Language, Education and Uyghur Identity in Urban Xinjiang 1138847720, 9781138847729

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
List of figures
List of tables
Acknowledgements
Contributors
1 Language, education and Uyghur identity: an introductory essay
2 Major determinants of Uyghur ethnic consciousness in Ürümchi
3 Between minkaohan and minkaomin: discourses on 'assimilation' amongst bilingual urban Uyghurs
4 The construction of Uyghur urban youth identity through language use
5 Second/third language learning and Uyghur identity: language in education for Uyghurs in urban Xinjiang
6 Representations of Uyghurs in Chinese history textbooks
7 Young Uyghurs' perceptions of Han Chinese: from Xinjiang to inland, from state to individual
8 Escaping 'inseparability': how Uyghur graduates of the 'Xinjiang Class' contest membership in the Zhonghua minzu
9 Education, religion and identity among Uyghur hostesses in Ürümchi
10 Conclusion: the importance of being Uyghur
Index

Citation preview

Language, Education and Uyghur Identity in Urban Xinjiang

As the regional lingua franca, the Uyghur language long underpinned Uyghur national identity in Xinjiang. However, since the Âbilingual educationÊ policy was introduced in 2002, Chinese has been rapidly institutionalised as the sole medium of instruction in the regionÊs institutes of education. As a result, studies of the bilingual and indeed multilingual Uyghur urban youth have emerged as a major new research trend. This book explores the relationship between language, education and identity among the urban Uyghurs of contemporary Xinjiang. It considers ways in which Uyghur urban youth identities began to evolve in response to the imposition of Âbilingual educationÊ. Starting by defining the notion of ethnic identity, the book goes on to explore the processes involved in the formation and development of personal and group identities. It considers why ethnic boundaries are constructed between groups and when ethnic identity markers might be employed in the pursuit of interests. It also questions how ethnic identity is expressed in social, cultural and religious practice and explores the relationship among language use, education and ethnic identity formation and expression. In order to address these matters, it reviews some key arguments in the field of ethnicity theory, and then considers research findings around identity development. As a study of ethnicity in China this book will be of huge interest to students and scholars of Chinese culture and society, Asian ethnicity, cultural anthropology, sociolinguistics and Asian education. Joanne Smith Finley is Senior Lecturer in the School of Modern Languages at Newcastle University, UK. Xiaowei Zang is Professor and Dean of the College of Arts and Liberal Sciences at the City University of Hong Kong.

Routledge Studies on Ethnicity in Asia Series editor: Xiaowei Zang City University of Hong Kong

This series provides a timely and important outlet for research outputs on ethnicity in Asia. It will encourage social science debates on theoretical issues related to Asian ethnicity and promote multidisciplinary approaches to the study of ethnicity in Asia. 1

Islam, Family Life and Gender Inequality in Urban China Xiaowei Zang

2

Language, Education and Uyghur Identity in Urban Xinjiang Edited by Joanne Smith Finley and Xiaowei Zang

Language, Education and Uyghur Identity in Urban Xinjiang Edited by Joanne Smith Finley and Xiaowei Zang

First published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2015 Joanne Smith Finley and Xiaowei Zang The right of the editors to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-84772-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-72658-8 (ebk) Typeset in Times by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

List of figures List of tables Acknowledgements Contributors 1

Language, education and Uyghur identity: an introductory essay

vii viii ix x

1

JOANNE SMITH FINLEY AND XIAOWEI ZANG

2

Major determinants of Uyghur ethnic consciousness in Ürümchi

34

XIAOWEI ZANG

3

Between minkaohan and minkaomin: discourses on ‘assimilation’ amongst bilingual urban Uyghurs

55

DAVID TOBIN

4

The construction of Uyghur urban youth identity through language use

75

ABLIMIT BAKI ELTERISH

5

Second/third language learning and Uyghur identity: language in education for Uyghurs in urban Xinjiang

95

MAMTIMYN SUNUODULA

6

Representations of Uyghurs in Chinese history textbooks

114

JANINA FEYEL

7

Young Uyghurs’ perceptions of Han Chinese: from Xinjiang to inland, from state to individual YANGBIN CHEN

132

vi

Contents

8 Escaping ‘inseparability’: how Uyghur graduates of the ‘Xinjiang Class’ contest membership in the Zhonghua minzu

157

TIMOTHY GROSE

9 Education, religion and identity among Uyghur hostesses in Ürümchi

176

JOANNE SMITH FINLEY

10 Conclusion: the importance of being Uyghur

194

GARDNER BOVINGDON

Index

205

Figures

3.1 ÂBilingual educationÊ hastens buds (ÂShuangyuÊ cui beilei) 5.1 Process for the implementation of the English language education policy in Xinjiang 6.1 Image from Ji and Li (2009b, 57) 6.2 Image from Ma and Qi (2009a, 84) 6.3 Image from Ma and Qi (2009a, 83)

61 102 121 123 124

Tables

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5

Background characteristics of the Ürümchi respondents Distribution of ethnic consciousness among Uyghurs in Ürümchi Correlations with ethnic consciousness among Uyghurs in Ürümchi Multivariate regression analyses of Uyghur ethnic consciousness Self-reported Uyghur language proficiency (%) Self-reported Chinese language proficiency (%) General patterns of language use (%) Generational differences in language use (means) Differences in language use between minkaomin and minkaohan (means) 5.1 Number of ethnic minority students at ethnic minority schools in 2004 5.2 Uyghur finalists in the CCTV English-Speaking Contest since 2004 7.1 Appendix: demographic information of Uyghur student respondents

45 47 47 48 82 82 84 88 90 101 108 153

Acknowledgements

This volume and the publication workshop that preceded it has been from start to finish a collaborative project and an equal partnership between the two editors. The editors and the authors of Chapter 1 are listed alphabetically. Opinions and arguments expressed in various chapters in this volume are the sole responsibility of the individual authors concerned, and should not in any way be attributed to the institutions with which they are associated. The editors thank Cambridge University Press and Modern Asian Studies for granting permission to reprint the following article as Chapter 2 of this edited volume: Xiaowei Zang, 2013, ÂMajor Determinants of Uyghur Ethnic Consciousness in Urümchi.Ê Modern Asian Studies 47(6): 2,046 71. We extend our sincere thanks to the China and Inner Asia Council of the Association for Asian Studies (US) and the White Rose East Asia Centre (UK) for their generous support of the workshop ÂUyghur Youth Identities in Urban Xinjiang,Ê held at the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield in July 2011, and which underpinned the production of this volume.

Contributors

Ablimit Baki Elterish joined the University of Manchester, UK, in August 2006, where he is currently working as Senior Language Tutor in Chinese Language in the School of Arts, Languages and Cultures. His research interests include language attitudes, language contact, bilingualism and bilingual education in Xinjiang, China; Uyghur anthropology; language teaching and learning (e.g. in Chinese and Uyghur) and translation (Chinese/Uyghur English and vice versa). He has published several journal articles and book chapters, and translated books on these topics, starting in 2001. His article ÂLanguage Contact between Uyghur and Chinese in Xinjiang: Uyghur Elements in Xinjiang PutonghuaÊ (International Journal of Sociology of Language) was published in 2012. Dr Baki Elterish is also one of the translators of Uyghur Meshrep in China (Xinjiang PeopleÊs Publishing House, 2013). Gardner Bovingdon is an Associate Professor in the departments of Central Eurasian Studies and International Studies at Indiana University, USA. He specialises in the study of nationalism; identity politics and conflict; socialism and post-socialism; and the political construction of peoples and spaces. He has published articles and book chapters on historiography, state policies, and everyday politics in Xinjiang, drawing on more than 22 months of fieldwork conducted there between 1994 and 2002. His book The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (Columbia University Press) was published in 2010. He is now conducting research for a book on architecture, urban planning and identity in Kazakhstan. Yangbin Chen is Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies in the School of Humanities at La Trobe University, Australia. Since 2004, he has published a range of journal articles and book chapters on Chinese ethnic and educational studies. Dr Chen is the author of Muslim Uyghur Students in a Chinese Boarding School: Social Recapitalization as a Response to Ethnic Integration (Lexington, 2008), and co-editor of an edited volume, Minority Education in China: Balancing Unity and Diversity in an Era of Critical Pluralism (HKU Press, 2014). He is also the co-developer and co-editor of a textbook, Yan and Yan: Learn Chinese and Study China (New South Publishing, 2015 forthcoming). His current research projects include a longitudinal study of graduates of the

Contributors

xi

ÂXinjiang ClassesÊ boarding schools at universities and workplaces in Xinjiang and eastern China; a sociological and cultural exploration of ethnic perceptions between Han and minority communities in China; and sociolinguistic enquiries on Asia Literacy and on e-learning in Chinese as a second language. Janina Feyel is a PhD candidate working towards her doctorate in Sinology at the University of Munich, Germany. She holds an MA in cultural anthropology and is a certified translator of Chinese. Her former research projects were focused on Hui and Uyghur culture. Her current dissertation research explores contemporary Chinese cookbooks and food museums. From 2010 to 2014 she worked as Research Associate for the Institute of Sinology at the University of Munich, teaching courses in Chinese language, material culture and minority culture. Timothy Grose is Assistant Professor of China Studies at Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology in Terre Haute, Indiana, USA. He completed his PhD in the Department of Central Eurasian Studies at Indiana University, Bloomington, in 2014. His work on Uyghur ethno-national identity, the ÂXinjiang ClassÊ boarding school and everyday expressions of Islam in Xinjiang has appeared in the Journal of Contemporary China, in Asian Studies Review, and in James Leibold and Yangbin ChenÊs edited volume Minority Education in China: Balancing Unity and Diversity in An Era of Critical Pluralism. Joanne Smith Finley joined Newcastle University, UK, in January 2000, where she is currently Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies in the School of Modern Languages. Her research interests include the formation, transformation, hybridisation and globalisation of identities among the Uyghurs of Xinjiang; strategies of symbolic resistance in Xinjiang; alternative representations in Uyghur popular culture (subaltern cosmopolitanism); the gendering of ethnopolitics in Xinjiang; and continuity and change in gender roles among Uyghurs in urban Xinjiang and in the diaspora. She has published a range of journal articles and book chapters on these topics, starting in 2000. Her monograph The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and Uyghur Han Relations in Contemporary Xinjiang (Brill Academic Publishing) was published in 2013. This is an ethnographic study of evolving Uyghur identities and ethnic relations over a period of 20 years (from the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union through the 1997 Ghulja disturbances and the 2009 Ürümchi riots to the present). Dr Smith Finley is also co-editor of Situating the Uyghurs between China and Central Asia (Ashgate, 2007). Mamtimyn Sunuodula was educated in China and in the UK, specialising in educational psychology and multilingualism. His current research focuses on multilingualism and negotiation of Uyghur identity in Xinjiang. He has lectured on educational psychology and conducted research on Uyghur education in Xinjiang, China, and worked for the BBC World Service and the British Library in the UK before joining Durham University, UK, as a specialist in Asian and Middle Eastern languages. He currently teaches research methods and skills

xii

Contributors to postgraduate researchers, and Chinese language and culture at undergraduate level. He is Secretary to the Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies and responsible for managing the University LibraryÊs Asian and Middle Eastern resources.

David Tobin joined the Politics department at Glasgow University, UK, in September 2013 following a previous appointment as Lecturer in Politics at the University of Manchester. His research interests are interdisciplinary, spanning international relations theory, social anthropology, Chinese studies, Xinjiang studies, identity politics, nationalism, ethnicity, post-colonial studies, post-structuralism, and globalisation. He conducted his doctoral research at the University of Manchester, which included a period of language training at Beijing University and Xinjiang Normal University. His PhD thesis, titled ÂNation-Building and Ethnic Boundaries in ChinaÊs North-WestÊ, examines how the concept of performativity can be applied to the securitisation of identity in official discourse and the politics of the everyday. The empirical focus is on how the party-stateÊs attempts to deepen integration of Xinjiang and Turkic-speaking Uyghurs into China shape popular responses and resistance to the nation-building project by both Han Chinese and Uyghurs. Dr Tobin is currently converting his thesis into a monograph, and preparing a series of journal articles on ethnicity in contemporary China based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork. His next large-scale research project will explore how ChinaÊs increasingly influential public intellectuals theorise the role of ethnicity in what they see as ChinaÊs rise to global superpower status. Xiaowei Zang received his BA from Xiamen University in China, and his MA and PhD from the University of California at Berkeley. He joined the City University of Hong Kong as Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences in 2013, after serving as Professor of Chinese Studies and Head of the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield, UK, for five years. He studies ethnicity, gender and elite behaviour in China, and has produced more than 120 research outputs, including five authored books and many refereed articles in top indexed journals.

1

Language, education and Uyghur identity An introductory essay Joanne Smith Finley and Xiaowei Zang

This book explores the relationship between language, education and identity among the urban Uyghurs of contemporary Xinjiang. We start by defining the notion of ethnic identity: what are the processes involved in the formation and development of personal and group identities? In what circumstances do ethnic identities (rather than other available identities) become salient? How and why are ethnic boundaries constructed between groups? When might ethnic identity markers be employed in the pursuit of interests? How is ethnic identity expressed in social, cultural and religious practice? And what is the relationship among language use, education (including language teaching and learning), and ethnic identity formation and expression? To address these questions, we review some key arguments in the field of ethnicity theory, and then consider research findings around identity development. Next, we provide a basic outline of Uyghur ethnohistory, and discuss self-representations among the Uyghurs of contemporary urban Xinjiang in the context of current language and education policies.

Ethnic identity Primordialism, a concept put forward by early anthropologists, refers to the tendency of human beings to attribute power to certain shared ÂgivensÊ, such as perceived (or actual) origins, language, territory or cultural characteristics (Shils 1957). Ethnicity is not of itself primordial; rather, humans perceive it as such because it is embedded in their common experience of the world (Geertz 1973). The concept has been criticised as ÂessentialistÊ insofar as it posits that ethnic identity is fixed, ÂnaturalÊ and unchanging (Green 2006; Bayar 2009). Primordialism is also a subjectivist position in defining an ethnic group to be a Âself-perceived group of people who hold in common a set of traditions not shared by the others with whom they are in contactÊ (De Vos 1975, 9). Group members select ethnic identity markers with which to structure their group from within (Eriksen 1993, 37), and thereby define how the group differentiates itself from others (De Vos 1975, 16). In this process of Âself-ascriptionÊ, the features taken into account are not the sum total of ÂobjectiveÊ cultural differences relative to other groups, but only those which the actors themselves regard as significant (Barth 1969, 14, our emphasis). ÂCriteria for cultural differenceÊ may include but are not limited to racial

2

Joanne Smith Finley and Xiaowei Zang

uniqueness (a sense of genetically inherited differences), place of origin (territory), economic independence, religious beliefs and practices, aesthetic cultural forms (food, dress, music, dance), and language (De Vos 1975, 9). When ethnic identity is treated as ÂprimordialÊ by a group, that groupÊs perception of irreconcilable cultural differences can make cultural assimilation difficult (Spencer 2006, 77), or provoke fear, conflict and violence between groups (Geertz 1973). Advocates of the instrumentalist (also situationalist/circumstantialist or objectivist) school, frequently political scientists, hold that ethnic groups and indeed nations are the artificial constructs of modern political and cultural elites (Green 2006). These scholars emphasise the interest-oriented dimensions of ethnicity, such as a groupÊs desire for political power or their articulation of demands for socio-economic equality (Keyes 1981). They hold that ethnicity becomes important Âonly insofar as it serves to orient people in the pursuit of their interests vis-à-vis other people who are seen as holding contrastive ethnic identitiesÊ (Despres 1975, 199). Without the incentive of material advantage, some have argued, psychological boundary maintenance between ethnic groups would simply disappear (Despres 1975, 199). Others take the more nuanced view that in order to be viable ethnicity must involve both instrumentalist and primordialist elements, namely, it must simultaneously serve political ends and satisfy psychological needs for belongingness and meaning (Cohen 1974). Within this complex understanding of ethnic identity as an intermeshing of common origins and shared political or socio-economic interests vis-à-vis the ÂothersÊ, the notion of ÂhomelandÊ may assume a prominent position: The ÂhistoricÊ land [. . .] where terrain and people have exerted mutual, and beneficial, influence over several generations. The homeland becomes a repository of historic memories and associations [. . .] The landÊs resources also become exclusive to the people; they are not for ÂalienÊ use and exploitation. (Anthony D. Smith 1991, 9) While re-introducing primordialism into the equation, these scholars departed from the earlier notion of culture as fixed, eternal and insulated from outside influence. Fredrik Barth famously argued that all ethnic groups Âmust include cultures in the past which would clearly be excluded in the present because of differences in formÊ (1969, 12). He also proposed that ethnicity is not isolated, but relative, writing extensively on the role of psychological boundary maintenance: ÂCategorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation [. . .].Ê (Barth 1969, 9. cf. Eriksen 1993, 10). In other words, ethnicity can only develop if an ethnic group is in regular contact with another group or groups from whom it considers itself substantially different. Drawing on Sartrean theory to expand this position, Thomas Hylland Eriksen (1993) argued that both Âwe-hoodÊ and Âus-hoodÊ are essential for an ethnic category to come into existence: not only must group members have historical and cultural experiences in common, they

Language, education and Uyghur identity

3

must also share a marked sense of feeling different from the ÂothersÊ. Ethnicity thus involves both commonalities (complementarisation) and differences (dichotomisation) between categories of people, and Âgroup identities must always be defined in relation to that which they are notÊ (Eriksen 1993, 35, 10). It is for this reason that the relevance of ethnic identity has sharply increased in the context of human migrations and globalising flows. Most scholars today agree that ethnic groups are fluid and endogenous to a set of social, economic and political processes (Bayar 2009). Individuals and groups may adopt a variety of identities in different contexts and at different times. Identities are by nature transient; they can lie dormant for a time, then be re-created in modified or modernised form in reaction to certain stimuli. This is how, for instance, group consciousness of a shared heritage of values led young Mongols to create an ancient Mongolian identity anew in the form of modern pop songs about Chingis Khan (Gross 1992, 15). Given the consensus that ethnic identity is contingent on the society around us, it follows that identity formation involves an interplay between the psychological and the social. Albert Epstein, while contending that identity is Âfed by taproots from the unconsciousÊ, notes that it is cognitive in another of its aspects (1978, 101). Eriksen emphasises the interdependence of the inner and social organisation, describing identity formation as a process Âlocated in the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal cultureÊ (cited in Epstein 1978, 7). The identities we assume as adults consist of Âidentity fragmentsÊ (Eriksen 1993, 147), understood as unconscious identifications made during childhood, combined with pieces of identity we consciously gather from the social world, based on positive and negative experiences. In this way, ethnic identity is constructed and modified as young people become aware of their ethnicity within the larger socio-cultural setting (Phinney 2003, 63). Ethnic identity formation, like other forms of identity construction, becomes especially salient during adolescence. During this fragile transition period, ethnic discrimination in society (for example, a language policy that disadvantages a particular group) can lead members of socially devalued groups to internalise negatively perceived traits, resulting in a decreased will to achieve, self-degradation, or a sense of inferiority. According to scholarship on three generations of ethnic change in the US, minority individuals from the younger generations became increasingly embedded in the ÂAmericanÊ way of life, and gradually became detached from the neighbourhoods of their parents and grandparents. Ethnic characteristics (e.g. cultural expressions of identity, religious affiliations, language use) became less stable over time, and, with each successive generation, rates of intermarriage rose. On the other hand, these studies show that ethnic prejudice in society in some cases fuelled group pride, leading to the ethnic incorporation of the devalued group. Thus, some groups worked to reinforce their ethnic identity, and resisted ethnic assimilation in all its forms, including exogamy (Horowitz 2013). It was common for later generations to develop novel and different ways of understanding and connecting to their ethnicity, a phenomenon some called Âsymbolic ethnicityÊ (Gans 1996).

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Ethnic identity development We can gain further important insights into ethnic identity by looking at studies of identity development. Theories in this area are situated at the intersection of developmental and social psychology. Developmental psychologists built on EriksonÊs seminal work Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968), which explains how the Âidentity crisis of adolescenceÊ is resolved by reconciling identities imposed by family and society with the personal need for an identity that brings feelings of satisfaction and competence. Meanwhile, social psychologists centred on the sense of group belonging, and the negotiation of social identity in the context of the value placed on group membership by society (summarised in French, Seidman, Allen and Aber 2006). Findings showed that individuals belonging to highly valued groups in society need not modify their social identity, while those belonging to devalued groups usually resort to one of three strategies: (a) individual mobility if possible, the individual chooses to physically leave the group and change group membership; where not possible owing to gender, race or ethnicity, the individual chooses to psychologically leave the group by dis-identifying with it; (b) social creativity the group as a whole chooses to redefine the meaning of their group membership by comparing themselves with the out-group on a dimension on which they are superior, or by changing the values assigned to the attributes of the group from negative to positive; and (c) social competition the group as a whole fights the current system to change the hierarchy of group membership in society. (Tajfel and Turner 1986) It was further suggested that people who are high in collective self-esteem are more likely to seek to actively redefine ethnic group membership (strategy b) or to restore a threatened social identity (strategy c), while people low in collective self-esteem tend to opt for individual mobility (strategy a) (Crocker and Luhtanen 1990). Studies show that older adolescents are more likely to be at higher stages of identity development than younger adolescents, suggesting that individuals progress linearly as they age, although it is also possible for individuals to regress to lower stages over time. French, Seidman, Allen and Aber (2000; 2006) conducted two studies to measure factors influencing changes in ethnic identity during early and middle adolescence. Using subscales of Âgroup-esteemÊ (how one feels about ethnic group membership) and Âidentity explorationÊ (the extent to which an individual searches for meaning in ethnic group membership) in the second study (2006), they recruited 420 students in the grade prior to the transition to either junior high or senior high school. Their average age at the time of the pre-transition year assessment (Time 1) was 11.28 years for the early adolescents and 14.01 years for the middle adolescents. At Time 1, both the early and the middle adolescents attended schools which were predominantly homogeneous in ethnic terms.

Language, education and Uyghur identity

5

At Time 2 (the transition year), the early adolescents transitioned into similarly homogeneous junior high schools, but the middle adolescents generally transitioned into ethnically diverse senior high schools. The results of this study are compelling: they indicate a significant increase over time in both group esteem and identity exploration, with higher increases occurring among the two minority groups (African American and Latino American) than among the majority group (European American). They also confirm a rise in identity exploration across the normative transition to ethnically mixed senior high schools. The authors explain this by noting that early adolescents live in racial and ethnic enclaves and thus may not interpret ethnicity as worthy of exploration. However, once adolescents leave the safety of the neighbourhood and are faced with persons who look and act differently, ethnicity becomes salient, and the process of exploration begins. At this point, negative ÂencountersÊ with members of other ethnic groups may push individuals towards exploring the meaning of ethnic group membership. Despite this lack of exploration, however, early adolescents had already begun to develop positive group esteem. The authors suggest that this results from the positive social influence of parents, peers and popular media. When it came to the middle adolescents, the African American cohort reported low group esteem at Time 1. They appeared to hold a negative view of their group membership, and to be psychologically distancing themselves from their group. However, over the next two years, group esteem increased dramatically among this cohort, indicating a rejection of the standards by which their group is judged by the wider society. These findings, which indicate ethnic identity development towards higher levels with age, provide an important backdrop to the questions explored in this volume. Below, we consider ethnic identity development among the Uyghurs through history.

A concise Uyghur ethno-history There are 56 officially recognised nationality groups in the PeopleÊs Republic of China (PRC). The Han Chinese are the ethnic majority, whereas the Uyghurs constitute the fifth largest minority nationality. There were nearly 3.3 million Uyghurs in Xinjiang in 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over this vast region (Yin and Mao 1996, 43 4; Li 2003, 38 9; Toops 2004, 243 8). The first PRC census found 3.6 million Uyghurs living in Xinjiang in 1953; the second PRC census, more than 4 million in 1964; the third PRC census, nearly 6 million in 1982; the fourth PRC census, nearly 7.2 million in 1990; and the fifth PRC census, more than 8.3 million in 2000, respectively (Toops 2004, 243 8; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Local History Compilation Committee 2004, 1). According to the sixth PRC census, taken in 2010, Uyghurs in Xinjiang numbered more than 10 million, compared with a regional Han population of just over 8.4 million (Australian Centre on China in the World 2012). The vast majority of Han residents inhabited the Âeconomic beltÊ and surrounding industrial cities of north Xinjiang in 2006, while over 80 per cent of Uyghurs were clustered around the impoverished southern oases of Artush, Kashgar, Yengi Shähär, Yarkand,

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Khotän, Lop and Keriya (Harlan 2009). In 2009, there were 1.75 million Han Chinese resident in Ürümchi city (regional capital), compared with 310,000 Uyghurs (Howell and Fan 2011, 125). Chinese sources claim that the origins of the Uyghurs can be traced back to the Dingling nomads of north and northwest China, and to the areas south of Lake Baikal and between the Irtish River and Lake Balkhash (in todayÊs Mongolia), by the third century B.C. The Dingling were subsequently referred to as the Tiele, Tieli, Chile or Gaoche, and Weihe in Chinese historical documents prior to the seventh century (Chang 2003, 40). In 744 they formed a powerful Uyghur steppe empire, which would last for one hundred years. Inhabiting a vast territory, their capital was Karabalghasun, located on the high Orkhon River in what is now the Republic of Mongolia (Mackerras 1972). When the Uyghur khanate collapsed in 840 following an invasion by Kyrgyz nomads, the Uyghurs migrated towards the south and southwest in three streams. One stream fled south to China; the second eventually settled in Gansu; while the third crossed the Tianshan to the region now known as south Xinjiang. There, in the Turpan basin, they built the Buddhist kingdom of Qarakhoja/Gaochang (850 1250), and gradually fused with the highnosed, bearded Iranian inhabitants of the Tarim basin (Geng 1984, 5 6; Barfield 1989, 150 7; Millward 2007, 42 6). The Uyghurs did not fall under direct Chinese rule until much later, when the Qing empire gained control over Xinjiang following a series of successful military campaigns against the Dzunghars (Mongolian warriors and rulers of the region at that time) in the seventeenth century. Qing rule in Xinjiang was contested in a series of local Turkic rebellions, of which the most serious was led by Yaqub Beg (1864 1877). Though feted as a Uyghur national hero today, Yaqub Beg was in fact a foreigner from the Khoqand khanate situated to the west of the region. Already at the beginning of his rule, local Kashgarians were collecting troops to oppose him (Kim 1986, 113 14), and over time they increasingly resented the privileges that Khoqandians held over them (Tsing 1961, 145) as well as the heavy taxation imposed by that regime (Tsing 1961, 149; Kim 1986, 189). Partly as a result of local disaffection with Yaqub Beg, the Qing Army was able to put down the local Turkic rebellion, and Xinjiang became a province of the Qing empire in 1884. Qing emperors relied on a beg system (beg was a generic term for the chief of a Turkic group in an oasis, appointed by the central government) to maintain their rule over the region. These indigenous leaders, who were bound by salaries and titles to the Qing empire, were frequently dubbed Âdogs with human facesÊ by their ethnic brethren (Kim 1986, 46). While Qing officials ran political and military affairs in the region, local peoples were able for the most part to preserve local languages, cultures and social practices under their jurisdiction (Newby 1998; Borei 2002, 276 80; Ji 2002, 95 162; Kim 2004, 11; Clarke 2011, 18 21). After the Qing empire was toppled in 1911, Xinjiang was ruled successively by three Chinese warlords: Yang Zengxin (1912 1928), Jin Shuren (1928 1934), and Sheng Shicai (1934 1944). In particular, General Sheng sought to suppress the emerging Uyghur nationalist movement, was known for his extensive use

Language, education and Uyghur identity

7

of torture in his campaigns against pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic activities, and was regarded by Uyghurs as a ruthless mass-killer (Forbes 1986, 151 61; Hyer 2006, 81). In 1933, Uyghur rebels formed the Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan (TIRET), based in Kashgar. While this republic was suppressed by Chinese and Tungan (Hui) forces in 1934, the central government of the Nationalist (Guomindang) regime was nonetheless unable to place Xinjiang under its direct control until 1944. It appointed four governors of Xinjiang between 1944 and 1949: Wu Zhongxin (1944 1945), Zhang Zhizhong (1945 1947), Masud Sabri (1947 1949) and Burhan Shähidi (1949) (Clarke 2011, 28 41). Later, with the support of the Soviet Union, Uyghurs established the East Turkestan Republic (ETR) in Ili, Tarbaghatay and Altay in northern Xinjiang between 1944 and 1949. Together, the TIRET (1933 34) and the ETR (1944 49) are regarded as landmarks in the evolution of Uyghur nationalism, beginning in the 1920s (Forbes 1986; Benson 1990; Bovingdon 2001; 2010). The East Turkestan Republic was absorbed into the PRC when the CCP and its army entered Xinjiang in 1949 (Braker 1985, 109; Bai and Ozawa 1992; Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, Institute for Historical Research 1997, Vol. 2, 328 40; Vol. 3, 92 165, 166 85, 329 34, 335 6, 435 48, 483 5, 495, 511 27; Ji 2002, 252 78; Li 2003, 145 57, 218 23; Huang 2003, 79, 127, 144; Clarke 2011, 37 9). Some Uyghurs expected that they would soon enjoy full political independence in Xinjiang as they had been promised by Mao Zedong a decade earlier; instead, ÂCCP officials asked Uyghurs to be satisfied with autonomyÊ (Bovingdon 2004, 5; Clarke 2011, 40 1). The region became the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on 1 October 1955.

The Uyghurs under the CCP During the Maoist period (1949 1976), the CCP promoted measures to integrate Xinjiang into the PRC, and prosecuted some Uyghurs with ÂdeviantÊ political or religious views (Millward and Tursun 2004, 88 9; Shichor 2005, 127; Van Wie Davis 2008, 2; Hess 2009, 85 6). In 1962, some 60,000 Uyghurs and Kazakhs fled northern Xinjiang into the Soviet Union, exasperated with CCP policies and with the number of Han migrants that had flooded the region in the wake of the famine associated with the Great Leap Forward (McMillen 1979; Niu 2005, 23; Bovingdon 2010, 51). Yet despite these incidents, there were relatively few examples of direct Uyghur Han conflict between 1949 and 1966 (Dillon 1995; 2004; Millward 2004). This situation changed during the Cultural Revolution (1966 1976), when the CCP carried out a draconian political campaign against the so-called Âagents of local nationalismÊ (local leaders and intellectuals who advocated cultural rights for minority groups) (Rudelson 1997, 104; Heller 2007, 47 8). During this ten-year period, 99,000 of a total of 106,000 minority cadres in Xinjiang were dismissed from their leadership posts (Koch 2006, 8). Large-scale religious repression took place, including the closing of rural bazaars, attacks on imams and mosques (with some turned into slaughter-houses for pigs), and the public burning of religious

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scripts (Dreyer 1968; Fuller and Lipman 2004, 322, 326 8; Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004; Van Wie Davis 2008, 2; Hess 2009, 86). This campaign was perceived in Xinjiang as an all-out attack on ethnic minority cultures and religions by the Chinese government and the Han people, which is an important factor underlying the growth of ethnic consciousness and resentment towards the CCP among Uyghurs in the post-1978 era (Heller 2007, 49). After the Cultural Revolution, the CCP recognised the damage that had been done. To attempt reconciliation, the Party introduced new policies which opened up a relatively tolerant environment for ethnic and religious expression from the late 1970s to the early 1990s (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004, 307; Hess 2009, 87). Uyghur intellectuals were given some freedom to express their versions of Uyghur history and culture, which were not always consistent with official rhetoric (Rudelson 1997, 115; Bovingdon 2001). Grose (2012, 372) shows that, during this time, Uyghur editorial teams were able to replace Ârigid Han-centric imaginings of Chinese national identityÊ in textbook content with Ânarratives that provide space for asserting a distinctively Uyghur ethno-national identityÊ. An example is one Uyghur language textbook published in 1991, compiled by two Uyghur editors, and Âembroidered with markers of Uyghur identityÊ (Grose 2012, 376). Written right to left in the modified Arabic script, it introduces Uyghur customs and festivals, the different oases of Xinjiang, daily life among Uyghurs, and the major religions that Uyghurs have followed. Crucially, the editors satirise the failure of Han Chinese cadres in Xinjiang to make efforts to learn about ethnic minority customs (Grose 2012, 376 7). Religion also flourished once more during this period. Pilgrimages to Mecca were resumed in 1979, after a fifteen-year break (Shichor 2005, 122), and some Uyghurs went to Malaysia, Pakistan and the Middle East to study Islam (Bequelin 2000, 88; Fuller and Lipman 2004, 330). By 1989, the number of mosques in Xinjiang had increased by 5.8 times compared with a decade earlier, to some 20,000 (Smith Finley 2007b, 634; Van Wie Davis 2008, 2). The Chinese government also accorded Uyghurs a certain level of preferential treatment in the areas of family planning, college admission, job placement and leadership representation (Rudelson 1997, 125; Koch 2006, 16; Reny 2009, 502). Since 2000, the CCP has placed economic development and regional stability firmly at the centre of political rhetoric with the launch of the Great Western Development (Xibu da kaifa, 西部大开发) campaign. This campaign consolidates policies pioneered during the 1990s; with it, the government hopes to resolve the Ânationality problemÊ, and strengthen ethnic unity in the region by way of accelerated economic growth (Sines 2002; Bequelin 2004; Goodman 2004, 317, 319 20; Hess 2009, 94 5; Koch 2006, 6, 14, 16; Van Wie Davis 2008, 4 5). At the same time, the CCP has endeavoured through its routine use of the phrases ÂChinese personÊ (Zhongguoren, 中国人) and ÂChinese peopleÊ (Zhonghua minzu, 中华民族) to include all nationality groups within the unitary ÂChinese nationÊ. The CCP insists that China is a united, multi-ethnic nation. This nation, it argues, resulted from the Âoutgrowth of the historical development of the past several thousand yearsÊ, and consists of a Âbig fraternal and co-operative family composed of all

Language, education and Uyghur identity

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nationalitiesÊ, within which ethnic minorities Âform with Han Chinese a single, unbreakable unitÊ (Bulag 2002; Hyer 2006, 76 7; Mackerras 2011, 114).

Rising Uyghur ethnic consciousness since the 1990s Despite the CCPÊs efforts to promote national unity in the PRC, ethnic consciousness has increased on a dramatic scale among the Xinjiang Uyghurs since the 1990s. Scholars report a growing discontent against a range of state policies (and in some cases Chinese rule itself), and there is an acute sense of separation between Us (Uyghurs) and Them (Han Chinese) (Cesàro 2000; Bellér-Hann 2002; Smith 2002; Koch 2006, 10 11; Van Wie Davis 2008). Within this context, a small number of Uyghur activists have taken direct (and sometimes violent) action against buildings, infrastructure and people representative of the Chinese government (Millward 2004; Shichor 2005, 121; Hess 2009, 89 90; Bovingdon 2010, 105 34). Yet the vast majority of Uyghurs have engaged in ÂeverydayÊ or ÂsymbolicÊ resistance of a non-violent nature (Rudelson 1997, 137; Smith 2002; Bovingdon 2002; Heller 2007, 8 9, 54; Smith Finley 2013a), a pattern that continues despite successive crackdowns following the Ghulja disturbances of 1997 and the Ürümchi riots of 2009. Of particular note is the process of re-Islamisation, which has gained momentum among a section of the Uyghur population, and which increasingly cuts across categories of age, gender, social/class background and oasis origin (Waite 2007; Smith Finley 2007b; 2013a; Harris and Isa 2014). It is significant that this pattern is also observable in the regional capital Ürümchi, a city formerly often viewed as a symbol of Uyghur linguistic and cultural ÂdilutionÊ. In the southern city of Kashgar, global flows have introduced reformist ideas, broadening local disputes over what are considered ÂcorrectÊ Islamic beliefs and practices (Waite 2007). This process of re-Islamisation has been largely peaceful and cathartic, and there is a diverse set of reasons behind it (Smith Finley 2013a). While some articulate Islamic renewal as a symbol of local opposition to national (Chinese) and global (US, Russian, Israeli) oppression of Muslims (Smith Finley 2007b), others characterise it as a response to failed development (as perceived by those who failed to benefit from it), and a corresponding desire to return to social egalitarianism. While some have returned to Islam as a response to the frustrated ethno-political aspirations of the 1990s (failure to achieve independence along the lines of the new Central Asian states), others did so as a reaction against modernity and a return to cultural ÂpurityÊ a process previously documented for many Middle Eastern societies (Ayubi 1991; Esposito 1997; 1998). For still others, Islam is a vehicle for personal and national reform in a context where (ethno-) political non-fulfilment is conceived as a divine punishment for moral decline. The re-Islamisation process both reflects and reproduces a rising Uyghur ethnic consciousness since the early 1990s. As Fuller and Lipman note, Islam is most prominent among a set of distinguishing Uyghur characteristics, and attending mosque and engaging in other public religious rituals are Âconsciously recognized as a means of reinforcing the distinctiveness of the Uyghur community from the dominant Han population and the Chinese stateÊ (2004, 339). For Dwyer

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(2005, 19, 22), being Turkic and Muslim is central to the modern manifestation of the Uyghur ethnic identity. Other scholars argue that in recent years the Uyghur national identity has come to be equated exclusively with Islam (Koch 2006, 10), and that those with questionable adherence to Islam are unlikely to be accepted as authentic members of the Uyghur nation (Hess 2009, 82). Nevertheless, other Uyghurs, in particular the urban youth, have drawn on a wider variety of sources to define and celebrate their ethnic identity. One such source is transnational cosmopolitanism. In the early 2000s, a young musician named Arken Abdulla (also known as the ÂUyghur Guitar KingÊ) provided a contemporary role model for Uyghur youth, as it began to move between regional and national boundaries, and then stepped across the national boundary altogether. As Baranovitch shows, Arken was one of the first artists to make Âthe move beyond Uyghur tradition and the geographical boundaries of XinjiangÊ, immortalising this act with his first studio album, The Dolan Who Walked Out of the Desert (Zou chu shamo de Daolang, 走出沙漠的刀郎), the title of which signals his aspiration to Âconnect to the rest of the worldÊ (2007, 70). This emerging cosmopolitanism among young Uyghurs should be regarded as both ÂsubalternÊ and ÂrootedÊ (or ÂpartialÊ). It is ÂsubalternÊ because cosmopolitanism can never be gender or ethnically neutral, in other words, cosmopolitan sociability cannot negate preexisting social relationships of unequal power. It is also ÂsubalternÊ because cosmopolitan openness is constrained by the particularities of the historical moment; by time, place and circumstance (Glick Schiller, Darieva and Gruner-Domic 2011, 411 13). It is ÂrootedÊ or ÂpartialÊ because cosmopolitan sociability is embedded within practice-based identities, and can be found only in social relationships that do not negate cultural, religious or gendered differences. Transnational networks of connection between people of different cultural backgrounds do not necessarily produce cosmopolitan openness; rather, they involve limits (Glick Schiller, Darieva and Gruner-Domic 2011, 403 4). For Uyghurs in urban Xinjiang, cosmopolitan sociability with other groups is limited by contestations over territory and culture, in a historical context of comparatively recent colonial domination (little more than two hundred years). They are therefore unlikely to enter into relationships of cosmopolitan sociability with Han Chinese. Instead, they seek out peoples with whom they have Âexperiential commonalities despite differencesÊ (Glick Schiller, Darieva and Gruner-Domic 2011, 403). This goes some way to explaining the fascination of contemporary Uyghur youth with the Flamenco culture of southern Spain, itself heavily influenced by North African Sufism, or with politically informed hip-hop in the US (Smith Finley 2011b). As one leading Uyghur musician put it: ÂSome cultures are more alike than othersÊ (Smith Finley 2013a, 208). Cosmopolitanism is often conceived as a threat to the claims of the nation-state; as sitting in opposition to national identity, and as seeking to transcend the nation (Catterall 2011, 342). Its trans-border loyalties may be seen as ÂtreacherousÊ, indeed, as a critique of nationalism itself (Glick Schiller, Darieva and GrunerDomic 2011, 401). In Xinjiang, where Uyghur continues to serve as the regional lingua franca despite increased levels of urban bilingualism, the popularity of

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Central Asian and Turkish songs (with their vocals in Turkic-Altaic languages) derives from a sense of linguistic and cultural closeness. In the Uyghur-dominated YanÊanlu district in southeast Ürümchi, university students Âlistened to music from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkey rather than from other regions of ChinaÊ in 2005, and the district was fast becoming Âa cultural hotspot influenced primarily by the Turkic westÊ (Eri 2008, 77 8). A shared linguistic identity also means that Uyghur customers will normally choose imported Turkish chocolate over locally produced Chinese chocolate, because it is labelled in the Latinised modern Turkish script and comprehensible to most Uyghurs, who retain familiarity with the yengi yeziq (the Latinised New Script in use before 1980) (Erkin 2009, 425 6). This food shopping phenomenon is of course also attributable to a shared cultural and religious identity. Uyghur customers are more likely to believe that Turkish brands of chocolate are halal (permitted in the Islamic religion). In this way, Âbranding, like national identity, trades upon familiarity, trust and aspirationÊ (Catterall 2011, 337); only, in this case, identifications and aspirations are linked not to the bounded Chinese nation-state but to the transnational pan-Turkic world. Smith Finley observed an example of pan-Turkic identification in Ürümchi in 2004, when 18-year-old Uyghur students Ömär and Dilbär related the following story around international football: During the last World Cup, it happened one time that China had to play Turkey. We were watching it in the big hall at school and, of course, China lost! It was really funny; every time Turkey began to do well, we cheered them, and our Han classmates looked askance at us and got really irritated! (Smith Finley 2013a, 387) She reports that, as they spoke, the two sat eating Turkish biscuits and chocolate, thus expressing (Pan-Turkic) cultural, religious and political affinities through the simultaneous consumption of international sport and halal foodstuffs. Such incidents fully demonstrate the importance of the notion of Âalternate centresÊ (Bequelin 2004, 377) in stressing an alignment away from Beijing and towards Turkey and the Turkic cultural sphere. In another example of identification with alternate centres, recent studies find that a minority of students in Xinjiang prefer to learn a different foreign language in place of Chinese (Schluessel 2007, 268 9). Uyghur youngsters seemingly have no fear of the Âglobal advance of EnglishÊ; for them, the threat to the Uyghur language emanates rather from Chinese, as the Âhegemonic language cultureÊ in their region (Catterall 2011, 338). Their preference for the mother tongue (Uyghur) and selected foreign languages is further suggested by the fact that since at least 2008 the YanÊanlu district of Ürümchi, which regularly receives Russian- and Turkicspeaking merchant visitors, has been characterised by a trilingual language environment, with signs reproduced in Uyghur, Chinese and Russian (Eri 2008, 79). Uyghur studentsÊ preference for foreign languages other than Chinese suggests an alternative set of cultural and political allegiances in defiance of the Chinese state requirement of minority group alignment with the Han centre.

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In addition to cosmopolitan goods, sports and foreign languages, many Uyghurs in Ürümchi seek to purchase real estate in ethnically Uyghur (Uy. milliy) districts of the city such as the YanÊanlu area. Yet this preference does not reflect an inward-looking, culturally exclusive myopia. Rather, many Uyghurs simply consider the district to be Âmore cosmopolitanÊ than other parts of Ürümchi. As one Uyghur university professor observed, foreigners and elements of foreign civilisations can be seen there, and Âmodern ideas and fashions reach YanÊanlu firstÊ (Erkin 2009, 425). In this way, it is Central Asian businessmen and the influx of Central Asian cultural products that they enable who are viewed as bridging the gap between Xinjiang and the modern outside world. The emerging Uyghur middle class chooses to enhance its identity with reference points from outside China rather than from within (Erkin 2009, 420, 422). Another salient reference point for contemporary identifications is the Middle East. A fashion for belly-dancing has emerged in Ürümchi since the end of the 1990s, and spread to high-end Uyghur restaurants in Beijing and Shanghai. This new trend almost certainly emanated from the Arab world, which has become a major inspiration for young Uyghurs, who see it as rich, modern, Muslim (therefore culturally close) and autonomous (Harris 2005, 633). In this way, selective reception of global flows enables the evolution of a modern Uyghur culture that orients itself towards the Turkic and Arab west, while YanÊanlu becomes the locus for a selective cosmopolitan modernity. Uyghurs have long been known as Âone of the most nationalistic and least assimilated minorities in ChinaÊ (Heberer 1989; Dautcher 1999, 54 5, 337 9; Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004, 311; Mamet, Jacobson and Heaton 2005, 191; Kaltman 2007, 2; Millward 2007, 348 51). In the context of a rising Uyghur ethnic consciousness since the early 1990s, Chinese state actors perhaps feel that this is more true now than ever. In response, the government has carried out multiple ÂStrike HardÊ campaigns to target what it calls Âthe three evilsÊ of separatism, terrorism and religious extremism, in a bid to securitise Xinjiang (Fuller and Lipman 2004, 324 5, 330; Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004, 307, 316 18; Hess 2009, 90). So far, however, this repressive and punitive policy seems merely to have encouraged the further development of Uyghur ethnic consciousness vis-à-vis the Han Chinese (Dwyer 2005, 63; Hastings 2005, 32; Hyer 2006, 78 9; Hess 2009, 89 90). In 2013 and 2014, perceived state violence was met with indigenous violence on several occasions. These incidents, while unsophisticated, were significant in touching civilian victims in China proper for the first time in Uyghur history.

‘Bilingual education’ and Uyghur identity As suggested by the above discussion, a complex combination of factors may have contributed to a strengthened Uyghur ethnic identity in contemporary times. One possible factor is repression of the Uyghur language: the regional lingua franca in Xinjiang. In this volume, we ask: to what extent has the sense of Uyghur identity been either weakened or strengthened as a result of the bilingual education policy? Although there are several published articles on this topic, there is

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yet to appear a book that empirically examines the relationship among language, education and Uyghur identity in the post-2002 era. This is therefore a preliminary attempt to narrow the knowledge gap by focusing on the patterns, effects and meanings of language use among contemporary urban Uyghurs. Scholars have consistently shown that the Uyghur language is central to Uyghur ethnic identity (Smith 2000, 155, 157 61; Smith 2002, 159 61; Dwyer 2005, 59; Hess 2009, 82; Schluessel 2007, 260; Reny 2009, 493 4). As the regional lingua franca, the Uyghur language has long underpinned Uyghur ethnic identity. However, since 1995 state education policy has steered away from accommodative pluralism towards assimilative monoculturalism (Dwyer 2005, 29, 38 9; Schluessel 2007, 256 8, 263). In particular, starting from 2002, the Chinese government has promoted the so-called Âbilingual educationÊ (双语教育) policy in Xinjiang. The term Âbilingual educationÊ is a euphemism for the imposition and mandatory use of Mandarin Chinese (i.e. the language of the majority Han) in what were previously minority-language schools or classes (Schluessel 2007). The new policy abolished the Âseparate-but-equalÊ parallel education system, which formerly allowed Uyghur parents to choose the linguistic medium (Uyghur or Chinese) in which their children received tuition. By 2005, all minority-language schools and Chinese-medium schools in urban Xinjiang had been ÂconsolidatedÊ, with students from all nationalities taught together in one class (Schluessel 2007, 257). As a result, Mandarin Chinese has been rapidly institutionalised as the sole medium of instruction in the regionÊs higher, secondary and primary institutes of education. A secondary impact of the policy has been to relegate foreign languages such as Russian, English and Japanese to the status of third language, with pupils forced to study this third language through the medium of Mandarin Chinese. Not surprisingly, a broad range of Uyghur social groups objects to Âbilingual educationÊ, even while the majority refrains from taking direct action to protest it. Studies suggest that despite the gradual institutionalisation of Mandarin Chinese, many Uyghurs continue to prefer the use of their mother tongue in all but the professional realm (i.e. situations in which they must converse with Han co-workers) (Smith 2002; Baki 2012; Smith Finley 2013a). Dwyer (2005, 55, 63; also Yee 2005, 47; Schluessel 2007, 262 3) writes that many Uyghurs consider their mother tongue to be the central aspect of their identity and inviolable. In this context, the bilingual education policy has been perceived as ÂlinguicideÊ or Âlinguistic genocideÊ (the forced extinction of the minority language) and as a direct attack on Uyghur identity. Potential parallels may be drawn here with language trends among native Americans in the US. In her work on contemporary Navajo communities, Louise Lamphere (2007, 1,133 6) points out that linguistic assimilation, in addition to occupational and residential integration, spatial dispersal and intermarriage, has been a key catalyst of structural assimilation. Yet Uyghur objections to bilingual education do not mean an outright rejection of learning Mandarin. In fact, opinions among Uyghur parents as to the pros and cons of an education in the mother tongue versus an education in Mandarin have been divided since at least the 1990s. While some Uyghurs view their mother tongue as intimately bound up with Uyghur culture and identity and a cultural

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property to be defended, other Uyghurs are more instrumentally driven, thinking strategically in terms of the potential socio-economic constraints associated with exclusively speaking the mother tongue, and the corresponding benefits of learning Mandarin (Benson 2004, 198; Reny 2009, 493 4). The latter believe that Âwe must compete with the Chinese on their termsÊ, and consider a Chinese-medium education essential for promoting Uyghur identity from within the system (Rudelson 1997, 128, 144). Nonetheless, it seems clear that the vast majority of parents would at least have preferred to retain the choice regarding medium of education. Few Uyghurs would describe themselves as actively choosing to ÂacculturateÊ to Han culture; in their own words, they make a pragmatic decision to accommodate to the prevailing system. Via a process Schluessel (2007, 270) terms Âinstrumental acceptanceÊ, they opt to use Mandarin Chinese as a tool to further personal and group interests, and to improve their life chances. At the same time, many continue to express their separate ethnic identity through certain patterns of language use (Smith 2002; Smith Finley 2013a, 135 9).

The Uyghur authentic The fact of Chinese as sole medium of education across all levels of schooling since 2005, combined with a heavily Han-centric curricular content, inevitably raises the question of cultural authenticity of the Uyghur youth trained under that system. According to Vannini and WilliamsÊ social constructionist theory of authenticity (2009), negotiation of the ÂauthenticÊ is a flexible and powerful scheme of evaluation, which involves boundary-making and has direct implications for the shaping of in- and out-group processes. Thus, definitions of what is or is not culturally ÂauthenticÊ can affect relationships between Uyghur sub-groups as well as relationships between Uyghurs and other ethnic groups. Following state efforts since the 1950s to foster a Chinese-speaking minority elite, by the 1980s, two Uyghur linguistic sub-groups had emerged in urban Xinjiang: minkaohan (i.e. Uyghurs educated in Mandarin Chinese) and minkaomin (Uyghurs educated in Uyghur). The minkaohan can be loosely divided into three generations, emerging within different political and socio-cultural environments. First-generation minkaohan, schooled in the 1950s 1960s, appear to have got on reasonably well with the first generation of Han Chinese who settled in Xinjiang. While newly appointed Uyghur cadres learned Chinese, many Han newcomers attained at least functional fluency in the Uyghur language, and nearly all abstained from cultural practices considered offensive in Islamic practice (Smith 2002, 172 3; Taynen 2006, 50 1). As a result, this early cohort of minkaohan was well placed to form a bridge between Chinese administrators and the local people. The second generation was essentially the product of repression of minority languages and cultures during the Cultural Revolution (1966 1976). These individuals enjoyed no control over their education. Few Uyghur schools remained open during this period, and most children in urban areas were forced to attend Han schools (Dreyer 1976). There, they were taught in the Chinese language, which subsequently became their first language, if not their mother tongue.

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At the same time, the Arabic script, used by the Uyghurs since their conversion to Islam (and known to contemporary Uyghurs as the Old Script, kona yeziq), was discontinued in favour of the New Script (yengi yeziq) based on the Latin alphabet (Bellér-Hann 1991; Dwyer 2005). The experience of this generation of minkaohan was characterised by an acute sense of schizophrenia; a lack of belonging, either to the Chinese social world to which they were expected to assimilate, or to their own people among whom they felt themselves ÂfakesÊ. The third generation has grown up during the free market economy period in the context of accelerating Han migration to Xinjiang, and represents a conscious decision taken by urban Uyghur parents to increase their childrenÊs life chances (education, employment, socio-economic status and stability) in a rapidly changing society. As numerous informants in Ürümchi explained in 2004: ÂA decade ago, private Han-run companies would only consider hiring minkaohan [not minkaomin]; now, many wonÊt hire Uyghurs full stopÊ (Smith Finley 2007a, 220). For this third wave, there was an element of choice regarding medium of education, albeit within an ethnically stratified environment that seemed to point to only one course of action. The minkaohan of the 1990s grew up in Uyghur families, where most received a solid and positive home education in Uyghur socio-cultural practices, many of them deeply influenced by Islam. On reaching school age they went to Han schools, where Chinese gradually replaced Uyghur as their first language, and where they were exposed to contrastive Chinese notions of culture (Ch. wenhua, 文化), including different attitudes to education, social and gender relations, religion and so on. The transfer affected individuals in different ways, producing a myriad of ÂtypesÊ on a broad spectrum of hybrid cultural combinations. For some, the experience produced a temporary or permanent sense of shame regarding their minority background, and a sense of cultural lack, as it had for second-generation minkaohan. Others enjoyed more positive identities, considering themselves ÂmodernÊ, ÂprogressiveÊ and ÂinternationalistÊ. Often, thirdgeneration minkaohan experienced all of these emotions, at once or in different moments. Upon leaving education, they entered adult life to find that their partial sinicisation earned them only partial entrance to the sphere of Han privilege, with access increasing in proportion to the degree of sinicisation, but not guaranteed. At the same time, the two worlds they spanned were fundamentally divided by inter-ethnic tension, and they were considered neither (wholly) Uyghur by minkaomin nor wholly Chinese by the Han. The experience of Chinese-educated Uyghurs in many respects mirrors that of Russian-educated Kazakhs in contemporary Kazakhstan, where the Russianspeaking identity is several decades more established (Smith Finley 2007a). The Russified Kazakhs, product first of the language and cultural policies of Tsarist Russia and then of Soviet nationality policies, were moulded by an aggressive programme of Âcultural colonizationÊ (including the introduction of atheistic education), intended to effect change in Kazakh self-identity (Akiner 1995, 51 2). As a result, some felt a sense of cultural deprivation regarding their limited command of the mother tongue (Akiner 1995, 58), while others began to associate the Kazakh language with ÂbackwardnessÊ and stigma (Nazpary 2002, 155 6). Today,

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many young ÂcosmopolitanÊ Kazakhs prefer the Russian-language press to the Kazakh-language press, considering it a better medium for acquiring information from the outside world (Dave 1996, 56). Yet awareness of a specifically Kazakh identity persists, and young people generally name Kazakh as their mother tongue (Akiner 1995, 51 2). In Xinjiang, the status of having Chinese as first language came to be perceived as a ÂminusÊ by sections of the Uyghur community in the 1990s, and as representing linguistic and cultural ÂdilutionÊ (Taynen 2006, 46; Smith Finley 2007a, 229 30). Minkaohan were often accused of having incomplete Uyghur linguistic and cultural knowledge, and even of becoming Âquasi-HansÊ (Smith 1999, 163 4). Minkaomin in particular claimed that minkaohan acted Âless like Uyghurs and more like HanÊ (Schluessel 2007, 259). Labelled ÂXinjiangÊs 14th nationalityÊ (Smith Finley 2007a, 229), minkaohan became the Âpreferred scapegoatsÊ of the minkaomin community and the butt of jokes; some even saw minkaohan as potential collaborators with Han Chinese, as ÂtraitorsÊ and Âsell-outsÊ (Taynen 2006, 51, 57; Smith 2007a, 230). Meanwhile, the superior status of Uyghur as the mother tongue was symbolically underlined by the frequent sight of a Uyghur offering apologies to an ethnic peer after mistakenly addressing them in Chinese (Smith 1999, 217 18; Smith 2002, 159 60; Taynen 2006, 48 9). In Beijing, too, a similar language hierarchy has been observed among minority students; there, minkaomin have tended to consider minkaohan as only loosely representative of their ethnic group, causing minkaohan in Beijing to experience a Âtorn identityÊ (Hasmath 2011, 1,850 1). Several scholars have examined the psychological effects of a minkaohan education among Uyghurs in Xinjiang. They found that, if growing up in a predominantly Uyghur neighbourhood, individuals tended to be academically confident and socially well-adjusted. If, however, an individual grew up in a mainly Han neighbourhood, they were more likely to be quiet, withdrawn and uncertain about taking the lead in activities with Han children (Taynen 2006, 52). Minkaohan often felt isolated in the Han classroom, being slow to follow the jokes and banter (in Chinese) of Han peers. Inhabiting Âan uncomfortable middle groundÊ, they had to contend with levels of ethnic discrimination not encountered by minkaomin, who studied in the linguistic and cultural safety of Uyghur-medium classes (Taynen 2006, 46; Smith Finley 2007a, 227 8, 230 1). One minkaohan father, who claimed it had taken him years to feel secure and capable, described the Chinese-medium classroom as Âsoul-destroyingÊ for Uyghur children (Taynen 2006, 53 4). The situation was equally unbearable when minkaohan returned to a Uyghur cultural environment. Put in a situation where they were expected to demonstrate Uyghur linguistic or cultural knowledge, many minkaohan felt trepidation and fear (Smith Finley 2007a, 226 7; Eri 2008, 76). Because they tended to be more articulate and comfortable using Chinese, they would shift easily between Chinese and their mother tongue. This frequent code-switching fed mistrust among minkaomin, and created a social barrier between the two (Taynen 2006, 48 9; Smith Finley 2007a, 229 30). Taynen cites a typical example of one Uyghur woman, who declined to dance at a Uyghur wedding because she felt she

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did not know how to dance ÂcorrectlyÊ; other guests took offence at this, viewing the womanÊs refusal as a social ÂslightÊ (2006, 56). In response to their experience of double prejudice from both Han and Uyghur communities, some minkaohan began to form a Âthird communityÊ; others, however, remained the Âperpetual outsider observing other peopleÊs culturesÊ (Taynen 2006, 46, 56). Following the standardisation of Mandarin Chinese as sole medium of education in the post-2002 era, one might expect that the stigma attached to minkaohan should gradually fade, as the proportion of Chinese-educated youth increases. In 2006, Taynen (2006, 48) noted that minkaohan children were Âirresistibly drawnÊ to Chinese movies, TV shows, comic books and music. Eri similarly observed that the growing popularity of Uyghur performers singing lyrics in Chinese to Uyghur-style music symbolises Âthe current social expectation for young Uyghurs to be fluent in Mandarin at the same time as being proud to be UyghurÊ (2008, 78). Such developments may however be received with horror by the older generations. To give an example, older Uyghur musicians tend to see any musical innovation, such as a new style of playing the tämbur introduced by Nurmuhämmät Tursun, or the fusion of Uyghur sounds with the rumba flamenca gypsy style, as a shocking deviation from authenticity that must necessarily have resulted from Chinese influence. Their horror reflects core anxieties surrounding the retention or loss of Uyghur culture and identity in an environment increasingly dominated by the Han language and culture (Harris 2005, 642; Smith Finley 2013a, 208). Despite these growing anxieties within the Uyghur community, it is increasingly clear that a Chinese-medium education does not have to lead to deep acculturation. Young Uyghurs can and often do emerge with multilingual and multicultural proficiency, while continuing to identify themselves solidly as Uyghur. The trend is reminiscent of LamphereÊs study, in which she shows how young Navajos in the US are combining elements of their own culture with Anglo culture while continuing to view themselves as Navajo (2007, 1, 133). Yet while young urban Uyghurs have become increasingly proficient at negotiating multiple languages and cultures, this proficiency has not improved their experience in an ethnically stratified labour market. In fact, employment opportunities have become increasingly scarce for Uyghur applicants, regardless of language proficiency. Poor labour market outcomes, including rising unemployment and under-employment, are another important reason for the growth and persistence of Uyghur ethnic consciousness. At the root of Uyghur disaffection is ethnically informed hiring discrimination, understood within a framework of relative deprivation. While it is true that economic development has been comparatively booming in urban Xinjiang, with a per capita GDP of 28,000 30,000 Chinese yuan in 2011 (Momtazee and Kapur 2013), and a regional GDP growth rate of 12 per cent in 2012 (China Briefing 2013), increasingly, Uyghurs are not accorded equal access to employment opportunities. In the early mid 1990s, minkaomin faced discrimination in job search on the basis of insufficient fluency in the Chinese language. Following the Ghulja disturbances in 1997 (see Millward 2004), minkaohan, once Âsignificantly better equipped to succeed economicallyÊ (Taynen 2006, 47, 54 5), also began to be disadvantaged, as Uyghur applicants

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were rejected solely on the basis of their ethnicity (Smith Finley 2007a, 220; 2013a, 44 55). It is common to see this caveat in the text of job advertisements in Xinjiang: ÂThe above-described post is restricted to ethnic Han applicantsÊ (Ch. yishang zhaopin xian Hanzu, 以上招聘限汉族) (Uyghur Human Rights Project 2012, 3 6). Moreover, Maurer-Fazio, Hughes and Zhang (2007, 177) have provided quantitative data to show that Uyghur men have been badly affected by these changes, with the percentage of working-age males in employment falling dramatically from 80 per cent to 60 per cent between 1990 and 2000. Even where Uyghurs are able to secure employment, they are often faced with poor or unequal progression opportunities. Relegated to lower administrative positions from where there is no hope of upward mobility (Taynen 2006, 51), or passed over for promotions, they watch as Han colleagues ascend within the hierarchy. Zang (2011; 2012) reports a substantial gap in income between Uyghur workers and Han workers in regional capital Ürümchi. As a result, many minkaohan experienced a strengthened ethnic awareness in response to workplace discrimination (Smith Finley 2007a, 228 9), and came to feel that they had sacrificed their culture and ethnicity (in the form of the mother tongue) to gain socio-economic advantages that did not materialise (Taynen 2006, 52).

