Kogun - The Japanese Army in the Pacific War

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THE LIBRARY

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

1 . •'v

KOGUN THE JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC WAR

SABURO H A Y A SH I In collaboration with A LV IN D. C O O X

THE M A R IN E CO RPS A S SO C IA T IO N Q U AN TICO, VA.

1959

Distributed By:

Box 6, College Park Sta. Detroit 21, Mich. - U.S.A.

F i r s t E d i t i o n , M a y 1959 Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 59-10,008

Published by the M a r i n e C o r p s A s s o c i a t i o n Box 1844, Quantico, Va.

First published in Tokyo, 1951, as Taiheiyo Senso Rikusen Gaishi. This English-language edition is published by arrangement with Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo.

Copyright 1959 by the Marine Corps Association. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publishers, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review to be printed in a magazine or newspaper.

PRIN TED IN T H E U .S .A . BY M

onum ental

P r in t in g

C o., B a l t i m o r e , Md.

Contents Foreword A Statement about this Book from the Former Japanese Ambassador to the United States Preface 1. The Army’s Course until World War II 2. Preparations for Launching Southern Operations 3. Success of First-Phase Southern Operations 4. Problems Facing High Command after End of First-Phase Operations 5. China Operations 6. Operations vs. Port Moresby, Midway, and the Aleutians 7. Guadalcanal Operations 8. Collaboration with Germany and Italy 9. South Pacific Battle Lines Pulled Back 10. Problems of Adjusting State Affairs and SupremeCommand 11. Military Operations in China (II) 12. Failure of Imphal Operation 13. Loss of Marianas Islands 14. Reinforcement of Japanese Homeland Defenses 15. Failure of Decisive Battle for Philippines 16. Operations in Southern Region (Except Philippines) 17. Loss of Iwo Jima and Okinawa 18. Operations in China (III) 19. Preparations for Decisive Combatin Japanese Homeland 20. Situation in Manchuria and Korea 21. Defeat Appendices Army War Diary Notes Biographical Digests Index

v xii xiii 1 29 36 41 47 51 58 68 71 79 86 92 102 113 119 133 137 145 151 169 176 183 184 192 220 243

Maps Southern Theater

37

Area North of Australia

52

Eastern New Guinea

54

Allied Thrusts, Eastern New Guinea and Solomons

63

Allied Thrusts, South and Central Pacific

75

China Theater

88

Burma Theater

94

Allied Thrusts, New Guinea Region

103

Philippines Theater

123

Allied Thrusts, Western Pacific

139

Operations OLYMPIC and CORONET

166

Illustrations Facing pages 18, 19; 50, 51; 82, 83; 114, 115; 146, 147; 178 and 179

All photographs from Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo, except for reproductions of Japanese art which are Department of the United States Army photographs.

FOREWORD D EFEA T comes easy to no people. For the proud men of Yamato, the denouement of 1945 was particularly incomprehensible. With their long, mystical, and divine dialectic, the Japanese sensed that the ending must be malcontrived, since the outcome was supposedly preordained. They had never once tasted the bitter dregs of defeat in modern times, although the foes they had vanquished included such latter-day giants as Imperial China, Czarist Russia, and the Kaiser’s Germany. When at last they them­ selves were visited with nuclear hells, the searing finale to their agony was not entirely out of context in massive horror and shocking impact. Over the radio in mid-August 1945 came the unexpected words of the Emperor, stunning in their import: “. . . according to the dictates of time and fate , We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come, by enduring the unendurable and suffering the in­ sufferable.” Across the arch of five decades floated back the famous phraseology of the Emperor Meiji, from the time of the Triple Interven­ tion of 1 8 9 5 .... Now there was only silence, and a numb void, empty of hope and illusion. The undertones were complex and varied, commixtures of rage and indignation, mortification and fear, despair and relief. Off Tokyo Bay rode a new Black Ship, Missouri, not Susquehanna as in Perry’s day. The Old Testament book of Samuel describes a comparable situation well: “How are the mighty fallen!” Little thought now for the brittle years when Star and Anchor dominated Japan, and Japan domi­ nated East Asia. Success had long been the glittering promise, but the cruel reward was abysmal military bankruptcy. Defeat was a raw, ugly, and unaccustomed word, which grated on nerves already frayed by night­ mares of terror borne from the skies. To put it simply, Japan preferred the refuge of amnesia. Or, as General Otozo Yamada, the last commander of the ill-fated Kwantung Army, ruefully put it: “Defeated generals should not talk of battles.” At last the 1940’s drew to a close; midcentury was at hand. Japanese instincts of dynamic industry and indefatigable cleanliness triumphed over lassitude and squalor, characteristics which had never marked the better days, the lost years. Embers still twinkled amidst the ashes; Japan dared hope again. And, with hope, crept back the past, its uglier aspects glossed over, its miseries dulled by time and by newly found prosperity. Of this phenomenon, Emerson remarked long ago, “Time dissipates to shining ether the solid angularity of facts.” Soon a forgotten or ill-remembered word, “Victory,” dared be con­

v

VI

FOREWORD

fronted once more; no longer was the word the monopoly of transitory occupiers. The nadir was indeed past. From the shadows emerged wraiths of yesteryear, forgotten heroes of domestic chronicles, of the wars fought and won at the turn of the century. Had not the tragic old Premier, Admiral Kantaro Suzuki (whom some had even irreverently called a “Badoglio” ), once led Japanese destroyers to victory over the Russians in 1905? Were not those Russians of the same breed which wore incongruously sparkling “socialistic” epaulets aboard the U.S.S. Missouri, and which overran Manchuria in borrowed Studebaker trucks? The wheel was finally turning full circle. The Shin Toho studios gauged the public pulse remarkably well when they brought out the highly successful film entitled Meiji Tenno to Nichiro Dai Senso (Emperor Meiji and the Russo-Japanese War) in 1957. Encouraged by their success, they immediately followed it up with an earlier period piece, Meiji Tenno Kogo Ryoheika to Nisshin Senso (Em ­ peror Meiji, The Empress, and the Sino-Japanese W ar), which appeared in 1958. That same year, the relatively best of the Japanese documentaries to come out of the second World War was released: Taiheiyo S enki (H is­ tory of the Pacific W ar). Critics have called this intelligently selected film “a real documentary, instead of the usual collection of newsreel snip­ pets or the so-called ‘documentaries’ which showed every battle up to the time that the tide began to turn against Japan.” Like the publishers, the movie men knew that a new generation was going to school now, a generation which scarcely remembered the terrify­ ing banshees’ wail of air raid sirens, and the raging flames of incendiary death. The teenagers of the 1950’s ( together with many sheerly nostalgic elders) flocked to the bookstalls to devour now-mushrooming war maga­ zines. As early as November 1955, the widely read Bungei Shunju prob­ ably set off the “boom” with a special issue entitled “Final [sic] Account of the Japanese Army and Navy,” the cover adorned with the photographs of six top wartime military and naval leaders. In the years that followed, Bungei Shunju published many more special issues, as did Chisei, Konnichi-no Wadai, Nippon Shuho, Shukan Sankei, Shukan Yomiuri, and Sunday Nippon. In the rather spectacular instance of the new periodical Maru, even its own editor admitted surprise at his magazine’s almost overnight success starting in 1956. “We did not really expect this fad to last long,” confessed Hajime Takagi, “but we soon discovered that we had a steady following of very serious-minded readers. So we too decided to get serious about it and put out a better magazine.” There was now no dearth of materials submitted by former officers and enlisted men of the old Imperial armed forces. Riding the crest with its competitors, Maru doubled its size—and its price; circulation soared. Special supplement followed special supple­ ment.9 •See Kiyoaki Murata’s article, “ Blood and Tears,” Japan Times, August 3, 1957; also his earlier survey, “ The W ar Saga Boom,” loc. cit., December 8, 1956.

FOREWORD

vii

Letters to the editors poured in, especially from the youngsters. A 15year-old from Tokyo wrote that he “loved war stories” and wanted to read newspaper accounts from the war years, about which he knew next to nothing. A 17-year-old from Kyoto wrote: I think the Japanese today lack a national consciousness. They admire everything that’s imported. We should realize what we Japanese are capable of; the best means would be to show the fine performances the Japanese armed forces gave. It is not to tan jingoism; but to know the truth would be the first step toward peace, I think. In the same vein, a 19-year-old from Tochigi said: Reading the Special Navy Supplement, I realized for the first time that Japan once had a mighty Navy. This was a wonderful experience for a person like me, who has known so very little about the old Navy. I hope that you will con­ tinue to publish books and magazines concerning military affairs, which are not very well known at all. By catering to juvenile—or reminiscent—popular taste, the commercial publishers inevitably tended to stress dramatic superficiality, lurid narra­ tive, and masochism. Thus the important Bungei Shunju (whose “lead” was previously mentioned) brought out, in August 1955, Hiroshi Akiyama’s “Saikin Sen wa Jumbi Sareteital” (Bacteriological Warfare Prepa­ rations Were Already Complete!). In this grisly article, Akiyama de­ scribed in revolting detail his alleged experiences with the infamous Unit 731, the Army’s “murder machine” stationed in Manchuria. His ostensible purpose: “To help in some small measure to warn people against the horrors of a third World War, and to prevent such horrors from occurring.” The Akiyama piece stirred up violent controversy concerning its very raison d’etre. An even more violent reaction attended the publication in March 1957 of the book entitled San Ko (Three Lights). This gory vol­ ume, which described the appalling atrocities committed by Japanese in occupied China, became an immediate best-seller, with some 50,000 copies bought up in the first two weeks following publication. Suddenly, however, the book was withdrawn from the stands, reportedly as the result of intense pressure brought to bear upon the publisher by incensed Rightist elements. The whole problem came to life again in August 1958, when a certain veterans’ group (the so-called “Liaison Council of Re­ turnees from China” ) got another publisher to republish the controversial book (in expanded form) under a new title, Shinryaku (Invasion). Act­ ing on the complaint of the original publisher, a Tokyo district court issued an interlocutory injunction prohibiting republication and sale of the book. • |n?j While some Japanese were seeking to expiate their sins, to propa­ gandize, or to “entertain” with painful but commercially profitable nowit-can-be-told confessions, others were devising a new rationale. Had

viii

FOREWORD

the noble souls enshrined in Yasukuni Jinja departed this life in vain? Did not genius, sacrifice, and even beauty sparkle in direst defeat? Was there not "humanistic glory and loveliness,” plus simple manly virtue in war s own forge of evil?0 The Japanese soldier and sailor, after all, had proved not unworthy of the Emperor in battle, but had instead been over­ whelmed by material technology and a lavish logistical abundance which the four fair isles of Hongoku could ill afford. This was the school which thought, like Havelock Ellis perhaps, that “Defeat brings prudence and concentration; it ennobles and fortifies.” With the emptying of Sugamo Prison in 1958, much of the emotional resentment against the International Military Tribunal’s judgments of “war guilt” may now be spent, although there appears to be a mounting agitation for the pardon of all so-called Class “B” and “C” prisoners, now released on parole. The Buddhist chaplain Shincho Hanayama, however, had already done much to “humanize” the more famous Class “A” war criminals, in his book translated as The Way of Deliverance (1950). Among the most interesting of Hanayama’s notes is the record of his interviews with former-General Iwane Matsui, in December 1948. Speak­ ing of his old military teachers ( Arao, Kawakami, Fukushima, Aoki, and Utsunomiya), Matsui had asserted: In these men there was nothing of the cut-throat or high­ wayman type such as has developed in the Army recently, with the rise of militarism. These fathers of the Japanese Army, living up to all that could be expected of them, were really filled with the spirit of the Emperor Meiji. Later, the whole nation underwent a change, and I believe it was the young ones, acting impetuously and without restraint, who finally brought everything to the present pass. In commenting upon the disgrace of Nanking, for example, Matsui said that the Japanese Government, “most likely, did not appreciate the fact, but a great change had taken place [since the days of the Russo-Japanese [ War] in matters like bushido and humanity.” Concluded Matsui: “After things turned out this way, I am really eager to die at any time.” More recently, Okinori Kaya, wartime Finance Minister (who was, significantly enough, elected to the Lower House during the national elections of May 1958), wrote in Nippon Shuho:J I believe that the Greater East Asia War was not premedi­ tated by Japan. I believe that the war broke out by force of circumstances during the China Incident. It was not like the war which the Nazis started after painstaking plan­ ning. . . . [The Japanese people nowadays] speak ill of ex­ soldiers, but the latter are not the ones who started the war. •See, for example, Nippon Shuho, Special Edition, 1956, which deals with the “ real records of the bloody battles fought by war gods in the modern era.” t "Sempan Toshite Iu" (My Say as a War Criminal), Nippon Shuho, May 25, 1958.

FOREWORD

ix

Nor are they responsible for Japan’s defeat; it was not be­ cause they were lax that Japan lost the war. It is indeed regrettable that they should be criticized, just because Japan lost the war. Former-Colonel Takushiro Hattori has also “re-evaluated” Japan’s wartime armed forces. In Bungei Shunfus special issue of March 1956, he observed that the Japanese Army had had “no peer in its terrific fighting capacity, which is quite apart from the fact that Japan lost the war.” In the teeth of the new trend, some articulate critics have spoken up. For example, the big daily newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun, in an editorial appearing as early as April 16, 1956, warned that there had already emerged a plethora of “uncritical romanticizations” of the Greater East Asia War, lacking historical or sociological perspective, while stimulating a hollow belligerency. Two years later, the same newspaper wryly ob­ served that “Japanese former soldiers are busy seeking pensions; when it comes to problems of war, their ideology scarcely differs from what it was in the old days.”0 Mature Japanese of objectivity and integrity would, in this broader view, seek to master the past, not be enslaved by it. They would be, one might surmise, the intellectual kin of the late James Forrestal, who had said, while the second World War was still fresh in the minds of the victors:f It is no reflection upon the character or the ability of the men who directed the prosecution of the recent war to acknowledge that mistakes were made. Rather is it evidence of their integrity that they should promptly call attention to those errors and propose corrective measures. . . . If we are to plan wisely for our future security we must measure all proposals against two standards: What weak­ nesses revealed by World War II should be corrected? What new dangers must we anticipate and guard against? The first test of any plan for future national security is the extent to which it applies these lessons of the past. Any plan which neglects this requirement is misconceived. Any plan which fails to meet this requirement must be judged inade­ quate. Saburo Hayashi is one knowledgeable Japanese who has devoted much thought to the meaningful questions asked by men like Forrestal. Born in 1904, Hayashi was graduated with the 37th Class from Japan’s prewar Military Academy in 1925, and went on to become an expert on the system and the regime which tantalizes the West’s best brains today: Soviet Russia. After a number of years of troop duty, he was graduated *"Henshu Techo" (Editorial Notebook), August 7, 1958. tBased upon testimony of then-Navy Secretary Forrestal before United States Senate Com­ mittee on Military Affairs, December 13, 1945; Transcript, pp. 577-78.

X

FOREWORD

from the War College in 1934. Assigned to the Russian intelligence sec­ tion of the General Staff’s Second Bureau in 1935, he was next sent to the Soviet Union and Poland in 1938 as a language officer. The following year he was appointed Assistant Military Attache in Moscow. In 1940 he returned to IGHQ’s Russian Section, which he eventually took over as Chief in 1943. Promoted to the rank of full Colonel in 1944, he subse­ quently assumed charge of the IGHQ Operations Bureau’s Organization and Mobilization Section ( June 1944). At a time which was highly criti­ cal for Japan, in April 1945, he became Military Secretary to the Minister of War, General Korechika Anami. He served that tragic historical per­ sonage until Anami’s suicide immediately following the capitulation in August 1945. From over five years of research and relentless soul-searching, as well as from his unique personal experience and former vantage point on the Imperial General Staff, emerged this book. Forthrightly and frankly, pulling no punches, he has told the story of the backgrounds and the actualities, from darkness to illusory light and back into darkness. There is no moralizing, no recrimination. The style is bold and clear, no mean feat within the semantic constrictions of Japanese ideographic expression. Equally impressive is his handling, within one incisive volume, of the major problems of the entire turbulent era lying between Meiji and Missouri. There is still no other brief analysis and chronicle quite like it in Japanese (or in English, for that matter)—as any serious student of the literature must soon discover to his chagrin. Hayashi’s Preface, taken without change from the original Tapanese edition, clearly summarizes his reasons for writing the book in the first place. No non-Japanese ( and probably few Japanese) could have provided his insights. Since Hayashi wrote the book for strictly Japanese consumption, it is no fawning apologia to Tapan’s wartime enemies, no vituperative iconoclasm, no whitewash. Hayashi is not ashamed to have served the Em­ peror as an officer of the Imperial Army to the best of his abilities. Unlike many of his more parochial colleagues, however, he is acutely interested in the geopolitics, economics, domestic affairs, and over-all strategy which shaped prewar Japanese militarism. He studies World War II combat operations only for lessons and chronology, not for journalistic detail, which is not here the purpose of his trained professional eye. The result has been a finely honed study, which fully deserves American attention, especially within the setting of the postwar rearmament of Japan as an anchor against the spread of world Communism in Asia." The English-language edition of Hayashi’s book does not differ in substance from the original version, although the general format has been slightly revised. To the text, however, I have added annotations of vary­ ing detail, as well as a long new appendix comprising biographical digests of the careers of most of the military personages mentioned in the body. I have enclosed supplementary explanations or amplifications within brackets in the text itself.

FOREWORD

xi

The translation of the original book has been a strictly private en­ deavor. Three colleagues at Shiga National University were associated with me in the draft translation: Professors Sadamu Hirota, Tadao Ichiki, and Nobuyuki Katayama. Valuable consultative and cartographic assist­ ance was rendered by Muraji Yano, a former Colonel on the Imperial General Staff. Numerous other Japanese friends and associates who formerly served in the Imperial armed forces very generously shared their knowledge and experience with me. I thank them individually and collectively. The translation has greatly benefited from a detailed critique provided by Mr. Ben Bruce Blakeney, attorney and counselor at law now practicing in Tokyo, and former Chairman of American Defense Counsel before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (where he defended Umezu and Togo, in particular). An especial word of acknowledgment is owed the Honorable Sadao Iguchi, former Japanese Ambassador to the United States (1954-56), who generously found the time, amidst his many duties, to provide a statement for the English-language edition of this book. I must also record my thanks to the Editorial Department of the Iwanami Press for their co-operation, particularly Messrs. Yoshino, Nunokawa, Hanashima, and Kigoshi; and to Brigadier General R. D. Salmon, Brigadier General S. R. Shaw and Lieutenant Colonel John A. Crown of the United States Marine Corps Association, whose interest and support made the English-language edition possible. Last words of gratitude (unrealistically brief in terms of my large debt) are reserved for Colonel Hayashi, whose personal friendship and profound wisdom I deeply value; and for my wife, Hisako, without whose encouragement and patient collaboration this book could never have seen the light of day. Only I, however, am responsible for any errors of commission or omission. A

Tokyo 1958

l v in

D.

C

oox

A STATEMENT ABOUT THIS BOOK FROM THE FORMER JAPANESE AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES HEALTHY understanding and respect between the Japanese and Ameri­ can peoples have perhaps never been more important than they are today. Yet, after a spate of “now-it-can-be-told” journalistic efforts which followed World War II, there has long remained the need for a critical, high-level appraisal and explanation of the Japanese military role in the global tragedy. The eminently well-qualified Saburo Hayashi has at last fulfilled this need with his brilliantly candid and concise study. His view­ point derives from the level of the Imperial General Staff, on which he served with distinction for many years. Although never originally in­ tended for publication abroad, this soul-searching book deserves, I feel, an extensive audience among the American reading public. The insights are deep, the treatment is authoritative, and the context is unusually broad.

S.

Iguchi

PREFACE IN THIS book I have tried to present a faithful account of the Army High Command’s actions, “as they were,” during the Pacific War. It has been my intention to focus my discussion upon the following problems: How did the Army High Command estimate the situation throughout the Pacific War? On what thinking were their plans of operations founded? How did they actually conduct matters? I have accordingly prepared an exact account of the utterly erroneous judgments of the situation (from the vantage points of results now visible), and of mismanagement in the conduct of operations—without retouching. The progress of operations in each campaign is described in the broadest outline, because of the limited number of pages at my disposal, as well as my belief that there are other suitable writers to treat strictly combat history. As for Naval operations, I have selected only those which had a direct bearing upon Army activities. I have gone to great pains in collecting and using materials for my work. The greater part of the records were burned at the time of Japan’s defeat; but even where some of them have survived, they remain under various restrictions for use. For my part, however, I have made every effort to ensure correctness in describing historical facts, without exag­ geration, and in accord with the dictates of my conscience. Some may nevertheless feel that certain points described herein are deficient; I wel­ come emendations from the reader. Lastly, I should like to express my hearty thanks to Messrs. Genzaburo Yoshino and Mitsuyoshi Ebihara of the Iwanami Press, who were kind enough to give me guidance and suggestions. I also desire to acknowl­ edge the generous help and frank advice rendered to me by many of my senior colleagues and friends during the writing of this book. Sabu bo H

ayash i

KOGUN is the short form for Imperial Japanese Army, whose full title would be Dai Nippon Teikoku Rikugun

This account of the Japanese Army in World War II was written by a Japanese Army officer from Japanese sources and for a Japanese audience. In the fog of war opposing sides have divergent views of what actually occurred. In order to preserve the authenticity of the Japanese view, no attempt has been made in this English transla­ tion to bring it into consonance with the American view of the operations described.

1

THE ARMY’S COURSE UNTIL WORLD WAR II

AFTER the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan set about satisfying her irrepressible longing: to achieve truly advanced statehood, second to none in the world, thereby insuring national independence. Two con­ temporary slogans illustrate Japan’s motivations: “National Prosperity and Military Power;” “Civilization and Enlightenment.” The major ob­ jectives implied in the second slogan necessarily derived from the first. Wealth and armed might were the twin foundations. It followed that national defense was bound to exert dominance over domestic politics. As a result of her victories in the wars against China (1894-95) and Czarist Russia (1904-05), Japan secured the basic elements of her nation­ al desires—for the time being. Afterwards she undertook the manage­ ment of Manchuria. This marked the first step in Japan’s policy of de­ veloping the Asiatic Continent and of striving for racial expansion. By their very success, the major developments in national policies greatly enhanced the already dominant r61e of national defense in politics. Peculiar to the Japanese armed forces in general was the complete autonomy of authority inherent in the supreme command function.1 This fundamental characteristic solidly underlay the predominance of national defense in the country’s politics. The independence of the military’s command prerogatives led to an actual separation of domestic political considerations from the function of national defense. Thus did the mili­ tary gain an overweening ascendancy and a springboard for their own developing political interests. The so-called political power of the Army in recent times stemmed from the independence of the supreme com­ mand prerogative, as prescribed in the Meiji Constitution.2 In fixing national policy, the Japan of the Meiji era possessed no strategic war plans involving a potential enemy. Concepts of national defense were, in fact, so vague that Japan merely intended to undertake defensive operations on her own territory in the event of an enemy in­ vasion. After the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,3 Japan commenced to regard Russia as the potential foe. The Japanese Navy of the time, however, was still so small and weak that the old national defensive policy remained unchanged. After, the termination of the Russo-Japanese War, Field Marshal Yamagata approached the Emperor, in 1906, concerning the necessity of preparing a basic national defense policy. The following year, the Army 1

L

2

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

and the Navy established the first national defense policy and specific programing.4 The Prime Minister was shown the basic documents, after which they were submitted to the Emperor for his sanction. The main objective of the national defensive policy centered upon the postulation of a potential enemy. In the first plans of 1907, the primary foe was judged to be Czarist Russia, which, it was presumed in Tokyo, would be seeking revenge for the reverse of 1904-05.5 The years which followed the establishment of a new national de­ fense policy witnessed remarkable changes in the international scene surrounding Japan: the ruin of the Czarist Russian empire; the birth of the Soviet Union; the powerful increase of American influence in the Far East; and the Japanese exclusion movement within the United States itself. As a consequence, the order of hypothetical enemies was rear­ ranged in 1918, whereby America assumed primary emphasis, followed by the U.S.S.R. and China, in that order. After the Washington Confer­ ence, the Imperial Defense Policy underwent minor revisions in 1923.6 By the time that the next slight alterations were effected in 1936, the Man­ churian Incident had already broken out. In normal times the General Staff customarily drew up annual opera­ tional plans and submitted them to the Emperor for his sanction. Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the Army could be expected to launch opera­ tions based upon the fundamental principles laid down in the annual plan then in effect.7 The basic operational policy of the Army had, in normal times, remained defensive prior to the Russo-Japanese War, but was thereafter converted to an offensive type.8 The transition is attributable to the annihilation of Czarist Russian naval power in Far Eastern waters, and to the acquisition by Japan of footholds on the Asiatic mainland. Both factors rendered offensive operations far more feasible for Japan than had been the case during the Russo-Japanese conflict.0 Japan’s basic policy embodying offensive operations was still in effect when the Pacific War commenced. After the first World War, the Japanese Army General Staff had specu­ lated that the nature of future wars would be long and drawn-out. The sum total of the Japanese national power potential appeared, however, to render the prospects for a protracted war difficult if not impossible for Japan. It followed that the country would therefore have to plan for a short war, which laid stress upon the opening moves and operational execution. To take the enemy by surprise (by initiating hostilities with­ out prior declaration of w ar), to provoke early battle, and to achieve an immediate decision—these were the fundamental objectives which were woven into the Army’s regular operational plans centering upon offensive action. No change in the operational fundamentals took place before 1941. The national policies put into effect after the Russo-Japanese War fixed Japan’s course on the Asiatic Continent for the decades to follow. At the time that it was fought, the war with Czarist Russia had been con-

ARMY’S COURSE

3

sidered an all-out national conflict; but in retrospect this was not neces­ sarily true, especially within the modern conception of total war. Japan nevertheless remained undeniably complacent, resting upon her laurels. She neglected to take a new and hard look at national policy or at the scope of the long-established operational plans, within the framework of all-out warfare. The Army dogmatically spoke of total war centering about itself, with the rest of the country inevitably following its lead. This was nothing less than a smug delusion bom of incomplete compre­ hension of modern war’s nature. The Army’s dogma ran counter to devel­ oping world trends; war was tending to become ever more d outrance, while at the same time the international balance of power was undergoing changes. Despite these factors, Japan’s policy of exclusively offensive strategic operations remained inflexible, ft was felt even more strongly than everlhat Manchuria wmTbound to be the hypothetical field~of battle 'for theJhpanese~Arrny, as well as the front line of national defense. In view of this emphasis, a demand for new policies toward the three Northeastern Provinces [of China; i.e. Manchuria] was bruited about in Japanese Army circles. After the fall of Czarist Russia and the removal of that threat, Japanese public opinion sought a reduction of the Japanese armed forces for budgetary reasons. Essentially to counteract this domestic pressure, the Army General Staff drafted new operational plans against Russia.10 Only in 1928 or 1929, however, did the Japanese Army really begin to devote serious attention to the Soviet Union as the major hypothetical ground foe. The first Soviet Five-Year Plan, launched in 1928, indicated that the U.S.S.R. was not only intent upon building up its total national defensive capability but was also determined to develop the economic resources of the Soviet Far East. In addition, the fierce Soviet Army offensive against Manchouli in 1929, which gave evidence of exceptional execution and tactical skill, greatly impressed the Japanese Army.11 It now appeared inevitable that Japan must soon take into account the Soviet Union’s growing strength. A recrudescence of Russian power in the East would seriously endanger Japan’s national policies on the Continent of Asia. In the late 1920’s and early 1930’s the general feeling of the Japanese was that the rights and interests won in Manchuria at the price of Army blood shed there during the Russo-Japanese War must not be thrown away. Nevertheless, the Chinese Nationalist Government led an antiJapanese movement which grew increasingly violent after 1928 or 1929. Between the two countries, more than 300 unresolved disputes remained pending. The Chinese persecuted the Japanese and the Korean residents (the latter being Japanese subjects), while they constantly whittled away at Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria. Daily the situation grew more serious, and only two ways out seemed possible: To evacuate every last Japanese from Manchuria; or to make China give up the so-called policy of recapturing her national rights. Kwantung Army Headquarters, in particular, clamored for the second solution.

4

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

To buttress Japan’s defensive position vis-a-vis the Soviet menace, it was extremely desirable that Manchuria be stabilized, a development which was closely tied up with the possibilities of stabilizing China itself. At the time, Japan was suffering from high tariff walls and from the exclu­ sion of her people who might want to migrate abroad. Under the circum­ stances, a stabilized Manchuria was important to Japan as a market for her products and as a place where her emigrants might settle. These notions were fast spreading among Army circles, especially among key officers [mostly of field grade, with staff assignments]. The situation was desperate, and some of the staff officers at Kwantung Army Headquarters secretly laid plans to solve the Manchurian problem satisfactorily and rapidly, by resorting to arms. On September 18, 1931, the Liutiaokou Incident broke out [near Mukden].12 At the time Kwan­ tung Army Headquarters was located at Port Arthur, and the garrison troops consisted primarily of one infantry division and six battalions of the Independent Garrison Unit [with headquarters at Mukden]. Existing treaties provided for no more than seventeen railway guards per kilome­ ter, and the total strength of the Kwantung Army amounted to only about 10,400 troops. On September 19, the day after the affair at Liutiaokou, the Japanese Government, which had decided upon a policy of localizing the incident, communicated its decision to the Kwantung Army authorities. Despite this, the Kwantung Army rapidly proceeded to expand its operations and, within the next five months, had seized most of the principal cities and towns throughout all Manchuria. From the Kwantung Army’s arbitrary decision and execution of the Manchurian Incident dates the nickname of “Kwantung Army” applied in Tapanese Army circles to any expeditionary force which ignored the Supreme Command’s dictates. The fact that such a nickname could now be heard in public gave evidence of the great transformations that were overtaking the Japanese Armv. The first great change which took place within the Army was its emergence into the political arena, in the period from about the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident to the “2-26” Incident of 1936.13 During these years, a series of incidents broke out in succession, fomented by Army officers and men; e.g., the March Incident,14 the Imperial Colors Incident,15 the “5-15” Incident,16 the Military Academy Incident,17 and the Aizawa Incident.18 It is well-known that the Army, impelled by these incidents, began to intervene in the very heart of national politics. A basic cause of the Army’s developing political activity was the in­ ternal situation in Japan or, more specifically, the case of the impov­ erished rural communities. The latter were extremely important to the Army as its primary source of military manpower. Most of the officer corps derived from small or middle-class landowner antecedents or from landed farm families; the majority of the noncommissioned officers and enlisted men came from rural communities. Poverty in agricultural dis-

ARMY’S COURSE

5

tricts served as an effective incitement for the Army (especially the younger officers) to turn to radical political movements of “reform.” Still another political influence arose from abroad—from Germany. Since the early days of the modern Japanese armed forces, Germany had served as a model for Japanese army officers, and had been intensely respected by them. In die 1930’s, the brilliant ascendancy of Nazi Ger­ many and its advanced armaments made an even deeper impression upon the admiring Japanese Army. The dominant opinion in Army circles therefore stressed that Japan ought to follow Germany’s lead, in order to effect a state of readiness swiftly. The German influence cannot be under- I rated as a cause of the Japanese Army’s intervention in domestic politics. Factionalism among Japanese Army cliques also entered into the pic­ ture. One faction was called the Kodo-ha [Imperial Benevolent Rule Clique] under generals like Araki, Mazaki, Yanagawa, and Obata. The second group, the Tosei-ha [Control Clique], was led by Generals Sugiyama, Koiso, Umezu, Nagata, and Tojo. After the Manchurian Incident, these two cliques struggled mightily against each other. The Kodo group believed that the so-called “Showa Restoration” [cp. Meiji Restoration] could only be effected by means of riots and the call-out of troops. The fundamental principle which they respected was the role of the Emperor as an Absolute Being. In the Kodo view, the Japanese political scene could be cleaned up it only the villainous court retainers were eliminated. Figuratively speaking, after the clouds were gone, the sun could once again shine down. The Tosei group, on the other hand, opposed radical political move­ ments like those of the Kodo clique, and insisted upon controlled military action. Fundamental to both factions, however, was the common belief that national defense must be strengthened through the reform of na­ tional politics. The previously mentioned “2-26” Incident of 1936 was caused by young officers influenced by the Kodo-ha. Taking advantage of the insurrection to crack down upon the Kodo faction, the Tosei-ha proceeded to purge the Army. They prohibited Army intervention in domestic politics, except through the agency of the Minister of War. Thereafter, cliquish factionalism began to abate; but the Toseis purge failed completely in its basic purpose—to avert Army interference in the political scene. After the purge, in fact, the Army entered legitimately into political organizations and thereby finally established a terrific voice in domestic politics. On one hand, the Army was allied with officialdom and the elder statesmen; on the other, it could deal with the worlds of industry and of politics. Military intervention in politics, and the resultant factional clashes of ideology, led to a second great transformation within the Army: the grow­ ing vogue of insubordination by lower-ranking officers [especially lieu~P tenants, captains, and majors] against their superiors. The so-called “young officers,” cocky and conceited because of their very youth and alleged powers of execution, sometimes reproached the prudence of older

A

6

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

officers. Not a few of the radicals committed outrages or upset military discipline. The military authorities, nevertheless, remained absorbed only with the doling out of appropriate rewards, while neglecting to mete out commensurate punishments. Certain key officers who most deserved severe punishment were mildly reproved or transferred to other posts, after which they were able to regain important assignments. Among the high-ranking officers themselves, there were many who lacked the judgment and ability necessary to guide the key officers and the troops. The worst of the superiors tried to curry favor among the younger officers by demonstrating allegedly radical views. Many of the previously cited factional quarrels between cliques may have sprung from this whole atmosphere. Apart from the extreme examples, however, there were only too many general officers who believed in the “broad­ minded” and celebrated attitude of appearing to swallow blindly what­ ever the young officers had to say. This trend swept the Army, with the result that it became impossible for a high-ranking officer to give a categorical Yes or No; he was more apt to give in to the opinions of sub­ ordinates.19 Whether or not this was all cause or effect, the tendency toward in­ subordination became ever more conspicuous within the Army. For ex­ ample, headquarters staff officers, whose essential function is to labor in the background, pushed forward into domestic politics. Some of them actually acted as if they were themselves Prime Ministers or high com­ manders. This state of affairs often led to the hushing-up of culpability or responsibility. '-TheJkrmy-wialded-great power over outside circles in the name of the monolithic “military wjR ” but the underlying facts were quite different, _as _we hayii-Sjeem—Ofte-eamiotr-say- that the whole Army was either under strict enntrnl nr evinced a clear singleness of purpose. Areas of responsi­ bility were exceedingly ill-defined: statements by a key officer or a field general often exerted great and undue influence upon the public, al­ though utterly unrelated to the true will of the War Minister or of the Chief of Staff. Political, economic, and social circles seemed to have scant grasp of the true state of affairs within the Army. This was unavoid­ able, for how could outsiders get behind the protective shield which the Army often threw up before itself? (e.g., the independence of the su­ preme command prerogative). At any rate, the gloomy and all-pervasive transformations which occurred within the Army in the 1930’s were an in­ disputably major factor which contributed tremendously to the eventual catastrophe of Japan. O £ As we have already observed, Japan’s defense policy underwent cer­ tain changes in keeping with the priorities assigned to potential enemies. Especially after the Manchurian Incident, it became imperative to estab­ lish a clearly fixed basis for deciding upon the relative emphasis to be allocated the Army and the Navy within the defense budget. We cannot

ARMY’S COURSE

7

| ascertain, however, whether a definitive policy decision was ever really made concerning the priorities to be assigned to the armed services. We ! do know, though, that after the Manchurian Incident the Army and the Navy fought tooth and nail in order to secure as much of the fluctuating military budget as possible. The struggle was no less fierce where the allocation of natural resources was concerned. The Army concentrated upon strengthening the defenses of Manchukuo, with a view toward the Soviet Union as the hypothetical primary enemy of Japan. The Navy, on the other hand, designed its program of construction against what it considered to be the potential foe—the U. S. Navy. As the international situation grew more critical, inter-service rivalries intensified. Eventually, reconciliation of interests proved im­ possible, and each of the armed services went its own way. In the event of a war with the Soviet Union, military operations had originally been predicated upon a struggle for vital North Manchuria, in two major sectors: the plains region between Harbin and the Upper Sungari River (which flows between Hsinking and Harbin); and the flatlands between Taonan and Tsitsihar. In the early summer of 1933, however, the Soviet Army began to erect tochka20 [pillbox] positions along the frontiers, opposite the border forts which the Kwantung Army then proceeded to build.21 Under the circumstances, Japanese opera­ tional planning was revised in 1934, whereby the opening rounds of a hypothetical war with the U.S.S.R. were contemplated in the neighbor­ hood of the Manchurian frontiers. By 1934, Soviet “super-heavy” bomber aircraft, reportedly capable of striking the Japanese home islands, were deployed in the Maritime Prov­ ince of Siberia. In view of this situation, the Japanese General Staff effected radical changes in its operational planning for the eventuality of hostilities with the Soviet Union: (1) From a mobilizable force of 30 fully equipped ground divisions, some 24 were earmarked for commitment to operations against the U.S.S.R. (2) Great importance was to be attached to air operations from the very outset of war. (3) Japan should seek to wage battle on Soviet soil from the begin­ ning of hostilities. (4) The primaiy axis of offensive operations should be eastward [from Manchuria]. (5) Submarine bases and bomber aircraft sites aimed at Japan must be wiped out at the beginning. (6) After the success of the eastward operations, forces should be deployed for an offensive northward, the objective being the Lake Baikal district. It should be noted that the idea of launching an eastern offensive was first conceived at the time of this new plan of 1934. Three years later, Japanese operational planning was again revised:

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

8

(1) At the very commencement of a war, the forces stationed in Manchuria will mount an offensive against the Soviet Union; reinforce­ ments thereafter dispatched from the homeland will join in the attack. This plan differed from its predecessor, which had called for an offensive only after the reinforcements had arrived in Manchuria. (2) After successfully concluding the eastern offensive, Japanese forces should not immediately drive toward the Lake Baikal region, but should instead consolidate along the Hsingan Mountain Range and pre­ pare for subsequent operations. (3) Operational planning against the U.S.S.R. must attach prime im­ portance to action against both China and Soviet Russia. In devising operational plans against the U.S.S.R., the hypothetical movements of the Soviet Far Eastern Army were a major consideration. The Japanese Army General Staff made the following estimate of the situation: The Soviets could be expected to commit 55-60 divisions for the Far Eastern operations. They would launch simultaneous, converging offensives from the east, north, and west of Manchuria. The enemy would strive to cut off communications between the Japanese homeland and the Asiatic Continent. If war broke out with the Soviet Union, a most important problem would arise: How to terminate hostilities? The General Staff feared that Russian territory was so boundless that Japan would be unable to deal a finishing blow to the enemy. Within the Army, the prevailing and popular opinion concerning the solution to this problem was to employ stratagem [subversion] simultaneously with military operations—as Colonel Akashi had so successfully done during the Russo-Japanese War.22 The Army therefore placed as much importance upon “political sabotage” as it did upon field operations, in planning for hypothetical operations against the Soviet Union. Researches were pursued and preparations laid for imple­ menting certain aspects of the over-all program.23 In 1931 there were 17 divisions in Japan. After the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the Army reinforced and consolidated its troop strength in Manchuria, as may be seen from Table 1. TABLE 1 K

w antung

Arm

y

Str en g th ,

1931-35

1932

Divisions

2

4

4

4

4

Air Squadrons*

3

9

12

15

18

64,900

94,100

114,100

144,100

164,100

Total Manpower

1933

1934

1931

1935

Even in peacetime the Japanese Army had to contemplate hypotheti­ cal operations against China as well as the Soviet Union. For a long time "Operational aircraft per squadron totalled about ten.

ARMY’S COURSE

9

no major changes had been made in the fundamental operational plan­ ning, which called for the seizure and occupation of various strategic points in China by a few divisions or independent brigades. Plans drawn up before the China Incident, for example, envisaged the following op­ erations: North China: occupation of Tientsin and Peiping by two or three divisions; Central China: occupation of Shanghai and environs by one or two divisions; South China: occupation of Amoy, Foochow, and Swatow by about one division. This was the gist, then, of hypothetical military operations against China, but the General Staff expected no actual war with that country. In fact, the General Staff issued orders in 1936 to its China Garrison Army (headquarters in Tientsin) that the officers and men should be instructed how to fight the Soviet Russian Army, and should be disciplined for such a mission. These orders concerning anti-Soviet training never envisaged a combat application against the Chinese Army, in the thinking of [thenMajor General] Kanji Ishihara, Chief of the First (Operations) Bureau of the General Staff.24 After withdrawing from the League of Nations [March 1933], Japan had sought to implement her national policy of promoting the growth K and strength of Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army and the China Garri­ son forces complied with this policy by establishing a “neutral zone” throughout Mongolia and North China. These actions were taken in order to cut off the political machinations which emanated from and were directed by China, and which were intended to upset peace and order wifhin-Manehukuo. On the other hand, the ardent desire of the Chinese to recapture Manchuria from Japan was welling up into a surge of anti-Japanese sentiment. In November 1936 occurred the Suiyuan Incident, when a Chinese army under General Fu Tso-i defeated the Kwantung Army’s own Inner Mongolia Army. This event instilled in the Chinese a confidence in their ability to resist Japan successfully. The Sian Incident25 of December 1936 led to co-operation between the Kuomintang Nationalists and the Communists, who had long been feuding with each other. All of China was now turning anti-Japanese. Under these circumstances, the Lukouchiao [Marco Polo Bridge] In­ cident broke out on July 7, 1937. The causes of the incident have not A been exhaustively investigated to this very day, but suspicions have not been dispelled that the whole thing was a ruse devised and executed on their own by a few willful men, rather than by the authorities of either v Japan or China.26 As soon as the Lukouchiao Incident erupted, the Japanese Govern­ ment decided upon a policy of localization, to settle matters on the spot. Under orders from the Government, the local authorities therefore sought to iron things out; they just missed succeeding. Primary reasons for the

10

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

eventual failure of all efforts to localize the incident may be summarized as follows: The policy of localization lacked consistency. On the Japanese side, there were tough groups within the Government, the Army, and the China Garrison forces which decidedly felt that Japan ought to avail herself of the opportunity to smash China at once. The dispatch of Japanese reinforcements [three divisions] to North China, close on the heels of troop mobilization, led the Chinese to suspect that Japan was playing for time by parleying with them while simultane­ ously completing preparations for launching war. Taking advantage of the incident, the Kwantung Army was eager to throw troops into North China, in order to deal a decisive blow to the political power of Chiang Kai-shek and thereby eradicate the disturbances to Manchukuoan tranquillity. Soon after Lieutenant General Kiyoshi Katsuki took over the command of the China Garrison Army [headquarters at Tientsin], he aligned him­ self with the elements which supported a tough policy vs. China. ( Gen­ eral Katsuki replaced Lieutenant General Kanichiro Tashiro, an authority on China, who had died of illness in July.) After the Lukouchiao Incident, anti-Japanese feeling was greatly stimulated among the Army and the people of China. The Langfang21 and Kuanganmen28 incidents exhausted the Garrison Army’s patience and prudence toward China. »

«

«

The Army High Command, upon receipt of information from the China Garrison Army, issued orders for the chastisement of the Chinese Army, with one restriction: that after launching their operations, the Japanese forces should not advance beyond the Yungting, a river which flows west and south of Peiping in the direction of Tientsin. This stipula­ tion clearly indicated the contemporary Japanese Army General Staff’s intention to fix limits in the application of military force, and to adhere to the policy of localization, in so far as possible. On August 13, 1937, the fighting spread to the Shanghai area, but even then the Japanese General Staff clung to the principle of localization in settling affairs in China. On November 17, Imperial General Head­ quarters (IG H Q ) was established.29 To expedite a termination of the “China Incident” [as the fighting was termed after September 2], IGHQ determined to promote co-operation between the Army and the Navy, and to select Nanking [the Chinese Nationalist capital] as the final objec­ tive of military operations. Underlying the decision was an estimate that it was entirely reasonable to suppose that Nationalist China might aban­ don its anti-Japanese struggle after the fall of Nanking. After hard fighting, Japanese troops completed the capture of Nanking on December 13,1937. The loss of the city jarred the Nationalist Chinese Government but did not deal it a death blow.

