Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and the New Republican People’s Party in Turkey 3031367650, 9783031367656

Table of contents :
Praise for Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and the New Republican People’s Party in Turkey
Contents
1 Introduction
Introduction
2 The Ideology and History of CHP
Paradox of the CHP: The Party of the State vs. Social Democrat
Multiparty System (1946–1960)
Bülent Ecevit (1972–1980)
The Center–Periphery Thesis and the CHP
Deniz Baykal Era (1995–2010)
Conclusion
3 Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: Life and Socialization
Kılıçdaroğlu’s Moral Worldview
Fathers and Sons: Erdoğan vs. Kılıçdaroğlu
Alevi Identity and Kılıçdaroğlu
Kızılbaş, Bektaşi, and Alevi
Dersim/Tunceli Sociopolitical Context
Memur Adam—Bureaucratic Personality
The New CHP and Its Identity
Conclusion
4 Kılıçdaroğlu’s Political Worldview
Moral and Political Worldview
State, Society, and Politics
Justice and Democracy
Secularism
Nationalism: Civic Nation
Moving to the Right or Reaching to the Conservative Population?
Kılıçdaroğlu’s Discourse of Amending (Helalleşme)
Kılıçdaroğlu’s Understanding of the Kurdish Issue
The Chief of the Anatolian Orchestra: The Table of Six
The Table of Governance and the Kitchen Table: A Collaborative Alliance
The Post-2019 CHP of Kılıçdaroğlu
Conclusion
5 Kılıçdaroğlu’s Foreign Policy
The Tenants of Kılıçdaroğlu’s Foreign Policy
Erdoğan vs. Kılıçdaroğlu’s Ideological Foreign Policy
The Pro-Wester Foreign Policy
The EU–Turkey Relations
Turkey’s Ties with Russia and Ukraine
Kılıçdaroğlu as a President: Challenges
Conclusion
6 Conclusion: The Prospects and 2023 Elections
The Building Blocks of Authoritarian Culture
The 2023 Elections and Potential Consequences
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

REFORM AND TRANSITION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SERIES EDITOR: IOANNIS N. GRIGORIADIS

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and the New Republican People’s Party in Turkey

M. Hakan Yavuz Ahmet Erdi Öztürk

Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean

Series Editor Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Bilkent University, Ankara, Türkiye

The series of political and economic crises that befell many countries in the Mediterranean region starting in 2009 has raised emphatically questions of reform and transition. While the sovereign debt crisis of Southern European states and the “Arab Spring” appear prima facie unrelated, some common roots can be identified: low levels of social capital and trust, high incidence of corruption, and poor institutional performance. This series provides a venue for the comparative study of reform and transition in the Mediterranean within and across the political, cultural, and religious boundaries that crisscross the region. Defining the Mediterranean as the region that encompasses the countries of Southern Europe, the Levant, and North Africa, the series contributes to a better understanding of the agents and the structures that have brought reform and transition to the forefront. It invites (but is not limited to) interdisciplinary approaches that draw on political science, history, sociology, economics, anthropology, area studies, and cultural studies. Bringing together case studies of individual countries with broader comparative analyses, the series provides a home for timely and cutting-edge scholarship that addresses the structural requirements of reform and transition; the interrelations between politics, history and culture; and the strategic importance of the Mediterranean for the EU, the USA, Russia, and emerging powers.

M. Hakan Yavuz · Ahmet Erdi Öztürk

Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu and the New Republican People’s Party in Turkey

M. Hakan Yavuz Department of Political Science University of Utah Salt Lake City, UT, USA

Ahmet Erdi Öztürk London Metropolitan University London, UK

ISSN 2945-641X ISSN 2945-6428 (electronic) Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean ISBN 978-3-031-36765-6 ISBN 978-3-031-36766-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36766-3 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: ADEM ALTAN/Contributor This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To our beloved children, Isabella Perin Öztürk, Armand, and Kaan Yavuz, May their lives be embraced by a Turkey that is free, democratic, and where the specter of marginalization holds no power.

˘ Praise for Kemal Kilic¸ daroglu and the New Republican People ’s Party in Turkey

“Yavuz and Ozturk have masterfully crafted an outstanding examination of Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu’s life, moral values, and political philosophy. Representing the first comprehensive study of the influential figure known as Gandhi Kemal, who played a pivotal role in shaping the political landscape of modern Turkey in its second century, this book is an essential resource for anyone seeking a profound understanding of the nation. One of the greatest success stories of our republic, which is secular and based on the will of the people, which Ataturk longed for, is the point where Kılıçdaro˘glu brought our Turkey.” —Hüsamettin Cindoruk, Former Speaker of the Turkish Parliament “This book on Kılıçdaro˘glu is an absolute must-read for those desiring a comprehensive grasp of Turkey’s intricate tapestry. Its pages illuminate the complexities of the nation’s history and present-day dynamics, inviting readers to delve deep into the forces that have shaped its course.” —Ilhan Kesici, Member of the Turkish Parliament “A timely, important, and path-breaking work by two eminent scholars on the man poised to become Turkey’s next president. This volume traces the rise, evolution, and world-view of Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu, whose victory would usher in a new era in Turkish politics.” —Paul Kupicek, Editor, Turkish Studies

vii

viii

˘ PRAISE FOR KEMAL KILIÇDAROGLU AND THE NEW …

“With meticulous research and insightful analysis, Yavuz and Ozturk shed light on Kılıçdaro˘glu’s journey, offering invaluable insights into his beliefs, motivations, and impact on Turkey’s trajectory. Their work stands as a testament to the significant contributions made by this transformative figure.” —Michael M. Gunter, Professor of Political Science, Tennessee Technological University

Contents

1 2

1

Introduction Introduction

2

The Ideology and History of CHP Paradox of the CHP: The Party of the State vs. Social Democrat Multiparty System (1946–1960) Bülent Ecevit (1972–1980) The Center–Periphery Thesis and the CHP Deniz Baykal Era (1995–2010) Conclusion

13

3

Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu: Life and Socialization Kılıçdaro˘glu’s Moral Worldview Fathers and Sons: Erdo˘gan vs. Kılıçdaro˘glu Alevi Identity and Kılıçdaro˘glu Kızılba¸s, Bekta¸si, and Alevi Dersim/Tunceli Sociopolitical Context Memur Adam—Bureaucratic Personality The New CHP and Its Identity Conclusion

45 49 53 56 60 65 67 69 72

4

Kılıçdaro˘glu’s Political Worldview Moral and Political Worldview State, Society, and Politics

75 76 78

15 20 23 29 36 42

ix

x

CONTENTS

Justice and Democracy Secularism Nationalism: Civic Nation Moving to the Right or Reaching to the Conservative Population? Kılıçdaro˘glu’s Discourse of Amending ( Helalle¸sme) Kılıçdaro˘glu’s Understanding of the Kurdish Issue The Chief of the Anatolian Orchestra: The Table of Six The Table of Governance and the Kitchen Table: A Collaborative Alliance The Post-2019 CHP of Kılıçdaro˘glu Conclusion

83 86 90 94 101 105 110

5

Kılıçdaro˘glu’s Foreign Policy The Tenants of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s Foreign Policy Erdo˘gan vs. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s Ideological Foreign Policy The Pro-Wester Foreign Policy The EU–Turkey Relations Turkey’s Ties with Russia and Ukraine Kılıçdaro˘glu as a President: Challenges Conclusion

123 124 126 128 129 132 135 137

6

Conclusion: The Prospects and 2023 Elections The Building Blocks of Authoritarian Culture The 2023 Elections and Potential Consequences

139 146 150

114 118 120

Bibliography

155

Index

161

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract This chapter embarks on an exploration of the extensive political legacy of the Erdo˘gan government, subsequently turning our attention to the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and its influential leader, Kılıçdaro˘glu, and the vision they offer to society. Furthermore, we provide a brief introduction to the core principles of Kemalism, which serve as the historical identity of the CHP. Lastly, we skillfully summarize the main arguments from each preceding chapter, culminating in a comprehensive overview of the political landscape and its implications. Keywords Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu · The Republican People Party · Kemalism · Modernity · Kurds · Bülent Ecevit · The 2013 Gezi Protests · Turgut Özal · Neo-liberalism · The Table of Six · Justice ˙ March · Ilhan Kesici

Everyone’s identity is their own dignity. I will end the political manipulation of the people’s faith, identity, and lifestyle.1

1 Kılıçdaro˘ glu’s statement on August 13, 2021, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ main-opposition-chp-chief-vows-to-resolve-kurdish-question-167045.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. H. Yavuz and A. E. Öztürk, Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu and the New Republican People’s Party in Turkey, Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36766-3_1

1

2

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Introduction After 22 years of Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan’s rule, Turkey has inherited a legacy of systemic issues that have left the country in a state of disarray.2 Among these issues is a kleptocratic bureaucracy that has enriched Erdo˘gan and his inner circle at the expense of the Turkish people.3 Additionally, Erdo˘gan’s authoritarian rule has led to a society that is deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines, resulting in a fractured and unstable nation. In essence, Erdo˘gan’s legacy is a “Republic of Fear” where citizens are afraid to speak out against the government or to express their opinions freely. This fear is compounded by a widespread crackdown on civil society and the media, leaving many individuals feeling isolated and vulnerable. Furthermore, Erdo˘gan’s authoritarian rule has seen an erosion of democratic norms and institutions, including the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of the press. This has created an environment where dissent is stifled and opposition voices are silenced, leading to a situation where the ruling party has near-total control over the political landscape. Turkey’s multiparty democracy is experiencing significant erosion due to a collapsing justice system, systemic corruption at all levels, and failing institutions. To overcome these challenges, Turkey needs a new vision for the future that is based on principles of democracy, equality, and justice. This will require a commitment to building a more inclusive society that values the contributions of all citizens, regardless of their background or identity. Erdo˘gan’s legacy is a cautionary tale of what can happen when leaders prioritize their own interests over those of the country they serve. To move forward, Turkey must learn from the mistakes of the past and work toward building a brighter future for all its citizens. There is hope for the future of democracy in Turkey through the new leadership of the Republican People’s Party (CHP; Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi). Under the leadership of Kılıçdaro˘glu, he reconstructed the CHP and became the hope for the majority of the population.

2 Yavuz, M. Hakan. Erdo˘gan: The making of an autocrat. Edinburgh University Press, 2021. 3 Cagaptay, Soner. The new sultan: Erdo˘gan and the crisis of modern Turkey. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020. Tol, Gönül. Erdo˘gan’s war: A strongman’s struggle at home and in Syria. Oxford University Press, 2022.

1

INTRODUCTION

3

Kılıçdaro˘glu represents honesty and a commitment to democracy, making him the best chance to stop the declining state and collapsing democracy. While President Erdo˘gan’s authoritarianism and corruption have been well-documented, there is no single study on the vision and policies of Kılıçdaro˘glu and his vision of the New CHP.4 This book seeks to explore the personality, policies, and potential implications of Kılıçdaro˘glu, who is the leading contender against President Erdo˘gan, who is ruling the country since 2002. Under Kılıçdaro˘glu’s leadership, the CHP has developed a strategy to reach out to other opposition groups and build a new, stronger, and inclusive opposition movement to end two decades-long corruption and authoritarianism of Erdo˘gan. To fully comprehend the significance of Kılıçdaro˘glu, this book will initially delve into the origins of his moral worldview and his political ideology and its subsequent adaptations in light of shifting socioeconomic circumstances. By examining the founding principles of his beliefs and their evolution over time, we can gain a deeper understanding of the context in which Kılıçdaro˘glu emerged as a prominent figure to repair the fractured political landscape. Through this exploration, we can also identify the key factors that have shaped his worldview and political outlook, and how they have informed his actions and policies. By contextualizing his ideas and actions within their historical and societal framework, we can better appreciate the impact of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s contributions to contemporary politics and society. As in the entire Ottoman modernization process, the main purpose of the ruling class, consisting of the military and civilian bureaucrats, was to modernize the state and society, with all its elements, from top to bottom, and to bring it to the level of contemporary civilization. The state tried to protect its modernizing spirit with the CHP.5 The founding principles of the CHP were rooted in the aspiration to embody the progressive ideals of the new Republic, embracing the modernizing principles of the state as its ideological foundation. It is crucial to acknowledge that the CHP was initially established as the party representing the state, which 4 For more about kleptocracy please see; Yavuz, M. Hakan, and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk. “Turkish secularism and Islam under the reign of Erdo˘gan.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 19, no. 1 (2019): 1–9. Yavuz, M. Hakan. “Understanding Turkish secularism in the 21th century: A contextual roadmap.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 19, no. 1 (2019): 55–78. 5 Yunus, Emre. Kokler CHP-Devamlilik ve Degisim. Tekin Yayinevi, 2020.

4

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

forms the bedrock of its identity. Consequently, as the party associated with the state, the CHP championed the spirit of modernization within both the state apparatus and society, positioning itself as the party of the ruling elite. The overarching objective was to bring about a comprehensive transformation of both the state and society, with the goal of creating a unified and classless “people” devoid of ethnic or social divisions. However, this vision of a secular nation necessitated decisions being made on behalf of the people, rather than allowing them to determine their own destiny. Thus, the construction of a secular nation was pursued “despite the people,” emphasizing a top-down approach in shaping the course of the nation’s development. The CHP’s identity, from its inception until 1946, was predominantly characterized by elitism, modernism, secularism, and popular nationalism. This foundational identity has consistently acted as a significant constraint on the extent to which the CHP could transform its core identity. It is important to recognize that the CHP’s historical identity has played a crucial role in shaping its trajectory and determining the boundaries of change. The party’s commitment to its founding principles has limited the extent to which it could alter its identity over time. When the party gradually adopted the core social democratic values under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit in the mid-1960s and 1970s, “the CHP has never abandoned Kemalism.”6 The stress that the CHP is at the “left of center” in relation to other socialist parties was a major change in the 1970s.7 In practice, the CHP’s ideological evolution has typically entailed the incorporation of additional layers onto its existing Kemalist identity. The CHP has consistently grappled with two opposing directions: representing the interests of the state versus championing the interests of the people. Throughout its history, the CHP struggled to develop a distinct ideological identity separate from the demands of the state until the mid-1960s. This ideological shift also marked a change in the CHP’s relationship with the state, breaking away from its previous association with the ruling elite. However, in the 1990s, the rise of Islamist and

6 Kılıçdaro˘ glu, Kerem. “Change in political party strategy and organization in Turkey: The Republican People’s Party in government and in opposition.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20, no. 4 (2020): 593–615. 7 Emre, Yunus. The emergence of social democracy in Turkey: The left and the transformation of the Republican People’s Party. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014.

1

INTRODUCTION

5

Kurdish movements led to a resurgence of the CHP’s realignment with the state. From early 1990s to 2010, the CHP remained more or less as the party of the state, rather than the party of the people. Its ideology, namely nationalism, populism, republicanism, etatism, revolutionism, and secularism, constitutes the founding philosophy of the state, which is also known as Kemalism. Kemalism provided unity and homogeneity to the ruling elite of the state, while the societal periphery remained fragmented along ethnic, religious, and regional identity lines. Thus, Turkey was a fragmented country between the ruling elite and the masses; between what Turkey wanted to become (a secular-European nation-state) and what Turkey was (a conservative Islamic country with deep nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire).8 This situation has been radically transformed by the neoliberal economic policies of Turgut Özal.9 There are several reasons for the erosion of the social base of the CHP in the 1990s. These are the CHP’s lack of comprehensive economic programs to help the lower-middle class. Yet, the trade unions in Turkey weakened and they were almost ineffective. Moreover, legally the connection between the labor union and the party was not possible either. The polarization of Turkish society took place along ethnic and religious lines and the political parties were based on this polarization. Some scholars also insist that the CHP failed to expand its social base in the 1980s, 90s, and under the Baykal era (1995–2010) because it is the state-founding party and had closer ties with the military and civilian establishment. It hardly tried to go beyond the establishment and stressed the secular lifestyle of the upper-middle-class Turks. In other words, the ideological roots and the policies of the party constitute major obstacles to pursuing more social democrat and liberal policies. Its historic Kemalist identity in establishing the Republic prevents radical changes since it was formed to transform society by mimicking Europe. The CHP’s elite-based modernization project and its commitment to secularism and its anti-religious attitude restrain its ability to transform itself according to the needs of modern society.

8 Yavuz, M. Hakan. Nostalgia for the empire: The politics of neo-Ottomanism. Oxford University Press, 2020. 9 More on the social and political impacts of Özal’s neoliberal economic policies, see Yavuz, M. Hakan. Islamic political identity in Turkey. Oxford University Press, 2003.

6

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Following the 2013 Gezi Protests, where oppositional movements were suppressed by Erdo˘gan’s AKP controlling all layers of the state, the CHP, led by Kılıçdaro˘glu, emerged as a beacon of hope for the people, striving to liberate civil society from Erdo˘gan’s authoritarian rule. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s role in building the Table of Six, also known as the Nation Alliance was significant, as his unifying and negotiating attitude provided the basis for these diverse groups to form an alliance. During this process, Kılıçdaro˘glu adopted a conciliatory political discourse that proved effective in breaking taboos against the perception of “CHP elitism disconnected from the people.” This approach also gave rise to “reckoning with the past mistakes,” (helalle¸sme) a popular political line that resonated with society and helped to create an image of Kılıçdaro˘glu as a unifying and transformative leader who was in touch with the concerns of the people. His “kitchen address,” which emphasized the importance of everyday issues, such as the increasing food prices, rather than lofty rhetoric, was a particularly effective tool in creating this image. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s ability to connect with the people in this way has had a positive effect on his political standing, and his depiction as “one of the people” has been longed for by society for some time. Overall, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s communication strategy has proven to be the right move, as it has helped to portray him as a relatable and trustworthy leader in the eyes of the public. Despite Erdo˘gan’s authoritarian tendencies and his utilization of state resources to delegitimize and criminalize the opposition, Kılıçdaro˘glu has displayed remarkable resilience in challenging such oppression and breaking down the walls of fear. In the face of Erdo˘gan’s strong-handed tactics, Kılıçdaro˘glu has remained steadfast in his commitment to democracy and the principles of political opposition. Despite the immense power wielded by the ruling party, Kılıçdaro˘glu has fearlessly confronted Erdo˘gan’s attempts to silence and marginalize the opposition. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s unwavering resolve and determination have proven instrumental in dismantling the wall of fear that Erdo˘gan sought to erect. Through his resolute leadership, he has inspired a sense of courage and unity among the opposition, empowering them to speak out against injustice and challenge the prevailing narrative. Moreover, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s ability to rally support and mobilize the masses has been instrumental in countering the authoritarian tactics employed by Erdo˘gan. Despite facing an uphill battle, he has effectively utilized his platform to expose the shortcomings of the ruling regime and foster a sense of solidarity among those who stand against it. By refusing

1

INTRODUCTION

7

to be intimidated and by confronting the oppressive regime head-on, Kılıçdaro˘glu has emerged as a symbol of resistance and hope. His ability to challenge Erdo˘gan’s authoritarianism, even in the face of overwhelming odds, is a testament to his leadership and unwavering commitment to democratic principles. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s communication skills and his ability to demonstrate his sincerity has a major impact on this election. His prudent approach, sound logic in arguments, and discourse presented with a shred of highly reliable evidence are among the most important elements that ensure that the political message is conveyed to and internalized by the voters. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s cautious statement on contentious issues, such as the Kurdish question, reflects his desire for peace on the basis of bridging and developing a rational language to overcome the politics of identity. Kılıçdaro˘glu stood against the identity politics that polarize society and prevents the debate over inequality, injustices, and failed education system. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s emphasis is not on “difference” or the “politics of identity” but on shared brotherhood and ideals. He aptly argued that: “There is a destiny that makes Turks and Kurds brothers. Fate brought us together. Fate told us to be brothers. Fate laid us down in Çanakkale, Sakarya and Dumlupınar. There is no deep love like brotherly love. We’ve been together for centuries. We lived together… For three or five votes, I will never, ever let anyone harm the brotherhood.”10 This book aims to thoroughly examine the perpetual tension that has characterized the evolution of the CHP as it oscillates between being the party of the state and the party of the people. By delving into the historical context, we will explore the factors that have contributed to this constant shift within the CHP’s trajectory. However, the primary focus of this study is to investigate how and under what circumstances, including external pressures and constraints, the CHP has transformed into the party of the people and emerged as a beacon of hope for rebuilding Turkish democracy. The central argument of this book asserts that while structural conditions undoubtedly play a significant role, the pivotal factor in this transformation lies in the leadership of Kılıçdaro˘glu. As the leader of the 10 Kılıçdaro˘ glu’s statement, April 18, 2023. https://www.politikyol.com/millet-ittifa kinin-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglundan-kurtler-baslikli-video-mesaji-3-5-oy-icin-kar deslige-kimsenin-zarar-vermesine-asla-ve-asla-izin-vermeyecegim/.

8

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Republican People’s Party (CHP), Kılıçdaro˘glu has shown unwavering commitment to his reform initiatives, ensuring they never wither away due to neglect. He has been willing to invest his political capital to drive the necessary changes forward. As the driving force behind the New CHP movement, Kılıçdaro˘glu exemplifies the behaviors and attitudes that are expected from all members of his party. Party members closely observe their leaders, seeking consistency between their words and actions as an indicator of whether the promised changes will truly materialize. Kılıçdaro˘glu consistently strives to align his words and actions, leaving no room for doubt. His leadership style goes beyond merely inspiring others to change; he actively involves people in the transformative processes. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s dynamism and empathy have been instrumental in motivating and engaging individuals throughout the change journey. Karl Marx’s insights, as presented in his work “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” offer a valuable framework for analyzing the role of political leaders. According to Marx, individuals have agency in shaping history, but they operate within a set of circumstances inherited from the past.11 This notion is applicable to Kılıçdaro˘glu and his leadership within the context of the Republican People’s Party (CHP). Kılıçdaro˘glu’s vision for change is influenced by the historical identity of the CHP and the existing socio-political structure. The CHP has a long-standing history, rooted in specific ideological foundations and a collective memory that shapes its identity. As the leader, Kılıçdaro˘glu must take these historical elements into account when formulating his desired changes. He is constrained by the party’s traditions, values, and the expectations of its members, as well as the broader socio-political climate in which the CHP operates. While Kılıçdaro˘glu may strive for transformative change, he must navigate within the boundaries set by the party’s historical legacy and the prevailing socio-political circumstances. These factors pose challenges and limitations that he must consider, as they shape the possibilities and feasibility of his proposed reforms. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s leadership, therefore, involves finding a balance between preserving the party’s identity and pushing for change within the constraints imposed by historical context and current socio-political realities. In this sense, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s leadership is a product of both his own agency and the historical conditions he inherits. He must work within the framework of 11 Marx, Karl. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. International Publisher, 1963.

1

INTRODUCTION

9

the CHP’s historical identity and the socio-political structure to effect meaningful change, striving to shape history while being mindful of the circumstances he confronts. Thus, our attention will be directed toward Kılıçdaro˘glu, the new leader who has assumed the role of the architect behind the rejuvenated CHP. By closely examining his leadership style, strategies, and vision, we will gain valuable insights into the factors that have contributed to the CHP’s shift toward becoming a party that champions the interests of the people and strives to rebuild and strengthen Turkish democracy. The first chapter will examine the party’s founding identity, tracing its roots to the Union and Progress movement, known as Ittihatcis. It then will analyze Mustafa Kemal’s revolutionary vision and the founding principles of the Turkish Republic. Next, we will explore how and why the CHP transitioned from being a “party of the state” to a social democrat party, and what forces constrained this transformation under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit. We will explore the conceptual framework of Serif ¸ Mardin’s Center–Periphery thesis to unpack the role of the CHP in the Turkish socio-political landscape. We will also delve into the impact of the 1980 military coup on the CHP’s transformation, analyzing the political, economic, and social factors that influenced the party’s evolution during this period. Furthermore, we will scrutinize Deniz Baykal’s decision to redefine the CHP as the party of the state, and how this shift affected the party’s popularity and electoral prospects. Finally, we will briefly examine the building blocks of the “New CHP” under the leadership of Kılıçdaro˘glu. The second chapter of this study will provide an in-depth exploration of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s life, socialization process, and the contextual factors that have influenced him. It aims to shed light on his moral and political worldview by examining various aspects of his personal background. To comprehensively understand his worldview, we will delve into his family life, placing particular emphasis on his relationship with his father. Additionally, we will explore the significance of his Alevi identity and how it has shaped his perspectives.12 Furthermore, the chapter will analyze the impact of his experience as a bureaucrat on his understanding of society and the state. By investigating these key elements of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s life, we 12 Yavuz, M. Hakan. “De˘ gisim Sürecindeki Alevi Kimli˘gi/Die alewitische Identitat in VeranderungsprozeB.” In Aleviler: Identitat und Geschichte Vol 1, pp. 75–95. Hamburg: Deutsche Orient-Institut, 2000.

10

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

can gain valuable insights into the foundations of his moral and political beliefs. The third chapter explores Kılıçdaro˘glu’s political worldview through four key questions. Firstly, it investigates the foundation of his moral worldview and what influences his political positions. Secondly, it examines how he understands the concepts such as politics, state, nation, secularism, and democracy. Thirdly, it analyzes how his “Justice March” initiative aligns with his overall political worldview and why he advocates for addressing past mistakes (helalle¸sme) to rebuild society. Additionally, it explores public responses to his initiative to form the Table of Six. Lastly, it investigates how and why Kılıçdaro˘glu formed an inclusive coalition to bring about a change of power in Turkey. After establishing a framework for Kılıçdaro˘glu’s political worldview, we seek to explore his views and policies on the Kurdish question. Overall, the chapter offers a comprehensive analysis of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s beliefs and policies, shedding light on the factors shaping his political stance. The fourth chapter will examine the framework of the foreign policy of the CHP by comparing and contrasting his foreign policy vision visà-vis Erdo˘gan. Four areas are relevant to the discussion, for comparing Kılıçdaro˘glu’s positions with those of Erdo˘gan: Turkish relations with the Western powers, especially with the European Union, Turkey’s relations with Russia; Turkey’s relations with the Turkic world and the Eurasian diaspora and its position as a regional power, and Turkey’s relations with Middle East countries. In the conclusion chapter, we will summarize and evaluate Kılıçdaro˘glu’s political vision, shedding light on the key principles and ideals that have guided his political career. By examining the overarching themes and objectives of his leadership, we will gain a deeper understanding of the underlying motivations driving his decision-making process. In addition, this chapter will venture into the realm of speculation as we explore the potential consequences of the upcoming 2023 elections. By considering various scenarios and potential outcomes, we will assess the possible implications for the country’s political, social, and economic landscape. This analysis will provide a foundation for understanding the potential future trajectories and challenges that may emerge as a result of the electoral process. We extend our heartfelt appreciation to all those who have graciously shared their valuable insights and expertise, which have been instrumental in the completion of this book. We would like to express our sincere

1

INTRODUCTION

11

gratitude to Bülent Ku¸so˘glu, whose unwavering support and promotion of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s presidential candidacy in 2022 have greatly contributed to our understanding of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s political perspectives. Ku¸so˘glu, a distinguished graduate of Turkey’s esteemed Mekteb-i Mülkiye (Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi) and a serving member of parliament, brings a wealth of knowledge and experience to his role as the chief economist of the CHP. During our interview, Ku¸so˘glu provided invaluable insights, offering a profound understanding of the core principles and values that underpin the CHP’s vision for the future of Turkey. His astute observations and thoughtful analysis have played a pivotal role in shaping the ideas and concepts presented in this book. We are immensely grateful to Ku¸so˘glu for his guidance and assistance, as his expertise has been instrumental in our comprehensive exploration of the CHP’s ideology and agenda. ˙ We are very grateful to Ihan Kesici, a distinguished member of parliament and a renowned center-right politician in CHP, who shared his experiences with us as a center-right politician within the social democrat CHP. His insights were instrumental in our understanding of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s vision for expanding the boundaries of the CHP toward the conservative sector of the population. Mr. Kesici emphasized that under the leadership of Kılıçdaro˘glu, the CHP has pushed beyond its traditional boundaries. We are also indebted to Professor Nihat Ali Özcan from TOBB University, whose contributions enabled us to unravel Kılıçdaro˘glu’s policy on the Kurdish issue. With his expertise and deep knowledge, Professor Özcan helped us gain an in-depth understanding of the complex dynamics surrounding this issue. ˙ Another key contributor to this book is Professor Irfan Özet, who conducted several fieldworks and produced the most comprehensive study of the CHP at the local level. Professor Özet facilitated our exploration of the local networks and practices of the CHP under the leadership of Kılıçdaro˘glu. His invaluable contributions helped us understand how the CHP evolved and formed a new map of ideology under Kılıçdaro˘glu’s leadership. We extend our heartfelt gratitude to Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, the series editor, for his unwavering support and enthusiasm throughout the entire process of preparing this book. His guidance and encouragement have been invaluable in shaping the content and ensuring its quality. Furthermore, we would like to express our sincere appreciation to Muhammet Cakmak, who generously devoted his time and expertise to reading and

12

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

providing insightful views on a wide range of issues addressed in this book. His critical comments and constructive feedback have played a pivotal role in refining the ideas presented within these pages. Without his valuable contributions, this book would not have reached its fullest potential. We are also immensely grateful to Dr. Les Roka, who meticulously edited the manuscript in different stages of its development. His keen eye for detail and expertise in language ensured that the manuscript was polished and refined. Dr. Roka’s contributions have been invaluable in bringing this book to its final form.

CHAPTER 2

The Ideology and History of CHP

Abstract This chapter will examine the party’s founding identity, tracing its roots to the Union and Progress movement, known as Ittihatcis. It then will analyze Mustafa Kemal’s revolutionary vision and the founding principles of the Turkish Republic. Next, we will explore how and why the CHP transitioned from being a “party of the state” to a social democrat party, and what forces constrained this transformation under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit. We will explore the conceptual framework of Serif ¸ Mardin’s Center–Periphery thesis to unpack the role of the CHP in the Turkish socio-political landscape. We will also delve into the impact of the 1980 military coup on the CHP’s transformation, analyzing the political, economic, and social factors that influenced the party’s evolution during this period. Furthermore, we will scrutinize Deniz Baykal’s decision to redefine the CHP as the party of the state, and how this shift affected the party’s popularity and electoral prospects. Finally, we will briefly examine the building blocks of the “New CHP” under the leadership of Kılıçdaro˘glu. Keywords Ottoman Empire · The Turkish War of Independence · Kemalism · Modernization · Ittihatci · Nation-building · Modernization · Populism · Nationalism · Mustafa Kemal Atatürk · ˙ ˙ Ismet Inönü · Bülent Ecevit · The 1980 coup · Social democracy · Deniz Baykal · The center of the left · Socialism © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. H. Yavuz and A. E. Öztürk, Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu and the New Republican People’s Party in Turkey, Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36766-3_2

13

14

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

In this chapter, we will undertake a comprehensive analysis of the ideological evolution of the CHP from its inception in 1923 to the year 2010, exploring how changes in leadership and governance have transformed the party and its standing among the populace. By examining three critical areas—the shift from a top-down to a bottom-up approach, changes in partisan blocs and cadres, and shifts in political leadership—we can gain insights into how political parties adapt and evolve in response to prevailing conditions. This chapter aims to address several key questions regarding the CHP’s transformation. Firstly, we will examine the party’s founding identity, tracing its roots to Mustafa Kemal’s revolutionary vision and the founding principles of the Turkish Republic. Next, we will explore how and why the CHP transitioned from being a “party of the state” to a social democrat party, and what forces constrained this transformation under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit. We will also delve into the impact of the 1980 military coup on the CHP’s transformation, analyzing the political, economic, and social factors that influenced the party’s evolution during this period. Furthermore, we will scrutinize Deniz Baykal’s decision to redefine the CHP as the party of the state, and how this shift affected the party’s popularity and electoral prospects. Finally, we will briefly examine the building blocks of the “New CHP” under the leadership of Kılıçdaro˘glu. By tracing the CHP’s ideological evolution across several decades, we can better understand the complex interplay of historical, economic, and social factors that have shaped the party’s identity and influenced its standing among the Turkish public. Nationalist and secularist sensitivities, which are widespread both at the grassroots and at the top of the party, create a point of resistance against new liberal discourses, limiting Kılıçdaro˘glu’s early attempts to reach the conservative sector of the society. However, Kılıçdaro˘glu gradually pushed some of the hardline nationalists and secularists away and introduced a radical policy by recruiting some conservative politicians from the center-right to run under the CHP name for municipal elections.

2

THE IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHP

15

Paradox of the CHP: The Party of the State vs. Social Democrat To gain insight into the ideology and essence of the CHP, it is crucial to delve into the two key roots that have shaped the party’s formation. These roots encompass the Ittihatcis (the Union and Progress Committee; CUP) and the associations of local militias (the Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia; ADRAR), which emerged during the resistance against the occupation of Anatolia in the aftermath of World War I.1 The Ittihatcis were linked to the broader Young Turk movement, and its members were commonly called Young Turks, even though the movement gave rise to other political parties. The Ittihatci movement was a political vision and organization that emerged in the late nineteenth century and played a significant role in the politics of the Ottoman Empire.2 The movement was founded in 1889 by a group of Ottoman intellectuals, primarily military officers, with the aim of preserving, modernizing, and centralizing the empire. In the ˙ Ottoman Empire, the members were recognized as Ittihatcılar (“Unionists”) or Komiteciler. Most former Ittihatcıs were able to join the growing Turkish nationalist movement and sustain their political careers in Turkey by joining the CHP.3 The founding figures of the Turkish Republic drew significant inspiration from the ideology and strategies of the Ittihatci movement.4 Following the conclusion of World War I, the local leaders who comprised the core group of former Ittihatcis came together to establish the CHP. Their primary objective was to implement Westernizing reforms that

1 Hanio˘ glu, M. Sükrü. ¸ The Young Turks in opposition. Oxford University Press on Demand, 1995. Ahmad, Feroz. The Young Turks. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969; Kayalı, Hasan. “The Ottoman experience of World War I: Historiographical problems and trends.” The Journal of Modern History 89, no. 4 (2017): 875–907. 2 Tunaya, Tarık Zafer. Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler Cilt 1. Ileti¸sim Yayınları, 2007 (1952). 3 Zucher, Erik Jan. The unionist factor: The role of the Committee of Union and progress

in the Turkish National Movement, 1905–1926. E.J. Brill, 1984; Smith, Elaine Diane. Turkey: The origins of the Kemalist movement and the government of the grand national assembly (1919–1923). Judd and Detweiler, 1959. 4 Zürcher, Erik J. Turkey: A modern history. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017.

16

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

would salvage the state and drive societal transformation in alignment with the evolving needs of the nation.5 The Ittihatci movement advocated for a set of political, social, and economic reforms in order to strengthen the Ottoman Empire and counter the challenges it faced from within and outside. Although the Ittihatci movement emphasized Ottoman nationalism, seeking to unite the diverse ethnic and religious groups within the empire under a common Ottoman identity, after the Balkan Wars (1912–1914), they concluded that the only solution would be the creation of a Turkish only nation-state in order to survive.6 The movement advocated for constitutional reforms to establish a representative government in the Ottoman Empire. They demanded the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, with a constitution that would guarantee basic rights and freedoms for all citizens. The Ittihatci movement believed in a strong central government and aimed to consolidate power in the hands of the modernizing and nationalizing state. They sought to reduce the influence of regional and local authorities, as well as the power of the Ottoman Sultan, in order to create a more efficient and unified administration. Finally, the Ittihatcis recognized the need for modernization in various aspects of the empire, including education, industry, infrastructure, and the military. They emphasized the importance of adopting Western technology, science, and education to catch up with the advancements of European powers. During the conflict against the West and also building a new Turkish nation-state, they aimed to unite Muslims across different regions and foster solidarity among them, particularly in response to the challenges faced by Muslim populations under European colonialism. It is important to note that the Ittihatci movement’s political vision was complex and evolved over time in response to military and political challenges. While they initially sought to bring about positive changes and reforms, their policies and actions later became more authoritarian and exclusionary, leading to tensions and conflicts within the empire. The movement’s influence peaked during the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, 5 Özbudun, Ergun. “Social change and political participation in Turkey.” In Social change and political participation in Turkey. Princeton University Press, 2015; Özbudun, Ergun. “Changes and continuities in the Turkish party system.” Representation 42, no. 2 (2006): 129–137. 6 Blumi, Isa, and M. Hakan Yavuz. War and nationalism: The Balkan wars, 1912–1913, and their sociopolitical implications. University of Utah Press, 2013.

2

THE IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHP

17

but it eventually declined, and the empire collapsed following World War I.7 The Ittihatci experience and its local leadership played a formative role in the formation and development of the CHP under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. The CHP’s second root can be traced back to the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia (ADRAR), known as Anadolu ve Rumeli Mudafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti in Turkish.8 This association was established in Anatolia and Thrace in 1918, following the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in World War I. Its primary purpose was to organize military resistance, protect the homeland from foreign occupation, and establish an independent political authority beyond the reach of the occupying forces. From 1918 to 1922, the ADRAR functioned as the political apparatus driving Turkey’s fight for independence. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the ADRAR played a pivotal role in the struggle for liberation, ultimately transforming into a political party with the establishment of the parliament in Ankara. This marked the birth of the CHP.9 The CHP, in order to consolidate its own historical narrative, designated its First Party Congress in 1927 as the second congress of the party, asserting that the first congress was held by the ADRAR in Sivas in 1919.10 Thus, the CHP considers itself as the direct continuation of the ADRAR, regarding its first congress as the inaugural gathering of the ADRAR. Upon closer examination of the prominent members of the ADRAR, it becomes apparent that many of them had previously been active participants in the Ittihatcis movement before aligning themselves with the CHP. This signifies a significant overlap in terms of personnel and ideology between the Ittihatcis and the ADRAR, ultimately influencing the development and direction of the CHP. The CHP considers itself as the rightful heir and continuation of the ADRAR, positioning its first

7 Hanio˘ glu, M. Sükrü. ¸ Preparation for a revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908. Oxford University Press, 2001. 8 Harris, S., and N. B. Criss. “Appendix condensed. Memorandum concerning the

organization and points of view of the league for the defense of the rights of Anatolia and Rumelia.” In Studies in Atatürk’s Turkey, pp. 201–212. Brill, 2009. 9 Çevik, Zeki. Millˆı Mücadele’de “Müdafaa-i Hukuk’tan Halk Fırkası’na” geçi¸s, 1918– 1923. Atatürk Ara¸stırma Merkezi, 2002. 10 Kolo˘ ˙ glu, Orhan. “Osmanlı basınında 1865 kolera salgını, Istanbul sa˘glık konferansı ve Mirza Malkom Han.” Osmanlı bilimi ara¸stırmaları 6, no. 2 (2005): 139–150.

18

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

congress as the ADRAR’s initial gathering. Notably, a significant number of the ADRAR had previous affiliations with the Ittihatcis, highlighting the interconnectedness and influence between these two entities.11 The CHP’s primary objective was the formation of a Turkish nationstate encompassing the entire territory indicated in the Misak-I Milli.12 In its early years until the late 1920s, the CHP followed an ideologically diverse approach, striving to reconcile conservative and progressive viewpoints. During this period, the leadership focused on modernizing the country while disregarding social divisions and abstaining from aligning with any specific social class. The CHP established the modern Turkish Republic and built its institutions as a single-party regime under the ˙ ˙ leadership of Mustafa Kemal (1923–1938) and then Ismet Inönü (1938– 1950). Thus, the CHP is not any other party in Turkey. It is the founding actor of the modern Turkish Republic.13 The CHP and its leadership, led by Mustafa Kemal, organized the war of independence and after the liberation, it engaged in a dual process of state and nation-building. Under Mustafa Kemal’s guidance, it carried out the most comprehensive modernization project in the Muslim world. It was and still is the party of the state.14 Its worldview has been informed by (a) building a modern state to lead and transform the society and (b) transforming traditional/ religious society to become a nation that would be guided by reason, not

11 Ahmad, Feroz. The Young Turks. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969; Ak¸sin, Sina. 100 ˙ Soruda Jön Türkler ve Ittihat ve Terakki. Gerçek Yayınevi, 1980; Hanio˘glu, M. Sükrü. ¸ ˙ Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük, 1889–1902. ˙ sim, 1986; Kansu, Aykut. The revolution of 1908 in Turkey. Brill, 1997. Ileti¸ 12 The Misak-i Milli was announced on February 12, 1920, by the Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul, shortly after the end of World War I and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The pact was a response to the Treaty of Sèvres, which imposed harsh terms on the empire and threatened to dismember it further. Misak-i Milli, also known as the National Pact or National Oath, refers to a set of principles and goals that were outlined during the final years of the Ottoman Empire and later adopted by the Republic of Turkey. It served as a declaration of the Turkish national movement’s objectives and aspirations during the tumultuous period of the early twentieth century. 13 Alpkaya, Faruk. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin Kurulu¸su. Istanbul: ˙ ˙ sim Yayınları, 1998; Ileti¸ Yetkin, Çetin. Türkiye’de tek parti yönetimi. Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1983; Uyar, Hakkı. Tek Parti Dönemi ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. Boyut Kitapları, Boyut Yayın Grubu, 1998; Mazıcı, Nur¸sen. Tek parti dönemi: seçilmi¸s makaleler. Pozitif, 2011; Koçak, Cemil. Türkiye’de milli ¸sef dönemi: (1938–1945). Yurt Yayınları, 1986. 14 Lewis, Bernard. The emergence of modern Turkey. Oxford University Press, 1968; Berkes, Niyazi. “The development of secularism in Turkey,” 1964.

