Kemalism as a Fixed Variable in the Republic of Turkey. History, Society, Politics 18665071, 9783956506321, 9783956506338

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ORIENTALISTIK

31

Lutz Berger & Tamer Düzyol (Eds.)

Kemalism as a Fixed Variable in the Republic of Turkey History, Society, Politics

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Lutz Berger & Tamer Düzyol (Eds.)

Kemalism as a Fixed Variable in the Republic of Turkey History, Society, Politics

https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

BIBLIOTHECA ACADEMICA

Reihe Orientalistik Band 31

ERGON VERLAG

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Lutz Berger & Tamer Düzyol (Eds.)

Kemalism as a Fixed Variable in the Republic of Turkey History, Society, Politics

ERGON VERLAG

https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.

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ISBN 978-3-95650-632-1 (Print) ISBN 978-3-95650-633-8 (ePDF) ISSN 1866-5071

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Table of Contents Lutz Berger and Tamer Düzyol Introduction ...........................................................................................

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Kahraman Solmaz The Kemalist Revolution – An Interpretation of the Kemalist Revolution with Arendt’s Concept of Violence .........................................

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Sara-Marie Demiriz The Image of Atatürk in Early Republican National Holiday Celebrations ........................................................................................... 27 Benjamin Flöhr “Love of one’s homeland is part of faith” – Islam and Nationalism in Ahmet Hamdi Aksekiʼs ʻcatechismʼ for the military .................................................................................................. 45 Başar Şirin A Kemalist Perception of Threat: Sèvres Syndrome in Contemporary Turkish Politics ................................................................ 75 Berna Pekesen Atatürk’s unfinished revolution – The Turkish student movement and left-wing Kemalism in the 1960s ....................................... 97 Lutz Berger The Leader as Father. Personality Cults in Modern Turkey ........................ 119 Tamer Düzyol Which Kemalism? – The Amorphous and Diverse Frames in the Party System ........................................................................................... 129 Burak Gümüş De-Kemalisation from above in “New Turkey” .......................................... 143 Contributors .......................................................................................... 175

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Introduction After winning the parliamentary elections in 2002, the Justice and Development Party’s politicians and especially their leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan repeatedly mentioned the expression “new Turkey” (“yeni Türkiye”) in their speeches. But what is meant by the “new Turkey”? A state under law and order or a democratic state where ethnic and religious minorities have guaranteed rights? The claim of creating a “new Turkey” is probably meant to be a promise to democratise Turkey, bring justice and build economic prosperity. Tulay Babuşcu’s controversial post on her social media account gives additional clues about what people around the current president have in mind when using the term. The MP of Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP – Justice and Development Party) of the 24th legislative period Babuşcu has rated the era between the founding of the republic until the AKP won the elections in 2002 as: “90 years of adverts that 600 years of the Ottoman Empire had come to an end”. This post expresses the perception of one part of Turkish society. Particularly, that the system shaped by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his companions differs from the Ottoman Empire and that this new system couldn’t bring the society away from its “own” “real” values. The core of this system is Kemalism. Since its foundation, Kemalism has played a significant role in the political and social life of the Republic of Turkey. At the same time, Kemalism is one of the most controversial terms in Turkish political life. It is connected to historical personalities like its eponym Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as well as other personalities like İsmet İnönü, Recep Peker and more. Positive as well as negative incidents and reforms are associated with Kemalism. The question of Kemalism looms in the background of many current debates about historical personalities or incidents in Turkey. Not only the “pure” Kemalism with its principles and “revolutions”, but also the institutions that were seen – until recently – as the guardians of a Kemalist system that banned parties, overturned governments and arrested politicians. While the adherents equate it with a program and starting point for a modern Turkey, others associate it with repression, prohibitions and discrimination. In the discussion about Kemalism there are many gaps. This publication is an attempt to close some of these gaps. Grasping Kemalism, and its various dimensions and implications is important in order to understand the party system, discourses and political and societal dynamics in Turkey. Because of that, this anthology focuses on Kemalism and deals with it in multidisciplinary way. The contributors take a look from a historical perspective and also consider perceptions today. Without a doubt, the War of Independence as well as the era of the founding of the republic and the following decades played an important role in the histohttps://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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ry of the Republic of Turkey. In this volume, Kahraman Solmaz deals with the Kemalist revolution itself using Hannah Arendt’s concept of violence. SaraMarie Demiriz focuses on Turkey’s national holiday celebrations and reviews whether such rituals help to generate a cult. Ahmet Hamdi Akseki’s ‘catechism’, which he wrote for the military, is the subject of the research of Benjamin Flöhr. The Treaty of Sèvres is in the centre of Başar Şirin’s contribution that illuminates the “Sèvres Syndrom”, the long-term fears created by the treaty that was supposed to end the Great War in the Middle East. The student movement of the 1960s is examined by Berna Pekesen, especially as regards its Kemalist/Atatürkist roots and the orientations of its leftist currents. Lutz Berger tries to answer the question of why, decades after the death of Atatürk, his cult continued to rise. Furthermore, he takes a look at the contemporary cult and its functions in the Turkish political system. The constitution and party law force political parties to work according to the Kemalist principles and the “revolutions”. Thus, Tamer Düzyol works out the perceptions of Kemalism in the Turkish party system through the communication of parties. Burak Gümüş finally deals with narratives of the AKP rule. He shows to what extent “de-Kemalization” has successfully taken place. The editors would like to thank the contributors for co-creating this anthology. January 2020 Lutz Berger & Tamer Düzyol

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The Kemalist Revolution – An Interpretation of the Kemalist Revolution with Arendt’s Concept of Violence Kahraman Solmaz

Introduction If we consider the studies of the founding period of the Turkish Republic in which the authors examine the Kemalist Revolution it becomes clear that, despite any differences, they reach a common conclusion: the Kemalist Revolution was intended to achieve a radical break with the past and aimed at creating a new Turkey in line with the ideals of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Despite this extensive agreement, there is no one study that deals systematically with the questions that follow directly from this result: How did that radical break come about? How did Mustafa Kemal Atatürk act when he set out to achieve his new Turkey? The objective of the present study is, with the aid of Hannah Arendt’s concept of violence, to examine precisely those questions in a systematic manner. It becomes clear in the following that Arendt’s concept of violence is the correct approach to take in this context because it defines violence as the attempt to apply the categories of work to the political space and maintains that this application took place for the first time in the history of mankind with the French Revolution, when the revolutionaries in France attempted to establish a genuinely completely new order independent of the past (Arendt 1986: 267). Accordingly, the study is divided into three parts. (1) In the first part, the chapter defining the theoretical framework, Arendt’s concept of violence is explained. (2) In the second step, on the basis of Arendt’s concept of violence, it is shown how the state elite, under Mustafa Kemal’s leadership, applied the categories of work to the political space when they undertook to unilaterally shape the people and their environment according to their elitist vision with the aid of existing means of violence. (3) Finally, the results are summarised.

1. Arendt’s concept of violence To show what Arendt means by violence as the application of the category of work to the political space, it is necessary to explain what Arendt means when she speaks of work. Arendt says that work, alongside labour and action, belongs to the basic activities of life (vita activa). How does she define it? Work is, for https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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Arendt, an activity in which by using means, directed by a model, objects are produced that are durable and make up the physical world of man (Arendt 2005a: 165–170). For this reason, Arendt regards work as a world-building activity: “Work provides an ‘artificial’ world of things, distinctly different from all-natural surroundings. Within its borders each individual life is housed, while this world itself is meant to outlast and transcend them all” (Arendt 1958: 7).

Homo faber, the producing man, creates this artificial world by giving natural beings a certain sustainability (Arendt 2005a: 161). Thus, work takes the form of objectification. But what does that have to do with violence? To produce sustainable objects, the producer must destroy nature twice: If it is the producer’s objective to produce a table, a tree must be felled, and the wood provided by the felled tree must be again destroyed in order to be able to finally take on the form of a table (ibid.: 291). Consequently, by destroying its resistance, the producer removes the tree from the natural life cycle and uses it to produce wood that, in the following stage of the process by additional violence, is so concentrated that, if correctly cared for, will last for centuries (ibid.: 165). While the first stage of production is characterised by the interruption of the natural intrinsic drive towards form-changing by the application of means, the means applied in the second stage aim at making a table from the wood, by permanently changing its form to give it a consistency that interrupts the intrinsic drive of the wood to permanently change its shape. Which type of politics are we confronted with if politics are exercised in the same ways as objects are produced? If the work-specific activity is applied to politics, one will be confronted by a certain type of political action such as occurs in production. Just as man must first uproot the tree and thus separate it from nature, i.e. destroy its resistance, which stands in the way of his plans, political figures who act like a producer, wishing to shape people and the world according to their vision, must first make them into a mass in order to shape them according to their ideas in the next step. That is because in politics it is only possible to reliably achieve a target if all those directly affected by the objective are themselves excluded from the definition of the objective. Similarly, all those who are required to achieve the objective must be instrumentalised and their resistance broken. In politics, the resistance to one-sided shaping of man and his world is situated in the political associations and spaces that connect people and empower them to common action (cf. Solmaz 2016a: 123–182). Those who wish to be active like a producer in the political arena come into direct conflict with these associations and spaces. Only once the resistance is destroyed is it possible to shape people and their world according to specific concepts and treat people

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like objects. For that reason, as Arendt said, “every identification of action and work leads to the elimination of freedom.” (Arendt 2002: 82). Thus, it can be stated in relation to the application of the categories of work to politics that Arendt speaks of political violence when political figures attempt to transform the world and people in a new way, unilaterally and radically, based on a vision, and for this purpose try to systematically neutralise society in order to, in a next step, equally systematically and also driven by a vision, force society into the desired form. Thus in summary it can be said that violence, in the sense of applying the categories of work to politics, as Dana Villa correctly emphasises, is the equivalent of a hubris because it exceeds the boundaries of human action and attempts to create a world by means of modern science and technology, or by means of violence respectively, in which all things and processes exist and happen according to the ideological orientation of the people in power (cf. Villa 1999: 184).

2. The Kemalist Revolution It is not difficult to answer the question as to who can transfer the category of work to the political sphere, because only a modern state or similar entity that possesses a large arsenal of means of coercion can undertake such an attempt. In the following it will be shown how the elite under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s leadership undertook that attempt during the foundational period of the Turkish Republic. This description consists of three parts: (2.1) In the first part it will be shown that the Anatolian revolutionaries reacted to the collapse of the state with the foundation of a political order securing freedom. (2.2) The second part will show that the elite, under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s leadership, by cunning and violence, destroyed the political order securing freedom founded by the many, because for them, that order represented an obstacle to transforming the people and their world according to their elitist ideal. (2.3) Finally, in the third part, it will be shown that Mustafa Kemal and his followers, after they had deprived society of power, set out to realise a ‘ratio-national revolution’ whose main purpose was to create a ‘civilised nation’. 2.1 Collapse of the Ottoman Empire and foundation of a freedom-securing order in Anatolia After the end of the First World War, the Ottoman State, as one of the losers, had to accept not only large territorial losses but also a massive loss of control in those areas that were not formally lost (cf. Tanör 2009: 77). Because the administrative structures had been overwhelmed to such a degree that the decihttps://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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sions made centrally in Istanbul could not be put into force in other parts of the empire, Bülen Tanör uses the term “capital monarchy” to describe the political state of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War (ibid.: 85). Tanör shows that the people in Anatolia reacted to the total collapse of state structures with the voluntary and spontaneous formation of associations and political societies (ibid.: 89–112). He also shows that the political associations that were formed in villages, communities and cities combined with those in neighbouring villages, communities and cities, thus building larger units (ibid.: 107). The combination was realised at congresses in which delegates, democratically elected by the lower level, participated (ibid.: 121–124). This principle of combining local representatives within the framework of congresses was then continued at the regional and national levels, so that what resulted was an entity that can be described as a multi-level federation (ibid.: 107). Tanör also establishes that the combining of the local congress governing bodies produced four higher-level regional congress governing bodies (ibid.: 101). In Sivas, in a third step, these congress governing bodies then completed this process by forming a national congress (ibid.: 187). After the occupation of Istanbul by Great Britain and the following dissolution of the Ottoman parliament, the Congress government in Sivas proclaimed a new national assembly with the name ‘Great National Assembly’ (Büyük Millet Meclisi) in Ankara, which had been ratified in new elections. The groups belonging to the Muslim Millet were not only able to come together spontaneously and create political bodies, they also attempted to make the thus-created bodies permanent and to stabilise them. Because with the foundation on 23 April 1920 of the Great National Assembly in Ankara, the first constitution of Anatolia (Constitutional Law of 1921, Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu) occured, which explicitly attempted to put all political power on the basis of democratic legitimation (Rumpf 1996: 60). Although the Constitutional Law of 1921 undoubtedly does not correspond to today’s idea of a constitutional democracy, it should not be forgotten that this signalled that the delegates pursued the objective of stabilising a government of the people in the long term, which had emerged spontaneously everywhere where the state had collapsed beforehand (Solmaz 2016b: 241–244). This objective was expressed through two significant characteristics of the constitution: first, the rule of the people should be guaranteed by the first article of the constitution: “The Nation shall be sovereign without any limitation or condition. The State administration is based on the principle that the people themselves shall genuinely control their fate” (Constitutional Law of 1921: 206). In order to stabilise and guarantee in the long term the spontaneously created democratic order, it was decided to proceed without any body that could usurp the power of the people. Conversely, all power was concentrated in the Great National Assembly. It combined the executive, legislative and judicial

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power in itself. In addition, a parliamentary committee was elected whose members were selected separately from the Assembly by absolute majority (Özbudun 1992: 61). This committee acted as the government of the National Assembly. In order to prevent any seizure of power by the government, the Constitutional Law of 1921 gave the Assembly the right to dissolve the government. Whereas the Assembly could be dissolved, after the objective of independence for the country had been achieved, only by the Assembly itself and by a two-thirds majority (ibid.: 61). The second characteristic that can be understood as securing the spontaneously emerged power concerned all low-level assemblies whose merging created the assembly in Ankara. Although the Constitution of 1921, as shown, concentrated all power in the Great National Assembly, it did not proclaim a centralised national state. Instead it produced a federative republic consisting of local, regional and national levels. In Tanör’s view, this is not a contradiction to the concentration of power in the Great National Assembly because the federative structures were necessary for the realisation of the principle of popular power, according to which “The people control their fate themselves”. Because the Assembly was the product of power-forming processes in which people came together and formed political bodies at the local, regional and national levels, the delegates did not envisage a nation as a prepolitical entity having specific characteristics, but an organised group that could “control their fate themselves”. Therefore, it was a matter of course that the constitution must stabilise and secure in the long term all political bodies at the local and regional levels in order to continue to guarantee the democratic structure. A look at the constitution itself makes this clear: Article 10 of the constitution stated accordingly that Turkey is made up of provinces, which are divided into municipal regions that in turn are made up of communities – and according to Article 11 provinces had the “character of legal persons and autonomy in local affairs” (Constitutional Law of 1921: 207). In turn, Article 12 stated that the affairs of the provinces are settled by the provincial councils that are elected by the population of the cities concerned. According to Article 17, the communities also had a democratically elected council (ibid.). In view of these regulations, it can be stated that the delegates attempted to secure the political bodies that had formed throughout Anatolia. It was intended that the constitution should permanently establish the bodies in which the people could themselves settle their affairs by discussing and convincing. In this connection, Ergun Özbudun ascertains that the delegates and political groups used the assembly itself as a space in which, despite all differences – of which there were many, due to the different beliefs, views, ethnic and confessional backgrounds – people could find a common solution for different, conflicting affairs (Özbudun 1992: 49). Both the new assembly in Ankara and the local and

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regional spaces such as could be found throughout Anatolia created a political bond between the various groups. 2.2 Removal of power from the people by the state elite in Anatolia While the many made every effort to stabilise and protect their power by means of the Constitution of 1921, the military bureaucracy under Mustafa Kemal’s leadership displayed the exact opposite intention: They wanted to use the regular army as well as extraordinary circumstances, in which violence was the determining factor, to totally destroy the political order (Solmaz 2016b: 245–259). Because although the various political associations, parliamentary and internal opposition within the political parties as well as the press appeared to Mustafa Kemal and his followers as a useful vehicle both for the legitimisation of the new state as well as for the support of the war, all those factors represented an obstacle to the central project: the transformation of Turkey according to Mustafa Kemal’s vision. A close examination of the content of this vision quickly reveals that Mustafa Kemal and the elite shared the common European idea that history is a process of progress that leads the people and societies from an underdeveloped to a developed stage and can be accelerated or slowed down (cf. Lewis 2002: 267). Like many people of his time, Mustafa Kemal did not believe in the simultaneous existence of different civilisations, but instead in a uniform process of progress, with the European countries at its head. From this perspective it was clear: “Civilisation means European civilisation” (Lewis 2002: 267). Based on this conviction, Turkey was stalled in its development (Mardin 2000: 232). Despite that, Mustafa Kemal and his followers were convinced that the ‘gap in progress’ between Turkey and Europe was already closing. Accordingly, in the Assembly, Mustafa Kemal stated: “The Turkish nation has perceived with great joy that the obstacles which constantly, for centuries, had kept Turkey from joining the civilized nations marching forward on the path of progress have been removed” (Atatürk cited by Lewis 2002: 267–268). In the process of approaching the contemporary level of civilisation, the elite who had attended western rationalism-oriented schools and academies assigned themselves an important role (Mardin 2000: 225). For example, Mustafa Kemal stated: “Civilisation is the only right way, and therefore the ideas of the people and how they see the world must be comprehensively civilised” (Atatürk cited by Rill 1984: 186). Consequently, the already civilised elite saw for themselves by nature the task of bringing all others up to the contemporary level of civilisation. For them, this was not just a desire, but an obligation (see Esen 1968: 42; Onar 1966: 175). As a self-proclaimed avant-garde that had already achieved the highest level of civilisation and consequently knew the necessary course of history, it was up https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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to them to ensure the connection of the people and society to the future. Accordingly, they lay claim, much like the ideologically-oriented European avantgarde, to “a right to a total explanation of the world” (Arendt 2005b: 964). That included a claim to the right to shape people and society to their truth. Thus, the subject-object relationship, typical for the production process, which is a relationship between master and object to be processed, was applied to the political relations between people. Those who were seen as stuck in the past were subject to those ‘who owned the truth’ and separated from the latter by a big gap. Because the supposed owners of the truth considered the people as a mass or object that continued to be under the influence of tradition and religion, and was therefore branded as irrational, the possibility to bring them close to the contemporary level of civilisation by means of persuasion was not seen as an option. The only means that remained for the avant-garde to civilise the people was violence and trickery. Therefore, they behaved like a master in the production process – like Homo faber. As shown in the case of violence as part of the production process, a political approach based on a Homo faber-oriented model must lead to many conflicts in politics. As with Homo faber, this calls forth resistance resulting from associations and political public spaces in which people are able to form new associations. As described, in politics it is only possible to reliably achieve a target if all those directly affected by the objective are themselves excluded from the definition of the objective. Similarly, all those who are required to achieve the objective must be instrumentalised and their resistance broken. Therefore, the categories of work can only be applied to human affairs if the power of society is neutralised. This desire of the state elite surrounding Mustafa Kemal to neutralise the power of the people became evident directly after Mustafa Kemal’s arrival in Anatolia. When, as the highest-level officer in the Ottoman army, Mustafa Kemal participated in the Erzerum Congress (Erzurum Kongresi) on 23 June 1919, there were four Congress governments in Anatolia and Rumelia. The first thing that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his followers did was to attempt to persuade the delegates in Erzerum to transform the upper-level autonomous political bodies into administrative units of the higher-level Congress government (Tanör 2009: 239–250). This subjugation and dissolution of the lower-level political units was pursued in Sivas, where the first big national Congress took place (ibid.: 242, 248). In Sivas, Mustafa Kemal insisted, with success, on the establishment of a central representative organ, called the ‘Representative Committee’ (Heyet-i Temsiliye) (ibid.: 243). This body’s decisions were to be binding for all political associations and regions. Mustafa Kemal wished to use this central decision-making committee to transform associations and Congress governments into lower-level offices. Mustafa Kemal’s determination to instrumentalise and destroy the political space was reflected after the foundation of the National Assembly in Ankara

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and the proclamation of the first Turkish constitution in 1921 by the pressure he exerted on the delegates to form a government independent of the Assembly as well as his demand for dictatorial powers. Although, as Ahmet Demirel (2007: 263) shows, the parliament at first successfully resisted this pressure, Mustafa Kemal finally managed to transform the Assembly into a place in which only his will was proclaimed. This was achieved in two steps and by means of violence and trickery. In a first step, the elimination of the opposition, which had always successfully defended the supremacy of the Assembly against the government, was achieved by illegally calling elections. Although the 1921 constitution stated that the Assembly should meet until the independence of the country and be dissolved only by a two-thirds majority decision of the Grand National Assembly and new elections organised, these elections on 1st April 1923 were called with only an absolute majority. Besides the support of half of the delegates, Mustafa Kemal’s good standing in the army was a significant factor for the success of this project (Kayalı 2005: 41). In a second step, the abolishment of the supremacy of the Assembly over the government was presented as an accomplished fact. That became necessary because the Assembly – although the opposition was no longer represented in this body – continued to be a space in which equals could discuss matters with each other and settle their differences by persuading and convincing. Despite the elimination of the opposition by the illegal proclamation of elections, the Assembly remained a political forum of equals in the sense of Arendt for two reasons: Firstly, Mustafa Kemal was not able to decide unilaterally who should be included in his group’s list. Kazım (Karabekir), who also played an important part in the War of Independence (Kurtuluş Savaşı), states in his memoirs that Mustafa Kemal, when compiling the list of candidates, insisted that “the people should express their trust in him and give him the power to select the delegates” (Kazım Karabekir cited by Demirel 2007: 571). However, he also emphasises that the others did not agree with this and finally those candidates were selected who had the best reputation and trust in their constituencies (Demirel 2007: 572). Accordingly, the proclamation of new elections could prevent the selection of members of the opposition – but it could not prevent that members of Mustafa Kemal’s own group continued to be able to form their own opinion and wished to and dared to do so. Thus, he did not manage to transform his group established before the election as a political party named ‘People’s Party’ (Halk Fırkası) into a party machine whose only task was to implement Mustafa Kemal’s will. The second reason lay in the Constitutional Law of 1921, which, as described above, stipulates the dominance of the legislative over the executive and in this connection stated, for example, that each minister must be individually elected by the Assembly (Tanör 2008: 258). The constitutional formation of the government was then realised by the ministers separate-

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ly elected by the Assembly for various political fields, who in their turn elected a chairman and, in this way, formed a parliamentary committee to act in the name of the Assembly while being independent of it, as individual ministers could at any time be dismissed and the committee as a whole dissolved by the Assembly (cf. Constitutional Law of 1921: 207). These conditions made the Assemblies into a political space of equals. Because every delegate could stand for election – and each had the same right through which they could seek the support of the others. Furthermore, the delegates also had the right to monitor the activities of the ministers and, where necessary, to call for a change of a committee member. By means of a constitutional amendment that was introduced as an urgent measure, Mustafa Kemal succeeded in abolishing the supremacy of the Assembly over the government. This was realised by his declaring the formation of the government the sole responsibility of the newly created position of the ‘President of the Republic’ (Reisicumhur), a position which he created exclusively for himself. In accordance with the constitutional amendment, as Mustafa Kemal said himself, this position was elevated to the “highest office in the State” (Mustafa Kemal Pascha 1928: 298). The creation of a position over the Assembly was now realised by adding a sentence to Article 1 that stated “the form of government of the Turkish State [is] the republic” (ibid.: 306). Thus the republic was proclaimed. In the next step, in a new article whose function – as Mustafa Kemal himself emphasises – to bring “greater clarity into the Articles 8 and 9 of the Constitutional Law” (ibid.), the position of President was created: “The President of the Turkish Republic will be elected from the members of the National Assembly for an election period [...] The President of the Republic will be the Head of State. In this function, he will lead, if he deems it necessary, the National Assembly and the Council of Ministers. The State President will select the Prime Minister from the members of the Assembly. The other ministers will be selected by the Prime Minister from the aforementioned members. The President of the Republic will then submit the list of the full cabinet to the Assembly for approval” (ibid.).

This change meant that, when the government was being formed, the Assembly had only the right to say yes or no. Thus, the formation of the government was no longer an object for discussion in the Assembly. Instead, from then on the president was responsible for forming the government. The creation of the office of president as ‘Head of State’ was not intended, as Mustafa Kemal claimed, to once and for all eliminate the monarchy, but first and foremost extend the power of Mustafa Kemal: The new position was intended exclusively for him. The change to the constitution was made on a single day, and on that same day he also became state president. Considering in this connection that the amendments were implemented on one day when “a number of celebrities from the independence war, Hüseyin Rauf, Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), Adnan (Adıvar), Refet (Bele) and Kazım (Karabekir) were not in the capital” (Zürcher 2003: 174), it is

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obvious that Mustafa Kemal wanted to avoid any discussion of his proposal and aimed literally at confronting the people with accomplished facts. However, those measures were still not sufficient to reduce the people and their world to a mere mass that could be shaped at will under the domination of an all-powerful master. After just a short time there was a split in the party of Mustafa Kemal: On the one side there was now the Republican People Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi CHP) whose delegates were faithful followers of Mustafa Kemal. On the other side there was the Republican Progress Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası TCF) that was made up of critics of Mustafa Kemal who feared the establishment of a dictatorship under him (Cağlar 2003: 164; Adanır 2002: 49; Ahmad 2008: 241; Zürcher 2003: 175). But it was not only the presence of a parliamentary opposition that prevented the reduction of the people and their world to an unresistant and passive mass. There continued to exist a dynamic public sphere consisting of various political parties, associations as well as numerous local, regional and national newspapers (see Cağlar 2003: 161). However, Mustafa Kemal, by citing an event that was shaped by violence, was able to neutralise both elements – the parliamentary and civil opposition as well as the aforementioned dynamic public sphere. This event, which at the same time led to the destruction of the political and public spheres, entered the history of Turkey under the name of the ‘Sheikh Said Uprising’ (Şeyh Said İsyanı). On 11th February 1925, the Kurds rose up against the Turkish State because Mustafa Kemal, taking as a basis the monopolisation of the Turkish armed forces, unilaterally declared the republic, thus abolishing the Calıphate and moreover calling the country a State of the Turks (see Yeğen 2011a: 118). The uprising spread rapidly to many Kurdish cities and led also to the siege of Diyarbakır by the rebels (Bezwan 2008: 271). The Kurds here refused to fit the image that Mustafa Atatürk as master had created for the population of his nation. This made them the enemies of the state, which they have remained up to the present time. As a reaction to the events, the government passed a law that entered Turkey’s history as possibly the most undemocratic law of all time: the ‘Law for Restoring Order’ (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu) (see Adanır 2002: 50). This law was passed on 4th March 1925, initially for two years but that was then extended for another two years. It “permits the government, with the approval of the State President, to close down all institutions hostile to the government, including the press, and to neutralise rebels, reactionaries and subversive elements” (Rill 1984: 178). In a next step, the National Assembly declared a state of emergency. The Kurdish uprising was brutally suppressed within two months and in many cases the leaders of the revolt condemned to death and executed by so-called ‘Independence Tribunals’ (İstiklal Mahkemeleri) (cf. Strohmeier /Yalcin-Heckmann 2010: 99).

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The Independence Tribunals and the Law for Restoring Order were Mustafa Kemal’s instruments: They were intended to eliminate all other centres of power that potentially opposed his plans and destroy all political public spaces in which government politics could be criticised and in which new political groups could emerge from shared opinions. With the Law for Restoring Order, Mustafa Kemal succeeded, besides the Kurds, in neutralising the oppositional press as well: “Eight of the most important newspapers and periodicals (conservative, liberal and even Marxist) in Istanbul were closed down, as were several provincial papers, leaving the government organs Hakimiyet-i Milliye [...] in Ankara and Cumhuriyet [...] in Istanbul as the only national papers. All the leading journalists from Istanbul were arrested and brought before the Independence Tribunal in the east” (Zürcher 2003: 179).

Both were also instruments for neutralising the parliamentary opposition. During the trials conducted against the Kurds, alleged and highly dubious evidence was presented to prove that the opposition promised the Kurds freedom (ibid.: 180). On the basis of this invented scenario, the delegates of the opposition party were finally excluded from the Great Turkish National Assembly, their party banned and 160 party members expelled from the country (ibid.). After that, the Assembly was no longer a forum for discussion and free argument: it thus served solely as a platform from which Mustafa Kemal announced his orders and plans. 2.3 The Kemalist Revolution as ‘Ratio-national revolution’ After neutralising the many, Mustafa Kemal and his followers began to change the people and their world systematically in accordance with their own elitist vision. When a journalist asked Mustafa Kemal what he considered to be his greatest achievement, he gave a correspondingly multifaceted reply: “Do not ask me what I have done, but what I still will do” (Atatürk cited by Rill 1984: 184). Without any self-doubt, he believed that at all times he knew exactly what still had to be done to ‘civilise’ the people and their environment: A radical break with the Osmanic tradition and religion was necessary, which – he was fully aware – could certainly not be brought about by moderate politics because “it is impossible to make a fundamental revolution by cautious politics” (ibid.: 185). The subsequent ‘fundamental revolution’, which aimed at civilising people, entered the history of the country as ‘Atatürk’s Revolution’. It began already during the state of emergency. It had two objectives: First, this revolution aimed at producing a new mankind and a new world corresponding to Western rationalism (cf. Demirel 2007: 609; Lewis 2002: 262; Solmaz 2016b: 259–260; Zürcher 2003: 194). Secondly, it was intended to produce a nation in line with the Western model that should no longer be based on different religious and

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ethnic groups, but instead on people with the same characteristics (cf. Parla 2008: 183; Seufert 2012: 207; Solmaz 2016b: 259–260; Zürcher 2003: 194). In the following, it will be shown how it was attempted to achieve those two objectives. What did the Kemalists do when they tried to make people and their world rational? Taking Weber's understanding of Western rationalism to describe the project of the rationalisation, it can be said that the Kemalists wanted to free people from traditional and religious influences, in order to produce people who see in worldly things and processes nothing other than things that can be, in principle, mastered by calculation (Weber 1988: 594). While religious and traditionally shaped people assume that supernatural powers like gods or demons act behind the things and events of the world and influence the destinies of men in an incalculable and therefore arbitrary manner, the man who thinks in the sense of Western rationalism says goodbye to exactly that way of thinking: He denies that there are unpredictable powers and unsolvable riddles – and assumes that if you want you can understand and explain everything, and therefore master all things by calculation (ibid.). The world that is determined by this basic attitude freed from magic and religion is divided into self-referential spheres of life, such as politics, economy, science etc. in which experts or “persons of vocation” (Berufsmenschen in the sense of Weber) deal with problems objectively (Weber 2006: 580). If we analyse Atatürk’s Revolutions we will see that Mustafa Kemal aimed firstly at the preparation of a ‘rationally thinking’ people and secondly at the creation of a ‘rational world’. And that is a systematic way, so that it can be stated that he applied the categories of work to the political sphere. In order to produce a rational thinking people, Kemalists had to break radically with history and were forced to destroy the institutions that delivered the religious and traditional worldview to posterity. The initiation of the corresponding breakdown began in 1925 with the adoption of a bill that obliged all men in Turkey to wear the western hat. The rational side of the Turkish Revolution found its symbolic expression in this bill. This law, which became known as the so-called ‘Hat revolution’ (Şapka İktisası Hakkında Kanun), as Bernard Lewis noted quite affirmatively, stood for “the forcible transference of a whole nation from one civilization to another” (Lewis 2002: 267). Mustafa Kemal stressed accordingly the following: “Gentlemen, it was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on the heads of our nation as an emblem of ignorance, negligence, fanaticism, and hatred of progress and civilization, to accept in its place the hat, the headgear used by the whole civilized world, in this way to demonstrate that the Turkish nation, in its mentality as in other respects, in no way diverges from civilized social life” (Mustafa Kemal Pascha 1928: 386, emphasis K. S.).

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However, the will to destroy tradition and religion and make the population into rational thinking men and women was not limited to symbolic acts. That same year, the government ordered the closing of Tekkes, the monasteries, the mausoleums and the repeal of all sects and all kinds of titles like Sheikh, dervish, disciples, occultist, magicians etc. The institutions that had previously operated as carriers of tradition and religion, should be hereby destroyed, just like the world view associated with these traditions and religion that sees in things and the events of the world more than the things and processes that can be mastered by calculation. In this context, Mustafa Kemal noted: “Would it be possible to regard as a civilized nation a population that allows itself to be dominated by a cabal of sheiks, babas and emirs? Who entrust their fate and their lives to magicians, charlatans and bangle-sellers? Is it permissible to maintain elements and institutions in the new Turkish state, the new Turkish republic, such as those that for centuries gave the nation a different character than it really had? Would that not have been the equivalent of committing the most serious crime that could never be corrected, against the mission of progress and re-awakening?” (ibid., emphasis K.S.).

In addition, it came to another act that also aimed to completely cut the influence of tradition and religion on the new generation. It was carried out by a law that induced the standardisation of education as well as closure of Islamic schools (medreseler). As a result, many centuries-old institutions that had ensured the maintenance and transmission of religion were abolished overnight (Adanır 2002: 49). This was accompanied by another revolution that would also curb the influence of religion and tradition: the so-called ‘alphabet revolution’ (Harf Devrimi). In 1928, Mustafa Kemal introduced the Latin alphabet in Turkey. Through this act he changed the entire written form of communication overnight fundamentally and at the same time deprived traditional intellectuals of their most powerful medium (Adanır 2002: 50). To keep the influence of the past on the present minimal and thus free people from traditional or religious influences, many old books that were issued in the Ottoman period were not published with Latin characters (Zürcher 2003: 197). In addition to these ‘revolutions’ there were other acts that aimed to make the world of the people rational. They included the liberation of the political sphere from religion, which was carried out by the abolition of the monarchy (1922) and the Caliphate (1924). The emancipation of the sphere of the legal system from religion and tradition was also amongst the reforms aimed at the rationalisation of the world that was realised by the full adoption of the European legal system (Rumpf 2012: 50). The will to rationalise the world expressed itself at the symbolic level with the abolition of the Islamic and the introduction of the Gregorian calendar in 1925 (Zürcher 2003: 196). Now it should be shown that Mustafa Kemal and his fellows executed the project of preparation of a nation that consists of people who are homogeneous in a systematic manner as well. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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This project found its expression especially in the efforts of the elite to make the people of Turkey, as members of a nation who speak the same language, consider themselves as members of same ethnic group, have the same religion and even the same collective memory. To start with language: In order to homogenise the population linguistically they declared all the languages that were spoken at that time in Anatolia to be the results of ‘degeneration’ of the Turkish language or languages that have been learned by the people later (Koçak 2010: 62). The Turkish language was declared from then on as the natural language of all those who lived in Anatolia (Yeğen 2011b: 127). To continue with the ethnic part of the production of nation: In order to homogenise the population ethnically, the Greeks living outside of Istanbul were exchanged for the Turks who lived in Greece outside Western Thrace (Seufert 2012: 215). The remaining non-Muslims who still lived within the borders of the Turkish Republic and were protected by the minority contracts of Lausanne were expelled by other measures, such as the imposition of special taxes. While Turkification of non-Muslims was not carried out, the assimilation of ethnic groups belonging to the Muslim Millet was decidedly enforced (Yeğen 2011b: 30). The policy of Turkification found its expression in two plans that had been drawn up by the elite for the Turkification of the Kurds: Namely ‘Reform Plan for the East’ (Şark Islahta Planı) and ‘Settlement Law’ (İskan Kanunu) (Yeğen 2009: 47–68). A brief excerpt from the aforementioned Reform Plan for the East reveals the force with which the policy of Turkification was implemented: “In order to make the Turkish population and its influence the dominant factor, in the villages situated on the major ethnic borderlines it is necessary to locate Turks and revive the Turkish village. In the city centres of the original Turkish cities and regions in which the Kurds have gained the upper hand, the Turkish language must be given the status of the dominant language. In the Kurdish territories, girl’s schools must be established as a priority. The Kurds who are scattered throughout the western part of the Euphrates must become the subject of Turkification. In the territory left behind by the Armenians that covers an area between Van and Midyat, Turkish people must be located. All languages other than Turkish must be forbidden in the centres and regions of population, in the State and local authorities, in the schools and public places and markets” (Reform Plan for the East cited by Yeğen 2011b: 30–31).

The 1934 Settlement Law went a step further in the ‘Turkification’ of the people in that it planned for a radical exchange of population between the western and eastern parts of the country. This law prescribed the resettlement of 500,000 Turkish-speaking people in those regions in which the majority of people spoke the Kurdish language, and the ejection of the Kurdish population who lived in the eastern part of the Euphrates (Yeğen 2011a: 31). Wherever the Kemalists encountered resistance, they reacted in an extremely brutal way: The brutal treatment of the Alevite Kurds in and around the province of Dersim behttps://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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tween 1937 and 1938, which official sources claim cost 18,000 lives and unofficial sources 70,000 lives, testify to this (van Bruinessen 1994: 145). To continue with the religious aspect of the homogenisation measures: This began with the abolition of the caliphate and the closure of Islamic schools and led to the establishment of a new government agency that would play an important role in the homogenisation of Islam: Namely the so-called ‘Presidency of Religious Affairs’ (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) (Seufert 2012: 211). The laws adopted on 3rd of March 1924 transferred to this authority the task of educating society in religious matters and the management of places of worship. Because the Presidency of Religious Affairs functioned as the only authoritative guide in clarifying religious questions and by the administration of places of worship, Sunni Islam became after the abovementioned closure of religious sects in fact the only legal form of Islam (ibid.: 211–215). In order to give the population the feeling of sharing the same past, the Kemalists created a fictitious past that was then circulated through national education (Altınay 2004: 232). The corresponding project of creating a common history began with the introduction of two new institutions: the ‘Turkish Historical Society’ (Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti) and ‘Turkish Linguistic Society’ (Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti). These institutions made up the central bodies for the intellectual production of the Turkish nation and nationalism in the 1930s. Three months after its establishment, the Institute of Turkish History published books about the history of Turkey, representing the Turks as the oldest race in the world that has, despite spreading out and mixing, not lost its special characteristics (Ersanlı 2009: 128). It was this view that was mandatorily taught in schools (see Copeaux 2006: 62; Altınay 2004: 21).

3. Conclusion To what extent did the Turkish Revolution achieve its purposes? Loosely speaking, the success of the ratio-national revolution was very modest. It produced as a rule even contradictory, counterproductive results. The project to create a rational thinking and acting people quite simply ran up against the brick wall of available resources. The ambitious project of relieving the population from the influence of tradition and religion and trying to transform the “whole nation from one civilization to another,” overwhelmed the administrative structures of then agrarian Turkey. Thus, Kemalists only succeeded in the centres of power to set up educational institutions in which a really ‘Kemalist Generation’ could be cultivated. The attempt to establish a rational thinking human being, therefore, led primarily to the creation of a deep chasm. On one side stood the centre where the ideal of a world purified of religion and magic had become a reality and hosted the ‘rational’ Kemalist-minded

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civil and military officials as well as the urban bourgeoisie. On the other hand, however, the periphery consisting of different ethnic and religious groups continued to be characterised by tradition and religion. The Kemalists succeeded in their objective to produce a nation consisting of similar people, at best, only partially – in the worst case also here completely opposite results were obtained. In fact, they could generate, through national education and propaganda, a certain extent of national feeling or a linguistic and ethnic homogenisation in a large part of the Turkish-speaking people and the non-Turkish-speaking Muslims. The attempts of homogenisation failed due to the Kurds. The Reform Plan for the East and Settlement Law, which planned for different measures for the homogenisation of the Kurds, were completed only on a very small scale – and it can be assumed that also in this case the limited means were ultimately the reason for the failure. As mentioned, the linguistic and ethnic homogenisation of the Kurds was based namely on a comprehensive exchange of populations between the western and eastern provinces, which would in turn require not only highly trained administrative, but also industrial production structures. The young Republic had, however, neither. Although the state was also quite able to spread its version of Turkish history from the western city of Edirne up to the eastern province of Kars, the different groups still retained their own collective memory. The pious Muslims, Kurds, Alevites, leftists and liberals – to name just a few – set and continue to set against the official Kemalist historiography until today their versions of the origin of Turkey, the Ottoman Empire and the Republic. Not least, the trends of the 90s showed that the homogenisation of Islam has failed too. Despite all oppression, many religious orders, sects and the Alevites could survive by going underground and maintain their difference in a quite intensified form. Ultimately, the project aimed at the production of a homogeneous nation brought about contrary results. The differences between people, through the policy of homogenisation, were enormously sharpened and politicised – and thus also the boundaries among the different ideological, religious and ethnic groups were emphasised. In accordance with Arendt’s theory, it can be stated that the elimination of the local, regional and national political spaces as well as the prohibition of a free press and political associations had the overall ruinous effect that the people were deprived of any possibility to form common grounds that would be able to transcend ethnic, religious, class and worldview boundaries. In view of the absence of political and public spaces, the failure of the homogenisation measures led to a society that, despite all Kemalistic expectations, was and is split into radically different groups. Consequently, the ‘national revolution’ did not result in a highly civilised human being, an enlightened world, or even a homogenous nation. The opposite was the case: The legacy of this revolution is

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a society characterised by countless splits and antagonisms among various groups.

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The Image of Atatürk in Early Republican National Holiday Celebrations Sara-Marie Demiriz

Discussing Turkey’s national building process during the early years of the republic without considering Atatürk is not possible. He is irrevocably linked with the Turkish nation. His many names are a testament to the devotion and glorification lavished on him, which points to a strong personality cult. In military terms his names elevate him to be, the ‘liberator of the Turkish nation’, ‘Gazi’, which literally means religious fighter, ‘our heroic Pasha’, ‘great soldier’, ‘unique hero’ or ‘unique leader of the national liberation struggle’. Names pointing out Atatürk as nationalist, politician and statesman are among others: ‘leader of his nation’, ‘courageous revolutionary’, ‘extremely sensitive patriot’ and especially ‘great Turk’. Even during his lifetime Atatürk was called ‘saviour’, ‘spiritual leader’ and ‘Prophet of the East’. Regardless to these many names the most used name people refer to him since the ‘reform of surnames’ in 1934 was Kemal Atatürk, which means ‘perfect father of the Turks’. This did not only elevate him to be creator of Turkey but also expressed a demand of eternity in being the father of the Turks. This article will explore how this name was not only a symbol but became truth to the Turkish people during the early years of the republic (1923–1938) (cf. for Atatürk’s many names: Dreßler 1999: 61–75). Research has already shed light on the personal cult surrounding Atatürk and the sacred character of Turkish nationalism – which seems to be attached to it – during the early republican period. Hanioğlu thereby indicates four cults in total: a cult arising around the Republican Peoples Party, (RPP), the personality cult surrounding Atatürk, a ‘cult of the Republic’ and a ‘cult of reason’ (cf. Hanioğlu 2011: 160–162). Also Sibel Bozdoğan (Bozdoğan 2001; Bozdoğan/ Kasaba 1997), Hale Yılmaz (Yılmaz 2013), and Ezra Özyürek (Özyürek 2006, 2007) in some regards investigated the personality cult surrounding Atatürk as well as the state cult of the new nation state. All of them show that Kemalist state politics were intended to promote new state values, reflect the newly written revolutionary history and communicate laws and social concepts of community. Buildings were constructed in a new national style in order to present the new way of life (cf. Bozdoğan 2001; Bozdoğan/Kasaba 1997). Clothes were to be a symbol of the so-called European modernity and the language was to be a reflection of the new and pure “Turkishness” (cf. Yılmaz 2013). These research results were gained on the bases of a variety of sources: Atatürk’s and other Turkish leader’s memories and their ideological thoughts, Turkey’s new https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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state architecture and building programs, party and school programs or sources that helped to gain knowledge about the newly founded societies. Only Hale Yılmaz and to some extent Ezra Özyürek also investigated the rituals of the cults. But as a cult cannot be generated without any ritual, the origin of the cult, however, hasn't yet been brought to light. It has not yet been explained how Atatürk became an object of the cult, how he was made leader of the nation and Father of the Turks – or at least how these images of Atatürk were created. Celebrations, which are defined as acts of higher meaning challenging “the citizens to identify with the state” (Ackermann 2000: 89), are capable of generating corporate feelings, and giving value to those things displayed during these celebrations.1 Regarding these aspects this article will analyse Turkey’s national holiday celebrations based on the assumption that national celebrations can take the function of a ritual with the help of which a cult can be generated, holiness created and a special bond between state (elite) and the people constructed. In focusing on some examples and aspects of different national holiday celebrations, it will be shown how images of Atatürk and their characteristics mentioned before were inseparably linked to the nation itself. In doing so it will be also pointed out that even the selection of holidays reflected Atatürk. It will be shown that the personality cult of Atatürk played a major role in elevating the new republic and that it was mainly built upon his image. In particular it shall be examined how Atatürk became “the most meaningful symbolic expression of a newly conceived community in the process of formation in which secular nationalism took the place of Islam as the centre of the sacred cosmos” (Seufert/Weyland 1994: 77). As it was mainly dependent upon his existence, his death in 1938 endangered the stability of the regime. Therefore, it will, lastly, be argued that the funeral ‘celebrations’ for Atatürk also functioned as state agencies and were to ensure a smooth transition from the time with to the time without Atatürk and to preserve the status quo. The article focuses on the early years of the Turkish Republic during Atatürk’s lifetime (1923–1938). It is assumed that Atatürk, who was the overall leader and head of the Kemalist state building process, was involved in creating his own cult or at least gave his approval to those images created and names attached to him. Even though his images may have changed, the ground of Atatürk’s images and their symbolised meanings must have been laid within these early years between 1923 and 1938 (cf. Hanioğlu 2011: 160–162; Tapper/ 1

As during the early years of the Turkish republic only about 10 per cent of society were able to read and write it is reasonable to conclude that books, newspapers, magazines or other written sources therefore could only reach a certain circle of people during Atatürk’s lifetime. Certainly with these tools Kemalists could not reach the masses or create a cult-like state doctrine. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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Tapper 1991: 79; Demiriz 2018). It was a time in which not only a new nation state arose, but the old Ottoman Empire, including its values, laws and especially its state religion, Islam, as bond of society and legitimising tool of the emperors had to be and were gradually dismantled (cf. Zürcher 2012: 176–182; Kreiser 2012: 39–62).