ARMY’S COURSE

11

At about this time, the German Ambassador to China, [Oskar] Trautmann, undertook to mediate between Japan and China, upon the following terms: (1) Give autonomy to Inner Mongolia. (2) Enlarge the garrison zones of [Japanese] troops in North China. (3) Allow no anti-Japanese individuals to be appointed to administra­ tive posts in North China. (4) Enlarge the demilitarized zone in Shanghai. (5) Root out anti-Japanese policies. (6) [Adhere to] the Anti-Comintern Pact. (7) [Take steps to] improve tariff relationships. (8) China should respect foreign countries’ rights and interests in her territory. The attempts at mediation ended in failure. Looking back upon the events, a Japanese official who held a responsible Governmental post at the time has observed that the failure was attributable to China’s ignor­ ing of the anticipated mediation. To the causes of failure, however, we must add that on the Japanese side there was a basic disagreement be­ tween foreign policy and military policy. The Japanese field armies, without knowledge of the mediation efforts then in progress, never slackened their hot pursuit of the Chinese Army, in the drive to capture Nanking. Under the circumstances, there was no room for mediation. Soon the Japanese were fighting on the Shantung Peninsula, where they captured Chinan and Tsingtao in succession.30 Until this time IGHQ had been pursuing a dual policy. It had continued to reserve its main strength (over 20 divisions) against the eventuality of operations against the U.S.S.R. While exerting this restraint upon the Soviet Army, the Japanese were simultaneously waging the campaign against China, with the balance of their forces. The reason for this two-fold policy lay in the fact that, within military circles, the opinion prevailed that a severe blow could be dealt the Chinese Army within a short period—say, one year. IGHQ, however, had experience with the fierce counterattacks of the Chinese Army at Taierhchuang, in Shantung Province. The High Command could not therefore avoid committing part of the troop strength previously reserved for anti-Soviet operations, with the start of the Suchow operation.31 Suchow itself was captured on May 19, 1938; from this very period dates IGHQ’s abandonment of the policy of localization of the China Incident. Between the policies of the High Command and of the field units there had been inherent contradiction. If the basic policy were to be localization, but the actual power to resolve matters was in effect left to the forces on the spot, then a successful solution could hardly be ex­ pected. It was, after all, characteristic of the Japanese Army that on-thespot commanders always exerted a more powerful local influence than did the High Command itself. From this point of view, in fact, IGHQ seems to have been lacking in resolute will.

12

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

After the success of the Suchow operation, followed by the Canton and Wuhan campaigns (in the latter or which, Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankow were captured), the Army held up its offensives for a while. Although the troop strength of the Chinese Army appeared to have dwindled to about 900,000, they continued their obstinate resistance. The Chinese took tire best possible advantage of their vast and boundless terrain. They preserved their own fighting strength while wearing down the Japanese troops with frequent shifts of force and fluid tactics of., advance or retreat, depending upon the situation. Because of the Fabian tactics of the Chinese, most of the annihilation operations of the Japanese Army ended in failure; only narrow belts of territory could be captured. The prompt settlement of the China Incident by force, as originally envisaged by the Japanese Army, thus failed in the long run. The strength committed by the Japanese was too small, for one thing. By and targe, however, Japan’s failure is attributable to the Army’s hasty judg­ ment that the Chinese military forces could be crushed in a single blow. They underestimated the national consciousness of the Chinese people and had no clear realization of the fact that the China Incident was characterized by racial warfare. Just before Prime Minister Konoye issued a statement on January 16, 1938, to the effect that Japan would have nothing further to do with the Nationalist regime, the High Command had advised the Government that such action was premature. The Army was still setting its hopes upon an early settlement of the China Incident. After Konoye’s state­ ment, the Army initiated secret overtures toward Wang Ching-wei.32 The objective of these feelers was to drag the Nationalist Government into making peace with Japan, by splitting and collapsing the various resistance groups. The Army dreamed that this scheme could be ac­ complished if Wang Ching-wei could obtain massive support within Chinese governmental quarters, after which he could gather these groups under his wing and clamor for peace with Japan. The Army advised the Government of its continuing efforts to co­ operate with Wang Ching-wei. The Government endorsed the Army’s report and on November 3, 1938, Premier Konoye declared on behalf of the Government that Japan would not refuse Nationalist China’s par­ ticipation in the establishment of a “New Order in East Asia”—if the Chinese Government were reconstructed. This statement was highly significant, through its indication that a combination of politics and force was going to replace the former method of naked military power alone, in settling the China Incident. One after another, however, the United States, Great Britain, and France avowed their intention of opposing the establishment of a New Order. After fleeing from Chungking, where he was considered a traitor to his country, Wang Ching-wei lost the ability to effect a peaceful settlement of the China Incident. Japan therefore acceded to his desire by assisting him to establish a new Nationalist Government, of which he was to be

l

ARMY’S COURSE

13

the head. The peace plan which Japan had intended to realize by making use of Wang Ching-wei had ended in failure. At about the same time, the General Headquarters of the China Ex­ peditionary Army was established in Nanking on October 1, 1939, under the command of General Nishio. In January 1940 this GHQ undertook secret peace overtures toward the Chungking Government. Especially great efforts were made to reach an understanding before Wang Chingwei’s regime moved to the capital at Nanking (scheduled for March 26, 1940). The peace conditions of the Japanese called for the (1) recogni­ tion of Manchukuo; (2) abandonment of anti-Japanese policies; (3) participation in anti-Communist operations, which would require a por­ tion of the Japanese Army to be stationed in China; (4) abolition of extra-territoriality; (5) return of the foreign concessions; (6) settle­ ment of the problem of the Wang Ching-wei regime; (7) evacuation of Japanese troops from China. The greatest stumbling block to mediation between Japan and China lay in the question of recognizing Manchukuo. Japan demanded that China bestow formal recognition upon Manchukuo, while Chungking insisted strongly upon only tacit acquiescence. Neither side retreated in the least from its strongly held position. GHQ of the China Expedi­ tionary Army did its utmost to reach agreement with Chungking, even going so far as to put off the formal installation of the Wang Ching-wei Government in the capital of Nanking (from the previously scheduled 26th of March to the 30th). The overtures failed, although negotiations dragged on for a while until September, when the Tripartite Alliance was signed between Japan, Germany, and Italy. IGHQ took this oppor­ tunity to break off the peace parleys. Chungking’s distrust of Japan was the greatest cause of failure for the peace overtures made to the Nationalists. The Chinese felt strongly that they could place no faith in a so-called peace which was far from genuine but represented only a temporary cease-fire. Nor could the Nationalists bring themselves to believe that Japan had abandoned a policy of inva­ sion as the real intention. This underlying distrust of Japan was deeply rooted in the Nationalist Government and dominated it from beginning to end of the China Incident. Even Wang Ching-wei perceived, from * the Japanese peace overtures to Chungking, that Japan could not be trusted After the establishment of the Wang Ching-wei regime, feelings of distrust toward Japan ran high in Nanking. Force had failed to settle the China Incident; nor had the subsequent policy of combining politics and military power achieved more than a deadlock. Now the Japanese Army stressed operations designed to cut off routes of aid to Chiang Kai-shek. The first step in these operations was the Nanning offensive, which commenced in November 1939. After the Nanning drive, IGHQ began to watch for the chance to close off Aid-to-Chiang channels leading through French Indo-China, Hong Kong, and Burma. These considerations were affected by developments in the

14

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

European War. In pursuit of operational objectives stemming there­ from, Japan advanced into South China and French Indo-China. o

o

o

While Japanese troops were fighting on many battlefields throughout China, two large-scale incidents broke out along the frontiers of Manchu­ ria. During the Changkufeng Incident (1938), the Japanese 19th Divi­ sion took on at least two Soviet infantry divisions, in a territorial dispute between Japan and Manchukuo, on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R., on the other. The Nomonhan Incident (1939) arose from border problems involving Japan-Manchukuo and the Soviet Union-Outer Mongolia. In April 1939 the Kwantung Army laid down regulations to guide front-line units in dealing with frontier troubles. The Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchurian Border Disputes stipulated: (1) The basic policy is never to invade and never to be invaded. (2) If an enemy violates the frontiers, he must be wiped out at once. (3) Where the borders are not precisely defined, the area defense commander will assume responsibility for demarcation and will so advise the front-line units, in order to avoid disputes and to facilitate troop movements. (4) An intolerable dilemma confronts border garrison units: They are considered cowardly if they are overly prudent in their actions, but will be called to task if they act too boldly or aggressively. In view of these apprehensions, it will hereafter be regarded as the responsibility of higher headquarters to deal with the consequences of situations which may arise from the positive actions of forward elements. In the Nomonhan region of West Manchuria, the Japanese and the Manchukuoans contended that the border line ran along the Halha River [known to the Russians as the Khalkhin-gol], which flows into Lake Buir Nor. The Soviets and the Outer Mongolians insisted, how­ ever, that the frontier lay about 30 kilometers east of Nomonhan. On May 12,1939, some 700 Outer Mongol horsemen crossed the Halha River. The Kwantung Army considered this action to be a violation of the Manchukuoan frontier, and repelled the raiders in conformity with the current Border Defense Guide regulations mentioned above. The Outer Mongolians, however, received reinforcements, re-crossed the river, and attacked again. In the course of successive engagements, both sides gradually built up their forces—the Russians and the Outer Mon­ golians vs. the Japanese and the Manchukuoans. By the middle of August, greatly reinforced strengths confronted each other. Kwantung Army forces were built around Lieutenant General [Michitaro] Komatsubara’s 23d Division [whose headquarters had been at Hailar, over 100 miles from the site of the fighting] .3S The Soviets had three infantry divi­ sions and five mechanized brigades (430 tanks and the same number of armored cars), while the Outer Mongolians possessed two cavalry divi­ sions.

ARMY’S COURSE

15

Refore the arrival of Kwantung Army reinforcements, the Soviet Army launched an offensive on August 20 and inflicted severe losses upon tire Japanese. The Russians employed encircling tactics and made skillful use of their superior artillery and armor. Of the 15,140 men in the Komatsubara Force, of which the 23d Division was the core, 11,124 were killed or wounded in action. During the period between July 1 and September 16—which covers most of the fighting at Nomonhan—casual­ ties totalled no less than 73%, as a percentage of the force engaged. Most of these losses were incurred during the Soviets’ August offensive. Ey way of comparison, the percentage of casualties suffered by the Japanese during the bloody fighting in the major battles of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05 had approximated: In 5 days of fighting at Liaoyang: 17% In 7 days of fighting at the Sha-ho: 17% In 13 days of fighting at Mukden : 28% Still awaiting the arrival of reinforcements, the Kwantung Army girded for a counteroffensive, but on September 15 an armistice was ar­ ranged in Moscow. The troops stopped fighting next day. Among Japanese military authorities, the most widespread opinion was that the Nomonhan Incident had been a maneuver instigated by the Soviet Union in order to restrain the Japanese Army from disposing of the China Incident. After the negotiation of the Nomonhan armistice, the newly ap­ pointed Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, [Yoshijiro] Umezu, took immediate steps to prevent further border troubles. He pulled back Japanese troops somewhat behind the frontiers where demar­ cation lines were not precise. A fundamental principle designed to prevent border incidents was General Umezu’s order that, in the event of Soviet or Outer Mongolian penetration of a disputed area, only the Com­ mander of the Kwantung Army himself could decide whether Japanese troops might counterattack. The new measures represented a funda­ mental revision of the old border defense principles. Bold and positive front-line attacks against the enemy, which had been formerly stressed, were not to be sanctioned now. As a result, a more peaceful atmosphere thereafter prevailed in the vicinity of the frontiers. The Nomonhan Incident gave the Japanese Army an opportunity to realize the actual ability of the Soviet Army. Seeing was believing. (1) The bulk of the Soviet ground forces—artillery and armor—were far superior to the Japanese Army in terms of fire power and mechanized equipment. (2) The Japanese were exceedingly surprised by Soviet capability of transporting and storing war materiel at a battlefront 600 kilometers away from a railroad terminal. (3) Having rid itself of the inflexibility which characterized the old Czarist forces, the Soviet Army proved able to change tactics from battle to battle. At the beginning of the Incident, for example, most of the

16

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

Soviet tanks were ignited by gasoline-bottles hurled at them by Japanese troops. A month later, however, the Russians were using crude-oil fuel, or were covering the tank chassis with wire nets. Other cases of Soviet field improvisation were numerous. (4) The Soviet Army was more tenacious than had been expected. After the end of the Nomonhan fighting, the Army High Command set up a committee to investigate the whole Incident. The commission was to evaluate the abilities of the Soviet Army, and to re-examine the perfonnance of Japanese armaments and operations against the Russians. Where military equipment was concerned, Japanese fire power proved far inferior. Heated debates ensued about the two basic alternatives: whether to effect a thoroughgoing reorganization, or whether to go only as far as reinforcing current fire power materiel. The second alternative was selected. Lurking in the background of the controversy was the problem of abandoning the principle of hand-to-hand fighting, a tradition of the Japanese infantry. The High Command did not awaken to the remarka­ ble progress of material potentials in modern warfare, but instead con­ tinued to esteem the superiority of spiritual fighting strength. This at­ titude could perhaps be traced to the fact that the Japanese Army did 5 not progress beyond comprehending fire power at the levels of 1904-05. It had never received a baptism of fire on the modern scale of World War I. Now the second World War had just broken out. Japanese military authorities, admiring the brilliant successes of German Army operations, began to cherish a desire to learn from German experience rather than from that of the Nomonhan Incident. This desire crystallized into the dispatch of the Yamashita Military Inspection Team to Germany.34 The high-ranking officers of the Army General Staff and Kwantung Army Headquarters were called to account for the defeat of Nomonhan. In Tokyo, Tetsuzo Nakajima (Deputy Chief of the General Staff) and Gun Hashimoto (Chief of the First Bureau) were ordered to retire from service. In Hsinking, enforced retirements were imposed upon Kenkichi Ueda (the Commander of the Kwantung Army) and his Chief of Staff, Rensuke Isogaya. Despite the shake-up, most of the staff officers in the 1st Section (Operations) at Kwantung Army Headquarters—officers who were alleged to have been really responsible and to have exerted major influence during the Nomonhan Incident—were merely transferred to sinecures. Moreover, the transferred officers afterwards obtained im­ portant posts within the High Command—unnoticed. Some of them, indeed, ended up by occupying key positions within the Operations Bureau at Imperial General Headquarters itself. The shake-up, in other words, was merely for the sake of appearances. Such were the workings of military personnel administration. Commensurate rewards or punishments were not dealt out fairly with­ in the Army. When advocates of strongly positive views made mistakes,

ARMY’S COURSE

17

the authorities in personnel administration overlooked them. Even if punishments were meted out, it was only for form’s sake. On the other hand, proponents of a prudent approach to things were apt to be treated like cowards and were often held to strict account when they erred. This system of administering military personnel affairs fostered a foolhardiness which, in turn, was to provoke successive disturbances which were quite uncalled for. It is generally acknowledged by those who held contemporaneous High Command posts that the officers respon­ sible for the Nomonhan debacle became strong advocates for launching the Pacific War. o

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The title of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact [November 1936] seemed to indicate the apparent objectives behind its conclusion, but there were hidden military aims. In the event that Japan or Germany had to fight the U.S.S.R., neither country was to do anything that could lighten the Soviet burden or relieve the Russians of fear for their rear; Russia had been unencumbered, in these respects, during both the war of 1904-05 and World War I. This was the major import of Article 1 of the secret protocol attached to the Pact. The Anti-Comintern Agree­ ment thus possessed inherent possibilities of developing into a fullfledged military alliance. On September 27, 1940, a Tripartite Pact was concluded in Berlin, between Japan, Germany, and Italy. The alliance was an extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and represented the concrete implementation of decisions adopted at the IGHQ-Government Liaison Conference of July 27, 1940. One article in the “Outline of Policy for Coping with Developments in the World Situation” formulated by that Liaison Con­ ference had called for the prompt strengthening of ties between the Axis Powers. By concluding the Tripartite Alliance, Japan intended to strengthen her diplomatic position and thus facilitate an early settlement of the China Incident. Germany also expected that the alliance would restrain America from participating in the second World War. There was hope, moreover, that co-operation between Japan and Germany would increase if the Soviet Union could be brought to align itself with the Tripartite Powers. Before its conclusion, the Tripartite Pact had actually given rise to heated controversies within the Japanese Government. The Army and the Navy, in particular, held diametrically opposed views. The first service earnestly desired consummation of an alliance, whereas the latter continued to oppose it for fear of provoking hostilities with the United States and Great Britain. The Navy eventually acceded to the Army’s desire, however, because naval opinions were heeded by the Army to some degree. Specifically, the first draft of the accord had been revised: Japan was no longer automatically committed to participation in an Axis war, but could in-

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JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

stead decide her course of action independently. Foreign Minister Matsuoka declared that he would do his best to adjust diplomatic rela­ tions with the United States and with the Soviet Union. The Army, in addition, assented to the Navy’s demands concerning war preparations (allocation of materials, etc.). Underlying the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact lurked a fear of “missing the bus,” on the part of the High Command, which was dazzled by the brilliant military successes of the German Army at the outset of World War II. An atmosphere of great worry prevailed lest Japan lose her chance if she maintained a cautious policy “with her hands in her pockets,” while Germany was stripping the world of its choice treasures. Within the High Command, the feeling rapidly gained sway that Japan should derive great advantage from tire Tripartite Pact by carving out her own sphere of influence in East Asia. Concurrently with the manifestation of these mounting sentiments inside Army circles, the military personnel administration began to mani­ fest some strange symptoms. High-ranking officers who had once studied in the United States or in Great Britain, and had intimate knowledge of actual conditions in those countries, now began to disappear from the High Command. Especially in the case of the War Ministry and the General Staff, only four or five officers who had studied in the United States or England remained in posts above the level of section chief. The key positions were occupied by officers who had been sent to Ger­ many to study. Such personnel policies by the military administration authorities resulted in an intensification of pro-German tendencies and of disdain for the United States and Great Britain. In the end, these policies proved to be a force which drove Japan into the Pacific War. With the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance, the Army renewed its efforts to solve the China Incident. To seek to do so through German co-operation was all a great illusion, however; in the eyes of everyone, the Incident appeared to be a failure, by then. But, influenced by Hitler’s estimate of the world situation, the Japanese military believed it possible to separate America from Great Britain, and made light of any view that the two democracies would unite against the Axis Powers. It was expected that the United States would forsake England once the latter was brought to its knees—a distinct possibility, since Britain was already old and infirm. After the consummation of the Tripartite Alliance, Japan therefore forced Great Britain and France to seal off the Aid-to-Chiang routes via Indo-China, Hong Kong, and Burma. Taking mean advantage of the weakness of the British and French armies in Europe, the Japanese Army proceeded to advance into northern Indo-China. It is well-known, how­ ever, that this drive strongly incited the American authorities to greater vigilance against Japan. i*

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Ar m y ’s c o u r s e

19

We have already seen | how Japanese troop strength reserved for hypothetical anti-Soviet operations had had to be committed to China after the Suchow offensive bf May 1938. By 1939 opinion was mounting within certain Army circles| that the existing plan of operations against the U.S.S.R. should be revised temporarily along defensive lines. Ac­ cording to this view, the China Incident should be settled as soon as pos­ sible by all-out concentration of military force. This meant that power­ ful elements of the Kwantung Army would have to be diverted to Chinese battlefields. The General Staff’s First Bureau ( Operations) never­ theless paid no heed to these opinions. As before, it adhered to the policy of offensive operations in the event of war with the Soviet Union. In the operations plan drawn up in 1939, the axes of Kwantung Army offensive operations were altered to embrace offensives launched simul­ taneously eastward and northward (from the Pleiho district). On April 13, 1941, Japan concluded a Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union. Prior to this treaty, Great Britain and France had withdrawn their troops from China, with the outbreak of the second World War, in order to strengthen the defensive posture of the home countries. This had left only two Powers confronting Japan in China, namely, the Soviet Union and the United States; but after the conclusion of the RussoJapanese Neutrality Pact, the situation was further simplified. Only the United States now confronted Japan. IGHQ seized this opportunity to draft a plan of operations against Chungking from two directions—along the Yangtze River, and from the Sian area. Several picked divisions from the Kwantung Army were to be diverted to the China front, but the Russo-German War broke out just when preparations were being made for the offensive in China. At the Imperial Conference held on July 2, 1941, the following policies were decided upon: (1) Do not intervene in the Russo-German War; (2) Proceed with prudent diplomatic negotiations while consolidating secret preparations against the U.S.S.R.; (3) If the Russo-German War turns out favorably for Japan, settle the Northern Problem by force and maintain stability in the north. Because of these decisions, which resulted from the outbreak of the Russo-German War, the Chungking operation had to be suspended. The Army High Command had traditionally strong tendencies of watchfulness toward the Soviet Union. There thus arose criticism that the settlement of the China Incident by force had been incomplete because Japan was nailed down by Russia. At the root of the High Command’s attitude toward the U.S.S.R. lay the following considera­ tions: Conflict between Japan and Russia was just a matter of time. It was taboo for Japan to demonstrate weakness toward the Soviet Union. Armaments were therefore the only means of stabilizing matters with Russia. After the Imperial Conference of July 2, IGHQ implemented the new

20

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

policy toward the Soviet Union by commencing the large-scale reinforce­ ment of the Kwantung Army. To keep the true reasons secret, the build­ up was called the “Special Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army,” or KANTOKUEN for short. The 400,000 troops in the Kwantung Army were suddenly stepped up to over 700,000, and some billion Yen in military funds were expended only upon KANTOKUEN. The “Special Maneuvers” consisted of preparations for the use of force against the Soviet Union, based upon the outlook that the Russo-German War might take a rapidly favorable turn for Germany. KANTOKUEN, indeed, can be compared to running toward a bus stop in order not to miss the bus. In the event that force was used against the U.S.S.R., the operational plan of 1939 was scheduled to go into effect, whereby simul­ taneous offensives were to be mounted toward the north and the east [from Manchuria]. Although the Kwantung Army had been reinforced, the Russo-Ger­ man War—about which the Japanese Army had held such great expec­ tations—was not turning out favorably for Germany, despite Hitler’s boasts. A serious problem consequently demanded resolution: How could the beefed-up Kwantung Army pull through the rigorous cold of a Manchurian winter? Meanwhile, interest in the southern regions was mounting. In the Navy, some advocated the necessity for driving southward, and attempted to restrain the Army’s desire to strike north. Previously, on June 12,1941, the IGHQ-Government Liaison Conference had already decided to enter southern French Indo-China. At the time, the actual move had been postponed because of Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s cautious arguments. The matter was reaffirmed, however, at the Imperial Conference of July 2, after the sudden outbreak of the Russo-German War. On the 28th and 29th of the month, the advance into South French Indo-China was effected. At another Imperial Conference, on September 6 , the commencement of preparations for the southern operations was determined. As a conse­ quence of this decision, the critical winter problem facing the Kwantung Army was solved after September: part of the forces in Manchuria were to be diverted to the southern operations. Thus the so-called “Special Maneuvers” did play an important role in “killing two birds with one stone.” Military preparations against both the U.S.S.R. and the southern areas had been stepped up and reinforced. We have already seen the circumstances which led to Japan’s entry into South Indo-China. In general, the Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941, merely reaffirmed most of the existing plans regarding the southern regions—with one new and major exception. It was now expressly resolved that Japan should not avoid war with the United States and Great Britain in carrying out her policies toward the southern regions.35 C oelceming this vital clause, the Army High Command planner explained that the Army itself was determined never to wage war against the

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ARMY’S COURSE

21

United States and England, but that they were obliged to use such ter­ minology because of the need to steer public opinion. The Chief and Deputy Chief of the General Staff also stated that prime consideration was being devoted to the settlement of the China Incident, and that the Army had not decided to consider fighting the Americans or even the British. Those who were concerned with operations interpreted the clause to signify no intention of launching a war, but instead to suggest that readi­ ness was required. Hostilities, in this view, would not be avoided with the United States and Great Britain if they used force to obstruct Japan’s intentions of realizing her established policies toward Thailand and French Indo-China through all possible diplomatic means. Interpretations of this critically important national policy were bound to vary. Even High Command circles lacked a unanimous understanding of the policy. The confusion had been caused by the intention of effect­ ing a compromise between the differing views. Rhetorical flourishes lent themselves to various interpretations, without resolving the divergencies by exhaustive discussion. Similar cases were frequent, throughout the Pacific War. Diverse interpretations were often put forth concerning important plans, due to a lack of clarity in views and of resultant plain­ ness in expression. Vital documents thus often proved to be inexplicable as to the meaning of words and phrases, in cases where the original author was transferred to some other post. On July 26, 1941—five days after the formation of the third Konoye Cabinet—a mutual defense agreement was concluded between Japan and the French Indo-China authorities. Two things rendered the arrange­ ment imperative. First, there was the situation in Thailand. That coun­ try was then outwardly manifesting good will toward Japan but was assiduously and secretly maintaining friendly relations with the United States and England. Japan was aiming to step up operations intended to seal off the Aid-to-Chiang routes from behind Chungking, via IndoChina, Thailand, and Burma; and to force Thailand to maintain a be­ nevolent neutrality. These objectives were to be achieved by moving troops into South Indo-China. Secondly, Japan was obliged passively to take steps to cope with the ring encircling her—the “ABCD” Powers of America, Britain, China, and the Dutch—politically, economically, and militarily. From the stand­ point of food supply, the pressure to be applied upon Thailand [by Japan] was especially important. For if the United States and Great Britain exerted strong pressure upon Thailand and French Indo-China ( especially the southern portion), the two southeastern Asiatic countries were bound to stay on the side of the Western Powers. The settlement of the China Incident would then prove impossible. Japan, endangered, would have to back down completely from her position. The major objective which lay behind the entry into South IndoChina thus was the settlement of the China Incident; but, simultaneouslyA

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22

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

Japan was pursuing a policy of “offense and defense” against the United States and England. It cannot be denied, however, that behind the at­ titude there lurked the idea that South Indo-China might serve as a foothold from which Japan could push on to the south. The Japanese entry into southern French Indo-China produced inter­ national repercussions. Relations between Japan and the United States in particular took a sudden turn for the worse. Soon after giving notice that in view of the situation no further basis remained for carrying on with the Japanese-American parleys, the United States froze Japanese assets and then proceeded to embargo aviation fuel on August i, 1941.® Governing circles in neither the Army nor the Navy had undertaken preliminary studies of the international consequences attending the move into South Indo-China. Yet peace is indivisible and cannot exist in only a limited part of the world. Sensibilities were too dull to grasp the fact that action against southern Indo-China concerned not only Japan and the French but was a matter of global policy affecting the Axis Powers and their enemies. The Japanese move was therefore bound to exert great influence upon the whole world. As a result of the Indo-China operation and the consequently com­ plete deadlock in the talks with the United States, Japan proceeded to carry out the decisions reached at the Imperial Conference of September 6 . She now accelerated full-scale preparations for war with the United States and with Great Rritain, setting the target date for their completion at the end of October 1941. Toward autumn of 1941, the Army High Command formulated cer­ tain estimates of the international situation. Concerning the outcome of the Russo-German War, the view prevailed that things would turn out favorably for Germany. Although the lightning war which Hitler had planned (of six weeks’ duration) had not materialized, the Soviet Army had suffered undeniably critical losses at the outset of hostilities. The Germans still possessed so much military power that they could yet smash the Soviet Army. Great expectations were therefore held concerning the Germans’ sum­ mer offensive slated to commence in 1942. The Russians had transferred several divisions from the Far East to the European battlefields, but the U.S.S.R. would never leave Siberia defenseless, even if the war with Germany turned out badly for her. It was thought to be almost beyond the realm of possibility for the Soviet Union to participate in a war between Japan and the United States, of her own accord—thereby having to wage two-front operations. Chinese Nationalist ground force strength was estimated at 3,000,000 men, supported by the domestic economy of the hinterland and by ex­ ternal assistance from the Americans and the British. The Japanese * *On July 26 both the United States and Great Britain had ordered Japanese assets frozen, thus ending any important trade between those countries and Japan. — A. C.

ARMY’S COURSE

23

High Command judged that the Nationalist regime could be brought to its knees by means of two operations: cutting off the Aid-to-Chiang routes; and driving upon Chungking. The Japanese Army had the impression that Great Eritain was already senile, for she had often appeased Japan during the China Incident. It was considered inevitable that German submarine operations, plus landings on the British Isles themselves, could bring down the English. There may have been other contributing factors. Thus, the governing circles in the Army High Command were, at the time, blinded by Ger­ many’s brilliant operations. They ignored America’s assistance to the British, and also lacked experts on England. The military had a strong tendency to disbelieve—and to treat as astronomical—official United States Government data indicating the rate of production of American industry. In addition, they made light of America’s spiritual fiber. The majority believed that the United States would find it difficult to instill a martial spirit throughout the nation as a whole. After all, isolationism was rampant there, and most of the ad­ vocates were influential figures.36 The Army High Command’s outlook upon the international situation was therefore remarkable for its tendency to overestimate Germany and to underestimate other countries. The underlying cause for misjudging the United States and Great Britain, in particular, can be traced back to both personnel administra­ tion and to the educational system in the military preparatory schools. We have previously touched upon aspects of personnel affairs, where high-ranking officers who had studied in either England or America could not attain positions of the highest command, simply because it was assumed that they were inevitably pro-American, pro-British, or defeatist. This outlook became even more pronounced after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. In so far as education in the military prep schools was concerned, foreign language study posed a number of problems. German, French, and Russian were the only foreign languages which used to be taught there. On the other hand, English and Chinese were special subjects to be pursued only by those who entered the Military Academy from high school.37 Nevertheless, most of the officers who were sent abroad to study military affairs were products of the military prep schools, not of the high schools. These officers were selected on the basis of their class standings at the time of their graduation from the Military Academy. As a consequence, most officers who had gone to study in Germany, France, or Russia obtained important posts upon their return home—a prospect open to only a few of those who had studied in the United, States or in England. Such a system resulted in but meager comprehen­ sion of America and Great Britain in Army circles. Toward the winter of 1940, the Army High Command asked the War Ministry’s Economic Mobilization Bureau 38 to investigate and predict possible developments in the power position of Japan. Two hypothetical

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

24

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Philippines. Only when the Americans attacked Luzon would the Army join in the decisive combat together with the Navy and the Air Force, This plan was based upon the weakness of Army strength in the Phil­ ippines, and upon the expectation that U. S. forces would land directly on Luzon Island, etc. Since IGHQ judged that American aircraft carrier strength had greatly dwindled as a result of the aerial battles off Formosa,0 they decided to modify the operational planning and to conduct the Army’s decisive battle against U. S. forces which had landed on Leyte (as mentioned above). The announcement of the results of the aerial battles fought ofl Formosa was not intentionally exaggerated; the Naval Command placed credence in the reports from the Combined Fleet. The latter, however, had not employed special reconnaissance measures to verify the results, but had merely passed on information received from the attack units. Reports from assault forces are often wrong—inevitably. Even so, the disparity between the figures announced by IGHQ and those admitted by the Americans) was excessive. The great error of IGHQ lay in the fact that they revised their very important decision—merely on the basis of unconfirmed reports.1 On October 22 the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army (Terauchi) ordered the Commander of the Fourteenth Area Army (Yamashita) to annihilate U. S. forces which had attacked Leyte Island. Maximum strength was to be employed, in conjunction with the Navy and the Air Force. General Yamashita, on the other hand, once held an opposing view about the decisive battle on Leyte, because he did not possess sufficient forces with him and had not prepared to send military equipment to Leyte. He had not readied even one ship, etc. Nevertheless he finally undertook decisive combat on Leyte, in accordance with Southern Army orders. The Combined Fleet, which had been expected to co-operate with the activities of the Fourteenth Area Army, ordered the implementation of the “Sho-1” Operation on October 18. It was planned to catch the U. S. Fleet in a crossfire from both flanks, in Leyte Gulf, by committing all available forces on the early morning of the 25th. The operation did not develop as planned. Before reaching Leyte Gulf, 24 warships were sunk: 3 battleships (including Musashi), one carrier, three converted carriers, nine cruisers, and eight destroyers. An­ other four cruisers were severely damaged, and many other vessels were hurt. The great decrease in Japanese naval strength thus rendered the decisive ground battle on Leyte even more difficult.2 Lieutenant General Shiro Makino’s 16th Division, which was defend-* * According to the IGHQ announcement of October 16, ten American carriers had been sunk and three crippled. tT h e Americans admitted that two cruisers were damaged.

BATTLE FOR PHILIPPINES

125

ing the shores of Leyte Gulf, suffered severe losses from the continuous bombardment unleashed by the powerful American Fleet, on October 19. Next day, about two American divisions began to land at Tacloban and other places. General Suzuki, commanding the Thirty-fifth Army, promptly dis­ patched two infantry battalions from the 30th and 102d Divisions toLeyte. He himself went there on November 2. Although a little too late, Area Army Commander Yamashita sent large amounts of weapons, ammunition, and provisions. He also rushed the 1st Division ( which had just now reached Manila from Shanghai) to Leyte Island about October 27. Lieutenant General [Tadasu] Kataoka’s 1st Division (less two infan­ try battalions) safely landed at Ormoc on November 1. At the time the following units were gradually arriving on Leyte: 16th Division (whose strength had diminished to approximately 3,500) 1st Division Four infantry battalions, 30th Division Two infantry battalions, 102d Division (commanded by Lieu­ tenant General Shinpei Fukuei) At the outset of the fighting, the Japanese made things somewhat dif­ ficult for the American forces. The Fourth Air Army attacked U. S. troopships, using ramming tactics: one plane to sink one ship. The flow of aircraft did not continue, however. Besides, five air fields on Leyte were all seized by the Americans by October 26. Two of these airstrips were soon put into operational commission by the U. S. Air Force. Around the end of October the Japanese and American air forces were approximately equal in strength. On October 28 the High Com­ mands of the Japanese Army and Navy made arrangements to carry out the “Sho-1” Operation, by moving almost all planes, personnel replace­ ments, and newly produced aircraft to the Philippines area. The 1st Division, which had landed on Leyte Island, began to attack the northern Ormoc sector from November 14, but could not push back the American troops. The 68th Independent Mixed Brigade (which had been expected to advance on the left wing of the 1st Division after landing on San Isidro) did not even reach the battlefield. On the right flank of the 1st Division, the 102d Division inched forward on November 18. IGHQ meanwhile transferred the 10th, 23d, and 19th Divisions to the Fourteenth Area Army. The 1st Raiding Group ( paratroop elements, forced-landing units, etc.) was added to the order of battle of the Fourth Air Army. The 1st Division was deadlocked in combat. At the end of Novem­ ber, the Area Army planned (as a last resort) to recapture the airstrip near Burauen with ground troops, glider units, and parachute troops. For the ground assault, it was decided that Lieutenant General Tsuyuo

126

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

Yamagata’s 26th Division (whose main elements had arrived on Novem­ ber 7) should move up. This Division, however, had lost most of its heavy weapons while en route at sea, and its fire power capability was accordingly very weak. With the drop of many paratroop units on the evening of December 5; the shock of glider-borne units of the 1st Raiding Group on the evening of the 6th; and the answering onrush of the ground troops—the Japanese temporarily recaptured the Burauen air strip and the San Pablo drome; but they could not secure their gains. By this time the American forces had already landed about seven divisions on Leyte Island. Their strength was eventually going to com­ prise some nine divisions. On December 7 about one division of American troops made a detour and landed south of Ormoc, on the other side of Leyte. Four days later they took Ormoc itself, with its stockpiles of munitions which the Japanese had hauled there after painstaking effort. Following the seizure of Ormoc, the Thirty-fifth Army lost its vital war materiel; supplies were completely cut off. The decisive battle for Leyte was as good as settled. Area Army Commander Yamashita thereupon abandoned the concept of fighting a decisive battle. About December 22 he ordered General Suzuki, commanding the Thirty-fifth Army, to conduct self-sufficient combat within his zone of operations; to continue resistance “perma­ nently;” and to provide the basis for an eventual Japanese counter­ offensive. At the time, Japanese strength on Leyte approximated 11,000 officers and men. * * # Until the end of 1943, IGHQ had regarded the Philippines as a rear base area. With the increasing probability, however, that the region would become a battlefield, preparations were begun for military opera­ tions, from about March 1944. These activities commenced in earnest after May, and were termed “Operational Preparations No. 11.” An American invasion of the Philippines later appeared imminent; whereupon the “No. 11” measures were renamed the “Sho-1” Plan, and were stepped up. The preparations, however, made little headway for a number of reasons: The lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Fourteenth Army (later Area Army)0 Commander, Shigenori Kuroda; The sinking of most of the transports bound for the Phil­ ippines; The deterioration of conditions within the Philippines. Only 50% to 60% of the projected program had been carried out by the time the Americans landed on Leyte. •Organized on November 6, 1941, the Fourteenth Army was deactivated and replaced by the Area Army of the same number on August 4, 1944. — A . C.

1

BATTLE FOR PHILIPPINES

127

The Japanese garrison, on the other hand, was somewhat listless after long years of occupation duty. As they began suddenly and vigorously to consolidate the air field facilities, the troops had no time to train in tactics against the U. S. forces. Thus they ended up by meeting the American landings without sufficient preparation. Another problem was attributable to the fact that the conduct of the decisive battle got off to a very bad start, due to the change in the plan of operations. As a consequence the Japanese air fields on Leyte were overrun with lightning speed. IGHQ, not the Fourteenth Area Army, was clearly responsible for the bad start in guiding the conduct of the decisive combat. The specific circumstances have already been discussed and need not be repeated here. Still another factor involved the shortage of aerial strength. At the outset of the fighting, Japanese aircraft primarily conducted ramming assaults against American transports. Meanwhile, however, the number of crippled planes increased markedly because of poor maintenance of the air fields. As a consequence only ten-odd replacement planes were arriving daily in the battle zone, toward the end of October—against a daily attrition rate of 20 to 25 aircraft. It became impossible for the supply to catch up with the losses. (One problem was the fact that many new-type fighter planes were being damaged en route to the front.) The situation tended to become aggravated with the unfurling of the battle. Therein lay a major cause of the inactivity of the Japanese Air Force: Aerial operations in the Philippines were conducted in the form of an aircraft-replacement race, instead of combat between hostile aircraft carriers. At the time, moreover, there existed such a tremendous differ­ ence in the air-replacement capabilities of the Japanese and the Ameri­ cans that there was scant opportunity for the former to win the decisive battle for Leyte—even if various other conditions were temporarily favorable. Another cause of failure may be traced to the unexpectedly severe losses suffered by the Combined Fleet, and to its consequent relinquish­ ment of control of the waters around the Philippines. The U. S. forces, which secured command of both sea and air, thus sought to isolate Leyte and to convert it into another Guadalcanal. Ground battles were repeatedly fought on Leyte, between Japanese troops who had landed on the island with inadequate fire power, and the American forces equipped with massively superior fire power. No chance whatsoever existed for the Japanese to triumph. Approximately two American regiments had previously landed on Mindoro Island (300 miles northwest of Leyte) on December 15, against a Japanese defense force consisting of only two companies. The U. S. landing units immediately secured the air facilities which they sought. Manila itself was now in great danger, and the maritime routes across the South China Sea lay completely exposed.

