Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970

Table of contents :
Self-Predication and the "Third Man" Argument
Roger A. Shiner
pp. 371-386
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Descartes's Conception of Perfect Knowledge
Willis Doney
pp. 387-403
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"General Rules" in Hume's Treatise
Thomas K. Hearn
pp. 405-422
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Franz Brentano and Intentional Inexistence
Linda L. McAlister
pp. 423-430
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R. B. Perry on the Origin of American and European Pragmatism
James A. Gould
pp. 431-450
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Agostino Nifo's Early Views on Immortality
Edward P. Mahoney
pp. 451-460
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Bibliography of the Writings of Jacob Loewenberg
Edwin S. Budge
pp. 460-466
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Announcements
pp. 467-468
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Zoroaster's Influence on Anaxagoras, the Greek Tragedians, and Socrates (review)
Felix M. Cleve
pp. 469-470
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The Esthetics of the Middle Ages (review)
Francis Joseph Kovach
pp. 470-475
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Le origini del metodo analitico: il Cinquecento (review)
Charles B. Schmitt
pp. 475-477
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Le thomisme et la penssée italienne de la Renaissance (review)
Paul J. W. Miller
pp. 477-478
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The Anatomy of Leviathan (review)
P. J. Johnson
pp. 478-482
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The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (review)
Robert Niklaus
pp. 482-487
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La Filosofia Politica di Schelling (review)
Giorgio Tonelli
pp. 487-488
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Gesammelte Werke, Vol. IV (review)
Henry Walter Brann
pp. 488-494
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Peter Yakovlevich Chaadayev: Philosophical Letters and Apology of a Madman (review)
Rosemary Radford Ruether
pp. 494-496
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The Chicago Pragmatists (review)
Van Meter, b. 1898 Ames
pp. 496-501
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Phenomenology in America: Studies in the Philosophy of Experience (review)
Stephen A. Erickson
pp. 501-504
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Heimkehr ins Eigentliche (review)
Herbert Wallace Schneider
pp. 504-505
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Books Received
pp. 505-510

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Self-Predication and the "Third Man" Argument Roger A. Shiner Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970, pp. 371-386 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

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Self-Predication and the "Third Man" Argument ROGER A. SHINER

1.1. IN COMMPm'mO on the 'Third Man' Argument (TMA), Proclus z produces the following line of thought. H e argues that. if the relation of resemblance between Form and particular were symmetrical, the argument in question would be valid; the relation is not, however, symmetrical. Where a Form and particular are both alike, have the quality of likeness, the likeness of that which is derived is not the same as the likeness of that from which it is derived, just because of the former's derivatory nature. Consequently, ~k tt~v ala01]x~ bttotoi3c0at ~re[vot~ (sc. xo~ ~Semv), abx~ 8~ xo6~ot~ oSr~xt, 'the sensible particulars resemble the Forms, but they are not in the same relation of resemblance to the particulars' (ibid., 913.29-30). That is to say, the bare relation of similarity may be symmetrical, but the relation of a similar copy to a similar original is not; the copy is 'a copy of' the original, but the original/s not 'a copy of' the copy. This way of defending the Theory of Forms against the T M A I shall for purposes of identification call the 'Ontological Defence'. It lays stress on the ontological difference between Form and particular in order to avoid the fatal implication that the relation between them is symmetrical. If we use the language of predication, the point is as follows: the T M A is valid, if the Forms have a given term predicated of them severally in exactly the same sense as it is predicated of their respective dependent particulars. This, however, is not the case, for the quality in virtue of which a given term is predicated of a given Form differs in ontological status from the quality in virtue of which that term is predicated of that Form's dependent particulars. Thus we see that underlying the Ontological x I am grateful for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper to Professor Gilbert Ryle, Professor John F. Malcolm and two anonymous readers for this Journal. Since this paper went to press, the following relevant articles have appeared: G. Vlastos, "'Self Predication' in Plato's Later Period," Philosophical Review, LXXVIII (1969), 74-78, and "Plato's 'Third Man' Argument (Parm. 132al-b2): Text and Logic," Philosophical Quarterly, XIX (1969), 289-301; K. W. Rankin, "The Duplicity of Plato's Third Man," Mind, LXXVIII (1969), 178-197; T. O. Smith, "'The Theory of Forms, Relations and Infinite Regress," Dialogue, VIII (1969), 116-123. 2 Proelus, In Platonis Parmenidem, ed. V. Cousin, Paris, 1864; 912.27 ft. [3711

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Defence is the following assumption--the fact that the Forms are self-predicating only causes problems for the Theory of Forms, if a given Form F and its corresponding particulars, a set of f things, have 'F' predicated of them univocally, are F in precisely the same sense. My thesis in this paper is that this latter assumption is false, it is, rather, quite sufficient for the Self-Predication Assumption (SPA) to be vicious, if 'F' is predicated of both Form and particular not equivocally. This is not the same as 'univocally', and furthermore it is not possible that Plato could have thought of the predication of a term of both Form and particular as equivocal, the only alternative left to him to escape the TMA. The SPA, therefore, is required for the Theory of Forms to make sense, and leads to an ineradicable defect in that Theory. 1.2. One minor terminological point must be noted before we proceed. There are two versions of the TMA in the Parmenides; the first runs from 131eS-132b2, and the second from 132c11-133a7. The second of these explicitly employs the language of copy-resemblance, 7mpdS~tytm ('paradigm'), 6lxoio)tta ('likeness'), ~tKao0~vat ('resemble') as an explication of ~t~0e~tq ('participation'): the first employs the lan~.,uage of cttx6 ~ xai3xa.., eIvat ('that by which things are . . .'), which, as Plato has already indicated (Phaedo 100d6-8), is deliberatety noncommittal as to the relation between Forms and particulars. I shall refer to the first argument as TMA(1) and the second as TMA(2). 2.1. The Ontological Defence has lately re-appeared in two separate papers. Peck s urges it wholeheartedly against both versions of the TMA. Moravscik ~ claims that the TMA(2) is valid only against the thesis that there is a completely symmetrical relation between Form and particular, and denies that there is such a symmetrical relation. He treats the TMA(1) rather differently, and this I shall come to later in the paper. I want first to examine this move against the TMA(2), and use this examination to establish certain points which can then be applied to the TMA(1). The move lays heavy, if not sole emphasis on the words 'copy' and 'original' to deny the symmetricality. It is qua copy and qua original, that the copy and the original are connected by the asymmetric relation of "being a copy of"; it is merely because it is a copy that the copy is a copy of an original, and merely because it is an original that an original has copies made of it. Certainly, there is an asymmetry here. However the point on which my case rests is that this is not the aspect of the paradigmatic relations between Forms and particulars that was most important to Plato, in the contexts in which he makes specific use of that A. L. Peck, "Plato versus Parmenides," Philosophical Review, LXXI, 1962, pp. 159-184. ' L M. E. Moravscik, "The 'Third Man' Argument and Plato's Theory of Forms," Phronesis, VIII, 1963, pp. 50-62.

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relation. According to Ross, 5 apart from casual references at Republic 500e3 and Theaetetus 176e3 (cf. also Politicus 285d-286a; though the casual nature of this is less obvious, it still differs greatly from the Timaeus), the only place where the paradigmatic relation is given any work to do is in the Timaeus. In the account of the creation of the world there given (27b4-34d9), what is important is not the bare fact that there are Forms and particulars which axe copies of them, but that the Forms are Forms of such-and-such, and the particulars such-and-such particulars. It is quite true that the created world is derived from the eternal model by means of a paradigmatic relation, but the whole emphasis of the narrative is on the fact that the eternal model is the eternal model of the world; it is qua eternal model of this type that it plays a vital role in the creation of the world, not merely qua eternal model. Similarly, the Demiuxge is not concerned merely that what he makes is a copy, but that it is a copy of such-and-such a type, namely, of the eternal model of the world. There is certainly an ontological disparity between Forms and particulars, but that alone is an insufficient explanation of the metaphysical function that the Forms perform. If the Forms are to be ditterentiable from one another, and thus be related to differentiable sets of particulars, they must not only be in some way qualitatively differentiable, but possess some sort of qualitative symmetry as regards to particulars. It is, however, with this necessary qualitative symmetry that Parmenides' arguments are concerned. There is an ontological asymmetry, but that is irrelevant to the point at issue in the TMA(2). Consider the case of the real live John Diefenbaker, and a photograph of him; one might say that there is an ontological asymmetry between the actual person, and the photo. But if it is a matter of answering the question, How does that photograph come to have the characteristics that it has?, it is no use merely replying that it is a photograph of a live original. That does answer the question how it derives its characteristic of being a member of the class of photographs, but is no answer to the question of how it comes to be a photograph of John Diefenbaker. For that question to be answered, the photograph must show an 'elderly gentleman, with close curly hair, staring eyes, a jutting chin, and the original subject of the photograph must possess these too. Of course, there are still differences; Diefenbaker's chin exists in three-dimensioual space, that in the photo does not; Diefenbaker's hair grows and is cut, that in the photo does not; one can account for these differences in terms of ontological disparity. But still, the chin must in neither case be receding, the hair like that of the Beatles. In case I should be accused of loading this argument by selecting the instance of a photograph and an original, it should be perfectly clear that the same can be said about a painting of Diefenbaker, even though there are more opportunities for Impressionism there. As far as concerns abstract painting, the precise thing s W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford U. P., Oxford, 1953, pp. 228-230.

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that, for many people, makes it meaningless is that there is little or no direct qualitative symmetry. So then, if asked the bald question, Does the copy resemble the original? one could answer negatively, if one considered the particular copy and original only as members of their respective wider classes. In a case where what is at stake is Does this copy resemble this original?, one who answered, 'No, because it'sonly a copy', would ordinarily be regarded as having misunderstood the point of the question. With these points before our minds, we should not then find it surprising that in the allegory of the Line in the Republic (509d6-510d10), Plato defines the relation of particulars to Forms in terms of the relation of paintings to actual men and material objects; to forestall any red herrings, let me emphasise that anything other than straight realist art was virtually unknown in Classical Greece. 6 Parmenides is not concerned with general theories, but with howin particular cases, the paradigmatic relation works; he is not at all, as the Ontological Dcfenc, implies, demoting the Form to the rank of a particular, in arguing that the Form must in some way bear a qualitative resemblance to its particulars. If the Form Largeness is not in s o m e sense large, how can it bc the mgtaphysical cause of each large thing's being large, given that this relation of causality is to be represented as that of copy to original? Parmenides is not suggesting that it has to b c a minimum of one cubic parasang in size, but that it has to be Large in whatever way the Form of F is F, and not Small or Deciduous, if it is to do its job of accounting for large things. Those who reply to Parmenides that the Form of Largeness does not resemble a particular large thing, because the Form is the original and the particular is a copy, are as much missing the point as our imaginary student of Canadian statesmen. Parmenides questions whether the paradigmatic relation w o r k s in practice, in particular cases, just as he questions whether participation works in practice (130e4-131e5), and, in the Mastership objection (133d7-134d8), whether the Theory of Forms itself works in practice. The underlying and mistaken assumption of the Ontological Defencc is that the TMA(2) is valid ouly against a theory where terms standing for qualities are predicated univocally of Form and particular; since Parmenides assumes his argument is valid, he must bc making the Form one particular among others. But Parmenides not only is not doing this, he does not need to d o it for his argument to be valid; his argument is valid even in the situation where the Form has an ontologlcally superior version of the quality in question. Peck I formalises this 6 "Greek representational art in all its aspects is subject to unremitting pressure towards realism, if by realism we understand visually exact imitatiol) of the material world of sight," Rhys Carpenter, Greek Art: a Study of the Formal Evolution of Style, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1962, p. 20. The relevant .facts are presented in more detail in chapters I and 2 passim; the author also there makes some interesting and pertinent remarks about the relation between those facts and the metaphysical issues which form the backdrop to the present discussion. * Ibid., p. 160 ft.

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situation thus--the particular is K(H) (sc. 6pd0~vov, 'visible') and the Form K(L) (se. Zoytctt~ ~.attf~av6p~vov,'intelligible');such a notation "enables us . . . to record both the distinction and the coincidence [Socrates] afflrms" (p. 165). H o w ever, as long as 'K' appears on both sides of the equation, there/s a resemblance, and the regress gets started. It is quite legitimate to argue that 'K(H)' and 'K(L)' are not univocal predicates: they are not equivocal either, which after all is supposed to be the saving grace of this formulation. But the TMA(2) can only be evaded by making the predication equivocal: this is the point that the Ontological Defence overlooks. If however the predication is equivocal, then the practical value of the paradigmatic relation is nil, and the Theory of Forms still fails to merit acceptance. One might put the matter this way: Given a copy of X and a Form X, there must be some quality Q, in virtue of which the relation of resemblance is asserted to hold between the particular X and the original Form X; if there is no such Q at all, then there can be no reason for holding that it is of X that both the copy is a copy and the original an original. Naturally, if the Form and particular are X in exactly the same sense, that is covered by this formalisation; but it also covers the case where the quality is the same in each case, and the Form merely has an ontologically superior version of it. This is what, according to the Ontological Defence, is the case in the Theory of Forms, and this is why the Ontological Defence will not work. If the quality is essentially the same, Parmenides' point is well-taken; if it is not even essentially the same, the paradigmatic relation seems valueless. 2.2. I conclude this section by considering another argument by which Cherniss s purports to demonstrate the invalidity of Parmenides' position. His case is (pp. 365-369) that a premiss of Parmcnides' argument entails self-contradictory conclusions, and therefore no argument which employs it is valid. H e attempts to prove both that the first F o r m in the regress must be diffcrent from the second, and that it must be identical with it; Parmenides' objection is therefore incoherent. Cherniss' argument in its turn depends on the obliteration of a vital difference, that between two senses of 'character' in the phrase 'share the same character'. There is a sense of 'character', which one would use in stating that everything that is green 'shares the same character'. There is a second sense of "character' such that, dcfmitionally, only m y copy of Plato and Parmenides has that character; though other peoples' copies of that book m a y be coloured exactly the same, they do not have the same character; (x) (if x has that character, then x is m y book).

s H. Cherniss, "The Relation of the Timaeus to Plato's Later Dialogues," reprinted in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965 (henceforth SPM), pp. 339-378.

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Cherniss outlines the regress in terms of a series of particulars a, b, c, and a series of Forms O, Oz, O3, etc. First he proves that for Parmenides' objection to hold, Oz and Os must be different from one another. If a, b, c, are similar, by being related to O, then a, b, c, and O all share the same character; if a, b, c, and O arc all similar by sharing the same character with Oz, then a, b, c, O and Oz all share the same character; this they can only do by sharing a common character with O3 and so on. If the explanation of the nature of a, b, and c in terms of similarity to O is intended, as Socrates undoubtedly did intend it to be, a final explanation, then wc have what is justifiably termed a vicious regress in this explanation. The proof of this regress also certainly needs the nonidentity of Oz and 03. None of this I disagree with. But let us consider the other limb of Chemiss' argument, that by which he proves that Parmenides' objection also requires that Oz and 03 bc identical, thus proving the internal inconsistency of that objection. Parmenides here invokes the principle that any two things similar to each other in a given respect are so similar by participation in one and the same thing, a and O arc similar by participating in Oz; they are also similar by participating in 03; therefore Oz and 03 are identical. The first thing to notice is the slide from the 'participation by resemblance" idiom to the 'participation' sirnpliciter idiom; but, while this undoubtedly helps Cherniss' case, it is neither the only nor the chief defect in it. Let us set out his argument in the 'share the same character' idiom; a and O arc alike, because they share the same character with Oz; they are also alike, becanse they share the same character with 03. It can only follow from this that therefore Oz and 03 are identical, if 'character' is being used in the second of the two senses that I outlined abovr If one remains with the first sense, then there is no problem at a11 of this type in a, O, Oz and O3 sharing the same character, in fact, on the terms" of the enquiry, they must do so. In the other sense, nothing can ever share the same character with anything, and the result is either extreme Heracliteanism, or extreme Parmenidean monism, neither of which Plato ever entertained as universaUy valid. Socrates would certainly deny that the Form and its particulars shared the same character in the second sense, and would cleny that they snared the same character, in a third sense of that word, such that all copies of Plato and Parmenides share the same character, but all green books do not. But he would want to assert that they share the same character in the first sense, and he does assert it. Further, I find nothing in the text to suggest it is in anything but the first sense that Parmenides is implying that the Form and its particulars share a character. The point I want to make above all is that the TMA(2) is valid even against a theory using this sense of 'character'. That Parmenides is concerned with what it is to share a common character in this sense comes out very clearly from Peck's analysis of the formal structure of the dispute. But what Peck cans the ignoring of a vital distinction by Parmenides, I should rather call justified concentration on the similarity that remains, r

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after the distinction has been made. Whatever distinctions there are as well, there must be some resemblance, and it is the resemblance, not the difference, that t h e Copy-Resemblance interpretation of participation emphasizes and employs. 3.I. I turn now to Moravscik's discussion of the Third Man Arguments. H e makes (lb., p. 51) a distinction between two different versions of self-predication, a version he rightly calls absurd, where the predicate is attached to F o r m and particular in the same sense, (his(S2)), and a version where the predicate is attached, 'in a sense different from and prior to' the ordinary sense, when it is attached to the Form. Here we have no talk of ontological disparity, but what might be better called 'logical disparity'. One may presume that this represents a worthy attempt by Moravscik to unpack the ontological issue into contemporary analytic terminology. H e goes on to explain that this latter version, ($1) of his pair, involves 'focal meaning' (p. 59, note 1). This is a label introduced by Owen 9 for Aristotle's concept of expressions that are ~rp6G ~v r a t ~ax~ ~tiav xtvdt tp6~tv kw/6ttevct (Metaphysics F, 1003a33-4; 'pros hen legomena" transliterated and for short). Aristotle's use of this concept in Metaphysics r and Z represents a radical shift from an earlier view of his. In his criticism of the Theory of Forms (el. Metaphysics A, 990b34-991a8; el. also Categories lal-12), Aristotle assumes that terms must be predicated either 6ttc0vftto)G or ouvt~v61x0)g, 'equivocaUy' or 'tmivocally', a simple dichotomy; there is no third possibility. Consequently, he denies the possibility of a universal science of ontology; things are said to be in different senses, and so there can be no unitary science of being (Metaphysics A, 992b18-24). Later, however, Aristotle claims that a term can be nok~.ct~bG Xe'/6la~vov, 'used in m a n y senses' without therefore being used 6tttov6btcoG, 'eqnivoca//y'; this wi/1 be so if the uses of the term are pros hen legomena. In these circumstances, the uses are different but connected; they are all orientated towards one basic sense. 'pros hen legomena' means in this context 'used with a single focus'. As a result, Aristotle resurrects the possibility of a science of z6/Sv ~ 6v, 'being qua being', on the assumption that 'being' is a term which is pros hen legomenz~n. This science will set out the different senses of 'being', and, specifically, concern itself with x6 5v ~nL~G, 'being in an unqualified sense', 'being simpliciter'. This is the primary sense on which the others are focussed, the sense which, in Professor Donald MacKinnon's ao happy phrase, is "the nuclear realisation of being qua being." o66La, 'substance', is this primary or nuclear sense of 'being'. If we explore the implications of this a little further, we will get at the central feature of pros hen 0 G. E. L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in some early works of Aristotle" (henceforth LMA), in Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, edd. L Dfiring and G. E. L. Owen, Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia, Vol. XI, Gothenburg, 1960, pp. 163-190. 1~ D. M. MacKinnon, "Aristotle's Conception of Substance," in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. Renford Bambrough, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1965, p. 98.

