Kant and Greek Ethics [I & II]

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Mind, Vol. 48, No. 191, (Jul., 1939), pp. 338-354

Mind, Vol. 48, No. 192 (Oct., 1939), pp. 446-463

III.-KANT

AND GREEK BY

ETHICS

(II.).

KLAUS REICH.

(Translatedby WV.H. Walsh.) PART II.-KANT

AND PANAETIUS.

As was pointedout earlyin the precedingpaper,' onlythe third sectionof the Foundationof theMetaphysicof Morals, entitled by Kant " Transitionfromthe metaphysicof morals to the critiqueof pure practicalreason", containsdoctrineswhichcan be said to be specificallycriticalin character. The doctrines in question concernthe fixingof a limitto the competenceof any systemof practicalphilosophy; Kant puts forwardthe idea that freedomis incomprehensible, that sincewe can demonstrate we cannotexplainits existence,but mustbe contentwithshowing is itselfpossible. In all this that no proofof its impossibility Kant is dealingwitha provincewhichhe was the firstto conquer. But in the firsttwo sectionsof the work,the " Transitionfrom commonto philosophicalrationalknowledgeof ethics" and the " Transitionfrompopular moral philosophyto metaphysicof morals", whichare of a purelyanalyticalnature,he is standing upon the same groundas his predecessorsin moral philosophy. It is true,of course,that he turnsthis groundover and ploughs is the disit up. Thus the peculiarobject of the Grundlegung of the supremeprincipleof morality, coveryand determination and the formulaofferedof it in the firsttwo sectionsis a new formula,originatedby Kant himself. But it should be noticed " what that Kant only claimsthe meritof having " formulated we mustdo ifwe are to fulfilour obligations; he neversuggests that he is introducinga new principleof all morality,forthat would be equivalent,as he says, to " discoveringmoralityfor the firsttime". What he believesthat he is the firstto do is to a principlewhichthe " most to give a precisedetermination enlightenedmoralists" of the past have long attemptedto determine. It is in accordance with this that, for example, 1 Cf.Kant and Greek Ethics,1MD,

July, 1939,p. 341.

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he praisesin the Critiqueof Pure Reason " the extremelypure morallaw ofour (Clristian)religion", or extolsin the same work the ideal conceivedby Stoic sages. In the Critiqueof Practical Reason (Book II, 2nd division,v) he says plainly that "the Stoics chose their suprememoral principle. . . perfectlycorrectly". Kant's appreciationof the moral philosophyof these latter "valiant men" is indeed evident; and the question naturallysuggestsitself,whetherit restedon a study of their theories. We mustfirstask what worksof the Stoics Kant could have studied. We possess only one systematicmanual of ethics fromthe middle period of Stoicism,in the shape of Cicero's versionof the Tept' roV Kac4KOVTOS' of Panaetius of Rhodes. that the de officiis This is the de officiis.But it is noteworthy textin moralphilosophyin the western becamethe authoritative world,and retainedthatpositionuntilintothe eighteenth century. too that Kant mentionsthe book in his late It is noteworthy MetaphysicofMorals (1797),whichcontainsa systematicpresenbothinthe" Introduction tationofhisethics: therearereferences to the doctrineof right" (ad fin.) and in the " Introductionto the doctrineof virtue" (ad init.). In a note in his essay on the saying " das mag in der Theorierichtigsein . . .", writtenin 1793, Kant quotes a passage froma book of " annotations" to Cicero'sworkby ChristianGarve,1and we knowthathe possessed in an editionin whichit appeared a copy of this commentary

ofthede offlCiiS.2 Andwe gain alongwithGarve'stranslation

some interestinginformationin this connexionfrom certain passages in Hamann's letters: we learn for instancefromthe letterto Herder of 8th February,1784, that " Kant is said to be workingon a replyto Garve'sCicero-he hasn't yet fixedthe that Kant read Garve's title". It is plain fromsuch references translationand commentary-or,if we like to put it that way, beforethe composition studied Cicero's de officiis-immediately ofthe Grundlegung. to Ciceroarejust as scarcein theGrundlegung Explicitreferences to Plato; and in decidingon passagesin which as are references Kant tookaccountofhisworkthegreatestcautionmustnaturally be exercised. One reason forthis is that the moral philosophy of ChristianWolffwas in the Stoic tradition,and Kant's ethical teachingcontinuallyfollowsthat of Wolff'smost distinguished pupil, Alexander Baumgarten. To establish with certainty 1Anmerkungen zu CicerosButchvondenPflichten (1783). 2 Ciceros iiberdie menschlichen Pflichten in dreiBilchern. . . Abhandlung comes von ChristianGarve(Breslau, 1783). This information ilbersetzt fromA. Warda,ImmanuelKantsBilcher(1922.),x, 21.

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to Cicerowe must gain possessionof a special Kant's references clue. Let us ask what Kant's principlewas in consideringthe workof his predecessorsin a science. We findit stated in the Metaphysicof Morals, "Doctrine of Virtue", ? 39, lwherewe are told that " we have a duty to show respectfora man also so far as the logical employmentof his reason is concerned; when his reason blunderswe must not censure its errorsas grotesque,ridiculousand the like, but ratherpresupposethat theremust be some truthin them,truthwhichwe should seek unmaskthe illusionwhichbetrayed out,whilstwe simultaneously him.

. .