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On November 9—shortly after the commencement of the decisive battle for Leyte—Area Army Commander Yamashita frankly admitted the truth of the failure on the part of the naval and air arms in the crucial encounter. He advised Southern Army Commander Terauchi that it was time to consider subsequent operations, but the recommendation was rejected. When the decisive battle for Leyte later proved hopeless, IGHQ’s First Bureau Chief, [Lieutenant General Shuichi] Miyazaki, came to Manila on December 21 for operational liaison. The Area Army Chief of Staff (Muto) then expressed his view—that the Japanese abandon deci­ sive combat operations on Leyte and switch emphasis to a campaign on Luzon. Muto was vague, however, as to whether the Luzon campaign was to be decisive or protracted (although the latter notion was some­ what more predominant). Regarding this viewpoint, General Miyazaki ( who had always been wary of “staff politics” ) did not commit himself; the “Sho-1” Operation had been left entirely to the Southern Army Commander. By this time, however, the Southern Army’s Chief of Staff (Jo Iimura) had come to Manila. The Southern Army then accepted the recommenda­ tion of the Area Army on December 19, whereupon the latter directed the Thirty-fifth Army to suspend the decisive battle for Leyte. About the same time, Area Army Headquarters commenced preparations for the Luzon campaign. Plans of operations were thoroughly examined, before it was decided to pursue a policy of protracted action. In Tokyo, meanwhile (on December 27), the Chiefs of the Army and the Navy General Staffs had advised the Emperor that they were awaiting the opportunity to strike and would continue to execute the “Sho-1” Operation, converting not only Leyte but the entire Philippines area into a decisive battle zone. Thus, in so far as the “Sho-1” Operation was concerned, certain differences existed between IGHQ, the Southern Army, and the Fourteenth Area Army—from the standpoint of unanimity of operational concepts. As late as January 27, 1945, IGHQ (which was busy preparing for operations in the homeland) gave the Southern Army a new mission: to secure strategic areas by defeating the invading American and British forces; to hinder the advance of the Americans in the direction of China and Japan; and to facilitate operations on the part of the whole Army. Indirect indications were thereby manifested of the intention to suspend the “Sho-1” Operation in the long run. IGHQ placed the Fourteenth Army under its direct control in June 1942, but again returned it to the order of battle of the Southern Army on March 17, 1944. At the instance of IGHQ, Southern Army GHQ moved from Sin­ gapore to Manila during the middle of May 1944. According to con­ temporary orders issued by the Southern Army, however, [a conflict in views existed]: Southern Army felt that only its combat headquarters was

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being transferred to Manila, and that the over-all GHQ really still re­ mained at Singapore. IGPIQ nevertheless anticipated that the Southern Army GHQ itself would move to Manila in toto. In this connection, the Seventh Area Army was accordingly activated, under General Kenji Dohihara, in Singapore on March 17. The new area army was built around the Sixteenth, Twentyfifth, and Twenty-ninth armies. In August, however, Southern Army Commander-in-Chief Terauchi advised IGHQ that he planned to return to the site of his old GHQ [Singapore], since he had completed most of his on-the-spot direction of preparations for the decisive campaign in the Philippines. As an alter­ nate to Singapore, he suggested Saigon as the location for his GHQ. IGHQ protested that it was not proper to change GHQ sites, from the standpoint of the psychological effects just at the time when the decisive battle was about to develop in the Philippines. Terauchi re­ mained adamant, vehemently asserting that Manila was a fighting com­ mand. IGHQ finally gave in. On November 17, in the midst of the crucial struggle for Leyte, South­ ern Army GHQ left Manila for Saigon. « « « For operations on Luzon, the Fourteenth Area Army drew up a set of plans whose essentials follow: The Area Army (with bases in the mountains east of Manila and west of Clark Field; at Baguio; and in the highlands around Balete Pass) should make concerted efforts to check the irruption of U. S. forces into Central Luzon. Thus the enemy advance toward the Japanese homeland and other places would be delayed. A detachment should be dispatched to Batangas Peninsula, in order to check the advance of American forces toward Manila. A force should be deployed around Aparri (the northern­ most extremity of the Philippines) to curb American land­ ings and secure the Cagayan River Valley. In connection with the preceding plan of operations, the Navy agreed with the idea of abandoning Manila. Only the Fourth Air Army Com­ mander (Tominaga) remained violently opposed. He stayed on in the city until January 7,1945. About now, guerrillas were annoyingly active. The Area Army was apprehensive lest all the natives become partisans whenever U. S. troops landed on Luzon. From the middle of November 1944, the Japanese therefore commenced to suppress the armed guerrillas. At the end of December the over-all strength of the Area Army ap­ proximated 90,000 officers and men, deployed as follows: Based east of Manila: S hinbu Group, built around 8th Division (less

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three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion); under 8th Division Commander, Lieutenant General Shizuo Yokoyama. Based west of Clark Field: Kenbu Group, consisting primarily of 1st Raiding Group plus one infantry regiment of 10th Division, and ground crews of Navy and Army air units; under Lieutenant General Rikichi Tsukada, Commander, 1st Raiding Group. Based in the north: bulk of Shobu Group (Fourteenth Area Army), deployed in six sectors: 1. Lingayen Gulf sector: 23d Division (which had landed at end of November) and 58th Independent Mixed Brigade. Main force occupied eastern shores of Lingayen Gulf; por­ tion held southwestern coasts of bay. 2. San Jose sector: 10th Division and bulk of 2d Armored Division were being assembled around Kabanatuan. N.B .: 10th Division had landed on December 23, losing 1/3 of its strength en route; and had detached one infantry regiment to the Bataan Peninsula. The Division Commander pos­ sessed only about five companies under his direct control at the time of the landings. 3. Northwestern Luzon: Approximately three infantry bat­ talions under 79th Infantry Brigade Commander. 4. Aparri sector: Main force of 103d Division. 5. Barel Bay and Dingalan Bay sectors: Three infantry bat­ talions. 6. San Fernando area: 19th Division assembling there. This Division had landed on December 19; about 1/3 of its strength had remained behind on Formosa. Stocks of arms and ammunition were extremely meager; about 80% of the shipping had been sent to the bottom since the summer of 1944. There were also no effective antitank weapons. Poor transportation facilities and a lack of provisions: these were the greatest weaknesses in the preparations for operations. American carrier-based planes had previously attacked Manila Bay on December 15 and 16, 1944. On January 6 and 7, 1945, they struck Luzon again. At about the same time, U. S. bomber squadrons and ground guerrillas turned to roads, bridges, tunnels, etc., as targets for attack, in an effort to hamper the movements of Japanese forces. On January 9—after a violent aerial and naval bombardment—Ameri­ can troops began to land on the southern shores of Lingayen Gulf. About 70,000 men had come ashore by sunset, securing a wide beachhead. During the same night, Japanese assault boats attacked the transports and damaged at least some twenty vessels. From around the 11th, American units attacked the positions of Lieu­ tenant General Fukutaro Nishiyama’s 23d Division. The Japanese sought to cling to their defenses during the daytime, and to engage in hand-tohand combat during the night; but they could not improve the over-all

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situation. After about January 23, the positions of the 23d Division were cut to pieces and surrounded. Around that time, powerful U. S. elements crossed the bend in the Agno River, pushed southward toward Manila, broke through the posi­ tions of the Kenbu Group, and struck in the direction of the capital. On January 29, American units landed on the western side of Luzon near Subic Bay and pushed eastward as if they were going to traverse the Bataan Peninsula. Two days later, U. S. paratroopers dropped at Nasugbu on Batangas Peninsula south of Manila; on February 6 they reached Nichols Field on the outskirts of the city. The Americans then proceeded to attack Manila from the north, northwest, and south. On February 23 they ripped into the old city walls. U. S. forces, on February 15, had meanwhile landed on the tip of I Bataan Peninsula after a severe bombardment from air and sea. Next day, American paratroopers came down on Corregidor. There the Japanese garrison fought on for about a fortnight, but finally blasted their own cave positions. The port of Manila was reopened to shipping early in March. On February 28, U. S. troops came ashore on the east coast of Palawan Island, where they occupied the two Japanese air fields in no time at all. From these bases, the U. S. Air Force was able to dominate not only the ■ South China Sea but also the Malay and Burma areas. Simultaneously with the bitter fighting on Luzon, the American Navy began to reoccupy the Philippine Islands, starting on March 10. First came a landing on the western shores of Mindanao (March 10) and a subsequent invasion of Panay (March 18). The second step oc­ curred when landings were made on Cebu (March 26); and the third took place on April 17, when the southern part of Mindanao was invaded. The Japanese garrisons on these islands offered limited resistance but could not offset the over-all situation. , On the 23d Division front, American troops continued their attacks in mid-February. From about that time the 23d Division and the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade pulled back their lines to the mountain peaks in the rear, while the 19th Division moved to the Bontoc sector. The Fourth Air Army had already exhausted its combat strength, and provi­ sions were running shorter and shorter. From about the middle of March, the focus of the ground fighting shifted toward the mountainous zone extending from Baguio to Balete Pass. There the American advance was temporarily held up by desperate Japanese resistance. On April 1, however, U. S. troops had landed at Legaspi and had begun to strike northward. Severe fighting raged on around Baguio. In April the American forces began to gain the upper hand at Baguio, 1 which they finally entered on April 23. On May 13 they seized Balete Pass as well. Later the battle front moved to the vicinity of Banban, into which the Americans pushed on June 5.

L

1

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The Area Army was cornered. On June 15, Area Army Commander Yamashita decided to betake himself to the mountainous belt lying in the upper reaches of the Ashin River and to resort to tactics of protracted resistance. This was approximately the time when the stage of the Pacific War had shifted to Okinawa, where operations were already entering the final phase. On June 21, guerrillas and American troops took Aparri. Two days later U. S. paratroopers dropped due south of the town and began push­ ing southward. Working in conjunction with other American units ad­ vancing northward, they proceeded to occupy the Cagayan Valley. The Japanese Area Army, however, held out in its mountain positions, fighting hunger but still going strong when the war ended. During operations on Luzon, the Fourteenth Area Army did not adopt so-called “death but no surrender” tactics. In order to execute the operational objective of confining the American forces to Luzon despite inferior strength, the Area Army followed tactics of resistance to the last, killing ten soldiers to one. These must have been difficult tactics for Japanese combat men, who easily despair and prefer quick death to eventual surrender. However, it was because of this policy, perhaps, that the Area Army was able to hole up in the mountainous districts of Luzon where, without disintegrating, it held out till the end of the war. A fairly large amount of American strength was pinned down in the process. After the war, the U. S. authorities disclosed their losses: 60,628 killed, wounded, or missing during the Philippines campaign.3

J

O PER A TIO N S IN SO U T H E R N R EG IO N (E X C E P T P H IL IP P IN E S)

FROM ABOUT the end of 1944 to the beginning of 1945, IGHQ came to expect that a final decisive battle would be fought around the Japanese homeland during 1945. In the Southern areas, on the other hand, opera­ tions were still going on in the Philippines and in Burma; the strategic position of the Southern Army, however, had by now evidently become a matter of strictly secondary importance. IGHQ thus found itself in the position of conducting operations with the main objective of even some­ what facilitating a decisive campaign around the Japanese main islands, which were of primary importance. IGHQ thereupon set out in earnest to investigate a revision in the basic mission of the Southern Army; measures concerning the stability and security of French Indo-China; and repatriation of various elements of strength (fuel, air units, ground crews, etc.)—all of which could con­ tribute to the decisive struggle in the homeland. On January 27, 1945, IGHQ issued the previously mentioned, all-im­ portant orders to Southern Army Commander Terauchi. These orders called for a revision of the Southern Army’s fundamental mission, and may be summarized as follows: The Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army should secure strategic areas by defeating the invading American and British forces; curb their advance toward the Japanese homeland or the Chinese Mainland; and facilitate opera­ tions on the part of the entire Army. Especially important features include: In the Philippines area, secure strategic points on Luzon, and attempt to defeat the invading U. S. forces. Secure strategic regions in Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, and Sumatra, since these constitute the core of the South. In districts other than those cited above, try to secure strategic and political areas which the Allied forces plan to attack and seize. Assign priority to important resources and major bases. (Remainder of section omitted.) « « « The Southern Army Commander-in-Chief, the China Ex­ peditionary Army Commander-in-Chief, and the Tenth Area Army Commander (Formosa Army Commander)

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should plan to secure communications between them by means of aircraft and small naval vessels, while striving to establish inland liaison routes between the Chinese Con­ tinent and the South. With the worsening military situation confronting the Japanese in Burma and in the Philippines, and with the recovery of power on the part of the De Gaulle regime, anti-Japanese acts increased tremendously in French Indo-China. Since Japanese forces in that area were small in number, IGHQ (in January 1945) dispatched the 22d and 37th Divi­ sions from South China overland to French Indo-China, where they were assigned to the Southern Army. ( At the time, Lieutenant General Yuitsu Tsuchihashi’s Thirty-eighth Army was stationed in Indo-China.) Fearing that American forces might land in French Indo-China, using the Philippines as a springboard, IGHQ keenly felt the necessity of tak­ ing measures to keep Indo-China absolutely quiet, no matter what hap­ pened. On February 28, orders went out to Southern Army Commander Terauchi, directing him to dispose of matters in French Indo-China in case of emergency. On March 9 the Japanese Ambassador to French Indo-China sub­ mitted a number of requests to the Governor, in keeping with the spirit of the joint defense agreement in effect between Japan and French Indo-China: Order the French Army in Indo-China, and the armed police units, to be placed under the unified command of the Japanese Army, and to act entirely according to the direc­ tions of the latter, as long as things remained as they were. Place all instrumentalities necessary for operations under Japanese control; e.g., railways, shipping, communications, etc. Ensure that all administrative functions in French IndoChina comply completely and faithfully with the Japanese requests. The authorities in French Indo-China refused to accede to the Japanese requests; whereupon Japanese troops (some 30,000 strong) im­ mediately began to deal with the matter. Military measures were executed in order to secure fulfillment of the requests. By March 11, operations were completed at important points along the railroads in northern and southern Indo-China. By the middle of the month, the majority of the French Army in the country (numbering approximately 70,000 officers and men) were disarmed. Thus the Japanese objective was practically attained. Later, the Japanese Army set about suppressing a portion of the French forces who had fled into the mountain fastnesses of northwestern and central Indo-China. < « « IGHQ’s order of January 27, 1945, called for Southern Army Com­ mander Terauchi to hold as much of southern Burma as possible, because

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it was the advance base for defending the core of the Southern region (French Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, and Sumatra). In other words the mission of intercepting or cutting off communications between China and India was completely eliminated, while southern Burma was viewed as an outpost zone. It is of interest to add that on January 28, an Ameri­ can truck convoy crossed the eastern borders of Burma and proceeded to Kunming. The Burma Area Army, under Lieutenant General Heitaro Kimura, was doing its best, early in 1945, to restore combat capabilities along the Irrawaddy River. It was awaiting the opportunity to counterattack, but the Anglo-Indian forces crossed the Irrawaddy near Pagan ( at the end of February) and then occupied Meiktila, which meant that the city of Mandalay was bound to be attacked from the north and the west. Severe fighting raged until March 21 near Mandalay, but when the city fell the Area Army could no longer maintain its battle lines along the Irrawaddy River. The Southern Army now ordered the Burma Area Army to redeploy along a line between Loikaw, Toungoo, and Rangoon. Prior to this re­ alignment, however, Anglo-Indian troops had entered Rangoon ( on May 3). The objectives of the Japanese Army in Burma could not now be achieved. All the while, the Indian National Army was co-operating with the Japanese Fifteenth Army, experiencing many bitter hardships, and taking part in the battles along the Irrawaddy River; but with the fall of Burma, the INA was finally disbanded. The Indian leader, Chandra Bose, es­ caped from Rangoon on April 24,1945, and moved his provisional govern­ ment to Saigon. Later, on his way to Tokyo, he was killed in an airplane crash at Taipei [Formosa].1 On the other hand, the Burmese National Army (which had been performing the mission of guarding the interior of the country during the Imphal campaign) became greatly agitated ever since the battles along the Irrawaddy River. When the Japanese battle line was eventually penetrated by the English and Indian forces, the Burmese finally revolted generally. Premier Ba Maw made a hairbreadth escape to Japan. At the outset of the Imphal Operation, the entire strength of the Japanese Army in Burma approximated 330,000; but no less than 200,000 officers and men were killed in action or died of disease. $ * ft Toward the end of October 1944, the Japanese Army and Navy reached an agreement to the effect that the Second Area Army (in the Celebes) and the Thirty-seventh Army* (in South Borneo) should as­ sume concurrent command of naval units serving in those areas and should control all ground defenses. •Commanded by LtGen Masao Baba, with a strength built primarily around two independent mixed brigades.

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Simultaneously with American operations aimed at recapturing the Philippines, U. S. and Australian forces commenced action on Borneo in May 1945. On May 1, an Australian division landed on Tarakan Island, the first Allied objective. The next target was Brunei Bay, where another Australian division landed on June 10 and captured the oil fields at Selia and Miri. Balikpapan was the third objective, which a new Australian force invaded on July 1. The Japanese troops defending these places offered partial resistance because of very scant strength. All the Southern areas were generally quiet, with the exception of Indo-China, Borneo, the Philippines, and New Guinea. The over-all deployment of Japanese forces at the end of the war is summarized below. The Seventh Area Army, under General Seishiro Itagaki, set up its headquarters at Singapore, from which it commanded three subordinate armies: Twenty-ninth Army (CG, Lieutenant General Teizo Ishiguro; with 94th Division, etc.): Malay Peninsula Sixteenth Army (CG, Lieutenant General Yuichiro Nagano; with 48th Division, etc.): Java area Twenty-fifth Army (CG, Lieutenant General Moritake Tanabe; with the Imperial Guard Division, etc.): Sumatra area. In the district north of Australia the Second Area Army Headquarters and the Nineteenth Army Headquarters were deactivated. Remaining responsible for garrison duty was the Second Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Fusataro Teshima, with headquarters near Makassar. The 5th, 32d, 35th, and 36th Divisions comprised the heart of this army. The Eighteenth Area Army (commanded by Lieutenant General Akito Nakamura) was stationed in Thailand. Under this area army came the Fifteenth Army (CG, Lieutenant General Shihachi Katamura), which had been badly mauled during the Imphal campaign. As for the Air Force, Lieutenant General Bin Kinoshita’s Third Air Army was assigned to Singapore, where it controlled the 5th, 7th, and 9th Air Divisions, etc.

17

LOSS O F IWO JIM A AND OKINAWA

IN D ECEM BER 1944 IGHQ abandoned the idea of waging a decisive campaign on Leyte. As for the anticipated direction of subsequent Ameri­ can advances, it was judged that the foe would move from the Philippines to South China, where he would construct air bases and then proceed to Okinawa; or else (instead of landing in South China) the Americans would seize the Bonin Islands and next strike at Okinawa or Formosa. On the isle of Iwo the Japanese possessed three airfields and a power­ ful aerial-defense observation system. From this foothold, they occasion­ ally attacked American air bases in the Marianas. If, on the other hand, Iwo Jima fell to the enemy, the Americans could provide the B-29’s bound for Japan with a fighter escort, and could intensify their bombing effort, since they could then hit Japan with medium bombers. It was therefore probably in the cards that Nimitz’s fleet would plan to seize Iwo Jima.1 From June 15, 1944, the U. S. Navy and Air Force began to shell and bomb Iwo Jima. The assaults were stepped up especially after Decem­ ber. Starting on February 16, 1945, the Americans then commenced pre­ landing bombardments and air raids. ( At the same time a fast task force was pounding air installations, plane factories, etc., around Tokyo—on February 16 and 17.) The current strength of Japanese Army units on Iwo Jima consisted of the following elements: Nine infantry battalions One tank regiment (23 tanks) Two artillery battalions (about 40 guns) Five antitank gun battalions (approximately 70 pieces) Five mortar battalions (about 110 pieces) Totalling some 17,500 officers and men, the Japanese garrison was under the command of 109th Division Chief Kuribayashi.2 There was also a Navy component totalling about 5,500, with 170 machine guns and 20 heavy field pieces. After a terrific bombardment which lasted for three days, two U. S. Marine divisions started landing on the southeastern shores of the island, from about 9 A.M. on February 19. By 8 P.M. they had succeeded in getting some 10,000 troops and 200 armored vehicles ashore. Despite desperate Japanese resistance, the Americans seized one airstrip by the evening of the 20th.

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At this time U. S. forces were sending uncoded messages such as: “Losses heavy. Don’t land tanks all at once.” “Need nothing, but send Medics quickly.” “Fuel stocks in flames.” A third Marine division landed on the 21st. The now-heartened Marine divisions which were already in action occupied the second air field and the positions on Mt. Suribachi (which rises at the southern end of the island) on the 23d. Within two more days they had overrun almost half of the isle. American Navy task forces were now appearing again in Japanese waters, attacking air fields and plane factories near Tokyo on the 25th, and raiding Hachi-jo Island on the 26th. Their intention appeared to be the interception of Japanese Air Force operations aimed at rescuing Iwo Jima. Intense ground fighting raged on Iwo Jima. Especially bitter battles occurred on the 26th, but the front lines remained almost the same. American bombardment grew more and more severe, as many as 30,000 rounds being fired in one day.3 Enemy planes constantly ruled the skies over the island, while a mighty American fleet patrolled the surrounding waters. Iwo Jima was literally isolated and helpless. The bulk of the 109th Division ( although it put up a good fight, em­ ploying shock tactics and counterattacks) could accomplish nothing in the face of the overwhelming odds. The main positions gradually began to be penetrated and hacked to pieces from about the 27th. Finally, on March 2, the third air field and the whole tableland area around Motoyama village were lost. American tanks, using flame-throwers, one by one mopped up the Japanese cave positions which were still resisting, and quickly reduced the defenders’ systematic resistance. General Kuribayashi thereupon determined to launch a glorious general offensive with himself in the lead. Zero hour was to be midnight, March 17. The General reported his intention to IGHQ and then broke off all wireless communication.4 The Army High Command had meanwhile been conducting earnest investigations into the possibility of mounting an effective attack against the U. S. naval forces which were swarming around Iwo Jima. Air power on hand was small, however, while over-water flight training was inadequate; hence a massive effort could not be staged. Nevertheless, by launching sporadic attacks with a portion of the Sixth Air Army, some degree of damage was inflicted upon the American naval vessels.5 U. S. Marine forces which came ashore on Iwo Jima totalled approxi­ mately 60,000. Their ground casualties amounted to some 20,200, of whom 4,300 were killed.® * # * Military preparations in the Formosa and Okinawa areas were basically finished by the end of 1944. When the situation worsened in the Philippines, however, IGHQ began to worry about the weakness of

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Formosa and therefore created the Fortieth Army Headquarters (Januuary 8,1945). Under the command of Lieutenant General Mitsuo Nakazawa, the new army was established at Kagi in southern Formosa, early in 1945. The 9th and 71st Divisions were then assigned to the Fortieth Army. With the arrival of these two additional divisions, the ground strength on Formosa totalled six brigades and five divisions (the others being the 10th, 50th, and 66th). The defense of Okinawa Island was weakened when the 9th Division was transferred to Formosa. Ground forces on the isle ended up with only the 24th and 62d Divisions and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade as the core of the Thirty-second Army (CG, Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima).7 It was therefore decided that the 84th Division should be dispatched to Okinawa to fill the gap; this intention was privately reported to the Emperor. First Bureau Chief Miyazaki nevertheless felt very strongly that it was more urgent and practical to build up military preparations in the Japanese homeland than to send troops to an isolated island bastion. As a consequence the transfer of the 84th Division was eventually suspended. The Japanese Government intensely feared that anti-war sentiment was mounting within the country. In case of an American assault upon Okinawa, it was secretly anticipated that a heavy blow could be dealt the enemy; whereupon, if possible, a way would be found to bring about a cessation of hostilities. First Bureau Chief Miyazaki, however, paid little attention to trends in the national morale, and pinned his hopes on a decisive struggle in the homeland, from the purely strategic point of view. Herein lay the difference in thinking between the Government and IGHQ. For the preceding reasons the 9th Division was never replaced. This is said to have been the most important factor which rendered the Thirtysecond Army’s defensive operations extremely difficult, in the face of the invading U. S. forces. On February 3, IGHQ ordered Tenth Area Army Commander Ando to crush American attempts to advance air and sea bases toward Formosa and Okinawa, and to facilitate simultaneous execution of all Japanese operations. The IGHQ orders clarified the nature of the envisaged Okinawa campaign. They did not direct the implementation of the so-called “Sho-2” Operation, which called for decisive battle in the areas of For­ mosa and Okinawa. The objective was instead to smash U. S. endeavors to move aerial and naval bases forward, and to carry out over-all opera­ tions. In other words, the execution of a decisive struggle in the home­ land was to be facilitated. After consultations, the Army and the Navy High Commands laid plans to unify and to co-ordinate both air forces. Especial emphasis was to be placed upon the use of Tokko [special attack: suicide] units

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in order to knock out the American forces; and upon the strengthening of the direct defense setup in the homeland. For the Okinawa campaign, the Army planned to commit a total of 970 planes: Homeland Sixth Air Army .................................................. 220 Tokko units ........................................................ 300 Formosa 8th Air Division ................................................ 200 Tokko units ........................................................ 250 A United States naval task force bombarded Okino Daito Island on March 2, after which it attacked various air fields in Kyushu as well as the Japanese Fleet at Kure (raids on March 18 and 19). From these actions, IGHQ judged that an American landing on Okinawa was im­ minent. On the 24th another U. S. task force struck the southeastern coast of Okinawa and, at the same time, began to sweep the waters off the main island. Two days later an American division landed in the Kerama Archipelago west of Okinawa itself. By the 31st the island group and the isle of Kamiyama [Keise] had been occupied. (Previously —on March 19—the Sixth Air Army had been assigned to the Com­ bined Fleet Commander in order to carry out operations in the Okinawa region.) On March 26 the Japanese commenced aerial operations (the socalled Ten-go [Heaven] Air Operation) under the combined command of the Army, the Navy, and the air forces. The Sixth Air Army and the 8th Air Division struck the U. S. transport group in Okinawan waters, while naval air units sought out and attacked the American task force; but neither element could mete out a decisive blow.8 During the morning hours of April 1, American naval bombardment shook the earth on Okinawa. Under cover of the shellfire, U. S. troops began to land in the Chuto [Chatan] sector on the western shores of the island, starting around 8:30 A.M. By noon, two airstrips [Yontan and Kadena] had been quickly seized. The landings progressed rapidly and by dusk about 50,000 men were already ashore. The Thirty-second Army planned to use its main force to secure the southern part of the island solidly, by carrying out a retrograde move­ ment. Part of the army was deployed in the central and northern districts to conduct guerrilla warfare during the final stages. The loss of the two airstrips as early as the very first day of the invasion nevertheless ren­ dered the army’s plans extremely difficult to implement. The fact that the 9th Division had not been replaced doubled the burden of the Thirtysecond Army. After forcing a landing, the American troops struck immediately across the island, reaching the eastern coast on April 3. Then the Marine

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divisions pushed northward while the Army forces (three to four divi­ sions) moved south.9 IGHQ felt that there were two keys to success in the Okinawa cam­ paign: Proper and effective aerial operations; and prevention of the establishment of an American beachhead. Hope was placed in the brave and resolute counteroffensive of the Thirty-second Army; for, in accord­ ance with the request of IGHQ, Tenth Area Army Commander Ando had ordered the Thirty-second Army to launch a counterattack. On the night of April 8 the army jumped off against the heights lying east of North Airfield. Lieutenant General Takeo Fujioka’s 62d Division comprised the first wave;10 Lieutenant General Tatsumi Amamiya’s 24th Division, the second. Other combat units were deployed in the third echelon. The offensive progressed well at first but was eventually checked by massive fire power and had to be suspended on April 13. Thereupon the Japanese fell back to their former positions. The strength of the American landing forces now totalled about six divisions.11 The Army and the Navy air forces stepped up their offensive from April 6.12 Without securing aerial mastery, however, the remaining strength of the Combined Fleet sortied into the waters off Kadena, where they were again severely crippled by American planes (April 7 ).13 This action is utterly beyond comprehension. Eveiy day suicide aircraft took off from their bases and headed for Okinawa. On April 11 they struck the U. S. task force. After the 12th the planes rammed into transports daily. Inevitably, on the 15th and 16th, American carrier-based aircraft attacked air bases in Kyushu, in an effort to crush the Tokkotai before they could get off the ground.14 Violent fighting continued on Okinawa. On April 19 the Americans recommenced their assaults against the entire front line of the Japanese positions. Powerful U. S. task force units supported the offensive with bombardment from the sea. Various Japanese Army elements dug into their cave positions, making clever use of the terrain. They badly hurt the American units and repulsed them. In the northern part of the island, the Kunisaki Detachment was try­ ing to check the northward push of the U. S. Marine divisions. Due to reduced fighting effectiveness, however, the Japanese found it difficult to put up systematic resistance after about April 22, and they finally had to resort to guerrilla warfare. The fighting scene then shifted to the southern part of Okinawa, where the bulk of the U. S. forces were con­ centrated. On May 3 the Thirty-second Army mounted a second offensive. The objective was to take advantage of the relief of the first-line American troops. Again checked by terrific fire power, however, each Japanese division was chopped down to about 20 or 25% of its original strength, while the artillery was reduced to one-half. The army was therefore compelled to abandon the offensive on the evening of the 5th and to

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143

return to its old positions. Suicide planes were active at about that time and achieved some re­ markable results. As a consequence, U. S. carrier-based planes again raided air fields in Kyushu on May 13, 14, and 24, attempting to prevent the take-off of suicide aircraft.15 Later (about May 26), American troops managed to penetrate the Japanese belt of defense positions, whereupon the battle lines north of Naha and Shuri fell into a chaotic state. It was reported that American recoilless guns (portable weapons which do not recoil when fired) dominated the loopholes of the Japanese cave positions.16 On May 21 the concentrated strength of the Japanese Army and Navy air forces struck the American transport group which was steaming north­ ward.17 Four nights later, 152 men of the Giretsu [Heroic] Airborne Unit dropped upon North and Central Airfields, engaged in hand-to-hand fighting, and for a time seized control of both strips.18 Toward the end of May, however, air operations became gradually deadlocked, and IGHQ felt that it was impossible to turn the tide. Recognizing the necessity of quickly effecting preparations geared to a decisive campaign in the Japanese homeland, IGHQ therefore ordered the Sixth Air Army to be removed from the over-all command of the Combined Fleet (May 26). U. S. carrier planes meanwhile raided air fields in Kyushu again on June 2, 3, and 8. Command of the skies over Okinawa lay completely in the hands of the U. S. Air Force; the Japanese Navy had already been rendered im­ potent. Thus the fate of the Thirty-second Army was just a matter of time. On June 21, Army Commander Ushijima finally dispatched a last, pathetic message to IGHQ, after which he broke off wireless communi­ cation. On this very day the American forces announced that organized resistance by the Japanese had come to an end, except for two small cave positions.19 « » • Bombings of the Japanese main islands were conducted on a large scale by the U. S. Air Force from around the end of February 1944. The damage inflicted upon cities and munitions factories mounted drastically. Estimates of the results of the air raids are summarized in Table 9. TABLE 9 E ffects of U. S. Am R aids Date 1942-44

Jan. ’45 Feb. ’45 March ’45 Apr. ’45 May ’45

1

Number of Raids 76 79 78 91

IOI 123

Number of Planes 2,079 598 3.193 4,608 2.997 5,462

Casualties 6,444

3,634

4,222 147,645 19,870 38,890

Buildings Hit 23,655 7,561 38,735 68,028 306,252 372,686

Number of Homeless 62,498 18,891

85,352 394,283 1 ,169,099 1 ,320,414

144

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

According to reports reaching the War Ministry about May [1945], the attendance rate at munitions factories immediately after an air raid amounted to only 20 to 30%. The average rate of absenteeism at factories in devastated areas approximated 40%. With the rapid increase in air raids, munitions production manifested a growing tendency to drop. For example, the total monthly output of Army and Navy aircraft was: January 1945 ................................................................ February 1945 .............................................................. March 1945 .................................................................... April 1945 .................................................................... May 1945 ......................................................................

1,943 1,263 1,937 1,816 1,625

These figures were far below the average monthly production of planes in 1944; that is, 2,352. The output of ordinary steel totalled only 253,000 tons during the first quarter of 1945—not even half the average production of 680,000 tons for a quarter in 1944. Aluminum production amounted to a mere 6,565 tons—less than a quarter of the average output of 30,000 tons dur­ ing any three-month period in 1944.

OPERATIONS IN CHINA (III) DURING 1945, operations in China underwent drastic changes. First, operational preparations against the Americans became the biggest task of the China Expeditionary Army, and emphasis in planning veered toward the coastal areas of the Continent. Secondly, in preparation for coping with Soviet Russian entry into the war, several divisions were transferred from the China Theater to Manchuria and Korea. At the end of 1944, Japanese forces in China comprised the following strength: 25 infantry divisions 1 tank division 10 independent mixed brigades 11 independent infantry brigades, etc. Between the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945, IGHQ felt that it must shift the emphasis of the China Expeditionary Army to the coastal regions of South and Central China. This constituted an epochal change: By ordering the China Expeditionary Army (which was en­ gaged in campaigns to the west) to reverse its momentum, IGHQ was obliging that army to switch to preparations against the U. S. forces instead. About that time the China Expeditionary Army, on the other hand, was entertaining strong hopes of undertaking thrust-operations against Chungking. This idea derived mainly from an estimate that one more push at this juncture could force the Chungking regime to accede to a separate peace or render its existence impotent, because of the success­ ful results achieved from the Hunan-Kweilin campaign. IGHQ held an opposite opinion: At a time when the tide of war was going against Japan and Germany, it was unthinkable to oblige Chung­ king to cease fighting. There were questions to investigate concerning supply matters involved in thrusting-operations across the plains of Szechwan. Similarly, there were doubts about employing the bulk of the Expeditionary Army in a campaign against the hinterland—at a time when it was imperative to strengthen the defenses of the Japanese home­ land. On January 22, 1945, IGHQ ordered the Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Army (General Okamura) to: foil attempts by American forces to advance into the Chi­ nese Continent; secure strategic areas on the Continent; and

145

146

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

strive to eliminate the influence of Chungking. These orders were based upon the principle of strengthening positions along the coastal reaches of Central and South China, especially along the lower stretches of the Yangtze River. Approval was simultaneously granted for the execution of surprise raiding operations using small forces, so long as they would not seriously affect the over-all employment of Japanese strength. Military plans for the China theater, drafted by IGHQ in accordance with the preceding concepts, were based upon four basic goals: To secure air bases necessary for covering the entire area of Japan, Manchuria, and China; To foil American efforts to force a landing on the coasts of Central and South China; Rapidly to consolidate the maintenance of law and order, as well as to complete preparedness; To hold all army reserves in readiness, to cope with any sudden changes in Soviet-Japanese relations. It was already intended to finish basic strategic defenses by about the spring or summer of 1945. Later, by adding the necessary revisions, an impregnable posture was to be established on the Continent by the summer of 1946. As the first step, it was planned (by the spring or summer of 1945) to increase the quantity of armed strength to: 20 combat divisions 20 security divisions 6 special guard divisions (for use against the Chinese Communists) 17 mixed brigades 50 battalions (to guard lines of communication) From the beginning of February, an immediate start was made to organize three combat divisions ( the 131st through the 133d); 12 mixed brigades; and seven independent guard units. The setup was completed in March. In order to reinforce military preparedness in the region of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, troops were meanwhile diverted from northern and central China, and concentrated at Shanghai and Hangchow and their environs. Sixth Army Headquarters was transferred to this area from Manchuria. Even after the commencement of operations on Okinawa, IGHQ ex­ pected that the next landing site of the Americans would be either near Shanghai or somewhere in the southern part of the Shantung Peninsula. On April 18 the Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Army, General Okamura, was ordered to transfer four divisions from southern China to the above-mentioned localities; i.e., the 3d, 13th, 27th, and 34th Divisions —the pick of the Japanese forces in China. After the Hunan-Kweilin campaign, the U. S. Air Force proceeded to

m

Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi

Lieutenant General Shinichi Tanaka

Nabesaburo Kit° Field Marshal Shunroku Hata (left) with General Yasuji Okamura (pointing)

CHINA (III)

147

expand the air field facilities at: Chechiang Chingchen Kweiyang

j- Hunan & Kweichow Provinces

Chungking Chaotung Chengtu

J- Szechwan Province

Laohokow Liangshan Ankang Sianfu Nancheng

- Northwestern Provinces

Kunming Yunnani Paoshan Luliang Chengkun Yangchie Tiencha

- Yunnan Province

The Americans also reinforced the numbers of their aircraft and planned to annihilate Japanese air power in China as well as to cut off land and sea communications. During February and March, the total number of sorties conducted by the U. S. Air Force greatly increased, reaching 300 to 400 per month. The total number of planes involved averaged 1,700 to 2,000 per month, a figure which was still on the increase. Especially serious were the activi­ ties based upon the northwestern facilities centering around Laohokow. Raids against river shipping, air fields, and the Tientsin-Pukow and Peiping-IIankow rail line were being stepped up. In order to wipe out the air base at Laohokow (northwest of Han­ kow), the China Expeditionary Army commenced operations against Laohokow on March 11, using the main force of the Twelfth Army (built around the 110th and 115th Divisions, the 3d Tank Division, and the 4th Cavalry Brigade) plus the 39th Division (from the Thirty-fourth Army). The campaign developed favorably, on the whole, and the Twelfth Army was able to occupy Laohokow completely on April 8.1 On April 15 the China Expeditionary Army initiated the Chihchiang campaign, which involved the bulk of the Twentieth Army (47th and 116th Divisions, plus 58th Independent Mixed Brigade). The purpose of the drive was three-fold: To destroy the cluster of air bases around Chihchiang (west of Hengyang);

148

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

To assume the initiative in defeating the main body of the Chungking forces in the Hunan area; and To facilitate battle-front readjustment operations in western and southern China (as will be discussed later). Overcoming the steep terrain west of Paoching ( west of Hengyang, in turn), the Twentieth Army pushed forward and engaged powerful American-equipped Chungking troops near Chihchiang. The Japanese were checked by intense enemy fire, however, and suffered heavy losses. Finally, on May 9, the offensive had to be given up.2 Toward the end of May 1945, IGHQ (which had abandoned the Okinawa Operation) was forced to co-ordinate two problems: Strengthening military preparedness in the coastal regions of Central and South China; Pulling out troops for transfer to Manchuria and Korea, as a result of the change in Soviet Russian policies toward Japan.* IGHQ quickly pulled out the 39th, 59th, 63d, and 117th Divisions plus the Thirty-fourth Army Headquarters, from Central and North China to new stations in Manchuria and Korea. To replace these forces, it was decided to evacuate occupied zones along the Hunan-Kweilin and Canton-Hankow rail lines in Hunan, Kwangsi, and Kiangsi provinces. In connection with the plans, appropriate orders went out to China Expedi­ tionary Army Commander-in-Chief Okamura, on May 28. The prompt decision taken by IGHQ to contract the battle lines in the same region, about four months after the termination of the campaign to open up the entire length of the Canton-Hankow line, differed from decisions to suspend the Imphal and Guadalcanal operations. Neverthe­ less the conduct of operations by IGHQ could not escape from criticism that it lacked a clear perspective. Early in the summer of 1945, the Japanese Army High Command made certain estimates concerning Chinese Army plans: The entire strength of the Chinese Army totalled some 300 divisions, approximately 3,000,000 men. American-equipped troops (considered to be the nucleus) would reach 15 to 20 divisions by August; 30 divisions by the end of the year. There was, besides, a strong possibility that the equipment of the Chinese Army in general would be reinforced. The main body of the Chinese Communist forces approxi­ mated 500,000 men, but the fighting capability of organized militia units could not be discounted in actions against the Japanese. # * * The U. S.-Chinese air forces would possess about 1,000 planes in August; 1,200 by the end of the year.3 • F r o m t h e e n d o f F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 5 , t h e S o v ie ts h a d b e g u n to t r a n s fe r tr o o p s to th e F a r E a st: a n d , o n A p r i l 5 , th e y h a d s c r a p p e d th e S o v ie t-J a p a n e s e N e u t r a li t y P a c t.

CHINA (111)

149

TABLE 10 Ja p a n e s e

F

o r ce s in

C

h in a

at

E

nd

of

W

orld

W

ar

II

U n it

C om m ander

C o m p o s itio n

L o c a tio n

A c t i v it y

T w e n ty - th ir d A rm y

LtGen

K y u ic h i Tanaka

I 0 4 th , I 2 9 th , 1 3 0 t h D iv i­

A ro u n d C a n to n

S e c u r in g s tr a te ­ g i c are a s

S ix th A r e a A rm y

Gen Naosaburo

E le v e n t h , T w e n ­ tie th A r m ie s

W id e zon e ex­ te n d in g fro m W u ch a n g -H an k o w to H c n g y a n g are a s

P o r tio n o f A r e a A r m y on m ove

E le v e n th

LtGen Yukio

5 8 th D iv is io n , e tc .

K w e ilin area

E v a c u a tio n

64th, 68th, 1 1 6th D iv i­

B e tw e e n H engyan g and W u ch a n g -H a n k o w

sio n s

A rm y

O kabe

K asah ara T w e n tie t h A r m y

LtGen Ichiro S a k a n is h i

s io n s , e tc .

3d, I 3th,

34th, I32d Divisions

T h ir te e n th A rm y

LtGen

T ak u ro M a ts u i

S ix t h A r m y H Q (C G , L tG e n J iro S o g a w a ) ; 60th, 61st, 6 5th , 69th, 70 th, 133d, 161st D ivi­

L o w e r re a c h e s o f Y a n g t z e R iv e r Y a n g t z e R iv e r b e ­ lo w H ukou ( e a s t o f H s ia o chihkou, or C h iu c h ia n g ); & a l o n g s o u th e rn p a r t o f T ie n t s in - P u k o w ra il lin e

A rea A rm y

Gen Sadamu S h im o m u r a

F ir s t , M o n g o lia G a r r is o n , T w e lfth , F o r­ ty-third A r ­ m ie s

F irst A r m y

M o n g o lia G a r r i­ son A r m y T w e lf t h

A rm y

O n sta tio n

I n tr a n s it

sio n s

N o rth C h in a

of

r e g io n

LtGen Raishiro Sumida

114th

LtGen Hiroshi

1 1 8 th e tc .

N em o to

LtGen

T akash i

T akam o ri

D iv is io n ,

etc .

H Q a t T a iy u a n in S h a n s i P r o v in c e

D iv is io n ,

noth, 115th, 3 d Tank D i­

H Q a t K a lg a n

HQ at chow

C heng­

v is io n s , e tc . F o r ty -th ir d

L tG e n T a d aya su

A rm y

H osokaw a

4 7 th D iv is io n , e tc .

