Korea and East Asia : The Stony Road to Collective Security [1 ed.] 9789004236479, 9789004229105

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Korea and East Asia

Studies in East Asian Security and International Relations Edited by

Rüdiger Frank University of Vienna

VOLUME 1

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/seas

Korea and East Asia The Stony Road to Collective Security

Edited by

Rüdiger Frank John Swenson-Wright

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2013

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Korea and East Asia : the stony road to collective security / edited by Rüdiger Frank, John SwensonWright. p. cm. -- (Studies in East asian security and international relations ; v. 1) Includes index. ISBN 978-90-04-22910-5 (hardback : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-23647-9 (e-book) 1. Security, International--East Asia. 2. East Asia--Foreign relations--Korea, North. 3. Korea,  North--Foreign relations--East Asia. 4. East Asia--Foreign relations--Korea, South. 5. Korea, South--Foreign relations--East Asia. 6. East Asia--Strategic aspects. 7. Korea--Strategic aspects. I. Frank, Rüdiger, 1969- II. Swenson-Wright, John. JZ6009.E18K67 2012 355’.031095--dc23

2012030341

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 2213-1051 ISBN 978-90-04-22910-5 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-23647-9 (e-book) Copyright 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

CONTENTS Foreword��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������vii List of Contributors��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ix Introduction: Security Issues for Northeast Asia����������������������������������������������1  Rudiger Frank Collective Security: The OSCE and the European Experience������������������� 25  Colin Munro Collective Security, a European Experience: The Italian Approach Based on Engagement with the DPRK��������������������������������������������������������� 41  Roberta Ballabio Security Spirals and Threat Perceptions: China and (Non-) Collective Security��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 59  Nele Noesselt Commentary on Papers by Colin Munro, Roberta Ballabio and Nele Noesselt���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 83  Rosemary Foot The Role of the United States in the International Relations of East Asia: Still a Leader?������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 89  David C. Kang and Leif-Eric Easley The Role of Japan in the International Relations of East Asia�����������������105  John Swenson-Wright Russia and Asian Integration Models: The SCO Experience and Ideas for Northeast Asia�������������������������������������������������������������������������127  Georgy Toloraya Strategic Choices and Political Paralysis in the Korean Crisis: Commentary on Papers by David C. Kang/Leif-Eric Easley, John Swenson-Wright and Georgy Toloraya���������������������������������������������149  Hazel Smith South Korea’s Foreign Policy and East Asia���������������������������������������������������155  Chaesung Chun

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North Korea’s Place in East Asian International Relations������������������������181  Haksoon Paik The Six Party Talks and Implications for Peninsular and Regional Peace and Security�����������������������������������������������������������������217  Chung-in Moon Commentary on Papers by Chung-in Moon, Chaesung Chun and Haksoon Paik��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������241  James Hoare ASEM and Europe-Asia Relations��������������������������������������������������������������������249  Sung-Hoon Park East Asian Regional Models of Collective Security: The East Asian Community��������������������������������������������������������������������������263  Scott Snyder Commentary on Papers by Sung-Hoon Park and Scott Snyder����������������281  Julie Gilson Index�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������287

FOREWORD From the conflict in the South China Sea to the long-standing territorial dispute between Japan and Russia, an axis of risk stretches through the region. China’s rise is only the most recognized among many shifts in the balance of power that affect security in all its forms. Given the economic and military weight involved, the impact of related developments will be global. It is thus imperative to improve our understanding of the complicated network of international relations in the East Asian region, of its dynamics, and of the effects on regional security. This volume marks the start of a new book series on East Asian Security and Interna­ tional Relations which seeks to contribute to the academic debate in this field. Korea and East Asia: The Stony Road to Collective Security sets out to achieve two major objectives. As implied in the title, we want to explore the capacity of the Korean peninsula as our vantage point to analyse the situation in the Northeastern part of the Asian continent. Such an approach has several advantages. It avoids the understandable focus on the two big players China and Japan but nevertheless considers them closely. It is conscious of East Asia’s history, where the peninsula, on many past occasions such as the Second World War or the Korean War, played a key role in the changing security dynamics of the region. It includes nuclear North Korea as one of the major regional security threats, and South Korea as a state that is not only hosting US forces but also continuously improves its own capacity and position as a player in East Asia’s international relations. We believe that our understanding of East Asia will benefit from an understanding of Korea—and vice versa. The fact that the DPRK to the north since December 2011 has a new leadership, and that we know relatively little about it, makes it even more important to understand the dynamics and currents shaping Pyongyang’s foreign policy and its interrelatedness with regional and global affairs and perspectives. Our second objective is to resuscitate the debate about collective security. This concept has been both enthusiastically promoted and heavily criticized. Simple analogies rarely work, even less so in the case of such multi-faceted issues and interest constellations as we find them in post-Helsinki Europe and East Asia in the early twenty-first century.

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However, if we look through and beyond the mist of a myriad of details, we find that history has a remarkable tendency to repeat itself. It thereby offers valuable lessons for those who are able and willing to see. European and East Asian experiences guide the authors in this book towards very different, often opposing, conclusions and thus provide ample food for thought. Although the reference to collective security in the title might suggest otherwise, we are not subscribing to one particular strand in international relations theory. In fact, the approaches in this edited volume are very diverse, from liberalists supporting collective security as a viable concept to realists rejecting it. The story of this book began with a conference in Vienna in June 2010 that brought together experts from Europe, America, and Asia. It was coorganized by the Chair of East Asian Economy and Society at the Depart­ ment of East Asian Studies of the University of Vienna and Cambridge University. The Korea Foundation deserves our grateful thanks and deepest appreciation not only for having been the main sponsor of this event, but also for its open-mindedness and wisdom that led it to support an endeavor that was not exclusively focused on Korea. Many individuals have made invaluable contributions to the various stages of this project. John Swenson-Wright used his academic networks to help us gather an impressive group of experts. Sabine Burghart combined her professional insights as a political scientist with outstanding managerial skills to ensure a perfect preparation and smooth progress of the conference. Susan Pares once more saved us from embarrassment by her careful language editing. Karin Fruewirth, Falko Loher and Stephan Park invested many hours into text editing, layout, and much more. Jim Hoare put us in touch with Paul Norbury of Brill/Global Oriental who saw the potential of this project and guided us through the final stages of its completion. Debbie de Wit at Brill showed great professionalism and support during the final stages of proof reading. Last, but certainly not least, I wish to extend my sincere thanks to the authors and commentators for their valuable insights, energy, and patience. We hope that this book, and the many that will follow in the new series on East Asian Security and International Relations, will deepen the discussion and knowledge about issues that are crucial to all of us. We are aware of our shortcomings but hope that these, too, will promote critical thinking among scholars and students of international relations and of East Asia, as well as among policy-makers and practitioners. Vienna, February 2012 Rudiger Frank

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Roberta Ballabio is a programme officer at the Italy-based think tank Landau Network Centro Volta and collaborates with the Center of Inter­ national Security of Insubria University in Como (Italy). Her work focuses on international relations and, in particular, she follows the Korean Peninsula Security Program and the implications of inter-Korean dialogue on regional security. Chaesung Chun is an associate Professor at the Department of Interna­ tional Relations, and an associate dean of the College of Social Sciences in Seoul National University. Major articles include “Theoretical Approaches to Alliance: Implications on the R.O.K./U.S. Alliance,” “The Cold War and Its Transition for Koreans: Their Meaning from a Constructivist View­ point”, and “Hans Morgenthau on Realist Normative Theory, Cold War Structure, and Some Implications on Inter-Korean Relations”. Leif-Eric Easley is Assistant Professor of international security and political economics at Ewha University and a Research Fellow at the Asian Institute for Policy Studies. His research interests include contested national identities and changing levels of trust in the bilateral security relationships of Northeast Asia. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University’s Department of Government. Rosemary Foot is Professor of International Relations and the John Swire Senior Research Fellow in the International Relations of East Asia, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, where she teaches predominantly on the International Relations postgraduate programme. Her research interests cover the international relations of the Asia-Pacific, aspects of US-China relations, as well as the relationship between human rights and human security policies in Asia and beyond. Her latest book, written with a co-author, Andrew Walter from the LSE, is entitled, China, the United States, and Global Order (2011). Rudiger Frank is Professor of East Asian Economy and Society at the University of Vienna and Head of the Department of East Asian Studies. His major research fields are socialist transformation in East Asia and Europe (with a focus on North Korea), state-business relations in East Asia, and regional integration in East Asia. His most recent books are:

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(with S. Burghart, eds., 2010) Driving Forces of Socialist Transformation: North Korea and the Experience of Europe and East Asia; (ed., 2011) Exploring North Korean Arts; and (with J. Hoare, P. Köllner and S. Pares, eds., 2011) Korea 2011: Politics, Economy, and Society. Julie Gilson is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham. She has worked on Japanese foreign policy, East Asian regionalism, and Asia-Europe relations, and her current interest is in civil society and transnational advocacy in East Asia. Her publications include Asia Meets Europe (2002) and the co-authored Japan’s International Relations (2005). James E. Hoare was a member of the British diplomatic service from 1969 to 2003, serving in Seoul, Beijing and Pyongyang. He now teaches at SOAS, University of London and writes and broadcasts on North Korea. His books include Japan’s Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements (1994), Korea (ABCClio World Bibliographical Series, Vol. 204, 1997), Japan: Biographical Portraits, Vol. III (ed., 1999), (with Susan Pares) Conflict in Korea (1999), Embassies in the East (1999), (with Susan Pares) North Korea in the 21st Century: An Interpretative Guide (2005) and (with R. Frank, P. Köllner and Susan Pares) Korea 2011: Politics, Economy and Society. David C. Kang is Professor at the University of Southern California, with appointments in both the School of International Relations and the Marshall School of Business. At USC he is also director of the Korean Studies Institute. His latest book is East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (2010). Kang is also author of China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (2007); Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Devel­ opment in South Korea and the Philippines (2002), and Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (co-authored with Victor Cha, 2003). Chung-in Moon is professor of political science, Yonsei University and editor-in-chief of Global Asia, a quarterly magazine in English. He served as chairman of the Presidential Commission on Northeast Asian Coop­ eration Initiative, a cabinet-level post, and ambassador for international security affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. He attended both the first and second Korean summits held in Pyongyang as a special delegate. Colin Munro was British Ambassador to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe from 2003–07. He is an expert on Central and Eastern Europe and International Security. He is the author of Britain, Berlin, German Unification and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (2009).



list of contributorsxi

Nele Noesselt is a post-doc research fellow at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies / Institute of Asian Studies in Hamburg, Germany. Among her books are The EU’s relations to China and Taiwan (2008) and Alternative models of world order: IR discourses in China (2010). Haksoon Paik is a Senior Fellow and the Director of the Center for North Korean Studies at the Sejong Institute in South Korea. Among his books are The Military in the North Korean Politics: Its Character, Status, and Role (2011) and The History of Power in North Korea: Ideas, Identities, and Structures (2010). Sung-Hoon Park is Professor of Economics and International Trade at the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS), Korea University since 1997. He has held a number of visiting professorships at universities around the world. In 2007, he was President of the Korea Association of Trade and Industry Studies (KATIS), and in 2009 served as President of the EU Studies Association of Korea (EUSA). Since January 2007, he has also been working as Director of the EU Research Center, Korea University. Hazel Smith is Professor of Security and Resilience and Head of the Resilience Centre at Cranfield University. She was previously Professor of International Relations at the University of Warwick (1998–2009). Between 2000 and 2001 she was on research leave in the DPR Korea (North Korea) working for the United Nations World Food Programme. Her most recent works on the DPRK include Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance and Social Change in North Korea (2005) and Reconstituting Korean Security: A Policy Primer (2007). Scott Snyder is Director of the Centre for U.S.-Korea Policy at The Asia Foundation and a Senior Associate at Pacific Forum CSIS. He is also Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korean Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and is based in Washington, DC. He lived in Seoul, South Korea as Korea Representative of The Asia Foundation during 2000–2004. His latest book is China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security (2009). His other publications include Paved With Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea (2003), co-edited with L. Gordon Flake, and Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behaviour (1999). John Swenson-Wright is the Fuji Bank University Senior Lecturer in Modern Japanese Studies and a fellow of Darwin College, Cambridge. His early research focused on early Cold War US-Japan foreign and security relations and was published as Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy Towards Japan, 1945–1960 (2005). In addition, he is the

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editor of The Best Course Available. A Personal Account of the Secret US-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations (2002). His current interest focuses on contemporary political and security interests in Northeast Asia, with particular reference to Japan and the Korean peninsula. He is an Associate Fellow at Chatham House. Georgy Toloraya is a professional diplomat (rank of minister) with decadeslong experience in Korean affairs. He now works for the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) Presidential Foundation in Moscow and is concurrently the director of Korean research at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He has published many articles and six books on the Korean peninsula and East Asia.

INTRODUCTION: SECURITY ISSUES FOR NORTHEAST ASIA Rudiger Frank Will the twenty-first century be the Asian century? Will the People’s Republic of China (PRC—China) overtake the United States as the lead­ ing  global superpower? Will an institutionalized Third Bloc emerge in international relations and challenge the transatlantic alliance that has dominated world politics for such a long time? While opinions on the details differ strongly, there seems to be a certain consensus that the East Asian region, roughly defined as Northeast Asia (China, the two Koreas, Japan and the Russian Far East) plus Southeast Asia (ASEAN), will be globally significant in the years to come and see its role growing. This includes almost all fields such as economics, science and technology, migration, culture, and international relations. These issues are interrelated and often overlap. In this book, the focus is on the field of international relations and in particular the question of collective security and its surroundings, i.e. the options for institutionalized mechanisms of a joint regional security policy. The need for such a focus is obvious: shifts in the global balance of power, as well as a multitude of conflicts in the region, some old and unresolved, some new and emerging, actual or potential, call for sustainable solutions. Strategic analyses of East Asia’s international relations produced in Europe, America and Asia are often, and for good reasons, relatively narrow and problem-centred, and look at specific conflicts such as those in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, or the Korean peninsula. In this book, we try to take a broader perspective and look at long-term and structural developments. The contributions and contributors to this book represent a variety of disciplinary approaches and area specializations; their perspectives are often quite different. This is not a book written only by political scientists, by scholars of China, Japan or Korea, or from an American, Asian or European vantage point. It is the result of the joint efforts of representatives from all these fields, and more. We thus hope to present insights that are new, based on rigorous methodology, and benefit from a deep understanding of the East Asian region and its components.

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These goals imply the need to focus. We have thus chosen collective security as our meta-topic. We did so not in the hope of showing how it can solve all the pending issues, but rather as a hypothesis to be tested. The conclusions reached by the authors of this book are far from being homogeneous and offer food for thought both for students and for practitioners of international relations. Regarding area focus, we have deliberately avoided putting China, Japan or the United States explicitly at the heart of our discussion. Even so, the questions of how to react to China’s rise or how the US role is, will or should be changing in the region play the central roles that they deserve in this book. We asked our authors to approach their topics with an explicit focus on Korea, which provides a different angle to the usual debates. This is no coincidence: this book is the result of the second in a conference series called ‘Korea and East Asia’, reflecting a strategic direction in research at the University of Vienna’s Chair of East Asian Economy and Society.1 The broader theoretical question thus posed to all authors in this volume was the applicability of the concept of collective security to the current and future situation of East Asia, whether a related mechanism exists or could be installed, and what potential lessons from other cases as well as particular challenges would be. We asked about a potential role for the two Koreas—the Republic of Korea (ROK—South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK—North Korea)—in this context, and about the applicability of the European experience. Not unexpectedly, the DPRK emerged as one of the focal points of our debate. It is arguably one of the biggest security challenges in the East Asian region. Like Taiwan, Korea is a place where, as a consequence of the Cold War, US troops are present on the ground and face, at only a short distance, the mainland of China. But while we have a relatively good understanding of the inner workings of the Taiwan conflict and of the parties involved, and recent years have shown a number of very positive developments hinting at a declining risk of war, our knowledge about North Korea remains painfully insufficient. Events since 2008 include the death of a South Korean tourist in 2008, a North Korean nuclear test in 2009, the sinking of a South Korean navy ship and the shelling of a South 1 The first book published in this context is Rudiger Frank and Sabine Burghart (eds, 2010), Driving Forces of Socialist Transformation: North Korea and the Experience of Europe and East Asia, Vienna: Praesens. A volume on Korea and East Asia in a Changing Regional and Global Environment is forthcoming at a Korean publisher. For more and updated information, visit us at http://wirtschaft.ostasien.univie.ac.at.



introduction: security issues for northeast asia3

Korean island in 2010. The illness of Kim Jong Il and later his death and succession by his son Kim Jong Un in December 2011 added to a dangerously volatile situation. Furthermore, we should add that the notion of the two Koreas being ‘small’ players is misleading. Their location between China, Russia and Japan make North Korea, and to a lesser extent even South Korea, appear to be of inferior significance. Many observers are accordingly surprised to see how an allegedly small and marginal country like the DPRK time and again manages to claim an active and determining position. Let us not forget that in a European context South Korea would be on par with France, the UK or Italy in terms of area and population. Taken together, the two Koreas could challenge Germany’s position. Even North Korea alone with its 24 million people and area of about 100,000 square kilometres would be a middle power were it located in Europe. Putting Korea at the centre is further justified by the fact that the most well-developed multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, the Six Party Talks (SPT), has emerged in almost exclusive relation to Korea. The SPT’s success is debatable, as is the question of whether the focus on Korea would be maintained in the future should the SPT develop beyond their initial objective. Nevertheless, the talks indicate how the North Korean problem can evolve into a nucleus for finding solutions to more general regional security issues that are not limited to the Korean peninsula. When we declare our intention to use Korea as a focus, we inevitably face the question of how to approach a country like North Korea. Can we sensibly integrate it into a discussion of phenomena that are shared with allegedly more ‘normal’ players in international relations? We strongly argue that we can. Admittedly, the DPRK is an actor in international relations with a unique set of domestic institutions and a very particular political and economic system. It is part of a divided country and finds itself in a rather unique geopolitical situation. That does not mean, however, that it requires special treatment and escapes all attempts at approaching it through established theories, models and methods. On the contrary: we can only significantly improve our understanding of North Korea’s behaviour when we apply broader disciplinary perspectives, be they liberalist, realist or constructivist. In fact, as we would argue, it is almost impossible to generate a proper picture of the complexities in and around North Korea without considering the established models of the discipline.2 For most other country cases, this may sound like carrying coal 2 In a related example, we have discussed the question of the applicability of economic development theories to North Korea. See Rudiger Frank (2006), ‘Can Economic Theory

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to Newcastle; however, the reality of research on North Korea shows how often a fatal ‘Columbus effect’ can be observed.3 Admittedly, North Korea almost irresistibly invites the researcher to regard it as a singular, unique case. The personalized, hereditary leadership, including its visual and verbal expressions, appears bizarre. The shortage of openly accessible and reliable information on the country leads to speculation and mystification. The political system is based on the Soviet blueprint and the Japanese colonial heritage, but at the same time has modified these and other influences almost beyond recognition. The language barrier is formidable and for many disciplinary researchers prevents access to primary sources. North Korea is unlike us, and it seems unlike anything that most of us have known. To many, North Korea is a black box. However, it not only engages in bellicose rhetoric, including repeated military threats against its opponents; it has conducted two nuclear tests and claims to possess nuclear weapons. Considering all this, we have included a number of renowned North Korea experts in our group of authors. The Cold War ended with a grand victory of the US-led West, but the war of words and ideals is not over. It has merely found other battlefields, one of which is North Korea. The DPRK is often and for good reasons perceived in the West as the antithesis to our societies, as the incarnation of the ‘other’, with a strongly negative connotation. The very existence of this country and its stubborn refusal to collapse seem to have the effect of a red rag. However, as so often in Korea’s history, the country is in many regards a means towards an end, a figure in a larger game. This game is not new, and it is played in East Asia as anywhere else. The results of this struggle for power, in particular at times of shifts in its balance, have rarely been without disastrous consequences. The resolution of the dangerous situation in and around Korea is thus a pressing matter of relevance far beyond the Korean peninsula. While there is broad agreement on the problem itself, there is much less unity on its solution. Bilateral and multilateral approaches compete with each other, and arguments are exchanged for and against hard-line policies with strict reciprocity on the one hand, or less coercive and more Demystify North Korea?’, in: Korea Review of International Studies, 9/1, Seoul: Global Research Institute, Korea University, 2006, pp. 3–26. 3 The Columbus effect in relation to North Korea is discussed in Aidan Foster-Carter and Kate Hext (2011), ‘DPRKrazy, Sexy, Cool: The Art of Engaging North Korea’, in: Rudiger Frank (ed.), Exploring North Korean Arts, Nuremberg: Verlag fuer Moderne Kunst, pp. 31–50.



introduction: security issues for northeast asia5

open, co-operative proposals on the other. This debate is reflected in our book, too, although the general tendency among our contributors seems to lean towards engagement. Among the questions we posed was that of the applicability of European experiences with multilateral and collective security arrangements to East Asia and to the problems of the Korean peninsula. Do we have to expect a Europeanization of East Asia? And if so, what would that mean—Europe on the brink of war before 1914, or Europe on the way to the European Union after 1990? There seems to be broad agreement that the former should be avoided, and that the latter would be desirable. Europe with its two devastating wars in the twentieth century showed the high costs of armed conflict; in the nuclear age, the potential price of war has even increased. At the same time, Europe has demonstrated that centuries-old bilateral animosities can be overcome, at least to some degree, and that a multilateral approach to security is possible. It has also shown that differences in ideologies do not necessarily exclude a structured and institutionalized dialogue. The current financial crisis in Europe is also a crisis of European institutions. This makes it even more important for East Asians to have a critical discussion of their own way forward, and of the lessons to be drawn from the European experience. This would result in the emulation of successful approaches, but also in an attempt to avoid mistakes. We thus hope that the discussions in this book will help to lift the debate about multilateral security and other arrangements to a new, more sustainable level. A Note on Methodology The single essays in the book are the product of individual authors and reflect their unique insights, experiences and approaches in the form of inherently consistent analyses. However, taken together these contributions follow a more general logic that has been discussed individually and jointly on the basis of the considerations briefly outlined above. This has allowed for adjustments and has thus created more coherence than would usually be the case for an edited volume. However, limitations remain. The most serious among these is the lack of a common theoretical foundation and thus a certain heterogeneity in the definition of key terms such as collective security, which often seems to overlap with regional issues and multilateral security. We believe that such a heterodox approach has its advantages; but it certainly also has its shortcomings.

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We start by looking at the question of multilateral security arrangements, in particular collective security. We do so broadly, with a view on the European experience, critically examining its applicability as indicated above. An important element of this more general approach is the inclusion of a thorough analysis of Chinese views on international relations theory. After a foundation has thus been laid, we move further into the field and explore the positions of the other major players in the region: the United States, Japan, Russia and the two Koreas. In relation to the latter, we arrive at the Six Party Talks as the currently most prominent multilateral security arrangement and a hopeful nucleus for a more permanent and less narrowly focused mechanism. We conclude the book with a closer look at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the East Asian Community (EAC). The authors of the single contributions are academics and practitioners alike. They come from various disciplinary and professional backgrounds and thus allow us to implement the aforementioned interdisciplinary approach that combines theoretical modelling with area-specific knowledge and expertise. With its focus on the question of collective security, this book addresses political scientists and specialists who are interested in such a debate related to East Asia and with a connection to Europe. Its broad scope that takes in the whole region and a number of institutionalized arrangements makes this book valuable for researchers in area studies and students who want to explore the dynamics of international relations in East Asia. The strong focus on Korea makes the book attractive for Korea specialists, but also helps readers concentrating on any of the other involved countries to understand the relevance of this usually not easily accessible area, in particular North Korea. This aspect corresponds with the theme of a conference series at the University of Vienna, as part of which this book has been produced: Korea and East Asia. A book, once printed, is essentially a monologue, which is not always the perfect format for dealing with complex and controversial issues. We have therefore tried to incorporate an element of dialogue by inviting discussants not only to help authors to improve their papers, but also to submit their own comments in written form to be included in this book. As a result, readers will here and there find shorter essays by renowned experts that add in a critical and productive way to the analysis of specific topics. The original contributions have been written in June 2010 and were revised until mid-2011. Meanwhile, North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Il has died and was succeeded by his son Kim Jong Un in December 2011.



introduction: security issues for northeast asia7

This has no major impact on the core issues as discussed in our book, except that new risks and chances have emerged in addition to existing ones. As of 2012, we have yet to see how the new young leader will solve the puzzle of regime survival, economic development, national independence and personal legitimacy. We hope that this book will contribute to a better understanding of the challenge Kim Jong Un faces. Contents of this Book Many readers will find it helpful to start with a concise outline of the complete book to identify its golden thread before turning to the single contributions in search of in-depth analysis and detail. In this section we have tried to present the essence of each contribution and in particular to show how they are interconnected. Colin Munro, basing himself on his experience as the UK’s repre­sentative to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), examines this organization and the European approach to collective security. He argues that the need to react to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions is obvious, but that neither Japan’s and South Korea’s security treaties with the US nor the restraining influences of China and Russia may be sufficient to deter North Korea from using its nuclear weapons. But because the latter fulfil a specific function for the preservation of the regime, Munro sees a way out primarily in the improvement of living conditions inside the DPRK. All this necessitates a bold multilateral effort including a better use of existing arrangements such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or the Six Party Talks, and makes it useful to study the European OSCE experience. However, an improvement in bilateral relations between Japan and its former enemies seems to be crucial as a precondition for success in this regard. Reflecting the need to maintain a comparative perspective as stressed above, Munro reminds us that the issues surrounding North Korea today are by no means unique. The case of British warships sunk by Albanian mines in 1946 bears some striking similarities to the Cheonan (Ch’ŏn’an) case of March 2010.4 A resolution in the earlier confrontation was only possible through the OSCE, with its principled renunciation of force to change the status quo. Munro further illustrates how the OSCE developed 4 A warship of the South Korean navy was torpedoed and sunk in March 2010, killing forty-six sailors. An international commission investigated the event and concluded that the torpedo was of North Korean origin.

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from a conference into an organization, and how its membership has expanded, thus showing interesting parallels with the SPT. Partnerships at the member and organizational level now exist with many countries in East Asia, indicating that the OSCE itself has in many respects ceased to be only a European organization and has already gained recognition in East Asia. However, Munro also highlights some of the weaknesses and limitations of the OSCE. These include a lack of personality, the difficulties of developing a consensus, and the hidden goals that members have pursued under the cover of the OSCE. Other weaknesses, such as the absence of a binding treaty mechanism and the organization’s consensual nature, are identified as also being strengths of the OSCE. These seem to be particularly relevant with regard to the contrary positions around the Korean peninsula. Historical processes and the current situation in Europe and East Asia are not seen as conducive to the establishment of an inclusive, comprehensive, co-operative and consensus-based regional security mechanism. The SPT or organizations such as the ARF alone are unable to provide a sufficient framework for preserving peace and security in the East Asian region. Thus, the European experience with the crucial supportive role of bilateral ties is applicable to East Asia and the Korean peninsula too. China, beyond much doubt, will play a crucial role in both respects, despite North Korea’s reluctance to be too closely guided. Roberta Ballabio of the Italian Landau Network–Centro Volta supports Munro’s call for intense bilateral contacts as a precondition for the success of multilateral endeavours. She starts along similar lines by outlining the increasing complexity of the North Korean conundrum, pointing at the inter-relatedness of the security issue with other aspects including social, economic and political ones. Her focus in highlighting the relevance of the European and in particular the Italian experience of dealing with North Korea is on the nuclear dimension and its role as a powerful tool of negotiation with the international community. Ballabio’s brief synopsis of the history of the nuclear issue in North Korea and in particular its relationship with other, mainly economic, developments shows the many ups and downs that this process has witnessed from cautious co-operation to outright confrontation. Italy has, despite these variations, continuously stressed an engagement approach. Instead of repeatedly changing its principal position to accommodate short-term developments, it adjusted its policy tools: official initiatives and low-profile meetings were used to keep the dialogue process going. Speciali­ zed think-tank organizations can play a crucial role in such endeavours.



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Political interaction, but also confidence-building measures, human engagement and science diplomacy are crucial components of this flexible and dynamic approach. Looking beyond current negotiations, the use of international scientific co-operation as a concrete tool of engagement is displayed as being of special significance regarding the question of preventing the proliferation of sensitive knowledge. Looking at the experience in Europe after the collapse of the socialist system, Ballabio stresses the importance of addressing the human factor, i.e. the scientists, during denuclearization. Identifying them and jointly developing concepts for their employment and commitment not only before and during, but also after, the denuclearization process is an important task in terms of regional security. Like many of those who have working-level experience with North Korea, Ballabio points at the importance of contextual factors that can influence the security frame, such as mutual and biased acts, a need for political prestige among the stakeholders involved, a need for short-term political success, or the political internal situation. A multi-staged engagement pro­cess, starting from the nuclear issue but reaching far beyond as undertaken by Italy requires due consideration of the other side’s limitations, a proper choice of instruments depending on the actual situation, flexibility, waiting for the right moment for initiatives, and a long-term perspective on the Korean peninsula security issue. This stress on mutual respect and acceptance corresponds well with the OSCE case as presented by Munro. Nele Noesselt of the University of Goettingen adds an important non-Western perspective on such principal matters as discussed by Munro and Ballabio. Drawing on extensive research in Chinese sources, she analyses Chinese positions on international relations theory and on formal and informal mechanisms of collective security and their theoretical foundations. She contrasts this largely unknown or ignored perspective with the much more widely recognized Western discussion on the security dilemma in East Asia. As a result, she argues that neither realist nor liberalist or constructivist assumptions will generate results that correspond with China’s national interest. From a realist zero-sum game perspective, conflict between China as the rising new power and the US as the centre of the old power system will be inevitable. As the US will hedge against such a future, China would have to expect containment. But even if liberalist win-win games, interdependence and mutual learning are accepted as possible and relevant, the related concepts have been developed by the West and would, as some authors claim, require China’s submission under the former’s rules, values and procedures.

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Chinese academics in their search for a way out of this dilemma accor­ dingly venture outside the realms of existing, Western-created theories of international relations. They have set out to develop their own theoretical views in a way that would lead to more optimistic prospects. At a higher level of abstraction, some readers will feel reminded of the Asian values debate in the early 1990s; in politics as in academia, the question of whether a particular theory is indeed only Western (and thus not applicable in the East) or of a truly universal nature is still a controversial one. As Noesselt shows, Deng Xiaoping himself initiated such a search, which became more intense along with the growing economic and political power of China, and in particular following the Chinese leadership transition of 2002/2003. The idea of the ‘peaceful rise’ is one of the mainstays of the new theoretical approaches developed in China. At the same time, it is a political statement demanding acceptance of China as an equal partner in international affairs, and rejecting the idea that any of the typically pessimistic and cynical (neo)realist expectations would become reality. One argument that seems to address such concerns directly is the explanation of China’s rise as a return to a status it had before, rather than as a new phenomenon. What realists would regard as a disruption of the global balance of power from this perspective appears as the opposite, like the long overdue restoration of a global equilibrium that had been missing for most of the twentieth century. The Chinese theory of international relations stresses that multilateral co-operation and collective security are key concepts in an increasingly interdependent world. However, Noesselt cautions us that this could be little more than a verbal smokescreen to hide the old-fashioned pursuit of national interest, a strategy that is by no means unique to China. This argument is supported by the fact that China’s participation in multilateral organizations is mostly non-committal and characterized by the refusal to transfer part of its national sovereignty to a supranational body. In addition to promoting the idea of a peaceful rise and of multilateral co-operation, Chinese experts take issue with the Western ‘China threat theory’ as inimical to China’s new role as a reliable mediator in international conflicts. This includes, very prominently, North Korea. Failure to manage this problem successfully would have potentially destabi­ lizing  effects domestically and affect the legitimacy of the Chinese party-state. This helps us to better understand the limitations China faces when dealing with its neighbour. Both from the perspective of domestic stability and of foreign policy, North Korea is a key challenge for Beijing.



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Noesselt thus shows how the parallel development of Chinese nationalism and the growth of its power and self-confidence alter Chinese perspectives on international relations and thus also the outcomes of processes related to creating a sustainable multilateral security architecture. Whether collective security is on that map remains to be seen. In fact, it seems that China would prefer security co-operation over more binding collective security. Rosemary Foot of Oxford University, in her comments on the first three contributions, focuses on the question of whether, and how, the European model of peaceful transition and management of security issues could serve as an example for the East Asian region. She discusses the actual meaning of ‘collective security’, and finds that these standards are difficult to achieve anywhere in the world. In fact, Munro seems to suggest that so far, East Asia has not achieved much beyond bilateral agreements. Foot analyses the factors that have enabled Europe to be more successful in this field, and finds that it will be difficult if not impossible to recreate all of them in East Asia. Among key issues is a ‘desire for reconciliation’, which in the case of North Korea is often doubted. The measures outlined by Ballabio seem to point into the future, Foot argues, rather than being already operating principles. Taking Noesselt’s points as a basis, Foot observes a re-labelling of China’s security concerns, rather than a fundamental paradigmatic change. The focus of this process is on national interests, which adds to those voices that see a collective security mechanism in East Asia only as a very remote possibility. On the other hand, North Korea may force China to rethink its position at least partially; having identified itself as a supporter on nuclear non-proliferation and having played a leadership role in related organizations, China has in fact promoted ideas of collective security. Opinion on this issue inside China has been divided. China thus is caught between its domestic and larger regional and global interests. So although the prospects for collective security in East Asia are not entirely bleak, Foot regards it as still too demanding a task—not unlike elsewhere in the world. David Kang and Leif-Eric Easley of the University of Southern California and Harvard University discuss the role of the United States and ask: is it still a leader? The question of whether and how China has challenged the US role in the region and globally is now presented from an American perspective, after Noesselt’s exploration of the Chinese view. Given its global concerns and pressing domestic issues, the capacity of the US for leadership is seen as generally limited. Despite a great interest in such leadership on the part of the countries in the region, Kang and Easley

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also identify a counter-movement of crafting independent security and economic arrangements. Their statement that leadership as a social phenomenon naturally implies hierarchy and submission helps us to understand the growing reluctance of East Asian countries to accept such an approach. On the other hand, the authors at the moment see no serious alternative to US leadership. So the core questions are: what will such leadership look like, and will it be able to develop in a way that corresponds with the changed needs and growing self-confidence of countries in the region? How will China react? It is analytically helpful to understand, as Kang and Easley emphasize, that the source of power and influence has changed since the Cold War. Military might seems to make room for economic factors that are becoming increasingly dominant. This explains why China as a growing and potentially huge market has gained such considerable attractiveness in international relations despite formerly insurmountable concerns over its ideology and political system. Accordingly, the authors suggest a ‘forwardleaning trade agenda’ in the Asia Pacific as a way for the United States to react to the changed expectations of potential followers. Another remarkable analytical step undertaken by the authors is to interpret the North Korean behaviour vis-à-vis the US as the expression of a desire for American leadership. This might sound counter-intuitive, but such a perspective indeed helps us to understand North Korea’s actual behaviour including insistence on a peace treaty and diplomatic relations with the United States. Involving the US would also correspond with the traditional strategy of hedging against a geographically close adversary by forming ties with one that is further away (‘fighting poison with poison’). In fact, it seems that the US has not yet fully utilized the North Korean fears of its gigantic Chinese neighbour, although a reality check suggests that active and dynamic engagement approaches like the one introduced by Ballabio in many respects seem to be limited to a specific group of countries. However, it is not only missed opportunities that should worry the US. Kang and Easley point to the new landscape of multilateral arrangements that has emerged in the region following the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. The US is in many cases excluded from these new forms of co-operation, as is also shown in the contributions by Toloraya, Park and Snyder. South Korea is presented as a model case for this trend. It has a traditionally close relationship with the United States, but at the same time its co-operation with China has been growing almost exponentially over the past years. Even the long-standing US alliance with



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Japan shows signs of weakening. Such assessments support Munro’s call for solid bilateral relationships as the foundation for collective security. Kang and Easley also take issue with China’s peaceful rise and question China’s willingness to adjust to Western international norms. This resonates well with Noesselt’s arguments concerning the principled Chinese reservations against such submission, and the resulting wish to create or establish China’s own norms and values internationally. Should a new, broadly accepted and shared set of beliefs and perceptions emerge in the region, it could indeed form the foundation for a new or renewed order in international relations. But how realistic is such an expectation of a pax sinica 2.0? And how will the neighbours react to such attempts? The authors in their conclusion are pessimistic and for the foreseeable future see no scenario for regional security that would exclude the US. However, they are less sure about the continuation of an active US leadership role. The future might thus bring a more integrated American leadership that would form part of multilateral arrangements and be much more open to regional considerations. John Swenson-Wright of Cambridge University explores the role of Japan in the international relations of East Asia. Japan is one of those countries identified by Kang and Easley as potentially hostile to a leadership role of China. At the same time, there is a growing debate over a possible attempt by Japan to redefine its alliance with the US in search of a more independent foreign policy role, signalling an end to the old policy of ‘abandoning Asia and joining the West’. As Swenson-Wright argues, this pertains mostly to Northeast Asia, because Japan’s role in Southeast Asia has in fact already diverged from this paradigm since the 1970s. The drivers of such policy changes are manifold. They include increasing frustration over being excluded from Asia; a growing uneasiness in the new generation over a too close and unconditional alliance with the United States; and new organizational opportunities in East Asia. Never­ theless, Swenson-Wright regards the likelihood of fundamental changes as exaggerated. Rather, he expects new initiatives to balance and supplement the old system, not to replace it. This, it seems, would make Japan more responsive to multilateral initiatives. The North Korean challenge has long played a key role in Japan’s security policy. It fulfils many functions: to overcome resistance among the Japanese against remilitarization, and to avoid a too open identification of China as the main security threat. From this perspective, it seems particularly important to engage in a security dialogue with the PRC, for which the Six Party Talks provide a useful arena. Swenson-Wright also

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reminds us that Japan still is among the most potent possible sources for a large economic package that could help finance either North Korean reforms, or a Korean unification. On the other hand, it seems impossible for Japan to achieve any progress on North Korea without a resolution of the abduction issue, which has developed into a political stalemate after hopeful signs had emerged briefly under Prime Minister Koizumi in 2002. Moreover, as reluctance to name China as the main strategic threat seems to diminish in Japan, new avenues might open up for Japanese–North Korean relations. The China threat theory, as it was mentioned by Noesselt and by Kang and Easley, is getting popular in Japan, although public opinion—as in South Korea—seems torn between regarding China as a danger or as an opportunity. Accordingly, Japan reacts very sensitively to the slightest moves on China’s part. Southeast Asia and the South China Sea are areas where Japan and China clash directly in their fight for influence. SwensonWright identifies an uncomfortable sense of being overshadowed, if not displaced, by China. We could add that the Second World War in the AsiaPacific was not least driven by Japanese fears of being excluded from access to vital resources. To prevent a repetition of such a situation should be in the interest of all regional powers and thus pave the way towards multilateral arrangements. How does Japan react to these changing realities? Even more than elsewhere, domestic issues seem to dominate the debate. The Hatoyama government once intensely promoted the idea of an East Asian Community (EAC; see Scott Snyder’s contribution in this volume). This momentum seems to be gone. Swenson-Wright sees a fatal vagueness and absence of any substantive proposal concerning the EAC. At the same time, Japan seems to be tilting away from the US. In this regard, the Futenma issue5 has gained significant public attention. Progress in the past years has been achieved in trilateral co-operation between Japan, China and South Korea, which at least in part is a function of improved bilateral ties, although many issues including territorial claims over Tokto/Takeshima remain unresolved. In his conclusion, Swenson-Wright argues that Japan has the potential for substantial contributions to a security regime in the region, but in many regards lacks the capacity for playing a leadership role. Georgy Toloraya of the Russian Academy of Sciences adds another often overlooked perspective to our discussion. Russia is not only back in the 5 US military base in Okinawa.



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top ranks of international relations, but is also in many respects rediscovering its identity as an East Asian nation. With the positions of the other parties in the Six Party Talks being more or less fixed by national interests and strategic alliances, Russia has much more freedom of action and thus could become a decisive and influential player. But are the conditions right for utilizing this potential? Toloraya draws a very bleak picture of the current situation in the region. Among the factors that might explain why, despite the urgent need to achieve progress, a multilateral security architecture in East Asia is far from being finalized he cites heterogeneity, unresolved historical issues, a lack of mutual trust, and competing bilateral alliances. On the other hand, Toloraya also sees reasons for optimism. These include the end of the ideological confrontation of the Cold War, growing economic interdependence, the increasing need for co-operation in the wake of common threats, and rising human mobility. Regionalization thus emerges as a trend that is mostly independent of state actors’ decisions. In contrast to the previous contributions on the rise of China and its strategic implications, Toloraya identifies reluctance on the part of China and Japan to play a leadership role in the region. The reasons are fear of fuelling a new and destructive competition, and of antagonizing smaller countries in the region that are suspicious of every move of these big powers. Russia, too, favours a polycentric system of co-operation in Asia. Against this background, Toloraya introduces the core characteristics and ideas of what he calls Russia’s ‘turn to Asia’. In addition to listing the various initiatives in which Russia already participates, he points to Russia’s criticism of new proposals that would exclude Moscow, such as the East Asian Community. Formats such as ASEAN+6+2, which would include Russia, are naturally seen in a much more positive light. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is presented as a success story that illuminates Russia’s experience of initiating and organi­ zing regional security processes. However, as Toloraya shows, actual interpretations of the role and impact of the SCO differ. They include the vision of checking American penetration of Central Asia, fear of China’s using the SCO as an entry gate into Central Asia, and the SCO as a military alliance. In particular the latter role is strongly rejected by Toloraya, who argues that the organization’s main focus is on anti-terrorism and that the scale of military co-operation is minimal. However, he also regrets the fact that economic co-operation between SCO members so far is relatively low, for which Russian experts hold China responsible.

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Toloraya argues that the SCO is focused on Central Asia and hence has no direct relevance for Northeast Asia. However, in light of Russia’s strong interests in the region, the example of the SCO could well be instructive for finding a mechanism to handle the situation in and around Korea. The Six Party Talks are presented as the basis offering good prospects for such an arrangement, which is then discussed through the prism of the most widely held beliefs. After a reality check, Toloraya concludes with his vision of the Six Party Talks becoming permanent and developing into a Northeast Asia Security and Co-operation Organization. Hazel Smith of Cranfield University in her comment stresses that collective security mechanisms depend on a number of factors, such as concessions by members and their reasonable expectations of gains. In practice, only the various ASEAN-plus organizations have come close to fulfilling these criteria. However, their design does not seem to be appropriate to ‘coax belligerent parties to the table’, which she regards as the reason for the emergence of the Six Party Talks. In essence, Smith sees the SPT as a continuation of long-standing unilateral, bilateral and sometimes trilateral practices based on strategic alliances. Focusing on Korea, she adds another element to the security equation in Northeast Asia: food security. This issue has a profound effect not only on domestic political stability in North Korea, but also affects the available options for the SPT members. The debate whether food deliveries are a moral imperative or help prolong a hostile regime is one expression of this dilemma. Smith further points out that the nuclear programme is just one potential source of destabilization in the region. Probably more imminent is political unrest that could lead to a collapse of the North Korean state and thus to a profound shift in the power balance in the region. Interalliance rivalries could be aggravated by such developments, which is why a stable multilateral security mechanism becomes even more important. Chaesung Chun of Seoul National University continues our analysis of the position of the key players in the region when he turns to the Korean peninsula. He takes a critical look at South Korea’s foreign policy and its connection to international relations in East Asia. Chun starts with a brief historical analysis of the introduction of modernity into East Asia, which, as he argues, was imposed upon the existing states. In the case of Korea, this imposition was followed by distorted modernization during the colonial period. The modernization process in the region accordingly remains incomplete. Chun thus offers an interesting interpretation of North Korea’s situation as an incomplete modern unit that has to compete endlessly



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with South Korea at the risk of its own disappearance. Echoing the concerns expressed in Noesselt’s paper, Chun warns us of an unrestricted application of Western theories of international relations, which mostly assume a set of players composed of mature nation states. Chun adds a few more elements to our discussion of collective security. He points to the existence of problems that cannot be resolved by nation states alone, such as climate change, and the coexistence of Westphalian and post-Westphalian orders. The changing nature of sovereignty calls for new multilateral approaches. To exemplify these observations, Chun outlines South Korea’s situation in the international relations of the region and the world, presenting insights into the current internal debate among academics and politicians in Seoul. He identifies a divide between globalists and traditional realists and calls for a combined approach to realize the great variety of South Korea’s interests. To achieve its goals, the alliance with the US is still the cornerstone of South Korea’s foreign strategy. But as Kang and Easley have shown, the situation is changing. Is Seoul ready for an adjustment? In any case, Chun stresses the need for South Korea to develop its own strategic view on global affairs. He argues that Korean understanding of the region is still very traditional, regarding it as a sum of bilateral relations rather than as a more comprehensive unit. Despite South Korea’s peculiar position between great powers and facing a difficult northern neighbour, or maybe exactly because of this situation, no consistent regional strategy has so far been developed. It seems that South Korea would benefit greatly from an inclusive multilateral arrangement. With an eye to the situation in Japan and Russia as discussed by Swenson-Wright and Toloraya, such an approach could somewhat alleviate the pressure on the ROK to make a tough and potentially painful decision in favour of either the US or China. Chun shows how South Korea emerges as one of the few players in the international relations of the region with a genuine interest in the nurturing of a stable and broadly defined multilateral security architecture, at least in theory. He calls for the development of complex networks rather than the traditional striving after an institutional balance of power, and the empowerment of new actors such as civil society organizations and international organizations at global and regional levels. Haksoon Paik of the Sejong Institute undertakes the difficult task of adding a North Korean perspective to our discussion. He does so with a focus on North Korea’s relations with and policies towards the United States and its East Asian neighbours in the post-Cold War era. Not

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surprisingly, the two goals of survival and prosperity stand at the core of North Korea’s policy objectives. The problem lies in the fact that these goals are often in collision with each other, forcing the North Korean leadership to make decisions in favour of the one or the other. Currently, the only way out of this conundrum, as Paik argues, is a drastically improved relationship with the United States. As the other contributions in this book have shown, in one way or the other North Korea has become a focal point of international relations in Northeast Asia for each of the countries involved. It limits South Korea’s options and at the same time sets a good part of Seoul’s foreign policy agenda; it is a threat to Japan and at the same time serves as an excuse for that country to hedge against China; it allows Russia to re-enter the centre stage of world politics; it poses both a challenge and an opportunity for the US in its attempt at reformulating its policy in the region; and it has become one of the biggest nightmares of China’s foreign policy, while offering a unique opportunity to show leadership and thus qualify for an enhanced role in the region. So far, we have mostly treated North Korea as an external variable. Paik helps us to understand the North Korean perspective, a factor that is needed to explore not only the existing and developing risks for security in the region, but also to find realistic solutions and to develop core components of a regional security mechanism. The prospects of such a development are seen in the fact that North Korea’s willingness to engage in substantial (and hence risky) economic reforms and opening strategies coincided with periods of feelings of relative security on the external front, and vice versa. Paik shows that North Korea has had to make a number of critical choices that illustrate the close interrelation between economic and foreign policy considerations in this ‘incompletely modernized’ state, as Chun put it. Echoing Smith’s warning, he points at the manifold dangers for North Korea’s domestic stability and the consequences this would have for regional security. Paik concludes that North Korea’s foreign policy has been remarkably consistent. However, the instruments applied have showed varying degrees of effectiveness, which creates the impression of a much more dynamic and flexible foreign policy blueprint. What is important for the issue of collective security is Paik’s conviction that North Korea is in principle ready for engagement, and that it is particularly eager to resolve the conflict with the United States. However, it will not do so at any cost. As interests in the region differ greatly, it is a challenging task to find a solution that will satisfy all partners in a multilateral security forum.



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Chung-in Moon of Yonsei University addresses the Six Party Talks, in particular their implications for peninsular and regional peace and security. The SPT have emerged as one of the common topics covered in all contributions in this book. There is broad agreement that among the single multilateral security arrangements in the East Asian region, the SPT are so far the most advanced and for some observers also carry the best prospects. Moon, too, points at the high stakes: failure to handle the nuclear issue around North Korea will have effects up to the global level. A key component in the related debate is that of bilateralism versus multilateralism. The former has been favoured by North Korea, whereas the United States has been in support of a multilateral solution. The two standpoints, bilateral and multilateral, seem to be motivated by strategic considerations. After an analysis of the various options and the progress that has been achieved so far, Moon arrives at the conclusion that despite their weaknesses, the Six Party Talks should be revived because there simply is no alternative. However, he also sees these talks ‘under siege’. He is particularly critical of the Lee Myung-bak government in Seoul, which has changed South Korea’s role from ‘facilitator to spoiler’. The Obama administration has not been very helpful, either; according to Moon, it has been much too passive and reluctant to achieve substantial progress, despite high expectations among, but not limited to, the North Koreans. In fact, he regards the standpoint of Obama’s Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as undistinguishable from that of the Bush administration. In conclusion, Moon sees the Six Party Talks as being on the verge of collapse, a development that must be avoided. He urges the need to develop a realistic and inter-subjective understanding of North Korea, a task that is daunting but not impossible. In particular, he signals the principled willingness in the North to reach a deal, a point that has been made by Kang and Easley in a different context. According to Moon, a prerequisite to any resolution of the North Korea issue(s) is nothing less than a paradigm shift in the US and the DPRK. Would that mean a movement towards a collective security mechanism in East Asia? In any case, it requires concerted efforts among the SPT members, not least to end North Korean attempts to play them off against each other. These efforts, however, would fail if they ended up isolating North Korea. James E. Hoare bases his comments on first-hand experience as a top UK diplomat in North Korea. He particularly stresses the productive role played by China, which resolved the stalemate resulting from ideologically entrenched positions in the US and the North. Hoare identifies as the core

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problem of the Six Party Talks the contrast between its singular goal—the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue—and the many other, often conflicting interests that have found their way into the considerations of the negotiating partners and thus made progress so complicated. He concludes with a key point: multilateral security arrangements such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, even if they have not yet been able to provide any tangible solution, have played an important educational role in showing North Korea and China how their policies are viewed by non-hostile countries. Sung-Hoon Park of Korea University explores a multilateral forum of co-operation that has emerged between Europe and Asia since the end of the Cold War. The Asia-Europe Meeting helps in overcoming a certain ambivalence and inequality in the relationship between the two regions. Echoing a number of concerns raised by other contributors in this book, Park observes that the beginning of the ASEM process in 1996 coincided with the end of the preoccupation of Asia with the US. Does Europe emerge as a key component in a multilateral security structure in East Asia? Such an assessment would not be very realistic. Park finds that the most significant progress has not been made in the fields of political and economic co-operation; rather, socio-cultural exchanges have marked the biggest achievements. This hints at the difficulties that exist concerning the ‘hard’ issues of multilateral co-operation. However, this notion of imperfectly used opportunities should not obscure our view of the fact that progress has been made on a number of substantial issues. The launch of ASEM per se marks a great breakthrough. There were push and pull factors that helped overcome the obstacles on that path. In addition to the strategic goal of diversification of security partners, the notion of a European fortress and the fear of coming late in the race for the huge emerging East Asian market highlighted the need for action to both sides. Interestingly, Park notes that dissatisfaction with another multilateral forum—the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)—served as a catalyst for Asia-Europe rapprochement. Security co-operation seems to be the least developed part in the ASEM framework. The reasons for this as provided by Park are diverse. They include a low security profile on the part of Brussels and active competition with diverging policies emerging from the US. Clearly, the EU is seen as a potent economic partner, but as a weak provider of security guarantees. Although this does not fully correspond with reality, growing regional initiatives for co-operation including the East Asian Community seem



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recently to be competing with the security component of ASEM and push it further into the background. However, successful initiatives such as the ARF do include Europe and provide a counterweight to a lack of progress in other areas. The main value of Europe regarding security in East Asia, however, seems to be its potential to share experiences such as the one with the OSCE as outlined by Munro. Scott Snyder of the Asia Foundation debates the so far most ambitious project of institutionalized multilateral co-operation in the region, the East Asian Community, which has been mentioned in different contexts in most of the essays in this volume, including those by Swenson-Wright, Toloraya and Park. This highlights the great attention the EAC is currently receiving. However, attention does not necessarily equal success. Is the EAC the grand solution to all the issues addressed so far, including those involving North Korea? Echoing Noesselt’s contribution, Snyder starts by reminding us that any multilateral agreement entails the sacrifice of at least some part of a participating nation’s sovereignty, and that such an option will only be chosen if co-operation is the best choice to meet certain types of national security and political needs. In other words, collective security will work if it is seen as a means towards an end, not as an end in itself. As we have seen, resistance to the delegation of national sovereignty to multilateral bodies remains high; most successful agreements, like those in Europe, were reached only after very intense, dramatic historical experiences that altered the cost-benefit evaluation of the parties involved. Snyder agrees that so far, there has been only slow progress on the way towards an East Asian security architecture. He analyses the major obstacles, or what are often displayed as such, including Asia’s divided states, Japan’s historical legacy, America’s Asian alliance network, and Asia’s heterogeneity and systemic differences. He arrives at the conclusion that while all of this is true, none of these factors sufficiently explains the current situation. Rather, he argues that the long period of peace since the Cold War has led to a preference for nationalism over regionalism. The fact that the only exception—the Six Party Talks—has occurred in a case of potential conflict supports this view. Comparing the various visions of East Asian co-operation with the European example, Snyder finds many similarities, at least in the concepts. Implementation, however, lags behind. In addition to the EAC’s statements being much narrower than the OSCE’s principles, he notes the complete absence of the human dimension, which formed a core of the Helsinki Final Act. Currently, Snyder identifies China, China-led economic

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interdependence and counter-strategies by countries such as Japan as the main basis for deepened regional integration. The role of Korea in these developments has been varying. The United States seems to look at Asian regional forums almost exclusively from a global perspective. Snyder concludes that unless a broader framework for Sino-Japanese relations is laid and Sino-US strategic reassurance is achieved, multilateral security cooperation in East Asia will remain fragmented, ad hoc and issue driven. Julie Gilson of the University of Birmingham in her comments on the contributions by Sung-Hoon Park and Scott Snyder points at the close relationship between the discussion on East Asian regionalism and debates over norms and institutions. She questions the assessment of an imminent end of US dominance in East Asia as overly optimistic, in particular hinting at the weakness of links between East Asia and Europe. The latter, so she argues, show no potential of strengthening as Europe is too concerned with its internal affairs including the 2011 economic and financial crisis. She questions the alleged failure of Asian security by referring to the fact that major war could so far be prevented on the Asian continent. Gilson raises an important point with regard to methodology by arguing that a proper definition of ‘regionalism’ is a crucial precondition for related debates and for comparative approaches. She suggests focusing in particular on the question of issues, rather than overarching relations, as the former seem to drive regional cooperation in East Asia in the sense of ‘ad hoc multilateralism’. Finally, she provides a valuable addition to the previous debates by introducing the literature on the value of ‘human security’ and ‘comprehensive security’ within the East Asian context. Conclusion We have seen that the current state of, and also the prospects for, multi­ lateral and collective security in East Asia do not invite optimism. However, there is hope in the fact that most of our authors seem to agree that the reasons are not systemic, but emerge rather from a very dynamic and developing situation. Many of them have been able to apply the concept of collective security, although the perspectives and results have varied. The forms and value of engagement are seen to be ambiguous, evolving around bilateral and multilateral arrangements according to need and circumstance. Bilateralism dominates at the moment, but it has no eternal monopoly, and competition from multilateral arrangements



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keeps growing. In particular, we note the dissatisfaction with the status quo, opening prospects for new strategies and approaches including those related to collective security. Whereas the United States so far plays the most crucial role, hope is mostly centred on China, not least because the US shows few signs of paradigmatic change. With the different constellations of power and the diversity of institutions in the region, East Asia presents itself as a not yet saturated system of international relations that is still on its way from the Cold War setting to a new security architecture. The European experience of the past is thus not completely different, although the composition of powers in East Asia and their geostrategic posture suggests other solutions. Nevertheless, an understanding of the basic mechanisms and the pros and cons of various options seems to be helpful for an assessment of what has been achieved, and what needs to be done. Korea, and in particular North Korea, has emerged not only as a source of trouble but also as a possible catalyst of integration. As the contributions in this book show, this is true under various scenarios, be it as a problem that calls for a joint resolution, a threat that must be countered, a failed state that could seriously disturb the regional balance of power, or a human security problem that cannot be ignored, to name only a few situations. South Korea in this regard faces the tough challenge of dealing with a problem that is both a national and an international issue. Whereas the strategy of the past decades has been to rely on a strong alliance with the United States and Japan, South Korea must react to changing realities by actively reaching out to China and Russia, unless Korea, again, wants to become a victim of history and great power politics. As the management of bilateral alliances, while still forming the core of any security strategy, will become more complex the more such relationships are involved, a way out could indeed be in a multilateral setting. The current situation in East Asia, however, is not promising. A large number of multilateral security arrangements exist, but many of these seem to be designed to serve the national interest of particular groups. The readiness to sacrifice national sovereignty for the sake of multilateral arrangements of interdependence is not yet big enough to overcome scepticism against co-operation and to build trust in collective security mechanisms. Ironically, as in particular our debate on the Six Party Talks has shown, the ever-growing need to deal effectively with the threat emanating from North Korea seems to have the potential to change the related calculations. A conflict over Korea involving the US and China is in nobody’s interest, neither in East Asia, nor in the rest of the world.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE OSCE AND THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE Colin Munro Introduction The conference held in Vienna on 4–5 June 2010 on ‘International Relations and Options for a Regional Collective Security Mechanism in East Asia’, organised by the universities of Vienna and Cambridge, was timely, and not only in view of the sinking by torpedo on 26 March of a Republic of Korea (ROK) warship, the Cheonan. In mid-April 2010, the foreign ministry in Pyongyang stated that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) had “developed nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterring the US attack and defending its sovereignty and right to exist”. The DPRK was a “responsible nuclear weapons state”. Meanwhile, countries such as the US, Japan and the ROK regard the DPRK as anything but “responsible”. On the contrary, it is widely perceived in the international community as an unstable, impoverished rogue state run by a brutal dictatorship that supports terrorism, starves its population, and has breached the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). Neither the now defunct Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), established in 1995 to provide the DPRK with facilities for civilian nuclear power generation to meet its energy needs, nor Six Party Talks (SPT) involving the US, Japan, Russia, China, DPRK and ROK, have deterred the DPRK leadership from pursuing a nuclear weapons programme which represents, according to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), a threat to international peace and security. Japan and the ROK do have bilateral security treaties with the US. But neither these treaties nor the restraining influence of China and Russia may be sufficient to deter the DPRK from using its nuclear weapons. Its predilection for breaching agreements, and staging incidents designed to escalate tension, such as sinking the Cheonan, is not the responsible behaviour of a nuclear weapons state. Response to such provocation by Japan, the ROK, and above all the US, is habitually used to unite the population in the face of an alleged external threat. In the case of responses by those states to the Cheonan sinking, the DPRK has threatened “all out war”. Heightening tension through provocative incidents and developing nuclear weapons provide a means for the leadership to maintain control

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over the population, supported by a bloated, privileged military establishment, including the world’s fourth-largest standing army, that consumes a vast proportion of the country’s meagre resources. It is therefore appropriate, and in present circumstances urgent, for the wider international community to consider ways and means of diminishing this long-standing threat to international peace and security. In the longer term this threat can only be removed by lifting living standards and promoting peaceful evolutionary change in the DPRK. It would be astonishing, and contrary to experience everywhere else in the world, if failed attempts to improve living conditions, including a botched currency reform, had no effect on how people view the regime. Of course the DPRK’s deplorable behaviour must be condemned. That is a political necessity in the ROK. Nuclear proliferation is profoundly dangerous. But loudspeakers blaring propaganda and cutting trade links will neither loosen the regime’s grip, nor remove the threat to peace posed by the DPRK. On the contrary, measures such as these may even increase it. In present circumstances, attempting to establish a new regional security mechanism on the European model would dissipate effort. There is however scope for making better use of existing regional fora such as the SPT and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), drawing on elements of European experience of conflict-prevention relevant to the situation in East Asia, including that of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). States in the region that have common security interests should also increase efforts to strengthen their bilateral relations. In particular, regional security would benefit from better relations at all levels between Japan and its former enemies. History and Essential Features of the OSCE There has been no European equivalent of the DPRK’s intense nationalism, political mobilisation and isolation, centred on the personality cult of the leader, although Enver Hoxha came close, running a brutal isolationist regime in Albania, as did Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania. Kim Il Sung was profoundly shocked by the execution on Christmas Day 1989 of Ceausescu, who had modelled his leadership on Kim’s and Mao’s after his visits to China and North Korea in 1971. Neither Albania nor Romania attempted to develop nuclear weapons, although the Cheonan sinking brings to mind the damage to two British warships by Albanian mines in the Corfu channel in 1946. Albania refused to accept the judgement of the international



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court which found in Britain’s favour. This dispute was only resolved after the revolutions of 1989, when Albania finally joined the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The Conference had met at the level of heads of state and government (HOSG) in Helsinki in 1975. This first CSCE summit agreed, in the Helsinki Final Act (HFA), on ten politically binding principles, including the renunciation of force to change the status quo, as the basis for maintaining dialogue, building confidence, and preventing conflict in a continent divided by the cold war. In 2010, chairmanship of the OSCE (a summit in 1994 agreed to replace the conference process with an organisation) rested with Kazakhstan, the first time that a successor state of the former Soviet Union had assumed responsibility for leadership of an organisation which has a comprehensive concept of, and a co-operative approach to, security, and includes 56 states reaching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The OSCE’s Asian partners for co-operation are Japan, the ROK, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Thailand and Australia. Co-operation is focussed on the OSCE’s mandate for prevention, management and resolution of conflict, and post-conflict rehabilitation. Partner states undertake a political commitment to work towards applying OSCE norms and principles in the way they treat their citizens and manage their international relations. Kazakhstan is also a member of both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Since 1995 Kazakhstan has co-operated with NATO through the latter’s Partnership for Peace programme. Part of its territory lies in Europe, so it is fully involved in negotiations on the future of conventional arms control in Europe. It has renounced nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan is also eligible for membership of the Council of Europe (COE), and has acceded to COE conventions on culture and higher education. It is working closely with the EU in the context of the latter’s central Asian strategy, which places particular emphasis on strengthening respect for the rule of law. Kazakhstan, moreover, secured consensus for what would be the first OSCE summit since 1999, on 1–2 December 2010 in Astana. There was an ambitious agenda. Russia, and other members of the CSTO, put forward proposals for a new European Security Treaty (EST). These, and other aspects of European security are under discussion in the OSCE, in the ‘Corfu’ process initiated by the Greek chairmanship in 2009, the OSCE being the only regional security organisation that includes all states that have an interest in these proposals. The summit in 2010 coincided with the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe at the second CSCE summit. President Nazerbaev was due to visit France in

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November to mark this important anniversary. The Charter was a politically binding agreement to close down the Cold War (in the Sword of Achilles, Philip Bobbitt describes it as the Peace of Paris, not least because this summit also brought the Second World War to a formal end one month after the unification of Germany) and implement the ten principles of European security elaborated in the HFA, including respect for democracy, the rule of law, individual human rights, agreement that frontiers between states can be changed peacefully in accordance with international law, and the right of states to choose their alliances. (‘Implement’ is not used in the OSCE as it is in Scots law, where it means to ‘perform an obligation’.) The members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact agreed at the Paris summit of 1990 on the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), which provided for drastically reduced weapon inventories and extensive confidence-building measures. The Open Skies treaty was also agreed in 1990. Kazakhstan, a party to all these agreements is thus, potentially at least, in a pivotal position to strengthen the OSCE’s role in promoting security, not only in Europe and Eurasia, but also with its Asian partners such as Japan and the ROK, and indeed with China. The chairmanship’s motto—Trust, Tradition, Tolerance, Transparency—suggests an ambition to combine Asian and Euro-Atlantic values and experience. It is important, however, certainly in an East Asian context, to bear in mind that, except for a brief period before and after the Paris summit, when institutions such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) were established, and a conference process (CSCE) was replaced by an organisation (OSCE), there has been no consensus among participating states (because the OSCE lacks legal personality, it does not have members) on what the CSCE/OSCE is actually for. Lack of consensus on the OSCE’s role will have limited the scope for initiatives by the Kazakh (and subsequent Lithuanian and Irish) chairmanship in East Asia. The original prime Soviet objective was to use the CSCE to confirm 1945 frontiers as immutable, including the one that divided Germany. Their secondary objective was to gain access to Western technology, especially military technology. The Helsinki Final Act was intended by the Soviet Union to be a substitute peace treaty, confirming the results of the Second World War. The West, including members of NATO, the European Community, and neutral and non-aligned countries such as Austria and Switzerland, sought to keep the door open for the peaceful unification of Germany (to which France, the UK and the US were committed by treaty), and to spread liberal democracy, the market economy, and the rule of law throughout the continent.



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One important reason, initially, for including the central Asian successor states of the Soviet Union in the CSCE/OSCE was to provide a regional security umbrella for the nuclear disarmament of countries such as Kazakhstan. In this it was successful. There followed however, disagreements over NATO enlargement and the OSCE’s role in promoting democracy and human rights, especially in the former Soviet Union. Russia envisaged transformation of the CSCE/OSCE into a regional security mechanism, replacing both NATO and the defunct Warsaw Pact at the apex of a hierarchy of regional and sub-regional organisations. It should have its own security council with three members—Russia, the US, and the EU. But the Soviet Union’s former allies in central and Eastern Europe gave priority to EU and NATO membership as the cornerstones of their security and prosperity. The EST proposal does not take account of the human dimension of security. It is based, not on the Charter of Paris, but selectively on HFA principles relating to the sovereignty of states and noninterference in internal affairs. It postulates a security system based on spheres of influence, preventing countries such as Georgia from aligning themselves as they wish, contrary to the agreements reached in Paris in 1990. It is thus neither co-operative, nor comprehensive, nor collective. Russia has, moreover, contrived closure of the OSCE mission in Georgia against the wishes of the host country, and has recognised breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Against this background, members of the EU and NATO contend, in the Corfu process discussions, that security in the OSCE context must continue to be based on its comprehensive concept, including its three dimensions and ten principles, in accordance with conclusions agreed by consensus at five summits held between 1990 and 1999. Therein lies the OSCE’s added value. The prospects for consensus on the OSCE’s future role in international security remain unclear. In spite of these limitations, the OSCE’s flexibility, in particular the absence of a treaty constraining the chairmanship’s freedom of action, and the scope for agreeing by consensus to redefine its role and assign it new tasks, does make it possible, now as during the Cold War, for all participants to engage in a security dialogue without sacrificing their positions of principle. OSCE discussion of Russia’s EST proposal in the Corfu process is a topical example. Kazakhstan has been adept at using the OSCE’s flexibility during the recent troubles in Kyrgyzstan—an example of crisis management by the chairmanship, exercising its responsibility to provide political leadership of the organisation. It would, for example, be possible for HOSG to assign to the OSCE new tasks related to the present

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instability in central Asia, including not only Kyrgyzstan but also Afghanistan. The subject of this paper is ‘Collective Security: the OSCE and the European experience’. The OSCE’s approach to security is consensual, comprehensive and co-operative, not collective. The consensus principle is attenuated by the autonomy enjoyed by the heads of OSCE field missions and institutions such as the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). Participating states do not have legally binding obligations towards each other, or towards their citizens, although most European participating states do, in three other regional organisations— the Council of Europe (COE), NATO, and the EU. Article V of the Washington Treaty provides that an attack on one member of NATO, which is a collective security organisation, is an attack on all. All European states except Belarus and the Vatican have legal obligations towards their citizens under the COE’s European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), enforceable at the Human Rights Court in Strasbourg. These obligations have been reinforced recently for EU member states by its Fundamental Rights Agency which is based in Vienna. These three regional organisations have been central to the experience, both of states and individuals in Europe since 1945. They provide an international, treaty-based framework for individuals to live at peace in prosperous liberal democratic states based on the rule of law and free market principles, tempered by adequate public provision for health, education and welfare. Good neighbourly relations between states, and reconciliation between former enemies have been at the heart of their development. The EU would have been impossible without reconciliation between France and Germany, sealed in the bilateral Elysée ‘friendship’ treaty of 1963, which set in motion a vast programme of youth exchanges designed to give young people a personal and realistic understanding of their neighbours. French and German pupils can now learn from a jointly produced history course book about their common past. The EU is in fact a unique international organisation, in which some elements of state sovereignty have been pooled for the common good. Its laws, like COE conventions, are international obligations which take precedence over the domestic laws of member states. NATO for its part has prevented conflict in Europe, even if it has not resolved fundamental differences between members such as Greece and Turkey. It is hardly surprising therefore, that Czechs and Slovaks, who had lived in a prosperous liberal democracy until Hitler dismembered their country, should have given priority to EU and NATO accession, as soon as they were free to do so.



