Kantian Perspectives on Issues in Ethics and Bioethics [1 ed.] 1527533042, 9781527533042

Table of contents :
Table Of Contents
Introduction
Chapter One Humanity: What Is Involved In Treating It Merely As A Means?!
Chapter Two Euthanasia
Chapter Three Sexual Objectification: The Problem!
Chapter Four Sexual Objectification: Suggested Solutions!
Chapter Five Organ Commerce And Donatiow
Chapter Six Abortiow
Epilogue Respecting Humanity:
Complex Issue
Bibliography

Citation preview

Kantian Perspectives on Issues in Ethics and Bioethics

Kantian Perspectives on Issues in Ethics and Bioethics By

Lina Papadaki

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Kantian Perspectives on Issues

in Ethics and Bioethics

By Lina Papadaki

This book first published in Greek ZlJr�f..Ia:ra H(}rK�� rPMo(5orpia� KaJ BlOlJ(}lK��: Kavnavi:� npQ(5ryyi(5£l� © 2017nissos publications

This edition first published 2019

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing

in

Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright© 2019by Lina Papadaki

All rights for this book reserved. No part ofthis book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any fonn or by any means, electronic, me chanical, photo copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior pennission ofthe copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-5275-3304-2 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-3304-2

In memory ofmy parents.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

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Chapter 1 Humanity: What is Involved in Treating it Merely as a Means?

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1 9

Chapter 2 ................................................................................................... 23 Euthanasia Chapter 3 ................................................................................................... 43 Sexual Objectification: The Problem Chapter 4 ................................................................................................... 61 Sexual Objectification: Suggested Solutions Chapter 5 ................................................................................................... 85 Organ Commerce and Donation Chapter 6 ................................................................................................... 99 Abortion Epilogue ................................................................................................... 1 1 7 Respecting Humanity: A Complex Issue Bibliography ............................................................................................ 127

INTRODUCTION

This book focuses on ethical and bioethical issues, like euthanasia, suicide, organ sale and donation, sexual objectification and abortion. unique regarding it is that it provides an analysis of these issues from a Kantian point of view. most important theories. philosophical thought worldwide. criticized for formalism and his philosophy has been thought by many thinkers as too abstract and inflexible to be of use in practical cases. Ironically, however, in contemporary discussions in applied ethics references to Kant's moral philosophy are rarely absent. In this book, we come across questions such as: Is the person who decides to commit suicide to avoid his misery autonomous? Is euthanasia compatible with the absolute worth of a person, her dignity? Is a person's choice to sell one of her kidneys free? Is the prostitute debased to the status of a mere object for the satisfaction of the clients' sexual desires? Can the fetus' potential for rational personhood constitute an argument against abortion? Of course, we also need to take into consideration the limits of applying Kant's views in contemporary reality. philosopher has remained, in a number of cases, bound by the beliefs and prejudices of his time. us in this book, for example, sexuality and marriage, appear to us as outdated and conservative. context of monogamous marriage can two (heterosexual) people exercise their sexuality in a way that is consistent with respect towards their humanity is not particularly appealing to us today. about men and women (the "beautiful sex" and the "noble sex") sound unacceptable - or, at the very best, funny - to our contemporary ears. indicates that some of Kant's 0\Vll ideas need to be reconsidered, and even completely abandoned, in order for Kantian philosophy to be able to give us the necessary tools for dealing with difficult moral dilemmas.

2

Introduction

For this reason, even though in the present book we often look at Kant's O\Vll ideas, we are not confmed to those. that will concern us will be examined from a Kantian perspective, in other words, under the light of basic Kantian moral principles. not to proceed to a simple analysis of Kant's ideas, but rather to present perspectives that are grounded in basic Kantian notions, like humanity, dignity, autonomy, and freedom. In some cases, as we will see, Kant's O\Vll ideas are incompatible with some Kantian conclusions one might be led to through applying Kantian principles to practice. as well as his prejudices concerning homosexuality, we are led to an interesting solution to the problem of sexual objectification, which has been defended by contemporary philosophers. Kant himself condenmed organ donation, one argument which is based on respect for the organ recipient's humanity can lead us to the Kantian conclusion that the act of organ donation, under some circumstances, can even constitute a moral obligation. issues discussed in this book, Kant himself did not express a view. example, Kant was not concerned with the issue of euthanasia. 2 of this book, where euthanasia is examined, Kantian perspectives of the issue of euthanasia are presented in order to decide whether it can be compatible with respect for humanity and dignity. In examining the ethical and bioethical issues of this book, special emphasis is given to the formula of humanity of Kant's categorical imperative. some beings to rationally set and pursue their O\Vll ends, without being driven solely by their instincts or desires. makes its bearers differ from animals and things, giving them an absolute value, which he called dignity. be treated as an end in itself, never merely as a means for the attainment of some further end/s. In this book, when examining ethical and bioethical issues such as suicide, euthanasia, sexuality, abortion, organ sale and donation, I am concerned with whether the humanity, or rational personhood, of the individuals involved is in some way treated merely as a means. discussing abortion, we are faced with the question whether the pregnant woman who is made to continue an unwanted pregnancy is used merely as 1 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 429.

A Kantian Perspective on Issues in Ethics and Bioethics

3

a means for the preservation of the fetus' life. whether the fetus can be thought to be used as a mere tool for the woman's 0\Vll ends should she proceed to having an abortion. In other cases, we refer to Kant's fOlTImla of universal law of the categorical imperative, according to which we must always act according to maxims which we can will to become universal laws2. person who commits suicide to avoid his miserable existence has the following maxim: "From self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life when its longer duration threatens more troubles than it promises agreeableness". chapters 1 and 2, cannot be universalized without contradiction.4 chapter 2, we are also concerned with maxims of euthanasia, and we come to the conclusion that some of them, unlike the maxim of the troubled person considering suicide, can consistently be universalized. But let us see, in more detail, the issues that will concern us in this book. In chapter 1, I look at the formula of humanity of Kant's categorical imperative. prohibition of treating it merely as a means. interpretations of the idea of treating humanity as a mere means, as put forward by Kantian scholars Allen Wood and Onora O'Neill. Wood and his end-sharing account, humanity is treated merely as a means when a person cannot share the end of the individual using him.5 According to O'Neill and her possible consent account, humanity is treated merely as a means when a person cannot give her consent to the way she is being used by someone else6 . Even though the accounts of these two important thinkers can explain why in cases, such as in Kant's example of the lying promise, a person's (the lender's) humanity is treated merely as a means, I argue that they nonetheless face serious shortcomings when applied to other cases of instrumentalization. Wood's and O'Neill's accounts, which I believe give a more satisfying answer to questions such as: 'Why does the person who commit suicide to avoid his pain and misery treat his humanity merely as a means (even though he appears to share the end of ending his life and give his consent 2 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 421 . 3 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 422. 4 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 422. 5 Wood, Kantian Ethics, 153. 6 O'Neill, Constructions o/Reason, 1 1 0-1 1 .

4

Introduction

to committing suicide)7 \¥by is the servile person treated merely as a means (even though she appears to share someone else's end of depriving her of her freedom and autonomy and give her consent to this kind of use)7 Through analyzing important Kantian concepts involved in the fOlTIlula of humanity of the categorical imperative, like the concept of "humanity" and its treatment as a mere means, chapter 1 offers the conceptual framework for the applied issues that will concern us in the remaining of this book. In chapter 2, I examine the issue of euthanasia. has not talked about euthanasia. suicide in order to reach conclusions regarding the morality of euthanasia in a Kantian context. this chapter and I reach the conclusion that, in some cases, suicide can be compatible with respect for humanity and thus it can be on a par with morality. necessarily use his 0\Vll humanity merely as a means and so in a morally disrespectful manner. Concerning euthanasia, now, I argue that it can, in some cases, be compatible with respecting a person's humanity and dignity. examine the issue of which patients are morally pellllitted to have access to it. euthanasia to practice. whether the Kantian argument in favour of voluntary euthanasia can open the path for justifying cases of involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, thus leading to a dangerous slippery slope. Sexual objectification, objectification that takes place through exercise of people's sexuality, is the issue of chapter 3. Here, I examine in detail Kant's views about sexual desire and use. person exercises her sexuality outside the context of monogamous marriage, she is in danger of becoming an "object of appetite", in other words, a thing at the disposal of others7 I also deal in this chapter with Kant's arguments against prostitution and polygamy, and explain why Kant thought that the prostitute as well, as the woman in a polygamous relationship, are reduced to objects. Moreover, in this chapter, I examine contemporary feminist discussions of sexual objectification, which have been influence to a great extent by 7 Kant,Lectures

on

Ethics, 27: 3 84- 85.

A Kantian Perspective on Issues in Ethics and Bioethics

5

Kant's own opinions on this matter. Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, who argue that women's objectification stems from our patriarchal societies and men's consumption of pornography. in the same way Kant does, namely, as the treatment of a person (and, more specifically, for these feminists, a woman) as a mere means for the satisfaction of men's sexual desires. discussion of Kant's 0\Vll ideas of sexuality and objectification and, moreover, offers an introduction to contemporary feminist discussions on sexual objectification. in the work of these important feminists enables us to comprehend more fully the contemporary feminist discussion around sexual objectification. The suggested solutions to the problem of sexual objectification are put forward in chapter 4. First of all, I examine Kant's 0\Vll solution, marriage, and explain why Kant thought that monogamous marriage can protect people from being objectified. Kant, the two spouses can (and ought) to exercise their sexuality without debasing themselves to objects, even if they do not aim at procreation. Chapter 4, furthermore, includes criticisms of Kant's idea that marriage can offer a solution to the problem of sexual objectification. mentioned that Kant's conception of the spouses as proprietors and properties of each other at the same time is problematic. Kant's ideas about men and women at face value, can inevitably lead to the wife's objectification. against Kant's view that marriage can offer a solution to the problem of objectification, protecting the woman from becoming an object at the man's disposal. marriage as the context that is not plagued by objectification and inequality, I argue in favour of abandoning Kant's outdated and sexist views on gender. Chapter 4 also includes Kant's discussion of friendship. are Kantian reasons to think that exercise of sexuality is on a par with morality in a relationship that has the basic characteristics of ideal friendship, "friendship of disposition". Kantian solution to the problem of sexual objectification, which does not restrict exercise of sexuality within the narrow context of marriage. Finally, in chapter 4, I discuss the solutions which have been offered by contemporary feminists for fighting sexual objectification.

6

Introduction

MacKinnon's and Dworkin's radical proposal for the necessity of eliminating gender and pornography from our societies, as well as Martha Nussbaum's solution. Kant, she defines objectification in a broader way and often mentions cases in which objectification can constitute a positive element of sexual life8 The subject of chapter 5 is the issue of organ sale and donation. to Kant, a person is not his O\Vll property and carmot dispose of his body in any way he likes. teeth without degrading himself to an object.' In the same way the prostitute sells her body to the clients, and inevitably sells, for Kant, her whole person, becoming an object for their use, the person who sells one of his organs, according to Kant, sells the whole of himself, and in this way he sacrifices his humanity. However, Kant does not only condenm the practice of organ sale, but also organ donation. outside the context of monogamous marriage, I argue that organ donation appears to be on a par with morality only in a context where the parties have gained rights of disposal over each other's persons (bodies and selves), for example, in a marital relationship. overly restrictive. have the right to acquire it. violation. In this chapter, I defend a Kantian argument in favour of free organ donation. somehow compromised through organ donation, the fact that she promotes another person's humanity can make this act morally pellllissible. Moreover, I argue against Kant's view that organ donation necessarily leads to the donor's humanity being used merely as a means. adequately defend the view that the donor's humanity is not used in a purely instrumental marmer, then we can even argue in favour of a Kantian duty to organ donation, which is based on the imperfect duty to help others in need. humanity, is rather an act of promoting humanity (in the person who receives the organ).

8 Nussbamn, "Objectification", 504. 9 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 386.

A Kantian Perspective on Issues in Ethics and Bioethics

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The issue of abortion is discussed in chapter 6. defended by feminist tbinkers) that prohibiting abortion, in the case of a woman who does not wish to carry her pregnancy to telTIl, constitutes an insult to the woman's humanity in treating her as a mere means (a fetal container or incubator) for keeping the fetus alive. chapter includes a discussion concerning the status of the fetus in a Kantian theory. woman who has an abortion can be thought to show disrespect towards the fetus, depriving it of its potential of ever acquiring rational personhood. These are the ethical and bioethical issues that will concern us in this book. than one Kantian perspective is considered. perspectives contradict each other. issue of euthanasia, in chapter 2, two contradictory Kantian conclusions are derived at. patients, whose rational capacities are bound to be seriously affected by their illnesses, is an act of respect towards their humanity and is therefore morally pelTIlissible. humanity is respected through keeping them alive. euthanasia is considered as a morally problematic act. conclusions are Kantian, since they are based on the Kantian conception of respect for humanity. Kantian argument in favour of voluntary euthanasia, the second conclusion, by contrast, constitutes a Kantian argument against it. I believe that a Kantian ethics, not necessarily Kant's 0\Vll theory, but a theory that is based on important Kantian principles, can offer us an efficient framework for the discussion of applied ethical issues. framework helps us to solve many ethical and bioethical dilemmas, or at least offers fertile ground for rethinking these issues in a different context. Examining issues like sexuality, abortion, euthanasia, prostitution, organ sale and donation from a Kantian point of view, can lead us to rethink our views concerning these issues. theory to practice leaves us with a sense of satisfaction that this theory has indeed a lot to offer to contemporary philosophical tbought. time, it reminds us of its deficiencies and limitations when applied to ethical and bioethical issues that concern us today.

10

Bordo, Unbearable Weight and Feldman, "Occupied Bodies".

CHAPTER ONE HUMANITY: WHAT IS INVOLVED IN TREATING IT MERELY AS A MEANS?!

At the heart of Kantian theory lies the prohibition against treating humanity merely as a means: So act that you use humanity, whether in your O"Wll person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means?

Humanity is an objective end, an end that holds for all rational beings, and gives them grounds for securing it. The is the capacity for rationally setting and pursuing one's own ends. with humanity is capable of deciding what is valuable, and of finding ways to realize and promote this value. [T]be distinctive feature of humanity, as such, is simply the capacity to take a rational interest in something: to decide, llllder the influence of reason, that something is desirable, that it is worthy of pillsuit or realization, that it is to be deemed important or valuable, not because it contributes to survival or instinctual satisfaction, but as an end - for its 0"Wll sake. 3

Humanity is what is special about human beings. from animals and from inanimate objects. an end in itself and has objective (rather than subjective) value. subjective end does not hold for all rational beings, but only for those who deem it worthy of realization. Kant holds for me because I have the desire to write this book and take this end to be important. 1 Some of the ideas discussed in this chapter have originally been published in "Treating Others Merely as Means: A Reply to Kerstein". Utilitas, 28: 1 (2016):

73- 100. 2 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 429. 3 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom o/Ends, 1 14.

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Chapter One

different desires and goals in life. all rational beings, independently from their desires and interests, and can be used to restrict all subjective ends4 . Moreover, humanity has unconditional and incomparable value. absolute worth of humanity cannot be diminished or changed, but always remains unalterable.5 dignity. What has dignity cannot be replaced by something else, not even by another being with dignity6 Humanity, according to Kant, is an object of respect (Kant, Groundwork 4: 428). We ought, in every case, respect humanity in our O\Vll person or in the person of any other. . . . what it [the formula ofhmnanity] basically asserts is the existence of a

substantive value to be respected. This value does not take the fonn of a desired object to be brought about, but rather the value of something existing, which is to be respected, esteemed, or honored in om actions.7

One way of showing disrespect for the worth of humanity, according to Kant, is to treat it merely as a means for the attainment of some further end. But the most influential interpretations of what is involved in the Kantian notion of treating a person (or a person's humanity) merely as a means have been offered by Allen Wood and Onora 0' Neill. that, according to Kant, a person is used merely as a means if she carmot share the user's end.8 an agent treats another merely as a means, if in his treatment of the other the agent does something to which the other carmot consent9 . However, Wood's and O'Neill's interpretations are vulnerable to criticism. I explain in this chapter that there are cases in which the individual gives her consent to be treated in some way by another and shares the other's end of using her, as well as cases in which a person treats her 0\Vll person in a particular way. end (or her own end) and gives her consent to be used by him (or by herself) in a particular way, she is nonetheless treated merely as a means. 4 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 428. 5 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 435- 6. 6 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 434. 7 Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, 141 . 8 Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, 153. 9 O'Neill, Constructions o/Reason, 1 10.

Humanity: What is Involved in Treating it Merely as a Means?

11

This problem will become clearer in the following chapters, when I discuss issues like suicide, euthanasia, prostitution and organ sale. instance, the person who commits suicide in order to escape from a miserable life seems to share her 0\Vll end of putting an end to her life and give her consent to this course of action. person in question treats humanity in her 0\Vll person merely as a means. In this way, the act of suicide, in this particular case, is morally impennissible. As we will see, a way to overcome this difficulty is through reconstructing Wood's and O'Neill's interpretations. life in order to escape from her misery is not, as I argue, in a position to share the end of ending her life or give her consent to using her person in this way. be incompatible with the person's promoting an end she is rationally compelled to have; that or respecting humanity in her 0\Vll person. us first of all examine Wood's and O'Neill's interpretations in more detail. I. Wood's end sharing account

Kant explains, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics ofMorals, why the promisor treats the promisee merely as a means in making a lying promise that he will pay him back: He who has in mind to make a false promise to others sees at once that he wants to make use of another human being merely as a means, without the other at the same time containing in himself the end. For, he whom I want to use for my purposes by such a promise cannot possibly agree to my way of behaving towards him, and so himself contain the end of this action. 10

According to Wood's end-sharing account of what it means to treat an agent merely as a means, what troubles Kant here is that the promisee carmot share the promisor's end. or circumvents that person's [the promisee's] rational agency, and thereby shows disrespect for it" . We will now examine two ways in which it is possible to understand the idea that the agent carmot share another's end. the case of the lying promise, the promisee carmot share the promisor's end because it would be logically impossible for him to do so. 10 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 429- 30. 11 Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, 153.

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Chapter One

account has been offered by Thomas Hill If. The lender, for Hill, cannot share the borrower's end of taking his money without the intention of repaying him. the borrower's end in question, he would not be lending him the money, but merely giving it to him. the part of the lender that the borrower will pay him back. of this belief, there can be no loan1. 2 This was the first way to understand the idea that an agent cannot share another's end; it is logically impossible for him to do so. understand this idea is offered by Christine Korsgaard. share another's end in treating him in some way, if the other's behaviour "prevents [him 1 from choosing whether to contribute to the realization of that end or not"13 In the lying promise example, (the lender) L cannot share (the borrower's) B's end of not repaying him. something prevents L from choosing to share this end, namely that he is unaware that B's end is that of the pelTIlanent, rather than the temporary, possession of his money. way of acting when they are given no chance to do so" .14 Even if L was aware of B's end, he would still, according to Korsaard, be unable to share B' s end: If I call your bluff openly and say 'never mind that nonsense, just take this money' then what I am doing is not accepting a false promise, but giving you a handout, and scorning yom promise. The nature of the transaction is changed: now it is not a promise but a handout.. . . My knowledge of what is going on makes it impossible for me to accept the deceitful promise in the ordinary way. 15

II, O'Neill's possible consent account

According to O'Neill's possible consent account: "An agent treats another merely as a means and thus wrongly if in his treatment of the other the agent does something to which the other carmot consent"1. 6 explains that a person can consent to a course of action, if it is possible for

12 Hill, "Hypothetical consent", 69- 70. 13 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom o/Ends, 139. 14 Kosragaard, Creating the Kingdom o/Ends, 138. 15 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom o/Ends 139. 16 O'Neill, Constructions o/Reason, 1 1 0.

Humanity: What is Involved in Treating it Merely as a Means?

13

her to dissent from it. "avert or modify the action by withholding consent and collaboration".17 Let us see how the possible consent account can be applied to Kant's lying promise example. This is because L is not aware that B's plan is to never pay him back, and this makes L unable to avert or modify B' s treatment of himself by withholding consent and collaboration. an agent is deceived or coerced by another, her dissent is in principle ruled out. 18 III. Problems with the end-sharing and the possible

consent accounts: The cases of suicide and servility

In this section, I deal with some problems Wood's end-sharing account and O'Neill's possible consent account face. cases in which A seems to share B's (or A's O\vn) end, as well as give his consent to the way he is treated by B (or A) and yet B (or A) treats A merely as a means. people are treated merely as means are those of suicide for the avoidance of misery and servility. person, however, appear able to share their users' ends, as well as give their consent to the ways the others treat them. possible consent account and the end-sharing account fail to yield the conclusion that the people in question are treated merely as means. Let us start with the case of suicide Kant examines in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A person feels sick of his life because of troubles that have grown to the point of despair. case is morally impelTIlissible.19 that the person who commits suicide in order to escape from his miserable existence does not respect humanity in his own person and makes his person into a thing2. 0 however, it appears that the person who commits suicide does not treat his own person merely as a means, and so does not objectify his person.

17 O'Neill, Constructions o/Reason, 1 10. 18 O'Neill, Constructions o/Reason, 1 1 1 . 19 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 421-2. 20 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 373.

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Chapter One

For Wood, more specifically, the person who commits suicide appears to share his O\Vll end of putting an end to his miserable life. in this case does not appear to be morally problematic. O'Neill's account, similarly, the person who commits suicide appears to give his consent to using his O\Vll person in this way. time, alter or modify this use of himself by refraining to proceed to the act of suicide. suicide is using himself merely as a means. Let us now move to the case of servile behaviour. "Servility and Self-Respect", offers the famous example of the "deferential wife": [A]wornan who is utterly devoted to serving her husband. She buys the clothes he prefers, invites the guests he wants to entertain, and makes love whenever he is in the mood ... . She does not simply defer to her husband in certain spheres as trade-off for his deference in other spheres. On the contrary, she tends not to fonn her mvn interests, values, and ideals... . No one is tramping her rights she says; for she is quite glad, and proud, to serve her husband as she does.21

Let us further assume that the husband encourages the wife's deferential behaviour. deference, he refrains from doing so because he actually uses his wife's deference to promote his 0\Vll purposes and interests. show what is problematic with the deferential wife's attitude towards her 0\Vll person2 .2 Hill explains that, no matter how willing a person is to submit to humiliation by others, they ought to show her some respect as a person. a person gives her consent to humiliations incompatible with this respect, she acts as if she waives a right which she cannot in fact give Up2. 3 I agree with Hill's arguments that the deferential wife treats her own person and humanity in a morally problematic manner.24 21 Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect, 6. 22 Following Kant's idea that servility is contrary to a perfect non-jillidical duty to oneself (Kant, The Metaphysics o/Morals, 6:434 7). 23 Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect, 16. 24 Although one might worry that the deferential wife example is paradoxical, or at least less easy to understand than it first appears. Deference is an action or attitude only to the extent that the person is indeed autonomous. The deferential wife and her husband have a compact which shapes their behavioill. Were this not the case she would not be a deferential wife, but a victim of domestic abuse. We may still

Humanity: What is Involved in Treating it Merely as a Means?

15

however, is to explain what is problematic with the husband's treatment of his wife. wife's deference, he ought to recognize her as an autonomous agent, and seek to encourage this autonomy. in order to promote his 0\Vll interests, and encourages her to go on willing to submit to humiliation by others (himself), there are Kantian reasons to believe that the husband treats the deferential wife merely as a means, and thus wrongly. Both the end-sharing and possible consent accounts, however, fail to yield the verdict that the husband treats the wife (who is happy and proud to serve him as she does) as a mere means. account. exploiting her deference, the account in question fails to entail that the husband treats the deferential wife merely as a means. the possible consent account, the wife appears to be able to give her consent to the way her husband (mis)treats her. account too fails to yield the verdict that the husband treats his wife merely as a means. therefore, fail to entail that the person who commits suicide treats his 0\Vll humanity merely as a means and the husband in the example we have seen treats his deferential wife merely as a means. reasons to believe that these are two instances in which individuals are being used merely as means. IV. Reconstructing the end-sharing and possible-consent

accounts

My aim, in this section, is to reconstruct the end-sharing and possible consent accounts so that it will become possible for them to explain the Kantian idea that the person who commits suicide to avoid his misery and the deferential wife are treated merely as means and thus wrongly. think that this is the case depending on how we lUlderstand the SOillce of her deference, but it seems that on the face of it we would wish to keep the two issues separate. So, the fact that it is appropriate to see her as deferential indicates that we see her as not lUlder the control of her husband. The deferential wife, in virtue of her deference, is an agent and retains her autonomy. Once we assume that she is no longer autonomous, then we must also assume that she is not showing her husband deference, but is merely acting as if doing so rather like an automaton might act as if it is deferentially bowing. In sum, if she is not free, then she is not deferential; and if she is deferential, then she is free.