HQ

a t T s in a n

O c c u p a tio n

by

m a in f o r c e O c c u p a tio n by portion of arm y

150

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC #

©

Supplies moved via the India-to-China route for aid to Chiang Kai-shek would total some 50,000 tons a month in August, and about 100,000 tons a month by the end of the year. a

e

e

Taking into consideration an American landing on the Chi­ nese Mainland, the Chinese Army (with its U. S.-equipped divisions at the core) would go over to the offensive against the Japanese. At the outset of the offensive, they would ad­ vance toward Hunan Province from the Kweilin, Liuchow, and Canton areas. There was a high degree of probability that, toward the end of the year, they would stage a general counteroffensive directed against Japanese forces in the Wuchang-Hankow district and the whole area of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River. The China Expeditionary Army’s contemporary plan of operations may be outlined as follows: The Expeditionary Army, with its main body, will control strategic areas in Central and North China, planning a pro­ tracted fight against the Soviet Union and China. It will simultaneously defeat U. S. forces invading the coastal areas, thus facilitating decisive combat in the Japanese homeland. Emphasis in military preparations against the American forces will be assigned, first, to the triangular zone (in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River); and, secondly, to the Shantung Peninsula. The districts around Nanking, Peiping, Wuchang, and Hankow must be secured even in case of really adverse conditions. The plan of operations was drafted in June. Amidst the China Expedi­ tionary Army’s redeployment measures according to schedule, the war came to an end. At that time, Japanese forces in China were deployed as seen in Table 10. Troops under the direct control of the Expeditionary Army included the 27th, 40th, and 131st Divisions, plus the 13th Air Division. Total strength of the Expeditionary Army amounted to about 1,050,000 officers and men.

PR EPA R A TIO N S F O R D E C ISIV E CO M BAT IN JA P A N E SE H O M E LA N D

WITH THE strengthening of defenses in the Japanese main islands, clashes between the Imperial Army and Navy grew more intense in every way—the rivalry between the so-called “Star” [Army] and “Anchor” [Navy]. Herein lay a major cause of wasted national energy and a hindrance to the full manifestation of combat power. There were many other troubles lying in the path of strengthening the homeland defenses: Lack of labor; Lowered production; Shortages of food, caused by military mobilization; Lack of arms and of billets to accommodate mobilized units; Difficulties with owners in securing lumber for construction of defenses. The worsened military situation, coupled with intensified air raids, lack of food, etc., increased the nation’s distrust of the armed forces and gradually gave rise to country-wide war weariness. In addition, there was disorderliness on the part of officers and men swarming in towns and villages; the troops were especially selfish in behavior where food was concerned. These actions, which incurred severe antipathy throughout the nation, were ascribable to the decline in the quality of personnel as a result of the great increase in forces mo­ bilized. It was, nevertheless, felt that the primary cause was hunger due to decreased food rations. The Army chieftains were sorely distressed in coping with such an atmosphere. They felt that the solidarity of soldiers, officials, and citizens was absolutely necessary for the crucial campaign in the homeland. Con­ sequently the military leaders seized every opportunity strongly to urge self-discipline upon the troops; enhancement of the nation’s fighting spirit; and concentration of combat strength on the part of soldiers, officials, and countrymen. War Minister Anami particularly emphasized that morality equals fighting power, and he constantly exhorted the Army to behave. Preparations for operations in the homeland made less progress than efforts overseas. The War Ministry therefore submitted special military measures to the 86th Diet session, and wartime emergency measures to the 87th Diet. Both sessions granted their sanction.

151

152

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

With the coining into force of the new laws, the implementation of emergency military matters essential for fortification and construction, etc., was facilitated. Since the substance of the preparations for homeland operations came within the purview of the War Ministry, demands by IGHQ came to be more and more controlled by that Ministry. As operational preparations progressed, the voice of the War Ministry regarding the conduct of the war and of actual operations grew consequently stronger. Much time was needed for practical discussions, however. In order to streamline and expedite practical contacts between IGHQ and the War Ministry, as well as to provide sufficient staff personnel, two or three sections of IGHQ and the Ministry were integrated on April 20. From about January 1945 until May of the same year, the idea pre­ vailed within Army circles that steps should be taken leading toward unification of the two armed services. This was a problem of long stand­ ing, but due to the old conventions of both protagonists, the solution had been deemed almost hopeless. Now, however, the tense wartime situation was of great help in caus­ ing the subject to be brought up again for discussion, under a different aspect from days gone by. The Army felt that it was essential to unify the Army and the Navy prior to any decisive campaign in the homeland, and to combine all the fighting forces under one will. After all, the Army had been only somewhat hurt, and its main force was still intact. With this main force the Army intended to wage the decisive battle in the homeland; but the Navy was now almost helpless, while Combined Fleet Headquarters was already ashore near Tokyo. Both the Army and the Navy were thus pretty much “in the same boat.” When General Anami became War Minister in the Suzuki Cabinet, the solution of the problem was one condition to his joining the Cabinet. In connection with the whole subject of unification, the Army’s final proposal comprised the following elements: The High Commands of the Army and the Navy should be unified. The War and Navy ministries should be left as they were, and not transformed into a National Defense Ministry. The Intendance, Medical, and Judicial bureaus of the Army and the Navy should, however, be unified. (There was no Military Administration Bureau in the Navy.) The Military Affairs bureaus should then be combined. The Personnel Bureaus should be left intact. If possible, the portfolios of Minister and Vice-Minister should be held concurrently by either the Army or the Navy Minister. (War Minister Anami declared that he would be content to be Vice-Minister while Admiral Yonai would be Navy and War Minister concurrently.) The negotiations did not progress because of strong opposition, mainly

DECISIVE COMBAT

153

on the part of Navy Minister Yonai. The reason for his resistance was not very clear—it was just that both services had their own time-honored traditions and it was difficult to reconcile them. Only the Information Departments of the Army and the Navy were eventually unified on April 27, and placed under the control of the Information Bureau. * # * IGHQ’s estimates of national strength in the spring of 1945 may be outlined as follows: 1. Personnel Strength In the Japanese homeland (as of about January 1945) the composition of the population of productive age (14-61) was: Employed ................................................. 70% Unemployed ............................................19% (including 10% students) Military employees ..................................11% (All percentages approximate.) A national registration was conducted in November 1944, covering males of 14-61 eligible for military service, plus unmarried females of 14-40. The breakdown showed ( in approximate percentages): Employed War industries .................................... 39% Civilian industries .................................21% Agriculture ............................................ 40% These figures indicated that there was no room for further drafting of labor, and that it was impossible to cut down and adjust civilian indus­ tries any further. More than 5,000,000 had been engaged in business be­ fore the war; this number had decreased to less than 2,000,000 by now. fc # # Production (approximate percentages) Males ................................................... 56% Females ................................................ 44% (of whom about 60% were engaged in agriculture) Of the male employees in various industries, 47% were connected with the military services.

The quality of the troops was summarized as follows: Percentages of active-duty soldiers within the armed forces (percent­ ages of active-duty soldiers to all enlisted men; figures approximate): Before the war ........................................60% (36%) At end of 1944 ..........................................40% (25%) After completion of military prepara­ tions in homeland ..................below 15% (below 12%) (The figures in parentheses show the percentages of officers who were graduates of the Military Academy, in terms of all officers.)

154

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

Percentages of physically fit active-duty soldiers actually called for military service (percentages of personnel mobilized, in terms of fit men of conscription age; figures approximate): 1941 51%

1942 60%

1943 “60%

1944 “89%

1945 90%

In 1944 and 1945, all men in Category 3-B° and above were drafted for active duty. e * * 2. Material National Strength The target for national strength in materiel during 1945 was set at: Steel ....................................................................................3,000,000 tons Planes .................................................................................. 40,000 Army shipping ..............................................more than 1,500,000 tons Liquid fuel (Japanese, Manchurian, Chinese) ..........1,660,000 kiloliters Compared with the plans for 1944, these were extremely reduced norms (except for aircraft). Liquid fuel was to be turned out in the amount of only about 50%. Steel production for Army ground equipment amounted to some 260.000 tons—only about 60% of the equivalent figure for 1944. It was considered extremely difficult to fit out the Army properly. The situation demanded the earnest encouragement of a number of measures: Consolidation of Army and Navy materiel; Rationalization of items; Utilization of substitute resources, etc.—thereby trying to step up the supply of goods as well as strengthening on-the-spot consolidation; Military utilization of idle materials, and use of captured items. O « * The supply of fuel for the Army was very meager at the end of March. There were only about 120,000 kiloliters of aircraft fuel; after September there would be nothing but alcohol. There were also only 70.000 kiloliters of motor fuel; in the second quarter there would be none. Heavy oil would be in the same fix by the second quarter. 3. Food Prospects for the food situation were indeed very dark. The estimated rice crop for 1945 would indubitably fall below the comparable figure for 1944; i.e., about 60,000,000 koku [one koku equals about five bushels]. The amount carried over from the previous year was on the decrease; the figure of approximately 2,600,000 koku from 1944 had been reduced to an estimated 2,300,000 koku in 1945. Since there was, moreover, no prospect of importing foreign rice, maximum efforts would have to be devoted to the import of minor grains from Manchuria. (It was planned • T h e lo w e s t p h y s ic a l c a t e g o r y o f n o n - e x e m p t m a le s . —

A. C.

DECISIVE COMBAT

155

to bring in 1,070,000 tons of new grain during the first quarter in 1945.) Military consumption of foodstuffs was, by the same token, increasing terrifically, because of preparations for operations in the homeland (stocks for the increased number of mobilized troops, plus readiness for combat). The requirement for about 3,000,000 koku in 1944 had soared to some 5,000,000 koku in 1945. Thus the daily food ration of two go, three shaku (per capita) was becoming difficult to maintain, even in­ cluding grain. [One go somewhat exceeds 3/10 pint; ten shaku equal one

| go-]

The supply of salt was also going to fall short, by about 350,000 tons. #

o

o

On January 20, 1945, IGHQ decided upon an “operational guide for the Imperial Army and Navy,” whose gist was as follows: Emphasis in operational policy was to foil the advance by U. S. forces; to secure strategic areas essential to the execution of hostilities by defeat­ ing the enemy’s fighting power everywhere, and by crushing his combat ' will. In accordance with this planning, the main battle theater was ex­ pected to be the Pacific and the East China Sea. Military preparedness was to be quickly strengthened, with the homeland as the core. Priority in preparations for homeland operations was devoted to the Kanto, Kyushu, and Tokai° districts. Importance was to be attached not only to these areas but also the Hanshin [Osaka-Kobe] region. On January 22, 1945, IGHQ abolished the army headquarters and instead created headquarters of area armies (which were operational armies); and Army District headquarters ( which handled military admin­ istration as their main function). So far as personnel were concerned, I an area army commander and an Army District Commander were one and the same person. From the vice-chief of staff downward, however, both the area army and the Army District had different personnel. [The following setup was adopted]: Fifth Area Army and Northern Army District (Sapporo) Eleventh Area Army and Northeastern Army District (Sendai) Twelfth Area Army and Eastern Army District (Tokyo) Thirteenth Area Army and Tokai Army District (Nagoya) Fifteenth Area Army and Central Army District (Osaka) Shikoku Army District ( Zentsuji) Sixteenth Area Army and Western Army District (Fukuoka) Seventeenth Area Army and Korea Army District ( Seoul) Tenth Area Army and Formosa Army District (Taipei) IGHQ ordered the national defense system consolidated, on February 9. In order that the combat troops might devote themselves to prepara­ tions for operations and for a decisive struggle, free from anxiety, guard units were to be organized from men in and out of office, in every prefec-* *Tokfli:

1

“ E a s te r n se a ” r e g io n , c e n t e r in g a b o u t N a g o y a . —

A. C.

156

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

ture throughout Japan. Guard commanders were to be appointed and placed under the Army District commanders. Personnel-wise, regimental district commanders were concurrently appointed guard chiefs; but in Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe, full-time guard commanders were selected. On February 28, IGHQ ordered the execution of initial measures for military readiness. This entailed the activation of 18 divisions for coastal defense combat, as well as preparations on the Goto Islands and the Korea Straits.® In March the 11th, 25th, and 57th [Infantry] Divisions and the 1st Tank Division were ordered transferred to the homeland from Manchuria. On April 2, IGHQ activated eight crack divisions, comprising the strength for decisive battle.] These troops prided themselves upon their “youthfulness;” their young and high-spirited staff officers, from division commanders down; and their high proportion of active-duty soldiers. Shortly afterward (on April 6), six independent tank brigades and five tank regiments were also activated. IGHQ (on April 5) decreed changes in the homeland command sys­ tem, organizing the First General Army, the Second General Army, and the Air General Army. With headquarters in Tokyo, Marshal Gen Sugiyama’s First General Army was to embrace eastern Japan east of the Tokai District as its area of operations. Under this general army would be the Eleventh Area Army (in the Tohoku, or northeastern, region); the Twelfth Area Army (on the Kanto Plain); and the Thirteenth Area Army (in the Tokai Dis­ trict). The Fifth Area Army (in Hokkaido) was to remain under the direct command of the Emperor. The Second General Army, under Marshal Shunroku Hata (with head­ quarters in Hiroshima), was to cover West Japan including the Kinki District and Shikoku as its operational area. Within its command would be the Fifteenth Area Army (in the Chugoku [Midlands] and Shikoku), and the Sixteenth Area Army (in Kyushu). General Masakazu Kawabe’s Air General Army (with headquarters in Tokyo) was to command the First Air Army, the Second Air Army (later replaced by the Fifth Air Army), and the Sixth Air Army. Throughout Japan, on April 7, appointment was made of divisional district chiefs—veteran generals hailing from their own birthplaces. This selective procedure was intended somewhat to cement local relationships between the military, the officials, and the people as a whole. On May 23, IGHQ ordered the activation of 19 more divisions. Eight of these divisions] were mobile forces (equipped with a supply and medical system, able to operate over great distances, and comparatively #T h e 1 8 d iv is io n s c o n s is te d o f th e 1 4 0 t h , I 4 2 d t h r o u g h 1 4 7 t h , 1 5 0 t h t h r o u g h

1 5 7 t h , 160 th,

8 8 th , a n d 8 9 th . + T h e e ig h t e lit e d iv is io n s w e r e th e 2 0 1 s t , 2 0 2 d , 2 0 5 t h , 2 0 6 th , 2 0 9 th , 2 1 2 t h , 2 1 4 t h , a n d 216th t T h e e ig h t d iv is io n s : 2 2 1 s t , 2 2 2 d , 2 2 4 th , 2 2 5 t h , 2 2 9 th th r o u g h 2 3 1 s t , a n d 2 3 4 th .

157

DECISIVE COMBAT

well provided with fire power). The remaining 11 divisions* were coastdefense formations. In addition, many mixed brigades, mixed regiments, and artillery units were ordered to be organized. A plan to fit out 500 air squadrons was then underway. In the process of formation were 240 squadrons: 32 reconnaissance 143 fighter 33 heavy bomber 15 light bomber 10 transport 7 anti-submarine The organization of suicide air units was, in addition, emphasized. By the end of June, various kinds of such aircraft had been produced (2,000 in number). From them, 187 daylight attack and 43 night attack units were being set up. A shortage of weapons was the greatest bottleneck lying in the way of ground preparedness. Even man-portable individual weapons such as rifles and bayonets were lacking. The insufficiency of field and mountain guns was to be made up for by mortars, which could be produced easily. Mobilization of personnel was nevertheless being pushed; this was all based upon the concept that harmony among individuals was more important than weapons themselves. People were called up and or­ ganized into units in an effort to cement unity—weapons would be sup­ plied as soon as they were turned out. Southern Kyushu, however, was accorded top priority in the issue of weapons and equipment, at the ex­ pense of other districts, because the American invasion was supposed to be imminent. Simultaneously with the issuance of orders for the third set of military preparedness measures, IGHQ decreed the establishment of the Tokyo Defense Army, and assigned it to the order of battle of the Twelfth Area Army. The mission of the Tokyo Defense Army was to secure the area centering around the Imperial Palace. Aside from this measure, the Army ( against possible emergencies) tentatively decided upon the site for a provisional Imperial Palace to be located in the suburbs of the city of Nagano. From about 1944, a large-scale Imperial General Headquarters was being secretly constructed in caves at the town of Matsushiro in Nagano Prefecture. o « * Around April 1945, IGHQ made a new estimate of conditions in the Far East: The American plan of operations apparently envisaged an advance to the Japanese homeland, followed by a short, decisive struggle there. After the end of the Okinawa campaign, U. S. forces would attempt land­ ing operations in strategic areas along the coasts of the Chinese Main*The remaining and 3 5 5 th .

3 5 4 th ,

1

n

divisions:

3 0 3 d , 3 0 8 th , 3 1 2 t h , 3 1 6 t h , 3 2 0 th , 3 2 1 s t ,

322d,

3 4 4 th , 3 5 1 s t ,

158

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

T

land, the Korea Straits, and the islands near the Japanese homeland— about summertime. It was deemed highly probable that (with the pre- | ceding places as springboards) the enemy would plan a final decisive battle against Japan Proper, after autumn. In their operations against the Japanese homeland, the Americans could be expected to render various systems helpless by means of aerial action. Then they would proceed to the Kanto District for a decisive battle, in order to bring the war to a quick finish. It was also believed possible, however, that the enemy might push into Kyushu beforehand. Soviet Russia might meanwhile seize a good chance to use military force and to try to extend its influence in the Far East. Troop movements to Far Eastern Russia had already commenced at the end of February. In summer or autumn the Russians would be ready to launch an attack against Japan at any time.0 Expecting an American landing in Japan Proper after autumn, IGHQ judged that the debarkation areas would lie in the Kanto District; or, alternatively, first in Kyushu and then in the Kanto. The Russian attitude toward Japan caused great concern at IGHQ, in view of all the contingencies. The general idea was that the Soviets would not venture an expensive war against Japan, because they had been severely mauled during the war with Germany. It was nevertheless ex­ pected that the Russians would in all probability attack while the Japa­ nese Army was in direst distress in the homeland: Whenever there arose a good opportunity to seize Manchuria easily, the Soviets would of course grasp that chance. The American landings in the homeland and the Soviet Army’s entry into the war against Japan could not therefore be viewed separately, but should instead be regarded as almost simultaneous matters. This was the premise underlying IGHQ’s estimate of the situation. On April 8, 1945, the Army Section of IGHQ drafted plans for deal­ ing with operational preparations in Japan Proper. This operational sum­ mary embodied Army-Navy operational principles drawn up in January, and may be outlined as follows: 1. The Japanese Army should speedily strengthen military prepara­ tions; establish a strategic setup to doom the American forces; and engage the invading U. S. troops at key points in the homeland. Thus the main fronts were to be the Pacific and the East China Sea; emphasis in military preparations was to be devoted to the Kanto and Kyushu districts. Noth­ ing should also be spared in guarding strategic places along the coast of the Japan Sea, and in preventing American maneuvers in those waters. 2. Efforts should be made to defeat U. S. Air Force raids; to restrain their rampant activities; and to protect the capital and key points in the homeland, especially production, communications, and operational-prepa­ ration centers. 3. Endeavors should be made to destroy American invasion attempts* * M a tte r s c o n c e r n in g C h u n g k i n g a r e o m itte d .

DECISIVE COMBAT

159

directed against strategic places in the homeland—on the high seas, in so far as possible—and to attack enemy landing forces on the ground with great gallantry, in order to obtain a quick decision. a. In conducting air operations, emphasis should be devoted to the destruction of the U. S. forces’ landing attempts; the major target of at­ tack should be transport convoys. With the preceding points in view, and within appropriate limitations, aerial battles of annihilation, air defense operations, and ground support action should be executed—in order to maintain and to foster fighting capabilities against hostile landing opera­ tions. b. Ground operations should be conducted with a view toward over­ whelming and annihilating U. S. troops who have landed at strategic sites on the coast, and thus seeking a final solution to the military situa­ tion. Ground forces should carry out their operations independently, even without the support of the air force, and should achieve their ob­ jectives. 4. Co-operation should be rendered the Navy in protecting maritime communications, conducting surface and submarine suicide operations, and defense. 5. Special characteristics of the terrain should be exploited. The Army must be prepared to attain its operational objectives, particularly displaying the whole nation’s spirit of universal conscription. To cope with inland penetration by elements of the American forces, and with changes in the situation, the Army should also prepare for interior re­ sistance throughout the country, and should make every effort to maintain domestic security. Vol. IV, ed. Walter Yust (Chicago, 1947), p. 726. O ’Neill states that 10,947 troops surrendered on Christmas Day. Op. cit., p. 125. 4. During the strike in Badung Strait (February 19-20, 1942), the Allied commander (Admiral Doorman, of the Dutch Navy) disabled one Japanese vessel but lost a destroyer {Piet Hein). On February 27 occurred the Battle of the Java Sea: “ In one afternoon and evening, half the ships of Admiral Doorman’s Striking Force had been destroyed; and the Admiral had gone down with his flagship. The Japanese had not lost a single ship, and only one destroyer was badly damaged. The [Japanese] convoy was untouched.” Among the Allied vessels lost were: Kortenaer (Dutch destroyer); Electra (British destroyer); Jupiter {do.); De Ruytcr and flagship Java (Dutch light cruisers). Note based upon Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. Ill, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942 (Boston, 1951), pp- 321-58. 5. The author is referring to the Battle of Sunda Strait, February 28-March 1, 1942. Lost were Perth (Australian light cruiser); Houston (American heavy cruiser); Evertsen (Dutch destroyer); also Exeter (British heavy cruiser); Encounter (British destroyer); and Pope (Ameri­ can destroyer)— the “ last Allied ship in the Java Sea.” Morison, op. cit., pp. 363-75. The only surface warships of the old U. S. Asiatic Fleet which survived the Java campaign comprised six destroyers, one cruiser ( Marblehead), and two gunboats. Ibid., p. 375. 6. The Japanese officially announced that the 93,000 Netherlands East Indies personnel in­ cluded 2,000 commissioned officers, and that the following equipment was seized: 152 warplanes, 367 armored vehicles, 732 cannon, 1,567 machine guns, and 97,384 rifles; etc. It was further stated that 24,000 Dutch troops and some 100,000 Indonesian soldiers were captured in the Indies, and that the natives were released. The Dutch were said to have lost two divisions and about fifteen independent battalions, while the Americans, British, and Australians lost the equivalent of one combined division. Japan Year Booh, J 944 ~45 > PP* 706-708. The Dutch military commander-in-chief on Java was General Hein ter Poorten; the Governor-General, A. W. L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer.

CHAPTER 4 1. Naotake Sato: Born at Osaka, October 1882; was graduated from Tokyo Higher Com­ mercial School, July 1904; passed Diplomatic and Consular Service examinations, October 1905; Attach^, Embassy, St. Petersburg, 1906; Consul-General, Harbin, 1914; Executive Staff, Peace Delegation, June 1921; Embassy Councillor, France, August 1921; Representative, Hague Conference, June 1922; Minister, Poland, August 1923; Representative, Preparatory Committee, Disarmament Conference, League of Nations, October 1926; member, Representative’s Suite, Naval Disarmament Conference, Geneva, April 1927; member, Representative’s Suite, Naval Conference, London, November 1929; Ambassador, Belgium— Representative, Preparatory Com­ mittee, Disarmament Conference, League of Nations, December 1930; Representative, General Disarmament Conference, Geneva, December 1931; assigned to France, November 1933; official duty, Manchukuo and China, September 1934; Minister of Foreign Affairs (Hayashi Cabinet), March 1937; resigned, June 1937; Diplomatic Adviser, Foreign Office (rst Konoye Cabinet), September 1938; resigned, October 1938; Ambassador, Italy— Representative for Italo-Japanese amity and negotiation of economic matters, March 1940; gave up post, August 1940; Diplomatic Adviser, Foreign Office (Tojo Cabinet), November 1941; resigned— appointed Ambassador to U.S.S.R., February 1942; interned at Moscow after Soviet declaration of war on Japan, August 1945; now active in United Nations affairs. Also see Japan's Struggle to End the War, United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Washington, D. C., 1946), p. 30; Toshikazu Kase, Journey to the Missouri, p. 204; James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), p. 211 (“ Ambassador Sato in Moscow was a realist and a courageous representative” ).

202

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

2. General Fuller states that “ it was not the [strategic] value of the Hawaiian Islands as a Japanese base from which to attack the United States which should have struck [Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet]; instead, it was their value as an American base to attack Japan from. The whole question was in fact not an offensive but a defensive one— namely, to occupy the islands and either hold them as long as possible, or anyhow sufficiently long to permit of their naval facilities being destroyed. . . . [But] even the tiny island of Wake, defended by 378 marines with twelve planes and six 5-inch guns, put seven Japanese warships out of acdon and held out for sixteen days." The Second World War,

p. 1353. The Navy’s view is presented by Fuchida and Okumiya: The reasons for the rejection were persuasive enough, but Navy circles suspected that they were a camouflage for the Army’s real intentions. The Army High Command, it was surmised, was confidently counting upon the success of the major offensive which Germany planned to launch in the Caucasus in the spring. Such success, of course, would radically alter the European war situation in Germany’s favor, and it was suspected that the Army desired to hold back a large part of its forces with a view to committing them on the continent against Russia when this favorable situation developed. In any event, it was abundantly clear that the Army did not want to commit substantial forces to the southeast area and would have no part of an attempt to invade Australia. Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, describing the so-called “ Australia-first” school of thought, in Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan; the Japanese Navy’s Story, ed. C. H. Kawakami and R. Pineau (Annapolis, 1955), p. 55. 4. To cite but one instance of the contemporary situation existing on the Allied side: “ On the books,” the Air Force Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area (Gen Kenney) had 517 American aircraft and 22 squadrons (about 250 planes) of Australian craft. After deducting those planes which were undergoing major overhaul, were being salvaged, were lacking guns or bomb racks, or were of no combat utility, there remained only some 150 U. S. and 70 Australian warplanes of all types, scattered throughout the Southwest Pacific. General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War, by George C. Kenney (New York, 1949), pp. 61-62; and The MacArthur I Know, by the same author (N ew York, 1951), pp. 47-48. 5. A 2d Imperial Guard Division was activated in 1943 and transferred to Sumatra.

CHAPTER 5 1. The original number of volunteers for Claire L. Chennault’s three-squadron A V G “ Flying Tigers” totalled only 100 pilots and 200 ground-crew personnel. Current production of latemodel fighters was insufficient to meet the priority requirements of the United States Army Air Force and the Royal Air Force. The Volunteer Group was therefore allotted 100 P-4oB's (“ Tomahawks” ), which were considered obsolescent and had been destined for Sweden. Training began at Rangoon in September 1941, but without replacement personnel or ample stocks of spare parts, only 43 of the original 100 planes were still operational, and 84 pilots fit for combat, by November. The first A V G combat mission occurred on December 20, 1941, during a Japanese bomber attack against Kunming. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War 11, Vol. I, pp. 488-89. 2. The second part of the phrase Seigo Kosaku signifies “ measures," while the first implies a generalized “ establishment of peaceful, ideal, and friendly conditions" throughout an area. In practice the program meant the ferreting out and mopping up of guerrillas and Communists infesting the interior of China, on the part of the Nanking ( “ puppet” ) Government and the Japanese military. Any translation of the above-cited term as “ country-clearing” is manifestly ambiguous. 3. The Americans originally planned to use twenty B-25’s but only 16 could be lashed aboard the U.S.S. Hornet. Fourteen of the crews came through alive from the mission. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War 11, Vol. I, pp. 440, 442.

CHAPTER 6 1. At Midway, in a battle which saw no combat between surface warships, the Japanese lost four aircraft carriers (Akflgi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu) and a cruiser (Mikuma). The Americans lost the carrier Yorktown and destroyer Hammann.

T NOTES

203

2. Off the Komandorski Islands an outgunned and outnumbered American task force thwarted a Japanese attempt to escort two transports and a freighter in to Attu. Involved were, on the Japanese side, two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, four destroyers, and two merchant cruisers. The Americans had one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and four destroyers. Neither side lost a vessel during 3/2 uninterrupted hours of fire. U. S. casualties were, in the words of Morison, “ incredibly low:” seven killed, seven hospital cases, 13 minor injuries. Japanese casualties amounted to 14 killed and 26 or 27 wounded (all but one in Nachi, a heavy cruiser). Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. VII, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942-April 1944 (Boston, 1951), pp. 22-35. The en­ counter actually occurred about 65 miles south of the Komandorski Pensinula. The War Reports of General . . . Marshall, General . . . Arnold . . . Admiral . . . King (Philadelphia, I 947)> PP- 554-55; Adm King’s First Report. 3. The American landing force was made up of a portion of the 7th Infantry Division, rein­ forced. Fighting their way across Attu, the Americans encircled Japanese forces defending Chichagof Harbor. When the operation was terminated at the end of May, 2,350 Japanese had been wiped out, at a cost of 512 U. S. Army troops. The War Reports, p. 102; Gen Marshall’s Second Report. Morison states that Col Yamazaki had 2,630 men to defend Attu, and that the ground fighting cost the Japanese 2,351 killed and 28 prisoners. Subsequent estimates of American casualties are 600 killed and 1,200 wounded (out of a landing force of 11,000). Op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 37-50. Some interesting details of Col Yamazaki’s last charge, with a “ howling mob a thousand strong” (as seen from the American side), may be found at ibid., pp. 50-51.

CHAPTER 7 1. Properly speaking, the Japanese possessed no “ Marines” in the true American sense.

The

Rikusentai (Naval Landing Force) consisted entirely of sailors under Navy officers trained at the Arm y’s Infantry School. Light fire-power equipment was furnished from Army stocks; heavier materiel was manufactured by the Navy. Rikusentai units were never grouped in larger than battalion strength. Numbered elements were named after the three Naval Districts (Yokosuka, Sasebo, Maizuru); e.g., 4th Sasebo Naval Landing Force, etc.

I

2. The naval actions which took place in the Guadalcanal region between August and November 1942 go by different names in Japanese and American naval usage. U. S. designations are used in this footnote. (1) August 8, Battle of Savo Island: The Japanese claimed to have sunk eight enemy cruisers and six destroyers, whereas the Allies actually lost four heavy cruisers (U.S.S. Quincy, Vincennes, Astoria; H.M.A.S. Canbetra). One other heavy cruiser ( Chicago) and two destroyers were damaged, the latter being Patterson and Ralph Talbot. The victorious Japanese had only one heavy cruiser (Chokai) slightly damaged, although they lost the heavy cruiser Kako next day (August 9). (2) August 24, Battle of the Eastern Solomons: Only aircraft versus ships were involved. The Japanese claimed to have seriously damaged one aircraft carrier and to have inflicted lesser wounds upon another carrier and one battleship. In actuality the American carrier Enterprise was moderately damaged and 20 planes were shot down. Sunk on the Japanese side were the carrier Ryujo, the destroyer Mutsuk}, and one transport; 90 planes were downed. The seaplane tender Chitose and the light cruiser fintsu were damaged. (3) October 11-12, Battle of Cape Esperance: The Japanese asserted that they sank one heavy cruiser and one destroyer, and heavily damaged one cruiser. The only American warship which went down was the destroyer Duncan, while the light cruiser Boise was severely damaged, the heavy cruiser San Francisco was hit, and the destroyer Farenholt was damaged. In the main encounter, the Japanese lost the heavy cruiser Furutakct and the destroyer Fubuki. The heavy cruiser Aoba (flagship) was moderately damaged and the heavy cruiser Kinugasa sustained light damage. Picking up survivors, the destroyers Murakumo and Natsugumo were sunk. (4) October 26, Battle of Santa Cruz (/.: Battle of the South Pacific). The claims of the Japanese included three aircraft carriers, one battleship, one cruiser, and one destroyer sunk. Actually sunk were the carrier Hornet and the destroyer Porter. Various degrees of damage were suffered by the aircraft carrier Enterprise, battleship South Dakota, light cruiser San Juan, and destroyer Smith. Seventy-four U. S. aircraft were shot down. The Japanese aircraft carriers Shokaku and Zuiho were damaged; the heavy cruiser Chikuma, heavily damaged; the destroyer Terutsuki, moderately damaged; and the destroyer Akiknze, heavily damaged. One hundred Japanese planes were lost. (5) November 13-15, Batde of Guadalcanal ( “ one of the most furious sea battles ever fought,” according to Admiral King’s account). The Japanese claimed to have sunk 7-8 cruisers, 4-8 destroyers; and to have crippled two battleships, 2-3 cruisers, about 4 destroyers.

204

JAPANESE ARMY IN TPIE PACIFIC

U. S. naval losses were indeed severe: three cruisers sunk ( Atlanta, Juneau, and Helena) and seven destroyers sunk ( Cushing, Laffey, Barton, Monssen, Preston, Benham, and Walke). Damaged were one battleship ( South Dakota), two cruisers ( Portland and San Francisco), and four destroyers ( Sterrett, O'Btmnon, Gwinn, and Aaron Ward). On November 13 the Japanese lost one battleship ( Hiei) and two destroyers (Akatsuki and Yudachi); four destroyers were hurt ilkazuchi, Murasame, Amatsukaze, and Hatsukfize). Next day one heavy cruiser ( Kinugasa) and six high-speed transports went down, while damage was incurred by two heavy cruisers (Maya, Choked), one light cruiser (Isuzu), two destroyers (Yukikaze. Michishio), and four transports. On November 15 the Japanese lost a second battleship (Kirishima) and a third destroyer (Ayanami) sunk. (6) November 30, Battle of Tassafaronga (Lunga Point): The Americans lost one heavy cruiser sunk (Northampton) and three others crippled (Minneapolis, New Orleans, and Pensacola). On the Japanese side, one destroyer (Takanami) was sunk and a second was damaged (Naganami). [Footnote based upon United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, The Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washington, D. C., 1946); and Admiral King’s First Report, March 1, 1944; The War Reports, passim.] 3. A total of approximately 60,000 United States Army and Marine Corps ground troops were eventually committed at Guadalcanal. Involved were the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, and the Army’s Americal and 25th Divisions. United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific, John Miller, jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive (Washington, D. C., 1949), p. 350. 4. In General Eichelberger’s own words: Buna was the first Allied Ground Force victory in the Pacific (the Buna campaign was ended before the fall of Guadalcanal), and it was bought at a substantial price in death, wounds, disease, despair, and human suffering. No one who fought there, however hard he tries, will ever forget it. I am a reasonably unimaginative man, but Buna is still to me, in retrospect, a nightmare. This long after, I can still remember every day and most of the nights as clearly as though they were days and nights last week.

Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, by Robert L. Eichelberger in collaboration with Milton Mackaye (New York, 1950), p. 17.

CHAPTER 8 1. Reports from Ambassador Oshima had hinted at the imminence of hostilities between Germany and Soviet Russia since April 1941. On May 28, Matsuoka asked that Germany avoid conflict “ by every means at its disposal.” T o this message the German Foreign Ministry replied that war was now unavoidable, but assurances were given that it would not last more than two or three months. “ Japan was not being asked to give any assistance in that war, and . . . besides, she would benefit considerably from its outcome.” Affidavit of Tomohiko Ushiba, Defense Exhibit No. 2735-A, IMTFE, Transcript, June 13, 1947, pp. 24,303-4. Ambassador Oshima states that the German request for Japan to enter the war against Russia (July 1942) was not repeated, the one proposal being turned down because Japan claimed that her military forces were “ barely sufficient for the China and Pacific theaters.” Interrogation of Hiroshi Oshima, April 22, 1946, Defense Exhibit No. 2693, ibid., June 2, 1947, PP* 23,558-60. 2. The Assistant Military Attache in Tokyo alleges that, in June or July 1942, Tojo told the German Ambassador and the Military Mission that “ German troops should advance as far as Aden and Basra, and the Japanese to India and Ceylon via Burma; the border line of their sphere of interests would lie along 70 degrees East.” Affidavit of LtCol Fritz von Petersdorf, Prosecution Exhibit No. 3858, IMTFE, Transcript, January 28, 1948, pp. 38,422-23. 3. According to German military intelligence sources, the Japanese, by virtue of their neutrality in the Russo-German conflict, should have been able to supply the Abwehr with intelligence from Russian sources which would have been of inestimable value. But in this respect they were most parsimonious; it was only where the Abwehr succeeded in suborning the sources at their disposal, and in the measure in which it was prepared to accept their evaluation of the material given by these sources that their neutrality was of any use from the Intelligence point of view. On the other hand, the Germans had no control whatsoever over the extent to which the Japanese passed on in­ formation and material collected inside the German sphere of domination. . . .

r NOTES

205

The Japanese were particularly interested in [the] attempts by the Abwehr to make use of the Ukrainian and other Eastern minorities. . . . They were in close touch with White Russian emigres in Germany . . . Paul Leverkuehn, German Military Intelligence, pp. 64, 159, 161. Conflicting evidence on the degree of collaboration at the Far Eastern terminal of the Axis connection will be found in the proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Thus, according to former LtCol Fritz von Petersdorf, Assistant German Military Attache in Tokyo, Japanese Intelligence provided “ all military information about the Russian Far Eastern Army, namely: disposition of troops, their strength, military transportation, details about reserves, movements of Soviet troops at the European front, as well as the data concerning war industry in the Soviet Union." In addition to intelligence interchanges of data, the Germans reportedly furnished the Japanese with prototypes of powerful hollow-charge grenades. German Army Ordnance experts arrived in the spring of 1942 to expedite mass production of advanced weapons in Japan, from German drawings and designs. Meanwhile blockade runners conveyed raw materials (rubber, tin, etc.) from Southeast Asia to Germany, according to what Admiral Wenneker (the German Naval Attache in Tokyo) is said to have told von Petersdorf. IMTFE, Transcript, January 28, 1948, Prosecution Exhibit No. 3858, pp. 38,425-29. Col Hiroshi Akita, Chief of the German Section within Japanese Intelligence, refutes most of von Petersdorf’s allegations. Ibid., February 3, 1948, Defense Exhibit No. 3892, pp. 38,769-71.

CHAPTER 9 1. In the words of General Eichelberger: Bougainville was the last major obstacle— on the Solomons side— before Rabaul. T w o small preliminary landings were made. The 8th New Zealand Brigade went ashore in the lightly held Treasury Islands, and the 2d Marine Parachute Bat­ talion landed on Choiseul Island. Further to confuse the enemy, there were naval barrages and aerial assaults at several other places. The main landing was made at Empress Augusta Bay in western Bougainville by the 3d Marine Division, under Lieutenant General A. A. Vandegrift, and the Army’s 37th Division. . . . Later the Americal Division came into Bougainville from Guadalcanal, and control of the beachhead went over to General Griswold’s XIV Corps. Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, p. 96. 2. The 2d Marine Division landed on Tarawa; a combat team of the 27th Division, on Makin. Concerning the situation at Tarawa, the U. S. Navy history states: The Japanese installations were not only skillfully planned but amply manned and bravely defended. The best enemy troops were those of the Sasebo 7th Special Naval Landing Force, 1497 officers and men under Commander Takeo Sugai, stout fellows who could take a lot of punishment. The 3d Special Base Force, a naval landing force of 1122 men who had been there since March 1943, were almost as formidable. The defenses had been constructed by the m t h Pioneers (a unit corresponding to our Seabees), 1247 strong, and by the Fourth Fleet’s construc­ tion unit of 970 men, of whom over half were Koreans. Subtracting these, and men killed or wounded in previous bombardments, there were over 4500 troops on the island 20 November, all well fed and hard as nails. The atoll commander, Rear Admiral Keiji Shibasaki, killed 21 November in his concrete command post, was reported by a prisoner to have declared that the Americans could not take Tarawa with a million men in a hundred years. . . . the Japanese on Tarawa did fight almost ‘to the last man.’ Only one officer, 16 enlisted men, and 129 Koreans were taken prisoner. Samuel Eliot Morison op. cit., Vol. VII, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 148-49. On D-Day at Tarawa about 5000 Americans were ashore and about 1500 of them had been killed or wounded. Ibid., p. 168. Total American casualties at Tarawa amounted to 1,009 killed and 2,101 wounded. Ibid., p. 184. The Japanese defenders of Makin Atoll numbered only 700-800 men, including construction workers. Attacking them were 6,472 American assault troops: the 165th Regimental Combat Team and a battalion landing team of the 105th Infantry, both of the 27th Division. In support were eight battleships and cruisers, 13 destroyers, and planes from five carriers; the Japanese possessed neither ships nor planes. American ground troop losses amounted to 64 killed and 150 wounded. Ibid., pp. 122, 134.

206

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

3. T w o points on Kwajalein Atoll (the world’s largest coral atoll) were the primary objectives o£ the Americans’ Marshall Islands operation: Roi-Namur in the north and Kwajalein Island in the south. On tiny Roi-Namur the Japanese concentrated 3,500-3,800 troops. The green 4tfc U. S. Marine Division was to storm Roi-Namur, while Kwajalein was the objective of the Army’s 7th Infantry Division. Morison summarizes strengths and casualties as follows:

V. s. Troops Committed

Killed, Missing, Died of Wounds

Wounded

Casualty Total

Kwajalein (South)

21,342

177

1.037

1,214

Kwajalein (North)

20,104

195

545

740

372

1,582

1.954

41,446

Japanese Estimated Total Strength Kwajalein (South) Kwajalein (North)

Counted Prisoners

Killed

5,112

4.398

91

(incl. 125 Koreans)

3.563

3,472

174

(inch 40 Koreans)

8,675

7,870

265

Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 278; also pp. 230-32. 4. Morison states that in retrospect the two-day strike against Truk was one of the most successful carrier operations of the war. It reduced by as much as 75 per cent the amount of supplies on hand; it deprived the Japanese Navy of 2 light cruisers, 4 destroyers, 3 auxiliary cruisers, 2 submarine tenders, 2 subchasers, an armed trawler and a plane ferry; and the merchant marine of 24 Marus (5 of them tankers) totaling 137,091 tons. And the 250 to 275 planes destroyed or damaged made a big dent on the Japanese air force. The capture of Eniwetok could now proceed without interference by a single enemy plane, and . . . fighters over Rabaul, on 18 February, for the first time encountered not one plane airborne over that former hive of aviation activity. U. S. losses for February’s strike period amounted to 29 pilots and crewmen killed or missing— all but three in combat. Eight fighters, six torpedo-bombers, and three dive-bombers were lost in combat. Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 329-30. The Japanese author’s textual statement concern­ ing American warships’ having approached the island of Truk and opened fire refers to naval encounters; “ naval gunfire from outside the reef could reach neither the islands nor the fleet anchorage in the lagoon.” Morison, ibid., p. 317. Involved, on the American side, in the strike on Truk was T F 58 (Fast Carrier Force) under Mitscher, with three carrier groups (nine carriers). Ibid., pp. 352-53. Taylor, in his biography of Mitscher, says that 72 fighters took part in the first raid, that the Japanese lost 56 planes in a few hours, and that about 72 more were knocked out on the ground. Theodore Taylor, The Magnificent Mitscher (New York, 1954). PP- 183-84.

