Lactantius the Theologian: Lactantius and the Doctrine of Providence

Table of contents :
Table of Contents ..................................................................................... v
Abbreviations .......................................................................................... vii
Acknowledgements ................................................................................. ix
Introduction .............................................................................................. 1
Chapter 1. Vita et Opera ........................................................................... 7
Chapter 2. Lactantius and Method ...................................................... 29
I. Method ........................................................................................ 29
II. Audience .................................................................................... 33
III. Sources ..................................................................................... 37
A. The Bible ............................................................................. 37
B. The Poets ............................................................................. 40
C. The Philosophers ................................................................ 42
D. Oracular Literature ............................................................ 45
IV. Christian Truth ........................................................................ 54
Chapter 3. Lactantius and Divine Providence ................................... 61
I. Developing the Arguments ...................................................... 62
II. The Arguments for Divine Providence ................................ 64
A. The Argument from Consensus (E consensu
omnium) ............................................................................. 64
B. Responding to Opponents ................................................ 67
C. The Argument from Design (Ex operibus dei) ................. 74
D. The Argument from Absurd Consequences
(Ex gradibus entium).......................................................... 87
III. Conclusion ............................................................................... 88
Chapter 4. Lactantius’ Doctrine of God ............................................. 93
I. Theology of God ....................................................................... 93
A. God’s Oneness ................................................................... 94
B. God’s Transcendence ........................................................ 99
C. God’s Incorporeity (Excursus) ....................................... 103
D. God as Eternal Mind ....................................................... 106
E. God and the Passions ...................................................... 109
II. God the Creator ..................................................................... 113
A. Creatio ex nihilo ................................................................... 113
B. Refutation of Atomism .................................................... 117
C. Theodicy ............................................................................ 122
III. Conclusion ............................................................................. 134
Chapter 5. Lactantius’ Anthropology ................................................ 139
I. Anthropology and Providence in De opificio Dei .................. 140
A. Chapters 8–13 ................................................................... 141
B. Chapters 14–19 ................................................................. 146
C. Conclusion ......................................................................... 151
II. A Systematic Treatment of Lactantius’ Anthropology .... 154
A. The Creation and Composition of the Human
Person ............................................................................. 154
B. The Human Person in the Created Order .................... 159
C. Status Rectus ........................................................................ 164
D. Vera Religio......................................................................... 168
E. The Virtues, Immortality, and Justice ........................... 174
F. Conclusion ......................................................................... 185
Chapter 6. Lactantius and Salvation History .................................... 191
I. Theology of History ................................................................ 191
II. Soteriology ............................................................................... 203
A. Soteriology and the Virtues ............................................ 203
B. Christology......................................................................... 210
C. Eschatology ....................................................................... 227
III. Conclusion ............................................................................. 231
Conclusion ............................................................................................. 235
Bibliography .......................................................................................... 245
Opera Lactantii ............................................................................... 245
Translations .................................................................................. 245
Primary Literature ........................................................................ 247
Secondary Literature ................................................................... 249
Index ....................................................................................................... 269

Citation preview

Lactantius the Theologian

Gorgias Studies in Early Christianity and Patristics 68

In this series Gorgias publishes monographs on Christianity and the Church Fathers in the early centuries of the Christian era. Gorgias particularly welcomes proposals from younger scholars whose dissertations have made an important contribution to the field of patristics.

Lactantius the Theologian

Lactantius and the Doctrine of Providence

Anthony P. Coleman

gp 2017

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2017 by Gorgias Press LLC

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1

2017

ISBN 978-1-4632-0723-6

ISSN 1935-6870

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A Cataloging-in-Publication Record is Available from the Library of Congress.

Printed in the United States of America

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents ..................................................................................... v Abbreviations .......................................................................................... vii Acknowledgements ................................................................................. ix Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 Chapter 1. Vita et Opera ........................................................................... 7 Chapter 2. Lactantius and Method ...................................................... 29 I. Method ........................................................................................ 29 II. Audience .................................................................................... 33 III. Sources ..................................................................................... 37 A. The Bible ............................................................................. 37 B. The Poets ............................................................................. 40 C. The Philosophers................................................................ 42 D. Oracular Literature ............................................................ 45 IV. Christian Truth ........................................................................ 54 Chapter 3. Lactantius and Divine Providence ................................... 61 I. Developing the Arguments ...................................................... 62 II. The Arguments for Divine Providence ................................ 64 A. The Argument from Consensus (E consensu omnium) ............................................................................. 64 B. Responding to Opponents ................................................ 67 C. The Argument from Design (Ex operibus dei) ................. 74 D. The Argument from Absurd Consequences (Ex gradibus entium).......................................................... 87 III. Conclusion ............................................................................... 88 Chapter 4. Lactantius’ Doctrine of God ............................................. 93 I. Theology of God ....................................................................... 93 A. God’s Oneness ................................................................... 94 B. God’s Transcendence ........................................................ 99 C. God’s Incorporeity (Excursus).......................................103 D. God as Eternal Mind .......................................................106 E. God and the Passions ......................................................109 v

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II. God the Creator .....................................................................113 A. Creatio ex nihilo ...................................................................113 B. Refutation of Atomism....................................................117 C. Theodicy ............................................................................122 III. Conclusion .............................................................................134 Chapter 5. Lactantius’ Anthropology ................................................139 I. Anthropology and Providence in De opificio Dei..................140 A. Chapters 8–13 ...................................................................141 B. Chapters 14–19 .................................................................146 C. Conclusion .........................................................................151 II. A Systematic Treatment of Lactantius’ Anthropology ....154 A. The Creation and Composition of the Human Person .............................................................................154 B. The Human Person in the Created Order ....................159 C. Status Rectus ........................................................................164 D. Vera Religio.........................................................................168 E. The Virtues, Immortality, and Justice ...........................174 F. Conclusion .........................................................................185 Chapter 6. Lactantius and Salvation History ....................................191 I. Theology of History ................................................................191 II. Soteriology...............................................................................203 A. Soteriology and the Virtues ............................................203 B. Christology.........................................................................210 C. Eschatology .......................................................................227 III. Conclusion .............................................................................231 Conclusion .............................................................................................235 Bibliography ..........................................................................................245 Opera Lactantii ...............................................................................245 Translations ..................................................................................245 Primary Literature........................................................................247 Secondary Literature ...................................................................249 Index .......................................................................................................269

ABBREVIATIONS Bailey

Bailey, Cyril, ed. Titi Lucreti Cari: De rerum natura. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947. BT 1994 Heck, E. and A. Włosok, eds. Lactantius Epitome Divinarum Institutionum. Biblioteca Teubneriana. Stuttgart & Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1994. BT 2005 ———. Lactantius Divinarum Institutiones Libri Septem, Fasc. 1, Libri I et II. Biblioteca Teubneriana. Munich & Leipzig: K. G. Saur, 2005. BT 2007 ———. Lactantius Divinarum Institutiones Libri Septem, Fasc. 2, Libri III et IV. Biblioteca Teubneriana. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007. BT 2009 ———. Lactantius Divinarum Institutiones Libri Septem, Fasc. 3, Libri V et VI. Biblioteca Teubneriana. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009. BT 2011 ———. Lactantius Divinarum Institutiones Libri Septem, Fasc. 4, Liber VII. Biblioteca Teubneriana. Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2011. quot(s). direct quotation(s) Clarke Clarke, G. W., ed. The Octavius of Minucius Felix. ACW 39. New York: Newman Press, 1974. Corp. Herm. Festugière, A. J. and A. D. Noch, eds. Corpus Hermeticum. 4 vols. Paris: 1946–1954. DI Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones Libri Septem Epi. Lactantius, Epitome Divinarum Institutionum fr(s). fragment(s) Hyst. The Oracle of Hystaspes. In J. Bidez and F. Cumont, eds. Les mages hellénisés. 2 vols. Paris: 1938. ID Lactantius, De ira Dei vii

viii LS MP OD Orac. Sib. Pease Usener

LACTANTIUS THE THEOLOGIAN Long, A. A. and D. N. Sedley, eds. The Hellenistic Philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: 1987. Lactantius, De mortibus persecutorum Lactantius, De opificio Dei Geffcken, J., ed. Die Oracula Sibyllina. Leipzig: 1902. Pease, A. S., ed. M. Tulli Ciceronis: De natura deorum. 2 vols. New York: Arno Press, 1979. Usener, H., ed. Epicurea. Stuttgart: 1966.

For all other abbreviations consult: Fitzgerald, Allan, ed. Augustine through the Ages. Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1999. Pp. xxvii–xlii. Hornblower, Simon and Anthony Spawforth, eds. The Oxford Classical Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xxix–liv. Latin quotations have been slightly altered from the original text for the benefit of readability [e.g., “v” = “u,” “j” = “i,” etc.].

The following texts have been consulted for the purposes of direct quotation: The New Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocrypha, New Revised Standard Version. Edited by M. D. Coogan, et al. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Bowen, Anthony and Peter Garnsey, trans. Lactantius: Divine Institutes. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003. Blakeney, E. H., trans. and comm. Lactantius’ Epitome of the Divine Institutes. London: SPCK, 1950. Creed, J. L., trans. and comm. Lactantius: De mortibus persecutorum. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. McDonald, M., trans. Lactantius: The Divine Institutes. FC vol. 49. Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1964. ———. Lactantius: Minor Works. FC vol. 54. Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1965.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Just as nature abhors a vacuum, so too is it impossible for a project of this nature to come to completion without the aid, guidance, and support of innumerable people. First among these are the entire faculty and staff in the Theology Department at Boston College who have fostered my growth and development as a student, teacher, and scholar. Among the many who could be mentioned, Fr. Robert Imbelli and Dr. Margaret Schatkin deserve particular attention. Fr. Imbelli has been a trusted mentor and friend to both my wife and I for over a decade. His many outstanding qualities as a teacher, scholar, and Christian have made a lasting impression upon me. Dr. Schatkin, who was crucial to the foundation of this project, has also been a great advocate for both my wife and I while at Boston College. I shall always treasure her words of encouragement and perseverance, and hold her enthusiasm for and appreciation of the saints and scholars of the early Church in high esteem. I offer sincere gratitude to them both. This project also benefited immensely from the insight, guidance, and direction of my dissertation committee: Dr. Stephen F. Brown (chair), Dr. Douglas Finn, and Fr. Gary Gurtler, S.J. I offer to them my deepest appreciation, as well as to Dr. Richard Gaillardetz (Chair of the Department of Theology at Boston College), for the generous gifts of their time and effort in bringing this project to fruition. Likewise, Dr. Matthew Steinfeld and the anonymous reviewers from Gorgias Press provided many helpful, encouraging, and constructive comments for this project. They have my sincere thanks for their contributions to the improvement of this work. I am also grateful to many members of the wider academic and religious community in Boston for their contributions to my scholarly and spiritual formation, in particular, Fr. Romanus Cessario, O.P. (St. John’s Seminary), Fr. William Palardy (St. Agatha’s Parish), Dr. Bruce Beck (Holy Cross School of Theology), Fr. John ix

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J. Connelly (St. John’s Parish), and the parish community at Sacred Heart in Newton Centre. The research for this project could not have been done without the help of those who work in the O’Neill Library at Boston College, in particular, Gail Lefebvre and the entire Interlibrary Loan staff. I would also be remiss not to thank my fellow graduate students Fr. Demetrios Tonias, Ph.D., Dr. Erin Stackle, and Dr. Will Britt, inter alios, for their companionship and support along this academic journey which we all shared. Lastly, this work could not have been undertaken without the unfailing love and support of the entire Coleman family, most especially, James C. and Anna Coleman, James N., Jennifer, J. Tyler and Shane Coleman, Michael, Debra, Audrey and Elena Sundin, and John and Lydia Taglieri. To my wife, AnneMarie Coleman, belongs a gratitude and appreciation which cannot be circumscribed by the words on this page. I have been blessed to be able to share this life with her and our three children: Moses Elias, Antony Pio, and Nicolina Zélie Coleman. Ό φίλος ἐστίν ἄλλος ἐγώ. This work is dedicated, under the protection of Ή Παναγία Θεοτόκος, to tre donne benedette: Nicolina Volpe, Anna Coleman, and AnneMarie Coleman.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Just as nature abhors a vacuum, so too is it impossible for a project of this nature to come to completion without the aid, guidance, and support of innumerable people. First among these are the entire faculty and staff in the Theology Department at Boston College who have fostered my growth and development as a student, teacher, and scholar. Among the many who could be mentioned, Fr. Robert Imbelli and Dr. Margaret Schatkin deserve particular attention. Fr. Imbelli has been a trusted mentor and friend to both my wife and I for over a decade. His many outstanding qualities as a teacher, scholar, and Christian have made a lasting impression upon me. Dr. Schatkin, who was crucial to the foundation of this project, has also been a great advocate for both my wife and I while at Boston College. I shall always treasure her words of encouragement and perseverance, and hold her enthusiasm for and appreciation of the saints and scholars of the early Church in high esteem. I offer sincere gratitude to them both. This project also benefited immensely from the insight, guidance, and direction of my dissertation committee: Dr. Stephen F. Brown (chair), Dr. Douglas Finn, and Fr. Gary Gurtler, S.J. I offer to them my deepest appreciation, as well as to Dr. Richard Gaillardetz (Chair of the Department of Theology at Boston College), for the generous gifts of their time and effort in bringing this project to fruition. Likewise, Dr. Matthew Steinfeld and the anonymous reviewers from Gorgias Press provided many helpful, encouraging, and constructive comments for this project. They have my sincere thanks for their contributions to the improvement of this work. I am also grateful to many members of the wider academic and religious community in Boston for their contributions to my scholarly and spiritual formation, in particular, Fr. Romanus Cessario, O.P. (St. John’s Seminary), Fr. William Palardy (St. Agatha’s Parish), Dr. Bruce Beck (Holy Cross School of Theology), Fr. John ix

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J. Connelly (St. John’s Parish), and the parish community at Sacred Heart in Newton Centre. The research for this project could not have been done without the help of those who work in the O’Neill Library at Boston College, in particular, Gail Lefebvre and the entire Interlibrary Loan staff. I would also be remiss not to thank my fellow graduate students Fr. Demetrios Tonias, Ph.D., Dr. Erin Stackle, and Dr. Will Britt, inter alios, for their companionship and support along this academic journey which we all shared. Lastly, this work could not have been undertaken without the unfailing love and support of the entire Coleman family, most especially, James C. and Anna Coleman, James N., Jennifer, J. Tyler and Shane Coleman, Michael, Debra, Audrey and Elena Sundin, and John and Lydia Taglieri. To my wife, AnneMarie Coleman, belongs a gratitude and appreciation which cannot be circumscribed by the words on this page. I have been blessed to be able to share this life with her and our three children: Moses Elias, Antony Pio, and Nicolina Zélie Coleman. Ό φίλος ἐστίν ἄλλος ἐγώ. This work is dedicated, under the protection of Ή Παναγία Θεοτόκος, to tre donne benedette: Nicolina Volpe, Anna Coleman, and AnneMarie Coleman.

CHAPTER 1. VITA ET OPERA Lactantius has left us few details concerning his life. 1 Our primary ancient resource is Jerome’s De viris illustribus, which provides us with the following biographical sketch: Firmianus, who is also called Lactantius, a student of Arnobius, during the reign of Diocletian was summoned with Flavius the grammarian – whose books On medicine composed in verse are extant – to Nicomedia to teach rhetoric. Because there were few pupils, since it was a Greek city, he took himself to writing. We have his Symposium, which he wrote as a young man in Africa, and an Itinerary from Africa to Nicomedia written in hexameters, another book which is called The Grammarian, and a most beautiful one On the wrath of God, and the Divine Institutes against the nations in seven books, an epitome of the

For biographical information on Lactantius see especially Timothy D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 11–14 with notes; Samuel Brandt, “Über die dualistischen Zusätze und die Kaiseranreden bei Lactantius: III. Über das Leben des Lactantius” Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 120/5 (1890): 1–42; Paul Monceaux, Histoire littéraire de l’afrique chrétienne, vol. 3 (Bruxelles: Culture et civilisation, 1963), 287–297; Jacques Moreau, ed., Lactance, De la mort des persécuteurs. SC 39 (Paris: Cerf, 1954), 13–22; Pichon, Lactance, 1–8; James Stevenson, “The Life and Literary Activity of Lactantius,” Studia Patristica 1 (1957): 661–677; and Antonie Włosok, “Lactance,” in vol. 5 of Nouvelle histoire de la littérature latine, ed. R. Herzog and P.L. Schmidt (Paris: Brepols, 1993), 426–459. For an exhaustive bibliography of secondary literature on Lactantius see Jackson Bryce, Bibliography of Lactantius, http://www.acad.carleton.edu/curricular/CLAS/ lactantius/part_4.pdf (accessed 06/15/2017). 1

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LACTANTIUS THE THEOLOGIAN same work in one book without a title, two books Ad Asclepiadem, one book On persecution, four books of epistles Ad Probum, two books of epistles Ad Severum, two books of epistles Ad Demetrianum, his pupil, and one book to the same On the work of God or the creation of man. In extreme old age he was tutor to Crispus Caesar in Gaul, the son of Constantine who was later killed by his father. 2

Building upon Jerome’s foundation, we are able to posit a date-ofbirth between 240 and 250 based on his description of Lactantius being in ‘extreme old age’ (extrema senectute) at the start of his final imperial commission. 3 The personal name Lactantius and the cognomen Firmianus have attestations elsewhere in the works of Jerome, as well as those of Augustine. 4 His nomen, however, is not mentioned in any of the ancient sources. Two options, CeDe viris illustribus 80 (Włosok, “Lactance,” 427): Firmianus, qui et Lactantius, Arnobii discipulus, sub Diocletiano principe accitus cum Flavio grammatico, cujus De medicinalibus versu compositi exstant libri, Nicomediae rhetoricam docuit ac penuria discipulorum ob Graecam videlicet civitatem ad scribendum se contulit. Habemus ejus Symposium, quod adolescentulus scripsit Africae, et Ὁδοιπορικόν de Africa usque Nicomediam, hexametris scriptum versibus, et alium librum, qui inscribitur Grammaticus, et pulcherrimum De ira Dei et Institutionum divinarum adversum gentes libros septem, et έπιτομήν ejusdem operis, in libro uno ἀκεφάλῳ, et Ad Asclepiadem libros duos, De persecutione librum unum, Ad Probum epistolarum libros quattuor, Ad Severum epistolarum libros duos; Ad Demetrianum, auditorem suum, epistolarum libros duos et ad eumdem De opificio Dei vel formatione hominis librum unum. Hic extrema senectute magister Caesaris Crispi, filii Constantini, in Gallia fuit, qui postea a patre interfectus est. 3 Most scholars have favored a date close to 250. One scholar reasonably argues that the phrase ‘extrema senectute’ indicates an age of 70 or older, which would favor a date closer to 240. See Oliver Nicholson, “Lactantius on Military Service,” Studia Patristica 24 (1993): 177 n. 10. 4 E.g., Jerome Epistulae 58.10; 70.5; 84.7; Chronicon AD 317; etc.; Augustine doc. Chr. 2.40.61; civ. Dei 18.23. For the ancient testimonia to Lactantius see Samuel Brandt and Georg Laubmann, eds., L. Caelii Firmiani Lactantii Opera Omnia, CSEL 27/1 (Vienna: 1893), 161–167. 2

1. VITA ET OPERA

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lius/Caelius or Cecilius/Caecilius, are provided by the manuscripts containing his works. 5 The oldest and most authoritative contain the former, and only a very few manuscripts give the praenomen Lucius. The sole manuscript of De mortibus persecutorum, however, refers to the author as Lucius Caecilius – a factor in the delay of identifying Lactantius as its author. 6 Further, Monceaux has pointed out that an inscription from Cirta, the provincial capital of Numidia under Diocletian, mentions a L. Caecilius Firmianus who died at the age of 25 – “a family member of the apologist no doubt.” 7 Thus, we are on firm ground in referring to the apologist as Lucius Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius. 8 Jerome alone informs us of Lactantius’ education under the rhetor Arnobius. 9 Arnobius, himself the author of a Christian apologetic work, was a teacher of rhetoric in the regional capital of Sicca Veneria – a city in the province of Numidia approximately 100 See Brandt, “Über das Leben,” 2–4. On the manuscript traditions see Samuel Brandt and Georg Laubmann, eds., L. Caelii Firmiani Lactantii Opera Omnia, CSEL 19 (Vienna: 1890), xiii–lxxiv. 6 On identifying the Lactantian authorship of MP see especially Pichon, Lactance, 337–360, and Brandt’s review of this monograph in Berliner philologische Wochenschrift 23 (1903): 1223–1228. The manuscript, C=Colbertinus, n. 2627, was discovered in 1678 by Abbé Raymond de Folhac. 7 Monceaux (Histoire, 3:288): sans doubte à la famille de l’apologiste. Cf. CIL 8.7241. 8 See also, in agreement, Timothy D. Barnes, “Lactantius and Constantine,” Journal of Roman Studies 63 (1973): 39; Anthony Bowen and Peter Garnsey, eds., Lactantius: Divine Institutes (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003), 1; Jackson Bryce, The Library of Lactantius (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990), 2–4. 9 De viris illustribus 80; Epistula 70.5. For a fine summary of Arnobius’ life and thought consult George McCracken, ed., Arnobius: The Case Against the Pagans, ACW 7 & 8 (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1949), 1–57. For a more detailed study in English see Michael Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 5

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miles southwest of Carthage. 10 Neither Arnobius nor Lactantius mention the other in any extant work. The most noticeable omission occurs in Lactantius’ list of previous Latin Christian apologists in Book 5 of the Divinae Institutiones (DI 5.1.22–28). At the very least, Lactantius could not have read the Adversus nationes until his composition of the Divinae Institutiones was nearly completed and appears not to have read it at all. 11 Most likely, Lactantius was never aware of Arnobius’ conversion. 12 The latter clearly states that he was an adult convert to Christianity (Adv. nat. 1.39; 3.24). Jerome adds the further detail that Arnobius composed the Adversus nationes, after being rebuffed by the local ordinary, in order to gain entry into the Church. 13 While it has long been thought that Lactantius was also an adult convert, he makes no similar confession to

The evidence is exiguous for the dates of Arnobius’ life. While his date-of-birth may always remain a mystery, Brandt (“Über das Leben,” 40) argues convincingly for a difference of only ten years between him and Lactantius. See also Micka, The Problem of Divine Anger, 148 n. 6. The date of 327 has been assigned by many as the date of Arnobius’ death – based on a scribal error in Jerome’s Chronicon AD 327 – but that too, at best, is reasonable conjecture. See Simmons, Arnobius, 47–50 with notes. 11 Simmons (Arnobius, 7, 93) dates the composition of Adversus nationes to 302–305, just prior to Lactantius’ composition of the Institutiones (305–310). There are certainly commonalities of language and expression, and passages of similarity between Adversus nationes and the Lactantian corpus, but nothing that demands Lactantius having firsthand knowledge of the work. On this point see Brandt, “Über das Leben,” 19–20; Hugo Koch, “Zu Arnobius und Lactantius,” Philol. 80 (1925): 467–472; Micka, The Problem of Divine Anger, 152–153. 12 De ira Dei, written c. 316 after the Institutiones, addresses the topics of divine providence and impassibility – two areas of obvious incongruity between Lactantius and Arnobius – yet Arnobius remains unmentioned. It seems reasonable to infer that had Lactantius read Adversus nationes, he would not have remained silent about this work in ID. 13 Jerome Chronicon AD 327. It is clear that Adversus nationes was written by a Christian neophyte. See Nicholson, “Military Service,” 177 n. 10. Hence, the probability is low that Arnobius could have been a Christian and in contact with Lactantius in Africa based on chronological considerations. 10

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that effect. The present author finds it likely that, after being reared in the traditional cults, his catechesis began sometime during his youth in Africa. 14 We can only speculate as to the circumstances of Lactantius’ early career as a teacher of rhetoric in Africa. He admits to being always the professor and never the lawyer (DI 3.13.12; cf. 1.1.8). The letter from Jerome to Aurelius of Carthage discovered by J. Divjak places Lactantius in Africa Proconsularis, the same province that was home to Cyprian and Tertullian. 15 Given the evidence for Lactantius’ Numidian origin – the inscriptional attestation to his cognomen and his rhetorical training with Arnobius – it seems likely that Jerome is referring to the province in which Lactantius made a name for himself professionally, rather than his place of birth. Further, in view of his later imperial appointment, it is difficult to imagine Lactantius not flourishing as a teacher in the educational center and provincial capital of Carthage. For those who maintain that Lactantius’ conversion took place at Nicomedia see Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 13; Brandt, “Über das Leben,” 14; Monceaux, Histoire, 3:290; and Włosok, “Lactance,” 429. For those who prefer an African venue see P. McGuckin, “The NonCyprianic Scripture Texts in Lactantius’ Divinae Institutiones,” VC 36 (1982): 185; Robert Ogilvie, The Library of Lactantius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 1; and Stevenson, “Life,” 666. The evidence for believing that Lactantius’ Christian education began in Africa includes the following: (1) his familiarity with the theological works of his fellow Latin African apologists; (2) his appearance, while a Christian, at court in Nicomedia during the winter of 302/3 (DI 5.4.1); (3) his command of Scripture – employed when appropriate to his argumentation (cf. DI 4.5.3); (4) his awareness of the African Novatians (DI 4.30.10–13); (5) his journey to Nicomedia with the Christian grammarian Flavius (cf. Jerome Adversus Jovinianum 2.6); and (6) the silence of Jerome in relation to an adult conversion– which would suggest that catechesis occurred in an unremarkable and ordinary fashion, i.e., during his youth. Augustine may allude to his conversion in doc. Chr. 2.40.61. 15 Ep. 27.3.1 (CSEL 88, 132): Alioquin cum in vestra provincia tanti in sanctas scripturas omnes fluxerunt, Tertullianus, Cyprianus, Lactantius, me quasi arentem rivulum velle nunc ridiculum est. 14

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Between 299 and 302 Lactantius was summoned by the emperor Diocletian (r. 284–305) to teach Latin rhetoric at Nicomedia in Bithynia. 16 Though prone to earthquakes and sacked by the Goths in 258, Nicomedia was made the eastern imperial capital by Diocletian. It was the emperor’s favorite city, the one in which he was proclaimed Augustus on November 20, 284, and Lactantius tells us that Diocletian’s great desire was to make it equal to Rome (MP 7.10). To accomplish such a grand feat would necessarily entail importing professors to train young men to serve the state as advocates and political bureaucrats. Although Latin rhetoric was largely a carbon-copy of the Greek art, the one area of Roman innovation was in the creation of a system for teaching law. 17 The Latin rhetor in late-antiquity was a magister juris, a professor who instructed his students in the forensic, as well as the deliberative and epideictic, elements of oratory. Beginning in the second century, institutiones and digesta had been written and collected for the benefit of those pursuing higher education in jurisprudentia. This discipline intensified during the Severan dynasty (193–235) and was undertaken, even in the Greek-speaking East, in Latin; hence the need to introduce scholars such as Lactantius from the West. Constantine (r. 306–337) himself was at court in Nicomedia prior to 306, and may have been one of his students. 18 In a rare autobiographical moment Lactantius mentions that he witnessed “at that time, a temple of God destroyed.” DI 5.2.2 (BT 2009, 442): eodem tempore dei templum everteretur. This may refer to the church at Nicomedia which was destroyed when Diocletian’s edict of persecution was issued on February 23, 303 (See MP 12; Eusebius HE 8.2.4), or, more figuratively, to the purging of Christians from the military in 299 by Diocletian and Galerius at Antioch (See MP 10; HE 8.1.7, 4.2– 4). 17 See, for example, Henri Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. G. Lamb (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 284– 291. 18 Even if Constantine was not a formal student of Lactantius at Nicomedia, the two certainly met there. This explains Lactantius’ appointment to tutor Crispus. See Hubertus Drobner, The Fathers of the Church (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2007), 182; Karl-Heinz Schwarte, 16

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Whether Jerome is correct in his assertion that Lactantius was forced to withdraw from his chair due to a paucity of students seems a moot point. Diocletian issued his first edict of persecution against the Christians from Nicomedia on the Roman feast of the Terminalia, February 23, in 303. 19 As a direct consequence, Christians were “deprived of all honors and status” 20 and Lactantius would have been forced to resign. As someone with access to the imperial court, this official pronouncement came as little surprise to Lactantius. The relative tolerance enjoyed by Christians, which had begun in 260 under Gallienus (r. 253–268), 21 was disturbed by an incident in 299 which Lactantius relays. While accompanied by his Caesar Galerius Maximianus (r. 293–311) at Antioch, Diocletian attended a sacrifice at which the haruspices were unable to obtain the desired effects from the innards of their victims. 22 The rite had “Lactantius,” in Dictionary of Early Christian Literature, ed. S. Döpp and W. Geerlings (New York: Crossroad, 2000), 366; Włosok, “Lactance,” 428. 19 On nature and consequences of the persecution edicts under Diocletian see especially Timothy D. Barnes, “Constantine and Christianity: ancient evidence and modern interpretations,” Journal of Ancient Christianity (1998): 274–294; Geoffrey E. M. de Ste. Croix, “Aspects of the ‘Great’ Persecution,” HTR 47 (1954): 75–113; H. A. Drake, Constantine and the Bishops (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 141–147, 162– 165. 20 MP 13.1 (SC 39, 91): carerent omni honore ac dignitate. Cf. HE 8.2. 21 Cf. HE 8.13; Barnes, “Constantine and Christianity,” 278–9. 22 On this incident see MP 10; DI 4.27.4–5; cf. HE 8.1.7, 4.2–4. On the reliability of Lactantius as a historian of the persecutions see, inter alia, Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 13–14, 19; id., “Constantine and Christianity,” 285; Arnold H. M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire 284–602, 2 vols. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), 71; William H. C. Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1965), 489–491. On the date and location of this incident see Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 18–19; P. S. Davies “The Origin and Purpose of the Persecution of AD 303,” JTS, n. s., 40 (1989), 89–92. By all accounts, Diocletian was a devout adherent to the traditional Roman pantheon. For example, consider his anti-Manichean Rescript of March 31,

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been disturbed, and the demons scattered, by the presence of a few Christians making the sign of the cross. After several vain attempts to repeat the offering, Diocletian flew into a rage and ordered the entire imperial household to sacrifice. Letters were then sent to military ‘commanders’ (praepositos) ordering every soldier to sacrifice or be discharged. Diocletian would have been satisfied with these measures but, according to Lactantius (MP 11.3), was spurred towards official persecution by Galerius. 23 In the winter of 302/3, therefore, Diocletian summoned a concilium, first privately and then with consultants, in order to debate and determine what the most prudent course of imperial action should be in relation to the “Christian question.” Lactantius says that not all of the participants were acrimonious to the plight of Christians, but acquiesced to the majority out of fear. 24 The most notably vitriolic were two unnamed critics whom Lactantius heard with his own ears (DI 5.4.1). The identity of the first of these opponents, whom Lactantius calls a philosopher, had long been in question. The recent scholarship of Digeser and Schott, however, has convincingly demonstrated him to be Porphyry of Tyre, the disciple of Plotinus and teacher of Iamblichus of Chalcis. 25 This opponent lobbied on behalf of 302. Cf. Timothy D. Barnes, “Sossianus Hierocles and the Antecedents of the ‘Great Persecution,’” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 80 (1976): 246–250; id., Constantine and Eusebius, 20. 23 Cf. MP 11. Lactantius tells us that Galerius’ hatred of the Christians derived from his mother. 24 MP 11.6. An allusion to Constantine? 25 See esp. Elizabeth DePalma Digeser, “Lactantius, Porphyry, and the Debate over Religious Toleration,” Journal of Roman Studies 88 (1998), 129–146; id., The Making of a Christian Empire: Lactantius and Rome (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 93–107; Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion, 177–185. For earlier supporters of this theory see Henry Chadwick, The Sentences of Sextus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 141, 143; Robert L. Wilken, “Pagan Criticism of Christianity: Greek Religion and Christian Faith,” in Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition, ed. W. R. Schoedel and R. L. Wilken (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1979), 130–134. Wilken argues for the identification of Porphyry based on his Philosophy from Oracles rather than Against the

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persecution because “‘it was the philosopher’s pre-eminent duty to rescue people from error […].’” 26 His oratorical presentation, however, was ineffective. The audience considered him cruel for vociferously attacking an already harassed minority (DI 5.2.10–11). The second combatant is easily identifiable as Sossianus Hierocles, governor of Bithynia in 303. Lactantius refers to him as a member of the judiciary and “a prime mover of the persecutions.” 27 During the concilium, he presented a pair of pamphlets entitled Φιλαληϑῖες (Truth-Loving), addressed to Christians rather than against them in order to avoid the appearance of hostility. 28 His criticisms addressed the contradictions contained in Scripture, the low status of the apostles, and the miracles of Christ – placing them on or below the level of Apollonius of Tyana. 29 After being subject to the sacrilegas litteras (DI 5.4.1) of these two men, Lactantius determined to undertake a massive apologetic project against the cultured despisChristians. This is the argument which Digeser and Schott pursue. For the limits of Lactantius’ dependence on Porphyry see S. Freund, “Christian Use and Valuation of the Theological Oracles: The Case of Lactantius’ ‘Divine Institutes,’” Vigiliae Christianae 60/3 (2006): 269–284. While it has been demonstrated that Lactantius did not draw directly from Philosophy from Oracles, other evidence still remains convincing for the identification of Porphyry as the ‘unnamed philosopher.’ See above, especially Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion, 177–185. For the belief that Porphyry is not the ‘unnamed philosopher,’ based on an inapt characterization of him by Lactantius in DI 5.2.3–11, see Timothy D. Barnes, “Porphyry Against the Christians: Date and the Attribution of Fragments,” JTS, n. s., 24 (1973): 437–442; id., Constantine and Eusebius, 164–167, 174– 178; Joseph Bidez, Vie de Porphyre (Hildesheim:1964), 112 n. 2. 26 DI 5.2.5 (BT 2009, 443): ‘ante omnia philosophi officium esse erroribus hominum subvenire […].’ 27 DI 5.2.12 (BT 2009, 444): et qui auctor in primus faciendae persecutionis fuit. Cf. MP 16.4. 28 DI 5.3.22. Eusebius identifies Φιλαλήϑη as a work by Hierocles in Contra Hieroclem 1. 29 DI 5.2.12–3.26. Apollonius was a first century CE magician who was worshipped by some. Cf. Cassius Dio 77.18.4; Strobaeus 1.3.96.

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ers of Christianity in order “to overthrow in one attack all the accusers of justice everywhere who are writing or will have written.” 30 The first of Lactantius’ extant works, however, is not the promised apologetic summa but its prolegomena, De opificio Dei (hereafter = De opificio). This treatise is a guarded Christian apology on behalf of divine providence. Given that Lactantius gives only a cursory treatment of this topic at the start of the Divinae Institutiones, while readily acknowledging that a Christian apology must begin by discussing providence (DI 1.2.6; cf. Min. Fel. 5; 18), De opificio can be viewed as the necessary prologue to the Divinae Institutiones. The work is addressed to Lactantius’ pupil Demetrianus (OD 1.1; 20.1), presumably the same person who received two books of nonextant epistles. A fellow Christian, Demetrianus was then engaged in ‘public service’ (publicae rei) (OD 1.4) and Lactantius hopes that he will be able to continue in this profession undisturbed. The author himself has not been so fortunate (OD 1.1) and references to persecution in the text establish 304 as an approximate date of composition (cf. also OD 1.7). This treatise was written so that, like Demetrianus, “the philosophers of our sect, which we protect, might be better instructed and taught in the future.” 31 All of Lactantius’ apologetic works evince this concern for the training of eloquent defenders of the Church. Especially in times of official persecution, Christians must be able to refute the objections of their opponents based on shared principles. Effective arguments can only be made when both parties accept the evidence. In De opificio, therefore, Lactantius argues for the existence of divine providence by examining the (often erroneous) positions of the philosophers and the intelligible structure of nature. His thesis is that creation, by its order and intelligibility, displays evidence of a most-provident God (providentissimus) (cf. OD 3.4). In particular, the human person is an exalted creature – endowed with language and reason – whose attributes cannot be DI 5.4.1 (BT 2009, 450–51): accusatores justitiae […] ut omnes, qui ubique idem operis efficiunt aut effecerunt, uno semel impetu profligarem. 31 OD 1.2 (SC 213, 106): philosophi sectae nostrae quam tuemur instructiores doctioresque in posterum fiant. 30

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reckoned to chance or fate, but must be gifts from an omnipotent Creator. Offering no biblical quotations, Lactantius views himself as completing the work first begun by Cicero in Book 4 of De republica (OD 1.12–14). This method of arguing to advance Christian doctrines using non-Christian sources will later be employed to great ends in the Divinae Institutiones, to which he alludes in the closing chapter (OD 20.2–9). In De opificio this method has the added advantage of concealing what needs to be hidden during a time of great duress for Christians (OD 20.1). Lactantius began work on his magnum opus, the Divinae Institutiones (hereafter = Institutiones), in 305. As we have seen, his literary activity was prompted by the events at Nicomedia during the winter of 302/3. A more precise terminus post quem is fixed by the author’s reference to a persecuted Christian withstanding torture for two years (DI 5.11.15). Elsewhere in Book 5, there is an extended metaphor on the ferocity of Galerius (DI 5.11.5–10), and Lactantius writes as if all the persecuting emperors were still alive and awaiting God’s just judgment (DI 5.23.1–5). The latest possible terminus ante quem, therefore, is 311; since the first persecuting emperor to die was the western Augustus Maximian (r. 293–310) in July of 310. 32 Lactantius’ whereabouts during this period, however, are far less clear. He certainly began composition of the Institutiones in Nicomedia, 33 but abandoned the East in 305/6 for a safer miThis dating for the main text of the Institutiones has not been seriously disputed since Heck. See Eberhard Heck, Die dualistischen Zusätze und die Kaiseranreden bei Lactantius (Heidelberg: 1972), 144. For example, see Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 291 n. 96; Elizabeth DePalma Digeser, “Lactantius and Constantine’s Letter to Arles: Dating the Divine Institutes,” JECS 2 (1994): 43–44; Ogilvie, Library, 2. Stevenson (“Life,” 669–673), based on these and other considerations, argues that books 5 through 7 were composed prior to books 1 through 4. Even if this were the case Lactantius certainly had the entire plan of the Institutiones in mind when he began the project. See Digeser, “Constantine’s Letter,” 44; Heck, Die dualistischen, 146–147; Ogilvie, Library, 3. 33 The aforementioned incident of a persecuted Christian withstanding torture for two years was witnessed by Lactantius at Nicomedia (DI 5.11.15). Cf. Timothy D. Barnes, “Lactantius and Constantine,” 40; Eliza32

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lieu. 34 Where Lactantius ventured after leaving Nicomedia is debated. Consideration has been given to Italy, Gaul, Africa, and even elsewhere in Asia Minor. 35 The most convincing argument to date holds that he fled home to Africa, but this is not uncontested. 36 Wherever Lactantius went, he was safe. In the Institutiones, unlike De opificio Dei, he feels free to zealously harangue those who adhere to the traditional cults and, most especially, the persecuting authorities. 37 The Institutiones mark the first attempt by a Latin scholar to give a complete treatment of the entire content of the Christian faith. In Lactantius’ own words, he is attempting to provide the totius doctrinae substantiam, a reckoning of the entire body of Christian knowledge (DI 5.4.3). While others had authored apologies, e.g., Tertullian, Minucius Felix and Arnobius, none prior to St. Augustine sought to answer the objections of detractors and exposit the tenets of Christianity in a single work. In this respect, the Institutiones can rightly be seen as the forerunner to De civitate Dei. Of course, the Institutiones is no peer of De civitate Dei in relation to either penetration of thought or scope of inquiry. But what is forebeth DePalma Digeser, “Lactantius and the Edict of Milan: Does it Determine his Venue?” Studia Patristica 31 (1997): 288. 34 See DI 5.2.2, where he speaks in the past tense of his time at Nicomedia. Cf. Barnes, “Lactantius and Constantine,” 40; Digeser, “Edict of Milan,” 288; Oliver Nicholson, “Flight from Persecution as Imitation of Christ: Lactantius’ Divine Institutes 4:18, 1–2,” JTS 40 (1989): 49. For passages in the DI which suggest composition in the West see Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 291 n. 96. 35 E.g., Italy: Bowen and Garnsey, Lactantius, 3; Gaul: Brandt, “Über das Leben,” 33–34; Vincenzo Loi, “Il libro quarto delle Divinae Institutiones fu da Lattanzio composto in Gallia?” in Mélanges Christine Mohrmann. Noveau recueil offert par ses anciens élèves (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1973), 61–79; Ogilvie, Library, 2; Pichon, Lactance, 356; Africa: Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 13, 291 n. 96; Davies, “Origin and Purpose,” 70; Asia Minor: Nicholson, “Flight from Persecution,” 48. 36 See Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 291 n. 96. Conversely, see Nicholson, “Flight from Persecution,” 48 n. 6. 37 Cf. DI 1 passim; 2.1–4, 6; 5.8, 23; etc.

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shadowed is the form. Lactantius was not satisfied with merely responding to the arguments of Christianity’s attackers, but with constructing his own counter-offense by presenting the Christian faith as the only religion with vera sapientia and the only philosophy with vera religio. The structure of the Institutiones mirrors this desire both to defend and to posit. In Books 1 through 3, pars destruens, Lactantius refutes the errors of pagan religion and philosophy, while in Books 4 through 7, pars construens, he examines the beliefs he deems central to Christian thought and life. 38 In Book 1, De falsa religione, 39 Lactantius begins by demonstrating the oneness of God based on reason and the testimony of the prophets, poets, philosophers and oracles. Following his discourse on monotheism, Lactantius embarks on a refutation of polytheism. Here we discover that Lactantius, like Cicero before him (cf. Nat. D. 2.62; 3.50), explains the existence of the gods according to the theory of Euhemerus. Drawing largely from Ennius’ Historia sacra, Lactantius maintains that the gods were human beings whom the poets elevated because of their notable deeds. These beings were clearly not the one true God because they possessed human origins and characteristics, and many committed horrendous acts of violence and vice. The cult of the pantheon emerged because people venerated these heroes and leaders. As time elapsed, these figures were elevated to the level of deities and every tribe could boast of having a god as an ancestor or founder. Book 2, De origine erroris, explores the reasons for adhering to the traditional cults: namely, ignorance and tradition. Even the educated among the pagans no longer believe in the Greco-Roman pantheon, but continue to promote its cult because of blind adherence to ancestral traditions. Human beings, however, are the acme of God’s created order and were not made to worship that which is below them. Forgetful of their own dignity, people drew away from the worship of the transcendent and omnipresent and towards the base and material. In the final chapters of this book, Lactantius See Émile Amann, “Lactance,” DTC 8:2428. Book titles in the Institutiones are not the work of a later editor, but are present in the manuscripts themselves. Scholars generally agree on their Lactantian authorship. 38 39

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gives a summary of the Judeo-Christian creation account in order to emphasize the integrity of the human person and acknowledge the role of demons in the spread of idolatry and superstition. The third book of the Institutiones, De falsa sapientia, contains Lactantius’ refutation of philosophy. Though he makes use of philosophers whose testimonies can support his arguments, Lactantius claims that their disparate theses demonstrate that no particular sect or philosopher has attained true wisdom. Rather, the philosophers engaged in speculation and the praises often bestowed upon them are undeserved. True wisdom, however, is something given rather than something to be sought after. While certain philosophers came nearer the truth than others, none could apprehend the true wisdom to be found in the gift of God’s revelation. Consequently, since philosophy is incapable of grasping true wisdom, it cannot succeed in uniting wisdom and religion. According to Lactantius, human beings were made for both true wisdom and true worship. The former is necessary in order to know humanity’s ultimate end, the latter in order to obtain it. By its incapacity to unite these two elements, therefore, philosophy fails to meet a fundamental human need. Lactantius begins Book 4, De vera sapientia et religione, by giving a brief summary of the preceding books on the inability of polytheism and philosophy to unite wisdom and religion. He then commences his positive exposition of Christianity by asserting that the Christian faith contains the integration of wisdom and worship to which the human person is called by nature. Chapters 5 through 21 present the life of Christ as God’s answer to humanity’s vice and idolatry. He was sent by the Father to unite all peoples in true worship of the one God and be a model of the virtuous life. Unlike the philosophers, Christ embodied the virtues which he preached and, by being true man, showed humanity that the virtuous life is possible. The remainder of Book 4 answers the objections often posed by critics of Jesus’ divine Sonship: such as why he should suffer, the nature of his miracles, and the unity of the Godhead. Lactantius opens Book 5, De justitia, by recalling the events which lead him to author this work. In doing so, he is creating a direct link between answering the objections of those who criticize Christianity and the virtue of justice. His treatment of justice begins not with philosophy but history. Lactantius gives a narrative history of justice starting with the pagan myth of the Golden Age and con-

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cluding with the persecution of Christians. His thesis is that justice had reigned among humans when and while there was worship of the one true God (cf. civ. Dei 19.21). Once the worship of God was abandoned, people were then free to vie against one another in contests of egoism and domination. Rather than being a disruption to the Roman Empire, Christians are advocating for a return to the state of justice which once inhabited the earth by worshipping the one God. Hence, persecution of them is both absurd and contrary to the dictates of justice. Far from violating the ancient practice of disciplina arcana, Book 6, De vero cultu, does not address the liturgical practices of early Christians but, rather, the true worship offered to God by a virtuous life. Much of this book is Lactantius’ rejoinder to Cicero’s De officiis, and he begins by invoking the metaphor of the two paths to describe the ways of virtue and vice (cf. Off. 1.32). The previous discussion concerning justice is then revived as Lactantius examines the ‘duties’ (officia) towards God (i.e., pietas) and humanity (i.e., aequitas) which justice requires. The truly just person will do what is right regardless of profit or personal safety. The virtues of ‘patience’ (patientia) and ‘innocence’ (innocentia), in particular, enable him/her to endure the difficulties which accompany living a virtuous life. In the second half of Book 6, Lactantius discusses the nature and role of the passions in the moral life. The passions are neither good nor evil in themselves, but should be directed – not obliterated – towards what is good. Caution must be exercised, however, while indulging the pleasures of the senses. Often vice comes under the appearance of what is good and pleasing, while virtue what is rough and arduous. But since God is invisible, the greatest form of worship is the invisible sacrifice of virtue made in the hearts of believers. The final book of the Institutiones, De vita beata, concerns the rewards which await those who worship God in justice and virtue. The philosophers, once again, could not understand the end of mankind and, consequently, were incapable of grasping the structure and meaning of the universe. Creation was made for the sake of humanity; that we might know God through his effects, practice the virtues and gain immortality. This is the fulfillment of the human person which God created and wills. He endowed the human being with an immortal rational soul so that s/he might live with him eternally. And just as God is the Creator of all that exists, so

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too will he bring his creation to its divinely-ordained end in the eschaton. In the second half of Book 7, Lactantius narrates in great detail, and with much help from the Sibyls, the coming apocalypse which awaits humanity in the near future. The Institutiones then closes as it opened, with a laudatory dedication to the Emperor Constantine. 40 Many scholars believe that Lactantius returned to Nicomedia following the completion of the Institutiones and resided there between 311 and 313. 41 Certain passages from De mortibus persecutorum, for example, would seem to suggest a firsthand knowledge of events in the East. 42 Digeser, however, has ably demonstrated why Lactantius need not have been in the East during this period. 43 Further, it is much more likely that Lactantius was engaged by Constantine to tutor his eldest son Crispus between 310 and 313. 44 The presumptive heir to the throne of Constantine was endowed with See note 47 below. E.g., Davies, “Origin and Purpose,” 77, 81; Heck, Die dualistischen,144; Monceaux, Histoire, 3:111, 121, 124, 130; Arne Søby Christensen, Lactantius the Historian (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 1980), 25, 56. 42 The events normally cited are the deathbed Palinode of Toleration by Galerius in 311 (MP 34), the liberation of his friend Donatus, after six years of captivity, from imprisonment in Nicomedia (MP 35.2–3), and Licinius’ Rescript from Nicomedia in 313 (MP 48.2–12), a.k.a., the socalled “Edict of Milan.” Using these passages as evidence of Lactantius’ presence in Nicomedia, however, is problematic. This would mean that he traveled back to Nicomedia while active persecution was still underway. Galerius’ Palinode was soon ignored after his death by the ascending Maximinus Daia (r. 305–313) (MP 36), and thus, persecution endured in the East until 313. In the West, on the other hand, toleration began in 306 under Constantine (with restitution) and the usurper Maxentius. On this point see Barnes, “Constantine and Christianity,” 280–283. 43 See Digeser, “Edict of Milan,” 287–95. 44 Jerome, De viris illustribus 80; Chronicon AD 317. On this issue see Elizabeth DePalma Digeser, “Constantine’s Letter,” 49–52. A key factor in this assertion is Constantine’s use of the DI in his letter to the Synod of Arles in 314. 40 41

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the title of Caesar in 317 and would not have required Lactantius’ instruction after that point. There are also ancient precedents for a scholar of Lactantius’ caliber to be entrusted with the tutelage of a youth from a prominent family. 45 Certainly, Lactantius must have viewed Constantine’s commission as a divine blessing. Jerome mentions the poverty of his condition prior to it. 46 The jubilation which he experienced over the favorable changes to his personal circumstances, and to those of Christians in Constantine’s realm of the empire, no doubt prompted Lactantius to work on the Constantinian dedications (and interpolations) to the second edition of the Institutiones at this time. 47 Lactantius’ milieu after this period E.g., Gratian. See Brandt, “Über das Leben,” 32–33; Pichon, Lactance, 356. 46 Chronicon AD 317 (CSEL 27/1, 162): sed adeo in hac vita pauper, ut plerumque etiam necessariis indiguerit. This resonates well with the image of someone who has been forced to flee his home and employment, and in his senescence has dedicated himself to extensive writing. 47 For a thorough analysis of the manuscript additions see Heck, Die dualistischen. The additions to the authoritative main text, according to the citation method of Heck and Włosok in Lactantius Divinarum Institutionum Libri Septem (Munich & Leipzig: 2005–2011), are the following: The Constantinian address of DI 1.1.13–16, and the dualist passage of DI 2.8.6 add.1–9, appear in R=Parisinus lat. (Regius) 1663, beginning of the ninth century; S=Parisinus lat. 1664, twelfth-century with editorial work in the fifteenth century; and g=Gothanus membr. 1 n. 55, fourteenth- or fifteenth-century. The Constantinian address of DI 7.26.10.11–17, and the dualist passage of DI 7.5.27 add.1–17, appear in the latter two sources. Brandt and Laubmann (CSEL 19, xxiii) regard the most authoritative codex to be B=Bononiensis 701, fifth-century with revision in the early sixth century. For the remaining manuscripts which also omit the passages in question see, most recently, Digeser, “Constantine’s Letter,” 41 n. 34. Since Pichon (Lactance, 23–29) most scholars agree that these passages came from Lactantius himself. Since Heck (Die dualistischen, 37–39) most agree that these passages were a later insertion by Lactantius. The dualist “addition” in OD, cited as 19 bis1–5 in Michel Perrin, ed., Lactance: L’ouvrage du dieu créateur, SC 213 (Paris: Cerf, 1974), appears in codices g and P=Parisinus lat. (Puteani) 1662, third quarter of the ninth century. Unlike the above, however, it seems much more likely that this passage is 45

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remains uncertain, but presumably he spent the remainder of his life under Constantine’s patronage at Trier. After the forces of Constantine and Licinius (r. 308–324) defeated those of Maxentius (312) (MP 44) and Maximinus Daia (313) (MP 47) respectively, Licinius published a rescript on behalf of Constantine and himself from Nicomedia on June 15, 313 (MP 48.2–12; HE 10.5.2–14). This document granted “to all people the freedom to follow whatever religion one wished,” 48 rescinded all previous legal precedents to the contrary, and ordered the immediate restitution of corporately-owned church property. While this did not mark the end of Christian persecution in the ancient world, 49 it would now be the exception rather than the rule. Lactantius, in order that none may fail to see the work of God’s providence in this most recent history, composed a pamphlet entitled De mortibus persecutorum (hereafter = De mortibus). Written between 313 and 315, 50 De mortibus is a history of the lives and deaths of the Roman emperors who persecuted the Christian church. The thesis of this work is that “the highest God has displayed His virtue and majesty in extinguishing and destroying the enemies of his name.” 51 The gruesome and horrific deaths which without fail befell the pera later redaction of, rather than an addition to, the original text. On this matter see Perrin, SC 213, 86–94. 48 MP 48.2 (SC 39, 132): omnibus liberam potestatem sequendi religionem quam quisque voluisset. 49 E.g., by the same Licinius between 320 and 324 in the East, and by Emperor Julian (r. 361–363). 50 On the dates see Barnes, “Lactantius and Constantine,” 46; id., Constantine and Eusebius, 13–14; J. L. Creed, ed., Lactantius: De mortibus persecutorum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), xxxiii-xxxv; Digeser, “Constantine’s Letter,”49. The last major event which Lactantius records is the death of Maximinus Daia in the summer of 313. His portrait of Licinius, favorable yet not without blemish, bespeaks of the period prior to 316; after which time the animosity between Licinius and Constantine finally erupted into violence. 51 MP 1.8 (SC 39, 79): virtutem ac majestatem suam in exdis delendisque nominis sui hostibus deus summus ostenderit.

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secuting emperors are the evidence of God’s activity in human history. God permitted his disciples to experience tribulation in order to display his justice by the total and utter destruction of the persecutors. Many scholars have noted the parallels which exist between De mortibus and 2 Maccabees. 52 Rather than a contribution to the tradition of Roman histories, such as those of Tacitus and Suetonius, De mortibus is a work of consolation to his fellow Christians who suffered at the hands of imperial tormentors. It is dedicated to a confessor named Donatus who withstood torture and imprisonment at Nicomedia for six years (MP 1.1; 35.2; 52.5). The difference of genre between De mortibus and Lactantius’ apologetic works accounts for the departure from his normally exquisite Ciceronian style. One may, with J. Creed, refer to it as “a piece of epideictic oratory devoted not to encomium but to vituperatio.” 53 Lactantius’ excoriation of the persecuting emperors also emphasizes the complete and manifest defects of their entire personhood. In other words, a persecutor will always be a vicious person and incapable leader. The three qualities are inextricably united, and one intensifies proportionately with the others. In relation to the division of material, the vast majority of De mortibus, Chapters 7 through 51, concerns the years 284 to 313: from the genesis of the tetrarchy to the death of the last persecuting emperor, Maximinus Daia. Thus, along with Eusebius’ Historia ecclesiastica, De mortibus remains an invaluable historical resource concerning this tumultuous and critical period in Roman history. Lactantius alludes to his next work, De ira Dei, in Book 2 of the Institutiones (DI 2.17.4–5). This treatise specifically deals with divine impassibility; a topic he could only treat in cursory fashion in the Institutiones. In De ira Dei Lactantius defends the wrath of God against those, especially Stoics and Epicureans, who find divine anger contrary to God’s nature. It was written after persecution had Cf. Creed, De mortibus, xxxviii; Moreau, SC 39, 62; Wilhelm Nestle, “Die Legende vom Tode der Gottesverrachter,” AR 33 (1936): 246–269; Jean Rougé, “Le De Mortibus Persecutorum, 5e livre des Macchabées” Studia Patristica 12/1 (1976): 135–143. 53 Creed, De mortibus, xxxviii. 52

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ended, 54 and intimates at the unrest which ensued following the conflict between Constantine and Licinius in 316 (ID 24.12; 23.26). Therefore, 316/7 can be asserted as an approximate date of composition. Both this work and De mortibus are dedicated to a Donatus (ID 1.1). It is only an assumption, albeit a reasonable one, that these dedicatees are the same person. Lactantius is never explicit. Lactantius’ treatise on the wrath of God exemplifies the dialogue between biblical and Greco-Roman notions of the divine which took place during the infancy of Christianity. Divine apatheia was affirmed by some Christians, such as Arnobius (cf. Adv. nat. 6.2), but Lactantius argues for a doctrine of God consonant with the biblical tradition without making use of scriptural evidence. He argues directly against the philosophers who view anger as incompatible with the divine nature. The wrath of God, according to Lactantius, is an essential part of God’s justice. Unlike the anger human beings experience, an emotion which springs from the passions, God’s anger is righteous indignation: “a movement of the mind arising for the restraint of offences.” 55 Just as a parent disciplines a beloved child, God too disciplines mankind because of his love. Furthermore, divine anger is the very basis for religion. Without it, there would be no reward for a virtuous life or reprimand for a vicious one. Indeed, if God did not possess righteous anger, there would be no need for religion at all. In addition to providing us with greater insight into Lactantius’ doctrine of God, De ira Dei also holds the distinction of being “the only monograph on that subject left by the ancients.” 56 The final extant apologetic work we possess is the epitome Divinarum Institutionum (hereafter = Epitome). This theological résumé was dedicated to a friend named Pentadius who desired an abridged version of the original tome (Epi. Pr.1). It was composed ‘long after’ (jam pridem) the Institutiones which suggests a range of Cf. ID 16.4; Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 292 n. 99. ID 17.20 (SC 289, 180): ira est motus animi ad coercenda peccata insurgentis. Cf. civ. Dei 15.25. 56 Harald Hagendahl, Latin Fathers and the Classics (Göteborg: 1958), 70. 54 55

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four to six years. 57 Therefore, Lactantius may have been at work on the Epitome and De ira Dei concurrently. In 73 chapters, of which chapters 15 through 19 are incomplete in the manuscripts, Lactantius offers a compendium to the Institutiones that eliminates much of the superfluity and repetitive quotations contained in the original. Greek quotations, which were retained in their original language in the Institutiones, appear in Latin in the Epitome. Additional sources have been consulted as well, such as Plato’s Timeaus (Epi. 63.1, 9; 64.5) and certain passages from Scripture (Epi. 59.3; 60.3; 62.3; 67.4). In sum, the abbreviated and condensed format of the Epitome lends itself to a greater degree of readability. Lactantius’ audience must have preferred the prototype, however, as there are only three manuscripts which contain this work. 58 The remaining works mentioned by Jerome – a Symposium, an Itinerary and The Grammarian – are all lost, as are the collections of epistles. Jerome claims that the epistles to Demetrianus firmly deny the subsistence of the Holy Spirit, 59 and pseudo-Damasus found the epistles he encountered far too vulgar. 60 Of his correspondents Severus and Probus we know nothing except a few details concerning a kinsman of the former. 61 In the Institutiones, Lactantius quotes from a text on providence sent directly to him by its author, ‘our Asclepiades’ (Asclepiades noster) (DI 7.4.17). This is surely the same person who received two books from Lactantius, but nothing else is known of him. Given the lack of evidence it is impossible to date his collections of epistles with any degree of certainty. Omitted from Jerome’s catalogue is De Ave Phoenice, a poem in 85 elegiac Epi. Pr.1; cf. Stevenson, “Life,” 677. The manuscripts of the Epitome are B, P, and T=Taurinensis Regii Tabulari I. See note 47 above. Of the three, the latter is the most complete. 59 Ep. 84.7; Comm. ad Gal. 2.4. 60 Jerome Ep. 35.1. On the authorship of this epistle see P. Nautin, “Le premier échange épistolaire entre Jerome et Damase: lettres réelles ou fictives?” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 30 (1983): 331–334. 61 See Jerome De viris illustribus 111. For the ancient fragments which mention the non-extant works see Brandt and Laubmann, CSEL 27/1, 155–160. 57 58

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couplets possibly written in the early 320’s. 62 Lactantius’ retelling of the fabled story of the phoenix, while traditionally read through the lens of Christian allegory, is deeply multivalent and suggests Constantinian influence. A few fragments have also survived, 63 but Lactantius’ desire to author two more apologetic works, a contra Judaeos (DI 7.1.26) and a contra haereticos (DI 4.30.14; ID 2.6), went unfulfilled. There is no record of his death in any of the ancient testimonia, but it would be difficult to imagine Lactantius enduring beyond the year 325.

See Jackson Bryce, “De Ave Phoenice and the religious policy of Constantine the Great,” Studia Patristica 19/1 (1989): 19. 63 See Brandt and Laubmann, CSEL 27/1, 148–151, 157–8. 62

CHAPTER 2. LACTANTIUS AND METHOD Prior to a detailed analysis of Lactantius’ use of the doctrine of providence, it is important to examine his method of composition. In an oblique way, Lactantius’ belief in providence is operative even in discussing matters related to theological method. The apologist himself admits as much in affirming that one cannot discuss other theological matters without also addressing the topic of providence throughout (DI 1.2.6). This chapter, therefore, addresses the (I.) method, (II.) audience and (III.) sources of Lactantius’ writings and will conclude with an excursus on (IV.) the apologist’s conception of Christian truth.