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Chapter One

The reconstructed end-sharing account: Agent X treats Y (or X's own self) merely as a means, if, even though Y (or X) can share X's end in treating her this way - in the sense that there is no logical impossibility in Y's (or X's) sharing X's end (Hill), Y (or X) has chosen to share X's end (Korsgaard), Y (or X) nonetheless carmot share X's end in a different sense: Y's (or X's) sharing X's end in question would be inconsistent with promoting some other end that Y (or X) is rationally compelled to have. in question being respecting humanity.25 The reconstructed possible consent account: Agent X treats Y (or X's O\Vll person) merely as a means, if, even though Y (or X) can give her consent to the way X treats her - in the sense that she is able to dissent from being treated in this way by averting or modifying X's treatment of her (O'Neill) - Y (or X) nonetheless cannot consent to being treated in this way by X in a different sense: because consenting to this sort of treatment would entail consenting to give up an end that Y (or X) is rationally compelled to have. It is my belief that the above two reconstructed accounts can explain the Kantian idea about the moral wrongness involved in suicide and servility. Let us begin with the reconstructed end-sharing account. commits suicide in order to avoid his miserable existence, as we have seen, appears to share his 0\Vll end of putting an end to his life. 25 In another article of his, Kerstein appeals to a version of the reconstructed end­ sharing account, in order to explain what it means for an agent to treat her 0\Vll person merely as a means. An agent would act irrationally if she willed an end, while at the same time willing another end, the attainment of which, as she is aware, would make it impossible for her to promote her original end. The latter is an end that she is rationally compelled to have. An end of this kind is, for instance, the preservation of one's 0\Vll humanity. Kerstein explains that the kind of practical irrationality he describes takes place when a person acts contrary to the hypothetical imperative. The latter instructs that if an agent wills an end, then she should also will, to the extent that she can, the means that are necessary for its achievement. Alternatively, she should abandon the end. In the case of the person who commits suicide, his end of taking his life would render himself lUlable to promote an end he is rationally compelled to have: that of protecting his 0\Vll humanity. This is how we can explain that suicide is morally impermissible (Kerstein, "Treating Oneself Merely as a Means", 210 12).

Humanity: What is Involved in Treating it Merely as a Means?

17

logically impossible for him to share this end, like it is the case with the lying promise example, in which Hill argues that there is a logical contradiction in the promissee's sharing the promisor's end of not returning his money. person who decides to commit suicide appears to be in a position to choose the sharing of the end of killing himself. However, there are Kantian reasons to believe that the person who considers suicide carmot share her end in question in a different sense: the individual's sharing this end would be inconsistent with an end that she is rationally compelled to have. make it impossible for this person to promote the end of respecting humanity in her 0\Vll person, an end she is rationally compelled to have. Sharing the end of killing herself, in other words, would be inconsistent with respecting humanity in her 0\Vll person. is not in a position to share the end of committing suicide in this sense, it follows that, according to the reconstructed end-sharing account, in the case of suicide the person uses her 0\Vll humanity merely as a means for the avoidance of misery, and so suicide in this case is morally problematic. Let us now move to the possible consent account. commits suicide appears to give her consent to ending her 0\Vll life, in the sense that she is in a position to dissent from being used in this way (in choosing not to proceed to the act of suicide). her consent to end her life through suicide in a different sense. who gives her consent to committing suicide would inevitably also give her consent to abandoning the end of respecting humanity in her 0\Vll person, an end she is rationally compelled to have. the possible consent account, the act of suicide in this particular case, is morally problematic. The reconstructed end-sharing and possible consent accounts can furthelTIlore explain the Kantian idea about the moral wrongness involved in servility. end of exploiting her deference, in the sense that there is no logical impossibility in sharing this end of his and she can choose to share it. According to the reconstructed end-sharing account, however, the deferential wife cannot share her husband's end, a Kantian is inclined to think, in the sense that sharing this end would be inconsistent with the end of respecting her own humanity: an end that she is rationally compelled to have. means.

18

Chapter One

Moreover, even though the deferential wife can consent to the way her husband treats her, in the sense that she is able to dissent from being used in this way if she so chooses, viewed from a Kantian perspective, she carmot give her consent to be so treated in a different sense: consenting to this way of being treated would amount to consenting to give up the end of respecting her humanity. compelled to have. consent to her husband's treatment of her, it follows that he treats her merely as a means, and thus wrongly. Let me say a bit more about how we could understand the Kantian position that the deferential wife cannot share her husband's end or give her consent to the way he treats her, while at the same time having the end of respecting her humanity. perfect duty to oneself.26 In devoting her life to serving her husband, the wife fails to show the appropriate respect to herself as a person. fOlming her own ends and ideals, as is appropriate to rational beings, she uses her person as an instrument to promote her husband's ends and interests. ... is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself and from other rational beings in the world... . Humanity in his person is the object of respect which he can demand from every other human being, but he must also not forfeitP

In being deferential, the wife forfeits her own humanity, instead of showing respect for it. wife to overcome her deference and show the appropriate respect for her humanity, simply goes along with it. his own interests and ends. wife cannot share her husband's end of furthering his interests through exploiting her deference (or her own end of being deferential, for that matter). husband. humanity in her own person, which as a rational being she ought to have. Perhaps, we could say furthermore, drawing on Kant's argument of why we ought not to treat animals cruelly, the husband's mistreatment of his 26 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 634- 7. 27Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 634- 5.

Humanity: What is Involved in Treating it Merely as a Means?

19

wife, as well a s the wife's mistreatment of herself, could make these people more prone to problematic attitudes towards other human beings. According to Kant, we have no duties towards animals. believes we should refrain from treating them with unnecessary cruelty is because of our rational nature. [V]iolent and cruel treatment of animals is far more intimately opposed to a human being's duty to himself, and he has a duty to refrain from this; for it dulls his shared feelings of their suffering and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in one's relations with other men.28

If mistreating animals can inculcate morally problematic traits in us, which could make us more prone to cruel treatment towards human beings, then it seems plausible to worry that mistreating a person could make one more prone to disrespect more people's humanity as well. so far as to forfeit humanity in her 0\Vll person, as the deferential wife does, there is no certainty that she will show the appropriate respect for the humanity of others. what is entailed in respecting humanity, or her desire to serve her husband renders her indifferent towards showing the appropriate respect for the worth of humanity. humanity in a person so close to him. wife's vulnerability to promote his 0\Vll interests, it is hard to see what would stop him from using other people merely as means for his purposes. There are Kantian reasons to worry therefore that the husband's treatment of his wife (as well as the wife's treatment of herself) threatens the perceived status of persons in general as beings deserving of respect. Conclusion and further reflections

In this chapter, I argued that even though Wood's and O'Neill's accounts can explain in a satisfying manner what is problematic in cases of deception, like the case of Kant's lying promise, they cannot nonetheless explain the problem with other cases of instrumentalization of human beings. cannot explain the moral problem in cases where the individual allows another person to treat her in a morally problematic way, as well as cases where the individual herself treats her own person in a problematic 28 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 443.

20

Chapter One

manner. Reconstructing these accounts has rendered them able to overcome these shortcomings. Concerning the case where an individual allows someone else to treat her in a morally problematic way, we examined the case of the deferential wife, who allows her husband to deprive her of her autonomy and freedom. see in the following chapters. sexually in exchange for profit. clients use her merely as a means for the satisfaction of their sexual desires, debasing her to the status of an object of appetite, this use carmot be judged as morally problematic according to Wood's and O'Neill's interpretations. to prostitute herself) appears to be in a position to share the clients' end of using her sexually in exchange for profit and give her consent to such a use. organs appears to do nothing morally problematic. individual in question is in a position to share the end of selling or donating his organ, as well as give his consent to the act of organ sale or donation. context of a Kantian theory. Moreover, as we have seen, the end-sharing and possible consent accounts carmot explain why an individual carmot treat her 0\Vll person in any way she likes. In the following chapters, we will come across this problem again when examining the cases of voluntary euthanasia and abortion. abortion, the woman's decision to use herself (her body) in the way she chooses, and so proceed to having an abortion might be incompatible with morality, depending on the fetus' status in the context of a Kantian theory. In other words, while it might appear that the woman gives her consent to aborting her fetus and shares her 0\Vll end of ending her pregnancy, it might be thought that she is not in a position to share the end of abortion or give her consent to this act, if the act of abortion has the consequence of making her abandon the end of respecting the fetus' humanity (or, more rightly, the fetus' potential for humanity). We realize, then, that the reconstructed end-sharing and possible consent accounts are necessary for understanding, not only the cases of suicide and servility discussed in this chapter, but other ethical and bioethical issues as well, such as euthanasia, exercise of sexuality, prostitution, organ sale and donation, and abortion which will be discussed in the chapters to follow.

Humanity: What is Involved in Treating it Merely as a Means?

21

Understanding the ethical and bioethical dilemmas that arise in the context of a Kantian theory, would be compromised without a detailed interpretation of the idea of treating humanity merely as a means. constitutes the conceptual framework for the analysis of the ethical and bioethical issues that will be discussed in detail in the remaining of this book.

CHAPTER Two EUTHANASIA

Euthanasia has been defmed as a deliberate act undertaken by one person with the intention of ending the life of another person to relieve their suffering l It can be divided into three kinds: (a) Voluntary euthanasia occurs at the request of the patient. patient who, even though he is not at the present moment capable of expressing his desire to be euthanized (for example, he is in a coma), has when in a position to rationally assess his interests - signed a document, in which his wish to be euthanized, wheniif he happens to be in this condition (coma), is stated clearly. euthanasia has been legal in certain cases since 2000. (b) Non-voluntary euthanasia occurs when the person is unconscious or otherwise unable to make a meaningful choice between living and dying (for example, in the case of a baby). die and gave no consent, another person takes the decision on the patient's behalf. ( c) Involuntary euthanasia occurs when the individual has made an expressed wish not to die. against his wishes because the doctor judges that it is in the patient's interest to die rather than live a life full of pain and suffering. involuntary euthanasia is in fact rare. motive of the doctor is the patient's benefit. (voluntary, non-voluntary, and involuntary) can be active, when the doctor takes a direct action designed to kill the patient (for example, she administers a lethal injection to the patient), or passive, when the doctor withholds or withdraws treatment and allows a patient to die (for example, the doctor does not carry out a surgery that will extend the life of the patient for a short time).

1 Dickens et ai. , "Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide", 72. Euthanasia is distinguished from assisted suicide, "the act of intentionally killing oneself with the assistance of another who deliberately provides the knowledge, means, or both" ("Special Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide.")

24

Chapter Two

Even in countries like the Netherlands where euthanasia is legal, however, not all patients may have access to it. perform euthanasia on a patient must: (a) be certain that the patient's decision is voluntary and that the patient has carefully thought about ending her life through euthanasia, (b) be certain that the patient's suffering cannot be alleviated by other means and that there is no possibility of improvement, (c) have thoroughly informed the patient about his condition and prognosis, (d) have reached the decision together with the patient that there is no other viable solution, (e) have consulted at least one independent doctor concerning the patient's condition and prognosis, and (f) end the patient's life (or in the case of assisted suicide, provide the patient with the means in order to end his own life) with the proper medical care and attention2. The case of voluntary euthanasia is of particular interest from a philosophical point of view. respect for the patient's autonomy. the time and place of her death must be respected, given only that they do not constitute hann to others. Another euthanasia is that most people wish to live a dignified life up until they die. undignified. promote some patients' interests since it spares them from hopeless and severe pain and suffering. It has connnonly be thought, however, that there can be no Kantian justification for voluntary euthanasia. agency), according to this line of thought, must always be respected. Therefore, regardless of the circlUllstances she finds herself in, she ought to preserve her life, which is a requisite for rational agency. escape from an incurable, and often severely painful, illness cannot be reason enough to give up one's existence as a rational agent. hlUllanity has an objective, incomparable and unconditional value, as we have seen in chapter 1, while a person's interests and preferences have only relative and conditional value. euthanasia, his views on suicide are often used to draw conclusions regarding the pelTIlissibility or not of euthanasia. example of the person who considers suicide to avoid a miserable existence, ending his life is judged inconsistent with morality because it expresses disrespect towards hlUllanity in his 0\Vll person. 2 "Termination of life on request and assisted suicide."

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25

question treats his humanity merely as a means to escape from his hardships3 . can be considered disrespectful towards humanity, and thus morally impennissible. In this chapter, my aim is to show that such general conclusions about the impermissibility of voluntary euthanasia (as well as suicide) in Kantian ethics are problematic. misreading Kant's 0\Vll views. for humanity is in some cases consistent with ending one's life whether through suicide or euthanasia. Section I, is devoted to an analysis of Kant's views on suicide. this section that, while some cases of suicide constitute acts of disrespect towards humanity and are thus morally wrong, others are consistent with respect for humanity. that wants Kantians unable to offer a justification of voluntary euthanasia, some instances of it are indeed on a par with morality. and V deal with the shortcomings of this Kantian justification of euthanasia. Kantian theory to practice when euthanasia is considered. express the worry that grounding euthanasia solely on respect for humanity can exclude some patients from having access to it, perhaps unfairly so. account of euthanasia: that it opens the path for a justification of instances of non-voluntary and even involuntary euthanasia. Kantians, it turns out, is not to argue in favour of voluntary euthanasia, but to argue against some cases of involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, which we are strongly convinced are morally impermissible. consider some ways for the Kantian to avoid such unwelcome conclusions. I: Suicide and respect for humanity

Kant is often portrayed as the philosopher who gives an absolute condenmation of suicide4 . to describe the person who considers such an act:

3 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27:373; Kant, Groundwork, 421-2, 429. 4 For an analysis and criticism of Kant's views on suicide, see Cholbi, "Kant and Irrationality of Suicide".

26

Chapter Two ... if, nevertheless, he disposes over his life, he sets upon himself the value of a beast. But he who takes himself for such, who fails to respect humanity, who turns hirnself into a thing, becomes an object of free choice for everyone; anyone, thereafter, may do as he pleases with him; he can be treated by others as an animal or a thing.5

According to this particular passage from Kant's Lectures on Ethics, the person who commits suicide disrespects his O\Vll humanity and debases his own person to the level of a thing or a beast. leave one in deep pessimism about the possibility that there can ever exist a justification of suicide in Kantian ethics. in which Kant claims that an individual is indeed turned into a thing or animal, he throws away his O\Vll humanity, and can be used as something of merely instrumental worth by others. Tempting as it might be to end the whole discussion here, however, concluding that there is no way a person's decision to end his life is in accordance with morality if it has such dire consequences to his 0\Vll humanity, it is a mistake to do so. fortunately, more sophisticated. an analysis of Kant's views on suicide in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of MoraZs, the Metaphysics of MoraZs, and his Lectures on Ethics, my aim is to show that Kant's claim that the individual debases himself to the level of a beast or thing, through sincide, in fact holds only for specific cases of suicide. which committing suicide can be seen as an instance of respect towards humanity. In the Metaphysics ofMoraZs, Kant writes: To annihilate the subject of morality in one's own person is to root out the existence of morality itself from the world, as far as one can, even though morality is an end in itself. Consequently, disposing of oneself as a mere means to some discretionary end is debasing hmnanity in one's person (homo nomnenon), to which man (homo phenomenon) was nevertheless entrusted for preservation.6

According to this passage, killing oneself amounts to annihilating the subject of morality in one's 0\Vll person. of suicide here does not apply to all cases. which an individual, through killing oneself, disposes of one's person as a 5 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 373. 6 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 422- 3.

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27

mere means to some discretionary end. A discretionary (or relative) end is an end a person is not rationally compelled to have, but rather an end that stems from this person's desires and goals in life. commits suicide in order to achieve a discretionary end, a person treats his 0\Vll humanity as a mere means. humanity is an end one is rationally compelled to have (it is an objective end), which cannot be given up. An example of what it means to destroy one's humanity for a discretionary end is given in Kant's Lectures on Ethics: Can I then take my life because I cannot live happily? No, there is no necessity that, so long as I live, I should live happily; but there is a necessity that so long as I live, I should live honoillably. Misery gives no man the right to take his life?

Happiness is, for Kant, a discretionary end, not an end one ought to have. A person cannot legitimately end his life because he considers it to be miserable. disrespectful manner. In the Groundwork, Kant explains the immorality of suicide in similar telTIls. imperative, Kant talks about a man who "feels sick of life because of a series of troubles that has gro\Vll to the point of despair". question is "still so far in possession of his reason" and can contemplate whether committing suicide in his case "could indeed become a universal law of nature,,8 His maxim is the following: "from self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life when its longer duration threatens more troubles than it promises agreeableness"9 . cannot become a universal law of nature because "a nature whose law it would be to destroy life itself by means of the same feeling whose destination is to impel toward the furtherance of life would contradict itself. This person's maxim of suicide cannot consistently be universalized, according to Kant, and the action it proposes is morally impelTIlissible. This is because (a) one considers suicide from self-love. Self-love's destination, according to Kant, is the furtherance of life, not its 7 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 373. 8 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 421-2. 9 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 422. 10 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 422.

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destruction, and so there is a contradiction in willing the latter for the sake of avoiding an unhappy life; (b) the person contemplating suicide is in possession a/his rational capacities. The act of suicide in this case would bring about the destruction of the person's humanity - which is something that ought to be respected in all cases; ( c) on top of that, and what makes the individual's act morally repugnant is that the destruction of humanity takes place to bring about a discretionary end (the avoidance of a miserable life). necessary that one's life is a happy one. maxim of suicide carmot be universalized. This does not mean, however, that other maxims of suicide are not universalizable. Alzheimer's disease. moment, she is aware that she will gradually lose them. suicide because she judges that allowing her rational capacities to undergo such demise is inconsistent with respecting her humanity. her maxim as follows: from respect towards my rational nature I make it my principle to shorten my life when its longer duration threatens a degradation o/my rational capacities. It would seem that there is no contradiction in universalizing this maxim. Unlike the person in Kant's example, the patient does not will to end her life from self-love, but rather from respect towards her rational nature. Even though she is still in possession of her rational capacities now, she is aware that, as her disease progresses, these will be severely impaired and eventually completely destroyed. her life in order to avoid a miserable and troubled existence, but in order to avoid the demise of her humanity (her rational nature). instead of leaving one's humanity at the whim of a disease that will certainly not spare it, can be seen as an act of respect towards humanity. When he discusses the formula of humanity in the Groundwork, Kant again explains that if a person: ... destroys himself in order to escape from a trying condition he makes use of a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life. A hlUllan being, however, is not a thing and hence not something that can be used merely as a means, but must in all his actions always be regarded as an end in itself]]

] ] Kant, Groundwork, 4: 429.

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29

The moral problem, here too, lies in the person who decides to end his life, and so destroy his humanity, simply because he wants to "maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life". case, is regarded as a thing he can use in any way he pleases and even discard. Kant's example of suicide, however, does not show that the patient's decision to end her life in order to avoid the destruction of humanity that her disease is bound to bring is at odds with morality. question does not use her own humanity merely as a means in order to achieve a tolerable condition. treats her life as a mere means in order to achieve an objective end: respect for humanity. Life, unlike humanity, for Kant, is not an end in itself, but something that can in some cases be legitimately sacrificed. ... in and of itself, life is in no way to be highly prized, and I should seek to preserve my life only insofar I am worthy to live.12 There are many conditions lUlder which life has to be sacrificed; if I cannot preserve it other than by violating the duties to myself, then I am bound to sacrifice it, rather than violate those duties; ... there is much in the world that is far higher than life. The observance of morality is far higher. It is better to sacrifice life than to forfeit morality. It is not necessary to live, but it is necessary that, so long as we live, we do so honomably; but he who can no longer live honourably is no longer worthy to live at all.l3

Life, for Kant, is by no means sacred. under all circumstances, be preserved. there are (many) cases in which a person ought to sacrifice his o'Wll life for the sake of morality. honourably. exactly is included in "living honourably", it is certainly safe to assume that respecting humanity is. We can, I believe, argue that the Alzheimer's patient who wills to end her life, in order to prevent her rational capacities from being destroyed by her disease, does show respect towards her humanity. 12 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 372. 13 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 373.

Chapter Two

30

here, that what makes her action morally pelTIlissible is the fact that she wants to end her life herself in order to respect humanity. If her end was, rather, to avoid living a miserable and troubled life, we would not be able to draw the same conclusions about the morality of suicide in her case. This is because she would be sacrificing her life for a discretionary end, not a morally obligatory one. from self-love, her maxim would not be able to be consistently universalized for the reasons Kant himself mentioned in his original example of suicide in the Grotmdwork. II: A Kantian justification of voluntary euthanasia

In certain cases, voluntary euthanasia, like suicide, can be seen as an act of respect towards humanity. ...we think that a person's death is acceptable if be can no longer live with dignity. ... When a person cannot sustain both life and dignity, his death may be morally justified . ... dignity can require not only the preservation of what possesses it but also the destruction of what is losing it, if the loss would be irretrievable. ...Respect for an object of dignity can sometimes require its destruction. 14

It is my belief that when an individual's rational agency is (or is bound to be) undermined, and irretrievably so, by his or her illness, respect for this person's dignity can serve as a justification of voluntary euthanasia. Consider the following cases: 1 . A patient suffers from terminal brain cancer. that - due to the location of his tumor - he will soon lose the ability to read, focus, follow simple instructions and complete basic tasks. FurthelTIlore, he is likely to experience changes in behavior and personality. will bring, the individual in question wants to use euthanasia. 2. Let us go back to the Alzheimer's patient mentioned in the previous section. unaffected. undermined and eventually lost as her disease progresses. discussing her prognosis with her doctor, she decides that, in order

14 Velleman, "Self-Termination", 617.

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31

to avoid the destruction of humanity which her disease is bound to bring, she wants to have access to euthanasia. In these cases, the patients' rational capacities are intact at present. However, they are aware that these will soon be severely compromised and eventually completely destroyed by tbeir diseases. constitute an act of respect towards these persons' humanity? I believe that we can answer this question positively. to end their lives out of respect for their humanity, and not merely to avoid a miserable condition, a Kantian justification for euthanasia is possible. It must be emphasized here, however, that euthanasia carmot be justified from a Kantian point of view because (at least not solely because) tbe patient does not wish to confront the difficulties of an incurable illness. other words, the desire to escape from a miserable existence carmot justify the destruction of a person. by contrast, if the continuation of a person's life is bound to affect her rational personhood in an irrevocable marmer. euthanasia can be regarded as an act of respect for the patient's humanity. The patient who asks access to euthanasia, as well as the doctor who performs itJar the sake a/humanity, regard humanity with respect. Dennis Cooley argues that in these cases euthanasia is not only justified, but it furthelTIlore constitutes a moral obligation for the patient who is bound to lose his rational capacities. physical existence in order to retain his moral existence. continuation of his life would amount to his degradation to a being of "a lower moral status"Y By contrast, David Altman argues that, even thought tbe patient knows that he will lose his rational capacities, he must not proceed to the telTIlination of his life. he holds, he in fact destroys that which he tries to protect, namely his humanity. these cases cannot be defended within a Kantian moral theory. It is true that, by killing himself, the patient would avoid the inevitable mental deterioration that will eventually rob him of his personhood .. However, the suicide victim would still end up dead in a moral sense, and earlier than he would have been otherwise. That is, he will cease to be a person as soon as he kills himself. ... Holding out against the disease is the 15 Cooley, "Soon-to-be-demented", 4 1 .

32

Chapter Two only way to ensure that one does not shorten one ' s rational existence. And this is very important, given the absolute worth of hmnanity. ... The person who succumbs to dementia is not demeaning himself. It would be demeaning, however, to kill oneself while one remains a rational being.16

Stephen Latham agrees with Altman. that he will lose his rational capacities does not voluntarily surrender his humanity. contrast, the person who ends his life intentionally actively destroys his humanity. However, the person who knows that something will "steal" his humanity away from him and yet wants to die naturally voluntarily chooses to continue a life which involves the deterioration of his rational personhood. The life of this person will have, from a Kantian point of view, the value of an animal, when his humanity will be severely compromised by his illness. notion of respect for humanity. case, even if this constitutes the insult, deterioration, fragmentation and, finally, loss of her humanity? The answer to this question is not simple. is not certain, however, like Altman and Latham believe, that euthanasia in the case of patients like in the above examples constitutes an act of disrespect towards humanity. Let us now examine a third case, which differs from the previous two cases we examined because the candidate for euthanasia does not have his rational capacities intact at the moment euthanasia is considered: 3. A person is in unbearable pain that cmmot be alleviated. rational agency is undelTIlined in that he is in no position to choose any ends for himself other than relief from pain. Frances Kamm illuminates the circumstances of this person: Suppose life involves such lUlbearable pain that one's whole life is focused on that pain. In such circlUllstances, one could, I believe, decline the honor of being a person. We might acknowledge the great (and normally overriding) value of being a person ... though we reject the thought that

16 Altman, Kant andApplied Ethics, 97- 8. 17 Latham, "Kant Condenmed All Suicide", 5 1 .

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33

rational agency is merely a means to happiness, we allow that some bad conditions may overshadow its very great value.1 8

Kamm argues that the person's unfortunate condition, described in her example, may overshadow the value of his rational agency. rightly, I believe, argues that Kamm misstates the Kantian view because she implies that humanity or dignity can be balanced against a person's interests, which is plainly \¥fong. what is good for a person is only a shadow of the value inhering in the person [his dignity], and cannot overshadow or be overshadowed by it". Hill's "modified Kantian principle", which is devised in order to allow cases of suicide and euthanasia in Kantian ethics, is susceptible to the same criticism. A morally ideal person will value life as a rational, autonomous agent for its 0"Wll sake, at least provided that the life does not fall below a certain threshold of gross, irremediable, and lUlcompensated pain and suffering. To end one's life in these conditions need not express the attitude that rational, autonomous living has no value in itself. It may simply show that one does not hold this lUlconditionally and above all else.20 The problem with Hill's principle here is that, for a Kantian, a person is not to value his rational agency and autonomy on the condition that (provided that) his life does not fall below a certain threshold. rational agency, rather, is unconditional. does not "unconditionally and above all else" hold the value of humanity is not a Kantian claim. Despite these criticisms, however, it is true that the rational capacities of the person who suffers from unbearable and irremediable pain are often impaired. Pain that tyrannizes the patient in this fashion lUldermines his rational agency, by preventing him from choosing any ends for himself other than relief. It reduces the patient to the psychological hedonist's image of a person a pleasure-seeking, pain-fleeing animal which is lUldignified indeed.21

1 8 Kamm, "Right to Choose Death", 20-3. E' Velleman, "Self-Termination", 6 1 3 . 20 Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect, 1 0 1 . 2 1 Velleman, "Self-Termination", 6 1 8 .