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predication which makes it relevant to the present problem of Platonic exegesis. Substance is one of the ten categories of x6 6v 'being' (Metaphysics Z, 1028a1020). If something is said 'to be' in the category of substance, then the term 'is' applies to that thing ~p~oxr "primarily" and x6 xt ~r "what a thing is', applies to that thing (x~k6~, 'in an unqualified sense'. If something is said 'to be' in one of the other categories, then the term 'is' applies to that thing ~ o p ~ v ~ , 'derivatively', and 'what a thing is' applies to that thing ~0r 'in a qualified sense (cf. Metaphysics Z, 1030a21-23). These different senses of 'being' are being predicated pros hen, focussing on one central sense, i.e., substance; substance is primary, for without substance, there would be no qualities of substances. On the other hand, a thing which is ~t~, 'in a qualified sense', is just as much as a thing which is (z~r~.t~, is a substance. It we apply this to the present case of a term 'F' being predicated both of the Form F-ness and of a particular f thing, we get the following. The predication is neither simply tmivocal, nor tmivocal plus a difference in ontological status, but something different again. The different 'F's all have the same focus, the same orientation, but are not identical. F-heSS is F primarily and in an unqualified sense; a particular f thing is F derivatively and in a qualified sense. Note, however, that even when we say that 'F' applies to F-hess in this primary sense, Aristotle's various chaxacterisations of this primary sense t~ indicate a less extreme ontological commitment than the x6 8v 6 w o ~ ('real being', 'bdng-y being'), x6 ~3v &~.~0~ ('true being'), or %6 8v c l k t r p t v ~ ('pure being') of the Theory of Forms. The significant difference is that no implication is built into 'focal meaning' that something which is F derivatively is 'not really F'; it certainly is F, although not in the same way as that which is F primarily. Moravscik suggests (p. 59) that Plato did conceive of the relation between Forms and particulars as involving 'focal meaning'; this suggestion I shall evaluate shortly. H e also implies (cf. p. 60 footnote) that, other things being equal, 'focal meaning' would provide Plato with an adequate defence against the TMA(1). lz (SI), be says (p. 59), avoids all the difficulties d ($2), the simple tmivocal account; against a theory involving it, the regress argument TMA(2) has no validity. H e thinks that other things are not equal, that there are other reasons for wanting to assert the validity of TMA(1); these I shall discuss in the last paragraphs of this paper. M y ~mmediate concern is to dispute Moravscik's claim that the TMA(2) turns on the predication of a term of both F o r m and particular being a univocal predication. If Moravscik were right about this, then 11 In the case of 'being', ~or example, he speaks of ~6 5v xvpior ~.c76~tcvov, 'the most important sense', ~6 6v ~rp&~c0~~.eY611cvov,'the primary sense' and ~6 5v &~X8~ X~Tbp~vov, 'an unqualified sense'. ~ It is to be noted that Owen (cf. LMA pp. 185-187) seems also to imply that 'focal meaning' evades the TMA. His reason for acquitting Aristotle of the charge of ignoring "focal meaning' as a dcfenc~ the Academy could make is not that it is not a defvnc~, but that the Academy did not themselves seem to tlfink it was.

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"focal meaning' would provide Plato with an adequate defence against the TMA(2). But I want to argue that he is not right about this; I want to argue that even if a term is predicated pros hen of Form and particular, the TMA(2) still goes through. 3.2. The weight of any argument to the effect that 'focal meaning' provides an adequate defence to the TMA(2) must be borne by the following claim (T): "If it is not the case that there is one single identifiable property, identical in each ease, in virtue of which the relation of resemblance holds between a Form F and a particular f thing, then the relation of resembling copy to resembling paradigm is not symmetrical." It is clear both the traditional Ontological Defence and Moravscik's account presuppose (T), even though they differ in the ways in which they proceed from this presupposition. 'Focal meaning', for Moravscik, enables us to assert the antecedent of (T); 'F', when predicated pros hen of Form and particulars, will not name a single identifiable property identical in each case. Being enabled to assert the antecedent, he feels justified in asserting the consequent; if P, then Q; P; so Q. [ do not deny that 'focal meaning' enables us to assert the antecedent of (T), but I do deny that the inference from antecedent to consequent is valid. Moravscik, as others before him, has been misled into emphasising only one aspect of the relation he is considering. Part of saying that the predicate 'F' as attached to the Form and the predicate 'F' as attached to a particular f thing are pros hen legomena is certainly the denial that the predication is univocal, that 'F' names an identical property. But this is only part Of what is said; the other part of what is said is that the predication is not equivocal either, that 'F' does not name a completely different property in each case. The doctrine of 'focal meaning' asserts that two things, even though they do not have 'F' predicated of them univocally, are both still rightly called 'F', are F. In other words, we still have a relation of resemblance obtaining. We still have an aspect of a Form and a particular, which is objectively identifiable as that aspect of their nature, in virtue of which the same predicate can be attached to them; this is so, in spite of it being true to say that the property of the Form named by 'F' in "F-hess is F " and the property of a particular named by 'F' in "This particular thing is F " are in some way different. In arguing against Peck, I claimed that, if the predication of a term of both Form and particular was not strictly equivocal, then a valid regress argument against the Theory of Forms could be developed. I then claimed that, as long as the Form and particular were both K (to return to Peck's symbols), this condition was fulfilled, even if the one was fully and correctly described as 'K(L)' and the other as 'K(H)'. I offer an argument exactly parallel to that one in the present

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case. Let us introduce the symbol '(P)' to stand for nptb-cco~, 'primarily', and the symbol '(E)' to stand for ~nol~vc0~, 'derivatively'. A given F o r m K will then be fully described as 'K(P)', and a given particular k thing as 'K(E)'. In this way we are aaain enabled to record both the coincidence and the distinction that the Theory of Forms involves. However, despite the difference which the symbols '(P)' and '(E)' indicate, there is still the quality K in common to both Form and particular. This is why they are related as K(P) to K(E); this is why they do resemble one another; this is why there is the fatal symmetry between them. The formalisation that I gave above (p. 375 of this paper) covers the notion of 'focal meaning' as well as it did Peck's suggestion--there is still a determinate quality in virtue of which we can say the relation of resemblance holds between particular k things and the F o r m K-hess. Under Peck's analysis, 'K' in "K-hess is K " is to be unpacked as 'K(L)', and, in "This particular thing is K," as 'K(I-I)'. Under the 'focal meaning' analysis, 'K' in "K-hess is K " is to be unpacked as 'K(P)', and, in "This particular thing is K," as 'K(E)'. In all four cases, however, the predicate is the name of some version of the quality K; K is, as it were, an ingredient 13 in all four cases. This is quite sufficient to entail the infinite regress. 3.3. If my argument here is correct, the question of whether or not the TMA(2) is valid against the Theory of Forms is not affected by the matter of whether or not Plato did believe that predicates as applied to both a F o r m and a dependent particular were pros hen legomena, applied simply univocally, or univocally plus an ontological difference. Some consideration, however, should be given to the question of whether it is at all plausible to suggest that Plato might have thought that this relation between F o r m and particulars was such that the predicate involved was applied to them pros hen. Since Peck provides ample evidence from the dialogues for the accuracy of his interpretation, we must first see whether Peck's account of how terms are predicated of Form and particulars can in fact be distinguished from 'focal meaning', as I have been hitherto suggesting it can. Peck argues (p. 160) that it is the same quality involved in each case, but that the Form has an ontologically superior version of that quality which can only be apprehended by Reason in the strong Platonic sense of that term. One might cite here Phaedo 103e4, where it is asserted that Form and particulars share the same lxopt0fi or 'immanent character'. It seems to me that this is not the same as 'focal meaning' but something less metalinguistically sophisticated. Moravscik, as noted (p. 377 this paper), equates 'focal meaning' with a 'sense different from and prior

z8 "The idea of a general concept being a property of its particular instances connects up with other primitive, too simple, ideas of the structure of language. It is comparable to the idea that properties are ingredients of the things which have the properties; e.g., that beauty is an ingredient of all beautiful things, as alcohol is of beer and wine, and that we therefore could have pure beauty, unadulterated by anything that is beautiful." L Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1960, p. 17, author's italics.

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tO'; the idea that Peck describes is no more than 'prior to'. At a stage of philosophy when formal understanding of these matters was embryonic, the less sophisticated notion is likely to have been the one employed. Owen's thesis, both in the paper already referred to (see footnote 9) and in another paper, x4 is that relative terms are the only category of terms for which there is any evidence at all that Plato thought of them as predicated pros hen of Forms and particulars. Owen's evidence for this is an Academic proof of the existence of the Form of Equality discussed by Aristotle in his lost " ~ p i 'IS&0v'" and preserved as part of fr. 3 of that work in the Oxford text (ed. W. D. Ross). That proof argues that the predication of a term of Form and particulars is I~fl 6/~r 'not equivocal', but that the term applies to the Form ~:~ptc0~ 'primarily', and the particulars are likenessess of that to which the term applies ~pko~. Given Peck's suggestion as different from 'focal meaning', and bearing in mind that we have here Academic rather than Aristotelian vocabulary (this latter being a point that Owen in his discussion of this proof is concerned to emphasise, cf. pp. 298-302), I suggest that a minimal interpretation of this proof is consistent with it depending on no more involved an analysis of what it is to predicate a term of Form and particular than that offered by Peck. Further, since it is Academic and not middle period Platonic vocabulary (cf. p. 295 of Owen's paper), there is still a step, albeit a short one, to the doctrine set forward in the proof being part of the Theory of Forms. Moravscik offers some different reasons for wanting to find 'focal meaning' in the Theory of Forms, but these reasons seem to me no more conclusive than any offered so far. He assumes that only 'focal meaning' will put the Theory out of the immediate reach of Aristotle's fork (see p. 377 this paper); this is not true, for the distinction Peck isolates is enough for that purpose. Peck's formulation also allows for criteria for identifying and individuating Forms, a necessary requirement that, for Moravscik, is only filled by 'focal meaning'. As far as concerns direct rather than circumstantial evidence that Plato in the middle dialogues used the notion of 'focal meaning', Moravscik has very little. He remarks that all the passages involving self-predication are compatible with either simple univocal predication or pros hen predication (p. 58), which is not much help. On p. 52, he cites Sophist 256a11-12, as one among other examples in the later dialogues showing Plato was aware of 611ov~l~[ct, 'equivocation' or 'ambiguity'. That passage does indeed involve the recognition and employment of the notion of conceptual ambiguity, but it is significant that it and its fellows are in the later dialogues. Since one of the wider issues at stake here is the degree to which Plato's later dialogues represent doctrinal developments from their predecessors, they cannot be direct evidence for the notion that 'focal meaning' played a part in the Theory of Forms of the middle dialogues. 14 G. E. L. Owen, "A Proof in the ~pt "IS~o~v," reprinted in SPM, pp. 293-312.

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It might seem that this 'temporal' obstacle can be surmounted, for Sprague 15 produces a strong case for equivocation being deliberately employed in the Hippias Ma]or and Euthydemus, both probably early dialogues. However, there is a deeper and, I think, unanswerable objection to this whole line of enquiry. Why should Plato's awareness of ambiguity be any proof of his awareness of 'focal meaning', since 'focal meaning' is deliberately and radically different from ambiguity; it is in fact from ambiguity that it requires to be most carefully distinguished. Moravscik argues (p. 52) that Plato is aware of ambiguity and that therefore he is aware of the notion of 'difference of sense', a notion which is involved in 'focal meaning'. However, what is involved in 'focal meaning' is not mere 'difference of sense', but a specia ! kind of 'difference of sense'. Besides, a few lines earlier, Moravscik takes care to distinguish 'difference of sense' as involved in 'focal meaning' from 'difference of meaning' as involved in ambiguity; this makes his initial claim that awareness of ambiguity involves awareness of 'difference of sense' look a little dubious. I cannot but conclude that this part of his thesis is unsatisfactory. 3.4. One further matter deserves to be mentioned at this point. Aristotle himself is under no illusion that for him the predication of a term of an original and of a copy of that original is not an example of a predication lrO6g ~v (cf. here Owen, LMA, p. 188). In the Parts of Animals he writes as follows: A hand constituted in any and every manner, e.g., a bronze or wooden one, is not a hand except i n name; and the same applies to a physician depicted on canvas, or a flute carved in stone. (640b36-641a3; trans. A. L. Peck) This he continues to cite as a paradigm case of ambiguity even in works which contain other passages employing the notion of 'focal meaning' (e.g., de Anima 412b20-22, 414b25-415al). There seems to be an even more dramatic example in Categories la3-5, where 'man' and 'picture' are given as ambiguous meanings of ~0ov. If ~0ov here means 'picture of a man" specifically, we have a clear example of the cases we have been considering. If it means 'picture' simply, 1r and this is far more likely, then we have the orthodox 'bank'/'bank' type of ambiguity. Aristotle selects these cases as examples of 6pcovt~la because of his concern with functions as forming part of the essence of things. Since the photograph of Diefenbaker cannot make inspiring speeches and disastrous appointments, it has no claim to the same type of reality as Diefenbaker himself, This, however, embodies on Aristotle's part a metaphysical evaluation of functions which we are at liberty to reject; we are not committed therefore to regarding ~5 R. K. Sprague, Plato's Use of Fallacy, Routledgr and Kegan Paul, London, 1962. ~6 Or "figure"; cf. Renford Bambrough, Mind, LXXVI, 1967, p. 141.

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these as examples of equivocal predication. We are not therefore begging any important questions in dainfing that Plato could have legitimately regarded a term that was predicated of a Form and of a particular as predicated pros hen, had it occurred to him to do so.

4.1. I shall now consider a point madc by Allen.17 He quotes passages from the dialogues (e.g.,Fhaedo 78e2 and from Aristotle'sdiscussion o~ the Theory of Forms (Metaphysics A987b3ff) to show that Plato referred to the relation between Forms and particulars as one of 'ambiguity' (61~c0vul~a). He goes on: Grammatical predicates are names which exhibit a systematic ambiguity according as they design~-teForms or particuh~rs.(p. 46) Particulars arc named after the Form because of their"pvctttiarlyintimate relation to it--they depend upon it for theircharacter and their existence.(p. 46)

Then he draws the anMogy with the standard pound and other instances of a pound's weight, as illustratingthis same sort of ambiguity; the sense in which the pound of apples in a supermarket is a pound is a different sense from that in which the standard pound is a pound. He places this form of ambiguity down towards the 'equivocal' end of the univocal/equivocal spectrum, in the belief that only by doing this can the Tlfird M a n regress be avoided. Later in the paper, he has a lengthy footnote (pp. $8, note I) where he acknowledges that this relationship is that referred to by Aristotle as pros hen legomenon; he calls it 'an interesting type of ambiguity, something intermediate between univocity and full cquivocity' and as requiring 'no more than some form of dependencc-relati0n to be applicable'. 4.2. I have already suggested that the case for attributing predication xptg ~v to the Theory of Forms has not to my mind been proven, so I will not comment further on that. Alien is impressed by this notion, because he sees in its apparent equivocity a way out of the regress arguments. The point, however, that I think needs emphasising is that this is hardly a case of equivocity or ambiguity in any orthodox sense of those words; for example, saying of an original and a picture that they are both hands or both physicians is not using a word with two different literalmeanings, a condition for the occurrence of ambigu/ty through simple equivocation laid down by Copi. Is Aristotle has, as we have noted, special reasons for wanting to cell this 'ambiguity', but I would hesitate to recommend those reasons for general acceptance. It seems to m e fair to say that the ambiguity involved in the standard pound and supermarket pound is also the :7 R. E. Allen, "Participation ~nd Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues," reprinted in SPM, pp. 43-60. :a I. M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, Macmillan, New York, 1961, p. 74.