National holidays: introductory notes Before going into details concerning Atatürk’s image in national holidays celebrations, the immense variety of national celebrations – national holidays as well as memorial days – created during the early years of the republic has to be pointed out. Examining the quantity of ceremonies, festivals and celebrations organised during the early years of the republic leads to the impression that there was not a single day without a celebration, at least somewhere in the republic. Between 1924 and 1939 a variety of celebrations referring to different occasions were held and performed. A scheme showing all “national holidays, ceremonies and memorial days” for the region Zonguldak in 1944, lists no less than 35 different public holidays and celebrations (cf. BCA 490.01.980.801.7: National Holidays in Zonguldak 1944). Although this list of holidays was only made in 1944, a similar festival calendar already existed at least since the introduction of the law on national holidays in 1935 (cf. Law No. 2739, 27.05.1935). Celebrations of republican “high-days”, or days that were considered to be important turning points leading to the proclamation of the Republic, were already organized after the founding of the Republic in 1923, but became bigger in style and size after the 10-year-aniversary of the Turkish Republic in 1933 (cf. Demiriz: 98–211). All national holidays were to mirror the new Turkish Republic, its values and its new secular order. Even though religious holidays still existed, national holidays and celebrations based on secular ideas and non-religious events were evidently supported by the Turkish government. Their increasing number highlights the importance Kemalists ascribed to those national holidays and memorial days during the phase the Turkish government had to work in order to build up a new state system. In addition to Youth and Sports Day (19th of May), Children's Day (23rd of April), Victory Day (30th of August) and Republic Day (29th of October), the four official national holidays, which are still national holidays in Turkey today, a variety of memorial days and holidays were celebrated. Many Turkish cities celebrated the day of its liberation from the yoke of the Allies, especially the Greek occupation: Istanbul celebrates October 6th as Liberation Day, İzmir September 9th and even Ankara joined in celebrating Liberation Day, although it had never been occupied. The scheme from 1944 also listed ceremonies that took place in honour of the opening of the first people’s houses, which Kemal-

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ists regarded as an instrument of education, teaching the people e.g. the new Turkish alphabet and spreading Kemalists’ thoughts. The first houses were opened on 19th of February 1932. Each year on the same date more people’s houses were opened. Big celebrations arranged by the Kemalist government were to lift up the people’s houses and invite people to get to know this facility. Other ceremonies and celebrations were held on the occasion of laying the foundation stone of new modern buildings, the completion of bridges or the opening of new school buildings and railway stations.2 In general, it is possible to differentiate between several kinds of celebrations and put them into categories: Firstly, celebrations commemorating an important event in Turkey’s national history that became an official holiday by law. Only Republic Day, Victory, Day, Children’s Day and Youth and Sports Day belong to this category. Secondly, celebrations referring to an important day in history but did not become official national holidays. This category includes the regionally celebrated Liberation Days, the Day of Lausanne, the Day of Çanakkale and the Day of the Airforce. Thirdly, celebrations that were created in order to attach importance to newly made achievements and reforms during the Republican era. The opening ceremonies of new buildings but also festival days like the Day of Language (Dil Bayramı) are included in this category. Although these festivities were somehow different, all of them have to be considered as ‘celebrations of the nation’ as they referred to either important days in the nation-building process of Turkey or to a significantly new national way of life – at least under Kemalists’ terms. In the following, mainly the first category of celebrations will be analysed, i.e., Republic Day, Victory, Day, Children’s Day and Youth and Sports Day. These four national holidays were the only official and legal ones with big celebrations all over the country. They were also similar in style and symbols used, including singing of the national anthem (Independence March), a parade (of different military forces, pupils and students, wearing uniforms in military style, and representatives of a variety of state or state-linked organisations), the Turkish national flag, hoisted everywhere, even on private houses, and speeches held by members of the party, the military forces or other state-loyal persons (cf. BCA 490.01.1150.37.1: Preparation for the Great Festivities of 1933). In addition, exhibitions, radio broadcasts, poems, theatre plays and a wide range of publications were part of the supporting programme, spreading state propaganda.3 2

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Cf. for more general notes on the different national holidays, memorial days and other festivities: Demiriz 2018: 57–71, Bolat 2007, Özdemir 2004. Demiriz also provides a chart listing and categorising the most important holidays, national holidays and memorial days, but also religious holidays (Demiriz 2018: 521–526). Cf. for the different propaganda instruments of the Celebrations in 1933: Demirhan: 1999; for a more general overview see also: Bolat 2007; Özdemir 2004; Demiriz 2018: 316– 336. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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Even without taking the national holidays’ ceremonies and symbols into account, the choice of theses national holidays alone points out particular cornerstone elements of the Turkish nationalism. Each of the four days was chosen to create and mark turning points in Kemalists’ Turkish history. The national holidays somehow can all be linked to the Turkish War of Independence (1919– 1922), led by Atatürk and other leaders of the Independence movements. The holidays in this way declared the Turkish War of Independence the most significant and meaningful event in Young Turkey’s history. It was declared the essential event leading to the proclamation of the republic, thus emphasising the role of the military forces and underlining the importance of sovereignty of the nation. According to the chronology of the official Kemalist calendar of celebration the first national holiday is the so-called ‘Children’s Day’ (Çocuk Bayramı). It was declared a national holiday on 23rd April 1921 (cf. Law No. 112: National Holiday of 23rd April, 23.04.1921).4 It was established to commemorate the opening of the first national assembly in Ankara in 1920. The assembly was led by Atatürk and must be considered as a formation against the Sultan and the foreign powers who occupied what was left of the former Ottoman Empire. The Assembly was one of the leading instruments organising and somehow legitimising the War of Independence. Each year on 19th May Youth and Sports Day (Gençlik ve Spor Bayramı) is celebrated – this day is also called Atatürk Memorial Day (Atatürk’ü Anma Günü) (cf. Law No. 3466: Additional Law on National and General Holidays 2739, 20.06.1938 and Law No. 2739: Law on National and General Holidays, 27.05.1935). The day refers to the day Atatürk landed in Samsun on 19th May 1919 refusing to fulfil the assignment of the Sultan, who ordered Atatürk to disarm the remaining Ottoman troops (cf. Kreiser 2012: 23f). Instead of following this order Atatürk began to gather an army and started, according to Kemalist history more or less single handedly, the War of Independence, which led to another three years of bloody confrontations and battles. The event is annually remembered with festivals including sport activities and was made an official holiday in 1938. Victory Day (Zafer Bayramı) commemorates and celebrates the victory against the Greek army in the battle of Dumlupınar on 30th August 1922 (cf. Law No. 795: Victory Day Law, 1.04.1926 and Law No. 2739: Law on National and General Holidays, 27.05.1935), which was implemented by the national assembly in 1924. The day therefore marks the end of military action and the War of Independence.

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Some supplements, changings and complements to Law No. 112 can be found here: Law No. 2739: Law on National and General Holidays, 27.05.1935, Law No. 2429: Law on National and General Holidays, 17.03.1981. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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The most important national holiday in terms of staging efforts and length of celebration was and still is ‘Republic Day’. It commemorates the proclamation of the Turkish Republic on 29th October 1923 and somehow marks the very end of the struggle for national Sovereignty and Independence. Even though the war was won on battle fields and ended in 1922, the proclamation of the Republic in 1923 completed the victory in establishing a new state. The holiday was officially introduced by law on April 19th, 1925 (cf. Law No. 628: 19.04.1925, Law on the Proclamation of the Republic and Law No. 2739: Law on National and General Holidays, 27.05.1935).

Atatürk’s Biography and the National Holidays Even though each day had its special distinction, there was a clear link to Atatürk, which somehow pointed out Kemal Atatürk’s leading role at that time. In that sense Youth and Sports Day celebrated on 19th May was meant to inform about and remind people each year of their heroic leader Atatürk who alone – according to the Kemalist view – started the fight against the rising enemies. Kemalists used that day in order to make people believe that the 19th May has always been the true beginning of the nation-building process which led to the proclamation of the republic. Similarly, celebrating Children’s Day on 23rd April not only aimed at honouring the gathering of the first national assembly in 1920, but also at pointing out Atatürk’s unique leadership, which made this assembly possible. Kemalists wanted people to believe that it was Atatürk who alone unified different kinds of national movements and even religiously motivated groups under the roof of independence. By celebrating Victory Day in memory of the great battle in the War of Independence against the Greek army on 30 th August 1922, Kemalists not only praised the army and its role in liberating Turkey but especially Atatürk as the commander of this victorious military, his abilities as leader and his great strategic genius (cf. Özdemir 2004). The same pattern was and still is to be seen on ‘Republic Day’. Although being called ‘Republic Day’ this day also celebrates Atatürk as the first president of the republic and his statesmanship. That this connection of Atatürk and the four national holidays were intentionally and deliberately set by the Kemalist elite can e.g. be seen from a graphic published on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the republic (29th October 1933) in the pro-government daily newspaper Cumhuriyet (cf. Cumhuriyet 29.10.1933). It shows five different counterfeits of Atatürk, each of them framed with either a round or square ‘picture frame’. On the bottom of each frame a year is inscribed. All five pictures are lined up from left to right, following a chronological order from 1919 to 1923: The first picture of Atatürk shows him wearing military clothes and is linked to May 1919 when to Atatürk arrived in

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Samsun (Youth and Sports Day). The second picture shows Atatürk in the year 1920 dressed in modern (Western) clothes – tie and suit but nor a hat. It refers to Atatürk’s position as presider of the national assembly, which was opened in 1920 (National Sovereignty and Children’s Day). The third picture shows Atatürk with tie, suit and fez – it is connected to the year 1921. It does not connect Atatürk to any specific event or holiday. It seems as if it was only included in order to provide a picture of Atatürk for each year between 1919 and 1923. It might be seen as a general symbol or image of the war and Atatürk’s extraordinary and powerful contribution to it.5 Next in line is a picture of Atatürk again wearing military clothes, but clearly pointing out his position as commander of the troops of the independence movement. The year given is 1922 and, therefore, unmistakably refers to the final battle of the War of Independence in August 1922 (Victory Day). The last picture in this row presents Atatürk dressed in tails and top hat. The ascribed date, October 1923, makes it perfectly clear that the last picture should refer to Atatürk’s position as president of the republic, which was proclaimed on 29th October 1923 (Republic Day). The graphic underlines the Kemalist leaders’ interpretation of Atatürk’s overall ruling and leading role throughout the whole struggle of Independence mentioned earlier. He was made the key figure in all cornerstone events. He was the main figure the holidays were dedicated to. Thus, the four national holidays not only set the story line of the victorious history of the Turkish nation, but also attached cornerstone events of Atatürk’s leadership and biography: from the destroyed Ottoman Empire to the glorious Turkish Republic, from designated and ‘outlaw’ soldier of the Ottoman Army to the first President of the Republic. Atatürk’s biography was to be read as the biography of the republic and vice versa. Therefore, celebrating the four national holidays every year was celebrating Atatürk and somehow re-enact his birth as leader and the nation’s way of building the republic.6 Additionally, the graphic shows the proclamation of the republic as an unavoidable conclusion and interprets it as if the landing in Samsun (May 1919), the gathering of the assembly (April 1920) and the war itself and especially the big last battle (August 1922) were fatalistically leading to the proclamation of the republic. Fixing the national holidays were to create the myth of a war that was only fought in order to establish republican Turkey.

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Only the fez seems to be an unusual and unnecessary element of the graphic. It might have been included to show, that even though the republic was national and ascribed to laicism, Islam in a modern and enlightened way was part of new Turkey. At least the noticed contradiction of Atatürk wearing not only tie and suit, but a fez, could be interpreted as such. Either way it shows that Islam as religion was never fully banned, but still played its part in everyday life – at least under state control. For further examples of Atatürk’s Image displayed in the newspaper Cumhuriyet on National Holidays, see Demiriz (2018: 527–536). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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This is symbolically expressed by a female figure, placed in the graphic to the right of the last counterfeit of Atatürk showing him as elected president in October 1923. The woman is dressed in a cuirass and a robe covering just one of her shoulders. In her right hand she is holding a torch, in her left a laurel wreath. She very much appears to have been created in the image of the French Marianne and, therefore, must be seen as the personification of the republic itself. The two items, torch and laurel wreath, clearly symbolise enlightenment and victory. Showing the republic as a symbol of enlightenment and victory together with the presidential Atatürk at the end of the graphic were used to express that the aim of the Turkish War of Independence had been achieved: The military victory was completed by a political victory, proclaiming the republic. This rather fatalistic interpretation is also reflected in the caption of the graphic: “General Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who reached Samsun in Mai 1919, took over the leading role of the nation when organizing the Sivas- and ErzurumCongress. The Great Liberator, who opened the GNAT in 1920, hoisted the flag of the holy war in 1921 and lead the holy battle, gave freedom to the fatherland at the forefront of the Turkish army, and proclaimed the Republic in accordance with the votes and desire of the whole nation, was elected president” (Cumhuriyet 29.10.1933). Thus, the graphic was formally meant to promote and spread two major Kemalist views of Turkey’s nation-building process: Firstly, Atatürk was the main force behind the formation of the nation. Secondly, there had always been a plan to proclaim the republic – regardless of the historical fact that until the proclamation of the republic the final political ‘structure’ of the post Ottoman Empire construct had not been set. In that way, Kemalists retrospectively declared that the uprising against the Sultan had been started in order to proclaim the republic, that the assembly was put in action to proclaim the republic, that the War of Independence had been fought in order to proclaim the republic and that Atatürk had always been its rightful president. Thus, the republic and Atatürk as its leader were made the reward for the sacrifices made during the war – either on battle fields or on the home front. The national holidays were to build a bridge connecting the people – who had also taken part in the war or had suffered from it – with the new Republic of Turkey. The national holidays were introduced in order to give meaning to the loss and sacrifice suffered during the war. The Turkish Republic was made the prize for all losses, all hardship and international embarrassment. Not valuing and supporting the republic therefore meant not honouring these sacrifices. Thus, in celebrating important days of the war, the war itself, the national community (assembly) that firmly stand together as well as the great victory and Atatürk as the constructor of the nation’s victory, were made a national treasure.

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Atatürk’s Images in Symbols and Elements of National-Holidays Celebrations Even though the four national holidays are to be seen as one connected ‘story’ and though they were similar in symbols and elements, each holiday had its special message and symbolism. While choosing and fixing important cornerstone events of the war as national holidays created the framework of Kemalists’ interpretation of national history, Kemalists needed to make this interpretation understood by the people. Apart from e.g., school education, lectures in people’s houses or ideological books, Turkish leaders used the celebrations of the above mentioned national holidays and their attached elements for this purpose. One political tool that helped to spread Kemalists thoughts, install a deep relationship between Atatürk and gain the youth’s allegiance during the celebrations was an oath. The oath was included in many holiday celebrations and ceremonies e.g. Victory Day, Republican Day, during the graduation ceremony of the army and foremost on Youth and Sports Day. The words of the oath were taken from the very last part of Atatürk’s Nutuk (Great Speech), which until today is known as his “Speech to the Youth” (cf. Gasi Mustafa Kemal Pascha 1928: 387–388). On the basis of this speech, an oath was sworn by the youth, e.g. in 1934 during the celebration of the 19th May: “Oh honoured beloved Atatürk, who made our existence, we swear to walk continually and without fear on the way that you opened to us in the Land that you saved, within the aims that you pointed out, and swear that we will spill our blood for it with joy” (Tan 25.05.1935). The oaths must be regarded as a specific act during ceremonies. They were to be a “solemn, [...] sacred, comprehensive commitment to a political organism and expression of belonging to it” (Prodi 1993: VII.). In this way, the oaths pledged during national holidays were a ‘political oath’, which – regardless of its sacred roots – took place in a politically-secular space. Due to the form of the oath, however, the political oath remains in ‘the sacred’ and also generated sacrality, which were transferred to another object or person. In this specific example, sacrality was transferred to Atatürk and the republic. Even though both – Atatürk and the republic – are regarded as secular values, they were thereby made sacred national goods. The oath taker was directly committed to keep their oath and “put their physical and spiritual life in pledge” (Prodi 1993: VII). With the oath, they were not only morally and socially obliged to the other people in the gathering, but also to the whole imagined community – the Turkish people, the Turkish nation, the Turkish Republic. Therefore, the oath had to be sworn personally but in community. It claimed confirmation and thus created a commitment. Pledging allegiance to Atatürk and the republic were to make the youth, or the military or whoever took the oath, part of something greater, part of the Turkish nation. Furthermore, the oath appointed the Turk-

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ish youth to be guardians of the republic – a special force fighting side by side with Atatürk himself. By swearing the oath, past, present and future were merged and the youth – regardless of the fact that they did not fight in the War of Independence – could become part of the greatest victory in the country’s history. Especially Youth and Sports Day promoted a deep relationship between Atatürk and the Turkish youth, in which the young generation should become an obedient and grateful servant to Atatürk and the nation. They were to secure the republic’s future. While under Atatürk’s leadership a separation of the military from politics was formalised and no politician could keep his military position, Mustafa Kemal himself was nevertheless associated with the military by means of stagings, especially through celebrating Victory Day on 30th August. Although he resigned from his position as commander, the ‘image’ as commander-in-chief and leader in the War of Independence was maintained. Recep Peker, who planned the Victory Day celebrations, was very clear in his ideas about how to use the Victory Day in order to nourish that image. He ordered that celebrations had to underline the importance “of this day, of this victory, the war of the High Commander, and the role of the commander-in-chief, the special characteristic of the day, the heroic deeds of the military in the Revolutionary War and War of the High Commander” (cf. Recep Pekers instructions [26th August 1926]: Sayılır 2014: 89–114). The 30th of August was not only named Victory Day but also Day of the War of the High Commander – Atatürk once again was made centre of the holiday. Propaganda slogans printed on banners or in newspapers in the following years supported Recep Peker’s message: “People! The victory of Dumlupınar was the creation of the Gazi7 and the military. Remember it with gratitude and respect to the great Gazi and the glorious military” (Cumhuriyet 30.08.1933). Even before Mustafa Kemal was given the name ‘Atatürk’, Father of the Turks, in November 1934, speeches held by members of the RPP or the Turkish Children’s Protection Society (CPS) during national celebrations helped to install his fatherly image. Although he was not named Father of the Turks, yet, at least he was declared ‘Father of the children’. In a speech given to poor and homeless children on Children’s Day in 1929 Sabahattin Efendi – most likely a member of the Turkish Children’s Protection Society (CPS) – proclaimed “as long the Gazi lives in the homeland, there will be no orphan and no child with hanging head” (Hakimiyet-i Milliye, later Ulus, 24.04.1929). Thus, Sabahattin Efendi as early as in 1929 told the children that Mustafa Kemal would be their father and care for them as he had cared for the nation in the past. Another representative of the CPS even connected the existence of every child with the existence of the Republic: “I am someone. I have newly learned. 7

In this case Gazi refers to Atatürk, see the introduction to this article. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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Because of the Republic I have realized that I am a creature. I am someone, because of the foundation of the future shining Republic. I have seen the story of the national Gazi (Ulu Gazi) in the Nutuk. I have seen the birth of my homeland. The nation is growing. My true mother is the homeland, my father the great Turkish nation.” (Hakimiyet-i Milliye, later Ulus, 24.04.1929) Considering the children’s need for a family, a father and a mother, the speaker tried to make up for their loss by offering the children to be a member of the republican family. Father and mother were to be replaced by ‘mother homeland’ and ‘father nation’. Certainly, the speaker reminded the children that it was Atatürk who protected the homeland and secured the nation. National holiday celebrations also fostered the image of Atatürk as a modernist and reformer. They declared Atatürk – victor of the War of Independence and architect of the republic – the ultimate force behind all new achievements of the republic. In order to symbolise this as well as the modernity of the republic and its closeness to Western Civilisation, Kemalists organised special opening ceremonies as part of the celebration programme of Republic Day and Victory Day. They were to promote and communicate all kinds of new achievements: new railway tracks, bridges, tunnels, roads, schools, state buildings as well as other buildings of public interest. Celebrating the opening of a new school was to tell people that Turkey was educated and enlightened. Celebrating the opening of a new railway station was meant to claim that Turkey was modern. Celebrating the opening of a library or concert house was to be a sign of high culture. By celebrating modernity and innovation on Republic Day, they were presented as achievements made by the republic itself. Innovations celebrated on Victory Day were linked to the victorious War of Independence. Each innovation was celebrated as yet another victory. As these two days were also connected to Atatürk, these innovative victories were linked to him; the ‘victories’ were presented as his contribution to modern Turkey. The message of these opening ceremonies to the people was: ‘As Atatürk created the Republic and achieved the Victory in battle, he laid the ground for all creations and all innovations to follow. Thus, the celebrations proclaimed that Atatürk’s victory on battlegrounds in 1922 made all the other ‘victories’ possible e.g., bridges, schools, concert halls, education, laws, reforms. Therefore, each ceremony that celebrated a new achievement regardless if it was a bridge, a school or a park, somehow proclaimed Atatürk’s power as creator and victorious leader. Celebrations made him the republic’s greatest modernist and innovator, its wise and heroic leader whose view always pictured a brighter future and whose revolutionary deeds continued even after winning the war and proclaiming the republic.

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National Holidays’ Preparation as Promoter of the People’s Love for Atatürk Throughout the course of the preparations for the celebrations, citizens, especially students, military officials and government workers, were confronted with propaganda spreading Kemalist Turkish nationalism when preparing the decorations, merchandise, and even literature in the months leading up to the celebration. Preparations of propaganda slogans began months prior to the actual festivities: the parades that took place in every city and town, special celebrations in the people’s houses as well as theatre plays, music, speeches and books, needed to be prepared in order to stage the ultimate celebrations. Preparing the national holidays’ celebration also included the preparation of propaganda slogans that were, for instance, put on cigarette boxes and big banners. In 1938 the Kemalist leaders started to prepare the slogans for Republic Day as early as May 1938. Instead of putting a regime-conforming group of writers in charge of writing slogans – though their might have been such a group and someone clearly must have been in charge of picking the ‘right’ slogans –, the celebration committee together with the Department of Culture ordered students to write short essays that should demonstrate “their feelings of love, respect and gratitude to Atatürk, the founder and protector of the Republic regime, and their feelings of loyalty to the party, with reference to the nation’s life, independence and future” (BCA 490.01.1153.45.1, Preparations for the 15th anniversary of the Turkish Republic: Letter to Şükrü Kaya, 24.05.1938). The task aimed at manifesting Atatürk’s central position in the republic, the importance of the party at his side and his leading role in the War of Independence. By collecting the best essays from every school, city and district the committee gained a pool of ideas and statements, which they could use to create propaganda slogans for the government’s message to the people. The Kemalist movement benefited from these essays in several ways: The task made the nations’ youth think and recall all they had learned about Atatürk, the republic, the military and the RPP from a personal point of view. As the essays were based on historical facts and myths as well as individual feelings of love, loyalty and gratefulness, Kemalist thoughts were to be embedded in the students’ minds and even hearts. The banners, the texts written by the students, gleaming from buildings, on squares and streets during the holidays, were to help the people to identify with the state, it’s values, and Atatürk as their leader. Knowing that the banners would or could contain at least some of their own writing, students as well as their parents might have even paid more attention to them, but even less attention to the fact that it was still a propaganda tool. Therefore, people could read messages such as: “Turkish youth, it is you Atatürk entrusted the Republic to.” “Those who love the revolution are marching.” https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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“If you don’t forget your past, you will understand your future well.” “Atatürk’s name is our flag.” “By Atatürk’s order we are soldiers with our hearts.” “Great humans arise from great nations.” “We are Atatürk’s and Atatürk is ours.” “The army is an enemy to enemies, but a friend of peace.” “The Turks are the Turkish revolution.” “Turkish woman, you gave birth to the greatest revolutionary” (See for the slogans of the banners: BCA 490.01.1156.57.1, Program and Preparation for the 15th anniversary: Banners and Sayings).8

People also needed to be trained how to perform within the celebrations in order to secure a perfect staging of the ceremonies. Therefore, people were taught where to stand, how to march in orderly manners within the parades and how to sing the national anthem correctly prior to the ceremonies of the main national holidays. In a directive by the Minister of Culture, schools, for instance, were instructed to prepare students to participate in the ceremonies of Republic Day in 1938 by training them for one hour every day after their last lesson from 1st October until the holiday (29th October). Teachers also had to explain the importance and meaning of the national anthem (Independence March) in a language understandable to the students whenever possible. Students were taught to perform commands like “basic position, march in height and right spacing of rows, stand still, walk head tilt and rotate” (BCA 490.01.1156.57.1, Program and Preparation for the 15th anniversary: Training pupils and students). Thus, the students visually were made a part of the military units that were always leading the parades of the national holidays. Most importantly, it is more than likely that the students also felt like part of the military and therefore as protectors of the republic and Atatürk. Training the Turkish citizen, here the students, how to sing the national anthem and how to perform during the celebrations were to serve two additional purposes: On the one hand, it was meant to “enable each student to feel the march he will sing himself and make the participants feel the same way” (ibid). On the other hand, and most importantly, the committee aimed at using the practise as an educational tool by teaching the Kemalist-view of Turkish history, the essential values of the new Turkish nationalism and Atatürk’s leading role in it each year even before the holidays started.

8

For more examples cf. Yılmaz 2013: 193 and Demiriz 2018: 242–247. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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Atatürk’s Death: The Disappearance of His Image As emphasised by the banners and supported by the preparations ahead, the Kemalist leadership worked hard to transmit Atatürk and the love people had for him to other elements of the celebrations. With Atatürk's death at 9:05 a.m. on 11th November 1938 however, the strongest symbol of the War of Independence, the unity of the nation that he had fought for and the republic that he had proclaimed, the modernity he declared, the high culture he symbolised in wearing suit and top hat and the strong leadership he stood for, disappeared at least from the immanent world. This made it of even greater importance for his successors to gain the people’s love. They had to make sure that the people would still support the republic and follow their new leaders as they had followed Atatürk. Big funeral ceremonies all over the country, which took place in every city, town and village, were to say goodbye to the person Atatürk, but to keep Atatürk’s image alive. Though the funeral services honoured the dead Atatürk, in the end it commemorated his life and his contributions to Turkey, especially his leading role in the War of Independence. The funeral services’ (in Ankara and elsewhere in Turkey) overall message to the people can be summarised as such: ‘As long as the Republic lives, Atatürk is not dead – if we protect the Republic, we protect Atatürk and keep him alive’. Atatürk’s successors used the funeral service to make the Turkish citizen aware of their task: They were to secure the existence of the republic and its values in order to honour in the end Atatürk and keep him alive, too.9 More than other ceremonies “burial and funeral ceremonies are acts of high meaning”. They are held in a “sacred space and invite the citizens to identify with the State” (Ackermann 2000: 89). The sacredness of the event thereby is transferred to the displayed symbols and presented to the participating citizens as “sole legitimate sacred cosmos” (Seufert/Weyland 1994: 72). Different kind of speeches show how Atatürk’s successors used the event of Atatürk’s death in order to gain the people’s trust, loyalty and respect (cf. BCA 490.01.1433.739.1, Reports on Atatürk’s Funeral). They were held during funeral ceremonies that took place parallel to the official state funeral in Ankara. They manifested the aforementioned stated message of the official funeral in Ankara (‘as long as the Republic lives, Atatürk is not dead’). The following is a quote from one of those speeches that were held before the whole nation in a similar message and style. It was delivered by a member of the RPP in front of an Atatürk bust in the town of Babadağ. “My father, Nation of Nations, Great of the Great. You died my father. […] No, you did not die, because before you passed away, while you were tearing the shroud, you were rising from the dead, […]. Who is the Creator, cannot die. […] You died so that 9

The main events of Atatürk’s Funeral are outlined and examined by Christopher Wilson (Wilson 2013) and Sara-Marie Demiriz (Demiriz 2018: 355–430). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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in heaven a wedding could take place. Thousands of people, especially the martyrs of Çanakkale and the War of Independence will raise their white wings as they say, the father of all ancestors has come; the father of victory is here […]. If we said that you don’t exist, all things in nature, the mountains and the green valleys in their mourning clothes, trees and flowers, […] and the flags on the buildings, would stand idle being downcast […]. We will walk on the way you walked. […] We will protect the Republic you have left to us up to the last drop of our blood. Therefore do not worry, my father. Give our regards to the martyrs of Çanakkale and the War of Independence from us” (BCA 490.01.1433.739.1, Reports on Atatürk’s Funeral, 21.11.1938).

The speech does not distinguish between our world and the next world. The speaker is talking to Atatürk as if he was still alive. With the last sentence, however, in the name of the listeners he says goodbye to Atatürk, who had fulfilled his duty. He is permitted to go and to hand over the republic to the people, in the knowledge, that they would fight with their last drop of blood in order to protect it. The speaker assures Atatürk that the republic will be well looked after by the Turkish citizens. Of course, it was not Atatürk who was informed about all this, but the listening audience, the Turkish citizens. The speech underlines and repeats the message of the funeral in Ankara and clearly uses religious terms to sacralise the content of the speech and thus lift up its meaning. People were to protect the republic as they would have protected Atatürk, love the republic in the way they had loved him, because as long as Turkey’s people would care for the republic, Atatürk would be alive. Every year since 1938 national holiday celebrations were to remind the Turkish nation of that ‘truth’, of their duty and of their heroic leader Atatürk, father of the Turks.

Atatürk as Eternal Image of the Turkish Republic The analysis of the here chosen selection of national holiday and national holidays celebrations during the early years of the republic explored their function as a vital tool used to create and spread the images of Atatürk which were introduced at the beginning of this article. Atatürk’s images were not only visible in the celebrations of the national holidays, but were reflected in the days themselves: Atatürk’s deeds for the nation, thus, were made the reason for establishing each national holiday. National holiday celebrations were also a vital tool of education as even preparations for the celebrations were used to teach students about Atatürk, the military, the Republican People’s Party and the republic. Above that it was shown that Atatürk’s images were not only created in order to glorify him, but were used as a force and tool to enable people to identify with the newly proclaimed Turkish Republic. Atatürk’s greatness became a synonym for the greatness of the republic and vice versa. Through Atatürk, the War of Independence as well as the military as victor of the war, the sovereignty of the nation as well as modernity and progress were linked to the republic itself.

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Even after his death, Atatürk was one of the strongest and most integrative symbols of the republic. It was his images the republic was built upon. Leaving all staging efforts aside, Atatürk’s glorification had a real and undeniable source of leadership in the War of Independence. Therefore, some of the people indeed looked to him with respectful love and gratitude. Nevertheless, the government had to maintain and spread these ‘natural’ feelings and rather aimed at creating a faith upon the beloved fundament Atatürk, in connecting the adoration and love people had for him to other values held by the Kemalists and their image of the republic. Kemalists’ national celebration policy aimed at creating Turkish citizens, who were to live a national life and pledge allegiance to the Republic based on their love and adoration for Atatürk. His fatherly and sacred image were meant to be the foundation on which this love and adoration also for the Republic and its new values could be built upon.

Bibliography Ackermann, Volker (2000): Die funerale Signatur. Zur Zeichensprache nationaler Totenfeiern von Wilhelm I. bis Willy Brandt, in: Sabine Behrenbeck and Alexander Nützenadel (eds.): Inszenierungen des Nationalstaates. Politische Feiern in Italien und Deutschland seit 1860/71, [The funeral signature. On the sign language of national funeral celebrations from Wilhelm I. to Willy Brandt, in: Sabine Behrenbeck and Alexander Nützenadel (eds.), Stagings of the Nation-State. Political celebrations in Italy and Germany since 1860/71], Köln, 87–112. Bolat, Bengül Salman (2007): Milli Bayram Olgusu ve Türkiye’de yapılan Cumhuriyet Bayram Kutlamaları (1923–1960), Ankara. Bozdoğan, Sibel (2002): Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic, Seattle and London. Bozdoğan, Sibel and Kasaba, Reşat (1997): Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, Seattle and London. Cumhuriyet (29.10.1933), Republic Day. Cumhuriyet (30.08.1933), Victory Day. Demirhan, Nezahat (1999): Cumhuriyetin Onuncu Yılının Türk İnkilap Tarhihinde Yeri ve Önemi, Ankara. Demiriz, Sara-Marie (2018): Vom Osmanen zum Türken. Nationale und staatsbürgerliche Erziehung durch Feier- und Gedenktage in der Türkischen Republik 1923–1938 [From Ottoman to Turk. National and civic education through celebration and commemoration days in the Turkish Republic 1923–1938], Baden-Baden.

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Dreßler, Markus (1999): Die Zivilreligion der Türkei. Kemalistische und alevitische Atatürk-Rezeption im Vergleich [The Civil Religion of Turkey. Kemalist and Alevite Atatürk Reception in comparison], Würzburg. Gasi Mustafa Kemal Pascha (1928): Der Weg zur Freiheit, Rede (Nutuk), gehalten von Gasi Mustafa Kemal Pascha in Angora vom 15. bis 20. Oktober 1927 vor den Abgeordneten und Deligierten der Republikanischen Volkspartei [The Path to Freedom, Speech (Nutuk), held by Gasi Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Angora before the deputies and delegates of the Republican People's Party from 15 to 20 October 1927], Leipzig. Hakimiyet-i Milliye (later Ulus), (24.04.1929), Children’s Day. Hanioğlu, Şükrü (2006): Turkism and the Young Turks, 1889–1908, in: HansLukas Kieser (ed.), Turkey beyond Nationalism. Towards Post-Nationalist Identities, London/New York, 3–19. Hanioğlu, Şükrü (2008): A Brief history of the late Ottoman Empire, Princeton/ Oxford. Hanioğlu, Şükrü (2011): Atatürk. An Intellectual Biography, Princeton/Oxford. Hanioğlu, Şükrü (2012): The Historical Roots of Kemalism, in: Ahmet T. Kuru and Alfred Stephan (eds.), Democracy, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, New York, 31–60. Kreiser, Klaus (2012): Geschichte der Türkei. Von Atatürk bis zur Gegenwart, München. Law No. 112: National Holiday of 23rd April (23 Nisanın Millî Bayram), 23.04.1921. Law No. 628: Law on the Proclamation of the Republic (Cumhuriyetin ilanına müsadif 29 Teşrinievvel günün milli bayram addi hakkında kanun), 19.04.1925. Law No. 795: Victory Day Law (Zafer Bayramı Kanunu), 01.04.1926. Law No. 2429: Law on National and General Holidays (Ulusal bayram ve genel tatiller hakkında kanun), 17.03.1981. Law No. 2739: Law on National and General Holidays (Ulusal Bayram ve genel tatiller hakkında kanun), 27.05.1935. Law No. 3466: Additional Law on National and General Holidays 2739 (Ulusal Bayram ve genel tatiller hakkındaki 2739 sayılı kanuna ek kanun), 20.06.1938. Özdemir, Diler (2004): Ankara’s Hippodrome: The national Celebrations of Early Republican Turkey, 1923–1938, unpublished doctoral thesis. Özyürek, Ezra (2006): Nostalgia for the Modern, State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey, London. Özyürek, Ezra (2007): Politics of Public Memory, New York.

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Prodi, Paolo (1993): Der Eid in der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte. Zur Einführung, in: Paolo Prodi, Glaube und Eid [The oath in European constitutional history. Introducing, in: Paolo Prodi, Faith and Oath], München. Sayılır, Burhan (2014): “30 Ağustos Zafer Bayramı Kanunu, İlk Zafer Kulaması ve Büyük Taarruz İle İlgili Bazı Bilgiler”. Çanakkale Araştırmaları Türk Yılığı 16, 89–114. Seufert, Günter and Weyland, Petra (1994): “National Events and the Struggle for the Fixing of Meaning: A Comparison of the Symbolic Dimensions of the Funeral Services for Atatürk and Özal”, New Perspectives on Turkey 11, 71– 98. Tan (25.05.1935), Concerning Youth and Sports Day Celebrations. Tapper, Richard and Tapper, Nancy (1991): Religion, Education and Continuity in a provincial town, in: Richard Tapper (ed.), Islam in Modern Turkey. Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State, London, 56–83. Wilson, Christopher S. (2013): Beyond Anıtkabir: The Funerary Architecture of Atatürk: The Construction and Maintenance of National Memory, Farnham. Yılmaz, Hale (2013): Becoming Turkish, Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey, 1923–1945, New York. Zürcher, Erik J. (2012): Turkey. A Modern History, New York. Documents: BCA 490.01.1156.57.1, Program and Preparation for the 15th anniversary of the Turkish Republic: Banners and Sayings. BCA 490.01.1156.57.1, Program and Preparation for the 15th anniversary of the Turkish Republic: Training pupils and students. BCA 490.01.1153.45.1, Preparations for the 15th anniversary of the Turkish Republic: Letter to Şükrü Kaya, 24.05.1938. BCA 490.01.1433.739.1, Reports on Atatürk’s Funeral. BCA 490.01.1433.739.1, Reports on Atatürk’s Funeral: Speech of CHP Member Kamil Panayırs, 21.11.1938. BCA 490.01.1150.37.1, Preparation for the Great Festivities of 1933. BCA 490.01.980.801.7, National Holidays in Zonguldak 1944: List of National Holidays and Celebrations and Important Memorial Days.