I. METHOD

Lactantius recognized that Christian apologetics in the Latin tongue had been attempted before him. He mentions the contributions of Minucius Felix, Tertullian and Cyprian, but his evaluation of their work is not altogether positive. Both Minucius and Tertullian are complimented for their skill of composition. The former, however, had not the time to devote himself wholly to the subject, while the latter “had little facility in eloquence, even less in adornment, and very obscure.” 1 Lactantius wishes that Tertullian, in his Apologeticum, had expounded the truths of the Christian faith rather than merely respond to the attacks of others (DI 5.4.3). Cyprian, the most distinguished of his predecessors, “had a natural genius, was studious, smooth and clear – the greatest of virtues in language – so that one could not discern whether elegance of language, sucDI 5.1.23 (BT 2009, 440): in eloquendo parum facilis et minus comptus et multum obscurus fuit. 1

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cess in explanation, or power of persuasion came first.” 2 His audience, however, was limited to existing members of the Christian flock. Cyprian spoke of mysteries known only to the Christian faithful and, because of his own deeply profound knowledge of Scripture, employed it as an authority where logic, philosophy or history would have been more convincing and appropriate. In short, Cyprian “was content with only those things which are the substance of our faith.” 3 Learning from the deficiencies of his predecessors, Lactantius seeks to exposit Christian doctrine in three ways. First, he maintains that the Christian apologist should be a person who possesses the requisite command of language so as to persuade his audience with pleasant speech. A common complaint levied against the early Christians was that their scriptural literature lacked style and sublimity, and its advocates education and erudition. 4 To combat this mean image Lactantius would employ the fruits of his classical education to defend Christianity. “I can now use my great and plentiful faculty to plead the cause of truth. Though truth can be defended, as many often have defended it, without eloquence, nevertheless it ought to be illuminated and indeed expounded with clarity and splendor of words.” 5 Many of those to whom Lactantius directs his defense would not respond favorably to an unpolished and banal manner of speech (DI 5.1.21; 4.5.2). “To that point nothing is true unless it is smooth on the ears, nothing is credible unless it proDI 5.1.25 (BT 2009, 440–41): Erat enim ingenio facili copioso suavi et, quae sermonis maxima est virtus, aperto, ut discernere non queas, utrumne ornatior in eloquendo an felicior in explicando an potentior in persuadendo fuerit. 3 DI 5.4.7 (BT 2009, 452): his solis contentus esset quibus fides constat. 4 Cf. DI 5.1.15–21, 2.17; 6.21.4–5; Acts 4:13; Origen C. Cels. 1.27.29; 3.18.44; etc. 5 DI 1.1.10 (BT 2005, 3): nunc majore copia et facultate dicendi causam veritatis peroremus. quae licet possit sine eloquentia defendi, ut est a multis saepe defensa, tamen claritate ac nitore sermonis inlustranda et quodammodo disserenda est. 2

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vides pleasure; they weigh not by truth, but ornament.” 6 Further, by employing fluid and lofty language Lactantius is not only presenting the truth through a more receptive medium, but also using a chief weapon of Christianity’s despisers against them (DI 3.1.2). “Rim the cup of wisdom with honey from heaven, so that the bitter remedy can be drunk unknowingly without giving any offense; while the initial sweetness allures, the harshness of the bitter medicine is hidden under the pretext of smoothness.” 7 Whereas philosophy, oratory and poetry are honey hiding poison, true religion is an acerbic quaff. In addition to splendor of language, Lactantius believes that a thorough and complete apology will not only tear down fallacious arguments, but also build up the truths of the Christian faith. “He proposes to attack the problem not merely with the reductio ad absurdam that is characteristic of Tertullian and Arnobius, but with a positive exposition of the Christian doctrine.” 8 The very title of the Institutiones bespeaks his desire to establish a positive body of knowledge akin to the institutiones civilis juris. 9 Just as there exists a legal code for settling disputes between citizens, so too should there be a divine law to guide believers away from the errors and superstitions of this world and towards the blissful immortality of the next life (DI 1.1.12; 1.1.21). Lactantius’ goal is to present the totius doctrinae substantiam; a reckoning of the entire body of Christian knowledge (DI 5.4.3). Such a work would instruct believers less formed in their faith and refute all possible opponents: past, preDI 5.1.17 (BT 2009, 439): Adeo nihil verum putant nisi quod auditu suave est, nihil credibile nisi quod potest incutere voluptatem; nemo rem veritate ponderat, sed ornatu. Cf. 1.1.7. 7 DI 5.1.14 (BT 2009, 438–39): Circumlinatur modo poculum caelesti melle sapientiae, ut possint ab imprudentibus amara remedia sine ulla offensione potari, dum inliciens prima dulcedo acerbitatem saporis asperi sub praetexto suavitatis occultat. Cf. Lucr. 1.936–950. 8 L. J. Swift, “Arnobius and Lactantius: Two Views of the Pagan Poets,” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 96 (1965): 445. 9 Cf. J. Stevenson, “Aspects of the Relations between Lactantius and the Classics,” Studia Patristica 4/2 (1961): 500. 6

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sent and future. “I decided I had to argue my case in such a way that previous writers would be undone together with all their works, and future writers would lose all opportunity of writing or of responding.” 10 In Lactantius’ view, if more men of learning and scholarship would but apply themselves to this task, to the exposition of truth, then false wisdom and religion would soon become a distant memory (DI 5.4.8). The final component of Lactantian apologetics concerns the author’s source material. In his elucidation of the Christian faith the rhetorician makes copious use of classical philosophers, poets and oracles. 11 Unlike Cyprian, Lactantius intends to nurse his pagan audience on the milk with which they are accustomed, i.e., their own literature, before feeding them the meat of revelation. 12 On demonstrating the existence of the one supreme God, for example, Lactantius writes: Let us come to the authors, and to prove the truth let us cite as witnesses those who are often used against us: the poets and philosophers. We must prove the unity of God from them, not because they have knowledge of the truth, but because the truth itself is so powerful that no one – not even a blind man –

DI 5.4.2 (BT 2009, 451): sic agendam mihi hanc causam putavi, ut et priores cum suis omnibus scriptis perverterem et futuris omnem facultatem scribendi aut respondendi amputarem. 11 On this topic see esp., Pichon, Lactance, 218–45; G. L. Ellsperman, The Attitude of the Early Christian Latin Writers toward Pagan Literature and Learning (Cleveland: 1984), 67–100. Bowen and Garnsey, for example, in the most recent English edition of the Institutiones, detect either direct or indirect quotations from among the following authors: Cicero (105), Vergil (50), the Sibyls (45), Lucretius (25) and Seneca (22). The Bible, on the other hand, in the conservative estimation of these scholars, is quoted 77 times. On the issue of what texts Lactantius might have possessed consult R. M. Ogilvie, Library. On the influence of the pagan authors on the thought of Lactantius see J. Bryce, Library. 12 DI 5.4.6; cf. 1.5.2; 1 Cor 3:2; Heb 5:12. 10

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could help but see divine brightness when it pours itself upon the eyes. 13

As we have seen, many educated pagans viewed Scripture as an inferior form of literature; a similar charge cast doubt upon their antiquity (DI 4.5.9). Therefore, the most effective apologetic method would be to support one’s arguments with testimonies from extra-scriptural sources. These testimonia include, first, the poets and philosophers, but also the quasi-divine works of oracular literature such as Hermes Trismegistus, the Sibylline Oracles, Apollo and even the Iranian text of Hystaspes. In appealing especially to the latter sources, Lactantius believed their utterances to be irrefutable by his opponents. 14 “What sort of proof could we better use against [our adversaries] than to bind them with testimony from their own gods?” 15

II. AUDIENCE

In the Institutiones, Lactantius makes clear that the members of his intended audience are educated pagans, or docti, whom he hopes to draw away from false wisdom and religion. The Institutiones begin with Lactantius praising the classical philosophers who, forsaking all worldly pleasures, pursued the lofty goal of attaining wisdom

DI 1.5.2 (BT 2005, 14–15): veniamus ad auctores et eos ipsos ad veri probationem testes citemus, quibus contra nos uti solent, poetas dico ac philosophos. ex his unum deum probemus necesse est, non quod illi habuerint cognitam veritatem, sed quod veritatis ipius tanta vis est, ut nemo possit esse tam caecus, quin videat ingerentem se oculis divinam claritatem. Cf. DI 3.1.2–3. 14 DI 7.13.2. Cf. Cicero Part. or. 2.6. Also, Jeremy Schott rightly states that Lactantius’ use of oracular literature parodies the method employed by his opponent Pophyry in Philosophy from Oracles. See J. Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion, 81. 15 DI 1.6.17 (BT 2005, 28): quod genus probationis adversus eos magis adhibere debemus quam ut eos deorum suorm testimoniis revincamus? 13

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(DI 1.1.1–4). 16 These great men ultimately failed, however, because truth and wisdom are gifts given to human beings by God and not goals to be attained by one’s own effort. This divine gift of wisdom has been given to all those who have received the Christian faith. As a Christian teacher, therefore, it is Lactantius’ mission to share true wisdom with those who are unacquainted with God’s revelation. Although Lactantius mentions the need to guide the docti towards true wisdom and the indocti towards true religion, it is evident that the aim of the Institutiones is to lead the former to both true wisdom and religion (DI 1.1.7). The philosophers, especially, are in desperate need of guidance since their internecine quarreling has virtually consumed their original goal of pursuing truth and virtue (DI 1.1.24). The question of audience is again addressed in Book 5, when Lactantius gives what amounts to a second introduction to the Institutiones, i.e., a recapitulation of his goals and motives for writing. Here we discover that his proximate motive for writing came from witnessing the slanderous presentations of two prominent men (DI 5.4.1). The greater motive, however, is to present the case for Christianity to all those governing authorities who persecute the Christian Church. These people condemn Christians to death without firm knowledge of Christian doctrine. Lactantius implores them to read his treatise straight through and reserve judgment until the end (DI 5.1.2). In doing so he hopes “to lead them from a stupid conviction to the truth.” 17 But the seasoned author also has realistic expectations as to the reception of his work. He recognizes that the most likely reaction to his apology by a persecutor will be derision and mockery (DI 5.1.1). Those who condemn Christians to death do not wish to hear the truth. They are contended in their sins and would rather put innocent people to death without hearing evidence (DI 5.1.3–8, 9.6). But despite the acknowledgement that his work may not resonate with Christianity’s more virulent oppoLactantius most certainly has Cicero in mind when he speaks of orators who retired in order to devote themselves to philosophy (DI 1.1.11; cf. Off. 1.2.4; 2.2.4; 3.2.5). 17 DI 5.1.8 (BT 2009, 437): hos ad veritatem ab inepta persuasione traducere. 16

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nents, the educated pagan in general remains Lactantius’ target audience in the Institutiones (DI 5.1.8). That Lactantius’ primary audience is a non-Christian one does not, however, eliminate potential Christian readership; especially since it was a common apologetic trope to address one’s defense to non-Christian authorities while composing for a predominantly Christian readership. 18 Lactantius admits that even if this tome should fail to persuade any pagan readers, it would still have the benefit of solidifying and reinforcing the faith of those Christians who are in need of instruction (DI 5.1.9). Those whose faith “is neither stable nor solid” 19 refers to Christians who have received a classical education. Lactantius mentions that people who have attained proficiency in letters often waver in faith (DI 6.21.4). By composing his apology in the style of the great orators, in particular Cicero, Lactantius hopes that these studiosi (DI 5.1.11) will become scholars in truth and virtue, rather than literature. Finally, the apologist confesses that, should no one give ear to his plea, his conscience rejoices at composing a work on Christian truth (DI 5.1.12). Only in the Institutiones does Lactantius explicitly mention composing a work for the sake of a non-Christian audience. His other surviving works are all addressed to fellow Christians and it would be difficult to imagine a majority of his readers, even of the Institutiones, being non-Christians. The topic of Lactantius’ addressees has been discussed in the previous section, but what ought to be emphasized here is what the consistent use of non-Christian sources throughout Lactantius’ apologetic works tells us about his intended audience. Though his treatises are all addressed to Christians they argue from evidence provided by reason, nature and non-Christian literature. The Epitome was written for the benefit of a Christian friend who desired a more compact compendium to the Institutiones, the fundamental aims and contents remaining the same as the original tome. In De ira Dei, Lactantius is engaged in refuting the positions of the Stoics and Epicureans concerning the existence and nature of divine anger (ID 2.7). While this might suggest that his primary 18 19

Cf., e.g., Justin 1 Apol.; 2 Apol. DI 5.1.9 (BT 2009, 437): non est stabilis ac solidis.

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audience consists of philosophers or educated pagans, the work is addressed to a Christian. Lactantius is writing expressly for the benefit of Donatus, so that “you yourself might not be deceived by the influence of men who consider themselves wise.” 20 It would be reasonable to infer that, like the aforementioned studiosi, Donatus is an educated Christian with whom the opinions of the great philosophers carry some weight. Beyond the addressee, however, Lactantius is more explicit about his wider readership in De opificio Dei. In composing this early work Lactantius openly bears in mind the formation of Christian scholars (OD 1.2). He writes for the intellectual and moral benefit of Christian teachers and preachers who are given no hearing and are commonly rebuked. They are in need of instruction and teaching, and Lactantius explicitly intends his treatise to benefit this wider group of philosophi sectae nostrae (OD 1.2). If convincing other Christians to believe in God’s providence (as in De opificio Dei) or righteous indignation (as in De ira Dei) were Lactantius’ only goals in composing these treatises then making use of scriptural evidence would be the most appropriate and convincing form of argument. In confining himself to extra-biblical authorities, however, Lactantius is committing himself to educating the Christian reader in effective apologetic practice. In this sense, I would argue, the intended readership about which Lactantius is explicit in De opificio Dei is also the case for all of his apologetic works. His selection of source material implies that Lactantius is concerned with educating Christian advocates for the public forum. In particular, those Christians who share a certain level of erudition and sophistication with the apologist, and who frequently come into contact with persons either hostile to or ignorant of the Christian message. According to Lactantius, producing learned advocates who could convincingly defend the faith to their peers, utilizing the fruits of their education, is the great deficiency of Latin Christendom (DI 5.1.21, 4.8). Therefore the apologist seeks to gather the scattered remnants of truth dispersed among the classical authors and present them in a comprehensive and cohesive body of ID 1.2 (SC 289, 90): ne et ipse fallaris inpulsus auctoritate hominum qui se putant esse sapientes. There also existed Christians, most notably Arnobius of Sicca, who denied the existence of anger in God. 20

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knowledge to those who would proclaim the gospel to the gentes (DI 7.7.1–4).

III. SOURCES A. The Bible Although, save for Book 4 of the Institutiones, the Christian Bible lurks in the background of Lactantius’ compositions it remains the standard of all truth and that “from which the font of holy religion flows as its source.” 21 All of Lactantius’ non-Christian sources are evaluated based on their resonance with sacred Scripture and Christian doctrine. This is the apologist’s primary criterion for measuring truth. Pedagogically, however, those who have not been initiated into the Christian mysteries need first to receive primary evangelization before reading Scripture. This is the case, first, because the Bible itself discourages an educated readership by its unadorned language. Scripture contains neither the sweetness and refinement of poetry or rhetoric, nor the sophisticated argumentation of philosophy (cf. DI 3.1.11; 6.21.4). Rather, the Bible is the written word of God. When God spoke he did so as the Author of creation and Lord of his people: “not by argument, but by pronouncement.” 22 Being the supreme teacher and pedagogue, God conditioned his language to suit his audience of ancient Israelites. These were ordinary folk and, consequently, biblical language is “in common and simple words.” 23 As a result, many non-Christians who conflate truth with eloquence are loath to read a text with DI 4.5.9 (BT 2007, 324–25): ex quo fonte religionis sanctae origo manaverit. Cf. 1.1.22; 6.24.31; 7.25.1. For an extensive treatment of Lactantius’ understanding of the Bible see P. Monat, Lactance et la Bible: Une propédeutique latine à la lecture de la Bible dans l’Occident constantinien (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1982). It is also worth remembering that scriptura sancta or litterarum divinarum to Lactantius does not signify the codified and canonized text which the Christian West possessed after the Vulgate was in wide usage. On the sources of Lactantius’ biblical quotations see P. McGuckin, “Non-Cyprianic Scripture,” 145–63. 22 DI 3.1.11 (BT 2007, 203–04): non argumentari, sed pronuntiare. 23 DI 5.1.15 (BT 2009, 439): communi ac simplici sermone. 21

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such a “short and stark” 24 tradition. The Bible is viewed by them as “stupid and vulgar,” 25 and this assessment extends to its advocates. 26 But, while acknowledging the need for more capable defenders, Lactantius believes that aversion to the Bible is also part of the divine economy. God willed that his revelation remain hidden, obscure and unattractive until the coming of his Son; so that he might reveal true wisdom to all peoples. 27 It was God’s plan that “the mysteries of divine religion” 28 should be preserved by the Jewish people and written in an arcane language until He Himself could be our teacher. In doing so God ensured that his Word would remain pure and uncorrupt from the alluring and seductive language commonly used to mask lies (DI 3.1.3). Secondly, the Bible discourages the novice reader because its contents cannot be easily discerned. Lactantius views biblical study as the final, and ultimate, step in Christian education. Given the skepticism and derision with which some of his non-Christian contemporaries treated the Bible, it was obvious to Lactantius that engaging sacred Scripture should initially be eschewed. Only when the auditor is convinced of the basic truths of Christianity should s/he be directed “to the most abundant and plentiful font of teaching itself.” 29 The first step in proclaiming the truths contained in Scripture is to arrange and explicate the contents of revelation in a manner more suitable to ordo disciplinae. This is precisely the task which Lactantius has taken up in writing the Institutiones. Though he could easily prove his theses using only biblical evidence, he opts instead DI 3.1.11 (BT 2007, 203): breviter ac nude. Lactantius believes this to be the primary reason why Scripture does not resonate with the educated classes. See DI 5.1.15–18. 25 DI 5.1.16 (BT 2009, 439): inepta vulgaria. 26 Cf. DI 5.1.18. In recalling the inflammatory speech of Sossianus Hierocles, Lactantius quotes him as referring to the apostles as “‘disseminators of falsehood’” and “‘rude and unlearned.’” DI 5.2.17 (BT 2009, 445): ‘fallaciae seminatores’ […] ‘rudes et indoctos.’ 27 Cf. DI 4.2.3, 8.8, 12.11, 15.30, 20.1, 3. 28 DI 4.8.2 (BT 2007, 332): divinae religionis sacramenta. 29 DI 1.1.22 (BT 2005, 5–6): ad ipsum doctrinae uberrimum ac plenissimum fontem. 24

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to give a rendering of Christian doctrine based on mutually acceptable sources. The process of Christian education for the uninitiated is systematically described by Lactantius in his final apologetic work, De ira Dei: The first step is to understand the false religions and to cast off the impious cults of things made by human hands. The next step, then, is to perceive with the mind that there is one supreme God whose power and providence in the beginning made the world and thereafter governs it. The third step is to know his minister and messenger whom he dispatched to earth and, by whose teaching, we are liberated from the error in which we are held and involved, and instructed in the worship of the true God; so that we might learn justice. 30

ID 2.2 (SC 289, 94): Primus autem gradus est intellegere falsas religiones et abicere inpios cultus humana manu fabricatorum, secundus vero perspicere animo quod unus sit dues summus, cujus potestas ac providentia effecerit a principio mundum et gubernet in posterum, tertius cognoscere ministrum ejus ac nuntium quem legavit in terram, quo docente, liberati an errore quo inplicati tenebamur formatique ad veri dei cultum, justitiam disceremus. As to the identity of the groups mentioned, those who have been tossed from the first stage recognize that the pantheon of gods is fiction yet cannot bring themselves to worship the one God. Instead, they remain content to marvel at the wonders of nature and the universe. Lactantius mentions that he has refuted these individuals in Book 2 of the Institutiones (ID 2.4). While he never names the specific sect about which he is writing, we can deduce from the context that Lactantius has the Epicureans primarily in mind. More broadly defined, however, this group would include all materialists. See Tadeusz Maslowski, “The Opponents of Lactantius [Inst. VII. 7, 7–13],” California Studies in Classical Antiquity 7 (1975): 187–213. Abandoning the second stage are those who, while acknowledging God’s unity and providence, nevertheless cannot grasp other aspects of the divine nature, such as God’s justice. While we can reasonably suggest that Lactantius is speaking in a veiled way about the Stoics, other groups of philosophical monotheists would certainly also qualify. Lastly, those thrown from the third stage have failed to accept 30

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This journey of intellectual transformation is an arduous one due to a luminescence of the truth. An individual is liable to be very easily thrown from this path if not firmly grounded. Hence, Lactantius takes great care to introduce new and foreign evidence to his audience only where other, more familiar, sources will not suffice. Such is the case in Book 4 of the Institutiones, where the testimony of the prophets is critical to Lactantius’ argument for Christ’s divine Sonship. For the most part the reader is reminded, at various points throughout the Institutiones, to consult Scripture if s/he wishes to know the whole truth on a given subject (e.g., DI 1.1.22; 6.24.31; 7.25.1; etc.). Lactantius’ lack of biblical evidence, therefore, is not due to any ambiguity in the mind of the author in relation to its authority. Rather, the apologist’s avoidance of scriptural quotations is consistent with his pedagogical model of Christian learning. B. The Poets Lactantius certainly has an innate fondness for the great Latin poets, especially Vergil, and his enthusiasm for them is unique among early Christian apologists. What may appear surprising in Lactantius’ overall treatment and use of the poets is his repeated defense on their behalf. Those to blame for the proliferation of polytheism and idol worship are not the poets, rather it is those who came after them. In true Roman fashion, Lactantius blames the Greeks for the institution and proliferation of polytheistic cults based on the works of the poets (DI 1.15.14). This occurred because the Greeks read poetry in a manner which was contrary to its literary genre. Lactantius sees the embellishment of the accomplishments of noble men throughout history as a reasonable exercise of poetic license. Poets rarely completely fabricate the truth (DI 1.11.23, 30; 2.10.12), but what they recount is wrapped in figurative language and metaphor. Poetry, therefore, needs to be read according to the

Christ’s role in salvation; either they reject him altogether or receive him in a manner contrary to the faith (ID 2.6). Lactantius is most certainly referring to Jews and heretics in this last entry.

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literary form in which it was composed, i.e., figuratively and allegorically. 31 The deference with which Lactantius treats older sources inclined him to employ this method of reading poetry first to Orpheus, “oldest of the poets, and equal to the gods themselves.” 32 In examining the evidence among the poets for God’s oneness, Lactantius asserts that Orpheus attests to it when he refers to God as πρωτόγονον (first-born). Far from claiming that God was born, this term was employed by the poet to signify that nothing came before God and everything is descended from him. 33 Similarly, Orpheus calls God Φάνητα (Appearer) because he existed when nothing else did. Probing the works of poets using this method, Lactantius is able to find further evidence for, inter alia, his Euhemerist theory of polytheism, the deluge, and resurrection of the body. Not all poetry, however, measures up to the standard of truth even when read allegorically. Again, in relation to establishing the unity of God, Homer is dismissed because he wrote about things human rather than things divine. Hesiod probed the mystery of the foundation of the universe in his Theogony, but began with chaos. Never did he think to explain “where the chaos itself came from, and when and how it began to exist.” 34 Vergil and Ovid, on the other hand, do provide evidence for monotheism. The former “is not far from the truth” 35 when he refers to God as mind (mentem) and spirit (spiritum) (DI 1.5.11; quot. Aen 6.724–27). The latter was also correct in calling God the “‘craftsman of the world’ and ‘maker of things.’” 36 When these and other poets are in agreement with This method of allegorical reading had already been in use among the Stoics and Christians to interpret, respectively, the myths and Hebrew Scripture. 32 DI 1.5.4 (BT 2005, 15): vetustissimus poetarum et aequalis ipsorum deorum. 33 DI 1.5.4; cf. E. Abel, Orphica (Leipzig: 1885), fr. 57. 34 DI 1.5.8 (BT 2005, 16): debuerit chaos ipsum unde quando quomodo esse aut constare coepisset. 35 DI 1.5.11 (BT 2005, 16): non longe afuit a veritate. 36 DI 1.5.13 (BT 2005, 17): quem ‘fabricatorem mundi’, quem ‘rerum opificem’. Cf. Met. 1.57, 79. 31

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Christian doctrine it is because they, like the philosophers, obeyed reason and nature (DI 1.5.6, 14). While Lactantius does not rule out the possibility of the poets reaching a portion of the truth by the preservation and transmission of some divine oracle (DI 2.10.6), he nevertheless stresses that the truths originating in the minds of the poets are examples of human beings thinking and acting according to their nature. 37 C. The Philosophers Lactantius’ attitude towards philosophy is marked by ambivalence. He does not seek to reconcile Christianity with philosophy in the manner of Justin Martyr. But neither does he display the open hostility towards philosophy that is indicative of Tertullian. Rather, Lactantius takes a middle road; using the philosophers as witnesses when they can help his arguments, but criticizing many of their positions and undermining their teaching authority. The apologist’s mission is to demonstrate that true wisdom lay within Christian teaching and, to further this end, Lactantius must reveal the deficiencies of the philosophers and unseat them as models of sapientes. 38 Lactantius recognizes that this task is more difficult than the one he similarly embarked upon in order to discredit polytheism Lactantius is not advancing the Epicurean doctrine of prolepsis or anticipatio. Cf. Cicero Nat. D. 1.44. Rather, he sees human beings as naturally ordered to knowing God by the light of reason and through His effects. Cf. DI 2.1.14–19. His position is closer to that of the Stoics. Cf. Nat. D. 2.4. 38 The philosophers Lactantius cites most frequently are all from the Latin tradition. First and foremost among them is Cicero, whom Lactantius calls perfect orator and supreme philosopher (DI 3.14.7). Cicero serves Lactantius not only as a linguistic model and representative of the Stoic and Eclectic schools, but also as an encyclopedic repository for the history of philosophy. The other philosophers most often mentioned are Seneca, the sharpest of Stoics (DI 1.5.26; cf. 1.7.13; 2.8.23; 6.24.14), and Lucretius. The latter is considered a philosopher rather than a poet because he is the primary representative of the Epicurean school; with whom Lactantius will battle vociferously. 37

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and idolatry (DI 2.19.1). The philosophers are generally considered more authoritative sources than the poets by virtue of their desire for wisdom (DI 1.5.15) and their eloquence and erudition carry much weight with the educated Greco-Roman reader (DI 2.19.4). They are to be lauded for their aim of knowing the truth but, according to Lactantius, their lofty goals are completely undermined by their staggering lack of product (DI 3.1.7). The apologist accounts for the philosophers’ failure to attain wisdom in two ways. First, he asserts that the philosophers are mistaken because they seek something which can only be possessed as gift. Lactantius’ primary focus in Book 3 of the Institutiones, where he offers his extended critique of the philosophers, is to demonstrate that true wisdom is not present in philosophy. The philosophers, he argues, by definition are seekers of wisdom rather than the possessors of it (DI 3.2.3–4). From the multiplicity of their beliefs, it is apparent that no philosopher or philosophical school has attained the wisdom which they all seek (DI 3.4.3–10). The dogmatic schools erred in thinking that they possessed that which they sought. The Skeptics were also in error by professing complete ignorance; the assertion of which demonstrates that something can be known (DI 3.5.5–8). In contrast to these two positions, Lactantius argues that the human person occupies a middle position between ignorance and wisdom. He does not fault the philosophers for wanting to discover the truth; such is the natural desire of human kind (DI 3.1.7). But to possess wisdom is rightly the province of God and God alone. If human beings were able to attain wisdom by their own efforts, then there would be no distinction between the human and the divine (DI 1.1.5). Wisdom, therefore, must be given to humanity from its divine source and author. Though some philosophers came close to the truth, they were unable to grasp it because they did not know the source of all wisdom (DI 1.5.28; 3.27.1). Because of this, even when they spoke the truth, their teaching authority was suspect because it lacked divine revelation (DI 3.27.1–3). In other words, there is never the certitude of knowledge, only rightly

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reasoned speculation. 39 Ultimately, therefore, the philosophers are unsuitable guides in the quest to find divine wisdom because their teachings rest on an unsure foundation. The second piece of evidence which Lactantius offers in order to undermine the authority of the philosophers is the division which they present between wisdom and religion. Running throughout the Institutiones like a leitmotif is Lactantius’ insistence on the unity and indivisibility of wisdom and religion. The very structure of the work bears Lactantius’ desire to establish Christianity as the only religion with true wisdom, and the only philosophy with true worship. In his estimation, all error can be traced back either to false worship or false understanding (DI 3.1.9). He concludes the introduction to Book 1 by offering his readers the following standard by which to evaluate the truths of philosophy and religion: “neither should any religion be accepted without wisdom, nor any wisdom approved without religion.” 40 Hence, worship of the gods may provide a cultus, but it must be considered false because it fails to seek virtue and truth (DI 4.3.1–2; cf. 5.19.27–34). Conversely, “because philosophy does not possess religion, that is, ultimate piety, it is not true wisdom.” 41 The philosophers also may be correct in their opinions by sheer coincidence (DI 3.3.12) or, as Lactantius says of Cicero, by “divining some spiritual instinct.” DI 6.8.10 (BT 2009, 560): divinent spiritu aliquo instincti. In DI 3.3 Lactantius outlines his epistemology. Scientia (knowledge), he contends, always comes from without; in most cases from physical objects through the five senses. Likewise, divine knowledge or true wisdom is given to humanity by God. All other “knowledge” is dubbed opinatio (opinion) because it lacks the authority of certitude. Philosophy, therefore, “contains nothing certain, since nothing comes from knowledge but is all derived from conjectures; with much of it varying and diverse.” DI 3.27.3 (BT 2007, 297): nihil […] certi est, nihil quod a scientia veniat, sed cum omnia conjecturis agantur, multa etiam diversa et varia proferantur. 40 DI 1.1.25 (BT 2005, 6): neque religio ulla sine sapientia suscipienda sit nec ulla sine religione probanda sapientia. 41 DI 4.3.2 (BT 2007, 316): philosophia quia religionem id est summam pietatem non habet, non est vera sapientia. Cf. DI 3.28.1. 39

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To their credit, the philosophers reached as far as the human intellect is capable in recognizing the falsity of polytheism and idolatry, but they were incapable of establishing true religion (DI 2.3.23–25). Not knowing what constitutes true worship they instead deemed all religions of equal value. This led either to abstention from all forms of worship or persistence in the worship of the gods; thereby falling into the same error which they condemned (DI 2.3.12–13, 22). What they failed to recognize was man’s singularly unique capacity to know and worship God. This is the ‘mystery of the human person’ (sacramentum hominis), which separates humanity from all other creatures and is the telos of the human person (DI 3.10.6). The philosophers cannot be judged wise, therefore, because they could not discover the truth of humankind’s natural end. “In this one thing is all human wisdom: to know and worship God. This is our doctrine, this is our maxim.” 42 By Lactantius’ standard, not recognizing the essential unity of wisdom and religion eliminates the philosophers as potential guides towards the truth. D. Oracular Literature Replacing philosophy with Christian wisdom is but one aspect of Lactantius’ apologetic goal. Similarly, the apologist seeks to substitute polytheism and idolatry for Christian religion and worship. To further this end, Lactantius believes that the gods themselves have given evidence of the truth of Christianity. 43 On the one hand, their evidence is similar to that of the poets and philosophers in that they were all considered legitimate auctoritates when arguing via external proofs (Quint. 5.11; cf. 5.7). Cicero made use of such evidence in various speeches. 44 In his Topica the great orator classifies divina testimonia into two distinct types: oracles (orationes) and the workings of the gods (opera divina) (Top. 77). The latter category is broadly defined as the evidence gathered from the divine effects DI 3.30.3 (BT 2007, 309): omnis sapientia hominis in hoc uno est, ut deum cognoscat et colat; hoc nostrum dogma, haec sententia est. 43 On Lactantius’ use of oracular literature see Oliver Nicholson, “Broadening the Roman Mind: Foreign Prophets in the Apologetic of Lactantius,” Studia Patristica 36 (2001): 364–374. 44 E.g., Cat. 3.21; Lig. 19; cf. Har. resp. 42

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contained in nature. This includes everything from the providential order and beauty of the universe to the inspecting of animal entrails. The former refers to direct divine utterance recorded in oracular literature. As part of his rhetorical inventio and amplificatio, Lactantius selects and employs material taken from these oracular sources in order to demonstrate the truths of the Christian faith. Unlike the poets and philosophers, however, oracular literature is divine evidence. 45 Lactantius, for whom Christian revelation possesses the greatest degree of certitude, presents divine proof to his readers in the event that they may consider humana testimonia to be fallible and uncertain. 46 He regards this evidence to be irrefutable by his opponents (DI 7.13.2). Not only does it suit Lactantius’ rhetorical devise of employing the same sources as were often used against Christians (DI 1.5.2), but it is the testimony of the very deities of his opponents (DI 1.6.17). Given the unique nature of this material from the perspective of a Christian, Lactantius on one occasion refers to this evidence as simile divino (DI 1.6.1). He makes use of this quasi-divine material by providing the reader with evidence taken from the Hermetic corpus, the prophetic text of Hystaspes, the oracles of Apollo, and the Sibylline Oracles. Lactantius knew the story behind the text of the Hermetica from Cicero’s De natura deorum (3.56). He identifies the author with the Egyptian god Thoyth, the last of five Mercuries (DI 1.6.3). Though Hermes was a man – Lactantius debates whether including him among the philosophers might not be more appropriate (DI 7.13.4) – his learning and erudition were so noteworthy that he was worshipped as a deity and bestowed with the name Trismegistus (thrice great). The works attributed to him were an eclectic collection of texts on philosophy, theology, astrology, alchemy and religious rituals collated between 100 and 300 C.E. What have survived Cicero divides all testimonia into human and divine (Part. or. 6). DI 1.6.6. Whether or not ancient docti found divina testimonia more convincing than humana testimonia is uncertain. Cicero certainly employs his fair share of divina testimonia in, for example, De natura deorum. Quintilian however, writing from the perspective of forensic oratory, seems less impressed: “It is rare, but not without utility.” Quint. 5.11 (LCL125, 454): Id rarum est, non sine usu tamen. 45 46

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from this diverse potpourri of late-antique thought, apart from fragments and the Nag Hammadi excerpts, are eighteen discourses and a Latin version of the Asclepius which exemplify the mystical tradition of Neo-Platonism. 47 From these discourses Lactantius primarily quotes the original Greek. 48 He knew some of the texts which we now possess and also provides us with a few otherwise non-extant fragments. 49 He also knew both a Greek version and Latin translation of the Asclepius, under the title Λόγος Τέλειος (Perfect Discourse), which we do not possess. 50 For the text of the Hermentica see A. J. Festugière and A. D. Nock, eds., Corpus Hermeticum, 4 vols. (Paris: 1945–54). An English translation of the eighteen discourses, with the Asclepius, can be found in Brian P. Copenhaver, ed. Hermetica (Cambridge: 1992). An English translation of the Nag Hammadi codices is located in James M. Robinson, ed. The Nag Hammadi Library in English (San Francisco: 1990), 321–38. For an exhaustive study consult A. J. Festugière La Révélation d’Hermes Trismégiste, 4 vols. (Paris: 1949–54). On Lactantius and Hermes see Antonie Włosok, Laktaz und die philosophische Gnosis (Heidelberg: 1960). 48 This, of course, raises the question of Lactantius’ knowledge of Greek. As we have already seen, his philosophical learning came almost entirely through Latin translations. See Pichon, Lactance, 222–27; Ogilvie, Library, 78–83. For example, his account of Socrates’ last moments is taken from Tusc. 1.99 rather than Ap. 42a (DI 7.2.10). He also displays a general lack of knowledge in relation to the Christian theology of the Greek East. His Logos Christology, for example, is derived from the Stoics, the Hermetica, and Tertullian (DI 4.9.1–4; cf. Prax. 5.2–3; Apol. 21.10). The divina testimonia, however, he almost always quotes in the original Greek and he does so with acumen. Given, therefore, the elevated status of Lactantius’ rhetorical career and his appointment to teach at Nicomedia, it seems reasonable to affirm that Lactantius possessed enough formal training in Greek to allow him to converse on a quotidian level. It always remained, however, very much a foreign tongue and not one in which Lactantius felt comfortable conducting intense scholarly research. 49 See Corp. Herm., vol. IV, frs. 3a, 5a, 6, 7, 8a, 11a, 12a & b, 13, 14. 50 The extant Latin text of the Asclepius can be dated between the years 353 and 420. It was first attested to by St. Augustine in civ. Dei 8.23– 24, 26. 47

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The evidence which Hermes provides Lactantius relates principally to God’s oneness and the divine nature of the Son. As to the former, the Hermetica lends to Lactantius an element of negative theology. He quotes Hermes as referring to God as unknowable (DI 2.8.68), nameless (DI 1.6.4; 4.7.3), and parentless (DI 1.7.2; 4.8.5, 13.12). “‘God is one, and what is one needs no name. He that is is nameless.’” 51 Hermes also vividly apprehended the generation of the Word, stating that God “‘loved and cherished him as his only son.’” 52 His profound knowledge of the Father and the Son led Lactantius to believe that Hermes obtained his insight by the summoning of demons (DI 4.27.19) – yet another reason why he is to be counted among the oracles rather than the philosophers. 53 It is Lactantius’ championing of the Hermetica for the purpose of Christian apology that makes him unique and quite extraordinary in relation to his peers. The value of the Hermetica was acknowledged by Athenagoras, Tertullian, Clement and Origen, but none of them integrate the Hermetic corpus into Christian doctrine with as much dedication or élan as Lactantius. Lactantius informs his audience that the seer Hystaspes was a Medean king from ages past who was given a prophetic vision of the end times. 54 The text of the oracle is non-extant but it can be DI 1.6.4 (BT 2005, 22): ὁ δὲ ϑεὸς εἷς, ὁ δὲ εἷς ὀνόματος οὐ προσδέεται. ἔστιν γὰρ ὁ ὢν ἀνώνυμος. Ascl. 20. 52 DI 4.6.4 (BT 2007, 327): ἠγάσϑη τε καὶ πάνυ ἐφίλησεν ὡς ἴδιον τόκον. Ascl. 8. 53 It is also worth mentioning that two principles which are central to Lactantius’ thought are also mentioned in conjunction with the Hermetica. First, that Christians refer to God as dominum et patrem is first mentioned in the Institutiones in relation to Hermes also doing so (DI 1.6.4; cf. Corp. Herm. Ascl. 20). Second, Trismegistus is also invoked to support Lactantius’ anthropology of θεοπτίαν or ‘godsight’ (DI 7.9.11; cf. Corp. Herm., vol. IV, fr. 14). 54 DI 7.15.19. For the extant fragments of Hystaspes see J. Bidez and F. Cumont, Les Mages Hellénisés, 2 vols. (Paris: 1938). For a detailed treatment see J. R. Hinnells, “The Zoroastrian Doctrine of Salvation in the Roman World,” in Man and His Salvation, ed. E. J. Sharpe and J. R. Hinnells (Manchester: 1973), 125–148. 51

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affirmed to have originated from a Zoroastrian milieu; probably from the first century B.C.E. or earlier. 55 Lactantius is our principal source of information concerning Hystaspes and the text does much to support Lactantius’ eschatological vision. The apologist specifically mentions the prophet foreseeing the coming destruction of Rome and God’s ultimate judgment of humankind (DI 7.15.19, 18.2). He emphasizes the latter point by quoting directly from the oracle: “‘the pious and the faithful will separate themselves from harm and, with weeping and wailing, stretch out their hands to heaven and beg for Jove’s faithfulness; Jove will examine the earth, hear the voices of men and extinguish the impious.’” 56 Aside from these explicit references, the influence of Hystaspes can be detected throughout Lactantius’ treatment of the eschaton, for example, in his narrative of the coming troubles before God’s judgment, his reckoning of the duration of the world, and the idea of fire being the medium for judgment and suffering. 57 As with the Hermetic literature, no Patristic author fuses the oracle of Hystaspes with Christian doctrine to the same degree as Lactantius. 58 Were it not for him, reconstruction of this lost text would be impossible. Apart from the above, rather eclectic, literature Lactantius also employed the universally regarded oracle of Apollo to defend Christianity. “Apollo indeed,” he writes “is certainly deemed most divine and prophetic.” 59 Like Hermes, Lactantius offers evidence See Hinnells, “Zoroastrian Doctrine,” 146. DI 7.18.2 (BT 2011, 706): ‘pios ac fideles a nocentibus segregatos […] cum fletu et gemitu extenturos esse ad caelum manus et inploraturos fidem Jovis; Jovem respecturum ad terram et auditurum voces hominum atque impios extincturum.’ From this quotation we know that a Latinized version and translation of Hystaspes was in circulation in Lactantius’ day. 57 See Hinnells, “Zoroastrian Doctrine,” 129–33. 58 The existence of the oracle is merely mentioned in passing by Justin (1 Apol. 20.1, 44.12) and Clement (Strom. 6.5.43). 59 DI 1.7.1 (BT 2005, 28): Apollo enim, quem praeter ceteros divinum maximeque fatidicum existimant. On the oracle of Apollo see especially Joseph Fontenrose, Didyma: Apollo's Oracle, Cult, and Companions (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988). 55 56

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from the oracle of Apollo principally to confirm his arguments for God’s unity and Christ’s divinity. He quotes the oracle at Colophon as teaching that God “‘is self-born, untaught, without a mother, undisturbed, not named by any word, [and] dwelling in fire.’” 60 Like all the gods of the pantheon, Lactantius believes that Apollo was a mortal (DI 1.10.3ff.). The oracular pronouncements which occur under his name at various places, however, are the work of demons (DI 1.7.9–10). It is they who prophesied as to the coming of the savior, the miracles he would perform, and the suffering he was to endure (DI 4.13.11–17, 15.6). The theology of Apollo which Lactantius cites is often crude, but it demonstrates the apologist’s ability to carefully select profane material in order to support Christian beliefs. Lastly, the most prominent and often cited divina testimonia utilized by Lactantius are the Sibylline Oracles. 61 The apologist himself played a pivotal role in transmitting to later generations the list of ten Sibyls organized by Varro: the Persian, Libyan, Delphic, Cimmeran, Erythrean, Samian, Cumean, Hellespontian, Phrygian and Tiburtine (DI 1.6.11). The most famous collection of these texts resided in Rome and Lactantius states that they were still treasured and read publically – except for the secretly held Cumean Oracle – in his own day (DI 1.6.13). In 83 B.C.E. this anthology was destroyed when a fire consumed much of the Capitol. Attempts were made to reconstruct the texts – Lactantius mentions that they had become confused (DI 1.6.13) – and much Jewish and Christian material was inserted into the collection. The apologist was well aware of the critique that the Oracles had been corrupted by interpolators (DI 4.15.26–30; cf. Origen C. Cels. 7.52). His response is to rely upon the authority of Cicero and Varro as to their authenticiDI 1.7.2 (BT 2005, 28): αὐτοφυὴς ἀδίδακτος ἀμήτωρ ἀστυφέλικτος, οὔνομα μηδὲ λόγῳ χωρούμενος, ἐν πυρὶ ναίων. 61 The definitive collection of Sibylline material is located in J. Geffcken, ed., Die Oracula Sibyllina (Leipzig: 1902). For an English translation consult J. J. Collins, ed., Sibylline Oracles, Vol. 1 of The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, ed. James H. Charlesworth (New York: Doubleday, 1983), 317– 472. 60

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ty. 62 He therefore dismisses the allegation of Judeo-Christian tampering without much ado. 63 Lactantius’ reliance upon the Sibyls to support his theological claims is nearly ubiquitous. 64 The Sibyls unequivocally attest to God’s oneness and providence, calling Him “one and highest of all” and “the only god.” 65 Lactantius mentions that, on one particular occasion, a contingent was sent from Rome to Erythrae in order to restore some of the destroyed Oracles. Among the verses retrieved was the following: “One god ruling alone, supremely great, unbegotten.” 66 Likewise the Sibyls support Lactantius’ Euhemerist account of the gods by providing their mortal genealogy (DI 1.14.8) and attacking the cult of the pantheon (DI 1.15.15; 5.13.21). But the most profound areas of Sybilline usage are in the fields of Christology and Eschatology. Of central import to Lactantius’ Christology is the belief that Jesus of Nazareth was not deemed the Christ because he worked miracles, but because he fulfilled the prophesies which foretold of a coming Savior (cf. DI 5.3). The Sibyls, in conjunction with the Hebrew prophets, provide Lactantius with the evidence to support this claim of Jesus’ prophetic fulfillment. They received revelations of the Savior’s divine Sonship (DI 4.6.3, 5, 9), his Jewish origins DI 4.15.27 (BT 2007, 370): Ciceronem Varronemque […] quarum ex libris ista exempla proferimus. Qui auctores ante objerunt quam Christus secundum carnem nasceretur. 63 Excepting Irenaeus and Origen, all of the early Patristic authors shared Lactantius’ opinion. 64 Lactantius draws most heavily upon the third, considered the Erythrean, and eighth Oracles. He knew only Oracles 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and possibly 7. His versions of the Oracles are not those which have survived, but were probably collected in the third century C.E. See Ogilvie, Library, 28; Marie-Louise Guillaumin, “L’exploitation des Oracles Sibyllins par Lactance et par le Discours à l’Assemblée des Saints,” in Lactance et son temps, ed. J. Fontaine and M. Perrin (Paris: 1978), 185–202. 65 DI 1.6.15 (BT 2005, 27): μόνος εἷς πανυπέρτατος. DI 1.6.16 (BT 2005, 28): μοῦνος γὰρ ϑεός. See also DI 2.10.4, 11.18, 7.13. 66 DI 1.6.15 (BT 2005, 27): εἷς ϑεός, ὃς μόνος ἄρχει ὑπερμεγέϑης ἀγένητος. Cf. Orac. Sib. 3.11–12. 62

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(DI 4.13.21), miracles (DI 4.15.9–30), suffering (DI 4.16.17), crucifixion (DI 4.18.15–20), and resurrection (DI 4.19.10). They also acknowledge Christ’s second coming and his role as judge at the end of days (DI 4.15.15; 7.18.5–8, 19.2, 24.1). Lactantius presents the Oracles as proof texts, inundating the reader with testimony from the Sibyls to corroborate the Hebrew Scriptures. This interweaving of the Hebrew prophets with the Sibyls is aptly demonstrated by the following pericope concerning Christ’s passion. And this is what has happened as announced by the voices of the prophets and the songs of the Sibyls. In Isaiah [50:5–6] it is written: ‘I am not obstinate nor do I answer back. I have given my back to the whip, my cheeks to the palms, and I do not avert my face from the filth of spittle.’ Similarly David writes in Psalm 34 [35:15–16]: ‘They gathered with whips around me and knew me not. They were wicked and remorseless. They tempted me and mocked me with laughter, and gnashed their teeth over me.’ The Sibyl [Orac. Sib. 8.287–90] also demonstrated this would happen: ‘Later he will come into the hands of lawless and faithless men, and they will give blows to God with unholy hands and poisonous spittings with polluted mouths. Then he will stretch out his back and give it to the whips.’ Further, about his silence which he firmly held unto death, Isaiah [53:7] also says: ‘Like a sheep he was brought to sacrifice and like a lamb to the shearers without a noise. Thus he did not open his mouth.’ And the Sibyl [Orac. Sib. 8.292–94] says: ‘Beaten, he was silent, lest anyone recognize what his word is or whence he came, so that he may speak to the dead and wear the crown of thorns.’ 67

DI 4.18.13 (BT 2007, 386–87): Haec autem sic futura fuisse et prophetarum vocibus et Sibyllinis carminibus denuntiatum est. Apud Esaiam ita scriptum invenitur: ‘Non sum contumax neque contradico. Dorsum meum posui ad flagella et maxillas meas ad palmas, faciem autem meam non averti a foeditate sputorum.’ (14) Similiter David in psalmo XXXIIII: ‘Congregata sunt in me flagella et ignoraverunt, dissoluti sunt nec compuncti sunt. Temptaverunt me et deriserunt me derisum, et striderunt super me dentibus suis.’ (15) Sibylla quoque eadem futura mons67

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Even where Lactantius fails to offer biblical evidence, however, Scripture remains the pattern and standard of revelation. Such is the case with the eschatological portrait he draws in the second half of Book 7. Lactantius’ account is derived primarily from the books of Revelation and Daniel but the Bible is never directly quoted. Instead the vast majority of evidence is provided by the Sibyls. They attest to the events which will precede the renewal of all things, such as the fall of Rome (DI 7.15.18), God’s judgment over the living and the dead (DI 7.20.2–5, 23.4) and Christ’s thousand year reign of peace on earth (DI 7.24.12–15). But most importantly, the Sibyls provide Lactantius with many details concerning the tumultuous state of affairs after Rome’s fall from power. According to the Oracles, the earth will be ravaged in the not so distant future by universal war, earthquakes, floods, disease and famine prior to Christ’s second coming (DI 7.15–16). Although his apocalyptic vision incorporates elements from outside the biblical canon, the apologist believes that both the prophets of this world (saecularium prophetarum) and heaven (caelestibus) were in agreement (DI 7.14.16; cf. 7.15.14). Unlike Apollo and Hermes, Lactantius refrains from accounting for the Sibyls’ divine knowledge through the presence of the demonic. He states that “visions were placed before their eyes by the divine spirit, and they saw things in their sight as if happening and accomplished.” 68 The meaning of these visions went unrecogtravit: Εἰς ἀνόμους χεῖρας καὶ ἀπίστων ὕστερον ἥξει, δώσουσιν δὲ ϑεῷ ῥαπίσματα χερσὶν ἀνάγνοις καὶ στόμασιν μιαροῖς ἐμπτύσματα φαρμακοέντα, δώσει δ’ εἰς μάστιγας ἁπλῶς ἁγνὸν τότε νῶτον. (16) Item de silentio ejus, quod usque ad mortem pertinaciter tenuit, Esaias iterum sic locutus est: ‘Sicut ovis ad immolandum adductus est et sicut agnus coram tondentibus sine voce, sic non aperuit os suum.’ (17) Et Sibylla supra dicta: Καὶ κολαφιζόμενος σιγήσει, μή τις ἐπιγνῷ, τίς λόγος ἤ πόϑεν ἦλϑεν, ἵνα φϑιμένοισι λαλήσει· καὶ στέφανον φορέσει τὸν ἀκάνϑινον. 68 DI 7.24.9 (BT 2011, 723): Visiones enim divino spiritu offerebantur oculis eorum et videbant illa in conspectu suo quasi fieri ac terminari. By contrast see Constantine’s Oration to the Saints, 18. In the case of Hystaspes, Lactantius gives no further information than to say that the apocalyptic vision came to the ancient king in a dream (DI 7.15.19).

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nized because only one taught by God can properly discern them. The poets, for example, embellished these visions for their own purposes without ever realizing their true significance. 69 The Erythrean Sibyl herself foresaw that she would be judged mad on account of her prophesies (DI 4.15.29; cf. Orac. Sib. 3.815–18). Perhaps Lactantius thought the antiquity of the Sibyls gave them access to knowledge which was once known to humankind in an age of universal monotheism (cf. DI 5.5.3–14). He certainly views the Sibyls as more reliable sources than his other divina testimonia, but without the absolute certitude of biblical revelation. 70 The apologist was not alone in recognizing the value of the Sibyls for the propagation of Christianity. Athenagoras, Tertullian, Clement and Theophilus all made use of the Sibyls in their apologetic works. But it was Lactantius who first systematically probed the Oracles for material which paralleled Christian belief. Almost a century after his death, Augustine would credit Lactantius with organizing and presenting the writings of the Sibyls in a manner which suited Christian apologetics. 71 Later generations of Western Christian theologians would be indebted to him for bringing the Sibyls to the fore as praeparationes evangelii.

IV. CHRISTIAN TRUTH

Given the proliferation of non-Christian material in his apologetic theology, one may reasonably inquire into the nature and content of Lactantius’ evangelical message. In Book 7 of the Institutiones the apologist provides us with a convenient summary of his gospel proclamation while discussing teleology. The following passage captures, in brief, what Lactantius considered to be the marrow of Christian theology; one might call it his kerygma.

DI 7.24.10. Lactantius explicitly credits the Sibyls for Vergil’s inspiration in composing Ecl. 4 (DI 7.24.12). By exercising their license, the poets also corrupted the Sibylline tradition concerning the nature of the netherworld (DI 7.22.6; cf. Aen 6). 70 DI 1.6.6. See Nicholson, “Foreign Prophets,” 371 with n. 42. 71 civ. Dei 18.23. See also Oration to the Saints, 18, which bears much Lactantian influence. Lactantius does not mention, however, the famous acrostic from Orac. Sib. 8.217–50. 69

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Now let us seal the whole argument briefly in outline. The reason why the world was made was so that we might be born. We were born so that we might acknowledge the world’s maker and our God. We acknowledge and worship Him so that we might receive immortality as a reward for our labors – the worship of God contains the greatest labors. We are granted immortality as a reward so that we might serve the supreme Father and Lord forever, becoming like the angels, and be God’s eternal kingdom. This is the sum of it all: the secret of God, the mystery of the world. Those who follow present pleasures are quite alienated from this. They surrender themselves to earthly and fragile things and they submerge their souls, which were born for the sweetness of things celestial, into lethal things as if mud and filth. 72

In this résumé the attentive reader cannot help but notice the striking lack of any belief particular and unique to Christianity. This is hardly St. Paul’s gospel proclamation that “Christ died for our sins in accordance with the scriptures” (1 Cor 15:3). Rather, this good news is something with which the philosophers made contact (DI 7.7.14). Lactantius intimates that if any philosopher had understood the entirety of the above summary then s/he would have grasped the entire truth (DI 7.7.1; cf. 7.5.2). Elsewhere he states that “wisdom is perfect in the person if he knows that God is one, and that all things were made by Him.” 73 The kerygma Lactantius proclaims

DI 7.6.1 (BT 2011, 668): Nunc totam rationem brevi circumscriptione signemus. Idcirco mundus factus est, ut nascamur; ideo nascimur, ut agnoscamus factorem mundi ac nostri deum; ideo agnoscimus, ut colamus; ideo colimus, ut immortalitatem pro laborum mercede capiamus, quoniam maximis laboris cultus dei constat; ideo praemio immortalitatis adficimur, ut similes angelis effecti summo patri ac domino in perpetuum serviamus et simus aeternum deo regnum. (2) Haec summa rerum est, hoc arcanum dei, hoc mysterium mundi, a quo sunt alieni qui sequentes praesentem voluptatem terrestribus et fragilibus se bonis addixerunt et animas ad caelestia genitas suavitatibus mortiferis tamquam luto caenove demerserunt. Cf. Epi. 64.1. 73 DI 2.8.71 (BT 2005, 163): Perfecta est in homine sapientia, si et deum esse unum et ab ipso facta esse universa cognoscat. See Arthur L. 72

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is the fulfillment of the teleological design for which humanity was created. Human beings were made to possess perfecta sapientia, and the divine effects contained in nature were intended to lead us to knowledge and worship of God. 74 Thus, Lactantius can castigate idol worshippers and polytheists for committing wicked deeds that they should know are contrary to human nature (DI 2.1.6). Christian truth, however, is not merely a recapitulation of the best of classical philosophy. While many thinkers were able to grasp certain individual elements of Lactantius’ kerygma none were able to conceive of the organic whole which makes up the totam veritatem (DI 7.7.14). Christian revelation was indeed needed in order to reveal the whole truth of the divine plan for salvation. 75 The vocabulary Lactantius employs to describe God’s divine economy (sacramentum, arcanum, mysterium) makes apparent the apologist’s belief in the necessity of revelation. 76 “The truth, that is, the secret of the supreme God who made all things, cannot be grasped by the

Fisher, “Lactantius’ Ideas Relating Christian Truth and Christian Society,” Journal of the History of Ideas 43/3 (1982): 359. 74 More will be said of this when discussing Lactantius’ anthropology. But, for now, it should be emphasized that Lactantius sees Christianity as the consummation of our natural desires and aptitudes. Consequently, and in light of his Gentile audience, the doctrinal elements of Christianity which he stresses center on the anthropological and teleological. 75 One cannot help but hear echoes of Aquinas here. STh I, q. 1, a. 1 (Textum Leoninum): Quia veritas de Deo, per rationem investigata, a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione multorum errorum, homini proveniret, a cujus tamen veritatis cognitione dependet tota hominis salus, quae in Deo est. Ut igitur salus hominibus et convenientius et certius proveniat, necessarium fuit quod de divinis per divinam revelationem instruantur. Necessarium igitur fuit, praeter philosophicas disciplinas, quae per rationem investigantur, sacram doctrinam per revelationem haberi. 76 For a detailed study of Lactantius’ use of the word sacramentum see Vincenzo Loi, “Per la storia del vocabolo ‘sacramentum’: ‘sacramentum’ in Lattanzio,” Vigiliae Christianae 18/2 (1964): 85–107.

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mind and the senses which belong to it.” 77 “Truly unless someone is taught it [i.e., the divine mystery and heavenly secret], no promise can be known.” 78 Lactantius emphasizes the furtive nature of Christian truth by often using these same terms to refer directly to Sacred Scripture or its contents, 79 and to the revelation preserved by the Jewish people. 80 Though human beings possess a natural capacity to know God, divine truth always remains hidden unless revealed by God. In addition to being a divine mystery, Christian truth according to Lactantius is a unified, integrated and indivisible whole. One must possess it entirely in order to possess it at all. The revelation of God’s truth is that He made and wills us to know and serve Him. As the phrasing of the previously quoted excerpt illustrates, Lactantius’ proclamation stresses God’s purpose, design and activity in creating the universe and, most especially, human beings. 81 Omission or neglect of any portion of this argument would be a misapprehension of the entire system, an undermining of the entire ratio of God’s divine plan. The philosophers, for example, “could perceive neither the causes, nor the reasons, nor the results of this divine work and counsel, so as to consummate the entire secret of the truth and bring it likewise to some final conclusion.” 82 In this DI 1.1.5 (BT 2005, 2): veritatis id est arcanum summi dei, qui fecit omnia, ingenio ac propriis sensibus non potest comprehendi. 78 DI 2.3.21 (BT 2005, 122): divini sacramenti et caelestis arcani. id vero nisi doceatur, aliquis scire nullo pacto potest. 79 E.g., arcanis religionis sanctae litteris (DI 2.9.1); prophetarum arcana (4.20.1); divinis […] arcanis (4.27.19); arcanis sacrae scripturae (7.14.7); arcanis sanctarum litterarum (7.15.1). 80 E.g., verae religionis sacramenta (DI 4.8.2); sanctum mysterium (4.12.11); arcanum dei (4.14.17); arcanae illorum litterae (4.15.12); sacramentum dei (5.3.17). 81 See note 72 above. Notice the adverbs idciro and ideo, and the corresponding use of ut clauses. See also Maslowski, “The Opponents of Lactantius,” 190. 82 Epi. 62.8 (BT 1994, 102): huius tamen divini operis atque consilii nec causas nec rationes nec exitus perspexerunt, ut omne veritatis arcanum consummarent atque aliquo veluti fine concluderent. Cf. DI 3.28.18– 19. 77

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sense, while acknowledging fragments of the truth scattered among them, Lactantius can affirm that the philosophers were ignorant of the ‘wisdom of heaven’ (caelesti sapientia) (DI 3.15.4; cf. 3.1.14) and far removed from the truth (DI 3.30.1; cf. Epi. 25.2). Because the totam veritatem remains inaccessible to humanity, it is necessary that those who have received Christian revelation teach the uninitiated. “We, however, who have received the mystery of true religion possess the truth by divine revelation, and we follow God as the teacher of wisdom and guide to virtue. We invite all people, without any discrimination according to age or sex, to partake of heavenly nourishment; for there is no sweeter food for the soul than knowledge of the truth.” 83 As we mentioned in our examination of Lactantius’ relationship to philosophy, wisdom and truth are attributes of God alone. Only those who have been educated by God, who have received the truth from Him by divine revelation, are capable of teaching wisdom and thus discerning the philosophical truth discovered by unaided human reason. “But if there existed someone who could have collected the scattered truth spread among the sects into one and restored it into a single body, he would certainly not disagree with us. But no one can do this unless he is an expert in truth and knowledge, and one cannot know the truth unless he has been taught by God.” 84 The Christian teacher, then, must be a skillful and deft editor; discarding what is contrary or superfluous to the gospel while skillfully and adroitly making use of the sources available. No credit or pride can be taken in performing this task however, as the teacher must always be mindful DI 1.1.19 (BT 2005, 5): Nobis autem qui sacramentum verae religionis accepimus cum sit veritas revelata divinitus, cum doctorem sapientiae ducemque virtutis deum sequamur, universes sine ullo discrimine vel sexus vel aetatis ad caeleste pabulum convocamus. (20) Nullus enim suavior animo cibus est quam cognition veritatis. Cf. DI 7.2.9. 84 DI 7.7.4 (BT 2011, 671): Quodsi extitisset aliquis, qui veritatem sparsam per singulos per sectasque diffusam colligeret in unum ac redigeret in corpus, is profecto non dissentiret a nobis. Sed hoc nemo facere nisi veri peritus ac sciens potest, verum autem scire non nisi ejus est qui sit doctus a deo. Cf. DI 2.3.21. Similarly, Tertullian famously writes (Apol. 18.4): Fiunt, non nascuntur Christiani. 83

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that s/he is not the author of this work. The pedagogue is merely passing on what has already been handed over by the source of all truth (ID 1.3; cf. DI 3.1.12).

CHAPTER 3. LACTANTIUS AND DIVINE PROVIDENCE In the previous section we concluded with an examination of the kerygma of Lactantius. The good news, according to Lactantius, is that God has made us for Himself. He created us to know and worship Him both in this life and for all eternity. God is the one Creator of all that exists and He sustains and directs all things to fulfill their proper ends. Those who have been created with an intellectual soul God calls into communion with Himself, and all other created beings fulfill their teleological ends by directing and aiding human beings in knowing, loving and worshipping God. The essence of Lactantius’ kerygma, then, is the very definition of the doctrine of providence; for “providence is God Himself considered in that act by which in His Wisdom He so orders all events within the universe that the end for which it was created may be realized.” 1 The gospel, which Lactantius proclaims, is that of a supremely providential God who wills the salvation of His creatures. Several authors have already noted the centrality of the doctrine of providence in Lactantius’ thought. 2 According to the apologist’s own words, one can hardly discuss any doctrine at all without touching upon the topic of providence (DI 1.2.6). A distinction ought to be made, however, between the uses of the doctrine of providence in Lactantius. The African rhetorician is primarily an apologist rather than a systematic theologian. Though he attempts to present the doctrinae totius substantiam (DI 5.4.3) of the Christian faith, he does so in a manner much more suited to disputatio than to expositio. His use of Leslie J. Walker, “Providence,” CE 12:510. See Micka, The Problem of Divine Anger, 91; Loi, Lattanzio, 66–69; Pease, “Caeli enarrant,” 193. 1 2

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diverse non-Christian sources, his attentiveness to the eloquence of language, and his desire to defend the Christian faith against her attackers indicate that Lactantius’ mission is as an apologist first, a theologian second. As such Lactantius both defends the doctrine of providence against its detractors and uses the doctrine, once established, to demonstrate other truths of the Christian faith. In this sense one cannot simply isolate and exposit Lactantius’ arguments for the existence of divine providence, but must examine the apologist’s theological vision as a whole and demonstrate how this doctrine functions within his system of thought. Direct arguments for the existence of divine providence are located throughout Lactantius’ works. It is the goal of the remainder of this chapter to present these passages in a systematic and coherent manner in order to draw some conclusions about the apologist’s use of the doctrine of providence. In this manner of presentation one can already detect Lactantius’ reliance upon the Stoic school for his material, especially the philosophical works of Cicero. Lactantius quotes the great Latin rhetorician, whom he calls “perfect orator and supreme philosopher,” 3 to support the doctrine of providence more than any other tenet of Christian belief. 4 There can be little doubt that Lactantius’ reliance upon the Stoic school is, in part, due to its representation in the philosophical works of Cicero. In Book 1 of the Institutiones, Lactantius writes that the doctrine of providence has been ably defended by the Stoics against the Epicureans (DI 1.2.2–3, 6; cf. 2.10.15–16), and specifically mentions Cicero’s De natura deorum as worthy of consultation on the matter (DI 1.2.3). It is through a Stoic lens, therefore, that we shall examine Lactantius’ arguments for the existence of providence.

I. DEVELOPING THE ARGUMENTS

In late-antiquity, the topic of providence was a debated thesis amongst the rhetorical schools. As an academic exercise, one portion of a class would advocate for the Stoic position of pro while DI 3.14.7 (BT 2007, 246): perfectus orator, […] summus philosophus. 4 Cf. Bryce, Library, 212. 3

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the other would support the Epicurean side of contra. 5 As a trained rhetorician, Lactantius would have therefore been familiar with the content and structure of the debate over providence. In Cicero’s enumeration of the Stoic division of theological topica the issue of divine providence comes third. This is articulated by the character Balbus in De natura deorum 2.3: “First they teach that the gods exist, next in what manner they exist, then that the world is governed by them, and lastly that they care for human affairs.” 6 While Cicero systematically organizes his theological exposition according to this model, questions of the existence and providence of the gods are often interrelated, and the same evidence could be employed to demonstrate either thesis. 7 For example, according to Cicero, the first step in establishing the existence of providence is to demonstrate the existence of the gods – a subject he has already addressed in the first of the topica. 8 Also, the well-ordered structure of the universe is used to demonstrate both the existence of the gods and that of providence (cf. Nat. D. 2.4; 2.98ff.), as is divination (cf. Nat. D. 2.12; 2.162–63). Accordingly, in his arguments for the existence of divine providence Lactantius makes use of the same types of arguments, or tropoi, employed by the Stoics to establish the existence of the gods. The clearest articulation of these tropoi is to be found in two sources: Cicero’s De natura deorum (2.4–12) and Sextus Empiricus’ Adversus mathematicos (9.60–61). While Lactantius knew only of the former, and that in great detail, Sextus’ list is more representative of the “orthodox” Stoic approach to the subject. 9 In the reckoning Cf. Ibid. Nat. D. 2.3 (Pease, 543–44): Primum docent esse deos, deinde quales sint, tum mundum ab his administrari, postremo consulere eos rebus humanis. Cf. Nat. D. 3.6. 7 Balbus says as much in Nat. D. 2.75. 8 Cf. Nat. D. 2.75. Just as the existence of the gods came under four topics, so too divine providence falls into three sections: (1) that the gods exist; (2) that all things are governed by nature; and (3) the wonder we experience in examining creation. 9 See Keimpe Algra, “Stoic Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. B. Inwood (Cambridge: 2003), 161. 5 6

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which Sextus provides, the tropoi for demonstrating the existence of the gods are: (1) by general consensus (e consensu omnium); (2) by the orderly motion of the heavens (ex operibus dei); (3) by the absurd consequences of denying divine existence (ex gradibus entium); and (4) by undermining the arguments to the contrary. 10 It is under these categories that we will evaluate Lactantius’ arguments for the existence of providence. Although many of his arguments may not fit squarely into one particular category, this method will allow us to view Lactantius’ defense of providence from within a tradition that was very much part of the apologist’s intellectual horizon.