Outline of chapters Given the institutionalisation of Chinese-medium education in Xinjiang since 2002, the relationship among language, education and ethnic identity constitutes an important direction for new research in Uyghur studies. Five chapters collected in this volume were originally explored at the workshop ÂUyghur Youth Identities in Urban XinjiangÊ, held at the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield in July 2011. At the workshop, established scholars and talented postgraduates came together to consider ways in which Uyghur urban youth identities are evolving in response to the imposition of Âbilingual educationÊ. In particular, we attempted to gauge where individuals including minkaohan and minkaomin locate themselves on the various spectra of modernisation, sinicisation, re-traditionalisation and globalisation. Following the Sheffield workshop, we successfully solicited another three contributions to the project, and decided to include Xiaowei ZangÊs paper on the major determinants of Uyghur ethnic consciousness, published in Modern Asian Studies in 2013, as a reprint. Below is a brief outline of the nine chapters. In Chapter 2, Xiaowei Zang seeks to identify the causes of rising Uyghur ethnic consciousness in the post-1978 era. Using quantitative survey data gathered in Ürümchi in 2007, Zang asks: is there a high level of ethnic consciousness among Uyghurs? And, if so, is Uyghur consciousness based more on instrumental factors than cultural properties, or vice versa? To answer these questions, Zang examines five potential sources of rising Uyghur consciousness: Han migration into Xinjiang; social stratification within the Uyghur community; Han Uyghur inequalities; Uyghur language use; and Islamic religiosity. Data

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analyses show a high level of ethnic consciousness among urban Uyghurs in Ürümchi. They also suggest that the effect of Han migration on Uyghur ethnic consciousness is not statistically significant. In other words, increased Han inmigration is not resulting in the cultural assimilation of local peoples; indeed, the opposite is more likely to be true. This finding demonstrates that levels of ethnic consciousness are not necessarily related to the relative size of minority and majority groups, and echoes patterns of ethnic revival observed among minority groups in the US and in Europe, where minority languages and cultures prevail despite the cultural and economic hegemony of white Americans and Europeans. On this basis, Zang concludes that levels of ethnic consciousness in Xinjiang are not dependent on the ethnic composition (majority minority ratio) of the regional population. On the other hand, his study indicates that religiosity and Uyghur language skills are both good determinants of Uyghur ethnic consciousness in Ürümchi, as too are class subjectivities (a Uyghur personÊs perception of their relative social rank). This latter should not be confused with level of income, which did not appear to be related to the degree of ethnic consciousness. So, why is a Uyghur high income earner not less nationalistic than a poorly paid Uyghur worker? Zang suggests that this is because Uyghur high income earners are more likely than other Uyghurs to work alongside Han Chinese. Many will have had to obtain higher qualifications or work harder than the latter in order to receive similar wages, in the context of ethnically based labour discrimination. Others, after comparing themselves with a Han counterpart, may place themselves on a lower rung in the urban social hierarchy, a comparison which in turn leads to resentment and heightened ethnic consciousness. Again, the perception of relative deprivation is salient here, helping to explain why class subjectivities are a good predictor of Uyghur ethnic consciousness, whereas income is not. Zang concludes that while levels of ethnic consciousness in the Uyghur community were based mainly on occupation in the 1980s (with intellectuals significantly more aware than either merchants or peasants), today, Uyghur language skills and Islamic affiliation are the key determinants of Uyghur ethnic consciousness in a context where cultural and religious factors have emerged as universal forces capable of promoting ethnic cohesion and unity. In Chapter 3, ÂBetween minkaohan and minkaomin: discourses on „assimilation‰ amongst bilingual urban UyghursÊ, David Tobin examines how Chinese party-state discourses on modernisation and Âbilingual educationÊ seek to produce the boundaries of, and order the meanings attributed to, the national and the ethnic in Xinjiang. In representing the Uyghur language as ÂbackwardÊ, the state positions the Uyghur minority on a rung below that imagined for the majority Han. Furthermore, this model of nation-building seeks to disconnect Uyghurs from their existing linguistic and cultural community through the elimination of the Uyghur language in PRC education. However, as Tobin shows, as they receive, negotiate and resist such discourses, young, urban, bilingual Uyghurs produce communities of a different kind. These alternative communities find shape in shared practices and social relations, in daily experiences that are real and visceral

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rather than ÂimaginedÊ. While meanings attributed by individuals to the use of the Uyghur language vary, that language retains a fixed viscerality and symbolic power to determine who is, and is not, a Uyghur. In seeking to predict possible futures for Uyghurs as ÂbilingualÊ schooling is rolled out region-wide, Tobin presents two in-depth, ethnographic case studies. At the request of his interviewees, Mukhtar and Mahigül, interviews were conducted primarily in English a circumstance which attests to the status of Mandarin as language of last resort among the Uyghur youth. TobinÊs case studies illustrate a divergent social trend apparent in Xinjiang since the second half of the 1990s. MukhtarÊs stance represents resistance to the imagined Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu) while MahigülÊs position is better described as accommodation. Yet at the same time, the attitudes articulated by these respondents bring nuance to the fixed boundaries of minkaohan and minkaomin. Rather than language use itself, Mahigül and Mukhtar emphasise the importance of a personÊs attitude towards language use. Through this lens, only those minkaohan who actively prefer to use Mandarin are placed outside of the self-identified Uyghur community (cf. Smith Finley 2013a, 368, 375; also Baki Elterish in this volume). For all other Chinese-educated and Chinese-speaking youngsters, Mandarin is simply seen as an unavoidable reality and necessity, which must be instrumentally negotiated to maximise the chance of finding decent employment in a labour market plagued by ethnically based hiring discrimination. As Tobin rightly underlines, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that by learning Mandarin, Uyghurs will Âbecome ChineseÊ. After all, neighbouring Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Tajiks did not Âbecome RussianÊ simply by dint of being Russian speakers (cf. Smith Finley 2007a, 221 2). Ultimately, coercive integration or Âimpact integrationÊ (see Chen in this volume) is unlikely to produce a willing and united multi-ethnic, national community; rather, it will produce destabilising effects as it strengthens UyghursÊ attachment to the mother tongue and their ethnic group. Continuing the focus on ÂbilingualÊ education, Ablimit Baki Elterish shows in Chapter 4 how the use of Uyghur or Chinese in interaction reveals much about contemporary identity construction. Starting from the premise that urban society in Xinjiang offers spaces in which people may become bilingual naturally through social experience, he compares language use among older people (Uyghurs aged 30 plus) and the youth (those aged between 15 and 29), as well as among minkaohan and minkaomin. Baki Elterish pays special attention to the internal identity politics produced among Uyghurs by the state policy turn towards Chinese as sole medium of education. His study illustrates how judgments concerning authenticity are often based on an individualÊs use of language: with whom and when does a person speak Chinese or Uyghur? And, more importantly, what is their personal attitude (see Tobin in this volume) towards the use of either language? The most significant finding in Baki ElterishÊs study, and one that helps to gauge the success (or failure) of the stateÊs Âimpact integrationÊ or linguistic assimilation agenda, is that next to no respondents use only Chinese (and no Uyghur) for verbal communication. While minkaohan use mainly Chinese for reading and writing, most use predominantly Uyghur or code-switch in verbal

Language, education and Uyghur identity

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interaction. The only time when Chinese is used exclusively is when respondents use the internet, write reports, read or send text messages. These are all domains in which the use of the Chinese script is institutionalised (state publishing; institutes of education; Han-managed work units or companies) or where the use of Uyghur script is not yet technically viable (telecommunications). The differences between minkaohan and minkaomin that emerge from this study could be construed as indicating a ÂpureÊ (essentialist) Uyghur ethnic identity versus a hybrid Uyghur identity. However, the authorÊs findings that in contemporary urban Xinjiang minkaohan youth use Uyghur regularly in verbal communication with parents and friends while minkaomin youth use Chinese regularly to engage with mass media suggest that this paradigm is in urgent need of revision. In Chapter 5, Mamtimyn Sunuodula draws on BourdieuÊs notion of the official national language as a ÂlegitimateÊ language imbued with symbolic capital to illustrate how policy makers over-promote the Chinese language in Xinjiang. One outcome is that there is no educational or socio-economic incentive for Han pupils to learn an ethnic minority language, despite the rhetorical stress the state places on the importance of reciprocal language learning. Another is the production of anxiety and resistance among ethnic minority students regarding the growing influence of the Chinese language and culture. Yet the study also contains clear evidence of group confidence regarding the ultimate retention of the Uyghur language and culture a confidence Sunuodula attributes to Âthe tenacity of indigenous culturesÊ. When it comes to English language education for ethnic minority pupils, the study finds little active participation of policy makers, and no guarantee of the required resources being made available in schools. While the Chinese government had initially intended English language education policies to be rolled out nation-wide, the author notes that it later issued a modified directive that implicitly excludes speakers of minority languages from access to English language tuition. In seeking to understand the impact of language policies in Xinjiang, Sunuodula asks how changes in the linguistic marketplace relate to processes of social, ethnic, national and global identity construction among the Uyghur youth. He rejects the notion that the study of English endangers local languages, seeing it rather as a new domain within the multilingual repertoire one that helps subalterns break with the constraints of ethnicity and class. Young Uyghur respondents demonstrated a keen interest in learning English, while the same motivation to learn was not in evidence when it came to Chinese. From their viewpoint, English is an important world language, mastery of which is essential to gain access to cutting-edge academic knowledge. Furthermore, an English language qualification can help a person find a better job and enable study abroad. According to Sunuodula, the meaning of obtaining a multilingual and multiliterate repertoire goes beyond socio-economic benefits to also include sociopolitical and cultural gains. In the first sense, his respondents reported that they have a real chance to compete with Han counterparts in the area of English language education. While Uyghur students face difficulty in adjusting to university studies in their second language (Chinese), and are disadvantaged in this respect

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compared with Han students, English is a foreign language for both groups. This area of study thus offers Uyghur students the possibility to balance the inter-ethnic power relationship. This finding is strongly borne out by the fact that Uyghurs have competed in the final rounds of almost every major English-speaking competition in China since 2004: despite representing less than one per cent of ChinaÊs total population, they consistently beat Han contestants from the best schools in the country. Their cumulative success means that Uyghurs are learning to be confident in their English language ability starting from a younger age (Beige Wind 2014). In terms of cultural gain, SunuodulaÊs respondents expressed a desire to learn about the world through the medium of English rather than what they see as the limited and filtered information available in Chinese. This fully suggests the wish to transcend PRC state discourses and national boundaries and become citizens of the world. As one commentator on Xinjiang put it: English study is fuelled by the desire to consume images that resonate with [young UyghursÊ] own aspirations [. . .] entering into an English-speaking world is also a way of drastically expanding the horizon of their imagination. Being able to watch and understand the lives of others in drastically different circumstances gives them ways of imagining a future life that might be different. (Beige Wind 2014) In this way, the willing investment in English as a third language is an investment in a young UyghurÊs identity, one closely related to their relationship with the world and their understanding of possibilities for the future. In Chapter 6, Janina Feyel considers the ways in which Uyghurs and the Xinjiang region are depicted in a set of contemporary school textbooks Zhongguo lishi (Chinese History). Comparing textual and pictorial depictions with the popular stereotypes of Uyghurs that appear in state discourses and circulate in Chinese society, she considers potential influences of Âtextbook knowledgeÊ on Uyghur identity construction. Because textbook knowledge is imparted at an age when children have not yet developed a value system and are most impressionable, textbooks and particularly history textbooks play an important role in the perpetuation of particular discourses and the shaping of young peopleÊs views. While the PeopleÊs Education Press (PEP) no longer enjoys the exclusive right to publish textbooks in the PRC, because of textbook censorship and pervasive self-censorship, textbooks continue to be highly uniform in content. Feyel finds that minority nationalities are under-represented in Zhongguo lishi, as much of the text deals with the history of the successive Central Plains states. As she observes, if we take into account the implicit connection between the respective terms ÂXinjiangÊ and ÂWestern RegionsÊ, then Xinjiang receives the most attention. Yet this attention is conditional on a particular vision: the directional verbs employed in descriptions of envoys and merchants moving between China proper and Xinjiang show that while Chinese persons Âwent westÊ (Ch. xi xing), those of the Western Regions Âcame eastÊ (Ch. dong lai). This language suggests an ingrained

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Confucian worldview that sees central and eastern China as situated at the centre of the universe while the Western Regions sit at the periphery (Harrell 1994). FeyelÊs second finding is that Uyghurs and Xinjiang, Tibetans and Tibet, are selectively deployed in the textbooks as a means of constructing a particular national history that serves the present. The Uyghur people are not mentioned in a chapter devoted to the Silk Road; rather, the text emphasises connections between the Han Dynasty and the ÂWestern RegionsÊ. One might legitimately deduce that the Chinese interest in Xinjiang now as then concerns the territory more than the people. A classroom activity, which is dedicated to the territorial integrity of China past and present, and stresses that Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan have been part of Chinese territory since antiquity, further bolsters this suspicion. When Uyghurs do briefly appear, it is as defenders of the Chinese empire. We are told that the Khoja rebellions occurring during the Qing period were resisted by Uyghurs and other ethnic groups, who recognised themselves as victims of an exploitative local aristocracy, and that Uyghurs supported Qing efforts to recapture Xinjiang from the Khoqandian outsider Yakub Beg. Past events pointing to separatist movements or to ethnic tensions between the Chinese heartland and the far west are modified or omitted altogether; there is no mention of the independent states formed during the 1930s and 1940s. Nor is reference made to contemporary conflicts between Uyghurs (or Tibetans) and Han; the text consistently stresses good relations between the groups. Feyel concludes that while earlier sets of history textbooks reproduced pejorative, discriminatory views of minority groups (Baranovitch 2010), Uyghurs and their ancestors are depicted in a neutral, perhaps even favourable, way in Zhongguo lishi. Given that textbook knowledge is Âa powerful tool in the process of discourse constitution and modificationÊ, she ventures that such depictions could act to smooth away the discriminatory stereotypes held about Uyghurs by the Han public. On the other hand, a possible negative consequence is that young Uyghurs may internalise PRC state-sanctioned historiography, with direct impacts on identity formation and self-image. Ultimately, it remains to be seen how far Âtextbook knowledgeÊ can challenge the alternative histories circulating in the Uyghur community. The CCPÊs insistence on the ÂfactÊ of Xinjiang as an inseparable part of China since antiquity may instead be recognised by a politically savvy youth as a reflection of state fear in the face of growing Uyghur resistance. Chapters 7 and 8 examine the impacts of the ÂXinjiang ClassÊ (Ch. Xinjiangban) programme on Uyghur identity formation and identity politics. In Chapter 7, Yangbin Chen investigates the ambiguous impressions and images held by a unique Uyghur educational elite Xinjiangban students in regard to Han Chinese. The Xinjiang Class a national-level boarding school programme created to educate Uyghur senior-secondary (Ch. gaozhong) students from Xinjiang in the eastern cities of China was implemented in 2000. The stateÊs hope and expectation is that this strategy will exert a positive influence on Uyghur Han interethnic relations. Chen asks three core questions: How do Xinjiangban students form their perceptions of Han people? Have their perceptions altered over the course of their studies in China proper? And what are the implications of their

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perceptions for ethnic and national identity construction? Through a comparison of the responses of one group of prep students and one group of senior students to a writing task entitled ÂHan People through My EyesÊ, Chen traces evolving views over a two-year period. The studentsÊ essays reveal a set of bipolar perceptions of Han people. On one hand, positive views seem to attest to the success of state discourses in disseminating an ÂidealÊ national identity in which the Han language and culture take centre stage. On the other hand, negative views reflect a more realistic understanding of Han people, and embody a strong sense of Uyghur ethnic dignity. The contrast, Chen suggests, is the result of changes over time in response to a prolonged encounter in a Han community (see our discussion of French et al.Ês studies above). Positive perceptions directly reflect the manifested goals of the Xinjiang Class programme. StudentsÊ admiration for Han Chinese, expressed along certain lines, stems not only from the essentialised images found in state propaganda but also from the attitudes expressed by their families (especially parents) towards Han neighbours and colleagues, and from their own positive inter-ethnic experiences during childhood in Xinjiang. Yet these positive perceptions of an ÂidealÊ Han people jar awkwardly with the more critical perceptions found among senior students, formed over time in everyday interactions. Negative images recorded in studentsÊ essays include Han Âcultural blindnessÊ (ignorance of Uyghur culture) and hostility from local Han residents. This finding reflects the fact that mistrust among Han Chinese towards the Uyghur ethnic group has deepened in China proper, as also in Xinjiang, following the Ghulja disturbances of 1997 and the Ürümchi violence of 2009 (Smith Finley 2011a). The articulation of critical perceptions of Han people enables Xinjiangban Uyghurs to resist state-sanctioned notions of the Han cultural ideal, while at the same time emphasising a superior Uyghur cultural identity. Ultimately, Uyghur ethnic dignity can be both damaged (via internalised oppression) or shored up by the experience of the Xinjiangban programme and sometimes both at the same time. Previous studies have shown that Uyghurs respond to negative cultural stereotypes circulated by Han Chinese (for example, the suggestion that Uyghurs are ÂdirtyÊ) with counter-stereotypes of their own. These include negative stereotypes of Han culture and positive stereotypes of Uyghur culture, many of which are based on contrastive religious beliefs and cultural practices (Rudelson 1997; Smith 1999; 2002; Cesàro 2000; Bellér-Hann 2002; Smith Finley 2013a). This process is also in evidence in ChenÊs study, where some Uyghur students condemned Han habits like spitting as ÂunhygienicÊ, while others pointed to superior Uyghur cultural practices such as familial commensality, elegant interior decor and female beautification, prowess in sports, and the art of hospitality. As Chen acknowledges, the persistence of negative stereotypes of Uyghurs among the Han, together with the creation of counter-stereotypes within the Uyghur community, can only hinder the development of mutual tolerance, understanding and respect. Chen concludes that, in the end, the apparent reduplication of Âthe Han idealÊ among Xinjiangban students lacks credibility. One reason given for his judgment is that all of the students had completed intensive training courses on Ânationality

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unityÊ and Âanti-separatismÊ before leaving Xinjiang, and were therefore prone to quoting the official line when describing Han people in the abstract. Positive perceptions are, however, less in evidence when the students reflect on individual experiences of real-life encounters. Moreover, studentsÊ capacity for independent judgement appears to strengthen over time, leading them to critically question official state discourses. In ChenÊs view, unless the negative perceptions of Han Chinese held by these Uyghur students are acknowledged and examined by the state and Han scholars, there is little hope of producing Xinjiangban graduates as a patriotic minority elite. In Chapter 8, Timothy Grose offers an analysis of a recurring decision reached among Xinjiangban graduates to not return to Xinjiang after completing their schooling. The CCP has explicitly stated its expectation that Xinjiangban graduates will return to Xinjiang and enter strategically selected segments of the labour market, including education (teaching of the Chinese language, or through the medium of Chinese), healthcare (including dissemination of the state family planning policy) and agricultural technology. As an incentive to return, if Xinjiangban graduates agree to serve in Xinjiang for a period of five to ten years, particularly in the rural areas surrounding Kashgar and Khotän, their university tuition fees are waived. The stateÊs hope is that through the Xinjiangban programme, students will be imperceptibly trained in the culture of the Central Plains, develop an attachment towards the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu), and deepen their sense of patriotism towards China. In this way, Xinjiangban students are expected to provide a stabilising, pro-CCP element within Xinjiang society. As Grose points out, such aspirations fully suggest a modern manifestation of ChinaÊs ongoing Âcivilising projectÊ (Harrell 1994). In this study, he asks two core questions: how do Xinjiangban students experience ethno-national identities? How successful are these individuals in navigating between Uyghur and Han Chinese cultural practices? Turning first to school life, Grose reports that Xinjiangban students commonly describe boarding school in China proper as like ÂprisonÊ. Expected to work up to fourteen hours a day, six days a week, they are rarely integrated with local Han students, and extra-curricular life is strictly monitored. Students complain in particular about the strict prohibitions placed on religious practice, with at least one case reported of expulsion of Xinjiangban students simply for attending prayer at a local mosque. Contact between students and their parents is limited. Following graduation, many Xinjiangban students are unwilling to return to Xinjiang because of earlier direct experience of ethnic discrimination by Han people resident in Xinjiang (cf. Kaltman 2007). For these individuals, the region is no longer considered ÂhomeÊ. Other reasons include tightened restrictions on religious activities; hiring discrimination practised by Han employers; lack of employment opportunities suited to graduatesÊ educational levels, abilities and expertise; lack of prospects to earn a sufficiently high salary to support a family; and better opportunities to advance their education abroad or in eastern China. Nevertheless, several respondents said that while they currently had no plans to return to Xinjiang, they may do so one day. This thought was motivated largely by the presence of family and friends in Xinjiang, the perceived need to raise children close to the

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extended family in a community dominated by Uyghur cultural norms, and pride in Xinjiang as the cultural homeland. Based on these findings, Grose contends that the decision to not (or at least not immediately) return to Xinjiang carries important implications regarding the ways in which these young Uyghurs interpret and challenge their assigned membership of the Chinese nation. Characterising their choice as both a form of ÂcovertÊ resistance and an assertion of Uyghur ethno-national identity, he posits that if these graduates had truly internalised state messages of ÂinseparabilityÊ, then they would consent to return to Xinjiang in service of the Chinese nation. The decision to not return suggests rather that they are not prepared to act as torch bearers for Central Plains Chinese culture. Instead, a significant number of these academically successful and often trilingual graduates of the Xinjiang Class seek to create new forms of political life through relocation abroad (see Sunuodula in this volume). Indeed, some seem to genuinely believe that pursuit of an overseas education while optimistically waiting for ChinaÊs decline is currently the best way to serve long-term prospects for the Uyghur nation. It is perhaps in the area of personal commitment to Islamic practice that GroseÊs most interesting finding regarding the Xinjiangban students emerged. Respondents complained about the strict prohibitions placed on even the most mundane forms of religious practice in the boarding school setting, such as greetings (ÂÄssalammu Äläykum [Peace be with you]Ê), as well as those affecting explicitly religious rituals such as the recitation of post-meal supplications and the five daily prayers. Moreover, graduates of the Xinjiangban cited tightened restrictions on religious practice back in Xinjiang as a core reason why they chose to indefinitely delay their ÂhomecomingÊ. According to Grose, their testimonies are an ÂoutcryÊ at the mistreatment individuals have experienced in Xinjiang since 2001, when, following 9/11, the CCP seized its opportunity to impose sanctions on religious practice in the name of fighting terrorism. Policies of securitisation increasingly infringe upon the daily lives of Uyghurs to the point where many feel they are treated as second-class citizens. Finally, in Chapter 9, Joanne Smith Finley addresses the identity constructions of karaoke hostesses in Ürümchi a stigmatised group in Uyghur urban society. Drawing on five case studies, she explores the ways in which family situation, the labour market, linguistic medium of education, and religion impact on these young womenÊs choice of work and the subsequent evolution of their identities. Different sub-groups in the Uyghur community seek to blame this humiliating phenomenon variously on Uyghurs from the north or south of the Tianshan (Heavenly Mountains), from other oases, from ÂbrokenÊ families, or from particular linguistic/educational backgrounds. However, Smith Finley finds no evidence to suggest that hostesses originate particularly from northern or southern, or from rural or urban, parts of Xinjiang. What does emerge is that hostess girls can operate more easily outside of their hometown, since they can then evade the social supervision of parents and communities. When it comes to educational background (i.e. the linguistic medium in which education was received), it seems that, contrary to community expectations, minkaomin (Uyghur-educated) individuals

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are more likely to enter the industry than minkaohan (Chinese-educated) individuals. Furthermore, while a small proportion of better-educated (as measured by a sino-centric education system and social hierarchy) and highly acculturated minkaohan might consider entering into a genuine romantic relationship with a Han person (cf. Smith Finley 2013b), minkaohan interviewees consistently assigned the ÂimmoralÊ world of hostessing to the socially ÂdamagedÊ (those from broken families) or to minkaomin, characterised as less well educated and of Âlower qualityÊ (Ch. suzhi di). All women interviewed for this study were minkaomin, and all hailed from families that were in some respect ÂbrokenÊ. Smith Finley acknowledges that ethnic discrimination in the spheres of language use, education and employment could potentially lead to low individual and group self-esteem. However, her findings suggest conversely that these factors have led to a strengthening of ethnic awareness among her female respondents. The young womenÊs indignation when describing the hiring discrimination they face demonstrates a keen awareness and resentment of ethnic inequalities vis-à-vis the Han majority. Furthermore, their determination in the face of such difficulties to do whatever it takes to better themselves, support parents and siblings, and achieve upward mobility, suggests a strong sense of self-respect at individual and group levels. Most important of all, the girlsÊ deep awareness of Islamic cultural mores (current profession notwithstanding), and their articulation of a superior morality compared with Han clients and Han hostesses, suggests a robust Uyghur ethnic identity, within which religion is the core element. By refusing to perform genital or oral sex acts, or to allow clients to kiss them on the mouth, respondents draw clear moral boundaries based on Islamic religious prescriptions of female chastity before marriage, male circumcision and abstention from forbidden foods.

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Bayar, Murat. 2009. „Reconsidering Primordialism: An Alternative Approach to the Study of Ethnicity.‰ Ethnic and Racial Studies 32(9): 1 20. Beige Wind. 2014. „Dispatches from Xinjiang: Why Do Uyghurs Speak English So Well?‰ http://beijingcream.com/2014/09/dfxj-why-do-uyghurs-speak-english-so-well/ [accessed 12 August 2014]. Bellér-Hann, Ildikó. 1991. „Script Changes in Xinjiang.‰ In Cultural Change and Continuity in Central Asia, edited by Shirin Akiner. London: Kegan Paul International, 71 83. Bellér-Hann, Ildikó. 2002. „Temperamental Neighbours: Uighur Han Relations in Xinjiang, Northwest China.‰ In Imagined Differences: Hatred and the Construction of Identity, edited by Günther Schlee. Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 57 81. Benson, Linda. 1990. The Ili Rebellion: Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang 1944 49. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe. ···. 2004. „Education and Social Mobility among Minority Populations in Xinjiang.‰ In Xinjiang: ChinaÊs Muslim Borderland, edited by S. Frederick Starr. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 190 215. Bequelin, Nicholas. 2000. „Xinjiang in the Nineties.‰ The China Journal 4: 65 90. ···. 2004. „Staged Development in Xinjiang.‰ China Quarterly 178: 358 78. Borei, Dorothy V. 2002. „Ethnic Conflict and Qing Land Policy in Southern Xinjiang, 1760 1840.‰ In Dragons, Tigers, and Dogs: Qing Crisis Management and the Boundaries of State Power in Late Imperial China, edited by Robert J. Antony and Jane Kate Leonard. Ithaca: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 273 301. Bovingdon, Gardner. 2001. „The History of the History of Xinjiang.‰ Twentieth-Century China 26(2): 95 139. ···. 2002. „The Not-so-silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang.‰ Modern China 28(1): 39 78. ···. 2004. „Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent.‰ Policy Studies 11, Washington, DC: East-West Center. ···. 2010. The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. New York: Columbia University Press. Braker, Hans. 1985. „Nationality Dynamics in Sino-Soviet Relations.‰ In Soviet Nationalities and Strategic Perspectives, edited by S. Enders Wimbush. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 101 57. Bulag, Uradyn. 2002. The Mongols at ChinaÊs Edge: History and the Politics of National Unity. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Catterall, Peter. 2011. „Democracy, Cosmopolitanism and National Identity in a ÂGlobalisingÊ World.‰ National Identities 13(4): 329 47. Cesàro, M. Cristina. 2000. „Consuming Identities: Food and Resistance among the Uyghur in Contemporary Xinjiang.‰ Inner Asia 2(2): 225 38. Chang, Chiung-Fang. 2003. „Fertility Patterns among the Minority Populations of China: A Multilevel Analysis.‰ PhD diss., Texas A & M University. China Briefing. 2013. „ChinaÊs Provincial GDP Figures in 2012.‰ Online report at Dezan Shira & Associates. Last modified 16 May 2013. www.china-briefing.com/news/2013/ 05/16/chinas-provincial-gdp-figures-in-2012.html [accessed 18 May 2014]. Clarke, Michael E. 2011. Xinjiang and ChinaÊs Rise in Central Asia: A History. London: Routledge. Cohen, Abner. 1974. Two-Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in Complex Society. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press. Crocker, Jennifer and Riia Luhtanen. 1990. „Collective Self-Esteem and Ingroup Bias.‰ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58: 60 7.

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Dautcher, Jay Todd. 1999. „Folklore and Identity in a Uighur Community in Xinjiang, China.‰ PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley. Dave, B. 1996. „National Revival in Kazakhstan: Language Shift and Identity Change.‰ Post-Soviet Affairs 12(1): 51 72. De Vos, George. 1975. „Ethnic Pluralism: Conflict and Accommodation.‰ In Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change, edited by George De Vos and Lola RomanucciRoss. Palo Alto, California: Mayfield, 5 41. Despres, Leo A. 1975. „Toward a Theory of Ethnic Phenomena.‰ In Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies, edited by Leo A. Despres. The Hague/Paris: Mouton, 187 208. Dillon, Michael. 1995. „Xinjiang: Ethnicity, Separatism and Control in Chinese Central Asia.‰ Durham University: East Asian Papers 1. ···. 2004. Xinjiang: ChinaÊs Muslim Far Northwest. Durham East Asia Series, London/New York: Routledge Curzon. Dreyer, June Teufel. 1968. „ChinaÊs Minority Nationalities in the Cultural Revolution.‰ China Quarterly 35: 96 109. Dreyer, June Teufel. 1976. ChinaÊs Forty Millions. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Dwyer, Arienne. 2005. „The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse.‰ Policy Studies 15. Washington, DC: East-West Center. Epstein, Albert L. 1978. Ethos and Identity: Three Studies in Ethnicity. London: Tavistock. Eri, Arfiya. 2008. „No One Can Take Away Who We Are.‰ Columbia East Asia Review 1: 76 9. Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. 1993. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. London: Pluto Press. Erikson, Erik H. 1968. Identity: Youth and Crisis (No. 7). New York: WW Norton Company. Erkin, Adilä. 2009. „Locally Modern, Globally Uyghur: Geography, Identity and Consumer Culture in Contemporary Xinjiang.‰ Central Asian Survey 28(4): 417 28. Esposito, John L. 1997. „Introduction.‰ In Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform? edited by John L. Esposito. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 1 16. ···. 1998, 4th ed. Islam and Politics. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Forbes, Andrew D. W. 1986. Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911 1949. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. French, Sabine Elizabeth, Edward Seidman, LaRue Allen and J. Lawrence Aber. 2000. „Racial/Ethnic Identity, Congruence with the Social Context, and the Transition to High School.‰ Journal of Adolescent Research 15: 587 602. French, Sabine Elizabeth, Edward Seidman, LaRue Allen and J. Lawrence Aber. 2006. „The Development of Ethnic Identity during Adolescence.‰ Developmental Psychology 42(1): 1 10. Fuller, Graham E. and Jonathan N. Lipman. 2004. „Islam in Xinjiang.‰ In Xinjiang: ChinaÊs Muslim Borderland, edited by S. Frederick Starr. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 320 52. Gans, Herbert J. 1996. „Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America.‰ In Theories of Ethnicity: A Classical Reader, edited by W. Sollars. New York: New York University Press, 425 59. Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. Geng Shimin. 1984. „On the Fusion of Nationalities in the Tarim Basin and the Formation of the Modern Uighur Nationality.‰ Central Asian Survey 3(4): 1 14. Glick Schiller, Nina, Tsypylma Darieva and Sandra Gruner-Domic. 2011. „Defining Cosmopolitan Sociability in a Transnational Age.‰ Ethnic and Racial Studies 34(3): 399 418.

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Goodman, David. 2004. „The Campaign to ÂOpen up the West.Ê ‰ China Quarterly 178: 318 34. Green, Elliott D. 2006. „Redefining Ethnicity.‰ Paper presented at the 47th Annual International Studies Association Convention, San Diego, CA, 22 25 March. http://personal. lse.ac.uk/greened/ISA.pdf [accessed 8 October 2014]. Grose, Timothy. 2012. „Uyghur Language Textbooks: Competing Images of a Multi-Ethnic China.‰ Asian Studies Review 36(3): 369 89. Gross, Jo-Ann, ed. 1992. Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change. Durham: Duke University Press. Gruner-Domic, Sandra. 2011. „Transnational Lifestyles as a New Form of Cosmopolitan Social Identification?‰ Ethnic and Racial Studies 34(3): 471 89. Harlan, Tyler. 2009. „Private Sector Development in Xinjiang, China: A Comparison between Uyghur and Han.‰ Espace populations sociétés 2009(3): 407 18. http://eps. revues.org/3772 [accessed 13 October 2014]. Harrell, Stevan. 1994. „Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them.‰ In Cultural Encounters on ChinaÊs Ethnic Frontiers, edited by Stevan Harrell. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 3 36. Harris, Rachel. 2005. „Reggae on the Silk Road: the Globalisation of Uyghur Pop.‰ The China Quarterly 183(1): 627 43. Harris, Rachel and Aziz Isa. 2014. „Islamisation by Smartphone: The Changing Shape of Uyghur Social Media Networks.‰ Paper presented at the strategic workshop „Ethnic Conflict in Xinjiang: How Far is Insecurity the Product of Increased Securitisation?‰ Newcastle University, 3 October. Hasmath, Reza. 2011. „The Education of Ethnic Minorities in Beijing.‰ Ethnic and Racial Studies 34(11): 1, 835 54. Hastings, Justin. 2005, „Perceiving a Single Chinese State.‰ Problems of Post-Communism 52(1): 28 38. Heberer, Thomas. 1989. China and Its National Minorities: Autonomy or Assimilation? New York: M.E. Sharpe. Heller, David. 2007. „Evolving Uyghur Identity and Chinese Regional Policy in Xinjiang.‰ http://digitool.fcla.edu/R/41BE5SX1C484M4FKIPT4RS8LSJU3QR7UHPV6TIQDB MBE56UHQ7-00958?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=160874&local_base=GEN01& pds_handle=GUEST [accessed 5 July 2014]. Hess, Stephen E. 2009. „Islam, Local Elites, and ChinaÊs Missteps in Integrating the Uyghur Nation.‰ Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Aras•tþrmalarþ (OAKA) [Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies] 4(7): 75 96. www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/4EeTmxtD NppkrrFTak6s43XcfD6iHq.pdf [accessed 5 July 2014]. Horowitz, Adam L. 2013. „Ethnic Identity.‰ In The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization, edited by George Ritzer. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Howell, Anthony and C. Cindy Fan. 2011. „Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: A Survey of Han and Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi.‰ Eurasian Geography and Economics 52(1): 119 39. Hyer, Eric. 2006. „ChinaÊs Policy towards Uighur Nationalism.‰ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 26(1): 75 86. Kaltman, Blaine. 2007. Under the Heel of the Dragon: Islam, Racism, Crime, and the Uighur in China. Athens: Ohio University Press. Keyes, Charles. 1981. „The Dialectic of Ethnic Change.‰ In Ethnic Change, edited by Charles Keyes. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 3 30.

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Kim Ho-dong. 1986. „The Muslim Rebellion of the Kashgar Emirate in Chinese Central Asia, 1864 1877.‰ PhD diss., Harvard University. ···. 2004. Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Koch, Jessica. 2006. „Economic Development and Ethnic Separatism in Western China.‰ Working Paper No. 134, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University. wwwarc.murdoch. edu.au/publications/wp/wp134.pdf [accessed 5 July 2014]. Lamphere, Louise. 2007. „Migration, Assimilation and the Cultural Construction of Identity: Navajo Perspectives.‰ Ethnic and Racial Studies 30(6): 1, 132 51. Mackerras, Colin. 1972. The Uighur Empire according to the TÊang Dynastic Histories: A Study in Sino-Uighur Relations, 744 840. Canberra: Australian National University Press. ···. 2011. „Ethnic Minorities.‰ In Understanding Chinese Society, edited by Xiaowei Zang. London/New York: Routledge, 111 26. Mamet, Rizvan, Cardell Jacobson and Tim Heaton. 2005. „Ethnic Intermarriage in Beijing and Xinjiang.‰ Journal of Comparative Family Studies 36(1): 187 204. Maurer-Fazio, Margaret, James Hughes and Dandan Zhang. 2007. „An Ocean Formed from One Hundred Rivers: The Effects of Ethnicity, Gender, Marriage, and Location on Labor Force Participation in Urban China.‰ Feminist Economics 13(3 4): 159 87. McMillen, Donald. 1979. Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949 1977. Boulder: Westview. Millward, James A. 2004. „Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment.‰ Washington, DC: East-West Center. ···. 2007. Eurasian Crossroads. New York: Columbia University Press. Millward, James and Näbijan Tursun. 2004. „Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884 1978.‰ In Xinjiang: ChinaÊs Muslim Borderland, edited by S Frederick Starr. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 63 98. Momtazee, James C. and Abhishek Kapur. 2013. „China in Transition.‰ Online report at Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., Last modified 9 April 2013. www.kkr.com/globalperspectives/publications/china-transition [accessed 18 May 2014]. Nazpary, J. 2002. Post-Soviet Chaos: Violence and Dispossession in Kazakhstan. London: Pluto Press. Newby, Laura J. 1998. „The Begs of Xinjiang: Between Two Worlds.‰ Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 61(2): 278 97. Niu Jun. 2005. „1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in ChinaÊs Foreign Policy.‰ CWIHP Working Paper No. 48, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC. www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/NiuJunWP481.pdf [accessed 6 July 2014]. Phinney, Jean. 2003. „Ethnic Identity and Acculturation.‰ In Acculturation: Advances in Theory, Measurement, and Applied Research, edited by Kevin M. Chun, Pamela B. Organista and Gerardo Marin. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 63 81. Reny, Marie-Eve. 2009. „The Politicization of Language and Religion.‰ Ethnic and Racial Studies 32(3): 490 521. Rudelson, Justin. 1997. Oasis Identities. New York: Columbia University Press. Rudelson, Justin and William Jankowiak. 2004. „Acculturation and Resistance: Xinjiang Identities in Flux.‰ In Xinjiang: ChinaÊs Muslim Borderland, edited by S. Frederick Starr. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 299 319. Schluessel, Eric T. 2007. „ ÂBilingualÊ Education and Discontent in Xinjiang.‰ Central Asian Survey 26(2): 251 77.

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Shichor, Yitzhak. 2005. „Blow Up.‰ Asian Affairs: An American Review 32(2): 119 36. Shils, Edward. 1957. „Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties.‰ British Journal of Sociology 7: 113 45. Sines, Abigail. 2002. „Civilizing the Middle KingdomÊs Wild West.‰ Central Asian Survey 21(1): 5 18. Smith, Anthony D. 1991. National Identity. Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press. Smith, Joanne N. 1999. „Changing Uyghur Identities in Xinjiang in the 1990s.‰ PhD diss., University of Leeds, UK. ···. 2000. „Four Generations of Uyghurs: The Shift Towards Ethno-Political Ideologies Among XinjiangÊs Youth.‰ Inner Asia 2(2): 195 224. ···. 2002. „Making Culture Matter: Symbolic, Spatial, and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese.‰ Asian Ethnicity 3(2): 153 74. ···. 2007. „The Quest for National Unity in Uyghur Popular Song: Barren Chickens, Stray Dogs, Fake Immortals and Thieves.‰ In Music, National Identity and the Politics of Location: Between the Global and the Local, edited by Ian Biddle and Vanessa Knights. Aldershot: Ashgate, 115 41. Smith Finley, Joanne. 2007a. „ ÂEthnic AnomalyÊ or Modern Uyghur Survivor? A Case Study of the Minkaohan Hybrid Identity in Xinjiang.‰ In Situating the Uyghurs between China and Central Asia, edited by Ildikó Bellér-Hann, M. Cristina Cesàro, Rachel Harris and Joanne Smith Finley. Aldershot: Ashgate, 219 38. ···. 2007b „Chinese Oppression in Xinjiang, Middle Eastern Conflicts and Global Islamic Solidarities among the Uyghurs.‰ Journal of Contemporary China 16(53): 627 54. ···. 2011a. „No Rights Without Duties: Minzu pingdeng [Nationality Equality] in Xinjiang since the 1997 Ghulja Disturbances.‰ Inner Asia 13(1): 73 96. ···. 2011b. „Turkestan Lovesongs, ÂNew FlamencoÊ and the Emergence of the Uyghur World Citizen in Urban Xinjiang.‰ Paper presented at the international workshop „Beyond ÂThe Xinjiang ProblemÊ ‰, Australia National University, Canberra, 4 5 November. ···. 2013a. The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and Uyghur Han Relations in Contemporary Xinjiang. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing. ···. 2013b. „Contesting Harmony in TV Drama: Ethnic Intermarriage in Xinjiang Girls.‰ In On the Fringes of the Harmonious Society: Tibetans and Uyghurs in Socialist China, edited by Ildikó Bellér-Hann and Trine Brox. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 263 92. Spencer, Steve. 2006. Race and Ethnicity: Culture, Identity and Representation. Abingdon: Routledge. Tajfel, Henri and John C. Turner. 1986. „The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior.‰ In Psychology of Intergroup Relations (2nd ed.), edited by Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 7 24. Taynen, Jennifer. 2006. „Interpreters, Arbiters or Outsiders: The Role of the Minkaohan in Xinjiang Society.‰ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 26(1): 45 62. Toops, Stanley. 2004. „The Demography of Xinjiang.‰ In Xinjiang: ChinaÊs Muslim Borderland, edited by S. Frederick Starr. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 241 63. Tsing Yuan. 1961. „Yaqub Beg (1820 1877) and the Moslem Rebellion in Chinese Turkestan.‰ Central Asian Journal 6(2): 134 67. Uyghur Human Rights Project. 2012. „Uyghur Homeland, Chinese Frontier: The Xinjiang Work Forum and Centrally Led Development.‰ http://docs.uyghuramerican.org/Uyghurhomeland-Chinese-Frontier.pdf [accessed 19 May 2014].

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Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth. 2008. Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China. Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=A DA493744 [accessed 6 July 2014]. Vannini, Phillip and Williams, J. Patrick, eds. 2009. Authenticity in Culture, Self, and Society. Aldershot: Ashgate. Waite, Edmund. 2007. „The Emergence of Muslim Reformism in Contemporary Xinjiang: Implications for the UyghursÊ Positioning between a Central Asian and Chinese Context.‰ In Situating the Uyghurs between China and Central Asia, edited by Ildikó Bellér-Hann, M. Cristina Cesàro, Rachel Harris and Joanne Smith Finley. Aldershot: Ashgate, 165 84. Yee, Herbert. 2005. „Ethnic Consciousness and Identity: A Research Report on Uygur-Han Relations in Xinjiang.‰ Asian Ethnicity 6(1): 35 50. Zang Xiaowei. 2011. „Uyghur Han Earnings Differentials in Ürümchi.‰ The China Journal 65: 141 55. ···. 2012. „Age and the Cost of Being Uyghurs in Ürümchi.‰ China Quarterly 210: 419 34.

Chinese language sources Bai Zhensheng and Shigeo Ozawa, eds. 白振声，鯉淵信一 (主编). 1992. 新疆現代政治 会史略，1912 1949 年 [A Brief Survey of Contemporary Politics and Society in Xinjiang] 京市: 中国社会科学出版社 [Beijing: China Social Sciences Press]. Huang Jianhua. 黃建华 (著). 2003. 國民党政府的新疆政策硏究 [Research on Guomindang Policies in Xinjiang]. 北京市: 民族出版社 [Beijing: Nationalities Press]. Ji Dachun. 紀大椿 (著). 2002. 新疆近世史论稿 [A Modern History of Xinjiang]. 哈尔滨 市: 黑龙江敎育出版社 [Harbin: Heilongjiang Education Press]. Li Sheng, ed. 厉声 (主编). 2003. 中国新疆：历史与现状 [Xinjiang, China: History and Current Situation]. 乌鲁木齐市: 新疆人民出版社 [Ürümchi: Xinjiang PeopleÊs Press]. Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of Historical Research. 新疆社会科学 院史硏究所編著. 1997 [1980]. 新疆简史 Vol. 1 3 [A Concise History of Xinjiang Vol. 1 3] 鲁木齐市：新疆人民出版社 [Ürümchi: Xinjiang PeopleÊs Press]. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Local History Compilation Committee. 新疆維 吾自治区地方志编纂委员会. 2004. 新疆年鉴 [Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2004]. 乌鲁木市：新疆年鉴社 [Ürümchi: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook Press]. Yin Zhuguang and Mao Yongfu, eds. 尹築光，茆永福 (主编). 1996. 新疆民族关系硏 [Research on Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang]. 乌鲁木齐市：新疆人民出版社 [Ürümchi: Xinjiang PeopleÊs Press].

2

Major determinants of Uyghur ethnic consciousness in Ürümchi Xiaowei Zang

Introduction Rising Uyghur ethnic consciousness in the post-1978 era is believed to be related to tense Uyghur Han relations and conflicts in Xinjiang.1 Scholars have accounted for rising Uyghur consciousness with variables such as Han migration into Xinjiang,2 ethnic inequalities,3 Uyghur language,4 and Islamic religiosity.5 Given the importance of this topic, it is surprising that there has been no concrete effort to summarise, elaborate, and verify these accounts. Furthermore, there are different opinions on the effect of each of these variables on Uyghur consciousness. It is not clear whether these variables are related to Uyghur consciousness. Nor is it clear which variables are good predictors of Uyghur consciousness and which variables are irrelevant for research on this important topic. More generally, is there a high level of ethnic consciousness among Uyghurs? Is Uyghur consciousness based more on instrumental needs than on cultural and psychological properties, or vice versa? This chapter addresses these questions with data from a survey (N = 900) conducted in Ürümchi in 2007. In this chapter, Âethnic consciousnessÊ refers to the awareness of membership in an ethnic group by both group members and the larger society in which they reside. Ethnic consciousness commonly emerges in situations where groups sharing common attributes and interests, such as a religious belief, organise to influence the exercise of state power, or to defend their shared interests.6

Uyghur ethnic consciousness in Mao’s China Uyghurs are one of the 56 nationality groups in the PeopleÊs Republic of China. Han Chinese are the ethnic majority. Uyghurs are a Turkic people and Sunni Muslims. They lived in north-western Mongolia. After the demise of the Uyghur Empire in 840, they migrated en masse to the areas known as Xinjiang today. They practiced Manichaeanism, Nestorian Christianity, and shamanism before 932.7 Some Uyghurs in southern Xinjiang became Muslims before the Mongol conquest of Xinjiang around 1200. Mass Uyghur conversion to Islam occurred after 1200 but was not completed until the mid-1400s.8 Some scholars argued that the conversion was not concluded until the 1600s. Xinjiang became a province of the

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Qing Empire in 1884. Uyghur rebellions against Qing rule occurred from time to time. Xinjiang was governed by Chinese warlords after the demise of the Qing Empire in 1911. The Nationalist government managed to place direct control over the region after 1944. With Soviet support, Uyghurs established the East Turkestan Republic in Ili, Tarbaghatay, and Altay in northern Xinjiang between 1944 and 1949, which was a landmark in the evolution of Uyghur national identity from the 1920s.9 Smith Finley argued that prior to 1949, there existed, in addition to oasis and social group identities, an over-arching regional identity based on social, cultural, and religious practices and norms common to all Central Asia and subsumed under the term ÂMuslimÊ.10 However, Rudelson maintained that most Uyghurs were oriented towards their oases before 1949.11 Shichor claimed that Uyghur nationalism began to take shape in the 1920s and 1930s.12 Gladney argued that Âthe people of the (Xinjiang) oases lacked any coherent sense of identityÊ.13 Heller believed that despite some commonalities throughout the oases, Uyghurs had Âa very weak historical claim to a coherent Uyghur identityÊ.14 When the Chinese Communist Party (Âthe PartyÊ) came to power in 1949, it strived for total power in an effort to transform China into a socialist country and to fully integrate Xinjiang into the PeopleÊs Republic of China. The Party regarded Islam as an alternative to political allegiance to the socialist state and made efforts to undermine the position of mosques and imams in Xinjiang. General Wang Zhen mercilessly handled ethnic affairs and executed some Uyghurs with ÂdeviantÊ political or religious views in the 1950s. The Party abolished Islamic taxes and expropriated mosque lands. ÂThe state then put clerics on its payroll and incorporated them institutionally within the Beijing-based Chinese Islamic Association.Ê15 In spite of these evolving socio-economic changes in Xinjiang, Uyghur Han relations seemed to be on good terms between 1949 and 1966. It is true that in the One Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1956 1957, some Uyghurs criticised government policies and raised the issue of Uyghur identity. In 1962, 60,000 Uyghur and Kazak refugees fled northern Xinjiang into the Soviet Union.16 But overall, there were few Uyghur Han disputes or conflicts between 1949 and 1966.17 Clark found undivided loyalty to the Party and total commitment to socialist construction among Uyghurs before 1966.18 The good Uyghur Han relations were partly based on the socio-economic development in Xinjiang that the Party promoted after 1949. The central government supported Xinjiang with relief funds, direct subsidies, and tax relief. The region witnessed the extensive development of infrastructure and rapid industrialisation. Employment opportunities were provided on an unprecedented scale by state enterprises. XinjiangÊs regional GDP per capita in 1952 Âwas a mere 170 yuan. By 1960 this figure had doubled, and reached 314 yuanÊ.19 UyghursÊ living standards were improved greatly.20 There was little ethnic inequality in income as China was one of the most equal societies (in terms of the Gini coefficient) in the world at that time. Also, early policies of the PeopleÊs Republic of China in Xinjiang were relatively liberal.21 Han migrants helped to develop the local economy, building much

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of the infrastructure in the region and training Uyghur workers with skills. Some of them attained functional fluency in the Uyghur language and abstained from practices that could have caused offence to Uyghurs. Many Uyghurs thought that the Party had been a positive force in Xinjiang.22 Finally, the government raised new Uyghur elite groups including professionals, officials, and the modern working class. These new social groups enjoyed upward mobility, benefited from XinjiangÊs modernisation process, and were the main supporters of the PartyÊs nationality policy in the region.23 They served as role models and gave hope for upward mobility to their co-ethnics. However, during the Cultural Revolution of 1966 1976, the Party carried out political campaigns against the so-called agents of local nationalism. Uyghur elite members, including intellectuals, were hit hard.24 It is found that from 1966 to 1976, 99,000 of the 106,000 minority cadres were dismissed from their leadership posts.25 Large-scale religious suppression included the closing of rural bazaars, attacks on imams and mosques, and the public burning of religious scripts.26 The political campaigns appeared to be an all-out attack on ethnic minority cultures and religions in Xinjiang by the Chinese government and Han Chinese. The extremist nature of the Cultural Revolution policies led to the growth of ethnic consciousness and resentment towards the Party among Uyghurs.27

Uyghur ethnic consciousness in the post-Mao era After the Cultural Revolution, the Party recognised the damages done to Uyghurs. To reconcile with Uyghurs, its policies allowed a relatively tolerant environment for ethnic and religious expressions from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s.28 In 1982, a campaign was launched to encourage Han Chinese to learn from minority groups29 and a return from Latin-based scripts to Arabic script was granted.30 Uyghur intellectuals were given some freedom to express their opinions on Uyghur history and culture, which were not always consistent with official rhetoric.31 Also, after a 15-year break, pilgrimage missions to Mecca were resumed in 1979.32 Some Uyghurs studied Islam in Malaysia, Pakistan, and some MiddleEast countries.33 By 1989, the number of mosques in Xinjiang had increased by 5.8 times compared with a decade earlier, to some 20,000.34 The Chinese government also gave Uyghurs preferential considerations in family planning, college admissions, job placement, and ethnic slots in leadership representation.35 Sautman claimed that an educated minority person in Xinjiang was more likely to attain an elite position than a Han of equal qualification.36 In 1984, the government announced the Âtwo restraints and one leniencyÊ policy to give minority suspects leniency in restraining and prosecuting.37 Han Chinese have complained about the lenient treatments and sentences that Uyghurs criminals have received from the courts in China. Finally, the Chinese government has placed economic development at the centre of political rhetoric, hoping that economic growth would strengthen ethnic unity.38 It introduced the Great Western Development policy in 2000 to boost economic growth in ChinaÊs west. Its policies have included tax exemptions and investments

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in infrastructure. XinjiangÊs economy has developed rapidly. Its GDP climbed from 105 billion RMB in 1997 to 420 billion RMB in 2008. The GDP per capita in Xinjiang increased from 1,680 RMB in 1997 to 16,820 RMB in 2007.40 However, economic growth did not enhance national unity in Xinjiang as was hoped by the Party. It was instead accompanied by rising Uyghur consciousness and intergroup tensions in Xinjiang.41 The creation of new Central Asian states encouraged Uyghurs to ask for more regional autonomy or outright independence.42 Uyghur demands began to manifest in the dissemination of alternative histories about Uyghur heroes and myths of origins.43 There was also violence against Han Chinese and the Chinese government.44 The government attributed the repeated unrest during the 1990s to its liberalisation of religious and cultural policy in the region,45 and has since 1996 carried out multiple ÂStrike HardÊ campaigns to target the three evils of separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism in Xinjiang.46 Yet Uyghur resistance has continued.47 Uyghurs have developed strong ethnic consciousness vis-à-vis Han Chinese and the Chinese government. There has been Âeveryday resistanceÊ by Uyghurs.48 For some Uyghurs, the ÂStrike HardÊ campaigns had turned their acceptance and tolerance to hatred towards Han rule.49 Growing Uyghur consciousness has become a major subject of discussion among China scholars. 39

Existing accounts of Uyghur ethnic consciousness Rudelson is perhaps one of the first scholars to examine the roots of rising Uyghur consciousness in the post-1978 era. Whilst acknowledging the possibility of a pan-Uyghur identity, he argued that the immensity and harshness of the Tarim Basin separated rather than united the oasis centres in the region. The practice of oasis endogamy (marriage within the community) perpetuated a local identity. Oasis identities led to competing Uyghur identities that undermined hopes to build a coherent Uyghur national identity.50 Rudelson also argued that Uyghurs were unable to forge a single ethnic nationalism due to political differences between urban secular activists and advocates of rural Islamic movements. Class distinctions between intellectuals, merchants, and peasants in Xinjiang were strong. Islam could not define the identity of all Uyghurs, as the majority of Uyghur intellectuals strongly rejected Islamic conservatism. Uyghur Âidentity is formed according to social class and occupation rather than family types, descent, or panoases solidarity.Ê51 More recent studies have emphasised a growing pan-Uyghur identity in Xinjiang. For example, when Smith Finley conducted her research in 1996, she met a minkaohan intellectual who expressed deep sympathy for the PalestiniansÊ situation.52 She did not find anyone from other Uyghur social groups who openly supported the PalestiniansÊ position. When she visited Xinjiang in 2004, she found that identifications with the PalestiniansÊ cause were a common attitude of all Uyghur social groups.53 Other scholars have reported widespread discontent against Chinese rule across social groups among Uyghurs, as there is an acute sense of Us (Uyghurs) and Them (Han Chinese) in the region.54 Yee found that

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88.7 per cent of his Uyghur respondents were proud of Uyghur identity.55 Below, I develop five hypotheses about ethnic consciousness based on the insights from the existing studies of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Status attainment The first account focuses on the relationship between status attainment and ethnic consciousness. It differs from RudelsonÊs claim that members of the Uyghur elite groups are the champions of Uyghur ethnic consciousness. Instead, Dwyer claimed that Uyghurs in better-off northern areas were more sinicised than Uyghurs in other regions.56 Steiner maintained that Uyghurs in northern urban centres accepted Han tendencies whilst remaining Uyghur only in name.57 Hess argued that the Uyghur elite groups Âmay be well connected to Hans in the workplace, well-integrated into the Chinese state, and loyal to the PRC.Ê58 The Chinese government has promoted a new, unified Xinjiang ren identity (Xinjiang person) and suppressed the moves to enhance Uyghur identity.59 The members of the Uyghur elite groups may be more likely than other Uyghurs to support the PartyÊs policy of national unity at the expense of Uyghur consciousness, and vice versa. Hence, Hypothesis 1: Status attainment is adversely related to Uyghur ethnic consciousness. Han migration Hypothesis 1 cannot be taken for granted. Members of the Uyghur elite groups may develop stronger ethnic consciousness than other Uyghurs because they are more likely than other Uyghur groups to compete with Han Chinese in the formal labour market and suffer from Han discrimination. Equally important, Uyghur consciousness may have little to do with status attainment. As noted, occupational mobility among Uyghurs took place before 1978, yet the rise of Uyghur consciousness has been a post-1978 development. Starr claimed that Uyghur identity was a historical conglomerate, and only recently has been constructed in opposition to Han Chinese state power.60 Heller argued that Uyghur identity was still evolving and the major catalyst to this evolution and formation of the ÂUyghurÊ identity was primarily a result of the governance of China61 it is government policy that has contributed to rising Uyghur consciousness. One of the policy issues at stake is post-1978 Han migration into Xinjiang. The Chinese government has supported Han migrants to move to Xinjiang as a means of strengthening Party control over the territory. The percentage of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang declined from over 75 per cent in 1949 to less than 46 per cent in 2004, whereas the Han population grew from under 10 per cent in 1949 to nearly 40 per cent in 2004.62 Thus, some Uyghurs have worried that Âthey are quickly becoming a minority nationality within their own territoryÊ,63 and have regarded Han migration as an encroachment on their ethnic space.64 Han migrants are not interested in learning the Uygur language and Âdenigrate the Uyghur language, dress, food, and social customsÊ.65 With the arrival of many Han migrants,

Uyghur ethnic consciousness in Ürümchi

39

Uyghurs believed that their culture and religion were under serious threat. They placed importance on ethnic cultural characteristics, such as Uyghur language and Islam, that distinguished themselves from Han Chinese.67 Also, Han migrants have competed with Uyghurs in the labour market. Governmental projects have employed Han workers rather than Uyghur workers,68 but the worst offenders are private Han enterprises, which are not obliged to fulfil ethnic quotas. This has led to heightened Uyghur consciousness. Furthermore, since Uyghurs and Han Chinese have separate interests, it is hard to avoid a stratification of ethnic identity in everyday life. Han migration is important to ethnic identity because it increases cultural clashes between Han Chinese and Uyghurs, therefore stratifying ethnic definitions.69 Uyghurs who see little Han migration or do not live in closer quarters with Han migrants Âharbor less suspicion of and ethnic hatred towards Han ChineseÊ.70 It is likely that the more contacts Uyghurs have with Han Chinese, the more intergroup tensions there are, and the higher the levels of their ethnic consciousness are. Hence, Hypothesis 2: The greater the percentage of Han Chinese in a UyghurÊs neighbourhood, the higher is his or her ethnic consciousness. 66

Uyghur Han inequalities Hypothesis 2 cannot be taken for granted. Intergroup contacts may lead to mutual understanding and a more tolerant environment for both the majority and minority groups, provided that both groups are of equal status. Intergroup contacts may lead to ethnic tensions if there are ethnic inequalities.71 Unsurprisingly, some scholars have highlighted intergroup inequalities as the root of rising Uyghur consciousness.72 As noted, the government has hoped to reduce ethnic inequalities and tensions with economic development. Yet some Uyghurs do not see themselves as benefiting from government development programmes.73 Uyghurs have claimed that the resources in Xinjiang have been sapped for the benefit of Han Chinese, and that they have received inadequate compensation.74 There has been a lack of economic opportunities for Uyghurs.75 It is found that ÂUyghurs are poorer than the HanÊ.76 Han Chinese have better and easier access to economic benefits, whereas Uyghurs are discriminated against.77 Some Uyghurs have expressed their growing discontent at widening Uyghur Han inequalities in the wake of successive regional development campaigns.78 ÂUrban dissatisfaction stems from the fact that Uyghurs now have something to compare themselves with. It is socio-economic inequalities, then, which lie at the root of a rapidly strengthening Uyghur national identity.Ê79 It is argued that these perceptions have fuelled the ethnic tensions and Uyghur discontent that have become Âindicative of their identityÊ.80 However, the post-1978 era has also witnessed a growing Uygur middle class and business community.81 It is argued that rural Uyghurs in pursuit of economic opportunity in Han-dominated economic sectors do not dislike Han Chinese as much as urban Uyghurs.82 If economic hardship has promoted Uyghur discontent and ethnic consciousness vis-à-vis Han Chinese and the Chinese government, it is possible that well-off Uyghurs are less nationalistic since they have benefited

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from Han-led economic growth in Xinjiang. Hence, Hypothesis 3: Income is negatively related to Uyghur ethnic consciousness. Uyghur language skills Hypothesis 3 cannot be taken for granted. As noted above, some Western scholars have observed widespread opposition to Han Chinese and the Chinese government across different Uyghur social groups. Smith Finley argues that Uyghur identity results from the combination of pre-existing ÂWe-hoodÊ (shared group experiences) and more recent ÂUs-hoodÊ (enmity towards the ÂOtherÊ) vis-à-vis Han Chinese.83 Hess claimed that Uyghurs had few unifying markers that transcended the entire grouping other than Islam, the Uyghur language, and an emerging sense of an imagined history.84 However it is necessary to discuss the effects of Uyghur language and religiosity on Uyghur consciousness separately. Reny stressed the different impacts of Uyghur language and religion on Uyghur mobilisation.85 Dwyer claimed that Uyghur language is central to ethnic identity since it embodies nearly every dimension of a given culture: Âritual and routine activity, conversation, emotion, and artistic expressionÊ.86 Taynen argued that it is vital to consider the role of language since it cuts across socio-economic lines among Uyghurs.87 Scholars have found that official education policy has steered away from accommodative pluralism towards assimilative monoculturalism after 1995.88 In 2004, the government directed schools in Xinjiang to use Mandarin as the language of instruction to improve the ÂqualityÊ of Uyghurs so that they would be more competitive in the job market. Also, this policy was said to promote economic and societal integration.89 Yet this policy has reframed the Uyghur ethnic sentiment of being distinct (that of being different from Han) into a politicised anti-majority feeling (being Âanti-HanÊ). Uyghurs have perceived it as a cultural attack; and this perception has fostered identity polarisation (Uyghur versus Han Chinese).90 Dwyer argued that the Uyghur language was valued by many Uyghurs as the central aspect of their identity. It was considered inviolable and semi-private; encroachment by a dominant Chinese culture was perceived as an attack on Uyghur identity. Restrictions placed on minority cultural expression have fostered resentment and resistance.91 Uyghurs Âoften emphasize language as a distinguishing feature of their ethnic identity and, indeed, one specifically in opposition to the language and identity of the Han ChineseÊ.92 Some Uyghurs have avoided pinyin as a matter of ethnic identity since pinyin smacks of Chinese-ness to them. Other Uyghurs have preferred Eastern Turkestan to Xinjiang to signal a strong ethnic identity in the face of Han dominance and to highlight the latterÊs ponderously colonialist tone.93 Some Uyghurs have chosen to study in Uyghur language schools (minkaomin). Other Uyghurs, however, have enrolled in Mandarin schools (minkaohan), where they may assimilate and advance their careers by entering the structure of the Chinese state.94 Minkaohan education is preferable to some Uyghurs who are Âwilling to sacrifice or risk their cultural identityÊ.95 Minkaohan often find

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41

difficulty functioning in Uyghur environments. They were taught in the Chinese language, have learned about the Chinese cultural heritage, and have absorbed the Chinese version of history. They tend to speak, dress, and act like Han Chinese.97 Taynen argued that minkaohan take on many Chinese characteristics culturally and linguistically.98 They are favoured for admission into Chinese society and receive political and employment advantages over minkaomin, who remain linguistically/culturally Uyghur. Minkaohan are integrated into the PeopleÊs Republic of China state, serve as its functionaries, and are described by minkaomin as the fourteenth minority neither Han Chinese nor Uyghur but an entirely different group altogether.99 However, it is empirically difficult to compare minkaohan and minkaomin in terms of Uyghur ethnic consciousness. ÂIn certain situations Uighurs can be very unconformable being labelled as Min kao Han. Complicating the prejudice against this group is the fact that it is not always superficially evident who is a Min kao Han.Ê100 A better approach is to compare the levels of Uyghur language skills and the levels of Uyghur consciousness, given the differences in Uyghur language skills between minkaohan and minkaomin. Those with weak Uyghur language skills are likely to be minkaohan and less nationalistic than those with better Uyghur language skills, who are likely to be minkaomin. Hess claimed that speaking Uyghur has become a central cultural marker of a personÊs claim to be a Uyghur, and those with limited ability to speak Uyghur are unlikely to be imagined or accepted as authentic members of the Uyghur nation, but rather are likely to be seen as outsiders.101 Hence, Hypothesis 4: Uyghur language skills are positively associated with Uyghur consciousness. 96

Religiosity Hypothesis 4 cannot be taken for granted. This is partly because Uyghur language skills may not be related to a high level of ethnic consciousness. Some Uyghurs say that ÂWe must compete with the Chinese on their termsÊ and consider minkaohan education essential for promoting Uyghur identity.102 Although some Uyghurs view their mother tongue as intimately bound up with Islam and Uyghur identity, other Uyghurs do not give the same importance to the Uyghur language. They might be more instrumentally driven, thinking strategically in terms of the potential constraints associated with exclusively speaking the mother tongue and benefits with learning Mandarin.103 In fact, the divide between minkaohan and minkaomin have become more and more blurred in recent years as some minkaohan are embracing religion and studying Uyghur language and culture.104 Furthermore, Uyghurs with good Mandarin skills may hold a higher level of ethnic consciousness than other Uyghurs. It is argued that Uyghur intellectuals, most of whom are minkaohan, are highly nationalistic, see themselves as part of the larger Turkic world, and play a key role in shaping cultural values and influencing identity formation among Uyghurs.105 Since these Uyghurs are better educated than other Uyghurs, they appear to know more about Uyghur tradition and culture than other Uyghurs.106 It is also argued that Uyghurs with good Mandarin

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skills Âcan sufficiently separate their professional and home identities and, indeed, work equally well in two environmentsÊ. There is a distinction between the instrumental use of Mandarin as a tool for achieving employment and taking on Uyghur as a mark of identity. There is no evidence that Âlearning Mandarin is part of acquiring a pan-Chinese identityÊ.107 Finally, Reny has pointed out that linguistic accommodation by the Chinese government (preferential policy and incorporation of Uyghur secular elites into the political hierarchy on the basis of language) has significantly reduced the possibilities of anti-regime sentiments and the incentives for disruption in Xinjiang. In comparison, Uyghur religious demands and interests have not been accommodated in a similar way and have been central to Ugyhur mobilisation in the region.108 Hence, Koch argued that in recent years the Uyghur national identity had come to be equated exclusively with Islam.109 Hess found that Islam has played a key role in defining Uyghur national identity and distinguishing Uyghurs from Han Chinese.110 Fuller and Lipman suggested that most prominent among those distinguishing Uyghur characteristics is Islam, and attending mosque and engaging in other public religious rituals are Âconsciously recognized as a means of reinforcing the distinctiveness of the Uyghur community from the dominant Han population and the Chinese stateÊ.111 Dwyer pointed out that being Muslim Turkic is central to a modern Uyghur ethnic identity.112 As with those with limited Uyghur language skills, those with questionable adherence to Islam are unlikely to be imagined or accepted as authentic members of the Uyghur nation, but rather are likely to be seen as outsiders.113 Islam has become a key component of Uyghur consciousness and identity for the following three reasons. Firstly, Smith Finley argued that Islamic revival in Xinjiang might be viewed as a means of alternative minority representation. Uyghurs have used Islam as the subtle means of representing their own identities. At present, Islam is increasingly assuming an important function in Uyghur social and cultural life and individual psychology, as well as in the political consciousness of some individuals.114 Secondly, some Uyghurs have used Islam Âto express social and political frustrations in a variety of areasÊ against Han Chinese and the government,115 which is conducive to a dichotomy between Us (Uyghurs) and Them (Han Chinese) and has strengthened Uyghur identity and consciousness. Thirdly, Smith Finley stressed the significance of Islam as a symbolic form of Uyghur opposition to the Chinese state.116 Moreover, the surveillance and suppression of religion have had the paradoxical effect of strengthening the central role of Islam in Uyghur life.117 Hence, Hypothesis 5: The more committed to Islam a Uyghur is, the higher his or her Uyghur consciousness. Hypothesis 5 cannot be taken for granted. It is likely that religiosity is not related to Uyghur consciousness. Fuller and Lipman argued that the phenomenon of Islam reinforcing nationalist movements has so far scarcely been manifested in Xinjiang.118 Shichor claimed that Islam has come to represent an integral part of Uyghur identity, Âyet not necessarily the dominant characteristicÊ, and that despite the impression that the influence of Islam is growing among Uyghurs, Âthe reality is the oppositeÊ due to strict government control over religion in Xinjiang.119

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43

Data This paper examines the above five hypotheses with survey data gathered in Ürümchi in 2007. Before the 2007 survey, local collaborators had obtained the official household registration map of Ürümchi as the sampling frame. Simple random sampling was not used: Uyghurs represented only 9 per cent of the total population in Ürümchi in 2001 and were not evenly distributed in the city. Geographical cluster sampling was used for the 2007 survey instead. The local collaborators chose ten neighbourhoods with the highest percentages of Uyghur households in Ürümchi as the sampling clusters. However, Badaowan Street and Toutunhe Street, which reported the seventh and tenth highest percentages of Uyghur households in the city, declined to cooperate with the survey-takers. Sangong Street, which was ranked eleventh with 17.06 per cent of Uyghur households among its residents in 2000, was used to make up the shortfall. A total of 1,394 Uyghur households were selected from the nine clusters using probability proportional to size selection methods. Data were collected by face-to-face interviews with one proxy respondent from each household (only those aged between 18 and 65 were selected). Among the sampled households, 494 were not interviewed due to unavailability, refusals, or lack of access to gated residential buildings. The completion rate for the survey was 64.7 per cent (n = 900).

Variables and measures The dependent variable is Uyghur consciousness. Two questionnaire items were used to solicit information on Uyghur consciousness in the 2007 survey. Each of the two items is coded from 1 (not important) to 10 (very important). The first item reads: ÂIt is important to use UyghurÊ. XinjiangÊs economy is dominated by Han Chinese. Some Uyghurs have been Âlured by new opportunities in education, employment and tradeÊ in the Han-dominated sectors.120 They have looked Âon knowledge of Chinese as the sine qua non for secular advancementÊ.121 Under this environment, the Uyghurs who insist on the importance of speaking Uyghur are likely to have a high level of ethnic consciousness. The second item reads: ÂIt is important to promote Uyghur cultureÊ. Rudelson and Jankowiak argued that some Uyghurs Âhave been assimilated into Chinese society mastered the Chinese language, achieved public recognitionÊ. Some of them have embraced Âa secular SinocentrismÊ at the expense of their Uyghur identity.122 They are unlikely to consider it vital to promote Uyghur culture. In addition, the Chinese government is hostile to attempts by Uyghurs to promote their identity and culture. Under this circumstance, those who explicitly insist on the promotion of Uyghur culture are likely to have a high level of ethnic consciousness. I recoded the responses from 10-point scales to 5-point scales, since many respondents thought it was vital to speak Uyghur and promote Uyghur culture. I then created a composite index of Uyghur consciousness by combining the responses to these two items. The CronbachÊs alpha is .838, indicating a high degree of reliability or internal consistency. The index ranges from 2 (not important) to 10 (very important).

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Data analyses below involve the prediction of Uyghur consciousness from a battery of thirteen independent variables listed below. Control variables. In data analyses, I control for age (an interval variable); sex coded as (1) male and (0) female; marital status coded as (1) married and (0) single, widowed, or divorced; and urban status coded as (1) urban residents and (0) rural migrants. Status attainment is measured by four variables. University education is a dummy variable with university graduates coded as (1) and others as (0). Professional is a dummy variable with professionals coded as (1) and others as (0). Professionals include educators, government officials, engineers, managers, and doctors.123 State employment is also a dummy variable with Uyghur state workers coded as (1) and others as (0). Employment in the state sector is a treasured achievement given the cut-throat competition in the labour market. Party membership is a key indicator of upward mobility in China. It is a dummy variable with Party members coded as (1) and others as (0). Inequalities are measured by two variables. The first is monthly income, which is an objective measure of income inequality. It is the sum of a respondentÊs monthly wage and bonuses in 2006, and is log-transformed to establish normality and constant error variance to obtain better linearity in the regression function. The second variable is family financial standing or subjective class status, which is an ordinal variable based on the respondentÊs subjective assessment of his or her family financial standing in the local community. It has four levels representing four income groups: (1) lower, (2) lower middle, (3) middle, and (4) upper middle. The percentage of Han residents. The effect of Han migration into Xinjiang is measured by the percentage of Han residents in the respondentÊs neighbourhood as reported by the respondent. This is an interval variable. Religiosity. Most scholars have used religious self-identification variables such as religious commitment and activities reported by survey respondents to measure the levels of religiosity.124 When I constructed the questionnaire for the 2007 survey, I decided not to use mosque attendance since Uyghur women were not allowed to enter the mosque. In the survey, the interviewer asked the Uyghur respondent: (1) ÂHow often do you pray?Ê; (2) ÂHow religiously pious do you think you are?Ê; and (3) ÂHow important is religion in your life?Ê The frequency of prayers ranges from (1) Âseveral times a dayÊ to (7) Âonce a year or neverÊ. The scale of religious piety ranges from (1) Âvery piousÊ to (7) Ânot pious at allÊ. The importance of religion in life ranges from (1) Âvery importantÊ to (7) ÂunimportantÊ. I created a composite index of religiosity by combining the responses to the three items. The index of religiosity ranges from (3) Âvery religiousÊ to (21) Ânot religiousÊ, and the CronbachÊs alpha is .736, indicating a good degree of reliability or internal consistency. In the 2007 survey, 16 respondents said they were not Muslims. Their answers to the above three questions were coded as (7). To gain a good picture of

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Uyghur consciousness, I conducted analyses with both the Ürümchi sample (n = 900) and Muslim sample (n = 884). No major differences were detected. Uyghur language skills. In the 2007 survey, the interviewer asked the respondent: ÂHow well do you speak Uyghur?Ê; ÂHow well do you read Uyghur?Ê; and ÂHow well do you write in Uyghur?Ê The answers to the each of the questions range from (1) Âvery wellÊ to (5) Ânot wellÊ. I recoded the responses from 5-point scales to 4-point scales because few respondents chose (5). I then combined the responses to the three items to create a composite index. The composite index ranges from (3) Âvery wellÊ to (12) Ânot wellÊ, and the CronbachÊs alpha is .755, indicating a good degree of reliability or internal consistency.

Findings Table 2.1 shows that 47.4 per cent of the Ürümchi respondents are men, 65.7 per cent are married, 89.8 per cent are urban residents, 17.3 per cent are university graduates, 19.7 per cent are professionals, and 42.4 per cent are employed in the state sector. Their mean age is 38.6 years old. Their average monthly income is RMB 825, and the log-transformed monthly income is 4.95. Table 2.1 also shows the other background characteristics of the Ürümchi respondents, including the distributions of class subjectivities, religiosity, and Uyghur language skills. Table 2.2 shows the distribution of the indicators of ethnic consciousness among the Uyghur respondents. It can be seen that 72.3 per cent of the Uyghur respondents consider it important to use Uyghur language and the mean score is 4.54 on the 5-point scales. More than 66 per cent of them agree strongly that it is important to promote Uyghur culture and the mean score is 4.41 on the 5-point scales. Finally, the composite index shows that nearly 62 per cent of the Uyghur

Table 2.1 Background characteristics of the Ürümchi respondents Variables Age 18 30 31 40 41 50 51 and above Men Married Urban status Percentage of Uyghurs in neighbourhood University State employment Professionals

Frequency 900 292 243 182 183 427 591 808 900 156 382 177

Per cent or means/s.d. 38.59/12.98 32.4 27.0 20.2 20.3 47.4 65.7 89.8 48.05/28.71 17.3 42.4 19.7 (Continued)

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Table 2.1 Continued Variables Party membership Monthly income Log (monthly income) Subjective class status Upper middle Middle Lower middle Lower Religiosity Uyghur language skills

Frequency 73 900 900 900 98 420 232 150 900 900

Per cent or means/s.d. 8.1 825.60/958.72 4.95/3.04 2.48/0.90 10.9 46.7 25.8 16.7 8.92/4.10 4.38/2.05

respondents scored 10 points (totally agree) and that the mean score is 8.96 on the 9-point scales. It can be concluded that there is strong ethnic consciousness among Uyghurs in Ürümchi. Table 2.3 shows the correlations between the composite index of Uyghur consciousness and each of the 13 independent variables. It can be seen that married Uyghurs tend to have lower levels of ethnic consciousness than single Uyghurs. Urban Uyghurs were more aware of their ethnic identity than rural Uyghurs. Also, the higher the subjective class status the respondent rates himself or herself, the higher the level of ethnic consciousness he or she holds. However, income is not statistically correlated with Uyghur consciousness. Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Table 2.3 also shows that the better the respondentÊs Uyghur language skills, the more nationalistic he or she is. This finding tentatively supports Hypothesis 4. Finally, the more committed to Islam the respondent is, the more nationalistic he or she is. This finding tentatively supports Hypothesis 5. The other independent variables such as the indicators of status attainment are not statistically correlated with Uyghur consciousness. These findings do not support Hypotheses 1 and 2. The above findings are derived from bivariate analyses. It is not clear if these findings are the outcomes of spurious relationships. Thus, I performed two OLS regression analyses to verify the relationship between Uyghur consciousness and the independent variables. It is necessary to mention that multicollinearity is not an issue as all independent variables in the multivariate analyses pass the tolerance tests (the tolerance levels range from .538 to .945). Model 1 of Table 2.4 uses the Ürümchi sample (n = 900). It shows that controlling for other independent variables, the indications of status attainment such as professionals and state employment are not statistically correlated with the dependent variables. This finding does not support Hypothesis 1 and suggests that the Uyghur elite social groups are no less nationalistic than disadvantaged social groups. Holding other independent variables constant, the coefficient for the percentage of Uyghur residents in the neighbourhood is not statistically significant. This finding does not support Hypothesis 2.

Table 2.2 Distribution of ethnic consciousness among Uyghurs in Ürümchi Ethnic consciousness ÂIt is important to use Uyghur languageÊ 1 (totally disagree) 2 3 4 5 (totally agree) ÂIt is important to promote Uyghur cultureÊ 1 (totally disagree) 2 3 4 5 (totally agree) Composite index 2 (totally disagree) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (totally agree)

Frequency

Per cent or mean/s.d.