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After the First World War, the League of Nations—which was intended to be a collective security organisation—failed to protect states that were victims of aggression, such as Ethiopia, China or Czechoslovakia. Its ineffective provisions for the protection of minorities such as Germans in Czechoslovakia, contributed to Hitler’s rise. Every member state had a veto in the League of Nations Council. The US did not even join the organisation that President Wilson had devised. Countries such as Japan walked out when they were criticised. The UN, and European regional organisations established after 1945, were designed to remedy the fundamental weaknesses of the League. In the UN, the power of veto was limited to the five permanent members of the Security Council, who, according to the original concept, would keep the peace that their victory over the Axis powers had secured. The Council of Europe (COE) would integrate Germany in a network of conventions establishing democracy, the rule of law and respect for individual human rights, preventing the reestablishment of dictatorship or authoritarian rule. NATO, through the Washington treaty, would provide collective defence against the emerging threat posed by the Soviet Union, involving the US and Canada directly in European security. (What is now) the EU would use economic means to promote integration, reconciliation and “ever closer union” between its members, notably between France and Germany, rendering war between them impossible. All European states would be eligible to join, as in the case of the COE. The inspiration for a continuing American commitment to European security and prosperity, Franco-German reconciliation and European unity had been provided in 1946 by Sir Winston Churchill in his speeches in Fulton in Missouri, and Zurich. The Soviet Union had a different approach. It sought to protect its security through a cordon sanitaire of ‘friendly’ satellites on its periphery. ‘Friendliness’ was ensured by imposing the Communist system on territory liberated from Nazi rule by the Red Army, including the Soviet Zone in Germany, and Korea north of the 38th parallel. The Warsaw Pact including the GDR was established in 1955 when the Federal Republic (FRG) became a member of NATO. The Western members of the wartime alliance and the Soviet Union had not been able to agree on how Europe, especially Germany, should be run. So, Europe was divided. There was no peace treaty with Germany, although treaties were concluded with Germany’s erstwhile allies: Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Austria was restored in 1955 as a neutral state within its 1938 frontiers. Nuclear weapons gave rise to the chilling concept of mutually assured  destruction—MAD for short. It was knowledge of the horrific

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consequences of MAD that prevented the use of nuclear weapons, including in the Korean War. Contrary to initial US expectations, possession of nuclear weapons did not provide additional leverage in negotiations with the Soviet Union. They could not be used as a means of depriving the Soviet Union of ‘friendly’ governments in its neighbourhood. The risk of miscalculation leading to MAD was such that neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact encroached on the opposing alliance’s vital interests. Thus, there was no attempt by NATO to exploit popular revolts against Communist oppression in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1956, 1970, 1979–81). ‘Roll back’ gave way to containment. Khrushchev pulled back from the brink in Berlin (1958–61) and in Cuba (1962). We know now that there were several occasions during the Cold War when nuclear war could have started because one side had misread the other’s intentions, for example in staging military exercises. Against this backdrop, Soviet proposals in the 1950s for a European security conference, excluding the US and Canada, were regarded by members of NATO as propaganda initiatives, not the basis for negotiation. However, construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 led to a fundamental rethink, in East and West. The Soviet Union decided to accept the presence in Europe of US and Canadian forces. Suppression of the movement towards democracy (the Prague Spring of 1968) in Czechoslovakia (socialism with a ‘human face’) increased Brezhnev’s sense that the Soviet empire was secure. Meanwhile Germans were coming to terms with the reality that their country would remain divided for the foreseeable future. A new approach was needed towards the East German state, and towards Germany’s former enemies in Central and Eastern Europe. The FRG’s Ostpolitik recognised the status quo, including the GDR as a state, and renounced force as a means of changing it. Both German states joined the UN on this basis in 1973. But FRG policy was also dynamic, in that it aimed to promote peaceful evolutionary change in central and eastern Europe. As far as East Germany (the GDR and the Soviet Sector of Berlin) was concerned, there was the additional aim of preserving a sense of national unity, and holding the door open for reunification. The FRG established itself as the major Western trading partner of Warsaw Pact members. The GDR’s economic dependence on the FRG was a major factor contributing to its collapse in 1989, by which time the Soviet Union was unable to provide an alternative source of economic support. The key principle in the HFA of renunciation of force to change the status quo was taken from the FRG’s treaties with the GDR, Poland and the



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Soviet Union, which entered into force in 1972. The Western powers (France, UK, US) and the Soviet Union had made their contribution by agreeing in 1971 to remove the divided city of Berlin as a source of EastWest tension. This agreement opened the way for: diplomatic relations between the FRG and Germany’s former enemies; negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe; Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) between the super powers; and the negotiations that culminated in agreement on the HFA at the CSCE summit in 1975. West German policy also had an element that was controversial in NATO at the time, but is relevant to the situation in East Asia now. In view of Germany’s history, leaders such as Brandt, Schmidt and Genscher saw no alternative, as far as German political leaders were concerned, to building up relations of trust and confidence with the dictators who held sway in countries such as Poland, the Soviet Union, and above all the GDR. They reasoned that it was leaders such as Honecker, not dissidents and human rights activists, who were in a position to make concessions that would improve the lot of the population. They sought to avoid giving Polish dictators the opportunity to garner popular support against a supposed revisionist German threat to Poland’s western border. In the Poland–FRG treaty negotiated in 1970, the latter recognised as inviolable the frontier between Poland and the GDR. West German leaders were thus more reticent than others in NATO, in building up links with Solidarity or dissidents in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Successive West German governments had to walk a tightrope; on the one hand acknowledging the injustice of imposing collective guilt and ethnic cleansing on 16 million Germans expelled from their homes between 1944 and 1947, and on the other, recognising and atoning for Germany’s responsibility for unleashing the Second World War. The Soviet Union made two concessions in the pan-European negotiations which culminated in signature of the Helsinki Final Act on 1 August 1975. First, that frontiers could be changed in accordance with international law, peacefully and by agreement, on the basis that it would never agree to any such change, and certainly not in respect of the frontier that divided Berlin and Germany. Second, that what is now the OSCE’s human dimension could be considered as a security issue, on the basis that the Soviet Union’s commitments to respect human rights would remain a dead letter in its empire. From a Soviet perspective, these turned out to be major miscalculations, although at the time it seemed to most Western observers that the Russians and their allies had secured their prime objective of rendering the division of Europe, including Germany, permanent.

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The contribution of the HFA to ending the division of Europe, the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, should not be exaggerated. The failure of central planning of the command economy, inability to keep pace with US military technology, and the leadership of the Polish Pope, were also very important parts of the picture. Gorbachev’s role was crucial. But not only did the HFA help the liberal democratic model of society gain traction in European parts of the Soviet empire before his accession to power in 1985, it also provided the framework for the unification of Germany, and the agreements on European security reached in Paris in 1990. Resemblances and Differences Between Europe and East Asia There are some similarities between this European experience and East Asia. After the Second World War the US security umbrella was extended over Japan and the ROK, as it was over Western Europe. The recovery and transformation of Japan and the ROK under US protection can be compared with that of Western Europe. Korea, like Germany until 1990, is divided, albeit without a capital city split in half by a brutal wall. But the differences are profound. The ROK’s GDP per capita at purchasing power parity was less than Ghana’s when that former British colony became independent in 1957. The figures now for the ROK and Ghana respectively are US$27,000 and US$1,500. Estimates put GDP per capita in the DPRK at US$1,900, most of it, unlike Ghana’s, spent on the military and security apparatus. The impoverished population may suffer more than Romanians did under Ceausescu. The gap between the two Korean states in all spheres of life is far greater than that which existed between the two German states in 1989. The economy is of particular importance. GDP per capita in the DPRK is less than 10 percent of that in the ROK, a much greater disparity than between the two German states in 1989. Unification would be a Herculean task for the foreseeable future. There are Asian echoes of European experience in regional security organisations such as ASEAN, established in 1967 after ‘confrontation’ between Malaysia and Indonesia had been ended, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) established in 1994, to “promote peace and security through dialogue and cooperation in the Asia Pacific”. But although the principle of non- interference in internal affairs has been well-nigh sacrosanct in ASEAN and the ARF, the DPRK does not at present participate in ARF political dialogue meetings, in case it should be criticised. The DPRK



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is unlikely to be attracted by current efforts in ASEAN to move human rights in member states up the agenda. The North East Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), a track-two process run by the University of California at San Diego, could have been modelled on some parts of the CSCE process. However, the proceedings of meetings under the auspices of NEACD indicate that relations between the two Korean states are more fraught than between the two Germanies when the Wall was built in 1961. The war against Germany was first and foremost fought on land. The defeated country and its capital were divided into four zones of occupation. German territory east of the Oder/Neisse line was placed under provisional Polish and Soviet administration, pending final determination of Germany’s frontiers in a peace treaty. The war against Japan was fought mainly at sea, and ended by the atomic bombs. Japan was occupied but not divided. There was no allied control commission and there is no Japanese equivalent of the German question. A peace treaty was concluded in 1951. The Japanese people, who retained their emperor and had been the victims of nuclear weapons, did not come to terms with their past in the same way as Germans. There has been no East Asian equivalent of the reconciliation between France and Germany, which was the foundation of what is now the EU. There was no war in Europe from 1945 until Yugoslavia began to break up in 1991. But there was a war in Korea involving the US and China. China has not renounced force as a means of regaining control of Taiwan, unlike Serbia, which has renounced force as a means of regaining control of Kosovo. China is not willing to follow the FRG’s example and recognise Taiwan as a state but not a foreign country. Taiwan for its part does not seem tempted by the Hong Kong model of one country, two systems. Taiwan enjoys US protection but not recognition as a state, an ambiguous situation that had no parallel in Europe. The future of Korea, unlike Germany, was not a major issue for the wartime allies. There was agreement between China, the UK and the US in Cairo (the Soviet Union was absent because it was not at war with Japan at the time) in November 1943 that Korea would “in due course” become “free and independent”. In the event, the Soviet Union kept its promise at the Yalta summit in February 1945, to join the war against Japan three months after the end of the war in Europe. It occupied Japan’s protectorate as far south as the 38th parallel. US troops subsequently occupied what is now the ROK. There was hardly any attempt to administer the country as one, and no agreement on what “free and independent” should mean in practice. The UN decision to deploy force to repulse the North Korean invasion in 1950 was possible only because the Soviet Union was boycotting the

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UNSC (United Nations Security Council) at the time, in view of the latter’s refusal to allow the recently proclaimed People’s Republic of China to occupy China’s seat on the Council. Thus, neither the historical background nor the present situation in East Asia is conducive to the establishment of an inclusive, comprehensive, co-operative, consensus-based regional security mechanism, modelled on the OSCE, or indeed any other European organisation. Gorbachev’s proposal in 1986 for a Pacific Ocean Conference on CSCE lines was viewed at the time with great suspicion by the countries that would have been involved. The US suspected a Soviet ploy to constrain the operations of its navy. There is still no US interest in subjecting its naval operations to the constraints of an arms control regime. It is hard in present circumstances to envisage in East Asia military confidence-building measures and reductions in conventional forces of the kind that have been implemented in Europe since the late 1980s. The OSCE’s Code of Conduct for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, approved at the 1994 summit, is nonetheless a pertinent example of the sort of agreement reached in the CSCE/OSCE when there was broad consensus on its role, that could be applied in East Asia if political conditions should change. The rise of China since 1978 indicates that it is possible in East Asian conditions to achieve tremendous economic progress, while political power remains in the hands of leaders who pay lip service to communism and suppress human rights, including the rights of members of national minorities; this even though China might well have become vastly more prosperous and stable than it now is without Mao’s great leap forward and cultural revolution. If Tibetans and Uighurs lived in a European country they would benefit from the provisions of the Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities, and the attentions of the HCNM. The Chinese leadership, however, considers that Gorbachev’s renunciation of force at home and abroad, his decision to join the Western consensus on how states should be run at the CSCE summit in 1990, and failure to grasp the nettle of economic reform, precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian economic model now holds few attractions for China, which is not endowed with such vast natural resources. China will not be party to a regional security mechanism based on the Charter of Paris for a New Europe or the Platform for Cooperative Security agreed at the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul. In these circumstances, the focus in East Asia should be on European confidence- and security-building measures that could actually be implemented in the period ahead. The CSCE ‘Document on Confidence Building



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Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament’ (1975), which provides for exchange of information on military manoeuvres and of observers, is one example that is relevant to the situation on the Korean peninsula. The FRG’s success in building relations of trust and confidence with the Communist rulers of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is another. The DPRK’s nuclear weapons programme is a manifestation of the regime’s profound sense of insecurity. The logical approach, therefore, would be to reduce its sense of insecurity, as the ROK tried to do in its ‘Sunshine Policy’. The impending change of leadership in the DPRK may provide new opportunities. No state has an interest in the precipitate collapse of the DPRK, least of all China and the ROK. The latter would find the economic and social burden of integrating the north an overwhelming challenge, threatening its own economic and political stability. There is no NATO or EU available in East Asia to integrate a united Korea in a regional security framework. Neither Russia nor China would welcome a close, but weakened, unstable US ally on its borders. The security interests of both Japan and the US will also be best served by gradual, peaceful evolutionary change, and economic recovery in the DPRK, the key to which lies in China. China’s combination of authoritarian politics and strong economy, developed since 1978, should commend itself to its client. As a permanent member of the UNSC and an NPT signatory, China has a strong interest in persuading the DPRK to renounce nuclear weapons. The Chinese know very well that there is no threat of an attack on the DPRK from the US, the ROK, Japan, or anyone else. There should be scope in the period ahead for co-ordinated action led by China to stabilise the economy and persuade the DPRK to renounce nuclear weapons. Intensive US diplomacy is encouraging, to some extent. It suggests that DPRK nuclear tests and the Cheonan sinking have concentrated minds in Washington on the need for concerted action. But US diplomacy needs to take a broader view. The DPRK should be viewed in Washington not only through the prism of its nuclear weapons programme and incidents such as the Cheonan sinking, but also in terms of economic stabilisation measures to stave off collapse. The Six Party Talks may only survive the present crisis as a multilateral forum for promoting stability in East Asia if participants endow it with more substance and broaden its scope. Japan has renounced the use of force in its constitution and can, in that sense, be compared with Germany. But compared with Germany, Japan has made less progress in reconciliation with its former enemies. Neither the EU nor NATO would have developed without Franco–German reconciliation, driven forward by leaders such as Adenauer, de Gaulle and

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Monnet. German unification would have been impossible without relations of trust and confidence between the FRG and the Soviet Union, a process that began in the mid-1960s. Co-ordination on the future of Germany and other issues affecting European security between France, the UK and the US was widened to include the FRG in the early 1960s. Their enemy became their close ally. The original concept for (what is now) the EU was devised by Jean Monnet, who had been Deputy Secretary General of the League of Nations from 1919 to 1933. He experienced the failure of the League as a collective security organisation at first hand. After 1945, Monnet soon discarded plans for the economic subjugation of Germany in favour of what turned out to be an outstandingly successful model for peace-building and security: link the economies of hitherto hostile powers so closely that war between them becomes impractical. The SPT and organisations such as the ARF are a necessary, but not a sufficient, framework for preserving peace and security in the East Asian region. Close bilateral co-operation between the US and China in dealing with the threat posed by the DPRK is indispensable, as are strengthened bilateral relations between Japan, China and the ROK. The German example shows that states can put fundamental differences, such as the dispute between Russia and Japan over the Kurile islands, to one side in the interest of co-operating to prevent conflict and build peace. A “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” was how the Japanese prime minister put it during a visit to China in 2008. The European experience since 1945 contains any number of examples of how such mutually beneficial relationships can be developed beyond the world of high politics, grand strategy, and even trade. Although the Monnet model of European integration and Franco–German reconciliation began as elite-driven projects, the vast Franco–German programme of youth exchanges which flowed from it made a decisive contribution to reducing the perception of the neighbour as the enemy. Conversely in Britain, ignorance and outdated hostile perceptions of Germany as the enemy had a strong influence on Margaret Thatcher in her mishandling of German unification in 1989–90. From a Chinese perspective it may seem inappropriate to draw on European experience of security and co-operation. But North Korean leaders seem as reluctant as King George III to “tremblingly obey and show no negligence”, in meeting Chinese requirements. If the DPRK were to use nuclear weapons, that would represent a failure of Chinese security policy, and a major brake on their recovery over the last thirty years from the era of decay, defeat and decline that followed their dismissal of Lord



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Macartney’s mission in 1793. China missed then the opportunity to modernise and compete with the West, an opportunity that was seized by Japan. China has the opportunity to co-operate now with its neighbours, treating them as partners and equals, and with fellow Permanent Members of the UNSC, in dealing with a major threat to international peace and security, not least in its own interest.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY, A EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE: THE ITALIAN APPROACH BASED ON ENGAGEMENT WITH THE DPRK Roberta Ballabio The conundrum represented by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) appears to be of constantly increasing complexity. As a matter of fact, social, economic, political and security aspects are deeply intertwined when dealing with North Korea. Nevertheless the choice of a holistic approach in analysing the DPRK has to be coupled with the fact that the security issue, and inevitably the nuclear factor, is the central theme that must influence all the other factors. The Nuclear Issue: A History of Ups and Downs The core issue of the security question in East Asia revolves around nuclear concerns. In 1974, twenty years after the armistice to halt the Korean War, the DPRK joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and, encouraged by the Soviet Union which provided it with nuclear energyrelated technology and equipment for peaceful use, signed the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. In 1992, the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula entered into force, and North Korea signed the Safeguards Agreement that paved the way for IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities, even if with limited access. Nonetheless, the constant discussions between the DPRK and the IAEA on the scope and extent of the inspections led the DPRK to announce the termination of its membership in June 1994. The issue became the object of bilateral negotiations between the United States (US) and the DPRK, which, in October 1994, culminated in the signature of the Agreed Framework (AF), with the objective of freezing and replacing North Korea’s nuclear power plant programme with facilities resistant to nuclear proliferation. The agreement foresaw the supply of two light water reactors—each with a power of one gigawatt (GW)—to be realised under an international consortium known as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), as well as the supply of five hundred thousand tons of heavy fuel oil, to give the DPRK the opportunity to satisfy its energy needs. These measures were

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meant to lead to a step-by-step normalisation of relations between the two countries. In the wake of the AF, the production of fissile material, usually undertaken in the Yongbyon nuclear complex1 and necessary to prepare nukes, was to be stopped and the complex dismantled. In 2000 and 2001, a new phase of interaction and of North Korean opening towards the international community started, hesitant but constant, even if slow economic reforms were ruled out in the centralised state economy. An example was the opportunity for the South Korean Hyundai Corporation to invest significantly in Kaesong (Kaesŏng).2 This constructive period, composed of mutual openings and confidence-building measures, was suddenly interrupted a couple of years later. Firstly, the inclusion of the DPRK among the countries belonging to the “axis of evil” by US President George W. Bush in January 2002, and secondly, the accusation, made ten months later by the US special envoy James Kelly, of pursuing a clandestine uranium enrichment programme aimed at producing nukes, brought a hostile answer from North Korea. In 2003, the IAEA inspectors were expelled from the country, the Yongbyon nuclear complex reactor was reactivated and the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Non- Proliferation Treaty.3 The following period was characterised by such deep mistrust that, in order to get out of the stalemate, the Chinese government, supported by South Korea, started a multilateral round of talks involving China, the US and the DPRK in April 2003. The format was immediately extended to Japan, South Korea and Russia, giving birth to the Six Party Talks (SPT), in order to extend the forum of discussion to regional key players. The first round (27–29 August in Beijing) was intended to address the nuclear question through “synchronous or parallel implementation” of actions from the countries involved: no agreement could be found around the question of methodology and no joint statement was released. During the following year the SPT convened twice, in February and June 2004, and, even if useful in terms of a better definition of mutual 1 The Yongbyon (Yŏngbyŏn) nuclear complex contains a 5 MW nuclear reactor, a fuel fabrication plant and a reprocessing plant for spent fuel. 2 Starting from 2004, the Kaesong Industrial Complex grew significantly in terms of South Korean investments, in particular in sectors such as textiles, machinery production, electric and electronic products. Nowadays it continues to be a very important asset in the North Korean economy. For a detailed analysis see Dick K. Nanto, Mark E. Manyin, The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex, CRS Report for Congress, February 2008. 3 The DPRK has been the first and only country up to now to withdraw from the NonProliferation Treaty since its entry into force in 1970.



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negotiating positions, the rounds confirmed a situation of stalemate, with the US proposing a concrete plan of action concerning the peaceful solution of the nuclear question based on “complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement”. This was a necessary precondition for every possible reward to the DPRK in terms of financial and energy support, besides the normalisation of the relationship between Washington and Pyongyang. This proposal was rejected by the DPRK, since a priori the irreversible dismantlement would have left North Korea without significant negotiation tools. The beginning of 2005 was marked by an escalation of tensions and mutual accusations between the US and the DPRK, which culminated in a formal announcement by the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2005, stating, for the first time, the effective production of nuclear warheads.4 The lack of concrete confidence-building measures and mutual political legitimisation between the two main stakeholders risked making the impasse fatal for the process. Track II diplomacy worked effectively on this occasion and was able to restart the fourth round of negotiations, where the ‘win-lose’ logic was abandoned in favour of a more open discussion approach. This fourth session led to the signature of the Joint Statement on 19 September 2005, in which “the DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” and “the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally”.5 The perspective underlying such a statement was that of ‘action for action’, which accepts the formula of simultaneous achievements instead of the consequentiality of actions; that would have implied North Korean nuclear disarmament as the precondition for every reward from the international community. This positive impulse was nevertheless to be frozen soon after the conclusion of the round, as a result of statements by the North Korean government that seemed to revise the DPRK position, as well as of allegations of money laundering and US currency counterfeiting activities. Despite the DPRK’s denial of any sort of complicity, the US Treasury imposed restrictions on the Banco Delta Asia in Macau (China), where North Korean

4 Up to that moment, the DPRK was considered to have a generic capacity of nuclear deterrence. 5 For the full text of the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six Party Talks (Beijing, 19 September 2005), see http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t212707.htm.

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funds were deposited.6 For this reason the DPRK abandoned the fifth round of the SPT, which began in November 2005. The impasse lasted throughout 2006 and the situation worsened following the North Korean missile test in July of that year, which violated a selfimposed moratorium in force since 1999. On 9 October, the DPRK carried out its first nuclear test, which was immediately followed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1718, unanimously adopted on 14 October 2006. The resolution, passed under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter, required the DPRK “not to conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile” and to “suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile  programme”, and imposed a series of economic and commercial sanctions.7 Other than the UNSC reaction, the members of the SPT decided to pursue efforts at negotiation, especially from the US side, in order to avoid dangerous escalations. The SPT therefore resumed in December 2006 after a thirteen-month hiatus. The fifth round was then held in Berlin in January 2007: the Joint Agreement of 13 February was a positive spin-off from the round, bringing the parties to reach agreement on ‘Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement’. On this basis North Korea agreed to shut down and seal its Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility, and to invite back the IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verification of these actions. The other five parties agreed to provide emergency energy assistance. After the first implementation step, the SPT plenary meeting of 27–30 September resulted in the 3 October 2007 agreement on ‘Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement’. In November 2007, the DPRK began to disable the three core facilities at Yongbyon and completed most of the agreed disablement actions. Following the DPRK’s progress on disablement and provision of a declaration, US President George W. Bush announced the lifting of the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) with respect to 6 For a close analysis of the issue see Dick K. Nanto, North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency, Congressional Research Service, June 2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ RL33324.pdf. On this issue see also an article by Martin Fackler in the New York Times published on 29 January 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/29/international/asia/ 29korea.html. 7 For the complete text of Resolution 1718 see http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/ atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20SRES%201718 .pdf.



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the DPRK and notified Congress of his intention to rescind North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. This progress in the relationship between the international community and North Korea was bluntly interrupted by the second missile test and nuclear test carried out in May 2009. On this occasion the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 18748 as a response to the test. According to this resolution further economic sanctions were imposed on the country. UN member states were authorised to inspect North Korean cargo ships and destroy any material that might be involved in the nuclear weapons programme. Member states were instructed not to provide financial assistance to the DPRK nuclear programme, and the arms embargo on North Korea was extended by banning all weapons exports. SPT sessions were again suspended. During the first months of 2010, some input came from the DPRK: official statements were released in order to restart the SPT “in favour of the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula”.9 From 26 March the situation entered a new phase of escalation, following the sinking of the Cheonan (Ch’ŏn’an), which left forty-six sailors dead: the South Korean vessel was operating in the Yellow Sea and after an explosion sank in unclear circumstances. A group of experts appointed by South Korea came to the conclusion that the wreckage showed evidence of DPRK responsibility. North Korea denied these accusations and warned of military repercussions if any action towards punishment were to be taken by the South as retaliation. South Korea brought the fact to the attention of the UNSC, among mutual accusations and increasing tensions between the two Koreas. Further events in 2010 have brought attention to the Korean peninsula, making even more complicated the understanding of political equi­librium in the region. In mid-August, US and South Korea held their periodical military drills near the maritime border between the two Koreas, amidst North Korean accusations of provocation and threats of retaliation. On 25–27 August, former US president Jimmy Carter visited the DPRK in order to secure the release of an American man jailed for illegally entering the country. Carter, thought not on an official visit,10 met Kim Yong Nam,    8 For the complete text of Resolution 1874 see http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/ atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20SRES%201874 .pdf.    9 See the article ‘N Korea “wants denuclearisation”’ published by Al Jazeera on 7 May 2010 http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2010/05/20105761215243891.html. 10 Carter had already visited North Korea in 1994 on an official mission at the request of  the then US president, Bill Clinton, not for humanitarian reasons but for reasons of

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president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, and had discussions with Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials “pending issues of mutual concern between the DPRK and the U.S.”. The officials “expressed the will of the DPRK government for the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and the resumption of the six-party talks”.11 The end of August was also marked by a visit of Kim Jong Il to China, presumably in order to secure financial help and political support from the North’s only ally, and by the announcement of broader financial sanctions against the DPRK by the Obama administration. The sanctions had the double aim of punishing North Korea for the Cheonan sinking and of putting pressure on the North Korean government to engage seriously in denuclearisation.12 Kim’s visit to China was particularly important in light of a key meeting of the Korean Workers’ Party that took place on 28 September 2010 (the last such meeting had been held in 1980). The main objective of the meeting was to mark a change in North Korea’s leadership and the eventual access of Kim Jong Il’s son, Kim Jong Un, to the succession13 In September 2010, some mutual conciliatory gestures were taken by both Koreas to reduce tension.14 During this period, US special envoy Stephen Bosworth held international meetings in Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing to see if conditions existed for negotiations and resumption of the SPT, but he expressed doubts that talks could resume soon.15 North Korea’s constantly unpredictable and provocative behaviour coupled with the fact that nuclear deterrence is the only negotiating tool that international security. Carter was able to arrive at an agreement with North Korea on freezing its nuclear fuel reprocessing. 11 Report on Jimmy Carter’s visit to the DPRK, Korean Central News Agency, http:// www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm, 27 August 2010. 12 The order sanctions the assets of North Korean entities that trade in conventional arms and luxury products and that counterfeit US currency. See http://www.reuters.com/ article/idUSTRE67P0CK20100830. 13 The key meeting was announced for mid-September but was postponed to 28 September. Rumours concerning the cause of the shift included Kim Jong Il’s alleged poor health as well as problems caused by the severe floods that had hit the country. As largely anticipated by analysts this occasion was used by Kim Jong Il to promote military ranks: both his twenty-seven-year-old third son, Kim Jong Un, and his own sister, Kim Kyong Hui, were named generals. http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm, 27 September 2010. 14 Pyongyang freed seven crew members of a South Korean fishing boat, while Seoul announced a considerable aid package to the North to support the population hit by the severe floods: around 5,000 tons of rice and other food aid. Both Koreas are considering the possibility of reopening discussions on reunions of families separated by the Korean War. http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2010/09/20109139850322872.html. 15 ‘U.S. Diplomat Sees no Rapid Return to North Korea Nuke Talks’, Global Security Newswire, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100915_8526.php.



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the country can play towards the international community, makes it very difficult to find a clear and definitive strategy for reaching security on the Korean peninsula. The DPRK is aware that because of its difficult financial situation and tense political conditions the nuclear issue represents a powerful tool in bargaining and negotiation. The DPRK nuclear capability in fact, has also been defined as an “insurance policy rather than an active weapon”.16 The country is aware that accepting international help and opening up to external relations will inevitably affect its monolithic state structure, reducing the country’s isolation, and eroding the authoritarian political system, the supremacy of the songun (military first) doctrine17 and the pillars of the centralised economy. Moreover the risks linked to the North Korean nuclear dimension are not only connected to the use the DPRK can make of it but also to the threats deriving from the proliferation of sensitive knowledge and dual technology use, with its potentially destabilising effects in the region in terms of an arms race. Of course diplomacy, both bilateral and multilateral, has always been the privileged instrument in dealing with and engaging the DPRK on security, in order to reach regional stability and international security: for this reason the nuclear dimension and the connected security aspects have always been addressed directly. The Italian Approach Based on Engagement as a Tool of Security European states such as Italy have always preferred an engagement approach with the DPRK, which, given their diplomatic position on the sidelines, is considered the best tool to address security implications. Isolation and confrontation are, according to this position, far worse than a dithering interaction built on direct and indirect approaches, themselves based on political exchanges and co-operative efforts. In the last ten years, Italy has been committed to an effort aimed at the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and the normalisation of 16 John Swenson-Wright, ‘Options for Promoting Peace in Northeast Asia in Cooperative Stability’ in North-East Asia: Denuclearisation and Economic Cooperation in the Korean Peninsula, Proceedings of the International Workshop and Round Table, 1 December 2008, Como, Italy. 17 For a deep analysis see Park Han S., Military-First Politics (Songun): Understanding Kim Jong-il’s North Korea, Academic Paper on Korea, Korea Economic Institute, 2008.

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relations with North Korea in the international scenario. This project is carried out on two different levels: through initiatives at official level or through low-profile interaction made up of unofficial meetings, the level of interaction being chosen according to the current situation. In the first case the initiative has a significant degree of visibility and the main actor in drafting the diplomatic action has been the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) through the direct involvement of official personalities. This patient and discreet action has been shaped through formal meetings and official visits between the main capitals involved, i.e. Pyongyang, Washington DC and Seoul, implementing the socalled shuttle diplomacy.18 On the other hand, low-profile interaction has been carried out by the Landau Network–Centro Volta (LNCV), an Italian think-tank that deals with international security issues, focusing especially on the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The LNCV runs a specific programme, the Korean Peninsula Security Program,19 and has been acting through informal interactions and meetings ‘off the record’ and by supporting dia­logue through seminars, as an opportunity for the exchange of ideas and confidence-building measures with respect to the international community. These workshops have been open to representatives from the DPRK but also to all the active stakeholders in the Korean peninsula, to experts and scholars, and to the countries participating in the SPT. The principal aim has been to engage North Korea, to reduce its international isolation and to discuss possible strategies for economic reforms, sustainable development and stability in the field of security. The joint use of the two complementary types of interaction aims at giving the international community some non-ideological interpretative keys in order to better understand internal processes in the DPRK and to present the North with non-biased international approaches on the Korean peninsula. Mistrust has always been an element feeding insecurity in the Korean peninsula, and opportunities to address mutual and dogmatic threat perceptions can represent important milestones.

18 Shuttle diplomacy is defined as ‘the movement of diplomats between countries whose leaders refuse to talk directly to each other, in order to try to settle the argu­ ment  between them’ (Collins Dictionary, http://dictionary.reverso.net/english-cobuild/ shuttle%20diplomacy last checked on 3 June 2011). 19 See http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/StaticPage.aspx?Control=Korea.



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The subtle link of mutual recognition built with the DPRK has been put under severe pressure on different occasions20 and consequently meetings and initiatives have been ‘frozen’; despite all the ups and downs though, it has managed to survive. In this context Italy has played the role of an honest broker, acting as a neutral stakeholder, being equidistant from consolidated and biased positions, not bound to geopolitical interests, and characterised by the political will to guarantee an open space for dialogue even when communicating with the DPRK becomes particularly complex due to positions and actions taken by North Korea itself. The DPRK has recognised the facilitator role played by Italy, and has considered it as a link to the international community. The First Phase of Engagement: Addressing the Nuclear Issue Through Human Engagement The primary tool used to interact with the DPRK on security issues has been the implementation of confidence-building measures, especially taking into consideration the cultural distance of the country and the past sixty years of isolation, as well as North Korea’s suspicious attitude towards some key stakeholders in the Korean peninsula. The human factor in this context is strategic and should be considered before framing concrete steps towards denuclearisation, since engagement needs planning, as shown in the redirection of Soviet scientists.21 Many lessons have been learned from that experience. (1) Human Dimension Of course, political will is a key issue leading towards denuclearisation but it has to be contextualised and framed within at least two other closely linked dimensions that need to be taken into consideration: on one hand, the redirection of structures and the securing of dangerous materials, on the other hand, involvement in people. Engagement in the security field means in particular a focus on the latter element, i.e. the human 20 Just to quote some recent emblematic occasions: the long-range missile launches in July 2006 and April 2009, the two nuclear tests carried out in October 2006 and May 2009, and the sinking of the Cheonan on 26 March 2010. 21 The Landau Network – Centro Volta: internal document.

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dimension of nuclear proliferation. Engagement with nuclear scientists is fundamental in preventing dual use and the proliferation of sensitive knowledge and in transmitting both a safety and a security approach: this is in fact the very first step in approaching the issue at grassroots level. This aspect is important both for former nuclear weapons scientists (NWS) and technical staff who need to be redirected (i.e. given new employment) and, in the medium term, for newly skilled students graduating in sensitive faculties, who could be interested in pursuing activities linked to nuclear weapons and proliferation. In the first case, re-employment is an important perspective in terms of preventing the proliferation of sensitive knowledge: new fields of activity,  a new status and commitment can change the perspective of NWS. Of  course, it implies an economic dimension that has to be carefully analysed in order to be effective and also to be acceptable to the DPRK government. Concerning students and graduates in physics, engineering and mathematics, their engagement in (international) research and internships could be an important element in preventing the risk that the best North Korean graduates might continue in, or begin to work in, the nuclear field. Certainly, dealing with the human factor implies a degree of uncertainty, and the strategy has to be based on local elements, since there is no solution of the kind ‘one size fits all’ that can be drawn from previous experiences.22 (2) Possible Role of a Centre of Excellence On this basis, some studies have elaborated the centre of excellence (CoE) concept, as a mechanism designed to serve regional security and safety objectives within a holistic and multi-functional approach in situations marked by political instability and the danger of proliferation. Centres of excellence are focused on developing safety and security and export control mechanisms, preventing illicit traffic and supporting scientists’ engagement in critical regions. A CoE structure could be built and then twinned with international partner institutes to facilitate the enhancement of information flows and scientists’ engagement in different regions.

22 Elements that imply different kinds of actions are, for example, the total number of persons, their age, alternative sectors existing in the country, regional context, etc.



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The underlying idea is that science can be significantly exploited for the public good and can contribute to alleviating the many interconnected causes of instability and insecurity, especially in those actual situations characterised by concerns over threats posed by the proliferation of technology in conjunction with the challenge set by terrorist groups and illicit trafficking. There is likely to be added value in forging links which enable closer engagement between scientists in different regions, thereby reducing isolation and opening up channels of communication. Indeed, there are a number of potential advantages to this approach, and closer engagement could serve to support a greater capacity for monitoring scientific and scientists’ activity and for mitigating the ideological motivation for supporting weapons programmes. The indirect advantages of this engagement and the emergence of a paradigm for scientific engagement are not to be underestimated. They include: • apolitical means of diplomatic engagement • forging and reinforcing a ‘deep water anchor’ in bilateral relations • alleviating confusion and developing common understanding • pushing broader issues through dialogue. One important element incorporated in the CoE is the integrated and interdisciplinary approach, which involves a legal framework, and scientific and technical support for safety and security measures, as well as more theoretical training on security risks. This is a key component in linking possible proliferation fields and sensitive knowledge to other disciplines, especially in contexts where prolonged isolation has replaced international relationships. The concept of a centre of excellence is intriguing especially with regard to North Korea: if this kind of mechanism becomes part of an international network, it can help in creating a number of mutually reinforcing strands aimed at preventing nuclear weapons (but not only those) and knowledge proliferation. A proposal made within this approach took shape in 2005 after the positive outcome of the fourth round of the SPT, which culminated in the signature of the Joint Statement. The proposal, which was capable of coping with the challenges posed, focused on the creation of an international research centre, based in Pyongyang. Given the specific nature of research and development (R&D) in the DPRK and its links with the military establishment, this centre of excellence had to avoid any risk that the conversion process might pursue military interests. The building-up of

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competitive civilian R&D in the country could be advanced within a specific ISTC23-type science centre or through internationally controlled, large laboratories like CERN to be established in Pyongyang.24 Another incisive proposal made in parallel with the one for the CoE was to redirect the Yongbyon nuclear complex into becoming an international research centre focused on specific non-proliferation technologies whose application could be useful and interesting for other stakeholders in the region.25 The added values of a project like this could be manifold: • It will involve workforces employed in nuclear complexes and related fields of research such as nuclear weapons scientists,26 skilled technicians, scientists/engineers with some specific experience (such as radio-chemistry, plutonium or uranium metallurgy, nuke/ missile component design, etc.) and administrative/security/military personnel • It will focus on relevant R&D issues and useful technologies that could foster collaboration and links with neighbouring countries and the international community, reducing North Korean isolation and possibly starting income-generating activities through the commercialisation of products stemming from the R&D It will feature a concrete possibility of involving students and •  graduates in physics, engineering and mathematics. An additional 23 The International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) was established by international agreement in November 1992 as a non-proliferation programme. The ISTC coordinates the efforts of numerous governments, international organisations and private sector industries, providing weapons scientists from Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) new opportunities in international partnership. Through its political, legal and financial frameworks, the ISTC contributes to fundamental research, international programmes and innovation and commercialisation, by linking the demands of international markets with the pool of scientists available in Russian and CIS institutes. In the Ukraine the corresponding structure to ISTC is the STCU (Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine). 24 CERN is the European Organisation for Nuclear Research. Officially it came into being in 1954 and its main missions are to provide for collaboration among European states in nuclear research of a pure scientific and fundamental character, to organise and sponsor international co-operation in research, promoting contacts between scientists and interchange with other laboratories and institutes. This includes dissemination of information, and the provision of advanced training for research workers, which continue to be reflected in the current programmes for technology transfer and education and training at many levels. 25 The proposal suggested focused on synchrotron-radiation experimental science and its applications. 26 Up to now it has been very difficult to quantify the number of nuclear weapons scientists in the DPRK: the lack of information in this field has led to hypotheses based on general considerations, but not supported by evidence.



collective security: the italian approach53 long-term perspective could foresee the creation and support of a student-to-student exchange programme between the centres and neighbouring countries such as the ROK, China, Russia and Vietnam. This network could be an important element in completing the students’ professional education and reducing their isolation in the international network • In this way the international community can achieve higher access to and control over the possible illicit use of sensitive knowledge

Of course this was an ambitious proposal in both its general security and political implications, especially given the current conditions and the concrete aspects connected to its realisation: these include the costs (not only for setting up the centre but also for decommissioning and dismantling27), the gathering of framework data, and possible interest among regional stakeholders. Any proposal and effort would obviously need to take into consideration the vagaries of DPRK reactions, but such a proposal could also be attractive for North Korea itself in terms of its image. The Second Phase of Engagement: Addressing Scientific Co-operation Through Science Diplomacy The impasse of the last years and the extreme positions taken by the DPRK prompted the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Landau Network– Centro Volta to think about another strategy for engaging the DPRK, which might involve introducing a sort of paradigm shift, focusing in a more stringent way on approaches in scientific co-operation instead of a purely diplomatic path. These approaches in fact are characterised by political benchmarks, restrictions on interaction reflecting the official role covered, the international context, needs connected to political prestige, and the biases induced by past events. Human engagement and redirection of scientists remain, of course, important elements of this strategy. 27 “The term ‘decommissioning’, when applied in its broadest sense to nuclear facilities, covers all of the administrative and technical actions associated with cessation of operation and withdrawal from service. It starts when a facility is shut down and extends to eventual removal of the facility from its site (termed ‘dismantling’). These actions may involve some or all of the activities associated with dismantling of plant and equipment, decontamination of structures and components, remediation of contaminated ground and disposal of the resulting wastes. These activities aim at removing some or all of the regulatory controls that apply to the nuclear facility, while securing the long-term safety of the public and the environment, and continuing to protect the health and safety of decommissioning workers in the process.” See The Decommissioning and Dismantling of Nuclear Facilities, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2002.

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The idea underlying this new perspective is to focus on and address cooperation in fields that are scientific and not strictly bound to international security and the nuclear issue. This kind of approach, based on science diplomacy, is thought of not only as a confidence-building measure but as also working indirectly to undermine the country’s isolation and to erode the monolithic structure of the state, injecting new perspectives through collaboration with scientists and experts. The idea of using international co-operation in science as a tool of diplomacy is by no means a radical argument: the three arms control treaties, covering nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, contain an element of peaceful co-operation. However, a more proactive approach, especially in the case of the two Koreas, could have the potential of contributing to security and stability, so as to achieve safer and secure scientific advancement. For this reason the LNCV would like to encourage and promote a scientist-to-scientist exchange at an international level, bridging gaps between North Korean and peer institutions through the involvement of the national academies of different countries. This could provide an inspirational guideline model, by introducing patterns of co-operation and partnership with the DPRK’s leading scientific and technical (S&T) institutions, aimed at promoting scientific and academic co-operation programmes in fields of mutual interest. This human capacity-building and exchange could cover different fields that might raise both parties’ interests in terms of scientific co-operation. Such an exchange could be a significant element in fostering networking among academic and research teams in non-proliferation fields. Its importance should not be underestimated. Capacity-building and exchange could include disciplines such as energy security/efficiency—a relevant issue for North Korea—environmental remediation, nuclear medicine, and food and water security, another sensitive matter. Since the DPRK has an undeniable interest in improving knowledge in these sectors, capacity-building and exchange can represent the first step towards interaction and co-operation within an integrated approach towards North Korea and the Korean peninsula. Many examples of scientific co-operation are already in place and under way,28 although inevitably attended by difficulties, including 28 One of the most evident examples is the collaboration between Syracuse University and Kim Chaek University of Technology in Pyongyang within the US–DPRK Scientific Engagement Consortium, founded in 2007.



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bureaucratic hurdles. Even so, from a strategic point of view, such contacts can result in important possibilities for collaboration. They can be considered a sort of embryonic attempt to build a civil society in the DPRK detached from the party ranks. The strategic value of this process could be seen as one which results in the creation of a parallel railway, a kind of safety net, able to guarantee a gleam of dialogue and a minimum degree of contact with North Korea, even in fragile and tense situations that might bring provocative acts and lead to further international isolation.29 A purely technical exchange can represent a way to keep dialogue channels open in difficult times. In the long term, science co-operation could become the tool to reach the ultimate goal: the denuclearisation of the peninsula and a peace treaty between the two Koreas. The Geopolitical Context When dealing with the DPRK it is vital to take into consideration the effects of actions, interactions and reactions at a diplomatic and scientific level in the whole region. It is like a chess game, where each move has effects on other pieces, changing the context, the perspective, the game play and the priorities. The influence of some exogenous and endogenous factors in this delicate balance should not be underestimated. Political prestige, a very important element in Korean culture, can dictate sudden actions most likely to be considered irrational from a Western perspective. It is also vital to underline, within the framework of security, especially when dealing with nuclear capability, how relevant the difference is between short-term interests and the long-term results of international and diplomatic effort. Each stakeholder involved has, in fact, to show achievements to different degrees (at the national and/or international political level), in order to gain votes and/or to mark international status: elections, be they midterm, administrative or political, can be a trigger for or become the end goal of international actions. On the other hand, the long-term results that such a complex regional issue implies need to be taken into considera­tion,

29 This kind of approach is already being used in other geopolitically difficult situations, such as, for example, the Middle East.

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since they require more time to be shaped and reached. They need a strategy and, in some cases, have to avoid publicity. The tension between the two perspectives is not explicit in most cases, and stakeholders are not constantly aware of it, but these frictions should be weighted and also balanced. As many analysts have already underlined, denuclearisation requires an attentive strategy to a “full range of longer-term possibilities on the peninsula, including uncertainties associated with North Korea’s political and economic future”.30 For this reason, it is important to be flexible in terms of constant commitment and persistence to reaching the final goal, so as to be aware that funds are necessary to pursue coherent efforts towards the DPRK.31 Last but not least, the internal situation of North Korea, coloured by Kim Jong Il’s succession, makes the framework more complex and raises more uncertainties. In October 2010, the media, censored by the military apparatus, showed a huge military parade marking the 65th anniversary of the foundation of the country’s ruling Workers’ Party, where Kim Jong Il appeared alongside his third son and future heir Kim Jong Un, a clear strategy to present him and build internal and international legitimacy for the succession. Many analysts have written on this phase, sketched scenarios, tried to gather information on the possible actions that could follow the official appointment as successor. Does Kim Jong Un resemble his father in terms of personal charisma notwithstanding his young age, or will he be mainly an expression of the military cast? Will he be openminded enough to seek his legitimacy also in reforms, negotiating external economic aid, or will he demonstrate military power through some new provocations, i.e. missile and nuclear tests? Many of these questions still have no final answer, even months after Kim Jong Il’s sudden death. Does North Korea really want to make a serious deal, “resume negotiations and accept the basic provisions of the denuclearisation and peace efforts”32 or will this be only a new page in the DPRK’s games book composed of raising stakes and demands for negotiations?33 Very hard to say. But again the nuclear negotiation tool is in the spotlight. 30 For a comprehensive view see Jonathan D. Pollock, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapon Development: Implications for Future Policy, IFRI Proliferation Papers, Spring 2010. 31 “Negotiating with North Korea is all about contradictions. What can be important one day can become unimportant the next. A position they hold stubbornly for weeks and months can suddenly disappear”, quoted from Victor D. Cha, ‘What Do They Really Want?: Obama’s North Korea Conundrum’, The Washington Quarterly, October 2009, p. 119. 32 Jimmy Carter, ‘North Korea Wants to Make a Deal’, op-ed on the New York Times, 15 September 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/opinion/16carter.html?_r=1. 33 Sung-Yoon Lee, ‘The Pyongyang Playbook’, Foreign Affairs, 26 August 2010, http:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66581/sung-yoon-lee/the-pyongyang-playbook.



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Continuing the chess game metaphor, since it is very difficult to foresee the next move of the North Korean leadership, a possible strategy for the outside world, pre-emptive and shared, would be to circumvent its accusations and blame through a tactic aimed at reducing any occasions for the North to charge the international community with hostility towards the country. All the pawns should co-ordinate. A coherent strategy towards North Korea not only focused on the country’s nuclear capability but encompassing it, could pave the way to a denuclearised and unified Korea and lead the region towards stability. Inconsistencies on all sides in considering the Korean peninsula issue or the adoption of ‘strategic patience’34 have little chance of making an impact on the DPRK and are probably not enough. Moreover, this approach, pursued especially by the US, confines North Korea to a sort of second-rate position in comparison with other sensitive international situations that receive more attention and greater deployment of efforts to be solved.35 But the DPRK considers itself a priority. The risk here is that it can remind the international community of that status. Maybe starting strategic negotiations with North Korea other than consultations and discussions about North Korea could be an important step forward. A political and diplomatic engagement fostered by a scientific one. We will see who will checkmate. References Arshad, Mohammed, Chris Buckley (2010): “U.S. expands North Korea sanctions, Kim hopes for talks”, Reuters, 30 August 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/ idUSTRE67P0CK20100830 (accessed 15 September 2010). Carter, Jimmy (2010): “North Korea Wants to Make a Deal”, New York Times, 15 September 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/opinion/16carter.html?_r=1 (accessed 26 September 2010).

34 The US ‘strategic patience’ policy foresees waiting for North Korea to come back to the negotiation table while maintaining pressure through economic sanctions and arms interdictions. 35 Just to quote some international crises and sensitive issues: the Middle East peace process, the nuclear issue in Iran, the war on terror in Afghanistan, the fragile situation in the new Iraq. It has to be noted that the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, barely mentioned North Korea on 8 September 2010 during her speech on US foreign policy. See ‘A Conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’, transcript http://www .cfr.org/publication/22896/conversation_with_us_secretary_of_state_hillary_rodham _clinton.html.

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CFR (2010): “A Conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton”, Transcript, 08 September 2010, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/22896/conversation_with_us_secretary_of_state_hillary_rodham_clinton .html (accessed 22 September 2010). Cha, Victor D. (2009): “What Do They Really Want?: Obama’s North Korea Conundrum”, The Washington Quarterly, October 2009, 32:4, 119–138. Collins dictionary, http://www.collinslanguage.com/ (accessed 26 September 2010) Fackler, Martin: “North Korean Counterfeiting Complicates Nuclear Crisis”, New York Times, 29 January 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/29/international/asia/29korea.html (accessed 27 September 2010). KCNA (2010): “Report on Jimmy Carter’s visit to the DPRK”, 27 August 2010, http://www .kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed 10 September 2010). KCNA (2010): “Kim Jong Il Issues Order on Promoting Military Ranks”, 27 September 2010, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed 10 September 2010). “Korean tensions thaw ahead of talks: Regional tensions between North and South Korea show signs of easing off for the first time in months”, Al Jazeera, 13 September 2010, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2010/09/20109139850322872.html (accessed 26 September 2010). Landau Network Centro Volta website http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/StaticPage .aspx?Control=Korea (accessed 10 September 2010). Lee, Sung-Yoon (2010): “The Pyongyang Playbook”, Foreign Affairs, 26 August 2010, http:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66581/sung-yoon-lee/the-pyongyang-playbook (accessed 25 September 2010). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2005): “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks”, Beijing, 19 September 2005, http://www.fmprc.gov .cn/eng/zxxx/t212707.htm (accessed 10 September 2010). “N Korea wants denuclearisation: Kim Jong-il tells China it will work towards a resumption of disarmament talks”, Al Jazeera, 07 May 2010, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia -pacific/2010/05/20105761215243891.html (accessed 26 September 2010). Nanto, Dick K., Mark E. Manyin (2008): The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex, CRS Report for Congress, February 2008. Nanto, Dick K. (2009): North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency, Congressional Research Service, June 2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33324.pdf (accessed 28 September 2010). OECD (2002): The Decommissioning and Dismantling of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Energy Agency, Paris: OECD. Park Han S. (2008): Military-First Politics (Songun): Understanding Kim Jong-il’s North Korea, Academic Paper on Korea, Seoul: Korea Economic Institute. Pollock, Jonathan D. (2010): North Korea’s Nuclear Weapon Development: Implications for Future Policy, IFRI Proliferation Papers, spring 2010, Paris and Brussels: IFRI Security Studies Center. Swenson-Wright, John (2008): “Options for Promoting Peace in Northeast Asia”, Cooperative Stability in North-East Asia: Denuclearisation and Economic Cooperation in the Korean Peninsula, Proceedings of the International Workshop and Round Table, 01 December 2008, Como: Landau Network Centro Volta. UNSC (2006): “Resolution 1718”, S/RES/1718 (2006), 14 October 2006, New York: United Nations, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3 -CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20SRES%201718.pdf (accessed 10 September 2010). UNSC (2009): “Resolution 1874”, 1874 S/RES/1874 (2009), 12 June 2009, New York: United Nations, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3 -CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20SRES%201874.pdf (accessed 10 September 2010). “U.S. Diplomat Sees no Rapid Return to North Korea Nuke Talks”, 15 September 2010, NTI Global Security Newswire, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100915_8526.php (accessed 26 September 2010).

SECURITY SPIRALS AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS: CHINA AND (NON-)COLLECTIVE SECURITY Nele Noesselt Since the decisions on reform and opening in 1978, the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has been undergoing an incremental transformation from a bystander to an active player in international politics. Though the role of China as a stabilising power centre in the East Asian region was more than welcome at the time of the Asian financial crisis (1997/1998), the so-called rise of China has also created new security dilemmas. These dilemmas differ from the systemic antagonisms of the Cold War and are not based on military power competition and deterrence. One has to keep in mind that China’s ongoing military modernisation will not enable China to reach military power parity with the US in the near future. The often-quoted ‘China threat’ does not, so far, derive from increasing military power capacities, but refers to its high-speed economic growth and growing influence on developing countries and non-Western regions. According to neo-realist assumptions, the ‘rise’ of China will result in an open confrontation between the PRC and the old power centre(s) (Friedberg 1993/1994: 5–33; Bernstein and Munro 1997; Goldstein 1997/ 1998: 36–73; Christensen 1999: 49–80). By contrast, liberal and construc­ tivist approaches postulate that, through growing inter­dependence and mutual learning processes, actors will avoid confron­tation and stick to co-operation in transnational issues (Kang 2003/04; Shambaugh 2004/05). It is obvious that both scenarios pose a challenge to the PRC’s national interests and visions of regional (and international) order. If other states perceive the PRC as a threat to world peace and regional security, they could resort to containment strategies. Contrariwise, liberalism and constructivism, which predict a non-military solution to the security dilemma, imply that the PRC accepts and supports the rules and regulations defined by the international community of states. The current global financial crisis, however, seems to have become an unexpected factor, not covered by any model of traditional IR theory, which could trigger a ‘peaceful’ redistribution of power resources among

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the main actors on the international and global stage. According to Chinese IR experts, the financial crisis and related discussions of theory offer a way out of the neo-realist security dilemma. The so-called rise of China, often referred to as a menace to world peace, could occur without causing any military confrontation, given that the international community of states accepts and supports China in playing a more important role in international affairs. But this leads to a twofold challenge: in some fields, interna­tional society expects the PRC to take over more responsibilities, e.g. in co-ordinated counter-measures against climate change. In other domains, mainly political fields, more active participation by the PRC is not applauded. Conversely, the PRC refrains from accepting internationally binding contracts for environmental protection, but demands more controlling and voting rights in international politics, e.g. the UN, as a compensation for the PRC’s willingness to stabilise international financial and economic structures. Even though the Cold War, the core security issue of the twentieth century, has officially come to an end (at least from a Western perspective), various new traditional and non-traditional security dilemmas have emerged. Most of them—such as the North Korean issue—are identified as global security challenges. At a first glimpse, this would imply that all state actors involved should be interested in solving the problem through co-ordinated and collective actions. But a further look at the given constellations in the East Asian region reveals that there are several factors, geopolitical as well as socio-historical, which impede the establishment of collective security mechanisms. The PRC plays a crucial role in the process of regional integration and co-operation in East Asia. Consequently, any analysis of current constellations or projection of future interactions in the East Asian region has to consider the theoretical frameworks and perceptions of the international environment that motivate and guide the PRC’s foreign policy decisionmaking and participation in regional co-operation and bargaining processes. How does the PRC interpret current political constellations? What are the decisive internal and external factors that constrain China’s engagement in security issues? Security Spirals and Threat Perceptions The ‘rise’ of China in terms of economic growth and the PRC’s growing influence in international affairs have triggered a shift in the distribution



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of power resources among (East) Asian powers and have already developed a remarkable spill-over effect on the level of world politics. These shifts and changes in international politics are commonly analysed with the help of frameworks drawn from (neo-)realist theory in order to predict and anticipate China’s new role and future positioning in international affairs. Following the assumptions of realist theory, the nature of the international system is by definition anarchic. There is no government or supranational power centre capable of ensuring that states behave according to the rules of the international game and, in cases of misbehaviour and dereliction from co-operation, of imposing sanctions to re-establish and safeguard the international order. The lack of a regulating and sanctioning power centre results in the emergence of a self-help system, in which states strive to maximise power in order to defend and safeguard their national interests. Whereas realists argue that states as rational and unitary actors focus exclusively on relative power, traditional neo-realists would identify security and survival as the highest national interests of any state actor. The ‘rise’ of a new player in international politics and the related redistribution of power resources would automatically threaten the interests of the other state actors—since realists conceive of these constellations as a zero-sum game, in which the old power centres would lose in terms of relative power—and provoke counter-measures including military (re-)actions. But the question is not only how states will react to the emergence of a new power, but also what kind of development strategy the emerging new power will choose. Realist theories differentiate between two scenarios: ‘offensive realism’ (Mearsheimer 2001) assumes that states behave entirely aggressively to maximise their power resources, as they are not satisfied with their current power position but try to attain hegemony. On the contrary, ‘defensive realism’ (Walt 1998) claims that states can achieve security without resorting to war. Both scenarios are linked to the security dilemma of international relations (Herz 1951). They assume that (mis-) perceptions of threats and feelings of insecurity will force states to engage in war. Given the anarchic structure of the international system, states would be continuously involved in military actions. As this is obviously not the reality of everyday politics, realist models identify factors and constellations that enable co-operation among state actors. A non-military stabilisation of the international system is possible if the hegemonic actor forces and convinces other states to co-operate according to the rules defined by the power centre. But smaller and weaker states that conceive of the hegemon as a threat could also decide to join in a coalition to oppose

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the power centre. Conversely, if the costs of opposing and balancing the stronger power exceed the benefits or if the power centre offers incentives to co-operate, the weaker states could also choose a strategy of band­ wagoning and join in a coalition with the stronger power(s). “Hegemonic stability” (Gilpin 2001) and “bandwagoning” thus both offer a solution to the security dilemma. Moreover, other variants of traditional realist models, such as regime theory, would add that co-operation under anarchy is possible in the context of political regimes (trade regimes, human rights regimes, collective security regimes). Likewise, neo-liberalism as an alternative approach opposed to the key assumptions of (neo-)realism postulates that although independent and sovereign nation-states remain the central actors in international politics, international institutions and organisations also matter. And as states are concerned with absolute gains, they are mostly willing to co-operate and avoid military confrontations. Analysts of regional constellations in East Asia also often make use of the above-summarised scenarios of defensive and offensive realism, which would at the end both lead to a situation of stability and dialogue-based mechanisms for conflict resolution. Analogously to hegemony in world affairs, China could emerge as a new regional hegemonic power practising a benevolent form of rule (wangdao as opposed to badao, the totalitarian form of imperialist rule) (Shambaugh 2005: 12). The problem with these approaches is that the PRC has officially renounced any striving for hegemony or any playing of a leading role (the formula ‘bu dang tou’ is one of the axiomatic principles of contemporary Chinese foreign policy). China describes itself as a daguo (great nation), with no ambitions to become a diguo (empire; hegemonic power centre) (Guo, Shuyong 2005: 31–32; Qin, Hui 2007). The other scenarios elaborated by international China watchers can be summarised as bipolar versus multipolar security systems. The bipolar approach focuses on the stabilising role and ordering function of the United States (US) and China in the East Asian region. This could turn either into open competition and military confrontation between the two powers and their antagonistic visions of regional order, or lead to the situation of a Sino-US condominium in Asia. It is also imaginable that one power—the US or China—could try to set up an alliance to balance the other power centre. The formation of the American hub-and-spokes system, to mention only one example, is now answered by a wide set of regional security structures and collective security mechanisms, in which the PRC plays an important role (ASEAN+1; ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO); the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP); Six Party Talks).



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Contrary to the ‘Western’ discussions, Chinese IR analysts identify the pessimistic interpretations of China’s global ambitions as the core of the new security dilemma. Following this argumentation, perceptions, not material aspects such as economic or military power, lead to the creation of a new security spiral. Against the background of the ‘China threat theory’, the international positioning of the PRC can thus no longer be explained by merely analysing the underlying self-image. Nor does it make sense to classify a state actor’s unexpected twists in foreign policy decision-making as misperception or misinterpretation on the part of international constellations.1 Instead, one should further differentiate between perceptions deriving from the application of ‘Western’ theories and those reflecting the state and nature of world politics as seen through the theoretical lenses of ‘Chinese’ frameworks of analysis. Since the late 1970s, Chinese IR experts have been encouraged to define a new framework of analysis that would guide China’s foreign policy and allow the successful realisation of the post-Maoist modernisation programme through international economic interactions (Noesselt 2010: 98–103). This search for a particular ‘Chinese’ theory can be divided into three phases. In the Maoist era, Soviet concepts were imported and adapted to the Chinese context. After the Sino-Soviet split, alternative concepts were step by step substituted for these models—the theory of intermediate zone(s) and the Three Worlds theory. In the 1980s, during the second phase, ‘Western’ theory concepts were introduced as new universal frameworks (Ni, Shixiong/Xu, Jia 1997: 11–15).2 The third phase, starting with Deng Xiaoping’s journey to the South in 1992, is still ongoing. The main concern seems to be the creation of new theory-based models that would help China to influence and shape the post-Cold War world order: States conduct diplomacy based on their self-images and images of the outside world. In the past 20 years, China has undergone a profound transformation in how it views itself and the world. It no longer views itself as a country on the edge of the international community, but as a rising

1 Starting from the 1980s, analyses of Chinese foreign policy often referred to the level of foreign decision- making as the main level of analysis, arguing that mainstream IR approaches lacked explanatory power when applied to the study of the PRC, which was not only characterised by a divergent political system, but also by a particular political culture (Rozman 1987; Shambaugh 1991; Whiting 1989; Wang Jianwei 2000; Friedrich 2000; WeigelinSchwiedrzik and Noesselt 2006). 2 Slightly divergent periodisations have been proposed by Yu Zhengliang and Chen Yugang 1999; Wang Yizhou 2006. For an analysis of these competing approaches see Noesselt 2010: 51–64.

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One example for the emergence of national self-images and related ‘national’ peace and security concepts would be the Chinese idea of ‘peaceful rise’. As Chinese political scientists emphasise, this concept is not to be understood as the result of learning from ‘Western’ IR theory, but as a particular Chinese peace model, which derives from the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the ideas of ‘peace and development’. The concept is said to reflect particular Chinese as well as universal global security interests (Hu, Zongshan 2006; Zheng, Bijian 2002; 2003). Most peace concepts proposed by the international community of states are not compatible with China’s development path. It is only too obvious that Democratic Peace theory cannot solve the predicted security dilemma resulting from China’s new ambitions to position itself on the international level. In Chinese political terminology, the expression ‘democracy’ is used in numerous political concepts or strategies, e.g. ‘new democratic revolution’, which describes the interim co-operation of Communist and bourgeois forces to overcome foreign domination, or  ‘demo­cratic centralism’, serving as one of China’s four basic principles, or ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’. Especially since the leadership transition in 2002/2003, the term ‘democratisation’ describes inner-party democratisation (Lin, Shangli 2002) and ‘democratisation’ of global politics (Yu, Zhengliang 2000). From the Chinese perspective, ‘democratisation’ is opposed to hegemony and hierarchy, defined as domination of global decisions by the most influential actor or groups of states sharing the same (‘Western’?) interests (Noesselt 2010: 175). Chinese IR theory and methodology researchers are aware of the contemporary discussions in the ‘West’ and often position themselves as realists, liberals or constructivists by referring to the related theory frameworks of ‘Western’ IR. But even if they are familiar with the theory of democratic peace, in internal Chinese discussions the concept is usually not applied to the PRC. The reason is that Democratic Peace theory is classified as an attempt to transplant ‘Western’ values to the East Asian region. Thus, the idea of ‘democratising’ China is identified as a ‘Western’ strategy to establish a post-Cold War world order and security mechanisms consisting of more or less functioning democracies, a strategy that obviously conflicts with the normative elements of the ‘Chinese’ theory discussion (expert discussion 2010). If, from a ‘Western’ point of view, China does not democratise, postCold War IR theory will have to cope with the persistence of a ‘socialist



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system with Chinese characteristics’ opposed to idealised concepts of Western ‘democracies’ and related value-based peace and security mechanisms. Background: Patterns, Principles, Axiomatic Concepts It is remarkable that although Chinese foreign policy witnessed a redefi­ nition in the years following the Sino-Soviet dispute (Wang, Yizhou 2006: 8–9), the main Soviet-oriented IR paradigms were not immediately replaced, but underwent numerous modifications and adaptations to the Chinese context. The normative interpretation of world order shifted from the Stalinist ‘two camps’ theory to Mao’s concept of ‘intermediate zones’ and later to his Three Worlds theory (Ye, Zicheng 2001: 128; Pu, Ning 2004: 20–21). In fact, foreign policy decision-making remained rooted in the principled ideas of national sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, presented at the Bandung conference of 1955 by the then Chinese foreign minister, Zhou Enlai, reflect these paradigms and formulate a code of conduct for interactions between the PRC and other socialist as well as non-socialist states (Yang, Fan 2006; Gong, Li 2004: 11; Pu, Ning 2004: 28–29). But although interpretations of world order and conflict constellations became more and more adapted to the Chinese context during the late 1960s and early 1970s, overall the dominant (Soviet) paradigm of ‘war and revolution’ still persisted (Feng, Tejun 2005: 92). The launching of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) posed an abrupt end to political research in the PRC. Most institutes were closed, and Chinese political scientists, branded as counter-revolutionaries, were persecuted or sent to the countryside for re-education. After this sharp interruption, IR research was restored and developed in new directions. In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping officially replaced ‘war and revolution’ by his more pragmatic model of ‘peace and development’. ‘Peace’ and ‘development’ were defined as interrelated and inseparable concepts, describing the ‘East-West problem’ (=> peace) and the ‘North-South problem’ (=> development) (Feng, Tejun 2005: 91–93). Adherence to ‘peace and development’ as leading paradigms was confirmed by party declarations in 1992 and 1997. Jiang Zemin’s normative interpretations of a future world order also relied on Deng Xiaoping’s ideas on ‘peace and development’, and the main assumptions were later repeated once more by Hu Jintao in his speech at the French Assemblée Nationale (Feng, Tejun 2005: 93). The concept of ‘peaceful rise’, which was

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first introduced by Zheng Bijian at the Bo’ao Forum in November 2003, presents the most recent theory-based modification of ‘peace and development’. Together with the concept of ‘harmonious society’ and ‘harmonious world’, the ‘peaceful rise’ is a central element in the PRC’s officially proclaimed foreign strategy for the twenty-first century (see Hu, Zongshan 2006: 5; Wen, Jiabao 10-12-2003). Modernisation and Defence The PRC’s white papers on modernisation and defence offer good insights into the strategic modelling and recalculating of national images. They also provide diplomatic explanations of the ‘real’ intentions and motivations of China’s military build-up, which are, at least according to these statements, not in line with the neo-realist conflict scenarios that guide most ‘Western’ China analyses. The quantity of terminological modifications in China’s white papers during the last ten years underlines once more the PRC’s sensibility concerning the shaping of China’s new international identity and the ‘misreading’ of China’s intentions by its strategic co-operation partners, who stick to neo-realist conflict scenarios. The PRC’s white paper on national defence published at the turn of the century (WP 2000) classifies the twentieth century as one of war(s) and major global conflicts, whereas in the twenty-first century by contrast, at least according to the PRC’s official statements, priority will be given to peace, development and modernisation. In the following short introductory retrospective, the 2000 white paper focuses on the two world wars and the Cold War, which shaped the PRC’s regional and international environment during the twentieth century. It is more than evident that military aggression is exclusively attributed to the two antagonistic power centres, the US and the Soviet Union, while China is presented as a victim of international power politics, as the PRC’s only experience of military conflict is—according to the white paper—China’s war of national liberation. It has to be remarked that the PRC’s wars and military confrontations with Vietnam, India, the Soviet Union and Taiwan, not forgetting China’s engagement in the Korean War3 are not mentioned.

3 For further analyses of China’s wars see: Korea War: Whiting (1960); Chen, Jian (1994); Cumings (1981; 1990); Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Litai (1993). Vietnam: Chen, King C. (1987); Mulvenon (1995). Sino-Soviet border clash: Ginsburgs and Pinkele (1978); Whiting (1975); Robinson (1970); Wich (1980).



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China’s military history is thus implicitly presented as a product of imperialist aggression (e.g. the Opium Wars) and the PRC is consequently identified as a mostly casual bystander of the systemic conflict between the two camps during the Cold War. By classifying China’s national interests and preferences—“state sovereignty”, “national unity”, “territorial integrity”, “security” (WP 2000)—as a consequence of the experience of colonisation and imperialism, the white paper describes China’s ongoing modernisation programme as a legitimate struggle to catch up with the rest of the developed world, and thus as part of a modern nation-building project that had been postponed by the military aggression of imperialist powers against China. To realise this highly ambitious modernisation programme, the PRC needs a “peaceful international environment” as well as a “favourable surrounding environment” (WP 2000). Though not formulated in the paper, the underlying argument is more than obvious: the current modernisation programme is understood as a modified and updated version of the reform attempts of the late nineteenth century, which have now become reactivated under the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party. The political legitimacy of the Chinese party-state derives not from open and competitive elections, but from the assumption that the party-state is able to provide and safeguard public good, e.g. political stability, national unity, territorial integrity and economic prosperity. Any interruption or abolition of the officially proclaimed modernisation programme would weaken the people’s support of and the trust in the political system of the PRC. Successful “liberation”, “independence”, “democracy” and “freedom” are listed as attributes of China’s political status quo; the modernisation programme, however, as the paper stresses, has still to be completed. National modernisation requires stability and continuity on the domestic and on the international level. Open rivalries and overt confrontations have to be avoided. In consequence, according to the official diplomatic terminology, the PRC pursues an “independent foreign policy of peace” and is “committed to a new world of peace, stability, prosperity and development”. In terms of the white paper, China consequently pursues “a defensive national defence policy” (WP 2000). A revised and updated version of China’s national defence strategy was presented in 2004. This was after the 16th party congress (2002), which marked the transfer of political power from the third generation (Jiang Zemin) to the fourth generation (Hu Jintao) of political leaders, and after Hu Jintao had been declared chairman of the Central Military Commission (2003). In contrast to the previous white paper, which depicted China’s

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modernisation as a legitimate struggle to catch up with the developed states, the 2004 paper concentrates on the aspect of military modernisation, which had also been part of China’s so-called four modernisations (economy; agriculture; military/national defence; science and technology). Nevertheless the military aspect had so far not been mentioned in the former official statements and white papers of the PRC. Instead of a retrospective, the 2004 paper documents the status quo of world politics and formulates future development prospects. The paper outlines that “peace” and “development”, China’s normative guiding concepts for the international system, and “security” and “stability”, the corresponding concepts related to the nation-state level, still face major obstacles and challenges. However, the following lines leave no doubt that the PRC’s blueprint for future global interactions rejects a return to open power struggles for hegemony, attributed to the twentieth century. The idealised twenty-first century is one of (peaceful) “coexistence of diverse civilisations, social systems and development models” (WP 2004). China’s official development goal is not to attain hegemony by winning the zero-sum game against the other major powers, but to build a “moderately prosperous society”. Even if military modernisation is now referred to as one central element in China’s national defence policy, the 2004 paper does not take an isolationist look at ‘modernisation’, but links it to the concept of ‘development’. Additionally, the paper specifies China’s foreign orientation not as a reiteration of the axiomatic term “independent foreign policy of peace”, but elaborates on this point by adding that China practises a “national defence policy of a defensive nature” (WP 2004) and restrains itself from any kind of expansionism or struggle for hegemony. The focus of the PRC’s external relations has thus shifted from the regional to the global stage, as the white paper refers to the necessity of a “peaceful international environment” and keeps silent on the status of regional constellations (WP 2004). This development was officially documented in the terminology of the revised follow-up version, which appeared two years later (WP 2006). The 2006 white paper explicitly pays respect to the phenomenon of the ongoing globalisation process and increasing mutual interdependence. Whereas the two other white papers had discussed China’s (military) modernisation as part of a postponed nation-building project, constrained and determined by external structures and constellations, the 2006 paper re-integrates the PRC’s modernisation and development efforts into the global context. The PRC’s modernisation is not a unique phenomenon, but finds its equivalents in the form of nation-building projects of other states belonging to the old



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periphery (former colonies or developing states in Asia, Africa and Latin America) of international politics. Key elements of China’s national modernisation strategy are now inscribed into a universally valid strategy of global development. “Peace”, “development”, “cooperation” and “winwin-constellation” are identified as universal and shared common goals. The Chinese concept of a “harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity” integrates elements of the global discussion on a “new” world order for the twenty-first century, i.e. after the end of the Cold War, plus key assumptions of idealist and liberalist theory-based models of international relations (WP 2006). A further look at the level of terminology in the white papers summarised above (WP 2000; WP 2004; WP 2006) reveals a transition in Chinese foreign policy formulation from the importing and mostly unmodified application of ‘international’ terminology towards the emergence and exporting of a distinct ‘Chinese’ terminology. The 2000 paper describes the political status quo in China by referring to “democracy” and “freedom”—two concepts with highly normative and value-based implications, as both were key elements of ‘Western’ transition theories and commonly used to describe and predict the necessity of system change in Communist states. The fact that the 2000 paper makes use of ‘Western’ terminology does not imply that the PRC accepted the normative claim for political reform and system change. It seems that concepts taken from international discussions were exploited to counter the international scepticism and perception of threat linked to China’s national development, as the PRC’s modernisation programme was not presented as a particular Chinese development path but as part of universal transition and transformation processes. The 2006 paper, however, replaced the internationally agreed and unified terminology of international politics by concepts and terms deriving from China’s domestic politics (e.g. ‘harmonious society’— ‘harmonious world’). The rules of future global interactions as fixed in the 2006 paper (WP 2006) are obviously elements in the internal Chinese discussion and formulation of IR theory. Though the “new security concept” (xin anquanguan)—consisting of “mutual trust”, “mutual benefit”, “equality”, “coordination”—is configured as a universally valid and applicable model of non-traditional common security, one should keep in mind that the “new security concept” has been formulated as a particular ‘Chinese’ concept and part of ‘China’s’ (military) modernisation programme. The concept is based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which symbolised a first attempt to elaborate a concept which is based on

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China’s strategic interests and foreign policy preferences, but at the same time is flexible and universal enough to capture, describe and guide foreign policy orientations and international interactions in the nonChinese world (Yang, Fan 2006: 141; 127–128). To sum up, the rules of international politics remain officially unchanged, but the key concepts have been modified or replaced by a new or partially redefined terminology. At the moment, it seems that the revision and modification of the theoretical pillars of world order do not aim at a reshuffling of ‘real’ political power on the global stage. The models and visions proposed by the Chinese side do not reject existing structures nor do they try to transform the social systems of other state actors. The purpose of the formulation of ‘Chinese’ security and world order concepts is more likely to be thought to devaluate and replace elements in the international debate which classify the PRC and the Chinese development path as a threat to world peace and common development. The 2006 paper iterates the PRC’s self-obligation to a “defence policy which is purely defensive in nature” and stresses that China would not engage in any arms race or pose a military threat to any other country. According to China’s white paper, modernisation in the military and defence sectors has to be “conducted on the basis of steady economic development” and to follow a “scientific development outlook” (WP 2006). The overall direction of this strategy shows a tendency toward “defensive realism”, including elements of social constructivist approaches (e.g. China’s national image campaign). Whereas the 2006 white paper constructs an interdependent relationship between China’s national development and global development and proposes a “Chinese” model of world order in the form of the “harmonious society”, the next updated version (WP 2008) returns to the plane of China’s domestic development. The introductory sentences emphasise that China sees itself now as an integral part of the world economy and the international system (not of international politics!). Furthermore, in 2008, China had to cope with major challenges and events—the earthquake in Sichuan, the Olympic Games, thirty years of reform and opening—which, according to the white paper, were all successfully managed and solved. China thus continues to follow the “road of peaceful development” and to implement reform and the opening process as central parts in China’s so-called socialist modernisation. The modernisation programme remains directly related to the officially proclaimed “scientific outlook on development”, and military modernisation is understood as a strategic “adaptation to (the) global military development”. The PRC will therefore stick to an



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“independent foreign policy of peace” and project a “national defence policy solely aiming at protecting its territory and people”. “National sovereignty”, “security” and “development” are defined as the “fundamental purpose” of China’s foreign policy formulation. Likewise, the PRC still favours the construction of a harmonious world and repeats the central aspects of the “new security concept” as guiding and constraining the parameters of future international and global interactions (WP 2008). The content and implications of China’s “new security concept” had already been discussed in an earlier white paper (2002). China’s concept is drafted against the background of the antagonistic power constellations and overt conflicts in the two world wars as well as during the Cold War. To attain common security and mutual benefit, flexible co-operation through multilateral security mechanisms and strategic dialogues is required. The modifications and adaptations in China’s official defence policy reflect thus a transition from a unilateral national strategy to multilateral security structures (WP 2002). Terminology Matters At a first glance, the white papers and most Chinese publications on IR seem to operate with the terminology and basic assumptions found in international academic discussion. Nevertheless, a closer look at Chinese materials reveals that the fact that Chinese scientists apparently work with the same terminology does not automatically mean that the content and values linked to it remain unmodified. A good illustration is the translation of ‘national interests’. The official translation as guojia liyi can be conceived as an equivalent to the internationally agreed definition of ‘national interests’, but at the same time it can also be retranslated into English as ‘interests of the state’, which has a completely different connotation and refers to a Marxist approach to IR theorising (Yan, Xuetong 1996a; 1996b). Other central elements and key concepts witness a similar remodulation and reconfiguration, after being translated and integrated into the Chinese context. The Chinese concept of power, often translated as ‘comprehensive national power’ (CNP), is conceived as an all- encompassing form of power which refers not only to the aspect of military strength, but furthermore incorporates political influence and cultural soft power resources. This broader understanding of power thus allows a state to be labelled as a “great nation”, even though its military resources

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would not validate this ranking. It was and is likewise possible to argue that the PRC was and is an integral part of the concert of great powers in world affairs, or to construct the EU as a pole in international politics, even though the EU still lacks a European defence and security structure independent of NATO. Apart from China’s matrix of comprehensive national power, which is used to calculate the limits, restraints and options of the major state actors in international constellations, a second derivative of the power aspect is the concept of ‘soft power’ as a new strategy to win control and influence without resorting to the use of force. It is striking that the turn towards a soft and constructivist approach in foreign policy is not a unique feature of the PRC’s attempts at strategic positioning in the early decades of the twenty-first century. Not only the emerging power centres on the former periphery of international politics, but also the old power centres, namely the US, undertake steps to reformulate their official understanding of power and security as elements in their international strategy. It is therefore hardly astonishing that the US version of ‘Smart Power’ (CSIS 2007: 7) and the concept of ‘soft power’ attributed to the current reorientation of China’s foreign activities seem to converge. The Chinese concept of ‘soft power’—a concept attributed to the American scientist Joseph Nye (1990; 2002; 2004), but used by Western as well as Chinese analysts to categorise China’s approach in international affairs—had originally been presented as a model to oppose and balance hegemonic hard power politics. The terminology, ruanshili (soft power), is not particularly Chinese and the necessity to put an end to the return of history, i.e. the repetition of worldwide struggles for hegemony, had been recognised long before in a broad variety of academic publications and political statements. But it is quite remarkable that an imported concept now serves as the guiding model for Chinese foreign politics. Though the understanding of some key concepts might converge, divergent or competing approaches still persist, especially concerning security issues. The term ‘collective security’ can be found in Chinese analyses of international organisations or frameworks of regional integration. However, regarding security issues in which the PRC is more or less directly involved, the Chinese side insists on intergovernmental mechanisms and favours security co-operation instead of collective mechanisms, even though the term ‘collective security’ might appear in official diplomatic statements.4 4 Quantitative and qualitative evaluation of Chinese databases (social science journals) for the period 1990–2010.



china and (non-)collective security73 Collective Security Mechanisms: Leaving the Security Spiral?