II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR DIVINE PROVIDENCE

A. The Argument from Consensus (E consensu omnium ) The most effective tool which Lactantius employs to demonstrate the existence of providence e consensu omnium is doxography, i.e., a short philosophical history of a particular idea. His use of this method has a double origin in popular rhetoric and in his mentor

Math. 9.60–61 (TLG): Οἱ τοίνυν ϑεοὺς ἀξιοῦντες εἶναι πειρῶνται τὸ προκείμενον κατασκευάζειν ἐκ τεσσάρων τρόπων, ἑνὸς μὲν τῆς παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνϑρώποις συμφωνίας, δευτέρου δὲ τῆς κοσμικῆς διατάξεως, τρίτου δὲ τῶν ἀκολουϑούντων ἀτόπων τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι τὸ ϑεῖον, τετάρτου δὲ καὶ τελευταίου τῆς τῶν ἀντιπιπτόντων λόγων ὑπεξαρέσεως. The four types of arguments for the existence of the gods given by Cicero (Nat. D. 2.4–12) are: (1) the orderly motion of the heavens; (2) general consensus; (3) the epiphanies of the gods; and (4) divination. Arguments (3) and (4) are obviously tailored to suit Cicero’s Roman audience and, for a Christian apologist such as Lactantius, making use of the latter would be completely out of the question. He does, however, cite the evidence of pagan divine utterances, for example, in his treatment of the unity of God (cf. DI 1.6–7). Lactantius makes use of their testimonia throughout the Institutiones when it conforms to the truth of Christian doctrine. He sees pagan oracular and quasi-divine literature, e.g., the Sibyls, Apollo, and Hermes Trismegistus, as a vital source of irrefutable evidence which can build a broad consensus (cf. DI 1.6.17; 7.13.2). 10

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Cicero. 11 It illustrates the uniformity of belief in divine providence among most classical philosophers, and thereby forms a consensus argument. Since it is far easier to highlight the few who reject providence than to enumerate all who have affirmed it, two of Lactantius’ doxographies list only the most notable dissenters. The first of these passages is located at the start of the Institutiones: The author of this opinion [i.e., denial of divine providence] was Democritus, and Epicurus confirmed it. But Protagoras had called the gods into doubt before that, and later Diagoras who rejected them and a number of others thought the gods did not exist. What was effected except that it might be thought that providence does not exist? 12

This doxography is dependent upon Cicero, who opens his De natura deorum along similar lines: On this question, as it were, the vast majority have affirmed the existence of the gods, which is the most probable view and the one to which we are all led by nature; but Protagoras was doubtful, and Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene thought that they do not exist at all. 13

Cf. S. Casey, “Lactantius’ Reaction to Pagan Philosophy,” Classica et Mediaevalia 32 (1980): 209; H. Hagendahl, “Methods of Citation in Postclassical Prose,” Eranos 45 (1947): 117, 123. 12 DI 1.2.2 (BT 2005, 6–7): Cujus sententiae auctor est Democritus, confirmator Epicurus. Sed et antea Protagoras, qui deos in dubium vocavit, et postea Diagoras, qui exclusit, et alii nonnulli, qui non putaverunt deos esse, quid aliud effecerunt nisi ut nulla esse providentia putaretur? Cf. Epi. 1.1–2. 13 Nat. D. 1.2 (Pease, 118–23): Velut in hac quaestione plerique, quod maxime veri simile est et quo omnes [sese] duce natura venimus, deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras, nullos esse omnino Diagoras Melius et Theodorus Cyrenaicus putaverunt. Franz Fessler, in Benutzung der philosophischen Schriften Ciceros durch Lactanz (Leipzig, 1913), 9, also cites dependence on Aca. 2.55 and 121 for the mention of Democritus. Cf. Usener, 247, fr. 368. 11

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Lactantius’ De ira Dei, a later work written to show that God’s wrath is an integral part of His justice, contains a similar doxography which relies on Cicero’s De natura deorum: When the opinions of philosophers of former times were in agreement about providence, when there was no doubt that the world had been formed by God and reason and was ruled according to a plan, first of all there arose in the time of Socrates, Protagoras, who said that it was not clear to him whether or not there was any divinity. […] But later Epicurus said that there was a god, because it was necessary that there be in the world something excellent, wonderful, and blessed, yet without providence […]. In those times after philosophy had already stopped flourishing, however, there arose a certain Diagoras of Melos, who said there was no god whatsoever, and for this opinion he was given the name ‘atheist,’ as was Theodorus the Cyrenean. 14

In this case, Lactantius goes into greater detail about the philosophers who rejected belief in providence. He mentions Protagoras’ banishment from Athens for impiety and the atheism of Diagoras of Melos and Theodore of Cyrene. The latter two, he contends, denied the existence of the gods simply because “everything had been said and discovered already” 15 and they wished to be seen as original thinkers by denying a universally accepted and unambiguous doctrine. ID 9.1 (SC 289, 120, 122): Cum sententiae philosophorum prioris temporis de providentia consensissent nec ulla esset dubitatio quin mundus a deo et ratione esset instructus et ratione regeretur, primus omnium Protagoras extitit temporibus Socratis, qui sibi diceret non liquere utrum esset aliqua divinitas necne.[…] (4) Postea vero Epicurus deum quidem esse dixit, quia necesse sit esse aliquid in mundo praestans et eximium et beatum, providentiam tamen nullam […]. (7) Verum his postea temporibus quibus iam philosophia defloruerat, extitit Melius quidam Diagoras, qui nullum esse omnino deum diceret ob eamque sententiam nominatus est atheus, item Cyrenaeus Theodorus. Cf. Nat. D. 1.2, 63; Usener, 247, fr. 368; Min. Fel. 8.3. 15 ID 9.7 (SC 289, 122): omnibus iam dictis et inventis. 14

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In Book 2 of the Institutiones, as part of his confirmatio to the thesis that God created the world, Lactantius lists all of the philosophers who throughout history have affirmed the existence of divine providence. From the Seven Sages to Socrates and Plato, from the Pythagoreans to the Stoics and Peripatetics, virtually all philosophers and philosophical schools testify to the reality of providence. 16 But these philosophers are not alone. Divine testimony also exists in both Christian and pagan circles. The Sibyls, Hermes Trismegistus, and Christian Scripture are all of one mind in affirming the doctrine of providence. Lastly, in addition to learned and divine authorities, the doctrine of providence is believed by “the testimony of all human beings.” 17 Indeed, on this topic, ‘the testimony of all people and nations’ (testamonio populorum atque gentium) (DI 1.2.4) are in total accord. Far from disproving Lactantius’ consensus argument, Protagoras, Epicurus and their followers succeed only in demonstrating that they are “small and weak philosophers” 18: “These are the ones who have calumniated the doctrine of providence, adhered to and defended for so many ages by so many geniuses.” 19 Prior to them philosophers were in agreement about providence and, even now, few have presumed to deny a doctrine so obviously apparent (ID 9.1). Lactantius’ argument e consensu omnium, therefore, encompasses not just the vast majority of philosophers, but all of humankind. B. Responding to Opponents The presence of those few dissenting voices, however, necessitates a response and Lactantius directly addresses the arguments of two philosophical schools that have questioned the existence of providence. In an isolated passage from Book 2 of the Institutiones, LacDI 2.8.48 (BT 2005, 158): etiam inter philosophos paene universes convenit; id enim Pythagorei Stoici Peripatetici. Cf. DI 1.5.21. To what extent the Peripatetics, the disciples of Aristotle, actually affirmed providence is a matter for debate. 17 Epi. 1.2 (BT 1994, 2): omnium mortalium testimoniis. 18 ID 9.8 (SC 289, 122): minutos et inertes philosophos. 19 ID 9.7 (SC 289, 122): Hi sunt qui tot saeculis tot ingeniis adsertam atque defensam providentiam calumniati sunt. 16

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tantius responds to the argument of Cicero’s representative of the Academy, the Skeptic Cotta. In a passage now absent from De natura deorum, Cotta seeks to undermine the Stoic belief in providence by challenging its demonstrability from the effects of nature. 20 If God created the universe, Cotta argues, He did so with the basic material already in existence, like a craftsman or artisan. Therefore, either this basic material must possess the capacity to organize itself by nature or it was so ordered by God. Of these two options, the former seems more likely, since one need not posit divine existence in order to account for the universe. To the Christian apologist, the unacceptable premise here is the denial of creatio ex nihilo, upon which the entire argument rests. Lactantius, however, wanting to refute this argument on its own merits, concentrates his response on the meaning of the word ‘nature’: “For if [nature] is capable of generation and creation, it therefore has reason and on that account must be God. Nor can there be any other name for His power, in which there exists both the providence for thinking and the skill and capacity for creating.” 21 Based on the tasks which Cotta has assigned to it, nature should more accurately be called God; who “is endowed with sense, reason, providence, power and virtue.” 22 Philosophers have often ascribed these attributes to a host of names, whether “nature or aether, reason or mind, the necessity of fate or divine law,” 23 but, rightly understood, they all refer to God. Therefore, either nature does not possess the capacity to perpetuate and order itself, in which case the existence of a providential This portion of Lactantius’ text provides us with a valuable fragment of the lacuna which begins at Nat. D. 3.65. Cf. DI 2.8.10–11. In fact, Lactantius is the primary source of quotations from this non-extant portion of the text. See also DI 2.3.2; ID 13.9–12, 19–21. 21 DI 2.8.21 (BT 2005, 153–54): si autem generandi et faciendi potens est, habet ergo consilium et propterea deus sit necesse est, (22) nec alio nomine appellari potest ea vis, in qua inest et providentia excogitandi et sollertia potestasque faciendi. 22 DI 2.8.40 (BT 2005, 156): sensu ratione providentia potestate virtute praeditus est. 23 DI 1.5.21 (BT 2005, 19): natura sive aether sive ratio sive mens sive fatalis necessitas sive divina lex. 20

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deity is necessary, or it contains these attributes innately, in which case Cotta is merely calling God by another name. In either scenario, the existence of a providential divinity is required. Seneca, whom Lactantius calls the sharpest of all Stoics (DI 2.8.23; 1.5.26), understood this perfectly when he wrote that “god himself is nature.” 24 The Stoics, at least, clearly understand that divine attributes must be posited of a divine being. Unlike the brief response to this Academic objection to providence, Lactantius’ dispute with the Epicurean school is ubiquitous and protracted throughout all of his apologetic works. Epicurus is the special target of Lactantius’ rhetorical venom and is referred to by the author as, inter alia, “neither wise nor sane,” “stupefied and crazy,” and “who sane and healthy is more crazily delirious than any sick person.” 25 While Lactantius does praise him for his critique of the pantheon (DI 7.3.26), he finds Epicurus’ simultaneous affirmation of divine existence and rejection of divine providence to be the height of absurdity. The following excerpt from Book 3 of the Institutiones summarizes Lactantius’ general estimation and opinion of Epicurean doctrine: The gods do not care; neither wrath nor gratitude move them; there are no penalties in the underworld to fear, because after death souls die and there is no underworld whatsoever; pleasure is the highest good; there is no human society; each person considers only himself; no one loves another unless it suits his own interest; the brave man fears neither death nor any pain, since even if he is being tortured or burnt, he can say he cares for nothing. Is it obvious why anyone would think to call these men wise, when they ought to be called most appropriately bandits? 26

DI 2.8.23 (BT 2005, 154): deus ipse natura est. Cf. D. Vottero, Lucio Anneo Seneca: I Frammenti (Bologna, 1998), 198, fr. 84. 25 DI 3.17.18 (BT 2007, 262): nec sapientem […] nec sanum; DI 7.3.26 (BT 2011, 654): hebetes […] et insane; DI 3.17.29 (BT 2007, 264): quo sano ac vigente nullus aeger ineptius deliravit. 26 DI 3.17.42 (BT 2007, 267): Deos nihil curare; non ira, non gratia tangi; inferorum poenas non esse metuendas, quod animae post mortem 24

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According to Lactantius, Epicurus’ denial of providence stems from his experience of life’s incongruities. “Epicurus saw that good people always face adversity, poverty, toil, exile and the loss of loved ones. Bad people, on the other hand, are happy, increasing power, and being bestowed with honors. He saw the innocent unsafe, and defamation committed with impunity […]. He was most moved by the fact that particularly religious people are stricken with grave evils. Whereas those who neglect the gods altogether, or do not piously worship, suffer little or no troubles.” 27 This led Epicurus to conclude that providence does not exist, the gods are idle, and there is no accountability for one’s actions aside from the natural outcomes of human activity. Consequently, according to Lactantius, Epicurus and his disciples advocated an ethical system which valued only earthy pleasure, and eschewed any notion of virtue or duty: “[Epicureanism] occidant nec ulli omnino sint inferi; voluptatem esse maximum bonum; nullam esse humanam societatem; sibi quemque consulere; neminem esse qui alterum diligat nisi sua causa; mortem non esse metuendam forti viro nec ullum dolorem, qui etiamsi torqueatur, si uratur, nihil curare se dicat. (43) Est plane cur quisquam putet hanc vocem viri esse sapientis, quae potest latronibus aptissime commodari.Cf. Usener, 228, fr. 341; Usener, 318, fr. 523; Usener, 324, fr. 540; Usener, 339, fr. 601. Lactantius’ distortion or cursory understanding of Epicurean doctrine has been noted. Cf. S. Brandt, “Lactantius und Lucretius,” Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik 143 (1891): 225–59; Casey, “Lactantius’ Reaction,” 209–10; J. Stevenson, “Aspects of the Relations,” 501. While his misrepresentations of Epicureanism are the most pronounced of any philosophical school, Lactantius is given to characterizing the tenets of pagan philosophy in a manner which suits his polemical goal. See, for example, the omission of eupatheia in his treatment of the Stoic doctrine of the passions in DI 6.14–15. Cf. M. Colish, The Stoic Tradition, vol. 2 (Leiden, 1985), 44–46. 27 DI 3.17.8 (BT 2007, 260): Videbat Epicurus bonis adversa semper accidere, paupertatem labors exilia carorum amissiones, malos contra beatos esse, augeri potentia, honoribus adfici; videbat innocentiam minus tutam, scelera impune committi […]. (9) Maxime autem commovebat hominess in primus religiosos gravioribus malis adfici, his autem, qui aut deos omnino neglegerent aut non pie colerent, vel minora incommoda evenire vel nulla. Cf. Usener, 248–50, fr. 370.

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opposes studying for the lazy, liberates the greedy from public largesse, prohibits the slothful from agreeing to public works, the sluggish from exercise, the timid from military service.” 28 In short, for Lactantius, the philosophy of Epicurus – especially in its moral dimension – represents l’esprit du paganisme. 29 At the root of Lactantius’ critique of the errors of Epicurus is his belief that the gods exist without exercising any providential care over creation. In De ira Dei, Lactantius argues that Epicurus’ denial of providence stems from his rejection of any analogy or likeness between God and human beings other than corporeality. “Firstly, [Epicurus’] opinion was that it is not fitting for wrath to be in God. And when this seemed true and unassailable he could not stop the consequences, because with one affection severed necessity itself compelled him also to remove the other affections from God.” 30 The result of Epicurus’ paring away of divine attributes is a DI 3.17.3 (BT 2007, 259): Desidiosum vetat litteras discere, avarum populari largitione liberat, ignavum prohibet accede ad rem publicam, pigrum exerceri, timidum militare. 29 Lactantius’ first-hand knowledge of Epicureanism is derived from Lucretius. On Lactantius and Epicureanism consult the following studies: Samuel Brandt, “Lactantius und Lucretius,” 225–259; Bryce, Library, 223– 75; Antonietta Bufano, “Lucrezio in Lattanzio,” Giornale italiano di Filologia 4 (1951): 335–349; Francesco Giancotti, “Il preludio di Lucrezio, il transposizionismo e Lattanzio,” Orpheus 1 (1980): 221–250; Hagendahl, Latin Fathers, 48–76; Jolanda Nicolosi, “L’infusso di Lucrezio su Lattanzio,” Raccolta di Studi di Letteratura cristiana antica 2 (1946): 5–18; Ogilvie, Library, 84–87; Emanuele Rapisarda, “La polemica di Lattanzio contro l’epicureismo,” Miscellanea di Studi di Letteratura cristiana antica 1 (1947): 5– 20. Some scholars, most notably Rapisarda, have maintained that Lactantius was a convert from Epicureanism. This seems unlikely given his harsh treatment and cursory understanding of Epricurean doctrine. Stevenson, for example, (“Aspects of the Relations,” 501) maintains that he did not even understand Lucretius. The present author agrees with Hagendahl’s assessment of this position; namely, that “scholars had better consign it to oblivion” (Latin Fathers, 52). 30 ID 4.10 (SC 289, 102): Prima autem sententia fuit iram in deum non convenire. Quod cum illi verum et inexpugnabile videretur, non po28

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god who “has no will whatsoever, no action, in short, no governance which is worthy of a god.” 31 What Epicurus succeeded in doing was to sever God from his divine activities, chief among them being the creation and governance of the world. Lactantius maintains that the nature of divinity necessarily entails the power and exercise of divine providence; one cannot exist without the other. “But if there are gods, then there is providence, one cannot conceive of a god otherwise, whose property it is to foresee.” 32 This argument for the existence of providence is essentially an ontological one, the predicate (providence) being contained in the subject (God). “What is so worthy or appropriate to God as providence? But if He cares for nothing, provides nothing, He has lost all divinity.” 33 In Cicero’s De natura deorum we find a similar argument: “they that admit the gods exist must allow them some activity, and outstanding activity at that; now nothing can be more outstanding than the administration of the world; therefore the world is administered by the wisdom of the gods.” 34 The flaw in Epicurus’ reasoning, then, was to admit the existence of the gods in the first place. If he wished to deny divine providence, he should have also denied divine existence. Since Epicurus rejected the doctrine of providence, he must account for the presence of particular beings in some other manner and does so by asserting that they sprang into existence spontaneously. “‘It is not the work of providence,’ [Epicurus] says, ‘for there terat consequentia resecare, quia uno adfectu amputato etiam ceteros adfectus adimere deo necessitas ipsa cogebat. 31 ID 4.3 (SC 289, 100): omnino nullam habet voluntatem, nullum actum, nullum denique administrationem quae deo digna sit. 32 Epi. 31.2 (BT 1994, 42): Sed si sunt dii, est igitur providentia. Aliter enim deus intellegi non potest, cujus est proprium providere. 33 ID 4.5 (SC 289, 100): Quid tam dignum, tam proprium deo quam providentia? (6) Sed si nihil curat, nihil providet, amisit omnem divinitatem. 34 Nat. D. 2.76 (Pease, 745–46): qui deos esse concedant iis fatendum est eos aliquid agere idque praeclarum; nihil est autem praeclarius mundi administratione; deorum igitur consilio administratur. See Nat. D. 2.77–80 for Cicero’s other arguments.

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are seeds which float through space, and from their chance combination the universe was begotten and grows.’” 35 Similar to the Academic Cotta, Epicurus views the universe as emerging from nature itself. For him, nature represents the whole of existence and is responsible for the generation of the world (cf. Nat. D. 2.82). But in order to account for the origin and sustenance of the world, according to Lactantius, nature must contain the divine attributes associated with God. Either they [Epicureans] did not know by whom the world was made, or they wished to persuade people that no divine mind was at work; thus their slogan that nature is the mother of all things, as if to say that all things were born from their own source. They plainly admit their foolishness in that one word. For nature, without a divine providence and power, is absolutely nothing. But if by nature they mean god, how perverse is it to replace the name God with nature? If, on the other hand, nature means reason or necessity or the condition of coming into being, since it has no sense in itself, a divine mind must exist whose providence first gave birth to all things. 36

The standard Epicurean response to Lactantius’ argument is to say that he assigns to nature attributes which it does not possess. Nature does not plan, order or sustain living things, but was merely responsible – through the spontaneous coming together of atoms – DI 3.17.21 (BT 2007, 263): ‘Non est’ inquit ‘providentiae opus; sunt enim semina per inane volitantia, quibus inter se temere conglobatis universa gignuntur atque concrescunt.’ Cf. Lucr. 2.1048–66; 5.187–94, 416–31; DI 3.17.16–27. 36 DI 3.28.4 (BT 2007, 300): Illi enim cum aut ignorarent, a quo esset mundus effectus, aut persuadere vellent nihil esse divina mente perfectum, naturam esse dixerunt rerum omnium matrem, quasi dicerent omnia sua sponte esse nata; quo verbo plane imprudentiam suam confitentur. Natura enim, remota providentia et potestate divina, prorsus nihil est. (5) Quodsi deum naturam vocant, quae perversitas est naturam potius quam deum nominare? Si autem natura est ratio vel necessitas vel condicio nascendi, non est per se ipsa sensibilis, sed necesse est mentem esse divinam, quae sua providentia nascendi principium rebus omnibus praebeat. 35

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for the conditions which made life possible. “‘There is no order,’ he [Epicurus] says, ‘for there is much that occurs other than it should.’” 37 Lactantius’ response to this objection is to affirm the intelligibility of the created order by illustrating the utility and beauty of its structure, i.e., by the argument from design. C. The Argument from Design (Ex operibus dei )

1. The Divinae Institutiones and De ira Dei The most common arguments for the existence of providence are those drawn from design or ex operibus dei. This tropos asserts that, upon minimal reflection, human beings can infer the existence of providence from the order, beauty, and utility of the universe. We first encounter an argument of this kind in Plato (Tim. 30b; cf. Diog. Laert. 3.24), and it is subsequently developed by Aristotle (Phys. VIII; Meta. Λ). But whereas the Peripatetics focus on a god as the cause of motion, the Stoics focus on a god as the cause of order and reason. With this distinction in mind, it is apparent from the substance of his arguments which school Lactantius relies upon for his defense of providence. “For who can doubt of a providence when he sees such an order and regularity to the heavens and the earth, so that the universe is not only modeled to beauty, ornament and wonder, but also that it might be for the utility of humankind and the most advantageous convenience of all living things? Hence, that which exists according to reason could not have a beginning without rationality.” 38 In other words, the universe can be observed as conforming to a well-ordered plan. But what is ordered according to reason cannot be the product of something irrational. Therefore, a rational being must be the author of the system that we perceive in the universe. DI 3.17.17 (BT 2007, 262): ‘Nulla’ inquit ‘dispositio est; multa enim facta sunt aliter quam fieri debuerunt.’ Cf. Lucr. 5.195–234. 38 Epi. 1.3 (BT 1994, 2): Quis enim de providentia dubitet, cum videat caelos terramque sic disposita, sic temperata esse, universa non modo ad pulcritudinem ornatumque mirabilem, sed ad usum quoque hominum ceterorumque viventium commoditatem aptissime convenirent? (4) Non potest igitur quod ratione constat sine ratione coepisse. 37

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This cosmological argument for the existence of providence is Lactantius’ fundamental answer to the Epicureans. 39 Those who assert that all things have come about by chance and the haphazard motion of atoms need only examine the workings of the universe in greater detail. The following passage from Book 7 of the Institutiones contains the essence of Lactantius’ response to Epicurus in the form of an extended argument ex operibus dei: [Epicurus] ruined what he had been right to see, and in his inward ignorance of the entire plan he destroyed all reason, and reduced the world and everything in it to the likeness of the most vain dream, inasmuch as human activity would make no sense. But truly we see that the world and all its parts are governed by a wonderful system, in the heavens the proportion and uniformity in the various courses of the stars and lights of heaven, the regular and remarkable delineation of the seasons, the diverse fecundity of the land, the level plains, the ramparts and mounds of the mountains, the viridity and fruitfulness of the forests, the strong eruption of springs, the timely flow of rivers, the rich and abundant spreading of the seas, the diverse and useful aspirations of the winds and everything else, everything exists according to a supreme plan. So who can be so blind as to think that something which simply radiates the wondrous provisions of a most providential plan was produced without a cause? If nothing can be nor come to be in any way whatsoever without a cause, and if the providence of God most high is manifest in the order and excellence, the magnitude, the power, and the governance of things, then those who said that providence does not exist are stupefied and crazy. I would not disapprove if they spoke against the existence of the gods, but when they do so to speak of none, anyone not reckoning them mad is mad himself. 40

Cicero, as do many of the Stoics, makes similar use of this cosmological argument, drawing a parallel between the universe and a wellordered house (Nat. D. 2.15). Cf. 2.17; 3.26; Min. Fel. 18.4; DI 2.8.66. 40 DI 7.3.24 (BT 2011, 653–54): Corrupit ergo quod recte viderat et totam rationem penitus ignorantia rationis evertit redegitque mundum et 39

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To enumerate the catalogue of wonders taken from the universe was a common tactic in demonstrating the existence of providence derived from the Stoic school and adopted by early Christian apologists (cf. Min. Fel. 17.4–11; Theoph. Ad Autol. 1.6). Lactantius’ primary source for this narration is undoubtedly Cicero’s De natura deorum, 2.98ff. Cicero cites the wonders of the universe as evidence for the existence of providence not by way of a complex syllogism but as the object of contemplation. “For we may now eschew subtle disputation and, in a certain way, contemplate with the eyes the beauty of the things of divine providence as we speak of their arrangement.” 41 A thorough examination of the workings of the universe ought to convince one, according to Cicero, as to the existence of divine providence: “no one considering the whole earth could doubt divine reason.” 42 omnia quae in eo geruntur ad similtudinem cujusdam vanissimi somnii, siquidem rebus humanis ratio nulla subsistet. (25) Cum vero mundum omnesque partes ejus ut videmus mirabilis ratio gubernet, cum caeli temperatio et aequalis in ipsa varietate cursus astrorum luminumque caelestium, temporum constans ac mira discriptio, terrarum varia fecunditas, plana camporum, munimenta et aggeres montium, viriditas ubertasque silvarum, fontium saluberrima eruptio, fluminum opportuna inundatio, maris opulenta et copiosa interfusio, ventorum diversa et utilis aspiratio ceteraque omnia ratione summa constent, quis tam caecus est ut existimet sine causa esse facta in quibus mira dispositio providentissimae rationis elucet? (26) Si ergo sine causa nec est nec fit omnino quicquam, si et providentia summi dei ex dispositione rerum et virtus ex magnitudine et potestas ex gubernatione nmanifesta est, hebetes ergo et insani qui providentiam non esse dixerunt, non improbarem, si deos idcirco non esse dicerent ut unum dicerent, cum autem ideo ut nullum, qui eos delirasse non putat, ipse delirat. Cf. DI 1.2.5; ID 10.25, 50; Nat. D. 2.98ff. 41 Nat. D. 2.98 (Pease, 791): Licet enim iam remota s ubtiliate disputandi oculis quodam modo contemplari pulchritudinem rerum earum quas divina providentia dicimus constitutas. 42 Nat. D. 2.99 (Pease, 795): nemo cunctam intuens terram de divina ratione dubitaret. See also 2.4, 15, where this argument is used as evidence for the existence of the gods.

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Several times throughout the corpus of his works, Lactantius offers the orderly system of the universe as proof of God’s providential design and care. In his cursory treatment of providence in Book 1 of the Institutiones, the only evidence the apologist cites is the wonder experienced from contemplating the universe. “For no one is so ignorant, so stricken with illness, that raising one’s eyes to heaven one cannot know that some providence exists – though one may not know that it is the providence of God which controls all that one sees – simply from the size of things, their movement, order, utility, beauty and system; nor could it be otherwise. How could that which is constructed with such wonderful reason be arranged if not by some superior plan?” 43 Again, while discussing the merits and shortcomings of Socrates in Book 3 of the Institutiones, Lactantius offers the ratio of the world as proof of divine providence. “For who cannot see that this world is governed, with such a wondrous and perfect plan, by some sort of providence; because there is nothing which can exist without some guide?” 44 Chapter 10 of De ira Dei contains one of Lactantius’ most thorough critiques of the Epicurean doctrine of spontaneous generation. There again we encounter Lactantius’ use of the marvels of the world to demonstrate the existence of providence. “For we see that there is nothing in the entire world which does not have in itself a great and marvelous system. Because this is above the understanding and skill of human beings, to what should this more rightly be granted than divine providence?” 45 Once again LactanDI 1.2.5 (BT 2005, 7–8): Nemo est enim tam rudis, tam feris moribus, quin oculos suos in caelum tollens, tametsi nesciat cujus dei providentia regatur hoc omne quod cernitur, aliquam tamen esse intellegat ex ipsa rerum magnitudine motu dispositio constantia utilitate pulchritudine temperatione nec posse fieri, quin id quod mirabili ratione constat consilio majore aliquo sit instructum. 44 DI 3.20.13 (BT 2007, 279): Quis enim non sentiat hunc mundum tam mirabili ratione perfectum aliqua providentia gubernari, quandoquidem nihil est quod possit sine ullo moderatore consistere? 45 ID 10.25 (SC 289, 132): Videmus enim nihil esse in omni mundo quod non habeat in se maximam mirabilemque rationem. Quae quia supra 43

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tius specifically cites the order and beauty of the cosmos as evidence of an intelligent Arranger. “Can he who sees things so great and of such a kind think that they were brought into being with no deliberation, no providence, no divine reason, but that such marvels have been compacted from tiny and minute particles?” 46 His argument in this portion of the chapter is that the existence of order and intelligibility in the universe must have an origin; rationality and order cannot be the outcome of a fundamentally irrational and chaotic process. “If [nature] lacks sense or form, how can that which has sense and form be made from it? Unless someone thinks that the fabric of living things, so delicate and so wondrous, could have been formed and animated by a non-sentient being, or that the very sight of heaven so providently governed for the use of living creatures, suddenly appeared in some way without a creator, without an artificer.” 47 In this form of the argument from design two items are worth highlighting, one in relation to style, the other to content. Stylistically, one might more properly refer to this evidence as contemplative observation rather than formal argumentation. Like Cicero, Lactanius considers the order of the universe to be sufficient evidence in itself to convince those who doubt the existence of providence. As such, the apologist relies heavily upon his rhetorical training to present these observations, often concluding with a question. Again the influence of Cicero can be detected in this regard. In De natura deorum, Cicero writes: “For what can be so plain and apparent, when we behold and contemplate the heavens, that hominis sensum et ingenium est, cui rectius quam divinae providentiae tribuenda est? 46 ID 10.32 (SC 289, 136): Tanta ergo qui videat et talia, potest existimare nullo effecta esse consilio, nulla providentia, nulla ratione divina, sed ex micis subtilibus et exiguis concreta esse tanta miracula? 47 ID 10.35 (SC 289, 136): Si [natura] caret sensu ac figura, quomodo potest ab ea fieri quod et sensum habeat et figuram? Nisi forte quis arbitratur animalium fabricam tam subtilem tamque mirabilem a non sentiente formari animarique potuisse aut istam caeli speciem tam providenter ad utilitates viventium temperatum nescio quo casu sine conditore, sine artifice subito extitisse.

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there is some divine plan of most excellent intelligence by which they are governed?” 48 With regard to content, the focus of these observations relates specifically to the order of the universe. The contemplation of this system (ratio, dispositio, temperatio) strikes the observer as both beautiful and intelligible and arouses the belief that an omnipotent mens must be responsible. Far from arguing for belief in a personal God, Lactantius’ observations are intended to convince one of the existence of a divine mind who is the source and sustainer (gubernare, regnare, temperare) of the patterned cycle of all that exists.

2. De opificio Dei Lactantius’ most sustained treatment of the argument from design can be found in his earliest extant work, De opificio Dei. In it the author intends to complete the work begun by Cicero in De natura deorum 2.98ff. (OD 1.13–14), where the Stoic Balbus gives a review of the marvels of the universe which bespeak an intelligent creator. 49 While confining himself to the wonders of the human person (cf. Nat. D. 2.134–53), Lactantius argues that a creature endowed with such beauty of structure, utility of parts, and wisdom of mind must have been fashioned – contra the Epicurean claim – by a “most provident artisan.” 50 “From the very function of all the members and the uses of the several parts we can understand with what great power of providence each has been made.” 51 Nat. D. 2.4 (Pease, 546–47): Quid enim potest esse tam apertum tamque perspicuum, cum caelum suspeximus caelestiaque contemplate sumus, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis quo haec regantur? 49 For Cicero’s treatment of the human person in particular see 2.134ff. Lactantius also mentions drawing inspiration from a want to expand on what Cicero had written in the, now fragmentary, Rep. 4 (OD 1.12). 50 OD 11.2 (SC 213, 168): providentissimus artifex. 51 OD 1.16 (SC 213, 112): quia ex ipsis membrorum officiis et usibus partium singularum quanta vi providentiae quidque factum sit. 48

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In this work Lactantius provides the prolegomena to apologetic theology, which he avoids at the start of the Institutiones. At the beginning of Book 2 of the Institutiones Lactantius states: Inasmuch as I am undertaking the duty of illuminating the truth, I have not thought it necessary to address first that question which seems to be the first by nature: whether providence cares for all things or whether everything has been made or generated by chance. 52

Lactantius deems providence to be the natural start of an apologetic theology due to the precedents set by his forebears Minucius Felix (Min. Fel. 17.4ff.) and Theophilus (Ad Autol. 1.4ff.). As for avoiding the topic at the start of Institutiones, Lactanius offers us two reasons: first, that the issue has been defended well by the Stoics, in particular Cicero (DI 1.2.2–5), and second, that concentrating on the topic now would add redundancy to the text, since he will have to address providence at various points throughout (DI 1.2.6). We may also surmise, however, that the devotion and intricacy with which Lactantius treats providence in De opicifio also led the apologist to consider this treatise a sufficient primer to his massive apologetic work. 53 As such, a more detailed examination of the treatise is merited at this juncture. After a brief introduction in which Lactantius mentions that he is expounding on a theme from Cicero, 54 the apologist indicates DI 1.2.1 (BT 2005, 6): Suscepto igitur inlustrandae veritatis officio non putavi adeo necessarium ab illa quaestione principium sumere, quae videtur prima esse natura, sitne providentia quae rebus omnibus consulat an fortuito vel facta sint omnia vel gerantur. 53 Having already addressed the topic of providence in De opificio is directly mentioned by Lactantius as a reason for omitting discussion of the issue in DI 2.10.15. 54 OD 1.12–14. Lactantius states that Cicero gave a restricted treatment of this topic in the now fragmentary book 4 of the Republica, and that he attempted a more comprehensive treatment in De natura deorum 2.47ff. What differentiates Lactantius’ treatment in OD is that he will concentrate his argument on the intelligibility of the human body, rather than the cosmos as a whole. 52

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that his chief argument for the providence of God will be the ratio of the created order – the utility and beauty of the arrangement of creation. He begins by essaying the gifts earthly creatures possess for the good of their survival (cf. Min. Fel. 17.10). Some animals are strong, some are fast, some possess natural weapons, and some can endure extremes of temperature. In other words, each creature is endowed with certain protective qualities which aid the preservation of its species. Above these capacities, however, humanity alone possesses the gift of reason. By possessing a rational soul the human person is “an eternal and immortal animal.” 55 Human beings enter this world naked and unarmed, but the gift of wisdom provides them with the greatest capacity for self-defense. It would therefore be superfluous for human beings to possess a skill or physical endowment comparable to brute animals since they possess the powers of perception and speech. Taken as whole, the order of creation is sustained by this balancing of gifts among creatures in a manner which is both useful and aesthetically pleasing. The existence of this system in nature leads Lactantius to conclude that it is the deliberate product of a supreme Designer and that this Designer endowed human beings with a gift that is His to give. “God gave to man sense and reason so that from them it might be apparent that we derive our being from Him, because He Himself is intelligence, He Himself is sense and reason.” 56 Lactantius’ description of the protective capacities of creatures – and the order which is produced by these properties – leads the apologist to address two arguments which the Epicurean school presents against the existence of this natural order and, by extension, divine providence. Their first objection is to humanity’s exalted place in the created order. According to Lactantius, the Epicureans believe that nature has been very cruel to the human race. Far from being the apex of the created order, human beings have the most wretched of lives. They are by nature so weak and needy that OD 2.9 (SC 213, 114): aeternum animal atque immortale. OD 2.1 (SC 213, 112): Dedit enim homini[…]deus sensum atque rationem, ut ex eo appareret nos ab eo esse generatos, qui ipse intellegentia, ipse sensus ac ratio est. 55 56

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they go through life wailing and weeping “‘as those for whom in life there remains only the passage of evils.’” 57 Lactantius responds first by recapitulating the intelligibility of the natural order. A creature possessing certain natural defenses has no need of intelligence. Likewise, a creature endowed with reason would render great physical abilities superfluous. To claim that humanity occupies a lowly station in life is to ignore the symmetry in the natural order, which results from the human person’s capacity to reason. “For considering the state of things I recognize that nothing should have been done otherwise. I do not say cannot, because God is omnipotent. But it was necessary that His most provident majesty brought about what was better and more right.” 58 Secondly, it is obvious that humanity, by being endowed with wisdom, has received the greater part of natural gifts. For everywhere one observes that human beings have dominion over the other creatures of the earth. The elephant, for example, is among the strongest of creatures yet can be made to serve human beings. Anyone who deems the human condition to be lower than that of beasts, therefore, ought to consider the words of Plato and “‘give thanks to nature that he was born human.’” 59 The second Epicurean objection to the existence of providence is the fact that human beings suffer sickness and death. The followers of Epicurus claim that if a providential order to the universe existed then man would not suffer illness and mortality. 60 OD 3.2 (SC 213, 116): cui tantum in vita restet transire malorum. Quot. Lucr. 5.227. For this argument see Lucr. 5.223–27; Cic. Rep. 3.2. For attestations to the contents of the non-extant portions of Cicero’s Rep. see August. c. Jul. 4.12.60; civ. Dei 2.21. 58 OD 3.4 (SC 213, 118): Considerans enim condicionem reum intellego nihil fieri aliter debuisse quam factum est, ut non dicam potuisse, quia deus potest omnia, sed necesse est ut providentissima illa majestas id effecerit quod erat melius et rectius. 59 OD 3.2 (SC 213, 116): naturae gratias egit, quod homo natus esset. Quot. Plut. Vit. Mar. 46. 60 Cf. Lucr. 5.222ff. Lactantius may also be referencing a non-extant work of Seneca, De immature morte. Cf. DI 1.5.26; 3.12.11; Perrin, SC 214, 269. 57

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First, Lactantius responds that one cannot divorce sickness from death; the former leads to the latter. For if mortality is the natural lot of created beings then, naturally, they would be susceptible to illness as well as death. “If [a living being] was of such strength that disease and affliction could not approach it, neither could death, because death follows disease.” 61 It is the course of nature, therefore, for bodily creatures to suffer disease as well as death. That all people should live to a ripe old age without suffering the effects of sickness or premature death would necessitate contravening the natural order of creation. Thus, those who complain about illness and untimely death merely mask their ultimate complaint, i.e., that they wish to have been born immortal and eternal (OD 4.1, 11–12). Second, Lactantius lays the blame for this Epicurean criticism on the sect’s dogmatic denial of divine providence. Rather than recognizing the rational order of the life/death cycle in nature, the Epicureans must invent instances where nature seems to falter and proffer these as examples of the irrationality of the condition of nature. By doing so, they are able to maintain that nature is not the product of a divine plan. But, Lactantius argues, fervently holding to the denial of providence means that Epicureans have committed themselves to a view of the natural world which prohibits them from recognizing its obvious intelligibility. “For when divine providence was excluded from human affairs, it necessarily followed that all things were born of their own accord. […] They had taken it for granted that nothing was made by a divine mind. And they could not prove this in any other way than to show that in some matters the system of providence appeared to limp.” 62 To the apologist, the Epicureans have allowed their denial of providence to cloud their judgment about the reality of the natural order. OD 4.3 (SC 213, 124): Nam si ejus [animal] roboris fieret, ut ad eum morbus et aegritudo adire non posset, ne mors quidem posset, quoniam mors sequella morborum est. 62 OD 4.13 (SC 213, 128, 130): Exclusa enim de rebus humanis divina providentia necessario sequebatur ut omnia sua sponte sint nata. […] (14) adsumpserant enim nihil fieri mente divina. Quod ipsum non aliter probare poterant quam si ostenderent esse aliqua in quibus videretur providentia ratio claudicare. 61

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Lastly, Lactantius argues that sickness and frailty contribute to the natural order by requiring human beings to live in communion with one another. What order would there be if one were capable of warding off all possible threats to one’s safety by oneself? If this were the case, people would grow insolent and lose all sense of humanity (OD 4.18). But since human beings are weak and subject to affliction they seek the comfort of society and establish laws (jura humanitatis) to govern themselves. 63 Hence death and illness serve the social function of bringing people into closer communion with one another. At the close of chapter 4, Lactantius gives a brief introduction to the next section of his text (chapters 5–7). He states that if he were to list all of the marvelous workings of providence, his treatise would be endless. Rather, he will confine himself to the workings of the human body and, by demonstrating the utility and beauty of its arrangement, confirm that a supreme Mind must be at work in its composition. In the next section, therefore, he will give an overview of the body in relation to the question of providence before examining it in detail (chapters 8–19). 64 Lactantius begins chapter five of De opificio by outlining the form of the body in broad terms; offering little insights into the purpose and utility of its various parts. The feet are extended from the torso for walking, the spine is made up of separate bones for bending, cartilage guards against the damage, which can be caused by bone rubbing against itself, and so on. All of these features demonstrate how “God wished to show his providence and power in a marvelous variety of many things.” 65 As the apologist considers this “wonderful system of providence” (OD 6.2), he is again drawn to address Epicurean criticisms of the doctrine. Citing De rerum For a more extensive discussion on the causes of social cohesion see DI 6.10. Here Lactantius uses an argument of the Epicureans against them, namely, that society was founded on the basis of fear and selfpreservation. Cf. Lucr. 5.1011ff.; Cic. Rep. 1.39; Sen. Ben. 4.18. 64 The structure and content of OD has been expertly treated by Peter Roots in “The De opificio Dei: The Workmanship of God and Lactantius,” Classical Quarterly, n. s., 37/2 (1987): 466–86. 65 OD 5.13 (SC 213, 138): Deus enim qui providentiam et potestatem suam multarum rerum mirabili varietate voluit ostendere. 63

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natura (Lucr. 5.837–54), Lactantius is baffled that they should view the chance coming together of atoms a more reasonable theory of creation than the divine providence of an omnipotent Creator. Having thus summarized the use of several of the body’s most vital parts, the apologist supports his claim of a supreme Designer by using the analogy of an architect (OD 6.5–6; cf. Nat. D. 1.19; 2.90, 141). Just as the specifications of a house are designed beforehand with the good of the structure in mind, likewise the parts of the body were planned in advance for the good of the organism. Each portion of the body can be observed as operating for the benefit of the whole, each performs its own duty in support of the creature’s overall teleological end. These qualities are the means by which things exist. How could anyone think that things began to exist before the means to exist came into being? In order for creatures to exist, therefore, the parts, which constitute their existence, must have been designed by an intelligent Creator with a view towards their self-perpetuation. The Epicureans claim, however, that the parts were in existence prior to their function: eyes existed before sight, ears before hearing, legs before self-ambulation, etc. (cf. Lucr. 4.822ff.; DI 3.17.19). It was only after a period of time that “the knowledge of their usefulness was born.” 66 Lactantius’ responds by again pointing out the system which exists in the natural world. If it were the case that the functions followed the existence of the parts, then why do all of the parts correspond to their uses throughout nature? Why do all animals with eyes see through them, or all animals with nostrils smell through them? There is a patterned uniformity in the function of these organs that should not exist if their common origin were “the chance combination of atoms.” 67 Since, then, all bodily functions observe their own laws throughout nature, it is evident that nothing was created by chance but rather, by a divine plan (divinae rationis) (OD 6.14). While an examination of the remainder of this text will be conducted when we discuss Lactanius’ anthropology, through the first Lucr. 4.854 (Bailey, 406): nata dedere suae post notitiam utilitatis. Cf. OD 6.10. 67 OD 6.12 (SC 213, 142): fortuitis atomorum concursionibus. 66

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seven chapters we can discern the apologist’s chief weapon in his defense of providence against the Epicureans. Namely, that the universe and all of the creatures in it display an intelligibility in relation to their structures and natural ends. All of Lactantius’ individual arguments, which we have encountered, either make use of or defend the pattern of existence to which the natural world can be observed to conform. What distinguishes the apologist’s treatment of providence in De opificio from his other works is the amplification of the teleological aspect of the argument from design. In De opificio, Lactantius is not content to allow contemplation of the order of the universe to be its own evidence. Rather, he replies to the objections of the Epicureans by affirming the existence of natural ends. Each creature is endowed with certain capacities that allow it to endure. The proper use of reason, which human beings possess and is the source of their natural superiority in the created order, is the natural end of the human person. We observe that organs and characteristics which are common to animal life all correspond in their function and cooperate to ensure the good of the entire organism. Further, these qualities not only provide for the preservation of the creature but for the species as a whole. Each species then exists in a relationship of symbiotic coherence to such a degree that “it seems that the plan of the whole work would not have endured at all, if the result was in any way different.” 68 Each species, each organism, and each individual quality seeks an end and performs a function which it was designed to do. Only in this way do living beings persevere and form the wondrous and beautifully integrated whole of the natural world. This ordered pattern of existence, in relation to both the whole and the parts, must therefore be the result of an omniscient Designer who crafted each aspect of creation to seek the end for which it was made. For Lactantius, the teleology of the natural world “makes manifest that nothing was created by chance, since the perpetual plan of divine reason is observed.” 69 OD 7.11 (SC 213, 148): videatur omnio non constatura fuisse totius operis ratio, si quicquam aliter esset effectum. 69 OD 6.14 (SC 213, 142): manifestum est nihil fortuito esse factum, quoniam divinae rationis dispositio perpetua servatur. 68

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D. The Argument from Absurd Consequences (Ex gradibus entium ) While not taking the form of a standard reductio ad absurdum syllogism, Lactantius does present two positions that, he argues, are the natural outcomes of Epicurus’ rejection of providence. It would perhaps be more appropriate, then, to refer to them as unacceptable rather than absurd consequences, though Lactantius would certainly consider them so. The first of these consequences is that denial of providence results in a practical atheism. We have seen how Lactantius attacked Epicurus for his illogical reasoning on this subject. For if “there is neither care nor providence in Him [God], nor some thought nor any sense in Him, it follows that He does not exist at all.” 70 If Epicurus had been willing to follow his premises to their logical conclusions, Lactantius argues, he would have denied the existence of the gods. The apologist mentions the claim, which he derives from Cicero, that Epicurus did not, in fact, believe in the gods but retained them in order to quell popular ill will (ID 4.7–8; cf. Nat. D. 1.85, 123). Whether this assertion is true or not, however, does not alter Lactantius’ critique. The gods of Epirucus are so aloof and stolid that, as far as human beings are concerned, it is as if they do not exist. “By excluding providence and divine care, it follows that you [Epicurus] should teach that God does not exist at all. Instead you have reduced Him to a word, truly taken Him away.” 71 What follows from this is the second absurd consequence, namely, that religion is rendered useless and barren. For if the gods care for nothing, feel nothing, and govern nothing, what use is there in propitiation? Much of Lactantius’ argument on this front, located in De ira Dei chapter 8, comes directly from De natura deID 4.13 (SC 289, 102): quia nec cura sit in eo nec providentia, ergo nec cogitationem aliquam nec sensum in eo esse ullum; quo efficitur ut non sit omnino. 71 Epi. 31.3 (BT 1994, 42–43): Exclusa enim providentia curaque divina consequens erat, ut non esse omnino deum diceres. Nunc eum verbo reliquisti, re sustulisti. 70

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orum 1.115–16. 72 “What honor is owed to one who cares for nothing, who is an ingrate? Or is there any reason why we might be bound to him who has nothing in common with us?” 73 While we have neither the time nor space to explore the centrality of religion in Lactantius’ thought at this juncture, suffice it to say, he believes that religion is humankind’s defining characteristic. The ability to know and worship our Creator is what separates us from all of creation (ID 7; DI 4.28; etc.). When religion is dissolved, therefore, as it is when one denies the doctrine of providence, human beings become no different from the beasts. 74 We are deprived of our personhood and that which makes us truly human. Further, not only is the truth of religion destroyed thereby, but also its utility. Religion loses its capacity to be a force beyond the law that guides the ethical behavior of men and women if God is disinterested in our moral lives (ID 8.10; cf. Nat. D. 1.77; Min. Fel. 8.3). “For conscience greatly refrains people, if we believe that our lives are in the sight of God; if we realize that not only what we do is seen from above, but also if we suppose that what we think or say is heard by God.” 75 In sum, for Lactantius, denying the doctrine of providence not only reduces God to an irrelevant hypothesis but strips us of the natural dignity and value which we possess by being human.

III. CONCLUSION

In this review of Lactantius’ treatment of the doctrine of providence, several key features are worth noting. First, and most obvious, is Lactantius’ reliance upon the Stoa, in particular Cicero’s De natura See further parallels between ID 8.3 and Nat. D. 1.124 (quot.), ID 8.4 and Nat. D. 1.85, ID 8.6 and Nat. D. 1.3, and ID 8.10 and Nat. D. 1.118. 73 ID 8.3 (SC 289, 116): Quis honor deberi potest nihil curanti et ingrato? An aliqua ratione obstricti esse possumus ei qui nihil habeat commune nobiscum? Cf. Nat. D. 1.115–16. 74 A thesis no philosopher has ever dared maintain (ID 7.1). 75 ID 8.8 (SC 289, 118): Multum enim refrenat homines conscientia, si credamus nos in conspectu dei vivere, si non tantum quae gerimus videri desuper, sed etiam quae cogitamus aut loquimur audiri a deo putemus. 72

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deorum, for his source material. The consensus argument, which Lactantius employs as evidence for the existence of providence, was a common Stoic device and is found in Cicero’s De natura deorum (1.43; 2.5) to support the existence of the gods. 76 Both Velleius (the Epicurean) and Balbus (the Stoic) make use of it, while Cotta (the Skeptic) attacks the notion that universal consent can be given as legitimate evidence (1.62; 3.11). We also find a similar parallel to Lactantius’ ontological argument, i.e., that providence is contained in the definition of God (ID 4.4–6), in De natura deorum (Nat. D. 2.76–78). Aspects of this argument can be found among the earliest of the Stoic fragments, and it is often articulated as an argument ‘of the better.’ A common formulation runs thusly: ‘If the gods exist, they must possess the greatest of qualities. Quality x is greater than y (or not x). Therefore, the gods possess quality x.’ In addition to providing his own form of the argument, Cicero also transmits variants by Zeno (Nat. D. 2.21) and Chrysippus (Nat. D. 2.16). 77 The arguments from design that we find in Lactantius take two forms. The first is based on the wonder we experience when examining the order of the universe. This form of the argument is the most frequently cited evidence to support the existence of a providential deity by ancient philosophers. 78 It can be well suited to an author with rhetorical prowess by including a detailed account of the workings of the universe. In this regard, it is in capable hands with both Cicero (Nat. D. 2.98ff.) and Lactantius (DI 7.3.24– 26; etc.). Such verbose and prosaic elaboration is, however, not a necessity, and both Lactantius and Cicero articulate this argument in its simplest form as well. 79 Secondly, Lactantius articulates the argument from design with an emphasis on the teleological pattern Cf. Nat. D. 2.12–13 (with note in Pease, 579); Sen. Ep. 117.6; Aelius Theon Progym. 12; Min. Fel. 8.1; 19.1ff. While most common to the Stoics, Dragona-Monachou traces the origin of this type of argument back to Socrates (The Stoic Arguments, 195). 77 For a version of this argument attributed to Cleanthes see Sextus Math. 9.88. Cf. Cic. Nat. D. 2.33–36 (unattributed). 78 Cf. Dragona-Monachou, The Stoic Arguments, 88–89. 79 Cic. Nat. D. 2.4, 15 (attributed to Cleanthes), 87, 95 (attributed to Aristotle’s lost De philosophia); DI 1.2.5; 3.20.13; ID 10; cf. Sen. Prov. 1.2–4. 76

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observed in nature. This form of the argument from design is characteristically Stoic. Cicero attests to this argument’s Stoic history by, again, providing examples attributed to Zeno (Nat. D. 2.22) and Chyrsippus (Nat. D. 2.17). In addition, Cicero’s own argument from design incorporates a strong teleological component in his treatment of the human person (Nat. D. 2.133ff.); which provided Lactantius with the inspiration for De opificio Dei (OD 1.13). In short, Lactantius’ defense of the doctrine of providence, in its general aspect, is thoroughly Stoic in both form and content. Next, we should ask why Lactantius places himself squarely within the dialectical conflict between the Stoic and Epicurean schools concerning the existence of providence. The most obvious reason for doing so is that the apologist’s rhetorical training provided him with a plethora of material and ready-made arguments originating from this debate. Thus, Lactantius’ vast knowledge of Cicero, which he accrued by virtue of his education, could easily be employed to defend the doctrine of providence. But aside from academic convenience, placing himself in the context of this debate conforms to Lactantius’ stated apologetic method in relation to his use of sources. In other words, integrating himself into this dialogue allows Lactantius to draw his arguments from non-Christian sources, which is one of the primary characteristics of his method. One cannot forget that Lactantius the Christian author is, above all, an apologist more than a systematic theologian or philosopher. The anti-Christian slander of prominent Roman citizens prompted him to compose the Institutiones (DI 5.4.1) and he is writing in the hopes that this work may contribute to the end of Diocletian’s persecution (DI 5.1.2). Lactantius adopted the method of “citing those who are customarily used against us” 80 and arguing from “fact and proof” 81 rather than from the revealed authority of Scripture, à la Cyprian (DI 5.1.24–28; 5.4.3–8), in order to maximize his potential persuasiveness with the elite of Roman society. Therefore, situating himself within the context of the Epicurean-versus-Stoic debate, Lactantius has the opportunity to employ evidence which his audience of Roman docti would find most authoritative and compelling. 80 81

DI 1.5.2 (BT 2005, 14): citemus quibus contra nos uti solent. DI 3.1.10 (BT 2007, 203): re et argumentis.

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More specifically, the Stoic arguments for existence of providence established for Lactantius a point of rapprochement between Christians and non-Christians on the most basic theological level. In allying himself with a philosophical school that valued this doctrine as highly as Christians, Lactantius was assuring that – at least on this topic – his appeal would not fall on deaf ears. This may not be the most appropriate way to articulate Christian theology for a systematic theologian but, for an apologist, it is essential. A concern does arise, however, over the context in which Lactantius frames the issue of providence in relation to aggiornamento. Was the debate between the Stoics and Epicureans over providence a milieu sufficiently up-to-date to speak to Lactantius’ audience? By late-antiquity, was not Epicureanism relegated to an encyclopedia entry in the history of philosophy, a relic of the past? Scholars have noted that Epicureanism, with its mere fringe popularity at the time of Lactantius’ writing, would have hardly constituted a clear and present threat to Christianity. 82 Intellectually, the disciples of Plato and Plotinus rather than Epicurus and Lucretius were posing the heaviest resistance. But Lactantius’ apologetic goal, at least in the Institutiones, was to author a treatise that would “overthrow in one attack all [the accusers of justice] everywhere who are writing or will have written.” 83 He intended this work to serve as a handbook of Latin Christian apologetics. It was authored with the express purpose of addressing and outlining the foundations of both Christian belief and non-Christian error. Throughout the work, Lactantius explores the history of certain erroneous beliefs in order to ‘dig up the weeds at their roots,’ so to speak. In this way, both present and future authors will be deprived of the resources and material with which to combat Christianity. To claim that LacColish, The Stoic Tradition, vol. 2, 47; B. Farrington, The Faith of Epicurus (London, 1967), 146; J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (New York, 1978), 10. 83 DI 5.4.1 (BT 2009, 450–51): accusatores justitiae […] omnes, qui ubique idem operis efficiunt aut effecerunt, uno semel impetu profligarem. Cf. DI 5.4.2. 82

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tantius was living hopelessly in the past, therefore, overlooks the author’s stated goals. 84 The presence of the doctrine of providence in all three of Lactantius’ treatises, especially the devotion shown to this topic in De opifico Dei, and the admission that this doctrine should rightly come first in a summa apologiae indicate that Lactantius viewed the defense of general providence as a priority of the highest order. Having thus examined his arguments supporting this doctrine, we can now explore the import of providence in relation to Lactantius’ theological vision as a whole. In the coming chapters we shall examine why the apologist thought that “it will be necessary for us to talk about the cleverness of divine providence throughout this entire work [i.e., the Institutiones].” 85

For this criticism, see Stevenson, “Aspects of the Relations,” 502. Other reasons for Lactantius’ animosity towards Epicureanism are the presence of Lucretius in the standard Latin curriculum and that Epicureanism represents all forms of atheism to Lactantius. Cf. Casey, “Lactantius’ Reaction,” 217–19. 85 DI 1.2.6 (BT 2005, 8): de sollertia divinae providentiae per totum hoc opus quod […] dicere nos necesse est. 84

CHAPTER 4. LACTANTIUS’ DOCTRINE OF GOD I. THEOLOGY OF GOD

In the previous chapter we examined the types of arguments for the existence of providence, or tropoi, used by the Stoics and their appearance in the works of Lactantius. We concluded by noting Lactantius’ dependence upon the Stoa for his material, especially Cicero’s De natura deorum, and the suitability of adopting Stoic material in order to advance his apologetic goals. In short, making use of Stoic arguments is congruent with Lactantius’ method of proceeding from what is commonly held and believed by all to what is held in greater suspicion and dispute. Having thus examined the arguments for providence of which Lactantius makes use, we can now treat the individual tenets of Lactantius’ theology in order to discover how the doctrine of providence functions throughout his thought. The remainder of this work, therefore, will be divided topically according to the length and depth with which Lactantius treats various aspects of Christian theology. In other words, Lactantius himself is determining which topics are addressed by virtue of their import to his accounting of the Christian faith. Thus, this chapter examines Lactantius’ doctrine of God, chapter 5 treats Lactantius’ anthropology, and chapter 6 addresses Lactantius’ understanding of salvation history. Divisions in this chapter have been made according to God’s attributes and His activity ad extra. Thus, Part I, Theology of God, will be divided according to the following topics: (A.) God’s Oneness, (B.) God’s Transcendence, (C.) God’s Incorporeity, (D.) God as Eternal Mind, and (E.) God and the Passions. Similarly, Part II, God the Creator, will discuss Lactantius’ doctrine of creation as expressed positively, (A.) Creatio ex nihilo, and by way of negation, (B.) Refutation of Atomism, as well as treat Lactantius’ account of the existence of evil, (C.) Theodicy. 93

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A. God’s Oneness The terms that Lactantius most frequently uses to describe God all stem from His oneness; from His singular and unique mode of existence. Demonstrating God’s oneness and providence is Lactantius’ chief theological aim, especially in composing the Institutiones, and are topics to which he returns throughout his works. Monotheism is the first issue given extended and systematic treatment in the Institutiones (DI 1.3.1ff.), and the apologist affirms that perfect wisdom lay in the knowledge of God’s oneness and providence (DI 2.8.71). Further, in the description of his apologetic method, Lactantius states that the first positive step in Christian education is to acknowledge that God is the one Creator of the universe (ID 2.2), and it was for the purpose of making His unity publicly manifest that God withheld punishment of the persecutors of Christianity until the appropriate time (MP 1.7). In short, God’s oneness and providence form the essence of Lactantius’ kerygma. 1 In the Institutiones (DI 1.2.1–6), Epitome (Epi. 2.1–8), and De ira Dei (ID 13.1–14.6), treatment of God’s oneness is accompanied by discussion of providence. In the first two treatises, arguments for providence precede those for monotheism so that Lactantius might progress from a topic which he believes to be universally held and clear, to an issue of considerable obscurity and varying opinion (Epi. 2.1). The interconnection between these two doctrines is apparent by the way in which the apologist phrases the question of monotheism in the Institutiones: “Whether the world is governed by the power of one God or many?” 2 In other words, given that Lactantius has already stated his case for the existence of divine providence, he now asks whether it is more reasonable to attribute this providence to one God or many. Lactantius begins his response to this question by offering several arguments of his own prior to submitting the testimony of other authors. At the start of the Institutiones, Lactantius argues that the possibility of there being more than one God is excluded based on the See Chapter 2, IV. Christian Truth. Cf. DI 7.6.1. DI 1.3.1 (BT 2005, 8): Utrum potestate unius dei mundus regatur anne multorum? 1 2

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definition of God; as such, one might call this Lactantius’ ontological argument for God’s oneness. 3 “If God is perfect, which He must be, He cannot be so unless He is one, so that all things are in Him.” 4 Those who argue for the existence of a plurality of gods must believe that each deity has a certain limited amount of power and virtue; for absolute power and virtue cannot exist in multiplicity. For example, a king who retains control over his entire kingdom possesses complete power. But if there should be a rival king, then the two rulers would share a power that is naturally diminished (DI 1.3.5–6). Since each singular deity possesses diminished power, therefore, none of them can be the supreme God, “who is eternal mind, who is indeed of consummate perfection and virtue in every way.” 5 In order for God to exist, therefore, He must by definition be one. Lactantius then addresses a number of potential objections to his argument that relate directly to the issue of providence. First, some may claim that the divine operations are shared among the gods and, in this way, they govern the world together (DI 1.3.10). If this were the case, contends Lactantius, then their powers would admittedly be diminished and incomplete since none of them could govern the world alone. “Thus, the governance of the world necessitates the perfect virtue of one being, rather than the weakness of many.” 6 Further, some may say that the world is far too vast and complex to be the work of a single deity. But, Lactantius argues, the grand and intricate workings of the universe ought to inspire them to believe in one supreme God, rather than a plurality of lesser divinities. For if we acknowledge that the universe could only be On the reasonableness of referring to this type of argument as ontological, i.e., as an anticipation of the argument eventually made by Anselm of Canterbury (Pros. 2), see Dragona-Monachou, The Stoic Arguments, 46, 92–96. 4 DI 1.3.7 (BT 2005, 9): Deus vero si perfectus est, ut esse debet, non potest esse nisi unus, ut in eo sint omnia. 5 DI 1.3.3 (BT 2005, 9): qui est aeterna mens, ex omni utique parte perfectae consummataeque virtutis est. 6 DI 1.3.11 (BT 2005, 10): Ita fit, ut ad regendum mundum unis perfecta virtute opus sit quam imbecillitate multorum. 3

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created and sustained by the greatest of beings, then a single perfect God, rather than many less than perfect deities, must be the Author of the natural world. In essence, the apologist is attempting to persuade his audience to alter the very way in which they conceive of divinity. Rather than thinking of the gods as personifications of the elements of nature or individual qualities, Lactantius exhorts his audience to contemplate the existence of a being who possesses every good quality perfectly, who transcends the natural finitude of the created order and, only by being such, is capable of creating and sustaining that order. Part of the difficulty, the apologist admits, is that recognition of such a being is accompanied by an acknowledgement of our own human limitations. The pantheon of deities can be easily explained as the anthropomorphic embodiments of natural phenomena or virtuous ideals, but a God who is incorruptible and eternal (DI 1.3.9), in whom exists all things, will naturally transcend the limits of human imagination and expression (DI 1.3.14). “In these matters we lack the perception and the words, because the human heart can put into earthly language neither the light of an intelligence so great nor the explanation of things so lofty.” 7 Despite the limitations of the human intellect, however, Lactantius believes that the providential governance of the world is ample evidence for belief in God’s oneness. The universe, according to the apologist, functions as a unified and organic whole. This order would not be possible unless it was ultimately governed by the providence of a single divine mind and will. As has already been stated, if there were many divine powers none would possess the absolute perfection of the one God. They would therefore naturally come into conflict, and discord would ensue since none of them could assert supremacy over the others (DI 1.3.17). But the DI 1.3.15 (BT 2005, 11): Qua in re quoniam et sensu deficimur et verbis, quia neque tantam intellegentiae lucem pectus humanum neque explanationem tantarum rerum capit lingua mortalis. On God’s incomprehensibility and ineffability see DI 1.1.5, 8.1–3; 7.5.11; Epi. 3.1, 53.2; OD 13.2; ID 1.9, 11.6, 11. On His incorruptibility see DI 1.3.23; 2.8.44; 7.2.6; Epi. 3.1, and for His eternal nature consult DI 1.3.3; 2.8.44; 4.12.16; 5.23.2; 7.2.6; Epi. 3.1. 7

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universe exists as a harmonious and integrated whole and, hence, cannot be governed by a multitude of gods. “It is necessary, therefore, for the world to be governed by a single will. For unless power over the individual parts is referred to one providence, the whole cannot exist intact; each one [god] would care for nothing greater than what pertained to him.” 8 To further illustrate this point Lactantius offers two analogies. If an army has more than one commander then organization is impossible. Though there are many distinctions of rank within the military, all members of the army must ultimately be subject to one authority in order to function as a whole (DI 1.3.19; cf. Epi. 2.4–6). Similarly, affirming the existence of many gods is akin to believing that there are many minds in the human person, each commanding the charge of a respective body part. The human person, however, is able to function precisely because there is one mind controlling the entire body, and the same is true of the universe. “For the governance of nature, unless it will be by a single being to whom the care of the entire whole is referred, the universe would be undone and ruined.” 9 This argument for the oneness of God, based on the providential order of creation, is repeated elsewhere in Lactantius’ corpus. As one might expect, there is a parallel passage contained in the Epitome that condenses the prolixity of the original. “It is not possible for all things to exist unless everything is referred to the One, unless the One has governance, unless the One guides the bridle and, as it were, one mind directs all the members of the universe.” 10 If multiple deities governed the world, argues Lactantius, then it would most closely resemble a state of chaos, if it came to be at all, rather than a patterned order of existence (Epi. 2.5). In De DI 1.3.18 (BT 2005, 11): Unius igitur arbitrio mundum regi necesse est. Nisi enim singularum partium potestas ad unam providentiam referatur, non poterit summa ipsa constare, uno quoque nihil curante amplius quam quod ad eum proprie pertinet. 9 DI 1.3.19 (BT 2005, 12): naturae imperio nisi unus fuerit ad quem totius summae cura referatur, universa solventur et corruent. 10 Epi. 2.3 (BT 1994, 3): Nec potest aliter rerum summa consistere, nisi ad unum cuncta referantur, nisi unus teneat gubernaculum, nisi unus frena moderetur regatque universa membra tamquam mens una. 8

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ira Dei, Lactantius again addresses the issue of God’s oneness. In this version of the argument from providence the apologist omits discussion of the alternative to monotheistic providence, i.e., how governance of the cosmos would appear if it were in the care of the gods, and instead focuses solely on the divine requirements for order within the sphere of creation. Since all of nature harmonizes into a unity, he asserts, “the God dwelling in the world is one; for the whole body cannot be ruled and inhabited except by a single mind. It is necessary, therefore, that all divine power be in the One by whose nod and command all things are governed.” 11 He also attempts to convince his audience of God’s unity by relying more heavily on analogy. “It is not possible, therefore, for there to be many rulers in this world, nor many lords in one house, nor many pilots on one ship, nor many leaders in a herd or flock, nor many kings in one swarm [of bees]. Neither is it possible for there to be many suns in the sky, nor many souls in one body, even as the natural world harmonizes into a unity.” 12 In the Epitome and De ira Dei, Lactantius also recapitulates his ontological argument for God’s oneness. In the former, the ontological argument follows that from providence. Consequently, it adopts a bit of the character of the argument from providence. The governance of the world, according to Lactantius, requires an omnipotent and intelligent God. A multitude of deities, however, will naturally possess limited individual powers and therefore be unable to care for creation as a whole. “None of them [the gods] can be called omnipotent, which is the true name of God, because he [the deity] will only be able to care for what is in himself, but what is in ID 11.5 (SC 289, 144): unum esse mundi habitatorem deum, siquidem corpus omne nisi ab una mente incoli regique non potest. (6) Omnem igitur divinam potestatem necesse est in uno esse cujus nutu et inperio regantur omnia. Cf. Epi. 2.4. 12 ID 11.4 (SC 289, 144): Non possunt igitur in hoc mundo multi esse rectores nec in una domo multi domini nec in navi una multi gubernatores nec in armento aut grege duces multi nec in uno examine multi reges, sed ne in caelo quidem multi soles esse poterunt sicut nec animae plures in uno corpore: adeo in unitatem natura universa consentit. 11

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another he will not dare to manage.” 13 The true God, therefore, is the being who is able to control all things throughout creation by His omnipotence, rather than individual aspects of the natural world. In De ira Dei, Lactantius’ ontological argument precedes that from providence. In fact, the two arguments are so seamlessly woven together that it is difficult to know where one ends and the other begins. The naturally limited capacities of a multitude of deities are again cited as the reason for their not fulfilling the definition of God, “in whom power and consummate might can be neither lessened nor altered.” 14 Consequently, based on these limitations, the gods are eliminated as possible sources of the providential order of the world (ID 11.4–5). B. God’s Transcendence After providing the reader with his own arguments for God’s oneness in the Institutiones, Lactantius then employs the testimony of various sources to support his thesis. 15 In addition to giving evidence in favor of monotheism, these sources succeed in elaborating on Lactantius’ doctrine of God as a whole; so much so that by summarizing their content for the Epitome, the apologist gives us a convenient résumé of his doctrine of God: “God, therefore, is one, perfect, eternal, incorruptible, impassible, subject to nothing, Himself possessing all things, [and] governing all things. Neither the power of the senses, the human mind, nor the eloquence of mortal tongues can describe Him. He is far loftier and greater than is possible for the thoughts and words of humankind to comprehend.” 16 Epi. 2.6 (BT 1994, 3–4): Nullus igitur eorum poterit omnipotens nuncupari, quod est verum cognomentum dei, quoniam id solum poterit, quod in ipso est, quod autem in aliis, nec audebit attingere. On God’s omnipotence see DI 1.1.15, 8.7, 19.3; 7.20.11, 26.5. 14 ID 11.3 (SC 289, 144): in quo vis et potestas consummate nec minui potest nec augeri. 15 See Chapter 3, II. The Arguments for Divine Providence, A. The Argument from Consensus. Cf. Nat. D. 2.5; Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion, 82. 16 Epi. 3.1 (BT 1994, 4): Unus igitur deus est, perfectus aeternus, incorruptibilis impassibilis, nulli rei potestative subjectus, ipse omnia possi13

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The negative attributes which Lactantius assigns to God (incorruptibilis, impassibilis, incomprehensibilis) were no doubt influenced by the Greek sources which the apologist cites in support of God’s oneness. With the exception of Orpheus, whom Lactantius counts among the poets (DI 1.5.4–7), these sources all fall within the category of divina testimonia, 17 and the evidence of their influence can be seen in the author’s transmission of these texts in their original language. Three words of particular import which Lactantius retains in the Greek all pertain to God’s transcendence: ‘nameless’ (ἀνώνυμος), ‘unbegotten’ (ἀγένητος), and ‘self-begotten’ (αὐτογενής). That God does not possess a proper name Lactantius attributes to Hermes Tresmigistus. “Should anyone require His name, he [Trismegistus] says it is ‘nameless,’ since He does not need a proper name because He is one. These are the words themselves: ‘god is one, he that is one need not be named, for he that is is nameless.’” 18 Names are needed, according to Lactantius, to indicate a distinction between things of a similar kind. But since there is only one omnipotent, omniscient and perfect Creator, a proper name would be superfluous. In fact, ‘deus’ is God’s proper name (DI 1.6.5). This is in contrast to the cult of the gentiles where, for the purposes of assigning divinity to the powers of nature, “they [philosophers] erred in being led by common religious custom to transfer a human name to a god.” 19 Referring to God as ‘nameless’ (ἀνώνυμος), therefore, signifies His singularly unique mode of exdens, omnia regens, quem nec aestimare sensu valeat humana mens nec eloqui lingua mortalis. Sublimior enim ac maior est quam ut possit aut cogitatione hominis aut sermone comprehendi. On God’s impassibility see also DI 1.3.23; 2.8.44. 17 See Chapter 2, III. Sources, D. Oracular Literature. 18 DI 1.6.4 (BT 2005, 22): Ac ne quis nomen ejus requireret, ἀνώνυμος esse dixit, eo quod nominis proprietate non egat, ob ipsam scilicet unitatem. Ipsius haec verba sunt: ὁ δὲ ϑεὸς εἷς, ὁ δὲ εἷς ὀνόματος οὐ προσδέεται · ἔστιν γὰρ ὁ ὢν ἀνώνυμος. Cf. Corp. Herm., vol. 4, fr. 3a; Ascl. 20; Ex 3:14; Epi. 4.5. 19 DI 1.11.38 (BT 2005, 49): vulgari consuetudine religionis inducti erraverunt, quod in deum nomen hominis transtulerunt.