In this way can we continueto esteemhis under-

standing." For brevity'ssake let us call the piece of advice given in these words Kant's " citizen of the world" maxim.' We may ask whetherit is not likelythat Kant paid the respect whichhe thoughtincumbentupon him, and conductedhimself ofthe mainwork as a " citizenofthe world" towards,the afCthor in moralphilosophybeforehistime,seeingthatthatworkclaimed his particularattentionwhenhe was composingthe Grundlegung. Ifnowweraisethequestion,in whatpassagesoftheGrundlegung we oughtat anyrateto lookforevidencethatKant had considered the doctrinesof the Stoic manual and thus paid " respect" to its author,we findourselvescompelledfromthe firstto regard two thingsas of crucial importance. The firstis the way in which the enquiryinto the problemof the principleof duties as such is instituted; if one likesit put in thisfashion,the way in which Kant plunges into his investigation. The second is betweenwhat is, in Kant's opinion, the mannerof distinguishing a newlyintroducedformulaofthe principleofduty,and previous thatprinciple. Theseoccupy,respectively, attemptsto determine thebeginningofthefirstand thewholeofthe secondsection. I proposenowto examinethesepassages. First,the beginning of the openingsection. The initial propositionis that " only the goodwillis goodwithoutlimitation". Afterthe enunciation betweenthe good will and various of thiscomesa distinguishing I The explanationof this phrasecan be foundin Anthropologie, ? 2: to testhisjudgment "The logicalegoistis one whobelievesit unnecessary to otherpeople's understandings.It is, however,certain by reference thatwe cannotdispensewiththismeansof becomingsureofthe truthof our judgments; so much so that perhapsthe most importantreason forfreedomof the whichimpelseducatedpeopleto cryout so insistently deprivedof a press is that whenthis is refusedwe are simultaneously of our ownjudgmentsand being weightymeansoftestingthe correctness deliveredfromourerrors. . . To egoismofthissortwe can onlyoppose in whicha man does not Pluralism,or in otherwordsthe way ofthinking believethat the wholeglobeis comprisedin his own self,but ratherconas no morethana citizenoftheworld." sidershimself

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other good things. Since the will (the character)is a faculty ofthe humansoul,it is naturalthat in makingsuch a distinction we should oppose goodness of will to other human psychical qualities-to " talents of the mind" and " propertiesof temperament". A furtherstep,leadinginto quite a different field, is takenwhenwe contrasta goodwillwithgiftsoffortune, power, wealth, honour and the like. Kant is consideringhere first, what can be good in man himself,and second,thosegood things which are good apart fromhim or in dependenceon external objects. The next and finalstep in this businessof comparing good thingsleads us into difficulties.Kant says: " There are certain qualities which indeed are advantageous to the good will and can make its task easier. Neverthelessthey have no inner unconditionedvalue but ratherpresupposea good will, which limitsthe high esteem in which they are (incidentally) quite rightlyheld,and forbidsour holdingthemto be absolutely good." It is with a certainastonishmentthat we notice that in theenumeration whichfollowsofthesequalitieswe are brought up once more against the internalpropertiesof man, against and character,despitethe factthat we have spirit,temperament already dealt with them: the qualities named are moderation, and thepowerofsoberdeliberation. Thus thewhole self-control, course of the comparisonof good thingsdisplaysa curioustripartite division: there come firsta considerationof human capacities,secondone of the giftsof fortune,and thirda return to the questionofhumancapacities. However,a remarkfollows which provides an explanation: "The ancients gave unconditionalpraiseto theselast-mentioned qualities,and pronounced them to be good withoutlimitation." The truth is that the qualities in questionare threeof thefour cardinalvirtuesof the Greeks; that the fourth,justice, is missingis a matterforno surprise,in view of the factthat Kant classedit withthat which we mustregardas good in itself. The question now arises, to whom the expression " the ancients" refersin this context. To answerit we have onlyto read the openingchaptersof the de officiis(Book 1, chs. 3-5). The subject of a " high' esteem" which is apparently unconditionedis, we are told, the "honestum, quod etsi nobilitatumnon sit,tamenhonestumsit,quodque veredicimusetiamsi a nullo laudareturnatura esse laudabile" (1, 4, 14). In Cicero this statementis followedby a division of " morallygood " thingsinto wisdom,justice, courage and self-control (ch. 5).1 1 The quotationtakenby Kant in 1793 (see above) fromGarve'scommentarycomesfromthe notesto thischapteron thefourcardinalvirtues.