33 14 37 165 651 900

3.7 1.6 4.1 18.3 72.3 4.54/.930

34 22 77 171 596 900

3.8 2.4 8.6 19.0 66.2 4.41/1.007

23 5 11 11 30 49 119 95 557 900

2.6 0.6 1.2 1.2 3.3 5.4 13.2 10.6 61.9 8.96/1.796

Table 2.3 Correlations with ethnic consciousness among Uyghurs in Ürümchi Variables Age Men Married Urban status Percentage of Uyghurs in neighbourhood University State employment Professionals Party membership Monthly wage Subjective class status Religiosity Uyghur language skills

Ürümchi sample (n = 900) .002 (.954) .014 (.683) .067 (.043)* .080 (.017)* .007 (.835) .039 (.238) .031 (.348) .053 (.111) .018 (.598) .008 (.800) .075 (.025)* .145 (.000)** .056 (.096)

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 Figures in parentheses are statistically significant (2-tailed) values.

Muslim sample (n = 884) .001 (.980) .017 (.614) .066 (.050)* .085 (.012)* .009 (.784) .024 (.476) .021 (.541) .053 (.116) .020 (.550) .008 (.809) .072 (.031)* .132 (.000)*** .055 (.099)

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Table 2.4 Multivariate regression analyses of Uyghur ethnic consciousness Covariates

Model 1 Ürümchi sample

Model 2 Muslim Sample

Age Men Married Urban status % Uyghurs University State employment Professionals CCP membership Monthly wage Subjective class status Religiosity Uyghur language skills R2 F-statistics N

.001 ( .221) .090 (.720) .310 ( 2.204)* .608 (2.937)** .002 ( .960) .021 (.114) .049 ( .303) .162 ( .885) .232 ( .968) .017 (.667) .169 (2.303)* .078 ( 4.878)*** .071 ( 2.300)* .052 3.761*** 900

.002 ( .295) .095 (.221) .293 ( 2.101)* .603 ( 2.941)** .002 ( .878) .091 (.493) .019 (.114) .210 ( 1.135) .103 ( .420) .013 (.535) .171 (2.347)* .076 ( 4.575)*** .068 ( 2.218)8 .049 3.442*** 884

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.

Controlling for other independent variables, the coefficient of religiosity is statistically significant. This finding supports Hypothesis 5. Holding other independent variables constant, there is a statistically significant relationship between Uyghur language skills and the dependent variable, supporting Hypothesis 4. Everything being equal, class subjectivities are related to the dependent variable statistically. However, the coefficient for income is not statistically significant. These findings suggest that Uyghur consciousness is associated with how someone feels about his or her material condition and social status rather than how much he or she actually earns. Hypothesis 3 is not supported by empirical data. Finally, Model 2 of Table 2.4 uses the Muslim sample (n = 884) to examine the relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables. It can be seen that the findings reported in Model 2 are similar to those reported in Model 1.

Discussion and conclusions This paper is an attempt to map the contours and main determinants of Uyghur identities. Rising ethnic consciousness among Uyghurs in the post-1978 era is a major subject of research, since it is related to Uyghur Han relations and ethnic conflicts in Xinjiang. Scholars have proposed different accounts of Uyghur ethnic

Uyghur ethnic consciousness in Ürümchi

49

consciousness. Surprisingly, there is no concrete effort to summarise, elaborate, and verify these accounts. It is not certain which of these accounts explain the roots of Uyghur ethnic consciousness. Nor is it certain whether Uyghurs hold a high level of ethnic consciousness. This paper shows the high level of ethnic consciousness among Uyghurs in Ürümchi. It also examines five possible accounts of Uyghur consciousness. It shows that the effect of Han migration on Uyghur consciousness is not statistically significant. This finding is plausible since the levels of ethnic consciousness are not necessarily related to the size of a minority group (or the size of the majority group). Whilst the majority group dominates society, it may not be able to prevent a minority group from developing its ethnic identity and consciousness. An example is the ethnic revival among minority groups in Europe and America. It seems that the levels of ethnic consciousness are dependent more on political, cultural, and religious factors than population size or ethnic composition. Indeed, this paper shows that religiosity and Uyghur language skills are two good determinants of Uyghur consciousness. The findings from this paper raise questions on the effect of inequalities on Uyghur consciousness. Uyghur ethnic consciousness is not statistically related to university education, state employment, professional status, Party membership, and income. These are the main indicators of status attainment in Xinjiang and China. Common sense suggests that a lower-status minority person is likely to have a high level of ethnic consciousness as a result of dissatisfaction and resentment against the majority group, whereas a high-status person is less likely to have a high level of ethnic consciousness since he or she may be bought off by the majority group. Why are not low-status Uyghurs more nationalistic than high-status Uyghurs? A possible explanation is that high-status Uyghurs are more likely than low-status Uyghurs to work with Han Chinese. It is possible that the former must have higher qualifications or work harder than the latter to receive similar wages, given discrimination against Uyghur workers in the labour market noted above. Thus, after comparing with a Han counterpart, a high-status Uyghur places himself or herself relatively low in the social hierarchy in Ürümchi. This comparison may lead to resentment and heightened ethnic consciousness. This account may explain why class subjectivities are a good predictor of Uyghur ethnic consciousness, whereas status attainment is not related to Uyghur consciousness in Ürümchi. The above discussion suggests that Uyghur identities result from a complex combination of instrumental and cultural/psychological factors. Different groups of Uyghurs draw on different variables to construct their versions of Uyghur identity, and identity expressions vary situationally over time and over space. As Heller points out, ÂUyghur identity is still evolvingÊ.125 In the 1980s, levels of ethnic consciousness were mainly based on occupational groups.126 Today, Uyghur language skills and Islamic affiliation are becoming key determinants of Uyghur ethnic consciousness. Cultural and religious factors are universal forces capable of promoting ethnic cohesion and unity among Uyghurs, whereas status attainment

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is a stratifying force. This may explain the emergence of a pan-Uyghur identity in Xinjiang as suggested by Smith Finley and other scholars.127

Notes 1 Joanne Smith Finley, ÂChinese oppression in Xinjiang, middle eastern conflicts and global Islamic solidarities among the UyghursÊ, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 16, No. 53 (2007), pp. 627 654; Colin Mackerras, ÂXinjiang at the turn of the centuryÊ, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 3: pp. 289 303; Joanne Smith, ÂFour generations of Uyghurs: The Shift Towards Ethno-Political Ideologies Among XinjiangÊs YouthÊ, Inner Asia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2000), pp. 195 224; Herbert Yee, ÂEthnic relations in XinjiangÊ, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 12, No. 36 (2003), pp. 431 452. 2 Jessica Koch, Economic Development and Ethnic Separatism in Western China (Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Working Paper # 134, 2006); David Heller, Evolving Uyghur Identity and Chinese Regional Policy in Xinjiang (Honour Thesis, Florida State University, 2007). http://digitool.fcla.edu/R/7I65HDJSXX5H-2XL98U6X 9YK19D9VPVBPGJVFDTQRCERD9F2LS3-00443?func=dbin-jump-full&object_ id=160874&local_base=GEN01 &pds_handle=GUEST [accessed 16 April 2013]. 3 Stephen E. Hess, ÂIslam, local elites, and ChinaÊs missteps in integrating the Uyghur nationÊ, Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Ara•stþrmalarþ (OAKA) [Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies], Vol. 4, No. 7 (2009), pp. 75 96. www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/ 4EeTmxtDNppkrrFTak6s43XcfD6iHq.pdf [accessed 16 April 2013]. Smith, ÂFour generationsÊ, p. 201. 4 Arienne M. Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict. Policy Studies 15 (2005). Washington, DC, East-West Center. www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS015.pdf [accessed 6 March 2013]; Eric T. Schluessel, Â „Bilingual‰ education and discontent in XinjiangÊ, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2007), pp. 251 277; Jennifer Taynen, ÂInterpreters, arbiters or outsiders: the role of the minkaohan in Xinjiang societyÊ, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2006), pp. 45 62. 5 Smith Finley, ÂChinese oppression in XinjiangÊ, pp. 628, 653 654; Marie-Eve Reny, ÂThe political salience of language and religionÊ, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2009), pp. 490 521. 6 Reny, ÂThe political salienceÊ, p. 492. 7 Koch, Economic Development, p. 10. 8 Graham E. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, ÂIslam in XinjiangÊ, in S. Frederick Starr (ed.), Xinjiang (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 328; Justin Rudelson and William Jankowiak, ÂAcculturation and resistanceÊ, in Starr, Xinjiang, p. 302. 9 Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang 1944 49 (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1990); Andrew D. W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911 1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 10 Smith Finley, ÂChinese Oppression in XinjiangÊ, pp. 629 630, 653; also Heller, Evolving Uyghur Identity, p. 7. 11 Justin Rudelson, Oasis Identities (New York: Columbia University Press 1997), p. 39. 12 Yitzhak Shichor, ÂBlow up: internal and external challenges of Uyghur separatism and Islamic radicalism to Chinese rule in XinjiangÊ, Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2005), p. 127. 13 Dru Gladney, ÂThe Chinese program of development and controlÊ, in Starr, Xinjiang, p. 103.

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14 Heller, Evolving Uyghur Identity, p. 7. 15 James Millward and Nabijan Tursun, ÂPolitical history and strategies of control, 1884 1978Ê, in Starr, Xinjiang, pp. 88 89; also Hess, ÂIslam, local elitesÊ, pp. 85 86; Shichor, ÂBlow upÊ, p. 127; Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2008). www.dtic. mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA493744 [accessed 16 April 2013]. 16 Niu Jun, 1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in ChinaÊs Foreign Policy (CWIHP Working Paper No. 48, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, 2005). www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/NiuJunWP481.pdf [accessed 6 March 2013]; Donald McMillen, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949 1977 (Boulder: Westview, 1979). 17 Taynen, ÂInterpretersÊ, pp. 50 51. 18 William Carl Clark, Convergence or Divergence: Uyghur Family Change in Urumqi (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1999). 19 Koch, Economic Development, p. 15. 20 Taynen, ÂInterpretersÊ, p. 51. 21 Schluessel, Â „Bilingual‰ educationÊ, p. 255. 22 Taynen, ÂInterpretersÊ, p. 51. 23 Fuller and Lipman, ÂIslam in XinjiangÊ, pp. 332 333; Taynen, ÂInterpretersÊ, p. 51. 24 Heller, Evolving Uyghur Identity, pp. 47 48; Rudelson, Oasis Identities, p. 104. 25 Koch, Economic Development, p. 8. 26 Fuller and Lipman, ÂIslam in XinjiangÊ, pp. 322, 326 328; Hess, ÂIslam, local elitesÊ, p. 86; Van Wie Davis, Uyghur Muslim, p. 2. 27 Heller, Evolving Uyghur Identity, p. 49. 28 Hess, ÂIslam, local elitesÊ, p. 87; Rudelson and Jankowiak, ÂAcculturation and resistanceÊ, p. 307. 29 Heller, Evolving Uyghur Identity, p. 51. 30 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict, p. 21; Schluessel, ÂÂBilingualÊ educationÊ, p. 256. 31 Rudelson, Oasis Identities, p. 115. 32 Shichor, ÂBlow upÊ, p. 122. 33 Nicolas Becquelin, ÂXinjiang in the ninetiesÊ, China Journal, Vol. 44 (2000), p. 88; Fuller and Lipman, ÂIslam in XinjiangÊ, p. 330. 34 Smith Finley, ÂChinese oppression in XinjiangÊ, p. 634; Joanne Smith, ÂMaking culture matterÊ, Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2002), pp. 202, 208; Van Wie Davis, Uyghur Muslim, p. 2. 35 Koch, Economic Development, p. 16; Reny, ÂThe political salienceÊ, p. 502; Rudelson, Oasis Identities, p. 125. 36 Barry Sautman, ÂPreferential policies for ethnic minorities in ChinaÊ, Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1 2 (1998), pp. 86 118. 37 Temtsel Hao, ÂXinjiang, Tibet, beyond: ChinaÊs ethnic relations.Ê Open Democracy website, 27 July 2009. www.opendemocracy.net/article/xinjiang-tibet-beyond-china-sethnic-relations [accessed 16 April 2013]. 38 Hess, ÂIslam, local elitesÊ, pp. 94 95; Koch, Economic Development, p. 6. 39 David Goodman, ÂThe campaign to „Open up the West‰ Ê, China Quarterly, Vol. 178 (2004), pp. 317, 319 320; Koch, Economic Development, pp. 14, 16; Van Wie Davis, Uyghur Muslim, pp. 4 5. 40 www.china-marketresearch.com/market-review/provincial-overview/xinjiang-demo graphic-economy.htm. 41 Koch, Economic Development, pp. 2, 6, 13 17.

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42 Gardner Bovingdon, ÂThe not-so-silent majorityÊ, Modern China, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2002), pp. 52, 65; Eric Hyer, ÂChinaÊs policy towards Uighur nationalismÊ, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2006), p. 75. 43 Rudelson, Oasis identities, pp. 40 42. 44 Hess, ÂIslam, local elitesÊ, pp. 89 90; Shichor, ÂBlow upÊ, p. 121. 45 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict, pp. 53 54, 63. 46 Fuller and Lipman, ÂIslam in XinjiangÊ, pp. 324 325; 330; Hess, ÂIslam, local elitesÊ, p. 90; Rudelson and Jankowiak, ÂAcculturation and resistanceÊ, pp. 307, 316 318. 47 Justin Hastings, ÂPerceiving a single Chinese stateÊ, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2005), p. 32; Hess, ÂIslam, local elitesÊ, pp. 89 90; Hyer, ÂChinaÊs policyÊ, pp. 78 79. 48 Bovingdon, ÂThe not-so-silent majorityÊ, p. 144; Heller, Evolving Uyghur Identity, pp. 8 9, 54; Rudelson, Oasis Identities, p. 137. 49 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict, p. 63. 50 Rudelson, Oasis Identities, pp. 116, 144; Schluessel,  „Bilingual‰ educationÊ, p. 270. 51 Rudelson, Oasis Identities, pp. 117, 119. 52 A Uyghur is a minkaohan (民考汉) if he or she finishes schooling in Chinese. Those who finish their schooling in Uyghur are minkaomin (民考民). 53 Smith Finley, ÂChinese oppression in XinjiangÊ, p. 652. 54 Koch, Economic Development, pp. 10 11; also Bovingdon, ÂThe not-so-silent majorityÊ, pp. 44, 51 53; Smith, ÂFour generationsÊ, pp. 200 201. 55 Herbert Yee, ÂEthnic consciousness and identityÊ, Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2005), p. 44; also Yee, ÂEthnic relationsÊ, p. 437. 56 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict, p. 9. 57 Nicholas J. Steiner, ÂNegotiating policy and identity in Uyghur China,Ê Wittenberg University East Asian Studies Journal, Vol. 35 (2010), p. 46. 58 Hess, ÂIslam, local elitesÊ, p. 95. 59 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict, p. 34. 60 S. Frederick Starr, ÂIntroductionÊ, in Starr, Xinjiang, p. 14. 61 Heller, Evolving Uyghur Identity, p. 5. 62 Rudelson and Jankowiak, ÂAcculturation and resistanceÊ, p. 306; also Stanley Toops, ÂThe demography of XinjiangÊ, pp. 241 263 in Starr, Xinjiang, pp. 244 249. 63 Rudelson, Oasis Identities, p. 122; Rudelson and Jankowiak, ÂAcculturation and resistanceÊ, p. 310. 64 Schluessel,  „Bilingual‰ educationÊ, p. 262. 65 Rudelson, Oasis Identities, p. 124; Yee, ÂEthnic consciousnessÊ, p. 42. 66 Fuller and Lipman, ÂIslam in XinjiangÊ, p. 339; Rudelson, Oasis Identities, p. 122. 67 Rudelson, Oasis Identities, pp. 115 116; Reny, ÂThe political salienceÊ, p. 511. 68 Koch, Economic Development, p. 16. 69 Heller, Evolving Uyghur Identity, p. 40. 70 Schluessel, „Bilingual‰ educationÊ, p. 269; also Smith, ÂFour generationsÊ, pp. 159 161. 71 Yair Amichai-Hamburger and Katelyn Y. A. McKenna, ÂThe contact hypothesis reconsideredÊ, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2006), pp. 825 843; Jeanne Novak and Patricia M. Rogan, ÂSocial integration in employment settingsÊ, Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2010), pp. 31 51. 72 Heller, Evolving Uyghur Identity, pp. 40, 43, 45. 73 Fuller and Lipman, ÂIslam in XinjiangÊ, p. 325; Koch, Economic Development, p. 16. 74 Hastings, ÂPerceiving a single Chinese stateÊ, pp. 30 31.

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75 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict, p. 64. 76 Toops, ÂThe Demography of XinjiangÊ, p. 262. 77 Shichor, ÂBlow upÊ, p. 121; also Koch, Economic Development, p. 15; Mackerras, ÂXinjiangÊ, p. 299. 78 Smith Finley, ÂChinese oppression in XinjiangÊ, p. 639. 79 Smith, ÂFour generationsÊ, p. 201. 80 Heller, Evolving Uyghur Identity, p. 45. 81 Koch, Economic Development, p. 15. 82 Schluessel, Â „Bilingual‰ educationÊ, p. 269. 83 Smith Finley, ÂChinese oppression in XinjiangÊ, pp. 629 630, 653. 84 Hess, ÂIslam, local elitesÊ, pp. 99 100. 85 Reny, ÂThe political salienceÊ, pp. 490, 493. 86 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict, p. 59; also Yee, ÂEthnic consciousnessÊ, pp. 38 39. 87 Taynen, ÂInterpretersÊ, p. 45. 88 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict, pp. 29, 38 39; Schluessel, Â „Bilingual‰ educationÊ, pp. 256 258, 263. 89 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict, p. 41; Schluessel, Â „Bilingual‰ educationÊ, pp. 254, 265, 268. 90 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict, pp. 41, 58; Schluessel, Â „Bilingual‰ educationÊ, pp. 252, 259 260, 271. 91 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict, p. 63; Yee, ÂEthnic consciousnessÊ, p. 47. 92 Schluessel, Â „Bilingual‰ educationÊ, p. 260; Smith, ÂFour generationsÊ, pp. 155, 157 161. 93 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict, p. 23. 94 Becquelin, ÂXinjiang in the ninetiesÊ, p. 376; Linda Benson, ÂEducation and social mobilityÊ, in Starr, Xinjiang, pp. 198 199, 213 214; Smith Finley, ÂChinese oppression in XinjiangÊ, p. 641; Fuller and Lipman, ÂIslam in XinjiangÊ, pp. 334 335; Schluessel, Â „Bilingual‰ educationÊ, p. 259; Rudelson and Jankowiak, ÂAcculturation and resistanceÊ, pp. 310 311. 95 Schluessel, Â „Bilingual‰ educationÊ, p. 260. 96 Steiner, ÂNegotiating PolicyÊ, p. 2; Schluessel, Â „Bilingual‰ educationÊ, p. 259; also Joanne Smith Finley, Â „Ethnic anomaly‰ or modern Uyghur survivor? A case study of the Minkaohan hybrid identity in XinjiangÊ, in Ildikó Bellér-Hann, M. Cristina Cesàro, Rachel Harris, and Joanne Smith Finley (eds), Situating the Uyghurs Between China and Central Asia (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 219 237, at pp. 229 230. 97 Smith Finley, ÂChinese oppression in XinjiangÊ, p. 641; also Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict, p. 38. 98 Taynen, ÂInterpretersÊ, p. 45. 99 Hess, ÂIslam, local elitesÊ, p. 99; Fuller and Lipman, ÂIslam in XinjiangÊ, pp. 334 335; Rudelson, Oasis Identities, pp. 127 128; Rudelson and Jankowiak, ÂAcculturation and resistanceÊ, p. 313; Schluessel, Â „Bilingual‰ educationÊ, p. 259. 100 Taynen, ÂInterpretersÊ, pp. 46 47. 101 Hess, ÂIslam, local elitesÊ, p. 82; also Reny, ÂThe political salienceÊ, pp. 493 494. 102 Rudelson, Oasis Identities, pp. 128, 144. 103 Reny, ÂThe political salienceÊ, pp. 493 494; also Benson, ÂEducation and social mobilityÊ, p. 198. 104 Smith Finley, ÂChinese oppression in XinjiangÊ, pp. 637, 654. 105 Rudelson, Oasis Identities, pp. 117, 121, 123. 106 Ibid., p. 128.

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107 108 109 110

Schluessel, Â „Bilingual‰ educationÊ, pp. 259, 262, 269 270. Reny, ÂThe political salienceÊ, pp. 490 491, 493. Koch, Economic Development, p. 10. Hess, ÂIslam, local elitesÊ, p. 98; also Smith Finley, ÂChinese oppression in XinjiangÊ, p. 628. Fuller and Lipman, ÂIslam in XinjiangÊ, p. 339. Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict, pp. 19, 22. Hess, ÂIslam, local elitesÊ, p. 82. Smith Finley, ÂChinese oppression in XinjiangÊ, pp. 630, 633, 639; Rudelson, Oasis Identities, p. 48. Rudelson and Jankowiak, ÂAcculturation and resistanceÊ, p. 316; Shichor, ÂBlow upÊ, p. 122. Smith Finley, ÂChinese oppression in XinjiangÊ, pp. 632, 634, 639. Hess, ÂIslam, local elitesÊ, pp. 89 90; Reny, ÂThe political salienceÊ, pp. 510 511. Fuller and Lipman, ÂIslam in XinjiangÊ, p. 340. Shichor, ÂBlow upÊ, pp. 127 128. Benson, ÂEducation and social mobilityÊ, p. 213; Fuller and Lipman, ÂIslam in XinjiangÊ, pp. 323 324; Smith, ÂFour generationsÊ, p. 157. Benson, ÂEducation and social mobilityÊ, pp. 198 199, 213 214; Fuller and Lipman, ÂIslam in XinjiangÊ, pp. 334 335; Smith, ÂFour generationsÊ, p. 160. Rudelson and Jankowiak, ÂAcculturation and resistanceÊ, pp. 310 311, 313 314. Hess, ÂIslam, local elitesÊ, pp. 94 95; Rudelson, Oasis Identities, pp. 116, 123. Jessica Collett and Omar Lizardo, ÂA power-control theory of gender and religiosityÊ, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2009), p. 213; Alan Miller and Rodney Stark, ÂGender and religiousnessÊ, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 107, No. 6 (2002), pp. 1,409 1,410. Heller, Evolving Uyghur Identity, p. 60. Rudelson, Oasis Identities. Smith Finley, ÂChinese oppression in XinjiangÊ, pp. 653 654; Koch, Economic Development, pp. 10 11; and Yee, ÂEthnic relationsÊ, p. 437.

111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124

125 126 127

3

Between minkaohan and minkaomin Discourses on ÂassimilationÊ amongst bilingual urban Uyghurs David Tobin

Introduction This chapter explores how national communities are produced and negotiated in multi-ethnic regions where conflicts over community boundaries are present. It will examine how official Chinese party-state discourses on modernisation and Âbilingual educationÊ (shuangyu jiaoyu) in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region seek to produce the boundaries of and order the meanings attributed to the national and the ethnic. However, it is crucial to analyse how members of this postulated community receive, negotiate, and often resist such discourses, thus producing communities of a different kind to that intended by this model of nation-building. These effects of nation-building will be examined through the lens of young, urban, bilingual Uyghurs in Ürümchi, the capital city of Xinjiang. This chapter asks how they frame the boundaries of community and how they receive the Chinese party-stateÊs model of bilingual education and its vision of the place of Uyghurs within China. Nations can be understood as a form of Âimagined political community and imagined as inherently limited and sovereignÊ (Anderson 1991, 5 6). These textual imaginations of states articulate how people ought to understand themselves through the demarcation and enclosure of the boundaries of community, belonging, and Self/Other. The security discourses of states are boundary-producing practices that Âinstantiate the identity in whose name they operateÊ and often in the name of survival of a way of life against OthersÊ (Campbell 1998, 73). Community and its articulation depend on the identification of outsiders and the exclusion of their postulated characteristics to produce a sense of Self. In reference to the exclusion of the Other in colonial discourses, what Gayatri Spivak termed Âepistemic violenceÊ (1988, 76) or Pierre BourdieuÊs Âsymbolic violenceÊ (2008) is not confined to international or inter-community security conflicts but occurs within the boundaries of states and of their many communities. This epistemic violence appears in official Chinese representations of ethnic minorities as ÂprimitiveÊ and has been conceptualised by Louisa Schein as Âinternal orientalismÊ. That is, those who are Othered are simultaneously understood by Othering agents as integral parts of the national community, but integrated on a low rung of the social

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hierarchy (Schein 2000, 106). This Othering of ethnic minorities in China as ÂbackwardÊ re-produces the boundaries of the officially articulated modern Chinese self (Zhonghua minzu) into which minorities are to be converted. Following Vered AmitÊs critique of Anderson, community is not simply conceptual but also visceral. People map out their own identities with reference to social relations which are symbolically close to them. Communities are constructed through social practices amongst community members, who unlike in an imagined community do in fact know one another (Amit 2002, 18). The boundaries articulated by states can be politically effective but their meaning can only truly be felt by potential members if they are able to realise them socially in their everyday lives (Amit 2002, 8). Attempts to produce community and its boundaries require that these attempts provide meaning and belonging-ness, which have some sense of correspondence with its postulated membersÊ lived experiences and how they think about them (Cohen 1985, 13, 28). Such nation-building attempts in Xinjiang are failing to convince both the Han majority and minority groups that they are part of the same national community because they continue to Other each other and choose to define their communities along ethno-linguistic lines (Tobin 2011). These ethnically defined communities may feel more real or visceral to their members because they are based on seemingly material bonds such as the Uyghur language; a shared form of knowledge of how to do things. However, while material and visceral social practices may have their own conditions and effects, they have no meaning without discourse (Hall 1996, 444). Community is constructed symbolically, and exists in the minds of its members such that the ÂdoingÊ community matters less than the ÂthinkingÊ about what its ÂdoingÊ means (Cohen 1985, 98). The position taken here is not that Uyghur language is visceral as opposed to imagined, for all Uyghur speakers do not know one another. It is that the Uyghur language has become a form of imagined viscerality. It is a social practice which is being symbolically imbued with viscerality and is being increasingly embedded in UyghursÊ self-identification. Despite the appearance of social rigidity, all symbols are mediated through the idiosyncratic experience of the individual and do not so much make meaning as give us the capacity to do so (Cohen 1985, 14). This chapter will argue that the Uyghur language is such a symbol. The specific meanings attributed to its use vary according to the idiosyncratic experience of individuals who define themselves as Uyghurs. Yet despite this contingency of meaning, it retains an appearance of fixed viscerality and its social power as a symbol demarcates the boundaries of who is and who is not Uyghur. All communities are sites of perpetual tension over who is and is not a real member, for they require exclusion for inclusion to have meaning. Uyghur language use is frequently employed as a marker of who is and is not a ÂrealÊ Uyghur (Smith Finley 2007). The internal and external boundaries of communities not only cut across one another but they are theoretically indivisible. Uyghur attitudes towards ÂsinicisationÊ and the meanings attributed to Uyghur and Mandarin language use amongst Uyghurs cannot be analysed in isolation. These meanings are thus framed as a socially contingent and idiosyncratically mediated internal/external boundary. All boundaries are fuzzy and membership is

Between minkaohan and minkaomin

57

always provisional such that exclusion awaits those who transgress these contingent boundaries (Bellér-Hann 2008, 1, 17). The first part of this chapter presents a discourse analysis of how the literature of the party-state imagines XinjiangÊs position within China as a national community. It will explore the officially articulated relationship between ethnic identity and national community in Xinjiang. This analysis will pay particular attention to how languages are imbued with hierarchical meanings within the discourse on bilingual education, which in practice means Mandarin Chinese-medium education. This section will examine how the boundaries of community are imagined for Uyghurs as the ÂcorrectÊ way to understand themselves and community (nation-building). Particular use will be made of resources from the party-stateÊs region-wide drive for ethnic unity education following the riots of July 2009. Parts two and three will present ethnographic data collected through detailed, semi-structured interviews with two key informants with whom long-term relationships based on trust were established. Sensitivities required that these interviews were conducted in private and long after friendly relations were built. The interviews took place in July 2010 after ten months of fieldwork during which a series of interviews established the widespread commitment to language as a key feature of Uyghur discourses on self-identification. This commitment was replicated in the case of these two individuals. Both interviewees were in their early twenties and were selected for this chapter because they were students of the same Âexperimental bilingual schoolingÊ scheme (shuangyu xianban). All students selected for the experimental scheme were selected on academic excellence, thus the interviewees were relatively gifted and hard-working individuals. Both former students were fluent in Uyghur, Mandarin, and English. According to the wishes of the interviewees, the interviews were conducted primarily in English instead of Mandarin Chinese, which reflects the intervieweesÊ attitudes towards Mandarin as a language of last resort1. Any key concepts which emerged such as unity (tuanjie) and assimilation (tonghua) were verified in Mandarin and Uyghur to ensure translatability. The Âexperimental bilingual schoolingÊ scheme was established in Ürümchi in the early 1990s and served as a precursor to the now universal programme of Âbilingual educationÊ (shuangyu jiaoyu). Bilingual education has largely replaced the parallel system of minkaohan and minkaomin schooling. Minkaohan and minkaomin refer to examination in Mandarin Chinese and examination in a minority language respectively but are also popularly used as categories to denote individuals who have undergone these forms of schooling. These two case studies thus offer a picture of potential futures for Xinjiang as ÂbilingualÊ schooling is universalised. The fieldwork location and relatively privileged position of the interviewees mean this picture is biased both towards Ürümchi and towards the educated. However, this is still a useful exercise, as the most educated are most likely to have the social status required to be listened to as legitimate articulators of Uyghur-ness. These interviews explored how these individuals framed their community, its boundaries, and its place within the Chinese nation with reference to official discourse. The case study material presented here focuses on attitudes

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towards Uyghur and Mandarin languages and how minkaohan and minkaomin categories overlap between Chinese-ness and Uyghur-ness. There are self-evident limitations to the representativeness of data drawn from two interviewees, which is an effect of the political controls and sensitivities in the region which make this type of research problematic to conduct. However, the ethnographic depth gained from conducting four-hour long interviews is often absent in studies of Xinjiang. Furthermore, the results are in many ways representative of the widespread commitment to Uyghur language use as an important component of identity in Xinjiang evident in other cases. For example, in 2011, 20 teachers at a college in Ürümchi refused new lower-rank jobs due to lack of Mandarin Chinese ability, with one stating Âwe are Uyghur, we should keep our language for the preservation of our cultureÊ (RFA 2011). The argument presented here is that the party-state is attempting to construct a national community (the Zhonghua minzu) based on the symbol of standardised Mandarin Chinese language. This involves integrating Uyghur-ness into a hierarchical national discourse on a rung below that imagined for the category of Han. Mandarin Chinese is promoted as a national symbol of modernity whereas the Uyghur language is represented as ethnic and backward, both deemed to be obstacles to national unity. This model of nation-building seeks to delink Uyghurs from their existing linguistic community through the elimination of Uyghur in the education system. As we shall see, meaning may be idiosyncratically mediated but the symbol of Uyghur language is being imagined as the visceral substance which holds the community together. Mandarin Chinese is seen as an imposition by outsiders and often as a threat of ÂassimilationÊ. There is no empirical evidence to suggest that by learning Mandarin Chinese, Uyghurs will become Chinese. Neighbouring Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks did not become Russian by learning the Russian language. Ironically, the party-stateÊs nation-building is producing unintended ethnicising and destabilising effects. Uyghurs master Mandarin Chinese but resent this requirement as an imposition, retaining their Uyghur selfidentification, and hardening the boundaries between Self and Other.

Part 1: imagining bilingual education, imagining Xinjiang The party-state frames China as a Âmulti-minzu2 nationÊ of 56 equal minzu under the Communist Party of China (PRC State Council 2009a, 8). Xinjiang today has been re-imagined by the party-state as an Âindivisible component of the Chinese nation since ancient timesÊ (PRC State Council 2009b, 3). The phrase Zhonghua minzu was first used in 1902 by the reformer Liang Qichao to refer to the Han and only later employed to re-imagine a multi-minzu nation with the Han at the centre (Leibold 2007, 29 31). These contingent boundaries of the Zhonghua minzu are forgotten in official representations of an unbroken, timeless ethnic hierarchy: ÂOver thousands of years of history the Han of the central plains and the surrounding areaÊs shaoshu minzu3 have assembled, becoming the unified and stable Chinese nation with the central plain as the core . . . the Han are superior in the areas of their economic cultural level, science and technology, and their labour

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resourcesÊ (Ministry of Information, Education Department 2009a, 43 4). The category of Han is interpellated by the party-state as national, modern, and active while Xinjiang and its various ethnic groups are interpellated as ethnic, backward, and passive. This colonial Othering, a form of epistemic violence which paradoxically demands inclusion in the national community, is reflected in how the party-state represents languages in Xinjiang and implements language policy. In 2002 the then Xinjiang party secretary Wang Lequan stated that: [the] languages of shaoshu minzu have very small capacities and do not contain many of the expressions in modern science and technology, which makes education in these concepts impossible. This is out of step with the 21st century. That is why the Chinese language is now used as the medium of instruction . . . to overcome the language barrier and obstacles to development. (Bequelin 2004, 376) In the Ministry of InformationÊs explanation of Âwhy bilingual education will benefit the development of shaoshu minzuÊ readers are told that unlike minority languages Mandarin Chinese is a Âtranscendent languageÊ (chaoyue yuyan) the primary means of transmitting Âscientific cultureÊ and Âmodern informationÊ (Ministry of Information, Education Department 2009b, 92 3).4 By framing Mandarin Chinese as a public symbol of modernity which transcends ethnic or minzu identity, the party-state then relegates Uyghur language to a lower position in the national socio-symbolic community: domestic and minzu. This of course includes Uyghurs in the national community, but by excluding their self-selected symbols of identity (Uyghur language) and elevating Mandarin it does so in a hierarchical way. Uyghurs are understood as behind the Han in this modernist teleology, and selfselected symbols of their ethnicity are excluded from the national community. The symbolic violence implicit in the ordering of meanings and values attributed to languages constructs the boundaries of a national Âlinguistic communityÊ (Bourdieu 2008, 45 6). The party-stateÊs minzu unity education materials in Xinjiang state its goals as ethnic extinction (minzu xiaowang) and the fusion (ronghe) of 56 minzu into the common identity of Zhonghua minzu. Its contention that Âonly if minzu exists can there be a minzu problemÊ (Ethnic Unity Education Editorial Board 2009, 37) suggests that the party-stateÊs approach is the eradication of minzu and ethnicity over the long term: ÂMinzu extinction is an inevitable result of minzu self-development and self-improvement . . . It is the final result of minzu development at its highest stage . . . in this big minzu family every minzu group has a higher level of identification the Zhonghua minzuÊ (Ethnic Unity Education Editorial Board 2009, 17, 79). The party-stateÊs ideology of historical materialism theorises history and identity as a progressive flow towards the formation of national community and modernisation which entails the disappearance of minzu, ethnicity, and their symbols. These materials claim that the constitutional right to Âmaintain and developÊ minority languages remains unaffected. However, the reduction of the number

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of languages in the world is said to be an Âinevitable outcomeÊ of the increasing connections between regions and expansion of Mandarin use to be an inevitability of modernisation (Ministry of Information, Education Department 2009b, 94 5). This orders identities within the national community such that ethnicity is represented as an obstacle to be overcome by economic developmentÊs inevitable outcome of a unified Chinese national community. In 2004, the Xinjiang Ministry of Education announced a gradual shift to what it termed Âbilingual educationÊ. The plan declared that by 2012 every school in the region was to adopt this system of using Chinese as the medium of instruction in all courses, with the exception of approximately four hours a week of minority literature studies for ethnic groups other than the Han (Schluessel 2009). While this was a new policy, it is better to characterise this as a quantitative rather than a qualitative shift. The regional government had long echoed the partyÊs push to promote Mandarin across the country at the expense of other dialects and minority languages. For example, in 1996 the Xinjiang Regional Government issued an Âeradicate illiteracy circularÊ (saochu wenmang tiaolie) (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Government 2009). Article One stated that illiteracy must be eradicated for the Âneeds of socialist modernisationÊ. Article Ten defined literacy for urban-dwellers as the ability to use 2,000 Chinese characters, while Article Four provided the right of the regional government to inspect and fine work units (danwei) whose members failed to reach these standards. In 1992, experimental bilingual classes were established in cities across Xinjiang to produce minority students capable of fluency in both Mandarin and their native language (han-min jiantong). Nevertheless, given the 60 million RMB and 16 million RMB in funds made available for the new drive for bilingual education by the central and regional governments respectively, this is now clearly a serious priority for the party-state (Ma 2009, 213). Ma Rong, one of ChinaÊs most politically influential social scientists, argues that this policy is essential for China to Âhave the ability to develop into a modernised nationÊ (Ma 2009, 240 1). The photograph in Figure 3.1 appeared in a free of charge, party-state organised exhibition in the regional expo centre in Ürümchi, September 2009. This exhibition showcased examples of Âethnic unityÊ (minzu tuanjie) following the riots of July 2009 and the ÂmodernisationÊ (xiandaihua) of Xinjiang under the rule of the party-state. The exhibit in Figure 3.1 was displayed in the section on Âimproving the peopleÊs livelihoodÊ alongside photographic representations and statistics on the development of cotton field production and the oil and gas industries. Its location in the exhibition illustrates how bilingual education, or education using Mandarin as the medium, is being promoted within the party-stateÊs discourse on development and ÂmodernisationÊ and is being disseminated to a broad audience. The caption  „Bilingual education‰ hastens budsÊ suggests that by being educated using the medium of Mandarin, young Uyghurs will be driven to blossom and prosper through the guidance of the party-state and its bilingual education policy. By omitting mention of the young studentsÊ mother-tongue in the exhibition, the implicit suggestion is that this does not offer the same opportunities for personal growth and prosperity. Furthermore, the caption ÂI can flyÊ articulates Mandarin

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Figure 3.1 ÂBilingual educationÊ hastens buds (ÂShuangyuÊ cui beilei) Originally published in its entirety in Anwei Feng and Mamtimyn Sunuodula, 2009, ÂAnalysing language education policy for ChinaÊs minority groupsÊ in International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, 12(6): 685 704. This photograph also appeared in the Xinjiang Daily and on the website of the national network with the caption ÂI can flyÊ (Wo neng fei).

as a modern language of development and mobility, and Uyghurs as in need of being developed by it. In Xinjiang, Mandarin Chinese is central to the partystateÊs nation-building model. It is being mobilised by the party-state as a symbol of the modern, national community whereas minority languages are being placed outside of the national community to remain in the ethnic and domestic spheres.

Mukhtar5: ‘they want to kill our language slowly then assimilate us’ The next two sections are based on detailed, semi-structured interviews. Their purpose is to explore how, as individuals, young urban Uyghurs define the boundaries of community and how they negotiate the boundaries of community offered by the party-state: that is, how they interpret the discussed official discourse on language and identity. These interviews reveal a tendency to define community in ethnolinguistic terms. During the ten-month period of fieldwork of which these interviews were a part, almost all Uyghurs interviewed defined language as a central defining feature of being Uyghur. A middle-aged businessman told me: ÂLanguage is a way of thinking, without it you lose your culture.Ê A Chinese language teacher of Uyghur ethnicity explained that, without the Uyghur language, Uyghurs would become ÂassimilatedÊ like other ethnic groups such as the Xibe. This challenges

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the party-stateÊs conception of the Zhonghua minzu as a national community with Mandarin as a central organising symbol. However, the interviews also illustrate how Uyghur communities are perpetual sites of tension over internal/external boundaries. Both interviewees define the foundation of community as a shared language to the extent that inclusion and exclusion is based upon the ability to use this shared language. Consequently, both question the Uyghur-ness of minkaohan because of their assumed limited grasp of the Uyghur language. Despite this shared symbol of community they imbue the Uyghur language with different meanings, as we shall see in their solutions to language maintenance the need for universal, public education proposed by Mukhtar against the domestic responsibility of the family for Mahigül. This helps us understand how Uyghurs maintain ethnic boundaries and a sense of individuality at the same time despite conflicts over the boundaries of the community within this community itself. Mukhtar, in his early 20s, had recently graduated from a university in Ürümchi and turned his hand to business. He grew up with his family in a Uyghur neighbourhood (mähällä) in the small city of Qorla a few hours from Ürümchi. He had grown accustomed to life in the big city of Ürümchi over the last five years and enjoyed the opportunities it offered to meet foreigners and chat in English. Mukhtar had excelled at languages and mocked the idea that Chinese was hard for Uyghurs to learn: ÂThey think it will be hard for us, they think we are barbarians, but itÊs easy.Ê Mukhtar represents an amalgamation of Joanne Smith [Finley]Ês (2000) ideal types of the Âpoliticised teenagerÊ and the Âyoung urban male intellectualÊ. He listened to foreign radio to get the Âreal newsÊ, frequently but quietly criticised the government, and constantly worried about the future of Xinjiang. As a relatively well-educated young man, he also read some academic literature on Xinjiang and hoped to pursue his studies one day at doctorate level. As a graduate of experimental bilingual middle and high schools he referred to himself as Âbetween minkaohan and minkaominÊ such that he was able to make friends with both groups. He lamented that they were divided by ÂmiscommunicationÊ and differing levels of Chinese cultural influence. Exemplifying the internal/external nature of this boundary, he referred to this as ÂsinicisationÊ and ÂassimilationÊ such that Uyghur-ness was being divided by Chinese-ness. He told me: ÂI have heard this stupid ittipaq yakhshi (Âunity is goodÊ) shit all my life, I think every single day; but itÊs stupid, they are assimilating us.Ê Mukhtar claimed that the bilingual education system was a Âtotal failureÊ because it was not bilingual and Âwe are losing our languageÊ. Like many urban Uyghurs, Mukhtar saw his own mastery of Mandarin solely as a means to economic advancement. When asked why he studied Chinese, he said that his parents knew it was essential to find a good job. He would say that he only used Mandarin Âwhen I talk to Chinese people. You know, shopping or doing random stuff. I mean, before it wasnÊt like this, but once I step out of my home I use Chinese because everywhere is Han Chinese people.Ê This remark framed Mandarin as a public language for practical use outside of the home and external to the boundaries of community, as he understood it. When asked what were the most important forms of cultural heritage in Xinjiang he always said the Uyghur

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language. He asked Âhow can you know your culture if you canÊt read the books of your elders?Ê Mukhtar imagined the boundaries of his community to be formed through what he understood as visceral, linguistic bonds. This excluded both nonUyghurs and those Uyghurs who could not speak Uyghur. Mukhtar defined community as ethno-linguistic, and being Uyghur as about being able to communicate, read, and write using the Uyghur language: Uyghur people look so different, some of us look like Europeans, some of us look like Chinese, some of us look like they are from India. The only thing that keeps us together is our language . . . IÊve heard there are even Christian Uyghurs6 . . . if they think they are Uyghurs and they speak the same language, and share the same culture as me, then, yeah, they are Uyghurs, theyÊre my friends, theyÊre my people. For Mukhtar, community is imagined as a visceral connection between fellow Uyghurs whose native tongue is Uyghur. This resists the partyÊs conceptual apparatus of minzu unity based on the shared identity of the Zhonghua minzu, with mastery of Mandarin as a central symbol. Mukhtar was rejecting the promotion of the Zhonghua minzu in Xinjiang through the discourses on bilingual education as irrelevant to his visceral, daily practices of communicating and socialising with Uyghurs using the Uyghur language.7 Mukhtar frequently framed Chinese policy and the attitudes of Han Chinese people as reflective of ÂsinicisationÊ and assimilation:8 ÂIt has always been their plan, to assimilate us.Ê He argued that bilingual education was the latest strategy and the gravest existential threat to the Uyghur community because it threatened to eradicate ethno-linguistic boundaries and transform Uyghurs into members of the Zhonghua minzu. When I asked him to explain how Uyghurs would be assimilated, he responded: We would become more Chinese, we would lose our language, our culture . . . of course, the main thing is our language. If we lost that, we would lose our identity, most of our identity. After that, we would naturally become like those Chinese people. He explained that while the disappearance of ethnic groups was often Ânatural,Ê in the case of ÂsinicisationÊ in Xinjiang it was a deliberate strategy running counter to nature. This romantic nature metaphor derived from his experiences growing up near the countryside in Qorla during a period Âbefore the Chinese cameÊ when Uyghur life was Âcloser to natureÊ. On our first meeting, I told him I had been informed by other Uyghurs that Qorla was a civilised place. He responded by saying: ÂWell, we used to have mädäniyät; now we have wenming.Ê9 In so saying, he stressed how Qorla had been transformed, as he saw it, from a Uyghur place to a site of Chinese culture. He would frequently essentialise Han Chinese people as having no ÂrespectÊ: ÂThey are supposed to have Confucius who tells them to respect their elders but they just donÊt.Ê During the same conversation, he also

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characterised this failing as a lack of respect for Uyghur culture and nature, often as if it were the same thing. This reflected how he understood Uyghur-ness as a natural, ethno-linguistic community, contrasted against the impersonal Otherness of the Zhonghua minzu. Whenever I asked about what type of changes waves of Chinese migration brought, he always lamented the loss of the mother tongue and at the same time the destruction of the orchards of Qorla. He recalled his parentsÊ and grandparentsÊ anger at this latter: ÂThey had lived that way, in the orchards, for hundreds of years.Ê Many of QorlaÊs orchards have been cut down in the partystateÊs drive for urbanisation and ÂmodernisationÊ, with little room for resistance. Farmers are not permitted to own land in China and they lease it from the government. Mukhtar explained through an extended narrative how ÂmodernisationÊ is being resisted in Xinjiang through language, selected as a means to demarcate the boundaries of community and exclude those whose mother tongue is not Uyghur: There used to be these trees which protect the land from desertification. Those trees are dying now. And itÊs really depressing to see that. We were walking into this jungle and then in the middle of that there was a desert. ItÊs already a desert. I mean I donÊt know whatÊs going to happen in 20 years. And the main reason was the trees couldnÊt get enough water and they are dying. And they are building a new fucking river in the city, Qorla, just to make the city look better. I mean, are you fucking kidding me? Those trees, which are protecting us, are not getting enough water and they are wasting water on making things look better, I mean, are they fucking nuts? And around that new river, those areas used to be orchards. One of my fond memories as a kid was going with my friends to steal fruits from the orchards. That was a lot of fun. You get chased by an angry owner or a dog. We would climb up on the walls or whatever. Of course in the city there are no more orchards. I had this picture that, since I hadnÊt been to those areas for a long time [outside the city], I had this picture that outside the city is all orchards, but when I went itÊs all skyscrapers and stuff, no more orchards. ItÊs part of the city now. And I went and there is this big fucking huge statue of Chinese man and it says Âspirit of the desertÊ. ItÊs like a huge statue, they didnÊt even explain who it is, it just said spirit of the desert, four fucking characters and I was like, what the fuck is this? ThatÊs the main thing that made me angry, seeing the river. Of course that Künchi river10 was also decorated, it looks artificial, it looks like a man-made river and that made me angry. And one fond memory is we would go there and swim and they had a lot of trees there, we would just jump into the river from the trees and stuff. It looked natural but now it doesnÊt, so that makes me angry. We are losing our own language. ThatÊs a bad sign. We had this life which was closer to nature, and what we did didnÊt do that much harm to nature. And seeing all those changes makes me realise itÊs not good, we should not lose our identity, our language. ItÊs just bad. I mean Chinese people would say itÊs good if we can assimilate those blah blah blah, they wonÊt be barbarians, they wonÊt be crazy Muslims blah blah blah, but itÊs not. Like I said I donÊt want to conform to what they are. I mean they are doing

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something wrong. We care, a lot of Uyghur people care about those dying trees, they write about them in magazines, they try to tell the government but they just donÊt give a crap. And, I donÊt know, I just donÊt want to see this place, [whispers] itÊs already occupied by Chinese people but this is a really important part of Central Asia. I mean we have as much right as them to live here. We shouldnÊt be assimilated. Mukhtar employed the symbols of nature and language in a single narrative on Chinese nation-building. He used these symbols to demarcate his self-defined natural and visceral ethno-linguistic community bounded outside the model of ÂmodernisationÊ offered by the Chinese party-state. This equated Han Chinese migrants and the party-stateÊs model of ÂmodernisationÊ as an existential threat to the ÂnaturalÊ fabric of the linguistic boundaries of the Uyghur community as he defined it. For Mukhtar the Chinese have brought skyscrapers, a lack of respect, and assimilative language policies, which have disrupted the natural bonds which hold the Uyghur linguistic community together and embed it in nature. The Uyghur language is the self-selected symbol to resist the model of ÂmodernisationÊ the partystate offers. Mukhtar framed Uyghurs as a Âdying nationÊ and his reference to the very real example of desertification in Xinjiang is a metaphor for how he saw the future of his community a cultural wasteland after being destroyed by the unnatural, assimilative impulse of the Zhonghua minzu and bilingual education. Mukhtar often described young Han Chinese men as feminine because they would Âcarry their girlfriendÊs handbagsÊ, ÂcanÊt take being teasedÊ, and ÂcanÊt fightÊ. This external boundary of urbanised, feminised Chinese-ness was then projected internally into the community and towards young Uyghur boys who spoke Mandarin instead of Uyghur and played games such as cards (a ÂChinese gameÊ) rather than playing football or stealing apples from orchards. Fear was asserted as characteristic of the Han community by Mukhtar. He described minkaohan as full of this fear because Âthey were afraid to make Uyghur friendsÊ due to Chinese influence: ÂThey are different, miserable to be honest. They are just scared, disorientated.Ê This placed minkaohan outside the Uyghur ethno-linguistic community and inside the unnatural desert of the Zhonghua minzu. For Mukhtar the Uyghur language symbolised community, nature, and masculinity whereas Mandarin represented assimilation, urbanisation, and femininity. He would frequently qualify his essentialisations, saying that not every minkaohan could be squeezed into this model. The important thing was that Âthey have to tryÊ to speak Uyghur instead of Mandarin. The boundary was no longer based simply on the schooling system itself; its contingent meaning had shifted to language choice and been imbued with meaning as a marker of willingness to resist ÂsinicisationÊ. This drew the theoretically indivisible internal/external boundary of contingent Uyghur-ness as one which appeared to be visceral and unchanging. For Mukhtar, the only way to reverse what he saw as the threat of Chineseness was through education using Uyghur as the medium of instruction. However, as an individual who was pessimistic about maintaining the very existence of his ethno-linguistic community, he threw doubt over whether this was enough

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by itself: ÂThat would be a way to slow it down but, no, we canÊt totally preserve it. I canÊt think of how to preserve it unless we get these people [Han Chinese] out of here or let these people start to learn Uyghur.Ê This reflected MukhtarÊs romantic vision of Qorla as a natural and visceral Uyghur linguistic community, as it had existed Âbefore the Chinese arrivedÊ and brought Mandarin and ÂsinicisationÊ. Mukhtar reversed the hierarchy of the party-stateÊs vision of Xinjiang as a frontier of China, with the Han at the centre. He positioned Uyghur not simply as a language for use in the home or even confined to his ethnic group but insisted that Han Chinese ought to study it in the same way he had to study Mandarin, as a language for public use. When I asked him whether all Uyghurs in Xinjiang should have to study Chinese, he responded: No! I think all Han Chinese should study Uyghur. If they want to come and live here they should. We are the local people. You know, if you come from some other place you should learn the language of the local people. As guests in his ÂhomelandÊ (wätän) Mukhtar felt it was a normative and common-sense demand for Han Chinese to study the language which for him defined both his community and the public cultural heritage of Xinjiang. For Mukhtar, the meaning behind the symbol of the Uyghur language was that it ought to be elevated to the status of a public, inter-ethnic language in all Xinjiang communities. He sought to reverse the stigmatisation of Uyghur ethnicity and language by re-elevating the Uyghur language and Uyghur-ness to the top of XinjiangÊs social hierarchy. Although Mukhtar imagined the Uyghur language as the foundation of what he understood to be his visceral community, he was not content with its use to remain in the home. He wanted to return to a ÂnaturalÊ state where the Uyghur language was restored to its status as the primary language of Xinjiang. He was imagining Uyghur-ness and he was imagining a Xinjiang he thought was inconceivable under the Chinese Communist party which he ÂhatedÊ. For Mukhtar, this imagined viscerality was the internal/external boundary of Uyghur-ness/Chinese-ness.

Mahigül: ‘we are neither minkaohan nor minkaomin, we are in the middle’ Mahigül was also in her early 20s but a born and bred Ürümchilik from a professional family. She and her family were proud to be Uyghurs but also proud to be urban, modern Ürümchiliklär.11 She had followed the same educational path as Mukhtar, attending a local primary school using Uyghur as the medium of instruction before being accepted into the six-year bilingual experimental scheme. In this system Mandarin was used for all classes except for four hours a week of Uyghur literature. Mahigül represents the young urban female individualist. She was a proud urbanite and mocked the widespread stereotype amongst Uyghurs that Ürümchi was a Âculture-lessÊ place and that it had Âno real UyghursÊ. She framed Uyghur language and writing as XinjiangÊs most important cultural heritage but only as tools to Âcreate new thingsÊ. For Mahigül, the ÂobsessionÊ with

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Uyghur folk music (muqam) and medieval literature Âheld us backÊ from progress. Mukhtar would proudly but sadly explain to me the meaning behind the lyrics of Ana Til (Mother Tongue) by the popular Uyghur folk singer Abdurehim Heyit as reflecting the importance of mother-tongue education and ethnic identity. Mahigül, on the other hand, preferred to listen to US hip-hop music and said she had no interest in traditional music. While she had friends from all over Xinjiang she would tease some of them as being altä shähärliklär. This meant they were literally Âpeople of the Six CitiesÊ, a widespread classist stereotype denoting Uyghurs from the oasis towns of southern Xinjiang as under-educated and poor. Mahigül often described attitudes from the ÂSix CitiesÊ as bäk mäto, to mean ÂbackwardÊ and behind the times, particularly with regard to fashion, something to which she paid particular attention. The importance of ethnic identity to Uyghurs and their continuing self-representation as a unified community to the outside persist. However, these stereotypes and how Mahigül played with them also illustrate that Uyghur communities, like many others, are sites of perpetual tension, divided by class and other forms of social status, including language competencies. Given MahigülÊs experiences within the same bilingual schooling scheme as Mukhtar, she had developed a self-understanding based on being between linguistic communities: ÂWe are neither minkaohan nor minkaomin, we are in the middle.Ê She imagined language as the basis of Uyghur identity and community such that this minkaohan minkaomin divide cut across ethnic boundaries and she occupied a middle ground. Unlike Mukhtar, she shied away from discussing politics directly. She explained her English studies with reference to interest in other cultures. When asked about Chinese culture, she said: ÂI know enough already, itÊs everywhere.Ê Her pragmatic attitude towards Mandarin use was comparable to MukhtarÊs: ÂItÊs the basic thing to live in China . . . we have to buy things, we canÊt always buy everything from Uyghurs.Ê She also suggested she would have no employment prospects but to sell food on the street in the Uyghur district Döngköwrük (Ch. Erdaoqiao) if she could not speak Mandarin Chinese. Like Mukhtar, she used Uyghur language with all her friends and family and refused to make friends with anyone in Ürümchi (other than foreigners) who could not speak Uyghur or at least try. She ethnicised language use and, like Mukhtar, employed an elision which equated the ethnic category of Han with the national category of Chinese: ÂI only speak Chinese to Chinese, Han Chinese to Han Chinese. I speak English to foreigners, I speak Uyghur to Uyghurs.Ê When I asked Mahigül why she felt language was so important to her identity she defined both herself and Uyghur-ness solely in ethno-linguistic terms: We are Uyghur, we speak Uyghur, we are not Uyghurs speaking Chinese, Uyghur is ours. Uyghur language also has many centuries of history so it deserves to be kept. ItÊs part of our culture. I mean, if we donÊt speak Uyghur in the future, we canÊt call ourselves Uyghur. WeÊd be Chinese. This ethno-linguistic demarcation of the boundaries of community defines inclusion in terms of mastery of oneÊs native tongue and in this case outside China

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framed as a Han nation-state. Otherwise the internal/external boundary is transgressed and one simply becomes a member of another community the Zhonghua minzu. The party-stateÊs discourse on the imagined community of the Zhonghua minzu had failed to convince Mahigül that she shared a community with nonUyghurs because it failed to correspond with her daily practices of communicating and socialising in Uyghur and how she imbued this with symbolic meaning. Furthermore, both Mukhtar and Mahigül were utterly perplexed when I asked if they thought that Chinese was a modern language, which shows how Uyghurs are unconvinced by the discourse of language ÂmodernisationÊ.12 While Mahigül equated language with ethnic identity by saying Uyghurs who could only speak Mandarin would become Chinese, she showed less concern about the level of threat of assimilation under the Chinese state than Mukhtar. This reflected her rejection of forms of Uyghur heritage deemed traditional and the need to Âcreate new thingsÊ. Where Mukhtar stressed the need to maintain a sense of community with the imagined community of the Uyghur dead, Mahigül emphasised language was to be used to ÂprogressÊ, regardless of its Âcenturies of historyÊ. When I asked if she worried like many other Uyghurs about the future of her language, she said: If there are some languages that have disappeared, itÊs because there are no more people who speak in that language but we are eight million Uyghurs. ItÊs not possible. It wouldnÊt happen that all of us would speak Chinese and forget Uyghur. So still there would be, say, a million people who could speak Uyghur, so it wouldnÊt disappear. MahigülÊs upbringing in Ürümchi meant she was accustomed to an urban lifestyle centred on the nuclear family in a gated apartment block. Her community had always centred on an apartment where family would congregate but in private with doors closed and locked. This allowed her symbolic security from the boundary-transgressing practices of the Chinese party-state and Mandarin speaking minkaohan. For Mahigül, as long as Uyghur could be spoken in the home, it would retain its symbolic power and ÂwouldnÊt disappearÊ. Mukhtar, on the other hand, explicitly longed for a return to a community life where Âall families hang out together on the streetÊ. This was not because he was raised in a remote rural region but because he was accustomed to a different type of urban environment a Uyghur mähällä, where doors are often left open and there is frequent interaction between neighbours.13 Mahigül and Mukhtar imbued the Uyghur language with different meanings. However, in each case it retained its social power as a common symbol, which demarcated the boundaries of their community as they imagined it. Mahigül was a fiercer critic of minkaohan than Mukhtar. This was because she saw language maintenance and the reproduction of community boundaries as the moral responsibility of the individual and the family within the community, rather than of the community per se. She was happy to explain to me the purported differences between minkaomin and minkaohan. She said she only had minkaomin

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friends because they were more fun to hang out with than minkaohan, because they used the Uyghur language to communicate. It was hard to imagine how the party-stateÊs vision of the Zhonghua minzu could convince her if she shared so few social practices with non-Uyghur speakers and consciously framed socialising through the prism of the internal/external boundary of her ethno-linguistic community. Unlike Mukhtar, her essentialisations were not qualified, and despite her claimed between-ness she often referred to minkaomin as ÂweÊ. According to Mahigül, the fundamental differences between minkaohan and minkaomin were reflected in the language they chose to speak and the ethnicity of their friends. She would lament that minkaohan may choose to date and socialise with Han Chinese. She offered little explanation as to why this was a problem other than that Âthey [the Han] are ChineseÊ, which suggested that inter-ethnic dating between Uyghurs and Han is inherently problematic. This placed minkaohan outside her symbolically constructed visceral community and into the imagined community of the Zhonghua minzu: They are more open-minded but not in a good way . . . We speak Uyghur. Some minkaohan speak Chinese. Their Uyghur is not good, I donÊt like that. The Uyghur classes [minkaomin], they study in Chinese but they communicate in Uyghur and they hang out with Uyghur friends but they [minkaohan] hang out with Chinese. They will be influenced by the Chinese, you know, from primary school to university. The boundary of community being drawn here reflects the indivisible boundaries of Self/Other, minkaohan/minkaomin, and Uyghur-ness/Chinese-ness. Mahigül told me she contravened the tenets of Islam by drinking alcohol and by wearing dresses which revealed her forearms, which indicates both the contingency and the persistence of these boundaries. She then claimed minkaohan were less Uyghur and less Islamic than minkaomin. By wearing clothes which also showed their upper arms, they contravened Islam more gravely as the contingent boundary between Uyghur Muslim and sinicisation shifted from lower to upper arm: ÂWe are Muslims. Chinese people dress like that, not us.Ê She attributed this dress-sense to ÂChinese influenceÊ through the medium of minkaohan schooling and mixing with Han Chinese. Minkaohan were transgressing the linguistic boundary which defined how Mahigül understood the Uyghur community. Although she would always refer to choice of language when I asked why she chose not to socialise with minkaohan, she would then continue with stories such as that above, which linked language to social characteristics. Minkaohan were being positioned outside of MahigülÊs self-defined ethno-linguistic community because she saw them as less Uyghur and more Chinese than her family and her minkaomin friends. Mahigül and Mukhtar imbued Chinese-ness and language with different meanings. Nevertheless, they self-consciously participated in internal/external boundary demarcation and the symbolic construction of community through language and imagined positions in a spectrum of what they called ÂsinicisationÊ. Mahigül

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laughed when I asked if the categories of minkaohan and minkaomin referred to the school system one had attended and reiterated that it was about what language one used, not what school one attended. They both suggested these categories will disappear as formal, educational designations under bilingual education policies. However, they both said they would continue to use them to refer to the language abilities, or the level of assimilation, of other Uyghurs. As Anthony Cohen argued, people Âthink themselves into difference . . . the appearance of continuity is so compelling that it obscures peopleÊs recognition that the form itself has changedÊ (1985, 86, 91). The boundary and the categories it encloses may appear rigid, but their meaning is contingent and shifts with social practice and the idiosyncrasy of those who employ them. When we discussed preservation of languages it emerged that despite Mahigül and MukhtarÊs shared sense of community, defined with reference to the common symbol of language, its meaning was not shared. They both deemed it laughable that they would speak any language other than Uyghur with their family and friends, with the exception of foreign friends. However, Mahigül rejected the need for public education and took a more individualistic approach, again rooted in her experience of growing up in a nuclear family in a private apartment in the big city of Ürümchi: You can maybe speak Chinese at school or at work, but at home you have your choice. I donÊt think itÊs a problem. ItÊs our job to keep it. ItÊs not about education. I think itÊs first the parentsÊ job, not the school. If my kids went to Chinese class, I would teach them Uyghur at home when they are very small. For Mahigül, there was no Chinese threat even though she framed the boundaries of community in very similar ways to Mukhtar. There was no threat because for Mahigül, the Uyghur language symbolised the home, the domestic, and the small-scale community. She would use Mandarin out of necessity and Uyghur out of the love of her mother tongue and her community. The responsibility to maintain this linguistic community lay in the hands of the individual and the nuclear family. Mahigül would regularly say that relations between Han and Uyghurs did not affect her life. However, she also thought that ethno-centrism was so fierce in Ürümchi that Han Chinese should not learn Uyghur because then they would Âknow we are cursing themÊ just like Âwe know when they curse usÊ. She said she had no feelings whatsoever about whether non-Uyghurs learned Uyghur, including foreigners, because it was Âour languageÊ. This was unlike Mukhtar, who expressed pride when he met several foreigners who at least tried to use basic Uyghur phrases. Mahigül, like Mukhtar, wanted to maintain the Uyghur language and saw it as her responsibility to preserve this defining boundary of her community against the existential threat of the Zhonghua minzu and the ÂsinicisedÊ minkaohan. However, for her the meaning which she sought to preserve was a domestic language which afforded her and her community privacy from outsiders. Mahigül did not seek to reverse stigmatisation or resist assimilation as such. She merely dismissed

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the possibility of assimilation altogether because she did not believe that China could intervene in the home, the site of the private reproduction of Uyghur-ness. Mahigül wanted to continue living as she had done all her life, in a family unit within an urban environment where two ethnic groups could not speak each otherÊs languages and so would not transgress the boundaries of her imagined visceral community.

Conclusions This chapter analysed how communities are symbolically constructed in overlapping, conflicting ways by both states and individuals. The medium of the individual case study helps avoid the tendency to reify ethnic identities in the study of ethnic boundaries and explore conflict within as well as between communities. This approach is often critiqued as idiothetic and in many ways the ontology of the idiosyncratic individual employed here reflects this. However, the chapter offered an analysis of the dynamics of how official macro-level politics play out at the micro level of everyday politics and self-understandings in ways which offer resistance to and set limitations on these official political strategies. Individuals select meanings from an existing array of social repertoires available to them. Symbols do not make meaning but give individuals the capacity to do so. The meaning of the Uyghur language is being mediated through the idiosyncratic experience of the individual, but it is being deployed as a symbol of imagined viscerality to maintain boundaries between and within ethnic groups. The party-state is attempting to produce a national-level imagined community (the Zhonghua minzu) based on the symbol of Mandarin. This nation-building project seeks to detach Uyghurs from their existing self-identified linguistic community through bilingual education. Mandarin is imagined by the party-state as a national-level symbol of modernity whereas the Uyghur language is represented as an ethnic, backward obstacle to the consolidation of national identity. Such a model of nation-building excludes how Uyghurs articulate themselves via language use but integrates them as integral components of the Zhonghua minzu. Uyghurs are not so much excluded as integrated into a hierarchical national community but on a rung below that imagined for the Han. As a form of internal orientalism, this discourse aims to build a national community based on epistemic violence and symbolic violence. The chapter argued that the individual case studies of Mukhtar and Mahigül represented particular social trends in Xinjiang such that Mukhtar represented resistance to the Zhonghua minzu whereas Mahigül represented accommodation. For Mukhtar, Chinese-medium education was to be understood as assimilation. This had to be reversed to elevate the status of the Uyghur language and to maintain the ethnic boundary between Uyghurs and Han. Mahigül saw public life as something which could be negotiated, with ethnic boundaries maintained through a Uyghurlanguage environment in the home. Both case studies indicated the contingency of the internal/external boundaries of community. They reframed these boundaries of minkaohan and minkaomin from formalised categories of schooling to attitudes

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towards language use. Both Mahigül and Mukhtar used minkaohan to mean Uyghurs who prefer to use Mandarin Chinese, seeing them as ÂsinicisedÊ and outside of their self-identified community. Their individual perspectives represent broader trends in Ürümchi, and perhaps the future for Xinjiang as the education system they experienced is universalised. They illustrated how the Uyghur language could be imbued with different meanings but continue to be deployed as an ethnicised symbol of imagined viscerality demarcating the internal/external boundaries of Uyghur-ness and Chinese-ness. Uyghur-ness is thus becoming an imagined viscerality in contrast to the Otherness of an unequal and imagined Zhonghua minzu. The official model of China as the Zhonghua minzu does not correspond with the imagined viscerality and the self-identified linguistic base of community amongst young, urban, bilingual Uyghurs. Mandarin continues to be seen as an unavoidable reality which needs to be negotiated to find employment, but also as an imposition by those outside the self-identified boundaries of community. The party-stateÊs nation-building project is thus producing unintended ethnicising and destabilising effects as it strengthens UyghursÊ attachment to their mother tongue and their ethnic identification. This type of coercive integration is unlikely to produce a self-identified multi-ethnic community. It neither offers an equal sense of belonging nor does it fit with postulated membersÊ lived experiences, which remain consciously mediated by social and psychological boundaries between and within groups. A discourse on ÂassimilationÊ has thus emerged amongst young, urban bilingual Uyghurs to demarcate the internal/external linguistic boundaries of community, which exclude Han and stigmatise minkaohan as un-Uyghur and ÂsinicisedÊ. The current practice of, and thinking behind, bilingual education thus far appears to be hardening rather than eradicating the boundaries between Self and Other in Xinjiang, and simultaneously creating new ones.

Notes 1 Unfortunately, due to my own limited Uyghur language abilities, conducting these interviews in Uyghur was not an option. 2 Official translation of the category minzu (民族) has changed from ÂnationalityÊ to ÂethnicityÊ. This is in accordance with the political exigencies of the CCPÊs shift in its legitimation from Leninist-Marxism to Technocratic-Nationalism. Following Harrell (1990, 517), the term will be used here without translating it. European and American scholarly conceptions of ethnicity tend to imply both self-identification and civic membership in ways the minzu category does not. 3 Shaoshu minzu is now officially translated as Âethnic minorityÊ. 4 During the fieldwork period for this study (2009 2010), all students at every higher educational institute in the region studied this particular text (50 Whys). Several informants told me how they had to pass exams and memorise its content to continue their education. 5 Interviewees are intended to remain anonymous and these pseudonyms are given purely for the convenience of the reader. 6 This particular comment is not representative of older generations of Uyghurs, who place the role of religion more centrally in their self-identification. However, it should be noted that Mukhtar still considered himself a Muslim.

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7 There is no room to discuss this fully here, but Mukhtar explicitly rejected ethnic unity on the grounds that it was a ÂcoverÊ for ÂassimilationÊ and that Han Chinese had no interest in Uyghur culture or unity, only in domination and resource extraction. 8 The two were in fact conflated by Mukhtar. In English he used ÂassimilationÊ; in Mandarin he used tonghua (lit. Âto be made the sameÊ), and in Uyghur khänzulishish (Âto be made HanÊ). 9 Mädäniyät and wenming are Uyghur and Mandarin Chinese terms respectively for ÂcivilisationÊ. They are translated here as roughly equivalent terms. 10 This man-made river is known as the Kongque (Peacock river) in Mandarin. 11 In the Uyghur language, the suffix -lik or-liq is added to place names to indicate a person from that place. An Ürümchilik is then a person from Ürümchi, while Ürümchiliklär is the plural. When I asked Mukhtar and Mahigül if they were Junggoliq (Âpersons from ChinaÊ), they found this amusing. This indicates the failure of the party-stateÊs interpellated categories of identification to hold any broad resonance with the population of Xinjiang. On the failure of the official ÂXinjiang personÊ (Xinjiangren) category, see Dautcher (2009). 12 Mukhtar did once reverse the stigma of backwardness attributed to Uyghur language: ÂThey think we are backward. Well, their language is made up of ancient, little drawings from caves that take years to learn. ThatÊs backward.Ê 13 Initially, this difference appeared to be a gendered view of politics, but other female interviewees from Qorla shared the same concerns as Mukhtar for the public status of the Uyghur language. On mähällä, see Dautcher (2009).