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istence and, thereby, distinguishes Him from both the natural order of finite creatures and the anthropomorphic deities of the GrecoRoman pantheon. The belief that God transcends the created order of being is commonly expressed in Patristic theology by the word ἀγένητος or ἀγέννητος, i.e., ‘unbegotten.’ 20 In Book 1 of the Institutiones, Lactantius maintains fidelity to the Greek by quoting the word directly from the Sibylline Oracles on two occasions. The first instance is preceded by Lactantius’ description of the history and nature of the Oracles (DI 1.6.6–14). He concludes the tale of their journey to Rome by quoting the Erythrean Sibyl on God’s oneness: “In these verses, which the envoys brought to Rome, we find this testimony to the one God: ‘One god, who rules alone, the greatest, unbegotten.’” 21 This evidence is also summarized in a parallel passage from the Epitome: “‘there is one god,’ they [the Sibyls] say, ‘the source, the creator, the parent, not generated by anything, but begetting himself […].’” 22 When Lactantius uses the term ἀγένητος again, later in Book 1 of the Institutiones, the testimonies of Apollo and Seneca support those of the Sibyl. “Truly it is impossible to have been created unless existence began at some time. Thus it follows that because nothing was made before Him, He created Himself from Himself before all things. Therefore, Apollo calls him ‘self-grown,’ and the Sybil ‘self-begotten’ and ‘unbegotten’ and ‘unmade.’ This is what Seneca, that sharp man, saw in his Exhortations. ‘We,’ he says, ‘consider ourselves from another. Thus we look back to someone else to whom we may attribute what is the best in ourselves. By another we were born, by another we were instructed; but god himself For an examination of the word ἀγένητος in Patristic theology consult G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London: 1952), 37–54. 21 DI 1.6.15 (BT 2005, 27): In his ergo versibus quos Romam legati attulerunt de uno deo haec sunt testimonia: εἷς ϑεός, ὃς μόνος ἄρχει, ὑπερμεγέϑης ἀγένητος. Quot. Orac. Sib. fr. 1.7, 17; cf. Theoph. Ad Autol. 112c. 22 Epi. 5.3 (BT 1994, 7): ‘unum deum esse’ testantur, ‘principem conditorem partentem, non ab ullo generatum, sed a se ipso satum […]’. 20

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made himself.’” 23 Further evidence of God’s self-generation is provided by Apollo, who describes God as “‘self-grown, untaught, unmothered [and] undisturbed,’” 24 Hermes Trismegistus, who calls God “‘unfathered,’ because his origin is not from another,” 25 and Orpheus, for saying that God is “‘first-born,’ because nothing was begotten before Him, yet all things were begotten from Him.” 26 Taken together, the Greek terminology that Lactantius employs illustrates two aspects of God’s transcendence. First, the terms used in reference to God’s self-origination, such as ‘selfbegotten’ (αὐτογενής), or ‘self-grown’ (αὐτοφυής), signify God’s reliance upon nothing other than Himself for His existence. God’s mode of being is absolute, perfect and unchanging. As such, dependence on contingent creatures would infringe upon His perfection. “Neither His origin nor His birth depends upon any other thing which could dissolve him by its alteration. He exists from Himself, as we said in Book 1, and for that reason He is of such a kind as He wished Himself to be: impassible, immutable, incorruptible, blessed and eternal.” 27 DI 1.7.13 (BT 2005, 31–32): Verum quia fieri non potest, quin id quod sit aliquando esse coeperit, consequens est ut, quoniam nihil ante illum fuit, ipse ante omnia ex se ipso sit procreatus, ideoque ab Apolline αὐτοφυής, a Sibylla αὐτογενής et ἀγένητος et ἀποίητος nominatur. Quod Seneca homo acutus in Exhortationibus vidit. ‘Nos’ iniquit ‘aliunde pendemus. Itaque ad aliquem respicimus, cui quod est optimum in nobis debeamus. Alius nos edidit, alius instruxit; deus ipse se fecit.’ Cf. Fontenrose, Didyma, 223–25, fr. 51; Orac. Sib. fr. 1.7, 17; Vottero, I Frammenti, 202, fr. 87. 24 DI 1.7.1 (BT 2005, 28): αὐτοφυὴς ἀδίδακτος ἀμήτωρ ἀστυφέλικτος. Cf. Fontenrose, Didyma, 223–25, fr. 51. 25 DI 1.7.2 (BT 2005, 27–28): ἀπάτορα […] quod origo illi non sit aliunde. Cf. Corp. Herm., vol. IV, fr. 4a. 26 DI 1.5.4 (BT 2005, 15): πρωτόγονον […], quod ante ipsum nihil sit genitum, sed ab ipso sint cuncta generata. Cf. Abel, Orphica, fr. 57. 27 DI 2.8.44 (BT 2005, 157): nec orts ac nativitas ejus ex aliqua re altera pendet, quae illum mutata dissolvat. Ex se ipso est, ut in primo diximus libro et ideo talis est qualem esse se voluit, impassibilis immutabilis 23

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Second, the negative attributes listed in relation to God’s aseity, such as ‘unbegotten’ (ἀγένητος), or ‘unmade’ (ἀποίητος), connote His lack of origin in the created order. Everything in the temporal world derives its being from another source. But God, being perfectly self-subsistent, has no source of being other than Himself. His mode of existence cannot be attributed to any cause within the temporal order of being. Thus, it can be said that God is “that which is not made,” 28 since ‘to be made’ implies causality within the order of creation. “He is the one, only, free and highest God; lacking origin because He Himself is the origin of created beings.” 29 God’s existence, therefore, is neither contingent upon nor derived from finite beings. C. God’s Incorporeity (Excursus) Though the topic of God’s corporeality diverts us, for the moment, from an examination of the divine attributes which stem from God’s oneness as articulated in Book 1 of the Institutiones, it is nevertheless worthy of an excursus at this point. Such is the case because the matter has not been without recent debate and a few words of clarification are certainly in order. 30 In Book 7 of the Instiincorruptus beatus aeternus. Cf. DI 1.7.13. On God’s impassibility and immutability see also DI 1.3.23; 2.8.38; Epi. 3.1. 28 DI 2.8.44 (BT 2005, 157): qui factus non est. 29 DI 4.29.12 (BT 2007, 430): Unus est enim, solus, liber, deus summus, carens origine, quia ipse est origo rerum. 30 Marcia Colish maintains that Lactantius believes that “God has a material nature” (The Stoic Tradition, vol. 2, 40). Cf. G. Verbeke, L’Évolution de la doctrine du pneuma du Stoicïsme à S. Augustin (New York: 1987), 469–82. As evidence Colish cites the following passage from DI 2.9.16 (BT 2005, 166): Nam cum virtus dei sit in calore et igni, nisi ardorem vimque ejus admixta umoris ac frigoris materia temperasset, nec nasci quidquam nec cohaerere potuisset, quin statim conflagratione interiret quidquid esse coepisset. Vincenzo Loi interprets this statement as referring to God’s power (virtus, vim), rather than His nature (Lattanzio, 130). The present author agrees with his assessment. Cf. Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition. Volume One: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451) (Atlanta: John Knox, 1975), 196.

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tutiones, on two occasions, Lactantius plainly states his belief in God’s incorporeity. The first instance occurs amid a refutation of Stoic pantheism, and Lactantius declares that God is “separated from a body and free.” 31 The apologist next mentions God’s incorporeity in an argument defending the immortality of the soul. “But if God is incorporeal, invisible and eternal, then it is not credible that the soul is destroyed.” 32 Similarly, when describing how it is possible that souls can be tormented after death, Lactantius states that only God has the power to do so since both souls and God “live only in the spirit.” 33 The evidence for Lactantius’ belief in God’s incorporeity often appears in connection with the incorporeity of the soul. For example, in his attack on the Greco-Roman cult, the apologist affirms that true worship is the praise of a pure soul because an incorporeal God has no use for corporeal sacrifices and idols (DI 6.25.7). A parallel passage from the Epitome contains the essence of this argument more succinctly: “But just as it is necessary to sacrifice corporeal things to the corporeal, so too it is necessary to sacrifice incorporeal things to the incorporeal.” 34 In De ira Dei, the apologist also cites Pythagoras as confirming belief in one incorporeal God (ID 11.14; cf. Cic. Nat. D. 1.27; Min. Fel. 19.6). Lactantius does, however, vehemently disagree with those who would affirm that God has no ‘form’ (figura/forma) (ID 2.5, 18.13). He ascribes belief in a formless deity to the Stoics, and the apologist demurs at offering a rebuttal to their position due to the constraints of time and space (ID 18.13). He fails to elaborate on

DI 7.3.4 (BT 2011, 649): a corpore soluta et libera. Cf. Tusc. 1.66. DI 7.9.7 (BT 2011, 676): Quodsi est deus et incorporalis et invisiblis et aeternus, ergo non idcirco interire animam credibile est. 33 DI 7.21.2 (BT 2011, 714): in solis spiritibus vivunt. Lactantius is explicit about the incorporeity of both. DI 7.21.2 (BT 2011, 714): a solidis et corporalibus nullam vim pati possunt. 34 Epi. 53.1 (BT 1994, 80): Sed sicut corporalis corporalia, sic utique incorporali incorporale sacrificium necessarium est. 31 32

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precisely what he means by ‘form’ and why it ought to be ascribed to the divine nature. 35 The immediate context of his remark is in relation to the human person being made in the ‘likeness’ (similtudinem) of God. Lactantius states that this likeness is not in relation to God’s form but His ‘spirit’ (animo) (ID 18.13). “If it belongs to God to think, to understand, to foresee, to excel, and these things the human person alone possesses from all living creatures, he was made therefore in the likeness of God.” 36 The distinction that Lactantius draws in this passage between God’s forma/figura and animo is not, however, without ambiguity. Elsewhere the apologist affirms that the human person is made in the ‘form’ (figuram) and ‘image’ (figmentum) of God (DI 6.12.30). What is clear from these excerpts is that the terms forma and figura did not possess codified and uniform meanings for Lactantius. Rather, their signification is determined by the specific context in which they are used. 37 As mentioned, in the text from De ira Dei chapter 18, Lactantius’ immediate concern is with the Stoic claim of God’s formlessness. What Lactantius most likely has in mind is the StoicEpicurean debate concerning God’s form and whether God has a corporeal human form, the Epicurean claim, or is formless, the Stoic position (cf. Nat. D. 1.48, 76, 90; 2.70ff.). Nowhere does the apologist affirm the Epicurean belief in God’s anthropomorphic In the scholastic era Thomas Aquinas will give a formal explanation. Cf. STh I, q. 3, a. 2 (Textum Leoninum): Est igitur per essentiam suam [deum] forma; et non compositus ex materia et forma. 36 ID 18.14 (SC 289, 186): Si deo subjacet cogitare sapere intellegere providere praestare, ex omnibus autem animalibus homo solus haec habet, ergo ad dei similitudinem factus est. 37 Vincenzo Loi points out that Lactantius is using the words figura and forma as synonyms. The Greek equivalents, however, connoted respective philosophical meanings. Figura, or σχἦμα, simply expressed the relationship between parts to each other and to a whole. Forma, or μορφή, on the other hand, Christian authors adopted at an early stage to signify God’s concrete existing reality (Lattanzio, 39). Cf. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, 13ff. 35

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figure. 38 The divine formlessness of the Stoics, however, did not account for God’s aseity but placed the divine nature within the realm of the cosmos. 39 Lactantius must have viewed affirmation of God’s form, therefore, as a counter to Stoic pantheism. 40 Indeed, Lactantius believes that form is given to nature by God and is not something which nature per se possesses. “But to say, as others do, that the world was brought about by nature, which lacks sense and form, this is quite truly absurd.” 41 If divine form exists independently from both nature and the human person, therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that, at least in De irae Dei, Lactantius is using the terms forma and figura to signify God’s transcendent selfsubsisting reality, accepting neither the Epicurean nor the Stoic sense of ‘form.’ D. God as Eternal Mind In Book 1 of the Institutiones, Lactantius also employs the humana testimonia of the poets and philosophers as part of the amplificatio to his thesis that God is one. Aside from Orpheus, the Greek poets offer little help in this regard (DI 1.5.3–7). Homer was concerned primarily with the human rather than the divine, and Hesiod was too frightened to probe more deeply into the truth of creation (DI 1.5.8–10). The best of Latin poets, however, supply Lactantius with evidence of a providential divinity. Vergil is nearest the truth in calling God ‘mind’ (mentem) and ‘spirit’ (spiritum) (DI 1.5.11; quot. Aen 6.724–27), and acknowledging His presence in all of creation (DI 1.5.12; quot. G. 4.221–24). Ovid offers similar evidence for God’s creative activity, calling Him the “‘craftsman of the world’ and ‘maker of things.’” 42 Turning to the philosophers, Lactantius’ evidence is derived primarily from a doxographical survey provided by Cicero (Nat. D. By comparison, see Pseudo-Clem. Hom. 16.19. Cf. Nat. D. 1.36; 2.46; Diog. Laert. 7.148. 40 On Lactantius’ rejection of Stoic pantheism see DI 2.5.7ff.; 7.3.1ff. 41 ID 10.34 (SC 289, 136): At enim, sicut alii dicunt, natura mundus effectus est quae sensu et figura caret. Hoc vero multo est absurdius. 42 DI 1.5.13 (BT 2005, 17): quem ‘fabricatorem mundi’, quem ‘rerum opificem’. Cf. Met. 1.57, 79. 38 39

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1.25ff.) and filtered through Minucius Felix (Min. Fel. 19.3–14). Though in De natura deorum this doxography is articulated through the voice of the Epicurean Velleius for the purpose of refutation, both Minucius Felix and Lactantius (DI 1.5.15–27; Epi. 4.1–5; ID 11.11–15) employ it to support belief in one God. 43 The first philosopher to be mentioned by Lactantius is Thales of Milteus, one of the famed Seven Sages, who asserts that God is the ‘mind’ (mentem) responsible for the creation of life from water (DI 1.5.16; cf. Epi. 4.3; ID 11.12; Nat. D. 1.25; Min. Fel. 19.4). Likewise, Pythagorus believes that God is the animating and rational principle (animus) diffused throughout all of nature from which all beings draw life (DI 1.5.17; cf. Epi. 4.3; ID 11.12, 14; Nat. D. 1.27; Min. Fel. 19.6). “Anaxagoras says that God is an infinite self-moving mind,” 44 and Antisthenes affirms that there is only one being who is God by nature, the Creator of the universe (DI 1.5.18; cf. ID 11.14; Min. Fel. 19.7). Chrysippus and Zeno, the early pioneers of the Stoa, also support Lactantius’ thesis. The former states that God is “the force of nature endowed with divine reason,” 45 and the latter refers to God as “natural and divine law.” 46 Aristotle, despite contradicting himself in many places, also acknowledges that the world is ultimately governed by one ‘mind’ (mentem) (DI 1.5.22; cf. Epi. 4.2; ID 11.15 ; Nat. D. 1.33; Min. Fel. 19.9). Plato is given the final place of honor in this enumeration. He is especially credited for his clarity of thinking in affirming the unity of God under the name of God, rather then under one of the many pseudonyms employed by other philosophers (DI 1.5.23; cf. Epi. 4.1; ID 11.11, 13; Nat. D. 1.30; Min. Fel. 19.14; Pl. Ti. 28c). With this survey complete Lactantius now turns his focus on philosophers from the Latin tradition. The apologist states that his Cf. Pease, 203–04; Clarke, 265 n. 236; Hermann Diels, ed., Doxographi Graeci (Berlin & Leipzig: 1929), 531–50. 44 DI 1.5.18 (BT 2005, 18): Anaxagoras deum esse dicit infinitam mentem quae per se ipsa moveatur. Cf. Nat. D. 1.26; Min. Fel. 19.6. 45 DI 1.5.20 (BT 2005, 19): nateralem vim divina ratione praeditam. Cf. Epi. 4.3; Nat. D. 1.39; Min. Fel. 19.10–11. 46 DI 1.5.20 (BT 2005, 19): naturalem divinamque legem. Cf. Epi. 4.3; ID 11.15; Nat. D. 1.26; Min. Fel. 19.10. 43

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mentor, Cicero, acknowledges the existence of God on several occasions (DI 1.5.24). Specifically, Lactantius cites De legibus for calling God ‘supreme’ (supremum) (DI 1.5.24; cf. Cic. Leg. 1.22), and provides two quotations to further illustrate Cicero’s insight; neither of which directly address the issue of monotheism. The first quotation is taken from Balbus’ argument for the existence of providence in De natura deorum: “‘Nothing is superior to god. It is, therefore, necessary that the world be governed by him. God is subject or obedient to nothing in nature. He, therefore, governs all of nature himself.’” 47 Lest there be any confusion over the nature of this providential divinity, Lactantius inserts an additional quotation concerning Cicero’s definition of God. According to the great rhetorician, God is “‘mind liberated from things and free, separated from all mortal accretions, perceiving and moving all things.’” 48 Lastly, Seneca describes God as the ‘leader’ (rectorem) of the universe, “‘the god of all the gods,’” 49 who guides and is extended throughout all of creation. 50 Lactantius admits that the findings of the poets and philosophers may be inconclusive in that they fail to establish a uniform understanding of the divine nature (DI 1.5.21). In fact, many of the authors cited do not directly address the issue of monotheism at all. While they may differ on their particular names for God, however, Lactantius argues that they are all unambiguously clear in attributing to a single supreme being the providential order of the universe (DI 1.5.21). In other words, while they may be deficient in their understandings of certain aspects of the divine nature, they all DI 1.5.24 (BT 2005, 20): ‘Nihil est praestantius deo, ab eo igitur mundum regi necesse est. Nulli igitur est naturae obediens aut subjectus deus. Omnem ergo regit ipse naturam.’ Quot. Nat. D. 2.77; cf. Pease, 747; Epi. 4.3. 48 DI 1.5.25 (BT 2005, 20): ‘mens soluta quaedem et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et movens.’ Cf. C. Vitelli, ed. M. Tullii Ciceronis Consolationis fragmenta (Mondadori: 1979), 50, fr. 21; Cic. Tusc. 1.66. 49 DI 1.5.26 (BT 2005, 21): ‘deorum omnium deum.’ Cf. Vottero, I Frammenti, 176, fr. 61. 50 DI 1.5.27; cf. Epi. 4.3; Vottero, I Frammenti, 200, fr. 86a. 47

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agree that providence is a divine attribute exercised by a being who is fundamentally one. Further, because the existence of providence is the defining activity of this being, it is most appropriately described as ‘eternal mind’ (aeterna mens) (DI 7.3.4; cf. Tusc. 1.66); since order is the product of intelligence and will. Thus, in this portion of his argument, nearly all of Lactantius’ sources abound with the language of rationality (e.g., ratio, mens, intellegere, cognitare). Beyond the passages that we have examined from Book 1 of the Institutiones, Lactantius repeatedly argues from the providential order of creation to the existence of God as eternal mind. For example, in chapter 2 of Book 1, the apologist commends the Stoic school for its belief that “it would not have been possible for the world to be made or to endure without divine reason, unless it is governed by ultimate reason.” 51 Likewise, in his attack on the philosophical schools that reject the doctrine of providence, Lactantius maintains that “it is necessary for a divine mind to exist which, by its providence, all things are first given life.” 52 And in De ira Dei, Lactantius employs his rhetorical skills to ask his audience if “it is possible to think that they [the wonders of the world] were brought about by no plan, no providence, no divine reason?” 53 Thus, Lactantius consistently argues from the doctrine of providence towards a concept of God which organically emerges from it; namely, God as the necessary aeterna mens who created and governs the universe. E. God and the Passions Before examining Lactantius’ doctrine of God as it relates to His activity ad extra, i.e., the doctrine of creation, a more thorough examination of the topic of divine impassibility is worth noting. Lactantius found this issue vexing enough to author an entire treatise on the passions in God and, as we shall see, the doctrine of proviDI 1.2.2 (BT 2005, 7): nec fieri mundum sine divina ratione potuisse nec constare, nisi summa ratione regeretur. 52 DI 3.28.5 (BT 2007, 300): necesse est mentem esse divinam, quae sua providentia nascendi principium rebus omnibus praebeat. 53 ID 10.32 (SC 289, 136): potest existimare nullo effecta esse consilio, nulla providentia, nulla ratione divina. On God’s rationality see also DI 1.8.2–3; 7.3.4; OD 2.1; ID 10.31–36, 24.6. 51

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dence figures prominently in the apologist’s defense of God’s wrath. As mentioned above, impassibility is a quality Lactantius believes God must possess in order to be God. By definition, God is a being of complete and utter perfection and, as such, is one, eternal, immortal and transcendent. “If the name of God is supreme power, He must be incorruptible, perfect, impassible and subject to nothing.” 54 Based on such reasoning, however, Lactantius’ teacher and fellow apologist Arnobius concluded that anger is incompatible with divine perfection (cf. Adv. nat. 7.5). According to Cicero, Arnobius’ conclusion is congruent with the universal opinion of classical philosophy. “All the philosophers agree that […] god is never angry or harmful.” 55 Lactantius authored De ira Dei with the opinions of these philosophers, especially the Epicureans, specifically in mind. 56 He is concerned with the influence they exert over individuals with a certain degree of education (ID 1.2) and, because their mistaken notion of divine anger “overthrows the condition of human life,” 57 Lactantius feels compelled to address the issue. The doctrine of providence supports Lactantius’ defense of God’s anger most acutely when addressing the Epicurean claim that God possesses neither anger nor kindness. According to the apologist, Epicurus’ desire to affirm an impassible and completely self-subsistent God led him to exclude any possible likeness or analogy between God and human beings, excerpt for corporeality. According to Epicurus, God “‘is blessed and incorruptible because

DI 1.3.23 (BT 2005, 13): Nam si deus nomen est summae potestatis, incorruptibilis esse debet, perfectus impassibilis nulli rei subjectus. Cf. 2.8.44; Epi. 3.1. 55 Off. 3.102 (LCL 30, 378): Commune est omnium philosophorum […] numquam nec irasci deum nec nocere. 56Cf. ID 1.1–4. Nowhere does Lactantius mention heterodox Christians as a possible target of rebuke. 57 ID 1.2 (SC 289, 90): ad evertendum vitae humanae statum. 54

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he cares for nothing, he has neither concern for himself nor does he display it for others.’” 58 Lactantius believes that Epicurus’ theological view is the natural outcome of not wanting to attribute wrath to God. Once Epicurus had excluded the possibility of anger in God, “he could not stop the consequences, because with one affection severed necessity itself compelled him also to remove the other affections from God.” 59 Lactantius argues that Epicurus’ position cannot be true because it denies God the important divine activites most proper to Him. 60 If God possesses neither kindness nor wrath, and if He cares for nothing, then providence is also not counted among His attributes. “But if there are no affections in God, because whatever is affected is weak, then neither is there care for anything nor providence in Him.” 61 Further, providence is such an integral part of God’s divine activity that denying it renders the definition of God unintelligible. What is God if not the provident Creator and Sustainer of the world? “What could be greater, what could be more exalted than to assign to God’s administration than the governance of the world? […] What is so worthy or appropriate to God as providence? But if He cares for nothing, provides nothing, He has lost all divinity.” 62 In essence, God without divine providence is ID 4.2 (SC 289, 98): beatus est et incorruptus, quia nihil curat neque ipse habet negotium neque alteri exhibet. Cf. Usener, 243–44, fr. 365; Nat. D. 1.45, 85; DI 3.12.15. 59 ID 4.10 (SC 289, 102): non poterat consequentia resecare, quia uno adfectu amputato etiam ceteros adfectus adimere deo necessitas ipsa cogebat. 60 See Chapter 3, II. The Arguments for Divine Providence, B. Responding to Opponents. 61 ID 4.12 (SC 289, 102): Quod si nullus adfectus in deo est, quia quidquid adficitur inbecillum est, ergo nec cura ullius rei nec providentia est in eo. 62 ID 4.4 (SC 289, 100): Et quae maior, quae dignior administratio deo adsignari potest quam mundi gubernatio […]. (5) Quid tam dignum, tam proprium deo quam providentia? (6) Sed si nihil curat, nihil providet, amisit omnem divinitatem. Qui ergo totam vim, totam substantiam deo tollit, quid aliud dicit nisi deum omnino non esse? Cf. 17.4; Nat. D. 2.76. 58

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tantamount to no God at all. If “there is neither care nor providence in Him, nor some thought nor any sense in Him, it follows that He does not exist at all.” 63 In eliminating all of the affections in God, therefore, Epicurus has rendered God an impotent hypothesis. If God must possess affections in order to be God, then, what sort of affections does He possess? Lactantius believes that both wrath and kindness must be in God, the former flowing from the latter (ID 6.1), because of His providential care over creation and especially for human beings. “If He truly has care over the world, then God cares for the life of a person and takes notice of the deeds of individuals, and earnestly wishes that they be wise and good. This is the will of God, this is the divine law; which those who follow and observe are dear to God. It is therefore necessary that God be moved by wrath against one who violates and spurns this eternal and divine law.” 64 The divine wrath to which Lactantius refers, however, is not to be equated with the passionate and intemperate emotion human beings often experience. This is where the philosophers erred, many of whom could not distinguish between righteous indignation and the desire for vengeance. Seneca, for example, defined anger as “‘the desire to avenge injury,’” 65 and Posidonius, Aristotle and Cicero provide similar definitions (ID 17.13, 20; cf. Arist. De an. 403a; Cic. Tusc. 4.21). These accounts of anger cannot be applicable to God, however, since God cannot be injured in any way (ID 17.14). Righteous indignation, on the other hand, Lactantius ID 4.13 (SC 289, 102): quia nec cura sit in eo nec providentia, ergo nec cogitationem aliquam nec sensum in eo esse ullum; quo efficitur ut non sit omnino. 64 ID 17.4 (SC 289, 174): Si vero mundi curam gerit, curat igitur hominum vitam deus et singulorum actus animadverit eosque sapientes ac bonus esse desiderat. (5) Haec est voluntas dei, haec divina lex; quam qui sequitur, qui observat, deo carus est. Necesse est igitur ut ira moveatur deus adversus eum qui hanc aeternam divinamque legem aut violaverit aut spreverit. 65 ID 17.13 (SC 289, 178): cupiditas ulciscendae injuriae. Cf. Sen. Ira 1.2. 63

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defines as “a movement of the mind arising for the restraint of sins.” 66 This God possesses in order to chastise and purify those who transgress His divine law. Just as a father reproves the members of his household in order to instill discipline and foster virtue, so too does God correct and restrain the wicked in order to establish justice (ID 17.16–17). There are affections that God does not possess, such as ‘lust’ (libido), ‘fear’ (timor), ‘greed’ (avaritia), ‘grief’ (maeror), and ‘envy’ (invidia), because they are vicious. But those affections which we reckon virtues, such as ‘righteous indignation’ (ira in malos), ‘love of the good’ (caritas in bonos) and ‘mercy’ (miseratio), exist in God in way which is perfectly ‘just and appropriate’ (proprios et justos) (ID 16.7) to Himself. All of the affections, as human beings experience them, can be either good or bad. They exist as part of the gift of reason and can be used in a manner that is either congruent with or contrary to reason (ID 17.12). Lactantius analogically applies divine anger to God, therefore, in a way similar to all of the virtues. It is counted among the greatest of human qualities to be ‘wise’ (sapere), ‘intelligent’ (intellegere) and ‘foreseeing’ (providere), and these virtues are credited to the God who made humanity in His own image (ID 18.14; cf. Gn 1:26–27). Thus righteous indignation, a virtue that is part of the gift of reason, should also be attributed to God. Lactantius maintains divine impassibility, therefore, by analogically attributing divine anger to God as a virtue of the divine mens stemming from His providential love for humanity.

II. GOD THE CREATOR

A. Creatio ex nihilo When examining Lactantius’ doctrine of creation one must keep in mind the distinction between the apologist’s refutatio and expositio. Because his positive theology of creation is more easily treated in conjunction with his theodicy and anthropology, what will be addressed in this section is derived from Lactantius’ refutation of er66

gentis.

ID 17.20 (SC 289, 180): motus animi ad coercenda peccata insur-

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roneous theories of creation. What will emerge from these arguments is Lactantius’ doctrine of God as it relates to His activity ad extra. It should come as no surprise, then, that what is revealed about God in the act of creation resonates well with the analogy of God as aeterna mens which we have already encountered. Lactantius’ belief in God’s creation of the world from nothing is mentioned on several occasions throughout his works (DI 1.3.13; 2.5.5; 7.27.5; ID 10.16; Epi. 22.2). An extended treatment of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is given in Book 2 of the Institutiones as part of the apologist’s presentation of Judeo-Christian cosmology. In this portion of the text, Lactantius first acknowledges that the poets provide little support since their creation accounts begin with chaos (DI 2.8.8; cf. 1.5.8; Ov. Met. 1.7ff.). Surprisingly, many of the philosophers have fallen into the same error – including Cicero (DI 2.8.9)! In the now lost portion of De natura deorum, through the voice of the Skeptic Cotta, Cicero argues that a providential account of creation is in no way demonstrable from the effects of nature (DI 2.8.10–11; cf. Pease, 1229). For if God created the cosmos He most likely did so by ordering already existing material, like a craftsman or shaper of wax. 67 Lactantius first suggests that Cicero consult his own works for convincing material in support of the doctrine of providence. “For no one can refute Cicero as vehemently as Cicero.” 68 The apologist then turns his attention towards Cotta’s understanding of the divine nature. In Lactantius’ estimation, by asserting that it is more probable that God created the world from preexisting material, Cotta has failed to understand the definition of God. First, Cotta conceives of God as a being who is, essentially, superhuman rather than divine. If God created the universe in the same way that human beings create objects of art, then no qualitative difference exists between God and humanity (DI 2.8.17). Human beings would differ from God only in relation to their accidents rather than their substance, argues Lactantius, which cannot See Chapter 3, II. The Arguments for Divine Providence, B. Responding to Opponents. 68 DI 2.8.13 (BT 2005, 152): Nec enim poterit ab ullo Cicero quam a Cicerone vehementius refutari. 67

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be the case. Further, since God is He “who by necessity is perfect in virtue, power and reason,” 69 He not only transcends the capacities of human nature but also those of every existing being. But if God were in need of existing material in order to create then His ‘power’ (virtutis) would be imperfect and flawed (DI 2.8.17). If God exists and is perfect, then He must have created the universe from nothing lest His perfection be compromised. “For it is wrong for God to have created from something else because from Himself and in Himself are all things.” 70 Lactantius then responds to the claim that nature is selfgenerating and self-organizing. If this were the case, according to Lactantius, then Cotta is merely referring to God by another name. “For if it [nature] is capable of generation and creation, it therefore has reason and on that account must be God. Nor can there be any other name for His power, in which there exists both the providence for thinking and the skill and capacity for creating.” 71 If ‘nature’ possesses the capacities to create intrinsically, then it is merely a synonym for ‘God.’ If it does not possess the capacity to create, however, then the activity of God is necessary for the act of creation. In either case, God, who “is endowed with sense, reason, providence, power and virtue,” 72 is the Author of creation. The Stoics who identified God with nature, such a Seneca, were at least clear-sighted enough to realize that only a divine agent could create (DI 2.8.23). Having demonstrated the impossibility of matter being selfgenerating, the apologist then turns his attention to the idea of preexisting matter. Lactantius excludes the possibility of pre-existing DI 2.8.19 (BT 2005, 153): quem necesse est perfectae esse virtutis potestatis rationis. 70 DI 2.8.29 (BT 2005, 155): Quia nefas est deum aliunde aliquid mutari, cum ex ipso vel in ipso sint omnia. 71 DI 2.8.21 (BT 2005, 153–54): si autem generandi et faciendi potens est, habet ergo consilium et propterea deus sit necesse est, (22) nec alio nomine appellari potest ea vis, in qua inest et providentia excogitandi et sollertia potestasque faciendi. 72 DI 2.8.40 (BT 2005, 156): sensu ratione providentia potestate virtute praeditus est. 69

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matter on the grounds that, should matter have an existence independent of God, then both God and matter would be eternal beings (DI 2.8.31). Two diametrically opposed and contrary forces cannot exist eternally, however, because “unity is the nature of the eternal.” 73 Therefore, either God created matter or matter created God. Of these two possibilities, only God has the capacity to create, because He alone possesses ‘sense’ (sensu), ‘providence’ (ratione provisum) and ‘will’ (voluntatem) (DI 2.8.33–35). The ability to create necessarily implies the existence of a creative agent who possesses the cognitive capacity to create, the ability to provide for creation, and the will to act. God, not matter, possesses these characteristics and therefore, only God can be the Creator of the world. Further, we observe in all living creatures of the natural world an element of the gift of ‘reason’ (ratione) (DI 2.8.36; cf. ID 7.10). If matter does not possess reason, however, then it cannot be the source of reason either in the natural world or in God. “Therefore, God was not born from matter because what is endowed with sense cannot come from the insensible, nor the wise from the irrational, nor the impassible from the passible, nor can one lacking a body arise from the corporeal. Rather, matter is from God.” 74 Lactantius also makes further arguments against the eternity of matter based on the nature of material existence. Everything that is material is, by nature, corruptible; and everything that is corruptible was born at some time. Since, therefore, the material of creation was born at some time, it is necessary that its origin be found in that which is immaterial, eternal and transcendent. The source for matter must therefore be “some perceiving and foreseeing agent, an expert at creating. This can be no one other than God.” 75 In addition, that which is eternal is also unchangeable. If matter existed eternally then it could not have been altered in the DI 2.8.32 (BT 2005, 155): aeterni natura sit simplex. DI 2.8.38 (BT 2005, 156): Non ergo deus ex materia, quia sensu praeditum ex insensibilis, sapiens ex bruto, impatibile de patibili, expers corporis de corporali numquam potest oriri, sed material potius ex deo est. 75 DI 2.8.39 (BT 2005, 156): aliquem sentientem providum peritumque faciendi. Is est profecto nec ullus alius quam deus. 73 74

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act of creation. But since the world is comprised of material beings, matter was most certainly altered by the act of creation. Matter, therefore, cannot be eternal (DI 2.8.42). Rather, He who created matter is eternal, unchangeable and impassible (DI 2.844). “God alone, therefore, is He who is not made. For that reason He can destroy anything, but He Himself cannot be destroyed.” 76 In lieu of explicit philosophical support for the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (DI 2.8.9), the apologist next provides his audience with doxographical confirmation of the doctrine of providence. He does so because, having argued for the impossibility of the preexistence and self-generative capacities of matter, and given the existence of God (DI 2.8.11), Lactantius views the doctrine of providence as his final argument in favor of creatio ex nihilo. In other words, if God is responsible for the intelligible order in the created world, He must also be responsible for the material of creation. Thus, Lactantius mentions that not only is divina testimonia – i.e., Hermes, the Sibyls and the prophets – in support of divine providence, but also virtually all of the philosophers (philosophos paene universos), such as the Seven Sages, the Pythagoreans, Stoics, Peripatetics, Socrates and Plato (DI 2.8.48). Given the broad consensus among these respected authorities, and the arguments which Lactanius has provided, Cotta’s initial comment concerning the greater likelihood of God creating from pre-existing matter appears to have turned on its head (DI 2.8.50; cf. 2.8.10–11). “For it is more credible that matter was made by God, because God can do all things, rather than not, because nothing can be made without mind, reason and deliberation.” 77 B. Refutation of Atomism Given the near unanimity among philosophers as to the existence of providence (DI 2.8.48), those few dissenting voices become all the more apparent. Lactantius believes that the alternative to a

DI 2.8.44 (BT 2005, 157): Solus igitur deus est qui factus non est, et idcirco destruere alia potest, ipse destrui non potest. 77 DI 2.8.52 (BT 2005, 159): Credibilius est enim materiam potius a deo factum, quia deus potest omnia, quam mundum non esse a deo factum, quia sine mente ratione consilio nihil fieri potest. 76

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providential theory of creation lies in the atomist physics of Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus. 78 For Lactanitus the choice is clear: either the world was created by divine providence or is the result of a random coming together of atoms (ID 10.1); there is no tertium quid. Several parallels exist between Lactantius’ defense of creatio ex nihilo and his refutation of atomism. The principal difference between the two arguments is that, in the case of creatio ex nihilo, Lactantius is refuting a position in which the existence of God is presupposed (DI 2.8.11). In his attack on Atomism, however, no such presupposition is given. Lactantius’ most sustained critique of Atomism is located in chapter 10 of De ira Dei. The apologist first attributes the theory of atoms to Leucippus (cf. Diog. Laert. 9.90; Pease, 363). According to Lactantius, Leucippus was the first to believe that the world is composed of ‘minute seeds’ (minuta semina) which come in all forms of shape and cannot be divided – hence the word atomus (‘uncut’) (ID 10.5; cf. Nat. D. 1.66; Lucr. 1.528ff.). These particles haphazardly fly through the ‘void’ (inane), like dust in the sun (cf. Lucr. 2.114ff.), and the existence of material beings is attributed to their random unions and dissolutions (ID 10.9; cf. Lucr. 1.215ff.; 2.1048ff.). “From these things the world itself came together.” 79 Lactantius’ identification of the Atomists as a uniform group, rather than individual philosophers, is here manifest by his attribution of atomist theory to Leucippus. The apologist is, in fact, paraphrasing excerpts from Lucretius to explain the theory of atoms. The credit for these beliefs is given through the voice of their originator, however, in order to portray the Atomists as a collective and isolated group of “two or three vain calumniators.” 80 In response to the Atomist theory of creation, Lactantius first asks where these atoms came from. What is their ‘origin’ (origo) and who or what is responsible for their ‘plan’ (ratio) (ID 10.11; cf. DI 3.17.21)? The implication, which Lactantius leaves unsaid, is that Cf. DI 3.17.23. Lactantius’ antipathy towards atomism, especially as articulated by Lucretius, is manifest and ubiquitous. See Maslowski, “The Opponents of Lactantius,” 187–213. 79 ID 10.9 (SC 289, 126): Ex his etiam mundus ipse concretus est. 80 ID 10.47 (SC 289, 140): duobus tribusue calumniatoribus vanis. 78

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these material particles – if they exist – must be the product of a Creator. But the apologist does not dwell on the origin of these seeds; rather he challenges their capacity to form intelligible objects. If the fortuitous coming together of atoms created the world, he states, then we should find many creatures springing into existence spontaneously throughout the natural world. In the order of creation, however, parents produce similar offspring: birds come from eggs, corn from cornstalks, etc. (ID 10.13). “From whence it is apparent that nothing is made from atoms because each and every thing has a fixed and particular nature, its own seed, its own law given from the beginning.” 81 Even Lucretius, in the sole mention of him by name in this chapter, attests to the existence of the immutable parent-offspring cycle in nature (ID 10.16; quot. Lucr. 1.205–07). Lucretius, however, does not always remain so hidden in Lactantius’ refutations. Elsewhere in his corpus, Lactantius responds directly to the Roman poet. According to Lactantius, Lucretius states that living creatures emerged from the earth, or ‘nature,’ only once and with the ability to propagate. Since these creatures possessed the capacity to reproduce, therefore, nature simply stopped creating them (DI 2.11.3; cf. Lucr. 5.793–96, 826–36). Lactantius replies by stating that, if indeed living creatures were born in such a fashion, then the existence of providence is inevitable (DI 2.11.5). For, in Lucretius’ estimation, plants and animals emerged from the earth with no natural parents, but with their parts already arranged so as to conform, ready-made, to the conditions of their environment. This set of fortuitous circumstances, however, is so unlikely to occur by chance that it beckons the existence of a ‘rational’ (ratione) and ‘foreseeing’ (provisum) Agent (DI 2.11.6). We observe in living creatures an order, a beauty, and a utility that must be the product of a careful arrangement and plan (ID 10.22). If we observe these qualities existing in a work of art, we attribute them to the skill of a great artist. How much more, then, should we credit the Artifex who made living, breathing and thinking creatures (ID ID 10.15 (SC 289, 128): Unde apparet nihil ex atomis fieri, quandoquidem una quaeque res habet propriam certamque naturam, suum semen, suam legem ab exordio datam. 81

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10.26–27)? Therefore, “it is necessary that someone divine with a capacity for reason foresaw [the creation of living things]. But who can foresee if not God?” 82 For the sake of argument, however, Lactantius concedes that material existence is made up of atoms. If this is so, he asks, “by what plan, in what arrangement of the confused heap did the atoms assemble themselves?” 83 The intricate marvels of nature cannot be the product of chance, but must be the result of ‘planning’ (consilio), ‘providence’ (providentia), and ‘divine reason’ (ratione divina) (ID 10.32; cf. DI 2.11.6). The formation of material beings can only be due to an agent who possesses both the ‘will’ (voluntatem) and ‘knowledge’ (scientiam) to create (ID 10.34; cf. DI 2.8.33–35). “Who can that be if not God?” 84 Some would claim, however, that nature itself is the organizing principle behind the arrangement of atoms. On the one hand, replies Lactantius, if nature does not possess the faculties of intellect and will, then it simply does not meet the requirements of a creative agent (ID 10.37). If, on the other hand, nature is granted the capacities of ‘planning’ (consilio), ‘reason’ (ratione), ‘skill’ (virtute) and ‘power’ (potestate), then it ought rightly to be called God (ID 10.38; cf. DI 2.8.21). Lactantius’ final critique of atomism in this chapter, before enunciating the humana testimonia of the philosophers, is that it does little to explain the existence of the rational soul. For if the body of the human person is derived from the earth (ID 10.43; Gn 2:7), “where is the human mind, so clever and so intelligent, believed to have sprung from.” 85 Even Cicero acknowledges that no origin can be found in the material world for the existence of the ‘rational soul’ (animo) (ID 10.45–46; quot. Tusc. 1.66). But reason can only come from reason (ID 10.52; DI 2.36–38). Since reason exists both DI 2.11.8 (BT 2005, 175): necesse est ut aliquis divina nescio qua ratione providerit. Quis autem potest providere nisi deus? 83 ID 10.31 (SC 289, 134): Quo igitur consilio, qua pactione de confuse acervo se atomi congregaverunt […]? 84 ID 10.37 (SC 289, 136): Quis igitur potest esse nisi deus? Quot. Nat. D. 2.16. 85 ID 10.42 (SC 289, 138): unde igitur mens humana tam sollers, tam intellegens orta esse credetur? 82

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in the human soul and in the order and governance of the world, it therefore must be provided by a ‘foreseeing Creator’ (provido artifice) (ID 10.51). Lastly, Lactantius once again supplies a confirmatio to his belief in providence by mentioning the eminent philosophers who share it. The Seven Sages, Pythagorus, Zeno, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle affirm that “the world is governed by divine providence, just as it was made [by divine providence].” 86 To the modern reader, Lactantius’ criticisms of Atomism may appear wanting. What concerns the apologist most, however, is Atomism’s inability to explain the intelligibility of the created order. If creation occurred fortuito (OD 6.1) then the natural world ought to act in a correspondingly haphazard and irrational manner. The chance coming together of atoms should yield creatures with no discernable telos, which come into existence and go out of existence like gusts of wind. In other words, Lactantius’ criticism is that Atomism, while it may offer some explanation of the origin of the universe, provides no insight into the structure of the universe as it exists in human experience. It cannot account for the observable pattern of life by which creatures act according to their own good and, consequently, Lactantius believes that the intelligible structure of the natural order is the best rebuke to the claims of Atomism and chance-driven creation. Thus, we find many common arguments between his defense of creatio ex nihilo and his refutation of Atomism, including a final doxography (DI 2.8.48–49; ID 10.47– 49). The result of this argumentation is a portrait of God as, above all, “the divine and eternal mind, separated from a body and free.” 87 God, who is Reason itself (OD 2.1), “planned the wonderful works of providence, constituted them by His virtue, perfected them by His reason, and now sustains them by His spirit [and]

ID 10.47 (SC 289, 140): divina providentia mundum regi sicut et factus est. 87 DI 7.3.4 (BT 2011, 649): deus est divina et aeterna mens, a corpore soluta et libera. Cf. Tusc. 1.66. 86

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guides them by his power.” 88 Human beings have the capacity to discover this by virtue of the well-ordered pattern of creation. The intelligibility of this order, its internal coherence, demands that it be the product of a “skillful and perceiving Leader.” 89 In this way, Lactantius’ doctrine of God qua Creator mirrors his amplicatio to the thesis that God is one. In other words, he proceeds from effect to cause in order to demonstrate the existence of God as divine Reason. Once again the existence of providence functions as the apologist’s primary evidence for understanding creation as a reflection of the divine mens. Lactantius would no doubt have agreed with Hopkins that “the world is charged with the grandeur of God.” 90 C. Theodicy 1. In the Authoritative Texts The problem of evil is a topic not easily tred upon in the works of Lactantius. This is the case because, unlike St. Augustine (cf. conf. 7.18–19; civ. Dei 11.22; 12.7), Lactantius does not possess a privation theory of evil, a lack of which leads to an undeniable dualism. In addition, the presence of dualist interpolations to the authoritative texts of the Institutiones (DI 2.8.6 add.1–9; 7.5.27 add.1–17) and De opificio Dei (OD 19 bis) only contribute to Lactantius’ heterodoxy on this count. While most scholars now agree that these insertions came from Lactantius himself, an effort will nevertheless be made to distinguish between the interpolations and the authoritative texts so that a final analysis may be conducted between these two sources. 91 Lactantius’ cosmology is best described by a phrase that he attributes to the philosophers and poets: ‘the concord of discord’ DI 1.8.2 (BT 2005, 32): mirifica opera providentia excogitavit, virtute constituit, ratione perfecit, nunc autem spiritu sustentet, potestate moderetur. 89 ID 10.51 (SC 289, 142): perito ac sentiente rectore. 90 Gerard Manley Hopkins, “God’s Grandeur,” in Gerard Manley Hopkins: The Major Works, ed. C. Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 128. 91 See Chapter 1, n. 47. 88

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(discordi concordi) (DI 2.9.17; cf. Sen. Q Nat. 7.27.4). It is permeated with references to contrary and complementary powers existing in tension in order to form the universe: the heavens and the earth, the light and the darkness, the day and the night (DI 2.9.2–5). This is particularly true of fire and water. The passive counterparts, water and cold, temper fire and heat (DI 2.9.16). Mortal life emerges from and is dependent upon these elements (DI 2.9.21, 24); which is why they are included in the marriage rite. 92 “All living creatures are composed of body and soul; the material body is in wetness, the soul in heat.” 93 Fire, therefore, is the celestial element in which God’s power exists (DI 2.9.16). The capacity to make use of fire signifies that human beings are “a heavenly and immortal creature,” 94 capable of knowing and worshipping God (DI 2.9.26). And whereas fire is always reaching skyward, a symbol of its divinity, water is always in search of the lowest ground, a symbol of death and mortality (DI 2.9.26). From these elements “God marvelously planned to sustain and bring forth all things.” 95 Contradictory forces were already at work, however, even prior to the creation of the universe. Before God made the world He “produced a spirit like Himself, who was endowed with the virtues of God the Father” 96 and referred to as His Son (DI 4.6.1). All things were then created through this incorruptible spirit (DI 2.8.7), who is co-equal to the Father in ‘virtue’ (virtute) and ‘might’ (majestate) (DI 4.6.2) and “is perfect in providence, reason and power.” 97 DI 2.9.21. Although Lactantius is not explicit, he is certainly referring to a Roman (non-Christian) ceremony. Cf. Loi, Lattanzio, 146. 93 DI 2.9.22 (BT 2005, 167): Cum enim constet omne animal ex anima et corpore, materia corporis in umore est, animae in calore. For a Stoic accounting of these complimentary elements in creation see Nat. D. 2.25–32. 94 DI 2.9.25 (BT 2005, 167): caeleste atque immortale animal. 95 DI 2.9.15 (BT 2005, 166): mirabiliter deus ad sustentanda et gignenda omnia excogitavit. 96 DI 2.8.3 (BT 2005, 148): produxit similem sui spiritum, qui esset virtutibus patris dei praeditus. 97 DI 2.8.7 (BT 2005, 151): providentia et ratione et potestate perfectus est. 92

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God then ‘made’ (fecit) another being in whom divinity was not to abide (DI 2.8.4) – that He did so through the Son is explicitly stated in a textual addition (DI 2.8 add.4). This second spirit, out of jealousy for the relationship between the Father and the Son, turned from good to evil of its own freewill (DI 2.8.4–5). Again, it is only through a textual addition that Lactantius explicitly states that, unlike the first spirit, the second was created liable to corruption (DI 2.8 add.4). This second being, whom the Greeks call ‘slanderer’ (διάβολον), attempts to lure human beings away from their immortal destiny (DI 2.12.17; cf. 6.4.2). He is the ‘lord of this world’ (dominator ille terrae), the commander of demons (DI 2.14.2–3), whom God permits to exist so that we might learn virtue (DI 6.4.17). Lactantius’ solution to the problem of evil hinges on this last point, namely, that evil exists in order for human beings to acquire virtue. “Why does God allow these things and not bring aid against such evil errors? So that evil might fight against good, so that vices might vie against virtues, so that He might have some to punish and others to honor.” 98 According to Lactantius, good and evil exist in a symbiotic relationship; one can neither be known nor exist without the other. Therefore, since our eternal salvation rests upon our mastery of the virtues God wills this dichotomy to exist until His return at the eschaton (DI 2.17.1). Since Lactantius makes this argument repeatedly in the authentic works (DI 2.17.1; 3.29.16; 5.7.4; 6.4.17; 7.4.12), two examples ought to suffice in order to demonstrate the point. In De ira Dei, chapter 13, Lactantius makes this argument while addressing an Epicurean critique of God’s providence. Epicurus, he claims, states that if God permits evil to exist then He is either ‘weak’ (imbecillus) because He cannot remove evil, or ‘envious’ (invidus) because He can and chooses not to remove evil (ID 13.21; cf. Usener, 252–53, fr. 374; Pease, 127; Min. Fel. 12.2). Epicurus’ argument, notes Lactantius, has puzzled many philosophers who have defended the doctrine of providence (ID 13.22). The truth, however, is that God is neither feeble nor pusillanimous, but permits evil to exist for the preservation of wisdom DI 2.17.1 (BT 2005, 195): cur ergo deus haec fieri patitur nec tam malis succurrit erroribus? Ut mala cum bonis pugnent, ut vitia sint adversa virtutibus, ut habeat alios quos puniat, alios quos honoret. 98

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and virtue. Since wisdom consists in knowledge of good and evil, and virtue consists in perseverance against evil, to remove all evil would necessitate the elimination of wisdom and virtue. It is through these two gifts, however, that we gain the summum bonum of immortality (ID 13.23). To suffer through life’s hardships, therefore, is but a small price to pay in order to reach our eternal and everlasting home (ID 13.25). Similarly, this argument is contained in chapter 29 of the Epitome; which corresponds to chapter 17 in Book 2 of the Institutiones. In this passage the apologist affirms the necessity of the existence of evil for the preservation of virtue. “If vice is evil because it attacks virtue, and virtue is good because it punishes vice, it is therefore not possible for virtue to exist without vice. If one removes vice, the merits of virtue are also removed.” 99 In order to further support this thesis Lactantius gives an extended quotation from fellow Ciceronian Gellius’ Attic Nights (Epi. 24.5–10; cf. Gell. NA 7.1.1–6; LS, vol. 2, 330–31). The excerpt from Gellius, however, primarily consists of an additional quotation from the non-extant Περὶ Προνοίας (On Providence) of Chrysippus; thereby revealing the Stoic nature of this argument. 100 Confirming Lactantius’ reasoning, Chrysippus states that “‘nothing is more wholly absurd than this: those who might say that good could exist if evil did not exist as well […].’” 101 All of the virtues are defined in relation to their opposites: justice to injustice, temperance to intemperance, prudence to imprudence (Epi. 24.8). If one should remove the opposite, then one must remove them both entirely (Epi. 24.9). Hence it is the wisdom of God, states Lactantius, that placed these opposites in Epi. 24.3 (BT 1994, 30–31): Si vitium ex eo malum est, quia virtutem inpugnat, et virtus ex eo bonum est, quia vitium adfligit, ergo non potest virtus sine vitio consistere et, si vitium sustuleris, virtutis merita tollentur. Cf. DI 2.17.1. 100 It should be noted that Epitome 24.5–10 is not listed in Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta by von Arnim. A reference to this passage ought to accompany the entry from Gellius NA 7.1.1–6 in volume II, fr. 1169. 101 Epi. 24.6 (BT 1994, 31): ‘nihil prorsus’ […] ‘istis insulsius, qui opinantur bona esse potuisse, si non essent ibidem mala […]’. Cf. Gell. NA 7.1.2. 99

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tension with one another; so that human beings would strive and struggle to achieve immortality through virtue (Epi. 24.11). 2. In the Interpolations to the Main Text The dualist interpolations to the authoritative texts confirm Lactantius’ cosmology of opposition and, once again, point directly to the role of virtue as the impetus for this duality. 102 Since it is both germane to this topic and has yet to be translated into any English version, a quotation of the complete interpolation from De opificio, chapter 19, is worth reproducing at this point. [God] gave to [the human person] and established a most wicked Adversary and deceitful spirit, with whom one may fight in this earthly life without any security of rest. I shall explain briefly why God appointed this vexation of the human race. Before all things He willed there to be discord and for that reason the truth is not commonly apparent, but He revealed the smallest amount of it. This discord contains all the secrets of the world. It is that which makes virtue possible (virtue not only exists, but also shows forth, because it cannot exist unless it has something to compare), and in conquering it one might put into practice or display one’s strength.

Now victory without struggle is not possible, just as virtue itself is not possible without an enemy. That is why virtue was given to human beings, it established for one an opposite from the Enemy, lest one’s nature be destroyed by virtue being sluggish on account of idleness. The reason for all these things is in the Enemy, so that one might stand firm against strikes and blows. One may come to the highest summit only if a prudent hand, constantly agitated, is fighting the struggle to secure one’s salvation. For God does not want the journey to His immortal beatitude to be delightful. Therefore to those He would give virtue He first gave the Enemy, by whom the souls of human beings were sent cupidity and vice. He is the author

For a detailed study of the dualist interpolations in Lactantius consult Eberhard Heck, Die dualistischen. 102

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of errors and the engineer of all evil. Just as God calls human beings to life, so too does he that he might snatch and lead them to death. This is who either induces and deceives those who study truth or, if he cannot by fraud and diligence, wears on the strong soul and attempts to weaken it by powerful vigor. He vexes and murders with unspeakable words and detestable plots. And yet just as he overthrows many, many he leaves nourished and humble. 103

Much of the content of this passage is also contained in the dualist interpolations from the Institutiones (DI 2.8.6 add.1–9; 7.5.27 add.1– 17). In the interpolation from Book 7, rather than probing into the cosmological sources of good and evil, Lactantius again focuses on the necessity of both for the existence of virtue. “For virtue cannot exist without the opposite having been created, nor can the OD 19 bis 1 (SC 213, 210, 212): Dedit ei et constituit adversarium nequissimum et fallacissimum spiritum, cum quo in hac terrestri vita sine ulla securitatis requie dimicaret. Cur autem deus hunc vexatorem generi hominum constituerit breviter exponam. (2) Anteomnia diversitatem voluit esse ideoque vulgo non aperuit veritatem, sed eam paucissimus revelavit: quae diversitas omne arcanum mundi continent. Haec est enim quae facit esse virtutem, quae scilicet non modo esse, sed ne apparere quidem, quia virtus esse non poterit, nisi fuerit compar aliquis, in quo superando vim suam vel exerceat vel ostendat. (3) Nam ut victoria constare sine certamine non potest, sic nec virtus quidem ipsa sine hoste. Itaque quoniam virtutem dedit homini, statuit illi ex contrario inimicum, ne virtus otio torpens naturam suam perderet. Cujus omnis ratio in eo est, ut concussa et labefacta firmetur nec aliter ad summum fastigium possit venire nisi prudenti manu semper agitate se ad salutem suam dimicandi tenore fundaverit. Noluit anim deus hominem ad immortalem illam beatitudinem delicato itinere pervenire. (4) Daturus ergo virtutem dedit hostem prius qui animis hominum cupiditas et vitia inmitteret, qui esset auctor errorum malorumque omnium machinator, ut quoniam deus hominem ad vitam vocat, ille contra ut rapiat et traducat ad mortem. (5) Hic est qui aut inducit et decipit eos qui veritati student, aut si dolo et studiis non quiverit, virile gerit animam qua sublimium vigorem labfactare conetur, infanda dictum et execrabilia moliens: vexat, interficit, et tamen ut prosternit multos, sic a multis victus prostratusque discedit. 103

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strength of good appear at all except by comparison with evil.” 104 Thus God established the discord between good and evil so that one might achieve victory in the conflict between good and evil by means of virtue (DI 7.5.27 add.5; cf. OD 19 bis 3). The entire ‘system’ (ratio) of virtue, therefore, rests upon this coming together of opposites (DI 7.5.27 add.6). Lactantius then answers several questions related to the existence of good and evil in prelapsarian human existence. He states that, even prior to knowing the difference between good and evil, Adam and Eve lived in a reality made possible by the duality between good and evil. This is because, from the moment of their creation, the first human beings were a composite of soul and body, spirit and earth, eternity and temporality (DI 7.5.27 add.8). They therefore existed in a world composed of both positive and negative elements but, since they lived in ‘a place of bliss’ (in beatitudinis loco), they had knowledge of neither good nor evil (DI 7.5.27 add.10). What was altered after the Fall was their ability to recognize the duality present in the created order. Once Adam and Eve received this knowledge, and understood that they had previously existed ‘in the context of good alone’ (in solo bono), they were banished from Eden (DI 7.5.27 add.11). What was made possible by Adam and Eve’s first sin, however, was the gift of wisdom; “for wisdom cannot exist without evil.” 105 Thus, as long as Adam and Eve lived without sin, they also lived – like children – without wisdom (DI 7.5.27 add.11; cf. ID 13.16–17). We might say, therefore, that Lactantius considered Adam and Eve’s prelapsarian state as devoid of moral evil but, to the extent that they existed in a world made possible by the coming together of contrary elements, their existence was conditioned by natural evil. This interpolation closes with another exposition on the necessity of the existence of both good and evil. Since the existence of evil is tied to our corporeality, a complete divorce from this sysDI 7.5.27 add.2 (BT 2011, 665): Nulla enim virtus esse poterat, nisi diversa fecisset, nec omnino apparere vis boni potest nisi ex mali comparatione. 105 DI 7.5.27 add.11 (BT 2011, 666): Sapientia igitur constare sine malo non potest. 104

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tem of opposition is only possible after death. Only then will the human person be both wise and free from evil, just as God is (DI 7.5.27 add.12). But until that time, humanity occupies a divinely ordained middle ground between good and evil, virtue and vice (DI 7.5.27 add.14). Wisdom is therefore needed to navigate this tumultuous state because, often, those things that appear good to the senses are temptations towards evil. Conversely, many bodily evils can camouflage the real goods that lay hidden beneath them; such is the case, most poignantly, with martyrdom (DI 7.5.27 add.14– 16). But, again, this is all part of the design of God, “so that [one] might obtain virtue and virtue might grant one’s immortality.” 106 In Book 2, Lactantius is more detailed about the cosmic origins of the duality established by God. Prior to the formation of the world, God set into opposition two contradictory forces, i.e., “in the beginning He created good and evil.” 107 The first and second spirits, which emanated from God, are “the two sources for these things.” 108 They have respective control over good and evil, and the combination of and conflict between these two elements accounts for everything in the world (DI 2.8.6 add.2). God created the nefarious spirit so that evil might have an origin other than Himself; since evil cannot proceed from an ever-loving and benevolent God (DI 2.8.6 add.6). Again, the pattern of God’s purpose in creating this duality is for the sake of virtue. “One cannot understand and perceive the good without the avoidance and shunning of evil, nor can evil be avoided and conquered without the aid of having understood and perceived the good. It was necessary, therefore, for evil to be made so that good might be made.” 109 Thus, before the creation of the human person, God created good and DI 7.5.27 add.17 (BT 2011, 668): ut virtutem caperet et ei virtus sua immortalitatem daret. 107 DI 2.8 add.3 (BT 2005, 147): fecit in principio bonum et malum. 108 DI 2.8.6 add.2 (BT 2005, 149): duos fontes rerum. 109 DI 2.8.6 add.5 (BT 2005, 150): Nam neque bonum comprehendi ac percipi potest sine declinatione ac fuga mali nec malum caveri ac vinci sine auxilio comprehensi ac percepti boni, necesse igitur fuerat et malum fieri, ut bonum fieret. 106

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evil so that virtue might exist and be humanity’s path towards salvation. 3. Analysis After examining both the authoritative texts of Lactantius and their interpolations on the problem of evil it must first be said that the apologist’s dualistic world-view is consistent and ubiquitous throughout his works. In other words, the dualist additions to the Institutiones and De opificio do not constitute a radical departure from an otherwise orthodox Christian cosmology and theodicy. Lactantius’ argument that God permits the existence of good and evil for the sake of virtue, and ultimately our salvation, is to be found in nearly every book which he authored (DI 2.8.6 add.3, 17.1; 3.29.16; 5.7.4; 6.4.17; 7.4.12, 5.27 add.5; Epi. 24.3; ID 13.24; OD 19 bis 3). While this argument, in itself, may conform to Christian orthodoxy when answering the question of why God permits evil to exist, it becomes problematic when Lactantius considers the sources, the ontological natures, of both good and evil. Lacking a privation theory of evil, Lactantius must account for the existence of evil substantially. He therefore places the responsibility for the existence of evil largely at the feet of the Adversarius, the second spirit who emanated from God (DI 2.12.17, 14.2–3; 6.3.14, 4.2, 17, 6.5; 7.24.5). God, however, does not simply permit evil to exist but actively creates, sustains and is ultimately responsible for the mutual existence of both good and evil (ID 15.2; Epi. 63.4–5). Thus Lactantius writes: “God simultaneously determined good and evil.” 110 To the apologist, the alternative to this dualist perspective is a cosmology and ontology which must account for the existence of evil without God. In other words, if the origin of evil does not ultimately reside in God, then evil has an eternal existence all its own. This very point is addressed in an argument unique to the Epitome, which would correspond roughly to chapter 4 of Book 7 in the Institutiones. In nature, Lactantius observes, there exists a commingling of good and evil. If God created only that which is good, then lum.