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If now we assumethat Kant had the beginningof Cicero'swork in mind in composingthe openingpages of the Grundlegung we can understandtheremarkabletripartite divisionoftheirsubjectmatter. In a passage immediatelyprecedingthose we have mentioned(ch. 3, ?? 9-10) Cicerohad explainedthe plan of the de officois.He had dividedit, he says,into threebooks to correkindsof " deliberation we undertakebefore spondto the different makingup our mindsto action". The questionsraisedin such werefirst,that of whetherthe action is " morally circumstances good or bad "; second," whetherit contributesto our needsthe comfortand pleasureof life; whetherit providesthe means of attaininghonour,wealthand power,and so enablesus to give these pleasuresto ourselvesor others: in a word,whetherit is usefulor not"; and thirdthosearisingfrom" thecases occurring fromtimeto timein whichthereis an apparentconflictbetween the good and the useful". We see from this that Kant's afterhe has drawn the obvious procedurein the Grundlegung, psychologicaldistinctionbetweencharacteron the one hand and on the other,is to contrastthe good talents and temperament will firstwiththe utileand thenwiththe honestum, i.e., withthe in theopinionofPanaetius conceptswhosediscussionconstituted, oftheirtheoryof ethics. and Cicero,the necessarysubject-matter The suppositionthat the beginningof the G(rundlegung refers back to the openingof the de officiis if (1, 3-5) is strengthened we take account of the followingcircumstance. Kant's comparison of good things(paragraphs1 and 2) and his repeated emphasison the statementthat the goodnessof the good will has nothingto do with its useful consequences(? 3) are immediatelysucceeded(?? 4-7) by a discussionwhichhas its counterpart in Cicero. The referenceis to chapter4 of the de officiis, which comes immediatelyafter the division of subject-matter to whichI proposeto relate Kant's determination of kinds of good things. Kant raises the question as to the " purpose of nature" in givingmen reason as the governorof their wills. His conclusionis that nature's action would have been quite pointlessif it had had the " preservationand well-being" of human beings as its " object" in tlhis. Now Garve translates Cicero's fourthchapterunder the heading " Derivation of the morally good fromhuman nature". The chapter bases this derivationon " the primaryinstinct,whichnaturehas implanted in -all living creatures,to preservethemselves,their lives and the groundof the honestum physicalwell-being ", and determines as a rationalbeing,from to man's specificdiflerence, by reference the brutes,retaininghoweverthe considerationof this primary

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instinct. It is thereforeconcernedwith the very thesiswhich Kant discussesand rejectsin ?? 4 to 7 ofthe Grundlegung. between If now we considermore closelythe correspondence the firstsevenparagraphsofKant's treatiseand thefirstchapters of Cicero'sbook to touch on the subject in question,we cannot avoid the assumptionthat Kant did have this compositionof the " ancients" in mindwhenhe wrote. What is more,we see that he did not merelycomparehis view with that of Cicero, in conformity withhis " citizenoftheworld" maxim, but further, triedto discoverthe truthin the Stoic doctrine. This is shown by his sayingthat " high esteemis (incidentally)quite rightly and the attached" to the qualities of moderation,self-control powerof sober deliberation,and his declarationthat they " are advantageousto thegoodwillitselfand can makeitstaskeasier". It is because of this that they have been identifiedwith the morallygood. Again, in the same strain,we read that " there so strangein theidea thatthemerewillhas absolute is something to any advantage worthwhenwe considerit withoutanyreference it may produce,that a suspicionmust arise that perhapsthis view is secretlybased on nothingmorethan a far-reaching flight of the imagination". The natural characterof this suspicion affordsan explanationof why philosopherstry to derive the morallygood fromhlumannature,i.e., fromthe instinctto preserveand fosterlifeand fromthe part whichreasonplays in the process. As a result of this discussionwe have convincedourselves, that Kant by referenceto the firstsectionof the Grundlegung, at least as faras the end ofthefifth tookaccountofthede officiis, chapterof the firstbook. What we must now ask is whether as his " citizenof the he took Cicero'sviews into consideration, world" maximrequiredthat he should,in dealing in the second section,withthe principalobject of the work,namelythe exact of the principleof duty. determination The verytitleof the sectionmakesthe suspicionof a reference of somehistoricalimportancea reasonableone. The firstsection, was labelled " Transitionfromcommon it will be remembered, to philosophicalrational knowledge of ethics", the second " Transitionfrompopular moralphilosophyto metaphysicof morals". It is naturalto ask the question,what is thispopular philosophywhich is here distinguishedfrom commonethical knowledge. To answerthis,let us noticefirstthat it is just the existence of thissectionon the " transitionfrompopularmoralphilosophy the exposition to the metaphysicof morals" whichdifferentiates

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fromthat in Kant's. of the law of moralityin the Grundlegung -theCritiqueof PracticalReason and the otherethical writings, MetaphysicofMorals. Purelyexternalevidenceofthe difference betweenthe treatisesis to be foundin the fact that the second contains,as does neitherof the other sectionof the Grundlegung of the works,a detaileddiscussionof a pluralityof formulations moral law. In the Critiqueof PracticalReason the formulaof the basic law of pure practicalreason runs: " So act that the maxim of your will can at all times have validityas principle of a universallegislation" (? 7). In the Metaphysicof Morals the wordsare, " Act in accordancewith a maximwhichcan at the same timehave the validityof a universallaw " (Introd.IV). What is the relationof theseexpressionsofthe morallaw (which are intendedto be equivalent) to the many formule of the ? To answerthis we need to knowfirsthow many Grundlegung contains. The of the moral law the Gru*dlegung formulations currentopinionis that there are three,and we must examine whetheror not this is right. In the pages followingthe 32nd paragraph (Berlin edition, IV, 421 fl.) Kant discusses three in detail and tests them with examples. In the 72nd formulma together paragraph(IV, 436) he bringsthe three formulations with the followingcomment: " The threeways we have menthe principleof moralityare at bottom tioned of representing only so many statementsof one and the same law, and one of them comprisesthe othertwo in itself. There is, however,a whichhas importancefo, betweenthem,a difference difference action in a subjectiveratherthan an objective manner,since it turnson the questionof how to make men, by means of a certainanalogy,bringan Idea of reason nearerto intuitionand derAnschauung eineIdee derVernunft to feeling" (" unm therefore (nach einergewissenAnalogie)und dadurchdem Gefiihlenaherzubringen"). AfterthisKant dividesthe threeformuleaccording to whethertheyexpressthe form,matteror systemwhichhe says that all maximsdisplay; and enumeratesthemas follows. (1) " Maximsmustbe chosenas iftheywereto have the validity of universallaws of nature"; (2) " Every maximshouldregard a rationalbeingas an end in himselfservingas a conditionlimiting all purelyrelativeand arbitraryends"; (3) " All maxims to be consistentwith a possible ought by theirown legislation. kingdomof ends conceivedas a kingdomof nature". " It is howeverbetter" (the passage continues)" if in formingmoral judgmentsone proceeds accordingto the strict method and adopts the generalformulaof the categoricalimperativeas a basis, this being 'Act accordingto the maximwhichcan at the