34

Chapter Two

Because the patient's pain, in this case, has compromised his rational agency reducing him to "a pain-fleeing animal", the justification of euthanasia put forward in cases 1 and 2 cannot be applied here. words, we cannot say that euthanasia, in this case, constitutes an act of respect for the person's humanity because his illness has already stolen (or at least severely compromised) his humanity. However, in this case euthanasia is morally acceptable because the humanity of the individual is so reduced so that we do not in fact kill a person. words, it is justified because there is no longer rational nature to respect. In my view, to argue that there is room in Kantian ethics for some cases of voluntary euthanasia is a fairly straightforward endeavour. task is, I think, to deal with the implications of grounding a justification of euthanasia on respect for humanity. that stem from a Kantian justification of euthanasia. III: Practical Difficulties

Grounding our justification of euthanasia on respect for rational agency is bound to give rise to a number of difficulties in putting it to practice. this section, I will discuss some of them. Going back to examples I and 2, the patients' rational capacities are (at least relatively) intact at the moment they are considering euthanasia. enables them to make an infolTIled and autonomous choice to end their lives. be administered. able to set and pursue ends using their reason. euthanasia now could be taken as an act of disrespect towards humanity, since euthanasia would destroy it. and Latham's worry against a moral justification of euthanasia. Would it be better to wait until the patients' humanity is undermined by their diseases? Perhaps the wisest course of action would be to have the patients give their consent now (when their rational capacities are still intact) to be euthanized sometime in the future when their humanity is affected. patient, for instance, the demise or her rational capacities is likely to be gradual and unpredictable. right moment to administer euthanasia? There is the fear that euthanasia is either administered too soon, thus possibly constituting an act of disrespect

Euthanasia

35

towards humanity, or that it is administered too late, when the patient's disease has already severely undermined her humanity. Moving on to example 3, we are not faced with the difficulty mentioned in the previous paragraphs because the patient's humanity has already been undermined by his unbearable pain at the point when euthanasia is considered. argue that the agent, under the circumstances, is in a position to intend to end his life for humanity's sake. seeking, pain-fleeing animal", it is likely that all he desires is for his pain to stop. no Kantian justification for euthanasia. since the person's rational capacities have already been compromised by his pain, there is no point in talking about respect for his humanity. other words, because his rationality is so compromised by his pain, euthanasia can be thought to be permissible because the person, in this case, does not have humanity to respect. Another difficulty that springs to mind here is deciding which pain is unbearable in a way that is destructive of humanity. it? The patient's or someone else's? The patient's unbearable pain does not allow him to be a competent judge concerning the state of his humanity. position to judge for the patient whether his pain has affected his humanity in a way that justifies euthanasia? These are difficult questions. the morality of euthanasia in some cases. Kantian apologize for her inability to always come up with the right answer. For these are complicated cases and it is challenging for any moral theory to deal with these practicalities. IV: Access to euthanasia

In the previous sections, I explained that there is room for voluntary euthanasia in Kantian ethics. Those patients who are in unbearable pain, as well as those who suffer from degenerating diseases like Alzheimer's are eligible candidates, on the condition that they intend to end their lives out of respect for their rational agency. example, it is inaccessible to those who suffer from telTIlinal illnesses,

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which nonetheless do not affect their rational capacities. Kantian-based account of euthanasia? Let us imagine an ALS (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis) patient in the final stages of this progressive neurodegenerative disease. muscles have become affected and he carmot survive without ventilator support to assist with breathing. affected: he can still set and pursue (at least some) ends. question does not want to go on living like that and asks for access to euthanasia. a legitimate candidate. justify destroying his humanity, which is and will likely remain intact until he dies, as is common among ALS patients. living against his will, when other patients (like Alzheimer's patients) have access to euthanasia? According to Samuel Kerstein's analysis, it might be. ... the patient might feel embarrassed, ashamed, and hmniliated. His sense a/self-worth might diminish. ... But a sense of self-worth is not dignity . that is lUlconditional and incomparable value, just as long as he has humanity. ... Granted, in refraining from acting on the patient's request, a doctor might not be expressing respect for a particular exercise of the capacity of rational choice. But ... failure to express respect for an exercise of this capacity need not amolUlt to a faihrre to express respect for the value of the capacity itself.22

Kerstein explains that the ALS patient in question is in a position to set and pursue a variety of ends. exercising his rational capacities2. 3 legitimately have his life ended. Without doubt, a Kantian cannot argue that respect for humanity can ever be consistent with destroying someone's rational personhood. concerns me, however, is whether this Kantian conception of respect for humanity might unfairly restrict access to euthanasia for some people who are in need of it. that brings an end to a patient's pain and suffering, which she considers to be intolerable. insensitive to the patient's pain and suffering, unless these undermine her 22 Kerstein, How to Treat Persons, 42- 3 . Kerstein specifically talks about turning off the respirator of an ALS patient. 23 Kerstein, How to Treat Persons, 135.

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rational capacities. compassionate and humane act solely on respect for rational agency. V: A slippery slope towards involuntary and non­ voluntary euthanasia

In the previous section, I argued that a Kantian-based account of euthanasia excludes some patients, perhaps unfairly, from having access to it. to a slippery-slope towards justifying some instances of involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia. eutlianasia or not is based solely on the ground of respecting humanity. we take euthanasia to be the act that respects humanity when the latter is threatened by the patient's incurable illness, it appears tliat we are left with a justification not only for some instances of voluntary euthanasia, but also of some instances of non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. In cases 1 and 2 mentioned in section II, what made euthanasia morally pelTIlissible was that it was taken to be an act of respect towards the patients' humanity. pelTIlissible because there was no longer rational agency to respect. patients' suffering, misery, fear, even pain itself, were not grounds for basing the decision to administer euthanasia. morally justified in those cases, not because it was in the patients' interest to shorten their lives, but rather for the sake of their rational agency. However, if we follow the Kantian route and take rational agency to have this absolute value that must always be respected even at the expense of people's interests, there will be cases in which we have to argue in favour of euthanasia even against the patients' desires. "respecting . . existence".24 as to constitute a moral obligation. Imagine an Alzheimer's patient who, while her mind is still sharp, makes it clear that she wants to live until the very end and die naturally. However, during the course of her disease, her rational agency will be severely undelTIlined. constitutes respect towards the humanity of the Alzheimer's patient, which will be undermined by her disease should she go on living. gives us an argument in favour of involuntary euthanasia in the case of the 24Velleman, "Self-Termination", 616.

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Alzheimer's patient who wants to go on living, namely, that we must not allow her humanity to be degraded by her disease. therefore that the doctor who proceeds with involuntary euthanasia in this case expresses respect towards the patient's humanity. Let us be reminded that a Kantian-based account of euthanasia is not grounded on a person's desires or interests, but rather on his dignity. Velleman puts it: The dignity of a person is a value that differs in kind from his interest. Unlike his interest, for example, his dignity is a value on which his opinion carries no more weight than anyone else's. Because this value does not accrue to him, he is no better position to judge it than others. Similarly, respect for a person's autonomy does not require deference to him on questions of his dignity, as it does on questions of his good. On the contrary, respect for a person's autonomy just is an appreciation of a value in him that ammmts to a dignity, in Kant's sense of the term, precisely because it commands respect. Challenging a person's judgment about his good is objectionable because it undermines his role as the agent of his own affairs; but his value as a person is not just his affair.25

Because one's value as a person is not just her affair, then, euthanasia must be administered in cases in which people's humanity is threatened regardless a/their opinion. After all, when it comes to a person's dignity, the person herself is not always the best judge as to what constitutes respecting it. involuntary euthanasia is morally insignificant from a Kantian point of view. this is through ending a person's life, it is insignificant whether this coincides with her desires. FurthemlOre, a Kantian account of euthanasia will justify cases of non­ voluntary euthanasia, which we would not ordinarily judge as morally pelTIlissible. mentally impaired individual. impaired by their conditions, then euthanizing them can be judged as morally permissible. these people are in no position to assess their situation and decide for themselves whether or not they would like to die in this way. Can a Kantian account of euthanasia avoid this slippery slope towards non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia? One might protest that, at least 25 Velleman, "Self-Termination", 610-12.

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in the case of the Alzheimer's patient, administering euthanasia against her will violates her autonomy and is therefore wrong. a convincing answer, but not for a Kantian. earlier, respect for a person's autonomy simply does not justify deference to her on questions of her rational agency. euthanasia in this case is not an act of violating the patient's autonomy, if euthanasia is what constitutes respect for her humanity. first Alzheimer's patient wants to have access to euthanasia, while the second does not, does not mean that the fOlmer is autonomous while the latter is not. And it is morally irrelevant that the second wants to go on living. Can we perhaps argue that the patient who does not want to be euthanized is being treated merely as a means if euthanasia takes place? After all, the patient in question carmot share the end of dying this way, or give her consent to this course of action. Wood's and O'Neill's interpretations, if an agent carmot share the end of the person using him, or give his consent to this use, he is being treated merely as a means. have shortcomings. the case of the person who considers suicide to end his miserable life, even though it appears that he shares his end to commit suicide and gives his consent to this course of action, he in fact cannot do so without giving up an end he is rationally compelled to have: respecting his humainty. Likewise, in the case of the Alzheimer's patient who does not want to be euthanized, we can say that, while it might appear that she cannot give her consent or share the end of dying through euthanasia, she in fact carmot but do so. respecting humanity. merely as a means. I will now consider another way to avoid this slippery slope. suggested in one of his papers that a Kantian is better off rejecting what he calls the "personification principle", according to which humanity or rational nature must be respected only in the person of a being who actually possesses it"2. 6 suggests, amounts to respecting, among other things, a being's having had humanity in the past, or having parts of it, or necessary conditions of it .27 Wood does not claim here that we have no obligation to respect humanity 26 27

Wood, "Duties Regarding Nomational Nature". Wood, "Duties Regarding Nomational Nature", 197.

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in persons, but rather that "we should also respect rational nature in the abstract, which entails respecting fragments of it or necessary conditions of it, even where these are not found in fully rational beings or persons"2. 8 In the case of the Alzheimer's patient who does not want to be euthanized, then, we could argue along the lines that, even when humanity is impaired by her disease, she will still have "traces" of humanity or "fragments" of it, which should not be destroyed. humanity in the past can give us reason to refrain from administering euthanasia in her case. for the severely mentally impaired and demented individuals: it could be argued that their having fragments or traces of humanity now and/or having had humanity in the past are reasons against euthanasia. Wood's account sounds promising. are to be maintained, and if the fact that an individual's having had humanity in the past gives us reason to keep him in existence now that he has lost it, then we can argue against euthanasia in the case of the Alzheimer's patient who does not wish to die, as well as in the cases of the demented and mentally impaired individuals. Wood's position here. fragments of humanity are and where they are to be found. this worry aside, however, and agree that the demented individual has had humanity in the past but only fragments of it now, it is not certain what the appropriate way to respect his currently fragmented humanity is. could possibly claim that the way to respect those fragments of humanity is to keep the patient alive. fragmented humanity requires ending the life of its bearer. In any case, the supporters of the first position, namely that traces and fragments of humanity in an individual are to be respected through maintaining his life, will have to argue against cases of voluntary euthanasia as well. who asks to be euthanized, no matter how her rational capacities are impaired as her disease progresses, there will always be fragments of it while she is alive. alive, then access to euthanasia is not an option for her. of argument against non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia, then, becomes an argument against voluntary euthanasia as well.

28

Wood, "Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature", 198.

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Towards an optimistic conclusion

The discussion of the different ways Kantians might understand the idea of respecting humanity (including its fragments) might lead us towards a more promising route. keep a Kantian justification of voluntary euthanasia and at the same time rule out problematic cases of involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia. As explained earlier, there can be disagreement among Kantians as to how fragments of humanity ought to be respected. that this can be done by keeping the individual alive, another can hold that fragmented humanity should not be maintained. This reminds us that there might not be only one act that shows respect towards humanity in a particular case. in justifying voluntary euthanasia, then, namely that it constitutes respect towards the humanity of the patient that is or will be undermined by her condition, is best taken with a grain of salt. as only one of the ways to respect the individual's humanity under the circumstances. we can to help her exercise her rational capacities until this is no longer possible can also be considered as a Kantian position2. 9 If we accept both these positions as legitimate from a Kantian point of view, then perhaps we can be allowed to include other factors in our considerations of whether euthanasia is to be administered in some case. This means that the Alzheimer's patient who wants to die in order to avoid the demise of her humanity can have access to euthanasia because euthanasia in this case is a way of respecting humanity. Alzheimer's patient who wants to die naturally does not have to be euthanized against her will because the continuation of her life is not necessarily inconsistent with respect for her humanity. If we are more open as to how humanity is to be respected, which I believe we ought to, we are in a position to allow for some cases of voluntary euthanasia, while ruling out some cases of non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. 29 GlUlderson argues along these lines in saying that "the progressively demented person is not violating the moral law, but simply losing over time the ability to think in terms of reason". The person who considers ending her life in order to prevent future loss of dignity, by contrast, violates her present dignity and thereby treats humanity in herself merely as a means (Gunderson, "Kantian View of Suicide", 2 80).

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attempting to come to conclusions as to how the dignity of humanity should be respected in action is bound to be done in "frustratingly unsystematic, ambiguous, and even conflicting ways"3 . does not fear that we will end up accepting all (including problematic) interpretations of what actions express respect towards the worth of humanity3 . convinced that "Kantians need not apologize for the fact that their principle does not lead to tidy utilitarian calculations". No fundamental moral principle should be seen as directly solving all moral problems (especially controversial ones). Its task is rather to provide a correct framework within which problems can be raised and discussed.32

3 0 Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, 154. 31 Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, 1 54- 5. 32 Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, 155.

CHAPTER THREE SEXUAL OBJECTIFICATION: THE PROBLEM!

Sexual objectification is a connnon theme in contemporary feminist theory. that due to men's consumption of pornography women as a group are objectified. work exploring the negative, as well as the positive, aspects involved in the notion of objectification. sexuality and objectification have their foundations in the philosophy of Innnanuel Kant. Within sexual relationships outside monogamous marriage, as Kant has argued, the risk of objectification is always present. In loving from sexual inclination, they make the person into an object of their appetite. As soon as the person is possessed, and the appetite sated, they are thrown away, as one throws away a lemon after sucking the juice from it. ... as soon as anyone becomes an object of another's appetite, all motives of moral relationship fall away; as object of the other's appetite, that person is in fact a thing, whereby the other's appetite is sated, and can be misused as such a thing by anybody.2

The loved person, Kant holds in this passage from the Lectures on Ethics, is made into an "object of appetite"; a thing. My purpose in this chapter is, first, to provide a focused study of Kant's views on sexual objectification. coherent theory of objectification. blurred and, at times, even sound contradictory. close and careful examination. 1 A version of this chapter entitled "Sexual Objectification: From Kant to Contemporary Feminism" has been published in Contemporary Political Theory 6: 3 (2007): 330- 348. 2 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 3 84- 5.

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proceed in sections rv and V, to some contemporary feminist discussions on sexual objectification, showing how influential Kant's ideas have been for thinkers like MacKinnon, Dworkin, and Nussbaum. these feminists' work focuses on the striking similarities, as well as the differences, that exist between their views on what objectification is and how it is caused, and Kant's. That Kant's ideas on sex and its dangers find application today in the work of these prominent scholars is an important observation. do indeed have an additional reason to take Kant's views on these issues, which have been criticized harshly by many as puritanical, conservative, even incomprehensible, more seriously. discover the Kantian elements in the work of these feminists is essential in order to comprehend their views on sexuality and objectification. I. Kant and the process of objectification.

I will start my investigation of Kant's views on sexual objectification by dealing with some apparently contradictory views he has about persons and sex. crucial in our understanding of the objectification process: There remains in him an inclination that may be called appetite, and is directed to the enjoyment of the other. This is the sexual impulse. Man can certainly enjoy the other as an instnunent for his service; he can utilize the other's hands or feet to serve him, though by the latter's free choice. But we never find that a human being can be the object of another's enjoyment, save through sexual impulse.3 2. Since the sexual impulse is not an inclination that one wman has for another, qua human, but in inclination for their sex, it is therefore a principium of the debasement of humanity, a SOillce for the preference of one sex over the other, and the dishonouring of that sex by satisfying the inclination. The desire a man has for a woman is not directed to her as a wman being; on the contrary, the woman's humanity is of no concern to him, and the only object ofhis desire is her sex.4 1.

A first glance at the above passages may give one the impression that they involve two contradictory ideas. desire is an appetite for enjoying another human being. She as a human being is the object of the man's enjoyment, and not her work or services. 3 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 384 (My italics). 4 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 385 (My italics).

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According to passage (1), then, sexual desire is directed towards a human being, in a way that makes the latter an object of her partner's enjoyment, and so a thing.5 In the second passage, Kant seems to locate the problem elsewhere; sexual desire is directed towards a human being's sex (towards her eroticized body or genitalia), not towards a human being as such. In fact, according to passage (2), what seems to be wrong with sexual desire is that it does not pay any attention to the other as a human being. involved, all the attention is directed towards the other's sex. those passages leaves us wondering whether the problem with sexuality is that it is directed towards the individual as a human being or, rather, that it is directed towards her sex only. Later on, in the Lectures on Ethics, Kant explains that a human being is constituted by a body and a self, or rational personhood. body and self are integrally bound together, in a way that the two cannot be separated.6 passage (1), that sexual desire is directed towards a human being. The inseparability between body and self makes it simply impossible that sexual desire is directed towards an individual's body only. It is necessarily directed towards an individual as a whole. (2) sounds even more puzzling now. sexual desire is directed towards sex only, not towards a human being as such.7 How can this be possible given his view on the inseparable unity between body and self in human beings? There is, I believe, a possible way to read passages (1) and (2) which removes the apparent contradiction between them. ways in which Kant uses the telTIl "human being" in the passages in question: (a) human being as a unity between body and self, and (b) human being as an individual with humanity, a being with dignity, an 5 Since women, according to Kant, generally have fewer rights and less power than men within sexual relationships outside monogamous marriage, they are the most likely victims of objectification. Even though, in theory, for Kant, a woman can objectify a man, this does not very often happen in practice, as his discussions of concubinage and polygamous marriage reveal. I have decided, therefore, to use the female pronoun for the "loved person" (the objectified) and the male pronoun for the "lover" (the objectifier) throughout this chapter. 6 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 387- 8. According to Herman, a person's self is her rational personhood (Herman, "Kant on Sex and Marriage", 61). 7 Kant, Lectures o n Ethics, 27: 385.

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absolute value that a person has qua person, and that must always be respected in moral choice and action. human being is constituted by a body and a self. I will call it the neutral use. Use (b) refers to the morally correct way to treat one's partner, which is, for Kant, to respect her humanity. "human being" the moral use. Let us go back to the two passages in question with the above in mind. When Kant says, in passage (1), that sexual desire is directed towards a human being he employs the neutral use of this term. directed towards another human being, in the sense that is directed towards an individual's body and self. In passage (2), now, when Kant writes that sexuality is not directed towards a human being as such but towards her sex, he employs the moral use of the telTIl. that, in exercising his sexuality, a person does not respect his partner's humanity. he only wishes to interact sexually. We can conclude from the above that Kant's views in passages (1) and (2) are not contradictory. of how Kant thought sexual desire can objectify: sexual desire is directed towards an individual's person (body and self) in a way that the individual in question is regarded as an object of appetite, a thing. she is not regarded as a person in the moral sense; her humanity is not respected. into) an object of appetite. II. What is it to be an "object of appetite"?

So far, we have dealt with the claim that sexuality leads to the lowering of a person to the status of an object. on what it actually means, for Kant, to be an object of appetite. sense does a person become a thing within a sexual context? In this section, I examine two distinct interpretations of Kant's notion of an object of appetite, Barbara Herman's and Christine Korsgaard's, and argue that a close look at Kant's discussions of prostitution and concubinage gives us evidence in favour of Hemmn's interpretation. According to Hennan's reading of Kant, sexual desire is initially directed towards an individual's body (or body parts). moved by sexual appetite, it is the sex (the eroticized body, the genitalia)

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of the other that is the object of interest".8 inseparability between an individual's body and self, sexual desire is inevitably directed towards her person; towards her body and her self9 . When this happens, HelTIlan believes, the loved individual is not treated as a person in the moral sense. not interest in the other as a person". 10 Rather, the loved person is treated as an object, in the sense of a mere instrument for the satisfaction of her lover's sexual desire. explains that "objectification is plausibly problematic" as it involves regarding someone "as an object - something for use". loved person's consent to be used as a mere tool for her lover's purposes is not, as HelTIlan points out, sufficient to make such use unproblematic: ". . it is possible to have rights of disposal over persons, sexual activity is morally impermissible. anyone (including ourselves) can have rights of disposal"1. 2 Korsgaard agrees with Herman that what Kant finds problematic about sexual desire is the fact that it is directed towards an individual's body and self, that it "takes a person for its object"Y However, Korsgaard, unlike HelTIlan, believes that instrumental treatment is not, for Kant, the problem in a sexual relationship. Regarding someone as a sexual object is not like regarding him as an instrument or a tool, but more like regarding him as an aesthetic object. Viewed through the eyes of sexual desire another person is seen as something wantable, desirable, and, therefore, inevitably possessable. To yield to that desire, to the extent it is really that desire you yield to, is to allow YOillself to be possessed.14

As an aesthetic object, then, an individual becomes nonautonomous; she has no control over her life but, rather, she is possessed and controlled by 8 Herman, "Kant on Sex and Marriage", 55. 9 Herman, "Kant on Sex and Marriage", 55 10 Herman, "Kant on Sex and Marriage", 5 5. II Herman, "Kant on Sex and Marriage", 57. 12 Herman, "Kant on Sex and Marriage", 59. Monogamous marriage is, for Kant, the only exception to this claim. As we will see in the following chapter, Kant thought that the married spouses do indeed gain rights of disposal over each other's persons. 13 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom a/Ends, 194. 14 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom a/Ends, 1 94- 195.

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her lover. Korsgaard, is reduced from person (moral use), someone with dignity, to aesthetic object, something with an "affective price".15 So, HelTIlan and Korsgaard differ in their understanding of what is, for Kant, involved in the reduction from person (moral use) to object within a sexual context. individual's body and self in a way that reduces her to a mere tool for sexual purposes. directed towards an individual's body and self in a way that reduces her to an aesthetic object with an affective price, something nonautonomous and possessable by another. HelTIlan's and Korsgaard's interpretations of Kant's notion of an object of appetite initially appear equally adequate, and it is difficult to decide between them. prostitution and concubinage, however, we notice that there is indeed reason for favouring Herman's interpretation over Korsgaard's. way to understand the prostitute's and the concubine's objectification, I suggest, is as involving a reduction from a person (moral sense) to a mere sexual instrument. III. Prostitution and concubinage

Let us start with prostitution, which Kant defines as the offer for profit of one's person for another's sexual gratification. carmot allow others to use her body parts sexually in exchange for money without inevitably losing her humanity and becoming an object.16 writes: Hence a man cannot dispose over himself; he is not entitled to sell a tooth, or any of his members. But now if a person allows himself to be used, for profit, as an object to satisfy the sexual impulse of another, if he makes himself the object of another's desire, then he is disposing over himself, as if over a thing, and thereby makes himself into a thing by which the other satisfies his appetite, just as his hunger is satisfied on a roast of pork 17

15 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom a/Ends, 214, footnote 1 1 . 16 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 386- 7. 17 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 386.

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A person cannot sell her sexuality or one of her body parts (for example, her tooth) without being reduced to an object of others' use.18 argument is put forward in the following passage: Man cannot dispose over himself, because he is not a thing. He is not his own property that would be a contradiction; for so far as he is a person, he is a subject, who can have ownership of other things. But now were he something o"Wlled by himself, he would be a thing over which he can have ownership. He is, however, a person, who is not property, so he cannot be a thing such as he might 0"Wll; for it is impossible, of COlise, to be at once a thing and a person, a proprietor and a property at the same time.19

Property, according to Kant, is by defmition a tbing owned by tbe proprietor. person). (property). use her for the satisfaction of their sexual desires. allows them to use her as a mere means for their ends. then, the prostitute sacrifices her humanity and is reduced to an object, which can be used by anyone.20 What remains to be discussed now is Kant's idea that selling part of one's body amounts to selling one's whole person. who becomes a slave sells himself, allowing another to use his whole person. sells her whole person, allowing others to use her whole person as an object. ... man is not his 0"Wll property, and cannot do as he pleases with his body; for since the body belongs to the self, it constitutes, in conjunction with that, a person; but now one cannot make one's person a thing ..

1 8 The practice described here by Kant is the less well-kno"Wll to us practice of selling one's tooth to be transplanted to another's mouth. According to Blacbvell, towards the end of the 18th century in Europe, rich individuals would purchase teeth from the least well-off. Surgeons extracted the teeth from the poor and implanted them into the mouths of their wealthy customers. This was, according to Blackwell's research, done mainly for aesthetic reasons, as white and healthy teeth were considered to be fashionable (Blackwell 2004). 19 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 3 86. 20 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 385.