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“Love of one’s homeland is part of faith” – Islam and Nationalism in Ahmet Hamdi Aksekiʼs ʻcatechismʼ for the military Benjamin Flöhr

Introduction: a moderate Islamist in the service of Kemalism Ahmet Hamdi Akseki (or Aksekili) (1887–1951) was without doubt one of the most influential thinkers of Turkish Islam (for a short biography based on his personnel file in the archive of the Diyânet see Alimoğlu 2005; for a detailed biography see Ertan 1988; for further short biographies see Bolay 1989; Kara 2011: 807–809; Yıldız 2009). Nonetheless, he never gained as much fame as his contemporaries Mehmet Âkif Ersoy (1873–1936) and Elmalılı Muhammed Hamdi Yazır (1878–1942) (for Mehmet Akif Ersoy see Bostan Ünsal 2005; Şeyhun 2015: 19–26; for Elmalılı see Flöhr 2015). After having received a traditional madrasa education in the village of his birth, Güzelsu, in the district of Akseki (province of Antalya), the young Ahmet Hamdi, just like many graduates of provincial madrasas in the late 19th/early 20th century, moved to Istanbul to continue his education at one of the institutions of higher religious education located in the capital. Like almost all leading Muslim intellectuals, who suffered immensely from the authoritarian policy of the Hamidian regime, he joined the oppositional Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (İttihâd ve Terakkî Cemiyeti) in Istanbul (for the ulema’s support for the CUP see Hanioğlu 1995: 49ff.; Hanioğlu 2001: 305ff.; Kara 2005a). During the Second Constitutional Period (1908–1918), he became a member of the circle of reformist Islamic intellectuals associated with the Islamist journal Sırât-ı Müstakîm/ Sebîlürreşâd (for a detailed study on Sebîlürreşâd see Debus 1991). Akseki translated Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā’s Muḥāwarāt al-muṣliḥ wa-l-muqallid1 into Turkish (Akseki 1332/1914) and thereby initiated a debate among the Ottoman ulema about the problem of blind submission (taqlīd) to the authority of one of the Islamic legal schools (madhāhib) and the use of individual reasoning (ijtihād) by Islamic jurists (Karaman 2005; Uçar 2005: 89; for Rashīd Riḍā see Badawi 1978: 97–139). Between 1916 and 1921 he held various positions at in-

1

This series of articles was published for the first time in the 3rd and 4th volume of the Journal al-Manār. In 1906, the Muḥāwarāt appeared in book form together with Riḍā’s fatwas on ijtihād and taqlid (Riḍā 1324/1906). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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stitutions of higher Islamic learning. He also conducted religious classes at the naval academy in Heybeliada. During the Turkish War of Independence, he moved to Ankara in order to support Mustafa Kemal’s National Movement.2 After the proclamation of the republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal himself praised Akseki for his religious services during a visit to the Darü’l-Hilâfe Medresesi in Konya (Ertan 1988: 15f.). After the abolition of the caliphate by the Grand National Assembly in 1924 and in the course of far-reaching secular reforms, Akseki was nevertheless accused of being a member of the Tarîkat-ı Salâhiye Cemiyeti (Committee of the Pure Path), an Islamist clandestine society aiming at the reestablishment of the Ottoman Caliphate. Therefore, he was brought before the Independence Tribunal in Ankara, but was finally acquitted by the court because the judge recognised Akseki’s potential for the future nation state (Cumhuriyet, 19 Temmûz 1925, 2, quoted from Tunaya 1988: 582; Ertan 1988: 17f.). In 1924, Akseki played a leading role in the newly established Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyânet İşleri Riyâseti).3 In its very beginning the so called ʻDirectorateʼ was nothing more than a kind of ʻsub-departmentʼ which, according to the Turkish Constitution, was responsible only for questions of faith (itikâd) and worship (ibâdât) and for the administration of the places of worship, a fact that can be attributed to the radical character of laicism in the early years of the republic (Tezcan 2003: 64ff.).4 When Mehmet Rifat Börekçi (1860– 1941), the former mufti of Ankara5, was President of Religious Affairs, Akseki was appointed chairman of the Higher Consultative Committee (Heyet-i 2

3

4

5

Most of the ulema and Islamist intellectuals supported Mustafa Kemal and his National Movement during the Turkish war of Independence (Sarıkoyuncu 2007). During the National Struggle, Mustafa Kemal and his companions adopted a strong Islamist rhetoric in order to mobilise the Muslim population regardless of ethnic differences and to attract the influential Sufi orders to his cause. He also intended to maintain the financial support of the Indian Khilāfat movement (Hanioğlu 2011: 102ff.; for Mustafa Kemal’s negotiations with the Sufi Orders, in particular with the Bektashīs see Küçük 2002). The policy of state control over the religious establishment and bureaucratisation goes back to the Hamidian regime and was continued by the Young Turks but with the difference that Abdülhamid II sponsored ulema who were loyal to him and his policy, whereas the Young Turks strived to reduce the ulema’s influence as a whole. So the Kemalists policy of state control over the religious establishment was nothing new but rather has its historical roots in the Young Turk era (Zürcher 2010: 279f.). After the introduction of the Swiss Civil Code and the Italian Criminal Law in 1926, in contrast to the old Ottoman body of higher religious functionaries, the Diyânet no longer had a monopoly on ʻsocial transactionsʼ (muʿāmalāt) and ʻpunishmentsʼ (ʿuqūbāt), which also belong to the main branches of Islamic Law (for the history of the Diyânet and its legal mission see Kara 2005b). As mufti of Ankara, Börekçi issued the famous counter-fetva that was also signed by other 153 Anatolian muftis. Börekçi became the first President of Religious Affairs. The counterfetva was a response to a fetva issued by the Şeyhülislâm, in which he declared Mustafa Kemal and the national movement to be traitors and rebels who, according to the sharia, must be killed. In the counter-fetva, Börekçi declares that the caliphate is under the control of foreign occupiers and therefore the caliph is not free to make his own decisions. It https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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Müşâvere) of the Diyânet. In this role he was able to convince the Pan-Islamist poet Mehmet Âkif Ersoy,6 who was the author of the Turkish National Anthem (the İstiklâl Marşı), as well as the conservative scholar Elmalılı Muhammed Hamdi Yazır and the anti-nationalist Kurdish Islamist Babanzâde Ahmet Naim (1872–1934), to work for the Directorate of Religious Affairs (for Ahmet Naim see Kara 2011: 320ff.; Somel 2010: 29; Şeyhun 2015: 59–64). On 21st February 1925, the Great National Assembly decided to fund a project to translate the central religious texts of Islam into Turkish and to compose a Turkish Qur’anic Commentary (tefsîr) (T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi 1341/1925: 249–270; for an analysis of the debate on the budget of the Diyânet in the Grand National Assembly see Flöhr 2015: 172ff.; for the translation project see also Wilson 2014: 127ff.). It was Akseki who succeeded in persuading Âkif to translate the Qur’an into Turkish, which was a highly sensitive issue at that time. Furthermore, he convinced Elmalılı to compose the commentary to the Qur’an and Ahmet Naim to translate the Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (Flöhr 2015: 195ff.). Elmalılı’s Qur’anic Commentary was published by the Directorate of Religious Affairs between 1935 and 1938 under the title Hak Dini Kur’ân Dili (The Religion of Truth, the Language of the Qur’an). Akseki and his Diyânet colleagues, who were still associated with the Islamist Journal Sebilürreşâd, vehemently opposed the Kemalist project of creating a modern Turkish Islam through the Turkification of Islamic rituals (for Börekçiʼs statements on that issue see Cündioğlu 1999: 232–237; for Akseki’s position see ibid.: 416–439).7 However, the ulema of the Diyânet supported the introduction of Turkish Fri-

6

7

is a duty for every Muslim to free the caliph from the hands of the infidels (for the counter-fetva see Sarıkoyuncu 2007: 151ff.; Kaplan 2011: 82ff.). During the National Struggle he was a member of the ʻRepresentative Committeeʼ (Heyet-i Temsiliye) (Kaplan 2011: 65ff.) and became a Member of Parliament from Menteşe (ibid.: 96ff.). Later, he was an active party member of the Republican Peoples Party (CHP) (ibid.: 213ff.). After working for a few years on the task, Akif rejected his part of the agreement with the Diyânet and retracted his manuscripts because he feared that his translations could be used for the Kemalists’ plan to Turkify the worship rituals of Islam (see below) (İz 1960: 986; Flöhr 2015: 200f.). There were even some much more radical projects to create a modern Turkish Islam in the early years of the republic: 1) a nationalist revision of Islamic history by the Minister for Education Reşid Galib (1893–1934) according to which even the Prophet Muḥammad was of Turkish origin (Cündioğlu 1999: 255–262), and 2) the creation of a kind of ʻprotestant-likeʼ enlightened Turkish Islam by a committee of the Faculty of Divinity of the Darü’l-Fünûn under the auspices of the historian Mehmet Fuat Köprülü (1888–1966) and the Kemalist pedagogue İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu (1886–1978) (ibid.: 249–254). In 1925, the Imam of the Göztepe Mosque in Istanbul, Cemâlettin Seven, was dismissed by the Directorate of Religious Affairs after he had recited the Fātiḥa and some of the short surahs of the Qur’an in Turkish translation during the Friday prayer (Kaplan 2011: 150f.). Yavuz is wrong when stating that Akseki “constructed and disseminated enlightened and Turkified Islam through the means of the state” (Yavuz 2003: 129). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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day sermons (hutbe),8 which they regarded as necessary, and also the introduction of the Turkish call to prayer (ezân) (for Börekçi’s order to implement the Turkish ezân all over the country see Kaplan 2011: 208ff.).9 The reactions and attitudes of the religious scholars and Islamist intellectuals to the new regime and its policies were quite varied: while ulema, on the conservative spectrum, questioned the republic’s legitimacy,10 others cooperated with the regime and justified Atatürk’s reforms from an Islamic point of view (for some examples of Islamic nationalists or so-called “Kemalo-Islamists” see Bein 2011: 109ff.). The majority of Muslim scholars tried to find a balance between uncompromising opposition and a fawning collaboration with the Kemalist government in order to keep their influence on the republic’s future religious policy (ibid. 2011: 107ff.). As Bein puts it, Akseki “embodied, more than any other religious official, the middle of the road approach” (ibid.: 2011: 114). On the one hand, he promoted a moderate modernist interpretation of Islam assorting well with the ideas of the Kemalist leadership, while on the other he tried not to deviate too radically from the mainstream Sunni interpretations (ibid.: 114ff.). After the Turkish language reform, he wrote several books on religious matters in the new script (for a list of all of his works see Kara 2011: 808f.).11 In 1939 Akseki was officially appointed as the Deputy of the President of Religious Affairs (Diyânet İşleri Reis Muâvini), a task he had actually been carrying out since the foundation of the Diyânet. In 1947, upon the death of Şerefettin Yaltkaya (1879–1947), he was appointed the third President of Religious Affairs. Yaltkaya maintained a close cooperation with the Kemalist government and, together with İzmirli İsmail Hakkı (1896–1949) supported the Kemalist 8

9 10

11

As President of Religious Affairs, Börekçi authored 51 model sermons in the Turkish Language, which were distributed to all the Imams throughout the country (Diyânet İşleri Reisliği 1927; for his position on Turkish Friday sermons see Kaplan 2011: 151ff.). The efforts to create a Turkish-Islamic identity go back to the Tanzîmât and the Second Constitutional Period (Bilir 2004: 27ff.). A famous opponent of the National Movement and the Kemalist government was the ʻultraconservativeʼ Islamic scholar and former Şeyhülislâm Mustafa Sabri (1869–1954), who was one of the founders of the Liberal Entente (Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası) and supported the Istanbul government during the Turkish War of Independence (for Sabri see Bein 2009). In 1926 the Islamic scholar İskilipli Mehmet Atıf Hoca was sentenced to death by the Independence Tribunal in Ankara for his opposition to the so-called ʻHat Actʼ, a law that ordered that no other headwear except the western-style hat was allowed anymore (Âtif 1340/1924; for İskilipli Âtıf see Albayrak 2000; for a partial translation into English see Şeyhun 2015: 41f.). Another example for an Islamist reaction to the Kemalist secularist ideology is the so-called ʻMenemem Incidentʼ, when the young Lieutenant Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay and some other soldiers were lynched to death by a group of radical Naqšīs (Azak 2010: 21ff.; for a good overview of Islamist reactions see Zarcone 2004: 142ff.). Among his works is a partial Turkish translation of the short surahs of the Qur’an, which Muslims usually recite during the ritual prayer. This book was reprinted several times by the Diyânet (Akseki 2006).

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project of the Turkification of the Islamic rituals (Cündioğlu 1999: 263ff; Kara 2011: 714–717; for İzmirli’s ʻturkifiedʼ revision of Islamic history see ibid.: 718– 744 and Laut 2000: 71ff.). Upon Atatürk’s death, Yaltkaya conducted the funeral prayer at the ʻFather Turk’sʼ state funeral in the Dolmabahçe Palace (Kara 2013: 309). Unlike his predecessor, Akseki’s piety had never been called into question by conservative Islamists. This fact, as well as his old ties to Sebîlürreşâd, secured for him the support of his Islamist companions from the Second Constitutional Period (Bein 2011: 145).

Producing pious soldiers: Akseki’s ʻCatechismʼ for the military In the early years of the republic, Akseki wrote several books on religious instruction and teaching. Among them were two Islamic manuals (ilmihâller), one entitled “Religious Instruction for the Soldier” (Askere Din Dersleri) (Akseki 1341/1925); and the other “Religious Instruction for the Villager” (Köylüye Din Dersleri) (Akseki 1928). Akseki wrote his military catechism at the request of the Chief of the General Staff Marshal Mustafa Fevzi Çakmak (1876–1950),12 a fact which sufficiently demonstrates the close ties between secular state elite and Islamic scholarship in the first years of the Kemalist Republic. Akseki’s ilmihâl for the military first appeared in 1925 in the Arabic alphabet. The Turkish ilmihâl literature had spread all over the central lands of the Ottoman Empire since the mid-sixteenth century, probably under the influence of the puritan Salafi Kadızâdeli movement. The ilmihâls were written by ulema for the broadest possible audience, which in this context means Turkish lay believers who were not able to read Arabic, in order to provide them with a basic knowledge of Islam. Unlike its forerunners, the Arabic ʿaqā’id, ilmihâls also include the matters of worship (ibâdât) and ethics (ahlâk). İlmihâls are strictly devoted to the Sunni (in a narrower sense to the Hanafi) doctrine and rite. This clearly indicates that ilmihâls were primarily written with the purpose of making their ordinary readers pious ʻSunniʼ Muslims. As Terzioğlu pointed out, the ilmihâl literature played a vital role in the ʻconfessionalisationʼ, or in other words for the Sunnitisation of the Ottoman Empire propelled by its rivalry with the Shiʿitising Safavid Iran (Terzioğlu 2013; for the Kadızâdelis see Çavuşoğlu 1990). The first work that could be considered an ilmihâl (arab. ʿilm al-ḥāl) is the Vasiyetnâme of Taqī ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī, better known as Imam Birgivî (1523–1573), who was the main inspiration for the Kadızâdelis (for Birgivi see Küfrevi 1960; Unan 2006). The first work bearing the title 12

The reader can find Çakmak’s petitionary letter to the Diyânet directly after the cover sheet (for general information about Çakmak see Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition 1965; for more detailed information about his military and political career see Gök 1997).

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ʻilmihâlʼ was the anonymously composed Mızraklı İlmihâl. The publication of ilmihal works gained momentum during the Tanzîmât period (1939–1876), with the introduction of printing in the Ottoman Empire, and later in the Young Turk Period. In contemporary Turkey one can find a broad range of ilmihâls based upon the different legal schools (madhāhib) – in this geographical context the ḥanafī and the shāfiʿī madhhab – and on the teachings of the various Sufi orders (for example the Bektashī order), as well as ilmihâls written for different types of audiences (women, children and families) (Kelpetin 2000; Arpaguş 2002). Today, probably the most popular ʻcatechismʼ is the Büyük İslam İlmihâli by the fiqh scholar Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen (1883–1971), first published in the 1950s (Bilmen 1955). This ilmihâl has been reprinted countless times in the contemporary Turkish language and is stocked in almost every Islamic bookstore (for Bilmen see Yaran 1992; for his legal theory see Uçar 2005: 131f.). The composition of ilmihâls specifically designed for soldiers started with the establishment of new military schools with European curricula in the period of modernising reforms in the Ottoman Empire, beginning with the Nizâm-ı Cedîd (New Order) of Sultan Selim III (reigned 1789 to 1807). According to Kara, Birgivi’s Vasiyetnâme served as a model for the later military catechisms. The publication of religious handbooks for soldiers had its climax during World War I. The intention behind the dissemination of these manuals was to strengthen the motivation of the troops in the wake of a series of defeats by propagating the Islamic concepts of martyrdom (şehitlik) and holy warriorhood (gâzîlik). The Kemalist leadership continued this tradition of religious indoctrination of the army in the early years of the republic. During this time several religious manuals for soldiers appeared (Kara 2007). Remaining faithful to the traditional Sunni teachings, the first chapter of Akseki’s Askere Din Dersleri deals with the articles of faith (itikâd) (Akseki 1341/1925: 3–94), specifically with questions like “What is religion (dîn)?”, “What is Islam?” and issues like “the belief in Islam and its conditions”, “the creed” (kelime-i tevhîd or şehâdet), “the attributes of God” (sıfatlar), “the love and fear of God” (Allah sevgisi, Allah korkusu), “the Prophets” (peygamberler), the Prophet “Muḥammad” (Muhammed sallallâhu aleyhi ve sellem), “the ethical behaviour of our Prophet” (Peygamber efendimizin ahlâkı), “the belief in the divine books” (Allâh’ın kitâblarına imân), “the noble Qur’an” (Kur’ânı Kerîm), “the belief in Angels” (Melâikeye imân), “the belief in the afterlife” (Âhiret gününe imân), “the belief in predestination” (kadere imân), “trust in God” (tevekkül), “the juristic schools and their imams” (mezheb ve mezheb imâmları), and also topics like “the protection from infectious diseases” (bulaşık hastalıklarından korunmak) and “work, trade, agriculture and craft” (calışmak, ticâret, zirâat, sanat). The second chapter is devoted to matters of worship (ibâdât) (ibid.: 95–173); here he lists the different forms of ablutions (abdest, gusül, teyemmüm), the ritu-

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al prayer (namaz), the congregational Friday prayer (cuma namazı), the Eid prayers (bayram namazı), the so called terâvîh namazları, which Sunni Muslims perform during the nights of the Ramadan, (for the Tarawīḥ prayers see Wensinck 2000) the funeral prayer (cenâze namazı), fasting during the Ramadan (oruç), the status of a traveller (müsâfir), the obligatory tax (zekât), the pilgrimage to Mecca (hac) and the five holy nights (mübârek kandil geceleri) (for the holy nights see Bozkurt 2001). He includes a subchapter with the heading “How Should a perfect Muslim be?” (tam bir müslüman nasıl olmalı), in which he argues that a Muslim, to be perfect, has not only to fulfil all these, but should also show flawless ethical behaviour. The whole ilmihâl is composed in a strict didactic fashion. The ilmihâl consists of so called ʻlessonsʼ (ders), which contain fictional dialogues written in a question-answer format. Akseki again and again addresses the soldiers directly as “my dear soldiers” (asker evlâtlarım). The aim of the catechism is to mould the soldiers into pious defenders of the Turkish Nation. At the end of most of the sections, corresponding ḥadīths and Qur’anic verses are added in Turkish translation. All of these fictional dialogues are followed by a commentary (izâh) in which Akseki explains them to the soldiers.13 Most striking with regard to the ilmihâlsʼ content is the third chapter, entitled “Ethical and Military Obligations” (vazâif-i ahlâkiye ve askeriye). Here, in “lesson thirty-three”, headed “Duties to Ourselves” (nefsimize karşı vazîfelerimiz), Akseki teaches the soldier that he has to take care of his body and to keep it fit in order to be able to fulfil his commitments to God (ibid.: 174ff.). Afterwards, the soldier is instructed to abstain from alcoholic drinks (and other intoxicants) and gambling, which are forbidden in Islam (Akseki 1341/1925: 179ff.). Very interesting is the apologia used by Akseki when defending the Qur’anic prohibition of alcohol: “To protect the people from that sin, which is the reason for all evil, our religion, 1300 years ago, declared even one drop of alcohol inadmissible. It [the religion, B.F.] gave orders frequently to prevent us from falling into this sin and informed us that everything bad can originate from alcohol and every disaster is caused due to it. Hashish, opium, and morphine have the same characteristics. They all wear down the body and destroy and devastate the people too. Therefore, it is prohibited and forbidden to use them. If so, it is a debt of honour for every Muslim to fight against that sin and to protect the people from it. My dear soldiers, other nations also very recently began to understand that alcohol is that bad. But they are not like us! Without understanding they started searching for solutions to get rid of that disaster. In particular, the reaction of the United States of America (Amerika devleti) was exaggerated. The alcohol consumption in today’s America is not our business. But these guys (herifler) prohibited the consumption of alcohol completely through strict laws. Although the Americansʼ religion did not command anything like that, they directly prohibited it without understand-

13

In his preface Akseki states that with regard to the way he wrote his ilmihâl, it distinguishes itself from previous works of this kind (Akseki 1341/1925: Birkaç Söz).

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ing the harms of alcohol. Although our religion prohibited it more than 1300 years ago, how can it still be that a Muslim consumes alcohol? How can it be that he brings that disaster with his own hand upon himself? Unfortunately – for whatever reason – in recent times this sin spread throughout our country; it even reached our women and children. But our government handled it in this way so that hereupon this scandal won’t happen again so easily. Thank God, our government made a law to abolish the alcoholic disaster. It prohibited drunkenness. Anyway, it is not right to transfer the matters all the time to the government! We have to take action too, at least a little bit. We also have to understand the harms and benefits [of alcohol]. Is it possible that the government should handle it all and we just sit, especially when its harms are obvious and our religion also prohibits it? It is the debt of every Muslim not to drink it. The government should make laws as it wants, and if it does not want, it should not. Inasmuch as it is something harmful, we shouldn’t do it, and we should talk the one who consumes alcohol out of it with kind words. That’s just exactly the way Islam is” (ibid.: 183f.).

In the lesson about the “family” (âile), the soldier is urged to obey his parents and to treat them in a good manner. Rebelling against his parents would be a sin as great as abusing God.14 Concerning his children, however, the soldier’s debt towards them is to educate them with the intention that the nation and the country will benefit from them, to teach them flawless ethical behaviour and the Islamic religion in a beautiful manner.15 Obviously in conflict with the Kemalist ideology is the image of women conveyed in the ilmihâl. As Hanioğlu puts it, for the Kemalist elites the ideal woman “was educated, nationalist, dressed in a civilized fashion, professional, secular and had fully internalized l’esprit républicain. Most conspicuously, piety – the paramount virtue of the ideal Ottoman woman – was left out” (Hanioğlu 2011: 209). In lesson thirty-six, dealing with the relationship between “Husband and Wife”, Akseki defends the traditional Islamic gender roles: “Working outside the house is not the wife’s job, it is the job of the man. It is an oppression and injustice to occupy the wife with work that is not her job. The man has to take care of it. Then it is the husband’s duty not to pay attention when his wife talks too much and to be patient then, to get on well with his wife, not to say harsh things to her and to inform her about her deficiencies concerning her faith (itikât), her worshipping (ibâdet) and her morals (ahlâk), if any exist. What are the wife’s duties? Her duty is the following: ʻIn accordance with the Islamic law (şeriat), she has to obey her husband and to protect the things that belong to him.ʼ She will acknowledge her husband as the head of the house (evin reisi) and obey his orders. She won’t do anything that he does not allow and agree with, she won’t go anywhere without his permission. When her husband is with her and in the time he is absent, she will refrain 14

15

“Anaya babaya karşı en birinci vazîfemiz onlara itaat etmek, onların dediklerinden çıkmamaktır. Çünkü Allah’a küfür etmek nasıl en büyük günah ise, Anaya babaya âsi olmak da öylece bir günahtır” (ibid.: 190). “[…] onları millet ve memlekete faydalı olacak bir surette terbiye edip okutma, ahlâklarının düzgün olmasına çalışmak, dini dünyası güzelce öǧretmek […]” (ibid.: 189).

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from wasting his property. She won’t disclose the secrets between her and her husband to others. It is the duty of the wife to do all these things. It is the husband’s right to demand that the wife will comply with all these” (Akseki 1342/1925: 195f.).

Akseki’s reference to the sharia is quite astonishing since the Islamic sharia courts were closed in 1924, one year before Askere Din Dersleri appeared. As is generally known, in 1924, the caliphate (on 3rd March) and the Ministry of Islamic Law and Pious Foundations (Şerʿiye ve Evkâf Vekâleti) were also abolished (for Atatürk’s view on secularism see Hanioğlu 2011: 129–159; for a brief but concise overview of the introduction of secularism in the time of Atatürk’s rule written from a left wing Kemalist point of view see Akşin 2009: 173ff.). Although the phrase “Religion of the State is Islam” had been removed from the Turkish Constitution in 1928, laïcité was not introduced officially until 1937. In the early 1920s the radical character of Atatürk’s secularism was not that obvious. In his speeches, Mustafa Kemal still used religious vocabulary, although not to the same extent as in his speeches during the War of Independence (Akyol 2008: 548f.). Even Çelebizade Mehmed Seyyid Bey (1873–1925), an Islamic scholar and the Republic’s first Minister of Justice, who provided the religious justification for the abolition of the caliphate in a speech before the Great National Assembly, underestimated Mustafa Kemal’s affinity to the West. In 1925, he criticised the Kemalists’ plans to adopt the Swiss Civil Code and therefore lost his position in the cabinet (Hanioğlu 2011: 151; for the protocol of the parliamentary session on the abolition of the caliphate see T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi 1340/1924: 17–81; for Mehmed Seyyid Bey’s speech in modern Turkish transcript see Kara 2011: 233ff.; for a partial translation into English see Şeyhun 2015: 137ff.). In 1926, the Kemalist government adopted the Swiss Civil Code, not word for word but rather a slightly modified version. The modifications primarily concerned the legal personality and the matrimonial and divorce law, which were adapted to Islamic and Ottoman traditions (Miller 2000). Nevertheless, it was still possible for ulema of the Diyânet, which was actually founded in 1924 after the abolition of the caliphate, to take Islam under state control, to defend traditional Islamic views in their works which were banned by the Swiss Civil Code, for example on polygamy (Flöhr 2015: 353ff.). The ulema of the Diyânet formed a kind of subsystem, an ideological ʻenclaveʼ surrounded by a secular state in which – despite all state reforms – they had the freedom to continue their traditional Islamic discourses (ibid.: 517ff.). So, it was the Kemalist state itself that offered the ulema, even though to a limited extent, the infrastructure to propagate their worldview. With regard to the political content of the ilmihâl, “Lesson Thirty-seven” entitled “Our Duties to the Government and the Country” (Hükümet ve Memlekete karşı vazîfelerimiz) is very interesting. Here Akseki quotes the following dialogue:

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“Q: Could you explain what government means? A: Government means an assembly which is elected by all the people living together from among themselves, to protect their lives, property, honour (ırz), chastity (namus), rights, and their country and to secure their comfort. Q: This means that it is the duty of the government to protect all of us and to let us live in comfort, right? A: Yes, right. Defending our homeland (yurtlarımız) from the enemy, the prohibition of theft and things like theft and disaster (uğursuzluk) in the home country (memleket), the cultivation of our homeland (vatan), the abolition of ignorance and the distinction between right and wrong. All these are the duties of the government. Q: How does the government handle all the things you mentioned? A: As they say, to distinguish between right and wrong, and to prevent theft, the government will convene courts. In order to abolish the ignorance among the people, it will open schools. It will build educational institutions (ilim yuvaları) everywhere. It uses the gendarmerie and the police to prohibit theft and disaster. In order to defend the homeland from the enemy it feeds the soldiers, and for our comfort it builds roads, operates railways, cleans the streets, builds hospitals and employs doctors. Hereby, our homeland will flourish and we all will live comfortably as well. Q: All right! Can’t the people live without a government? A: No. The people can never live without a government. Like a sheep can never live without a shepherd, the people also cannot live without a government. A government is necessary under any circumstances. We have understood the services of the government and its duty towards us. What is our duty towards the government? A: Our major and very first duty towards the government is to obey its laws and not to oppose it. Our second duty is to pay taxes. Q: How many kinds of taxes do we owe the state and the government? A: It is our debt of honour to pay two kinds of taxes to the government. One is the property tax (mâl vergisi), the other the life tax (can vergisi). Everybody, according to his conditions, has to pay some money to the government. This is the property tax. With this money, the government makes streets, railways, hospitals, cartridges and rifles. It opens schools and courts. Furthermore, it is necessary to set something against the enemy who wants to occupy our homeland. Just like we give our property, it is our debt of honour to go and face the enemy whenever the government demands, and to use our bodies as shields to prevent the enemy from coming to our homeland. This is exactly what is called live tax. Q: What happens if we don’t pay these taxes to the government? A: If we don’t pay these taxes our homeland cannot flourish. Neither could streets be built in our homeland nor could a school be opened, and things like hospitals and bridges could not come into existence. Theft and disaster would take place in our home country, the enemy would trample down our homelands. One could neither earn money nor sleep comfortably anymore. Q: How many kinds of government exist?

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A: There are several kinds of government. But no matter how many kinds there are, there is no need for [all] of them. I just know the following: the best form of government is the republican form (cumhuriyet şeklinde olanıdır). Q: Why is the republican form of government so suitable? A: Republican government means a government that is formed by taking into account the opinions of the people. The people appoint for themselves individual deputies. From among these deputies they appoint one president, and this is the ʻPresident of the Republicʼ (cumhuriyet reisi). Thereafter, this president chooses some of the deputies to carry out the matters of the country. And by performing the work of the country with them together, it is in truth the people who do it. And due to the fact that the people carry out their matters themselves, the republican form, the republican government, is the best form of government” (Akseki 1341/1925: 203ff.).

In his commentary to the dialog, Akseki praises again the republican form of government: “My dear soldiers, in this world there are several forms of government. The best of them is the ʻRepublicʼ, because republic means a government which is elected und chosen by the people. The people choose a deputy from among themselves and appoint him. These deputies, meeting regularly, elect a president. This president is called ʻPresident of the Republicʼ. This president chooses, from among the deputies, five to ten persons. He says ʻWhat would you say if I were to carry out the affairs of our home country together with them?ʼ. If they answer ʻAll right, it is appropriateʼ, then the chosen men deal with the country’s affairs. The deputies we appointed monitor their colleagues who are permanently occupied with the matters of the country. If they do their job well, then everything is all right. If they don’t, they remove them and replace them with others. That means since they are our deputies that it is still us who perform the work. That is why the ʻRepublicʼ is the best form of government “ (ibid.: 209).

This position is not surprising, since Islamist thinkers of the Second Constitutional Period had already defended constitutionalism from an Islamic viewpoint before the onset of the Turkish Republic and developed their own shariabased concepts of constitutionalism (Kara 2001: 95ff.; Debus: 67ff.; for Elmalılı Hamdi’s concept of constitutionalism see Flöhr 2015: 225ff.). Lesson thirty-eight focuses on military service (askerlik). With regard to its title military service is actually the main topic of the ilmihâl. By quoting several sayings of the Prophet Muḥammad, Akseki declares military service obligatory for all Muslims: “Q: What kind of duty is the military service? A: The soldier is the force that protects our homeland, our honour and our chastity against the enemy. That is the reason why the military service is a very important and holy (mukaddes) duty. Everybody who loves his God, his Prophet and his homeland and knows the value of his honour and chastity performs his military service with great pleasure. In our religion the status of the soldier is very high: if he dies, he becomes a martyr, if he returns alive, he becomes a gâzî [arab. ghāzī, title of honour for someone who has distinguished himself in a military expedition, B.F.]. Q: What do we have to do when we are called to serve in the military? https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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A: We have to go there with great joy and great eagerness. Since our Prophet, peace be upon him, said: ʻWhen you are called upon to take up arms, accept the call.ʼ It is our debt of honour to comply with the command of the Prophet. Q: How do we describe those who do not accept the call or those who do go not voluntarily [to the military, B.F.]? A: The first group are those who rebelled directly against God and the Prophet. The second group are the hypocrites (münâfik). God is not pleased with them and the Prophet not contented with them. The situation of someone with whom God and the messenger are not pleased is disastrous (haraptır). He won’t experience the pleasures of this world and the hereafter. Q: What is the major duty of the soldier? A: To be very obedient to their commanders and officers and to deviate not in the least from their commands. Q: Why is it necessary to obey the orders of the commanders and officers? A: Because it is only possible to defeat the enemy and become victorious when the individuals in the army are very obedient to their commanders. The Prophet, peace be upon him, said: ʻWhether you like it or not, listen to the orders of your commanders and officers and obey them.ʼ Therefore, obedience to the commanders and officers means to obey our Prophet. Obedience to the Prophet means obedience to God. Q: What happens when individuals in the army disobey their commanders? A: Well, first of all, it is considered that they have rebelled against God and the Prophet. Then, that they have committed treason as well. If the individuals in the army do not obey their commanders and officers from their heart and soul, the army will fall into disorder. When the army collapses, the enemy will be victorious. Thus, the nation and the country will fall down, be destroyed and perish as well. A soldier who knows his duty well will do whatever his commanders and officers say. Thus he will find God’s and the Prophet’s acceptance and perform a great service for his country and nation. A disobedient soldier in turn will garner the wrath of God and the Prophet. He will disgrace himself and be destroyed” (Akseki 1341/1925: 210ff.).

In his commentary Akseki narrates the events of the Battle of Uḥud where the Muslims were defeated by the Meccan Army, the paternal uncle of the Prophet Muḥammad, Hamza, died on the battlefield, and the Prophet himself was wounded (for the battle of Uḥud and the preliminary events leading up to the battle see Nagel 2008: 352ff.). According to Akseki, the Muslim army lost the battle because they did not follow Muḥammad’s orders blindly: “But our Prophet commanded the archers ʻnot to leave their position, as long as there is no message from him, whether the enemy is defeated or comes out victoriously.ʼ Our Prophet gave such an order. But the soldiers who were in that position disobeyed his decisive order. They said that the enemy had been defeated and they desisted from his army. They did not listen to the word of their supreme commander. Thereupon they were defeated again. My dear soldiers, now, you listened to that story, didn’t you? There is such a thing as a moral of the story. There is also a lesson or moral that we https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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took from that story: the duty of the soldier is to obey commands. When the commander says to him, ʻYou will wait here!ʼ then he will wait there willingly. When he says, ʻYou will go there!ʼ then he will go there with great eagerness. When he says, ʻDo your work this wayʼ then he will do his work without thinking. Because the commander, the leader, is the one who will think. The commander first thinks of it, considers it from all sides, makes a decision and then he commands. The soldier immediately executes this command without thinking and does not deviate from it. To think whether this command is helpful or not, and hesitating to execute it or not, is absolutely inadmissible. In conclusion: every man who wants safety for his homeland, his religion, his state, his nation and everything that is sacred to him, should come with great eagerness, without hesitating, when he is called to serve in the military. In the barrack (asker ocağı), he should obey the orders of his commanders, officers and headmen. You can’t say: ʻI will deviate from God’s and the Prophet’s command.ʼ If you do so, then our homeland, our state, our nation, our religion and everything that is sacred to us will be trampled down by the enemy and you will experience torture in this world and the hereafter” (Akseki 1341/1925: 216f.).

In the following ʻlessonsʼ the soldier learns, besides other things considered important virtues, that it is a “good action” (amel-i sâlih) and an act of worship (ibâdet) to spy on the enemy and to be on guard duty (talim etmek, nöbet beklemek) (ibid.: 218f.), that courage and bravery (şecâat ve cesâret) are important characteristics of a soldier (ibid.: 225ff.), and that it is the greatest honour to die as a martyr (şehîd) (ibid.: 258f.). The last subchapter is entitled “Father’s Advices to the Soldier” (askere baba nasîhatı), in which the soldier is reminded from the perspective of a fictional father to follow the instructions he has learned in the chapters before. The chapter contains all in all sixty-one of these suggestions. Here are a few examples: “Never let God out of your heart”; “Fear God”; “Don’t insult our Prophet and the book [the Qur’an, B.F.]”; “Obey the commands of God and the Prophet, don’t deviate from them!”; “Love your duty and try to fulfil it in the best way”; “Don’t neglect your duty”; “Obey the government and the laws of the government”; “When you are called to serve in the military, go there with great eagerness”; “Obey your commanders”; “Don’t act against the orders of your officers and commanders”; “Love your homeland and your folk. Do not betray your homeland”; “Don’t be afraid of the battle and do not flee it, trust in God and move forward”; “Don’t turn your back on your enemy when you face him”; “Remember it is an honour to die in a confrontation with the enemy” (ibid.: 263ff.). One can recognise the manipulative use of language in the ilmihâl. According to its own logic, the defence of the country is a religious duty, since an attack on the homeland and the nation is considered an attack on Islam (which implies an attack on God and the Prophet as well) and thus on the dignity of the Muslims.

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The Politicisation of Islam: The Kemalist state Islamises itself Only one year before Turkey’s transition to a multi-party system, Akseki revised his ilmihâl and published a second edition, this time in the Latin alphabet. It was printed by the Diyânet under the title Askere Din Kitabı (Akseki 1945). With regard to the content, the reader will notice some striking differences to the first edition.16 What catches the reader’s eye first is the İstiklâl Marşı addressed “to our heroic army” (kahraman ordumuza), which is immediately inserted after Akseki’s introduction. This is followed by a chapter with the title “The Soldier’s Emotions” (Askerin Duygusu), a fictional dialogue between a lieutenant and his sergeant called Hasan,17 a villager who served during the Balkan War, the First World War and the Turkish War of Independence. Akseki describes Hasan Çavuş as a pious man who even acted as imam for the soldiers in his battalion in the evenings and in his free time. To give an impression of the contents of the dialogue, a small part of it is quoted below: “Lieutenant: What does homeland (vatan) mean for us? Hasan Çavuş: It is our mother. Q: What kind of mother is our homeland? A: It is a holy mother who deserves passion and love and to have one’s life sacrificed for her. Q: Why do you love your mother? A: I love her because she is my mother. Q: If that is the case, then do you love your homeland as well? A: Of course I do, as it is our most beloved and holiest mother. Just as we love our mother with passion, we will love our homeland with passion in the same way. We will love it because it is our homeland. In addition to this, just as all the goodness of a human being stems from the love and fear of God, so loyalty, willingness to make sacrifice, unity and fraternalism stems from the love of one’s homeland. Moreover, our Prophet declared, ʻLove of one’s homeland is part of faith (vatan sevgisi imandan gelir)ʼ.

16 17

Kara has already pointed out some differences between the first and the second edition with regard to the scope and the number of lessons (Kara 2007: 51). It is not clear whether Hasan Çavuş was a historical figure or not. Since Hasan is a very common name, there could have been many sergeants called Hasan fighting in Çanakkale. In 2009 a letter was found in a private archive, written by a reserve officer, called Kemal Efendi, who served in the 14th division under Kâzım Karabekir (1882– 1942). The letter is dated to the year 1915 and was sent right from the front in Çanakkale. In his letter, Kemal Efendi tells his father about the heroic deeds performed by Hasan Çavuş from Erzincan during the battle of Kerevizdere against the French. According to the letter, Hasan Çavuş, who was the commandant of the second brigade of the second battalion of the 41st regiment, heroically gave his life to stop the invaders (Oral 2009).

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That is why I love my homeland very much. My ancestors’ bones are in its womb; my religion, my chastity (namus), my honour (şeref) are within it. Q: How would you consider an enemy’s attack on your homeland? A: It would be as if he trampled down my mother, he violated my honour (ırz) and my chastity (namus). And in such a situation I would scream. A Turk and a Muslim cannot bear it, because he lives and dies for his homeland” (Akseki 1945: 8f.).

Although medieval Islamic scholars categorised the famous ḥadīth “Love of one’s homeland is part of faith” (arab. “ḥubb al-waṭan min al-īmān”) – quoted here by Hasan Çavuş – as fabricated (mawḍūʿ) (Aḥmad 1417/1996: 165)18, it nevertheless had a great impact on modern nationalist thought. In the 19th and early 20th century, this saying attributed to the Prophet Muḥammad, was used as the motto of several Arabic nationalist movements to support their political agenda. Originally, the Arabic term waṭan had a completely apolitical meaning, simply carrying the connotation of one’s place of birth or stay (Haarmann 2002; Hourani 1962: 101). In the 19th century, under the influence of the Young Ottomans, several Arabic-Islamic words were given new meanings corresponding with the nationalist ideas of that age. In the political vocabulary of Nâmık Kemal (1840–1888), vatan became the equivalent of the French patrie (Mardin 2000: 326ff.; Zürcher 2005: 68). According to Lewis, this new political meaning of the word vatan can be dated back to the last years of the 18th century. The earliest example of the use of the word vatan in the sense of patrie is a letter from the Turkish ambassador to Paris. In the 19th century, influenced by the impacts of the French Revolution, the word with its derivatives ʻpatriotismʼ and ʻpatriotʼ became common in political linguistic usage. However, after the import of European political structures in the course of the rise of nationalism in the Islamic world in the 20th century, vatan finally acquired the connotation of patrie, Vaterland, rodina, and so on (Lewis 1988: 40ff.).19 Akseki, without a doubt uses the term vatan with this connotation. A patriotic poem, called “Turkish Homeland” (Türk Vatanı) and an invocation for the homeland (Vatan Duası) of the nationalist poet Emin Ali Sipahi (1895–1952) have been inserted into the text immediately afterwards (Akseki 1945: 14). It is also striking that Akseki added a section entitled “Our Prophet’s Military Service” (Peygamberimizin Askerliği) to the itikâd-chapter in which he informs the reader that Muḥammad was “our greatest Soldier” ever (bizim peygamberimiz en büyük askerdi) and, referring to the biography of Muḥammad, tells us how the Prophet commanded his troops and fought in the battles of Badr and Uḥud 18

19

Even in the 20th Century, the famous Salafi ḥadīth specialist Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī (1914-1999) explicitly denied the authenticity of “ḥubb al-waṭan min al-īmān” (al-Albānī, al-Shaykh Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn: Hal ḥadīth (ḥubb al-waṭan min al-īmān) ṣaḥīḥ? (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Z6CdOm6OZQ, accessed on 09.10.2016). To make Lewis’ illustration more understandable, one should add that patriot means ʻvatanseverʼ and patriotism ʻvatan sevgisiʼ in Turkish.

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(Akseki 1945: 67–81). In the second edition, under the section called “Tales of Bravery and Heroism” (Şecâat ve Kahramanlık Menkibeleri), the reader can now find several stories of individual Turkish ʻheroes of warʼ beginning with the Beyliks, the conquest of Malazgirt by the Seljuk sultan Alparslan in 1071, to the Battle of Çanakkale during the First World War in 1915, up to the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1923). Then, the ilmihâl continues with a new subchapter entitled “In Islam Every Individual is a Soldier” (Müslümanlıkta her fert askerdir), in which Akseki, again with reference to the Prophet Muḥammad’s biography, argues that in Islamic history women also participated in the military jihād and fought for the cause of Islam, at least by bringing water to the wounded soldiers (ibid.: 355f.). Immediately afterwards, Akseki tells the story of the Turkish war heroine Fatma Seher Erden (1888–1955), also known as “the brave Fatma” (Kara Fatma)20 from Erzurum, who distinguished herself during the Turkish War of Independence (ibid.: 356f.). For her achievements, she was later decorated with the Medal of Independence (İstiklâl Madalyası) (for a list of officially recognised Turkish war heroines on the website of the Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi see Kurnaz 2013; for a biographical study based on archive documents, personal testimonies and old photographs see Bektaş 2013). Akseki narrates the story of Kara Fatma as follows: “Kara Fatma from Erzurum was a Turkish woman. At the time, when the troops of the enemy surrounded the city of Erzurum, she was together with the soldiers in the bastion of Aziziye. She was a Turkish mother who brought water and food to the soldiers, carried the wounded soldiers on her shoulders and dressed their wounds. The enemy understood that it was impossible to take the bastion from the Turks, so he tried it by using a trick. At midnight, the enemy sent a foot soldier to near our soldiers’ barrack. This soldier fired a rifle and thereby extinguished the light of our barrack. Up until the morning, our soldiers considered each other enemies and killed each other. Thus the enemy came and captured the bastion easily. Kara Fatma could not bear what had happened and sought revenge. She immediately went back to Erzurum and gathered all the children and old people she could find there. With this handful of Turks, whom she gathered with might and main and persuaded to join her, she attacked the bastion of Aziziye. The rain of bullets and cannon balls fired by the enemy could not stop Fatma. When she entered the castle she cut all the enemy’s men into pieces until not a single one of them was left alive. Under this heap of dead bodies, she reconquered the bastion and took her revenge. On the Martyr's Cemetery in Erzurum, not only male volunteers are buried, but also female martyrs. Kara Fatma is one of these heroines. During the War of Independence there were several women who displayed a great spirit of self-sacrifice. The world must know that our women are as brave as our men. Noone could harm these great lionesses and they are absolutely untouchable” (Akseki 1945: 356).

In the second edition, in the chapter on matters of worship (ibâdet), the reader finds an additional section called “The Islamic and Heroic Emotions Among 20

When used for worriers, ʻkaraʼ usually means great, mighty, strong or brave, rather than ʻblackʼ. Not to be confused with karafatma, which means ʻcockroachʼ in Turkish.