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same time be made a universallaw '. But if one's aim is also to ensurethat the morallaw gains admittanceto men's minds, it is a veryusefulthingto considerone and the same action in the lightof the threeconceptionsnamed above, and so to bring its principle,as faras is possible,nearerto intuition". The questionwe must ask is whetherthe " generalformula" is identicalwith one of the three ways we have describedof the principleof morality. It is commonlysaid to representing be the same as the firstof them (the one about laws of nature) or as the third(that which speaks of a kingdomof ends conceived as a kingdomof nature). Verbally,however,no such can be made; and in truththereis a real difference identification betweenthe " generalformula" we have referredto and the the principleof morality" in questhree " ways of representing tion, which are " particular" formulationsof it. Of this we shall be mosteasilyconvincedifwe considerthethreeparagraphs which followthe one we have analysed. These bringtogether the resultsof all that has preceded. In them Kant firstof all expressesthe " generalformula" in the form" Act always in accordance with a maxim whose universalityyou can simultaneouslywill to hold as law " and designatesit as the supreme good will; and then expoundsone rule of an unconditionally based on the conceptsof " a law afteranotherthe threeformulm of nature", " an end in itself" and " a kingdomof ends,"which in each case to theiragreementwith we have discussed,referring the " general formula" and stating a special reason for the adequacy with whichthey expressor representit. From this it is apparent that Kant regards the " general formula" as the law of the good will, whilst the other being immediately because theirrelationship threeformuleare onlysuchindirectly, to the " generalformula" can be shown. And this procedure one " general" and three compelsus to speak of fourformulw, " particular" in character. The " general" formulaalready emergesfromthe discussionin thefirstsectionofthe Grundlegung

inthesecondsection(??31,72,73, (? 17,IV, 402). It is repeated

IV, 421, 436-437)and is identicalwiththe preceptof ? 7 of the to the Critiqueof PracticalReason and that of the introduction Metaphysicof Morals.'

1 OfcourseI do notdenythatanyoneparticular formula maybe specially whetherthatparticularformulabe suitedto expressthegeneralprinciple, the first,whichconsidersonlythe formofthe maxim,or the third,which " theprincipleofautonomy withsomeprecision is capableof " elucidating (? 57). And this explainswhy particularformulwhave been identified withthe generalformula. I thinkthat I may be allowedto feelmyself not obliged to expose the illusion which conduces to this mistaken identification.

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Wlhenthis is establishedwe can see that it is the appearance the second of the threeparticularformulewhichdifferentiates sectionofthe Grundlegung fromthe otherpassagesin whichKant discussesthenatureof the morallaw. In viewof this,the point whichmustexciteour specialinterest,if our aim is to determine the characterofthe popularethicsfromwhichKant is proposing to effecta transitionto " metaphysicof morals", is that of the relationshipof the threeparticularstatementsand the general had expressedhimself formula. Kant, it will be remembered, as if he thoughtthat only the last-namedwas in accordance withthe strictmethodof moraljudgment. In consequencethe three otherscan really only produce confusionin our ethical judging. The source of this confusionis plain enough: it can lie only in the threeconceptsunderwhichin these formulean action subject to moral judgmentis brought; in the three concepts,thatis to say, ofa " law ofnature", "an end in itself" and " a kingdomof ends thoughtas a kingdomof nature", so far as these are employedto representthe supremeprincipleof morality. If, however,the particularmodes of representation can thus lead to confusionin our ethicaljudging,how can it be so certainthat theyenable us to intuitand feelwhat is thought in the moral law ? This questionis certainlya- just one, and the answerwe give to it must reveal the natureof the popular moralphilosophyfromwhichKant is to pass in the Grundlegung to the metaphysicofmorals. In view of our previous conclusionsthe question becomes inevitablewhetherthe clue to the testingof an obligatoryact by the three problematicalmodes of representation may not has to say have been suppliedto Kant by what the de officiis about the supreme principleof morality. Accordingto the heuristicmaximwe have set out we can onlyanswerthisquestion if we can showthat at the basis of thesethree in the affirmative therelie principleswhich,thoughcapable modesofrepresentation at best of expressingcorrectmoral rules, are neverthelessemphaticallyrejected by Kant when conceivedas equivalent to the supremeprincipleof morality. When such an identification is made theseprinciplesmustin his sightbe called " blundersof themin a contemptuous reason"; and ifwe wishto characterise way we can describethemas " grotesqueand ridiculous". To of the moral law, findtruthin them as alleged representations and at the same time expose the deceptiveillusionwith which theyare boundup, we shall need to take specialpains and make of ethicalinterpretation.' a specialeffort 1 The reference, ofcourse,is to thepassagefromtheMetaphysic ofMoral& quotedabove,p. 448.