110

ID 15.2 (SC 289, 164): Simul deum proposuisse bonum ac ma-

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evil must possess an existence independent of God. By having its own existence, therefore, evil must be more eternal than good and, hence, superior to good (Epi. 63.3). But if evil is not superior to good then either God created neither of them or “they flowed from a single source.” 111 Since, therefore, it is more rational that God should be the Creator of everything rather than nothing, He indeed “joined all things good and bad.” 112 For Lactantius, the allencompassing providence of God must account for the entire reality of the created order. The existence of evil, therefore, must in some way take its origin from within the divine mens and function so as to advance God’s providential design. Hence, “God preserved the Adversary for us so that we might receive virtue.” 113 Lactantius’ position on the existence of evil is not fundamentally rooted in his cosmology, however, but in his ethics. The dualism, which the apologist transplants into the realm of metaphysics, takes its origin from the concrete and experiential structure which he observes in the moral life: the battle between good and evil, virtue and vice, persecuted and persecutor. His dualist perspective may be characterized, therefore, as primarily an ethical dualism derived from the Stoic school. 114 When Lactantius attempts to construct a cosmology from within this hermeneutic, one which gives ontological priority to the oneness of God and His providence, the apologist is fundamentally inconsistent when it comes to addressing the issue of the ontological fons of evil. Though God hates evil, He nevertheless allows this dualist model of existence to endure so that good might come from it (ID 15.2). He also created a spatial and temporal existence in which a dualist structure is a constitutive element (DI 2.9). In this regard, the existence of evil can be seen as the natural consequence of being spatially and temporally condi111

mala.

112

Epi. 63.4 (BT 1994, 104): ex uno fonte fluxerunt. Epi. 63.5 (BT 1994, 104): omnia enim complexus est et bona et

DI 6.4.17 (BT 2009, 542): nobis adversarium deus reservavit […], ut possemus capere virtutem. 114 See Loi, Lattanzio, 145–52; Michel Perrin, L’homme antique et chrétien: L’anthropologie de Lactance, Théologie historique 59 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1981), 352–56. 113

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tioned creatures. Lactantius appears unable to reconcile the fact that in this cosmological model God can be seen as the Author of evil. Rather, what concerns the apologist most is his belief that God willed humanity to be composed of conflicting elements so as to battle virtue against vice for the gift of immortal beatitude (DI 7.5.18). Contrasting the authoritative texts with their interpolations does little to alleviate the tension that Lactantius has created in this regard. Though there are instances where omissions of an interpolated text contribute to a more orthodox reading of a particular passage, the dualist structure that pervades Lactantius’ work remains nonetheless intact. For example, Lactantius describes the origin of the human person in the following manner: “Humanity was created from these diverse and combating elements just as the world was created from [good and evil,] light and darkness, life and death.” 115 Omitting the phrase ‘from good and evil’ (ex bono et malo) may preserve the orthodoxy of this particular passage, but it does so by the margin of a razor’s edge. The cosmological dualism by which the universe was created still remains, even if the identification of evil with the dark/corporeal/mortal element is merely implied rather than explicit. There also remain other authentic passages where either direct correlation is made between these elements or God is stated to be the source of evil (ID 15.3; Epi. 63.4–5). These excerpts need to be tempered, however, with Lactantius’ repeated claims that the Adversarius is the “‘head and cause of these evils.’” 116 The greatest obstacle to a precise understanding of Lactantius’ theodicy, therefore, is the apologist’s own deficiencies in the field of metaphysics. Further, not only are the interpolations not solely responsible for Lactantius’ heterodoxy in the field of cosmology, but on at least two occasions they interject a note of orthodox thought that would DI 2.12.7 (BT 2005, 178–79): Ex rebus ergo diversis ac repugnantibus homo factus est sicut ipse mundus [ex bono et malo,] ex luce ac tenebris, ex vita et morte. The bracketed portion of this quotation is an interpolation to the main text. Cf. ID 15.3. 116 DI 2.8.2 (BT 2005, 147): ‘caput horum et causa malorum.’ Quot. Verg. Aen 11.361; cf. DI 2.12.17, 14.2–3; 6.3.14, 4.2, 17, 6.5; 7.24.5 115

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have otherwise been absent. The first of these instances has already been mentioned, that is, Lactantius’ distinction between the incorruptible nature of the Son and the corruptible nature of the Diabolus (DI 2.8 add.4). While the difference between the Son and angelic creatures will be addressed more fully elsewhere in the Institutiones (e.g., DI 4.8–10), the interpolation serves to abate a juxtaposition of equality between the first and second spirits which could otherwise be read very easily into the cosmological account in Book 2, chapter 8. Similarly, Lactantius also makes a statement concerning the mutual co-existence of good and evil which contains the echoes of an anti-Gnostic invective. “[The person], therefore, who wishes us to exist in the context of good alone, desires especially that we live without the bodies in which evil resides.” 117 Since living amid the contrary elements of good and evil is constitutive of the entire created order, and is not the product of two mutually eternal and absolute forces, it is apparent to the apologist that simply eschewing the bodily cannot be the solution to the problem of evil. The desire to do so, in fact, is a rejection of the divinely created and providential order which God deliberately constructed for the benefit of humanity (DI 7.4.19). The flesh needs to overcome temptation by acquiring virtue, not by being eradicated (DI 6.15.2, 7). In the final analysis, while the ethical dualism present in the interpolations resonates with the rhetoric of Lactantius’ moral and anthropological thought as a whole, the subordinated metaphysical dualism of these passages succeeds only in contributing to the ambiguity that surrounds his cosmology. For example, in the interpolation to Book 2 of the Institutiones, Lactantius mentions “in the beginning [God] created good and evil,” 118 and that “it was necessary, therefore, for evil to be made so that good might be made.” 119 DI 7.5.27 add.13 (BT 2011, 667): Qui ergo vult nos in bono esse tantum, id potissimum desiderat, ut sine corpore vivamus, in quo est malum. Among the heterodox Christian sects of his day, Lactantius mentions by name the Phrygians, Novatians, Valentinians, Marcionites and Anthropians (DI 4.30.10). 118 DI 2.8 add.3 (BT 2005, 147): fecit in principio bonum et malum. 119 DI 2.8.6 add.5 (BT 2005, 150): necesse igitur fuerat et malum fieri, ut bonum fieret. 117

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In the same passage, however, the apologist states that “since it was not right that evil might proceed from God, for He cannot make what is contrary to Himself, He made one who is the inventor of lies […]. [God] willed there to appear one contrary to His virtues.” 120 The one in question is, of course, the Adversarius; who with the Son are “the two sources for these things which oppose and combat each other.” 121 Thus, on the one hand, Lactantius wishes to attribute the duality present in nature to God’s eternal plan. But, on the other hand, he also wants the Adversarius to bear the responsibility for being the fons of evil. The dualist interpolations therefore reflect Lactantius’ ubiquitous ambivalence on the topic of theodicy that exists as the result of a subordinate dualism and cannot be resolved on the metaphysical level. Lactantius cannot account for the existence of evil in an intellectually satisfying or consistent way because he cannot reconcile the ultimate reality of God and His providence with the substance of evil. In short, Lactantius’ lack of a privation theory of evil is the determining factor in his inconsistent and conflicting metaphysical drama.

III. CONCLUSION

It is difficult to overestimate the degree to which Lactantius’ theology of providence impacts his doctrine of God and vice versa. When treating the topic of God’s oneness, Lactantius always surrounds his arguments with evidence of the existence of providence. In two prominent places (DI 1.2.1–6; Epi. 2.1–8), Lactantius first argues for the existence of providence and then proceeds to build upon this foundation to argue for the existence of a singleprovident Creator; thus arguing from effect to cause. In another portion of his corpus (ID 13.1–14.6), his arguments for the existence of providence and a single foreseeing Deity are so intertwined as to be nearly indistinguishable. In all of these passages, Lactantius DI 2.8.6 add.6 (BT 2005, 150): Et quoniam fas non erat, ut a deo proficisceretur malum – neque enim contra se ipse faciet –, illum constituit malorum inventorem […]. Ab eo contraria virtutibus suis voluit oriri. 121 DI 2.8.6 add.2 (BT 2005, 149): duos fontes rerum sibi adversarum inter seque pugnantium. 120

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argues that a multitude of deities could not be responsible for the well-ordered pattern of creation. Rather, since the cosmos can be observed as conforming to the design of an organic whole, it must be the product of a single mind and will. This leads Lactantius directly to a concept of God as ‘divine reason’ (divina ratione) (DI 1.5.20). By operating from within the boundaries of the doctrine of providence in order to articulate his theology of God as aeterna mens, Lactantius is committing to his apologetic goal of arguing so as to attract the widest possible audience. The apologist does not articulate his theology of God, therefore, beginning with the attributes of God contained in Scripture, but beginning with the evidence contained in nature that can be discerned by human reason. According to this method, God can be understood, not as the ‘Lord of History,’ but as Governor of the universe. This same method of argumentation is present in Lactantius’ treatment of the passions in God. Without recourse to sacred Scripture, which would provide the author with ample evidence of God’s righteous indignation, Lactantius begins by affirming the existence of divine providence. The apologist then argues that if God is the providential Ruler of creation then He must care especially for the apex His creation, the human person (ID 17.4). Further, if God cares for the human person then He must be moved by righteous indignation at humankind’s vices and by love at humankind’s virtues (ID 16.7). Arguing from the existence of providence to divine attributes, in addition to being apologetically sound and logically coherent, also possesses an anthropological value for Lactantius. It supports his belief that human beings have the natural capacity to know that God exists and is the one Ruler of the cosmos. The humana testimonia, which Lactantius provides, demonstrates that “men of the highest genius attained, and nearly grasped, the truth.” 122 Unfortunately, since they did not possess the whole truth, i.e., revelation, they were led astray in thinking that other gods existed, and that human beings ought to worship what is beneath them (DI 1.5.28). Had these authors been attentive to the conclusions to which they were led by reason and nature, however, DI 1.5.28 (BT 2005, 21): summo ingenio viros attigisse veritatem ac paene tenuisse. 122

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they would have understood clearly that God is the one Creator and Governor of the universe (DI 1.5.14). Though, in His essence, God “is incomprehensible both to the eyes and to the mind,” 123 human beings were created to know Him through His effects (DI 7.5.4). Lastly, in relation to Lactantius’ theology of God, one ought also to note the different theological methods represented in Lactantius’ source material. The Greek divina testimonia, for example, Lactantius accepts and treats as oracular evidence on the inner life of God. The Sibyls and Hermes, according to Lactantius, can speak of God’s transcendence, in a way that unaided human reason cannot, due to their direct connection with the supernatural. It is no coincidence, therefore, that their findings attest more categorically to God’s oneness than Lactantius’ humana testimonia, and are much more in keeping theologically with the via negativa. The evidence of the poets and philosophers, on the other hand, Lactantius employs so as to argue for an analogical understanding of God as divine and eternal Reason. Though lacking God’s revelation, the human mind is capable of pursuing the via positiva, of reasoning from effect to cause, and coming to an understanding of God as the Author of creation and providence. In short, Lactantius makes use of both the way of negation and the way of analogy in order to demonstrate God’s attributes, and does so based on the type of sources he employs. The doctrine of providence also plays a pivotal role in Lactantius’ defense of God as the Creator of the universe. While much of Lactantius’ defense of the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is spent refuting alternative views, the apologist bases his positive argument for this doctrine on the consensus among philosophers as to the existence of divine providence (DI 2.8.48). That is to say, since Lactantius has already demonstrated God’s existence and oneness, it is this one omnipotent and provident Deity who must be responsible for the creation of the world, just as He is responsible for its governance. The most significant opposition to this view of creation is the Atomist account of the world’s coming to be. Lactantius refutes this position, again, by citing the orderly pattern 123

Epi. 53.2 (BT 1994, 80): est et oculis et mente incomprehensibilis.

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of the universe as evidence that the world could not have originated in a fortuitous and haphazard manner. Should the Atomist account of creation be correct, then the world ought not to conform to the intelligible and well-structured pattern to which, in fact, it does correspond. Just as with his arguments for God’s oneness, therefore, Lactantius demonstrates that the one God is responsible, not just for the order of the universe, but also its creation by proceeding from effect to cause beginning with the providential structure of the universe. Lastly, the doctrine of providence is operative, yet in a more latent manner, in Lactantius’ account of the problem of evil. The reason for Lactantius’ dualist cosmology can be traced directly back to his lack of a privation theory of evil. Given the absence of this theory to his thought, the apologist must account for the existence of evil in way that gives priority to God’s providence. In other words, evil must, in some way, find its origin in God and conform to His providential plan for humankind. The answer, which Lactantius iterates repeatedly throughout his works, is that God permits evil to exist in order for virtue to exist. Without both good and evil, it is impossible for virtue to exist. Since it is through the practice of virtue that the human person merits salvation, God permits the existence of evil for the ultimate good of the human person (cf. DI 2.8.6 add.3, 17.1; 3.29.16; 5.7.4; 6.4.17; 7.4.12, 5.27 add.5; Epi. 24.3; ID 13.24; OD 19 bis 3). Thus, even the existence of evil serves God’s plan for the redemption of humankind. The only alternative to this view, according to Lactantius, would be an account of the world in which evil possesses an existence of its own apart from God. Because of the apologist’s insistence that God is the sole Author and Governor of all of creation, this alternative view of evil’s origin is unacceptable (cf. Epi. 63). But despite the limitations this cosmology presents when examined in relation to Christian orthodoxy, it resonates well with the teachings of the Stoa (cf. Epi. 24). In this way, Lactantius constructs his theodicy according to the same apologetic method as he demonstrated God’s oneness and other attributes, i.e., by making use of sources mutually agreeable to both Christians and educated Roman docti. Lactantius’ method of accounting for the existence of evil also builds upon the foundation he has already laid in previous arguments. That is to say, Lactantius begins with the providential order of creation, then proceeds to articulate the characteristics of the

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divine being based on the evidence contained in nature. Further, having demonstrated God’s oneness and providential care for the world, Lactantius must now account for the existence of evil in a manner that is consistent with what he has already established. In Lactantius’ doctrine of God, therefore, the doctrine of providence is not only the point from which the apologist begins, but it is a determining factor in that which proceeds from it.

CHAPTER 5. LACTANTIUS’ ANTHROPOLOGY The topic of anthropology looms large in the corpus of Lactantius. 1 It seems appropriate, therefore, to treat this subject in two forms. First, this chapter will address the topics of anthropology and providence as they appear in De opificio Dei, a work which Lactantius devoted to those subjects. In De opificio, Lactantius authored an entire treatise in order to demonstrate that the human person was created “by the supreme God, Creator and Maker of all things, whose divine providence and most perfect virtue cannot be comprehended by the senses nor expressed in words.” 2 As proof of this thesis, the apologist examines the beauty and utility of the human person and argues that a creation of such planning and ‘order’ (ratio) must be the product of divine providence (OD 1.16). Since De opificio is dedicated to the twin themes of providence and anthropology, it is appropriate that we treat the material in the body of the work as a whole, i.e., chapter 8 and following, to demonstrate Lactantius’ use of anthropology to defend the doctrine of providence. Second, a more systematic, synthetic and integrated view of Lactantius’ anthropology will be treated in the section that follows.

For an entire monograph on the subject see Perrin, L’homme antique. Perrin argues that anthropology is the center of Lactantius’ thought, at least based on the works which have survived (L’homme antique, 533). 2 OD 1.11 (SC 213, 110): a summo illo rerum conditore atque artifice deo, cujus divinam providentiam perfectissimamque virtutem nec sensu comprendere nec verbo enarrare possible est. 1

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I. ANTHROPOLOGY AND PROVIDENCE IN DE OPIFICIO

DEI

Lactantius’ primary targets in De opificio are the Epicureans who deny the existence of divine providence. As we have seen, the standard Epicurean explanation of the origin of the universe is in “the chance combination of atoms.” 3 The cosmos was formed by the random coming together of particles, which eventually lead to the spontaneous generation of organic life. What this theory lacks, according to Lactantius, is an adequate accounting of the intelligible order (ratio) of creation. If the formation of the world occurred in a haphazard and fortuitous manner, states the apologist, then the structure of the universe ought to reflect this by existing in a similarly random and unintelligible way at the present moment (OD 6.12–14). The best evidence against the atomistic theories of the Epicureans, therefore, is the intelligible and patterned structure of creation. In De opificio, Lactantius pursues this line of argumentation by examining the human person in particular. Inspired by a similar technique employed by his mentor, Cicero (OD 1. 12–13; cf. Nat. D. 2.134–53), the apologist reviews the constitutive elements of the human person in order to demonstrate that they fulfill functions that serve the good of the whole. 4 These teleological observations support Lactantius’ belief in divine providence by exemplifying the intelligibility of the entire created order. In other words, human beings can apprehend that things act for an end. By illustrating the uses and designs of the various parts of the human person, Lactantius is demonstrating their conformity with the patterned order of creation and, in doing so, citing them as evidence in support of a providentially governed universe.

OD 6.12 (SC 213, 142): fortuitis atomorum concursionibus. Peter Roots convincingly argues that “the taking on of the mantle of Cicero determines the whole character of the opif. and, indeed, that the treatise is very closely modeled on the ND, being intended to supplement and improve on it” (“De Opificio,” 472). 3 4

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A. Chapters 8–13 After responding to Epicurean arguments against the existence of divine providence in chapters 2 through 7 of De opificio, Lactantius begins his examination of the human person in chapter 8. 5 The apologist starts his exposition by indicating that the status rectus of the human form distinguishes humankind from the rest of creation, and points us towards the heavens in contemplation of our divine Creator (OD 8.2–3; cf. Nat. D. 2.140). The more formal similitude which the human person bears to its Creator resides in the ‘mind’ (mens); which is placed on top of the head so as to signify its dominance both over the body and other earthly creatures (OD 8.3). Perception occurs by the mind’s apprehension of objects through the senses. For this purpose, God fashioned the sense organs, such as the ears and eyes, on the face. The eyes especially have been paired by their Creator so as to form a beautiful symmetry (OD 8.6–7). Their function is to be a visual conduit to the mind; for through the eyes the mind perceives exterior objects (OD 8.10–11). There are those, however, who remain skeptical as to the reliability of the senses in general and the eyes in particular (OD 9.1; cf. Lucr. 4.379–470). Lactantius affirms, however, that examples of the eyes being deceived – a favorite rhetorical tool of those who wish to question the reliability of the senses – do not prove that the senses are unreliable (OD 9.5). When the sense organs seem to fail, it is either a defect of the organ (e.g., in the case of blindness), a misuse Peter Roots has pointed out that OD, chapters 2–7, correspond to Nat. D., book 1, in that they both provide the Epicurean view of providence with refutations. Similarly, OD, chapters 8–13, correspond to Nat. D., book 2, in that they both provide a teleological account of the parts of the human body. While the entirety of Nat. D., book 2, is devoted to the Stoic arguments for the existence and providence of the gods, Cicero’s teleological account is located in 2.133–50. The final correspondence is between OD, chapters 14–19, and Nat. D., book 3, based on the skeptical critique of providence. In OD, chapters 14–19, this skeptical critique occurs in relation to the more speculative and contestable qualities of the soul. Lactantius’ exposition proceeds along skeptical lines in that he lists the opinions of others on obscure matters, then concludes with what can be known for certain. See Roots, “De Opificio,” 480. 5

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of the organ (e.g., in the case of looking at things too closely), or an impairment of the mind (e.g., in the case of insanity) (OD 9.5). Not being mindful of the objects of vision, i.e., not judging the information which is being given through the eyes correctly, does not prevent those objects from being seen and, consequently, does not cast doubt upon the reliability of the senses. Perception occurs because the eyes act as a window for the mind and, in this way, the mind and will are to be distinguished from the eyes. 6 The ability of the eyes to accurately transmit exterior objects is so great, in fact, that they must be the product of “the ineffable power of divine providence.” 7 Lactantius’ exposition then addresses the other parts of the head, the ‘summit of entire divine work’ (totius divini operis quasi culmen) (OD 10.10), which are the mediums for the five senses. The nose is most useful for breathing, sensing odor and secreting mucus (OD 10.7). God constructed the nose, however, in such a way so as not to detract from the beauty of the face. “How wonderfully and how great the divine plan by which God built these things.” 8 Just as the nose contains two nostrils, God constructed the entire human person in a bifurcated manner, with two eyes, ears, hands, feet, and two chambers in the heart (OD 10.10–11). This symmetry not only aids one’s capacity for motion and sensory perception, but also contributes to the ‘marvelous beauty’ (decoremque admirabilem) (OD 10.10) of the body. Unlike the aforementioned body parts, however, there exists one mouth on the face located below the nose in a transverse manner. The utility of the mouth is to be found, with the tongue, teeth, and lips, in its capacity to take in food and utter speech. On account of the latter ability, the tongue is referred to as the “interpreter of the mind.” 9 It also aids in eating and drinking, and is where the sense of taste is located (OD 10.20). The teeth contribute to the utterance of speech as well, and are most useful in the mastication of food. Lest all of these parts be OD 8.11–12. For the contrary view see Lucr. 3.359–69. OD 8.16 (SC 213, 154): ineffabilis divinae providentiae virtus. 8 OD 10.7 (SC 213, 160): Quas ipsas deus quam mirabili, quam divina ratione molitus est. 9 OD 10.13 (SC 213, 162): interpres animi. Quot. Lucr. 6.1149. 6 7

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exposed, and to aid in the act speaking, God fashioned the lips to cover the mouth and “how handsomely He separated [them].” 10 Lactantius concludes his treatment of the head by again extolling the beauty of the parts of the body (OD 10. 21). At this point it ought to be mentioned that Lactantius’ extended exegesis on the organs which relate to the senses in chapters 8 through 10 is due to the apologist’s belief that the ‘mind’ (mens) is the ruler of the body, and is to be distinguished from the sense organs which serve it. 11 Lactantius borrowed this view from Cicero’s Tusculanae disputationes: “For there is no sense in the body, but […] there are certain avenues which pierce from the seat of the soul to the eyes, ears, and nose.” 12 The distinction between the mind and the senses is important for Lactantius in view of the case that the apologist will make for the immortality of the soul (OD 19). If perception is located strictly in the bodily senses, and not in the soul or mind, then it would necessarily cease when the body dies. But the sense organs are the ‘servants’ (ministeriis) of the mind (OD 8.5); which is the true seat of government of the entire human person (OD 5.6). Thus, since perception is not co-terminus with the senses, but resides in the soul, it does not end with the cessation of bodily life. “When, however, there will be nothing besides the soul, no physical thing will prevent perceiving whatever there is.” 13 The final section of chapter 10 of De opificio examines, in brief, the remaining parts of the exterior of the human body. The hands are worthy of much praise as they are the “ministers of reason and wisdom.” 14 The hand is completed by the fingers in such a way that it is difficult to determine whether beauty or utility should be acOD 10.19 (SC 213, 164): quam decenter interscidit! See Roots, “De Opificio,” 476–78. 12 Tusc. 1.46 (LCL 18, 54, 56): neque est enim ullus sensus in corpore, sed […] viae quasi quaedem sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares a sede animi perforatae. 13 Tusc. 1.47 (LCL 18, 56): cum autem nihil erit praeter animum, nulla res objecta impediet quo minus percipiat quale quidque est. 14 OD 10.22 (SC 213, 166): rationis ac saptientiae ministris. Cf. Nat. D. 2.150; Pease, 939. 10 11

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corded to them first (OD 10.22). The joints of the fingers make them most suitable for grasping objects, with the thumb acting as the “leader and moderator of them all.” 15 The majesty of the chest also reflects the dignity of the human person. God created it to be broad and upright “because being full of reason given from heaven it ought not to be lowly or unbecoming.” 16 The breasts and nipples, too, hold a quality of beauty and utility; especially in women who nurse their offspring by use of them (OD 10.27). Lastly, below the chest lays the stomach, which in women is the location of the fetus. It is also here that the navel is not unbecomingly placed; which, through the umbilical cord, the fetus is nourished by its mother (OD 10.27). In chapter 11 Lactantius begins his examination of the interior parts of the human person. These organs, since they are concealed, do not exhibit the same beauty as do their exterior counterparts. They are, however, exceedingly wondrous in their functionality. In the center of the body the ‘most provident Creator’ (providentissimus artifex) (OD 11.2) designed a receptacle to digest food and liquids, and from which to disseminate their nutrients to the rest of the body. Just as the body is sustained by the consumption of food and liquids, the ‘soul’ (anima) is sustained by the act of breathing which takes place, above the stomach, in the lungs. 17 In order to facilitate OD 10.24 (SC 213, 166): rector omnium atque moderator. OD 10.26 (SC 213, 168): quia plenum rationis a caelo datae humile aut indecens esse non debuit. 17 OD 11.3. Across his works, Lactantius does not establish a clear distinction between the soul as ‘life-principle’ (anima) and the soul as ‘mind’ (animus), i.e., he often uses the words interchangably. In fact, the issue of whether the anima is the same as the animus will be addressed in chapter 18 of De opificio. In this portion of the text, however, Lactantius is clearly speaking of the ‘soul’ (anima) as a life-principle. This life-principle is incorporeal (OD 11.6), yet resides in the lungs (11.3), and is nourished by air (11.5). While Lactantius prefers the dualistic language of corpore atque anima (11.3) to describe the composition of the human person, therefore, it is probably more accurate to refer to his anthropology as tripartite; with the human person being composed of ‘body’ (corpore), ‘soul’ (anima or animus) and spirit (spiritus or anima). On this point see Perrin, SC 214, 342–43; 15 16

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eating and drinking, there exists a pipe that travels from the stomach to the mouth (OD 11.6). Likewise, and so that human beings would have the capacity for speech, ‘divine skill’ (divina sollertia) (OD 11.11) fashioned a separate pipe for breathing which extends from the lungs both to the nostrils and to the mouth (cf. Nat. D. 2.136). Once ingested, food travels from the stomach through the intestines; which digests food and carries their nutrients throughout the body (OD 11.16). Rather than proceed through the same intestinal tract as food, however, excess liquid gathers in the bladder from the stomach (OD 11.18). Taken as a whole, the entire digestive system is a ‘marvelous work of God’ (mirificum dei opus) (OD 11.16) displaying a ‘most fine construction-plan’ (ratio subtilissima) (OD 11.18). Lactantius next examines the human reproductive system beginning with the male. Here we find the apologist victim of the prevailing physiology of late-antiquity, as he affirms that the right and left testes produce male and female semines respectively (OD 12.3; cf. Arist. Gen. an. 763b28–764a2). Similarly, in females, the right ovary is masculine and the left feminine (OD 12.5). This natural complementarity appears throughout the entire human body: “in all things the right part of the body is masculine, the left is feminine.” 18 The remaining account of the act of conception, and the causes of a child’s gender and characteristics related to gender, Lactantius clearly attributes to Aristotle via Varro (OD 12.6); perhaps in recognition of the speculative nature of such matters. But despite the lack of certainty regarding human knowledge of the process of conception, the natural complementarity of male and female in the act of procreation is a wondrous ‘institution of God’ (institutum dei) (OD 12.15). The etymology of the words ‘man’ (vir) and ‘woman’ (mulier) reflect this complementarity in that they are derived from the words ‘strength’ (virtus) and ‘softness’ (mollitia; comp. mollier) (OD 12.16–17; cf. Varro Ling. 5.73; Cic. Tusc. 2.43). Loi, Lattanzio, 187. To avoid ambiguity, I have attempted to include the original Latin words for ‘soul’ (anima/animus) or ‘mind’ (animus/mens) while addressing these matters. 18 OD 12.3 (SC 213, 178): omnino in toto corpore pars dextera masculina est, sinistra vero feminina. Cf. Hippoc. Aph. 5.48.

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And God’s ‘most skillful arrangement’ (sollertissime comparatum) (OD 12.18) can be found also in a child’s nursing from the milkproducing breasts of its mother. “Nothing else would have been suitable for the wise creature than to draw nourishment from the heart.” 19 Lactantius omits further discussion of the sexual organs out of a sense of modesty (OD 13.1), but not without issuing a denunciation of those who would abuse their proper use. Lactantius warns those individuals who might profane and debase “the divine and admirable work of God, created and provided for the propagation of succession […]; so that they seek nothing from the most holy institution other than vain and sterile pleasure.” 20 To conclude his exposition of the body parts which ‘reason can understand’ (ratio intellegi potest) (OD 13.9), Lactantius then adumbrates the lower extremities. The buttocks provide a wellneeded cushion for sitting. The thighs are strong and thick to support the weight of the upper-body. The knees provide a joint for self-ambulation. The calf muscle both strengthens and adorns the lower leg. The feet, the ‘foundations of the entire work’ (totius operis quasi fundamenta), were made extended by the ‘marvelous Creator’ (mirificus artifex) (OD 13.6) so as to bear much weight. Lastly, the toes are separated from each other for the sake of beauty only, rather than utility (OD 13.7). Taken together, what person could claim that the human body lacks either ‘design or beauty’ (ratione aut pulchritudine) (OD 13.2)? B. Chapters 14–19 The third section of De opificio is dedicated to those parts of the human body with an uncertain nature and/or function. What, Lactantius cites as an example, can be understood of the spleen or the liver (OD 14.4)? These organs are internal and cannot be observed OD 12.17 (SC 213, 182): Nec enim decebat aliud quam ut sapiens animal a corde alimoniam duceret. The appropriateness lay in the belief that the ‘soul’ (animus/mens) resides in the heart (cf. Tusc. 1.18; Tert. De anim. 15.3–6); though Lactantius questions this wisdom (cf. OD 16.3). 20 OD 13.2 (SC 213, 184): divinum et admirabile dei opus ad propagandum successionem inexcogitabili ratione provisum […], ut iam nihil aliud ex re sanctissima petant quam inanem et sterilem voluptatem. 19

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performing their functions while the subject is still alive. Their purpose, therefore, remains hidden (OD 14.6). The voice is another example Lactantius cites to demonstrate the limits of human understanding. Though some believe that the voice is located in the mouth, it more likely originates in the chest (OD 15.1–2; cf. Nat. D. 2.149). The truth of the matter, however, resides with God (OD 15.3, 5). So that the reader may not be induced into thinking that the author possesses answers to questions beyond his capacity, the apologist avers that he will henceforth only provide the opinions of others concerning such matters (OD 16.2). The one truth Lactantius can avow with certainty concerning all of the parts of the body is that, since they are all a part of the living human organism, they all ‘contain’ (habere) the ‘soul’ (anima). 21 In relation to the ‘mind’ (animus) and ‘soul’ (anima), Lactantius believes that their activity is beyond the grasp of human reason and “is known only to the Creator who alone knows His work.” 22 Certain philosophers have suggested that the seat of the ‘mind’ (mentis) is in the chest (OD 16.3; cf. Tusc. 1.18ff.; Tert. De anim. 15.3–6). Others have suggested, and with good reason, that it resides in the brain (OD 16.4; cf. Tusc. 1.19ff.); for nothing could be more appropriate “than that which moderates the whole by reason to be highest, just as the Lord and Ruler of the world Himself is.” 23 While Lactantius appreciates the soundness of the latter argument (OD 16.6), he ultimately refrains from making a definitive judgment on the matter in this portion of the text (OD 16.11; cf. 8.3). The one position regarding the mind that can be effectively eliminated, however, is the belief that the mind does not exist at all (OD 16.13; OD 14.9. Here, again, we see Lactantius using the word anima as a synonym for the ‘life-principle.’ His belief that the anima resides in the lungs (OD 11.3), but is spread throughout the body, accords with the Stoic view. Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.156–57. 22 OD 14.9 (SC 213, 190): scire nisi artifex cui soli opus suum notum est. 23 OD 16.4 (SC 213, 194): esse sublimius quam id quod universum ratione moderetur, sicut ipse mundi dominus et rector in summon est. In OD 8.3 Lactantius seems rather definitive that the ‘mind’ (mens) is located in the head. 21

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cf. Tusc. 1.20, 51). Aristoxenus taught that what we call the mind is merely the harmonious working of the body; like the strings of an instrument which, when plucked, play music. Lactantius uses this analogy against the philosopher by stating that the mind is not like music but, rather, like the player of the instrument (OD 16.17). Without a mind to guide it, the human body would be but an unused instrument. The most finely tuned strings do not produce music of their own accord, but need something they do not contain – i.e., a rational subject – in order to move them. Aside from excluding the possibility of the ‘mind’ (mentis) not existing, Lactantius again remains ambivalent as to where it might reside. It may even be diffused throughout the entire body as Xenocrates supposed (OD 16.12; cf. Tusc. 1.20). The existence of the mind in the human person does, however, lead one to marvel at the ‘divine plan’ (divina ratione) (OD 16.8) that enabled human beings to possess a rational soul. Further, it also leads one to ponder the magnitude of God’s divine reason; for if the human mind possesses such a great power of sense and apprehension, how much greater is the “divine mind of God which guides every part of the world, rules all things and moderates all things, is everywhere present and everywhere diffused.” 24 As to the nature of the ‘soul’ (anima), Lactantius claims that the only certainty is that it is immortal; “since whatever lives and is always moved by itself, and can neither be seen nor touched, must be eternal.” 25 Many philosophers have speculated as to the nature of the ‘soul’ (anima) – whether it is blood, or fire, or wind – but there is no consensus. 26 It seems that it is nourished by blood, for OD 16.10 (SC 213, 196): divina mens dei per universas mundi partes intent discurrit et omnia regit, omnia moderator, ubique praesens, ubique diffusa. 25 OD 17.1 (SC 213, 198, 200): quoniam quidquid viget moveturque per se semper nec videri aut tangi potest, aeternum sit necesse est. Cf. Cic. Rep. 6.27; Tusc. 1.53–55. In this portion of the text it is again clear that Lactantius is referring to the ‘soul’ (anima) as a principle of life. 26 OD 17.2; cf. Tusc. 1.18–19. Lactantius also states that the Latin words for ‘soul’ (anima/animus) are derived from the Greek word for ‘wind’ (ἄνεμος) (OD 17.2). 24

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when the body is emptied of blood then life is extinguished, but is not itself blood (OD 17.3). Likewise, though the absence of body heat marks the end of life, the ‘soul’ (anima) cannot itself be fire; for it is endowed with “sense perception, cannot be seen, and does not burn. Whence it is apparent that the soul is that which is like unto God.” 27 And again, though the ‘soul’ (anima) seems to be nourished by the air, it cannot itself be ‘breath’ (spiritum); for the ‘soul’ (anima) is present in the human person at the moment of conception prior to the drawing of any breath (OD 17.7; cf. Tert. De anim. 27.1ff.). Thus, Lactantius concludes, though we cannot know the precise nature of the soul, human reason can discover what it is not (OD 17.6, 9). The next topic the apologist addresses is whether or not the ‘soul’ (anima) is to be considered the same as the ‘mind’ (animus) (OD 18.1). On this topic there is no consensus among philosophers. Some claim that the two are the same “because neither can one live without sensing nor sense without life.” 28 Others, however, believe that the two are not identical. This point is illustrated by the fact that it is possible for a person to possess a ‘soul’ (anima) without a ‘mind’ (mentem); for example, in the case of insanity (OD 18.3). Further, it is argued, death puts the ‘soul’ (anima) to rest just as sleep puts the ‘mind’ (animus) to rest. Hence the two are not identical (cf. Tert. De anim. 12.1–6). Though he would seem to favor the latter arguments, Lactantius is not explicit about which opinion he prefers. The apologist merely passes on to the last issue to be addressed; namely, from whence the ‘soul’ (anima) arises (OD 19.1). Despite acknowledging that the question of the origin of the ‘soul’ (anima) is an uncertain one, Lactantius quite definitively excludes the possibility that it should arise from a person’s parent or parents. He does so based on the principle that matter cannot, of its own nature, generate spirit (cf. Tusc. 1.65–67). “It is possible for a body to be born from bodies, because something is conferred OD 17.4 (SC 213, 200): sensu acta est et videri non potest et non adurit. Unde apparet animam nescio quid esse deo simile. 28 OD 18.2 (SC 213, 204): quod neque vivi sine sensu possit nec sentiri sine vita. Cf. Lucr. 3.421ff. 27

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from both, but a soul cannot be born from souls, because no thing can result from a thing that cannot be grasped.” 29 The essence of the human person lays in his/her incorporeal and immortal soul (OD 19.9). That which is incorporeal and immortal cannot reproduce because reproduction is the generation of that which is bodily and mortal. It is the ‘result’ (decedere) of ‘physical stuff’ (re). Since the ‘soul’ (anima) is not of a corporeal and mortal nature, however, there is no ‘stuff’ (re) to impart or transmit. That which is incorporeal and immortal can only come from the source of incorporeity and immortality, i.e., God. The soul of a human person, therefore, can only come directly from God. 30 “It is [God’s] gift that we breathe, that we live, that we flourish.” 31 Lactantius concludes his examination of the human person by marveling at the creation God has made. “Great indeed is the strength, great the reason, great the mystery of the human person.” 32 The sublimity of God’s work should encourage, therefore, all people to seek virtue. By endowing human beings with wisdom, God wished that they might use this ‘heavenly and remarkable gift’ (munere caelesti atque praeclaro) (OD 19.8) to enter into communion with Himself, to become ‘like unto God’ (similis deo) (OD 19.9; cf. 17.4). This is accomplished by fulfilling of the natural end of the highest capacity of the human person. It is through the exercise of virtue, by eschewing earthly pleasures for the sake heavenly wisOD 19.2 (SC 213, 208): Corpus enim ex corporibus nasci potest, quoniam confertur aliquid ex utroque, de animis anima non potest, quia ex re tenui et incomprehensibili nihil potest decedere. Cf. Cic. Luc. 1.39. 30 OD 19.4. Lactantius is quite ahead of the curve in condemning Traducianism from the Christian persepective (cf. August. an. et or. 1.25; Jer. Ep. 126.1; 144.7). Tertullian, for example, does not refute it as a possible theory for the origin and transmission of souls (cf. De anim. 19.6; 26.4; 27.1–5; 40.1). 31 OD 19.5 (SC 213, 208, 210): illius munus est quod spiramus, quod vivimus, quod vigemus. It is as true for every human being as it was for the first human being, according to Lactantius, that God ‘inbreathes the soul’ (inspiratio animae) (OD 19.5; cf. Gn 2:7; DI 1.11.42; 2.11.19, 12.3). 32 OD 19.9 (SC 213, 212): Magna est enim vis hominis, magna ratio, magna sacramentum. 29

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dom, that the human person fulfills its natural end and ‘merits eternal life’ (merebitur sempiternam) (OD 19.10; cf. 19.8). C. Conclusion In chapters 1 through 7 of De opificio, Lactantius responds directly to individual arguments against the existence of divine providence made by the Epicureans. 33 In order to bolster his claim that the world could not have been created without divine providence, in chapters 8 through 13, Lactantius examines the parts of the human body which, by their beauty and utility, suggest that they were made by a ‘most provident Creator’ (providentissimus artifex) (OD 11.2). Playing the part of Balbus in Cicero’s De natura deorum (cf. Nat. D. 2.133–50), Lactantius surveys the human body, indicates the functions for which certain parts were designed, and marvels at the beauty they display in fulfilling their natural ends. The repetition of these qualities, i.e., beauty and utility, is consistent throughout these chapters (OD 8.1, 5–8, 13; 10.4, 7, 10, 12, 18–27; 11.1; 13.3, 5, 7), and are seen as a direct rebuttal against those who would affirm that the creation of the human person occurred in a random and haphazard manner (cf. OD 6.1, 12). In this regard, Lactantius has taken up the Stoic mantle of defending the existence of providence against Epicurean claims to the contrary. 34 Indeed, Stoic anthropology as transmitted through the works of Cicero provides Lactantius with a basic outline of the composition of the human perFor a detailed analysis see Chapter 3, II. The Arguments for Divine Providence, C. The Argument from Design (Ex operibus Dei), 2. De Opificio Dei. 34 Although Brandt argues that this is due to the influence of the Corpus Hermeticum rather than the Stoics (cf. Corp. Herm. 5.1–11; DI 2.10.14), Roots has rightly and ably returned the focus of the question of Lactantius’ sources in OD back to Cicero’s work – in particular Nat. D. See Roots, “De Opificio,” 466–86. In Roots’ estimation, the primary sources for OD are “Varro, Lucretius and Cicero plus, probably, a grammatical reference work” (“De Opificio,” 486). On the Hermetic scholarship see S. Brandt, “Über die Quellen von Laktanz’ Schrift ‘De opificio dei,’” Wiener Studien 13 (1891): 270ff.; L. Rosetti, “‘De Opificio Dei’ di Lattanzio e le sue fonti,” Didaskaleion 6 (1928): 195–200; cf. Perrin, SC 213, 48ff. 33

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son. This is especially true of Lactantius’ belief that the ‘mind’ (mens) is not co-terminus with the sense organs, but uses the senses in order to perceive the external world (OD 5.6; 7.10; 8.5; 16.6); the senses themselves being credible transmitters of external experiences (OD 8.10; LS, vol. 1, 315, fr. G; 316, fr. M). That the mind is the seat of government of the entire body corresponds to the Stoic notion that the highest part of the soul is the ‘commanding faculty’ (ἡγεμονικόν) of the body (LS, vol. 1, 315, frs. E-H). Further, the Stoics believed that this ‘part of the soul’ (μέρη δὲ ψυχῆς) continues to exist after the death of the body (OD 17.1; Tusc. 1.46–47; Diog. Laert. 7.157; LS, vol. 1, 318, fr. W), and that the ‘soul’ (anima) resides in the lungs

(OD 11.3; LS, vol. 1, 315, fr. G), but its activity and influence is spread throughout the body (OD 14.9; Diog. Laert. 7.156–57; LS vol. 1, 314, fr. B; 316, fr. K; Tert. De anim. 14.5). Stoic anthropology and psychology, however, are not beyond dispute when it comes to those parts of the human person that are not easily discovered by human reason. In chapters 14 through 19 of De opificio, Lactantius feels free to correct a number of Stoic positions regarding the nature of the soul. For example, Lactantius affirms that the ‘soul’ (animus) has an incorporeal nature (OD 16.11; 17.1; cf. Diog. Laert. 7.156; LS, vol. 1, 272, frs. C-D), and therefore cannot be the parent of another soul. 35 The apologist questions the standard Stoic belief that the ‘mind’ (mens) resides in the chest or heart (OD 16.3; cf. Tusc. 1.18ff.; Tert. De anim. 15.3–6; LS, vol. 1, 314, fr. D) and, in fact, finds the head or brain a more likely place for the sedem mentis (OD 8.3). Lactantius eschews the Stoic identification of the ‘soul’ (anima) with fire or breath (OD 17.3–6; cf. Diog. Laert. 7.156; LS, vol. 1, 282, fr. H; 315, frs. E, G), and refuses to confirm the Stoic distinction between the ‘soul’ (anima/ψυχὴν) and the ‘mind’ (animus/ἡγεμονικόν) (OD 18.1; Diog. Laert. 7.138–39; LS, vol. 1, 315, fr. F; 316, fr. K). Thus, while the Stoics certainly provide Lactantius with a conceptual framework for demonstrating the existence of providence via an examination of the human perOD 19.2. Although Lactantius finds support for this position in Cicero. Cf. Tusc. 1.65–67; Luc. 1.39. For an excellent treatment of the Stoic doctrine of the soul consult A. A. Long, “Soul and Body in Stoicism,” Phronesis 27 (1982): 34–57. 35

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son, they are by no means beyond reproach and cannot be said to possess a knowledge of things that belongs to God alone (OD 15.5). As in his other works, Lactantius’ method in De opificio is to make use of extra-revelatory sources in order to defend Christian belief – in this case, the doctrine of providence. In this regard, the Stoics have provided Lactantius with a wealth of material at the ready to employ against the detractors of providence. But also consonant with Lactantius’ method is the belief that the philosophers are ultimately unsuitable guides in the quest for true wisdom. No sect possesses the fullness of truth and, because of this, they undo themselves with their bickering and erroneous positions (OD 20.2– 3). The ‘philosophers of our sect’ (philosophi sectae nostrae) (OD 1.2), as Lactantius calls them, therefore need to be trained and prepared to answer those philosophers whose instruction can be detrimental to the truth of faith (OD 1.2–3). Further, in order to be effective at answering the critiques of opponents, this training needs to be philosophical in nature so as to refute erroneous beliefs based on mutually acceptable sources (OD 20.1–2). Apropos of this method, De opificio defends the doctrine of providence by skillfully, yet critically, making use of the philosophical sources at Lactantius’ disposal. Lactantius’ primary goal in De opificio is not to author a treatise on ‘Lactantian psychology,’ but to defend the doctrine of providence by examining the intelligible – i.e., the useful and beautiful – parts of the human person. If these parts work for ends that can be known by human reason, and if they display an aesthetic quality, then they must, according to Lactantius, be the product of an intelligent Creator. But, as chapters 14 through 19 illustrate, there are some parts of the human person which reason cannot understand. Though the modern Christian reader may wish that Lactantius possessed a clearer grasp of some matters in relation the soul, the apologist repeatedly acknowledges the limits of the human mind in expounding on matters only God can rightfully know. “The human person itself cannot be touched, nor seen, nor comprehended, be-

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cause it is concealed beneath that which is seen.” 36 De opificio, therefore, both defends the doctrine of providence by examining the intelligible structure of the human person and, in doing so, demonstrates that the human person is not reducible to its constituent parts. 37 Those parts of the human person that cannot be understood by reason do not offer proof that the human person is confined and limited by the bodily senses. Rather they support the view that the essence of the human person transcends the mortal and corporeal realm (OD 19.9), and inspire one to marvel at the designs of divine providence by which they were created (OD 16.9– 10). By writing a treatise in defense of providence, and by citing the human person as the primary evidence in support of this belief, Lactantius has provided his audience with the sources, method, and introductory content necessary to understand what he will later write in the Institutiones (OD 20.4–9; DI 1.2.6). In short, De opificio serves as prolegomena to the Institutiones by addressing the topic Lactantius acknowledges must come first in any grand apology. 38

II. A SYSTEMATIC TREATMENT OF LACTANTIUS’ ANTHROPOLOGY A. The Creation and Composition of the Human Person Lactantius begins his formal examination of the human body by first stating that God is the Creator of the human person (OD 8.2). In the Institutiones we find that this point is not beyond dispute, as some of the poets claimed that human beings were fashioned out of clay by Prometheus (DI 2.10.5; cf. Hor. Carm. 1.16.13–16; Hyg. OD 19.9 (SC 213, 214): Nam ipse homo neque tangi neque aspici neque comprehendi potest, quia latet intra hoc quod videtur. Cf. OD 14.1; 15.3; 16.11. 37 Cf. Roots, “De Opificio,” 481. 38 DI 1.2.1. It must be noted that one of Lactantius’ reasons for not addressing the doctrine of providence in any extended manner at the start of the Institutiones is that it had already been tackled by ‘people of clarity and eloquence’ (hominibus argutis et eloquentibus) (DI 1.2.6). While he most certainly has Cicero in mind for this compliment, could Lactantius not also be alluding to his own treatment of the subject in OD? 36

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Fab. 142; Stat. Theb. 8.305, 11.468). The poets were correct concerning the terrestrial origin of the human body, but erred nevertheless in relation to the agent of creation. This admixture of truth with fancy is typical of the license which poets take. “The poets are not wont to speak lies entirely, but wrap and obscure what they say in figures of speech.” 39 Since they did not have recourse to sacred Scripture, the poets transmitted the tale of humanity’s creation according to a diluted version of the truth originating with the ‘prophets’ (prophetarum). 40 The genesis of the myth ascribing the formation of the human person to Prometheus, argues Lactantius, stems from his occupation as a sculptor. “Prometheus was the first to have formed the likeness of the human person from the soft and moldable mud; from him first came the art of making statues and images […]. The truth has thus been disguised by falsehood. That which was created by God began to be attributed to a person who imitated the divine work.” 41 The ancient sculptor was the son of Japetus (DI 2.10.8) and a contemporary of Jupiter (DI 2.10.12), and therefore, since he was himself a man, could not have created the first human beings. 42 Further, Prometheus was also the father – according to one version of the Greek myth – of Deucalion; the only man to be saved from the great flood. 43 Yet how could the earth have been filled with people destroyed by the deluge if the DI 2.10.12 (BT 2005, 170): poetas […] non omnino mentiri solere, sed figuris involvere et obscurare quae dicant. Cf. DI 1.11.23, 30. 40 DI 2.10.6. Here Lactantius may be alluding to Hermes (DI 2.10.14; cf. Corp. Herm. vol. I, 1.12ff.; vol. IV, fr. 8a) and/or the Sibylline Oracles (cf. Orac. Sib. 8.445). 41 DI 2.10.12 (BT 2005, 170, 171): primum omnium Promethea simulacrum hominis formasse de molli ac pingui luto ab eoque primo natam esse artem statuas et simulacra fingendi […]. (13) Sic veritas fucata mendacio est et illud quod a deo factum ferebatur, homini, qui opus divinum imitates est, coepit adscribi. 42 On Lactantius’ Euhemerist account of the gods see Chapter 6, I. Theology of History. 43 DI 2.10.10; cf. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1.17.3. Lactantius admits that the poets, again, have mixed the truth with poetic fiction in their version of the flood narrative (DI 2.10.11). 39

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father of the only male survivor was humanity’s creator (DI 2.10.10)? It was most assuredly God, therefore, who created human beings from the mud of the earth (DI 2.10.13; cf. Gn 2:7). In confirmation of this thesis, Lactantius cites various sources that have affirmed God’s creation of the human person. Hermes, the Sibyl and sacred Scripture all attest to this truth (DI 2.10.14, 11.18; cf. Corp. Herm. vol. I, 1.12ff.; vol. IV, fr. 8a; Orac. Sib. fr. 5; Gn 1:26–27; 2:7). The Stoics also supported this view “when they discussed providence,” 44 and Cicero in particular deserves special praise for his apprehension of humanity’s divine Creator (DI 2.11.17). “‘This foreseeing, sagacious, manifold, sharp-witted, mindful creature, laden with reason and counsel which we call the human being, was made by the supreme god in outstanding fashion.’” 45 In contrast to the evidence of the Stoics on this topic, however, Aristotle believed that the world had always existed and that human beings always have and always will exist (DI 2.10.17; cf. Cic. Luc. 2.119; Tusc. 1.70; Arist. Cael. 268a1–b10). But, responds Lactantius, all things in nature are born, live and die. This universal pattern demonstrates that there must have been an instant when the human person first came into being; for that which is mortal cannot exist apart from this cycle. “Because [the human person] exists it is apparent that he began at some time; for nothing can exist without a beginning. And because he begins it is apparent that he will cease to be at some time; for that which is made mortal cannot be immortal.” 46 Despite Aristotle’s belief to the contrary, therefore, the overwhelming majority of divine and human testi-

DI 2.10.15 (BT 2005, 171): cum de providentia disserunt. DI 2.11.16 (BT 2005, 176): ‘Animal hoc providum sagax multiplex acutum memor plenum rationis et consilii, quem vocamus hominem, praeclara quadam condicione generatum esse a supremo deo.’ Quot. Cic. Leg. 1.22. Cf. 1.27; Nat. D. 2.133; Rep. 4.1. 46 DI 2.10.22 (BT 2005, 172–72): Nam quoniam est, apparet aliquando coepisse – esse enim nulla res sine exordio potest –, et quia coepit, apparet quandoque desiturum; nec enim potest id totum esse immortale quod ex mortalibus constat. 44 45

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mony agree, and the voice of reason declares “the God who made all things created the human person.” 47 In creating the human person God fashioned a composite reality. The duality present in all of creation is no less present in the human person, who consists of ‘body’ (corpore) and ‘soul’ (anima) (DI 2.9.22), ‘spirit’ (spiritum) and ‘earth’ (terreno) (DI 7.5.13). “When the body was made, [God] breathed into the creature from the living source of His own spirit – which is eternal – so that it could bear a likeness to the world itself, which is constructed from contrary elements. For it is composed of soul and body, i.e., like heaven and earth, since the soul by which we live comes from God it is from heaven, and the body from the earth, having been formed, as we said, from the mud.” 48 In being a composite reality, the human person is at once a microcosm and a ‘bridge’ (pontem) (DI 3.6.4). It embodies the diverse elements of the universe – spirit and earth, good and evil, wisdom and ignorance – in itself (DI 7.5.13), while at the same time mediating between these modes of existence. “Whence we have something in common with God and creatures.” 49 By incarnating both the celestial and the earthly, the human person also manifests within its ontological nature the existential choice between good and evil (DI 7.4.12). Humankind’s physical nature consists of earthly material drawn towards what is base and lowly, while its spiritual nature consists of heavenly material attracted to the transcendent and eternal. “We are made from two equally opposing parts, soul and body, one which is ascribed to heaven because it is light and intractable, the other to earth because DI 2.11.14 (BT 2005, 171): Deus igitur rerum omnium machinator fecit hominem. 48 DI 2.12.3 (BT 2005, 177–78): Ficto enim corpore inspiravit ei animam de vitali fonte spiritus sui qui est perennis, ut ipsius mundi ex contrariis constantis elementis similtudinem gereret. Constat enim ex anima et corpore, id est quasi ex caelo et terra, quandoquidem anima qua vivimus velut e caelo oritur a deo, corpus e terra, cujus e limo diximus esse formatum. Cf. DI 2.11.19; Gn 2:7. 49 DI 3.6.3 (BT 2007, 213): unde nobis et cum deo et cum animalibus est aliqua communitas. 47

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it is comprehensible, one is constant and eternal, the other weak and mortal. Good adheres to one, therefore, and evil the other.” 50 This division is necessarily so. God deliberately willed that the human person be a composite being and be naturally drawn by these elements in opposite directions for the purpose of meriting salvation (DI 7.4.12). “Because the human person is made from two elements, body and soul, one of which is earthly and the other heavenly, human beings have been assigned two lives. One life is temporal, which pertains to the body, and the other is eternal, which belongs to the soul. […] The former is earthly, like the body, and thus finite. The latter is truly of heaven, like the soul, and thus has no end. We receive the former first by being born, the latter we receive by knowledge. For the virtues are not given by nature, but because God wanted us to vie for our lives in life.” 51 The divine element of the human person, that which separates it from the remainder of creation, is the product of God’s desire to create a being in His own ‘image’ (imaginis) (DI 2.10.3; cf. Epi. 22.2; Gn 1:27) and after His own ‘likeness’ (simulacrum) (Epi. 36.3; cf. DI 6.10.1; 7.4.3; ID 13.13). God created the human person, on the one hand, from the mud of the earth; from which Lactantius reckons the word ‘human’ was derived. 52 On the other hand, God created human beings with a capacity for reason and intelligence: an ‘icon’ ID 15.3 (SC 289, 164): nos ex duobus aeque repugnantibus compacti sumus, anima et corpore, quorum alterum caelo ascribitur quia tenue est et intractabile, alterum terrae quia comprehensibile est; alterum solidum et aeternum est, alteri fragile atque mortale. Ergo alteri bonum adhaeret, alteri malum. Cf. DI 3.12.1. 51 DI 7.5.16 (BT 2011, 662): Nam quia homo ex duabus rebus constat, corpore atque anima, quorum alterum terrenum est, alterum caeleste, duae vitae homini attributae sunt, una temporalis, quae corpori adsignatur, altera sempiterna, quae animae subjacent. […] (17) illa terrena est sicut corpus et ideo finitur, haec vero caelistis sicut anima et ideo terminum no habet; illam primam nescientes accipimus, hanc secundum scientes: virtuti enim, non naturae datur, quia volvit nos deus vitam nobis in vita comparare. For more on this motif see above under “Theodicy.” 52 The apologist considers the word homo, ‘human being,’ to come from the word humus, ‘mud’ (DI 2.10.3; cf. Gn 2:7). 50

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(εἰκών) of Himself (DI 2.10.4; quot. Orac. Sib. 8.402), and ‘most holy living creature’ (sacrosanctum animal) (DI 6.20.17). “Then [God] made for Himself a sensible and intelligent likeness that is in the form of His image; which nothing can surpass in perfection.” 53 The content of the imago Dei, i.e., the quality in humanity that contains the divine likeness, is the gift of reason or wisdom (ID 10.41). “If it belongs to God to think, to understand, to foresee, to excel, and these things the human person alone possesses from all living creatures, he was made therefore in the likeness of God.” 54 B. The Human Person in the Created Order Being made in the imago Dei, humanity occupies an exalted place in the order of creation. “[God] breathed wisdom into [the human person] alone, so that he might subjugate all things to his dominion and authority, and make use of all of the world’s blessings.” 55 Because human beings possess wisdom they are endowed with authority over the created world (DI 7.4.16). In this way the human person participates in the providence of God by ruling over creation just as God governs and sustains the cosmos. “Great, right and wonderful, therefore, is the strength and reason and power of the human person. God made the world itself and all things for him to have so great an honor; so that he might command all things.” 56 So as to signify this noble vocation, and to confirm humanity’s position as the apex of His creation, humankind was the DI 2.10.3 (BT 2005, 168–69): Tum fecit sibi ipse simulacrum sensibile atque intellegens, id est ad imaginis suae formam, qua nihil potest esse perfectius. 54 ID 18.14 (SC 289, 186): Si deo subjacet cogitare sapere intellegere providere praestare, ex omnibus autem animalibus homo solus haec habet, ergo ad dei similitudinem factus est. 55 ID 13.13 (SC 289, 156): inspiravit ei sapientiam soli, ut omnia imperio ac dicioni suae subjugaret omnibusque mundi commodis uteretur. Cf. 14.2; OD 8.3; Gn 1:26–28. 56 DI 7.4.16 (BT 2011, 657): Magna igitur et recta et admirabilis est vis et ratio et potestas hominis, propter quem mundum ipsum et universa quaecumque sunt deus fecit tantumque illi honoris habuit, ut eum praeficeret universis. 53

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last of all creatures to be made by God (DI 2.8.63; cf. Gn 1:26–31). “‘A creature holier than these, more capable of lofty thoughts, and which had dominion over the rest was yet missing. The human person was born.’” 57 God deliberately established this hierarchy of creation for the benefit of humankind; so that human beings might recognize their status in the order of the natural world. “All things are subject to [the human person] so that he himself might be subject to God, his Maker and Creator.” 58 Supporting Lactantius’ belief in humanity’s preeminent role in the cosmos is the Stoic idea that the world was created for the benefit of humankind. 59 “If someone were to consider the administration of all the things of the world, he would know for sure how true are the words of the Stoics who say that the world was constructed for our benefit.” 60 In observing the order of the universe one can see that all things providentially work to support and promote human flourishing. Therefore, reckons the apologist, God created the world for the sake of humankind. “God made the world for human beings. He who does not see this is not much different from a beast. Who contemplates the heavens except the human person? Who marvels at the sun, the stars, and all of God’s works except the human person? Who cultivates the earth? Who harvests its fruit? Who navigates the sea? Who has dominion over the fish, the birds, and the quadrupeds except the human person? God, therefore, made all things for the human person because all DI 2.8.64 (BT 2005, 161): ‘sanctius his animal mentisque capacius altae deerat adhuc et quod dominari in cetera posset, natus homo est.’ Quot. Ov. Met. 1.76–78. 58 ID 14.2 (SC 289, 162): idcirco ei cuncta subjecta sunt ut fictori atque artifici deo esset ipse subjectus. 59 On this point see Cic. Nat. D. 1.23; 2.37, 133, 154–62; Fin. 3.67; Off. 1.22; Luc. 2.120. Cicero mentions this idea in relation to Chrysippus, with whom it probably originated. Cf. Gell. NA 7.1; LS, vol. 2, 330, fr. Q; Pease, 949; Clarke, 344 n. 536. 60 ID 13.1 (SC 289, 150, 152): Si consideret aliquis universam mundi administrationem, intelleget profecto quam vera sit sententia Stoicorum, qui aiunt nostra causa mundum esse constructum. Cf. DI 2.8.63; 7.3.4; Epi. 63.7. 57

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things yield to the needs of the human person.” 61 God could not have made the world for Himself, states the apologist, because He is in no way dependent upon the world for His existence. “[God] can exist without the world, just as He did before it, and God uses none of the things in it or generated by it.” 62 The world must have been created, therefore, for those living creatures that benefit from its existence. Further, it is clear that other living things exist for the sake of humankind because human beings care for and are served by the rest of creation. Since, therefore, the human person has dominion over all other creatures, and since “[other creatures] do not perceive the plan of the world as the human person does,” 63 the world and all it contains must have been created for the benefit of humankind. “The most high God established [these things] not for His own sake, because He needs nothing, but for the human person who might use them fittingly.” 64 There can be little doubt that Lactantius is once again relying on the philosophical material provided by his mentor Cicero for this argument. The natural wonders of the world, according to Cicero, serve those beings with an intellectual nature – “for it is reason which exceeds all things” 65 – and thus the world was created for gods and human beings (Nat. D. 2.133, 154). Upon closer examination of the ways in which the natural world is suited to meet human Epi. 64.3 (BT 1994, 106): Fecit deus mundum propter hominem. Hoc qui non pervidet, non multum distat a pecude. Quis caelum suspicit nisi homo? Quis solem, quis astra, quis omnia dei opera miratur nisi homo? Quis colit terram? Quis ex ea fructum capit? Quis navigat mare? Quis pisces, quis volatilia, quis quadrupedes habet in potestate nisi homo? Cuncta igitur propter hominem deus fecit, quia usui hominis cuncta cesserunt. Cf. ID 13.1–6. 62 DI 7.4.8 (BT 2011, 656): potest esse sine mundo, sicut fuit antea, et iis omnibus quae in eo sunt quaeque generantur deus ipse non utitur. Cf. Min. Fel. 32.2. 63 DI 7.4.10 (BT 2011, 656): non sentiunt mundi rationem, sicut homo. 64 DI 7.4.19 (BT 2011, 658): Instituit ergo summus deus non propter se, quia nihilo eget, sed propter hominem, qui iis congruenter uteretur. 65 Nat. D. 2.133 (Pease, 896): ratio est enim quae praestet omnibus. 61

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needs, however, Cicero concludes that the recipients of these benefits are primarily human beings rather than gods (Nat. D. 2.154– 62). Lactantius also takes from Cicero the primary Academic critique of this Stoic position. Why, asks Cicero, if God created the world for humankind are there so many things that work to humanity’s detriment (DI 7.4.11; quot. Cic. Acad. Pr. 2.120; cf. ID 13.9)? In answer to this question Lactantius states that the responses of the Stoics were severely lacking (ID 13.10). They claimed that the utility of a great number of things remains unknown and that, over time, the necessity of their existence for humankind will be discovered (ID 13.10; cf. Sen. Q Nat. 7.30.5). But, replies the apologist, this argument simply fails to address the question of why, if all things were created for the benefit of humanity, evil exists in the world. Referring to evil as a yet unknown good merely masks the reality of its existence. 66 In response to the Academics, Lactantius once again affirms the necessity of evil for the sake of wisdom. 67 “[The human person] was given wisdom, therefore, so that he would know the nature of good and evil and might exercise the power of his reason in desiring good and turning away from evil. […] Unless evil exists, which is to be avoided and by which one can distinguish from what is good and useful, wisdom is not needed.” 68 The existence of evil serves humankind because without it ID 13.12. Lactantius is using the Stoics as the proverbial “straw man” in his critique of their efforts to explain the problem of evil. Seneca, for example, does argue that many evils are merely “unknown goods,” and that they are for the moral benefit of those whom they afflict. But he also adds that evils which an individual suffers can serve the good of the whole (Prov. 2.2). Lactantius was most certainly aware of a wider range of Stoic responses to the problem of evil than he is letting on here (cf. DI 5.22.12; Epi. 24.4–9). 67 ID 13.16; DI 7.4.13–15. Cf. DI 2.8.6 add.3, 17.1; 3.29.16; 5.7.4; 6.4.17; 7.5.27 add.5; Epi. 24.3; ID 13.24; OD 19 bis 3. For further discussion of the problem of evil in Lactantius see Chapter 4, II. God the Creator, C. Theodicy. 68 DI 7.4.13 (BT 2011, 657): Idcirco enim data est illi sapientia, ut cognita bonorum malorumque natura et in appetendis bonis et in malis 66

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wisdom – which is what separates human beings from other living creatures (DI 7.4.13.14; cf. OD 2.2–8) – would cease to exist. God therefore established evil, like all things, for the benefit of humanity. The Stoics rightly apprehended that in the natural world the human person is the greatest beneficiary of the fruits of creation, especially in possessing the gift of reason, and therefore that the natural world exists for the sake of humankind. But, lacking divine revelation, the Stoics were at a loss to explain why human beings were created as the apex of the natural world (DI 7.3.14, 4.2; Epi. 63.7). If the philosophers had been able to answer this question, they would have apprehended the entire ‘mystery of the human person’ (sacramentum hominis) (DI 7.5.2). According to Lactantius, God established the contradictory elements that make up the world’s existence – good and evil, spirit and matter –so that human beings might “come to the inexpressible reward of eternal life with the greatest difficulty and through mighty labors.” 69 God created human beings for two purposes: to fill and subdue the earth, and to endow them with immortality in recompense for living virtuously (DI 7.5.15; cf. Gn 1:28). By combining matter and spirit in the composition of the human person, God ensured that virtue would not come easily. Rather, these two dimensions fight and quarrel with one another, with the goods of the soul and those of the body battling for supremacy (DI 7.5.23). But humankind’s fulfillment, the end for which it was created, is to be found in shunning bodily temptations and pursuing wisdom and virtue; i.e., knowing and living according to the good. What the philosophers did not know, what they could not have known, is that a life of earthly fulfillment in wisdom and virtue brings forth the reward of heavenly fulfillment: a life of knowing and worshipping God ‘in eternal beatitude’ (in aeternum beatus) (DI 7.5.27). declinandis vim suae rationis exerceat. […] (14) Nisi ergo essent mala, quae caveret, quae a bonis utilibusque distingueret, non esset ei sapientia necessaria. Cf. ID 13.14. 69 DI 7.5.9 (BT 2011, 660): aeterna vitae ineloquibile praemium cum summa difficultate ac magnis laboribus pervenirent.