References Amit, Vered. 2002. „Reconceptualizing Community.‰ In Realizing Community: Concepts, Social Relationships, and Sentiments, edited by Vered Amit. London: Routledge, 1 21. Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso Press. Bellér-Hann, Ildikó. 2008. Community Matters in Xinjiang, 1880 1949: Towards a Historical Anthropology of the Uyghur. Leiden: Brill. Bequelin, Nicholas. 2004. „Staged Development in Xinjiang.‰ The China Quarterly 178: 358 78. Bourdieu, Pierre. 2008. Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Polity Press. Campbell, David. 1998. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Cohen, Anthony P. 1985. The Symbolic Construction of Community. London: Routledge. Dautcher, Jay. 2009. Down a Narrow Road: Identity and Masculinity in a Uyghur Community in Xinjiang China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ethnic Unity Education Editorial Board. 2009. Minzu Lilun Changshi [Common Knowledge of Ethnic Theory]. Beijing: Central Television and Broadcasting Publishing House. Hall, Stuart. 1996. „New Ethnicities.‰ In Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, edited by David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen. London: Routledge, 422 51. Harrell, Stevan. 1990. „Ethnicity, Local Interests, and the State.‰ Comparative Studies in Society and History, 32(3): 515 48. Leibold, James. 2007. Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism: How the Qing Frontier and its Indigenes Became Chinese. New York: Palgrave. Ministry of Information, Education Department. 2009a. Minzu Tuanjie Jiaoyu: Tongsu Duben [Ethnic Unity Education: Basic Study Guide]. Beijing: Study Press.

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Ministry of Information. 2009b. 50 ge „Wei shenme‰: Weihu guojia tongyi, fandui minzu fenlie, jiaqiang minzu tuanjie duben [50 Whys: Study Book on Protecting National Unification, Opposing Ethnic Separatism, and Strengthening Ethnic Unity]. Wulumuqi: Xinjiang Education Press. Ma Rong. 2009. „The Development of Minority Education and the Practice of Bilingual Education in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.‰ Frontier Education China 4(2): 188 251. PRC State Council. 2009a. Zhongguo de minzu zhengce yu ge minzu gongtong fanrong fazhan [ChinaÊs Ethnic Minority Policies and the Common Prosperity of All Ethnic Groups]. Beijing: PeopleÊs Publishing Press. PRC State Council. 2009b. Xinjiang de fazhan yu jinbu [Development and Progress in Xinjiang]. Beijing: PeopleÊs Publishing Press. Radio Free Asia (RFA). 2011. „Laid-Off Profs Reject Deal.‰ Last modified 27 September 2011. www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/deal-09272011172719.html. Schein, Louisa. 2000. Minority Rules. London: Duke University. Schluessel, Eric. 2009. „History, Identity, and Mother-Tongue Education in Xinjiang.‰ Central Asian Survey 29(4): 383 402. Smith, Joanne. 2000. „Four Generations of Uyghurs: The Shift Towards Ethno-Political Ideologies Among XinjiangÊs Youth.‰ Inner Asia 2(2): 195 224. Smith Finley, Joanne. 2007. „ ÂEthnic AnomalyÊ or Modern Uyghur Survivor? A Case Study of the Minkaohan Hybrid Identity in Xinjiang.‰ In Situating the Uyghurs between China and Central Asia, edited by Ildikó Bellér-Hann, M. Cristina Cesàro, Rachel Harris, and Joanne Smith Finley. Aldershot: Ashgate, 219 38. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1988. „Can the Subaltern Speak?‰ In Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 271 313. Tobin, David. 2011. „Competing Communities: Ethnic Unity and Ethnic Boundaries on ChinaÊs North-West Frontier.‰ Inner Asia 13(1): 7 25. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Government. 2009. „Xinjiang Weiwuer zizhiqu saochu wenmang tiaolie‰ [„Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Government: Regulations on the Eradication of Illiteracy‰]. Xinjiang guotu ziyuan. Last modified 19 February 2009. http://gtt.xinjiang.gov.cn/10120/10190/2009/15754.htm.

4

The construction of Uyghur urban youth identity through language use Ablimit Baki Elterish

Introduction TodayÊs young Uyghurs are caught between identities, balancing their ethnic identity with the identity imposed by the state, which requires them to identify as members of the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu). Uyghur youth face dramatically increased pressure from state policies to assimilate culturally and linguistically to Chinese majority culture (Bovingdon 2004). Much of this pressure comes directly from the state language policy, which promotes Chinese as sole medium of instruction, and reduces the use of Uyghur at all levels in educational institutions. The pressure is stronger in urban Xinjiang, where the increasing use of Chinese in important domains such as education, government, business, and mass media is further exerting an influence on young Uyghurs. For urban Uyghurs in Xinjiang, using a particular language in interactions with Han Chinese, and particularly in interactions with their Uyghur peers, in specific situations, contributes to the construction of their ethnic identity in a Han-dominated Chinese society.

Ethnic identity and Uyghur identity Ethnic identity is not something people ÂpossessÊ but rather something they ÂconstructÊ in specific social and historical contexts (Wan and Vanderwerf 2009). In other words, ethnic identity is not isolated, but relative (Smith 2002). Ethnic identity often involves shared objective characteristics such as language, religion, culturally defined notions of descent, and socio-political circumstance (Gladney 2004). Among these, language is a key characteristic, and is deployed as a marker of ethnic identity when interacting with a variety of others in different situations. Bilingual society offers bilingual experiences; in other words, people may naturally become bilingual through social experiences without undergoing any specific training or bilingual education (Li 2000, 5). However, as a result of complex socio-economic factors, such experiences are often restricted to minoritylanguage speakers rather than majority-language speakers. Bilingual Xinjiang offers an ideal setting for the study of the role of language in the construction of identity. The purpose of this chapter is to examine which language or languages young urban Uyghurs opt to use, in dialogue with a variety of others, and in specific situations, in the construction of their ethnic identity.

76 Ablimit Baki Elterish The construction of Uyghur identity is closely linked to the social experiences of the Uyghurs, as well as to a broad range of historical and socio-political factors in Han-dominated society. To some extent, the social experiences of the Uyghurs are a complex combination of local, regional, and national interactions. Traditionally, Uyghurs identified themselves with the oases they came from. Rudelson (1997) observed that the oasis identifications of Uyghurs were intensified by the physical isolation of the oases as well as by various cultural influences on XinjiangÊs borders throughout history. This view was challenged by Bovingdon (1998), who argued that the importance of oases in shaping Uyghur identity was reduced by the development of formal education (received at schools) in Xinjiang. The isolated oasis identities of the Uyghurs tended to become less important when awareness of Uyghur group identity strengthened in the face of the life experiences of Uyghurs in an ethnically stratified Chinese society. Subsequently, Smith (2002) argued that ethnic boundaries were deliberately constructed by Uyghurs vis-à-vis Han Chinese during the 1990s, helping to consolidate a common ethnic identity among Uyghurs across the region, regardless of their oasis origin. The social experiences of Uyghurs have also strengthened the religious element of Uyghur identity. Viewing Islam as a potential root of Uyghur separatist unrest in Xinjiang, the state has placed tight religious and cultural restrictions on Uyghurs from the mid-1990s onwards. These restrictions continue today. Currently, Uyghur youth, particularly those enrolled at schools and universities, and those in government employment, are prohibited from engaging in any religious activities. In one study, Smith Finley (2007b) has noted that the recent revival of Islam among Uyghurs in Xinjiang, occurring in direct response to state restrictions on religion and culture, acts to reinforce their religious identity and their sense of distinction from the Han Chinese. This renewed identification of Uyghurs with Islam, and sense of separateness from the Han Chinese, Smith Finley argues, constitutes a subtle means of self-representation and an expression of opposition to state policy. Empirical research has shown that ethnic identity is closely associated with ethnic boundaries. Ethnic boundaries may be defined as collective efforts to determine ethnic criteria and behaviour acceptable to the members of an ethnic group (Nagel 1994). In interactions with the Han Chinese, Uyghurs tend to draw clear ethnic boundaries in a number of respects. Bellér-Hann (2002, 60 77) illustrates five types of boundaries between the two groups, based on the perceptions of Uyghurs towards Han Chinese. These boundaries include time and space, occupation and education, dress code and fashion, ÂtemperamentÊ and diet, and intermarriage. According to Bellér-Hann, these are the boundaries through which the Uyghurs differentiate themselves from the Han Chinese. Bellér-Hann stresses the primacy of social practices in local communities for the production of Uyghur ethnic identity. In a similar study, Smith (2002, 158 69) distinguishes three types of boundary: symbolic, spatial, and social. According to her, Uyghurs emphasise symbolic (language, time, and religion), spatial (residence), and social (friendship, intermarriage) boundaries between themselves and the Han Chinese. But, in SmithÊs opinion, it is in reality political conflict that underlies reinforced

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boundaries between the two groups. Smith (2002, 155) further comments that symbolic and spatial boundaries did not prevent Uyghurs from interacting with Han Chinese in the past for instance, with first generation Han settlers. She finds, rather, that it is growing Uyghur perceptions of socio-economic inequalities between Uyghurs and Han Chinese that lie at the root of increased tensions. Ethnic boundaries have been drawn particularly keenly by Uyghur intellectuals in their literary and cultural works. Smith (2007) has investigated Uyghur construction and dissemination of metaphorical representations of the Uyghur people, and of the Han Chinese, in popular songs. She found that songs reflected popular perceptions of ÂUsÊ and ÂThemÊ, and were able to reproduce a broadbased Uyghur identity throughout the region. Harris (2001; 2005) has conducted research on the representation of Uyghur identity through music and dance. She maintains that various themes expressed in Uyghur popular song and dance are bound up with issues of ethnic identity. According to Harris, sounds and meanings in Uyghur music are adapted and re-signified in the construction of Uyghur identity. In a bilingual community, one group often attempts to distinguish itself from the others. One way of doing this is through language use. Smith (2002) maintains that Uyghurs use their mother tongue to clearly draw cultural boundaries between themselves and the Han Chinese, in order to resist both the stateÊs assimilation policies and Han in-migration. One way in which Uyghurs achieve this, according to Smith, is by distinguishing language use in the home environment (times when they speak Uyghur) and Âthe outsideÊ (times when they speak Chinese). To most Uyghurs, she finds, Chinese is only a necessary tool, so that it is almost impossible for a member of the Uyghur ethnic group to address another Uyghur in Chinese in public (Smith 2002). To illustrate this, Smith describes her multiple experiences of witnessing a Uyghur, initially not looking at the interlocutor, begin speaking to another Uyghur person in Chinese. After realizing that the partner in the conversation was another Uyghur, he or she immediately switched to using the Uyghur language and apologised for the mistake. For these individuals, the times at which they opt to use either Uyghur or Chinese define a clear boundary between their own ethnic group and the ÂOthersÊ. The Uyghur experience of mother-tongue education is very important in the construction of modern Uyghur identity. Mother-tongue education in Uyghur began in the 1880s with the establishment of new, progressive Uyghur schools (Schluessel 2009). These institutions delivered courses which spread progressive ideas about ethnicity that later became an important aspect of Uyghur identity. Modern Uyghur identity, according to Schluessel, is thus partly the product of a series of educational institutions beginning to operate mother-tongue education in the region. One important aspect of modern Uyghur identity is its hybridity, formed in relation to the different educational experiences in different media of instruction. Scholars identify two types of Uyghur individual produced by the Chinese education system operating in the 1990s: minkaomin (Uyghur persons educated in their mother tongue) and minkaohan (Uyghur persons educated in the Chinese language). Hybrid Uyghur identity is perhaps represented principally by the

78 Ablimit Baki Elterish minkaohan, who can be found mainly in urban Xinjiang. Through intensive interaction with the Han Chinese, some minkaohan have gradually adopted many Han Chinese characteristics, both linguistically and culturally (Taynen 2006). As a result, the minkaohan have been considered by Xinjiang society as neither wholly Uyghur nor wholly Han Chinese, because of their Âin-betweennessÊ (Smith Finley 2007a, 219). One of the most notable features of Uyghur hybrid identity is language use. The minkaomin prefer to maintain use of their mother tongue, Uyghur, and use Mandarin only as a tool (Schluessel 2007). According to Schluessel, the use of Chinese outside of the classroom is considered shameful and uncomfortable among minkaomin. On the contrary, the minkaohan tend to use Chinese voluntarily in many situations, particularly among Uyghurs of the same educational experiences, and are often regarded by other Uyghurs as having lost mother-tongue competence and cultural knowledge in exchange for economic gain (Rudelson 1997). Different educational experiences have also created cultural divisions among Uyghurs. Tsung and Clarke (2010, 12) find that language plays a crucial role as a key symbol of socially constructed ethnic identities in Xinjiang, serving as a marker of the perceived differences between different groups of Uyghurs. All these studies suggest that Uyghur identity has been formed in relation to social experiences: namely, interactions of Uyghurs with Han Chinese, or with other Uyghurs, in a Han-dominated urban society, and interactions with stateimposed education policies. In other words, interaction-induced ethnic boundaries are at the root of the construction of modern Uyghur identity. Despite existing studies, the role of language use in the construction of Uyghur identity has hitherto not been sufficiently analysed. This study proposes to begin to fill the gap in this area.

Comparative approach to the study of Uyghur urban youth identity In this study, I adopt a comparative approach to the exploration of Uyghur urban youth identity in two senses, age and education. Historically, research on youth has been conducted in the fields of psychology, education, and sociology (Erikson 1968). Issues studied range from emotions and personality to social problems (Brake 1990; Cieslik and Pollock 2002). These studies have examined the role of the family and of society in the construction of individual youth identity. In China, ÂyouthÊ encompasses those between the ages of 15 and 29 (Xi et al. 2006). The Uyghurs in Xinjiang can be divided, notably, along generational lines, as far as ethnic identity is concerned. The distinction between older people (Uy. chonglar) and youth (Uy. yashlar) is central to the analysis of the construction of Uyghur identity through language use. Cross-generational comparisons will help us better understand Xinjiang youth identities, just as such comparisons work to inform an understanding of youth issues across the globe, because these two groups have had different social experiences in their interactions in Chinese society. Smith (2000) argued that the younger generation of Uyghurs is more engaged with nationalistic ideas than their elders, which would seem to indicate that such ideas are set to become stronger in the future. In this study, therefore, two generations have been identified, in order to compare the patterns of their language use.

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TodayÊs young Uyghurs in urban Xinjiang are the group most heavily affected by state education policy and by various cultural and religious restrictions in place since the mid-1990s. Young Uyghurs grow up with an acute awareness of the marginalisation of their mother tongue in education. The so-called ÂbilingualÊ education policy, launched initially in 2002 at university level, has now been expanded to the pre-school level throughout Xinjiang. ÂBilingualÊ education utilises the Chinese language as sole medium of instruction, while the native language of the Uyghurs is reduced to the status of a school subject (Schluessel 2007). The increased promotion of Chinese and the marginalisation of Uyghur in the educational sphere have had a profound impact on ethnic identity. The sense of linguistic marginalisation has served to reinforce the feeling of ethnic distinctness among the Uyghurs (Bovingdon 2010), serving as a powerful fuel for increased ethnic awareness, particularly among young people in Xinjiang. The most frustrating experience for young Uyghurs in Xinjiang is perhaps the one of being marginalised in employment. Chinese law prohibits employment discrimination. In Xinjiang, however, it is unofficial policy to employ people on the basis of ethnicity. Many companies explicitly advertise their jobs with a statement of overwhelming preference for Han Chinese applicants, thereby placing an extra condition of ethnicity on employment. As a result, the unemployment rate among minority students throughout Xinjiang is much higher than that among Han Chinese, as reported by Liu and her colleagues (2006). According to this report, only 20% of Uyghur graduates in 2003 found jobs, compared to 80% of Han Chinese. The same report found that in 2004, although the employment rate of Uyghur graduates had increased to 34%, the proportion of Han graduates who were employed remained far higher. Mainly because of this extra condition of ethnicity on employment, young urban Uyghurs find it hard to find jobs. In a similar study, Wang (2006) found that the unemployment rate of minority students living in urban areas (most of them Uyghurs) was as high as 68%. According to Wang, this trend among minority graduates is likely to increase year by year if legislation prohibiting employment discrimination is not properly enforced. Young Uyghurs are also affected by state policies of religious and cultural restriction (Fuller and Lipman 2004). Currently, Uyghur college or university students at all levels in Xinjiang are prohibited from practising Islam in the public domain. This includes prohibitions on going to the mosque, reading the Quran, and fasting during Ramadan. Young Uyghur men at universities and other state institutions are discouraged from wearing the doppa, the traditional ethnic Uyghur hat, and from growing a burut, or moustache, considered by many Uyghur men as a symbol of masculinity. Although these religious and cultural restrictions are clearly a threat to the survival of their ethnic identity, many young Uyghurs nevertheless find ways to maintain the religious elements of their Uyghur cultural identity in private (Smith Finley 2007b). Young Uyghurs have comparatively more opportunities for direct interaction with Han Chinese in urban Xinjiang, where societal bilingualism is the norm. As a result, many young urban Uyghurs are actually bilingual, being able to speak both Uyghur and Chinese. In contrast, most Han Chinese are monolingual, speaking only Chinese. When interacting with Han Chinese and other Uyghurs, young

80 Ablimit Baki Elterish urban Uyghurs manipulate their use of Uyghur and Chinese, depending on the situation. Using a particular language in a specific situation in this way may exhibit oneÊs linguistic repertoire, but, more importantly, it reveals oneÊs ethnic identity. In contrast, the older generation of Uyghurs grew up with a different set of social experiences on which to reflect. They have experienced numerous changes of state policy, from freedom of religion, to restriction of religious and cultural expression, and back again (Smith 2000). Furthermore, many older Uyghurs are not only recipients of state policies but also actors implementing those policies. This is particularly true of the sphere of education, where some instruct through the medium of Chinese. The social experiences of the older generation of Uyghurs have taught them to juggle multiple identities: they can be a CCP member in the danwei (work unit), and a Muslim in the private sphere (home); they can be a Chinese citizen in one situation, and a member of the Uyghur ethnic group in another. These multiple identities may sometimes come into conflict, but older Uyghurs tend to be more adept at handling them. Urban Uyghurs in Xinjiang can also be divided along educational lines, depending on the language medium through which they were taught at school. Education plays an important role in marking the distinction between minkaomin and minkaohan. Minkaomin Uyghurs are widely considered to be ÂrealÊ Uyghurs because they speak, dress, and behave in culturally normative ways. Conversely, minkaohan Uyghurs are commonly seen as neither wholly Uyghurs nor wholly Chinese because, to differing degrees, they speak, dress, and behave more like Han Chinese (Smith Finley 2007a, 219). Smith Finley (2007a) has observed that for the minkaohan, switching between a normative Uyghur identity on the one hand and a hybrid Uyghur identity on the other can be problematic. Individuals may struggle to carry on conversation in Uyghur with minkaomin interlocutors, and switch to Chinese once conversing with other minkaohan. Kaltman (2007) maintains that minkaohan also struggle against the pejorative title Khitay (meaning ÂChineseÊ, here defined as Chinese-speaking Uyghur), levied by their more conservative peers. These studies accentuate the important role of language as a marker of Uyghur ethnic identity, both normative and hybrid. The questions that I attempt to answer in this study include: (1) What are the general patterns of language use among urban Uyghurs in Xinjiang? (2) What are the differences of language use between Uyghur youth and their elders? (3) Are there any significant differences of language use between minkaomin and minkaohan? These questions provide the basic structure for this exploration of the construction of Uyghur urban youth identity.

Methodology In order to find answers to the above research questions, a survey was designed. The survey included a questionnaire and interviews. The questionnaire had three parts: (1) demographic questions; (2) questions on self-reported language proficiency; and (3) questions on language use. Demographic questions asked respondents to provide personal information on gender, age, and the type of schools that

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they attended. Self-reported language proficiency asked respondents to evaluate their listening, speaking, reading, and writing skills in Uyghur and Chinese on a four-point Likert scale, where 1 = ÂnoneÊ, 2 = Âa littleÊ, 3 = ÂgoodÊ, and 4 = Âvery goodÊ. Obviously, this type of questionnaire raises the question of validity since it involves reliance on a self-reported evaluation of language skills. In order to partially overcome this problem, these self-reports were assessed against respondentsÊ choice of language when completing the survey: they were asked to choose either Uyghur or Chinese. Seventeen questions on language use (adapted from Lasagabaster and Huguet 2007) were used to identify respondentsÊ patterns of language use in a number of specific situations. A five-point Likert scale was used for this part of the questionnaire, where 1 = Âonly UyghurÊ, 2 = Âmostly UyghurÊ, 3 = Âboth Uyghur and ChineseÊ, 4 = Âmostly ChineseÊ, and 5 = Âonly ChineseÊ. Interviews were conducted to supplement the questionnaire data. To analyse the responses, data from the questionnaire were entered into SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science) 16. When scoring the answers, scores were recategorised as ÂUyghurÊ, Âboth Uyghur and ChineseÊ, and ÂChineseÊ, because the responses at the extreme ends of the Likert scale were minimal. High mean scores (ranging from 4 to 5) indicate a predisposition to Chinese, and low mean scores (ranging from 1 to 2) a predisposition to Uyghur. A midpoint score (3) indicates a predisposition to both languages, Uyghur and Chinese. The survey was conducted by telephone conversation through Skype during the first few months of 2011. One hundred and twenty respondents were selected. One of the selection criteria stipulated that respondents must be living in cities in Xinjiang, such as Ürümchi and Kashgar. Initially, respondents were randomly selected from among my social contacts; following this, additional respondents from outside my social circles were introduced by my social contacts. To be selected for the study, participants also had to be aged between 18 and 50. Finally, they must have received formal education, allowing them to be divided into either minkaomin (people who were taught in Uyghur from primary to secondary school), or minkaohan (people who were taught in Chinese throughout their primary and secondary school education). These criteria were important for the results on language use to be feasibly compared along generational and educational lines. An approximate number of participants representing each of the subdivisions of the demography was selected in order to reduce bias based on gender, age, or education. Before conducting the telephone survey, participants were informed of the purpose of the study, and anonymity was guaranteed. Telephone surveys proved to be very useful. They helped the author not only to fill in the questionnaire but also to spontaneously ask follow-up questions. This allowed for the collection of more in-depth information.

Findings The research sample includes 120 respondents, comprising 57 males (47.9%) and 63 females (52.1%). In terms of age, 67 are young people aged between 18 and 29 (56.2%) and 53 are older people of between 30 and 50 years of age (43.8%).

82 Ablimit Baki Elterish In terms of education, the sample consisted of 70 minkaomin (58.3%) and 50 minkaohan (41.7%). The subdivisions of each of the three categories (i.e. gender, age, and education) are therefore well balanced for the purpose of statistical analysis. The data on self-reported language proficiency in Uyghur and Chinese are presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. As seen in Table 4.1, there is an imbalance between listening-speaking skills and reading-writing skills. Among the respondents, reported listening and speaking skills in the Uyghur language are overwhelmingly higher than reading and writing skills. This indicates that the verbal communication skills (listening and speaking) of Uyghurs participating in this study are stronger than their literacy skills (reading and writing skills) in the language. It also reflects the only-partial proficiency in the mother tongue among some minkaohan. In this study, about 42% of the respondents are minkaohan. While most minkaohan are able to communicate in Uyghur verbally, some will be only partly literate in the written form of the Uyghur language. Table 4.2 displays self-reported Chinese language proficiency. The imbalance between verbal communication and literacy skills in the Chinese language among the respondents is clear. More people claim that their skills in listening, speaking, and reading skills in Chinese are good or very good. Yet although more than half of the participants reported that their writing skills in Chinese are either good or very good, more than 40% say that they have difficulty in writing Chinese. This reflects the general trend of societal bilingualism in urban Xinjiang, wherein many urban Uyghurs can communicate easily with Han Chinese in all language skills except for written communication, in which they struggle.

Table 4.1 Self-reported Uyghur language proficiency (%) Listening Uyghur None A little Good Very good

0 0 5.0 95.0

Speaking 0 0.8 4.2 95.0

Reading

Writing

7.5 15.0 10.0 67.5

14.2 16.7 3.3 65.8

Table 4.2 Self-reported Chinese language proficiency (%)

Chinese None A little Good Very good

Listening

Speaking

Reading

Writing

1.7 10.0 35.0 53.3

2.5 25.0 20.8 51.7

4.2 20.0 30.8 45.0

6.6 34.2 16.7 42.5

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General patterns of language use Table 4.3 presents general patterns of language use among urban Uyghurs. Data show that in the family domain, the use of the Uyghur language is dominant. The vast majority of the respondents report that they interact with their father and mother almost exclusively in Uyghur (84% and 89% respectively), and only a small fraction claim they use a mixture of both Uyghur and Chinese with their parents (16% and 11% respectively). The exclusive use of Chinese with parents is non-existent in the home. The dominant use of Uyghur with Uyghur parents in the home is an indication of the strong maintenance of the mother tongue in the private sphere, and this in turn contributes to the construction and maintenance of Uyghur ethnic identity. The use of two languages of communication among a few respondents and their parents suggests that in a small number of families there is a degree of tolerance towards the use of both Uyghur and Chinese in the home. This tolerance can be seen as reflecting a positive attitude towards the use of two languages in the home among some parents. Like their children, Uyghur parents can also be divided into minkaomin and minkaohan. Uyghur parents may choose to use Uyghur only, or a mixture of both Uyghur and Chinese, with their children, a choice often dictated largely by their own language proficiency. In other words, minkaomin parents are likely to choose to use only Uyghur with their children, while minkaohan parents may use both Uyghur and Chinese. In comparison, the results relating to language use with brothers and sisters differ slightly. Over two-thirds of the respondents say that they use Uyghur with their brothers (72%) and sisters (74%). Although the use of Chinese is minimal (2.5% and 0.8% respectively), there is a considerable rise in the use of two languages when interacting with brothers and sisters (rather than parents) in the home. About a quarter of the respondents state that they use both Uyghur and Chinese with their siblings (26% and 25% respectively). The increased use of two languages in the home among the younger generation can be seen as a direct result of a rapid increase of the number of young minkaohan on the one hand, and the dominant use of Chinese in many public domains on the other. Over the past decade, the assimilatory Âbilingual educationÊ policy, stepped up since 2001, has produced more minkaohan through the imposition of Chinese-medium instruction (and phasing out of Uyghur-medium instruction), through dislocated schools located in inland China (the so-called Xinjiangban or ÂXinjiang ClassesÊ see Chen and Grose in this volume), and through mergers between Uyghur-medium and Chinese-medium schools. Under this policy, Uyghur has been all but replaced by Chinese in education, government, and business, so that an involuntary mix of Uyghur and Chinese, or even the use of Chinese only, can now be heard among urban Uyghurs in their in-group interactions. It can be seen that, in forming friendships, language plays an important role as a vehicle for communication in all situations. In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to report which language or languages they use when interacting with minkaomin and minkaohan in the neighbourhood, at work, or at school. The results reveal a sharp contrast of language use across these two situations. The use

84 Ablimit Baki Elterish Table 4.3 General patterns of language use (%) Categories In the family domain

In the friendship domain

Questions 1. In interaction with father

84.2

0

15.8

2. 3. 4. 5.

89.1 71.6 74.2 99.2

0 2.5 0.8 0

10.9 25.9 25.0 0.8

55.0

4.2

40.8

95.9

0

55.0

3.3

41.7

16.6 50.8 45.0 25.0 23.3

27.5 12.5 26.7 39.2 38.3

55.9 36.7 28.3 35.8 38.4

12.5 2.5 24.2 25.8

39.2 7.5 56.7 40.7

48.3 90.0 19.1 33.5

6. 7. 8. Activities

Uyghur Chinese Uyghur and Chinese

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

In interaction with mother In interaction with brothers In interaction with sisters In interaction with minkaomin in the neighbourhood In interaction with minkaohan in the neighbourhood In interaction with minkaomin colleagues/schoolmates In interaction with minkaohan colleagues/schoolmates Watching television Listening to and singing songs Listening to the radio Reading books Reading newspapers and magazines Writing reports Shopping Sending text messages Using the internet

4.1

of Uyghur is dominant when communicating with minkaomin both in the neighbourhood (99%), and at work or school (96%). In contrast, Uyghur is used by only slightly more than half of the respondents when they are in interaction with minkaohan in the neighbourhood (55%), and at work or school (55%). A mixture of Uyghur and Chinese is used by less than half of the respondents when communicating with minkaohan in the community (41%), and at work or school (42%). The use of Chinese with minkaomin is minimal in the neighbourhood and at work or school, and very few minkaohan use Chinese exclusively among themselves (4% and 3%). The contrast in the respondentsÊ reported language use with minkaomin and minkaohan in the friendship domain suggests that Uyghur is considered as the sole medium of communication with minkaomin, while a mixture of the two languages, both Uyghur and Chinese, is normally used for this purpose with minkaohan. This reflects the socio-linguistic situation in urban Xinjiang. Societal bilingualism is the defining feature of urban Xinjiang where the minkaohan can be found. However, because of the way in which they are educated at school, most minkaohan are actually not Âbalanced bilingualsÊ (Baker 2011), because they are not approximately equally fluent in both languages. The relative linguistic proficiency of minkaohan often affects their language use. It is relatively easier for the minkaohan to use Chinese than to use their mother tongue.

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However, using Chinese to communicate with other Uyghurs is viewed disparagingly by most minkaomin, and minkaohan may be criticised as ÂHanifiedÊ (Uy: Hanzuchäliship kätkän), or assimilated into the Han Chinese ethnic group. Because of these negative attitudes towards the use of Chinese amongst minkaomin, many minkaohan tend to use Uyghur with minkaomin, but use a mixture of Uyghur and Chinese when conversing with other minkaohan. A considerable number of minkaohan may thus be classed Âsubtractive bilingualsÊ (Baker 2011), since using Chinese as the sole medium of instruction in the education of Uyghurs may cause partial or complete loss of the mother tongue. Greater competence in the Chinese language and relative incompetence in the mother tongue in turn contributes to the formation of a hybrid culture and hybrid identity. The next section of the questionnaire involved asking nine questions regarding language use in individual activities. In most of these activities, respondents had complete freedom of choice regarding the use of a particular language, without any restrictions. An exception was the compulsory use of Chinese in report writing, as required by certain institutions. The answers given in relation to questions on the exclusive use of the Uyghur language show that just over half of the respondents listen to and sing Uyghur-language songs (51%), while somewhat less than half listen to Uyghur radio programmes (45%). In contrast, very few claim to use only Uyghur for shopping purposes (3%), while a few say that they use the Uyghur language for writing reports (13%). When asked why Uyghur only is used for music and songs, a female interviewee commented that she had grown up with Uyghur music and Uyghur-language songs. She added that she often attends Uyghur family events and Uyghur parties, which all involve only ethnic Uyghur music, songs, and dance. According to her, she Âfeels like a UyghurÊ when she listens to and sings songs in Uyghur. Another, male interviewee gave his reasons for his preference for Uyghur over Chinese when listening to radio programmes. According to him, many Uyghur programmes are far more interesting and useful. He explained that he likes listening to the Uyghur itot (short plays), because they are yumurluq (humourous), bilimlik (scholarly or learned), and turmushqa aÊit (relevant to life). These responses illustrate the important role of the Uyghur language in consumption of Uyghur popular culture. The findings in relation to questions on the exclusive use of Chinese indicate that more than half of the respondents use Chinese for text messaging (57%). Chinese is also the language chosen by about 40% of the respondents when using the internet (41%), writing reports (39%), reading books (39%), and reading newspapers and magazines (38%). In contrast, very few respondents claim to use only Chinese for shopping (8%), while a few report using the language for listening to and singing songs (13%). These findings reflect the fact that the Chinese language has a number of practical advantages in Xinjiang. First, mobile phones throughout Xinjiang do not have the necessary linguistic function enabling the use of the Arabic-based Uyghur script (kona yeziq) when sending text messages. Therefore, many people have to type in Chinese characters in order to send text messages. That said, a large number of Uyghurs simply use the Chinese linguistic function (the pinyin transliteration system) as a springboard for sending text messages not

86 Ablimit Baki Elterish in Chinese but in the Latinised Uyghur New Script (yengi yeziq).1 Second, there are more websites that use the Chinese language than Uyghur. Third, it is compulsory to use Chinese for writing reports in official state domains such as universities, hospitals, and government offices. These man-made advantages to using Chinese in communication have limited the use of the Uyghur language in many domains by default. The results relating to the use of a mixture of the two languages, Uyghur and Chinese, show that mixing is common in many individual activities. The vast majority of the respondents report that they use both languages when shopping (90%); more than half say they watch both Uyghur- and Chinese-language television programmes (56%); and just under half claim to write reports in both Uyghur and Chinese (48%). A little more than a third of respondents say they use both Uyghur and Chinese for reading newspapers and magazines (38%), listening to and singing songs (37%), reading books (36%), and using the internet (34%). In contrast, only just over a quarter claim to listen to the radio in both Uyghur and Chinese (28%), while less than 20% of respondents report that they send text messages in both languages. By and large, these results suggest that using two languages is currently the major trend when conducting most individual activities. These results reflect the societal use of both Uyghur and Chinese, and societal bilingualism, in urban Xinjiang. Since it is equally possible that urban Uyghurs may frequent shops owned or staffed by Uyghurs or Han Chinese, both Uyghur and Chinese become powerful languages of communication in shopping. It is also possible for Uyghurs to watch either Uyghur- or Chinese-language TV programmes broadcast from regional and local TV stations, making both Uyghur and Chinese useful languages for TV consumption. Generational differences in language use Table 4.4 shows generational differences in language use between younger and older Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Responses to the questions were scored on a fivepoint Likert scale. ÂOnly ChineseÊ was assigned to 5, ÂMainly ChineseÊ to 4, ÂBoth Uyghur and ChineseÊ to 3, ÂMainly UyghurÊ to 2, and ÂOnly UyghurÊ to 1. However, the scores are recategorised as ÂChineseÊ, ÂBoth Uyghur and ChineseÊ, and ÂUyghurÊ, because the responses at the extreme ends of the Likert scale are minimal. High mean scores (ranging from 4 to 5) indicate a predisposition to Chinese, and low mean scores (ranging from 1 to 2) a predisposition to Uyghur. A midpoint score (3) indicates a predisposition to both Uyghur and Chinese, or bilingualism. The results related to language use with parents in the family domain did not produce significant differences on a generational basis. Both younger and older Uyghurs use Uyghur predominantly with their parents (means range from 1.04 to 1.79). The results on language use with siblings, however, did produce slight generational differences. In Q3 and Q4, the mean scores of the younger group are higher (M=2.12 and M=2.09 respectively) than those of the older group (M=1.29 and M=1.26 respectively). This suggests that a greater proportion of young Uyghurs use Uyghur mixed with some Chinese when interacting with their

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siblings. In contrast, a greater proportion of older Uyghurs tend to use Uyghur exclusively with their brothers and sisters. When asked for the reasons for this, one young female minkaohan explained: Most of the time, I talk with my sister in Uyghur. But sometimes we talk to each other in Chinese, particularly when we get stuck in expressing some idea or concept in Uyghur, because these concepts are introduced to us at school in Chinese. This is quite understandable, given the fact that Chinese has been promoted via the Âbilingual educationÊ policy in recent years. A greater proportion of young urban Uyghurs are now receiving education through the sole medium of Chinese. It is therefore perhaps inevitable that young urban Uyghurs should use both Uyghur and Chinese at home with brothers and sisters, especially when discussing philosophical or academic issues. The results suggest generational similarities and differences of language use in the friendship domain. There is a close parallel between the mean scores of the younger respondents in Q5 and Q7 and the mean scores of the older group in Q6 and Q8. This shows that both younger and older Uyghurs use Uyghur exclusively with minkaomin, while both age groups use Uyghur mixed with some Chinese with minkaohan. That said, one older female minkaohan made the following comments: When I was young, I would always start to talk to a Uyghur person in Uyghur; but, after finding that the person was minkaohan, I liked to switch to Chinese in our conversation. But now that I am middle-aged, I seldom use Chinese with minkaohan. I am a Uyghur person. I now realise that I need to speak Uyghur to a Uyghur person all the time. This has an important implication. Young urban Uyghurs tend to use only Uyghur if the interlocutors are minkaomin, switching to a combination of mainly Uyghur plus some Chinese when communicating with minkaohan. However, the comment made by the older minkaohan respondent demonstrates categorically that awareness of Uyghur ethnic identity increases among minkaohan with age. This bears particular linkage with the existing understanding. Nandi and Platt (2012) maintain that ethnic identity is not only formed but also develops and may change throughout life. The strengthening of ethnic awareness and self-esteem over the life course of a minkaohan individual indicates that older Uyghurs tend to reconsider their hybrid identity and seek out Uyghur identity in a way that brings them satisfaction and a sense of belonging to a group. When generational differences of language use in individual activities are examined, the analysis of mean scores indicates that there are both similarities and differences. Both younger and older Uyghurs tend to use Uyghur to a similar extent when listening to and singing songs (M=2.70 and M=2.11 respectively). Likewise, the two groups are likely to use a mixture of Uyghur and Chinese to

88 Ablimit Baki Elterish Table 4.4 Generational differences in language use (means) Categories In the family domain

In the friendship domain

Questions 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Activities

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

In interaction with father In interaction with mother In interaction with brothers In interaction with sisters In interaction with minkaomin in the neighbourhood In interaction with minkaohan in the neighbourhood In interaction with the minkaomin colleagues/ schoolmates In interaction with minkaohan colleagues/schoolmates Watching television Listening to and singing songs Listening to the radio Reading books Reading newspapers and magazines Writing reports Shopping Sending text messages Using the internet

Youth

Older people

1.79 1.60 2.12 2.09 1.57

1.04 1.04 1.29 1.26 1.17

2.54

2.04

1.60

1.21

2.51

2.09

3.36 2.70 3.12 3.60 3.61

2.91 2.11 2.17 2.87 2.85

3.75 3.06 3.99 3.52

3.30 3.06 3.04 2.91

a roughly parallel extent when writing reports (M=3.75 and M=3.30 respectively), shopping (M=3.06 and M=3.06 respectively), and sending text messages (M=3.99 and M=3.04 respectively). These correspondences emerge from the similar life experiences within Chinese society of both younger and older Uyghurs, namely: participation in Uyghur social and cultural events (dominated by Uyghur-language song); equal access to Uyghur-run and Han-run shops; and the various man-made advantages to using Chinese in communication. Differences in language use between the two generations are shown by the respondentsÊ language use when watching television, listening to the radio, reading books, reading newspapers and magazines, and using the internet. Younger Uyghurs seem to use two languages for these activities (M=3.36, M=3.12, M=3.60, M=3.61, and M=3.52 respectively), while older Uyghurs tend to use more Uyghur when engaged in these activities (M=2.91, M=2.17, M=2.87, M=2.85, and M=2.91 respectively). These differences arise from the degree of ethnic awareness experienced at different ages. One young minkaohan male interviewee made the following comments: I watch both Uyghur-language and Chinese-language TV programmes. There are more channels and more programmes in Chinese than in Uyghur. TV news broadcasts in Xinjiang are all produced in Chinese first and then translated

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89

into Uyghur. However, I also watch Uyghur TV programmes. I have never thought of my Uyghur identity when watching TV in either Chinese or in Uyghur. It is just my personal preference. In comparison, an older minkaohan man explained why and how he had changed from using mainly Chinese to mainly Uyghur for these activities. He commented: As I become more mature, I tend to socialise with mainly Uyghurs, as I am now more interested in identifying who I am and which group I belong to. I want to get rid of any Chinese influence on me, as I want to be a true Uyghur person. This is another example in support of a heightened ethnic identity among Uyghurs with the increase of age. Showing a greater interest in finding oneÊs sense of belonging when one is mature is apparent among the older minkaohan. Differences in language use between minkaomin and minkaohan The data in Table 4.5 reveal differences in language use between minkaomin and minkaohan. As in the previous section, the responses are on a five-point Likert scale. The responses elicited were 5=Âonly ChineseÊ, 4=ÂMainly ChineseÊ, 3=ÂBoth Uyghur and ChineseÊ, 2=ÂMainly UyghurÊ, and 1=ÂOnly UyghurÊ. Again, as the responses at the extreme ends of the Likert scale are minimal, the answers are recategorized as ÂChineseÊ, ÂBoth Uyghur and ChineseÊ, and ÂUyghurÊ. Hence, mean scores of 4 and 5 indicate a predisposition to Chinese, while 1 and 2 indicated a predisposition to Uyghur. The midpoint 3 indicates both Uyghur and Chinese. The results on language use in the family domain show that both minkaomin and minkaohan express an almost equal preference for using Uyghur predominantly with their parents (mean scores ranged from 1.13 to 1.70). However, these two groups reported slightly different preferences for language use with their siblings. The minkaomin tend to use Uyghur exclusively when communicating with their brothers (M=1.34) and sisters (M=1.39), while the minkaohan are likely to use Uyghur, in addition to some Chinese, when conversing with their siblings (M=2.32 and M=2.20 respectively). One young minkaohan interviewee explained that he speaks with his minkaohan brother at home mainly in Uyghur but sometimes they communicate with each other by using Chinese as well when their parents are not present. These findings reflect the societal norm whereby most Uyghur parents forbid their children to speak any language other than Uyghur in the home. The results relating to language use in the friendship domain show that minkaomin and minkaohan differ in their language use, according to interlocutor. Minkaomin participants reported an almost equal preference for using predominantly Uyghur with both minkaomin and minkaohan in all situations (mean scores ranged from 1.31 to 1.87). Conversely, while claiming equal preference for using predominantly Uyghur when interacting with minkaomin in the community, and

90 Ablimit Baki Elterish at work or school (M=1.50 and M=1.58 respectively), minkaohan seem inclined to use both Uyghur and Chinese when communicating with other minkaohan, both in the community (M=2.98) and at work or school (M=2.96). These mean scores are nearing the middle point 3, a clear indication of the use of both languages. When asked why she likes to use both Uyghur and Chinese to talk to another minkaohan, one young female minkaohan explained: We minkaohan often use Uyghur and Chinese when we are together because we want to make ourselves look different from minkaomin. On this same topic, a female minkaomin from Kashgar related how one day she had heard two Uyghur girls talking to each other in Chinese on the bus. She said that she asked herself angrily whether these two Uyghur girls considered themselves more ÂcivilisedÊ by speaking to one another in Chinese in a public place. The reason why some minkaohan might want to Âlook differentÊ from minkaomin possibly reflects awareness of what Harrell (1995) calls the Chinese civilisational hierarchy, which ranks the ÂcivilisedÊ (meaning the Han Chinese) above the ÂbarbaricÊ (meaning the ethnic minorities). The minkaohan may have involuntarily accepted this notion via a subliminal process of internalisation during the course of their school education in Chinese. This is another indication of hybridised identity among minkaohan Uyghurs.

Table 4.5 Differences in language use between minkaomin and minkaohan (means) Categories In the family domain

In the friendship domain

Questions 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Activities

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

In interaction with father In interaction with mother In interaction with brothers In interaction with sisters In interaction with minkaomin in the community In interaction with minkaohan in the community In interaction with the minkaomin colleagues/schoolmates In interaction with the minkaohan colleagues/schoolmates Watching television Listening to and singing songs Listening to the radio Reading books Reading newspapers and magazines Writing reports Shopping Sending text messages Using the internet

Minkaomin Minkaohan 1.29 1.13 1.34 1.39 1.31

1.70 1.67 2.32 2.20 1.50

1.84

2.98

1.31

1.58

1.87

2.96

2.80 1.81 1.99 2.49 2.53

3.66 3.32 3.70 4.38 4.32

2.86 2.97 2.80 2.39

4.52 3.18 4.64 4.46

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As for differences in language use between minkaomin and minkaohan in individual activities, the results show that minkaomin use Uyghur predominantly when listening to and singing songs (M=1.81), and when listening to the radio (M=1.99). Furthermore, they claim to use mainly Uyghur for reading books (M=2.49), reading newspapers and magazines (M=2.53), and using the internet (M=2.39). On the other hand, minkaomin seem to use some Chinese in addition to Uyghur when writing reports (M=2.86), shopping (M=2.97) and sending text messages (M=2.80), because the mean scores are nearing the middle point 3. By comparison, minkaohan respondents reported that they use both Uyghur and Chinese when watching television (M=3.66), listening to and singing songs (M=3.32), listening to the radio (M=3.70), and shopping (M=3.18). Moreover, using Chinese is common among the minkaohan when reading books (M=4.38), reading newspapers and magazines (M=4.32), writing reports (M=4.52), sending text messages (M=4.64), and using the internet (M=4.46). These results indicate that minkaomin tend to use more Uyghur in almost all situations, while minkaohan are likely to use more Uyghur for speaking and listening purposes, but tend to use mainly Chinese for reading and writing purposes. This phenomenon reflects the lower levels of Uyghur language proficiency of the minkaohan. Taken together, these differences in language use are an important indication of normative Uyghur ethnic identity versus Uyghur hybrid identity.

Discussion and conclusions This study has analysed the construction of Uyghur urban youth identity through language use. The comparative approach to analysis has proved very useful. Findings from the generational comparison show that younger Uyghurs use Uyghur at home and with their minkaomin friends, but that there is an increased use of two languages among young Uyghurs, both between siblings and in the wider friendship domain (which includes minkaohan). Older Uyghurs, however, tend to use Uyghur not only in the family domain but also in the friendship domain. For individual activities, younger Uyghurs use a mixture of two languages to a greater extent, while the older Uyghurs use two languages to a lesser extent. These generational differences reflect the educational experiences of the two generations. In the past, many Uyghurs received a mother-tongue education, learning Chinese only as a school subject. Mainly because of this, older Uyghurs are more likely to be monolingual (in Uyghur) with limited proficiency of Chinese. Younger Uyghurs, however, received education mainly in Chinese. Because of this, they are more likely to use both Uyghur and Chinese in a range of domains. The findings from the educational comparison reveal that minkaomin use Uyghur exclusively in the family and friendship domains. By contrast, although minkaohan use Uyghur at home when speaking to their parents, there is an increased use of two languages with siblings and with other minkaohan. The results relating to language use in individual activities suggest that minkaomin use mainly Uyghur but that there is a tendency towards using two languages particularly when shopping, watching television, and sending text messages. The minkaohan use both

92 Ablimit Baki Elterish languages, but there is strong evidence of their using mainly Chinese for many individual activities. Given that language use is a typical manifestation of an individualÊs ethnic identity and constitutes an important aspect of Uyghur identity (Dwyer 2005), the dominant use of Uyghur in the family and friendship domains among Uyghur urban youth implies the positioning of ethnic identity through language use. In other words, foregrounding the Uyghur language in these important settings suggests a deliberate expression of ethnic identity. The increased use of two languages among Uyghur urban youth further indicates an adaptation to state policy. Rudelson and Jancowiak (2004, 300) listed three types of Uyghur response to state policy. These are acculturation, nonviolent resistance, and violent resistance. Acculturation is defined as adaptation to Chinese policy, both active and passive. Uyghurs follow this path when they trust Chinese policy. Nonviolent resistance refers to urban Uyghurs who are mistrustful of Chinese policy but respond in nonviolent ways. Violent resistance is construed as fierce anti-government action conducted by a small number of Uyghurs. According to this typology, many of the young urban Uyghurs in this study may be seen as an example of nonviolent resistance, in that they are using language expression in interactions in Xinjiang society as a means to construct and project their ethnic identity. This type of interaction, while nonviolent at present, may yet lead to conflict at a later stage. As Dwyer (2005, 3) argues, for both urban and rural Uyghurs, ethnic identity is closely linked with religious and linguistic identity; thus, youths may become radicalised if they sense that their religion or language is under threat. Radicalisation may in turn result in violent response to state policy if the right policy prescription is not found. The dominant use of two languages in activities such as shopping and watching television, and the increased use of Chinese in telecommunications among the Uyghur urban youth, and among minkaohan in particular, is at the same time an unconscious and a deliberate act. As one aspect of their identity construction, some minkaohan intentionally choose to speak two languages, or even the Chinese language exclusively, in order to show society that they are ÂdifferentÊ (superior). However, as this hybridised Uyghur identity involves taking on many ethnic Chinese characteristics, both linguistically and culturally, minkaohan are likely to be favoured by Han Chinese but despised by more conservative minkaomin peers (Taynen 2006).

Note 1 The New Script (yengi yeziq) was in use for about 20 years in Xinjiang until officially replaced by the Old Script (modified Arabic script kona yeziq) in 1982.

References Baker, Colin. 2011. Foundation of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism. Berlin: Multilingual Matters. Bellér-Hann, Ildikó. 2002. „Temperamental Neighbours: Uighur Han Relations in Xinjiang, Northwest China.‰ In Imagined Differences: Hatred and the Construction of Identity, edited by Gunther Schlee. New York: Palgrave, 57 81.

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Bovingdon, Gardner. 1998. „From Qumulluq to Uyghur: The Role of Education in the Development of a Pan-Uyghur Identity.‰ Journal of Central Asian Studies 3(1): 19 29. ···. 2004. „Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent.‰ Policy Studies 11. Washington, DC: East-West Center. ···. 2010. The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. New York: Columbia University Press. Brake, Mike. 1990. Comparative Youth Culture: The Sociology of Youth Cultures and Youth Subcultures in America, Britain and Canada. London: Routledge. Cieslik, Mark, and Gary Pollock, eds. 2002. Young People in a Risk Society: The Restructuring of Youth Identities and Transitions in Late Modernity. Aldershot: Ashgate. Dwyer, Arienne M. 2005. „The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse.‰ Political Studies 15. Washington, DC: East-West Center. Erikson, Erik H. 1968. Identity: Youth and Crimes. New York: Norton. Fuller, Graham E., and Jonathan N. Lipman. 2004. „Islam in Xinjiang.‰ In Xinjiang: ChinaÊs Muslim Borderland, edited by S. Frederick Starr. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Gladney, Dru C. 2004. Dislocating China: Reflections on Muslims, Minorities and other Subaltern Subjects. London: Hurst & Co. Harrell, Stevan. 1995. „Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them.‰ In Cultural Encounters on ChinaÊs Ethnic Frontiers, edited by Stevan Harrell. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Harris, Rachel. 2001. „Cassettes, Bazaars and Saving the Nation: The Uyghur Music Industry in Xinjiang, China.‰ In Global Goes Local: Popular Culture in Asia, edited by Timothy Craig and Richard King. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 265 83. Harris, Rachel. 2005. „Reggae on the Silk Road: The Globalisation of Uyghur Pop.‰ The China Quarterly 183: 627 43. Kaltman, Blaine. 2007. Under the Heel of the Dragon: Islam, Racism, Crime, and the Uighur in China. Athens: Ohio University Press. Lasagabaster, David, and Angel Huguet. 2007. Multilingualism in European Bilingual Contexts: Language Use and Attitudes. Berlin: Multilingual Matters. Li Wei. 2000. The Bilingual Reader. London: Routledge. Liu Yan, Yuling Zhang, and Ru Sun. 2006. „Xinjiang shaoshu minzu daxuesheng jiuye de zhengce jianyi.‰ [„Policy Proposals Concerning the Employment of Ethnic Minority University Students in Xinjiang‰]. Xinjiang jiaoyu xueyuan xuebao [Journal of Xinjiang Education College] 22(3): 57 9. Nagel, Joane. 1994. „Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Rethinking Ethnic Identity and Culture.‰ Social Problems 41(1): 152 76. Nandi, Alita, and Lucinda Platt. 2012. „Developing Ethnic Identity Questions for Understanding Society.‰ Longitudinal and Life Course Studies 3(1): 80 100. Rudelson, Justin. 1997. Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along ChinaÊs Silk Road. New York: Columbia University. Rudelson, Justin, and William Jancowiak. 2004. „Acculturation and Resistance: XinjiangÊs Identities in Flux.‰ In Xinjiang: ChinaÊs Muslim Borderland, edited by S. Frederick Starr. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 299 310. Schluessel, Eric T. 2007. „ ÂBilingualÊ Education and Discontent in Xinjiang.‰ Central Asian Survey 26(2): 251 77. Schluessel, Eric T. 2009. „History, Identity, and Mother-Tongue Education in Xinjiang.‰ Central Asian Survey 28(4): 383 402. Smith, Joanne N. 2000. „Four Generations of Uyghurs: The Shift towards Ethno-political Ideologies among XinjiangÊs Youth.‰ Inner Asia 2(2): 195 224.

94 Ablimit Baki Elterish Smith, Joanne N. 2002. „Making Culture Matter: Symbolic Spatial and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese.‰ Asian Ethnicity 3(2): 153 74. Smith, Joanne N. 2007. „The Quest for National Unity in Uyghur Popular Song: Barren Chickens, Stray Dogs, Fake Immortals and Thieves.‰ In Music, National Identity and the Politics of Location: Between the Global and the Local, edited by Ian Biddle and Vanessa Knights. Aldershot: Ashgate, 115 41. Smith Finley, Joanne. 2007a. „ ÂEthnic AnomalyÊ or Modern Uyghur Survivor? A Case Study of the Minkaohan Hybrid Identity in Xinjiang.‰ In Situating the Uyghurs between China and Central Asia, edited by Ildikó Bellér-Hann, M. Cristina Cesàro, Rachel Harris, and Joanne Smith Finley. Aldershot: Ashgate, 219 37. Smith Finley, Joanne. 2007b. „Chinese Oppression in Xinjiang, Middle Eastern Conflicts and Global Islamic Solidarities among the Uyghurs.‰ Journal of Contemporary China 16(53): 627 54. Taynen, Jennifer. 2006. „Interpreters, Arbiters or Outsiders: The Role of the Min Kao Han in Xinjiang Society.‰ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 26(1): 45 62. Tsung, Linda, and Matthew Clarke. 2010. „Dilemmas of Identity, Language and Culture in Higher Education in China.‰ Asia Pacific Journal of Education 30(1): 57 69. Wan, Enoch, and Mark Vanderwerf. 2009. „A Review of the Literature on ÂEthnicityÊ and ÂNational IdentityÊ and Related Missiological Studies.‰ Global Missiology 3(6). http:// ojs.globalmissiology.org/index.php/english/article/viewFile/194/542 [accessed 21 March 2011]. Wang Yingzi. 2006. „Xinjiang shaoshu minzu daxuesheng jiuye wenti diaocha yu fenxi‰ [„An Analysis and Investigation of Employment among Ethnic Minority University Students in Xinjiang‰]. Zhongguo daxuesheng jiuye [Chinese Journal of Graduate Employment] 16: 35 8. Xi Jieying. 2006. „Introduction to Chinese Youth.‰ In Chinese Youth in Transition, edited by Jieying Xi, Yunxiao Sun, and Jingjian Xiao. Aldershot: Ashgate, 79 96.

5

Second/third language learning and Uyghur identity Language in education for Uyghurs in urban Xinjiang Mamtimyn Sunuodula

Introduction Following the turn of the new millennium, the Chinese government issued a series of policies concerning English language in education, which, in combination with a number of internal and external forces, helped to push the status of the English language to an unprecedented new height in Chinese society. This was hailed by some as one of the major educational and linguistic stories of the contemporary age (Bolton 2006; Adamson 2004; Wang and Gao 2008; Feng 2011; 2007). Today, the number of English learners in China is estimated at 400 million, a figure indicative of the importance of English in todayÊs society, although only a small proportion of these learners eventually succeed in being able to speak English competently (Gil and Adamson 2011, 23 45). English language teaching has become a multi-billion dollar business, with more than thirty thousand private English language schools established (Zhan and Sun 2010). Although the policies were initially intended to be applicable nationwide, the government later issued a modified directive, including a statement that implicitly excluded minority language-speaking groups from the promotion of English language education. The directive stated that, in education, Âthe relationship between the minority language and Mandarin Chinese should be correctly managed . . . English should be offered in those regions where favourable conditions existÊ (PRC State Council 2002). The directive offers no explanation of how Âcorrect managementÊ is defined, nor of what Âfavourable conditionsÊ are, but it appears that two of the main factors which influenced this modification were, first, the stateÊs priorities regarding minorities in terms of second language acquisition, and, second, conditions on the ground in terms of resources necessary to implement the national policies (Feng and Sunuodula 2009). In another development, the ÂNational Common Language ActÊ came into force in 2001, which placed a renewed emphasis on Mandarin Chinese as the countryÊs most commonly used language, and provided the legal framework for language planning and policies to promote and enforce Mandarin Chinese as the dominant national language (PRC Ministry of Education 2000; Xu 2000). In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (hereafter XUAR), a region with a rich ethnic and linguistic diversity, a series of policy implementation directives

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were issued in response to the central governmentÊs policies (XUAR PeopleÊs Government 2004; Kumul City Government 2006; Zhou 2002). The local government began to implement an education policy in which Mandarin Chinese replaced the minority languages as the principal language-in-education at schools and Chinese script replaced minority scripts, demoting the minority languages to the status of a school subject (Ma 2009). Based on a case study of Uyghur youths in urban centres in Xinjiang, this study tries to answer the following questions: (a) What is the historical context in Xinjiang with regard to policies surrounding language and language education? (b) What is the response of local policy makers at various levels to the nationwide rise and promotion of English and the increased demand for minorities to become proficient in Mandarin Chinese? (c) What is the impact of these policies and processes on young Uyghurs, and what are their perceptions of these policies? (d) Is the outcome consistent with the aim, or are there gaps in the cycle? (e) How do changes in the linguistic marketplace in Xinjiang relate to processes of social, ethnic, national, and global identity construction among the Uyghur youth?

Literature review A study of English language acquisition among the Uyghur youth sets both a theoretical and an empirical challenge, because the literature on foreign language provision for ethnic minorities in China is as yet underdeveloped. Traditionally, language education for ethnic minorities aimed primarily at developing bilinguals in both the minority language and Mandarin Chinese (Feng 2005). In recent years, owing to the large-scale promotion and spread of English nationally, there has been an increase in English language provision for ethnic minorities in China, and a corresponding increase in research and debate on that topic. A number of researchers and scholars working both inside and outside of China have contributed to a literature that aims to understand issues related to tensions between the mother tongue, Chinese (as the Ânational languageÊ), and English (Adamson and Feng 2009; Beckett and MacPherson 2005; Chen 2008; Feng 2007; Feng and Sunuodula 2009; Olan 2007; Yang 2005). These issues include policy formulation, the cycle of policy making and implementation, and the various socio-cultural, economic and political factors that affect English language education, or the absence of it, in specific contexts. This new literature can be broadly divided into two categories. Falling into the first category are those that focus on English language provision for ethnic minorities since the turn of the century, and particularly since 2001 when the new policies were promulgated. The majority of these discussions give somewhat dismal accounts of the situation, listing various difficulties and problems minority students face in learning English, from lack of resources to the

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cognitive, affective and socio-cultural hurdles that minority pupils experience in learning a third language (Ju 2000; Li 2003; Wu 2002; Yang 2005). This view is prevalent in Chinese-language publications, though it is not limited to them. In his analysis of the issues facing minority pupils, Yang (2005) lists four factors: lack of resources, lack of motivation, the interference of existing bilingual policies, and the difficulty of learning a third language. Yang asserts that ethnic minorities appear to be content both with learning the Chinese language and with the opportunity to study in ChinaÊs eastern coastal cities (the so-called ÂXinjiang ClassÊ project see Chen and Grose in this volume). Here, he seems to adopt the view that ethnic minorities in impoverished border areas study the powerful national language because that would bring them financial gains and economic benefits. This argument lacks, however, a serious reflection on the complex socio-political, cultural and linguistic dimensions at play in language learning. Also out of this category comes the argument for a general lowering of expectations regarding minority studentsÊ English proficiency. Strong calls are often made by educators and scholars, such as Cao and Xiang (2006) and Zhang (2002), to formulate special policies for minority students at all levels. The second category of debate centres on unequal access to English as linguistic capital, and argues that the rise and spread of English in China has further marginalised ethnic minority populations living in impoverished border areas. Based on an examination of the socio-economic conditions of Tibetans and Uyghurs and their relationship with the majority Han, Beckett and MacPherson (2005) speculate that the promotion of bilingual English/Chinese education for native Chinese speakers, and the act of making it a requirement for social, economic and political advancement for citizens, will further polarise and disadvantage already marginal communities by creating additional obstacles: ÂEnglish is exacerbating the educational inequities facing minority and indigenous peoples, who already face significant educational and literacy disadvantagesÊ (Beckett and MacPherson 2005, 305). Of relevance to my discussion here is VaishÊs (2005) study conducted in India, which demonstrates that groups who have historically been linguistically ÂsubalternisedÊ have gained more equitable access to linguistic capital only due to the market forces of globalisation. His argument is based on the notion of the ÂsubalternÊ, a term popularised by Antonio Gramsci (1971) to refer to repressed groups in society that suffer from the hegemony of the ruling class. Vaish challenges those who fail to acknowledge the tenacity of indigenous cultures in being able to maintain their longevity, and who assert that the spread of English endangers local languages and perpetuates inequality. He regards this as a type of Âlinguistic OrientalismÊ that reproduces the inequitable distribution of linguistic capital (Vaish 2005). For him, English adds a new domain to the multilingual and multi-literate repertoire of subalterns that can help them break the constraints of class and caste.

Analytical concepts In this chapter I offer a case study of the Âlinguistic OrientalismÊ in operation in Xinjiang and illustrate this, using key concepts taken from Bourdieu

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(1977; 1986; Bourdieu and Thompson 1991). Bourdieu (1977) has proposed that capital comes in four guises. For him, economic capital is directly convertible into material wealth. Cultural capital, on the other hand, entails accumulated knowledge and skills that allow people to participate in social life effectively, including being able to speak and write in the language of the dominant classes. Ignorance of what the dominant classes define as Âbasic knowledgeÊ makes it difficult for those in marginal or subordinate groups to compete successfully (Johnson 2000). Another area of capital is social capital, which Bourdieu defines as the actual or potential resources linked to membership in a group; that is, the provision of members with ÂcredentialsÊ that bring them various entitlements. The fourth guise of BourdieuÊs capital is symbolic capital, which is seen as accumulated prestige or honour. Bourdieu highlights a countryÊs official national language as an example of a ÂlegitimateÊ language imbued with symbolic capital, stating: ÂThe official language is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses. It is in the process of state formation that the conditions are created for the constitution of a unified linguistic market dominated by the official languageÊ (1991, 45). He explains: ÂAll linguistic practices are measured against the legitimate practices, e.g. the practices of those who are dominantÊ (Bourdieu 1991, 51). This brings in the notion of power, and how power plays out in relation to different forms of capital. Bourdieu further argues that Âlanguage is not only an instrument of communication or knowledge but an instrument of powerÊ (1977, 648). Thus, the ability to speak a language and use it in certain ways, i.e. the linguistic capital a person possesses, signifies a measure or subcategory of cultural capital (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990). Norton (1997) extends BourdieuÊs social theory into second language learning by questioning how relations of power in the social world affect social interaction between second language learners and target language speakers. She argues that power relations play a crucial role in social interactions between language learners and target language speakers, and uses the notion of ÂinvestmentÊ to capture the relationship of the language learner to the changing social world. This notion presupposes that when language learners speak, they are not only exchanging information with target language speakers but they are constantly organising and reorganising a sense of who they are and how they relate to the wider social world. Thus an investment in the target language is also an investment in a learnerÊs own social identity, an identity which is constantly changing across time and space. Norton refers to identity as the process of Âhow people understand their relationship to the world, how that relationship is constructed across time and space, and how people understand their possibilities for the futureÊ (1997, 410). She also takes the position that a personÊs identity will shift in accordance with changing social and economic relations. The above insights from Bourdieu and Norton guide my study of how the study of the English language and English-medium education is perceived by Uyghur students. In the rest of this chapter, I first review languages and language education in Xinjiang. I then make use of some of the concepts mentioned above, namely capital, power, investment in second or third language learning, and identity.

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In my analysis of case study data drawn from the experiences of young Uyghur students, I focus on evidence showing these factors at play. My primary focus is on young UyghursÊ perceptions of the second and third language, i.e. Mandarin Chinese and English, in relation to their mother tongue, on their willingness to ÂinvestÊ, and on processes of social identity negotiation and transformation (Olsson and Larsson 2008, 10 1).

Languages and language education in Xinjiang The first of two policy documents specifically mentioning foreign language education for minority nationalities in Xinjiang was issued in May 1950 by the provincial government. A document entitled ÂDirective on Reforming the Current Education SystemÊ required Chinese-medium schools to opt either for an ethnic minority language or Russian as second language, while minority languagemedium schools were required to opt for Mandarin Chinese or Russian as second language (Xinjiang Weiwuer zizhiqu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 2000). Therefore, in the first couple of decades after XinjiangÊs incorporation into the PRC, the teaching of Russian as a foreign language was possible in principle, even at minority schools. On 15 December 1977, a second foreign language education policy document was formulated in Xinjiang and promulgated by the XUAR Education Bureau. This document was titled ÂCurriculum Plan for Ten-year Full-time Primary and Secondary Schools in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (draft plan)Ê and stipulated that: Ethnic minority schools provide Mandarin Chinese as the compulsory second language school subject from Year 3 of primary school until the end of secondary school education; no foreign language courses are to be provided. Han and Hui primary schools should generally teach an ethnic minority language as a school subject. At the junior secondary school, two thirds of the Han and Hui schools should offer ethnic minority language courses and the other third should offer foreign language courses. At the senior secondary school level, all Han and Hui schools should offer a foreign language curriculum; no ethnic minority language curriculum is to be offered. (Xinjiang WeiwuÊer zizhiqu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 2000, 275; authorÊs translation and emphasis) Though a Âdraft planÊ, the document seems to be the only official policy that was practised during the period between its formulation and the early 2000s. Foreign language provision was very limited for minority pupils. For example, a recent survey at six junior and senior secondary schools in Kashgar Prefecture, which is dominated by Uyghurs, revealed that until the end of the 1990s, no Uyghur school (at primary, junior or senior secondary level) had offered any English or other foreign language classes (Li 2005). English was not a required subject for the university entrance examination for Uyghur students.

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Thus, between 1977 and the promulgation of the Xinjiang Âbilingual educationÊ policy in 2004, the education system in Xinjiang was largely divided into two parallel subsystems: minority language-medium education for ethnic minority students, with Mandarin Chinese as a second language school subject; and Chinese-medium education for the Han population, with English as the preferred second language school subject. Within this system, schools were divided along ethnic lines on the basis of language of instruction, and, as Uyghur is one of the two official languages in the XUAR, most Uyghurs were educated in their mother tongue. Their knowledge of Mandarin Chinese varied depending on where they lived and on the possibilities (or absence of these) of interaction with the Han population (Benson 2004, 190 202). An official survey conducted in 1986 showed that only 4.4% of Uyghurs self-reported as Âfully communicativeÊ in Mandarin Chinese, while 90% reported that they did not have basic communicative skills in that language (Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan and Guojia minwei wenhua xuanchuanshi 1994). A few minor changes occurred in the late 1990s as some junior and senior secondary schools in relatively developed areas in Xinjiang started teaching English to a select group of ÂtalentedÊ students in so-called Âexperimental classesÊ. But due to resource restraints, most offered English only on a two-hour-per-week basis. The qualification levels of English teachers in schools also looked gloomy (Li 2005), with 20% of teachers having received diploma-level education, 30% having completed only one year of intensive English language teacher training, 30% being supply teachers with high-school-level education, and 15% being university graduates with non-English majors. At the turn of the century, despite the promulgation of the New Curriculum Standards (hereafter NCS), specified to apply to schools all over the country, the official position in Xinjiang with regard to ethnic minorities learning English or another foreign language had not changed, i.e. the document issued in 1977 still applied to Xinjiang. What had evidently changed, however, was the fact that while Chinese language had been strongly promoted and its curriculum enhanced in minority language-medium schools (Blachford 2004), minority languages had gradually disappeared from the curricula in Chinese-medium schools and for Han pupils in mixed schools, and had been replaced by English (Tsung and Cruickshank 2009). In 2001, there were 6,221 primary schools in Xinjiang, of which 56% (3,507) were Uyghur-medium schools; there were 1,457 lower secondary schools, of which 39% (566) were Uyghur-medium schools; and at higher secondary school level, the proportion of Uyghur-medium schools was less than 34% of a total of 472 schools (158) (Zhao 2004). According to Zhao (2004), the percentage of ethnic minority students receiving their education in native language-medium schools represented somewhere between 65 and 70% of the total number of students, but in south Xinjiang, where Uyghurs are dominant, the percentage was sometimes as high as 96%. Another survey confirmed that the proportion of Uyghur university students who graduated from Uyghur-medium schools was high, at over 90% (Cui 2005). Table 5.1 shows the number of Uyghur students at Uyghur-medium schools in 2004, in contrast to the statistics for other ethnic minorities.