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At the beginningof Book 3 of the de officiis Cicerois, in the language of Garve's marginalnote, seeking " a universalrule which will resolve the apparent conflictbetween duty and interest". He beginshis investigations fromwhat he describes in 3, 4, 20 as " haec formulaStoicorumrationidisciplinaeque maximeconsentanea": " convenienter naturaevivere" (3, 3, 13). It is interesting to noticethat Cicerofeelsit necessaryto explain in myopinion,this: to strive the meaningofthis. It " signifies, in everycircumstance forinnerperfection"(so Garve translates virtus)" and to accept or rejectexternalthingsagreeableto our natureaccordingto whetheror not theyare consistentwiththe promotionof such perfection ". Now Kant too, in the second sectionof the Grundlegung, triesto make a beginningfromthe idea of a lex naturae,as witnessthe followingpassage: " Since ofthe law ofthe productionof effects it is the universality which constituteswhat is properlyunderstoodby naturein the most general (formal)sense (nature being here taken to mean the existenceof thingsso far as it is determinedby universallaws), the universalimperativeof duty mightverywellbeformulated as ' Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through yourwilla universallaw of nature' " (? 33, IV, 421). An attempton Kant's part to make use of this conceptionof a lex naturaein illustrationof the law of moralitymust strike us at firstsightas paradoxical. For in truththe moral law is just not a law of nature: the kingdomof freedomor that which oughtto be is independentofand indeedopposedto the kingdom of nature or that whichis. It followsthat a rule prescribing a reference to the law of naturecan becomea morallaw onlyif it has been previouslybroughtunderthe law of freedom. Consistentlywith this we see Kant remarkingin a Reflexionpresumedto date from1776-78(Berlinedition,XIX, 6984), " The precept 'naturae convenientervivere' indicates the rule of philosophiamoralisapplicata and shows what belongs to the of a subject. All principiaborrowedfromnatureare perfection empiricaland so do not belong to philosophiapura." Again, it is withthe same idea in mind that he deniedto the formula of agreementwith nature the characterof a " principiumof morality" in his courseof lectureson ethics,deliveredbetween 1775 and 1780 (cf.Paul Menzer'sedition,p. 33). In view of thesefactswe cannotdoubtthat,in composingthe Kant himselfrealised that it was paradoxical to Grundlegung, representthe supremeprincipleof moralityby means of the conceptofnaturein thenaive way followedby the Stoics. What then can have moved him, despite this, to make use of that

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conceptand to discussthe portrayalofthe morallaw based upon it in such detail ? Shall we be farwrongif we supposethat the considerationwhichweighedwith Kant was that a relatingof vivere,emhis " generalformula" to that of naturaeconvenienter ployed by those Greek philosopherswho stood highestin his estimation,would necessarilyhave a very great effecton the feelingsand imaginationsof his readers? Shall we be wrong too in thinking thatit was throughhis occupyinghimselfwiththe de officiis that this circumstancebecame clear to him-for certainly he had not previouslymade any use of this formulaas a principleto explainhis own views? If thesesuppositionsare made,it is at onceobviousthatwe have beforeus a case in which Kant put his " citizenof the world" maxim into practicein dealingwiththeworkofhis predecessors. Respectforits author made him treat a particular" blunder" on reason's part from the point of view which saw some truthbehind it, and this truthhe soughtto discoverby apieco of ethicalinterpretation. What made success possible was the artificeKant adopted of theword' nature' in Cicero'sformulain the sense understanding not of somethingactuallyexistingbut as an Ideal, i.e., as equivalentto whatI can willit tobe. If it is truethatit had occurred to him to make use of thisformulaon some previousoccasiona possibilitywhich we cannot exclude-it is also certainthat he neverattachedany untilhe was composingthe Grundlegung the moral law. Now, importanceto this way of representing however,afterhavingrevealedthe truthin the formulaof agreement with nature in the way we have seen, he proceededto unmaskthe " illusion" which" betrays" meninto settingaside its belongingonly to a particularformof ethicalinterpretation and lettingit appear as an adequateexpressionof the supreme principleofmorality. At thesametimehe added " theextremely thatonemustnotlet oneselfcometo thepoint important warning, of wishingto derivethisprinciplefromthe particularcharacteristics of human nature" (? 42, IV, 425). Now " propensities, of humannature" (" constituinclinationsand the oonstitution tionofhumannature" is the translationGarvegivesforCioero's naturaeratioat 3, 5, 23) are the groundsto whichappeal is made in Cicerowhen the derivationof the moral law is in question, as is shown by the passage settingout the programmeof the at the beginningof 1, 4. We have alreadyreferred to de officiis thisand givenKant's accountofwhywe are seducedintomaking such a derivation. withan objection. We At this point we shall be confronted shall be told that this warningof Kant's can be understoodas