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Chapter Three Now it is evident that if someone concedes a part of himself to the other, he concedes himself entirely. It is not possible to dispose over a part of oneself, for such a part belongs to the whole.21

Thus, for Kant, body and self are inseparable and together constitute tbe person. sexuality. body and self. Kant's answer here is vulnerable to criticism. person would not be a self without a body, we are not rationally compelled to embrace the view tbat selling part of her body amounts to the agent's selling her whole person. "the fallacy of division", that is, he mistakenly argues that what is true of a whole must also be true of its parts. Human beings have dignity. Human beings can also suffer offenses against dignity ... But it is fallacious to argue that, in consequence, hmnan body parts have dignity or can suffer offences against dignity. Similarly, even if a living hmnan being has an lUlconditioned and incomparable worth, it does not follow that parts of that hmnan being's body do. And even if persons lack property rights in themselves or their whole bodies, it does not follow that they lack property rights in their body parts or that those parts are not commodities.22

Despite the above criticism, we can now understand more clearly why Kant thought that tbe prostitute is used merely as a means. that the clients reduce her to a thing that can be bought, an object, a property. clients' end of using her for sexual satisfaction or give her consent to such a use. compelled to have, namely that of respect towards her humanity. person who commits suicide to avoid a miserable existence carmot, as discussed in the first chapter, give his consent or share his own end of putting an end to his life without abandoning tbe end or respect for humanity in his 0\Vll person. sexuality for profit while at the same time keeping her humanity intact. Kant puts most of the blame on the prostitute for tbe harm done to her humanity. and degradation, as long as she voluntarily allows others to use her person 21 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 387. 22 MlUlzer, "Property Rights on Body Parts", 275.

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(body and self) sexually for profit, and so to tum her into a n object.23 is inclined to think here that, according to Kant, it is the prostitute and not the clients who makes her 0\Vll person into an object. reading, the clients are not responsible for the loss of the prostitute's humanity because they are not the ones who objectify her. interpretation, however, is problematic. the context of prostitution is natural, in other words it is use of another person 's sexual attributes. moment she was sexually used by the clients, the latter would be using an object and the sexual use in question would be unnatural.24 According to Kant, then, it is the clients who make the prostitute into an object in using her for the satisfaction of their sexual desires. the clients objectify the prostitute, however, Kant blames the prostitute for her objectification and degradation. the clients to use her person in this way and hann her humanity. then, there are two wrongs involved in prostitution: on the one hand, what the prostitute does (allowing others to use her sexuality in exchange for profit), and on the other hand, what the clients do (using the prostitute for the satisfaction of their sexual desires and thus reducing her to an object). According to Korsgaard, as we have seen, to be an object of appetite, for Kant, is to be an aesthetic object; something desirable and inevitably possessable; something nonautonomous, yet not a mere sexual tool. it be plausible to say that the prostitute is reduced to an aesthetic object? I believe not. that the clients derive pleasure from possessing her and admiring her beauty, but not from using her as an instrument for sexual satisfaction. We can certainly imagine someone who has no interest in using the prostitute as an instrument for sexual gratification. question only wants to possess and control her. could possibly think of the prostitute as an aesthetic object. is not the typical way in which clients treat prostitutes. mainly - if not exclusively - to use the prostitute as a tool for sexual purposes.

23 The clients in prostitution do not, for Kant, get objectified. In blindly slllTendering to their sexual inclinations, however, their humanity is harmed because it is, as Kant explains, "put on a par with animal nature. ... So the sexual impulse puts humanity in peril of being equated with animality" (Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 385). 24 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 390-2, Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 277.

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The above special case, furthelTIlore, does not seem to capture Kant's O\Vll views about prostitution. about prostitution is that the prostitute disposes over her person, allowing everyone to use her as a thing for the satisfaction of sexual desire. prostitute is used, Kant writes, for the satisfaction of one's sexual appetite, just like a steak is used for the satisfaction of one's hunger.25 prostitute is comparable to a steak, she carmot, for Kant, have the status of an aesthetic object. interpretation of an "object of appetite" as a mere tool successfully captures what is involved in the prostitute's objectification. Korsgaard's reading of an object of appetite as an aesthetic object, moreover, cannot very easily be used to describe the objectification of the concubine. relationship between a man and more than one woman (the concubines). According to Kant, concubinage is a purely sexual relationship in which all parties aim at the satisfaction of their sexual inclinations2. 6 with this relationship is that the parties surrender themselves to one another merely to satisfy their sexual inclination, but retain freedom and rights in regard to other circumstances affecting their person (for example, the concern for each other's happiness). only part of each individual's person (their sexual attributes) and not the whole person.27 However, this, according to Kant, is not possible: Yet if, in concubinage, I enjoy one part of the other, I thereby enjoy the whole person. Now since, under the terms of concubinage, I have no right to that whole, but only to a part of it, it follows that I am treating the whole person as a thing; hence this method of satisfying one's inclinations is likewise impermissible on moral grOlUlds.28

The reason the partners in concubinage carmot gain rights of disposal of their whole persons is, for Kant, because concubinage is a relationship of inequality. but he does not totally surrender himself to any of the women. concubinage, then, the man, like his female sexual partners, does surrender his body, and so his person (neutral use), to each of those women. inevitable, given Kant's views on the unity between body and self in human beings. 25 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 386. 26 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 387. 27 Kant, Lectures o n Ethics, 27: 386. 28 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 387- 8.

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does not totally (in the sense of exclusively) surrender his sex, and so he does not completely surrender his person (body and self) to any of those women. individual can wholly (completely) or partly surrender his sex (and so his person) to his sexual partner2. 9 It is this inequality in the surrender between the man and each of his concubines that Kant thinks leads to the objectification of the party who surrenders herself wholly to her partner. Metaphysics of Morals, in polygamous relationships the woman, in surrendering her body and self completely to her partner, allows the latter to completely possess (and make use of) her person. writes, "gets her completely", whereas the woman "gains only part of the man". to completely possess her person, without herself being able to similarly possess his person, Kant believes, a concubine loses her person and is reduced to an object.3 takes place in concubinage: Concubinage

• The concubine surrenders her person (body and self) completely to her male partner.

'She allows him to possess her person completely. • She loses her person and becomes a thing.

• The male partner does not completely (only partly) surrender his person to her.

•He does not allow her to possess hisperson completely.

• He does not lose his person, and so he does not get objectified.

29 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 387-9. Kant's views are very similar when it comes to polygamous marriage. He \Vfites about a man who has two wives: " .. each wife would have half a husband, since she has given herself totally to him, and thus has a total right to his person as well" (Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27:389). 3 0 Kant, Metaphysics ofMorals, 6:278. The man in concubinage manages to save himself from objectification (the idea seems to be, albeit odd, that he does not surrender his person completely to any woman, so no woman can possess his person completely, so he does not lose his person). However, he is morally harmed as well. In exercising his sexuality within this morally problematic context, he lowers himself to the level of animals. It is the danger of animality, therefore, that threatens his hmnanity.

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How plausible is the idea of a concubine as an aesthetic object with an affective price? We could perhaps imagine a man who regards his concubines as aesthetic objects and attributes to each of them a special affective price. and wants to keep them in his possession; he wants to be able to enjoy them, in the same way he enjoys a collection of art objects. able to enjoy each of these women whenever he wishes to, he must possess and control them. his nonautonomous women/aesthetic objects. However, we must remember that, for Kant, concubinage is a purely sexual relationship. surrenders to the other merely to satisfy inclination". concubine as an aesthetic object loses its plausibility as soon as we bring that to mind. beautiful objects to possess, control and admire, he above all regards them as instruments for his sexual satisfaction. aesthetic objects fails to capture Kant's emphasis on the sexual use that is clearly present within this relationship. concerned with the fact that the concubines are used for the satisfaction of sexual desire, that the male partner disposes over those women's bodies and selves and turns them into objects for sexual pleasure. HelTIlan's interpretation of Kant's "object of appetite", in this context again, manages to capture the instrumentality that occurs within concubinage. Within women are reduced not to precious aesthetic objects but, rather, to mere sexual instruments, useful tools for sexual pleasure. IV. Sexual objectification: The feminists

It has been argued, in the previous sections, that objectification, for Kant, involves the reduction of a person to the level of an object for use; a mere sexual instrument. individual's humanity; she no longer has a dignity, an absolute value, but only a relative or instrumental value. MacKinnon and Dworkin describe objectification in strikingly similar telTIls. 31 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27:388. 32 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 387- 9.

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person as an object, a mere instrument for someone else's purposes, in such a way that the person in question is reduced to the status of an object for use. phenomenon of sexual objectification: Objectification occms when a human being.. is made less than human, turned into a thing or commodity, bought or sold. When objectification occms, a person is depersonalized ... those who can be used as if they are not fully human are no longer fully hurnan in social terms; their humanity is hurt by being diminished.33

MacKinnon too uses Kantian language in her description of sexual objectification. A sex object is defined on the basis of its looks, in terms of its usability for sexual pleasme ... A person, in one Kantian view, is a free and rational agent whose existence is an end in itself, as opposed to instnunental. In pornography women exist to the end of male pleasure.34 Women's objectification, according to Dworkin and MacKinnon, is brought about by men's consumption of pornography. pornography as follows: [Pornography is] the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women though pictures or words that also includes women dehurnanised as sexual objects, things, or commodities; enjoying pain or humiliation or rape; being tied up, cut up, mutilated, bruised, or physically hurt; in postures of sexual submission or servility or display; reduced to body parts, penetrated by objects or animals, or presented in scenarios of degradation, injmy, torture; shO\vn as filthy or inferior; bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexuap5

According to this definition, pornography does not only cause women's objectification and subordination but it constitutes it. pornography is women's objectification and subordination. Kant compares the objectified individual to a lemon, used and discarded afterwards, and elsewhere to a steak consumed by people for the satisfaction of their hunger.3

33 Dworkin, "Censorship, Pornography, Equality", 30- 1 . 34 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, 173, 158. 35 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, 176. 36 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 384, 386.

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due to men's consumption of pornography women become comparable to cups, and as such they are valued only for how they can be used by men.3 For Kant, Dworkin, and MacKinnon, then, objectification involves treating a person as an object (a mere sexual tool), in a way that leads to the reduction of the individual in question to the status of a thing for use (a lemon, a steak, a cup). constitutes a serious hatm to an individual's humanity. Nussbaum conceives of objectification in a much broader way than Kant, MacKinnon and Dworkin. the idea of objectification: instrumentality, denial of autonomy, inertness, fungibility, violability, ownership, and denial of subjectivity.38 aims to challenge the idea shared by Kant, as well as by MacKinnon and Dworkin, that objectification should be conceived as a phenomenon that necessarily halTIls an individual's humanity. suggests, can be treated as an object in one or more of these seven ways, without such treatment posing a threat to her humanity. she believes, can possibly constitute a hannless or even a "wonderful" element of sexual life3 . Nussbaum, however, does acknowledge the fact that objectification often takes negative fOlTIls, constituting a serious harm to people's humanity. For example, Nussbaum agrees with MacKinnon, Dworkin and Kant that objectification in the fOlTIl of treating an individual as a mere instrument for another's purposes is deeply problematic morally. appear that Kant, MacKinnon, and Dworkin are correct in one central insight: that the instrumental treatment of human beings, the treatment of human beings as tools of the purposes of another, is always morally problematic".4 Sexual objectification, then, as described by Kant, involving the treatment of a person as a mere sexual instrument, is still recognized as a deeply worrying phenomenon by contemporary feminists. and Dworkin, furthelTIlore, agree with Kant that the phenomenon of objectification is tightly linked to inequality. thought, because of the inequality in the possession of the two parties' persons, the woman eventually loses her person and becomes a thing. 37 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, 138. 3 8 Nussbaum, "Objectification", 257. 39 Nussbaum, "Objectification", 251 . 40 Nussbaum, "Objectification", 289.

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marriage, by contrast, there is no objectification taking place precisely because the two spouses are equal in the O\vnership of each other' persons. Nussbaum follows Kant in arguing tbat within sexual contexts characterized by inequality and lack of mutuality between the parties involved, people's humanity is at risk. argues, is of a negative kind. negative objectification, in her article: a passage from Hankinson's novel, Isabelle and Veronique, in which the heroine Isabelle is raped and physically hurt by a man; An example from Playboy, in which the woman depicted in the magazine is treated by men as a mere sexual tool; and, finally, a passage taken from James' Golden Bowl, where the two heroes, Adam and the Maggie, treat their respective spouses as antique fumiture.4 In all three of tbese cases, characterized by inequality and lack of reciprocity, the powerless individuals' humanity, as Nussbaum acknowledges, is deeply hurt. MacKinnon and Dworkin also take inequality of power to be closely bound up with objectification. that the phenomenon of inequality is much more widespread and pervasive than Kant and Nussbaum take it to be. emphasize that we live in a world of gender inequality. A person's gender is, for MacKinnon, clearly distinguished fOlTIl a person's sex. Gender, being a man or a woman, is socially constructed, whereas sex, being male or female, is biologically defined. and women have very clearly defined roles: women (all women, women as a group) are objectified, whereas men (all men, men as a group) are their objectifiers. For MacKinnon and Dworkin, then, women are by definition the objectified. is responsible for creating and sustaining this unfortunate reality4 . by contrast, did not take women's objectification to be a necessary fact. 41 Nussbaum, "Objectification", 252- 3, 253, 353- 4 respectively. 42 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, 6, 32- 45, 50, MacKinnon, Feminist Theory ofthe State, 1 1 3- 4, 128, 137- 40, Haslanger, "On Being Objective", 98- 1 0 1 . 43 A s MacKinnon explains: "Men treat women a s who they see women as being. Pornography constructs who that is. Men's power over women means that the way men see women defines who women can be. Pornography is that way. Pornography is not imagery in some relation to a reality elsewhere constructed. It is not a distortion, reflection, projection, expression, fantasy, representation, or symbol either. It is sexual reality" (MacKinnon, 1987, 172- 3).

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Even though he did acknowledge the fact that women are the most common victims of objectification, Kant did not exclude the possibility of a woman objectifying a man if she happens to be in a position of power within a certain relationship. Dworkin, thought that men's humanity is also at risk when engaging in problematic sexual contexts, even when they do not get objectified. instance, within prostitution and concubinage, as we have seen, Kant believed tbat men's humanity is threatened by the danger of animality. Interestingly, Kant and the anti-pornography feminists in question agree that a person's consent to allow herself to be sexually used by others as an object is not enough to make such use pelTIlissible. towards tbe objectified individual is completely different. Kant, it is the responsibility of a person to refrain from offering herself as a sexual instrument outside the contexts of monogamous marriage, in order to protect her own humanity and avoid her objectification. does allow others to make sexual use of her, then she is responsible and blamewortby for the harm done to her humanity. harsh towards the objectified individual who, according to him, chooses to dishonour her humanity in offering her person as a thing to be sexually used by others. MacKinnon and Dworkin, on the other hand, believe that women consent to be sexually used by men, not because they truly want to be used in this way, but simply out of lack of options available to them witbin our patriarchal societies. MacKinnon notes: "The sex is not chosen for the sex. medium of force and provides the cover for consent".4 Dworkin, then, do not take women to be truly blameworthy for their reduction to objects of merely instrumental value. according to them, is demanded and inflicted by men in our societies. Dworkin characteristically writes: " . . take the initiative in your own human destruction . . Conclusion

This chapter has provided an analysis of Kant's views on sexual objectification, the degradation of a person with humanity and dignity to a sexual object to be used by others. 44 MacKinnon, Only Words, 28. 45 Dworkin, Intercourse, 143.

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humanity and is turned into a thing with merely instrumental value. Moreover, this chapter dealt with Kant's views on prostitution and concubinage. to Kant, sacrifice their humanity and are being reduced to mere tools for the satisfaction of others' desires. Kant's ideas have been extremely influential for contemporary feminist theory. objectification as involving a reduction from a person to a mere sexual instrument. allow one's person to be used for sexual purposes is not sufficient to make such use pelTIlissible. tool, according to these feminists, is not true consent in the context of our patriarchal societies. Nussbaum Dworkin that, when a person is used merely as a means for the satisfaction of others' desires, her humanity is halTIled. possibility, as we will see in the following chapter, that objectification might take positive forms if it takes place in contexts characterized by the Kantian ideal of equality and mutuality.

CHAPTER FOUR SEXUAL OBJECTIFICATION: SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS!

I. Kant's solution: Monogamous marriage

Kant, in the Lectures on Ethics, admits that exercise of sexuality is very important. Without it, thought that the only context in which people can exercise their sexuality without debasing their humanity is that of monogamous marriage ? This section explains Kant's reasons for thinking that sexuality is on a par with morality only in a monogamous marital relationship. According to Kant, two heterosexual people who want to make use of each other's sexuality in a way that is in accordance with morality must come to O\Vll each other's whole persons (their bodies and their selves). they must gain rights to control and to make use of each other's bodies and selves. follows that M has a right over the body of W, and so M is allowed to use W sexually. between an individual's body and self. The body, Kant states in the Lectures on Ethics, is an inseparable part of the self, and together with the self it constitutes the person. W gives M the right to control and make use of W's body sexually and otherwise 4 "But how am I to obtain it [the rights over the whole person of another]?," Kant asks. precisely such a right over my whole person, and this happens only in marriage". 1 A version of this chapter entitled "Kantian Marriage and Beyond: "Why it Is Worth Thinking About Kant on Sex and Marriage" has originally appeared in Hypatia 25: 2 (2010): 276- 294. 2 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 385. 3 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 388. 4 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 278- 9. 5 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 388.

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person of W is to give W the very same right over his whole person. is, M must allow W to own his body and self. In order for M and W to gain such rights over each other's persons, they must, for Kant, marry. Marriage gives the spouses a right to lifelong O\vnership of each other's whole persons, which includes the right to lifelong ownership of each other's bodies. the right to use each other's sexual attributes. Kant makes it absolutely clear that monogamy is required. Metaphysics a/Morals: ... the relation of the partners in a marriage is a relation of equality of possession, equality ... in their possession of each other as persons (hence only in monogamy, since in polygamy the person who smrenders herself gains only a part of the man who gets her completely, and therefore makes herself into a mere thing) ... 7

Polygamous marriage (as well as other non-marital, polygamous relationships) lacks equality in the degree of surrender between the two partners' persons. man, thus allowing him to completely 0\Vll her person. However, does not exclusively surrender his person to her, and so he does not allow her to 0\Vll his person completely. fails to gain her person (which is owned by her partner) back, and is objectified. surrender their persons exclusively to each other, each allowing the other to completely own his or her person (body and self). reciprocity in the giving and taking of the two parties' persons that guarantees neither of them will lose his or her person and become a thing. Kant writes: If only one partner yields to the other his person, his good or ill fortune, and all his circumstances, to have right over them, and does not receive in turn a corresponding identical right over the person of the other, then there is an inequality here. But if I hand over my whole person to the other, and thereby obtain the person of the other in place of it, I get myself back again, and have thereby regained myself, for I gain the person to whom I have myself as property. The two persons thus constitute a lUlity of wilJ. 8

6 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 278- 9. 7 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 278. 8 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 388.

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Figure 1 below explains what takes place in this mutual giving and taking of the spouses' persons, which Herman has described as a "romantic blending" of the spouses9: 'Romantic blending'

-The wife surrenders her person (body and self) completely to her husband, allowing him to 0\Vll her person.

-The husband surrenders his person (body and self) completely to his wife, allowing her to 0\Vll his person.

-The wife loses her person, which is now in her husband's o\Vllership.

-The husband loses his person, which is now in his wife's o\Vllership.

• But the wife owns the husband, who O\VllS her person.

• And the husband owns the wife, who O\VllS his person.

-So, the wife manages to gain her own person back (through owning the person of her husband).

• And the husband manages to gain his person back (through owning the person of the wife)�

Figure 1

So far, we have seen that the two partners within a monogamous relationship are not in danger of being objectified because they are in a position to completely 0\Vll each other's persons. contrast, the woman inevitably is objectified, as she carmot 0\Vll her partner's person completely. relationship between two sexual partners must be in accordance with law, that is, it must be a marital relationship? Kant wants something external, the law, to guarantee the lifelong o\Vllership of the two parties' persons. Marriage is a legal contract, which obligates the two parties to surrender their persons exclusively to each other, each allowing the other to completely 0\Vll his or her person. right to stop surrendering their persons to each other in this way. obligation to surrender one's person to one's spouse is what makes marriage different from a relationship between two unmarried partners. Within a non-marital relationship the two partners may surrender their 9 Herman, "Kant on Sex and Marriage", 6 1 .

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persons completely to each other, as long as they feel like it, but there is nothing external to guarantee that this reciprocal surrender will last. absence of a legal obligation to keep surrendering their persons to each other for life, there is always the risk that one of the two partners will leave the other. each of the two parties security: since each spouse is O\vned by the other, neither of them has the right to leave the other. can safely surrender his or her person completely, reassured that the other will do the same. To summarize, two people who wish to use each other sexually must, for Kant, gain rights over each other's persons (bodies and selves). rights, Kant thought, can be gained within monogamous marriage. relationship between the two parties must be: (a) monogamous, so that both parties gain their persons back and avoid their objectification; and (b) legal, so that the lifelong ownership of the partners is guaranteed. II. Spouses as proprietors and properties: Paradoxical and Objectifying

According to Kant, as we have seen, in becoming each other's properties, the spouses eventually come to win their persons back. spouse to be the property of the other and, at the same time, the other's proprietor. conception of the married partners as both proprietors and properties. Furthermore, it raises the worry that Kantian marriage might result not in a "romantic," but rather in an "objectifying" blending of the two spouses. So, is it really possible for the two spouses to win their persons back through equally and reciprocally owning each other. marriage in the Lectures on Ethics, Kant makes the following statement about proprietors and properties: Man cannot dispose over himself, because he is not a thing. He is not his own property- that would be a contradiction; for so far as he is a person, he is a subject, who can have ownership of other things. But now were he something o"Wlled by himself, he would be a thing over which he can have ownership. He is, however, a person, who is not property, so he cannot be a thing such as he might 0"Wll; for it is impossible, of COlise, to be at once a thing and a person, a proprietor and a property at the same time.10

10 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 386.

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Kant says in this passage that an individual cannot be both a proprietor and a property. both a person and a thing, which is conceptually impossible. by definition, the tbing to be owned (controlled) by the proprietor. proprietor is, by definition, the person who O\VllS (controls) property. a person cannot be property (and property cannot be a person). comes to marriage, Kant seems to ignore his previously expressed conviction that it is impossible for one to be both a proprietor and a property. and properties at the same time. becomes paradoxical. (proprietor) and a thing (property), yet the spouses achieve their "romantic blending" through being each other's properties and proprietors. Qinte clearly, the equal and reciprocal ownership of each spouse by tbe other that Kant envisages carmot be achieved, if we take seriously his view about the impossibility of being the proprietor and the property at tbe same time. becomes a thing to be owned by her. position to 0\Vll the wife. wife) and one property (the husband). that the wife becomes her husband's property, she becomes a thing, and as such she cannot possibly 0\Vll her husband. husband is tbe proprietor and tbe wife is the property. The spouses, therefore, carmot mutually acquire each other as properties. They cannot possibly be proprietors and properties at the same time. Kant wants to describe marriage in terms of proprietors and properties, he can only go so far as to say that one spouse is the proprietor and the other is the property. two spouses, would never accept that this can be the case in marriage. One might think that the paradox in Kantian marriage can be avoided if we take Kant to be making a more limited claim about the impossibility of someone being both a proprietor and a property. to be making the claim tbat a person cannot be his own property. words, an individual cannot be the O\Vller of his 0\Vll person. this reading, however, there is no contradiction in saying that a person is someone else's property. the wife's property and the wife is tbe husband's property, Kant's conception of marriage no longer sounds contradictory. seems to have vanished, one might think.

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not free of complications. his person, the husband comes to O\Vll his person. who owns her person, the wife regains ownership of her person. then, is presented by Kant as being his own property. is her own property. ll spouses manage to eventually "reclaim" their persons: each reacquires his or her own person in O\vning the person by whom he or she is owned. to Kant, then, the husband is indeed his own property, and the wife is her O\Vll property. his or her own property does not get us any finther in avoiding the contradiction in marriage; ultimately, Kant presents each spouse as being his or her own property, which is conceptually impossible. So here we are, back at the very heart of the paradox: two spouses, whom Kant wants to be both each other's proprietors and properties, but who carmot possibly be conceived as each other's proprietors and properties at the same time. insists on the importance of reciprocity in O\vnership between the spouses, but such reciprocal O\vnership of the two spouses' persons by each other cannot be conceived. each other. reciprocally 0'Wll each other, however, it is dubious that this could ever result in the sort of "romantic blending" Kant had in mind. each other, the husband and the wife would tum each other into properties, and so into things. reciprocal objectification, as explained in Figure 2 below. 'Objectifying blending'

•The wife surrenders her person (body and self) completely to her husband, allowing him to own herperson.

-The husband surrenders his person (body and self) completely to his wife, allowing her to own his person.

'The wife is her husband's propertv, and so a thing.

'The husband is the wife's propertv, and so a thing.

•

The wife has lost her person.

Figure 2

11

Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 278.

•

The husband has lost his person.