During the Maoist era, China’s IR experts and foreign policy advisers assumed that an unavoidable confrontation existed between the capitalist (often referred to as imperialist) and the socialist states of the world. According to these interpretations and perceptions of world constellations, the PRC had to fear a foreign military attack and thus a violation of its officially proclaimed national core interests, i.e. territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Because of these (mis-)perceptions and the assumption of an inevitable antagonism between the ‘two camps’, the PRC’s security strategy in the Maoist era generally relied on deterrence. Conversely, during the period of reform and opening and especially after the renormalisation of China’s bi- and multilateral external relations in the 1990s, the focus shifted from traditional to non-traditional security concerns. Transnational terrorism, energy security, environmental security and domestic stability are only the most essential elements in China’s modified security strategy (Yan, Jin 2002: 603–607). The PRC’s national interests have not changed, but concepts and strategies have been adapted to the regional and international environment of the increasingly interdependent post-Cold War world. Economic and financial globalisation have meant that individual security can only be achieved through multilateral co-operation and mechanisms of collective security. The PRC has participated in most of the UN’s peacekeeping missions (see He, Yin 2007) and actively contributed to the stabilisation of the world economy during the Asian crisis and the ongoing financial crisis (Wang, Mengkui 2009). The PRC has joined co-operation and consultation mechanisms set up by the Southeast Asian states (ASEAN, CSCAP, etc.)—initially established as security alliances to balance China’s increasing influence and supposed assertive power ambitions— and has contributed to the construction of a regional security architecture, the SCO, independent of NATO and in the long run opposed to the US security strategy for (East) Asia. Nevertheless, an overt confrontation with the US is, at least at this point, not intended. The PRC acts as a mediator in the Six Party Talks and supports the US in combating transnational terrorist actions. Xinjiang is often presented as China’s Chechnya—any intervention by the military or the armed police is consequently in line with international efforts to combat terrorist activities (see also Weigelin-Schwiedrzik/Noesselt 2006). Nonetheless, the PRC’s engagement in the above-mentioned cases is mainly motivated by Chinese security concerns, which are only subsequently identified as common and collective security concerns. This strategic move allows legitimisation of China’s participation in international

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organisations, whose rules have generally been defined by the nonChinese part of the world, and also explains China’s attempts to reorganise the existing structures of international and global interactions (e.g. China’s paper on the reform of the UN: sina.com 12 June 2005). One should also keep in mind that the PRC only agrees to enter inter­ national co-operation structures that do not require a transfer of national power to the supranational level or a pooling of sovereignty. The Chinese concept of the ‘state’ is shaped by two slightly divergent philosophical traditions. The first can be traced back to the self-image of ‘all under heaven’ (tianxia) (Zhao, Tingyang 2005: 3–35); the second is more inspired by the idea of modern nation-states. But both concepts exclude individual and non-state actors from foreign policy-making and do not conceive of the international system as anarchic. It is almost impossible to predict which self-image as a ‘state’ actor will dominate Chinese foreign policy in the coming decades. The search for a Chinese IR theory is still going on, so one could assume that the preference for one or the other concept will vary to reflect shifting domestic and international power constellations. Nonetheless, collective security does not solve the current perceptionbased security dilemmas between China and its regional or global neighbours, as the maintenance of China’s status quo requires the peaceful co-existence of divergent systems and their interaction through multilateral intergovernmental frameworks. These structures definitely do not include collective security or defence mechanisms. Theory Discussions in the Shadow of the Financial Crisis Though the Chinese economy was also struck by the economic crisis—as stated in the government work report presented by the Chinese prime minister, Wen Jiabao, the year 2009 would prove to be “the most difficult year for our country’s economic development since the turn of the new century” (quoted from Fewsmith 2009)—Chinese IR analysts and strategic advisers of the PRC’s political leaders discovered an unforeseen strategic window of opportunity opened by the deterioration of the global economic system. Their analysis relies on two principal assumptions: 1. Building a New World Order for the Twenty-First Century First of all, according to Chinese IR scholars, the dominant features of the current financial and economic system were defined and shaped by



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a group of Western capitalist states, which solely aimed at maximising their national power and economic benefits. To achieve their plans, these state actors agreed on a common capitalist framework maintained through multilateral financial institutions. For a long time, the financial and economic backbone of the international order had been taken as given and unalterable. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of Eastern Europe, however, Chinese political scientists had voted for a restructuring of the existing international system. Nonetheless, they had to admit that the year 1989 did not trigger a rearrangement of the existing structures, but that the old bipolar world had simply been replaced by an exclusively capitalist world system dominated by the interests and preferences of the last remaining superpower, i.e. the US. The visionary idea of an alternative world order remained alive and served as a source of inspiration for the next generation of Chinese IR scholars. After the announcement of a prevailing global financial and economic crisis, the concept of a multipolar world order, in which the Chinese development model would play a leading role, has been reactivated and has become a central element in China’s foreign policy calculations.5 One or, according to the Chinese models, a variety of state actors would take over the responsibilities of the former power centre. 2. Blueprints for National and International Development The assumption that all states would undergo a system change and in the long run become democratic has been falsified by the Chinese development model. Even after the decisions on reform and opening in 1978 and the PRC’s accession to multilateral financial and economic institutions (e.g. World Bank, GATT/WTO),6 the PRC continued to prescribe norms and general principles of macro-economic development through the mechanisms of the Five-Year Plans. The restructuring of the former state-owned enterprises and the de-collectivisation of the rural economy resulted in the coexistence of planned economy and market principles. At a first glance, the emerging hybrid economic structures seemed to contradict the ideological foundations of socialist state systems. But in the case of the PRC, these structures were legitimised by Deng Xiaoping’s 5 Feng, Tejun (2005 [1987; 1994]: 32–33); Chen, Yue (2001: 30). 6 The historical process of China’s WTO accession has been analysed by Gertler (2004:21–28). For a summary of China’s commitments to the accession to the WTO see: Ching, Cheong/Ching, Hung Yee (eds) (2003), Handbook on China’s WTO Accession and its Impacts. World Scientific Publishers.

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theoretical writings on “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. Chen Yun’s ideographic term of a ‘bird in a cage’—the bird standing for the market, which is not allowed to leave the framework of the planned economy—illustrates the focus and concerns of this first phase of China’s economic reforms. The cage prohibits the bird from flying out of control of the political elites, but it also protects it from being fatally struck by the financial and economic crisis.7 State intervention and state-sponsored programmes to stabilise the national economy, such as the stimulus package initiated in 2008 (12 percent of 2008 GDP, equalling 4 trillion RMB, was to be invested to expand domestic demand and stabilise economic growth; Naughton 2009: 2), are more than tolerated in times of global turbulence. So far, the economic and administrative reforms in the post-Maoist era have—contrary to the main assumptions of transformation theories— not resulted in a diversification of the party system nor have they led to the introduction of democratic features at the national level. The PRC has managed to become an integral part of international financial and economic structures without major political reforms of the centralist party-state. The initial plan to induce a system change by integrating the PRC into the global capitalist system has led to a completely unexpected situation: the capitalist world is closely interrelated with the hybrid economic system of the PRC, which officially perpetuates socialist principles and thus contradicts the norms and values shared by the majority of (Western) democracies. Gallagher goes so far as to argue that economic reforms stabilised the Chinese model and thus have delayed a democratic transition (Gallagher 2002: 338–372). Since the decisions on reform and opening, the PRC’s foreign strategy had followed the principle of tao guang, yang hui (hide brightness, nourish obscurity). Economic consolidation and stability were at the top of the agenda. Interaction with the capitalist world was thought to contribute to China’s ongoing national modernisation programme. China seemed to abide by the official rules of the game. Nonetheless, the global financial crisis might in the long run trigger a change in the PRC’s central foreign policy paradigm and lead to a reorganisation of multilateral financial institutions and the related frameworks for international co-operation. China is no longer hiding its real capacities: at the Davos summer meeting

7 In the late 1990s, Lubman came to the conclusion that the economic bird had already left its cage, whereas other fields, i.e. the legal sector and the political field, remained highly controlled by the party-state (Lubman 1999: 2).



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in Tianjin, the Chinese prime minister, Wen Jiabao, referred to the Chinese model of national development as a blueprint and orientation for all those states hit by the global financial crisis (Wen, Jiabao, 27 July 2008). A few months later, Wen further elaborated on the idea of a non-Western scenario of future global development (Wen, Jiabao, 28 January 2009). By stating that the inability of the Western world to cope with the financial crisis had proven the final weakness of the capitalist system, the Chinese side voted for a substitution of the old development models by alternative paradigms, which could be deduced from the Chinese economic experiences since 1978. In March 2009, the head of the National Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, presented a proposal for the replacement of the US dollar by a new supranational currency unit (Zhou, Xiaochuan 23 March 2009), an idea also discussed on the occasion of the BRIC meeting in June 2009.8 Instead of contributing to the stabilisation of the global financial system according to the rules and interests as defined by the developed capitalist states, Chinese scholars now describe the PRC’s role as follows: China will consider taking more responsibilities…in order to strive for a fair and reasonable global economic system, a new development mode for mutual interests and a larger contribution to the world economy (Huo Jianguo 28 August 2010).

These remarks left no doubt that a reconstruction of the financial order will have to integrate the PRC’s demands and interests, as, in exchange for more active participation in international constellations, China is demanding more voting rights and wants to have a voice in the reconstruction of the world order in the twenty-first century. Vice versa, in the shadow of the global financial and economic crisis, the international community of states has a keen interest in transfer­ ring  global responsibilities to the PRC. Instead of containing China’s rise, these states need a robust and powerful PRC as a new stabilising pillar of the global economy. This U-turn in international politics relies on the assumption that the PRC, through growing economic interdependence and the effects of globalisation, will not try to defect from the established frameworks and principles of international finance and trade, as 8 Even though the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India and China) underlined the necessity of introducing a new reference currency, none of these states would be interested in a devaluation of the US dollar. China holds the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves (USD 1.8 trillion) and was the largest foreign holder of US treasuries, until it slashed a huge share of those in December 2009 (China Daily 18 February 2010).

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turbulence in those areas would immediately also have an effect on the Chinese economy. Conclusion China’s transition from a state outside the international system to one inside it has led to the still ongoing search for particular ‘Chinese’ interpretations of the international system. The fact that mainstream IR theory is understood as highly influenced by the national interests of the theory progenitor states means that China’s struggle to be accepted as an ‘equal’ partner in global affairs implies a modification or a partial rebuilding of normative IR theory, which guides structures and processes in interaction on the international level. China’s political leaders are aware that foreign policy has to rely on scientific interpretations of the international environment and China’s position in the system. The substitution of central IR paradigms, the replacement of ‘war and revolution’ by ‘peace and development’, illustrates this shift in theory-building and strategy discussions. Other concepts—‘peaceful rise’ and ‘harmonious society’—represent alternative, yet quite utopian models of a future world order. The main motivating factor behind this discussion remains the construction of a new international architecture, which should allow the realisation of China’s national interests through co-operation and convince the international community of states not to impose any sanctions or to balance China’s re-ascendancy. China favours security co-operation instead of a collective security mechanism. Neither a partial transfer of national rights nor a pooling of sovereignty is compatible with the axiomatic principles of Chinese IR. However, the PRC has a keen interest in being perceived as a reliable and peaceful strategic partner. But these strategic partnerships should be based on reciprocity and equality. The only way to leave the new security spiral of East Asian and global politics (i.e. ‘China Threat’ vs. ‘Peaceful Rise’) seems to consist in the integration of divergent security concerns and development strategies, which can be found in China’s IR theory reflections or other ‘peripheral’ discourses, and to configure a global IR theory for the twenty-first century. It is more than evident that—to overcome parochialism and hegemony in IR theory-building and to avoid misperceptions and misinterpretations of foreign policy orientations—core assumptions and units of analysis have



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to be modified or replaced, even if divergent political cultures make it difficult to find common or even collective definitions. References Bernstein, Richard, and Munro, Ross H. (1997), The Coming Conflict with China. New York: Knopf. Chen, Jian (1994), China’s Road to the Korean War. New York: Columbia UP. Chen, King C. (1987), China’s War with Vietnam, 1979. Issues, Decisions, and Implications. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. China Daily (18 February 2010), “China’s holdings of US Treasury debt slashed”. Christensen, Thomas (1999), “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia”, International Security 4 (Spring 1999), 49–80. CSIS (2007), CSIS Commission on Smart Power. A smarter, more secure America. Washington (DC): CSIS Press. Cumings, Bruce (1981; 1990), The Origins of the Korean War. Princeton: Princeton UP. Feng 冯, Tejun 特君 (2005 [1987; 1994]), Dangdai shijie zhengzhi jingji yu guoji guanxi (Modern World Politics, Economics and IR) 当代世界政治经济与国际关系. Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe. Fewsmith, Joseph (2009), “Social Order in the Wake of Economic Crisis”, China Leader­ ship  Monitor 28. http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/3571 (10 May 2010). Friedberg, Aaron L. (1993/1994), “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia”, International Security 3 (Winter 1993/1994), 5–33. Friedrich, Stefan (2000), China und die Europäische Union: Europas weltpolitische Rolle aus chinesischer Sicht. Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde. Gallagher, Mary E. (2002), “Reform and Openness: Why China’s Economic Reforms have Delayed Democracy”, World Politics (April 2002), 338–372. Gertler, Jeffrey L. (2004), “What China’s WTO accession is all about”, in Bhattasali, Deepak/ Li, Shantong/ Will, Martin (eds.) (2004), China and the WTO. World Bank / Oxford UP, 21–28. Gilpin, Robert (2001), Global political economy: Understanding the international economic order. Princeton: Princeton UP. Ginsburgs, George, and Pinkele, Carl F. (1978), The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, 1949–1964. New York: Praeger. Goldstein, Avery (1997/1998), “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival”, International Security 3 (Winter 1997/1998), 36–73. Goncharov, Sergei, Lewis, John W., and Xue, Litai (1993), Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War. Stanford: Stanford UP. Gong 宫, Li 力(2004), “Mao Zedong waijiao sixiang jingsui yu lilun gongxian” (Essence and theory contribution of Mao Zedong’s foreign policy concepts) 毛泽东外交思想精髓 与理论贡献, in Fu 傅, Yaozu 耀祖/ Gu 顾, Guanfu 关福 (eds.) (2004), Zhongguo guoji guanxi lilun yanjiu 中国国际关系理论研究 (Research on IR theory in China). Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 3–18. Guo 郭, Shuyong 树勇 (2005), “Guanyu Zhongguo jueqi de ruogan lilun zhengming jiqi xueshu yiyi” (On some competing theories of China’s rise and their scientific implications) 关于中国崛起的若干理论争鸣及其学术意义, Guoji Guancha (2005) 4, 31–38. He, Yin (2007), “China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations”. Silk road studies – Asia Paper. http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/2007/ YinHe0409073.pdf (10 November 2008). Herz, John H. (1951), Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities. Chicago: Chicago UP.

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Hu 胡, Zongshan 宗山 (2006), Zhongguo de heping jueqi: Lilun, lishi yu zhanlüe (China’s peaceful rise: Theory, history, strategy) 中国的和平崛起: 理论, 历史, 战略. Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe. Huo Jianguo, quoted from: RMRB (27 July 2010), “Expert: China Won’t take more responsibilities than it can handle”. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/ 7082254.html (28 August 2010). Kang, David (2003/04), “Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations”, International Security (Winter 2003/04) 3, 165–180. Li 李, Jingzhi 景治 (2002), “Ruhe renshi dangjin de shijie geju” (How to understand the current structure of the world) 如何认识当今的世界格局, in Liu 刘, Liyun 丽云/ Bao 保, Jianyun 建云 /Fang;房, Lexian 乐宪 (eds.) (2004), Dangdai Zhongguo yu shijie yanjiu (Studies on Contemporary China and the World) 当代;中国与世界研. Bejing: Renmin Daxue Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan, 3–12. Lin 林, Shangli 尚立 (2002), Dangnei minzhu: Zhongguo gongchandang de lilun yu shijian (Inner-party democracy: The CCP’s theory and practice) 党内民主中国共产党的理 论与实践. Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Press. Lubman, Stanley (1999), Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao. Stanford: Stanford UP. Mearsheimer. John J. (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Mulvenon, James C. (1995), “The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border War”, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 3 (Fall 1995), 68–88. Naughton, Barry (2009), “Understanding the Chinese Stimulus Package”, China Leadership Monitor   28.http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/ 5588 (03 February 2010). Ni, Feng (2004), “The Shaping of China’s Foreign Policy”, in Kokubun, Ryosei / Wang, Jisi (ed.) (2004), The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order. Tokyo; New York: Japan Center for International Exchange. Ni 倪, Shixiong 世雄 / Xu 许, Jia 嘉 (1997), “Zhongguo guoji guanxi lilun yanjiu: Lishi huigu yu fazhan” (Research on IR theory in China: Historical retrospective and development) 中国国际关系理论研究: 历史回顾与发展, Ouzhou (1997) 6, 11–15. Noesselt, Nele (2010), Alternative Weltordnungsmodelle? IB-Diskurse in China (Alternative models of world order? IR debates in China). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Nye, Joseph (1990), Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of AmericanPpower. New York: Basic Books. —— (2002), The Paradox of American Power—Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go Alone. Oxford: Oxford UP. —— (2004), Soft Power—The Means to Success in WorldPpolitics. New York: Public Affairs. Pu 蒲, Ning 宁 (2004), “Lun Mao Zedong de diyuan zhanlüeguan” (Mao Zedong’s view on geopolitical strategy)论毛泽东的地缘战略观, in Fu 傅, Yaozu 耀祖/ Gu 顾, Guanfu 关福 (ed.)(2004), Zhongguo guoji guanxi lilun yanjiu (Research on IR theories in China) 中国国际关系理 论研究. Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 19–32. Qin 秦, Hui 晖(2007), “Shenme shi daguo?” (What is a daguo?) 什么是大国. http://www .southcn.com/nflr/wszj/1/200704020328.htm (03 March 2009). Robinson, Thomas (1970), The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development and the March 1969 Clashes. Santa Monica: RAND. Rozman, Gilbert (1987), The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978–1985. Princeton: Princeton UP. Shambaugh, David (2004/05), “China Engages Asia. Reshaping the Regional Order”, International Security (Winter 2004/05) 3, 64–99. —— (1991), Beautiful Imperialist—China Perceives America, 1972–1990. Princeton: Princeton UP. —— (2005), “Introduction”, in Shambaugh, David (ed.) (2005), Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics. Berkeley; L.A.: University of California Press.



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Sina.com (12 June 2005), “Pinglun: Lianheguo gaige yao li yu guoji guanxi minzhuhua he fazhihua” (Commentary: The reform of the UN benefits democratisation and the rule of law in international relations) 评论:联合国改革要利于国际关系民主化和法制化. http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2005-06-12/14276150407s.shtml (10 May 2007). WP 2000 = China’s National Defence in 2000, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/2000/ index.htm (01 January 2010). WP 2002 = China’s National Defence in 2002, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/ index.htm (01 January 2010). WP 2004 = China’s National Defence in 2004, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/ index.htm (01 January 2010). WP 2006 = China’s National Defence in 2006, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/ book/194421.htm (01 January 2010). WP 2008 = China’s National Defence in 2008, http://www.china.org.cn/government/ whitepaper/node_7060059.htm (01 January 2010). Walt, Stephen (1998), “International Relations: One World, Many Theories”, Foreign Policy 110, 29–45. Wang, Jianwei (2000), Limited Adversaries: Post-Cold War Sino-American Mutual Images. New York: Oxford UP. Wang, Mengkui (ed.) (2009), China in the Wake of Asia’s Financial Crisis. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge. Wang 王, Yizhou 逸舟(2006), “Guodu zhong de Zhongguo guoji guanxixue” (Chinese IR in transition) 过渡中的中国国际关系学, Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (2006) 4, 7–12. Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne, and Noesselt, Nele (2006), “Striving for Symmetry in Partnership: An Analysis of Sino-EU Relations Based on the Two Recently Published Policy Papers”, in Weigelin-Schwiedrzik/Schick-Chen/Klotzbücher (2006), As China Meets the World. Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 11–34. Wen 温, Jiabao 家宝 (10 December 2003), “Ba muguang tou xiang Zhongguo” (Turning your eyes to China) 把目光投向中国. http://www.scol.com.cn/focus/jrjj/20031211/ 2003121185158.htm (08 January 2005). Wen, Jiabao (27 September 2008), “Reform and opening-up: The eternal driving force of China’s   development”.   http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-09/27/content _10122832 (25 November 2008). Wen, Jiabao (28 January 2009), “Jianding xinxin, jiaqiang hezuo, tuidong shijie jingji xin yi lun zengzhang” (English version: “Proceed with confidence, strengthen cooperation and drive the new growth of the world economy”) 坚定信心 – 加强合作 – 推动 世界经济新轮增长. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-01-29/011017118920.shtml (10 June 2009). Whiting, Allen S. (1960), China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War. New York: Macmillan Company. —— (1975), The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. —— (1989), China Eyes Japan. Berkeley: California UP. Wich, Richard (1980), Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics. Cambridge: Harvard UP. Yan 闫, Jin 瑾(2002), “Qianxi Zhongguo xin anquanguan xingcheng de guoji beijing jiqi neihan” (New security concept: Analysis of the international background leading to its formulation and its content) 浅析中国新安全观 形成的国际背景及其内涵, in Liu 刘, Liyun 丽云/ Bao 保, Jianyun 建云 / Fang 房, Lexian 乐宪 (eds.) (2004), Dangdai Zhongguo yu shijie yanjiu (Studies on Contemporary China and the World) 当代中国与 世界研究. Bejing: Renmin Daxue Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan, 603–607. Yan 阎, Xuetong 学通 (1996a), Zhongguo guojia liyi fenxi (Analyse der nationalen Interessen Chinas) 中国国家 利益分析. Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe. —— (1996b), “Shenme shi guojia liyi?” (Was sind nationale Interessen?) 什么 是国家利益, in Wang 王, Jisi 辑思(ed.) (2007), Zhongguo xuezhe kan shijie (2), 3–23.

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Yang 杨, Fan 凡 (2006), Zhongguo waijiao fanglüe: Heping gongchu wu xiang yuanze yu Zhongguo (China’s foreign strategy: China and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence) 中国外交方略和平共处五项 原则与中国. Hebei: Hebei Renmin Chubanshe. Ye 叶, Zicheng 自成 (2001), Xin Zhongguo waijiao sixiang: Cong Mao Zedong dao Deng Xiaoping (New Chinese diplomatic concepts: From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping) 新中国外交思想: 从毛泽东到邓 小平. Beijing: Beijing UP. Yu 俞, Zhengliang 正梁 / Chen 陈, Yugang 玉刚 (1999), “Zhongguo guoji guanxi de zhanlüe zhuanxing yu lilun yanjiu 20 nian” (20 years of Chinese IR : Strategy transformation and theory research) 中国国际 关系的战略转型与理论研究二十年, Fudan Xuebao (1999) 1, 12–17. Yu 俞, Zhengliang 正梁(2000), Quanqiuhua shidai de guoji guanxi (IR in the age of globalisation) 全球化时代 与国际关系. Shanghai: Fudan UP. Zhao 赵, Tingyang 汀阳 (2005), “Tianxia’ gainian yu shijie zhidu” (The concept of tianxia and the ordering structure of the world ) 天下概念与世界制度, in Wang 王, Jisi 辑思 (Qin 秦, Yaqing 亚青) (ed.) (2007), Zhongguo xuezhe kan shijie (1), 3–35. Zheng, Bijian (2002), “The sixteenth National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and China’s peaceful rise”, in Zheng, Bijian (2005), China’s Peaceful Rise—Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997–2005. Washington: Brookings, 74–81. —— (2003), “A new path for China’s peaceful rise and the future of Asia”, in Zheng, Bijian (2005), China’s Peaceful Rise—Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997–2005. Washington: Brookings, 14–20. Zhou, Xiaochuan (23 March 2009), “Reform the International Monetary System”. http:// www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6500&id=178 (10.04.2009).

COMMENTARY ON PAPERS BY COLIN MUNRO, ROBERTA BALLABIO AND NELE NOESSELT Rosemary Foot This conference had two main objectives: to assess the contours of the security structure of the region in the immediate and medium term, in particular, the extent to which it is becoming dominated by China, or is developing a more co-operative or multi-layered security system, culminating in a collective security arrangement; and to examine the degree to which, in this time of transition, lessons could be learned from the European experience of security co-operation. Could the European model of peaceful transition and management of security issues serve as an example? If so, under what conditions? These illuminating papers respond to most if not all of these objectives, but in rather different ways. If there are two themes that join these three papers together they are, first, that the prospects for establishing a collective security system in the region are rather remote, at least for the near future; and second, that East Asia is a region where mutual trust has been difficult to build. The possible avenues for building trust are explored, especially in the papers by Munro and Ballabio. It might be useful first of all to establish what we mean by collective security. Collective security has been defined as a “system in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to aggression”.1 The United Nations (and the League of Nations before it) was supposedly based on such a system, but has been stymied by the UN’s selectivity in responding to threats to international peace and security, and its inability to assure participating states that the “system protects them all equally”. The UN has also found it difficult to develop “a decision-making procedure to reach effective and consistent determinations that a threat to or breach of the peace requiring a response has occurred”.2

1 Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds) United Nations, Divided World, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) p. 30. 2 Roberts and Kingsbury, United Nations, p. 30.

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We are clearly a long way from developing a collective security system either in Northeast Asia or in the Asia-Pacific more broadly. Indeed, it is a highly demanding form for most regions of the world. Significant parts of Europe have established a security community where there are dependable expectations of peaceful change and no country prepares for war with its neighbours or expects war to break out in response to conflicts of interest with other members of the region,3 but even this highly developed form of community does not quite reach the level of collective security. NATO is a collective defence organisation, not a collective security system. Instead, Colin Munro reminds us that, in the case of East Asia, it is bilateral mechanisms, the Six Party Talks (SPT), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that are the primary tools for managing disputes, avoiding war, and moving towards co-operative solutions rather than confrontation; but he suggests that it is the bilateral dimension that is the most promising route of all these examples. The tripartite dialogues involving Japan, the ROK and China do not attract his attention perhaps because, for him, he cannot discern as strong a basis for common interest among the three as in the potential and actual bilateral dialogues. While the European multilateral experience might look attractive as a model to which East Asia could aspire—after all, the OSCE has many of the characteristics that we would like to see established in East Asia, including a consensual method of decision-making, a comprehensive and co-operative notion of security, and a remit of conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as post-conflict rehabilitation—as he acknowledges, there are deep structural conditions that prohibit this kind of development in East Asia. As he puts it towards the end of his paper: “neither the historical background nor the present situation in East Asia is conducive to the establishment of an inclusive, comprehensive, co-operative, consensus-based regional security mechanism, modelled on the OSCE, or indeed any other European organisation”. Why was Western Europe reasonably successful in providing the basis for a European Union, a security community, and eventually the OSCE? Perhaps the key factor is this matter of the painstaking building of trust between former enemy states. This has been a slow but effective and remarkable process in Europe with respect to France and Germany, 3 Useful discussions of security communities, including the European example, can be found in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds) Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).



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accomplished via a dense network of economic, political, cultural and security institutions (such as NATO); and a vast programme of exchanges between young people. Important, too, I would add, was a West German desire to be so integrated and to find its place, security and identity within Europe rather than focusing on self-help mechanisms and narrow national interest. The Constitutional provisions of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) that restricted its various uses of force and weapons acquisitions were important signalling devices at a time of high risk of failure for the integration project. The first steps of institutional creation involved the European Coal and Steel Community—again, an important signalling device in the realm of security and for the building of trust. The process also deepened as a result of a common threat perception (the Soviet Union); and US support for integration via its Marshall Plan. Later on, the FRG was involved in other attempts at building trust and confidence, this time with the former Soviet bloc. Its (admittedly more limited) success rested on Western Germany convincing the states within the Soviet bloc that it wanted no revision of borders and that it was satisfied with the status quo. Bilateral agreements and the Helsinki Final Act embodied these understandings. We cannot recreate all or many of these conditions in East Asia. Can the DPRK be induced to sign multilateral treaties like the 1975 Helsinki Final Act which included the renunciation of force for solving issues in dispute (the provisions outlined in ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation come to mind)? Does North Korea have any desire for reconciliation? Can it be induced to want what we want? Here the paper by Roberta Ballabio is instructive. Ballabio describes ten years of effort by Italy to engage North Korea at track one and track two levels. Her paper discusses some important confidence-building measures and other related proposals that are designed to give North Korea some vision of and confidence in a better future. But so far these are proposals rather than actually operating projects, and it seems to me that none of these has much chance of advancing unless and until there is a desire in North Korea for reconciliation with its neighbours, as was the case with West Germany after the Second World War, or like the former Soviet Union under Gorbachev, or China under Deng Xiaoping. We are not at this point on the Korean peninsula; so her paper is primarily relevant to a more productive future phase on the peninsula, if we ever get there. Munro’s and Ballabio’s papers also address in a more general sense how trust can be generated in East Asia. They both agree that the key to

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productive and peaceful change is “reducing North Korea’s sense of insecurity”. For Ballabio, that role might better be played by a more distant, neutral, impartial actor such as the government of Italy, or the track two institutions that are a part of its society. For Munro, the key role falls primarily to China, or China and the United States. Munro ends his paper with a call for China to seize the opportunity to co-operate more fully with its neighbours and partners among the five permanent members (P5) of the United Nations Security Council, and finally persuade North Korea to come into the fold. He does not see a cooperative security mechanism such as that currently offered by the ARF as very promising, even though the emphasis is on reassurance, inclusion and consensus within that body. His eggs are in the China basket. What I would like him to ponder is how improved bilateral relations between China and its neighbours Japan and South Korea will affect the thinking in North Korea. The Chinese seem to believe that if they vastly improve relations with Japan and the ROK this might make the North even more desperate and enhance its feelings of isolation. China, for various motives, has tried to keep lines open with the North. Thus, in its view, strengthening yet further its relations with North Korea’s enemies, or other members of the P5, might not be the way forward. So what do we know about China’s intentions, perceptions and moti­ vations? Here we turn to Nele Noesselt’s instructive paper, which debates one of the critical questions of our time: what does China’s rise to great power status portend for regional and global order? She investigates this via expectations generated by core IR theories, on the basis of Chinesegenerated analysis (including those Chinese scholars who focus on the domestic constraints on China’s goals), and close reading of China’s Defence White Papers, which have been produced every two years since 1994. Rather than commenting on all aspects of this paper, I focus on the section where she begins to draw these various sections together and begins to outline China’s security framework. According to Noesselt, China’s understandings of security, power and interest have evolved in interesting (and potentially fruitful) ways, at least at the rhetorical level. Its notion of power is comprehensive, and includes the idea of soft power, with its emphasis on persuasion, and getting others to want what you want, without using coercive means. She states that China’s focus has shifted from traditional security to non-traditional security concerns; and there is a stated recognition that true security can only be achieved through multilateral co-operative security mechanisms (hence its more



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active role in UN Peace Keeping Operations, at the ARF, and within other multilateralist endeavours). But what she also suggests is that it is a relabelling of Chinese security concerns that is going on—a desire to project a particular identity— rather than a fundamental change of belief about what constitutes real security or the full adoption of a new identity. It will not support bodies with supranational elements, or pooled sovereignty, she states. It is actually focused on national interest rather than milieu goals or more solidarist interests, and its main desire is to stop sanctions against it or attempts to balance its rising power. This implies that, with China an important actor in East Asia, we are going to continue to have regional mechanisms and organisations that are modest in their aims and that emphasise dialogue over problem-solving. A collective security arrangement is nowhere in sight in this vision, given that states have to agree in advance that they will respond to aggression from wherever it emerges and not according to their own particular interests. What does this suggest for the North Korean–South Korean relationship then, or for regional order, or for security mechanisms in East Asia? At the least, this implies a deep tension in the Chinese position, where it has identified itself (for example) as a supporter of the nuclear nonproliferation regime; it has ruled out the use of force for settling issues in dispute (as seen in its signature of TAC and its Defence White Papers);4 and it has supported ideas of co-operative security. Yet we know also that China is reluctant to follow through entirely on the logic of these positions: it is held back from developing a common regional position on North Korea by its fears of a North Korean collapse and its concerns about a Korea unified under leaders in alliance with the United States. The sinking of the South Korean ship, the Cheonan, is very instructive in this regard. There appears to have been some division inside China as to how to respond to this: whether to recognise that condemning North Korea would simply add to the latter’s sense of insecurity, might even tip the balance in favour of those waiting to take over from Kim Jong Il, and thus would be counter-productive in terms of regime stability and lead to a further acceleration of the nuclear weapons programme. But, on the other hand, there is the realisation that some form of condemnation has to take place in order to make credible China’s identity of responsible 4 As ever, Taiwan is an exception where use of force is concerned, given that it is a “domestic matter”, according to China, and the threat of the use of force is meant to deter a formal Taiwanese declaration of independence.

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state and claim that the use of force, except in circumstances of selfdefence, is illegitimate in current world politics; that a nuclear-armed DPRK cannot be allowed to stand, given that China is on record as supporting the nuclear non-proliferation regime. That has been a feature of its ‘harmonious world’ rhetoric, and is in danger of being undermined by its failure to come out fully in support of those who feel most threatened by North Korea’s conventional and nuclear power. So, I agree with those papers that suggest that China is a key player and that we need approaches that persuade that country to adopt a larger conception of its interests in this matter. But China is caught between its domestic and larger regional and global interests, and like all other countries, is heavily stymied by an unwillingness in North Korea to be reconciled with its neighbours, largely born out of regime fragility and succession issues. The most we can hope for is the restarting of some form of political dialogue that helps to contain the range of tensions that will occur over the next few years. Engagement in contingency planning is also an imperative. The establishment of a co-operative security mechanism is a long way off for Northeast Asia. Collective security is far too demanding, as it is in most other places of the world too.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF EAST ASIA: STILL A LEADER? David C. Kang and Leif-Eric Easley Although the United States has been the predominant leader in East Asia for the past sixty-five years, the past decade has raised increasing doubts about whether it will continue in its leadership role.1 China’s domestic consolidation and international emergence provide perhaps the most vivid example of the potential challenge to US leadership in East Asia. Moreover, the region has changed in many ways since the end of the Second World War, judging from the remarkable economic success and also the growing political stability of many countries in the area. At the same time, the US is increasingly preoccupied with events both at home and in other parts of the world, and it is not clear that it has the commitment or the capability to continue its leadership role in East Asia. Given its global concerns—from financial stability to Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq—it is difficult for the United States to make East Asia its top priority. In terms of the capacity to lead, the country faces serious resourcedemanding challenges at home including unemployment and economic recovery, debts and deficits, entitlements and health care, energy and the environment, education, and so on. While all countries in the region desire more US involvement and attention, they also are increasingly crafting security and economic arrangements on their own. The United States thus faces a difficult challenge—how to remain effectively involved in a region that is rapidly transforming, often without US action or involvement.2 However, global and East Asian international relations remain dominated by ideas, institutions and norms developed in the West, and the United States remains the most widely accepted global representative of those ideas. The concept of leadership necessarily implies that there are

1 Kishore Mahbubani: “The US Risks Losing Asia,” Global Asia 2, no. 2 (Fall 2007), pp. 16–23; Yoichi Funabashi, “Power of Ideas: The US is Losing its Edge,” Global Asia 2, no. 2 (Fall 2007). 2 Michael Mastanduno, “Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and Security Order in Asia,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: instrumental and normative features (Stanford, 2003), pp. 141–170; G. John Ikenberry, “American hegemony and East Asian Order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 3 (September 2004), pp. 353–367.

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followers, and implies also that there exists a recognised social rank-order that places leaders above followers. The two are not equal in voice, responsibility, standing or influence. Leadership can only emerge if there is some level of consensus on what comprises leadership and who gets to lead. That is, leadership is inherently a social phenomenon, and whether and why some states may be willing to follow is as important a question as why other states wish to lead. The concept of leadership incorporates ideas about ‘soft’ or ‘smart’ power, changing nationalisms, regional integration, and how publics and governments view their own and other countries’ places in the region.3 Whether the United States can lead in the Asian century is an open question without a clear answer.4 However, there is no realistic replacement for the US in East Asia, and one can conclude that the US will remain the most likely leader in East Asia well into the future. Using the concept of leadership provides an interesting lens with which to view the region: the future of East Asian international relations will not depend purely on a military balance of power or on how economic relations develop. Rather, whether the region continues its stability or slides into conflict will largely depend on how states sort out regional leadership, and their views of themselves and others. With this perspective, then, there are three important factors that will affect whether the United States will lead in the so-called Asian century: first, continued US leadership will depend centrally on US goals and commitments to the region. Second, whether the US remains a leader will depend on whether other countries in the region continue to desire its leadership. Finally, the future of US leadership depends on whether any East Asian country—such as China—hopes to replace the US as the regional leader. Leadership in International Relations Although the term ‘leadership’ is prevalent in modern discussions about international relations, scholars have rarely directly explored its meaning within our existing theories of international relations. In fact, standard theories have little room for leadership. Realism in all its variants assumes 3 Joseph Nye, The Powers to Lead, Oxford University Press, 2008. 4 For background on the economic rise of Asia and why many refer to the twenty-first as the ‘Asian Century,’ see Bill Emmott, Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India, and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade, Mariner Books, 2009.



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that states are sovereign and equal, and as Waltz writes, “each state is the equal of all others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey.”5 In fact, realists would view leadership as the precursor to some type of domination, and are likely to predict that states would avoid a leader for fear of making themselves vulnerable. Likewise, formal theories of international relations that emphasise commitment and informational problems are also likely to be sceptical about the possibility of leadership in international relations. After all, states are uncertain about each others’ intentions, and states have incentives to prevaricate. Under these conditions, few would take at face value attempts towards leadership by another state, given the difficulties in reliably knowing another state’s intentions and ultimate goals.6 Yet we continue to use the term ‘leadership’, and it is possible to arrive at notions of leadership if we widen slightly our understanding of international politics to include informal hierarchies within the anarchy of international politics. Following Richard Ned Lebow and William Wohlforth among others, we define informal status hierarchy as a rank-order based on an attribute. A hierarchy is an ordinal measure from highest to lowest. Richard Ned Lebow calls status hierarchies “honour systems”, which are inherently relational in nature, arguing that “honour is inseparable from hierarchy…the higher the status, the greater the honour and privileges, but also the more demanding the role and its rules.”7 Lebow notes that: “Hierarchies justify themselves with reference to the principle of fairness; honour worlds have the potential to degenerate into hierarchies based on power and become vehicles for exploitation when actors at the apex fail to carry out their responsibilities.”8 As Andrew Hurrell argues, “policymakers in emerging states are acutely aware of the importance of hierarchy, especially of the social categories, the clubs, the memberships, and the criteria for admission through which hierarchy in international relations operates.”9 Viewed this way, leadership presents perhaps the most prevalent hierarchy in international relations. Indeed, although the Westphalian system is comprised of formally equal units, we see substantial hierarchy even 5 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Waveland Press 2010 (reissue), p. 88. 6 Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization XYZ. 7 Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations, CUP, 2008, ch. 2. 8 Lebow 2008, ch. 2. 9 Andrew Hurrell, “Rising Powers and the Question of Status in International Society,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, NY, 15–18 February 2009, p. 2.

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today. For example, any mention of ‘leadership’ in international relations is an implicit discussion of hierarchy.10 After all, leadership necessarily implies that there are followers, and also implies that there is a rank order that places leaders above followers. The two are not equal in voice, responsibility, standing or influence. Leadership implies more responsibility for leaders than followers, and also implies that the leader has more right or ability to set the course of action for the future than do followers. Thus, debate about the future of ‘US. leadership’, or questions about Japanese or European leadership, all imply a hierarchy of states, with some more influential and respected than others. Purely equal states would not have leadership, they would all simultaneously decide what to do. Leadership is different to military power or economic wealth because it must be given by other states. To paraphrase Lebow: “[Leadership] is a gift, bestowed upon actors by other actors…it has no meaning until it is acknowledged.”11 Critical to this definition of status is then the agreement upon what constitutes leadership, consensus upon how it is achieved, and agreement upon which state can or should be a leader. Leadership is inherently relational, and inherently social. A state has far more control over its military and economic actions than it does over its ability to be a leader. Formal leadership also manifests itself in positions within various organisations, and this is also an element of status: leadership or chairmanship of the IMF, World Bank, UN Security Council membership, and other institutions. Informal leadership is given when countries look to another state for guidance and provision of critical solutions and coordination in complex problems. The Changing US Role in East Asia The past half-century saw the United States deeply involved in East Asian politics and economics, crafting a set of relationships and institutions that clearly reflected its position as the most powerful country in East Asia. 10 The question of leadership is prevalent in the international relations literature. See, for example, Kent Calder, “China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry,” Foreign Affairs (March/ April 2006); Takashi Terada, “Forming an East Asian Community: A site for Japan-China power struggles,” Journal of Japanese Studies 26, no. 1 (May 2006), pp. 5–17; Barack Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2007); Joseph S. Nye, “Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2006); Robert G. Sutter, “China’s Rise: Implications for U.S. Leadership in Asia,” Policy studies, no. 21 (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2006). 11 Lebow, 2008, p. 64, 67.



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During the Cold War, the US generally avoided creating regional institutions, choosing instead to interact with East Asia through a series of bilateral arrangements—the ‘hub and spoke’ model—with countries such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and South Vietnam.12 When US power was at its height during the Cold War, this strategy was largely successful at promoting US interests and fostering growth and stability in the region. Economically, US markets and investment were central to the region’s rapid economic rise. The majority of trade flows were directed from East Asian export-oriented economies into the US consumer market, Japan being perhaps the best example of this trend. Institutionally, US-created or -dominated global institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs—the precursor to the World Trade Organisation) were those that governed East Asian economic relations. At the same time, East Asian countries during the Cold War were generally institutionally weak and economically underdeveloped, emerging as they did from a century of colonialism to attempt to create modern nation states. Many states feared for their survival, facing both internal and external threats. Civil wars, often strongly nationalist, engulfed China, the Korean peninsula and Vietnam, while significant domestic insurgencies plagued the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and other countries. Some countries had experienced centuries of political cohesion, such as Korea or China; but other countries were born modern, in the post-colonial era, such as Indonesia and Malaysia. The relative strength of the United States and the weakness of the East Asian states created a set of conditions in which US goals, ideas and leadership were unavoidable and welcomed by many. However, the Cold War of the 1960s and 1970s is long gone, replaced in East Asia by a region that is economically vibrant, increasingly politically stable, and in which interactions between governments in the region are well established and becoming more numerous. Burma (Myanmar) suffers from a degree of self-isolation, but really only North Korea and Taiwan fear political absorption. US military deployments reached their height in the 1970s, with over half a million soldiers stationed at bases from Japan and South Korea to the Philippines, South Vietnam and Thailand. Today, the United States has permanent military deployments in only two East Asian countries, and the overall number of troops based in the region 12 Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3, Winter 2009/10, pp. 158–196.

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stands at far less than 100,000. Moreover, the US is enduring difficult negotiations over its military bases in Japan.13 Bilateral alliances remain critically important and the US military presence continues to provide reassurance and stability, but mostly via a credible commitment of the US nuclear umbrella and the promise of rapid reaction by US forces. Thus, the role of forward-deployed American troops has evolved from the primary deterrent in East Asia to supplement allies’ conventional deterrence capabilities. Meanwhile, economic growth, not military conflict, has been the hallmark of the past three decades in East Asia. Although US economic ties to the region are deep, it is becoming apparent that China is replacing the United States as the economic centre of gravity in the region. Over the past thirty years, China has surpassed the US as the major trading partner of Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN nations (Figures 1–3). Investment as well is flowing into China in record amounts. What is significant is not just that such a transition has taken place, but the rapidity with which China has emerged to become the locus of economic activity in the region. The United States remains important, of course, both as a final destination for

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many products made in China and the rest of East Asia, and also as a source of investment, innovation and capital. To be truly be a “resident power” in East Asia (Secretary of Defence Robert [SECDEF] Gates, remarks at 2008/09 Shangri-la Dialogues) and for Mr Obama to be “America’s first Pacific president” (Obama’s November 2009 Tokyo speech), the US will need a forward-leaning trade agenda in the Asia-Pacific, perhaps starting with ratifying the Free Trade Agreement with South Korea [KORUS FTA]. The US economy remains key for the region, and US leadership in global institutions from the IMF and WTO to the UN and G20 still has great relevance in East Asia. This said, the United States is not an East Asian nation; rather, it is a global power with regional interests. The US is only intermittently attentive to the region; Washington often sees problems elsewhere in the world as more proximate and urgent than issues in East Asia, such as terrorist groups in the Middle East or financial stability in Europe. The US will intervene in East Asia when it is in its interests to do so—Washington does not believe it must be engaged with every problem in the region. This has implications for regional governments, because East Asian states can expect selective, not unquestioned US involvement.14 Despite limitations, the US remains the most powerful and important country in the world, and thus faces difficult choices in the foreseeable future. It can attempt to remain the region’s leader, but this will require more sustained attention to the region and a more equal relationship with many countries than has existed in the past. US leaders and the American public have not come to a definitive conclusion about their long-term goals in East Asia—some hope the US will not need to be as involved, while others argue it is central to American interests to remain deeply engaged in Asia.15 East Asian Regional States Want More US Attention Just as important as whether the United States wants to be a leader is the question of whether other countries are willing to follow. East Asian states, including even North Korea, want more, not less, attention from the US, as revealed in North Korea’s consistently stated desire for direct bilateral 14 Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Cornell University Press, 2005). 15 Lake, David A. 2006. “American Hegemony and the Future of East-West Relations.” International Studies Perspectives 7: 23–30.



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talks with the US.16 The benefits from having good relations with the United States are substantial. Furthermore, no East Asian state in the region, even China, wants to exclude the US from the region. For example, at the G20 summit in Toronto in June 2010, Hu Jintao welcomed a closer relationship with the United States, saying: “We also want to strengthen the communication and coordination with the United States on major regional and international issues.”17 However, East Asian states have also been moving forward on their own to create regional institutions and relationships in the absence of sustained American initiatives. The end of the Cold War created permissive conditions for states to co-operate more closely with each other, and the rapid economic growth in the region over the past half-century resulted in states both more confident and also increasingly interconnected. One formative event that helped shape contemporary East Asian views of the US leadership was the Asian financial crisis of 1997. That crisis sparked both an awareness of the interconnectedness of the region as well as feelings that the US was not as willing to aid East Asia to the extent that had previously been believed. Following the crisis, many East Asians felt that the US was indifferent to their problems. Although the causes and consequences of the crisis have been hotly debated, it is worth noting that US and East Asian perceptions of these causes and consequences tend to be at odds with each other. American analyses tended to emphasise the poor business practices of East Asian firms and governments (‘crony capitalism’), putting blame for the crisis on the countries themselves.18 In contrast, East Asian analyses emphasised the indifferent attitude of the IMF and the US government in particular as the most important causes of the crisis. Political scientist Donald Emmerson notes that “from within ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations)…Washington was reproached for hostility, or indifference, or both—for torching the region’s economies and then letting them burn”.19 In response, East Asian states have increasingly forged a number of informal and formal agreements that are stitching the region together. 16 Tabassum Zakaria, “North Korea seeking attention with missiles: Biden,” Reuters, 5 July 2009 (http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5641C020090705). 17 Caren Bohan and Patricia Zengerle, “Obama invites China’s Hu for state visit,” Reuters, 26 June 2010 (http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2620875920100627). 18 David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), chapter 7. 19 Donald K. Emmerson, “What do the blind-sided see? Reapproaching regionalism in Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review 18, no. 1 (March 2005), pp. 1–21, 9.

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In 1990, for example, there were only two major regional institutions: APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Council), and ASEAN (which consisted of only six countries). By 2005, ASEAN had expanded to ten countries, and regional states had formed other organisations such as the Chiang Mai initiative for currency swaps among Asian countries (2000); CSCAP (Committee on Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 1993); ACFTA (ASEAN–China Free Trade Area, 2005); ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum, 1994); ASEM (Asia–Europe Meeting, 1995); ASEAN+3 (ASEAN and Japan, China, and South Korea, 1997); and the East Asia Summit (2005). China also initiated, in 1996, the grouping that grew into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which now comprises China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The United States is active in few of these institutions, and indeed the US is participant in only two out of sixty-eight bilateral free trade agreements either concluded or under negotiation in East Asia. South Korea provides an illuminating case study of how the region is changing. The US alliance is the key South Korean political relationship and was central to South Korea’s survival during the 1950s; US influence is pervasive in South Korea, and South Korean citizens flock to the US to study and live. However, Koreans are also increasingly going to China. In 2010, according to data from the Institute of International Education, 25.7 percent of all foreign students in China came from South Korea, or almost 68,000 South Korean students This number is similar to the 70,000 South Korean students currently studying in the United States. These numbers are almost equal, and while the US will continue to remain an important destination for South Korean students, China is clearly also becoming one too. In 2008, over 800,000 South Korean tourists visited the United States; in 2006, 3.9 million South Koreans visited China. The reasons for this are obvious: Korea and China are located next to each other, and thus it is no surprise that there is more travel. But this is exactly the point: China and Korea will inevitably interact in numerous and extensive ways. This should not come as a surprise. Though there are clearly worries in South Korea over the rapid rise of Chinese manufacturing and technological prowess, this concern has not stopped the headlong rush of South Korean firms into China. Nor does the South Korean government resist regional moves— mostly initiated by China—to further both economic integration and open borders. Although it would prefer to implement a free trade agreement with the US first, South Korea has plans to conclude such agreements with India and Europe without waiting for the US.



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Even the US–Japan relationship is changing. After six decades of a close alliance, in which Japan was a committed follower of the US, the election of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has led to friction between the two countries.20 The first DPJ prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, in 2009 called for “more equal Japan–US ties”, and the then party secretary, Ichiro Ozawa, advocated a more even balancing of Japanese relations with the US and China. While the politicians replacing those leaders took a more traditional line on the centrality of US–Japan relations, and there is no doubt the US–Japan alliance will endure, the DPJ is expressing newfound Japanese willingness to debate the future of US leadership in Asia. The stability of the US relationships with South Korea, Japan and Taiwan during the 1970s and 1980s was largely a result of the longenduring political leadership in those countries. In the 1990s, both South Korea and Taiwan experienced democratic transitions, and most recently in Japan the opposition firmly took over the reins of government for the first time in over fifty years. With democracy, changes in government are not only to be expected, but welcomed. Thus it is probably unrealistic to assume that relations will ever be as stable and enduring as they were during the era of military governments in South Korea and Taiwan, or under the old LDP ‘1955 system’ in Japan. From now on, voters and politicians in the East Asian democracies will have to balance the demands of their domestic, immediate needs and their long-term, strategic relations with the US (and increasingly, other countries). East Asian states want US leadership because it is tested and reliable, and they want US participation in the region because such involvement is cost-effective and promotes stability. But regional capitals are not waiting for Washington. East Asian countries are transforming bilateral relationships with America, and regionally are continuing to move forward with economic, cultural, and sometimes even political and military relationships that increasingly do not include the United States. China–US Relations The final issue regarding continued US leadership concerns whether China will emerge to compete with the US for regional leadership. 20 Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani, and Aki Mori, “Electing a New Japanese Security Policy?: Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democratic Party of Japan,” Asia Policy, No. 9, January 2010, pp. 45–66.

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Since the introduction of market reforms in 1978, China has rapidly emerged as a major regional and even global power, averaging over 9 percent economic growth for over three decades. Although China’s economy in 1980 was less than 10 percent of the size of that of the United States, by 2008 it had grown to more than half the size of the US economy and had surpassed Japan, when measured by consumption (Figure 4). Foreign businesses have flocked to invest in China, while Chinese exports have begun to flood world markets. China is modernising its military, has joined numerous regional and international institutions, and is increasingly visible in international politics.21 The world has reacted in two ways to China’s rise. On the one hand, policymakers, business executives and the popular press have marvelled at China’s successes and scrambled to participate in the tremendous economic opportunities that have arisen in the past few decades. Indeed, eight consecutive US presidents have encouraged China’s integration into the global system, from Richard Nixon’s belief that “dealing with Red China…means pulling China back into the world community”, to President GDP($ of US), $trn (2005 PPP) 50 45 40

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21 Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2007); Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007).



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George Bush encouraging “the emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous, and that supports international institutions” and President Obama’s often-quoted line that “the U.S. welcomes a China that is a strong, prosperous and successful member of the international community”. On the other hand, there is increasing concern that the arrival of a new superpower may challenge the US politically and perhaps even lead to military conflict. The US Pentagon’s 2008 assessment of China’s military power concludes that “much uncertainty surrounds China’s future course, in particular in the area of its expanding military power and how that power might be used.”22 Whether China can rise peacefully, or whether it can even continue that rise, is thus one of the major policy and scholarly issues of our time. Today, as China increasingly appears poised to return to its position as the most powerful country in East Asia, there is a corresponding question about whether or not China can enjoy the legitimacy that it once held, or even whether it may attempt to challenge the United States for leadership in East Asia. Will China show restraint, wisdom, and a willingness to provide leadership and stability for the region? Or will it merely use its power to pressure and bully other states? That has not yet become clear, and is the source of other regional states’ uneasiness with China’s rise. While many are willing to give China a chance and wait and see, few take the Chinese government’s statements at face value. Most notable are questions about whether China can adjust itself to the Western international norms and rules that have come to dominate the globe, and whether China will attempt to challenge the position of the US as regional leader. Capitalism, democracy, human rights and other ideas have now become accepted as the international norms and rules of the game, even while Asia’s least common denominator norms—sovereignty and non-interference—are indeed China’s norms and the Anglo-American model of capitalism has been tarnished in 2008–10. While contemporary countries can choose not to follow these norms, to ignore them is to step clearly outside accepted boundaries of contemporary international relations. For example, today few authoritarian states trumpet their authoritarianism with pride; almost all claim to offer some form of democracy and justify their rule on the basis of some special need or circumstance. Similarly, few human rights violators do so with pride; they tend to rationalise their abuses with some other justification or deny them 22 2008 Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf.

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outright. As the twenty-first century gets under way, it is not yet clear how China will fit into this system. The Chinese government and people, with a different history, an authoritarian political system, and current tensions with other countries, have not yet completely accepted or internalised all of these international norms. Thus, more important for future stability than the regional balance of power and whether China continues its economic and political growth may be the question of whether the East Asian states can develop a clear, shared set of beliefs and perceptions about each others’ intentions, and their relative positions in the regional and global order. Particularly important is the question of whether other East Asian states are prepared to grant China the mantle of leadership, with all the legitimacy and responsibility implied in the term. That is, although it is natural for scholars to focus on measurable yardsticks such as economic size, military spending and demographic trajectory, a focus on leadership suggests that the more important factors are the intentions and beliefs states have about each other. By these criteria, China has a long way to go before becoming a leader.23 Although China may already be—or may soon become—the largest economic and military power in East Asia, it has virtually no political legitimacy as a leading state. The difference between China at the height of its hegemony five centuries ago and China today is most clearly reflected in the fact that nobody today thinks China is still the civilisational centre of the world. Although China may have been the source of a long-lasting civilisation in East Asia in the distant past, today it has no more such influence than does modern Greece. That is, ancient Greek ideas and innovations had a central influence on Western civilisation, and Greek concepts continue to be influential today, whether they be democracy, algebra or philosophy. Yet contemporary Greece has no discernible ‘soft power’, and few people look for Greek leadership in international relations. In the same way, few contemporary states or peoples look to China for cultural innovation or for practical solutions to present problems, and although China self-consciously promotes its own soft power, the real question is whether other states and peoples will accept it. Can China ever return to its position of centuries earlier as a centre of cultural and political innovation, where other states admiringly look to China as model, guide and inspiration? It is impossible to predict how 23 David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (Columbia University Press, 2007).



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Chinese beliefs about themselves and their place and role in the world will evolve, and it will depend on an enormous number of factors. There is certainly a grudging respect for Chinese economic accomplishments over the past three decades; but there is just as much wariness about Chinese cultural and political beliefs. Will Chinese nationalism become brittle, confrontational, insecure and defensive? Or will it eventually return to the self-confidence of centuries ago? The Chinese people—as evidenced by the highly contentious response to protests about Tibet in the spring and summer of 2008—show that they are far from comfortable with their own position in the world and how they are perceived by others. Will the Chinese Communist Party cling to its power indefinitely, or will it eventually find a way to craft some type of peaceful transition from authoritarianism? Chinese society and its views about itself, its government and China’s relations with its neighbours are all still in flux, and as yet have not achieved the stability that would allow us to make conclusions about the future with confidence. Turning to other East Asian states, how and whether they accept China will depend on their own beliefs about themselves and their relations with China. For example, although few Japanese fear another great power war in East Asia, the Japanese are used to seeing themselves as a leader in the region and the most important Asian country. Whether Japanese can adjust to an increasingly important China, and how the two countries come to view each other, will have enduring repercussions for regional stability. Will Japan and China be ‘co-leaders’ in East Asia or will Japan accede to being second? As to Korea and Vietnam, recent history has radically altered their relations with Beijing, despite their long histories as its close followers. New nationalist histories in both Korea and Vietnam no longer emphasise their cultural debt, but rather their difference, and in some ways their superiority, to China. Whether these two countries can live comfortably in the shadow of their big neighbour or whether they seek an equivalent status, and how they manage their relations with the US and Europe will be central to stability in the future. Conclusion: US Leadership Nested in Asian Regionalism Given the central place of the United States, even in the changing international system, and given Asian neighbours’ concerns about Chinese leadership, there is almost no chance that China will become the unquestioned hegemon in East Asia in the foreseeable future. The US—even as it adjusts

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to changing circumstances—is not going to disappear from the region. It remains too materially powerful, and US-championed ideas have become too deeply accepted around the globe, for the country not to be central to the region’s economic and political life. The Cheonan incident, in which North Korea is accused of sinking a South Korean naval ship in March 2010, re-emphasised the demand for a US presence and engagement in a difficult neighbourhood. It appears likely that US leadership will remain an important part of East Asia’s international relations and collective security, at least for South Korea and Japan, and probably with other countries in the region. Perhaps the more important question is whether the United States can continue to be an active leader in Asia, with the very real problems facing it at home and abroad, and the insistence from countries across the globe that it pay attention to their region. There is no clear answer to that question, and while East Asian states generally desire US leadership, they are also slowly and fitfully forging ahead to create regional order on their own, as well.

THE ROLE OF JAPAN IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF EAST ASIA John Swenson-Wright Introduction Japan’s post-war involvement in East Asia has, as has so often been observed, been conditioned by the past. The legacy of the Second World War, whether in the form of contentious reparations settlements or disagreements over how best to apportion blame and responsibility for Japanese military expansion in the 1930s, has discouraged post-war Japanese governments from pursuing an assertive, high-profile leadership role in the region. Instead, Japan relied throughout the Cold War upon the strategic reassurance and guarantees provided by the United States, while focusing on promoting its economic development at home, consistent with the political vision of Yoshida Shigeru, Japan’s early post-war leader and in many ways the architect of Japanese post-war diplomacy. Over time, as Japan became more closely integrated into international society, especially following its accession to the United Nations in 1956, this approach took on a more explicitly conditional character—a hedging strategy in which Japan’s leaders offset their explicit Cold War alignment with the US with a more nominally politically independent stance expressed through the internationalism of the UN. Some of this reflected a pragmatic desire by Japan’s elites to maximise their policy options; some also reflected genuine ambivalence about Japan’s post-war alignments, indicative of a long-standing and unresolved debate over whether Japan should define itself as an Asian or a Western nation. This familiar and frequently emotional debate, symbolised by the phrase “datsu-a, nyu-o” (‘abandoning Asia and joining the West’), coined by the nineteenth-century intellectual Yukichi Fukuzawa, explains in part the difficulty that Japanese governments have had in defining their regional priorities in post-1945 Asia. Japan’s pragmatic elites have, in keeping with the uncertainty associated with this unresolved debate, pursued a regionally differentiated approach. In Northeast Asia, Japanese policy has been conditioned above all by security fears arising from the Korean War and the Soviet military

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presence in the Far East (intensified especially after the late 1970s and the invasion of Afghanistan), as well as by the long-standing ideological and political challenge posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the dispute over Taiwan. In this context, Japan’s leaders have viewed international relations in the region primarily through the prism of bilateral security alliances, most notably the US–Japan partnership. The need for this focus on the relationship with the United States was all the more pressing, given the absence of any credible collective security structures in Northeast Asia comparable to NATO in Western Europe. Added to this has been the role of historical animosities, mainly the legacy of pre-war colonialism, which prevented the United States from effecting sustained and substantial security colla­ boration between its two primary regional allies, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. Consequently, Japan’s approach to Northeast Asia remained broadly fixed by the Cold War narrative framework, despite Japan’s normalisation of relations with nominal friends (ROK in 1965) and adversaries (China, first in 1972 and then more decisively in 1978). In Southeast Asia, by contrast, Japan adopted a more flexible, creative and ultimately more ambitious diplomatic agenda, symbolised by its support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its articulation of the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977. Central to this approach was the willingness of Japanese officials to use Japan’s substantial economic resources not only to promote its trade and investment interests but also to foster regional stability. Since the ending of the Cold War in the 1990s, and especially within the first decade of the twenty-first century, a succession of Japanese prime ministers, beginning most strikingly with Jun’ichiro Koizumi in 2001, have sought to embrace a more explicitly strategic approach to foreign policy formulation in general, but also in terms of the country’s approach towards East Asia. In the process, some of the sub-regional differences in Japan’s foreign policy have diminished, opening the door to active co-operation with a range of diplomatic partners, both states and non-state actors, that appears to be subtly modifying Japan’s traditional reliance on the United States. Propelling the government in this direction has been a number of new and important regional and global developments. These include: • Japanese elite-level frustration with Japan’s perceived exclusion from Asia, or at least its limited influence in the region • Political and generational change in Japan, importantly the election in August 2009 of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) under the



japan in the international relations of east asia107 leadership of Yukio Hatoyama. The foreign policy rhetoric of the new administration suggested at first glance and somewhat dramatically that Japan was breaking from the past, seeking to turn towards Asia and away from the United States • New organisational opportunities in Asia, including the reviving of old institutions and talk of possible new modes of co-operation, whether bilateral, mini- or multilateral. This change is part of a new debate over Asian regionalism amongst policy-makers and academics, one that remains contentious but which suggests, in the face of new pressing global and regional economic and political challenges, that the mechanisms and opportunities for promoting security in East Asia may be changing in ways that will enhance the policy options for states such as Japan.

The following analysis explores some of these historical themes as well as identifying explicitly the forces shaping the policies of the current DPJ administration and considers whether we are likely to witness a radical re-orientation of Japan’s diplomacy consistent with the rhetoric of the new Hatoyama government. For now, the likelihood of fundamental change seems exaggerated. The common interests of the US–Japan alliance will keep the relationship between the United States and Japan at the centre of Japan’s regional and global diplomacy, but not in a way that precludes important and innovative institutional adaptation. That there is pressure for change and some risk of bilateral decoupling is confirmed by the vigorous efforts of the Obama administration to sustain and bolster its ties with Japan, most evident through the frequent visits to the region by both the president and the US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton.1 Japan’s leaders for their part, while keen to find a new path, have yet to settle on a clear and coherent approach towards East Asia that will allow the country to maximise its national interests. Nonetheless, the extent of strategic soul-searching that has taken place since the ending of the Cold War and the post-9/11 environment, demonstrates that both the need and arguably the desire to change are very real. Whether the country has the means—in terms of both practical resources and political maturity—to do so coherently is another matter.

1 John Swenson-Wright, “East Asia: Searching for Consistency,” in Robin Niblett, ed., America and a Changed World. A Question of Leadership (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 74–77.

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Japan’s policy challenges in East Asia are multiple and varied. They are both long-standing and new, both conventional and unconventional, and a function of both familiar inter-state rivalry as well as the emergence of novel security challenges post- 9/11, involving a range of non-traditional security threats that encompass climate change, mass migration, domestic instability in states such as Thailand, piracy and terrorism, and the impact of natural disasters. A limited, but not exhaustive consideration of some of these highlights the pressures and substantive difficulties confronting Japan’s politicians and bureaucrats in shaping Japan’s relations with the region.  The DPRK Nuclear Challenge Of the traditional threats, the most striking is of course the challenge posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), nuclear, and increasingly belligerent. The DPRK’s two nuclear tests of October 2006 and May 2009 and a series of missile or ‘satellite’ launches into the Sea of Japan, the most recent in April and July 2009, have all reinforced Japan’s sense of vulnerability. Added to this was the inflamed situation following the sinking of the Cheonan on 26 March 2010, which once again brought the region to the brink of crisis—with talk of renewed tensions and the risk of armed conflict generating concern among governments as well as sending stock markets plunging both within and outside the region. Since the mid-1990s, and the first nuclear crisis of 1993/4, Japan’s security planners and politicians have been acutely conscious of the danger posed primarily (from Japan’s perspective) by the ballistic missile threat from the DPRK, as well as the existential threat of a nuclear North Korea and the wider challenges associated with the risk of nuclear proliferation. The response to this, on the part of Japan’s politicians, has been both creative and in some cases politically ambitious if not courageous. Prime Minister Koizumi demonstrated no small measure of political bravery in seeking to open the door to normalisation in 2002 and 2004. His failure to seal the deal with the North was largely a consequence of the domestic blow-back from a Japanese public opinion fixated on the fate of a handful of Japanese citizens abducted in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as a willingness on the part of some of Koizumi’s successors, most notably Shinzo Abe, to play to the public gallery by exploiting the abduction problem (rachi mondai) to bolster their standing (and by extension their electoral prospects) amongst conservative voters.