CHAPTER 10 I. "In order to unify orders for munitions production and to bring about a unified adminis­ tration of all affairs relating to munitions production, in harmony with the policy of expanding munitions production, particularly the production of aircraft, the Government on November 1 created a new Ministry of Munitions by abolishing the Board of Planning and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, as a unified organ of production in which the total industrial power of the nation is to be concentrated. With the establishment of this new organ, all matters relating

NOTES

207

to the State General Mobilization Act and all matters tinder the jurisdiction o£ the Board of Planning and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry were transferred to the new organ. . . . the decision to create the Ministry of Munitions [was taken] on September 28 . . . " The Japan Year Book, 1944 -45 , PP' 163-64.

CHAPTER 11 CHAPTER 12 1. Ba Maw, who had been Prime Minister during 1937-39, was in prison when the Japanese invaded Burma. The Japanese got him to head a coalition government, a “ Burmese Executive Administration” being set up in Rangoon on August I, 1942. A Japanese-drafted Burmese “ Declaration of Independence” was issued one year later, and Burma declared war upon Great Britain and the United States, while concluding a Treaty of Alliance with Japan. See F. C. Jones, Japan’s New Order in Bast Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1957-45 (London, 1954), pp. 352' 57Jones makes use of the IMTFE Transcript, passim. 2. Of Chandra Bose and the INA, British Captain D. H. James (who was captured by the Japanese in Malaya and spent the rest of the war in prison camps) has bitterly written: . . . within a few hours of the unconditional surrender of Singapore thousands of . . . disloyal troops were joining the Indian National Army. They needed no persuasion, these traitors of the 3 Indian Corps, and within a few weeks there were 15,000 volunteers in the ranks of the first I.N.A. . . . [until] the fall of Singapore, two hundred [Indians] acted . . . as a fifth column and propaganda unit for the Japanese Army. . . . part of this unit were landed with the first wave of Japanese troops to cross from Johore Bahru to Singapore Island on 8/9th February [1942]. This unit, termed Royal Volunteers, acted as the nucleus of the I.N.A. Gestapo. . . . the sorry story of the I.N.A., the propaganda rabble of the subsequent Japanese thrust through Burma to India. The 1 st I.N.A. broke up into groups of partisans and was ‘reformed’ under the leadership of Subas Chandra Bose as the 2d I.N.A. in August, 1943— after Chandra Bose had been [brought] over from Germany. . . . The Government of Azad Hind was ‘established’ on 21st October with Chandra Bose as head of the State. On 24th October, 1943 the Azad Hind Government declared war on Britain and the United States of America. The first action, against British troops by the I.N.A., took place on the Manipur frontier in February, 1944. . . . The maximum number of traitors who joined the I.N.A. was 30,000 (military and civilians) so the extent of their patriotism may be compared with that of the loyalty of the real Indian Army [2,500,000 on all fronts; casualties 177,315 in­ cluding 23,698 killed]. The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire (London, 1951), pp. 211-12, 251-52. Also see footnote on Chandra Bose’s fate, Chapter 16, below. Compare Captain James’ account with official Japanese contemporary pronouncements; viz., "the burning spirit and renewed resolve of the Indian patriots who have risen in close unity under the Provisional Government of Azad Hind,” etc. The Japan Year Book, ‘ 944 -45 , P- 1793. This was the same Kotoku Sato who, as a Colonel, commanded the 75th Infantry Regiment during the Changkufeng Incident of 1938. His Regiment executed a daring night assault which ousted the Russians from the disputed hill, in an action which the Japanese considered to be a model of its tactical type. At the time of the Nomonhan Incident in 1939, Sato was in command of the 2d Sector Unit, 8th Border Garrison Unit (Hailar). Then a Major General, he replaced the wounded commanding general of the 23d Infantry Group on the Nomonhan battle front. When the present editor interviewed General Sato in June 1956, that earnest ex-officer immediately proceeded to defend his actions in Burma as having saved the lives of troops (although this was not then the subject under immediate discussion). Sato's alleged “ insubordination” in Burma cost him any further military career in World War II.

CHAPTER 13 t. The Battle of the Philippine Sea raged on June 19-20, 1944, as Japanese carrier-based planes struck Admiral Spruance’s Fifth Fleet covering the Saipan operation. Two American battleships,

208

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

two carriers, and a heavy cruiser were damaged. The Japanese lost over 300 aircraft, while U. S. submarines sank two aircraft carriers (June 19). Next day carrier-based planes from Admiral Mitscher’s Fifth Fleet carrier task force sank the Japanese carrier Hiyo. In the two days of battle the Japanese lost 395 (92% ) of their carrier planes and 31 (72 % ) of their float planes. Only 35 carrier planes and 12 float planes remained operational. In addition to the losses afloat, about 50 land-based Japanese aircraft from Guam were downed. American losses were 130 planes and 76 airmen for the two days. “ After the Battle of the Philippine Sea the Japanese high command thoroughly understood that the war was lost.” United States Naval Chronology, World War II, prepared in the Naval History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department (Washington, D. C., 1955), pp. 93-4. Contemporary Japanese victory an­ nouncements asserted that the Americans lost “ more than five aircraft carriers sunk or damaged, one battleship sunk, and more than 100 planes shot down” on June 19-20, west of the Marianas. The Japan Year Boo\, 1944-45, p. 728. Toshikazu Kase, a Foreign Ministry official at the time, reminds us that “ it was customary for GHQ to make false announcements of victory in utter disregard of facts, and for the elated and complacent public to believe in them.” On the evening of June 21, 1944, [relates Kase] I dined with several naval officers of GHQ. They were profuse in assuring me that our fleet had emerged victorious from the engagement [in the Philippine Sea]. They even drank hilariously to the spectacular victory. When the party dispersed one of my trusted friends, Captain Watanabe, remained behind and told me in strict confidence that what I had heard a few minutes before was the official version of the battle but that the truth was our fleet had suffered a devastating defeat. Journey to the Missouri, pp. 73-4. 2. “ Tojo did not relinquish power without a struggle. He clung to office tenaciously and tried every means to retain it. . . . He refused to resign from the premiership until the last moment and even disputed his removal with the Emperor.” Kase, op. cit., pp. 79, 81.

CHAPTER 14 1. The American press blackout rendered it difficult for the Japanese to assess the effectiveness of the 9,000 incendiary balloons which were launched on eastward winds. Physical destruction effected by those balloons which did reach the North American Continent actually amounted to “ a few grass fires and the death of six people.” V. L. and M. H. Albjerg, Europe from 1914 to the Present (New York, 1951), p. 596. The Japanese themselves used the code name " Fu-go” for the balloon operation. Almost fifteen years later, in January 1958, Dr. Lincoln La Paz, Director of the New Mexico University Institute of Meteoritics, and one of the world’s outstanding sky-watchers, discussed the luminous phenomena he had observed for 40 years. “ Almost everyone scoffed when ranchers and farmers reported seeing bright stationary fire­ balls in the skies over the western half [of the United States] in late 1944 and early 1945. It was not until we captured hydrogen-filled Japanese paper balloons with a large wad of magnesium flash powder cemented to the envelope that we realized these eyewitnesses had been accurately reporting self-destroying, man-made objects overhead.”

CHAPTER 15 1. The Japanese officially announced the following “ authentic scores” for air battles which raged off Taiwan between October 12-16, 1944: Sunk

Damaged

Total

4 -

I II

11

2

5

October 12 Aircraft Carrier Unidentified Warship

October

5

ij

Aircraft Carrier Cruiser or Destroyer Battleship Cruiser Warship (on fire)

3 1 — — -

I I

1 1 1

7

7

-

209

NOTES Sunk

Damaged

Total

October 14 Aircraft Carrier Battleship Cruiser or Destroyer Unidentified Warship Warship (on fire)

5

-

2 1 2

“

5

5

1

3 2

-

2 1 2

October 15 Aircraft Carrier Cruiser

3 1

4

—

-

1 1

1 1

17

40

57

IT

8 4

19 4 7

13

13

1

October 16 Aircraft Carrier Battleship TO TAL

By Categories Aircraft Carrier Battleship Cruiser Cruiser or Destroyer Unidentified Warship Warship (on fire) Data based upon The Japan Year Book,

2

3

I -

2

2

1

12

—

12

'■-45 , PP- 728-29.

Official postwar U .S. Navy records indicate the following naval casualties incurred during the same period: October 13: Carrier Franklin damaged by suicide plane and heavy cruiser Canberra damaged by aerial torpedo (Luzon and Formosa areas). October 14 (same area): Carrier Hancock damaged by horizontal bomber; light cruiser Houston damaged by aircraft torpedo; light cruiser Reno damaged by suicide plane; destroyer Cassin Young damaged by strafing. October 15: Carrier Franklin again damaged by horizontal bomber (Philippine Islands area). October 16: Light cruiser Houston again damaged by aerial torpedo (off Luzon). Naval Chronology, World War II, pp. 105-6. (Cp. author’s footnotes in body of text.) 2. According to the official postwar U. S. Naval records, the following losses were sustained by both sides in the course of the climactic Battle for Leyte Gulf (October 23-26, 1944): Sunk

Damaged

October 23 Japanese Navy:

Heavy cruiser

(Maya) Heavy cruiser

(Atago) October 24 U. S. Navy:

Light carrier Light cruiser ( Princeton); ( Birmingham) sunk by U. S. forces after damaged by dive bomber. Ocean tug Destroyers

(Sonoma)

(Morrison, Gatling, Irwin; Leutze; Albert W. Grant) Oiler LST (two)

1

210

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

October 24 ( Coni.)

Sunk Japanese Navy:

Damaged

Battleship

(Musashi) Destroyer

( IVa/(aba ) Submarine

(1-362) October 25 U. S. Navy:

Escort carriers

(St. Lo; Gambier Bay)

Escort carriers

(Hoel, Johnston)

(Sangamon, Suwanee, Santee, White Plains, Kalinin Bay, Fanshaw Bay, Kitkun Bay)

Destroyer escort

Destroyer

(Samuel B. Roberts)

(Heerman)

Destroyers

Destroyer escorts PT-493 Japanese Navy:

(Richard M. Rowell; Dennis)

Carrier

(Z u i\a\u ) Light carriers

(Chitose, Chiyoda, Zuiho) Battleships

(Fuso, Yamashiro) Heavy cruisers

(Chikuma, Chohjri, Suzuya; Mogarni) Light cruiser

(Tama) Destroyers

(Asagumo, Michishio, Yamagumo; Al(izu\i; Hatsuzukj) October 26 U. S. Navy:

Escort carrier

(Suwanee) PT-132 Japanese Navy:

Light cruisers

(Abukuma; Kinti, Noshiro) Destroyers

(Hayashimo; N ow a\i; Uranami) Data based upon Naval Chronology, World War II, pp. 107-10.

3. This is the casualty figure given by General Marshall in his Third Report to the Secretary of War, covering the period July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945. In liberating the Philippine Islands, the Army Chief of Staff estimated that MacArthur’s forces killed at least 317,000 Japanese; 7,236 Japanese were known to have been captured alive. The War Reports, p. 241.

NOTES

211

CHAPTER 16 i. As recently as May 1956 a four-man Indian team visited Japan to probe the circumstances of Bose’s alleged death in the crash of a military aircraft at Taipei on August 18, 1945. Sup­ posedly a “ veil of secrecy” cloaked the “ mysterious” tragedy (including some bizarre tales of murder and gems). But Japanese eyewitnesses (including Army surgeons who actually con­ ducted blood transfusions for the dying Indian leader) state that Bose’s death from injuries sus­ tained in the air crash is indisputably authenticated.

CHAPTER 17 1. Japanese geographies described Iwo Jima as an “ island of sulphur springs, with no water, no sparrow, and no swallow.” The defenders of the bleak, corrugated isle had the following garrison song: When dark tides billow in the ocean A wink shaped isle of mighty fame Guards the gateway to our empire: IWO JIMA is its name. . . . From dawn to dusk we train with zeal A t our Emperor’s command W e’ll bring the enemy to heel. Oh, for Emperor and homeland There’s no burden we won’t bear. Disease, hardship, and foul water; These are less to us than air. In the lonely mid-Pacific, Our sweat a fortress will prepare. If the enemy attacks us Let him come, we will not care. Extract from a Japanese document captured at Iwo Jima by J. S. Harris, L T 1/27 (Engineers); tr. Lt D. S. Kaplan, USA, G-2; in Howard M. Conner, The Spearhead: The World War II History of the $th Marine Division (Washington, D. C., 1950), pp. 105-6. 2. Of General Kuribayashi, the American Marine General Holland M. Smith has written: Of all our adversaries in the Pacific, Kuribayashi was the most redoubtable. Some Japanese island commanders were just names to us and disappeared into the anonymity of enemy corpses left for burial parties. Kuribayashi’s personality was written deep in the underground defenses he devised for Iwo Jima. He held us at arm’s length until we cornered him and the remnants of his force in the caves of Kitano Point. Iwo Jima was notable in that organized resistance did not collapse after the first few days, but continued to the end. As one of my officers fervently remarked, ‘Let’s hope the Japs don’t have any more like him.’ . . . Kuribayashi’s strictly business qualities were reflected in other matters besides his defenses. He must have been a martinet. When we sailed from Pearl Harbor, we took with us rations for the 1,500 civilians we expected to find on Iwo Jima. These rations were unnecessary. Months before we attacked, Kuribayashi evacuated to Japan all civilians. . . . He wanted no civilian hindrance. To him, Iwo Jima was solely a military base. He permitted none of the pleasures of Japanese camp life to undermine the morale of his men. No women were found on the island. Although he pledged his men to a typical Japanese oath— to die for their Emperor and take ten Ameri­ cans with them in death-— he permitted no mad charges inspired by the sake bottle. We found no large stocks of liquor on Iwo Jima, as on Guam and Saipan. As a matter of fact, I fail to recall that anyone picked up a single bottle on the island. General Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, Coral and Brass (New York, 1949), pp. 255-56. Conner amplifies General Holland’s statement concerning Kuribayashi: This man differed from most Japanese [Army] commanders. He had been to Canada for two years and had visited the United States. American industry and its mass production methods had impressed him. T o Kuribayashi, guns, ships, and many troops won battles. ‘Give me these things,’ he later radioed Tokyo, ‘and I will hold Iwo.’ . . .

212

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

A t first he speculated with the idea o£ sinking the island into the sea or cutting it in half to destroy the airfield in case of invasion. . . . However, Kuribayashi had other problems. After August 1944, American planes and submarines had so choked the supply route to Iwo Jima that its garrison had only thirty days’ supply of rice and fifteen days of supplementary food. In two months the Japanese lost 1,500 men and fifty thousand tons of foodstuffs and equipment trying to run the blockade, and Kuribayashi resorted to desperate measures. He ordered sailing boats and fishing vessels to make the run from Chichi Jima at night. The lack of a good harbor, rough weather, and almost daily air raids made this supply precari­ ous, but by February, troops on Iwo had seventy days’ supply of rice, plus other rations which could be made to last for two months. [The Japanese] troops were, in addition, faced with a continuous water shortage, and were forced to collect rain in barrels and bottles. . . . There were no fresh vegetables on the island and twenty per cent of the troops suffered from malnutri­ tion and paratyphoid. Conner, The Spearhead, pp. 35-36. The Island Commander, however, disseminated a docu­ ment intended to “ raise and unite the spirit of his troops.” The paper was found by the Americans on the bodies of the majority of the Japanese dead at Iwo, where it was also posted on pillbox walls.

Courageous Battle Vow Above all else we shall dedicate ourselves and our entire strength to the defense of this island. We shall grasp bombs, charge the enemy tanks and destroy them. We shall infiltrate into the midst of the enemy and annihilate them. With every salvo we will, without fail, kill the enemy. Each man will make it his duty to kill 10 of the enemy before dying. Until we are destroyed to the last man, we shall harass the enemy by guerrilla tactics. A partial translation, as provided in The Fourth Marine Division in World War 11, ed. Carl W. Proehl (Washington, D. C., 1946), pp. 154-55. 3. The 14th Marines alone fired 156,000 rounds on Iwo Jima, in a period of 26 days and nine hours after the first American troops landed. Ibid., p. 159. The four battalions of the 13th Marines fired 129,962 rounds in the same period. Conner, The Spearhead, p. 114. 4. On March 12, 1945, General Cates (4th U. S. Marine Division Commander) made a direct appeal to the last Japanese defenders to give up. The repeated broadcasts by prisoners, language officers, and Nisei interpreters produced no results for the last three days of combat on Iwo. General Kuribayashi radioed Tokyo: “ The Americans advised us to surrender by loud­ speaker, but we only laughed at this childish trick and did not set ourselves against them.” A prisoner taken by the 3d U. S. Marine Division later stated that Kuribayashi and other senior officers were in the final attack force but examination of corpses, captured swords, and docu­ ments could not confirm this fact. The Japanese General’s fate was never directly ascertained by the U. S. Marine victors. Conner, The Spearhead, pp. 115, 120. Kuribayashi had vetoed all plans for mass counterattacks. His last message to Tokyo stated: “ We have not eaten or drunk for five days, but our fighting spirit is still running high. We are going to fight bravely to the last.” Ibid., pp. 115, 118. Also see Proehl, Fourth Marine Division, p. 159. 5. Naval vessels hit by the Japanese during the Iwo Jima campaign were later disclosed to have comprised: destroyer John W. Weeks, damaged by coastal defense gun, February 19; LST-779, damaged by coastal mortar, February 20; escort carrier Bismarck Sea, sunk by suicide plane, February 21; carrier Saratoga, damaged by suicide planes, same day; escort carrier, Lunga Point, do.; net cargo ship Keokuk, do.; LST-477 and 809, do.; LST-684 and 792, dam­ aged by coastal defense guns, February 23; LST-792, do., February 24; LST-760 and 884, do., February 26; destroyer Bennett, damaged by aircraft bomb, February 28; destroyer Terry, dam­ aged by coastal defense gun, same day; destroyers Terry and Calhoun, do., March 1; attack transport Bolivar, do., March 3. Later, on March 20, the U. S. submarine Devilfish was dam­ aged by a suicide plane off the Volcano Islands. Based upon Naval Chronology, World War 11, pp. 129-34. 6. The author’s figures on U. S. ground casualties are based upon Admiral King’s Third Re­ port to the Secretary of the Navy (December 8, 1945), and cover 26 days of actual combat, as reported on March 17, 1945. Conner states that the Iwo Jima operation cost the landing

NOTES

213

forces a total of 20,979 officers and men, of whom nearly 5,000 died. The Spearhead, p. 121. The losses of the 27th Marines, for example, had been so severe that the average battalion, which had landed with 36 officers and 885 men, now mustered 16 officers and 300 men, including the hundreds of replacements who had been funneled in since D-Day. Many small units were now commanded by corporals and privates first class. Ibid., p. 119. Conner also asserts that 13,449 Japanese dead were interred on Iwo by the American landing forces, in addition to the thousands (estimated 10,000) buried by the Japanese themselves or sealed into caves during combat. Only 150 Japanese and 58 Koreans were taken prisoner, of whom n died and 85% of the rest required medical care for wounds. A large proportion of the Japanese dead, in fact, bore evidence of previous wounds. Ibid., pp. 118, 120. 7. LtGen Mitsuru Ushijima had relieved LtGen Masao Watanabe as Thirty-second Army Commander in August 1944. Ushijima and his chief of staff, the “ hard-driving, aggressive” LtGen Isamu Cho, “ reorganized the staff of the Army, replacing the incumbents with bright young officers from Imperial [General] Headquarters. As reconstituted, the staff was distin­ guished by its youth, low rank, and ability.” As for General Ushijima himself, according to the members of his staff, [he] was a calm and very capable officer who inspired confidence among his troops. He had commanded an infantry group in Burma early in the war and came to his new assignment from the position of Commandant of the Japanese Military Academy at Zama. . . . The combination of Ushijima’s mature judgment, Cho’s supple mind and aggressive energy, and the shrewd discernment of Yahara [Col Hiromichi; senior staff officer in charge of operations] gave the 32d Army a balanced and impressively able high command. Quotations from Okinawa: The Last Battle, by Roy E. Appleman et al., United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific (Washington, D. C., 1948), pp. 84-85. For interrogation sources (Yahara and Shimada), see ibid., p. 85, note 3. 8. On March 26, the U. S. Navy reports that the following warships suffered damage from Japanese air attack: one battleship, one light cruiser, four destroyers, one destroyer escort, and two miscellaneous vessels. During the next four days (prior to the U. S. landings on Okinawa), one heavy cruiser and eight miscellaneous craft were damaged. Naval Chronology, World War II, pp. 135-37. “Despite American attacks on enemy airfields and installations, approximately roo Japanese planes made 50 raids in the Okinawa area during the period from 26 to 31 March. . . . With few exceptions, the attacks came during early morning or by moonlight.” Appleman et al., Okinawa, p. 67. 9. Ill Amphibious Corps consisted of the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions; XX IV Corps, of the Army’s 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions. 10. . . the 62d Division was considered by the commanding general [Ushijima] and his staff to be the best in the 32d Army. . . . the division was formed from the 63d and 64th Brigades, each consisting of four independent infantry battalions which had fought in China since 1938. It lacked divisional artillery but by April 1945 had been brought up to a strength of about 14,000 by the addition of two independent infantry battalions and a number of . . . Okinawa Home Guards." Appleman et al., Okinawa, p. 85. 11. U. S. troop reinforcements included the 27th Division (held until then in “ floating re­ serve” ), which came in on April 9, was assigned to XXIV Corps, relieved the 96th Division in its western sector, and was in position by April 15. The 7th and 96th Divisions received a further 1,200 replacement troops from Saipan. Ibid., pp. 188-89. 12. On April 6, Japanese suicide planes mounted the “ first heavy attack . . . on United States ships at Okinawa.” Sunk were two destroyers, one minesweeper, and two LS T ’s; while one light carrier, eleven destroyers, two destroyer escorts, and eight other craft were dam­ aged. Next day Japanese planes hit one battleship, one aircraft carrier, one destroyer, one destroyer escort, and one other vessel. Naval Chronology, World War II, pp. 140-41. 13. An American submarine spotted the battleship Yamato, the light cruiser Yahagi, and eight destroyers heading across the East China Sea toward Okinawa. Aircraft from Admiral Mitscher’s fast carrier task force destroyed the battleship, the light cruiser, and four destroyers.

214

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

Task Force 58 itself lost only ten aircraft of the 386 which took part in the action. Ibid., p 142; and Appleman et at., Okinawa, p. 99. 14. Japanese aircraft inflicted the following damage upon U. S. warships around Okinawa dur­ ing the period under discussion: April 11— one battleship, two carriers, four destroyers, and two destroyer escorts damaged; April 12— one destroyer sunk; two battleships, four destroyers, four destroyer escorts, and three miscellaneous vessels damaged; April 13— one destroyer escort dam­ aged; April 14— one battleship and three destroyers damaged; April 15— two destroyers and one other vessel damaged; April 16—one destroyer sunk; one carrier, one battleship, one destroyer, one destroyer escort, and three miscellaneous vessels damaged; April 17— one de­ stroyer damaged. Naval Chronology, World War 11, pp. 143-46. 15. In connection with the “ remarkable results” achieved by Japanese suicide planes during the Okinawa campaign, the official U. S. Army history is illuminating: The total Japanese air effort was far greater than that encountered in any other Pacific operation. . . . Altogether, there were 896 air raids against Okinawa. Approximately 4,000 Japanese planes were destroyed in combat, 1,900 of which were suicide planes. The intensity and scale of the Japanese suicide air attacks on naval forces and shipping were the most spectacular aspects of the Okinawa campaign. Between 6 April and 22 June there were ten organized Kamikaze attacks, employing a total of 1,465 planes. . . . In addition, sporadic small-scale suicide attacks were directed against the American fleet by both Arm y and Navy planes, bringing the total number of suicide sorties during the campaign to 1,900. The violence of the air attacks is indicated by the damage inflicted on the American forces. Twenty-eight ships were sunk and 225 damaged by Japanese air action during the campaign. Destroyers sustained more hits than any other class of ships. . . . some of the [bigger ships suffered] heavy damage with great loss of life. The radar picket ships, made up principally of destroyers and destroyer escorts, suffered proportionately greater losses than any other part of the fleet. The great majority of ships sunk or damaged were victims of the Kamikaze. Suicide planes accounted for 26 of the 28 vessels sunk and for 164 of the 225 damaged by air attack during the entire campaign. Appleman et al., Okinawa, pp. 362, 364. 16. The American 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles fired conventional artillery-type projectiles at velocities which resembled those of standard artillery. The recoilless design permits escape of certain of the propellant gases through exhaust ports in the breech. The range of the 57mm version exceeded two miles; of the 75mm model, four miles. One American veteran of the Pacific fighting stated that “ For ranges under 1,500 yards, the 75mm [recoilless] rifle can’t be beaten. My crew fired at caves of all sizes and into wooded ravines and scored direct hits in every case." By virtue of its portability and remarkable accuracy, the recoilless rifle could be used to knock out Japanese cave and pillbox defenses which standard artillery could not engage. The recoilless weapons were used for the first time in the Pacific at Okinawa. See MajGen G. M. Barnes, Weapons of World War 11 (New York, 1947), pp. 52-55; and W. H. B. Smith, Small Arms of the World (Harrisburg, Pa., 1955), pp. 223-26. 17. The U. S. Naval Chronology, World War ll, states that the Japanese mounted concentrated aerial attacks on May 24 and 25. On the first day one destroyer, two destroyer escorts, and four miscellaneous warships were damaged; on the second day one transport was sunk and one destroyer plus another craft were damaged. Earlier, on the 20th, one destroyer, one destroyer escort, and four miscellaneous vessels had been damaged. Op. cit., pp. 153-54. 18. According to the official U. S. Army account, six aerial raiding waves bombed (or attempted to bomb) Yontan and Kadena airfields, in perfect weather— a clear sky and a full moon. In the seventh raid, five low-flying twin-engined “ Sally” bombers attacked Yontan from the direction of Ie Shima. Four of the Japanese planes were shot down in flames, but the fifth made a belly-landing, wheels up, on a runway at Yontan. At least eight heavily armed Japanese rushed out of the plane and began tossing grenades and incendiaries into American aircraft parked along the run­ way. Seven U. S. planes were destroyed and another 26 were damaged. In addition, two 600-drum fuel dumps (containing 70,000 gallons of gasoline) were destroyed. In the wild confusion that followed the landing of the Japanese airborne troops, two Americans were killed and eighteen injured. . . . When a final survey could be made, it was found that ten Japanese had been killed at Yontan; three

NOTES

215

others were found dead in the plane, evidently killed by antiaircraft fire. The other four ‘Sallys’ each carried fourteen Japanese soldiers, all of whom died in the flaming wrecks. Sixty-nine bodies in all were counted. A Japanese soldier killed at Zampa Point the next day was thought to be the last of the airborne raiders. Yontan airfield was nonoperational until 0800 of 25 May because of the debris on the runway. This was the enemy’s only attempt to land airborne troops on Okinawa during the battle. Appleman et al., Okinawa, pp. 361-62. A total of eleven “ Sallys” were brought down at Kadena and Yontan by U. S. Marine and Army antiaircraft batteries. The American ground casualties mentioned earlier in this footnote were all Marine Corps personnel guarding the air strips. Judging from the damage done by eight to ten trained men, if even one or two more enemy transports had landed, the amount of destruction would have been staggering. Fortunately [for the Americans], the antiaircraft defense of Okinawa was superlative, and even the one plane that penetrated the fire barrier was riddled with shell fragments. Major Charles S. Nichols, Jr., USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific, Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps (Washington, D. C., I 955)> P- zoo. The Marine data on U. S. planes damaged or destroyed during the raid on Yontan differ slightly from the Army version. 19. Generals Ushijima and Cho committed ceremonial suicide before dawn, June 22; American patrols found the bodies three days later. The Okinawa campaign cost the Japanese (according to American data) 107,539 “ counted dead;” 23,764 believed to have been “ sealed in caves or buried by the Japanese themselves;” and 10,755 prisoners-of-war. Since this casualty total of 142,058 was ‘far above a reasonable estimate of military strength on the island,’ Tenth [U. S.] Army intelligence officers con­ cluded that approximately 42,000 civilians had fallen victim to artillery, [naval gunfire], and air attacks because of their unfortunate proximity to Japanese combat troops and installations. An estimated 7,830 Japanese planes were shot down. On the American side, battle casualties totaled 49,151 (including 12,520 killed or missing in action). Nonbattle casualties amounted to 26,221 officers and men. Plane losses (to all causes) totalled 763. Nichols and Shaw, Okinawa, p. 260; Appleman et al., Okinawa, pp. 473-74. The latter source vividly describes the suicides of Generals Ushijima and Cho (from Japanese sources), op. cit., pp. 470-71. Supplementary information will be found in Nichols and Shaw, op. cit., p. 258.

CH A PTER 18 1. U. S. Air Force authorities judged that the Japanese Army ground campaign against the air bases stemmed from the increased harassment of the railways in North China. The Four­ teenth (U. S.) A ir Force base at Laohokow was one of four American bases which were being used to interdict the rail complex. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Air Opera­ tions in China, Burma, India; World War II (Washington, D. C., 1947), p. 85. 2. Chihchiang (Chihkiang) was the site of the largest Fourteenth (U. S.) Air Force forward base south of the Yangtze. Japanese successes in eliminating the American air installations in Honan and Chihchiang would have resulted in the facilitation of a “ massive pincers offensive along northern [and] southern approaches to Chungking.” Effective air-ground co-ordination between the Chinese Fourth Area Army and the U. S. Fourteenth Air Force halted the Japanese thrust, which had never been more than 130 miles from Chihchiang at its most distant. Of the 65,000 Japanese troops estimated to have been involved, the Fourteenth Air Force reported to have killed about 4,000 by daily fighter sorties. USSBS, ibid., p. 86. 3. The U. S. Fourteenth Air Force actually possessed the following plane strength in June 1945: Fighters— 483; medium bombers— 127; heavy bombers— 65; photo and night-fighter aircraft— 48; total— 723. USSBS, ibid., p. 67.

CH A PTER 19 1. According to the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey: Monthly tonnage [of bombs] dropped increased from 13,800 tons in March to 42,700 tons in July, and, with the activation of the Eighth Air Force on Okinawa,

216

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

would have continued thereafter to a planned figure of 115,000 tons per month, had the war not come to an end. Summary Report (Pacific War), (Washington, D. C., 1946), p. 17. 2. The authoritative U. S. Naval Chronology, World War II states that American carrier-based planes from Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet struck the Inland Sea area for two days (July 24-25), hitting Kure Naval Base and air fields at Nagoya, Osaka, and Miho. Three Japanese battleships (Hyuga, Ise, Haruna), one escort carrier ( Kaiyo ), and two cruisers ( Aoba, Iu/ate) were sent to the bottom. On July 28, U. S. naval planes destroyed the aircraft carrier Amagi, the heavy cruisers Tone and lzumo, the light cruiser Oyodo, the destroyer Nashi, and one submarine. Next day, American battleships, cruisers, and destroyers bombarded shops, plane factories, and other installations at Hamamatsu. Op. cit., pp. 162-63. 3. Kyoto University Professor Hideki Yukawa was a nuclear physicist whose brilliant predic­ tions dated back to 1935. Another able Japanese scientist, Dr. Odan, was killed by an explosion which occurred in his laboratory during tests conducted in Tokyo toward the end of World War II. . . . when scientists asked for a meager research grant of 50,000 yen to carry on atomic research, the [Japanese Army] laughed it off as a pipe dream of the scientists. Only when Dr. Odan and two buildings, including his laboratory, exploded before their very eyes did the military take notice, but by that time the atomic bomb was a reality in the United States. Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry (New York, 1949), pp. 618, 623. 4. To cite but one example of the Japanese Arm y’s studied contempt for (or ignorance of) the fearsome effects of the atomic bombs, the following incident is reported to have occurred on the eve of Japan’s capitulation: On the morning of the 14th [of August 1945], the War Minister [Anami] dined with Field Marshal Hata. The Marshal told the Minister then that the atomic bomb had hardly any effect on the ground one foot below the surface. Im­ mediately, the Minister told the Marshal: ‘Please explain about this to the Emperor without fail when you report to him, and make him understand that the atomic bomb is not such a dreadful weapon.’ It is said, however, that the field marshal did not have the opportunity to relate the above to the Emperor when he was granted an audience. Statement dated October 13, 1949, by former LtCol Masao Inaba, who had been a member of the War Ministry’s Military Affairs Bureau and of the IGHQ Army Section. Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II (GHQ-FEC, MIS-GS, Historical Division); Vol. I, p. 585. 5. According to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, approximately 60,000 to 70,000 people were killed by the atomic blast at Hiroshima; 50,000 were injured. (The population of the city was estimated to have been about 245,000 at the time.) At Nagasaki approximately 40,000 persons were killed or were missing, while another 40,000 were injured, from a population estimated at 230,000. Summary Report (Pacific War), pp. 23, 24. 6. The Americans’ V Marine Amphibious Corps consisted of three divisions (2d, 3d, 5th). The floating reserve (IX Corps) was to conduct a feint with the 98th, 81st, and 77th Army Divisions. (General Marshall’s Third Report to the Secretary of War, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945; The War Reports, Figure 34, p. 245.) 7. On Kyushu the Americans expected to hold a one-corps reserve of one airborne and three infantry divisions. From here the plan was to fan out to the north and clean up the remainder of the Japanese islands. Supporting the clean-up would have been an air garrison equivalent to 50 groups. Ibid., p. 244.

C H A P T E R 20 1. Toshikazu Kase states that Japanese defeats . . . did not fail to produce international reactions. On . . . the anniversary of the Red Revolution, Generalissimo Stalin unexpectedly denounced Japan as an aggressor, creating widespread speculation throughout the world. We were shocked

.

NOTES

217

by this denunciation which seemed at that moment uncalled for. As every gesture, however insignificant, on the part of the Kremlin as a rule presaged some action, we could not take this ominous statement lightly. When the alarmed Japanese Government ordered its diplomatic representative in Moscow to seek clarification from the Russians, Molotov assured Ambassador Sato . . . that Stalin meant to refer to the past conduct of Japan and did not imply any criticism of her present policy. Journey to the Missouri, pp. 96-97. 2. The deadline for denunciation of the Pact was April 13; the Russians obviously waited until the last week to notify the Japanese of their decision. “ This came as a bolt from the blue, shattering all illusions,” recounts Kase. The Soviet note stated that the world situation was by now “ entirely altered:” . . . Germany attacked the Soviet Union, and Japan, an Ally of Germany, helps the latter in her war against the U.S.S.R. Besides, Japan is fighting against the United States and Britain, who are allies of the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances the neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan has lost its sense and a prolongation . . . is impossible. Ibid., p. 154. 3. Reconstruction of contemporary Japanese intelligence reports by the Kwantung Army indi­ cates the following identification of Soviet Arm y units engaged: Zabaikal Area Arm y (West Manchuria and Inner Mongolia fronts)— four infantry divisions, two tank divisions, three tank brigades, one cavalry division. Second Far East Area Army— four infantry divisions and one tank brigade (operating against North Manchuria). First Far East Area Army (East Man­ churia and North Korea fronts)— ten infantry divisions, one tank corps, one tank division, two tank brigades. The sum of the preceding estimates totals: 18 infantry divisions, one tank corps, three tank divisions, six tank brigades, and one cavalry division. It is now known that Marshal Vasilevsky commanded the over-all Soviet Far East General Army; Malinovsky, the Zabaikal Area Army; Purkayev, the Second Far East Area Army; Meretskov, the First Far East Area Army.

C H A PTER 21 1. The Introduction to the Senjin\un stated, in part: The Imperial Rescript to the armed forces is explicit, while the regulations and manuals clearly define conduct in combat and methods of training. Conditions in the zone of combat, however, tend to cause soldiers to be swayed by immediate events and become forgetful of their duties. Indeed, they should be wary there, lest they run counter to their duties as soldiers. The purpose of the present Code lies in providing concrete rules of conduct, in the light of past experience, so that those in zones of combat may wholly abide by the Imperial Rescript and enhance the moral virtues of the Imperial Army. The Code treated the following subject matter: The Empire, The Imperial W ay ( Kodo ), Discipline, Unity, Co-operation, Aggressiveness, The Conviction to Win (Ch. 1); Piety, Filial Piety, Salutes and Manners, The Way of Comrades in Arms, Initiative in Exemplary Conduct, Responsibility, Views on Life and Death, Honor, Simplicity and Fortitude, Integrity, Counsel Concerning Field Service, Achievements of Soldiers in the Field, Conclusion (Ch. 2). 2. Prince Mikasa, the youngest of the Emperor’s three brothers, had been originally com­ missioned in the Cavalry. Now a Major, he was serving in the Inspectorate-General of Army Aviation and was on the staff of the Air General Army. Mikasa-no-Miya (Takahito), as he is known in Japanese, was born on December 2, 1915, the fourth son of the Emperor Taisho. He was graduated from the Military Academy in 1936, and from the War College in 1941. His wartime assignments included staff duty in Nanking (1943). Since the War, he has attracted public attention by attending the Department of Literature at Tokyo University (1947), where he majored in Hebrew and in ancient Asian history. An instructor at Tokyo Women’s Univer­ sity since 1955, he has written a number of widely publicized books on ancient history, and has travelled very widely (Ceylon, Middle East, 1956; South America and the United States, 1958). 3. Marquis Koichi Kido was born July 18, 1889, and was a graduate of Kyoto University. Throughout his career, it has been said, he alternated in holding posts between the Government

218

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

and the Palace, exerting major influence in both places. In 1930, he was chief secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. He became Education Minister in the Konoye Cabinet of 1937, and Welfare Minister in 1938. In the Hiranuma Cabinet (1939), he was Home Minister. He was appointed, in June 1940, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal ( Naidaijin ). Kido, one of the principal supporters of Tojo, was arrested as a war criminal in December 1945, and faced charges on 54 counts (two more than Hiranuma, and four more than Tojo himself). Sen­ tenced to life imprisonment by the Internadonal Military Tribunal for the Far East, in Novem­ ber 1948, he was eventually paroled in 1956. 4. Ichigaya Heights is located in present-day Shinjuku Ward (formerly Ushigome) within the metropolis of Tokyo. A t the end of the War the following military organs were located at Ichigaya: IGHQ (Army Section); the General Staff; the War Ministry; the Inspectorates-General of Arm y Training and of Arm y Aviation; the Arm y Aeronautical Department; and the Army Mechanized Headquarters. 5. Commenting upon the situation prevailing at the nerve center of Tokyo in early August 1945, Gen Torashiro Kawabe (Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff) later said: “ We even felt that American and Red Arm y parachute divisions might land on the General Staff office and occupy the Imperial [General] Headquarters.” IMTFE, Transcript, October 14, 1946, p. 7,686. 6. LtCol Masahiko Takeshita, brother-in-law of War Minister Anami, and a staff officer in the War Ministry at the end of the War, has made some illuminating recollections concern­ ing the state of mind within' certain Army quarters when news of imminent capitulation was received: The news of the Imperial decision [pained us] severely. Although preserva­ tion of the national polity had been made the sole condition for surrender, dis­ bandment of the Japanese armed forces and occupation of our homeland by foreign troops would mean that we would be compelled to change the national polity in whatever way the occupation forces desired. Since such a unique national polity as we enjoyed was beyond the understanding [of] foreign nations, there was little doubt that the occupation forces would eventually compel us to transform it as they wished. . . . It would be useless for the people to survive the war if the structure of the State itself were to be destroyed. . . . Although [a coup d'etat] would [mean] temporary disobedience to the present Emperor— a situation certainly to be avoided— to act in compliance with the wishes of his Imperial Ancestors would constitute a wider and truer loyalty to the Throne, in the final analysis. . . . True loyalty must accompany remon­ strance and expostulation. . . . We did not believe that the entire people would be completely annihilated through fighting to the finish. Even if a crucial battle were fought in the homeland and the Imperial Forces were confined to the mountainous regions, the number of Japanese killed by enemy forces would be small. Despite the constant victories of Japanese troops in the China Incident, relatively few Chinese were killed. Almost all the strategic points in China were occupied, but the Chungking Government . . . could not be defeated. Even if the whole [Japanese] race were all but wiped out, its determination to preserve the national polity would be forever recorded in the annals of history, but a people who sacrificed will upon the altar of physical existence could never rise again as a nation. . . . W e decided that the peace faction should be overruled and a coup d’etat staged in order to prevail upon the Emperor to revoke his decision. The purpose of the projected coup d'etat was to separate the Emperor from his peace-seeking advisers and persuade him to change his mind and continue the war. It was not considered essential to kill the members of the peace faction. A ll we wanted was a military government with all political power concentrated in the hands of the War Minister. Extracts from statement by Masahiko Takeshita, March n , 1950; Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II (GHQ-FEC, MIS-GS, Historical Division), Vol. IV, pp. 75 '78’ See also statement by same respondent, June 11, 1949, ibid., pp. 68-69, 71-73-

NOTES

219

7. According to Takeshita, [General] Mori had always declared, 'I am the commander of the Guards Division. Unlike other divisions, unless ordered to do so by the Emperor himself, I cannot carry out any action which is contrary to the wishes of the Emperor even though orderd to do so by the Minister of War.’ This was Gen Mori’s reply to the young officers when they came . . . to confer with him about 12 August. Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 74 (June 11, 1949). LtCol Masataka Ida recalls the fatal after-midnight hours of August 15, when a party of desperate officers went to “ reason" with General Mori at Imperial Guard Division Headquarters: About 0200 hours [2 A.M.] . . . we heard a pistol shot and a noise. As we rushed out we saw a white-faced [Major] Hatanaka [another War Ministry staff officer in the attempted coup] come out. ‘Pardon me,' he said, ‘I have dis­ posed of him [Gen Mori] for fear that we may only waste more time this way.’ Statement made May 23, 1950; ibid., Vol. I, p. 512. According to Ida, Gen Mori had been talking about going to worship at the Meiji Shrine “ to help him make up his mind." Hatanaka committed suicide on the Imperial Plaza. 8. As of October 1955, the minimal figures for “ detainees” still abroad totalled: U.S.S.R. and OuterMongolia ............................................................................. Sakhalin and Kurils .......................................................................................... North Korea ................................................................................................... Red China ............................................................................................................ Total

..............................................................................................................

