 141, 149, 156–7, 170–1, 177–8, 181–2, 184, 196, 204 Terminology 16, 52, 61–2, 88–9, 97, 99, 100, 130–1, 158–9, 181 Textbooks 31, 37–41, 54, 56, 60–3 in KA 63, 91, 98–9, 102 in KY 63, 123, 130, 136–7, 139 in TA 63, 180, 186–8, 194 in TU 63, 155–7, 162, 164 in UZ 64, 68, 140 in Karakalpak 66 in English 72 in French 74 in German 73–4 in Russian 112, 160, 180, 189, 193 Theatre 36, 67, 73, 92–3, 134, 155, 185 Til Dil 131, 138 Titular ethnies 7–8, 10, 120, 126, 151, 198, 203 Titular languages 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 15–17, 34, 49, 78, 83, 120–1, 169, 199–201, 204–5

266

L ANGUAGE POLITICS

Tog‘ayev, To‘lkin 57 Tokmok 149 Toponymy 100 Tosuncuoğlu, Irfan 141 Treaty of Cooperation (TU) 162 Trilingual project 106–7 Trilingualism 64, 106–7, 154, 163, 165 Tsakhurs 20, 35, 40 Tugzhanov, Yerali 92, 107 Tuimebayev, Zhanseit 107 Tulip Revolution 120, 130 Turkestan 109 Turkey 12, 13, 20, 30, 32–5, 57, 73, 81–2, 108, 117, 144, 147, 149, 165–6 Turkic languages 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 15–17, 34, 49, 78, 83, 120–1, 169, 199–201, 204–5 Turkic speakers 10, 11, 13 Turkicization 64, 184 Turkish alphabet 31 Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TIKA) 13–14 Turkish language 8, 12–14, 27, 32–4, 43–5, 54, 57, 71–2, 76, 99, 105, 108–9, 111, 142–6, 166, 168, 170, 192 Turkish Language Centre (AZ) 34 Turkish Language Teaching Centre (KY) 144 Turkish Language Training Centre (TA) 192 Turkish Ministry of National Education 34, 192 Turkish World Research Foundation 34 Turkism 23 Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights 153 Turkmen language 14, 57, 67–70, 106, 152ff, 157ff, 162ff, 167, 169, 170, 186, 189 Turkmen Language Institute 155

IN

CENTR AL A SIA

Turkmenistan XIII, 1, 10, 13, 49, 67, 81, 106, 108, 151–173, 188–9, 201–3, 206, 211ff Turkmenization 153–4, 157–8, 160–2, 169, 171–2 Turkmens 48, 67, 152, 160, 165, 171, 173–4, 192 Turks 117 Türkmen Döwlet Habarlary 170 Türkmenabat 158 Türkmenbaşy 154, 158 Udins 20, 35, 40 Uighur language 74, 92, 108, 114 Uighurs 48, 80–1, 85, 94, 107, 118, 138 Ukrainian language 43, 74, 108, 114 Ukrainians 20, 35, 48, 80, 118, 148, 152, 174 UN Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination 161 UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs 160 UNESCO 33, 43, 171 Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Turkmenistan 170 Union of Kyrgyzstan’s Education Organizations 127 United Kingdom 109, 112, 160 United States of America 33, 49, 109–12, 140, 143, 147, 167, 188, 202 United States Information Agency 77 Universities 13, 15–16, 143–4, 210 in AZ 13, 29, 32, 34, 36, 42–3, 46 in KA 13, 90, 94, 108–12 in KY 13, 130, 144ff in TA 179, 192–4 in TU 13, 157–8, 163–8 in UZ 60–2, 65, 67, 75 in Turkey 13, 34, 73, 165–6

INDEX in the Russian Federation 160, 189 See also by university’s name University of Central Asia 109, 147, 193 University of Kentucky 147 Uzbek language 14, 49, 51ff, 56–61, 64, 68–71, 75–8, 92, 108, 119, 134, 142, 152, 155, 163, 177, 184, 186–9, 194, 196 Uzbek National University 75 Uzbek State University of World Languages 67, 75 Uzbekistan XIII, 1, 10, 47–78, 81, 117, 134, 140, 155, 161, 173–4, 185–6, 196, 198–9, 201–2, 206, 211ff Uzbekistan Communist Party 49 Uzbekistan Teachers of English Association 72, 77 Uzbekistan’s Lawyer Association 53 Uzbekization 51–3, 184 Uzbeks 8, 48ff, 53, 61, 192, 198–9 in KA 8, 80, 107 in KY 117–8, 125–6, 130, 133ff, 141, 150, 199, 207

267

in TA 173–4, 176–7, 185–6, 192, 196 in TU 161, 171 Vienna 111, 153 Vocabulary intervention 16, 33, 52 Westernization 147 Westminster International University 75 World Association of Kazakhs 82 World Bank 38, 68 Writers’ Unions 83, 196 Xinjiang 49, 81, 117 Year of education 187 Year of the Tajik language 177 Yomut tribe 153 Yurdakök, Murat 32 Zarafshon 50 Zhezkazgan University 109