2

THE IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHP

19

by religion or primordial identities.15 This worldview is also known as Kemalism and the CHP presents and represents this worldview.16 Kemalism was the guiding ideology of the Republic of Turkey at its inception, drawing inspiration from European modernization projects.17 It rejected irredentist claims and instead prioritizing the creation of a secular nation-state. Kemalists aimed to transform Turkish society through state power, seeking to build an enlightened republic guided by reason and science rather than religion or tradition. The political doctrine of Kemalism was officially announced at the second party congress in October 1927, during which Mustafa Kemal delivered an extensive speech spanning six days, outlining the goals of the CHP. These goals included republicanism, advocating the rejection of monarchy; nationalism, denouncing any claims to statehood based on dynastic, religious, or racial grounds; secularism, emphasizing the separation of religion and state; and popularism. In response to the economic crisis of 1929, the party incorporated etatism, the concept of state economic enterprises, into its principles. The turning point for both the CHP and Turkey as a whole came during the third party congress in May 1931. This gathering symbolized the six principles of Kemalism through the representation of six arrows. Recep Peker articulated these principles and they became the ideology of the CHP.18 The congress marked a significant shift in the CHP’s direction, with a heightened emphasis on nationalism and secularism. The state assumed the role of arbiter in religious matters, and the new definition of nationalism aimed to elevate the Turkish nation to the highest level of civilization. These principles aimed to create a homogenous society without class conflict, emphasizing nationalism, secularism, populism, statism, reformism, and republicanism. While these principles succeeded in unifying some urban areas, they failed to reach rural and provincial regions due to limited resources and communication. Consequently, the

15 Safa, Peyami. Türk Inkılabına ˙ Bakı¸slar. Ötüken Yayınları, 1990. 16 Mahmut, Bozkurt, Peker Recep, and Tengir¸senk Yusuf Kemal. Ilk ˙ Inkılâp ˙ Tarihi

˙ Ders Notları. Hz.: Oktay Aslanapa. Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Ara¸stırmaları Vakfı, 1997.

17 Özbudun, Ergun. “The nature of the Kemalist political regime.” Atatürk: Founder of a modern state (1981): 79–102. 18 Kıdı¸s, Osman. “Atatürk Döneminde Recep Peker (1920–1938).” Master’s thesis, 2006.

20

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

CHP’s ideology had limited success in creating a homogenous society in Turkey during the single-party era. Due to the winds of fascism and authoritarianism in Europe, the CHP merged with the bureaucracy in 1935, and the minister of interior automatically assumed the position of general secretary of the party. In 1937, the constitution incorporated the six principles of Kemalism. Following ˙ ˙ the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938, Ismet Inönü succeeded him as the national leader and the one-party regime continued to dominate for six consecutive elections, with two failed attempts to establish competing parties in 1925 and 1930.19 The CHP faced persistent accusations of elitism, statism, and being overly influenced by militant secularism. Some critics even dubbed it the party of the ‘establishment and privileged,” referring to the urban, secular, progressive, and Western-oriented segments of Turkish society. This group was often seen as detached from traditional societal values, leading to accusations that the CHP was out of touch with the broader conservative population. During the 1940s and 50s, this criticism reached a fever pitch as many accused the CHP of being stuck in the past and failing to connect with the evolving needs of Turkish society.

Multiparty System (1946–1960) ˙ ˙ After Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s death in 1938, Ismet Inönü, a retired general who led the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Peace Conference, became the president and chairman of the CHP. He was also known as the “National Chief” (Milli S¸ ef ).20 The harsh economic conditions during World War II and Turkey’s huge defense spending left the economy in dire straits, and the masses were extremely unhappy.21 In 1946, in order to join NATO and other Western institutions, the CHP leadership decided to adopt a multiparty system. The CHP tried to justify its presence and relevance by presenting itself as the “Party of the State” and the guardian of the Kemalist regime and reforms. However, the party’s presence remained more effective in some urban centers, and its 19 Aydemir, Sevket Süreyya. Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal Ataturk Vol 1–3. Remzi Kitabevi, 1997. 20 Heper, Metin. Ismet ˙ ˙ Inönü: The making of a Turkish Statesman. Brill, 1998. 21 VanderLippe, John. M. The politics of Turkish democracy: Ismet ˙ ˙ Inönü and the formation of the multi-party system, 1938–1950. SUNNY Press, 2005.

2

THE IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHP

21

influence sharply declined in rural and provincial towns. When the Democrat Party (DP) was formed in 1946, it defined itself as the party of the periphery and representative of alternative Islamic-conservative values and championed democratic values and individual freedoms. In fact, the DP’s famous slogan, “Enough! It is the people’s turn to speak (Yeter! Söz Milletindir),” openly challenged the values and ideology of the CHP, which marked the beginning of a new politics in Turkey.22 The opposition coerced the government to modify the electoral law, resulting in a new law in 1949 that introduced secret balloting, open counting, and judicial oversight. On May 14, 1950, the DP captured 53.3% of the popular vote and 83.8% of the parliamentary seats, leading to a peaceful transfer of power, and the DP formed the new government. Nonetheless, relations between the government and the opposition began to deteriorate after 1953 as the DP catered to business interests and peasant voters. The DP became more authoritarian toward the end of the 1950s. Over time, the DP’s leadership began to consolidate power and erode democratic institutions. By the late 1950s, the party had become increasingly authoritarian, with Menderes himself wielding significant dictatorial powers to silence opposition and suppress dissent. One of the DP’s main opponents was the CHP, which had strong support among urban and secular elites. The DP viewed the CHP as a threat to its political dominance and implemented aggressive policies to undermine the party’s base. These policies included restricting freedom of the press, suppressing civil society organizations, and using state resources to bolster DP loyalists. In April 1960, the DP formed a parliamentary investigating committee that accused the opposition of subversive activities. This development sparked unrest, culminating in the military coup of May 27, 1960, and the dissolution of the DP.23 The military, backed by a coalition of political parties, removed Menderes and his government from power, and established a temporary government to oversee the country’s transition to democracy. The coup was initially met with support from many segments of Turkish society, who saw it as a necessary step to restore democracy and prevent further erosion of democratic institutions. After the coup, the new Constitutional Assembly wrote the 1961 22 Kili, Suna. 1975 Döneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Geli¸smeler. Bo˘ gaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1976. 23 Harris, George S. “The causes of the 1960 revolution in Turkey.” Middle East Journal 24, no. 4 (1970): 438–454.

22

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

constitution and the CHP played a dominant role. The military coup orchestrated the formulation of a new constitution, which broadened political rights and opened up fresh avenues for the leftist movement. The 1961 constitution established a bicameral parliament, comprising the Senate and the National Assembly. A distinct electoral law was implemented to ensure proportional representation. The president was elected jointly by the Senate and National Assembly. The constitution also introduced the Constitutional Court and the State Planning Organization. Its aim was to establish independent institutions to safeguard against the politicization of state entities. The inaugural elections took place in October 1961. Subsequently, the military withdrew from direct political involvement, although the members of the National Unity Committee retained some influence as lifelong members of the Senate.24 In the years following the coup, Turkey experienced a period of political instability, with multiple governments rising and falling amid protests, violence, and military interventions. Nevertheless, the 1960 coup is widely seen as a turning point in Turkish history, marking the beginning of a tumultuous period of democratic experimentation and military interventions that would shape the country’s political landscape for decades to come. Almost all conservative and religiously oriented groups rallied around the DP against the heavy-handed secularist policies of the CHP. The 1960 coup was an important moment in Turkey’s political history, as it solidified the military’s role as the guardian of the Kemalist system. This resulted in the militarization of Kemalist ideology, with any challenge to it framed as a security threat. A power struggle emerged between elected officials and the bureaucracy, which saw itself as the custodian of the Kemalist order. The bureaucracy intervened to protect the Kemalist legacy, often with the support of the CHP, which was closely tied to the state apparatus. This gave the military and bureaucracy significant influence over politics, shaping Turkey’s political development for decades. The coup also highlighted the historic role of the military in defending the founding philosophy of the state. However, as the CHP moved away from the founding philosophy in the 1960s, the military became more involved and militant in defending the Kemalist philosophy. Due to their shared historic identity (Kemalism), the CHP and the military gradually 24 Weiker, F. The Turkish revolution, 1960–1961: Aspects of military politics. The Brookings Institution, 1963.

2

THE IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHP

23

aligned themselves to defend the Kemalist philosophy as the Islamist challenge became more powerful after the 1980s. The CHP realized that the ballot box was not enough to come to power and that the people of Turkey were not fully enlightened and progressive enough to turn against those parties that instrumentalize religion and impede the progress of the nation. The 1960 coup, therefore, had a profound impact on the Turkish political landscape, transforming the country’s governance and setting the stage for a new era of political and economic development. While it had its fair share of criticisms, the 1960 coup remains a significant turning point in Turkey’s history, with its legacy still being felt in the country’s political and social fabric. However, in the 1961 elections, the CHP failed to garner a majority vote and formed a coalition government with the Justice Party. A number of short-lived coalition governments failed to address the country’s economic and political problems. The major change took place ˙ in the 1965 national election when Inönü declared the CHP’s new identity as the “left of center” and committed to pursuing a different set of policies. In 1967, Bülent Ecevit became the CHP’s general secretary and the party underwent a transformation to offer a moderate-left option to disadvantaged voters.

¨ Bulent Ecevit (1972–1980) Ecevit (1925–2006) was renowned for his modest way of life, and throughout his extensive career spanning nearly half a century, he was never implicated in any corrupt activities. He remained devoted to his partner, Rahsan Aral, whom he married during their time as students, and the couple functioned as a team throughout their union. Thanks to his time at Robert College in Istanbul, a distinguished secondary school in Turkey founded by Americans, and his four-year tenure at the Turkish Embassy in London, Ecevit was fluent in English and spoke it flawlessly. During his stay in London, he also wrote several collections of poetry and translated works by T. S. Eliot and Rabindranath Tagore into Turkish. In the 1950s, Ecevit was fortunate enough to receive a fellowship from the US State Department, which granted him the opportunity to work at the Winston-Salem Journal and Sentinel in North Carolina. This experience exposed him to American journalism and presented a chance to improve his skills. However, what he witnessed in the American South left an indelible mark on him, as he was deeply troubled by the pervasive racism he encountered.

24

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Despite his time in the United States, Ecevit remained unwavering in his commitment to fighting for the underprivileged and those who were unable to advocate for themselves. Throughout his life, he saw himself as a champion of the underdog and consistently sought to support causes that aligned with his principles. Ecevit believed that everyone deserved to be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their background or circumstances. His dedication to social justice and human rights guided his political career and his personal life. He was known for his unwavering integrity and steadfast commitment to his values. It is his worldview and moral commitments that shaped Ecevit’s political life. In order to prevent further consolidation of the popular socialist Turkish Labor Party (TLP), which was established by a group of leftist trade unionists, the CHP redefined its ideological position as “the left of center” to distance from the socialist left of the TLP.25 Although this ˙ ideological shift started during the period of Inönü, it was Ecevit who filled this concept and made the central identity of the CHP. Ecevit was committed to protecting the rights of workers and ensuring that they were treated fairly. When he was appointed as Minister of Labor from 1961 to 1965, during which time he worked tirelessly to improve working conditions and employment opportunities for Turkish citizens. Ecevit sought to inject a social democrat identity into the CHP, he did not intend to erase the party’s foundational identity of Kemalism. Instead, he aimed to add another layer of identity that incorporated a leftist interpretation of Kemalism. In the 1970s, the CHP, under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit, identifies itself as social democratic party.26 It was not easy for the CHP to move away from safeguarding the principles of the founding philosophy of the Turkish state. Its core institutional identity has always been known as Kemalism and it is the guarding of the Kemalist worldview. The party always shuttled between its foundational identity—nation-state and secular-nation-builder—and attempts to become a social democracy. For instance, due to its foundational identity,

25 See Nihat Erim’s op-ed on the difference between communism and the left of center, Ulus, 17 July 1965. More on the issue, see for the discussions, see Milliyet, 20– 30 December 1965; Yon, “CHP’de Ortanın Solu Kokteyli,” Yön, no. 139 (26 November 1965): 4–5. 26 Bülent Ecevit, Bu Düzen De˘gi¸smelidir. Istanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1968; Ecevit, Bülent. Atatürk ve Devrimcilik. Tekin Yayınları, 1970.

2

THE IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHP

25

it supported a number of undemocratic policies such as banning headscarves, taking a rigid position on religious education, and supporting the assimilation policies of the state against minorities. In other words, the CHP was stuck between the needs and identity of the state and the new aspirations of the society. Rather than distancing the party from its roots, Ecevit sought to modernize the CHP’s image and make it more inclusive. He recognized that the party’s previous elitist and statist reputation needed to be overcome to remain relevant in a changing political landscape. To achieve this, he promoted a social democrat identity that would appeal to workingclass and marginalized communities that had previously felt excluded from the CHP’s elitist image. Despite his efforts to add a leftist interpretation to Kemalism, Ecevit remained committed to the party’s foundational principles. However, he recognized the need to reinterpret and modernize them to make them more relevant to contemporary society. By embracing a more diverse and inclusive approach, Ecevit’s efforts broadened the CHP’s appeal and helped it to better reflect the changing needs of Turkish society. While accusations of elitism and Western influence have long plagued the CHP, Ecevit’s efforts to incorporate a social democrat identity helped to modernize the party’s image and make it more relevant to a wider swath of the Turkish population. In the early 1960s, there was a systemic effort by Bülent Ecevit to move CHP to the center-left and become a social democrat party.27 During the 1969 election campaign, he used the slogan “Soil belongs to those who cultivate it and water belongs to those who use it” (Toprak i¸sleyenin, su kullananın) as a representation of his most significant objective. When he became the secretary general of the CHP, Ecevit introduced a new discourse to renew the role of the CHP. His “left of center” discursive shift helped him to become the leader of the party in 1972. Following the formation of the Republican Party in 1972 due ˙ ˙ to a second split in the CHP, Ismet Inönü resigned from his position on May 8th of the same year. As a result, Bülent Ecevit took over the leadership of the party. This change in leadership marked a significant shift for the CHP, as Ecevit aimed to push the party toward a more left-wing position, further distancing it from the Kemalist ideology that had defined the party since its inception. During the Ecevit period, “the

27 Ecevit, Bülent. Ortanın solu. Kim Yayınları, 1966.

26

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

party adopted the democratic left ideology. It is during this same period that the party centered its orientation on the needs and demands of the people. The CHP also began viewing society through an economic-based lense, like other Western social democrat parties at the time. Those who criticized the CHP s new orientation left it and established a Kemaliststatist, nationalist party.”28 Under Ecevit’s leadership, the CHP began to embrace a more social democratic approach, focusing on issues such as income inequality, workers’ rights, and welfare reform. Ecevit’s policies also aimed to reduce the influence of the military in politics, a goal that was particularly significant given the military’s historical role in Turkish politics. During Ecevit’s leadership, the party began to gain support from the working class. Umudumuz Ecevit (“Our hope Ecevit”), Halkçı Ecevit (“Populist Ecevit”), and Karao˘glan (“Brunet Boy,” a popular folk hero) were Bülent Ecevit’s epithets. The general public strongly associates him with the populist slogans of “Halkçı (populist) Ecevit” and the legendary image of a people’s savior known as “Karao˘glan.” This identification is reinforced by various symbols and aspects of his lifestyle. His choice of headwear, the kasket (a traditional peasant’s cap), Ecevit’s signature blue color, his iconic parka, and his overall modest and uncorrupted way of life all contribute to this identification. Additionally, his reputation for honesty and his association with the symbol of the white dove further solidify his image as a champion of the people. Despite facing opposition from conservative forces, Ecevit’s leadership and his party’s progressive policies gained significant support from Turkish citizens, particularly from the working-class and urban populations. This growing support ultimately led to the CHP’s success in the 1973 and 1977 elections, where it secured a majority of the votes and gained control of the government. By reinterpreting the Kemalist principle of populism, known as “halkçılık,” he promoted this shift by arguing that the CHP must work with the trade unions and defend the rights of the middle and lowermiddle class.29 In fact, in the 1960s, Turkey went through a major industrialization process and experienced a major mass migration from rural areas to urban centers. These new villagers in urban areas created

28 Tosun, Tanju. “The new leader for the old CHP: Kemal Kılıçdaro˘ glu.” Insight Turkey (2010): 31–42. 29 Emre, Yunus. CHP, Sosyal Demokrasi ve Sol. Ileti¸ ˙ sim Yayınları, 2013.

2

THE IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHP

27

a series of shanty towns and they became the hotbed of new leftist ideology.30 Under this socio-economic milieu, the CHP tried to present itself as a party of “the people rather than a party of the state.”31 Those who were not happy with this new ideological position of the CHP left the party and established a new nationalist and statist party to defend the core principles of Kemalism. However, due to its historic legacy and roots in the establishment of the nation-state, CHP’s social democratic identity always remained temporary and never fully fit into the party. Throughout the majority of his career, Ecevit maintained a staunch opposition to proposals that sought to legalize Kurdish-language education or television broadcasting. He believed that such actions would only exacerbate existing tensions and potentially lead to a dangerous separation between different ethnic groups. By introducing “the left of center” as a new discourse, the CHP gave up its goal of anti-class discourse and became the “voice of the working class and the trade unions.” This shift stressed justice and especially egalitarian demands within society to protect the vulnerable sector of the population. Ecevit’s new political discourse recognized class differences and developed policies to help those who needed support. He stressed the fairer distribution of incomes, economic opportunity, and elimination of anti-egalitarian practices in semi-feudal rural areas. He argued that Turkey has two different people who are economically oppressed, which includes labor, small peasants, and small artisans. He wanted the CHP to be the voice of this voiceless large sector of the population. The other sector of the population remained a small group of usurers, large landowners, big industrialists, monopolist fractions of capital, and compradors. Under Ecevit’s leadership, the “left-of-center” discourse became the defining element of the CHP’s identity. Ecevit became the leader of the party as a result of his vehement reaction to the military coup in March 1971. When the military junta established a provisional government under the leadership of Nihat Erim, who was a member of the CHP, ˙ Ecevit opposed the support of Inönü, then the leader of the CHP, and resigned from the general secretariat. For Ecevit, the equation “CHP + Army = Power” is definitely not acceptable. Ecevit wanted to free the 30 Kili, Suna. “Kemalism in contemporary Turkey.” International Political Science Review 1, no. 3 (1980): 381–404. 31 Tosun, Tanju. “The new leader for the old CHP: Kemal Kılıçdaro˘ glu.” Insight Turkey (2010): 31–42.

28

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

CHP from the identification with the ruling elite, especially the military. At the 5th CHP Extraordinary Congress of 1972, Ecevit was elected as the leader of the CHP. Although Ecevit was elected as the leader of the party, there were three factions within the CHP. The first of these three groups would later form the Republican Confidence Party (CGP), which represented the interest of the bourgeoisie and accepted the fact that bureaucracy was defeated.32 The second was Ecevit’s “left-of-center” team, included Turan Güne¸s, Haluk Ülman, and Besim Üstünel. This team accepted that the militarycivilian bureaucracy was exhausted and rejected to serve the interest of the bourgeoisie and wanted to represent the interest of the marginalized people. The third group, on the other hand, continued to represent the alliance between the military-civil bureaucracy. According to Ecevit, those on the “left of center” were “humanists” who wanted to serve the people, social justice, and defended social security for all the population. Thus, they were progressive, revolutionary, reformist, and statist and committed to freedom.33 Ecevit also stressed the moral values of the poor sector of the population. He argued that high moral values such as mercy, solidarity, compassion, egalitarianism, and participation in political processes are deeply rooted in the humanism of Anatolia. In fact, Ecevit wanted to redefine this sector of the population as the “real Turkish people” who represent the values of Anatolia which he claimed to be universal. Unlike the traditional CHP elite, he developed a friendlier attitude toward Islam, especially Sufism of Anatolia. The party aimed for a liberal and pluralist social order, a mixed economy, land reform, and a strong cooperative movement. Ecevit always argued that politics must serve the people and especially those who were the most vulnerable and needed the protection of the state. His new inclusive and populist political language was supported by the people of Turkey. He had major success in the 1973 and 1977 elections. In the 1973 elections, he had 33% of the votes and in 1977 he had 41% of the votes. During his leadership, the CHP became a member of the Socialist International but the social democracy it advocates had entirely different roots than the social democratic parties of

32 Bozkır, G. “Türk Siyasal Hayatında Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi.” Ça˘gda¸s Türkiye Tarihi Ara¸stırmaları Dergisi 6 (2007): 275–308. 33 Ecevit, Bülent. Ortanın solu. Kim Yayınları, 1966.

2

THE IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHP

29

Western Europe. Although it framed itself as a social democrat party, the CHP has always committed to the Westernization of the country, stressed the role of the state in the economy, and defended the sovereignty of the country against regular US interventions. Ecevit’s leadership of the CHP marked a turning point for Turkish politics, with the party shifting toward a more social democratic platform that emphasized equality, fairness, and social justice. Although the CHP was the largest party in the parliament, factionalism within the party and the conflict with the right-wing nationalist movement prevented the formation of a stable coalition. The 1970s witnessed a tumultuous decade in Turkey characterized by intense clashes between leftist movements and the nationalist Grey Wolves (Ülkü Ocakları) on the streets. This period was marked by internal strife, acts of terrorism, and the complete breakdown of state institutions, leading to a state of fragmentation. Due to the civil unrest, violence, and poor performance of coalition governments, the military staged a third coup in September 1980.

The Center–Periphery Thesis and the CHP In the 1970s, scholars tried to understand the dynamics of Turkish politics on the basis of existing sociological cleavages. There were two dominant paradigmatic readings of the function and ideology of the CHP in academic discourses. Idris Küçükömer (1925–1987), a professor of economics at Istanbul University, argued that the meaning of the left and right is different in Turkey.34 Usually urban, secular, upper, and uppermiddle class tend to support the “leftist” CHP due to their lifestyles. While conservative, low-middle class and rural and provincial voters strongly support the religio-nationalist center-right Justice Party (Adalet partisi; AP) of Süleyman Demirel. Therefore, rather than economic interest socio-religious values inform the voting behavior of the Turkish electorate. In other words, lifestyles are more important in making one’s political worldview than economic interests. Thus, ethnicity and especially religion are the two most powerful determinants of how the Turkish electorate vote. The left and right in the case of Turkey is deeply shaped by the socio-historical legacy of Turkish society. Küçükömer argued that in

34 Akat, Asaf Savas. Idris Küçükömer Mirası. Bilgi University Press, 2004.

30

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Turkey “leftists are right-win and right wings are leftist” due to the legacy of Kemalism and the clash between Islamic and secular worldviews.35 Küçükömer argues that: LEFT SIDE: an eastern-Islamist-popular alliance based on the alliance of the janissary, merchants, and Islamic scholars. It includes Prince Sabahattin Wing of the Young Turks, Freedom and Entente; The Second Group (in the Defense of the Law Society in the First Grand National Assembly); Progressive Party, Free Party; Democrat Party, and Justice Party. RIGHT SIDE: As far as the right side of Turkish politics is concerned, it represents the Westernist-secular bureaucratic tradition. It includes Young Turks’ Progress and Union Wing; Committee of Union and Progress (first society, then sect); First Group (In Defense of Law Society in the First Grand National Assembly); Republican People’s Party (Party); CHP–MBK (National Unity Committee); CHP (left of center).36

Küçükömer argues that the CHP emerged from the bureaucratic-statist roots of the collapsing Ottoman Empire and it always remained as an elitist movement with the goal of preserving the state’s power. It evolved out of the Union and Progress Committee of the late Ottoman Empire. Küçükömer argues that the CHP just like the previous modernizers of the Ottoman Empire did not allow bottom-up reform or change and remained very suspicious of the people due to their religious identity and traditional worldview. Küçükömer concludes that the CHP is not leftist but rather a right-wing, conservative, and statist party with a deep suspicion of the ordinary people. He presents the center-right parties such as the DP and the AP as parties that represent the ordinary people, are less elitist, and are more connected with the people. Thus, he calls the centerright parties more leftist than the CHP. According to Tanju Tosun, a leading scholar of the leftist movement in Turkey, “the CHP sacrificed the needs of the people for the interests of the state.”37 This state-centrism was the core legacy of Islamo-Ottoman-Turkish political thought. In Europe and many other countries, economic and social issues play a critical role in the formation of political parties and the evolution of the

35 Küçükömer, Idris. ˙ Düzenin Yabancıla¸sması. Ant Yayınları, 1969. 36 Idris ˙ Küçükömer, Düzenin Yabancıla¸sması, p. 92. 37 Tosun, Tanju. “The new leader for the old CHP: Kemal Kılıçdaro˘ glu.” Insight Turkey (2010): 31–42.

2

THE IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHP

31

left vs. right divide. In the case of Turkey, the party formation and the electoral behavior are heavily determined by the religious vs. secular clash and economic concerns are secondary to cultural values. The CHP, the center and the core of the founding philosophy of the Republic of Turkey used to have close ties with the military, judiciary, and overall bureaucracy to protect the state and the founding principles of the republic. The early CHP had an ideological foundation that was both elitist and populist in nature. The party’s main goal was to create a society without class distinctions, and to this end, it embraced solidaristic and corporatist features that aimed to transcend class antagonisms. However, the tension between the elite and the masses was a defining characteristic of Turkish politics during this period. The CHP, as the instrument of the elite, sought to mold a new society, which led to a struggle for power between the elite and the masses. This struggle also defined the identity of Turkey’s first successful opposition party, the Democrat Party of Adnan Menderes. The article by Serif ¸ Mardin, a prominent professor of political sociology, presented the second and paramount conceptual elucidation of the Turkish political landscape. Mardin’s “center-periphery approach” aimed to delve into the underlying conflicts between the state and society, as well as the ideological divisions between leftist and right-wing political parties and the cultural battles they engendered. One of the most influential frameworks which helped us to understand Turkish politics as well as state–society relations was Mardin’s center– periphery framework, which is originally developed by Edward Shils.38 The center versus periphery thesis of Edward Shils suggests that societies are divided into two distinct spheres: the center and the periphery. The center is characterized by urbanization, industrialization, and modernization, and is associated with the dominant elites of society. The periphery, on the other hand, is often rural and less developed and is associated with traditional values and cultures. Shils argues that these two spheres are in a constant state of tension, as the center seeks to maintain its dominance and the periphery resists assimilation into the dominant culture. This framework has been applied to many different contexts, including politics, 38 Shils, Edward. Center and periphery: Essays in macrosociology. Vol. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975; Mardin, Serif. ¸ “Center-periphery relations: A key to Turkish politics?” Daedalus (1973): 169–190; Levin, Paul T. “Reflections on Serif ¸ Mardin’s center-periphery thesis.” Turkish Studies (2023): 1–23.

32

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

culture, and economics, and has been used to analyze the relationship between different regions or groups within a society. According to this framework, there is a tension between a populist-traditional-religious camp and a bureaucratic-elitist-secular-western camp that shapes Turkish politics. Mardin utilized this framework to examine how this tension shapes Turkish politics. He argued that “Until recently, the confrontation between center and periphery was the most important social cleavage underlying Turkish politics and one that seemed to have survived more than a century of modernization.”39 The tension between the elite and the masses also led to a divide between the center and the periphery in Turkey. The center–periphery framework suggests that the center represents the elite and the periphery represents the masses. The tension between the two creates a cleavage that shapes Turkish politics. The periphery is often associated with the traditional and religious values of the masses, while the center is associated with bureaucratic and secular values. The persistent tension in Turkish policies can be attributed to the lack of integration between the center and periphery. Two distinct cultures, worldviews, and communities coexist in parallel, leading to an ongoing conflict. This divide between the center and periphery has fueled the culture wars in Turkey. Despite the Kemalist system’s efforts to address this issue, the situation has persisted and, according to Mardin, continues to shape the conflict in Turkish society as of 2017.40 Mardin argued that in contrast to the cultural homogeneity that characterized the imperial center, the attitude of those living in the periphery who opposed the state’s incursions into their economic and social life was infused with localism, particularism, and heterodoxy.41 In the periphery,

39 Mardin, Serif. ¸ “Center-periphery relations: A key to Turkish politics?” Daedalus (1973): 170. 40 We respectfully disagree with Mardin’s stark binary analysis of Turkish society. Particularly since the implementation of neoliberal economic policies in 1980, it is increasingly challenging to draw a clear line between the center and periphery. In the present day, there are multiple centers, each vying for influence, as well as competing peripheries, with the gap between them becoming increasingly narrow. The traditional notion of a single, centralized authority is being challenged by a diverse range of groups and interests. Therefore, the rigid categorization of Turkish society into a binary framework of center versus periphery is no longer applicable, and a more nuanced analysis is required to capture the complexities of the current landscape. 41 Mardin, Serif. ¸ “Center-periphery relations: A key to Turkish politics?” Daedalus (1973): 172.

2

THE IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHP

33

so-called “primordial groups” played an important role as sources of identification. These groups were often defined by factors such as language, religion, or ethnicity, and provided a sense of community and belonging for individuals living in the periphery. According to Mardin, this emphasis on localism and particularism created a constant tension between the peripheral groups and the imperial center. The state’s attempts to assert its authority over the periphery were often met with resistance from these groups, who saw the state as a threat to their way of life and their autonomy. This tension was not limited to the economic and social spheres but also had cultural and political dimensions. The imperial center often attempted to impose its cultural and political values on the periphery, leading to further resistance and strengthening of local identities. In summary, the cultural homogeneity of the imperial center stood in stark contrast to the localism, particularism, and heterodoxy of the periphery. This tension between the two created a complex and dynamic relationship that was characterized by resistance and negotiation. Ultimately, the peripheral groups played a crucial role in shaping the cultural, economic, and political landscape of the empire. In the nineteenth century, the periphery’s heterogeneity was reduced as an Islamic, unifying dimension was added to the peripheral code. This led to the provincial world being united by an Islamic opposition to secularism, including both the upper and lower classes. Additionally, during modernization, the periphery came to be increasingly associated with primordial groups and was seen as the locus of a counter-official culture. Mardin argues that despite attempts at top-down modernizing state and nation-building reforms by the CHP during the Republican era, the societal division was not bridged. Like imperial officials before them, the party was unable to connect with the rural masses, who continued to rely on notables for credit, social assistance, and protection in some regions of Turkey. Taking advantage of the failures of the CHP and state officials to engage with the people of the periphery, the Democrat Party’s electoral campaigns relegated Islam and traditional rural values and employed client politics at new levels. The DP was formed in 1946 by former CHP members, and Mardin argues that the CHP represented the bureaucratic center, while the Democrat Party represented the fragmented periphery and was the real party of movement. Mardin also notes that to him, the military coup of 1960, as well as the military intervention in 1971, were attempts by actors representing the center to maintain or restore the rigidity of the old order in opposition to those who wanted change.

34

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Despite the tension between the elite and the masses, the CHP wanted to portray itself as populist, which meant that it had to appeal to the masses. This led to a conflict between the party’s elitist ideology and its populist image. In conclusion, the CHP’s core ideology was elitist yet it attempted to portray itself as populist. The tension between the elite and the masses defined Turkish politics during this period, and this tension was reflected in the center–periphery framework that shaped political life in Turkey. This framework helped to explain the tension between the populist-traditional-religious camp and the bureaucraticelitist-secular-western camp in Turkish politics. The center–periphery framework is widely recognized as a powerful tool for understanding the formation of political parties and ideological polarization in Turkey. While the CHP represented an elitist, bureaucratic, and secular approach, aimed at spreading elitist values to the periphery, opposition parties such as the DP of Menderes, Justice Party of Demirel, Motherland Party of Turgut Özal, and Justice and Development Party of Erdo˘gan were regarded as representing the periphery. According to Mardin, political parties in Turkey are primarily formed on the basis of this deep sociological division, rather than on the basis of class struggle or economic interests. In other words, cultural values play a more significant role in shaping Turkish politics than economic class interests. The center–periphery cleavage in Turkey has also influenced the way political parties articulate their policies and shape their ideology. Political parties in Turkey tend to identify with one of the two camps and shape their policies accordingly, leading to polarization and division. Overall, the center–periphery framework provides a useful lens for understanding the dynamics of Turkish politics and the ways in which cultural values intersect with politics in the country. It sheds light on the deep-seated divisions that exist in Turkish society and the ways in which they are reflected in political party formation and ideology. However, there was a major change started to take place in the 1980s as a result of Özal’s neoliberal economic policies which resulted in the formation of opportunity spaces. These opportunity spaces empowered the “agents of the periphery” and allowed them to infiltrate the center and redefined it in terms of Islamic values. As a result of the rise of the AKP into the government, the periphery controlled and dictated its identity on the center, and the old Kemalist center has been totally destroyed. The inclusion of these groups into the political center has also had a significant impact on Turkey’s political agenda, with issues related

2

THE IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHP

35

to religion, ethnicity, and national identity gaining increasing prominence in political discourse. These developments have made it challenging for any single party or coalition to govern effectively, further complicating Turkey’s already complex political landscape. During the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey witnessed the implementation of neoliberal economic policies, globalization, and export-oriented strategies that opened up new avenues of opportunity. These newly created opportunity spaces became fertile ground for the emergence of previously suppressed identity politics within the country. Various sectors such as private education, media, market, civil associations, and alternative public spheres provided platforms for the expression and articulation of ethnic, religious, and other political identities. Consequently, the political landscape became heavily dominated by identity-based politics, significantly impacting the social democratic parties. In this era, political debates in Turkey revolved around the framework of identity, and these identity-focused discourses posed significant challenges for social democratic parties, including the CHP. The CHP, under pressure to respond, found itself aligning closely with secularism and a secular way of life, which further marginalized the party. When Deniz Baykal assumed leadership of the CHP, he sought to redefine the party’s identity as the guardian of Kemalist principles, particularly secularism. The CHP established a strong association with the secular establishment, as the military and judiciary’s emphasis on secular sensitivity found common ground with the party’s ideology. Consequently, the CHP became known as the defender of secularism and the secular worldview in the face of the rising tide of political Islam. In summary, the 1980s and 1990s marked a period in Turkey where neoliberal economic policies and globalization created new opportunity spaces that led to the emergence of suppressed identity politics. The dominance of identity-based politics weakened social democratic parties, including the CHP, and forced the party to align itself closely with secularism, thereby becoming associated with the state and the secular establishment. This positioning shaped the CHP’s role as a defender of secularism against the growing influence of political Islam in the country.42 42 Öni¸s, Ziya, and Ioannis N. Grigoriadis. “Europe and the impasse of centre-left politics in Turkey: Lessons from the Greek experience.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 12, no. 3 (2010): 259–274.

36

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Deniz Baykal Era (1995–2010) The military coup of the 1980s brought about significant changes in Turkish politics. The coup resulted in the closure of the CHP. The 1980 military coup by banning the CHP stopped this ideological transformation. The multi-layered social, political, and economic chaos of the 1970s ended with the military coup of September 12, 1980: an extremely important development for identity and power relations in Turkey. The main argument put forward by the military was that they were the best and only true guardianship mechanism against chaos, and therefore would lead the country to a better future. In the coup declaration, the military put it clearly: “The aims of this operation are to safeguard the integrity of the country, sustain national unity and fraternity, prevent the existence and the possibility of civil war and internecine struggle, re-establish the existence and the authority of the state, and to eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working of the democratic order.”43 Yet the 12 September coup did not establish a peaceful and democratic regime. On the contrary, it has transformed the state identity around Kemalism, oppressed the leftist movements, and treated Islam as a national glue of the newly imagined Turkish nation. This closure allowed for the formation of the People’s Party (HP; Halkci Parti), which represented a continuation of the CHP’s political base. However, as time passed, the HP gradually lost its appeal, and a new leftist party, the Social Democracy Party (SODEP; Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi), emerged on the political scene. As a result, the HP and SODEP eventually merged under the Social Democrat People’s Party (SHP; Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti) in 1985. After the legal changes, the CHP was re-established in 1992 and elected Deniz Baykal as its new leader. Baykal’s political career began in 1973 when he was elected to parliament. He served as the Minister of Finance in the CHP-MSP coalition in 1974 and later as the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources in Bülent Ecevit’s third government from 1978 to 1979. However, Baykal’s political journey was not without its setbacks. During the 1980 Turkish coup d’état, the CHP was dissolved, and Baykal was briefly imprisoned. Nevertheless, he returned to parliament in 1987 as a member of the newly formed SHP. 43 Cited in; Tachau, Frank, and Metin Heper. “The state, politics, and the military in Turkey.” Comparative Politics 16, no. 1 (1983): 27.

2

THE IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHP

37

Baykal played a significant role in the re-establishment of the CHP in 1992 and served as its leader until the party merged with the SHP in 1995. In the 1995 election, the CHP secured 10.8% of the vote. After his re-election as leader later that year, Baykal led the party to victory in the 1995 general election, forming a coalition government with Tansu Çiller’s True Path Party. He served as deputy prime minister and minister of Foreign Affairs until 1996. However, the party’s fortunes took a turn for the worse in the 1999 general election when it failed to meet the 10% election threshold, resulting in its complete removal from parliament. The CHP’s share of the vote dropped to a mere 8.6%, resulting in its exclusion from the parliament. Despite Baykal’s resignation from the party leadership in 1999, he was re-elected in 2000 and managed to achieve 19.3% of the vote in the 2002 election. Baykal resigned as party leader following this landslide defeat, but he was re-elected to the position in 2000. Under his leadership, the party experienced a moderate resurgence in the 2002 general election, becoming the leader of the opposition. Despite the challenges he faced throughout his political career, Baykal remained a prominent figure in Turkish politics and played a crucial role in shaping the country’s political landscape. The CHP continued to face challenges in reconciling its traditional political stance with the changing political landscape of the country. In particular, the party was confronted with the issue of Kurdish and Islamist identity claims, which reignited historic fears of the CHP. The CHP, as the party of the state, had long harbored deep-seated concerns about “separatism” (bölücülük) related to the Kurdish identity claims and “fanaticism” (irtica) associated with Islamic fundamentalism. The Kurdish political movements, which demanded the reconfiguration of the Turkish constitution and the state, and the Islamic political movements, which aimed to end the secular nature of the state, triggered the CHP’s dormant fears. In response to these “securitized threats,” the CHP defended the founding philosophy of the Turkish state, Kemalism, which emphasizes the importance of secularism, democracy, and modernity.44 The party saw itself as the guardian of the Turkish state and its founding principles and thus sought to protect them from perceived threats. Overall, the reopening of the CHP marked a significant moment 44 Baykal, Deniz, “Önsöz”, Türkiye’nin 75 Yıllık Tercihi: Cumhuriyet Demokrasi Laiklik Paneli Kitabı. CHP Yayınları, 1998.

38

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

in Turkish politics. However, the party’s traditional political stance and deep-seated fears have made it challenging for the party to reconcile with the changing political landscape of the country. Baykal defined the CHP in terms of its founding ideology as the statistnationalist-elitist-security-seeking party.45 Baykal marginalized the role of local branches and he ruled the party top-down fashion. He never allowed any room for dissent within the party. This was one of the key reasons why the CHP remained in opposition during the leadership of Baykal.46 Baykal fully supported the post-modern military intervention of February 28, 1997, and this was a fatal mistake CHP made. The military coup that took place in Turkey in 1997, often referred to as the “February 28 coup,” was a pivotal moment in the country’s history. This coup is also known as a “soft coup” or the “February 28 process” due to the military’s use of non-violent means to engineer an anti-Welfare Party drive to force the recently elected Erbakan government to resign. The military mobilized various powerful actors, including business associations, media cartels, university rectors, and the judiciary, who had long been subservient to its commands.47 The military’s pressure resulted in the resignation of the Erbakan government. The coup aimed to frame Islamic identity as a national security threat and initiated a series of directives to cleanse the Islamic presence in public spaces. The February 28 process was not limited to the removal of the Erbakan government. It was also a process of monitoring, controlling, and criminalizing all Islamic activism as a security threat, and institutionalizing a permanent legal framework to ostracize devout and/or active Turkish Muslims from the market, educational, and political spheres. During this process, Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan, who was serving as the mayor of Istanbul, was removed from his position and imprisoned for 120 days. He was convicted of “inciting the people to religious hatred” because he quoted a poem that read, “The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our soldiers.” This experience had a profound impact on Erdo˘gan, and he 45 Emre, Yunus. “Why has social democracy not developed in Turkey? Analysis of an atypical case.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 17, no. 4 (2015): 392–407. 46 Kiri¸s, Hakan Mehmet. “The CHP: From the single party to the permanent main opposition party.” Turkish Studies 13, no. 3 (2012): 397–413. 47 More about the coup, Yavuz, M. Hakan. “Turkey’s fault lines and the crisis of Kemalism.” Current History 99 (January 2000): 33–39.