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Kantian marriage, therefore, results in the creation of two things: the husband and the wife. person in tliat thing which is her husband, and tlie same holds for tlie husband. be said to 0\Vll each other anymore. things. first, the wife no longer is a person but a thing and, second, because he also is a thing and as such incapable of o\Vlling anything or anyone. the same reasons, the objectified wife cannot own the husband's person. This way, reciprocity falls apart completely and all we are left witli in marriage are two separate things, the husband and the wife, incapable of any sort of reciprocal relation between them. ideal union Kant hoped them to, the spouses seem, rather, to be sinking into a sort of mutual objectification. III. Saving Marriage: The "Unity of Will"

Is there a way to save Kant's conception of marriage? In this section, I consider an alternative reading of Kant, suggested by Christine Korsgaard, which can provide a promising solution to the marriage paradox, and can furthermore lead to a spousal "romantic blending". Korsgaard seems to be taking marriage as an exception to Kant's claim that one cannot be both a proprietor and a property. believes that Kantian marriage involves reciprocal proprietary relations of a different sort. in a somewhat different way. sense that she is a person to be controlled by the fOlTIler. husband is the wife's property, in the sense that he is a person to be controlled by her. not reduced to something. Rather, someone to be controlled by the other spouse. the telTIl property in marriage can be supported by Kant's 0\Vll claim in the Metaphysics ofMorals that each spouse is "acquired by tlie other as if it were a thing . . . them to be persons who are owned by each other as if they were things. What does this mean? Each spouse is controlled by the other, in the same way the spouse can control the things that he or she O\VllS. the wife is justified in controlling the objects that she O\VllS, say in the 12 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom a/Ends, 194-95, 215 (footnote 14). 13 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 278.

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household, and so has a right to bringing her own husband back in her possession, should he leave her, just as [she] is justified in retrieving them back into her possession if they are taken away from her. Since the spouses manage to get away with being each other's properties without reducing themselves to the status of objects, it seems that Kant's view on the impossibility of being both a proprietor and property does not hold in marriage. Kant suggested in the Lectures on Ethics, to be both a person and a thing. Each spouse manages to remain a person even as the other's property, which is what allows him or her to be the proprietor of the other. Marriage, then, is no longer paradoxical. both proprietors (controllers) and properties (controlled). of them is able to control the way the other controls him or her. their equal and reciprocal controlling, Korsgaard holds, the two spouses are transfOlmed into a new entity: a unified agent. separate agents, the husband and the wife, but one larger agent: the couple, or what Kant calls in a more dramatic fashion, a "unity of will". But what does it mean, more specifically, to say that the spouses have unified their wills? As Korsgaard explains: If you think of the will as a pre-existing entity, rather than as a product of self-constitution, it smmds very mysterious, like some sort of act of ontological fusion. But Kant doesn't mean anything like that. When we interact with each other what we do is deliberate together, to arrive at a shared decision. Since the conduct of practical syllogism is an action, the result is an action that we perform together, governed by a law we freely choose together.15

As a unity of will, then, the spouses engage in shared deliberation and decision-making. spouse and to direct his or her conduct. direct the conduct of each, they must now make their decisions together. Figure 3 below summarizes what happens to the spouses' persons in marriage, if we take Korsgaard's reading.

14 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 388. 15 Korsgaard, "Integrity and Interaction", 190.

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"Unity of will blending"

-The wife surrenders her person (body and self) completely to her husband, allowing him to 0\Vll her person.

-The husband surrenders his person (body and self) completely to his wife, allowing her to 0\Vll his person.

'The wife is her husband's property, and so controlled by him.

'The husband is his wife's property, and so controlled by her.

• But the wife controls the husband who controls her.

• And the husband controls the wife who controls him.

-So, the wife controls her 0\Vll person (through controlling the person of her husband).

• And the husband controls his own person (through controlling the person of the wife).

A unity ofwill is created out of the two spouses. (. .

Figure 3

The ttunity of will blendingtt of the two spouses is free from the objectification threat. is to be someone (a person) controlled by another. nor the wife is in danger of being turned into an object as a result of their mutual ownership of each other. the couple. control of their shared lives. IV. Feminist Concerns

The question that arises now is: is this perfect equality and reciprocity in the owning and controlling of the two spouses really possible between a Kantian husband and a Kantian wife? Kant vividly states in Observations and Anthropology that men and women are by their natures very different.

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as the !tfair sex!!) carmot reason as well as men, but are better at sensing and using their intuitions; they do not care about that which is useful, but only about the beautiful; education is not proper for them, since it ruins their beautiful nature; they are incapable of principles; they perfonn an action only if it pleases them, not out of duty; women are not fit for serious employments; they are physically and emotionally weak and depend on men for protection. the ttnoble sextt) are characterized by a deep understanding and a noble disposition; they are capable of principles; men can avoid evil actions out of duty; they are stronger than women, and more fit for engaging in serious deliberations and dealing with practical matters. Given Kant's beliefs about the natural differences that exist between men and women, his claim that the husband and the wife can equally and reciprocally 0\Vll each other in marriage sounds unrealistic to the modern reader. controlling him and directing his conduct. by his nature the party to direct: he has a deep understanding of things, which makes him the one to make the decisions within marriage. woman, by contrast, does not seem to be equally capable of making serious decisions and dealing with practical matters. the husband who is in the best position of controlling his wife's conduct and of making decisions for both himself and his wife. hope, then, that marriage, given Kant's views on men and women, can be a relationship of true equality and reciprocity in the controlling between the two spouses. the husband is the O\Vller, the one to control, and the wife is one to be o\Vlled and controlled. 'When then, far from being a relationship of equality and mutuality, marriage looks more like a Hobbesian struggle for power, where the husband dominates the wife. Contemporary feminists have been critical of Kant's conception of marriage, pointing out that it is indeed a context characterized by inequality between the two spouses. views on men's and women's status in society, holds that when it comes to marriage, Kant never departs from his belief that man is naturally superior to woman, nor does he question the concomitant right of the husband to command the wife quite clear that the natural superiority of the husband brings with it the right to command on his part, and the duty to obey on 16

Kant, Observations, 77-96; Kant,Anthrop% gy, 22.

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her parttt. and the wife are naturally equal, but the wife chooses to submit to her husband for the interest of the family; at other times, Kant claims that the husband and the wife are by their nature unequal. As Mendus rightly suggests, ttthe crucial point . . . woman is fOlmally equal with man, her nature is different from man's naturett. inclination and man's with reason. [women] are not strictly rational,tt Mendus writes. man, according to Kant's views, is more capable of ruling and controlling. Marriage, Mendus argues, is not a relationship of equality between the two spouses; it is a context in which the husband is the one to control, and the wife is the one to be controlled. Pateman is also suspicious of the unity of will that is, for Kant, created out of the husband and the wife. wills is represented by the will of the husbandtt. Kant regards women (as opposed to men) as passive citizens by their nature. marriage as a contractual arrangement. lack the civil standing that is necessary in order to enter into contracts or hold property. commodity, a piece of propertytt. The class of passive citizens, however, also includes, for Kant, a large number of men: those who sell their labor or skills directly to others for a wage as opposed to selling the products of their labor in the open market. So it is not unusual at all to have a marriage in which both the husband and the wife are passive citizens. they are incapable of contracting with each other. is clear that being classified as a passive citizen does not entail that you carmot 0\Vll property and enter into contracts as an equal under the law. Kant explicitly insists that the dependence and unequal power of passive

Mendus, "An Honest but Narrow-Minded Bomgeois", 176. Mendus, "An Honest but Narrow-Minded Bomgeois", 178. 19 Mendus, "An Honest but Narrow-Minded Bomgeois", 1 80. 20 Pateman, "Feminism and the Marriage Contract", 172. 21 Pateman, "Feminism and the Marriage Contract", 172. 17

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citizens is not to be understood as warranting legal treatment at odds with their innate rightstt. Even if we take it, then, that women are passive citizens by their nature with no hope of ever becoming active citizens, this does not automatically lead to the conclusion that women are indeed incapable of being O\vners (both owners of their husbands and of their material goods). passive citizen does not necessarily disable an individual from being an O\vner, reducing him or her to the status of property. has concluded somewhat too quickly that within Kantian marriage the man is the proprietor, and the woman his property. Pateman, however, is right to be suspicious of Kant's conception of marriage. property, carmot legitimately be reached from the mere fact that women are passive citizens, it can indeed be reached, as mentioned earlier, from Kant's general beliefs about the nature of men and women. obvious from what Kant writes in the Observations and the Anthropology that women are by their nature the ones to be controlled by men. Feminists, then, have good reason to worry that Kantian marriage does entail inequality and lack of reciprocity in the owning and controlling between the spouses. appears far less attractive if we think of men and women in the way Kant instructs us to think of them. as equally and mutually controlling their lives by engaging in shared deliberation and decision-making. husband, who is really autonomous and in control. pointed out: "The threat to the autonomous agent would seem to be increased rather than resolved in the surrender to the new union of persons, a threat that is especially acute to women, who are not likely to share equally in the direction of the new union". The marital blending of a Kantian man and a Kantian woman into a unity of will, then, is likely to leave the modem reader unsatisfied, given Kant's beliefs about men's and women's natures. unquestionably deeply disappointing, and Kant deserves to be harshly criticized for holding them. took the way men and women were in his environment to be a product of 22 Wilson, "Kant and the Marriage Right", 1 19. 23 Herman, "Kant on Sex and Marriage", 61.

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their natures. have nothing interesting philosophically to offer us. are better off ignoring them. Even if we are justified in rejecting Kant's views on men and women, however, it would be unfair to reject his conception of marriage with the same ease. feminism, if we flesh it out with his views on men and women from the Observations and the Anthropology. This, however, is not something we need to do. from Kant's no longer accept able views on gender. views on the natural differences between men and women, and assuming equality and reciprocity between two spouses can lead to the creation of a true unity of will: one that is represented and controlled equally. V. Beyond Marriage

Marriage, then, if we disentangle it from Kant's outdated views on men and women, can be a morally sound relationship, and we can understand Kant's reasons for believing that sex within this morally safe context is pelTIlissible. conviction that marriage is the only context in which people can exercise their sexuality in a morally unproblematic way. that setting aside Kant's beliefs about men's and women's natures can also allow for the moral permissibility of sexual use within a different relationship: one that has the characteristics Kant attributes to "friendship of disposition". by absolute confidence between the friends, based on true communication and understanding. According 25

If I possess such a friend, of whom I know that his disposition is upright and kindly, neither malicious nor false, he will already be helpful in rectifying my judgement, when I have gone astray. This is the whole purpose of man, which allows him to enjoy his existence.26

Marriage and friendship, as Kant describes them, have a lot in common. The most striking similarity between these two relationships is that they both involve a blending of persons into a unity of will. Only. instead 24 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 424, 27: 426 25 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 426- 7. 26 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 427.

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language of mutual ownership and control used by Kant to describe the "spousal blending", the "friendship blending" is presented as one of mutual love, care, and happiness: The greatest love I can have for another is to love him as myself, for I cannot love anybody more than that; but if I would love him as myself, I can do it no otherwise than by being assured that he will love me as much as himself; in that case I am requited for what I part with, and thereby gain occupancy of rnyself.27 If I choose friendship only, and look solely to the other's happiness, in the assmance that he is similarly looking after mine, then this is indeed a reciprocal love, whereby I am again requited. Here each would be tending the other's happiness from generosity; I do not throw away my happiness, but merely place it in the other hands, while I have the other's happiness in my O"Wll.28 In friendship, we might say, the lUlity of the persons, or the reciprocal possession of one another by two persons, whereby they feel and think in common, is still more perfectly present, and with more equality, than in marriage.29

Friendship is very much like marriage but without the O\vnership element of the latter. other. owning each other, but through equally and reciprocally surrendering their happiness to each other. friends is more ideal than the unity of will between two married spouses. This might have to do with the absence of ownership in friendship. spouses need something external, the law, to bring and keep them together. By contrast, friends are brought together by freely surrendering their happiness to each other. going: I love my friend and look after his happiness; he loves me and looks after my happiness. be promoted by the generosity of others, and this is the Idea of friendship, where self-love is swallowed up in the idea of generous mutual love". Friends, furthermore, are capable of reaching a very high level of communication with each other. 27 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 423- 4. 28 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 424. 29 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 683. 3 0 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 423.

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people to reach this high level of communication and understanding? Kant answers: Identity of thought is not required for that purpose; on the contrary, it is difference, rather, which establishes friendship, for in that case the one supplies what the other lacks; but in one particular they must agree: they need to have the same principles of understanding and morality, and then they can fully lUlderstand each other.31

If friends share the same moral and intellectual principles, their relationship can be one of complete understanding. each other and become stronger as a result: they become better intellectually and morally as they equally take care of each other's lives and reciprocally surrender their happiness to each other. Friends, then, can fOlTIl such an ideal relationship and reach a perfect union of will without owning each other. point is: Why did Kant not even consider tlie possibility of a man and a woman within a sexual relationship reaching a similar union of will without having to own each otlier? Why did he think it is only possible for two heterosexual partners to reach an admittedly less ideal unity of will based on mutual ownership within a marital relationship? The answer is simple and disappointing: when talking about friendship of disposition Kant clearly has two male friends in mind. only men are capable of reaching this high level of communication with each other and achieving this ideal union of persons as friends. be led to tliink here tliat Kant could make a great advocate of gay marriage. be "blended" into a union of persons, through marriage; it would be much easier than struggling to convince us that a man and a woman, whom he took to be so extremely different by nature, can form a unity of will. seems that gay marriage could have every potential of being the perfect kind of marriage for Kant. Kant easily rejects such a possibility in arguing that homosexual relations are contrary to nature and, as such, degrade a person "below the beasts, 2 and dishonour humanity,, ? According to Altman, however, it is possible to construct a Kantian argument in favour of homosexual marriage. marriage, for Kant, is necessary in order for two people to be able to

31 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 429. 32 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 3 9 1 .

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exercise their sexuality without endangering their humanity, homosexual people must have access to it.33 He \Vfites: If the purpose of sex in general is not only (or not necessarily) procreation but also enjoyment, and if a healthy, non - demeaning sexual relationship is an important part of the good life, then two consenting adults should be allowed to fonn a contract in order to express their sexuality in a way that preserves their dignity.34

According to Kant, then, a man and a woman, unlike two men, could never reach such a high level of communication required for friendship of disposition. This relationship is based on the sharing of the same moral and intellectual principles between people, and Kant declares about women in the Observations that there is: Nothing of duty, nothing of compulsion, nothing of obligation! Woman is intolerant of all commands and all morose constraint. ... I hardly believe that the fair sex is capable of principles.. 35

Women, as Kant thought of them, carmot fOlTIl friendships of disposition because they are naturally incapable of principles. As we have already seen, however, Kant's views on women and their natures are best forgotten. Kant might have thought of women as incapable of principles but we should not. His claim about women's incapability of principles is certainly one to be ignored by the contemporary reader. So, if we take it that men and women are equally capable of principles, then we can consider the possibility of a man and a woman fOlTIling a friendship of disposition, and achieving a lUlity of will without having to own each other. A man and a woman, then, can fOlTIl this morally ideal friendship Kant thought can exist only between two male friends. And what if we make the friends into sexual partners? Could two people (a man and a woman, and also, setting aside Kant's views on the unnaturalness of homosexuality, a man and a man or a woman and a woman) within a sexual relationship fOlTIl a unity of will similar to that in friendship? There is no reason to think they could not, given that they share the same moral and intellectual principles that would allow them to reach the high level of communication required by Kant for the formation of such a perfect unity of will. 33 Altman, Kant andApplied Ethics, 139- 65. 34 Altman, Kant andApplied Ethics, 168. 35 Kant, Observations, 8 1 .

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Now, is there any reason for thinking that sexual use within this ttrelationship of dispositiontt would be worrisome? The answer seems to be negative. Sexual use within such a morally sound context would not lead to objectification. Within this relationship of perfect communication and understanding the two partners would clearly not regard each other as mere tools for sexual pleasure. The partners in a relationship of disposition would never allow each other to "lose their persons": they would deeply value, respect, and promote each other's humanity. Marriage, then, is not the only context in which people can exercise their sexuality in a morally unproblematic way; owning your sexual partner is not, as Kant thought, necessary in order for sexual use to be in accordance with morality. In fact, such O\vnership of the two persons in marriage leads, as we have seen, to a unity of will less ideal than that achieved within a relationship of disposition. One might think, however, that even if the unity of will achieved within a relationship of disposition is superior to that fonned within marriage, the fonner is still a more dangerous context for sexuality than the latter. This is because there is no added security of legal protection when it comes to a relationship of disposition. Adinittedly, this relationship lacks the legal element of marriage, which, as we have seen, gives the two parties rights to control each other's persons. Within a relationship of disposition the two partners are certainly not each other's O\vners; there is no legal contract that brings and keeps them together; they are not obliged by anything external, only by their free wills, to keep surrendering their persons to each other. But do two partners, who have reached such a high level of communication and understanding in their relationship, need legal security in order to keep surrendering their persons to each other? Kant surely insisted on the importance of the legal aspect of marriage. But we must also remember that Kant thought that only men are capable of forming relationships of high communication and understanding. Since we are more optimistic than Kant about the ability of two people, regardless of their gender, to achieve the high level of communication and understanding Kant thought possible only between two men, we might also want to accept that legality is not in all cases necessary in order to keep two sexual partners (heterosexual or homosexual) together. Another concern arises at this point: even if we grant the moral excellence of a relationship of disposition one might plausibly worry that this relationship, based on Kant's model of friendship of disposition, is

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extremely hard to fOlTIl, even unattainable. According to Kant, one of the things that makes friendship morally ideal is the balance between "love" and "respect" between the friends. He states: "For love can be regarded as attraction and respect as repulsion, and if the principle of love bids friends to draw closer, the principle of respect requires them to stay at a proper distance from each other. ,,36 This balance between love and respect, which is characteristic of friendship, might be hard to attain within a relationship of disposition. Although it is sweet to feel in possession of each other in a way that approaches fusion into one person, friendship is something so delicate (teneritas amicitiae) that it is never for a moment safe from interruptions if it is allowed to rest on feelings, and if this mutual sympathy and self­ smrender are not subjected to principles or rilles preventing excessive familiarity and limiting mutual love by requirements of respect.37

This excessive familiarity and intimacy Kant feared are much more likely to burden a relationship between two friends. The sexual element present within the fOlmer makes it even harder for the !\VO parties to live up to the requirements of respect needed in order for the relationship to keep its high moral standing. Lara Denis expresses a similar worry about the balance be!\veen love and respect within marriage. She writes: It is true that married people will have a much better view of each other's frailties than others, that their living together makes them dependent on each other physically, emotionally, and financially, and that their sexual relationship shows them aspects of each other that might be embarrassing or disconcerting.38

However, she adds, Kant exaggerates the amount of distance needed even in friendship: Smely part of being a friend is recognizing the other as a human being like oneself: flawed, but with dignity and various good traits of character. If one's friend has the virtues of trustworthiness, honesty, conscientiousness, and the like, his weaknesses shoilld not be grounds for om loss of respect or of pessimism about the human race.39

Two sexual partners, then, like two friends, should try to keep some distance from each other, although perhaps not the amount of distance 36 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 470. 37 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 471. 3 8 Denis, "From Friendship to Marriage", 2 1 . 3 9 Denis, "From Friendship to Marriage", 2 1 .

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Kant himself has suggested. Even if this is undeniably difficult for both friends and sexual partners, they nonetheless ought to do their best in order to achieve a balance between love and respect in their relationship. Kant was confident that: " . . . human beings have a duty of friendship,, 4o We might go even further than Kant in claiming that human beings also have a duty to create relationships of disposition, in order to achieve the genuine communication and understanding that leads to the fOlmation of a perfect unity of will. v. Feminists' suggested solutions to the problem

of sexual objectification

Kant's solution to the problem of sexual objectification was straightforward. People, both men and women, should avoid engaging in problematic sexual relationships such as concubinage and prostitution. Exercise of sexuality is, for Kant, only allowed within monogamous marriage. Within this context, the two spouses are obliged by law to surrender their whole persons (bodies and selves) completely to one another, each allowing the other to 0\Vll his or her person wholly. This way, Kant thought, neither of the two parties is in danger of losing his or her person and getting objectified. In the previous section, I have taken Kant's argument a step further in arguing that we have reason to believe that sexual objectification can also be avoided in the context of relationship of disposition. For MacKinnon and Dworkin, however, who see objectification as a much more widespread and pervasive phenomenon, the Kantian solutions to the problem is clearly inappropriate. Within our societies of gender hierarchy, objectification is inevitably present within all sexual relationships between men (who are by defmition the objectifiers) and women (who are by definition the objectified). Marriage, or any other heterosexual relationship for that matter, is clearly not regarded as an exception by the feminists in question. Within marriage, a woman is nothing more than an object for her husband's use and abuse. To use Dworkin's pessimistic language: "Wife beating and marital rape are predicated on the conviction that a man's o\Vllership of his wife licences whatever he wishes to do to her: her body belongs to him to use for his 0\Vll release, to beat, to impregnate".41 Marriage, then, for feminists like MacKinnon and Dworkin, is yet another relationship in which women suffer their objectified fate. 40 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 490. 41 Dworkin, Pornography, 34.

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So, how do the feminists in question suggest we can fight objectification? As mentioned in the previous chapter, MacKinnon and Dworkin believe that objectification has its roots in gender inequality, which is created and sustained by men's consumption of pornography. The first step towards ending gender inequality, then, for the thinkers in question is to eliminate pornography. FurthemlOre, we need to completely eliminate gender from our societies. The ideal world is, for MacKinnon and Dworkin, one without any men (objectifiers) or women (objectified). Our goal, then, is the creation of a genderless world. In her discussion of MacKinnon, Haslanger uses an analogy between the concept of gender and the concept of meat to illuminate the idea of gender elimination. She writes: "What COlUlts as meat varies from culture to culture. The class of things that cmmt as meat for a given group of people is determined by their attributes, desires, and appetites. The category of meat is not a 'natural' category; like gender, it is social, relational, and hierarchical. Like gender, the category of meat is a 'fiction' which hmnans have the power to enforce. As (many) vegetarians aim for a day when nothing will fall into the category of meat, (many) feminists aim for a day when no one will fall into the category of women.42

For MacKinnon, then, as well as for others who defme gender hierarchically, Haslanger notes: "If feminism is successful, there will no longer be a gender distinction as suchyone goal of feminism is to fight against the sexual subordination that constitutes these categories of men and 43 women". Given MacKinnon and Dworkin's pessimism, however, about the way things currently are, one might plausibly worry about who within our gender hierarchical societies is going to act in order to fight objectification. Men, as defined by these feminists, are the ones with the power in our world, which makes them capable of acting in order to fight gender inequality and so objectification. Yet, men, in MacKinnon and Dworkin's picture, seem to be enjoying being the dominant objectifiers; they enjoy having women readily available for their use. It is very unlikely, then, that men will act in order to change the existing situation. Women, on the other hand, who are in MacKinnon and Dworkin's eyes objectified as a group, may have the desire to change reality, but they certainly do not have the 42 Haslanger, "On Being Objective", 1 0 1 . 43 Haslanger, "On Being Objective", 1 0 1 .

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power required for such changes. This means that women are not likely to act in order to fight objectification either. The way MacKinnon and Dworkin have described reality, then, is so pessimistic that it is doubtful people will act in order to eliminate gender inequality. Men benefit from being the objectifiers, and women have the status of mere objects for men' use. Moreover, women, according to these feminists, are not even truly responsible for their objectified fate; they are presented as completely powerless and victimized. These feminists' solution to the problem of sexual objectification, then, seems like an impractical, even unrealistic, one, since it is at odds with their understanding of men's and women's status in our world. Kant's solution to the problem of sexual objectification, as already mentioned, is that people refrain from engaging in problematic sexual contexts, like prostitution and concubinage. They should only exercise their sexuality within safe contexts like marriage, in which equality in the giving and taking of the two parties' persons is guaranteed. The instruction that people refrain from engaging in certain problematic sexual contexts seems like a feasible solution for the avoidance of objectification, also given Kant's faith that men and women are responsible individuals capable of acting in ways so as to protect their humanity. In seeing women as responsible individuals, Kant gave them the choice MacKinnon and Dworkin never did; the choice to protect their own humanity, and not fall victims of objectification. Kant may have been very harsh towards the objectified individual, who, according to him, has chosen to sacrifice her 0\Vll humanity for the satisfaction of sexual desire or, in the case of the prostitute, for money, but he also did see her as someone capable of having done differently. Interestingly, Kant had more faith than MacKinnon and Dworkin in tlie ability and willingness of a woman to respect and protect her 0\Vll humanity, and so make a choice to avoid her objectification. Kant encourages women to fight against their objectification. MacKinnon's and Dworkin's pessimistic view of our world, by contrast, might serve to discourage any possible attempts by individual women to end gender inequality and objectification. Nussbaum shares much of Kant's optimism that it is indeed possible for men and women to exercise their sexuality in ways that are consistent with respect for their 0\Vll humanity. She criticizes MacKinnon and Dworkin's tendency to see sexuality in our societies as always posing a threat to women's humanity, accusing the feminists in question for being

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"insufficiently sensitive" to "human complexities".44 Nussbaum follows Kant in arguing that within contexts characterized by equality and mutuality people's humanity is safe from harm. In her article "Objectification", Nussbaum mentions the example of the two lovers in Lady Chatterley's Lover, Connie and Mellor, who "in a context of mutual respect and rough social equality" manage to make sexual use of each other in a morally hatmless way.45 Even though the Lawrentian lovers treat each other as objects in identifying themselves with their bodily organs, their objectification is, according to Nussbaum, of a benign sort, that is, it poses no threat to their status as beings with humanity. Kant, as we have seen, thought that it is only within monogamous marriage, a context of perfect equality and reciprocity in the O\vnership of persons, that the two parties' humanity is not in danger of being lost or halTIled in any way. Nussbaum, in a similar spirit, suggests that within a context that she believes is one of equality and mutuality (the case from Lady Chatterley), the two partners' humanity is safe. Nussbaum, however, does not describe the relationship between Connie and Mellor as one of equality and mutuality in the ownership of each other's persons. What she has in mind, rather, is a sort of equal and reciprocal surrender of the two partners' feelings, an equal and reciprocal sharing of their lives and happiness. For Nussbaum, then, unlike for Kant, this ideal of equality and reciprocity that makes sexual use unproblematic is not necessarily found in a marital relationship. Nussbaum offers an appealing Kantian solution to the problem of sexual objectification, for those who find Kant's 0\Vll suggestion of restricting sexuality only within marriage overly demanding; people, both men and women, Nussbaum tells us, can avoid hannful objectification in exercising their sexuality within relationships, marital or not, of equality and reciprocity. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that Kantian marriage can indeed survive the criticisms it has received by contemporary thinkers. I have offered an analysis of Kant's conception of marriage, and have explained that this need not be thought of as paradoxical or otherwise flawed. FurthelTIlore, I have suggested that Kantian marriage can and should be rescued from his 44 Nussbaum, "Objectification", 273. 45 Nussbaum, "Objectification", 275.