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Table 5.1 Number of ethnic minority students at ethnic minority schools in 2004 Uyghur Total Primary 1,021,101 Middle 579,868 High 93,135

Kazakh Percentage Total 47.63 50.28 24.01

114,489 69,215 22,606

Mongolian

Kyrgyz

Percentage Total Percentage Total 5.34 6 5.83

6,024 4,078 1,913

0.28 0.35 0.49

13,931 9,601 1,689

Percentage 0.65 0.83 0.45

Source: Xinjiang Education Department, XUAR education statistics (2005) 新疆维吾尔自治区教育统计资料 (2005 年)

Those Uyghur students who did not attend Uyghur-medium schools went through a variety of other schooling routes, where the medium of instruction was Chinese. These included Chinese-medium schools in Xinjiang, special classes set up for ethnic minorities outside Xinjiang (内高班, or the ÂXinjiang ClassÊ; see Chen and Grose in this volume), specially established classes for ethnic minorities in Chinese-medium schools in Han majority areas in Xinjiang (疆内民族班), mixed Uyghur/Han schools, and experimental Chinese-medium classes in Uyghur-medium schools. In 2004, the Xinjiang government promoted a Âbilingual educationÊ policy, which stipulated that Mandarin Chinese be made the primary or sole language of instruction in primary and middle-school classrooms (XUAR PeopleÊs Government 2004). In practice, Âbilingual educationÊ has come to mean that Chinese is the medium of instruction from primary school onwards, while minority languages are relegated to the status of a school subject (Ma 2009), or not taught at all. Increasing numbers of Uyghur pupils in mixed communities or in the cities attend Chinese-medium schools or Chinese/Uyghur mixed schools from childhood, or the so-called Âbilingual kindergartensÊ (Tsung and Cruickshank 2009). Emphasis on Chinese as the dominant language, in contrast to the lack of foreign language provision in schools, is most noticeably demonstrated by the fact that tertiary institutions require minority students to pass the Chinese Proficiency Test (HSK) for admission and graduation purposes, while exempting them from taking the nationwide University English Test 4 (Yang 2005). The stark difference in implementation of two different sets of language education policies in Xinjiang, as outlined in the 2004 government document, illustrates the dynamic relationship among the key actors in the model. In the process of promoting the Chinese/Uyghur Âbilingual educationÊ policy, all actors specified in the model are fully mobilised to play their respective roles. The literature and the data show that policy makers at regional, prefectural and county levels tend to carry the state policy excessively far by over-emphasising the promotion of the Chinese language, whereas parents and pupils rather seek to balance the benefits, time and resources invested in the system. The policy cycle regarding English language provision for ethnic minority students, on the other hand, showed a weak link among policy makers at the regional, prefectural and county levels (see Figure 5.1). Without active participation of these key actors, there is no guarantee of

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Figure 5.1 Process for the implementation of the English language education policy in Xinjiang (Feng and Sunuodula 2009)

resources being made available; nor will other preconditions for policy implementation necessarily be met, resulting in limited policy implementation in schools and thus limited access to English language education for pupils. Olan (2007) conducted an empirical survey among 618 minority students at Xinjiang University and found that, even there, 62% of those students had no experience of learning English whatsoever. The remaining 38% of students surveyed, according to Olan, had gained experience of learning English through the following channels: by attending schools where Chinese is the medium of instruction; by taking private lessons from profit-making English language teaching agencies; by virtue of living in socio-political and economic centres such as Ürümchi or the major city of a prefecture, where educational opportunities are more accessible; and, for the highly motivated, through self-study. Different to the case of learning English or another foreign language, there is no clear educational or socio-economic incentive for Han pupils to learn an ethnic minority language, despite the rhetorical stress placed by policy makers on the importance of reciprocal language learning for ethnic harmony and stability. This has widened the gap between the two subsystems for the Han majority group and other ethnic minority groups and created further obstacles preventing pupils in the region from integrating with one another. The regional government announced in 2010 that it would become compulsory for all government employees to be bilingual in both Chinese and an ethnic minority language (China Daily 2010), but it is yet to be seen whether this policy will have a real impact on the ground.

Case studies Ten tertiary students were chosen for two rounds of ethnographic interviews, which involved a first round of minimally structured interviews followed by a second round of semi-structured interviews with a focus on emergent themes from the first round. The interviews were conducted in Uyghur. The findings of this research in respect to language learning can be categorised under the following five subheadings, which are interrelated.

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English as symbolic capital One general question asked in interview elicited intervieweesÊ perceptions of the English language. The following answers are representative: English is an important language. It is a world language . . . It is important to know English for learning new and cutting edge academic knowledge and scholarly exchange. Many Han scholars publish their work in English. English dominates the academic literature published (S-6, Uyghur male, first-year, MA in humanities). English is now a popular language in China. A few years ago, knowing Chinese was sufficient for getting a job. Now everyone knows Chinese, so learning English gives you an extra qualification to get better jobs (S-2, Uyghur male, fifth-year in social sciences). I wanted to learn English because when I went to see my sister in Beijing, where she was studying, I came across her speaking English with some of her friends. I think English is easier to learn than Chinese. But my sister is now a teacher in the Kashgar region, and her English is wasted. (S-4, Uyghur female, fourth-year in humanities) As an MA student, the Uyghur male who gave the first opinion viewed the English language as the access point to Âcutting edge academic knowledge and scholarly exchangeÊ that is, the linguistic capital he needs to acquire so as to be able to participate in his specialist field successfully. In the third example, the word wasted reveals all; the respondentÊs sister had gained the linguistic capital, but failed to translate it into the life chance that usually goes with it. In all cases, the language is perceived as being important, and the motivation to acquire it is obvious. Though Uyghur students usually start learning English at a later stage than their Han counterparts, many set high goals for themselves, e.g. the pursuit of studies abroad, or the attainment of sufficient competence to access information in English: I am studying English because I have a desire to continue my studies in a European country. I also want to learn about the world through the medium of the English language, rather than the limited and filtered information I get through the Han language. Europe has been leading the world in cultural and technological terms for hundreds of years and many important inventions were discovered by Europeans, for example, trains, Newton, Shakespeare, Dante, Rousseau, Picasso, these are just a few (S-3, Uyghur male, fifth-year in journalism). I would like to go abroad to study if I get the opportunity. English is also a very important tool to learn about what is happening around the world, rather than reading about it in Chinese translation or re-interpretation. Knowledge of English has also become important for finding employment and being

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Mamtimyn Sunuodula able to use computers. Teachers in my hometown [in the Kashgar region] are required to have knowledge of English and be able to offer English language classes. (S-1, Uyghur female, fifth-year in sociology)

In addition to their high expectations, it is also worth noting that both interviewees wish to learn what is happening around the world through the medium of English directly, not through their second language, Chinese. This suggests that, to the interviewees, the meaning of obtaining the multilingual and multi-literate repertoire goes beyond economic benefits to include socio-political and cultural gains. Willingness to invest NortonÊs (1997) notion of investment has great relevancy to the interview data we collected. The investment can be either in the form of time, through self-study, or in the form of financial resources, by paying to attend private English lessons available on the market: I started studying English because I wanted to progress to a Masters level programme. I also wanted to explore the possibility of studying abroad. English is the language of international contact and exchange. I studied English by myself, but also attended some private tuition. I did not even know the English alphabet when I started. (S-5, Uyghur male, majoring in humanities) Learning Uyghur, Chinese and English languages will provide me with greater employment opportunities. I learned English by myself, but stopped when it became too hard. I would like to go abroad for visits if I get the chance. I feel confident about finding employment, and my knowledge of English will be an asset for that. (S-4, Uyghur female, fourth-year in humanities) Despite the difficulties the Uyghur female student in humanities found herself in, she made the time investment on the understanding that the value of her cultural capital will be increased. Some young Uyghurs may even have started cashing in on the demand for the English language, drawing upon their hard-acquired competence: I started learning English in 2002. I heard of English being offered to experimental classes (select class for top performing students) only while at high school. I am now privately coaching Uyghur primary school children in English at home. (S-3, Uyghur male, fifth-year in journalism)

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Perceptions of languages at play As a language with a long history, Uyghur is spoken by about 10 million speakers in Xinjiang, as well as in bordering countries such as Kazakhstan. Uyghur culture in terms of literature, medicine, arts and music is among the most sophisticated in the world. Not surprisingly, therefore, there is clear evidence in the interview data of confidence in maintaining the Uyghur language and culture: I am confident that the Uyghur language will survive into the future, and my aim of learning other languages is to learn the valuable aspects of other cultures. (S-1, Uyghur female, fifth-year in sociology) I do not worry about the threat to the Uyghur language and culture. Uyghur culture and language are well advanced and deeply rooted among the Uyghurs. Uyghur culture has exerted many influences on Han culture in aspects such as food, dress, respect for the elderly . . . Uyghurs possess a well-developed tradition of commerce and trade. This is also very important for preserving the Uyghur identity. (S-3, Uyghur male, fifth-year in journalism) This confidence could be seen as an illustration of what Vaish (2005) calls the tenacity of indigenous cultures. However, because of the rapid increase of the majority Han population and its growing economic and socio-political influence on the region, interviewees also showed anxiety about the status of minority groups in Chinese society, and about their own future if lacking Chinese language competence. The same male student in his fifth year in journalism had the following to say: I am more worried about the great influx of Han immigration into Uyghur areas. This trend will have greater impact than the language assimilation policy. (S-3, Uyghur male, fifth-year journalism) Other respondents opined as follows: Chinese is a difficult language to learn. I am required to write my thesis in Chinese. There is little originality and creativity in it, because I donÊt have deep enough knowledge of Chinese to fully express myself. What is happening is language assimilation, not bilingual education. Most lectures are about politics, or Han ChinaÊs history and culture. I canÊt relate to what was taught about Qing history. (S-6, Uyghur male, first-year, MA in humanities) I am very concerned about the overwhelming influence and pressure to learn Chinese. Uyghurs are less knowledgeable in the Chinese language compared

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Mamtimyn Sunuodula with most other minority nationalities in China. I am not sure if I will be able to progress to a MasterÊs degree when I finish my BA. (S-2, Uyghur male, fifth-year in social sciences)

Decades of rigorous, top-down promotion of Chinese language education does not seem to have brought about the desired outcomes. The data as a whole suggest that the strong influence of the majority culture and the governmentÊs policy to promote it (Feng 2007, 271 2) cause anxiety and even resistance among minority groups, which in turn may become a major hurdle in terms of minority studentsÊ successful acquisition of the Chinese language. On the other hand, when they talked about learning the English language, most interviewees demonstrated a keen interest, and there seemed to be a consensus that, in this arena, Uyghur students have a real chance to compete with their Han counterparts: Uyghur children perform better than their Han counterparts in learning English because they are genuinely interested and motivated to learn it, rather than only interested in passing exams. I have now passed the Level 4 English language test for university students. Han people also recognise the Uyghur studentsÊ ability to learn new languages. (S-3, Uyghur male, fifth-year in journalism) If a lecture is delivered in English, and all other factors being equal, Uyghurs can compete with Han students. In the oral English language classes that I recently attended, most Uyghur students performed better than their Han counterparts attending the same class, despite the fact that the Hans would have studied English for at least seven or eight years longer than the Uyghurs. (S-5, Uyghur male, majoring in humanities) Most interviewees agreed that the motivation to learn English among Uyghurs is very strong, and that this Âgenuine interestÊ is not in evidence when learning Chinese. The intrinsic motivation to learn English shown by many interviewees such as the two above seems to be derived both from the desire to show their competitiveness or capability of learning and from the fact that English is not a compulsory subject for minority students and thus they learn it out of real interest. When combined, these two factors, as the interview data suggest, have brought about desirable outcomes. Role of mother tongue in the learning of a second/third language To develop competence in a second or third language, a practical question often raised in China is: which language should be adopted as the zhongjieyu [roughly translated, language of instruction], i.e. which language should be used to teach and learn English in the classroom, or when compiling textbooks for use by minority students? Many educators and researchers, such as Xiao (2003), argue

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that the zhongjieyu should be the studentsÊ mother tongue. However, in practice, the Chinese language dominates both the classroom and textual materials for English teaching and learning. This mismatch is also evident in the data gathered for this study. With regard to the choice of zhongjieyu, the following view expressed by an English major was representative: Yes, I think the use of the mother tongue as the explanatory language in classrooms and textbooks will bring about better results. Students can use the mother tongue to learn grammar, to recite vocabulary, and this helps them to memorise things easily. (S-9, Uyghur female, majoring in English) Several interviewees also commented on the correlation between creative thinking and the use of the mother tongue. They seemed unanimous in the view that the use of the second language as zhongjieyu inhibits the thinking and learning process rather than facilitating it. There are, in addition, practical issues, as one interviewee pointed out: There is a practical problem here. In exams, there is always a part that asks us to translate English into Chinese. This is where Uyghur students who are not good at Chinese lose points (marks). What can you do? (S-7, Uyghur male) The issue of choice of zhongjieyu is certainly not trivial according to these interviewees, who believe that while majority Han students benefit from their natural linguistic capital, the use of Chinese as zhongjieyu in English language education acts to limit minority studentsÊ options of learning strategies and affects their learning outcomes, as measured in high-stake tests.

Acquisition of symbolic capital and desire for equality and recognition The interviewees showed a strong desire to be recognised in Chinese society, and to get equal opportunities to access linguistic capital, usually defined as English in their perception. There have been Uyghur representatives at the finals of the very toughest test in English in the PRC, the China Central Television (CCTV) English-Speaking Contest, held almost every year since 2004. The programme is broadcast nationally and internationally by CCTV, and is watched by millions of enthusiasts all across China, including Uyghur students in Xinjiang. Attendance at the finals of this contest can be called a rare success story for any minority group in China. The Uyghur winner of the 2010 competition, Umid Haji, started learning English in a systematic way, mostly at his own expense, and in his spare time while studying economics at Xinjiang Finance University. He had been inspired by an earlier contestant of Uyghur nationality (Haji 2010).

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Table 5.2 Uyghur finalists in the CCTV English-Speaking Contest since 2004 Year

Name

Prize achieved

Place of study

Place of birth

2010

Umut Haji

Champion

Ürümchi

2008

Faruk Mardan

Semi-finalist

2007

Nasrulla

2006

Sabahat

Qualifier, ShaÊanxi province JudgesÊ choice award

2005

Adiljan Abdukerim Kasimjan Abdureyim Azimat Rustam

Runner-up (2nd prize)

Xinjiang Finance University Xinjiang Medical University XiÊan Petroleum University Tianjin Foreign Languages University Xinjiang University

3rd Prize

Xinjiang University

Xinjiang

Best Pronunciation Award

Xinjiang Medical University

Xinjiang

2004 2004

Ürümchi Qäshqär Xinjiang Xinjiang

Below is a quote from the Uyghur finalist of 2008, Faruk Mardan, who spoke about the boundless energy for English language learning in Xinjiang, in answer to one of the judgesÊ questions: I have to tell you that people in Xinjiang are really enthusiastic about learning English. Because we have lots of youngsters who are willing to speak English, who are willing to learn English. There are lots of ethnic groups in Xinjiang. They are passionate and enthusiastic. They like new things, English is really new and it is like new blood in their body. (China Central Television 2008) The following are representative of the key opinions expressed in my ethnographic interviews: Uyghur children perform better than their Han counterparts when learning English because they are genuinely interested and motivated to learn it, rather than only interested in passing exams. I have now passed the Level 4 English language test for university students. Han people also recognise the Uyghur studentsÊ ability to learn new languages. (S-3, Uyghur male, fifth-year in journalism) I very much welcome the opportunity to study subjects in English. This will provide both Han and Uyghurs with the same starting point and an equal footing, and the Han student will get a taste of how it is to learn subject knowledge in a foreign language. I think Uyghurs are better at learning languages. (S-5, Uyghur male, majoring in the humanities)

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When I was at primary and secondary school, there was no English learning offered to us. So at university, I had to learn English all by myself. I found myself quite confident. Unfortunately, I had to drop the language because of other pressures . . . However, I feel that if Uyghur students are put on an equal footing with Han students, we can compete with them. (S-8, Uyghur female, fourth-year in history) As the above examples show, most interviewees were keenly conscious of their minority status, but at the same time, in VaishÊs (2005) words, they seemed to sense that the national drive to provide English language education represents an opportunity to gain equitable access to the linguistic capital so valued in todayÊs society.

Discussion It is not hard to imagine that the majority view about the effects of the national drive for English language education on linguistic minorities is to consider that this could strengthen the hand of the already powerful majority Han group. This is so because the majority group sets the rules, and has access to vastly superior cultural and economic resources in achieving that goal. In turn, the drive might act to further marginalise linguistic minorities. Yet the data presented here show that Uyghur students at the tertiary level perceive the importance of the English language, and are highly motivated to learn it, though they face more difficulties than their Han counterparts because of the limited English language education they received, if any, in earlier schooling. While the origins of this motivation observed in student interviewees are complex, studentsÊ strong desire for recognition and equal conditions in education, as well as their willingness to invest, signify that they seek to acquire a wider range of symbolic and material resources, which will increase the value of their cultural capital. Thus, consideration for economic and material gains in second or third language learning, as argued by several authors reviewed above and also by some policy makers, is not the only factor influencing second language acquisition by linguistic minorities. As social groups, Uyghur and Han students are unavoidably situated in a dynamic power relationship, which exerts a significant influence on how they invest in linguistic capital. While Uyghur students face great difficulty in adjusting to the study of university subjects in their second language, Chinese, they are at the same time aware that this system puts Han students in an advantageous position because of their natural linguistic capital. English, which is a foreign language for both groups, may therefore provide Uyghur students with a real chance of balancing this power relationship. The data show clearly that Uyghur students are aware of this possibility, and that many therefore invest heavily in the third language. A related issue I wish to discuss is the question of whether there should be Âspecial policiesÊ to establish English standards for linguistic minorities which are lower than those required by the NCS. This is a call often found in the scholarly

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literature, but seldom debated. Of the many arguments made in this literature (see, for example, Yang 2005), financial issues such as inadequate resources and lack of funding cannot justify the call, since these problems can and should be addressed gradually by a country that is experiencing rapid economic development. On the other hand, if the proposal to lower the standards is based on the argument that minority students attach lower value to foreign languages and/or they face more cognitive and affective barriers than their majority counterparts in English language learning, this argument is clearly refuted by the data presented above. On the contrary, my interviewees showed a strong motivation to learn the third language, and saw many strengths in learning it. Thus, I wish to restate an argument made elsewhere (Feng 2008; Feng and Sunuodula 2009), namely: if minority groups are expected to be structurally integrated into mainstream society, which is a widely acknowledged political objective in the PRC, it is misguided to call for a lowering of the standards. Such a policy, once introduced, would not benefit minority groups in any way; rather, it would segregate them further from mainstream society, and place them on an unequal footing with regard to life chances. Having restated this view, I would also make it explicit that I am not arguing against special policies that have proved necessary both nationally and internationally for minority groups, such as Âpreferential policiesÊ or positive discrimination in education (see Feng and Sunuodula 2009). In the case of English language provision, I agree with many other authors that special policies to provide additional funding, resources and incentives for education in minority regions are not only necessary but crucial. These policies can help create Âequal conditionsÊ (Feng 2008) for minority peoples to engage with the nation and with the world.

Conclusions Above, I have reflected on my findings in terms of BourdieuÊs concept of capital, and considered how they relate to language, social identity, and dynamic power relations between languages and their speakers. Subsequently, I feel in a position to argue that, although under intense pressure to become proficient in the national language (Chinese) at the expense of their native language (Uyghur), some Uyghur students see an opportunity in English language learning: the study of English as a second or third language may create the conditions for a shift in the balance of cultural and symbolic capital (and thus power) in their favour. They are strongly conscious of their ethnic and social identities, and very aware of how they relate to the world around them and of possibilities for the future. With this in mind, they constantly organise and reorganise their relationships, and invest time, effort and resources in the issues which matter to them most, and which in their view promise the best returns. The challenge may not necessarily marginalise them further, as many predict, and government policies do not necessarily achieve the impact they set out to achieve. Indeed, this apparently adverse policy situation could be a blessing in disguise, triggering Uyghur studentsÊ motivation to negotiate their identity by investing in linguistic capital, and leading to debates among educators, researchers and policy makers on key issues in minority education. There is

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already evidence in the literature on language provision for minority students that the key stakeholders, as mentioned above, do not look at language education solely from the point of view of third language acquisition. Rather, they reflect also on the role of the first language in relation to second and third language learning, and on the socio-political, cultural and economic dimensions of language use and language education. This may lead to a repositioning of languages in classroom use and a restructuring of curricula, impacting positively on language provision for minority groups: something which, indeed, has long been necessary.

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6

Representations of Uyghurs in Chinese history textbooks Janina Feyel

Introduction Children learn to live together in many ways, not only from what they are taught in the classroom but also from the atmosphere of their school and from the life of their community. Their school textbooks are, however, a very important vehicle for shaping their understanding of the world, not least because they perceive that textbooks represent the ÂofficialÊ point of view of grown-ups. (Foster 2006, ix)

While there are some publications on textbook knowledge of the PeopleÊs Republic of China (PRC), that research is predominantly focused on questions concerning socialist education and/or the change of textbook knowledge content in the course of the new policies of reform and opening up under Deng Xiaoping (see Jones 2002; 2005; Kwong 1985; Vickers and Kan 2005). Little has been published on representation of ethnic minorities in PRC textbooks. Some monographs mention the topic, but most publications on minorities and education in the PRC are concerned mostly or even exclusively with minority language policies, preferential educational policies and unequal access to educational opportunities (see Hawkins, Jacob and Li 2008; Ma 2009; Postiglione 1999; Schluessel 2007; Zhu 2007), or with education and identity formation (see Grose 2010; Hansen 1999; Wang 2004; Wang and Phillion 2010). One recent exception is an article by Baranovitch (2010), discussing the change in minority representation in the PRC since its founding. Nevertheless, when it comes to textbook representations of Uyghurs in particular, as far as I am aware, there seems to exist not a single scientific publication on the topic in either the Chinese language or Western languages. How are Uyghurs and the region in which they predominantly live Xinjiang depicted in an up-to-date and widely used set of Chinese history textbooks? Is there frequent reference to Uyghurs and Xinjiang, or are these topics underrepresented? Which themes are mentioned, what information is given, and which topics are neglected? Is there a certain story line that connects pieces of textbook knowledge on Uyghurs? If textbook knowledge is assumed to be part of the official discourse on Uyghurs and Xinjiang, then to what extent does public discourse challenge those textbook depictions?

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To gain an insight into these questions, I analysed a set of Chinese history textbooks published by the PeopleÊs Education Press. Many have published on the topic of methods adopted in textbook research (see Höhne 2005; Mikk 2000; Pingel 2010; Weinbrenner 1992), and it is not my intention to introduce this theoretical discussion here. Rather, I will give a short outline of the methodology used for this particular paper. My research interests and the aims of my research differ from classical textbook research. In contrast with the majority of textbook research conducted in the past, my aim is not to examine whether a certain textbook (and its design and content) is an appropriate teaching medium in the pedagogic or didactic sense, and I do not intend to give suggestions about necessary changes of textbook content. My approach is to treat textbook content as one text among others that influence, and are influenced by, a certain discourse. The discourse I am interested in is the discourse on Uyghurs. Parts of this discourse overlap with other discourses; for example, those on minority groups in the PRC and/or on Han Chinese identity. I understand textbook content to form one piece or line of discourse that I believe to be quite important for discourse constitution, as will be demonstrated below. To extract textbook knowledge from the books analysed, I first conducted a simple word frequency analysis, working with categories and terms that were determined after a first reading of the textbooks and before the beginning of word frequency count. Categories and terms were chosen in relation to the research questions. Following word frequency analysis, I located, extracted and paraphrased all the chapters, paragraphs and images that refer to Uyghurs or Xinjiang.1 These chapters, paragraphs and images were analysed more deeply and compared and contrasted with background knowledge on Uyghurs, Xinjiang and minorities in the PRC derived from outcomes of scientific research, public discourse and my personal experience. During this process of critical contrast and comparison, conclusions were drawn and tested, connections discovered and proven, and new questions raised regarding the discourse on Uyghurs that cannot yet be answered at this stage of the research. I am aware that my approach has its strengths and weaknesses. Word frequency count provides only basic statistical information. Reading the findings presented in this chapter, it should be kept in mind that differences in frequency are to some extent connected to the different roles minorities have played throughout Chinese history. Meanwhile, the descriptive-interpretive approach is of course subjective and liable to bias. Yet at the same time, it renders the scholar open to new ideas emerging in the course of analysis, allowing the possibility of discovering connections between different pieces of information and parts of discourse, and of revealing a story line. In the end, I would like to stress that my results and conclusions should not be understood as an incontestable truth, but as one possible interpretation.

Why textbooks? Textbooks are a means of passing on rules, norms, beliefs, traditions and narratives to the next generation: ÂThey should provide points of reference for students whose

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behavioural and cognitive patterns are being formedÊ (Pingel 2010, 37). Textbooks are extremely important for forming pupilsÊ value systems. Mikk (2000, 309) even proposes that the formation of the ÂrightÊ values and attitudes is the most important aim of schooling in a society: ÂA person with broad knowledge in different subjects may even be dangerous for the society if his/her values are destructive. Another person with little knowledge but with appreciated social values is a nice person.Ê Furthermore, textbook knowledge is utterly important for the process of shaping views, because it is taught and learned during childhood, at an age when children have not yet developed a value system of their own (Mikk 2000, 311) and Âwhen they are most impressionableÊ (Greaney 2006, 47). Textbooks are a trusted source of knowledge for pupils and seldom contested (Pingel 2010, 50). Although it should be acknowledged that views of others during childhood are also formed by personal experience, peer group influence, the influence of the community pupils live in, and popular culture (Greaney 2006, 49, 58), I am convinced that school education in general and textbooks in particular are very important for shaping discourse. This is even more the case with subjects that introduce a completely new body of knowledge to children, like history. As Pingel (2010, 41) reminds us: ÂHistory teaching normally starts at a stage when the pupil has no concept of an abstract historical time comprised of centuries and millennia.Ê In China, history education has a long tradition of having been Âfundamental to the transmission of the state-authorised memories on which state-authorised identities may be constructed and to the suppression or control of alternative ethnic, regional or political identities perceived as threatening the integrity of the Chinese state and the legitimacy of the ruling regimeÊ (Jones 2002, 545f). Or to put it in a nutshell: history education and history textbook knowledge play a huge role in the perpetuation or variation of particular discourses on, for example, Uyghurs. It is powerful knowledge for two reasons. First, it contains official, state-authorised knowledge, and thus is an artefact of official discourse. Second, its content is often the first piece of information that children absorb on certain topics, and is a piece of information that must be internalised because pupils need the knowledge to pass tests. In general, even if there have been several changes during recent decades, textbooks seem to play a much more important role in compulsory education in the PRC than they do, for example, in Europe. One reason among others is that many teachers in the PRC still have not been trained in their profession, and thus rely heavily on textbooks for teaching their classes (Greaney 2006, 61). Another reason is that teachers tend to stick to textbooks to the letter, where textbooks are designed to exactly reflect the curriculum, as is the case in the PRC (Pingel 2010, 46; Pöggeler 2005, 25). A third reason is that books are greatly worshipped, and textbooks carefully read, by pupils in the PRC (You 2005, 634).

Education system and textbook publishing in the PRC Since the founding of the PRC, the countryÊs education system underwent several major changes. Nowadays, the PRC education system consists of up to three years

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of pre-school education, a nine-year compulsory education, usually divided into six years of primary education and three years of junior secondary education, followed by another three years of senior secondary education (not compulsory). Primary school is normally entered at the age of six. According to official statistics, enrolment rates even for junior secondary school are high; in 2002, for example, they reached more than 97 % (Ministry of Education 2008). History is considered an important subject in the PRCÊs education system, and since 1981 history class hours have increased significantly (Jones 2002, 555). The introduction of world history classes, however, once again reduced the number of class hours earmarked for Chinese history (Jones 2002, 557). Today, Chinese history is taught in the first and second semester of the first (Grade 7) and second (Grade 8) years in junior secondary school, whilst the third yearÊs (Grade 9) history lessons are dedicated to world history (PeopleÊs Education Press 2012). In the first years after the proclamation of the PRC, responsibilities for education were clearly divided between the Ministry of Education (renamed several times, today known as the Ministry of Education again) and the PeopleÊs Education Press (PEP, Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe). The Ministry of Education created curricula and syllabi, while the PEP compiled and published textbooks nationwide. A couple of years later, all three responsibilities were fulfilled by the PEP alone (Jones 2002, 548). Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the PEP falls under the direct leadership of the Ministry of Education, and thus is linked to the central government (PeopleÊs Education Press 2007a). The most recent curriculum reform for compulsory education dates back to 2001. PEP textbooks amended to this new curriculum (kecheng biaozhun) comprise the tenth set of textbooks in the PRC and started to be piloted during the same year (PeopleÊs Education Press 2007b). They are now in use throughout China and include the history textbooks analysed for this chapter. From the mid-1980s on, historians, teachers, educationalists and other experts were included in the process of curriculum design and choice of textbook knowledge, but their role and their possibilities should not be overestimated. At the same time, a limited textbook pluralism was introduced (Jones 2002; Ministry of Education 2008; You 2005, 649). Shanghai, Zhejiang and Beijing were granted the right to compile their own curricula and, according to these curricula, to use textbooks of different content than the rest of the PRC. However, while the PEP has lost its exclusive right to publish textbooks, and certain middle schools may use different sets of textbooks, for several reasons these still tend to be highly uniform in content and very close to the textbooks published by the PEP. First of all, there is a rigid system of textbook censorship in the PRC: ÂAll textbooks for obligatory subjects taught in primary and secondary schools have to be examined and approved by the State Textbooks Examination and Approval Committee before publication in terms of ideological content, scientific spirit and adaptability to classroom instructionÊ (Ministry of Education 2008). Second, in the PRC curriculum and textbook research is the responsibility of the Curriculum and Teaching Materials Research Institute, which is staffed by the same personnel team as the PEP (Peoples Education Press 2007a). In other words, this government-authorised

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institution not only forms the state curricula and provides the most widely used textbooks but can also dictate the outcomes of research on curricula and alternative textbooks. These two points ensure a very close binding of all textbooks to the state curriculum, and promote textbook uniformity under the cover of increased textbook plurality. A third issue that is connected directly to these points and is also relevant for other media publications in the PRC, for example novels and short stories, is self-censorship (Jones 2002). Compiling a textbook is quite expensive; alternative textbook publishers therefore try to write their textbooks in accordance with state curricula, guidelines and regulations in order to pass textbook examination and obtain approval. Furthermore, although it is officially stated that due to regional disparities in this vast country, textbook contents can or even should be adapted according to the needs of different provinces (Ministry of Education 2008), a comparison of two of the latest sets of PEP textbooks used for this study one published in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, one published in Jiangsu Province revealed no differences at all.

Data The body of data used for this analysis consists of four history textbooks (Grade 7, 1st semester; Grade 7, 2nd semester; Grade 8, 1st semester; Grade 8, 2nd semester) on Chinese history (Zhongguo lishi) that belong to the presently used set of textbooks for junior secondary school published by the PeopleÊs Education Press. At this point, the information I have given above about the education system and textbook publishing in the PRC becomes relevant for explaining exactly why these four books were chosen for analysis. As shown above, a limited textbook plurality has been granted in the PRC at the present time. This means that the textbooks published by the PeopleÊs Education Press and examined for this paper are not the only textbooks available and used for classroom instruction according to the latest curriculum standards in the PRC. The set published by the PEP was chosen because, as I have pointed out above, even in the new era of limited textbook pluralism in the PRC, the PEP is still dominating the Chinese textbook landscape. Its textbooks can still be considered a widely used, if not the most widely used, set in Chinese secondary schools. This assumption is made not only in accordance with statements made by the PEP (PeopleÊs Education Press 2007a), it is also supported by my own experience. The state-run and sole nationwide bookstore, Xinhua Shudian, offers a large array of supplemental learning materials for pupils, but when it comes to official school textbooks, bookshelves are mostly filled exclusively with the sets published by the PEP. Moreover, this publisher is not only the market leader for textbooks in the PRC; in addition, the former monopolist now has the power and ability to influence the textbook content of competing sets via the textbook research conducted by the Curriculum and Teaching Materials Research Institute. The class levels selected for analysis were picked on the basis of a standard compulsory school career that consists of six years of primary education and three years of junior secondary education. According to the aim of this piece of

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discourse analysis that is, to extract and analyse what pupils have learned about Uyghurs from their PEP history textbooks by the end of their school career all history textbooks of the chosen set that serve as teaching and learning materials during a standard school career must be consulted. Since there are no history classes in primary education, and Grade 9 history courses and textbooks exclusively cover world history (and therefore do not feature any information concerning or connected to Uyghurs or Chinese history), the class levels relevant for this research project will be Grades 7 and 8, during which time history classes are dedicated to Chinese history. Although history education is a component of senior secondary education as well, those textbooks were not included in the data set, because senior secondary education is not compulsory, and is not attended by all pupils in the PRC.

Findings The misrepresentation of minority groups in textbooks is a quite frequent phenomenon revealed by textbook research. In some cases, the contributions of minorities to the development of a country or the course of national history are omitted or downplayed (Greaney 2006, 50). The under-representation of ChinaÊs minority nationalities in general has already been shown by Wang and Phillion (2010, 571) in relation to PRC primary school textbooks. The same is true for the history textbooks examined for this chapter. Most chapters and paragraphs deal with the history of the Chinese heartland, or what Bovingdon calls Âthe successive Central Plains statesÊ (2001, 97). A simple word frequency analysis of the body of data shows that terms which point to China in general and might create a we-group feeling, like Âour landÊ (wo guo) and ÂChinaÊ (Zhongguo), are used extensively at least once on every text page. In several paragraphs, ÂChinaÊ is replaced by the word ÂmotherlandÊ (zuguo). Less extensive is the use of the term ÂChinese nationÊ (Zhonghua minzu). The word ÂminorityÊ (shaoshu minzu) occurs 27 times, 16 times in the modern usage of the term, 11 times with reference to Dynastic China. When it comes to word frequency counts of ethnonyms for Chinese nationalities, analysis reveals that the Uyghur nationality is under- and over-represented at the same time. Uyghurs (Weiwuerzu), who comprise the fifth largest officially recognised minority nationality in the PRC, are under-represented because they are mentioned only 12 times directly, while there are 18 direct references to the Tibetan nationality (Zangzu), although its population is significantly smaller. Nevertheless, word frequency counts of ethnonyms for the largest official Chinese minority nationalities show that other groups are even more clearly under-represented. The Zhuang nationality (Zhuangzu) the largest minority group in the PRC is not mentioned once; the Hui nationality (Huizu) occurs only six times, though it is the third largest minority nationality; and the name of ChinaÊs fourth largest nationality, the Miao (Miaozu), turns up only once. The term ÂHan nationalityÊ (Hanzu) by far the largest ethnic group in the PRC is used 26 times. Word frequency analysis concerning minority areas showed that the word ÂTibetÊ (Xizang) appears 42 times, while ÂXinjiangÊ

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(Xinjiang) is used 37 times. The term ÂWestern RegionsÊ (Xiyu), first mentioned in the history textbooks (Grade 7, 1st semester) as Âthe area of todayÊs Xinjiang and faraway placesÊ ( jintian Xinjiang diqu he bianyuan de difang) (Ma and Qi 2009a, 82), turns up 47 times. Before conducting word frequency analysis, it was assumed that texts about Xinjiang would refer to richness of natural resources and the Silk Road, while stressing that Xinjiang is a part of China. Actual analysis revealed that no mention is made of a connection between Xinjiang and natural resources; however, it is pointed out four times that Xinjiang is part of China, while a connection between Xinjiang and the Silk Road was drawn the same number of times. The textbooks examined speak of good relations between Uyghurs and Han twice, while good relations between Tibetans and Han Chinese are stressed six times. There is not a single reference to bad or difficult relations between Uyghurs/Tibetans and Han. To sum up the results of this simple word frequency analysis, ethnic minority groups are definitely under-represented in the data set, and the space dedicated to them is very small. Nevertheless, Uyghurs, along with Tibetans, are the minority nationalities referred to most often, although the number of references is still very small compared to the bulk of information given about Central Plains history. Xinjiang at least if the connection between the terms Western Regions and Xinjiang is taken into account is the minority region that receives the most attention in the textbooks examined. Analysis also revealed that references to minority groups who (or whose ethnonyms) still exist today are not distributed across the textbooks, but concentrated in a small number of chapters. Perhaps it is not surprising that the Chinese history textbooks examined do not offer a special chapter about Uyghurs and their history or present situation. Rather, textbook knowledge about Uyghurs is composed of only small paragraphs or single sentences that touch on the topic, and appear mostly in texts that give information about the history of what is today western China, or in chapters about the multi-ethnic composition of China, past and present. Uyghurs are mentioned not once in the textbooks for Grade 7, 1st semester, although there is a whole chapter devoted to the Silk Road and the connections between the Han Dynasty and the Western Regions (Han tong Xiyu he Sichouzhilu). The first piece of textbook knowledge about Uyghurs is given in Chapter Five of the second semester textbooks for the seventh grade. The chapter is entitled ÂUnited as one familyÊ (Hetong wei yi jia), and gives information about minority groups that were living in the borderlands of the Tang Empire. Most paragraphs deal with Tibet, but there is one sub-paragraph on ÂThe rise of the HuiheÊ (Huihe de boxing), who are introduced as Âthe ancestors of the UyghursÊ (Ma and Qi 2009b, 24). The short text of only eight sentences is accompanied by a picture of Huihe nobility. The textbooks analysed are divided into units (danyuan) that are subdivided into chapters (ke). At the end of each unit, instructions are provided for a classroom activity (huodong ke) on a topic covered by the unit. The classroom activity offered on four pages at the end of Unit One is related to Chapter 5, but

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concentrates on Tibetans and Tibetan history alone. The Uyghurs do not appear again until Chapter 19 in the same book, where a sub-section is devoted to the ÂrebellionÊ ( panluan) of various Khojas (hezhuo) during the Qing Dynasty. A footnote explains that ÂKhoja is the autonym of Uyghur aristocratsÊ (Weiwuerzu shangcengguizu zicheng hezhuo). In the text, a clear distinction between the Khojas on one side and Âthe Uyghurs and the other ethnic groupsÊ (Weiwuer deng zu renmin) on the other side is drawn (Ma and Qi 2009b, 111). Here, we notice an allusion to the multi-ethnic composition of the north-western region, but specific ethnonyms and this is also true for the rest of the data set are not given. This time, the unitÊs classroom activity, dedicated to the territorial integrity of China past and present, lays equal stress on Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan, and the notion that these regions Âhave been a part of ChinaÊs territory since antiquityÊ (zigu yilai jiu shi zhongguo de lingtu) (Ma and Qi 2009b, 132). Nevertheless, it should be recognised that these paragraphs are not about ethnic groups, but rather about Chinese territory, therefore the term ÂUyghurÊ does not appear at all. Almost the same is true for Chapter 3 of the book written for Grade 8, 1st semester. The chapter is about the ÂRecapture of XinjiangÊ (Shoufu Xinjiang) from Yaqub Beg,2 an important event in Uyghur history, but Uyghurs are mentioned only once in four pages, and only as supporters of the Qing EmpireÊs efforts to recapture the region. In the 2nd semester of Grade 8, a whole chapter is dedicated to ÂNational UnityÊ (minzu tuanjie) (Ji and Li 2009b, 56). The unit is mostly about minority nationalities in the PRC and the multi-ethnic composition of China in general, but when it comes to different minority groups in particular, Tibetans are mentioned most often, with nearly two pages out of four and two pictures dealing with Tibet and Tibetans. Uyghurs appear only in a short exercise about minority songs and in a small picture (Figure 6.1), with a caption that translates as: ÂUyghur children at the grape festival of Turpan, XinjiangÊ (Ji and Li 2009b, 57). At this point, history textbook knowledge on Uyghurs has been completed, since the remaining chapters do not feature any further reference to Uyghurs or Xinjiang.

Figure 6.1 Image from Ji and Li (2009b, 57)

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Textbook knowledge and the discourse on Uyghurs As textbook narratives influence, and are influenced by, the various discourses on a topic that exist in a society (Höhne 2005), I will now compare and contrast textbook knowledge on Uyghurs, extracted from the current data set, with disparate discourses (official and societal) on the Uyghurs. In China, I argue, official discourses on various topics, including minorities in general and Uyghurs in particular, are omnipresent. They dominate state media like newspapers, television and, to a large extent, the Chinese internet as well. As the national curriculum in the PRC is virtually designed by members of the central government, and textbooks have to strictly follow this curriculum, official discourses may be assumed to dictate textbook knowledge. Of course, if children were exposed only to these statesponsored discourses, they would be ÂperfectÊ future citizens, and there would be no point in examining whether and how textbook knowledge corresponds to popular opinions on Uyghurs held and expressed by either Han Chinese or Uyghurs. But I believe that societal or public discourses in the PRC do challenge official discourses and textbook knowledge to a certain extent. As a consequence, textbook knowledge should be understood as a fragment of the official discourses on Uyghurs a fragment that is influenced by, and influences, the different fragments of public discourse on Uyghurs. If textbooks over-emphasise the narrative of one particular ancient nationality and neglect or downplay the roles and traditions of other ethnic groups, pupils might overestimate the status of their own ethnic group and society and look down on others (Pingel 2010, 42). The Chinese history textbooks examined clearly stress the uniquely long history of China, meaning that of the Central Plains area, and rarely refer to minority histories. But, compared to other minorities, the space devoted to Uyghurs is quite large, although it should be kept in mind that this is to a certain extent a result of the different roles different ethnic groups played in the course of history. At the same time, certain ethnic minority groups seem to be more important for the aim of constructing a national history that serves the present. According to the results introduced in the previous section, Uyghurs and Xinjiang, Tibetans and Tibet, seem to be of some significance for this purpose. In China, history education since the end of the Cultural Revolution is meant to generate and deepen acceptance of the political system and party policies, to legitimise the rule of the CCP, and to promote patriotism and national pride among and this is important all ethnic groups in the PRC.3 Even before the Deng Xiaoping era, Chinese history textbooks portrayed contested territories as inseparable parts of the PRC territory, and stressed the brotherhood of the various nationalities of China (Jones 2002, 548f). This does not seem to have changed much, as the textbooks analysed repeatedly emphasise that Xinjiang has been an intrinsic part of China since antiquity. Thus, the first piece of information given about Xinjiang in the set of textbooks reads as follows: In the year 119 BC, Emperor Wu of the Han for the second time sent Zhang Qian as emissary to the Western Regions. The diplomatic mission led by Zhang Qian took more than ten thousand cows and sheep and huge amounts

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of silk with them to the Western Regions, where they visited a lot of countries. The countries of the Western Regions in return sent envoys to visit ChangÊan. From that day on, frequent contact was developing between the Han Dynasty and the Western Regions ( jiaowang cong ci ri qi pinfan). (Ma and Qi 2009a, 83) Another, even more interesting paragraph follows almost directly: The countries of the Western Regions one after the other submitted to the authority of the Han Dynasty. In 60 BC, the Han government established the Protectorate of the Western Regions to govern the area. Since then, the area of todayÊs Xinjiang came under the jurisdiction of the central government. It became an inseparable part of our country (chengwei woguo bu ke fenge de yibufen). (Ma and Qi 2009a, 83) The chapter is accompanied by a photograph showing a pair of silk stockings dating from the Eastern Han Dynasty that have been unearthed in Xinjiang (Figure 6.2). This offers further proof of the long history of the Han Chinese presence in Xinjiang. The chapter also stresses that the contact was not one-sided, but that envoys and merchants from the Western Regions Âwent westÊ (xi xing), while those of the Western Regions Âcame eastÊ (dong lai) to the Han Dynasty heartland (Ma and Qi 2009a, 83). The verbs used nevertheless reveal a worldview that sees central and eastern China at the centre of the universe and the Western Regions (or as shown above: Xinjiang) at the periphery. The image accompanying the text (Figure 6.3) supports this view, as ChangÊan is printed in bold and in larger font size than the other place names. This could be criticised as a sino-centric approach, and, to be sure, it is a tool for constructing and perpetuating the narrative of a linear Chinese national history.

Figure 6.2 Image from Ma and Qi (2009a, 84)

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Figure 6.3 Image from Ma and Qi (2009a, 83)

Claiming long historical ties between a certain nation and a certain territory, and thus inventing a common, linear past while omitting the contesting histories of other ethnicities, is a means frequently found in textbooks to claim Âcultural dominance, uniqueness and exclusivenessÊ (Pingel 2010, 38). Thus it emerges as an important part of the narrative of Chinese national history that the Xinjiang region has belonged to China almost for ever. The chapter on the recapture of Xinjiang, for example, starts with a sentence saying ÂXinjiang [. . .] has been Chinese territory since antiquity (zigu yilai jiu shi Zhongguo de lingtu)Ê (Ji and Li 2010a, 12). Word count analysis revealed not only that the code for ÂXinjiang as a part of China since antiquityÊ appeared in the data four times, but that there were eight references to Âunity and territorial integrityÊ as well. Ordinary Han Chinese mostly share this narrative of Xinjiang having become a part of China at a very early time, and hold views like: ÂEven if they are Uighur, they are still Chinese. In fact, all minorities are first Chinese, then their minority [. . .] If it werenÊt for China, where would the Uighur live?Ê (Kaltman 2007, 60) or ÂThe Uighur donÊt understand history, so many canÊt understand that Xinjiang has always been a part of ChinaÊ (Kaltman 2007, 76). Another recurring theme whenever knowledge on Uyghurs is provided in the textbooks concerns the good relations between the centre and the border regions, between Han Chinese and the various nationalities of Xinjiang. As the sentences quoted above imply, good relations are often indicated by brisk trade, travels to and fro, and/or cultural exchange. Throughout the rest of Chapter 15 in the history textbooks of the 1st semester of Grade 7, good relations between the Western Regions and the Han Dynasty are further underlined (Ma and Qi 2009a, 83 6). Another text passage reads, for example: ÂIn the middle of the eighth century, the Huihe established a Khanate. Its leader was bestowed with the title of Huairen Khan by Emperor Xuanzong of the Tang, and bilateral relations were friendly (shuangfang guanxi youhao)Ê (Ma and Qi 2009b, 24). Of equal importance in history textbook knowledge is mutual cultural exchange and the emphasis on mutual adoption of certain habits, customs and cultural traits of the other group. In the context of trade, economic relations and regular exchange, the mutual benefits that arose from those contacts is stressed frequently in the textbooks. See, for

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example, the closing lines of the paragraph on the Huihe, who are introduced as the ancestors of the Uyghurs: Many Huihe people were engaged in trade with the Tang Empire, and more than a thousand Huihe traders were living in the city of ChangÊan alone. They traded horses and fur with the Han ethnic group for light silk, tea and grain. The Han in ChangÊan and Luoyang were influenced by the customs of the Huihe, they loved to wear Huihe dresses. (Ma and Qi 2009b, 25) Thus, while the first sets of history textbooks used promoted rather discriminatory views of minority groups (Baranovitch 2010), things have now changed completely. Uyghurs and their ancestors are depicted in a neutral, even slightly favourable way. The paragraph on the rise of the Huihe, for example, states: ÂThe Huihe are the ancestors of the Uyghur [. . .] They always remained brave (chongshang yonggan); they were simple, honest and unspoiled people (minfeng chunpu)Ê (Ma and Qi 2009b, 24). Where events in the past point to separatist movements, or to conflicts or tensions between the Chinese heartland and the far western regions or between Han and Uyghurs, these parts of history are either omitted or modified. For instance, the Three Districts Rebellion (1944) and the existence of the East Turkestan Republic (1944 1949) are left out of the textbooks. Nor is there any reference to unrest or ethnic tensions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, although contemporary history is covered in the textbooks. One example of the modification of historic events is the paragraph on the Khoja revolts. A footnote explains that the term Khoja refers to the Uyghur aristocracy. During the reign of the Qianlong emperor, the Khoja: launched a rebellion against the Qing and established a separatist regime (geju zhengquan). Not only did they brutally plunder the Uyghurs and the people of other ethnic groups (Weiwuer deng zu renmin), furthermore they committed murder and arson everywhere. The Qianlong emperor gave orders to send troops on a punitive expedition, and declared that the troops should only capture the Khojas, while the Uyghurs and the people of other ethnic groups should be spared, because they were all innocent [. . .] Supported by the Uyghurs and the people of other ethnic groups, the Qing troops after two years of fighting put down the rebellions of the Khojas that had split the motherland ( fenlie zuguo). (Ma and Qi 2009b, 111) In this excerpt, a clear distinction between the Khojas (as aristocracy) and ordinary Uyghurs is made. Uyghurs are depicted as victims of their own upper class, and as supporters of the Qing, while the theme of Uyghur support for the independent governments is neglected. The same is true for the chapter on the recapture of Xinjiang from Yaqub Beg. This time, the scapegoats are forces from

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foreign regions outside Xinjiang, while Uyghurs are reported to have supported the Qing troops with relevant information that led to their victory over Yaqub Beg (Ji and Li 2010a, 13). Both text passages evoke the feeling that facts are deliberately left out for the purpose of painting a positive picture of Uyghur loyalty, and to underline that the Uyghur people have always disapproved of separatist movements and maintained good relations with China and the Han. This textbook knowledge on Uyghurs is, however, challenged by different pieces of public discourse. While the fragments of official discourse that can be extracted from the textbooks examined propose a neutral or even slightly positive portrayal of Uyghurs, Han public discourses on Uyghurs rather perpetuate stereotypes and discriminatory views. Uyghurs are often portrayed as a backward people, who fall far behind the Han Chinese on a scale of developmental progress that is based on cultural-materialist and Stalinist views of culture. In Blaine KaltmanÊs research on Uyghur Han relations, this dichotomy of backward/modern and underdeveloped/developed seems to have been the number one topic most often referred to by Uyghur and Han interviewees alike. Han respondents, for example, are quoted as holding views such as: ÂThe Uighur are a less developed people [. . .] In fact, theyÊre probably the least developed of ChinaÊs minoritiesÊ (Kaltman 2007, 117f). This construction of the Uyghurs as backward and underdeveloped goes hand in hand with the idea of a Chinese Âcivilising missionÊ (Harrell 1994), i.e. the notion that Han Chinese need to assist, or even take charge of, the development of Uyghurs and Xinjiang. Han interviewees expressed views such as: ÂHan influence is necessary for Xinjiang and Uighur developmentÊ (Kaltman 2007, 34). In the textbooks examined, there is only one chapter on the development of minority nationality groups, and it refers only fleetingly to Xinjiang: For a very long time, the political, economic and cultural development ( fazhan) of the different nationalities in our country has been very imbalanced (hen bu pingheng). After the foundation of the PeopleÊs Republic, the central government implemented a policy for the common development of every nationality (gongtong fazhan de zhengce) that led to the rapid development of minority areas [. . .] Today, the minority areas have already become an important component of nationwide economic development. With the economic development of these regions, the living standards (shenghuo shuiping) and the cultural level (wenhua shuiping) of the minority nationalities increased significantly. Since the central government promoted the implementation of the Strategy of Developing ChinaÊs West (Xibu da kaifa zhanlüe), ChinaÊs western areas with their relatively large minority populations (shaoshu minzu renkou jiaoduo de xibu diqu) have experienced a new atmosphere of opening up and of huge development. (Ji and Li 2009b, 57) These sentences show that development ( fazhan) is currently seen as an important goal in the PRC, but they also provide an example of the one-sided portrayal of development and conflict. It is not mentioned, for instance, that Uyghurs, as

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a result of the Strategy of Developing ChinaÊs West, not only experience opening up and huge development but also experience increased Han in-migration to Xinjiang. Also absent are their complaints about decreased occupational opportunities resulting from the Hanification of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Bovingdon 2004, 26; Bellér-Hann 2002, 65). Nevertheless, in my opinion, these sentences neither stress that minorities in the western part of China are incapable of achieving development on their own nor refer to a Âcivilising missionÊ (in the form of infantilisation). One might argue that the picture (Figure 6.1) of Uyghur children most of them girls wearing traditional dresses, cheerfully smiling into the camera, standing on a cart or balcony that is decorated with grapes, celebrating the grape festival in Turfan closely matches the findings of Louisa Schein (1997), who outlines that due to a discourse of internal orientalism in China, minorities are other-represented as exotic, traditional, wild (rather than civilised) or as young, female, erotic and affiliated to nature (Schein 1997, 75). I would suggest, however, that rather than constituting a deliberate discriminatory act, the choice of this captioned picture within a history textbook designed for children may have been intended simply to connect with the peer group of the young reader. The folklorisation of ethnic groups as good singers and dancers is another point that is omnipresent in public and official discourses alike (Gladney 1999, 51). Therefore, it is not surprising that at the end of the chapter on ethnic unity, pupils are asked to allocate minority song titles to the right minorities. The possible choices include Uyghurs, among others (Ji and Li 2009b, 59). But this stereotype perpetuated in public discourse on Uyghurs is perhaps rather harmless compared to some others. Uyghurs are routinely believed to be lazy and unwilling to work hard (Kaltman 2007, 29, 31). They are seen as too lazy and simply unwilling to learn the Chinese language. By contrast, the language problem is not referred to at all in the textbooks. In public discourses, UyghursÊ assumed primitiveness is often seen as being connected to their belief in Islam, as one Han explained: ÂThe Uighur are more primitive. Their culture is a religious one, which prevents some of them from developing as quickly as other minoritiesÊ (Kaltman 2007, 43). On the other hand, the textbooks examined neglect the religious dimension almost completely. In public Han discourses, Uyghurs are not only said to be fierce people, they even have a reputation for being dangerous, with Xinjiang described as Âdangerous and primitive, because of its Uighur populationÊ (Kaltman 2007, 73). In my own experience, Han Chinese often tried to persuade me to refrain from travelling to Xinjiang, because they thought it was too dangerous. At the same time, however, I was sometimes envied by Han backpackers in their twenties for being able to visit Xinjiang. They often said they would love to do so, but, as they were Han Chinese, they could not travel there because Uyghurs were known to kill Han Chinese arbitrarily. They warned me not to talk to Uyghur people. Another piece of public discourse that challenges the textbook discourse on Uyghurs is constituted by Uyghurs themselves. Uyghur views and selfrepresentations challenge textbook knowledge by, for example, providing alternative historical narratives. Most Uyghurs interviewed by Kaltman disapproved of

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the Han influx to Xinjiang, commenting: ÂTheyÊve come to Xinjiang and made it their own, and we Uighur have been pushed aside in our homelandÊ (Kaltman 2007, 37). Other Uyghurs strongly resent the suggestion that Han Chinese have helped to modernise Xinjiang, and see development more as a natural process (Kaltman 2007, 38).

Conclusion Analysis of a selected set of PRC history textbooks reveals that there are only limited references to Uyghurs and Xinjiang. Nevertheless, compared to textbook representations of other ethnic minority groups in China, the space dedicated to Uyghurs and Xinjiang is quite considerable. Textbook knowledge on Uyghurs and Xinjiang that can be extracted from this set of history textbooks most often focuses on Xinjiang as an inseparable part of China since antiquity. The stress laid on this topic might be read as a state response to Uyghur separatist aspirations; in other words, it is possible that separatist ideas which challenge Chinese national unity are one reason for the rather frequent reference to Uyghurs in the textbooks. Other themes in the textbook knowledge on Uyghurs and Xinjiang include mutual benefit, good relations, cultural exchange and mutual adoption of cultural traits between todayÊs Xinjiang and Central China on the one hand, and Uyghurs and Han Chinese on the other. Overall, Uyghurs are depicted in a neutral, or even slightly favourable way. However, when it comes to the existence of tensions or conflicts between the region and central China, historical facts are either amended, used selectively, or omitted altogether. Textbook discourse on Uyghurs seems to follow a certain story line. It is the narrative that Uyghurs and Xinjiang have been since antiquity, and will always be, an inseparable part of a harmonious and peaceful nation; that they are blessed with the wisdom and experience that derives from the long history of China. Uyghurs, their ancestors and Han Chinese have all had a share in building what we know as Chinese culture today, and have all contributed to upholding the integrity of the Chinese motherland and to putting down contemporary disturbances that threaten national unity. In the friendship between todayÊs Uyghurs and Han, neither side has ever neglected its duties. Unrest and ethnic conflict has not occurred in Xinjiang since the death of Yaqub Beg (1877). Generally, when rebellions were waged against the Central Plains empires throughout history, they were incited not by the people of the Western Regions/Xinjiang but by foreign protagonists or a small class of exploitative aristocrats. People never supported those rebellions, and were happy to help dynastic troops to suppress them. In this way, the narrative establishes firmly that Uyghur people have always supported the central Chinese government and thus play, and will continue to play, an inseparable part in Chinese history. While textbook knowledge is trimmed to this narrative, stressing certain pieces of information and omitting others, public discourses do not always match the official discourse found in the textbooks. For one thing, public discourse is less neutral and frequently marked by discriminatory views. While the above historical narrative suits a nation-state which aims to maintain its territorial integrity and to avoid ethnic tensions, it is of limited use to individuals who may seek to build a positive

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ethnic (rather than national) identity. Meanwhile, public discourse stimulates the process of othering and the circulation of negative stereotypes of Uyghurs. Public discourses shape official discourses, and vice versa. In turn, discourse shapes identities and is itself reshaped by individuals. Everything is in flux. Textbook knowledge is a powerful tool in the process of discourse constitution and modification. As textbook knowledge about Uyghurs and Xinjiang is found to be much more neutral than the views commonly expressed in public discourses, it is possible that textbook knowledge may act to smooth certain discriminatory stereotypes held about Uyghurs by the Han public. In 2002, the central government changed its education policy for minority nationalities in China from a system that supports minority-language instruction to one that implements Mandarin as sole language of instruction (Schluessel 2009, 395). This change in education policy makes former official minority-language textbooks obsolete, leading by default to the extended use of Chinese-medium textbooks (uniform in language and content) all over China, and especially in Xinjiang, one of the main target regions of the new policy. As a result of these changes in the education system, the textbooks examined for this study may by now have gained in importance and influence, since they may have already become the main source of history textbook knowledge for increasing numbers of Uyghur pupils. This could lead to textbook knowledge and the official Chinese state discourse on Uyghurs being adopted more often for the purpose of Uyghur identity construction. Uyghurs might start to incorporate, and believe in, Han Chinese constructed narratives more readily, and change their self-image and their own narratives of history accordingly. On the other hand, it remains to be seen to what extent official discourse disseminated in the form of textbook knowledge can combat competing popular discourses circulating among the Han and Uyghur communities in Xinjiang.

Notes 1 It was assumed that the discourse on Uyghurs cannot be reconstructed if the discourse on Xinjiang is excluded. Nevertheless, Xinjiang and Uyghurs were not considered to be the same in the course of this research. Every step of the analysis and all findings clearly state whether a piece of textbook knowledge is about Uyghurs or the area of Xinjiang more generally. 2 Yaqub Beg was a Khoqandi adventurer, who established a khanate in Kashgar between 1864 1877. Some Uyghurs today claim that he was of Uyghur ethnicity, and link him to a long history of Uyghur resistance against China. 3 On contested histories of Xinjiang, see Bovingdon 2001 and Millward 2009.

References Baranovitch, Nimrod. 2010. „Others No More: The Changing Representation of Non-Han Peoples in Chinese History Textbooks, 1951 2003.‰ Journal of Asian Studies 69(1): 85 122. Bellér-Hann, Ildikó. 2002. „Temperamental Neighbours: Uighur Han Relations in Xinjiang, Northwest China.‰ In Imagined Differences: Hatred and the Construction of Identity, edited by Günther Schlee. Münster: Lit Verlag, 57 81.

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Bovingdon, Gardner. 2001. „The History of the History of Xinjiang.‰ Twentieth Century China 26(2): 95 139. Bovingdon, Gardner. 2004. Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent. Washington, DC: East-West Center. Foster, Stuart J., and Keith Crawford, eds. 2006. What Shall We Tell the Children? International Perspectives on School History Textbooks. Greenwich: IAP. Gladney, Dru C. 1999. „Representing Nationality in China. Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities.‰ In Consuming Ethnicity and Nationalism: Asian Experiences, edited by Kosaku Yoshino. Richmond: Curzon, 48 88. Greaney, Vincent. 2006. „Textbooks, Respect for Diversity, and Social Cohesion.‰ In Promoting Social Cohesion through Education: Case Studies and Tools for Using Textbooks and Curricula, edited by Eluned Roberts-Schweitzer, Vincent Greaney and Kreszentia Duer. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 47 69. Grose, Timothy A. 2010. „The Xinjiang Class: Education, Integration, and the Uyghurs.‰ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 30(1): 97 109. Hansen, Mette Halskov. 1999. Lessons in Being Chinese: Minority Education and Ethnic Identity in Southwest China. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Harrell, Stevan. 1994. „Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them.‰ In Cultural Encounters on ChinaÊs Ethnic Frontiers, edited by Stevan Harrell. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 3 36. Hawkins, John N., W. James Jacob and Wenli Li. 2008. „Higher Education in China: Access, Equity and Equality.‰ In Inequality in Education: Comparative and International Perspectives, edited by Donald B. Holsinger and W. James Jacob. Dordrecht: Springer, 215 39. Höhne, Thomas. 2005. „Über das Wissen in Schulbüchern: Elemente einer Theorie des Schulbuchs.‰ In Das Schulbuch zwischen Lehrplan und Unterrichtspraxis, edited by Eva Matthes and Carsten Heinze. Bad Heilbrunn: Julius Klinkhardt, 65 93. Ji, Bingxin, and Weike Li. 2009a. Zhongguo lishi: Ba nianji shang ce. Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe. [姬秉新 and 李伟科, 中国历史: 八年级-上册 (北京: 人民教育出 版社).] Ji, Bingxin, and Weike Li. 2009b. Zhongguo lishi: Ba nianji xia ce. Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe. [姬秉新 and 李伟科, 中国历史: 八年级-下册 (北京: 人民教育出版社).] Jones, Alisa. 2002. „Politics and History Curriculum Reform in Post-Mao China.‰ International Journal of Educational Research 37: 545 66. Jones, Alisa. 2005. „Changing the Past to Serve the Present: History Education in Mainland China.‰ In History Education and National Identity in East Asia, edited by Edward Vickers and Alisa Jones. New York: Routledge, 65 100. Kaltman, Blaine. 2007. Under the Heel of the Dragon: Islam, Racism, Crime, and the Uighur in China. Athens: Ohio University Press. Kwong, Julia. 1985. „Changing Political Culture and Changing Curriculum: An Analysis of Language Textbooks in the PeopleÊs Republic of China.‰ Comparative Education 21(2): 197 208. Ma Rong. 2009. „The Development of Minority Education and the Practice of Bilingual Education in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.‰ Frontier Education China 4(2): 188 251. Ma, Zhibin, and Jixiang Qi. 2009a. Zhongguo lishi: Qi nianji shang ce (Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe. [马执斌 and 齐吉祥, 中国历史: 七年级 上册, 北京: 人民教育出 版社).]

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Ma, Zhibin, and Jixiang Qi. 2009b. Zhongguo lishi: Qi nianji xia ce (Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe. [马执斌 and 齐吉祥, 中国历史: 七年级 下册; 北京: 人民教育出 版社).] Mikk, Jaan. 2000. Textbook: Research and Writing. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Millward, James A. 2009. „Positioning Xinjiang in Eurasian and Chinese History: Differing Visions of the ÂSilk RoadÊ.‰ In China, Xinjiang and Central Asia: History, Transition and Crossborder Interaction into the 21st Century, edited by Colin Mackerras and Michael Clarke. London: Routledge, 55 74. Ministry of Education. 2008. „Basic Education in China.‰ http://202.205.177.9/english/ basic_b.htm [accessed 30 June 2011]. PeopleÊs Education Press. 2007a. „An Introduction to the PeopleÊs Education Press.‰ www. pep.com.cn/EnglishVersion_1/englishwenzhang/rjjj/201008/t20100831_840883.htm [accessed 30 June 2011]. PeopleÊs Education Press. 2007b. „History.‰ www.pep.com.cn/EnglishVersion_1/english wenzhang/history/201012/t20101201_977699_3.htm [accessed 30 June 2011]. PeopleÊs Education Press. 2012. „Chuzhong lishi.‰ www.pep.com.cn/czls/ [accessed 26 February 2012]. Pingel, Falk. 2010. UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision. Paris; Braunschweig: UNESCO. Pöggeler, Franz. 2005. „Zur Verbindlichkeit von Schulbüchern.‰ In Das Schulbuch zwischen Lehrplan und Unterrichtspraxis, edited by Eva Matthes and Carsten Heinze. Bad Heilbrunn: Julius Klinkhardt, 21 40. Postiglione, Gerard A., ed. 1999. ChinaÊs National Minority Education: Culture, Schooling, and Development. New York: Falmer Press. Schein, Louisa. 1997. „Gender and Internal Orientalism in China.‰ Modern China 23(1): 69 98. Schluessel, Eric T. 2007. „ ÂBilingualÊ Education and Discontent in Xinjiang.‰ Central Asian Survey 26(2): 251 77. Schluessel, Eric T. 2009. „History, Identity, and Mother-Tongue Education in Xinjiang.‰ Central Asian Survey 28(4): 383 402. Vickers, Edward, and Flora Kan. 2005. „The Re-education of Hong Kong: Identity, Politics, and History Education in Colonial and Postcolonial Hong Kong.‰ Ê In History, Education and National Identity in East Asia, edited by Edward Vickers and Alisa Jones. New York: Routledge, 171 202. Wang Jianxin. 2004. Uyghur Education and Social Order: The Role of Islamic Leadership in the Turpan Basin. Tokyo: Research Institute for the Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa. Wang Yuxiang and JoAnn Phillion. 2010. „Whose Knowledge is Valued: A Critical Study of Knowledge in Elementary School Textbooks in China.‰ Intercultural Education 21(6): 567 80. Weinbrenner, Peter. 1992. „Methodologies of Textbook Analysis Used to Date.‰ In History and Social Studies: Methodologies of Textbook Analysis, edited by Hilary Bourdillon. Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 21 34. You Xiaoye. 2005. „Textbooks and the Rhetoric of Production in China.‰ College Composition and Communication 56(4): 632 53. Zhu Zhiyong. 2007. State Schooling and Ethnic Identity: The Politics of a Tibetan Neidi Secondary School in China. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

7

Young Uyghurs’ perceptions of Han Chinese From Xinjiang to inland, from state to individual Yangbin Chen

Background The Ürümchi riots of 2009 shocked the world and clearly signalled the degree of some UyghursÊ resentment towards ethnic Han people in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (hereafter XUAR). They also make imperative a re-examination of Uyghur Han inter-ethnic relations in Xinjiang, as well as in inland China. Increasingly, the Chinese government has been contemplating different strategies to address Âthe Xinjiang problemÊ in the long term. In 2000, a national policy was implemented to run four-year boarding high-school classes (Inland Senior High School Xinjiang Classes or neidi Xinjiangban, hereafter Âthe Xinjiang ClassÊ) in local Han majority schools in eastern cities, mainly targeting minority Uyghur students from Xinjiang (Chen 2008; Chen and Postiglione 2009). This policy is a duplication of an earlier model of Tibetan boarding schools (Xizangban), established in Han majority areas for Tibetan students since 1984 and intended to address a long-term ÂTibetan problemÊ (Wang 2009). The aim of the Xinjiang Class is to train a Uyghur educational elite (Chen 2014) through the national high school curriculum and university education in inland China, thus enhancing ethnic integration (PRC Ministry of Education 2000). Enrolment figures reached 23,968 students in 2011 across 76 senior high schools in 39 inland cities (Xinjiangban Management Office 2011, PRC Ministry of Education/National Committee on Development and Reform/Ministry of Finance 2005), which arguably constitutes a significant group in terms of the future of the Uyghur people.1 The state fully expects this strategy to exert a broad impact on Uyghur Han inter-ethnic relations in China. This chapter examines a specific group of young Uyghur students who have studied in a boarding school in eastern China, and their cultural perceptions of Han people. What do members of this young Uyghur educational elite think about Han people? How do they form such perceptions? Have their perceptions altered in the course of this life-changing experience? Moreover, what are the implications of their perceptions for ethnic and national identity construction? This chapter is based on the authorÊs ethnographic field studies, conducted in one of nine Xinjiang Classes in a local senior high school in a provincial capital city during 2000 to 2003, where the author lived together with 413 Xinjiang Class

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students (more than 80 per cent were Uyghurs). He successfully built a rapport with the students as an outsider (an educational researcher) as well as an insider (a trusted friend). Though situated within the same campus, these nine Xinjiang Classes had their own teaching buildings, dormitories and canteens, which were segregated from those of the more than four thousand local Han students. Abundant qualitative data was gathered, using a variety of research methods, including: in-depth individual interviews and focus group interviews with Uyghurs and other minorities, as well as with local Han students and teachers; observations of studentsÊ daily life on campus; school documents; and studentsÊ writings. In particular, the author conducted an in-depth analysis of 55 copies of themed Chinese-language practice essays. These were collected from two groups of Uyghur students. The first consisted of 19 newly enrolled preparation-year students (hereafter Âthe prep studentsÊ). The second consisted of 36 Grade Two students (hereafter Âthe senior studentsÊ). The former had as yet had little contact with the local Han community, as they had lived less than one month in the school. In contrast, the latter had completed nearly three years of schooling in the local community. Further demographic information is provided in Table 7.1 at the end of the chapter. Both groups submitted an essay entitled ÂHan People through My EyesÊ. A combination of the compositions of the prep students and the senior students allows a comparison of the different groupsÊ views, while also providing a means to trace changes in their views, according to the varied durations spent living in the local Han community. These essays became a focused source for examining Uyghur studentsÊ perceptions of Han people, as well as the expression of their ethnic and national identities. The essay data was carefully handled. Freestyle Chinese writing practice was a typical class activity. Students were informed that the essay was not required for assessment purposes, and thus there would be no ÂrightÊ or ÂwrongÊ answers. Instead, they were encouraged to openly express their thoughts and feelings. Other researchers working in Chinese ethnic minority studies have also used student essays written in a second language as a main data source (Blum 2001; Zhu 2007). As an overseas academic visitor, the present author lived with the students in the same dormitory on campus, and was able to gain the trust of the students. Moreover, being the sole known audience for the essays allowed him to gather a more credible data set than would otherwise have been possible. This strategy is also proven in BlumÊs case: ÂThe fact that foreigners were the known audience meant that students may have felt less constrained to produce what might be regarded as the standard version of the minority nationality storyÊ (2001, 38 9). Upon completion, the essays were immediately collected by the author to avoid any external interference. Furthermore, wherever possible, the analysis of essay data is triangulated with analysis of other data sets gathered from interviews, observations and documentary materials.