2

THE IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHP

39

emerged from prison as a political figure determined to challenge the power of the secular establishment in Turkey. The February 28 coup had long-lasting effects on Turkey’s political and social landscape. The coup created a culture of fear and repression that stifled democratic participation and resulted in the marginalization of large segments of Turkish society. However, it also gave rise to a new generation of political actors, including Erdo˘gan, who challenged the dominance of the secular establishment and worked to build a more democratic and inclusive Turkey. It distanced itself from the demand for liberalization of society and it redefined itself as the party of the state and Kemalism. It is crucial to highlight that in January 1998, the constitutional court of Turkey ordered the shutdown of the Welfare Party (WP) on the grounds that it was involved in anti-secular activities. Moreover, the court also banned the party’s key members from participating in politics. This decision had significant implications for the country’s political landscape, and it was further compounded by the military intervention of February 28, 1997. The February 28th incident was characterized as a post-modern coup that aimed to safeguard Turkey’s secular identity. Despite the claims made by the proponents of the February 28th process that its impact would last for more than a century, it eventually led to the emergence of another Islamist political movement, namely the AKP, which has since become a dominant force in Turkish politics. After the demise of the WP, Turkey experienced a period of political instability, marked by fragile coalition governments, severe economic crises, and domestic security challenges. It would be disingenuous to attribute all of Turkey’s political instability to the February 28th coup, but it undoubtedly had a profound impact. Like most military interventions, the February 28th coup resulted in immediate changes that were favored by the Army, such as the replacement of high-ranking bureaucrats and members of the media, as well as the imposition of restrictions on civilian politics. However, the polarizing and short-sighted policies of the military would become the fertile ground for the rise of the Erdo˘gan-led Islamist movement in the long run, and this would leave deep scars on the conservative sector of the population and the coup would also unify all religious movements. During this period, Erdo˘gan criticized the CHP as elitist, statist, the party of the “White Turks,” and the “enemy of the traditional Islamic values.” Since the AKP controlled the media, it was not easy for the CHP

40

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

to form and spread its own narrative. Yet, Baykal was also ineffective and did not try to develop a new story for the CHP but remained mostly on the defensive of the founding philosophy of the state. Our 34 interviews indicate that members and local branch activists of the CHP are very ideological and they define the core identity of the party as Kemalist. They prefer to be in opposition rather than in government as long as they do not compromise their ideological identity. Many of them have more faith in the ideology of the party than its leadership. During Baykal’s leadership, “the CHP always placed the interest of the state over the demands of Turkey’s citizens. Especially in the 2000s, the party did not listen and try to understand the Turkish people.”48 On April 27, 2007, the military posted its discomfort on the official website of the Turkish Armed Forces in reaction to Abdullah Gül’s presidential candidacy. It criticized the way the country was ruled and the principles of secularism were undermined by the AKP government. The manifesto said, “If necessary, the Turkish Armed Forces will not hesitate to make their position and stance abundantly clear as the absolute defenders of secularism.” The CHP of Deniz Baykal rather than criticizing the intervention of the military into politics defended the manifesto and called the government to “seriously consider these words.”49 Since 1993, the party has been engaged in a profound ideological discourse encompassing various topics such as secularization, state–society relations, the role of the nation-state, globalization, and minority rights and freedoms. The Anatolian Left has ignited a fresh interpretation of secularism, initiated by Baykal in 2000. The concept of the New Left and what we refer to as the Anatolian Left share a significant overlap. Baykal argues that The Anatolian Left advocates for a politics centered around humanity (insan). Similarly, one of the fundamental aspects of the New Left is its focus on being human-oriented rather than state-oriented. In essence, both the Anatolian Left and the New Left are united by their shared emphasis on a human-centric approach to politics. Delving into Anatolian history, we find that its roots can be traced back to the 13th century. During

48 Tosun, Tanju. “The new leader for the old CHP: Kemal Kılıçdaro˘ glu.” Insight Turkey (2010): 31–42. 49 For more declarations from the CHP leaders, see http://www.todayszaman.com/col umnist-278832-april-27-memorandumand-the-chp.html.

2

THE IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHP

41

this time, influential figures such as Mevlana, Hacı Bekta¸s Veli, and Yunus Emre expressed an understanding of society and politics based on the principles of human love. It is this philosophy that forms the foundation of the Anatolian Left, placing human well-being and freedom at its core. While Europe was undergoing a dark period in the same century, Anatolia stood out for its philosophy centered on humanity and the importance of love for fellow human beings. This human-oriented approach distinguished Anatolia and shaped the development of the Anatolian Left.50

In summary, the concept of the New Left aligns closely with the Anatolian Left, as both prioritize a human-centered perspective. The Anatolian Left draws inspiration from the rich historical traditions of Anatolia, where the writings of Mevlana, Hacı Bekta¸s Veli, and Yunus Emre emphasized the significance of human love. This philosophy remains a vital element in shaping the Anatolian Left’s ideology, underscoring its commitment to human well-being and freedom. This perspective draws connections between different Muslim groups (Alevi and Sunni) as well as nonMuslims. Baykal argues that a more profound and accurate understanding of Turkish culture and history is necessary for the CHP. By embracing Anatolian roots and asserting a genuinely national character, the divide between the elite and the masses can be bridged. This shift entails moving beyond class analysis to a human-centric approach. The CHP maintains positive relations with certain organized interest groups, including trade unions, small business organizations, and secular women’s associations. The party expresses sympathy for the quest for identity among individuals of Kurdish origin but remains firm in distinguishing between ethnic separatism and identity politics. Human rights hold a paramount position for the CHP, and it has made this issue its primary focal point. During the 2002 electoral campaign, the party emphasized parliamentary accountability and administrative transparency in its political discourse. As for the foundation of a welfare state, the CHP advocates for universal education, healthcare, and social security reforms. In terms of the economy, the CHP supports a market-based system but seeks to regulate it through organized labor and consumer groups. The CHP actively endorses Turkey’s accession to the European Union and maintains membership in the Socialist International. However,

50 https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/fikret-bila/baykal-anadolu-solu-ndan-sap madim-1023874.

42

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

the party faces significant weaknesses, including factional dominance and intensifying internal competition due to its declining size. There was a major scandal on May 7, 2010, that resulted in the resignation of the CHP leader. In 2010 a video was leaked on the internet, which displayed Baykal’s relationship with Nesrin Baytok, the former member of parliament from Ankara, in the same bed. After the leak of this video, Baykal announced his resignation from the leadership of the CHP. This resignation became an opportunity for the restructuring of the CHP. Kılıçdaro˘glu was then elected as the 7th chairman of the party at the 33rd Ordinary CHP Congress on May 22, 2010, following Mustafa Kemal ˙ ˙ Atatürk, Ismet Inönü, Bülent Ecevit, Deniz Baykal, Hikmet Çetin, and Altan Öymen. It was a major change since its establishment in 1919 the CHP first time had a leader from an oppressed and marginalized sector of the population.

Conclusion The Republic of Turkey’s founding philosophy, which centers around the ideas of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, also constitutes the ideological identity of the CHP, the country’s oldest political party. However, this tradition has not remained static but has undergone regular challenges and reformulations by diverse generations. One of the main factors driving this reformulation is the need of each generation. The CHP’s leadership and elite have continuously retold their own histories, formulating new projects of emancipation in opposition to the Islamist opposition that has been running the country since 2002. Each challenge has opened a space to rethink and reformulate the Republic’s founding philosophy to meet the present time’s needs. In fact, Jaroslav Pelikan’s statement that “Tradition is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the living” accurately captures the dynamic nature of the CHP’s ideological identity.51 Under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit and Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu, there have been more attempts to revise and reinterpret the founding philosophy of the Republic to meet the current challenges facing the Turkish state and society. The identity of the CHP is not fixed but rather a living tradition that evolves in response to the changing socio-political conditions of the country. This

51 The vindication of tradition: 1983 Jefferson Lecture in the humanities (1984), p. 65.

2

THE IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHP

43

chapter highlights the circumstances that contribute to the continuous development of the CHP’s foundational identity. The fact that there is an ongoing discourse surrounding the tradition of the CHP signifies that it is not a stagnant or obsolete tradition but rather an identity that is adaptable, transformative, and expanding. The CHP’s ability to adapt and change is a testament to its resilience and responsiveness to the needs and aspirations of the society it represents. In an ever-evolving political landscape, the CHP remains relevant by embracing new perspectives and engaging in meaningful discussions that shape its identity. The party’s capacity to incorporate new layers into its foundational identity ensures its vitality and effectiveness in addressing the challenges of the times. This openness to change demonstrates the CHP’s commitment to staying in tune with the dynamics of society and remaining an influential force in shaping the country’s political landscape. It is through this continuous process of dialogue and introspection that the CHP keeps its identity alive and meaningful. By embracing change, the CHP can effectively respond to the evolving demands and expectations of the people it represents. The ability to adapt and expand its identity ensures that the CHP remains a dynamic political entity capable of effectively navigating the complexities of the socio-political landscape. One notable difference between Kılıçdaro˘glu and his predecessor, Deniz Baykal, is their vision of the tradition of the CHP. Baykal’s backward-looking vision of the CHP led to a suffocating, joyless, and sometimes dangerous form of military-secular ideology. In contrast, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s forward-looking vision aims to revise the CHP and turn it into a living tradition that keeps the ideals of the party alive and relevant. After the 1960 coup, when the establishment could not protect the principles of Kemalism with the ballot boxes they never hesitate to use the military to defend the state and its founding principles. Thus, Turkey experienced a series of coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. The military positioned itself as the guardian of the principles of the Kemalist state and draw the limits within which the civilian politicians could act. The rise of political Islam further provided the necessary reason for the military to be more assertive. This clash is at the center of the rise of the AKP into power. The CHP has been constantly evolving and adapting its identity to the changing political and social landscape of Turkey. In its pursuit of a more inclusive and democratic identity, the party has experimented with different ideological frameworks that combine Kemalism with social democracy. These frameworks include the “Left of the Center/

44

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Democratic Left,” “New Left,” “Anatolian Left,” and “New CHP.” Each of these conceptualizations represents a response to the dominant socioeconomic forces and expectations of the CHP. For example, the “Left of the Center/Democratic Left” was an attempt to distance the party from its traditional Kemalist image and appeal to a broader segment of the population. The “New Left” emphasized the need for a more humanistic approach to politics, while the “Anatolian Left” drew on the humanistic philosophy of Mevlana, Hacı Bekta¸s Veli, and Yunus Emre.52 During the leadership of Baykal, however, the CHP underwent a shift toward a more statist and Kemalist identity. This was in response to the rise of political Islamic movements and the growing activities of Kurdish nationalism, particularly the PKK. In order to preserve the unity of the nation and the secular nature of the Turkish state, Baykal emphasized the unitary and Kemalist aspects of the party’s identity. Despite these shifts, the CHP remains a dynamic and evolving force in Turkish politics. Its willingness to adapt to changing circumstances and incorporate new ideas into its identity ensures that it remains relevant to the needs and aspirations of the Turkish people. In summary, the CHP’s ideological identity is closely linked to the founding philosophy of the Republic of Turkey, but it has evolved over time to meet the challenges of each generation. Under Kılıçdaro˘glu’s leadership, the party is striving to reinterpret this tradition and keep it alive as a living faith that adapts to the changing needs of Turkish society. The CHP’s identity is not a stagnant tradition, but rather a living and evolving entity. It embraces change and engages in conversations that contribute to its growth and relevance. By remaining open to new ideas and perspectives, the CHP ensures its continued significance and impact in shaping the political discourse of the country.53

52 Baykal, Deniz ve Cem Ismail. ˙ Yeni Sol. Cem Yayınevi, 1992. 53 Shils Edward. Tradition. The University of Chicago Press, 1981; Birner J. “Popper

and Hayek on reason and tradition.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44, no. 3 (2014): 263–281.

CHAPTER 3

Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu: Life and Socialization

Abstract The chapter of this study will provide an in-depth exploration of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s life, socialization process, and the contextual factors that have influenced him. It aims to shed light on his moral and political worldview by examining various aspects of his personal background. To comprehensively understand his worldview, we will delve into his family life, placing particular emphasis on his relationship with his father. Additionally, we will explore the significance of his Alevi identity and how it has shaped his perspectives. Furthermore, the chapter will analyze the impact of his experience as a bureaucrat on his understanding of society and the state. By investigating these key elements of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s life, we can gain valuable insights into the foundations of his moral and political beliefs. Keywords Alevi · Turkish tribes · Sufism · Bektasi · Dersim · Kurds · Dersim Rebellion · Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu · Yahya Kemal · Turkish modernization

Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu was born on December 17, 1948, in the Nazimiye district of Tunceli, as the fourth child of his parents, land registry officer Kamer Bey and housewife Yemu¸s Hanım. In 1950, his family changed © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. H. Yavuz and A. E. Öztürk, Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu and the New Republican People’s Party in Turkey, Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36766-3_3

45

46

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

their surname from Karabulut to Kılıçdaro˘glu, taking after their greatgrandfathers. As a result, Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu adopted this new surname at a young age. He was born into a family of seven children, and they were members of the Alevi religious minority, which follows a distinct form of Islam. Kılıçdaro˘glu, hailing from a comparatively underdeveloped region of Turkey, was always a curious child with a passion for reading. He said: “I loved reading. I started reading Kerime Nadir’s novels. It was the novels that made us feel very emotional in our youth. Later, my ˙ school teacher gave Ya¸sar Kemal’s book Ince Memed. I read it, then several foreign authors’ books were given. Of course, there was no library in our school.”1 Growing up, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s family faced discrimination and marginalization due to their religious identity, which instilled in him a strong sense of social justice and activism.2 He never stressed his roots and always ignored the politics of identity. He knows from the massacres against Alevis in Corum, Kahramanmara¸s, and Erzincan that it is easier to ignite the fires of religious and ethnic extremism than extinguish them. Thus, he has always refused to employ identities for political gains. This is one of the key reasons why he has been cold toward the ethnic parties. Kılıçdaro˘glu, a successful student, graduated from Elazı˘g Commerce High School as the most accomplished student and later attended the Ankara Academy of Economics and Commercial Sciences. He had an impressive academic record, consistently earning high grades throughout his school years. As a left-leaning student of the 1968 generation, Kılıçdaro˘glu was selected to be a part of the Science Board of the Federation of Social Democracy Associations. However, he did not exhibit any

1 Kerime Nadir Azrak (Subat ¸ 5, 1917–Mart 20, 1984) was born in Istanbul and wrote

40 novels. The most of her books examine the psychological impacts of broken loves. Her novels were criticized for being divorced from the social reality of society. She has crafted novels filled with intense emotions, captivating readers, and making a significant impact on the community’s literary landscape. For Kılıçdaro˘glu’s interview see https://tele1.com. tr/cocuklugundan-siyasete-kemal-kilicdaroglu-hayatinin-bilinmeyenlerini-anlatti-168139/. 2 For more information on Alevism, see Ocak, Ahmet Ya¸sar. Türk Sufili˘gine Bakı¸slar:

˙ sim Yayınları, 2016. Türkiye’de Tarihin Saptırılması Sürecinde. Ileti¸ Yaman, Ali. “The transformation of the role of Dedes in modern times.” Journal of Alevism-Bektashism Studies 22 (2020): 3–24. Erdemir, Aykan. “Tradition and modernity: Alevis’ ambiguous terms and Turkey’s ambivalent subjects.” Middle Eastern Studies 41, no. 6 (2005): 937–951.

3

˘ KEMAL KILIÇDAROGLU: LIFE AND SOCIALIZATION

47

particularly strong activist tendencies at the time, which is perhaps indicative of his cautious and democratic nature. From a young age, he adopted a humanist political stance and always advocated for non-violent, democratic methods of struggle. Interestingly, Kılıçdaro˘glu was also classmates with Devlet Bahçeli, a nationalist activist who would later become the chairman of the Nationalistic Movement Party (MHP; Milliyetci Hareket Partisi). Bahçeli was once known to have a great deal of respect for Kılıçdaro˘glu and his ethical values, often speaking in glowing terms about him. Bahçeli’s admiration was rooted in Kılıçdaro˘glu’s reputation for being a person of integrity, honesty, and unwavering dedication to public service. However, in recent times, Bahçeli’s stance toward Kılıçdaro˘glu has shifted dramatically after he aligned himself with Erdo˘gan and his political machine. This newfound association has resulted in Bahçeli adopting hostile and unethical language toward Kılıçdaro˘glu, which is a departure from his previously held views. Kılıçdaro˘glu graduated from Academy in 1971 and started his career in the Ministry of Finance as an account specialist. After the graduate he married with Selvi Kılıçdaro˘glu.3 After becoming an accountant, he spent a year in France and attained an intermediate level of French language proficiency. Kılıçdaro˘glu served as the head of the department and later as the Deputy General Manager at the General Directorate of Revenues in 1983. He was then appointed as the General Manager of Ba˘g-Kur in 1991 and subsequently moved to the General Directorate of the Social Insurance Institution (SSK) in 1992. Kılıçdaro˘glu was later chosen as the Deputy Undersecretary at the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, earning the title of “Bureaucrat of the Year” in 1994 by the Economic Trend magazine due to his exceptional performance. In January 1999, Kılıçdaro˘glu resigned voluntarily from his position at SSK with the intention of pursuing politics as a member of the social democrat Democratic Left Party (DSP; Demokratik Sol Parti), led by his admired left-wing leader Bülent Ecevit. However, his entry into politics was delayed when Ecevit did not nominate him at the time. Kılıçdaro˘glu then led the Informal Economy Specialization Commission and lectured at Hacettepe University in Ankara while serving as the president of the Citizens’ Tax Protection Association. He later joined the Board of Direc˙ s Bankası and was invited to the CHP’s Science Culture tors of Türkiye I¸ 3 The family of Kılıçdaro˘ glu comprises of a son named Kerem and two daughters named Asli and Zeynep.

48

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Platform by the then-party chair Deniz Baykal. As a result of his hard work and original ideas at the communities of the CHP, Kılıçdaro˘glu decided to run for the parliament. Kılıçdaro˘glu was elected as the CHP Istanbul deputy in the general elections of November 3, 2002, marking his entry into parliament. He was re-elected as an Istanbul deputy in the July 22, 2007 elections. Although he was not well-known to the Turkish public before 2007, Kılıçdaro˘glu drew attention with his labor-friendly statements and concrete criticisms of the government’s policies on Kanaltürk TV, owned by famous journalist Tuncay Özkan. Kılıçdaro˘glu emerged as a beacon of hope for the CHP. He became very popular during the TV debates that exposed the corruption of the AKP Deputy Chairman Saban ¸ Di¸sli and Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat, leading to their resignations as vice presidents. Kılıçdaro˘glu earned the monikers of “dualist” and “gladiator” due to his outstanding performance in debates, where he even put popular Ankara Metropolitan Mayor Melih Gökçek in a difficult position ahead of the March 29, 2009 local elections. Kılıçdaro˘glu, just like Ecevit, cared for the ordinary people and never hesitate to speak out against corruption. In 2009, he was nominated as the CHP’s candidate for the Istanbul metropolitan municipality mayor, but he lost the election to the incumbent mayor, Kadir Topba¸s. Despite his loss, Kılıçdaro˘glu remained an important figure in the CHP and was appointed as the group deputy chairman of the party in 2009. During his mayoral campaign in Istanbul, Kılıçdaro˘glu, who closely worked with diverse sectors of the population, gained widespread recognition and popularity throughout the country. He reinforced this image by walking on muddy roads in shantytowns with hole shoes and renting a house in a middle-class neighborhood. His modest personality and honesty won him public admiration, despite not winning the election. He even earned the nickname “Gandhi Kemal” due to his peaceful approach to the problems and also his physical resemblance to Mahatma Gandhi, and “Second Ecevit.” Despite losing the election, Kılıçdaro˘glu received 2,566,000 votes and increased CHP’s votes by 25% compared to the previous elections, bringing it to 37%. He managed to sway 243,000 people who did not vote for the party, thanks to his personal charisma and leadership. Even the song “Kılıçdaro˘glu,” created by folk music artist Onur Akın for the election campaign, helped spread his name all over the country, even in the most remote villages. Kılıçdaro˘glu continued to frequently appear on television programs as the

3

˘ KEMAL KILIÇDAROGLU: LIFE AND SOCIALIZATION

49

deputy chairman of the CHP Group. He visited nearly 50 cities in a 1.5year period and held conferences and public sessions. During this period, Kılıçdaro˘glu invited Bülent Arınç, a sharp-tongued member of the AKP, to a duel in an open session, but Arınç refused, saying Kılıçdaro˘glu was “not his equal.” As far as becoming the leader of the CHP, Kılıçdaro˘glu never prepared or expected to become the leader of the party. He said: “I never had any intention of entering politics or pursuing the leadership of the CHP. Even when Mr. Baykal offered me the chairmanship of the parliamentary group, I declined as my area of expertise lies in the plan budget commission. However, when Baykal insisted, I accepted the position of the whip of the party group in parliament. The leadership of the party was never on my radar, and I had no intention of pursuing it until I found myself in this position.”4

˘ KiliÇdaroglu’s Moral Worldview To fully comprehend the political stance and identity of Kılıçdaro˘glu, it is crucial to focus on his personal background and the socialization process that shaped his worldview. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s moral worldview, which shaped his political beliefs, has been profoundly influenced by four primary social institutions (family, religious faith, education, and being a bureaucrat) that have played a crucial role in his life. These institutions have molded his moral outlook and ultimately contributed to the development of his political identity. The first institution that significantly impacted Kılıçdaro˘glu’s worldview was his family and particularly his relationship with his father. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s father (Kamer) was a staunch believer in the principles of communal morality and public virtues such as social justice, honesty, and being merciful and caring. He instilled these values in his son from a young age. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s upbringing instilled in him a deep sense of responsibility and obligation toward society, which ultimately influenced his political philosophy. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s moral compass was also heavily influenced by his Alevi religious background and his strong conviction that his family lineage descended from the household of Prophet Muhammed, commonly

4 https://www.krttv.com.tr/kilicdaroglu-Erdo˘ gan-koltugunu-korumak-icin-arayisicinde.

50

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

referred to as Ehli Beyt.5 As a member of the Alevi community, Kılıçdaro˘glu was raised with the values of tolerance, equality, and social justice. These values have been integral to his political philosophy, which prioritizes the rights and needs of marginalized communities. The third institution that influenced Kılıçdaro˘glu’s political identity was the regional context within which he was raised and went to schools. Growing up in Tunceli/Bingol/Elazig, Kılıçdaro˘glu was exposed to the challenges faced by his community, including poverty, discrimination, and political repression. These experiences have played a significant role in shaping his political views and priorities, with a focus on social justice, human rights, and democracy. In his university years, he was an active student. He said: Throughout my time in university, I faced the challenge of balancing both academics and employment. Life was undeniably difficult, but being a student in Ankara held immense significance for me. Despite the hardships, I made a conscious effort to nourish my intellectual growth during those years. One author whose new book I eagerly purchased and devoured was Yasar Kemal. His writings captivated me, providing profound insights into various aspects of life. Furthermore, there was another influential figure in my reading repertoire during that period: Sevket Süreyya Aydemir. His works played a pivotal role in shaping my historical and political perspectives. Exploring Aydemir’s writings expanded my understanding of these subjects and left a lasting impact on me.6

When asked to name his favorite book by Aydemir, Kılıçdaro˘glu expressed a fondness for “Suyu Arayan Adam.”7 He cited the author’s sentimental

5 Ehli Beyt, which translates to “people of the house,” originally denotes the family lineage of Muhammad. However, in Sunni Islam, the term has expanded to encompass all descendants of the Banu Hashim (Muhammad’s clan) and, in some cases, even all first generation Muslims. 6 Sevket ¸ Süreyya Aydemir (1897–1976), is a Kemalist revolutionary, historian, journalist, and bureaucrat. Socialist who later became Kemalist. Took part in the early years of the Bolshevik revolution, and wrote the first book on Lenin in Turkish. Arrested in Turkey in 1925 for underground communist activity. Left the prison a Kemalist. He established the intellectual journal, Kadro, which produced radical interpretations of Kemalism. After being sacked from the bureaucracy in 1950, he became a prolific historian and novelist. 7 Aydemir’s autobiographical novel Suyu Arayan Adam (The Man in Search of Water, 1961) showcases a remarkable literary style and unveils a profound exploration of individual and national identity, a rarity within Turkish prose.

3

˘ KEMAL KILIÇDAROGLU: LIFE AND SOCIALIZATION

51

reflections and personal experiences as instrumental in portraying the transformation from an empire to a republic. The book also explores the painful and destructive process of massacres, deportations, and poverty that precipitated the empire’s collapse and the republic’s formation. Additionally, Kılıçdaro˘glu appreciated how the book explores the profound impact of losing one’s ideals and the immense difficulty of generating new ideas to give life meaning. Kılıçdaro˘glu emphasized that Aydemir’s works offer a holistic understanding of Turkish modernization and the challenges that accompanied it. Although he is critical of some of Aydemir’s ideological positions, he acknowledges that, at the time, the author’s views were seen as progressive. Overall, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s admiration for “Suyu Arayan Adam” stems from its ability to convey both the personal and societal dimensions of Turkey’s transformation, making it a valuable contribution to the country’s literary canon. Additionally, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s experience as a civil servant (memur) has also influenced his political identity. As a bureaucrat, Kılıçdaro˘glu witnessed firsthand the corruption and inefficiency of the government, which solidified his commitment to transparency, accountability, and good governance. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s political identity is the product of several social institutions that have deeply influenced his moral worldview. Let me share with you my background and how it shaped my understanding of society and its values. I grew up in a family of seven children, in challenging circumstances. My father was a civil servant, and although his income was modest, we were considered comparatively well-off in our region since my father had a regular salary as a civil servant. We used to wear shoes that were made out of black plastic, and if one per shoe was bought, seven per were needed for the family. These were hard times for the family and the entire region. As a result, I attended primary school in Van Erci¸s and studied up to the fourth grade before moving to Tunceli. Later, I completed my middle school education in the Genç district of Bingöl and finished high school at Elazig Commerce High School. These diverse environments provided me with the opportunity to interact and socialize with various segments of society, which has proven to be invaluable. Through these experiences, and living in different parts of the region, I have developed a deep understanding of the needs, concerns, and problems of society that a political leader must be aware of. I did not come from an aristocratic or rich family background. I hailed from the sector of the

52

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

society that taught me the problems of the country. So it is easy for me to connect with people at every level. By speaking to people and listening to their concerns, I have gained insight into their needs and aspirations. Moreover, some of my childhood friends from these towns have become mayors of the Welfare Party, and I am still in touch with them. This has allowed me to maintain a connection with the grassroots level of society. In summary, my upbringing and educational background have given me an advantage in politics by providing me with a deep understanding of society’s values and expectations.8

In his interviews, Kılıçdaro˘glu always stresses the role of his family and the Republic as the sources of his values and well-being. He said “The values taught to us were honesty and hard work. We believed that if we worked hard, received a good education, and lived honestly, we would win… I have never forgotten that we owe everything we have to two things: the values my family gave me in that little house and the opportunities our Republic gave us.”9 While he always stressed the ethical values he learned from his father, he also emphasized the national culture and its contribution to his worldview. He said “The fundamental principles I learned embody the essence of this nation’s spirit and constitute an inseparable component of our culture. They are the same values that every mother and father strives to instill in their children: honesty, hard work, and patriotism. One statement from my father particularly resonates with me: Stand upright, and wrongdoing will face the consequences.”10

Kılıçdaro˘glu is fully aware of the collective trauma and pain behind the emergence of the Republic and the loss of the Empire, He said The Balkans, which we hold dear, have been devastated by successive wars, while the Middle East, which we once revered, has been lost in the most painful way possible. Our journeys, fueled by great aspirations and hopes, have been met with endless losses and successive traumas. Our country has been engulfed in fire and blood due to occupation, and under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a new struggle for a new society, a new way 8 Interview with Kemal Kılıçdaro˘ glu, 12 October 2019, Karar TV, https://www.krttv. com.tr/kilicdaroglu-Erdo˘gan-koltugunu-korumak-icin-arayis-icinde. 9 Kılıçdaro˘ glu, Kemal. “Preface.” In Mesut Ozcan, Dersim ve Madımak Söyle¸sileri. Istanbul: Dogan, 2017, p. 12. 10 Kılıçdaro˘ glu, “Preface,” p. 13.

3

˘ KEMAL KILIÇDAROGLU: LIFE AND SOCIALIZATION

53

of life, and a new state began in the aftermath of such great suffering. The generation of our forefathers gave birth to Turkey by passing through a crucible of blood, fire, and sweat. They etched their values onto the foundations of this country - honesty, hard work, selflessness, perseverance, and an unwavering spirit of independence.11

Although he always cherished and praised the core Republican values, he also recognized the unfulfilled promise of equality of all citizens and the well-being of society. He summed up this in the following way: Within the framework of these beautiful values, the Republic started its activities as the “person of the orphans”. It offered great opportunities to its citizens with very limited economic resources… However, I cannot help but ponder over a question raised by the renowned literary figure, Yasar Kemal. He once remarked, “My family lived on the fertile soil of Cukurova, one of the most bountiful lands on earth. We toiled to plant, harvest, and gather crops, only to surrender two-thirds of the yield to the landlord. Despite living on such fertile land, we remained mired in unimaginable poverty. It is a tremendous injustice that people should experience such destitution on such land; it is a disgrace and a blight on our society.” Yes, we have worked honestly, benefited from the opportunities this country has to offer, and achieved successes that we can be proud of. But why shouldn’t all the children of this country get the best education and work in the best conditions?12

This background differentiated Kılıçdaro˘glu from the previous leader of the CHP. Yet, it took some time to put his stamp on the policies of the party. Only after 2010, there was a new dynamism and attempt to develop its own story against the corruption of the AKP.

˘ ˘ Fathers and Sons: Erdogan vs. KiliÇdaroglu A father’s role is to provide love, guidance, and support to his children, and when this is absent, it can be incredibly damaging. The different relationships that the two leaders had with their fathers had a deep effect on their personalities and leadership styles. The kid who is badly treated by his father may struggle with feelings of anger, resentment, and even 11 Kılıçdaro˘ glu, “Preface,” p. 13. 12 Kılıçdaro˘ glu, “Preface,” pp. 14–15.

54

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

hatred toward their father and extend this to the established authority. The lack of love they feel for their father is often a result of the mistreatment they have experienced. Children who grow up in abusive households may develop a mistrust of authority figures, including political and social leaders. This can lead to a lack of faith in government and social institutions. In the case of Erdo˘gan, this personality is behind why he destroyed the established rules and institutions of the Turkish state.13 One key difference between the two childhood experiences is the way in which they viewed their fathers. Erdo˘gan saw his (Ahmet) father as an oppressive figure who frequently resorted to violence and yelling to discipline his children, while Kılıçdaro˘glu’s father (Kamer) was seen as a positive influence who instilled strong values and principles in his children. Another notable difference is how their childhood experiences influenced their leadership styles. Erdo˘gan’s mistreatment at the hands of his father left him with deep emotional scars that have influenced his worldview and approach to leadership. He often portrays himself as a strong, authoritarian leader who is not afraid to use force to maintain control. In contrast, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s positive relationship with his father and the values he instilled in him has shaped his leadership style, which tends to be more democratic and focused on social justice. Kılıçdaro˘glu always mentions the positive and ethical role of his father. He says: My relationship with my parents was quite different. While my mother served as our confidant, my father was rather disciplinarian. I have no recollection of him ever holding any of his children. Whenever we had an issue or need advice, we turned to our mother for support. Interestingly, my brother had difficulty communicating with his wife in front of our father after getting married. Even when my late mother and father visited me and my wife in Istanbul, I struggled to express myself freely in front of my father. However, I confided in my mother, telling her that I needed to say something but was hesitant to do so in my father’s presence. To my surprise, my father agreed that I could speak my mind. From that point on, I became the first person in my family to openly converse with my wife in my father’s presence. The experience was quite liberating, and we

13 More on Erdo˘ gan’s relations with his father, see Yavuz. Erdo˘gan: The making of an autocrat. Edinburgh University Press, 2021, pp. 36–39.

3

˘ KEMAL KILIÇDAROGLU: LIFE AND SOCIALIZATION

55

no longer needed to request permission to do simple things like bringing tea.14

In our interview, Kılıçdaro˘glu spoke about his father as a role model, emphasizing his father’s three essential moral values: care, compassion, and respect toward others. His father embraced everyone regardless of their identity but always emphasized the importance of shared moral values as the foundation of society’s functionality.15 He believed that compassion and helping those in need were core human values, and he took great pleasure in sharing and helping those in need. Kılıçdaro˘glu fondly remembers his father always extending support to the weak and vulnerable. In addition to his compassion, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s father was also a caring person, not only for his immediate family but also for extended family members. He never tolerated any disrespectful behavior, emphasizing the importance of respect in all human interactions. He said: “My father was an honest man, and he had three major moral cores: caring, compassion, and respect toward others. He never tolerated disrespectful conduct.”16 When we inquired about his mother, Kılıçdaro˘glu indicated that she was an affectionate and loving person. With seven children to care for, she often let his father draw the moral guidelines for their actions, yet she remained available when they required her assistance or advice.17 Kılıçdaro˘glu’s parents believed in a non-violent approach to discipline and never resorted to physical punishment. Instead, they would engage in open communication and explain the errors of their ways. If the children continued to repeat their mistakes, they would be denied certain privileges, but physical punishment was never an option. This approach to discipline has shaped Kılıçdaro˘glu’s perspective on parenting and society’s role in nurturing children. He believes that children need a safe and caring environment to develop into responsible and empathetic individuals. He advocates for an education system that promotes critical thinking, creativity, and emotional intelligence.

14 https://tele1.com.tr/cocuklugundan-siyasete-kemal-kilicdaroglu-hayatinin-bilinmeye nlerini-anlatti-168139/. 15 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu, conducted by the authors on 17 April 2023. 16 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu, conducted by the authors on 17 April 2023. 17 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu, conducted by the authors on 17 April 2023.

56

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Kılıçdaro˘glu emphasizes the importance of creating a society that prioritizes the well-being of its citizens, especially its youth, to build a brighter future. Erdo˘gan, unlike Kılıçdaro˘glu, was raised in a household where his father mistreated him and regularly sought to discipline him through physical punishment.18 Growing up with a father who was responsible for the mistreatment was an incredibly difficult experience for Erdo˘gan. In contrast, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s father is typically seen as the protector and caregiver of the family, and Kılıçdaro˘glu speaks of his father’s ethical and moral principles with admiration. Erdo˘gan’s father was physically abusive, emotionally neglectful, or verbally aggressive. These forms of mistreatment shaped Erdo˘gan’s childhood. The abusive treatment leaves a child feeling confused, helpless, and without any sense of security. When Erdo˘gan was mistreated by his father, he took refuge in the arms of his mother. Thus, he always mentions his mother (Tenzile) in terms of positive feelings. In addition to the immediate effects of the mistreatment, the long-term consequences have been very damaging. Children who are mistreated by their fathers may struggle with depression, anxiety, and other mental health issues, and especially develop resentment and hatred against the authority. They may also have difficulty forming healthy relationships later in life and may struggle to trust others. Erdo˘gan’s upbringing gave him a deep-seated sense of anger and resentment, which he has channeled into his political career. Kılıçdaro˘glu, on the other hand, has faced opposition and criticism from within his own political party, but he has remained steadfast in his commitment to social justice and democratic values. Ultimately, the childhood experiences of these two leaders have had a significant impact on their personalities, leadership styles, and political careers.

˘ Alevi Identity and KiliÇdaroglu Kaygusuz Abdal’s nefes: “Hak’kı ararsan Adem’de ara, Irak’ta, Mekke’de, Hac’da de˘gil”

18 Yavuz, M. Hakan. Erdo˘gan: The making of an autocrat, pp. 36–39.

3

˘ KEMAL KILIÇDAROGLU: LIFE AND SOCIALIZATION

57

(If you are looking for God, look for it in Adam. Not in Iraq, Mecca or pilgrimage.)19

During the Presidential election, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan and his political allies launched a smear campaign against the opposition leader, Kılıçdaro˘glu, targeting his religious identity as an Alevi. In response, on April 19, 2023, Kılıçdaro˘glu released a video message to the public, in which he openly declared his faith as an Alevi and emphasized that the election was not about identities, but rather about fundamental principles of justice, equality, and democracy. In the video message, he said: I am Alevi Muslim. I am a sincere Muslim who was raised with the faith of Prophet Muhammed and Ali. I was born in a poor house far from everything in this beautiful country that (Mustafa Kemal) Atatürk gifted us. Our identities are what make us who we are. And of course, we have to claim them with dignity, we cannot choose them. We are born, grow and live with them.20

He added that there are some crucial things that “we can choose in this life. We can choose to be a good person, to be honest, to be moral, to be conscientious, to be virtuous and just. We can choose to live a better life in a free and wealthy country.” Kılıçdaro˘glu said “we will no longer talk about identities, differences, and separations” but achievements, shared dreams, and concurrences. “Will you join our expedition of change? Will you stand with me in this change? Will you prefer an honest and moral system instead of this system that says no to Alevis?”21 Kılıçdaro˘glu’s response was a powerful statement against the divisive and polarizing tactics used by Erdo˘gan and his supporters during the election campaign. By openly acknowledging his religious identity and refusing to be intimidated or marginalized, Kılıçdaro˘glu demonstrated a firm commitment to inclusivity and tolerance in Turkish politics.

19 Özmen, Ismail. Alevi-Bekta¸si Siirler ¸ Anatolojisi. Vol. 1. Kültür Bakanlı˘gı Yayınları, 1998, p. 593. 20 https://www.duvarenglish.com/hdp-mp-garo-paylan-says-lack-of-armenian-mp-can didate-is-a-shortcoming-news-62240. 21 https://www.duvarenglish.com/hdp-mp-garo-paylan-says-lack-of-armenian-mp-can didate-is-a-shortcoming-news-62240.

58

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Moreover, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s message went beyond mere identity politics and highlighted the crucial issues at stake in the election, namely the need for a fair and just society that values diversity and promotes democratic values. This emphasis on core principles of democracy, rather than mere identity politics, is essential for fostering a healthy and vibrant democracy in Turkey. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s video message serves as a powerful reminder that democracy and social justice require a commitment to inclusivity, respect, and equality for all, regardless of identity or background. In a time of growing polarization and intolerance, such messages are more important than ever for ensuring a just and prosperous future for all. To truly understand Kılıçdaro˘glu’s perspectives and worldview, exploring his faith’s social and political importance is crucial. Kılıçdaro˘glu originates from the region of Tunceli, where the Alevi community has long suffered from marginalization, suppression, and ostracization, and this background has undoubtedly played a crucial role in shaping his worldview. His experiences growing up in a community that has faced discrimination and oppression have likely fueled his passion for promoting social justice and equality, which are key tenets of the Alevi faith. When we asked him, how he would like to define his religious identity he said: As an Alevi Muslim, my identity is an essential part of who I am. However, I do not view it as the totality of my being. I believe that identities can provide valuable insights into our social world, but they should not become limiting factors that reduce individuals to a single label. While our religious identity plays a significant role in shaping our moral worldview, it is not the only source what constitute our moral map. Each of us has multiple identities that influence our experiences, perceptions, and interactions with others. In addition to our religious identity, we may identify with our ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status, profession, and more.22

As far as public identity, he said In public life, my political identity as a member of the CHP is more crucial than my private religious identity. I am passionate about standing on the side of the oppressed and marginalized, and my political affiliation aligns with those values. As such, I strive to ensure that my political beliefs and actions reflect my commitment to justice, equality, and fairness for all. Let me repeat again, while identities are important in our socialization and 22 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu, conducted by the authors on 17 April 2023.

3

˘ KEMAL KILIÇDAROGLU: LIFE AND SOCIALIZATION

59

worldview formation, we must acknowledge and embrace the complexity of human beings beyond just one identity.23

As a member of the Turkmen–Alevi community, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s worldview is heavily influenced by the principles and teachings of the Alevi faith, which holds a significant place in his life. He belongs to one of the most important Turkmen–Alevi Kure¸san ethnoreligious communities, known as Ocak (Hearth) in Turkish.24 Ocak is an ancestry claimed to be originated from a specific holy lineage with religious knowledge being an inherent part of these families. This knowledge is passed down through generations, ensuring its continuity and transmission within the family. The Kure¸san Hearth originated from Deylam in the Khorasan region of Iran and was eventually influenced by Shia Islam.25 The region’s people, who were previously Zoroastrian, Shamanist, mixed with Arab and Turkic tribes, and under the influence of other religious traditions, converted to Islam in the second half of the ninth century. However, due to the Mongol invasion, they were forced to leave their homeland and settle in Anatolia, where they gradually formed the Bekta¸si–Alevi tradition. Nine major historic holy lineages settled in Tunceli region in the twelfth century, presumably from Khorasan in Iran. Moreover, in Tunceli, all tribes are headed by religious leaders known as pir and seyyid. Among these tribes, the Kure¸san holy lineage is the most notable, and it is believed to be descended from the lineage of Prophet Muhammad.