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extended rather than the orthodox notion of ambiguity. Let us however evaluate Allen's reason for saying it is not; he says (p. 58) this extended notion requires no more than a dependence-relation to be applicable. This is the same paradox as I have discussed above (See. 2.1), and I shall show again how it is a paradox. Take two different particulars, an f thing and a g thing. If there were nothing more to the predication than a simple dependence-relation, then we would have no more reason to say the particular f thing was F by being dependently related to the Form of F than we would have for saying it was F by being dependently related to the Form of G. Clearly, however, this is absurd; another quote from Allen shows his realisation of this---'particulars depend upon the Form for their character and their existence' (p. 46; my italics). The standard pound analogy is very relevant here. It may be true that the standard pound could be any old weight and still be a pound, provided the requisite number of other alterations in the world were made; but it could not be true that there could be any old differential between the standard pound and the supermarket pound and the lot of them still be pounds. As soon as one admits, as one must, and Allen despite his manoeuvring sees that one must, that it is to F that a particular f thing is related and not to G or X or Pi, then one has set up a relation which prima facie deserves to be called something more than simple ambiguity or simple equivocation. And as soon as that happens, then, my thesis is, the infinite regress is set up: the notion that the predication of the term of both Form and particular could be an equivocal predication, and yet the Form be responsible for the character of the particular as much as for its existence, this notion, I submit, is quite untenable. 5. Let us return now to the TMA(1). I have noted several times already that it does not imply directly that a Form and a dependent particular have qualities which resemble each other. One might therefore be tempted to claim that the regress only results from the attribution of qualities, that the different language of the Theory of Forms mentioned in the TMA(1) is logically aseptic. There is a relevant philosophical point involved here, for to say that something is F, and to say that it is F in virtue of a certain quality is by no means to repeat oneself. The thesis that, if x is F, then it is F in virtue of possessing the quality of F-hess is only one general account among several of how things are what they are. It is a particularly problematic thesis in the case of ethical terms; consider, for example, Kerner's 19 criticism of G. E. Moore's claim that goodness is a quality in this sense. However, the preceding pages have, I hope, done enough to show that to insert thus a wedge between the two TMAs is illegitimate. The regress depends simply on the fact that there is objective justification for saying that a given F o r m and a particular dependent on it are united in a way in which no other Form and its dependent particulars are. When we say something is F, and that another ~9 G. C. K~rner, The Revolution in Ethical Theory, Oxford U.P,. Oxford, 1966, pp. 8-16.

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thing is also F, we are saying that both are F, both have a certain character. This is true, whatever further explanation we go on to give for the general activity of ascribing characters to things. The only circumstances in which this is not true, are those in which we deem ourselves to be randomly bestowing labels. This is an explication of what we do when we call things what we do call them that has been and still is defended by some philosophers. It was however the metaphysical thesis that Plato was concerned to disprove by means of the Theory of Forms. Given that fact, the TMA(1) is as valid as the TMA(2); the difference between them is that the former operates at a slightly higher level of generality. 6. There remains one further matter to be dealt with, and that is Moravscik's interpretation of why the TMA(1) is invalid. It talks about how we apprehend Forms and particulars as being F, a matter of ways and means of cognition, not of qualities of that which is the object of the cognitive act. It is by emphasising this that Peck and Moravscik are able to distinguish heavily between the TMA(1) and TMA(2). I want to argue that this fact cannot be used to differentiate between the two arguments, and to claim that as a matter of fact the TMA(1) and (2) are not for this reason two separate arguments, but two aspects of one and the same argument, two ways of looking at one and the same problem. The TMA(1) is concerned with how we apprehend particular and Form, the TMA(2) with how particulars come to have their respective characteristics; the one apparently an epistemological question, the other a metaphysical one. But the point to be underlined is that the issue in the TMA(1) is not epistemological, in the sense of that word in which the philosophy of perception is called epistemology. The question is not simply, How do we know particulars exist?, How do we perceive their physical characteristics? It is rather a matter of how ultimately we know them to be F, what justification there ultimately is for calling them F. These matters are not separable from questions of how they are F, when the issues are taken as falling within the scope of the Theory of Forms. For that is a metaphysical, not a physical theory, and metaphysical questions as to how we know things are F are the same as metaphysical questions about how things are F. For this reason, Moravscik's account of the TMA(1), although having the merit of originality, misses the real point of the argument. He is perfectly aware that 'the manner of apprehension . . . has nothing to do with content' (p. 57): but he is mistaken in thinking that the TMA(1) is solely concerned with the manner of apprehension. H e constructs the TMA(1), to produce a regress, on the basis of its being concerned with the manner of apprehension. But the concern of the TMA(1) is not merely with the manner of apprehension, but with what ultimately it is to apprehend a particular as being of such-and such a type. Peck is at fault there in a different way; he realises the point I have just made, but does not appreciate the resultant parallelism of the two TMAs.

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7. I have not here touched upon the wider issues of whether Plato knew the Third Man Arguments to be valid, and what effect this knowledge might have had on the development of the Theory of Forms: these axe matters requiring separate treatment. I have been t r y i n g to bring some further light to bear on the structure of these arguments, and to consider whether certain defenccs are valid. I have taken Peck as rightly explaining the mechanics of predication in the Theory of Forms. This has two consequences, firstly, that the simple version of self-predication, where the quality is predicated absolutcly univocally of the Form and particular, and the dispute over whether Plato believed in it, are ruled out of order. Secondly, I have tried to argue that no more complicated conception, such as univocal predication plus ontological difference or predication ~p6g ~v, is of help to the Theory of Forms either. The Third Man Argument is valid against any version of the Theory of Forms where the predication of a quality of Form and particular is not purely equivocal. Since it is impossible that the predication involved is purely equivocal, I conclude that Parmenides has correctly set u p an infinite regress of explananda.

University of Alberta

The Esthetics of the Middle Ages (review) Francis Joseph Kovach Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970, pp. 470-475 (Review) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

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of fundamental notions (e.g., "creator" and "demiurge") are omnipresent. Sometimes even a confusion happens of Anaxagoras with Democritus when the "atom" is ascribed to Anaxagoras (p. 48). A n d the author does not seem to feel the fatal inadequacy of merely second-hand knowledge. While he in longura et latum argues with Aristotelian presentations and misrepresentations of Anaxagorean tenets, there is good reason for the suspicion that he might never have read even one authentic sentence written by Anaxagoras himself. For those interested in general cultural history, this book, the religious diatribe of a m o d e m Zoroastrian believer, is very worthwhile reading. For the historian of philosophy, it is of rather modest value. P-~LIX M. CLEVE New School for Social Research New York City

The Esthetics of the Middle Ages. By Edgar De Bruyne. Trans. Eileen B. Hennessy.

(New York: Frederick Uugar, 1969. Pp. viii+232. $6.50) This book has a very complex character. It is the English translation of a French work, L'Esth~tique du m o y e n dge,I which, in turn, is a one-volume abridged version by Edgar D e Bruyne of his o w n original three-volume work, I~tudes d'Esth~tique M~di~vale.2 Thus, one m a y evaluate this book either as a translation or, presupposing the faithfulness and correctness of the translation itself, as a relatively short work by E. D e Bruyne, or else in its relation to or as compared with the original three-volume work. I will confine myself here to the latter two considerations.3 First, considering this book in comparison with the three-volume original work, one of the principal writings of D e Bruyne and one of the most significant contemporary contributions to the history of medieval aesthetics, we can find both quantitative and qualitative differences between the original work and its abridged version. The quantitative difference is considerable. While the abridged work, at least in its English translation, is less than a quarter of a thousand pages in length, the original work includes altogether 1,224 pages 4 and is thus more than five times longer than thc translated abridged version of it. The qualitative or methodological difference is at least equally great. In the original work, each of the three volumes deals primarily with the various medieval authors of aesthetic works and doctrines in a chronological order.5 In contrast, the contents of the translated abridged version follow a topical arrangement with chronology playing only a subordinate role, if any at all, within Louvain. L'Institut Supdrieur de Philosophic, 1947. Brugge: De Tempel, 1946. s I have had no access to the abridged French original. 9 Vol. I, xiv+370; II, x-{-420; III, x-F400. 9 VoL I: Boethius to Erigena; II. "L'l~poque Romane," from the Carolingian period to the schools of Chartres and St. Victor; and Ill: the thirteenth century, from St. Bernard to Duns Scotus.

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each topic. The six chapters are entitled, "'The Sources," "The Fundamental Principles," "Various Esthetic Systems," "The Esthetic Experience," "Art," and "The Fine Arts." To this may be added a third difference that is the result of the first two differences. There is virtually neither any direct quotation from any author on any topic, nor a~y direct reference to texts in the works of medieval authors mentioned or discussed. While the quantitative difference in itself is understandable, since only a scholar specializing in this field would read over 1,200 pages on medieval aesthetics, and while the qualitative difference is perfectly justified in terms of an intelligent summary, the absence especially of direct references to discussed texts is, as will be shown below, deeply regxettable. So much for the relative consideration of this translated abridged work. Let us next consider the abridged work in itself in the form of a positive and a negative evaluation. Second, despite the relative brevity of the work, one finds this book extremely valuable both in terms of the quantity and the quality of the data it contains. As to quantity, D e Bruyne manages to compress an enormous amount of information about medieval aesthetic thought into this book. The significance of this, to confine ourselves at this point only to the readers of the English translation of this work, lies in the fact that every English work on the history of aesthetics leaves the reader with the impression that after Plotinus, with the possible exceptions of Augustine, Thomas and Dante, there had been no significant contribution to aesthetics up to the time of the Renaissance, if n o t to the seventeenth or the eighteenth century. 6 The quality or content of the great amount of information to be found in this abridged work by De Bruyne is even more valuable and surprising. For the truth about medieval aesthetics is not simply that much has been written about beauty and art and artist from the sixth to the fourteenth century, but also that the scope, variety, and diversity of insights, ideas, doctrines, theories, and systems are far beyond anything the sophisticated or complacent student of modern and contemporary aesthetics would suspect or, perhaps, like to realize. In terms of scope, for instance, he will learn not only of the aesthetic value of the finite material accidents of natural things and artworks but also of the beauty of immaterial beings (both substances and accidents), like the soul, the angel or pure spirit, God, and virtue, as well as religious figures and institutions, like the Trinity, the Son, Christ, Mary, the Church, grace, etc. Similarly, in terms of variety or diversity in approach, the reader will learn not only of the psychology of artistic creation and aesthetic experience and of the physical, chemical, or biological varieties of scientific aesthetics, but also of dogmatic, moral, and mystic as well as allegorical approaches to the realm of beauty. But even if neither the scope nor the variety of approaches amaze the contemporary reader, there is one interesting feature brought out about medieval aesthetics in this book. It is this. We pride ourselves today on the contributions of modern and con-

CL the works by B. Bosanquet, Wln. Knight, Gilbert-Kuhn, et al. Moreover, even if such works do treat of medieval aesthetics at all, they do so not only defectively, disorganizedly, and rather dilettantishly, but, which is much worse, admittedly (e.g. by Bosanquet), through secondary sources or secondhand information.

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temporary aesthetics to questions concerning beauty, the artist, artistic creation, and aesthetic contemplation, all being topics m a n y think to have been unknown or untreated in pre-modem times. Yet, in chapter five we read about aesthetic transcendence, religious nostalgia and aesthetic melancholy (ideas as Plotinian as existentialist); about art as a talent; about the artist as a genius; about artistic inspiration, motivation and creation (ideas invariably identified with Kant, German romantics, or British, German, and French psychologists); about content and form. And, in chapter six, we read about such things as the difference between utilitarian and fine arts, betweenunconscious aesthetic enjoyment and conscious aesthetic judgment or criticism, and between the beautiful and the sublime (not to mention many other aesthetic categories) as well as questions like the hierarchy of arts, the ideal or perfect masterpiece (anticipating Wagner's notion of G e s a m t k u n s O , the beauty of being and of expressiveness, etc. The greatest single surprise, however, will come to the uninitiated reader from learning that the idea of aesthetic disinterestedness is not Kant's discovery, nor the modem contribution to aesthetics of eighteenth century British aestheticians, 7 but that it is an insight first expressed in the Middle Ages by Erigena and, after him, by Richard and Hugh of St. Victor in the twelfth century; and by Thomas Gallus, William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, Jean de la Rochelle, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, et al., in the thirteenth century. This one fact alone would make the reading of this book quite worthwhile! Third, while this abridged work by D e Bruyne is very successful in condensing a great amount of the wealth and diversity of medieval aesthetic thought, there are also, of course, certain weaknesses in terms of structure, omissions, and interpretations confined mainly to the first three chapters. In chapter one the author discusses, among the sources of medieval aesthetics the Bible, ancient and pre-medieval thinkers, technical handbooks and Church Fathers from Origen to Augustine. This listing is unfortunate for at least three reasons. One is the overlapping. Augustine, for example, is both a thinker and a Church Father; Cicero, both a thinker and the author of "handbooks" on rhetoric; and both Augustine and Cicero are treated under two headings. A second reason is the disproportionate stress on the contents or doctrines of these sources, especially concerning the principles of beauty, thereby anticipating m u c h of the proper contents of later chapters. The third reason is the limited role attributed to Aristotle as a source of medieval aesthetic theories. For, while mentioning his idea on beauty as a m e a n between two extremes, his distinction of beauty from the pleasurable and useful, his view on the higher senses as being aesthetic, D e B m y n e mentions only symmetry, of all the Aristotelian principles of beauty, keeping silent on the two historically most influential principles, viz., order and integrity,s This he does despite the facts that order, as the synthetic definition of beauty, had become an almost universal doctrine in the Middle Ages (see pp. 65, 90-92, and 139); and that the greatest medieval thinker, T h o m a s Aquinas, added integrity or perfection to the two other, neo-Platonic principles (proportion and clarity or splendor) explicitly on the authority of Aristotle in his first major work 9 As had been taught up to 1964 in aesthetic books and journals even in this country.

s Met. XIII,3, 1078b 1~ Poet. VII,4, 1450b 37f.; Nic. Eth. IV,3,7, 1123b 5-6. " In I. Sent. Petri Lombardi, d.31,q.2,a.l,soL

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and incorporated the same principle as an integral part into his aesthetic theory. 10 This latter Aristotelian contribution is the more significant since, through it, Thomas' analytic definition of beauty (integritas, proportio, claritas) has become a tradition from the thirteenth to the twentieth century among Thomists all over the world. The structure of chapters two and three is even worse. Chapter two is entitled '~I'he Fundamental Principles"; chapter three, "Various Esthetic Systems." Yet, the former treats of musical, metaphysical, symbolist, and allegoristic aesthetics as well as the aesthetics of light; the latter, of natural, moral, "sapiential," and mystical aesthetics (besides "esthetic optimism"). Now, the first five kinds of aesthetics are supposedly differentiated by their "invariable principles" (p. 47), whereas the introductory part to chapter three stresses that the major writers all made use of the etymological method in expounding their aesthetic views or systems (p. 80), thereby implying that etymology is the principle of the four species of aesthetics treated in this chapter. But if this is so, then etymology is as much a principle of expounding an aesthetic system as symbolism, allegory, and light are (p. 47). Why, then, should the five systems be treated under "Fundamental Principles," and another four under "Various Esthetic Systems," especially since the author himself admits that those who conceived natural, moral, "sapientiar' and mystic aesthetics "did not confine themselves exclusively" to the use of the etymolog/cal method? An additional aspect of the separation of these aesthetic systems is even more disquieting. Having discussed the Victorines and Gilbert Foliot as the main representatives of natural aesthetics, De Bruyne declares that "with William of Auvergne we enter a completely different world," that of moral aesthetics, since "his entire esthetic system (rests) on the parallelism between moral beauty (the Good) and physical beauty" (p. 86). However, this is not unique with William of Auvergne. For both Albert 1~ and Thomas, 12 to mention only two great thinkers, state the same parallelism between physical and morat beauty, thereby indicating that they have expounded their philosophic aesthetics this way. From empirical observations they deduced a universal definition of the essence of material beauty; 13 then they postulated an analogy between material and immaterial beauty; and finally, worked out the details of their philosophy of moral, spiritual, angelic and divine beauty. Similar is the situation with what De Bruyne calls "sapiential esthetics." It is not a separate aesthetic school of any medieval century but an integral part of both philosophic and theological aesthetics. The author indirectly admits this fact by naming as its first thirteenth-century representative the same theologian he declared to have expounded moral aesthetics: William of Auvergne (p. 90). The historical confirmation of this criticism comes from the commentaries on such aesthetically significant biblical texts as the Canticle o~ Canticles or Psalm 44,3 and 26,4, by St. Bernard, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, and from the first two chapters of Book Five of the unique treatise by St. Albert, D e L a u d i b u s

1o Summ. theoL 1,39,8c.; II-IL 145, 2c. 11 Summ. theol. [,VI,26,1,2,3,soL and ad obi.; Borgnet ed., voL 3I, 242; Opusc. de pulchro, q,5,soL 12 S u t u r e . theol, II-II 145, 2c; Contra impugn. Dei cult. et relig., p.2,c.6,n.5,ad 9. is Cf. Albert, Suture. theol., ibid.; In Dion. De coeL bier., VII, 5, dub. 2, ad 5; ed. cit., vol. 14, 173; Thomas, In I. Sent. 31,2,1,sol.; Suture. theol. 1,39,8c; De real. 8,4c.; De regno, 1,3; De virt. in comm. 9, ad 16; De virt. card., 2,12a; etc.

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Beatae Mariae Virginis. Even mystical aesthetics is not so much a separate school or anyone's separate or exclusive aesthetic theory in the Middle Ages as an integral part of the numerous components of the aesthetic thought or system of a number o f medieval philosophers and theologians. The large number of commentaries on the works of Pseudo-Denis, especially his D e divinis nominibus, chapters four and five, like those by Albert and Aquinas, are uncontestable proofs for this. Finally, it may be pointed out that the various systems o f aesthetics listed in chapters two and thrr do not do justice to the richness and ramifications of either the philosophic or the theological aesthetics of the Middle Ages. For there is little or no mention in these chapters of logical, arithmetical, geometrical, metaphysical, cosmological, and pneumatological aesthetics, on the one hand; and of trinifistic, Christological, Mariological, angelological, charistic, sacramental, eschatological, ecclesiological, and general and special moral theological aesthetics, on the other hand. Fourth, in addition to these mainly structural defects, one finds in this book some instances of doctrinal misinterpretations, historical misstatements and one technical shortcoming. Starting with the first of the three kinds of defects, there is an isolated misinterpretation of Aristotle in the statement that Aristotle considered m a n to be a symbol of materiality, animality, and rationality (p. 70) while, in reality, Aristotle taught that man was material, an animal, an~ rational. ~4 Richard of St Victor's doctrine of allegory is summed up by asserting that, to him, allegorical value was a "transcend~tal quality of beauty" (p. 76). If this is to mean that allegory was a quality extraneous to the physical reality of beauty, the summary is faithful; if "transcendental" is supposed to mean that every beauty has allegorical value, the assertion is alien to Richard's thought. Similarly, William of Auvergne is stated to have held that beauty, was "born of the meeting of an object . . . with our soul" (p. 88). This is wrong doctrinally since it is based on the statement, pulchrum visu dicimus quod nature est per se ipsum placere which simply means that visible beauty is called that which "'is born," that is, which by its very nature is pleasing of itself. The same interpretation is wrong also historically since this would make William of Auvergne the first aesthetic relationist 500 years before Lord Kames, who seems to have been the father of this school of thought very popular today. The statement that medieval thinkers "often began by forming a general idea of the subject to be defined, and then analyzed the term, distorting it, if necessary, until it conformed to their requirements" (p. 79) is definitdy of the kind one frequently hears from contemporary historians of aesthetics charging medieval aestheticians with aprioristic (yon oben herab) methods. The truth is that this holds true only for some rather insignificant and highly specific doctrines within the realm of "sapiential" aesthetics; when, namely, the theologian philosophers tried to give some rational interprctations of rather cryptic biblical texts, a s Augustine, T h o m a s , and especially Albert to Wisdom 11, 21. Similarly, the assertion that "St. Thomas insisted from time to time on the esthetic nature of higher senses, to the point of excluding the others" (p. 121) carries little weight in the light of the fact that no text is given to support this charge,

*" Cf., e.g., Met. VII,11, 1036b 3-5; 1037a 5-6 and 28f.; De an. III,3, 427a 16-19; Pol. lII,6, 1278b 19; Cat. I, la 8-9; 3b 10-15; etc.