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directedequallyagainstthe Englishmoralsenseschool,and thus against the ethicaltheorywhichKant himselfaccepted in the years1762-67(a theoryto whichhe assignedsecondprizeamong firstplace the doctrinesof his predecessorsin the Grundlegung, " theory); with the going to the Stoics for their " perfection result that it proves nothingabout his having any particular relationshipto Panaetius and the Stoa. We can escape this to the next paragraph(? 43, IV, 425). objection by referring as custodian Kant saysthatphilosophy" mustproveherintegrity of her own laws, and not simplybe a mouthpieceof such truths as an implantedsense or who knowswhat guardian-likenature has whisperedto her". Now just as the term " an implanted sense" is directedagainstHutcheson,so is the expression" who knows what guardian-likenature" aimed at the Stoics. And that Kant is not thinkingof Wolffor of some otherphilosopher, 1,4, in mind,is rendered but reallyhas thederivationofde officiis, extremelyprobable by the followingcii'cumstance. Cicero's chapter4, which,in thewordsofGarve'smarginalrubric,supplies us witha " derivationofthe morallygood fromhumannature", is followedat the beginningof chapter5 by thispassage: " This is the formand, so to speak, the countenanceof virtue,a form which,were it visible to our earthlyeyes, would, accordingto Plato's expression,kindlein us the most fierylove of itselfand of wisdom." Now Kant ends his " warning" against deriving the moral law from" who knows what guardian-likenature" that " cautionscannotbe too oftenissued against by remarking a derivationofthiskind,in thathumanreasonlikesto substitute formoralitya bastard whichlooks like anythingone wishesto see in it but has no resemblanceto virtuein the eyes of a man who has once beheld its true form". And in a note he gives a precisedefinitionof the sense in whichthe phrase " to behold virtuein its trueform" is to be understood. We are now in a positionto make the followingpronouncement. The clue to the discoverythat the formula" act as if the maxim of your action were to become throughyour will a universallaw of nature" is suited to " procureadmittance" forthe morallaw and to enable us to " intuitand feelit " was of the rule to Kant by the statementin the de offtiiis furnished naturaeconvenienter vivere,the formulawhichwas discoveredby the ancient Stoics and, thanks to Panaetius and Cicero,had remainedpopular until Kant's own time.' 1 A precisetheoryofthepartplayedby theconception ofa law ofnature of the morallaw is to be foundin the sectionof in the representation the Critiqueof PracticalReasonentitled" Of the typicof purepractical

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to notice that Cicerotoo, in the passage we It is interesting have quoted, does not findthe rule naturaeconvenienter vivere satisfactoryin everyrespect. He too feels obliged to give an explanationof it. His sayingthat it impliesthat " we should " is of course afterinnerperfection strivein everycircumstance slighthelp to him, seeingthat reallyit is simplytautologous. Further elucidationis required. In the course of this Cicero arrives at moral rules which, unlike the naturae convenienter arenotto be metwithas universalethicalprinciples vivereformula, in Wolffand Baumgarten,but do figurein thatcapacityin Kant's expositionofthe morallaw in the Grundlegung. Cicero's explanationof his precepttakes two forms. In the firstof thesewe read that a personholdingthat it is legitimate to injureanotherman is doingnothingmoreor lessthandivesting biimof all that makeshima man (as Garvehas it, " is abolishing his humanity").1 This is betterexpressedin a positiveway, as it is in the nextsection: a man oughttXocare fora man,whoever he be, just because he is a man. Now a preceptof this the supreme kind appears in Kant as a means of representing moral principle: it is foundin the rule that " humanityis an endin itself" and theimperative" So act thatyoutreathumanity bothin yourownpersonand in that of everyoneelse at the same timeas an end and neveras a meansonly." Oncemore,theuse oftheidea ofan " end " to illustrateKant's conceptionofthemorallaw appearsat firstsightto be paradoxical. The decisive peculiarityof the Kantian moral philosophyis just its acceptanceof the principlethat " the moral law is not concernedwith the matter of the action"; yet the end an action contemplatesis its matter. It is with this point that the discussionof the categoricalimperativeis introducedin the (2nd section,?? 16, 22). Again, " no preceptinto Grundlegung whichthereentersas conditionof its possibilityan object of the will,or in otherwordsan end,is fittedto be an originalprinciple of morality", to give the senseof ? 8 of the CritiqueofPractical Reason. Indeed, it is his acceptance of this propositionwhich him fromall previousmoral philoKant wishesto differentiate sophers. What then can have caused his employmentof the to the reasonwhy, judgment". Thispassage containsa remarkreferring theconceptofa lexnaturaeis able to makeus objectively, whenconsidered intuitsomething-inthis case the morallaw. " The law of naturelies at the basis ofall the mostordinaryand empiricaljudgmentsofthe comin consequencehas the law monestunderstanding.The understanding of naturealways at hand." 1 De officiis, 3, 5, 26: " omninohominemex hominetollit". Garve's aufhebt". translation is " im Menschendie Menschlichkeit

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concept of an end to representthe supremelaw of morality? Can it have been anythingelse than the principleof acting as a " citizen of the world" in philosophicalinvestigation ? It was thiswhichmade himtake the Stoic rulethat we shouldlove it morallyin such a way that it would humanity,and re-interpret serve to elucidatethe supremelaw of ethics. It was that too whichled him to unmaskthe illusionresponsibleforour taking the trivialformto be identicalwiththe highestprinciple. The mistake,Kant explains,lies in our confusinghumanityas an object which one actually sets as an end to one's actions-in this followinga fundamentalinstinct,knownto us throughexperience-withhumanityas an Idea ofthe limitationofall actual settingup of ends, an Idea springingfromreason itself(? 55,

IV, 431).