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the Soldiers” (Türk Askerlerinde Müslümanlık ve Kahramanlık Duyguları) dealing with the military jihād, which is, according to the classical Islamic doctrine, the sixth pillar and a religious obligation (farz) of Islam (ibid.: 195ff.; for the history and the doctrine of jihād see Peters 2009 and Tyan 1965). According to Akseki, looking at Islamic history, the Turks fulfilled this duty best (“İslâm milletleri içinde müslümanlığın farz kıldığı bu vazifeyi en iyi Türkler yapmışlardır”) (ibid.: 195). Another striking difference from the first edition is that in the section about the “Duties to the Government and the Country”, Akseki no longer makes reference to the republican form of government (ibid.: 275f.). Instead, he inserts a new lesson called “The Qur’an Commands to Defend the Country” (Kur’anı kerim vatan müdafaasını emreder) in which – probably due to the experience of World War II and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki21 – he argues, with reference to verse 60 of surah 8,22 that Muslims have to gain enough power and be prepared to be able to defend their country against all kind of attacks, be that from the air, from the seaside or by a nuclear weapons. According to Akseki, Muslims should, in accordance with the requirements of the time, be able to produce their own warships, military aircrafts, rifles, munitions and tanks and not buy them from foreign powers. Therefore, as Akseki states, it is a religious obligation to build factories and naval shipyards and to train the competent personnel.23 The support for the adoption of Western technology and military technology, while refusing Western philosophy and the ʻdecadentʼ lifestyle of Western societies, is a widespread topos in Islamist thinking. One can find a similar pattern of argumentation in the ilmihâl of Hüseyin Hilmi Işık (1911–2001),24 the leader of the Işıkçılar or Işıkçı Cemaati, a subsection of the Mujaddidiyya-Khālidiyya 21 22

23

24

Turkey remained neutral until the end of the World War II. In 1941, a non-aggression pact between Nazi-Germany and Turkey was signed. “Make ready for them whatever force and strings of horses you can, to terrify thereby the enemy of God and your enemy, and others besides them that you know not; God knows them. And whatsoever you expend in the way of God shall be repaid you in full; you will not be wronged” (Arberry 1964: 176). “Dinimiz, kitabımız kuvvet hazırlamamızı emrediyor. Binaenaleyh bu zamanda «kuvvet» ne ise onların hepsini hazırlamak, onları yapacak her çeşit fabrikalar vücuda getirmek, tersaneler yapmak ve onları idare edecek adamlar yetiştirmek üzerimize farzdır. Muhtaç olduğumuz kuvvetleri, lâzim olan silâhları her vakit yabancılardan almakla vazifemizi yapmış sayılmayız. Gemilerimizi, tayyarelerimizi, topumuzu, tüfeğimizi, tanklarımızı” (Akseki 1945: 283). Işik, Hüseyin Hilmi (2014): Tam İlmihâl – Seʿâdet-i Ebediyye, 139th ed., Istanbul. (http:// www.huseyinhilmiisik.com/kitaplar/00ilmihal.pdf), accessed on 09.10. 2016], 532ff. “Batının ilm, fen, teknik ve her sâhadaki fennî gelişmelerini almak elbette lâzımdır. Zâten islâmiyyet bunu emr eder” (ibid.: 534). And concerning the adaption of Western technology: “Bugün herkes, atomu ve atom enerjisini merâk etmekde, dost, düşman her memleketde atom üzerinde çalışılmakdadır. İstikbâlin harbleri, atom silâhları ile yapılacak, atom kuvveti bulunmıyan milletler, yaşamak hakkı bulamıyacakdır. Küçük, büyük, herkesin sık sık işitdiği atomu ve atom enerjisini ve kullanılmasını, din kardeşlerime kısaca bildirmeği lüzûmlu gördüm. Çünki, atom kuvveti, harbde de, sulhda da kullanılacakdır. Müslimânların, düşman-

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branch of the Naqshbandiyya Sufi lineage (for the Işıkçılar see Tekin 2005). Hüseyin Hilmi Işık received his religious education from the Naqshī Shaykh Abdülhakîm Arvâsî (1865–1943). Like all Khālidis he is very much influenced by the teachings of Ahmad Sirhindī (1565–1624) also known as Imām Rabbānī (for an overview of the history the Naqshbandiyya in Turkey and its influence in politics and society, especially of the Khālidī lineage and its branches see Mardin 1994). Işık was, and his followers still are, vehement opponents of Kemalist positivism and Westernisation policy (for Atatürk’s Europeanism and his understanding of science see Berger 2014). With regard to its content, the second edition of Askere Din Dersleri is much more political than the first. This is not surprising, since the influence of Islamic groups in public life and politics began to increase from the mid-1940s (Yavuz: 59ff.; Azak: 60ff.). In 1976, by decision of the Diyânet, a third edition was published, now in simplified modern standard Turkish (sadeleştirilmiş) (Akseki 1976). The ʻsimplificationʼ was carried out by a Turkish university theologian. The 1970s were characterised by political violence between the political right and left and the rise of political Islam (Çakır 2005; Çalmuk 2005; Sarıbay 2005; Yavuz 2005). Thus, the update of Askere Din Kitabı, which mixed up Islam and Turkish nationalism, could perhaps be related to the ideology of ʻTurkish-Islamic Synthesisʼ (TİS) according to which Turkishness and Islam are two sides of the same coin. The TİS was originally developed under the rule of the Democrat Party (1950–1960) by a group of conservative intellectuals. The TİS had its political heyday in the 1970s with the establishment of the Aydınlar Ocağı (the Intellectuals’ Hearth). After the military coup in September 1980, the Turkish Islamic Synthesis was integrated by the junta into the official state policy of fighting against the growing influence of left-wing ideologies and to promote loyalty to the state among conservative Islamic groups (Çetinsaya 2009). For the latter purpose, an Islamic manual was probably an appropriate tool.

Conclusion: ilmihâls as a political tool Akseki’s Askere Din Dersleri was commissioned by the military at a time when the newly founded and still unstable republic was being challenged by several Islamist groups. The most infamous case was the Şeyh Sait Rebellion in 1925, an Islamic and Kurdish nationalist revolt which called for the restoration of the da bulunan silâhları öğrenmesi ve yapması, farzdır. O hâlde, bugün atom bombasını yapmağa ve bunun için lüzûmlu matematik, fizik, kimyâ bilgilerini öğrenmeğe çalışmak farzdır. Önümüzde bulunan atom harbine hâzırlanmazsak, dînimizi, milletimizi koruyamayız. Harb için, atom te’sîslerini hâzırlamak, bunlardan sulh zemânında, terfîh-i ibâd için istifâde etmek, dînî vazîfemiz ve ibâdetimizdir. Devletin, milleti cihâda hâzırlaması, ibâdetdir. Hâzırlamaması, büyük günâhdır“ (ibid.: 546). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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caliphate, but was ultimately suppressed by the Turkish Army (van Bruinessen 1978). Akseki’s “Religious Instruction for the Soldiers” demonstrates very clearly that Islam and nationalism went hand in hand in the early years of the Turkish Republic. It further shows how the Kemalist leadership used Islam for its nationalist political agenda. The fusion of nationalism, militarism and religion also becomes very evident in some of the first Turkish model sermons the Diyânet distributed to all Imams throughout the country in 1927. The second sermon for example deals with the “Defence of the Home Country” (Vatan Müdâfaası) and the third sermon with “Aid for the Aeroplane Society” (Tayyâre Cemiyeti’ne Yardım) and sermon fifty-one with the “The Honour of Being a Soldier” (Askerliğin Şerefi) (Diyânet İşleri Reisliği 1927: 12–16, 18–23, 260–267). The ilmihâls were very widespread among the population since the days of the Ottoman Empire. They were written in simple language, targeting ordinary believers. Therefore, ilmihâls were an effective tool to disseminate the Kemalist ideas of Turkish nationalism and republicanism among the ordinary people. Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, who, more than any other Islamic scholar, embodied the alliance between the secular Kemalist state elite and moderate Islamists, authored several Islamic catechisms for all types of readers, one even dedicated to small children. “Religious Instruction for our Children” (Yavrularımıza Din Dersleri) (Akseki 1943) was published by the Diyânet in 1943, shortly before the second edition of Askere Din Dersleri appeared. Since then, it has been reprinted several times. Just like Askere Din Dersleri, the catechism for children contains a chapter called “Father’s Advices to the Children” (Çocuklara Baba Nasihatı), where; amongst others, he gives the following two pieces of advice: “7. The homeland is our most valuable and holiest mother. We will love our mother with passion because she is our mother, and not because we have benefit from her, 8. The homeland deserves passion and love and to have one’s life sacrificed for it” (Akseki 1983). After a fictional dialogue between a teacher and his pupils, one can also find here Ali Sipahi’s poem “Turkish homeland” (Türk Vatanı) (ibid.: 59). When reading Akseki’s works, in particular with regard to his defence of conservative Islamic gender roles, he does not really appear as “the major developer of Atatürk’s ‘enlightened’ Islam project”, as Yavuz suggests (Yavuz 2003: 138), but rather as a defender of traditional Islam and Islamiser of Kemalist nationalism. Another popular ilmihâl is the Yeni Âmentü Şerhi written by the Turkish major (binbaşı) Numan Kurtulmuş (d. 1952), grandfather of Turkey’s former deputy prime minister of the same name. The publication of Kurtulmuş’s Âmentü Şerhi was approved by the Diyânet. The book appeared for the first

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time in 1943. The Âmentü Şerhleri (“gloss on the formula of belief”)25 are a sort of ʿaqīda works which go back to the Ottoman period. The first work of this type was the Ferâidü’l-fevâid fî beyâni’l-akâid authored by the Şeyhülislâm Ahmed b. Muhammed Emin İstanbuli Kadızâde Ahmed Efendi (d. 1580). In addition to matters of creed, the Âmentü Şerhleri also cover matters of fiqh. Thus, there are no major differences between them and the ilmihâl works (Yavuz, Y. Ş. 1991: 30; Arpaguş treats the Âmentü Şerhleri equally with the ilmihâl works, see Arpaguş 2002: 27ff.). To come back to Kurtulmuş’s Âmentü Şerhi, one can notice that some of its contents are equally of a highly political nature. Under the heading “Love of one’s homeland” (vatan aşkı) Kurtulmuş gives the following explanation to the ḥadīth “ḥubb al-waṭan min al-īmān”, which reflects very clearly the nexus between religious and nationalist thinking: “Vatan is the place where Muslims live their religion, where Muslims find their life. It is the vatan of the mücahit Turks [who have performed the jihād, B.F.] which the independent Muslim Nation ruled for ten centuries on Earth (and which, with all its resources, its mountains and lands, its districts and corners, is more valuable than our lives); it is this independent Muslim vatan for which martyrs from every spot of its earth shed their blood. (To love the homeland stems from faith). This vatan is holy because it preserves our glorious ancestors’ sacred bones in its womb. This vatan is valuable, because the living descendants of the vatan find shelter in it. If the almighty God gives his favour, it will also preserve our bones after we have died, it will let our descendants live until the end of the world, and it will be a protection of the religion [Islam, B.F.] like the other Muslim countries. In this respect, this vatan is holy (aziz). Our Prophet said, ‘When the ümmet renounces war, it will fall into slavery and humiliation. If they do not lay down their arms, they will live free until the end of the world.’ For this reason, the military service which is an art of our ancestors will continue in Turkey until the end of the world. With God’s favour, they will not lay down their weapons until the end of the world” (Kurtulmuş 1984).

According to Kurtulmuş, since the Prophet predicted in a ḥadīth the conquest of Istanbul by the Turks, the Turkish army now has to continue this “spiritual honour” (mânevî şeref). For Kurtulmuş, vatan is a highly emotional term. That is why patriotism, according to him, stands above everything else.26 Thus the martyr (şehit) dies while fighting not only in the cause of God and his faith, but 25

26

Āmantu is the first person singular of āmana in Arabic. Followed by the preposition ʻbiʼ it means ʻI believe inʼ. Here, āmantu suggests the first word of the Islamic credo which according to the Sunni doctrine contains the pillars of faith: “Āmentu billāhi wamelā’ikatihi wa-kutubihi wa-rusūlihi wa-l-yawmi l-ākhiri wa bi-l-qadari khayrihi wa-sharrihi mina llāhi taʿālā wa-l-baʿthu baʿda l-mawti ḥaqq ashhadu an lā ilāha illā llāh wa ashhadu anna Muḥammadan ʿabduhu wa-rasūluh” (“I believe in God and his angels and his books and his messenger and the Last Day and in the divine decree, whether it is good or bad, and that resurrection after dead is true. I testify that there is no god but God and that Muḥammad is his servant and messenger”). This formula of faith is a compilation of several Qur’anic Verses (in particular 2/177 and 4/136) and aḥādīth dealing with the matters of faith (īmān) (Yavuz, Y. Ş. 1991). „Vatan sevgisi her şeyin üstündedir. Vatanseverliğin itibar ve kıymeti her şeyden yüksektir” (Kurtulmuş 1984: 256).

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also in the cause of his homeland and his nation.27 Apart from Turkish Nationalism, Kurtulmuş’s book seems to be in clear opposition to Kemalist ideology. It contains inter alia a chapter called “The Refutation of the Naturalist” (Tabiatçıyı Reddetmek). In the late Ottoman Empire and the early republic, materialist thinkers, most notably Abdullah Cevdet (1869–1932), Kılıçzâde Hakkı (1872–1960) and Celal Nuri İleri (1881–1938), were deemed ʻnaturalistsʼ, although Kurtulmuş does not mention them here by name. The Ottoman materialists were influenced by the German Vulgärmaterialismus à la Ludwig Büchner (1824–1899). For them, religion was the main obstacle to progress. To overcome this obstacle, their main objective was to completely westernise the Ottoman society. The so called ʻWesternistsʼ had a great impact on Atatürk’s thinking (Hanioğlu 2011: 48ff.). Returning to Akseki, an analysis of the second edition of Askere Din Dersleri reveals that more and more political content, including aspects of the classical political doctrine of Islam, was inserted into the ilmihâl. The reason for this must be sought in Turkey’s political context of the mid-1940s, which was characterised by debates on secularism and the Turkish ezân. After Turkey’s shift to a multi-party system, it was the Republican People Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) itself that initiated the debate around the reintroduction of religious education as a weapon against the growing threat of communism. At the same time, the Republican People’s Party’s politics towards religion was criticised vehemently in print media by Islamist intellectuals, among them the famous poet Necip Kısakürek (1905–1983) and the editor of Sebilürreşâd, Eşref Edip Fergan (1882–1972) (Azak 2010: 62ff.; for Kısakürek see Özdenören 2005; for Eşref Edip see Arabacı 2005). So in 1948, the government decided to introduce elective religious courses in the curriculum for the elementary schools. In 1949, it opened secondary schools for Imams and preachers (imam hatip kursları) and the first Faculty of Divinity (İlâhiyat Fakültesi) at Ankara University to train ʻenlightenedʼ men of religion (for the latter see Koştaş 1999). In such a political atmosphere, the Diyânet – as a tool of the government – tried to promote loyalty to the state among the people through the publication of Islamic manuals that were written in an easy language. With the rising influence of Islam upon Atatürk’s death, both in society and in politics, and as a result of Turkey’s shift to a multiparty system – particularly in the aftermath of the coup d’état of 1960 – the Diyânet ulema extended ever further their monopoly on the interpretation of religious matters to include the political aspects of classical Islamic doctrine. In 1960, the junta added the vague category of ʻethicsʼ (ahlâk) to the Diyânetʼs mission with the purpose of influencing the Turkish people with state ideology (Tezcan 2003: 64ff.). A look at the second volume of the current ilmihâl of the Diyânet reveals how extensively 27

„Allah yolunda, din, vatan ve millet uğrunda muharabede ölene şehit denir“ (ibid.: 259).

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the institution defines its mission today. Although the ilmihâls were originally not composed as handbooks of fiqh, it covers in a very detailed manner many topics which belong to the fields of ʻsocial transactionsʼ (arab. al-muʿāmalāt, türk. muâmelât) and ʻexpiatory actsʼ (arab. al-kaffārāt, türk. kefâretler) under Islamic law, and which were not included in the founding mission of the Diyânet. Despite its constitutional position, the Diyânet deals here with sharia regulations, some of which are obviously in conflict with the Turkish civil code, like the repudiation of a wife by her husband (talâk) and the marriage of a minor daughter against her will by a male blood relative (velâyet-i icbâr) (Diyânet İşleri Başkanlığı: İlmihal; for the velâyet-i icbâr see ibid.: 212ff. and for the talâk see ibid.: 229ff.; for an analysis of the ilmihâl’s view on apostasy from Islam see Flöhr 2016: 15ff.). On the other hand, the authors of the ilmihâl defend the abolition of the caliphate with reference to Mehmed Seyyid Bey’s historical speech in front of the Grand National Assembly (see above) and ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziq’s (1888–1996) book “Islam and the Foundations of Governance” (Al-Islām wa-uṣūl al-ḥukm, 1925) (Diyânet İşleri Başkanlığı: İlmihal: 276ff.). The ilmihâl was authored by a committee under the auspices of the Islamic fiqh scholar Hayrettin Karaman (b. 1934) (for Karaman see Uçar 2005: 139ff., 180ff., 239f.), who is a member of the conservative nationalist Intellectuals’ Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı) and a vehement supporter of the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). In October 2015, Karaman urged the people to vote for the AKP in the Islamist daily newspaper Yeni Şafak (Karaman, 18.10.2015) As Berger pointed out, the world-view promoted by the authors of the ilmihâl overlaps in many aspects with the Millî Görüş ideology, in particular with regard to their romanticised version of Ottoman history. But unlike the followers of Millî Görüş, since the ulema of the Diyânet are representatives of a governmental institution, they cannot express their opposition to the secular state in an outspoken manner (Berger 2009). In conclusion, it seems that Diyânet officials, aside from their support of nationalism, never intended to reform Islam according to the Kemalists’ agenda but rather tried to preserve traditional Islamic teachings within the infrastructure provided by the state. At its core, the Islam propagated by the Diyânet can even be considered as an ideology that opposes Kemalist secularism. Turkey is not the only ʻsemi-secularʼ Muslim country whose government promoted the publication of catechisms for its military. Three months before the October War in 1973, the Egyptian Ministry of Defence printed a short ʿaqīda brochure and distributed it to the soldiers in order to motivate them for the war against the “Jewish enemies” (Ǧumhūrriyya Miṣr al-ʿArabiyya – Wizārat Al-Ḥarbiyya 1973). The manual with the title “Our Religious Creed and Our Path to Victory” (ʿaqīdatunā al-dīniyya wa-ṭarīqunā ilā l-naṣr) is preceded by an introduction by the commander Saʿd al-Dīn al-Šādhilī (1922–2011)

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who was chief of staff during the October War (Al-Maṣrī l-Yawm, 12.10.2015). ʿAqīdatunā al-dīniyya is composed in a similar fashion to Askere Din Dersleri. Besides others it contains chapters on “Knowledge About the Basis of Force and Progress” (ʿilm asās al-quwwa wa-l-ruqiyy), “Liberty and Human Dignity” (alḥurriyya wa-l-karāma al-insāniyya), “The Formation of the Soul” (tarbiyat alnafs), “Self-discipline” (al-inḍibāṭ al-ḏātī), “Obedience” (al-ṭāʿa), “Leadership” (al-qiyāda), “Weapons Training” (al-tadrīb ʿalā l-silāḥ), “Physical education” (altarbiya al-badaniyya), “The Role of Women on the Battlefield” (dawr al-mar’a fī l-maʿraka) and “The Doctrine of Jihād in the Cause of God” (ʿaqīdat al-jihād fī sabīl Allāh). It is interesting to note that the Egyptian ʿaqīda-book also quotes verses from the Bible in addition to Qur’anic verses, probably to address the Coptic Christian soldiers in the Egyptian army. As is well known, Anwar asSādāt (1918–1981) held close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, even before his presidency. Unlike his predecessor, Ǧamāl ʿAbd an-Nāṣir (1918–1970), who launched very harsh repressions of the Brotherhood, as-Sādāt strengthened the Islamist spectrum of Egypt and pursued a policy of cooption in order to consolidate his political power and to force back the influence of Nasserist and leftist groups. The relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood cooled after Sādāt signed the peace treaty with Israel in 1979 (Sullivan 2009: 164; Ranko 2015: 65ff.). Finally, it should be noted that military catechisms, as well as Islamic catechisms in general, have not been the object of comprehensive and comparative historical research so far, especially with respect to the question as to whether and to what extent German and French military catechisms served as a model for their Islamic counterparts.

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Kara, İsmail (2013): “Yaltkaya, Mehmet Şerefettin”, in: Türkiye Diyânet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 43, Istanbul, 308–310. Karaman, Hayrettin (2005): “Fıkıhçı Olarak Aksekili Ahmed Hamdi Efendi”, in: Hüseyin Arslan and Mehmet Erdoğan (eds.): Ahmet Hamdi Akseki (Sempozyum), Ankara, 39–46. Karaman, Hayrettin (18.10.2015): “Niçin AK Parti’ye oy vermeli” (http:// www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/hayrettinkaraman/nicin-ak-partiye-oy-vermeli-2022462), accessed on 09.10.2016. Kelpetin, Hatice (2000): “İlmihâl”, in: Türkiye Diyânet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 22, Istanbul, 140–141. Koştaş, Münir (1999): “Ankara Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi (Dünü Bugünü)”, A. Ü. İFD, Özel Sayı (1999), 141–184. Küçük, Hülya (2002): The role of the Bektāshīs in Turkey’s national struggle – a historical and critical study, Leiden/Boston. Küfrevi, Kasım (1960): “Birgewi”, in: The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 1, Leiden/London, 1235. Kurnaz, Şefika (2013): “Milli Mücadelede Türk Kadını” (http:// www.atam.gov.tr/dergi/sayi-34/milli-mucadelede-turk-kadini), accessed on 09.10.2016. Kurtulmuş, Numan (1984): Yeni Âmentü Şerhi (Büyük İlmihal), 20th ed., Istanbul. Laut, Jens Peter (2000): “Zur Sicht des Islam in der Türkischen Republik bis zum Tode Atatürks”, in: Wolfgang Schluchter (ed.): Kolloquium des Max Weber Kollegs VI–XIV (1999/2000), Erfurt (http://www.freidok.uni-freiburg.de/vo lltexte/627/pdf/Ausgabe.pdf), accessed on 09.10.2016. Lewis, Bernard (1988): The Political Language of Islam, Chicago. Mardin, Şerif (1994): “The Nakşibendi Order in Turkish History”, in: Richard Tapper (ed.), Islam in Modern Turkey – Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State, London/New York, 121–144. Mardin, Şerif (2000): The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought – A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas, Syracuse. Miller, A. Ruth (2000): “The Ottoman and Islamic Substratum of Turkey’s Swiss Civil Code”. JIS 11: 3, 335–361. Nagel, Tilman (2008): Mohammed – Leben und Legende, München. Oral, Haluk (2009): “Çanakkale’den mektup var – Erzincanlı Hasan Çavuş ve 1915 yılında yaşanan gerçek bir kahramanlık hikâyesi”. NTV Tarih 7, 26–34. Özdenören, Rasim (2005): “Necip Fazıl Kısakürek”, in: Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.): Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, vol. 6: İslamcılık, 2nd ed., Istanbul, 126–146.

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Peters, Rudolph (2009): “Jihād”, in: Esposito, John (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, Oxford/New York, vol. 3, 252–256. Ranko, Annette (2015): The Muslim Brotherhood and its Quest for Hegemony in Egypt – State-Discourse and Islamist Counter-Discourse (Dissertation Hamburg University 2012), Wiesbaden. Riḍā, Rashīd (1324/1906): Kitāb al-muḥāwarāt al-muṣliḥ wa-l-muqallid: maqālāt nushirat fī l-mujallad al-thālith wa-l-rābiʿ min al-Manār, yalīhā fatāwā nushirat fī l-mujallad al-sādis minhu mawḍūʿuhā l-ijtihād wa-l-taqlīd wa-kulliyyāt al-dīn al-Islāmī, Kairo. Sarıbay, Ali Yaşar (2005): “Milli Nizam Partisi’nin Kuruluşu ve Programının İçeriği”, in: Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, vol. 6: İslamcılık, 2th ed., Istanbul, 576–590. Sarıkoyuncu, Ali (2007): Milli Mücadelede Din Adamları, vol. 1-2, 5th ed., Ankara 2007. Şeyhun, Ahmet (2015): Islamist Thinkers in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic, Leiden/Boston. Somel, Selçuk Akşin (2010): The A to Z of the Ottoman Empire, Lanham/ Toronto/ Plymouth. Sullivan, Dennis J. (updated by Kéchichian, Joseph A.) (2009): “Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt”, in: John Esposito (ed.): The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, vol. 4, Oxford/New York, 164. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, Cilt I, II. İntihâp Devresi, II. İçtimâ Senesi, (3 Mart 1340/1924), 17–81. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, II. İntihâp Devresi, II. İçtimâ Senesi, Cilt 14 (56. İçtimâ: 15 Şubât 1341; 65. İçtimâ: 26 Şubât 1341), 249–270. Tekin, Mustafa (2005): “Işıkçılar”, in: Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.): Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, vol. 6: İslamcılık, 2nd ed., Istanbul, 341– 344. Terzioğlu, Derin (2013): “Where ilmihâl meets catechism: Islamic manuals of religious instruction in the Ottoman Empire in the age of confessionalization”. Past and Present 220, 1–36. Tezcan, Levent (2003): Religiöse Strategien der „machbaren“ Gesellschaft – Verwaltete Religion und islamistische Utopie in der Türkei, Bielefeld. Tunaya, Tarık Zafer (1988): Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, Vol. II (Mütareke Dönemi 1918–1922), 2nd ed., Istanbul. Tyan, E. (1965): “Djihād”, in: The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, Vol. II, Leiden/London, 538–540. Uçar, Bülent (2005): Recht als Mittel zur Reform von Religion und Gesellschaft – Die türkische Debatte um die Scharia im 20. Jahrhundert, Würzburg.

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Unan, Fahri (2006): “Dinde Tasfiyecilik Yahut Osmanlı Sünnîliğine Sünnî Muhâlefet: Birgivî Mehmed Efendi” (http://yunus.hacettepe.edu.tr/~unan/ak ademik3.html), accessed on 09.10.2016. van Bruinessen, Maarten Martinus (1978): Agha, Shaikh and State: On the Social and Political Organization of Kurdistan, Utrecht. Wensinck, A.J. (2000): “Tarāwīḥ”, in: The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 10, Leiden, 222–223. Wilson, M. Brett (2014): Translating the Qur’an in an Age of Nationalism – Print Culture and Modern Islam in Turkey, London. Yaran, Rahmi (1992): “Bilmen, Ömer Nasuhi”, in: Türkiye Diyânet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 6, Istanbul, 162–163. Yavuz, M. Hakan (2003): Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, Oxford/New York. Yavuz, M. Hakan (2005): Millî Görüş Hareketi: “Muhalif ve Modernist Gelenek”, in: Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.): Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, vol. 6: İslamcılık, 2. ed., Istanbul, 591–603. Yavuz, Yusuf Şevki (1991): “Âmentü Şerhi”, in: Türkiye Diyânet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 3, Istanbul, 30. Yavuz, Yusuf Şevki (1991): “Âmentü”, in: Türkiye Diyânet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 3, Istanbul, 28–30. Yıldız, İlhan (2009): “Akseki, Ahmet Hamdi”, in: Esposito, John (ed.): The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, vol. 1, Oxford/New York, 97–100. Zarcone, Thierry (2004): La Turquie moderne et l’islam, Paris. Zürcher, Erik J. (2005): Turkey: A Modern History, 3rd ed., London. Zürcher, Erik J. (2010): The Young Turk Legacy – From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey, New York.

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A Kemalist Perception of Threat: Sèvres Syndrome in Contemporary Turkish Politics Başar Şirin

Introduction “We put into our pockets everything you reject today (…), but we will soon put them back one by one on the table” (İnönü 1998: 131). The statement of George Curzon, the British secretary of state for foreign affairs and the chief negotiator for the Allies during the Conference of Lausanne (1922–1923), is probably one of the most famous quotations from this conference that many Turks remember. As the chief negotiator of Turkey, İsmet İnönü, explains in his memoirs, these words were spoken by Curzon to show his discontent towards the intransigent attitude of the Turkish delegation during the negotiations. İnönü adds that Curzon asked him how Turkey could find the money needed to reconstruct the country if they rejected all the allies’ proposals. Also, he reminded İnönü that all these issues would be reassessed when Turkey came to Britain to borrow money (İnönü 1998). For some people, this quote is a clear indicator that the victorious countries, which could not complete disintegrating the motherland of Turks during the First World War, retain such ambitions even today. In fact, this belief is not a unique understanding for ordinary Turkish people. On the contrary, even the former state president of Turkey, Ahmet Necdet Sezer (2006), expressed Curzon’s words in one of his speeches as, “we noted what we have given, but we will take them back as soon as possible” in order to emphasise the role of economic independence for full political independence. As this small example also shows, the period of transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey is still a disputable issue in the eyes of many Turks. Even if it was ratified by neither the Ottoman Empire nor the new republic, the Sèvres Treaty, which was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the victorious Allied Powers of the First World War on 10th August 1920, plays a vital role in this development. Moreover, replacing that treaty with the more favorable Lausanne Treaty, which was signed just after the Turkish War of Independence on 24th July 1923, could not alter the widespread belief that imperialist Western countries are secretly plotting against Turkey to divide the country by any means necessary, as was once attempted with the Treaty of Sèvres. Seen from a historical perspective, both the Treaty of Sèvres and Lausanne connote a special meaning to many Turks. In fact, with the Lausanne Treaty, it https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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was designated by the Allied Powers that only 10 percent of the former Ottoman lands were left to the Turks. However, when it is compared with the Sèvres Treaty, which proposed 5 percent of the former imperial lands for Turks, one realises that in three years between 1920 and 1923, the Turks almost doubled the land left for them (Göçek 2011). Also, when the Armenian and Kurdish states in Anatolia, together with the loss of İzmir, Eastern Thrace, and southern Anatolia, are taken into consideration, it is more understandable how Turks perceived the Sèvres Treaty. Even though the new Republic was officially declared in 1923, neither a “Turkish nation” nor a “Turkish identity” existed in that time, as the Ottoman state administration, the millet system, was based on religious subdivision within society.1 Therefore, it was not so easy for the leaders of the new nation-state, particularly for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, to take these non-existent, hypothetical entities, fill them within a short period and present them as if they existed (Mardin 1981). For this purpose, two primary methods were accepted. First, religion was excluded from public life and seen entirely as a part of personal life. Second, all the different ethnicities in the country were unified under a supraidentity of “Turkishness.” In that sense, westernisation was the core theme for the formation of the new state, together with those two methods. As a pragmatist statesman, Atatürk thought that Western imperialism and Western civilisation were two different notions, and the only way to protect the country against the imperialist West was to bring the country to the level of Western civilisation. Therefore, all the westernisation attempts of the country were actually part of the fight against Western imperialism (Berkes 2002). Although the leaders of the new republic could realise most of their plans, they attempted to suppress or ignore some problems they inherited from the Ottoman Empire or some new challenges in order to protect their nation-state project. Among them, the denial policy of non-Turkish, Muslim ethnicities, especially of Kurdish identity, the acceptance of Armenian, Greek (Rum) and Jewish population of the republic as legal minorities,2 and the failure to exclude Islam from political life, might be seen as the most problematic heritage the

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The term “millet system” refers to the legal division of the religious groups in the Ottoman Empire until the Imperial Reform Edict of 1856, which proclaimed equality of all Muslim and non-Muslim populations. According to this system, every Muslim ethnicity in the empire such as Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians, Lazes are considered as a part of one Muslim “ruling community”. Besides, Armenian, Greek Orthodox and Jewish communities were accepted as non-Muslim millets and accordingly some legal privileges were granted to them (cf. Barkey and Gavrilis 2016; Braude 2014). Although in the Lausanne Treaty all non-Muslim population in Turkey obtained legal minority rights, in practice only those “big three communities” (Armenian, Greek, Jewish) were allowed to enjoy the guaranteed minority rights, such as establishing their own schools and foundations. Smaller Christian groups like Assyrians, Caldeans, Nestorians, etc. were excluded from those rights (cf. Oran 2007). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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early republican period Kemalists left to their successors, who always considered themselves the guardians of the secular Turkish nation-state. When they are considered together, the effects of both the Sèvres Treaty and the deficiencies in the state formation process on contemporary Turkish politics have become a disputable issue in academic literature starting in the 1990s. There is also a growing tendency among scholars to interpret some turning points in the history of Turkey through the lenses of the Sèvres Treaty or to associate every kind of xenophobia in society with the early republican period. In the most general sense, however, “Sèvres Syndrome” could be described as a widespread belief that “external enemies” of Turkey, with help from some “internal enemies” plot against Turkey to divide the country, as they once sought to do with the Treaty of Sèvres. Nevertheless, the historical background, emergence, and the usage of this syndrome vary depending on the context they are used in. Therefore, the following contribution aims to illuminate the concept of the Sèvres Syndrome by emphasising (i) the gradual decreasing political and social power of Kemalists after the 1980 military coup, (ii) the perception of the new threat objects as a reason for their losing power, and (iii) the transformation of these threat elements to a syndrome over the process of time.

Current Literature on the Sèvres Syndrome As a historical concept, it is not so easy to determine when the term “Sevres Syndrome” was used for the first time. However, the Sèvres Syndrome became somewhat popular among journalists from the mainstream Turkish media, especially during and after the 1991 First Gulf War, when the Kurdistan regional government was established in northern Iraq. This development was generally perceived in Turkey as the first step towards an independent Kurdish state in the region.3 Besides that, the academic literature also rapidly flourished after that time, and many scholars approached the issue in a wide variety of ways. Göçek (2011), for instance, makes one of the most comprehensive analyses of the Sèvres Syndrome and sees the transformation of the Sèvres Treaty into a syndrome from a long historical perspective. In her work “Why is there still a Sèvres Syndrome,” she argues that the feelings of despair the Turks experienced from losing an empire and the forced silence due to the lack of public discussion in the Ottoman Empire is the first factor that contributed this process. Also, after the War of Independence, building an entirely new nation without acknowledging the traumatic events in the past helped the transformation of the Sèvres Treaty into a national myth in the early republican period. As a result, the West became a monolithic entity that must be defended against, and 3

(Cf. Kohen 1991; Sazak 1992; Alpay 1996). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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some social groups and identities were basically excluded from the public and transformed into internal enemies. For her, throughout the history of Turkey, Kemalist elites have identified four main external enemies; Europe until the end of World War II, the Soviet Union, the United States during the Cold War, and, more recently, the European Union. Neighbouring countries were classified as the “local accomplices” of these external enemies. Besides that, the Greek, Armenian and Jewish minorities, Kurds and the Islamists were seen as internal enemies. The analysis of Islamist and secular press in Turkey is another significant contribution to the debate from Michelangelo Guida (2008). Similar to other contributions, he describes the Sèvres Syndrome as; “the form of an irrational fear that Western powers are bent on dismantling Turkey visà- vis the abortive Treaty of Sevres in 1920. This “insecurity complex” has been reinforced by other threats and dangers to Turkey’s national security in the intervening years, ranging from Stalin’s expansionist statements in the mid-1940s, to Armenian and Syrian irredentism, to the bilateral military cooperation of Greece and Syria, to the invasion of Iraq, and finally, to Turkey’s ostracism from the European Union. Going hand-in-hand with this enduring perception of threats from without are threats from within, most notably the Islamists who plot to demolish the secular state, but also the hardline secularists who plot to prevent Islamists from gaining power and popularity. There are also fears that Christian, Kurdish, or Armenian minorities are colluding with foreign powers to divide and destroy the country” (ibid.: 38).

As is seen, Guida approaches the issue in view of the whole history of the republic and regards the syndrome as applicable for both the Islamists and Kemalists in Turkey. From this aspect, the Pope, as the symbol of new crusaders to conquer Istanbul, the European Common Market, which is assessed as Zionistimperialist plot, or even attempts of the Hun empire Attila to conquer Rome and in response the imaginary revanchist feelings of the Europeans could all be considered as various fear objects under the Sèvres Syndrome. Turkish historian Taner Akçam’s contribution (2004) emphasises the ethnic and religious minorities in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, especially the Armenians. According to Akçam, in order to designate the country that they idealised, the new rulers of the Turkish republic created five taboos, which then became the major founding principles and “state dogmas” of the new state. These taboos are: “(i) Turkish society has no classes. We are a classless, unified society. (ii) There are no ethnic-cultural differences. All citizens are Turks. (iii) Turkey is a secular state. Islam and Islamic culture have been declared enemies. (iv) No massacre whatsoever was carried out and directed at the Armenians. (v) The armed forces are the guardians of these taboos, and the role of the armed forces within the state is a taboo subject” (ibid.: 24). He believes that when the threat towards the integrity of the country changes, the elites also transform their security concept through the official instruments such as National Policy

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Documents or the decisions National Security Council. Thus, the syndrome continues to be useful in Turkish politics. Ali Tekin (2007), similarly, sees the main founding principles of Turkey as the primary reason for the syndrome. The Republican elites, according to him, wanted to create a secular and ethnically homogenous nation-state and so that denied all minority rights of non-Turkish Muslim communities, mainly Kurds, and traditional Islamic cultural values during the nation-state building process. However, as these questions became part of Turkey’s Europeanisation process in the late 1980s, the Kemalist elites created a highly anti-Europeanisation stance as a continuation of the Sèvres Syndrome, which was inherited from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Nonetheless, Tekin rejects the idea that Turkey’s security policy was formed under the influence of such a phobia. On the contrary, Turkey has always been enthusiastically bound to Western organisations, as is seen during the NATO membership process in the 1950s or more recently through Turkey’s willingness to join Western military instruments such as the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) or the decision-making procedures of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Baskın Oran (2013) is, without a doubt one of the most significant contributors not only to the Sèvres Syndrome but also to the Kemalism debate in a broader sense. For him, this syndrome is the result of a two-sided panic reaction by the contemporary Kemalists. On the one hand, the outbreak of the republic’s unresolved long-term questions, such as the Kurdish, Armenian, Islam, and Cyprus issues, and on the other hand, the loss of privileges in the state administration forced Kemalists to take action against these developments. Correspondingly, globalisation, the Kurdish movement, democratisation, and political Islam were designated as the principal enemy objects and in ultimately these enemies altogether turned to a paranoia, which was based on three significant slogans of Kemalists: “Kurds and the Western imperialists will divide Turkey”, “Islamists will force our daughters to cover their heads” and “people are keeping on voting for wrong people, so only the army can protect secular order” (ibid.: 74). Danish political scientist Dietrich Jung (2003) contributed to the discussion in the early 2000s. He describes the Sèvres Syndrome as “the perception of being encircled by enemies attempting the destruction of the Turkish state” (ibid.: 1) and sees the roots of this belief in the period of Ottoman modernisation efforts in the 19th century and the Kemalist reforms after the founding of the republic. For him, because both these reform processes were initiated and protected by the military-bureaucratic elite, the governmental institutions they created also represent an authoritarian state tradition. Correspondingly, when this privileged position of the Kemalist elites is challenged by different political actors, this syndrome emerges with the foundational myth of the republic, which mainly includes betrayal and conspiracy allegations towards domestic actors,

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like ethnic and religious minorities or external forces. Unlike Oran, however, Jung evaluates this phenomenon from a more historical perspective. While he accepts the rising of the syndrome in the 1990s as a reaction to Kurdish and Islamist movements, he argues that earlier foreign policy decisions of the country have been severely affected by the Kemalist tradition, as was experienced for example during the Jupiter missile crises in 1960s or the Turkish army’s intervention in Cyprus in the 1970s. As is seen, while some scholars embrace a broader historical and actor-based approach for explaining the Sèvres Syndrome, others see the issue as concerning a more limited period and fewer social and political actors. As mentioned previously, this contribution examines the syndrome as a more contemporary political concept, which started to emerge gradually during the 1980s and reached its peak during the 2000s. In order to understand this development, the following section will make an actor-based analysis and show the transformation of Kemalism and Kemalist groups in politics through the four decades after the September 12, 1980 military coup d'état in Turkey.

Evolution of Kemalism after 1980 Like many other political, social, and economic notions in Turkey, Kemalism, the founding ideology of the modern Turkish republic, experienced a significant transformation just after the 1980 military coup. In fact, Kemalism has been discussed for a long time from various historical perspectives such as its political and social roots (cf. Kili 1967), main principles (cf. Karal 1981), influences on various early-republican intellectuals (cf. Türkeş 1998) and more recently the role in the contemporary Turkey (cf. Dağı 2012; Cizre and Çınar 2003; Oran 2001). At the same time, effects of Kemalism on Turkish foreign policy also became a quite popular topic in current academic literature (cf. Robins 2007; Fuller 2008; Kösebalaban 2011). On the other hand, the post-coup period necessitated a redefinition of Kemalism as a whole. When the military cadre of the 1980 coup, led by Chief of the Turkish General Staff and then President of Turkey Kenan Evren, initiated the coup, they actively used Atatürk and the principles of Atatürkism4 as fundamental rules of this new military regime. In that sense, the junta regime or so-called “National Security Council” blamed the “reactionary and other perverted ideologies” for pulling the country into a civil war, instead of embracing Atatürkism (Heper 1984). One crucial point to remark upon here is that the intentional and constant usage of the word “Atatürkism” together with the “Atatürkist Thought System” rather than “Ke4

The word “Atatürkism” is translated from the Turkish word “Atatürkçülük.” As the word “Atatürkçülük” does not contain the suffix “-izm” (-ism in English), it has a less ideological image, when compared to the word “Kemalizm.” https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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malism” shows that the junta proposes Atatürkism as a neutral and supra-ideological method, which at the same time makes all other ideologies unnecessary (Bora 2017). As a direct action against the extreme politicised and polarised Turkish society during the late 1970s, the exclusion of Kemalism from social and political life and popularising it with an ideologically hollow concept, however, was not welcomed by leftist/secularist Kemalist intellectuals. For Kemalist thinkers, the image of going hand in hand with the military junta under the large umbrella of Atatürkism was an undesirable result. Ultimately, this military intervention was not a Kemalist one, and in addition to many different political groups, Kemalist intellectuals, academics, and opinion leaders also suffered from this new oppressive regime. Even though rapidly growing Islamist and Kurdish movements prevented the deepening of the cleavage between the army and these Kemalists, two major developments after the coup made it harder to be gathered under one unified Kemalist/Atatürkist camp. Firstly, after the coup, the separatist movement in Turkey, namely the rapidly growing Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), was perceived as the most significant threat to the military junta. In that sense, especially with the effects of Cold War, all leftist-communist groups were heavily suppressed during this period. Furthermore, not only did General Evren support the rising Islamist movement against the separatist movements under the “Turkish-Islam synthesis” concept, but also a political figure from the Islamist movement, Turgut Özal, was directly appointed as deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs and state minister. Secondly, the Özal decision at the same time meant that the generals actually wanted to promote the neo-liberal economic system, unlike the anti-imperialist, leftist Kemalists (Taşkın 2004). As a candidate of the Islamist National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) in the 1977 parliamentary election, Özal did not manage to be elected as a member of parliament. However, his long-term experience in the state bureaucracy, rather liberal personal life and the Kurdish roots from his mother’s side made him a perfect candidate for the new regime. In fact, the whole economic liberalisation process was initiated and carried out in the country with the help of Özal as state minister, then prime minister and state president. The 1990s were a significant turning point for Kemalists as the first initiatives towards a “neo-Kemalism” emerged in that period. On the one hand, the army succeeded in keeping its power and intervened in politics whenever they felt it was needed. On the other hand, some civilian Kemalist initiatives had gained power in that period on the core idea that the state and the social democratic parties, specifically the Republican’s People Party (CHP) and Bülent Ecevit’s Democratic Leftist Party (DSP), were insufficient to fight against Islamist movements. Moreover, weakening the Kemalist dominance in the state bureaucracy through Özal’s spoils system triggered civilian initiatives as an actor in a new societal struggle (Erdoğan 2004). Among them, two NGOs, the Atatürkist

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Thought Association (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği-ADD) and Association for the Support of Contemporary Living (Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme DerneğiÇYDD) took the leading role over the Kemalist groups. Nevertheless, the main difference between these two organisations is that while the ADD kept their close relations with the army through former military commanders, who joined the organisation after their retirements, the ÇYDD tried to keep their distance from the army and followed a more civilian struggle, especially in universities.5 At first sight, the “official” Kemalism of the 1920s and this newly emerging neo-Kemalist understanding resemble each other in the sense that both aim at gathering consent from society in order to establish their own hegemony over all state apparatus. Nevertheless, unlike official Kemalism, neo-Kemalism has retained strong anti-imperialist and national independence notions, which rose dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s with the influence of socialist-leftist ideologies.6 Concerning that, positioning itself on a “third worldist” and sometimes “Eurasianist” line, embracing strict statism against liberalism and opposing concepts such as globalism, new world order, or institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were all distinctive characteristics of neo-Kemalism (Erdoğan 2004). With all that, these old-fashioned political stances also implied that as the Kemalists continued to lose ground in the state administration and the seemingly untouchable power of the Kemalists was severely challenged by new political actors, Kemalists embraced more and more non-progressive, reactionary policies and methods to keep their power. In parallel with these developments, therefore, it is not a coincidence that the Sèvres Syndrome became quite obvious starting from the early 1990s. Although the neo-Kemalist groups formed their civil organisations and were fairly active, especially on issues such as the headscarf ban in universities and the public sector or increasing nationalist propaganda in the mainstream media, the 2000s became a total disaster for neo-Kemalists regarding their attempts to create a hegemony over society. In that sense, another Islamist party’s coming to power with the 2002 election, in which the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) gathered almost 35 percent of the popular votes, was the first shock for the Kemalists. As this party was formed with the Islamist cadres from the National Outlook (Milli Görüş) movement of Necmet-

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Four of previous heads of the ADD were former military members, including Şener Eruygur, who was General Commander of the Gendarmerie of Turkey from 2002 to 2004 then the main defendant of Ergenekon (an alleged secret, secularist ultra-nationalist organisation that aims to overthrow the AKP government with the help of various secret elements in the Turkish army, police forces, state bureaucracy, some political parties, nongovernmental organisations and media groups) trials. The leftist interpretation of Kemalism came up the first time by the intellectuals around the “Kadro” journal in the 1930s. The second attempt was initiated by prominent leftist intellectuals such as Doğan Avcıoğlu, İlhan Selçuk, Mümtaz Soysal and Sadun Aren in the “Yön” journal (cf. Altun 2010; Ulus 2010). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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tin Erbakan, the AKP was immediately perceived as another Islamist party trying to subvert the secular order. Moreover, the growing support for the AKP from global actors as well as different political groups within society, such as EU supporters, former centre-right politicians or liberal intellectuals, corroborated the Kemalists’ belief that the AKP was actually an international project, which was planned by global imperialist powers to expel Kemalists from state administration and to control the country through their domestic collaborators. The reaction of the Kemalists to the solid victory of the AKP in the election was indeed very traumatic. They felt that in addition to the contemporary Kemalist groups and ideas, actually the legacy and entire body of achievements of the Kemalist revolution were under attack by different internal and external actors. On the other side, this feel of encirclement caused deep pessimism and despair in that group.7 As this was also case in the 1990s, the rapidly growing fear also contributed to the appearance of the Sèvres Syndrome in Kemalist groups in that period. The continuing disappointments in the 2000s such as AKP’s having 46,58 percent of the popular votes in the 2007 general election despite the massive protest meetings organised by leading Kemalist actors against the AKP government were followed by the election of Abdullah Gül, whose wife wears a headscarf, as the state president. Moreover, the unsuccessful closure trial of the AKP in 2008 fueled feelings of despair in those groups. In addition to that, the deKemalisation process of the state apparatus with the 2010 constitutional referendum, which brought some significant changes in the higher judicial bodies including the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), and the following high-profile trials; namely, Ergenekon, Balyoz (Sledgehammer), Poyrazköy and Military Spying, against hundreds of military officials and Kemalist intellectuals, journalists and academics for staging a coup against the AKP government broke the remaining power of Kemalist elites within the society, together with the higher judiciary and the Turkish army. A surprise development in the Turkish politics during the late 2010s, the resignation of the leader of the CHP, Deniz Baykal, after the leak of a video of his extramarital relationship with another CHP member, was another blow to the Kemalists, as newly elected party leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu initially adopted more social-democratic values for the party. Also, he concentrated on the secularism issue much less than his predecessor and promised a new way to solve the Kurdish question democratically (cf. Celep 2010; Ciddi and Esen 2014). Moreover, the replacement of neo-Kemalist members in the party administration with new political actors from various ideological backgrounds not only 7

In that period, the “İleri” journal became an important discussion arena for the prominent Kemalist intellectuals, such as Attila İlhan, Erol Manisalı, Gökçe Fırat, Yekta Güngör Özden, etc. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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diminished the neo-Kemalist influence in the party but also sparked a debate about whether there was an international plot to redesign the CHP (Özlü 2014). In that sense, the appointment of Mehmet Bekaroğlu, a prominent political figure from the Islamist movement, and Sezgin Tanrıkulu, a Kurdish human-right activist, and lawyer, as vice-chairperson of the party was intensively criticised by neo-Kemalist politicians and intellectuals. All these political and social developments resulted in the rapid weakening of Kemalist ideas both in state apparatus and society and started a new period in Turkish politics, a post-Kemalist era. As a reaction, however, the neo-Kemalist groups had to transform themselves one more time. Also, this transformation caused a split within the neo-Kemalist groups. One the one hand, the socalled ulusalcı (nationalitarian) groups, still retain their anti-imperialist and national independence notions against the neo-liberal world order. Although regarding its active members and supporters in society the number of these neoKemalists is continuously decreasing, thanks to their on-going fear objects, they are certainly the major actors using the Sèvres Syndrome as the vital element of their contemporary politics. Nevertheless, unlike the more serious and staider stance of the older Kemalist intellectuals, the changing form of the language is probably one of the most distinctive features of this new generation of Kemalists. Because both the printed and visual media is right now the only way to express their ideas, the neo-Kemalists have a very aggressive journalist-broadcaster language, which also uses persuasive nationalist and populist discourses (Bora 2017). As one of the most circulated newspapers in Turkey, Sözcü (The Spokesman) and the provocative stance of newspaper’s prominent writers such as Soner Yalçın and Yekta Güngör Özden play without a doubt a very crucial role in mobilising the Kemalist social groups. On the other hand, there is also growing “pop” or “post-ideological” Kemalism in Turkey, which in essence does not have any systematically-created philosophical background. Instead, it is constructed around the principle of “defending secular, modern and democratic Turkey” (Erdoğan 2014). While, the “civilian” image of Kemalism remains in the forefront of this idea, Atatürk, as the leader figure, is mostly presented as “typical middle-class secular Turk, often enjoying or participating in regular, daily activities dressed in Western leisurewear” (Furman and Sungu 2011: 316). In that sense, the most distinctive feature of pop-Kemalism is its perception of globalisation and the Western world. Unlike ulusalcı Kemalists, pop-Kemalists see neo-liberal economic order and Western world from a quite positive perspective. Moreover, except for the “Turkish-Islam synthesis” of Evren, pop-Kemalism has many similarities with the Atatürkism of the 1980 coup as well. Most notably, these people prefer to call themselves “Atatürkist” rather than “Kemalist” because of the intense ideological connotations that the word “Kemalist” has. However, they are still prone to be

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the object of the Sèvres Syndrome, especially when one of the fear elements becomes a critical issue on the political agenda.