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Mutual perceptions among ethnic groups in China Central to this chapter is the concept of cultural stereotypes. For the purpose of this study, the author follows Lawrence BlumÊs formulation of stereotypes as Âfalse or misleading generalizations about groups held in a manner that renders them largely, though not entirely, immune to counterevidenceÊ (2004, 251). Stereotypes have further been regarded as Âan individualÊs set of beliefs about characteristics or attributes of a groupÊ (Judd and Park 1993, 110). Blum also suggests that stereotypes are Âcultural entities, widely held by persons in the culture or society in question and widely recognised by persons who may not themselves hold the stereotypeÊ (2004, 252). In ethnic studies, the notion of cultural stereotypes is often interchangeable with certain other terms. In her study of ethnic perceptions in southwest China, Susan Blum summarises Han peopleÊs general understanding of minoritiesÊ cultural characteristics as a process of ÂtypificationÊ (2001, 175). Other relevant terms used include Âpersonal beliefsÊ and ÂperceptionsÊ (Blum 2001, 9). Krueger (1996, 536) suggests that the study of cultural group stereotypes can be achieved by an examination of participantsÊ perceptions. Studying how one ethnic group perceives other groups, especially where this concerns majority and minority, is one way of looking at inter-ethnic relations. As modelled by Susan BlumÊs ÂHan Attributes from the Point of View of Minorities, as Reported by HanÊ, the study of ethnic perceptions in China can be broken down into the following categories: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Majority HanÊs views about themselves; Majority HanÊs views about the 55 minorities (e.g. Uyghur); Majority HanÊs views about how minorities view Han people; MinoritiesÊ views about minorities themselves; MinoritiesÊ views about the majority Han people; MinoritiesÊ views about how the Han majority views minorities. (Blum 2001, 60)

Among these categories, the relationship between the Han majority and ethnic minorities in China is perceived by most Han people as a parallel of a Âbig brother, little brotherÊ relationship (Harrell 1995, 10; Guan 2010). Even as attention to minorities research has increased, the emphasis has remained on minority voices telling their own stories. Studies regarding minoritiesÊ views on Han people have yet to gain much attention (Blum 2002), although see Chapter 2 of Smith Finley (2013) on counter-stereotypes of Han Chinese deployed by Uyghurs. Clearly, this is potentially a politically sensitive topic within China where the Han constitute an overwhelming majority. Most domestic Chinese researchers have to tune their views strictly in line with official political discourses (He 2004). For overseas researchers, on the other hand, the challenge is related rather to the problem of gaining access to minority respondents (cf. Blum 2002; Smith 2006). Even if data collection is achieved, researchers may then find that political sensitivities continue to cause complications during the process of data analysis. In Western scholarship, Gladney (1994), Mackerras (1998; 2004), Blum (2001), Smith (2002; 2007), Baranovitch (2003) and Smith Finley (2013) are noted for

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their focus on the inter-ethnic relationship between Han and minorities in contemporary China. Gladney (1994) discusses how state discourses posit a dichotomy of (Han) modernity versus minority ÂbackwardnessÊ, as well as the tendency among the majority Han to essentialise and eroticise ethnic minorities. He considers that minorities are seen as followers by the Han majority, and always characterised with a sense of ÂothernessÊ (Gladney 1994, 99, 114). The Han majority tend to ÂtemporarilyÊ tolerate the differences among the ÂbackwardÊ minorities (Gladney 1994, 116). In contrast, official state rhetoric highlights minoritiesÊ symbolic tribute to the Han people, which, Gladney suggests: becomes an important link with ChinaÊs past, establishing their own feudal pasts, and a signal of who will lead the future. It also legitimates the stateÊs authority to enforce homogeneity, morality, and ÂcivilityÊ among the nearly 92 percent Han majority. (1994, 116) Mackerras (1998) highlighted the significance of social relations between Han and ChinaÊs Muslims, as well as intra-Muslim relations in the field of political study. These relationships affect social stability in north-western China, and potentially pose a long-term threat to ChinaÊs national security and the legitimacy of the CCP ruling elite. In particular, Mackerras suggests that Âin the early 21st century, Han relations with the Uyghurs are worse than with any other ethnic minority in China, including the TibetansÊ (2004, 226). Nevertheless, he distinguishes between different generations of Han people, arguing that UyghursÊ hatred towards newly arrived Han settlers far exceeds that towards Han people of longer residence since the establishment of the XUAR. Susan Blum claims that Âminority views of the Han are rarely reproduced for outside consideration, aside from periodic complaints in autonomous regions about da Hanzuzhuyi (Han chauvinism)Ê (2001, 176). Thus, her study tends rather to explore Han views on minorities, such as the assumption that minority groups are ÂbackwardÊ (Blum 2001, 63). Moreover, her study also distinctly reveals Han assumptions about how minorities view the Âgood pointsÊ and Âbad pointsÊ of the Han majority (Blum 2001, 60). Smith (2002; also Smith Finley 2013) emphasises the role of culture in the construction of ethnic boundaries. She found the emergence of an ÂUs and ThemÊ dichotomy between Uyghur and Han people in Xinjiang in the 1990s, with Uyghurs employing an intricate system of ethnic boundaries, including symbolic (e.g. language, Islam, exogamy), spatial (e.g. residence) and social (e.g. interaction) boundaries, in order to emphasise their contrastive ethnic identities. Following Barth (1969), Smith suggests that ethnic distinctions cannot exist within a vacuum of contact and information, but rather entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation. Thus, depending on the standpoint, different ethnic groups are perceived in terms of boundaries denoting ÂUs and ThemÊ as well as Âinsider and outsiderÊ (Smith 2002, 155). Lastly, Baranovitch (2003) describes the imagination and representation of Uyghurs in inland China. In Beijing, Uyghur migrants feel that they have been

136 Yangbin Chen labelled as ÂOthersÊ and ÂoutsidersÊ by mainstream society (Baranovitch 2003, 726). Since the 1990s, the three most conspicuous images of the Uyghur in Beijing have been the drug dealer, the young pickpocket and the kebab vendor (Baranovitch 2003, 734). However, Baranovitch also shows how some Uyghur middle-class entrepreneurs, often restaurant owners, have striven to create a more positive ethnic image for Uyghurs in ChinaÊs capital city. Their efforts carry substantial potential for reshaping Uyghur Han relations. There are, in addition, several quantitative studies which attempt to describe ethnic images and perceptions statistically rather than in words. Conducted nearly two decades ago with a small group of Han university students in Tianjin, Fong and SpickardÊs (1994) study analysed Han peopleÊs views on minorities and foreign nationals, finding that Han people held positive images of Uyghur people. In contrast, in a more recent survey-based study, Yee (2003) indicated only a small degree of integration between Uyghur and Han people in Xinjiang. Worse, the study found that both Uyghur and Han respondents hold prejudices against the other group while both groups express a lack of trust towards Han and Uyghur cadres. Each of the above studies explores the views of mature individuals towards another ethnic group. However, little has been done in terms of examining perceptions among the future generation that is, young minority individualsÊ views on Han people which are still in the process of formation. This study employs a number of distinct perspectives in order to explore contemporary Uyghur Han relations. In terms of age, it focuses on young people instead of adults. In terms of social group, it interrogates high school students rather than peasants, merchants, intellectuals (see Rudelson 1997) or cadres (see Dillon 2004). Also, in terms of locality, it is interested in Uyghurs residing in the inland cities of China rather than those residing in Xinjiang. Finally, it scrutinises the views of the minority group rather than those of the majority Han. The cultural stereotypes presented below emerge from the general perceptions expressed by Uyghur young people interviewed for this study with regard to the majority Han. These perceptions have accrued both from the studentsÊ schooling experiences and from their everyday life in the community, including their previous experiences in Xinjiang and their current encounters in inland China. The views represent these young UyghursÊ personal beliefs about Han peopleÊs cultural characteristics. The particular significance of this study lies in bringing a case of Uyghur Han ethnic relations drawn from the specific context of inland boarding schools (Xinjiang Classes) in inland China. Furthermore, the chapter tries to reveal the social and political contexts underpinning Uyghur perceptions of Han: for example, the increasing inequalities in socio-economic development between ethnic groups and the role of the party state in strengthening ethnic integration and nationality unity in the region.

‘Flower’ and ‘thorns’ Uyghur studentsÊ essays reveal a set of bipolar perceptions. While most prep students invariably convey positive views towards Han people, the more senior

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students tend to acknowledge the negative sides. Using metaphors from contemporary Chinese popular culture, the positive views can be represented as ÂflowerÊ, and the negative views as ÂthornsÊ. The positive cultural perceptions centre on characteristics such as ÂfriendlyÊ, ÂpunctualÊ and Âstrong attention to educationÊ. Meanwhile, the negative perceptions concentrate on local Han peopleÊs Âlack of awareness of Uyghur cultureÊ and Âsense of Han superiorityÊ. While the positive views may be construed as manifesting the stateÊs success in imposing an ÂidealÊ national identity with a positive focus on Han culture, the negative views reflect a more realistic understanding of Han people, and suggest a strong sense of Uyghur ethnic dignity. The contrast embodied in these views may be due to prolonged real encounters with local Han people in the community, experienced while at the boarding school. This real-life encounter has helped senior students to form more critical and rounded views. ÂThe most beautiful flower of the motherlandÊ In one popular Chinese song from the post-Maoist era about Han minority relations, the lyrics read: ÂFifty-six ethnic groups, fifty-six flowersÊ.2 Twenty students, mostly prep students, adopted this metaphor when expressing their positive perceptions about Han people. One prep student even described them as Âthe most beautiful flower of the motherlandÊ.3 This particular perception falls neatly in line with Chinese official rhetoric concerning Âethnic unityÊ and Âethnic harmonyÊ. Friendliness and diligence In terms of the most common descriptions of Han peopleÊs cultural characteristics, some students explicitly stated that they considered Han people to be ÂfriendlyÊ and ÂdiligentÊ. Among the 36 senior studentsÊ essays, there appear ten descriptions of Han people as being Âwarm to othersÊ or ÂfriendlyÊ. Six out of the nineteen prep students made similar statements. Similarly, ten descriptions of ÂdiligenceÊ were found in the senior studentsÊ essays, and seven in the prep studentsÊ essays. One prep student wrote: „I feel that Han people belong to an ethnic group of friendly and very hard-working people‰ (prep student, no. 1). Apart from the above comments, these two attributes were also implicitly reflected in other sections of the essays. Some students further related this perception to their childhood experiences in Xinjiang: When I was in Xinjiang, Han people could also be seen in rural areas. I mean, they were very hard-working. During this summer vacation, my mum and I went to my grandmotherÊs home. We saw around eight to nine Han people working under the scorching sunlight in the farm near the road. They were very efficient. I was curious and asked my mum: ÂWhy donÊt they go home?Ê Mum said: ÂHan people are all such hard-working people.Ê I was so convinced; they were born to be hard-working. (prep student, no. 2)

138 Yangbin Chen However, many students from southern Xinjiang had rarely socialised with Han people while living in their hometown, and their views were therefore influenced mainly by their interactions with local Han peers in inland China: Since I came here, local Han people have impressed me in many ways. The most important point was that they were not afraid of tedious work, and not afraid of difficulties. I have seen local Han students studying hard and earnestly. When we were in the playground, or strolled on the campus, we always saw them reading books. Compared with them, we did not study so hard. (prep student, no. 5) There were also other positive comments made by Uyghur students (15 senior students and ten prep students) which characterised Han people, including local teachers and peers, and Han neighbours in Xinjiang, as ÂcaringÊ, ÂwarmÊ and willing to befriend Uyghurs: Firstly, I find that Han students are as warm and open as us. They would speak out and make friends with you. Some of them think you are handsome, or unique; they would admire you, and try to make friends with you. (senior student, no. 5) Another senior student felt indebted to local teachersÊ care: They would find the time to make up lessons for us during summer and winter vacations. They even celebrated the spring festival with us rather than having dinner with their families at home. If we were sick, they would bring us to a hospital no matter how late at night. (senior student, no. 6) Among the few students who had frequently encountered Han people while living in Xinjiang, two senior students and four prep students described their childhood Han peers as ÂfriendlyÊ. The other issue of significance is Uyghur parentsÊ influence on studentsÊ interactions with Han people and studentsÊ views of Han people. Some students mentioned that their early images of Han people were formed through interactions with their parentsÊ Han colleagues or friends. One prep studentÊs statement highlighted how strongly her parents urged her to interact with Han people: ÂMy mum told me „if you want to make friends with other people, it will be better to find a Han friend‰ Ê (prep student, no. 12). Punctuality Thirteen senior students, over one third of the whole subgroup, made a point of mentioning Han peopleÊs punctuality and sense of valuing time. However none of the prep students noticed it. Considering the more indirect comments,

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this perception is mainly dominant among the senior students. One stated: ÂMy first impression of Han people in the boarding school is that their sense of timekeeping is very strong. I would say that the manifestation of this trait among Han people far exceeds any other ethnic groupÊ (senior student, no. 1). The student did not specify whether she meant ethnic groups in China or ethnic groups all over the world. Another senior studentÊs remark underlined the point: ÂThese inland Han people profoundly influenced me, such as their punctuality, sense of valuing time, and being able to use time and apply diligence wiselyÊ (senior student, no. 12). One senior student gave a vivid description of time management in the boarding school: Han people are normally good at managing their time. Apart from the time spent in the classroom or at work, they even manage every minute after class and after work well. If you come one minute later than the set dining time in the school canteen, you will not be able to buy any food [as the canteen will close on time]. Sometimes, if you had an arrangement to meet [Han] friends but you arrived there one minute late, you would notice their unstated unsaid unhappiness, despite their smiling faces: ÂWasting time!Ê Or you may be overtly told how much time you have wasted. (senior student, no. 13) One student recalled an incident that occurred during his prep year. A politics teacher came late to class by about three minutes. He gravely apologised to the whole class, before going on to explain his notion of time: ÂOne minuteÊs delay from me will literally add up to 40 minutesÊ delay for the 40 students in the classÊ (senior student, no. 3). The Uyghur student, on the other hand, felt that this case was trivial, and not worth mentioning. The reason the prep students had not noticed this issue is that they were newly arrived at the boarding school and had not yet experienced the tight schedule and management system. In contrast, the senior students had been immersed in this setting for over two years, and this had caused them to reflect further on the contrastive practices of people back in Xinjiang: It has been a taken-for-granted habit for people in Xinjiang to have no sense of punctuality. If you are going to see a friend at eight oÊclock in Xinjiang, they are sure to appear at nine oÊclock or nine-thirty. We are a people without time sensitivity. (senior student, no. 26) High expectations and attention to education Another sharp perception expressed by Uyghur students (26 senior students and ten prep students) is that Han parents typically have intense expectations for their childrenÊs education. For the prep students, this view was mainly derived from

140 Yangbin Chen their everyday life and schooling experiences in Xinjiang. The senior students had also witnessed this perception in interactions with local Han students at the school. One prep student recalled his encounter with a Han elder on the street in Xinjiang, who made a living by collecting and selling used materials: ÂHe seemed to be in his late fifties, his waist was bent, and his face was sweatingÊ. When the student asked the man why he kept on working at his age, the old man replied: I have two daughters and one son. My two daughters have married [out] and do not belong to my family, but they still contribute to my living expenses. My son is a university student. He is a top student. My wife and I are doing this to earn some money, and send it to my son, so that he can concentrate on his study. I heard my son is going to study overseas; we all support him; thus, we have to work harder and earn more money. (prep student, no. 10) The senior students (26 out of 36 students) similarly remarked that Âtheir [Han peopleÊs] attitudes toward education are very strictÊ (senior student, no. 10). More importantly, students again sought to compare this point with the attitudes of their own families in Xinjiang: I feel they [Han people] have a strong sense of responsibility. Every [Han] parent strives to provide all kinds of learning resources and create a suitable environment for their childrenÊs schooling. They have done much better in this than our Uyghur parents. Even those [Uyghur] parents who support their childrenÊs education normally do not support it as intensely as Han parents. There may be some reasons behind this difference. (senior student, no. 1) Another senior student made a lively comparison based on her experience in the boarding school: Once, my school held a parentsÊ meeting for Han students. I was shocked when I saw the attendance of both parents in some families. When I was in the minority-language school in Xinjiang, many parents would feel reluctant to spare a little time to know about their childrenÊs study. Some did not even know which year their children were in at school. This is so disappointing! I mean their [lack of] conscientiousness! (senior student, no. 8) A third senior student acknowledged: My parents did not go to school for long, therefore they did not pay much attention to my study at home. They also could not read much information [owing to their semi-literate status]. While I have been here, I found local people all read a lot. Students read newspapers and magazines; older people

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listen to the radio and watch the TV news. I have benefited a lot from this kind of learning environment. (senior student, no. 25) Hence, these Uyghur students identified an ethnic boundary between Han and Uyghur people through the comparison of parentsÊ attitudes towards education, noting a stark difference between ÂThemÊ [Han parents] and ÂUsÊ [Uyghur parents]. Idealisation and admiration These perceptions of Han peopleÊs friendliness, diligence, punctuality and high educational expectations are all in accord with the goals of the school and of the Xinjiang Class programme. Uyghur students (15 senior students and 11 prep students) had optimised their positive views about Han people as an idealised ethnic group and spared no words to express their admiration. There existed a general tendency of marking Han people as an ÂidealÊ ethnic group. One prep student made the surprising comment: Around the world, I have seen quite a few bad people, who are not knowledgeable and just wander on the street, waste their parentsÊ money, or even fight with each other. Those bad people cannot represent Han people. Only people with virtues can represent Han people, and good people far outnumber bad people. (prep student, no. 11) The most compelling point in this remark is that the student believes quite simply that Âonly people with virtues can represent Han peopleÊ. While the underlying logic is clearly erroneous, it nonetheless demonstrates that some Uyghur prep students have an idealised image of Han people. Moreover, this idealisation was sometimes echoed by the senior students. In relation to Han peopleÊs diligence, one student wrote: ÂDiligence is our virtue as Chinese, which is normally best represented by the Han peopleÊ (senior student, no. 17). This process of idealisation was also apparent when viewing Han peopleÊs skills in time management. One senior student remarked: ÂPossibly, many ethnic groups observe punctuality. However, so far, I could not find any other ethnic group having a stronger sense of time than Han peopleÊ (senior student, no. 20). In this way, many students overtly expressed their admiration of Han people: ÂI really admire Han people and look up to whatever they have doneÊ (senior student, no. 6). The primary factors beneath these manifestations of idealisation and admiration could be the attitudes of Uyghur studentsÊ families, studentsÊ childhood experiences, or essentialised, positive images of Han people disseminated by state schools and state-controlled media. One senior student explained: Sometimes, I have seen my father socialising with his Han colleagues. From what my father says, he highly praises his Han friends. Thus, I also gradually knew Han people. I have a sense of admiration for them. (senior student, no. 22)

142 Yangbin Chen Another prep student recollected her personal story about a childhood Han neighbourhood friend, who helped the student to significantly improve her Mandarin proficiency: ÂFrom that moment, I developed a sense of respect towards them [Han people]Ê (prep student, no. 16). As noted by Lawrence Blum (2004, 254), positive perceptions of an ethnic group may sometimes emerge from a positive experience had with an individual from that group. This is typical in the process of formation of cultural stereotypes. For Uyghurs in Xinjiang who may have limited contacts with Han people, positive encounters with Han peers and neighbours very much shape, or even determine, their later attitude to Han people in the teenage years, as evidenced among Uyghur students in this partially segregated boarding school. However, it must be acknowledged that studentsÊ restricted interactions with Han teachers and students from the mainstream classes within the boarding school constitute a controlled rather than a realistic social experience. Behind the idealisation of Han people, one can easily identify the substantial impact of state education and the state propaganda machine in instilling the official rhetoric of (ideal) ethnic relations in China. Students readily absorb notions such as: ÂThe Han are the most populous ethnic group in the whole worldÊ, ÂChinese is spoken by the most populous people around the worldÊ and ÂHan have the longest history of civilisation in the worldÊ. Moreover, they are likely to adopt officially promoted configurations about ethnic relations in China Âfifty-six ethnic groups, like fifty-six flowers of the motherlandÊ which are disseminated in songs broadcast by the state-controlled mass media. This is clearly demonstrated in the fact that both prep and senior students (17 senior students and eight prep students) used the expression Âtwo inseparablesÊ4 to describe relations between Han and ethnic minorities: Since childhood, I remembered that parents at home and teachers in schools always talked about the Âtwo inseparablesÊ. Han people cannot live without minorities and minorities cannot live without Han people either. (senior student, no. 7) ÂThere is no perfect ethnic group in the worldÊ For most senior students and some prep students, perceptions of Han people become more rationalised and more critical over time. Evidence can be gathered from the studentsÊ essays of neutral or negative perceptions of Han people, based on life experiences in Xinjiang, at the boarding school, or in the local Han community. Some are derived from their parentsÊ views or from public media. More importantly, the critical perceptions help students to resist Han peopleÊs sense of superiority and to uphold Uyghur dignity and a contrastive ethnic identity. Jealousy, lack of awareness and distrust: encounters with Han people at the school Ironically, the above positive perceptions of an ÂidealÊ Han people contrast starkly with studentsÊ perceptions about real Han people as formed in everyday

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interactions. The campus is the most constant and important environment for inter-ethnic contact between Uyghur students and local Han people. The main Han counterparts are local teachers, student peers and school service employees (e.g. supermarket staff and cleaners). Depending on the closeness and frequency of interactions, Uyghur studentsÊ negative views of Han people related mostly to non-teaching staff, less so to Han students, and least of all to Han teachers. None of the prep students raised any problems, except for one student who appealed for more ethnic interaction: I do not know why, in this first month after our arrival, our teachers have not arranged any exchange programmes between our classes and the local Han classes to build up a friendship. I reckon if my teachers had done that, it would be enhancing ethnic unity. (prep student, no. 15) Among senior students, I recorded 14 negative views of Han people encountered inside school, accounting for over one third of the entire subgroup. Most commonly, students complained of Han peopleÊs ÂjealousyÊ, Âlack of knowledge about Xinjiang and ethnic minoritiesÊ and Âdistrust of Uyghur peopleÊ. In most cases, local teachers were highly commended by the students for their dedication, sense of responsibility, care and teaching skills. Nevertheless, there appeared occasional negative views toward local Han teachers for their Âlack of awareness and general knowledgeÊ about Uyghur people and the region of Xinjiang. One student wrote: Teachers in this school all care about our Xinjiang classes. They are decent people. However, there are also a couple of teachers who do not know much about Xinjiang or our students. Sometimes they may make inaccurate comments. But this is understandable. (senior student, no. 29) Where local Han teachers intentionally expressed negative opinions about Uyghur people, students tended to become resentful towards those particular teachers, owing in part to their usually high and positive expectations of teaching staff at the school: They [local Han teachers] made disparaging remarks about other ethnic groups. Last time, during the school sports meeting, when a local Han student stepped on the line on the race track . . . it was not penalised by the teacher umpire. One of our [Uyghur] classmates argued with the teacher: ÂWhy are we picked on, but students from Han classes are not?Ê The teacher openly replied: ÂBecause you are from the Xinjiang classes . . . we have to pick on you!Ê Why did this happen? Why should we suffer this attitude? (senior student, no. 10) Slightly more negative perceptions are derived from contact with local Han students. Uyghur students themselves acknowledged their general disadvantage in

144 Yangbin Chen academic competition with local Han students due to various factors, e.g. the use of Chinese as the language of instruction rather than UyghursÊ mother tongue, and lower quality of education received in Xinjiang. However, they all felt they could regain their confidence in the sports arena since Uyghurs normally outperform local Han students in competitive sports. As a result, tensions could flare in the sports arena very quickly: Some local Han students belittled us. When we did well on the sports ground, some Han students would provokingly remark: ÂSo what? You Xinjiang people arenÊt so great!Ê Quite a few times, I have heard this kind of comment. I heard from a local Han friend that some Han students quite dislike us. I asked why. She said she did not know. I hope this concerns only a small group of Han people. (senior student, no. 17) Another student heard a similar comment from Han students during a relay race: Â „The Xinjiang Classes are nothing special!‰ He intentionally shouted loudly, so as to be heard by othersÊ (senior student, no. 14). Another student witnessed the following scenario: Once, during a basketball match, I saw that a Han player deliberately tripped up our player. During the sports meeting, Uyghur students were also annoyed to hear Han students jeering: ÂFail, Xinjiang classes! Fail, Xinjiang classes!Ê (senior student, no. 29) Although this kind of conflict may be normal during sports competitions, Uyghur students unavoidably view such acts as inter-group hostility from Han students. In another case, the negative perception came from local studentsÊ perceived lack of awareness of Uyghur culture and customs. One student reported a story about how one of his Han friends offered him a steamed bun (baozi), which he rejected since these are commonly stuffed with pork (and thus forbidden according to Islamic dietary prescriptions). Though this Uyghur student did not feel particularly offended, he complained: ÂHe [the Han student] simply did not know about our ethnic groupÊs customs and habitsÊ (senior student, no. 21). The most serious confrontations and conflicts with Han people involved nonteaching staff, with school supermarket assistants viewed most negatively by Uyghur students owing to the staffÊs overt distrust: Sometimes I feel that some Han people look down upon us, particularly those assistants in the school supermarket. They are indifferent to us, and do not care about us. When we shop there, they always follow behind us, spying on us in a very strange way; it seems [they think] we are not shopping but shoplifting there. (senior student, no. 11)

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Cultural blindness, arrogance, hostility: encounters in the Han community Off campus, the local community constitutes a more genuine setting for Uyghur Han ethnic interactions. Unfortunately, while Uyghur students generally held positive perceptions about Han people when considering them in an abstract sense as an ÂidealÊ group, they expressed pessimistic views about Han people they encountered in real life. StudentsÊ essays recorded frequent cases of cultural blindness, ignorance and even hostility from Han residents in the local community. The most negative views concerned local Han residentsÊ cultural blindness and ignorance of the Uyghur people and the Xinjiang region: Some Han people may not know much about Xinjiang. They rely on hearsay, or read the news from books or newspapers. But their views are as obsolete as the outdated information in those books and newspapers. They think Xinjiang is just a piece of desolate desert, without even modern transportation. Moreover, in the first year, some local Han people asked us: ÂDoes Xinjiang have schools? Why do you come here to study? We already have too many people living here.Ê (senior student, no. 31) A second student told a story of local peopleÊs cultural blindness, which had deeply bruised their ego. As they strolled on the street with friends, local Han people had expressed curiosity and asked offensive questions: ÂYou do not look like Xinjiang people, but look like our inland people. She looks like a Xinjiang person.Ê At that time, I did not know how to respond, just kept silent and smiled. They even said: ÂYou look like a foreigner, with curly hair!Ê Sometimes their words even annoyed us: ÂWe cannot understand your language!Ê That was ridiculous; they certainly cannot understand our language without studying it. In their eyes, Xinjiang is a remote area and isolated. One personÊs words made me speechless for a whole day: ÂDo you ride horses or camels to school every day?Ê (senior student, no. 33) The most negative encounters occurred when students were shopping or banking in the local community, and concerned the abrupt expression of distrust: I was angry with those fruit vendors in the market . . . My classmate wanted to buy some bananas. We approached a woman in her thirties or forties. My classmate asked her the price, and she replied rudely. Having seen her bad attitude, we decided not to buy and just left. As we prepared to leave, she shouted something in the local dialect. We could understand a little. She said: ÂJust forget it, you Xinjiang people always act like that [in a ridiculous way].Ê My classmate stared angrily at her. If it had occurred in Xinjiang, I would at least have hit her, but I could not do that here!Ê (senior student, no.2)

146 Yangbin Chen Another student expressed the same feeling about local small businesspeople: ÂThose small business owners were cold to us. Even if you buy things from their stores, they do not care about you. Their behaviour was not like real businessmenÊsÊ (senior student, no. 24). The source of the misunderstanding or hostility can be understood when we consider the below warning from a Uyghur cadre who visited the students: When Ms. A [Uyghur counsellor from Xinjiang] was here, she reminded us: ÂWear your school badge when you go shopping in town, especially when you are on the buses. Because when we are onboard public transport, the minorities are seen as thieves in their minds!Ê (senior student, no. 36) This student further explained her thoughts about the reason for this hostility, as follows: ÂIn recent years, Xinjiang has been unstable. Thus, Han people, especially in the region itself, have slightly changed their attitudes to minorities. Here, in inland China, some people also display these kinds of attitudesÊ (senior student, no. 36). One can also associate the negative perceptions formed among Uyghur students through encounters in the inland Han community with studentsÊ previous experiences in Xinjiang. The prep students reported three cases, while the senior students revealed 14 cases of conflicts. One prep student wrote: Yali [former Han neighbour and female friend in Xinjiang] told me one day, she is Han, I am Uyghur, and her parents would not allow her to play with me any longer. And her family would move away soon. (prep student, no. 7) Another boy provided a similar but more detailed description: When I was little, I always liked to go out and play with Han kids. Because I was Uyghur, I would be dealt with indifferently by those kids and their parents. The adults always grabbed their kidsÊ hands and said: ÂMy good children, please do not play with the balangzi,5 hurry up, and come home!Ê I did not feel sorry as I was little at that time. (prep student, no. 8) While these two cases reflect Han peopleÊs negative attitudes towards Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the findings also show that Uyghur students counter-attack by projecting negative perceptions of Han people in society more broadly: I have read some books about things happening in Xinjiang from 1900 to 1949. These books all described how Han have oppressed other ethnic groups in Xinjiang. They wilfully killed people from all different ethnic groups, and bullied them. At that time, I developed a bad impression of Han people. In my mind, Han people are very evil. (prep student, no. 18)

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This is a very thought-provoking case. On the one hand, one might assume that this student had read books written by Uyghur authors and circulated by Uyghur people. On the other hand, it is possible that the student had subjectively reinterpreted material published in official history textbooks used in state schools, originally intended to portray the ugly side of Chinese warlord rule and the Chinese Nationalist Party, that is, the political regimes of the pre-CCP (Chinese Communist Party) era. Whatever the truth, this Uyghur student had developed an aversion towards Han people in general, based on his reading of that period of history. Another senior student described his personal feelings about Han people, formed in early childhood on the basis of information gleaned from the state media. His interpretation of that information is quite disparate from the original goal of the media dissemination, as the below demonstrates: As soon as I learnt how to count from one to three in Chinese, my whole family started to watch Chinese TV programmes. That was also the reason why I determined to learn Chinese well. In particular, watching TV news programmes gave me the impression that the inland area was really horrible. Han people were very dangerous, not only to Uyghurs but to fellow Han people as well. They robbed othersÊ money, sold drugs and took drugs, such as heroin. Some even kidnapped others on the street. They were also aggressive. We heard that Xinjiang people were belittled by inland [Han] people, treated as a poor ethnic group that could only sell raisins or kebabs. At first, I would not come to the Xinjiang class when I thought about this point, as I did not want to endanger my life. I was bewildered for a while before making the decision to study here. (senior student, no. 27) Ironically, the student concludes: Â[When I first arrived] I just wanted to stay away from Han people in the prep year, as I wanted to stay alive.Ê ÂThey are not necessarily better than usÊ In the ethnic dichotomy of ÂUsÊ (Uyghur) and ÂThemÊ (Han), Uyghur students do not necessarily always feel put down when compared with Han people. Three prep students indicated things that Han people could not do as well as Uyghur people, while seven senior students mentioned points where they felt that ÂTheyÊ were inferior to ÂUsÊ. In this way, some Uyghur students have dragged the idealised image of Han people out of the heavens and back to reality. When mistakenly seen as a Han person by locals, one Uyghur student responded with the utmost dignity: I feel that we do not have any differences. They [Han] are just normal people in my mind, like other Uyghur people, like Americans. Deep in my heart, I feel people are all the same, except for aliens [Ch. waixingren]! (senior student, no. 18) Interestingly, while quite a few local Han teachers and students considered that Uyghur students had bad personal habits, some Uyghur students also made the

148 Yangbin Chen same judgement of Han people, condemning habits such as spitting as ÂunhygienicÊ6: ÂWhat are their shortcomings? I think some of them pay no attention to hygiene. Also, they are a bit stubbornÊ (prep student, no. 14). When I went shopping in the supermarket, I saw piles of rubbish in front of the supermarket. They [Han people] also littered on the street. The most unhygienic habit is spitting. Not only [Han] students but also many [Han] teachers have this bad habit. (senior student, no. 14) Another senior student voiced the same perception: ÂHan people also have weaknesses. In terms of bad manners, I have seen some of our teachers spitting in the classroomÊ (senior student, no. 24). In contrast, Uyghur students expressed pride in the UyghursÊ lifestyle: Regarding the bad things, I dislike one habit of the Han people. I have heard about this from others, and I have also witnessed this. That is, they do not pay attention to eating manners. During meal times, people just scatter everywhere and do not sit and eat properly. They just hold their rice bowls, and eat outside the house. This behaviour shows no common sense or grace. (prep student, no. 6) The student went on to imply that Uyghur people maintain superior dining practices: ÂDuring dinnertime, a whole [Uyghur] family gathers together, and eats food happily. How good it is!Ê (prep student, no. 6). More overtly, Uyghur students claim that they know better about home decoration and female beautification. One commented: ÂI have visited quite a few Han peopleÊs houses. It seems they are not as keen as us to decorate their homesÊ (senior student, no. 20). Another stated: ÂThey are not fond of colourful flowers; their women are not used to wearing make-up (Ch. hua zhuang) and home decorationsÊ (senior student, no. 23). Unlike when they felt themselves in academic competition with local Han students, Uyghur students felt confident about their talents in art and sports. As mentioned previously, most inter-ethnic confrontations occurred on the sports ground: Everyone knows that minority groups in Xinjiang excel at singing and dancing, and have stronger bodies. Every sports meeting, our Xinjiang class students have outperformed Han teams in basketball and football matches. Then Han students were unhappy. They were reluctant to play ball games with our players. (senior student, no. 29) Finally, there were some other areas where Uyghur students believed that Uyghurs did better than Han people. For example, seven students commented that

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Uyghurs are Âmore hospitable to guestsÊ compared with Han people, while four prep students criticised the fact that the local environment has been heavily polluted, in comparison with that in Xinjiang.

Imposed ideal perceptions vs. individualised real encounters As Gladney suggests, Âmajorities are made, not bornÊ (1998, 1). This observation implies that the formation of a majority group takes a long time, and involves negotiations, confrontations and conflicts in the power relationship between majority and minority. It is, of course, equally true for the formation of a minority. Even after over three decades of the post-Maoist era, ChinaÊs party-state continues to attempt to define the process of remaking the relationship between Han majority and Uyghur minority, and of reconstructing ethnic identities and boundaries in Xinjiang and inland China. Nevertheless, the stateÊs definition has encountered an unyielding challenge from Uyghurs, based upon their growing experiences of domestic migration in the post-Deng era. As shown in this chapter, relocated Uyghur students in inland China appear to develop a set of contrasting perceptions of the majority Han, which can be analysed within socio-economic, political and ethnic parameters. Uyghur studentsÊ positive perceptions of Han people include ÂdiligenceÊ, ÂpunctualityÊ and Âhigh educational expectationsÊ. A willingness to work hard and the valuing of education may be considered traditional Chinese values, rooted in a traditionally agriculturalist society and in Confucianism (Chen 1999). The perception of punctuality can be partly explained by the actual gap in socioeconomic development between Uyghur and Han, west and east China: ÂA decade after China started its Western Development Programme, the gap between its target regions and the eastern areas remains vastÊ (China Daily 2010). ChinaÊs Open Door and reform policy is moving gradually through the eastern and coastal areas, into the middle provinces, and finally on to the western regions. Punctuality, as a reflection of good time management, constitutes the basic requirement of the industrial and service economies in the eastern areas (Zhang 2007). Yet attitudes towards work, lifestyle and time are not stagnant. While Han people in inland China have assumed a fast-paced life earlier than the Uyghur students interviewed for this study, Han people themselves pursued a slow-paced lifestyle 30 years ago, prior to the 1980s (Zhou 2010). Similarly, Uyghur people have been traditionally accustomed to a sedentary lifestyle of mixed pastoral and agricultural traditions in the oases (Cao 1999). However, as Cao (1999) also suggests, the traditional Uyghur lifestyle is gradually undergoing a transformation to a modern lifestyle. In years to come, Uyghur people will also change their social attitudes towards lifestyle and time management amid the nationwide acceleration of marketisation, including that spurred by the Western Development Programme. For Uyghur students, perceiving Han people as ÂdiligentÊ, ÂpunctualÊ and Âhaving high educational expectationsÊ simultaneously suggests a discouraged self-image

150 Yangbin Chen of Uyghurs as not diligent, lacking a sense of time management, and having low educational expectations. The contrast recalls HarrellÊs (1995) discussion of the recurring tendency in ChinaÊs official discourse to place Han majority and ethnic minority on a modernity backwardness scale, which appears to have damaged young Uyghur studentsÊ sense of cultural dignity. Uyghur studentsÊ cultural stereotypes of Han people should be scrutinised in the broader context of ethnic relations between Han and ethnic minorities in China. On the one hand, the state has relentlessly promoted the official discourse of Ânational integrationÊ between Han and minorities. The perceptions of ÂfriendlinessÊ and idealised images of Han people can be partly explained by this. On the other hand, both Han and minorities lack awareness of the specific cultures of other ethnic groups (Zheng 2002; Mackerras 2004). Perceptions regarding Han peopleÊs ÂjealousyÊ and Âlack of awareness of Uyghur cultureÊ underline this point. In fact, Uyghur perceptions of Han people cannot be isolated from Han views about the Uyghurs since both become intermingled in the formation of ethnic boundaries. This understanding is in line with GladneyÊs (2004) notion of the Âdialogical relationshipÊ between ChinaÊs Muslim peoples and the Han people. Gladney (1998) posits that minorities have been negatively feminised by Han people on the basis of their perceived ÂexoticÊ cultures and ÂbackwardÊ socio-economic levels. However, Uyghurs have responded to these negative cultural stereotypes with their own versions of ethnic identity, based on contrastive religious beliefs and cultural practices (Rudelson 1997; Teng 2002; Smith Finley 2013). Consequently, a series of ethnic boundaries have been erected to protect UyghursÊ ethnic dignity. Both processes may hinder the formation of positive interactions between the Uyghur minority and Han majority. An idealised image of Han people: superficial state rhetoric for nation building The cultural stereotype of Âthe most beautiful flowerÊ, as applied to the Han people, demonstrates a long and intensive attempt at political indoctrination by the Chinese government. It also reflects the impact of state power in constructing a national identity among young Uyghur minorities, via two essential devices: propaganda and state education. Enrolments in the Xinjiangban have increased dramatically. Emulating the original Xinjiang Class programme in inland China, a new programme of junior high school Xinjiangban (Ch. neichuban or qunei Xinjiangban) has been launched within the Xinjiang region.7 At the same time, a Âbilingual educationÊ programme has been vigorously implemented across the schools in the XUAR. While ÂbilingualÊ in name, this programme is seen as emphasising Chinese language proficiency over Uyghur language proficiency (Schluessel 2007). Intentionally or unintentionally, all of these state school programmes spare no effort in promoting Han culture as the dominant culture in Xinjiang. Gladney (1992) has argued that the officially constructed Chinese

Young UyghursÊ perceptions of Han

151

national identity has a monolithic quality, and that it is often confused with Han identity. His view has recently been echoed by high-level Chinese officials and scholars (cf. Zhu 2012; Ma 2012). In this study, Uyghur students were familiar with all the political terms disseminated by the state, such as the song of Âfiftysix ethnic groups and fifty-six flowersÊ and the catchy slogan Âtwo inseparablesÊ (denoting the majority minority relationship), and frequently quoted them in their essays. Indeed, an idealised image of Han people has been superficially reduplicated in the common narrative expressions employed by minority students in the school context. However, the credibility of this idealised image is highly questionable in terms of the extent to which these students genuinely believe in these expressions. Furthermore, the idealised Han image implies a narrowly defined Chinese national identity, which diminishes the role played by a minority groupÊs ethnic identity. To date, the overall impact of the policy of Han idealisation has not been publically examined. Indeed, the effects of this form of political propaganda are questionable. In one sense, it has acted to consolidate a stereotypical and superficial impression of Han people among young Xinjiang Class students, making them the passive recipients of the propagandist process. Other data from the field study suggest that apart from the long-existing standard politics subject taught in primary and junior high schools, all Xinjiang Class students had to go through a short but intensive themed training programme on Ânationality unityÊ and ÂantiseparatismÊ before their departure from Xinjiang. This may explain why the prep students often quote the official rhetoric when describing Han people in general, but employ this less when reflecting on individual experiences of real-life encounters with Han Chinese. Furthermore, when students reach the senior year, they become more critical and adopt the official rhetoric much less frequently. Often, their critical reflections are accompanied by negative feelings towards Han people and signal a sense of rebellion. This variation shows that Uyghur studentsÊ capacity for independent judgement strengthens over time, leading to a more critical examination of the official discourses. Negative perceptions in real life: revived ethnic identity While the image of the Âbeautiful flowerÊ should be carefully scrutinised, Uyghur studentsÊ negative images of Han people (ÂthornsÊ) are evidently alarming. Postiglione, Zhu and Ben (2004) have explored the concept of Âimpact integrationÊ (a state-controlled process of ethnic interaction, which bypasses the lengthy stage of mutual adaptation) when examining Tibetan inland schools. With regard to Xinjiang Classes, while real integration with local Han people is yet to be seen, a possibly blunt impact (i.e. negative experience of impact integration) is observable in studentsÊ reflections. This negative side is manifested in Xinjiangban studentsÊ confrontations and conflicts with Han people on the school campus and in the local community. Such stories have contributed to the forging of negative cultural stereotypes of Han people. Moreover, when looked at from

152 Yangbin Chen the Uyghur side, these negative perceptions are often accompanied by Uyghur studentsÊ narratives of success or expressions of dignity. Again, Uyghur students can be seen to possess a strong ethnic identity, and project their culture, habits and customs with dignity. The incongruence between ÂflowerÊ and ÂthornsÊ is by no means trivial for either side. In the boarding school, most Han people and the government organisations are used to hearing minoritiesÊ positive impressions of the Han majority. Han people are not yet ready to understand and respond to negative perceptions held in Uyghur eyes. Such negative views are yet to be acknowledged, let alone examined openly in official discourses, such as academic publications by mainland Chinese scholars or PRC government documents. In addition, the school curriculum and school rules tend to fall strictly in line with political correctness and have not anticipated Uyghur studentsÊ negative perceptions. It could be argued that state-promoted representations of the ÂidealÊ Han person and of ÂidealÊ majority minority relations have hindered Uyghur students in learning to interact with Han people in daily encounters.

Implications for Uyghur ethnic identity and Chinese national identity Young Uyghur studentsÊ polarised cultural stereotypes of Han people can shed light on both Uyghur and Han people when rethinking the inter-ethnic relationship. This chapter suggests that the dislocated boarding classes should open their doors to the wider local community, in order to facilitate minority studentsÊ full immersion in an authentic majority Han environment, and vice versa, to allow for local Han people to gain a holistic understanding of the Uyghurs. In contemporary China, while the majority Han people are born to Âbe ChineseÊ, some minority groups have been explicitly directed in the process of Âlearning to be ChineseÊ through educational institutions. This is particularly the case for some populous frontier minority groups such as the Uyghurs, the Tibetans and the Mongols. Enrolled in the early years of the Xinjiang Class (in 2001 and 2003), the group of young Uyghur students in this study come mainly from urban Xinjiang (townships, counties and cities) and from quite well-educated family backgrounds (the fatherÊs educational level is high school or beyond in more than half of cases). This considerably elite minority group might be expected to absorb the stateÊs propaganda, which is channelled through the rigid state apparatus, education, and the mass media, more readily. Nevertheless, Uyghur students, particularly the senior students, still tend to question the state-imposed Chinese national identity. In the meantime, their Uyghur ethnic identity remains strong. This circumstance echoes the finding of Âimplicit national identity explicit ethnic identityÊ reported in another empirical study on the Uyghur Xinjiang Class in Beijing (Elias 2011). Considering the increasingly high proportion of Xinjiang Class students now being drawn from rural Xinjiang and less well-educated family backgrounds, the call to foster a patriotic minority educational elite (Chen 2014) appears a more daunting and complicated task.

Young UyghursÊ perceptions of Han

153

Appendix Table 7.1 Appendix: demographic information of Uyghur student respondents No.

Pseudonym

Gender

Age

Type of junior high school in Xinjiang

Hometown

1 2 3

Prep # 1 Prep # 2 Prep # 5

Male Male Female

15 16 15

Kashgar Khotän Kashgar

4 5 6

Prep # 12 Prep # 10 Prep # 18

Male Female Female

16 16 14

7 8 9

Prep # 11 Prep # 16 Prep # 15

Female Male Male

15 16 15

10

Prep # 6

Male

15

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Prep # 7 Prep # 8 Prep # 14 Senior # 24 Senior # 23 Senior # 11 Senior # 14 Senior # 12 Senior # 13

Female Female Male Male Female Male Male Female Male

16 15 15 18 18 17 18 17 18

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

Senior # 3 Senior # 26 Senior # 10 Senior # 1 Senior # 36 Senior # 2 Senior # 18 Senior # 29 Senior # 17 Senior # 8 Senior # 25 Senior # 31 Senior # 33 Senior # 20 Senior # 6 Senior # 22 Senior # 7

Male Male Male Female Female Male Female Female Female Male Male Male Male Female Female Female Female

17 17 18 17 17 18 18 17 17 17 17 18 17 17 18 17 17

Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Experimental class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Experimental class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Han school Experimental class, Uyghur school Experimental class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Experimental class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Experimental class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Experimental class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Experimental class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school

37 38 39

Senior # 21 Senior # 27 Senior # 5

Male Male Female

18 17 17

Experimental class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school Normal class, Uyghur school

Kashgar Aqsu Kashgar Khotän Ürümchi Khotän Yili [Ghulja] Qorla Kashgar Kashgar Turpan Kashgar Khotän Turpan Kashgar Ürümchi Khotän Kashgar Aqsu Altay Kashgar Qaramay Altay Khotän Shihezi Aqsu Aqsu Yili [Ghulja] Aqsu Yili [Ghulja] Yili [Ghulja] Changji Hami [Qumul] Kashgar Khotän Aqsu

154 Yangbin Chen

Notes 1 The Uyghur population was 10,069,346 in 2010 according to data from the sixth national census. National Bureau of Statistics of China. www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/pcsj/ rkpc/6rp/indexch.htm [accessed 10 September 2014]. 2 The song is ÂLove My ChinaÊ (1991), lyrics by Qiao Yu, composition by Xu Peidong. It was the theme song for the PRCÊs fourth National Ethnic Minority Games. One of the key lyrics reads: ÂFifty-six minzu (ethnic groups), fifty-six flowers, brothers and sisters from fifty-six minzu all belong to one familyÊ. It has been widely sung across China, particularly at official events. http://baike.baidu.com/view/97422.htm [accessed 10 September 2010]. 3 This sentence can be interpreted quite subjectively given the current ethnic tensions in Xinjiang (for instance, as a joke or a politically wary response). However, readers should bear in mind that the studentsÊ essays were written in 2002, when the situation in Xinjiang was relatively peaceful, and the Xinjiangban policy had just commenced (in 2000) and was being well received. 4 The common expressions are Âtwo inseparablesÊ (liangge libukai) or Âthree inseparablesÊ (sange libukai). In 1990, during his trip in Xinjiang, Jiang Zemin, the former CCP leader, first proposed his vision for inter-ethnic relations in China: ÂHan cannot live without minorities, and minorities cannot live without Han; minorities themselves also cannot be separatedÊ. Chinese Communist Party News, 25 February 2010. http://theory.people. com.cn/GB/68294/182630/11030702.html [accessed 10 September, 2010]. 5 Balangzi is the Chinese pronunciation of the Uyghur word bala, meaning ÂchildÊ or Âlittle oneÊ, as commonly understood by Han people in Xinjiang. 6 Although students did not characterise this notion explicitly, their view of Han people as unhygienic clearly suggests that Uyghurs are by comparison more hygienic. Both perceptions probably derive from Uyghur religious beliefs and behaviours. In Chinese, ÂIslamÊ is translated as qingzhenjiao (the pure and true religion). 7 The policy of Xinjiang qunei chuzhongban (neichuban) (Junior High School Classes within the Xinjiang Region) followed the model of Inland China Xinjiang Classes, and was set up in major cities across Xinjiang, e.g. Ürümchi, Qaramay and Shihezi. Neichuban mainly enrol minority primary school graduates. See www.ts.cn/special//mlfy/201212/03/content_7511802.htm [accessed 2 December, 2012].

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Chen Jingpu. 1999. „Huaxia nongye wenming yu huaren jiaoyu linian‰ [„Chinese Agricultural Civilisation and Chinese Educational Ideology‰]. Jiaoyu yanjiu [Educational Research] 20(2): 39 45. Chen Yangbin. 2008. Muslim Uyghur Students in a Chinese Boarding School: Social Recapitalization as a Response to Ethnic Integration. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Chen Yangbin. 2014. „Towards Another Minority Educational Elite Group in Xinjiang?‰ In Minority Education in China: Balancing Unity and Diversity in an Era of Critical Pluralism, edited by James Leibold and Yangbin Chen. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 201 19. Chen Yangbin and Gerard A. Postiglione. 2009. „Muslim Uyghur Students in a Dislocated Chinese Boarding School: Bonding Social Capital as a Response to Ethnic Integration.‰ Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts 2(2): 287 309. China Daily (2010) ÂDevelopment in the West Crucial to Nation: GovernmentÊ. 9 July 2010. www.chinadaily.com.cn/ china/2 010-07/09/content_100 84471.htm [accessed 10 September 2010]. Dillon, Michael. 2004. Xinjiang: ChinaÊs Muslim Far Northwest. New York: Routledge. Elias, Goolzypa. 2011. Xinjiangban xuesheng de guojia rentong he minzu rentong [National Identity and Ethnic Identity of Xinjiang Class Students: A Case Study of Luhe High School, Beijing]. MasterÊs diss., Beijing University. Fong, Rowena, and Paul R. Spickard. 1994. „Ethnic Relations in the PeopleÊs Republic of China: Images and Social Distance between Han Chinese and Minority and Foreign Nationalities.‰ Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 13(1): 26 48. Gladney, Dru C. 1992. „Constructing a Contemporary Uighur National Identity: Transnationalism, Islamicization and State Representation.‰ Cahiers dÊ études sur la Méditerranée, orientale et le monde turco-iranien 13(3): 165 84. Gladney, Dru C. 1994. „Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities.‰ Journal of Asian Studies 53(1): 92 123. Gladney, Dru C. 1998. Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Gladney, Dru C. 2004. Dislocating China: Reflections on Muslims, Minorities and Other Subaltern Subjects. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Guan Kai. 2010. „Dangdai Zhongguo shehui de minzu xiangxiang‰ [„Images of Minzu in Contemporary Chinese Society‰]. China Minzu News, 9 July 2010. http://minzu.people. com.cn/GB/165242/12100189.htm [accessed 10 September 2010]. Harrell, Stevan. 1995. Cultural Encounters on ChinaÊs Ethnic Frontiers. Washington: Washington University Press. He Qinglian. 2004. Media Control in China. Human Rights in China online publication. http://ir2008.org/PDF/initiatives/Internet/Media-Control_Chinese.pdf. Judd, Charles M., and Bernadette Park. 1993. „The Assessment of Accuracy of Social Stereotypes.‰ Psychological Review 100: 109 28. Krueger, Joachim. 1996. „Personal Beliefs and Cultural Stereotypes about Racial Characteristics.‰ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71(3): 536 48. Ma Rong. 2012. „Ruhe sikao 21 shiji Zhongguo de wenhua fazhan zhanlue‰ [„On ChinaÊs Strategy of Cultural Development in the 21st Century‰]. Sociology of Ethnicity 107: 1 13. Mackerras, Colin. 1998. „Han Muslim and Intra-Muslim Social Relations in Northwestern China.‰ Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 4(1): 28 46. Mackerras, Colin. 2004. „What is China? Who is Chinese? Han Minority Relations, Legitimacy, and the State.‰ In State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation, edited by Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen. New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 216 34.

156 Yangbin Chen Postiglione, Gerard A., Zhiyong Zhu, and Jiao Ben. 2004. „From Ethnic Segregation to Impact Integration: State Schooling and Identity Construction for Rural Tibetans.‰ Asian Ethnicity 5(2): 197 217. PRC Ministry of Education. 2000. „Neidi Xinjiang gaozhongban guanli banfa (shixing)‰ [„Administrative Regulations on Inland Xinjiang High School Classes (trial version)‰]. 5 June 2000. www.gdjyw.com/jyfg/21/law_21_1020.htm [accessed 12 August 2015]. PRC Ministry of Education/National Committee on Development and Reform/Ministry of Finance. 2005. „Guanyu kuoda neidi Xinjiang gaozhongban zhaosheng guimo de tongzhi‰ [„Proposal on the Expansion of Enrolment in Inland Xinjiang Senior High School Classes‰]. 17 May 2005. www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A09/moe_752/200505/t20050 517_77957.html [accessed 12 August 2015]. Rudelson, Justin Jon. 1997. Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along ChinaÊs Silk Road. New York: Columbia University Press. Schluessel, Eric T. 2007. „ ÂBilingualÊ Education and Discontent in Xinjiang.‰ Central Asian Survey 26(2): 251 77. Smith, Joanne N. 2002. „ ÂMaking Culture MatterÊ: Symbolic, Spatial and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese.‰ Asian Ethnicity 3(2): 153 74. ···. 2006. „Maintaining Margins: The Politics of Ethnographic Fieldwork in Chinese Central Asia.‰ The China Journal 56: 131 47. ···. 2007. „The Quest for National Unity in Uyghur Popular Song: Barren Chickens, Stray Dogs, Fake Immortals and Thieves.‰ In Music, National Identity and the Politics of Location: Between the Global and the Local, edited by Ian Biddle and Vanessa Knights. Aldershot: Ashgate, 115 41. Smith Finley, Joanne. 2013. The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and Uyghur Han Relations in Contemporary Xinjiang. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing. Teng Xing. 2002. Zuqun, wenhua yu jiaoyu [Ethnic Groups, Culture and Education]. Beijing: Minzu chubanshe. Wang Wei. 2009. „Jianxing jianjin Xizangban‰ [„Tibetan Classes Step by Step‰]. PhD diss., Central Nationalities University. Xinjiangban Management Office. 2011. „Quanguo xinzeng 10 suo Xinjiang neigaoban banxue xuexiao.‰ [„Another Ten High Schools Host Inland Xinjiang Classes‰]. 29 July. www. chuangtoucn.cn/Financing/training/2011-08-07/162883.html [accessed 12 August 2015]. Yee, Herbert S. 2003. „Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang: A Survey of Uygur Han Relations in Urumqi.‰ Journal of Contemporary China 12(36): 431 52. Zhang Ping. 2007. „Zhongguo dongbu zhongbu he xibu gongye jiegou de chabie‰ [„Differences of Industrial Structure in ChinaÊs Eastern, Middle and Western Areas‰]. Jingji Pinglun [Economic Review] 5: 53 7. Zheng Xinrong. 2002. „Final Report of Research on Ethnic Minority Language Teaching Materials in Compulsory Education in China.‰ Beijing: Ford Foundation Project. Zhou Xiaohong. 2010. „Gaige kaifang yilai Zhongguo shehui xintai de bianqian‰ [„The Change in Social Mentality in China since the Open Door and Reform Policy‰]. Chinese Social Sciences 18 May 2010. http://new.21ccom.net/articles/sxpl/sx/article_20100 5189715.html [accessed 10 September 2010]. Zhu Weiqun. 2012. „Dui dangqian minzu lingyu wenti de jidian sikao‰ [„Some Thoughts on Recent Minzu Issues‰]. Study Times, Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao [Party School of the CCP Central Committee], 15 February 2012. http://cpc.people.com.cn/ GB/64093/64102/17122242.html [accessed 20 September 2013]. Zhu Zhiyong. 2007. State Schooling and Ethnic Identity: The Politics of a Tibetan Neidi Secondary School in China. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

8

Escaping ‘inseparability’ How Uyghur graduates of the ÂXinjiang ClassÊ contest membership in the Zhonghua minzu Timothy Grose

In his English-language anthology published to reach audiences beyond China, Ma Rong (2008), the noted Peking University sociologist and prolific writer on ChinaÊs ethnic minorities, invoked the title of a Han dynasty (206 BCE 220 CE) poem The Peacock Flies Southeast (Ch. Kongque dongnan fei) to describe the increasing number of Han professionals and intellectuals who have fled the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) for ChinaÊs eastern cities. Ma (2008, 375) diagnoses the recent out-migration of XinjiangÊs Han Chinese population as a consequence of two key factors: (1) the shortage of high-paying jobs in the region; and (2) the perception that a ÂMuslim separatist movementÊ is fuelling ethnic tension between Han and Uyghurs. Although MaÊs analysis is thoughtprovoking, he has ignored the significant numbers of Uyghurs who have also left Xinjiang (Kaltman 2007; Iredale et al. 2003), especially during ChinaÊs reform era (a period often understood as 1979 to the present) and the relaxation of restrictions on hukou residency permits (Wang 2004). This chapter focuses on one specific group within the PeopleÊs Republic of China (PRC) Uyghur population that has left Xinjiang graduates of the ÂXinjiang ClassÊ (Ch. neidi Xinjiang gaozhong ban; Uy. ichkiri ölkilärdiki Shinjang toluq ottura sinipliri).1 The Xinjiang Class is a national-level boarding school programme created to educate mostly ethnic Uyghur senior-secondary (Ch. gaozhong) students who will return to Xinjiang after completing their university education to fill criticalneed occupations. However, according to my research, the Xinjiang Class is only meeting half of its objectives. Unquestionably, the programme has been an effective measure to entice young Uyghurs to leave their homes and complete their formal schooling in neidi; however, a potentially significant number of Xinjiang Class graduates are not returning to the region. Instead, many of these highly educated Uyghurs, citing difficulties finding work in Xinjiang comparable to their abilities and expertise, tightened restrictions on religious practice in the XUAR, discrimination at the hands of Han Chinese employers, and potential opportunities to advance their education abroad or in more developed cities in eastern China, delay their homecomings indefinitely. In this chapter, I argue that the decision not to immediately return to Xinjiang is a significant one, and carries important implications regarding the ways in which these young Uyghurs interpret and, in

158 Timothy Grose some cases, challenge their assigned membership to the Zhonghua minzu (translated loosely as ÂChinese nationÊ).

Methodology This chapter draws on nearly thirty months of field research conducted in Beijing and several oases of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region between February 2006 and August 2013. During this period of research, I spoke with over sixty graduates of the Xinjiang Class. Through regular interactions with these highly-educated young adults, I sought to answer a series of questions about their ethno-national identities, personal commitments to Islam, and their ability to navigate between two distinctly defined sets of cultural practices Uyghur and Han Chinese. The settings for these interactions varied. Most often, I spoke with informants at coffee shops, at Muslim restaurants and cafeterias, or at celebrations organised by Uyghur university students. Depending on the informantÊs preference, I conducted interviews in the Uyghur language, Chinese, or in rarer cases English.2 By October 2010, after the completion of an advanced, intensive one-on-one Uyghur language course, I carried out most interviews in Uyghur. Because of the political sensitivities associated with research on the Uyghurs, I recorded only hand-written notes of these exchanges, and pseudonyms will be used throughout this chapter in order to protect informantsÊ identities.

The Xinjiang Class A 1999 policy paper on Âstrengthening minority educationÊ (Ch. jiaqiang shaoshuminzu jiaoyu) drafted by the General Office of the State Council quietly announced the establishment of a senior-secondary (Ch. gaozhong) boarding school programme to begin in the fall of 2000, in which 80% of the student body would be composed of rural and nomadic ethnic minority students (Ch. shaoshu minzu nongmumin zinü). The document indicated that coursework would be conducted entirely in Chinese at one of twelve designated cities in neidi but offered few other details about the new education policy (General Office of the State Council 1999). In a statement that consisted of fewer than five hundred characters, arguably the most dramatic change to XinjiangÊs contemporary education system the Xinjiang Class was born. Academically, the boarding school programme prepares students for ChinaÊs national university entrance examination (Ch. gaokao). Upon formal acceptance into the programme, which rests primarily on studentsÊ performances in tests administered by the XUAR Department of Education, students enrol in a year-long Âpreparatory courseÊ (Ch. yuke). During the year of preparatory studies, Xinjiang Class students complete intensive coursework aimed at improving studentsÊ grasp of Putonghua (standard Mandarin Chinese) and building strong foundations in mathematics and the sciences. For the remaining three years of the programme, students follow a highly-structured schedule of coursework and monitored self-study. Students are expected to work up to 14 hours a day, six days

Escaping ÂinseparabilityÊ 159 a week, and Uyghur Xinjiang Class students are rarely integrated with local Han students (Chen 2008; Grose 2010).3 Life outside the classroom is strictly monitored by school officials. My informants often bemoaned the monotonous routines in the Xinjiang Class, in which students spend the preponderance of their time studying, eating, and sleeping. Students also complained about the strict prohibition placed on religious practice, from behaviours as mundane as greeting each other with the expression ÂÄssalammu Äläykum [Peace be with you]Ê to practices with more explicit religious overtones such as reciting post-meal supplications (Uy. chay duÊasi) and performing IslamÊs obligatory five daily prayers (Uy. bäsh waq namaz).4 Contact between students and their parents is also limited. Students are permitted to return home only once a year, during summer vacation, and must remain on campus during the month-long winter break, which corresponds with the Chinese Lunar New Year. Although sporadic ÂofficialÊ campus tours for a small number of parents are arranged (Tianshan 2011), parents and relatives of students are generally discouraged from visiting their children (Xinjiang Daily 2005). Having studied under these tightly monitored conditions for four years, many of my informants unsurprisingly described their lives in the boarding school as being like ÂprisonÊ (Ch. jianyu; Uy. turmä). Enrolment in the Xinjiang Class continues to grow despite the programmeÊs heavy workloads and stringent policies. From 2000 to 2014, yearly enrolment jumped from 1,000 to 10,000 students. The number of schools hosting a Xinjiang Class has correspondingly increased from 12 to 91, and these schools are spread across 45 cities (Xinhua 2013). By 2014, over 35,000 individuals had graduated from the Xinjiang Class and another 35,000 students were actively enrolled in the programme.5

Encouraging Xinjiang Class graduates to return to Xinjiang Although the CCP continues to invest heavily in the expansion of the Xinjiang Class programme, party officials may not have foreseen the possible ramifications of educating a large number of ethnic minority students in neidi. In 2008, as the first cohort of Xinjiang Class students prepared to graduate from university, the CCP confronted its first potentially serious problem: what was to be done with graduates of the Xinjiang Class after they completed their formal schooling? In fact, ensuring employment opportunities would be available for the nearly 1,000 graduates of the programmeÊs first graduating class was considered by policy makers as Âa serious concern for [Chinese] society as a wholeÊ (Ch. shehui gejie guanzhu de wenti) (General Office of the MOE 2008). The same document, which was released jointly by the General Office of ChinaÊs Ministry of Education (Ch. Jiaoyubu), the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Ch. Guojia minwei), the Ministry of Public Security (Ch. GongÊanbu), and the PeopleÊs Government of the XUAR (Ch. Xinjiang zizhiqu renmin zhengfu) on 12 May 2008, instructed university administrators on ways in which to guide prospective university graduates of the Xinjiang Class. The formal policy Âencouraged Xinjiang Class graduates to

160 Timothy Grose return to XinjiangÊ but Âallowed them to remain in inland ChinaÊ if they so wished (Ch. guli huixiang; chongxu liu neidi) (General Office of the MOE 2008). Although the policy, at least in principle, permits Xinjiang Class graduates to remain in neidi, policy makers clearly intend for these graduates to return to, and secure employment opportunities in, Xinjiang itself. Indeed, the CCP has been explicit about its expectations for Xinjiang Class graduates to return to the region and has urged graduates of the programme to enter specific segments of the job market: Xinjiang Class students should be encouraged to return to Xinjiang for employment . . . in order to strengthen the Communist partyÊs work at the grass roots level. Xinjiang Class students should be guided to be employed at basic level public service institutions in order to fully utilise [these studentsÊ] professional skills and expertise in order to meet the needs of education, health care, family planning, agricultural technology, and other areas that have a high demand for professionals. (General Office of the MOE 2008) According to the same document, Xinjiang Class graduates possess skills and traits that are attractive to CCP leaders and potential employers alike: they have Âmastered both Uyghur and ChineseÊ (Ch. minhan jiantong); they have been trained in neidi for eight years; and they Âgenerally are of good qualityÊ (Ch. yiban juyou jiaohao de suzhi).6 Having equipped Xinjiang Class students with these new tools, CCP leaders can now showcase them as reliable participants in XinjiangÊs social and economic development programmes. Certainly, the CCP has vigorously recruited Uyghur graduates of the Xinjiang Class to serve as teachers in rural Xinjiang. To this end, top-rated universities in China, Beijing Normal University (Ch. Beijing shifan daxue) being a notable example, offer a special teacher training programme for graduates of the Xinjiang Class. If Xinjiang Class graduates agree to serve in Xinjiang, particularly in the rural areas surrounding Kashgar and Khotän, for a period of five to ten years, their university tuition fees are waived.7 In addition, the Xinjiang regional government will help these students secure a job. The CCP accomplishes two tasks if Xinjiang Class graduates agree to serve as teachers: they provide stable jobs to young Uyghurs, and they can begin to relieve the shortage of well-trained, bilingual teachers in Xinjiang, especially in southern XinjiangÊs impoverished rural areas. For those graduates wanting to remain in neidi, they must undergo a lengthy process of approval. This process is outlined in a 22-page document posted on the Xinjiang ClassÊs official website. To summarise this document, once a student is offered a job, he/she is required to send the contract to the Xinjiang Class Work Office for approval. Only if this department approves the application can Xinjiang Class graduates accept the job offer (Xinjiang Class Online 2011). In reality, Xinjiang Class graduates who want to remain in neidi need to scale a series of bureaucratic hurdles. In December 2007, Ayjamal, a Xinjiang Class graduate from Qumul (Ch. Hami) who attended university in Beijing, stumbled over these hurdles.

Escaping ÂinseparabilityÊ 161 Ayjamal was offered a full-time position at a business firm in Beijing. Before accepting this job, Ayjamal, in accordance with official policy, first applied for permission from XinjiangÊs Department of Education (Ch. Xinjiang jiaoyubu). After a several-week delay, XinjiangÊs Department of Education finally provided written permission for Ayjamal to accept the position. However, unknown to Ayjamal at the time, the regulations in place at AyjamalÊs university in Beijing had not yet been updated in accordance with the 2008 policy, and stipulated that Âupon graduating, [Xinjiang Class graduates] must return to [Xinjiang] for employmentÊ (Ch. biye hou hui yuanji jiuye) (UIBE no date). Interpreting earlier policies rather than the 2008 amendment, the university denied Ayjamal permission to accept the job offer without citing a specific reason. Entangled in bureaucratic red tape and uncertain about her future, Ayjamal delayed her graduation date and her return to Xinjiang by accepting an unpaid internship in India (field notes, 14 December 2007). Although Xinjiang Class graduates are, in theory, permitted to seek work outside of Xinjiang, Han intellectuals confidently predict that they will feel compelled to return to the region. Zhao Jie, the noted Beijing University linguist who has published extensively on Han minority relations in contemporary China, writes: Xinjiang Class students will be imperceptibly [Ch. qianyimohua] trained in the culture of the ÂCentral PlainsÊ [Ch. zhongyuan wenhua], so that they will develop an attachment [Ch. yiliangan] towards the Zhonghua minzu and steadily deepen their sense of patriotism [toward China]. Upon returning to Xinjiang, these minority students, having been educated for a long period of time in neidi, will sense a call of duty [Ch. shi minggan] to propagate Chinese culture, and will be a great Âspiritual forceÊ [Ch. jingshen liliang] to consolidate ethnic unity, oppose foreign hostile forces, and reject separatist activities. (Zhao 2007, 134) Echoing sentiments of the Confucian concept Âcome [to the centre of Chinese civilization] and be transformedÊ (Ch. laihua), which essentially paved a path for non-Chinese ÂbarbariansÊ to become ÂcivilisedÊ (Ch. shufan) through a proper Confucian education and by adopting acceptable Âmodes of livelihoodÊ, ZhaoÊs statement confirms that the Xinjiang Class is intended to act as a modern manifestation of ChinaÊs Âcivilizing projectÊ (Harrell 1995, 19). Confident that Uyghur graduates of the Xinjiang Class will act as torchbearers of the Central Plains culture and light the way for other Uyghurs, the CCP expects that Xinjiang, too, will one day be ÂenlightenedÊ by Chinese culture. Chinese state-mediated reports provide a similarly optimistic outlook on the programmeÊs effectiveness in enlisting Xinjiang Class graduates in the CCPÊs state-building projects. During an interview with the Ürümchi-based Xinjiang Daily (Ch. Xinjiang ribao), XinjiangÊs most widely circulated newspaper, Sun Qi, Director of the Xinjiang Class Office of Student Affairs (Ch. Neidi Xinjiang xuesheng gongzuo bangongshi), was asked about the number of Xinjiang Class

162 Timothy Grose graduates who return permanently to Xinjiang. While he admitted that some graduates have remained in neidi, Sun maintained that the ÂmajorityÊ (Ch. da bufen) of graduates choose to return to Xinjiang for employment. According to Sun, these young individuals have already emerged as the Ânew forceÊ (Ch. yi zhi xinsheng liliang) behind XinjiangÊs rapid economic and social development (Xinjiang Daily 2012).

Are the majority of Xinjiang Class graduates really returning to Xinjiang? Unfortunately for the CCP, the assessments provided by Zhao Jie and Sun Qi may not accurately depict reality. Sun Qi, unable or unwilling to cite specific numbers in his interview with the Xinjiang Daily, is covering up an inconvenient truth. Rarely published statistics confirm that at least 50% of those Xinjiang Class graduates who complete a university degree do not return to Xinjiang (Xinjiang TV, 10 March 2012).8 My research underscores these statistics, and even suggests that a potentially higher proportion of Uyghur graduates of the Xinjiang Class are not responding to the CCPÊs call to return to Xinjiang. In an attempt to verify these numbers, I asked graduates of the Xinjiang Class about their post-graduation plans, and many stated that they did not intend to return to Xinjiang after completing their university education. In fact, a significant portion of my informants either planned to relocate or are already living outside of China. More precisely, out of the 52 students I interviewed who were not contractually bound to serve as school teachers in Xinjiang,9 33 individuals did not plan to return, were already enrolled in a graduate programme in Beijing, had imminent plans to move abroad, or had already relocated to another country. In other words, among Xinjiang Class students who had a choice whether or not to return to Xinjiang, almost three-fifths have decided to pursue opportunities outside of the region. Although the number of individuals included in this study is relatively small, it is likely that many other Xinjiang Class graduates share similar feelings to those expressed by my informants. In fact, virtually all of my informants had a Xinjiang Class acquaintance who was working in neidi or was living abroad. Below I present some of the reasons why graduates of the Xinjiang Class are reluctant, or refuse, to return to Xinjiang following completion of their studies.