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In considering this issue, perhaps the key point to keep in mind is the potential role that Japan might come to play in any future settlement, assuming that some form of accommodation might be reached. Of all the principal actors involved in the Six Party Talks process, it is Japan that—as the world’s second largest economy—is arguably best placed (notwithstanding Lee Myung-bak’s talk of a ‘Grand Bargain’ with the DPRK) to offer a substantial package of assistance to the North. Just as in 1965, when Japanese financial assistance to the government of Park Chung-hee helped, as part of diplomatic normalisation, to lay the foundations for the ROK’s remarkable pattern of post-war economic growth, so too a comparable deal with the North—approaching anywhere between US$5 and $10 billion—could have substantial impact in shaping the prospects for future economic recovery by the DPRK and any hope of the regime becoming successfully reintegrated within East Asia. However, despite this very substantial carrot of potential economic aid, there is little sign that the necessary conditions can be secured to allow such a pack­ age  of assistance to be negotiated. If anything, the DPRK appears more committed than ever to holding on to its nuclear deterrent, and public opinion in Japan remains if anything even more resolutely obdurate on the abductions question—a point thrown into relief by renewed calls within Japan for further economic sanctions against the DPRK, and the current domestic controversy surrounding proposals to extend the government’s generous package of public fee waivers to schools administered by Chosen Soren, the pro-DPRK association of North Korean residents in Japan.2 With Japan having just assumed the important position as head of the UN Security Council, the Hatoyama administration will undoubtedly play a critical role in shaping the international community’s response to the Cheonan crisis and in this context, there is little reason to anticipate any new radical diplomatic overture from Japan to the DPRK.  The China ‘Threat’ Japanese concerns regarding the DPRK have their roots in anxieties surrounding the actions of a fundamentally weak and defensive regime potentially inclined to respond precipitously by lashing out against its neighbours with possibly catastrophic destructive force. In the case of China, however, Tokyo’s concerns have been far more nuanced, reflecting 2 David Kang and Ji-Young Lee, “Japan-Korea Relations: Same as It Ever Was,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 12, No. 1, April 2010, p. 109. Available at: http://csis.org/files/ publication/1001q.pdf.

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the ambivalence of Japanese government and private sector representatives, who recognise that China’s rapid economic growth presents Japan with both opportunities and challenges. In the security context, this fear has been concentrated in the first instance on the steady expansion of Chinese military spending—a twoyear pattern of double digit growth (at least until 2010, when Beijing announced an official defence budget of 7.5 percent) that has encouraged the Japanese defence community to routinely label China as a “potential threat” to Japanese security interests. Much of this nervousness can be traced back to the mid-1990s and China’s two nuclear tests of 1995, its provocative military exercises in the Taiwan strait in 1996, the continuing stand-off over territorial claims to the Senkaku islands, and regular incursions by Chinese vessels into Japanese waters on so-called scientific research exercises.3 Such developments are consistent with a narrative that sees China as intent on developing a credible blue-water naval presence, an aspiration reflected in China’s recent announcement of plans to construct two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and its focus on constructing new harbour facilities with Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Pakistan. Fundamentally, such worries reflect Japanese anxieties regarding China’s long-term intentions, as well as its actual capabilities. Much in the way that Americans in the 1980s worried about the emergence of Japan as a trade and economic competitor that threatened to eclipse US global political influence, popular opinion in Japan has often tended to frame the relationship in emotive, zero-sum terms, assuming that China will eventually supersede Japan both regionally and globally and that rivalry rather than co-operation will form the basis of any future relationship. One expression of this view was provided by the Chinese leadership’s efforts to thwart Japanese attempts in 2005/6 to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council—a particularly vexatious issue for Japanese officials who have long argued that their substantial contribution to the UN budget (averaging some 20 percent) entitles Japan to a seat at the top diplomatic table. This negative perception of China has also been fuelled by unresolved tensions over contentious Japanese history books and by qualified or seemingly insincere apologies by past Japanese leaders for Japan’s wartime actions. 3 Jun Tsunekawa, “Toward a Stable Relationship between Japan and China: From a Bilateral to a Multilateral Approach,” in Masafumi Iida, ed., NIDS Joint Research Series No. 3. China’s Shift. Global Strategy of the Rising Power (Tokyo: National Institute of Defense Studies, 2009), p. 103. Available at: http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/ joint_research/series3/series3.html.



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Individual leaders, it is clear, have often had a decisive role in blocking or limiting the opportunities for national reconciliation. Strikingly, for example, in November 1998 President Jiang Zemin’s much-heralded summit meeting in Tokyo foundered on a bitter disagreement over the language of the official communiqué and the inability of the Japanese side to provide the Chinese with a written apology for the excesses of the pre-war era. Similarly, former Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro’s controversial and repeated visits to Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine and the Chinese populist backlash, spurred in part by internet-driven anti-Japanese campaigns, all helped to provoke large-scale and often violent anti-Japanese riots in a number of major Chinese cities in 2004 and 2005.4 Engaging with ASEAN Of course, Japan’s anxiety is not purely a function of contentious historical issues or actions that should be viewed as unduly combative or essentially hostile. In some cases, the friction between the two countries reflects a simple jockeying for influence between two states that share common regional aspirations. Nowhere is this clearer, perhaps, than in Southeast Asia, where China’s growing political and economic presence has increasingly been seen by many Japanese officials as challenging Japan’s post-war position of local influence, one that Tokyo had worked steadily to establish and expand from the late 1960s onwards. Japan’s post-war role in Southeast Asia can be seen in the context of a variety of initiatives. In the immediate aftermath of the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, much of Japan’s early engagement with countries of the region was filtered through the lens of reparations settlements—an issue that provided the rationale for Japanese companies to assist in the development of power resources and social infrastructure in the region. Early post-war prime ministers, most notably Nobusuke Kishi in the late 1950s, were quick to recognise the long-term importance of the region for Japan’s economic development. At the same time, the promotion of economic relations was not driven exclusively by a narrowly mercantilist outlook. As writers such as Nishihara Masashi have argued,5 4 Masafumi Iida, “Japan-China Relations in East Asia: Rivals or Partners?” in Masafumi Iida, ed., NIDS Joint Research Series No. 3. China’s Shift. Global Strategy of the Rising Power (Tokyo: National Institute of Defense Studies, 2009), p. 129. Available at: http://www.nids .go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series3/series3.html. 5 See, for example, Masashi Nishihara, Japanese and Sukarno’s Indonesia: Tokyo-Jakarta Relations, 1951–66 (Hawai’i: University of Hawai’i Press, 1986).

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there was a shrewd recognition by Japan’s leaders, even at this relatively early stage, of the opportunities of leveraging economic engagement into the promotion of political stability, an issue of importance at all stages of the Cold War, but especially as the conflict in Indochina intensified during the 1960s. It was this awareness that encouraged Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda and his successor Eisaku Sato to deploy Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) as a tool with which to limit the expansion of Commu­ nist, and in particular Chinese Communist, influence in the region. The importance of aid and Japan’s growing presence in the region was aptly symbolised by Japan’s formative role in establishing the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1966—an early sign of Tokyo’s ability, albeit in a relatively understated manner, to play a proactive and constructive role in regional institution-building.6 Of course, aid alone was not the sole means by which Japan’s regional influence expanded over time. The dramatic example of Japan’s success in promoting its unique developmental-stage strategy soon encouraged regional imitators and, for ‘little tigers’ such as Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, offered the opportunity to become part of a ‘flying geese’ model of integrated economic development—a pattern of emulation that found its clearest apotheosis in Mahathir’s famous ‘Look East’ strategy of the early 1980s. Japan’s regional presence was, however, not without contention, particularly as local elites and public opinion reacted against what some saw as Tokyo’s over-reliance on tied aid and an economic role that some felt to be exploitative. The riots of 1974 in Jakarta and Bangkok in protest against Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit symbolised this discontent and ultimately led to a more explicit effort by Japanese officials to both recalibrate and redefine the basis for Japan’s involvement in the region. This was summed up by the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977, with its focus on equality, the importance of trust-based relations, confirmation of Japan’s rejection of military power, and above all support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.7 ASEAN has remained at the heart of Japan’s approach to Southeast Asia and has found expression in many different contexts, including the 1977

6 Shoji Tomotaka, “Pursuing a Multi-dimensional Relationship: Rising China and Japan’s Southeast Asia Policy”, in Jun Tsunekawa, ed., NIDS Joint Research Series, No. 4. The Rise of China: Responses from Southeast Asia and Japan (Tokyo: National Institute of Defense Studies), p. 160. Available at: http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/joint _research/series4/series4.html. 7 Tomotaka, ibid., p. 161. .



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establishment of the Japan–ASEAN forum, Japanese participation from 1978 in ASEAN foreign ministers’ meetings, critical Japanese support for the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994, and the creation of the Japan–ASEAN summit in 1997. The ODA linkage has also remained important throughout the post-war period, particularly after Prime Minister Ohira’s articulation of the country’s “comprehensive security” doctrine (sogo anzen hosho). While in part a response to renewed burdensharing pressures from the Nixon and Carter administrations in the 1970s and a desire to find a way of engaging Japan proactively in the political and economic dimensions of a freshly renewed Cold War conflict, comprehensive security was also an opportunity to reassert Japan’s commitment to the region and it was no accident that Southeast Asia has long been assigned a special priority in Japan’s ODA strategy.8 Money alone, it should be stressed, has not been the only means of fostering closer ties with the region. Over time, and as the taboo against the overseas deployment of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces has gradually eased, men and materiel have also been usefully deployed to the region, whether in UN peace-keeping operations in Cambodia in the 1990s, or in providing disaster relief following the 2004 tsunami, or since the late 1990s in support for UN-sponsored reconstruction and relief efforts in East Timor. This brief but necessarily selective overview of Japanese involvement in Southeast Asia provides a salutary rebuttal to the criticism that Japan has been a reluctant participant in regional political or security issues, or that its low-profile diplomatic posture has been tantamount to an abnegation of political responsibility. It also helps to explain why Japanese diplomats and politicians have been increasingly concerned at the growth of China’s presence in the region. Since the mid-1990s, the PRC has pursued a series of constructive measures in the region, intended to demonstrate to local states that its interests and policies, whether in the economic, political or security spheres, are neither threatening nor exploitative. This so-called smile diplomacy has been conspicuously successful in reassuring many Southeast Asian nations that Chinese involvement in the region is on balance beneficial rather than harmful. The year 1996 marked the start of a series of rapidly expanding contacts between China and ASEAN, when China joined the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) as one of 8 Ibid., p. 176.

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ASEAN’s dialogue partners; in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China won plaudits locally by providing much-needed credit, export aid and emergency medical assistance to countries hit hardest by the crisis. In 2001, China highlighted its aspiration to expand substantially its economic ties with the region by announcing an understanding with ASEAN to conclude a China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement within ten years—an accord reached in January 2010. China has complemented its economic diplomacy in the security field by reaching an agreement with ASEAN in 2002 that underlined a shared commitment to a peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea. Similarly, in 2003, at the ASEAN plus China summit that year, China and ASEAN issued a joint declaration on a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity.9 For successive Japanese governments, there has been an uncomfortable sense of being overshadowed, if not displaced by an altogether diplo­ matically more agile, focused and proactive political and economic rival. Although Japan has enjoyed some notable successes in the last few years in implementing important bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with a number of countries in the region (for example, with Indonesia, Brunei, Vietnam and the Philippines in 2008) and with ASEAN itself at the end of 2008, there is a sense that Japan has been far too reactive—playing ‘catch up’, responding to initiatives first articulated by China, rather than setting the trade and regional integration agenda itself. This in part reflects domestic politics and the role of agricultural lobbies in Japan, which have made Japanese politicians and some trade bureaucrats wary of international agreements that require substantial economic liberalisation of protected home markets.10 To compensate for this perceived weakness, Japan’s recent prime ministers have gone out of their way to signal, rhetorically at least, their desire to bolster Japan’s regional presence. In 2002, Koizumi called for a new com­ prehensive economic partnership with ASEAN, focusing on co-operation in a wide variety of areas extending beyond “trade and investment, to encompass science and technology, human resource development, and tourism”. Similarly, in August 2007, in a speech in Indonesia, Shinzo Abe ventured into somewhat unusual, politically contentious terrain for a Japanese premier by stressing the importance of co-operation between   9 Ibid., p. 164–169. 10 Amy Searight, “New Challenges, New Vision, Pedestrian Progress,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 12, No. 1, April, 2010, pp. 136–140. Available at: http://csis.org/files/ publication/1001q.pdf.



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Japan and ASEAN in promoting human rights and respect for the rule of law. Most ambitiously of all, Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo, son of former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, sought in late 2008 to both embrace and extend his father’s regionalist agenda, by calling for the creation of a new “inner sea” within the Pacific Ocean, linking the continental and island states of the region in a context in which Japan and ASEAN would co-operate to promote constructive policies on climate change, disaster prevention and disease control.11  Nonstate Actors and Unconventional Security Threats Post-9/11 the challenges presented by non-traditional security threats have increased substantially both globally and regionally. In East Asia, the challenge posed by the Taliban in Afghanistan, by radical Islamist terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, or by separatist groups such as Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Army in the Philippines, have been especially difficult for the international community to confront. Related to this have been the increased concerns associated with nuclear proliferation and the worries about how best to monitor and limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Japan’s official response to these and related challenges demonstrates both the opportunities and limitations faced by recent Japanese administrations. Japan enjoys considerable technical expertise that can be selectively deployed to assist in the dismantling of existing WMD stockpiles. Whether by rendering safe chemical munitions left over from the Second World War in northern China, or in participating in the Star of Hope programme to dismantle former Soviet nuclear submarines, Japan’s scientists and technicians can and do play a vital role. It is relatively easy to imagine how such expertise—financial resources permitting—might be deployed to address present or future security challenges, including, in principle, the challenge of dismantling the DPRK’s nuclear weapons programme. In other areas, however, the political limits to Japan’s policy activism are more striking. Take, for example, Japan’s role in promoting stability in Afghanistan. Under previous Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administrations, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Forces (MSDF) played a key role in providing, in the Indian Ocean, important logistical and fuelling support to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the joint UK/US-led effort to stabilise Afghanistan. MSDF refuelling efforts were authorised and effected 11 Tomotaka, “Pursuing a Multi-dimensional Relationship”, pp. 179–180.

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through passage of an Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, key enabling legislation that was to be re-enacted on a biennial basis. From 2003, however, such efforts faced persistent opposition from the then opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan. In the wake of its loss of control of the Upper House of the Japanese Diet in 2007, the LDP was forced to introduce new legislation, a Special Measures for Refuelling Assistance Bill, passed by a two-thirds Lower House majority to override the opposition of the upper chamber.12 The controversy was important in demonstrating two shortcomings in the Japanese government’s ability to respond to such new, non-traditional security threats: first, the absence of any permanent enabling legislation governing the deployment of the SDF overseas; second, the lack of a clear political consensus at home regarding the role of Japan’s military forces beyond Japan’s shores. Following the transition to the Hatoyama-led DPJ government in August 2009, the SDF’s role in the Indian Ocean was allowed in January 2010 to lapse in favour of a new five-year US$5 billion aid package. This reorientation of the government’s approach represents in some regards a return to a more traditional approach to global and regional security issues, reminiscent of the pre-Koizumi era of the late 1990s. The new government’s strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, embodied in its ‘New Strategy to Counter the Threat of Terrorism’, encompassed a three-fold approach that included providing assistance to the Afghan National Police, assistance in re-integrating anti-government forces into Afghan society, and the provision of rural and agricultural developmental assistance.13 Although this is a strategy that can be defended and justified in conceptually coherent terms, there is a danger that by lowering its manpower commitments in the field and limiting the risk to its military forces of being caught up in actual conflict situations, Japan will appear to be running shy of its international responsibilities. Moreover, legal impediments all too often complicate the efforts of the government to respond to new security challenges both within the region and further afield. At one level, past and present governments have shown a willingness to confront some of these challenges. Japan is, for example, a member of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the multinational

12 National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2010 (Tokyo: NIDS, 2010), p. 247. Available at: http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/e2010 .html. 13 Ibid., pp. 248–49.



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accord intended to restrict the spread of WMD in general and, in particular, the proliferation risks associated with the DPRK. Similarly, since July 2009, when the then Aso government passed new anti-piracy legislation, Japan has shown new resolve in confronting the threat of international piracy. Yet there are peculiarities and limitations associated with such measures that complicate Japan’s ability to align itself with the international community in confronting such threats. Long-standing cabinetlevel rulings prohibiting Japanese forces from participating in collective security actions mean that the SDF can only intervene against pirates threatening Japanese vessels but not those of other countries. Similarly, legislation allowing the Japanese Coast Guard to board and inspect foreign vessels suspected of carrying WMD is very narrowly drawn, so much so that Japanese authorities are only permitted to intercept a ship in international waters when they have reason to believe that a Japanese national is on board and carrying chemical or other hazardous devices, and when they have consent of the country whose flag the vessel flies.14  The Global (and Regional) Economic Crisis Since the onset of the global economic crisis in the summer of 2007, following the collapse of the American subprime market, East Asia has been buffeted by economic pressures that pose their own separate security risks. Early hopes that the region might decouple itself from the downturn in Europe and the US were quickly eclipsed by the evidence of sharp falls in export earnings—averaging a 30 percent fall—and real declines in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) across the region. While China and India have continued to experience healthy growth, Japan saw its real GDP fall by 8 percent, and other developing economies experienced similar contractions.15 In the face of such insecurity, the response of the world’s second largest economy clearly has been a key issue. In some regards, the Japanese reaction has been positive. Mindful of past criticism in the 1980s of having failed to respond swiftly and decisively to previous downturns, the government of Taro Aso was quick to come up with a series of three stimulus plans between 2008 and 2009, “combining new spending and tax total­ ing 12 trillion yen, or about 2% of GDP”.16 However, while potentially of 14 Ibid., pp. 265. 15 Searight, “New Challenges, New Vision, Pedestrian Progress,” p. 126. 16 William W. Grimes, “Japan, the Global Financial Crisis, and the Stability of East Asia,” in Ashley J. Tellis, Andrew Marble, and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 2009–10.

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benefit domestically in helping to stave off bankruptcies and rising unemployment, such plans were not co-ordinated with other regional economies, either with China, Korea or with the US, and the absence of a coherent regional strategy has been a serious shortcoming. The same deficiency has been evident in the provision of international liquidity. Japan moved quickly in February 2009 to offer US$100 billion to the IMF and showed a willingness to work within the G20 framework to deal with the global economic crisis. However, the absence of a coordinated regional strategy was striking. While Japan had played a key role in the Asian financial crisis of 1997 in setting up the Chiang Mai Initiative—a mechanism for providing emergency liquidity through regional swap arrangements—this mechanism has remained largely undeployed in the current crisis. South Korea has, for example, turned to the US Federal Reserve to secure a $30 billion credit line, and even when, by March 2010, Japan, China and South Korea were able to agree on a new initiative—the new Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation—doubts remain about its effectiveness, its continuing dependence on IMF supervision, and whether the new mechanism will provide sufficient capital to deal with any future liquidity shortfall.17 For the new Hatoyama administration such economic challenges are likely to intensify rather than diminish, particularly in the face of worsening economic conditions at home. Official unemployment remains relatively high for Japan at 5.7 percent, government indebtedness is forecast to rise to an eye-watering 200 percent of GDP, and the government’s generous pre-election spending commitments, which include universal child care allowances, increased pensions and government scholarships, as well as pledges to cut taxes for small and medium-sized enterprises, are all set to impose new constraints on what the government is able to do. Compared to recent LDP administrations and the deregulatory focus of the Koizumi government, the DPJ has a distinctly populist approach, and has consistently sought to present itself as promoting equality rather than efficiency.18 In this regard, its appeal to disadvantaged and marginalised groups in society harks back to the pork-barrel politics of the pre-1990s era—an approach that may pay electoral dividends at the ballot-box, Economic Meltdown and Geopolitical Stability (Seattle, Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010), p. 113. 17 Grimes, op. cit., p. 115; Searight, op. cit., p. 128. 18 Michael J. Green, “The Japan-US-China Triangle Under New Management,” Freeman Report, October 2009 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009). Available at: http://csis.org/publication/freeman-report-october-2009-vol-7-no-10.



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but which is financially very difficult to sustain. Add to this the perennial structural and demographic challenges faced by Japan, with the country’s population forecast to fall by as much as 30 percent by 2055, a drop from 130 million to 89 million people, and it is easy to see why the government’s policy options—both at home and abroad—are likely to narrow rather than expand over time. Political Opportunities for the DPJ: A New Foreign Policy Agenda for a New Government? Ostensibly, the landslide electoral success of the DPJ in the Lower House elections of August 2009 presaged a major reorientation of Japan’s foreign policy priorities. The LDP had its ranks decimated, losing some 60 percent of its seats and seeing its representation in the Lower House cut from 300 to a mere 119. By contrast, the DPJ secured some 65 percent of the seats, garnering 311 out of 480 seats, and in alignment with its two original coalition partners, the People’s New Party (PNP), and the left of centre Social Democratic Party (SDP), picked up another ten seats. A strong showing here, coupled with a small but secure majority in the Upper House, where the DPJ and the PNP together hold 122 out of 242 seats, has ensured that the government should not need to worry about holding onto its support in parliament or about potentially losing a non-confidence vote.19 However, to see this vote as an unambiguous endorsement of the DPJ and therefore an indication of the Japanese public’s desire for the policies set out in the DPJ’s election manifestos would be to overlook the depth of accumulated resentment towards the LDP. Opinion polls from the election suggest that the voters were motivated more by a desire to oust the old guard, rather than a desire actively to embrace a new agenda for reform. As such they voted against the LDP, rather than for the DPJ.20 Taken at face value, Hatoyama’s vision for Japan has appeared to represent a sharp break from the past. Centred around two core themes of fostering a more equal relationship with the United States, and reorienting Japan’s foreign policy towards East Asia, Hatoyama’s approach hinted at an ambitious, constructive programme, defined in part by the novel 19 Emma Chanlett-Avery, William H. Cooper & Mark E. Manyin, Japan-US Relations: Issues for Congress, February 24, 2010 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service), p. 17. 20 Michael J. Green, “Japan’s Confused Revolution,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 1, January 2010, p. 8.

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concept of ‘amity’ or yuai and bolstered by calls for the realisation of a new East Asian Community. In many respects, the new approach borrowed explicitly from the policy preferences of Hatoyama’s grandfather, Hatoyama Ichiro, who in the mid-1950s sought during his two tenures as prime minister to lessen Japan’s dependence on the United States in favour of a more Asia-centric diplomacy, premised on a desire (ultimately only partially fulfilled) to normalise relations with Japan’s Russian and Chinese Communist neighbours. Four key signature issues21 defined the tilt away from Washington, including: • Revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governing the legal status and treatment of US forces in Japan • Reducing Japanese Host-Nation Support for US forces in Japan—at some US$4 billion per annum, a substantial contribution • Ending MSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean as part of Operation Enduring Freedom • Scrapping a 2006 US–Japan agreement to redeploy US marines based at Futenma air base, Okinawa, to a new location within the same prefecture. Hatoyama, in an effort before the election to win the support of disgruntled Okinawa residents, gave an undertaking to push for the redeployment of the marines out of Okinawa and potentially also outside of Japan Hatoyama’s policy assertiveness—while rhetorically ambitious—has, however, quickly run into practical obstacles, most strikingly over the issue of Okinawa. Despite pledging to scrap the original Futenma relocation plans, the prime minister was forced in May 2010 to resile from his ambitious plans in the face of opposition from the United States and the realities of alliance politics—a condition made all the more pressing in light of the renewed strategic uncertainty associated with the Korean peninsula following the Cheonan incident. The same has been true more generally of policy towards the United States. In contrast to the electoral message of Japan distancing itself from the US, Japan’s new foreign minister, Katsuya Okada, was quick to point out to senior US officials shortly after taking office the need to sustain the 21 For an extended discussion of the evolution of the DPJ’s foreign policy posture, see Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani & Aki Mori, “Electing a New Japanese Security Policy? Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democratic Party of Japan,” Asia Policy 9, January 2010. Available at: http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=394.



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bilateral alliance, noting that: “The important thing is that Japan-US relations continue and deepen for another thirty, fifty years and that it becomes deeper.” Similarly, the prime minister’s bold talk of a renewed and reintegrated East Asian Community has been undermined in part by its vagueness and by the absence of any coherent or substantive proposals on how best to promote such a goal, as well as by an apparent lack of consensus within the government on whether the United States should or should not be part of such a community. The cost of such inconsistency and confusion has been high electorally, with the DPJ experiencing a haemorrhaging of support at home. In a mere ten months, Hatoyama’s own popularity and that of the cabinet he led, dropped from a high of 71 percent in August 2009 to an anaemic 17 percent in June 2010,22 not much higher than the dismal 13 percent support levels of the previous Aso administration. The Okinawa issue was especially damaging, prompting the loss from the government coalition of its small, but symbolically important partner, the Social Democratic Party, and raising doubts about Hatoyama’s political authority and the prospects of his continuing as leader in the run-up to 2010’s important July Upper House elections, a contest in which the DPJ expects to fare badly. In distinguishing between the rhetorical and substantive changes in foreign policy that have taken place following the advent of the new DPJ government, it is worth noting that the ‘Asianist’ theme in current Japanese foreign policy is consistent with past initiatives under previous administrations. Prime ministers Abe, Fukuda and Aso all, in different ways, sought to recalibrate and re-emphasise Japan’s links with its neighbours, particularly with China and South Korea, and sought to develop a more flexible set of regional security partnerships to complement Japan’s traditional alliance with the United States. The more important long-term shift in Japan’s foreign policy practice is likely to emerge institutionally, via the shift in political authority away from the bureaucracy and towards career politicians—although even here, many of the current changes mirror trends set in train by previous LDP administrations. Key developments in this context have been the expansion of personal advisers in the Kantei, (the Prime Minister’s office), the establishment of a new National Strategy Unit (Kokka Senryaku

22 “Hatoyama clings to post as calls grow for him to quit,” Asahi Shinbun, 2 June 2010, Available at: http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201006010486.html.

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Kyoku), and the ending of the tradition of co-ordinated and regular meetings of the government’s administrative vice-ministers (Jimu jikan kaigi), the government’s most senior civil servants.23 This change of emphasis symbolises the growing authority of the political class, a change prompted in part by growing public disaffection with the bureaucracy. As a populist measure likely to generate political dividends, the approach has some merit, but it also entails substantive policy risks as Japan’s political leaders find themselves deprived of the expert practical advice of a knowledgeable and professionally accomplished civil service. Mechanisms for Enhancing Japan’s Policy Flexibility in East Asia For the immediate future, the US–Japan relationship is likely to remain at the heart of Japan’s regional and global diplomacy. Some US commentators, most strikingly Kenneth Pyle and Michael Finnegan,24 have stressed the limitations of the bilateral relationship and the tensions between Japan and the United States, arguing (in Finnegan’s case) for a more limited, strictly defensive role for Japan, one which eschews the ambitious regional and global agenda associated with the bilateral defence dialogue in recent years. Undoubtedly recent bilateral tensions over Okinawa, over Japanese access to new US F-22 fighter plane technology, over the DPJ’s disclosure of past secret diplomatic understandings governing the deployment of nuclear weapons in Japan, as well as growing disquiet amongst Japanese defence planners about the reliability of US extended deterrence in Asia in the wake of the Obama administration’s ambitious push for global nuclear disarmament, have all placed new strains on the alliance. However, it is important to note how far the security and political relationship between the two countries has developed since the ending of the Cold War. From the passage of the 1997 US–Japan Defence Guidelines, to the establishment of the two-plus-two consultative process at the turn of the millennium, through to the promulgation of the 2006 United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, there has been an incremental enhancement of the alliance, including substantive improvement in

23 Michael J. Green, “Japan’s Confused Revolution”, op. cit., p. 9. 24 Kenneth B. Pyle, “Troubled Alliance”; Michael Finnegan, “Return to Basics: Recalibrating the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance,” both in Asia Policy 10, July, 2010. Available at: http://www.nbr.org/Publications/issue.aspx?id=203.



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joint operational relations between the militaries of the two countries and a renewed stress on flexibility and the co-ordination of the roles and missions of US and Japanese forces.25 It is clear, too, that the Japanese political and military establishment is grappling with the practical question of how to strengthen its security role in Asia. Under the previous Aso administration, the government established in January 2009 a Council on Security and Defence Capabil­ ities, calling for a new “comprehensive, multilayered, and effective” security strategy. As part of this approach, the report advocated enhanced cooperation between Japan and its existing allies, as well as co-operation with other countries in Asia to boost Japan’s security, offset the emergence of new threats, and “maintain and strengthen the international system”. Notwithstanding this focus on outcomes and means, the report suffers from definitional vagueness, nor does it help to clarify the relationship between measures intended to facilitate co-operation and those intended to bolster deterrence in the face of new emerging threats.26 In the immediate future, substantive progress in addressing these concerns is likely to take place in the context of the drafting of Japan’s New National Defence Programme Guidelines, scheduled for completion at the end of 2010. Yet it is difficult to anticipate how far this will move Japan in a more explicitly region-focused direction where defence and security policy more generally are concerned. One notable area of progress in recent years has been the growing emphasis on trilateral co-operation between China, South Korea and Japan. Where once such co-operation took place primarily in the context of the ASEAN Plus Three process, this has now taken on an independent character and there has been a steady expansion in both the range and depth of trilateral co-ordination following the inaugural summit in Fukuoka, Japan, in December 2008. The latest meeting on 29 May 2010 in Jeju [Cheju], South Korea, was striking in terms of the ambition of the participants, symbolised by a new ten-year roadmap entitled ‘The Trilateral 25 See, Kei Koga, “Regionalizing the Japan-US Alliance: Toward the Construction of a Peaceful Transition System in East Asia,” Issues & Insights, Vol. 10, No. 8 (Honolulu, Hawai’i: Pacific Forum, CSIS, 2010), passim. Available at: http://csis.org/publication/issues-insights -vol-10-no-08; John Swenson-Wright, “Contending with regional uncertainty: Japan’s response to contemporary East Asian security challenges,” in Marie Söderberg and Patricia A. Nelson, eds., Japan’s Politics and Economy: Perspectives on Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 27. 26 National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2010 (Tokyo: NIDS, 2010), pp. 251–252. Available at: http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/ e2010.html.

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Cooperation Vision 2020’. This set out areas for co-operation including environmental policies, economic integration, expanded personal and educational exchanges and security enhancement both regionally and internationally. Importantly too, the latest agreement establishes, for the first time, a permanent secretariat for the group to be based in Seoul and with an annual rotating directorship. Some of this improved trilateral co-operation can be attributed to recent improvements in bilateral ties between Japan and the two other partners—the product in part of regular summit meetings, new practical initiatives to manage territorial disputes, as well as the publication of the findings of joint academic bodies set up to examine contentious historical issues. None of this should obscure the important differences that still divide the three countries, but the trajectory for enhanced co-operation for now at least appears to be moving in a positive direction. For Japan, operationalising and prioritising its co-operation with its neighbours will require it to make some difficult choices in terms of allocating its increasingly limited resources (symbolised by declining defence and ODA budgets) to potentially an expanding range of strategic priorities. There are no shortage of political, security and economic frameworks in Asia in which Japan can play an important, and in some cases leading, role. Whether in promoting positive economic development in the Mekong delta, or in chairing the APEC summit in November 2010 in Yokohama, or in pushing for an Asian version of the Organization for Economic Development, Japan can and undoubtedly will remain active. Similarly, new minilateral and bilateral partnerships, most notably Japan’s new security partnerships with Australia and India (agreed respectively in 2007 and 2008), or Japan’s chairmanship of the Asian Senior-level Talks on Nonproliferation (ASTOP),27 all represent new forums in which Japanese politicians and bureaucrats can demonstrate their policy activism. Both within Japan and more widely throughout the region and also in the United States, the preference amongst policy-makers is for a functional, targeted approach, rather than any desire to engage in a radical programme of new institution-building.28 In part, this reflects the frustration with existing institutions—notable, in this context, are the limitations of the Six Party Talks process in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. 27 Hitoshi Tanaka, “Japan’s Foreign Policy and East Asian Regionalism,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 2009. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/project/1352/regional _impulses_in_northeast_asia.html. 28 Ibid., p. 11.



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It also reflects a general sense of institutional fatigue, an acceptance that there has been a proliferation of regional institutions in recent years and an absence of a consensus regionally and internationally on how such bodies should be co-ordinated and how best to determine their respective functions. This poses a fundamental challenge in considering how states such as Japan can best contribute to the difficult task of enhancing regional security. In confronting the North Korean nuclear crisis or the wider range of regional security challenges, there is good reason to assume—on the basis of past precedents—that the Japanese political and policy-making establishment is well equipped to contribute substantively whether in terms of resources and institutional innovations, or the simple deployment of much-needed second-tier human resources and expertise. It is less immediately obvious that Japan’s leaders have the necessary experience or political acumen to play a leading or decisive role in setting the agenda and direction for future security initiatives in the region. As such, and in confronting current and future crises, Japan may have to resign itself to playing a secondary, supporting role. Less immediately obvious is which country is best positioned to seize the initiative in addressing regional security challenges that may prove to be resistant to even the most imaginative and ambitious of collective or co-operative security initiatives.

RUSSIA AND ASIAN INTEGRATION MODELS: THE SCO EXPERIENCE AND IDEAS FOR NORTHEAST ASIA1 Georgy Toloraya Russia’s General Approaches to Asian Security A potential for serious conflict exists in Asia and the Pacific. It was here that the Second World War started (not actually in Europe!) and unlike in Europe its outcome is still not fully agreed on. We witness here record increases in military budgets, the arms trade, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and the growth of non-traditional challenges and threats. Mistrust and lack of understanding between nations are common. The regional political geography is not a set and stable system, and possible conflicts and changes cannot be excluded (take the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan, not to speak of numerous border conflicts). A crisis in inter-Korean relations, started by Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong (Yŏnp’yŏng) Island shelling in 2010 is a vivid example of the need for a new mechanism for region-wide security discussions and problemsolving. However, the existing security architecture dates back to the Cold War era and is based on bilateral alliances. Although we have witnessed the exponential growth of new multilateral organisations, they have yet to become an effective tool for security preservation. What is the reason that the multilateral security architecture in Asia is still far from being finalised? The reasons often cited include: • the heterogeneous nature of the region: different civilisations, ideologies, levels of development • historical problems including territorial disputes • lack of mutual trust, an arms race and military confrontation • the absence of a common denominator for threats and challenges and for state interests • The rise of China and forming of alliances, competing with each other.2 1 Publisher’s Note: Links to websites have been given where appropriate. These were working links at the time of going to press—except where indicated. Please note that due to the ephemeral nature of the internet, these are subject to change at any moment. 2 Promoting Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Findings of the Northeast Asia Security Policy Forum and Its Future—October 2005- vol 11, N 2, December 2006, pp. 14–31.

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At the same time, new tendencies have been at work over the span of the last two decades to increase the importance of the factors that make a regional co-operation mechanism necessary. They include: • an end to ideology-based confrontation after the end of the Cold War, which has provided space for pragmatically based relationships • growing economic interdependence, new globalising information technologies and the need for regionwide multilateral projects (especially in infrastructure, transportation, energy, communications, etc.) • the need to jointly withstand global economic calamities such as the global financial crisis • increasing awareness of the fact that traditional security challenges (military power, the arms race, confidence-building, non-proliferation) should be addressed on a multilateral basis to be satisfactorily solved • new security threats and challenges (trans-border crime, terrorism, infectious diseases, natural disaster control, environmental problems, etc.) • increasing human mobility and uncontrolled migration. It should be noted that the big regional powers (China, Japan) are reluctant to take the lead in these undertakings for fear of fuelling new competition between themselves and throughout the region and of antagonising Asian countries, suspicious of the historical role of the Asian giants and their new aspirations. The closed military alliances with United States participation are viewed with suspicion by many countries of the region. Therefore the most important Asian integration processes so far have put ASEAN in the ‘driver’s seat’ (ASEAN+ 3, East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) etc.) and have placed emphasis on the ‘ASEAN way’: confidence-building, rule by consensus, comfort level, the lowest common denominator approach.3 ASEAN’s ‘driver’s’ role is increasingly being challenged. It was vividly demonstrated by the failure of ARF in 2012 to adopt a common statement because of contradictions between China and ASEAN countries over South China sea issue. ASEAN wishes to reestablish its position. In 2009–10 different new models of regional architecture were discussed. A Japanese proposal was based on an ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6 format with possible US participation; this excluded Russia,

3 Richard W. Hu. China and East Asian Community Building Presentation at Brookings Institution.



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hence Russia’s lukewarm attitude to it. An Australian APC concept called for participation by all the countries of the region, including Russia. The idea of ASEAN+6+2 (US and Russia) seemed to be more practical. Reacting to this in April 2010, the 16th ASEAN summit in Hanoi agreed to consider US and Russian participation in the EAS mechanism. In October 2010, Russia and the US were officially admitted to this forum from 2011. EAS has the potential to become the central element in the Asia-Pacific regional architecture. Speaking of the role of EAS at the forum, the Russian Foreign Minister noted: “So far the Asian security problems were dealt with fragmentarily, mainly with regard to separate regions. Issues like non-proliferation of WMDs, military transparency enhancement, (CBMs) [confidence-building measures] are ‘spread’ over to different dialogue formats. EAS could become a mechanism, which could undertake the task of consolidation of the regional agenda in security area, developing strategic dialogue for its promotion in all the aspects. Security by its essence is indivisible, so a comprehensive, systematic approach is needed for guaranteeing it.”4 At the same time, regional meetings of ministers of defence in the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting, ADMM+8, are becoming an important new security mechanism. However, according to experts, the Joint Declaration adopted at the first meeting in Hanoi in October 2010 identified important security threats rather than ways and means to combat them. One researcher commented: The initiative is expected to be an emphatic diplomatic statement and an important face-saving exercise for ASEAN-led cooperative processes, which are otherwise giving way to evolving great power politics, bilateral strategic partnerships, and hedging. Meanwhile, it remains to be seen whether the grouping uses the vast expertise and resources at the disposal of ASEAN or gets lost in a labyrinth of formalized structures, never-ending CBMs, meaningless meetings, and pretentious diplomacy that characterise the flip side of ASEAN forums. The real litmus test will be its second ADMM+ in Brunei in 2013.5

4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Mid.ru) (2010): “Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergei Lavrov Addresses the 5-th East-Asia Summit in Hanoi in October 2010”, in Mid.ru, 30 October 2010, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4 .nsf/0/E77F18CD37BD1A22C32577CC00439B03. 5 Institute of Piece & Conflict Studies, IPCS. Org (2010): “ADMM+: Another Case of ‘Pretentious Diplomacy’?”, Shekhar, Vibhanshu, in Institute of Piece & Conflict Studies, IPCS. Org, 29 October 2010, http://www.ipcs.org/article/china/admm-another-case-of -pretentious-diplomacy-3268.html.

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Russia is now trying to ‘turn to Asia’, recognising the growing importance of the region in the wake of global crises and also taking into consideration the forthcoming APEC summit in Vladivostok in 2012. This is another attempt to “equalize the heads of the Russian [two-headed] eagle”. The first attempts date back to the middle of the nineteenth century (British and French advances in the Far East were the reason), the second to the threshold of the twentieth century (the Japanese factor), the third to the 1930s in the framework of Communist modernisation.6 Now Russia wants to “turn its face to Asia”, to become a truly “Europacific power”. During a meeting in Khabarovsk on 2 July 2010 devoted to strengthening Russian positions in Asia and the Pacific, then President Medvedev noted that “integration with the Asia-Pacific region countries offers great potential for developing the economy of the Far East and Russia in general. Such integration should be supplemented with relocation of goods, works and services from one part of the country to another while promoting closer cooperation within the Asia-Pacific region to the benefit of the eastern areas of Russia.”7 Recent years have seen increased Russian activity in participation in, and the creation of, multilateral organisations in Asia.8 In November 2000, the Russian government approved the ‘Concept of Russia’s Participation in APEC’. The document states that Russian participation is aimed at the following goals: 1. Preventing the unilateral orientation [of Russia] to Europe and the US, raising the priority of Asia and Pacific in overall foreign policy 2. Using the market offered by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries to promote Russian industrial exports, including military sales, energy supplies through a network of pipelines and power lines, an increase in Russian investment in Asia, and a Russian presence in financial and bond markets 3. Attracting foreign investment from this area for development of Siberia and the Russian Far East 4. Raising Russia’s political and diplomatic presence in Asia and the Pacific, joining multilateral political and economic agreements with regional groupings (NAFTA, Andean Community, ASEAN, 6 See Victor Larin in “Russia and Multilateral Structures of Asia and the Pacific”– Proceedings of All-Russian Conference, 18 December 2008, MGIMO, 2009, p. 85. 7 Integration with the Asia-Pacific region countries offers great economic potential for developing Russia’s Far East, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/541. 8 In April 2012 President Vladimir Putin declared development of Russian Far East to be the most important task for the country in the coming years.



russia and asian integration models131 MERCOSUR), participating in the ADB and other multilateral IFOs, promoting Russia’s participation in the Asia-Europe dialogue (ASEM) and dialogue between the CIS and APEC (using the SCO mechanism as well), avoiding participation in alliances aimed against friendly APEC countries, broadening co-ordination with APEC countries in international organisations.9

In July 2010 in Khabarovsk, then President Medvedev specifically pointed out that: We need to strengthen Russia’s role in the Asia-Pacific region’s organisations, namely, in APEC, the SCO, ASEAN, and the BRIC group. Russia already has a solid footing in these groups, but we should recognize that people are nonetheless looking to us to be more active. This will require better coordinated efforts of the Russian Foreign ministry and other relevant agencies. We are offering our vision of how to build a polycentric and non-bloc based security and cooperation architecture in the region.10

Russia also takes part in regional organisations such as the Pacific Economic Council. It joined the ASEM in October 2010 at the eighth summit in Brussels, and co-operates in the framework of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), which unites thirty states of Asia and the Middle East. Russia also supports the Kazakhstan-sponsored Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Especially important are the activities of the ASEAN Regional Forum. In November 2004, during the 10th ASEAN Summit in Laos, Russia joined the  Bali treaty of 1976 and in December 2005 participated for the first time in the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, where the action plan for Russia-ASEAN co-operation for 2005–2015 was signed. At the 14th Ministerial meeting in 2007 in the Philippines, Russia sponsored a statement on the development of dialogue between civilisations. Russia’s goals vis-à-vis ASEAN include becoming a strategic partner of this organisation by 2012, and increasing the scope of economic co-operation to a mature level. During the second Russia-ASEAN summit in Hanoi in November 2010, then President Medvedev mentioned Russia’s openness to efforts to   9 The Concept of Russia’s Participation on APEC Forum. Ruskiy Zhurnal (2007): “World Agenda. Russia and its partners in APEC. Some Results of the Summit on the 8–9-th of September 2007 in Sydney”, Suslina, Svetlana, in Ruskiy Zhurnal, russ.ru, 10 September 2007, http://www.russ.ru/Mirovaya-povestka/Rossiya-i-ee-partnery-v-ATES. 10 Excerpts from Transcript of Meeting on the Far East’s Socioeconomic Development and Cooperation with Asia-Pacific Region Countries, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/ 547.

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built a “common Asia-Pacific home” and stressed the need for consolidation of all discussion formats in Asia, including ASEAN, APEC, SCO, ARF, ASEM, and ADMM. In general, Russia favours the creation of a polycentric system of cooperation in Asia, but its positions are flexible. The main purpose as Russia sees it is to overcome the regional divides and to build a comprehensive regional infrastructure of security and co-operation. Such an infrastructure should be multi-layered and based on collective interests and equality, transparency and generally recognised principles of international law. A network of horizontal diplomacy might be especially effective in this region. The future regional architecture should be based on the principles of inclusive participation, multi-dimensional activity, creation of a regional community and common identity. In September 2010 during a summit in Beijing, a joint Russian-Chinese initiative was put forward, suggesting the creation in Asia and the Pacific of an “open, transparent and equal security and cooperation architecture, based on the principles of international law, non-block foundation and consideration of the lawful interest of all the parties.” The countries of the region were urged to abandon confrontation and efforts directed against third parties, and to observe such universally acknowledged principles as respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference, equal and indivisible security, the defensive nature of military doctrines, nonuse of force, absence of attempts to undermine foreign governments, peaceful resolution of conflicts, joint response to non-traditional threats, etc.11 The Joint Statement adopted at the second Russia-ASEAN summit points out that regional architecture should be based on the principles of collectivity, multilateralism and universally adopted norms of international law and should be inclusive.12 Russia has recently increased its efforts to be a part of the discussions and integration processes in order to bring in its contribution to them. In 2009 the Russian National Committee of CSCAP (the ‘track 2’ of ARF) was

11 China-Embassy.org (2010): “The Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China about a more intensive multilateral cooperation, partnership and strategic coordination between RUSSIA and CHINA, Beijing”, in China-Embassy.org, 28 September 2010, http://ru.china-embassy.org/rus/zgxw/t757139.htm. 12 Russian Presidential Executive Office, Dmitry Medvedev (2010): “A Speech at the Second Summit Russia—ASEAN”, Hanoi, 30 October 2010, in President of Russia, Speeches and Transcripts, 30 October 2010, http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/9380.



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re-created and its members actively joined the discussion both in plenary meetings and study groups of CSCAP.13 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Experience and Problems Russia has had a unique experience of initiating, together with China, a new Asian multilateral organisation, the Shanghai Five process, which grew out of border talks in 1996. Maybe unexpectedly, the process gained momentum in the 1990s, reflecting a regional demand for co-ordination and consultation, and in 2001 the SCO was created by signing a summitlevel agreement in Shanghai on 15 June of that year. In 2007, the treaty for long-term good neighbourliness, friendship and co-operation was signed in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. The mechanism has by now grown into a fully-fledged organisation, uniting not only the original members— Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan—but also observers (Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Iran) and partners for dialogue (since 2008, Sri Lanka and Belarus), the list of which is tending to grow rapidly. The Tashkent summit in June 2010 approved the SCO Rules of Procedure, which were designed to enhance the efficiency and internal mechanisms of the organisation and for the first time approved the regulations on the admission procedure for new members.14 This was a milestone event, as the criteria for new membership now exist for the first time in the organisation’s history. Though Mongolia, Pakistan, Iran and India participate in the SCO as observers, they are ready to become members. The representatives of Afghanistan, Belarus, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and some other countries have also expressed a wish to join the SCO.15 In 2012 Afganistan was given the status of observer (which was widely seen as SCO filling the vacuum created by NATO’s withdrawal and Turkey was given the status of the dialogue partner. The rules included limiting membership to countries within the Eurasian continent that have diplomatic relations with other members and are either SCO observers or dialogue partners. Conversely, countries under United Nations sanctions are barred: President Medvedev noted 13 http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/General%20Conf%20Reports/CSCAP%20 2009-Summary%20Report-Public.pdf. 14 “SCO Tashkent summit concludes”-http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010sco/ 2010-06/11/content_9968146.htm. 15 http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/06/09/9427713.html.

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that countries under international sanctions cannot join the SCO, thus excluding the possibility of Iran’s participation.16 (The Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, decided to snub the meeting in Tashkent after ties between Russia and Iran were strained over the UN Security Council vote imposing fresh sanctions on Iran.)17 Kazakhstan’s position concerning the expansion of the SCO appears tepid at best, suggested Rustam Burnashev, a security analyst based in Almaty, who said that: “If India and Pakistan are admitted, then the SCO has to deal with their problems.”18 “The organisation is in the process of defining itself”, said one Western diplomat, “but this is pretty thin soup.”19 However, it is increasing the basis for addressing important international crises and problems. The anniversary 10th SCO summit in Astana was important for that, adopting several important documents. During 2012 Beijing summit the new version of the rules for reacting on situations, threatening regional peace and security was adopted and mid-term SCO development strategy, calling for closer cooperation, was approved.20 The mechanism includes not only regular summits, but also councils at prime minister level and minister of foreign affairs level, meetings of ministers, SDL meetings and working groups, as well as parliamentary exchanges (however, the latter are not favoured by all members). The secretariat is located in Beijing, the regional anti-terrorist structure resides in Tashkent. Decisions are taken on the basis of consensus, although some countries may abstain from participating in some projects. What are the raison d’être and the vulnerability of the SCO? Some critics say it is “much more façade than real policy substance”. Back in 2001 it was an obvious effort by China and Russia to check the chaos and Western penetration in Central Asia. It still remains the only political organisation that enables Russia to project its influence in the area. Some Russian experts, however, argue that rather than an instrument of checking Chinese penetration, it is a tool for Chinese inroads into the region. The

16 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation opens to India and Pakistan, not Iran. http:// www.speroforum.com/a/34725/Shanghai-Cooperation-Organization-opens-to-India -and-Pakistan-not-Iran. 17 “Iran skips Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit”, http://blog.taragana.com/ politics/2010/06/10/iran-skips-shanghai-cooperation-organisation-summit-42769/. 18 SCO’s Tashkent Summit Cooks Up “Thin Soup” http://www.eurasianet.org/ node/61276. 19 Ibidem -http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61276. 20 http://oko-planet.su/politik/politiklist/120964-vputin-vystuplenie-na-zasedanii -soveta-glav-gosudarstv-chlenov-shanhayskoy-organizacii-sotrudnichestva.html.



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Chinese experts consider China’s role in the organisation as a “leadership” one, which is “growing”, “mature” and “holding much promise”.21 However, it seems that China does not need or want to win more influence in Central Asia or get ‘client’ states on its borders, which would burden it with the need to support their weak economies. China gets what it needs without further involvement in the region, although this is not excluded in the future, as the region remains volatile (as seen in the example of Kyrgyzstan). Chinese analysts point out that the focal points of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are strategies for fighting the “three evil forces”, namely, terrorism, separatism and extremism; safeguarding security and stability; and advancing pragmatic co-operation.22 Russia was on the defensive when the SCO started as an instrument for co-ordination and the sharing of influence between China and Russia and for checking growing Western influence in the area. Later, however, the territorial scope, which SCO addresses, has broadened. Afghanistan has become an essential object of discussions and joint efforts. During the Tashkent summit in 2010, for example, state leaders discussed the possibilities for combining forces to help rebuild Afghanistan and stabilise the situation in Kyrgyzstan.23 There are several schools of thought in Russia, some of which say the SCO should be a Eurasian organisation, broadening its mandate from Central Asia, and regard the ‘SCO area’ as a zone of geopolitical responsibility of the SCO. They think that the SCO should increase its membership and area of responsibility through more co-operation with the observer countries and dialogue partners. Reflecting these ideas, Western attention to SCO, as Ambassador Leonid Moiseev, the Russian national co-ordinator in SCO, noted, “has considerably grown since 2005”.24 However, the widespread accusations that this is an anti-American alliance do not have a solid basis. Most countries distance themselves from any activity that might endanger their relations with the US. At the 2006 SCO ‘jubilee summit’ in Shanghai, several CIS members, including Russia, insisted that the SCO is not built on opposition to the West and that it is 21 Jia Qingguo. The SCO: China’s Experiment in Multilateral Leadership/ In: Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia, vol 2, ed.by Iwashita Akihiro, Sapporo, Hokkaido University, 2007, p.121. 22 SCO Tashkent summit reiterates adherence to regional stability http://english .peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7023313.html. 23 Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Council of Heads of State http:// eng.kremlin.ru/news/417. 24 Promoting Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Findings of the Northeast Asia Security Policy Forum and Its Future—October 2005- vol 11, N 2, December 2006, p.27.

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not a rival to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Russia, for example, clearly does not like the idea that Iran should use the SCO platform to provoke the US, thereby dragging everyone else into the conflict. The August 2008 SCO summit tried to avoid unequivocally supporting Russia against the West in its conflict with Georgia and the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.25 China insisted that it could not reward the secessionist regions by recognising their sovereignty, and the smaller member states abstained from support. The most common misperception is that the SCO is moving towards becoming a military alliance. This contradicts the Chinese position of non-participation in military blocs. So far, progress in military co-operation has been very modest (mostly limited to ‘anti-terrorist exercises’), and countries are reluctant to move any further, although some Russian generals would like broader security and military co-operation within the SCO.26 The ‘anti-terrorist exercises’ (Kazakhstan 2003, Uzbekistan 2006, and Kyrgyzstan and Russia 2007) are not frequent27 and involve just a few thousand soldiers (the biggest one, the ‘Peace mission 2010’ exercise, involving about three thousand soldiers, took place in Kazakhstan in September 2010).28 Concerning military co-operation in the area of SCO responsibility, the official position is that the Common Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), which includes five of the six SCO members (only China is excluded) plus Belarus and Armenia, is the place for such activity. Following the 2003 anti-terrorist exercise in Kazakhstan, the host government urged restraint; the fight against terrorist networks, so it argued, is the responsibility of law enforcement agencies and it went on to warn that military-led exercises “create a mistaken impression of SCO goals in the world community”.29 25 Novoteka.ru (2008): “Even Shanghai Cooperation Organization did not Support Russia”, (Россию не поддержала даже Шанхайская организация сотрудничества) in Novoteka.ru, 29 August 2008, http://www.novoteka.ru/sevent/4480961/11179375/18713166. 26 A. Klimenko in “Russia and Multilateral Structures of Asia and the Pacific”Proceedings of All-Russian Conference, 18 December 2008, MGIMO, 2009, p. 41, http:// www.mgimo.ru/files2/y09_2010/141253/kb-13_Lukin.pdf. 27 http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?119254-SCO-Russia -China-Anti-Terrorism-Exercise-Videos. 28 RIA Novosti, Multimedia Press Center, rian.ru (2010): “Kazakhstan is Making Preparations for ‘Peace Mission-2010’ Exercises Carried out Together with Shanghai Cooperation Organization” in ria.ru, 26 June 2010, http://www.rian.ru/defense _safety/20100406/218647162.html; http://212.113.124.22/ru/news/view/48409/. 29 The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation: Probing the Myths by Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, Royal Danish Defence College. Copenhagen, Alexander Lukin, “The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation: What Next?”, Russia in Global Affairs 5/3 (2007), p. 145. December 2008, p.8.



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The idea of sending CSTO forces to Kyrgyzstan to quell the unrest there in summer 2010 was floated; however, President Dmitry Medvedev emphasised at the SCO summit that there were no such plans.30 One of the main limitations of the SCO is that its role in economic cooperation between member states remains marginal. Total intra-SCO trade in 2007 stood at US$89 billion or a mere 3.3 percent of the total trade of the six member states. Russian scholar Alexander Lukin complained that the main obstacle to successful economic co-operation is “the aggressive and selfish manner of China to uphold its trade interests, not always taking its partners’ interests into account”.31 Chinese interests lie in seeking access to Russian and Central Asian energy and mineral resources. Both Russia and Kazakhstan want to diversify their exports but not to be dependent solely on Chinese importers, nor to give them the chance to dictate prices. It should be clear that the SCO is centred mostly on Central Asia and has no mandate or capacity, nor desire, to engross itself in the complex issues of East Asia. Russia sees the (now defunct) Six Party Talks as the instrument with which to create a multilateral mechanism of peace and security in the Northeast Asian region. Approaches and Ideas for Northeast Asia I believe Northeast Asia (NEA) holds no less importance for Russia than Central Asia, where the SCO already functions. Northeast Asia is a specific area of Asia and the Pacific where the interests of the strongest and most influential global powers meet and yet no mechanism for stability and security preservation exists. Russia has repeatedly proposed a North­ east  Asian dialogue structure that would encompass a wide range of issues, from economics, energy and ecology to disarmament, confidencebuilding, non-proliferation and new challenges. As long ago as 24 March 1994, the Russian Foreign Ministry suggested holding an international conference on security and the non-nuclear status of the Korean peninsula, with the participation of Russia, the US, China, Japan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as well as representatives of the UN Secretary 30 SCO’s Tashkent Summit Cooks Up “Thin Soup” http://www.eurasianet.org/ node/61276. 31 Alexander Lukin, “The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation: What Next?”, Russia in Global Affairs 5/3 (2007), p. 145.

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General and of the Director General of IAEA. The purpose would have been to find a comprehensive solution for nuclear non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula, which could include: promotion of denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula; guarantees of non-interference into the internal affairs of both Korean states and preservation of their sovereignty; military confidence-building measures on the Korean peninsula; replacement of the Armistice agreement of 1953 with a peace treaty; normalisation of bilateral relations between the conference participants (DPRK–US, DPRK–Japan).32 The present Six Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear programme could become the basis for such a mechanism. Russia, chairing the working group on peace and security in Northeast Asia in the framework of the Six Party Talks, has worked out the Guiding Principles for peace and security preservation in the region and has conducted intensive diplomacy to get them accepted by all participants, although the common denominator is pretty low because of the sharp differences between the countries. Nevertheless, the Guiding Principles were agreed upon during the working group meeting in Moscow in February 2009. However, the consequent North Korean walk-out from the talks as well as the Cheonan sinking incident and later the Yeonpyeongdo shelling, which were seen by South Korea and the US as preventing their own return to the talks, have put this question in limbo. Nevertheless, it is still relevant for Northeast Asia, and efforts to find an agreed solution on the concept of a future for the Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism should be resumed if and when the diplomatic process on the Korean problem should restart. I am convinced that the North Korean nuclear programme cannot be solved separately, i.e. without addressing the basic security problems of the Korean peninsula (including guarantees of security and development for the North Korean regime), so the agenda of the diplomatic process should be comprehensive and not concentrate solely on the ‘North Korean nuclear problem’. The questions that come to mind are: 1) Does a niche for a Northeast Asian co-operation/security mechanism exist within a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of international organisations and consultative mechanisms in Asia and the Pacific? 2) How can this hypothetic mechanism draw on the experiences of existing systems, supplement them and interact with them? 32 Denisov, Valery. The Problem of Nuclear Security on Korean Peninsula, In Obozrevatel—Observer -journal, Rau-University research company, N 3 (74) 1996, http:// www.rau.su/observer/N03_96/3_06.HTM.



russia and asian integration models139 3) How should one proceed from co-operation to the architecture of security? 4) What are the practical steps to be taken at this stage?

Russia has always been a proponent of a multilateral security mechanism in Asia, dating back to the ideas put forward by the Soviet Union in 1969 and later included in Gorbachev’s concept of universal international security.33 At that time the principle goal was to check the growing influence of the US and to contain China. Russian positions in Asia have considerably weakened after the demise of the USSR, and now the country is concerned with promoting its interests through such a multilateral structure, in getting access to the decision-making process and preventing unilateralism. Russia was the first to propose in the wake of the first nuclear crisis in 1993 that it be dealt with through “a six-party conference”. Later Russia confirmed it would “propose focusing on measures to ensure smooth six-party talks and create a friendly atmosphere, and in the longer term, we will seek to set up a body to tackle security issues in northeastern Asia.”34 Why was Russia entrusted with chairing the working group on regional peace and building a security mechanism in the Six Party Talks? I think that reflects the mood in Asia that the US and Russia should take the lead in providing a blueprint for such a structure, as the controversies among the Asian members of the club would prevent them from setting up a charter for a Northeast Asian security and co-operation structure. The crisis in inter-Korean relations should be left behind as soon as possible to avoid further deterioration of the situation. That will probably not happen before President Lee Myung-bak moves out of the Blue House in Seoul in 2013, but after that the ideas on a sub-regional mechanism on peace and security might be in demand again. Rather than broad all-Asian structures like ARF, I favour ‘sub-regionalisation’, a narrower forum that is more concentrated on just a few regional issues. Even the universal EAS mechanism might have regional ‘subdivisions’ at a lower level, reporting to heads of states as a problem-solving mechanism. The small number of countries involved would mean that “all major parties dance at the ball”35 and meaningful decisions could be 33 Arin, Oleg (R.Sh.-A.Aliyev), (1997): Asia-Pacific Region: the Myths, Illusions and Reality, Moscow: Flinta, Nauka, 1997, http://www.olegarin.com/olegarin/Aziatsko-tihookeanskij _region__mify,_illuzii_i_realnost.html. 34 RIA Novosti, 15 March 2007, http://en.rian.ru/Russia/20070315/62042130.html. [Publisher’s Note: These papers have been removed. No new link given.] 35 Etel Solingen. Comparative Perspectives of Regional Security Institutions. Presentation at the 18th NEACD Session- Moscow, 12 November 2007.

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taken and implemented. Northeast Asia, where the interests of four major world powers (US, China, Japan, Russia) meet seems to deserve a consultative mechanism of its own, if only to harmonise the interests of the great powers. “Dangerous balance-of-power politics have begun taking hold in Northeast Asia to offset the rising power of China…Additionally, lingering territorial disputes and ‘history’ issues create the potential for serious regional conflict”, note US researchers.36 At the same time the area is “the engine of the twenty-first century global economy”, which means that reliable security and co-operation structures are vital for the stability not only of this region, but of the world economy as a whole.37 Historically, for Northeast Asia the greatest security threat to be addressed by all the parties concerned is the situation on the Korean peninsula, and the security mechanisms suggested for the region are usually centred on the Korean issue. The multilateral approach to this issue is not a recent invention. The Armistice agreement of 1953 signed after the end of the Korean War recommended that the governments of the countries concerned hold a conference to solve the problem of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and the conclusion of a peace agreement. The idea of a six-party “consultative conference” raised during the forty-third session of the UN General Assembly was first proposed by South Korea and was supported by Japan. A multilateral approach is historically justified: the Korean security issue (the nuclear problem being a part of it) is rooted in the long history of relations between the four powers (Japan, the former USSR, US, China) on the Korean issue. In historic order, Japan was the colonial master of Korea and only its defeat in the Second World War by the US and USSR enabled Korean independence. The US and the USSR were the powers that agreed on the division of Korea in Yalta: soon after, however, they became adversaries in the course of the Korean War, which also involved China. Cold War confrontation brought up a security system in which global competition between two systems (on the one side, the USSR and China, both of which, although at odds with each other, had alliance treaties with the DPRK and supported North Korea, versus, on the other side, the US–Japan–South Korea bloc) provided the security balance on the peninsula. The disseverance of the USSR led to a dangerous loss of equilibrium on the Korean peninsula, which descended into the possibility of the 36 A Framework for Peace and Security in Korea and Northeast Asia—Report of the Atlantic Council Working Group on North Korea- Washington, April 2007, p.24. 37 Etel Solingen. Comparative Perspectives of Regional Security Institutions.



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use of force that drove North Korea to create a ‘nuclear deterrent’. To preserve lasting peace and stability in this area and create opportunities for development of the territories located nearby the need for a new security mechanism around the Korean peninsula is obvious. Some Speculative Ideas on a Multiparty Security Structure in Northeast Asia The prospects for a Northeast Asian security co-operation structure are now dim. However, the need for such a structure is stronger than ever, and ways and ideas to create it should be explored. It is difficult to argue with those experts who suggest that the tasks of a possible multilateral security organisation might include: • Resolving misunderstanding and preventing miscalculations • Encouraging transparency in the mutual relations of member states • Affirming a joint commitment not to use or threaten force in mutual relations • Enhancing regional economic co-operation within the larger framework of the global economy • Promoting the peaceful resolution of disputes • Contributing to higher living standards of all people living in the area • Promoting the free movement of people, information and ideas among their nations • Fostering an improved mutual understanding of each other’s histories and cultures.38 However this future-oriented philosophy of a new Northeast Asia mechanism might not match with today’s realities. Can all these noble principles be introduced instantaneously and the tasks tackled simultaneously? Can the experience of other regions be a prompt for producing a ‘Northeast Asia symphony’? One of the suggestions is that a Conference of Northeast Asian Peace and Prosperity (CPPNA), based on the European experience, should be convened in order to promote the process of creating a regional security organisation.39 Another idea is to convene a special (six party) 38 James Goodby. The Six Party Talks: Opportunity or Obstacle—Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005. 39 Hong Ki Joon. Envisioning a Conference on Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia: In view of the European experience—Paper presented at NEACD, Moscow, 12 November 2007.

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regional conference at the level of foreign ministers under the auspices of East Asian summits, which would become the central structure for security co-operation in the whole of Asia and the Pacific. At this moment, of course, the fate of the Six Party Talks is uncertain and even if restarted it is difficult to expect any movement towards this long-term goal in the near future. However, in the distant future the six party negotiation structure should obviously continue to exist as a mechanism monitoring the implementation of Korea-related agreements. On such a basis the regional consultative mechanism could become a permanent one and later evolve into a ‘Northeast Asia Security and Co-operation Forum’ (or ‘Organisation’) (NEASCO). We should bear in mind the example of the SCO, which grew out of border talks. Today we could presume the interest of at least China and Russia in such a development, while the US and Japanese positions are controversial, and the North Korean one has turned from uncertain to negative in the wake of the security crisis in Korea. It is especially interesting to analyse the evolution of the ROK’s position. The previous South Korean administration of Roh Moo-hyun put forward an ambitious “peace and prosperity” concept of turning the ROK into a regional “balancer” and an “economic hub” of Northeast Asia;40 it was interested in a multilateral organisation to enhance its position as a “middle power” vis-à-vis the great powers and take the leading role in turning the Korean peninsula into an “economic centre” of the region. In 2004, the South Korean govern­ ment revealed its intention to “investigate a plan for developing the SixParty Talks into a framework for security dialogue in Northeast Asia”,41 a position that was directly corroborated by the South Korean president himself.42 However, with Lee Myung-bak’s assumption of power and growing tensions on the Korean peninsula these ideas were unfortunately abandoned. What could be the mandate of such a regional six party+ organisation? 1. Northeast Asia is still plagued by political and military instability which hinders economic progress, so the political-military field 40 See: Zhiqun Zhu. Small power, big ambition. - Korea and World Affairs, Vl31, N 2, Summer 2007, p.148. 41 National Security Council, Peace, Prosperity, and National Security: Plans for Security Policy, 2004, p. 56. 42 At the ROK-Japanese summit meeting in Jeju-do in July 2004, President Roh stated that: “If the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved, then it would be desirable for the SixParty Talks to be utilized as a framework for dialogue and negotiations on security issues in Northeast Asia.” Chosun Ilbo, 22 July 2004.



russia and asian integration models143 would appear, for an optimist, a lucrative area of interaction. However, finding a common agenda would not be easy, taking into consideration US–Chinese strategic competition, the struggle for dominance between China and Japan, regional territorial disputes, arguments over interpretations of history, etc. The stated mission of a putative NEASCO might be to prevent the emergence of security irritants of regional concern and to compare positions on existing ones. True, most of such irritants are of a bilateral nature and too sensitive to be addressed in a multilateral format. It is difficult to imagine that the organisation would start from discussing substantial issues of military strategy and military build-ups, power balance, etc., many of which also have a sensitive bilateral dimension. Its primary function in the traditional security area should be eventually setting the ‘rules of the game’ and a region-wide system of mutual assessment and defence information- sharing and confidence-building. For example, the possibility of confidence-building measures, both bilateral and multilateral, should be discussed. They could include measures for prevention of incidents at sea and in airspace (overdue for the region), mutual invitations of observers to military exercises (that could be very relevant to North Koreans), annual reviews of defence postures (‘white papers’), etc. NEASCO could sponsor series of workshops and other Track 2 and Track 1.5 events to this end. “The ten thousand li road starts with a first step”—and the start of a search for common approaches towards arms reductions and confidence-building in Northeast Asia is overdue. 2. If we might have some doubts about NEASCO’s role in addressing conventional security threats, in any event such an organisation would be a promising venue for discussion and decision-making on non-conventional threats, which are more and more internationalised and not properly addressed at the territorial level. Terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy, pollution and environmental hazards,43 infectious diseases, illegal migrations, and natural disasters are often

Nautilus Peace and Security Network (NAPSNet) (2007): “Policy Forum 07-051: The Prospects for Institutionalizing the Six-Party Talks”, Keun-sik Kim, Kyungnam University, July 12th, 2007 in NAPS.Net, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/ the-prospects-for-institutionalizing-the-six-party-talks/. 43 The New York Times (“AS CHINA ROARS, POLLUTION REACHES DEADLY EXTREMES”, 27 August 2007) reported that just as the speed and scale of the PRC’s rise as an economic power have no clear parallel in history, so its pollution problem has

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international by nature and almost always need a co-ordinated international response. A system of mutual information and co-ordination could be created under the aegis of NEASCO which would not replicate an international one, drawing on the resources of adjacent territories of the countries involved (such as the Russian Far East and Northeast China). Although many of the problems are coordinated within the broader international system of co-operation in the prevention of new challenges, adding a Northeast Asian subsystem would be useful, especially if the DPRK would become a part of it. A joint response to non-conventional challenges could also become a rehearsal for deepened co-operation in conventional security affairs. For example, if the troops of regional countries were to start participating in joint relief or control operations, that would help in building up mutual trust and experience of operational interaction. The SCO’s experience, which started its multilateral practical activity with anti-terrorist training and exercise, should be taken into consideration. NEASCO could become a focal point for securing the safety of the sea lines of communication in Northeast Asia and joint maritime humanitarian and search and rescue operations. We note the point of view of those experts who state that “dialogue and the architecture [in NEA] should begin with a focus on the maritime arena”.44 Once formed, an international institution, whose main function is to make co-operation possible, carries its own momentum. More complicated issues could then be brought to the floor. 3. The discussions on the economic basket are even more promising. Asia is increasingly separated into bilateral FTA areas, and before it is too late a more comprehensive trade system should be dis­ cussed.  For example, Chinese economists have recently suggested shattered all precedents. Environmental degradation is now so severe, with such stark domestic and international repercussions, that pollution poses not only a major long-term burden on the PRC public but also an acute political challenge to the ruling Communist Party. And it is not clear that the PRC can rein in its own economic juggernaut. 44 See an excellent essay by Marc Valencia (http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/ 07065Valencia.html) who goes as far as to suggest that “given this network of arrangements, a multilateral agreement on a ‘code of conduct’ for Northeast Asian seas would be a natural next step. Initially, multilateral arrangements should address common maritime problems like search and rescue, environmental protection, drug trafficking, and smuggling of arms and humans. Further out to sea, in time and space, a Northeast Asian ocean peacekeeping force might ensure safety and security of navigation, undertake air/sea rescue, protect fisheries from illegal fishers, and monitor the environment against polluters.”



russia and asian integration models145 the creation of a regional FTA comprising three northeastern Chinese provinces and Inner Mongolia, ten regions of the Russian Far East and Chita province (11+4). In the future, Japan and Korea could be brought into this FTA, Chinese experts argue.45 Given the plans to create Japan-ROK-China FTA it is quite natural to discuss such projects. Russia, for example, would not like to be designated as a simple resource supplier within such an FTA. Russian experts are worried by the prospects of the Russian Far East being “torn away” from Russia as a result of its growing dependence on foreign markets as opposed to internal economic ties with Russia proper.46 Many new projects in NEA (energy, infrastructure) are international by nature, and a relevant venue for discussing alternative plans and modalities is important. Mutual exchange of information in economic planning, standardisation, changes in legislation could be a starting phase of economic integration. 4. One obvious topic of primary importance is a co-ordinated economic assistance programme for the DPRK. It would probably start with joint efforts to make provisions for the energy security of the DPRK. I am convinced that wider economic and development assistance to North Korea should be rendered on the basis of a wellprepared long-term plan and contribute to the economic deve­l­ opment and modernisation of the DPRK, deepening into its involvement in the international division of labour. Several years ago, Russia proposed an innovative concept of three-party economic co-operation (well-known examples are the Transkorea–Transsib transit and the joint RFE–DPRK–ROK power grid). The concept of combining North Korean labour, Russian resources and new technological developments and South Korean capital as well as mass-production technologies also gives space for Chinese and Japanese participation in new North Korean industrybuilding efforts. Why not initiate discussion of these projects by government and business structures under the aegis of NEASCO? Of course, that would only become possible after the end of current hostilities between North and South (thus, probably not before 2013). 5. Setting up frameworks for cultural and civilisational integration in the area and scientific and educational exchanges could also become

45 China Economic & Trade Herald 4 July 2007. 46 http://www.akm.ru/rus/press-club/press270199.stm. [Publisher’s Note: This site only carries current news. Archive material available on subscription only.]