The proofthat there is really a referencehere to Cicero is furnishedby what we are to demonstrateabout the further propositionto whichhe has recoursein his elucidationof naturae vivere. In Cicero as in Kant the formulaeabout convenienter laws of natureand humanityas an end are followedby a third precept,to whichtheythemselvesgiverise. The connectionin Cicerois more or less as follows. Nature prescribesthat one man shall care foranother,just because he is a humanbeing. This is a commonlaw, to whichall men are " by nature" subject. Consequently,the argumentgoes on, the good of each individualis identicalwith the good of the community(3, 6, 26), and everyman's advantageis a common advantage. Just because the law is by nature commonto all men it is at the same timethe law of the community of human beings. It is in this sense that Cicerospeaks of the ideas of a. communishumanigenerissocietas(5, 22; 6, 28) and a commune: tanquamhumanitatiscorpus (6, 32) as conceptswhich express. the suprememorallaw. This corpusis also describedin 3, 5, 2& as a dtis immortalibus constituta interhominessocietas.1 In Kant the "law of nature" formulais preservedfrom "naturalistic" interpretation;and the consequenceis that the thirdprinciplewhichspringsfromits unionwiththe preceptto treat hanity as an end takes the shape of the " Idea of the will of every rational being as universallylegislative". This Idea of the autonomyof the will,the conceptionthat " in duty 1 Cf.1, 43, 153, wheredeorum et hominum communitaset societas inter ipsos is said to be the object of truewisdom. As beforethe generalre-

ferenceis simplyto the discussionin 3, 3-7 of " theuniversalrulewhichis to resolve the apparent conffictbetweenduty and interest". Garve bringsoutin an emphaticmannerits importance as a principle.

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man is subjectto legislationof his own whichis yet universal", lay beyond Panaetius' range, for reasons already referredto. thanks to its derivationfrom The principleleads nevertheless, the formuleabout laws of natureand humanityas an end, to humanma conceptionanalogousto Panaetius' idea of a commune tatiscorpusconstitutedby the omniumutilitascommunis. This conceptis that of " a totalityof all ends (of rationalbeingsregarded as ends in themselvesand of the particularends which ", each one ofthemcan sethimself)boundtogethersystematically that is to say, a kingdomof ends (? 62); or, to put it moreprecisely,thatof" a possiblekingdomofendsconceivedas a kingdom of nature" (? 72, IV, 436). Kant's use ofthisconceptofthe " totalityofends " to represent the supremeprincipleof moralitymust, like that of the other two conceptswe have discussed(and indeedbecause it is the case with them),strikeus initiallyas paradoxicalin the face of the principlesof his philosophy. In consequencewe must look for a special reasonforits beingemployedforsuch a purpose. We findsuch a reasonif we supposethat,in his task of illustrating and givinglifeto the morallaw, Kant continuedto be animated by respectfor his " citizen of the world" maxim. We shall thenbe assumingthat the clue to Kant's discoverythat the concept of a " totalityof ends" will serve as a means of making the morallaw alive in thisway was the " truth" he foundin the ", " ut eadem situtilitasuniuscuiusqueet universorum de officiis, " omnemutilitatemesse communem". Now thereis an objectionto this argument. It is that the of rationalbeingsin the sensibleworld" idea of " a community in the strictlymoral sense already appears in the Critiqueof Pure Reason,beingused thereforthepurposeofelucidatingthose a priorithe em" purelymorallaws whichdeterminecompletely ploymentof freedomon the partoftherationalbeingas such ".1 But in point of fact the discussiongiven of this conceptin the of our interpretation passagementionedbearsout the correctness Kant says ofthis" objectofpurereason in a surprising-fashion. " (B 836) that it " is thoughtmerely in its practicalemployment is made fromall conas an intelligibleworld,since abstraction ditions(all ends) and even fromall impedimentsto morality". the Now in the passage whichinterestsus in the Grundlegung ofall ends object of practicalreasonis conceivedof as a " totality (of rational beings regardedas ends in themselvesand of the particularends whicheach one-of them can set himself)bound 1 B 835. This comesfromthe sectionon " The Ideal of the Summum Bonum" (B 832-847).

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togethersystematically, i.e., a kingdomof ends", a " kingdom of ends conceived as a kingdomof nature". The difference of the mannerin whichthe conceptof a kingdomof rational beingsis discussedin the Critiquefromthe way in which it is treatedin the Grundlegung is not to be overlooked. It is just this difference whichneedsexplaining. I maintainthat it can be explainedconsistently withthe interpretationI have offered oftheconceptofa kingdom ofthefunction of ends in the Grundlegung.This functionconsistsexclusively in enablingus to intuitand feelthe contentof the morallaw: a task whichKant undertakesonlyin this one work. Now the conceptsof a communityof rationalbeingsin the purelymoral sense which Kant's moral philosophyprovidesapart fromthis have quite a different significance.They are two in number. First of all, with the concept of freedomor of the categorical imperativewe are given " intimation" (Anzeige)of a mundus intelligibilis,whose fundamentallaw is the law of morality. The simplereason forthis is that freedomcannot exist in the sphereofnature. Kant givesthe names" kingdomoffreedom" and " kingdomof morals" to the mundusintelligibilisas so conceived; and the concept belongs properlyto the Analytic of pure practicalreason. Secondly,we are told that a need of purepracticalreasonleadsus to the" ideal ofthesupremegood "; and so faras thisis the case and an attemptis made to represent thisideal,the kingdomoffreedomis thoughtmoredeterminately as a realmin whichthererulesnot onlythe morallaw, but also that of the apportioningof happinessto virtue. When made thus determinatethe kingdomof intelligiblebeingsbecomesthe " kingdomof grace" or the " kingdomof God ", and the proper place forthe conceptis theDialecticofpurepracticalreason. We can distinguishbetween these concepts by calling them, respectively,the transcendentalrational concept of the law of moralityand the mythof the law of morality(herewe are using " myth" in thesame senseas Plato in his fableofeternaljustice). Now the " kingdomof ends conceivedas a kingdomof nature" in theGrundlegung doesnotcoincidewitheitherthetranscendental conceptorthemythofthelaw ofmorality. It cannotbe identical with the realm of freedom,for in that realm " abstractionis made fromall ends ". Nor can it be equivalentto the realmof grace, since the concept of such a realm presupposesthat a kingdomof ends and a kingdomof naturecannotbe regarded as identical: as the Dialectic of pure practicalreason shows,it is the antinomy in the idea ofthe connectionofvirtueand happinesswhichgivesriseto the ideal. This is the reasonforits being