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C. Status Rectus Central to Lactantius’ anthropology is the meaning which the apologist gives to the bipedal stature of the human person. 70 Lactantius offers the status rectus of the human person as proof of its divine origin and telos on several occasions throughout his works. 71 In De opificio, as elsewhere, this motif serves to establish humanity’s unique place within the created order. “And so the human person alone possesses right reason, and a sublime stature and countenance, in common with God the Father, which testifies to his origin and maker.” 72 Unlike the rest of creation, the human person has been given the gift of wisdom, which allows him/her to recognize the existence of reason both in the universe and its Author. “The human person, however, with an upright stature and sublime face raised to the contemplation of the world, compares his countenance with God; and reason knows reason.” 73 Therefore, it is the capacity to know and worship God that is most clearly signified by humanity’s erect posture. In the final book of the Institutiones, while combatting the erroneous opinions of Epicurus (DI 7.5.4, 7), Lactantius again cites This is a standard philosophical tropos which was readily adopted by Christian apologists. Cf. esp. Cic. Nat. D. 2.37, 140; Leg. 1.26; Justin 1 Apol. 1.55; Min. Fel. 17.2; Ire. Adv. Haer. 1.24.1; Cypr. Ad Dem. 16. For an exhaustive list of citations see Pease, 914–15. Lactantius cites two sources for this idea, Ovid (DI 2.1.15; quot. Met. 1.84–86) and Hermes (DI 7.9.11; cf. Corp. Herm., vol. 4, fr. 14), who refers to this capacity as ϑεοπτίαν, ‘godsight.’ For secondary literature on the subject see especially Loi, Lattanzio, 137; Perrin, L’homme antique, 68–69 with notes; Antonie Włosok, Laktanz und die philosophische Gnosis (Heidelberg: 1960), 182, 221. 71 Cf. OD 8.2, 10.26, 19.10; DI 2.1.15, 2.23, 18.1; 17.9, 18.1; 3.10.11, 12.26, 20.11, 27.16, 28.16; 7.5.6, 20, 9.11; ID 7.5, 14.2, 20.10; Epi. 20.4ff., 25.1, 65.4. 72 OD 8.3 (SC 213, 150): Hominis itaque solius recta ratio et sublimis status et vultus deo patri communis ac prximus originem suam fictoremque testator. 73 ID 7.5 (SC 289, 112): Homo autem, recto statu, ore sublimi ad contemplationem mundi excitatus, confert cum deo vultum, et rationem ratio cognoscit. 70

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the human person’s erect posture as evidence of its exalted place in the order of creation. “What clearer argument could be offered that God made the world for human beings, and that the human person was made for its own sake, than that out of all living creatures [the human person] alone was formed with its eyes directed towards heaven, face gazing towards God, countenance shared with its Parent, so that it might be seen that God enkindled the human person to contemplation of Him by lifting it up from the mud as with an outstretched hand.” 74 Contrary to Epicurus’ belief that God did not create the world for humankind (DI 7.5.4; cf. Usener, 250, fr. 371; Lucr. 5.165–67), Lactantius offers the status rectus of the human person as proof of its singular and unique status in the order of creation. Since human beings are the only creatures capable of contemplating their Creator, as their erect stature signifies, they are undoubtedly the summit and reason for creation itself. The apologist also employs this trope to support many other theses contained throughout his works. Early in the Institutiones, this motif is used in order to demonstrate that idolatry is contrary to human nature. For the human person is endowed with a spiritual and rational soul, and ought never to offer worship to what is composed of earthly matter. “When our one and only Parent formed the human person, He made an intelligent animal capable of reason. Raising him from the ground, God lifted him to the contemplation of his Creator.” 75 The stature of the human person embodies the natural desire to seek what is above and on this account, reckons Lactantius, the human being “is called ἄνϑρωπον by the DI 7.5.6 (BT 2011, 659): Quod planius argumentum proferri potest et mundum hominis et hominem sua causa deum fecisse, quam quod ex omnibus animantibus solus ita formatus est, ut oculi ejus ad caelum directi, facies ad deum spectans, vultus cum suo parente communis sit videaturque hominem deus quasi porrecta manu allevatum ex humo ad contemplationem sui excitasse? 75 DI 2.1.15 (BT 2005, 112): Parens enim noster ille unus et solus cum fingeret hominem id est animal intellegens et rationis capax, eum vero ex humo sublevatum ad contemplationem sui artificis erexit. Cf. ID 20.10. 74

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Greeks, because he looks above.” 76 Though many creatures can view the sky, only the human person possesses an upright posture by an act of divine providence that signifies his destiny to know and worship God (DI 2.1.17; cf. 2.2.23, 17.9, 18.1). Worship of artificially made objects and non-sentient nature, therefore, forces the human person to stoop to the ground, i.e., to venerate that which is below it in the order of creation. “Let us adore and worship nothing other than the name of our one Maker and Parent, who has fashioned the human person in an unbending manner, so that we might know that we are called to what is above and heavenly.” 77 When Lactantius’ apologetic aim shifts towards the false opinions of the philosphers, he again employs the status rectus motif to combat the skepticism of the Academy. In contrast to the Socratic claim that “‘what is above us is nothing to us,’” 78 Lactantius offers the upright stature of the human person as evidence that humanity was born to contemplate its origin and destiny. If the skeptical position were true, the apologist argues, human beings would be no better than animals; attending to what is base and earthly. But by our erect stature we are “raised up to contemplation.” 79 We were created with this posture in order to marvel at the providential order of the cosmos, its “wonderful and perfect system,” 80 and thereDI 2.1.16 (BT 2005, 112): ἄνϑρωπον Graeci appellaverunt, quod sursum spectet. Cf. Epi. 20.9. Lactantius understands the word to be a combination of ἀνά (upwards), ἀϑρέω (to look), and πρόσωπον (face). Cf. Włosok, Laktanz, 148; Perrin, L’homme antique, 408. 77 DI 2.17.9 (BT 2005, 165–66): nihilque aliud adoremus, nihil colamus nisi solius artificis parentisque nostri unicum nomen, qui proterea hominem rigidum figuravit, ut sciamus nos ad superna et caelestia provocari. 78 DI 3.20.10 (BT 2007, 279): ‘quod supra nos, nihil ad nos.’ Cf. DI 3.28.16–17; Epi. 32.3; Min. Fel. 13.1. Lactantius attributes this quotation to Socrates. Tertullian, however, ascribes it to Epicurus (Ad nat. 2.4.15). It was most likely proverbial. See Clarke, 240–41. 79 DI 3.20.11 (BT 2007, 279): contemplationem sumus excitati. Cf. ID 14.2. 80 DI 3.20.13 (BT 2007, 279): mirabili ratione perfectum. 76

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by to recognize that it is the product of a supreme ‘Leader’ (moderatore). Similarly, this trope appears in Lactantius’ critique of the philosophers in general. Paramount to the apologist’s argument that the philosophers are unsuitable guides in the quest for wisdom is his firm belief in the unity and indivisibility of wisdom and religion. 81 The two are so indivisibly linked that, according to Lactantius, “neither should any religion be accepted without wisdom, nor any wisdom approved without religion.” 82 The philosophers, however, cannot be of any help in attaining the truth because they did not grasp the importance of religion in this vital unity. “For if we behold the heavens it is surely for no other reason than religion; if religion is removed, there is no rational connection between us and the heavens. Accordingly, one must either behold the heavens or sink down to the earth. We cannot fall to the earth, even if we desired to do so, because of our erect stature. We must behold the heavens, therefore, to which the nature of the body tends.” 83 The status rectus of the human person, then, testifies to the importance of religion by being a physical manifestation of the human inclination towards the divine. From the foregoing exposition it is clear that the status rectus motif is used by Lactantius primarily as evidence that the natural fulfillment of the human person is to be found in religion, i.e., in knowing and worshipping the transcendent Creator. “It is [the human person] alone who, possessing sense and the capacity for reason, can know God, who can admire His works, perceive His virtue and power. For that reason he has been endowed with counsel, For a fuller discussion of this argument see Chapter 2, III. Sources, C. Philosophers. 82 DI 1.1.25 (BT 2005, 6): neque religio ulla sine sapientia suscipienda sit nec ulla sine religione probanda sapientia. 83 DI 3.10.10 (BT 2007, 232): Si enim nobis in caelum spectandum est nhil utique aliud quam ob religionem, si religio tollitur, nulla nobis ratio cum caelo est. (11) Itaque aut eo spectandum est aut in terram procumbendum. In terram procumbere ne si velimus quidem possumus, quorum status rectus est. (12) In caelum igitur spectandum est, quo natura corporis provocat. 81

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mind and prudence. And on that account he alone out of all living things is upright of body and rigid of stature, so that he seems to have been raised to the contemplation of his Parent. ” 84 In this quotation, God’s providential intent in creating humanity with an upright statue is made clear by Lactantius’ grammatical style. His repeated use of adverbs denoting purpose (ideo, idcirco) and corresponding ut clauses, stress the teleological nature of the human form. In other words, an erect posture is the product of a deliberate design that physically manifests a spiritual reality; namely, that in religion one discovers the true meaning of the human person. “Whoever strives to safeguard the mystery of the human person and desires to grasp the reason for his nature, let him raise himself from the ground and direct his eyes to heaven with an erect mind.” 85 D. Vera Religio By virtue of the gift of reason, the human person can know and worship God. It is this unique characteristic of human life which the status rectus signifies. Lactantius believes, therefore, that humanity’s natural fulfillment is to be found in religion. Religion alone, i.e., knowing and worshipping God, is the singular virtue that separates humankind from all living creatures and must, therefore, be the natural end of humanity’s highest capacity. “Therefore, as Cicero says, ‘there is no animal except the human being who possesses any knowledge of God.’ For it has been instructed in wisdom, so that it alone understands religion. This is the extraordinary or only differ-

ID 14.2 (SC 289, 162): Solus est enim sentiens capaxque rationis intellegere possit deum, qui opera euis admirari, virtutem potestatemque perspicere; idcirco enim consilio mente prudentia instructus est, ideo solus praeter ceteras animantes recto corpore ac statu fictus est, ut ad contemplationem partentis sui excitatus esse videatur; ideo sermonem solus accepit ac linguam, cogitationis interpretem, ut enarrare majestatem domini sui possit, postremo idcirco ei cuncta subjecta sun tut fictori atque artifice deo esset ipse subjectus. Cf. DI 3.20.11. 85 DI 2.18.1 (BT 2005, 198): Quicumque igitur sacramentum hominis tueri rationemque naturae suae nititur obtinere, ipse se ab humo suscitet et erecta mente oculos suos tendat in caelum. 84

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ence between human beings and the dumb animals.” 86 In De ira Dei, Lactantius lists many of the qualities that are thought to be sui generis to humankind only to find traces of them in the wider animal kingdom. Speech, for example, is thought to be unique to human beings, but there are many species of animals that communicate amongst themselves using their own sounds (ID 7.7–8; DI 3.10.2). An element of intelligence can also be found in other creatures, such as ants and bees, “which plan and provide for the future.” 87 But there is no trace or vestige of religion in any creature outside of the human family. “We alone of all creatures sense the divine strength and power, while in others there is no knowledge of God.” 88 The uniqueness of the human capacity to know and worship God, argues Lactantius, indicates that humankind’s natural end is to be found in religion. “The greatest good of the human person is in religion alone.” 89 Religion succeeds in fulfilling the human person’s natural end by uniting the perfections of humanity’s greatest capacities. In other words, for Lactantius, true religion is a union of wisdom (knowing God) and virtue (worshipping God). Just as the cult of the pantheon is to be regarded as empty because it lacks wisdom, so too the teachings of the philosophers are to be considered false because they lack virtue or ‘ultimate piety’ (summam pietatem) (DI 4.3.1–2). “Worship of the true God, and no other thing, is wisdom. Indeed, God is the highest and Creator of all things; who made the human person after His likeness. Therefore He gave reason solely to human beings from out of all the animals, so that they yield honor to Him as Father and fear Him as Lord. And by ID 7.6 (SC 289, 112): Propterea « nullum est animal, ut ait Cicero, praeter hominem quod habeat notitiam aliquam dei ». Solus enim sapientia instructus est ut religionem solus intellegat, et haec est hominis atque mutorum vel praecipua vel sola distantia. Quot. Leg. 1.24; cf. DI 3.10.7. 87 ID 7.10 (SC 289, 114): quam ratio et providentia futuri. Cf. DI 3.10.3–4. 88 ID 7.14 (SC 289, 114): soli omnium divinam vim potestatemque sentimus, in illis autem nullus sit intellectus dei. Cf. DI 2.3.14. 89 DI 3.10.1 (BT 2007, 230): Summum igitur hominis bonum in sola religion est. 86

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this piety and obedience they merit the reward of immortality. This is the true and divine mystery.” 90 Lactantius traces the etymology of the word religio to the verb religare, ‘to bind or fasten,’ because humankind is bound to God by the virtue of piety (DI 4.28.3, 12). This etymological reading of religio directly conflicts with the explanation provided by Cicero, who derives religio from relegere, ‘to re-read.’ 91 In a passage quoted by Lactantius, Cicero explains that those found frequently in the temple praying for their children ‘to survive’ (superesse) were referred to as ‘superstitious’ (superstitiosi), whereas those who diligently ‘considered’ (retractarent) and ‘studied’ (relegerent) the worship of the gods were deemed ‘religious’ (religiosi). Lactantius is astonished at “this interpretation, which is inept,” 92 and suggests that what distinguishes superstition from religion is the object of worship rather than the disposition of the worshipper. “Religion is undoubtedly the worship of what is true, superstition the worship of what is false.” 93 Therefore, according to Lactantius, vera religio is found “where the one God is worshipped, of course, where all life and action returns to the one beginning and the one end.” 94 The wisdom contained in vera religio, the knowledge which accompanies true piety, is the recognition of God as both ‘Lord’ (dominus) and ‘Father’ (pater). The pairing of these titles to describe how the pious individual relates to God is an integral part of LacEpi. 36.2 (BT 1994, 50–51): Nam deum verum colere, id est nec aliud quidquam [quam] sapientia[m]. (3) Ille enim summus et conditor rerum deus, qui hominem velut simulacrum suum fecit, idcirco utique soli ex omnibus animalibus rationem dedit, ut honorem sibi tamquam patri et tamquam domino referret et hac pietate atque obsequio immortalitatis praemium mereretur. Hoc est verum divinumque mysterium. 91 DI 4.28.4–5; quot. Nat. D. 2.71–72. St. Augustine agrees with Lactantius’ etymology (vera rel. 55.111; retr. 1.13.9), though he is also aware of Cicero’s interpretation (civ. Dei 10.3; retr. 1.13.9). 92 DI 4.28.6 (BT 2007, 425): Haec interpretatio quam inepta sit. 93 DI 4.28.11 (BT 2007, 427): Nimirum religio veri cultus est, superstitio falsi. 94 DI 4.3.7 (BT 2007, 317): scilicet ubi deus colitur unus, ubi vita et actus omnis ad unum caput et ad unam summam refertur. 90

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tantius’ view of religion and a major contribution of the apologist to Christian thought. 95 This motif appears throughout Lactantius’ works in his discussions of God’s unity (DI 1.6.4, 7.3; Epi. 2.2), religion (DI 4.3.13, 4.2, 6, 11, 28.12; Epi. 36.3; ID 24.2), justice (DI 5.18.14; Epi. 51.1, 54.4), repentance (DI 6.24.4), and providence (DI 2.27.5; ID 19.6). Lactantius first makes mention of God as Lord and Father while citing the work of Hermes Trismegistus in support of monotheism: “[Hermes] calls [God] by the names we use: ‘Lord and Father.’” 96 These titles for God become almost axiomatic for Lactantius when the apologist exposits the nature of true wisdom and religion. By Book 4 of the Institutiones Lactantius has already demonstrated God’s unity (Book 1), the falsity of the polytheistic worship (Book 2), and the folly of philosophy (Book 3). Building upon that foundation, Lactantius next examines the content of true wisdom and finds it in the knowledge that God is one, i.e., in vera religio. “Wisdom is in religion and religion in wisdom. They cannot be separated because to be wise is nothing other than honoring the true God with just and pious worship.” 97 The human person, by virtue of being the only portion of God’s creation endowed with the gift of reason, has the potential to apprehend God’s unity and, by doing so, to acknowledge that He is the one Father and Lord of all that exists (Epi. 36.3). It is in this knowledge that wisdom exists (DI 2.8.71; 3.30.3). Further, to understand God’s paternity and dominion over the universe is to recognize one’s relationship to God within this dynamic existence. In other words, if God is the Father and Lord of the cosmos then we – His only creatures capable of apprehending this wisdom – are ‘bound’ (religemur) to Him. Human beings are obliged to offer God The theme of God as dominus et pater appears in Tertullian (Apol. 34), as does the concept of vera religio (Apol. 24), but these ideas are developed extensively by Lactantius. Cf. Digeser, “Constantine’s Letter,” 36–7; Włosok, Laktanz, 232–46. 96 DI 1.6.4 (BT 2005, 22): nominibus appellat quibus nos ‘dominum et patrem.’ Cf. Ascl. 20; DI 1.7.3. 97 DI 4.3.10 (BT 2007, 317): Idcirco et in sapientia religio et in religion sapientia est. Ergo non potest segregari, quia sapere nihil aliud est nisi deum verum justis ac piis cultibus honorare. 95

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the veneration and worship that is due to Him as the one Father and Lord of creation. “Worship must therefore be given to the One who can truly be called Father. The same One must also be Lord because He can forgive and, thus, also punish.” 98 What human beings owe to God is akin to what is owed the Roman paterfamilias by the members of his household (DI 4.3.16–18). The paterfamilias is a father because he has sired his children, and a lord because he is the master of his servants. This does not mean that his powers are divided but, rather, that he is both father and lord over his entire household. In fact, mentions Lactantius, when a son reaches adulthood he is manumitted like a servant and, conversely, when a servant is freed he takes the last name of his master like a son (DI 4.3.17). The paterfamilias, therefore, has the ‘double power’ (duplici potestate) of being both a father and a lord. Similarly, since God both created and gives order to all that exists, He is the one Father and Lord of the universe. And just as the members of a household owe the paterfamilias both their affection and obedience, so too ought we to love God because He is Father and obey Him because He is Lord. “God is one since He sustains the role of both of Father and Lord. We ought to love Him because we are His children, and fear Him because we are His servants.” 99 True worship for Lactantius is the disposition of the human person towards God as both Father and Lord. Just as true wisdom is in knowing God’s unity, true worship demonstrates this knowledge by loving God as Father and fearing Him as Lord. Wisdom and worship, therefore, are inextricably linked. They cannot be divided since wisdom is related to worship as knowing is to doing. Wisdom naturally comes prior since perception precedes action, but the two are joined together to form vera religio, i.e., in returning to God what is owed Him (DI 4.4.3). Just as creation flows from God’s gratuitous act of self-giving, the human person returns DI 4.3.14 (BT 2007, 318): Unus igitur colendus est, qui potest vere pater nominari; idem etiam dominus sit necesse est, quia sicut potest indulgere, ita etiam coercere. 99 DI 4.4.2 (BT 2007, 320): Deus autem, qui unus est, quoniam utramque personam sustinent et patris et domini, et amare eum debemus, quia filii sumus, et timere, quia servi. 98

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to God what is His due by apprehending His oneness (true wisdom) and offering Him love and obedience (true worship). This exitusreditus cycle is the very pattern of religion for Lactantius. “This is the condition of our birth, that we might offer just and deserving obedience to the God who created us, that we might acknowledge and follow Him alone. We are tied and bound by this chain of piety to God; from whence the term religion received its name.” 100 To love God as a Father and obey Him as Lord is to fulfill the relationship whereby the human person is tied to God by virtue of being a homo sapiens, i.e., a rational creature. “Because God has bound the human person to Himself and tied him to piety, it is necessary for us to serve Him as Lord and obey Him as Father.” 101 Since wisdom and worship are united in the one movement of piety, Lactantius rejects the possibility that vera religio can be found where the two are divided. “Neither can religion be separated from wisdom nor wisdom severed from religion; because it is the same God who we should both understand, which is wisdom, and honor, which is religion.” 102 Thus the standard for vera religio is that it contain both knowledge and worship of the one God. “Where, however, wisdom is inseparably joined together with religion each is necessarily true; because we ought to be wise in worship – i.e., to know what and how we might offer worship – and in being wise to DI 4.28.2 (BT 2007, 424–25): Hac enim condicione gignimur, ut generanti nos deo justa et debita obsequia praebeamus, hunc solum noverimus, hunc sequamur. (3) Hoc vincula pietatis obstricti deo et religati sumus, unde ipsa religio nomen accepit. Pope John XXIII uses Lactantius’ description of religion in DI 4.28.2–3 to support the cause of religious liberty. Since being religious is such a vital part of being human, argues Pope John, governments ought to respect the conscience of the individual person on such matters. Cf. Pacem in Terris 14. 101 DI 4.28.12 (BT 2007, 427): quod hominem sibi deus religaverit et pietate constrinxerit, quia servire nos ei ut domino et obsequi ut patri necesse est. 102 DI 4.4.2 (BT 2007, 320): Non potest igitur nec religio a sapientia separari nec sapientia a religion secerni, quia idem deus est qui et intellegi debet, quod est sapientia, et honorari, quod est religionis. 100

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worship – i.e., to fulfill the obligation and action that we know.” 103 Since the union of wisdom and worship is a necessary precondition of vera religio, Lactantius eliminates both philosophy and the worship of the gods as possible candidates. While particular philosophers might have acknowledged God’s oneness and providence, because philosophy has failed to offer God the veneration that He deserves, true wisdom cannot reside in philosophy (DI 4.3.2–3). Similarly, since animal sacrifice and idolatry are the forms of worship in the cult of the gods rather than the shaping of the inner affections of the human person towards God, it cannot be regarded as true worship (DI 4.3.1–2). Further, the defining characteristic of the element of worship in vera religio, i.e., loving God as Father and obeying Him as Lord, was known to neither group (DI 4.4.6). Though individuals such as Plato or Cicero may have apprehended God’s unity, neither they nor any other philosopher could be said to offer God the affection and devotion, i.e., the worship, that vera religio demands (DI 4.4.6). Given the criteria he has established, Lactantius submits that vera religio is to be found in the Christian religion alone (DI 4.30.11). “Ours, the true religion, is firm and solid and immutable, because it teaches justice, because it is always with us, because its worship is entirely spiritual, because it treats the mind itself as its sacrifice.” 104 E. The Virtues, Immortality, and Justice Being the only creature endowed with the gift of reason, argues Lactantius, the human person was created for religion. Vera religio, i.e., the fulfillment of humankind’s religious capacity, is in knowing that God is one (true wisdom) and in loving Him as Father and obeying Him as Lord (true worship). Further, Lactantius believes DI 4.3.6 (BT 2007, 316–17): Ubi autem sapientia cum religion inseparabili nexu cohaeret, utrumque esse verum necesse est, quia et in colendo sapere debemus, id est quid nobis et quomodo sit colendum, et in sapiendo colere id est re et actu quod scierimus implere. Cf. DI 6.25.7; Epi. 36.5. 104 DI 5.19.30 (BT 2009, 513): Nostra vero religio eo firma est et solida et immutabilis, quia justitiam docet, quia nobiscum semper est, quia tota in animo colentis est, quia mentem ipsam pro sacrificio habet. 103

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that it is through the exercise of the virtues that we offer God true worship. “This is the religion of heaven, not that which consists of corruptible things but of the virtues of the soul which arise from heaven. This is true worship, by which the mind of the worshipper is itself offered to God as an immaculate victim.” 105 The virtues are the concrete ways in which human beings demonstrate their love and obedience to God as Father and Lord. “It is the first duty of justice to recognize God, to fear Him as Lord and to love Him as Father; for He is the same One who created us, who animated us with life-giving spirit, who nourishes us, and who preserves us. He has the authority to chasten us, not just as Father but also as Lord, having power over life and death. Hence the human person owes to Him a twofold honor, i.e., love and fear.” 106 In true Roman fashion, Lactantius places the practice of vera religio squarely within the bounds of the cardinal virtues, especially justice. 107 Lactantius believes that the virtues begin in the emotions. The emotions were implanted in the human person by the ‘marvelous providence’ (mirabili providentia) of God so that they might be the seat of either virtue or vice (DI 6.15.9). The Stoics were in error for believing that the goal of the virtuous life is the eradication of the emotions (DI 6.14.8, 15.3). They affirmed that the emotions themselves, i.e., desire, joy, fear, and sorrow, be replaced in order to be virtuous. Thus they substituted desire with inclination, joy with gladness, and fear with apprehension; sorrow being eliminated entirely (DI 6.15.10–11). According to Lactantius, the Peripatetics DI 6.2.13 (BT 2009, 532): Haec est religio caelestis, non quae constat ex rebus corruptis, sed quae virtutibus animi qui oritur e caelo, hic versus et cultus, in quo mens colentis se ipsam deo immaculatam victimam sistit. Cf. DI 6.24.26–31, 25.7; Epi. 53.3–4. 106 Epi. 54.4 (BT 1994, 82): Primum autem justitiae officium est deum agnoscere eumque metuere ut dominum, diligere ut patrem. Idem enim, qui nos genuit, qui vitali spiritu animavit, qui alit, qui salvos facit, habet in nos non modo ut pater, verum etiam ut dominus licentiam verberandi et vitae ac necis potestatem, unde illi ab homine duplex honos, id est amor cum timore debetur. 107 On the relationship between justice and religion see especially Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.161, Nat. D. 2.71–72. 105

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were nearer the truth by attempting “to demonstrate how providentially and necessarily God, or nature as they put it, armed us with our emotions.” 108 First, by redefining the emotions the Stoics have merely substituted vocabulary. They failed to demonstrate a qualitative difference between the emotions and those qualities that have replaced them. Desire begins with inclination, joy is the expression of gladness, and apprehension arises out of fear (DI 6.15.15). What the Stoics have described with their nuanced terms are, in fact, the emotions properly moderated – not eliminated – which is precisely the Peripatetic position (DI 6.15.16–17). Second, the nature and power of virtue is in “the endurance of evil.” 109 If the emotions were not inclined to good or evil, virtue or vice, then virtue could not exist at all. “Where there are no vices, nor are there any virtues; just as there is no victory where there is no adversary. So it is that good cannot exist without evil in this life.” 110 The emotions are necessary parts of the virtuous life because it is through them that the human person is drawn towards what is good and repulsed by what is evil (DI 6.15.10; cf. August. civ. Dei 14.8). What determines the character of a person, states Lactantius, is not the emotions themselves but how they are directed (DI 6.16.11; cf. Epi. 56.3–7; August. civ. Dei 9.5). “It is good that the emotions be moved in the right direction, and bad in the wrong direction.” 111 Thus one might feel lustful desires most intensely, but if lust is confined within marital chastity then there is no fault in it. Similarly, a lustful desire may be slight, but if this desire is indulged outside of the marriage covenant then it is a grievous vice (DI 6.16.9). The virtuous person, therefore, is the one who, understanding that the emotions are part of the human person’s GodDI 6.15.2 (BT 2009, 590–91): ostendere, quam providenter et quam necessario deus sive natura – sic enim dicunt – his nos armarit adfectibus. 109 DI 3.11.9 (BT 2007, 234): in malorum perferentia. 110 DI 6.15.7 (BT 2009, 592): Ubi ergo vitia non sunt, ne virtuti quidem locus est, sicut ne victoriae quidem, ubi adversaries nullus est. Ita fit ut bonum sine malo esse in hac vita non possit. 111 DI 6.16.8 (BT 2009, 596): Sic moveri adfectibus in rectum bonum est, in pravum malum. 108

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given nature (DI 6.15.2–3, 9), exercises them in accordance with right action; i.e., directs them to their proper ends. Even when the emotions draw a person in the wrong direction, however, they ought not to be considered bad in themselves, but as providing the opportunity to exercise virtue. Virtue, according to Lactantius, consists primarily of strength of character; their nature and power residing in “the endurance of evil.” 112 In this regard, the presence of both good and evil is necessary in order to exercise virtue. “For this reason the first stages of transgression [i.e., improper feelings or emotions] are not enough for God to cast down punishment, but provide the human person with the opportunity to exercise his military service for the sake of virtue; which, unless agitated and strengthened by continual vexation, cannot be perfect because virtue is perfected by the strength of evils and invincible patience. Hence if there is no adversary, there is no virtue.” 113 The argument that good and evil both exist necessarily so that the human person might acquire virtue permeates all of Lactantius’ written work. 114 In the apologist’s view, good and evil exist in a symbiotic relationship for the moral advancement of the huDI 3.11.9 (BT 2007, 234): in malorum perferentia. Cf. DI 3.8.36. Though he makes use of their arguments against the Stoic belief that the emotions should be eradicated, Lactantius does not agree with the Peripathetics in reckoning virtue as the mean between excess and defect or the habit of living well (cf. DI 6.15.5; Epi. 56.2; Arist. Eth. Nic.1104b4– 1108b18). Virtue, as strength of character, is most naturally displayed under conditions of conflict, either internal or external, according to Lactantius. 113 DI 3.29.16 (BT 2007, 307): Idcirco enim in primordiis transgressionis non statim ad poenam detrusus a deo est, ut hominem militia sua exerceat ad virtutem; quae nisi agitetur, nisi vexatione adsidua roboretur, non potest esse perfecta, siquidem virtus est perferendorum malorum fortis atque invicta patientia. Ex quo fit ut virtus nulla sit, si adversarius desit. Cf., esp., 4.4.15–17; 5.19.25–26; 6.4.18, 15.7; OD 19 bis 3–5; Epi. 24.3. 114 See Chapter 4, II. God the Creator, C. Theodicy, 3. Analysis. Cf. DI 2.8.6 add. 1–9, 17.1; 3.29.16; 5.7.4–8, 22.2–4; 6.3.13, 5.12, 15.5–9, 20.3, 22.2; 7.1.18, 5.27 add. 1–17; Epi. 24.2–11; ID 20.2; OD 19 bis 1–5. 112

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man person, i.e., so that one might possess virtue, since it is impossible for virtue to be acquired without resistance, without the struggle of combating evil, without the allure of pleasures which can lead to vice. “By the most ingenious workings of providence human beings have been given an infinite desire and propensity to fall into vice; so that to display one’s virtue one might always combat desire as if it were an internal enemy.” 115 Evil and vice, therefore, are necessary components of the moral life which God has established for the good of the human person (DI 2.17.1; 6.22.2; Epi. 24.11). Because acquiring virtue necessitates a contrary force against which it might be exercised, argues Lactantius, the virtuous life itself cannot be the ultimate end, or summum bonum, of the human person. The apologist arrives at this conclusion by first establishing the following criteria for the summum bonum: it must belong to the human person alone, it must belong to the ‘soul’ (animus) alone, and it must be attained through virtue and knowledge (DI 3.9.1). Given these parameters, Lactantius quickly eliminates the possibility that humankind’s greatest good can be found in the goods of the body (DI 3.8.3–23). While the gift of reason is seen by many to be a unique attribute of humankind, the summum bonum cannot be found in knowledge alone because knowledge is not sought aimlessly, but is directed towards achieving some practical end (DI 3.8.24–25). Further, while the summum bonum certainly requires the use of reason, all knowledge is not of equal value. The type of knowledge which one seeks must be of the greatest and highest object in order to participate in the summum bonum (DI 3.8.28–29). Virtue is also a necessary component of the greatest good but is not the summum bonum itself (DI 3.8.32). Virtue, i.e., the capacity to endure pain and shun pleasure, exists in order to attain an end rather than being the end in itself (DI 3.11.9–15). “[Virtue] is a good and certainly a universal good. But it is not the blessed life because DI 6.20.3 (BT 2009, 613): Homini vero sollertissimi artificis providentia dedit voluptatem infinitam et in vitium cadentem, quia proposuit ei virtutem, quae cum voluptate semper tamquam cum domestic hoste pugnaret. 115

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its power and nature lies in enduring evil, so it, in fact, cannot be the greatest good.” 116 The Stoics rightly affirmed that virtue alone produces the ‘blessed life’ (vitam beatam), but erred in identifying the blessed life with the virtuous life here on earth (DI 3.12.12, 27.4). The summum bonum, however, “must be perfect so that there might be nothing which can vex it, or diminish it, or change it.” 117 Thus the summum bonum is not the virtuous life of this world, but the blessed life of immortality (DI 3.12.18). In this regard, virtue is the means of achieving that perfection but is not the end itself. “If, however, virtue is to be sought – as is rightly said by [the philosophers] – because the human person is born to live in virtue, there should be another better hope to bring a great and valuable solace from the evils and labors which accompany the virtues.” 118 The virtuous life produces the greater hope of immortal beatitude. In fact, without this hope the virtuous life makes little sense to Lactantius. “Will virtue lose its reward or, rather, will it perish? By no means! But it will receive its recompense at God’s judgment, and will live and flourish always. Take that away and nothing can be as useless in human life, nothing can be shown to be as stupid, as virtue.” 119 That the virtuous life would be rewarded by God, and would find its true telos in the immortal life of bliss, is something the philosophers did not realize (DI 5.17.16). Though some philosophers, DI 3.11.9 (BT 2007, 234): quin et bonum sit et omnium certe bonum. Sed si beata esse non potest, quia vis et natura ejus in malorum perferentia posita est, non est profecto summum bonum. Cf. 3.8.36. 117 DI 3.12.15 (BT 2007, 237): perfecta esse debet, ut nihil sit quod eam vexare aut minuere aut immutare possit. 118 DI 6.9.22 (BT 2009, 564–65): Si autem virtus, ut ab iis rectissime dicitur, capessenda est, quia constet ad eam nasci hominem, subesse debet spes aliqua major, quae malorum et laborum, quos perferre virtutis est, magnum adferat praeclarumque solacium. Cf. 3.8.32; August. civ. Dei 19.4. 119 DI 5.18.9 (BT 2009, 505): Perdetne suum praemium virtus aut potius peribit ipsa? Minime, sed et mercedem suam deo judice accipiet et vivet ac semper vigebit. (10) Quae sit tollas, nihil potest in vita hominum tam inutile, tam stultum videri esse quam virtus. Cf. 6.9.18; 7.1.3; Epi. 30.1. 116

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especially Plato (DI 7.8.2), rightly affirmed the immortality of the soul, they did not grasp that immortal beatitude is not a consequence of the nature of the soul but a reward given by God and reserved for those who have endured in virtue through the trials of this mortal life (DI 7.5.20). Ultimately, the philosophers failed to recognize that immortal beatitude is the summum bonum of all humankind, and the end for which human beings were created (Epi. 24.11). God made humankind, “first, so that an infinite power of souls could be begotten and could fill the entire earth with its multitude; second, so that virtue would be set before the human person, i.e., the toleration of evils and labors, through which one might obtain the prize of immortality.” 120 Thus the life of immortal beatitude is the true end of the human person. “The one supreme good is therefore immortality; we were born and formed from the beginning to seek it […], [and] virtue leads us to it.” 121 While Lactantius believes that endurance in virtue merits immortal beatitude (DI 4.25.10; OD 19.10), the apologist also affirms that only God possesses the capacity to bestow this reward upon the virtuous person (DI 6.9.23; 7.5.20). The perfection of the human person therefore depends entirely upon God. It is God who rewards those who have lived virtuous lives with immortal beatitude after their deaths (DI 7.10.8; Epi. 24.11; cf. August. civ. Dei 19.10). Further, since achieving the reward for living virtuously depends solely upon the generosity of God, the virtue that most directly affects the life of bliss – the one upon which the attainment of the summum bonum depends – is justice in particular. Justice, according to Lactantius, “is the supreme virtue or the source of virtue.” 122 The apologist holds this virtue in such esteem DI 7.5.15 (BT 2011, 661–62): Primum, ut infinita vis animarum gigneretur omnemque terram multitudine oppleret, deinde, ut proponeret homini virtutem id est tolerantiam malorum ac laborum, per quam posset praemium immortalitatis adipisci. 121 DI 7.8.1 (BT 2011, 673): Unum est igitur summum bonum immortalis, ad quam capiendam et formati a principio et nati sumus […], ad hanc nos provehit virtus. 122 DI 5.5.1 (BT 2009, 453): ipsa est summa virtus aut fons est ipsa virtutis. 120

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that he dedicated an entire book of the Institutiones to its exposition. In book 5, after recounting the history of justice on earth (DI 5.5.1–8.11) and making several impassioned appeals to end the unjust persecution of Christians (DI 5.1.1–4.8, 9.1–13.21), Lactantius examines the nature of justice itself. Justice is divided into two virtues: piety, which is the virtue of rendering to God what is His due, and equity or fairness, which is the virtue of rendering to other human beings what is their due. “Piety and equity are [justice’s] two veins. All justice arises from these two sources; in the first is its head and origin, in the second all its power and reason.” 123 These two sources are so inextricably linked that justice cannot exist without them both. “Even though justice embraces all of the virtues at once, there are two principles which cannot be separated or torn apart from it, piety and equity.” 124 While some philosophers were able to grasp God’s unity, none of them had any idea about how to worship God and, hence, lacked piety. And since they did not possess piety, neither did they possess justice; which is its source (DI 5.14.12–14). This is the reason why, states Lactantius, Carneades was able to overturn justice so easily. 125 “If justice is worship of the true God […], then the philosophers did not know justice.” 126 DI 5.14.11 (BT 2009, 489–90): Pietas vero et aequitas quasi venae sunt ejus, his enim duobus fontibus constat tota justitia. Sed caput ejus et origo in illo primo est, in secundo vis omnis ac ratio. 124 DI 5.14.9 (BT 2009, 489): Justitia quamvis omnes simul virtutes amplectatur, tamen duae sunt omnium principales quae ab ea divelli separarique non possunt, pietas et aequitas. 125 DI 5.14.8. Carneades of Cyrene (c.214–c.129) was a Skeptic and founder of the New Academy. In 155 he was sent to Rome as an ambassador from Athens with the Stoic Diogenes and the Peripatetic Critolaus. While in Rome he caused a stir by arguing both for and against the existence of justice on consecutive days. For Lactantius’ use of Carneades’ see DI 5.14.1–8, 16.2–17.34. For the source of the tale and Carneades’ argument see Macrob. Sat. 1.5 and Cic. Rep. 3.8–31; the latter of which Lactantius quotes from extensively. 126 Epi. 51.1 (BT 1994, 75): Nam si justitia est veri dei cultus […], nescierunt ergo justitiam philosophi. 123

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The two sources of justice, piety and equity, are exercised through acts of ‘religion’ (religio) and ‘humanity’ (humanitas), and are founded upon relationships of ‘obligation’ (officiis). 127 These obligations exist by virtue of our creation and stem from God’s universal paternity and lordship. “But since the human person alone has been given wisdom so that he might know God, and this alone distinguishes the human person from non-rational creatures, justice itself is bound by a double obligation: one is owed to God as Father, the other to the human person as brother; for we are all children of the same God.” 128 Since these obligations exist as a condition of our birth, and their proper fulfillment is achieved through the exercise of justice, Lactantius affirms that humankind was indeed born for justice. “‘But of all things considered by the disputation of the learned, nothing is truly as remarkable as the clear understanding that we were born to justice.’” 129 To satisfy the obligations of justice, i.e., to practice and endure in the virtue to which all human beings have been called, is the universal vocation of humankind. Further, in living out this vocation faithfully human beings not only fulfill the natural ends for which they were created, but also their supernatural ends; for it is principally by exercising justice that the human person is rewarded by God with the gift of immortal beatitude. “It is justice alone that gives birth to eternal life for the human person, and eternal life is bestowed only by God.” 130 Throughout book 6 of the Institutiones, Lactantius is in dialogue with Cicero’s De Officiis. 128 Epi. 29.5 (BT 1994, 40): Sed quoniam soli homini sapientia data est, ut deum intellegat, et haec sola hominis mutorumque distantia est, duobus officiis obstricta est ipsa justitia: unum deo debet ut patri, alterum homini velut fratri; ab eodem enim deo geniti sumus. Cf. Epi. 54.4–5; DI 6.10.1; ID 14.5. 129 DI 6.25.9 (BT 2009, 638): ‘sed omnium […] quae in hominum doctorum disputatione versantur, nihil est profecto praestabilius quam plane intellegi nos ad justitiam esse natos.’ Quot. Cic. Leg. 1.28; cf. Epi. 29.7. 130 DI 7.14.2 (BT 2011, 693): solam esse justitiam, quae vitam homini pariat aeternam, et solum deum, qui aeternae vitae praemium largiatur. Cf. ID 24.8; Epi. 64.7. 127

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The first of these virtues, piety, consists of knowing God and offering Him proper worship (DI 5.14.11; cf. Nat. D. 2.153; Corp. Herm. 9.4). This definition of piety, it should be noted, is identical to Lactantius’ description of vera religio and, in fact, the apologist conceives of vera religio as the true expression of piety and justice. “True religion is nothing unless it exists in virtue and justice” 131 In true apologetic fashion, Lactantius is claiming the virtue of justice for Christianity by redefining the proper object of its head and source, piety. “The plan of the human person is thus, if one is wise, made plain: his chief characteristic is humanity. What is humanity if not justice? What is justice if not piety? And piety is nothing other than acknowledging God as Parent.” 132 With the object of piety focused on the one God, Lactantius then makes piety the sine qua non of justice. If one errs in relation to the proper object of piety, either by not recognizing God’s unity or by not offering Him the worship He is due, then one can neither know nor practice justice. “The sum of things turns, therefore, on the recognition and worship of God. In this is the hope and salvation of all human beings. This is the beginning of wisdom, that we might know who our true Father is and that we might follow Him as the only debt of piety.” 133 Justice is so dependent upon piety that Lactantius often identifies religion and piety with justice itself. “Justice is nothing other than the pious and religious worship of the one God.” 134 The vital role which piety plays in the virtue of justice has significant consequences for the praxis of the virtuous life. Once piety is properly understood as the knowledge and worship of the one DI 6.25.7 (BT 2009, 638): Nulla igitur religio vera est nisi quae virtute ac justitia constat. 132 DI 3.9.19 (BT 2007, 229): Expedita est igitur hominis ratio, si sapiat; cujus propria est humanitas. Ipsa humanitas quid est nisi justitia? Quid justitia nisi pietas? Pietas autem nihil aliud quam dei parentis agnitio. 133 DI 6.9.24 (BT 2009, 565): Ergo in dei agnitione et cultu rerum summa versatur, in hoc est spes omnis ac salus hominis, hic est sapientiae gradus primus, ut sciamus, qui sit nobis verus pater, eumque solum pietate debita prosequamur. 134 DI 5.7.2 (BT 2009, 460): justitia est, quae nihil aliud est quam dei unici pia et religiosa cultura. Cf. DI 6.5.19; Epi. 29.6, 51.1. 131

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God, then the virtues themselves take on a different character. Some actions considered vicious are transformed into virtues by a true understanding of piety. Desire, for example, which is reckoned a vice by the Stoics, becomes a virtue when directed towards things celestial (DI 6.17.10). Other actions regarded rightly as virtues also become more fully understood in light of true piety. The Stoics correctly identify constancy as a virtue, but it is truly a virtue only if properly understood as fidelity to God above all else (DI 6.17.24). “Thus it happens that neither the virtues nor the exact extent of the virtues can be known or possessed by any person at all estranged from the religion of the one God.” 135 A right understanding of piety also radically changes the nature of the other virtue associated with justice, equity or fairness. The just person exercises equity most especially by practicing ‘humanity’ (humanitas). “[Humanity] is a virtue proper to the just and pious worshippers of God because it alone contains the reason for communal life.” 136 The key to understanding the practice of humanity, according to Lactantius, is never to perform good works with the expectation of earthly rewards (DI 6.12.2). “Is the preserving of humanity something other than loving a human being because he is a human being and we are all the same?” 137 Whereas Cicero claimed that charitable works ought to be given in moderation to deserving people, Lactantius believes that “that is just, pious and humane which is done without hope of return. This is ‘true and genuine justice […].’” 138 Actions that characterize the practice of humanity include hospitality to the poor, ransom of captives, DI 6.17.29 (BT 2009, 602–03): His rebus efficitur, ut neque virtutes neque virtutum exactissimos limites nosse aut tenere possit omnino quisquis est a religione dei singularis alienus. 136 DI 6.10.2 (BT 2009, 566): Quae virtus propria est justorum et cultorum dei, quod ea sola vitae communis continet rationem. 137 DI 6.11.1 (BT 2009, 571): Id autem ipsum, conservare humanitatem, quid aliud est quam diligere hominem, quia homo sit et idem quod nos sumus? 138 DI 6.11.13 (BT 2009, 573): Id enim juste, id pie, id humane fit, quod sine spe reciendi feceris, haec est ‘vera illa et germana justitia […]’. Quot. Cic. Leg. 1.48; cf. DI 6.17.18; Cic. Off. 2.52–54. 135

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care of widows, orphans, and the sick, and burial of the dead (DI 6.12.1–41). Since piety views God as the one Father of all creation, all human beings are understood to be God’s children and, hence, should relate to each other as brothers and sisters (DI 6.10.1, 14.17; Epi. 29.5, 54.4–5). “What, therefore, or where, or what sort of thing is piety? Truly it exists where people know nothing of war, maintain concord with all, are friends even with enemies, love all human beings like brothers, know how to restrain anger, and soothe all indignation of the soul with tranquillizing moderation.” 139 Conversely, in the absence of piety, the most that human effort can hope to achieve is not equity but expediency (DI 6.9.2). This is the case because justice and equity, if not based on a proper understanding of piety, can appear to be a sort of foolishness (DI 5.14.2). The virtues provide no ultimate motivation for goodness without the hope of immortal beatitude for those who persevere in them (DI 6.9.18). Thus, anyone who believes that justice is confined to this mortal realm, and that the virtues die along with the individuals who possess them, “will necessarily depart from the rule of justice.” 140 Justice, therefore, and within it piety, is a sine qua non for possessing the virtues; which are themselves necessary for attaining eternal beatitude. F. Conclusion The doctrine of providence is everywhere present in Lactantius’ understanding of the human person. According to the apologist, God created the human person for the purpose of enjoying communion with Him, knowing and worshipping Him for all eternity (DI 3.9.14; 7.5.15, 6.1, 26.5; ID 14.1–4). Being created for this end, God constructed the world, and humanity itself, in order to achieve DI 5.10.10 (BT 2009, 473): Quae ergo aut ubi aut qualis est pietas? Nimirum apud eos qui bella nesciunt, qui concordiam cum omnibus servant, qui amici sunt etiam inimicis, qui omnes homines pro fratribus diligent, qui cohibere iram sciunt omnemque animi furorem tranquilla moderatione lenire. 140 DI 5.18.3 (BT 2009, 503): a justitia regula discedat necesse est. On piety’s determinative effect upon a person’s character see Chapter 6, I. Theology of History. 139

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this goal. God created the human person in His own ‘image’ and ‘likeness,’ endowed with the capacity to know and worship Him (DI 2.10.3–4; 6.10.1; 7.4.3; Epi. 22.2, 36.3; ID 18.14). Evidence in the natural world of the human person’s supernatural origin and end is found, most especially, in the human person’s ‘upright stature’ (status rectus). 141 “It is [the human person] alone who, possessing sense and the capacity for reason, can know God, who can admire His works, perceive His virtue and power. For that reason he has been endowed with counsel, mind and prudence. And on that account he alone out of all living things is upright of body and rigid of stature, so that he seems to have been raised to the contemplation of his Parent.” 142 The providential structure of the universe, and humankind’s unique position among all created beings, were designed in order to draw the human person to a knowledge of the one God by the use of reason (DI 7.4.10–16; Epi. 64.3; ID 13.1, 14.2). The perfection of humankind’s greatest capacities, therefore, is to be found in knowing (wisdom) and worshipping (virtue) the one God; the union of which Lactantius refers to as ‘true religion’ (vera religio). Like the cosmos, however, God created the human person from within the context of the struggle between good and evil, virtue and vice, so that he might come to know Him and merit eternal beatitude through wisdom and virtue. 143 Hence, though human beings were created to know and worship the one God, He ensured that such an endeavor would not be free from Cf. OD 8.2, 10.26, 19.10; DI 2.1.15, 2.23, 18.1; 17.9, 18.1; 3.10.11, 12.26, 20.11, 27.16, 28.16; 7.5.6, 20, 9.11; ID 7.5, 14.2, 20.10; Epi. 20.4ff., 25.1, 65.4. 142 ID 14.2 (SC 289, 162): Solus est enim sentiens capaxque rationis intellegere possit deum, qui opera euis admirari, virtutem potestatemque perspicere; idcirco enim consilio mente prudentia instructus est, ideo solus praeter ceteras animantes recto corpore ac statu fictus est, ut ad contemplationem partentis sui excitatus esse videatur; ideo sermonem solus accepit ac linguam, cogitationis interpretem, ut enarrare majestatem domini sui possit, postremo idcirco ei cuncta subjecta sun tut fictori atque artifice deo esset ipse subjectus. Cf. DI 3.20.11. 143 Cf. DI 2.8.6 add.3, 17.1; 3.29.16; 5.7.4; 6.4.17; 7.4.12–13, 5.27 add.5; Epi. 24.3; ID 13.24; OD 19 bis 3. 141

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labor and discipline. But those who persevere in vera religio will not only fulfill their natural ends but, in doing so, will merit the reward of their supernatural ends, i.e., the immortal life of divine bliss (DI 6.2.13, 24.26–31, 25.7; Epi. 53.3–4.). Lactantius’ anthropology is thoroughly teleological and, as such, thoroughly providentially oriented. In order to emphasize this point, it may be valuable to examine once again the passage from Book 7 of the Institutiones that represents Lactantius’ kerygma. Now let us seal the whole argument briefly in outline. The reason why the world was made was so that we might be born. We were born so that we might acknowledge the world’s maker and our God. We acknowledge and worship Him so that we might receive immortality as a reward for our labors – the worship of God contains the greatest labors. We are granted immortality as a reward so that we might serve the supreme Father and Lord forever, becoming like the angels, and be God’s eternal kingdom. This is the sum of it all: the secret of God, the mystery of the world. 144

The essence of Lactantius’ kerygma, as can be discerned from the foregoing chapter and the above periscope, is that God has providentially created the human person for a supernatural end. Lactantius’ kerygma is the “good news” that God has created humanity for Himself, to know and worship Him in this life and the next. In the above passage, as he does elsewhere (cf. DI 3.20.11; ID 14.2), Lactantius underscores the teleological nature of this anthropology grammatically by his use of adverbs denoting purpose (ideo, idcirco) and corresponding ut clauses. As with De opificio Dei, therefore, the DI 7.6.1 (BT 2011, 668): Nunc totam rationem brevi circumscriptione signemus. Idcirco mundus factus est, ut nascamur; ideo nascimur, ut agnoscamus factorem mundi ac nostri deum; ideo agnoscimus, ut colamus; ideo colimus, ut immortalitatem pro laborum mercede capiamus, quoniam maximis laboris cultus dei constat; ideo praemio immortalitatis adficimur, ut similes angelis effecti summo patri ac domino in perpetuum serviamus et simus aeternum deo regnum. (2) Haec summa rerum est, hoc arcanum dei, hoc mysterium mundi. Cf. Epi. 64.1. 144

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doctrine of providence accompanies Lactantius’ anthropology throughout his works. Lastly, as with his defense of the doctrine of providence and his concept of God as aeterna mens, Lactantius’ anthropology incorporates much from the Stoic school. This is especially true concerning Lactantius’ belief that humankind is the apex of the created order and that all other creatures were brought into existence in order to serve humankind. 145 The Stoics also give support to Lactantius’ belief in God’s authorship of the human person (DI 2.10.15, 11.17), the human person being composed of diverse and conflicting elements, the necessary existence of these diverse elements for the preservation of virtue and wisdom, 146 the status rectus of the human person, 147 and the human person’s fulfillment in a life of virtue (DI 3.8.32; 6.9.22, 25.9; Epi. 29.1–7; Cic. Leg. 1.28). Building upon this foundation, Lactantius then adds the supernatural end for which humankind was created, i.e., to know and worship God eternally. In other words, the apologist adds supernatural final causality to this Stoically influenced and teleological-driven anthropological scheme: (1) the life of virtue should find its ultimate fulfillment in the immortal life of bliss, and (2) unbeknownst to the Stoics, God created human beings to this end. “They [the Stoics] bring to light no reason as to why the human race was created or formed by God. It is our duty, therefore, to explain the mystery of the world and the human person.” 148 Because it is congruent with Stoic anthropology in many regards, Lactantius’ Christian anthropology is able to meet the needs of his apologetic goals, of making use of non-Christian sources and building a consensus between Christians and non-Christians alike. Once again, in Lactantius’ anthropology we find an example of the consummate apologist makSee note 71 above. See Chapter 4, II. God the Creator, C. Theodicy, 3. Analysis. Cf. also DI 2.9.17; Epi. 24.6; Sen. Q Nat. 7.27.4; Gellius NA 7.1.1–6. 147 See note 82 above. Cf. also Nat. D. 2.37; Pease, 914. 148 DI 7.3.14 (BT 2011, 651–52): Illi [Stoici] enim nullam rationem afferebant, cur humanum genus vel creatum vel constitutum esset a deo. Nostrum hoc officium est, sacramentum mundi et hominis exponere. Emphasis added. 145 146

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ing use of the sources available to him, correcting what is in err, and bringing what is lacking to completion and fulfillment.

CHAPTER 6. LACTANTIUS AND SALVATION HISTORY The final chapter of this work addresses God’s providential intervention into history in order to bring about the salvation of human beings. As we shall see, Lactantius views all of human history as salvation history. Since the human person was created in order to know and worship God, the story of the human person is a tale about a creature who, at times, lives according to his nature and, at times, does not. The denouement of this drama occurs when God directly intervenes into this story by the sending of His Son; thereby calling the human person to return to his true nature and signaling history’s final act. This chapter is therefore divided between (I.) Lactantius’ theology of history and (II.) Lactantius’ soteriology. The latter division is composed of sections that treat (A.) Lactantius’ understanding of the role of the virtues in soteriology, (B.) his Christology, and (C.) his Eschatology.

I. THEOLOGY OF HISTORY

Lactantius’ theology of history begins halfway through Book 1 of the Institutiones, immediately following his arguments in defense of monotheism. Its placement at this juncture of the work reflects Lactantius’ desire to read human history in terms of fidelity to, or dissidence from, worship of the one true God. Having established that the world and all of its creatures are under the divine guidance of one God, Lactantius now seeks to explain the existence and proliferation of polytheistic cults. The apologist does so by constructing a universal history of religions that posits the existence of an

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ur-monotheism from which human beings have strayed. 1 In direct contrast to the tribal and ethnic cults of the pantheon, Christianity is seen as a replevin of this original and catholic vera religio which fulfills the natural human desire to know and worship God. Lactantius begins his universal history of religions by affirming the mortal nature of the deities of the Roman pantheon. Though many people regard them as gods, the Roman deities hardly embody the attributes that constitute true divinity, such as incorporeity, immutability and virtue. Rather, the gods are engendered and reproduce by coition (DI 1.8.5–6). Hercules, renowned for his virtue and deemed a god, was in fact a slave to his vices and obviously mortal (DI 1.9.1–11). Jupiter, acknowledged as the head of the pantheon (optimus maximus), committed virtual parricide, debauchery and adultery. 2 There are sundry tales of the Roman deities illustrating their mortal natures and vicious lives, thereby proving that they are not truly divine (DI 1.10.1–9). Lactantius credits the theory that the gods were actually elevated heroes to Euhemerus of Messene (DI 1.11.33), the author of the non-extant Ιερὰ ἀναγραφή (Sacred History). In the Latinspeaking West, this work was popularized by its translation and insertion into the Historia (Annals) of Ennius, which accounts for its greater resonance among the Latin apologists than their Greek counterparts (cf. Cypr. De idola 1–5; Tert. Apol. 10.3ff.; Min. Fel. 21.1ff.; Arnob. Adv. nat. 1.37). Lactantius, who provides us with more quotations from the non-extant Historia than any other single author, 3 uses the mortal genealogies of the gods provided by Ennius as written testimonia to their human origin and nature. For example, the war between the gods and the Titans, according to Ennius, On this point see especially the excellent work of Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion, 96–101. Schott finds the genesis of this belief, from the Christian perspective, in Romans 1:18–32. 2 DI 1.10.10–14. Lactantius’ singling out of Jupiter and Hercules in particular is no coincidence. The founding Augusti of the tetrarchy, Diocletian and Galerius, had adopted the titles Jovius and Herculius respectively. Cf. Pan. Lat. 10(2).21, 11(3)10.5. 3 Cf. DI 1.11.34–35, 45–46, 63–65, 13.2, 14, 14.2–7, 10–12, 15.31, 18.11, 22.21; 5.1.5. 1

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was actually a civil war in Crete between the forces of Jupiter, rightful heir to his father Saturn’s throne, and those of his uncle Titan (DI 1.14.10). Lactantius thus accounts for the existence of the pantheon by affirming a Euhemerist account of their origins. Lactantius believes that the deification of heroes and kings is the product of civilization. Since life was rustic and uncivilized prior to the establishment of the rule of law, citizens wished to honor those figures responsible for the founding of civic order. The origin of the cult of the pantheon was therefore born as an expression of gratitude towards deceased leaders and as an example of good governance for present rulers (DI 1.15.1–5). In support of this theory, and revealing its Stoic character, Lactantius quotes Cicero’s De natura deorum: “‘And in many states it can be known that […] the memory of strong men was made holy in accordance with the honor of immortal gods.’” 4 The cults of worship, which emerged from these honors, were then passed on from one generation to the next until the fame of the greatest of heroes became known throughout the world. Similarly, cults also began to emerge in local communities so that every town, city and nation possessed its own penates (DI 1.15.7–10). “Just as Egypt worships Isis, the Moors Juba, the Macedonians Cabirus, the Carthaginians Urania, the Latins Faun, the Sabines Sancus and the Romans Quirinus in the same way does Athens worship Minerva, Samos Juno, Paphos Venus, Lemnos Vulcan, Naxos Bacchus, and Delos Apollo. Thus various rites were upheld by peoples and countries for as long as the people wished to give thanks to their leaders and could not discover what other honors might be offered for the life of the dead.” 5 Polytheistic worship is therefore the mark of tribal and culDI 1.15.6 (BT 2005, 63–64): ‘Atque in plerisque civitatibus intellegi potest […], virorum fortium memoriam honore deorum immortalium consecratam.’ Quot. Nat. D. 3.50. Lactantius also quotes Nat. D. 2.62 (DI 1.15.5). While Lactantius agrees with the Stoics on this point, he nevertheless attacks the allegorizing tendency of the school for reckoning the gods as personifications of nature rather than human beings (DI 1.12.1–10, 17.1–5). 5 DI 1.15.8 (BT 2005, 64): ut Aegyptus Isidem, Mauri Jubam, Macedones Cabirum, Poeni Uraniam, Latini Faunum, Sabini Sancum, Romani 4

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tural particularity; that is to say, it is fundamentally ‘ethnic’ rather than universal. 6 A surprising element in Lactantius’ attack on the cult of the gods is the apologist’s reluctance to criticize the poets as promoters of polytheistic worship. They certainly joined this tradition by regaling their audiences with fanciful tales (DI 1.15.13), states Lactantius, but rarely do poets completely fabricate the truth (DI 1.9.8, 11.23, 30; 2.10.12). On the contrary, they are given to embellishment and poetic license, but such are the tools of their craft. The poets ascribe divinity to human beings in order to add beauty and color to their poetry, not to seduce their audiences into polytheistic beliefs (DI 1.11.36). One must read poetry, therefore, with an understanding of metaphor and allusion, lest one be deceived into thinking that these paeans refer to gods rather than human beings (DI 1.11.23–25). Moreover, expounding the works of the poets enables Lactantius to find ample evidence in support of his Euhemerist account of the gods. For example, Ovid writes of Saturn’s journey by boat to the river Arno (DI 1.13.6; quot. Fast. 1.233–34), and Vergil claims that he united the disparate people surrounding Latium into one kingdom (DI 1.13.9; quot. Aen 8.321–23). While these poets were in err concerning Saturn’s divine status, states Lactantius, they nevertheless accurately described the events of his life; demonstrating his wholly human nature (DI 1.13.10). The poets are, on the whole, trustworthy witnesses of the people and events they describe, but their works should always be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with their literary genre, i.e., allegorically. An example par excellence of Lactantius’ Euhemerist reading of poetry that supports his theology of history is the famous myth of Quirinum, (9) eodem utique modo Athenae Minervam, Samos Junonem, Paphos Venerem, Vulcanum Lemnos, Liberum Naxos, Apollinem Delos. (10) Sic per populos atque regiones varia sacra suscepta sunt, dum homines grati esse in suos principes cupiunt et quos alios honores vita carentibus deferant, invenire non possunt. 6 Cf. Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion, 97.

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the ‘Golden Age’ (aureum saeculum). 7 To Latin speaking audiences this legend concerning the reign of Saturn was popularized, inter alia, in the works of Vergil (Ecl. 4; G. 2.538–60; Aen 6.792–93; 8.319–29) and Ovid (Met. 1.88–114; Fast. 1.263–76). According to the poets, the Golden Age refers to the conditions of humanity’s earliest existence. Justice and equity among persons were characteristic of human life in this epoch, as were peace, leisure and prosperity (cf. Ov. Met. 1.88–114). In the Virgilian account, these conditions were made possible by the reign of Saturn, who gathered the scattered tribes of Latium and gave them laws (Aen 8.321–23). “Under his reign was the so-called Golden Age, for he ruled the people in serene peace.” 8 Lactantius maintains that this idyllic state is not to be thought of as a pious myth, but the condition of the world when human beings worshipped the one true God. “This indeed is not poetic fiction, but may be taken as true.” 9 Lactantius believes that the Golden Age spoken of by the poets refers to the condition of humankind prior to the introduction of polytheistic cults. He is not identifying the classical myth with the biblical account of paradise in Eden, but rather with the ‘historical’ event of Saturn’s reign. 10 According to Lactantius, Saturn was the final king to rule prior to the introduction of polytheistic cults. On this topic see Louis J. Swift, “Lactantius and the Golden Age,” The American Journal of Philology 89/2 (1968): 144–56. 8 Verg. Aen 8.324–25 (LCL 64, 82): Aurea quae perhibent illo sub rege fuere saecula: sic placida populos in pace regebat. 9 DI 5.5.3 (BT 2009, 453): Quod quidem non pro poetica fictione, sed pro vero habendum est. 10 According to Lactantius, Saturn was born c. 1500 B.C.E. (DI 1.23.5). By comparison, the apologist estimates that the fall of Troy took place c. 1170 B.C.E. (DI 1.23.4; cf. Epi. 19.6). On Lactantius’ use of dates see Oliver Nicholson, “The Source of the Dates in Lactantius’ Divine Institutes,” JTS 36 (1985): 291–310. It should be noted that Lactantius’ characterization of Saturn has changed due to his apologetic goals. In his attempt to display the mortality and vice of the gods Lactantius viewed Saturn as a cruel murderer (DI 1.12.1–2). Now that his goal is to demonstrate the historic primacy of monotheism, Lactantius treats Saturn as the last monarch to maintain the cult of the one God (DI 5.6.11). 7

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He and the citizens of his state adhered to the primordial urmonotheism of humanity’s earliest religious experience. As long as this worship continued Saturn presided over his kingdom in a state of perfect justice. There was neither discord nor war, and people shared all of the bountiful gifts of the earth amongst one another. 11 Human life was characterized by the exercise of ‘kindness’ (humanitas), ‘fairness’ (aequitas) and ‘mercy’ (misericordia) (DI 5.6.4). The existence of these qualities in human society, states Lactantius, necessarily entails worship of the one God. For just as justice cannot be separated from ‘fairness’ (aequitas), neither can it be separated from ‘piety’ (pietas) (DI 5.14.9). To live in a just world is therefore to live in a society that embraces the worship of the one true God (cf. August. civ. Dei. 19.17, 21). Worship of God is the only cause of “a person caring for other people and knowing that he is tied by a bond of fraternity, for God is ‘father of all.’ […] This is certainly justice and this is the Golden Age.” 12 Hence, during the reign of Saturn, “God was certainly worshipped.” 13 In addition, once Jupiter drove out his father out of his own kingdom, and the worship of God was replaced with emperor worship, people were overcome by a sense of greed (DI 5.5.9, 6.1). They fought with one another over personal possessions, sought to subject weaker parties to servitude, and what was once shared by many was now claimed by an elite few (DI 5.6.1–2). This behavior was prompted, and the Golden Age ended, by Jupiter himself. His tyranny, violence and avarice banished justice from among the people. 14 The root cause of these evils was Jupiter’s abandonment Although, adds Lactantius, this does not mean that there was no private property; simply that every person was generous to the extent of providing for all (DI 5.5.7). 12 DI 5.6.12 (BT 2009, 459): homo hominem carum habeat eumque sibi fraternitatis vinculo sciat esse constrictum, siquidem ‘pater idem omnibus’ deus est […]. (13) Haec est profecto justitia et hoc aureum saeculum. Quot. Lucr. 2.992. 13 DI 5.5.3 (BT 2009, 453): deus utique colebatur. Cf. Epi. 20.1. 14 Again, one cannot help but hear veiled criticisms of Diocletian in Lactantius’ attack on Jupiter’s reign (DI 5.6.6–13), promotion of emperor 11

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of vera religio, thereby turning the people towards impiety (DI 5.6.6). Once worship of God ceased, little by little evil habits became more the custom (DI 5.6.10). Thus, while Jupiter’s reign may have marked the end of the Golden Age of monotheism, the moral and spiritual degeneration Lactantius describes occurred gradually and in separate parts of the world. Ignorance of vera religio began with Noah’s son Ham who, after being cursed, did not follow his father in worship of the one true God (DI 2.13.6; cf. Gn 9:25–27). Though Shem and his offspring, the Hebrews, preserved worship of God the descendants of Ham, the Canaanites, were responsible for allowing vera religio to fall into desuetude (DI 2.13.7–8; cf. Gn 10:6, 15–20). The descendants of Ham, the Egyptians, were the first to worship the celestial elements of nature (DI 2.13.10). From Canaan and Egypt, the cult of nature spread across the known world until, recently, temples were built as places of sacrifice and statues were made as objects of veneration. The shift from the worship of nature to the cult of the pantheon originated on Crete with either Jupiter’s grandfather Melisseus, according to Didymus of Alexandria, or Jupiter himself, according to Ennius (DI 1.22.18–28). But, in either case, Lactantius believes that worship of the gods had endured not longer than 1,800 years by his own day (Epi. 19.6). The apologist holds the Greeks primarily responsible for the proliferation of polytheistic cults. The institution of the cults began with them, and the rest of the civilized world followed their lead out of sheer admiration (DI 1.15.14). The cult of the gods is therefore the newest religious developments that emerged only after ‘knowledge of God’ (notitia Dei) had been lost (DI 2.13.12–13). The propagation of these cults was then enhanced by the intercession of demons. These demons are the fruits of salacious relationships between angels and human women (DI 2.14.2; cf. Gn 6:1–4). Since they belong neither to heaven nor to the underworld, they serve the Diabolus by tempting human beings into perdition (DI 2.14.11; cf. Epi. 22.9–11). As enemies of God and the truth, they attempt to goad human beings into worshipping them as deiworship (5.5.9) and being extolled in ‘evil panegyrics’ (malos panegyricis) (1.15.13).