23 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu, conducted by the authors on 17 April 2023. 24 In his book, Anadolu’da Asiretler, Cemaatler, Oymaklar (1453–1650). Ankara: TTK,

2009 on the basis of the Ottoman documents, Yusuf Halaço˘glu shows that the members of the Kure¸san Oca˘gı are Turkmen and belong to the Begdili tribe of the Bozok branch of the Oghuzs. The Begdi Turkmen population were spread over a wide area in Anatolia: Adana, Afyon, Aksaray, Ak¸sehir, Ankara, Antakya, Aydın, Antep, Birecik, Yozgat, ˙ Çorum, Diyarbakır, Içel, Karaman, Kayseri, Kır¸sehir, Kilis, Konya, Kütahya, Malatya, Maras, Mardin, Mugla, Nigde, Samsun, Sivas, Tarsus, Urfa. Another important study by Cevdet Türkay, who used the Ottoman and local documents, states that the some of those Kure¸san Hearth was connected to the Ak¸sehir Sanjakand some remained in Tunceli and the former became Sunni while those in Tunceli remained as Alevi. He concludes that the Kure¸san Oca˘gı comprised by Turkmen tribes who originated from Khorasan an Central Asia. Cevdet Türkay. Osmanli Imparatorlu˘gu’nda Oymak, Asiret ve Cemaatler. Istanbul: Isaret, 2017. 25 There are competing and conflicting views about the origins and belief system of the Kure¸san Oca˘gı. For the Kure¸san Oca˘gı, see Ta¸s, Kibar. “Dünü ve bugünü ile Kurey¸san a¸siretleri.” Unpublished Dissertation, Ankara University, 2017.

60

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Kılıçdaro˘glu comes from this lineage, which has played a significant role in shaping his religious and cultural identity.

Kizilba S¸ , Bekta S¸ i, and Alevi Today in Turkey, the Alevi community, whose membership is defined by descent and which was previously known as Kızılba¸s and Bekta¸si, represents approximately 15–20% (approximately 10–15 million of 84 million) of Turkey’s population. The community is divided along ethnic (Turkish, 8 million; Kurdish, 2–3 million; and Zaza Alevi-Dersimli, 1 million), regional, and class lines.26 A closer examination of the origins of these identities also shows their sociological foundations. Kızılba¸s identity was an outcome of the tension between the sedentary and nomadic lifestyles of Turkic tribes, the rivalry between the Ottoman and Safavid empires, and the presence of heretical ideas in Anatolia. The nomadic Turks sought to preserve their way of life and freedom against the sedentary Ottoman polity, which sought to control the population through Sunni Islam. After the establishment of the Safavid state in the sixteenth century, nomadic heterodox Anatolian tribes cooperated with the Safavids. Those who adopted a sedentary life and settled in cities with their Sufi lodges were called Bekta¸si, and those who remained seminomadic and resisted the state’s control came to be known as Alevi. The Ottoman state historically viewed the Alevi community as a potential fifth column for Shi’a Iran and consequently treated Alevis as blasphemers and heretics. As a result, Alevis suffered numerous massacres at the hands of the central government, forcing them to reside in small, isolated communities in the mountainous areas of Turkey. Within these rural and marginalized communities, Alevis formed their own syncretic religious-social worldview, centered on resistance and escape from the state’s power, as well as building alternative communal life in the mountains of Anatolia. In short, the Alevi community evolved in Anatolia during the late Seljuk and early Ottoman periods and continues to thrive in Turkey

26 Yaman, Ali. “Alevilikte Ocak Kavrami: Anlam ve Tarihsel Arka Plan.” Türk Kültürü ve Hacı Bekta¸s Veli Ara¸stırma Dergisi 60 (2011): 43–64.

3

˘ KEMAL KILIÇDAROGLU: LIFE AND SOCIALIZATION

61

and other regions.27 It starts to form after the arrival of the Turkmen tribes from Iran and Central Asia between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries turn. Fuat Köprülü, the most important authority of early Islam in Anatolia, aptly sums up the point: The vigorous religious coalescence that took place in Anatolia and western Iran up to the eleventh/seventeenth century and the various groups and tariqas that came into existence there beginning in the seventh/thirteenth century are closely bound to the history of the Qalandariyya…28

Those tribes which hailed from Central Asia were seminomadic and they were still deeply shaped by their Shamanistic faith.29 Those Turkmen who migrated from Khorasan in Iran also called Horasan Erenleri and later called Bektasi brought their own version of a syncretic religion.30 In fact, thirteenth-century Khorasan was a site of competing and conflicting versions of religious movements. Bekta¸si/Alevi tradition evolved out of this religio-intellectual milieu and crystallized as the Alevi faith. This milieu is shaped by a set of heretic religious movements such as Qalandariyya (Kalenderilik), which is defined by their indifference to worldly issues and stressing ultimate commitment to the divine love of God.31 According to A. Y. Ocak, Bektashism is deeply influenced by Qalandarism. Haci Bekta¸si Veli (1210–1271), the saint patron of Bektasism, was a Qalandari follower. In fact, the most important poet of Bektashism, Abdal Musa was a Qalandari follower. Köprülü argues that: Under the apparent guise of Sufism, and in the name of such orders as the Qalandariyya and Haidariyya, the babas spread extremist Shi’i doctrines and batıni (esoteric) ideas among the Turkmen clans. The first religio-political 27 Bilici, Faruk, Tord Olsson, Elisabeth Özdalga, and Catharina Raudvere. “The function of Alevi-Bektashi theology in modern Turkey.” Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives 8 (2005): 59. 28 Köprülü, Mehmet Fuat. Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion. Trans. and Ed. Gary Leiser. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1993, p. 12. 29 Basilov, Vladimir N. “Islamic Shamanism among Central Asian peoples.” Diogenes 40, no. 158 (1992): 5–18. 30 Doja, Albert. “A political history of Bektashim from Ottoman Anatolia to contemporary Turkey.” Journal of Church and State 48 (2006): 423. 31 Ejder, Ömerül Faruk. “Osmanlı Imparatorlu˘ ˙ gu’nda Marjinal Sûfilik: Kalenderîler.” ˙ Tasavvuf Ilmi ve Akademik Ara¸stırma Dergisi 23, no. 46: 167–169.

62

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

movement that they initiated in Anatolia was known as the Babai rebellion (1240).32

Those dervishes came from Khorasan with Central Asian Shamanistic roots and played a critical role in the formation of the Ottoman state. Bektasi–Alevi faith system synthesizes diverse religious traditions and stresses the godly aspect of a human being. The Alevi/Bektasi faith is founded on the principles of love, compassion, and humanism, which underpin its philosophical tenets. The faith emphasizes the significance of inner spiritual growth and personal transformation as the means to achieve a profound comprehension of the divine. Central to the Alevi/Bektasi faith is the concept of “Hakikat ” or truth, which is not an external reality but an inner one, accessible through meditation, contemplation, and spiritual practice. The faith recognizes the potential of every individual to attain this truth and asserts that it is the responsibility of each person to endeavor toward this goal. The Alevi/Bektasi faith regards “Irfan” or gnosis as a crucial tenet, representing an intuitive understanding of reality attained via spiritual practices and self-reflection. The faith emphasizes direct experience over intellectual inquiry for this understanding. Additionally, community and social justice hold significant importance in the faith. The Alevi/Bektasi faith teaches that all individuals are equal and that it is the community’s responsibility to ensure everyone is treated with dignity and respect. The faith also emphasizes communal ritual, known as “cem,” where members come together to engage in prayer, meditation, and spiritual practices. The poem of Kaygusuz Abdal sums up this worldview: If you are looking for God, look for it in Adam, Not in Iraq, Mecca, or pilgrimage.”

Almost all Alevi teaching and ceremonies stress communal autonomy and cohesion of the group vis-à-vis the state. Since the Sunni ulema and the state regarded the Alevis as heretics, the Alevis could not build their own educational structures, and their sacred traditions were transmitted orally. Teaching and preservation of religious knowledge took place by means of stories and anecdotes. Communal actions are informed by lived habits. These oral narratives allowed a plurality of beliefs and ideas to 32 Köprülü, Fuat. “Islam ˙ ansiklopedisi.” Cilt 2 (1979): 28–38.

3

˘ KEMAL KILIÇDAROGLU: LIFE AND SOCIALIZATION

63

coexist, and they also kept the doors open for outside ideas and beliefs to color Alevi narrative stories. In order to avoid the Ottoman bureaucracy, the Alevis developed their own communal justice system to solve disputes in their secret religious gatherings, known as cem or ayini cem. In these religious communal gatherings, they discuss and resolve disputes, reserving the imposition of dü¸skünlük (ex-communication) for those who have committed a grievous transgression against Alevi norms. This collective yet isolated psychology of solidarity played a key role in maintaining the inner boundaries of the community, especially through dissimulation as a way of overcoming Sunni prejudices. Historically, the cohesion of Alevi collective identity has been determined by external threats rather than a fully articulated shared code of theology or conduct. This communal experience of oppression at the hands of the Ottoman state inclined the Alevi community to become a main supporter of the Kemalist reforms, and especially the War of Independence itself. Alevis welcomed the disestablishment of Sunni Islam—which had long excluded them—in public life and the creation of a secular polity; initially, many Alevi notables actually presented themselves as ardent supporters of the Kemalist project of radical secularization and a homogeneous ethnolinguistic nationalism. Alevi worldview is dominated by their understanding of human beings as the manifestation of God. Alevi theology is behind its socio-cultural practices and the sense of community. It has a deep effect on the followers’ moral actions. It calls believers to become a kamil-insan (morally perfect person). Its core teachings represent the humanistic ideology of tolerance, love, kindness, sharing, fraternity, respect for diversity, and treating humans as free and equal. Zeidan sums up: Socially Alevism is seen as a positive revolutionary force always fighting against oppression and all forms of evil in society, representing the poor and marginalised nomads, peasants and worker classes in their struggles against their exploiters, and demanding equality and justice. Ali was the defender of the poor and oppressed. . ..Religious differentiation was transformed into political differentiation and Alevism became the representative of socialism, progress, social justice, and a classless society, branding Sunnism as reactionary.33

33 Zeidan, David. “The Alevi of Anatolia.” http://www.angelfire.com/az/rescon/ ALEVI.html, 1995.

64

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Despite scholarly evidence that Alevilik has roots in Turkish Shamanism and the geo-tribal lifestyle of Anatolia, some Kurdish nationalists attempt to portray Alevilik as a Kurdish religion, leading to the misconception that everyone from Tunceli province is an Alevi Kurd. However, this is not always accurate. For example, Kılıçdaro˘glu is an Alevi Turk who has always been active in the secular political spectrum. Kılıçdaro˘glu said, “Along with pioneers of the enlightenment in Anatolia, such as Hacı ˙ Bekta¸s Veli, Baba Ilyas, Mevlana, Ahi Evran, Yunus Emre, Taptuk Emre, and Kul Himmet, they have made significant contributions to the cultural legacy of modern Turkey. Hacı Bekta¸s Veli, in particular, deserves to be remembered and honored.”34 Kılıçdaro˘glu emphasized that “Hacı Bekta¸s Veli was a great thinker and Anatolian saint who helped preserve the moral and just traditions of the Khorasan region.” He added that “Hacı Bekta¸s Veli’s contributions to the promotion of concepts such as human love, tolerance, and pluralism are fundamental to the sound, moral, and philosophical foundations of Anatolian Islam.”35 Kılıçdaro˘glu’s moral world is deeply shaped by his understanding of the philosophy of Alevi Islam, especially his reading of Hacı Bekta¸s Veli. He said “Keep your seat clean, deserve the bite you’ve earned,” not only conveys advice on cleanliness, honesty, work, and earning halal, but also reflects his attitude against destructiveness, oppression, exploitation, and laziness. This quote embodies the essence of a respectable and deep Anatolian culture. Religious identity is a crucial determinant of voting behavior in Turkey, and the Sunni-Alevi fault line is a significant electoral cleavage. Politically oriented Sunni Muslims are more likely to vote for conservative parties, especially the AKP, while Alevis are more inclined to support secular and leftist parties.36 Alevis typically vote for the CHP, particularly after the emergence of political Islam in Turkey, which has led many Alevis to seek refuge in the CHP.37

34 https://www.gercekbandirma.com/kemal-kilicdaroglu-haci-bektas-ocagi-aydinlanmave-egitim-ocagidir. 35 https://www.gercekbandirma.com/kemal-kilicdaroglu-haci-bektas-ocagi-aydinlanma-

ve-egitim-ocagidir. 36 Çarko˘ glu, Ali. “Political preferences of the Turkish electorate: Reflections of an Alevi– Sunni cleavage.” Turkish Studies 6, no. 2 (2005): 273–292. 37 Açikel, Fethi, and Kazim Ate¸s. “Ambivalent citizens: The Alevi as the ‘Authentic Self’ and the ‘Stigmatized Other” of Turkish nationalism.” European Societies 13, no. 5 (2011): 713–733.

3

˘ KEMAL KILIÇDAROGLU: LIFE AND SOCIALIZATION

65

Moreover, the Alevi-Sunni divide also constitutes a major divide within Kurdish nationalism. Alevi Kurds usually vote for secular left parties rather than ethno-nationalist Kurdish parties. However, in recent years, Alevi Kurds also overwhelmingly vote for the Kurdish ethnic-nationalists HDP. In the early years of the Republic, Alevis supported the reforms of the Republic and voted for the CHP. For instance, Alevi Kurds refused to support the Sheikh Said Rebellion against the modernizing reforms of the Republic. Moreover, this religious division prevented the Kurdish nationalists to form a common during Koçgiri and Dersim rebellions in 1920 and 1937. Alevi Kurds remained in close alliance with the Alevi Turks. The sectarian difference is still more important than the ethnic difference why Alevis vote for the secular and modernist CHP.38

Dersim/Tunceli Sociopolitical Context Kılıçdaro˘glu always was curious about his ethnoreligious origin and the local history of his hometown, Tunceli. Tunceli, located in eastern Turkey, is known for being the most leftist and predominantly Alevi-Zaza province in the country.39 It is religiously (Alevi) the most homogenous province. The Alevi-Zaza community constitutes over 95% of the population of Tunceli. It has always remained on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire and the modern Turkish Republic until the late 1930s. Due to this isolationism, Alevism has developed into an endogamous socio-religious community and always remained a zone of resistance against the state and orthodox Islam. It has developed its own version of Alevism. The state oppression and a deep sense of insecurity created a political opportunist and calculating culture. ˙ As early as 1986, he had an interview with Ihsan Sabri Ca˘glayangil, who was the government representative in 1938 to oversee the execution of the leaders of the rebellion, especially Seyyit Rıza, explained what really took place.40 About his local research of the events of 38 Kehl-Bodrogi, Krisztina. “Atatürk and the Alevis: A holy alliance?” In Turkey’s Alevi

Enigma, pp. 53–69. Brill, 2003. 39 Leezenberg, Michiel. “Kurdish Alevis and the Kurdish nationalist movement in the 1990s.” In Turkey’s Alevi Enigma, pp. 197–212. Brill, 2003. 40 See the entire interview in Mesut Ozcan. Dersim ve Madimak Soylesileri. Istanbul: Dogan Kitap, 2016, pp. 53–65. For the criticism of this interview, see Erdem Atay. “Dersimli ‘Seyit’ Kemal Gercegi,” https://youtu.be/eUtBeb5xHQ; Bilâl N. Sim¸ ¸ sir.

66

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

1938 in an interview, Kılıçdaro˘glu said: “The last person we talked to ˙ was Ihsan Sabri Ça˘glayangil. We talked at his house in Yalova. This happened in the 80s. I was interested in local history, I had a passion for research.”41 Kılıçdaro˘glu chose not to publish any work under his own name and instead opted to have his research published by other activists. This decision may have been influenced by his status as a civil servant, which made it reasonable for him to avoid publishing under his name. Kılıçdaro˘glu addresses the historical oppression and mistreatment of the Alevi community within the context of victimhood. The strong emotions associated with Tunceli/Dersim are closely tied to the unfavorable image of the region held by those in power. Individuals originating from Tunceli are often labeled as “rebellious” and “anti-state militants,” further fueling the passion surrounding the area. This perception has undoubtedly had a significant influence on Kılıçdaro˘glu as well. The stigma attached to the people of Tunceli can be traced back to historical events that were perceived as rebellious against the state’s authority. This label has remained attached to the region and its inhabitants, shaping the way in which they are viewed by the establishment. Despite efforts to counteract these negative stereotypes, the stigma persists, perpetuating the emotional connection many individuals feel toward Tunceli and its people. It was Erdo˘gan who shamelessly tried to exploit the local history of Dersim for political gains. On November 23, 2011, Erdo˘gan, then prime minister, issued an apology on behalf of the Turkish state for the killings of Kurdish Alevi citizens that occurred during the Dersim massacre of 1937–1938.42 He acknowledged the severity of the tragedy, stating, “Dersim is the most tragic event in our recent history,” and took responsibility by saying, “I apologize and I do.”43 What took place in Dersim what a rebellion and

˙ Ingiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye’de Kürt Sorunu (1924–1938): S¸ eyh Sait, A˘grı, ve Dersim Ayaklanmaları. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991. 41 https://www.krttv.com.tr/gundem/kilicdaroglu-Erdo˘ gan-koltugunu-korumak-icin˙ sim, 2010, p. 221. “Dersim arayis-icinde-h16323.html; Dersim Raporu. Istanbul: Ileti¸ Raporu” is a collection of detailed reports written on the region which was compiled in 1933–1934. 42 The Kurdish-Alevi rebellion took place between 1936 and 1939 in and around Dersim, renamed as Tunceli, and it resisted the modernizing and centralizing policies of the new Turkish Republic. 43 Hürriyet, 23 November 2011.

3

˘ KEMAL KILIÇDAROGLU: LIFE AND SOCIALIZATION

67

the excessive use of state force to suppress it. The uprising led by Alevi leaders against the Turkish Republic’s authority was met with disproportionate use of military force, including aerial bombings that resulted in hundreds of casualties. The Dersim rebellion was a Kurdish/Zaza uprising against the central government in the Dersim region, which includes parts of Tunceli Province, Elazı˘g Province, and Bingöl Province. The rebellion was led by Seyid Riza. In 1937 and 1938, the Turkish Armed Forces carried out three Dersim operations against the rebellion, which resulted in the death of hundreds of people, and the leaders of the rebellion were all hanged.44 The way in which the rebellion was suppressed is still the major debate among the scholars and activists.45 Erdo˘gan’s apology was seen by some Alevis as a political ploy to undermine Kılıçdaro˘glu, the leader of the Atatürk’s CHP party, whose family originated from Dersim. Erdo˘gan shifted the blame toward the CHP, referring to them as the “author of this bloody episode,” and suggested that they should apologize and take responsibility. However, the apology did not effectively address the grievances of the Alevi community, and many remain distrustful of the AKP rule.

Memur Adam---Bureaucratic Personality Kılıçdaro˘glu’s professional identity as a bureaucrat (1971–1999) has played a significant role in shaping his beliefs and attitudes toward the state and its role in society. Having grown up in a family of state employees, Kılıçdaro˘glu deeply respects the authority and power of the state. Unlike his political rival, Erdo˘gan, Kılıçdaro˘glu views the state as a benevolent institution that provides a necessary framework for civic life. He sees the state as an entity that can provide care and protection for its citizens. There are two contrasting perspectives on the nature of the state held by Erdo˘gan and Kılıçdaro˘glu. Erdo˘gan perceives the state as a

44 Hallı, Resat. Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde ayaklanmalar (1924–1938). Ankara: T. C. Genelkurmay Ba¸skanlı˘gı Harp Tarihi Dairesi, 1972, p. 377. 45 The trial and executions were hastily conducted to ensure completion before Pres-

ident Atatürk’s visit to the area. The officials in charge were concerned about potential embarrassment if the local populace appealed to the president for mercy. These events are recounted with a sense of shame by Ihsan Sabri Ça˘glayangil, who was tasked with organizing the summary trial and executions, in his memoirs titled Anılarım. Istanbul: Yılmaz, 1990, pp. 45–55.

68

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

source of wealth that can be exploited and plundered for personal enrichment. In his view, the state is merely a tool to be wielded for the benefit of himself and his family. On the other hand, Kılıçdaro˘glu views the state as the embodiment of the highest ethical principles, essential for fostering a civil and civilized coexistence within society. According to Kılıçdaro˘glu, the state should not be subjected to pillaging and exploitation for personal gain; rather, it should be safeguarded as an ethical entity, dedicated to the well-being of the society as a whole. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s “bureaucratic identity” is characterized by his respect for hierarchy, rules, regulations, and specialization. He believes that the authority of the state, based on the rule of law, is what keeps society together. In contrast to Erdo˘gan, who views the state as an ugly institution controlled by the elite “White Turks” that must be dismantled, Kılıçdaro˘glu views the state as a caring and protective entity that serves the needs of its citizens and it must be protected. As a bureaucrat, Kılıçdaro˘glu places a strong emphasis on facts, logical thinking, and rule-based action, rather than emotions or personal biases. He has a cool and calm demeanor that prioritizes the efficient functioning of government institutions. In his view, the state is an important facilitator of societal well-being, and he is committed to using his bureaucratic expertise to ensure that it functions effectively and in the best interests of all citizens. Working as a civil servant can have a significant impact on one’s worldview. Civil servants are individuals who work for the government and are responsible for implementing policies and programs that affect society. As they work toward serving the public good, civil servants gain an understanding of the complexities of the system, and this knowledge shapes their perception of the world. Kılıçdaro˘glu spent most of his career working as a civil servant in Turkey’s financial bodies. His work as the director of the Social Security Institution earned him a reputation for weeding out corruption. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s experience as a civil servant had a profound impact on his worldview, as evidenced by his political views and actions. One way in which working as a civil servant shapes one’s worldview is by exposing them to the realities of governance. Civil servants work at the forefront of government policy, and as such, they are privy to the intricacies of the system. They understand how different branches of government work together to achieve a common goal, and they also gain an understanding of the challenges involved in implementing policies. As a civil servant, Kılıçdaro˘glu would have gained insights into the challenges of balancing

3

˘ KEMAL KILIÇDAROGLU: LIFE AND SOCIALIZATION

69

the budget and allocating resources efficiently. He would have learned about the importance of transparency and accountability in government operations. These insights likely influenced his later efforts to root out corruption in government institutions. Furthermore, working as a civil servant can also instill a sense of duty and responsibility toward the public. Civil servants are responsible for serving the people, and their actions can have a direct impact on the lives of citizens. This sense of duty can lead to a heightened awareness of the needs of society and an increased commitment to working toward the greater good. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s work as a civil servant likely instilled in him a strong sense of duty toward the Turkish people. This sense of duty likely motivated his efforts to fight corruption and promote transparency in government institutions. Additionally, his work as a civil servant may have influenced his political views and his decision to enter politics.

The New CHP and Its Identity He prioritized addressing real issues over identity politics and is widely regarded as a humble political leader who crusades against corruption. Kılıçdaro˘glu successfully reinvented the CHP and established the “New CHP” during the 2011 elections, which gained popularity due to its slogan “a CHP for everyone.” Under the leadership of Kılıçdaro˘glu, the CHP has become a catch-all party for every segment of the population.46 This new approach to the CHP’s ideology focused on four key aspects: (a) new leadership, (b) democratic left politics, (c) less emphasis on secularism and nationalism, and (d) more emphasis on income distribution and egalitarian policies. These principles took some time to crystallize and redefine the CHP’s ideological content. Although the "New CHP" emphasized change, it did not experience a significant increase in the 2011 elections. In contrast to Baykal’s nationalist and anti-Kurdish cultural claims, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s CHP reached out to the urban poor, developed policies to improve the economic situation, and adopted a pro-EU stance while rejecting elitism and anti-religious positions. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s dedication to addressing these vital issues in Turkey and reaching out to ordinary people was commendable.

46 Uysal, Ayçen, “CHP Herkesi Yakala Partisi Oluyor”, interview with Nese Düzel, Taraf , May 30, 2011.

70

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

According to the 2011 election manifesto, the CHP envisioned a new society by listing the following defining characteristics of the new society: “For liberated individuals, For sustainable development, For social justice and humane living, For a happy society and a happy countryman, For contemporary living standards and developed urban society, For a just and secure world. CHP, for everyone…”

The conceptual framework of the “New CHP” draws heavily from the German Social Democrat Party’s “Building the Good Society.”47 The CHP’s election manifestos of 2007 and 2009 emphasized nationalism, secularism, communal salvation, and strengthening state institutions. However, the 2011 manifesto took a different approach, prioritizing individual freedoms, multiculturalism, and respect for diverse lifestyles. The “New CHP” distinguished itself from Baykal’s CHP regarding the Kurdish question. While the 2007 and 2009 manifestos viewed Kurdish political activism through the lens of terrorism, the 2011 manifesto recognized the importance of identities and multiculturalism in addressing the issue. The CHP promised to address the Southeast problem by promoting a peaceful approach, turning Diyarbakir prison into a museum, opening archives on the Dersim events, investigating political murders, and allowing Kurds to express their identities and establish language classes in their mother tongue. However, the new CHP’s proposals were still constrained by its institutional identity which was the founding party of the state. Kılıçdaro˘glu, as the 7th leader of the party, removed away from cultural issues and start to stress actual practical issues such as increasing inequality, the collapse of the justice system, poverty, and the worsening education system. Yet, in the early period of his leadership, Kılıçdaro˘glu could not remove the party away from its hard-core ideological position as far as nationalism and secularism are concerned. This prevented Kılıçdaro˘glu

47 A major guide in this process is a twenty-page pamphlet, which was edited by Andrea Nahles and published by the German Social Democratic Party entitled Building the Good Society: The Project of The Democratic Left, this pamphlet covered topics such as personal freedom, environmentalism, and sustainable development.

3

˘ KEMAL KILIÇDAROGLU: LIFE AND SOCIALIZATION

71

to reach the conservative sector of the population. Kılıçdaro˘glu gradually adopted a more liberal position on the headscarf issue, religious education, and different lifestyles. In fact, after 2013, Kılıçdaro˘glu moved beyond the Kemalist ideological framework and focus on the daily problems of the ordinary people. With Kılıçdaro˘glu as the leader of the party, it totally rejected the “tutelage” of the military and it stressed the “ballot box” as the only way to govern the society. One of the main differences between Baykal and Kılıçdaro˘glu is their approach to the identity of the CHP. Baykal was known for his emphasis on the party’s roots and history, and he often looked to the past to define the party’s identity. He was a backward-looking leader. On the other hand, Kılıçdaro˘glu is more forward-looking and has sought to reinvent the party’s identity as a liberal leftist. Another important difference between the two leaders is their attitude toward individual freedoms and multiculturalism. Kılıçdaro˘glu has emphasized the importance of respecting and recognizing cultural differences at the individual level, and he has taken a liberal approach to issues such as the headscarf. However, he has also maintained a classical understanding of secularism, which means that religion should remain outside of state affairs. In contrast, Baykal was known for his more “laicist” worldview, which emphasized the strict control of religion by the state. While he also valued individual freedoms, his emphasis was more on maintaining a secular society with the power of the state and protecting the nation-building principles of the Turkish Republic. While both Baykal and Kılıçdaro˘glu share a commitment to the Republic’s core values, their approaches to modern questions and societal challenges vary. Moreover, Kılıçdaro˘glu, unlike Baykal, is more society-centric and regards democracy as a way of modifying society and the relations between the state and society. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s more liberal and multicultural approach has helped to move the party in a new direction and has resonated with many Turkish voters who are looking for a more open and inclusive political vision. Under the leadership of Kılıçdaro˘glu, coalition building, closely working with other political groups on the same issues, opening the party to different actors, and becoming an all-catch party became the goal. His main goal was to remove Erdo˘gan from power and stop the process of the disintegration of Turkey. In order to achieve this, Kılıçdaro˘glu moved to the center and developed a more syncretic political discourse to appeal to diverse sectors of the Turkish population. In fact, Kılıçdaro˘glu as an effective composer has managed to harmonize these diverse voices toward one

72

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

end: remove Erdo˘gan from power and stop the destruction of the state. In the most recent local elections in 2019, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s policies resulted in a major electoral victory and his candidates won Ankara, Istanbul, and some other major cities such as Adana, Antalya, Aydın, Hatay, and Mersin.

Conclusion The moral worldview of Kılıçdaro˘glu, shaped by the socio-cultural context in which he grew up, has had a profound impact on his political outlook. His family background, educational experiences, religious identity, and the region he hails from all contribute to the foundations of his moral worldview. Notably, his education, particularly his years at the university in Ankara, played a crucial role in broadening his moral and political perspectives. Furthermore, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s extensive civil service career spanning twenty-eight years significantly influenced his understanding of politics, the dynamics of state–society relations, and the role of the economy. This background is vital in comprehending his political identity and the path he has taken to shape the New CHP. Due to its institutional identity, it was not easy for the CHP to navigate its self-claim social democratic identity. One sees the major transformation under the leadership of Kılıçdaro˘glu. He did not give the founding philosophy of the state but reinterpreted them to expand its appeal base. In fact, Kılıçdaro˘glu opened the party for center-right and liberal politicians to stop Turkey’s further move into authoritarianism. It did not present a clear ideological line but in practice, he presented a democratic and clean leader, along with a group of conservative politicians, who cared and serve for the core principles of the CHP. The emergence of the New CHP under Kılıçdaro˘glu’s leadership represented Turkey’s only hope for putting an end to Erdo˘gan’s authoritarian rule. The New CHP embodies three distinct defining features. Firstly, it places less emphasis on rigid ideology and instead prioritizes inclusivity, actively seeking to integrate diverse sectors of the Turkish population, including conservative groups. Secondly, the New CHP has departed from the staunchly secular position associated with the Baykal era, adopting a fresh perspective that recognizes religious practices as fundamental human rights. This shift reflects a commitment to upholding individual freedoms and ensuring equal treatment for all citizens.

3

˘ KEMAL KILIÇDAROGLU: LIFE AND SOCIALIZATION

73

Lastly, Kılıçdaro˘glu emphasizes the need for the CHP to redefine itself based on the demands and challenges of contemporary society, rather than being confined by its historical legacy. This forward-thinking approach demonstrates a willingness to adapt and address the evolving needs of the Turkish population. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s personal background and political vision have contributed to the transformation of the CHP into a progressive force that seeks to challenge authoritarian rule, foster inclusivity, and prioritize the well-being and rights of all citizens in Turkey.

CHAPTER 4

Kılıçdaro˘glu’s Political Worldview

Abstract This chapter explores Kılıçdaro˘glu’s political worldview through four key questions. Firstly, it investigates the foundation of his moral worldview and what influences his political positions. Secondly, it examines how he understands the concepts such as politics, state, nation, secularism, and democracy. Thirdly, it analyzes how his “Justice March” initiative aligns with his overall political worldview and why he advocates for addressing past mistakes (helalle¸sme) to rebuild society. Additionally, it explores public responses to his initiative to form the Table of Six. Lastly, it investigates how and why Kılıçdaro˘glu formed an inclusive coalition to bring about a change of power in Turkey. After establishing a framework for Kılıçdaro˘glu’s political worldview, we seek to explore his views and policies on the Kurdish question. Overall, the chapter offers a comprehensive analysis of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s beliefs and policies, shedding light on the factors shaping his political stance. Keywords Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu · The Justice March · Deniz Baykal · The 2018 Elections · The Good Party (IYI Parti) · Meral Aksener · Yasar Kemal · Ince Memet · Sevket Süreyya Aydemir · Suyu Arayan Adam · Secularism · Nationalism · Civic Nation · The People’s Alliance · The New CHP · Helalle¸sme · The Kurdish Question

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. H. Yavuz and A. E. Öztürk, Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu and the New Republican People’s Party in Turkey, Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36766-3_4

75

76

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

The focus of this chapter is to explore Kılıçdaro˘glu’s moral and political worldview through four interrelated questions. Firstly, what is the moral foundation of his policies, and what informs his political positions? Secondly, how does he understand the concepts of politics, state, nation, and secularism? Thirdly, why and how did he expand the frontiers of the CHP to reach out to the conservative sector of the population by recruiting politicians with conservative backgrounds? Finally, how do his initiatives of “Justice March,” call for a “reckoning with past mistakes,” addressing the Kurdish problem, and establishing the Table of Six to create the most inclusive coalition to change power in Turkey? In this chapter, we will explore into three sections. The initial section will explore Kılıçdaro˘glu’s moral and political worldview. Moving on, the second part will examine his views on the state, politics, secularism, and nationalism. Following that, the third section will analyze Kılıçdaro˘glu’s approach of reaching out to the conservative sector of the population through interviews. Subsequently, we will examine the political consequences of his initiatives, focusing on the “Justice March” aimed at restoring the rule of law, advocating for a “reckoning with past mistakes” to shape a better future, and addressing Turkey’s contentious Kurdish problem. Additionally, we will assess the public’s response to Kılıçdaro˘glu’s initiatives and explore the reasons behind his formation of the most inclusive coalition to bring about a change in power in Turkey. Overall, this chapter aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s political worldview by examining the various factors that influence his beliefs and policies.

Moral and Political Worldview Kılıçdaro˘glu has recognized the significance of ethical values in shaping public policy and underscores the importance of collaboration to attain common objectives in politics. According to him, prioritizing ethical values within the political framework facilitates the resolution of challenges. It is imperative to heed constructive criticism and consider issues from diverse perspectives since societal events have several dimensions that necessitate multifaceted analysis. He argues that If ethical values are prioritized by the political establishment, it becomes easier to overcome problems. Listening and being receptive to critics

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

77

is crucial. It’s essential to assess problems from all angles and dimensions, as social events are multi-faceted and cannot be viewed from a one-dimensional perspective. Decisions that affect farmers will also impact industrialists, and those that involve tradesmen will have consequences for traders. Similarly, decisions related to healthcare have implications for patients, doctors, midwives, nurses, and pharmacists alike. Ultimately, addressing social issues requires a team effort, and everyone must work together.1

As far as the Republic is concerned, Kılıçdaro˘glu always talks about the values of the Republic as responsibility, honesty, compassion, justice and hard work, and “especially enlightenment” (akılcılık). When we asked him what he means by enlightenment, he said: “making decisions by reason and always listening to what the experts, scientists, and scholars say on any issue. The public decisions must be made on the basis of facts and scientific thinking.”2 In fact, Kılıçdaro˘glu differentiates science from religion and he argues that religion could provide moral values but science should guide our public actions. By referring Mustafa Kemal’s “our true mentor in life is science,” he argues that the institutions and policies should be based on scientific facts. In fact, he contends that The notion of a republic embodies key values such as enlightenment and freedom of thought. It represents equality between men and women, as well as virtuous governance. When the Republic of Turkey was established, the concept of enlightenment was central to its vision. To understand the significance of this, it is important to examine the state of education in Turkey at the time. In 1923, upon leaving the vast Ottoman Empire, Turkey had only 554 doctors, 69 pharmacists, 136 midwives, and 4 nurses within its borders. There were only 86 inpatient hospitals available. In response to this, the founders of the Republic prioritized the establishment of a national education system. At the time, the literacy rate for women was a mere 8 out of a thousand, while for men it was 6-7%. The Republic recognized the need to address this inequality and improve access to education for all. Thus, they made strides in advancing education and promoting enlightenment, a crucial pillar of the Republic. By reflecting on

1 https://tele1.com.tr/cocuklugundan-siyasete-kemal-kilicdaroglu-hayatinin-bilinmeye nlerini-anlatti-168139/. 2 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu, conducted by the authors on 17 April 2023.

78

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

these numbers, we can better understand the significance of the Republic’s mission and the challenges it faced in building a modern society.3

Kılıçdaro˘glu’s upbringing instilled in him a strong sense of frugality and a deep respect for public property. He has always been mindful of avoiding wastefulness, especially with public resources, and has made it a personal principle to abide by the rules of frugality in all aspects of his life. In his view, waste is considered “haram” or forbidden according to his belief system, and while he cannot impose this view on others, he strives to live by it. For example, when giving his Tuesday speeches, he uses blank sheets of used paper, a habit he picked up from the Ministry of Finance and encourages others to adopt. He believes that every conscious effort to save contributes to the preservation of our environment, a value he has upheld throughout his personal and public life. When making purchases, his primary consideration is whether there is a genuine need for the item in question. He sees these actions as reflective of what politics should be in a mature democracy. He says: “We abide by rules of frugality, whether in the state, administration or at home. Waste is viewed as “haram” or forbidden in our belief system, and I personally adhere to this principle.”4

State, Society, and Politics Kılıçdaro˘glu has a clear understanding of the distinction between the state and government in relation to their functions and objectives. He draws a distinction between the state and government by stating that “the state thinks about the long term, whereas politics or government tends to think more short term.” (Devlet her zaman bakidir, ama hükümetler gecicidir.)5 He clarifies that the state is “concerned with its direction over the course of 100 years, while the government’s rule is limited to the duration of its election term, typically five years.” Kılıçdaro˘glu emphasizes that the government’s role is not to replace the state, but rather to operate within its established framework and regulations. As a result, the government’s existence is fleeting, while the state should be guided by moral principles, 3 https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-genel-baskani-kemal-kilicdaroglu-ilk-meclisten-anitka bire-buyuk-cumhuriyet-yuruyusune-katildi. 4 https://tele1.com.tr/cocuklugundan-siyasete-kemal-kilicdaroglu-hayatinin-bilinmeye nlerini-anlatti-168139/. 5 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu, conducted by the authors on 17 April 2023.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

79

appoint and promote its officials based on merit, and be governed equitably. Kılıçdaro˘glu also stresses that state institutions should cultivate their distinct culture.6 He argues that the state tradition in Turkey is deeply influenced by the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, where the highest ethical value is to help people reach their full potential. He believes that failed or weak states result in destructive consequences throughout the country. Therefore, he emphasizes the importance of a strong state for “coexistence, peace, and economic development. He insists that the state must be founded on shared morality and respect for human dignity to maintain its legitimacy.”7 Kılıçdaro˘glu’s conception of society is deeply shaped by the Republican understanding of a unified society in which everyone is equal before the law and no one gets special treatment because of his or her identity or class affiliation. He argues that for a society to function it must be based on “shared moral values, shared memory, and especially respect for the dignity of every member of that society.” Kılıçdaro˘glu also recognizes that there are set of communities (cemaats ) in Turkey with different religious beliefs but he stresses that society (toplum) should provide a unified glue for these diverse communities to coexist in peace. Society should have a shared understanding of the future and focus on providing the necessary environment for everyone to realize their human potential. He consistently emphasizes the importance of engaging in constructive dialogues with all segments of society, which should be grounded in respect for diverse opinions, justice, and the fundamental rights of every individual. He has a deep concern for safeguarding and promoting societal peace in the face of any provocations or assaults from Erdo˘gan’s government. His composed demeanor in the face of several attempted lynchings has earned him immense respect.8 Politics, for Kılıçdaro˘glu, is the process society organizes itself and seeks to control and orient the state to serve for the interest of society. In fact, he said, “Politics is the coordination and cooperation with diverse 6 https://tele1.com.tr/cocuklugundan-siyasete-kemal-kilicdaroglu-hayatinin-bilinmeye

nlerini-anlatti-168139/. 7 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu, conducted by the authors on 17 April 2023. 8 “Kemal Kılıçdaro˘ glu saldırıya u˘gradı.” Cumhuriyet, April 19, 2019.

https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/kemal-Kılıçdaro˘glu-saldiriya-ugradi-1355941; https://sputniknews.com.tr/20190422/kilicdaroglunun-sigindigi-evin-sahibi-esim-kor kudan-kapiyi-kilitlemis-acmasi-icin-yalvardim-1038834402.html.