11,200 1,600 3,400 45,000 61,200

In the Southern regions, about 4,000 more ex-service personnel were beli»ved to be still alive but unable— or unwilling— to return home. (Welfare Ministry data.) The Japanese Govern­ ment continues to make efforts to investigate discrepancies and massive omissions in Soviet Russian and Communist Chinese reports on “ detainees” and “ war criminals.” 9. The Japan Statistical Year-book,, 1949 presents a breakdown of Japanese armed-force casualties. Army dead total 1,140,429, incurred as follows: In American battle zones ................................................................................ In English and Dutch territory ....................................................................... China .................................................................................................................... In Australian battle zones ................................................................................ French Indo-China ............................................................................................. Manchuria (and U.S.S.R.) ................................................................................ Other overseas ................................................................................................... Homeland ............................................................................................................

485,717 208,026 202,958 199,511 2,803 7,483 23,388 10,543

Wounded totalled 295,247, while another 240,000 soldiers’ fate was “ obscure.” (Data based upon Tables 608-609, op. cit., p. 1058; as of December 21, 1946— Army only; collations by First Demobilization Bureau.) The yearbook was prepared by the Statistics Bureau of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Executive Office of the Statistics Commission (Tokyo, May 1949)-

Biographical Digests A t the end of World War II, there were approximately 250,000 commissioned officers in the Imperial Japanese Army, against an authorized full table-of-organization strength of 336,629, Including specialists, the following numbers of general officers and colonels are estimated to have been on active duty as of August 15, 1945: Grade

Regulars

Reserves & Recalled Retired

Actual Total

2 21 100 484 1,096 473 1,601 575 6,301 2,247 4.054 •There was no Japanese rank strictly comparable to that of BGen.

General (& Field Marshal) LtGen MajGen Total General Officers* Col

19 384 623 1,026

Authorized Total

21 560 1.432 2,013 7,096

T o record the significant career data concerning even a small portion of the highest-ranking Japanese Army officers corps (quite apart from the Navy) would obviously constitute a full-scale undertaking, lying far beyond the scope and purpose of the present brief study. An effort has been made, nevertheless, to present available biographical data concerning the high-ranking officers (primarily Army, of course) whose names are mentioned in this book. The result has been by no means inclusive, since a sizeable proportion of the desired information has been lost or destroyed, by design or by accident. In the preparation of this Appendix (which is based upon highly original sources), invalu­ able assistance was rendered by the Historical Division, Japanese Ground Self Defense Force, and by the Personnel Section, Repatriation Relief Bureau. Of strictly limited value for our purposes, in addition, was T he Japan Biographical Encyclopedia and Who's Who, published by Rengo Press (Tokyo, February 1958). All in all, there are 91 officers whose careers are summarized in alphabetical fashion in this Appendix. Another 24 officers are described in varying degrees of detail in the Footnotes. The latter group includes the following officers, arranged alphabetically: AK ITA , Hiroshi ARISUE, Seizo CHO, Isamu HASHIMOTO, Gun H A T A N A K A , Kenji HAYASHI, Saburo HAYASHI, Senjuro INABA, Masao INADA, Seijun ISHII, Akiho ISOYA, Goro KOM ATSUBARA, Michitaro M ATSUTANI, Makoto M IKASA, Prince Takahito NISHIURA, Susumu N U K A T A , Tan SAKURAI, Tokutaro SATO, Hiroo SATO, Kotoku TAKESH ITA, Masahiko USHIJIMA, Mitsuru W ATAN ABE, Masao YA H A R A , Hiromichi YAM AZAKI, Yasuyo 0

0

0

220

BIOGRAPHICAL DIGESTS

221

ADACHI, Hatazo: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1910; was graduated from War College, Movember 1922; Member, Army General Staff, May 1925; Major, March 1926; Member, Army General Staff, December 1928; LtCol, August 1930; official duty, Europe, September 1932; attached to Headquarters, Kwantung Army, March 1933; Commander, Kwantung Army Railroad Command, April 1934; Colonel, August 1934; Section Chief, Army General Staff, August 1935; Regimental Commander, 12th Infantry, December 1936; attached to Head­ quarters, Kwantung Army (MajGen), March 1938; 26th Infantry Group Commander, December 1938; 37th Division Commander (LtGen), August 1940; Chief of Staff, North China Area Army, November 1941; Eighteenth Army Commander (New Guinea), November 1942. AIZAW A, Saburo: Born Iwate Prefecture, 1889; held rank of LtCol, when he assassinated General Nagata, August 1935; executed by firing squad, July 12, 1936. AKASHI, Motojiro: Born Fukuoka, 1864; attached to General Headquarters during SinoJapanese War, as aide to Gen Soroku Kawakami; served in various Japanese Legations, Germany, France, Russia; under Governor-General Masatake Terauchi, was Commander of Gendarmerie; then Chief of Staff, Korea Army; Chief, Police Affairs Department, Government-General, Korea; directed Japanese psychological warfare efforts in Europe during Russo-Japanese War; while on way to Formosa to take up post of Governor-General, fell ill and died at Fukuoka, 1919; full General, baron; noted for his poetry and paintings. AKASHIBA, Yaezo: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1912; Major, March 1928; Staff Officer, 1st Division, March 1928; attached to Personnel Bureau, War Ministry, April 1932; LtCol, August 1932; Member, Personnel Bureau, War Ministry, August 1935; official duty, Europe, February 1936; Colonel, August 1936; Regimental Commander, roth Infantry, July 1937; Commanding Officer, Cadet Unit, Military Academy, July 1938; MajGen, March 1939; Director, Military Academy, October 1941; 25th Division Commander (LtGen), October 1942; 1st Imperial Guards Division Commander, October 1943; Commanding General, Fifty-third Army (Kanagawa), April 1945. ANAMI, Korechika; Born Oita Prefecture, February 1887; 2dLt (Infantry), December 1906; was graduated from War College, November 3918; attached to Army General Staff, April 1919; Member, same, December 1919; Major, February 1922; Staff Officer, Sakhalin Expeditionary Army, August 1923; Member, Army General Staff, May 1925; LtCol, August 1925; official duty, France, August 1927; attached to 45th Infantry Regiment, December 1927; Depot Unit Commander, same, August 1928; Aide-de-Camp to Emperor, August 1929; Colonel, August 1930; Regimental Commander, 2d Imperial Guards, August 1933; Superintendent, Tokyo Military Preparatory School, August 1934; MajGen, March 1935; Chief, Military A d­ ministration Bureau, War Ministry, August 1936; Chief, Personnel Bureau, same Ministry, March 1937; LtGen, March 1938; 109th Division Commander (China), November 1938; Vice-Minister of War, October 1939; Eleventh Army Commander (Central China), April 1941; Second Area Army Commander (Manchuria), July 1942; General, May 1943; to Southern Theater, where he directed operations in western New Guinea and Halmahera area, November 1943; Inspector General of Army Aviation— concurrently Military Councillor— and Chief. Army Aeronautical Department, December 1944; War Minister, April 1945; committed suicide upon Japan’s capitulation, August 15, 1945. ANDO, Rikichi; 2dLt (Infantry), November 1914; was graduated from War College, December 1914 (? ); Resident Officer, England, January 1939; Major, August 1920; official duty, Europe, September 1921; LtCol, August 1924; Military Attache, India, August 1925; Member, Army General Staff, April 1927; Regimental Commander, 13th Infantry (Colonel), March 1928; Chief of Staff, 5th Division, May 1930; Chief, Military Administration Section, Military Administration Bureau, War Ministry, March 1931; Military Attache, England, May 1932; 1st Infantry Brigade Commander, December 1934; Superintendent, Toyama Army School, August 1935; Commander, 5th Independent Garrison Unit, April 1936; Vice-Chief, Inspectorate General of Military Training, August 1937; 5th Division Commander, May 1938; Twenty-first Army Commander, November 1938; South China Area Army Commander, February 1940; transferred to reserve list, January 1941; recalled to active duty— Commanding General, Formosa Army, November 1941. Full Genera! at end of military career. ARAKI, Sadao: Born Tokyo, May 26, 1877; was graduated from Military Academy, Novem­ ber 1897; 2dLt, June 1898; istLt, November 1900; Company Commander, 1st Infantry Regiment, Imperial Guard Division during Russo-Japanese War, February 1904-; Captain,

222

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

June 1904; Army General Staff, April 1908; Language Officer, Russia, November 1909; Military Attache, Russia, May 1912; Adjutant, War Ministry, March 1914; Kwantung GovernmentGeneral (Major), July 1918; Staff Officer, Expeditionary Army Headquarters, Vladivostok, November 1918; Regimental Commander, 23d Infantry, July 1919; Army General Staff, April 1921; Brigade Commander, 8th Infantry Brigade (MajGen), March 1923; Provost Marshal General, January 1924; Bureau Chief, Army General Staff, May 1925; LtGen, July 1927; Commandant, War College, August 1928; 6th Division Commander, August 1929; Inspector General of Military Training, August 1931; Minister of War, December 1931 (Inukai Cabinet; Saito Cabinet, 1932); General, October 1933; Military Councillor, January 1934; baron, 1935; retired, March 1936 (after 2-26 Incident); Education Minister in Konoye Cabinet of 1937— ardent advocate of militaristic education and Imperial Way; sentenced to life imprisonment as Class A war criminal by International Military Tribunal for the Far East; temporarily released for reasons of health, June 1955. ARAO, Okikatsu (Koko): Born March 18, 1902; 2dLt (Infantry)— 61st Infantry Regiment, October 1923; istLt, October 1926; Captain, August 1932; Section Member, War Ministry, November 1932; student abroad, Soviet Union and Poland, August 1934; Assistant Military Attache, Poland, March 1936; Section Member, Personnel Bureau, War Ministry, May 1937; Major, August 1937; Member, Army General Staff, April 1938; LtCol, August 1939; Instructor, Infantry School, September 1940; attached to Army Section, IGHQ, July 1941; attached to Kwantung Army Headquarters, July 1941; Army Section, IGHQ, September 1941; Staff Officer, Southern Army, November 1941; Section Chief (Railways and Shipping), Army General Staff, May 1942; Colonel, August 1942; Chief, Army Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, April 1945; concurrently Staff Officer, IGHQ, April 1945. AYABE, Kitsuju; Born April 18, 1894; was graduated from Military Academy, May 1915; 2dLt (Cavalry)— attached to 12th Cavalry Regiment, December 1915; Army Cavalry School (Equitation Student), October 1917; Siberian Expeditionary Army, August 1918-July 1919; istLt, April 1919; Army Cavalry School (long-term student of equitation), August 1919; was graduated from Army Cavalry School, July 1920; Captain, March 1924; was graduated from War College, November 1924; Company Commander, 12th Cavalry Regiment, January 1925; attached to Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, December 1925; Member, Army Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, October 1926; Military Student, Poland and Soviet Union, September 1928; Major, August 1930; Member, Army Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, November 1930; concurrently Instructor, War College, August 1931; Member, Army General Staff, November 1933; LtCol, August 1934; Staff Officer, Kwantung Army, August 1935; Colonel, August 1935; engaged in Chahar area operation as Staff Officer, Kwantung Army, North China Detachment, August 1937-October 1937; Section Chief (Organization and Mobilization), Army General Staff, October 1937; Regimental Com­ mander, 25th Cavalry (Central China), March 1939; Staff Officer, Third Army (Manchuria), March 1940; Deputy Chief of Staff, same army (MajGen), August 1940; Army General Staff, October 1940; Member, Military Observer Mission to Germany and Italy (under LtGen Yamashita), December 1940-july 1941; Deputy Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, July 1941; Chief of Staff, First Area Army (Manchuria), July 1942; Chief, First Bureau, Army General Staff— Staff Officer, IGHQ, December 1942; Deputy Chief of Staff, Southern Army, October 1943 (Singapore); LtGen, October 1943; hospitalized in Java after air accident, February 1944; assigned to Seventh Area Army Headquarters (Singapore), April 1944; Chief of Staff, same area army, June 1944 till end of War. DOHIHARA, Kenji: 2dLt (Infantry), November 1904; was graduated from War College, November 1912; Captain, August 1913; Member, Army General Staff, June 1918; Military Advisor to Chinese Government, November 1918; Major, July 1919; Member, Army General Staff, January 1920; official duty, Europe, May 1921; official duty, China, December 1922; LtCol, August 1923; 3d Infantry Regiment— official duty, China, March 1927; Colonel, July 1927; Military Advisor to Chinese Government, March 1928; “ contract cancelled," March 1929; Regimental Commander, 30th Infantry, March 1929; attached to Army General Staff. December 1930; Headquarters, Kwantung Army (MajGen), August 1931; 9th Infantry Brigade Commander, April 1932; attached to Headquarters, Kwantung Army, October 1933; LtGen, May 1936; Headquarters, 1st Division, May 1936; Commanding General, Fourteenth Army, March 1937; Commanding General, Fifth Army, May 1939; Military Councillor, September 1940; General, April 1941; Inspector General of Army Aviation, June 1941; Com­ manding General, Eastern District Army, May 1943; Commanding General, Seventh Area Army, March 1944; Inspector General of Military Training, April 1945; Commanding Gen­

BIOGRAPHICAL DIGESTS

223

eral, Twelfth Area Army, August 1945; Commander-in-Chief, First General Army, September 1945. Executed for war crimes, December 23, 1948. FUJIE, Keisuke: 2dLt (Artillery), June 1900; was graduated from War College, Novem­ ber 1914; attached to Army General Staff, August 1915; member of same, April 1916; Assistant Military Attache, France, August 1917; attached to Army General Staff, October 1919; Instruc­ tor, War College, April 1922; LtCol, March 1926; Colonel, August 1929; member of Japanese Delegation, General Disarmament Conference, Geneva, August 1931; Regimental Commander, 2d Heavy Field Artillery, August 1932; Director, Field Artillery School (MajGen), August 1934; Brigade Commander, 4th Heavy Field Artillery Brigade, August 1935; Chief, General Affairs Bureau, Military Police, Headquarters, Kwantung Army, August 1936; Commander, Kwantung Army Military Police, March 1937; LtGen, November 1937; 16th Division Com­ mander, July 1938; attached to Army General Staff, August 1939; Superintendent, War College, December 1939; Commanding General, Western District Army, April 1941; General, February 1943; Commanding General, Eastern District Army, March 1944; Commanding General, Twelfth Area Army— concurrently commanding Eastern District Army, February 1945; re­ tired, April 1945; recalled to active duty— Commanding General, Eleventh Area Army— con­ currently Commanding General, Toho\u District Army, June 1945. HASHIMOTO, Kingoro: Born Okayama City, 1890; 2dLt (Artillery), 1911; was grad­ uated from War College, 1920; military assignments included Attache duty, Japanese Embassy, Turkey, and Chief, Special Service Agency, Hailar; Colonel, 1933; active in secret extremist societies, and notorious for his actions during Panay incident, 1937; political activities included organization and presidency of Dai Nippon Seinen-to (Great Japan Youth Party), subsequently renamed Dai Nippon Sekisei-kjxi (Great Japan Sincerity Association); elected Member, House of Representatives, 1944; became vice-president of Diet Members’ Society of Yo\usan Seiji-f{ai (Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association); sentenced to life imprisonment by International Military Tribunal for the Far East; died 1957. H A T A , Shunroku: Born Hokkaido, July 1879 (younger brother of General Eitaro Hata); 2dLt (Artillery), June 1901; was graduated from War College “ with top scholarly rank,” November 1910; Army General Staff, December 1910; military student, Germany, March 1912; Major, July 1914; official duty, Europe, September 1914; LtCol, July 1918; official duty, Europe, December 1918; member, Plenipotentiary’s Suite, Peace Conference, February 1919; Regimental Commander, 16th Field Artillery (Colonel), July 1921; Brigade Commander, 4th Heavy Field Artillery Brigade (MajGen), March 1926; Chief, Fourth Bureau, Army General Staff, July 1927; Chief, First Bureau, Army General Staff, August 1928; Inspector General of Artillery Training (LtGen), August 1931; 14th Division Commander, August 1933; Chief, Army Aeronautical Department, December 1935; Formosa Army Commander, August 1936; Military Councillor, August 1937; Inspector General of Military Training, August 1937; General, November 1937; Commanding General, Central China Expeditionary Army, February 1938; Military Councillor, December 1938; Senior Aide-de-Camp to Emperor, May 1939; War Minister, August 1939 (Abe and Yonai cabinets); Military Councillor, July 1940; Commander-in-Chief, China Expeditionary Army, March 1941; Field Marshal, June 1943; Inspector General of Military Training, November 1944; Commander-in-Chief, Second General Army (Hiroshima); charged by Chinese Government with various war crimes; convicted and sentenced to life im­ prisonment. HATTORI, Takushiro: Born Tsuruoka City, Yamagata Prefecture, 1901; was graduated from Military Academy, July 1922; 2dLt (Infantry)— 37th Infantry Regiment, October 1922; istLt, October 1925; was graduated from War College, November 1930; Captain— Machine Gun Unit Commander, 37th Infantry, August 1931; Army General Staff Headquar­ ters, October 1931; Adjutant to Field Marshal (Prince) Nashimoto, August 1932; Resident Officer, France, June 1934; observer, Italo-Ethiopian War, October 1935; General Staff Head­ quarters— Army Tank School, Research Section, December 1936; Army Engineer School, Research Section, April 1937; Major, August 1937; Member, Army General Staff Headquarters *—Army Staff Officer, IGHQ, November 1937; Staff Officer (Operations), Kwantung Army Headquarters (LtCol), March 1939; Army Infantry School, September 1939 (after Nomonhan Incident); Member, Inspectorate General of Military Training, June 1940; Instructor, War College— Army Staff Officer (Training), IGHQ, June 1940; Army General Staff Headquarters, Army Staff Officer (Operations), IGHQ, October 1940; Member, Naval General Staff— Naval Staff Officer (Operations), IGHQ, February 1941; Section Chief (Operations), Army General Staff— IGHQ, Army Section, July 1941; Colonel, August 1941; Secretary to War Minister—

224

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

Adjutant, W ar Ministry, December 1942; Section Chief (Operations), Army General Staff Headquarters— IGHQ, Army Section, October 1943; Member, Naval General Staff— Naval Staff Officer, IGHQ (Operations), August 1944; Regimental Commander, 65th Infantry (China), February 1945; demobilized, May 1946; subsequendy established historical research institute. HIGASHIKUNI, Prince Naruhiko: Born Kyoto, December 1887; established House of Higashikuni by order of Emperor Meiji, November 1906; was graduated from Military Academy, 1908; was graduated from War College, 1914; Commanding Officer, 29th Infantry Brigade (Captain), 1915; Battalion Commander, 7th Division (Major), July 1918; Resident Officer, France, studying military tactics, April 1920; Staff Officer, Army General Staff Headquarters (MajGen), December 1929; 5th Infantry Brigade Commander, 1930; 4th Division Commander (LtGen), August 1934; Military Councillor, December 1935; Chief, Army Aeronautical De­ partment, August 1937; Commanding General, Second Army (China), April 1938; Military Councillor, January 1939; General, August 1939; service in China— awarded Order of Golden Kite, 1st Class, 1940; Commander-in-Chief, Home Defense Headquarters— concurrently Mili­ tary Councillor, December 1941; resigned as Commander-in-Chief, Home Defense Headquarters, July 1944; formed Cabinet after Japan’s capitulation, August 1945; resigned after 50 days, October 1945; requested Imperial permission to revert to commoner status, November 1945; as commoner, operated a provisions store, second-hand goods store, and dressmaker’s shop; became head of a new religious order (Higashikuni-kyo) , 1950, which was banned under the terms of the Organizations Control Ordinance. "Higashikuni was . . . little more than a figure­ head in any of his army posts.” United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War, p. 23. HIGUCHI, Kiichiro: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1909; was graduated from War College, November 1918; Member, Army General Staff, April 1922; Staff Officer, Korea Army, December 1923; Major, August 1924; Military Attache, Japanese Legation, Poland, May 1925; attached to 34th Infantry Regiment, February 1928; LtCol, August 1928; attached to Army Technical Department, August 1930; Staff Officer, Tokyo Garrison Headquarters, August 1932; Colonel, March 1933; Regimental Commander, 41st Infantry, August 1933; Chief of Staff, 3d Division, August 1935; Army General Staff, March 1937; Headquarters, Kwantung Army (MajGen), August 1937; Chief, Second Bureau, Army General Staff, July 1938; LtGen, October 1939; 9th Division Commander, December 1939; Commanding General, Northern District Army, August 1942; Commanding General, Northern Army, February 1943; Commanding General, Fifth Area Army, March 1944; concurrently Commanding General, Northern District Army Command, February 1945. HOMMA (HONM A), Masaharu: Born 1888; 2dLt (Infantry), November 1907; was graduated from War College, December 1915; Member, Army General Staff (Captain), August 1917; military student, England, August 1918 (and served as observer with British forces in France); Instructor, War College, June 1921; Resident Officer, India, August 1922; Member, Army General Staff, August 1925; Aide-de-Camp to Prince Yasuhito Chichibu, January 1927; Military Attache, England, June 1930 (subsequently decorated with Military Cross of British Empire); Colonel, August 1930; Army General Staff, May 1932; Regimental Commander, 1st Infantry, August 1933; Brigade Commander, 32d Infantry Brigade (MajGen), August 1935; Army General Staff, December 1936; Chief, Second Bureau, Army General Staff, July 1937; 27th Division Commander (LtGen), July 1938 (blockade of Tientsin foreign concessions, 1939); Commanding General, Formosa Army, December 1940; Fourteenth Army Com­ mander, November 1941 (Philippines Campaign); transferred to First Reserve List, August 1943; convicted by United States military commission, Manila, February 1946 (charged with responsibility for “Death March” on Bataan); executed by firing squad, Los Banos (Luzon), April 3, 1946. HORII, Tomitaro: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1911; attached to Headquarters, Shanghai Expeditionary Army, February 1932; Battalion Commander, 68th Infantry Regiment, August 1932; LtCol— attached to 3d Infantry Regiment— Training Officer, Waseda University, August 1933; attached to 12th Independent Infantry Regiment, January 1935; Colonel, August 1937; attached to Headquarters, 8th Depot Division, October 1937; Regimental Commander, 82d Infantry, July 1938; attached to Headquarters, n th Depot Division (MajGen), March 1940; 55th Infantry Group Commander, August 1940 (dispatched to Rabaul and New Guinea, as Commanding General, South Seas Detachment); killed in action, date of confirmation Novem­ ber 23, 1942; posthumously promoted to LtGen.

BIOGRAPHICAL DIGESTS

225

H YA K U T A K E, Haruyoshi: 21;I.t (Infantry), i)ecemher 1909; was graduated from War College, December 1921; attached to Arm y General Staff, December 1922; member of same, June 1923; Major, August 1924; Resident Officer, Poland, December 1925; LtCol, August 1028; attached to Headquarters, Kwantung Army, August 1931; attached to Army Signal School (Colonel), August 1932; Section Chief, Army General Staff, February 1933; Regimental Commander, 78th Infantry, March 1935; Superintendent, Hiroshima Military Prep School, April 1936; MajGen, March 1937; Superintendent, Army Signal School, August 1937; 4th Independent Mixed Brigade Commander, March 1939; LtGen, August 1939; Inspector General of Signal Training, April 1940; Seventeenth Army Commander, May 1942; ranking Army general officer in Papua and Solomons area until December 1942, when Eighth Area Army was activated; thereafter directed operations in Solomons region (Bougainville); returned to Japan, February 1946; died March 10, 1947. ICHIKI, Kiyonao: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1916; attached to Army Infantry School, February 1935; Instructor at same, April 1935; do., LtCol, March 1938; Member, Research Branch, Toyama Army School, September 1939; Instructor, Army Infantry School, August 1940; Colonel, March 1941; Regimental Commander, 28th Infantry, July 1941; killed in action on Guadalcanal (MajGen), August 1942. IIDA, Shojiro: Born August 8, 1888; 2dLt— 42d Infantry Regiment, December 1908; istLt, December 1911; was graduated from War College, December 1915; Army Ordnance Department, October 1916; Captain, December 1918; parucipated in Siberian Expedition, Febru­ ary 1919; 42d Infantry Regiment, June 1921; Instructor, Infantry School, August 1922; Major, March 1924; Battalion Commander, 44th Infantry Regiment, August 1926; Instructor, Infantry School, December 1927; LtCol, August 1928; Staff Officer, 4th Division, March 1930; In­ structor, Infantry School (Colonel), August 1932; Regimental Commander, 4th Infantry, Guard Division, August 1934; Chief of Staff, 4th Division, August 1935; Chief, Military Admin­ istration Bureau, War Ministry (MajGen), March 1937; Chief of Staff, First Army, January 1938; Commanding General, Formosa Mixed Brigade, October 1938; LtGen, August 1939; Commanding General, Imperial Guard Division, October 1939; Twenty-fifth Army Commander, July 1941; Fifteenth Army Commander, November 1941; assigned to General Defense Com­ mand, April 1943; retired, December 1944; recalled to be Thirtieth Army Commander, July 1945. IIMURA, Jo: Born Ibaraki Prefecture, 1888; adLt (Infantry)— 3d Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment, December 1909; istLt, February 1913; Company Commander, 3d Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment, June 1919; Captain, June 1919; was graduated from War College, December 1921; Member, Army General Staff Headquarters, August 1923; Major, August 1924; assigned to Headquarters, Korea Army (with duty station in Manchuria), October 1924; Instructor, War College, December 1926; LtCol, August 1928; Military Attache, Turkey, January 1930; Colonel, August 1932; Instructor, War College, September 1932; Section Chief, Army General Staff Headquarters, March 1933; Regimental Commander, 61st Infantry, March 1935; Member, Research Staff, War College (MajGen), March 1937; Deputy Commandant, War College, March 1938; Commandant of same, March 1939; LtGen, August 1939; Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, September 1939 (after Nomonhan Incident); Army General Staff Headquarters, October 1940; Chief, Total Warfare Research Institute, January 1941; Com­ manding General, Fifth Army (Manchuria), October 1941; Commandant, War College, October 1943; extensive trip throughout East Asia, to collect instructional materials, February 1944; Chief of Staff, Southern Army, March 1944; Commanding General, Second Area Army, December 1944; Commanding General, Tokyo Defense Army, June 1945; concurrently Com­ manding General, Tokyo Divisional District, July 1945. IMAMURA, Hitoshi: Born Miyagi Prefecture, 1886; 2dLt (Infantry), December 1907; was graduated from War College, December 1915; Captain, May 1917; Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, May 1917; Military Student, England, April 1918; Assistant Military Attache, England, October 1918; official duty, Europe, August 1920; Army General Staff, August 1921; Major, August 1922; LtCol, August 1926; Resident Officer, India, April 1927; Section Chief, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry (Colonel), August 1930; Section Chief, Army Genera! Staff, August 1931; Regimental Commander, 57th Infantry, April 1932; Commandant, Narashino Army School, August 1933; Brigade Commander, 40th Infantry Brigade (MajGen), March 1935; Deputy Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, March 1936; Commandant, Army Infantry School, August 1937; Chief, Army Administration Bureau, War Ministry, January 1938; LtGen, March 1938; 5th Division Commander, November 1938;

226

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

Deputy Chief, Inspectorate General of Military Training, March 1940; Twenty-third Army Commander, June 1941; Eighth Area Army Commander, November 1942; General, May 1943ISHIHARA, Kanji: Born January 17, 1889; 2dLt— 65th Infantry Regiment, December 1909; istLt, February 1913; was graduated from War College, November 19x8; assigned to 65th Infantry Regiment (Captain), April 1919; Office of Military Training, July 1919; Central China Expeditionary Army Headquarters, April 1920; Instructor, War College, July 1921; Language Officer, Germany, July 1922; Major, August 1924; Instructor, War College, October 1925; LtCol, August 1928; Staff Officer, Kwantung Army, October 1928; Colonel, August 1932; Member, Japanese Delegation to Geneva Conference, October 1932; Regimental Com­ mander, 4th Infantry, March 1933; Section Chief (Operations), Army General Staff, August 1935; Bureau Chief (Operations), Army General Staff (MajGen), March 1937; Deputy Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, August 1937; Commanding General, Maizuru Fortified Zone, December 1937; retired, 1938; recalled to active duty, 16th Division Commander, 1938-40. ITAGAKI, Seishiro: 2dLt (Infantry), November 1904; was graduated from War College, November 1916; Staff Officer, Central China Expeditionary Unit, July 1919; Major, April 1920; Battalion Commander, 4odi Infantry Regiment, April 1921; LtCol, August 1923; As­ sistant Military Attache, China, June 1924; dispatched to China, September 1927; Regimental Commander, 33d Infantry (Colonel), March 1928; Staff Officer, Kwantung Army, May 1929; attached to same army (MajGen), August 1932; Deputy Chief of Staff, same army, December 1934; Chief of Staff, same army, March 1936; LtGen, April 1936; 5th Division Commander, March 1937; War Minister, June 1938; Commanding General, Korea Army (full General), July 1941; Commanding General, Seventeenth Area Army— concurrently Commanding General, Korea District Army Command, February 1945; Commanding General, Seventh Area Army, April 1945; executed as war criminal, after judgment by International Military Tribunal for the Far East, December 23, 1948. KAN D A, Masatane: 2dLt (Infantry)— 18th Infantry Regiment, December 1911; istLt, December 1914; Army General Staff, April 1916; Captain, December 1920; Member, Army General Staff, May 1921; Kwantung Army Headquarters, October 1922; Army General Staff, March 1924; Member of same, October 1924; Kwantung Army Headquarters, May 1925; Major, August 1926; 39th Infantry Regiment, December 1927; Battalion Commander, 39th Infantry Regiment, August 1928; Staff Officer, Korea Army, December 1929; LtCol, August 1930; Army General Staff, November 1931; Military Attache, Japanese Embassy, Turkey, May 1932; Member, Army General Staff, March 1934; Section Chief, Army General Staff (Colonel), March 1935; Regimental Commander, 45th Infantry, March 1936; Department Chief, Inspec­ torate General of Military Training (MajGen). July 1938; LtGen, March 1941; 6th Division Commander, April 1941; Seventeenth Army Commander, April 1945. K A T A O K A , Tadasu: 2dLt (Cavalry), December 1915; was graduated from War College, November 1925; Army General Staff, December 1926; Member of same, December 1927; In­ structor, War College, March 1931; attached to Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, February 1932; Member, Army General Staff, December 1932; Staff Officer, Cavalry Group (LtCol), August 1934; Instructor, Army Cavalry School, March 1937; attached to Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, March 1937; attached to Headquarters, 4th Depot Division, April 1937; Staff Officer, same Division, November 1937; Colonel, March 1938; Chief of Staff, 104th Division, July 1938; Commander, Imperial Guard Cavalry Regiment, April 1939; Commander, Imperial Guard Reconnaissance Regiment, December 1940; Brigade Commander, 3d Cavalry Brigade (MajGen), March 1941; Chief of Staff, Fifth Army, February 1943; Acting Com­ manding General, 1st Division, August 1944; 1st Division Commander (LtGen), October 1944; landed at Ormoc (Leyte), November 1944 (from Shanghai); engaged in operations on Leyte. KAW ABE, Masakazu: Born Toyama Prefecture, 1886 (elder brother of future LtGen Torashiro Kawabe); 2dLt— 35th Infantry Regiment, December 1907; istLt, November 1910; was graduated from War College, 1915; Company Commander, 35th Infantry Regiment (Captain), August 1917; Resident Officer, Switzerland, April 19x8; Section Member, Inspectorate General of Military Training, June 1921; Major, August 1923; Member, Army General Staff, June 1925; LtCol, July 1927; Military Attache, Germany, August 1929; Colonel, August 1931; Regimental Commander, 6th Infantry, April 1932; Commanding Officer, Training Regiment, Infantry School, August 1933; Chief, First Section, Inspectorate General of Military Training, March 1934; attached to same Inspectorate (MajGen), March 1936; Infantry Brigade Com-

BIOGRAPHICAL DIGESTS

227

mandcr, North China, April 1936; Assistant Chief of Staff, North China Area Army, August 1937; Chief of Staff, Central China Expeditionary Army, February 1938; Chief, Main Depart­ ment, Inspectorate General of Military Training, January 1939; LtGen, March 1939; Acting Inspector General of Military Training, for about one month, October 1939; 12th Division Commander, March 1940; Third Army Commander, March 1941; Chief of Staff, China Expedi­ tionary Army, August 1942; Commanding General, Burma Area Army, March 1943; Com­ manding General, Central District Army, December 1944; Commanding General, Fifteenth Area Army— concurrently Commanding General, Central District Army Command, February 1945; General, March 1945; Commanding General, Air General Army, April 1945 (took charge of Army air operations in homeland, Korea, and Ryukyus); took command of First General Army after suicide of Marshal Sugiyama following Capitulation. KAW ABE, Torashiro: Was graduated from Military Academy, May 1912; 2dLt (Artillery) — 3d Field Artillery Regiment, December 1912; Captain, August 1920; was graduated from War College, November 1921; Operations Section, Army General Staff Headquarters, Decem­ ber 1922-August 1925; Resident Officer, Riga, Latvia (studying Soviet military affairs), Janu­ ary 1926-September 1928; Major, March 1927; Instructor (Tactics), War College, December 1928-April 1929; Operations Section, Army General Staff Headquarters, April 1929-January 19325 LtCol, August 1931; Military Attache, U.S.S.R., February 19 3 2 -A pril 1934; Staff Officer (Operations; Intelligence), Kwantung Army, August 1934-March 1936; Colonel, March 1935; Commanding Officer, Field Artillery Regiment, Guard Division, March 1936-February 1937: Operations Section Chief, Army General Staff Headquarters, March 1937-February 1938; Colonel (Air Force), August 1937; Hamamatsu Army Flying School, March 1938-September 1938; MajGen, July 1938; Military Attache, Germany, October 1938-February 1940; concur­ rently Military Attache, Hungary, August 1939; Commanding General, 7th Air Brigade, September 1940-July 1941 (Manchuria; then Canton, after February 1941); Chief of Staff, General Defense Command, July 1941-November 1941; LtGen, October 1941; Chief, General Affairs Department, Inspectorate General of Air Force, December 1941-May 1943; Commanding General, Second Air Army (Manchuria), May 1943-August 1944; Deputy Chief, Inspectorate General of Air Force, August 1944-April 1945; Deputy Chief of Army General Staff, IGHQ, April 1945-August 1945; chief of surrender team dispatched to Manila, August 19, 1945. KAW AGU CH I, Kiyotake: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1914; was graduated from War College, November 1922; Captain, August 1923; attached to Army General Staff, November 1923; Staff Officer, 4th Division, May 1925; Staff Officer, Formosa Army, August 1928; In­ structor, Army Heavy Artillery School (Major), August 1929; Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, September 1930; Adjutant, same Ministry, August 1931; Staff Officer, China Garrison Army, August 1933; LtCol, March 1934; attached to 4th Division Headquarters, March 1935; Staff Officer, Tokyo Bay Fortress, March 1937; attached to Headquarters, North China Area Army (Colonel), November 1937; Staff Officer, same army, December 1938; Staff Officer, Central Defense Army, March 1939; Staff Officer, Central District Army, August 1940; Brigade Commander, 35th Infantry Brigade (MajGen), December 1940; after outbreak of Pacific War, participated in Borneo invasion and, later, in general offensive on Guadalcanal Island; attached to Headquarters, Eastern District Army, November 1942; unassigned list, March 1943; transferred to first reserve list, April 1943; recalled to active duty, March 1945— Commanding General, Tsushima Fortress. KIMURA, Heitaro: Born September 28, 1888; 2dLt (Artillery)— 16th Artillery Regiment, December 1908; istLt, December 1911; was graduated from War College, November 1916; Army General Staff, September 1917; Captain, July 1918; Staff Officer, 3d Division Head­ quarters (participated in Siberian Expedition), August 1918; returned to Japan, April 1919; Resident Officer, Germany, January 1922; Major, August 1923; Army General Staff, May 1925; Instructor, War College, October 1925; Battalion Commander, 24th Artillery Regiment, August 1926; Artillery Department, Office of Military Training, July 1927; LtCol, March 1928; Mem­ ber, Japanese Delegation, London Conference, 1929-May 1930; Regimental Commander, 22d Artillery (Colonel), August 1931; Instructor, Field Artillery School, August 1932; Section Chief, Economic Mobilization Bureau, War Ministry, March 1935; Chief, Military Adminis­ tration Bureau, War Ministry, March 1936; MajGen, August 1936; Vice-Minister of War (LtGen), April 1941-March 1943; Commanding General, Burma Area Army, August 1944; General, 1945. KITA, Seiichi: Born December 20, 1886; 2dLt (Infantry)— 36th Infantry Regiment, December 1907; 68th Infantry Regiment, February 1908; istLt, November 1910; Tientsin

228

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

Garrison Infantry Unit, June 1911; 68th Infantry Regiment (Captain), April 1918; was grad­ uated from War College, November 1919; Army General Staff, April 1920; Resident Officer, China, February 1921; Major, August 1923; Army General Staff, May 1925; Instructor, War College, February 1926; Resident Officer, China, May 1927; Resident Officer, England, September 1927; LtCol, October 1927; Army General Staff, August 1928; Regimental Commander, 37th Infantry (Colonel), August 1931; Shanghai Expeditionary Army Headquarters, February 1 932; Staff Officer, Kwantung Army, August 1933; (7th) Section Chief, Army General Staff, August 1934; Resident Officer, China, June 1935; Military Attache, China, March 1936; later Command­ ing General, Twelfth Army (North China); and later assigned to Army General Staff. Com­ manding General, First Area Army (Manchuria), September 1944; captured by Russians, 1945; reported to have died during prison-camp captivity in Soviet Union, ca. 1951. KITAN O, Kenzo: 2dLt (Infantry)-— attached to 38th Infantry Regiment, December 1910; istLt, December 1913; assigned to Army General Staff, January 1915; attached to 38th Infantry Regiment, May 1916; was graduated from War College, December 1919; Company Commander, 38th Infantry Regiment (Captain), April 1920; attached to Inspectorate General of Military Training, became section member of same, December 1920; attached to same, July 1922; Resident Officer, Germany, September 1922; Major, August 1925; attached to Inspectorate General of Military Training, October 1925; Section Member of same, December 1928; Battalion Commander, 3d Infantry Regiment, March 1929; Section Member, Inspectorate Gen­ eral of Military Training (LtCol), August 1929; Member, Personnel Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, August 1930; Commanding Officer, Senior-Course Cadet Unit, Military Academy (Col), August 1933; Regimental Commander, 37th Infantry, March 1935; Hunchun Garrison Commander (Manchuria)— MajGen, August 1937; Chief of Staff, Korea Army, March 1938 (period of Changkufeng Incident); Military Police (Gendarmerie) Commander, China, September 1939; 4th Division Commander, July 1940; from Shanghai to Philippines campaign, February 1942; to Osaka (after conquest of Bataan and Corregidor), July 1942; Commandant, Kungchuling Army School (Manchuria), July 1942; Nineteenth Army Commander, October 1943 (Headquarters: Amboina); attached to Army General Staff Headquarters, March 1945; Com­ mandant, Military Academy, March 1945. Final rank, LtGen. KOISO, Kuniaki: Born Yamagata Prefecture, March 1880; 2dLt (Infantry)— 30th Infantry Regiment, June 1901; istLt, November 1903; Battalion Adjutant, 30th Infantry, September 1904; Company Commander, same regiment, March 1905; Captain, June 1905; was graduated from War College, November 1910; Instructor, Military Academy, December 1910; Army Staff Officer, Kwantung Government-General, September 1912; Major— Battalion Commander, 2d Infantry Regiment, August 1914; Army General Staff Headquarters, June 1915; LtCol, July 1918; Staff Officer, 12th Division, August 1918; Chief of Staff (LO C), 12th Division, September 1918; Army General Staff Headquarters, April 1919; Army Air Service, July 1921; Colonel, February 1922; official duty, Europe, June 1922; Regimental Commander, 51st Infantry, August 1923; Section Chief, Army General Staff, May 1925; Military Instructor, War College (MajGen), December 1926; Chief, Administrative Division, Army Aeronautical Department, July 1927; Chief, Materiel Mobilization Bureau, War Ministry, August 1929; Chief, Military Affairs Bureau, same Ministry, August 1930; LtGen, August 1931; Vice-Minister of War, February 1932; Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army— concurrently Chief, Special Service Depart­ ment, same army, August 1932; 5th Division Commander (Hiroshima), March 1 9341 Com­ manding General, Korea Army, December 1935; General, November 1937; Army General Staff, July 1938; retired to first reserve list, July 1938; Minister of Overseas Affairs, April 1939; released from post, August 1939; Minister of Overseas Affairs, January 1940; released from post, July 1940; Governor-General of Korea, May 1942; Prime Minister, July 1944; Commander-in-Chief, Volunteer Corps, April 1945; resigned as Premier, April 1945; ordered arrested as war criminal, November 1945; sentenced to life imprisonment by International Military Tribunal for the Far East; died, 1950. KOZUKI, Yoshio: Born November 7, 1886; 2dLt (Infantry)— 4th Infantry Regiment, Imperial Guard Division, December 1909; istLt, February 1913; was graduated from War College, assigned to Army General Staff, August 1918; Adjutant, War Ministry (Captain), July 1919; Language Officer, Germany, November 1921; Major, August 1924; assigned to Military Affairs Bureau, August 1925; LtCol, August 1928; assigned to Military Administra­ tion Bureau, December 1930; Colonel, August 1932; Regimental Commander, n t h Infantry, March 1935; Brigade Commander, 40th Infantry Brigade (MajGen), August 1937; Chief, Military Administration Bureau, July 1938; LtGen, August 1939; Commanding General, Shipping Transportation Headquarters, March 1940; 19th Division Commander, August 1940;