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ties. Their goal is to divert people from vera religio and, consequently, to join them in an eternal life severed from God (DI 2.16.9). “These are the ones who taught [human beings] to form images and likenesses, so that the minds of people might turn away from worship of the true God. They made replicas of the countenance of dead kings, adorned them with exquisite beauty, and had them stationed and consecrated. They adopted their names like some characters.” 15 However, the greatest ruse which demons play on human beings is through oracular pronouncements. Since they understand ‘God’s designs’ (dispositiones Dei) by their quasi-divine nature, demons are privy to a certain amount of knowledge with regard to the course of future historic events (DI 2.16.14; cf. 14.6). They then share this knowledge with human beings in order to ingratiate themselves to the people. They promise to protect families and nations as long as temples are built and sacrifices are made in their honor (DI 2.16.14–15). The cult of the pantheon is then spread by the nefarious workings of demons performing miracles and uttering portents under the names of the gods. “By this craftiness and skill they have abolished knowledge of the one true God among all of the nations.” 16 According to Lactantius’ reading of human history, abandonment of the worship of the one God is responsible for all of humanity’s ills (DI 5.8.11). The apologist directly correlates ignorance of vera religio with the moral and social degeneration of humanity (DI 5.5.13–14; cf. 6.9.2, 17.29). “People are evil and unjust because they worship the gods. Evil increases in human affairs every day because God, the maker and ruler of the world, has been forsaken. Impious religions were accepted against what is right because, finalDI 2.16.3 (BT 2005, 190): Hi sunt qui fingere imagines et simulacra docuerunt, qui ut hominum mentes a cultu veri dei averterent, effictos mortuorum regum vultus et ornatos exquisita pulchritudine statui consecrarique fecerunt et illorum sibi nomina quasi personas aliquas induerunt. Cf. Epi. 23.4. 16 DI 2.16.20 (BT 2005, 195): Hac versutia et his artibus notitiam dei veri et singularis apud omnes gentes inveteraverunt. 15

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ly, you do not allow God to be worshipped, or only by a few.” 17 Further, Lactantius believes that knowing and worshipping the one true God is the determinative factor in one’s ethical life. One could not be wrong about religion, ‘the head of all things’ (rerum omnium caput), and lead a virtuous life in every other regard (DI 5.9.23). Since religion is the ‘summit’ (summa) of human experience, falsa religio will invariably lead to the disintegration of one’s moral character. Conversely, it is impossible for a practitioner of vera religio to be vicious in every other respect. In short, religion imparts a ‘pattern’ (regula) upon one’s life; the truth or falsity of which determines one’s ethical character (DI 5.9.24). This belief is demonstrated, in Lactantius’ mind, by the mutual behavior of Christians and non-Christians. With mellifluous oratorical skill, the former rhetorician states that it is ‘not his people’ (non enim de nostro) who are brigands, pirates, pillagers, poisoners, and murders of parents, spouses, and children (DI 5.9.15). Rather, “our entire religion is about living free from stain and blemish,” 18 and “our people do nothing other than what is fair and good.” 19 Despite their virtuous behavior, however, Christians were persecuted at the time of Lactantius’ writing. The apologist therefore had to answer the specific charge that God cares not for Christians because He allows them to suffer. Lactantius offers three possible explanations for the ongoing persecution of the Church. First, he begins by invoking the “wise and almost divine” 20 words of Seneca. The sharpest of Stoics (DI 1.5.26) observed that God permits the vicious to live in luxury and indulgence because He deems them unworthy of correction. The good, however, God loves, and He DI 5.8.5 (BT 2009, 462–63): homines ideo malos et injustos esse, quia dii coluntur, et ideo mala omnia rebus humanis cottidie ingravescere, quia deus mundi huius effector et gubernator derelictus est, quia susceptae sunt contra quam fas est impiae religiones, postremo quia ne coli quidem vel a paucis deum sinitis. 18 DI 5.9.21 (BT 2009, 470): cujus omnis religio est sine scelere ac sine macula vivere. 19 DI 5.9.22 (BT 2009, 470): nostros autem nihil aliud operari nisi aequum et bonum. 20 DI 5.22.11 (BT 2009, 522): sapienter ac paene divinitus. 17

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sends them many trials and tribulations so that they might acquire and practice virtue (DI 5.22.12; cf. Sen. Prov. 1.6; 2.5–6; 3.3). “From this we know that God cares for us, because when we sin He gets angry.” 21 Second, and in keeping with the theme that God reproves those whom He loves, there is historical precedent for God permitting His chosen people to suffer. God created many adversaries for the ancient Israelites as punishment for straying from His divine law (DI 5.22.14–15), and as opportunities to strengthen their virtue and refine their devotion (DI 5.22.17). As the successores Judaeis (DI 5.22.14), therefore, Christians should expect to be chastened and purified by hardships until “those who receive power beyond the limits fitting for human beings are punished by the judgment of God.” 22 Lastly, while the persecutions endure they bring a great many people to the Church (DI 5.22.18; cf. Tert. Apol. 50; Scap. 5). Thus God may allow Christians to suffer so that “the people of God are increased.” 23 Lactantius’ explanation of the suffering of Christians again highlights his view of human history as the story of obedience and disobedience to the worship of the one true God. Like St. Paul, the apologist believes that the responsibility for abandoning vera religio lies entirely with human beings. “For though they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him […]. And since they did not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a debased mind and to things that should not be done” (Rom 1:21, 28). The human person was created in order to know and worship God (DI 7.5.4). At the earliest stage of human history, in conformity with God’s providential design, all shared the ‘knowledge of God’ (notitia Dei). As human history progressed, worship of God began to erode; until, finally, ‘the mystery of true religion’ (verae religionis sacramenta) resided only with the oft-recalcitrant Jewish people (DI 4.8.2, 14.17). The result of the loss of knowledge of God was the spread of vice and corruption among human beings. DI 5.22.13 (BT 2009, 523): Ex quo intellegimus esse nos deo curae, quibus, quoniam peccamus, irascitur. 22 DI 5.23.2 (BT 2009, 525): Punientur enim judicio dei qui accepta potestate supra humanum modum. 23 DI 5.22.18 (BT 2009, 524): dei populus augeatur. 21

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But just as the Golden Age of ur-monotheism disappeared with the introduction of polytheistic cults, so too can it also reappear by returning to the worship of God. The coming of the Son marks the beginning of God’s restoration of the Golden Age by calling all nations to the worship of Himself through His ‘messenger’ (nuntium) (DI 5.7.1). “The Golden Age therefore returns in its beauty and was indeed brought back to earth, but few recognize justice, which is nothing other than pious and religious worship of the one God.” 24 The knowledge of God, which enabled the Golden Age to exist, had long been lost among the gentes. The life, death and resurrection of God’s Son, however, brought this knowledge back to humanity. The Golden Age, the epoch in which human beings lived in perfect justice, is therefore once again available to all those who seek the face of the one true God. “Remove all the evil thoughts from your hearts and at once this Golden Age will return to you. But you cannot have it unless you begin to worship the true God.” 25 Far from simply being a relic of the past, Lactantius interprets the Golden Age as any state in which justice reigns by the worship of God. “If God alone were worshipped, there would be no dissensions or war, people would know that they are children of the one God and united by a sacred and inviolable bond of divine necessity.” 26 Lactantius not only views humanity’s past and present through the lens of worship of the one God, but also its future. Although, with the coming of His Son, God has restored justice to the few, He nevertheless wills the division between good and evil, virtue and vice, to remain in existence. God does this in order for human beings to acquire virtue, which cannot exist without both DI 5.7.2 (BT 2009, 460): Rediit ergo species illius aurei temporis et reddita quidem terrae, sed paucis adsignata justitia est, quae nihil aliud est quam dei unici pia et religiosa cultura. 25 DI 5.8.3 (BT 2009, 462): Deponite omnem malam cogitationem de cordibus vestris, et statim vobis tempus illud aureum revertetur: quod aliter consequi non potestis, quam si deum verum colere coeperitis. 26 DI 5.8.6 (BT 2009, 463): Quodsi solus deus coleretur, non essent dissensiones at bella, cum scirent homines unius se dei filios esse, ideoque divinae necessitudinis sacro et inviolabili vinculo copulates. 24

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good and evil (DI 5.7.4). By enduring evil through the exercise of ‘patience’ (patientia), the human person is brought to ‘absolute perfection’ (absolutam perfectam) (DI 5.7.8). In this way, God wills the salvation of human beings through the acquisition of virtue (DI 5.7.4). But while evil is necessary to achieve the good of virtue, the continued existence of the admixture of good and evil, the retained diversitas, prevents Lactantius from claiming that the Golden Age has returned to earth in an unqualified and univocal sense (DI 5.7.10). The true Golden Age, in which God alone will be worshipped and justice will preside among the people, will only return when God removes all evils from the earth at the eschaton (DI 4.12.21). In Lactantius’ millennialist vision of the eschaton, Christ will return to earth to rule for one thousand years in justice and peace while the Diabolus is held captive (DI 7.24.1–5). Christ will establish a holy city from whence he will rule (DI 7.24.6). The righteous dead will be resurrected and act as governors over the living (DI 7.24.3). The earth will be abundantly fruitful and God will be known and worshipped by every nation (DI 7.24.12–15). This is the Golden Age of which the poets spoke. Lactantius believes that the Sibyls were the recipients of this revelation, who then transmitted their visions to the poets. In the process, their oracles were misinterpreted as visions of the past rather than prophecies of the future (DI 7.24.9–10). Vergil however, following the Cumean Sibyl, does not make this mistake and rightfully foretells of the time when “the earth will be subject to God.” 27 It is curious that the apologist should so readily identify the Golden Age of the poets with the eschatological future given his use of the motif in describing the urmonotheism of the past. It appears that Lactantius is more comfortable making use of the motif of the Golden Age where he deems it applicable to his apologetic argument, rather than rendering a complete and exhaustive interpretation of the myth in a single place. This is further evidence of the apologist’s priority of disputatio over expositio in theological discourse. DI 7.24.11 (BT 2011, 724): subjecta erit deo terra. Cf. DI 7.24.11– 12; Orac. Sib. 7.139–49; quot. Verg. Ecl. 4.21–22, 28–30, 38–41, 42–45. 27

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This lack of consistency in Lactantius’ use of the Golden Age, his positing its significance at once to the past and again to the future, is perhaps also evidence that the non-Christian testimonia which he used to support his vision of history was of secondary consequence to the content of the vision itself. That is to say, Lactantius’ use of the Golden Age is an apologetic devise to illustrate his theology of history to a non-Christian audience. 28 For Lactantius, human history is an exitus from God and reditus to God. The period in between these two modes of being is more than an interim; it is an interregnum. It is an era in which God is not acknowledged and worshipped as the one Ruler of the universe. Since the human person was created in order to know and worship God, when the rightful Sovereign of humanity remains dishonored, disorder ensues in His kingdom in the form of sin and lawlessness. But, conversely, when human beings act according to their nature and recognize God as their Lord and Father, the fruits of this order are justice and peace. “You want justice to remain on earth amid the worship of the gods, that arrangement is in no way possible. […]. All of these evils on earth, as I have said, would not exist if everyone was united to God’s law, if all people behaved as our one people do.” 29 Lactantius’ theology of history, therefore, is a living narrative in support of his anthropology. His interpretation of human history is evidence that the flourishing of human beings takes place when they act according to their nature; which is to know and worship the one true God.

II. SOTERIOLOGY A. Soteriology and the Virtues Lactantius believes that the life of beatitude is granted by God to those who have persevered in virtue (cf. DI 3.8.32; 5.18.9; 6.9.18, 22; 7.1.3; Epi. 30.1; etc.). This belief appears most commonly in See Swift, “Golden Age,” 155–56. DI 5.8.4 (BT 2009, 462–63): Vos autem manente cultu deorum justitiam desideratis in terra, quod fieri nullo pacto potest. […] (8) Non esset igitur, ut dixi, haec omnia in terra mala, si ab omnibus in legem dei conjuraretur, si ab universis fierent quae unus noster populus operatur. 28 29

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connection with Lactantius’ arguments for immortality as the summum bonum. In order to demonstrate that the life of virtue should be sought, and is neither a fruitless ideal nor an end in itself, Lactantius states that the virtues are the means to attaining the summum bonum of immortality. If the hope of immortality is taken away from the virtuous life, the apologist argues, then practicing the virtues is folly (cf. DI 5.18.10; 6.9.18; 7.1.3). The greatest good, therefore, is not the life of virtue per se, but the immortal life of bliss is attained by a life of virtue. “The reward of virtue is the life of bliss if virtue, as it is rightly said, creates the life of bliss. It is not, therefore, for its own sake that virtue is sought, but for the life of bliss; which is attained necessarily by virtue.” 30 From within the context of this argument, the apologist’s goal is not to demonstrate that one’s salvation is achieved through the exercise of the virtues, but that the virtuous life is to be lived in the hope of attaining a greater, in fact the greatest, good. In the seventh and last book of the Institutiones, however, Lactantius expounds on the salvific end of the virtuous life from within the wider context of his entire kerygma. It is again appropriate at this point to reiterate the résumé of Lactantius’ kerygma which the apologist provides in chapter 6 of the final book of the Institutiones. Now let us seal the whole argument briefly in outline. The reason why the world was made was so that we might be born. We were born so that we might acknowledge the world’s maker and our God. We acknowledge and worship Him so that we might receive immortality as a reward for our labors – the worship of God contains the greatest labors. We are granted immortality as a reward so that we might serve the supreme Father and Lord forever, becoming like the angels, and be God’s

DI 3.12.12 (BT 2007, 237): Ergo virtutis praemium beata vita est, si virtus, ut recte dictum est, beatam vitam facit. (13) Non est igitur ut aiunt propter se ipsam virtus expetenda, sed propter vitam beatam, quae virtutem necessario sequitur. Cf. 3.27.13; 5.17.16, 18.1–11; 6.9.18–23; Epi. 30.1, 59.1. 30

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eternal kingdom. This is the sum of it all: the secret of God, the mystery of the world. 31

While in the above quotation Lactantius nowhere mentions the life of virtue, the apologist consistently affirms that true worship of God, which alone merits the reward of the blessed life of immortality, lies in the practice of the virtues. 32 This is especially true in relation to the virtue of justice: “the supreme virtue or the source of virtue.” 33 It is through the practice of justice that the human person comes to know that God is one and to worship him as Father and Lord. “It is the first duty of justice to recognize God, to fear Him as Lord and to love Him as Father; for He is the same One who created us, who animated us with life-giving spirit, who nourishes us, and who preserves us. He has the authority to chasten us, not just as Father but also as Lord, and the power over life and death. Hence the human person owes to Him a twofold honor, i.e., love and fear.” 34 For Lactantius, then, the virtuous life, the exercise of true justice, and the practice of vera religio are all inextricably linked. DI 7.6.1 (BT 2011, 668): Nunc totam rationem brevi circumscriptione signemus. Idcirco mundus factus est, ut nascamur; ideo nascimur, ut agnoscamus factorem mundi ac nostri deum; ideo agnoscimus, ut colamus; ideo colimus, ut immortalitatem pro laborum mercede capiamus, quoniam maximis laboris cultus dei constat; ideo praemio immortalitatis adficimur, ut similes angelis effecti summo patri ac domino in perpetuum serviamus et simus aeternum deo regnum. (2) Haec summa rerum est, hoc arcanum dei, hoc mysterium mundi. Cf. Epi. 64.1. See also Chapter 2, IV. Christian Truth; Chapter 5, II. A Systematic Treatment of Lactantius’ Anthropology, F. Conclusion. 32 Cf. DI 4.25.10; 5.17.16; 6.9.18–20; 7.5.20, 10.6; Epi. 30.1, 69.7; OD 19.10; ID 19.2. See also Chapter 5, II. A Systematic Treatment of Lactantius’ Anthropology, E. The Virtues, Immortality, and Justice. 33 DI 5.5.1 (BT 2009, 453): summa virtus aut fons est ipsa virtutis. 34 Epi. 54.4 (BT 1994, 82): Primum autem justitiae officium est deum agnoscere eumque metuere ut dominum, diligere ut patrem. Idem enim, qui nos genuit, qui vitali spiritu animavit, qui alit, qui salvos facit, habet in nos non modo ut pater, verum etiam ut dominus licentiam verberandi et vitae ac necis potestatem, unde illi ab homine duplex honos, id est amor cum timore debetur. 31

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To be virtuous one must practice justice, and to be just one must know and worship the one God. “If one serves God as Lord and Father, this attendance, this homage, this devotion, is the consummation and perfection of justice.” 35 And since vera religio and true justice cannot be separated, it is according to an individual’s practice of justice on earth that God will determine his/her reward in the life to come. “God is to be worshipped, therefore, so that through religion – which is justice – the human person might receive immortality from God.” 36 It is here where Lactantius’ anthropology and soteriology meet. For Lactantius the exercise of justice is the greatest expression of humankind’s true nature. “If a person who was truly wise were to ask for the reason of his birth, he would readily and boldly reply that he was born to worship the God who created us; so that we might serve Him. To serve God is nothing other than to protect and preserve justice by good works.” 37 Further, the fulfillment of the human person on earth, i.e., the practice of justice, leads directly to the human person’s ultimate fulfillment, i.e., the blessed life of immortality. “It is justice alone that gives birth to eternal life for the human person, and eternal life is bestowed only by God.” 38 Like all of the elements of his kerygma, Lactantius believes that the human person being created in order to attain the life of immortal beatitude is the work of God’s providence. In fact, knowledge of this truth, knowledge of the end for which the huDI 6.25.16 (BT 2009, 640): Quodsi deo, patri ac domino, hac adsidvitate, hoc obsequio, hac devotione servierit, consummata et perfecta justitia est. Cf. DI 6.2.17. 36 Epi. 64.7 (BT 1994, 107): Colendus est igitur deus, ut per religionem, quae eadem justitia, accipiat homo a deo immortalitatem. 37 DI 3.9.14 (BT 2007, 228–29): Quare si quis hominem qui vere sapiat interroget, cujus rei causa natus sit, respondebit intrepidus ac paratus colendi se dei gratia natum, qui nos ideo generavit, ut ei serviamus. (15) Servire autem deo nihil aliud est quam bonis operibus tueri et conservare justitiam. 38 DI 7.14.2 (BT 2011, 693): solam esse justitia, quae vitam homini pariat aeternam, et solum deum, qui aeternae vitae praemium largiatur. Cf. ID 24.8; Epi. 64.7. 35

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man person was created, is the ‘linchpin’ (cardo rerum) of the entire ‘mystery of the human person’ (sacramentum hominis); without which the truth concerning human nature is lost (DI 7.5.2). The human person was created “so that he might understand [God’s] work, have a sense of admiration and proclaim verbally the providence of its arrangement, the plan of its creation, and the virtue of its completion. The sum of these things is this: that one worship God.” 39 But in order to attain the life of bliss, in order to worship God in immortal beatitude, one must endure the evils of mortal life by persevering in virtue. 40 This, too, has been providentially ordered by God. God has deliberately established contrary forces in the world, i.e., good and evil, with which the human person might contend in order to acquire virtue and, thereby, merit immortal life. By God’s design good and evil coexist in the world “so that virtue would be DI 7.5.4 (BT 2011, 659): ut esset qui opera ejus intellegeret, qui providentiam disponendi, rationem faciendi, virtutem consummandi et sensu admirari et voce proloqui posset. Quorum omnium summa haec est, ut deum colat. cf. Usener, 250, fr. 371; Lucr. 5.165–67. 40 Lactantius most certainly does not possess an Augustinian concept of grace. In fact, he comes rather close to the position that one can earn immortality through a life of virtue (cf. DI 4.25.8; 7.5.19). But two things ought to be noted which balance this belief. First, it is true that from Augustine’s De natura et gratia we know that Lactantius was among the authorities which Pelagius cited in his De natura. But the quotations from Lactantius which Augustine states were used by Pelagius do not pertain to the believer ‘earning salvation by virtuous works.’ Rather, they concern the issue of Christ’s sinlessness (DI 4.24.12, 25.10). The bishop of Hippo, while not condemning the quotations outright, nevertheless suggests that their author – whom Augustine states was unnamed – might want to consider being more theologically precise in his use of language (nat. et gr. 71). Second, and perhaps more importantly, Lactantius states that though the virtuous life is the means of attaining salvation, only God can bestow immortality as its ‘prize’ (praemium) or ‘reward’ (merces) (DI 7.5.20, 27, 14.2; Epi. 24.11, 64.7). In other words, the life of immortality is not something which human beings can bring about exclusively through their own powers, it must granted to them by the one who ‘alone possesses it’ (solus possidet) (DI 7.20.27). 39

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set before the human person, i.e., the toleration of evils and labors, through which one might obtain the prize of immortality.” 41 It is by God’s will, therefore, that evil exists in order for virtue to exist, and for virtue to exist so that, by means of it, human beings might be granted immortality as a reward for their labors. “On this account, therefore, God desires the worship and honor of Himself as Father by the human person […]. The piety of the human person by which he honors God brings about this prize; that he might be in eternal beatitude and in the presence of God and with God always.” 42 The centrality of the doctrine of providence in Lactantius’ kerygma is such that, prior to summarizing the content of his kerygma in Book 7 of the Institutiones (DI 7.6.1–2; cf. Epi. 64.1), the apologist finds it necessary, once again, to give a defense of the doctrine of providence. [Epicurus] ruined what he had been right to see, and in his inward ignorance of the entire plan he destroyed all reason, and reduced the world and everything in it to some likeness of a most vain dream, inasmuch as human activity would make no sense. But truly we see that the world and all its parts are governed by a wonderful system, in the heavens the proportion and uniformity in the various courses of the stars and lights of heaven, the regular and remarkable delineation of the seasons, the diverse fecundity of the land, the level plains, the ramparts and mounds of the mountains, the viridity and fruitfulness of the forests, the strong eruption of springs, the timely flow of rivers, the rich and abundant spreading of the seas, the diverse

DI 7.5.15 (BT 2011, 661–62): ut proponeret homini virtutem id est tolerantiam malorum ac laborum, per quam posset praemium immortalitatis adipisci. This argument appears throughout the corpus of Lactantius. See Chapter 4, II. God the Creator, C. Theodicy. Cf. DI 2.8.6 add.3, 17.1; 3.29.16; 5.7.4; 6.4.17; 7.4.12, 5.27 add.5; Epi. 24.3; ID 13.24; OD 19 bis 3. 42 DI 7.5.27 (BT 2011, 664): Propterea igitur coli se deus expetit et honorari ab homine tamquam pater […] pietatem hominis qua deum honoraverit hoc adficit praemio, ut sit in aeternum beatus sitque apud deum et cum deo semper. 41

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and useful aspirations of the winds and everything else, everything exists according to a supreme plan. So who can be so blind as to think that something that simply radiates the wondrous provisions of a most providential plan was produced without a cause? If nothing can be nor come to be in any way whatsoever without a cause, and if the providence of God most high is manifest in the order and excellence, the magnitude, the power, and the governance of things, then those who said that providence does not exist are stupefied and crazy. I would not disapprove if they spoke against the existence of the gods, but when they do so to speak of none, anyone not reckoning them mad is mad himself. 43

This impassioned and somewhat literary recounting of the wonders of the universe that bespeak of divine providence is the foundational evidence of Lactantius’ kerygma. From the belief that the world is governed by divine providence, the apologist argues – in step with the Stoics – that the world was created for human beings; DI 7.3.24 (BT 2011, 653–54): Corrupit ergo quod recte viderat et totam rationem penitus ignorantia rationis evertit redegitque mundum et omnia quae in eo geruntur ad similtudinem cujusdam vanissimi somnii, siquidem rebus humanis ratio nulla subsistet. (25) Cum vero mundum omnesque partes ejus ut videmus mirabilis ratio gubernet, cum caeli temperatio et aequalis in ipsa varietate cursus astrorum luminumque caelestium, temporum constans ac mira discriptio, terrarum varia fecunditas, plana camporum, munimenta et aggeres montium, viriditas ubertasque silvarum, fontium saluberrima eruptio, fluminum opportuna inundatio, maris opulenta et copiosa interfusio, ventorum diversa et utilis aspiratio ceteraque omnia ratione summa constent, quis tam caecus est ut existimet sine causa esse facta in quibus mira dispositio providentissimae rationis elucet? (26) Si ergo sine causa nec est nec fit omnino quicquam, si et providentia summi dei ex dispositione rerum et virtus ex magnitudine et potestas ex gubernatione nmanifesta est, hebetes ergo et insani qui providentiam non esse dixerunt, non improbarem, si deos idcirco non esse dicerent ut unum dicerent, cum autem ideo ut nullum, qui eos delirasse non putat, ipse delirat. Cf. Chapter 3, II. The Arguments for Divine Providence, C. The Argument from Design, 1. The Divinae Instituiones and De Ira Dei; DI 1.2.5; ID 10.25, 50; Nat. D. 2.98ff. 43

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the only creatures capable of apprehending God’s providence at work in the universe. 44 Lactantius then takes the further step of affirming that good and evil both exist for the ultimate good of humankind (DI 7.4.11–19); which is the attainment of immortality (DI 7.5.1–27). In other words, without the doctrine of providence, without first acknowledging that the world was created and is governed according to the ‘providence of God most high’ (providentia summi dei), Lactantius’ kerygma is rendered null and void at its initial stage, and the first step in understanding the ‘plan of the world’ (rationem mundi) is lost (DI 7.3.26, 4.10). B. Christology Lactantius makes clear, especially in his kerygma: soteriology is the fulfillment, the perfection, of human anthropology. “The one supreme good is therefore immortality; we were born and formed from the beginning to seek it […], [and] virtue leads us to it.” 45 Thus far in our examination, however, Christ’s unique role in bringing about salvation has been overlooked. Lactantius’ own kerygma makes not a mention of Jesus Christ (DI 7.6.1; Epi. 64.1), and Lactantius acknowledges that his own apologetic method prohibits him from using Scripture unless it is absolutely necessary (DI 4.5.3). In book 4 of the Institutiones, after eliminating the possibility that vera religio might be found in either Roman religion or classical philosophy, the apologist finally expounds on the life and teachings of Jesus Christ. He maintains that God, in His providence, did not abandon humankind to discover the truths of salvation – i.e., Lactantius’ kerygma – on its own. Rather, in the fullness of time, God sent his only Son so that he might “establish God’s temple and teach justice.” 46 The following quotation sums up nicely Lactantius’ account of the divine pedagogy at work in the life of Christ: DI 7.4.1–10; Cf. Chapter 5, II. A Systematic Treatment of Lactantius’ Anthropology, B. The Human Person in the Created Order. 45 DI 7.8.1 (BT 2011, 673): Unum est igitur summum bonum immortalis, ad quam capiendam et formati a principio et nati sumus […], ad hanc nos provehit virtus. 46 DI 4.10.1 (BT 2007, 337): constitueret deo temlum doceretque justitiam. 44

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When God saw the evil, and how great the worship of false gods had spread throughout the world, so that soon His name would almost be erased from human memory – indeed, even the Jews, who alone were entrusted with the secret of God, abandoned the living God, were entrapped in worshipping images, and led astray by deceitful demons so as not to want to turn back to God despite the rebukes of the prophets – He sent His Son, the prince of angels, to human beings; so that he would turn them from vain and impious worship to knowledge and worship of the true God, and likewise lead their minds from foolishness to wisdom, from iniquity to works of justice. 47

Lactantius believes that his kerygma contains the entire ‘secret of God’ (arcanum dei) and ‘mystery of the world’ (mysterium mundi) (DI 7.6.2). And though many and various philosophers have grasped individual portions of it, neither has there been nor can there be anyone who could grasp the ‘entire truth’ (totam veritatem) without the aid of divine revelation (DI 7.7.14). “We, however, who have received the mystery of true religion by divine revelation, since it be the truth, follow God as teacher of wisdom and guide to virtue.” 48 And since no one is capable of coming to knowledge of the totam veritatem by reason alone, neither is anyone able to live up to its demands – i.e., the life of virtue – because knowledge precedes action (DI 6.5.11, 6.11, 9.8–24). The mission of Jesus Christ, therefore, is

DI 4.14.17 (BT 2007, 363): Deus enim cum videret malitiam et falsorum deorum cultus per orbem terrae ita invalvisse, ut jam nomen ejus ex hominum memoria fuisset paene sublatum – siquidem Iudaei quoque, quibus solis arcanum dei creditum fuerat, relicto deo vivo ad colenda figment inretiti daemonum fraudibus aberrassent nec increpiti per prophetas reverti ad deum vellent -, filium suum principem angelorum legavit ad homines, ut eos converteret ab impiis et vanis cultibus ad cognoscendum et colendum deum verum, item ut eorum mentes a stultitia ad sapientiam, ab iniquitate ad justitiae opera traduceret. 48 DI 1.1.19 (BT 2005, 5): Nobis autem qui sacramentum verae religionis accepimus cum sit veritas revelata divinitus, cum doctorem sapientiae ducemque virtutis deum sequamur. See Chapter 2, IV. Christian Truth. 47

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primarily pedagogical. Christ is the doctor justitiae, who reveals the totam veritatem about God, the world, and humankind. Jesus’ status as pedagogue, however, is not isolated to the realm of knowing. The goal of Jesus’ ministry is to bring human beings back to the worship of the one God. He accomplishes this task by revealing the truth and, thereby, leading human beings to virtue. Jesus’ ministry is therefore aimed at action rather than contemplation. What human beings learn from Jesus the pedagogue is not simply the nature of justice, but the praxis of justice. For this reason, doctor justitiae is one of Lactantius’ most frequently used titles for Jesus, and certainly the title most unique to the author. When recounting the divine pedagogy at work in the life of Christ, Lactantius repeatedly refers to the salvific role of Jesus in terms of leading humankind to justice. “When the most high God and Parent of all wished to transmit His religion, He sent a teacher of justice from heaven, so that new worshipers might be given a new law in him or through him.” 49 This ‘new law’ (novam legem) both reveals the truth to human beings and provides for them a way in which to live out this truth. “Our Father and Lord, who […] saw the errors of humankind, sent a guide who opened the path of justice for us.” 50 Further, by sending the doctor justitiae to humanity, God inaugurated the restoration of the just order, the ‘Golden Age’ (aureum tempus), which comes as a result of worshipping the one God. “God, however, like a most indulgent parent, when the last age was drawing near, sent a messenger who restored that old age and brought back justice from exile; lest humankind remain thoroughly and perpetually aggrieved by errors. The Golden Age therefore returns in its beauty and was indeed brought back to earth, but few recognize justice, which is nothing other than pious and reliDI 4.13.1 (BT 2007, 352): Summus igitur deus ac parens omnium cum religionem suam transferre volvisset, doctorem justitiae misit e caelo, ut novis cultoribus novam legem in eo vel per eum daret. Cf. DI 4.14.17. 50 DI 7.27.5 (BT 2011, 733): Pater enim noster ac dominus, qui […] perspectis erroribus hominum ducem misit qui nobis justitia viam panderet. 49

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gious worship of the one God.” 51 The relationship between acquiring the knowledge of the totam veritatem and practicing justice, i.e., that the former is meant to lead to the latter, is nowhere more clearly stated than in Lactantius’ account of Christian education. The final step in the education of a Christian “is to know [God’s] minister and messenger whom He dispatched to earth and, by whose teaching, we are liberated from the error in which we are held and involved, and instructed in the worship of the true God; so that we might learn justice.” 52 The Jesus of Lactantian Christology, therefore, is not simply a revealer of divine truths; the knowledge of which is itself the means to one’s salvation. Rather, for Lactantius, Jesus is the ‘master and teacher’ (magistro ac doctori) who gathers a people that he might lead to God through justice (DI 4.26.22). “Since Christ came to earth prepared with virtue and justice, or better yet, because he is virtue itself and justice itself, he descended so that he might teach this and form humankind. When the teaching office and ambassadorship of God were performed, because of his virtue which he both taught and lived, he merited and made possible belief in God by all nations.” 53 Since the practice of justice is that which determines humankind’s salvation (DI 7.14.2; ID 24.8; Epi. 64.7; etc.), and since human beings can neither know nor practice justice without divine aid (DI 6.6.28, 17.29; etc.), DI 5.7.1 (BT 2009, 459–60): Sed deus ut parens indulgentissimus appropinquante ultimo tempore nuntium misit, qui vetus illud saeculum fugatamque justitiam reduceret, ne humanum genus maximis et perpetuis agitaretur erroribus. (2) Rediit ergo species illius aurei temporis et reddita quidem terrae, sed paucis adsignata justitia est, quae nihil aliud est quam dei unici pia et religiosa cultura. 52 ID 2.2 (SC 289, 94): cognoscere ministrum ejus ac nuntium quem legavit in terram, quo docente, liberati an errore quo inplicati tenebamur formatique ad veri dei cultum, justitiam disceremus.Cf. Chapter 2, III. Sources, A. The Bible. 53 DI 4.16.4 (BT 2007, 373): Qua virtute ac justitia quoniam Christus instructus venit in terram, immo vero quoniam ipse virtus et ipse justitia est, descendit, ut eam doceret hominemque formaret. Quo magisterio ac dei legatione perfunctus ob eam ipsam virtutem, quam simul et docuit et fecit, ab omnibus gentibus et meruit et potuit deus credi. 51

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it was therefore necessary for the salvation of humankind that God send His Son among human beings as the doctor justitiae. One should also avoid reckoning Lactantius’ Christology as clearly fitting the “Jesus as moral exemplar” model due to Jesus’ divine nature. Lactantius’ pre-existence Christology is hinted at in Book 2 of the Institutiones, but is elaborated upon in greater detail in Book 4. 54 Prior to the creation of the universe, God “begat a holy and incorruptible spirit whom He called the Son.” 55 Though God later ‘created’ (creavisset) many other angels, “there is a great difference between this Son of God and the other angels.” 56 God’s Son, His ‘first-born’ (primogenitum), is equal to Him in ‘virtue and majesty’ (virtute ac majestate) (DI 4.6.2; cf. 2.8.3; Epi. 37.3), and His true name is known only to the Father; not to any angel (DI 4.7.1). God’s Son is the eternal Word spoken by the Father. This is more appropriately signified by the Greek word logos than the Latin sermo; “for logos signifies both word and reason, because [the Son] is the voice and wisdom of God.” 57 Since the Father has given everything that is His over to the Son, he “is virtue, he is reason, he is the Word of God, he is wisdom.” 58 In the Son these divine attributes co-inhere because, in God, there is no distinction between His Word and His power (DI 4.29.6). Cf. DI 2.8.1–7 with adds. See also Chapter 4, II. God the Creator, C. Theodicy. 55 DI 4.6.1 (BT 2007, 325): sanctum et incorruptibilem spiritum genuit, quem filium nuncuparet. Cf. Epi. 37.1. 56 DI 4.8.7 (BT 2007, 334): magna inter hunc dei filium ceterosque angelos differentia est. When pushed to be more specific about the difference between the Son and the angles, Lactantius states – after acknowledging that such things are beyond the scope of the human mind – that sacred Scripture refers to the angels as God’s breath (spiritus), whereas the Son is God’s voice (voce) (DI 4.8.6–11; cf. Heb 1:7–14). See P. McGuckin, “Lactantius as Theologian: An Angelic Christology on the Eve of Nicaea,” Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa 22 (1986): 492–497 57 DI 4.9.1 (BT 2007, 336): λόγος enim et sermonem significant et rationem, quia ille est vox et sapientia dei. 58 Epi. 37.2 (BT 1994, 51): est virtus, hic ratio, hic sermo dei, hic sapientia. Cf. 1 Cor 1:24. 54

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Because the Son “is perfect in providence and reason and power,” 59 God created the entire universe through him (Epi. 37.4; quot. Jn 1:3). The Son is the ‘counsellor’ (consiliatore) and ‘artificer’ (artifice) of creation (DI 2.8.7). That God’s Son should have such a role in the formation of the universe, according to Lactantius, is attested to by extra-biblical sources as well as sacred Scripture. 60 “Thus Trismegistus calls him ‘God’s craftsman’ and the Sibyl ‘advisor,’ because he was given such wisdom and virtue by God the Father so as to use his counsel and handiwork in the making of the world.” 61 These same sources affirm that God’s Word, through whom God created all things, is also to be reckoned as God. 62 It should not be supposed, however, that Christians worship two gods. The Father and the Son are one God “because there cannot be the Father without the Son, nor can the Son be separated from the Father. Indeed, one cannot be called a father without a son, nor can a son be generated without a father.” 63 Because of the unity between the Father and the Son, in order to worship the Father one must worship the Son. There is no other way to the Father save through the Son. “One who thinks he worships the Father alone, so as not to worship the Son, does not worship the Father. One who accepts and adopts the name [of the Son], however, truly 59

tus est.

DI 2.8.7 (BT 2005, 151): providentia et ratione et potestate perfec-

On Lactantius’ scriptural evidence for the pre-existence of the Son see DI 4.6.6–8; quot. Prv 8:22–31; DI 4.8.14–16; quot. Ps 33:6; 45:1; Eccl 24:3–4; Jn 1:1–3. 61 DI 4.6.9 (BT 2007, 329): Idcirco illum Trismegistus δημιουργὸν τοῦ ϑεοῦ et Sibylla σύμβουλον appellat, quod tanta sapientia et virtute sit instructus a deo patre, ut consilio ejus et manibus uteretur in fabricatione mundi. Quot. Corp. Herm. Ascl. 26; Orac. Sib. 8.264; cf. Epi. 37.2; quot. Corp. Herm. 1.9; Orac. Sib. 8.264. 62 DI 4.6.4–5; quot. Corp. Herm. 5.1; Orac. Sib. 3.775; 8.329; fr. 1.5; cf. Ascl. 8; Epi. 37.2–6; quot. Corp. Herm. Ascl. 8; Orac. Sib. fr. 1.6; Orac. Sib. 8.329. 63 DI 4.29.3 (BT 2007, 428): quia nec pater a filio potest nec filius a patre secerni, siquidem nec pater sine filio nuncupari nec filius potest sine patre generari. 60

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worships the Father and the Son together; because the Son is the ambassador, messenger, and high priest of the Father. He is the gate of the great temple, the path of light, the guide to salvation, and the entrance to life.” 64 The necessity of worshipping the Father through the Son because of the inseparable communion between the Father and the Son is stated clearly and precisely by Lactantius in his Epitome. Nevertheless, it must not be held that [the Father and the Son] are two gods; for the Father and the Son are one. The Father loves the Son and bestows on him all things. The Son is faithfully obedient to the Father, and does not will anything save from the Father. One certainly, and by necessity, cannot divide such as this. Thus, they might be called two, but in substance, will, and faith they are one. Therefore, the Son is in the Father and the Father is in the Son. One honor must be paid to both as to one God and, even though it is divided into two cults, the division itself is overcome by the inseparable bond. He abandons himself who separates the Father from the Son or the Son from the Father. 65

When God was to inaugurate humankind’s redemption, it was therefore most fitting that He should send His Son; thereby redeeming humanity through the same agent as He created humanity. DI 4.29.14 (BT 2007, 431): Qui solum patrem se colere putat, sicut filium non colit ita ne patrem quidem. (15) Qui autem suscipit et nomen ejus gerit, is vero cum filio simul et patrem colit, quoniam legatus et nuntius et sacerdos summi patris est filius. Hic templi maximi janua est, hic lucis via, hic dux salutis, hic ostium vitae. Cf. DI 4.14.2–3. 65 Epi. 44.4 (BT 1994, 65–66): Nec tamen sic habendum est, tamquam duo sint dii. Pater enim ac filius unum sunt. Cum pater filium diligat omniaque ei trabuat et filius patri fideliter obsequatur nec velit quidquam nisi quod pater, non potest utique necessitudo tanta divelli, ut duo esse dicantur, in quibus et substantia et voluntas et fides una est. (5) Ergo et filius per patrem et pater per filium.Unus est honos utrique tribuendus tamquam uni deo et ita dividendus est per duos cultus, ut division ipsa compage inseparabili vinciatur. Neutrum sibi relinquet, qui aut patrem a filio aut filium a patre secernit. 64

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It was according to God’s providential plan that, when humankind was in utter ruin – denying the existence of the transcendent, worshipping the elements of the earth which are below them, and giving themselves over to vice and injustice (DI 4.1.3–6) – that He should send His ‘great leader’ (ducem magnum) to unite wisdom and religion in his very person (DI 4.2.5–6). Through the incarnation of the Son, the Father calls human beings of every nation back to worship of Himself. It is most appropriate that this mission be accomplished through the incarnation of the Son so that it would be God’s very Word “who would be the master of God’s teaching and bringing the secret of heaven to humankind.” 66 The incarnation of the Word occurred in a manner reflective of the communion between the Father and the Son. Just as God the Father is called ‘fatherless’ (ἀπάτωρ) and ‘motherless’ (ἀμήτωρ) because He is without origin, so too is the Son called ‘motherless,’ in that He originates from the Father, and ‘fatherless,’ in that his advent on earth occurred without the intervention of a human father (DI 4.13.2–5; cf. Corp. Herm., vol. 4, fr. 4a; DI 1.7.2; 4.8.5; Epi. 2.2, 4.4). Thus, “he was made Son of God through the spirit and made man through the flesh, i.e., both God and man.” 67 It was according to God’s divine plan that the Son should become incarnate in ‘the form of a man and mortal condition’ (figura hominis et condicione mortali) so that, living according to the virtue which he preached, “he would rise from the dead and offer the hope of conquering death to humanity; for whom he took on flesh and was born.” 68 In answering the question of why God needed to become human in order to effect redemption, Lactantius once again concentrates his arguments on the pedagogical; i.e., on the necessary conditions of the ‘perfect teacher’ (doctor perfectus). If Christ came simply as a man, then his teachings would contain no DI 4.8.8 (BT 2007, 334): quod ille magister futurus esset doctrinae dei et caelestis arcani ad homines perferendi. 67 DI 4.13.5 (BT 2007, 353): Factus est dei filius per spiritum et hominis per carnem, id est et deus et homo. 68 DI 4.10.1 (BT 2007, 337–38): resurgeret et homini, quem induerat, quem gerebat, et spem vincendae mortis offerret et ad praemia immortalitatis admitteret. 66

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credibility, no certainty. The doctrines of a teacher who was simply human would not only be left open to doubt and criticism, but – supposing the perfection of his/her doctrines – the teacher could in no way live up to them. “Even if he/she possessed great virtue, he/she could not possess it supremely, sufficient to resist all vice; the material of which [i.e., vice] is contained within. So it is that an earthly teacher cannot be perfect.” 69 On the other hand, if Christ came solely as God, then his teachings would be deemed impossible for human beings to live by, the divine fiat of an authoritarian lawgiver (DI 4.23.8). “Now if [Christ] came to human beings as God, […] he certainly could not teach virtue as God because, lacking a body, he will not do what he teaches and thus will not be perfect in his teaching. […] The master and teacher of virtue must be most like humanity so that, in conquering sin, he teaches the human person that sin can be conquered by him.” 70 It was necessary, therefore, for the doctor perfectus to be both God and man. “He was, therefore, both God and man, existing as the middle between God and humanity – hence the Greeks call him ‘Mediator’ – so that he could lead human beings to God; i.e., to immortality. For if he had only been divine, as said above, he could not present humanity with examples of virtue. But if he had only been man, he could not lead human beings to justice.” 71 DI 4.24.4 (BT 2007, 404): Et si maxime possit, summam tamen virtutem capere nequeat et omnibus vitiis resistere, quorum materia in visceribus continetur. Eo fit, ut terrenus doctor perfectus esse non possit. Cf. DI 4.32.3–10. 70 DI 4.24.6 (BT 2007, 405, 406): Nam si veniat ad homines ut deus, […] ipse certe deus virtutem docere non poterit, quia expers corporis non faciet quae docebit ac per hoc doctrina ejus perfecta non erit. […] (12) oportet magistrum doctoremque virtutis homini simillimum fieri, ut vincendo peccatum doceat hominem vinci ab eo posse peccatum. Cf. DI 4.24.19; Epi. 45.1–5. 71 DI 4.25.5 (BT 2007, 409–10): Fuit igitur et deus et homo, inter deum atque hominem medius constitutus – unde illum Graeci μεσίτην vocat –, ut hominem perducere ad deum posset id est ad immortalitatem, quia si deus tantum fuisset, ut supra dictum est, exempla virtutis homini 69

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Christ’s status as the divine pedagogue, therefore, is contingent upon his personhood. Christ could not be the doctor justititia unless he was both human and divine. Thus, while Lactantius’ soteriology may lack a satisfaction theory of atonement – i.e., Christ’s passion and cross are largely demonstrations of Jesus’ virtue which serve as pedagogical examples – it is not because the apologist denies Jesus’ divine origin. 72 Many scholars have maintained, however, that Lactantius’ pre-existence Christology resonates with Arianism. 73 This position is based, essentially, on two points: first, Lactantius’ quoting of Proverbs 8:22–31 in DI 4.6.6–8 and, second, the resonance of DI 4.29.12 with Novatian’s De Trinitate 31.1–2. 74 The first point is regarded as evidence of Lactantius’ subordinationist Christology simply because “the Arians were so fond of using [Proverbs 8:22–31] in their arguments.” 75 The flaw in this reasoning, of course, is that it would place every ante-Nicaean Christian theologian who quoted Proverbs 8:22–31 in the category of protoArian; a rather sweeping judgment which fails to consider the context in which the quotation is used and the source from which it is most likely derived. Lactantius employs Proverbs 8:22–31 to support of Jesus’ identity as God’s divine Wisdom made flesh, not to praebere non posset, si homo tantum, non posset homines ad justitiam cogere. Cf. Gal 3:19–20; 1 Tm 2:5; Heb 8:6. 72 Concerning the cross, Lactantius states plainly that from it ‘God was suspended’ (dei suspensus est) (DI 4.18.12). 73 Cf. V. Loi, Lattanzio, 203–07; A. Grillmeier, Christ in the Christion Tradition, vol. 1, 201–02; B. Studer, “La sotériologie de Lactance,” in Lactance et son temps, ed. J. Fontaine and M. Perrin (Paris: Beauchesne, 1978), 253–69; A. Bowen and P. Garnsey, Lactantius: Divine Institutes, 232 n. 18. 74 My claim that there are two pieces of evidence which support a subordinationist reading of Lactantius’ Christology takes into account Fr. McGuckin’s critique of this position. In other words, Fr. McGuckin has already adequately addressed what might be seen as other evidence of Lactantius’ subordinationist Christology. Cf. P. McGuckin, “The Christology of Lactantius,” Studia Patristica 17/2 (1982): 813–20. The present author concurs entirely with Fr. McGuckin’s analysis. 75 A. Grillmeier, Christ in the Christion Tradition, vol. 1, 202. See also note 150 on the same page.

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demonstrate that the Son was ‘made’ (condidit) (DI 4.6.6). Further, though Tertullian – a theologian from whom Lactantius drew much and who was given to subordinationism (adv. Prax. 9.2; 10.1) – does quote a portion of Proverbs 8:22–31 (adv. Prax. 7.1, 3), it is far more likely that Lactantius derived this quotation from Cyprian’s Ad Quirinum (Testim. 2.1.1). The latter text is a catena of scriptural passages from the Hebrew Bible meant to demonstrate Christ’s divinity to a Jewish audience. Lactantius made use of the passages contained in Ad Quirinum extensively throughout Book 4 of the Institutiones. 76 In fact, if there is any genre of early Christian literature that Book 4 of the Institutiones mirrors in both content and form, it is an Adversus Judaeos. 77 Simply inserting a scriptural passage – known at a later date! – by Arians is hardly, therefore, sufficient evidence in itself to warrant that Lactantius be given the label of subordinationist. The observation that DI 4.29.12 corresponds remarkably to Novatian’s De Trinitate 31.1–2 is certainly an accurate one if the periscopes are isolated. 78 In the former passage, Lactantius states: “He is the one, only, free and highest God; lacking origin because He Himself is the origin of created beings and in Him are bound

For an exhaustive list of Lactantius’ use of Ad Quirinum in Book 4 of the Institutiones see BT 2011, 773–74. On this topic, see also, P. McGuckin, “Non-Cyprianic Scripture,” 145–63. 77 Cf. P. McGuckin, “Non-Cyprianic Scripture,” 154–55. While time prevents us from exploring Lactantius’ Christology in greater depth, an important point to note is the apologist’s consistent argument that Jesus ought to be reckoned as the messiah not because he worked miracles, but because in his life, death, and resurrection he fulfilled the messianic prophecies contained in both the OT and non-scriptural divina testamonia (cf. DI 5.3.1–26). As a result, Book 4 of the Institutiones is rife with scriptural and non-scriptural quotations which, according to Lactantius, find their fulfillment in the person and work of Christ. This method of demonstration aligns well with an Adversus Judaeos; which is precisely the case with Cyprian’s Ad Quirinum. 78 Cf. Loi, Lattanzio, 205. 76

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together, at the same time, the Son and all things.” 79 In the latter passage, Novatian remarks: “God the Father is, therefore, the Former and Creator of all things. He alone knows no origin. He is the invisible, infinite, immortal, eternal, and one God; to whose magnitude, majesty, and virtue, I would not say nothing is shown, but nothing can be compared. From Him, when He willed it, the Son, the Word, was born.” 80 The similarities between these two periscopes, which are certainly present in relation to content, are such that one would not necessarily attribute the sourcedependence of one upon the other, and there is little evidence which shows that Lactantius even knew of Novatian’s treatise. 81 In fact, when viewed in their respective contexts, it appears much less likely that Lactantius had Novatian’s treatise in mind when formulating his thoughts about the relationship between the Father and the Son. In chapter 31 of De Trinitate, Novatian, like many subordinationists after him, equates the fullness of divinity with being ‘unbegotten’ (non genitus). If the Word, like the Father, was ‘without origin’ (sine origine), then there would be two gods (31.8). Novatian’s purpose in this chapter is to demonstrate the Word’s divine status by affirming that he has no source of origin other than the Father (31.13), while at the same time preserving Christian monotheism by asserting that only the Father is the one, unbegotten, God (31.20– DI 4.29.12 (BT 2007, 430): Unus est enim, solus, liber, deus summus, carens origine, quia ipse est origo rerum et in eo simul et filius et omnia continentur. For another possible source of inspiration for this passage, although without making mention of the Son, see Cic. Tusc. 1.66. 80 Novatian, De Trinitate 31.1 (PL 3): Est ergo Deus Pater omnium institutor et creator, solus originem nesciens, invisibilis, immensus, immortalis, aeternus, unus Deus; cujus neque magnitudini, neque majestati, neque virtuti quidquam non dixerim praeferri, sed nec comparari potest. (2) Ex, quo, quando ipse volvit, Sermo Filius natus est. 81 The greatest possible link between Lactantius’ work and Novatian’s De Trinitate is their common use of the word verbum, instead of sermo, in quoting John 1:1 (DI 4.8.16; 6.25.12; De Trin. 30.17). In more concrete terms, however, Lactantius’ use of verbum in this instance simply means that his source for John 1:1 was not Cyprian, but neither was it necessarily Novatian. Cf. R. M. Ogilvie, Library, 105. 79

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21). When referring to the Word as ‘God,’ therefore, Christians are not equating the Son with the Father, but referring to the Word’s divine origin, the divinity granted to him by the Father, and his communion with the Father (31.17, 20). “Whence the true and eternal Father is seen as God.” 82 Lactantius, on the other hand, is not concerned with such lofty and speculative theological dogmas. The language which Novatian uses to describe the relationship of origin between the Father and the Son – e.g., non genitus (31.7) unigenitus (31.14) primogenitus (31.14) – appears sparingly in the works of Lactantius. 83 The adjectives which Lactantius uses to describe God – e.g., solus, liber, summus, carens origine – as well as the Son and all of creation being contained in Him (DI 4.29.12), are not attributed specifically to the person of the Father, as they are in Novatian’s De Trinitate (31.10– 14), but to God or the divine nature in general. The apologist’s goal has little to do with parsing the nuances of binitarian theology. Rather, he merely seeks to emphasize the co-equal status of the Father and the Son in such a way as to make worship of the Son necessary for salvation. “The Father, therefore, makes the Son and the Son makes the Father; between them there is one mind, one spirit, one substance. […] Since, then, the mind and will of the one is the other or, better yet, since one mind and will is in both, each merits to be called the one God; because whatever is in the Father flows to the Son and whatever is in the Son descends from the Father. It is not possible, therefore, to worship the one almighty God except through the Son.” 84 When placed into their mutual contexts, thereNovatian, De Trinitate 31.20 (PL 3): Unde unus Deus ostenditur verus at aeternus Pater. 83 Of the three terms mentioned, Lactantius uses only the word primogenitum to refer to the Son’s origin (DI 4.6.2, 11.7). But he also uses the same word – as derived from the Orphica – to describe the nature of the Father (DI 1.5.4, 7). Thus, the apologist is not using this term with the same precision as Novatian. 84 DI 4.29.4 (BT 2007, 428, 430–31): Cum igitur et pater filium faciat et filius patrem, una utrique mens, unus spiritus, una substantia est. […] (13) Quapropter cum mens et voluntas alterius in altero sit vel potius una in utroque, merito unus deus uterque appellatur, quia quidquid est in 82

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fore, these two passages – which at first glance appear very similar – can be seen as excerpts in two very different theological arguments. 85 Lastly, maintaining a subordinationist Christology would have undermined Lactantius’ entire apologetic goal of portraying Christ as the doctor perfectus. Again, the thrust of Lactantius’ argument is that the doctor perfectus must be both human and divine. Christ’s divinity gives authority to his teaching. Christ’s humanity demonstrates that his teaching can be lived. “The Mediator came therefore, i.e., God in the flesh, so that the flesh could follow him and he might rescue humankind from the death which rules over the flesh. On this account he clothed himself in the flesh so that by taming the desires of the flesh he might teach that sin is not a necessity, but a matter of temptation and will.” 86 Fundamentally, Lactantius conceived of his own Christology as consistent with the universal and catholic Church; a Church which Christ himself founded and, in which, the Father and Son are worshipped together. This is Lactantius’ primary concern, that the unity between the Father and the Son be acknowledged in such way as to demand the worship of them both as to one God; such worship as occurs only in the Church. Any further detail as to their eternal relationship is patre, ad filium transfluit, et quidquid est in filio, a patre descendit. (14) Non potest igitur summus ille ac singularis deus nisi per filium coli. It should be noted that Novatian also refers to the Father and the Son as sharing a ‘common substance’ (substantiae communionem) (31.20). This is further evidence that determining the orthodoxy of ante-Nicean authors based simply on their use of Nicean and post-Nicean Trinitarian ‘key words’ is less than helpful. 85 It is also worth mentioning that Lactantius refers to the Novatianists as heretics in DI 4.30.10. It seems hard to imagine that the apologist would knowingly adopt the subordinationist Christology of the founder of a sect which, in his estimation, had ‘ceased being Christians’ (Christiani esse desierunt) (DI 4.30.10). 86 DI 4.25.8 (BT 2007, 410): Itaque idcirco mediator advenit id est deus in carne, ut caro eum sequi posset, et eriperet hominem morti, cujus est dominatio in carnem. Ideo carne se induit, ut desideriis carnis edomitis doceret non necessitatis esse peccare, sed propositi ac voluntatis.

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beyond the scope of the apologist’s aim. “[The Church] is the house of the faithful, the immortal temple, in which if one does not sacrifice, he/she cannot obtain the prize of immortality. Christ was the maker of this great and eternal temple, thus it is necessary for him to have the eternal priesthood in it; nor can one come into the sight of God except through him who established the temple.” 87 According to Lactantius, therefore, the person and work of Christ is neither simply didactic nor should it associated with subordinationism. It is Christ who, by being both God and man, is the doctor perfectus. In his teaching he revealed the knowledge of the one God (vera sapientia), and by his life of virtue he demonstrated how the one God is to be worshipped (verus cultus). Thus true wisdom and true worship find their embodiment, their enfleshment, in the person of the incarnate Word, Jesus Christ. 88 In the words of Fr. McGuckin: “For Lactantius, Christ is the personal atonement of Religion and Wisdom.” 89 Further, just as human beings are brought to knowledge of the one God by Jesus’ teachings – i.e., by Christ’s munus as prophet –, so too are they lead to God through the Church which Jesus founded and in which he holds the eternal high priesthood – i.e., through Christ’s munus as priest. Only in the Church can one come to know Jesus’ teachings and exercise the proper worship that is God’s due; namely, worship of the Father and the Son together. “It is only the catholic Church, therefore, which has retained true worship. She is the source of truth, the house of the faithful, and the temple of God. If one should not enter her or if one should exist away from her, one is separated DI 4.14.2 (BT 2007, 360): Haec est domus fidelis, hoc immortale templum, in quo si quis non sacrificaverit, immortalitatis praemium non habebit. (3) Cujus templi et magni et aeterni quoniam Christus fabricator fuit, idem necesse est habeat in eo sacerdotium sempiternum, nec potest nisi per eum qui constituit ad templum et ad conspectum dei perveniri. 88 One should recall here Lactantius’ criteria for truth which he articulates at the start of the Institutiones. DI 1.1.25 (BT 2005, 6): neque religio ulla sine sapientia suscipienda sit nec ulla sine religione probanda sapientia. 89 P. McGuckin, “The Christology of Lactantius,” 814. 87

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from the hope of life and salvation.” 90 The priesthood of Christ was demonstrated nowhere more perfectly than at his crucifixion. “The cross exalted [Jesus] in both deed and symbol, so that his majesty and virtue might be noticed by all through his passion. For when he extended his hands for the yoke, he in fact spread his wings eastward and westward, under which all nations from both parts of the world might gather to find rest.” 91 Similarly, Christ founded the Church as an eternal temple so that, through her, he “might summon all nations to true religion.” 92 As for Jesus’ munus as king, from whence the title of Christ has been given to him (DI 4.7.7–8; Epi. 37.9), this will be fulfilled at his second coming. “God has established that Christ would come to earth twice, first so that he might proclaim the one God to the nations, second so that he might reign.” 93 Because Jesus fulfilled his earthly mission to teach humankind justice by conquering the passions, not only has God granted to him victory over death, but victory over all of creation. Quoting Daniel 7:13–14, Lactantius applies this apocalyptic vision of ‘the son of man’ (filius hominis) to the person of Jesus, who “is liberator, and judge, and avenger, and king, and God, and whom we call Christ.” 94 While the details of Christ’s second coming will be addressed in the section below, it DI 4.30.11 (BT 2007, 433): Sola igitur catholica eccelsia est, quae verum cultum retinet. Hic est fons veritatis, hoc domicilium fidei, hoc templum dei. Quo si quis non intraverit vel a quo si quis exierit, a spe vitae ac salutis alienus est. 91 Epi. 46.5 (BT 1994, 67–68): Adeo illum crux et re et significatione exaltavit, ut omnibus majestas ejus ac virtus cum ipsa passione notuerit. Nam quod extendit in patibulo manus, utique alas suas in orietem occidentemque porrexit, sub quas universae nationes ab utraque mundi parte ad requiem convenirent. Cf. DI 4.26.33–34. 92 DI 4.14.1 (BT 2007, 360): universas gentes ad religionem veram dei convocaret. Cf. DI 1.1.19–20. 93 DI 4.12.14 (BT 2007, 349): sit a deo constitutum, ut idem Christus bis adveniat in terram, semel ut unum deum gentibus nuntiet, deinde rursus ut regnet. 94 DI 7.19.4 (BT 2011, 709): est enim liberator et judex et ultor et rex et deus, quem nos Christum vocamus. Cf. Dn 7:13–14. 90

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should suffice here to note that his munus as king, which he won by his teaching and virtue, awaits fulfillment at the eschaton. “At that time evil will be removed from all things human [and] the golden age, so called by the poets, will arise; i.e., a time of justice and peace.” 95 Thus, while the name of Christ is absent in much of Lactantius’ work, this does not mean that he plays a lesser role in God’s providential plan for humanity. On the contrary, Jesus is central to Lactantius’ theology. Christ’s role in salvation history, however, is related by Lactantius according to his apologetic method. Lactantius treats Jesus in a way which is similar to his use of Scripture, i.e., he reserves the use and discussion of specifically Christian sources and topics until his exposition demands that they be addressed. In practical terms this means withholding the revelation of the incarnation of the Word until the final stage of Christian education (cf. ID 2.3). Though this method may strike the contemporary Christian as counter-intuitive, Lactantius is concerned with articulating the Christian faith to his audience of Roman docti in the manner to which they will be most receptive (ordo disciplinae); not in the manner which Christians themselves would find most coherent (ordo doctrinae). If one were to take into account the entire breadth of salvation history, however, one would find that, for Lactantius, the person of Christ stands at the summit of God’s divine plan for humanity. In Christ wisdom and religion are united in a single person. He reveals the one God to humankind and, in doing so, the demands of justice in relation to the one God. Further, he lived out this teaching by his own conquering of sin, and founded the community in which others might do the same; thereby bringing to humanity the means of salvation. Lastly, his coming marks the beginning of God’s direct intervention into all of human history at the eschaton. For the brief time in between Christ’s first and second coming “the holy people are being formed by the teaching and preDI 4.12.21 (BT 2007, 352): tunc sublato de rebus humanis omni malo aureum saeculum ut poetae vocant, id est justum ac pacificum tempus orietur. 95

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cepts of God.” 96 Thus, the entire sweep of human history is brought to its fulfillment, to its divine telos, in the person and work of Christ. Precisely how this will be accomplished is the subject our next section. C. Eschatology Lactantius begins his exploration into Eschatology midway through the seventh and final book of the Institutiones. 97 Here we discover that the rhetorician follows the millennialist path pioneered by Irenaeus, Justin and Tertullian. 98 As one scholar has noted, Lactantius’ eschatological writings are “the high point of chiliasm in the West.” 99 In other words, few approach the length and detail with which Lactantius proclaims the coming millennial reign of Christ. His explication begins with a confession that the world is in its senescence (DI 7.14.3; cf. Lucr. 2.1144–74; Corp. Herm. Ascl. 25– 26). God created the cosmos in six days (cf. Gn 2:1), and since “‘before your eyes, Lord, one day is just as a thousand years,’” 100 the temporal finitude of the earth’s presently constituted order must last for six thousand years. According to the calculations Lac-

DI 7.14.13 (BT 2011, 696): sanctus populus doctrina et praeceptis dei ad justitiam figuratur. 97 For a recent commentary on Book 7 of the Institutiones see Stefan Freund, Laktanz, Divinae Institutiones Buch 7: De Vita Beata. Einleitung, Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009); see also Hedwigis van Rooijen-Dijkman, De vita Beata, het 7e boek van de Divinae Institutiones van Lactantius: Analyse en bronnenonderzoek (Assen: 1967). 98 In De viris illustribus, 18, Jerome conveniently lists many of the Patristic millennialists: i.e., Papias, Irenaeus, Apollinaris of Hierapolis, Tertullian (cf. adv. Mar. 3.24–6), Victorinus of Pettau and Lactantius. 99 Charles Hill, Regnum Caelorum (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2001), 41. Quot. G. G. Blum, “Chiliasmus II. Alte Kirche,” TRE 7: 731. 100 DI 7.14.9 (BT 2011, 695): ‘ante oculos tuos, domine, mille anni tamquam dies unus.’ Quot. Ps 90:4. For further millennial readings of Ps 90:4 see 2 Pt 3:8; Pseudo-Barnabus Ep. 15.4; Victorinus of Pettau De fabrica mundi 6; Irenaeus Adv. Haer. 5.23.2; Justin Dialogue with Trypho 81.3; et al. 96

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tantius accepts, no more than two hundred of these years remain. 101 Further, just as God rested on and sanctified the seventh day (cf. Gn 2:2), at the terminus of six thousand years God will inaugurate a millennial Sabbath; where “all evil will be abolished from the earth and justice will reign for a thousand years.” 102 The events that precipitate the millennial Sabbath are as numerous as they are unpleasant. They will begin with the fall of Roman imperial dominance. 103 Ten rulers will emerge to fill the political vacuum and constant civil strife will ensue. A prince from the north will then assert himself over this decemvirate, destroying three of its members, forming an alliance with the remaining leaders, and transferring the seat of power from Rome to the east. 104 The reign of this tyrant will be marked by military conquest, natural disasters en masse, and celestial catastrophes (DI 7.16.5–11). During this horrific period people “will pray to God and He will not hear them, they will desire death and it will not come.” 105 The human DI 7.25.5. On the dating which Lactantius uses see Theophilus of Antioch Ad Autol. 2.29. See also Nicholson, “The Source of the Dates,” 291–310. 102 DI 7.14.11 (BT 2011, 695): malitia omnis aboleatur e terra et regnet per annos mille justitia. 103 DI 7.15.11–16. Lactantius, like Tertullian (cf. Apol. 32.1), views the fall of Rome as an ominous and highly undesirable event despite his antagonism towards the political authorities for the persecution of Christians (cf. DI 7.25.6–8). This sentiment is shared neither by the Sibyls (Orac. Sib. 8.1–16, 165–73) nor Hystaspes (Hyst. fr. 13a). 104 DI 7.16.3. On the ten rulers see Rv 13:1; 17:12; Dn 7:8, 24; Tert. De resurrection carnis 24.18; 25.1; Ire. Adv. Haer. 5.26; et al. On the significance of the mysterious figure from the north, a clue may be located in prophetic literature, where bad things tend to come from the north (cf. Jer 1:13–15; Ez 1:4). On the catalogue of horrendous events see Orac. Sib. 2.21–24; 4.152–57; 5.179; 8; Corp. Herm. Ascl. 25; Hyst. fr. 14. On the empire moving to the east see Orac. Sib. 3.350–55; 4.145–48; 8.9–165; Hyst. fr. 13a. 105 DI 7.16.12 (BT 2011, 703): orabunt deum et non exaudiet, optabitur mors et non veniet. Cf. Rv 9:6; 15:18; Orac. Sib. 2.306–11; 3.544; 7.5, 103, 123; 8.350–65; Corp. Herm. Ascl. 24–25. 101

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race will be decimated, and even two thirds of the cultoribus dei will perish (DI 7.16.14; cf. Rv 9:15, 18; Orac. Sib. 3.544; 7.123). At the same time a great prophet of God will arise to work miracles and will convert many people to the worship of the one God (DI 7.17.1–2; Cf. Rv 11:3–14; Justin Dial. 49; Orac. Sib. 2.187–95). At the end of his ministry, a king from Syria will kill the prophet who will exceed all previous evils (DI 7.17.2–3). This second despot, whom Lactantius elsewhere refers to the anti-Christ (DI 7.19.6), will also possess the power to perform wonders. He will severely persecute the worshippers of God; forcing them to flee into the desert. This tyrant will proclaim himself to be the Christ, emblazon a mark upon his disciples and lay waste to the earth for 42 months. 106 The denouement of his reign of terror will be a siege against the righteous in the desert; where God will finally answer the prayers of the faithful. At that moment, Christ will descend from the skies accompanied by a host of heavenly angels and inextinguishable fire. 107 The anti-Christ alone from among the nefarious forces will survive the barrage of this heavenly assembly. He will repeatedly renew his offensive against the celestial army “until the fourth war brings about the conquering of all the impious.” 108 At this time the princeps daemonum himself will be captured and restrained (DI 7.24.5; cf. Rv 20:2).