The Elements of Sèvres Syndrome in Contemporary Turkish Politics Although there is a relatively clear ideological cleavage among today’s Kemalist groups in society, quite large numbers of people could be mobilised against both internal and external enemies of the state when it comes to the Sèvres Syndrome. Also, the priority of a threat quickly changes according to time and political developments. Nevertheless, one crucial issue about xenophobia in Turkish politics should be noted at this point. As mentioned above, some scholars, which deal with the syndrome, tend to approach issue from a holistic point of view. In other words, they consider every xenophobic idea in Turkish politics as an element of Sèvres Syndrome. However, regardless of being right-wing or left-wing, xenophobia is a common characteristic of populist political movements in Turkey and therefore, for both Kemalist nationalists, Turkist/Turanist nationalists and Islamists, the image of “others” has always played a crucial role in their world views (Bora 2003). In fact, this trend is not unique to Turkey. On the contrary, notions like populism, ethnocentrism, racial intolerance or xenophobia can be seen today anywhere in the world. Therefore, this fact should be taken into consideration when analysing the main threat objects of the Sèvres Syndrome, especially the AKP, which has ruled the country since 2002 and nowadays represents almost 50 percent of the voters in Turkey but is still accepted as an internal threat by Kemalists.

The West “The West,” as a major threat to the Turkish state, has always been a fancied concept in Turkish politics, and it has been used when someone is needed to blame for any political, social, or economic incident in Turkey. In fact, as already mentioned, some scholars approach the concept from different threat perceptions. However, especially in contemporary Turkish politics, “the West” seems more of a monolithic entity that includes various countries and political actors. Without a doubt, the United States is the principal actor of this western camp, and especially for anti-imperialist Kemalists it is the primary evil country that always tries to shape Turkey and Turkish politics according to its own interests. This trend is relatively evident in the eyes of the former Kemalist higher military officials, most of whom were either sentenced to very long prison sentences or forced to retire from their positions during the Ergenekon, Balyoz (Sledgehammer) and Poyrazköy trials. Among them, for instance, the former

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admiral, Balyoz prisoner, and then parliamentary candidate from the neo-Kemalist Patriotic Party (Vatan Partisi), Semih Çetin (2013) sees the trial process as a plot of “global imperial powers” that intended to hinder technological advancements in the Turkish military. For him, these improvements made the Turkish army less dependent on the Western armament manufacturers and let the naval forces act effectively without the permission of the “so-called ally” of Turkey, the United States. In addition to the United States, many European states are accepted as a vital part of these Western enemies. In line with that, a very powerful Kemalist reaction in the 2000s emerged against the massive reform process to harmonise Turkish law with the European Union. As Oran also showed, Kemalist elites’ concerns that with the EU process they would lose their powers to the EU institutions demonstrated a perfect example of the Sèvres Syndrome in that period (Oran 2004). As retired deputy chief of the General Staff, four-star General Ergin Saygun (2012), explains in his book “The Sledgehammer to the Turkish army” the whole EU accession process as a process of “dreams and disappointments” with the critique that joining the European Union basically means sharing sovereignty. However, because the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU are currently almost stopped, the appearance of the EU as a source of threat has also decreased in contemporary politics. Instead of this, some European states are accepted time to time as a threat. Among them, Germany is perceived as a country that tries to intervene in the domestic politics of Turkey. Especially the political foundations of the German parties, such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (close to the Christian Democratic Party), Friedrich Ebert Foundation (close to the Social Democratic Party) or Heinrich Böll Foundation (close to the Green Party) has been seen as actors that actively support ethnic and religious minorities or a federal system in Turkey (Savaş 2000: 63). While carrying out its plans, different international organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) play a very crucial role for the West. One of the most vigorous advocates of this anti-imperialist, anti-Western stance, Doğu Perinçek should also be mentioned in this context. As mentioned above, the close relationship between the Turkish army and the Perinçek’s Patriotic Party (named the Worker Party until 2015) makes the party and Perinçek important actors in contemporary Turkish politics. For Perinçek (2013), the counter-revolution against the Kemalist revolution started with the Americanist 1980 coup, and the integration with the global economic system undermined the national economy. Furthermore, with the emerging power of the AKP in line with the Greater Middle East Project (explained in the next part) the Kemalist revolution was ruined. Besides, during the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, the “soldiers of Kemal” were suppressed, the revolution of Atatürk was wiped away in the state bureaucracy, the de-facto separation of Turkey

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deepened, and the enlargement project of Barzanistan8 towards Diyarbakır and the Mediterranean Sea was conducted.

Political Islamists The Islamist political movement in Turkey was not only one of the essential factors in the transformation of the Kemalism over the last three decades, but it is also still a very effective factor that triggers Sèvres Syndrome. Although the first organised Islamist political movement, National Outlook (Milli Görüş), was founded in the late 1960s and then joined several coalition governments as smaller partner, their rapid rise in Turkish politics started with the surprisingly high results of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan in the 1994 local elections. In this election, the Welfare Party gained 6 of 15 metropolitan municipalities, including the biggest metropolitan municipality Istanbul (won by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) and the capital Ankara. Moreover, in the following year, the party won the general election with 21,38 percent of the popular votes, and the party leader Necmettin Erbakan became prime minister. As an immediate response, the Welfare Party was first forced to leave the government after the Turkish military memorandum of 28 February 1997 (cf. Cizre and Çınar: 2003) and then closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1998. Nevertheless, the successor party to the movement, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi), repeated their success in the 1999 local elections by winning in Istanbul and Ankara once again. After two years, however, the Constitutional Court this time banned the Virtue Party. In addition to the periodic interventions of the Turkish army, members of the higher judiciary bodies also acted as the primary defenders of Kemalist ideas against the rise of political Islam in those years. For instance, in his famous book “Militant Democracy,” former Chief Public Prosecutor Vural Savaş (2000), who was also the prosecutor for both the Virtue and Welfare Party trials, openly calls people for a fight against religious backwardness and separatism, as these ideas could not be simply tolerated on behalf of freedom of opinion and expression. Despite these many judicial and military actions, however, the AKP emerged as a new political party coming initially from the National Outlook Movement, but unlike its successor held a very positive stance towards the Western countries and organisations such as NATO and the EU. The great disappointment of the Kemalists after the AKP’s enormous success in the 2002 parliamentary election as a first-party, and with the help of 10 percent election threshold gaining 8

Perinçek refers with Barzanistan the Iraqi Kurdistan Region by naming Masoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq since 2005. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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363 of 550 total seats in the parliament gave rise to once again fearful propaganda, like in 1990s. Another leading higher judiciary member Yekta Güngör Özden (2008), who was the president of the Constitutional Court (1991–1998) and after his retirement president of Atatürkist Thought Association (1998–2000) and columnist for Sözcü newspaper, suggests an Atatürkist struggle against the political Islam for full independence of Turkey. For him, the AKP’s growing anti-Atatürk and anti-Republic stances were underpinned by imperialist powers, who exploit notions like democracy and human rights in order to achieve what they could not succeed with the Sèvres Treaty. The other contemporary Kemalist thesis against the AKP is the leading role of the AKP for the “Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative” or with the publicly known name “Greater Middle East Project” of the United States. As proposed for the first time during the 2004 G8 Summit in Sea Island, the principal aim of this project was “to stem the threats of political instability, economic stagnation, and terrorism in the Greater Middle East” (Kirton et al. 2005: 11). However, Kemalists perceived this concept as an international project to transform traditional Kemalist policies both internally and externally. Internally, on the one hand, Turkey should first abandon all the Kemalist policies and instead embrace a moderate Islam as a role model for the Middle Eastern countries. Externally, on the other hand, the central foreign policy principle of Kemalism, “Peace at home, peace in the world” should be replaced with an interventionist foreign policy. Mainly the Turkish army should act as a medium of NATO (Yalçın 2009). Similarly, according to prominent neo-Kemalist intellectual Gökçe Fırat Çulhaoğlu (2006), who is the editor of Kemalist journals Türksolu and İleri and the leader of National Party (Ulusal Parti), AKP’s being put into power by the US aimed to divide nationalist and anti-imperialist Turkey with ethnic and religious separation plans. As noted earlier, after a “tape conspiracy” against Deniz Baykal, the change in the leadership position of the CHP, which was a safe haven for the Kemalists through the whole 2000s, was perceived as a part of that plan by removing the anti-imperialist cadres from politics.

Kurds The armed conflict between Turkey and the PKK or with a widely known name “the Kurdish question in Turkey” is, without a doubt, one of the most vital political and social issues in the history of modern Turkey. From a historical perspective, the ignorance and denial of the Kurdish identity both in social and political life was a fundamental principle of the Kemalist nation-state building project, and this attitude towards the Kurdish issue had continued for a long time. Nevertheless, as it is exemplified above through various political develop-

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ments, after the military coup in the 1980s, this question experienced a turning point that has also altered Turkish politics fundamentally. At the first stage, as Yavuz (2007) describes, the “PKK-led violent insurgency period” from 1983 until the late 1990s led to the pursuit of an extraordinary security policy in southeastern Anatolia by establishing the Regional State of Emergency Governorate in 1983. Moreover, the emergence of ultra-rightist paramilitary groups and religious fanatics to fight against the PKK severely corroded the rule of law in the region. Although the State of Emergency was lifted by the first AKP government under Abdullah Gül, just two days after obtaining a vote of confidence in the parliament on 30 November 2002, strong adverse reactions against any initiative to solve the problem in a peaceful way strictly continued in the 2000s and 2010s. The first initiative towards solving the problem was actually promoted by the European Union after the recognition of Turkey as a candidate during the 1999 Helsinki Summit. This development was then followed by the abolishment of the death penalty, which spared the life of the captured PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, lifting the ban on the use of the Kurdish language, allowing the teaching of Kurdish in private institutions and starting Kurdish broadcasting on state TV channels. Not surprisingly, these rapid changes were not welcomed by the Kemalist bureaucracy. Besides, the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government after the Iraq War and the end of the unilateral ceasefire of the PKK triggered a massive wave of nationalist reactions in the early 2000s. Kemalists were convinced in this period that the Kurds in Turkey intended to separate a Kurdish region from Turkey, as was the case in Northern Iraq (Yeğen 2011). The second and more important initiative towards the solution of the Kurdish question was the so-called “Kurdish Opening” or “Resolution Process” between the AKP government and the major actors of the Kurdish movement in Turkey; Abdullah Öcalan, the Qandil Group and the People’s Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi – HDP). Though the process was officially announced in 2013, the meetings between the sides traced back to 2009, and one of the most critical turning points in this period, the Habur incident, could easily be evaluated from the perspective of Sèvres Syndrome. In September 2009, following Öcalan’s instructions to help the advancement of the process, 8 PKK militants from Qandil camp and 26 Kurdish refugees from Makhmour Refugee Camp in Iraq came to Turkey through the Habur Border Gate between Turkey and Iraq. However, their release after a rapid interrogation at the border and the massive celebrations in the region, during which the crowd chanted in favor of Öcalan were purposefully depicted by some media institutions as a “victory for PKK.” Also, the events were widely perceived as a starting point for the series of developments that will one by one break up the national unity of Turkey (Kardaş and Balcı 2016).

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Similarly, as the Resolution Process moves along, the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) emerged as another threat object. Especially increasing votes in the western cities of Turkey and the growing appearance of the party in the mainstream media turned the HDP into a target for Kemalists. According to Yalçın (2015), for example, the whole HDP project is actually a project of autonomy for Kurds and becoming the state president for Erdoğan. The real power behind the project is, nevertheless, the United States, which abuses different social groups in the society including Alevi and socialist citizens. Also more recently, after the failure of the resolution process, the lifting of the parliamentary immunity for the HDP deputies, most of whom were charged with being affiliated with the PKK, was substantially supported by the Kemalist groups.

Neighbouring Countries and Religious Minorities The proverb that “Turkey is surrounded on three sides by the sea and four sides by the enemies” has been for a long time a common expression in order to show the secret plans of Turkey’s neighbours against the “indivisible unity of the country.” The “National Security Studies” course taught in Turkish high schools until 2012 was probably one of the clearest examples of this understanding. As a course that was taught by an actual military official such as majors or colonels of the Turkish army, “The Games Played over Turkey” part of the course consists of information about the all neighbouring countries, which were shown as enemies of Turkey. Among them, for instance, while Greece and Armenia were emphasised by their historical goals over the Anatolia respectively “Megali Idea” (Great Ideal) of Greece and Greater Armenia, Syria’s ambitions to acquire the Hatay province of Turkey and Iran’s intentions to create a theocratic regime in Turkey were discussed in that course. Moreover, it was always argued that there are some “divisive elements” in the country, who claim themselves as part of a different race or ethnic identity (Altınay 2004). In that sense, non-Muslim minorities of Turkey; especially Jews, Armenians, and Greeks, have also become the subject of the Sèvres Syndrome from time to time. Even though it has always been a popular topic for Islamist and right-wing intellectuals, conspiracy theories about a Crypto-Judaic society (Dönme or Sabetaycı in Turkish) were brought into question by left-wing Kemalist intellectuals in the 1990s and 2000s. For them, the secret organisation of Crypto-Judaic groups in society not only plots against the Turkish state in the name of foreign countries but also degenerates Turkish culture to destabilise the nation (Nefes 2015). Soner Yalçın’s famous book Efendi (Master) and Yalçın Küçük’s series of books, such as Şebeke: Network or Tekelistan, were frequently referred to throughout the 2000s. Even today, some important politicians, businesspeople or journalists are still classified by those groups as members of this

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secret organisation. A similar fear of the Greek minority in Istanbul, on the other hand, concentrates mostly on the Eastern Orthodox Church in Istanbul, namely, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. There is a widespread rumor about the purchasing of the landed estate in the Fener district of Istanbul, in which the church is located, in order to create an independent land like the Vatican in Rome (Oran 2003). Another hugely discussed topic of the National Security courses was the recognition of the Armenian Genocide issue. Formalised as the “3T Plan of Armenians”, the issue was perceived as a threestep process of right claiming with Tanıma, Tazminat, Toprak (Recognition, Compensation, Land). In this regard, especially the 100th anniversary of the incidents was considered a very serious turning point in this plan. More recently, Doğu Perinçek’s conviction in Switzerland for “publicly denying of the Armenian Genocide” and following the Perinçek v. Switzerland trial in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was responded to very positively. In this case, the ECHR (2015) decided in favor of Perinçek against Switzerland that it is freedom of speech to publicly express that the mass deportations and massacres suffered by the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 and the following years did not amount to genocide. Even though the court emphasised that it was not required and duty of the court to determine whether the events were genocide or not, Kemalist newspapers like Aydınlık and Sözcü interpreted this decision as the “great victory of Perinçek” or “approval by universal law that genocide is an international lie” (cf. Özdil 2015; Çakır 2016).

Conclusion As the central ideology behind the Turkish nation-state building process, Kemalism beyond doubt played a vital role in Turkish politics and society for many years. In fact, the leading military-bureaucratic cadre of the early republican period, who also initiated the Ottoman modernisation efforts during the last decades of the empire, saw themselves as the indisputable protectors of the new nation-state project. Nevertheless, maintaining this duty became harder and harder as the Kemalist parties began to lose ground in society, and oppressed or neglected problems of the nation-building process gradually arose one by one. While the Republican elites tried to retain their power over the state apparatus through the army, higher judiciary, and the media for a while, they used those long-lasting problems of the republic as fear elements, namely, the imperialist West, Islamists, Kurds, neighbouring countries and religious minorities by hoping that the society could be kept under their control. Nevertheless, these expectations were turned down. Even worse, this feeling of threat transformed into a syndrome over the course events.

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In fact, it is not so easy to determine when exactly the Kemalists perceived such fear objects for the first time. What is evident, however, is that after the 1980 coup, the process of “de-Kemalisation” has gained signification momentum, and the more Kemalists lost authority over the society, the more visible the Sèvres Syndrome became. Today, in so-called post-Kemalist Turkey, the ability or power of the Kemalists to affect Turkish politics is quite limited. Current Kemalist parties become smaller day by day, and even the founding party of Turkey, the Republican’s People Party, tries to follow rather modern social democratic policies, even if some fundamental Kemalist notions are still contained within the party. After a series of trials and legislative regulations, the Kemalist power over the army and higher judiciary has severely deteriorated. On the other hand, despite the increasing pressure on it, a small portion of the mainstream media provides an area for Kemalist ideas, and they use this opportunity in effective and provocative ways. Also, the long-lasting deficiencies of the republic are still alive. Therefore, as long as these problems remain unresolved and the Kemalists manage to defend their positions one way or another, it is expected that the Sèvres Syndrome will maintain its role in Turkish society and politics.

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Robins, Philip (2007): “Turkish foreign policy since 2002: between a ‘post‐Islamist’government and a Kemalist state”, International Affairs, 83(2), 289– 304. Savaş, Vural (2000): İrtica ve bölücülüğe karşı militan demokrasi, Istanbul. Saygun, Ergun (2012): Türk ordusuna balyoz, Istanbul. Sazak, Derya (13.10.1992): “Kürt Fobisi ve Özal”, in: Milliyet. Sezer, Ahmet Necdet (2006): “Atatürk’ü Anma Toplantısı” in Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, available, in: http://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusma lari-ahmet-necdet-sezer/1721/7802/ataturku-anma-toplantisi.html, accessed on 23.12.2016. Taşkın, Yüksel (2004): “12 Eylül Atatürkçülüğü ya da Bir Kemalist Restorasyon Teşebbüsü Olarak 12 Eylül”, in: Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds), Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, vol. 2, Kemalizm, Istanbul, 570–583. Tekin, Ali (2007): “Sharing Sovereignty: Turkey’s Sovereignty Culture and the EU Accession”, Paper Presented at ECPR Standing Group on International Relations, Sixth Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Turin. Türkeş, Mustafa (1998): “The ideology of the Kadro [cadre] movement: a patriotic leftist movement in Turkey”, Middle Eastern Studies, 34(4), 92–119. Ulus, Özgür Mutlu (2010): The army and the radical left in Turkey: military coups, socialist revolution and Kemalism, London/New York. Yalçın, Soner (22.11.2009): “Bu da siyasi dejavu”, in: Hürriyet, http:// www.hurriyet.com.tr/bu-da-siyasi-dejavu-13010782, accessed on 18.12.2017. Yalçın, Soner (24.03.2015): “Yetmez ama HDP”, in: Sözcü, http:// www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/yazarlar/soner-yalcin/yetmez-ama-hdp-781564/, accessed on 18.12.2017. Yavuz, Hakan M. (2001): “Five stages of the construction of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 7(3), 1–24. Yeğen, Mesut (2010): “The Kurdish Question in Turkey”, in: Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden (eds.), Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism, and the Kurdish Issue, Oxfordshire/New York.

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Atatürk’s unfinished revolution – The Turkish student movement and left-wing Kemalism in the 1960s Berna Pekesen

Introduction As in many countries around the globe, Turkey in the 1960s witnessed increasing political student activism, which reached its peak by the end of the decade. Like their peers in Western societies, Turkish student unions organised sit-ins, marches and huge demonstrations not only for the rights of students, but also against US-imperialism, colonialism and NATO’s presence in Turkey, as well. The Vietnam War and Cuba’s successful revolution had fired the imagination of an entire generation throughout the world. Anti-Americanism, liberation and revolution became the watchwords of the “red decade”. Solidarity with the liberation movements in the colonial world – so-called “Third Worldism” – triggered a wide range of leftist movements across the world – including Turkey. In Turkey, however, the national hero Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was as popular as the revolutionary icons Che Guevara, Fidel Castro or Ho-Chi-Minh. From the perspective of most of the left-wing currents of today’s Turkey, Kemalism is certainly viewed as an obvious case of “fascism”. During the 1960s, however, when left-wing ideologies and activism became popular among the Turkish intelligentsia (and university students), Atatürk and his doctrine, Atatürkçülük in the left-wing dictum, were rather perceived as a pioneering antiimperialist movement of the “Third World”1. This view was supplied, amongst others, by Lenin’s early comments on “Turkey’s war of liberation”, which Lenin conceived as a progressive and anti-imperialist struggle worthy of support from the Soviet Union. Hence, his admirers in Turkey declared Atatürkçülük a pioneering model for all suppressed nations around the world, and thus, compatible with the world-wide heightened anti-imperialist discourse of this time. However, when Turkish leftist youth of the late 1950s and early 1960s protested against the then ruling Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti – DP), demanded academic freedom and more public schools, they were arguably not asserting a change of the “system”, but on the contrary, they called for the restau1

For a critical view of the construction of the “Third World” see Escobar, A. (1995): Encountering Development. The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton, NJ; and Mason, M. G. (1997): Development and Disorder. A History of the Third World since 1945, Hanover NH. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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ration of the Kemalist values, which was in their eyes betrayed by the DP Government. Even during and aftermath of the climax of the “1968 revolt”2, when Turkish protesters had discovered other revolutionary role models than Atatürk and his ways of anti-imperialistic politics, Atatürkçülük remained by and large the main point of reference for Turkish activists. It was only after the military putsch in 1971, which was used to round up leftist groups and crushed their revolutionary organisations, that the Turkish left started to reflect on their Kemalistic roots. New studies have shed some light on the Kemalist orientation and on the local roots of leftist thinking among Turkish left circles. In summarising and discussing some of the pertinent findings of these works, this contribution will elaborate on the symbolic relationship of these groups and circles to Kemalism, the official state ideology of Republican Turkey since its foundation in 1923. I specifically will address the pro-military stance of the political activists of the 1960s in relation to some main Kemalist features such as anti-imperialism, developmentalism, nationalism and the supposed revolutionary agency of the intelligentsia. What aspects of Kemalism were incorporated into the new left ideologies? How did the leftist youth stand in relation to the subject of nationalism if – as will discussed below – they felt themselves committed to the Turkish nation, at least during the 1960s? The question, however, as to whether their ideological orientation possibly had an impact on their interpretation of socialism or with regard to ideas and concepts like equality, social justice and plurality goes beyond the scope of this paper. Likewise, there is no room here to go into detail about the ideological differences and distinctions between the individual militant groups. Of course, there were distinct leftist milieus and they should not simply be lumped together. The focus on the student’s movement in this contribution is owed to the fact that the protest movement that emerged in the mid-1960s was mainly a student movement. To a certain extent, in its broad appeal and politicisation, it was the most important extra-parliamentary political force in the 1960s, even preceding the other social and political movements that developed in the 1960s, such as the labour and trade union movement.

2

“1968” is normally understood as a retrospective cipher that stands for more than the calendar year 1968. In this contribution the concept “1968” is conceived as a protest cycle that was triggered by the events of 1968 and extended well into the 1970s. See Frei, N. (2008): Jugendrevolte und globaler Protest 1968 [Students´ Protest and Global Revolt 1968], Bonn, 211. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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Leftist student movement and the army: the founding event 28. April 1960 On April 28, 1960, students from a wide range of departments at the University of Istanbul went to the barricades in order to protest against the establishment of a parliamentary panel. This new board, which was filled exclusively with members of the ruling Democratic Party (DP), was charged with investigating the activities of the opposition and had recently announced that any kind of political activity outside of Parliament was indefinitely prohibited. The demonstrators came together early in the morning at the Atatürk memorial on the campus. As legend has it, tens of thousands of students protested and chanted in unison “Down with the dictatorship!” (kahrolsun diktatörlük) and “We demand freedom!” (hürriyet isteriz). They also sang well-known Kemalistic marches and recited the national hymns. A riot broke out when security forces stormed the campus against the will of the rector. The demonstrators bombarded the police’s barrier chain with everything they could get their hands on – stones, paint bombs, bottles. A melee then broke out between the students and the police, and the rector, who positioned himself between the two lines, was injured. Finally, shots were fired and a student was killed. Dozens of demonstrators were injured and hundreds were taken into custody. The next day, on April 29, 1960, the turbulence also took shape in Ankara, where students gathered in front of the university’s departments of law and political science. There was also rioting here and shots fell. The students barricaded themselves and several dozen were detained by the police in the seminar rooms. Since the police were not able to handle the students on their own, they called on the military for reinforcement. Something then occurred, however, that was quite remarkable: The soldiers decided to free the students and send away the police. They showed solidarity with the youth, who proceeded to call out “Long live the Turkish army!” Similar scenes of fraternisation between the demonstrators and the soldiers also took place in Istanbul. The protesting students appealed to the “glorious Turkish army”, and encouraged them to make good on their duty as protectors and defenders of Kemalism by liberating the country from its traitors. In those days, the leftist youth fought the police, but whenever soldiers appeared for reinforcement they shouted promilitary slogans “Long live the military”, “On to the National Front”, “Army and Students Hand in Hand” (Samim 1981: 72)! Approximately one month after the student protests in April 1960, the Turkish military carried out a putsch against the governing Democratic Party on May 27, 1960 and arrested the leaders in the cabinet. According to Şerif Mardin the student’s movement were prominently involved in the events that preceded the coup, and were successful, at least, in mobilising public opinion against the regime and in creating a tense political atmosphere of intolerance. This is why

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Mardin called the students’ movement of this time political “giant killers” (Mardin 1978: 232). In the scandalous show trials that followed the coup, minister president Adnan Menderes and two of his ministers were condemned to death and executed a year later. Leftist and Kemalistic circles were jubilant about the overthrow of the government. Leftist (of one sort or another) and Kemalist circles later celebrated the day of the military intervention in 27 May 1960 as the beginning of the “Second Revolution”. The First Revolution was carried out by Atatürk and his “enlightened” comrade officers in the military. DP critical circles also praised the revolutionary youth as the “true guardians” of the republic; and Ataturk’s famed “Address to the Youth” resonated in the pertinent press as “justification for the students’ concern regarding the fate of the country” (Keyder 2014). In fact, Turkish students’ active and militant engagement in politics had begun essentially after the establishment of multiparty politics in 1945. During the Atatürk period (1923–1938), and until the end of the single-party period of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) (1923–1945), Turkish students remained relatively inactive in politics. The research literature on this period indicates merely a few overt demonstrations in which students associated themselves rather in favour than against state policies (Taylak 1969; Roos, Roos Jr. and Field 1968). Students’ growing sensibility for politics coincided with the Democrat Party’s accession to power in 1950, which may be regarded as a fundamental change in Turkish history. The political involvement of students was mainly supportive for the CHP which was relegated to the opposition benches in 1950, and reached its early peak – as described above – in the days before the 1960 military putsch ousting the Democrat Party from power. Prime minister Adnan Menderes, who had led the DP to an overwhelming victory in the first free election in 1950, was accused of winning the support of the rural peasantry through populist Islamist politics, and what is more significant, by sacrificing many of Atatürk’s secular reforms. The DP was indeed supported by a coalition of peasants, businessmen, and members of free professions, but rejected by salaried groups such as the bureaucrats and military men – the backbone of the Republican’s elite – who did not benefit directly from the DP`s economic policies (Roos, Roos and Field 1968: 190). Social and socialist thinking began to taking hold among the elite. The leftists’ disappointment about the increasingly conservative parliamentary democracy was exacerbated by the tangible negative consequences of social change, which only deepened the existing social rifts among society. Moreover, the authoritarian rule of the DP Government, and particularly its drive to silence the opposition, only encouraged the rebellious sprit among the students and a broad coalition of the (Kemalist) opponents of the DP regime. Contemporary sources attest to the prevailing enthusiastic faith that was exhibited by the leftist groups towards the “revolutionary army” during the 1950s

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and early 1960s. What were the motivating factors for the pro-army orientation of the leftist circles (Ulus 2011)? How are we to understand the fact that the Turkish student movement of the 1960s appealed to a dictatorship and its army – over a decade after one-party Kemalistic rule had come to an end – while, at the same time, demanding “freedom” and calling for the demise of the “DP’s dictatorship”? Where else did the global (leftist) student movement expect the military to support a revolution? Surely, this was inconceivable in Western Europe, and especially in Western Germany. There the military branches of the military were long considered to be the instruments of the ruling classes because of their ideological traditions and political functions and thus counted among the oppressors. The simultaneous processes of “student revolt” in Turkey and in Western European countries should, however, not obscure the fact that their manifestations and expressions were shaped locally and were therefore quite different (Alper 2014: 255–274). Thus, the comparison between the “Turkish 1968ers” and the “Western 1968ers”, drawn upon usually in Turkish literature and collective (left) memory, is problematic, as the global phenomenon of the “student revolt” is being reduced to the West. The comparison not only overlooks the protest movements in other world hemispheres than in the West and in the East, in the countries behind the “Iron Curtain”, as well as in developing countries – each with their own specific protest causes, motivations, and manifestations –, but also posit the Western protest movements as an ideal type. This leads then to the conclusion that the Western “1968 revolt”, is the original case, and others in other world hemispheres are “wrong” or “deficient” (For example Şenocak n. d.). In fact, the protests in developing countries, including Turkey, were largely centred on social and economic difficulties, while the protests in the West were chiefly informed by criticism of capitalism and imperialism, but also of society in general. From this perspective, the Turkish student movement of 1968 obviously distinguished itself from its Western counterparts – above all in its predilection for the army. This is not to say, however, that the pro-army orientation made the Turkish left unique. In many countries of the so-called Third World, especially in the Near East, the armed forces were viewed as revolutionary agents. Such revolutionary trends may have played a role, and the Turkish activists no doubt received some inspiration from the Baath regime in the Near East or from the Cuban Revolution (1959) and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966). Notwithstanding several commonalities in the respective movements of 1968, the ideological-political development of the Turkish left student movement cannot be adequately captured without considering Turkey’s specific political culture and historical traditions.

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Left-Kemalism and the National Democratic Revolution The predilection for the army as a revolutionary force resonated particularly among the YÖN circle, which in turn exercised a great appeal on the militant Turkish youth. This circle of intellectuals, led by the renowned Doğan Avcıoğlu (1913–1975), who issued the journals YÖN (“Direction”, 1961–1967), and Devrim (“Revolution”, 1969–1971), played a tremendous role in formulating a refashioned but certainly expanded left-wing interpretation of Kemalism. Briefly stated, the intelligentsia around the journal YÖN, composed of former communists and ardent Kemalists, opted for a third path between capitalism and socialism – not a far cry from the Kadro-Movement of the 1930s (Tekeli and Ilkin 2003). This new understanding was represented under the motto “Turkish socialism”, but at the same time they were convinced that the underdeveloped Turkey was not yet ripe to adopt socialism. The primary contradiction in Turkey, in their view, was not principally between capital versus labour but between the country as a whole and imperialism, i.e. foreign powers, above all the United States which had widened its influence and presence in Turkey since 1945. This analysis certainly was similar to the Latin American dependency model but were also supplied by the Kemalist experiences of the Atatürk era. In fact, they believed that the Kemalist economic policies, namely the state-led industrialisation project carried out during the 1930s under the shadow of the Great Depression could now be revived, which would lead to a radical de-linking from the capitalist world.3 The Kemalistic concept of the rapid industrialisation was maintained as a developmental strategy to overcome backwardness and poverty. The country, therefore, first needed to complete the “national democratic revolution” (Milli Demokratik Devrim, MDD), Atatürk’s unfinished revolution, i.e. to start the second stage of the “war of independence” to bring Atatürkçülük to its full fruition. While the entire history of the Republic was interpreted from a socialist viewpoint, Atatürk began to be described as “socialist at heart” (Karpat 1966: 184 f.). Some socially minded elite referred to the Kemalist idea of a classless-harmonious society and interpreted this from a socialistic viewpoint, while at the same time neglecting the fact that Kemalists’ vision of a classless society implied rather a society without class conflicts from a corporatist perspective à la Durkheim.4

3

4

On this and other “peculiarities” of the Turkish Left see Tunçer, Irem (2008): Peculiarism in the Turkish Left During the 1960´s. Unpublished Master Thesis, METU, Ankara, available online at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.633.2130&rep=re p1&type=pdf, accessed on 08.07.2016. For a recent comprehensive study comparing Kemalism to Italian Fascism and Soviet Communism see Plaggenborg, Stefan (2012): Ordnung und Gewalt. Kemalismus – Faschismus – Sozialismus [Order and Violence. Kemalism, Fascism, Socialism], München. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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YÖN followers and other MDD groups criticised Turkey’s ties to the Western world and particularly the close Turkish-American relationship, which in their eyes, one-sidedly favoured American interests and had turned Turkey into a satellite of US imperialism. Instead, particularly the older cohorts of communist origins referred to Lenin’s dictum advocating a bourgeois or “national democratic revolution” (MDD) for underdeveloped or colonised countries, which became the guiding line for the “progressive-minded intellectuals” among the Turkish intelligentsia, and above all the militant students, who were eager followers of the YÖN circle. Imprinted by the YÖN teachings, the Turkish militant youth made a cult of the slogan “Fully Independent Turkey”, or “Turkey without a yoke”, as will be discussed below, to the extent of overt nationalism, often with xenophobic overtones. The second guiding line of the YÖN intellectuals was related to the agents of the impending national democratic revolution (MDD). Since the working class in Turkey was underdeveloped and the peasant class lacked the necessary consciousness, the revolution had to be organised and carried out by the enlightened intelligentsia – among which they expressly included the Turkish armed forces (Ulus 2011: 22–27). This awareness would not have to be introduced to the peasant class by the enlightened intelligentsia until the national democratic revolution was underway. That the peasants had acquired a false consciousness and were estranged from their actual needs was supposedly demonstrated, among other things, by the fact that they repeatedly voted for their actual enemy, the conservative camp. The pro-army orientation was underpinned with historical references to the “Ottoman-Turkish military tradition” – explicitly advocated by Hikmet Kıvılcımlı but also by several other YÖN intellectuals. References were made to the Young Turks, the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, who, in their views, had also carried out a revolution against despotism as forward-looking officers. They also recalled the success of the “war of independence” (also referred to as such by the left) from 1919 to 1922, led by the charismatic General Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his officer comrades. In any event, there were an ample number of examples from Turkish history suggesting that the Turkish army was constantly a motor of progress. The views represented by the YÖN were nothing but Kemalism in modern clothing. That is why Kemal Karpat evaluated “this new leftist movement” as one which was “not associated directly with marxism (!), as was the most case for most earlier leftist endeavours.” On the contrary, he concludes, that it “was a response to domestic conditions, not a replica for a foreign ideology” (Karpat 1966: 179).5 The most critical element of the YÖN philosophy was, however, 5

Ulus as well evaluates the YÖN movement and the adherents of the “national democratic strategy” as an “eclectic ideology based on Kemalism and laborism”, but sees also impacts of the dependency theory and of some popular works of “prominent Marxist writers such as Oscar Lange and Paul Baran” (Ulus 2011: 27). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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the notion that the national revolution would have to be carried out, as in the past, “from above” and led by the progressive-minded officers of the Turkish army. Appeals were often made in YÖN as well as in Devrim for a military putsch and the domestic intelligentsia was also called upon to band together with the revolutionary officers (Landau 1974: 84–85; Cemal 1999: 30 f., 35 f., 41, 55–59). During those years many young officers, particularly officers from lower ranks, were influenced by this kind of left-wing interpretation of Kemalism. As Hamit Bozarslan cites, “Even a right-wing general such Faruk Gürler (1913– 1975) could tell his colleagues that an officer, who didn’t read Avcıoğlu, could not be considered as having accomplished his training as a ʻTurkish officer’” (Bozarslan 2014). Thus, Kemal Karpat attests to some social and even socialist motivations among the instigators of the military coup d’état in 1960: “The revolution [1960, BP] was carried out by officers, mostly men in their thirties, raised in the same atmosphere and with the same aspirations as the new intelligentsia supporting them. The military government showed little favour to the groups which had grown rich under the Democrats; it stressed the importance of economic development and social justice, and its leading members, including president Cemal Gürsel, openly declared that socialism might be beneficial to Turkey” (Karpat 1966: 181).

In fact, the leaders of the putsch from 1960 had introduced a liberal constitution which, in hindsight, must be considered the most liberal constitution Turkey ever had since 1923. It guaranteed fundamental basic rights, including freedom of opinion, assembly, and the press and created new opportunities to articulate particular interests. For the first time a socialist party Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP (Turkish Labour Party) was legally present in the parliament. The right to unionisation, collective bargaining and strikes was no longer forbidden. Hence, compared to the repressive one-party dictatorship of the CHP, the 1960s were marked by a relative pluralisation and democratisation of the political sphere (Landau 1974; Lipovsky 1992). With the re-establishment of a civilian parliamentary regime, i.e. the assumption of power by the centre-right Adalet Partisi (Justice Party), led by Süleyman Demirel, the hopes of the socialist camp for radical reforms were dashed. The leftists’ disappointment about the increasingly conservative parliamentary democracy was exacerbated by the tangible negative consequences of social change, which only deepened the existing social rifts in society. Enormous problems derived from the population explosion in the least-developed parts of the country, and social inequality in the metropolises gave rise to further frustration among the urban intellectuals. While in 1950 the industrial middle class accounted for about five per cent of the total population, this rate had risen to over twenty per cent by 1965 (Karpat 1966: 177). At the same time the rate of internal migration increased dramatically in the 1960s: Between 1950 and 1960 1.5 million immigrants moved to urban areas and 600.000 to the four largest cities, implying a population increase in the four largest cities of 75 per cent

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(Keyder 1987: 137). The administrations of the industrial areas and the metropolises, above all, were caught off-guard and completely overwhelmed by mass migration. The inhabitants of the so-called gecekondu’s – illegal settlements on the edge of the cities – succumbed to a state of neglect because of a lack of job opportunities. From a statistical standpoint, urbanisation increased, though the effect was less an “urbanization of the provinces” than rather a “ruralization of the cities” (Karpat 1976; EJTS 2014). The simultaneous educational expansion undoubtedly increased social permeability in society, but this also went hand-in-hand with grave losses to educational quality. In many newly established universities, specialist libraries and laboratories were missing, and a lack of instructors and teaching materials worsened the situation. Stipends and housing opportunities for students were rare, which of course only added to the frustrations of the student body (cf. Syzyliowitz 1972: 43–47). From the point of view of the leftist, i.e. socialist camp, it was hardly a welcome development that the free elections always brought the conservative camp to power. Gradually they came to the conclusion that the (unenlightened) people did not know what was good for them and that revolution, as in the past, had to be carried out from the top. Within the YÖN circle and its close associates the hopes for a revolution under the guidance of the “Atatürkist army” grew anew during the second half of the 1960s (Ahmad 1977: 177–185). They advocated a military intervention that would make possible a government run by technocrats, dedicated to anti-imperialist developmentalism. Within the YÖN and MDD groups, however, they were differences in approaching the army, and different degrees of cooperation with mostly junior officers. According to Selçuk Polat, member of the underground organisation THKP-C (People’s Liberation Party Front of Turkey), 90 from 256 persons brought to THKP-C trial after the military putsch in 1971 were junior officers or military students (Toklucu n. d.). This is not to say, however, that the radical leftist movement had an effective foothold in the army. After all, the admiration for the military was by no means characterised by mutual affection. The negligible size of left-inclined officers in the army units were far from being able to organise a military take-over. On the contrary, under the leadership of Cevdet Sunay (1899–1982), chief of the general-staff and president of Turkey (1966–1973), the military hierarchies were restructured under the command of “right-wing” generals, who were “explicitly commissioned to fight against communism; the army has also adopted the counter-guerrilla strategy (…); but many young – and less young – Kemalist officers shared the feeling that the Kemalist legacy, which was fully compatible in their eyes with a kind of “national” socialism, has been betrayed by the successors of Atatürk” (Bozarslan 2014).