80

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

sectors of the population, making rules of coexistence, and shaping the policies of the state.”9 Moreover, his understanding of the function of politics is also the reason why he has always been involved in political activities. The reason why he entered into politics “is to improve the social and economic conditions of the citizens.” His sense of politics is not to promote ideological or identity community but rather the entire country. He said: We were united in the same boat, regardless of whether we hailed from Giresun, Sırnak, Edirne, or Malatya - we shared a common country. Despite hailing from different cities and possessing different political or ideological beliefs, we shared a shared destiny. Every event that unfolded within the country affected us all; when turmoil swept through the streets, we all felt the pain, and when the economy faltered, we all suffered the consequences. Unemployment and poverty did not discriminate, impacting all individuals indiscriminately. Consequently, we sought a Turkey that would serve all inhabitants of the country, devoid of discrimination, oppression, or neglect, standing alongside the marginalized, impoverished, and oppressed.10

The political life of Kılıçdaro˘glu is about learning and bringing diverse sectors of the population together around the common good. However, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s path to political leadership, which may lead to the presidency soon, did not begin as successfully as anticipated. Although Kılıçdaro˘glu initiated important democratic reforms on behalf of the CHP, such as lifting the headscarf ban in universities and public institutions and removing restrictions for Imam Hatip School graduates in university entrance exams, he was unable to defeat AKP and Erdo˘gan in many elections. Despite the party’s increase in vote shares, CHP was not a serious contender for AKP until recently. For instance, under the leadership of Deniz Baykal, CHP received 19.39% of the votes in the 2007 general elections, while it received 20.87% in the 2011 general elections, 25.98% in the 2015 June general elections, 24.95% in the 2015 November general elections, and 25.32% in the 2018 general elections under Kılıçdaro˘glu’s leadership. Therefore, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s vote increase remained at the 5% level compared to the Baykal period. Similarly, in the

9 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu, conducted by the authors on 17 April 2023. 10 Kılıçdaro˘ glu. “Preface,” p. 14.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

81

presidential elections, Kılıçdaro˘glu could not deliver a superior performance that would meet the high expectations. In the 2014 presidential ˙ election, Kılıçdaro˘glu and the MHP chose Ekmeleddin Ihsano˘ glu as their candidate but were unable to prevent Erdo˘gan’s first-round victory with 51.79% of the votes. Likewise, in the 2018 election, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s candi˙ date, Muharrem Ince, lost to Erdo˘gan in the first round, this time with an even larger margin of votes. Kılıçdaro˘glu, a persistent politician who refused to give up, adopted a different strategy to challenge the seemingly unbeatable AKP and its formidable leader, Erdo˘gan. One of his notable moves was organizing a “Justice March,” a long march from Ankara to Istanbul to expose the politicization justice system in the country. Kılıçdaro˘glu also succeeded in recruiting opposition elements within the ruling bloc, which significantly ˙ I˙ Parti) strengthened his position. He first attracted the Good Party (IY and Meral Ak¸sener from the MHP, then took the Felicity Party (SD; Saadet Partisi) and the Democrat Party, which were close to the government, with him. Finally, he pulled the Future Party (GP; Gelecek Partisi) and Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA; Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi), which recently emerged from the AKP to his side, making him the mastermind and leader of the Nation Alliance. Through this strategy of alliance formation with other parties, Kılıçdaro˘glu learned the art of compromise and expanding the frontiers of the CHP to defeat the AKP. He succeeded in opening his party/bloc not only to leftist voters but also to wider segments of the center and center-right. By doing so, Kılıçdaro˘glu paved the way for a potential victory in the 2023 elections. Kılıçdaro˘glu has consistently emphasized the importance of citizenship and the need to move beyond identity politics. He believes that the polarization of society is a result of politicians exploiting identity-based differences to gain political power and that this trend must be reversed if Turkey is to move forward. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s vision is to create a national conversation in which all citizens can participate, regardless of their background or political affiliation. This conversation would be based on a shared language, history, concerns, and common sense, and would aim to establish a consensus on what is right and wrong for society. By engaging in this conversation, Kılıçdaro˘glu hopes to bridge the gap between the past and present and to prepare for the future. To achieve this goal, Kılıçdaro˘glu believes that it is necessary to transcend ideological boundaries and focus on common concerns and issues. He argues that only by working together

82

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

can the country overcome the challenges it faces, such as economic inequality, corruption, and threats to democratic institutions. By emphasizing common ground, Kılıçdaro˘glu seeks to move beyond the divisive identity politics that have dominated Turkish politics in recent years. Ultimately, Kılıçdaro˘glu believes that the only thing that can keep Turkish society together is a commitment to a national conversation that creates a shared language and civility. This conversation must be inclusive and respectful and must be based on a commitment to the common good. By emphasizing citizenship and shared values, Kılıçdaro˘glu hopes to create a society that is stronger, more united, and more democratic. Kılıçdaro˘glu holds great respect for the values and accomplishments of the Republic. However, his mission is to transform the Republic into a fully democratic entity. His entire political activity is dedicated to moving Turkey away from Erdo˘gan’s authoritarian and fascist governance toward a truly democratic system. He says: Let’s focus on the main objective now. The founders and leaders of the Republic achieved three significant revolutions - establishing the Republic, transitioning to a multi-party system in 1945, and introducing social democracy under the guidance of the late Ecevit. It is now time for us to unite and embark on the fourth revolution, which is to establish a fully democratic Turkey. Our ultimate goal is to create a Turkey where democracy complements the Republic. To achieve this, our priority should be the implementation of complete democracy throughout the country. By achieving this, we can serve Turkey in the best possible way, making it a respected nation of the 21st century, admired throughout the world.11

He understands that democracy is essential for ensuring that the people’s voices are heard and their rights protected. He envisions a Turkey where freedom of speech, assembly, and the press are guaranteed, where the rule of law prevails, and where power is not concentrated in the hands of a few individuals or groups. Kılıçdaro˘glu recognizes that Turkey’s transition to a democratic system will not be an easy one. It will require significant changes in the country’s political culture, institutions, and practices. Nevertheless, he is committed to this transformation,

11 https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-genel-baskani-kemal-kilicdaroglu-ilk-meclisten-ani tkabire-buyuk-cumhuriyet-yuruyusune-katildi.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

83

and he believes that it is achievable through peaceful and constructive means. Through his leadership, Kılıçdaro˘glu aims to bring together people from all segments of society to work toward this common goal. He believes that a democratic Turkey will not only benefit its citizens but also contribute to regional and global stability. By embracing democracy, Turkey can strengthen its position as a respected member of the international community, a country that upholds human rights, promotes peace and prosperity, and sets an example for others to follow. He calls on every society to face its history and learn what really took place by exploring why: Looking back at history, one can find various forms of suffering such as pains, tears, and other kinds of atrocities that have occurred in every country. These events can be terrifying to read about, and those who examine the history of humanity with a calm eye cannot help but feel the pain. Nevertheless, some individuals live in countries where they can openly discuss and reveal the truth about these painful events, learn from them, and make necessary improvements to their systems. Unfortunately, some people are deprived of this opportunity to confront their past. The value of a republic and democracy lies not in being perfect or never making mistakes, but in providing an environment for people to discuss and rectify past wrongs. No other regime gives its citizens this opportunity…Turkey is a powerful country, not because it has never made mistakes in the past, but because despite its shortcomings, it has created an environment of freedom where mistakes can be acknowledged and addressed. The key to the longevity of the Republic of Turkey is the principles that allow for freedom and critical thinking to flourish.12

Justice and Democracy When the authors asked which book had a major impact on him, he said Ya¸sar Kemal’s Ince Mehmed. Kılıçdaro˘glu has expressed his admiration for Yasar Kemal’s Ince Memed on several occasions, and it is evident that this book has significantly influenced his worldview.13 The novel, published in 1955, depicts the struggle between injustice and the fight for justice. It highlights the importance of having faith in the human capacity 12 Kılıçdaro˘ glu. “Preface,” p. 17. 13 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu, conducted by the authors on 17 April 2023.

84

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

to establish a fair system that ensures the just distribution of resources and the restoration of human dignity. The story of Ince Memed, who is often referred to as the Robin Hood of Anatolia, inspires the reader to fight for the poor and oppressed using deep human values to mobilize the people. This novel is about persecution, injustice, and violation of basic human dignity and the fight against all these by Ince Memed and the persecuted people to bring justice and restore human dignity. Ya¸sar Kemal, one of Turkey’s most celebrated writers, authored a collection of ˙ four epic novels titled “Ince Memed.” These novels chronicle the journey of Memed, the lone offspring of a destitute widow who flees his village in Anatolia, where wealthy landowners reign supreme, and transforms into a renowned figure reminiscent of Robin Hood. Memed champions the cause of landless peasants in Anatolia, battling corrupt and avaricious landowners to improve their plight. In fact, Kılıçdaro˘glu also sees his role against Erdo˘gan’s oppression as Mehmedesque in the name of justice. Close analysis of the speeches of Kılıçdaro˘glu, the most used concept is justice. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s admiration for Ince Memed is not just limited to the story’s central themes. He is fascinated by the novel’s detailed portrayal of the Anatolian people, their customs, and their way of life. The book’s narrative evokes the hardships faced by ordinary people and the sacrifices they make in their struggle for a better life. Kılıçdaro˘glu believes that Ince Memed’s story resonates with the struggles of people all around the world, and the book’s themes are as relevant today as they were when it was first published. Ince Memed’s story is a powerful reminder of the importance of fighting for justice and the role that human values can play in mobilizing people to take action. For Kılıçdaro˘glu, the book is a constant source of inspiration in his political career, and he often refers to it when discussing the need for a fairer and more just society. Due to widespread injustices and the conviction of Enis Berbero˘glu, the member of the parliament of the CHP, who was sentenced to 25 years in prison for allegedly revealing state secrets to journalists about the transportation of arms to jihadists in Syria, Kılıçdaro˘glu launched a “March for Justice” from Ankara to Istanbul.14 This protest activated the grassroots of the CHP. Kılıçdaro˘glu has consistently voiced his opposition to the politicization of the justice system, firmly advocating for its independence

14 Sönmez, Selahattin. Adaleti Yolda Arayanlar. Istanbul: Dogan Kitap, 2017.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

85

and impartiality. One notable instance that exemplifies his stance on this issue is his strong opposition to the 2010 Constitutional referendum. At the heart of his objection was the concern that the referendum would pave the way for the politicization of the justice system. During the referendum, Kılıçdaro˘glu staunchly opposed the proposed changes to the constitution, which would grant the ruling party significant influence over the appointment of judges and prosecutors. He argued that such alterations would undermine the fundamental principles of an independent judiciary, a cornerstone of a functioning democracy. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s opposition to the referendum was rooted in his belief that the justice system should remain free from political interference, ensuring that it operates solely based on the rule of law and upholding justice for all. He recognized the dangers associated with intertwining political agendas with judicial decisions, as it could lead to a compromised and biased justice system. He emphasized the significance of an impartial judiciary in upholding the rule of law and protecting the rights and liberties of the citizens, regardless of their political affiliations. Kılıçdaro˘glu also warned that the changes would lead to the politicization of the judiciary and would allow President Erdo˘gan to use the judiciary to criminalize his opponents. As a result, Kılıçdaro˘glu called on the Turkish people to vote “no” in the referendum, and the CHP campaigned vigorously against the proposed amendments. Despite their efforts, the referendum was ultimately passed, and the changes went into effect. However, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s warning about the potential for the politicization of the judiciary has proven prescient, as the Turkish judiciary has become increasingly politicized in the years since the referendum was passed. Kılıçdaro˘glu emphasized the significance of social justice and the rule of law during his speeches and interviews, underscoring their essentiality for establishing a harmonious and stable society. Consequently, prioritizing the social dimension of the Republic of Turkey becomes crucial, encompassing the provision of fundamental necessities like food, shelter, and healthcare to every individual. Achieving this objective requires the implementation of policies and programs aimed at addressing poverty and inequality, while also fostering inclusive economic growth and development that benefits all strata of society.

86

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Secularism Kılıçdaro˘glu holds a strong belief in the intrinsic connection between secularism, democracy, the rule of law, and the establishment of a just society. His comprehensive understanding of secularism encompasses its close association with democracy and the rule of law, as he recognizes that these principles collectively contribute to the creation of a society in which every individual can fully realize their potential. In contrast to many of his peers within the CHP, Kılıçdaro˘glu does not view secularism as an independent and superior principle used to undermine democracy for the sake of protecting secular values. He argues that At the same time, it is important to uphold the principles of secularism, democracy, and the rule of law in order to ensure that the social state operates within a framework of fairness, equality, and justice. This can be achieved through the establishment and enforcement of laws and regulations that protect the rights and freedoms of all individuals, regardless of their social or economic status. Ultimately, creating a strong social state requires a holistic approach that considers all aspects of society, including the economic, political, and social dimensions. By prioritizing the needs and dignity of all individuals, and by upholding the principles of democracy and the rule of law, the Republic of Turkey can become a truly social state that works for the benefit of all its citizens.15

Kılıçdaro˘glu places great importance on secularism, which he believes is the fundamental rule that promotes respect for all religions. He argues that in a secular society, no single belief should dominate over others and everyone should have the freedom to practice their own beliefs. Secularism, in his view, is crucial for respecting the human right of individuals to express their beliefs and identity. Moreover, he believes that secularism is a formula for maintaining social cohesion by emphasizing humanity over religious and ethnic differences. However, Kılıçdaro˘glu also argues that secularism is not merely about the state’s neutrality toward religion and beliefs. Instead, it should prioritize reason and science, and competent individuals should be selected for any job based on their qualifications, rather than their religion, belief, lifestyle, or, clothing.16 He 15 “Asıl Elden Giden Sosyal Hukuk Devleti.” Cumhuriyet, March 12, 2019. https:// www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/asil-elden-giden-sosyal-hukuk-devleti-191052. 16 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu, conducted by the authors on 17 April 2023.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

87

believes that secularism represents a great opportunity for Turkey, but it is unfortunately not fully understood by certain individuals, including the AKP government. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s definition of secularism encompasses two key aspects. Firstly, he argues that secularism represents a principle that requires the state to treat all religions equally, and protect the rights of individuals to practice their faith. Secondly, he believes that secularism establishes a system based on reason and science, which is a significant revolution for Turkey.17 However, Kılıçdaro˘glu laments that the current government fails to comprehend the importance of secularism. It is apparent that he is referring to the AKP government as a significant recipient of his critique. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s interpretation of secularism is deeply rooted in rationality and the utilization of empirical and scientific evidence as the basis for decision-making. He succinctly captures his perspective by stating that secularism signifies an ideology that places reason and science at the forefront. This understanding holds great significance, as it emphasizes the prioritization of rational thinking within the framework of secularism. For Kılıçdaro˘glu, secularism entails entrusting responsibilities to those who possess the necessary competence and expertise. In his view, the involvement of experts is paramount in effectively governing the state. He asserts that decisions should be made not based on religion, belief systems, personal lifestyles, or outward appearances, but rather on the qualifications and capabilities of individuals. This approach highlights the importance of meritocracy and adherence to professional standards in the governance of a secular state.18 Kılıçdaro˘glu’s definitions of secularism highlight two critical points. The first emphasizes that the state must maintain an equal distance from all religions and guarantee the rights of all faiths. The second point emphasizes the importance of establishing a system based on reason and science, which represents a revolutionary opportunity for Turkey. Unfortunately, according to Kılıçdaro˘glu, there exists a significant challenge in the form of a mentality that fails to understand the importance of secularism. He views this mentality as a great misfortune and identifies the AK

17 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu, conducted by the authors on 17 April 2023. 18 Kılıçdaro˘ glu’s speech, see Cumhuriyet, % November 2013. https://www.cumhuriyet.

com.tr/haber/kilicdaroglundan-Erdo˘gana-adam-ol-adam-6399.

88

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Party government as one of the key recipients of his criticism.19 Those who use tools are those who do not believe in religion and have no faith. Every citizen should know and should believe and should not vote for anyone who uses religion as a tool for politics.20 Kılıçdaro˘glu: Some circles defined secularism as irreligion for years. However, secularismmeans freedom of religion and conscience, that is, people freely practice their beliefs. bring them. Nobody can oppose it. People have beliefs. Mine My faith is different, his faith is different, there are sectarian differences. In our own country, We have people of different denominations. We have a Muslim, a Muslim We have non-citizens. But in this country, we are all at peace we can live. The guarantee of this is freedom of religion and conscience. That is secularism. So everyone can believe whatever they want. Now a compromise on this we have to provide.21

Under his leadership, secularism is interpreted as a part of democratic culture. He tried very hard to remove secularism out of political polarization, he said: “The debate of secularism should now be removed from Turkey’s agenda... No one should debate the dress code of women. This should not be the political agenda of Turkey.”22 In fact, Kılıçdaro˘glu worked very hard to focus on the real material issues such as corruption, inequality, and unemployment as the most fundamental issues of Turkish society. He has succeeded to shift the debate to real issues rather than symbolic cultural issues as Erdo˘gan wanted to focus on. His initiatives and policies depoliticized the headscarf issue. He never hesitated to accept and

19 “Kılıçdaro˘ glu: Laikli˘gi Her Zaman Savunaca˘gız.” Milliyet, 6 Subat, ¸ 2012. 20 “Kılıçdaro˘ ˙ glu: Ben de Dindar Bir Insanım.” Dünya Bülteni. https://www.dunyabult

eni.net/guncel/kilicdaroglu-ben-de-dindar-bir-insanimh330045.html. 21 “CHP Genel Ba¸skanı Kemal Kılıçdaro˘ glu, CNN Türk’te Yayınlanan Sirin ¸ Payzın ile ˙ skin Soruları Yanıtladı.” CHP. https://www.chp. ‘Ne Oluyor?’ Programında Gündeme Ili¸ org.tr/haberler/chp-genel-baskani-kemal-kilicdaroglu-cnn-turkteyayinlanan-sirin-payzinile-ne-oluyor-programinda-gundeme-iliskin-sorulariyanitladi?q=Laiklik. 22 “CHP Genel Ba¸skanı Kemal Kılıçdaro˘ glu, Halk TV Canlı Yayınına Katıldı.” CHP. https://www.chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-genel-baskani-kemal-kilicdaroglu-halk-tv-can liyayinina-katildi-2-ocak-2021?q=ba%C5%9F%C3%B6rt%C3%BCs%C3%BC.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

89

criticize the role of the CHP in the politicization of the headscarf issue.23 He says: Let’s acknowledge that the CHP has often prioritized the headscarf issue as a prominent concern in Turkey. However, it is fundamentally inappropriate for male politicians to meddle in matters concerning women’s clothing choices. Women have the freedom to dress as they please, guided by their personal values, familial influences, neighborhood norms, city customs, and the cultural backgrounds they embody, whether in urban or rural settings. Whether a woman chooses to wear a headscarf due to her religious beliefs or for any other reason, it is unjust to blame her for exercising her personal choice. Are people truly criticized for wearing a headscarf, for goodness’ sake? Or are individuals criticized merely because their clothing preferences do not align with personal preferences? It is important to recognize that we are living in the 21st century, where individual autonomy and freedom of expression should be respected, regardless of one’s attire.24

In fact, it was Kılıçdaro˘glu’s intervention that helped those headscarf students to attend the universities. In recent years, he indicated how he intervened the process: While being the party of the people, you have to respect the values, beliefs, identities and lifestyles of the people. Increasing their economic standard of living has to be the common task of politics. Now, I said about this headscarf for the last time in Adana, but I had said it many times before that. When Yusuf Ziya Özcan was the President of YÖK, I made a statement at that time. I told him to let headscarf students attend university.25

Kılıçdaro˘glu is always against the instrumentalization of religious identities for political goals. He is fully aware of how religion has been used to polarize society and marginalize those woes are faithful. He wants secularism that stresses freedom of religion as much as freedom from oppressive and politicized religion. His goal is to remove debate over 23 “Kılıçdaro˘ glu: Ba¸sörtüsü sorununu Türkiye’nin bir numaralı sorunu haline getirdik.”

Karar, January 15, 2020. 24 “CHP Genel Ba¸skan Kemal Kılıçdaro˘ ˙ glu, Milliyetçi Imam Hatipliler Derne˘gi Üyeleriyle Görü¸stü.” CHP. https://www.chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-genel-baskan-kemal-kil icdaroglumilliyetci-imam-hatipliler-dernegi-uyeleriyle-gorustu?q=Dindar. 25 Interview with Kemal Kilicdaroglu, 12 October 2019, Karar TV. https://www.krttv. com.tr/kilicdaroglu-Erdo˘gan-koltugunu-korumak-icin-arayis-icinde.

90

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

common concerns and public good from the domain of religion to the domain of reason. Society has become deeply divided due to the politicization of religion, causing significant polarization. It is crucial for us to unite and steer society away from this divisive path. There is no valid reason to perpetuate such divisions, as they do not benefit society but rather serve the interests of political institutions. These institutions seek to manipulate their support base by exploiting these divisions. It is imperative to break free from this cycle. Kılıçdaro˘glu argues that there was a time when we managed to move beyond this divide. As the CHP, we have historically played a pivotal role in shaping the perception of the headscarf issue in Turkey. Allow me to provide an example from the Fourth Great Congress of 1935, during the time when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was still alive. One of the topics discussed during the Congress was whether women should wear the hijab or if it should be banned. Ultimately, a decision was made to not interfere with women’s clothing choices. This demonstrates the historical role that the CHP has played in shaping the discourse surrounding women’s attire.26

Nationalism: Civic Nation The CHP was founded with the intention of embodying the spirit of the new Republic by adopting the modernizing principles of the state as its ideological foundation. It’s crucial to note that the CHP was established as a state party, which is the cornerstone of its identity. Moreover, the CHP was the party of the ruling elite. It was the party of the establishment. Due to its historic association with the state, the CHP was unable to establish an independent ideological identity outside the needs of the state until the mid-1960s, especially under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit. The ideological change also constituted the transformation of the relationship between the CHP and the state and it ceased to be the party of the ruling elite. Throughout the process of Ottoman modernization, the ruling class, comprising military personnel and bureaucrats, had a primary objective of modernizing the state and society comprehensively, from top to bottom, in order to bring it to the level of contemporary civilization. In this 26 Interview with Kemal Kılıçdaro˘ glu, 12 October 2019, Karar TV. https://www.krttv. com.tr/kilicdaroglu-Erdo˘gan-koltugunu-korumak-icin-arayis-icinde.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

91

pursuit, the state endeavored to preserve its progressive essence through the establishment of the CHP. The underlying aim was to initiate a complete transformation of both the state apparatus and society, with a particular focus on the “people” as a unified and equal class. However, this reconstruction was intended to occur “despite the people,” implying that decisions were made on their behalf without granting them agency in shaping their own destiny. The intention was to determine what was deemed to be in their best interest and proceed accordingly. The CHP’s identity, from its inception until 1946, primarily revolved around being elitist, modernist, secular, and rooted in popular nationalism. However, a significant transformation occurred as the party gradually embraced core social democratic values. This shift resulted in positioning the CHP as “left of center” in comparison to other socialist parties, signifying a substantial change in its ideological stance. The presence of nationalist and secularist sentiments, prevalent among both the party’s grassroots and its leadership, creates a certain resistance to new liberal discourses. These sensitivities also pose a challenge for Kılıçdaro˘glu in effectively engaging with the conservative sector of society. Nevertheless, Kılıçdaro˘glu has made efforts to bridge this gap by gradually distancing some nationalist elements within the party. Notably, he introduced a radical policy by recruiting conservative politicians to run for municipal elections under the CHP banner. This strategic move aimed to expand the party’s appeal and diversify its support base. Kılıçdaro˘glu has embarked on a mission to reconcile nationalism with pluralism, although the historical identity of the CHP makes his success less likely. Additionally, Kılıçdaro˘glu strongly opposes the politics of identity and perceives ethnic group rights as a potential risk to the country’s unity. However, his vision of the nation revolves around civic-based principles and emphasizes citizenship. Rather than embracing nationalism, he finds comfort in the concept of patriotism, which he defines as “a deep love for one’s homeland and a commitment to advancing the nation’s progress while empowering every citizen.” In contrast to many other CHP leaders, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s vision of the nation is more state-centric and civic-oriented. He firmly rejects the ruling People’s Alliance’s narrative that the “survival of the state” is under threat (known as “beka sorunu” in Turkish). Instead, he astutely argues that the biggest menace to national unity and security stems from the corruption within the Erdo˘gan administration and the erosion of the justice system. Kılıçdaro˘glu asserts that the policies

92

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

implemented by Erdo˘gan’s government have been polarizing, divisive, and jeopardize the nation’s unity. He firmly believes that in order to define nationalism, it should be associated with serving the betterment of the entire country and constructing a just and equitable society, free from fear and poverty. The CHP has long been identified as the “party of the state,” with other identities taking a secondary role or being used solely for electoral purposes. Kılıçdaro˘glu, like Ecevit before him, aimed to challenge this and establish a more society-oriented party that recognizes the diversity of Turkish society, including its various lifestyles. It is essential to view Kılıçdaro˘glu’s “New CHP” in the context of this historical legacy. In his speech to the parliamentary group on October 30, 2012, Kılıçdaro˘glu stressed that the party’s greatest strength lies in the people and that they must respect their values and lifestyles. He also emphasized that their legitimacy comes solely from the people and that they must work with and for them. Kılıçdaro˘glu places a strong emphasis on addressing the needs of marginalized communities in his speeches. He has pledged to prioritize the fight against poverty and corruption, combat income inequality, and defend the rights of workers to collective bargaining, strike action, and association. Additionally, he has highlighted the need to address challenges facing the rural population, such as issues related to livestock and agriculture, to improve their quality of life. According to Kılıçdaro˘glu, poverty and unemployment represent the most pressing challenges facing society today. His key message has always been: “Politics is made with ideas, not with identity.” Baykal maintained the belief that safeguarding the Republic, Turkey, democracy, and national unity necessitates avoiding the transformation of politics into “identity politics.” However, he staunchly adhered to a specific definition of the Turkish nation and adamantly opposed any compromise regarding the recognition of Kurdish ethnicity and its potential political implications. On the other hand, Kılıçdaro˘glu shares Baykal’s rejection of identity politics and the granting of group rights, yet he embraces a more civic understanding of the nation. According to Kılıçdaro˘glu, promoting equal citizenship and fostering prosperity are crucial for the advancement of the nation. Essentially, he contends that democracy and its associated processes serve as mechanisms for “repairing” and “restoring faith” in both the nation and the state. In this perspective, Kılıçdaro˘glu views democracy as a means to address and

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

93

rectify existing societal and political challenges, ultimately reinforcing the bond between the citizens and the nation. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s conception of nation and nationalism is civic-based and inclusive. For him, the nation is about citizenship, and ties with the state, not about race or ethnicity. This understanding of nationalism, which rejects ethnic or religious-based politics, is pluralistic and respectful of all cultural identities as long as they do not seek to define politics on the basis of narrow identities. In addition, nationalism, with reference to the CHP program, is based on the equality of all citizens before the law, regardless of their ethnicity, language, or belief. Having such an understanding of nationalism, the CHP holds the view that the state should maintain an equal distance from all ethnic identities and create the assurance of cultural pluralism, and defends the principle of respect for individual and cultural rights. Kılıçdaro˘glu argues that “Lastly, the CHP envisages the unconditional protection of the unity and security of all citizens constituting the Turkish Republic, the independence and sovereignty of the country, and the integrity of Turkey with its lands and people. This kind of nationalism is an invitation to unity, not division; It is an understanding in which no one is marginalized and everyone is embraced.”27 . In other words, nationalism, according to him, is the moment of transcending all ethnic, religious, sectarian, and similar affiliations. Apart from this, Kemalist nationalism is the expression of treating everyone equally on the basis of citizenship and embracing everyone. It can be said that Kılıçdaro˘glu’s evaluations of the Kurdish issue acted from a perspective based on the understanding of nationalism he adopted. According to him, togetherness in pain and joy is the main argument for being a country, a homeland and being a citizen. It is essential to embrace anyone without marginalizing or separating anyone in terms of belief and identity.28 He rejects identity politics and argues that “Every citizen who does not pursue ethnic identity has a place above our heads. By saying, “No one should engage in politics on the basis of ethnic identity”.29

27 Kılıçdaro˘ glu’s statement at the Parliamentary Group of the CHP at the Turkish Parliament, 29 January 2013. 28 Kılıçdaro˘ glu’s statement at the Parliamentary Group of the CHP at the Turkish Parliament, 8 January 2013. 29 “Kimseyi Ikinci ˙ Sınıf Yurtta¸s Görmeyiz.” Milliyet, 25 Ocak 2013.

94

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Moving to the Right or Reaching to the Conservative Population? Under the leadership of Kılıçdaro˘glu, the CHP “opened” itself to the conservative sector of the population to expand its political frontiers and therefore come to power. Kılıçdaro˘glu noted that; In the past decade, our party has undergone a remarkable transformation, which holds great significance for us. We were frequently criticized as the party of the elite, one that disregards the concerns of the common people. However, we have successfully undergone a substantial change, positioning ourselves as a party representing ordinary citizens’ interests and worries. This transformation required a dedicated process and time to unfold. Fortunately, our provincial, district, and local leaders are fully aware of this change and recognize its broad acceptance within society. We are committed to further expanding our influence among the conservative segment of the population. While I am aware that some individuals criticize our party’s shift towards the right, it is crucial to acknowledge that we aim to engage with a broader range of people and effectively address their needs. By actively reaching out to the conservative sector, we strive to foster a more inclusive political landscape where diverse perspectives are valued and represented.30

In fact, Kılıçdaro˘glu made major inroads into the conservative sector of the population by developing culturally sensitive political discourse and also recruiting conservative politicians into the CHP. His inclusivity and engagement with different segments of society are not at the expense of our core principles and values of the CHP. He has remained steadfast in upholding CHP’s foundational beliefs while ensuring that the concerns of all citizens, regardless of their ideological inclinations, are acknowledged and addressed. By adopting a more inclusive approach, Kılıçdaro˘glu aspires to strengthen the bonds between our party and all sectors of the people, establishing a stronger connection that resonates with the diverse fabric of our society. Bülent Ku¸so˘glu, an influential figure within the political landscape of Turkey, has emerged as a key confidant and vice chairman of the CHP. In a groundbreaking move, Ku¸so˘glu became the first politician to 30 https://www.krttv.com.tr/kilicdaroglu-Erdo˘ gan-koltugunu-korumak-icin-arayisicinde.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

95

openly propose and ardently defend the presidential candidacy of Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu, the leader of the main opposition party. This momentous occasion took place during an interview on September 16, 2022.31 In our interview, he said “Kılıçdaro˘glu’s role as the leader of the CHP extends beyond representing the party alone; his aim is to embody the diverse range of perspectives and voices that make up the fabric of the Republic. With a comprehensive vision in mind, Kılıçdaro˘glu seeks to tackle the prevailing polarization that has been instrumental in keeping President Erdo˘gan in power. By recognizing that the polarization of Turkish society has served as a significant foundation for Erdo˘gan’s continued political influence, he tried to overcome these divisions and foster unity.”32 Ku¸so˘glu also insists that Kılıçdaro˘glu has been very successful to avoid the politics of identity and lifestyle-related issues by focusing on the pressing problems that impact the lives of everyday citizens. He says “by directing attention towards economic issues, Kılıçdaro˘glu aims to improve living standards, create opportunities for all, and bridge the wealth gap that fuels social divisions. His approach involves addressing the day-to-day challenges faced by the nation, particularly in the realms of economics, social issues, education, and justice.”33 Ku¸so˘glu’s unwavering support for Kılıçdaro˘glu stems from a deep belief in his leadership abilities and his profound understanding of how to foster reconciliation and compromise among diverse sectors of the population. Ku¸so˘glu argues that “as a seasoned politician with years of experience, Kılıçdaro˘glu possesses the necessary skills to navigate complex political landscapes and find common ground that can bring people together.”34 Ku¸so˘glu’s argument is rooted in the belief that Kılıçdaro˘glu’s presidency would be marked by a dedication to inclusivity, fairness, and the well-being of all citizens. Ku¸so˘glu also insisted that “by embracing the role of the Table of Six, Kılıçdaro˘glu would demonstrate his commitment to representing the interests and aspirations of every sector of society. This inclusive approach would not only bridge societal divides but also encourage dialogue and collaboration among various political factions,

31 Interview conducted with Bülent Ku¸so˘ glu 32 Interview conducted with Bülent Ku¸so˘ glu 33 Interview conducted with Bülent Ku¸so˘ glu 34 Interview conducted with Bülent Ku¸so˘ glu

by the authors on 12 April 2023. by the authors on 12 April 2023. by the authors on 12 April 2023. by the authors on 12 April 2023.

96

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

fostering a spirit of unity and cooperation that is crucial for the progress and stability of the nation.”35 During our interviews with a number of local and national politicians and activist they all stressed Kılıçdaro˘glu’s commitment to justice-related issues as another pillar of his strategy to overcome polarization in society. In fact, many people identify the collapse of the justice system as the number one problem of Turkey and they all want Kılıçdaro˘glu to ensure a fair and impartial judiciary system that upholds the rule of law, safeguards individual rights, and promotes accountability for all. By addressing systemic injustices and empowering the judiciary, Kılıçdaro˘glu aims to restore public trust and confidence in the institutions of the Republic. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s aspirations reach far beyond his role as the CHP leader. He envisions himself as a representative of the diverse tapestry of voices within the Republic, seeking to dismantle the polarization that has perpetuated President Erdo˘gan’s hold on power. By prioritizing everyday economic, social, educational, and justice-related issues, Kılıçdaro˘glu aims to forge a path toward unity, progress, and a more inclusive society for all Turkish citizens. The CHP made a strategic move by enlisting a group of influential center-right politicians to assist in expanding their political and electoral reach to include the conservative sector of the population. At a critical juncture in Turkey’s political landscape, when Erdo˘gan’s admin˙ istration was attempting to dismantle the Republic’s institutions, Ilhan Kesici emerged as a key figure who supported the CHP’s stance to ˙ defend the Republic and its institutions. Ilhan Kesici, born in 1948, is an accomplished politician who served as the Undersecretary of the State Planning Organization.36 He began his political career in 1995 when he was elected as the Bursa deputy of the Motherland Party. In 2007, Kesici joined the CHP and was elected as a deputy, a position he has held in Istanbul since then. Kesici’s decision to join the CHP was a significant move, as he brought with him a wealth of experience and a strong base of support from the center-right. His support was crucial for the CHP to 35 Interview conducted with Bülent Ku¸so˘ glu by the authors on 12 April 2023. 36 It is important to note that the State Planning Organization (SPO) held significant

authority and wielded considerable influence as the foremost decision-making body in economic matters. Working directly with the Prime Minister, the SPO’s director enjoyed more power than many ministers due to their pivotal role as the intellectual force behind the country’s economic and social development.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

97

reach out to the conservative sector of the population, which had traditionally been loyal to the AKP party. With Kesici on board, the CHP was able to tap into this base and expand its political and electoral frontiers. Moreover, Kesici’s support for the CHP’s stance to defend the Republic and its institutions was a crucial moment in Turkey’s political history. As Erdo˘gan’s administration threatened the country’s democratic institutions, Kesici’s decision to side with the CHP demonstrated a commitment to preserving the core values of the Republic. In doing so, he exemplified the importance of putting the country before political affiliations and demonstrated a dedication to the greater good. Ilhan Kesici, a key figure who embodies the conservative, nationalistic, and Kemalist elements of society, has been working with Kılıçdaro˘glu since 2010. Hailing from the nationalist youth movement, Kesici represents conservative Anatolian values and is dedicated to Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies that align with the West. Drawing on his experience as a former director of a State Planning Organization, Kesici possesses a deep understanding of the intricate social and political fabric that characterizes Turkish society. Kesici claims that “Turks, as a collective, exhibit a conservative inclination while harboring a simultaneous yearning for modernity.”37 In fact, one of the persistent challenges Turkish society has faced is the struggle to reconcile the rich tapestry of tradition with the aspirations of modernization. Interestingly, ordinary individuals seamlessly intermingle elements of modernity and tradition in their daily lives, often without engaging in explicit theorizing or introspection on these processes. According to Kesici, an insightful observer, the Turkish people can be defined by three key attributes.38 Firstly, there exists an innate desire to reside in a prominent nation with global ambitions. Collectively, there is a shared belief that Turkey should assume a position of great power on the global stage. Additionally, there is an unwavering aspiration to witness a technologically advanced Turkey. It is for this reason that nearly all center-right and conservative Islamic parties have prioritized industrialization as a key objective. Furthermore, “the Turkish people embrace their religious identity while upholding the principles of Kemalism. They hold Gazi Mustafa Kemal in high regard, considering him the visionary

37 Interview conducted with Ilhan Kesici by the authors on 30 March 2023. 38 Interview conducted with Ilhan Kesici by the authors on 30 March 2023.

98

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

and founding father of the Republic.”39 Kesici asserts that these values harmoniously converge to shape the political vision of Kılıçdaro˘glu. In our interview, Kesici said “Working with Kemal Bey is a great pleasure for me. He has successfully revitalized the CHP, making it more accessible to the Anatolian people, and his inclusive approach to centerright individuals has broadened our horizons. Thanks to his efforts, the CHP now embodies the vision of Gazi Mustafa Kemal and represents all of Turkey. The new CHP embraces Anatolian values, acknowledges religious diversity, opposes identity politics, and champions Turkey’s European aspirations.”40 When we asked him “why the new CHP is against or uncomfortable with the politics of identity?” In response, he stated that Turkey is a society that comprises various regional, religious, ethnic, and competing Sufi and other religious groups, including Sunnis, Alevis, Kurds, Bosnians, Albanians, Torbes, Circassians, and many others. Therefore, it is not possible for the party to solely represent a single identity group. As the founding party of the Republic, the CHP upholds the Republic’s modernizing vision, which is embedded in the party’s program. The party must represent the entire population, as what brings these diverse groups together is their shared citizenship and commitment to a democratic, secular, and economically strong Turkey. Although people may have different names, they all share the same last name, which is Turkey. Kılıçdaro˘glu embodies this new vision, and that is why he is a part of the CHP.41

When we questioned the prominence of identity politics in Turkey, particularly with regard to the Kurdish issue, Kesici acknowledged that it has been deepened and exploited by Erdo˘gan to polarize society. He argued that “politics in the country should be based on common concerns, a shared vision, and the expansion of public services for all citizens. In contrast, the politics of identity is destructive and divisive, as it focuses on the past and perpetuates biases, rather than paving the way for a brighter future.”42 He pointed out that Turkey’s history is 39 Interview conducted with Ilhan Kesici by 40 Interview conducted with Ilhan Kesici by 41 Interview conducted with Ilhan Kesici by 42 Interview conducted with Ilhan Kesici by

the authors on 30 March 2023. the authors on 30 March 2023. the authors on 30 March 2023. the authors on 30 March 2023.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

99

also held hostage to the politics of identity, where each group presents a biased, identity-based perspective on the past. He emphasized the need to move forward as a country while acknowledging and learning from past mistakes and accomplishments. Ultimately, he stressed that the country should prioritize inclusive policies and avoid divisive politics that may only hinder progress. Kesici is a member of the NATO Assembly and represents the CHP in major international organizations. He staunchly advocates for Turkey’s Western-oriented foreign policy and considers the “Copenhagen criteria” as a guiding principle for the new Turkey. He affirms that Kılıçdaro˘glu aims for a democratic, economically robust, and Western-leaning Turkey. Kesici also plays a crucial role in formulating the new CHP’s approach to appeal to the conservative sector of Turkish society. When asked about the Kurdish question and the party’s plans, he emphasized that “while the CHP recognizes and embraces diverse identities, it opposes any politics based on sub-national identities. This is also the clear position of Kılıçdaro˘glu.”43 According to him, Kurdish society holds a range of opinions, similar to every group in Turkey. The majority of them prioritize the present and future, not past grievances. He emphasized that “the CHP, as the institutional memory of the late Ottoman and early Republican period, opposes divisive policies and prioritizes citizenship ties and national unity. The Turkish nation is not defined by ethnicity but by a civic union that comprises diverse ethnic and religious communities.”44 In fact, Kesici echoes the ideas and position of Kılıçdaro˘glu that the politics of the CHP is to free Turkey from the destructive consequences of the politics of identity. He also insisted that the “New CHP” under the leadership of Kılıçdaro˘glu seeks to bring the state and nation together. When we asked his vision of the state, he said: To grasp the essence and purpose of the state, comprehension of the Ottoman Empire’s philosophy is imperative. At its inception, the Ottoman state recognized that in order to prosper and expand its territories, it must coexist with various ethnic, religious, and cultural communities. However, the Turks, who migrated from Central Asia to Anatolia, encountered civilizations that differed from their own. Consequently, they assimilated and 43 Interview conducted with Ilhan Kesici by the authors on 30 March 2023. 44 Interview conducted with Ilhan Kesici by the authors on 30 March 2023.

100

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

adapted to these diverse cultures. Thus, those who arrived in Anatolia also assimilated the customs and traditions of the Anatolian people. The fundamental principle was coexistence, upon which the Ottoman Empire was constructed, emphasizing the value of respecting other cultures. This imperial legacy has been instilled in the Republic of Turkey, and its society and government are a continuation of the Ottoman Empire.45

In fact, when the Turks encountered various civilizations, they were compelled to scrutinize, explore, and amalgamate them. The present-day Turkish state tradition is an outcome of this prolonged process. The roots of the Republic of Turkey can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire and its worldview. During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire made an effort to modernize and endure by assimilating Western institutions and cultural practices. It is undeniable that the Republic of Turkey adopted the concept of a nation-state, but it had to be mindful of the existing sociological landscape while doing so. As the Ottoman Empire witnessed the decline of its power and influence, it realized the importance of modernizing its infrastructure and systems. It endeavored to catch up with the advanced Western nations, which significantly impacted the Empire’s intellectual and cultural development. As a result, the Empire experienced a cultural awakening, and its worldview expanded to include new concepts, including secularism, democracy, and nationalism. Kesici believes that “the Republic of Turkey emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, but it inherited its predecessor’s worldview. At the same time, it also had to navigate a new world order, which required it to adapt to the global socio-political dynamics. Hence, the Republic of Turkey adopted the idea of a nationstate, which was popularized in Europe, but it had to mold it according to its cultural and social context.”46 According to Kesici, the Turkish state tradition is an intricate blend of diverse cultural and historical influences, with the fundamental worldview of the Ottoman Empire serving as its core. In order to navigate the global socio-political landscape, the Republic of Turkey had to undergo a process of adaptation while simultaneously remaining faithful to its cultural identity. As a consequence, the concept of a nation-state was embraced, and customized to suit the distinctive sociological framework of Turkey. 45 Interview conducted with Ilhan Kesici by the authors on 30 March 2023. 46 Interview conducted with Ilhan Kesici by the authors on 30 March 2023.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

101

This amalgamation of cultural and historical elements shaped the trajectory of Turkish statehood, forging a distinct path that diverged from conventional models. Recognizing the necessity to balance global integration with the preservation of cultural roots, the Republic of Turkey devised a nation-state concept that was uniquely tailored to its socio-political context. This adaptation allowed for the harmonization of modernity and tradition, enabling Turkey to carve out its place on the global stage while preserving its cultural identity. By acknowledging the Ottoman Empire’s historical legacy and drawing upon its insights, the Turkish state tradition evolved into a dynamic framework that encapsulates the essence of Turkey’s historical and cultural heritage. This nuanced approach to statecraft reflects the complexities of Turkey’s historical narrative and underscores the nation’s commitment to harmonizing its traditional values with the demands of a changing world. Kesici’s perspective highlights the intricate interplay between cultural heritage and the need to adapt to the evolving global landscape. It underscores the unique trajectory of the Turkish state tradition, wherein the Republic of Turkey successfully fuses its rich historical legacy with contemporary socio-political realities, culminating in a tailored nationstate concept that resonates with the Turkish sociological context.