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no longer acceptable views on gender. Setting aside Kant's views on men and women allows us to see marriage as a morally sound relationship, one that leads to the creation of a true unity of will. Moreover, it allows us to constructively use Kant's ideas on marriage to go beyond the conservative view that only marital sex is in accordance with morality. Drawing on Kantian marriage, I have argued in this chapter for the moral pennissibility of sexual use within yet another relationship, which has the basic characteristics Kant attributes to friendship of disposition. This chapter's philosophical investigations suggest that, at the very least, it is worth thinking about Kant on marriage. Kant was confident that an individual woman can and should avoid her 0\Vll objectification in choosing to exercise her sexuality within monogamous marriage, where equality and reciprocity in the surrender of the two parties' persons is guaranteed. In MacKinnon and Dworkin's picture, by contrast, a woman is completely incapable of protecting her 0\Vll humanity from the objectification threat. Kant's ideas seem, then, to be in at least this sense more empowering for an individual woman trying to avoid her objectification than MacKinnon and Dworkin's. This surprising fact fits well with Nussbaum's use of Kant. Nussbaum, like Kant, is hopeful that an individual is capable of protecting her 0\Vll humanity in exercising her sexuality within contexts characterized by the Kantian ideal of equality and reciprocity. Taking Kant's argument a step further, Nussbaum suggests that this ideal, which is so important for the avoidance of negative objectification, is not one found in marriage alone.

CHAPTER FIVE ORGAN COMMERCE AND DONATIOW

Can choosing to sell one's kidney be morally permissible? "No", Kant would answer. There are, as we have already seen, limitations on what a person can pelTIlissibly do to her body, and on how she may allow others to use her for their purposes. Humanity, whether in one's O\Vll person or that of any other, must never be treated merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end, is Kant's instruction.2 He thought that organ sale violates this imperative. "To deprive oneself of an integral part or organ (to maim oneself}--for example, to give away or sell a tooth to be transplanted to another's mouth . . are ways of partially murdering oneself'.} Kant explains: ... a man is not entitled to sell his limbs for money .... One may dispose of things that have no freedom, but not of a being that itself has free choice. If a man does that, he turns himself into a thing, and then anyone may treat him as they please, because he has thrO\vn his person away; as with sexual inclination, where people make themselves an object of enjoyment and hence into a thing.4

Under no circumstances is it pelTIlissible for a person to sell her kidney, according to Kant. In this chapter, I aim to throw light on Kant's reasons against commerce in organs. This is done through drawing on his views on prostitution, and the moral impermissibility of sexual use within this context. Kant himself compares the selling of one's sexuality (prostitution) to the selling of one's body part(s), and uses the same argument to support his conclusion that both are morally impelTIlissible. Let us now proceed to a different question. Can choosing to donate one's kidney be morally permissible? In the United States, about 14,000 kidney 1 A version of this chapter with the tile "Bodies, Persons, and Respect for Hmnanity: A Kantian Look at the Permissibility of Organ Commerce and Donation" has originally been published inPhi/osophy Study 3 : 3 (2013). 2 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 429. 3 Kant, Metaphysics o/Morals, 6: 423 4 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 346.

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transplants are perfOlmed every year. Just over one third of transplanted kidneys are from living donors. At any point, about 55,000 people are on a waiting list for a kidney transplant. Every year, over 3,000 people die while waiting for a kidney transplant S We connnonly regard the act of donating one's organ as one of utmost generosity and selflessness. If we take Kant's views at face value, however, it would follow that he would be against organ donation in the majority of cases. This is because the donor runs the risk of being used merely as a means. Like sexual use, for Kant, is morally pelTIlissible only within the context of monogamous marriage, it would follow that organ donation is on a par with morality only if it takes place in a context where people have gained rights over each other's persons (for example, a marital context). This is not only an unintuitive view, because it severely restricts the permissibility of organ donation. What is more is that, in this context, it appears that a person has a right to her spouse's kidney should she happen to need it. Like marital rape can become imperceptible within Kantian marriage, bodily violation where one spouse, exercising her right, demands the use of the other's kidney can also be difficult to condemn. In this chapter, I argue that a more charitable interpretation of Kant might, after all, be possible. There is reason to believe that one can legitimately put his life and humanity at risk in order to preserve someone else's humanity. The case Kant himself discusses of the hero who risks his life in the battlefield in order to save his comrades supports this idea. Even assuming that the donor is used merely as a means in donating her kidney, then, it is possible to conclude that what she does is not morally condenmable. I then offer some arguments in favour of the view that kidney donation does not in fact involve treating the donor merely as a means as the receiver's attitude is one of respect towards the donor's humanity. If this is so, while there appear to be Kantian reasons to condenm kidney sale in all cases, there is no reason for a Kantian to condenm the act of kidney donation.6

5 Access to US Government Information on Organ and Tissue Donation and Transplantation (Retrieved January 2010, http://organdonor.gov/) 6 In this chapter, I refer to cases of kidney sale and donation, where a living person undergoes nephrectomy. I do not discuss the issue of cadaveric kidney sale and donation. Kant would similarly condenm the sale of other organs. Moreover, he would regard the donation of organs the extraction of which foreseeably results in the donor's death (and destruction of her humanity), for example, cases where a living person decides to donate his heart or lungs, as morally impermissible in all cases. I have chosen to talk about kidney extraction throughout this chapter,

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I. Organ sale

Kant examines prostitution and the sale of one's body parts/organs together, and uses the same arguments to explain the moral impelTIlissibility of both these practices.7 As we have seen in chapter 3, when examining the case of prostitution Kant writes: "Hence a man carmot dispose over himself; he is not entitled to sell a tooth, or any of his members. But now if a person allows himself to be used, for profit, as an object to satisfy the sexual impulse of another . . . then he is disposing over himself, as if over a thing, and thereby makes himself into a thing".8 This is because an individual's body and self are inseparable and together they constitute her person. Thus, the person who sells her kidney inevitably sells her whole person, body and self, and makes her person into a thing to be used by the organ recipient. In this way, the person gets objectified. Like the prostitute who cannot choose to sell only her sexuality or body to the clients but rather her whole person, the person who sells her organ can, in a similar manner, only sell the whole of herself to the organ recipient. According to Kant, as we have seen, a person is not her 0\Vll property and cannot use her body in any way she wishes .' Even though it might initially appear that the organ seller is in a position to choose the end of removing her organ to be transplanted to another's body and give her consent to such an action, the situation is in fact more complicated. In chapter 1, we mentioned Wood's and O'Neill's reconstructed accounts. According to them, the person who wants to sell one of her organs carmot in fact choose the end of selling her organ or give her consent to this. This would amount to abandoning an end that she is rationally compelled to have, namely, respecting humanity in her 0\Vll person.

because death resulting from kidney extraction is rare (if done according to certain standards, of cO lise), and current research indicates that kidney extraction does not change life expectancy or increase a person's risks of developing kidney disease or other health problems. Moreover, studies have shown that one kidney is sufficient to keep the body healthy, and after recovering from surgery, a person can in most cases work and exercise, and lead an otherwise normal life (University of Maryland Medical Center. Retrieved January 2010, from http://www.umm.edultransplantlkidney). 7 And I believe it is interesting to note that some kidney sellers compare themselves to prostitutes and experience similar feelings of shame and worthlessness (Zargooshi, "Quality of Life", 1795-96). 8 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 386. 9 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 387.

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Jean-Christophe Merle argues against Kant's view that an individual's selling one of her body parts amounts to selling her whole person. To begin with, he believes that it is necessary to distinguish between three categories of body parts. In the first category, there are those organs without which a person cannot survive. One such organ is the heart. In the second category, there are the organs which, when removed, carmot be replaced by the body (for example, a tooth or a kidney). In the third category, does not contain body organs but rather parts of the body (for example, blood or bone marrow). Merle argues that, at least for the body parts that belong to the third category, there should be no Kantian prohibition against selling them. This is because selling those parts does not in any way affect a person's freedom, that is the freedom which we cannot use but only through our bodies.1O Merle's position is plausible. It is easy to understand why the person who sells her heart sells her whole person and loses her humanity through the destruction of her body. The person who sells her body marrow, by contrast, or even one of her kidneys, does not necessarily sell her whole person and sacrifices her humanity. Kerstein too believes that there is no absolute Kantian prohibition against the sale of organs. For him, whether or not this practice is morally impelTIlissible depends on whether a person's selling her organ "would make someone more inclined than he otherwise would be to accept the notion that someone's humanity is available for others to use as they will".u In the case of poor people selling their teeth, it seems reasonable to believe that their doing promoted the idea that their humanity is up for sale so that the poor can be used merely as means for the use of the rich. But this need not be true in all cases of organ sale, Kerstein argues.12 Kerstein seems to be assuming, here, that the attitude of the buyer towards the seller is an empirical matter. In other words, some organ buyers might be led to treating the sellers' humanity merely as a means. Some other buyers, however, are not led to treating the sellers' humanity in a purely instrumental manner, and in this case the sale of organs should not be considered morally wrong. Merle's and Kerstein's positions, according to which there are cases of selling body parts which do not constitute harm to the sellers' humanity, are attractive. However, they carmot constitute a satisfying counterargument 1 0 Merle, "Duty to Donate One's O\VIl Organ", 94- 99. 11 Kerstein, "Kantian Condemnation of Commerce in Organs, 1 6 1 . 12 Kerstein, "Kantian Condemnation of Commerce in Organs", 1 60- 1 .

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to Kant's view that the person who sells one of her body parts uses her person (her humanity) like a mere means, therefore reducing herself to something that can be bought, a property. Kant's concern with the case of organ sale and, similarly, with prostitution is not so much whether the purchaser will become more likely to regard the seller as a mere means. Kant's concern is, rather, that the seller treats and reduces himself (his person and his humanity) to something that can be sold. In the same way the prostitute allows the clients to use her person as a mere means for the satisfaction of their sexual desires and in this way reduce her to a mere thing for use, the person who sells one of her body parts allows the buyer to treat her person as a mere means for his end of saving his life through the organ transplant. Even if the buyer is not the kind of person to treat the seller's humanity as a mere means, the organ seller nonetheless allows her person to be at another's disposal and in this way offers herself as a thing which can be bought and used. II, Organ donation

Kant went much further than merely condemning the selling of one's sexuality. In fact, for him, as we have seen in chapter 4, the only context in which sexual activity can take place "without debasement of humanity and violation of morality" is that of monogamous marriage.13 Two people can pelTIlissibly use one another's sexual attributes only in a context of equality and mutuality in the possession of the their persons. What could the implications of the above view be for organ donation? Is the kidney donor, like the person who exercises her sexuality outside the context of monogamous marriage, also used merely as a means in offering her kidney to save someone's life?14 Given Kant's view on the insepambility between body and self in persons, the kidney donor, in giving her kidney (part of her body), would inevitably be giving her whole person (body and self) to the receiver. The donor, then, would be at risk of "losing" her person, unless she had the receiver's person in her possession. From Kant's view on the impelTIlissibility of extramarital sexual use, then, it would appear to follow that in donating her kidney, the individual would 13 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 388. 14 Nicole Gerrand emphasizes the fact that Kant's worry is both with selling and donating body parts. That is because his primary concern is not what happens to a body parts after its removal, but rather that a person should not have any of her body parts removed unnecessarily, that is, for reasons other than his 0"Wll self­ preservation (Gerrand, "The misuse of Kant", 61).

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be treated merely as a means by the receiver. This would seem to be the case unless she and the kidney receiver were in a legal relationship of mutual rights over each other's persons (for example, a marital relationship). This, however, is a deeply worrying thought. In the context of such a relationship of reciprocal O\vnership and mutual rights of disposal over the two parties' persons, it would appear that the person in need of a kidney transplant has a right over her partner's kidney. Since her partner's person (body and self) is in her ownership, she has rights over his person, which include the right to use his body: his kidney in the given case. Her partner, of course, has the same rights over her person, and so, in theory, the right to use her kidney too. As things stand, however, there is only one in need of a kidney transplant and the idea that this person can, exercising a right, make use of her partner's kidney even without his will, is outrageous. In this case, bodily violation becomes disguised as a right one has over another's person. This case parallels the imperceptibility of spousal rape within Kantian marriage. Since Kant wants the spouses to have complete rights of disposal over each other's persons, rights to use each other sexually marital rape can become indistinguishable from nOlmal sexual use. Forcing sex on someone would count as a straightforward case of coercion in any other context. In marriage as Kant describes it, however, it can easily be disguised as sex, the exercise of a spousal right.15 One could attempt a defence of Kant here. Admittedly, he thought that the partners within a marital relationship have rights over each other's persons, and hence rights to use their bodies sexually and otherwise. Surely, however, there must be limits as to how they can permissibly use one another. Kant would certainly think, for example, that killing one's spouse or selling them into slavery are morally impelTIlissible ways of using them. That is true indeed, and yet not enough to ease our worry. The limits between pelTIlissible and impermissible use can be difficult to 15 The way Kant thought exercise of spousal rights takes place is indeed alanning: " ... if one of the partners in marriage has left or given itself into someone else's possession, the other partner is justified, always and without question, in bringing its partner back under its control, just as it is justified in retrieving a thing" (Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6:278). It should further be noted here that Kant does not take the exercise of sexuality to be morally lUlproblematic in marriage for the pillposes of procreation only. The spouses can legitimately engage in sex merely for the purposes of enjoyment. Furthermore, Kant thought that sexual use is necessary in order for marriage to exist (Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 277-80). Marriage, he thought, is "realized only through the use of their [the spouses] sexual attributes by each other" (Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6:280).

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discern, in a context where people have complete rights of disposal over each other's persons. The weaker and more vulnerable will always be in danger of being abused in the name of their partners' exercising their rights. One could argue that a more promising context for organ donation is that of Kant's perfect form of friendship, "friendship of disposition", which is characterized, as we have seen in chapter 4, by absolute confidence between the friends, based on true communication and understanding.16 This relationship, like marriage, is conceived by Kant as a context of perfect equality and reciprocity between the parties involved. The friends' relationship, however, is, unlike that of the spouses, not based on rights of use of each other's person, but on mutual love and care for each other's happiness. Moreover, even though Kant did not acknowledge this, sexual use, as argued in the previous chapter, can be pelTIlissible within the context of "relationship of disposition". It could be thought, then, that organ donation in the contexts of friendship of disposition and relationship of disposition would not pose a threat to the donor's humanity, since the latter is deeply respected by the receiver within these relationships of perfect equality and reciprocity between the two parties. Within these contexts, the friend or the partner in need of a kidney does not have the right to use the other's kidney because the latter is not his property. In this way, the bodily violation that can take place in the context of a marital relationship can be avoided, and an individual can freely choose to donate her kidney to her friend or partner. III. Rethinking the Kantian Condemnation Against Freely Donating One's Organs

In the previous section, we have seen that organ donation would appear to be morally pelTIlissible, for Kant, in contexts where people have gained rights over each other's persons. A worry with this idea is that it can promote bodily violation. Even if we could find a way to overcome this worry, however, by arguing that organ donation does not promote bodily violation in the contexts of friendship and relationship of disposition, the view that organ donation is permissible only within these contexts is overly restrictive. Organ donation is something that we encourage in our society. We consider the donor's act as one of utmost generosity, love, and

1 6 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 427.

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respect for another's humanity; a morally good act. In what follows, I wish to rethink the Kantian condenmation against free organ donation. Let us fIrst go along with the assumption that the kidney donor is being used merely as a means. In giving part of her body, she inevitably also gives herself to the receiver. And if the latter does not have a right over her person, he is using her merely as a means for his purposes (like is the case in non-marital sexual relationships). Let us assume, then, that the donor carmot share the receiver's end of maintaining his life, without thwarting the end of respecting her O\Vll humanity. And, furthellllore, that she carmot rationally consent to this kind of treatment, because doing so would make her unable to dissent from disrespecting humanity in her O\Vll person. There is an important difference between the sexual case and the kidney donation case, which I believe could let one think that the donor, unlike the woman engaging in a non-marital sexual relationship, may legitimately choose to be treated merely as a means. The male partner's end in using the woman is that of satisfying his sexual desires. The kidney receiver's end in using the donor is to save his life that is to preserve his humanity. The latter's end, unlike the fOlmer's, is morally relevant. In sharing the receiver's end to avoid death by renal failure and in consenting to be used for this purpose, the donor would be showing respect for the receiver's humanity. By contrast, in letting herself be used merely as a means for someone else's sexual gratification (and similarly, in the tooth transplant case, for the improvement of a rich person's appearance), the person in question would not be respecting anyone's humanity. Since humanity, for Kant, whether in my 0\Vll person, or in that of any other has an absolute worth and ought to be respected and promoted, why can I not, in the case of kidney donation, choose to give priority to the other's humanity?17 A possible answer to this question would be to say that this is something I should not do, because in doing so, I allow my humanity to be used merely as a means, whereas if I do not give my kidney to my dying friend I do not use him merely as a means. This could be so. Even if the friend in question is not being treated merely as a means 17 According to Kant, " ... to have a dead or diseased organ amputated when it endangers one's life ... cannot be counted as a crime against one's own person .. " (Kant, Metaphysics ofMorals, 6: 423). Also, he -writes: "Thus a man can have his foot amputated, for example, insofar as it impedes him in life" (Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 370). We might think, however, that if I may amputate a foot to save my own life, why not donate an organ to save another's life? Is there a relevant difference between preserving my 0"Wll humanity and preserving another's?

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in the case I do not offer him my kidney, my not proceeding to this act of donation nonetheless shows disrespect for his humanity. 'While I am in a position to help him stay alive and maintain his humanity, I choose not to. I think a parenthesis might be useful here, to remind ourselves of Kant's views on heroic acts, and how they are distinguished from acts of suicide "to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life".18 Suicide, for Kant, is morally impermissible: "Can I take my life because I cannot live happily? No, there is no necessity that, so long as I live, I should live happily; but there is a necessity that, so long as I live, I should live honourably".19 However, even a person's life can legitimately be sacrificed in some cases: For to risk one's life against one's foes, and to observe the duty to oneself, and even to sacrifice life, is not suicide. He who runs away to save his life from the enemy, and leaves all his comrades in the hITch, is a coward; but if he defends himself and his fellows to the death, that is no suicide, but is held to be noble and gallant; since in, and for itself, life is in no way to be highly prized, and I should seek to preserve my life only insofar I am worthy to live.20

Here is where the moral problem lies, for Kant: " . . . disposing of oneself as a mere means to some discretionary end is debasing humanity in one's 0\Vll person. . . . ".21 Sacrificing one's life to avoid a life of misery is, for him, a discretionary end, as we have seen in chapter 2. That is, an end that one is not rationally compelled to have. There is no necessity that one's life be a happy one. Sacrificing one's life while doing one's duty, by contrast, for example while staying at the battlefield and protecting the lives of one's comrades, is not a discretionary end. Giving one's life in this case is, rather, what one ought to do. Going back to the kidney donation case, now, we might think that since the kidney donor is not being used as a mere means for a discretionary end, her action, to say the least, is not a morally impelTIlissible one. The act of the kidney donor, to my view, resembles acts of heroism of the sort discussed above, where a person puts his humanity aside in order to preserve and promote humanity in others. It is important to bear in mind, moreover, that the hero's aim is not to do anything degrading to his Kant, Groundwork, 4: 429. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 373. 20 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 370- 1 . 21 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 423. 18

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person, but rather to protect his comrades. Similarly, the donor: his aim is not to degrade himself, but to save another's life. Could we similarly rethink the Kantian prohibition against kidney sale? The kidney seller too, we might think, allows his person to be used merely as a means and in doing so he preserves the receiver's humanity. This case appears to be different from the one of kidney donation, in tbat the kidney seller's end is monetary gain. Putting one's humanity aside for the sake of profit could not, for Kant, be morally pelTIlissible, even if the outcome of such an action is that of preserving the receiver's humanity. Kant's discussion of motivation is relevant here. The kidney seller is acting out of the motive of indirect inclination (he sells his kidney in order to receive some profit). Thus, his action is, can be thought to be morally unworthy and even morally condenmable. To end the discussion here, however, would be to oversimplify things. Ruth Chadwick explains that "if I may have my foot amputated to save my life, why not sell my kidney to pacify the loan sharks from whom I am in fear for my life? The motive of self-preservation is obvious in both these cases, so why think that the latter, unlike the former, is not morally pelTIlissible?"22 As Munzer also points out, " . . . money is just a medium of exchange. Thus, receiving money in return for a body part is not inherently or always morally objectionable. One has to look at the reason for which the seller wants the money".23 As mentioned earlier, however, no matter how morally worthy tbe end of selling my kidney might be, Kant is concerned that tbe organ seller allows his person (body and self) to be used as a thing by otbers. So far, I have been going along with tbe Kantian assumption that tbe kidney donor is being treated merely as a means. I defended tbe view that the kidney donor's act can nonetheless be in accordance with morality. My final attempt to rescue Kant's theory from the unintuitive view against free organ donation is to question the very idea that the kidney donor is treated merely as a means. In concubinage, we have seen that the concubine gives her body, and so inevitably her person to her male partner. Her person is in his possession and control. And since she cannot similarly possess her partner, she is incapable of "regaining" her person. As a result, for Kant, she loses her person and becomes a mere tool for her partner's sexual purposes. Women 22 Chadwick, "Market of Bodily Parts", 134. 23 MlUlzer, "An Uneasy Case", 2 7 1 .

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in Kant's time were in a position of vulnerability and were thought to be in need of male protection. Given this situation, then, Kant's worry about a woman being at the whim of her partners' desires, without herself having any rights to control his conduct (like he thought is the case in non-marital relationships) is understandable. The idea that the organ donor ends up a mere tool at the receiver's hands, however, is not an intuitive one. Unlike the male partner is concubinage, who is bound to use her as a mere tool for his sexual gratification, the organ recipient is not likely to regard the donor in a marmer that resembles to the least the former's attitude. The gratitude the recipient is likely to feel towards the donor will make him try to respect the latter's humanity as much as possible. If this is so, then it is plausible to thirik that the donor can share the end of the recipient, without thwarting the attainment of an end she is rationally compelled to have (that or respecting her humanity). FurthemlOre, the donor can rationally consent to give her kidney because in doing so she would not be unable to dissent from disrespecting her 0\Vll humanity. This would mean that the kidney donor is not treated merely as a means, and thus the act of kidney donation is not to be judged as morally condenmable. Unfortunately, the above view is vulnerable to objection. It is true that the organ recipient will in all likelihood express respect towards the donor's humanity. Moreover, we can understand Kant's worry that the attitude of the sexual partner towards the woman's humanity in a non-marital relationship of his time is bound to be that of disrespect. What is important, however, and where Kant's concern lies, is that the donor (and the woman sexual partner) allows herself to be at someone else's disposal. It would be foolish, for Kant, to rely on another's whim as to how he will treat our humanity; in our case, on the assumption that the kidney receiver will show respect for the donor's humanity. I do not see why we should share Kant's pessimism here, however. The concern in question in the case of organ donation appears to be exaggerated. We can agree with Kant that a person ought to protect and promote his own humanity, and refrain from engaging in contexts in which his dignity is not appropriately respected. But a person who, in order to protect himself, refrains from looking around him and offering his help to others is an egoist. It is obvious to me that the hero's act of risking his life for others is morally superior to the act of the person whose sole preoccupation is to protect his o\Vll life.

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If we reject the view that the donor is used merely as a means by the receiver, the case of organ donation can further be supported by appealing to Kant's O\Vll discussion of the duty of beneficence. According to Kant, we have a duty to help those who are in need of our help, when in a position to do so. This duty, which follows from the Categorical Imperative, is classified by Kant as an impeifect or wide duty, which means that we are allowed to decide when to help another person, or at least to what extent we are going to help her.24 In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant holds that, according to the Humanity Fommlation of the Categorical imperative, we must respect humanity, whether in our O\Vll person or that of any other, and treat it always as an end in itself .25 When someone offers his help to a needy other, what he does is respect and promote the latter's humanity and dignity. The organ donor fulfills the duty of beneficence in a way relatively few people do: he chooses to give one of his organs to save another's life. This act shows the utmost respect towards humanity. Turning to the Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative, now, one ought to act only in accordance with that maxim through which she can at the same time will that it become a universal law.26 Kant explains why the maxim of non-beneficence carmot coherently be universalized: a world in which no one helps others in need is one that can be conceived without logical contradiction. An agent, however, cannot will to live in such a world. Because willing the universalized maxim of non­ beneficence would mean that no one would help the agent when she finds herself in need of assistance.27 In the case of organ donation, the potential donor can formulate her maxim as follows: "I will not donate my kidney, in order to save the life of a dying person, even though this poses no significant threat to my life and well-being". The universalized version of this maxim is: "No one will donate their kidney, in order to save the lives of dying people, even though this poses no significant threat to their life and well-being". In willing this universalized version of the maxim of non­ beneficence, the agent in fact wills that no one help her to stay alive when in need of a kidney. As a rational being, who respects humanity in her 0\Vll person, the agent carmot possibly will the universalized version of this maxim. Drawing on Kant's discussion of beneficence, then, allows us to

24 Kant, Metaphysics o/Morals, 6: 390 25 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 429. 26 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 421. 27 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 423.