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whereas in some texts Aquinas explicitly teaches that the higher senses of vision and hearing are the ones that mainly (praecipue, principaliter) lead to aesthetic experience. t5 Moreover, the statement that only in the thirteenth century was the question of the distinction between the higher and lower senses explicitly raised (p. l13f.), is true only if the author meant to exclude the pre-medieval or patristic as well as the ancient period of philosophy. 16 Finally, there is one technical weakness in this book that cannot be left unmentioned. The overwhelming majority of references are not to the original medieval texts treated and/or quoted in the three-volume edition, but to the number of volume and page in that edition. Thus the reader must be both familiar with French and in possession of the original three-volume work, or remain hopelessly frustrated every time he wishes to consult the original texts or at least know which texts are being mentioned. Yet, if one knows French, he does not need the English translation; and if he is also fortunate enough to have access to the original three-volume version, he will not need the abridged version of the original work at all. For this reason, should there be a second edition of this translation, the references should be changed from the l~tudes to the original medieval works. Although the negative remarks are more lengthy in this review than the positive evaluation is, it would be a grave mistake to conclude from this that the defects outweigh the value of the book. As a matter of fact, upon finishing the reading of this translation of De Bruyne's work, this reviewer was left with the conviction that, in the final balance, the reader can only greatly benefit from this work, and we all owe gratitude to the translator for having made this highly informative work available in the English language. FRANCIS J. KOVACH University of Oklahoma 1~ Summ. theol. I-II,27,1,ad 3; In Psalm. 44,2. ~6 Cf. Plato, Hipp. maL 298 A; Gorg. 474 D; Leg. XII, 961 D; Aristotle, De an. III,3, 429a 3; Augustine, De lib. arb. II,7, 16-19; 14,38; De ord. II, ll, etc.

L e origini del metodo analitico: il Cinquecento. By Angelo Crescini. (Udine: Del Bianco, 1965. Published by the Istituto di Filosofia, Facnlt~ di Lettere e Filosofia of the Universit~ degli Studi di Trieste. Pp. 340. L 5,000)

Professor Crescini has certainly picked a topic of great interest upon which to write. Recent students of Renaissance logic such as N. W. Gilbert, V. Mufioz Delgado, W. Ong, G. Papuli, W. Risse, and C. Vasoli have pointed out the vitality and significance associated with the development of the logical thought of the period. The general question of methodology has produced an enormous scholarly literature in recent years, I but much remains to be done before we fully understand how various methodologies have evolved and what relation philosophical discussions of method have had to the actual practice of science. Therefore, it would be most desirable to have a 1 For further information see Laurens Laudan, "Theories of Scientific Method from Plato to Mach: A Bibliographical Review," History of Science 7 (1968), 1-63.

R. B. Perry on the Origin of American and European Pragmatism James A. Gould Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970, pp. 431-450 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/229332/summary

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R. B. Perry on the Origin of American and European Pragmatism JAMES A. GOULD

WESTERN civxr.lz_~aaor~ HAS EXPERmNCr~D the birth of many philosophical movements. Most of these have had their origin in a particular geo~aphical area. One usually refers to the "Continental Rationalists." the "British Empiricists." and the "American Pragmatists." Just as "Rationalism" is said to have been created in Great Britain, it is usually said that "Pragmatism" was born in America. One speaks of pragmatism as "characteristically American." The date of birth of pragmatism in America has been pin-pointed. Its genesis came about during the early part of "The Classical Period in American Philosophy," a period extending from about 1870 to 1910. Both Perry ~ and Wiener 2 have stated that in the United States the movement arose during the 1870's due in part to conversations held by James, Peirce, Wright, Holmes, Fiske, and others at the meetings in Cambridge of an organization called "The Metaphysical Club." At these gatherings the main scientific and philosophical ideas of the day were discussed, and these men produced "American Pragmatism," in part from these discussions, and in part from independent work. Although the birth of pragmatism in America has been quite thoroughly examined, the genesis of pragmatism in Europe has been only sparsely written about. There were many writers in Europe who were associated with the pragmatic movement. In Italy there were Papini and Vailati; in England the most famous pragmatist was Schiller; in France there were Blondel and Poincarr; and in Germany

x R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character of William lames, Vol. II, Philosophy and Psychology (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1935). 2 p, Wiener, Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949).

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one associates the word "pragmatism" with such men as Jerusalem, Goldstein, Jacoby, and Vaihinger. The purpose of this paper is to show how pragmatism originated in Europe at the same time as it did in the United States, independent o4 its development there, and from a different source. This will be shown by tracing through the consequences of suggestions made to this writer in a letter from R. B. Perry a few years before he died: The writer inquired of Perry about the relationship of James to the European pragmatists, especially Vaihinger. Perry replied: There would seem to me to have been (regarding the origin of pragmatism) two parallel and independent streams: one springing from Locke and the other from Kant. James derived from Locke and the other Britishers to such a large extent that I think he would have arrived at his pragmatism if he had never known Renouvier. Renouvier himself drew from Kant as did Vaihinger also. Start from Locke and move in the direction suggested by his "nominal essences," or start with Kant and give a pragmatic turn to his a priori, and you are likely to come out at the same spot. (Letter: February 15, 1952.) In order to determine whether Perry was correct concerning the development of pragmatism it is first necessary to define the term. Webster gives a very good definition which states that there are three elements in pragmatism; The meaning of conceptions is to be sought in their practical bearings; the function of thought is a guide to action; truth is pre-eminently to be tested by the practical consequences of belief, s These three a s p e c t s - - a theory of meaning, the instrumental theory of ideas, and a theory of truth--are certainly characteristic of James's pragmatism but perhaps less so of some of the other philosophers of this school. Lovejoy 4 claimed there were thirteen distinguishable types of pragmatism. Hence when characterizing someone as a pragmatist it is not necessary that James's three elements all be present. Nonetheless, the three elements will be important guidelines. Before examining Perry's thesis, these three elements must be further explained. Instrumentalism concerns the role of ideas in human action. This theory, often said to represent the influence of Darwin in philosophy, contends that ideas are a product of the human organism during the course of its development. It maintains that the organism develops certain ideas which enable the organism to obtain desired goals. These ideas act as aids or instruments to help us reach the ends Webster's N e w Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: G. and C. Merriam Co., Publishers, 1961). By good definition I mean commonly accepted. ' A. Lovejoy, "The Thirteen Pragmatisms," The Journal of Philosophy, V (1908), 5-12, 29-39.

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which satisfy our needs. James calls them concepts, which he distinguishes from percepts. What is a conception? It is a teleological instrument. It is a partial aspect, which for our purpose we regard as its essential aspect, as the representative of the entire thing. 5 These concepts act as tools in the service of the organism: Made of percepts, or distilled from parts of percepts, their (the concepts') essential office, it has been said, is to coalesce with percepts again, bringing the mind back into the perceptual world with a better command of the situation there. 6 With concepts we go in quest of the absent, meet the remote, actively turn this way or that, bend our experience, and make it tell us whither it is bound. We change its order, run it backwards, bring far bits together and separate near bits, jump about over its surface instead of flowing through its continuity, string its items on as many ideal diagrams as our rtiind can frame. 7 Thus the function of. ideas is to aid us in successful adaptation and satisfactory intercourse with the world. In the earliest eras of human intelligence, thought proper undoubtedly had an exclusively practical use. N o w much later through the study of these concepts there have been developed new and abstract relations among them, and hence the sciences of mathematics and logic have come about. In these "static worlds" nothing happens, and so these concepts acquire their "eternal character." Furthermore, when we study a series of percepts in a particular science, and ~rom these develop certain laws, then in such cases: We may well call this a theoretical conquest over the order in which nature originally comes. The conceptual order into which we translate our experience seems not only a means of practical adaptation, but the revelation of a deeper level of reality in things, s This, then, is the ins~umentalism of James. Fundamental to his pragmatism the theory differentiates his thought f r o m other p h i l o s o p h e r s ' - - especially the positivists, who like most philosophers ask only, What is the nature of our thoughts? James has gone a step further and demanded, W h y do we have thoughts, anyway? The second d e m e n t of James's pragmatism, and coupled with his instrumentalism is James's theory of meaning. James has a double standard of meaning. The William James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Mhzd, IV (1879), 318. 6 William James, Some Problems of Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1948), pp. 48-49. Ibid., p. 64. 8 Ibid., p. 71.

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first standard is set down in his essay, "What Pragmatism Means," 9 and the second in the essay, "The Will to Believe." 10 James's examination of the conditions under which statements have i m p o r t comes out with a twofold result. T h e first part of the result is not unlike the famous statement of Peirce: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object, xt James puts it this way: T o attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve---what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all. a2 What, then, is the meaning of an idea as thus interpreted by these two men? Meaning is essentially prospective; it is the possible consequence in experience. A n y idea is like an opera ticket: if I use the ticket then certain expected consequence will result; if I employ a certain idea then I will exDer;ence conse-u~ W h a t I believe these consequences will be is the meaning of this idea. And notice that James says, " O u r conception of these et~ects.., is m e n ~or us the waote of our conception of the object." The entire meaning of an idea to us is our conception of the possible consequences in experience. The consequences are not just part of the meaning of an idea, they are its meaning. And as Henle points out it is this point that is "both new and s t a r t i n g " in this theory of Peirce and James. a3 M a n y analysts would admit that its consequences are part of an idea's meaning, but few would admit that these are its entire meaning. The second part of the theory of meaning adds that other statements not having experiential consequences are meaningful. Statements are meaningful if belief in these statements has consequences in experience. Consider the statement, " G o d exists." This statement is not meaningful according to the first part of James's theory of meaning, but if we consider it in accordance with the second part, then it can b e held as meaningful. F o r belief in this statement has consequences, and this belief 8 William James, Pragmatism (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1947), pp. 43-84. to William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), pp. 1-30. ~a Charles Peiree, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," Popular Science Monthly, XII (January, 1878), 293. ~2 James, Pragmatism, pp. 47-48. as Henle in Fisch, et aL, Classic American Philosophers (New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, Inc., 1951), p. 160.

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makes a difference in one's life. A belief in G o d can give a person confidence and courage, and make him a happier person. James says: . . . . how could pragmatism possibly deny God's existence? She could see no meaning in treating as "not true" a notion that was pragmatically so successful, x4 Before I turn to the third element of James's pragmatism, the theory of truth, there are two points to notice about the theory of meaning. T h e first point is the determination of the kind of statements that are meaningful under the second criterion. They are statements of our beliefs. These beliefs must be such that there is no experience, as far as we can tell, which would settle the issue such as in the case of the existence of God. T h e other point concerto what constitutes the meaning of statements of this second kind. Henle has brought out this point: There is a further point, however, in this connection. Suppose that a belief in God, as James suggests, affects a person's emotional outlook and mode of conduct, and consider the meaning of the statement "God exists" from the point of view of the person holding the belief. If it is to be believed, the statement must itself have meaning. This meaning cannot be the consequences of holding the belief, since, for the believer, these consequences are the result of holding the belief, not the meaning of the statement itsdf. Thus if a person i~ to feel relief because he is sure God exists, the relief is not the meaning of saying that God exists, but rather the result of the belief. Neither can the statement have meaning in the tougbmindexl sense (this refers to the first part of the twofold theory of meaning) previously discussed, since admittedly there is no experimental test for the existence of God. Thus there must be another Unexplained sense of meaning in which James is ready to allow that the statement "God exists" is meaningful, xs The point here is clear. We cannot determine exactly what is the meaning in these statements, although we do have the criterion of meaningfulness. A m o n g all the statements which axe meaningful to a philosopher, there will be certain ones which will be true, which brings me to the third element of James's pragmatism. Only meaningful statements have the possibility of being true. Furthermore, the character of truth-falsity applies only to statements. .6 We have seen that two types of statements are meaningful for James, and it will follow that there are two senses of the word truth for him. These two senses correspond to the two parts of his theory of meaning. The first part of the theory of meaning held that statements with experiential

*' James, Pragmatism, p. 80. *~ Henle, op. cit,, p. 126. Italics are m i n e . ,6 James c a m e to realize this definitely only after a rather strong but friendly letter from Dewey. See R- B. Perry, The Thought and Character oj William James, VoL II, Philosophy and Psychology (Bo~ton: Little, Brown, and Co., 1935), p. 530.

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consequences are meaningful. Thus if someone says, "It is snowing ontside," it is possible for me to walk out through the door and verify the truth or falsity of this statement. The statement is meaningful because, either I experience the snow falling on my face, or I don't. If I do, then the statement is true; if I don't, then the statement is false. Something different happens in my experience if the statement is true than would happen if the statement were false. James puts it this way: But the great assumption of the intellectualists is that truth means essentially an inert static relation. When you've got your true idea of anything, there's an end of the matter . . . . EpistemologicaUy you are in stable equilibrium Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question. " G r a n t an idea or belief to be true," it says, " W h a t concrete difference will its being true m a k e in anyone's actual life? H o w will the truth be realized? W h a t experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cashvalue in experiential terms?" 17

Thus, a true statement will not disappoint a person when he acts upon it. I put on my heavy clothing before going outdoors because someone has remarked that it is snowing. If his statement is true, then I will not be disappointed in my expectations, which are in this case the expectations of somewhat chilly weather. "True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verily. False ideas are those that we cannot, is Thus verification is fundamental in the determination of truth. James adds, "Simply and lully verified leadings are certainly the originals and prototypes of the truth-process.19 However, in the very necessity of living we cannot fully verify every statement. We assume that the clock on the wall has works inside of its case, and we assume that Japan exists although we have never there. Why? Because it works to do so. Something is uselul because it is true, and vice versa. Furthermore, if a belief is to work, is to be useful, then it must not conflict, insofar as it is possible, with our other beliefs. There must be a general consistency among our beliefs. "Truth is made largely out of previous truths." Of course, from time to time some of our old beliefs will be proven to be incorrect, and they will have to be replaced by new ones. The second part of James's theory of meaning, his other standard, maintained that a statement is meaningful if a belief in it has experiential consequences, although the statement itself has no such consequences. Consider the statement, " G o d exists." James contends that the truth or falsity of this question cannot be decided on intellectual grounds. There is neither direct nor indirect evidence which will verify this statement. Still, he says one is forced to decide one way or the other.

:T James, P r a g m a t i s m . p. 200. la Ibid., p. 201. lo Ibid.. p. 206.

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If we want to leave the question open, then this too is a decision, and here we risk losing the truth. What is the situation if one considers the statement true? For many people they will feel a sense of relief, a sense of being accompanied through life by another power greater than they are, a sense of satisfaction. The belief in this statement would have experiential consequences. This belief creates its own truth, its own verification in one's subsequent experience. In this case the verification would be the sense of satisfaction: On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. 2~

Thus belief in God causes one to adopt a different attitude toward life; it makes a difference in experience. Consequently, any belief which is of the kind described above that leads to satisfactory results, is true. The number of beliefs that come under this heading would be quite limited, as the restrictions which determine the admittance of beliefs to this are numerous: We must not be able to decide the issue one way or the other on intellectual grounds; it must be alive for us, and finally it must be an unavoidable decision. In sum: The fundamental points of James's pragmatism are threefold: the instrumentality of ideas, a twofold theory of meaning, and finally, a corresponding twofold theory of truth.

II Let me turn now to the central question of this paper: Is Perry correct in claiming that a pragmatic turn to Locke's nominal essence doctrine could and did in fact give rise to any or all of the three elements of James's pragmatism? To answer this it is necessary to consider the origin of each of these three aspects of James's pragmatism. As previously mentioned, James's instrumentalism was one of his m o r e important doctrines. He was never the thoroughgoing instrumentalist that Dewey was. but his work, S o m e Problems in Philosophy, dealt at length with the topic. This book, being not only his last work, but also his unfinished attempt to orcate a systematic philosophy, contains some of James's more important conclusions. Jarnes's first writing professing instrumentalism was his article, "The Sentiment of Rationality," published in 1879: What is a conception? It is a teleological instrument. It is a partial aspect, which ~o Ibid., p. 299.