˘ Kilicdaro ¸ glu’s Discourse of Amending (Helalles¸me) Kılıçdaro˘glu’s advocacy for a reckoning with the past is intricately connected to his aspiration to broaden the horizons of the CHP and appeal to the religious sector of the population. Simultaneously, it serves as a means to elucidate his vision of the “New CHP.” By emphasizing the need to confront historical issues and address past grievances, Kılıçdaro˘glu aims to create a more inclusive and diverse political platform that can resonate with individuals from religious backgrounds. His objective is to transcend traditional political boundaries and foster an atmosphere of understanding and acceptance, ensuring that the CHP is a party that represents the interests and aspirations of all segments of society. This call for reckoning with the past encompasses acknowledging historical events, promoting dialogue, and fostering a collective sense of healing and unity. Kılıçdaro˘glu recognizes that by confronting the legacy of the past, the CHP can build bridges with the religious sector, creating a space where individuals from diverse religious backgrounds feel welcomed

102

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

and represented. Furthermore, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s vision of the “New CHP” extends beyond religious inclusion. It encompasses a broader transformation that seeks to redefine the party’s values, policies, and approach to governance. This includes embracing progressive ideals, emphasizing social justice, advocating for equality, and promoting the principles of democracy and human rights. Through the notion of the “New CHP,” Kılıçdaro˘glu aims to position the party as a forward-thinking force in Turkish politics, one that is responsive to the changing needs and aspirations of the population. By expanding the frontiers of the CHP to encompass the religious sector and articulating his vision for a more inclusive and progressive party, Kılıçdaro˘glu seeks to forge a path that resonates with a broader base of support and ensures the CHP’s relevance and effectiveness in shaping the future of Turkey. Kılıçdaro˘glu always conscientiously avoided the polarizing politics of identity and stressed the role of the state in the improvement of living conditions and making sure no one is marginalized because of his or her identity. His main focus has always been to end the exclusion and marginalization, along with the “removal of poverty” from Anatolia.47 He is not a leader who seeks to polarize the population for political gains but rather seeks to reach out and expand his influence. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s discourse of reckoning with the past, commonly referred to as “helalle¸sme” (meaning reconciliation), represents a significant stride in acknowledging and understanding the collective pain experienced by various communities. It serves as a vital catalyst for fostering mutual recognition and forgiveness.48 In November 2021, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s new discourse of forgiveness and reconciliation aims to address some of the painful past events of the Republic. He identified the unhealed wounds of the past as barriers to building a new future and he called everyone to recognize their responsibilities and leave the tormented past behind. He called this process the time of helalle¸sme. His goal is to heal and repair Turkey’s past wrongs 47 “CHP Lideri Kılıçdaro˘ glu: ‘Hiçbir çocu˘gun yata˘ga aç girmemesi için bu organize kötülükle kavga edece˘giz.’” Politikyol, November 27, 2021. https://www.politikyol.com/ chp-liderikilicdaroglu-hicbir-cocugun-yataga-ac-girmemesi-icin-bu-organize-kotulukle-kav gaedecegiz/. 48 Kılıçdaro˘ glu. “CHP lideri Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu: ‘Helalle¸sme oy iste˘gi de˘gildir.’” Cumhuriyet, 14 August 2022; CHP—Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. “Ben ömrümde, ülkemizde nefreti ve sevgiyi gördüm. Artık sevgi kazansın istiyorum…” Youtube, November 13, 2021. https://youtu.be/5iyFG0faDUI.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

103

and overcome these wounds-based divisions. His discourse of helalle¸sme means recognition of past mistakes and starting the process of healing through reciprocal forgiveness and making amends. Kılıçdaro˘glu issues a video that listed the past painful events and asked the society to start a process of healing and reconciliation. He said: We know now that we can’t go anywhere with the scars of the past. Now is the time to say goodbye to those old scars. Whatever the cost, we must know how to take responsibility for the mistakes made in the past and ask each other for forgiveness in order to strengthen our social relations and heal our wounds. The party that I lead also caused deep wounds in the past through its policies. For a long time, I struggled to change the system that first created these wounds. Now it’s time to move outside and create a new political climate. I am going on a journey of asking for forgiveness and creating a culture of forgiveness to heal the wounds of the past. I will start my meetings with communities, individuals, and representatives of different lifestyles that we have hurt and frightened in the past. In my life, I have seen a lot of hate and love in this country. And love always got stronger. Now is the time to win this war for love. By embracing forgiveness and forgiveness, we must be able to ask for and give halal. Walking towards hope, peace, and joy together will only be possible by bandaging each other’s wounds.49

Kılıçdaro˘glu was very committed and sincere in his call for amending and mutual recognition of the suffering of other communities.50 He said “We can heal by facing our pain. Only in this way can we heal our wounds. If we no longer want to live in the past, if we want to look ahead, it is imperative that we close all open wounds in this country.”51 He listed those wounded communities, by arguing that;

49 https://www.politikyol.com/kilicdaroglunun-helallesme-cagrisinin-muhatabi-kim/. 50 Hatem Ete, “Helalle¸sme Ça˘ grısı,” December 1, 2021. https://www.perspektif.onl

ine/helallesme-cagrisi/. 51 https://www.politikyol.com/kilicdaroglunun-helallesme-cagrisinin-muhatabi-kim/.

104

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

We will address and heal the wounds caused by the events of February 28th, seeking reconciliation. We will strive to reconcile with our headscarved girls who were confined in persuasion rooms. We will also work towards reconciliation with the Roboski incident. The state will provide compensation to the affected individuals, and furthermore, we are committed to making amends. Our efforts extend to reaching out to the victims of the Sivas and Kahramanmara¸s massacres, seeking reconciliation with them as well.52

He enumerated a number of other groups who have historically suffered injustices as a result of governmental policies. Among these groups, he mentioned: were Diyarbakır prison inmates, Roma people who have been further marginalized with the recent gentrification process, minorities imposed with “wealth tax” (“varlık vergisi” in Turkish), victims of Sept. 6-7, 1955 pogrom, Turkey’s bright youth who migrated abroad, the family of killed ˙ Gezi Park protester Ali Ismail Korkmaz, family members of men killed in the Soma mining disaster, and exiled Kurdish singer Ahmet Kaya. We will make amends, my friends. When our children look at the past in the near future, they will say, ‘So many things happened, but they knew how to look ahead, well done to them.’53

Although Kılıçdaro˘glu’s statement brought the debate on dealing with past wrongs back to the public agenda, he failed to offer an acceptable solution how to heal the past wounds. For instance, beyond repentance, there was no argument for how to redress the past damages and make sure they would not be repeated. It is clear that the nation-building in Turkey involved massive deportations, massacres, oppression, torture, grab of property, trauma, and discrimination. He hardly mentioned the role of the state and how would state redress these past wounds. The victims must be compensated and the right to remember and mourning of persecuted groups must be recognized. In fact, his call for helalle¸sme does not heal the past wounds but rather seeks to cover up these historical injustices.

52 He said during his party’s parliamentary group meeting on November 16. 53 https://www.politikyol.com/kilicdaroglunun-helallesme-cagrisinin-muhatabi-kim/.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

105

Some scholars stressed the instrumental aspect of his call for reconciliation and reckoning. For instance, Hatem Ete said: “Kılıçdaro˘glu has presented the call for halal in a language and framework that transcends politics, but it is rooted in a pragmatic political calculation. His need for the support of conservative and Kurdish voters is crucial, not only for his own candidacy but also for the opposition’s objective of achieving a change in power. Therefore, Kılıçdaro˘glu cannot afford to risk losing the support of these crucial voting blocs, which underscores the importance of his call.”54 The call for amending and acknowledging past mistakes is not only a strategic political move but also a reflection of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s ethical values and principles. It reveals his commitment to accountability, honesty, and justice, which are essential components of a healthy and functional democracy. By publicly admitting past mistakes and taking steps to rectify them, Kılıçdaro˘glu is not only appealing to the moral conscience of the electorate but also setting a positive example for future leaders to follow. Moreover, this call serves a dual purpose by acknowledging and addressing the historical grievances of marginalized communities, including the Kurds. It underscores Kılıçdaro˘glu’s commitment to promoting inclusivity, pluralism, and diversity in society, which are essential for building a stronger and more united nation. Therefore, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s call for amending past mistakes is not just a political calculation but also a reflection of his ethical worldview and his vision for a more equitable and just society.

˘ Kilicdaro ¸ glu’s Understanding of the Kurdish Issue Given that the Kurds, despite their aspirations, have never been granted a homeland and that this issue has caused a great deal of violence in the ensuing years, the “Kurdish question” has occupied both the domestic and foreign policy of Turkey to varying degrees for over eight decades. Turkey has the largest Kurdish population (15% of the Turkish population is Kurdish) in the world. The Kurds of Turkey have demands ranging from full secession to federalism, and the recognition of individual rights as Turkish citizens within the framework of the process of Turkey’s entry

54 Ete, Hatem. “Helalle¸sme Ca˘ grısı.”

106

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

into the European Union (EU). Undoubtedly, the worst symptom of the Kurdish ethno-nationalism in contemporary history has been the terrorist activities led by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) against the Turkish state and moderate Kurds, and the Turkish armed forces’ equally violent backlash against Kurdish terrorists and innocent Kurdish civilians. Turkish soldiers have battled the PKK in the southeast since 1984, a conflict that has resulted in an estimated 39,000 fatalities. In addition to this human suffering, the PKK-led rebellion has defined the meaning of politics, redefined the boundaries between state and society, and empowered certain state institutions at the expense of others. It has also retarded the democratization process of Turkey. Furthermore, the conflict has increased Turkey’s defense spending at the expense of education and healthcare. In a way, Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies have been hostages to the Kurdish problem for the past 50 years. Among other things, the conflict has transformed the country’s demographic structure with large-scale population movements: Millions of Kurds willingly, as well as by force, moved away from their homes in southern Turkey to major cities in western Anatolia. Since the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, in 1999, the organization has shifted its strategies and, much to the chagrin of the Turkish military and the Kemalists communalized the Kurdish problem by using new-found opportunity spaces brought about by the EU’s Copenhagen criteria. These criteria require full implementation of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities. On the basis of the Copenhagen criteria, the EU asked Ankara to reform its legal system and provide minority rights for the Kurds. Today, Turkey is more polarized along ethnic lines than a decade ago, and the Kurdish problem has shifted from the military sphere to the social and political spheres. It is not the Turkish state that is confronting the Kurds any longer but Turks and Kurds confronting each other. Almost all parties in Turkey propose competing and conflicting solutions on how to cope with the Kurdish issue. The AKP of Erdo˘gan rather than addressing the problem preferred to use the Kurdish issue as a weapon against secularism in Turkey, identifying secularism as a cause of division between Turks and Kurds. In recent years, Erdo˘gan is using the Kurdish issue as a threat to national unity to mobilize the nationalist masses behind his rule. He moved from his favored solution––“Islam as cement”––to the Kurdish problem to the Kurds are the most significant threat to the national unity

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

107

of the Turkish nation. No leader in Turkey marginalized and excluded the Kurds as a threat to the nation and state as much as Erdo˘gan did. The Kurdish issue has been one of the Achilles’ heels of the CHP since it was the “party of the state” and led the process of “nation-building” by suppressing diverse ethnic identities.55 The CHP historically considered the Kurdish issue as the by-product of the underdevelopment of the region and also exploitation of the external forces to destabilize Turkey. To cope with the problem the CHP framed the Kurdish demands and challenges as a security issue and this securitization created deep wounds in the Kurdish society. During the leadership of Baykal, the CHP fully supported the oppressive policies of the military and refused to recognize the cultural rights of the Kurds. The Kurds in Turkey have put forward a set of three core demands. Firstly, they seek legal recognition of their ethnic identity as Kurds and the freedom to teach and utilize their Kurdish language. Secondly, they aspire for a level of autonomy in regions where they constitute the majority population. It’s worth noting that a portion of the Kurdish population also advocates for complete independence. Regarding these demands, Kılıçdaro˘glu, on the other hand, vehemently opposes making any concessions, as he fears that granting these demands could potentially lead to the division of the country. Instead, he presents a three-fold interconnected approach to address the Kurdish issue, encompassing democratization, the establishment of the rule of law, and economic development. Kılıçdaro˘glu firmly believes that the root cause of the problem lies within the country’s democratic deficit, the failure to uphold the rule of law, and the prevailing socio-economic backwardness. He views the Kurdish issue as a consequence of these factors, compounded by policies that have perpetuated oppression and marginalization. Expanding on Kılıçdaro˘glu’s proposed solutions, he suggests that a comprehensive democratization process should be undertaken, allowing for broader political participation and representation of all segments of society, including the Kurds. Additionally, he emphasizes the necessity of strengthening the rule of law to ensure equal rights and protections for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity. Lastly, he highlights the 55 Be¸sikçi, Ismail. ˙ Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası’nın programı (1931) ve Kürt sorunu. Vol. 131. Belge yayınları, 1991. Yayman, Hüseyin. “Sark ¸ meselesinden demokratik açılıma: Türkiye’nin Kürt sorunu hafızası.” Seta, 2011.

108

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

significance of robust economic development initiatives aimed at reducing socio-economic disparities and addressing the grievances arising from marginalization. By pursuing these interlinked strategies, Kılıçdaro˘glu envisions a path toward resolving the Kurdish problem in Turkey, fostering inclusivity, and establishing a more equitable and harmonious society.56 Kılıçdaro˘glu emphasizes the process and a model in which to address the problem. He first wants to address the question of the interlocutor of the debate. He stressed the three layers of the framework: civil society associations; experts who study the problem; and the parliament has to make the legal changes in light of the information they will receive from civil society and experts.57 Kılıçdaro˘glu does not want a single party or association to be the only interlocutor. In fact, the HDP (People’s Democratic Party; Halkin Demokrasi Partisi), Kurdish ethnic party which promotes Kurdish rights, is not very pleased with this proposal since they see themselves as the sole “interlocutor.” HDP Co-Chair Mithat Sancar said, “Of course, the HDP is the interlocutor and the platform is the parliament.” Kılıçdaro˘glu always indicated, “The parliament is the address of the solution.”58 Erdo˘gan, who invested more time how to manipulate the problem rather than solve it, preferred to deal with Abdullah Ocalan, the leaders of the Kurdish political movement who is in prison in Turkey, and totally ignore the HDP. Yet, Kılıçdaro˘glu, unlike Erdo˘gan rejects the criminalization of the HDP. Kılıçdaro˘glu aims to tackle the Kurdish issue through parliamentary means, advocating for a series of legal reforms. Importantly, he emphasizes the significance of avoiding the marginalization of any social or political group, including the HDP. Kılıçdaro˘glu perceives the HDP as a legitimate and one of the critical concerned partners in resolving the Kurdish question. However, a significant challenge lies in the fact that

56 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu on 17 April 2023. 57 After the process of open negotiation between the government and the outlawed

Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) to resolve the Kurdish problem in 2012 and ended after the killing of the two policemen in Urfa in June 2015. During this period, the AKP establish The Wise People Commission, which consisted of a group of 63 prominent figures to explain the government’s new policy and also collect information from the local groups what to do and how to address the problem. 58 https://www.duvarenglish.com/kurdish-question-and-the-interlocutor-debate-art icle-59022.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

109

the HDP is not an autonomous political entity but rather viewed as being reliant on directives from the PKK, an organization designated as a terrorist group within Turkey. When he was asked about his policy on the Kurdish issue, he said: The HDP, which received between 6 to 6.5 million votes, should not be unjustly accused of terrorism, as such claims are inherently undemocratic. However, it is reasonable to expect all political parties to distance themselves from any association with terrorism and unambiguously condemn it. It is unjust to disregard the HDP in parliament or label their voters as terrorists. Furthermore, it should be recognized that the HDP has support outside of the Kurdish community, with some voters supporting them with the aim of exceeding the 10 percent electoral threshold. As such, the HDP should be acknowledged as a political party that represents all of Turkey and has the right to express its views on legislative changes. In politics, double standards must be avoided, and the truth should always guide decision-making processes. It is crucial to prioritize finding a peaceful solution to Turkey’s terrorism problem instead of using it as a means to accuse others. Focusing on constructive solutions that bring about lasting peace and stability should be the core of any political strategy.59

Indeed, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s conciliatory approach and Erdo˘gan’s antiKurdish policies played a significant role in the success of the CHP in winning major cities during the local elections, with support from the HDP.60 In the 2019 local elections, the ruling AKP of Erdo˘gan formed a close alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party of Bahceli, which further compelled the pro-Kurdish HDP to collaborate with the CHP.61 Since 2015, President Erdo˘gan has adopted a much more aggressive stance and has attempted to mobilize public support by arguing that Kurdish nationalism is a threat to the state itself. He has utilized all available state resources to manufacture false national security threats, and has initiated military incursions into Syria to bolster his support among

59 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu on 17 April 2023. 60 “Kürt sorununu Kemal karde¸siniz çözecek!” HaberTurk, May 31, 2011, available at

http://www.haberturk.com/secim/haber/635600-kilicdaroglu-diyarbakirda. 61 Tosun, Tanju. “CHP, Kürt Sorunu ve Çözüm Süreci.” In Al-Jazeera Turk, 29 October 2014. http://bit.ly/1y0Q3jE.

110

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

nationalist and conservative voters. To avoid being accused of being antistate, Kılıçdaro˘glu had no choice but to support the military during these operations. For example, in 2016, the CHP deputies voted alongside the AKP and the MHP to lift parliamentary immunities of Kurdish politicians. Erdo˘gan has framed almost all challenges as national security issues and has securitized his opponents in order to eliminate them and silence the opposition party. He has consistently used national security arguments to restrict the space for opposition parties. In recent years, he has begun to view himself as the sole owner of the state. The real threat to the future of Turkey is not the Kurds or Turkey’s neighbors, but Erdo˘gan himself. He has dismantled state institutions and has established a new form of revivalist Islamism that is devoid of any ethical dimension.

The Chief of the Anatolian Orchestra: The Table of Six Kılıçdaro˘glu gradually moved away from Baykal’s rigid secularist position and tried to recognize the diversity of Turkey, along with social and economic problems. He formed the Nation Alliance with IYI Party of Meral Ak¸sener and the religious Saadet Party of Temel Karamollao˘glu to transform Turkey’s political landscape in the 2018 general elections.62 In 2019, he reached out to Kurdish political groups and managed to win the municipal elections in major cities.63 He carefully avoided identity politics and adamantly focused on the real economic and social issues of the middle and lower-middle classes.64 His strategy was successful to remove

62 Demonization of the CHP and IYIP’s “Nation Alliance” was carried out by usage of wordplays on word millet such as “alliance of abasement” [zillet ittifakı] and “alliance of malady” [illet ittifakı]. Another venue of demonization was association of opposition mayoral candidates with terrorist organizations. Erdo˘gan also blamed Kılıçdaro˘glu with Islamophobia and for being “together with terrorists”. 63 Yavuz Yılmaz, Hakan. “When local becomes general: Turkey’s 31 March 2019 elections and its implications for dynamics of polarization and sustainability of competitive authoritarianism.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 23, no. 4 (2021): 622–642. 64 Examples include the copying of CHP’s retirement pension plan (on Kılıçdaro˘ glu’s ˙ Maas”. proposal see: “CHP’den emekliye iki maa¸s”; “Kılıçdaro˘glu, Emeklilere Yılda Iki On AKP policy declaration see: “Son dakika: Ba¸sbakan Yıldırım’dan” and the acquisition of onions and potatoes from producers in need, and distribution to the poor. See CHP— Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, “Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu, Aksaray’da”; CHP—Cumhuriyet Halk

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

111

the politics of identity becoming the dominant issue of Turkish politics.65 Kılıçdaro˘glu gradually included more parties in the Nation Alliance. It included Ali Babacan’s Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA) and Ahmet Davuto˘glu’s Future Party (Gelecek) under a separate communicative body called “Table of the Six” (Altılı Masa).66 He presents the Table of Six as the “Table of Prophet Abraham” (Halil Ibrahim Sofrasi) where no one left hungry and what they have will be distributed to those who are in need. By the Table of Abraham, he means the following: The emphasis on differences has transformed into weapons that divide our society. The social conflict has been fueled by identities, leading people to align with different groups. As the Nation Alliance, we have embarked on a mission to break this polarization, rescue our country from identity politics, and establish a political culture rooted in values. As leaders, we gather around the Table of Abraham, inviting you to join us in the pursuit of justice, equality, the rule of law, freedom, and fair distribution. The Table of Abraham we have set up for our nation represents peace, order, and continuity. It symbolizes unity, solidarity, shared resources, and the ongoing journey of life. This table embodies equality and equity, offering a place for everyone, where respect and dignity are valued. There is no display of power or prestige at this table, in stark contrast to those who engage in corrupt and unjust practices. Corruption, extravagance, inequality, and injustice find no place here. This table is dedicated to upholding rights, ensuring that everyone receives their fair share. It is a table of friendship, where our togetherness flourishes. The blessings of this table extend to our entire country. The values cultivated at this table give rise to a meaningful and purposeful life. These seeds will sprout, grow into saplings, and eventually bloom, leading us to the most beautiful of springs together.

˙ Partisi, “CHP Grup Toplantısı”; Sözcü Istanbul, “Cumhurba¸skanı Erdo˘gan’ın talimatıyla ˙ ˙ Tarım ve Orman Müdürlü˘gü, “Ihtiyaç Sahibi Ailelerimize Ücretsiz”. alınan”; Istanbul Il 65 Ta¸skın, Burcu. “The 2019 provincial elections in Turkey: AKP’s struggle to retain power vis-a-vis a revitalized CHP.” Regional & Federal Studies 31, no. 3 (2021): 461– 474. 66 Davuto˘ glu, Ahmet. “Bir Toplum Sözle¸smesi Çabası Olarak Altılı Masanın Tarihi ve Dü¸sünsel Arkaplanı.” https://www.politikyol.com/bir-toplum-sozlesmesi-cabasi-olarak-alt ili-masanin-tarihi-ve-dusunsel-arkaplani/.

112

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

In this remarkable nation, peace will replace tension, understanding will replace conflict, and brotherhood will replace enmity. Our culture of coexistence will triumph over divisive politics that exploit religious, ethnic, and sectarian differences for conflict.67

What significance does the Table of Abraham hold in the current political landscape of Turkey? Kılıçdaro˘glu represents a beacon of hope, aiming to unite the nation by acknowledging diversity and rebuilding the state based on principles of justice. He instills hope in marginalized sectors of the population, offering them the prospect of reaching the highest office in the country. While “the Table of Abraham” has gained prominence in recent years as a symbol of interfaith dialogue and understanding, Kılıçdaro˘glu adapts it to the Turkish context, using it as a means to bring together diverse groups and identities under a common language grounded in shared values and principles. According to Kılıçdaro˘glu, these values encompass fundamental ideals such as compassion, mercy, justice, love, equality, and the spirit of sharing. Furthermore, “the Table of Abraham” emphasizes the notion that people from all ideologies and lifestyles have a collective responsibility to collaborate in promoting peace and justice worldwide. This entails not only fostering dialogue and building relationships across ethnic, religious, and ideological boundaries but also taking concrete actions to address issues like social and economic inequality, environmental degradation, and other pressing national and regional challenges. From a theological perspective, the Table of Abraham finds its roots in the belief that every individual is created in the image of God, possessing inherent dignity and worth. This belief resonates across various religious traditions and provides a foundation for a universal language that fosters understanding and cooperation among different faiths. Simultaneously, the Table of Abraham acknowledges the significant differences present within diverse communities, emphasizing the importance of respecting and honoring these distinctions. Rather than attempting to diminish or dilute ideological differences, Kılıçdaro˘glu encourages individuals to celebrate and embrace their unique identities while collaborating toward shared objectives.

67 https://www.dha.com.tr/yerel-haberler/istanbul/kilicdaroglu-liderler-olarak-halil-ibr ahim-sofr-2237482.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

113

In essence, the “Table of Abraham” symbolizes a potent politicotheological concept that can serve as a framework for facilitating dialogue and understanding, ultimately forging a collective vision for Turkey and its ideals. By uniting individuals from diverse political parties and sectors of society, with a shared commitment to common values and principles, Kılıçdaro˘glu endeavors to promote peace, justice, and a more harmonious world for all.68 According to Muhammed Cakmak, a religious studies professor and advisor to the CHP, “Kılıçdaro˘glu embodies the yearning for justice and national unity. In contrast, Erdo˘gan chooses to engage in politics by exploiting the wounds of the country, whereas Kılıçdaro˘glu aims to heal society and emphasize shared values rather than differences. He represents a vision of restoration, harmony, and recognizing our common humanity.”69 In fact, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s approach, rooted in the understanding of the Table of Abraham, rejects the practice of “otherizing” or marginalizing any group based on their identities or beliefs. Moreover, Kılıçdaro˘glu draws inspiration from “the profound humanism that has deep roots in Anatolia, as expressed by influential figures such as Yunus Emre, Mevlana Rumi, and Haci Bektasi Veli. These luminaries embody values of inclusivity, compassion, and spiritual enlightenment, which Kılıçdaro˘glu seeks to embody in his political endeavors. By embracing this rich tradition, he endeavors to foster a society that transcends divisions and promotes a sense of shared belonging.”70 Kılıçdaro˘glu’s approach represents a departure from the politics of division and animosity, aiming to build bridges and nurture unity. By emphasizing our shared humanity and drawing from the wisdom of Anatolian humanism, he seeks to create an inclusive and harmonious society that celebrates diversity while fostering a sense of belonging and togetherness.

68 Kılıçdaro˘ glu, Kemal. “Kılıçdaro˘glu yazdı: Alçakgönüllü bir uygarlı˘gın in¸sasına ça˘grı.” Cumhuriyet, April 22, 2020. https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/kilicdaroglu-yazdia lcakgonullu-bir-uygarligin-insasina-cagri-1734359. 69 Interview with Muhammed Cakmak on March 9, 2023. 70 Interview with Muhammed Cakmak on March 9, 2023.

114

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

The Table of Governance and the Kitchen Table: A Collaborative Alliance Your dreams are going to become my goals.71

Over the last two decades, Turkey has transformed into a prime example of a “competitive authoritarian” state. Initially viewed in the West as a practical economic reformer, Erdo˘gan’s leadership has become increasingly authoritative, with his inner circle gaining greater influence over Turkish institutions. Erdo˘gan has incarcerated his adversaries, and many establishments have been stripped of their power. Although there are electoral processes in place, the playing field is unequal, and the opposition faces significant obstacles. Nevertheless, despite the challenges, the opposition is making a concerted effort to unite under the “Table of Six” movement, which aims to restore civility and democracy and also reverse the concentration of power within Erdo˘gan’s circle. With the upcoming elections, the opposition’s failure to rally behind a single leader means that the vote will likely be fiercely contested, and the results may be disputed. Under Erdo˘gan’s leadership, the AKP has significantly weakened state capacity, leading to the dismissal or imprisonment of thousands of civil servants deemed insufficiently loyal to the ruling government, particularly after a failed coup attempt in 2016. Kılıçdaro˘glu, as the architect of the Nation Alliance, commonly called the Table of Six, is the only hope to rescue Turkey from this ongoing destruction. The two primary alliances leading up to the elections are the People’s Alliance, which is led by Erdo˘gan, and the Nation Alliance, which represents a significant portion of the opposition and is led by Kılıçdaro˘glu. However, it is worth noting that both alliances have leaders representing different religious and nationalist factions, which challenges the notion that the ruling party is the sole representative of nationalist and religious groups. During the 20-year reign of Erdo˘gan, the beliefs and attitudes of Islamic and nationalist actors have evolved. In fact, there is slow but very effective Turkification (nationalization) of Islamic movements took place. Yet, a large number of Islamists and nationalists also took a very critical attitude toward Erdo˘gan’s instrumentalization of Islam and nationalism to cover up his corrupt rule and authoritarian governance. Erdo˘gan lost 71 Kılıçdaro˘ glu told in his public rally in Nigde.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

115

his claim of being a “Black Turk” or being the victim of the system. The public sees how the victim has become the worst victimizer of modern Turkish history. The Nation Alliance has the potential to put an end to deep-seated social, ethnic, and religious divisive polarizations that stem from the sociological faultiness of Turkey. Indeed, Erdo˘gan exploited and manipulated these divisions to keep his crony system in power. Kılıçdaro˘glu accepted each sector as they define itself but tried to offer a new set of principles on how these diverse voices can coexist and how they can rebuild the rule of law and restore the legitimacy of the state power. By bringing together all of these diverse voices, the Alliance presents a new political paradigm that transcends the politics of identity, the state–society conflict, and especially secular-Muslim tensions. The Table of Six, which prioritizes social peace, the rule of law, and respect for human dignity, has garnered significant public respect, suggesting that the political climate has shifted from polarization to reconciliation. The Table of Six helped to replace hostile and confrontational politics with a new understanding of respect, compromise, and listening to each other. In fact, Kılıçdaro˘glu offered a new solution how to come together and discuss our problems. He reacted to the deep societal reacted yearning for social peace and reconciliation. One of the key reasons why he succeeded to construct the Table of Six is his determination to transcend the politics of identity and not to get bogged down in the identity issues of the segment of the population but rather develop a unifying language for the entire society. As Turkey is celebrating its 100’s anniversary of establishment, Kılıçdaro˘glu offered a new road map for how to complete the unfished project of Turkish modernization. The emergence of the Table of Six as a political coalition is the most important development at the beginning of the second century of the Republic. This coalition is not only formed to remove Erdo˘gan from power but also presents a new roadmap for Turkey on how to address its problems by expanding the political sphere and providing a shared set of principles on how to cope with public issues. Moreover, Kılıçdaro˘glu rather than putting emphasis on “I” or “me,” always stresses “We” and “us together” in order to enhance the sense of “public, society, and participatory politics.” From the perspective of Kılıçdaro˘glu, the Table of Six represents a coalition of forces that brings almost all diverse sectors of the population together. Decisions are reached after a long discussion and debate among

116

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

the leaders. As a result of these discussions and persuasion, they reach a consensus on what should be the frame of their policy on a number of events. The most debate took place about the future constitution that seeks to bring the parliamentary system back. In fact, the Table of Six functions as a mini parliament or an assembly to set the foundational rules of the parliamentary system and enhance the parliament’s power. It becomes a model of and for the future parliamentary system to show how the parliament should act. In other words, the Table of Six also seeks to show what the parliament should become. Kılıçdaro˘glu became the nominee for the presidency after these ongoing deliberations among the six leaders. Thus, his political discourse and rhetoric are cautious and reflect the consensus and shared positions of the six leaders. When announcing his candidacy for the presidency, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s declaration of “I am not the candidate, the candidate is all of us” was a powerful example. Moreover, he made this declaration together with other members of the Table of Six. He made the declaration at the headquarters of the Felicity Party since the last meeting took place at the Felicity Party. By addressing his candidacy as a team and identifying other party leaders as vice president, Kılıçdaro˘glu seeks to overcome Erdo˘gan’s game of “divide and rule” and has shattered the image of a divided Turkey. Rather than stressing each identity-based community and mobilizing one against the other for a vote, he stresses the shared goals, dreams, and a socio-political context in which each individual can realize their potential. Since 2019, Kılıçdaro˘glu has been working diligently to expand the boundaries of the public sphere and recognize each voice as long as they seek to create a rational public sphere to redefine the collective goods and determine how they should be distributed. This new public sphere’s crucial goals are inclusivity, equity, and shared moral language. In contrast to the populist movements of the twenty-first century, which often promote a monolithic “one-people” ideal and tend to mobilize around an authoritarian leader who presents himself as the “father” of the people, Kılıçdaro˘glu presents an alternative understanding of society consists of diversity and values every group on the basis of the rationality of their argument to promote and advance the shared public goods. In fact, Kılıçdaro˘glu presents a new vision to challenge the destructive forces of populist nationalism by stressing diversity and inclusivity as the defining features of society. His politics and vision constitute an antidote to Erdo˘gan’s dictatorial politics and populist (Islamo-Turkish) nationalism.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

117

As the architect of the Table of Six, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s leadership style, characterized as unifying, listening, inclusive, and respectful seek to change the conventional understanding of leadership. His leadership role at the Table of Six has been accepted by diverse sectors of the population. The Table of Six needs further empirical and theoretical investigation in terms of its deliberations, its attempts to redefine the public sphere, state– society relations, the role of religion in society, and especially the meaning of politics. Kılıçdaro˘glu addressed the nation always from his kitchen since the public TV and Erdo˘gan-dominated media refused to provide him access to the mainstream media, he preferred to get his message across the society through YouTube short videos. He usually addressed the nation from his kitchen. Why his kitchen which was left over from the early 1970s and incredibly humble kitchen. The reason he preferred the kitchen because of two reasons: first the worsening conditions of the economy directly felt in the kitchen. The people could not buy their basic food such as onion, bread, and meat and the economic fire was in the kitchen first. Second, the kitchen was the place of women and an informal site where most of the family and political debate take place over the kitchen table. Moreover, as a man he enters the kitchen to identify the most important problem of the country: the dire economic situation that the people cannot buy their basic grocery needs. He communicates with the public beyond the patriarchal power norms and the masculine displays of strength often employed by political leaders. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s approach to populism (halkçılık) within the CHP is distinct from the traditional top-down and homogenized notion of people in which the state seeks to transform diverse groups to become a unified nation. He realizes the power of the state to guide and create an environment for diverse groups to form a rational and shared moral and political language on how to govern and distribute public goods such as education, healthcare, transportation, and justice. Rather, he implements populism by connecting with the people’s lives, problems, and aspirations through observation and empathy. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s outreach to individuals with different lifestyles and beliefs promotes pluralism and avoids identity politics. This grassroots approach has allowed the CHP to become closer to society, evident in the various micro-political actions that the party has taken, such as the justice march, calls for reckoning with the past mistakes, nominating mayors who could work with the people and mobilizing its municipalities to help the earthquake zone. Despite the attempts

118

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

by Erdo˘gan and his associates to undermine or disregard such endeavors, Kılıçdaro˘glu is introducing a fresh perspective on politics, administration, and leadership, outlining his vision for Turkey’s governance in the coming century. His emphasis on confronting previous errors is a crucial move toward scrutinizing Turkey’s past blunders, not for retribution, but to learn from them and elevate the nation to a higher standard. The dynamics of the Table of Six and his successful attempt to enter the debate through the kitchen table bring a new paradigmatic understanding of politics that transgresses the public and private, formal and informal, and ultimately seeks to converge and complement the Table of Six and the kitchen table. The Table of Six successfully demonstrates the possibility of an open public debate for common concerns and recognizes a participatory and pluralistic society. As a result, the Table has set the agenda, rallied society around this agenda, and generated hope for change in society. In fact, the Table of Six destroyed the wall of fear Erdo˘gan created through his authoritarian machine and generated hope for a new Turkey that is based on the rule of law and respect for human dignity.

˘ The Post-2019 CHP of Kilicdaro ¸ glu The CHP has undergone significant changes and ideological shifts over the course of several decades, especially after the 2019 local elections. At present, it can be argued that the party is primarily comprised of two main factions with distinct political orientations.72 The first faction, referred to as the neo-nationalist (ulusalcı group), is characterized by its skepticism toward the European Union and its anti-American. This faction is strictly secularist and does not support any accommodation with the Kurdish political movement. The second faction, which is currently represented by the party’s leadership, is the larger group of social democrats with a commitment to Turkey’s European orientation. They defend the rule of law, and a degree of political liberalization as long as it does not endanger the founding philosophy of the Republic, and they support the idea of a social market economy. In fact, the second group represents the new synthesis between liberalism and Kemalism and seeks to redefine

72 Alaranta, Toni. “Turkey’s Republican People’s Party and the EU.” FIFA Working Paper, December 2019. https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/turkeys-republican-peoplesparty-and-the-eu.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

119

Kemalism within the context of Turkey’s desire to join the EU.73 They also stress equal opportunities, along with individual liberties. Despite the differences between the two factions, the CHP as a whole is a prodemocracy party that aims to promote human rights, the rule of law, and social justice in Turkey. The party seeks to establish a pluralistic society where diverse perspectives and opinions are respected and accommodated. Overall, the CHP’s internal ideological competition and transformation reflect the dynamic nature of Turkish politics, as well as the challenges and opportunities that come with it. Under the leadership of Kılıçdaro˘glu, the CHP has embarked on a concerted effort to update and modernize its core identity based on the dominant social democratic worldview in Europe. The party has attempted to create a new conceptual groundwork for a workable synthesis, with the goal of broadening its appeal and increasing its electoral support. In the 2019 local elections, the CHP made significant gains, winning several key mayoral races and capturing control of major cities such as Istanbul and Ankara. This success has been attributed in part to the party’s efforts to redefine its identity and messaging to better align with the values and aspirations of the Turkish electorate. The CHP’s 2018 election manifesto signifies a notable shift in perspective, showcasing a progressive reevaluation of the long-standing Kemalist principles that have underpinned the party’s ideology. In this new approach, the concept of republicanism is reframed as a steadfast dedication to human rights and the principles of a pluralistic liberal democracy. Atatürk’s nationalism is now understood as an embrace of cultural diversity while upholding the values of equal citizenship. The once-prominent tenet of statism is presented as a symbol of social justice and progress, rather than a central pillar of Kemalist ideology. Similarly, secularism is redefined as a principle that safeguards the rights and freedoms of individuals with diverse beliefs and lifestyles. Populism, emphasizing national unity and cohesion, is seen as a means to foster humanism and solidarity among citizens. Furthermore, revolutionism, traditionally associated with radical change, is aligned with the ideals of the Enlightenment and democratic revolution.

73 Gülmez, Seçkin Bari¸s. “The EU policy of the Republican People’s Party: An inquiry on the opposition party and euro-skepticism in Turkey.” Turkish Studies 9, no. 3 (2008): 423–436.

120

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

These reinterpreted principles collectively form the foundation of the CHP’s strategic narrative, positioning the party as a champion of universal social democratic principles in the twenty-first century and the torchbearer of the Anatolian Enlightenment. By reframing its core ideology in this manner, the CHP aspires to broaden its appeal to a wider spectrum of voters and establish itself as a credible alternative to the ruling AKP. In summary, the CHP’s endeavors to revise and modernize its core identity reflect a broader trend in Turkish politics toward increased openness and pluralism. By embracing social democratic values and reinterpreting its traditional Kemalist principles, the party aims to position itself as a progressive force for change in Turkey and a beacon of hope for those seeking a more democratic and inclusive future.

Conclusion Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu has dedicated almost his entire professional career to civil service, making him a unique political leader in Turkey who possesses extensive experience in bureaucracy and a deep understanding of the functioning of the state. Unlike many of his contemporaries in politics, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s experience in the civil service has given him a nuanced understanding of the meaning and role of the state in Turkish society. As a member of the Khorasan Turkmen tribe, Kılıçdaro˘glu also brings a unique perspective on the role of ethnicity and religion in Turkish society. His background as a member of the Bekta¸si–Alevi faith has given him an insight into the complexities of religious diversity in Turkey and the challenges faced in building a unified nation-state. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s experiences and insights into the workings of the state and the challenges facing Turkey are invaluable assets for a political leader. His experience in the civil service has given him an understanding of the intricate workings of government and the importance of public service. This has also helped him develop a deeper appreciation for the importance of maintaining the rule of law, protecting human rights, and promoting social justice. As a leader of the CHP, Kılıçdaro˘glu has been an outspoken advocate for democracy and human rights in Turkey. His leadership has focused on promoting transparency, accountability, and good governance while advocating for the protection of individual freedoms and the rule of law. Kılıçdaro˘glu has also been a vocal critic of the current government’s policies, particularly with regard to its treatment of minority groups and its handling of the ongoing conflict in Syria.

4

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S POLITICAL WORLDVIEW

121

Overall, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s background and experience make him a unique political leader in Turkey who possesses an understanding of the intricacies of the state and the challenges facing the country. His leadership has been crucial in advocating for democratic values, social justice, and human rights while providing a strong voice for the marginalized and the oppressed in Turkish society.