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georgy toloraya an important area of NEASCO activities. Joint multilateral projects in this area could be less contentious and easier to implement than bilateral ones.47 Russian experience in arranging a ‘Year of Russia in China’ and then a ‘Year of China in Russia’ could be a template for such multilateral projects and events. They are especially important to overcome historic hostilities and create the possibilities for more interaction of the younger generations. NGOs of the relevant countries working in co-ordination and probably with organisational and financial support from NEASCO could contribute to implementing this very important future-oriented function.

What about the organisational structure of NEASCO and the future vector for building its organisation? I am convinced that although the experience of SCO, ASEAN, and OSCE should be taken into account, it should not be copied. One principle is that the process would be lengthy, multi-staged and non-confrontational, developing from simpler ad hoc forms to deeper international forms. The evolution of the ad hoc Six Party Talks into a more permanent mechanism would require high-level political support. We might suggest that regular (maybe annual) meetings of the six countries’ foreign ministers could act as a supreme decision-making body for the organisation. Later technical committees working on a more or less permanent basis could develop out of some of the current working groups, probably with a broader agenda. A secretariat to co-ordinate the agenda and solve many organisational issues is an unavoidable option at some stage (most probably based in Beijing). Institutional templates exist and should be studied and discussed.48 NEASCO or a Northeastern Asian subdivision of the East Asia Summit could become both an instrument of and the reason for an increased cooperative relationship between the countries, especially between those where hostilities still exist, and help smooth out bilateral concerns as well. The organisation should not necessarily become an exclusive club: such nations as Mongolia, India, Australia, Canada, etc., could eventually get observer status.

47 China plans to establish Russian cultural centres in its border cities and stage regular bilateral cultural events there. 48 Building Six-Party Capacity for a WMD-Free Korea- by James L. Schoff, Charles M. Perry, Jacquelyn K. Davis, A Publication by The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. In Association with The Fletcher School, Tufts University- Brassey’s, Inc., 2004.



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Asia News (2010): “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation opens to India and Pakistan, not Iran”, in Spero News, 12 June 2010, http://www.speroforum.com/a/34725/Shanghai -Cooperation-Organization-opens-to-India-and-Pakistan-not-Iran. The Atlantic Council of the United States (2007): A Framework for Peace and Security in Korea and Northeast Asia, Report of the Atlantic Council Working Group on North Korea-Washington, April 2007, http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/1/070413 -North_Korea_Working_Group_Report.pdf. China Daily (2004): “China pins high hopes on 6-party talks”, in China Daily (5 May 2004), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-02/05/content_303162.htm. China Daily (2010): “SCO Tashkent summit concludes”, in China Daily, 6 June 2011, http:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010sco/2010-06/11/content_9968146.htm. Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) (2009): 7th General Conference: New Challenges to Asia Pacific Security, Jakarta, 16–18 November 2009, Report, http:// www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/General%20Conf%20Reports/CSCAP%20 2009-Summary%20Report-Public.pdf. EurasiaNet.org (2010): “SCO’s Tashkent Summit Cooks Up “Thin Soup””, in EurasiaNet.org, 11 June 2010, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61276. Goodby, James (2005): The Six Party Talks: Opportunity or Obstacle, Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Han Yong-Sup and Chung Kyung-Yung (2006): “Promoting Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Findings of the Northeast Asia Security Policy Forum and Its Future”, in The Korea Journal of Security Affairs, vol. 11, no. 2 (December 2006), pp. 14–31. Hong Ki Joon (2007): “Envisioning a Conference on Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia: In view of the European experience”, Paper presented at NEACD, Moscow, November 12, 2007. Hu, Richard W. (2007): “China and East Asian Community Building: Implications and Challenges Ahead”, Presentation at the Brookings Institution, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, October 2, 2007, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/ events/2007/1002_east_asia/1002_east_asia.pdf. IANS/RIA Novosti (2010): “Iran skips Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit”, in The Gaea Times, 10 June 2010, http://politics.gaeatimes.com/2010/06/10/iran-skips-shanghai -cooperation-organisation-summit-42769/. Jia Qingguo (2007): “The SCO: China’s Experiment in Multilateral Leadership”, in Iwashita Akihiro (ed.): Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia. Volume 2: Russia and its Eastern Edge, Sapporo: Hokkaido University, pp.113–125. Kahn, Joseph and Jim Yardley (2007): “As China Roars, Pollution Reaches Deadly Extremes”, in The New York Times (27 August 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/ asia/26china.html. Larin, Victor (2009): “Russia and Multilateral Structures of Asia and the Pacific”, in Proceedings of All-Russian Conference, Dec.18, 2008, MGIMO. Li Xiaokun (2010): “SCO Military Exercises to Target Regional Terrorism”, in China Daily, September 14, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/14/content_11298808 .htm. Lukin, Alexander (2008): “The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation: What Next?”, in Russia in Global Affairs, vol. 5, no. 3 (July-September 2007), http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/ number/n_9132. National Security Council (2004): Peace, Prosperity, and National Security: Plans for Security Policy, Seoul. People’s Daily Online (2010): “SCO Tashkent summit reiterates adherence to regional stability”, in People’s Daily Online, 12 June 2010, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/ 90883/7023313.html.

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Russian Presidential Executive Office (2010a): “Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Council of Heads of State”, in President of Russia: News, 11 June 2010, http:// eng.kremlin.ru/news/417. Russian Presidential Executive Office (2010b): “Integration with the Asia-Pacific region countries offers great economic potential for developing Russia’s Far East”, in President of Russia: News, 2 July 2010, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/541. Russian Presidential Executive Office (2010c): “Excerpts from Transcript of Meeting on the Far East’s Socioeconomic Development and Cooperation with Asia-Pacific Region Countries”, in President of Russia: Speeches and Transcripts, 2 July 2010, http://eng .kremlin.ru/transcripts/547. Schoff, James L., Charles M. Perry, Jacquelyn K. Davis (2004): Building Six-Party Capacity for a WMD-Free Korea (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. in Association with The Fletcher School, Tufts University), Herndon, Virginia: Brassey’s. Solingen, Etel (2007): “Comparative Perspectives of Regional Security Institutions”, Presentation at the 18th NEACD Session, Moscow, 12 November 2007. Splidsboel Hansen, Flemming (2008): The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation: Probing the Myths, Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, http://www.forsvaret.dk/FAK/ Publikationer/Briefs/Documents/The%20Shanghai%20Co-operation%20 Organisation%20-%20Probing%20the%20Myths.pdf. Valencia, Mark J. (2007): “A Maritime Security Regime for Northeast Asia”, in Policy Forum Online, 07-065A (30 August 2007), http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/ napsnet/forum/security/07065Valencia.html/. Weitz, Richard (2007): “The Korean Pivot: Challenges and Opportunities from Evolving Chinese-Russian and U.S.-Japanese Security Ties”, KEI Academic Series, vol. 1, no. 3 (March 2007), http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/KEIKoreanPivotWeitz27mar0 7.pdf. Yenikeev, Victor (2010): “SCO summit in Tashkent promises to become a milestone in its history”, The Voice of Russia, 9 June 2010, http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/06/09/9427713.html. Zhu Zhiqun (2007): “Small power, big ambition: South Korea’s Role in Northeast Asian Security under President Roh Moo-Hyun”, in Korea and World Affairs, vol. 31, no. 2 (Summer 2007).

STRATEGIC CHOICES AND POLITICAL PARALYSIS IN THE KOREAN CRISES: COMMENTARY ON PAPERS BY DAVID C. KANG/LEIF-ERIC EASLEY, JOHN SWENSON-WRIGHT AND GEORGY TOLORAYA Hazel Smith Rudiger Frank reminds us in the introduction to this book that in East Asia security dilemmas are by no means resolved, that collective security mechanism are by no means secure and reliable; and that many of the Cold War-generated conflicts that no longer animate Europeans’ security discourse are still raw and consequential for the millions who live and work in this region.1 The three chapters (5,6 and 7) that focus on Russia, Japan and the United States have at their core the central question of how these major powers cope with the unresolved security tensions in East Asia in the absence of a shared collective security mechanism in which all are prepared to invest. Such a collective security mechanism would presuppose that, as is the case within the United Nations machinery, member states were, on some issues at least, prepared to compromise and negotiate to achieve common goals. A functioning collective security mechanism would also depend on the readiness of states, at least occasionally, to temper considerations of national interest and aim for negotiated trade-offs across issues through a process of political bargaining (as, for instance, happens within the European Union). Successful collective security mechanisms presuppose that states consider that, in toto, the gains made from membership are more than those achievable from going it alone. They also presuppose that members consider that there is value added by the machinery itself, perhaps to provide a forum for debate, as a confidence-building environment, and as a means of providing what theorists of integration have called the ‘habit of cooperation’.

1 I draw on work I have published in Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance and Social Change in North Korea (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005); Hazel Smith (ed.) Reconstituting Korean Security, (Tokyo: United Nations press, 2007); and ongoing work in Hazel Smith, The Transformation of North Korea: History, Politics, Economic, Society (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

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The three major powers that are the subject of the preceding chapters have all recognised to varying degrees that not all security tensions can be resolved by states working on their own, but so far have only found acceptable the most ‘light-touch’ of inter-governmental mechanisms. These states, and others in the region, have in practice found that it is the ASEAN plus organisations, with their commitment to consensus-building, sovereign equality of each member state, and avoidance of friction between members, that provide the most acceptable form of collective regional cooperation machinery. The chapters on Russia, Japan and the United States show that all three states have participated to varying degrees in such machinery and all have recognised that the ASEAN plus structures represent a legitimate regional voice, not just for Southeast Asia but, sometimes, for a wider East Asian diplomatic community. In terms of the concerns at the heart of this book, of instability in the Korean peninsula, the ASEAN plus mechanisms, the incipient collective security alternatives for the region, were not designed as fora in which belligerent parties could be coaxed to the table and encouraged to engage in tough negotiations, and were certainly not designed to intervene in security issues in which member states considered their national interests were threatened. The major states thus were forced to invent new multilateral mechanisms, the most visible regional security mechanism being provided by the Six Party Talks, in which Russia, Japan and the United States joined with China, North Korea and South Korea to work for denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. The Six Party Talks convened in 2003, but as Toloraya (Chapter 7) documents, they follow a number of initiatives since the 1990s, all designed to try to achieve the same purpose and all failing to meet their objectives. The Six Party Talks have similarly foundered during the last couple of years, with the proximate cause this time the renewed antagonism between North and South Korea after the election of Lee Myung-bak to the presidency of South Korea in December 2007. In the absence of a strong collective security mechanism in East Asia, but with the continuing fear of threats to regional stability from North Korean nuclear development, these major powers have operated through preferred and long-standing alliances and have tentatively engaged in unilateral, bilateral and sometime trilateral activity. Swenson-Wright shows the historical foundation of the Japan–United States alliance and its continued durability “at the heart of Japan’s regional and global diplomacy”. Conversely, Kang and Easley (Chapter 5), in the context of their discussion  of changes in the United States–Japan alliance leadership, are



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unequivocal that “there is no doubt the US–Japan alliance will endure”. Russia may seem the exception here in its apparent isolation from this long-held alliance that had been at the heart of East Asian security dynamics throughout the Cold War. A closer look reveals, however, that Russia remains engaged within important alliances of its own in the region. Toloroya’s mention of the September 2010 Russia–China security declaration resonates with a shared geopolitical history in which both saw the United States as an interloper in the region and both were wary of the United States’ strategic intentions in Northeast Asia. In Japan and the United States, initiatives towards Korea have often been propelled by domestic public opinion as much as by strategic ‘rational choice’ and as a result interest, priorities and activities have waxed and waned with successive administrations. Russia, whose main strategic priority is to keep the United States out of ‘its’ sphere of influence in its Eastern provinces, has been much less affected by public opinion in its policy-making but has sporadically tried to assume the mantle of peacemaker through its relatively good access to the North Korean leadership. Toloroya’s chapter, for example, documents the repeated attempts by Russian governments to instigate comprehensive multilateral diplomacy on North Korea, well before the formal instigation of the Six Party Talks. In the mosaic of six-state relations that frame the complex dynamics of the Korean crises there are, also, several layers of complication that add to the ongoing unresolved crises threatening regional stability. These include, but are by no means confined to, questions over nuclear programmes, political conflict, and economic destabilisation combined with food insecurity. One security dilemma is provided by North Korea’s nuclear programmes. Japan, South Korea and the United States argue that North Korea has a history of belligerent behaviour and there is a risk that these weapons will be used. Russia and China are less concerned that these nuclear weapons will actually be employed, but remain hostile to North Korean nuclearisation because they fear escalation of the long-running conflicts to hot war. Russia and China believe that any military action by the United States or South Korea, even if intended to be limited, perhaps ‘surgical strikes’ against North Korean nuclear facilities, would risk all-out war in Korea. In that case both Russia and China would be a destination for North Korean refugees and both China and Russia would find their economic development plans for their northeastern provinces severely disrupted. As Toloroya points out in his chapter, Russia is looking to invest and integrate in its Eastern provinces and, again like China, fears that

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continuing instability does not help bring investor confidence to its Northeast Asian territory. Another level of security tension is that provided by North Korea’s antique and vulnerable political structures. North Korea, although formally abandoning communism in its 2009 constitutional revisions, still operates politically as an authoritarian and insular state whose leadership fears that any political relaxation at home will open the floodgates for a display of mass dissatisfaction and anger that could topple the regime. Japan and the United States would, of course, welcome such an event, but Russia would prefer to see a negotiated liberalisation of North Korean politics. This is partly because, as it shares a border with North Korea, it would face practical problems if unrest spilled over into Russia’s Maritime provinces. Russia would also be wary of a rapid change in strategic balances in Northeast Asia; expansion of South Korean, and by extension United States influence, right up to its border areas would cause President Medvedev and the alleged power behind the throne, ex-President Putin, some cause for concern. Another layer to the ongoing Korean security crises is that of North Korea’s chronic economic problems. The low level of economic activity combined with continuing chronic cereal deficits means that the majority of the population still faces a real threat of hunger and potentially starvation every year. This is particularly so in the agricultural lean season when food stocks run down, between May/June and September/October. Japan and the United States, although not neighbours of North Korea, are involved to a certain extent with the welfare impact of hunger in North Korea. A constant debate, more so in the United States but still ongoing in Japan, centres around whether to offer humanitarian assistance to North Korea’s hungry population, or whether these sorts of actions constitute giving free goods to the North Korean government and hence end up prolonging the regime. North Korea of 2012 is not the North Korea of 1991, when the population went hungry but had little knowledge of their neighbours in China and South Korea or any experience of solving their own economic problems through self-directed economic activity. The North Korean population of the 2010s is very well informed as to the prosperity of its neighbours and is also much less inclined to accept the omniscience of the state than it was in the early 1990s. The failed attempt to control the market economy through currency reform in late 2009 brought misery to many millions of Party members, security officials and bureaucrats and it was these functionaries, whose job was primarily to enforce state diktats and sanction



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those who criticised the state, who were as loud in their complaints about the government as the rest of the population. The fragility of the political structures in North Korea, widespread discontent caused by economic deprivation and the cynicism of the population in respect to government together mean that the conditions for regime disintegration are partially in place. Russia (and China) now need to make contingency plans for rapid political change if and when it were to take place in neighbouring North Korea. Human security considerations have implications for political stability in North Korea that go beyond regional disaster management. A bigger strategic issue for Russia, Japan and the United States, along with South Korea and China, is how to prepare for possible military repression by the North Korean government against the population if there is outright political unrest. There is also a fear that if the North Korea regime is in trouble (as it is), it may do as many states have done in the past, and provoke a military action so as to mobilise the population around a nationalist message. It is no accident that the DPRK’s remaining ideological underpinnings are shaped by independence and nationalist discourses. These discourses are still capable in many countries of mobilising populations around unpopular governments. Some cynics have argued that limited military conflict over Korea would suit the United States because of its fear of China as a rising force and as a challenge to US power in East Asia (see the discussion by Kang and Easley). The argument is that a limited military conflict would force China into recognising the predominant political role of the United States in the region and would, in the end, result in a South Korean defeat of North Korea, thus forcing a reconfiguration of the balance of power in East Asia in favour of the United States. Despite the overall tilt to Asia that it is possible to discern in Japanese foreign policy (see Chapter 6 by SwensonWright) and the continuing caution about being perceived as militarist, there are powerful domestic currents in Japan that would also welcome a decisive military action against the North Korean regime. Until recently, the South Korean government had acted as a moderating voice in these debates, but the discussion now in the US/Japan/South Korea alliance is probably not about ‘why’ such activity should be undertaken but ‘why not?’. This takes us back then to the failure of multilateral diplomacy over Korean security complexities and the absence of a stable and reliable collective security mechanism in East Asia. The various parties are reduced to periodically repeating static positions about their views on how to bring

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about a stable security regime for the Korean peninsula, its inhabitants and the region as a whole. Diplomacy has failed and political paralysis has ensued. In this diplomatic vacuum the military planners prepare for the worst and, as they do so, may succeed in bringing about the worst through those very preparations.

SOUTH KOREA’S FOREIGN POLICY AND EAST ASIA Chaesung Chun South Korea, which for many years lacked a forward-looking foreign strategy, is now in a position to opt for something longer term and ambitious. These days, there are growing debates and burgeoning discourses about the desirable future trajectory of South Korean foreign policy. A theoretical perspective that will guide South Korean foreign strategy in defining the policy environment and specifying purposes and interests is necessary, together with a more concrete exploration of future policy agendas. I. Theoretical Perspective for East Asian International Relations: Multiple Historical Dimensions with Overlapping Organising Principles Western International Relations theories, discourses and foreign policy thinking have been based on the assumption that there have been paradigmatic or grand transitions in organising principles and constitutional structures in the making of the medieval, modern or postmodern order.1 Symbolised by events such as the fall of the Roman Empire or the Treaty of Westphalia, the Western order has witnessed mega-transitions that affected the formation of ‘international’ or regional political structures or the constitution of individual agents and units. Scholars agree that modern international relations have been structured under the organising principle of ‘anarchy’, in which state units retain sovereignty internally and externally. Positivist-oriented IR scholars have built ‘scientific’ theories of international relations on the basis of this assumption, and historical sociologists have traced the process by which territorial states as units gain superiority over other competing units such as empires, city states and principalities.2 Various paradigms such as realism, liberalism or 1 For the concept of ‘constitutional structure’, see Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and all that”, International Organization 47–1, (1993). 2 Stephen Hobden, International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down Boundries (New York: Routledge, 1998); Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson, Historical Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

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structuralism, although they diverge in their basic theoretical assumptions, share the view that the organising principle of anarchy is overarching in forming the international political structure and the character of state units. While modern political transition in Europe was driven by inherent forms of logic such as the rise of territorial states, empowerment of the bourgeoisie through the development of capitalism, and the role of rationalism and a secular world view, which led to the strengthening of territorial kings, modernity, for Asians, was imposed externally.3 Charles Tilly’s thesis that “war makes states, and states make war” also applies to Asia, but in a quite different way.4 The Opium War in 1840 paved the way for Westerners to transform fundamentally the organising principle of the Asian regional order. In a sequence of unequal treaties that forced open ports, China was made accustomed to the ‘modern international’ order. Throughout the nineteenth century, other nations such as Japan and Korea were also transformed into modern units, characterised by sovereignty, territorial boundaries, and empire-colony relations. The process of modernisation in regional order was couched in severe rivalries among Western powers, a new inherent growing empire such as Japan, and a modern colony such as Korea.5 The impact of externally imposed modernisation, and of distorted modernisation based on empire-colony relations has been enormous. To establish modern international relations means establishing an equilibrium among units in observing the basic constitutional norms, even though the relationships between these units are highly competitive. Without common rules and principles, which make competition itself possible, order cannot be maintained. State sovereignty entails norms of mutual recognition as independent units and non-intervention.6 The fact 3 See Moon, Chung-In and Chun, Chaesung, “Sovereignty: Dominance of the Westphalian Concept and Implication for Regional Security”, in Alagappa, Muthiah. Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 4 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, ad 990–1990 (USA: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Charles Tilly, “War making and State making as Organized Crime,” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 5 Chaesung Chun, “Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory? Reflections on and from Korea,” in Amitav Acharya, and Barry Buzan, eds., Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives On and Beyond Asia (New York: Routledge, 2010). 6 Osiander, Andreas, The States System of Europe, 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International stability (Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 1994);



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that these norms are frequently violated to the extent that the independence of states is subjugated by expansionary powers does not negate the basic tenet that the international structure is still based on the continuing organising principle of anarchical society. In Asia, the basic norms that should constitute stable modern regional order failed to apply in their entirety. The tasks of making complete modern state units, and concomitantly establishing a stable organising principle of ‘anarchy’ with observation of the norms of basic sovereignty remained unachieved. For example, in Northeast Asia completion of the state- building process is still to be seen: two Koreas and two Chinas still compete for exclusive sovereignty with the purpose of ‘unification’. As long as these units claim their exclusive rights to be just sovereign units, each negating the sovereign status of the other, a genuine anarchical society cannot be set up. Japan, too, even though it was quite successful in transforming itself into a modern sovereign state, labours under the constraints originating from its imperialist past and suffers from the daunting task of accomplishing the status of a ‘normal’ state and recognition as a non-expanding modern state. Japan’s difficulties in overcoming constitutional constraints upon its military power, and subsequently upon its foreign policy, do not come just from the post-Second World War arrangements, but also from the memories of East Asian peoples, who are easily reminded of Japanese imperialism. As East Asians, especially those who had been under Japanese colonisation, are not sure about a great power status for Japan that is not oriented towards expansionism, Japan’s normalisation still lies under the historical influence of incomplete modernisation in the region. The organising principle of international relations in East Asia can, then, be characterised as pre-Hobbesian anarchy in the sense that, to set up Hobbesian anarchy or a basic anarchical society, let alone Lockean and Kantian anarchy, basic norms of sovereignty must be observed.7 In a situation where the existence of state units is frequently threatened, the modern working of international relations is still difficult. For example, North Korea’s nuclear ambition originates not just from its aggressiveness and adventurism, or from diplomatic calculation that makes full use of brinkmanship. North Korea, as an incomplete modern unit which has to Reus-Smit, Christian, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 7 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2002[1977]). For tripartite distinction, see Wendt, Alexander Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

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compete endlessly with South Korea, rejects engagement with the South, because stable inter-Korean relations at a time of extreme power imbalance may lead to unification and the disappearance of North Korea forever. Under these circumstances, observation of the norms of sovereignty between the two Koreas is impossible, making the situation one of a constant war of survival against the other. Another point to be noted is that there is not just one, but multiple organising principles in East Asian international politics. Western theories tend to assume that the overarching principle of anarchy orients modern international politics. Even though the quality of anarchy can be categorised into multiple forms according to its degree of sociability, the fact is that the underlying principle is always unitary. However, in East Asia, the principle of pre-Hobbesian anarchy, or of an incomplete Westphalian system, coexists with the typical modern logic of anarchy. To be sure, East Asian countries are dominated by the modern logic of a balance of power, power transition, and other liberal mechanisms of market peace, democratic peace, or institutional peace. In particular, the absence of any strong multilateralism in East Asia makes the modern logic of the balance of power more salient. During the Cold War period in Northeast Asia, nations assumed that the two Koreas and two Chinas, and a not-normal Japan, should be just players alongside the two superpowers, an arrangement that made the balance of power game work in typical fashion. The five Northeast Asian countries were recognised as quasi-sovereign states in running the balance of power game.8 Three Communist states competing with three other liberal democratic states made the region look like any other region under the Cold War confrontation. Alliances were formed with a precise definition of who the enemies were, regional multilateralism was lacking, and a security dilemma over the arms race continued. Seen from the angle of a modern balance of power, East Asia could be analysed using Western theories of international relations. In the twenty-first century, considerations of the changing balance of power are most crucial issues for all East Asian countries. Debates on the passing of American unipolarity,9 the rise 8 Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 9 Christopher Layne, Bradley A. Thayer, eds. American Empire: A Debate (Routledge, 2006); Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, 2007); Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Harvard, 2004); Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War



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of China and subsequently the rise of the G2 testify to the importance of the modern logic of power distribution and power transition. One thing to be noted, however, is that the above logic of incomplete modernisation, to which I have alluded, has been in operation at the same time. For example, competition between the two Koreas within each alliance system worked following the balance of power logic. Among incomplete sovereign units, the modern logic of a balance of power has operated as if these units are self-sufficient. During the Cold War period, this logic of a balance of power was strong enough to conceal the fact that the task of modern transition still remained. However, under this mechanism lies the fear that any weakening of one’s power would lead to unification and the end of survival as a sovereign unit. The phenomenon of multiple, transitional and overlapping organising principles, constitutional structures, or security architectures is not specific to the Asian region. Most Third World nations and their region have gone through the process of imperialism and post-colonial normalisation, and their international relations are defined by the legacies of a modern transition period, or even of traditional times. Even in Europe, there were periods when old organising principles coexisted with new ones. From the period of modern transition in the fifteenth century to the early nineteenth century, typical nation states coexisted with more archaic empires such as the Holy Roman Empire.10 Imperial norms negating the norms of sovereignty periodically came to the fore with the advent of modern regionalism, or revolutionary states such as Napoleonic France, which aimed at a French empire. Norms of sovereignty arguably took root after the Napoleonic War, thereby creating equilibrium among European powers, who now observed the rights of other nations to their sovereignty.11 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1999); Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”, International Security, 17,4 (Spring 1993), 5–51; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment”, International Security, 31, 2 (Fall 2006), 7–41. 10 Stephen D. Krasner, “Westphalia and all that”, in Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the making of Modern International Relations (London: Verso, 2003); Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe, 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International stability (Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Andreas Osiander “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth”, International Organization 55–2, (2001). 11 For the prolonged process of establishing modern states system, see Andreas Osiander, “Before Sovereignty: Society and politics in ancient regime Europe, in Michael Cox, Tim Dunne, and Ken Booth, eds., Empires, Systems and States: Great Transformations in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

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In addition to the overlapping organising principles of modern transition and modernity, we are living in a time where a post-Westphalian order coexists with a Westphalian one. Other units than nation states are gaining powers, giving rise to the phenomenon of multi-levelled governance both globally and regionally. The power of international institutions, subnational organisations such as NGOs, and transnational ones such as multinational corporations is so enhanced as to let them work with the authority of nation states. As actors at different levels are related to each other in a highly intricate way, global governance is no longer ‘inter-nationally’ defined. Rather, complex networks are to be formed, with no single unit exclusively determining the course of events.12 Thus sovereignty does not seem to reside in any one unit, not even in nation states in an empirical sense. There are networks of institutions in different issue-areas that do not belong to the domain of state affairs. So many transnational issues are crucial these days, such as the environment, terrorism, and natural disasters, all of which exceed state control in some ways. Future historians may evaluate our time as the one with overlapping principles of Westphalian order and post-Westphalian order, or one of postmodern transition. We do not know exactly what kind of postmodern global or regional order will materialise. But it is certain that there will be multiple key actors including nation states, and most issues will be global and not confined to national boundaries. East Asia is not an exception. We see the rise of new, complex networks: we witness new areas and new actors in Northeast Asia, which might be called ‘postmodern’ phenomena, which in turn determine relations among states. Climate change and the role of global and regional co-operative mechanisms change the way how states look at, and define, the problem. Just as environmental changes do not know national borders, so the solution should be transnational as well. As interest groups and civil society organisations are more empowered, and as this trend continues in the future in already democratised countries such as South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, and also in less democratised countries, how they think and feel 12 Miles Kahler, ed., Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Castells, Manuel, and Gustavo Cardoso eds., The Network Society: From Knowledge to Policy, (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006); Castells, Manuel, ed., The Network Society: A Cross-cultural Perspective, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004); Latour, Bruno, Reassessing the Social: An Introduction to Actor-network Theory. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Slaughter, Anne-Marie, A New World Order. (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004); Urry, John. 2003. Global Complexity. (Cambridge: Polity, 2003).



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will affect the future of Northeast Asian countries. States should gain public support not just from the domestic arena but also from other nations as well. Soft power and public diplomacy will be more important in accomplishing a state’s foreign policy goals. The public realm for more active communicative action both on line and off line at the regional level is growing in discussion of important regional issues. It is still to be seen if the pace of new regional governance will be fast enough to have the effect of easing power competition between states. However, the potential of new networks in new issues, together with the empowerment of new actors, draws the expectation that power transition and future international relations will be grounded not just in rivalry between states but also in multi-layered networks. All these arguments lead to the conclusion that East Asian international politics are based upon at least three organising principles: moderntransitional, modern, and postmodern. A contracted and externally imposed process of modernisation rendered the modernising process incomplete. The powerful logic of the Cold War made the balance of power work in typical fashion even among incomplete sovereign units. Now the newly arising principle of complex networks affects already complicated Northeast Asian politics. It is thus not rare to confront all of these three principles in analysing an issue. We face complicated soures of conflict even when examining just one question. For example, South Korea’s efforts to pave a new way for co-operation with Japan are overlaid with many issues such as territorial disputes, issues of history, policies of economic co-operation, policy coordination regarding the rise of China, North Korean nuclear problems, and trilateral security co-operation with the United States. Memory politics and territorial disputes arise in the modern transitional period because basic problems belonging to the sovereignty issue have not been solved. They exist in reality and in the minds of people as the effect of memory politics. They are also mixed with the modern logic of the balance of power and power transition, when we deal with the issue of the rise of China. All of these issues are furthermore interpreted through the postmodern spectrum, where new questions loom large, such as the transformation in the alliance with the United States, which aims at perpetuating its hegemony in totally new strategic environments where it is faced with nontraditional actors such as global terrorists, and human security goals such as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hence any effort to solve an issue from a rather simple perspective is trapped in multilayered, structural problems as the issue becomes more complicated.

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Overlapping organising structures at three levels Organising principle

Basic logic

Policy issues

Moderntransitional

Pre-anarchy

Incomplete establishment of norms of sovereignty

Unification, normalisation of sovereignty rights, nationalism, memory politics

Modern

Anarchy

Balance of power, liberal co-operation

Post-modern transitional

Complex network

Network/ governance among multilevel actors in multi-issue areas

Policy tasks for South Korea

Inter-Korean relationship, establishing mature sovereign norms with Japan and China, nationalism and history consciousness Security dilemma, Maintaining power balance, defence alliance, power and deterrence transition, against North regional Korea, peaceful multilateralism power transition, establishing regional co-operation Transgovernmental Increasing soft and positional power, networks, developing multi-level network co-operation, co-operation overcoming regionally and network failure globally

II. Developing Discourses on the Future of South Korean Foreign Policy South Korea has been a relatively weak and divided country, surrounded by four great powers: the United States, China, Russia and Japan. One can easily understand how difficult it has been for South Korea to define a long-term, ample foreign strategy of its own. South Korean foreign policy has suffered from overwhelming international factors, a lack of policy



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measures, and insufficient strategic thinking and discourses. Competition with North Korea, which has always threatened South Korea’s very survival, has also obliged South Korean policy-makers to focus upon much more short-term problems and impending events, such as deterring the North’s possible aggression and defending the country. Such situations have changed due to external and internal factors. Externally, the end of the Cold War and the rapidly changing foreign policies of the great powers have provided new criteria for South Korean foreign policy. Especially inter-Korean reconciliation, albeit fluctuating and unstable, has made new space for the South’s foreign policy. Internally, the growth of South Korean economic power and successful democratisation have changed the relative status of South Korea, and now the country seeks to establish itself as a middle power player in regional and global arenas. To have a long-term and overall foreign strategy, however, is not easy. The endeavours of South Korea’s post-Cold War presidents have been characterised by incomplete conceptualisation and short-term perspectives and incoherence, running through a series of administrations. President Roh Tae Woo pursued the so-called Nordpolitik, followed by President Kim Young Sam’s globalisation strategy, which was later criticised for worsening the economic situation and leading to the Asian financial crisis in 1997. President Kim Dae Jung and President Roh Moo Hyun led the country with more or less progressive policy ideas such as the Sunshine Policy, the Asia-Pacific era, a strategic balancing role and the Northeast Asian era, only to be followed by the current conservative administration of Lee Myung Bak. All these discourses and strategies had their own meanings, but they generally lacked well-prepared, long-term and overall visions and perspectives. Theoretical reflections on East Asian international relations show that the challenges are multi-layered, and policies should also be multifaceted. The factor of an incomplete modern transition has produced many challenges such as inter-Korean rivalry and the question of unification, territorial disputes with Japan, nationalist antagonism among Northeast Asian countries, and the politics of apology with Japan regarding past colonialisation. Modern Westphalian international politics question the alternatives for South Korea’s foreign policy regarding the issues of the rise of China, the possible decline of US hegemony, any future alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the US, and inter-Korean competition and co-operation. The post-Westphalian order, a complex network, poses challenges and opportunities as yet unexperienced. Rising issues have

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opened diverse arenas for new global politics, and the shifting balance between state actors and non-state actors in determining foreign policy demands the most appropriate form of state and decision-making procedures in a new era. New issues such as climate change, the financial crisis that started in 2008, nuclear non-proliferation, the fight against terrorism, policy co-ordination with the US as it seeks to lead the post-Westphalian order, and maximisation of soft power provide a few examples of new challenges. What South Korea should do is, first, to understand the complex nature of the challenges and opportunities coming from East Asian international relations, second, to clarify the long-term purpose of its foreign policy, and third, to augment policy measures to achieve its goals. Since the inauguration of the Lee government, there are currently two schools of thought or discourse in South Korea regarding South Korean foreign policy. A new school can be labelled the globalist school. Regardless of party political orientations, the presidential election in 2007 had shown that the range of South Korean foreign policy now extends beyond East Asia. President Lee’s ‘Global Korea’ was shared by other presidential candidates in 2007, although the expressions used varied. The expanding economic relations of South Korean business, South Korea’s rapidly rising cultural power and global role in many international institutions helped to enlighten politicians and policy-makers. The Lee government has tried to establish itself as a global player with middle power status regarding the agendas for climate change, financial crisis, and security. President Lee must have been encouraged by the new roles South Korea has acquired in holding the G20 Seoul summit in November 2010 and the nuclear security summit scheduled for 2012, and also in taking the initiative in the reduction of CO2 emissions. Globalists argue that South Korea should focus on the role of mediator, facilitator of co-operation, convener in international co-operation, agenda-setter, bridge-builder, or switcher in international networks. They believe that now is the time to rethink the whole paradigm of calculating national interests and to broaden the range of South Korea’s influence. An enhanced status for South Korea globally would strengthen its regional role by giving it a new reputation and moral stature. These strategic ideas are supported by the advent of the post-Westphalian global order, in which the share of material power is decreasing, whereas soft power and positional power in networks—as contrasted with resource power—are on the rise. Globalists note that South Korea should refresh its vision, which has been trapped in old issues such as inter-Korean relations, Northeast Asian politics, and traditional concerns in the ROK–US alliance.



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On the opposite side of the debate stand more traditional realists. They argue that Northeast Asia is still determined by hard politics with the priority on security relations. As the region lacks any effective multilateral, co-operative mechanism, power determines major events. A keen sense of the changing distribution of national power is called for. Maintaining superiority over North Korea both militarily and economically, aiming finally at engagement or unification, will be highly important in maximising South Korea’s national strength. The rise of China poses challenges to every regional player because no one knows the end-state of this fundamental power transition. As history teaches the pre-eminent importance of power, realists try to prepare for China’s rise with the option of maintaining strong relations of alliance with the US. Given that this is somewhat of an ideal-type distinction, where the combination of the two is quite possible, we might add another dimension of conservatives vs. progressives to that of globalists vs. traditional realists. We may then have the following table: Major agendas for each school conservatives

progressives

Globalist

counter-terrorism, democratic network

Traditional realist

security on the peninsula, emphasis on the ROK–US alliance

transnational NGO networks, global anti-liberal movement, peace movement inter-Korean reconciliation, criticism of the ROK–US alliance, regional multilateralism

The core of the question, then, is not to determine which school is right, but how to combine different perspectives. It would be misleading to be overly optimistic just because South Korea’s soft power or positional power has become stronger, when there is no significant increase in material power. Moreover, global politics are still in a state of post-Westphalian transition and are not yet exactly post-Westphalian. The traditional power index defined by military and economic power is still very much effective. It is good to host important meetings such as the G20 and nuclear security

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summits; but insufficient material power will build a barrier to South Korea’s self-claimed roles of mediator or bridge-builder. To focus upon traditional power politics, on the other hand, is also unwise. There are new areas of competition and co-operation for global politics for which every nation strives. For maximising soft power, many states are eager to develop efficient public diplomacy, to strengthen their charm offensive and exploit their positional power. Unless the role of the state in these new issue-areas is defined, the purpose of even traditional power political concerns will not be accomplished. Problems related to the remnants of incomplete transition to the modern era also have to be tackled. The Lee administration struggles with the questions raised by North Korea’s nuclear issues, with strengthening ties with Japan, and so on. All these issues are based on the organising principle of pre-Hobbesian anarchy. South Korean policy-makers should know that the country’s unification policy, the problem of setting the proper level of Japan’s apology for past colonialisation, and the answer to nationalist antagonism among East Asians are not just issues to be handled with simple answers, but ones solvable only by transforming the underlying structure of East Asian international politics. III. Tasks for a Future South Korean Foreign Policy 1. Long-Term Interests and Purposes of South Korean Foreign Policy Combining the above-mentioned factors, the national interests and purposes of South Korean foreign policy can be formulated theoretically as the following: first, to complete the process of modern transition, meaning that the norms of sovereignty are established among the East Asian units, such as peaceful coexistence, and the solution of sovereignty issues; second, to manage peacefully the balance of power and power transition; and third, to form a new framework of co-operation in dealing with new transnational issues, with the hope that it will spill over into more traditional issues. South Korea may thus want to maintain peaceful relations with the North and help to establish norms of peaceful coexistence and sovereign equality, to facilitate co-operation among great powers so as to effect a peaceful transition of power, and to lead the process of transnational co-operation and formation of regional co-operative, multi-layered networks for the new issues of the twenty-first century. These purposes correspond to the following vital and critical interests of South Korea’s foreign policy.



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Vital interests can be listed as below: • to prevent military conflicts with North Korea and maintain peace on the peninsula • to preserve the state’s survival and security, political autonomy and socio-economic development in the Northeast Asia region • to continue economic development led by developing leading sectors and gaining access to global markets to prevent any military conflicts among major powers in the •  region, especially any possible persistent bipolar or multipolar confrontations • to maintain access to energy resources • to preserve national values such as democracy, freedom, human rights, and the market economy. Critical interests can be listed as below: • to reunify Korea in a peaceful and democratic way • to engage the North structurally, leading the North to processes of reform and opening • to maintain peaceful and co-operative relationships with surrounding powers and to establish a sustainable and multilateral form of security co-operation • to develop the ROK–US alliance with more fundamental common strategic interests and visions • to pursue a middle power strategy to transform the security environment of Northeast Asia and to facilitate co-operation among major powers • to lead the cultural and identity politics of the region towards a more communitarian atmosphere • to establish South Korea as a global middle power contributing to global affairs with universal values, substantial policy means, and proper policy goals. 2. ROK–US Alliance The ROK–US alliance is the cornerstone of South Korea’s foreign strategy in transforming the state of pre-Hobbesian anarchy, stabilising the Northeast Asian balance of power, and dealing smoothly with the postWestphalian transition. Although there have been various critiques of the future of the alliance, the lesson has been learned that South Korea will need the alliance partnership with the US in a new structure. South Koreans also feel the importance of redefining basic missions and tasks for the alliance in the twenty-first century.

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The alliance, formed in 1953 during the early period of the Cold War, has worked to maintain the balance of power on the peninsula and in the region, meaning that the modern logic of power balance has been at its core. The raison d’être of the alliance is thus to deter outside security threats, mainly from North Korea. The most basic mission of the ROK–US alliance has been deterrence and defence against any possible North Korean attack, and it will remain, for the time being, one of the most essential elements in the alliance. In the aftermath of the collapse of former Communist countries, North Korea’s ‘military first policy’ aims at maximising the political effects of military means, legitimising its dictatorship, and revitalising its system in the future. With North Korea’s continuous efforts to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, getting them dismantled and providing extended deterrence will be key tasks in the future. The North Korea question, however, is fundamentally changing. Although threats from North Korea’s long-established strategies will continue, there are new ones relating to ‘North Korea in transition’ and possibly contingent accidents or instability inside the North. The fact that events could take an unexpected course as a result of Kim Jong Il’s ill health and any possible leadership succession, gives new purpose to the alliance. There could be economic turmoil, political strife inside the leadership or uprisings from below. Above all, domestic instability might foster unexpected provocations against South Korea, as already witnessed in the events of the Cheonan incident, and the shelling of Yeonpyeong island in 2010. Whichever event materialises, it is certain that the alliance’s mission should include a strategy to deal with a North Korea in transition, stabilise the stage, and look to a more beneficial and managed future. This mission touches on the problem of how to set up stable and durable political relations between the two Koreas and how to define North Korea’s position in the future picture of Northeast Asia. This is an issue related to the problem of an incomplete modern transition and the question of sovereignty between the two Koreas. Yet both the US and South Korea seem to be ill prepared to plan and co-ordinate a long-term, new North Korean policy. There should be an intense debate about how to convince the North Korean leadership of their survivability with detailed programmes of modernising the North, once they decide to give up their nuclear programmes. As we do not know how much time is left before any contingencies erupt, delays in preparing for a comprehensive deal will narrow the chance to manage the transition period.



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The United States, especially the former George W. Bush administration, had the tendency to look at the North Korean nuclear problem from the angle of global non-proliferation, particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attack. Any possible transfer of nuclear materials from North Korea to terrorists is something that both the US and South Korea will prevent with any means. However, the political effect of dealing with the North Korean question mainly from the non-proliferation perspective is that one easily forgets the complex political dimensions of the problem. As the logic of non-proliferation relates to global norms and human security, i.e. to a network of post-Westphalian transgovernmental norms, it is important for the alliance to deal with the North Korean issue from more complex perspectives concerning the modern logic of power balance and at the same time sovereignty. South Korea will hold the 2012 nuclear security summit, from which it will gain a lot: international status as a trustworthy country concerning nuclear safeguards, economic sideline effects leading to the export of nuclear technologies, and the opportunity to internationalise more broadly the North Korean nuclear question. Regarding the North Korean issue, however, concentrating on the non-proliferation dimension may have the effect of relatively minimising the political dimension of the problem. As the Lee government is so eager to pursue the strategy of ‘Global Korea’, the delicate question of North Korea’s political status might be alienated. It is not an easy task to be continuously reminded of all three organising principles at the same time when dealing with the concrete issue. Yet it is an imperative. More generally, how the idea of ‘Global Korea’ will fill in actual foreign policy agendas and especially how this idea will fit into the possibility of “globalizing the ROK-US alliance” is far from certain. Apart from a strategic dimension of globalising South Korea’s interest structure, the South Korean public still adheres to its old self-perception to confine South Korea’s role and target regions. It will take some time for the country to transform itself into a prosperous, democratic and global middle power, and how to manage this transitional stage will be crucial.13 This is the issue of how to combine the globalist perspective with the traditionalist one. What is important is for South Koreans to have their own strategic view on global affairs, and then to find consensus in globalising the ROK–US 13 Kurt M. Campbell, Victor D. Cha, Lindsey Ford, Nirav Patel, Randy Schriver, Vikram J. Singh, Kazuyo Kato, Going Global: The Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance (Center for a New American Security, 2009).

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alliance. Global missions imposed by the alliance without a solid national consensus at first hand might work in the short term, but will finally fail in the long run. It would be regrettable if both countries were to weaken the possibility of promoting a long-term, global alliance by lacking well-staged plans. 3. Regional Strategy in Northeast Asia South Korea has tried to have strategically co-operative relationships with neighbouring countries, because as a relatively weak power in the region, maintaining co-operation is the key to survival. The Lee administration has endeavoured to establish strategic relations with all four great powers, resulting in a “strategic alliance” with the US, a “strategic cooperative partnership” with China and with Russia, and a “mature partnership” with Japan. However, as South Korea has never looked at the whole region as a policy unit to be handled, the sum of individual neighbourhood policies does not constitute a coherent regional policy. The most desirable regional future for South Korea would be one without major competition among the big powers. If a situation of rivalry arose, South Korea would have to make the painful decision to turn its back on one of the rivals. A competitive or even antagonistic G2 would be the worst equilibrium, with regional multilateralism as the best end-state. South Korea’s co-operation with China is indispensable in many areas, not only in bilateral issues, but also in North Korean issues, regional ones, and global issues. China, now the number one trading partner of South Korea, the most significant player in solving the issues of North Korean nuclear development and peace on the peninsula, and a country that maintains many traditional and modern values with South Korea, shares strategic interests with the South. The future of any Northeast Asian power transition stemming from the rise of China is unpredictable, however. Neither South Korea nor China desire any possible conflicts in the region, and agree on a peaceful transformation of the regional order towards one that is more pacific and mature and more responsive to the regional public; there are thus many areas for co-operation. To have a balanced and mutually beneficial relationship with China in the middle of Northeast Asian regional relations will be crucial for South Korean national interests. To list some of South Korea’s interests towards China, South Korea needs to further economic co-operation and find a favourable environment for settling any possible economic disagreements. Other purposes include: to



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develop socio-economic exchanges so as to share greater understanding about each other, for example, in the form of cultural exchanges and human exchanges at various levels; to facilitate political co-operation by developing multi-level exchanges of officials and diverse conferences for strategic dialogues; to find a better way to reconcile nationalism in the region with common values such as economic development and prosperity, regional co-operation, democracy, a new postmodern civilisation, human rights, and peace as the basis for solving critical problems; to cooperate for the peaceful solution of the North Korean nuclear issue, and to find a policy for engagment with the North to facilitate the peace and stability of the peninsula; to co-operate for the establishment of a durable peace regime on the peninsula and possibly for peaceful reunification, which will contribute to regional stability; to establish a multilateral mechanism for co-operation between Northeast Asian countries and to enhance openness and transparency in solving critical regional issues such as environmental problems, refugees, and nuclear proliferation; and to cooperate in global arenas such as climate change, energy security, environmental protection, poverty, contagious diseases, and other global issues. The Lee government has tried to strengthen its strategic relationship with China at the same time as restructuring the ROK–US alliance. It is not clear how much room South Korea can have in these double strategic relationships. So far, strategic relations with China, in the form of a “strategic cooperative partnership”, are evolving. Under the framework of this partnership, both countries, on the economic front, have raised the issues of expanding substantive co-operation and seeking mutual benefit, covering the fields of two-way investment, trade, the telecom industry, energy, intellectual property, food safety and quality inspection, logistics, finance, polar science and technology. The need to study and promote the process of a China–ROK free trade agreement (FTA) is also being examined. Both sides are dealing also with the question of expanding exchanges between their young people and of boosting their personnel exchanges by studying and adopting measures to facilitate the visa process. Regarding regional/global relationships, China promises to continue its support for improving inter-Korean ties through dialogue and consultation. Regarding the Korean peninsula nuclear issue, both countries are seeking joint efforts with the other parties in the Six Party Talks, to realise the denuclearisation of the peninsula. South Korea reaffirms its recognition of the People’s Republic of China as the only legal government representing China and its adherence to the one-China policy.

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There will also be joint efforts towards tripartite co-operation between China, the ROK and Japan; the need to hold a trilateral summit and for their respective foreign ministers to talk regularly is recognised. Climate change, weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, financial crimes, piracy, high-tech crime and other issues are also of common concern. However, it is also to be noted that as the bilateral relationship develops, more issues come to the fore for management. Now the two countries feel a strong need to invent mechanisms for conflict management/resolution. There are many newly arising problems between the two counties. To name a few: bilateral trade disputes, managing problems in South Korean investment, issues of history, the clash of nationalism in the two countries, strategic issues regarding the ROK-US alliance, a joint vision for the solution of North Korean nuclear problems and the future of North Korea, and more recently their common dealings with the incident of the naval ship Cheonan in 2010. From now on, the Lee government’s effort towards China will be evaluated by whether proper mechanisms of conflict resolution and co-ordination can be implemented. As the bilateral networks at various levels between South Korea and China develop, a new culture of co-operation is beginning to flourish. Co-operation in human security issues in a post-Westphalian fashion has the effect of correcting past patterns in the bilateral relationship under the Cold War. The question is how to deal peacefully with the phenomenon of power transition and how to define South Korea’s role in this process. The traditional theory of power transition notes that a rising power with dissatisfied perceptions at some point challenges the existing hegemon, usually ending up with a hegemonic war.14 However, there are several particular points in the current power transition in Northeast Asia, which may be indicative of a possible peaceful process of transition. First, the phenomenon we see is one of a power 14 Charles Kupchan et al., Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order (New York: United Nations University Press), 2001, Zhiqun Zhu, US-China Relations in the 21st Century: Power Transition and Peace (London: Routledge), 2006; Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke (eds.), Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger (Ann Arbor: MI, University of Michigan Press, 1996); Woosang Kim, “Power, Alliance, and Major Wars, 1816–1975,” Journal of Conflict Resolutions, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1989, pp. 255–273. Woosang Kim, “Alliance Transitions and Great Power War,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1991, pp. 833–850, Woosang Kim, “Power Transitions and Great Power war from Westphalia to Waterloo,” World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1992, pp. 153–172, and Woosang Kim and James D. Morrow, “When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1992, pp. 896–922.



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transition in a situation of unipolarity. Rising powers should adapt themselves for a certain period of time to the structural frameworks made by the current hegemon. For example, China, to further its rise, needs for the time being to conform to the security, political and socio-economic framework made by the US. The need to rise under unipolarity might have the effect of orienting the rising power in line with the existing structural framework and of lessening its degree of dissatisfaction. This possibility is optimistic in that it increases the chance of a peaceful power transition in the region. However there are still lingering doubts over possible cooperation between the US and China as experienced in many issues in 2010, such as the arms sales to Taiwan, military drills in the Yellow Sea, and the debate regarding the South China Sea. If no preparation is made against possible controversial issues, these will soon degenerate into problems aggravating the security dilemma between the existing hegemon and the rising power. Second, the relatively short experience of a system of modern states from the mid-nineteenth century makes the revival of a pre-modern, traditional regional order easier. China refers to its own behaviour as that of a “benevolent hegemon” during traditional times and compares the current rise of China with past experience. The so-called discourse of “the fourth rise of China” after the Qing-Han, Tang, and Ming-Qing dynasties has been invented to lessen the worries of surrounding countries. Such a discourse might press China towards a more cooperative stance. However, it is to be noted that the perception of traditional Chinese dynasties as benevolent hegemons is not necessarily shared. For instance, South Koreans rather rapidly changed their perception on the rise of China from a positive to a negative feeling, after witnessing Chinese efforts to monopolise the history of Goguryeo (Koguryŏ). Thus, it might not be the rise of China as an individual great power that would threaten neighbours, but the rise of a Chinese system as a whole, to which surrounding countries cannot but find reference in historical experience. Here memory politics work strongly. Third, the current power transition occurs not only in the area of hard power, but also in that of soft power. International politics in the era of informatisation and democratisation work differently from before these megatrends appeared. The candidate hegemon needs to develop soft power resources to lead the region, inventing a better soft power vision for the region than that of the existing hegemon. Soft power transition occurs during the rise of competing states, during which time regional identity and normative politics become more complicated. China is trying to

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strengthen its soft power strategy, both to advance a better regional framework than that of the US and to search for space in which to construct a soft balance against the US through possible soft power alliances. Northeast Asian countries like South Korea, in the middle of soft power competition, sometimes have a hard time in taking a stance. What South Korea can do under these circumstances is to work as a smart mediator for co-operation among the great powers, and as the cultivator of a new form of co-operation. Lacking hard power to affect the power equilibrium among the great powers, South Korea could express its feelings about the rise of China, giving China a vision of a genuinely benevolent regional hegemon blessed by neighbouring countries. It might remind China of global norms that South Korea wants to see realised in the region and strengthen bilateral ties at various levels including that of civil societies. When China becomes a leader not just in hard power politics, but also in the regional public realm and regional value politics, the common vision of true regionalism will be realised. Whereas South Korea’s relationship with China sometimes seems uncertain because of the future, its relationship with Japan experiences hardship due to the past. Deep-seated memory politics, or politics of identity formed under the past experience of Japanese colonisation of the Korean peninsula from 1910 to 1945, prevent the possibility of future strategic co-operation. The keyword in the Lee government’s Japan policy is likely to be “postideological, benefit-focused pragmatic diplomacy”. The backdrop to such a perception seems to be the Lee government’s own analysis that, while the Roh Moo Hyun government carried out a Japan policy that placed priority on moral issues rather than benefits after it made a transition from ‘quiet diplomacy’, the outcome was disappointing on both fronts—the moral grounds and benefits. In light of this, the immediate task for the Lee government was to break with the phase of confrontation and open a new page of co-operation in its relations with Japan. Its benefit-focused foreign policy line grounded in a hardheaded calculation of the advantages and disadvantages was, therefore, a rational choice. It does not appear to be simply a return to the ‘quiet diplomacy’ of the past but a strategy aimed at maximising the national interest by avoiding unnecessary irritation and hence diplomatic conflict, while at the same time standing by core values on outstanding issues.15 15 Jo Yangheon, New Government’s Policy Toward Japan : Tasks and Prospects,” The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), Policy Brief 2008-4, May 2008.



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The two countries share many strategic interests and also a democratic identity. Besides impending issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem and the future of Korea, expanding the economic partnership to include both the bilateral and trilateral (with China) angles, and deepening military consultation, constitute the core of the relationship. As the two most advanced democracies in Northeast Asia, they share values and visions for the region towards democratic peace. New issues such as climate change, counter-terrorism, drug-trafficking and human rights are also good arenas for co-operation. Building a new alliance network based on the definition of new roles for the ROK–US alliance and the US–Japan alliance is another important domain for co-operation. Developing a common policy for the peaceful rise of China that might lead to a peaceful power transition would be good for both countries. Thus seemingly there is hope that the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan might be promising, if they managed to develop strategic co-operation on postmodern issues and the modern logic of a balance of power. What really obstructs the relationship is the problem coming from an incomplete modern transition. The two countries, in general, have been at odds over territorial and historical issues, such as repeated visits by Japanese leaders to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, compensation for Korean comfort women, and distortions of the two countries’ shared history in Japanese textbooks. With South Koreans thus reminded of their past experience where the sovereignty of South Korea was negated by Japan, the bilateral relationship deteriorates as soon as this dimension comes to the front. It will be a challenge for the two countries to find an answer to this question by cultivating more future-oriented co-operation. 4. Regional Multilateralism After the end of the Cold War, almost every region witnessed the rise of regional multilateralism.16 The US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Kurt M. Campbell, for instance, once remarked that it sounds like “alphabet soup” when East Asian talk about various designs and plans for regional multilateral institutions: ARF, APEC, ASEAN plus Three, East Asian Summit, and so on. US Secretary of State Hillary

16 Alan S. Alexandroff and Andrew F. Cooper, Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance (Waterloo, Ontario: The Centre for International Governance Innovation).

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Clinton has specified US endeavours for Asian multilateralism with five principles and priorities.17 What we can see in these discussions is that Asian countries are trying to institutionalise international relations, and there are many different plans and conceptualisations. So far the ques­ tion, especially during the Cold War period, was why East Asians could not have any meaningful regional multilateral mechanism, but the question now is: why are there so many? Although theorists in International Relations contrast realism with liberalism, in the form of uninstitutionalised power politics vs. institutionalised liberal co-operation, what we can see here is the mix of the two: that is, institutional balancing or an institutional balance of power.18 Naked competition among states in the logic of a balance of power has been tamed, but still the rivalry and competition are at work in different institutional settings. How to establish the basic norms and principles of institutions, and to determine who is in and who is out, will be critical in institutionalising the balance and distribution of power. In Northeast Asia, there are plans for regional multilateralism that reflect each nation’s future strategies. China’s design for a future ‘harmonious world’ is based on the role of China as a responsible great power with its own world views and value systems that come from the Chinese tradition of strategic culture. Japan’s appeal for an ‘East Asian community’ reminds of Japan’s future role as a regional power, with some adjustments from an America-first policy. The United States welcomes all these moves that purport to overcome a balance of power with the perspective of a power of balance, but it is still vigilant to see if these moves will hurt American national interests. New knowledge, new concepts and new words based on the post-Westphalian conception of regional politics will define how we think about the future. Knowledge power and linguistic practice will help. What we need in orienting future regional politics is not an institutional balance of power, but complex networks in many areas, especially new areas such as climate change, with empowerment of new actors such as civil society

17 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities,” Imin Center-Jefferson Hall, Honolulu, Hawaii, 12 January 2010; Kurt M. Campbell, “The U.S. and China in 2025,” Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C., 19 October 2009. 18 Kai He, “Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia” European Journal of International Relations, September 2008, vol. 14 no. 3, pp. 489–518.



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organisations, and international organisations at global and regional levels. Cultivating the culture of co-operation in the areas free of past strife will solidify the basis of co-operation and hopefully spill over into other arenas. As Northeast Asia experiences modern-transitional disputes and identity politics, the modern logic of a balance of power, and postmodern transitional politics, institutions or networks there should deal with these problems at the same time. For example, given that the North Korean nuclear problem originates from the country’s position as a divided country, its precarious status after the end of the Cold War, and its violation of global norms of non-proliferation, networks dealing with these problems cannot but face all of these issues at the same time. The Six Party Talks have their meaning in the sense that six countries are dealing with these questions, but are not without limitations. By allowing other actors than states to raise their voices in many fields, modern inter-state rivalry, which is less competent in establishing new governance in dealing with new issues, will make room for a new regional architecture. References Alexandroff, Alan S., and Andrew F. Cooper (2010): Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance (Waterloo, Ontario: The Centre for International Governance Innovation). Bacevich, Andrew J. (2004): American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Harvard University Press). Bull, Hedley: The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2002[1977]). Campbell, Kurt M., Victor D. Cha, Lindsey Ford, Nirav Patel, Randy Schriver, Vikram J. Singh, Kazuyo Kato (2009): Going Global: The Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance (Center for a New American Security). Campbell, Kurt M.: “The U.S. and China in 2025,” Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C., October 19, 2009. Castells, Manuel, and Gustavo Cardoso eds. (2006): The Network Society: From Knowledge to Policy, (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins Center for Transatlantic Relations). Castells, Manuel, ed., The Network Society: A Cross-cultural Perspective, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004). Chun, Chaesung: “Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory? Reflections on and from Korea,” in Amitav Acharya, and Barry Buzan, eds., Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives On and Beyond Asia (New York: Routledge, 2010). Clinton, Hillary Rodham: “Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities,” Imin Center-Jefferson Hall, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 12, 2010. He, Kai: “Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia” European Journal of International Relations, September 2008, vol. 14 no. 3, pp. 489–518. Hobden, Stephen, and John M. Hobson, Historical Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

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Hobden, Stephen: International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down Boundaries (New York: Routledge, 1998). Jo Yangheon, New Government’s Policy Toward Japan : Tasks and Prospects,” The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), Policy Brief 2008–4, May 2008 Kahler, Miles ed., Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). Kapstein, Ethan B. and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1999). Kim, Woosang: “Power Transitions and Great Power war from Westphalia to Waterloo,” World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1992, pp. 153–172. Kim, Woosang: “Alliance Transitions and Great Power War,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1991, pp. 833–850. Kim, Woosang: “Power, Alliance, and Major Wars, 1816–1975,” Journal of Conflict Resolutions, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1989, pp. 255–273. Kim, Woosang, and James D. Morrow: “When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1992, pp. 896–922. Krasner, Stephen D.: “Westphalia and all that”, in Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). Kugler, Jacek, and Douglas Lemke (eds.), Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger (Ann Arbor: MI, University of Michigan Press, 1996). Kupchan, Charles et al., Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order (New York: United Nations University Press), 2001. Latour, Bruno, Reassessing the Social: An Introduction to Actor-network Theory. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Layne, Christopher: “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise.” International Security, 17,4 (Spring 1993), 5–51. Layne, Christopher: “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment,” International Security, 31, 2 (Fall 2006), 7–41. Layne, Christopher: The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, 2007). Layne, Christopher, and Bradley A. Thayer, eds. American Empire: A Debate(Routledge, 2006). Moon, Chung-In and Chun, Chaesung, “Sovereignty: Dominance of the Westphalian Concept and Implication for Regional Security”, in Alagappa, Muthiah. Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). Osiander, Andreas: “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth”, International Organization 55–2, (2001). Osiander, Andreas: “Before Sovereignty: Society and politics in ancient regime Europe, in Michael Cox, Tim Dunne, and Booth, Ken eds., Empires, Systems and States: Great Transformations in International Politics(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Osiander, Andreas, The States System of Europe, 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International stability (Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Reus-Smit, Christian: The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). Robert, Jackson: Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Ruggie, John Gerard: “Territoriality and all that”, International Organization 47–1, (1993) Slaughter, Anne-Marie: A New World Order. (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004). Teschke, Benno: The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the making of Modern International Relations (London: Verso, 2003). Tilly, Charles: “War making and State making as Organized Crime”, in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).



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Tilly, Charles: Coercion, Capital, and European States, ad 990–1990 (USA: B.Blackwell, 1990); Urry, John. 2003. Global Complexity. (Cambridge: Polity, 2003). Wendt, Alexander Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Zhiqun Zhu, US-China Relations in the 21st Century: Power Transition and Peace (London: Routledge), 2006.

NORTH KOREA’S PLACE IN EAST ASIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Haksoon Paik Introduction This study focuses on North Korea’s strategy of survival and prosperity for the twenty-first century as expressed in its relations with, and policies towards, the United States and its East Asian neighbours in the post-Cold War era. It aims to illuminate how North Korea’s policy goals and instruments for those countries have been structured to secure its national interests as part of this strategy. North Korea has been consistent in its efforts to fulfil the goals set out in the early 1990s as an ‘exit strategy’ from the unfavourable circumstances brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union and East European socialist states. Several prominent factors, however, at the levels of both agency and structure, have influenced the successes and failures of the country’s policy toward its East Asian neighbours and the United States. In the following essay, North Korea’s post-Cold War strategy will first be explained. A review of seven critical choices made by North Korea in implementing its strategy and an investigation into the factors at operational and structural level that influenced the making of those choices then follow. The study will next attempt to examine the policy instruments of hard and soft power that North Korea has employed during the conception and implementation of its choices. North Korea’s concrete policies towards its East Asian neighbours of South Korea and China,1 and the United States, are then reviewed, followed by an assessment of the North’s strategies and policies. In addition, the study will deal with the 2010 incident of the South Korean navy corvette Cheonan and its policy implications, and the developments in North Korea’s succession politics in which Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Il’s third son, became the official heir to his 1 North Korea’s policy towards Japan and Russia will not be covered here, since neither country has had a significant place in North Korea’s overall strategy in recent years. It is true, however, that North Korea’s policies towards Japan and Russia will become more important when the country succeeds in solving pending issues with the United States and South Korea and expands its engagement with the rest of the world with a new Weltanschauung.

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father. Finally, the essay will discuss what the future holds for North Korea in East Asian international relations. North Korea’s Strategy of Survival and Prosperity for the Twenty-first Century After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the East European socialist states the North Korean leadership was faced with dramatically changing domestic and external circumstances. Its top priorities since then have been maintaining political stability, legitimising its rule, and achieving the security of the state, regime and system on the one hand, and economic recovery and development on the other. As for any state, national security and economic development were, and are, the two most vital goals for North Korea. Its leadership seemed determined in its search for nuclear resolution and security assurances from the United States, while enhancing domestic economic performance; this despite being subject to hostile circumstances and extended nuclear confrontation with the United States. North Korea’s efforts towards normalisation of its relations with the United States should thus be interpreted in a positive light—as its best attempt to kill two birds with one stone. It was obvious at the time of the nuclear crisis that North Korea’s efforts towards economic recovery and development would be severely limited by its isolation from the international community, an isolation that would continue indefinitely without either a resolution to the nuclear problem or security assurances and normalisation of relations with the United States. North Korea’s fixation with national security had much to do with its hostile relations with the United States. For almost two decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea’s policy towards the United States has been remarkably consistent in that it desired to end the Korean War officially by signing a peace agreement and sought to normalise bilateral relations. By doing so, North Korea aimed to dismantle the Cold War structure in place on the Korean peninsula, namely, of confrontation with the United States. As for economic recovery and development, North Korea introduced market-oriented reform into its economy, despite increasing tension on the peninsula and security threats from the Bush administration. North Korea was well aware of the dangers entailed. The reforms would necessarily undermine the existing socio-economic order and could possibly

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations183 even lead to social instability and chaos. So the North’s introduction of market elements in July 2002 was a thoroughly premeditated critical choice made to strengthen further the security of its regime and system by way of improved economic performance. It is noteworthy that North Korea’s top priority has been focused on economic recovery and development ever since the mid-1990s, during which it experienced a famine on an unprecedented scale. It was only a matter of course that North Korea pursued the policy of ‘building up a strong and prosperous state’ before all else, for the situation pressed it to strengthen its economy and feed its people. We must also note that North Korea’s pursuit of economic recovery and development as its top agenda coincided with the engagement policies of the Clinton administration and the Kim Dae-jung government. President Kim Dae-jung came to power in 1998 and initiated his Sunshine Policy towards North Korea, which helped the United States to realise that engaging North Korea would be in its national interest. During the Clinton-Kim era, North Korea worried less about external security threats and was thus allowed to focus more on economic recovery and development. It is clear that domestic regime and system security had precedence over external national security for North Korea in the presence of less confrontational governments in the United States and South Korea. North Korea showed just how serious it was in extricating itself from its predicament, in which it was forced to pursue two possibly contradictory policies together, by exerting serious diplomatic efforts to receive from the United States security assurances that were absolutely necessary for its economic recovery and development. Seven Critical Choices, 1991–2010 Since the early 1990s, North Korea has made seven critical choices for survival and prosperity, the outcome of the interaction between variables of agency and structure in the form of conflict and co-operation between politics and economics in North Korea. The first choice was made in 1991– 94, the second in 2000, the third in 2002, the fourth in 2005, the fifth in 2006–07, the sixth in 2009,2 and the seventh in 2010. 2 Haksoon Paik, “Changing Dynamics of the North Korean System” in “New Paradigms for Transpacific Collaboration,” Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Series, Vol. 16 (Washington, D.C.: KEI, 2006), pp. 121–141; Haksoon Paik, “North Korea Today: Politics Overloaded and Secularized” in Philip W. Yun & Gi-Wook Shin, eds., North Korea: 2005 and Beyond

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Concretely, the first critical choice North Korea made, in 1991–94, just after the Soviet Union and East European socialist states had collapsed, included the Rajin–Sonbong free economic and trade zone, the first-ever high-level dialogue with the United States since the Korean War, and the seven rounds of normalisation talks with Japan, the Agreement on Recon­ ciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation with South Korea, accession to UN membership simultaneously with South Korea, the unrealised 1994 inter-Korean summit, and the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea for the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. What is remarkable is that the choices made from the second round to the sixth were basically the implementation of the agendas set out in the first critical choice in the early 1990s. In other words, the first critical choice was the blueprint for North Korea’s strategy of survival and prosperity for the new post-Cold War era, and the five choices made up to 2009 were concrete expressions of how the first critical choice was carried out under changing circumstances with changing policy instruments. All in all, the seven critical choices that North Korea has made since the early 1990s have demonstrated how strategically and coherently North Korea’s policy goals towards the United States and its East Asian neighbours, and its policy instruments with which to achieve those goals, have been structured.  First Critical Choice, 1991–94: Agenda-setting for the Post-Cold War Era North Korea made its first critical choice during the period 1991 to 1994. The Soviet Union and East European socialist states collapsed in the early 1990s, forcing North Korea to seek a breakthrough to overcome economic and security crises caused by the downfall of the socialist countries and the subsequent transformation of world politics. To induce foreign investment, North Korea designated the RajinSonbong strip along the east coast as a free economic and trade zone. The country began as well to seek ways to open a channel for high-level dialogue with the United States and to normalise relations with Japan. In December 1991, North Korea concluded the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation (hereafter referred to as (Stanford, CA: The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2006), pp. 37–54; and Haksoon Paik, “North Korea’s Choices for Survival and Prosperity since 1990s: Interplay between Politics and Economics,” Sejong Policy Studies, 3, 2 (2007), pp. 250–264.

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations185 the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement) with South Korea, and together they entered the United Nations. In June 1994, North Korea was scheduled to have an inter-Korean summit the following month, but the summit was cancelled because of Kim Il Sung’s sudden death in early July 1994. In October 1994, North Korea made another critical decision to give up its nuclear weapons programme in exchange for light-water reactors (LWRs) for power generation, full normalisation of political and economic relations between North Korea and the United States, and a joint effort to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.3 The Agreed Framework clearly illustrates North Korea’s strategy of survival and prosperity, demonstrating a grand bargaining between the two countries in their efforts to secure their respective national interests. These critical measures could be regarded as a serious attempt on North Korea’s part to adapt its policy to the changing international relations so as to increase its survival as a regime and a system. It is worth mentioning here that these reforms and measures for increasing exposure and accessibility were limited to the external realm only. The North Korean leadership’s intention was to keep the domestic realm intact, and thus protect its own form of socialism by favourably restructuring its access to exter­nal opportunities for survival and by obtaining economic co-operation and assistance from the outside—the United States, Japan and South Korea.4  Second Critical Choice, 2000: Inter-Korean Summit and US—DPRK Joint Communiqué In 2000, North Korea made another round of critical choices: the first-ever inter-Korean summit and a dramatic improvement in North Korea–US relations. The summit between the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and the then South Korean president, Kim Dae-jung, was held in Pyongyang in June 2000, and both sides announced a joint declaration. This historic event granted new momentum not only for improved relations between the two Koreas, but also for the international community, in particular for the United States, giving it an opportunity to review and revise its policies toward the Korean peninsula.5 3 The Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Geneva, 21 October 1994. 4 Haksoon Paik, “Changing Dynamics of the North Korean System,” p. 123. 5 US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, address at the National Press Club, Washington DC, 2 November 2000.