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for our purpose we regard as its essential aspect, as the representative of the entire thing. 21 This is his first statement on instrumentalism, and thus having determined the time he reached this view, the question arises, " F r o m whom, if anyone, did he acquire the position?" T o this there is no precise answer. One can speculate, nevertheless, and this speculative search becomes very interesting. One might think that the source was James's study of Darwin; however. James's early Darwinism is quite a limited Darwin. This is pointed out by Wiener: In studying the effect of Darwin's ideas on James' pragmatism, we must continually keep before us the two aspects of Darwinism--in other words, of the n a t u r a l selection theory: (I) the conception of random and therefore of spontaneous "chance" variations; (2) the conception of the action of environmental conditions in selecting those variations having survival value and vigorously eliminating all others. It was characteristic of James . . . to make much of the first, with its possibly . . . indeterminate implications. On the other hand, the instrumentalist strain in pragmatism seems akin to, and perhaps partly derivative from, the second aspect of Darwinism . . . . Though this way of thinking--which long antedates Darwin--probably had some influence on James, in the main he was antipathetic to it . . . . 22 This (1) is James's early view of Darwinism, which gradually became less important to him than the second aspect (2). T h e reason for this increased regard would seem to have two causes. The first was the discussion of the theory of evolution which took plaee in the Metaphysical Club. This philosophical discussion group included Peiree, James, Chauncey Wright, John Fiske, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and others around Harvard. Peirce m a d e the only written statements about this group. Weiner says: Peirce was more conscious than any of his contemporaries of the historical significance of the discussions by his group of the major ideas of the time, particularly the ideas of evolution, or more ae'curately, evolutionism--the generic name for the flock of generalizations that invaded every province of thought with the gradual acceptance of the Darwinian theory of evolution, much debated in the two or three decades after 1859. Many of these provinces were represented by the several members of Peirce's "Club." From the distinctive bent each gave to the idea of evolution in his chosen field of work there emerged a dazzling variety of pragmatisms. 23 The point is that these discussions gradually led James to emphasize the second ~ James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Mind, IV (1879), 318. ~ Wiener, Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-

versity Press, 1949), pp. 103-104. ~ Ibid., p. 26.

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aspect of Darwin's theory, and the result of this emphasis is James's instrumenmlism as given in Some Problems of Philosophy. His own studies led him also to this position. Some unpublished notes, f r o m a course in cosmology, bring out this fact: Atoms, the ether, and similar scientific entities are not to be construed as themselves perceptual realities. They are fictions or metaphors whose purpose it is to enable us to describe the perceptual realities in terms of "functional variations." They are tools of thought, the proof of which lies in their satisfying certain theoretical demands such as prediction, elegance, and simplicity, z4 James thus adopted the descriptive and instrumental interpretation of physical concepts. Thus, the discussions supplemented by his own studies brought him to accept an instrumentalism. H o w did the second element, James's theory of meaning, originate? Most accounts of this subject quote James: A glance at the history of the idea will show still better what pragmatism means . . . . It was first introduced into philosophy by Mr. Charles Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," in the "Popular Science Monthly" for January of that year, Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that, to develop a thought's meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance . . . . This is the principle of Peirce, the principle of pragmatism. 2s Then the usual accounts state that this quotation tells us the source of James's pragmatic method. Actually this is only a small part of the true situation. T h e origin of James's pragmatic method is more complex than this usual account. James did not immediately accept Peirce's principle. James himself said that he first heard of it in the '70's, 2~ and Perry pins it down between the years 1870-72. 27 Yet James did not acknowledge Peirce's influence on him until 1884, 2s and he did not publish the statement of the principle, until 1898. 29 Between the time he first heard Peirce mention the principle, and his acknowledgment of his acceptance, James made a long study of the British empiricists. In this study J a m e s found confirmation of the pragmatic theory of meaning. Consequently, as will be

2, See William James's Notebooks, Houghton Library, Box L. Look for example at Notebook X (1876-1877) for James's independently developing pragmatic ideas. 25 James, Pragmatism, pp. 46-47. ,e William James, Collected Essays and Reviews (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1920), p. 410. 2, Perry, Ol7. cir., II, 407. 2s James, The Meaning of Truth, p. 40. 29 James, Collected Essays and Reviews, p. 411.

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shown, he derived this significant part of his pragmatism from the empiricists, especially Locke, whereas Peirce acknowledges Kant to be an important source of his own view. 3~ James's general motivation for following the empiricist position is brought out by Perry: That in philosophy James should have chosen the way of empiricism was primarily due to the circumstance that his scientific training was in biology, and to the accident that his teachers in that field were Agassiz, Jeffries Wyman and Charies Darwin. Biology as James knew it employed observation and experiment. The good scientist had an alert and discerning sense of fact, and fitted theory to fact with a few idealogicat wrinkles as possible . . . the purpose of theoretic invention, as James first saw it, was the economical and useful description of fact . . . . Hence, the method of science, as James knew it best, inclined him in the direction of empiricism, zl This quotation informs us of James's motivation for his position; he himself found philosophic reasons for this belief through his analyses of the British empiricists, and furthermore, his study of them led him to m a k e the statement that these men were the first pragmatists. I am happy to say that it is the English-speaking philosophers who first introduced the custom of interpreting the meaning of conceptions by asking what difference they make for life . . . . The great English way of investigating a conception is to ask yourself right off, "What is it known as?" In what facts does it result? What is its cash-value, in terms of particular experience, and what special difference would come into the world accordingly as it were true or false? Thus does Locke treat the conception of personal i d e n t i t y . . . . So Berkeley with his "matter." . . . Hume does the same thing with causation, a2 L e t us now turn to those ideas of Locke, the main empiricist influence on James, which he adopted. The most important doctrine of Locke's which ~tfluenced James was the notion of "nominal" essences. To understand Locke's doctrine of nominal essence properly it is necessary to grasp how it arose and developed historically. The notion of essence and its companion term, accident, were first introduced by Aristotle to solve a dilemma which troubled the early Milesian philosophers. If an entity which changes actually changes, then it cannot be one and the same thing which undergoes change. But if the changing entity has the same identity, then it cannot actually have changed. To solve this dilemma Aristotle introduced the notion of so Peirce states this in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1902), in his contribution to tae article on "Pragmatist and Pragmatism," II, 321. aa Perry, op. cit., I, 468. sz James, Collected Essays and Reviews, pp. 434-435.

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substantial change, which is said to occur when an entity undergoing the change does not persist through it. If a substantial change occurs regarding any entity, and its essential property remains, then it is only a change in the accidental properties. This is Aristotle's ontological basis for distinguishing essence from accident. He also distinguishes them epistemologically saying that knowledge of the essence of a thing is more important than knowledge of its accidents. He says, in fact, that to know each thing is just to know its essence. The most serious objection to the Aristotelian position originally was stated by Locke although many people have since restated it. This objection maintains that there is no genuine difference between any attributes-even the essential and accidental ones. This alleged distinction is not as objective as is claimed. It really is a subjective one as to whether or not a thing changes is a function of our particular interests. If we are primarily interested in the shape of an object, then no matter what happens to the color, if the shape remains the same the object doesn't change in its essentials. If, however, we are primarily interested in color and it does change, then we would say the object has changed in its essentials. The chameleon is a good example of such color interests. Dewey put it this way: "Anything is 'essential' which is indispensable in a given inquiry and anything is 'accidental' which is superfluous." 33 Locke was the first to treat essences this way although one can find s'mailar suggestions in Gassendi and Boyle. Locke said that real essences, the set of properties which determines the other properties of a thing, are unknowable. We can, however, know "nominal essences." Locke arrives at this concept in the following way. He says, first, that our idea of a particular substance is a complex idea composed of a number of simple ideas which one observes to be constantly together, plus the notion of a substratum "wherein they do subsist." Second, an abstract idea of a sort is made out of our complex .ideas of various particular substances that resemble each other by omitting "that which is peculiar to each" and retainir "only what is common to all." Such a general idea is called a "nominal essence." The most knowable and observable qualities are the ingredients in the nominal essence of an object. Hence the nominal essence is for Locke "a creature of our making." We decide what we mean by the universal, which "belong not to the real existence of things, but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding made by it for its own use . . . . ,, 34 Nominal essences are developed according to our needs. They are made to be used, and different intended uses will determine different essences. For practical people, "Vulgar notions suit vulgar .discourses; and both, though confused enough, yet serve pretty well the market and the wake." Hence we conceive what is the essence of objects according to our practical interests. "Merchants and lovers, cooks and taitors, have words wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary as John Dewey, Logic: The Theory o/ Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1938), p. 138. a, Locke, ~In Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Ch. 3, Pars. 11.

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affairs." 35 These people develop a rather permanent group of nominal essences to better deal with their daily affairs and problems. Regarding nominal essences then, "it is evident that they are made by the mind, and not by nature." 36 Nominal essences will vary with our knowledge: . . . (we) therefore are so undetermined in our nominal essences, which we make ourselves, that, if several men were asked concerning some oddly-shaped /oetus, as soon as born, whether it were a man or no, it is past doubt one should meet with different answers. 37 In this determination of essences the model system would be made according to "those qualities which would best show us their most material (i.e. physical) differences and agreements"; 3s however, our immediate needs necessitate a more superficial and provisional division, according to their obvious appearances. Thus, these appearances will be the nominal essence to us, i.e., their meaning. The mind may pick out what it regards as the essence of an individual. What shall determine this choice? In this determination, J a m e s locates L o c k e ' s "practicalism.'" 39 A b o u t this Perry says: James was quick to detect hints of what in the margin he noted as "practicalism." Locke speaks of "ease" of "quickness of dispatch," or "shortening the way to knowledge." a0 With one more aspect of Locke established, we can see the seed of James's theory of meaning. The point is that in the final analysis meaning refers to actual experience. In the Principles ol Psychology there is the quotation: And Locke's main doctrine remains eternally true, however hazy some of his language may have been, that "though there be a great number of considerations wherein things may be compared one with another, and so a multitude of relations; yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about, those simple ideas either as sensation or reflection, which I think to be the whole material of all our knowledge." 4~ Thus, meaning is in terms of sense data. Which sense data? Those which are the most useful--those which lead to "ease" or "quickness of dispatch." Consider

as Ibid., Book III, Ch. i0, See. 10. ss Ibid., Book III, Ch. 6, p. 26. ~ Ibid., Book II, Ch. 6, p. 27. 9s Ibid., Book HI, Ch. 6, p. 30. s' See Iames's copy of Essay, Houghton Library, WJ551.13, pp. 276, 296, 300; also Students' notes, Philosophy 5 (1884-1885), byR. W. Black. 9e Perry, op. cit., I, 548. See esp. Perry's interleaved copy of his own book, p. 550, Houghton Library. 41 James, Principles of Psychology, II, 6.

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an example where James considered that Locke used the pragmatic theory of meaning" In Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the great revolution towards empiricism begins. Personality is now explained as a result, and not assumed as a principle. . . . Locke believes, indeed, in souls as substances and in their identity; but the mere ontological self-identity of such a soul would, he says, make no personal identity unless a recollecting consciousness were joined thereto. "Consciousness" is what makes a person, when it remembers past experiences, as having been 'also its own . . . . The importance of Locke's doctrine lay in this, that he eliminated "substantial" identity (the only practically important sort), a directly verifiable empirical phenomenon.42

The relation of this position and that taken by James in "Does Consciousness Exist?" is definitely similar, and James pays tribute to Locke in the essay.43 If Locke had applied this theory to all phases of his philosophy, then the outcome would have been close to the first part of James's pragmatism.44 Although James drew heavily from Locke and the other British empiricists, it must always be remembered that their empiricism basically differs from pragmatic empiricism. The former is concerned with phenomena that have happened; the latter looks to future phenomena. Pragmatism uses ideas as tools for the exploration of the world, while Locke considered them to be in a sense copies of the world. James is interested in our reaction to phenomena, rather than our reception of them. We 0nly understand the meaning of an idea after we have acted on it. Thus the pragmatist is characterized by activity; the British empiricists by passivity. But a "pragmatic turn" to the doctrine of nominal essences, as has been shown, brings the two close together. James chose to reinterpret this empiricism, and in doing so, made it a more adequate philosophy, rather than making the same choice as many of his contemporaries who decided that Kant had provided the fountainhead of philosophical thought. Nevertheless James is indebted to Kant. In the first place, the original idea of pragmatism might never have come to James if Peirce, who in turn admitted his debt to Kant, hadn't brought it to James's attention. Secondly, James was aware that he had to answer Kant's criticism of Hume. Here Kant was not so much a source as a stimulus to James. 45 I have now accounted for the first part of James's theory of meaning showing that he was led to this point of view for the most part through his analysis of the 4~ James, "Person and Personality," Johnson's Universal Cyclopaedia (1895), VI, 539-540. 9a James, Radical Empiricalism, p. 10. " It would not include, of course, the second part of James's theory of meaning. 9s It will be pointed out later that Renouvier influenced James. Renouvier was indebted to Kant, and so here' is another indirect Kantian influence.

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British empiricists, especially Locke. The influence of Kant on James came through Peirce. Peirce's influence on this phase of James's thought was singular. The standards ~.re the same. And James made it clear that he owed his formulation to Peirce. 4~ Although James attributed the principle to Peirce, there is strong evidence that Peirce came to this view only after long discussions in the Metaphysical Club. The formulation came from Peirce. Its acceptance came from his study of Locke. 9What can we say was the source of the other aspect of the theory of meaning? The main source of the second part of James's theory of meaning is the philosophy of the nineteenth century Frenchman, Charles Renouvier. For thirty years James and Renouvier were the closest of friends. Although they met but once. their correspondence was enormous. Perry says of their relationship: That Renouvier's was the greatest individual influence upon the development of James' thought cannot be doubted. Renouvier's phenomenalism, his pluralism, his fideism, his moralism, and his theism were all congenial to James' mind . . . it was the voltmtaristic and fideistic sequel which touched James most deeply. 47 James himself writes: He (Renouvier) was one of the greatest philosophic characters, and but for the decisive impression made on me in the seventies by his masterly advocacy of pluralism, I might never have got free from the monistic superstition under which I had grown up. 4s Specifically with regard to the second aspect of the theory of meaning it was the fideism of Renouvier that most deeply influenced James. Perry quotes a very significant line from a letter that James wrote to Peirce: The volume entitled T h e Will to Believe, published in 1897, was made up of articles and addresses which had been written at intervals from 1879 to 1896. Its doctrines go back to his early examination of "the motives of philosophizing," and are pervaded throughout by the influence of R e n o u v i e r - - " c r i b b e d j r o m Renouvier'" ] a m e s once wrote Peirce. 49

The particular source of James's fideism was Renouvier's great three-volume work, ,6 Ibid., pp. 46-47. When James completely accepted this principle is an interesting problem. I have stated that he and Peirce first talked about it between the years 1870 and 1872. James's public acknowledgment came in 1898. Ma~rice Baum, writing an article, "~I'he Development of James' Pragmatism Prior to 1879" (Iourn. of Phil., X X X 0933), 43-51), brings out that James as early as 1878 wrote statements similar to Peirce's. Even so, he would have had time to accept it by way of the Empiricists as he studied them around 1875. (See Perry, op. cit., I, 549.) ": Perry, op. cit., I, 655-657. 9s James, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. I65, note. ,9 Perry, op. cit., II, 208-209. Italics mine.

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Essais de Critique G~n~rale: TraitJ de Psychologie RationneUe, which was published in 1859. James read and m a r k e d his v o l u m e in 1870. 5~ It m u s t be remembered that the rise of interest in theories of m e a n i n g is a relatively recent event. A l t h o u g h there are harbingers of this theory, such as L o c k e and Berkeley, the thoroughgoing study of it as such is a twentieth-century affair. 51 Renouvier did n o t clearly demarcate his theory of meaning f r o m his theory of truth. I n this his influence on James is seen again for James n e v e r cleaxly m a d e the distinction, although his general system can be subjected to being so distinguished. So the statements of Renouvier distinguish m o r e a double standard of truth than one of meaning; none the less there is this double standard of m e a n i n g implicit in the f o r m e r standard, just as there is in J a m e s ' s philosophy. Consider the following statements of Renouvier:

One is uncertain when one doubts. One does not doubt in any one of three cases: when one sees, when one knows, when one believes . . . . Of these three terms, to see, to know, and to believe, belief, or that which is ordinarily called this, seems the least appropriate to assure this perfect stability of a given affirmation, because one applies it to some cases for which another person, or the same person at a different time, under other impressions, with other knowledge, makes different judgments. Experience shows only too often these sorts of changes. To believe, one will say, it is precisely to affirm without seeing, without knowing, on incomplete and varied elements; also the wise man should strike all the acts of believing that he makes, and that he is morally obliged to make with a certain coefficient of doubt. But let us change the point of view; the question appears to be different. Whatever rigor one wants to give to the terms to see and to know, and provided that their application may not be entirely exempt from judgment, it is an incontestable fact that there are continual or reappearing divergences of the affn'mations of the philosophical schools, which pretend to have no other foundation than to see and to know. Thus believing is not the only thing that varies. 52 Renouvier next distinguishes two orders of "certitude." T h e first is the certitude of the immediate p h e n o m e n a , and of which we construct our general laws: This first assertion is thus the assertion of reality, of that reality in the positive sense of the word, which by the grouping of the phenomena, establishes laws . . . . We have indicated two senses of the word reality. The one relates to the actual phenomenon in the mind where it is given; the other is based on the law, which, 60 Ibid., I, 657. NB this early date.

51 Of course there were in the nineteenth century such men as Peirce, who were explicitly concerned with a theory of meaning. My point is that it was not until the twentieth century that it became a topic generally discussed. 52 Charles Renouvier, Essais de Critique G~ndrale: Traitd de Psychologie Rationnelle (2rid ed., rev.; Paxis: Martinet, 1875), II, 130-131. My translation.