‘I will not be treated as a second-class citizen in my homeland’ Modern Uyghur ethno-nationalism is partly predicated on claims of indigeneity to the oases of the Tarim Basin. Now enclosed within modern geo-political borders, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, formally established in 1955, has provided the Uyghurs with a Âconvenient frame to Uyghur political imaginingsÊ (Bovingdon 2004, 4). Consequently, as the titular group of Xinjiang, the Uyghurs often come into conflict with the growing number of both short-term Han migrants and permanent Han residents in the area. The swelling number of Han Chinese living in Xinjiang is routinely viewed by Uyghurs as a modern form of Chinese

Escaping ÂinseparabilityÊ 163 colonial ÂoccupationÊ of Xinjiang (Gladney 1998; Smith 2000, 209). The attitudes of recent waves of Han migrants, who generally do not respect Uyghur cultural norms (Smith 2000; 2002), coupled with state-led policies limiting the expression of Uyghur Islamic culture since the mid-1990s (Grose 2012; Harris and Dawut 2002; Mackerras 2001), have exacerbated Uyghur discontent. The shift in XinjiangÊs demographics has strained Uyghur Han relations, and stories of Han mistreatment of Uyghurs are widespread (Bovingdon 2010; Caprioni 2011; Kaltman 2007; Mackerras 2001; Millward 2007; Rudelson 1997; Smith 2000). The discrimination and maltreatment experienced directly by my informants have left them feeling alienated in their own homeland. Aynur, a female student who graduated from the Wuxi Xinjiang Class and who spent her childhood in Qumul, intends to relocate abroad after graduation. Since Aynur was studying English as her university major, her decision to further her education abroad appeared logical enough. However, AynurÊs decision to relocate to another country had little to do with her future career. Instead, Aynur cited what she perceived as political injustices as the main reasons for wanting to relocate, and her dissatisfaction with the CCP has emerged despite both of her parents being Party members and, as described by Aynur, Âsupportive of the government and its policiesÊ. When asked why she did not want to return to Xinjiang, she answered with two stories that illustrate the type of discrimination Uyghurs may confront. I paraphrase below: During National Holiday,10 I went to Dalian with four other Uyghur girls to visit my sister, who is currently enrolled at the Xinjiang Class there. Before we boarded the ferry [which carries passengers to Dalian from Tianjin], the armed police [Ch. wujing] came up to us, pointed their guns, and demanded to see our identification cards [Ch. shenfenzheng]. I thought I was going to die. We didnÊt do anything wrong. The only reason they stopped us was because we were Uyghur. Then, in Qumul, right before the Olympics [summer 2008] guards checked our purses as we boarded buses, and if [Uyghur] passengers carried drinks, they had to take a sip in front of the guards. I do not want to return to a place where I am treated like this. (field notes, 10 September 2010) AynurÊs experiences are reminiscent of the Âstop and searchÊ and Âstop and friskÊ policies once practiced unchecked in London and New York respectively. In the case of New York, federal judges have recently ruled that the cityÊs police unfairly targeted young black and Hispanic men, and that this constituted an obvious violation of their constitutional rights (Usborne 2013).11 It is possible to draw a parallel between AynurÊs experiences and those of Ilham, a graduate of the Xinjiang Class in Hangzhou, who is now studying in the Netherlands. On one occasion Ilham explained: At first, I thought I would return to Xinjiang to work because [Xinjiang] is my home [Uy. ana yurtum]. But as a Uyghur, I could have only found

164 Timothy Grose work as a government official [Uy. mamuriy khadim] or as a teacher. There arenÊt many other options [Uy. Bashqa jiq talash yoq]. Also, I pray every day. If I had returned to Xinjiang to work, I wouldnÊt have been able to pray because it is forbidden [Uy. Chäklinidu] for professional workers [Uy. ishqikhizmätchilär] to pray. All I want is to be able to pray, do my job well, and make an honest living. I donÊt have any other intentions, but if I work in Xinjiang, I would be unable to do these things [Uy. bundaq qilalmaymän]. So, I decided not to return to Xinjiang. (field notes, 1 July 2012) Crackdowns on unapproved forms of religious expression in Xinjiang appear to factor into many of my informantsÊ decisions about returning to Xinjiang. Less than two decades after Deng Xiaoping announced ChinaÊs economic opening and called for a general relaxation on policies pertaining to ChinaÊs ethnic minorities, CCP officials have once again been hard at work devising strategies to curtail IslamÊs influence on the Uyghurs. In a report presented at a 10 January 1995 meeting in Kashgar, party officials urged: Religion is a type of socio-historical phenomenon, and with the development and progress of an economic society and scientific culture, [religion] can only become weaker, and it must not become stronger. We Communist Party members are atheists and should expand the scope of atheism to the best of our ability, and should not allow the influence of religion to strengthen. (A Work Report from KashgarÊs Third District, Level-Three CadresÊ Meeting, cited in Zhang 2009, 173) The contents of this message are the trickle-down result of large-scale, systematic attempts by the CCP to erase XinjiangÊs Islamic legacy. To find examples of nationwide campaigns aimed at eliminating Islamic ÂfanaticismÊ, one does not need to look far. In response to growing Uyghur nationalism, especially among Uyghur youth in the mid-1990s (Smith 2000), the CCP has launched several ÂStrike HardÊ (Ch. yanda; Uy. qattiq zärbä berish härikätliri) campaigns in Xinjiang. Although annual ÂStrike HardÊ campaigns are carried out on a national scale in the PRC, those campaigns implemented in Xinjiang (and Tibet) after 2001 carry the additional responsibility of eradicating ÂterrorismÊ (Ch. kongbuzhuyi; Uy. terrorchiliq), ÂseparatismÊ (Ch. fenliezhuyi; Uy. bölgünchilik), and [religious] ÂextremismÊ (Ch. jiduanzhuyi; Uy. ekstrimizm) the so-called Âthree evil forcesÊ (Ch. san gu shili; Uy. üch xil küch) (Bovingdon 2010, 54). The testimonies of Aynur, Ilham, and Adil appear to be outcries over the mistreatment these individuals have experienced in Xinjiang. Certainly, the 11 September attacks on New York and Washington, DC, and the USÊs subsequent military operations against global terrorist networks, which identified the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a Uyghur ÂterroristÊ organisation, opened a window of opportunity for the CCP to impose sanctions on religious practice in the name of fighting terrorism (Millward 2004; Shichor 2005). These policies

Escaping ÂinseparabilityÊ 165 often infringe upon the daily lives of Uyghurs to the point that many feel they are treated as second-class citizens in their own homeland (Bovingdon 2010; Fuller and Lipman 2004; Smith Finley 2007).

‘There are no suitable jobs for me in Xinjiang’ Uyghurs also face employment discrimination, especially during the hiring process. As mentioned above, the population of XinjiangÊs Han residents has ballooned over the last 60 years from roughly 200,000 in 1949 (Toops 2004, 245 6) to nearly 8.4 million registered Han Chinese in 2010 (SBX 2010, cited in Howell and Fan 2011, 123). In addition to activating ethnic boundaries between Han and Uyghurs based on cultural, religious, and linguistic differences (Bellér-Hann 2002; Cesàro 2000; Mackerras 2001; Smith 2002), consecutive waves of Han migrants have placed noticeable pressures on XinjiangÊs fragile labour market, as Han migrants have secured a disproportionately high number of jobs in the manufacturing, professional, clerical, and government sectors of XinjiangÊs labour force (COX 2002, 572 9, cited in Ma 2008, 362; Mackerras 2001). Conscious of the current complexion of XinjiangÊs labour force and aware of the tendency for employers to favour ethnic Han employees, several Uyghur graduates of the Xinjiang Class insisted that employment opportunities suited to their educational levels and abilities are unattainable in Xinjiang. Raziya, a Business English major from Qorla, whom I first met in 2007, anxiously contemplated the possibility of returning to Xinjiang after graduation. Visibly stressed, she insisted that if she could not find a job in Beijing, she would be forced to work as a high school teacher in Xinjiang. Having studied at a prestigious university in Beijing and achieved near-native English competency, Raziya adamantly believed her education would be wasted in Xinjiang. Raziya complained that she had attended university in order to become a successful business person, not to become a teacher, and therefore Beijing would be an ideal city in which to gain work experience (field notes, 7 December 2007). After several months of searching, Raziya secured employment at an international business firm in Beijing and, shortly thereafter, she married a physicist from Pakistan. Raziya and I reconnected in Beijing, in June 2011. Since our previous meeting in 2008, she and her husband had given birth to their first child, and the three of them had just returned to Beijing from several monthsÊ stay in Pakistan.12 Raziya and her husband were optimistic about job prospects in the United States or the Middle East once RaziyaÊs husband had completed his doctoral dissertation. I questioned the necessity of working abroad, but Raziya, who was then working as an English teacher at a Chinese pre-school, retorted that neither she nor her husband would be able to earn enough money to properly care for her child in Xinjiang (field notes, 20 June 2011). Even though Raziya was not working in a business firm, as she had so desperately hoped in 2007, she was satisfied in the knowledge that she made more money working part-time in Beijing than she would working full-time in Xinjiang.

166 Timothy Grose Nazakät, a female university student from Aqsu and a 2008 graduate of HangzhouÊs Xinjiang Class, voiced many of the same concerns about job prospects in Xinjiang. When we first met, Nazakät was in her third year of university and was preparing for graduate school examinations. She aspired to study in Germany and hoped her test scores would be high enough to earn a scholarship. I asked Nazakät why she wanted to study in Germany, and whether she would return to Xinjiang. Pondering over my questions for a moment, Nazakät replied: I have studied German in college, and I want to improve my German. Studying at a German university will help me improve. I donÊt know if I will come back though. If I canÊt find a job in Germany, then maybe I will come back to Xinjiang. But, you know, finding a good job in Xinjiang is difficult. I know first-hand. My mother had a good job working in a government-owned cotton factory. Eventually, the factory was privatised and for no reason all of the Uyghur workers were laid-off and Han Chinese migrants were hired to replace the Uyghurs. It is like this all over Xinjiang. (field notes, 4 November 2010) Similar to RaziyaÊs assessment, Nazakät acknowledged the difficulties of finding work in Xinjiang. However, unlike Raziya, Nazakät attributed some of these difficulties directly to the influx of Han Chinese migrants to the region. Other informants pointedly blamed Han migrants for the scarcity of jobs in Xinjiang. Murad, a male Xinjiang Class student from Kashgar who had studied in Qingdao, became so frustrated with hiring practices in Xinjiang, which he claimed overwhelmingly favour Han applicants, that he emigrated to Italy. Writing from Italy, Murad protested: Currently in Xinjiang, people are openly discriminated against. Although government agencies are hiring, they clearly write that they are only hiring Han. ThereÊs simply no solution [for me in Xinjiang], so I found my own path elsewhere, and I didnÊt return to my motherland. [Hazir xinjiangda adämni ochuqtin ochuq kämsitidu. Hätta hökümät organlirimu adäm qobul qilmaqchi bolsa eniq xänzula alimiz däp yazidu. Päqätla chiqish yoli yoq. Shunga özüm siritlarda bir chiqish yoli tapay däp wätängä qayitmidim.] (field notes, 30 June 2011) Voicing his discontent over hiring practices in Xinjiang even more forcefully, Mahmud, a 2005 graduate of a Xinjiang Class in Beijing and a native of Kashgar who is currently conducting doctoral research in the United States, protested: Every time I returned to East Turkestan, or ÂXinjiangÊ as you [the author] call it, I was hoping to have a great time with my family and friends. But every time I returned home, and saw how the Han Chinese were treating my people, how my friends who graduated from college could not find a job, and how

Escaping ÂinseparabilityÊ 167 Han Chinese who had only graduated from high school were bossing around Uyghurs, I felt like someone was stabbing me in the heart. (field notes, 5 December 2010) Although it is difficult to verify the claims put forth by these individuals, they nonetheless add to the growing volume of anecdotes contending that the Han people occupy XinjiangÊs best-paying and most prestigious jobs, especially in the oil industry, in high-level government positions, and in the private sector (Benson 2004, 214; Dautcher 2009, 223 7; Kaltman 2007, 29 39 and 100 7; Liu 2010).13 Considering this imbalance, the noted demographer Stanley Toops agrees that even though Uyghurs are better educated than before, Âto get a good job is not easy in Xinjiang [for young Uyghurs], to do so one needs connections or guanxiÊ (2004, 24). Even for those Uyghurs who have been educated at senior-secondary schools and universities located in neidi, employment in Xinjiang is by no means guaranteed.

‘Maybe one day I will go back’ In contrast to the more jarring testimonies presented above, other Xinjiang Class graduates plan to return to Xinjiang after first pursuing employment or advanced degrees in neidi. Häsän, a male student from Kashgar who completed his seniorsecondary schooling in the Nanjing Xinjiang Class in 2007, provides a response largely representative of students who ultimately planned on returning to Xinjiang. Häsän studied English at a university in Beijing and after graduation has tentative plans to start a media company there. After working in ChinaÊs capital city for several years, a strategy he insisted would provide him with a higher income than if he started a similar company in Xinjiang, Häsän intends to return to Kashgar and settle. Häsän, with a hint of regret in his voice, explained that he believes it is important to raise his future children near his family, and in a community that is dominated by Uyghur cultural norms, an experience he, as a Xinjiang Class student, did not enjoy as a child (field notes, 2 September 2010). Graduates of the Xinjiang Class regularly point to the importance of being near family as a factor worth careful consideration when planning for the future. Amangül, a female university student in Beijing who graduated from GuangzhouÊs Xinjiang Class in 2008, insisted she would return to Xinjiang even if her service agreement did not require her to serve ten years as a teacher in rural Xinjiang. Amangül excitedly explained that her family and many of her friends still live in Kashgar, and she looked forward to reuniting with them. Moreover, having being born in Xinjiang was a source of pride for Amangül. She admitted that Âalthough Xinjiang may not be developed [Uy. gärchä Shinjang täräqiy bolmisa], I love my home [Uy. Yurtum] anywayÊ (field notes, 20 November 2010).

Escaping inseparability Assertions of ethno-nationalism are not limited to the maintenance of common ethnic markers (e.g. language, religion, customs). Rather, expressions of

168 Timothy Grose ethno-national identity involve many nuances, and can take the form of resistance to political culture. This resistance does not always manifest itself in public protests and violent uprisings. Gardner Bovingdon (2002), building on the works of Foucault (1990) and James Scott (1990), has persuasively demonstrated the necessity for Uyghurs to engage in ÂcovertÊ rather than overt forms of resistance. In other words, because Uyghurs face strong repercussions from the state for engaging in public demonstrations, their resistance regularly takes subtle, though no less important, forms such as stories, songs, and jokes; media which cannot be easily controlled by the state (Dautcher 2000; Smith 2007; Smith Finley 2013). Following this line of inquiry, I contend that the choice to not return to Xinjiang is both a form of ÂcovertÊ resistance and an assertion of Uyghur ethno-national identity. More specifically, the decision among Uyghur graduates of the Xinjiang Class to not return to Xinjiang suggests resistance to the governmentÊs attempts to convince these Uyghurs that they are members of the Zhonghua minzu. If these young Uyghurs had internalised the CCPÊs messages of being ÂinseparableÊ members of the Zhonghua minzu, they would likely consent to return to Xinjiang in service of Âthe Chinese nationÊ. Closely connected to this point, the decision to not return to Xinjiang further suggests that these Uyghurs are asserting a distinctly non-Chinese, specifically Uyghur ethno-national identity. Put differently, the decision to not return to Xinjiang Âexposes the gap between the stateÊs vision of the Uyghurs as PRC citizens and the UyghursÊ understanding of themselves as first and foremost UyghursÊ (Bovingdon 2002, 44). We can stretch BovingdonÊs argument one step further. Bovingdon remarks that Uyghurs Âcannot directly resist the form of social and political life into which they are born, so they resist its representationÊ (2002, 46). Yet Xinjiang Class graduates show how Uyghur youth can actively resist the often harsh realities of life in Xinjiang. In other words, by choosing not to return to Xinjiang, Uyghurs can create new forms of political life for themselves. My assertion rings especially true for those Xinjiang Class graduates who emigrate abroad. As the official employment policy I have outlined above indicates, there are only two acceptable options for Xinjiang Class graduates: one is to return to Xinjiang; the other is to remain in neidi. These policies do not entertain a potential third option of going abroad, even if the relocation is only temporary. Paradoxically, the education Xinjiang Class students receive in neidi and their status as students enrolled at neidi universities can expedite the normally lengthy processes of obtaining a Chinese passport and applying to universities abroad, as experienced by Uyghurs educated in Xinjiang. There are widespread reports citing the difficulties surrounding, or even the impossibility of, Uyghurs obtaining a Chinese passport (see for example Radio Free Asia 2007; 2012).14 Uyghur graduates of the Xinjiang Class can largely bypass these obstacles. Like all college students in China, Xinjiang Class graduates are provided with a Âstudent groupÊ residency permit (Ch. daxuesheng jiti hukou) upon enrolling in a university. With this official document, Xinjiang Class graduates can apply for a passport at the nearest Entry-Exit Administration Bureau (Ch. churu jing guanlichu), the office

Escaping ÂinseparabilityÊ 169 responsible for handling and processing passport applications. For academically successful and often trilingual graduates of the Xinjiang Class there is little keeping them from starting a new life abroad once their Chinese passport is in hand.15 Some graduates of the programme firmly cling to the belief that pursuing an education abroad (while optimistically waiting for ChinaÊs decline or even collapse) is the best way to help other Uyghurs in the long term. Later in our conversation, Mahmud, the Xinjiang Class graduate currently studying in the US whom I have referred to earlier in this chapter, proclaimed: First I purely wanted to go abroad to get an education, and [I planned] to go back to my country and change it into a better place like the United States or European countries. Currently, I can see that as long as China becomes more and more powerful, I honestly cannot see any bright future [for me in Xinjiang], or a chance to build [a better Xinjiang]. After completing my PhD in engineering, I want to make money, and I want to inspire my people [Uyghurs]. IÊll do what I can do to save my people [Uyghurs]. (field notes, 5 December 2010) For at least some graduates of the Xinjiang Class, the decision to not return to Xinjiang is significant on two levels. First, the decision implies that Xinjiang Class graduates are not responding to the CCPÊs attempts to mould Uyghurs into political pawns who will eventually develop Xinjiang for the benefit of the rest of China. Secondly, the decision suggests that these Uyghurs are responding to a different call, a call to ÂinspireÊ other Uyghurs to embrace their ÂUyghurnessÊ. Certainly, graduates of the Xinjiang Class who have relocated abroad are often committed to raising political awareness of the situations faced by many Uyghurs and, through social media networks, are very vocal about the reported injustices occurring in Xinjiang.

Concluding remarks Hand-picked by the XUAR regional government and trained with the resources provided by ChinaÊs central government, Uyghur Xinjiang Class students are predicted to become the Ânew forceÊ driving government-led development projects in Xinjiang. Equally as important, they have been entrusted with providing a stabilising, pro-CCP element within XinjiangÊs society. However, the CCPÊs investment appears to have been a miscalculation, as many Uyghurs fail to return to Xinjiang. Instead of returning to the region, a significant proportion of Uyghur Xinjiang Class graduates, citing discrimination in their daily lives and in their careers, decide to pursue opportunities in neidi and abroad. These individuals choose to reject the status quo in Xinjiang where Uyghurs are routinely treated as Âsecondclass citizensÊ, especially when they can find more prestigious employment opportunities and be paid more elsewhere. Although interpreting these young UyghursÊ decisions to not return to Xinjiang as examples of resistance to the current Chinese government and as assertions of a non-Chinese, specifically Uyghur ethno-national

170 Timothy Grose identity, may seem a stretch for some readers, at the very least, by relocating abroad or remaining in neidi, a significant number of Xinjiang Class graduates are refusing to fulfil two important goals of the Xinjiang Class programme: training minority elites to develop XinjiangÊs economy, and stabilising Xinjiang. Ma RongÊs invocation of The Peacock Flies Southeast to assess the situation of Han Chinese leaving Xinjiang because of a lack of desirable work and growing ethnic tensions is curious since he is addressing an English-speaking audience that is unlikely to be familiar with Han dynasty poetry. The Peacock Flies Southeast presents a tragic story of failed marriage. Told in over 1,700 words, this poem features two young lovers who are forced to separate because the young manÊs mother disapproves of their relationship. Heart-broken, the two lovers ultimately commit suicide. In invoking this poem, Ma clearly believes that ethnic relations in Xinjiang have soured like a Âbroken marriageÊ. However, it is important to note that it is not only Han Chinese who are suffering. We can aptly apply the metaphor of a broken marriage to this study. By choosing not to return to Xinjiang, Uyghur graduates of the Xinjiang Class are suggesting tacit disapproval of CCP policies and are redefining (or even rejecting) their membership in the Zhonghua minzu. Thus, many Uyghurs, too, find ways to escape a dysfunctional family.

Notes 1 The neidi Xinjiang gaozhong ban has also been translated into English as ÂInland Xinjiang Senior Secondary School ClassesÊ, and abbreviated as ÂXinjiang ClassesÊ (Chen 2008; Chen and Postiglione 2009). Although these translations are accurate, I have chosen to play with the absence of plural suffixes for most nouns in modern Chinese and translate this programme as the ÂXinjiang ClassÊ (Grose 2010), despite the Uyghurlanguage rendering of ÂsinipliriÊ or ÂclassesÊ. I have chosen to leave ÂclassÊ in its singular form in order to emphasise that although there are multiple schools hosting Uyghur senior-secondary students across ChinaÊs neidi (China proper), these schools are part of one, overarching programme that is uniformly managed. I will use the term neidi [Ch. inland; interior] throughout this chapter as my informants often distinguished the rest of China (excluding Tibet) as such. Their use of the term vis-à-vis Xinjiang implies that China consists of diverse cultural, linguistic, and religious regions. 2 In general, my informants appreciated (and were patient with) my insistence on conducting interviews in Uyghur. Sometimes, my informants seemed to feel that speaking in Chinese would ensure that I understood what they were saying. A few individuals, especially those who were studying English as their academic major, utilised their time with me to practise English. In many of these cases, I would ask questions in Uyghur and individuals responded in English. 3 According to the governing documents of the programme, the Xinjiang Class is designed to eventually integrate Uyghur students with local Han Chinese. Article Five of the ÂAdministrative Procedures of the Xinjiang Class (trial)Ê instructs that Âwhen conditions ripen [Ch. tiaojian chengshu hou], Xinjiang Class students will be „mixed‰ [Ch. hunhe] into the same classÊ with local Han Chinese students (see China Education and Research Network 2000). This discrepancy between policy and practice (Levinson et al. 2009) likely reflects the concerns of school administrators, who fear that placing Xinjiang Class students in the same classrooms as local Han students may breed conflict. The

Escaping ÂinseparabilityÊ 171

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11 12

13

14

Beijing Luhe school provides one known exception to the norm of segregating Xinjiang Class students from local Han students. From conversations with students who have graduated from this school, it remains unclear to me why administrators have decided to integrate the students. Although students are permitted to observe Islamic dietary norms and are prepared halal meals cooked either by a local Hui chef or a Uyghur chef, most other Islamic practices are forbidden. For example, in July 2011 two male Uyghur students of the Xinjiang Class in Hangzhou were reportedly expelled for attending prayer at a local mosque. See Radio Free Asia (2010). These totals have been calculated from yearly enrolment figures that are regularly announced. See for example, China Radio International 2005; Xinhua 2006; Xinhua 2008; Xinhua 2013; Xinjiang Education Newspaper 2010. The term suzhi refers to the ÂqualityÊ of an individual. Those individuals possessing superior quality (Ch. suzhi gao) are generally considered to be well educated, value cleanliness, economically stable, etc. The term has entered into Chinese state discourse concerning development, and its usage distinguishes between practices and modes of thinking advocated by the state and those considered ÂbackwardÊ (Ch. luohou). For more on this topic, see Jacka (2009). In fact, according to the 2007 recruitment plan for universities in neidi that enrol graduates of the Xinjiang Class, Beijing Normal University had seventeen places open to Xinjiang Class graduates, one of the highest numbers among such universities in Beijing (Xinjiang Department of Education 2007). According to the numbers provided in this report, only 2,280 Xinjiang Class graduates who have completed a four-year university programme, out of 4,200, have returned to Xinjiang to find employment. Apart from this report, I have found no other published statistics measuring the number of Xinjiang Class graduates who return to Xinjiang. Nine of my informants chose to enrol in one of ChinaÊs pedagogical universities (Ch. shifan daxue or shifan xueyuan) to participate in these universitiesÊ teacher training programmes. As I note above, Xinjiang Class graduates who become teachers receive a free university education. All nine of these students spent their early childhoods in southern Xinjiang (especially Kashgar, Khotän, or Aqsu), and their parents were either farmers or common labourers. For families in southern Xinjiang who rely primarily on agricultural production for their often modest annual incomes, the Xinjiang Class provides the most feasible option for children from these impoverished areas to receive senior-secondary and university educations. The PRC was established on 1 October 1949. Currently, PRC citizens are given a weeklong break to commemorate the founding of the New China. Similar to ChinaÊs Spring Festival period, this holiday is a time for many Chinese citizens to travel. I want to express gratitude to Joanne Smith Finley, who through personal communication pointed out these important comparisons. For the three year period from 2008 2011, Raziya and I maintained email correspondence. However, during my six months of field research in China, conducted between June and December 2010, Raziya was living in Pakistan with her husband. In fact, within XinjiangÊs energy sector, which accounts for 57% of XinjiangÊs GDP, only 1% of its employees are Uyghur. The average income for a worker in the oil industry is 60,000 RMB (approximately US$10,000), which is twenty times the income a Uyghur farmer can make (Liu 2010, 29). My own informants, especially those Uyghurs living in Xinjiang, often share stories about unsuccessful attempts to obtain Chinese passports. Many of these individuals

172 Timothy Grose claim that the fees required for Uyghurs to successfully apply for a passport, including ÂofficialÊ fees and bribes, exceed 50,000 RMB (approximately US$8,000). Others talk of an endless string of requests from passport officers, who make spontaneous and random requests for documents from an individualÊs university, employer, bank, etc. 15 There is evidence from my research suggesting that Xinjiang Class graduates who apply for their visas outside of the XUAR have enjoyed much higher success rates than those who apply for passports in Xinjiang. A 2004 graduate of the Xinjiang Class in Hangzhou who finished her university degree in 2008, Nadirä returned to Xinjiang to look for employment. Unable to find work, she began studying for her postgraduate entrance exams. Receiving high scores, Nadirä was accepted onto a postgraduate programme in Australia, but confided to me the difficulties the government in Xinjiang had created for her as she applied for her passport. At the time of my visit, Nadirä had been trying to obtain a passport for over six months. I asked her if she planned on returning to Xinjiang once she had earned her higher degree, and assuming she would obtain her passport. She looked at me sternly and replied: ÂNo, I will never come back [to Xinjiang]Ê (field notes, 22 September 2010). Similarly, a Xinjiang Class graduate who had attended senior-secondary school in Wuxi and university in Harbin before going to the US to pursue a postgraduate degree, changed her residency status fromÊ XinjiangÊ to ÂHarbinÊ using the jiti hukou while still a university student. One of her classmates, another Uyghur graduate of the Xinjiang Class who had also studied in Harbin, had been offered a summer internship in the US. However, this particular student had not opted to change her residency status to ÂHarbinÊ. Subsequently, this student had to return to Xinjiang in an attempt to obtain her passport. Unfortunately, this student was never issued a passport, and was unable to participate in the summer internship programme (field notes, 26 June 2012).

References Bellér-Hann, Ildikó. 2002. „Temperamental Neighbours: Uighur Han Relations in Xinjiang, Northwest China.‰ In Imagined Differences: Hatred and the Construction of Identity, edited by Günther Schle. Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 57 81. Benson, Linda. 2004. „Education and Social Mobility among Minority Populations in Xinjiang.‰ In Xinjiang: ChinaÊs Muslim Borderland, edited by S. Frederick Starr. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 190 215. Bovingdon, Gardner. 2002. „The Not-So-Silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang.‰ Modern China 28(1): 39 78. ···. 2004. Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent. Washington, DC: East-West Center. ···. 2010. The Uyghurs: Strangers in their Homeland. New York: Columbia University Press. Caprioni, Elena. 2011. „Daily Encounters Between Hans and Uyghurs in Xinjiang: Sinicization, Integration or Segregation?‰ Pacific Affairs 84(2): 267 87. Census Office of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (COX). 2002. „Xinjiang WeiwuÊer zizhiqu 2000 nian renkou pucha ziliao‰ [„The Data of the 2000 Census of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region‰]. China Statistical Press. Cesàro, M. Cristina. 2000. „Consuming Identities and Resistance among Uyghur in Contemporary Xinjiang.‰ Inner Asia 2: 225 38. Chen Yangbin. 2008. Muslim Uyghur Students in a Chinese Boarding School: Social Recapitalization as a Response to Ethnic Integration. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Escaping ÂinseparabilityÊ 173 Chen Yangbin and Gerard Postiglione. 2009. „Muslim Uyghur Students in a Dislocated Chinese Boarding School: Bonding Social Capital as a Response to Ethnic Integration.‰ Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts 2(2): 287 309. China Education and Research Network. 2000. „Neidi Xinjiang gaozhong ban guanli banfa (shixing)‰ [„Administration Regulations for the Xinjiang Class (Trial)‰]. www.edu.cn/ xie_zuo_826/20060323/t20060323_110910.shtml [accessed 15 October 2008]. China Radio International Online. 2005. „Neidi Xinjiang gaozhong ban zhaosheng guimo fanyifan‰ [„The Xinjiang Class will Double Its Enrolment‰]. 24 June 2005. http://gb.cri. cn/3821/2005/06/24/[email protected] [accessed 15 April 2012]. Dautcher, Jay. 2000. „Reading Out-of-Print: Popular Culture and Protest on ChinaÊs Western Frontier.‰ In China Beyond the Headlines, edited by Timothy Weston and Lionel Jensen. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 273 94. ···. 2009. Down a Narrow Road: Identity and Masculinity in a Uyghur Community in Xinjiang China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Foucault, Michel. 1990. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Vol. 1. New York: Vintage. Fuller, Graham, and Jonathan Lipman. 2004. „Islam in Xinjiang.‰ In Xinjiang: ChinaÊs Muslim Borderland, edited by S. Frederick Starr. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 320 52. General Office of the Ministry of Education, and General Office of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission. 2008. „Guanyu zuo hao putong gaoxiao zhaoshou de neidi xinjiang gaozhong ban xuesheng daxue biye jiye gongzuo de yijian‰ [„Proposals Concerning Employment Efforts for Colleges and Universities who have ÂXinjiang ClassÊ University Graduates‰]. http://zbb.shu.edu.cn/graduateweb/news/viewnews.asp?id=2528&type=8 [accessed 19 April 2011]. General Office of the State Council of the PRC. 1999. „Guowuyuan bangongting zhuanfa jiaoyubu deng bumen guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang shaoshu minzu diqu rencai peiyang gongzuo yijian de tongshi‰ [„Information about Proposals of the State CouncilÊs General Office to the Ministry of Education and other relevant Departments concerning Work for Strengthening Education in Minority Areas‰]. www.xjdrc.gov.cn/copy_3_copy_1_ second.jsp?urltype=news.NewsContentUrl&wbtreeid=11118&wbnewsid=122283 [accessed 9 April 2012]. Gladney, Dru. C. 1998. „Internal Colonialism and the Uyghur Nationality: Chinese Nationalism and its Subaltern Subjects.‰ Cashiers dÊEtudes sur la Méiterranée Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien 25: 47 63. Grose, Timothy. 2010. „The Xinjiang Class: Education, Integration, and the Uyghurs.‰ The Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 30(1): 97 108. ···. 2012. „Uyghur Language Textbooks: Competing Images of a Multi-Ethnic China.‰ Asian Studies Review 36: 369 89. Harrell, Stevan. 1995. „Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reactions to Them.‰ In Cultural Encounters on ChinaÊs Ethnic Frontiers, edited by Stevan Harrell. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 3 36. Harris, Rachel, and Rahilä Dawut. 2002. „Mazar Festivals of the Uyghurs: Music, Islam and the Chinese State.‰ British Journal of Ethnomusicology 11(1): 101 18. Howell, Anthony, and C. Cindy Fan. 2011. „Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: A Survey of Han and Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi.‰ Eurasian Geography and Economics 52(1): 119 39. Iredale, Robyn, Naran Bilik, and Fei Guo, eds. 2003. ChinaÊs Minorities on the Move: Selected Case Studies. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Jacka, Tamara. 2009. „Cultivating Citizens: Suzhi (Quality) Discourse in the PRC.‰ Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 17(3): 523 35.

174 Timothy Grose Kaltman, Blaine. 2007. Under the Heel of the Dragon: Islam, Racism, Crime, and the Uighur in China. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. Levinson, Bradley A. U., Margaret Sutton, and Teresa Winstead. 2009. „Education Policy as a Practice of Power: Theoretical Tools, Ethnographic Methods, Democratic Options.‰ Education Policy 22(6): 767 95. Liu Yong. 2010. „An Economic Band-Aid: BeijingÊs New Approach to Xinjiang.‰ China Security 6(2): 27 40. Ma Rong. 2008. „Economic Development, Labor, Transference, and Minority Education in the West of China.‰ In Ethnic Relations in China, edited by Ma Rong. Beijing: China Tibetology Press, 359 86. Mackerras, Colin. 2001. „Xinjiang at the Turn of the Century: The Causes of Separatism.‰ Central Asian Survey 20(3): 289 303. Millward, James. 2004. „Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment.‰ Washington, DC: East-West Center. ···. 2007. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New York: Columbia University Press. Radio Free Asia (English Language Service). 2007. „China Confiscates MuslimsÊ Passports.‰ 27 June 2007. www.rfa.org/english/uyghur/uyghur_passports-20070627.html [accessed 15 January 2013]. ···. 2012. „Student Battles Travel Ban.‰ 20 December 2012. www.rfa.org/english/ news/uyghur/travel-12202012143138.html [accessed 7 January 2013]. Radio Free Asia (Uyghur Language Service). 2010. „Khitay daÊiriliri khitay ottura mäktäpliridiki ÂXinjiang sinipiÊning sani häm kölimini yänä kengäytti‰ [„Chinese Leaders Will Again Expand the Number of Schools and Scale of the Xinjiang Class‰]. 8 August 2010. www.rfa.org/uyghur/xewerler/tepsili_xewer/shinjang-sinipi-08022012163222.html [accessed 5 August 2012]. Rudelson, Justin Jon. 1997. Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along ChinaÊs Silk Road. New York: Columbia University Press. Shichor, Yitzhak. 2005. „Blow up: Internal and External Challenges of Uyghur Separatism and Islamic Radicalism to Chinese Rule in Xinjiang.‰ Asian Affairs 32(2): 119 35. Scott, James C. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. State Statistical Bureau (SBX). 2010. Xinjiang tongji nianjian [Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2010]. Beijing: China Statistical Press. Smith, Joanne. 2000. „Four Generations of Uyghurs: The Shift towards Ethno-political Ideologies among XinjiangÊs Youth.‰ Inner Asia (2): 195 224. ···. 2002. „ ÂMaking Culture MatterÊ: Symbolic, Spatial and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese.‰ Asian Ethnicity 3(2): 153 74. ···. 2007. „The Quest for National Unity in Uyghur Popular Song: Barren Chickens, Stray Dogs, Fake Immortals and Thieves.‰ In Music, National Identity and the Politics of Location: Between the Global and the Local, edited by Ian Biddle and Vanessa Knights. Aldershot: Ashgate, 115 41. Smith Finley, Joanne. 2007. „Chinese Oppression in Xinjiang, Middle Eastern Conflicts and Global Islamic Solidarities among the Uyghurs.‰ Journal of Contemporary China 16(53): 627 54. ···. 2013. The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and Uyghur-Han Relations in Contemporary Xinjiang. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing. Tianshan. 2011. „Neidi Xinjiang gaozhong ban jiazhang daibiao dao ban ban xuexiao kanwang haizi‰ [„Xinjiang Class Parent Representatives Arrive at Xinjiang Class Schools

Escaping ÂinseparabilityÊ 175 to visit the Children‰]. 21 October 2011. www.ts.cn/news/content/2011-10/21/content_ 6264251.htm [accessed 1 November 2011]. Toops, Stanley. 2004. „The Demography of Xinjiang.‰ In Xinjiang: ChinaÊs Muslim Borderland, edited by S. Frederick Starr. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 241 63. University of International Business and Economics (UIBE). No date. „Changjian wenti ji jieda‰ [„Frequently Asked Questions and Their Answers‰]. http://sit.uibe.edu.cn/ben candy.php?id=243 [accessed 24 September 2012]. Usborne, David. 2013. „New York PoliceÊs Use of Stop and Search Powers is Racist, Says Judge.‰ The Independent. 12 August 2013. www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/ new-york-polices-use-of-stop-and-search-powers-is-racist-says-judge-8758200.html [accessed 14 August 2013]. Wang Fei-Ling. 2004. „Reformed Migration Control and New Targeted People: ChinaÊs Hukou System in the 2000s.‰ The China Quarterly 177: 115 32. Xinhua. 2006. „2006 nian neidi xinjiang gaozhong ban zhaosheng 3,990 ren‰ [„In 2006 the Xinjiang Class will enroll 3,990 students]. 21 August 2006. www.xj.xinhuanet. com/2006-08/21/content_7831800.htm [accessed 15 July 2014]. ···. 2008. „Jinnian neidi xinjiang gaozhong ban zhaosheng renshu tupo 5,000 ming‰ [„This Year Students Enrolled in the Xinjiang Class Will Break 5,000‰]. 10 August 2008. http://news.sohu.com/20080810/n258731070.shtml [accessed 15 July 2014]. ···. 2013. „Xinjiang neigaoban jinnian jihua zhaosheng 9,122 ren xin zeng 6 suo xuexiao‰ [„The Xinjiang Class Plans to Enrol 9,122 Students and Increase Schools by Six This Year‰]. 11 May 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2013 05/11/c_115727788. htm [accessed May 14 2014]. The Xinjiang Class Online. 2011. „Neigaoban daxue biyesheng jiuye zhengce wenda‰ [„Questions and Answers about the Employment Policies for Xinjiang Class Graduates‰]. June 2011. Accessed 22 October 2012. www.xjban.com/xjb/bysjyzd/jyzc/2011/43475. htm [accessed 5 August 2015]. Xinjiang Daily. 2005. „Neidi xinjiang gaozhong ban zouguo wu nian‰ [„The Xinjiang Class Goes into Its Fifth Year‰]. 25 November 2005. Accessed online 15 September 2008; no active link. ···. 2012. „Zizhiqu neixueban fuzeren zuoke benbao minsheng lianxian shi jieshao neigaoban jinnianqi shixing tanxing xuezhi‰ [„An Administrator Representing XinjiangÊs Inland School Programmes is Guest Interviewed to Introduce the Connections with the Livelihood of People and This YearÊs Flexible Education Programme‰]. 3 March 2012. Accessed online 3 December 2012; no active link. Xinjiang Department of Education. 2007. „2007 nian putong gaodeng xuexiao zhaoshou neidi Xinjiang gaozhong ban biyesheng zhaosheng jihua renwu he luoshi zhuanye jianyi biao‰ [„Proposals for the 2007 Recruitment Plan for Colleges and University to Enrol Xinjiang Class Graduates‰]. www.docin.com/p-20323643.html [accessed 1 October 2012]. Xinjiang Education Newspaper. 2010. „Ichkiri ölkilärdiki xinjiang toluq ottura sinipliri on yilda xinjianggha 30 mingdäk oqughchi täbiyäläp bärdi‰ [„During the Past Ten Years, the Xinjiang Class has Educated Nearly Thirty Thousand Students for Xinjiang‰]. 30 April 2010. Zhao Jie. 2007. Minzu hexie yu minzu fazhan [Ethnic Harmony and Ethnic Development]. Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe. Zhang Touming. 2009. Xinjiang fan fenlie douzheng he wending gongzuo de shijian yu sikao. [Practice and Thinking on Stability and the Struggle against Separatism in Xinjiang]. Ürümchi: Xinjiang PeopleÊs Press.

9

Education, religion and identity among Uyghur hostesses in Ürümchi Joanne Smith Finley

Introduction In this chapter, I address identity constructions among a stigmatised group in urban Uyghur society: karaoke hostesses in Ürümchi. Research on hostess culture in contemporary China has focused on Han (majority group) hostesses in the cities of China proper, and explores socio-economic aspects of hostess work, including rural urban inequalities and employment discrimination (Hershatter 1996; Xin 1999; Sun 2002; Zheng 2004; 2007; Jeffreys 2004); the re-emergence of gender asymmetry in reform China (Wang 2000; Sun 2002; Zheng 2006; 2008; Zhang 2011); health-related aspects of sex work (Gil et al. 1996; Zhang 2006); prostitution as a social threat (Âspiritual pollutantÊ) and the stateÊs attempts to regulate it (Jeffreys 1997; 2004; Wang 2000; Sun 2002; Zheng 2009; 2010; 2011); and the link between hostessing and official corruption (Zhang 2006; Jeffreys 2008). Here, I consider the situations of five Uyghur (minority group) hostesses working in the politically contested border region of Xinjiang, and explore how these young women make sense of their social, religious and ethnic identities. When the act of playing hostess to a Han majority male is construed by the Uyghur community as ÂimmoralÊ in religious terms,1 and ÂtraitorousÊ in ethno-political terms, how do these women explain their choices? From which linguistic and educational backgrounds do they hail? Are they predominantly minkaohan, i.e. young women educated in Mandarin Chinese, and more used to interaction with Han classmates and neighbours? Or are they minkaomin, i.e. Uyghur-educated, and less familiar with Han peers? How do they reconfigure notions of religious morality, ethnic identity and group loyalty? Data are drawn from ethnographic interviews conducted in Ürümchi in 2004. Interviews were conducted in the Uyghur language, or in a mixture of Uyghur and Chinese, as preferred by respondents.

The hostess industry in Ürümchi Like their Han counterparts in China proper, Uyghur hostesses in ÜrümchiÊs karaoke clubs (Ch. yezonghui) described two types of hostess (Ch. sanpei xiaojie)2: those who Âsit on stageÊ (Ch. zuotai accompany the customer at the venue) and those who Âgo off stageÊ (Ch. chutai return with the customer to his hotel). Zuotai girls earned a basic fee of 100 yuan per customer, although several hundred yuan

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could be earned from clients of a favourable disposition. Usually, a zuotai girl would ÂsitÊ with one customer for a maximum of three hours. Chutai girls earned a basic fee of between 500 and 1000 yuan, but had to pay around 20 per cent of this to their ÂPR managerÊ (Ch. gongguan jingli). The manager connected girls with customers, and received a separate introduction fee from the client (cf. Xin 1999, 1,427; Zheng 2008, 445). According to a Uyghur hotel employee in his thirties named Zunun, speaking in 2004, just a tiny percentage of Uyghur girls worked as hostesses in Ürümchi; yet he acknowledged that the number had increased since my previous field trip in 2002. Viewed against the community taboo on Uyghur Han intermarriage, which operates as the principal form of symbolic resistance to Han encroachment (Smith Finley 2013a; 2013b), what do we make of this seeming paradox? Does it signal the crumbling of ethnic boundaries constructed by Uyghurs to separate themselves from Han Chinese and to express symbolic opposition to PRC political control? Or is it a new and controversial form of accommodation, given appeal by the promise of financial reward and enhanced social mobility? Finally, is this trend connected to the aggressive mainstreaming of the Chinese language and Chinese-medium education since 2002, and, if so, how? Below, I seek to answer these questions based on five case studies.

Five case studies Mädinä (20, Uyghur-educated, born in Ürümchi) Mädinä3 came from a broken family, and lived in an Ürümchi apartment with her grandfather, his second wife and a half-brother. Mädinä had a history of self-harm. Both her forearms were covered in scars, injuries she had inflicted on herself when her Âold manÊ (Ch. laogong; here, boyfriend) died from a heroin overdose. Mädinä first heard about the hostessing industry at the age of 15, when she ran away from home to Shanghai. Taking up residence at the home of a male Uyghur cousin, she was raped by his friend, then beaten by her cousin for Âmaking him lose faceÊ (damaging his male honour). Mädinä subsequently fled with another of his friends, only to be beaten again when she had no choice but to return. It was then that a friend suggested she might support herself financially by becoming a hostess. In the beginning, Mädinä explained, she could not bring herself to do hostess work, since ÂIÊm a Uyghur, we believe in Islam.Ê She confided that she had wanted to die after the rape took place, and contemplated committing suicide. While her sense of shame recalls that commonly experienced by rape victims, regardless of religious background, for Mädinä it was closely linked to the importance of female purity in Uyghur culture.4 During her second sojourn in China proper, Mädinä had finally succumbed to hostess life. Describing how a client had given her a 1,500 yuan tip in sympathy after she burst into tears one evening in a Kunming club, she laughed at the memory, impressed in retrospect by what now appeared a scam. Several years into the lifestyle, Mädinä was clear about the instrumental and temporary nature of her occupation: ÂThis work isnÊt forever; it will end one day. Then I will have a job, a good husband, and a home.Ê

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Mälikä (20, Uyghur-educated, born in Ürümchi) Mälikä came from a one-parent family (father deceased). When her mother needed money to send MälikäÊs younger sister and brother to school, a friend had urged her to become a hostess.5 She described her dread at the prospect: I felt awful, ashamed of myself, like I was becoming two people. I was losing face in front of my best friend. I was terrified that I would be seen [entering a club] by people I knew, and I couldnÊt bear that. Once people know that about you, youÊre finished. Unable to face the associated stigma, Mälikä wrote a pile of suicide letters, tidied the house and took an overdose. When this suicide attempt failed, she tried again. The third attempt followed her break-up with her Uyghur fiancé, when his parents obstructed the marriage on the grounds of MälikäÊs adverse family circumstances. This time, she slit her wrist.6 By the time of our interview, Mälikä would go for long periods without doing hostess work, resorting to a few nights here and there only when she ran into financial difficulties. She directed her earnings straight into her university fees, vowing that after graduation she would find a steady job (and a man with a steady job) and give up hostessing for good. Khalidä (18, Uyghur-educated, born in Ürümchi) Khalidä also came from a single-parent family (father deceased). Following the loss of the family head, her mother could not afford the tuition fees to send KhalidäÊs elder brother to university in Shanghai. Having passed the university entrance exam, the disappointment of having to give up his place was hard for him to bear, and he became addicted to heroin, later requiring hospitalisation. Throughout our interviews, Khalidä referred to her brotherÊs medical condition as a Âheart problemÊ, a euphemism frequently used for heroin abuse in Xinjiang, where the pathology claimed the lives of many disillusioned young men in the 1990s (Dautcher 2004). When KhalidäÊs brother fell ill, staff at the First Affiliated Hospital of Xinjiang Medical University (Ch. Xinjiang yike daxue diyi fushu yiyuan 新疆医科大学 第一附属医院) refused to admit him unless medical costs were paid in advance.7 At that point, a Han schoolmate suggested she get work as a hostess, remarking that some customers would pay several thousand yuan for a virgin. Khalidä insisted in interview that she would never have entered such a club unless forced to by circumstance, and it is instructive that her first Âoff-stageÊ experience was with a Uyghur not Han client. She periodically wept during the course of her narrative, reverting from Chinese to her mother tongue whenever distressed. Tragically, while her earnings had enabled the family to get medical treatment for her brother, he later died in hospital. Khalidä continued: ÂThen I hated myself, hated everything, and wanted to die. I took a lot of pills and tried to kill myself.Ê Unable to reveal the depth of her shame to her family, Khalidä told her mother that she had attempted suicide out of grief for her brotherÊs death. Her second Âoff-stageÊ experience was with a Han client. Initially refusing to go

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through with the sex act, she had endured a beating and then a rape, too inexperienced to know that she could request the managerÊs help in such circumstances. Aminä (18, Uyghur-educated, born in Ürümchi) Aminä came from a broken family (parents divorced). Her mother had struggled financially, pinching a living out of sweeping the streets (a line of work Uyghurs are traditionally too embarrassed to undertake).8 Though Aminä had been accepted onto a course at the Xinjiang Medical University (Ch. Xinjiang yike daxue 新疆医 科大学), she had found herself unable to pay the tuition fees, and had reluctantly become a hostess following an introduction by her friend, Khalidä (above). For Aminä, hostessing was a gruesome but necessary means to an end: Basically, you feel afraid. Because some customers are nasty. Most of all, you just want to get it over with and get off home as quickly as possible. You sit with the customer for 30 minutes, get your 50 yuan or whatever, and escape before he starts trying to maul you. Tunisa (22, Uyghur-educated, born in Ürümchi) Tunisa also hailed from a broken family (parents divorced). Following his remarriage, her father had failed to protect her from her step-motherÊs hostility, with the result that she had fled to China proper at the age of 17. She described how she and ten other Uyghur girls were tricked into prostitution by domestic traffickers: We went to HaÊerbin by train with two Han managers. They said we would perform Uyghur dance in restaurants. But we overheard them talking privately on the phone, and realised they planned to sell us as prostitutes [. . .] three of us were sold on for 2,000 yuan each. Tunisa first slept with a Han client at 18. Learning first how to Âsit on stageÊ, she was told almost immediately that she would also be expected to Âgo off stageÊ. In the first week, she slept with five or six Han men. When I asked how this had made her feel, she giggled nervously, covered her face in embarrassment, and replied: ÂI just lay there with my arm across my eyes. I felt sick, disgusted. Most of them were old men in their forties or fifties. And they stank of pork.Ê Asked whether she would have felt differently if the clients were young and attractive, she responded in the negative: ÂEven the good-looking Han guys canÊt compete with Uyghur guys [Uy. yätmäydu].Ê Eventually, Tunisa and a companion were ÂrescuedÊ by a Uyghur client, who promised to help them. By pretending that the manÊs wife was their estranged mother, who now wanted her daughters back, they were able to leave the club and went to stay at the coupleÊs restaurant. The situation turned sour, however, when the couple tried to force them into arranged marriages, in an apparent bid to restore their Âfallen honourÊ. Finding their way to a Hui restaurant in Tianjin, they once again took work as hostesses, this time for a Uyghur female manager. Tunisa

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described how in four months she was paid just 1,000 yuan. When she protested the poor conditions and threatened to return to Xinjiang, the manager demanded that she give the 1,000 yuan back Âto cover her board and lodgingÊ. Subsequently, Tunisa and the other girls were forbidden to go outside, and became virtual prisoners in the restaurant. Later, the manager demanded that they make contact with friends in Xinjiang and help her recruit them as hostesses. On a second sojourn to China proper, Tunisa undertook hostess work together with Mädinä in Beijing.

Motivations: labour market inequality or pathology? A key issue in studies of sex work is whether women get involved in prostitution because they are in economic need or because they want to make easy money: ÂHostessing offers high incomes in the least amount of timeÊ (Zheng 2008, 445; cf. Jeffreys 1997, 53). In Ürümchi, the picture is mixed. Uyghur hostesses frequently blamed their line of work on adverse employment prospects for ethnic minorities in a Han-dominated urban labour market. Mädinä and Mälikä, both lacking a university degree, explained: Of course we donÊt like the work! What a thought. We do it because we have to. You get fed up of being rejected by one company after another . . . itÊs all private companies now, and they wonÊt take Uyghurs. Those who are best educated usually minkaohan [Chinese-educated Uyghurs] have a better chance. Otherwise, [employers] arenÊt interested. In a follow-up interview, Mädinä added: ÂWeÊre uneducated [Ch. meiyou wenhua]. Wherever we go, weÊre told „We donÊt want minorities! [Ch. Bu yao minzu!]‰.Ê They described how some Uyghur women undertook hostessing as a second job in the evenings because their regular jobs did not pay enough, citing one hostess who worked in the PeopleÊs Courts by day. Jelil, a university graduate in his late twenties, confirmed this, observing: ÂThere is no other way for them to eat. They canÊt get [well-paid] jobs.Ê Financial difficulties resulting from ethnic discrimination in the urban labour market were often further complicated by difficult family backgrounds. All of my respondents hailed from one-parent families. As Mälikä explained, ÂOften, the girlÊs father is dead, or the mother is dead. Or the parents are divorced, and there is a step-parent who doesnÊt care for the child properly because he/she is not their own.Ê In this way, young women lacking a family head or committed carer seem more likely to wander into hostessing. The same may be true for women who lack a supportive male partner, or who have previously suffered abuse at the hands of men. As Mädinä observed, ÂWhy should I care about my self-respect if there is no relative, no man caring for me?Ê [my emphasis]. This reading was confirmed by members of the urban community. Patigül, a CD trader in her early thirties, explained: ÂMost of these girls have come from troubled backgrounds. Either their parents are divorced . . . or they donÊt have a mother or father. Or somehow theyÊve ended up leaving home.Ê It is perhaps significant to note that Mädinä had

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not been willing to work as a hostess when her boyfriend was alive, that is, when she had someone close by who genuinely cared about her.9 At the time of our interview, Mädinä explained that her career goals rested entirely on the generation of capital through hostessing. With her accumulated earnings, she had so far been able to register for a computing course, and now she dreamed of saving enough to take driving lessons and buy a car: ÂThen I could set myself up as a private-hire driver.Ê The gap between eking out a meagre subsistence and having disposable income that might be used to achieve social mobility is of crucial importance here. For Mälikä, it was necessary to endure hostess work in order to secure a better future for herself and her family. She explained earnestly how she had worked hard to fund her first year at university, but was then unable to pay advance tuition for her second year. When the university asked her to discontinue her studies, a friend introduced her to hostess work. She related: At first I was really reluctant; I felt I would be letting myself down . . . I didnÊt know what to do, how to dance, sing. I ended up in floods of tears! But the guy still gave me 200 yuan he felt sorry for me . . . Later, my friend said ÂSee how easy it was to make 200 yuan?Ê As Mälikä pointed out, since girls in higher education attend class by day, they need a job that does not require them to work during the day, or indeed every night, and this rules out employment in the service industries. Some female students therefore do hostess work on Friday and Saturday nights, since there is no college the next day and students are therefore permitted to sleep off campus. For her part, Khalidä eventually came to see hostessing as a necessary evil, which would allow her to raise university tuition fees (10,000 yuan per year), to support her mother (an independent trader of insecure income), and to secure a good education for her two younger sisters. The social and religious stigma attached to the work had caused her to repeatedly lie to her mother about the origins of the extra funds. At the same time, however, she presented her decision as an Âact of selfless loveÊ, exercised in the name of familial devotion (filial virtue), an argument often forwarded by prostitutes across Asia, and which may sometimes gain a degree of sympathy from society (cf. Do 2006, 178; Lindquist 2010, 293). While all five girls claimed to have been forced into hostessing by circumstance, there were also indications that some had chosen to continue in the profession rather than enter the service industries. Generally, this was because of a disinclination to perform labour-intensive work. When I met Mädinä, she had just given up a hotel job because it was Âtoo tiringÊ (Ch. tai lei). On another day, she described how she had worked briefly in a pharmacy before resigning: ÂIt was exhausting; you had to stand on your feet all day!Ê Mälikä and Mädinä admitted on separate occasions that some Uyghur girls ÂdonÊt like heavy or dirty workÊ, an attitude corroborated by respondents from the urban community. Ghäyrät, a migrant worker in his thirties from Aqsu, commented: ÂIf a girl canÊt earn money doing a light job, she ends up doing this [hostessing] instead.Ê10 Nonetheless, both

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Mädinä and Mälikä insisted that a person could not make a ÂdecentÊ living by working a service job alone. A portion of Uyghur hostesses, having fallen into hostess work when in financial difficulty, subsequently get used to the lifestyle. As Mälikä observed, ÂThey get used to the money coming easily. They get a spending habit, want new clothes, and canÊt go back to having no disposable income.Ê Mädinä similarly remarked: ÂTake me, I spend money like water . . . Girls want to wear nice clothes and eat well! [Ch. Yao chuan de hao, yao chi de hao!]Ê This view too was reiterated among Uyghur members of the urban community. Though Patigül, a music trader in her early thirties, initially argued that such women were simply victims of employment discrimination, she later conceded that the city Âhad opportunities for everyone if they chose to take themÊ. Räwiä, a state employee in her forties, similarly remarked: ÂItÊs rubbish to suggest that they canÊt do other jobs! ItÊs just that they wonÊt.Ê

Intra-group divides: social stigma and disassociation In China proper, the reform-era obsession with wealth accumulation and an increasingly liberalised attitude towards sex have meant that prostitution is less stigmatised among the majority Han than it once was (Xin 1999, 1,428). The prevailing attitude is neatly encapsulated in the popular saying: ÂLaugh at a poor man rather than a prostituteÊ (Ch. Xiao pin bu xiao chang 笑贫不笑娼). The same is not true for Uyghur communities in Xinjiang, where the involvement of daughters in the hostess industry is viewed with uniform horror. The shame associated with the industry was brought into immediate relief by the way in which I first gained entry to that community. Observing a Uyghur prostitute meet a Han client in a city hotel one evening in 2002, I raised the issue of sex work with long-term respondent Zunun, a male in his thirties born in Ürümchi. Zunun then revealed with manifest discomfort that his half-sister (whom I had known as a small child many years earlier) now worked as a hostess. Eager to speak to her, I was disappointed when Zunun was reluctant to arrange a meeting. It was only on a return trip in 2004 that I discovered the source of his reluctance: at no time had half-brother and -sister openly acknowledged to one another that he knew what she did for a living. The contentious issue had remained unspoken because, as Zunun sadly observed, he felt he had no right to intervene on behalf of the moral reputation of a half-sister. When he did finally set up a meeting, he did not broach the issue with his half-sister directly, but simply directed her to my hotel room, and implied that a simple conversation could earn her some money.11 Following our first interview, his half-sister had implored: ÂPlease donÊt say anything to my step-brother! In his heart, he knows what I do. And he knows that I know that he knows! But we would never voice it aloud.Ê While it is common for women in many parts of the world to conceal sex work from family members, an acute sense of social stigma caused Uyghur hostesses in Ürümchi to go to extraordinary lengths to keep their Ânight workÊ secret. This was because, as in other Islamic societies, community supervision is deployed among Uyghur communities in Xinjiang to collectively enforce public morals

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(Ayubi 1991). Mädinä and Mälikä revealed that they never smoked cigarettes in public, although both were addicted to nicotine owing to the nature of hostess work. They explained that if Uyghurs in the community saw a girl smoking in public, they immediately labelled her a ÂprostituteÊ. Previously, hostesses had been easily recognisable since they had worn make-up and clothes that more obviously evoked the industry; recently, however, hostesses tended to look just like university students, using very little make-up and dressing in casual clothes. It has therefore become harder to tell whether a Uyghur girl out with a Han male in the evening is a hostess, his romantic partner or his work colleague.12 Nonetheless, my respondents lived in acute fear of another Uyghur seeing them emerge from a karaoke bar, an institution recognised across China as an illicit den of immoral activity (cf. Jeffreys 1997, 49 50; Jeffreys 2004, 95). Khalidä related: Once, another hostess and I were coming home from a bar at about midnight, Xinjiang time.13 I bumped straight into a [Uyghur] friend, who was out with her boyfriend. I donÊt know if she saw me coming out of there. I lied and said I had been to call on another friend at home . . . The trouble is, as soon as one person sees you, they tell someone else, and then that person tells someone else . . . You have to do what you can to not get seen. IÊm afraid of being seen even by Uyghurs who donÊt know me. Because they look at you as if to say ÂWhat are you doing out at this hour?Ê The problem is not only of where but at what time a Uyghur girl is seen on the street, particularly if she is unaccompanied by a suitable male escort. ÂDecentÊ Uyghur girls are subject to an evening curfew by parents, who are increasingly anxious to protect urban daughters from immoral pursuits in a rapidly modernising city. In order to prevent their parents coming to know of their activities, many hostesses would join forces. Mädinä and Mälikä explained how girls would tell their parents they were having a sleepover at a female friendÊs house on a given night, then take turns to stay at one anotherÊs homes, so that no one set of parents became overly suspicious on observing their daughterÊs late return every night. The fact that, despite working in close proximity with Han clients, Khalidä used Xinjiang rather than Beijing time tells us much about the strength of her ethnic identity. In 2012 2013, even some Uyghurs who work at the PeopleÊs Courts in Ürümchi, a state institution which officially uses Beijing time, persist in using Xinjiang time (personal communication, Tim Grose). This suggests that workplace interaction with Han Chinese does not in itself determine whether an individual uses Xinjiang or Beijing time; rather, their level of ethnic consciousness does. Indeed, the obstinacy among Uyghurs in using local Xinjiang time may even have contributed to its increased use among Han residents. Visitors to the region have observed that some Han-managed hotels in Ürümchi now use Xinjiang time for check-in purposes (personal communication, Tim Grose). The acute social stigma attached to the hostess industry meant that most urban Uyghurs were keen to disassociate themselves and their social sub-group from

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the activity. Social divides of rural urban, north south and oasis origin, as well as minkaohan minkaomin (Chinese- or Uyghur-educated) background, were invoked to effect this. Räwiä, a minkaohan state employee in her forties, asserted that most hostesses in Ürümchi are from south Xinjiang or Ghulja (Yining, another northern city), insisting: ÂÜrümchi Uyghurs donÊt work here, they work in China proper. Nobody knows them there. The southerners can work in Ürümchi without fear of bumping into relatives or neighbours.Ê Some members of the community suggested that it was predominantly urban minkaohan (Chinese-educated) girls who hostess. Tahirjan, a migrant worker in his thirties from Aqsu in south Xinjiang, argued: Uyghur girls in this city grow up alongside Han girls, who mess about with their [Han] male classmates. Uyghur girls are influenced by them. You know, just as a blackened cooking pot leaves your hands black if you touch it. The Uyghur girls become ÂbrokenÊ [Uy. buzuq, i.e. lose their virginity] and before you know it, theyÊre on the game [involved in sex work]. The implication is that the behaviour of Uyghur minkaohan may over time be affected by the more liberal gender relations they observe among their Han peers in the classroom. The latter are more likely to embark on romantic relationships while still in education; conversely, school-aged Uyghurs are routinely instructed by parents to avoid romantic relationships until they enter the world of work. However, in my conversations with female minkaohan in Ürümchi, the suggestion that it is mainly minkaohan who hostess was firmly rejected. Gülshäm, a highly acculturated minkaohan aged 20 (who spoke very little Uyghur), protested vigorously: ÂHostesses come from Uyghur-medium schools. Girls from Chinesemedium schools donÊt do that, no way!Ê She appeared extremely uncomfortable discussing this in the presence of her father, a minkaohan educated during the Cultural Revolution period, who conversed mainly in Chinese. Gülshäm asserted that such girls have a low educational level (Ch. wenhua shuiping), and thus have few other occupational paths open to them. Her comment corroborates the growing body of data pointing to an adverse employment environment for young urban Uyghurs, particularly those who lack fluency in Chinese. Gülshäm also blamed damaged family relations, arguing that most girls involved in hostess work had not received a solid family education and had Âgone off the railsÊ as a result. According to this argument, then, it is not linguistic acculturation development of Mandarin Chinese as first language, and resultant familiarity with Han culture that leads young Uyghur girls to engage in inappropriate interaction with Han men, but a poor state education (the result of financial constraints associated with a one-parent family) combined with a poor family education (the result of an absent parent). The data gathered on the five hostesses interviewed for this study confirm much of what minkaohan respondents had to say, with one exception. While the hostesses confirmed that Uyghur girls will usually take hostess work in locations other than their hometown, all five were themselves Ürümchi-born and working

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in Ürümchi. The fact that they had ended up undertaking this activity potentially under the noses of Uyghur relatives, neighbours and friends is likely a measure of the depth of desperation each had felt. Having lost (in one way or another) the male provider in the family, none had been able to enter university (where they would have been formally trained in Mandarin Chinese in the first year), and all had consequently struggled to subsist in an urban labour market that rejects all but the most heavily acculturated ethnic minority candidates. In this, the testimonies of minkaohan respondents that hostesses hail from broken families and from minkaomin educational backgrounds (and are therefore disadvantaged in the job market) ring clear and true. As the result of a departed parent, resultant financial difficulties, and a prematurely halted education, all five girls in this study had had to resort to hostess work, which in turn had led to severe conflicts of personal and group identity. The personal shame and social stigma attached to the hostessing profession by the Uyghur community, particularly in an environment charged with inter-ethnic tension, had driven them even to contemplate taking their own lives. Yet each had subsequently picked herself up, dusted herself down and determined to ÂuseÊ the hostess industry as a means to improve her future social position and that of her ethnic group, as we shall see below. The fact that the girls spoke mainly in Chinese or code-switched when talking about the details of the hostessing profession demonstrates that they placed this activity firmly in a Han linguistic and cultural frame of reference, creating a moral distance; that the girls reverted to speaking entirely in Uyghur when describing their feelings or when distressed suggests on the other hand that they derived a sense of cultural belonging and emotional comfort from the use of the mother tongue.

Reconfiguring morality: religious and ethno-political boundaries Any study centred on Uyghur hostesses who work with Han clients must address the question of morality management, in both religious and ethno-political terms. Certainly, religious considerations were frequently cited by urban Uyghurs in their censure of the profession. Dilbär, for instance, described her motherÊs reaction on seeing a Uyghur girl standing outside a bar with a Han male: ÂMy mum was furious. Because those places arenÊt halal; and she was going inside . . . with a Han!Ê But how do hostesses reconcile themselves with the Islamic component of their identities? In her studies of rural migrant hostesses in China proper, Zheng Tiantian used the phrase Ânew moral visionÊ to describe how Han respondents fundamentally revised standards of right and wrong with regard to Confucian mores of female propriety. Within that vision, the deliberate commodification of romance, the body and intimacy is Âtransformed from a denigration of female virtue into a route to empowermentÊ (Zheng 2008, 459). This process takes place in a context where rural hostesses have learned from painful experience that female purity is appreciated neither by urban men nor by society at large.

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Within orthodox Islamic law (including Sunni schools of jurisprudence), marriage is the central institution for Âsanctioned erotic pleasureÊ. As such, it defines premarital and extramarital sex by men and women as practices defiling the sanctity of the marital union (Gutiérrez 2012, 156). Because of the shame attached to an unmarried Muslim woman Âopening her faceÊ to a man who is not a blood relative, my respondents struggled with their conscience when entering the industry, and that struggle continued well beyond the first act of religious ÂbetrayalÊ. Mädinä and Mälikä confirmed that they had bitterly reproached themselves at first, on the grounds that they were Muslims. Mädinä described how she had studied at a religious school (Uy. mäktäp) when she was of primary school age, and had kneeled behind her grandmother as the latter prayed. She retained a crystal clear memory of her grandmotherÊs loud and sonorous intonation of the prayers (Uy. namaz). Both girls denied any suggestion that they enjoyed the recreation afforded by hostess work (an admission made by some Han hostesses; see Gil et al. 1996, 144), and both vowed to give up drinking and smoking once they had earned enough money to change career, stating: ÂThat will be a new start in every way.Ê According to convention, a hostess can refuse to perform genital or oral sex acts (Zheng 2004, 128). This creates an important means for Uyghur hostesses to draw moral boundaries, based on religion, in relation both to Han clients and to Han hostesses. Mädinä grimaced as she explained: ÂSome clients want to grope (Ch. luanmo) your breasts and thighs, or kiss you; but not all [Uyghur] girls will do that.Ê Mälikä, for example, reported that she did not Âgo off stageÊ, and never allowed clients to ÂmaulÊ her. While her customers sometimes lost their temper as a result, for Mälikä, this produced a good result, since they would frequently decide that she was Âtoo prim and properÊ and dismiss her after paying the basic fee. Although some customers offered her as much as 10,000 yuan for sex calling it Âan investment for her futureÊ she always refused. As she noted: ÂItÊs important to be a virgin in Uyghur culture. If the family of the groom finds youÊre not a virgin on your wedding night, itÊs a big problem.Ê I would suggest that, in fiercely protecting their chastity vis-à-vis Han clients, my respondents deliberately underlined ethnic and religious group membership. Thus, Mälikä was in a position to assert: ÂI donÊt believe I have let myself down in any way [. . .] I have nothing to reproach myself for.Ê She succeeded in Âtaking the moral high groundÊ while simultaneously Âoccupying the economic low groundÊ, to borrow OtisÊs (2008, 370) phrase. While it appears that some Uyghur hostesses, possibly those who are hardened to the character of the industry, are less strict with regard to sexual fondling, even they maintain certain limits. Tunisa complained of Âuneducated and lewdÊ Han customers, who would ÂmaulÊ a girl without even speaking to her. While she admitted that once drunk (an occupational hazard), she might let clients touch her breasts or kiss her cheek, she was clear that she would never allow a Han client to kiss her mouth, because Âthey are not Muslims and they eat porkÊ. Mädinä gave the same reason for her refusal to sleep with Han clients, raising the further problem that Han clients are not circumcised. This culturally conservative behaviour often caused Han hostesses to remark that the Uyghur girls did not know how to

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have fun (Ch. bu hui wanr). At such times, Mädinä and Mälikä would evoke the counter-stereotype that Han people are introverts and killjoys, a charge based on the relative disinclination among Han people to perform (dance) for others (Smith Finley 2013a). Where a Uyghur hostess did consent to sleep with a Han client, that individual often had an extraordinary motivation. Khalidä slept (as a virgin) with a Han client out of desperation to raise money for her brotherÊs medical care. A friend of MädinäÊs slept with Han clients regularly because she had epilepsy, and needed money to purchase her medication. On the other hand, some Uyghur hostesses occasionally slept with a Muslim client, though this was rarely with the intent of earning money alone. As Zheng notes, ÂidealÊ exit strategies for Han hostesses include becoming an independent businesswoman, marrying a client, or becoming the mistress (Ch. ernai) of a wealthy client (2004, 142). These strategies hovered also in the minds of my respondents. I have earlier described MädinäÊs aspiration to buy a car and become a private-hire driver. She also mentioned that she had come to genuinely care for certain of her Muslim clients, and to hope she might have a future with them. For instance, while hostessing in Kunming, she had met a Turkish jade merchant. As she related: I didnÊt sleep with him right away, only after IÊd ÂsatÊ with him four or five times. But then I slept with him for 1,500 yuan, and he got a bad impression of me, thinking I did that sort of thing all the time. But I genuinely liked him, so the second time I slept with him I didnÊt take his money. And his attitude began to change. On another occasion in Ürümchi, Mädinä had become acquainted with a Tajik client from Central Asia, who worked as a commercial airline pilot. She confessed that she had Âutterly fallen for himÊ, and, again, slept with him for no charge: He really liked me. You know, Islam allows men to take four or five wives? Well, he had a wife in Tajikistan. But he wanted to make me his second wife and ÂkeepÊ me in a flat here in Ürümchi. He said I wouldnÊt need to hostess any longer, that he would pay for everything I needed. Mädinä had even taken this lover back to her grandfatherÊs house (Uy. chong öy), although she had not dared to tell the old man the truth, introducing the pilot only as a ÂfriendÊ. In this way, Uyghur hostesses sometimes sought to render their activities Âsustainable in ethical termsÊ and emotionally bearable by keeping a regular client with whom they had the possibility of a long-term relationship, a strategy also observed in southeast Asia (cf. Lindquist 2010, 297). One might surmise that the religious boundaries drawn by these hostesses in relation to Han clients are the natural outcome of a minkaomin education, assumed to be less secularised than an education received in Mandarin Chinese. Yet the reality is far less clear-cut. For one thing, although minkaomin students received their education in the Uyghur language from native Uyghur teachers, the curriculum

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they studied will likely have been as devoid of religious content as that studied in minkaohan classrooms. It is more likely that the hostessesÊ religious knowledge was absorbed in the family home during childhood, as in the case of MädinäÊs observations of her grandmother. Furthermore, that knowledge will have deepened in the current climate of re-Islamisation in the Uyghur community at large. At the time when I interviewed the girls, MädinäÊs step-mother (her grandfatherÊs second wife) had embarked on a self-taught Quranic education, and prayed by herself at home five times a day. I had never observed this person pray over the 15 months I knew her back in 1996. Another explanation is that the religious boundary put in place when dealing with Han clients is to at least some extent politically motivated. After all, it can disappear when interacting with a Muslim client, although Islam strictly proscribes pre-marital and extra-marital sex.