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In October 2000, Jo Myong Rok, first deputy chairman of the National Defence Commission of North Korea, in his capacity as a special envoy of Kim Jong Il, visited Washington DC to reciprocate the visit to Pyongyang in May 1999 of William Perry, US North Korea Policy Coordinator. Jo carried Kim Jong Il’s message that he was willing to improve relations with the United States and resolve various problems, including the missile issue. Kim Jong Il demanded from the United States a security guarantee for North Korean sovereignty and territory.6 On 12 October 2000, the United States and North Korea issued a joint communiqué, which provided a brief opportunity for a dramatic improvement in relations between the two countries. Kim Jong Il, through Jo, also invited US President Bill Clinton to visit Pyongyang. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright paid a return visit to Pyongyang later that month and discussed President Clinton’s possible visit to North Korea with Kim Jong Il, as well as other pending problems including the missile issue.7 And in early November 2000, the sixth round of the US– North Korean experts’ meeting on missile talks was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. North Korea’s offers and compromises in the second half of 2000 with regard to the North Korean missile issue were “unprecedented” in scope.8 The meeting concluded that the United States and North Korea needed just one more high-level negotiation regarding this particular issue before President Clinton could pay a visit to North Korea, but this did not transpire because of developments in the Middle East and the US presidential election in November 2000.  Third Critical Choice, 2002: Economic Reform and Opening In its third critical choice, North Korea announced, on 1 July 2002, a policy designed to improve its economy by introducing market elements into its economic management system. This choice was noteworthy in that it was designed to introduce reform in the domestic economic realm, 6 Jo Myong Rok’s speech delivered at a banquet hosted by US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, Washington DC, 10 October 2000. In his speech, Jo said, “if the US provides the North Korean leadership with definite and detailed guarantee for the safety of North Korean sovereignty and territory, then Chairman Kim Jong Il will certainly make an important political decision to convert the current hostile relations between the two sides to friendly and cooperative ones.” 7 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, toast at dinner hosted by Chairman Kim Jong Il, Pyongyang, 23 October 2000; Albright, press conference, Koryo Hotel, Pyongyang, 4 October 2000. 8 Council on Foreign Relations, letter to President George W. Bush, 22 March 2001.

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations187 unlike the two previous choices, which basically dealt with the external situation. The reform measures included the following. First, North Korea abolished the existing food and commodity rationing system, and accordingly, factories and firms were no longer given subsidies for carrying out production or distribution activities. Instead, the price was to be calculated in accordance with the actual cost. This policy action aimed to encourage producers to increase output. Under this new price system, the government would purchase rice from farmers at 40 won (wŏn) per kilogramme and sell it to consumers at 44 won. Previously, under the food rationing system, the government used to purchase it at 80 chŏn and ration it at 8 chŏn per kilogramme.9 This was groundbreaking because the government, which had hitherto subsidised farmers, had now begun to pursue profit in trade. The new price system was to be applied to all commodity items as well as to the service sector. However, as far as rice was concerned, the government still maintained a control system by providing each household with coupons in order to limit the purchasable amount of rice.10 Secondly, the new wage system raised the basic payment for ordinary workers from 110 won to 2,000 won a month, and that of heavy workers, such as miners, to 6,000 won. Previously, all workers in the same job classifications had received the same payment. With payment depending on the type of labour and the amount of production, this new system was designed to encourage workers to work harder. On farms, for example, farmers who engaged in field work would earn more, while those who engaged in warehouse management would receive less. And indeed, as expected, farm workers began to prefer field work. The new wage system not only applied to the manual labour force but brought significant change to the output of the intelligentsia as well. College professors would be paid according to the number of papers they wrote, and their wages would vary between 3,000 won and 6,000 won. Literary writers would receive as much as 150,000 won depending on the feature length of their publication.11 Third, North Korea devalued its currency from 2.15 won to 150 won to the US dollar. North Korea appeared to expect that this devaluation would  9 One chŏn is one-hundredth of one won. That is, 100 chŏn make one won. 10 Haksoon Paik, “North Korea’s Struggle to Overcome Its Economic Crisis: Three Critical Choices, 1991–2003,” Vantage Point 26, 11 (November 2003), pp. 46–47. 11 Ibid., p. 47.

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be capable of inducing foreign exchange hidden in the private economic sector to come into the open and that it would help the country expand its foreign trade.12 All of these steps were revolutionary because they actually introduced market and capitalist practices. North Korea also purportedly attempted to introduce contract farming in Hoeryong (Hoeryŏng) and Musan in North Hamgyong (Hamgyŏng) province as test cases. As for factories, their management was turned over from factory party committees to factory managers and these managers, moreover, ran their factories from self-reliant income and under an autonomous responsibility system. This policy aimed to increase competitiveness among factories and enterprises.13 In late 2002, North Korea also took effective measures to increase economic access to the outside world and improve relations with Japan. These were: the designation of Sinuiju (Sinŭiju) as a special administration district, of Mt Kumgang (Kŭmgang) area as a special tourist zone, and of Kaesong (Kaesŏng) as a special industrial zone, and the signing of the DPRK–Japan Joint Declaration in Pyongyang (‘Pyongyang Declaration’). In April 2003, Kim Jong Il emphasised the need to carry out economic reform and opening more vigorously and the need to increase motivation for production by introducing ‘general markets’. Farmers’ markets, where the main trade commodities had until then been only grown produce, grew into general markets where a great variety of goods were sold. Local authorities began to collect rental fees from merchants.14 The spirit that cut across all these reform measures could be summarised thus: free rides and averaging out were to be prohibited, while ‘practical gain’ was to operate as a top priority. The North Korean government named its economic policy ‘practical-gain socialism’ (or ‘realgain socialism’) (silli sahoejuŭi), and emphasised the importance of making real profits in running factories and businesses.15 Firms and factories were evaluated by the criterion of real profits; those that failed to achieve such profits were punished. North Korean households were held to a similar standard: unless family members were able to earn their own share of bread, they would inevitably be left behind in the new economic milieu, where the government would no longer act to ensure their livelihood. 12 Ibid. p. 47. 13 Ibid. p. 47. 14 Ibid. p. 47. ; Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) 10 June 2003. 15 Haksoon Paik, “North Korea Today: Politics Overloaded and Secularized,” p. 40.

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations189  Fourth Critical Choice, 2005: 19 September 2005 Joint Statement The success of North Korea’s planned performance resulting from the 2002 economic reforms and opening hinged on economic support from the outside world. Improvement of relations with the United States was vital, but starting in October 2002, the situation deteriorated, dimming hope of any compromise. In early October 2002, the US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, James Kelly, visited Pyongyang in the capacity of special envoy of President George W. Bush. But his visit resulted only in worsening US–North Korean relations as they laboured under the charge of a North Korean ‘covert uranium enrichment programme’. Starting December 2002, the United States suspended its supply of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. North Korea rejected the US criticism that North Korea had “violated” the Agreed Framework,16 and resumed operation of the Yongbyon (Yŏngbyŏn) nuclear facilities that had been frozen under the Agreed Frame­ work. Moreover, North Korea removed IAEA surveillance cameras from the frozen facilities, removed seals from the spent fuel rods, and expelled IAEA inspectors from North Korea. On 10 January 2003, North Korea declared that it would withdraw from the NPT, and then claimed that it no longer was obliged to abide by the IAEA safeguards agreements.17 The deadlock between North Korea and the United States could not simply continue indefinitely as North Korea’s capacity for developing nuclear weapons grew; so finally in April 2003, three-way talks between North Korea, the United States and China were held in Beijing to deal with the North Korean nuclear situation. These three-party talks would later expand into the Six Party Talks involving North and South Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan. The first round of the Six Party Talks took place in August 2003. North Korea made it clear from the very start that its ultimate goal was denuclearisation and put out a four-stage resolution formula based on the ‘principle of simultaneous actions’ from both sides. At each and every stage, North Korea was resolute in that both sides had to take simultaneous reciprocal measures, thereby trying to avoid breaches of promise by making goodwill unilateral concessions towards the United States. 16 Haksoon Paik, “North Korea-U.S. Relations (1945–2007)” in Center for North Korean Studies of The Sejong Institute, ed., Foreign Relations of North Korea (in Korean) (Sungnam: The Sejong Institute, 2007), p. 42. 17 “The Statement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” KCNA, 10 January 2003.

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North Korea, aware of the asymmetry of its denuclearisation process, opened the talks defensively. For North Korea, denuclearisation meant that it had to forsake its nuclear card—which had been its only remaining national security card—from the outset, while the United States retained theirs. Finally, the second phase of the fourth round of talks held in September 2005 successfully culminated in a joint statement concerning the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. The 19 September Joint Statement was the fourth critical choice made by North Korea.18 In the Joint Statement, North Korea agreed to abandon all nuclear programmes and weapons and return to the NPT as soon as possible, in exchange for a security guarantee from the United States, US–North Korean normalisation of relations, and economic and energy co-operation from the states participating in the Six Party Talks. The participant states agreed to respect North Korea’s stated right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to discuss the issue of the LWRs “at an appropriate time”. They also reached another landmark—to have the states directly concerned hold a separate forum for negotiation of a permanent peace settlement in the Korean peninsula. The Joint Statement set out the methods to implement the agreements: the principle of “words for words” and “actions for actions” was to be observed through “mutually coordinated measures”. This way, North Korea could hope to prevent any breach of trust by the United States. During the first nuclear crisis of the early 1990s, North Korea risked losing its chance of ensuring energy supply and economic recovery. During the second nuclear crisis that started on October 2002, the stakes were much higher—without caution, the survival of the regime and system could be jeopardised. The Joint Statement clearly indicated that North Korea had made a critical strategic choice. It agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons and programmes in exchange for a US guarantee not to invade or attack North Korea, normalisation of US–North Korea relations, and energy, trade and investment from the states participating in the Six Party Talks. The Six Party Talks did not fare well due to the political clout of the neo-conservatives and hardliners in the US capital. These groups pressed the Bush administration to continue its demand for North Korea’s unilateral abandonment of nuclear weapons programmes, despite the agreed 18 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six Party Talks, Beijing, 19 September 2005.

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations191 principle of simultaneous actions in the Joint Statement. They were unwilling to negotiate with what they regarded as “evil” and were not ready to accommodate any meaningful co-operative actions required as goodwill gestures necessary for denuclearising North Korea. For the hardliners, the Joint Statement was more of a temporary political mechanism “to manage the crisis” at the level of “words for words”, and nothing more. The neo-conservatives and hardliners immediately entrapped the pronegotiators and tried to prevent the implementation of the Joint Statement by raising issues of North Korea’s illicit activities such as ‘illegal’ bank transactions at the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) and counterfeiting of US currency.  Fifth Critical Choice, 2006–07: Nuclear Test and Subsequent Actions Agreements19 North Korea made another critical choice when it conducted a nuclear test on 9 October 2006 and afterwards signed the initial and second-phase actions agreements on 13 February 2007 and 3 October 2007, respectively. North Korea’s nuclear test, above all, symbolised the farce that was the efforts hitherto of the United States and the international community to prevent North Korea from going nuclear. But it also resulted in additional pressure on the United States for a renewed, proactive negotiation and a faster resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem, in the light of the continued accumulation of plutonium in North Korea without any effective institutional control mechanism. In June 2006, North Korea invited Christopher Hill, US chief negotiator at the Six Party Talks, to Pyongyang as a goodwill gesture, but the United States refused the invitation. North Korea had explained that it wanted to hear from Hill in person whether the United States was genuinely intent on carrying out the 19 September Joint Statement.20 In inviting Hill, North Korea repeated its long-held argument that there was no change in its determination to realise a nuclear-free Korean peninsula through faithful implementation of the Joint Statement. It reiterated that it had no need for even a single nuclear weapon and was willing to give up its nuclear 19 North Korea’s fifth critical choice—the October 2006 nuclear test and the February 2007 initial actions agreement— represented the decisions that had to do with the implementation of the fourth critical choice, that is, the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement. In this sense, unlike the previous four choices, this fifth choice was more of ways and means of carrying out the fourth critical choice. 20 “DPRK Foreign Ministry Invited the Head of the US Delegation of the Six-Party Talks to Pyongyang,” KCNA, 1 June 2006.

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ambition as agreed in the Joint Statement21—if only the United States stopped pursuing anti-North Korea policies and implemented a threatfree approach based on successful trust-building. In retrospect, the invitation to Hill was the last chance the United States had to prevent North Korea from conducting a nuclear test. The Bush administration, however, rejected this invitation. A chain of disasters for the United States and the international community followed: on 4 July 2006, North Korea test-fired ballistic missiles; on 3 October, it warned of its first-ever nuclear test; and finally six days later, it conducted an actual nuclear test. North Korea, aware of the effectiveness of the nuclear card, pulled the tug-of-war to extremes and called the Bush administration’s bluff. Ironically, however, North Korea’s nuclear test, confirmed by the United States and other countries, catalysed negotiations regarding the nuclear problem and even bore fruit in the critical initial actions agreement of 13 February 2007. This agreement was the first step in taking ‘actions’ towards the implementation of the 19 September Joint Statement, which was a ‘word-for-word’ agreement. The crux of the matter was that North Korea’s strategy of survival and prosperity, in which the country would barter away its nuclear card for the guarantee of security, normalisation of relations, and overall help from the United States, could not be executed if North Korea did not implement the Joint Statement, the 13 February initial actions agreement and the 3 October second-phase actions agreement in the first place. Thus, the nuclear test and the subsequent agreements were calculated, critical choices of the North Korean leadership for a negotiated resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The defeat of the Republican Party in the US mid-term elections in November 2006 as a consequence of the botched Iraq policy brought about a change in US policy towards North Korea. The initial and secondphase agreements would not have been possible without the Republicans’ defeat.  Sixth Critical Choice, 2009: Second Nuclear Test This choice was made when North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on 25 May 2009 and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) levied economic and other sanctions as punishment. A stalemate set in 21 Ibid.

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations193 afterwards and the Six Party Talks have not resumed since. In less than two months North Korea made a move, however, to explore the possibility of dealing with the root causes of the North Korean nuclear problem with the new US administration—the Obama administration—with the peace regime issue topping its agenda. To that end, Kim Jong Il invited former President Bill Clinton to Pyongyang in early August 2009 and Stephen Bosworth, US special representative for North Korea policy, in early December 2009. Ri Gun, director of the American Affairs Bureau in North Korea’s foreign ministry, visited the United States in October–November 2009 and expressed the hope of establishing a “strategic relationship” with the United States by negotiating a peace regime in Korea.22 But both sides have failed to reach an agreement to that effect. North Korea has consistently demanded that the UN sanctions be lifted as a precondition for the resumption of the Six Party Talks and that a peace regime be negotiated and established for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula23—all the while continuing to demonstrate its resolve to strengthen its status as a nuclear-weapons state whenever its relations with the United States deteriorated.  Seventh Critical Choice, 2010: Choosing the Third Son as Successor North Korea made another critical choice in September 2010 when Kim Jong Il convened a meeting of representatives of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) and officially designated his third son Kim Jong Un as his successor. Kim Jong Un was elected to the Central Committee (CC) of the KWP and to the first vice-chairmanship of the KWP’s Central Military Committee. Kim Jong Un’s election to the latter position will help to facilitate his full control of the military as successor, while his election to the CC of the KWP will also ensure his election to the Central Committee’s Politburo and the Politburo’s Standing Committee whenever that is deemed necessary at a later stage. It is noteworthy that Kim Jong Il restored the authority of the KWP fully this time by getting new members elected to the Central Committee, to its Politburo and to the Politburo Standing Committee. This measure to restore the party’s authority appears to have been designed to counter or balance the power of the military in North Korean politics at a time when 22 Author’s interview with an anonymous participant in the New York seminar, 6 November 2009. 23 Li Gwan Il, “The Issue of the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula,” 2010 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, 4–6 March 2010, Moscow.

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Kim Jong Il, whose health is failing, was handing power over to his young and inexperienced son. Any politician, past or present, Kim Jong Il being no exception, would understandably be concerned about the disproportionate power yielded by the military under the current circumstances of North Korea. It can also be pointed out that the North Korean leadership has tried its best to maintain political stability during the power succession processes. Since international confrontation could negatively affect these processes, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un appear to have a chosen a strong peace offensive vis-à-vis the outside world in order to stabilise the politics of succession. All in all, the seven critical choices that North Korea has made since the early 1990s have demonstrated that North Korea’s decisions have been calculating and strategic. These choices have also shown North Korea’s flexibility in meeting the needs of the times and enhancing the survivability of its regime and system, even under extremely unfavourable domestic and external circumstances. North Korea has managed, eventually, to survive and has even been strengthened in some ways, thanks to its political stability reinforced by strategic choices of the leadership. Variables The variables that have contributed to the critical choices North Korea has made for the past two decades can be classified into two categories: those of agency and structure.  Variables of Agency I will deal with the ‘ideas’ of North Korean policymakers that have served as foundation for ‘identities’ and ‘interests’ in the country’s strategy and policy towards its East Asian neighbours and the United States. This research will accordingly adopt the constructivist approach that social reality—here North Korea’s strategy and foreign policy in its relations with its neighbours—is constituted basically of shared ideas and that the identities and interests of North Korean policymakers are not given, but created and constituted by human interactions and discursive practices based on ideas. The constructivist approach attaches importance to the process of interaction between actor and structure and understands both as mutually determining. There are several key ideas or values that have given meaning to North Korea’s dealings with its East Asian neighbours and the United States:

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations195 independence or the concept of juche, based on historical experience of anti-Japanese and anti-American struggle; ideas expressed in socialist revolution and construction of the party-state system; nationalism and the cause of national unification; the ‘military-first’ idea, etc. In addition, the still-persisting ‘siege mentality’ that North Koreans have suffered for the past two decades has made the state defensive and inflexible in dealing with the outside world. The death of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il’s health problems, and Kim Jong Un’s rise are also factors that exist at the level of policymakers in terms of understanding changes and priorities in North Korea’s policy toward the outside world.  Structural Variables Structural variables that have contributed to North Korea’s strategy of survival and prosperity and the critical choices in North Korea include the domestic power structure of the suryong (suryŏng) system, economic failure, the power transition in the East Asian international order characterised by the rise of China, inconsistencies in the policies of the United States, South Korea and Japan towards North Korea, etc.  Domestic Power Structure North Korea has a distinctive monolithic, unitary power structure called the suryong system, in which the supreme leader or suryong positions himself above the party, the state and the military, and controls and coordinates the party–state–military relationship itself. The personality cult of suryong imbedded in the political system allows the supreme leader to dictate his ideas, identity and interests, to be shared by the party, the state and the military in forming strategy and making policy, domestic or external. One of the problems that have loomed large in policymaking in the suryong system has been that proper discussion of the key issues has not been done in many cases. Often top-down directives have not been appropriate enough for North Korea’s strategy of survival and prosperity. It is noteworthy that military-first politics has allowed the military to be a much more powerful actor in North Korean politics than before, a consequence of ‘security threats’ coming from the outside world. Vacancies in the party’s key organisations such as the Central Committee, the Politburo or the Standing Committee have not been filled by new members after the death or expulsion of incumbents. Under the circumstances, the party could not function properly or maintain full control over the military.

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Recently, as demonstrated in the party representatives’ meeting held in September 2010, there is an indication that the authority of the party has been successfully restored by Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un to counter the overreaching power of the military.  Economic Failure North Korea’s economic failure has heavily constrained the scope for action by policymakers in North Korea. Economic recovery and development, besides achieving national, regime and system security, had to be a top priority for the leadership to make sure it could feed its own people and provide daily necessities for them. The North Korean leadership’s poor performance in meeting the basic needs of the people has continued to be a serious limit to the successful implementation of future strategies and policies. North Korea has consistently strengthened its economic ties with China in the absence of inter-Korean economic co-operation during the Lee Myung-bak government’s tenure. Particularly after the Cheonan incident, North Korea appears to have abandoned its ‘Southern policy’, in which it has pursued co-operation with the United States and South Korea, and adopted a new ‘Northern policy’ (a Nordpolitik), in which it would seek and strengthen co-operation with China.24 Kim Jong Il’s visits to China in May and August 2010 clearly pointed to that effect.  Power Transition in the East Asian Order: The Rise of China The rise of China has reshaped power relations between the United States and China in East Asia and this change is reflected rather faithfully in the East Asian international order. This power transition has had a serious impact on the Korean peninsula, which has shown itself in North Korea’s growing dependence on China’s support in its policy towards South Korea, the United States and its East Asian neighbours. China, on the other hand, has accelerated its effort to make North Korea more dependent on it, in preparation for its inevitable and forthcoming rivalry with the United States in this region. The effects of this power transition and conflict of interests between the United States and China dramatically revealed themselves in the handling of the Cheonan incident. The US– South Korean joint naval exercise against North Korea and China,

24 Lim Dong-won’s interview with The Hankyoreh, 20 October 2010.

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations197 conducted in Korea’s East Sea in July 2010, was the largest in scale in more than three decades, and the confrontation between the two blocs— the US and South Korea vs. China and North Korea—signified the reemergence of a pseudo-Cold War confrontational structure in the East Asian international order.  Inconsistencies in US and South Korean Policies Towards North Korea Inconsistencies in US and South Korean policies towards North Korea have also been responsible for the failure of North Korea’s policy towards these states. The North has suffered enormous frustration in dealing with these countries, whose policies towards it have oscillated from one administration to the next. The changes from the Clinton to the Bush administrations, and from the Kim Dae-jung/Roh Moo-hyun to the Lee Myung-bak governments have appeared as 180-degree turnarounds. Such inconsistencies have been most problematic and have naturally resulted in failure to maintain and consolidate whatever had been achieved in relations with North Korea in the previous administrations. Policy Instruments: Hard and Soft Power States prefer to combine hard and soft power as policy instruments or policy resources, and North Korea is no exception in this regard. In making foreign policy and conducting diplomacy, North Korea does not have any effective soft power to apply except for the negative image of ‘the world’s most reclusive country’, the ‘only remaining Stalinist state’, an ‘evil state’, or one ‘blackmailing’ others. Thus, there remains no room for positive soft power, that is, diplomatic and cultural power assets. When it comes to hard power, North Korea has no economic power to use as a policy instrument, and the only remaining power is its military power, particularly its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles capabilities. The North Korean nuclear and missile problems have been brought about and highlighted by North Korea’s intention to strengthen its military capability by developing asymmetrical means of threat and a delivery system, against the background of intensified US–North Korean confrontation in the post-Cold War era where Soviet protection is no longer available for North Korea. However, the problem is that using and strengthening military power has put North Korea in a negative and destructive position in dealing

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with its neighbours. Even China, North Korea’s only ally, has consistently employed the policies of ‘three no’s’ on the Korean peninsula, that is, “no nukes, no war, and no collapse of North Korea”.25 China continues to adhere to the ‘three no’s’ policy even though its priorities towards the Korean peninsula have changed after George W. Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ statement and North Korea’s nuclear test of October 2006. Those priorities are: peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, stability of North Korea, and the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, in that order, whereas priority to denuclearising North Korea had come first before George W. Bush pursued collapsing and transforming North Korea. North Korea’s Policies Towards its East Asian Neighbours and the United States An analysis of North Korea’s policies toward its East Asian neighbours (excluding Russia and Japan—see footnote 1) will show how North Korea’s strategy of survival and prosperity has been pursued concretely in dealing with its neighbours.  North Korea’s Policy Towards South Korea The North’s strategy has been designed to establish a framework for peaceful co-existence and co-prosperity with the South. The opportunity to help fulfil that objective opened for North Korea when President Kim Dae-jung came to power in the South in 1998. President Kim pursued the ‘Sunshine Policy’, designed to promote trust, national reconciliation and interKorean co-operation on the Korean peninsula. The two Koreas held a firstever summit talk in June 2000 in Pyongyang and issued the landmark 15 June North-South Joint Declaration. Thanks to this development, cooperation between the two Koreas picked up in quite a few areas, such as government-to-government dialogue, humanitarian assistance, economic co-operation, etc. North Korea’s policy of reconciliation and co-operation with the South continued throughout the Roh Moo-hyun era. The first year of Roh’s presidency posed some challenges to the North’s strategy in the change in attitude from the Kim Dae-jung administration in some areas, but the basic 25 Scott Snyder, “The Rise of U.S.-China Rivalry and Its Implications For The Korean Peninsula,” in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim, eds., Korean Security Dynamics In Transition (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p.123.

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations199 principle of peaceful co-existence and peaceful co-prosperity between the two Koreas was not violated. But when President Lee Myung-bak, a conservative businessmanturned-president, came to power in 2007, he completely overturned the previous policy of reconciliation and co-operation to one of confrontation and demanded that North Korea first give up its nuclear arsenal in return for continuation of and any improvement in inter-Korean relations. The inter-Korean relationship has deteriorated dramatically and has since posed a serious threat to North Korea’s strategy of survival and prosperity. There has been no government-to-government dialogue for the resolution of national or peninsula-wide issues, no co-operation in dealing with the nuclear issue, and no trust whatsoever between both sides. Mindful of this negative development, North Korea took a series of retaliatory measures until recently.  North Korea’s Policy Toward the United States As with South Korea, North Korea’s strategy of survival and prosperity was designed to establish a framework for peaceful co-existence with the United States. But North Korea repeatedly faced difficulties in dealing with the US government’s changing policies. First of all, North Korea’s preoccupation with promoting national security had much to do with its hostile relations with the United States. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the goal of North Korea’s policy towards the United States has been noticeably consistent for almost two decades. It wanted officially to end the Korean War, sign a peace agreement and normalise relations with the United States with a view to dismantling the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula and ensuring that North Korea and the United States no longer harboured mutual hostility. North Korea has pursued normalisation of relations with the United States, more for national security and economic development than for anything else, understanding that such a step was the best way to ensure both its security and its economic interests. The North’s choice of normalising its relations with the United States as the most preferred policy option was demonstrated in the first nuclear crisis and its resolution—when it used the nuclear card and strategically abandoned it in exchange for normalisation, a guarantee of security, and economic and energy assistance. In the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea, both sides agreed on a give-and-take deal: to co-operate to replace North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with LWR

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power plants; to move towards full normalisation of political and economic relations; to work together for peace and security on a nuclearfree peninsula; and to work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.26 Working towards full normalisation of political and economic relations, both countries agreed: to reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions; to open liaison offices in each other’s capitals following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert-level discussions; and to upgrade bilateral relations to ambassadorial level.27 On the other hand, North Korea revealed its intention to get out of the contradiction or dilemma associated with pursuing its two policy priorities simultaneously, when it made serious efforts to get security assurances from and normalisation with the United States by using the nuclear card. North Korea took the position that it needed security assurances from the United States to facilitate reform and improve relations with the United States and Japan for economic recovery and development. This position experienced a series of setbacks when the Bush administration’s lack of urgency and of political will to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue prevented North Korea from starting real negotiations with the United States. The North’s inability and frustration was basically responsible for its provocative actions: on 10 February 2005, North Korea announced its intention to manufacture and possess nuclear weapons, its intention to expand the nuclear arsenal, and its decision not to return to the Six Party Talks until the United States acted to meet certain conditions;28 and later, on 9 October 2006, it announced a successful detonation of a nuclear device. In other words, North Korea consciously threw the ‘stone’ of the nuclear card at the ‘two birds’ of national security and economic development. Its destructive offensives of February 2005 and October 2006 immediately put the ball in the US court and forced the United States into a defen­sive position, when the United States did not have any problemsolving strategies and effective countermeasures against the North Korean offensive.

26 The Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Geneva, 21 October 1994. 27 Ibid. 28 Spokesman’s statement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 10 February 2005.

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations201 In the impossibility for both the United States and North Korea of achieving their respective policy goals toward each other—denuclearisation of North Korea and the prevention of nuclear proliferation outside North Korea for the United States; security assurances and normalisation of relations, and energy and economic co-operation for North Korea— both sides were able to compromise as was shown by the September 2005 Joint Statement, the February 2007 initial actions agreement, and the October 2007 second-phase actions agreement. Unfortunately, however, the 19 September Joint Statement could not be implemented until early 2007 because of the US financial sanctions on North Korean funds of US$25 million deposited at the Banco Delta Asia in Macao and because of US charges against North Korea of alleged counterfeiting of US dollar bills. The US Treasury Department had conducted more than one and a half years’ investigations into these financial irregularities from September 2005 under the US Patriot Act and the Illicit Activities Initiative (IAI) introduced by the Bush administration.29 North Korea’s frustration increased in proportion to the Bush administration’s prolonged efforts to block North Korea’s free access to and transactions in the international financial system, to strangle North Korea’s troubled economy, and to overthrow North Korea’s current leadership, regime and system. Against this backdrop, North Korea decided to step up its nuclear card. On 3 October 2006, North Korea issued a warning about its impending nuclear test and finally detonated a nuclear device six days later. North Korea, aware of the effectiveness of the nuclear card, conducted a nuclear test, which played a catalytic role in speeding up the negotiated resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem and for producing the 13 February initial actions agreement and the 3 October second-phase actions agreement. These agreements were the very first steps of taking “actions” towards the implementation of the 19 September Joint Statement. One the other hand, it is noteworthy that North Korea’s strategy of survival and prosperity for the twenty-first century itself—in which North Korea endeavours to achieve both national security and economic development simultaneously by bartering its nuclear card for the guarantee of security, normalisation of relations, and overall economic help from the United States—could not be executed if North Korea does not implement

29 David L. Asher, “The Impact of U.S. Policy on North Korean Illicit Activities,” Heritage Lectures, No. 1024, delivered 18 April 2007 and published 23 May 2007.

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the 19 September Joint Statement through the 13 February initial actions agreement and the 3 October second-phase actions agreement. What has happened since the 3 October agreement of 2007, which was designed to implement the second-phase actions of the 19 September Joint Statement of 2005? What factors have contributed to the failure of implementing the 3 October agreement? Several factors have contributed to the failure to carry out the secondphase actions agreement of 3 October 2007. More than anything else, what was lacking was co-operation among the parties to the Six Party Talks in faithfully implementing the agreement. North Korea’s distrust of the United States and US suspicions of North Korea’s motives underlie the particular lack of co-operation between the two countries. North Korea has constantly been on guard against US schemes to entrap it in nuclear negotiations, of which it appears to have perceived at least five instances during the Bush administration: the first trap was set up by James Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2002, scrapping the Agreed Framework; the second was US financial sanctions on North Korea’s deposits at the BDA; the third was the US demand for a “complete and correct” declaration of North Korean nuclear programmes, including the uranium enrichment programme; the fourth was the US demand for a “strict” verification protocol that would even “confirm the absence of the undeclared facilities, materials, and related activities”; and, lastly, there was the US demand for “sampling” to be included in the verification protocol, even when North Korean negotiators had not envisaged any place for it in the second-phase actions.30 The US presidential campaign in 2008 and the practical absence of US policy towards North Korea during the campaign period also contributed to the lack of co-operation between the United States and North Korea over the North Korean nuclear issue. In general, the months of a US presidential campaign can be characterised by a power vacuum. The incumbent president cannot pursue policies aggressively on controversial issues, especially with opposition candidates campaigning on a platform of opposing policy promises. The George W. Bush administration’s North Korea policy was no exception in this regard. North Korea appears to have exploited the presidential campaign period and the early months of the Obama administration to restructure 30 Haksoon Paik, “No More Victims to the Devil of America’s Own Creating,” Policy Forum Online 09-009A: 3 February 2009 (http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/ napsnet/policy-forums-online/security/09009Paik.html/?searchterm=Haksoon Paik).

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations203 its nuclear negotiations. Doubtlessly dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the nuclear negotiations during the last months of the Bush administration, when the level of negotiation fell to the lowest in the eyes of the North Korean leadership, with technical issues such as sampling on the table, North Korea appears to have been worried about the possibility that the new US administration would, despite the change in government, wish to pick up where they left off—where the previous administration had stopped—and that the United States and North Korea would resume negotiations at the stage of discussions concerning whether sampling was to be included in North Korean nuclear verification, rather than whether US duties should be fulfilled as promised in the 19 September Joint Statement. Against this backdrop, North Korea seems to have resolved to restructure the nuclear negotiations by reprioritising agendas, with the ‘peace regime’ issue at the top, as well as to entertain the domestic political need to boost public morale and promote succession politics. North Korea is planning to launch a ‘strong and prosperous state’ in 2012, commemorating the 100th anniversary of the late President Kim Il Sung’s birth, and is in urgent need of improving economic conditions and stabilising the political leadership, with succession politics completed, by that date. It is clear that the satellite launch and nuclear test were designed by the North Korean leadership to serve as a strong boost for public morale and political stability. On the other hand, US suspicions of North Korea’s intentions have been expressed in many different ways. What is North Korea’s ultimate objective? Is it agreeing on denuclearisation or is it seeking the status of a nuclear-weapons state? And will North Korea return to the Six Party Talks? The Clinton administration made serious efforts to engage North Korea. The George W. Bush administration on the other hand, labelled North Korea as a state on ‘the ‘axis of evil’ and never acknowledged that North Korea had pursued a policy of its own to put an end to the confrontational relationship with the United States as an exit strategy in the post-Cold War era. This exit strategy has been reflected rather faithfully in the key agreements with the United States such as the 1994 Agreed Framework, the 2000 US–DPRK Joint Communiqué, and the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement. It is noteworthy that a serious issue of ‘trust’ with regard to the US government surfaced when the former secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, publicly stated in a TV interview in December 2008 that only an “idiot” would trust North Korea. This may have reminded some Americans as well

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as North Koreans that the US government, too, was not trustworthy and just as defensive and inflexible as its North Korean counterpart. But Rice’s remarks reflected the general atmosphere among the American negotiators dealing with North Korea: North Korea was for all purposes an evil state that was intrinsically untrustworthy, unco-operative and deceitful. When President Obama came to power, it was known that he was serious about resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation. But North Korea launched a satellite with long-range missile technology in April 2009, and the UNSC strongly condemned North Korea’s action by issuing a UNSC Presidential Statement that strengthened sanctions on North Korea.31 North Korea retaliated by conducting another nuclear test in May 2009, and the UNSC, in turn, levied stricter sanctions on North Korea by passing UNSC Resolution 1874 in June 2009. After obtaining its intended objective of practically becoming a nuclearweapons state, North Korea now made a move to deal with the root causes of the Korean problem by placing the peace regime issue atop the agenda. North Korea invited Bill Clinton and Stephen Bosworth to Pyongyang in early August and early December 2009 respectively. North Korea has consistently demanded that the UN sanctions be lifted as a precondition for the resumption of the Six Party Talks and that a peace regime be negotiated and established for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.32 Against this, the United States has adopted a policy towards North Korea of ‘strategic patience’, which has practically meant a lack of any initiative on the part of the United States. In order to make a breakthrough, China has proposed a three-step approach to the resumption of the Six Party Talks and made efforts to bring it about: US–North Korea bilateral talks first, then preparatory meetings of the countries participating in the Six Party Talks, and finally the Talks themselves. But the Cheonan incident of 2010 destroyed all these efforts.  North Korea’s Policy Towards China North Korea’s strategy of survival and prosperity has also been expressed in its policies towards China. North Korea has used China as a supporter 31 Statement by the President of the Security Council, 13 April 2009. 32 Li Gwan Il, “The Issue of the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula,” 2010 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, 4–6 March 2010, Moscow.

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations205 for its regime and economic recovery and development. The North Korean leadership also tried to learn from the Chinese experience in economic reform and to co-operate with China in the opening of the special economic zones in Rajin-Sonbong and Sinuiju. China’s place in North Korea’s external relations has been unambiguously revealed in Kim Jong Il’s frequent visits to China. He has visited China seven times so far. His first trip was in 1983 with his father Kim Il Sung. He went again towards the end of May 2000, his first time in his capacity as supreme leader, in order to discuss the inter-Korean summit slated for June 2000. This second visit was followed by a third in January 2001, to learn about Chinese success in reform and opening. He toured the Fudong district of Shanghai and as many as six places including stock exchanges, high-tech development districts, the US car-maker General Motors, the Japan-invested NEC, the Sino–US joint factory Bell, and the agricultural development district, etc. He was quoted as saying that: “Shanghai has undergone miraculous changes”, during his visit to the Fudong area. Impressed by these Chinese developments brought about by policies of reform and opening, Kim introduced market elements into North Korea’s economy on 1 July 2002, designated Sinuiju as economic special zone in September 2002, and announced the Kaesong Industrial Zone Law and the Mt Kumgang Tourism Zone in November 2002. Kim Jong Il’s fourth visit to China was in April 2004 after Hu Jintao came to power in China and promised to co-operate in the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. On his fifth visit in January 2006, Kim toured the Zhuhai and Shenzhen regions of Guangdong province for nine days and is said to have been enchanted by China’s economic liberalisation policies. His sixth visit, said to have been requested by China, was in early May 2010 after the Cheonan incident. Kim visited Dalian, Tianjin, Beijing and Shenyang, where he saw various aspects of the economic development underway in China. The latest trip was in late August 2010. This time Kim visited the historic sites in Jilin, Changchun and Harbin in the northeastern provinces in China, where his father was engaged in anti-Japanese activities during the period of Japanese rule over Korea. Hu Jintao himself flew to Changchun to meet Kim for a summit, which demonstrated the strengthening of Sino–North Korean ties in the post-Cheonan era. It was not difficult to read between the lines to detect North Korea’s announcement of Kim Jong Un as the successor and China’s recognition of it.

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China’s traditional objectives on the Korean peninsula include: maintaining Chinese influence over matters relating to the peninsula, maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula, maintaining the stability of the North Korean regime, securing a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, preventing North Korean refugees from entering China and causing disturbance, promoting economic development and social stability in northeast China, preventing Korean nationalism from showing itself in the northeast provinces of China and among the Korean-Chinese, and expanding economic co-operation with South Korea.33 Since the 1990s, China’s policy towards North Korea has been articulated within three categories: relations with the great powers, its neighbours, and Third World countries. When China normalised its relationship with South Korea in 1992, it proved that Chinese foreign policy was successful in separating Korean issues from great power relations. The Korean peninsula in general has fallen within an area requiring the application of “relations with neighbouring countries”.34 However, when the first North Korean nuclear crisis broke out in 1993, the Korean peninsula became a subject of great power politics for China, although the nature of its relations with neighbouring countries remained unchanged. For instance, during the late 1990s, the growth of America’s and Japan’s strategy of containment of China caused China to reconsider North Korea’s strategic value. The George W. Bush administration that came to power in 2000 negatively changed the international security environment around China by replacing the Clinton administration’s engagement policy with an aggressive containment policy, which elevated the strategic value of North Korea. In this context, during the last years of the Jiang Zemin era, Kim Jong Il paid two visits to China, in May 2000 and January 2001 respectively, and in return, Jiang visited North Korea in September 2001.35 Chinese diplomacy under the Hu Jintao government (2002–present) has inherited Jiang Zemin’s “great power relations, neighbouring country relations, and multilateral diplomacy”, yet has shown different characteristics of a more active diplomacy in pursuit of “the Great Power”. While emphasising the previous diplomacy of peace and development, it has

33 Heungkyu Kim, “The Sino-North Korean Relationship at the Crossroads,” Haksoon Paik & Seong-Chang Cheong, eds., North Korea in Distress: Confronting Domestic and External Challenges (Seongnam: The Sejong Institute, 2008), p. 185. 34 Ibid., p. 185. 35 Ibid., pp. 186–187.

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations207 added co-operation, thus displaying a decision to take a more active and positive role in the international arena. Hu’s diplomacy has emitted phrases such as ‘peaceful rise’, ‘peaceful development’, ‘peace (harmony) first’, and ‘harmonious world strategy’. These phrases have implied that China takes relations with the United States as the most important factor and seeks to avoid conflicts with the United States under all possible circumstances.36 The second North Korean nuclear crisis that occurred at the beginning of Hu’s succession to power disturbed both China’s peace and its policy of stability for Northeast Asia and forced China to re-examine North Korea’s strategic importance. The Hu government overcame the previous position of hesitant intervention in external matters. That is, Hu’s leadership adopted a more proactive attitude, whereas Jiang’s leadership had restrained Chinese intervention as much as possible. Hu took up the role of active mediator and established a solid international image by successfully launching the Six Party Talks. In other words, China pursued a win-win strategy of keeping North Korea under its influence in response to aggressive stances by the United States and Japan, while attempting to become an honest broker and a responsible power by taking on the role of problem-solver in regard to the North Korean nuclear problem.37 It is reasonable to assume that China realised that its status quo policy was insufficient to maintain stability on the Korean peninsula, especially given the Bush administration’s aggressive policies. So China decided to react flexibly to the changed international environment by mediating between North Korea and the United States for the sake of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula while preserving the Kim Jong Il regime. It is worth recalling that China had maintained three principles regarding the peninsula up until George W. Bush made a decision to remove Kim Jong Il and his regime: denuclearisation of the peninsula; maintenance of stability and peace; and solving the problem through dialogue. Although unarticulated, China’s additional policy towards North Korea has been the acknowledgment of legitimate (from the North Korean perspective) security concerns for the North’s regime survival. The Chinese leadership seems to have made a strategic decision to engage North Korea much more actively around 2003, when its policy

36 Ibid., pp. 187–188. 37 Ibid., p. 188.

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towards the Korean peninsula changed from equidistance to stability.38 The leadership was afraid of a collapse of the Kim Jong Il regime, consequent on the coercive measures adopted against it by the Bush administration. In such a possibility, the stability and security of northeast China would be in great danger. In the event of turmoil, China would have to confront South Korea and the United States over the control of the North Korean situation.39 What, then, has been the state of the Sino–North Korean relationship after North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006? North Korea had previously promised President Hu Jintao that there would be “no nuclear tests” and a “return to the Six Party Talks”, but broke its promise and conducted the nuclear test, despite China’s strong warnings. While revealing high distrust of China, North Korea wanted to resolve the problem through direct negotiations with the United States. It was a fatal blow for Chinese diplomacy.40 Because of this betrayal, China’s perception of and policy towards North Korea under Hu Jintao’s leadership has undergone changes from the ‘special relationship’ to a normal ‘state-to-state relationship’. Since the North Korean nuclear test augmented the possibility of Sino– North Korean conflict, China has had to clarify policy principles and priorities with respect to the Korean peninsula. Priority in policy has changed to: first, stability on the peninsula; second, the survival of Kim Jong Il’s regime; and third, North Korean denuclearisation. The new priority suggests China’s difficulty in pursuing complete isolation of North Korea, or using military force for the actualisation of North Korean denuclearisation.41 It has been observed that China has employed a dual-approach strategy to handle the North Korean nuclear issue since the second nuclear crisis of October 2002. At the tactical level, China has relied on multilateral forums such as the Four Party Talks or Six Party Talks to avoid the possibility of military conflict, control tension and even reduce insecurity on the North Korean side. At the strategic level, China has tried to encourage North Korea to start reform and an open-door process. The logic behind this dual-approach strategy is that controlling tension or even reducing insecurity on the North Korean side would help North Korea to start its

38 Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), p. 17. 39 Heungkyu Kim, “The Sino-North Korean Relationship at the Crossroads,” p. 190. 40 Ibid., p. 192. 41 Ibid., pp. 195–196.

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations209 market reform and open the door to the outside world, while reform and an open door would help to resolve the nuclear issue.42 It is important to recognise that since North Korea’s second nuclear test in May 2009, China has de-linked the Six Party Talks from its bilateral ties with North Korea. The linkage policy not only failed but also ignored the new developments—that the situation within North Korea had deteriorated, leading to increased uncertainty. Stability in North Korea took priority over progress on the North Korean nuclear issue. The other reasons why China decided to de-link its bilateral relationship with North Korea from the Six Party Talks included the growing tension between South and North Korea, the stalemate in the relationship between North Korea and the United States, the impact of the global financial crisis, the fluctuation in Sino–US relations, etc.43 In April 2009, China initiated a dialogue with the US—the US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue—after the Obama administration came to power. The dialogue, consisting of two tracks—strategic and economic—was to discuss a wide range of political, strategic, security and economic issues between the two countries at the bilateral, regional and global levels. North Korean issues have been discussed between the two countries through the Dialogue as well as at the Six Party Talks. Unlike previous years, when the George W. Bush administration pursued the removal of the North Korea leadership and regime, China succeeded in establishing a framework in which it could at least keep the US government from unilaterally pursuing the collapse of North Korea. All in all, both China and North Korea have used each other for strategic purposes and needs. This means that while they are mutually dependent, one could betray the other at whim. Hence, the flipside of the Sino– North Korea relationship is North Korea’s concern that China might abandon it and the Chinese concern that North Korea might grow closer to the United States and Japan after having used China to divert the nuclear issue. In the end, both countries will maintain a mutually dependent relationship for the sake of their own national interests, but the strategically co-operative relationship between the two countries will be tested

42 Jin Canrong, “Why does China de-link the Six-Party Talks and the bilateral rela­ tionship with DPRK now?” International Relations and Options for a Regional Collec­ tive  Security Mechanism, Organised by Chair of East Asian Economy and Society, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Vienna and University of Cambridge, June 4–5, 2010. 43 Ibid.

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by changes in national interests and the surrounding international environment. An Assessment of North Korea’s Strategy and Policy Any assessment of North Korea’s strategy and policy has to examine how the country’s policy goals and policy instruments have been structured to secure its national interests of survival and prosperity for the twenty-first century. North Korea has been coherent in its policy goals, which were concretely expressed in the making of the critical choices outlined above for national, regime and system security and economic recovery and development. But the key policy instruments North Korea has employed, such as the nuclear and missile cards, have not been as effective in achieving those policy goals as North Korea might have expected. In other words, the incongruity between policy goals and policy instruments has served to prevent North Korea from successfully implementing its strategy of survival and prosperity and achieving policy goals. Beyond that, among North Korea’s key ideas and values that gave meaning to its dealings with South Korea, the United States and China, the concepts of independence, ‘military-first’ and a siege mentality appear in particular to have played a significant role. In addition, the death of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il’s health problems and his changing priorities, and succession politics in North Korea have also played an important role in terms of understanding changes and setting priorities in North Korea’s policy towards the outside world. The rise of China and the resultant power transition in the East Asian international order, in reshaping power relations between the United States and China in this region of the world, have had serious impacts on North Korea’s relations with its neighbours in such a way that it was forced to depend more on China for political, economic and other support, when it could have chosen otherwise if circumstances had been different. Finally, inconsistencies in US and South Korean policies towards North Korea have also been responsible for the failure of North Korea’s policy toward these countries, where policies have oscillated from one administration to the next. Cases in point are the changes in US policy towards North Korea between the Clinton and Bush administrations, and the change in South Korea’s North Korea policy between the Kim Dae-jung/ Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak governments.

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations211 The Cheonan Incident and its Implications On 26 March 2010, the South Korean navy corvette Cheonan was sunk in the West Sea by a North Korean torpedo, according to the report of the South Korean government-led investigation of the incident. The South Korean and US governments immediately tied in the sinking with the issue of the resumption of the Six Party Talks, by announcing that the Cheonan incident should be cleared first before talks were resumed. North Korea has denied its involvement in the incident and suggested that it send an inspection team to the South to test the authenticity of the South’s investigation. China has remained neutral and emphasised the importance of keeping a level head in dealing with the incident. China has also maintained an attitude of refusing to acknowledge the conclusions of South Korea’s official investigation, suggesting that current evidence was “insufficient”. In the trilateral summit talks between South Korea, China and Japan, held on Jeju Island on 29–30 May 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao avoided backing sanctions on North Korea. Wen “expressed no support for proposed UN sanctions against ally North Korea over its alleged sinking of a South Korean warship, declining…to join other key nations in blaming Pyongyang”. He emphasised that “the urgent task for the moment is to properly handle the serious impact caused by the Cheonan incident, gradually defuse tensions over it, and avoid possible conflicts” and that “China will continue to work with every country through aggressive negotiations and cooperation to fulfil our mission of maintaining peace and stability in the region.”44 Russia sent an independent investigation team of its own and reportedly concluded that it could not find any decisive evidence of a torpedo attack by North Korea. On 9 July, the UNSC “condemn[ed] the attack which led to the sinking of the Cheonan”, but did not determine North Korea as the attacker of the ship.45 What will be the policy implications of the aforementioned linkage politics for the denuclearisation of North Korea? South Korea’s stance in alliance co-operation with the United States, that the Cheonan incident 44 Young-Joon Ahn, “China premier avoids backing sanctions for North Korea,” Associated Press, 30 May 2010. 45 Statement by the President of the Security Council, 9 July 2010.

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should first be resolved for the resumption of the Six Party Talks, is likely to result in a hiatus in the talks in the near future. Worse will be the difficulties the parties will face in negotiating the denuclearisation of North Korea even if the Six Party Talks were to resume. It is highly likely that North Korea will find enough excuses to hold on to its nuclear weapons and weapons programmes when confronted with deteriorating relationships with the United States and South Korea. What is more worrisome is China’s perception that its vital strategic interests in the Korean peninsula and East Asia are being challenged by South Korea in alliance with the United States. The worsening interKorean and South Korean–Chinese conflicts that have been revealed in the Cheonan incident will destabilise East Asian politics and undermine the strategic interests of the countries involved. Heightened tension between the two Koreas due to the Cheonan Incident, South Korea’s and United States’ decision to link it to the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, and the worsened Sino-South Korean relations cast an ominous cloud over the future of inter-Korean relations, the SixParty Talks and prospects for denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, and South Korea-China relations. It appears that the Six Party Talks may not be resumed soon through US and South Korean reluctance to return to the talks without any “significant” measures taken by the North Korean side, even though Kim Jong Il expressed his intention to come back to the negotiating table at the China–North Korea summit held at Changchun in late August 2010. This grim prospect will have a negative influence not only on attempts to denuclearise North Korea but also on North Korea’s efforts to implement its strategy of survival and prosperity. The most serious failure may be felt in the North’s launching of a “strong and prosperous state” by 2012, the year commemorating Kim Il Sung’s centenary. The problem is that if North Korea continues to fail, it may, in a worst scenario, decide to stop paying attention to the instrumental value of its nuclear weapons and weapons programmes and start using them as a deterrent against the newly-formed threat it sees as coming from an alliance between the United States, South Korea and Japan. But the North Korean leadership may have a keen and serious percep­ tion  of this security threat derived from confrontation between two power blocs of a quasi-Cold War type, not based on ideologies this time but on the fundamental power transition taking place in this region of the world.

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations213 Prospects for North Korea in the International Relations of East Asia Finally, in the context of survival and prosperity for the twenty-first century, what kinds of critical choices are to be expected from the North Korean leadership in the future? In the domestic realm, choices will inevitably have much to do with further economic reform and opening: production increase in food and daily necessities, agricultural reform such as the introduction of a North Korean version of the household responsibility system, business and industrial reform, price reform, financial reform, trade reform, and so on. In support of such developments, the North Korean leadership already took a self-initiated, albeit limited, reform in July 2002 based on the introduction of market elements as a viable option for the country. In addition, the idea of practical-gain socialism has been emphasised to make it more conducive to economic reform and opening. More importantly, the new leader and successor Kim Jong Un will have to provide his people with more food and daily necessities not only for the legitimation and consolidation of his power but also for the launching of a strong and prosperous state in 2012. In the external realm, North Korea will have to improve its relations with the United States and South Korea, among other countries. In this regard, at least two things should be achieved: a peaceful and speedy resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem, and closer co-operation with South Korea in the economic, political-security, humanitarian and social and cultural areas. Whatever critical choices North Korea will make with regard to the international community, they will fall within the purview of what has been dealt with in the Six Party Talks and other bilateral and multilateral negotiations; this includes the denuclearisation of North Korea, North Korea–US normalisation, and a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula. A faithful implementation of the 19 September Joint Statement will be required for the irreversible and verifiable denuclearisation of North Korea and for permanent peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Failure to implement the joint state­ ment  will mean failure for North Korea in implementing its strategy of survival and prosperity. One concern, though, is that North Korea appears to have fewer incentives to give up its nuclear option since its second nuclear test in May 2009 and the Cheonan incident in March 2010.

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Another area in which North Korea will make critical choices is in interKorean relations. Ever since the Lee Myung-bak government came to power in South Korea, inter-Korean relations have deteriorated, and North Korea publicised its decision to sever dialogue with the Lee government until the end of his term. The Lee government appears neither to have abandoned its ‘theory of North Korea’s collapse’, which is responsible for the unrealistic character of South Korea’s North Korea policy and for the incongruence between what the Lee government has said in public and what it has harboured as a hidden agenda with respect to North Korea. What is crucial for any reform or opening or critical choice in North Korea is political stability. If North Korea has any fair chance of success in conducting economic reforms and openings, nuclear resolution with the United States, and close co-operation with South Korea, it will owe much of it to the success of the power succession in North Korea. Kim Jong Un will have to prove that he is competent enough in accommodating, balancing and controlling the key power-holders, in coming up with a compromise solution and in mobilising them for loyalty and compliance to himself. The problems Kim Jong Un will have to deal with are exactly the problems his grandfather and father struggled with for decades. Like them, Kim Jong Un will constantly face the question of how to strengthen the legitimacy of the North Korean system and how to prove his ability as the ‘supreme leader’ under circumstances in which he is caught between the domestic demand for better economic performance and the external demand for a solution to the nuclear problem and the introduction of more reform and opening. To prove himself as a capable leader, he must demonstrate performance in some critical areas: the ability effectively to indoctrinate the people for voluntary compliance with the leadership’s new policy choices, flexibility in accommodating the changes and developments inside and outside North Korea, proactively dealing with outstanding security and international issues including the nuclear issue, and finally, the ability to provide daily necessities for the people and achieve macro-economic goals. Inevitably, a time will come when Kim Jong Un and the North Korean system’s capabilities will be tested in terms of how well they will maintain political stability and simultaneously accommodate more liberalised political demands. What is almost certain, however, is that in the future the North Korean leadership will make a series of critical choices that will render it more responsive to and more accountable for the needs of the people—economic, material needs in particular. And those critical

   north korea’s place in east asian international relations215 choices to make in the future will be reflected in North Korea’s policies towards and relations with its East Asian neighbours to ensure its survival and prosperity for the twenty-first century. References Ahn, Young-Joon (2010): “China premier avoids backing sanctions for North Korea,” Associated Press, 30 May 2010. Albright, Madeleine K. (2000): “Address at the National Press Club”, Washington D.C., 02 November 2000. Albright, Madeleine K. (2000): “Toast at Dinner Hosted by Chairman Kim Jong Il”, Pyongyang, DPRK, 23 October 2000. Asher, David L. (2007): “The Impact of U.S. Policy on North Korean Illicit Activities”, Heritage Lectures, 1024 (23 May 2007). CFR (2001): “Letter to George W. Bush, President of the United States of America”, 22 March 2001. Jin, Canrong (2010): “Why does China de-link the Six-Party Talks and the bilateral relationship with DPRK now?”, Speech held at the Conference on International Relations and Options for a Regional Collective Security Mechanism, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Vienna 4–5 June 2010, Vienna. Jo, Myong Rok (2000): “Speech Delivered at a Banquet Hosted by U.S. State Secretary Madeleine Albright”, Washington, D.C., 10 October 2000. KCNA (2003): “The Statement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, 10 January 2003. KCNA (2006): “DPRK Foreign Ministry Invited the Head of the U.S. Delegation of the SixParty Talks to Pyongyang”, 01 June 2006. Kim, Heungkyu (2008): “The Sino-North Korean Relationship at the Crossroads,” Haksoon Paik and Seong-Chang Cheong (eds.): North Korea in Distress: Confronting Domestic and External Challenges, The Sejong Institute: Seongnam. Lee, Je-hyun (2010): “Korea Peace Forum leader calls for new direction in N.Korea policy”, The Hankyoreh, 20 October 2010. Li, Gwan Il (2010): “The Issue of the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula”, 2010 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, 4–6 March 2010, Moscow. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2005): “Spokesman’s Statement”, 10 February 2005. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2005): “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks”, Beijing, 19 February 2005, http://www.fmprc.gov .cn/eng/zxxx/t212707.htm. Paik, Haksoon (2003): “North Korea’s Struggle to Overcome Its Economic Crisis: Three Critical Choices, 1991–2003”, Vantage Point, 26:11 (November 2003), 46–47. Paik, Haksoon (2006): “Changing Dynamics of the North Korean System”, New Paradigms for Transpacific Collaboration, Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Series, 16, KEI: Washington, D.C., 121–141. Paik, Haksoon (2006): “North Korea Today: Politics Overloaded and Secularized”, Philip W. Yun and Gi-Wook Shin (eds.): North Korea: 2005 and Beyond, The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center: Stanford, CA, 37–54. Paik, Haksoon (2007): “North Korea’s Choices for Survival and Prosperity since 1990s: Interplay between Politics and Economics”, Sejong Policy Studies, 3:2 (2007), 250–264. Paik, Haksoon (2007): “North Korea—U.S. Relations (1945–2007)”, Center for North Korean Studies of The Sejong Institute (ed.): Foreign Relations of North Korea (in Korean), The Sejong Institute: Sungnam.

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Paik, Haksoon (2009): “No More Victims to the Devil of America’s Own Creating,” Policy Forum Online, 09-009A: 3 February 2009 (http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/ napsnet/policy-forums-online/security/09009Paik.html/?searchterm=Haksoon Paik). Snyder, Scott (2001): “The Rise of U.S.-China Rivalry and Its Implications For The Korean Peninsula”, Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim (eds.): Korean Security Dynamics in Transition, Palgrave: New York. Snyder, Scott (2009): China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security, Lynne Rienner: Boulder, CO. UNSC (2009): “Statement by the President of the Security Council”, S/PRST/2009/7, 13 April 2009, New York: United Nations. UNSC (2010): “Statement by the President of the Security Council”, S/PRST/2010/13, 09 July 2010, New York: United Nations.

THE SIX PARTY TALKS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PENINSULAR AND REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY1 Chung-in Moon I. Introduction Controversy over the highly enriched uranium (HEU) programme in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK—North Korea) that surfaced during the visit by American special envoy James Kelly to Pyongyang in October 2002 triggered the second round of the North Korean nuclear crisis, reminiscent of the 1994 crisis. Despite intense diplomatic efforts, however, the nuclear stand-off does not show any signs of reaching an immediate and peaceful settlement. Rays of hope brought by the adoption of the 19 September Joint Statement in 2005 as well as the agreement of 13 February 2007 on ‘Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement’ at the Six Party Talks (SPT) have been fading away. The uncompromising and even incomprehensible attitude of North Korea, passive diplomacy by the Obama administration, spoiling politics by Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK—South Korea), and lukewarm leadership in China have all contributed to complicating the current stalemate. The sinking of a South Korean navy corvette allegedly by a North Korean submarine torpedo on 26 March 2010 and North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong (Yŏnp’yŏng) island and two civilian causalities on 23 November 2010 have further heightened military tension on the Korean peninsula, profoundly undermining prospects for a negotiated settlement through the Talks. Failure to handle the North Korean nuclear quagmire through peaceful and diplomatic means could carry serious negative security implications for the Korean peninsula, the Northeast Asian region, and the world. It could severely destabilise peninsular security by breaking the interKorean military balance and heightening the chances for conflict escalation. A nuclear North Korea could also threaten regional strategic stability

1 A revised version of a paper presented at an international conference on “Korea and East Asia: International Relations and Options for a Regional Collective Security Mechanism,” University of Vienna, Austria, 4–5 June 2010.

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by precipitating a precarious nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia. More importantly, nuclear proliferation through North Korea’s transfer of nuclear materials to rogue states and global terrorists could be accompanied by formidable threats to global security as well. Thus, the North Korean nuclear problem is not simply a peninsular issue, but touches on the common security of the region and the world. It is in this context that the Six Party Talks (SPT) deserve attention as a multilateral mechanism for co-operation and co-ordination in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. Against this backdrop, the paper aims to explore the present status and future prospects for the Six Party Talks. The first part of the paper examines the ongoing debates on modalities in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem. The second part looks into the rationale of the SPT and makes an in-depth analysis of the overall negotiation process. Finally, the paper identifies obstacles to the SPT process and suggests some policy implications for regional peace and security. II. Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Quagmire: Debates on Modalities One of the major difficulties in resolving the second North Korean nuclear crisis has involved the modality of negotiations. Whereas North Korea has consistently favoured bilateral talks with the United States, the US has preferred multilateral formats. Some have even suggested punitive unilateral actions.2 Thus, it seems worthwhile to examine the contending models of resolving the North Korean nuclear problem before the relevancy of the SPT is discussed. Unilateral modality: The unilateral mode starts with a pessimistic view of negotiated settlements. Given past track records, it is virtually impossible to change North Korea’s behaviour through dialogue and negotiation, and the only credible way to disarm North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is either to transform the North Korean regime through isolation and containment or to reply with military options. 2 Victor Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 2007);. Charles Jack Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2007); Chung-in Moon, “Diplomacy of Defiance and Facilitation: The Six Party Talks and the Roh Moo-hyun Government,” Asian Perspective, 32: 4 (2008), pp.71–105.



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A strategy of hostile neglect based on isolation, containment and transformation is predicated on several assumptions,3 the most critical being that the North Korean nuclear problem cannot be solved without toppling the evil regime in North Korea. As long as Kim JongI Il stays in power, North Korea will want both dialogue and the nuclear bomb simultaneously. Removing him from power and creating a new regime in North Korea is the best and surest way to solve the North Korean nuclear dilemma.4 Thus, the United States and its allies and friends should work together to isolate, contain and transform North Korea. If they work together, the transformation of North Korea will materialise faster than its emergence as a real nuclear power. Another assumption is to “let North Korea go nuclear”.5 This assumption implies that there is no other option but to recognise North Korea as a nuclear power either because of delayed dialogue and negotiations with the North, or because of North Korea’s unfailing intention to develop nuclear weapons for both survival and as bargaining leverage. But allowing the North to be a nuclear power would not pose any immediate nuclear threats to countries in the region, since it would require more time to emerge as a fully fledged nuclear power. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which President Bush proposed in Krakow, Poland, on 31 May 2003, was one of those unilateral actions. The PSI is designed to “combat proliferation by developing new means to disrupt WMD trafficking at sea, in the air, and on land”.6 Although the PSI was not intended to isolate and contain North Korea (and eventually to transform its regime), North Korea, being designated as one of the rogue states, was bound to be subject to pressures from the initiative. Along with this, the United States deliberated on extensive measures to isolate and contain the North through a ban on arms-related exports and sales, controls over the export of dual- use items, prohibitions on economic assistance, and the imposition of miscellaneous financial and other 3 Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1999); Henry Sokolski, “Let’s Not Do It Again,” National Review Online, (Online) www.nationalreview.com/comment (24 October 2002); Victor Cha, “Isolation, Not Engagement.” New York Times, 29 December 2002; Henry S. Rowen, “Kim Jong Il Must Go” Policy Review, No. 121 (2003). 4 Rowen, Policy Review, p. 15. 5 Sonni Efron, “U.S Said to be Resigned to a Nuclear Korea.” The Los Angeles Times, 5 March 2003. 6 John Bolton, “Nuclear Weapons and Rogue States: Challenge and Response.” Remarks to the Conference of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Fletcher School’s International Security Studies Programme. (Online) Available: http://www.state.gov/t/us/ rm/26786.htm [accessed 10 December 2003].

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restrictions.7 The Japanese government also joined the US in pressuring North Korea by undertaking several measures such as the suspension of a regular ferry linking Japan and North Korea and of remittances from Chosensoren, a pro-North Korean organisation in Japan, as well as a trade embargo. South Korea under the Lee Myung-bak government has also been pursuing a strategy of hostile neglect, which became further intensified as a result of North Korea’s alleged armed attack on its naval vessel. The Lee government has banned exchange and co-operation programmes with the North through the May 24th measure, calling for comprehensive international sanctions and other punitive measures.8 Another unilateral approach is the military option. It could emerge as a last resort when, and only if, both negotiated settlement and options of hostile neglect fail. The United States and South Korea might deliberate on three possible military options. The first might be a pre-emptive surgical strike on nuclear facilities in Yongbyon (Yŏngbyŏn), a move that was once considered during the 1994 nuclear crisis. The second might be a combination of a surgical strike and a pre-emptive all-out attack on North Korea. The final option might involve a sequence of a surgical attack, retaliation by North Korea, and counter-attack. Regardless of the types of options, military actions are likely to result in a major catastrophe through escalation of the conflict. Even a well-planned and well-conducted surgical strike would eventually erupt into a major conflict. But both unilateral actions—isolation and a military strike—seem less desirable. The hostile neglect and eventual transformation of North Korea do not appear to offer a viable solution to the current crisis because of several serious limits, constraints and forms of negative backlash.9 Such moves would worsen rather than reduce the current nuclear stand-off and eventually lead to a major conflict on the Korean peninsula.10 Moreover, the option has proven to be problematic, as the Kim JongI Il regime did not collapse, and North Korea has declared itself as a nuclear weapons

  7 Counterterrorism Office, US Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. (Online) Available: http://www/state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/pdf (accessed on 10 December 2003).   8 Yonhap News, 24 May 2010.   9 Henry H. Kissinger, “Toward an East Asian Security System.” International Herald Tribune. 17 August 2003; Bruce Bennett and Hachigian, Nina. “Don’t Try Regime Change in North Korea.” International Herald Tribune, 31 January–1 February 2004. 10 Wade Huntley, “Coping with North Korea,” Foreign Policy in Focus. 24 February 2003. Online) Available: http://www.fpif.org/papers/korea2003.html [4 June 2003]; Chung-in Moon and Jung-hoon Lee, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis Revisited: The Case for a Negotiated Settlement,” Security Dialogue 34:2 (2003), pp.135–151.



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state. Its proponents also seem to commit the fallacy of underestimating the regime durability in North Korea. Outside pressures on North Korea will not only strengthen the position of hardliners in the name of ‘militaryfirst politics’, but also enhance its internal cohesiveness, weakening the possibility of transformation from within. Outside efforts to isolate and contain could solidify Kim’s power base and extend his regime survival, the more so because of the intense and widespread anti-American sentiments in North Korean society that have resulted from both its people’s long-lasting memory of American air raids during the Korean War and the ruling regime’s systematic and prolonged indoctrination. It seems highly unlikely, too, that China would join in any additional sanctions that go beyond those stipulated by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. Several factors also make the military option less feasible. South Korea and the United States cannot wage an effective war on North Korea without winning support from neighbouring countries, especially China and Russia. It also seems doubtful whether South Korea and the US would be able to achieve their political and military objectives through military actions. A surgical strike on the Yongbyon nuclear facilities could not satisfy the goal of destroying North Korea’s nuclear capabilities completely, for though such a strike might be able to resolve the present nuclear problem (i.e. the reprocessing of spent fuel rods and manufacturing of plutonium), it could not get rid of nuclear warheads and materials, including HEU, which the North has already acquired. And no matter how backward and ill equipped, the North Korean military still remains powerful and well fortified. The ideology of ‘military-first politics’, widespread antiAmericanism deeply embedded in the North Korean people, a hostile terrain and the fortification of military bases, and asymmetric forces deployed along the Demilitarised Zone would not yield an easy victory to the United States. The most critical aspect would be the profound collateral damages associated with military action, which would deal a critical blow to South Korea’s security and prosperity. It is for this reason that the South Korean people, if not the government, would strongly oppose military action. Bilateral Modality: The bilateral formula presupposes the settlement of the North Korean nuclear problem through direct dialogues and negotiations between the United States and North Korea. The two countries have entered three major bilateral agreements: the joint communiqué on non-military threat in 1993, the Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994, and the Albright and Jo Myong Rok joint communiqué of October 2000 on

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non-hostile intent, mutual respect of sovereignty, and the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. The Agreed Framework was the first bilateral agreement on the nuclear issue between the two states. It stipulates that North Korea’s return to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the freezing of its nuclear activities should be rewarded with the supply of heavy oil, the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs), negative security assurance, and an overall improvement in bilateral economic and political relations. The current nuclear stand-off has already nullified the Agreed Frame­ work. Nevertheless, North Korea has been trying to revive the bilateral modality by calling for direct bilateral talks with the US. Since the current nuclear crisis is essentially a product of hostile American policy towards North Korea, the North argues, its removal through bilateral negotiations is the prerequisite for the resolution of the nuclear problem. Otherwise, there is no choice for the North but to strengthen its nuclear deterrence capability to cope with American nuclear threats. Disabling, verifiable inspections, and the irreversible dismantling of its nuclear materials and weapons are contingent upon American security assurances, other followup incentives, and eventually diplomatic normalisation. But the US has rejected the North Korean proposal by pointing out the previous failures of a bilateral approach under the Clinton administration. Hardliners in the Bush administration believed that the Geneva Agreed Framework was nothing but an act of appeasement that rewarded North Korea’s bad behaviour. They were not going to repeat the same mistake of appeasing North Korea’s blackmail. Henry Kissinger aptly summarised the Bush administration’s perception of bilateral modality: “The bilateral route urged by North Korea is a trap and demand for a non-aggression pact is a canard.”11 A deeply rooted distrust of North Korea, which was widely shared among key decision-makers in the Bush administration, blocked the chance for direct bilateral talks. Although President Obama expressed his willingness during his presidential election campaign to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue by holding direct bilateral talks with Kim Jong Il, the pledge never materialised. The Obama administration did have bilateral talks with the North, but they were held within the parameters of the SPT process. Thus, bilateral negotiations seem highly unlikely unless the SPT make significant progress in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem.

11 Kissinger, “Toward an East Asian Security System.” 17 August 2003.



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Trilateral Modality: As disputes over the modality of negotiations prolonged the nuclear stand-off after Kelly’s October visit in 2002, heightening the potential for conflict escalation, China intervened and arranged three-party talks among North Korea, the United States and China in Beijing in April 2003. Strictly speaking, what China had in mind in arranging these talks was to create an opportunity for direct bilateral contacts between North Korea and the United States within the three-party framework. Failure to stop the fiasco and North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons could threaten China’s national security interests. It was thus a pre-emptive diplomatic measure to prevent further aggravation of the North Korean nuclear problem. American pressure also worked. Realising China’s leverage over North Korea, the US pressed China strongly to play a more active role in blocking North Korea’s nuclear ambition. And with the inauguration of a new leadership under Hu Jintao, China might have wanted to pursue a more proactive diplomacy.12 China succeeded in persuading the North to attend the three-party talks through extensive shuttle diplomacy. During the three-party talks, North Korea made a concrete proposal, terming it a ‘bold initiative’. According to this initiative, North Korea was willing to make a binding public pledge to abandon its nuclear weapons programme through verifiable dismantling and to continue the moratorium on missile test launching and the export of missile parts and components and technology, provided its requests for a nonaggression document, normalisation with the US, non-obstruction of its economic co-operation with Japan and South Korea, and alleviation of its energy situation, including the Shinpo LWR project, were met. More specifically, the proposal was based on a four-stage approach. The first stage involved an exchange of North Korea’s public declaration to abandon its nuclear development programmes in return for the resumption of heavy oil supplies and humanitarian food aid. The second stage comprised the signing of a US–North Korean non-aggression treaty, compensation for electricity lost through the delayed completion of the lightwater nuclear reactors, and the freezing and inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. The third stage presupposed the diplomatic normalisation of North Korea’s relations with the US and Japan and the resolution of the missile issue. Finally, North Korea would completely dismantle

12 Evans S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy.” Foreign Affairs, 82:6 (2003) 22–35.

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its nuclear programmes upon completion of the light-water nuclear reactors.13 But the United States simply ignored the North Korean proposal. Even with the Chinese government’s enormous efforts at mediation, James Kelly refused to engage in any direct bilateral talks with North Korea. The American position was clear: unless the North started a verifiable dismantling of its nuclear programme, the US would not engage in any dialogue and negotiations. What made the situation worse was North Korea’s recourse to its traditional strategy of brinkmanship diplomacy. Informal remarks by North Korea’s chief delegate, Li Gun, to Kelly that the North had not only acquired one or two bombs, but had also completed reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods destroyed the overall atmosphere of the three-party talks. Even China was angered by North Korea’s cheating behaviour. While the North informally notified the US of its possession of nuclear bombs and reprocessing of spent fuel rods, it denied their existence to China. Moreover, China’s dubious role as a mediator and not as a direct party limited its effectiveness. The three-party talks ended in dismal failure and were adjourned after only one meeting.14 Multilateral Modality: The multilateral formula can be defined as the various collective efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem through multilateral co-ordination and co-operation. It has so far been manifested in three distinct forms. The first is the United Nations/Inter­ national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) route. This was taken in tandem with North Korea’s compliance with the NPT, embodied in the Geneva Agreed Framework. The second involved a proposal for the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) plus five others (South Korea, North Korea, Japan, Australia and the EU), which was suggested by the Bush administration in January 2003. The proposal was a calculated move by the US to bring North Korea to a multilateral negotiation table, while avoiding any form of bilateral talks with North Korea. The move was seen as a pretext for the transfer of the North Korean case to the United Nations, should this venue fail as a result of North Korea’s nonco-operation. The P5 + 5 formula was attractive because it featured all the relevant parties, the five permanent members of the UN Security 13 IFANS (Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security), “Bukhaek Munjeai daehan Hanmiil Gongjo Banghyang [Direction of ROK-US-Japan Cooperation on the North Korean Nuclear Problem]” IFANS Policy Brief 9 July 2003; Funabashi, The Peninsula Question; Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy. 14 Funabashi, The Peninsula Question.; Woo-tak Lee, The Survival Game of Obama and Kim Jong-il (Seoul: Changhae, 2009) (in Korean); Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy.