CHAPTER 5

Kılıçdaro˘glu’s Foreign Policy

Abstract The fifth chapter will examine the framework of the foreign policy of the CHP by comparing and contrasting his foreign policy vision vis-à-vis Erdo˘gan. Four areas are relevant to the discussion, for comparing Kılıçdaro˘glu’s positions with those of Erdo˘gan: Turkish relations with the Western powers, especially with the European Union, Turkey’s relations with Russia; Turkey’s relations with the Turkic world and the Eurasian diaspora and its position as a regional power, and Turkey’s relations with Middle East countries. Keywords NATO · The European Union · Russia–Turkey relations · Turkey–Ukrainian Relations · The Copenhagen Criteria · Turkey–Syrian Relations · The Syrian Refugees · The Cyprus Problem · Turkey–Azerbaijani relations

This chapter aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the key principles underlying Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu’s foreign policy. As the leader of the CHP, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s foreign policy approach plays a crucial role in shaping the party’s stance on international affairs. By examining Kılıçdaro˘glu’s public statements, speeches, and policy proposals, this paper identifies and explores the fundamental principles that guide his foreign policy © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. H. Yavuz and A. E. Öztürk, Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu and the New Republican People’s Party in Turkey, Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36766-3_5

123

124

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

vision. The analysis sheds light on Kılıçdaro˘glu’s perspectives on issues such as Turkey’s relations with the West, neighboring countries, global organizations, and regional conflicts. Additionally, the paper evaluates the potential implications of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s foreign policy principles for Turkey’s international standing and the country’s broader engagement with the international community.

˘ The Tenants of KiliÇdaroglu’s Foreign Policy Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu’s foreign policy is grounded in four core principles, each designed to elevate Turkey’s position on the global stage. The first principle centers around bolstering security alliances with Western powers, with a particular emphasis on fostering a more constructive role within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This entails deepening collaboration, aligning Turkey’s policies with Western norms and values, and actively contributing to collective security endeavors. In order to enhance Turkey’s standing within NATO, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s foreign policy emphasizes forging stronger partnerships and fostering closer ties with member states. Recognizing the importance of multilateralism, he advocates for active participation in NATO initiatives and joint military exercises, reinforcing Turkey’s commitment to the alliance’s shared goals of collective defense and regional stability. By aligning with Western powers, Kılıçdaro˘glu aims to strengthen Turkey’s security cooperation and leverage the benefits of a closer relationship with NATO member states. Furthermore, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s foreign policy also prioritizes the advancement of Turkey’s diplomatic and economic relations with Western nations. By actively engaging in dialogue and diplomacy, he seeks to build bridges and cultivate stronger ties with Western partners, fostering mutual understanding and cooperation in various areas, including trade, investment, technology, and cultural exchange. This approach aims to position Turkey as a reliable and valuable partner in the international arena, enhancing its influence and economic opportunities. In addition to security and diplomatic dimensions, Kılıçdaro˘glu recognizes the importance of aligning Turkey’s foreign policy with Western norms and values. This entails prioritizing human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, and actively working toward their promotion both domestically and internationally. By demonstrating a commitment to these fundamental principles, Kılıçdaro˘glu aims to reinforce Turkey’s reputation as a responsible and progressive actor in the global community.

5

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S FOREIGN POLICY

125

Second, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s foreign policy agenda places significant emphasis on revitalizing Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership process. This entails reinvigorating negotiations, addressing the necessary reforms, and demonstrating a genuine commitment to European integration. By actively pursuing EU membership, Kılıçdaro˘glu aims to forge closer economic, political, and cultural ties with the European Union. He recognizes the potential benefits of aligning Turkey’s policies with EU standards, promoting economic growth, and enhancing cooperation in various sectors, such as trade, energy, and technology. Third, Kılıçdaro˘glu advocates for a non-interference policy in the domestic affairs of neighboring countries, particularly within the Middle East. His approach emphasizes respecting the sovereignty and independence of neighboring nations, allowing them to determine their own paths without external interference. By adopting a non-interventionist stance, Turkey aims to foster peaceful and stable relations with its regional neighbors, promoting mutual understanding and cooperation. Kılıçdaro˘glu recognizes the importance of dialogue and diplomatic channels to resolve conflicts and address regional challenges, as opposed to pursuing confrontational approaches. Finally, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s foreign policy framework is rooted in a commitment to adhere to international norms and principles. He emphasizes the significance of diplomacy as the preferred means of conflict resolution, advocating for dialogue and negotiation to address disputes and promote peaceful solutions. By upholding international norms, Turkey under Kılıçdaro˘glu’s leadership seeks to enhance its reputation as a responsible global actor, actively engaging in international institutions and organizations to contribute constructively to global affairs. It is crucial to note that Kılıçdaro˘glu’s foreign policy decisions are firmly grounded in Turkey’s domestic economic and political needs. Rather than pursuing an ideology-driven approach, he prioritizes Turkey’s national interests and economic well-being. This distinction sets Kılıçdaro˘glu apart from President Erdo˘gan’s interventionist and confrontational approach, particularly regarding countries like Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s focus on pragmatic policies and constructive engagement aims to position Turkey as a reliable partner in the international arena, fostering stability, and promoting the country’s overall development. Kılıçdaro˘glu advocates for a non-ideological stance, which means that Turkey’s foreign policy decisions will not be guided by Islamist ideology or prioritize the interests of

126

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. Instead, the focus will be on pragmatic and constructive engagement with Arab countries and the broader international community. To gain insights into Kılıçdaro˘glu’s foreign policy vision, it is useful to compare and contrast it with Erdo˘gan’s foreign policy approach.1 The dynamics of domestic politics have significantly influenced Turkey’s foreign policy under Erdo˘gan’s leadership.2 The AKP capitalized on domestic political struggles, which presented opportunities for shaping its foreign policy agenda between 2002 and 2023. During this period, Turkey’s foreign policy became more active compared to previous years, yet it struggled to establish a distinct and defining characteristic.

˘ ˘ Erdogan vs. KiliÇdaroglu’s Ideological Foreign Policy One of the notable turning points in Turkey’s foreign policy under AKP rule was the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, as many observers have pointed out.3 The unexpected rejection of military operations on Turkish soil became a pivotal moment. The AKP instrumentalized foreign policy for its political goals and domestic political competition. It used foreign policy to expose its Islamist credentials and challenge the Kemalist domestic system. Its Islamist and nationalistic foreign policy decisions in mobilizing popular support for their governance. Despite the prevailing public opposition to the war, it was widely expected that Turkey would join the US-led “coalition of the willing.”4 However, the AKP took a leading role in parliament’s rejection of Turkey’s involvement in the American-led war in Iraq. This marked a turning point for the AKP, as

1 Fore Erdo˘ gan’s foreign policy, see Yavuz, Erdo˘gan: The Making of an Autocrat, pp. 282–313. 2 Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi. Religion, identity and power: Turkey and the Balkans in the twenty-first century. Edinburgh University Press, 2021. 3 Kösebalaban, Hasan T. Turkish foreign policy: Islam, nationalism, and globalization. Palgrave, 2011. 4 Coskun Bezen Balamir, Do˘ gan Salih, Demir Mustafa. “Foreign policy as a legitimation strategy for the AKP’s hegemonic project of the “New Turkey””. In Baser Bahar, Öztürk Ahmet Erdi, (eds.), Authoritarian politics in Turkey: Election, resistance and the AKP. London, IB Tauris, 2017, pp. 88–89.

5

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S FOREIGN POLICY

127

it gained leverage over the Kemalist military and state elites who tacitly supported joining the coalition. As Erdo˘gan single-handedly determines the parameters of his government’s foreign policy, his sense of history, ideology, and identity are instrumental to understanding the dynamics of continuity and changes in foreign policy. But, Erdo˘gan’s assertive foreign policy instead has done more to induce regional countries to align against Turkey rather than opening space for Turkish national interests to be addressed constructively. Erdo˘gan’s foreign policy decisions are militarized, interventionist, and anti-Western.5 Erdo˘gan’s principal goal is to consolidate his domestic power and maintain a public image validating his role as “regional leader” and “the leader of umma.” Erdo˘gan envisions Turkey as a global Muslim actor and the leader of a distinct (Islamic) civilization.6 Turkey’s national interests, for Erdo˘gan, are defined in accordance with his compulsion to remain in power and enrich his coffers. His foreign policy is free from institutional constraints and is based instead on personalized, assertive, and militaristic dynamics converging on his obsessive goal to consolidate his power.7 For instance, Turkish–Russian relations depend on the personal ties and mutual trust that Putin and Erdo˘gan have established. During this period, Erdo˘gan began emphasizing the importance of considering different policy options in Turkey’s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors. This signaled a shift in Turkey’s identity, characterized as “populist and pro-active, but ambiguous.”8 Erdo˘gan sought to present a new image of Turkey that departed from cautious, norm-based Kemalist foreign policy, taking a more assertive and populist approach in its foreign policy endeavors. By understanding the contrast between Erdo˘gan’s foreign policy trajectory and Kılıçdaro˘glu’s vision, one can better comprehend the distinct approaches and perspectives on Turkey’s international relations.

5 Yavuz, M. Hakan, “The Motives behind Erdo˘ gan’s foreign policy: neo-ottomanism and strategic autonomy.” Turkish Studies 23, no. 5 (2022): 659–680. 6 Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi, and Bahar Baser. “The transnational politics of religion: Turkey’s Diyanet, Islamic communities and beyond.” Turkish Studies 23, no. 5 (2022): 701–721. 7 Gözaydın, I¸ ˙ star. “Ahmet Davuto˘glu: Role as an Islamic scholar shaping Turkey’s foreign policy.” International Relations and Islam: Diverse Perspectives (2013): 91–110. 8 Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi. “Islam and foreign policy: Turkey’s ambivalent religious soft power in the authoritarian turn.” Religions 12, no. 1 (2021): 38.

128

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

The Pro-Wester Foreign Policy Kılıçdaro˘glu highlights the critical need for systemic changes and a more transparent and inclusive approach to foreign policy, one that upholds democratic values, strengthens civil society engagement, and ensures Turkey’s active and respected presence on the international stage. Kılıçdaro˘glu also emphasizes the importance of transparency as a key attribute of a democratic society. In this context, he recognizes the significant role that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play within such a societal structure. A reform-oriented Ministry of Foreign Affairs would engage not only with academic circles, which are essential elements of this democratic structure but also with think tanks comprised of Turkish citizens residing abroad. This approach aims to harness Turkey’s soft power and transform it into an effective tool for public diplomacy. Kılıçdaro˘glu advocates pro-Western foreign policy. He argues that: The CHP sees Turkey as part of the Euro-Atlantic family, and our place in foreign policy is the West. For the past 200 years, we have been trying to westernize ourselves, and the People’s Republican Party does not have any hesitations on that matter. And we do endorse the view that Turkey has to become a full member of the EU. We attach importance to the North Atlantic Alliance, and we do believe that NATO’s role, importance, and effect have all been bolstered in our today’s world. And Turkey is a country that is loyal to its alliances. And we do believe that allies have to be in harmony when it comes to defense matters. The People’s Republican Party believes that relations between Turkey and the United States have to take place on an equal footing, and around the concept of common values and mutual interests.9

The AKP government has displayed significant activity beyond Turkey’s borders, utilizing both state institutions and various compatriot and religious organizations. Drawing from their past experiences with the Islamist movement of Erbakan, the AKP has maintained a presence in the Balkans, Continental Europe, Asia, and Africa through entities such as the Directorate of the Turks Abroad and Relative Communities, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, the Yunus Emre Institute, the Maarif Foundation, and even Turkish Airlines. This presence is largely supported 9 Kemal Kılıçdaro˘ glu’s lecture at the Brooking Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/ wp-content/uploads/2013/11/20131202_kilicdaroglu_turkey_transcript.pdf.

5

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S FOREIGN POLICY

129

by the utilization of Sunni Islam as a tool in foreign policy and diaspora management, going beyond the traditional concept of soft power. While this approach is received positively in some regions, it also generates negative reactions in others. Kılıçdaro˘glu wants a non-interventionist and non-ideological foreign policy. Rather than these religious structures, he prefers the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to play a critical role in the making and implementation of foreign policy. It appears that Kılıçdaro˘glu aims to pursue a foreign policy guided by respect for international law and based on universal values. The principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and the peaceful resolution of disputes through diplomacy and dialogue will form the foundation of this policy. By upholding these principles, Kılıçdaro˘glu intends to establish an effective and respected presence for the CHP on the global stage, despite the party’s limited resources compared to the AKP.

The EU–Turkey Relations Kılıçdaro˘glu’s CHP maintains a strong pro-Western stance, aligning with the party’s historical position. Kılıçdaro˘glu has repeatedly urged the EU to revive Turkey’s stalled full membership process. He expresses disappointment that Turkey is only discussed in the context of foreign policy matters in Brussels. The CHP has consistently advocated for Turkey’s accession to the EU by elevating democratic and human rights standards to align with European norms. Kılıçdaro˘glu emphasizes the need for global democrats to unite around the principles of the rule of law, and human rights, opposing the rise of authoritarian populist trends. He calls on the EU and European politicians to reject opinions that exclude Turkey from European integration. Moreover, under Kılıçdaro˘glu’s leadership, the CHP emphasizes its role as Turkey’s social democratic party and staunch supporter of EU enlargement to include Turkey. The party calls for Turkey to meet the EU’s Copenhagen political criteria more effectively and implement additional regulatory and social reforms. In these challenging times, the world requires opportunities for a better global order amid financial and political transitions. A stronger Europe, with a larger single market, a social model, and greater political unity, is essential. Successful Turkish membership in the EU would bring geostrategic significance, economic vitality, a youthful workforce, natural and cultural richness, security, and energy to Europe.

130

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Kılıçdaro˘glu made it very clear that if he is elected as a president of Turkey, he would be upholding the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). This would entail the release of prominent Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtas and Turkish philanthropist Osman Kavala from prison, in accordance with the ECHR rulings.10 The commitment to releasing political prisoners and abiding by ECHR judgments signals Kılıçdaro˘glu’s emphasis on respecting human rights and adhering to international legal standards. Additionally, his pledge to fulfill EU requirements, regardless of membership, highlights the willingness to engage with the EU and establish a constructive relationship. However, the realization of certain objectives, such as visa-free travel to the Schengen area, may pose significant challenges due to various factors, including policy negotiations, security concerns, and diplomatic intricacies. By upholding ECHR judgments and pursuing EU benchmarks, the government aims to improve Turkey’s standing in the international community and foster constructive relationships with key stakeholders. Kılıçdaro˘glu asserts that foreign policy must transcend partisan boundaries and be a national endeavor, serving Turkey’s interests rather than promoting any specific ideological or group agenda. He stresses the importance of inclusivity, advocating for the active involvement of both the ruling government and the opposition in shaping Turkey’s foreign policy. One of his key objectives is to redefine Turkey’s trajectory, placing greater emphasis on cultivating relationships with Western nations as opposed to Russia. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s ultimate vision is for Turkey to be recognized as an integral part of the global community, existing harmoniously within the civilized world. Regarding the prioritization of foreign policy objectives, Kılıçdaro˘glu highlights the imperative transformation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into a central hub. He emphasizes the need to depoliticize the ministry, fostering a non-partisan environment that enhances its institutional quality and capacity. A cornerstone of his approach is the concept of institutionalization, wherein diplomacy takes precedence over military might when pursuing national goals. This stance aligns closely with the principles espoused by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, particularly his motto of “Peace at home, peace in the world.”11 By

10 https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkish-main-opposition-chp-leader-kilicdarogluonce-again-calls-for-release-of-osman-kavala-selahattin-demirtas-news-61067. 11 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu on 17 April 2023.

5

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S FOREIGN POLICY

131

placing diplomacy at the forefront, Kılıçdaro˘glu seeks to establish a framework that prioritizes peaceful relations both domestically and globally, shunning a reliance on military power as the primary means of achieving objectives. He states that relations with the United States will be advanced based on equal understanding and institutional cooperation while maintaining an alliance based on mutual trust. However, he also emphasizes that pursuing EU membership, valuing NATO, and developing relations with the United States do not mean that ties with Russia and China will be severed. Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy based on structural factors will continue despite changes in power. Furthermore, Kılıçdaro˘glu highlights the importance of realistic and sustainable evaluations of relations with organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN, underscoring that they cannot be an alternative to Turkey’s NATO membership.12 The immigration issue poses a significant challenge to the positive agenda envisioned by the Western alliance. Kılıçdaro˘glu and the parties comprising the Nation Alliance advocate for joint responsibility and burden-sharing with the EU on the asylum seeker problem in Turkey. He intends to review both the 2014 Readmission Agreement and the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding with the EU. Notably, one of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s fundamental promises is to repatriate Syrian refugees within two years, which has caused concern in European capitals. In 2020, Kılıçdaro˘glu pledged a complete overhaul of foreign policy, stating that it would undergo a 180-degree change. He proposed the establishment of the Middle East Peace and Cooperation Organization, involving Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. He believes that peace cannot be achieved in the Middle East as long as sovereign powers dominate the region, emphasizing that peace should be fostered by the people and states. He rejects the idea of engaging in conflicts with countries such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, or Iran, emphasizing the futility of fighting when peace can be pursued. Kılıçdaro˘glu emphasizes that traditional national state policies will not be relinquished and no concessions will be made in foreign policy matters. He asserts that national interests will not be compromised regarding issues such as Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon deposits, security policies in Syria, the Cyprus issue, and a set of

12 Interview with Kılıçdaro˘ glu on 17 April 2023.

132

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

issues with Greece such as the territorial waters, continental shelf, and Turkish minority’s rights in Western Trace. He also indicated Turkey’s full support for Azerbaijan to restore its territorial integrity. Additionally, Kılıçdaro˘glu affirms that defense industry projects and domestic national productions will not be abandoned. He states that the defense industry, like foreign policy, will witness steps toward larger national productions and projects, countering concerns about the potential discontinuation of ˙ UAV and SIHA projects.

Turkey’s Ties with Russia and Ukraine Western capitals are closely monitoring Ankara’s stance on Russia, particularly after the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. Despite the conflict, Erdo˘gan has managed to maintain a delicate balance between Moscow and Kyiv, even providing military assistance to the latter without receiving backlash from Russia. Both opposition officials and analysts suggest that Turkey should continue this approach by positioning itself as a mediator between the two countries. However, there are differing views on whether Ankara should join Western sanctions against Russia. While some believe that Turkey should avoid imposing sanctions, others argue that Turkey should align with its Western allies on this issue. Although Kılıçdaro˘glu’s party has taken a harder line than expected on the United States, they are willing to maintain relations with the United States on the basis of equal partnership. Nevertheless, there remain unresolved issues that have the potential to impact the relationship between Turkey and the United States, most notably the US support for Kurdish armed groups operating in Syria. This particular matter has emerged as a pivotal concern that has significantly soured public sentiment in Turkey toward the United States. One area where the opposition hopes to make progress with the United States is in re-entering the fifth-generation F-35 fighter jet program. Turkey was removed from the program in 2019 after purchasing Russian-made S-400 missile defense systems. While the opposition aims to re-enter the program, it remains to be seen how they will address the issue of the S-400 s, as the United States has indicated that activation of the missile system could jeopardize Turkey’s participation in the F35 program.13 Since Erdo˘gan has personalized the foreign policy and 13 https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20230425-how-the-west-russia-see-tur key-S-presidential-elections.

5

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S FOREIGN POLICY

133

uses foreign policy to keep himself in power or cover up his corrupt practices, Turkey’s ties with the United States is getting worse. Whenever the United States talk about human rights issue or the role of the narcotic money in Turkish economy, Erdo˘gan reads this as a criticism of his government. For instance, when the US Ambassador Jeff Flake in Ankara met Kılıçdaro˘glu, Erdo˘gan burst his anger by threatening to not to allow any government officials to with the US Ambassador. Erdo˘gan, harboring suspicions toward Washington, has been particularly wary of President Joe Biden’s remarks during the 2020 US election campaign. Biden’s statement suggesting support for the opposition and implying that Erdo˘gan must face consequences for alleged human rights violations has fueled the Turkish president’s skepticism. Capitalizing on his control over media outlets and state resources, Erdo˘gan has effectively cultivated an atmosphere of anti-American sentiment within the public sphere. In fact, Turkey has emerged as the NATO member state with the highest degree of anti-American sentiment. In contrast to this prevailing sentiment, Kılıçdaro˘glu emphasizes the urgent need for Turkey to engage in professional and dignified dialogues with Western capitals. Such a shift in approach would be greatly welcomed by influential European centers such as Berlin, Brussels, London, Paris, and Washington, DC. The prospect of a more constructive and respectful discourse between Turkey and Western powers would undoubtedly provide significant relief to these capitals, fostering an environment conducive to addressing shared challenges and concerns. Based on our interviews with Ambassador Ünal Çeviköz, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s foreign policy advisor, it becomes evident that should Kılıçdaro˘glu be elected as president, he will place a significant emphasis on the expertise and involvement of professional diplomats in shaping Turkey’s foreign policy. A key aspect of his approach would involve reestablishing Turkey’s alignment with Western nations, rekindling its orientation toward the West. Furthermore, Kılıçdaro˘glu intends to distance Turkey from foreign policies that are influenced by Islamic orientations in the Middle East. His vision entails a departure from such ideological considerations and a renewed focus on a more pragmatic and balanced approach to regional affairs. Çeviköz’s statements regarding CHP’s foreign policy are crucial in understanding their approach. In a recent interview, he emphasized

134

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

the need to rebuild trust between Greece and Turkey and suggested that difficult disputes can be addressed later.14 Regarding Cyprus, Çeviköz stated that the solution must be found by the two communities on the island, with Ankara refraining from interfering in the affairs of Turkish Cypriots and Athens refraining from interfering in the affairs of Greek Cypriots. Regarding EU–Turkey relations, Çeviköz expressed the desire to be seen as a normal candidate country again, acknowledging that EU membership is a long-term goal for any Turkish government. He also highlighted the importance of political predictability to attract investors and expressed hope for more confidence in the face of Turkey’s challenging economic situation. Additionally, he mentioned the visa-free regime as part of the so-called refugee deal. Çeviköz believes that a change in power could alter Turkey’s relations with the West. He stated that many problems are related to the collapse of the rule of law in Turkey, and thus strengthening the rule of law is a top priority for the Nation Alliance. Their goal is for Turkey to be perceived as a like-minded member of the Western community of nations. While economic and diplomatic relations with Russia and Ukraine would continue, under the new government led by Kilicdaroglu would reexamine Turkey’s increasing dependence on Russia. He pointed out that no Turkish government would adopt sanctions imposed by individual states or the EU, but they would adhere to UN resolutions. Despite the current conflict caused by the Russian occupation, he believes that a European security architecture that includes Russia is the only viable long-term solution. Çeviköz acknowledged that Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 air defense systems from Russia was a “big mistake” and resulted in significant costs. He expressed regret over Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 fighter jet development program, as it weakened both security policy and the defense industry. While unable to provide a binding commitment, he expressed confidence in finding a solution to the problem. Cevikoz argues that: The consequences of Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 air defense systems from Russia are significant. Not only did we incur substantial costs, but we 14 Cevikoz’s statements are based on his latest interview; https://www.cumhuriyet. com.tr/dunya/unal-cevikoz-ukraynada-tum-taraflarla-konusabilme-avantajimizi-kullanaca giz-2078850.

5

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S FOREIGN POLICY

135

were also expelled from the new F-35 fighter jet development program. This outcome not only undermines our security policy but also represents a missed opportunity for our defense industry. While I cannot make a binding commitment at this moment, rest assured that we are determined to find a solution to this problem.

Regarding the situation of Syrian refugees in Turkey, Çeviköz emphasized the need to establish a dialogue with Syrian President Assad. He stressed the importance of creating favorable conditions, supported by international aid, for the safe return of these individuals. This entails making investments in various areas and seeking assurances from the Damascus government that returnees will not face persecution. Çeviköz further highlighted Turkey’s significant role as both a destination and transit country for refugees. Consequently, he advocated for Turkey’s inclusion in a unified European immigration policy. This broader context also encompasses discussions on visa-free travel. It is crucial to address these interconnected issues collectively. Importantly, Çeviköz assured that his party would not exploit refugee policies as a means of pressuring the European Union. They firmly oppose engaging in political blackmail tactics. The focus of the proposed approach is to facilitate the dignified and voluntary return of Syrian refugees, ensuring their safety and well-being. By fostering dialogue and collaboration, Çeviköz envisions a comprehensive solution that respects humanitarian principles and alleviates the burden on both Turkey and the EU.

˘ KiliÇdaroglu as a President: Challenges If Kılıçdaro˘glu becomes the president of Turkey, there will be a significant change in Turkish foreign policy, especially in the areas of security and defense. Turkey will become more involved in Western security arrangements and play a more positive role within NATO and maintain a more institutional relationship with Russia. Turkey could take several key actions in relation to its foreign policy objectives. Firstly, it may work toward preventing Russia from circumventing Western sanctions across various industries. Secondly, it could remove its opposition to Sweden joining NATO. Thirdly, it may increase its military presence in the alliance’s reassurance missions along its Eastern flank, spanning from Estonia to Romania. Fourthly, Turkey may consider removing the S-400 missile batteries, which were delivered by Russia in July 2019, from its

136

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

soil. Lastly, Turkey could enter into discussions about procuring and/ or developing a missile defense system that is compatible with NATO’s systems, which would aid in modernizing the country’s fighter jet fleet. These proposed actions have far-reaching implications, involving not only Turkey and Russia but also the United States, the European Union, and NATO. The potential outcomes would not only affect the security of the European continent but also fundamentally alter Turkey’s political standing. However, each of these actions would be met with opposition from Russia, who may exert pressure on Turkey through various means such as controlling gas supplies and transit, exerting influence over the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, limiting tourist flows, and controlling agricultural purchases. Despite this opposition, it is crucial for Turkey to consider the potential benefits of these actions and weigh them against the possible consequences. These discussions could lead to a significant shift in Turkey’s foreign policy, but it is ultimately up to the government to determine the best course of action. Kılıçdaro˘glu has set two clear objectives with regard to Syria: to reconcile with President Bashar al-Assad; to return Syrian refugees to their homeland; and to remove Turkish troops from Syria as a result of the negotiation. Achieving these goals would have far-reaching consequences, including potential to end the presence of US troops, which allied with the PKK-related Kurdish groups. Ankara would withdraw its forces from the four areas where they are currently deployed, namely Idlib, Afrin, Jarabulus, and the area between Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ain, in order to proceed toward normalization. Kılıçdaro˘glu wants to see a secured border and firm to defend Turkey’s national interest. Additionally, a policy aimed at returning Syrian refugees to their homeland would raise legal and ethical concerns, as there is currently no internationally agreed-upon framework for such a massive transfer of population. This would also impact the EU’s own refugee pact with Turkey, which may require renegotiation. Moreover, by aligning with the emerging Arab consensus to accept Assad’s return to international legitimacy, Ankara would distance itself from the West’s policy of nonengagement with the Syrian president. This could lead to a significant shift in Turkey’s foreign policy approach, as it moves toward closer relations with Syria and potentially other non-Western countries. In conclusion, achieving Turkey’s objectives with Syria would require significant changes in policy and international relations, and would have far-reaching consequences for Turkey, the EU, and the broader Middle East region.

5

˘ KILIÇDAROGLU’S FOREIGN POLICY

137

Regarding Turkey’s relations with its neighbors Greece and Cyprus, both opposition officials stated that the Kılıçdaro˘glu government would pursue a results-oriented dialogue with Athens. However, if a resolution cannot be reached, they are prepared to take the matter to court, including disputes over maritime delimitation, territorial waters, and airspace. The officials also addressed the issue of Cyprus, stating that the government would first seek to unify the Turkish-controlled north by addressing the opposing views of local government supporters of independence and those who advocate for a federal solution. Following this, the Kılıçdaro˘glu government would initiate continuous UN-brokered talks with the Republic of Cyprus in the south, as was done during the unsuccessful 2017 dialogue in Crans Montana. Despite the election of Kılıçdaro˘glu, foreign policy differences are expected to persist, particularly with the EU, over issues such as Cyprus. Even if Turkey’s new leadership prefers the current option of a two-state solution, achieving a comprehensive Cypriot settlement would remain a challenging issue.

Conclusion Kılıçdaro˘glu argues that the foreign policy pursued by Erdo˘gan’s government has led to the isolation of Turkey on the global stage, making it increasingly challenging to effectively defend the country’s historic national interests. To rectify this situation, Kılıçdaro˘glu advocates for the establishment of alliances and the strengthening of ties with Western countries. He expresses deep regret over the abandonment of longstanding principles of Turkish diplomacy that have traditionally prioritized peace, dialogue, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Moreover, Kılıçdaro˘glu criticizes the government’s interference in the internal affairs of regional countries, particularly in the Middle East. He asserts that such interventionist actions have given rise to bilateral issues, further straining Turkey’s relations with neighboring nations. By highlighting these concerns, Kılıçdaro˘glu aims to underscore the need for a more measured and respectful approach to international relations, one that fosters cooperation, mutual understanding, and respect for the sovereignty of other countries. Overall, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s foreign policy approach revolves around the four fundamental principles of enhancing security ties with Western powers, actively engaging within NATO, fostering closer diplomatic and

138

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

economic relations with Western nations, and aligning Turkey’s policies with Western norms and values. By pursuing these objectives, he seeks to elevate Turkey’s international standing, strengthen its alliances, and contribute to global stability and prosperity. His policy seeks the reinvigoration of Turkey’s EU membership process, the adoption of a non-interference policy in neighboring countries, a commitment to international norms and principles, and an emphasis on diplomacy for conflict resolution. By pursuing these objectives, Kılıçdaro˘glu aims to strengthen Turkey’s ties with the EU, foster peaceful relations with neighboring nations, enhance Turkey’s global standing, and prioritize the country’s national interests and economic prosperity.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion: The Prospects and 2023 Elections

Abstract In this concluding chapter, we will summarize and evaluate Kılıçdaro˘glu’s political vision, shedding light on the key principles and ideals that have guided his political career. By examining the overarching themes and objectives of his leadership, we will gain a deeper understanding of the underlying motivations driving his decision-making process. In addition, this chapter will venture into the realm of speculation as we explore the potential consequences of the upcoming 2023 elections. By considering various scenarios and potential outcomes, we will assess the possible implications for the country’s political, social, and economic landscape. This analysis will provide a foundation for understanding the potential future trajectories and challenges that may emerge as a result of the electoral process. Keywords Alevi · The People’s Alliance · The New CHP · Kurds · 2002–2018 elections · 2023 election

Kılıçdaro˘glu’s moral principles, personality, and ideas are a blessing for Turkey, a country with a strong civil society and a non-sectarian belief system based on secularism, unlike neighboring countries like Syria, Iraq, and Libya, which have been ravaged by civil wars and turmoil in the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. H. Yavuz and A. E. Öztürk, Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu and the New Republican People’s Party in Turkey, Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36766-3_6

139

140

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Middle East. The election of a president from Tunceli of Alevi origin, much like the election of African American Barack Obama as President of the United States several years ago, would be a positive development that would demonstrate that Turkey’s political system is not based on racist or sectarian foundations. Such a development would foster greater loyalty among citizens from diverse backgrounds, including Kurds and Alevis, to the Republic and the state. It would also showcase Turkey’s level of democracy and civilization to the rest of the world. Kılıçdaro˘glu has deliberately avoided ethnic, sectarian, and regional-based politics by embracing a transparent and merit-based approach to governance that encompasses all identities and groups. After identifying authoritarianism, the collapsed rule of law, and widespread corruption, Kılıçdaro˘glu proposes a set of solutions: the rule of law, fully operational democracy, transparency in governance, the end of preferential status to religious groups, and starting the process of the EU membership. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s political stance is characterized by his unwavering commitment to honesty and the fight against corruption, which is a crucial factor for anyone seeking to work with him. From a theoretical perspective, this can be seen as an adherence to the normative principles of good governance, which emphasize transparency, accountability, and integrity in public office. Such a stance is particularly relevant in the context of Turkey’s current economic crisis and widespread corruption. Erdo˘gan systematically cultivated political networks by leveraging financial resources and the distribution of state assets. In a brazen manner, he utilized the power of the state to suppress his opponents, resulting in the erosion of the fundamental pillars of governance and a significant dent in the state’s legitimacy. Throughout his tenure, Erdo˘gan harnessed state resources to finance and promote a series of historical television dramas, which played a crucial role in shaping a political culture that glorified strongman leadership, fostered authoritarian tendencies, and bred intolerance while harboring suspicion toward external influences. The political culture that has emerged under Erdo˘gan’s leadership has permeated society, characterized by a strong sense of nationalism, a yearning for authoritative rule, a rejection of pluralism, and a pervasive fear of being divided or manipulated by powerful external forces. This deeply ingrained mindset instills a belief in the necessity of a strong leader who can safeguard national unity and protect against perceived threats. However, this political culture also engenders an environment that is less receptive to

6

CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS AND 2023 ELECTIONS

141

diversity of opinions, resistant to democratic norms, and resistant to constructive engagement with the international community. The legacy of Erdo˘gan’s rule, with its networks of patronage and the molding of a political culture centered around a strongman figure, presents significant challenges for Turkey’s future political landscape. Turkey’s far-right, nationalist, and socially and religiously conservative Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Great Unity Party (BBP); and the nationalist-socialist Homeland Party (Vatan Partisi) allied themselves with Erdo˘gan and they constitute the People’s Alliance under the leadership of Erdo˘gan. Erdo˘gan’s intention has become clear after the 2013 Gezi Protests. He doubled the military budget to build a new military industry as a way of channeling public resources to his cronies, especially his son-in-law’s drone program. Erdo˘gan killed the state-owned company and directed all resources to his son-in-law in order to produce the drones. He constantly created hysteria about internal and external threats against the state and Islam to justify his military spending and he helped to create one of the most militarized and violence-prone societies in the region. His rhetoric and the use of the military outside the country pushed populations and societies to a whole new level of mindless and utterly unnecessary militarization, under the alibi and scaremongering that “the state, in some cases Islam, is in danger if we do not take action now.” In order to counter this religious-nationalist block, Kılıçdaro˘glu worked very hard to build a counter-block, known as the Nation Alliance. The main glue of this Nation Alliance is anti-Erdo˘gan and they all want to move into the parliamentary system and stop the further derailing of the state by restoring democracy, the rule of law and re-open Turkey’s EU membership process. The party leaders of the Nation Alliance all agree to reverse the process of a one-man authoritarian system and restore democracy in Turkey and clean the system from institutionalized and systemic corruption. Moreover, these parties all agree on the core principles of the Republic, including its pro-Western foreign policy. Furthermore, the Nation Alliance has expressed their intention to address the preferential treatment enjoyed by Islamic groups in Turkey. This led to the corruption of Islamic networks and their instrumentalization by the Erdo˘gan’s corrupt administration. This approach can be seen as an attempt to promote the principles of secularism in terms of

142

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

protecting religion from political manipulation as much as the manipulation of politics by these corrupt religious networks. The Nation Alliance agrees that secularism is the key tenet of democratic governance. Kılıçdaro˘glu emphasizes the importance of rooting out corruption and promoting merit-based appointments. His political approach is grounded in normative principles of good governance and democratic ideals such as secularism and equal opportunity. His commitment to honesty and the fight against corruption, as well as his inclusive policies, hold the potential to address some of Turkey’s most pressing challenges. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s commitment to restoring the parliamentary system in Turkey is a key aspect of his political agenda. The Table of Six, which is created by Kılıçdaro˘glu, has been functioning as a mini parliament where all leaders air their opinions. Not identities but the power of argument shaped the consensus. He recognizes the importance of the parliament as the cornerstone of Turkey’s politics and intends to prioritize its role. In line with his humble demeanor, Kılıçdaro˘glu proposed repurposing the Presidential Palace as a public library, educational institution, or community center, and may impose budgetary restrictions to reflect his commitment to fiscal responsibility. If Kılıçdaro˘glu wins the presidential election, he will adhere to the rule of law and act justly without bearing any grudges. This is particularly important in non-institutionalized political systems like Turkey, where power transitions can often lead to bloody feuds and revenge cycles. To avoid this outcome, Kılıçdaro˘glu must proceed with caution and in close coordination with state institutions. Under Kılıçdaro˘glu, the CHP is moving toward the center in order to secure electoral victory. It is moving toward the new center of the political spectrum and courting nationalists, socially conservative, and even liberal Islamist voters. Its commitment to people, one of the six principles of Kemalism, also known as halkcilik, aimed to act “for the people, despite the people.” However, Ecevit and Kılıçdaro˘glu have redefined politics as “for the people, with the people,” reflecting the democratic norms of our time. Although the CHP has historically been embedded in tension between nationalist/secularist versus global/liberal worldviews. On one hand, a large sector of its supporters is nostalgic for the single-party era of the 1930s, and those who support the multicultural aspect of Turkey and full political participation. The failure to fully reconcile or formally split has given the party a schizophrenic character, with some members supporting the EU and minority rights, while others view such reforms as a threat to secularist Turkey. The party’s attempts to balance pro- and

6

CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS AND 2023 ELECTIONS

143

anti-globalization, social democratic, and nationalist positions have left it stagnant, unable to mount a serious challenge to the government. As a result of long process, Kılıçdaro˘glu has moved the CHP toward liberal social democracy. He is the most globalist leader since Ecevit. When Kılıçdaro˘glu assumed leadership in 2010, scholars like Tanju Tosun highlighted the need for the CHP to go beyond appealing solely to low-income individuals in order to win elections.1 According to Tosun, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s CHP had to undergo a shift in its political discourse, moving away from traditional, Jacobin Kemalism and 1970s-style leftism toward a contemporary, progressive, and left-libertarian ideology. Tosun emphasized that unless Kılıçdaro˘glu’s CHP managed to break free from the lingering dominance of its leader, inherited from the Baykal era, the change in leadership would remain symbolic and fail to inject new life into the party. Tosun advocated for a “liberal left opening” in the CHP, which involved the party embracing the socially responsible market, cultural pluralism, constitutional reforms, democratization, the headscarf issue, and civil-military relations. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s speeches and his initiatives all indicate such an opening. It took over a decade for Kılıçdaro˘glu to steer the CHP away from its previous ideology and establish a new CHP that harmonized liberalism and social democracy. This liberal left opening, as envisioned by Kılıçdaro˘glu, required the CHP to confront and address issues such as the socially responsible market, cultural pluralism, constitutional reforms, democratization, the headscarf issue, and civil-military relations. The CHP not only embraced these issues but also formulated coherent and intellectually sound arguments concerning them. Nonetheless, there are still factions within the CHP that cling to the old party ideology. Kılıçdaro˘glu sums up the process of transformation: We have undergone significant transformation in the past decade, and this holds immense significance for our party. In the past, we were often criticized as an elitist party, disconnected from the concerns of the people. However, this is no longer the case. The journey toward change has been a gradual and inclusive process, requiring extensive dialogue, negotiation, and persuasion with those who may hold differing views. Change of this magnitude takes time. Our party’s administrators at the provincial, district,

1 Taraf , “Pazartesi Konu¸smaları,” May 24, 2010.

144

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

and local levels are well aware of the transformative shift we have undergone. They have embraced and internalized this change, and the wider society is also familiar with the New CHP. We are open to criticism and committed to addressing any shortcomings that are brought to our attention. Through this ongoing process of change, we aim to connect with diverse segments of the population. We prioritize addressing the everyday concerns of the working class in Turkey, focusing on bread-and-butter issues that affect their lives. Simultaneously, we staunchly advocate for democracy, justice, and the rights of all individuals, without marginalizing anyone. Our party is not elitist; rather, we proudly represent the interests of the people. This is the essence of the New CHP.2

Under the leadership of Kılıçdaro˘glu, the CHP’s foundational identity has not been rejected but rather reinterpreted. The modernization project of Turkey is still incomplete, and Kemalism is a vital component of this endeavor. However, the interpretation of Kemalism has been focused on preserving linguistic unity rather than adapting to the changing needs of society. Rather than being a static ideology, Kemalism should be seen as a dynamic force that balances the practical possibilities with transformative thinking to evolve and shape society. Rather than adhering to a rigid version of Kemalism, there needs to be an acknowledgment of the tension between practical implementation and forward thinking. The Kemalist ideology needs to be flexible enough to adapt to the changing needs of society and to accommodate new perspectives while also maintaining its core principles. This approach requires a constant reevaluation of the values and principles of Kemalism and their relevance to contemporary society. Thus, rather than a fixed and stagnant Kemalism, there should be a dynamic and evolving Kemalism that embraces transformative thinking and adapts to societal changes. This way, Kemalism can continue to be an essential component of Turkey’s modernization project and a force for progress in the country. In his lecture at the Brooking Institute, Kılıçdaro˘glu summed up his vision of the “New CHP” in terms of “Now, this vision is actually—or I

2 Interview with Kemal Kılıçdaro˘ glu, 12 October 2019, Karar TV, https://www.krttv. com.tr/kilicdaroglu-Erdo˘gan-koltugunu-korumak-icin-arayis-icinde.