BIOGRAPHICAL DIGESTS

229

Second Army Commander, July 1942; Commanding General, Mongolia Army, June 1943; Eleventh Army Commander, November 1944; Seventeenth Area Army Commander (Korea), April 1945. KURIBAYASHI, Tadamichi: 2dLt (Cavalry), December 1914; was graduated from War College, November 1923; Resident Officer, United States, September 1927; Major, March 1930; Military Attache, Canada, April 1930; LtCol, August 1933; Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, December 1933; Regimental Commander, 7th Cavalry, August 1936; Section Chief (Cavalry), Military Administration Bureau, War Ministry, August 1937; Colonel, August 1937; Brigade Commander, 2d Cavalry Brigade (MajGen), March 1940; Brigade Commander, 1 st Cavalry Brigade, December 1940; Chief of Staff, Twenty-third Army, September 1941; Commanding General, 2d Imperial Guard Depot Division (LtGen), June 1943; 109th Division Commander (Ogasawara Group), May 1944; combat action from February 19, 1945; killed in action, Iwo Jima, March 22, 1945; posthumous promotion to full General, March 1945. KURODA, Shigenori: Born October 25, 1887; 2dLt (Infantry)— 47th Infantry Regiment, December 1909; istLt, February 1913; was graduated from War College, November 1916; Office of Military Training, August 1917; Amur Railway Detachment Headquarters, August 1918; later Company Commander, 47th Infantry Regiment; Captain, June 1919; Office of Mili­ tary Training, August 1919; Resident Officer, England, January 1922; Major, August 1924; Office of Military Training, May 1925; Battalion Commander, 57th Infantry Regiment, March 1928; LtCol, August 1928; Office of Military Training, August 1929; Regimental Commander, 59th Infantry (Colonel), August 1932; Section Chief (Conscription), War Ministry, August 1933; Military Attache, India, August 1935; MajGen, March 1937; Army General Staff, May 1937; Bureau Chief, Office of Military Training (LtGen), July 1941; Chief of Staff, Southern Army, June 1942; Fourteenth Army Commander, October 1943; Fourteenth Area Army Com­ mander, July 1944 (replaced by General Yamashita, September 1944). MAKINO, Shiro: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1914; was graduated from War College, November 1922; Instructor, Military Academy, August 1928; Major, August 1930; Battalion Commander, 4th Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment, March 1931; Instructor, Military Academy, April 1932; Instructor, War College (LtCol), August 1933; Staff Officer, 12th Division, December 1935; Colonel, August 1937; attached to Military Preparatory Academy, November 1937; Regimental Commander, 29th Infantry, July 1938; Chief of Staff, Fifth Army (MajGen), March 1940; Senior Instructor, Military Preparatory Academy, April 1941; Director of same, October 1941; Superintendent of same, December 1942; LtGen, June 1943; 16th Division Commander (Leyte), March 1944. MAZAKI, Jinsaburo: Born November 27, 1876; was graduated from Military Academy, November 1897; 2dLt— 46th Infantry Regiment, June 1898; Tsushima Guard Battalion (Infantry), May 1899; istLt— 46th Infantry Regiment, November 1900; Instructor, Training Unit, Military Academy, December 1900; Captain, June 1904; was graduated from War College, December 1905; Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, November 1907; Major, January 1909; Language Officer, Germany, May 1911; Battalion Commander, 42d Infantry Regiment, June 1914; LtCol, November 1914; Section Chief, Office of Military Training, November 1916; Colonel, January 1918; Regimental Commander, 1st Infantry, Imperial Guard Division, July 1921; Brigade Commander, 1st Infantry Brigade, August 1922; Commandant, Military Academy, August 1923; LtGen, March 1927; 8th Division Commander, August 1927; 1st Division Commander, July 1929; Deputy Chief, Army General Staff, January 1932; General— Military Councillor, June 1933; Inspector General of Military Training, January 1934; Military Councillor, July 1935; retired, March 1936; died, August 31, 1956. MINAMI, Jiro: Born Oita Prefecture, 1874; 2dLt (Cavalry), 1895; Company Commander, 1st Cavalry Regiment, Russo-Japanese War (took part in assault on Port Arthur); Major, 1905; MajGen, 1919; next assignments included command of garrison forces in China, and direc­ tion of Cavalry School; 16th Division Commander (LtGen), 1926; Vice Chief of Staff, 1927; Commanding General, Korea Army, 1929; General, 1930; Minister of War (Wakatsuki Cabinet), 1931; Commanding General, Kwantung Army— concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo, 1934; placed on reserve list, 1936 (after “ 2-26 Incident” ); Governor-General of Korea, 1936-42; Member, Privy Council, 1942; sentenced to life imprisonment by International Military Tribunal for the Far East; released from Sugamo Prison for reasons of healdi; died, 1957. MIYAZAKI, Shuichi: 2dLt (Infantry)— 17th Infantry Regiment, December 1916; istLt,

230

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

April 1920; Cadet Unit, Military Academy Preparatory School, February 1921; Captain, August 1925; Company Commander, 17th Infantry Regiment, December 1927; Army General Staff Headquarters, February 1929; Military Instructor, War College, June 1932; Major, August 193a; LtCol, August 1935; Colonel, March 1938; Staff Officer, Eleventh Army, August 1938; Regi­ mental Commander, 26th Infantry, October 1939; Military Instructor, War College, October 1940; MajGen, October 1941; Chief of Staff, Seventeenth Army, October 1942 (Rabaul); de­ parted Rabaul for Seventeenth Army Command Post (Guadalcanal), October 1942; withdrew from Guadalcanal, arrived Bougainville, February 1943; Chief, Fourth Bureau, Army General Staff Headquarters, May 1943; Deputy Commandant, War College, August 1943; Chief of Staff, Sixth Area Army, August 1944; LtGen, October 1944; Chief, First Bureau, Arm y General Staff Headquarters, December 1944; attended operational liaison conference between IGHQ, Southern Army, and Fourteenth Area Army (Manila), December 1944. MORI, Takeshi: 2dLt (Cavalry), December 1916; Captain, August 1925; was graduated from War College, December 1927; Company Commander, 13th Cavalry Regiment, January 1928; attached to Army General Staff, April 1929; Member, Arm y General Staff, December 1929; attached to same, and dispatched to China, March 1931; Major, August 1931; Staff Officer, Kwantung Army, February 1932; Instructor, Cavalry School, August 1933; Instructor, War College, June 1935; LtCol, August 1935; Staff Officer, First Army, August 1937; Colonel, March 1938; Instructor, War College, July 1938; Deputy Chief of Staff, Sixth Army, July 1941; MajGen, August 1941; Chief of Staff, Sixth Army, July 1942; Deputy Chief, Military Police Headquarters, February 1943; Chief of Staff, Nineteenth Army (region north of Australia), January 1944; attached to Eastern District Army (LtGen), March 1945; Commanding General, 1st Imperial Guard Division, April 1945; killed during abortive coup d'etat launched against him at Imperial Palace, August 14, 1945. M UTAGUCHI, Renya: Born October 7, 1888; 2dLt (Infantry)— 13th Infantry Regiment, December 1910; istLt, December 1913; was graduated from War College, November 1917; Army General Staff, July 1918; Captain, April 1920; 4th Infantry Regiment, March 1921; Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry (Major), May 1927; Resident Officer, France, December 1928; Instructor, War College, November 1929; LtCol, August 1930; Section Chief, Army General Staff, January 1933; Colonel, March 1934; Commanding Officer, Peiping Garrison Infantry Unit, February 1936; assigned to Kwantung Army Headquarters (MajGen), March 1938; Chief of Staff, Fourth Army, July 1938; Commandant, Military Academy, April 1939; 18th Division Commander, April 1941; Fifteenth Army Commander, March 1943; Army Gen­ eral Staff, August 1944; retired, December 1944. Final rank, LtGen. MUTO, Akira: 2dLt (Infantry)— assigned to 72d Infantry Regiment, December 1913; member of Oita PW Internment Camp staff, December 1914; was graduated from War College, November 1920; assigned to Military Academy, April 1921; assigned to Inspectorate General of Military Training, July 1922; Captain, August 1922; Member, Inspectorate General of Military Training, December 1922; Major, August 1928; Member, Army General Staff, November 1930; LtCol, August 1932; assigned to 1st Infantry Regiment, March 1934; assigned to Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, March 1935; staff officer, Kwantung Army, June 1936; Colonel, August 1936; Section Chief, Army General Staff Headquarters, March 1937; MajGen, March 1939; Chief, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry— concurrently Chief Secretary, Supreme War Council, September 1939; LtGen, October 1941; Imperial Guard Division Commander, April 1942; 2d Imperial Guard Division Commander, June 1943; Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army, October 1944; executed as “ Class A ” war criminal, December 23, 1948. N A G A T A , Tetsuzan: Born Nagano, January 14, 1884; was graduated from Military Acad­ emy, October 1904, and from War College, November 1911; Company Commander, 58th Infantry Regiment, August 1913; Language Officer, Germany, October 1913; Office of Military Training, August 1914; Language Officer, Denmark, June 1915; Military Attache, Sweden, June 1921; Army General Staff, February 1923; Office of Military Training, March 1923; Military Affairs Bureau, December 1924; Section Chief, Economic Mobilization Bureau, October 1926; Colonel, March 1927; Regimental Commander, 3d Infantry, March 1928; Section Chief, Military Affairs Bureau, August 1930; Chief, Second Bureau, Army General Staff (MajGen), April 1932; Brigade Commander, 1st Infantry Brigade, August 1932; Chief, Military Affairs Bureau, March 1934; assassinated by LtCol Aizawa, August 1935, because he was reputedly putting the Army “ in the paws of high finance;” posthumously promoted to LtGen. NAK AI, Masutaro: 2dLt (Infantry)— n t h Infantry Regiment, December 1918; Siberian Expedition, 1919-20; assigned to Manchuria Independent Garrison Unit, April 1924; 20th

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Infantry Regiment (Captain), December 1926; was graduated from War College, December 1930; Instructor, Military Academy (tactics), December 1931; Resident Officer, China, April 1933 (for two years); Major, August 1933; Staff Officer, China Garrison Arm y (intelligence), May 1935; LtCol, August 1936; Military Attache, China, August 1937; Staff Officer, 2d Division, July 1938; Headquarters, South China Expeditionary Army, July 1939; Colonel, August 1939; Staff Officer, South China Expeditionary Army, October 1939; Staff Officer, Twenty-third Army, March 1940; Staff Officer, French Indo-China Expeditionary Army, November 1940; Instructor, Army Infantry School, December 1940; Chief of Staff, 20th Division, March 1941; arrived at W ewak (New Guinea), January 1943; directed landings by rear divisional elements, Hansa Bay, March 1943; 20th Infantry Group Commander (MajGen), August 1943 (directed road construction in Finisterre Mountain Range); Nakai Detachment Commander, Kaiapit sector, September 1943 (covered 51st Division’s withdrawal from Lae; defended Finisterre Range); attacked Kesewi, December 1943; covered withdrawal of 20th and 51st Divisions, Cape Gumbi, January 1944; Commander, Sepic River Crossing Unit, April 1944 (when main army forces moved to W ewak sector); commanded advance unit of 20th Division, toward Aitape— Acting Division Commander, 20th Division, after Division Commander killed, April 1944; defended But coast, August 1944; LtGen, March 1945; withdrew bulk of Division to sector south of mountains, engaged Australian forces, April-August 1945. N A K AN O , Hidemitsu: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1912; was graduated from War College, November 1920; attached to Army General Staff, June 1921; Member, Army General Staff, August 1924; Headquarters, Kwantung Army, May 1926; Battalion Commander, 63d Infantry Regiment, August 1928; Member, Army General Staff, August 1929; Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, December 1930; Army General Staff, August 1931; 48th Infantry Regiment, August 1933; Headquarters, Kwantung Army, June 1934; Headquarters, China Garrison Army, August 1937; Regimental Commander, 13th Infantry, March 1938; Head­ quarters, Twenty-first Army, February 1939; Headquarters, South China Area Army, February 1940; Brigade Commander, 39th Infantry Brigade, March 1940; Headquarters, Kwantung Army, December 1940; 51st Division Commander, November 1941 (engaged in Lae and Salamaua operations); final rank, LtGen. N A K AZA W A , Mitsuo: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1912; was graduated from War College, December 1920; Member, Army General Staff, March 1922; was graduated from Tokyo Foreign Language School (specialty German), March 1923; Resident Officer, Germany, July 1923; Member, Army General Staff, April 1925; Major, March 1927; Instructor, War College, December 1929; LtCol, July 1932; Instructor, Military Academy, August 1934; Member, Army General Staff, March 1935; Regimental Commander, 18th Infantry (Colonel), March 1936; Chief of Staff, 16th Division, August 1937; Director, Military Preparatory Academy (MajGen), March 1939; 1st Division Commander (LtGen), October 1941; Superintendent, Military Preparatory Academy, March 1944; Commanding General, Fortieth Army, January 1945; headquarters of this army were transferred from Formosa to southern Kyushu, early June 1945 (encharged with defense of Satsuma Peninsula area). NISHIHARA, Kanji; 2dLt (Infantry)— n th Infantry Regiment, December 1911; istLt, December 1914; attached to Depot Unit, n th Infantry, June 1919; Company Commander, same regiment (Captain), April 1921; was graduated from War College, November 1921; assigned to Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, December 1922; attached to n t h Infantry, December 1922; Section Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, August 1923; Resident Officer, France, February 1926; Major, March 1927; Section Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, September 1928; attached to Army Technical Department (LtCol), August 1930; Section Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry— concurrently Instructor, War College, September 1930; Staff Officer, Korea Army, May 1931; Director, Research Depart­ ment, Infantry School, December 1933; Colonel, December 1934; Deputy Commandant, Narashino Army School, March 1935; Regimental Commander, 31st Infantry, August 1936; Chief of Staff, 8th Division, October 1937; Deputy Commandant, Narashino Army School (MajGen), July 1938; Commandant of same, December 1938; 23d Division Commander (LtGen), March 1941; Inspector General of Chemical Warfare, November 1942; Acting Deputy Chief, Inspector­ ate General of Military Training, May 1943; Commanding General, Fourth Army, February 1944; attached to Western Army District Headquarters, March 1945; Commanding General, Fifty-seventh Army (in charge of defensive operations in southern Kyushu), April 1945. NISHIO, Juzo: Born Tottori Prefecture, October 31, 1881; 2dLt— 40th Infantry Regiment,

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June 1903; participated in Russo-Japanese War, infantry battalion adjutant, 40th Infantry Regiment, April 1904-February 1906; Captain, December 1909; was graduated from War College, assigned to Military Affairs Bureau, November 1910; Language Officer, Germany, August 1912; Arm y General Staff, August 1914; Major, November 1916; Adjutant, War M inistrySecretary to War Minister, April 1919; LtCol, August 1920; 10th Infantry Regiment, April 1922; Instructor, War College (Colonel), April 1923; Regimental Commander, 40th Infantry, March 1925; Section Chief, Office of Military Training, March 1926; Brigade Commander, 39th Infantry Brigade (MajGen), August 1929; Chief, Fourth Bureau, Arm y General Staff, April 1932; LtGen, August 1933; Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, March 1934; Deputy Chief of Army General Staff, March 1936; Commanding General, China Expeditionary Army (full General), October 1939-March 1941; Military Councillor, 1941; placed on reserve list, 1942; Governor, Tokyo Metropolis, 1944 until end of war. NISHIYAMA, Fukutaro: 2dLt (Infantry), March 1912; was graduated from War College, December 1925; Instructor, Military Academy, November 1927; Staff Officer, 2d Division, August 1929; Instructor, Military Academy (LtCol), August 1932; attached to Headquarters, Independent Garrison Unit, November 1933; Staff Officer, 2d Independent Gar­ rison Unit, December 1933; Staff Officer, 10th Division, December 1934; Staff Officer, 1st Depot Division (Colonel), August 1936; Regimental Commander, 12th Infantry, March 1938; 107th Infantry Brigade Commander (MajGen), March 1939; LtGen, June 1943; 23d Division Commander, January 1944; moved to Luzon with Division, December 1944. N O DA, Kengo: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1912; was graduated from War College, November 1920; Member, Army General Staff, September 1922; Staff Officer, Korea Army, March 1925; Major, October 1926; Battalion Commander, 14th Infantry Regiment, August 1927; Member, Army General Staff, August 1929; LtCol, August 1931; Instructor, Infantry School, April 1932; Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, August 1933; official duty, Europe, December 1934; Colonel, August 1935; Regimental Commander, 33d Infantry, August 1936; Commanding Officer, Training Unit, Infantry School, January 1938; Chief, Second Bureau, Inspectorate General of Military Training (MajGen), July 1938; Chief, Personnel Bureau, War Ministry, October 1939; Deputy Chief of Staff, China Expeditionary Army, April 1941; LtGen, August 1941; 14th Division Commander, December 1942; Deputy Chief, Inspectorate General of Military Training, October 1943; Commanding General, Fifty-first Army, April 1945. OBA, Shihei: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1910; attached to Military Preparatory Academy, August 1924; attached to 1st Infantry Regiment, August 1927; LtCol, August 1931; attached to Toyohashi Army Reserve Officer School, August 1933; Commanding Officer, Depot Unit, 7th Infantry Regiment (Colonel), August 1936; Commanding Officer, Infantry Unit, Toyohashi Reserve Officer School, August 1938; attached to Headquarters, 10th Depot Division (MajGen), August 1939; Commanding General, 10th Infantry Group, 1940; 16th Division Commander (LtGen), August 1942; attached to Army General Staff, March 1944; Commanding General, Tokyo Bay Fortress, June 1944; concurrently Commanding General, Tokyo Bay Group, April

1945OBATA, Hideyoshi (Eiryo): 2dLt (Cavalry), December 1911; was graduated from War College, December 1919; Instructor, War College, April 1921; military student, England, April 1923; Major, March 1926; Instructor, War College, May 1926; Resident Officer, India, November 1927; Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, August 1929; Army General Staff (LtCol), August 1930; Colonel (Cavalry, as before), August 1934; Regimental Commander, 14th Cavalry, December 1935; Colonel (Air Force)'— attached to Second Air Group Head­ quarters, August 1937; Commandant, Akeno Army Air School, November 1937; Commanding General, same school (MajGen), March 1938; Fifth Air Group Commander (LtGen), December 1940; Third Air Army Commander, March 1943; Army General Staff, December 1943; Thirty-first Arm y Commander (Central Pacific), February 1944; killed in action, Guam, August 1944; death confirmed, September 1944— posthumous promotion to full General. OBATA, Nobuyoshi (Shinryo): . . . Instructor, War College (Colonel), March 1939; Com­ manding Officer, Transportation Regiment, Imperial Guard Division, May 1940 (Tokyo; French Indo-China; Malaya; Sumatra); MajGen, March 1943; Chief of Staff, Fifteenth Army, March 1943; Chief, Harbin Special Intelligence Agency, Kwantung Army, May 1943; Chief of Staff, Kwantung Defense Army, October 1944; Chief of Staff, Forty-fourth Army (Manchuria), June 1945; captured by Soviet Army, August 1945; not repatriated until 1956.

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O BATA, Toshishiro (Binshiro): Born February 19, 1885. Approximate dates of high points in his career: Chief, Operations Section, Army General Staff, 1928; Chief, Operations Bureau, Army General Staff, 193a; Deputy Commandant, War College, 1935-36. Promoted to LtGen, March 7, 1936; retired on August 1 of same year. Date of death unknown. OKA D A , Tasuku: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1911; was graduated from War College, November 1922; Member, Army General Staff, December 1924; Assistant Military Attache, England, November 1925; Major, May 1927; Instructor, War College, March 1928; attached to Headquarters, 3d Division, January 1929; Aide-de-Camp to Prince Kotohito Kanin, June 1930: Member, Inspectorate General of Military Training (LtCol), August 1933; Regimental Commander, 80th Infantry (Colonel), March 1935; Chief of Staff, 4th Division, March 1937; Brigade Commander, 8th Infantry Brigade (MajGen), July 1938; Superintendent, Army Tank School, October 1939; Chief, Sagami Army Arsenal, September 1940; LtGen, March 1941; 2d Tank Division Commander, September 1942; Commanding General, Thirteenth Area Army— concurrently Commanding General, T o \ai District Army (Nagoya), February 1945OKAMURA, Yasuji: Born May 1884; 2dLt (Infantry), November 1904; was graduated from War College, November 1913; adviser to Sun Chuang-fang, Chinese military leader of 1920’s; Regimental Commander, 6th Infantry (Colonel), July 1927; Section Chief, Army General Staff, August 1928; Chief, Assignments Section, Personnel Bureau, War Ministry, August 1929; attached to Army Ordnance (MajGen), April 1932; Deputy Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, August 1932; Army General Staff, December 1934; Chief, Second Bureau, same, March 1935; LtGen, March 1936; 2d Division Commander, March 1936; Command­ ing General, Eleventh Army, June 1938; Military Councillor, March 1940; General, April 1941; Commanding General, North China Area Army, July 1941; Commanding General, Sixth Area Army, August 1944; Commander-in-Chief, China Expeditionary Army, November 1944 (re­ placed Hata); formally surrendered his forces to Chinese General Ho Ying-chin, September 9, 1945. OKIDO, Sanji: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1913; was graduated from War College, November 1924; Army General Staff, December 1925; Member of same, December 1926; In­ structor, War College, November 1931; Member, Army General Staff— LtCol, August 1932; Army General Staff, January 1933; Member, Military Affairs Bureau, W ar Ministry, August 1936; attached to Headquarters, 5th Division (Colonel), August 1936; attached to Army General Staff, January 1937; Staff Officer, China Garrison Army, August 1937; Regimental Commander, 76th Infantry, July 1938; Brigade Commander, 29th Infantry Brigade (MajGen), March 1939; attached to Personnel Bureau, War Ministry, August 1940; LtGen, November 1941; 22d Division Commander, March 1942; Chief of Staff, North China Area Army, November 1942; Commander, Military Police Forces, October 1944. OSHIMA, Hiroshi: Born Tokyo, 1886 (eldest son of Ken-ichi Oshima, former Minister of War); was graduated from Military Academy, 1906; was graduated from War College, 1915; LtGen, 1938. While MajGen, stationed in Berlin as Military Attache, working for alliance between Japan and Nazi Germany (Anti-Comintern Pact, 1937; Tripartite Alliance, 1940); Ambassador to Germany, 1940. Sentenced to life imprisonment by International Military Tribunal for the Far East; released, 1955. SAKAGUCHI, Shizuo: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1910; Member, Army Central Ord­ nance Depot, April 1921; attached to Headquarters, 7th Division, August 1928; Adjutant, 7th Division, August 1930; attached to 24th Infantry Regiment (LtCol), August 1932; 9th Independent Garrison Battalion Commander, August 1935; Colonel, August 1937; attached to Headquarters, 16th Division, November 1937; MajGen, August 1938; Brigade Commander, 12th Infantry Brigade, September 1939; Commanding General, Infantry Group, Kurume Divi­ sion, August 1940; Commanding General, Infantry Group, 56th Division, November 1941; Commanding General, Zentsuji Division (LtGen), June 1943; Commanding General, 65th Division, August 1944; attached to Western District Arm y Command, March 1945; transferred to first reserve list, April 1945. SAN AD A, Joichiro: 2dLt (Infantry)— 9th Infantry Regiment, December 1919; istLt, December 1922; Company Commander, 9th Infantry Regiment (Captain), August 1928; Staff Officer, Tokyo Garrison Command, August 1929; Adjutant, W ar Ministry, May 1931; Member, Army Affairs Section, War Ministry, August 1932; Major, August 1934; official duty, Europe and

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United States, September 1936-September 1937; assigned to Army Aeronautical Department, March 1937! Member, War Ministry section (Maintenance), September 1937; LtCol, Novem­ ber 1937; Secretary to War Minister— concurrently Adjutant, same Ministry, August 1938; Regi­ mental Commander, 86th Infantry (Colonel), August 1939; Staff Officer, China Expeditionary Army— Staff Officer, China Area Fleet, August 1940; Chief, Army Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, February 1941; Aide to War Minister, IGHQ, November 1941; Chief, Military Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, April 1942; Chief, Second Section, Army General Staff Headquarters— Staff Officer, IGHQ (Navy Section), December 1942; MajGen, August 1943; Chief, First Bureau, Army General Staff Headquarters, October 1943; Chief, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, December 1944; Central District Army Head­ quarters, March 1945; Deputy Chief of Staff, Second General Army, April 1945. SASAKI, Minoru: Born January 1, 1893; 2dLt (Cavalry)— 5th Cavalry Regiment, December 1914; istLt, July 1918; Depot Unit, 5th Cavalry Regiment, August 1919; Adjutant, same Regiment, October 1920; attached to same Regiment, January 1921; Captain, August 1923; Company Commander, 5th Cavalry, December 1923; Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, May 1925; Section Member, same Bureau, August 1925; Member, Army Remount Department, October 1926; Military Student, U.S.S.R., September 1927; same for Poland and U.S.S.R., August 1928; Major, August 1929; Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, June 1930; Section Member, same Bureau, August 1930; Army Ordnance Main Depot, November 1931; Instructor, War College, December 1932; Director, Research Department, War College (LtCol), August 1933; Member, Army General Staff, March 1936; Chief, Research Section, Admin­ istration Department (Cavalry), March 1937; Colonel, August 1937; Ordnance Bureau, War Ministry, August 1937; Army Ordnance Main Depot (MajGen), August 1939; Commanding General, 4th Cavalry Brigade, October 1939; Chief of Staff, Sixth Army, December 1940; Mechanized Department, August 1942; Commanding General, Nanto (Southeast) Detachment (New Georgia operations), May 1943; Eighth Area Army Headquarters, November 1943; LtGen, October 1944. SATO, Kenryo: Born Ishikawa Prefecture, 1895; was graduated from Military Academy, 1917; was graduated from War College, 1925; Government Planning Board, 1937; Chief, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, 1942; 37th Division Commander, 1945; final rank, LtGen. Sentenced to life imprisonment by International Military Tribunal for the Far East; released, 1956. SHICHIDA, Ichiro: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1908; was graduated from War College, November 1919; Member, Army General Staff, December 1920; Battalion Commander, 1st Infantry Regiment (Major), March 1924; Instructor, Infantry School (LtCol), August 1928; Resident Officer, France, May 1931; Colonel, August 1932; Section Chief, Inspectorate General of Military Training, August 1933; Brigade Commander, 24th Infantry Brigade (MajGen), March 1937; Director, Military Academy, November 1937; LtGen, August 1939; 20th Division Commander, September 1939; Superintendent, Military Preparatory Academy, April 1941; Commanding General, Mongolia Garrison Army, March 1942; Commanding General, Second Army, May 1943; Superintendent, Army School of Science, March 1944; Superintendent, Toyama Army School, October 1944; retired, April 1945; recalled to active duty— Commanding General, Fifty-sixth Army, April 1945. SHIGETA, Tokumatsu: 2dLt (Artillery), December 1912; was graduated from War College, November 1923; Staff Officer, 8th Division, August 1925; Major, December 1927; Battalion Commander, 1st Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment, August 1928; Staff Officer, Tokyo Bay Fortress, March 1931; LtCol, August 1932; Staff Officer, 2d Division, August 1934; Regimental Commander, 10th Artillery, March 1936; Colonel, August 1936; Chief of Staff, 6th Division, March 1938; Brigade Commander, 1st Field Artillery Brigade, March 1939; MajGen, March 1940; Director, Field Artillery School, April 1941; Superintendent of same, June 1941; LtGen, October 1941; 35th Division Commander, March 1942; Inspector General of Artillery Training, March 1943; 72d Division Commander, July 1944; Fifty-second Army Commander, April 1945. SHIMADA, Shigetaro: Born Tokyo, September 24, 1883; was graduated from Naval Academy, November 1904; Ensign, August 1905; Lt(jg), September 1907; Lt, October 1909; Naval War College (Class “ A ” Student), December 1913; LtCdr, December 1915; Assistant Naval Attache, Italy, August 1916; Naval Attache, same country, December 1917; Staff Officer, Naval General Staff, June ig2o; Cdr, December 1920; Instructor, Naval War College, December 1923; Captain, December 1924; Commander, 7th Submarine Division, De*

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cember 1926; Captain o£ Tama, August 1928; Captain of Hiei, December 1928; Rear Admiral, November 1929; Chief of Staff, 2d Fleet, November 1929; Chief of Staff, 1st Fleet— Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, December 1930; Commandant, Submarine School, December 1931; Chief of Staff, 3d Fleet, February 1932; Staff Officer, Naval General Staff, June 1932; Chief, Third Department, June 1932; concurrently Chief, First Department, November 1932; Chief, First Department alone (Naval General Staff), October 1933; Vice-Admiral, November 1934; ViceChief, Naval General Staff, December 1935; Commander, 2d Fleet, December 1937; Com­ mandant, Kure Naval District, November 1938; Commander, China Area Fleet, May 1940; Admiral, November 1940; Commandant, Yokosuka Naval District, September 1941; Navy Minister, October 1941; Chief of Naval General Staff, February 1944; relieved as Navy Minister, July 1944; relieved as Chief of Naval General Staff, August 1944; appointed to Supreme War Council, August 1944; retired to Reserve, January 1945 (at own request); arrested as war criminal, September 1945; indicted on 55 counts, including crimes against the peace, “ conven­ tional war crimes,” and crimes against humanity; sentenced to life imprisonment upon con­ viction by International Military Tribunal for the Far East, November 12, 1948. SHIMOYAMA, Takuma: Born December 1, 1892; 2dLt (Infantry)— 1st Infantry Regiment, December 1913; istLt, August 1917; was graduated from War College, November 1921; In­ structor, Military Academy (Captain), August 1922; Resident Officer, Germany, March 1925; Office of Military Training, November 1927; Major, August 1928; Military Administration Bureau, War Ministry, August 1930; Army General Staff (LtCol), August 1932; Instructor, War College, August 1934; Staff Officer, n th Division, December 1934; Kwantung Army Head­ quarters— Adviser, Manchukuoan Military Administration Bureau, December 1935; Colonel, August 1936; Staff Officer, North China Area Army, August 1937; Regimental Commander, 16th Air Regiment, June 1938; Army Aeronautical Department (MajGen), March 1939; Staff Officer, Air Force, August 1939. A t end of World W ar II, he was Commanding General (LtGen), Fifth Air Army, stationed in Seoul, Korea. SUGAW ARA, Michio: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1909; was graduated from War College, 1919; Major, August 1924; Battalion Commander, 76th Infantry Regiment, March 1925; Major (Air Force), May 1925; Arm y Aeronautical Department, December 1927; LtCol (Air Force), August 1928; Regimental Commander, 6th Air Regiment (Colonel), March 1928; Section Chief, Army Aeronautical Department, March 1935; Brigade Commander, 2d Air Brigade (MajGen), August 1937; Brigade Commander, 3d Air Brigade, July 1938; LtGen, October 1939; Commandant, Shimoshizu Army Air School, December 1939; First Air Group Commander, August 1940; Third Air Group Commander, September 1941; Third Air Army Commander, July 1942; Commandant, Military Air Academy, May 1943; Deputy Chief, Army Aeronautical Department, April 1944; Chief, same Department, July 1944; Air Training Army Commander, August 1944; Sixth Air Arm y Commander, December 1944. Between March and May 1945, General Sugawara was engaged in the Ten-Go Air Operation, under the Commanderin-Chief, Combined Fleet. SUGIYAMA, Gen: Born Kokijra City, Fukuoka Prefecture, 1880; 2dLt (Infantry), June 1901; was graduated from War College, November 1910; Army General Staff, December 1910; official duty, Philippines, February 1912; official duty, Singapore, October 1912; Major, August 1913; Military Attache, India, February 1915; LtCol, August 1917; Commander, 2d Air Battalion, December 1918; Colonel, June 1921; Chief, Army Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, August 1923; Chief, Supply Bureau, Army Aeronautical Department (MajGen), May 1925; Chief, Military Affairs Bureau, August 1928; Acting Vice-Minister of War, June 1930; Vice-Minister of War (LtGen), August 1930; 12th Division Commander, February 1932; Chief, Army Aeronautical Department, March 1933; Deputy Chief of Army General Staff— concurrently Military Councillor, August 1936; General, November 1936; War Minister, February 1937; Military Councillor, June 1938; Commanding General, North China Area Army, December 1938; concurrently Commanding General, Mongolia Garrison Army, August 1939; Military Councillor, September 1939; Chief of Army General Staff, October 1940; Field Marshal, June 1943; Inspector General of Military Training, February 1944; War Minister, July 1944; Commander-in-Chief, First General Army, April 1945; he and wife committed suicide following Japan’s capitulation, August 1945. SUZUKI, Kantaro: Born Chiba Prefecture, 1867; was graduated from Naval Academy, 1887; was graduated from Naval War College, 1898; commanded a torpedo boat during SinoJapanese War, participated in night torpedo assault on Wei-hai-wei (L t); commanded 4th Destroyer Division, which picked up survivors of the Port Arthur Blockade Squadron, during Russo-Japanese War (Commander). Vice-Minister of Navy, 1914; Vice-Admiral, 1917; Admiral,

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1923; Military Councillor; Chief of Naval General Staff. After retirement, Grand Chamberlain and Privy Councillor. Seriously wounded during “ 2-26” Incident. Prime Minister, April-August 1945; died, 1948. SUZUKI, Sosaku: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1912; was graduated from W ar College, November 1919; Army General Staff, April 1920; Member, same, November 1921; Resident Officer, Germany, March 1923; Staff Officer, Army General Staff, November 1925; Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, December 1928; LtCol, August 1931; Staff Officer, Kwantung Army, December 1933; Regimental Commander, 4th Infantry (Colonel), August 1935; Chief, 2d Section, Inspectorate General of Military Training, March 1937; MajGen, July 1938; Deputy Chief of Staff, China Expeditionary Army, September 1939; Chief, Third Bureau, Army General Staff, March 1940; LtGen, March 1941; Chief of Staff, Twenty-fifth Army, November 1941; Army Ordnance, Administration Department, October 1942; Chief, Army Shipping Department, April 1943; Chief, Central Shipping Transportation Headquarters, September 1943; Thirty-fifth Army Commander (Central and Southern Philippines), July 1944; killed in action, date confirmed June 14, 1945 (General). SUZUKI, Teiichi; Born Chiba Prefecture, 1888; 2dLt (Infantry), December 1910; was graduated from War College, November 1917; attached to Army General Staff, July 1918; Member, same (Captain), April 1920; attached to 48th Infantry Regiment (Major), Decembei 1925; Battalion Commander, 48th Infantry Regiment, August 1926; Member, Arm y General Staff, July 1927; Assistant Military Attache, China, December 1929; LtCol, March 1930; Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, August 1931; Colonel, December 1933; Mem­ ber, Research Division, War College, March 1934; attached to Military Affairs Bureau— con­ currently Member, Cabinet Research Board, May 1935; Regimental Commander, 14th Infantry, August 1936; attached to 16th Division Headquarters (MajGen), November 1937; first Chief, Political Affairs Section, Asia Development Board (China Affairs Board), December 1938 ( “ was charged with providing guidance for W ang Ching-wei’s new regime at Nanking” ); LtGen, August 1940; Acting Secretary-General, Asia Development Board, December 1940; transferred to first reserve list— Minister of State (Without Portfolio)— concurrently Chief, Cabinet Planning Board, April 1941; relinquished posts, October 1943 (after serving in 2d and 3d Konoye Cabinets and Tojo Cabinet); Imperial nominee to House of Peers, 1943; sentenced to life imprisonment by International Military Tribunal for the Far East, after indictment on 49 counts; released, 1956. T A N A K A , Hisaichi: This Commanding General, 21st Division, is known to have held the following posts during his career; Language Officer, United States; Instructor, War College; Chief of Staff, Formosa Army; Chief of Staff, Southern Expeditionary Arm y (Canton, 1938). Last post: Commanding General, Twenty-third Army, Canton (LtGen). T A N A K A , Shinichi: Born Hokkaido, 1893; was graduated from Military Academy, July 1913; 2dLt (Infantry)— assigned to 52d Infantry Regiment, December 1913; was graduated from War College, December 1923; Section Member, Inspectorate General of Military Training, 1924; Staff Officer, Kwantung Army, April 1932; Army General Staff Headquarters, December 1933; attached to 59th Infantry Regiment, July 1935; Chief, Military Service Section, War Ministry, April 1936; Chief, Army Affairs Section, same Ministry, March 1937; Chief of Staff, Mongolia Garrison Army, February 1939; attached to Army General Staff Headquarters, August 1940; Chief, First Bureau, Army General Staff Headquarters— Chief of Staff, Inspectorate General, LOC, October 1940; inspection tour, French Indo-China, March 1941; LtGen, October 1941; inspection tours of French Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, Philippines: JanuaryFebruary 1942; attached to Southern Army Headquarters, December 1942 (after dispute with Tojo concerning conduct of Guadalcanal operations); 18th Division Commander (Burma), March 1943; Chief of Staff, Burma Area Army, September 1944; attached to Northeastern Army District Headquarters (Japan Proper), May 1945; wounded and hospitalized, May 1945. T A N A K A , Shizuichi: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1907; was graduated from War College, 1916; Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, April 1918; Resident Officer, England, March 1919; Member, Army General Staff, June 1922; Major, August 1922; Battalion Com­ mander, 22d Infantry Regiment, December 1924; Military Attache, Mexico, May 1926; LtCol, March 1927; Regimental Commander, 2d Infantry (Colonel), August 1930; Military Attache, United States, May 1932; Chief of Staff, 4th Division, August 1934; Brigade Com­ mander, 5th Infantry Brigade (MajGen), August 1935; Chief, General Affairs Bureau, Military Police Forces Headquarters, August 1936; Commander, Kwantung Army Military

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Police Units, August 1937; Commander, Military Police Forces (LtGen), July 1938; 13th Division Commander, August 1939; Commander, Military Police Forces, September 1940; Com­ manding General, Eastern District Army, October 1941; Commanding General, Fourteenth Army, August 1942; attached to Army General Staff, May 1943; General, September 1943; Military Councillor— Superintendent, War College, August 1944; Commanding General, Twelfth Area Army— concurrently Commanding General, Eastern District Army, March 1945. TERAM OTO, Kumaichi: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1910; was graduated from War College, December 1921; Member, Army General Staff, August 1923; Member, Army Aeronau­ tical Department, August 1926; Assistant Military Attache, United States, December 1928; LtCol (Air Force), March 1930; attached to Army General Staff, February 1931; Member, Army Aeronautical Department, August 1931; Regimental Commander, 8th Air Regiment (Colonel, Air Force), August 1933; Member, Army Aeronautical Department, December 1936; Director, Hamamatsu Army Air School (MajGen), November 1937; Superintendent, same School, August 1939; Commanding General, Second Air Group (LtGen), August 1940; Com­ manding General, Fourth Air Army, July 1943; attached to Army Aeronautical Department, August 1944; Chief, same, April 1945. TERAUCHI, Count Hisaichi: Born Yamaguchi Prefecture, 1879 (son of a Field MarshalPrime Minister-Governor General of Korea); 2dLt (Infantry), April 1900; was graduated from War College, December 1903; Major, October 1911; Assistant Military Attache, Austria, December 1911; Military Student, Germany, February 1913; LtCol, November 1916; Regi­ mental Commander, 3d Imperial Guards (Colonel), July 1919; Chief of Staff, Imperial Guard Regiment— Chief of Staff, Imperial Guard Division, January 1922; Brigade Commander, 19th Infantry Brigade (MajGen), February 1924; Chief of Staff, Korea Army, August 1927; Independent Garrison Unit Commander (LtGen), August 1929; 5th Division Commander, August 1930; 4th Division Commander, January 1932; Commanding General, Formosa Army, August 1934; General, October 1935; Military Councillor, December 1935; War Minister (Hirota Cabinet), March 1936; Inspector General of Military Training— concurrently Military Councillor, February 1937; Commanding General, North China Area Army, August 1937; Military Councillor, December 1938; Commander-in-Chief, Southern Army, November 1941; Field Marshal, June 1943; formally surrendered his Command, Saigon, November 1945; was moved to Malaya, died at his quarters, Johore Bahru, of cerebral haemorrhage, June 12, 1946. TESHIMA, Fusataro: 2dLt (Infantry), December i9ro; was graduated from War College, November 1916; attached to Army Ordnance Department, August 1917; Captain, April 1920; Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, April 1921; Major, August 1925; attached to 33d Infantry Regiment, March 1926; Battalion Commander, same Regiment, March 1927; Member, Military Administration Bureau (Economic Mobilization), War Ministry, March 1928; LtCol, August 1929; attached to Korea Army Headquarters, August 1931; Regimental Commander, 33d Infantry (Colonel), March 1934; Chief of Staff, 1st Division, March 1936; attached to Headquarters, 12th Depot Division (MajGen), November 1937; Brigade Com­ mander, 27th Infantry Brigade, April 1938; Chief, General Affairs Bureau, Provost Marshal Headquarters, March 1940; Provost Marshal General (LtGen), August 1940; 3d Division Commander, September 1940; Imperial Guard Division Commander, January 1942; Second Army Commander (western New Guinea), October 1943. TOJO, Hideki: Born December 30, 1884; 2dLt (Infantry), April 1905; was graduated from War College, December 1915; official duty, Switzerland, August 1919; Major, August 1920; official duty, Germany, July 1921; LtCol, August 1924; Colonel, August 1928; Regi­ mental Commander, 1st Infantry, August 1929; MajGen, March 1933; Commandant, Mili­ tary Academy, March 1934; 24th Infantry Brigade Commander, August 1934; Commanding General, Military Police, Kwantung Army, September 1935; LtGen, December 1936; Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, March 1937; Vice-Minister of War, May 1938 (during first Konoye Cabinet); Inspector General of Army Aviation, December 1938; War Minister, July 1940 (second Konoye Cabinet); continued as War Minister in third Konoye Cabinet, July 1941; Prime Minister— concurrently Minister of Home Affairs— and Minister of War, October 1941; concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs (General), September 1942; concurrently Min­ ister of Education, April 1943; concurrently Minister of Commerce and Industry, October 1943; concurrently Minister of Munitions, November 1943; Chief of Army General Staff, February 1944; relieved of all posts, July 1944; retired to first reserve list; attempted suicide, September 11, 1945; entered Sugamo Prison, December 1945; indicted on 50 counts as “ Class A ” war criminal, before International Military Tribunal for the Far East; hanged, December 23, 1948.