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enveloping a whole series, poses the possible terms, determines them in time and place, and allows their prediction and their verification. . . . 53

T h e second order to certitude concerns the decisions of the will: A second order to certitude will comprise the fundamental decisions that one has

not admitted to the first . . . . The second order to certitude comes entirely from the interpretation of the facts of the affirmative will . . . . After all that I have said in other places, and under diverse points of view of the probability of the existence of a free will, or source of primary determinations in man, and of the impotency of man in being able to determine a proof of fact or a logical demonstration, it is clear that the solution of the problem can only demand the practical reason . . . . In other words practical reason must form its own basis, and that of all real reason, for reason does not divide itself: reason, according to our knowledge is nothing else but man, and man is never anything but the practical man. 54 The first quotation informs us that we must not limit ourselves to accepting as certain only perceptually obtained information, as this area has wide divergence f r o m what is acceptable. F r o m this standpoint Renouvier then distinguishes his two orders of certitude. The first is the certitude of immediate appearance; Renouvier refers to it as the data actuel. This corresponds to James's first standard of truth. If a statement has been verified, then it is true. T h e verification comes by means of perceptual data. But there is still another order to certitude. There are times when logic and perceptual information will be inadequate for m a n to deal with the world. Man must act on h,~s beliefs, since in certain areas the facts cannot present us with the solutions. So the practical reason takes over. Certainty in this case is what the will affirms. Thus, for Renouvier as for James, belief creates its own truth. If a statement is true for a philosopher, then it must be meaningful to him. This is the case independent of the source of the truth. If one intuits certain truths, then these intuited statements are meaningful; and in the same way, if one contends that empirically verified statements are true, then these same statements will be meaningful. I n other words the class of all meaningful statements for a particular person includes within it the class of all truth statements. Consequently, corresponding to Renouvier's double standard of truth would be a double standard of meaning: the first being all perceptual statements, and the second being certain statements about our beliefs. Thus, the source of James's second standard of truth was the writings of Renouvier, a fact which, as I pointed out, James freely admitted. ~6 Ibid., 231-232. 5, Ibid., 320-322. ss

s~ It is over this aspect of Iames's philosophy that he and Peirce parted philosophical

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What, then, in summation are the fundamental points in James's pragmatism? T h e first is the instrumentality of ideas. It was brought out that his theory of the function of ideas is instrumental in character. Ideas are devised for our successful adaptation to our environment. O u r possession of these ideas provides us with "invaluable instruments of action." With these tools we have better c o m m a n d of the porceptual world. The second basic point is James's theory of meaning. H e held a twofold theory of meaning. A statement is meaningful in terms of its experiential consequences. If a statement has no experiential conse~luences but belief in the statement has experiential consequences, then it is also meaningful. James applies his twofold theory of meaning to the problem of truth. This also has two aspects. Firstly, a statement is true if there are verifiable experiential consequences. Secondly, if a statement has no experiential consequences, but belief in the statement has verifiable experiential consequences, then the statement is true. These beliefs are to be maintained only if they are useful to us. And if they are useful to us, then they are true. Utility then becomes not only the meaning of truth but also the criterion of truth. Furthermore, utility is the determinant for the acceptance of a statement. This is the fourth fundamental point of James's pragmatism. Our ground for accepting any statement ought to be its utility value. The term "accept" is ambiguous. T h a t one "accepts" a statement m a y m e a n that one is willing to act upon it, or that one believes the statement to be true. James did not m a k e this distinction. H e held that if one is will,ing to act on a statement, then it is true. F o r example, James accepted the statement, "Life is worth living." H e accepted it on the grounds of utility, and because of this the statement is true. In this case utility determines acceptance. One, then, can say of James that he accepted a significant number of statements ultimately on the basis of utility. Actually, this fourth element is a general statement of the third. If "acceptance" means "believes to be true," then the fourth element reduces to the third element. This is the case for James but not so for others such as Vaihinger. Thus, there are four fundamental points in James's pragmatism: his instrumentalism, his theory of meaning, utility as both the criterion and meaning of truth,

ways. Perry said that "Renouvier's was the greatest individual influence upon the development of James's t h o u g h t . . . " (Perry, op. cit., I, 655). I r~ave pointed out that James's fi~ieism stems from Renouvier. Now, insofar as Renouvier's fideism comes out of Kant, then does James's fideism also ~ave its source in Kant. Renouvier was an adherent to Kantianism, but James prized him for his Kantian heresies rather than for his "fidelities" (Perry, op. cit., I, 465). We find Renouvier saying: "Whatever may be the reproaches that the Kantian criticism has encountered, Kant still remains the greatest of philosophers, and the last whose work should be the point of departure of the works undertaking the questions of certitude and method" (Renouvier, op. cir., p. 223. Italics mine). And it was from Kant that Renouvier developed his "two orders of certitude" which James took over. In this regard James was in debt to Kant.

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and utility as a determinant for acceptance of a significant number of statements. All of these points have been traditionally included in a thoroughgoing pragmatism. They are not all necessarily equally pragmatic. Any philosopher who holds less than all four is less a pragmatist than James, but I maintain that any person who holds any one of the tenets is a pragmatist. This means that the men traditionally ,referred to as pragmatists, Peirce and Dewey (as well as James), come under the definition. As we shall see, Vaihinger does too. As earlier shown, it is the first part of James's theory of meaning which reflects his long study of Locke's nominal essences. In the back flyleaf in his copy of the Essay James writes that, "He (Locke) shirks its treatment." James himself did not shirk its treatment in his lectures for the Locke-Berkeley-Hume course, Which he taught for years at Harvard. In Locke's Essay he found the philosophical practicalism, which was later to be called pragmatism. His much marked copy of the Essay exhibits this ground, and so do student lecture notes from this course. ~' The essence of a concept is the complex of predicates which serve us most usefully. This is the "pragmatic turn" which James gave to Locke's doctrine of nominal essences and of which R. B. Pony talks in his quoted letter. Hence Perry was correct in regarding James's pragmatic criterion of utility and his first theory of meaning as products of his interpretation of Locke's "nominal essence" doctrine. James's other pragmatic elements, instrumentalism and his second theory of meaning, are not the result of Locke's doctrine. They are products of his empirical studies and the influence of Renouvier, .respectively. Hans Vaihinger (1852-1933) represents a philosopher developing a pragmatism by giving "a pragmatic turn" to his (Kant's) a priori. Vaihinger hence represents a verification of the second half of Perry's remarks as to the origin of pragmatism. In his book, Philosophie des Als Ob, 57 Vaihinger's central thesis is that the concepts and theories achieved by mathematics and the natural sciences, by economic and political theory and jurisprudence, by ethics, aesthetics and philosophy, are convenient fictions, devised by the human mind. Vaihinger's fictionalism is of an extreme sort: He maintains that fictional constructions of the mind "contradict" reality and, in the case of the boldest and most successful fictions, are even "self-contradictory." This position may be characterized as empiricism insofar as he assigns to experience an indispensable role in the initiation and application of thought----even fictions. Such a fictionalism stresses the free, creative and inventive activity of the mind or "psyche" in the constitution of concepts and theories; the psyche is not a substance, but the sum-total of the so-called mental actions and reactions of the organisms. The context in which Vaihinger develops his theory of fictions is biological and purposive. Like James's and Dewey's pragmatism, Vaihinger's fictionahsm interprets iogical thoughtas an activity which fulfills the bioIogical function of assisting the organism to adapt and accomodate itself to its physical and social ~ See footnote 40. ~r Die Philosophic des "'Als Ob" (Berlin: Reuther and Reichard, 1911).

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environment. He repeatedly calls attention to the purposiveness and practical corroboration, on the experimental test of the utility of the logical structures that are the product of the organic function of thought." Hence as a minimum he adheres to the fourth fundamental point in James's pragmatism, viz., that utility is the detexminant for the acceptance of a statement. That this tenet is uniquely pragmatic is seen when one realizes that positivists, phenomenologists, and Whiteheadians would not employ this tenet. I shall now turn to showing the truth of Perry's remark concerning a pragmatic turn to Kant's a priori. Kant's role concerning the development of Vaihinger's fictionalism was of no little import. Vaihinger freely discusses his debt to Kant, and he presents a very detailed analysis of their relationship. Vaihingex maintains that the most important notions in Kant's writings are those concerning the transcendental ideas and the concepts of freedom, God, immortality, and the s u m m u m bonum. The ideas are for Kant regulative principles of pure reason. They contribute to the extension of knowledge by serving as rules to be foLlowed in the realm of experience. The concepts of freedom, immortality, etc., are also fabricated by ourselves. These ideas and concepts are not true, i.e., they have no phenomena corresponding to them. Because they are not true, Vaihinger refers to them as "fictions." Being fictions these ideas and concepts are considered by Vaihinger to be false. (It is, of course, the propositional functions that make up a concept that are false.) Truth means correspondence to Vaihinger, i.e., correspondence to a fact. Usually the correspondence theory of truth means correspondence to a fact and also not being incompatible with other facts. Thus when Vaihinger refers to the fictions as false he means just no correspondence to a fact and not that it is necessarily incompatible with other facts. Although they are fictions we should "accept" these ideas and concepts as it they were true because of their utility value. We should "accept" them in the sense that we should act upon them. Notice how close this is to Bain's pragmatic statement, "A belief is an idea upon which one is prepared to act." Thus, Vaihinger's belief that utility is the determinant for the acceptance of a significant number of statements had its original determining impetus in the writings of Kant. The difference between the Kantian and the Vaihingerian position is seen in part by their consideration of scientific principles. Most principles of science axe to Kant constitutive principles, i.e., they give us the possibility of objective knowledge, while Vaihingex considers a great number of scientific principles to be regulative. The fictions are regulative principles. As Vaihinger's "hypotheses" are constitutive, he does not hold that all principles are regulative. Thus here the difference between Kant and Vaihinger would be a difference in degree rather than in kind. Another fundamental difference between the two men is their respective treatment of the categories. Kant maintains that there are a fixed number of categories, and that the synthetic a priori propositions that they give .rise to are universal and necessary. Vaihinger says that the categories arise during the process of evolution. They are regulative principles that are "demands" of the organism for its successful adaptation to the world. There then is an indefinite and changing number of them.

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In this case the synthetic a priori propositions are neither necessary nor universal in the Kantian sense. (Inherent to this Vaihin,gerian position is the taking of time to be real---ontologically ultimate, which again differentiates it from the Kantian position.) It is this treatment of the categories that Perry referred to when he said that if you give a pragmatic turn to the a priori, then you have the genesis of pragmatism. Thus when you apply the theory of evolution to the idea of the categories, and come out with an indefinite number, you then have given a pragmatic twist to the a priori, and have laid the basis for a pragmatic philosophy. What, then, can we conclude with regard to R. B. Perry's statement: Start from Locke and move in the direction suggested by his "nominal essences,"

or start with Kant and give a pragmatic turn to his a priori, and you are likely to come out at the same spot. 5s

Regarding Locke, Perry's statement is seen to be only partially true. It applies only to James's first theory of meaning. If one goes along in the direction suggested by the nominal essences doctrine (as James did), then one does come up with this aspect of meaning. And it has been shown that James's long study and lecturing on Locke's Essay probably led him to this conclusion. His notes in his copy of Locke's Essay substantiate this. His main attention is drawn to the "practicalism" of the nominal essence doctrine. On the other hand, Perry is wrong to regard the entire pragmatic philosophy of James to have come from Locke. For neither James's instrumentalism nor the second aspect of his theory of meaning have Locke as their source. Their sources are mainly Darwin and Renouvier, respectively. Vaihinger, in contrast to James, gave a pragmatic turn to Kant's a priori, and came up with his pragmatic philosophy. Hence he verifies Perry's statement about Kant. There were in Europe others, such as Poincar6, who followed Vaihinger's course. Hence pragmatism is not simply the result of Peirce's and James's intellectual endeavors, but represents a general intellectual movement of that age. The genesis of pragmatism can be best summed up in the words of Jacoby, a man who was born at its birth, who developed his philosophical thought under the tutelage of both James and Vaihinger when the movement reached its zenith, and who can now look back upon the entire pragmatic movement and say: . . . Alle drei, James, Vaihinger, u n d Poincar6 waren Kinder ihrer empiristischbiologistisch-positivistisch gerichteten Zeit. Alle drei formulieren n u r u n d bilden nur weiter, was sowieso in ihren Zeit lag. 59

University o] South Florida ha Letter to author: February 15, 1952. 59 Letter to author: May 27, 1952.

"General Rules" in Hume's Treatise Thomas K. Hearn Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970, pp. 405-422 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

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"General Rules" in Hume's Treatise THOMAS K. HEARN, JR.

IT COULD BE CONFIDENTLY ASSERTED in 1925 that H u m e was "no longer a living figure." x Stuart Hampshire records that when he began his philosophy studies in 1933, H u m e ' s conclusions were regarded at Oxford as "extravagances of scepticism which no one could seriously accept." 2 T h a t virtually no Anglo-American philosopher would now share such opinions about H u m e testifies not only to the general change in the philosophical climate but, in addition, it reflects a transformation which has occurred in the interpretation of H u m e ' s philosophy. In eitecting this transformation .much credit is due to the work of N o r m a n K e m p Smith. K e m p Smith argued that preoccupation with H u m e ' s empiricist heritage and his scepticism had blinded scholars to the fundamentally constructive intent of his philosophy, and, indeed, that only from the perspective of his positive achievement was it possible to grasp the nature and significance of H u m e a n scepticism. This paper, in keeping with the basic orientation of K e m p Smith, sets out a central feature in the attempt to describe and assess H u m e ' s constructive, nonsceptical point of v i e w : H u m e attributes to general rules " a mighty influence on our actions and unders t a n d i n g . . . " (374). 4 This paper examines the Treatise to show that this was not just a casual comment. T o discuss the "influence" of general rules requires an examination of their character and the various aspects of "action and understanding" in which such rules function. The thesis to be developed can be stated briefly. In Book I H u m e introduces two sorts of general rules which must be distinguished carefully. One type of rule describes a propensity of the imagination to extend the scope

This research was supported by a grant from the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities. x Charles W. Hendcl, Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume (New York, 1963), p. 20. (First published in 1925.) For Professor Hendel's later comments on this statement, see pp. xxi ft. "Hume's Place in Philosophy" in David Hume, ed. D. F. Pears (London, 1963), p. 3. a Proper stress is due here to the phrase "basic orientation." There is much about Kemp Smith's understanding of Hume which is mistaken in my view. 9 The page references in parentheses refer to the Svlby-Bigge edition of A Treatise o/ Human Nature (Oxford, 1888).

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of judgments formed in one set of circumstances to other resembling but non-identical circumstances. The other type of general rule, the discussion of which largely occupies this paper, functions to correct certain natural propensities which result in erroneous belief or action if permitted to operate unchecked. The same pattern, a natural tendency requiring correction by general rules, is exhibited in all three books of the Treatise, and can be said to represent one of the basic ingredients in Hume's account of human nature and experience. It is somewhat surprising that in a book which patiently discusses almost evcxy theme in the Treatise, Kemp Smith's study contains no discussion at all of rules. This is the more puzzling as Kemp Smith clearly recognized that by reflection the understanding supplies principles which are normative for the interpretation of experience. 5 Our aim in this study is to discuss what for Hume these principles are, and, as far as possible, how they fit into the Humean account of human nature. A fuller understanding of the nature and function of such reflective principles is required to spare Kemp Smith's interpretation from a seeming inconsistency. This apparent inconsistency arises because Kemp Smith takes the slavery of reason to the passions as the "key" to his understanding of Hume, but then develops the view that for Hume reason/s a passion, in Hume's words, "a wonderful and unintelligible instinct." (179)6 The inconsistency disappears when it is recognized that Kemp Smith's account of Hume requires a more subtle and complex understanding of the role of reason than that suggested by the emphasis on the "slavery of reason" especially in the early parts of the book. This study represents a way of supplying the broader and more const,ructive understanding of reason which Kemp Smith's view of Hume requires. Another important element in Kemp Smith's study is the insistence on the basic affinities between Hume's moral theory and epistemology. Believing that it was through the "gateway of morals" that Hume established the basic doctrines of the Treatise, Kemp Smith undermined the positivistic interpretation of Hume by insisting that feeling is no less central to Hume's account of empirical judgment than it is in his account of morals. The principle of vivacity is the foundation of empixical belief for Hume, and this same principle functions in Hume's account of morals because sympathy is regarded as a mechanism whereby ideas of passions become enlivened. We shaU see that the principle of vivacity does not per se commit Hume to either epistemological scepticism or ethical subjectiv,ism. General rules provide corrective, normative principles for the evaluation of those feelings which form the basis of both empirical and moral beliefs. Concem4ng matters of fact Hume states that the degree of vivacity and assent are not proportional: " A like xeflection on general rules keeps us from augmenting our belief upon every increase of the force and The Philosophy of DavM Hume (London, 1960), pp. 128, 382-388. First published ' in 1941. 6 Kemp Smith regards "passion" in Hume as the name of a class which includes "instinct" among other things. See p. 11.

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vivacity of our ideas." (632) He recognizes that in moral matters our sympathies are " m o r e li'vely" depending on the special relationships in which we stand to the objects of moral evaluation. However, as in the case of empirical belief, the force of feeling must be checked by general rules if one is to be a "judicious spectator." Furthermore, in both factual and moral matters the influences of natural feelings or propensities and corrective rules result in a kind of "inner conflict." In Book I of the Treatise the imagination and the judgment conflict, while in Book III there can be opposition between the judgment and the sympathetic affections. Such conflict means that at some times the one and at other times the other will prevail, but Hume's claim is that one who adheres most resolutely to the reflective rules is most likely to render an appropriate verdict.