Up to the next military coup d’état in 1971 the Turkish left, by and large, but with the exception of the TİP and ephemeral communist circles, held the Turk-

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ish army as an institution that was not only expected to topple a dictatorship, but also to represent the vanguard of a social revolution. They had been, however, mistaken in the gauging of the real objectives of the military forces. The Turkish army was deemed to be anti-imperialist as they had been during the War of Independence (1919–1922), and thus were expected to act accordingly. The hopes were particularly laid on junior officers who would overthrow the “betrayers” in the top-level hierarchy and prepare the ground for the revolution, according to the prediction, side by side with other “vigilant forces”. The military putsch in March 1971, however, which had initially been welcomed by leftist circles since it was not yet known whether this would be a “right putsch”, turned out to be a bitter defeat for the left (cf. Ulus 2011; Ahmad 2010: 92–16; Ahmad 1977). The military forces cashed in on the 1960 constitution’s liberal provisions, declared a state of emergency, and crushed the secret organisations of the revolutionaries. Hundreds and thousands of persons, among them students, were thrown into prison, three of whom – Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan, Hüseyin İnan – were executed by hanging in 1972.

Atatürkçülük in action: Generation 1968 and the National Democratic Revolution The students’ movement, which began its political activity in the youth branches of the CHP in defense for Kemalism during the 1950s, reached its peak by the latter half of the 1960s almost assuming forms of a mass movement. It was the same time, when new left ideologies gained some momentum – globally and in Turkey as well. The changes in attitudes and symbols were widely reflected in the protest repertoires of the student movement. Whereas left-wing student activists in the pre-1960 era were mainly occupied with the protection of Atatürk reforms and the “fight against reaction”, students and youth in general from the mid-1960s on became more concerned with questions of social justice, poverty, inequality, the lot of the workers’ class, economic development and the like. Global problems (Vietnam War, Arab-Israeli conflict etc.) were now given more attention and new terms and slogans such as imperialism, colonialism, socialism, revolution etc. were introduced to their political rhetoric. During the 1960s several leftist journals appeared and then multiplied by the late 1960s. Most of them called “(…) openly for resistance and revolution, its timing, ways, and perpetrators (intellectuals, or a union of workers, peasants) varied from one magazine to the other, the prescription was identical and the need for resistance and revolution was never doubted. If anything, impatience was the order of the day (…)” (Landau 1974: 39).

The leftist student movement, organised during the mid-1960s under the umbrella of Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu (FKK – Intellectual Club Federation), rehttps://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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organised itself to Devrimci Gençlik (briefly Dev-Genç, Revolutionary Youth) by the late 1960s. By and large the militant student movement proved to be eager followers of the MDD strategy6, in accordance with the teachings of the YÖN circle. They brought the ideological premises of the YÖN and later the MDD groups to militant action, while the anti-American theme proved to be the main background factor conditioning the protest repertoire of the students’ movement. The anti-communist policies of the US administrations, and the Vietnam conflict in particular, triggered a range of leftist and left-nationalist reactions against American infiltration worldwide, in the “Third World” as well as in most European countries. In Turkey, which had never formally been a colony, anti-Americanism assumed forms of a revolutionary ritual, and became a longstanding central dogma of the Turkish Left. “Fully Independent Turkey”, “Turkey without a yoke” and “No-to America” became the watchword and standard protest theme of the time. Indeed, Turkey from the point of view of geostrategic concerns, who shared borders with the Soviet bloc, had gained some attention from the USA in the context of the Cold War. Although not having been part of the Second World War, Turkey was granted financial funds within the Marshall Plan. During the 1950s Turkey took part in the Korean War (1950), and became in turn a member of NATO (1952), which was followed by several bilateral agreements with the USA during the next decade. Development aid and other technical and financial support by the USA was meant to help “backward” Turkey to modernise, and at the same time draw her closer to the West. The centre-right governments promoted the capitalist growth model and Turkey’s world market integration under the supervision of US-American institutions or other international bodies, particularly by the World Bank and the OECD. Indeed, it was a time when modernisation expertise became widely a transnational affair. Development aid, development assistance and cooperation between countries in these field became increasingly institutionalised in the 1960s. International institutions such as the World Bank, the United States and its sub-organisations and nongovernmental institutions acted as political actors, provided or transferred tools of development thinking and strategies, and took on many responsibilities that had formerly being duties of national governments (cf. Unger 2010). In Turkey and other underdeveloped countries these institutions challenged in some fields the sovereignty of the nation-state (Keyder 2014). On the 6

Inspired by the YÖN teachings, the MDD group was born from the internal struggles of the TİP. Its spiritus rector was Mihri Belli, former member of the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) who exercised great appeal for larger parts of the militant leftist youth during the 1960s. In 1967 the MDD group published the journal Türk Solu, where among others Deniz Gezmiş and Mahir Ҫayan, who later became the leaders and cult figures of two of the Turkish revolutionary movement, contributed article and columns. Supporters of the TİP within the FKK and later Dev-Genç were in the minority, and were rather engaged in trade unions and the youth branches of the TİP. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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other side, the development paradigm certainly served USA to extend control over underdeveloped regions and neutralise their revolutionary potential. The modernisation, i.e. development concept proved to be influential until it became challenged by the Vietnam War and triggered off an anti-American and anti-establishment counterculture worldwide (Appy 2010; on foreign aid and developmental thinking see Lancaster 2007; Latham 2000; Murphy 2006; Picard and Buss 2009). It would be no exaggeration to say that anti-American sentiments were the main motivating factor for militant activism in Turkey, for both leftist and rightist as well as Islamist opposition groups – although obviously for different reasons. Leftist groups in particular took exception to the growing US-presence in Turkey, saw an undue interference of the USA in Turkish domestic affairs, thus impeding Turkey’s sovereignty. The main concern with American imperialism focused on NATO, the joint military installations and the lack of Turkish judiciary control over American personnel stationed in the country (Türkmen 2010: 337). Particularly during the 1960s and 1970s Turkish-US relations faced several up and downs, mostly in the form of Cyprus-centred issues, some of them reaching “crisis” level, as happened during the Jupiter missile crisis in 1962, and with the so-called “Johnson letter” in 1964, when the US president in anticipation of a Turkish intervention in Cyprus threatened Turkey with sanctions (Bölükbaşı 1993). When the conflicts with Greece and the USA over the Cyprus issue (in 1964 and in 1967) triggered strong nationalist outbursts across Turkey the major leftist groups were quick to join in. The left did not shy away from employing furious nationalistic rhetoric and did not even hesitate to label America or Greece as “gâvur” (infidel). Americans were charged by left-wing intellectuals with harassing and raping Turkish women, or “killing children in the streets just for fun” (Kemal 1968: 4; Yücel 1968: 4; on Anti-Americanism see also Güney 2008). Meanwhile, horrible invented stories and conspiracy theories became rampant, such as “the Turkish nation being deliberately poisoned by American wheat” (Türkmen 2010: 338). Deniz Gezmiş and Mahir Çayan, both symbolic figures of the subsequent Turkish revolutionary movement, were among the organisers and/or participants of the widespread “anti-NATO” and “anti-imperialism” protests in 1967 and 1968. The demonstrators took to the streets demanding the end of the US-hegemony over Turkey in general, and the withdrawal of the country from the NATO in particular.7 7

According to Emin Alper the first massive mobilisation against US imperialism began during the Arab-Israeli War in June 1967, whereas anti-Vietnam campaigns remained marginal in Turkey. Alper describes how the influential youth organisation TMTF (The National Federation of Turkish Students) led by leftist students employed a chauvinistic stance during the anti-USA campaigns in 1967, called for the solidarity with Arab countries, and condemned both USA and Israel, accusing the latter as a state “founded by American Jewish millionaires” (Alper 2014: 261f.). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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The core argument of the campaigns was that imperialist dependence was the main problem of the country, and the continuing American presence was humiliating the Turkish people. Even when most of the leaders of the student movement began to be mesmerised by the ideas of the global cult figures and national heroes such as Che Guevara, Fidel Castro and Mao Zedong, both the leaders and the larger body of the 1968-student movement still held their own hero Atatürk, i.e. Atatürkçülük, aloft. They held vigils at the Atatürk Mausoleum in Ankara and organised a “Mustafa Kemal March for Full Independence” from Ankara to Samsun. Female activists organised “March of the Girls” against the arrival of the US Sixth Navy fleet in Izmir, and chanted slogans like “Watch out, here come the new Halide Edip’s!” (Yeni Halide Edip’ler geliyor!); “Turkey is not the brothel of US 6th Navy Fleet!” (Türkiye 6. Filo’nun genelevi değildir!); or “Freedom or Death” (Ya istiklal ya ölüm!). One of the popular slogans of that time called “We have hatred against the gâvur!” (gâvura hıncımız var!) (Pekesen 2015). The revolutionary youth politically socialised in this environment have been described by the sociologist Çağlar Keyder as “more antiimperialist than socialist” (Keyder 1987: 209). At any rate, the “first successful anti-imperialist struggle of Atatürk” seemed to be amazingly compatible with the world-wide heightened anti-imperialism discourse of this time. The regular visits of the US Navy “Sixth Fleet” to Turkish piers became one of the main targets of leftist activists and almost every visit ended in turmoil. In one of these protests in Istanbul in 1968 some US marines were thrown into the Bosporus – a symbolic scene conjuring up the fate of Greeks during the War between Turkey and Greece (1919–1922), who in popular parlance also were “thrown to sea”. One of these anti-America protests in February 1969, which were organised by trade unions and students’ organisations in conjunction with the scheduled visit of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in Istanbul, ended in tragedy. “Bloody Sunday” (kanlı pazar) is the name given to this incident when participants of that demonstration collided with the counter-protest of the right-wing militants. Two persons were killed and over 200 wounded, many of them seriously. In a leaflet put into circulation before the demonstration FKF (Intellectual Club Federation) had called out for action with the motto: “Join in our Resistance against the American gâvur and the Sixth Fleet!” (Kepenek 2001: 75). From the latter half of the 1960s onwards violent actions against American officials visiting Turkey has spread: among others against Cyrus Vance, the US special emissary on Cyprus, in 1967, US marines of the US Sixth Fleet in 1968 in Istanbul and Izmir, or US Ambassador Robert Kommer, whose car was burnt on the university campus in Ankara 1969 (Türkmen 2010: 338), and finally several American servicemen and soldiers in 1970, who were harassed for “seeking fun” with Turkish women, while five US airmen were kidnapped in 1971.8 8

The abducted soldiers were later released unharmed (Krahenbuhl 1977). In another hostage case in February 1971, THKO had kidnapped under the cover of the night a black https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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By the closure of the 1960s and the early 1970s Atatürkçülük forfeit some of its influence among the radical left, which coincided with its gradual radicalisation. In 1969/1970, at the peak of their influence, the student movement represented by Dev-Genç decayed into several split-off groups. Captivated by Guevarist ideas of “urban guerilla” (focoism) both THKO (People’s Liberation Army of Turkey) and THKP-C (People’s Liberation Party Front of Turkey) scathed the prevailing “quagmire of legalism” and took to the mountains to start the armed struggle against the “rotten regime”. The political dictum of the youth began gradually to change. Former Kemalist precepts of “progress” and “development” were replaced by notions such as “dictatorship of the proletariat”, “people’s war”, “urban guerilla” and so on, while the motto “independence” had been redefined. As Hamit Bozarslan put it: “(…) in the beginning of the decade the left conceived itself simply as defender of the “national state”, at the end of the decade many young militants aimed at the destruction of the state seen as the repressive organ of the “dominant classes” acting as “agents” of “neo-colonial” or “imperialist” powers” (Bozarslan 2014).

However, up to the 1970s Kemalism/Atatürkçülük was not completely disposed of. Fostered and strengthened by the strong nationalist education at all levels of schooling, and probably “through unconscious internalization of the main Kemalist precepts” left-oriented students and youth in Turkey in general maintained strong Atatürkist leanings (Keyder 1987: 210). This was widely reflected in a nationalist/anti-imperialist posture. Even groupings explicitly critical of Atatürkism – since the “Atatürk revolution” was a “bourgeois” one – tried at least to restore “Atatürk’s war of liberation” as a pioneering anti-colonialist ideology into the contemporary anti-imperialist paradigm. Even the above mentioned urban guerilla organisations THKO and THKP-C are described by Ahmet Samim as adapting Guevarist ideas of urban-guerilla ʻfocoism’ into Turkish terrain “where a revolutionary junta was foreseen as imminent. The result was a compelling “fit” between Guevarist concepts of revolutionary immediacy and the tradition of left-Kemalism” (Samim 1981: 71). Among the Kemalist leanings probably the prevalent attitude of elitism might be the most striking one. Like their Kemalist parents or grandparents’ generations the leftist revolutionary youth of this time divided the world into “progressive” (or “advanced”) and “backward” people and thus discounted any revolutionary agency of the people. The left (of one sort or another) saw themselves as the mentor, leader and teacher of the unenlightened masses. Just as the American GI. After realising that the American soldier was black they decided to release him because of his colour, since black people in their view were exploited people just as the “colonised” Turks (Dündar 2014: 243; Samim 1981: 70). Most of the violent actions of this time had been directed at US organisations and soldiers, their rate estimated at 16.000 living in Turkey, as well as Turkish enterprises with American connections (Landau 1974: 43f.; Krahenbuhl 1977: 4). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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Kemalist generation, the Turkish 1968ers, mostly young men and women from well-off, to some extent solidly middle-class families, felt pity for the backward peasantry, but considered them ignorant people who, in their eyes, did not know what was good for them, and thus, needed their guidance as the forward post of the people. Only the revolutionary vanguard, i.e. the revolutionaries themselves, were able to see through the manipulations and veiled contexts of the exploiter class. Consequently, the revolution, as in the past, had to be carried out from above. This corresponded to the Kemalist/elitist top-down understanding of revolution but certainly also to some new left ideologies, first and above all, to Herbert Marcuse, who challenged the notion of the working class’ agency for the socialist revolution. Further Kemalist precepts such as the “positivist belief in progress and science leading to social engineering and an absolutisation of the “ʻnational good’ from above” also found admission in their revolutionary conceptions (Keyder 1987: 210). Thus, many young militants and left-wing currents of the 1960s hold on to the conception of the state as an agent of radical change while discounting the role of culture and society. What was happening in society was not conceived as politics, consequently the prevailing (Kemalist or socialist) elitist assumptions were rarely questioned. A pamphlet of the THKO probably put into circulation at beginning of 1971 to justify their previous actions, including two bank robberies, attacks on police posts and the abduction of four American soldiers, provides ample evidence for the prevalent paternalistic approach of the people and the nation: “(…) First: The People’s Liberation Army of Turkey fights to liberate the people and believes that the independence of the country can only be won through armed struggle and that is the only way. Second: The People’s Liberation Army calls on all patriots of the fatherland to take up this holy war. We affirm that we will carry out this war against the traitors until the day of victory and until the death of our last soldier. Third: Our objective is to destroy the United States and all foreign adversaries in order to establish a completely independent Turkey that has been cleansed of its enemies (…) Fourth: The national liberation army is the forward post of our people, and it will undertake no other action than to liberate our people” (THKO pamphlet n. d.).

Variations of this statement can also be found in numerous contemporary sources such as pamphlets, brochures, leaflets, printed publications, and the like. Especially illuminating is a statement that Osman Bahadır, a THKO member, uttered during the military trial where he was brought with several other THKO members after the military memorandum on March 12, 1971: “(…) we believe that the people can only be liberated through armed struggle. We will supply the peasants with the necessary consciousness, and free them from their unconsciousness in order to make them able to stand up on their own for their rights and participate in the civil war. With the support of the peasants, we will kemalize the struggle, and ultimately eliminate the imperialists, the big landowners, and the exploiting class” [my emphasis, BP] (Osman Bahadır’s statement before the military prosecutor 29.06.1971 in: TÜSTAV, Nebil Varuy Fon/ THKO Davası 1135/13).

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It was particular the THKO group, led by the charismatic Deniz Gezmiş, who posited itself explicitly as successors to Kemal Atatürk, even claiming that Atatürk, “if he would be alive in the 1960s he certainly would became a socialist” (From THKO group’s legal defense 1971, in: TÜSTAV, Nebil Varuy Fon/ THKO Davası 1187/14). One might explain Gezmiş’s popularity even among the common people to this day in Turkey not only with his bold manners and charismatic appearance but also to his popular reception as a truthful follower of Atatürk.9 For the THKP-C group, however, the other safe haven for revolutionary minded students of that time, Kemalism obviously was only one source among others (orthodox Marxism of the Leninist-Stalinist type, new left ideologies and urban guerilla warfare á la Che Guevara and Carlos Marighella) from which they extensively drew on to form their eclectic ideology. Even if the group has not been deemed as pronounced pro-Kemalist, it adopted a favorable attitude towards the “war of liberation” notion of Kemalism, at least in the court room: “We are not Kemalists. Kemalism and socialism are different things. However, two different things can come together if they both have the same goal. The differences among them cannot hinder them to align themselves together. The goal of Kemalism was the national liberation, to be against the imperialism. We socialists [too fight] American imperialism and aim to establish a fully democratic and independent Turkey. However, socialists [of different countries, BP] do not pursue always the same goal. Depending on the special conditions of a society it can assume different types” (Ömer Güven’s statements before the military court in 1971, in: TÜSTAV, Nebil Varuy Fon 1310/16).

Similar statements in varying tones and undertones can also be found in their periodicals and other printed texts elsewhere, for example in the journals Ant (“pledge”, or “oath”, 1967–1970), Türk Solu (“Turkish Left”, 1967–1970) or Aydınlık (“Enlightenment”, 1968–1970), where Deniz Gezmiş, Mahir Ҫayan and others elaborated their opinions on Atatürkçülük, Turkish socialism and revolution.

9

Deniz Gezmiş enjoys great popularity among the Turkish people, not only by the subsequent parties and groups of the THKO, but even more by the moderate left (Kemalists of all colors, particularly CHP followers and Alevis). His name Deniz (sea) had become a popular name for children both girls and boys since his execution in 1972, and over the last three decades scores of hagiographic biographies, reminiscences, TV films, poets, and songs have been produced about him, and to a lesser extent on other protagonists of the Turkish 1968ers movement. His execution with two of his follow compatriots by hanging, during which Deniz Gezmiş reportedly chanted slogans to the end, obviously contributed to his reception as a victim and martyr of the military putsch among his admirers. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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Conclusion The aim of this contribution was to provide an overall impression of the Kemalist/Atatürkist roots and orientations of the leftist currents, and in particular the students’ movement in Turkey during the 1960s. To be sure, there is little agreement on what the ideology of Kemalism, if at all, stands for. For Zürcher [1993: 189], for example, Kemalism lacked “a coherent, all-embracing ideology”. And what is more, the evaluation of Kemalism today depends upon the perspective of the beholder, which often implies ahistorical reasoning (Aytürk 2015). As Ҫağlar Keyder rightly observes, the basic tenets of Kemalism, such as nationalism and state-centred narratives, fashioned both left-wing and right-wing ideologies (Keyder 1987: 197f.). Developmentalism and nationalism, disguised by an amorphous understanding of patriotism10 and anti-imperialism, were highlighted and found expression in the ideological thinking of the most leftist currents, particularly by the MDD groups in Turkey. True to their Manichean way of thinking, the Turkish left in a broader sense, as well as the radical left in this period qualified Kemalism/Atatürkçülük – by degrees – as a “progressive” or “advanced” ideology in contrast to “reactionary” forces and ideologies in politics and national history. Undemocratic or authoritarian features of the Kemalist single-party rule were either downplayed or exculpated. Parliamentary democracy, as discussed above, has not been given priority by most of the radical leftist groups anyway. “Dictatorship”, whether in the name of Kemalism or of socialism, was rarely questioned. On the contrary, it was regarded as a necessary means to bring enlightenment or socialist salvation to the backward masses of the country. Just as with Kemalism, the contested substance of the “left” is also an ongoing issue of debate and controversy. Being on the left meant different things to different groups, organisations and political parties, and these meanings have been subject to constant changes over time. This is why in this contribution neither the term Kemalism nor socialism were deployed in a normative way. As mentioned, the stance of leftist groups in Turkey regarding Kemalism changed radically after the military coup in 1971. The “rightist putsch” (instead of the expected “left putsch”) turned out to be a bitter defeat for the left of all sorts. It was a catastrophe – a “worst case scenario” they had not reckoned with. The military cashed in on the 1960 constitution’s liberal provisions, declared a state of emergency, and wiped out the secret organisations of the revolutionaries. Hundreds of leftist students were thrown into prison, three of whom – as 10

Suphi Kahraman, for example, a contributor to the leftist journal Türk Solu (“Turkish Left”, 1967–1970), defined nationalism as istiklal (independence) plus devrim (revolution), which was obviously the prevailing interpretation of nationalism by most of the leftists of this time. “Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük”, Türk Solu, I. Nov. 17, 1967, cited in: Landau 1974: 76.

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noted earlier – were executed. It was only after the putsch that the radical left started to reflect on their Kemalistic roots, as well as on the Kemalistic state and the army. The new orientation of the radical left was certainly due in part to their disappointment about the army, which not only did not carry out a leftist putsch, but had also become in their eyes an instrument of oppression against the “popular will”. Henceforth, slowly but surely their lexicon was cleansed of Kemalistic terminology and came to resemble more and more – depending on the ideological orientation – the orthodox socialism of the Leninist-Stalinist or Mao type. Even the evolution of the Kurdish question played a role in this process that should not be underestimated. Many frustrated Kurds turned away from leftist organisations, which they accused of nationalism, in order to begin their own war of liberation. From the 1970s on Kemalism began slowly to be discredited. A radical break with the Kemalist legacy was later initiated by İbrahim Kaypakkaya, i.e. his Maoist organisation TKP-ML (Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist, 1972), who rejected Kemalism as a “fascist” ideology and regime. In today’s Turkey it is Doğu Perinçek’s “Vatan Partisi” (“Homeland Party”, or “Patriotic Party”), which expressly views itself in the tradition of left Kemalism. Perinçek himself was also a member of the 1968 movement and co-founder of the “Devrimci İşçi-Köylü Partisi” (Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey, 1971). A quick search in the internet reveals that the Vatan Partisi is alternately labelled as a left-nationalist, left-Kemalist, right-wing or ultranationalist party. Perinçek himself became to be known to the international public as the first Turkish person to be convicted and fined by a Swiss court in 2007 for saying that the “Armenian genocide is a great international lie”. This is just an extreme example of the varying left-wing perspectives on Kemalism in today’s Turkey. Together with the CHP (commonly defined as the legitimate heirs of the initial Kemalist party) Perinçek represents a new generation of (left) Kemalists, stamped by virulent “anti-Westernism, anti-globalization [and] a recurrent emphasis on the nationalist aspects of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s ideas.” (Alaranta 2014: 99). In contrast, for the more explicitly socialist-oriented left, Kemalist tradition is worthy of being consigned to the dustbin, as it stands for an exclusively nationalist, totalitarian and militaristic state tradition. Meanwhile, recent significant ruptures in Turkish democracy under the authoritarian Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule have seemed to generate a rethinking of the historical experience of Kemalism. This is testimony to the fact that the retelling of what happened in history changes constantly, and this is true with almost every major event in the past.

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Bibliography Ahmad, Feroz (1977): The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975, London. Ahmad, Feroz (2010): “Military and Politics in Turkey”, in: Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem and Philip Robbins (eds.), Turkey’s Engagement with Modernity. Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century, London. Alaranta, Toni (2014): Contemporary Kemalism. From Universal Secular-Humanism to Extreme Turkish Nationalism, New York. Alper, Emin (2014): “Protest Diffusion and Rising Political Violence in the Turkish ʾ68 Movement: The Arab-Israeli War, ‘Paris May’ and the Hot Summer of 1968”, in: Lorenzo Bosi, Chares Demetriou and Stefan Malthaner (eds.) (2014), Dynamics of Political Violence. A Process Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict, Farnham/London, 255– 274. Appy, Christian G. (ed.) (2010): Cold War Constructions. The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, Amherst, 1945–1966. Aytürk, Ilker (2015): “Post-post-Kemalizm: Yeni Bir Paradigmayı Beklerken” [Post-post Kemalism: Waiting for a new paradigm], Birikim, 319 (November), 34–48. Bölükbaşı, Suha (1993): “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 29, no. 3, 505–525. Bozarslan, Hamit (2014): “From Kemalism to the Armed Struggle: Radicalization of the Left in the 1960s“, paper presented at the Conference “Turkey in the Sixties”, University Hamburg, Dpt. For Turkish Studies, June 2014. Cemal, Hasan (1999): Kimse Kızmasın Kendimi Yazdım [No one should be annoyed. I wrote about myself], Istanbul. Dündar, Can (2014): Abim Deniz [My brother Deniz], Istanbul. EJTS (2014): European Journal of Turkish Studies 1:1 (special issue gecekondu). Escobar, Arturo (1995): Encountering Development. The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton. Frei, Norbert (2008): Jugendrevolte und globaler Protest 1968 [Students’ Revolt and Global Protest 1968], Bonn. Güney, Aylin (2008): „Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present”, Middle Eastern Studies 44:3, 471–487. Karpat, Kemal (1966): „The Turkish Left“, in: The Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 1, no. 2, 169–186. Kemal, Yaşar (1968): “Kanlı İktidarın Ortakları” [Collaborator of the Murderous Regime], Ant, 2. July.

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Kepenek, Nuran Alptekin (2001): Oy Cihan, Bizum Cihan, [O Cihan, our Cihan] Istanbul. Keyder, Ҫağlar (1987): State and Class in Turkey. A Study in Capitalist Development, London/New York. Keyder, Ҫağlar (2014): “Social Change and Political mobilization in the 1960’s”, in: Paper presented at the Conference “Turkey in the Sixties”, University Hamburg, Dpt. For Turkish Studies, June 2014. Krahenbuhl, Margeret (1977): Political Kidnappings in Turkey, 1971–1972, Santa Monica CA. Lancester, Carol (2007): Foreign Aid. Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, Chicago. Landau, Jacob (1974): Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, Leiden, 84–85. Latham, Michael E. (2000): Modernization as Ideology. American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kenney Era, Chapel Hill. Lipovsky, Igor P. (1992): The Socialist Movement 1960–1980, Leiden. Mardin, Şerif (1978): „Youth and Violence in Turkey”, in: Archives européennes de sociologie, 19, 229–254. Mason, Michael G. (1997): Development and Disorder. A History of the Third World since 1945, Hanover. Murphy, Craig N. (2006): The United Nations Development Programme. A Better Way?, Cambridge. Pekesen, Berna (2015): „Öğrenilecek bir Erdem Olarak Özgürlük“ [Freedom. Virtue to be learned], Birikim, 316/317 Ağustos/Eylül, 47–54. Picard, Louis A. and Buss, Terry F. (2009): A Fragile Balance. Re-examining the History of Foreign Aid, Security, and Diplomacy, Sterling, VA. Plaggenborg, Stefan (2012): Ordnung und Gewalt. Kemalismus – Faschismus – Sozialismus [Order and Violence. Kemalism, Fascism, Socialism], München. Roos Jr., Leslie L./Roos, Noralou P. and Field, Gary R. (1968): “Students and Politics in Turkey”, Daedalus 97:1, 184–203. Samim, Ahmet (1981): „The Tragedy of the Turkish Left“, New Left Review, 120, 60–85. Şenocak, Zafer (n. d.): “Turkey: The Lost Generation”, http://www.ghi-dc.org/ fileadmin/user_upload/GHI_Washington/Publications/Supplements/Supplement_6/bus6_175.pdf, accessed on 22.04.2015. Taylak, Muammer (1969): Saltanat, Meşrutiyet ve 1. Cumhuriyette Öğrenci Hareketleri [Students Movement during Sultanate, Constitutionalist Regime and the First Republican Period], Ankara.

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Tekeli, İlhan/İlkin, Selim (2003): Bir Cumhuriyet Öyküsü: Kadrocuları ve Kadro’yu Anlamak [A Republican Tale: Understanding the Kadro and the Kadroists], Istanbul. THKO pamphlet (n. d.), Archives of TÜSTAV (= Social History Research Foundation of Turkey), Nebil Varuy Fon/ THKO Davası 1185/14. Toklucu, Murat (n. d.) “Darbeciler 68’lileri Kullandı Mı?” [Were the 68-ers controlled by the putschists?], in Yeni Aktüel, http://www.yeniaktuel.com.tr/ dun109,[email protected], accessed on 07.07.2016. Tunçer, İrem (2008): Peculiarism in the Turkish Left During the 1960’s. Unpublished Master Thesis, METU, Ankara, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/do wnload?doi=10.1.1.633.2130&rep=rep1&type=pdf, accessed on 08.07.2016. Türkmen, Füsun (2010): “Anti-Americanism as a Default Ideology of Opposition: Turkey as a Case Study”, Turkish Studies, vol. 11, no. 3, 329–345. Ulus, Özgür Mutlu (2011): The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey. Military Coups, Socialist Revolution and Kemalism, London/New York. Unger, Corinna R. (2010): “Histories of Development and Modernization: Findings, Reflections, Future Research”, in: http://www.hsozkult.de/literatur ereview/id/forschungsberichte-1130, accessed on 10.06.2016. Yücel, Can (1968): “No laissez faire no laissez passer no!”, Ant, July 2. Zürcher, Erik Jan (1993): Turkey. A Modern History, London – New York.

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The Leader as Father. Personality Cults in Modern Turkey1 Lutz Berger

The cult of Mustafa Kemal started at the end of the War of Independence in 1923 and gained momentum at the end of the 1920s. Speeches were held and poems composed to praise his achievements, his name and picture invaded the last corner of the public sphere. A good indicator of the growth of the cult of Mustafa Kemal is the number of statues that were erected in his honor.2 A first was put up at Istanbul in 1926 to be followed by many others during the late 20s and 30s. If we leave aside the comparatively early (1928) monument on Taksim Square in Istanbul, where he is seen in company of his colleagues İsmet (İnönü) and Kazım (Karabekir), Mustafa Kemal is the only figure of the War of Independence to be honoured by monuments during his rule. The cult of Mustafa Kemal was not restricted to monuments as we have seen. His own great speech of 1928 was reprinted several times and became the standard version of what happened in Turkey after the First World War. In The Speech, as it has been known in Turkey since then, Mustafa Kemal presented himself as the sole great leader of the War of Independence. He succeeded in pushing aside concurrent versions of the story, which would have given a greater role to people with whom he had since fallen out, most notably Kazım Karabekir.3 After 1928, open critique of the leader was becoming difficult even in fields like history and linguistics where he was at best an aficionado of rather limited knowledge. These two subjects came to occupy more and more of his time (Hanioğlu 2011: 160–198). This cult grew in parallel with the lack of interest that Mustafa Kemal increasingly showed for day-to-day politics. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk died on the 10th of November 1938.4 His longtime Prime Minister İsmet İnönü was chosen as successor by parliament. Mustafa Kemal was buried with due pomp. Soon planning for a mausoleum had begun, but it was only in 1953 that this mausoleum, the famous Anıtkabir, was finished and put to use.5

1 2 3 4 5

For an inspiring general picture of the cult of Atatürk that partly stresses different points than this paper see Ünder (2009). For an analysis of statues of Atatürk with many useful insights in the praxis of his cult more generally see Tekiner (2010). On The Speech and its function see Zürcher 2010: 6–16. The anniversary of his death with its ritualised mourning is still an important part of the praxis of the Atatürk cult in Turkey. On the mausoleum see Wilson (2013). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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There was a certain break in the intensity of the dead leader’s cult after his death. Certainly, Atatürk was still seen as the “Eternal Chief” (Ebedi Şef). As new head of the ruling party his successor İsmet İnönü became only the “Unchangeable Chairman”. But besides that, İnönü acquired for himself an appealing title of his own as head of state with a definitely fascist ring: He had himself styled Millî Şef, National Chief. His picture replaced Atatürk’s on stamps etc. Atatürk’s great justificatory speech was not reprinted anymore (Tekiner 2010: 152). The craze of Atatürk statues subsided. There was no new one set up after his death for about two years and after that new statues of the deceased “Eternal Leader” were created at a much more comfortable pace than before. Instead of the “Eternal Leader” the “National Chief” now got his fair amount of petrified recognition.6 In 1946 İnönü accepted the principle of multi-party democracy. In 1950, he and the former single party, the Republican People’s Party, lost the first free and fair election. The man who had been the Millî Şef handed power over peacefully to what had been the opposition party, the Democrats. It was in this moment that the cult of Atatürk was coming to centre stage again, only to grow even more after the coups d’états of 1960 and 1980. Under the rule of the Democrats in the 1950s the reprinting of Atatürk’s Speech resumed to continue apace in subsequent decades (Tekiner 2010: 152). A law was passed that made the insult of Atatürk an offense. Already at the end of İnönü’s rule the production of Atatürk statues was resumed, twelve being erected between 1946 and 1960, fivefold the amount in the decade after 1960 (Tekiner 2010: 156). In the 1980s even small towns finally had their share of Atatürk monuments (Tekiner 2010: 187ff.) and it was only in 1985 that Istanbul’s major airport was named after the founder of the republic. Things and places named after Atatürk are now a common feature all over Turkey. One has desisted from renaming major towns though, as was done in the USSR during the Stalin era.7 Real and imagined sayings of Atatürk are present all over Turkey in the most unexpected places and with the most unexpected content. Taxi-drivers in Turkey are happy that it was the great Atatürk himself who allegedly praised them as the most polite in the world. Hospitals pride themselves that Atatürk supposedly would have had only Turkish doctors to take care of him.8 (In such cases, the cult of the leader helps the very people who adulate the leader to give value to themselves as cherished members of his group. This circular function is part and par-

6 7 8

Unfortunately there doesn’t seem to be an inventory of these statues of İnönü, but Google helps to come across a good deal of them. Only smaller places are named after Atatürk. The real Mustafa Kemal did consult foreign doctors, especially during his final illness (Mango 1999: 518ff.). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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cel of personality cults generally, but can’t be discussed in greater detail here.)9 Small books with his quotes are published over and over again, as was the red book in Maoist China. His picture is everywhere and even nature is protected when it is said to be in the image of the hero. The question is why should this be so decades after his death and how are we to place Atatürk’s personality cult in contemporary Turkey in the more general picture of political religions and authoritarian rule in the post-World War I period? Since the post-World War one period, political personality cults have usually focused around two topoi: The leader is presented as a selfless genius and he is the incarnation of his people. Atatürk is certainly shown to us as a selfless genius. He is the man who had singlehandedly (tek adam) saved Turkey after the debacle of the Ottoman Empire. The revolutionary changes that were pushed through in Turkey were His revolutions. He was wise not only in politics but also in all kinds of science. In all this he is presented in very much the same way as other political cult objects, from Hitler and Stalin to the members of the Kim family. The second topos, the leader as incarnation of his people, is part of the Atatürk narrative in a very particular way. On the one hand, Atatürk is not only what the Turkish people in the nationalist imagination traditionally are. He is the Gazi, the prototypical fighter for the rights of (Turkish) Muslims. But he is, on the other hand, also something else. He is the incarnation of what the Turks 9

Insofar as the adored leader is usually a personification of what is best in his group, his virtues reflect the virtues of the whole group, here the Turks and their taxi-drivers, doctors, etc. The self-aggrandizement of the people who adore the leader insofar as they exclusively are privileged to call such a hero their own can also be found in the cult of Stalin or Hitler but as well in more recent examples as the nascent cult of ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ as-Sīsī in the Egypt of our days. All the world is said to envy the Egyptians because of their leader, the lion of the Arabs, who is equal the hero of the Arab nation Nasser and to Nelson Mandela (http://www.masralarabia.com/%D9%81%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%82%D8%A7 %D9%81%D8%A9/247511-%D9%83%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%86%D8 %AD%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8 %AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8% A8%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%85, accessed on 08.08.2014) at the same time as-Sīsī is represented on many posters as the incarnation of the Egyptian people in a Stalinian way (http://www.egyptimenews.com/2013/07/blog-post _120.html, accessed on 08.08.2014). This identification of leader and group can also be found among the supporters of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: He is the prototypical Turk of lower class origins who has, against all odds proven himself. As such he is the incarnation of the value of all people of his ilk who all too long had to suffer from the spite of the Kemalist elites. He can do things and even achieve “mad” (turk.: çılgın) projects like the greatest airport or the Istanbul channel. And he is capable to do so exactly because he is the greater-than-life incarnation of simple hard-working Turkish Muslims and not a snobbish Europeanised “monşer” (mon cher, a dandy) like his concurrent for the presidency in the campaign of 2014, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu. On Erdoğan’s calling his concurrent monşer see (http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/erdogandan_ihsanogluna_ilk_elestiri_bunlar_mo nser-1200480, accessed on 08.08.2014). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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are to become: a part of European modernity and all it meant for him. This included not only big things like science, but also paraphernalia such as dress and musical taste.10 Depending on whether people are more conservative or more modernist, they will stress the one or the other of these traits of the Father’s personality. Let us have a short look at debates on personality cults amongst historians and social scientists in order to better understand the function of the Atatürk cult during his lifetime and afterwards. Personality cults outside the communist world have been little studied by historians and social scientists. When they have been, it has often been done within the framework of the concept of political religion. For Burrin a political religion may be defined as follows: “The specific nature of political religions lies in the fact that they utterly deny the legitimacy of the liberal idea of separate spheres in social life and that they replace the liberal distrust of politics with an absolutization of the latter. Their goal is not to return to a state religion, much less to a theocracy or Caesar-Papism, but to realise the historically new will to encompass the entire life of society in the political. This goal can only be achieved by using forms and means reminiscent of those employed by religion in order to ensure its hold over traditional societies. The rejection of liberal culture leads logically to the organization of enthusiasm, to the supervision of the economy, to the prescription of artistic norms, even to the control of sexuality. At the same time, this “omnipolitics,” whether guided by the idea of the nation or of the revolution—the two driving ideas of political modernity—attempts to suppress religion itself, which under the pressure of liberal culture has become one autonomous sphere amongst others and is now threatened with disappearing not only from the public space, but also from the private one” (Burrin 1997: 328). The Kemalist regime, as an essay in massive social engineering, fits very much to this description (leaving aside the question if religion had already become an autonomous sphere in Ottoman Turkey). As it seems to me, Burrin here equates political religions more or less with totalitarianism.11 Within this framework, as Burrin remarks, ideologies and practices fulfill functions that are generally held to be part of what is termed religion: They create meaning and community.12 They also create legitimacy. We now have reached the point where the inevitable Max Weber enters the stage and it is him that we will try 10

11

12

That Mustafa Kemal personally preferred the not very “European” Balkan folk music was less a part of his public persona than his endorsement of classical forms of Western music. It would nonetheless be totally wrong to see Mustafa Kemal in line with Hitler and his ilk. Mustafa Kemal thought dictatorship was a necessity during a period of transition. For him the French 3rd Republic was the hallmark of modern statecraft see e.g. Berger (2014). “The first axis is the construction of a tradition, a system of affiliation that binds together the past and the present by authenticating a narrative of foundation and tribulations,

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to follow for the rest of this paper. Weber did not live to see the blossoming of 20th century authoritarianism, totalitarianism and personality cults, but his concept of charismatic legitimacy and rule is of central importance to the explanation of the prevalence of the cult of Atatürk in modern Turkey. It is easy to describe the cult of Atatürk, and objects of personality cults more generally, in terms of Weber’s charismatic leadership. The leader has the right to overthrow whatever rules and institutions there were, as he is the bearer of an absolute authority. This authority doesn’t prove itself by reference to things past or by set rules13 but by the belief of the supporters in the extraordinary and novel nature of their leader. This nature proves itself further by the capacity of the leader to provide well-being for his supporters. This well-being usually consists of some kind of economic benefit. But in contrast to rational political systems this benefit is provided by extra-economic means, as booty (Weber 1972: III 4. § 10, IX 5. §§ 1–3). The Gazi (i.e. the hero in a war of Muslims against non-Muslims) Mustafa Kemal, the savior of the nation from foreign occupation, ethnic cleansing and all kinds of encroachments, had provided extraordinary benefit in a political situation where this was scarcely to be hoped for. Military heroism was part of the traditional Ottoman-Turkish imaginaire. The most radical reforms of Kemalism (the abolition of the monarchy and the caliphate, the disestablishment of religions foundations, the prohibition of sufi-orders) were legitimised by the charisma won by military victory. But, as we have seen, although it started in 1923, the fully-fledged personality cult of Mustafa Kemal is a phenomenon of the years after the mid-20s, when most of the revolutionary changes had already been implemented. What is more: very soon the cult took forms that did not necessarily serve the function to legitimise change in the eyes of the populace. It was rather the cult itself that needed legitimisation. This is true most of all for the monuments that were (and are) erected in his honor all over the country. The monumental representation of leaders was not an easily communicable way of projecting charisma in Turkish society at the time.14 The Ottoman Empire’s traditional rulers, the Sultans, never had public statues of themselves erected anywhere. Statues were seen by many as a form of idolatry that did not

13 14

by honoring heroes and martyrs and by placing the community’s dead at the center of a remembrance designed to perpetuate the collective identity. The second is the attribution of exceptional value to a person or group of people embodying a world view that offers a system of final causes, defines good and evil, and contains the promise of a better society. The third is an invasive ritualization that seeks to enclose the members of the community in a network of gestures and signs, intended to create a complete and exclusive membership, thereby making the group a kind of “emotional community” in the Weberian sense and surrounding it with a halo of transcendence or an aura of the sacred” (Burrin 1997: 331). “gesatzte Regeln” in Weber’s peculiar German. That it was possible at all is, of cause, a consequence of the power to bring about revolutionary change that is the hallmark of the bearer of charismatic legitimacy.

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provide legitimacy but rather sapping the legitimacy the regime derived from its military prestige. The erection of statues of the leader was as much a revolutionary measure as the “revolution” of clothing or the introduction of the Latin alphabet.15 Statues were part of the general Kemalist policy of adaption to Western cultural norms. Great statesmen were given statues all over Europe. In order to be a European country, Turkey needed its share of such statues. In republican Turkey the history of the defunct Ottoman Empire had become anathema. Therefore, Ottoman leaders were not readily at hand to fulfill the function that was fulfilled by Bismarck and Wilhelm I. in imperial Germany. It had to be leaders of the War of Independence. The war had had a plurality of leaders and this was still recognised publicly when the monument at Taksim square was erected, as we have seen. After 1928 things had changed. Other leaders of the war of independence who wanted their fair share of power were ousted. Mustafa Kemal still allowed for differences of opinion within the Kemalist elite on a variety of policy issues; yet he did not allow anyone to doubt his role as final arbiter of all inter-elite conflicts anymore. Mustafa Kemal came to monopolise power as well as statues and encomia. The cult of Mustafa Kemal during his lifetime turns out to have had two different functions that led to differing forms of veneration. Firstly, in the absence of any rousing ideology the charismatic figure of the Gazi served to legitimise the regime and its revolutionary changes. The Gazi had saved his people from outside, non-Muslim enemies and had the right and duty to have all measures carried through that he thought fit for the future of the people he had saved. The second function was to give a regime that was poorly institutionalised a final arbiter for all kinds of intra-elite conflicts. Atatürk had the unquestioned power to replace leaders if they had (to him) outworn their usefulness. He alone decided to replace İnönü as Prime Minister by Celal Bayar in 1937. He alone had the wisdom to solve conflicts on policies, e.g. economic strategies. The monuments erected to Atatürk, and to him alone, made manifest to everybody within the elite that Turkey had an unquestioned leader who stood far above the fray.16 It was this intra-elite function of the Atatürk cult that led to its temporary toning down after his death. The regime needed a new arbiter, and he was found in the person of the Millî Şef İsmet İnönü. Atatürk was not debunked to be sure. But to keep the dead Atatürk too much alive would have given highly 15

16

Massive and violent opposition against the representation of Atatürk is known only from the 1950s, as far as I can see. After the victory of the Democrats, members of the Ticani-order of dervishes started smashing busts of Atatürk. The government reacted by laws protecting the memory of the leader (Kaynar 2009: 1104ff.). That personality cults provide legitimacy to the regime and at the same time give weakly institutionalised regimes an unquestioned arbiter who can solve intra-elite conflicts seems to me to be a more general function of personality cults. It would be easy to show the same for Nazi-Germany and Stalinist Russia.