Discussion and conclusions In this chapter I have documented the backgrounds and experiences of Uyghur hostesses in Ürümchi, and explored how they make sense of social, ethnic and religious identities. Based on my limited sample of five case studies, there is no evidence to suggest, as some members of the Uyghur community argue, that hostesses originate particularly from rural or urban Xinjiang, or from north or south. What does emerge is that girls can work more easily when operating outside of their hometown, since this allows them to evade the social supervision of parents and communities. Even so, this does not prevent some Uyghur hostesses from working in their home cities when in severe financial straits, as my case studies demonstrate: all five women are Ürümchi-born. Regarding the popular assertion that minkaohan (Chinese-educated) women are more likely to enter this profession, data collected for this study casts doubt. It appears that better-educated and highly acculturated minkaohan are more likely than minkaomin to consider a genuine romantic relationship with Han schoolmates or colleagues. My earlier study on Uyghur Han inter-ethnic courtship corroborates this claim (Smith Finley 2013b). However, minkaohan assign the ÂimmoralÊ world of hostessing firmly to the socially ÂdamagedÊ (those from broken families) and to minkaomin, whom they perceive as less well educated owing to their only partial fluency in Chinese and their education in less well-funded Uyghurmedium schools. It is notable that all five women interviewed for this study hail from broken families and are minkaomin. At a time when a strict community taboo outlaws Uyghur Han intermarriage, what does it mean when Uyghur females consent to work in close proximity to Han males in a sexually liberal environment? How far does it signal the collapse of inter-ethnic boundaries constructed by Uyghurs to claim cultural and moral superiority vis-à-vis Han Chinese? My sample suggests that young Uyghur women become involved in hostessing at times of severe economic need, often following the loss of the family head through death or divorce. They rarely have a university degree, although some use income from hostessing to fund university studies in the present or future. Having no degree, they fall victim to ethnically

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ordered employment discrimination in Han-dominated urban Xinjiang, where Han employers prefer Uyghur minkaohan (Chinese-educated) candidates over minkaomin (Uyghur-educated) candidates, and many will not countenance hiring Uyghurs at all. These young women resort to hostess work in the absence of more gainful employment, or in addition to their day job, as a means to pay the bills, become socially mobile or amass disposable income. For my Ürümchi respondents, as for ZhengÊs (2004; 2008) Han rural migrant hostesses, the industry is a temporary means to an end. Fully aware that their ethnic group is disadvantaged by employment realities in urban Xinjiang, these young Uyghur women justify what is seen by the broader Uyghur community (especially males) as an act of Âethnic betrayalÊ as a defendable drive for upward social mobility. A key point to emerge is the gap between simply subsisting and having disposable income that might be invested towards personal social improvement (and, by extension, improvement of the social position of the Uyghur ethnic group). This may take the form of ownership of material/consumer goods, establishment of an independent business or the pursuit of a white-collar career. Surrounded by Han peers who are better off and better able to consume a range of aesthetically pleasing products, some young Uyghur women aspire to do the same. For those who lack full fluency in Chinese or a sufficiently high level of education, the Ârice bowl of youthÊ (Ch. qingchun fan 青春饭; Wang 2000, 73) may be viewed as the only way to achieve this. Hostess work simultaneously constitutes a moral ÂsacrificeÊ (here, a crossing of ethnic and religious boundaries) and a Âstepping stoneÊ towards a young Uyghur womanÊs life goals (cf. Zheng 2007). So what does the decision to enter the hostess industry say about these young womenÊs sense of ethnic identity, and how do their experiences within that industry further impact on their level of ethnic awareness? Below I will discuss factors mitigating towards a weak and negative ethnic identity before going on to assess those that suggest a strong and positive one. First, a core contingency leading to a potentially negative ethnic identity is the nature of these girlsÊ broken family background. Several have been affected by heroin abuse among male relatives, including brothers and boyfriends. While this pathology can to a degree be seen sympathetically as the Uyghur male response to dwindling chances, since the 1990s, of political independence, for female relatives it translates into an absence of male support and dependability and a severely compromised financial situation. Some fathers may be absent owing to arrest (even execution) for becoming involved in political separatist activities. Again, while a sympathetic view might cast these men as honourable martyrs, their actions may be viewed by Uyghur women (traditionally more practical when it comes to questions of the UyghursÊ future within the Chinese nation-state) as a failure to put family before ethnonational politics. The girls interviewed for this study had also formed negative views of Uyghur menfolk and possibly of norms governing male female interaction within Uyghur culture as a result of their abuse by male relatives and boyfriends, and the fact of continuing high levels of divorce in Uyghur society. Another potential source of low self-esteem among these girls is the ethnic discrimination suffered by all Uyghurs in the spheres of language use, education

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and employment, although this may conversely lead to a strengthening of ethnic awareness (see below). Having once entered the hostess industry (and decided to stay there despite the possibility of getting work in the service industries), it could be argued that these girls value consumer goods and money over their ethnic dignity. Indeed, the fact that they knowingly continue to place themselves in a position where some Han clients will subject them to ethnically-based humiliation could be construed as a sign of low self-esteem in group terms and frequently is construed as such by male members of the Uyghur community. Yet my sample also produced much evidence to the contrary. The girlsÊ deep awareness of Islamic cultural mores, their keen desire to conceal their night-time activities from their families and the Uyghur community, and their deployment of a superior cultural morality in the face of Han clients and Han hostesses suggest a robust Uyghur ethnic identity, in which religion is the core element. Their indignation when faced with ethnic discrimination in the labour market demonstrates a keen awareness of inter-ethnic inequality. Meanwhile, their determination to do whatever it takes to better themselves, support their families and achieve upward mobility suggests a strong sense of self-respect at both the individual and the group level. Khalidä described how some Han customers would tell Uyghur hostesses that they should Âforget any idea of taking an equal place in this societyÊ. Yet when I asked whether she ended up believing them, she was clear: ÂNo. We have to do whatever we can to educate ourselves and match them.Ê MälikäÊs response was equally defiant: ÂIf you believe them, thatÊs the end of self-confidence, and the end of any chance of bettering yourself.Ê Asked whether they considered themselves Âservants to the HanÊ (as charged by many Uyghur males), Mädinä and MälikäÊs counter-argument was convincing: ÂWell, even if we work somewhere else scrubbing dishes or making beds, arenÊt we still being servants to the Han? WhatÊs the difference?Ê Furthermore, the more savvy of the five took advantage of the hostess scenario to reverse the ethnic hierarchy and mock unwitting Han males on both linguistic and cultural levels. The position taken up by the girls in my sample is perhaps most neatly described in this final comment from Khalidä: Where is my sense of ethnic self-respect? Everything IÊve done, IÊve done for my brother, my mother and my sisters. What will happen to us, to me, if I donÊt do this work? If I donÊt get myself a college education, how will I support my family? If my cultural level remains low, how will it be for my family, for Uyghurs as an ethnic group? We will always be inferior! What IÊm doing is the best I can do, for myself, and for the Uyghurs as a group.

Notes 1 While courtship and marriage with an out-group member (non-Muslim) are frequently frowned upon in Muslim societies, it is important to note that romantic and sexual relations with an in-group (Muslim) man are equally proscribed when taking place prior to marriage. 2 Sanpei denotes Âthree accompanimentsÊ, and refers variously to chatting, singing, dancing, lighting of cigarettes (and smoking), and pouring of drinks (and drinking). It may

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5

6 7

8

9

10 11 12

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also include heavy petting or sex. Cf. Jeffreys 1997, 50; Xin 1999, 1,412, 1,427 8; Wang 2000, 74; Sun 2002, 191; Otis 2008, 366. RespondentsÊ names are changed to protect their identities. Until quite recently, a brideÊs mother-in-law would check the marital sheets for blood on the morning after a wedding. My Uyghur respondents in the mid-1990s acknowledged the continuation of this practice in some families, and described how a bridegroom might cut himself and let his own blood onto the sheets to protect his brideÊs honour (Smith 1999). While young Uyghurs tend to deny the existence of this practice in the 2000s (personal communication, Tim Grose), in some cases this may stem from a desire to appear ÂmodernÊ. While middle school education is free (no tuition fees), the miscellaneous costs relating to uniforms, books and other materials may prevent some Uyghur families from sending their children to school. For similar cases in which Han women became hostesses after being humiliated by their loverÊs family and/or abandoned by their lover, see Zheng 2008, 457 8. This is common practice throughout China, reflecting the marketisation of healthcare in the reform era. This particular refusal did not occur because the patient was a drug addict, nor because he was a Uyghur (i.e. it was not based on social or ethnic discrimination). In 2012 and 2013, increasing numbers of Uyghur female street cleaners could be observed on Xinhua nanlu and Gongyuan beilu in Ürümchi, areas dominated by Han residents (personal communication, Tim Grose). This suggests that adverse socioeconomic circumstances in Uyghur families (where males suffer a high unemployment rate) are increasingly driving the womenfolk to take formerly unthinkable work roles. It is instructive that such work is being undertaken in Han rather than Uyghur residential areas, implying a desire to avoid the negative social stigma attached to it by the Uyghur community. Probably, MädinäÊs boyfriend would not have allowed her to do hostess work (open her face to men), even had she wanted to. However, I did hear of occasional cases where male partners Han and Uyghur encouraged their girlfriends to augment the coupleÊs income through hostessing. See also Hasmath 2012, who provides statistical data on labour choices among urban Uyghurs. Respondents were paid 100 yuan per hour of interview, a ÂwageÊ consistent with that they would have earned while hostessing. It should be noted that, for some Uyghurs, there is little difference (in terms of shame) between ÂaccompanyingÊ a Han male for money and embarking on a genuine, romantic relationship with him. ÂXinjiang timeÊ, which is two hours behind ÂBeijing timeÊ, is the local time corresponding to the topographical position of the XUAR, and is used by Uyghurs and other Central Asian groups who consider themselves indigenous to the region (Smith 2002; Bellér-Hann 2002; Bovingdon 2010; Smith Finley 2013a).

References Ayubi, Nazih N. 1991. Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. London & New York: Routledge. Bellér-Hann, Ildikó. 2002. „Temperamental Neighbours: Uighur Han Relations in Xinjiang, Northwest China.‰ In Imagined Differences: Hatred and the Construction of Identity, edited by Günther Schlee. Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 57 81.

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Bovingdon, Gardner. 2010. The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. New York: Columbia University Press. Dautcher, Jay Todd. 2004. „Public Health and Social Pathologies in Xinjiang.‰ In Xinjiang: ChinaÊs Muslim Borderland, edited by S. Frederick Starr. New York & London: M.E. Sharpe, 276 98. Do, Tess. 2006. „Bargirls and Street Cinderella: Women, Sex and Prostitution in Le HoangÊs Commercial Films.‰ Asian Studies Review 30: 175 88. Gil, Vincent E., Marco S. Wang, Allen F. Anderson, Guo Matthew Lin and Zongjian Oliver Wu. 1996. „Prostitutes, Prostitution and STD/HIV Transmission in Mainland China.‰ Social Science & Medicine 42(1): 141 52. Gutiérrez, Ramón A. 2012. „Introduction: Islam and Sexuality.‰ Social Identities 18(2): 155 9. Hasmath, Reza. 2012. „Migration, Labour and the Rise of Ethno-Religious Consciousness among Uyghurs in Urban Xinjiang.‰ Journal of Sociology 1440783312459101, first published 3 October. Hershatter, Gail. 1996. „Chinese Sex Workers in the Reform Period.‰ In Putting Class in its Place: Worker Identities in East Asia, edited by Elizabeth J. Perry. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 199 224. Jeffreys, Elaine. 1997. „ ÂDangerous AmusementsÊ: Prostitution and Karaoke Halls in Contemporary China.‰ Asian Studies Review 20(3): 43 54. Jeffreys, Elaine. 2004. „Feminist Prostitution Debates: Are There Any Sex Workers in China?‰ In Chinese Women: Living and Working, edited by Anne E. McLaren. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 83 105. Jeffreys, Elaine. 2008. „Advanced Producers or Moral Polluters? ChinaÊs BureaucratEntrepreneurs and Sexual Corruption.‰ In The New Rich in China: Future Rulers, Present Lives, edited by David S. G. Goodman. London: Routledge, 243 91. Lindquist, Johan. 2010. „Putting Ecstasy to Work: Pleasure, Prostitution, and Inequality in the Indonesian Borderlands.‰ Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 17: 280 303. Otis, Eileen M. 2008. „The Dignity of Working Women: Service, Sex and the Labor Politics of Localization in ChinaÊs City of Eternal Spring.‰ American Behavioral Scientist 52(3): 356 76. Smith, Joanne N. 1999. Changing Uyghur Identities in Xinjiang in the 1990s. PhD diss., University of Leeds, UK. ···. 2002. „Making Culture Matter: Symbolic, Spatial, and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese.‰ Asian Ethnicity 3(2): 153 74. Smith Finley, Joanne. 2013a. The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and Uyghur-Han Relations in Contemporary Xinjiang. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing. Smith Finley, Joanne. 2013b. „Contesting Harmony in TV Drama: Ethnic Intermarriage in Xinjiang Girls.‰ In On the Fringes of the Harmonious Society: Tibetans and Uyghurs in Socialist China, edited by Ildikó Bellér-Hann and Trine Brox. Copenhagen, Denmark: NIAS Press, 263 92. Sun Wanning. 2002. „Invisible Entrepreneurs: The Case of Anhui Women.‰ Provincial China 7(2): 178 95. Wang Zheng. 2000. „Gender, Employment and WomenÊs Resistance.‰ In Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, edited by Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden. London: Routledge, 62 82. Xin Ren. 1999. „Prostitution and Economic Modernization in China.‰ Violence against Women 5(12): 1,411 36.

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Zhang Heqing. 2006. „Female Sex Sellers and Public Policy in the PeopleÊs Republic of China.‰ In Sex and Sexuality in China, edited by Elaine Jeffreys. London: Routledge, 139 58. Zhang Xingkui. 2011. „Men, Masculinities and Power in Contemporary China: Reflections on the Phenomenon of Bao Ernai.‰ In Sexuality, Gender and Power: Intersectional and Transnational Perspectives, edited by Anna G. Jonasdottir, Valerie Bryson and Kathleen B. Jones. London: Routledge, 142 57. Zheng Tiantian. 2004. „From Peasant Women to Bar Hostess: Gender and Modernity in Dalian.‰ In On the Move: Women in Rural-Urban Migration in Contemporary China, edited by Arianne M. Gaetano and Tamara Jacka. New York: Columbia University Press, 124 44. Zheng Tiantian. 2006. „Cool Masculinity: Male ClientsÊ Sex Consumption and Business Alliance in Urban ChinaÊs Sex Industry.‰ Journal of Contemporary China 15(46): 161 82. Zheng Tiantian. 2007. „Performing Media-Constructed Images for First-class Citizenship: Political Struggles of Rural Migrant Hostesses in Dalian.‰ Critical Asian Studies 39(1): 89 120. Zheng Tiantian. 2008. „Commodifying Romance and Searching for Love: Rural Migrant Bar HostessesÊ Moral Vision in Post-Mao Dalian.‰ Modern China 34(4): 442 76. Zheng Tiantian. 2009. „State Management of the Sex Industry in ChinaÊs Past and Present.‰ In Managing Gender Diversity in Asia: A Research Companion, edited by Mustafa F. Özbilgin and Jawad Syed. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 250 70. Zheng, Tiantian. 2010. „Anti-Trafficking Campaigns and the Sex Industry in Urban China.‰ In Sex-Trafficking, Human Rights, and Social Justice, edited by Tiantian Zheng. London: Routledge, 84 101. Zheng Tiantian. 2011. „Sex Work and the State in Contemporary China.‰ In Policing Pleasure: Sex Work, Policy, and the State in Global Perspective, edited by Susan Dewey and Patty Kelly. New York and London: New York University Press, 45 58.

Conclusion The importance of being Uyghur Gardner Bovingdon

Importance of the book This book is important and timely. First, it showcases ethnographic and textual research among Uyghurs in a period when scholarsÊ access to the region is exceptionally difficult. The richly detailed chapters provide a textured and complex understanding of people often reduced to snapshots and sketch portraits. Second, and relatedly, this complexity is important given the depictions in Chinese and even international media of Manichaean struggles between ÂgoodÊ and ÂbadÊ Uyghurs and between Uyghurs and Hans. In this book we encounter individuals making thoughtful choices about their own lives and their relationships to larger collectivities, declining to be pawns in larger political games and yet unable to evade completely the influence of those games on their lives. The focus of the chapters is pressure and how individuals respond to it. Uyghurs are under extraordinary pressure these days: cultural, linguistic, religious, demographic, and political. Many Hans view Uyghurs suspiciously, especially after the Ürümchi riots of July 2009, as at least potential religious fanatics and terrorists.1 Uyghurs are increasingly subjected to the rigours of a market economy in transition from high to medium growth, and a growth in which few Uyghurs have yet participated fully. Unemployment is nearly epidemic, and discrimination against Uyghurs in cities makes finding formal work in urban settings hard if not impossible. Uyghurs who speak their mother tongue fluently but Chinese not so well face discrimination because Hans regard imperfect or accented Chinese as a sign of lack of education and ÂbackwardnessÊ, and seem to be flummoxed by UyghursÊ use of their own language.2 Further, in spite of decades of official multiculturalism, notably enshrined in the PRC Constitution, most Hans continue to believe that their culture is superior to all others represented in China, and regard UyghursÊ pride in their own culture as a sign of narrow-mindedness or ignorance: how could anyone with the chance to absorb Chinese language and culture make any other choice?3 But if the pressures on Uyghurs as a whole are strong, they are especially so for Uyghur urban youths. With adult Uyghurs, the government appears to expect only that they stop undesirable behaviours like openly practising Islam or protesting against state policies they dislike; Uyghur youths are all taken as problems and construction projects (social work cases?). They have certain imputed pathologies,

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and they need to be educated and shaped out of them. They must shed their religiosity. They are expected to acknowledge that Chinese is their ÂnationalÊ language and the language of modernity, and that to become modern and full citizens they must leave their ÂbackwardÊ language behind. In fact, Uyghur youths face a double pressure, because while Chinese society expects them to assimilate and yet continues to view them with suspicion for not being fully Chinese, Uyghur society suspects them of betraying their own culture and people, and no longer being fully Uyghur. That is a nearly impossible situation. What was once the special burden and dilemma of the so-called minkaohan (Taynen 2006; Smith Finley 2007) now confronts an entire cohort of Uyghur youths being educated in Chinese-language schools; the problem is especially acute for students in the Xinjiang Classes (see Chen and Grose in this volume) and for the Uyghur hostesses described by Smith Finley (Chapter 9 in this volume). The authors of the chapters admirably avoid oversimplifying this complex situation. Beijing is often criticised simplistically for forcing Uyghurs and Tibetans to abandon their cultures and assimilate to Han majority culture; some even condemn Beijing for ethnocide. However, the actual situation is far more complicated. Even in the post-2004 era, after the merging of all minzu and Han schools, the education system in Xinjiang is not purely assimilative. The system allows Uyghurs to learn and use their language, if certainly not to the full extent many might wish. By the same token, many observers paint the choices facing Uyghurs in starkly binary terms: either assimilate or resist, with no room in between. The chapters in this book illustrate that individual Uyghur youths have sought and developed strategies for accommodating the pressure to master the Chinese language and absorb aspects of Chinese culture, without leaving their own behind or ceasing to identify as Uyghurs. As individuals, they appear to themselves and their interlocutors as complex beings. They negotiate with themselves, their families and friends, schoolmates and teachers, and wider society. This is particularly well drawn in the chapters by Chen, Grose, and Smith Finley. In Chapters 7 and 8, Chen Yangbin and Tim Grose consider the ÂXinjiang class.Ê Chen notes the striking disjuncture between the idealised images of Hans that Uyghur students absorb from textbooks and lectures, and the more negative impressions they form over several years of real-life interactions with Hans in and out of class. These negative impressions develop partly in reaction to the suspicion Uyghurs encounter from Hans, who are influenced by the partial official coverage of sporadic violence in Xinjiang. By contrast, Grose finds that despite feeling that the Xinjiang class and personal religious observances were regulated too tightly, Uyghur students found the atmosphere and job prospects in ChinaÊs heartland more congenial than those at home, and chose not to return to Xinjiang. These classes were ostensibly established to give Uyghur students educational opportunities hard to find in Xinjiang, and to instill in them Chinese cultural values and identifications. Both Chen and Grose found that, contrary to official intentions, the classes strengthened studentsÊ Uyghur (as opposed to Chinese) identities and stimulated many individuals to become more religiously observant. In Chapter 9, Smith Finley shows

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how Uyghur female informants who have worked as hostesses feel pressures from the wider society not to socialise, let alone have sex, with Han men. These women Âjustify what is seen by the broader Uyghur community (especially males) as an act of „ethnic betrayal‰ as a defendable drive for upward social mobility.Ê Here, an especially noteworthy aspect of collective identification is the imputed claims of the group over individualsÊ behaviour: Âas a member of us, you are not allowed to behave in thus and such a way.Ê Many advocates of individual (human) rights view assertions of collective rights skeptically for just this reason: someone may invoke the rights of the group to foreclose or prevent individualsÊ claiming of their own rights (Kymlicka 2001). In Smith FinleyÊs study, young Uyghur women insist on their prior individual right to benefit themselves and seek personal growth; more than that, they claim the right to their own persons (and bodies), the right to be more than a pawn in a game of ethnic conflict. In so doing, they refuse to be a female chattel of the patriarchal corporate entity called the ÂUyghur ethnonational group.Ê

Rising ethnic consciousness The editors assert in the Introduction (Chapter 1) that Âethnic consciousness has increased on a dramatic scale among the Xinjiang Uyghurs since the 1990s. Scholars report a growing discontent against a range of state policies (and in some cases Chinese rule itself), and there is an acute sense of separation between Us (Uyghurs) and Them (Han Chinese).Ê I wonder immediately whether the discontent is a good index of rising consciousness, and whether the acute sense of separation demonstrates a rising rather than a steady state. In Chapter 2, Zang Xiaowei identifies the key indicators for this trend as religious belief and fluency in the Uyghur language. Let us assume that we can reach agreement on how to define a term like ethnic identity, awareness, or consciousness. No one has yet hit upon a widely accepted way to measure ethnic awareness, consciousness, or nationalism. Thus, each scholarÊs measure is idiosyncratic and not strictly comparable. Add to this the problem that demonstrating rising consciousness requires accurate timeseries data, which we simply do not have. Abdelal et al. propose that we discipline the study of identity and make case studies more comparable by replacing attempts to gauge the intensity of identities with measures of their contestation the extent to which members of a given group agree (or disagree) on the meaning of their shared identity (Abdelal et al. 2006). Lisa Wedeen argues, perhaps a little too peremptorily, that it is Âimpossible to get into peopleÊs heads, to discern what a „strongly binding‰ allegiance is and how it differs from a „loosely structured,‰ mildly constraining [one] . . . except insofar as such sensibilities relate to observable actionÊ (Wedeen 2008, 281).4 But herein lies a challenge for scholars working with Uyghurs: the structure of governance in Xinjiang and securitisation measures resulting from the PartyÊs strong suspicion that many Uyghurs might be disloyal (too religious, not patriotic enough, unwilling to abandon a wish for independence, and therefore prone to violence) have drastically limited UyghursÊ horizons, their ambits of action.

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Hence the importance of a set of fairly subtle and ostensibly non-political individual actions whether to study Chinese seriously, how to read Chinese history, whether to settle in Xinjiang or the Central Plains or emigrate; whether to maintain religious observance; and so on. In the end, scholars infer identity and affiliation from these actions, and use them to predict the potential for other actions. Perhaps we do not need a scale of consciousness or awareness or identity to establish that many Uyghurs have felt, and continue to feel, a strong affinity for the collective group. In Roger BrubakerÊs terms, they feel strong identification with the group, or ÂgroupnessÊ (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). What is of interest to the various chapter authors are the implications of that identification. How do young Uyghurs conceive of that groupness? What obligations and expectations do they feel in relation to the group? How and why is it important to them to identify with the group, and what might be the stakes of leaving it, or being abandoned by it? As we think further about the relationship between UyghursÊ collective identities as Uyghurs and as Chinese, we may want to take into account the suggestion raised by Tang Wenfang and He Gaochao, based on a survey conducted in 2006 2007, that Uyghurs and Tibetans (along with other non-Hans) evinced a strong Âethnic identityÊ and Ânational identityÊ, and indeed stronger identification with the nation than seen among members of minorities in the US and Russia (Tang and He 2010, 42).5

What of identity? Why, ultimately, does it matter how strongly Uyghurs identify with their group and whether they also identify as members of the ÂChinese nationÊ (Ch. Zhonghua minzu)? I think it matters for a number of reasons. First, scholars have long been interested in how states have attempted to integrate Ânational minoritiesÊ into the body politic, and how those minorities have responded to this attempt. In Chapter 3, David Tobin shows that XinjiangÊs so-called Âbilingual educationÊ policies - a misnomer for a system that requires Uyghurs to learn and use Chinese, without imposing any corresponding requirement that Hans learn some Uyghur - deliver to Uyghurs the message that they are Âbackward,Ê and that Chinese culture and language are their sole path to modernity. Tobin nicely shows that instead of either embracing this proposition or rejecting it outright, many Uyghur students have negotiated their own paths, learning Chinese but also maintaining strong Uyghur communities. Second, it matters to Uyghurs themselves. Many clearly feel that their collective inheritance history, language, culture, religion is a precious possession no one must deny or take away from them, but also recognise that if they ÂclingÊ to their collective identity, they will continue to be seen as a problem, and to endure pressure and suspicion. At the same time they feel pressure from the Uyghur community to belong and not to be Âethnic traitorsÊ (Smith Finley 2007). Chapter 4 by Ablimit Baki Elterish illustrates this quandary, demonstrating that even Uyghur students who have attended Chinesemedium schools from earliest childhood retain some fluency in Uyghur and continue to use the language with family and close friends. In Chapter 5, Mamtimyn

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Sunuodula goes beyond this linguistic binary to show how many Uyghur youths reject the supposition that learning Chinese is their sole avenue to modernity and cosmopolitanism, instead seeking out English classes and learning the language with impressive speed and accuracy. Third, it matters to ChinaÊs leaders, who worry that if Uyghurs continue to identify strongly as Uyghurs, they will correspondingly refuse to identify with China and the ÂChinese nationÊ. It has become increasingly clear that Beijing regards the collective identities of Tibetans and Uyghurs as a problem of state security (Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe 2011). In the chapters of this book, we encounter a series of policies that seek to transform UyghursÊ collective identifications, through invitation and compulsion: by requiring them to learn Chinese, forcibly weaning them off their religious practice (and belief), and scattering them in small groups into Han-dominated areas where they can finally properly experience their ÂminorityÊ status and recognise the inevitability and rightness of their full assimilation. As Janina Feyel reminds us, even the writing of history textbooks appears to serve BeijingÊs securitising goals. In Chapter 6 in this volume, she writes cautiously that Âseparatist ideas which challenge Chinese national unity are one reason for the rather frequent reference to Uyghurs in the textbooksÊ. Revealing the construction of an official Chinese history that allots Uyghurs and Xinjiang minor and carefully distinguished parts in a drama centred on Hans and the Chinese heartland, she notes both the frequent ÂmisrepresentationÊ of Uyghur historical figures and the marked omission of episodes of Uyghur-Han conflict (to give the impression of a history of harmonious interactions). Fourth, it matters to outside observers interested in the governance challenges Beijing faces. The PRC government is already grappling with increasingly widespread Han-led protests over land requisitions, environmental problems such as air and water pollution, an inevitable economic slowdown that seems to have begun in the last year, and various international challenges to BeijingÊs global ambitions.

Nationality or ethnicity? The editors and most of the authors in this volume have referred to Âethnic identityÊ and Âethnic groupsÊ throughout. But we should ask whether this is appropriate. The problem stems in part, but only in part, from the unstable and polysemous term minzu. This Âlinguistic „chameleon‰ Ê maps onto multiple English words, from nation to nationality to ÂraceÊ to ethnic group (Leibold 2007, 8). Because of its ambiguity, a number of scholars have chosen not to translate the term, instead maintaining it in its original Chinese form. The phrase Âethnic groupÊ conjures an entity that fits within a state; ÂnationÊ suggests something that might merit its own state and have a right to self-determination. If we must translate it, perhaps the term Âethnonational groupÊ is better, as it avoids deciding an issue of political interpretation. In fact, one of the main sources of frustration and alarm among ChinaÊs leaders is that they have not yet persuaded most Uyghurs (or Tibetans or Mongols) to

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see themselves as merely ethnic. Many Uyghurs continue to believe they are members of a Uyghur nation, and that their history, culture, and language are their national heritage, not simply ethnic peculiarities, regional characteristics, or local colour. BeijingÊs protracted quest for a way to change that is the principal motivation for many of the policies described in the chapters of this book. When we turn to the words with which Uyghurs identify their people, nation, and homeland, we must recognise that their mother-tongue etymologies and semantic fields are vastly different from the Chinese-language terms above. Millät (nation), of course, came from the Ottoman empire, where it designated the different faith communities, each with a distinctive place in that empire. It was redeployed by the Soviets in Central Asia to draw distinctions among the many Turkic-speaking Muslims and ward off the threat of Pan-Turkism (Roy 2000, 52 and passim). Chinese Communists followed Soviet practice, right down to the categories of Turkic peoples (Rudelson 1997, 6). One reason this matters is that even were Beijing to decide to stop referring to Uyghurs and Tibetans and the 53 other Others as minzu, we can be quite confident that Uyghurs would continue to refer to themselves as a millät. Even Uyghurs fluent only in Chinese would likely retain these vital tokens of collective identity and land a kind of linguistic last stand. To put it most plainly, many if not most Uyghurs believe they are members of a nation, not merely an ethnic group, and no amount of Chinese language study, official historical discourse, religious repression, or political pressure is likely to persuade them otherwise.

Pressure to belong Here is the subtlest and yet the most important aim of Chinese policies toward Uyghurs: Beijing wants them to feel they belong to China, and to the ÂChinese nationÊ. All the other policy foci, whether language, medium of education, or religiosity, converge on this ultimate goal. And both scholars and leaders realise that no policy, no force, can compel Uyghurs to feel they belong. This is the hidden implication of the often-repeated formula that Âminzu problemsÊ are complicated and will last for a very long time. But the other problem facing Uyghurs is like that of African Americans and other minority groups around the world, what Ernest Gellner calls Âentropy-resistant characteristicsÊ: they are compelled to belong, and at the same time prevented from fully doing so (Gellner 1983). As that scholar observes in another essay, Âthose excluded from a welcoming incorporation in the given culture will have ample motive for seeking some rival identification. In other words . . . some alternative nationalismÊ (Gellner 1995, 245). UyghursÊ distinctive physical features lead police to stop them at transportation hubs, as Mähigul experiences while travelling (see Tobin, Chapter 3 in this volume), and hotel clerks to refuse them rooms. The message is unmistakable: Uyghurs are told to stop thinking of themselves as distinctive, yet Han citizens and government personnel plainly still regard them as distinctive, threatening, and unwelcome.

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The enormous volume of Han in-migration has utterly transformed the regional demography of Xinjiang, as is now widely known. In this light, the comment of a Han student to a Uyghur student, reported to Chen, seems strikingly obtuse and deeply revealing: Â „Does Xinjiang have schools? Why do you come here to study? We already have too many people living here‰ Ê (Chen, Chapter 6 in this volume). While Uyghurs are troubled to find themselves unwelcome when they venture into China proper, they are expected to welcome the millions of Hans who have settled in Xinjiang. There is a particularly savage irony in the employment reality many Uyghurs face, as discussed in the Introduction: employers in Xinjiang frequently state explicitly, or demonstrate by the pattern of interviews and hiring, that they are only looking for Han employees. When Uyghur students who participated in a state-sponsored education programme aimed at cultivating their patriotism and equipping them to spread Chinese culture discover that they have few job prospects in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (see GroseÊs chapter in this volume), that simple fact sends a very disturbing message.

Identity and comparison This volume on Uyghur youth identities emerges 66 years after the founding of the PeopleÊs Republic of China, in a period when China appears both unprecedentedly powerful and oddly brittle. After decades of extraordinary economic growth, military modernisation, and engagement with the world, the country enjoys muchaugmented authority in global affairs. At the same time, the Party leadership appears strikingly touchy in the domestic sphere, devoting enormous resources to censorship. It has cracked down on individuals and organisations deemed threatening, ranging from the Han pro-democracy activist Liu Xiaobo to the Uyghur economist Ilham Tohti. These actions bespeak not confidence but fear and vulnerability, suggesting that one of the worldÊs last self-styled communist parties continues to fear the subversive effects of speech, text, and symbolic action just as its former counterparts in the Soviet bloc did. Naturally, one reason for the PartyÊs concern is the very scarcity of communist parties today; academics in the PRC have spent over two decades seeking to extract lessons from the Soviet collapse and the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe to enable Beijing to avert a similar outcome.6 By coincidence, a similar volume on changes to collective identities in Soviet Central Asia was published in 1984, 67 years after the Russian revolution of 1917.7 That volume came out five years after MoscowÊs invasion of Afghanistan, in the final years of the Cold War, when many government analysts and a few scholars in the US and Europe believed that the West could cripple the Soviet Union by mobilising the Muslims living in the vast southern zone stretching from the Caucasus to Kazakhstan. Books on Soviet nationalities had predicted for years that the USSR would founder on its unresolved Ânational questionÊ despite Russian official claims to have solved it. In order to determine how profound the threat was, analysts needed to understand how the identities of the Central Asians had changed over the decades since 1917. Had Central Asians lost their

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separate identities, their Muslim allegiance, and joined the great mass of new Soviet Men? The various authors concluded that they had not. Central Asians continued to practise Islam despite decades of anti-religious policies and propaganda, and they continued to identify with their nationalities Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik, and so on in spite of decades of Russian-medium education. One of the authors argued that increasing numbers of officials in Moscow had reluctantly acknowledged by the early 1980s that Âmodernization, however successful, fails to dilute ethnic identityÊ (Rywkin 1984, 79). The authors raised sincere, scholarly questions, and the answers were best guesses in a time when no fieldwork on these topics was possible. Whether or not individual authors intended their work to contribute to the cause, the volume was recognisably a product of the Cold War, in which adversaries faced off at a great distance, and most scholarly work on the Soviet world relied on the tools of Kremlinology: reading official propaganda against the grain, identifying the real-world correlates in allegories, probing the ostensibly unbroken surface of official discourse for gaps and contradictions, and hunting heterodox figures and texts for alternative and, it was presumed, more accurate depictions of Soviet life. The same was certainly true of much of the scholarship on Xinjiang from the 1950s through the 1980s (McMillen 2009, 3). It is important to recognise, and refute, a charge Beijing now commonly levels at Western scholarship about Xinjiang and Tibet: that far from being neutral scholarship, it is hostile and instrumental, intended to serve the goal of ÂcontainingÊ China by threatening it from within. Chinese sources often directly impugn this scholarship for serving the foreign policy aims of Western states (Li 2015). The present book, happily, avoids the tendentiousness of Cold War-era scholarship and presents the complexities of UyghursÊ lives in Xinjiang with admirable balance. It presents a wealth of field research, by both established and young scholars, who have enjoyed exceptional access. It also benefits from systematic sociological studies of job and income disparities between Hans and Uyghurs (Zang 2011; 2012), based on statistics and comparisons intentionally omitted from statistical yearbooks for years.

Notes 1 The noted PRC dissident scholar Wang Lixiong argues that this suspicion is the direct result of Chinese policies in Xinjiang, rather than an aberration (Wang 2007). 2 Note the amusement of the Hans who remark to one of ChenÊs Uyghur informants in Chapter 6, ÂWe cannot understand your language!Ê In a recent class at Indiana University, a Han Chinese student asked in all seriousness whether Uyghur was a written language, and was surprised to learn that the Uyghur script is visible on every Renminbi (RMB) note circulated in China. 3 While I was studying in Xinjiang in the mid-1990s, Han interlocutors frequently asked me in great puzzlement why I bothered to study the Uyghur language instead of Chinese the language in which those conversations occurred. 4 Wedeen quotes the phrases from Brubaker and Cooper (2000, 21).

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5 This said, it is also important to note several obvious problems with the authorsÊ conclusion. Their measures of ÂethnicÊ and ÂnationalÊ identity do not fully overcome the concern that non-Hans offered politically safe answers, fearing reprisals, and thus overstated their identification with the Chinese nation. Second, the ÂminoritiesÊ sampled in the US included African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos, all immigrant groups, but not indigenous respondents, who would provide a more appropriate comparison to Uyghurs and Tibetans in China. 6 See, for example, Chen Lianbi (1998); Xu Xin (2001); and Ma Rong (2004). 7 ÂFocus on Central Asian Identity,Ê Central Asian Survey 3(3), 1984.

References Abdelal, Rawi, et al. 2006. „Identity as a Variable.‰ Perspectives on Politics 4(4): 695 711. Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. 2000. „Beyond ÂIdentityÊ.‰ Theory and Society 29(1): 1 47. Chen Lianbi. 1998. Eluosi minzu guanxi wenti yanjiu [Research on the problem of minzu relations in Russia], Vol. 2007. Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan Dongou Zhongya yanjiusuo. Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gellner, Ernest. 1995. Anthropology and Politics: Revolutions in the Sacred Grove. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe. 2011. Di er dai minzu zhengce: cujin minzu jiaorong yiti he fanrong yiti [Second-generation minzu policies: promoting minzu blending into one body and flourishing as one body]. In Zhongguo minzu zongjiao wang [Chinese minzu and religion web]. Kymlicka, Will. 2001. Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. USA: Oxford University Press. Leibold, James. 2007. „Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism: How the Qing Frontier and its Indigenes became Chinese.‰ New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Li Zhiting. 2015. Â „Xin Qing shi‰: „Xin diguo zhuyi‰ shixue biaobenÊ (ÂNew Qing historyÊ: A sample of histioriographic Âneo-imperialismÊ). www.wyzxwk.com/Article/sichao/ 2015/04/342430.html [accessed 27 April 2015]. Ma Rong. 2004. Lijie minzu guanxi de xin silu shaoshu zuqun wentide Âqu zhengzhi huaÊ [New thoughts on how to understand minzu relations ÂDepoliticisingÊ the problem of ethnic minorities]. Beijing daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 41(6): 122 33. McMillen, Donald H. 2009. „China, Xinjiang and Central Asia ÂglocalityÊ in the year 2008.‰ In China, Xinjiang and Central Asia: history, transition and crossborder interaction into the 21st century, edited by Colin Mackerras and Michael E. Clarke. London/ New York: Routledge, 1 20. Roy, Olivier. 2000. The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations. New York: New York University Press. Rudelson, Justin Jon. 1997. Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along ChinaÊs Silk Road. New York: Columbia University Press. Rywkin, Michael. 1984. „The impact of socio-economic change and demographic growth on national identity and socialisation.‰ Central Asian Survey 3(3): 79 98. Smith Finley, Joanne. 2007. „ ÂEthnic anomalyÊ or modern Uyghur survivor? A case study of the minkaohan hybrid identity in Xinjiang.‰ In Situating the Uyghurs between China and Central Asia, edited by Ildikó Bellér-Hann, M. Cristina Cesàro, Rachel Harris, and Joanne Smith Finley. Aldershot: Ashgate, 219 38.

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Tang, Wenfang, and Gaochao He. 2010. „Separate but Loyal: Ethnicity and Nationalism in China.‰ Policy Studies (56): 1 58. Taynen, Jennifer. 2006. „Interpreters, arbiters, or outsiders: the role of the Min kao Han in Xinjiang society.‰ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 26(1): 45 62. Wang Lixiong. 2007. Wo de Xiyu, ni de Dong Tu [My Western Regions, your Eastern Turkestan]. Taibei: Dakuai wenhua chuban gu fen you xian gong si. Wedeen, Lisa. 2008. Peripheral visions: publics, power, and performance in Yemen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Xu Xin et al. 2001. Chaoji daguo de bengkui Sulian jieti yuanyin tanxi [The collapse of a superpower an analysis of the causes of the Soviet UnionÊs disintegration]. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe. Zang, Xiaowei. 2011. „Uyghur Han Earnings Differentials in Ürümchi.‰ The China Journal (65): 141 55. Zang, Xiaowei. 2012. „Gender Roles and Ethnic Income Inequality in Ürümchi.‰ Ethnic and Racial Studies 35(2): 238 58.

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Index

11 September attacks 164 Abdurehim Heyit 67 acculturation 14, 17, 27, 92, 184 5, 188 African American 5, 198, 202n5 alcohol 69, 186, 190 Altay 7, 35 Âalternate centresÊ 11 Arken Abdulla 10 Artush 5 assimilation 55 73, 75, 77, 195, 197 cultural 2, 19, 40, 75 ethnic 3, 12, 13, 15, 43, 85 linguistic 13, 40, 58, 65, 83, 105, 75 structural 13, 110 atheism 15, 164 attitudes 15, 20, 63, 116, 141, 142, 146, 149, 163 to education 140, 141 to language use 20, 56, 57 8, 71 2, 83, 85 autonomy 7, 12, 37 backwardness 15, 56, 58, 59, 67, 71, 73n12, 126, 135, 150, 171n6, 194, 195, 200 Âbalanced bilingualsÊ 84 barbarian 62, 90, 161 bäsh waq namaz (five daily prayers), see prayers Beijing 11, 12, 16, 117, 135 6, 152, 158, 165, 195, 197 200 Beijing Normal University 160, 171n7 bilingualism 75, 77, 82, 84 7, 101, 105 bilingual education policy 12 13, 18, 55, 57 63, 66 7, 70, 71 72, 79, 83, 96 7, 100 2, 150, 200 bilingual teachers 160

experimental bilingual schooling 57, 60, 62, 66, 100, 101, 104 urban 10, 55 boundaries boundary maintenance 2, 62, 71 boundary-making 14, 55 7, 67 8, 69, 177 boundary transgression 57, 68, 69, 71 ethnic 55 6, 61 4, 67 72, 76 8, 135, 141, 149, 150, 165, 177, 188 ethno-linguistic 56, 63 5, 67, 69 ethno-political 185 8 internal/external 56, 62, 65 72 linguistic 58, 59, 62 5, 69, 72 regional and national 10, 55, 59 religious 69, 185 9 social 70, 72, 76 7, 135 spatial 76 7, 135 symbolic 69, 76 7, 135 Burhan Shähidi 7 business 39, 75, 83, 146, 161, 165, 187, 189 cadres 7, 8, 14, 36, 136, 146, 164 capital cultural 98, 104, 109 economic 98, 181 linguistic 97, 103, 17, 109, 110 social 98 symbolic 98, 103, 107, 110 census 5, 154n1 Central Asia 9, 10 11, 12, 37, 65, 198, 199 Central Plains 22, 58, 119, 120, 122, 128, 161, 196 ChangÊan 123, 125 childhood 3, 116, 137, 138, 141 2, 147, 171n9, 188, 200 Chile, see Dingling China proper, see inland China

206

Index

Chinese Lunar New Year 159 motherland 119, 125, 128, 137, 142 multi-ethnic nation 8, 58, 72, 120, 121, see also Zhonghua minzu warlord period 6, 35, 147 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 5, 7 9, 35, 58, 66, 72n2, 122, 135, 147, 154n4, 159 64, 168 70, 199 Chinese Nationalist Party 147 Chinese Proficiency Test (HSK) 101 Chinese-ness 40, 58, 62, 65, 66, 69, 72 citizens of the PRC 80, 168, 195 second-class 162 5, 169 civilising project 126, 161 class 9, 19, 36, 37, 39, 44 5, 47 9, 67, 97 8, 128, 136 code-switching 16, 20, 86, 185 coercive integration 72, see also impact integration colonial occupation 10, 40, 162 3 community imagined 55 6, 57, 63, 68 72 ÂrealÊ member of the Uyghur 56, 66, 80 supervision, see social supervision Confucianism 63, 149, 161, 185 cosmopolitanism 10, 12, 200 Cultural Revolution 7, 8, 14, 36, 122, 184 cultural accommodation 13, 14, 71, 177, 195 anxiety 17, 105, 106 authenticity 10, 14, 17, 41, 42 ÂblindnessÊ 24, 145 7 ÂcolonizationÊ 15 conservatism 37, 186 ÂdilutionÊ 9, 16 dominance 40, 42, 49, 75, 78, 150, 167 essentialism 1, 63, 65, 69, 134, 135, 141 exchange 124, 128 gain 104, 109 heritage 3, 41, 62, 66, 68, 197 homogeneity 135 immersion 139, 152 knowledge 16, 56, 78, 98 morality 190 navigation 158 norms 35, 80, 89, 115, 163, 167, 189 perceptions 132 practices 14, 15, 150, 158 preservation 6, 58, 70, 105 restrictions 40, 76, 79 80

superiority 4, 16, 58, 92, 109, 137, 142, 148, 171n6, 188, 190, 194 tenacity 97, 105 curriculum 99, 100, 116, 117 18, 122, 132, 152, 187 8 reform 117 Deng Xiaoping 114, 122, 149, 164 Dingling 6 discourses colonial 55 discourse constitution 115, 116, 129 party-state/official 8, 36, 55, 57 62, 65 9, 71 2, 73n11, 122, 127 9, 134 5, 137, 142, 149, 150 2, 171n6 public/popular 114 15, 122, 126 9 security 55 discrimination 3, 16, 163, 169 in employment 17 18, 27, 38, 39, 49, 79, 157, 165, 166, 176, 180, 182, 189 90, 194 positive, see preferential policies divorce 44, 179, 180, 188, 189, see also family domestic abuse 180, 189 Döngköwrük 67 drug abuse, 147, 177, 178, 189, 191n7 Dzunghar 6 East Turkestan 166 East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 164 East Turkestan Republic (ETR) 7, 35, 125 economic advancement 62, 97 development 8, 17, 35 7, 39 40, 60, 110, 126, 136, 149, 160, 162, 164, 170, 199 gains/benefits 18, 97, 104, 109 education attitudes to 15, 140, 141 Chinese-medium 13 14, 16 18, 25, 57, 59 60, 71, 75, 79, 83, 85, 87, 99 102, 129, 177, 184, 200 compulsory 116, 117, 118 19 English-medium 98, see also English language learning ethnic or minzu unity 57, 59 pre-school 79, 117, 165 state policy on 13, 59 60, 75, 78, 79, 92, 101, 116, 118, 132, 142, 147, 150, 152, 198 9

Index Uyghur-medium 13, 16, 65 6, 83, 100 1, 184, 188 university/higher 21 2, 72n4, 181, 25, 44, 45, 47 9, 62, 69, 79, 99, 100, 102, 109, 132, 136, 140, 157, 158, 159 63, 165 6, 167, 168, 171 2, 178, 180, 181, 185, 188 9 educational elites 132 opportunities 43, 97, 102, 103, 108, 109, 110, 114, 157, 201 resources 95, 96 7, 101 2, 104, 109, 110, 140, 169 employment opportunities 18, 25, 35, 43, 67, 104, 127, 159 60, 162, 165 6, 169, 180, 199, 201 English 13, 57, 62, 170 as a global language 11, 103 language learning 67, 95 111, 163, 165, 167, 170n2, 200, see also education, English-medium Erdaoqiao 67 eroticisation 127, 135 ethnic awareness 3, 18, 19, 34, 46, 76, 79, 87, 88, 189 90, 195, 196 betrayal 189, 195, 201 cohesion 49 composition 19, 49, 120, 121 conflict 7, 34, 35, 38, 128, 144, 146, 151, 162, 170n3, 201, see also political conflict consciousness 3, 8, 9 12, 17, 34 50, 183, 195 6, 200 dichotomy 42, 126, 135, 147 dignity 137, 142, 150, 152, 190 disadvantage 3, 46, 189, 200 discontent 9, 37, 39, 163, 195 distinctness, distinctiveness 2, 8, 9, 39, 40, 42, 76, 77, 79, 135, 168, 197, 198 extinction 59 harmony 102, 128, 137 hierarchy 4, 19, 58, 55 56, 66, 71, 90, 190 markers 1, 8, 40, 167 perceptions 39, 76, 77, 132 154 prejudice 3, 17, 126 resentment 8, 19, 36, 40, 49, 58 segregation 110, 133, 142, 171n3 stratification 15, 17, 39, 76 unity 8, 36, 49, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 73n7, 121, 127, 137, 143, 151, 161, 197 ethno-history 5 7, 122

207

ethno-nationalism 162, 167, see also identities, ethno-national ethnonym 119, 120, 121 European American 5 exogamy, see marriage existential threat 63, 65, 70 exoticisation 127, 150 extremism 12, 36, 37, 164 face, concept of 177, 178 family ÂbrokenÊ 27, 170, 177, 179, 185, 188 9, see also divorce education, see home education nuclear 68, 70 one-parent, single-parent 178, 180, 184 planning 8, 36, 160 female chastity, virginity, see purity, female filial virtue 181 flamenco 10 folklorisation 127 foreign language provision/learning 11 12, 13, 96, 99 102, 109, 110 Gaochang, see Qarakhoja Gaoche, see Dingling gender 4, 9, 10, 73n13 asymmetry 176 relations 15, 184 generational differences/similarities 3, 14 15, 17, 72n6, 78 80, 81, 83, 86 8, 91 2, 135 Germany/ German language 166 Ghulja 184 disturbances of 1997, 9, 17, 24 global flows, see globalisation globalisation 3, 9, 12, 97 government agencies 166 officials 44, 163 4 Great Leap Forward 7 Great Western Development policy 8, 36, 126, 149 group belonging 4, 15, 55 6, 72, 87, 89, 137, 195, 197 8 consciousness, see ethnic consciousness membership 1, 2, 4 5, 34, 38, 41, 42, 55, 56, 58, 76 7, 80, 186, 190n1, 196, 197, 198, 201 Guangzhou 167

208

Index

halal 11, 171n4, 185 Han chauvinism 135 cultural ideal 141, 142, 147, 150 1, 201 dynasty 120, 123, 124, 157, 170 majority 5, 13, 34, 56, 97, 101, 102, 105, 107, 109, 132, 134 6, 149 52, 176, 182, 195 population 5, 9, 38, 42, 100, 105, 157, 165 settlers 77, 135 Hangzhou 163, 166, 171n4, 172n15 Hanification, see sinicisation healthcare 160, 191n7 Heavenly Mountains, see Tianshan heroin, see drug abuse history alternative histories 37, 127 historical narratives 8, 115 6, 122 4, 127 9 home education 15, 70, 104, 184 ÂhomelandÊ, notion of 2, 26, 66, 128, 162 3, 197 honour 98, 117, 179, 191n4 hospitality 24, 149 Hui 7, 99, 119, 171n4, 179 Huihe 120, 124 5 hukou residency permit 157, 168, 172n15 hybridity 15, 77 8, 80, 85, 87, 90 2 idealisation ÂidealÊ ethnic group 141 ÂidealÊ national identity 137, 142 of Han by young Uyghur 141 2, 145, 147, 150 2, 201 identification cards 163 identities adolescence and identity formation 3 5 assertion 8, 169, 169 70 Chinese national 8, 42, 63, 71, 75, 115, 116, 137, 150 2, 196, 201, 202n5 ethnic 1 3, 4, 10, 59 60, 67 8, 75, 116, 128 9, 142, 150 2, 176, 183, 188 90, 195 9 ethno-national 8, 39, 59, 132 3, 158, 162, 167 70 group 1 3, 4, 35, 56, 76, 98 9, 110 11, 176, 185, 188 90, 196 201 identity formation/construction 3, 4 5, 11 12, 56, 92, 96, 98 9, 114, 129, 132 3, 149, 176, 195 6 identity negotiation 4, 14, 17, 55, 61, 71 2, 99, 110, 149, 195, 200

linguistic 11, 40, 58, 61, 64, 83, 92, 95 111 multiple 80 Muslim 10, 12, 35, 42, 69, 72n6, 80 normative Uyghur 80, 91 oasis 35, 37, 67, 76, 184 religious 11, 76, 150, 176, 185 6, 188 90 self-identity 15, 56 8, 71 2, 72n2, n6 Uyghur 1 3, 10, 12 14, 17, 34 35, 37 43, 46, 48 50, 57, 67 8, 75 80, 83, 87, 89 91, 135, 188 90, 196 201 youth 75 92, 199 Ili 7, 35 illiteracy 60 impact integration 151 independence 7, 9, 37, 125, 189, 196 individual mobility 2, 4 inequality and access to English 97, 107 10, 200 Han Uyghur 18 19, 27, 34, 36, 39 40, 190 income gap 18 19, 35, 44, 49, 200 in education 109, 114, 200, see also preferential policies in life chances 14, 15, 110 in social relationships 10, 39 labour market 17 18, 20, 27, 38, 39, 49, 165, 180 2, 190 rural urban divide 39, 46, 160, 176, 184 socio-economic 2, 35, 77, 136 infantilisation 127 inland China 12, 83, 132, 135 6, 138, 146, 149, 150, 154n7, 157 62, 167 71, 176, 177, 182, 185, 198 inseparability 122, 128, 142, 151, 154n4, 167 9 institutionalisation 13, 18, 35 instrumentalism 2, 14, 41, see also language as a tool inter-ethnic confrontation 148 contact 143 dating 69, 188, 190n1 relations 69, 132, 134 5, 152, 154n4, 188 tension 15, 37, 39, 77, 125, 128, 144, 145 7, 154n3, 157, 170, 185 internalisation, internalised oppression 3, 23, 24, 26, 90, 168 internet 84 6, 88, 90 1, 122 intra-group divides 182, 62, 71 Islam dietary prescriptions 144, 171n4 orthodox law 186 8

Index practice and cultural mores 11, 14, 69, 144, 171n4, 186 8, 190 UyghursÊ conversion to 34 see also identities, Muslim Islamic ÂfanaticismÊ 164, 194 renewal, re-Islamisation 9, 34, 42, 49, 76, 157, 188 see also identities, Muslim Italy 166 Jin Shuren 6 Karabalghasun 6 karaoke hostesses, see hostesses Kashgar (Qäshqär) 5, 7, 9, 81, 129n2, 160, 167, 171n9 Kazakhstan, Kazakhs 7, 11, 15 16, 58, 101, 199 Keriya 6 Khoja rebellions 121, 125 Khotän 6, 25, 160, 171n9 language as a tool 14, 42, 66, 77, 78, 103, 160, see also instrumentalism choice 65, 69 70, 81, 83, 85, 106 7 common/shared 11, 62, 68, 70 competency 67, 78, 85, 95, 103 6, 165 domains 75, 83, 84, 86, 86 92, 97 hierarchy 16, 57, 58 9, 71 learning, second-/third-, 13, 21 2, 95 111 legitimacy 98 mainstreaming 110, 177 majority 13, 75 minority 13 14, 19, 57, 59 61, 75, 95 6, 99 102, 114, 129, 140 native 60, 63, 67, 79, 97, 100, 110, 187 of instruction 40, 100, 101, 106, 129, 144 official 98, 100 preservation 6, 58, 66, 70 proficiency/fluency 14, 17, 36, 57, 60, 84, 184, 188, 189, 194, 198, 200 reciprocal language learning 102 self-study 102, 104, 158 symbolic power of 20, 56, 59, 68 9 use and telecommunications 21, 92 see also linguistic Latino American 5, 202n5 Liang Qichao 58 ÂlinguicideÊ 13

209

linguistic ÂdilutionÊ 9, 16 diversity 95, 170 community 58, 59, 64 7, 69 71 genocide, see ÂlinguicideÊ investment 98 9, 104, 109 11 marginalisation 79, 97, 109 market 96, 98 repertoire 80, 97, 104 see also language listening-speaking skills 81, 82, 84 8, 90 1, see also reading-writing skills literacy 60, 82, 97 Âlocal nationalismÊ 7, 36 London 163 Lop 6 mäktäp 186 Maoist period 7 marketisation 149, 191n7 marriage 186, 187, 190n1 endogamy 37 exogamy 3, 35, 140 intermarriage 3, 13, 76, 177, 178, 188 see also ÂbrokenÊ families, divorce masculinity 65, 79, 177, 189 Masud Sabri 7 media mass/popular 5, 75, 142, 152 social 169 state-controlled 122, 141, 142, 147 medieval literature 67 Middle East 8, 9, 12, 36, 165 migration 3, 6, 15, 18 19, 34, 38 9, 44, 49, 64, 77, 105, 127, 149, 157, 168, 196, 198 Ministry of Education 117, 132, 159 Ministry of Public Security 159 minkaohan 14 18, 29, 40 1, 52n52, 55 72, 77 8, 80 5, 87 92, 176, 180, 184 5, 188 9, 195 minkaomin 14 18, 40 1, 52n52, 55 72, 77 8, 80 5, 87 92, 176, 184 5, 187 9 minority elites 14, 36, 38, 42, 46, 132, 152, 170 histories, see ethno-history nationalities 5, 38, 99, 106, 119 21, 126, 129, 133 modernisation 3, 36, 55, 59, 60, 64 5, 68, 128, 183, 199 modernity 58 9, 71, 135, 149, 150, 195, 200 Mongolia, Mongols 3, 6, 34, 101, 152, 197 monoculturalism 13, 40

210

Index

monolingualism 79, 91 morality and hostessing 176, 182 3, 185 6, 188 190 moral responsibility 68 perceived moral decline 9 Uyghur articulation of superior 188 mosques 7, 8, 25, 35, 25, 26, 79 mother tongue 11, 13 16, 41, 60, 64, 67, 70, 72, 77 9, 82, 83 5, 91, 96, 99, 106 7, 178, 185, 194, 197, see also language, native multiculturalism 17, 194 multilingualism 17, 97, 104 muqam 67 Nanjing 167 nation-building 55 58, 61, 65, 71 72 nation-state 10, 11, 68, 128, 189 national community 55 62, 71 history 41, 58, 59, 105, 114 29, 142, 147, 196 7, 199 200 territory 121, 122, 124, 128 unity 9, 24 5, 37, 38, 58, 121, 128, 151, 197 National Common Language Act 95 nationalism 7, 10, 35, 36, 37, 72n2, 162, 164, 167, 195, 198 native Americans (Navajos) 13, 17 nature metaphor 63 66, 127 neidi, see inland China New York 163, 164 nomadic 6, 158 nonviolent resistance 9, 92 north south divides/differences 5 6, 38, 100, 171n9, 184, 188 Open Door policy, see reform era orientalism ÂinternalÊ 55, 71, 127 ÂlinguisticÊ 97 8 Other, see Self/Other Ottoman empire 197 over-representation 119 overseas education 21, 26, 103, 104, 140, 157, 163, 168 70 Pakistan 8, 36, 165 Pan-Islamism 7 Pan-Turkism 7, 11, 198 parental influence 3, 5, 13 15, 64, 70, 83, 89, 138, 139 41, 142, 146, 159, 178, 183, 184, 188

passport applications 168 9, 171n14, 172n15 patriotism 152, 161, 196, 199 PeopleÊs Education Press 115, 117, 118 PeopleÊs Government of the XUAR, see Xinjiang Regional Government pictorial depictions 120, 121, 127 pilgrimage 8, 36 pinyin transliteration system 40, 85 pluralism 13, 40, 117, 118 political allegiance 11, 35 conflict 76, see also ethnic conflict control 7, 177 independence 7, 189 injustice 163, 169 legitimacy 116, 135 pawns 169, 194, 201 sensitivities 134, 158 popular culture 2, 10 11, 17, 67, 77, 85 91, 116, 137, 142, 151, 168 song 3, 10 11, 77, 137, 142, 151, 154n2, see also Uyghur folk/ traditional music power relationship 98, 109, 110, 149 prayers 5, 26, 44, 159, 164, 171n4, 186, 188 preferential policies 8, 36, 42, 110, 114 primitiveness 55, 127 primordialism 1 2 private companies 15, 39, 167, 180 tuition 95, 102, 104 propaganda 142, 150, 151, 152, 199 200 prostitution, sex work 27, 176, 179, 180 4, 186 public protest 168 purity cultural 9, 21 female 27, 177, 179, 184 6, 191n4 Qarakhoja 6 Qäshqär, see Kashgar Qing dynasty 6, 23, 34 5, 125 6 Qingdao 166 Qorla 62, 63 4, 66 Quran 79, 188 radicalisation 92 race 1 2, 4, 5 Ramadan 79 rape 117, 179 reading-writing skills 81, 82, 84 6, 88, 90 1, see also listening-speaking skills

Index reform/Open Door era 114, 127, 149, 157, 164, 182, 191n7 relative deprivation theory 17 religiosity 19, 34, 40, 41 2, 44 9 religious affiliation 3, 49 beliefs 2, 9, 34, 127, 150, 154n6, 197, 200 betrayal 186 commitment 26, 42, 44, 46, 158 expression 8, 36, 80, 163, 164 practices 1, 2, 9, 14, 35, 157, 159, 164, 171n4, 186, 197 restrictions 25, 26, 76, 79 80, 157, 159 rituals 9, 42 scripts 7 8, 36 relocation 149, 162, 163, 168, 169, 170 representations self-representation 1, 42, 67, 76 state/official 55, 58, 114 29, 152, 201 repression 7, 12, 14, 97 resistance 3, 9, 37, 40, 55, 64, 65, 70, 71, 77, 92, 126, 129n2, 168, 169, 177, 195 romantic relationships 183, 184, 185, 188, 190n1, 191n12, see also inter-ethnic dating Rumba flamenca 17 Russia 9, 11, 196, 199 Russian 11, 13, 15 16, 20, 58, 99, 199 school boarding 132, 136, 137, 139 42, 152, 157, 158 9, see also Xinjiang Class expulsion 25, 171n4 high 4 5, 13, 62, 72n4, 100, 104, 132, 136, 150 3 primary 13, 66, 69, 81, 99 101, 109, 116 17, 118 19, 151, 154n7 secondary 13, 81, 99 100, 109, 116 17, 118 19, 157, 158, 167, 170n1, 171n9 script Arabic 8, 15, 36, 92n1 Chinese 96 minority 96 New Script (yengi yeziq) 11, 15, 86, 92n1 Old Script (kona yeziq) 15, 92n1 Turkic/Turkish 11 Uyghur 85, 201n2 securitisation 12, 196, 197 Self/Other 3, 55 6, 40, 58 9, 64, 69, 72, 77, 198, see also ÂWe-hoodÊ/ÂUs-hoodÊ self-censorship 22, 118 self-esteem 4, 87, 189 90

211

self-harm 177 self-respect 27, 180, 190 separatism 12, 37, 76, 125 126, 128, 157, 161, 164, 189, 197 service industries 149, 181, 190 sex work, see prostitution shame 15, 78, 177 8, 182, 185, 186, 191n12 Shanghai 12, 117 Sheng Shicai 6 sibling relationship as metaphor 122, 134, 154n2 Silk Road 120 sinicisation 15, 38, 56, 62, 63, 65, 66, 69 70, 72, 85, 127 sino-centrism 43, 123 Six Cities 67 social competition 4 connections 167 creativity 4 exclusion 2, 55 7, 59, 62 4, 71, 72, 135, 198 hierarchy 4, 19, 27, 49, 55 6, 66, 71, 90, 190 integration 13, 20, 25, 38, 40, 41, 55 6, 71 2, 102, 110, 136, 150, 151, 159, 170n3, 196 interaction 68, 75, 76 9, 83 4, 86 90, 92, 98, 100, 135, 138, 142 3, 145, 150, 151, 152, 176, 183, 201 mobility 18, 27, 36, 38, 44, 61, 177, 181, 189, 190, 201 position 18, 20, 36, 185, 189 stability 15, 135 status 48, 57, 67 supervision 26, 182, 188 socialism 35, 60, 114 Soviet Union 7, 15, 35, 198, 199 200 State Ethnic Affairs Commission 159 stereotypes about Uyghurs in textbooks 126 counter-stereotypes 24, 134, 187 cultural 134, 136 52 held by Han about Uyghurs 24, 126 7, 129 held by Uyghurs about Han 24 held by Uyghurs about Uyghurs 66 7 stigmatisation 15, 17, 66, 70, 72, 73n12, 176, 178, 181, 182 5, 191n8 ÂStrike HardÊ campaigns 12, 37, 164 students prep 133, 136 43, 146 9, 151, 153 senior 133, 136 48, 151 3

212

Index

studying abroad, see oversees education subalternity 10, 21, 97 Âsubtractive bilingualsÊ 85 suicide 170, 177, 178 Âsymbolic ethnicityÊ 3 symbolic community 56, 59, 68 9, 71 2 resistance/opposition 9, 42, 76, 177 taboo 177, 188 Taiwan 121 Tang dynasty 120, 124, 125 Tarbaghatay 7, 35 Tarim Basin 6, 37, 162 teacher training and teaching qualifications 58, 100, 104, 116, 160, 162, 163 4, 165, 167, 171n9 territorial/state integrity 116, 121, 124, 128 terrorism 12, 26, 37, 164, 194 text messaging 84 6, 88, 90 1 textbook censorship 117 18 history textbooks 114 29, 147, 197, 201 ÂknowledgeÊ 114 16, 119 29 uniformity 117 18, 129 Three Districts Rebellion 125 ÂThree evilsÊ 12, 37, 164 Tianjin 136, 179 Tianshan 6, 26 Tibet, Tibetans 97, 119 21, 122, 132, 135, 151, 152, 164, 170n1, 195 8, 200, 202n5 Tiele/Tieli, see Dingling trade 43, 105, 124 5 trilingualism 11, 26, 169 Tsarist Russia 15 Turkey 11 Tungan, see Hui Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan (TIRET) 7 Turpan 6, 121 under-employment 17 under-representation 22, 119 20 unemployment 17, 79, 191n8, 194 United States 3, 8, 10, 13, 17, 19, 67, 164, 165, 166, 169, 172n15, 196, 199 university campus life 133, 138, 143, 145, 151, 159, 181 entrance examination 99, 158, 172n15, 178 tuition fees 160, 178, 179, 181, 191n5

University English Test 101, 108 urbanisation 64, 65 ÂUs-hoodÊ, see ÂWe-hoodÊ/ÂUs-hoodÊ Ürümchi 9, 11 12 2009 riots in 9, 57, 60, 132, 194 demographics of 6 ethnic consciousness in 34 50 income gap in 18 Uyghur folk/traditional music 2, 10, 17, 67, 77, 88, 105, 127, see also popular song intellectuals 8, 36, 37, 41, 62, 77, 136 merchants 37, 123, 136 nation, nationalism 6 7, 8, 10, 12, 34 5, 37, 39 42, 49, 65, 107, 119 20, 124, 126, 150, 162, 164, 168, 169 70, 197 8 peasants 37, 136 population 9, 38, 43, 127, 154n1, 165 pride 70, 148, 167, 194 steppe empire 6, 34 tradition 10, 18, 41, 67, 68, 76, 79, 105, 127, 149, 179, 189 youth 4, 10, 14, 75 92, 96, 164, 194 5, 199, 200 Uyghur-ness 57 8, 62 72, 169 value systems 41, 116 violence ÂepistemicÊ or ÂsymbolicÊ 55, 59, 71 indigenous 9, 12, 24, 37, 92, 201 inter-group 2 state 12 Washington, DC 164 ÂWe-hoodÊ/ÂUs-hoodÊ 2 3, 40, 119, see also Self/Other Weihe, see Dingling Western Regions 120 8, 149 Wu Zhongxin 7 Xibe 51 Xibu da kaifa, see Great Western Development policy Xinhua shudian 118 Xinjiang demography of 163, 167, 194, 198 time 183, 191n13 Xinjiang Class 83, 97, 101, 132 3, 136 52, 154n3, 157 72, 195, 201 Xinjiang Regional Government 60, 102, 159, 160, 169 Xinjiangban, see Xinjiang Class Xiyu, see Western Regions

Index Yaqub Beg 6, 125, 128, 129n2 Yang Zengxin 6 Yarkand 5 Yengi Shähär 5

213

Zhang Zhizhong 7 Zhonghua minzu 8, 56, 58 9, 62 5, 68 72, 75, 119, 158, 161, 168, 170, 196, see also Chinese multi-ethnic nation zhongjieyu, see language of instruction