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conclude that the act of kidney donation is one a Kantian would, to say the least, encourage. We could furthermore argue that the morality of the act of donation, within the context of a Kantian theory, will also depend on the donor's motivation. There is the person who donates her kidney, because it is her duty to do so (like Kant's example of the soldier who defends his comrades because he has a duty to do so). But there is also the person who donates her kidney out of love or sympathy. While the former's act is morally worthy because it stems from the motive of duty, the latter's act, stemming from the motive of direct inclination, could be judged as not having moral worth. This, for many at least, would be an unintuitive idea. Kant's discussion of motivation is complex and there is no space to examine it further here. Even if we accept that that act of donation which stems from the motive of love or sympathy does not have moral worth, it can nonetheless be morally right, so long as it does not involve the treatment of the donor as a mere means. Noticing the great similarities that exist between cases of heroism and those of organ donation, and given Kant's explicit appraisal of the former, I am much intrigued by the following thought: if we can successfully argue against the view that the organ donor is treated merely as a means, a path may be opened towards a Kantian duty to organ donation. How could a Kantian, in this case, not embrace the view that one ought to donate one's kidney to another person, whose life and humanity are dependent on one's very act of donation?

CHAPTER SIX ABORTIOW

This chapter examines the issue of abortion from a Kantian perspective. More specifically, it focuses on Kant's FOlTIlUla of Humanity of the Categorical Imperative and the prohibition against treating humanity merely as a means.2 It has been argued by feminists that the woman who is made to continue a pregnancy against her will (in cases, for example, where abortion is illegal, and thus inaccessible to women) is being treated as a mere means for sustaining the fetus, a mere "fetal incubator".} This constitutes an assault on her humanity, the capacity for rationally setting and pursuing her O\Vll ends. On the other hand, the woman who aborts her fetus can be seen as treating it merely as a means for her O\Vll ends. She wants to terminate her pregnancy, in order to achieve some further end(s) that she has, which are not consistent with being pregnant and/or caring for a child. In the case of an unwanted pregnancy, therefore, it appears that one of the two parties (woman/fetus) is being treated merely as a means, and so in a morally problematic way.

1 A version of this chapter entitled "Abortion and Kant's Formula of Hmnanity" has originally been published in Humana Mente: Journal ofPhilosophical Studies 22 (2012): 145- 166. 2 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 4: 429. Indeed, most of the philosophical work done on the issue of abortion, within Kantian ethics, has focused on the Universal Law formula of the Categorical Imperative. See, for instance Hare, "A Kantian Approach to Abortion"; Gensler, "A Kantian Argmnent Against Abortion"; "On a Kantian Argmnent Against Abortion"; Denis, "Abortion and Kant's Formula of Universal Law". The Formula of Universal Law in itself, however, is insufficient in giving us answers regarding the morality of abortion. Denis herself talks about "the faihrre of this much-favomed formulation of the categorical imperative to provide guidance regarding the morality of abortion" (Denis, 2007, 548). It appears that before we are able to put into use maxims of abortion, it is crucial that we know what the status of the fetus is within Kantian ethics. That is, whether (and, if so, how) the fetus' potential for hmnanity is to cmmt in our moral deliberations and be weight against the pregnant woman's humanity. This is exactly my focus in this chapter. 3 Bordo, Unbearable Weight, 77.

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Which of these two evils is graver? There is the view that the fetus is not a being with humanity, a rational agent. For this reason, some people argue that the woman's right to control her body should be given priority. She is a fully-fledged human being, after all, an autonomous agent. For someone to be in a position to recognize her O\Vll agency, she must be able to exercise some control over her sexual and reproductive life. As Feldman puts it, "to develop agency, a person must be able to assent to or refuse sex and pregnancy".4 Being forced to continue a pregnancy against her will constitutes an insult on her rational nature and violates her autonomy. Things, however, are not that straightforward. The fetus is not a being with humanity at present, but it has the potential to become a person with humanity. Because of this potential the fetus deserves to be respected and protected. Aborting the fetus is destructing its potential for humanity, which can be taken to be a serious moral wrong. The Kantian discussion of abortion, therefore, is a complicated one. It gives rise to a number of important questions regarding humanity and how it should be treated. Does respecting the pregnant woman's humanity, and so enabling her to have an abortion if she so chooses, go against appropriately respecting the fetus? What does it really mean to respect a being's potential for humanity (in our case, the fetus' potential for humanity)? And how must this potential for humanity count against actual humanity in the person of the pregnant woman? My purpose in this paper is to examine how a Kantian can deal with these issues. There is not one Kantian answer to these difficult questions, clearly. An analysis of how Kant's theory can be applied to these issues concerning the morality of abortion, however, is illuminating. It helps us see the Kantian prohibition against treating humanity merely as a means from a different, less familiar perspective, and puts new challenges to Kant's theory. At the same time, it gives us new and useful insights on the much-discussed issue of the fetus' status in the abortion debate. I. Treating the pregnant woman merely as a means

Let us begin with the pregnant woman who wants to have an abortion, but because abortion is deemed illegal and is thus inaccessible to her she is being forced to continue her pregnancy. Beginning with O'Neill's interpretation, we can say that the pregnant woman in this case cannot consent to continuing her pregnancy. She carmot avert or modify the situation of being pregnant. In other words, she is unable to dissent from 4 Feldman, "Occupied Bodies", 275- 6.

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it. Taking Wood's interpretation now, the woman in question cannot share the end of continuing her pregnancy. She has not chosen to realise it, but rather it is an end that has been forced on her. Thus, according to both these interpretations, the pregnant woman's rational agency is frustrated and disrespected, and she is being treated merely as a means. Much feminist discussion has been devoted to explaining the wrongness involved in forcing a woman to continue her pregnancy, pointing to her treatment merely as a means for sustaining fetal life. In her classic paper on abortion, Judith Jarvis Thomson mentions that the pregnant woman is sometimes seen as having "the status of house" for the fetus. Quite often, the fact that she is a person, an autonomous agent, is forgotten. As Thomson puts it: " .. if the woman houses the child, it should be remembered that she is a person who houses it".5 Susan Bordo argues that in our societies women are treated as "fetal incubators" or "fetal containers", whereas the fetus has the status of a "super-subject".6 As she puts it: The essence of the pregnant woman .. is her biological, pmely mechanical role in preserving the life of another. In her case, this is the given value, against which her claims to subjectivity must be rigorously evaluated, and they will usually be found wanting insofar as they conflict with her life­ support function. In the face of such a conflict, her valuations, choices, consciousness are expendable. The nature of pregnancy is such, however, that to deprive the woman of control over her reproductive life ... is necessarily also to mount an assault on her personal integrity and autonomy (the essence of personhood in our culture) and to treat her merely as pregnant res extensa, material incubator of fetal subjectivity?

In a similar manner, Feldman argues that the prohibition of abortion leads to an objectifying treatment of women. The woman is regarded as "a passive object of the state of pregnancy", "the vessel for the fetus" or the "flowerpot" in which it grows. However, as she explains, moral agents have choice over which activities to perfOlTIl and which to decline. In order to avoid treating women as mere fetal vessels, therefore, women's agency, and so their ability to choose whether or not to continue a

5 Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion", 52-3. 6 Bordo, Unbearable Weight, 77, 72. 7 Bordo, Unbearable Weight, 79, 94.

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pregnancy, must be respected.8 People must not think of women primarily in their reproductive role of value to a fetus. Furthermore, women must not think of themselves in this way. In doing so, they are in danger of falling into servility, thus failing to confer the morally appropriate self-esteem to themselves. Feldman writes: It seems likely that one way in which a person comes to think of herself as a lesser being or a mere thing is through treatment by others as such. The prohibition of abortion involves such a treatment. One effect of such a prohibition is to diminish the empirical moral life of the moral agent. In Kantian language, it will lessen the likelihood that a person will recognize her O"Wll status as autonomous rational being, and her own worth as such. I can think of no better illustration of 'treating a person as a mere means' than thiS.9

From the above we can conclude that, in cases where the pregnant woman carmot consent to continuing her pregnancy, or share the end of remaining pregnant, she is being treated merely as a means. She has become a mere instrument (an incubator, a container, a house, a vessel, a flowerpot, to use the above mentioned feminist metaphors) for sustaining the life of the fetus. This is inconsistent with treating her humanity as an end in itself, and thus violates the Formula of Humanity of Kant's Categorical Imperative. II. Treating the fetus merely as a means

In the previous section, it has been explained how we can make sense of the claim that the woman, who is made to continue a pregnancy, is being used merely as a means for keeping the fetus alive. This section will shed light to the much complicated question of how the fetus can be seen as treated merely as a means. Let us go back to the two interpretations of what it means to treat someone merely as a means discussed in section A. According to O'Neill, as we have seen, A treats B merely as a means, if, in his treatment ofB, A does something to which B carmot consent.10 And, according to Wood, individual A treats B merely as a means, in the case where B cannot share A's end ll It is difficult to see how these interpretations can be applied to 8 Feldman, "Occupied Bodies", 270. 9 Feldman, "Occupied Bodies", 274- 5, 279. 10 O'Neill, Constructions o/Reason, 1 1 1 . 11 Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, 153.

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the case of the fetus. It would be absurd to say that the fetus is in a position to give its consent to being treated in some way or another. Similarly, the fetus carmot be regarded as able to share any ends whatsoever. At a first glance, then, we seem to be faced with a dilemma: either we admit that these two interpretations do not capture the fetus' treatment as a mere instrument in cases of abortion, or we draw the conclusion that, because of its inability to give its consent or dissent and/or share ends, the prohibition against treatment merely as a means does not hold for the fetus. These alternatives are unsatisfying. In what follows, I will argue that we have to accept neither. To say that there is nothing morally problematic with treating the fetus merely as a means, because it is not in a position to share ends and give its consent to how others treat it, is too quick a conclusion. Severely mentally incapacitated individuals, people in a comma, infants and young children are too unable to end-sharing, as well as consenting or dissenting to the ways others treat them (to a lesser or greater degree, depending on their condition). We would be far from eager, however, to conclude that, for this reason, people are pelTIlitted to treat them merely as means for their chosen ends. According to Korsgaard, the question of who to consider a rational agent, a being with humanity and dignity, is not an empirical matter (a matter of how capable an individual is in exercising her rational capacities). Korsgaard explains that moral freedom is an ideal concept, which no human being fully exemplifies. We do not ascribe this concept to ourselves and others only if we/they come close to this ideal.12 Korsgaard believes that, even though children do not have rational capacities, they are nonetheless moral subjects (persons) at a certain stage of development. Therefore, we ought to respect children because children are persons.13 According to Korsgaard, then, children (and possibly also fetuses) have moral value as members of the community of human beings, which are rational beings.14 I share Altman's view that it is not plausible to regard children (or fetuses) as persons only because they are members of the community of humans, which are persons. To decide who has dignity we need, according to Kant, look at particular individuals and not the 12 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom a/Ends, 352, 355- 7. 13 Korsgaard, "Fellow Creatures", 79- 110, 96 fn. 49. 14 A similar position has been put forward by Holly Wilson, who argues that it does not matter that the fetus is not capable of exercising its rational capacities. What matters is that the fetus is a member of the human species (Wilson, "The Green Kant", 62- 70).

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community they belong to because the community is not a morally relevant category.15 At this point, it would be useful to look at Kant's 0\Vll discussion of children and their parents' obligations toward them. For him, parents have a duty to preserve and care for their children. This means that "... children, as persons, have by their procreation an original innate (not acquired) right to the care of their parents until they are able to look after themselves... " .16 Kant explains that the act of procreation is to be understood as our decision to bring a person into the world without his or her consent. This creates an obligation in the parents to make the child content with its existence to the extent that they can. He writes: They [the parents] cannot destroy their child as if he were something they had made (since a being endowed with freedom cannot be a product of this kind) or as if he were their property, nor can they even just abandon him to chance, since they have brought not merely a worldly being but a citizen of the world into a condition which cannot now be indifferent to them even just according to concepts of right. ... From this duty there must necessarily also arise the right of parents to manage and develop the child, as long as he has not yet mastered the use of his members or of his lUlderstanding: the right not only to feed and care for him but to educate him, to develop him both pragmatically, so that in the future he can look after himself and make his way in life, and morally, since otherwise the fault for having neglected him would fall on the parents.17

For Kant, then, from the fact that their rational capacities are not yet (fully) developed it certainly does not follow that parents may treat them merely as means. Quite the contrary, Kant clearly states that parents have an obligation to make sure that their children grow into independent adults, and, importantly, into moral agents. Children must be treated as persons with the hope that they will some day become moral subjects. What seems to be important, for Kant, is children's potential for rational personhood. It is unclear whether Kant would see the fetus as deserving of a similar treatment as that of a child. Does the pregnant woman have an obligation not to destroy the fetus "as if [it] were something [she] had made or as if [it] were [her] property"?18 Does she have a duty to give birth to it, and 15 Altman, Kant andApplied Ethics, 253. 16 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 280. 17 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 2 8 1 . 1 8 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 2 8 1 .

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make sure that it develops into an adult human being, a moral agent? The difference between the fetus and the child, one might think, is that the fOlmer, unlike the latter, has not, at the time, been brought into the world by the woman. It is, however, unclear whether this fact frees the woman from the obligation to provide the fetus (which has the potential to become a rational agent should the woman bring her pregnancy to telTIl and give birth to it) with what it needs to eventually become a being with humanity. As we have seen earlier, Wood's and O'Neill's interpretation appear inapplicable to the case of the fetus. Clearly, the fetus is not in a position to share any ends of give its consent to the ways that others treat it. One could argue, however, that, were the fetus in a position to do so, it would not give its consent to being aborted by the pregnant woman and, similarly, it would not share her end to have an abortion. To avoid the awkwardness of considering whether the fetus would consent to x or y, or share this or that end, we may think of an adult human being who, having past the phase of being a fetus, is now a rational agent. Harry Gensler argues along these lines, in order to support his conclusion that abortion is morally wrong. He asks you to think of yourself: "If you are consistent and think that it would be all right to do A to X, then you will consent to the idea of someone doing A to you in similar circumstances".19 His argument concerning abortion goes as follows: P I : If you are consistent and think that abortion is normally morally permissible, then you will consent to the idea of your having been aborted in normal circumstances. P2: You do not consent to the idea of your having been aborted in normal circumstances.

Conclusion: If you are consistent, then you will not think that abortion is normally permissible.20

Hare has a similar argument against abortion. He asks us to imagine that there is a time switch into the past, which would enable us to speak with our mothers who are considering aborting the pregnancies which would result in our births. Let us assume, he says, that I consider my existence as valuable to me and that I am a normally happy person. Furthermore, let us assume that my mother will not die if she continues her pregnancy and gives birth to me. In this case, Hare argues, I would tell her that she should 19 Gensler, "Kantian Argument Against Abortion", 89- 90. 20 Gensler, "Kantian Argument Against Abortion", 93- 4.

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not have an abortion because my preference to live and enjoy life outweighs my mother's preference to have an abortion. If abortion is deemed impermissible in this case, it would be impermissible for everyone in similar circumstances. Abortion is deemed pelTIlissible in cases where the completion of pregnancy would result in the woman's death, or in cases where the fetus would not develop into a person who is happy to be alive.21 Under nmmal circumstances, then, and considering that I am generally satisfied with my life, I do not consent now to my having been aborted as a fetus, and similarly I do not now share my mother's end to have had an abortion. So, if a woman, who considers aborting her fetus now, is happy to be alive and would not want her mother to have aborted her, she ought not perfOlTIl an abortion. Hare's and Gensler's arguments, however, leave open the possibility that some people would consent to having been aborted as fetuses. If my life is miserable and I am unhappy with it, then I could consent to my mother having had aborted me, and I could share her end to have had an abortion. These arguments, therefore, are not particularly useful in helping us judge the morality of abortion. If it all depends on what I want, desire or prefer my mother to have done to me as a fetus, or on whether I consider my life worth living, then I could possibly share her end to abort me and consent to her doing so. If, for example, my life is miserable as a result of having been neglected and mistreated by my mother as a child, it is not implausible to say that I could consent to her having aborted me instead of giving birth to me. Likewise, it is not implausible to say that I could share her end to abort me, since she was not in a position to properly care for me, and give me what I need in order to have a good life. In this case, then, where I judge my mother's decision to abort me as preferable to her giving birth to me and neglecting my needs, my mother would not treat me (as a fetus) merely as a means. On the contrary, one could argue that my mother would act irresponsibly by not having an abortion in this case to spare me from a miserable life. Lara Denis rightly explains the problem with Hare's and Gensler's arguments: ... Kant is concerned with willing not wishing, wanting, or preferring. And the question is not what an agent can will based on some inclinations or feelings she has, but what reason commits her to, or precludes her from, 21

Hare, "Kantian Approach to Abortion", 6- 8.

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willing. ... what is key is whether consent is in principle possible, or what rational people with proper respect for themselves and others would consent to, what free and reasonable people would agree to, etc., not whether some particular agent happens to consent.22

Dennis explains that Kant is not interested about what a particular person happens to desire or prefer, but what rational people would consent to. I believe that the problems with Hare's and Gensler's arguments could be avoided, if we turn to Wood's and O'Neill's reconstructed accounts discussed in detail in chapter 1 . Even in the case I prefer not to have been born, I cannot nevertheless consent to my mother having had aborted me as a fetus, or share her end to so doing. Doing so would lead me to abandon an end I am rationally compelled to have, that of respecting humanity in my 0\Vll person. Since humanity has absolute value, I carmot will its nonexistence today, through my destruction as a fetus. It would be helpful to bring in mind Kant's discussion of suicide here. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explains what is morally problematic with the decision of an individual to end his life to avoid a miserable existence: If he destroys himself in order to escape from a trying condition he makes use of a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life. A hlUllan being, however, is not a thing and hence not something that can be used merely as a means, but must in all his actions always be regarded as an end in itself.23

Respecting his humanity requires protecting and promoting it, even under bad conditions. Remember also Kant's justification for been inconsistent in willing not to help others in need, when in a position to do so. Such an individual in fact wills that others not help him when in need of their help, and so "would rob himself of all hope of the assistance he wishes for himself' .24 We can, of course, imagine a person who would rather die than accept help from others. This person's desire not to be helped, however, is irrelevant from a moral standpoint. The person in question carmot, as a rational agent, will that others not help him when in need of their help. Doing so would involve an improper attitude towards his 0\Vll humanity, which must always be respected. 22 Denis, "Abortion and Kant's Formula of Humanity", 55 1 . 23 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 429. 24 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 423.

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To return to our issue, now, even if my life is miserable at present, I carmot as a rational agent will my mother to have had aborted me as a fetus. Willing such a thing would be to will a disrespectful attitude towards my humanity, which I must in all cases value and respect. It is not possible, therefore, to consent to or share my mother's end of aborting me as a fetus. I, as a rational agent, can only will that my humanity is protected and promoted, and willing to have been destructed as a fetus amounts to willing not ever becoming a being with humanity. Since it is not possible to consent to my having been aborted as a fetus or share my mother's end in question, it follows that if she had aborted me she would have treated me merely as a means, and so in a morally disrespectful marmer. One might object, here, that there is a difference between Kant's examples of the person who considers suicide to end a miserable life and the case of the person who wills not to be helped by others when in need and the case of my willing to having been aborted as a fetus. In the fOlmer cases, we have an already born individual who considers ending his life or who is in danger of, say, losing his life deprived of others' help. In the latter case, I do not will to end my life now, but rather will not to have been born. That is, I will to have been aborted as a fetus, before I was a rational agent, a being with humanity. The act of my having been aborted by my mother would not constitute the destruction of my humanity because I had no humanity as a fetus. All we can say is that I, at that time, had the potential to become a being with humanity, and that my mother's act of aborting me would have destructed this potential. How this potential for humanity is to count in our moral deliberations is a complicated issue, which will be discussed in detail in the following section. III. Treating the pregnant woman merely as a means vs. treating the fetus merely as a means

In the heart of the feminist discussion lies the prohibition against treating a woman, a fully-fledged moral agent, a being with humanity, merely as a means. Treating her as a mere "fetal container" shows disrespect towards her humanity, and is inconsistent with treating it as an end in itself. Feldman argues that a woman's choice to have an abortion should be respected. She bases her argument on Kant's claim that we have an imperfect duty to ourselves to develop our talents. Even though the fulfillment of an imperfect duty is morally meritorious, adopting as a

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principle not to fulfill it is morally wrong." We are morally required to include projects of self-development in our lives. Pregnancy can, in some cases, disrupt these projects. Feldman \¥fites: While some people find that their ongoing projects are perfectly compatible with pregnancy, other people with different projects determine that they are not. ... the quality of its [pregnancy's] outcome is strongly affected by the effort that the pregnant woman puts into it. Knowing this, it is less plausible that anyone or nearly everyone can sustain a healthy pregnancy in combination with every sort of demanding project. Sometimes it is possible. Sometimes it is not. You can't always do two things at once.26

In those cases, where the continuation of pregnancy interferes with a woman's fulfillment of the duty to self-perfection, it is morally permissible to have an abortion. Interestingly, Denis uses the same Kantian idea of an individual's duty to oneself to argue that abortion is morally problematic. Imperfect duties to oneself, she explains, "require sometimes acting on maxims of promoting ends whose adoption constitutes a commitment to realize one's rational nature".27 Duties to oneself as an animal and moral being prohibit individuals from acting on maxims of using their bodies in ways that are inconsistent with their dignity, or that threaten to undennine their bodies' ability to play their reason-supporting role. A virtuous Kantian agent, Denis holds, understands that the way she treats her body reflects the way she views her rational nature. Her body, life, and health are essential for the expression of her rational nature. This means that she must not allow herself to be directed by her animal drives, but must govern herself through reason. Insofar, however, that some impulses or feelings in her animal nature are conductive to morality, a virtuous Kantian agent must not stifle them for merely inclination-based ends.28 For Kant, individuals have duties to themselves and to others that require them to protect and promote feelings of kindness, love, and sympathy for other people. Sympathy, more specifically, makes a person more perceptive of the needs of others.29 Denis explains that pregnancy involves 25 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 423, 4: 430; Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 390, 6: 4446. 26 Feldman, "Occupied Bodies", 273. 27 Denis, "Animality and Agency", 1 1 9. 28 Denis, "Animality and Agency", 120- 3. 29 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 456- 7.

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certain feelings, like attachment and protectiveness towards the fetus carried by the woman. As she writes: If we accept Kant's view that feelings of love and sympathy that aid us in fulfilling duties of love to rational human beings may be fostered by kind treatment of animals and stunted by callous treatment of them, we may assume also that such feelings can be encouraged by attentiveness toward one's fetus and weakened by destructiveness toward it. Killing her developing fetus goes against a woman's morally significant tendencies toward love and sympathy generally, and toward attachment to her fetus in particular. ... Thus, abortion is problematic for a virtuous Kantian agent.30

The view that abortion weakens or destructs a woman's morally significant feelings of love and sympathy is, of course, open to question. Denis herself acknowledges the fact that a single abortion does not irrevocably impair a woman's capacity for these morally important emotionsY FurthemlOre, she accepts that there are cases where abortion may be compatible with the morally significant feelings of love and sympathy. For example, if the fetus has been prenatally diagnosed with a devastating and untreatable illness. In this case, it could be thought kinder to abort the fetus than to bring it into a life of pain and suffering.32 Perhaps, we may argue beyond Denis, it could also be thought kinder for a woman to abort the fetus if she knows that she is unable to properly care for a child and attend to its needs. In any case, even if we accept the view that abortion can interfere with a woman's morally significant feelings of love and sympathy, the worry that pregnancy is often incompatible with the duty to develop one's talents and perfect oneself remains. Denis acknowledges that when she writes that abortion is often morally pelTIlissible, for example in order to avoid having to drop out of school (and even morally required, in cases when it is necessary to preserve the woman's life)Y Besides interfering with a woman's duty of self-perfection, the prohibition of abortion also interferes with a woman's autonomy. As Feldman puts it, such a prohibition "will lessen the likelihood that a person will recognize her own status as autonomous rational being and her 0\Vll worth as such".34 An autonomous agent is free to decide in which ways and for which reasons she will act. If a woman's life is spent thinking that her 3 0 Denis, "Animality and Agency", 128, 1 3 1 . 31 For a more detailed examination of this objection and Denis' response to it, see Denis, "Animality and Agency", 133-4. 32 Denis, "Animality and Agency", 132. 33 Denis, "Animality and Agency", 132. 34 Feldman, "Occupied Bodies", 275.