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placed enemies of the new leader material to legitimise all kinds of oppositional moves. Instead, by refocusing personality cults on himself (and at the same time reintegrating Mustafa Kemal’s old enemies like Kazım Karabekir) İnönü stabilised his newly found position as the arbiter of conflicts within the Kemalist leadership. As we have seen, after free elections in 1950 that led to the loss of power of İnönü, Atatürk’s cult came back in force. The new Democrat government, although it certainly profited much from the popularity and charisma of its Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, did not try to instate a fully fledged cult of personality in his favor. As it seems, with the change to multi-party politics the elites had now found procedural and formal ways of managing internal conflicts (namely elections) and were not in need of an unquestioned arbiter anymore. But by now, all younger Turks had been brought up in state schools in reverence of Atatürk and his exploits in war and peace. Criticism of him had been a taboo for decades. Many elements of the cult that had shocked earlier generations had now become as common a feature of the Turkish landscape as the Latin script or European forms of headgear. As everybody, not only members of the elite, had learned to worship him, the cult of the republic’s dead founding father could now serve as a neutral legitimising cult figure for the Kemalist elite as a whole. Atatürk had created Turkey and all that was worth living for. He had been the origin of the very “well-being” the charismatic Weberianstyle leader is supposed to provide. Everybody in the country could be counted on to pay his respect to him. By producing a totem figure for the regime in the person of Atatürk, fundamental criticism of Turkish realities had become a taboo.17 The cult of this totem was consequently increased in periods of crisis, as after the period of unrest of the late 70s and early 80s. He provided them shelter from all the enemies of the Turkish state: “reactionaries” (Islamists), “separatists” (Kurds) and communists. Even after his death Atatürk in a way continued to provide for his people, i.e. the Kemalist elite. Like holy texts and cult figures in all religions that survive for long periods, the Atatürk of the cult is largely an empty signifier, an auberge espagnole. Everybody can see whatever he likes in his image. Atatürk is a leftist anti-imperialist for the Kemalist left and at the same time a devout Muslim Turkish nationalist for the Kemalist right. Only general criticism of the state he has founded is excluded. It is this very emptiness of the cult figure that allows all parts of the elite to take part in the cult. During the Gezi-Protests of the summer 2013, the image of Atatürk was still used as a protective icon by Kemalists. But it seems as if Atatürk is of no help anymore in their fight against the new Anatolian bourgeoisie that has taken over the country in a slow process beginning in the 1980s (now embodied in 17

For Atatürk as a totem-figure see Kaynar (2009).

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both the AKP and its nemesis, the Fethullahcıs). Ironically, during the Geziconflict Atatürk’s picture was used by these very new elites to defuse Kemalist criticism against them.18 As these examples show, the Atatürk-cult is very much alive (even if we can doubt the sincerity of the AKP’s leaders when they pay their respect to him). How long this will continue after the seemingly terminal decline of the elites as whose totem Atatürk served is difficult to tell and not a question a historian should try to answer. But why did the cult survive so much longer than other cults born during the inter-war period? As we have seen, it was of some use. The Atatürk-cult legitimised an elite that could not readily legitimise itself by service (providing for the economic well-being of the people) or some strong identity-building ideology (Islam has always been more or less an opposition ideology and nationalism ambivalent in a country that is home to two strong nationalisms). But its usefulness and the fact that it was and is instilled in schools do not explain why the cult found credence in a relatively open society, although it was as much open to ridicule as any such cult? Of course one could say that many democratic polities are built on cult-figures or myths that serve similar functions and are not readily put in question.19 But rarely are these figures or myths as present on the political scene on a day to day basis as Atatürk is in Turkey and rarely does the cult of these figures take the grotesque proportions that we can witness in Turkey. One might ask whether this has something to do with a more general structure of politics in Turkey. Even though at first glance Turkey is a democracy along western lines, the structure of politics in Turkey has many features in common with neo-patrimonial systems and more generally with countries where the Western state is an imported commodity. The consequences of this have been analysed in detail by Bertrand Badie in his seminal study L’État importé. One thing that Badie (1992: 23ff., 82ff.) draws our attention to is the prevalence of segmentary conflict, i.e. conflicts between groups defined not on the basis of social-economic class in the widest sense but on a common cultural identity (religious groups, tribes, common geographic origin etc.). This means that politics in Turkey is a game not so much between political programs as between these identity groups that, in the Turkish case, accept the legitimacy of other groups and their identity claims only to a limited

18

19

On this e.g. http://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/1043145-akmdeki-ataturk-posteri-ned en-indirildi, accessed on 08.08.2014. While Erdoğan avails himself of Atatürk in his fight against the Kemalists by keeping his figure a taboo, İsmet İnönü is not above the melee. Erdoğan uses the personality cult about İnönü during the Millî Şef-period in order to impute totalitarian tendencies to the present day CHP-leadership see e.g. http://www.sonda kika.com/haber/haber-erdogan-zorla-inonu-yu-cumhurbaskani-sectirdiler-6277726/, accessed on 08.08.2014. E.g. Lincoln and the founding fathers in the US, 1789 and human rights in France, Churchill and Britain’s stand against Nazi Germany.

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degree.20 These groups are in a constant struggle for control of resources that are distributed by access to political power. The internal structuring of these groups is authoritarian and personalised and reproduces modes of behavior that are prevalent in the family (respect for the superior / elder who provides for the lower ranking / younger members of the group). Internal rifts would weaken the group and thereby diminish its chances of success. The identification of the leader and the group,21 unquestioning (outward) support, the avoidance of (public) criticism and even adulation of leaders is something that is deeply ingrained in the structure of Turkish political society far beyond the cult of Atatürk. Therefore, most Turkish political leaders, once they have acquired a substantial following, remain the leaders of their group until they die.22 Atatürk could survive as a cult figure because the Kemalist elite needed his support and kept his cult going. But this worked because he is not the only but simply the biggest idol in a political landscape that was and is full of figures and cults of his kind.

Bibliography Badie, Bertrand. (1992): L’État importé. L’occidentalisation de l’ordre politique, Paris. Berger, Lutz (2014): Der beste Führer im Leben ist die positive Wissenschaft. Atatürk und Europa, in: Reiner v. Arntz, Michael Gehler and Mehmet Tahir Öncü (eds.), Die Türkei, der deutsche Sprachraum und Europa, Wien, 129–139. Burrin, Pierre (1997): Political Religion. The Relevance of a Concept, History and Memory, vol. 9, No 1/2. Hanioğlu, Şükrü (2011): Atatürk, Princeton. Kaynar, Mete Kaan (2009): Totem, Tabu, Mustafa Kemal ve Atatürkçülük, in: Murat Belge (ed.), Dönemler ve Zihniyetler, Istanbul, 1089–1120. Mango, Andrew (1999): Atatürk, New York.

20

21 22

Often these segments enter into conflicts on binary terms as “Kemalist laicists vs. Sunni Muslims”, “Sunnis vs. Alevis”, “Turks vs. Kurds”. But segments may also not have any specific other, but still stick together to defend their interests like migrants to Istanbul or Ankara from a certain origin, members of religious communities like the Fethullahcıs, members of a tribe or extended family etc. On such patterns in Turkey (and not only, as the title suggests, in the conservative Muslim milieu) see Seufert 1997: 63–236. See footnote 9. İsmet İnönü being the one example of a political leader to have stepped down several times during his career accepting political defeat: Most notably from the presidency in 1950 and from the leadership of the CHP in 1972 This makes the fact that the very much inamovible Erdoğan uses him as an example of authoritarian rule (see above note 18) is a bit ironic.

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Seufert, Günter (1997): Politischer Islam in der Türkei. Islamismus als symbolische Repräsentation einer sich modernisierenden muslimischen Gesellschaft, Istanbul. Tekiner, Aylin (2010): Atatürk Heykelleri. Kült, Estetik, Siyaset, Istanbul. Ünder, Hasan (2009): Atatürk İmgesi Siyasal Yaşamdaki Rolü, in: Murat Belge (ed.), Kemalizm, Istanbul. Weber, Max (1972): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Tübingen. Wilson, Christopher S. (2013): Beyond Anıtkabir: The Funerary Architecture of Atatürk, Farnham. Zürcher, Erik Jan (2010): the Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building. From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey, London.

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Which Kemalism? – The Amorphous and Diverse Frames in the Party System Tamer Düzyol

Introduction Kemalism is a term derived from the founder and first president of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. He led the Turkish War of Independence from 1918–1922 and played an important role in the first decades of the newly founded republic, but he also had a lasting influence on the state system and society. This program that changed the state and society is referred to as “Kemalism”. But what does Kemalism include? Technically one can combine the six principles that are named in the party programmes of the Republican Peoples’ Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) in the 1930s: nationalism, laicism, populism, republicanism, revolutionism and etatism. Retrospectively, the reforms that were implemented during the first decades of the state founding are also seen as core to Kemalism. In today’s Turkey, Kemalism plays a formal role, due to the fact that Kemalism is included in the constitution and also in the Party Law. The Party Law assumes that political parties in Turkey commit to the principles and “revolutions” of Atatürk (Turkish Party Law 2002: 13). Since the foundation of the Constitutional Court, 18 parties have been banned. So, one can imagine that because of this latent pressure threatening parties in Turkey, parties have had to ensure that their ideology conforms to the system and communicates a position to Kemalism considered acceptable by the state institutions. Through examining this issue, this essay shows the Kemalism frames that exist in the Turkish party system. 1

Kemalism The term “Kemalism” was mentioned for the first time by “Western” authors (Karal 1997). While “Kemalism” didn’t appear in the 1931 party program of the

1

This article is based on a dissertation that was submitted to the University of Erfurt under the title “Kemalism as historical and institutional subject: Frames in the Turkish party system“(„Kemalismus als historischer und institutioneller Gegenstand: Deutungsrahmen innerhalb des türkischen Parteiensystems“) in 2014. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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Republican People’s Party, the party program of 1935 includes the term in the first pages. After Atatürk died (10.11.1938) İsmet İnönü became the second president of the republic. To criticise the authoritarian regime wasn’t easily possible. So opponents used the term “Atatürkist” to describe themselves when expressing their critique of the İnönü-Regime. After 1960, leftist groups discovered “Kemalism” as a term and “Atatürkism” was claimed by nationalist-conservative groups. Levent Köker (2004) uses both terms simultaneously: “Kemalism/ Atatürkism”. For Mesut Yeğen (2004), Atatürkism in the İnönü rule is a set of several ideas that are flexible, whereas Kemalism is a systematic and holistic program to design a new state system and society. Taha Parla (1995) makes it clear that Atatürkism and Kemalism can’t express completely different ideologies because both refer through their name to the chief ideologist Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. There are also some attempts to build different variations of Kemalism-types, which subdivide a complex issue to help understand Kemalism better in history and modern times. Taner Timur (2010) makes a distinction between “real Kemalism”, which is a military ideology in the context of the 1980 military coup, and “historical Kemalism”, which he contextualises with the Turkish War of Independence. For Taha Parla (2009), Kemalism is composed of different parts. For him, if one wants to understand Kemalism as a whole, one has to understand the several parts it is composed of. There exist two types for Parla: the “cultural Kemalism” and “political Kemalism”. “Political Kemalism” describes a regime type. It is also a historical-political ideology that is authoritarian and etatist. “Cultural Kemalism” is a movement and as well an ideology that includes laicism, rationalism and cultural reformism. However, these Kemalismtypes are not detailed enough to show us the whole picture. If we want to deal with Kemalism we also need to consider this subject historically. The term itself remains unclear and has gained no clarity during its historical development. The first time Kemalism was defined was in the party program of the Republican People’s Party. On the party conference of this party on the 10th of May 1931, the basic principles of the party and so of Kemalism were resolved. The party programs of 1931 and 1935 contain Kemalism and are seen as reference works for it. So, the six principles nationalism, laicism, republicanism, populism, statism and revolutionism build the basic structure of the Kemalism. The definitions in the party programs remain superficial and imprecise. So, speeches of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who is seen as chief ideologist, and other important representatives of the CHP are used to understand the principles. Moreover, the reforms – called revolutions – that have implemented the six principles are understood as a part of Kemalism. They show the spirit of the ideology.

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There are a lot of reforms that symbolise the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic. In March 1924, the caliphate system of the Ottoman state system was abolished. In the same year the Ottoman family was banished from Turkey. The dual education system, which offered a religious and secular type of education, was simultaneously abolished as well. The “Hat Revolution” was a law in 1925 that prescribed civil servants to wear a hat and suit. Afterwards a law was introduced that determined a hat as headgear instead of the fez, which was commonly wore by men. In 1926 sharia law was abolished and the new Turkish civil code was passed, which was copied from the Swiss civil code. In 1928 Islam as a state religion was removed from the constitution. In same year the “Letter revolution” happened by publishing a law that introduced the Turkish alphabet based on Latin letters. In 1934 the passive suffrage and in 1935 the active suffrage of women was introduced. These reforms focused on the state system and society and aimed to break with the Ottoman past as well as with Islam. Despite the three elements – the six principles, Kemalist reforms and the speeches and writings of Atatürk and other Kemalist officials – which should draw a more accurate picture, there is still room left for doubt and space left for interpretation. Discussions about the principle of nationalism as a key important principle of Kemalism demonstrate this difficulty. Ahmet Yıldız (2004) recognises different concepts. He classifies three phases where the notions of nationalism distinguished. (1) In the first period, between 1919 and 1923, nationalism leaned on religion. (2) In the second time period from 1924 to 1929 the notions of nationalism turned to an inclusive nationalism. (3) The nationalism of the third phase between 1929 and 1938 was based on Turkish ethnicity. So, which nationalism notion was meant by Kemalism? In his book “But which Atatürk” (Ama Hangi Atatürk) Taha Akyol (2008) considers the different speeches and policies of Atatürk in different periods. He makes it clear that Atatürk adapted his policies to his current strategy. So Kemalism with its elements remains amorphous. Nevertheless, by 1937 the six Kemalist principles were entered into the constitutional law of 1924. Thus Kemalism became the official ideology of the republic. For the newly founded Republic of Turkey, Kemalism was to represent a spirit for the state and society.

State Institutions as Guardianship Since the founding of the republic, state institutions played an important role in enforcing a state policy oriented to Kemalism. Especially the military and the constitutional court shaped the political life in Turkey.

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Atatürk and his companions on the path to an independent nation state were mainly soldiers. So from the beginning the military played an important role, not only to secure the country and the nation against foreign threats, but also to secure Kemalism. Till the era of the period of rule by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) the military perceived itself as an instance of control beyond checks and balances. No wonder then, that the military intevened several times. There were three “successful” manifest military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980.2 It seems unclear whether Kemalism played a role in the reasoning behind these interventions. But in its declarations the military uses “stylistic” elements of Kemalism. In 1950 for the first time a party other than the CHP came to power. The Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti – DP) upon winning this election became more and more of an autocratic government that oppressed members of the opposition. The DP was not as strict on the issue of secularism as the CHP government. The military disliked the fact that the DP didn't take laicism as seriously as the CHP government and observed the DP's policy closely. So the military made a coup on the morning of May 27th 19603 with no reference to Kemalism except for Atatürk’s famous expression “peace at home and in the world”, a key principle of Atatürk’s foreign policy. This expression can be understood as a signal for neighbouring countries that this military intervention did not have expansionist aims. While the coup in 1971 shows no obvious links to Kemalism or Atatürk, the intervention by the military in the coup of 1980 and afterwards was different. Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren already legitimated the intervention in a speech by referencing the weakened influence of the principles of Atatürk (Evren 1980). One of the reasons for the intervention was the street battles between leftist and rightist groups. So on one hand, the military aims to depoliticise the society in Turkey and on the other hand the military wants to put Atatürk and his principles in the foreground to secure national unity. For example, the ruling military celebrated the 100th aniversary of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s birth as ‘Atatürk year’. Also in 1981 institutions were (re-)established, like The Turkish Language Institution, The Turkish Historical Institution and the Institution for Ataturk, Culture, Language and History to educate intellectuals who spread the idea of Kemalism. A new constitution directly and indirectly referred to the principals of Kemalism, and contained an article making 2

3

The coup attempt of 2016 is not included as a part of the analysis. It seems that in the background of the junta attempt was the network of the cleric Fethullah Gülen. The main aim of the attempt was to remove from office the AKP government, not because of the closeness to religion or any other reason which could be connected to Kemalism. Subsequently to the military coup Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was punished with the death penalty. Also, the Foreign Minister Fatih Rüştü Zorlu and Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan were sentenced to death. In the collective mind of conservatives, the death penalty of Menderes is representative of the brutality of the Kemalist system. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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these sections irrevocable. And also the party law and the Higher Education Act includes strong references to Kemalism. On one hand the military put Atatürk in the foreground and on the other hand, religion received more space in political and public life. It appears contradictory if one understands Kemalism as a program that wants to weaken the ties of the state and society with religion. But in the historical context of the Cold War the reinforcement of religion and religious movements show a trend to weaken leftist groups and movements. So it wasn’t suprising that Kenan Evren refered to Islam in his speeches. Beside these manifest military coups there were also military interventions without the assumption of power over the government’s affairs. For instance, the process of the 28th February (in 1997), referred to as a “velvet coup”, where under pressure from the military the Islamic politician and prime minister Necmettin Erbakan resigned. That was the first time a politician belonging to a clearly religious-centered movement became the prime minister. He and his Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP) brought a lot of religious issues onto the agenda. The military has shown its attitude towards these changes publicly. The military gathered several times for consultation, which was reported by the media. After an event about the Palastine-Israel-conflict where the demands to introduce Sharia law in Turkey were made in Sincan, Ankara, a tank patrol made a tour. That the millitary might make an intervention was a common perception in society. Finally at the meeting of the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu – MGK) the military submitted a list with recommendations for pushing back Islamism in Turkey. Erbakan didn’t subscribe but resigned. Abdullah Gül, the presidential candidate and the ruling Justice and Development Party was threatened with a so-called “E-memorandum” by the military. Abdullah Gül clearly belongs to the political Islam movement in Turkey and Gül’s wife wears a headscarf. The Presidency Palace is seen as a public building. So that is how the headscarf moved into the presidential palace, despite the fact that it was banned from public buildings, from universities, administration to other public places. The Judiciary was one more gatekeeper for the Kemalist state system. So a large number of political parties were banned in the history of the republic. The six principles of Kemalism were incorporated into the 1937 constitution. In the constitutions of 1961 and 1982 “Kemalism” wasn’t mentioned explicitly, as one can find in the first constitution, but they are “Guiding Principles” (Parla 2007). Already in the preamble to the constitution of 1982 one can find Atatürk-Nationalism, including the principles of inseparability of the state, laicism, and sovereignty of the people, amongst others. Even though the term “Kemalism” isn’t included the constitution references Atatürk’s principles and revolutions. While Kemalism was the half official ideology in the constitution

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of 1961 it once again becomes the official ideology in the constitution of 1982 (ibid.), like in the modified first constitution of the republic. Segregation

Anti-Laisist National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi)

20.05.1971

Workers Party of Turkey (Türkiye 20.07.1971 İşçi Partisi)

Party of Inward Peace (Huzur Partisi)

25.10.1983

Labour Party of Turkey (Türkiye Emekçi Partisi)

The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)

16.01.1998

United Communist Party of Turkey 16.07.1991 (Türkiye Birleşik Komünist Partisi)

Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi)

22.06.2001

Socialist Party (Sosyalist Parti)

10.07.1992

People’s Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi)

14.07.1993

08.05.1980

Freedom and Democracy Party 23.11.1993 (Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi) Party of a Socialist Türkey (Sosyalist 30.11.1993 Türkiye Partisi) Party of Democracy (Demokrasi 16.06.1994 Partisi) The Socialist Unity Party (Sosyalist 19.07.1995 Birlik Partisi) Party of Democracy and Change 19.03.1996 (Demokrasi ve Değişim Partisi) Labour Party (Emek Partisi) Party of Democratic (Demokratik Kitle Partisi)

14.02.1997 Mass 26.02.1999

People’s Democracy Party (Halkın 13.03.2003 Demokrasi Partisi) The Democratic Society Party 11.12.2009 (Demokratik Toplum Partisi)

Table 1: Party bans by constitutional court – Reasons and prohibition date (mark stands for the bans before and after the 1980 military coup)

The first two articles of the current constitution continue to contain the spirit of Kemalism: “ARTICLE 1– The State of Turkey is a Republic. […] ARTICLE 2– The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by rule of law, within the notions of public peace, national solidarity and justice, respecting human rights, loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982: 11, emphasis in original).” Especially two terms make unclear what they mean in their complexity: “secular state” and “nationalism of Atatürk”. The last one is a neologism in the constitutional history in Turkey. This new term does not make clear what this typus of nationalism means. Atatürk espoused several different concepts of nahttps://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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tionalism at different times. The concept of “secular state” don’t answer why the state can offer religious services via the Presidency of Religious Affairs and yet refuse education for students wearing the headscarf. In several places the constitution refers to Kemalism. But also other laws include references to Kemalism. So the party law of 1983 draws the borders of action areas for political parties. The party law defines which duties and prohibitions parties in Turkey have. Political parties in Turkey are elements of the democratic political life that are bound by the principles and revolutions of Ataturk (Party Law 2002). The 4th part of the Party Law (§§ 78 – 96) is explicitly concerned with prohibitions for political parties. While §§ 79 – 83 refer under the title “Protecting the Characteristics of the Nation State” to the nationalism principle, §§ 84 – 89 refer to laicism, which is shown by the title “Protecting the Principles and Revolutions of Atatürk and the Characteristics of a Secular State”. So the prohibitions concentrate on the unity of state and nation and laicism. The party bans confirm that. 18 parties were banned after 1960 by the court.4 The number of bans increased after the coup of 1980. Three of 18 parties were prohibited after this coup.While 14 parties were seen as a threat to territorial integrity, four parties as a threat to the secular state system. Thus, mainly communist/socialist, Islamist and Kurdish parties were affected by prohibitions. The last prohibitions particularly affected parties from the National Vision and Kurdish rights movements. The National Vision Movement is connected with the parties in which Necmettin Erbakan played a role. Ideologically, the movement can be classified as Islamist and the historical context of repression against people who lived out their Islamic faith gave meaning to the movement. So issues like the headscarf and religious education were their concern. The National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi), the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) and the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) were banned parties of this movement. The prohibition of the Welfare Party is particularly interesting, because the party was the biggest group in the parliament when it was prohibited. The Party of Democracy (Demokrasi Partisi), People’s Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi), People’s Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi) and the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) are parties of the Kurdish rights movement, which were confronted with accusations of segregation and prohibited because of that. Officially in the Turkish party system, parties exist that aren’t compatible with Kemalism. The Party Law is clear how the relation to Atatürk, the six principles and the revolution have to be. So how do the parties in Turkey commu-

4

But party bans existed before 1960 as well, starting in 1920. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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nicate about Kemalism? Are they hiding their critiques? And which frames are visible?

Kemalism-Frames in the party system The basis of the analysis are, on the one hand party literature, programs and statutes, and on the other hand interviews with officials and reprensentatives from the sample parties.5 Both give the data for the Kemalist-frames in the Turkish party system, which are generated through a frame analysis independently of each other. The sample parties were the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP), Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi – BDP), Great Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi – BBP), Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP), Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti – DP), Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti – DSP), Labour Party (Emek Partisi – EMEP), People’s Voice Party (Halkın Sesi Partisi – HAS-Parti), Party of Right and Equality (Hak ve Eşitlik Partisi – HEPAR), Liberal Democratic Party (Liberal Democratic Party – LDP), National Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP), Nationalist and Conservative Party (Milliyetçi 5

The sample of the parties oriented on accredited parties for the June 2011 elections for the Turkish parliaments by Supreme Election Council (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu). So 14 parties were part of the analysis: Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP), Great Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi – BBP), Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP), Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti – DP), Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti – DSP), True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi – DYP), Labour Party (Emek Partisi – EMEP), People’s Voice Party (Halkın Sesi Partisi – HAS-Parti), Party of Right and Equality (Hak ve Eşitlik Partisi – HEPAR), Liberal Democratic Party (Liberal Democratic Party – LDP), National Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP), Nationalist and Konservativ Party (Milliyetçi ve Muhafazakar Parti – MMP), Nation Party (Millet Party – MP), Fecility Party (Saadet Partisi – SP) and Communist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Komünist Partisi – TKP). The Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi – BDP) was included in the sample because the party didn’t participate in the parliamentary election because of the high ten percent threshold. The party saw itself as representatives of the Kurds in Turkey. And the predecessor of the Peace and Democracy Party was banned by the constitutional court because of the segregation accusation. Interviews with officials or representatives of all mentioned parties could be conducted except with a representative of the True Path Party. Making a contact wasn’t possible personally over the telephone nor by e-mail. Because of that the True Path Party was taken out of the sample, although it was accredited to the elections. The frame-analysis – an interpretative method to recognise definitions of reality or symbolic order which are negotiated interactively by social actors (Keller 2007) – is done for Kemalism as whole, for the principles nationalism and laicism and for Atatürk, which can be seen as an element of Kemalism because he is a historical person, founder of Turkey and chief ideologist of Kemalism. This essay deals only with the frame-analysis of Kemalism as the whole ideology. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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ve Muhafazakar Parti – MMP), Nation Party (Millet Party – MP), Fecility Party (Saadet Partisi – SP) and Communist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Komünist Partisi – TKP). The parties have to been seen less as individual parties and more as families of parties (von Beyme 1984). One can recognise eight party families. The AKP, SP and HAS-Party can be seen as religion-centered parties. Politicians from these three parties worked together in the Milli Görüş parties. CHP and DSP are the parties that are closest to Kemalism. For them a laicist state system is an important issue and both are social democratic parties. The MHP, BBP and MMP are categorised as Turkish nationalist . These parties are mixing Turkishness with Islam. EMEP and TKP are communist/socialist parties. BDP is an ethnic and regional party. The DP represents laicist conservertism, LDP is a liberal party and HEPAR a national populist (Düzyol 2014).

Kemalism-Frames Before I deal with the Kemalism-frames. I give a descriptive overview of Kemalism in the party literature. None of the parties in the sample use the term “Kemalism”. The Republican People’s Party is the only one that mentions the six Kemalist principles not only as “principles” but uses the term “Atatürk’s revolution and the six-arrow-principles” (CHP programm: 12). The Democratic Left Party (DSP) mentions “Atatürkism” without describing it and also mentions “laicism”, “Atatürk-Populism”, and “revolutions of Atatürk” in its party literature. 11 parties use synonyms. Just one of the synonyms that one can find is, “Atatürk principles and revolutions”, “stock characteristics of the republic”, “basic values of the republic”, “basic principles of the republic/constitution”. Four parties don’t use any synonym in their party literature: the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), the Labour Party (EMEP), the Felicity Party (SP) and the People’s Voice Party (HAS-Parti). If one first takes a look at the frames of Kemalism that are based on party literature there are three frames: (1) Carriers of the different values, (2) Paradigm of Modernity and (3) The Monolithic System.6 In the first frame “Carrier of different values”, based on the party literature, the parties associate Kemalism with different values: The DSP links the notion of nation based on nationalism and laicism with Kemalism. The TKP sees the basic characteristics of the Republic of Turkey as independence and laicism. The Democratic Party associates Atatürk’s principles with equality and the position of women. The Republican People’s Party embraces Kemalism in a broader 6

The party literature of BBP, HEPAR, LDP, MHP, MMP and MP give no possibilities to generate Kemalism-frames although they are using synonyms for Kemalism. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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sense: The party understands the Atatürk Revolutions and six arrow principles as a process of nationalisation and as a laical republic. At the same time, Kemalism is the source of the ambition of independence, sovereignty of the people and a modern society. The second frame, “Paradigm of Modernity”, has two sub-frames. The common denominator of the two sub-frames is the connection to modernity. The first sub-frame, “Kemalism as Instrument”, sees Kemalism as a means to an end, which helps the society to become a “mordern society”. In the other sub-frame, “Kemalism as guide”, Kemalism is more than an instrument. Kemalism is equated with modernity, with a modern Turkey of the 21st century. The last frame, “the monolithic system”, which is generated by the analysis of the party literature, doesn’t mention Kemalism and also does not use synonyms for it. But there are some political parties (BDP, EMEP and SP) give clues as to their position on Kemalism. So the Fecility Party speaks from a monolitic thinking which is seen as democracy against which they are (Fecility Party party program). The BDP evaluated the founding era of the republic: “The existence of other identities, cultures, beliefs were denied. Thus an authoritarian and monolithic structure were created. Instead of our rich geographical heritage it rules a notion of one party, one leader, one reality, one ideology, one culture and one folk” (Peace and Democracy Party ?: 118).

The party refers to the one-party era, the eternal leader Atatürk who promotes Kemalism, Sunni-Islam and Turkishness (Düzyol 2014). Moving on from the frames which are based on party platforms and statutes I will now discuss the frames which I generated from the interviews I conducted. Here I identify three frames: (1) Kemalism Mask, (2) Paradigm 1923 and (3) “The forged Kemalism”. The first of those frames, which I call the “Kemalism Mask”, was mentioned in an interview. Here Kemalism is seen in the historical context after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. So a group of stakeholders, or rather bureaucratic elites, exploited Kemalism to stay in power and realise its targets with a Jacobin mentality. This group tried to keep the “periphery” (in centre-periphery cleavage) out. The second frame is named “Paradigm 1923”. In this frame, the officials who I interviewed associated Kemalism with the foundation of the republic and certain values like the six principles, reforms of the start-up phase, the founding philosophy and Atatürk’s thinking. According to party ideology, the parties count certain values: For the TKP the strongest argument of Kemalism is a classless society. The Interviewee of the Labour Party EMEP calls Kemalism a “bourgeoise ideology” that builds a capitalist system. The CHP official sees the republic and laicism as important objectives while founding the new state.

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WHICH KEMALISM? Party Literature

Interviews

Porter of Different Values

Kemalism Mask

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CHP, DP, DSP, TKP

AKP, BDP, DP, HAS-Party, HEPAR, LDP, MHP, SP

Paradigm of Modernity

Paradigm 1923

Kemalism as Instrument

Kemalism as guide

AKP

CHP, DP, DSP

CHP, DSP, EMEP, MP, TKP

The Monolitic System

The Forged Kemalism

BDP, EMEP, SP

BBP, MMP

Table 2: Kemalism-Frames – based on party literature and Interviews (Düzyol 2014: 118, 123; matched table 5 and 6)

This third frame, “The Forged Kemalism” appears on the basis of the two right wing parties that I interviewed. There are two phases, which are linked to two historical personalities: Atatürk and İnönü. The interviewees believe that in the İnönü phase, Kemalism was mixed with socialism, which then forged the Kemalism. This ideology was similar to a dictatorship. It remains unclear what the pure Kemalism was. At first look this frame might seem strange. But at second glance it is understandable why Kemalism is seen as forged with socialism. Like I mentioned these parties are right wing parties (BBP and MMP). They were stuck in Cold War Turkey, where fights between leftist and rightist groups were a daily reality. Social leftist groups were adherents of Kemalism.

Conclusion As I show, one can identify different Kemalism-Frames: within the Historical Kemalism we had no static version. The written source, the platforms of the Republican People’s Party of the 1930s itself aren’t clear enough to determine what Kemalism is in detail, aside from that it consists of six principles and that the reforms have a meaning for it. After implementing a pluralist party system in the mid 1940s, state institutions hold the guardianship of Kemalism in their hands, which was solidified by the law especially after the coup of 1980. So primarily nationalism, laicism and Atatürk are the elements Kemalism was reduced to. In contemporary Turkey, Kemalism is perceived in various frames by the parties. Thus there does not exist a commen sense understanding of what Kemalism is. But the fact that I could not find the term “Kemalism” in the party literature and that it was also avoided by the interviewees show that there exists a consensus of a negative connotation. So the parties are using different synonyms, like for example “principles and revolution of Atatürk”, “basic values of the republic” or “Atatürkism”. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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Concerning the party platforms Kemalism is associated to values which are rather positively connoted. These positive connotations could be results of the restictive party law and experiences of party bannings. Only those parties that were excluded by the state system show their opposition to Kemalism directly. According to the frames generated by analysing interviews, one can state that the parties locate Kemalism mainly in a historical time space. The frames “Kemalism Mask” and “The forged Kemalism” are negatively connoted. And as well the frame “Paradigm 1923” was not associated with values which were not seen as positive achievments. Exceptions are the laical or social democratic parties, which link Kemalism with positive values, showing that Kemalism is contested. That shows that Kemalism is one of the conflict lines which exist between the parties as well in the society. The conflict lines we know from the cleavages theory of Lipset and Rokkan are also valid for Turkey. But the dominant conflict line is based on the fundamental issue that goes back at least to the era of the first decade after the republic’s founding and continues through the decades until today. This conflict line runs mainly along the question of nationalism, the role of religion and Atatürk, which could be seen as the pillars of today’s Kemalism.

Bibliography Akyol, Taha (2008): Ama Hangi Atatürk [But which Atatürk], Istanbul. Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (?): Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, Tüzük & Program [Peace and Democracy Party, Statute and Programm]. Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (1982), https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/ docs/constitution_en.pdf, accessed on 09.01.2018. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (?): Çağdaş Türkiye için Değişim Programı [Change Programm for a modern Turkey]. Dağı, İhsan: Why Turkey Needs a Post-Kemalist Order, in: Insight Turkey, vol. 14, no. 1/2012, 29–36. Düzyol, Tamer (2014): Kemalismus als historischer und institutioneller Gegenstand: Deutungsrahmen innerhalb des türkischen Parteiensystems [Kemalism as historical and institutional issue: Frames in the türkisch partysystem], Dissertation, Erfurt. Evren, Kenan: Radio and TV speech of Kenan Evren, http://www.belgenet.com/ 12eylul/12091980_08.html, accessed on 01.10.2012. Karal, Enver Ziya (1997): The Principles of Kemalism, in: Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (eds.), Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State, London, 11–35.

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Keller, Rainer (2007): Diskursforschung. Eine Einführung für SozialwissenschaftlerInnen [Discourse Research. A Introduction for social scientists], Wiesbaden. Köker, Levent (2004): Kemalizm/ Atatürkçülük: Modernleşme, Devlet ve Demokrasi [Kemalism/ Atatürkism: Modernisation, State and Democracy], in: Ahmet İnsel (ed.), Kemalizm. Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce [Kemalism. Political Thinking in the modern Turkey], vol. 2, Istanbul, 97–112. Parla, Taha (1995): Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Rsmî Kaynakları. Kemalist TekParti İdeolojisi ve CHP’nin Altı Ok’u [Official sources of the political culture in Turkey. The kemalist one-party-ideology and the six arrows of CHP], vol. 3, Istanbul. Parla, Taha (2007): Türkiye'de Anayasalar [Constitutions in Turkey], Istanbul. Parla, Taha (2009): Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm [Ziya Gökalp, Kemalism and Corporatism in Turkey], Istanbul. Yıldız, Ahmet (2004): Kemalist Milliyetҫilik [Kemalist Nationalism], in: Ahmet İnsel (ed.), Kemalizm. Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce [Kemalism. Political Thinking in the modern Turkey], vol. 2, Istanbul, 210–234. von Beyme, Klaus (1984): Parteien in westlichen Demokratien [Political Parties in Western Democracies], München. Weiker, Walter F. (1963): The Turkish Revolution 1960–1961. Aspect of Military Politics, Washington. Saadet Partisi (?): Program [Programm], http://www.saadet.org.tr/kurumsal/visonuc/688, accessed on 29.05.2013. Timur, Taner (2010): Osmalı Kimliği [Ottoman Identity], Ankara. Turkish Party Law (2002), Ankara. Yeğen, Mesut (2004): Kemalizm ve Hegemonya? [Kemalism and Hegemony?], in: Ahmet İnsel (ed.), Kemalizm. Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce [Kemalism. Political Thinking in the modern Turkey], vol. 2, Istanbul, 56–74.

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De-Kemalisation from above in “New Turkey”1 Burak Gümüş

Introduction The mildly-Islamist Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) or the JDP of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which has uninterruptedly been in office and the winner of all parliamentary, municipal and presidential elections and popular votes since 2002, has forwarded the radical departure of Turkey from the nationalist concept of the secular and unitary state-nation, guaranteed the plurality of ethnic identities and of the Sunni re-Islamisation “from above” and reinforced its claim to imperial neo-Ottoman power in the Middle East. During the presidential election campaign in 2014, Erdoğan announced that he wanted to create a “New Turkey”2 so that the existing Turkish Republic would have to be redesigned accordingly. There can hardly be any doubt among pro-government, liberal, leftist, proKurdish and Kemalist authors of the fact that the term “old Turkey” indirectly refers to the national-secularistic Kemalist republic (cf. Maraşo 2015; Yaşlı 2014; Çandar 13.08.2014). Especially after the popular vote of Erdoğan to the office of the state president in August 2014, the term “New Turkey”, which had been put into circulation by the JDP and the mass media, has been a central leitmotif since the 2011 election campaigns of the ruling government. Even Graham Fuller used the term “New Turkish Republic” to describe the country as a “Piv1 2

This is a revised, shortened and upgraded version of another article (cf. Gümüş 2015). Depending on which of the competing factions was in power in Turkey, a “New Turkey” was either attested by foreign observers or propagated by the rulers to legitimise their own power. Some examples are publications of the period of the Young Turks and the Kemalist single-party-state are the “Neue Türkei und ihre Führer” (“The New Turkey and its Leaders”) after the coup d’état in 1913, “Die neue Türkei: politische Entwicklung: 1924–1929” (“New Turkey: the political development between 1924 and 1929”) and the German translation of Atatürk’s Address to the Turkish nation after the establishment of the Kemalist Republic [“Die neue Türkei: 1919–1927: Der Weg zur Freiheit” (“The New Turkey between 1919 and 1927”)], cf. Nossig 1916; Ziemke 1930; Gasi Mustafa Kemal Pascha 1928. In the Kemalist “New Turkey”, the Ottoman sultanate and the Caliphate were abolished. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) the whole country was to be westernised: he declared a secular state, adopted a western civil code and abolished the Islamic Shariah law, (cf. Kollmorgen 2015; Members of the pro-American and pro-European wing of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP) of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, who seceded from the ruling coalition and provoked re-elections, established also the Party of New Turkey (Yeni Türkiye Partisi, YTP), (cf. Aktürk 2015). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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otal State in the Muslim World” which is undergoing a process of reform (cf. Fuller 2007). While the pro-government Star Daily Newspaper is defining itself as the “Newspaper of New Turkey”, the speeches of the JDP Prime Minister can be found in the category “On the way to New Turkey” (Yeni Türkiye Yolunda) in the office of the Prime Minister (cf. Başbakanlık Basın Merkezi w.d.). The mantra-like repeated expression “New Turkey” is a part of the repertoire in the speeches of President Erdoğan, who uses it both as a situational definition of the current and target states of the country in order to claim Muslim legitimation of his own rule: “For a great Turkey, for a new Turkey, we must cleanse all our institutions of cancer cells, starting with our justice system” (cf. Presidency of the Republic of Turkey 02.02.2015). Erdoğan’s “New Turkey” acts Islamic and promotes a conservative family image. While the ban on the headscarf in public is lifted, more and more women are forced to adopt an 'Islamic' way of life. The country regards itself as the successor to the Ottoman Empire, while the history of the great sultans is omnipresent in the media and school curricula and the 'Ottoman' (Arabic) script is taught in the schools (Steinbach 23.02.2015). The current declaration of “New Turkey” was initiated through the de-Kemalisation of state and society by the JDP and the Fethullah Gülen movement, which cooperated with Erdoğan until 2012.The article argues that the JDP and its former ally Fethullah Gülen put forward the de-Kemalisation of the Turkish state and society by removing Kemalists from positions of power and influence in the areas of politics, military, judiciary, and society through criminalisation, defamation and punishment campaigns, the usage of memory politics, depreciation of nationalist and secularist guiding principles in favour of Muslim values and norms in order to create a “Sunni Nation” (Yaşlı 2014).

De-Kemalisation Before even defining the concept “de-Kemalisation”, it has to be clear what is understood by the term “Kemalism”. Kemalism is an ideology based on the founder of the modern Republic of Turkey (1923), Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) that consists of six main principles called Six Arrows (Altıok/Altı Ok): nationalism3, secularism4, populism5, republicanism6, etatism7 und modernism8. 3

There are both national and international components of nationalism. On the international level, nationalism is the strive for an independent and equal status of the Turks beside other nations. The unification of ethnically different groups within Turkey in order to establish a unitary indivisible nation state is the aim of nationalism on the national level. The nation is understood as a politically and constitutionally defined union of all citizens represented by a legislative assembly without any regard to ethnicity, race, religion or sect (cf. Gümüş 2010). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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“Following Atatürk’s principles, there should be no particularistic special rights for differing ethnic, sectarian or religious groups or tolerance towards Islamism in order to protect the Turkish nation of citizens in the constitutional state. Against the background of the political turbulences in the first foundation years of the republic and the political instability chronic and continuing political instability after the introduction of the multi-party-system (re-elections, change of government, polarisation between religious fanatics, attempted coups or coups), the concern for security takes precedence over Kurdish-separatist, Islamist, communist and other movements and limits their legal scope for action” (Gümüş 2010: 27).

Kemalist values and norms changed the definition of the core society after the abolition of the obsolete Ottoman Empire: “The ‘5 Pillars' [of Islam, BG] were replaced by the ‘6 Principles' of Kemalism” (Dreßler 1999: 32). The “Six Arrows “were used to define the republican core society of the “Nation of western, modern, civilised, secular Turks” in contrast to the community of the Sunni Muslims of the Ottoman Empire, defined from a religious point of view. While the Kemalist “Six Arrows” were used as reference criteria for the construction and maintenance of the modern state nation, the JDP reintroduced Muslim values and norms in order to proclaim the “Sunni Nation” (Yaşlı 2014). De-Kemalisation should be understood in this context as an implemented programme of the ruling JDP and its then-allied Fethullah Gülen Movement in order to remove the Kemalist impact from the Turkish society, economy, judiciary, media, politics and culture by the removal of its supporters. Even if the process of the dismissal of the ruling Kemalist state elites began with the introduction of the multi-party-system and return of Islamism after the election victory of the bourgeois-conservative Democratic Party of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in 19509, the focus of this study is placed on the JDP era. Besides the removal and sanctioning of the “statist and elitist” Kemalists and

4 5 6 7

8 9

Kemalist secularism supports a banishment of religion of state, society and public life (cf. Toprak 1984). This principle is based on the concept of popular sovereignty and regards the population as “classless whole without any privileges for groups or individuals” (cf. Dreßler 1999). Both the Sultanate and Caliphate are refused in favour of a republican form of government (cf. Parla 1995). According to this principle, the centralised unitary state has to intervene in different areas, especially in the economy in service for the general interest of the community, if the private sector is insufficient (cf. ParIa 1995). This principle promotes the consistent pursuit of the reforms that have begun (cf. Parla 1995). After the introduction of the multi-party-system the Democratic Party won the elections as a representative of business in 1950 and also with the electoral promise to implement the Muslim revision of the previous domestic policy. The Kemalist institutions for socializing (People’s Houses, Village Institutes) were abolished, the establishment of mosques were promoted, the Islamic call to prayer in Turkish was replaced by the call to prayer in the Arabic language, high schools for the training of imams were opened and the exemption of optional Sunni Islamic religious lessons were hindered. As of 1982, these lessons became obligatory for all grades. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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their replacement by “traditional-liberal” circles, de-Kemalisation under the JDP has been reached through implementation of an extensive set of measures. It included among other things the complete demilitarisation of politics through stigmatisation and condemnation of Kemalists in the military as plotters and putschists against the Erdoğan government in lawsuits, Sunni re-Islamisation, ensuring the pluralism of ethnic identities in the Kurdish Question and the Muslim redefinition of the collective memory through the so-called process of “coming to terms with the past”. The de-Kemalisation has enabled political and criminal prosecution of leading Kemalists in the so-called lawsuits against putschists, Sunni revision of the current education policy and legislation and the pursuit of an anti-Kemalist policy of memory and, subsequently, the removal of Kemalist symbols from public institutions. The de-Kemalisation was linked to a mildly-Islamist transformation.