238

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

TOM INAGA, Kyoji: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1913; was graduated from War College, November 1923; attached to Army General Staff, December 1924; attached to 23d Infantry Regiment, February 1925; attached to Headquarters, Kwantung Army, December 1925; Army General Staff, December 1927; Assistant Military Attache, USSR, December 1928; Member, Japanese Delegation to General Disarmament Conference, Geneva, December 1931; Army General Staff (LtCol), August 1932; official duty, Germany, December 1935; Section Chief, Army General Staff (Colonel), August 1936; Staff Officer, Kwantung Army, March 1937; Infantry Regiment Commander, 2d Imperial Guards; Chief, Fourth Bureau, Army General Staff (MajGen), March 1939; Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Army General Staff, September 1939; attached to Eastern District Army, September 1939; Commandant, Kungchuling Army Tank School (Manchuria), December 1939; Chief, Personnel Bureau, War Ministry, April 1941; LtGen, December 1941; Vice-Minister of War, March 1943; Fourth Air Army Com­ mander, August 1944; arrived Manila— engaged in Philippines Campaign, September 1944; transferred to first reserve list (Formosa), May 1945; 139th Division Commander (organized in Manchuria, July 1945); prisoner-of-war, Siberia, 1945-1955 (returned to Japan, April 18, 1955). TSUCHIHASHI, Yuitsu: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1912; was graduated . from War College, November 1920; attached to Army General Staff, May 1921; Member of same, June 1922; official duty, France, May 1924; Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, May 1926; Battalion Commander, 1st Infantry Regiment, August 1930; Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, August 1931; Member, Army General Staff, August 1932; Member, Mili­ tary Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, August 1934; Regimental Commander, 20th Infantry (pre­ sumably Colonel), August 1935; Military Attache, France— and, concurrently, Belgium, August 1 937; Chief of Staff, Twenty-first Army, August 1939; Chief, Second Bureau, Army General Staff, December [1939?]; Deputy Chief of Staff, China Expeditionary Army, October 1940; concurrently Military Attache, China, December 1940; 48th Division Commander (Philippines Operation), September 1941; Commanding General, Indo-China Garrison Army, November 1944; Commanding General, Thirty-eighth Army (Indo-China), December 1944. Final rank, LtGen. TSUJI, Masanobu: Born Ishikawa Prefecture, 1903; was graduated from War College, 1931; Staff Officer (Operations), Kwantung Army (Major), during Nomonhan Incident, 1939; Eleventh Army Headquarters (Hankow), immediately thereafter (September 1939). As a Colonel during the Pacific War, served in Malaya and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Following surrender of Japan, he disguised himself as a priest and made his famous “ underground escape” across Indo-China and China, returning to Japan in 1949. Elected to House of Repre­ sentatives in 1952 and twice thereafter; has written numerous books and articles. TSU KAD A, Rikichi: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1916; was graduated from War College, November 1924; attached to Army General Staff, December 1925; attached to Training Unit, Shimoshizu Army Air School, July 1927; Instructor, same School, March 1930; Staff Officer, 20th Division, August 1930; Staff Officer, 39th Infantry Brigade, September 1931; Staff Officer, Kwantung Army, February 1932; attached to 7th Air Regiment, March 1933; Instructor, Hamamatsu Army Air School, August 1933; attached to staff section, China Garrison Army Headquarters, May 1936; LtCol (Air Force), August 1936; Staff Officer, North China Area Army, August 1937; Colonel (Air Force), March 1938; 7th Air Regiment Commander, June 1938; Chief of Staff, First Air Group, December 1939; MajGen, August 1941; Third Air Brigade Commander, April 1942; Chief of Staff, Third Air Army, February 1944; Commanding General, Airborne Operations Training Unit, August 1944; Commanding General, 1st Airborne Raiding Group, November 1944; moved to Luzon— participated in battle for Clark Field, January 1945 (Kenbu Group); LtGen, March 1945. UEMURA, Toshimichi: 2dLt (Infantry), December 1910; was graduated from War Col­ lege, November 1922; Member, Army General Staff, February 1925; Battalion Commander, 13th Infantry Regiment, July 1926; Staff Officer, 9th Division (LtCol), August 1930; Staff Officer, Formosa Army (Colonel), August 1933; Regimental Commander, 24th Infantry; Section Chief, Army General Staff, August 1936; Deputy Chief of Staff, Shanghai Expeditionary Army, August 1937; MajGen, March 1938; Superintendent, Tokyo Army Preparatory School, March 1938; Chief of Staff, Third Army, March 1940; LtGen, December 1940; 29th Division Commander, April 1941; Fifth Army Commander, October 1943; Thirty-skth Army Com­ mander, July 1944.

BIOGRAPHICAL DIGESTS

239

UGAKJ, Kazushige: Born Okayama Prefecture, 1868; was graduated from Military Academy, 1891. General, 1925. War Minister four times. Governor-General, Korea. Premier-designate after fall of Hirota Cabinet, February 1937, but could not form Cabinet due to difficulties with Army. Foreign Minister (first Konoye Cabinet), May 1938; resigned, September 1938. Elected to House of Councillors, 1953; died, 1956. UMEZU, Yoshijiro: Born Oita Prefecture, January 1882; adLt (Infantry), March 1904; was graduated from War College, November 1911; Captain, March 1912; Military Student, Germany, April 1913; same, Denmark, March 1915; Army General Staff, May 1917; Major, June 1918; Military Attache, Switzerland, November 1919; LtCol, February 1922; Ordnance Bureau, War Ministry, March 1923; Regimental Commander, 3d Infantry (Colonel), Decem­ ber 1924; Section Chief, Army General Staff, December 1926; Chief, Army Affairs Section, War Ministry, August 1928; 1st Infantry Brigade Commander (MajGen), August 1930; Chief, General Affairs Bureau, Army General Staff, August 1931; Commanding General, China Garrison Army, March 1934 (Ho-Umezu Agreement, June 1935); LtGen, August 1934; 2d Division Commander, August 1935; Vice-Minister of War, March 1936; First Army Commander, May 1938; General, August 1939; Commanding General, Kwantung Army, September 1939; Commander-in-Chief, same army, October 1942; Chief of Army General Staff, July 1944; signed surrender instrument aboard U.S.S. Missouri, on behalf of Japanese Armed Forces, September 2, 1945; indicted as “ Class A " war criminal on 39 counts before International Military Tribunal for the Far East; sentenced to life imprisonment; died of cancer, January 8, 1949. USHIROKU, Jun: Born Kyoto, September 28, 1884; 2dLt (Infantry)— 38th Infantry Regiment, April 1905; 53d Infantry Regiment (Russo-Japanese W ar), January 1906; istLt, December 1907; Adjutant, 19th Infantry Brigade, January 1909; attached to Training Unit, Military Academy, December 1912; 53d Infantry Regiment (Captain), April 1915; was grad­ uated from War College, November 1917; assigned to Kwantung Government-General, Septem­ ber 1918; Staff Officer, 3d Division, July 1919; Staff Officer, 5th Division (Vladivostok), August 1919; Major, July 1921; Army General Staff, February 1923; LtCol, March 1925; Kwantung Army Headquarters, August 1925; Regimental Commander, 48th Infantry (Colonel), August 1929; Staff Officer, 4th Division, August 1931; Kwantung Army Headquarters, February 1932; MajGen, March 1934; Chief, Third Bureau, Army General Staff, August 1934; Chief, Personnel Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, August 1935. (See text for interim developments.) General; Senior Deputy Chief of Army General Staff, March-July 1944; Third Area Army Commander, Manchuria, August 1944; captured by Russians, August 1945; not repatriated until 1956. YAM AD A, Otozo: Born Nagano Prefecture, 1881 (family name: Ichikawa); 2dLt (Cavalry)— 3d Cavalry Regiment, June 1903; istLt, February 1905; participated gallantly in Russo-Japanese War; entered War College, December 1909; was graduated therefrom, 1912; 3d Cavalry Regiment (Captain), September 1912; Army General Staff, August 1913; Instructor, Cavalry School, November 1914; Instructor, War College, January 1917; Instructor, Cavalry School (Major), June 1917; Office of Cavalry Training (Inspectorate General of Military Train­ ing) (LtCol), August 1922; Regimental Commander, 26th Cavalry (Toyohashi), September 1922; Colonel, August 1925; Chief of Staff, Korea Army, March 1926; Army General Staff, July 1927; Chief, Training Branch, Cavalry School (MajGen), August 1930; Brigade Com­ mander, 4th Cavalry Brigade (Nagoya), August 1931; Chief, Army Signal School, August 1932; Chief, Third Bureau, Army General Staff, August 1933; Chief, Personnel Bureau, AGS (LtGen), August 1934; Chief, Third Bureau, AGS, August 1935; Superintendent, Military Academy, December 1935; 12th Division Commander (Tungning, Manchuria), March 1937; Commanding General, Third Army (Mutanchiang, Manchuria), January 1938; Central China Expeditionary Army, December 1938; Inspectorate General of Military Training, October [1939P]; General, August 1940; concurrently Commander-in-Chief, General Defense Command (temporary), July 1941; Commander-in-Chief, Kwantung Army, July 1944 until end of War, when Soviet Army flew him to imprisonment and subsequent trial as “ war criminal;’’ not released until June 1956, at which time he was repatriated in ill health. YA M A G A TA , Aritomo: Born 1838. Has been termed the founder of the modern Japanese Army. During his long and versatile career, he held the following important Governmental posts, among others: first War Minister (1872); Home Minister during three Cabinets (188591); Prime Minister (1889-91, 1898-1900); Chief of the General Staff (1874-76, 1878-82, 1884-85); Commanding General, First Army, Sino-Japanese War (1894-95); President, Privy

240

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

Council (1893-94, 1905-09, 1909-22); Acting War Minister (1898). Yamagata, who held the rank of Field Marshal since 1898, died in 1922. YAM ASHITA, Tomoyuki (Hobun): Born Kochi Prefecture, 1888; 2dLt (Infantry), June 1906; was graduated from War College, November 1916; attached to Army General Stall, August 1917; Member, same, February 1918; Military Student, Switzerland, April 1919; MilitaryStudent, Germany, July 1921; Member, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, July 1922; In­ structor, War College, March 1926; Military Attache (LtCol), Austria— and Hungary, concur­ rently— February 1927; Regimental Commander (Colonel), 3d Infantry, August 1930; Chief, Army Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau, April 1931; Brigade Commander (MajGen), 40th Infantry Brigade, March 1936; Commanding General, China Garrison Mixed Brigade, August 1937; LtGen, November 1937; Chief of Staff, North China Area Army, July 1938; 4th Division Commander, September 1939. (For interim developments, see text and refer­ ences.) Military Councillor, June 1941; Commanding General, Kwantung Army Defense Army, July 1941; Twenty-fifth Army Commander, November 1941 (took Singapore, February 1942; conquered Bataan and Corregidor, April-May 1942); First Area Army Commander (Manchuria), July 1942; General, February 1943; Fourteenth Area Army Commander, Septem­ ber 1944; arrived Manila, directed Philippines Campaign, October 1944; surrendered, Baguio, September 1945; convicted of war crimes, Manila, December 1945; hanged, February 23, 1946. Y A N A G A W A , Heisuke: Born October 2, 1879. During his career, he attained the posts of Division Commander and Vice-Minister of War, becoming LtGen in December 1931. He was retired on September 26, 1936; and died on January 22, 1945. YASUDA, Takeo: 2dLt (Engineers), December 1909; was graduated from Artillery and Engineering School, July 1916; Resident Officer, Germany, January 1922; Major, August 1924; Instructor, Artillery and Engineering School, September 1924; Member, Research Branch, Army Signal School, May 1925; LtCol, May 1929; Colonel, August 1932; Member, Research Branch, Army Signal School, April 1933; Chief, Defense Section, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, December 1934; attached to Army Air Technical Laboratories (MajGen), March 1937; Chief, Second Bureau, Army Aeronautical Department, August 1937; Chief, Army Air Technical Laboratories, December 1938; LtGen, August 1939; Commanding General, First Air Army, June 1942; Inspector General of Army Aviation— Chief, Army Aeronautical Department, May 1943; Military Councillor, March 1944; Commanding General, First Air Army (encharged with aerial defensive responsibility for eastern Honshu), April 1945. YOKOYAM A, Isamu: Born March 1, 1889; 2dLt (Infantry)— 3d Infantry Regiment, December 1909; istLt, February 1913; was graduated from War College, December 1915; Army General Staff, January 1917; 3d Infantry Regiment, April 1919; Captain, June 1919; Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, October 1921; Resident Officer, Germany (Major), August 1924; Economic Mobilization Bureau, War Ministry, March 1927; LtCol, August 1928; Section Chief, Planning Bureau, Cabinet Resources Board, April 1929; Kwantung Army Head­ quarters, April 1932; Colonel, August 1932; Section Chief, Economic Mobilization Bureau, War Ministry, August 1933; Regimental Commander, 2d Infantry, August 1934; Chief of Staff, 6th Division, March 1936; Chief, Planning Bureau, Cabinet Resources Board (MajGen), March 1937; Chief, General Affairs Bureau, Cabinet Planning Board, October 1937; Chief, First Bureau, Cabinet Planning Board, April 1939; LtGen, August 1939; 1st Division Com­ mander, September 1939; Commanding General, Fourth Army, October 1941; Commanding General, Eleventh Army, December 1942; Commanding General, Western District Army, November 1944; Commanding General, Sixteenth Area Army, February 1945. YOKOYAM A, Shizuo: 2dLt (Infantry)— 24th Infantry Regiment, December 1912; Captain, February 1922; was graduated from War College, November 1925; Company Com­ mander, 24th Infantry Regiment, December 1925; General Staff Headquarters, December 1926; Member, Army General Staff (Major), March 1928; Korea Army Headquarters, Decem­ ber 1929; Member, Army General Staff (LtCol), April 1932; official duty, Europe,_ September 1934; Member, Railway Sector Headquarters, Kwantung Army, March 1935; Commander, same Sector Headquarters (Colonel), August 1935; assigned to Kwantung Army Headquarters, December 1937; Regimental Commander, 2d Infantry, March 1938; Commanding General, 2d Field Railway Command (MajGen), March 1939; Commanding General, 1st Field Rail­ way Command, October 1940; LtGen, October 1941; 8th Division Commander, June 1942; Commanding General, Shinbn Group (Fourteenth Area Army command), December 1944: Commanding General, Forty-first Army— concurrently Acting Commanding General, 8th Division, March 1945.

BIOGRAPHICAL DIGESTS

241

YON AI, Mitsumasa: Born Iwate Prefecture, March 2, 1880; was graduated from Naval Academy, 1901; Ensign, January 1903; L t(jg), July 1904; Lt, September 1906; LtCdr, December 1912; was graduated from Naval War College, 1913; Resident Naval Officer, Russia, 1915; Commander, December 1916; Sasebo Naval District, 1917; Navy General Staff, 1918; Captain, December 1920; Chief of Staff, Second Fleet (Rear Admiral), December 1925; Navy General Staff— Member, Technical Council, Navy Technical Department, December 1926; Commander-in-Chief, First Expeditionary Fleet (Yangtze River), December 1928; Vice-Admiral, December 1930 (commanded Chinkai Naval Station); commanded Third Fleet, December 1932; commanded Sasebo Naval District, November 1933; commanded Second Fleet, November 1934; commanded Yokosuka Naval District, December 1935; Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet— and, concurrently, First Fleet, December 1936; Navy Minister (in Hayashi, first Konoye, and Hiranuma cabinets), February 1937-August 1939; Admiral, April 1937; Supreme War Councillor (Cabinet status), August 1939— Imperial Councillor; Prime Minister, January 16, 1940 (placed on reserve list); resigned July 21, 1940 (became ]ushin— Elder Statesman); Deputy Prime Minister— concurrently Navy Minister (Koiso-Yonai Cabinet), July 22, 1944; returned to active duty list during tenure as Navy Minister; retained as Navy Minister, Suzuki Cabinet, April 1945; adviser to War Relief Association, April 1945; Navy Minister, Higashikuni Cabinet, August 1945; Ministry abolished, November 1945. After the War, Yonai evinced interest in the development of Hokkaido; he died in 1948.

Index A

[

I1 1 [

jj | |j

“ A BCD ” Powers, 21 Adachi, Hatazo, 55, 66, 105, 221 “ A-Go” Operation, 106-08, n o Aid-to-Chiang route, 39, 47-48 Air Defense Policy, 159-60 Aitape, 104-05 Aizawa Incident, 4, 195 Aizawa, Saburo, 221 Akashi, Motojiro, 221 Akashiba, Yaezo, 221 Akita, Hiroshi, 205 Akyab, 95, 99-100 Aleutians, 51, 56 Amamiya, Tatsumi, 142 Ambon Island, 38 Anami, Korechika, vi, 46, 77, 102, 104-05, 151-52, 178-79, 181-82, 221 Ando, Rikichi, 121, 140, 142, 221 Angaur, 120 Anti-Comintern Pact, n , 17 Anti-Japanese Movement (1928-29), 3 Aoki, Jusei, 104 Araki, Sadao, 5, 221-22 Arao, Okikatsu, 180, 222 Arisue, Seizo, 198-99 Army Aeronautical Research Institute, 81 Army High Command vs. War Ministry, 62 Army-Navy Central Agreement, 64 Asaka, Prince, 182 Ashin River, 132 Atomic Bomb, 162 Atomic casualty estimates, Hiroshima & Nagasaki, 163 Attu, 56, i n Australia, 43 Australian Army, 55 Axis Powers, 69 Ayabe, Kitsuju, 62, 222 B

I

’

Baba, Masao, 135 Baguio, 131 Balete Pass, 131 Bali, 39 Balikpapan, 38, 136 Balloon Bomb, 118 Ba Maw, Premier, 135 Banda Sea, 72 Banjermasin, 38 Banzai, Kazuyoshi, 90 Bataan, 38, 131

Batangas, 131 Batavia, 39 Bena Bena, 67 Biak Island, 104-06 Bismarcks, 39, 32 Bonin Islands, 77, 106, 137 Bontoc, 131 Borneo, 38, 136 Bose, Chandra, 93, 135 Bougainville, 65, 73 British Forces Anglo-Indian Forces, 97, 135 Air Force, 92 Far East Fleet, 36 H .M .S. Prince of Wales, 36 H .M .S. Repulse, 36 Wingate Brigade, 92 Brunei, 38, 136 Buna, 53, 66 Burauen, 125-26 Bureau of Military Affairs, 27 Burma, 39, 92, 135 C Cabinet Planning Board, 28 Cagayan Valley, 132 Canton-Hankow Railway, 90 Cape Gloucester, 74 Cape Munda, 66 Cape Torokina, 73 Carolines, 76-77, 106 Casablanca Conference, 86 Cebu, 122, 131 Celebes, 38 Changfukeng Incident (1938), 14 Changsha, 89 “ CHE-KIANG” (operadon), 49 Chengtu, 91 Chiang Kai-shek, 10, 47 Chiangshan, 50 Chihchiang Campaign, 147 China Incident, 4, 19; settlement plan, 48 China Theater, 33, 47, 86, 145-46 Chindwin River, 39, 92, 96-99 Chinese Forces, 46, 95. 148 Chinhua, 50 Chinjui, 50 Cho, Isamu, 194, 213, 215 Chuhsien, 50 Chungking, 13, 48, 145-46 Chuto, 141 Collaboration with Germany and Italy, 68

243

244

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

Coral Sea, Battle of, 51 CORONET, 167 Corregidor, 38, 131 Counteroffensive operations (1943), 73 Coup d ’etat, 180 Czarist Russia, i, 1-2 D Dampier Straits, Battle of, 67 Davao, 78 Defeat, summary, 176 Defensive measures vs. USSR (after Southern Operations), 33 Demobilization, 182 Dohihara, Kenji, 129, 222-23 Doolittle bombing raid, 51 Dutch Air Force, 38 Dutch East Indies, 38 Dutch East Indies Forces, 39 E East N ew Guinea Operation, 55 Effects of US Air Raids, 143 Eichelberger, Robert L., 66 Emperor (Hirohito), i; (Meiji), i, iv Estimate of conditions (April 1945), 157 Estimate of the situation (after German Sur­ render), 170 F Fiji, 51 Finschhafen, 74 First Bureau, 19, 27 Five-Year Plan, 3 Foochow, 91 Food Survey (1945), 154-55 Formosa, 113, 140-41 French Indo-China, 20, 90, 134; operational measures against, 86; policies toward, 21 Fuel Stocks (1941), 24 Fuel Survey (1945), 154 Fujie, Keisuke, 223 Fujii, Yoji, 165 Fujioka, Takeo, 142 Fujiwara, minister of munitions, 81 Fukuei, Shinpei, 125 Fushimi, Prince, 108 Future War Direction Policy (1943), 72 G Germany, Influence, 5, 16 Gilbert Islands, 76, 111 Gohoku region, 77 Guadalcanal, 50, 55, 58; evacuation of, 65; operations, 58 Guam, 39, 106-07, I0 9>i n ; operations, essen­ tials of, 32 H Halmahera, 104-05 Hanaya, Tadashi, 95 Hangchow, 146

Hankow, 12 Hansa, 67, 102 Hanyang, 12 Harada, Kumakichi, 165 Hashimoto, Gun, 16, 196-97 Hashimoto, Kingoro, 223 Hata, Hikosaburo, 112, 181 Hata, Shunroku, 33, 48-49, 89, 121, 156, 223 Hatanaka, Kenji, 219 Hattori, Takushiro, v, 62, 223-24 Hawaii Operation, 42 Hayashi, Saburo, v, vii, ix Hayashi, Senjuro, 195 Hengyang, 89 Higashikuni, Naruhiko, Prince, 113, 115, 224 Higuchi, Kiichiro, 113, 174, 224 Hiroshima, 156, 162 Hitler, 68, 70 Hollandia, 104 Homeland Area: 46; command system, 156; defense, 113-14, 151, 157; operations, 152

Homma, Masaharu, 224 Honda, Masaki, 96 Hong Kong Operations, 32, 38 Hongo, Yoshio, 174 Horii, Tomitaro, 33, 224 Hoshino, Toshimoto, 164 Hosokawa, Tadayasu, 149 Hozumi, Matsutoshi, 56 Hukawng Valley, 95-96 Hunan, 49, 89, 150 Hunan-Kweilin Campaign, 145 Hyakutake, Haruyoshi, 51, 58, 60, 225

I Ichiki, Kiyonao, 55, 225 IGHQ: Conference (31 Dec., 1942), 62; Government Liaison Conference (1941), 20, 41 Iida, Shojiro, 225 Iimura, Jo, 128, 225 Imai, 177 Imamura, Hitoshi, 61, 67, 73, 102, 225-26 Imperial: Colors Incident, 4; Conference (2 July, 1941), 19; Conference (1 Dec., 1941) , 28; Conference (6 Sept., 1941)’ 29; Decision, 181; Household Depart­ ment, 84 Imphal, 39, 92-93, 95-97, 99, too Inaba, Masao, 216 Inada, Seijun, 198 India, 92 India-to-China Route, 150 Indian National Army, 96, 135 Inner Mongolia, 11 Inner Perimeter, 65, 109 Inoue, Sadae, 106 Intelligence Estimates: (Mid-1941), 34; (May, 1942) , 44; (Sept., 1943), 71; ( 1944). 113; US Air Force strength (June, 1945), 159

INDEX Intelligence Section, 45 International Military Tribunal, iv Ipoh, 36 Irrawaddy River, 99, 135 Ishiguro, Teizo, 136 Ishihara, Kanji, 9, 226 Ishii, Akiho, 199 Island Defense, essentials of, 115-16 Isogaya, Rensuke, 16 Isoya, Goro, 199 Itagaki, Seishiro, 136, 226 Ito, Takeo, 39 Iwo Jima, 108, 137-38

I Japanese-American parley, 22 Japanese Forces A ir Force Strength (1938-41), 35 Air Armies: 2d, 175; 3d, 46, 136; 4th, 67, 102, 121-22, 125, 131; 5th, 89, 91, 96; 6th, 115, 138, 141, 143 Area Armies: Burma, 93, 95-96, 98, 135; North China, 89; 1st, 46; 2d, 46,77. 102, 104, 106, 135; id , I I I ; 5th, 113; 6th, 90; 7th, 129, 136; 8th, 61, 64, 66, 73; 10th, 140; 14th, 121, 128; 18th, 136 Armies by number: 2d, 46, 78, 136; 4th, 175; n th , 50, 89-90; 12th, 147; 13th, 49-50, 91; 14th, 32, 38, 45; 14th, deployment of, 34; 15th, 32, 36, 39, 92-93, 95, 98-99, 135-36; 15th, deployment of, 34; 16th, 32, 38-39> 136; 16th, deployment of, 35; t7th, 51, 53, 55, 58-59, 61, 73; 18th, 55, 61, 66-67, 74, 102, 104-05; tgth, 78; 20th, 90; 23d, 31-32, 38, 90; 25th, 32, 36, 136; 25th, deploy­ ment of, 35; 27th, 113; 3.8th, 93; 29th, 136; 31st, 77, 105; 31st, order of battle, 105; 33d, 140-42; 33d, 96; 34th, 90, 148; 35th, 121-22, 125-26, 128; 36th, 114; 37th, 135; 40th, 140 Army Ground Divisions, number of (1937-41), 25; (1945), 182 Army High Command, 43, 64, 79 Brigades: 21st Independent Mixed, 32; 23d Mixed, 87; 35th Infantry, 51 Burmese National Army, 135 China, end of W W II, 149 China Expeditionary Army, 87, 89, 145,

147

China Garrison Army, 9-10, 13 Deployment (Aug, 1945), 163-65 Detachments: Aoba, 51, 58; Eastern, 39; Hokkai, 56; Ichiki, 55, 58-59, 65; Kawaguchi, 35, 38, 59; Kunisaki, 142; Nanto, 66; North Seas, 56; Sakaguchi, 35, 38; South Seas, 32, 39, 51, 53; Yamagata, 55, 66

245

Divisions: 2d, 59, 66; 3d, 50; 4th, 38, 45; Sth, 45; n th , 49; 13th, 49; 14th, 76, 78; 15th, 49, 96; 16th, 45, 125; 18th, 98; 19th, 14, 131; 20th, 67, 74; 2 1st, 32; 22d, 49; 23d, 14-15, 130-31; 24th, 142; 29th, 77; 31st, 96; 34th, 50; 41st, 67; 48th, 38; 49th, 98; 51st, 61, 67; 52d, 46, 77; 55th, 34, 39, 951 56^ , 3i> 39, 95; 59th, 45; 60th, 45; 63d, 142; 70th, 49; 71st, 45; 116th, 49 Air Divisions: 6th, 67, 104; 7th, 67; 8th, 141 Imperial Guard Division, 34, 45 Field Railway Commands, 84 General Armies: Air General, 156, 161; 1st, 156; 2d, 156; Kwantung, 3-4, 7-8, 10, 15, 19, 76, 112, 173-74; Mechanized, 46; Southern, 30, 32, 35, 39, 43, 89-90, 93, 95, 98, 104, 121, 128, 133, 135; Szechwan, 47; Tokyo Defense, 157 General Defense Command, 113 Groups: 3d Air, 35, 37; 5th Air, 32, 35; 30th Fighter, 122; Kenbu, 130; Shinbu, 129; Shobu, 130 Manchuria and Korea (1941-45), 173 Navy: 1st Air Fleet, 53; Combined Fleet, 53, 55, 76, 82, 107, 122, 124, 152; 2d China Expeditionary Fleet, 32; 2d Fleet, 53; 4th Fleet, 32; 8th Fleet, 53; 9th Fleet, 104; 2d Com­ bined Naval Landing Force, 55 Shipping Convoy Headquarters, 82 Tokko Units, 140-41 Java, 38 Johore, 36 Joint Army-Navy Conference (March, 1944),

Kadena, 141-42 Kagi, 140 Kamaing, 97 Kamchatka Peninsula, 169 Kamimura, Toshimichi, 164 Kanda, Masatane, 66, 226 Kanhsien, 49 Kanin, Prince, 182 KAN TOKUEN, 20, 69 Kasahara, Yukio, 149 Katamura, Shihachi, 136 Kataoka, Tadasu, 125, 226 Katsuki, Kiyoshi, 10 Kawabe, Masakazu, 93, 97, 156, 226-27 Kawabe, Torashiro, 112, 227 Kawaguchi, Kiyotake, 38, 227 Kaya, Okinori, iv Ketsu-go Operation, 160 Kiangsi, 49 Kido, Koichi, 181 Kimura, Heitaro, 135, 227 Kinhwa, 87

246

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

Kinoshita, Bin, 136 Kiska, 56 Kita, Seiichi, 227-28 Kitano, Kenzo, 78, 228 Kobayashi, Nobuo, 165 Kodo-ha, 5 Kohima, 96-97 Koiso, Kuniaki, 5, 112, 228 Kokoda, 53 Kolombangara Island, 66 Komatsubara, Michitaro, 14-15 Konoye, Prince Fumimaro, 12, 27-28 Konoye Cabinet (3d), 21 Kota Bharu, 36 Kowloon, 38 Kozuki, Yoshio, 46, 174, 228-29 Kragan, 39 Kuantan, 36 Kuching, 38 Kunming, 135 Kure, 141, 162 Kuribayashi, Tadamichi, 106, 137-38, 229 Kuril Islands, 72, 113 Kuroda, Shigenori, 121, 126, 229 Kushibuchi, Senichi, 174 Kwajalein, 76 Kwangchow Wan, 87 Kwantung, 12 Kweichow, 90 Kweilin, 89-90 K y u sh u , 14 1-4 3

L Lae, 67 Lamon Bay, 36 Laohokow, 147 Legaspi, 131 Leyte, 122, 124, 126 Leyte, Battle of, 125 Liaison Conference (15 Nov, 1941), 68 Linchuan, 50 Lingayen, 36, 130 Lingling Air Field, 90 Lishui, 49 Liutiaokou Incident (1931), 4 Liuchow, 89-90 Luichow Peninsula, 87 Lukouchiao Incident (1937), 9, 10 Luzon, 124, 128, 129, 131 M MacArthur, Gen, 102 Madang, 67, 74 Makassar, 38 Makin, 76 Makino, Shiro, 129, 229 Malaya, 36 Manchouli (1929), 3 M a n ch u k u o , 7 , 13

Manchuria, 14, 45, 171 Manchuria: Soviet invasion, 173, 175 Manchurian Incident, 2, 3

Mandalay, 135 Manila, 36, 122, 130-31 Mano, Goro, 104 Manokwari, 104 March Incident, 4 Marcus Island, 76 Marianas: 77, 106-09; loss of, 102 Maruyama, Masao, 59 Masbate, 122 Matsui, Iwane, iv Matsui, Takuro, 149 Matsuoka, Yosuke, 18, 20 Matsutani, Makoto, 199 Matsuyama, Yuzo, 95 Mazaki, Jinsaburo, 5, 229 Meiji Constitution, 1 Midway, 51, 53,55 Mikasa, Prince, 181 Military Academy, Class Graduates: 25th, 29th, 34th, 35th, 27 Military Academy Incident, 4 Military Affairs Bureau, 179 Minami, Jiro, 229 Mindanao, 131 Mindoro, 127 Mineki, Juichiro, 57 Miri, 38 Miyazaki, Shuichi, 128, 140, 229-30 Mono Island, 73 Mori, Takeshi, 181, 230 Morotai, 120 Mugikura, Shunsaburo, 105 Munitions Ministry, 80 Munitions Production, 144 Murakami, Keisaku, 174 Mutaguchi, Renya, 92-93, 95-97, 99, 230 Mutanchiang, 46 Mutanchiang Plain, 175 Muto, Akira, 122, 128, 230 Myitkyina, 98, 100 N Nagano, Yuichiro, 136 Nagasaki, 162 Nagata, Tetsuzan, 5, 230 Nagatsu, Sahishige, 172 Naha, 143 Nakai, Masutaro, 104, 230-31 Nakajima Air Works, 80 Nakajima, Tetsuzo, 16 Nakamura, Akito, 136 Nakano, Hidemitsu, 104, 231 Nakazawa, Mitsuo, 140, 231 Nanking, 10-11 Nanning, 13, 90 Nashimoto, Prince, 108 Nassau Bay, 66 National defense sphere, 72 National Strength Estimates (1945), 153-55 Nationalist Army, 48 Nationalist China, 10

INDEX Naval High Command, proposal of (1944), 117 Nemoto, Hiroshi, 149 New Britain, 74 New Caledonia, 51 New Georgia, 66 New Guinea, 55, 78, 102, 104 New Ireland, 66 “ New Order in East Asia,” 12 Nimitz, Admiral, 102, 137 Nishihara, Kanjii, 231 Nishio, Juzo, 13, 231-32 Nishiura, Susumu, 199 Nishiyama, Fukutaro, 30, 232 Noda, Kengo, 232 Nomonhan Incident (1939), 14, 15, 16 North Korea Defenses, 172 Nuclear Studies, 162 Nukata, Tan, 199 O Oba, Shihei, 232 Obata, Hideyoshi, 5, 46, 77, 107-08, 232 Obata, Nobuyoshi, 99, 232 Obata, Toshishiro, 233 Ogata, Keishi, 108 Okabe, Naosaburo, 90 Okada, Tasuku, 233 Okamoto, MajGen, 70 Okamura, Yasuji, 89, 145, 148, 233 Okido, Sanji, 180, 233 Okinawa, 113, 140-41, loss of, 137 OLYMPIC, 167 Operational Guide (1945), 155 Operational Summary (April, 1945), 158-59 Operational Preparations Number n , 126 Operations: No. 1, 89; No. 5, 50; No. 21, 92; “ U ,” 95-97 Operations Bureau, 42, 62, 108 Operations Section, 62 Ormoc, 125 Oshima, Hiroshi, Ambassador, 68-69, 233 Outer Perimeter Operations, 42, 51 Owen Stanley Mountains, 53 P Palau, 32, 76, 78, 106 Palawan, 131 Palembang, 38 Panay, 122 Paoching, 148 Pearl Harbor, 36, 42 Peiping-Hankow Operation, 89 Peleliu, 120 Philippines, 29, 36, 120 Port Moresby, 51 Potsdam Conference, 162 Precepts concerning the decisive battle, 178 Problems: after end of first-phase operations, 41; adjusting state affairs and supreme command, 79

247

Production, aircraft (1944), 81 Provisional Indian Government, 93

R Rabaul, 32, 66, 102 Radar, characteristics of, 83 Rangoon, 39, 135 Rendova Island, 66 Rivalry: Army vs. Navy, 151 Russo-German War, 19 Russo-Japanese War, ii, 1-3, 15 Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact (1941), 19 S Saipan, 76-77, 106-11 Saito, Yoshitsugu, 106-07 Sakaguchi, Shizuo, 38, 233 Sakanishi, Ichiro, 149 Sakhalin, 169 Sakurai, Shozo, 93 Sakurai, Tokutaro, 196-97 Salween, 92, 95, 98 Samar, 122 Samoa, 51 Sanada, Joichiro, 62, 233-34 Sano, Tadayoshi, 60, 90 Sansapor Point, 105 Sasaki, Minoru, 66, 234 Sasebo, 91 Sato, Hiroo, 199 Sato, Kenryo, 234 Sato, Kotoku, 96-97 Sato, Naotake, 41, 201 Savo, engagement off, 58 Sawada, Shigeru, 49 Scientific development, 115 Second Bureau, 16th Section, 70 Shanghai, 10-11, 146 Shantung Peninsula, 11 Shichida, Ichiro, 234 Shigeta, Tokumatsu, 234 Shimada, Shigetaro, 84, 234-35 Shimizu, Noritsune, 173 Shimomura, Sadamu, 149 Shimoyama, Takuma, 91, 235 “ Sho” operations: “ Sho-i,” 115, 121-22, 12426, 128; “ Sho-2,” 115, 140; “ Sho-3,” 115, “ Sho-4,” 115; “ Sho-Go,” 114-15 Shuri, 143 Siang-Kwei Operation, 89, 91 Singapore, 36 Singora, 36 Sino-Japanese War, ii Soerabaja, 39 Sogawa, Jiro, 149 Solomons, 66 Solomons, 1st Battle, 58; 3d Battle, 58 Sorong, 104 South Pacific, battle lines pulled back, 71

JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

248

South Sea Island Mandates, operations against, 72

South Sea Regions: operational planning pol­ icy, 31; objectives, 31; forces employed, 32; supplies and equipment, 33; opera­ tional guide, 31 Southern Region Operations, 29, 36, 133 Soviet Army forces, 6, 8, 15, 33, 76, 169 Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, 169-70 Soviet-Manchurian Border Disputes, 14 Soviet Union, 7, 145, 175 Ssupingchieh, 46 Subic Bay, 131 Suchow, 19, i t Suez Canal, 68, 69 Sugamo Prison, iv Sugawara, Michio, 115, 235 Sugiyama, Gen, 5, 27, 112, 156, 235 Suichuan, 90 Sumatra, 39 Sumida, Raishiro, 149 Suribachi, 138 Surrender, Italy, 71 Suzuki Cabinet, 152 Suzuki, Kantaro, ii, 28, 235-36 Suzuki, Sosaku, 121, 125-26, 236 Suzuki, Teiichi, 236 Szechwan, 48 T Tacloban, 125 Taierhchuang, 11 Takamori, Takashi, 149 Takashina, Hyo, 106 Takeshita, Masahiko 218, 219 Takeda, Prince, 182 Takehara, Saburo, 98 Tama, army technical research institute, 83 Tanabe, Moritake, 136 Tanaka, Hisaichi, 236 Tanaka, Kyuichi, 90 Tanaka, Shinichi, 62, 95, 236 Tanaka, Shizuichi, 178, 182, 236-37 Tarakan Island, 38, 136 Tarawa, 76 Tashiro, Kanichiro, 10 “ Ten-go" Air Operation, 141 Terakura, Shozo, 113 Teramoto, Kumaichi, 67, 237 Terauchi, Hisaichi, 33, 38-39, 46, 73, 89, 104, 121-22, 124, 128-29, 133-34, 237 Teshima, Fusataro, 77, 136, 237 Thailand, 36, policies toward, 21 Timor, 39 Tinian, 77, 106-08 Tojo Cabinet, 109, m - 1 2 Tojo, Hideki, 5, 28, 45, 62, 64, 79, 84, 176, 179, 237; control over army, 27 Tominaga, Kyoji, 121, 238 Tosei-ha, 5 Trautmann, Oskar, 11 Tripartite: Alliance, 13, 17; Operations, 69-70; Truk, 74, 76-77, 105

Truman, 163 Tsitsihar, 46 Tsuchihashi, Yuitsu, 134, 238 Tsuji, Masanobu, 238 Tsukada, Rikichi, 130, 238 Tulagi, 58 U Uchiyama, Eitaro, 89 Ueda, Kenkichi, 16 Uemura, Mikio, 174 Uemura, Toshimichi, 238 Ugaki, Kazushige, 239 Umezu, Yoshijiro, 5, 15, 112, 178, 239 Unified Command, 117 Uranium, 162 Ushijima, Mitsuru, 140, 143, 213, 215 Ushiroku, Jun, 79-80, 112, 239 US Forces: American Volunteer Group, 46 American Forces, tactics of, n o B-24 Bombers, 76 B-25 Bombers, 49 B-29 Bombers: 91, 160; raids against Japan, 89 8th US Army, 66 Air Fields in China, 147 Air Force, 91, 105, 107, 137; Strategic Air Force, 162 Marines, 76, 108, n o , 120, 137, 141-42 Navy, 107, 137-38; Pacific Fleet, 36, 42; Task Force Raids, 160, 162; U.S.Australian Fleet, 53 Paratroopers, 131-32 V Vella Lavella, 66 Vogelkop Peninsula, 105 W Wake Island, 39, 76 Wang, Ching-wei, 12-13, *97 War Ministry: 151-52; Economic and Mobili­ zation Bureau, 23; predictions, 24; vs. Army High Command, 62 War, preparations for, 22 Watanabe, Masao, 213 Wau, 67 Wenchow, 50, 91 Wewak, 67, 102 Wuchang, 12 Wuhan, 12 X X-Day, 32-33 Y Yahara, Hiromichi, 213 Yalta Conference, 169 Yamada, Otozo, i, 172, 239

INDEX Yamagata, Aritomo, i , 239-40 Yamagata, Rikao, 66 Yamagata, Tsuyuo, 126 Yamashita, Tomoyuki, 46, 121-22, 124-26, 128, 132, 240 Yamashita Inspection Team, report, 26 Yamauchi, Masabumi, 96 Yamazaki, Yasuyo, 57 Yanagawa, Heisuke, 5, 240 Yanagida, Genzo, 96

Yangtze River, 146 Yasuda, Takeo, 240 Yenchi, 46 Yokoyama, Isamu, 90, 240 Yokoyama, Shizuo, 130, 240 Yonai, Mitsumasa, 112, 152-53, 241 Yon tan, 141 Yoshida, Shin, 46 Yunnan, 95, 98 Yushan, 49-50

249