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Council as well as the active participants in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The final formula was the Six Party Talks that convened through Chinese mediation in late August 2003. Whereas the United States initially favoured either the UN formula or the P5 + 5 formula, North Korea opposed the multilateral approaches. Even the Six Party Talks formula was rejected. The reasons behind North Korea’s rejection of the IAEA route underscored its dislike of the multilateral approaches. First, North Korea perceived that the IAEA was nothing but an instrument of America’s hostile policy on North Korea. Despite North Korea’s not admitting to the possession of its highly enriched uranium programme, the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a resolution that not only treated North Korea as a criminal, but also called for abandonment of the programme through verifiable means. For North Koreans, “It is nothing but an American conspiracy to strangulate us through the manipulation of IAEA.”15 Second, North Korea argued that IAEA’s double standards could not be tolerated. In this regard, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) made an interesting comment: “We are the victim of an aggressive policy by the United States. It is the United States who violated the NPT and the Geneva Agreed Framework, but the IAEA is asking us to give up our rights to selfdefence under American pressures without mentioning a single word on American behaviour. Such attitude reveals how false and hypocritical its claims are to impartiality.”16 North Korea decided to withdraw from the NPT because of America’s hostile policy and its nuclear threats. According to the North, the United States violated the principle of negative security assurance embodied in the NPT. Thus, a lack of neutrality and impartiality became a primary source of North Korea’s grievances towards the IAEA. Third, North Korea also questioned the autonomy of the IAEA as an independent international organisation. North Korea alleged that the IAEA made decisions only after getting instructions from the United States17 and that the IAEA’s actions and decisions relied very heavily on intelligence materials fabricated by the United States. It claimed that abuse and misuse of international organisations by the United States were most vividly evidenced through the UN Security Council’s discussion of the Iraqi issue, which the US attempted to use as an excuse for war. The following statement from KCNA revealed the point par excellence: 15 Korean Central News Agency, 10 January 2003. 16 KCNA, 10 January 2003. 17 KCNA, 13 February 2003.

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“The Iraqi War shows that to allow disarming through inspection does not help avert a war but rather sparks it.”18 Fourth, North Korea’s obsession with bilateral agreements with the United States was another hurdle. For the North, its compliance with the NPT safeguard agreement was effective only for as long as the Geneva Agreed Framework remained effective. When the Geneva Agreed Frame­ work was nullified, North Korea did not have any obligations to honour the NPT. North Korea justified its decision to withdraw from the NPT because of KEDO’s failure to supply heavy oil and the revival of hostile American policies and intentions to undertake pre-emptive nuclear attacks.19 Citing Article 10, section 1 of the NPT, North Korea claimed that it reserved the right to withdraw from the NPT if its national interests were severely threatened. In other words, the North perceived the multilateral approaches as viable only within the context of bilateral agreements with the United States. Fifth, North Korea raised a fundamental question on the authority and legal boundaries of the multilateral arms control regime. The Board of Governors of the IAEA decided to transfer the North Korean nuclear case to the UN Security Council on 12 February 2003. North Korea responded by arguing that since the lifting of a temporary ban on its effective withdrawal from the NPT was made on 10 January, making its withdrawal from the NPT immediately effective, the DPRK was not obliged to comply with the NPT.20 For the North, the IAEA decision to transfer the North Korean nuclear case to the UN Security Council was, therefore, an act of interference in the domestic affairs of the DPRK.21 The following quotation underlined North Korea’s view of the IAEA in a clear and concise way: “IAEA has not only underscored its authority and honour as an international organization, but also alienated itself from the resolution of the nuclear problem by dealing with the Korean nuclear problem in an unfair manner that arises from the application of a double-standard under American influence.”22 Finally, North Korea rejected the proposals on the P5 + 5 and the Six Party Talks, claiming that they were nothing but American ploys to defuse

18 KCNA, 7 April 2003. 19 KCNA, 28 December 2003. 20 DPRK–US Joint Communiqué, 11 June 1993; Geneva Agreed Framework, 21 October 1994. 21 KCNA, 13 February 2003. 22 KCNA, 10 December 2002.



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attention and to build rationales for exerting collective pressure on it. According to the North, they were simply time-delaying tactics. III. Why the Six Party Talks Process? Rationale and Assessment of Status North Korea’s opposition notwithstanding, however, China successfully engineered the Six Party Talks process with the help of Russia and South Korea. It represented a compromise between the American proposal of P5 + 5 and the North Korean proposal for bilateral talks. The SPT process has not been smooth, however. Its track record has shown a roller-coaster pattern, as ups and downs as well as stop-and-go have characterised the overall process. No progress was made in the first three rounds of the talks. A major breakthrough with the adoption of the 19 September Beijing Joint Statement came during its fourth round in 2005, but immediately met with a major setback over the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue. After a relatively long stalemate (from November 2005 to February 2007), the six parties adopted the 13 February agreement on initial implementation of the 19 September joint statement at the third session of the fifth round of the talks (8–13 February 2007). Although technical and procedural difficulties associated with the transfer of North Korean bank accounts at BDA to a third-party bank again stalled the process, bilateral talks between North Korea and the US revived the Six Party Talks by facilitating North Korea’s shutting down, sealing and disabling of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, which constituted the first and second stage of the 13 February agreement. However, verification protocol issues, along with the reciprocal supply of heavy oil, again derailed the process. North Korea had high anticipations of the Obama administration, but lack of action from the new administration drove the North to test-launch a long-range missile on 5 April 2009 and to conduct the second underground nuclear testing on 25 May 2009. The sinking of the South Korean naval corvette, the Cheonan, on 26 March 2010, allegedly by a North Korean torpedo, as well as North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong island on 23 November 2010, have complicated the situation all the more, making the resumption of the talks very unlikely. Despite this setback, the Six Party Talks should be revived and sustained, because there are no other alternatives. Two documents adopted by the talks, namely, the 19 September 2005 joint statement and the 13 February 2007 agreement, are critical in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem in a peaceful and diplomatic manner as well as fostering

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a peace regime on the Korean peninsula and multilateral security coope­ration in the region. The 19 September joint statement represented a promising step towards the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nucle­ar problem. According to the statement, North Korea committed itself to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, as well as to returning to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. The American affirmation of non-hostile intent, mutual respect of sovereignty, peaceful co-existence and eventual normalisation was also refreshing and tremendously encouraging to the overall process. In particular, the American commitment to refrain from attacking or invading North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons reduced the risk of catastrophic military conflict on the Korean peninsula. The five countries also gave an assurance that they were willing to help rebuild the failing North Korean economy by engaging in bilateral and multilateral economic co-operation with North Korea in the fields of energy, trade and investment. Such willingness sent an auspicious signal to a North Korea burdened by extreme economic hardship. The agreement produced two other positive peace dividends. One was the agreement to negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula; the other was that the six parties committed themselves to making joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia by agreeing to explore ways and means to promote multilateral security co-operation. Both are vital to shaping a new peace and security architecture on the Korean peninsula and in the region. The agreement underscored the triumph of innovative diplomacy where everyone was a winner: security assurances as well as economic and energy assistance for North Korea, abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and programmes for the United States, and diplomatic success for China. South Korea was perhaps the greatest beneficiary of all, as the joint statement addressed most of the issues on its long-cherished wish list: a non-nuclear North Korea, no military action by the United States, resuscitation of the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and multilateral security co-operation in the region. Japan and Russia must also have shared in the overall satisfaction. The 13 February 2007 agreement on ‘Initial Actions for the Imple­ mentation of the Joint Statement’ was also significant.23 According to the

23 MOFAT 2007. For its full text, refer to http://www.mofat.go.kr/mofat/mk_a008/ mk_b083/mk_c063.html.



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agreement, North Korea pledged to “shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility” and “invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications.” The North also agreed to come up with “a list of all its nuclear programmes as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods”. In return for these initial actions, the United States agreed to start bilateral talks with North Korea aimed at “resolving pending bilateral issues” (i.e. removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and terminating its application of the Trading with the Enemy Act to North Korea in the UN) and “moving toward full diplomatic relations”. Japan agreed to resume bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalise its relations with the North, and five countries (United States, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia) undertook to make an initial shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) to the North within the next sixty days, contingent upon North Korea’s implementation of its initial pledges. The six parties also established five working groups (denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, DPRK–US normalisation, DPRK–Japan normalisation, economic and energy co-operation, and a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism) in order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the Joint Statement. If North Korea made a complete declaration of all nuclear programmes and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plants, then economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of one million tons of HFO, including the initial shipment of 50,000 tons, would be provided to North Korea. It seemed quite innovative to include in the agreement a provision that “once the initial actions are implemented, the six parties will promptly hold a ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia”. It was also decided that the sixth round of the Six Party Talks would be held on 19 March 2007 to hear reports of working groups and discuss actions for the next phase. Although the 13 February agreement was nothing but a first step towards the fuller denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, it deserves commendation for several reasons. First, in contrast to the Joint Statement, which was rather comprehensive and declaratory, the agreement gave a very concrete picture of actions with a clearly defined timetable. Second, the agreement was also innovative in the sense that it effectively combined bilateral with multilateral approaches. Most interesting was the shifting

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US position. The United States became pragmatic enough to pursue bilateral contacts with the North, departing from its previous adherence to multilateral contacts. It is particularly noteworthy that all five countries pledged to share the costs of energy assistance to North Korea in accordance with the principle of equality and fairness. Third, both North Korea and the United States appeared to have committed themselves to the diplomatic resolution of the nuclear problem through the Six Party Talks process by overcoming the inertia of the past. Immediately after signing the agreement, both parties were moving quickly. Whereas the United States pledged to resolve the BDA problem within thirty days and invited ViceForeign Minister Kim Gye-gwan, North Korea’s chief delegate to the Beijing talks, to visit New York on 1 March to initiate bilateral talks on normalisation, North Korea reciprocated by inviting Mohamed ElBaradei, the then head of the IAEA, to visit the North, which was viewed as a pretext for the return of its inspectors. Finally, there was a shared perception and unity of purpose among all parties, even including North Korea: that the breakdown of the agreement could lead to the collapse of a negotiated settlement, portending a major disaster, and that no one wanted to lose face by becoming a spoiler. But several challenges have haunted the Six Party Talks process since mid-2008. The scope of the nuclear activities and programmes to be declared, inspected and dismantled was not clearly identified in the two documents. Does “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes” include the highly enriched uranium programme? Obvi­ ously, the US would think so, whereas the North has denied its existence until its disclosure in November 2010. Verifiable inspections posed another daunting challenge. Would North Korea allow an intrusive inspection? Given the clandestine nature of North Korean society, its extraordinarily high national pride, and the powerful position of its military, it would be extremely difficult for outside inspectors to undertake a sweeping and intrusive inspection of nuclear facilities in the North. Even if North Korea showed a passively co-operative attitude, verifiable inspections might still prove difficult, with the Iraq experience an obvious testament to the dilemma of inspections. Even if it were assumed that North Korea would fully co-operate with a verifiable dismantling, such co-operative behaviour is predicated on incentives, bilateral and multilateral energy assistance, expansion of trade and investment, and other forms of support. But pooling financial resources for assistance of such scope would pose another challenge. When it came to other pending issues such as missile proliferation, human



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rights violations, and trafficking in illicit drugs and counterfeit currency, Japan and the United States might discover significant domestic political opposition to assuming the lion’s share in assisting North Korea. Japan might not join in such efforts at all unless the issue of abducted Japanese was resolved, and provision of incentives and engagement with North Korea would become less effective without the participation of Japan and the United States. From a logistical point of view, it would also be a formidable task to co-ordinate and steer five working groups simultaneously. IV. Why Stalled?: The Six Party Talks Under Siege With the advent of the Lee Myung-bak government in South Korea in 2008, the overall equation of the Six Party Talks began to change as its role shifted from facilitator to spoiler. The Lee government has been pursuing a two-track approach regarding North Korea. On the one hand, it has proposed a ‘De-Nuke, Open 3,000’ exchange to the North, whereby, if North Korea denuclearised, the South would lift its per capita income to US$3,000 within ten years by facilitating opening and reform in the North. On the other hand, the Lee government would continue to rely on the SPT as a diplomatic channel to resolve the problem. However, the North has shown a more confrontational attitude to the Lee government by dismissing the ‘De-Nuke, Open 3,000’ proposal as a ploy by the latter to undermine its regime and system through opening and reform. On the SPT, the Lee government has not taken a proactive approach, while passively following the American moves. Furthermore, the government has not shown any interest in pursuing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula and a multilateral security co-operation regime in Northeast Asia. Priority has been given to the ROK–US alliance and ROK–US–Japan trilateral co-ordination. The Lee government has become much tougher after the North undertook a second nuclear test in May 2009. It has not only overtly sought an American nuclear umbrella through the application of extended nuclear deterrence, but has also proposed a ‘grand bargaining strategy’ which stipulates that the South would take bold and comprehensive measures to help the North, if the North showed any willingness to denuclearise itself. Otherwise, the other five members of the SPT would seek concerted efforts to penalise the North. The South is also critical of any bilateral contacts between North Korea and the United States without prior consultation with the ROK. South Korea has all of a sudden emerged as a major barrier to the SPT process, as Japan was in the past. South Korea has become much

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tougher, especially after the sinking of the naval ship and the North’s shelling of Yeonpyeong island, calling for a “North Korean apology first, resumption of the SPTs later.” The passive diplomacy of the Obama administration has also played a major role in derailing the SPT process, defying the high anticipation that the new administration would adopt a more progressive policy towards North Korea, based on the Clinton–Kim Dae-jung model. President Obama might have avoided the current confrontation if he had sent a high-ranking envoy to North Korea immediately following his inauguration with the message that the US was willing to normalise its relations with the North and to remove the posture of mutual hostility that had characterised the past eight years. With a concrete road-map for the verifiable dismantling of nuclear facilities, programmes and weapons presented through such a gesture, the concurrent pursuit of Six Party Talks and US– North Korean bilateral talks might have facilitated a breakthrough in the North Korean nuclear quagmire. However, the Obama administration was preoccupied domestically with the economic crisis and internationally with issues around Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Palestine, leaving North Korea a low policy priority. Moreover, the administration’s review of the United States’ existing North Korea policy as well as nominations for key positions responsible for this policy were all delayed. Although US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on 20 February 2009 officially announced the appointment of Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth as Special Representative for North Korea Policy during her visit to Seoul, the announcement has had little substantive impact. Rather, it was other remarks made during her visit that proved more significant, as, perhaps unintentionally, she provoked the ire of the North Korean leadership. Aside from her views on North Korea’s HEU programme, the stance presented by Secretary Clinton was largely indistinguishable from that of the Bush administration. The similarity was apparent in both tone and substance from her remarks, which used such phrases as “the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula”, and “becoming a global strategic alliance that rests upon shared commitments and common values—democracy, human rights, market economies, and the pursuit of peace”, put explicit emphasis on the “tyranny and poverty” in North Korea and warned that “North Korea’s relations with the US will not improve until it engages in dialogue with South Korea”. Clinton also made it clear that North Korea “cannot improve its relationship with the United States while insulting South Korean leadership and refusing dialogue with



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the South”. Although it is natural for the US to stand with South Korea as its ally, Secretary Clinton should have shown more prudence and deliberation in her language regarding North Korea, as the remarks appeared needlessly provocative and could be misconstrued as reflecting a concrete US policy towards the North that at the time was not yet finalised. The inactivity of the Obama administration in addressing the North Korean issue has proved especially unfortunate in that North Korea had high expectations of the new administration and hoped to engage positively with it sooner rather than later. However, it grew impatient as the US diverted its attention elsewhere. In fact, North Korea’s rocket launch on 5 April 2009 can be seen as an attempt to strengthen not only its domestic positioning with a display of ‘a strong, prosperous and great nation’ (kangsŏng taeguk), but also its bargaining position as the US inevitably refocused its attention towards the North. But the real motive behind the launching may also have been to test the Obama administration’s true intentions towards, and perception of, North Korea. A series of North Korean actions before and after the rocket launching clearly corroborates this argument. For instance, the country went to altogether remarkable lengths to comply fully with international regulations and procedures when it launched the rocket in April 2009. When it launched the Taepodong 1 on 31 August 1998, North Korea let the world know four days after the test launch, while it made a similar announcement one day after the launch of Taepodong 2 in July 2006. This time, however, North Korea notified the International Maritime Organisation of the expected launch time and flying trajectory almost one month before the launch. Moreover, it explicitly declared that the projectile was a research satellite for scientific and telecommunications purposes and voluntarily signed six international treaties and agreements related to the peaceful use of outer space. Additionally, after close consideration, North Korea seemed to have deliberately identified and exploited an unfortunate but nevertheless legitimate loophole in Resolution 1718 of the United Nations Security Council insofar as it knew there were no concrete regulations concerning satellite activity as opposed to ballistic missiles and related technology. The final point is especially worth noting, because by using the launch as proof of normal behaviour in complying with international rules and procedures, North Korea structured a calculated test to determine how willing the new administration was to recognise the North as a normal international state. International reaction, and the reaction of the United States in particular, to the rocket launch was negative. The US regarded the rocket as a

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missile and accused the North of violating UNSC Resolution 1718. North Korea’s claim that it had launched a satellite as part of its commitment to the peaceful use of space was flatly rejected, and the act was interpreted as a provocation which threatened the US and neighbouring allies. The US decided to apply to North Korea the ‘crime and punishment’ principle advocated by the George W. Bush administration. It argued that North Korea’s rocket launch was a clear violation of UNSC Resolution 1718 and required firm punishment from the international community. In pursuing these punitive efforts, the US operated closely with South Korea and Japan, not to mention the UN, and aggressively solicited the participation of China and Russia. The Obama administration also announced that it would not make any concessions in order to bring North Korea back to the Six Party Talks, as had been done in the past, effectively conveying to the North that the US would no longer concede to habitual North Korean threats and blackmail. Although its response to the rocket launch was unusually unforgiving, the United States had cause for its resolute stance. President Obama himself appealed to the North to refrain from the launch and sent Stephen Bosworth as Special Representative to Beijing in order to explore the possibility of a visit by Bosworth to North Korea. But the North defied these goodwill gestures, making the US increasingly impatient. The North further angered the Obama administration by undertaking the rocket launch fully aware that the Obama administration had not yet been able to appoint its key officials on North Korean policy and that its policy review on North Korea had not been completed. North Korea’s failure to accommodate such circumstances by delaying any provocative actions proved a critical miscalculation. At the same time, diplomatic pressure from Japan and South Korea played a significant role in shifting US policy towards a hardline stance, as the South Korean government, in close co-operation with the Japanese government, demanded immediate punitive actions against North Korea. This was in dramatic contrast to the past, when South Korea served as a counterweight to hardline US policy. As the United States could not turn a deaf ear to the demands of two major allies in the region, the options available to the Obama administration in addressing the issue were considerably limited. Despite its inconsistent actions, North Korea’s hope for new progress must have been severely disappointed. Following the adoption of the UNSC’s resolutions, i.e. sanctions against three North Korean compa­ nies  and other follow-up measures, North Korea responded with an equally tough stance. It declared its withdrawal from the Six Party Talks,



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expelled IAEA inspectors, and formally announced the recommencement of reprocessing of spent fuel rods. Then, on 29 April 2009, North Korea stated that it would conduct a second nuclear test, test launch an intercontinental ballistic missile and build a light-water reactor by securing low-enriched uranium unless the UNSC issued an apology. As announced, North Korea carried out a second nuclear test on 25 May 2009 and now appears determined to act on its own, following its own timetable. The sinking of the Cheonan corvette and the shelling of Yeonpyeong island in the course of 2010 have further worsened the situation. The South Korean government made it clear that the SPT would not be resumed unless its demands on both these events, including a formal apology from the North, are met. However, a major change came in the middle of 2011. By relaxing its earlier demand, the Lee Myung-bak government suggested a threephased approach to the resumption of SPT under the pressure from China and the U.S.: first, inter-Korean talks, second, DPRK-U.S. talks, and finally the resumption of SPT. Nevertheless, no progress was made so far. Likewise, the mismatch of perception and policy choices among South Korea, North Korea and the United States has severely undercut the viability of the SPT. China, as chair of the SPT, has worked hard to revive the process by seeking to persuade the North to return to the negotiation table, while urging co-operation from South Korea and the US. But Chinese efforts have been unable to win either concession from North Korea or positive signals from South Korea and the United States. Japan’s scope for manoeuvre has been fundamentally limited because of the ‘kidnapped Japanese’ issue, while Russia has become virtually an indifferent thirdparty bystander. V. Conclusion: Implications and Policy Suggestions The Six Party Talks are on the verge of collapse, and such a development should be prevented. Failure to resuscitate the SPT process could deal a critical blow not only to the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem, but also to peace-building in Korea and a new Northeast Asian security architecture based on multilateral co-operation. The demise of the SPT architecture could rekindle the spectre of the old Cold War confrontation on the Korean peninsula and nuclear domino in the region. What to be done? Prudence matters. As reckless and unilateral policy behaviour could worsen the situation, South Korea and the United States need to exercise more care with a realistic and inter-subjective

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understanding of North Korea. Despite its past erratic and even deceptive behaviour, the North Korean leadership is not irrational. Although the North is a tough bargainer, it is willing to co-operate if the proper mix of incentives is offered. North Korea has always responded positively to positive reinforcement, and vice versa.24 Recognition of its identity, provision of tangible incentives, and occasional face-saving treatment has yielded and can still yield wished-for results. The Obama administration should reflect deeply on the lessons learned from the ‘five lost years’ of the George W. Bush administration and reexamine the merits of the ‘Clinton–Kim Dae-jung’ model. In particular, it should look to the successes of the first and second inter-Korean summit meetings and consider seeking a breakthrough based on such summit diplomacy. Prerequisite to any resolution concerning the North Korean issue is the need for a symbolic and substantive paradigm shift. President Obama’s speech delivered at Cairo University on 4 June 2009 touched the entire Islamic world and laid the groundwork for severing what has been a cycle of ‘suspicion and discord’ between the US and Islamic countries. The United States needs to make a similar political gesture of comparable scale and scope to North Korea as well, through which it can restore a sense of hope and possibility. At the same time, the US needs to send explicit signals that it will change its North Korea policy to back up such rhetoric. The slow and steady bureaucratic ‘tit-for-tat’ approach of the past is insufficient to the task of inspiring the dramatic turnaround needed. Only a bold and comprehensive approach will be able to resolve the current crisis. For this to happen, the Obama administration needs to apply greater empathy in evaluating the situation from the perspective of North Korea by listening not only to functional experts who specialise in the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction but also those with an area specialism in North Korean affairs. I would also suggest that it should be more exacting when distinguishing between the assessments of such genuine specialists and those of the amateur generalists so prevalent in Washington. The same can be said of North Korea. Self-serving interpretations and a resort to brinkmanship diplomacy alone cannot ensure its national 24 Chung-in Moon, “North Korea’s Foreign Policy in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective,” in B.C. Koh, North Korea and the World: Explaining Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 2004), pp.355–368; Joseph Cirincione and Jon Wolfsthal, “Dealing with North Korea,” Proliferation Brief, 6:23 (19 December 2003).



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interests. North Korea is not the centre of the universe, and it should learn how to survive through mutual understanding and co-operation. Developments since the 13 February 2007 agreement might be the last chance for assuring positive sum outcomes for all. North Korea’s failure to grasp the new opportunity could lead to negative sum outcomes, where everybody loses and nobody wins. Its new leader, Kim Jong Un, should express his firm commitment to peace and de-nuclearization. There must be concerted efforts among the SPT members. Each of them needs to restrain its own agenda, while giving top priority to the nuclear issue. The sinking of the Cheonan corvette, the shelling of Yeonpyeong island, human rights, kidnapped Japanese, money-laundering and smuggling are all important issues, and they should not be treated lightly. But now is the time to focus first and foremost on the nuclear issue. When the nuclear problem were resolved, and trust were formed, then it would be much easier to tackle other issues, including missiles and bio-chemical weapons. North Korea might be tempted to deliberate on a policy of divide and rule by pitting the US and Japan against China, South Korea and Russia. These five countries should make concerted efforts to cope with such a move. However, co-ordination and co-operation between them should not be conducted in such a way as to isolate North Korea. The current Six Party Talks structure lacks an adequate system of checks and balances. China has been struggling to revive the SPT in the face of the concerted hardline position adopted not only by the United States, South Korea and Japan, but also by North Korea. Without the prospect of a possible middle ground, the Six Party Talks have quickly lost their bearing and are at risk of losing legitimacy. The US needs immediately to find a way to re-establish the equilibrium, while China should make a more active diplomatic effort as host of the SPT. South Korea too needs to realise that a tough stance against North Korea is not the only solution. Lastly, most of SPT members will undergo domestic political changes in 2013. I hope new leaders would come up with a collective wisdom to resolve the North Korean nuclear quagmire in a peaceful manner through the resumption of the SPT. References Albright, David (2003): “North Korea’s Current and Future Plutonium and Nuclear Weapon Stocks”, in ISIS Issue Brief 15 January 2003. (Online) Available: http://www .isis-online-org/publications  http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/JBW /nknuclearweaponproductionpotential.pdf  www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/msl/msl _overview.html  [2 November 2003 ].

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Bennett, Bruce, and Nina Hachigian (2004): “Don’t Try Regime Change in North Korea”, in The International Herald Tribune, 31 January-1 February 2004. Bolton, John (2003): “Nuclear Weapons and Rogue States: Challenge and Response.” Remarks to the Conference of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Fletcher School’s International Security Studies Programme, 2 December 2003, (Online) Available: http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/26786.htm [10 December 2003]. Cha, Victor (2002): “Isolation, Not Engagement”, in New York Times, 29 December 2002. Cha, Victor, and David C. Kang (2003): Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies, New York: Columbia University Press. Cirincione, Joseph, and Jon Wolfsthal (2003): “Dealing with North Korea”, in Proliferation Brief, 6:23 (19 December). Counterterrorism Office, U.S. Department of State (2002=: Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. (Online) Available: http://www/state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/pdf. Eberstadt, Nicholas (1999): The End of North Korea, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. Efron, Sonni (2003): “U.S Said to be Resigned to a Nuclear Korea”, in The Los Angeles Times, 5 March 2003. Funabashi, Yoichi (2007): The Peninsula Question. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute. Huntley, Wade L. (2003): “Coping with North Korea”, in Foreign Policy in Focus. 24 February 2003. (Online) Available: http://www.fpif.org/papers/korea2003.html [4 June 2003]. IFANS (Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security) (2003): “Bukhaek Munjeai daehan Hanmiil Gojo Banghyang [Direction of ROK-US-Japan Cooperation on the North Korean Nuclear Problem]”, in IFANS Policy Brief 9 July 2003. Institute of Political Education for Unification (IPEU), Department of Unification (2003): Understanding North Korea. Seoul: IPEU. Kissinger, Henry H. (2003) “Toward an East Asian Security System”, in The International Herald Tribune. 17 August 2003. Lee, Woo-tak (2009): The Survival Game of Obama and Kim Jong-il. Seoul: Changhae (in Korean). Medeiros, Evan S. and Fravel, M. Taylor (2003): “China’s New Diplomacy”, in Foreign Affairs 82:6, 22–35. MOFAT (2007): “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement”. For its full text, refer to http://www.mofat.go.kr/mofat/mk_a008/mk_b083/mk_c063.html. Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies (2003): “North Korean Nuclear Capabilities”, (Online) Available: www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/msl/msl_overview.html [2 November 2003]. Moon, Chung-in (2004): “North Korea’s Foreign Policy in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective”, in B.C. Koh, North Korea and the World: Explaining Pyongyang’s Foreign Policy, Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, pp. 355–368. Moon, Chung-in (2008): “Diplomacy of Defiance and Facilitation: The Six Party Talks and the Roh Moo-hyun Government”, in Asian Perspective. 32:4, pp. 71–105. Moon, Chung-in, and Jung-Hoon Lee (2003): “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis Revisited: The Case for a Negotiated Settlement”, in Security Dialogue 34:2, pp. 135–151. Nerris, Robert S., Hans M. Kristensen, and Joshua Handler (2003): “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme”, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59:2, pp. 74–77. Pritchard, Charles J. (2007): Failed Diplomacy, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institutions. Rowen, Henry S. (2003): “Kim Jong Il Must Go”, in Policy Review No. 121. Selig, Harrison (2003): Turning Point in Korea: New Dangers and New Opportunities for the United States, Washington, DC: Center for International Policy. Sigal, Leon V. (2002): “North Korea is no Iraq: Pyongyang’s Negotiating Strategy”, in Arms Control Today, 32:10. Sokolski, Henry (2002): “Let’s Not Do It Again”, in National Review Online, (Online) Available www.nationalreview.com/comment [24 October 2002].



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The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2003): “Je 1cha 6ja hoidam Gtolgwa mit hyanghu daechaek [Results of the First Six-Party Talk and Future Policy Directions],” The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Unification, the National Assembly. 1 September. Wolfsthal, Jon B. (2003a): “Freezing and Reversing North Korea’s Plutonium Programme”, Working Paper of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability No. 38. Wolfsthal, Jon B. (2003b): “Estimates of North Korea’s Unchecked Nuclear Weapons Produc­ tion Potential,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (Online) Available: http:// www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/JBW/nknuclearweaponproductionpotential.pdf [2 November 2003].

COMMENTARY ON PAPERS BY CHUNG-IN MOON, CHAESUNG CHUN AND HAKSOON PAIK James Hoare These are three very different papers. There are common themes running through them, but they are treated in different ways. What they do show is that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK—North Korea) needs careful handling, that there is little sign of that careful handling, and that dealing with the DPRK highlights the problems of any attempt at establishing an Asian regional security organisation. Professor Foot, in her comments on the first set of papers, has made it clear just how far off that is. The sheer diversity of Asia, in terms of peoples, systems of government and complex inter-state issues makes an idea of an effective regional security organisation far more difficult than in Europe, so often seen as the model of how to do things. In his paper, Professor Moon Chung-in looks at the issue of the Six Party Talks with the eye of a pragmatist rather than a theoretician, although, as is well known, he can play that role as well. The Six Party Talks, as he makes clear, developed as a way of handling the DPRK nuclear issue after US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s confrontation in Pyongyang in October 2002 led to the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework.1 There is no evidence that the Bush administration had any idea of what was to happen after the end of the Agreed Framework; it was sufficient to end it and to cease “negotiating with evil”, as Vice-President Cheney is supposed to have put it. As Moon makes clear, the Six Party Talks were by no means the only option considered. Some favoured neglect, others military action. But the first would do nothing to stop the DPRK from developing nuclear weapons, and the second ran the risk that, if it did not work, the Asian region might be plunged into conflict. Given our uncertain knowledge of

1 See Robert Carlin, “Negotiating with North Korea: Lessons Learned and Forgotten”, in Rüdiger Frank, James E Hoare, Patrick Köllner and Susan Pares, eds., Korea Yearbook 2007: Politics, Economy and Society (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2008), 235–251 for a succinct account of these developments. They are also covered in more detail in works such as Yuichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Nuclear Crisis, (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 2007), and Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, (New York: St Martin’s Griffin, 2009).

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exactly what nuclear facilities the DPRK has and where they are situated, a pre-emptive strike would be a risky business. What is certain is that the nuclear issue did not go away and neither did the concerns about it. The Kelly visit added complications to an already difficult situation. Having clambered on to the moral high ground, the Bush administration refused to go back to direct negotiations with the DPRK. For its part, the DPRK, seeing the benefits of the Agreed Framework slipping away, turned back to what it may have wanted to do all along: develop some form of nuclear deterrent that would keep its enemies at bay. It also made it clear that since it was the US that it saw as its main enemy and thus the main threat to its continued existence, it would deal only directly with the US. So the problem was not solved, but new and more dogmatic positions had been taken up on both sides. It was China that provided the way out. Neglect was not going to solve the issue—as would be made abundantly clear on several occasions in the coming years—so some means had to be devised to get the DPRK and the United States back together. The first attempt, in April 2003, was to get the US, the DPRK and China to the negotiation table. It failed when the US refused to accept anything less than complete, verifiable and irreversible (CVI) denuclearisation. There would be no more Clintonstyle “appeasement”, even if nobody was quite sure what CVI meant; as some commentators noted, it would not be easy to eradicate knowledge of nuclear weapons and how to make them, even if programmes were closed down. Eventually, after various other multilateral routes were examined and dismissed, the Chinese came up with the formula of the Six Party Talks. The US and the DPRK would not have to face each other alone. Instead, the major regional powers would all sit down and discuss the nuclear issue. And although in origin the Six Party Talks were merely a device to get the US and the DPRK in the same room, gradually they took on a more complex role. There was something in them for everybody, whether status or an opportunity to raise issues of concern beyond the nuclear issue that if solved, would contribute to the peace and security of East Asia. Thus the Six Party Talks, like the Agreed Framework, worked, although there were some difficult moments on the way, when different agendas were pursued by one party or the other. Indeed, they worked so well that there were those who saw them as the possible basis for the regional security regime that (East) Asia has so far conspicuously lacked. This pious hope ignored the fragility of the arrangement, which had always been evident. The talks nearly foundered in 2005, when different parts of the US administration seemed to pull in opposite directions and



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effectively stymied a just-concluded agreement. The direct consequence of that error was the DPRK nuclear test of October 2006. The test brought the parties back to the table and led to a new agreement in February 2007. But the fundamental problem came when the balance within the group was altered. This happened when the US government under President Bush proved reluctant to support the policies of the Roh Moo-hyun government of the Republic of Korea (ROK—South Korea) towards the DPRK; some on the US side thought it was too left-wing. Clearly support for one’s allies is only given if they are following policies acceptable to the US. But the biggest change in the balance came after the election of Lee Myungbak as president of the ROK in 2007. Moon is careful—after all, he worked for the two previous governments—but he clearly sees in the Lee government’s approach a return to the unproductive antagonistic attitudes of pre-1997 ROK governments. He also is concerned at the way US foreign policy is made, in particular, by what he sees as the distinction between the “genuine specialists” and the “amateur generalists”. This seems rather an arbitrary division, since he sees the former among the area specialists of the State Department and the latter among the proliferation experts. He also clearly feels that the Obama administration has failed to take on board how important the DPRK nuclear issue is both regionally and internationally, and has certainly not given the matter the priority it deserves. He also finds in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s approach to the DPRK another throwback to the past. The hectoring tone she has adopted is “needlessly provocative” in his estimation, and has certainly done nothing to modify DPRK behaviour. In the end, the dilemma and the problem with the Six Party Talks is that their purpose was to contain the DPRK’s nuclear programme but other interests and concerns kept intruding, whether it was Japan’s concern over the issue of abductees, the US Treasury Department’s wish to nail the DPRK over the issue of counterfeiting US banknotes, or the Lee government’s wish to get away from the “appeasing” policies of its predecessors. Although everybody says they wish to end the DPRK’s nuclear programme—even at times the DPRK itself—when it comes down to it, other interests and concerns raise their heads. Currently, US banknotes have faded from the agenda, but the question of the Japanese abductees or apologies for the sinking of the Cheonan (Ch’ŏn’an) and for the shelling of Yeonpyeong (Yŏnp’yŏng) island currently appear to take precedence over nuclear matters. Although the nuclear issue sometimes appears to be one that preoccupies mainly the US and the DPRK, this is clearly not the case. All the regional powers share concerns about something that could destabilise an

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area where large armies face each other and there are many problems left over from the past. No state is more involved than the ROK, even though the DPRK usually does its best to try to keep its brothers to the south at arm’s length. This is partly a question of legitimacy, since neither Korean state has fully accepted the other’s right to exist, despite both joining the United Nations. Even if neither has done very much to bring about the reunification of the peninsula since the end of the Korean War in 1953, both still proclaim reunification as their ultimate goal. Professor Chun Chaesung, indeed, sees problems with the very concept of statehood in East Asia. He notes the emergence of European states and, presumably, their offspring such as Argentina, Australia and the US, as deriving from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which brought to an end the Thirty Years’ War—an interesting point to consider in Vienna. But a similar process was lacking in East Asia. There, until the nineteenth century brought the West into the region, East Asian powers existed under a loose Chinese hegemony, made up of political and cultural elements. The idea of the modern state came from outside the region. First embraced by Japan, which then tried to impose it on Korea, Chun argues that it was never completely assimilated into East Asian thought. Despite apparently accepting modernity, he believes no East Asian state, even Japan, has actually got there. Japan remains in the shadow of the Second World War, and both China and Korea, once unified states, are now divided. This seems to me to be stretching the Westphalia concept somewhat and exaggerating the unchanging nature of the states that emerged from Westphalia. Whatever else it did, Westphalia did not stop states dividing and re-dividing—again, holding a conference in Vienna should bring home just how Europe has changed and reinvented itself time and time again since 1648, 1815, 1918 or 1945. What is true is that the states of East Asia are certainly not all equal. The sheer size of China and Russia—which must be considered as both European and Asian—the economic power of Japan, still there despite the difficulties of recent years, and the might of the United States, which like Russia looks two ways but is undoubtedly ‘Asian’ in terms of presence and influence in a way that Europe is not now, whatever it was in the past, all mean that both Koreas are dominated by their powerful neighbours. One suspects that this would be true of a united Korea, as it was in the past, even though a modern united Korea would be far stronger than its Yi dynasty counterpart. Chun argues that this weakness has inevitably affected the ROK’s approach to the world. Unable to put forward its own grand strategies—one wonders how many countries can—he sees it as



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engaged in essentially short-termist approaches to issues. He notes that the government of Lee Myung-bak, while maintaining the alliance with the US, is also pushing forward the concept of ‘Global Korea’ and seeking better relations with surrounding states. Chun sees this as a sign of an emerging, more mature approach in foreign affairs. This may be so, but none of it is new. Since the 1990s, all ROK leaders have wanted to improve relations with their neighbours, and it is hard to distinguish President Lee’s global policies from those of President Kim Young-sam, for example. But whatever grand strategies ROK presidents put forward, and however much international travel they engage in, the understandable preoccupation with the DPRK and the relatively short power span of a ROK presidency have usually led back to the short-termism that Professor Chun has identified. Each new president rediscovers the world, only to find that soaring dreams are quickly brought down to earth by harsh local realities. Better relations with China are good, but awkward issues intrude from time to time. The same is true of relations with Japan, and Professor Chun notes that preoccupation with issues such as apologies for the past can quickly sour attempts to get on to a more co-operative level in ROK– Japanese relations. Chun notes that the idea of regional co-operation is hardly a new one in East Asia, though it is not one that has made much progress. The interests of individual states are still too strong to see much willingness to subordinate them to the greater good. The United States, for all its apparent altruism, has its own strategic interests in the region, which will often override local ones. He hints at this in the context of the DPRK, noting the US concentration on the nuclear issue because this is potentially the greatest threat for the US, while ignoring other issues that are of much importance. He does not dwell on the point that Moon touches on, which is that under the Obama administration, even the DPRK nuclear issue has dropped down the list of US concerns, as the focus shifts to Iran, the Middle East more broadly and to domestic issues. The original version of the third paper in this group looked at the way the DPRK approached international issues and its very survival. Professor Paik noted the many variables that have to be taken into account when considering these issues and pointed out that we know relatively little about how the DPRK functions or how issues such as Kim Jong Il’s apparent illness in 2008 and the related question of the succession may affect foreign affairs. The revised paper, while covering these themes, is much richer. It begins by examining the way the DPRK has reacted to the great changes that have affected it since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

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Moving away from the often negative assessments that are made of the DPRK’s policy choices, especially among ROK scholars and policymakers, Paik shows that it can be argued that the DPRK leadership has followed a strategically coherent policy. Seeing the US as its greatest enemy and the biggest threat to its existence, it has tried to engage with the US and to end the continued Cold War system on the peninsula. This policy has not been without success, though for the present it is stalled because of US preoccupations with other issues. At the same time, when faced by the equally difficult challenge of economic problems, the DPRK has taken a series of measures to tackle them that, in Paik’s view, make a lot of sense. They range from the creation of its first special economic zone at Rajin-Sonbong in 1991, through engagement with the ROK to the economic reforms of 2002. To Paik, these were serious efforts to deal with problems. He also thinks that they had more success than is usually acknowledged. Although he sometimes exaggerates the extent of the success, he is surely right to give credit to the DPRK leadership for trying. Like most people, Paik believes that the ultimate aim of the DPRK’s leaders is survival. While they may believe that they can only achieve that by persuading their enemies that it is too dangerous to attack, he also shows that they are aware that other policies are needed. At the same time, he also believes that the DPRK’s insecurity has been increased by the lack of policy consistency among all its neighbours, including the US. Policies have been taken up and abandoned by successive governments and administrations, so that the DPRK leadership and those who carry out its policies have never been sure that what is agreed by one will not be rejected by the next. Indeed, despite the frequent charge of DPRK unpredictability, Paik indicates that this is a charge that would be better directed at others. One may disagree with the methods chosen by the DPRK to advance its goal of survival, but they have not been inconsistent. He notes, as does Moon, that for good historical reasons, the DPRK is suspicious of multilateral approaches, whether it be the 1954 Geneva Conference or the Six Party Talks, seeing them all as attempts to tie it down. He also sounds a note of warning. If the DPRK fails, whatever that means, such a development will not necessarily be beneficial to its neighbours. He does not spell this out, but I tend to agree. It is not just the prospect of large numbers of refugees, and the enormity of the task of reconstruction, although those would be very difficult matters to handle. There are also the political problems of trying to reintegrate two sets of people who, whatever their common past, have grown far apart economically, socially and most of all,



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politically. Viewed from such a perspective, the engagement policy of the two previous ROK governments made a lot of sense and the confrontational approach of the Lee government seems misguided and only likely to make any prospect of eventual reunification more difficult, however satisfying it is to conservative circles in the ROK. Finally, all three papers show just how difficult it will be to create a regional security regime for East Asia, and help us to understand why the existing attempts have not succeeded. The problems left over by history and the new problems that are constantly emerging tend to keep intervening in the orderly creation of structures to handle conflict. Westerners and some East Asians trained in the West tend to see something on the model of what has been done in Europe as the way forward. I am not so sure, especially since conditions in Europe since 1945 have in reality been very different from those in East Asia. It may be that groups like the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and even more its offspring such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN plus Three have played an important educational role, even if they have not solved the problems. It has been salutary for North Korean, Chinese and even Burmese officials attending such groups to have been made aware of how their policies are viewed by non-hostile countries, something they are unlikely to learn at home. That their deliberations and procedures are seen as slow and cumbersome by thrusting Western officials may be less important than the fact that participants find them more congenial. As these papers show, there are more ways than one to catch a rabbit or to solve a problem, even such an apparently intractable problem as the future of the Korean peninsula.

ASEM AND EUROPE-ASIA RELATIONS Sung-Hoon Park I. Introduction ASEM has been a venue for Asia-Europe bilateral co-operation over the last fifteen years. Having expanded to forty-five members from its initial membership of only twenty-six, ASEM now encompasses most of the Asian countries and all the EU member states. Asia-Europe relations have, since the inception of the ASEM process, been upgraded considerably. Having embraced political and security co-operation as an area of bilateral co-operation, ASEM is well positioned to start more affirmative action plans in the areas of a collective security mechanism. These opportunities notwithstanding, increasing challenges have emerged, especially by comparison with the initial period of ASEM. Bilateral Asia-Europe co-operation in the area of collective security has to take a number of initiatives emerging within the framework of East Asian and Asia-Pacific regional architecture into consideration. Both new initiatives, such as the Asia-Pacific Community (APC) and the East Asian Community (EAC), and existing initiatives, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), envisage incorporating a security agenda, in addition to the region’s traditional agenda of economic integration. In fact, the degree of institutional competition for a regional security mechanism has increased considerably over the last few years. This has put a number of challenges to the ASEM process on its way towards the consolidation of its own collective security mechanism. As Park and Kim (2008) have noted, the relationship between Asia and Europe can be termed as ambivalent. In fact, the two continents have maintained a long-lasting relationship, ever since Marco Polo discovered Asia. However, for a long period the bilateral relationship was not based on an equal partnership, until a number of Asian countries were freed from colonial rule by their European empires in the 1950s. A real partnership was instituted with the launch of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, which effectively ended both the predominance of the United States as a regional power in Asia and Asia’s preoccupation with the US as the main destination of political and economic attention. The ASEM

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framework, over the past fifteen years of its existence, has functioned as a meaningful venue for strengthening the bilateral relations between Asia and Europe.1 It is true that the respective focus of Asia and Europe in their approaches towards bilateral co-operation, notably through the ASEM framework, has shown a big divergence. Asian countries appear to have a stronger interest in enhancing both political and economic co-operation with European countries, thus pursuing a balance between the EU and the US as partners in co-operation. In contrast, European countries have focused more on economic co-operation, because they have regarded the political sphere as the domain of their competitor, the United States. The European Commission (1994) in its presentation of concepts for a New Asia Strategy (NAS), for instance, recognised the predominant role of the US in the Asian region, and declared itself not yet ready to contest it. However, it is rather ironic to find that among the three pillars of co-operation— political, economic and socio-cultural—set out in the ASEM framework, it is in the socio-cultural area that the most significant achievements have been made so far. In fact, both the Asian and the European team, which were established to evaluate ASEM’s ten-year performance in furthering the bilateral co-operative relationship, agreed in their report in identifying this area as the pillar demonstrating the greatest progress in the co-operation agenda of the ASEM process (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland 2006). A number of projects were commissioned thereafter to solicit modalities and initiatives to strengthen activities in the remaining two areas of co-operation: political and economic. These evaluations notwithstanding, Asia-Europe co-operation in political and security-related issues had been identified as one of the most important and relevant areas. Fort (2004), for example, early on suggested a relatively wide-open window of opportunities for Asia and Europe to engage more actively with each other in security co-operation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (2006, p. 16), as well, in its report identified “addressing security threats and challenges” as one of the niches for Asia-Europe co-operation where the ASEM process could contribute added values to the existing frameworks at the bilateral and multilateral level. 1 The sixth ASEM summit held in Helsinki 2006 adopted the ‘Helsinki Declaration on the Future of ASEM’, and the summit identified ASEM as a “prime point of convergence between Europe and Asia”, and reasserted the role of ASEM as “a catalyst in the broader context of EU-Asia relations”.



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Against this backdrop, this paper attempts to assess the achievements of ASEM as a pillar of political and security co-operation, and to identify some areas where the two regions may well play a more significant role. The paper is organised as follows. After this introduction, Section II revisits and discusses in some detail the positive and negative geopolitical factors surrounding Asia-Europe bilateral relations in the 1990s. This discussion is followed by an analysis of the European Union’s New Asia Strategy as one of the instrumental factors leading to the launch of ASEM. Section III then investigates the ASEM as a new avenue of Asia-Europe political and security co-operation, paying attention mainly to the evolution of this co-operation over time after the establishment of ASEM. Section IV provides some concluding remarks. II. Revisiting the Geopolitics of the 1990s and the EU’s New Asia Strategy The launch of ASEM in 1996 can be regarded as the official crowning of a series of EU strategic approaches to East Asia. Established at a summit meeting, ASEM in the meantime has positioned itself as an important inter-regional co-operation forum between the two continents. With a comprehensive and widespread co-operation agenda ranging from the political to the economic to the socio-cultural fields, ASEM has awakened attention on both sides to the importance of such co-operation, especially in the light of Asia’s recognition of its too strong dependence on the political, security-related and economic dominance of the United States in the region. In fact, an increasing consciousness in the East Asian countries of the necessity of diversifying their external relations has been effectively accommodated by the EU’s discovery since the mid-1980s of the increasing strategic value of East Asia. This coincidence of mutual interests, which had been growing since the beginning of the 1990s, triggered a process of consultations, thereby leading to the launch of the first ASEM summit in Bangkok in 1996. While the launch of ASEM has improved and upgraded bilateral relations between the two continents, there have been both positive and negative developments.2 This section sketches the dynamics between these two contradictory developments, which constituted the main background 2 Pelkmans and Shinkai (1997), for example, provide a detailed discussion of these signals, which were conflicting rather than consistently positive or negative.

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for the launch of the ASEM process, but which still exert an influence on bilateral relations. 1. Negative Signals for Asia-Europe Relations in the Early 1990s The following negative factors had surrounded bilateral relations between Asia and Europe in the early 1990s. First, the announcement of the Single European Market in 1986 and its achievement by the end of 1992 generated suspicion and scepticism about the orientation of both the EU’s trade policy and its external relations, which faded only slowly and gradually. East Asia observed cautiously the developments in the deepening process of European integration. In fact, especially in the area of trade policy, many major trading partners of the EU, including Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea, were concerned about the EU’s becoming a “fortress”3 with higher protectionist barriers for products from non-member countries. The increasing direct investment by Japanese firms in Europe from the mid-1980s was fuelled by a strong appreciation in the Japanese yen and the pre-emptive ‘tariff-jumping’ strategy of Japanese firms seeking to overcome the allegedly stronger EU protectionism, rather than by expectations of an improving business environment in Europe. Second, during the final stage of the Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations, the rigid position of the EU on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that was revealed, with its widespread and heavy subsidy programmes, appeared to lie in the way of a successful conclusion of the global trade deal. As East Asian countries had been the main beneficiaries of an incrementally liberal trading system since the end of the Second World War, they became worried about the failure of the UR negotiations and thus strengthened their ties with the US, for example through the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Cooperation (APEC) mechanism in 1989. East Asia believed that prolonged UR trade talks would lead to increasing opportunity costs, and found in the stronger alliance with the United States an effective instrument with which to pressure the EU to conclude the UR negotiations with concessions on issues of agricultural liberalisation, a tactic that was seemingly successful.4 3 The fear of ‘Fortress Europe’, which implied increasing trade and investment barriers by way of the Single European Market programme during the 1980s, is now being raised in a new context: human rights activists are fearful that the EU, through the newest enlargement to the east, may become non-accessible for asylum seekers or other potential immigrants. 4 Bergsten (1997).



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Third, with the EU’s decision to pursue enlargement to the north (to Sweden, Austria and Finland in 1995) and to the east (ten countries in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region in 2004; two more in 2007), East Asian countries were concerned over the potential diversion of trade and investment activities on the part of the relatively rich old EU member states. They became increasingly sensitive about the size and economic impact of these EU members states’ investments that might be diverted to the new candidate countries in the vicinity of EU territory. Fourth, the EU’s external relations with individual Asian countries were also over-shadowed by a number of bilateral tensions. Problematic issues involved enhancing democracy (China: Tiananmen Square) and human rights (ASEAN: East Timor), resolving chronic bilateral trade imbalances (Japan), and countering aggressive trade policies (South Korea: shipbuilding, steel, etc.). This set of negative signals has functioned as a centrifugal force, leading both parties to keep a distance from one another. 2. Positive Signals for Asia-Europe Relations in the Early 1990s On the other hand, there were also positive developments fostering AsiaEurope relations, which functioned, in contrast to the aforementioned negative signals, as centripetal forces, leading both parties to take favourable policy stances towards one another. First of all, with both the successful conclusion in 1993 of the UR negotiations and the successful launch of the Single European Market at the beginning of 1993, the EU started constructing a balance between internal and external policy, thus allocating more human resources and energy towards strengthening external relations, especially with East Asia. Second, motivated by the remarkable economic performance of many East Asian countries and alerted by an increasingly aggressive Asia strategy on the part of the United States, Europe moved towards improving the profile and presence of European nations and business in the fastest growing Asian markets, making it one of the top priorities in their external relations. This ultimately prompted the European Commission to elaborate strategic concepts towards East Asia, thereby leading to the adoption of a series of strategic concept papers towards East Asia as a whole, and towards individual countries in the region. Third, the EU was thus led to start negotiating and/or concluding a series of different types of co-operation agreements with individual East Asian countries, most of which came into effect during the second half of the 1990s. This shift in the EU’s strategic approaches in favour of East Asia

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once again underlined the increasing strategic value of East Asia as a partner in co-operation for the EU. Despite these rather conflicting developments in Asia-Europe relations, it seems that the centripetal forces in Asia-Europe relations have outpaced the centrifugal forces. In particular, the new general orientation of EU strategy towards Asia had been most strongly influenced by the increasing strategic value of Asia over the preceding decade, and its countries were, for instance, praised as “miracle economies” by the World Bank (1993). Thereafter, East Asia appeared for a long time to possess the potential to become the centre of world economic growth in the twenty-first century. Following this analysis, the US and even the EU launched and/or revised their own strategic concepts towards Asia. The US’s strategy towards Big Emerging Markets (BEMs), for instance, included ambitious initiatives to pursue stronger political and economic co-operation with seventeen BEMs, twelve of which were Asian countries. As mentioned above, the EU responded with its own new strategic concept in 1994, by adopting a Commission Communication titled ‘Towards a New Asia Strategy’.5 It is only fair to note that for a long time Asia, for its part, had also neglected Europe as a serious partner in co-operation. Asian countries were long satisfied with their strong economic and political ties with the US and Japan, on the basis of which they had been able to enjoy high growth rates over the preceding two decades. In the late 1980s, they entered into an inter-regional co-operation scheme with North America through the establishment of APEC, which, above all, was to promote the construction of an economic community in the Asia-Pacific. With APEC, it was signalled, many Asian countries wanted to engage with China, in order to withstand the increasing political and economic challenges coming from that future major regional and global power. In short, it is true that Asia too was as preoccupied with its own regional agenda as well as with external relations with the US, as the EU was with its own integration agenda. With APEC incrementally turning out to be a vehicle to channel US business and (to some extent as well) political interests into the fast growing Asian markets, Asian countries became conscious of their too strong 5 It is often argued that the EU’s new approach towards Asia came too late and especially much later than that of the US, mainly because the EU was preoccupied with its internal priority issues. For example, such happenings as German unification in the late 1980s, the EMS crisis in 1992 and 1993, the scheduled northern and eastern enlargement, and the revealed inefficacy of EU involvement in Yugoslavia’s conflicts tested the capacity of the EU and individual member states to the maximum, so that little energy was left to pay attention to other issues.



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dependence on the US and Japan—in both political and economic terms—and started to search for alternatives. These geopolitical factors, which prevailed in the early and mid-1990s and implied a coincidental increase in the mutual interest of Asia and Europe in one another, contributed to the strengthening of bilateral relations. The launch of ASEM can also be understood in this context. 3. New Asia Strategy of the European Union as a New Impetus for Bilateral Co-operation In any analysis of the EU’s strategic approach towards East Asia, the New Asia Strategy of 1994 and a series of country-specific concept papers should be put at the centre of the discussion.6 The NAS, which was adopted in 1994 and revised in 2001, was developed in the midst of both the deepening of European integration and the prolonged UR negotiations, and adopted immediately after these two major internal and external missions had been accomplished. In some sense, the strategy can be seen as the way in which the EU, through the NAS, had been preparing for the governance of the global political and economic order after these two major events. The growing strategic value of East Asia, which came to be observed, provided a timely and welcome additional impetus to the intensified EU approach towards East Asia. The original NAS strategy identified the Asian region as a group of the most dynamic countries, which appeared to have the potential to lead world economic growth and development into the twenty-first century. Categorising the Asian countries into three subgroups—Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia—the strategy paper issued by the European Commission elaborated on ways and modalities to promote the presence, profile and influence of Europe in Asia.7 The NAS strategy focused especially on the East Asian group, comprising Southeast and Northeast Asia, as major co-operation partners for the EU. In this regard, it is noteworthy that prior to and after the adoption of the NAS, the EU had adopted several strategy papers for relations with individual East Asian countries, as already noted.

6 These official documents can be found in European Commission (1993, 1994, 1995a, 1995b and 1996). 7 The follow-up NAS concept paper of the EU, which was adopted in 2001, includes Australasia (Australia and New Zealand) as an additional sub-region of East Asia. See European Commission (2001).

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It is also worth mentioning that the EU, in its NAS strategy paper, acknowledged the unique and predominant role of the US in the field of regional security in East Asia. Thus, the EU’s new approach towards East Asia can be interpreted as a strengthened pursuit of more balanced political and economic co-operation with East Asia.8 III. ASEM as a New Avenue for Asia-Europe Political and Security Co-operation 1. Challenges to Asia-Europe Security Co-operation in the ASEM Framework In fact, the security agenda in the ASEM co-operation framework has not yet been accorded a central position in the process. As noted before, the regional and global predominance of the US presence and role has overshadowed the process shaping related co-operation and dialogue. Besides the presence of the United States as one of the main hindrances for the EU in devising a more affirmative policy agenda in its security-related cooperation with Asia, a number of asymmetries have led to the failure of the security dialogue to develop as a terrain in the Asia-Europe dialogue, as noted by Fort (2004, pp. 357–358). He listed three asymmetries: (i) that between ASEM’s economic rationale and the diverging logic of international security; (ii) that pertaining to different sets of motivations between Asia and the EU; and (iii) asymmetry in regional security concerns and interests between the two continents. Another obstacle appears to be the relatively low profile of the European Union—in Asian eyes—as a global actor in security issues. A series of multi-country projects that assessed the perception in the Asia-Pacific region of the European Union9 revealed that the EU was relatively well recognised as a global economic actor, but did not enjoy a strong profile as a global political and/or security actor. To some extent, as Holland (2007) put it, the EU has been facing “a global relevance challenge”. It can be expected that this problem might be resolved slowly through the effective implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, which is expected to raise the 8 The European Commission (2001) report, for example, identifies “… strengthening the EU’s political and economic presence across the region, and raising this to a level commensurate with the growing global weight of an enlarged EU” as one of the core objectives in its relationship with Asia. 9 For the details of the results of this multi-country survey of how the EU was perceived in the Asia-Pacific, see Holland et al. (2007) and Chaban and Holland (2008).



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external profile of the EU by the appointment of a stronger representative of its foreign and security policy. 2. The Early Stage of the ASEM Framework and Security Co-operation between Asia and Europe The positive and negative geopolitical factors elaborated in Section II constituted background factors for the emergence of ASEM in 1996, which was reinforced by the coincidence of mutual interests of the EU and Asian countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (2006), in its evaluation report of the ten years of ASEM co-operation, additionally suggested a number of factors leading to the launch of ASEM, most of which overlap with those presented in this paper. Most notable and instrumental among these contributing factors in establishing ASEM as the main official venue for bilateral co-operation was the adoption by the European Union of the New Asia Strategy in 1994 (Park and Kim 2008). A careful investigation of the strategic concept documents issued by the European Commission during the period 1993–96 reveals a number of characteristics. First, in the political co-operation agenda, which included security dialogues with East Asia, the EU appeared cautiously to accept the key role played by the United States through a vast network of bilateral security arrangements with most of the countries in the region. The European Union, for instance, admitted in its first NAS strategy that “no single Asian country or outside power appear to be in a position to take over the role of the US”.10 This feeling of inferiority of Europe vis-à-vis the United States, especially in the security co-operation agenda, appears to have largely shaped the strategic concept of the European Union and its member states when approaching East Asia, leading to a rather careful jabbing-and-soliciting posture as far as a security agenda was concerned. Second, despite the EU’s weak strategic position relative to the United States, the European Union at the same time identified political co-operation as one of the priority areas in Asia-Europe bilateral relations. This apparent dilemma in the formation of the EU’s external strategy towards Asia, however, has been resolved through the readiness of its Asian partners to adopt a unique co-operation framework with the EU, much differentiated from their existing co-operation process with the United States under the heading of APEC. In fact, whereas APEC focuses on the economic agenda, the ASEM framework embraces political and 10 European Commission 1994, “Towards a New Asia Strategy”, COM (94) 314 final, Brussels. Communication from the Commission to the Council, p. 8.

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socio-cultural agendas into its central structure of co-operation, in addition to the traditional economic agenda, making ASEM a comprehensive co-operation body. The successive summit declarations in the initial stages of ASEM reaffirmed the strategic value of political co-operation, and the Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework, which was adopted at the 2000 Seoul summit meeting, reconfirmed this comprehensiveness as one of the distinguishing characteristics of the ASEM framework (AECF 2000, paragraph 5). Third, the European Commission’s first NAS paper of 199411 listed a number of subjects as candidates for political discussion and co-operation with East Asia. These included, for example, (i) arms control and nonproliferation; (ii) human rights; (iii) drugs. This relatively narrow initial definition of areas for Asia-Europe political co-operation, however, was later expanded substantively through a number of new developments, such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the consequent war against terrorism led by the United States. For instance, since 2003, ASEM member countries have held a series of annual ‘ASEM Conferences on CounterTerrorism’,12 the results of which have been issued in the form of a ‘Chairman’s summary’. Fourth, compared to the first NAS paper, the 2001 Commission Commu­ nication, titled ‘Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships’, presented more confident EU objectives, such as to “focus on strengthening the EU’s political and economic presence across the region, and raising this to a level commensurate with the growing global weight of an enlarged EU” (European Commission 2001, p. 15). The upgraded NAS then set up a number of more concrete and significant priority areas, such as (i) strengthened engagement with Asia in old and new global and regional security issues; (ii) support for conflict prevention efforts; (iii) dialogue in justice and home affairs, with the view of contributing to ‘peace and security in the region and globally’. These developments in the EU’s strategic concepts for Asia-Europe bilateral political and security-related co-operation, which were observed during the early stages of ASEM, show succinctly that the EU has slowly but consistently freed itself from its initial cautious approach and has incrementally become more confident. Internal and external factors appear to have contributed to this policy shift. 11 Ibid, pp. 11–13. 12 This series of conferences was successively held in Beijing (2003), Berlin (2004), Semarang (2005), Copenhagen (2006), Tokyo (2007), Madrid (2008), and Manila (2009). The conference in 2010 was held on 11–12 June in Brussels. See www.aseminfoboard.org.



asem and europe-asia relations259 3. Changed Environments and Intensified Co-operation in the Twenty-first Century

The security agenda in the ASEM’s co-operation framework has seen a number of new developments, especially since the beginning of the twenty-first century. First, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the consequent US-led war against terrorism have made both European and Asian countries in the ASEM framework alert to increased regional and global security threats. Ironically enough, this change in the global security environment has provided the ASEM process with a welcome opportunity to discuss hard-security issues, thus leading to a plethora of related meetings and conferences. For example, since 2002, ASEM has started convening an annual conference on counter-terrorism. Eight such conferences have been organised so far, with the last one held on 10–11 June 2010. Through this instrument, Asian and European members of ASEM meet regularly to “take the necessary steps to enhance cooperation and to prevent and combat terrorism” (ASEM 2010). In addition, ASEM has endeavoured to focus on niches for co-operation, where it can bring added value to the series of regional and multilateral frameworks that already exist and compete for global leadership. ASEM partners have been especially keen to “make full use of its multidimensional framework” (Japan Center for International Exchange and University of Helsinki Network for European Studies 2006) when addressing global challenges. Such cross-cutting issues as human rights, environmental protection, and trafficking of drugs and women, which fall into the category of soft-security issues, have been identified and clustered so as to form main areas of co-operation within the ASEM framework as well. Furthermore, the ever-recurrent threats emanating from the Korean peninsula have constituted another channel through which Asian and European ASEM partners have come together to discuss regional and global security matters. Inter-Korean relations, which appeared to be more favourable around 2000, when the third ASEM summit was held in Seoul and the two Koreas seemingly started their strengthened contacts and exchanges, have waned rapidly with a series of incidents such as the naval battles in the West Sea, and North Korea’s launch of missiles and nuclear tests. ASEM, though with limited capacity, took part in international efforts to address the non-proliferation issues. Whereas these three developments outlined above have provided a favourable environment for Asia-Europe dialogue and co-operation in security issues, more recent developments in the Asian region appear to counter this trend: the increasing new initiatives for Asia-Pacific regional

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architecture. The regionalist tendency in Asia is a relatively new phenomenon, observed only since the end of the 1990s. However, Asia and the Asia-Pacific region have in the meantime emerged as the most dynamic regions in this worldwide tendency towards increasing regionalism. As more and more Asia-Pacific countries form bilateral, minilateral and subregional FTAs with other countries in the same region, a number of new initiatives have been put on the table, with the view of cleaning up the ‘spaghetti bowl’ phenomenon by fostering regionwide affiliations. These efforts to shape the Asia-Pacific regional architecture, however, have been contesting ASEM’s burgeoning role in security matters, especially in the Asian and Asia-Pacific areas. The new initiatives to establish an AsiaPacific Community (APC), proposed by Australia, and/or an East Asia Community (EAC), proposed by Japan, all contain security co-operation as one of their most significant agendas for co-operation, thus causing the weight of ownership of security co-operation to shift away from the ASEM process. As the United States is deemed to be a core prospective member of these emerging institutions, the role of the European Union could be weakened, more specifically in the area of security co-operation. Despite these seemingly contradictory developments, the ASEM process has set up a number of regular and irregular dialogue forums for security co-operation. The Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework (AECF) of 2000 seems to have been instrumental in strengthening Asia-Europe common activities in security issues, as the AECF confirmed the necessity for Asia and Europe to promote their efforts towards arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The already existing venues, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the EU-ASEAN dialogue and the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), have been increasingly used as channels for enhanced Asia-Europe security co-operation (University of Helsinki Network for European Studies 2006). The document also provides a detailed discussion of the emerging role of security in the ASEM process, in such areas as (i) regional conflicts; (ii) war on terrorism; (iii) non-proliferation and weapons of mass destruction; (iv) global threats of common concern. In addition, some European ASEM members have been co-operating with individual Asian members in different forms of security issues, as shown by Fort (2004). In spite of this intensified, security-related co-operation and dialogue between Asia and Europe, limitations have still been observed with regards to the effectiveness of the ASEM framework. The European Background Study of ASEM’s first decade identified a lack of dialogue on some regional conflicts, mainly caused by their high sensitivity, as a major



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problem in bilateral security co-operation. Nonetheless, the same Background Study was more confident about naming non-traditional security areas as possible avenues for Europe to acquire a global role and a chance to build global partnerships with Asian countries, especially by way of the ASEM framework. IV. Concluding Remarks This paper has discussed the old and new geopolitical constellations surrounding security co-operation between Asia and Europe. The AsiaEurope Meeting (ASEM) appears to have provided a number of new opportunities for strengthened bilateral co-operation in this field. On the one hand, the European Union has upgraded its strategic approaches towards Asia, and has slowly but consistently freed itself from its initial caution to gain stronger confidence. Asia, as well, has opened its door to discuss security matters with its European counterparts, and has engaged in a number of new dialogues and initiatives with Europe, thereby trying to balance its strategic partnerships with the United States and the EU. Despite these strengthened mutual interests and engagements, co-operation over security remains an underperforming area in the bilateral co-operative relationship between Asia and Europe. References ASEM, 2010, “Concept Paper of 8th ASEM Conference on Counter-terrorism”, Brussels, June 10–11, 2010. Chaban, Natalia and Martin Holland (Eds.), 2008, “The European Union and the AsiaPacific: Media, Public and Elite Perceptions of the EU”, Routledge. European Commission, 1994, “Towards a New Asia Strategy”, Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM (94) 314 final, Brussels. European Commission, 1995a, “A Long-term Policy for China-Europe Relations”, Communication from the Commission, COM (95)279 final, Brussels. European Commission, 1995b, “Europe and Japan: The Next Steps”, Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM (95)73 final, Brussels. European Commission, 1996, “Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations”, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, Final Text, Brussels. European Commission, 2001, “Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships”, Communication from the Commission, COM (2001)469 final, September. Fort, Bertrand, 2004, “ASEM’s Role for Cooperation on Security in Asia and Europe”, in: Asia-Europe Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 355–363. Japan Center for International Exchange and University of Helsinki Network for European Studies, 2006, “ASEM in Its Tenth Year: Looking Back, Looking Forward. An Evaluation of ASEM in Its first Decade and Exploration of Its Future Possibilities”, March 2006.

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Holland, Martin, 2007, “Assuming Superpower Status?: Evolving Asian perceptions of the EU as a Political and Economic Actor”, in: Holland, Martin, Peter Ryan, Alojzy Z. Nowak and Natalia Chaban (Eds.), 2007, “The EU Through the Eyes of Asia: Media, Public and Elite Perceptions in China, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Thailand”, ESiA Publication, Asia-Europe Foundation, pp. 225–245. Holland, Martin, Peter Ryan, Alojzy Z. Nowak and Natalia Chaban (Eds.), 2007, “The EU Through the Eyes of Asia: Media, Public and Elite Perceptions in China, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Thailand”, ESiA Publication, Asia-Europe Foundation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2006, “ASEM in Its Tenth Year: Looking Back, Looking Forward. An Evaluation of ASEM in Its First Decade and an Exploration of Its future Possibilities”, Prepared by Japan Center for International Exchange and University of Helsinki Network for European Studies. Park, Sunghoon and Heungchong Kim, 2008, “The Asia Strategy of the European Union and Asia-EU Economic Relations: History and New Developments”, in: Balme, Richard and Brian Bridges (Eds.), Europe-Asia Relations: Building Multilateralism, Palgrave 2008, pp. 66–82. University of Helsinki Network for European Studies, 2006, “ASEM in Its Tenth Year: Looking Back, Looking Forward. An Evaluation of ASEM in Its First Decade and an Exploration of Its Future Possibilities”, European Background Study.

EAST ASIAN REGIONAL MODELS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE EAST ASIAN COMMUNITY Scott Snyder I. Introduction The development of institutionalised multilateral co-operation for the purpose of achieving collective security aims has naturally been driven by a common recognition that certain types of national security and political needs may best be met through co-operation. This recognition usually occurs in direct response to specific historical events or experiences; otherwise, the political will is not present to invest in international co-operation without a clear and abiding sense that such approaches conform to both national interests and the collective interests of the parties concerned. For this reason, the institutionalisation of regional security co-operation has occurred as a response to specific events.1 Successful forms of co-operation have been driven less by ‘vision’ and more by the necessity of co-operation to meet specific political and/or security needs or the expectation of tangible benefits to be derived from collective approaches to shared problems. In the absence of a shared sense of mutual interest, the likelihood is low that co-operation will successfully take root. Thus, prerequisites for the successful development of regional security co-operation are a shared perception of common interests and a recognition that co-operation is necessary to achieve those interests. Since the end of the Cold War, many visions have been put forward for the development of a co-operative framework for pursuing collective security in East Asia, but events in East Asia for whatever reason do not seem to have driven the development of multilateral co-operation in ways that match the vision. According to the Regional Security Outlook for 2009–2010 prepared by the Committee on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), “[m]ultilateral cooperation, to address both traditional and non-traditional security agendas, is a necessity, not an option. The dilemma, however, is that the Asia Pacific lacks adequate multilateral institutional infrastructure and that existing institutions continue to 1 G. John Ikenberry, A New East Asian Security Architecture: A Note from Our Guest Editor,” Global Asia, Vol. 5, No. 1 (spring 2010), pp. 8–11.