The De-Kemalisation of the Turkish military The “Power Struggle of Turkey’s Elites” (Thumann 2010: 16) or the “conflict between the traditional state elite and the new Muslim Anatolian middle class” (Hermann 2008: 146) is the starting point, which is the continuation of the decades-long rivalry between “elitist-statist” and the “traditionalist-liberal” circles in Turkey asserted by the sociologist Emre Kongar. He assumes that there is an existing rivalry existing since late Ottoman Turkey up to the present between elite factions competing with each other for influence (cf. Kongar 2002). The first group consists of so-called well-read “statist elites” (devletçi-seçkinci) and includes high-ranking officers in the military and bureaucrats, looking for a westernisation of state and society. This nationalist and secular group consisted of, in part, expellees from the Balkans aimed at political, economic, social and cultural reforms with the assistance of the authoritarian state even against the resistance of feudal and traditional circles in the Anatolian population. The second group consists of traditionalists and liberals, who regard themselves as defenders of Islam against the secular tutelage or are supporters of a free market economy. They were supported by local feudal elites, Islamic scholars and ethnic activists who demanded freedom for individuals, religious orders and brotherhoods and autonomy movements and were excessively critical of the centralising unitary state. Since the presidency of Turgut Özal, who had “initiated the formation of a Muslim Anatolian middle class” (Hermann 2008: 101), the “Islamist Bourgeoisie” (Yılmaz 2012: 93–124), which is preferred by the JDP government in contract tendering and awards in the public sector10, constitutes the main ele10

These preferential treatments often consist of improper or illegal favouritism (cf. Deutsch-Türkische Nachrichten 03.01.2014).

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ment of the “traditionalist-liberals”. This rising middle class is made up of Muslim academics, religious family businesses and medium-sized enterprises (cf. Karakaş 2007), who are in conflict with the Kemalist establishment. The last confrontation between these two factions was the conflict between the state elite in the army, judiciary and bureaucracy and the JDP, which is supported by a demographic majority of conservative Sunni voters. The Turkish armed forces saw themselves as the guardians of the Kemalist state ideology and intervened four times so far in the history of the republic in Turkish politics. After the end of Cold War, the Kemalist ideology and large parts of the Kemalist-minded army leadership were classified as reform blockers during the Europeanisation of Turkey and as incompatible with Western interests, since they were opposed to the strengthening of the pro-Western partnership with the United States and the European Union, instead supporting a rapprochement with Russia and Iran in matters of foreign affairs ('geopolitical option Eurasia'). Moreover, they rejected reforms in terms of unilateral concessions in the Kurdish Question, Armenian Issue or in the Cyprus Problem. The then-General Secretary of the National Security Council, General Tuncer Kılınç, had clearly and publicly expressed his opposition to Turkey's EU accession and advocated a rapprochement with Russia and Iran instead in 2002 (cf. Aktürk 2015). The previous state ideology has been questioned ever more openly and critically by the ruling JDP, as well as by the United States and the EU. The concept of a trans-ethnic and mono-cultural secular nation state that ignored ethnic differences and religious freedoms was not suitable for progress from a liberal democratic point of view (cf. Karakaş 2011), particularly as anti-Kemalist Kurds and moderate Muslims were not necessarily regarded as anti-Western groups (cf. Peters 2015, Hermann 2008). The division of the Turkish general staff between pro-Western supporters of Atlantic partnership with the United States and supporters of a pro-Russian “Eurasian” Alliance against the West was so relevant that reports about Turkey had entered into secret documents of the U.S. Embassy. According to leaked Wikileaks documents, the proponent of Atlantic partnership, chief of staff General Hilmi Özkök who was in charge as the JDP came to power, was surrounded by NATO-sceptic supporters of an Eurasian partnership, which threatened US-interests in Turkey and in the Middle East: “Ozkok is opposed by a coterie of senior Army generals from the rigid-nationalist and Eurasianist camps, including most notably: (1) Deputy TGS Chief Gen. Yasar Buyukanit; (2) Gen. Aytac Yalman, the Land Forces Commander, the position from which future TGS Chiefs are usually elevated, though Yalman is likely to be retired; (3) First Army Commander Gen. Cetin Dogan; (4) Second Army Commander Gen. Fevzi Turkeri, who, according to Demir, has long used the nationalist socialist weekly ‘Aydinlik’ to leak scurrilous, anti-American stories (e.g., accusations that the U.S. materially supports PKK/KADEK); (5) General Tuncer Kilinc, the secretary-general of the powerful NSC and an outspoken advocate of stronger Turkish ties to Russia and Iran ...; (6) Gen. Sener Eruygur, Commander of the Jandarma” (Wikileaks w.d).

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As of 2007, the above-mentioned senior military officers who were accused of blocking the enforcement of U.S. interests in the Turkish domestic and foreign policy, were all arrested on charges of a planned coup d'état against the JDP government and removed from their previous influential positions11. The famous Ergenekon and Balyoz lawsuits belonged to the so-called trials against coup-plotters. Ergenekon is the designation for an alleged nationalist underground organisation in Turkey, which was accused of trying to overthrow the mildly-Islamist JDP government through disinformation, attacks and terrorism. Kemalist or nationalist active and retired military staff, famous opposition politicians, well-known academics, university rectors, legal and public prosecutors, trade unionists, association officials, media representatives, authors, and journalists were charged as members of this alleged network jointly pursuing the goal of the fall of the Erdoğan Government (and the Gülen network associated with it at the time). According to the accusation, members of the alleged Ergenekon network aimed to destabilise the country in order to create a favourable environment to make a (pro-Russian) military coup against the ruling JDP (cf. Önderoğlu 11.05.2006). The investigations were accompanied by a cascading wave of mass arrests. The mass detentions were legally dubious, because there was a “tendency to detain suspects and then begin searching for evidence against them” (Jenkins 28.09.2009). The Balyoz or Sledgehammer lawsuits were based on a newspaper report of Taraf with the headline “AKP ve Gülen‘i Bitirme Planı” (Plan to destroy the JDP and Gülen), which was only founded as pro-Western, anti-Kemalist and pro-government daily in 2007. The Taraf daily published alleged authentic military documents about an action plan to combat (Islamist) reaction (cf. Taraf 12.06.2009), initiating further waves of mass detention of high-ranking Kemalist army officers. The only thing that the accused people had in common was their nationalist and/or secularist opposition towards Erdoğan’s JDP and the Gülen movement. The indictments of these lawsuits did not provide concrete evidence for a plot against the government or the existence of Ergenekon (cf. Keetman 08.03.2011), but “there are a handful of occasions when there appear to be indications that a few of the accused were engaged in other forms of illegal activity. No attempt has been made to investigate them” (Jenkins 2009: 80). These open-ended investigations, mass detentions and accusations gained momentum and initiated further individual processes with overly long and confusing indictments12. Instead of directing investigations into specific felonies and criminal offences, the prosecutors detained 11 12

These high-ranking officers believe that the US was involved in their removal (cf. Çamlıbel 06.04.2015). The juridical line of argument in these indictments that encompassed several thousand pages, based on tape records of a questionable testimony of the then-journalist and employee in the pro-Gülen TV channel Samanyolu, Tuncay Güney, who lives in Canadian exile. The file material found in Güney’s apartment in 2001, testimonies of “secret witnesses”, illegally recorded and published tape recordings that were broadcast by pro-gov-

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more and more suspects without explicit indication of the charges. Instead of clear evidence for a coup there were only allegations, exaggerations and misinterpretations (cf. Jenkins 2009). The indictments contained numerous inconsistencies and many logical contradictions (cf. Jenkins 2009). When it comes to the litigation, prosecutors who were not hard enough on the defendants and judges who passed lenient sentences were sanctioned and transferred for disciplinary reasons by the High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (Hakimler ve Savcilar Yüsek Kurulu, HSYK) (cf. Gümüş 2016; Saymaz 15.07.2011; Gazeteciler Online 06.05.2012; Deutsch-Türkische Nachrichten 20.02.2013). With the accusation and raids against civilian Kemalist associations, such as the then-largest Turkish Club for Kemalist Thought (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği, ADD) and the distinctly secular Association to Support Contemporary and Modern (Way of) Life (Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği ÇYDD), their famous leaders were also discredited, indicted and arrested. With the criminalisation of the military and opposition academics, media, parties and associations, the Kemalists, secularists and nationalists were derived from shaping public opinion and from participation in the formulation of politics in Turkey. This happened before the opening policies of the JDP towards the PKK, Iraqi Kurds, Greek Cypriots and Armenia. Moreover, critical reporting about the course of legal processes was largely prevented. Many opposition journalists were accused because of their critical coverage of the supposedly secret investigations and proceedings with attempts to “influence the judiciary” and sentenced (cf. Radikal 06.02.2010), while liberal and pro-government newspapers published more and more alleged documents against Kemalists and became part of the slander campaign without being punished. Gülenist newspapers like Zaman, Today’s Zaman and the abovementioned daily Taraf played a significant role in these lawsuits and “stirred and maintained the public debate” (Akbulut 2013: 216). According to Ahmet Şık the coup investigation and mass detentions followed the same scheme. Illegal tape recordings were made available online or pro-Gülen and pro-government newspapers like Taraf, Zaman, Star, Yeni Şafak and (V)Akit published leaked “documents” with a list of suspects who were stigmatised as coup plotters (cf. Şık 2012). These media launched the allegations as ernment media and “discovered” or manipulated evidence like print and PC-documents belonged to further “evidence” (cf. Jenkins 13.02.2013; Jenkins 25.06.2014; Rudrik 2014: 8). There is at least one famous example of manipulation: “The Balyoz indictment claimed that the defendants had discussed staging a coup at a military seminar in Istanbul on March 5-7, 2003. The prosecutors even produced a CD containing what they maintained was a detailed coup plan. The metadata on the CD appeared to show that the documents containing the coup plot had been last saved on March 5, 2003 and not subsequently amended. However, not only did the documents contain numerous anachronisms, contradictions and absurdities but forensic analysis showed that they had been written using Microsoft Office 2007 – the beta version of which was not available until 2006” (Jenkins 25.06.2014). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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plans for a putsch against the JDP, put them on the agenda and made them circulate, to form a critical public against the nationalists and secularists, and to legitimise the wave of mass detentions (Yaşlı 2014; Şık 2012). The detention of the then-chief of staff of İlker Başbuğ as the alleged leader of a terrorist group within the framework of the Ergenekon network was the culmination of the investigation and marked the victory over the Kemalists (cf. Leiße 2013). This fact and the mass resignation of the army leadership in August 2011 after their dispute with Erdoğan over the promotion or dismissal of suspects of coup plotting were a symbol for the political defeat of the Kemalists and nationalists (cf. Jung 2011; Cumhuriyet 03.02.2012). The Kemalists were replaced by Gülen-supporters13. Most defendants received draconian sentences. Years later, during the struggle between Erdoğan’s JDP and the Gülen movement for power (cf. Şık 2014; Yaşlı 201414), the situation for the weakened defendants changed completely. They were released by the struggling JDP government in the midst of accusations of corruption (cf. Spiegel 04.08.2014; Jenkins 12.03.2014). Their cases were brought back to the court in order to gain Kemalist support for Erdoğan’s campaign against the Fethullah Gülen Movement. The Constitutional Court ordered the release of these (political) prisoners of the Ergenekon lawsuits (cf. Deutsch-Türkische Nachrichten 22.06.2014). The defendants of the Balyoz case were also discharged before investigations against Gülenist policemen and prosecutors were started. These policemen and prosecutors had brought the Kemalists in jail previously and detained the sons of ministers of Erdoğan’s government environment (cf. BirGün 01.04.2015; Cumhuriyet 31.03.2015; FriedrichEbert-Stiftung 2015). The removal of the Kemalist elements from their influential positions was the result of the Ergenekon and Balyoz lawsuits. Moreover, “[t]he army received a serious blow in terms of losing its well-educated cadres and human capital…, which terminated the careers of hundreds of staff officers, including generals and admirals” (Yinanç 06.04.2015). On the basis of the facts above, it can be ruled out that the Kemalists would be able to organise a coup in the future at all (cf. Seufert 2013a). According to Akbulut, the military had presented its previous successful coup attempts for the sake of the republic both as legal and as legitimate, but such actions will be treated as acts of terror (cf. Akbulut 2013). This leads inevitably to the loss of the military deterrent potential of the Kemalists and nationalists towards their Sunni Islamist and Kurdish separatist opponents. This fact ensured the opening initiatives of the mildly-Islamist JDP gov13 14

This subject is to be discussed below. After the victory over the Kemalists in the army, Gülenist police and prosecutors detained four sons of JDP ministers because of corruption in December 2013 while unknown activists made secret records of Erdoğan online that support the suspicion of corruption. The Erdoğan government started a “de-Gülenisation” campaign to get rid of Gülen-supporters in the judiciary and police (cf. Şık 2014; Yaşlı 2014).

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ernment towards the PKK and the re-Islamisation campaign “from above”, because the high-ranking Kemalist officials were neutralised as veto players. Despite their release and the acquittal of those defendants who are still living after five years in prison, the Kemalists are as weak as the “progress” of re-Islamisation in the Turkish society. In addition to the deprivation of liberty and defamation of character, there are also serious health injuries or aggravation of pre-existing chronic diseases and even some casualties due to poor imprisonment conditions, since numerous imprisoned accused people suddenly got cancer15 or died of heart failure, not to mention those who committed suicide while facing imminent arrest16. The mass detentions and lawsuits were regarded as a pressing need within a frame of transformation of Turkey into a pluralistic liberal-democratic society, as a chance for demilitarisation of Turkish politics and as a precondition for coping with the past of the wrongdoings of the so-called “deep state” (cf. Hermann 2008). Hence, Kemalist victims of the justice system were ignored. The mass detentions and lawsuits were viewed as a part of “Transitional Justice”17 of a transforming society on its way to Europe (cf. Johansson-Nogues and Jonasson 2011), even if the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention defined the mass detentions in the Balyoz case as “arbitrary” (UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 05.07.2013). The JDP government and its then-ally Fethullah Gülen sought to satisfy the demand of the EU for reforms and together as moderate Islamists fought the authoritarianism of the military (cf. Leiße 2013)18. The Ergenekon and Balyoz lawsuits were explicitly supported by liberal, pro-Kurdish and conservative intellectuals despite the victims of justice. With these trials, the psychological prevalence of the Kemalist narrative broke down in favour of the Sunni Islamic conservativism of the JDP (cf. Kaya 2012). The removal of the Kemalist statist elites and veto-players weakened the resistance against Erdoğan’s New Turkey (cf. Yaşlı 2014). For most of the defendants had criticised the rising Islamism and opening initiative of the JDP towards the PKK and the local “Kurdish Regional Government” in Northern Iraq (cf. Öz15 16

17

18

For example, the treatment of Muzaffer Tekin, who suffered cancer, was prevented with ill intent by the prison authorities (Email correspondence with Özge Tekin, 03.04.2015). While Kuddusi Okkır, Kâşif Kozinoğlu, Uçkun Geray or Murat Özenalp died in prison or shortly after their release due to illness, İlhan Selçuk, Erhan Göksel, Türkan Saylan, Hüseyin Görüm und Muzaffer Tekin succumbed to their sufferings (cf. CNNTürk 22.03.2015; Serbest 02.04.201; Öztürk 2014). While the Alevi colonel Ali Tatar committed suicide, then-General Şener Eruygur was paralysed after an “accident” in prison. The term “Transitional Justice” is understood as a catalogue of measures in order to redress human rights abuses in post-dictatorships or post-war communities whereas truth commissions, institutional reforms, coping with the past and lawsuits against elites of the ancient regime contribute to the transformation of the community into liberaldemocratic society (cf. Kritz 1995). Even German(-speaking) authors and columnists supported the lawsuits against the alleged Kemalist Junta (cf. Rainer Hermann 2010; Hermann 2008; Alpay 21.09.2009; Söy 21.09.2009).

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dağ 06.08.2013). As a result, the de-Kemalised army gave up its previous opposition towards the concessions of the JDP towards the PKK (cf. Söyler 2009).

The De-Kemalisation of the Opposition Parties CHP and MHP The elimination of the Kemalists in the army, in the administration and in the judiciary after the successful popular vote in 2010 further restricted the political leverage of the Kemalist and nationalist opposition parties in the National Assembly. As a result, the de-Kemalisation of the political parties occurred with the de-Kemalisation of the military. In the past, there was a chance to compensate for their political weakness due to fewer votes with the threat of army intervention to the politics. Both the secular Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) were considered as obstructionists regarding the opening initiatives of the JDP in the Kurdish Question (cf. Söyler 2009), or towards the “Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq”, in the Armenian Question and the Cyprus Issue. Michael Thumann regarded the Kemalist CHP as an “elitist minority party with no visible intent or ability to actually win elections. To the end of retaining control, the CHP agreed on coalition governments in the past. But first and foremost, the party relies on the traditionally secularist institutions, the army, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary. Instead of trying to govern through a majority in parliament they merely block unwelcome policies of others by appealing to the Constitutional Court or calling on the army to intervene” (Thumann 2010: 11).

The criminal prosecution of Kemalist media, associations and extra-parliamentary opposition parties like the (Kemalist) Workers Party19 (of left-wing nationalist Doğu Perinçek) or the New Party (of Tuncay Özkan) within the Ergenekon lawsuit led to the elimination of radical options except the MHP und CHP. Moreover, both the leadership of the CHP and MHP were changed or seriously weakened after leaked sex tapes of the then-leader Deniz Baykal (CHP) or topleadership of the MHP, who were forced to resign. Their removal prevented the radicalisation of these parties despite the growing pressure of their Kemalist and nationalist base. Moreover, the removal of theses hardliners from the CHP and the MHP caused bases for liberalisation by giving up previous nationalist approaches (Taraf 16.03.2012; Gottschlich 12.06.2011; Uzun 2014). The “Reformer” Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu followed the “hardliner” Deniz Baykal. Kılıçdaroğlu tried to appeal broader sections of the electorate like religious, liberal and Kurdish circles beyond the Kemalist core voters of the Six Arrows and Alevis. As a result, the leadership of the “new CHP” explicitly supported the legal reforms of the JDP for the sake of the negotiations between the JDP and the 19

The name of this party was changed in Homeland Party (Vatan Partisi, VP) in 2015.

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PKK (cf. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2014a). This situation would have been impossible under Deniz Baykal and of course under the “military tutelage”. The complete removal of the MHP leadership except its leader Devlet Bahçeli reduced the militancy: From then on, Bahçeli only concentrated on radical rhetoric for the weekly meetings of his political group in the Turkish Parliament on Tuesday and avoided real obstructive action like the application of the constitutional court or armed conflicts “in the streets” (cf. Göktürk 07.11.2012), like the militant Grey Wolves did in the 1970s. Bahçeli hindered his party members from their participation in the Gezi protests against the JDP or street battles against PKK sympathisers (Habertürk 07.6.2013; Kaya 2015: 8). Moreover, both party leaders started to avoid nominating coup defendants, Kemalists or nationalist hardliners as candidates for the general elections in 2015 (Cumhuriyet 24.03.2015; Çamlıbel 16.03.2015; Milliyet 19.03.2015; Erdem 30.03.2015). The common decision of the MHP and CHP leadership to nominate the national-conservative academic, former Secretary-General of the organisation of the Islamic Conference States and son of an anti-Kemalist dissident, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, as a candidate for the presidential elections in 2014 displayed the low level of Kemalist values in these parties, while neither of the three presidential candidates, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu and the pro-Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtaş, seemed to be a Kemalist (cf. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2014a).

De-Kemalisation of the media Under the JDP, Islamist media has obtained much better opportunities to develop than was the case before (cf. Adaklı 2009; Sendika Online 18.02.2008), while Kemalist points of view are mentioned less and less. One striking example is the daily Cumhuriyet, which replaced Kemalist columnists like Mehmet Faraç or Alev Çoşkun with anti-Kemalist left-wing liberal intellectuals like Ahmet İnsel, Aydın Engin or Nuray Mert. Tuncay Özkan was forced to sell its TVChannel Kanaltürk to the pro-Gülen İpek Group in 2008 (cf. Çalışkan 28.06.2013) before his own detention as an alleged member of Ergenekon. More and more secular and opposition journalists, anchors or presenters were dismissed (Schmitt 04.06.2013). According to Human Rights Watch, press freedom was curtailed in the JDP era (cf. Sinclair-Webb 29.05.2013) years before the state of emergency after the failed coup attempt by the Gülenists in July 2016.20 Meanwhile, assumptions about the existence of a “second single-party era” (Özdağ 2011) or “Erdoğan State” (Der Spiegel 04.08.2014) are popular. The deKemalisation of the military, judiciary, politics enabled the top-down re-Islami20

This subject will be discussed below.

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sation, reinterpretation of the collective memory and concessions towards the PKK during the opening initiative. All obstacles for the transformation of Turkey have been removed.

Sunni Reislamisation, reinterpretation of the collective memory and concessions to the PKK To replace the Kemalist concept of the “modern civilized Turks”, the idea of the “Sunni Nation” was stressed by highlighting Islamic values and norms, Muslim education reforms, a sectarian Sunni or “Neo Ottoman” foreign policy21 towards the Middle East (Gümüş 2013a) and a religious reinterpretation of the collective memory of the Turks. “Those who belong to this nation, are at first [pious] Muslims and Sunnis” (Yaşlı 2014: 131). “Oppositional Socialists, Kemalists, [separatist] Kurds” are excluded from this nation and regarded as “enemies within” (Yaşlı 2014: 140). Erdoğan even used anti-Alevi resentments during his election campaigns to discredit his rival Kılıçdaroğlu who is in fact an Alevi. He tried to indicate that the Alevi Kılıçdaroğlu and the Alawi President of Syria, Bashar Assad, might be brothers in arms (cf. Hoş 2015). Moreover, the JDP intended to impose its Islamic norms on the whole society: the sale of alcohol was regulated (Seufert 2013b) and an attempt to segregate the sexes was introduced for rooming houses and even private homes of unmarried students, although the infringement of privacy is unconstitutional (Schmitt 12.11.2011; Topçu 04.12.2013). Even if there is obligatory Muslim religious education for all grades since the coup of 1980, the JDP redesigned the educational system. While the ritual nationalist Kemalist oath, which had been carried out every morning (Andımız), was abolished (cf. Milliyet 08.10.2013), the ban on anti-secular teaching content was lifted (cf. Hürriyet 15.09.2012), and increasing numbers of places introduced school prayer (cf. Cumhuriyet 04.04.2014). More and more schools for Imams were opened (İmam-Hatip), in which pupils are socialised in an Islamic way, while more and more secular primary, secondary and high schools are transformed into these religious institution (cf. Yinanç 11.08.2014; Arman 18.07.2014; Ertem w.d.; Eğitim Sen 08.09.2014; Hürriyet Daily News 28.08.2014). According to the last reform, more Islamic courses like interpretation of the Quran and the biography of Muhammad are to be taught (cf. Birand 03.02.2012). Although these courses are optional, there are reports about families who were forced to choose them (BirGün 15.04.2012; Cumhuriyet 02.03.2012). 21

The JDP focused its activities in the Middle East and was accused of supporting militant Sunni militia against Damascus and Baghdad (cf. Güller 2014; Pipes 13.06.2014).

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The JDP is also redesigning the culture of memory (cf. Bakiner 2013). The government banned or reduced the participation in all official Kemalist nationalist rituals (Gazeteciler Online 6.05.2012b), while Muhammad’s Birthday is celebrated (cf. Yaşlı 2014). Even coming to terms with the “Kemalist past” was made a subject of discussion by the JDP, where Atatürk was related with the military operations towards uprisings of local clans in Tunceli (Dersim) (cf. Gümüş 2012, 2013b), whereby the suppression of a local revolt of feudal Kurdish and Zaza clans was transfigured as a Kemalist massacre of the Alevis during the CHP era. Erdoğan apologised for the Dersim operations and accused the current CHP leader instead because of his sectarian and local origin: “Is it me who should apologise or you …? If there is an apology on behalf of the state and if there is such an opportunity, I can do it and I am apologising. But if there is someone who should apologise on behalf of the CHP, it is you, as you are from Dersim. You were saying you felt honoured to be from Dersim. Now, save your honour” (Doğan 23.11.2011).

In so doing, he tried to destroy the historical bond between Atatürk and the Alevis, who are core voters of the CHP. Moreover, the official ceremonies of the Battle of Gallipoli (1915) were also “de-Kemalised” as Atatürk’s role in the fight was no longer mentioned, as it was in “Old Turkey”. The concept of the “Sunni Nation” seems to be the “Ottoman solution” (Gürbey 2013: 32) of the Kurdish Question: through highlighting common Islamic values and norms for Sunni Kurds and people of Turkish origin at the cost of secularism, both groups form a sectarian alliance and could together bring order to the Middle East (cf. Yaşlı 2014):. With his statement about the “Fraternity under the umbrella of Islam” (Yaşlı 2014: 146) the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan showed his support for a common Islamic future in 2013. The JDP had a liberal approach towards the Kurdish Question when it comes to dealing with the PKK and the renegade “Kurdish Regional Government” in Northern Iraq. Hence, the JDP government negotiated with the PKK and introduced some reforms, like the launch of the Kurdish TV Channel TRT 6/Kurdî, the legalisation of instruction in Kurdish in private schools and the establishment of Kurdish institutes at Turkish universities (cf. Kurban 2013). The JDP legalised negotiations with the PKK (cf. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2014b) and recognised the breakaway “Regional Government Kurdistan” (Habertürk 30.03.2011; Gürbey 2013: 30–32). According to the so-called Dolmabahçe Agreement between the HDP and the JDP in February 2015, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan appealed to the PKK to lay down its arms (cf. Süddeutsche 28.02.2015). This (temporary) opening initiative occurred during the Ergenekon and Balyoz lawsuits, which were welcomed by pro-Kurdish circles as members of anti-terror forces within the counterinsurgency warfare were in service against the PKK (cf. Tanrıkulu 2009: 22– 27) and were considered obstructionist hardliners who could veto JDP conces-

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sions in the Kurdish Question. Therefore, the Ergenekon and Balyoz lawsuits could also be seen as a concession towards the PKK. Moreover, the EMASYAProtocol, which left the decision for military operations against the PKK to local army commanders, was amended in order to make military operations dependent on local governors. Therefore, military operations were made impossible so that the PKK gained more control in the Eastern provinces and became capable of executing road checks on its own (cf. İçgen 22.04.2013; Mynet 11.11.2014; Bozkurt 20.03.2015). Without the de-Kemalisation process, the Islamisation “from above” and the temporary Kurdish Opening would be impossible.

Summary and epilogue: From the (re-)election in 2015 and the failed coup attempt in July 2016 up to the military operation in Northern Syria in February 2018 The Kemalist state ideology and its supporters were considered as reform blockers for the transformation of Turkey by the both JDP government and the Gülen movement, which wanted to re-Islamise the country and start negotiations with the PKK. With the removal of the Kemalists and nationalists from the military by the political “coup lawsuits”, the previous state elites lost their means of pressure against the Erdoğan government. Therefore, the criminalisation and stigmatisation of the Kemalists weakened the secular and nationalist opposition to the JDP, providing it with greater freedom of action. Since working towards full independence seems to be more profitable than the vision of limited autonomy within Turkey as illustrated by the prospect of an own country in collapsing Syria, the PKK did not lay down its arms and began to dig ditches in HDP-led and predominantly Kurdish-inhabited towns instead. Despite the abovementioned Dolmabahçe Agreement, HDP leader Selahattin Demirtaş clarified that his party would not support the introduction of a presidential system favoured by Erdoğan, so that he criticised the consent (cf. Yücel 19.09.2016). Afterwards the JDP government lost its parliamentary majority due to nationalist voters in June 2015 (cf. Konda 18.06.2015). While disaffected pro-Turkish voters turned to the Turkish-nationalist MHP to end the concessions towards the PKK, Kurdish voters tended to vote for the HDP with its close ties to the PKK (cf. Hürriyet 09.06.2015). During the unsuccessful coalition talks, the Suruç bombing targeting pro-Kurdish activists (cf. Euro News 20.07.2015) and the assassination of two policemen by the PKK took place in July 2015 (cf. Le Figaro 22.07.2015). As a result, the JDP government started military operations towards the PKK in Southeast Turkey, Northern Iraq and Northern Syria (cf. Der Spiegel 28.07.2015) and Erdoğan set re-elections (cf. Hürriyet Daily News 28.08.2015). https://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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If there had not been any lawsuits against the Kemalist hardliners in the army, the military strength of the PKK would have grown, because the opening initiatives would have been hindered by the Turkish military. The escalation of the Kurdish Question in Turkey and in Northern Syria would have been limited. The operations towards the separatist PKK, which proclaimed autonomy and dug ditches with the local help of the HDP, can be regarded as the orientation of the JDP back to the Kemalist point of view (cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 11.02.2016). While the conflict between the PKK and Turkey restarted, the rivalry between the Gülen movement and Erdoğan’s JDP escalated. After the loss of the (Kemalist) “enemy without” the Gülenists and Erdoğan’s JDP began to struggle for power, the climax of which was the failed coup attempt on July 15th, 2016 (cf. Çalışkan 2017; Çalışır 2016). Besides Erdoğan and JDP, Turkish nationalists and Kemalists rejected the coup because of the involvement of the Gülen movement22. The failed coup d'état was the last stand of the Gülenists before the announced political cleansing of the Turkish Armed Forces by Erdoğan since the start of the “de-Gülenisation” of the police and judiciary and the economy in 201423: “Rapidly losing its power in public bureaucracy, media, judiciary, and the market, the FGM [Fethullah Gülen Movement] then faced losing recruitment its institutions and economic framework. The 2016 coup attempt came at a time when various prosecutors took decisive steps against Gulenists in the country and just a few weeks before an important Higher Military Council (HMC) meeting, which was announced by the AKP government as an opportunity to further decrease Gulenists’ power in the army” (Çalışkan 2017: 99).

Besides the “intra military resistance [of non-Gülenists in the Army], that refused all offers of the putschists” (Başbuğ 2016: 16–18), other actors like new media (Twitter, Facebook, Instagram), mobile communication networks (WhatsApp, SMS) and mosques (night calls by the muezzin) played a role in the defeat of the coup attempt. The broadcast by the private station CNNTürk with an appeal by President Erdoğan via FaceTime led to a nationwide mobilisation of the masses against the attempted coup d'état (Ünver and Alassad 14.09.2016).

22

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One of the Gülenist coup plotters, Colonel Levent Türkkan, adjutant of chief of staff Hulusi Akar, confessed that members of the Gülen movement gave him questions for the incoming test for the army, (cf. Çalışır 2016). According to this statement, the Gülenists have tried to infiltrate the Turkish Armed Forces for decades. Additionally, right-wing nationalist writer Yavuz Selim Demirağ pointed out, that the army has been subverted for decades (cf. Demirağ 2016). Some details of the failed coup attempt can also be found in intelligence reports (cf. The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2016).

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After the coup attempt, a state of emergency was declared and political purges started with mass detentions and mass dismissals of people on previously created black lists of (alleged) Gülenists, pro-Kurdish activists and left-wing liberals, but also with alleged Gülen-supporters in the whole state apparatus, the media world and the economy in July 2016. Further human rights were restricted with reference to the state of emergency, while Erdoğan used the political climate, with the help of the MHP, to transform the republic into an authoritarian hyper-presidential regime with massive powers for the head of state (dissolving parliament, appointing judges) with a constitutional referendum in April 2017 (cf. Martens 2017; Somer 2016; Ataay 2017). The policy area and the JDP were so far spared from the partial “de-Gülenisation”. Only a few days after the failed Gülenist coup, the former Kemalist defendants of the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer lawsuits got orders from the army to go into action and fill the gaps that were left by the Gülenist officers (cf. Güneş 22.07.2016). The return of some of the justice victims to the open positions can be seen as a partial and temporary “re-Kemalisation”, the more so as the JDP government has begun to orientate itself to Russia and started a military operation towards the Kurdish-separatist YPG in Northern Syria, which could be seen as a nationalist and Eurasian policy. The reason why the return of some former high-ranking Kemalist officers to their former jobs and the rapprochement with Russia can only be called temporary and partial re-Kemalisation, is the fact that the Islamist Erdoğan regime wanted only to use secular Kemalists as temporary stopgaps in the staff of the apparatus of the state, consisting of either Kemalists or Gülenists, since the JDP has not been capable of forming its own experienced team in the state bureaucracy. Hence, the state apparatus of the police is also recruited from Islamists orders and communities like the Menzil-Group (cf. Oda TV 10.11.2016) instead of Kemalists. Moreover, Erdoğan wants to use the failed coup as a founding myth with the “narrative of an Islamist defense of democracy” (cf. Arango 07.08.2016) in the legitimising discourse of his “New Turkey”, in order replace Atatürk with himself as the “new founding father”. On the 79th anniversary of the death of Atatürk (10.11.2017), President Erdoğan said surprisingly, that he would protect his legacy. “We consider it a duty to give Atatürk due credit as the commander-in-chief of our Independence War and the founder of our Republic, in front of our nation. Our nation’s respect for Atatürk is eternal,” (Hürriyet Daily News 10.11.2017) he added. Erdoğan led the commemoration ceremony at this time, although he gained attention because of his demonstrative absence at the official Kemalist remembrance events before. Surely, one reason is the fact that he needs more voters to win the Presidential elections in 2019, since his own Islamic voters “are just not enough to give him more than half of the nation’s mandate” (Akyol 17.11.2017).

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Even though or perhaps precisely because the Kemalists don't appear to be a powerful political player in Turkey any more, some remnants of them like Perinçek’s Homeland Party (Vatan Partisi, VP) tend to support the JDP government. These Kemalists strongly support the Erdoğan government and refer to his De-Gulenization campaign as some kind of secular Kemalist policy against Islamism, even though JDP's policy is obviously far away from being secularist. Columnists of the leftist BirGün Daily or the rival Türksolu Weekly criticise Perinçek’s party of acting just like the anti-Kemalist left-wing liberal intellectuals before, when it comes to helping the authoritarian Erdoğan regime to consolidate its power (cf. Yaşlı 14.02.2018; Türksolu 02.03.2018). The oppositional VP – and the MHP – can be accused of acting as auxiliary parties helping the JDP government just like the former bloc or satellite parties in the totalitarian German Democratic Republic (cf. Kulback, Weber and Förtsch 1969). One could ask why marginalised Turkish nationalists and Kemalists have been supporting President Erdoğan against (Kurdish) separatism and the Gülenists since 2015. In order to answer this question, one has to take a closer look at the Kemalist and nationalist point of view. Like Erdoğan, Kemalists and Turkish nationalists consider both separatists and Gülenists as a sort of “fifth column” of Western states against Turkey. The successor of the Workers Party, the Homeland Party, sees the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer Trials, the “Trench war” (“Hendek Savaşı”) against the PKK (2015, cf. Dalay 2016), the failed Gülenist coup attempt in July 2016, the Turkish military operations named “Euphrate Shield” (“Fırat Kalkanı”, August 2016–March 2017) and “Olive Branch” (“Zeytin Dalı”, January 2018) against the Kurdish-separatist PYD in Northern Syria in an overall context of a covert Turkish-American conflict. For example, the frustrated coup attempt of the Gülen movement is viewed as a campaign to establish “a pro-American dictatorial regime” (Perinçek 2017: 12). Growing Western criticism of Turkey and Erdoğan’s policy against the PKK and the Gülen movement has led to the fact, that more and more Kemalists and nationalists tend to think, that the fate of Erdoğan and of Turkey are closely interrelated. As a result, they support President Erdoğan temporarily in order to protect Turkey within a “covert war between Turkey and the USA” (Perinçek 2016a: 77). According to the report of the Homeland Party, a successful support for him would move the Kemalists to a more favourable position to form a “national government” without Erdoğan after the final “rescue” of Turkey from “Western imperialism” (cf. Perinçek 2016b). Moreover, especially the Kemalists want the current Turkish government to form a geopolitical Eurasian alliance with Russia, Iran, Syria and Iraq across different political regimes to counterbalance “subversive” pro-Western influences and the common Kurdish separatist threat (cf. Gültekin 2014) within a regional axis between Moscow and Ankara (cf. Dugin 2007; Polat 2017). Another reason

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for their support of Erdoğan is his late realisation that the previous appeasement policy of the ruling JDP towards the PKK and its Syrian branch, the USbacked PYD, has had counterproductive effects for the territorial integrity of Turkey, when it comes to ending terrorism and secessionism in South-East Anatolia and Northern Syria. For years, many Kemalists and Turkish nationalists have been warning that the so-called Peace Process within a neo-Ottoman umbrella between the JDP and the PKK would strengthen the Kurdish separatists. Moreover, according to the Kemalist point of view, the territorial integrity of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey is in danger of “pro-western Kurdish separatist movements” in these countries (cf. Güller 2015a). For example, the US-backed Syrian branch of the PKK, the PYD, which was also initially supported by the Turkish government (2013–2015) against the Baathist Assad Regime, have obtained the strategic opportunity to unite its selfproclaimed Kurdish “cantons” in north-western and north-eastern Syria. The consequence would be a new continuous Syrian-Kurdish territory between the renegade “Kurdish Regional Government” in Northern Iraq and the Mediterranean Sea (cf. Güller 2015b) which could also claim Turkish, Iraqi and Iranian territory. So, Kemalists and nationalists have been calling for military solutions. Since Erdoğan’s tougher crackdown on the PKK in South-Eastern Turkey and the PYD in Afrin in North-Eastern Turkey in order to hinder a Kurdish continuous territory in Syria, one essential requirement of the Kemalists and nationalists has been fulfilled by Ankara. Closer cooperation between Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is another act (Daily Sabah 13.11.2017), these sort of Kemalists have been calling for24. 24

Unlike Doğu Perinçek’s Homeland Party, representatives of a minority viewpoint of the Kemalist splinter group of the National Party (Ulusal Party) strictly oppose Erdoğan further and refuse any Eurasian cooperation with Russia, although Turkey is already regarded within the “axis of evil” and can be a target of western intervention in their opinion (cf. Erdem 2017). Their party leader Gökçe Fırat has been in custody due to suspicion of supporting the Gülenists because of his allegation that Erdoğan’s university degree is forged (Adımlar Dergisi 26.09.2016). If Fırat’s statement was true, then Erdoğan’s presidency would be at stake. While Fırat focused more on the opposition to Erdoğan, progovernment leader Perinçek tends to be more an anti-Gülenist. In contrast to Perinçek’s Homeland Party and Fırat’s National Party, the People’s Liberation Party (Halkın Kurtuluşu Partisi, HKP) opposes both Erdoğan and the Gülenists similarly. While the Homeland Party criticizes government opponents like the CHP, HDP and the National Party for serving Gülen and foreign interests, this Kemalist splinter group accuses all other parties like the government and the opposition parties, including Perinçek’s party, of betraying Turkish national interests (Ankut 2016, 2017). All other parties are regarded as parties of the system, some of which, like the government and the Homeland party, are pretending to be Eurasian parties while secretly supporting the US. While both the government and other parties use the anti-Gülenist expression “FETÖ” (Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü, Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation), Nurullah Ankut, the leader of the People’s Liberation Party, goes one step further and uses also the expression “TATÖ” (“Tayyipçi Terör Örgütü, Tayyipist Terrorist Organisation)” as a byword for the “Erdoğan regime” (cf. Ankut, 2016: 118). Even Ankut’s book title is clear, after which the

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Contributors Lutz Berger, born 1969, is Professor of Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Kiel (Germany). Benjamin Flöhr studied Islamic studies and political science at the Ruhr University Bochum. He received his PhD from the Department of Oriental Studies at Kiel University in 2014 with a thesis on the religious policy of the early Kemalist Republic with a focus on the work of the theologian Elmalılı Muhammed Hamdi Yazır (1878–1942). From 2013 to 2016 he was Assistant Lecturer at the Department of Oriental and Islamic Studies of the Ruhr University Bochum. Here he did research on Islam in modern Turkey, Turkish tafsir literature and radical Sufis and Salafis in contemporary Turkey. Sara-Marie Demiriz studied Modern and Contemporary History, Political Science and Culture, Communication & Management at the Westfälische Wilhelms-University Münster. She received her PhD from the Faculty of Philosophy at Münster University in 2015 with a thesis on the national state-building process of the Kemalist Republic, focusing on the meaning of national holiday celebrations and Turkey’s state cult as well as the personality cult surrounding Kemal Atatürk. From 2016 to 2018 she was a Post-Doctorate-Scholar at Stiftung Geschichte des Ruhrgebiets, Bochum. Here she started to work on her new research field “Migration and Education” with a special focus on “education” and “knowledge” as an engine of social and societal participation. Tamer Düzyol works as parliamentary advisor in the state parliament of Thuringia in Germany. He also teaches in the field of Turkish studies at the University of Erfurt. His main research interests are Turkish Studies, political party research, symbolic politics and societal cleavages. Burak Gümüş, born in Germany in 1974, studied Sociology (migration, marginal groups, xenophobia) and Political Science (state theories, international cooperation, foreign policy) at the University of Constance (Universität Konstanz). He made there his PhD on the “Revival of Alevism in Turkey and in Germany”. His fields of research interest are (Semi-) Presidentialism and Parliamentarian Democracy, Alevism, De-Kemalisation [Dekemalizasyon/ Entkemalisierung], political institutions and sociology, Turkish foreign policy and politics, German-Turkish relations, rituals and identity, German-Turks, collective memory, and transnational migration. He has several publications mainly dealing with Turkish Alevis and the Turkish Domestic and Foreign Policy in the Erdoğan era. He is Professor, PhD in the Division for Political and Social Sciences at the Department for Political Science and Public Administration in the Faculhttps://doi.org/10.5771/9783956506338 Generiert durch Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB), am 11.02.2020, 15:55:15. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

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ty for Economics and Administrative Sciences at the Trakya University in Edirne/Turkey. Berna Pekesen is Bridge Professor for Modern Turkish History at the Institutes for Contemporary History and Turkish Studies, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany. She published several articles and book chapters on topics of modern Turkish history. She has authored: Zwischen Sympathie und Eigennutz. NSPropaganda und die türkische Presse im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Münster 2014); Nationalismus, Türkisierung und das Ende der jüdischen Gemeinden in Thrakien, 1918–1942 (München 2012). She is editor of the forthcoming edited volume “Turkey in Turmoil: Social Change and Political Radicalisation in the 1960s” (2020). Kahraman Solmaz is a lecturer at the Technical University of Darmstadt in the Department of History and Social Sciences. He has published several articles and a book about Hannah Arendt's political thought and about democracy and constitutionalism in Turkey. His most recent publications are: Solmaz, Kahraman (2015): Die Türkische Verfassung unter dem Einfluss des EU-Reformprozesses, in: Der Staat, Vol. 54, No:2, pp. 159–199; and Solmaz, Kahraman (2016): Krise, Macht und Gewalt. Hannah Arendt und die Verfassungskrisen der Türkei von der spätosmanischen Zeit bis heute, Baden-Baden: Nomos. Başar Şirin is a Ph.D. candidate at Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science at Free University of Berlin with particular interests in media studies, politics in Turkey and in Germany. Previously, he worked for three years as research assistant at the department of International Relations of Middle East Technical University, Ankara, from where he holds his M.A. and B.A. degrees in International Relations. Since 2015, Şirin is an international doctoral fellow of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

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