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a myth. To assume that a kingdomof ends can be thoughtas a kingdomofnatureis to assumesomething per impossibile.

In this it exactlyresemblesanotherassumption,namelythat my maxims have the validityof universallaws of nature. If we understandthis in a literal mannerit is an impossibility, since otherwisemy maxim could not be an act of my freewill. Similarly,the conceptionofthe kingdomof ends as a kingdomof we shouldhave to postulate natureis impossiblebecauseotherwise of a finite that eternaljustice was open to the comprehension intelligence. But reallyit is only a myth.' We may conclude that its functionin representing the moral law is the same as that ofthe conceptofa law ofnature. In bothcases the purpose served is that of expressinga thoughtin an image, " reducing it to 'type'" To lead Kant to discoverthe capacity of the concept of a image, stirringup the kingdomof ends to providean effective feelingsand makingintuitionpossible,a special stimuluswas needed. This was because of the paradox whichwas necessarily bound up with his use of such a concept. Now the simplest possibilityis plainlythat the operativecause is the same in this case as it was in that of the conceptof a law of nature. If in enter the one case Cicero'streatmentofthe preceptnaturaeconveni viveresuppliedthe stimulus,in the otherit may well have been his discussionof the ideas of omniumutilitas communisand communehumanitatiscorpus. Through ethical interpretation on Kant's part the conceptbecame that of a worldof rational of the will of beings made possiblethroughthe self-legislation into an every such being; and in this way was transformed the morallaw.2 image capable of illustrating Had Kant followedhis " citizenof the world" maxim to its he wouldfurther have explained fullestextentin theGrundlegung, the reason for the mistakenview that the concept of utilitas communiswas an adequate expressionof the moral law. In 1 It is then no coincidencethat the expression" a kingdomof ends thoughtas a kingdomof nature" appearsneitherin the secondCritique ofMorals. norin the Metaphysic 2 Ah explanationof why,considered eitherthis formulaor objectively, that whichtakes humanityas an end does serveto illustratethe moral law lies outsidethe scope of this paper. In givingsuch an explanation we shouldhave to startfromthe viewthat " althoughmoralitydoes not of an end,no determination need forits ownpurposesany representation " of the humanwill can take place entirelywithoutrelationto intention we should (ReligionwithintheboundsofReason,1stpreface). And,further, " to have to discussthe relationof the " commonesthumanintelligence frommorality to religion". the questionofthe " transition

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point of fact he does give a hint on the subject. Towardsthe end of the secondsection(? 75, IV, 439), in continuationof the discussionofthe conceptof a kingdomof ends,he calls attention in an emphaticmannerto the " paradox" that " the rational being cannotcounton it that . . . the kingdomof nature . . . will be in conformity withwhat is demandedby his own proper in a kingdomofendsmadepossibleby himself. . . participation withthe resultthat respectfora mereIdea, withoutthe prospect of attainingthroughit any otherend or advantage,has to serve as an unavoidablepreceptofthewill". It was aversionfromthe paradox here mentionedwhichdrovethe Stoics to the opposite forhappiness".1 But thisidentiview that " virtueis sufficient ficationof virtueand happinesson the part of the Stoics led themto equate commonwell-beingin the senseof humanhappiness-somethingwhich,as we have seen, is not conceivableas the supremedetermining groundof an absolutel1y good willwith that whichoughtto be the commoninterestof mankind, i.e., withthat whichfollowsas a commoninterestfrom" obligation out of respectfora mereIdea ". Thus it was the erroneous proposalto take what was merelyideal for somethingactually of the will whichbroughtabout the existentin the determining to the empiricalsphere Stoic flightfroma " useless" formalism ofutilitascommunis. And the consequencewas thatwhatreason could legitimatelyregard only as an image was hypostatised into a real objectforpurereasonin its practicalemployment. Let us now state the developmentof ideas in all this. In moral philosophyKant originallyfollowed the lead of the Wolffians,who were themselvesinfluencedby the Stoics, and of the English moral sense school. From this positionit was Plato's " quite peculiarmerit" to have deliveredhim. We now see him bringinginto play the lessonhe had learnedfromPlato against Stoic ethicalteaching,as represented by Panaetius,and correctingthis in the light of his new insight. It is true that Plato as well as the Stoics lacked the principleof the autonomy of the will. But afterhis time Stoicismmade moralphilosophy systematic; and thena sparkfromthe Platonictheoryof Ideas, cast upon the popularStoic ethicswhichKant followedin conjunctionwiththe theoryof moral sense,kindledthe fireof the Idea of the autonomyof the will.' And by this firethe ore of Stoic teachingwas refinedto pure gold. 1 Cf.Cicero,ParadoxaStoicorum, 2 ; de offlciis, 3, 7, 34.

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