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body is subject to use by others without her consent, she is unlikely to think of herself as possessing agency. And, if a person does not think of herself as having agency, she will most likely not conceive of herself under the idea of freedom. Rather, she will think of herself merely as someone to whom things happen. Feldman explains: To develop agency, a person must be able to assent to, or refuse, sex and pregnancy, before and after the fact. ... Denial of this will reinforce a belief in her mvn inferiority, her lack of right to exercise her rights, so to speak. It will make her see herself as the object of the choices of others, and not the subject with reasoned choices of her 0\Vll. ... That this activity [pregnancy] is chosen, or voluntary implies that women must choose whether to engage in this activity . ... If women are denied the ability to make this choice, they are condenmed to the life of a less mature, less respected, and less self­ respecting moral patient a morally lesser being.35

So far, I presented and analyzed the view that a Kantian has reasons to think that the pregnant woman should be given priority over the fetus because she is a fully-fledged moral agent, a being with humanity and dignity. If her choice to telTIlinate the pregnancy is not respected, this can interfere with her duty of self-perfection and constitute a violation of her autonomy. We reached this conclusion, however, using Wood's and O'Neill's original interpretations of what is involved in treating humanity merely as a means. In other words, since the pregnant woman carmot share the end of continuing her pregnancy or give her consent to remaining pregnant, in the case she is forced to continue her pregnancy, she is being used merely as a means. But going back to the reconstructed end-sharing and possible consent accounts, we realize that things are far more complicated. According to these reconstructed accounts, we need to examine whether the act of abortion is at odds with promoting humanity. If we take it that the act of abortion somehow shows disrespect towards the fetus' humainty (or potential for it), it can be defended that the pregnant woman call1lot but consent to her remaining pregnant and share the end of continuing her pregnancy. This means that the woman in question is not used merely as a means if her wish to have an abortion is not fulfilled because this wish of hers is at odds with an end she is rationally compelled to have; that of respecting humanity. To see if this is the case, we need to look more closely to the status of the fetus in the context of a Kantian theory and, more specifically, the proper treatment of those beings which only have the potential for humanity.

35 Feldman, "Occupied Bodies", 275- 7.

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As mentioned above, the fetus does not have humanity, rationality. It has, however, the potential to become a being with humanity, if the pregnant woman gives birth to it. In having an abortion, the woman irrevocably destroys this potential. But do we have Kantian reasons for respecting and promoting a being's potential for humanity? Wood believes that we do, in rejecting the so- called "personification principle", according to which humanity or rational nature must be respected only in the person of a being who actually possesses it.36 A logocentric ethics, however, which grounds duties on the value of humanity, must not be committed to the personification principle. In order to respect humanity as an end in itself, we ought, in some cases, respect a being's potential for rational nature and humanity, or a being's having had humanity in the past, or having parts of it or necessary conditions of it. 37 Wood does not deny that we ought to respect rational nature in persons, but argues that "we should also respect rational nature in the abstract, which entails respecting fragments of it or necessary conditions of it, even where these are not found in fully rational beings or persons".38 Wood asks us to think of small children and people with severe mental impailTIlents or diseases, which deprive them temporarily or permanently of the capacity to set and pursue ends. Being indifferent to the potential for humanity in children, for example, would show contempt for rational nature. Similarly, it would show contempt not to respect rational nature in those individuals who have temporarily lost it, and not help them recover their rational capacities.39 Regarding fetuses, Wood explains that, if we abandon the personification principle, what is permissible to do to them might be limited, as fetuses, like small children, are beings which have rational nature potentially. 40 One could argue therefore that personhood must be respected from the beginning of life (at a fetal stage). In this way, we can avoid the problematic view that infants and young children, which are incapable of exercising their rational capacities, have smaller value than adults. The crucial question that arises at this point, however, is how respecting rational nature in the abstract or a being's (a fetus') potential for humanity is to be weighted against respecting fully-realised humanity in an 36 Wood, "Kant on Duties Regarding Nomational Nature", 193. 37 Wood, "Kant on Duties Regarding Nomational Nature", 197. 3 8 Wood, "Kant on Duties Regarding Nomational Nature", 198. 39 Wood, "Kant on Duties Regarding Nomational Nature", 198. 40 Wood, "Kant on Duties Regarding Nomational Nature", 209.

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individual (the pregnant woman). Denis believes that we have reasons not to regard fetuses as deserving of the same moral treatment as young children or adults who have developmental, cognitive, or psychological conditions, which prevent them from exerting their rational capacities. She explains: ... with fetuses it is not a matter of underdeveloped, fluctuating, fledging, degenerating, or impaired agency that makes us hesitate in calling them agents, but an absence of any traces of agency. The practical attributions and attitudes constitutive of our ascribing freedom to others are not naturally elicited by fetuses. Fmther, they make no sense when directed toward fetuses. We cannot see omselves as literally cooperating with fetuses, nor can we properly hold them morally responsible for anything or ascribe maxims to them. And in the case of the fetus, lUllike an lUlconscious but otherwise normal adult human, we have no reason to think of the fetus as someone who has maxims on which she is simply lUlable to act because of her physical state.41

Another argument against destroying the fetus' potential for humanity is that our bodies constitute the material condition for our human agency and rationality. Each of us inevitably passes through the stages of fetus, infant, child, etc. before becoming an adult capable of fully exercising her rational capacities. Destroying the body of an adult human being (by killing her), deprives this individual of the material condition necessary for her agency. This is why it is judged as morally impermissible. But destroying the body of a fetus also deprives it of a necessary material condition for agency. So it too can be judged as morally wrong. Denis rightly argues, however, that the devaluation of rational nature in an adult human being is significantly different from the devaluation of potential agency in a fetus. The fetus only has the potential for humanity. In other words, it has the potential to become a rational agent. And it would be a mistake to think of it as a rational agent now. Killing an adult human being is depriving a being, who is a rational agent now, of its humanity. Thus, it constitutes the devaluation of a rational agent. Aborting a fetus, by contrast, deprives a being of possibly acquiring humanity someday. It constitutes a devaluation of potential agency.42 Feldman, similarly, notes: "The fetus, if valuable at all, is valuable as a potential

41 Denis, "Abortion and Kant's Formula of Humanity", 566. 42 Denis, "Abortion and Kant's Formula of Humanity" , 570- 1 .

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rational being. That is, it has the potential to become valuable. But a potential value must in every case be less than that value fully realized".43 Altman argues that the view according to which we ought to respect fragments and traces of humanity as well as a being's potential for humanity is problematic because fragments and traces of humanity are morally important only if they support moral agency. When they do not, as it is the case with the fetus, then the thing is not directly considerable.44 He characteristically writes: " . . . having some relation to rational nature is not the same thing as having a rational nature, and it is the latter that makes someone worthy of direct moral consideration".45 If devaluation of potential agency is taken to be as equally problematic with devaluation of actual agency (in the face of an adult human being), then we could embrace the view that a doctor's decision to let a pregnant woman die in order to save the fetus, or - to push the example even further - his decision to actively kill the woman in order to save the fetus is morally permissible. If the potential for humanity is equally important with humanity in the person of a fully-developed moral agent, then it does not really matter whether the doctor kills the woman or the fetus. Wood's idea that we must respect rational nature in the abstract IS appealing. However, one sees its drawbacks when trying to put it into practice. Traces of humanity, or the potential for humanity, can be found nearly everywhere. Not only in fetuses, infants, and some animal species, but also in biological entities like the zygote (the fusion of egg and sperm prior to implantation in the uterine wall). This could imply that taking the contraceptive pill is morally impennissible, as it destructs the zygote's potential for humanity. And, disturbingly, it could further be taken to imply that destructing the zygote is as morally problematic as killing an adult human being (if the potential for humanity is put on the same level as actual humanity). Traces of humanity can also be taken to exist in spenn or in a woman's egg. One can imagine the implications of this realisation, if rational nature in the abstract is to be valued in the same way as rational nature in a person. Wood, to be fair, does not claim that we have the same moral obligations to fetuses and other biological entities that have traces of humanity as we have to persons. However, he does not give us any clues as to how rational 43 Feldman, "Occupied Bodies", 278. 44 Altman, Kant andApplied Ethics, 257. 45 Altman, Kant andApplied Ethics, 258.

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nature in the abstract is to count when in conflict with rational nature in a person, like it is the case when abortion is at stake. Without a theoretical framework that explains and highlights our obligations toward rational nature in the abstract, we are left with a theory that threatens to put women, sperm, zygotes, fetuses, etc. in the same boat, with all the above mentioned awkward consequences. If traces of humanity are to count equally as humanity fully-realised, we are in danger of losing the idea which lies in the heart of Kant's theory: that a person 's humanity ought to be respected and treated as an end in itself in all instances. Even if we do not take the value of the fetus and its potential for humanity to be equally important with humanity in a moral agent, however, the idea of regarding it as a mere thing, with only derivative value, is unappealing. The problem seems to arise from Kant's 0\Vll dichotomy between rational beings with absolute and intrinsic value and mere objects with only contingent value. If there existed a category in between persons and mere things, perhaps we would not be unhappy to place the fetus into it. This could avoid the awkwardness of considering the fetus as having equal rights with these of the pregnant woman, on the one hand, and having to think of the fetus as a mere thing subject to any person's whims, on the other. What this category would be like, which sort of beings would deserve to be placed in it, and what our moral obligations would be toward them are all complicated questions to which the present chapter can offer no definite answers.

EPILOGUE RESPECTING HUMANITY: A COMPLEX ISSUE

The ethical and bioethical issues discussed in this book were examined mostly in the light of the formula of humanity of Kant's categorical imperative. Those with humanity have the capacity to rationally set and pursue their O\Vll ends. They have the capacity to make free choices, based not on their inclinations and desires, but on reasons which are justifiable to others. A person, within a Kantian ethics, is free and autonomous, if her choices are bound by the right principles, principles which stem from the obligation to respect and promote humanity in her O\Vll person as well as in that of others. By contrast, a person is not free and autonomous if she simply promotes ends, which stem from her desires and instincts. The Kantian model of autonomy and freedom is clearly different from the personal model, where infolTIled consent is sufficient to make a choice free and the agent making it autonomous. The person, for example, who decides to commit suicide in order to escape from his suffering, is not, from a Kantian point of view, as we have seen, autonomous and his choice to end his life is not free. He would be autonomous, by contrast, if he chose to continue his life, no matter how unbearable, and in this way show respect for humanity in his person. The imperative of respecting humanity, rational personhood, constitutes the grounding principle of Kantian ethics, a principle we readily embrace. Humanity must never be treated merely as a means for the attainment of some further end/so This is because humanity has an absolute, incomparable and unconditional value. An individual's dignity stems from his humanity. Even though the principle of respecting humanity is one we intuitively embrace, it is nonetheless difficult to put it to practice. 'What are the conditions of respecting humanity? In the context of applied ethics, when faced with difficult issues, like euthanasia, suicide, prostitution, organ sale and donation, and abortion, we realize it is extremely difficult to answer

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this question. In the case of voluntary euthanasia, for instance, when a person knows she is bound to lose her rational capacities in the future, does euthanasia constitute an act of respect or disrespect towards her humanity? Likewise, in the case of kidney donation, should we take Kant's position that removing a person's body part constitutes an act of disrespect towards humanity at face value, or should we consider the act of organ donation as one of respect towards the humanity of the organ recipient? In these cases, we are dealing with rational beings: the person who wants to have access to euthanasia, the person who wants do donate one of her kidneys, and the one who is in need of an organ transplant. All three individuals have rational personhood, humanity, which we are bound to respect. But what is the way to respect people's humanity in these cases? And what are we to do when respect for a person's humanity (for example the organ recipient) possibly constitutes an assault to the humanity of another (the organ donor)? There is not one Kantian answer to these difficult questions in the field of applied ethics, as we have seen in the relevant chapters of this book. Moreover, things become more complicated when we move to the category of beings with only the potential for humanity (like fetuses and infants), beings with fragmented humanity (severely mentally ill patients, people with dementia), and, finally, beings whose humanity is lost (people in a non-reversible coma). Should we respect the potential of a person to acquire humanity in the future? If so, what exactly are our obligations towards those with the potential for humanity (for example, a fetus) versus our obligations towards fully rational agents (like the pregnant woman)? Should we keep alive a person who only has traces of humanity (for example, a demented person) or should fragmented humanity require, or at least justify, putting an end to his life? And what, if any, are our obligations towards an individual who has completely lost his rational capacities (the case of a person in an irreversible coma)? We realize, then, that respecting humanity in practice is a complicated matter. The following categorizations can help us understand the complexity of the issue: A. Fully rational human beings. These individuals are in a position to set and pursue their own ends without being influenced solely by their instincts and desires. In this category, we have normal adults,

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in other words individuals without an illness or impairment that prevents them from exercising their rational capacities. B. Human beings without humanity. For example, people in a coma. C. Human beings with restricted or fragmented humanity. For example, children, mentally ill individuals, and demented individuals. D. Beings with the potential for humanity. In this category, we come across fetuses, infants, young children, and people in a reversible coma. Possibly also the zygote, spelTIl and OVLU1l, which do not have hLU1lanity at the present moment, but nevertheless have the potential to acquire it in the future. E. Human beings without the potential for humanity. For example, people in a non-reversible coma, severely abnolTIlal fetuses, and infants with serious illnesses that are expected to die in a short amount of time. From these categories we can be led to the following combinations: A&B. Human beings with humanity, which is bound to be lost in the future. For example, people in the beginning stages of dementia or some kinds of cancer and other degenerating illnesses. Those people have rational capacities at present, which are bound to be destroyed with the deterioration of their condition. A&C. Human beings with humanity, which will be affected and restricted in the future. For example, a person with a degenerating illness, which will affect his rational capacities without completely destroying them. B&D. Beings without humanity, but with the potential to acquire it in the future. For example, fetuses, infants, and people in a reversible coma. B&C. Human beings without humanity, but with the potential to acquire restricted humanity in the future. For example, a fetus or infant with a serious abnormality or illness, which is bound to seriously affect, yet not destroy, its rational capacities in the future. B&E. Human beings without humanity, nor the possibility of acquiring it in the future. For example, a person in a non-reversible coma or a dying infant.

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These cases make us realize more fully the complexity of the imperative to respect humanity. As Kantians, we cannot but agree that humanity ought to be respected. However, in the difficult questions that arise during its application to practical issues, the answers are far from clear. In this final part of this book, I aim to put forward some ideas and give directions as to the way to deal with the issue of respect for humanity in practice. Before going any finther, it should be noted that I do not share the view of some Kantian scholars that all human beings have the same absolute value (dignity) as members of the human community, independently from whether, or to what degree, they are in a position to exercise their rational capacities. According to this view, we ought to treat all human beings as ends in themselves and never merely as means because they are members of the human community.l If rational personhood is what gives an individual absolute value, dignity, how can we claim that an individual who, for example, has forever lost his rational capacities has absolute value on the basis that she is a member of the human community? Isn't this a straightforward fonn of speciesism? Moreover, this view is too abstract, inevitably resulting in an empty command. It is not clear, for example, what it means, in Kantian tenns, that a person who is in a non-reversible coma has absolute value. And, furthennore, what does accepting this position entail? The obligation to keep him alive as a member of a community of individuals whose life constitutes a necessary condition for their rational agency? Or, in the case of the fetus, if we also accept it as a member of the human community, can we argue that it is worthy of respect? And do we have the same obligations towards it as we do towards already born human beings? The acceptance of the position that all human beings have the same absolute value as members of the human community leaves us with an empty obligation of respect. In this way, we lose the meaning of the value of rational personhood. Because it is no longer rational personhood that commands the treatment of a being as end in itself, but rather whether or not this being is a member of the human community. It is preferable, I believe, to abandon the seemingly appealing view that every being who is a member of the human community (or who has the potential to become a member of this community) has absolute value and choose to deal with our

1 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends. 352- 7; Wilson, "The Green Kant", 65- 72; Schwartz, The Moral Question ofAbortion. 1 00- 1 .

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moral obligations (or lack thereof) towards each of the members mentioned in the above categories. Quite clearly, at least for some of the beings in these categories, we are unwilling to accept that it is permissible to use them merely as means for the ends of fully rational agents. For example, we think it is outrageous that children, people with mental impairments or those in a reversible coma may be used merely as means because of their underdeveloped, restricted, or temporarily absent humanity. The idea of equating these individuals with animals and inanimate objects which can, according to Kantian ethics, be used merely as means for the attainment of rational beings' ends, is unappealing. It is not impossible to argue, in the context of a Kantian theory, that using those individuals merely as means is morally wrong. We can claim that these individuals do not have dignity in the Kantian sense of this tenn because of their underdeveloped in the case of children, impaired in the case of people with mental disabilities, or temporarily lost in the case of people in a reversible coma, humanity. However, treating them as mere means for the attainment of the ends of rational agents is problematic because it shows disrespect towards the humanity of those who possess it. According to Kant's views on animals, even though we do not have direct duties towards them, as they lack rational personhood and so dignity, mistreating them is, nonetheless, morally condenmable. This is because the person who mistreats an animal does not, in fact, respect humanity in his 0\Vll person. Moreover, it is very likely that this person will manifest an equally cruel treatment towards other human beings.2 Kant writes in the Metaphysics a/Morals: . . . violent and cruel treatment of animals is far more intimately opposed to a human being's duty to himself, and he has a duty to refrain from this; for it dulls his shared feeling of their suffering and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in one's relation with other men. 3

Of course, some will not easily accept the view that the reason we should not treat, for example, a child or a person with a mental disability merely as a means for our ends is because doing so shows disrespect towards humanity in our own person or/and we become more prone to mistreat fully rational human beings. That is, the idea that we do not have direct 2 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 459 60; Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 443. 3 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 443.

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duties towards the child or the mentally ill person is one that understandably troubles us. In the same way that Kantian theory is, for many, disappointing concerning the way it includes animals in its moral considerations, it is also disappointing concerning our duties towards some categories of individuals whose rational capacities are restricted or absent. This seems to be the price of accepting a purely logocentric theory like the Kantian. Of course, as it becomes clear from the above categorizations, things are more complex in the case of human beings like they are in the case of animals. It is clear that animals do not have rational personhood in the way this is defined by Kant, namely the capacity to set and pursue their ends independently from their desires and instincts. Moreover, they do not have the potential to ever acquire rational agency. Therefore we could more easily accept Kant's conclusion that we do not have direct duties to animals and that treating them nicely stems from our duty to respect our 0\Vll humanity.4 Besides the category of beings who are in a non-reversible coma and, like animals, do not have rational capacities or the potential to ever acquire them, in the rest of the cases we are confronted with beings who have restricted or fragmented humanity, or do not have humanity at the present moment but have, nonetheless, the potential to acquire it. Even if in the case of the person in an irreversible coma we can accept that the reason we must not treat him merely as a means for our ends (for example, perfOlTIl experiments on him in a lab) is our rational personhood and dignity, the reason we must not use a mentally disabled individual merely as a means does not solely have to do with our rational personhood. Because, even though this person may not be in a position to fully exercise her rational capacities, she nonetheless has traces or fragments of humanity. It could be argued in this case, then, that we ought to respect fragmented humanity in this person. However, the way humanity is to be respected in these kinds of cases, as it was discussed in the chapters of this book, is a difficult issue. It should be made clear here that in the case of a mentally disabled person it can be defended that we have duties of respect towards her, not because she is a member of the human community but because she has, albeit compromised, humanity. Therefore accepting that we ought to respect this 4 However, it is not easy to accept such a conclusion at least for some kinds of animals, which seem to possess traces of rational agency.

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individual and refrain from treating her merely as a means for our ends is quite different from the abstract duty to respect this individual as a member of the human community. What concerns us in this case is the fragmented, but nonetheless existent, humanity of this individual and not the fact that she is a human being. Moreover, in the case of an infant, its potential to acquire rational personhood constitutes a reason for not treating it merely as a means for our ends, even though the infant does not have rational personhood at the present moment. As Kantians it is not possible not to acknowledge the potential of an infant to acquire humanity, claiming that it is pennissible to treat it as a mere means, or that the reason we must not treat it in a purely instrumental way is our rational nature. Of course, the difficulty with accepting this line of thought is where to place the limits of acknowledging a being's potential for humanity. In the case of the infant, we feel certain that its potential for humanity ought to make us refrain from treating it merely as a means for our ends. 'When it comes to the fetus, things are not as clear and there is disagreement concerning how its potential for rational personhood ought to be taken into consideration in our moral deliberations (especially when it is in conflict with respecting humanity in the person of the pregnant woman). In the case of the zygote, we tend to think that its potential for humanity should not restrict us, at least not in the same way it restricts us in the case of an infant. Concerning the sperm's and egg's potential to develop into beings with humanity, the view that we ought to give them the chance for such a development is clearly extreme. The fact that we have a duty to respect rational nature as well as the potential of some beings to acquire it does not mean that we have a duty to create as many rational agents as we possibly can, and so rule out contraception as morally wrong. In any case, we can more easily accept that, in the case of a person who does not have humanity at present nor the potential to ever acquire it, like it is the case with the individual in an irreversible coma, it is pennissible to treat her merely as a means. We could therefore accept the view that we are not morally obliged to keep this person alive, and that it is morally pennissible to tum off any mechanical support. Moreover, it can be argued that we can use her organs in order to save other people's lives. On the other hand, however, it appears implausible to accept that it is morally pennissible to end the life of a healthy infant or use its organs to save a fully rational human being. Even in the more controversial case of the

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fetus, its potential to acquire humanity can reasonably restrict our decision concerning the telTIlination of a pregnancy. Let us now look at the case of fully rational human beings, those beings who are in a position to rationally set and pursue their ends, in the sense that their condition is not such as to prevent them from exercising their rational capacities and fulfill their moral obligations. We are understandably concerned with regard to the way we ought to treat those rational agents who choose to disrespect humanity in their O\Vll person. For example, an adult prostitute who is not somehow forced or coerced to prostitute herself, but decides to make a living through offering herself to be used sexually by others in exchange for profit. This woman has humanity and dignity, she is a rational agent. However, she chooses, as Kant argues, to disrespect her humanity. In this way, Kant thought that she allows her person to become an object of use and can be used as a mere thing by anyone, in the same way people use a piece of meat to satisfy their hunger.5 Ifwe accept the Kantian argument against prostitution, the prostitute seems to lose her humanity through her 0\Vll choice. She is lowered, from a being with absolute value, to a being with only relative and instrumental value. The same holds for the person who decides to commit suicide in order to escape from his miserable existence. Even in the case he fails to kill himself, Kant seems to believe that this person has lost his humanity, having degraded himself to the level of an object. 6 Of course, it is not necessary to espouse Kant's argument against prostitution and the inevitability of degrading herself to a thing for use, as well as Kant's argument that the miserable person who attempted suicide has caused damage to his humanity. 'What concerns me here is rather the Kantian view that a person (not necessarily for us the prostitute or the suicide) can, through his or her choices, degrade and lose his rational personhood. If we reject the view that every member of the human community has absolute value and must, therefore, be treated as an end in itself, we are reasonably troubled with cases in which some rational agents choose to insult or damage their own humanity. If we accept, like Kant did, the fact that, for example, the prostitute's humanity is lost and that she ends up a mere thing for others' use, how can we defend the view that we must respect her humanity? Wouldn't this be as umeasonable as claiming that 5 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 386. 6 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27: 373.

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we ought to respect the humanity of a person in an irreversible coma? In both tbese cases we talk about the loss of humanity, which means that nothing can prevent us from a purely instrumental attitude towards these individuals, but our rational personhood and our duties towards ourselves as rational agents. Let us be reminded here of Kant's harsh words concerning the person who chooses to degrade his person: "But one who makes himself a WOlTIl carmot complain afterwards if people step on him".7 One could argue here that the loss of humanity in tbe case of a person who is in a non-reversible coma is certain. It is clear, that is, that this person is not in a position to rationally set and pursue his ends because of his condition. It is, however, hard to see the prostitute and the person who attempted to commit suicide as individuals without the capacity to rationally set and pursue ends. Perhaps Kant's claim that tbe prostitute is turned into a thing for others' use thus losing her humanity is an exaggeration. In his effort to emphasize the immorality of prostitution and the harm the prostitute causes to her person, Kant talks about the loss of her humanity in a metaphorical marmer. Or, we might think, his claim that the prostitute can be used as a thing by everyone, since she has chosen to degrade herself, can be understood as a fOlTIl of punishment for the person who does not respect the value of her rational personhood. Kant's harshness for those people who show disrespect towards tbeir humanity may sound extreme to us. However, we are understandably concerned regarding the way we ought to treat people who intentionally act in ways inconsistent with respecting humanity in their 0\Vll person. Because, in these cases, we do not talk about people who are led to a deterioration of their humanity caused by something out of their control, like an illness, but about people who intentionally degrade and disrespect their own humanity. Along with our concerns regarding the way we ought to treat the beings in the above mentioned categories, therefore, we ought to add our concern regarding the way we ought to treat those individuals who disrespect their humanity by choice. The Kantian notion of dignity therefore as an absolute, incomparable and unconditional value is attractive in theory. Dignity, however, in the context of a Kantian ethics, stems from a being's rational personhood, which in many cases is present only as a potential with whatever this may imply for its value and our obligations towards it. Moreover, in being 7 Kant, Metaphysics a/Morals, 6: 437.

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confronted with real situations, we realize that people's rational capacities can, intentionally or not, be undelTIlined, diminished, or even lost. Unavoidably, therefore their value is also affected, along with our duties towards them in the context of a purely logocentric theory. The problem with Kantian ethics, as mentioned in the chapter where abortion was discussed, is that it acknowledges the existence of two categories of beings. The category of things and animals, towards which we have no direct duties and which can be used merely as means for our ends, and the category of beings with humanity, which ought, in every case, be treated as ends in themselves. It should not come as a surprise, then, that in many cases we are uncertain in which category to place beings such as a fetus, a mentally disabled individual, a comatose individual, and even an person who has intentionally chosen to diminish humanity in her own person.

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