It is in the context of "reflections" added to the discussion of probability that the subject of rules is first raised in the Treatise. Hume's remarks at this point concern the influence of general rules on the passions, and he comments, "These general rules we shall explain presently." (142) The explanation follows in the next section which is concerned with the subject of unphilosophieal probability. There is a species of unphilosophieal probability, says Hume, which is derived from general rules which we "rashly form to ourselves, and which are the source of what we properly call Prejudice." (146) An illustration follows: An Irishman cannot have wit, and a Frenchman cannot have solidity; for which' reason, the' the conversation of the former in any instance be visibly very agreeable, and of the latter very judicious, we have entertain'd such a prejudice against them, that they must be dunces or fops, in spite of sense and reason. (146) We are then given the promised explanation of general rules: Shou'd it be demanded why men form general rules, and allow them to influence their judgment, even contrary to present observation and experience, I shou'd reply, that in my opinion it proceeds from those very principles, on which at[ judgments concerning causes and effects depend. Our judgments concerning cause and effect are deriv'd from custom and experience; and when we have been accustom'd to see one object united to another, our imagination passes from the first to the second by a natural transition, which precedes reflection, and which cannot be prevented by it. Now it is the nature of custom not only to operate with its full force, when objects are presented, that are exactly the same with those to which we have been accustom'd; but also to operate in an inferior degree, when we discover such as are similar; and tho' the habit loses somewhat of its force by every difference, yet 'tis seldom destroy'd where any considerable circumstances remain the same. (147)

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Thus, the origin of general rules is to be sought in the same principles "on which all our judgments concerning e a u s ~ and effects depend," i.e., the effect of constant conjunction in generating habit or custom. The imaginataon has a propensity to extend opinions derived from one set of circumstances to resembling sets of circumstances. This propensity is a source of general rules. In effect, general rules result from the combined effects on the imagination of custom and resemblance. Hume immediately confronts an objection to his thesis that all judgments are formed on the basis of custom. If custom without qualification were the only force at work in our reasoning, it would not be possible to account for conflicting elements in xeasoning. H u m e acknowledges such cortfliet and attributes it to the differing influence of custom on the imagination and the judgment. The' custom be the foundation of all our judgments, yet sometimes it has an effect on the imagination in opposition to the judgment, and produces a contrariety in our sentiments concerning the same object. (147-148) A more complete statement of the difficulty is also given: According to my system, all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom . . . . It may, therefore, be concluded, that our judgment and imagination can never be contrary, and that custom cannot operate on the latter faculty after such a manner, as to render it opposite to the former. This di~culty we can remove after no other manner, than by supposing the influence of general rules. (149) Hawing reduced all reasoning concerning matters of fact to custom, how is H u m e to explain the fact that custom's influence permits an opposition of judgment and imagination? The problem can only be answered, Hume comments, by "supposing the influence of general rules." This now brings us to an interesting and important aspect of our discussion. One of the effects of custom on the imagination is the formation of rules of a certain sort. "General rule" is hardly the best way to designate the notion H u m e is employing here. What is involved is a generalizing propensity of the imagination which extends the scope of judgments or opinions under certain conditions. When a given judgment has been formed on the basis of a particular set of circumstances C, the imagination has a propensity to generalize and make the same judgment in oircumstances C' or C". Having formed the opinion that Irishmen are witless on the basis of the observation of a certain number of dull Irishmen, the imagination has a propensity to extend this verdict to a new set of conditions in which one is confronted by an Irishman who is apparently very witty. The imagination's propensity to generalize is governed largely by the degree of resemblance of the conditions, but this propensity is "seldom destroy'd where any material circumstances remain the same." (147)

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The same custom goes beyond those instances, from which it is deriv'd, and to which it perfectly corresponds; and influences [one's] ideas of such objects as are in some respects resembling but fall not precisely under the same rule. (148) 7 The influence of custom on the imagination provides us with "rules" of a certain sort which are a n operative factor in o ~ judgments, but before we can understand the conflict between the imagination and the judgment and how such conflict is explicable in terms of the influence of general rules, we must notice a different sort of rule to which H u m e now refers: We shall afterwards take notice of some general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects; and these rules are form'd on the nature of the .understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects. By them we learn to distinguish accidental circumstances from efficacious causes . . . . (149) Though the "rules by which to judge causes and effects" a~e specified later, they are introduced here as rules which are not the result of a propensity of the imagination, but which are "form'd on the nature of the understanding." Before we try to distinguish these two sorts of general rules m o r e carefully, let u~ indicate how H u m e answers the problem he set for himself concerning the opposition of the imagination and the judgment. On any given occasion when we are making a causal judgment, both of these sorts of rules are apt to be present and operative. Let us continue with the preceding quote: By them [i.e. the rules formed on the understanding] we learn to distinguish accidental cireurnstances from efficacious causes; and when we find that an effect can be produc'd without the concurrence of any particular circumstance, we conclude that the circumstance makes not a part of the efficacious cause, however frequently conjoin'd with it. But as this frequent conjunction necessarily makes it have some effect on the imagination, in spite of the opposite conclusion from general rules, the opposition of these two principles produces a contrariety in our thoughts, and causes us to ascribe the one inference to our judgment, and the other to our imagination. (149) In other words, in the production of admost any effect there is a complication of m a n y circumstances, some of which are essential to the given effect, and some which though frequently conjoined with the essential circumstances are superfluous. These superfluous factors, however, still have an effect on the imagination: Now we may observe, that when these superfluous circumstances are numerous, and remarkable, and frequently conjoin'd with the essential, they have such an influence For other statements by Hurne of this same generalizing tendency, see pp. 374, 551.

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on the imagination, that even in the absence of the latter they carry us on to the conception of the usual effect. . . . (148) For example, let us suppose that C is known to be sufficient and necessary for the production of E. However, when C produces E, it i,s conjoined with D which is entirely incidental to the production of E. The effect of the conjunction of D with C, however, is that the imagination extends the principle "'C causes E " to the resembling circumstance "C and D cause E." The imaginauon even can be led to expect the production of E when D is present and C absent. This effect on the imagination is what H u m e here calls the "first influence of general rules." (150) If we ~re to reason correctly about causal relationships, however, it is necessary that we correct this propensity of the imagination: But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we find it to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most establish'd principles of reasonings; which is the cause of our rejecting it. This is a second influence of general rules and implies the condemnation of the former. (150) The conflict of imagination and judgment is to be explained by the conflict of two sorts of general rules: Sometimes the one, sometimes the other prevails, according to the disposition and character of the persons. The vulgar are commonly guided by the first, and wise men by the second. (150) The first sort of "rule," we have seen, is the result of the effect of custom and resemblance on the imagination; rules of the second type are said to be formed "on our undorstanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects." (149) The first are prone to lead to error as, for example, in the prejudice we hold against t h e w i t of an Irishman or when we err in including accidental circumstances in describing causal ,relations. " H u m a n nature," Hume notes, "is very subject to errors of this kind . . . . " (147) The sense in which the second sort of .rule is a product of custom will be discussed in the next section. At this point, we note that these rules are precisely concerned to avoid or correct potential errors resulting from the generalizing propensity of the imagination. The second sort of rules also have a reflective character; by that I mean that they are consciously formulated and adopted, s They are not the result of mere propensities. The justification of this claim largely depends upon the whole discussion which follows, but in setting out the rules for the direction of 8 The remainder of this paper is largely concerned with rules of this type. to them as "reflective rules."

I shall refer

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causal judgments H u m e speaks of "fixing" (173) these rules, and we have seen that those who follow these rules are designated "wise." In addition, these rules are directive in oharacter; we "ought" to follow them and failure to do so is a potential source of error. Hence, if I have read this admittedly dlffiedt section correctly, H u m e has called "general rules" two things which are very different. There is a propensity of the imagination to generalize, and H u m e regards this propensity as a source of "rules." There are also "rules of the understanding" which, as contrasted with the previous type are corrective, reflective and directive. The distinction between these senses of "rule" is essential if we are to understand the entire treatment of this subject in the Treatise. For example, Passmore, who gives more attention to general rules than any recent commentator, regards all general rules as propensities, and, thus is unable to account for the corrective function H u m e attributes to these rules. 9 Hampshire comments that H u m e lacks any "absolute distinction" between "rules to which any thinking m u s t conform" and "mere habits and uniformities in our thought and behavior." lo Though Hampshire's use of "absolute" and "must" are troublesome, it ~s my contention that the Treatise does contain exactly this distinction. H Let us now turn our attention to the question of the ecigin and stares of these reflective rules within the Humean framework. 11 There is no difficulty in accounting for the generatlzlng propensity of the imagination which is explicable in terms of the familiar Humean principles of custom and resemblance. The problem is to determine whether H u m e has also allowed for the formation and use of reflective rules. This .l'equi~es a brief examination of Hume's discussion of belief. It is sometimes suggested that Hume's theory of belief is fully analysable in terms of the vivacity of perceptions. However, as Church points out, " T h a t s,uch ~s the case no one who has taken seriously Sections 8 to 14 of Book III [Part III, Book I] will be likely to agree." 12 The function of vivacity is more accurately described in this comment Hume makes ~ega.rding the bc~ef which attends the impressions of memory and sense: 9 Hume's Intentions (Cambridge, 1953), p. 64. The only place I have found the distinction between the two sorts of rules presented is in the work of the French scholar A. Leroy. David Hume. (Paris, 1953), p. 71. x0 Pears (ed.), p. 7.

ix Interpreters sometimes accuse Hume of introducing rules as a purely ad hoc device for overcoming difficulties to which his commitments lead him. See, for example, Passmore, pp. 19, 53. Ed. Selby-Bigge, Hume's Enquiries (1899), p. xxix. Without dealing with specific arguments, this section attempts to show that these rules are not simply a bit of philosophical ad hocery. x2 Hume's Theory of the Understanding (Ithaca, N.Y., 1935), p. 192.

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'Tis merely the force and liveliness of the perception, which constitutes the first act of judgment, and lays the foundation of the reasoning which we build upon it, when we trace the relation of cause and effect. (86) Vivacity, hence, is the foundation not the whole edifice, and H u m e ' s considered position is that while vivacity is a necessary, it is not a sufficient condition of warranted assent. The phrase "first act of judgment" in the preceding quotation is an important one for our purposes, and in order to understand it one must turn to Section I of Part IV. A t this point H u m e refers to the "first judgment" and the "first deoision," and asserts here also that this "first act" is based upon vivacity or "force and liveliness." I suppose, there is some question propos'd to me, and that after revolving over the impressions of my memory and senses, and carrying my thoughts from them to such objects, as are commonly conjoin'd with them, I feel a stronger and more forcible conception on the one side, than on the other. This strong conception forms my first decision. (184) This first act, however, is not sufficient to determine our belief. In every judgment, which we can form concerning probability, as well as concerning knowledge, we ought always to correct the first judgment, deriv'd from the nature of the object, by another deriv'd from the nature of the understanding . . . . Here then arises a new species of probability to correct and regulate the first, and fix its just standard and proportion. As demonstration is subject to the control of probability, so is probability liable to a new correction by a reflex act of the mind, wherein the nature of our understanding, and our reasoning from the first probability become our objects. (181-182) With this in mind, we must look again at the section in which general ru,les are introduced. This is H u m e ' s procedure for correcting the imagination's propensity to generalize: But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we find it to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most established principles of reasonings; which is the cause of our rejecting it. (150) There are, thus, a variety of texts suggesting that H u m e was abundantly aware of the fact that by reflecting on the nature of ou~ mental acti~ties and operations, we are able to correct certain tendencies which ~ e "destructive of all the most established principles of reasoning . . . . " It .is in this reflex activity of mind wherein our cognitive activities themselves are scrutinized that the origin of reflective rules is to

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be located. For the outcome of this reflection is the formation of rules by the use of which the correction occurs. In the only example thus far discussed, the rules by which to judge of causes and effects which serve to correct the generalizing propensity of the imagination am founded on our reflective awareness of our understanding and "our experience el its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects." (149, italics added) We deferred until this section discussing the sense in which these rules are products of custom. Clearly, for Hume, there is no sense in which these rules could be other than empirical and, hence, products of probable reason or custom. He thus speaks of a new species of probability, but, as has just been emphasized, the experience relevant to their formation concerns "the nature of the understanding, and our reasoning from the first probability . . . . " This new species of probability functions io regulate and control the first. As we reflect upon the understanding as employed in causal judgment, we form certain rules the following of which makes possible the coherent and ordered interpretation of our experience. One wishes that Hume had been more explicit and careful about these matters. Particularly, it would be desirable to understand precisely how this rule forming capacity is to be related to Hume's general account of mental activity and how such rules might be justified in terms of Hume's general outlook. In weighing the force of these texts we have just been considering, however, there are some obvious but important matters to keep in mind. The first is that much of Hume's entire philosophical achievement presupposes our ability to attend to those principles operative in human nature in cognitive and affective experience. His celebrated discussion of causality certainly rests upon this presupposition. One could note, in addition, the important functions of the self as the observer of its own activities which are discussed by Kemp Smith. 13 This is only to underline the fact that the "'second act of judgment" refers to a dimension central to Hume's interests in the science of man. Further, as Professor Wolff has argued in a most convincing manner, Hume's actual account of mental activity is far more subtle and complicated than the presuppositions of the early pages of the Treatise could possibly explain or justify. 14 Now while considerations of this order by no means account for the origin or justify Hume's use of reflective rules, they do indicate that these texts do represent tendencies in Hume's thought generally which must be seriously weighed. Expositing what Hume says regarding the origin and justification of reflective r d e s is best accomplished by developing the suggestions of Goodman in his wellknown discussion of Hume. Goodman suggests, quite apart from reference to Hume, that there is a "virtuous circularity" in the relationship between rules and x~ Kemp Smith, pp. 73, 92, 98, 224, etc. ~" "Hume's Theory of Mental Activity," Philosophical Review, LXIX (1960). Reprinted in Chappell (ed.), Hume (Garden City, N. Y., 1966). The suggestion developed here that the understanding reflecting on its own activity supplies rules which are in some sense normative for the interpretation of experience extends the analysis offered by Wolff.

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the inferences which such rules govern. That is, the rtrles which determine valid inference, deductive or inductive, do in fact reflect our practice in making and approving such inferences. "The point is that rules and particular inferences alike are justified by being brought into agreement with each other." is Thus, the rules are in one sense empirical, and yet their use is at the same time determinative of valid inference. Hume's version would require statement in different terms. When we follow certain rules in the evaluation of causal judgments, we reach conclusions which make possible the coherent and reliable interpretation of experience. These rules, deriving from reflection on the activity o f the understanding in causal judgment, in the final analysis become determinative for the justification of such

judgments.

It would require a n o t h ~ paper to explicate the textual support which underlies this pragmatic, coherence theme in Hume. General rules are "justified" in that they enable us to deal reliably with experience and to determine which beliefs can and cannot cohere with those "system(s) of realities" (109) which are formed by the senses, memory and judgment. Fortunately, this aspect of Hume has been elab. orated by Kemp Smith in defense of his claim that it is not sheer custom but "experience as extended in and through our reflective activities" which is normative for Hume. . . . reflective thinking and the criteria to which it appeals are . . . indispensably necessai'y for the conduct of human life. . . . Only through reflective scrutiny can the uniformities which are truly causal be distinguished from those which, as resting on contingently determined c o m b i n a t i o n s of causes, may at any moment vary . . . . Clearly on his final view . . . custom is far from king. It is because it so usuany u s u r p s sovereign power that reflective thinking, and the logic which ought to govern it, a r e imperatively demanded. 1~ It is clear now that Kemp Smith's account of Hume requires an analysis of general rules since these are the rules of the "logic" which governs "reflective thinking."

III Thus far we have examined reflective rules concerned with belief, but one of the aim~ of thi~ paper is to show that the same notion of rules is used by Hume in various aspects of his analysis of experience. Both to demonstrate this and to provide additional support for the interpretation just given of the origin and status x~ Fact, Fiction, and Forecast :6

Kemp Smith,

(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1955), p. 67.

p. 386. Cf. 382-388.

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of reflective rules, we move to Book II of the Treatise to examine certain "enlargements" or "limitations" which Hume adds to his account of pride and humility. I may add . . . that general rules have a great influence upon pride and humility, as

well as on all the other passions. Hence we form a notion of different ranks of men, suitable to the power or riches they are possest of; and this notion we change not upon account of any peculiarities of the health or temper of the persons, which may deprive them of all enjoyment of their possessions. This may be accounted for from the same principles, that explain'd the influence of general rules on the understanding. Custom readily carries us beyond the just "bounds" in our passions, as well as in our reasonings. It may not be amiss to observe on this occasion, that the influence of general rules and maxims of the passions very much contributes to facilitate the effects of all the principles, which we shall explain in the progress of this treatise. For 'tis evident, that if a person fullgrown, and of the same nature with ourselves, were on a sudden transported into our world, he wou'd be very much embarrass'd with every object, and would not readily find what degree of love or hatred, pride or humility, or any other passion he ought to attribute to it. The passions are often vary'd by very inconsiderable principles; and these do not always play with a perfect regularity, especially on the first trial. But as custom and practice have brought to light all these principles, and have settled the just value of everything; this must certainly contribute to the easy production of the passions, and guide us, by means of general establish'd maxims, in the proportions we ought to observe in preferring one subject to another. (293-294) ~7

This is in some respects a difficult passage, but I shall argue that its chief difficulty can be resolved on the basis of the previous discussion. First a terminological matter must be clarified. Hume speaks here of explaining these rules from the same principles which accounted for their influence on the understanding, and the principle provided is that of custom. H u m e was notoriously lax about terminology, but it is clear that "understanding" is used here in the broad sense in which it occurs in the title of Book I and not in the restricted sense in which "understanding" or "judgment" is contrasted with "imagination." The pllzzling part of this text, however, is that it appears to say two conflicting things about the influence of custom. Custom "carries us beyond our just bounds," but it also guides us "in the proportions we ought to observe . . . . " The difficulty is resolved by noticing that custom is operating here at two distinct levels. The imagination, we have seen, has a propensity to generalize illegitimately on the basis of the influence of custom and resemblance. The passions also have certain "natural deficiencies." In Hume's inimitable way of putting it, the passions are "vary'd by very inconsiderable principles." Plume often points out that the passions are influenced by special ~' The first sentence of the second paragraph of this quotation again emphasizes the importance of general rules for Hume.