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perform below expectations.”2 Many issues have been identified as obstacles to the development of an East Asian Community, including the persistence of Cold War divided-state conflicts across the Taiwan strait and on the Korean peninsula, the inability of Japan to face up to its historical legacy of aggression and the constraints that ongoing antagonisms have placed on Japan’s diplomatic role in the region, the perception that the American alliances inhibit the development of collective security approaches, and the diversity of political systems and levels of development across the region. In addition, recent efforts to promote an East Asian Community have been beset by an incipient competition for leadership between Japan and China, in part as a manifestation of the latest major trend that carries some significance for East Asian security multilateralism: namely, the implications and regional response to China’s rise. Despite each of these obstacles, there has been gradual progress in the development of new, overlapping forms of co-operation that might eventually lay the basis for the establishment of an East Asian Community. This paper will first provide a brief critical evaluation of obstacles to the development of Asian regionalism. Second, the paper will examine calls for a multi-layered vision approach to Asian regionalism and will compare East Asian community-building efforts to the development and role and security contributions of the European Union as a primary component in the multi-layered approach that has developed in Europe. Third, the paper will examine the emergence of the ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asian Summit (EAS) as two alternative organisational axes around which an East Asian Community might be formed, with special reference to the possible implications of China’s rise for the development of East Asian regionalism. Fourth, the paper will provide a brief overview of the evolution of US views regarding Asian regionalism since the end of the Cold War. Finally, the paper will conclude with an evaluation of conditions under which further progress might be made in pursuing collective security in East Asia. II. Obstacles to the Development of an East Asian Community: Are They Really Obstacles? Many valid reasons have been offered for the failure of East Asian regionalism. Rather than simply accept these reasons at face value, this section 2 Brian L. Job and Erin Williams, “2010: Will Regional Multilateralism Meet the Region’s Challenges?” in CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2009–2010, CSCAP, 2009, p. 5.



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questions the extent to which each perceived obstacle has truly stood in the way of the development of an East Asian Community, given that a number of Asian regional groupings, however weakly institutionalised, has developed in spite of the persistence of these obstacles. These arguments are counter-intuitive to the widely accepted conventional wisdom underlying the lack of development of Asian regionalism and are meant to sharpen analysis regarding the actual barriers to co-operation necessary to pursue regional co-operative security arrangements: a) Asia’s Divided States Many blame the continuation of Cold War conflicts on the Korean peninsula and across the Taiwan strait as obstacles to the development of an East Asian Community. But it is not clear that either of these ongoing conflicts has posed an insuperable obstacle to the development of such a community, and the situation on the Korean peninsula has even been a catalyst for steps towards the development of regional security architecture through the establishment of the Six Party Talks. Although the issue of whether or not Taiwan would be able to participate in new regional community-building arrangements has been an issue of contention and subject of debate in the formation of multilateral bodies for co-operation, this issue has not inhibited the development of existing regional co-operation mechanisms. With the exception of status for Taiwan within the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) under the rubric that APEC includes regional economies, China has successfully denied Taiwan membership in the development of every regional forum within Asia that has been established since the early 1990s. Taiwan is not a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Europe meetings, or the Six Party Talks; even its participation in Track Two forums such as CSCAP has been carefully circumscribed as a result of PRC efforts to limit Taiwan’s representation. East Asian community-building has essentially proceeded without Taiwan, and it is hard to argue that Taiwan’s exclusion has been the critical obstacle to the further development of an East Asian Community. Likewise, Korea’s division has not prevented East Asian communitybuilding efforts from going forward. In fact, North Korean unilateralism has consistently provided the basis for enhanced security consultations among North Korea’s neighbours, leading to the establishment of the Six Party Talks, even while serving as an example of the limits of Asian regional efforts effectively to address the region’s most intractable security

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challenges. North Korea has participated in multilateral security mechanisms even while serving as the primary obstacle to their further institutionalisation. North Korea joined the ASEAN Regional Forum, even while critics have argued that a measure of ARF’s ineffectiveness is its inability to address meaningfully the grave security challenges on the Korean peninsula. North Korea has been a full participant in the Six Party Talks, including a number of working-level dialogues such as one designed to establish a permanent regional security mechanism in Northeast Asia. In fact, one might argue that North Korea’s behaviour—and even its participation in the Six Party Talks—has ultimately proven to be a major factor in contributing to the ineffectiveness of this dialogue. b) Japan’s Historical Legacy Japan’s failure to take steps to acknowledge its imperialist past prior to and during the Second World War has been a sticking point in Japan’s relations with Asia, but it has not prevented Japan from developing economic and political relations with every country in Asia except North Korea. While Japan’s past may evoke hesitancy regarding renewed Japanese political leadership across the region, Japan has played a de facto economic leadership role through the development of vertical integration and supplier ties, especially in Southeast Asia. In fact, during the Asian financial crisis most Asian countries wanted to see Japan step up its leadership role rather than resisting it. In recent years, Japan has been at the top of BBC polls rating national perceptions of other countries, suggesting that the history issue has not prevented Japan from developing a positive public image around the world, with the notable exception of China (and, until 2009, South Korea). The country’s efforts to face up to its own past may be regarded as an indicator of its willingness and capacity to play a broader regional leadership role; from this perspective, Japan’s failure to address historical issues effectively has created obstacles in its bilateral relationships, particularly with South Korea and China, that have inhibited its ability to play such a role. c) America’s Asian Alliance Network Some critics have blamed the US-led ‘hub and spokes’ alliance system for being a barrier to the development of Asian regionalism. This is ironic given US efforts in the early post-Second World War period to promote Asian regional collective security organisations, with the alliance as the main underpinning for such efforts. These failed efforts show that



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the  United States actually supported the establishment of an Asian regional collective security organisation, but those efforts occurred in the context of a divided Asia during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, the United States opposed early efforts by Mahathir Mohamed, the then Malaysian prime minister, to create an East Asian Economic Caucus in 1990 on the grounds that it was exclusionary, but American attitudes towards the establishment of East Asian regionalism have moderated over time. The United States has supported APEC through the establishment of an annual leaders’ meeting in 1993, but has otherwise remained aloof from the discussion of East Asian Community-building, with the caveat that the process remain open and inclusive. In January 2010, Secretary of State Clinton emphasised the importance to US regional strategy of existing organisations like APEC as well as of new ones such as the East Asia Summit, which the United States joined in 2011 along with Russia.3 The conventional wisdom among US analysts is that there is no contradiction between the maintenance of US alliances and the development of an East Asian Community. The US focus has primarily been on how to utilise regional understandings to achieve global objectives, rather than focusing on regionalism in and of itself, but American alliances in Asia have not been and do not appear to be an obstacle to the development of an East Asian Community. The US alliance system is the main sticking point in differences with China in thinking about regional security multilateralism, as seen in China’s reaction to unprecedented US–Japan–South Korea co-ordination on North Korea in December 2010,4 despite the fact that the joint trilateral statement from foreign ministerial talks included an “enduring commitment to building strong, productive, and constructive relations with China, and to achieving a common objective of creating a peaceful Northeast Asian community of nations”.5 d) Asia’s Diversity and Differences of System Among the traditional excuses provided for the absence of regionalism in East Asia, the diversity of governments and systems arguably might be the most serious obstacle to overcome. However, system differences were set 3 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities, Honolulu, HI, 12 January 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135090 .htm. 4 “China refutes criticisms on efforts for emergency six-party consultations,” Xinhua, 2 December 2010. 5 Trilateral statement Japan, Republic of Korea, and the United States, 6 December 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/12/152431.htm.

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aside as an obstacle to the expansion of ASEAN in the early 1990s and have not prevented the convening of the Plus Three meetings since the late 1990s among China, Japan and South Korea, whose leaders produced a ten-year blueprint for trilateral co-operation at the third trilateral summit in May 2010, covering a host of issues including regional and international peace and stability.6 The post-Cold War security agenda in East Asia has expanded to include many non-traditional security issues that require functional co-operation regardless of system type. Although a latent competition for leadership in East Asia between China and Japan appears to have emerged in recent years, there is little evidence to suggest that differing regime types have inherently limited prospects for co-operation. At the same time, there are those who argue that community-building should be based on strong common values as the strongest possible basis for deepening co-operation. The establishment of an ASEAN Charter with a membership that transcends regime type offers the most powerful potential counter-example to that argument, but it remains to be seen whether ASEAN’s effort to build a strong community will be truly successful. If these multiple rationales are insufficient to explain the absence of strong regional institutions in East Asia, why has Asian regionalism been so slow to develop? Perhaps Asian regional institutions have been relatively stunted in their growth during the post-Cold War period precisely because the region has enjoyed relative peace. As a result, there has been little need for the development of new regional institutions, a notable exception being the establishment of Six Party Talks to address the situation on the Korean peninsula. Or, as Michael Green and Bates Gill have argued, existing Asian efforts to promote Asian regionalism have been sabotaged by an underlying competition for power, or, as Shin Gi-Wook has argued, these efforts have been hobbled by the predominance of and preference for nationalism over regionalism in East Asia.7 Any of these explanations point to factors that rely less on historical constraints and more on national anxieties regarding future developments in regional security that inhibit prospects for multilateral co-operation.

6 Trilateral Cooperation Vision 2010, 29 May 2010, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ wjdt/2649/t705962.htm. 7 Bates Gill and Michael J. Green, “Unbundling Asia’s New Multilateralism,” in Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community, Columbia University Press, 2009; and Shin Gi-Wook and Daniel C. Sneider, eds., Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia, Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, 2007.



east asian regional models of collective security269 III. The East Asian Community Vision and the Realities of European Integration

In 2001, the unofficial East Asia Vision Group (EAVG), composed of highly respected scholars and former officials from across the region, released its roadmap for the establishment of an East Asian Community “based on cooperation and openness”, including increased economic, financial, political and security, environmental and social co-operation, as well as the institutionalisation of an East Asian Summit and a non-governmental East Asia Forum. According to the EAVG statement, the development of a regional identity based on enhanced economic integration requires East Asian nations to overcome “political rivalries, historical animosities, cultural differences and ideological confrontation” if East Asia is to move from a “region of nations to a bona fide regional community”. The EAVG put forward eight guiding principles for establishing a stronger East Asian community: 1) shared identity, 2) economic co-operation as the catalyst, 3) people focus, 4) inclusiveness, 5) international norms, 6) regional thinking, 7) progressive institutionalisation, and 8) harmony with the global system. Building on a road map designed to institutionalise functional cooperation as a means by which to enhance regional peace and prosperity and “to foster the identity of an East Asian community”, the EAVG advocated a comprehensive list of co-operative measures. These were led by specific suggestions for promoting trade, investment, financial and development co-operation, including the idea of an East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA), stepped-up co-ordination in exchange rates, the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), and a range of environmental, social and cultural measures. Subsequently, it is in these economic areas that insti­ tutionalisation has thus far shown the most tangible progress. The EAVG also advocated the establishment of an East Asian Summit, adherence to a mutually agreed code of conduct, ongoing implementation of confidencebuilding measures, the development of a Network of East Asian Think tanks (NEAT), and the strengthening of the ASEAN Regional Forum “so that it can serve as a more effective mechanism for cooperative security”.8 The EAVG emphasised strengthened integration within East Asia, but also preferred to maintain a security role for the United States in the region in the context of greater regional integration. The EAVG anticipated the 8 “Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress,” East Asia Vision Group Report, 2001.

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establishment of an East Asian Summit, which was realised in 2005, but it did not anticipate the development of the Six Party Talks, with their primary focus on Northeast Asia versus East Asia, or the cleavage in emphasis between Japan and China over the relative importance of the more inclusive East Asian Summit and the role of the ASEAN Plus Three. This is not the only vision for East Asian community building: Two new visions for East Asia community-building were offered in 2009 by Australia (Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s Asia Pacific Community proposal) and Japan (former Prime Minister Hatoyama’s East Asian Community), although both of them remain inchoate and have proven to be non-starters. More recently, Hitoshi Tanaka of the Japan Center for International Education has proposed an East Asian security architecture in line with this vision that emphasises a “multilayered” approach to developing a security framework for East Asia. This approach would consist of three main pillars: 1) strengthening trilateral and “minilateral” dialogues, including among the United States, Japan and South Korea and by establishing a strategic dialogue with the United States; 2) the establishment of the Six Party Talks as a “permanent sub-regional forum” to address Northeast Asian security issues; and 3) the establishment of an East Asian Security Forum to address transnational and non-traditional security issues. This multilayered approach is conceptually appealing, but ad hoc institutionalisation continues to be the primary driver for the practical development of regional security architecture in Asia, as it appears to have been in Europe.9 Overall, a comparison of Asian aspirations for an East Asian Community and European accomplishments underscores the lack of progress in the institutionalisation of East Asian co-operation when compared to the European experience. For instance, Europe’s post-Cold War security architecture underscores the overlapping, multi-layered nature of institutions in Europe, including NATO, the European Union, the Western European Union, the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Terrence Hopmann places emphasis on the OSCE as an institution that has played a central role in conflict management in Europe, spanning system and economic differences among its members, and underlines the extent to which Europe’s security architecture has occurred as a result of

9 Hitoshi Tanaka, “Asia Uniting: Many Tiers, One Goal,” Global Asia, Vol. 5, No. 1 (spring 2010), pp. 17–21.



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ad hoc institutionalisation driven by responses to specific new challenges to European security.10 The East Asian Community-building idea is most directly analogous to the development and contributions of the European Union to European security. Hopmann sees these contributions in the context of efforts to promote a Common Foreign and Security Policy supported by deep Franco-German integration, but there is nothing in the Asian vision that is remotely comparable to the level of institutionalised integration that has been achieved through the European community over decades.11 But despite limited economic co-operation and rapidly growing trade interdependence, the political conditions for China and Japan to engage in deep integration are far from being realised. At present, there is no Asian institution that is comparable to the OSCE, although some analysts have actively urged Asian countries to apply the OSCE experience to Asia. For instance, James Goodby argues that the operationalisation of a Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism along the lines of the Helsinki Final Act might draw on language regarding freedom of travel and contact and the establishment of military confidence-building measures, some of which have already been agreed to but never fully implemented in the 1992 Basic Agreement.12 This author has argued that the September 19, 2005, Six Party Talks joint statement represents a start for Northeast Asia in trying to replicate common understandings analogous to the Decalogue, the ten founding principles of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). However, the understandings contained in the Joint Statement are considerably narrower than the CSCE’s founding principles and completely fail to address issues that touch on the “human dimension”.13

10 P. Terrence Hopmann, “Managing Conflict in Post-Cold War Eurasia: The Role of the OSCE in Europe’s Security ‘Architecture,’” International Politics, 2003, 40 (75–100). 11 Only recently has the European Common Foreign and Security Policy begun to be implemented in practical terms following the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 and the establishment of a High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 12 James Goodby, “The Emerging Architecture for Security and Cooperation in North­ east Asia,” Issues and Insights, Vol. 8, No. 3, Honolulu, HI: Pacific Forum CSIS, March 2008. 13 Scott Snyder, “Prospects for a Northeast Asian Security Framework,”Korea Economic Institute, 15 October 2008. Accessed at http://www.keia.org/Publications/Other/HS-Snyder .pdf.

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scott snyder IV. China’s Rise and New Developments in Asian Regional Co-operation

The rapidity of China’s economic rise has had mixed implications for East Asian community-building efforts as a result of the growth of Chinacentred economic interdependence. China had been hesitant and cautious about regional co-operation through the mid-1990s, but embraced multilateral co-operation as it recognised that its own economic integration with the world would provide China with considerable opportunities for economic growth. Richard Hu argues that a major impetus for China’s turning outwards has been to provide reassurance to its neighbours through opening, integration, and accommodative policy change.14 However, the rapidity of the development of China-led economic interdependence as a basis for deepened regional integration was unanticipated. It stirred a counter-reaction in Japan and other countries in response to the perception that China may surpass Japan as the natural economic leader in the region. At the same time, China’s rising economic influence has also stimulated Japanese acceptance of the idea that they are not destined to play a leadership role in building an East Asian Community. The urge to counter China’s rise has been shown through the impulses and background activities in the run-up to the establishment of the East Asian Summit in 2005. At that time, there were active efforts to broaden the membership of the EAS by including states that would weight the organisation more strongly in the direction of countries with democratic value systems. The inclusion of Australia, New Zealand and India in the EAS was in part designed to signal the need for an organisational character that might prize openness and counterbalance China’s influence.15 On the economic side, China has placed greater emphasis on arrangements that have been more China-centric, such as the ASEAN Plus Three and the establishment of closer trading arrangements between China and ASEAN. These efforts in turn seemed to catalyse Japanese initiatives to strengthen Economic Partnership Arrangements (EPAs) with Southeast Asia, highlighting differences between China-centred production arrangements and long-standing Japanese production ties in Southeast Asia. As China’s 14 Richard W. Hu, “China and East Asian Community Building: Implications and Challenges Ahead,” Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2 October 2007, as referenced at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2007/1002_east_asia/1002_east_asia .pdf, 1 June 2010. 15 Kori Urayama, unpublished conference paper on East Asia summit, 2006, Fudan University.



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overall role in global trade has grown to the extent that China is now the leading trade partner with Japan, South Korea and ASEAN, efforts to pursue competitive trade arrangements have declined in favour of efforts to strengthen trade promotion. At the same time, China’s rise has also enabled new forms of political co-operation involving China and Japan. Since 1999, the leaders of Japan, South Korea and China have met, initially as a side-meeting to the annual ASEAN Plus Three meetings. Since December 2008 they have pursued a leadership-level meeting separate from the ASEAN meetings. This development has had a number of effects: 1) it has facilitated, and been enabled by, the development of functional co-operation on non-traditional security issues that have few political implications, for instance, on environmental co-operation to mitigate the impact of ‘yellow dust’ from the Gobi desert on South Korea and Japan, 2) it has provided a channel for discussions of closer economic co-operation, including feasibility studies to promote the possibility of a trilateral Japan-South Korea-China FTA, 3) it has led to the promotion of modest new forms of people-to-people exchanges among the three countries, 4) it has provided opportunities for discussion on challenging political issues, including questions related to the future of North Korea. The establishment of a Northeast Asia-centred dialogue among Japan, South Korea and China complicates the development of East Asian regionalism, while also possibly providing momentum for the development of an independent push towards co-operation in Northeast Asia that is no longer linked more broadly to East Asian co-operation. The regularisation of Northeast Asian summits might serve as an impetus for a China– Japan–South Korea free trade agreement. (Or, ongoing efforts by the ‘five parties’ to deal with North Korea might serve as the kernel of the eventual development of a Northeast Asian security architecture.) From an ASEAN perspective, this development is worrisome since it bifurcates the discussion and organisational energy of Northeast Asian countries into two channels—one on prospects for East Asian regionalism and the other on prospects for regionalism in Northeast Asia—by creating for the first time  a regional initiative that is not tied to or led directly by ASEAN. Thus  far, institutionalisation of a trilateral China–South Korea–Japan dialogue has moved slowly, although the establishment of a trilateral co-operation secretariat in Seoul in 2011 is a positive step forward in line with ‘Vision 2020’, which identifies institutionalisation of a trilateral partnership as the first agenda item. The establishment of the trilateral dialogue also marks the first independent Northeast Asia-led multilateral

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dialogue effort, with the unintended effect of dramatising the gap between Southeast Asian-led and Northeast Asian-led approaches to communitybuilding in East Asia. V. US Views on East Asian Community-building16 The tendency among US government officials has been to consider how Asian regional forums can be used to support global objectives. There is relatively little motive to think about specific regions in and of themselves other than instrumentally, as a means by which to build momentum toward a global objective. Regional bureaus within the US State Depart­ ment are one prism through which US policy initiatives are shaped, but a panoply of functional interests weakens the role of these bureaus, and there is no high-level political interest in Asian regionalism built into the structure of the US government beyond the existence of East Asian bureaus at various agencies within government. Even the respective definitions of East Asia that have been used to constitute those regions differ from department to department. The record of US performance in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings over the course of the past two decades has indicated that the US approach to APEC has been primarily ad hoc, utilitarian, or instrumental.17 And this is despite the fact that at least APEC has generated institutional momentum sufficient to justify the creation of an ambassador-level position within the Department of State charged with handling APEC affairs. Traditionally, APEC has been a useful stepping stone in building momentum for trade liberalisation—or when necessary, as a forum to address regional instability (for instance, in East Timor in 1998) or to address global terrorism (i.e. as it did in Shanghai in 2002), but has not generated an agenda that mobilises US officials in its own right. Following the decision to elevate APEC to the level of heads of state in 1993, when Bill Clinton hosted APEC in the United States, the US has seen APEC primarily as a way-station in building support for global trade objectives in WTO negotiations, and has not invested in APEC to any significant 16 This section draws from Scott Snyder, “U.S. Domestic Politics and Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” as part of the Council on Foreign Relations project on Regional Impulses in Northeast Asia, available at http://www.cfr.org/project/1352/regional _impulses_in_northeast_asia.html. 17 See Scott Snyder, “Constructing a global architecture with an American blueprint: The ambivalent U.S. attitude toward Asian regional cooperation,” Global Economic Review, Volume 28, Issue 3, 1999, pp. 76–89.



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degree as an end in-and-of-itself. The trade liberalisation aims signalled by the Bogor Declaration suggested that APEC could be used as a source of momentum to press a global trade liberalisation agenda. Given the interest in US leadership at a global level, any expectations Asians may have had that the United States would pursue APEC or the development of an East Asian Community as an end rather than as a means were inevitably disappointed. With the political difficulties surrounding the Doha round of global negotiations on trade liberalisation and the resulting focus on bilateral free trade agreements, APEC has been adrift and the United States has been unable to utilise it effectively as the means to promote liberalisation objectives in global trade. As APEC’s momentum has flagged, some analysts have seen efforts to create new Asian forums like the East Asian Summit and ASEAN Plus Three as a potential vehicle for China to gain in influence at the expense of the United States, with the United States in turn investing renewed effort in promotion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. During the run-up to the establishment of the East Asian Summit, there was reportedly some concern within the US government over whether US distraction with Iraq and China’s increasing economic clout might combine in ways detrimental to US interests. The US response to the East Asia Summit has been lukewarm, and some have worried about the United States being excluded. Its inception in 2005 drew some concern in the US policy community that the United States might play a limited role in the rise in Asian regionalism and that China may use the EAS to strengthen its leadership in the region.18 A high-level dialogue sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in January 2005 explored the contours of Asian regionalism, concluding that there was no mutually acceptable candidate for leadership among Asian nations, and “none would accept any of the others as regional leader or honest broker, helping the United States to retain that role”. The report of the discussion suggested that competition might be used to winnow the field and determine which institutions were able to survive, that multiple institutions addressing specific issues might be layered, with no need for a co-ordinating mechanism, or that ad hoc multilateralism, spurred by specific needs as they arose, might be the most likely driver for development of an Asian regional security architecture. An American senior official stated clearly at the dialogue that the United 18 Bruce Vaughn, “East Asia Summit: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, 11 January 2006, https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/2715/RL33242_ 20060111.pdf?sequence=1.

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States should be regarded as a Pacific power and that to be effective, dialogues must have a specific purpose and objectives and the means/will to implement those objectives. This discussion, and particularly the remarks by the senior US official, appeared designed to send the message that the East Asia Summit needed to accomplish something to be relevant and was unlikely to be able to accomplish anything without the participation, or at least the blessing, of the United States. But the United States offered no alternative vision or action plan for the expression of East Asian regionalism.19 The question of security architecture drew attention from the Bush administration’s secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, on the issue of whether the Six Party Talks might be able to serve as the precursor to a permanent, multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia. At Secretary Rice’s behest, the Six Party Talks established a working group in 2007 designed to promote a permanent peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia. This working group would presumably outlive the Six Party Talks, but in the absence of concrete progress on denuclearisation, disablement and normalisation, the agenda for the working group on a peace mechanism for Northeast Asia was abstract. There were a series of discussions about the possibility of adopting a Charter for Northeast Asia, but little progress was made in obtaining consensus for such a document. In lieu of a charter, the Six Party Talks themselves (although currently in a hiatus, given North Korea’s announcement of 14 April 2009, that it would “never” come back to the talks) served as the venue for negotiation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, which represents the lowest common denominator consensus among all the parties concerned. The paradox of the Six Party Talks as a foundation for a regional security architecture continues to be that without North Korea, there is no compelling agenda that will bring together the concerned parties of Northeast Asia around the negotiating table, but that when North Korea is present at the talks, it is not possible to have a multi-party discussion on any issue but North Korea. In April 2009, James Steinberg, deputy secretary of state, outlined a three-pronged US strategy towards Asia under the Obama administration, which integrates US engagement with allies, emerging partners including 19 “Regional Structures in the Asia-Pacific,” Embassy of Australia and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17–18 January 2005, conference summary accessed at http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_events/task,view/id,25/ on 1 May 2009.



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China and India, and regional institutions.20 In Tokyo in November 2009, President Obama defined the United States as “an Asia Pacific nation” and revealed plans to “participate fully in appropriate organizations”, recognising that “the United States has been disengaged from many of these organizations in recent years”, as part of efforts towards “deeper and broader engagement” in the region on common challenges shaping a “collective future” including economic recovery, climate change, nuclear nonproliferation, and other transnational threats.21 Regarding the East Asia Summit, Secretary of State Clinton in January 2010 suggested US willingness to explore jointly with Asian partners “how the United States might play a role in the East Asia Summit, and how the East Asia Summit fits into the broader institutional landscape, and how major meetings in the region can be sequenced most effectively”.22 VI. Whither the East Asian Community?: Enabling Conditions and Next Steps Much of the debate over the establishment of an East Asian Community in recent years has revolved around practical issues including issues regarding membership, scope of the agenda, leadership, and future institutionalisation. But these debates sidestep the need to establish an enabling environment that addresses the core obstacles to broader cooperation on collective security issues. These issues, the dimensions of which will be further outlined below, include the need to broaden Sino– Japanese and Sino–US strategic understanding regarding the purposes and motives for collective security co-operation in East Asia, and the need to rationalise the relationship between East Asian and Northeast Asian co-operative security approaches. Until the region’s powers are able to be satisfied on these core issues, multilateral security co-operation in East Asia is likely to be fragmented, 20 James B. Steinberg, “Engaging Asia 2009: Strategies for Success,” Remarks at National Bureau of Asian Research Conference, Washington DC, 1 April 2009, http://www.state .gov/s/d/2009/121564.htm. 21 Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall, Tokyo, Japan, 14 November 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama -suntory-hall. 22 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities, Honolulu, HI, 12 January 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135090 .htm.

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ad hoc, and issue driven. While some forms of transnational co-operation may emerge with a focus on non-traditional security issues, it is unlikely that such co-operation will be deeply institutionalised or serve as a building block towards deeper integration. Instead, it is likely that there will be a multiplication of the patchwork of existing forms of co-operation—both in loose opposition to and in co-ordination with each other—driven primarily by regional perceptions regarding whether the impact of China’s growing influence on the region will prove to be benign or hostile. a) Establishing a Broader Framework for Sino–Japanese Relations Shi Yinhong, a scholar from Renmin University, points out that a main “impediment to security multilateralism in China’s foreign policy is its strategic suspicion of Japan”.23 Although some progress has been made in recent years in putting together a broader framework for constructively managing Sino–Japanese relations, Yoshihide Soeya of Keio University points to a fundamental mismatch in Chinese and Japanese respective foreign policies, with China’s regional outlook still strongly influenced by nationalism, rivalry with the United States, military modernisation and territorial integrity, while Japan’s interests are “post-industrial”, with a focus on human security, and problems of civil society and an ageing society. This mismatch between Chinese and Japanese priorities, which is a function of the differing perspectives shaped by differing sets of interests and levels of development, will make the forging of a broad co-operative framework for the management of regional security issues particularly difficult.24 b) Sino–US Strategic Reassurance and US Attitudes Towards East Asian Regionalism The Sino–US relationship has become widely recognised as the strategic relationship among major powers that is most likely to set the context for regional security co-operation in East Asia. This relationship is characterised by complex economic interdependence and by mutual hedging, 23 Shi Yinhong, “Perceptions of Inherited Histories and Other Discussion Relating to East Asian Cooperative Security,” as part of the Council on Foreign Relations project on Regional Impulses in Northeast Asia, available at http://www.cfr.org/project/1352/regional _impulses_in_northeast_asia.html. 24 Yoshihide Soeya, “An East Asian Community and Japan-China Relations,” East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/17/an-east-asian-community-and-japan -china-relations/, posted 17 May 2010.



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creating a complex and uncertain environment in which regional actors must plan to meet their own security needs. To the extent that the United States and China are able to set the tone by strengthening regional security co-operation and developing a common understanding on a longterm strategic framework for managing existing security issues such as the Korean peninsula, this set of understandings can provide an anchor for the deepening of multilateral security co-operation in other areas. The United States will need to state more clearly its policies and preferences regarding the development of an East Asian security architecture as a concrete component of a policy designed to clarify US preferences and to alleviate Chinese doubts about US intentions in this area. By the same token, US clarification of its own preferences is unlikely to forgo the development of existing alliances or the establishment of new forms of collective security in the event that China’s rising influence turns exclusive or is perceived to be designed to dominate the region. c) East Asian vs. Northeast Asian Co-operative Security Approaches Although most East Asian community-building efforts have been designed to promote co-operation across the region, it is increasingly clear that Northeast Asian security challenges, perceptions and needs may differ fundamentally from needs as they exist across East Asia. On the one hand, Northeast Asia is the flashpoint for interaction by powers that also have global influence and a historical legacy of confrontation. On the other hand, the establishment of both the Six Party Talks and the trilateral Japan–South Korea–China dialogue carries with it opportunities to promote new forms of co-operation in a region that has been particularly resistant to such co-operation at a regional level. Both the limits and the potential for deepened Northeast Asian security co-operation will have an impact on broader prospects for an East Asian community that is premised on a co-operative approach, and those prospects for co-operation are ultimately dependent on strategic management of relations among the larger powers in the region. As a result, the management and interaction of East Asian and Northeast Asian co-operation requires further development and consideration. The most practical way of addressing these concerns is the identification and placement of specific current issues on the policy agenda into a broader strategic context, and the use of those issues as the drivers for the development of practical mechanisms for co-operation. In this context, one potential starting point would be the initiation of a US–China

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dialogue designed to provide China with reassurance over US strategic intentions towards North Korea, out of which might develop a broader discussion including South Korea and other parties in Northeast Asia (including Japan) regarding a co-operative approach to the management of long-term stability on the peninsula. Given the foundation that has been laid through the Six Party Talks and the necessity of stable relations among major powers as a prerequisite for the establishment of a broader framework for security co-operation in East Asia, this seems like the natural place to start in strengthening the institutionalisation of multilateral security approaches in East Asia.

COMMENTARY ON PAPERS BY SUNG-HOON PARK AND SCOTT SNYDER Julie Gilson These two contributions by Park and Snyder provide a detailed and thorough review of the development of certain regional security features within East Asia and of the growing dialogue between Asia and Europe since the inauguration of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996. Together, the papers raise interesting and important questions about the nature of institution-building in the loosely constituted ‘East Asian’ region today. In so doing, they tap into a growing literature on the nature of East Asian regionalism, which, as I have argued elsewhere, is closely associated with debates over norms and institutions (Gilson 2007: 29). Indeed, both authors highlight the need to reflect more extensively upon the contested nature of regionalism in East Asia itself. Both papers set out clearly the historical trajectory that has led to the challenges and opportunities faced by states within East Asia today. They also clearly illustrate the ongoing role of dominant regional actors (notably the United States and China) and the specific relevance of particular bilateral relationships. Sung-Hoon Park provides a detailed history of the origins of ASEM, particularly against the backdrop of a failing Uruguay Round and continued European Union (EU) enlargement. In particular, he explains clearly the likely reasons for the apparent mutual neglect between the two regions. These include an Asian preoccupation with its own regional interests, notably the behaviour of Japan and the US, as well as a European concern with internal deepening and widening strategies. In response to the recognition that in theory these two regions have much to offer one another, Park explains the relevance of the New Asia Strategy produced by the European Commission, which noted a need for Europeans to develop a more balanced political and economic relationship with Asia. Of the three pillars housed within ASEM—namely, socio-cultural and educational, political and economic—Park observes the relative success of the socio-cultural dimension, and it would have been interesting to explore further the reasons for this dominance. The Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) has proactively driven forward the cultural agenda of inter-regional relations, by facilitating the exchange of thousands of

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individuals across a wide spectrum of activities. In addition to hosting events and producing reports, ASEF also publishes a scholarly journal to highlight inter-regional interests. Whilst this pillar may offer the prospect of increased interaction among particular groups of individuals from each region, it is in reality the economic pillar that has drawn the attention of ASEM participants, and which has had modest success with initiatives such as the ASEM Trust Fund in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.1 In contrast, Park’s central focus is on the political pillar, with additional material on security issues. He rightly notes that potential security cooperation is hampered by different concerns among Asians and Europeans; by the dominance of the US in both regions; and by the relatively low profile of the EU as a security actor.2 Indeed, this analysis exemplifies the ways in which ASEM cannot play a major role in significant security issues. In terms of political issues, Park argues that a ‘real partnership’ is developing between the two regions and he goes as far as to claim that this new forum has ended ‘both the predominance of the United States as a regional power in Asia and the preoccupation of Asia with the US’. This overoptimistic assessment of ASEM’s credentials is, it seems, subsequently challenged by Park’s own concluding sections, in which he demonstrates that significant aspects of the relationship between Asia and Europe continue to underperform. Indeed, exemplifying the distance still to be travelled in order to bridge the gaps between the two regions is the de facto continued centrality of the US in East Asia and Europe. As a result, Park fails to explain how the EU recognises the ‘increasing strategic value of Asia’, particularly as European states, like the US itself, are retrenching in order to address domestic economic woes. As a long-time observer of ASEM, I find that its present role remains a minimal part of the foreign policies of its constituent states and that it does not contribute substantively to greater regionalising trends within Asia, a theme that is taken up by Snyder’s contribution. At the same time, however, Park’s paper does demonstrate a number of ways in which ASEM has been utilised. First, it promotes directly the pre-existing interests discussed at bilateral levels, such as Japan–EU and South Korea–EU dialogues, thereby providing an additional forum to air such issues and concerns. Second, it allows for the discussion of these interests in a forum that embraces important regional 1 The Trust Fund provided a number of countries affected by the crisis with money for technical assistance, advice on restructuring their financial sectors and measures to deal with the growing social problems caused by the crisis; see Gilson 2010. 2 As Park notes, the global relevance of the EU is addressed to some extent by the recent Lisbon Treaty.



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neighbours. In so doing, states including Japan have been able to sit round the table with their Asian partners, and this process contributed to the development of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process and later East Asia Summits. Third, with its primary focus on trade matters and other nonmilitary topics, ASEM provides a means to discuss collectively a range of inter-related issues, including UN reform, international terrorism and drugs trafficking, conventional and nuclear arms control, and regional stability in Europe and Asia. ASEM’s enlargement of 2010 (to include Russia, Australia and New Zealand) will raise interesting problems and opportunities in regard to all of these issues. Scott Snyder’s paper examines models of collective security, and it would have been interesting to see a longer debate about the theoretical possibilities of this term, particularly as Snyder defaults to a dominant European understanding and utilises the European model as a point of reference for Asia. Snyder begins with the premise that Asian security has ‘failed’, in contrast to the views of observers like Leavitt (2005), who note the lack of war on the Asian continent and try to explain the ‘defensive realism’ that sustains it. Like Park, though, Snyder points to the diverse systems at play here, linked to weak institutionalism, continued historical divisions and the role of the US. In asserting the ‘failure’ of Asian regionalism, I find that Snyder holds to a particular concept of regionalism, but one that is not developed within the paper itself. Without a clear definition, when calling for a ‘multilayered vision approach to Asian regionalism’, Snyder appears to move away from a unique focus on security and hints at the need to examine these broad sets of relationships from a variety of perspectives. Indeed, like Park, he demonstrates the pervasive influence and impact on inter-regional dynamics of the relations between particular states, notably the Sino-Japanese relationship and US-China relations. Similarly, the importance of novel clusters of states, such as the Japan–South Korea–China dialogue, is becoming more apparent. What I find most compelling is the hint that ‘issues’ are increasingly becoming the ‘drivers for the development of practical mechanisms for cooperation’. Hook et al. (2011) have shown how Japan–EU relations are increasingly based on ad hoc, issue-led agendas, focusing not on overarching relations but more specifically on issues of mutual concern and the different states and institutions needed to address them. Thus, for example, areas such as environmental degradation and particular security issues such as piracy need to be addressed at a range of levels. In addition to a focus on the various attempts at East Asian community- building, then, it would have been valuable to gain an insight into the ways in which particular issues shape

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inter-regional relations. By developing further the concept of ‘ad hoc multilateralism’, Snyder begins to engage with this debate. In essence, both papers point to the need to discuss and analyse the nature of East Asian regionalism, connected as it is to institution-building, as well as to debate the contentious concept of ‘security’. First, it is difficult to compare Asian forms of regional integration with the particularities of the European model of regionalism. Institutions, as a now vast theoretical literature testifies, can be understood and interpreted in a wide range of ways, and may be anchored in normative or historical frameworks rather than physical agencies (see Hettne et al. 1999). Institutions may be seen to reflect or implement state policies, but they may also come to shape those very policies as they take on a normative significance. Moreover, linked as it is to region-building, many authors ask whether there is something uniquely ‘Asian’ about the form of regionalism being adopted in East Asia (Jones and Smith 2007; Stubbs 2002). The process of institution-building in East Asia hinges—as both papers show in the examples they give—on loose structures designed to promote dialogue per se, rather than intended to lead to a particular form of deeper integration. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and APT both have ASEAN at their core, implying that the Association’s own normative framework sits at the heart of any regionbuilding. Crucially, these frameworks have demonstrated to date that there remains a ‘lack of a coherent regional voice’ in Asia (Stubbs 2002: 447), and a continued preference for East Asian states to co-operate ‘with a pro-Western Asia-Pacific orientation rather than exclusive forms of East Asian regionalism’ (Hund 2003: 411). The papers also reflect the reality that agreements made in East Asia are frequently the outcome of ‘minilateral’ or bilateral discussions, comprising two or more interested parties, depending on the issue at hand. This focus on an issue-led agenda, or Snyder’s ‘ad hoc multilateralism’, seems to me to distinguish Asian forms of region-building from European alternatives. Second, there is a need to reflect on what ‘security’ means today, and in the context of East Asia in particular. Snyder’s paper could have examined in greater detail how the debates about security are being played out in discussions about East Asia, and it would have been interesting and valuable to set alongside traditional security concerns a critical approach that embraces the ‘diffusion of power in speaking security’ (McDonald and Burke 2007: 20). Whilst authors such as Acharya and Haacke have examined the nature of collective security with particular reference to ASEAN (Acharya 2007; Haacke 2002), a host of works also consider the value of ‘human security’ and ‘comprehensive security’ within the East Asian



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context (Acharya 2001; Emmers 2009). I have suggested elsewhere that a human security framework enables us to comprehend some of the contradictions inherent in Asian institutions. Thus, for example, when looking at the ARF, ‘while the modalities of the ARF may draw heavily on ASEAN practices, the reality of the Forum is that it has forced difficult issues onto the table, but with no effective mechanisms or even a mutually comprehensible framework within which to deal with them’ (Gilson 2007: 31). In addition, work on comprehensive security broadens the scope of what constitutes security interests and demonstrates in particular that economic security lies at the heart of collective regional endeavours today (see Sharpe 2002). Stubbs (2002), from a slightly different angle, also highlights this focus in his reference to ‘competitive regionalism’. Ravenhill demonstrates most keenly the interplay of economic and political forces (2010), thereby drawing attention once again to the need to consider the ‘complex security’ inherent in East Asian regionalism (McDonald and Burke 2007). In essence, both papers illustrate the paths taken towards security and political co-operation in East Asia so far, and highlight both the scholarly and diplomatic work still to be done. References Acharya, A. (2001), ‘Human Security: East versus West’, International Journal 56(3): 442–460. Acharya, A. (2007), ‘The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics’, World Politics 59: 629–652. Dent, C.M. (2008), East Asian Regionalism, London: Routledge Emmers, R. (2009), ‘Comprehensive Security and Resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Approach to Terrorism and Sea Piracy’, RSIS Working Paper, Nanyang Technological University. Available at http://dr.ntu.edu.sg/handle/10220/4389 (accessed 1 September 2011). Gilson, J. (2007), ‘Regionalism and Security in East Asia’, in M. McDonald and A. Burke (eds), Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 25–40. Gilson, J. (2010) ‘The Asia-Europe Meeting’, in M. Beeson and R. Stubbs (eds) Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, London: Routledge Haacke, J. (2002) ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. Hettne, B., A. Inotai and O. Sunkel (1999), Globalism and the New Regionalism, London: PalgraveMacmillan. Hook, G., J. Gilson, C.W. Hughes, and H. Dobson (2011), Japan’s International Relations, 3rd edition, London: Routledge. Hund, M. (2003), ‘ASEAN Plus Three: Towards a New Age of Pan-East Asian Regionalism? A Skeptic’s Appraisal’, The Pacific Review 16(3): 383–417. Jones, D.M., and M.L.R. Smith (2007, ‘Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order’, International Security 32(1): 148–184. Leavitt, S.R. (2005, ‘The Lack of Security Cooperation between Southeast Asia and Japan’, Asian Survey 45(2): 216–240.

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McDonald, M. and A. Burke (eds) (2007), Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Ravenhill, J. (2010), ‘The “New East Asian Regionalism”: A Political Domino Effect’, Review of International Political Economy 17(2): 178–208. Sharpe, S. (2003), ‘An ASEAN Way to Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia?’, The Pacific Review 16(2): 231–250. Stubbs, R. (2002), ‘ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism’, Asian Survey 42(3): 440–455.

INDEX 9/11 terrorist attacks 169, 258, 259 Abandoning Asia and joining the West (datsu-a, nyu-o) 105 Abduction issue (rachi mondai) 14, 108, 109 Abkhazia 29, 136 Adenauer 37 Administrative vice-ministers (Jimu jikan kaigi) 122 Afghan National Police 116 Afghanistan 27, 30, 89, 106, 115, 116, 134, 135, 232 Africa 69 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation 184 Albania 26, 27 Albright, Madeline 186 America’s Asian alliance network 21, 266–7 East Asian Economic Caucus 267 Mahathir Mohamed 267 America’s first Pacific president 96 American unipolarity 158 Amity (yuai) concept 120 Andean Community 131 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law 116 Anti-terrorist exercises 136 Peace mission 2010 136 APEC 98, 252, 254, 265, 274, 124, 129–132, 175, 257, 267, 275 Armenia 136 Arms control 27, 36, 54, 226, 258, 260, 283 ASEAN 1, 34, 35, 73, 85, 94, 106, 111–115, 128–131, 146, 247, 253, 268, 272, 273, 284, 285 ASEAN +1 62 ASEAN+3 98, 128 ASEAN+6 128 ASEAN+6+2 15, 129 ASEAN and Japan, China and South Korea (ASEAN+3) 98 ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) 98 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM+8) 129

ASEAN-plus organizations 16, 150 ASEAN Plus Three 123, 128, 175, 247, 264, 270, 272, 273, 275, 283 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) 113, 260 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 7, 20, 26, 34, 62, 84, 98, 113, 128, 247, 260, 265, 266, 269, 284 ASEAN Summit 131 ASEM Trust Fund 282 Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) 131 Asia Monetary Fund (AMF) 269 Asia Pacific Community proposal, Kevin Rudd’s 249, 270 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 20 Asia’s diversity 267–8 Asia’s divided states 21, 265–6 Korean peninsula 265, 266 Taiwan strait 265 Asia’s heterogeneity 21 Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework (AECF) 258, 260 Asia-Europe cooperation 249, 250, 258 Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) 281 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 6, 20, 98, 131, 132, 249–61, 265, 281–283 Asia-Europe relations Negative signals 252–3 Asia-Pacific Cooperation (APEC) mechanism 252 Austria 252 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 252 East Timor 253 EU enlargement 253 Finland 253 Single European Market 252, 253 Sweden 253 Tiananmen Square 253 Uruguay Round (UR) 252 Positive signals 253–5 Big Emerging Markets (BEMs) 254 Miracle economies 254 Towards a New Asia Strategy 254 World Bank 254 Asian aspirations for East Asian Community 270

288

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Asian century 1, 90 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 112 Asian financial crisis 97 Attitude of IMF 97 Poor business practice 97 Washington hostility or indifference 97 Asian Senior-level Talks on Nonproliferation (ASTOP) 124 Asia-Pacific Community (APC) 249, 260 Australia 27, 124, 128, 147, 224, 244, 260, 270, 272, 283 Austria 28, 31, 253 Axis of evil 42, 198, 203 Balance of power 1, 10, 17, 23, 102, 140, 153, 158, 159, 161, 166–168, 175–177 Bali treaty 131 Banco Delta Asia (BDA) (Macau, China) 43, 191, 201, 202, 227, 230 Bandung conference 65 Bangkok 112 Basic sovereignty 157 Beijing 42, 44, 110, 132, 134, 146, 189, 205, 223, 230, 234 Belarus 30, 133, 134, 136 Berlin Wall 32 Bilateral mechanisms 84 Bilateralism versus multilateralism 18 Biological weapons 54 Bishkek 133 Blue House, Seoul 139 Bo’ao Forum 66 Bosworth, Stephen (US special envoy) 46, 193, 204, 232, 234 Brezhnev 32 Brunei 114, 130 Bulgaria 31 Burma (Myanmar) 93 Bush administration 19, 169, 182, 190, 192, 197, 200–203, 206–210, 222, 224, 232, 234, 236, 241, 242 Bush, George W. 42, 44, 101, 189, 198, 219, 243 Cairo 35 Cambodia 113 UN peace-keeping operations 113 Campbell, Kurt M. (US assistant secretary of state) 175 Canada 31, 32, 147 Capitalism 101, 156 Carter, Jimmy 45, 113 Ceausescu, Nicolae 26, 34 Central Asia 137

Centre of excellence concept 50–3 CERN 52 Changing US role 92–6 Charter of Paris for a New Europe 27, 36 Chechnya 73 Chemical weapons 54 Cheney, Vice-President 241 Cheonan (Ch’ŏn’an) 3, 7, 25, 26, 37, 45, 46, 87, 104, 108, 109, 120, 127, 138, 139, 168, 172, 181, 196, 204–206, 211–213, 217, 227, 232, 235, 237, 243 Chiang Mai initiative 98, 118 China as regional leader 101 China National interests or interests of the state 9, 59, 67, 71, 73, 78 New security concept (xin anquanguan) 69 China, four modernisations 68 Agriculture 68 Economy 68 Military/national defence 68 Science and technology 68 China, rise of 59 Active participation 60 Badao (totalitarian form of imperialist rule) 62 Bandwagoning 62 Bipolar versus multipolar security systems 62 Climate change 60 Daguo (great nation) 62 Defensive realism 61 Democratic Peace theory 64 Democratisation 64 Diguo (empire; hegemonic power centre) 62 Distribution of power 59 Environmental protection 60 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 64, 69 Hegemonic stability 62 New security dilemmas 59 Offensive realism 61 Peaceful rise 64, 65 Realist theories 61 Security spirals and threat perceptions 60–5 Wangdao (benevolent form of rule) 62 China Threat vs. Peaceful Rise 78 China threat 10, 13, 59, 63, 78 China, Three no’s policy 198 China, Central Military Commission  67, 193

index289 China’s economic rise 272 China’s modernisation and defence 66–71 China’s political legitimacy as leading state 102 China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 114 China-US relations 99–103 Chinese Communist Party 67, 103 Chinese concept of power (comprehensive national power (CNP) ) 71 Chinese Five year Plans 75 Chinese IR 60, 63, 64, 74, 75, 78 Chinese national defence strategy 67 Chosen Soren 109 Churchill, Sir Winston 31 Civil wars 93 Clinto, Bill 183, 186, 193, 197, 203, 204, 206, 210, 222, 242, 274 Clinton, Hillary (Secretary of State) 19, 107, 175–6, 233, 236, 243, 267, 277 Code of Conduct for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 36 Cold War 2, 4, 12, 15, 19, 21, 22, 27–29, 32, 59, 60, 66, 67, 69, 71, 93, 97, 105–107, 112, 113, 122, 127, 128, 140, 149, 151, 158, 159, 161, 163, 168, 172, 175–177, 182, 199, 235, 246, 263–265, 267 Collective security 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 10, 12, 16, 18, 21–23, 83, 150, 249, 283, 284 Collective security mechanisms 9, 11, 16, 19, 23, 60, 62, 73–4, 78, 86, 88, 149, 150, 153, 249 Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) 27, 136, 137 Committee on Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) 98, 263 Common Foreign and Security Policy 271 Common Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) 136 Complete, verifiable and irreversible (CVI) denuclearisation 43, 213, 222–224, 232, 242 Concept of Russia’s Participation in APEC 130 Conference of Northeast Asian Peace and Prosperity (CPPNA) 141 Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) 131 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 27–29, 33, 35, 36, 271 Decalogue 271 Confidence-building measures (CBMs) 9, 28, 36, 42, 48, 49, 54, 85, 129, 138, 143, 269, 271

Council of Europe (COE) 27, 30, 31, 270 Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities 36 Counterfeiting US currency 43, 191 Cuba 32 Cultural Revolution 36, 65 Czechoslovakia 31, 32 Czechs 30 De Gaulle 37 Decommissioning and dismantling (nuclear facilities) 43, 53, 115, 222–224, 230, 232 Democracy 28–32, 64, 67, 99, 101, 102, 167, 171, 232, 253 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 99, 106, 107, 115, 116, 118, 119–22 Deng Xiaoping 10, 63, 65, 75, 85 Denuclearization 9, 41, 45–47, 49, 55, 56, 138, 146, 150, 171, 189, 190, 193, 198, 201, 203–205, 207, 208, 212, 213, 228, 229, 232, 242, 276 Director General of IAEA 138 Document on Confidence Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament 36–7 Domestic insurgencies 93 DPRK civil society 17, 55 DPRK, financial sanctions against 44–46, 109, 192, 193, 201, 202, 204, 211, 220, 221, 234 DPRK geopolitical context 55–7 65th anniversary of Workers Party 56 Endogenous factors 55 Exogenous factors 55 Political prestige 55 DPRK isolation 26, 47–49, 51–55, 86, 151, 182, 208, 218–220, 237 DPRK monolithic structure 47, 54, 195 DPRK nuclear capability 47, 55, 57, 221 DPRK nuclear challenge 108, 109 Missile launches 108 DPRK songun (military first) doctrine 47, 168, 195, 210, 221 East Asia Forum 269 East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) 269 East Asia Summit (EAS) 98, 147, 249, 267, 275–277, 283 East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) 269 East Asian Community (EAC) 6, 14, 15, 20, 120, 121, 249, 263–80, 283 East Asian Security architecture proposed by Hitoshi Tanaka 270

290

index

East Asian Security Forum 270 East Asian Summit (EAS) 142, 175, 264, 269, 270, 272, 275 East Germany 32 East Timor 113, 253, 274 Reconstruction and relief 113 Eastern Europe 29, 32, 37, 75, 253 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 114 Economic Partnership Arrangements (EPAs) 272 Eisaku Sato 112 Energy security/efficiency 54 Environmental remediation 54 Ethiopia 31 EU member states 30, 249, 253 EU 20, 27, 29–31, 35, 37, 38, 72, 224, 249–258, 261, 281, 282 EU-ASEAN dialogue 260 Europacific power 130 Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships 258 Europe and East Asia (resemblances and differences) 34–9 Europe, multi-layered institutions in 270 European Coal and Steel Community 85 European Community 28 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 30 European leadership 92 European Security Treaty (EST) 27, 29 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 31–33, 35, 37, 38, 85 Finland 31, 253 First World War 31 Food and water security 54 France 3, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 35, 38, 84 Franco-German reconciliation 31, 37, 38 Free Trade Agreement with South Korea (KORUS FTA) 96 French Assemblée Nationale 65 Fukuda Doctrine 106 Fukuda Takeo, Prime Minister 115, 121 Fukuoka 123 Fundamental Rights Agency 30 Futenma 14, 120 G20 96, 97, 118, 164, 165 GDR 31–33 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 93 Georgia 29, 136 Germany 3, 28, 30, 31, 33–35, 37, 38, 84

Ghana 34 Gorbachev 34, 36, 85, 139 Greece 30, 102 Hatoyama government 14, 107, 109, 116, 118 Hatoyama Ichiro 120 Hayato Ikeda, Prime Minister 112 Heavy fuel oil (HFO), supply ot North Korea 41, 189, 229 Helsinki Final Act (HFA) 21, 27–29, 32–34, 85, 271 Hereditary leadership 4 High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) 30, 36 Hill, Christopher 191, 192 Historical animosities 106 Hitler, Adolph 30, 31 Hobbesian anarchy 157 Holy Roman Empire 159 Honecker 33 Hong Kong 35, 129 Honour systems 91 Hu Jintao 65, 67, 97, 205, 206, 208, 223 Hub and spoke model 93 Human engagement 9, 49, 53 Human rights 28, 29, 31, 33, 35, 36, 62, 101, 115, 167, 171, 175, 232, 237, 253, 258, 259 Hungary 31, 32 Hyundai Corporation 42 Ichiro Ozawa (DPJ party secretary) 99 IMF 92, 93, 96, 97, 118 Indian Ocean 115, 116, 120 Indonesia 34, 93, 112, 114, 115 Inner sea within Pacific Ocean 115 Intermediate zones (Mao’s concept) 63, 65 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 41, 42, 138, 189, 224–226, 228–230, 235 Iran 89, 133, 134, 136, 232, 245 Iraq 89, 192, 230, 232, 275 Iraqi War 226 Islamist terrorist groups 115 Jemaah Islamiyah 115 ISTC (International Science and Technology Centre) 52 Italy 3, 8, 9, 31, 47, 49, 85, 86 Jakarta 112 Japan GDP fall 117 Japan structural and demographic challenges 119 Japan’s historical legacy 21, 264, 266

index291 Japan’s New National Defence Programme Guidelines 123 Japan-ASEAN forum 113 Japanese abductees 243 Japanese Coast Guard 117 Japanese colonial heritage 4 Japanese Host-Nation Support for US forces 120 Japanese imperialism 157 Japanese leadership 14, 15, 92, 105, 266, 268 Japan-EU dialogue 282 Jeju (Cheju) 123, 211 Jiang Zemin 65, 67, 111, 206, 207 Jo Myong Rok [Cho Myong-rok] 186, 221 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula 41, 228 Joint regional security policy 1 Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister 14, 106, 108, 111, 114, 116, 118 Kaesong 42, 199, 205 Kantei (Prime Minister’s office) 121 Kantian anarchy 157 Katsuya Okada (foreign minister) 120 Kazakhstan 27–29, 98, 131, 133, 134, 136, 137 Kelly, James (US special envoy) 42, 189, 202, 207, 223, 224, 241, 242 Khabarovsk 130, 131 Khruschev 32 Kim Dae Jung 163, 183, 185, 197, 198, 211 Kim Gye-gwan 230 Kim Il Sung 26, 185, 195, 203, 210, 212 Kim Jong Il 46, 56, 87, 168, 181, 185, 186, 188, 193–196, 205–208, 210, 212, 218–222, 245 Kim Jong Un 46, 56, 181, 193–196, 206, 213, 214 Kim Yong Nam (president of Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly) 45 Kim Young Sam 163, 245 Korea 1–4, 6, 15, 16, 21, 23, 31, 34, 35, 37, 87, 98, 103, 127, 140, 142, 145, 151, 153, 156, 167, 175, 167, 175, 193, 205 Korean peninsula 1, 3–5, 8, 9, 16, 37, 41, 45, 46, 48, 49, 54, 57, 85, 93, 120, 127, 137, 138, 140–143, 150, 154, 171, 174, 182, 185, 190, 191, 193, 196, 198, 199, 204–208, 212, 213, 217, 220, 225, 228, 229, 231, 232, 235, 237, 247, 259, 264–266, 268, 269 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) 25, 41, 225, 226 Korean Peninsula Security Program 48 Korean War 32, 41, 105, 140, 182, 184, 199, 221, 244 Peace agreement 182

Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) 46, 193 Kosovo 35 Kurile islands 38 Kyrgyzstan 29, 30, 98, 133–137 Landau Network-Centro Volta (LNCV)  48, 53 Latin America 69 LDP 1955 system Leadership as precursor to domination 91 League of Nations 31, 38, 83 Lee Myung-bak, President 109, 139, 142, 150, 163, 196, 199, 243 Government 19, 197, 203, 211, 220, 231, 245 Grand Bargain 109 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 115, 116, 118, 119, 121 Lisbon Treaty 256 LNCV 54 Lockean anarchy 157 Low-profile interaction 48 Mahathir Mohamed 267 Look East strategy 112 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Iranian president) 134 Malaysia 34, 93, 112, 186 Maritime border (two Koreas) 45 Maritime Self-Defence Forces (MSDF)  115, 120 Marshall Plan 85 Medvedev, President Dmitry 130–132, 134, 137, 152 Mekong delta 124 MERCOSUR 131 Military drills, US and South Korea 45, 173 Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Italian 48, 53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland  250, 257 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 43, 46 Modern transition 159 Money laundering 43, 237 Mongolia 27, 133, 145, 147 Monnet, Jean 38 Multilateral security 3, 5, 6, 10, 14, 16–21, 23, 71, 127, 139, 141, 228, 231, 166, 176, 277, 279, 280 Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) 33 Mutually assured destruction (MAD)  31, 32

292

index

NAFTA 131 Napoleonic France 159 Napoleonic War 159 National Bank of China 77 National Defence Commission of North Korea 186 National Strategy Unit (Kokka Senryaku Kyoku) 121–2 NATO 27–33, 37, 72, 73, 84, 85, 106, 136, 270 Nazerbaev, President 27 Network of East Asian Think tanks (NEAT) 269 New Asia Strategy 250, 251, 254, 255–6, 257, 281 New Strategy to Counter the Threat of Terrorism 116 Nixon, Richard 100, 113 Nobusuke Kishi 111 North East Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) 35, 131 North Korea famine 183 North Korea policy towards South Korea 198–9 North Korea seven critical choices 183–94 North Korea strategy of survival and prosperity 181 North Korea, Cheonan incident 211–12 North Korean industry building efforts 145 North Korean invasion 35 North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs 43 Northeast Asia 1, 13, 16–18, 84, 88, 105, 106, 127–48, 151, 152, 157, 158, 160, 165, 167, 168, 170–5, 176, 177, 207, 213, 218, 229, 231, 255, 266, 270, 271, 273, 276, 279, 280 Northeast Asia Security and Cooperation Forum (or Organisation) (NEASCO) 142–147 Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism 271 Northeast Asian security cooperation structure 139, 141, 279 North Korea American Affairs Bureau 193 Ballistic missiles test fire 192 Central Committee (CC) of KWP 193 Central Committee’s Politburo 193 Covert uranium enrichment programme 189 Currency devaluation 187 DPRK-Japan Joint Declaration in Pyongyang 188 Economic failure 196

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) programme 217 Hoeryong, North Hamyong 188 Juche 195 Kaesong (special industrial zone) 42, 188, 205 Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) 193 Mt Kumgang (special tourist zone) 188, 205 Musan, North Hamyong 188 New price system for rice 187 New wage system 187 Nordpolitik 196 Northern policy 196 Nuclear test, first 192 Politburo’s Standing Committee 193 Practical-gain socialism (sillisahoejuui) 188 Shelling of Yeonpyong island 217 Sinuiju (special administration district) 188, 205 Southern policy 196 Suryong system 195 Yongbyon nuclear facilities 189 North Korea policy towards China 205–210 Beijing 205 Changchun 205 Dalian 205 Four Party Talks 208 Harbin 205 Jiang Zemin era 206 Jilin 205 Kaesong Industrial Zone Law 205 Kim Jong Il visit to China 205 Mt Kumgang Tourism Zone 205 Second nuclear crisis 207 Shenyang 205 Shenzen in Guangdong province 205 Sino-North Korean conflict 208 Tianjin 205 Zhuhai in Guangdong province 205 North Korea policy towards US 199–205 Agreed Framework Bosworth, Stephen, invitation to Pyongyang 204 Clinton, Bill, invitation to Pyongyang 204 Illicit Activities Initiative 201 Kelly, James, vist to Pyongyang 202 Rice, Condoleeza, public TV statement 204 US financial sanctions 201 US Patriot Act 201

index293 Nuclear medicine 54 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 25, 37, 41, 189, 190, 222, 224–226, 228 Nuclear test, North Korean 2, 4, 37, 44, 45, 56, 108, 191–3, 198, 201, 203, 204, 208, 209, 213, 227, 231, 235, 243, 259 Nuclear weapons 4, 7, 25–27, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 43, 50, 51, 54, 115, 122, 151, 168, 185, 189–191, 193, 197, 200, 203, 204, 212, 219, 220, 223, 228, 230, 241, 242 Nuclear weapons scientists 50, 52 Obama, Barack 96, 101, 204, 222, 277 Administration 19, 46, 107, 122, 193, 203, 209, 217, 222, 227, 232–234, 236, 237, 243, 245, 276 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 28 Ohira, Prime Minister 113 Comprehensive security doctrine (sogo anzen hosho) 113 Okinawa 120–122 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 115, 120 Opium Wars 67, 156 OSCE 7, 9, 21, 84, 146, 270, 271 European experience 7, 25–39 Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) 112 Pacific Economic Council 131 Pacific Ocean Conference 36 Pakistan 110, 116, 133, 134 Park Chung-hee 109 People’s New Party (PNP) 119 People’s Republic of China (PRC; China) 1 Perry, William (US North Korea Policy Coordinator) 186 Philippines 93, 114, 115, 132 Platform for Cooperative Security 36 Poland 32, 33, 219 Polycentric system of cooperation 15, 132 Post-9/11 107, 108, 115 Post-Cold War 17, 63, 64, 73, 181, 184, 197, 203, 268, 270 Post-Maoist modernisation programme  63 Post-Westphalian 17, 160, 163–165, 167, 169, 172, 176 Prague Spring 32 Pre-Hobbesian anarchy 157, 158, 166, 167 Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly 46

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 116, 219 Pseudo-Cold War 197 Putin, ex-president 152 Pyongyang 25, 43, 48, 51, 52, 185, 186, 188, 189, 191, 193, 198, 202, 204, 211, 217 Rajin-Sonbong free economic and trade zone 184, 205, 246 Red Army 31 Regional cooperation mechanism 128, 265 Regional FTA suggested by Chinese economists 145 Regional Security Outlook for 2009–2010 263 Replacement for US in East Asia 90 Resident power in East Asia 96 RFE-DPRK-ROK power grid 145 Ri Gun 193 Roh Moo-hyun 142, 163, 174, 197, 198, 211, 243 Roh Tae Woo 163 ROK 27 Romania 26, 31 Ruanshili (soft power) 72 Rudd, Kevin 129, 270 Russia 3, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17, 23, 25, 27, 29, 37, 38, 42, 53, 98, 127–47, 149–153, 162, 170, 171, 189, 198, 211, 221, 227–229, 234, 235, 237, 244, 267, 283 Russia-ASEAN summit 132 Russian National Committee of CSCAP 133 Russian thought on SCO 135 Science diplomacy 53–8 Scientific cooperation 8, 53–5 Sea of Japan 108 Second World War 14, 28, 33, 34, 85, 89, 105, 115, 127, 140, 157, 244, 252, 266 Reparations 105 Self-Defence Forces 113 Senkaku islands 110 Seoul 16, 17, 19, 46, 48, 124, 139, 164, 232, 258, 259, 273 Separatist groups 115 Abu Sayyaf 115 Moro Islamic Liberation Army 115 Serbia 35 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 15, 27, 62, 98, 133–7, 73, 127–47 Shanghai Five process 133 Shinzo Abe 108 Shuttle diplomacy 48, 223

294

index

Sino-Japanese relations 22, 278, 278, 283 Sino-US strategic reassurance 22, 277, 278 Six Party Talks (SPT) 3, 6, 7, 13–16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 37, 42, 44, 46, 48, 62, 73, 84, 109, 124, 137–139, 142, 146, 150, 151, 171, 177, 189–191, 193, 200, 202–204, 207–209, 211–213, 217–37, 241–243, 246, 265, 266, 268, 270, 271, 276, 279, 280 Bio-chemical weapons issue 237 Brinkmanship diplomacy 236 Clinton-Kim Dae-jung model 236 Missiles issue 237 North Korean nuclear quagmire 218–27 Albright and Cho Myong-rok [Jo Myong Rok] joint communiqué 221 Bilateral modality 221–2 Board of Governors of IAEA 225 Demilitarized Zone 221 Geneva Agreed Framework 221 Isolate and contain 219 Josoren [Chosensoren] 220 Kissinger, Henry 222 Korean Central news Agency (KCNA) 225 Li Gun 224 Military first politics 221 Military options 220 Military strike 220 Multilateral modality 224–7 Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 222 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 219 Shinpo LWR project 223 Trilateral modality 223–4 Unilateral modality 218–21 Nuclear problem to be resolved 237 Obama speech at Cairo University US and Islamic countries, suspicion and discord 236 Why SPT process? 227–31 Heavy fuel oil (HFO) 229 Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement 228 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 228 Kim Gye-gwan 230 Mohamed ElBaradei 230 Trading with the Enemy Act, removal of 229

Why stalled? 231–5 Bosworth, Stephen 232 Chinese efforts 235 Clinton, Hillary 232 De-nuke, Open 3,000 231 Diplomatic pressure on US 234 International Maritime Organisation 233 Missile 234 Obama administration preoccupied domestically 232 Resolution 1718, loophole in 233 Rocket launch 233 Taepodong 1 233 Taepodong 2 233 Slovaks 30 Small players (two Koreas) 3 Smart power 72, 90 Smile diplomacy 113 Social Democratic Party (SDP) 119, 121 Soft power 71, 72, 86, 102, 161, 164–166, 173, 174, 181, 197–8 Soft-security issues 259 Environmental protection 259 Human rights 259 Trafficking in drugs 259 Trafficking in women 259 South China Sea 1, 14, 114, 173 South Korean foreign policy 162–6 Conservatives vs. progressives 165 Global Korea 164 Globalists vs. traditional realists 165 Inter-Korean reconciliation 163 Nordpolitik 163 ROK-US alliance 164 Sunshine Policy 163 South Korean foreign policy, Future tasks for 166–77 Alphabet soup 175 Cooperation with China 175 Critical interests 167 Japanese textbooks 175 Koguryo, history of 173 Korean comfort women 175 Northeast Asia 170–5 Regional multilateralism 175–7 Roh Moo Hyun government 174 ROK-US alliance 167–70 Soft power strategy 174 South China Sea military drills 173 Strategic relations with China 171 Taiwan 173 Vital interests 167 Yellow Sea military drills 173

index295 South Korea free trade agreements with India and Europe 98 South Korea-EU dialogue 282 South Korean island (Yonpyong; Yonpyeong), shelling of 2, 168, 217, 227, 232, 235, 237, 243 South Korean navy ship, sinking of, see Cheonan South Korean students in China 98 South Korean students in US 98 South Korean tourist, death of 2 South Korean tourists in China 98 South Korean tourists in US 98 South Ossetia 29, 136 South Vietnam 93 Soviet bloc 85 Soviet blueprint 4 Soviet Union 27–29, 31–38, 41, 66, 75, 85, 139, 181, 182, 184, 199, 245 Soviet Zone (Germany) 31 Special measures for Refuelling Assistance Bill 116 Sri Lanka 110, 133, 134 Stalinist two camps theory 65 Star of Hope programme 115 Status hierarchies 91 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 120 Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) 33 Sunshine Policy 37, 163, 183, 198 Supranational currency to replace US dollar 77 Switzerland 28 Systemic differences 21 Taiwan 2, 35, 66, 93, 99, 106, 127, 129, 160, 173, 265 Taiwan Strait 1, 110, 264, 265 Tajikistan 98, 133 Taliban 115 Taro Aso 117 Technical staff (nuclear) 50 Thailand 27, 93, 108 Thatcher, Margaret 38 Theory of North Korea’s collapse 214 Third Bloc 1 Three Worlds Theory 63, 65 Tokyo 46, 96, 109, 111, 112, 277 Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) 44, 229 Transkorea-Transsib transit 145 Treaty of Westphalia 155, 244 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) 28

Trilateral Cooperation Vision 2020, The 123–4 Trust, Tradition, Tolerance, Transparency 28 Tsunami 113 Turkey 30 UK 3, 28, 33, 35, 38, 115 UN Peace Keeping Operations 87, 113 UN Secretary General 138 Unequal treaties 156 United Nations 83, 105, 134, 149, 185, 224, 244 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 25, 31, 35–6, 37, 39, 44, 45, 86, 92, 109, 110, 134, 192, 204, 211, 221, 224–226, 233–235 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 44, 233, 234 United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation 122 UNSC, Permanent Members of 31, 37, 39, 86, 224 Upper House 116, 119, 121 Uruguay Round 281 US and South Korean policies towards North Korea 210 US as economic centre of gravity 94 US goals and commitments 90, 93 US military deployments 93 US Pentagon 101 US Treasury 43, 201, 243 US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 209 US-Japan alliance 99, 107, 151, 175 US-Japan Defence Guidelines 122 US-Japan relationship 99, 122 US-South Korean joint naval exercise 196 US views on East Asian community building 274–7 Center for Strategic and International Studies 275 Charter for Northeast Asia 276 Performance in APEC meetings 274 Steinberg, James 276 Uzbekistan 98, 133, 136 Valdivostok 27, 130 Vatican 30 Vision 2020 124, 273 Warsaw Pact 28, 29, 31, 32, 34 Washington DC 37, 43, 48, 96, 97, 99, 120, 186, 236

296

index

Washington Treaty 30, 31 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 115, 117, 127, 129, 161, 172, 219, 236, 260 Wen Jiabao 74 West Sea 259 Western civilisation 102 Algebra 102 Democracy 102 Greek influence 102 Philosophy 102 Western Europe 34, 84, 106 Western theories of anarchy 158 Westphalia concept 244 Westphalian 16, 91, 158, 160, 163 Wilson, President 31 World Bank 75, 92, 93, 256 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 75, 93 Xinjiang 73

Yalta summit 35, 140 Yasukuni Shrine 111, 175 Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister 115 Year of China in Russia 146 Year of Russia in China 146 Yellow Sea 45, 173 Yokohama 124 Yongbyon nuclear complex 42, 44, 52, 189, 220, 221, 227, 229 Yoshida Shigeru 105 Japan’s post-war diplomacy 105 Yugoslavia 35 Yukichi Fukuzawa 105 Yukio Hatoyama (first DPJ prime minister) 99, 107, 119–121, 270 Zheng Bijian 66 Zhou Enlai (Chines foreign minister) 65 Zhou Xiaochuan (head of National Bank of China) 77