DI 7.17.7–8. Cf. Rv 13:11–18; Orac. Sib. 3.63–70. On the duration of 42 months see Rv 13:5. On the similarities between DI 7.17 and Rv 11 and 13 consult David Aune, Word Biblical Commentary: Revelation, vol. 2 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 590–93, 726–28. 107 DI 7.19.5. Quot. Orac. Sib. 3.652; 5.107–10; 8.326; Hyst. fr. 15; Corp. Herm. Ascl. 26; cf. Rv 19:11–21. No other Patristic author does more than merely mention the existence of Hystaspes (cf. Justin 1 Apol. 20.1, 44.12; Clement Strom. 6.5.43). For an analysis of the Oracle of Hystaspes in Patristic authors, largely Lactantius, see John R. Hinnells, “The Zoroastrian Doctrine,” 125–48. 108 DI 7.19.6 (BT 2011, 710): donec quarto proelio confectis omnibus impiis debellatus. Quot. Orac. Sib. 3.618; 8.224; cf. Rv 19:11–21; Mt 24:29–31; Justin 1 Apol. 1.52. 106

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With justice and peace secured, those who worshipped the one God will be resurrected and judged by Christ. 109 This reckoning will be determined according to people’s ‘actions’ (opera). “If the good and just ones are more numerous and profound, then they are given a life of bliss. If the bad ones should prevail, however, they are condemned to punishment.” 110 The means by which this judgment occurs is a literal trial by fire. A divine conflagration, which burns but does not consume (cf. Ex 3:2), will scorch and torment those whose sins are too great but leave the virtuous unharmed. 111 Once this process is completed, with only the righteous remaining, Christ will rule over the earth for one thousand years with the resurrected faithful acting as judges. Justice and peace will prosper, the natural world will become abundantly fecund and serene, and all shall honor their king as Lord in this heavenly city he has established. 112 Nearing the end of the millennium, however, the princeps daemonum will be released from his prison, gather many to his sinister cause, and make war upon the civitas sancta. 113 God’s DI 7.24.1. This is the first resurrection of only those who worshipped the one God. Quot. Orac. Sib. 3.741–43; 4.40–43; 8.81–83, 241– 42, 413–16; fr. 4; cf. Rv 20:4–6; Tert. De res. 25; adv. Mar. 3.24–26. 110 DI 7.20.6 (BT 2011, 712): si plura et gravia fuerint bona justaque, dentur ad vitam beatam, si autem mala superaverint, condemnentur ad poenam. 111 DI 7. 21.6–7. Cf. Rv 20:14; 21:8; Tert. Apol. 48.4, 13–15; Hyst. fr. 16; Orac. Sib. 2.253–56; 8.410–11. 112 DI 7.24.2, 6–8. Cf. Rv 20:1–6. On the natural conditions of the earth during Christ’s millennial reign see Is 11; Ez 47:12; Am 9:13–15; etc. To support belief in a thousand year duration of earthly bliss Lactantius quotes Verg. Aen 6.719–21, 748–51; Ecl. 4.21–22, 28–30, 38–45; Orac. Sib. 3.619, 787; 5.281. For an analysis of how Lactantius employs the pagan myth of the Golden Age to this belief see Swift, “Golden Age,” 144–56. 113 DI 7.26.1; cf. Rv 20:7. Concerning those who rally around the prince of demons: Lactantius mentions that Satan’s legions will be comprised of those who were ruled by the resurrected just (DI 7.26.1). Hence, they must be the descendants of those who were alive at Christ’s second coming (cf. DI 7.24.3), for all those alive at that time would have been judged at the first resurrection. Thus it is possible, during Christ’s millen109

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final wrath will then be unleashed upon the unfaithful. For three days, while the people of God take shelter under the earth, hailstorms of fire will consume the treacherous adversaries until they are no more (DI 7.26.2; cf. Ez 38:20, 22). For the remaining seven years of the millennium, only the people of God will remain. They will live in peace and serenity until the second, general resurrection of all the dead occurs; “at which time the unjust will be expelled to eternal torment.” 114 At the terminus of the millennium will be the consummation of all things. “The world will be renewed by God […] and God will transform humankind unto the likeness of angels,” 115 serving and worshipping Him forever.

III. CONCLUSION

This last chapter has addressed Lactantius’ understanding of salvation history. Lactantius views all of human history through the lens of salvation history. The human person, according to Lactantius, is a ‘heavenly creature’ (caeleste animal), endowed with intelligence and reason (DI 2.1.14–15), who was created by God with these capacities in order to know and worship Him. Since this is the end for which humankind was created, to be ignorant of the one God and to worship ‘the work of fingers’ (opera digitorum) (DI 2.1.19) is to act contrary to human nature. Accordingly, when Lactantius interprets human history it is through this anthropological lens. Since knowing and worshipping God is the end for which humankind was created, Lactantius maintains that in their earliest history human beings, being closer in time to their actual creation, knew and worshipped the one God. This ur-monotheism is the true ‘natural religion,’ it is the religion to which humankind was led in conformity nial reign on earth, for people to bear offspring and – for these individuals – to be converted to the cause of the Adversarium. 114 DI 7.26.5 (BT 2011, 729): in qua excitabuntur injusti ad cruciatus sepiternos. Cf. Rv 20:12–15; Justin Dial. 81.4; Orac. Sib. 3.649–51; et al. At the second or general resurrection (publica omnium resurrection) all of the dead shall be judged. 115 DI 7.26.5 (BT 2011, 729): renovabitur mundus a deo […]. Et transformabit deus homines in similtudinem angelorum. Cf. Mt 22:30; Mk 12:25; Lk 20:36; Tert. De res. 62.

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to its nature. As time progressed, however, human beings gradually fell away from the knowledge and worship of the one God and, thereby, grew more and more isolated from justice. Since justice is “the source of virtue” 116 from which all other virtues flow, abandonment of justice also led to the proliferation of every vice across the human spectrum. God, however, seeing the pitiable condition into which humanity had fallen, sent His Son in order to draw people back to Himself by giving them the knowledge and the means by which they might practice justice. In this way, i.e., by living a life of virtue and justice, the human person is able to merit the reward for which he was created; namely, a life of immortal beatitude, knowing and worshipping God for all eternity (DI 7.14.2). Not much time remains, however, for humanity to return to the knowledge and worship of the one God. In less than two centuries (DI 7.25.5), God’s Son will return to earth to reign for a thousand years, after which, the entire cosmos will be transformed by God. When that occurs, all of creation will be brought to its final perfection, and the blessed will be ‘in the likeness of angels’ (in similitudinem angelorum) and will “always be in the sight of the Almighty.” 117 As mentioned above, Lactantius’ theology of history is a living demonstration of his anthropology. Though Lactantius does not explicitly make this comparison, there is an interesting parallel to be noted between the cosmology and anthropology advocated by Lactantius and that of the philosophical school against which he never tires of rattling, the Epicureans. One of Lactantius’ chief critiques of the Epicurean denial of providence is that if this doctrine is denied then there is no accounting for the well-patterned order of creation. The random and haphazard coming together of atoms could in no way produce a universe with such intelligibility, utility, and beauty. If providence did not exist, in other words, the result ought to be chaos and a “formless void” (Gn 1:2) devoid of structure. Similarly, when the human person acts as if he were not providentially designed to know and worship God, then the chaos of vice reigns within him. In this analogy, human history after the disappearance of ur-monotheism resembles Epicurus’ ‘chaos of mat116 117

DI 5.5.1 (BT 2009, 453): summa virtus aut fons est ipsa virtutis. DI 7.26.5 (BT 2011, 729): semper in conspectu omnipotentis.

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ter’ (materiae confusa) (DI 1.5.8), an age dominated by evil habits, ignorance, and blindness (DI 5.6.10). God’s providential will, however, cannot be thwarted. Human beings were created in order to know and worship God. They were born for justice (DI 3.9.19; 6.25.9; cf. Cic. Leg. 1.28; Epi. 29.1–7). By His direct intervention into human history, through the incarnation of His Son, God has endeavored once again to bring justice to humankind. Christ’s role in salvation, therefore, is to return human beings to God by returning them to themselves, to their true natures, to the piety that ‘binds’ (religat) them to God because they are rational creatures. Christ’s work in his first coming, then, is fundamentally restorative. This restoration, however, is but preparation for final transformation. Christ’s first coming, according to Lactantius, inaugurates the beginning, rather than the end, of the restoration of justice. It ushers in a new Golden Age which, at the time of the apologist’s writing, was to find its ultimate perfection at Christ’s second coming in the not-so-distant future. Christ came to restore humankind’s natural end, i.e., justice, as preparation for receiving its supernatural end, i.e., the immortal life of bliss. Since this chapter treats Christian salvation history, it is far from difficult to find God’s providence at work in the events recounted. But the firm connection to be noted in what has been addressed is between salvation history, the doctrine of providence, and anthropology. Although Lactantius is an apologist rather than a systematician, when the topics he treats are examined systematically, as has been done here, one can discern the pattern of the positive theological structure which Lactantius is constructing. Lactantius begins by defending of the doctrine of providence and, once defended, uses providence as evidence for what he believes are the most essential divine attributes – this is especially true of God’s oneness and status as aeterna mens. The apologist once again uses the evidence of providence to confirm that God is the sole Creator of all that exists, including humankind. With a plentitude of testimony found in the natural world, Lactantius then demonstrates that the human person was created in order to know and worship his Creator; that is, created for justice. This is precisely what characterizes human existence at its earliest history but, having forgotten the knowledge and worship of God, humankind fell into ignorance and vice. It was necessary, therefore, for God Himself to raise up humankind from the lowly status to which it had sunk by

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acting contrary to its nature, contrary to the providentially-designed way in which it was created. The end of salvation history, therefore, is the fulfillment of providence. It is God entering into human history in order to bring about the perfection of the creature who is made to know and love Him eternally.

CONCLUSION The aim of this work has been to examine the role of the doctrine of providence in the theology of Lactantius. Prior to this examination, however, consideration was given to understanding Lactantius’ goals and method as an apologist. Lactantius expressly mentions in the Institutiones that his goal in writing this grand apology is “to overthrow in one attack all the accusers of justice everywhere who are writing or will have written.” 1 The apologist is inspired to compose this work by the very real and immanent threat posed to Christians by those in political power who condemn the innocent without providing an opportunity for their defense (DI 5.1.2). In order to defend Christians against these attacks, Lactantius believes that an apologist must expose the errors of Greco-Roman religion and philosophy, and allow the truths of Christianity to shine forth. Lactantius’ goal, as he tells us in the Institutiones, is to “demonstrate human wisdom to be nothing and, consequently, show the mistaken and the wanderer the way to immortality.” 2 Lactantius’ method, therefore, is twofold: ‘to defend and build up’ (defendere et instituere) (cf. DI 5.4.3). As the title of the Institutiones suggests, the apologist is not merely concerned with the tearing down of fallacious arguments, but also with the constructing of a positive Christian theology; in the apologist’s own words, the totius doctrinae substantiam (DI 5.4.3). Because of his need to exposit the Christian faith in resonating manner with a non-Christian audience, however, Lactantius DI 5.4.1 (BT 2009, 450–51): accusatores justitiae […] ut omnes, qui ubique idem operis efficiunt aut effecerunt, uno semel impetu profligarem. 2 DI 1.1.6 (BT 2005, 2): humanam sapientiam nullam esse monstraret et erranti ac vago viam consequendae immortalitatis ostenderet. 1

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must construct this theology in a way which will appeal to the sensibilities of the Roman docti. Therefore, the apologist is committed to defending and expositing the Christian faith using eloquent speech and, until necessity demands its inclusion, holding back on the use of Judeo-Christian evidence in his arguments. In this way, Lactantius aims to be heard by the widest possible audience or, as one author has put it, at a “cross-cultural consensus.” 3 According to Lactantius’ own goals and method, therefore, Christians and non-Christians alike must agree upon the foundation of his theological project. The doctrine of providence is such a principle; having already been ably defended by the Stoics and other philosophers (DI 1.2.2), and being the topic which should naturally come first in any apology (DI 1.2.1). Lactantius believes that the first positive step in Christian education, after the falsehood of Roman religion is recognized, “is to perceive with the mind that there is one supreme God whose power and providence in the beginning made the world and thereafter governs it.” 4 Thus, in order to establish the doctrine of providence as the fundamental principle in his positive theology, Lactantius adopts many of the arguments already provided by the Stoic school and, in particular, those found in the works of his mentor Cicero. 5 In Chapter 3 we examined these arguments according to their division in Stoic theology and demonstrated that the importance of this doctrine is underscored by Lactantius’ consistent and ubiquitous defense of it throughout his apologetic works. 6 Further, not only has this doctrine been deSchott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion, 93. ID 2.2 (SC 289, 94): Primus autem gradus est intellegere falsas religiones et abicere inpios cultus humana manu fabricatorum, secundus vero perspicere animo quod unus sit dues summus, cujus potestas ac providentia effecerit a principio mundum et gubernet in posterum. On this point see Schott, op. cit., 82 with n. 22. 5 See especially Chapter 3, III. Conclusion. 6 For example, the consensus argument (DI 1.2.2; 2.8.48–52; Epi. 1.2; ID 9.1–7); responding to opponents (DI 2.8.10–47, 53–71; 3.17.7–43, 28.4–5; Epi. 31.1–6; ID 4.1–15); the argument from design (DI 1.2.5; 3.20.13; 7.3.24–26; Epi. 1.3–4; ID 10.25–35; OD 2.1, 3.2–6, passim); the argument from absurd consequences (ID 4, 8; Epi. 31.3). 3 4

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fended by many non-Christian docti, but also by ‘the testimony of all people and nations’ (testamonio populorum atque gentium) (DI 1.2.4). By making providence the foundation of his theological institutum, therefore, Lactantius is maintaining his primary apologetic goal of securing for himself the widest consensus possible among Christians and non-Christians alike. With the doctrine of providence serving as a foundation which many can agree upon, Lactantius then proceeds to argue for a doctrine which is considered much more disputable, but which Lactantius views as the defining dogma of the Christian faith, i.e., God’s oneness. Having demonstrated the existence of providence, Lactantius is able to use providence as evidence for the existence of one supreme God who is its Author (DI 1.2.1–6; Epi. 2.1–8; ID 13.1–14.6). God’s oneness is the defining characteristic of the divine nature for Lactantius – the apologist affirms that wisdom is perfect in the person who acknowledges God’s oneness and providence (DI 2.8.71) – and, once he has demonstrated God’s oneness, Lactantius thenmakes use of the doctrine of providence in arguing for other divine attributes, most notably divine anger. 7 This a posteriori method of arguing for the existence of divine attributes leads Lactantius to characterize God, above all, as ‘eternal mind’ (aeterna mens) (DI 7.3.4; cf. Tusc. 1.66), as the divine reason and will responsible for the providential order of the universe. This portrait of the divine, once again, resonates well with the Stoic conception of god, and Lactantius freely draws from their representative Cicero to support this characterization. 8 Lactantius employs the same method of argumentation in order to establish God’s activity ad extra. Given that he has already demonstrated that God is the one Author of providence, the apologist rejects the possibility that creation could have occurred in any way apart from His providence (DI 2.8.8–71). The evidence of providence makes it particularly clear ID 4, passim. See also Micka (Divine Anger, 112–13) who agrees that the doctrine of providence is both the central tenet of Lactantius’ theology and the basis for his affirmation of the existence of righteous indignation in God. 8 See, inter alia, DI 1.5.20–27, 8.2–3; 7.3.4; Epi. 4.3; ID 10.31–36, 11.15, 24.6; OD 2.1; cf. Cic. Nat. D. 1.26, 39; 2.77; Tusc. 1.66. 7

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that only a divine Mind could arrange and sustain the well-ordered pattern of creation (DI 2.8.48–52, 11.3–8; ID 10.31–47). Even the existence of evil, Lactantius believes, can be observed to conform to a providentially guided system. Evil exists for the benefit of humankind, without which virtue – the means of salvation for the human person (DI 4.25.10; 5.17.16, 18.1–117.5.20; Epi. 24.11, 29.7, 30.1, 64.1, 7; OD 19.10) – cannot exist. 9 In treating the doctrine of providence in relation to anthropology, the first item to be observed is that Lactantius authored an entire treatise, De opificio Dei, in defense of providence. This work argues that the beauty and utility present in the human person, in each of his parts as well as the whole, bespeaks of his formation by ‘a most provident Creator’ (providentissimus artifex) (OD 11.2). Given that Lactantius begins the Institutiones with only a cursory discussion of the doctrine, while readily acknowledging that a Christian apology must begin by treating providence (DI 1.2.6; cf. Min. Fel. 5; 18), De opificio can be viewed as the necessary prologue to the Divinae Institutiones in this regard. In De opificio and throughout his works, Lactantius’ treatment of anthropology is thoroughly teleological. The human person is able to apprehend the ends for which things were created. In the case of the human person, what can be discerned is the exalted place within the created order that he occupies. Borrowing yet again from Stoic anthropology, Lactantius affirms that human beings are the apex of the created order and that all other created things exist in order to serve them. 10 The quality that humans possesse that establishes their position atop the created order is the capacity to know and worship their Creator. Physical evidence of this quality can even be found in the ‘upright stature’ (status rectus) of the human person. 11 DI 2.8.6 add.3, 17.1; 3.29.16; 5.7.4; 6.4.17; 7.4.12, 5.27 add.5; Epi. 24.3; ID 13.24; OD 19 bis 3. 10 DI 7.4.8–19; Epi. 64.3; ID 13.1; cf. Cic. Nat. D. 1.23; 2.37, 133, 154–62; Fin. 3.67; Off. 1.22; Luc. 2.120; Gell. NA 7.1; LS, vol. 2, 330, fr. Q; Pease, 949; Clarke, 344 n. 536. 11 OD 8.2, 10.26, 19.10; DI 2.1.15, 2.23, 18.1; 17.9, 18.1; 3.10.11, 12.26, 20.11, 27.16, 28.16; 7.5.6, 20, 9.11; ID 7.5, 14.2, 20.10; Epi. 20.4ff., 25.1, 65.4. While Lactantius identifies this idea with Ovid (DI 2.1.15; quot. 9

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Since the human person is the only creature capable of knowing and worshipping his Creator, the highest natural end of the human person must be in doing so. 12 The human person, therefore, was created in order to know and worship God, i.e., created for vera religio. True religion is a union of true wisdom (an apprehension of God’s oneness) and true worship (a life of virtue lived in loving obedience to God). What the philosophers were unable to grasp concerning this anthropology, however, is that by living a life of virtue the human person not only satisfies his natural end, but also merits the reward of his supernatural end, i.e., a life of immortality. This is the ultimate end for which human beings were created and which forms the essence of Lactantius’ teleologically-centered and providentially-driven kerygma. Now let us seal the whole argument briefly in outline. The reason why the world was made was so that we might be born. We were born so that we might acknowledge the world’s maker and our God. We acknowledge and worship Him so that we might receive immortality as a reward for our labors – the worship of God contains the greatest labors. We are granted immortality as a reward so that we might serve the supreme Father and Lord forever, becoming like the angels, and be God’s eternal kingdom. This is the sum of it all: the secret of God, the mystery of the world. 13

Lactantius not only uses the beauty and utility of human person to demonstrate the existence of providence, therefore, but yet again Met. 1.84–86) and Hermes (DI 7.9.11; cf. Corp. Herm., vol. 4, fr. 14), he no doubt found it also in Cicero (Nat. D. 2.37, 140; Leg. 1.26). 12 DI 2.3.14; 3.10.7; Epi. 36.2–3; ID 7.6–14; cf. Cic. Leg. 1.24. 13 DI 7.6.1 (BT 2011, 668): Nunc totam rationem brevi circumscriptione signemus. Idcirco mundus factus est, ut nascamur; ideo nascimur, ut agnoscamus factorem mundi ac nostri deum; ideo agnoscimus, ut colamus; ideo colimus, ut immortalitatem pro laborum mercede capiamus, quoniam maximis laboris cultus dei constat; ideo praemio immortalitatis adficimur, ut similes angelis effecti summo patri ac domino in perpetuum serviamus et simus aeternum deo regnum. (2) Haec summa rerum est, hoc arcanum dei, hoc mysterium mundi. Cf. Epi. 64.1.

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uses the doctrine of providence, once proven, in order to show what constitutes the human person’s natural and supernatural ends. Further, by making the above proclamation concerning the nature and destiny of the human person his central teaching, rather than a doctrine more unique to Christianity, Lactantius once again uses providence to advance a theological truth which can appeal to both Christians and non-Christians alike. In order to provide historical verification of his belief that human beings are providentially designed to know and worship the one God, Lactantius constructs a universal history that posits the existence of an ur-monotheism at the dawn of human history. Human beings, living in conformity with their natures, knew and worshipped the one God at the earliest stage of their existence. Monotheism, therefore, is the natural and universal religion of humankind rather than the debasing and ethnically sectarian cults of the pantheon. Once the latter practices began to flourish, however, sin and vice also began to spread exponentially among human beings. Seeing the great depths to which human beings had fallen, God sent his Son into human history so that they might return to their natures by honoring and worshipping Him. This process of restoration, which began with the sending of His Son to earth, will be brought to fulfillment upon Christ’s second coming. After Christ has reigned on earth for a millennium all of the living and the dead will be judged. God will then transform the cosmos and bring it to its final perfection. The blessed will then live in communion with God for all eternity. In conformity with his apologetic method, Lactantius holds off discussing the ministry of Jesus until Book 4 of the Institutiones after his critique of Roman religion and philosophy is complete. He similarly delays treating the eschaton until Book 7, the final book of the Institutiones. While discussing both Christology and Eschatology, Lactantius once again places them within the context of God’s providence. The coming of the Son to earth marks the beginning of God’s direct intervention into human history in order to bring the entire cosmos to its final perfection. Prior to this consummation, however, it is the mission of the Son to gather a people to himself and restore them to their natural ends; so that they might find and enjoy their supernatural ends at the eschaton. Lactantius’ Christology, therefore, is solidly placed within the context of bringing the human person to the perfection for which he was designed.

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Even more explicitly, Lactantius deemed the doctrine of providence so vital to his Eschatology that he included yet another explicit defense of it in Book 7 of the Institutiones just prior to his exposition of the last things (DI 7.31–26). For the apologist the doctrine of providence supports belief in the eschaton because the last day can only be brought about without the intervention of a provident God who wills the perfection of His creation. Thus, despite not being able to cite as evidence for his Christology and Eschatology many of the philosophers upon whom he had relied previously, 14 Lactantius treats these doctrines as extensions of the doctrine of providence. They are the ways in which God sees to the execution of His providential will for the human person. It has been the goal of this work to demonstrate the centrality of the doctrine of providence in the works of Lactantius. In doing so, it has endeavored to identify the doctrine as that which functions as the grundaxiom of Lactantius’ positive theology. At the genesis of his apologetic works Lactantius defended the doctrine of providence and continued to do so throughout them all. Once defended, the providential governance of the world, and especially the human person, provided Lactantius with evidence to support his other theological arguments. And when reckoning salvation history, Lactantius interpreted its events, both past and future, through the lens of humankind’s fidelity to its own nature, to the providentially-designed ends for which they were created. By employing the doctrine of providence to support and integrate his entire theological system in this way, Lactantius has made the linchpin of his theology a doctrine that finds common ground among both Christians and non-Christians. Thus, his positive theological project is supported and guided by a doctrine that serves his apologetic aim. That Lactantius was an apologist first and foremost The non-Christian authorities which Lactantius cites in support of his Christology and Eschatology are largely taken from divina testimonia. There is some evidence, however, of Stoic influence in Lactantius’ treatment of the eschaton. Cf. Jean Doignon, “Le placitum eschatologique attribué aux Stoïciens par Lactance (Institutions Divines VII, 20): Un exemple de contamination de modèles littéraires,” Revue de Philologie 51 (1977): 43– 55. 14

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is not an original assessment of the North African rhetorician. The aim of the present work, however, has been to analyze Lactantius’ written work and to demonstrate that there exists a concept that gives form, coherence, and structure to his theology. Though Lactantius may have found the tearing down of fallacious arguments a task more easily performed – or more necessary to the plight of Christians – than the building up of Christian teaching, he nonetheless articulates a positive Christian theology; with the doctrine of providence serving as its foundational and determinative principle. 15 Perhaps twenty years ago or so, scholars of late-antiquity increasingly began to recognize Lactantius’ import as an early fourth century Christian advocate. 16 Like the study of late-antiquity as a whole, scholars from many disciplines can examine the works and impact of Lactantius from the perspectives of their respective fields and by utilizing various heuristic tools. The present work has sought to contribute to this body of knowledge in relation to Lactantius’ theology and apologetic method. Further study may make use of its contributions to relate these aspects of Lactantius’ thought to his wider religious and socio-cultural context. The apologist was active at a decisive time and place in Christian history amid dyer crises, emerging hopes, and developing ideas. The role and influence of Lactantius both during and after these events, and in various milieux (e.g., religious, political, intellectual, etc.), remains to be explored further. Many recent studies have already appeared which do just this, and scholarly interest in the apologist continues to grow. 17 It is the hope of the present author that this work may One may recall Jerome’s comments regarding Lactantius: “would that he could have supported our [teaching] as easily as he destroyed foreign [teaching]!” Ep. 68.10 (CSEL 27/1, 164): utinam tam [doctrina] nostra affirmare potuisset quam facile aliena destruxit! 16 Though they should not be viewed in isolation, the monographs of H. A. Drake and E. DePalma Digeser deserve specific recognition for their roles in this renewal of interest. See their entries in the bibliography, as well as a combined review of these texts: R. L. Wilken, “In Defense of Constantine,” First Things 112 (2001): 36–40. 17 The recent monograph by Blandine Colot is particularly worthy of 15

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be of use to scholars wishing to examine in greater detail the thought and legacy of this Latin-speaking Christian. He was, in his lifetime, a member of a persecuted minority and a voice in the corridors of power, an author in exile and an imperially-appointed tutor, a lover of Cicero and Constantine, an apologist and a theologian.

mention in this regard. See B. Colot, Lactance: penser la conversion de Rome au temps de Constantin (Firenze: Olschi, 2016). Scholars from various disciplines have also taken recent interest in Lactantius’ contribution to the development of the concept of religious liberty. See J. R. Bowlin, “Tolerance Among the Fathers,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 26 (2006): 3–36; E. G. Wallace, “Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradition,” Penn State Law Review 114/2 (2009): 485–570; P. Hartog, “Religious Liberty and the Early Church,” Detroit Baptist Seminary Journal 17 (2012): 63–77; A. P. Coleman, “Lactantius and ‘Ressourcement’: Going to the Sources of Religious Liberty in the Civic Order,” Vox Patrum 34 (2014): 209–219.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OPERA L ACTANTII

Brandt, S. and G. Laubmann, eds. L. Caeli Firmiani Lactanti Opera Omnia. CSEL vols. 19 and 27. Vienna: 1890/1893/1897. Heck, E. and A. Włosok, eds. Lactantius Epitome Divinarum Institutionum. Biblioteca Teubneriana. Stuttgart & Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1994. ———. Lactantius Divinarum Institutiones Libri Septem, Fasc. 1, Libri I et II. Biblioteca Teubneriana. Munich & Leipzig: K. G. Saur, 2005. ———. Lactantius Divinarum Institutiones Libri Septem, Fasc. 2, Libri III et IV. Biblioteca Teubneriana. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007. ———. Lactantius Divinarum Institutiones Libri Septem, Fasc. 3, Libri V et VI. Biblioteca Teubneriana. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009. ———. Lactantius Divinarum Institutiones Libri Septem, Fasc. 4, Liber VII. Biblioteca Teubneriana. Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2011. LeBrun, J. B. and N. Lenglet-Dufresnoy, eds. L. Caelii Firmiani Lactantii Opera Omnia. Paris: 1748; reprinted by J. P. Migne, PL vols. 6–7. Paris: 1844.

TRANSLATIONS

Bowen, Anthony and Peter Garnsey, trans. Lactantius: Divine Institutes. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003. Blakeney, E. H., trans. and comm. Lactantius’ Epitome of the Divine Institutes. London: SPCK, 1950. Creed, J. L., trans. and comm. Lactantius: De mortibus persecutorum. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. 245

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Rooijen-Dijkman, H. van, trans. and comm. De vita Beata, het 7e boek van de Divinae Institutiones van Lactantius: Analyse en bronnenonderzoek. Assen: 1967. Fletcher, W., trans. Lactantius: Complete Works. Ante-Nicene Library, vols. 21–22. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1871; reprinted in AnteNicene Fathers, vol. 7. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999. Freund, S., trans. and comm. Laktanz, Divinae Institutiones, Buch 7: De Vita Beata. Einleitung, Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009. Hartl, A. and A. Knappitsch, trans. Des Lucius Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius Schriften: Von den Todesarten der Verfolger. Vom Zorne Gottes. Auszug aus den Göttlichen Unterweisungen. Göttes Schöpfung. Bibliothek der Kirchenväter vol. 36. Kempten & Munich: 1919. Heck, E. and G. Schickler, trans. and comm. Lucius Caelius Firmianus genannt Lactantius: Göttliche Unterweisungen in Kurzform. Munich & Leipzig: K. G. Saur, 2001. Ingremeau, C., trans. and comm. Lactance, La colère de Dieu. SC vol. 289. Paris: Cerf, 1982. ———. Lactance, Institutions divines, livre VI. SC vol. 509. Paris: Cerf, 2007. McDonald, M., trans. Lactantius: The Divine Institutes. FC vol. 49. Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1964. ———. Lactantius: Minor Works. FC vol. 54. Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1965. Monat, P., trans. and comm. Lactance, Institutions divines, livre V. SC vols. 204–205. Paris: Cerf, 1974. ———. Lactance, Institutions divines, livre I. SC vol. 326. Paris: Cerf, 1986. ———. Lactance, Institutions divines, livre II. SC vol. 337. Paris: Cerf, 1987. ———. Lactance, Institutions divines, livre IV. SC vol. 377. Paris: Cerf, 1992. Moreau, J., trans. and comm. Lactance, De la mort des persécuteurs. SC vol. 39. Paris: Cerf, 1954.

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Perrin, M., trans. and comm. Lactance, L’ouvrage du Dieu créateur. SC vols. 213–214. Paris: Cerf, 1974. ———. Lactance, Épitomé des institutions divines. SC vol. 335. Paris: Cerf, 1987.

PRIMARY LITERATURE

Abel, E., ed. Orphica. Leipzig: 1885. Arnim, J. von, ed. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. 4 vols. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1921/1923/1924. Basore, J. W., trans. Seneca: Moral Essays, Vol. I. LCL vol. 214. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1928; reprint, 1970. ———. Seneca: Moral Essays, Vol. II. LCL vol. 254. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932; reprint, 1965. ———. Seneca: Moral Essays, Vol. III. LCL vol. 310 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935; reprint, 1975. Bailey, Cyril, ed. Titi Lucreti Cari: De rerum natura. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947. Bidez, J. and F. Cumont, eds. Les mages hellénisés. 2 vols. Paris: 1938. Bury, R. G., trans. Plato: Laws. LCL vols. 187 and 192. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, 1968. ———. Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism. LCL vol. 273. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1933. ———. Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians. LCL vol. 291. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935; reprint, 1961. ———. Sextus Empiricus: Against the Physicists, Against the Ethicists. LCL vol. 311. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936; reprint, 1960. ———. Sextus Empiricus: Against the Professors. LCL vol. 382. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949; reprint, 1961. Chadwick, H., trans. and ed. The Sentences of Sextus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959. Clarke, G. W., trans. and ed. The Octavius of Minucius Felix. ACW 39. New York: Newman Press, 1974. Collins, J. J., trans. and ed., Sibylline Oracles. Pp. 317–472 in: The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha. Vol. 1. Edited by J. H. Charlesworth.

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New York: Doubleday, 1983. Copenhaver, B. P., trans. and comm. Hermetica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Cornford, F. M., trans. and comm. Plato’s Cosmology: The Timaeus. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1937. Diels, H., ed. Doxographi Graeci. Berlin & Leipzig: 1929. Falconer, W. A., trans. Cicero: De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione. LCL vol. 154. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923; reprint, 1959. Festugière, A. J. and A. D. Nock, eds. Corpus Hermeticum. 4 vols. Paris: 1945–54. Geffcken, J., ed. Die Oracula Sibyllina. Leipzig: 1902. Hennecke, E. and W. Schneemelcher, eds. New Testament Apocrypha. 2 vols. Translated by R. McL. Wilson. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963. Hicks, R. D., trans. Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers. LCL vols. 184 and 185. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925. Keyes, C., trans. Cicero: De Re Publica, De Legibus. LCL vol. 213. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1928; reprint, 1966. King, J., trans. Cicero: Tusculan Disputations. LCL vol. 141. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927; reprint, 1960. Long, A. A. and D. N. Sedley, eds. The Hellenistic Philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: 1987. McCracken, G., trans. and ed., Arnobius: The Case Against the Pagans. ACW vols. 7 and 8. Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1949. Miller, W., trans. Cicero: De Officiis. LCL vol. 30. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913. Oates, W. J., trans. The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers. New York: Random House, 1940. Pearson, A. C., ed. The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes. London: C. J. Clay & Sons, 1891. Pease, A. S., ed. M. Tulli Ciceronis: De natura deorum. 2 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955/1958; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1979.

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Rackham, H., trans. Cicero: De finibus bonorum et malorum. LCL vol. 40. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914; reprint, 1931. ———. Cicero: De natura deorum, Academica. LCL vol. 268. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933; reprint, 1961. ———. Cicero: De oratore III, De fato, Paradoxa Stoicorum, De partitione oratoria. LCL vol. 349. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942. Robinson, J. M., trans. and ed. The Nag Hammadi Library in English. San Francisco: 1990. Russell, D., trans. Quintilian: The Orator’s Education. LCL vols. 124– 127. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. Sutton, E. W. and H. Rackham, trans. Cicero: De oratore I & II. LCL vol. 348. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942. Usener, H., ed. Epicurea. Stuttgart: 1966. Vitelli, C., ed. M. Tullii Ciceronis Consolationis fragmenta. Mondadori: 1979. Vottero, D., ed. Lucio Anneo Seneca: I Frammenti. Bologna, 1998.

SECONDARY LITERATURE

Aalders, G. “The Hellenistic Concept of the Enviousness of Fate.” Pp. 1–8 in: Studies in Hellenistic Religions. Edited by M. Vermaseren. Leiden: Brill, 1979. Adamik, T. “Die Funktion der Vergilzitate in Laktanz’ De mortibus persecutorum.” Acta Antiqua et Archæologica 25 (1984): 85–95. Alban, B. “Conscious Rôle of Lactantius.” Classical Weekly 37 (1943/44):79–81. Alfonsi, L. “Cultura classica et cristianesimo: l’impostazione del problema nel proemio delle Divinæ institutiones di Lattanzio e nell’Epistula XVI di Paolino da Nola.” Parole e le idee 8 (1966): 163–176. ———. “Ovidio nelle ‘Divinae Institutiones’ di Lattanzio.” Vigiliae Christianae 14 (1960): 170–176. ———. “Potuit esse verus Dei cultor… (Lattanzio, ‘Div. Inst.’ VI, 24, 13): Sestio, Seneca e Vangeli.” Athenæm, New Series, 54 (1976): 175–176.

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Journal 24 (1983): 141–148. ———. “Lactantius as Theologian: An Angelic Christology on the Eve of Nicaea.” Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa 22 (1986): 492–497. Merton, T. “Lactantius.” Cistercian Studies, 7/3 (1972): 243–255. Micka, E. F. The Problem of Divine Anger in Arnobius and Lactantius. Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1943. Molignoni, G. “Lattanzio Apologeta” Didaskaleion, New Series, 5 (1927): 117–54. Monat, P. “Lactance comme témoin du texte de Virgile. Note sur VERG. georg. 2, 341” L’Antiquité classique 43 (1973): 380–383. ———. “Lactance et Cicéron: à propos d’un fragment de l’Hortentius.” Revue des études latines 53 (1975): 167–248. ———. “Le classement des manuscrits par l’analyse factorielle. Recherches pour l’établissement d’un stemma: Lactance, Instituions divines, livre IV.” Revue d’Histoire des Textes 5 (1975): 311– 330. ———. Lactance et la Bible: Une propédeutique latine à la lecture de la Bible dans l’occident constantinien. 2 vols. Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1982. ———. “Étude sur le texte des citations bibliques dans les Institutions divines: la place de Lactance parmi les témoins des «Vieilles Latines».” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 18 (1982): 19–32. ———. “Lactance contre Junon: de la polémique au dialogue avec les païens,” Pp. 259–269 in: Hommages à Jean Cousin: Recontres avec l‘antiqué classique. Edited by F. Gaffiot. Paris: Université de Besançon, 1983. ———. “La Polémique de Lactance contre Hercule: tradition orientale et culture occidentale” Pp. 575–583 in: Hommages à Lucien Lerat. Edited by H. Walter. Paris: Belles Lettres, 1984. ———. “Les testimonia bibliques de Cyprien à Lactance,” Pp. 499– 507 in: Le monde latin antique et la Bible. Edited by J. Fontaine and C. Pietri. Paris: Beauchesne, 1985. ———. “Notes sur le texte de Lactance: ID 4,21,1 et Epit. 42 (47) 3” Texte und Textkritik 123 (1987): 417–425.

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INDEX ANCIENT AUTHORS, NAMES, AND SOURCES

Academics 68, 69, 162, 166, 181n125 Adam (and Eve) 128 Aelius Theon 89n76 Apollinaris of Hieropolis 227n98 Apollo, Oracle of 33, 46, 49, 50, 53, 64n10, 101, 102, 193 Apollonius of Tyana 15 Anaxagoras 107 Anselm of Canterbury 95n3 Antisthenes 107 Aristotle 67n16, 74, 89n79, 107, 112, 121, 145, 156, 177n112 Aristoxenus 148 Arius (Arians) 1, 219, 220 Arnobius 3n9, 9–11, 18, 26, 31, 36n20, 110, 192 Augustine 8, 11n14, 21, 26n55, 47n50, 54, 82n57, 122, 150n30, 170n91, 176, 179n118, 180, 196, 207n40 Athenagoras 48, 54 Bacchus 193 Balbus (from Nat. D.) 63, 79, 89, 108, 151 Barnabus (pseudo-) 227n100 Bible, The (Scripture) 11n14, 15, 25, 27, 30, 32, 33, 37–40, 41n31, 52, 53, 55, 57, 67, 90, 100n18, 113, 120, 135, 150n31, 155, 156, 157n48,

269

158, 159n55, 160, 163, 192n1, 197, 200, 210, 211, 214, 215, 219, 220, 221n81, 225–32 Cabirus 193 Cassius Dio 15n29 Christians 6, 12–17, 21, 23, 25, 26, 30, 34–37, 41n31, 46, 48n53, 91, 137, 181, 188, 199, 200, 215, 222, 223n85, 226, 235–37, 240–42 Chrysippus 89, 107, 125, 160n59 Cicero 1, 2, 4, 5, 17, 19, 21, 25, 32n11, 33n14, 34n16, 35, 42, 44n39, 45, 46, 47n48, 50, 51n62, 62, 63, 64n10, 65, 66, 68, 72, 73, 75n39, 76, 78–80, 82n57, 84n63, 85, 87–90, 93, 99n15, 104–108, 110–112, 114, 118, 120, 123n93, 125, 140, 141, 143, 145, 146n19, 147, 148, 150n29, 151–52, 154n38, 156, 160n59, 161, 162, 164n70, 168, 169n86, 170, 174, 175n107, 181n125, 182–84, 188, 193, 209n43, 221n79, 233, 236, 237, 238n10, 239, 243 Cleanthes 89 Clement of Alexandria 48, 49n58, 54 Clement (pseudo-) 106n38

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Constantine 1n4, 7n1, 8, 11n14, 12–14, 15n25, 17, 18, 22–24, 26, 28n62, 37n21, 53n68, 54n71, 171n95, 242n16, 243 Cotta (from Nat. D.) 68, 69, 73, 89, 114, 115, 117 Crispus (son of Constantine) 8, 22 Critolaus (the Peripatetic) 181n125 Cyprian 11, 29, 30, 32, 37n21, 90, 164n70, 192, 220, 221n81, Damasus (pseudo-) 27 Decretum Gelasianum 1 Democritus 65, 118 Deucalion 155 Diagoras 65, 66 Didymus of Alexandria 197 Diocletian 2, 7, 8n2, 9, 12–14, 90, 192n2, 196n14 Diogenes (the Stoic) 181n125 Diogenes Laertius 74, 106n39, 118, 147n21, 152 Dionysius of Halicarnassus 155n43 Donatus (friend of Lactantius) 22n42, 25, 26, 36 Ennius 19, 192, 203 Epicurus (Epicureans) 25, 35, 39n30, 42n37–38, 62, 63, 65–67, 69–75, 77, 79, 81–87, 90–92, 105–07, 110–12, 118, 124, 140, 141, 145, 151, 164–66, 208, 232 Euhemerus (Euhemerism) 19, 41, 51, 155n42, 192–98 Eusebius of Caesarea 7n1, 11n14, 12n16, 13, 14n22, 15, 17n32, 18, 24, 25, 26n54 Faun 193 Flavius (the Grammarian) 7, 11n14

Galerius 12n16, 13, 14, 17, 22n42, 192n2 Gallienus 13 Gellius 125, 160n59, 188n146, 238n10 Gnostics 133 Gratian 23 Ham 197 Hercules 192 Hermes Trismegistus 33, 46– 49, 53, 64n10, 67, 100, 102, 117, 136, 151n34, 155n40, 156, 164n70, 171, 183, 215, 217, 227, 228, 229n107, 239n11 Hesiod 41, 106 Hippocrates 145n18 Homer 41, 106 Horace 154 Hyginus 154–55 Hystaspes, Oracle of 33, 46, 48, 49, 53n68, 228–29 Iamblichus 14 Irenaeus 51n63, 164n70, 227, 228n104 Isis 193 Japetus 155 Jerome 1, 2, 7–11, 13, 22, 23, 27, 150n30, 227n98, 242n15 Jesus (Christ) 6, 15, 18n34, 20, 40, 50–53, 55, 103n30, 201, 202, 207n40, 210–27, 229, 230–33, 240 Jews 28, 40n30, 57, 200, 211, 220 Juba 193 Julian 24n49 Juno 193 Jupiter 155, 192, 193, 196, 197 Justin Martyr 35n18, 42, 49n58, 164n70, 227, 229, 231n114

INDEX Lactantius, passim (direct quotations listed in bold) Ad Asclepiadem (non-extant) 8, 27 De Ave Phoenice 27, 28n62 Ad Demetrianum (non-extant) 8, 16, 27 DI 17–22, et passim 1.1.5 57n77 1.1.6 235n2 1.1.10 30n5 1.1.19 211n48 1.1.19–20 58n83 1.1.22 38n29 1.1.25 44n40, 167n82, 224n88 1.2.1 80n52 1.2.2 65n12, 109n51 1.2.5 77n43 1.2.6 92n85 1.3.1 94n2 1.3.3 95n5 1.3.7 95n4 1.3.11 95n6 1.3.15 96n7 1.3.18 97n8 1.3.19 97n9 1.3.23 110n54 1.5.2 33n13, 90n80 1.5.4 41n32, 102n26 1.5.8 41n34 1.5.11 41n35 1.5.13 41n36, 106n42 1.5.18 107n44 1.5.20 107n45, 107n46 1.5.21 68n23 1.5.24 108n47 1.5.25 108n48 1.5.26 108n49

271 1.5.28 1.6.4 1.6.15 1.6.16 1.6.17 1.7.1 1.7.2 1.7.13 1.8.2 1.11.38 2.1.15 2.1.16 2.3.21 2.8.2 2.8 add.2 2.8.3 2.8 add.3 2.8 add.5 2.8.6 add.2 2.8.6 add.5 2.8.6 add.6 2.8.7 2.8.13 2.8.19 2.8.21–22 2.8.23 2.8.29 2.8.32 2.8.38 2.8.39 2.8.40 2.8.44

135n122 48n51, 100n18, 171n96 51n65, 51n66, 101n21 51n65 33n15 49n59, 102n24 50n60, 102n25 102n23 122n88 100n19 165n75 166n76 57n78 132n116 129n108 123n96 129n107, 133n118 129n10109 134n121 133n119 134n120 123n97, 215n59 114n68 115n69 68n21, 115n71 69n24 115n70 116n73 116n74 116n75 68n22, 115n72 102– 03n27, 103n28, 117n76

272

LACTANTIUS THE THEOLOGIAN 2.8.48 2.8.52 2.8.64 2.8.71 2.9.15 2.9.16 2.9.22 2.9.25 2.10.3 2.10.6 2.10.12 2.10.12–13 2.10.15 2.10.16 2.10.22 2.11.8 2.11.14 2.12.3 2.12.7 2.16.3 2.16.20 2.17.1 2.17.9 2.18.1 3.1.10 3.1.11 3.6.3 3.9.14 3.9.19 3.10.1 3.10.10–12 3.11.9 3.12.12–13 3.12.15 3.14.7 3.17.3 3.17.8, 9 3.17.17 3.17.18 3.17.21 3.17.29 3.17.42–43

67n16 117n77 160n57 55n73 123n95 103n30 123n93 123n94 159n53 155n40 155n39 155n41 156n44 156n45 156n46 120n82 157n47 157n48 132n115 198n15 198n16 124n98 166n77 168n85 90n81 37n22, 38n24 157n49 206n37 183n132 169n89 167n83 176n109, 177n112, 179n116 204n30 179n117 62n3 71n28 70n27 74n37 69n25 73n35 69n25 69–70n26

3.20.10 3.20.11 3.20.13 3.27.3 3.28.4–5 3.28.5 3.29.16 3.30.3 4.3.2 4.3.6 4.3.7 4.3.10 4.3.14 4.4.2 4.5.9 4.6.1 4.6.4 4.6.9 4.8.2 4.8.7 4.8.8 4.9.1 4.10.1 4.12.14 4.12.21 4.13.1 4.13.5 4.14.1 4.14.2–3 4.14.17 4.15.27 4.16.4 4.18.13–17 4.24.4 4.24.6 4.24.12 4.25.5 4.25.8 4.28.2–3 4.28.6 4.28.11

166n78 166n79 77n44, 166n80 44n39 73n36 109n52 177n113 45n42 44n41 174n103 170n94 171n97 172n98 172n99, 173n102 37n21 214n55 48n52 215n61 38n28 214n56 217n66 214n57 210n46, 217n68 225n93 226n95 212n49 217n67 225n92 224n87 211n47 51n62 213n53 52–53n67 218n69 218n70 218n70 218– 19n71 223n86 173n100 170n92 170n93

INDEX 4.28.12 4.29.3 4.29.4 4.29.12 4.29.13–14 4.29.14–15 4.30.11 5.1.7 5.1.8 5.1.9 5.1.14 5.1.15 5.1.16 5.1.23 5.1.25 5.2.5 5.2.12 5.2.17 5.4.1 5.4.2 5.4.7 5.5.1 5.5.3 5.6.12 5.7.1–2 5.7.2 5.8.3 5.8.4 5.8.5 5.8.6 5.8.8 5.9.21 5.9.22 5.10.10 5.14.6 5.14.11 5.18.3

173n101 215n63 222n84 103n29, 221n79 222– 23n84 216n64 225n90 31n6 34n17 35n19 31n7 37n23 38n25 29n1 30n2 15n26 15n27 38n26 16n30, 91n83, 235n1 32n10 30n3 180n122, 205n33, 232n116 195n9, 196n13 196n12 213n51 183n134, 201n24 201n25 203n29 199n17 201n26 203n29 199n18 199n19 185n139 181n124 181n123 185n140

273 5.18.9–10 5.19.30 5.22.11 5.22.13 5.22.18 5.23.2 6.2.13 6.4.17 6.8.10 6.9.22 6.9.24 6.10.2 6.11.1 6.11.13 6.15.2 6.15.7 6.16.8 6.17.29 6.20.3 6.25.7 6.25.9 6.25.16 7.3.4

179n119 174n104 199n20 200n21 200n23 200n22 175n105 131n113 44n39 179n118 183n133 184n136 184n137 184n138 176n108 176n110 176n111 184n135 178n115 183n131 182n129 206n35 104n31, 121n87 7.3.14 188n148 7.3.24–26 75– 76n40, 209n43 7.3.26 69n25 161n62 7.4.8 7.4.10 161n63 7.4.13–14 162– 63n68 7.4.16 159n56 7.4.19 161n64 7.5.4 207n39 7.5.6 165n74 7.5.9 163n69 7.5.15 180n120, 208n41 7.5.16–17 158n51 7.5.27 208n42 7.5.27 add.2 128n104 7.5.27 add.11 128n105 7.5.27 add.13 133n117

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7.5.27 add.17 129n106 7.6.1–2 55n72, 187n144, 205n31, 239n13 7.7.4 58n84 7.8.1 180n121, 210n45 7.9.7 104n32 7.14.2 182n130, 206n38 7.14.9 227n100 7.14.11 228n102 7.14.13 227n96 7.16.12 228n105 7.18.2 49n56 7.19.4 225n94 7.19.6 229n108 7.20.6 230n110 7.21.2 104n33 7.24.9 53n68 7.24.11 202n27 7.26.5 231n114, 231n115, 232n117 7.27.5 212n50 Epi. 26–27, et passim 1.2 67n17 1.3–4 74n38 2.3 97n10 2.6 99n13 3.1 99– 100n16 5.3 101n22 24.3 125n99 24.6 125n101 29.5 182n128 31.2 72n32 31.3 87n71 36.2–3 170n90 37.2 214n58 44.4–5 216n65 46.5 225n91 51.1 181n126 53.1 104n34

53.2 54.4

136n123 175n106, 205n34 62.8 57n82 63.4 131n111 63.5 131n112 64.3 161n61 64.7 206n36 Grammaticus (non-extant) 7, 27 ID 25–28, et passim 1.2 36n20, 110n57 2.2 39n30, 213n52, 236n4 4.2 111n58 4.3 72n31 4.4–6 111n62 4.5 3n10 4.5–6 72n33 4.10 71–72n30, 111n59 4.12 111n61 4.13 87n70, 112n63 7.5 164n73 7.6 169n86 7.10 169n87 7.14 169n88 8.3 88n73 8.8 88n75 9.1 66n14 9.4 66n14 9.7 66n14, 66n15, 67n19 9.8 67n18 10.9 118n79 10.15 119n81 10.25 77–78n45 10.31 120n83 10.32 78n46, 109n53 10.35 78n47

INDEX 10.34 10.37 10.42 10.47

106n41 120n84 120n85 118n80, 121n86 10.51 122n89 11.3 99n14 11.4 98n12 11.5 98n11 13.1 160n60 13.13 159n55 14.2 160n58, 168n84, 186n142 15.2 130n110 15.3 158n50 17.4–5 112n64 17.13 112n65 17.20 26n55, 113n66 18.14 105n36, 159n54 Itinerary (non-extant) 7, 27 MP 8, 9, 12–14, 15n27, 22, 24–26, 94 1.8 24n51 48.2 24n48 OD 16–18, et passim 1.2 16n31 1.11 139n2 1.16 79n51 2.1 81n56 2.9 81n55 3.2 82n57, 82n59 3.4 82n59 4.3 83n61 4.13–14 83n62 5.13 84n65 6.12 85n67, 140n3 6.14 86n69 7.11 86n68 8.3 164n72 8.16 142n7

275 10.7 10.13 10.19 10.22 10.24 10.26 11.2 12.3 12.17 13.2 14.9 16.4 16.10 17.1 17.2 17.4 18.2 19.2 19.4 19.5 19 bis 1–5 19.9

142n8 142n9 143n10 143n14 144n15 144n16 79n50 145n18 146n19 146n20 147n22 147n23 148n24 148n25 148n26 149n27 149n28 150n29 150n30 150n31 127n103 150n32, 154n36 Ad Probum (non-extant) 8, 27 Ad Severum (non-extant) 8, 27 Symposium (non-extant) 7, 27 Leucippus 118 Licinius 22n42, 24, 26 Lucretius 31n7, 32n11, 42n38, 70n26, 71n29, 73n35, 74n37, 82, 84n63, 85, 91, 92n84, 118, 119, 141, 142, 149n28, 151n34, 165, 196n12, 207n39, 227 Macrobius 181n125 Maxentius 22n42, 24 Maximian 17 Maximinus Daia 22n42, 24, 25 Melisseus 197 Minerva 193 Minucius Felix 16, 18, 29, 66n14, 75n39, 76, 80, 81, 88,

276

LACTANTIUS THE THEOLOGIAN

89n76, 104, 107, 124, 161n62, 164n70, 166n78, 192, 238 Montanists (Phyrgians) 133n117 Nestorius 1 Noah 197 Novatian (Novatians) 11n14, 133n117, 219–23 Origen 30n4, 48, 50, 51n63 Orpheus 41, 100, 102, 106, 222n83 Ovid 41, 106, 114, 160n57, 164n70, 195, 239n11 Papias 227n98 Paul of Tarsus 55, 200 Pelagius 1, 207n40 Pentadius (friend of Lactantius) 26 Peripatetics 67, 74, 117, 175, 176, 177n112, 181 Plato (Platonism) 27, 47, 67, 74, 82, 91, 107, 117, 121, 174, 180 Plotinus 14, 91 Plutarch 82n59 Porphyry 14, 33n14 Posidonius 112 Prometheus 154, 155 Protagoras 65–67 Pythagoras (Pythagoreans) 67, 104, 107, 117, 121 Quintilian 45, 46n46 Quirinus 193 Sancus 193 Saturn 193–96 Seneca 32n11, 42n38, 69, 82n60, 84n63, 89, 101, 102n23, 108, 112, 115, 123, 162, 188n146, 199, 200 Seven Sages, The 67, 107, 117, 121 Sextus Empiricus 14n25, 63, 64, 89n77

Sibylline Oracles, The 4, 22, 32n11, 33, 46, 50–54, 64n10, 67, 101, 102, 117, 136, 155, 156, 159, 202, 215, 228–31 Simon Magus 1 Shem 197 Skeptics (Skepticism) 43, 68, 89, 114, 141n5, 166, 181n125, Socrates 47n48, 66, 77, 89n76, 117, 121, 166 Sossianus Hierocles 15 Statius 155 Stoics 4, 25, 35, 39n30, 41n31, 42n37–38, 47n48, 62, 63, 67–70, 74–76, 79, 88–91, 93, 95n3, 103n30, 104–07, 109, 115, 117, 123n93, 125, 131, 137, 141n5, 151–53, 156, 160, 162, 163, 175–77, 179, 181n125, 184, 188, 193, 199, 209, 236–38, 241 Strobaeus 15n29 Suetonius 25 Tacitus 25 Tertullian 11, 18, 29, 31, 42, 47n48, 48, 54, 58n84, 146n19, 147, 149, 150n30, 152, 166n78, 171n95, 192, 200, 220, 227, 228, 230, 231n115 Thales of Milteus 107 Theodorus of Cyrene 65, 66 Theophilus 54, 76, 80, 101n21, 228n101 Thomas Aquinas 56n75, 105n35 Titan(s) 192, 193 Urania 193 Varro 50, 51n62, 145, 151n34 Vergil 32n11, 40, 41, 54n69, 106, 132n116, 194, 195, 202, 230n112

INDEX

277

Velleius (from Nat. D.) 89, 107 Venus 193 Victorinus of Pettau 227

Vulcan 193 Xenocrates 148 Zeno of Citium 89, 90, 107, 121

INDEX OF MODERN AUTHORS

Davies, P.S. 13n22, 18n35, 22n41 De Ste. Croix, G.E.M. 13n19 Diels, H. 107n43 Digeser, E.D. 2n8, 14, 15n25, 17n32, 18, 22, 23n47, 24n50, 171n95, 242n16 Divjak, J. 11 Doignon, J. 241n14 Döpp, S. 13n18 Dragona-Monachou, M. 89n76, 89n78, 95n3 Drake, H.A. 13n19, 242n16 Drobner, H. 12n18 Farrington, B. 91n82 Fessler, F. 65n13 Festugière, A.J. 47n47 Fisher, A. 56n73 Folhac, R. 9n6 Fontaine, J. 51n64, 219n73 Fontenrose, J. 49n59, 102 Frend, W.H.C. 13n22 Freund, S. 15n25, 227n97 Garnsey, P. 9n8, 18n35, 32n11, 219n73 Geerlings, W. 13n18 Geffcken, J. 50n61 Giancotti, F. 71n29 Grillmeier, A. 103n30, 219n73, 219n75 Guillaumin, M.-L. 51n64 Hagendahl, H. 26n56, 65n11, 71n29 Hartog, P. 243n17 Heck, E. 17n32, 22n41, 23n47, 126n102 Hennecke, E. 1n1

Abel, E. 41n33, 102n26 Algra, K. 63n9 Amann, É. 19n38 Arnim, J. 125n100 Aune, D. 229n106 Bailey, C. 85n66 Barnes, T.D. 7n1, 9n8, 11n14, 13n19, 13, 14n22, 15n25, 17, 18, 22n42, 24n50, 26n54 Bidez, J. 15n25, 48n54 Bowen, A. 9n8, 18n35, 32n11, 219n73 Bowlin, J.R. 243n17 Brandt, S. 7n1, 8n4, 9, 10, 11n14, 18n35, 23n45, 23n47, 27n61, 28n63, 70n26, 71n29, 151n34 Bryce, J. 7n1, 9n8, 28n62, 32n11, 62n4, 63n5, 71n29 Bufano, A. 71n29 Calvin, J. 1, 2n5 Casey, S. 65n11, 70n26, 92n84 Chadwick, H. 14n25 Charlesworth, J.H. 50n61 Clarke, G. 107n43, 160n59, 166n78, 238n10 Coleman, A.P. 1n5, 243n17 Colish, M. 70n26, 91n82, 103n30 Collins, J.J. 50n61 Colot, B. 242n17 Copenhaver, B. 47n47 Creed, J.L. 24n50, 25 Cumont, F. 48n54

278

LACTANTIUS THE THEOLOGIAN

Herzog, R. 7n1 Hill, C. 227n99 Hinnells, J.R. 48n54, 49n55, 49n57, 229n107 Hopkins, G.M. 122 Inwood, B. 63n9 Jones, A.H.M. 13n22 Kelly, J.N.D. 91n82 Koch, H. 10n11 Labriolle, P. 1 Laubmann, G. 8n4, 9n5, 23n47, 27n61, 28n63 Loi, V. 3n9, 18n35, 51n64, 56n76, 61n2, 103n30, 105n37, 123n92, 131n114, 145n17, 164n70, 219n73, 220n78 Long, A.A. 152n35 Marrou, H. 12n17 Maslowski, T. 39n30, 57n81, 118n78 McCracken, G. 9n9 McGuckin, P. 11n14, 37n21, 214n56, 219n74, 220, 224 Merton, T. 1, 2n6 Micka, E. 3n9, 10, 61n2, 237n7 Mirandola, P. 1 Monat, P. 37n21 Monceaux, P. 7n1, 9, 11n14, 22n41 Moreau, J. 7n1, 25n52 Nautin, P. 27n60 Nestle, W. 25n52 Nicholson, O. 2n8, 8n3, 10n13, 18, 45n43, 54n70, 195n10, 228n101 Nicolosi, I. 71n29 Noch, A.D. 47n47 Ogilvie, R. 11n14, 17n32, 18n35, 32n11, 47n48, 51n64, 71n29, 221n81 Pease, A.S. 3n9, 61n2, 63n6, 65n13, 72n34, 76, 79n48,

89n76, 107n43, 108n47, 114, 118, 124, 143n14, 160n59, 161n65, 164n70, 188n147, 238n10 Perrin, M. 23n47, 24n47, 51n64, 82n60, 131n114, 139n1, 144n17, 151n34, 164n70, 166n76, 219n73 Phillips, C. 122n90 Pichon, R. 1, 7n1, 9n6, 18n35, 23n45, 23n47, 32n11, 47n48 Prestige, G.L. 101n20, 105n37 Rapisarda, E. 71n29 Robinson, J.M. 47n47 Roncalli, A.G. 173n100 Rooijen-Dijkman, H. 227n97 Roots, P.A. 84n64, 140n4, 141n5, 143n11, 151n34, 154n37 Rosetti, L. 151n34 Rougé, J. 25n52 Schmidt, P.L. 7n1 Schneemelcher, W. 1n1 Schoedel, W.R. 14n25 Schott, J. 2n8, 4n11, 14, 15n25, 33n14, 99n15, 192n1, 194n6, 236 Schwarte, K.-H. 12n18 Sharpe, E. J. 48n54 Simmons, M. 9n9, 10n10–11 Søby Christensen, A. 22n41 Stevenson, J. 7n1, 11n14, 17n32, 27n57, 31n9, 71n29, 92n84 Swift, L. 31n8, 195n7, 203n28, 230n112 Usener, H. 65n13, 66n14, 70, 111n58, 124, 165, 207n39 Verbeke, G. 103n30 Vitelli, C. 108n48 Vottero, D. 69n24, 102n23, 108n49

INDEX Walker, L. 61n1 Wallace, E. 243n17 Wilken, R.L. 14n25, 242n16 Wilson, H. 1n3

279 Wilson, R. McL. 1n1 Włosok, A. 7n1, 8n2, 11n14, 13n18, 23n47, 164n70, 166n76, 171n95