6

CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS AND 2023 ELECTIONS

145

will try to build it on three main pillars, and these will be strong democracy, strong economy, and a responsible foreign policy.”3 By democracy, he means “the separation of powers: the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary.” In the same speech, he has also been very critical of the presidential system. He argues that “On top of that, we do not accept the proposals for a presidential system which would actually give an institutional structure to the single-man rule in Turkey, and it will also bolster the authoritarian tendencies and habits in our country.” The rule of law and the freedom of the press and civil society are all regarded as necessary conditions for the functioning of proper democracy. He also identifies a set of problems of democracy in Turkey. He claims that “Another very important topic in the democracy discussion in our country is the Kurdish issue. The Kurdish issue cannot be solved with religious preferences which—with electoral investments, or with showing. And in a society that is so divided, both mentally and spiritually, we cannot find a lasting solution to such a problem. So, CHP, the People’s Republican Party, will be the one defending social consensus for the solution of this problem.”4 Kılıçdaro˘glu acknowledges that the Kurdish question stands as one of Turkey’s most significant challenges, as it has created a sense of apprehension regarding the country’s potential division. In his view, resolving the Kurdish issue requires a foundation built upon principles of rights, freedoms, respect for diverse identities, and an inclusive concept of equal citizenship. He firmly rejects the idea of group rights or any notion of autonomy as a means of addressing the Kurdish problem. Instead, he emphasizes the importance of a peaceful approach that upholds human rights and the rule of law. Of course, the most contentious issue among the six leaders is their divergent views on the Kurdish issue. Moreover, there are differences among each political party that constituted the Table of Six in terms of identities and their policies in regard to the key problems of Turkey. These differences can always lead to potential cracks and even disintegration of the six-table coalition.

3 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/20131202_kilicdaro glu_turkey_transcript.pdf. 4 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/20131202_kilicdaro glu_turkey_transcript.pdf.

146

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

The Building Blocks of Authoritarian Culture By examining the electoral contexts (2002, 2007, 2011, 2015, and 2018), we aim to provide a concise overview of Turkey’s trajectory during the rule of President Erdo˘gan, a period marked by significant changes that have impacted the country’s institutions and governance. During Erdo˘gan’s tenure, Turkey experienced a series of political and social transformations that have generated both support and criticism. Under Erdo˘gan’s leadership, Turkey was destroyed as the state of the rule of law, created a more authoritarian, intolerant and strong-man-based political culture. Through a combination of electoral victories and constitutional changes, Erdo˘gan extended his influence over state institutions, resulting in an authoritarian system. This concentration of power has drawn criticism from those concerned about the erosion of democratic checks and balances. Critics argue that Erdo˘gan’s government has weakened the independence of the judiciary, stifled media freedom, and restricted civil liberties. They claim that this has created an environment where dissenting voices face suppression, undermining the country’s democratic fabric. It is important to consider these viewpoints to gain a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics at play during Erdo˘gan’s tenure. However, it is equally crucial to acknowledge the electoral support Erdo˘gan has garnered throughout his rule. He has consistently secured victories in various elections, reflecting a significant base of popular support. This support is attributed to factors such as economic growth, infrastructure development, and conservative values that resonate with a considerable portion of the population. In assessing Erdo˘gan’s impact on Turkish institutions, it is important to approach the subject with nuance and consideration of different perspectives. While some argue that his policies have damaged state institutions and fostered a culture of corruption, others contend that his leadership has brought stability and prosperity to the country. Ultimately, understanding Turkey’s recent history under Erdo˘gan’s rule requires a comprehensive examination of the political, social, and economic dynamics at play. By considering the elections as the key building block, we seek to offer a more comprehensive picture about the evolution of the authoritarian culture in Turkey.

6

CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS AND 2023 ELECTIONS

147

The 2002 election—In the aftermath of the oppressive February 28 period and a severe economic crisis, Turkey found itself in a challenging state leading up to the 2002 elections. During this time, the AKP emerged as a beacon of hope for the country, promising to broaden the political landscape, strengthen the rule of law, and actively pursue EU membership. From 2002 to 2007, the AKP government embarked on significant structural reforms, with EU integration serving as a guiding principle for the new Turkey. Throughout this period, two crucial concepts, namely the will of the people and the Copenhagen criteria, played a dominant role in challenging the resistance of the Kemalist establishment against the AKP’s initiatives. The AKP government faced staunch opposition from the entrenched Kemalist bureaucracy, which was reluctant to embrace the reforms proposed by the AKP. This resistance intensified when Abdullah Gul, a member of the AKP, declared his candidacy for the presidency, setting the stage for a momentous showdown between the civilian government and the military-backed Kemalist establishment. The confrontation reached a critical point when the Constitutional Court intervened, stating that a quorum of 367 parliamentarians must be present for the presidential election to proceed. Subsequently, the military issued a memorandum, further exacerbating public discontent. These events deepened popular frustration, leading to the 2007 elections. Importantly, this period of confrontation planted the seed for the eventual transition to a presidential system in Turkey. Overall, the 2002 elections took place against the backdrop of a nation grappling with the aftermath of oppression and economic turmoil. The AKP emerged as a symbol of hope, driven by a vision to expand the political landscape, uphold the rule of law, and steer Turkey toward EU membership. However, their agenda faced significant resistance from the Kemalist establishment, triggering a series of events that would shape Turkey’s political trajectory. In the 2007 elections, voters expressed their opposition to the interference of the military in the presidential elections, and the AKP’s support grew, ultimately winning 47% of the votes. However, the AKP’s victory did not come solely from its efforts, as it heavily relied on the support of the Gülen movement. The Gülen movement implemented a series of “cleansing strategies” aimed at eliminating the secular establishment, particularly the Kemalist military and judiciary. During the 2007–2011 period, a power struggle ensued between secular and conservative groups for control of state institutions. The AKP found itself in

148

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

a position where it had no choice but to collaborate with the Gülen movement, which needed political support to protect its networks and economic interests and to place its members in government positions. Additionally, the AKP benefited from the Gulenist media channels to broadcast its message to a larger audience. However, the power of the Gülen movement came with a price. They managed to infiltrate key ministries, politicize the judiciary, and monopolize state power. This led to the corruption of state institutions and the mismanagement of several significant incidents, including the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer coup attempts. Moreover, the 2010 Constitutional Referendum granted the Gülen movement complete control over the judiciary, further consolidating its power within the state. As the Gülen movement became more prominent, Erdo˘gan and other AKP members began to feel uncomfortable with their influence and authority. The movement’s growing power sparked discontent and tension within the AKP, indicating that their alliance was not without its flaws. The 2011 elections took place amid an atmosphere of conflicts and social polarization, heavily influenced by the simmering power struggle between the Gülen movement and Erdo˘gan, which had been brewing since Erdo˘gan’s victory over the secular civilian-military bureaucracy. Initially, Erdo˘gan relied on the support of the Gülen movement to overcome this bureaucratic stronghold. However, as time passed, Erdo˘gan became reluctant to share power with the Gülen movement, leading to escalating tensions between the two factions. From 2011 to 2015, the covert power struggle between these two Islamist structures transformed into overt warfare. The clash between Erdo˘gan and the Gülen movement encompassed various significant events. It began with the leak of the Oslo negotiations between the PKK and the Erdo˘gan government, followed by the Gülen movement’s attempts to marginalize Hakan Fidan, who was then the Director of the Turkish Intelligence Service. In response, Erdo˘gan moved to close down the Gülen movement-affiliated private university preparation schools, known as “dershane.” The conflict further intensified with police-led initiatives to expose and arrest Erdo˘gan’s son and several ministers during the December 17–25, 2013 events. Additional factors contributed to Erdo˘gan’s growing concerns and subsequent authoritarian tendencies. The widespread Gezi mass demonstrations and the coup in Egypt deepened Erdo˘gan’s fears and reinforced his determination to consolidate power. These events served to reinforce

6

CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS AND 2023 ELECTIONS

149

his narrative that he was facing external threats and justified his tightening grip on authority. The 2011 elections thus took place against a backdrop of intense power struggles, strained relations between Erdo˘gan and the Gülen movement, and a series of pivotal events that exacerbated Erdo˘gan’s anxieties, ultimately contributing to a shift toward a more authoritarian rule. The 2015 elections marked a significant turning point as Erdo˘gan emerged victorious. Spanning two stages from 2015 to 2018, these elections were characterized by distinct developments. In the first stage, Erdo˘gan strategically embraced security policies targeting the Gülenists and the Kurdish movement. He allied with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), consolidating his position by purging dissent within his party. The primary objective of the Erdo˘gan government was to eliminate the Gülen movement and suppress Kurdish nationalist activism. Exploiting these perceived national security threats, Erdo˘gan tightened his grip on power and formed a close alliance with the MHP, led by Bahceli. The second phase was shaped by the tumultuous events of the 2016 coup attempt, which triggered a state crisis and led to the implementation of extraordinary measures and an unprecedented regime. Following the failed coup, Erdo˘gan and key figures like Hulusi Akar and Hakan Fidan initiated constitutional changes and dismantled state institutions. The state itself transformed into a political entity with mafia-like tendencies, enabling the appropriation of not only state resources but also the private properties of individuals associated with the Gülen movement. This second wave set the stage for the establishment of the new regime, often referred to as the “July 15 regime,” and forged a new alliance between Islamist and nationalist forces. Utilizing the power of Presidential Decrees, Erdo˘gan embarked on a vast purge of the civilian and military bureaucracy, replacing them with loyalists and reshaping the state apparatus. This radical transformation consolidated Erdo˘gan’s authority and led to the birth of a new political landscape defined by an Islamist-nationalist alliance. The Presidential Decrees granted Erdo˘gan sweeping powers, allowing him to wield substantial influence over various aspects of governance. The 2018 elections solidified the consolidation of a one-man regime heavily reliant on the security forces. Erdo˘gan effectively unified and exerted control over the three branches of the state, namely the legislative, judiciary, and administration. This consolidation of power allowed

150

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Erdo˘gan’s regime to steer the country toward extreme measures from 2018 to 2023, resembling a state operating under mafia-like principles. Leading up to the 2023 elections, individuals such as Sedat Peker, Muhammed Yakut, and Ali Yesildag released statements and shared documented videos that shed light on the rampant pillaging of state resources and the erosion of the justice system. These revelations exposed the extent to which corruption had permeated various levels of governance and its damaging consequences on the country. Erdo˘gan’s control over key institutions and the misuse of state resources showcased a disturbing pattern of abuse and manipulation. Once a pillar of fairness and accountability, the justice system suffered significant deterioration during this period. The revelations made by individuals like Peker, Yakut, and Yesildag served as powerful testaments to the alarming state of affairs within Turkey under Erdo˘gan’s regime.

The 2023 Elections and Potential Consequences The 2023 elections hold a special significance for many Turks, as they coincide with the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 following the fall of the Ottoman Empire. This milestone event is scheduled to be celebrated on October 29th, and the president will be presiding over the festivities. Given the historical importance of this occasion, many voters are particularly invested in the outcome of the elections, as they see it as an opportunity to shape the future trajectory of the country as it enters its second century as a republic. The election results will have a significant impact not just on the country’s political landscape but also on its economic and social development, and its relations with the rest of the world. The significance of the centennial anniversary also extends beyond Turkey’s borders, as the country has historically been seen as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East, and its role in global affairs continues to be a topic of interest and debate. The outcome of the elections is likely to have implications for regional stability, particularly given the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq and the ongoing tensions with neighboring countries such as Greece and Cyprus. On May 14, 2023, a highly significant election unfolded, marking a pivotal moment in the history of the Turkish Republic. It was a deliberate move by Erdo˘gan to select this particular date, aiming to convey to conservative-religious masses that he embodies the principles and ideals of

6

CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS AND 2023 ELECTIONS

151

Menderes. The significance of May 14 dates back to 1950 when Turkey witnessed its inaugural free and fair multiparty election, resulting in the opposition leader Adnan Menderes defeating the ruling CHP. Tragically, Menderes and two of his prominent ministers were executed during the 1961 military coup, leaving an indelible collective trauma within Turkey’s conservative-religious community. The narrative surrounding the execution of Menderes played a crucial role in shaping a victim identity and fueling the politics of revenge. Erdo˘gan has consistently capitalized on this narrative to further his political agenda. However, it would take 22 years for the realization to dawn that Erdo˘gan was not a successor to Menderes but rather a self-serving figure who exploited state resources and orchestrated the most corrupt mafia state in the country’s history. As the President announced the election date, he invoked the words of the late Adnan Menderes, who declared on May 14, 1950, “Enough is enough, the nation’s voice shall be heard,” following a resounding victory at the ballot box. Erdo˘gan aimed to rally the masses in the name of democracy and freedom, drawing a parallel to the present day, 73 years later, by suggesting that “the people would once again reject coup plotters and those deemed incompetent, reminiscent of the infamous Table of Six.” However, this attempt to harness the historic significance of May 14 to galvanize support for Erdo˘gan fell short. It became apparent that he did not truly represent the change, freedom, and democracy that characterized the CHP in the 1950 election. Furthermore, while the CHP of 1950 may have exhibited authoritarian tendencies, they were not as corrupt as the current Erdo˘gan government. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s CHP embrace of May 14 and their slogan, “Enough is enough, the Will of the People Will Prevail,” was driven by a desire to resist Erdo˘gan’s corruption and mismanagement of the current administration and call for change. Erdo˘gan has presided over the most corrupt administration in the history of Turkey, systematically undermining state institutions and pillaging state resources. Thus, the opposition CHP made the right decision to embrace the slogan of the 1950 election: “Enough is enough of the corruption and dictatorial regime of Erdo˘gan.” For Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu to win the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, almost all socio-political conditions exist. The Presidential System crafted by Erdo˘gan himself to rule the country as an Ottoman Sultan failed to manage the country, deepened the corruption, destroyed the justice system, ruined the national education system by Islamizing it and using force and judiciary to silence the opposition.

152

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

Many Turks compare the last decade of Erdo˘gan’s rule to the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century which destroyed the institutions and economic fabric of the Anatolian communities. Under Erdo˘gan’s leadership, a new political culture marked by nationalism and authoritarianism has taken hold in Turkey. This culture has been successfully nurtured and reinforced by Erdo˘gan’s policies and rhetoric. However, in the current political landscape, which is heavily dominated by this authoritarian and divisive climate, there is a concern that Kılıçdaro˘glu may face difficulties and could potentially lose the 2023 elections. His vision of politics stands in direct contrast to the prevailing political climate in the country. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s approach to politics emphasizes a more inclusive and pluralistic society, promoting democratic values and fostering dialogue. This stands in stark contrast to the dominant political culture, which favors strongman leadership and espouses a more confrontational and polarizing approach. Consequently, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s vision faces significant challenges and may struggle to resonate with a populace that has become accustomed to the nationalist and authoritarian discourse propagated by Erdo˘gan and his supporters. The outcome of the 2023 elections will be influenced by the political climate and the degree of support for the nationalistic and authoritarian agenda. Kılıçdaro˘glu will need to navigate through this challenging environment and effectively communicate his alternative vision for Turkey’s future. It remains to be seen if he can successfully mobilize and rally enough support to overcome the obstacles posed by the dominant political culture and secure victory in the elections. Erdo˘gan still has a chance to win the election because Turkey’s parties are not based on rational economic and political conditions but on identity politics and personalities. The opposition could win this election if, and only if, they all work together to convince the public that the issue is not identity but rather the future of the country. They should all work to choose someone who can represent the diversity of Turkey and respect the rule of law. Kılıçdaro˘glu’s political leadership profile coincides with the yearning of Turkish opposition for a democratic, clean, rule-of-law-bound, and patriotic leader who is always on the side of the oppressed. The most important development in 2023 election is that the pro-Kurdish Green and Left Party (YSP; Yesil Sol Parti) and the left bloc openly declared their support for Kılıçdaro˘glu whose political profile aligns with their values. With the support of the YSP (it constitutes 9–11 percent of the votes),

6

CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS AND 2023 ELECTIONS

153

Kılıçdaro˘glu has a good chance of winning the presidential election. As far as his position on the Kurdish question is concerned, Kılıçdaro˘glu stresses the rule of law. By establishing a law-based state, he believes that we could address the Kurdish problem. Yet, he rejects any negotiation with the PKK and he was very critical of Erdo˘gan’s negotiation with the PKK by ignoring the parliament and other diverse voices. He believes that the issue should be discussed in the parliament and a solution must be found there as well. Moreover, he will end the criminalization of peaceful Kurdish political movements.5 Nevertheless, the open political support for Kılıçdaro˘glu could also pose challenges for him, given the manufactured anti-Kurdish climate engineered by Erdo˘gan’s government, where every individual of Kurdish origin is unjustly labeled as a terrorist. In this prevailing political atmosphere, all political leaders recognize the importance of the Kurdish vote but hesitate to be publicly associated with Kurdish nationalist leaders. Erdo˘gan could readily exploit the support of the Kurdish nationalist party (YSP) to depict Kılıçdaro˘glu as a “Kurdish terrorist” as well, capitalizing on the divisive rhetoric and fear-mongering that has permeated the political landscape. The stigmatization of Kurds in Turkey has created a complex political dynamic, where political figures must navigate a delicate balancing act to secure electoral support without being tarnished by associations with Kurdish nationalist groups. This situation presents a significant challenge for Kılıçdaro˘glu, as Erdo˘gan’s manipulation of the anti-Kurdish sentiment may be utilized to undermine his credibility and hinder his electoral prospects. To counter these potential attacks, Kılıçdaro˘glu and his supporters will need to strategically address and challenge the antiKurdish narrative, while also emphasizing their commitment to inclusivity, human rights, and respect for all citizens, regardless of their ethnic background. Additionally, building alliances and coalitions with diverse groups and promoting a vision of unity and understanding will be essential in countering Erdo˘gan’s divisive tactics and presenting a more inclusive alternative to the electorate. Under Kılıçdaro˘glu’s leadership, the CHP underwent a significant transformation, positioning itself as a party that aimed to encompass a broader political spectrum. This shift was exemplified by the party’s ˙ motto, “Herkes Için CHP,” which translates to “CHP for everyone.” The CHP aspired to become a party that represented the entire nation, embracing the multitude of diverse voices and identities within society.

5 Interview with Muhammed Cakmak on march 9, 2023.

154

M. H. YAVUZ AND A. E. ÖZTÜRK

The CHP’s commitment to inclusivity and its desire to open space for various perspectives and ideologies were key elements of its strategy under Kılıçdaro˘glu’s leadership. The party sought to move away from being perceived as a party of a particular group or ideology and instead aimed to appeal to a wider range of citizens. This strategic approach was aimed at fostering unity and creating a platform where different segments of society could find common ground and contribute to the party’s vision. By positioning itself as an all-encompassing party, the CHP aimed to bridge gaps and foster a sense of belonging among diverse groups. The party recognized the importance of representing the interests and aspirations of all citizens, regardless of their background, beliefs, or social status. This inclusive approach aimed to create a more pluralistic and representative political landscape, where individuals from various walks of life could find a home within the CHP. In summary, Kılıçdaro˘glu’s leadership brought about a significant transformation in the CHP, as the party sought to become an allembracing political force. By adopting the motto “CHP for everyone” and aiming to represent the entire nation, the party signaled its commitment to inclusivity and the recognition of diverse voices and identities within society. We would like to end this book which focuses on the vision and policies of Kılıçdaro˘glu’s perspective of history and change: We cannot completely reject the past and start anew; it remains an integral part of our history. We can criticize or praise it, acknowledging its strengths and weaknesses. It would be misguided to entirely dismiss it, as that would be akin to engaging in populism or exploiting it for electoral purposes. Our aim is for this country to progress through democratic means while respecting all its values. This serves as the core of our philosophy. Our past, including the era of single-party rule, is not solely the heritage of the CHP but our collective history. We had figures like Necip Fazıl Kısakürek as our congress delegate, but we also had Nazım Hikmet imprisoned and Sabahattin Ali killed. There was a time when coffins were prevalent. It is crucial to evaluate that period on its own terms, free from the lens of today’s values or outcomes. Presenting history from a singular perspective or through a narrow window would misinform society. History should be presented to society in all its complexities, acknowledging its positives and negatives, within the context of its own values and the conditions of that particular era. It is through societal deliberation that history can be properly understood.6

6 Interview with Kemal Kilicdaroglu, 12 October 2019, Karar TV, https://www.krttv. com.tr/kilicdaroglu-Erdo˘gan-koltugunu-korumak-icin-arayis-icinde.

Bibliography

Açikel, Fethi, and Kazim Ate¸s. “Ambivalent citizens: The Alevi as the ‘authentic self’ and the ‘stigmatized other’ of Turkish nationalism.” European Societies 13, no. 5 (2011): 713–733. Ahmad, Feroz. The Young Turks. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969. ˙ Ak¸sin, Sina. 100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve Ittihat ve Terakki. Vol. 49. Gerçek Yayınevi, 1980. ˙ skileri Etrafında Alaattin, A. K. Ö. Z., and Hilmi Bahadır AKIN. “Devletle Ili¸ Bekta¸silik: Do˘gu¸su, Dönü¸sümü Ve Krizi.” Türk Kültürü ve Hacı Bekta¸s Velî Ara¸stırma Dergisi 100 (2021): 537–560. ˙ ˙ sim Yayınları Alpkaya, Faruk. “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin Kurulu¸su.” Istanbul, Ileti¸ (1998). Basilov, Vladimir N. “Islamic Shamanism among Central Asian peoples.” Diogenes 40, no. 158 (1992): 5–18. ˙ Baykal, Deniz ve Cem Ismail. Yeni Sol. Cem Yayınevi, 1992. Baykal, Deniz. “Önsöz.” Türkiye’nin 75 Yıllık Tercihi: Cumhuriyet Demokrasi Laiklik Paneli Kitabı, CHP Yayınları, 1998. Baykal, Deniz. “Baykal: Türban Yabancı Üniforma.” Milliyet, January 30, 2008. Berkes, Niyazi. The development of secularism in Turkey. McGill University Press, 1964. Berkes, Niyazi. “The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Reissue edition” (1999). ˙ Bilâl N. Sim¸ ¸ sir. Ingiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye’de Kürt Sorunu (1924–1938): S¸ eyh Sait, A˘grı, ve Dersim Ayaklanmaları. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. H. Yavuz and A. E. Öztürk, Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu and the New Republican People’s Party in Turkey, Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36766-3

155

156

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bilici, Faruk, Tord Olsson, Elisabeth Özdalga, and Catharina Raudvere. “The function of Alevi-Bektashi theology in modern Turkey.” Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives 8 (2005): 59. Birner J. “Popper and Hayek on reason and tradition.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44: 3 (2014): 263–281. Blumi, Isa, and M. Hakan Yavuz. War and nationalism: The Balkan wars, 1912– 1913, and their sociopolitical implications. University of Utah Press, 2013. Bozkır, G. “Türk Siyasal Hayatında Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi.” Ça˘gda¸s Türkiye Tarihi Ara¸stırmaları Dergisi 6 (2007): 275–308. Bülent, Ecevit. Bu Düzen De˘gi¸smelidir. Istanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1968. Cagaptay, Soner. The new Sultan: Erdo˘gan and the crisis of modern Turkey. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020. Çarko˘glu, Ali. “Political preferences of the Turkish electorate: Reflections of an Alevi–Sunni cleavage.” Turkish Studies 6, no. 2 (2005): 273–292. Çevik, Zeki. Millˆı Mücadele’de” Müdafaa-i Hukuk’tan Halk Fırkası’na” geçi¸s, 1918–1923. Atatürk Ara¸stırma Merkezi, 2002. Coskun, Bezen Balamir, Do˘gan Salih, and Demir Mustafa. “Foreign policy as a legitimation strategy for the AKP’s Hegemonic project of the “New Turkey”.” In Baser Bahar, and Öztürk Ahmet Erdi (eds.), Authoritarian politics in Turkey: Election, resistance and the AKP. London: IB Tauris, 2017, pp. 88–89. Doja, Albert. “A political history of Bektashim from Ottoman Anatolia to contemporary Turkey.” Journal of Church and State 48 (2006): 423. Ecevit, Bülent. Ortanin solu. Kim Yayinlari, 1966. ˙ Ejder, Ömerül Faruk. “Osmanlı Imparatorlu˘ gu’nda Marjinal Sûfilik: Kalen˙ derîler.” Tasavvuf Ilmi ve Akademik Ara¸stırma Dergisi 23, no. 46: 167–169. ˙ sim Yayınları, Istanbul ˙ Emre, Yunus. “CHP, Sosyal Demokrasi ve Sol.” Ileti¸ (2013). Emre, Yunus. The emergence of social democracy in Turkey: The left and the transformation of the Republican People’s Party. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014. Emre, Yunus. “Why has social democracy not developed in Turkey? Analysis of an atypical case.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 17, no. 4 (2015): 392–407. Erdemir, Aykan. “Tradition and modernity: Alevis’ ambiguous terms and Turkey’s ambivalent subjects.” Middle Eastern Studies 41, no. 6 (2005): 937–951. ˙ star. “Ahmet Davuto˘glu: Role as an Islamic scholar shaping Turkey’s Gözaydın, I¸ foreign policy.” International Relations and Islam: Diverse Perspectives (2013): 91–110. Gülmez, Seçkin Bari¸s. “The EU policy of the Republican People’s Party: An inquiry on the opposition party and Euro-skepticism in Turkey.” Turkish Studies 9, no. 3 (2008): 423–436.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

157

Hallı, Re¸sat. Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde ayaklanmalar (1924–1938). Ankara: T. C. Genelkurmay Ba¸skanlı˘gı Harp Tarihi Dairesi, 1972. ˙ Hanio˘glu, M. Sükrü. ¸ Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı Ittihad ve Terakki ˙ sim, 1986. Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük, 1889–1902. Istanbul: Ileti¸ Hanio˘glu, M. Sükrü. ¸ The Young Turks in opposition. Oxford University Press on Demand, 1995. Hanio˘glu, M. Sükrü. ¸ Preparation for a revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908. Oxford University Press, 2001. Harris, George S. “The causes of the 1960 revolution in Turkey.” Middle East Journal 24, no. 4 (1970): 438–454. Harris, S., and N. B. Criss. “Appendix condensed. Memorandum concerning the organization and points of view of the league for the defense of the rights of Anatolia and Rumelia.” In Studies in Atatürk’s Turkey. Brill, 2009, pp. 201– 212. Heper, Metin. The state tradition in Turkey. Beverly, Eothen, 1985. ˙ ˙ Heper, Metin. Ismet Inönü: The making of a Turkish statesman. Vol. 62. Brill, 1998. Kansu, Aykut. The revolution of 1908 in Turkey. Vol. 58. Brill, 1997. Kayalı, Hasan. “The Ottoman experience of World War I: Historiographical problems and trends.” The Journal of Modern History 89, no. 4 (2017): 875–907. Kehl-Bodrogi, Krisztina. “Atatürk and the Alevis: A holy alliance?” In Turkey’s Alevi Enigma. Brill, 2003, pp. 53–69. Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu. “Preface.” In Mesut Ozcan (ed.), Dersim ve Madimak Soylesileri. Istanbul: Dogan, 2017, p. 12. Kıdı¸s, Osman. “Atatürk Döneminde Recep Peker (1920–1938).” Master’s thesis, 2006. Kili, Suna. “1975 Döneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Geli¸smeler.” Bo˘gaziçi ˙ Üniversitesi Yayınları, Istanbul (1960). Kili, Suna. “Kemalism in contemporary Turkey.” International Political Science Review 1, no. 3 (1980): 381–404. Kılıçdaro˘glu, Kerem. “Change in political party strategy and organization in Turkey: The Republican People’s Party in government and in opposition.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20, no. 4 (2020): 593–615. Kiri¸s, Hakan Mehmet. “The CHP: From the single party to the permanent main opposition party.” Turkish Studies 13, no. 3 (2012): 397–413. Koçak, Cemil. Türkiye’de milli s¸ef dönemi: (1938–1945). Yurt Yayınları, 1986. ˙ Kolo˘glu, Orhan. “Osmanlı basınında 1865 kolera salgını, Istanbul sa˘glık konferansı ve Mirza Malkom Han.” Osmanlı bilimi ara¸stırmaları 6, no. 2 (2005): 139–150. ˙ Köprülü, Fuat. “Islam ansiklopedisi.” Cilt 2 (1979): 28–38.

158

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Köprülü, Mehmet Fuat. Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion. Trans. and Ed. Gary Leiser. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1993, p. 12. Kösebalaban, Hasan T. Turkish foreign policy: Islam, nationalism, and globalization. Palgrave, 2011. ˙ Küçükömer, Idris. Batılıla¸sma: düzenin yabancıla¸sması. Vol. 2. Profil yayıncılık, 2010. Leezenberg, Michiel. “Kurdish Alevis and the Kurdish nationalist movement in the 1990s.” In Turkey’s Alevi Enigma. Brill, 2003, pp. 197–212. Levin, Paul T. “Reflections on Serif ¸ Mardin’s center-periphery thesis.” Turkish Studies (2023): 1–23. Lewis, Bernard. The emergence of modern Turkey. No. 135. Oxford University Press, 1961. ˙ Inkılâp ˙ Mahmut, Bozkurt, Peker Recep, and Tengir¸senk Yusuf Kemal. “Ilk Tarihi Ders Notları.” Hz.: Oktay Aslanapa, Türk Dünyası Ara¸stırmaları Vakfı, ˙ Istanbul (1997). Mardin, Serif. ¸ “Center-periphery relations: A key to Turkish politics?” Daedalus (1973): 169–190. Mazıcı, Nur¸sen. Tek parti dönemi: seçilmi¸s makaleler. Pozitif, 2011. Mesut Ozcan. Dersim ve Madimak Soylesileri. Istanbul: Dogan Kitap, 2016, pp. 53–65. Ocak, Ahmet Ya¸sar. Türk Sufili˘gine Bakı¸slar: Türkiye’de Tarihin Saptırılması ˙ sim Yayınları, 2016. Sürecinde. Ileti¸ Öni¸s, Ziya, and Ioannis N. Grigoriadis. “Europe and the impasse of centre-left politics in Turkey: Lessons from the Greek experience.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 12, no. 3 (2010): 259–274. Özbudun, Ergun. “The nature of the Kemalist political regime.” Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State (1981): 79–102. Özbudun, Ergun. “Changes and continuities in the Turkish party system.” Representation 42, no. 2 (2006): 129–137. Özbudun, Ergun. “Social change and political participation in Turkey.” In Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey. Princeton University Press, 2015. Özmen, Ismail. Alevi-Bekta¸si Siirler ¸ Anatolojisi. Vol. 1. Kültür Bakanlı˘gı Yayınları, 1998. Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi, and Bahar Baser. “The transnational politics of religion: Turkey’s Diyanet, Islamic communities and beyond.” Turkish Studies 23, no. 5 (2022): 701–721. Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi. “Islam and foreign policy: Turkey’s ambivalent religious soft power in the authoritarian turn.” Religions 12, no. 1 (2021): 38. Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi. Religion, identity and power: Turkey and the Balkans in the twenty-first century. Edinburgh University Press, 2021. ˙ ˙ Safa, Peyami. “Türk Inkılabına Bakı¸slar, Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınları” (1990).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

159

Shils, Edward. Center and periphery: Essays in macrosociology. University of Chicago Press, 1975. Shils Edward. Tradition. The University of Chicago Press, 1981. Smith, Elaine Diane. Turkey: The origins of the Kemalist movement and the government of the grand national assembly (1919–1923). Judd & Detweiler, 1959. Sönmez, Selahattin. Adaleti Yolda Arayanlar. Istanbul: Dogan Kitap, 2017. Tachau, Frank, and Metin Heper. “The state, politics, and the military in Turkey.” Comparative Politics 16, no. 1 (1983): 27. Ta¸s, Kibar. “Dünü ve bugünü ile Kurey¸san a¸siretleri.” Unpublished Dissertation, Ankara University, 2017. Ta¸skın, Burcu. “The 2019 provincial elections in Turkey: AKP’s struggle to retain power vis-a-vis a revitalized CHP.” Regional & Federal Studies 31, no. 3 (2021): 461–474. Tol, Gönül. Erdo˘gan’s War: A strongman’s struggle at home and in Syria. Oxford University Press, 2022. Tosun, Tanju. “The new leader for the old CHP: Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu.” Insight Turkey (2010): 31–42. Tunaya, Tarık Zafer. Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler Cilt 1. Ileti¸sim Yayınları, 2007 (1952). Uyar, Hakkı. Tek Parti Dönemi ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. Boyut Kitapları, Boyut Yayın Grubu, 1998. VanderLippe, John. M. The politics of Turkish Democracy: Ismet Inonu and the formation of the multi-party system, 1938–1950. SUNNY Press, 2005. Weiker, F. The Turkish Revolution, 1960–1961: Aspects of military politics. The Brookings Institution, 1963. Yaman, Ali. “Alevilikte Ocak Kavrami: Anlam ve Tarihsel Arka Plan.” Türk Kültürü ve Hacı Bekta¸s Veli Ara¸stırma Dergisi 60 (2011): 43–64. Yaman, Ali. “The transformation of the role of Dedes in modern times.” Journal of Alevism-Bektashism Studies 22 (2020): 3–24. Yavuz Yılmaz, Hakan. “When local becomes general: Turkey’s 31 March 2019 elections and its implications for dynamics of polarization and sustainability of competitive authoritarianism.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 23, no. 4 (2021): 622–642. Yavuz, M. Hakan, “De˘gisim Sürecindeki Alevi Kimli˘gi/Die alewitische Identitat in VeranderungsprozeB.” In Aleviler: Identitat und Geschichte. Vol. 1. Hamburg: Deutsche Orient-Institut, 2000, pp. 75–95. Yavuz, M. Hakan, and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk. “Turkish secularism and Islam under the reign of Erdo˘gan.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 19, no. 1 (2019): 1–9.

160

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Yavuz, M. Hakan. “Understanding Turkish secularism in the 21th century: A contextual roadmap.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 19, no. 1 (2019): 55–78. Yavuz, M. Hakan. “Turkey’s fault lines and the crisis of Kemalism.” Current History 99 (January 2000): 33–39. Yavuz, M. Hakan. Islamic political identity in Turkey. Oxford University Press, 2003, 2005, 3rd print. Yavuz, M. Hakan. Nostalgia for the empire: The politics of neo-Ottomanism. Oxford University Press, 2020. Yavuz, M. Hakan. Erdo˘gan: The making of an autocrat. Edinburgh University Press, 2021. Yavuz, M. Hakan. “The motives behind Erdogan’s foreign policy: NeoOttomanism and strategic autonomy.” Turkish Studies 23, no. 5 (2022): 659–680. Yetkin, Çetin. Türkiye’de tek parti yönetimi. Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1983. Yunus, Emre. Kokler CHP-Devamlilik ve Degisim. Tekin Yayinevi 2020. Zeidan, David. “The Alevi of Anatolia.” http://www.angelfire.com/az/rescon/ ALEVI.html, 1995. Zücher, Erik Jan. The unionist factor: The role of the committee of union and progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905–1926. E.J. Brill, 1984. Zürcher, Erik J. Turkey: A modern history. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017.

Index

A Akın, Onur, 48 AKP, 6, 34, 39, 40, 43, 49, 53, 64, 67, 80, 81, 87, 97, 106, 108–111, 114, 120, 126, 128, 129, 147, 148 Ak¸sener, Meral, 81, 110 Alevi, 9, 41, 46, 49, 50, 57–67, 98, 120, 140 Anadolu ve Rumeli Mudafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti, 17 Arınç, Bülent, 49 Aral, Rahsan, 23 Aydemir, Sevket Süreyya, 50, 51

B Babacan, Ali, 111 Bahçeli, Devlet, 47 Balkan Wars, 16 Baykal, Deniz, 5, 9, 14, 35–38, 40–44, 48, 49, 70–72, 80, 92, 107, 110, 143

Bekta¸si, 59–61, 120 Berbero˘glu, Enis, 84 Bey, Kamer, 45 C ˙ Ça˘glayangil, Ihsan Sabri, 66, 67 Cakmak, Muhammed, 11, 113 Çetin, Hikmet, 42 Çeviköz, Ünal, 133–135 China, 131 Çiller, Tansu, 37 Civil servant, 51, 66, 68, 69, 114 Cyprus, 131, 134, 137, 150 D Demirel, Süleyman, 29 Demirtas, Selahattin, 130 Democrat Party (DP), 21, 30, 31, 33, 70, 81 DEVA (Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi) Party, 81, 111 Di¸sli, Saban, ¸ 48

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. H. Yavuz and A. E. Öztürk, Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu and the New Republican People’s Party in Turkey, Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36766-3

161

162

INDEX

E Eastern Mediterranean, 131 Ecevit, Bülent, 4, 9, 14, 23–29, 36, 42, 47, 48, 90, 92, 142 Egypt, 125, 131, 148 Erdo˘gan, Recep Tayyip, 2, 3, 6, 7, 38, 39, 54, 56, 57, 66, 67, 71, 72, 79, 81, 82, 84, 85, 88, 91, 92, 95–97, 108–110, 113–116, 125–127, 132, 133, 137, 140, 141, 146, 148–153 Erim, Nihat, 24, 27 Etatism, 5, 19 Ete, Hatem, 105 Europe, 5, 20, 30, 41, 100, 119, 129, 150 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 130

F Fanaticism, 37 February 28th coup, 39 Felicity Party, 81, 116 Future Party, 81, 111

G Gezi Protests, 6, 141 Gökçek, Melih, 48 Greece, 132, 134, 137, 150 Grey Wolves, 29

H Hacettepe University, 47 Halkçılık, 26 Hanım, Yemu¸s, 45 HDP (Halkin Demokrasi Partisi), 65, 108, 109 Helalle¸sme, 6, 10, 101–104

I ˙ Ihsano˘ glu, Ekmeleddin, 81 ˙ Ince Memed, 46, 84 ˙ Ince, Muharrem, 81 ˙ ˙ 18, 20, 23–25, 27, 42 Inönü, Ismet, Iran, 59, 61, 131 Islamic, 5, 30, 33, 34, 37–39, 97, 114, 127, 133, 141 Ittihatci/Ittihatcis, 9, 15–18 ˙ I˙ Parti, 81 IY

J Justice March, 10, 76, 81

K Karamollao˘glu, Temel, 110 Kavala, Osman, 130 Kemalism, 4, 5, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, 30, 36, 37, 39, 43, 50, 97, 118, 142, 144 Kemal, Mustafa, 9, 14, 17–20, 42, 52, 57, 77, 90, 97, 130 Kemal, Ya¸sar, 46, 50, 53, 83, 84 ˙ Kesici, Ihan, 11, 96–101 Khorasan, 59, 61, 62, 64 Kitchen address, 6 Kızılba¸s, 60 Köprülü, Fuat, 61 Küçükömer, Idris, 29, 30 Kurds, 7, 65, 70, 98, 105–107, 110, 140, 153 Kure¸san, 59 Ku¸so˘glu, Bülent, 11, 94, 95

L Lausanne Peace Conference, 20 Left-of-center, the, 24, 27, 28 Libya, 125, 139

INDEX

M Mardin, Serif, ¸ 9, 31–34, 59 Mehmet Fırat, Dengir Mir, 48 Mekteb-i Mülkiye, 11 Menderes, Adnan, 21, 31, 34, 151 MHP (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi), 47, 81, 110, 141, 149 Middle-class, 48 Military coup, 9, 14, 21, 22, 27, 33, 36, 38, 151 Milli Sef ¸ , 20 Misak-I Milli, 18 Modernization, 3–5, 16, 18, 31–33, 51, 97, 115, 144 Multi-party democracy, 2 Musa, Abdal, 61 Muslim, 16, 18, 41, 57, 88, 115, 126, 127

N Nation Alliance, 6, 81, 110, 111, 114, 115, 131, 134, 141, 142 Nazimiye, 45 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 20, 124, 128, 131, 133, 135–137

O Ocalan, Abdullah, 108 Ottoman, 3, 15–18, 30, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 79, 90, 99–101, 151 Öymen, Altan, 42 Özal, Turgut, 5, 34 Özcan, Nihat Ali, 11 Özcan, Yusuf Ziya, 89 ˙ Özet, Irfan, 11 Özkan, Tuncay, 48

P Peker, Recep, 19, 150

163

Pelikan, Jaroslav, 42 PKK, 44, 106, 108, 109, 148, 153 Polarization, 5, 34, 58, 81, 88, 90, 95, 96, 110, 111, 115, 148 Political Islam, 35, 43, 44, 64 Populism, 5, 19, 26, 117, 119, 154 Prophet Muhammad, 59 R Republican Confidence Party, 28 Republican People’s Party, 2, 4, 118, 119 Riza, Seyid, 65, 67 Russia, 10, 130–132, 134–136 S S-400 missile system, 132, 134, 135 Safavid, 60 Sancar, Mithat, 108 Secularism, 3–5, 10, 14, 19–21, 29–35, 37, 39–41, 44, 63, 65, 69–72, 76, 86–89, 91, 98, 100, 106, 119, 139, 142, 147, 148 Separatism, 37, 41 Shils, Edward, 31 Social Insurance Institution, 47 Socialist International, 28, 41 Sunni, 41, 50, 59, 60, 62–65, 98, 129 Syria, 84, 109, 120, 125, 131, 132, 136, 139, 150 T Table of Six, 6, 10, 76, 95, 110, 111, 114–118, 142, 145, 151 Topba¸s, Kadir, 48 Tosun, Tanju, 30, 143 True Path Party, 37 Tunceli, 45, 50, 51, 58, 59, 64–66, 140 Turkification, 114 Turkish Labor Party (TLP), 24

164

INDEX

U Ukraine, 134 United States, 24, 128, 131, 132, 136, 140

W War of independence, 18 Welfare Party (WP), 38, 39, 52 World War I, 15, 17, 18 Y Young Turk Revolution, 16

V Veli, Haci Bekta¸si, 41, 44, 61, 64, 113

Z Zaza, 60, 65, 67