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relations in which we stand to the exciting objects, and as a result they fail to be apportioned to the "intrinsic worth" of the objects. Customarily, therefore, the passions are apt to can-y us "beyond our just bounds." Now the second reference to oustom and practice refers not to our immediate experience of the passions themselves, but to our awareness of those principles according to which the passions are influenced. This second level "custom," corresponding to what was called in Book I the second act of judgment, enables us to form "general establ,ish'd maxims" which then can be used to "guide u s . . . in the proportions we ought to observe in preferring one object to another." The pa~aalel between this discussion of the principles operative on the passions and the treatment of the basic themes of Book I is underlined by Hume's use of the "Adam argument" both here and in his analysis of causality. Before an Adarnie figure could make causal judgments or know how to proportion his attitudes, it would be necessary that he have experience in both senses just designated. The experience of the conjunction of objects and the arousal of passion must finally be scrutinized by .reflective insight into those principles operative when we make causal claims or exporience passions when these activities are appropriately done. Thus, .reflective rules as they apply to passion and belief arise from insight into the principles operative in human awareness. If followed, these rules direct us in the way most likely to provide us with correct means of dealing with experience, t8

IV Having noted the employment of general rules in belief and passions, it is now our intention to show that Hume extends the application of such rules into the area of human action. In Book III of the Treatise Hume divides the virtues into two categories. The natural virtues are those deriving from instinctive human responses. The artificial virtues, however, come about "by means of an artifice or contrivance which arises from the circumstances and necessity of mankind." (477) The artificial virtues comprise the "rules of justice" (or the "laws of nature" as he also terms them), the "laws of nations" which concern the origin of government and the nature of our obligations of obedience to sovereignty, and '~another set of duties, viz. the chastity and modesty which belong to the fair sex . . . . " (570) It is vital to recognize, however, that these artificial virtues constitute, for H~me, another .instance of reflective general rules. Most of Hume's discussion is given to the rules of justice. These rules are three in number and concern the stability Of possessions, the tramis "All the rules of this nature are very easy in their invention, but extremely difficult in their application . . . . " (175)

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ferenc, of possession by consent of the owner, and the performance of promises. Of these Hume regards the stability of possessions as the most important, and since my concea-n here is to demonstrate the employment of the concept of rules and not to discuss the a~tificial virtues as such, I shall use the rule concerning property as exemplary of a pattern which can be discerned in nil the artificial virtues. In short, I intend to show that the rule concerning the stability of possessions is a reflective general rule. There are, in the first place, several texts in which this rule concerning possession is called a "general rule." x9 In addition, this class of rules has all the essential characteristics distinguishing reflective rules. To see how these rules of justice come about, we must imagine the life of man in the so-called "state of nature," a concept which Flume regarded as a convenient "philosophic fiction." The establishment of society, says Hume, depends upon the institution of these general rules of justice. T h e e are two distinct matters to be dealt with: the first and for purposes here more important, is how these rules are "establish'd by the artifice of men," given that there is no natt~al or instinctive motive which causes men to act in accordance with such rules; the second is why there comes to be a moral sentiment attached to these rules, i.e,, why the artificial virtues are virtues. No virtue, Hume asserts, "is more esteem'd than justice; nor are there any qualities, which go farther to the fixing the character, either as amiable or odious." (577) Briefly, Hume's solution to this second problem is that once these laws or rules of justice are established, we recognize their utility, and the moral sentiment of humanity and the moral effects of sympathy cause us to morally approve whatever serves the social good. The first problem concerning the origin of these rules Hume attacks by observing that only in man, among all nature's animals, is there such a great disparity between the quantity of wants and necessities for sustaining life and the scarcity of physical endowments for the satisfaction of these many needs. (485) The solution to the problems created by the disjunction of ability and need is to be found in the formarion of society. The beginning of the social order comes as a result of the sex appetite which unites a man and woman and "preserves their uniTon, fi1,1 a new tye takes place in their concern for their common offspring." (485) The children which spring .from this natural necessity become, by custom and habit, sensible of the advantages to be derived from the societal relationship. There are, however, disintegrating forces which threaten the social order. Chief among these is the selfishness which character~.es man's "natural temper." (485) Though what Hume terms the "kind affections" or the "benevolent principles of our frame" taken together outweigh selfishness, man's first concern is for himself and then for his family and friends. This partiali:ty of our affections coupled with a9 pp. 497, 502, 504n., 532. In some cases, what Hume in these texts is that this rule must apply to all and to each the "generality" of these rules, and the point could be made apply to the whole class of judgments or activities which

stresses by the term "general" with equality. This emphasizes about all reflective rules. They they regulate.

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the scarcity of essential goods means that each person's possessions are "expos'd to the violence of others." (487) This problem threatens the fabric of society and because it is created by the state of man's natural temper, this partiality is not open to a "na~ral remedy," i.e., one based solely on instinctive human tendencies. This remedy, then, is not deriv'd from nature, but from artifice; or more properly speaking, nature provides a remedy in the judgment and the understanding for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections. (489) Notice, especially, that the remedy is provided by the "judgment and understanding." The remedy is, . . . a convention enter'd into by all the members of the society to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry. (489) This convention is formulated as the rule of justice, the general rule establishing the stability of possession, and this rule "is of all circumstances the most necessary to the establishment of society." (49I) Though the rule here being discussed by Hume concerns the direction of action rather than belief or feeling, it shares the same characteristics which marked the reflective rrules d,iscussed already. As just noted, the rule is reflective. Hume's entire discussion is based upon the fact that man becomes aware of the problem created by the partiality Of his instincts, and judges what means he must take to solve this problem. The alteration of ot~r love of gain, he commen~s, "must take place necessarily upon the .least reflection. . . . " (492) Human nature, he points out, is composed of two principal paxts, the affections and the understanding: "'Tis certain, that the blind motior~,s of the former, without the direction of the latter, incapacitate men for society. . . . "(493) Thus the establishment of the rule has the deliberate chaxacter of an "invention." (543) The reflective insight required for the establishing of this rule differs from that required by the rules previously discussed. Those rules required insight into the nature of the human understanding and affections ~since these were the dimensions of experience in which they functioned. Here, what is required is the ability to grasp the consequences of our actions, in brief, "causal foresight." 20 The corrective aspect of these rules is equally apparent, being devised precisely to correct a problem which arises from man's natural temper. The correction here does not take the form of destroying man's avidity, any more than by following the rules of causal judgment one destroys the propensities of the imagination.. What happens, however, is that the acquisitive Lmpulse is redirected to a more suitable ~0 This expression is A. B. Glathe's. Hume's Theory of the Passions and of Morals (Berkeley, 1950), p. 113. Glathe gives no attention to Hume's account of rules even though his work comprises a most careful study of Books H and III o f the Treatise.

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means of satisfaction. It is the function of this rule to bring about what Hume calls a "remedy" or a "restraint." The third characteristic, directiveness, is also stressed, for without the observance of this rule man will not be able to enjoy the benefits of society which are essential to his well being. Hece the notion of coherence is extended to the requirements of the social order. Originally, there is no moral sanction involved in the following of this rule, and the "ought" .involved here is a purely prudential one based upon the fact that without compliance to this rule the social fabric will be destroyed. Once established and their utility reco~iTed, a moral sentiment comes to be attached to ~hese rules and their obed~ience becomes a moral as well as a prudential requirement. With the formation of government, legal sanctions are brought into being and a host of social forces converge to aid in the inculcation and promotion of these rules. The artifices of politicians, the concern of each man for his reputation, parenta1 concern, private education and public praise, all "assist interest and reflection." (500) Thus, when Hume speaks of the "rules of justice," it is clear that he intends us to understand this discussion from the perspective of his treatment of rules in Books I and II. There is additional internal evidence to justify this claim. In discussing general rules in Book I, Hume makes reference to "rules of good breeding" which "condemn whatever is openly disobliging, and gives a sensible pain and confusion to those with whom we converse." (152) In Book III the "rules of good breeding" are compared to the "laws of nature" or artificial virtues. In like manner, therefore, as we establish the laws of nature, in order to secure property in society, and prevent the opposition of self-interest; we establish rules of good breeding, in order to prevent the opposition of men's pride, and render conversation agreeable and inoffensive. (597) This seems to be decisive support for the claim that axtifieial virtues are regarded by Hume as reflective general rules.

V There is one other important use of general rules made by Hume which occurs in the concluding section of the Treatise. In the presentation of this part of Hume's moral theory, two issues must be separated. One is the experience of the moral sentiments; the other is the judgments made which have these sentiments as their basis. The form of Hume's argument will be familiar for his claim is that the moral sentiments require correction by reflective principles if one is to be a "judicious spectator." (581)

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Hume begins by stressing the pervasive influence of the mechanism of sympathy in accounting for moral approval. This discussion is familiar and does not require comment. However, of special interest here are Hume's comments regarding two circumstances "which may seem objections to the present system." (580) The first stems from the fact that the intensity of the sentiments we receive sympathetically is variable according to the relationships in which we stand to those with whom we sympathize: But notwithstanding this variation of our sympathy, we give the same approbation to the same moral qualifies in China as in England. They appear equaUy virtuous, and recommend themsdves equally to the esteem of a judicious spectator. The sympathy varies without a variation in our esteem. Our esteem therefore, proceeds not from sympathy. (581) Hume points out that our own personal situation is "in continual fluctuation," and if our moral pronouncements reflected only our personal perspectives, " . . . 'tis impossible w e cou'd ever converse together on any reasonable terms . . . . " (581) The soletion to this fluctuation is the provision of a rule which specifies the point of view which a legitimate moral judgment must reflect. H e proceeds to state this point of view: " ' T i s therefore from the influence of characters and qualities, upon those who have an intercourse with any person that we praise or blame him." (582) Given this point of view, it follows that moral judgments are strictly impartial: "We consider not whether the pecsons, affected by the qualifies, by our acquaintance or strangers, countrymen or foreigners." (582) Thus, the same pattern of a natural propensity ~equiring correction by a reflective principle or rule is found again. Here the xeflective awareness concerns the principles by which the mechanisms of sympathy are influenced, and unless certain natural propensities of sympathy were corrected it would be impossible for men to "converse together on reasonable terms" regardin, g moral matters. Before coming to the second objection Hume poses against his position, there are three matters Hume mentions in this discussion which should be underscored. It is emphasized that corrections are "common to all the senses . . . . " There is a corrective, reflective factor operative in perceptual reports as well as in moral and aesthetic determinations. "Momentary appearances," in each case, .require correction by reflection. Such corrections take place by the use of general rules. The second point is that our felt moral sentiments often are not affected by these corrections: But however the general principle of our blame or praise may be corrected by those other principles, 'tis certain, they are not altogether efficacious, nor do our passions often correspond entirely to the present theory. "I'is seldom men heartily love what lies at a distance from them, and what no way redounds to their particular benefit. . . . " (583)

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Just as the rules of justice do not obliterate the natural selfish propensity of man nor the causal rules the tendencies of the imagination, so these "other principles" do not always alter our- felt moral sentiments. However, and this is the third point, the reflective principles are "alone admitted as the standard of virtue and morality." (591) Furthermore, this reflective point of view alone determines when it is appropriate to use moral terms, for even when we cannot correct our sentiments, we can correct our language. (582) And the' the heart does not always take part with those general notions, or regulate its love and hatred by them, yet are they sufficient for discourse, and serve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools. (603) These corrective principles hence determine when one can appropriately use moral terms, and, thus, when one can be said to be making moral judgments as opposed to judgments reflecting one's own interests alone. We come now to the second consideration whioh H u m e concedes as counting prima facie against his thesis that sympathetic feelings are the predominant source of moral approval. The dit~culty arises from Hume's recognition that there might be a person the natural tendencies of whose actions would normally be beneficial to those around him, yet "particular accidents" prevent this person's activities from realizing their intended consequences. It would seem that sympathy with the good of mankind is possible only if the good has .in fact been achieved. This view, however, would contradict Hume's already stated claim that motives alone are the appropriate objects of moral evaluation. " ' T i s evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motive that produced them . . . . T h e external performance has no merit." (477) To Hume's specification of the point of view of a moral judgment, we see that such judgments also have a specified object. The manner in which he resolves the seeming discrepancy between the object of a moral judgment and the effects of sympathy is interesting because we also find here the operation of the generalizing propensity of the imaginalion. The first question as to why we are able to sympathize with "consequences" which are not realized is dealt w.ith as follows: . . . where any object, in all its parts, is fitted to attain any agreeable end, it naturally gives pleasure, and is esteem'd beautiful, even the' some external circumstances be wanting to render it altogether effectual, q'is sufficient if everything be compleat in the object itself. . . . Where a character is, in every respect, fitted to be beneficial to society, the imagination passes easily from the cause to the effect, without considering that there are still some circumstances wanting to render the cause a compleat one. General rules create a species o f probability, which sometimes influences the judgment, and always the imagination. (584-585) Hume is claiming here that our approval ,in these c.a~ses rests upon the propensity of the imagination to generalize from one set of circumstances in which certain

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qualifies have produced good consequences to resembling ones in which the qualifies are seemingly present but the consequences prevented. This generMizing tendeney has a~ready been explained though in this case Hume does not regard this propensity as a source of error. Yet there is still necessity here for the operation of those general rules which "sometimes influences the judgment." This function .is necessary because our sympathies are "more lively" when the effect of a virtuous motive is existent, and "yet we do not say that it ,is more virtuous, or that we esteem it more." (585) Hume regards this as a parallel instance of the correction .involved when "we correct the different sentiments of virtue, which proceed from ,its different distances from ourselves. . . . " (585) Here again, reflecting on the nature of sympathy, rules a~re formulated which enable us to correct certain natural propensities, and thus to provide order in the interpretation of moral experience. VI The object of this paper has been to discuss a neglected aspect of Hume's account of experience in the Treatise. 2x Human nature is subject to the influence of certain feelings and propensities which if uncorrected tend to result in erroneous belief and action. General rules serve this corrective function, and Hume asserts that those who employ these rules are the "wi,se" and "judicious." The importance to Hume of these .rules is underscored by the fact that they appear in each book of the Treatise. T h e recognition of this function permits us to understand how Hume sought to avoid the apparently sceptical, subjective consequences of his emphasis on the role of feeling in both cognitive and moral experience. The task remains of working out in detail the 4inplications of a proper appreciation of general rules for various issues in Hume's philosophy. In some cases, the direction such work might take seems rather clear and quite suggestive. For example, there has been a scholarly eontxoversy concerning whether Hume's moral theory is more adequately characterized as some form of naturalism or non-cognitivism. The results of this study suggest that a genuine moral judgment for I-Iume is the outcome of certain moral feelings corrected or evaluated by general rules. If so, Hume's view of moral judgment would appear to approximate the "qualified attitude" theory whose best known recent advocate is Richard Brandt. 22 This interpretation, if sustained, would represent a considerable cla~cation of the issues basic to the understanding of Hume's moral philosophy. College of William and M a r y

~1 Other than the Treatise, the work in which .most use is made of general rules is the Enquiry Concerning the Principles o/ Morals. See especially Sections V, IX, Appendix I. There are scattered references to these rules in Hume's other works. as Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs,NJ., 1959), Ch. 10.

Descartes's Conception of Perfect Knowledge Willis Doney Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970, pp. 387-403 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

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Descartes's Conception of Perfect Knowledge WILLIS DONEY

IN THE FIFTH MEDITATION, after presenting his a priori argument for the existence of God, Descartes compares the certainty of his conclusion with the c~rtainty of conclusions of mathematical demonstrations. In stating the view that Descartes expresses here, I shall use letters: D for the conclusion of his a priori argument, ttamely, that there is a God, and R for an example that he gives of a conclusion that he has reached in mathematics, that is, the proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Concerning the certainty of D and R, he maintains in the Fifth Meditation that he is as certain of D as of "anything else that seems most certain," implying that D is for him as cea-tain as R; and he goes on to make what is clearly intended to be a stronger claim: I also observe that the certainty of other things so depends o n this that without it nothing can ever be perfectly known, x

This claim is repeated, by way of a conclusion, in the next to the last sentence of the Meditation: A n d so I clearly see that the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends on an apprehension of the true God, in such a fashion that, before I knew him, I could have no perfect knowledge of anything else. 2 i AT VII, 69; HR I, 183. "AT" stands for the edition of Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, (Euvres de Descartes (Paris: L~.opold Cerf, 1897-1913); "'HR" for the English translation by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, The Philosophical Works of Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931). In quotations I have departed from HR to avoid infeficities or inaccuracies. The Latin locution translated "perfec0y known" is perfecte sciri; in the French translation, sfauoir parfaitement is used (AT IX, 55). This is the first occurrence of this locution in the Meditations. 2 AT VII, 71; HR I, 185. The Latin locution in the last clause is perfecte scire; the F~-ench is, again, s~auoir parfaitement (AT IX, 56). In HR there is vacillation in the translation of scientia. In these passages in the Fifth Meditation, scientia and cognitio are both rendered "knowledge"; whereas, in the Replies to the Second Set of Obj~cttons, vera scientia is "true science" (AT VII, 141; HR II, 39). For scientiae certitudinem & veritatem, I have used "certainty and truth of knowledge," and "apprehension of the true God" for veri dei cognitione.

[3S7]

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In these sentences, Descartes does not limit his claims about certainty and perfect knowledge to propositions Like R, and one of his contemporaries, taking him to be asserting that, unless a person has knowledge of God's existence, h e cannot be certain of anything else, raised the objection that, earlier in the M e d i t a t i o n s , Descartes claimed to be certain of his own existence as a thinking thing prior to having proved the existence of G o d ) In his reply, Descartes accused his critic of misreading what he had written in the Fifth Meditation. The claim that he made there was not about all propositions---about principles and evident propositions, such as ego cogito, ergo s u m and s u m res eogitans, as well as propositions like R m b u t specificaUy and exclusively about propositions like R.* Whether, when confronted with his critic's objection, Descartes retracted or modified a view expressed in the M e d i t a t i o n s is a question on which sides have been taken. In my paper I have something to say about this question, but I shall be concerned primarily with a problem of interpretation that arises whether or not we take Descartes at his word; that is, whether we take the claim that he makes in the Fifth Meditation to be exclusively about propositions like R or, contrary to Descartes's reply to his critic, to be about other propositions as well. The problem arises when we try to make sense of what he says in the Fifth Meditation in support of this claim. In the first part of my paper, I shall pose the problem, pointing out that, on a very tempting and prima facie plausible interpretation of these passages, there appears to be a fairly obvious inconsistency in the Fifth Meditation. The second part of the paper deals with alternative interpretations devised in part to exonerate Descartes of this inoonsistency. Finally, I shall support the initial interpretation by offering an explanation of why Descartes did not think that the stand he takes in the Fifth Meditation contains an inconsistency.

In support of his contention that certainty about propositions like R depends on an apprehension of the true God, Descartes maintains that someone having no knowledge of D lacks "perfect knowledge" of propositions hke R. The question that I want to raise is why he thinks that this is so. But there is a prior question to be considered, namely, what is meant by the locution that I have trandated "per"Second Set of Objections," AT VII, 124-125; HR II, 26. In this passage, Descartes's critic also takes him to be asserting that a person cannot have a clear and distinct cognition prior to knowing that God exists. 9 AT VII, 140; HR II, 38. Descartes introduces notitia for knowledge of principles and reserves scientia for knowledge of conclusions like R, following, he says, the usage of the dialecticians. In the body of the Meditations, however, he does not consistently follow this rule. With respect to propositions that he claims in this passage are unlike R, he says in the Third Meditation: Atque his paucis omnia recensui quae vere scio, vel saltem quae me scire hactenus animadverti (AT VII, 35; HR I, 157). Further on in his reply to his critic, he introduces the expression per/ectissima certitudo, which he applies to principles as well as conclusions like R (AT VII, 144-146; HR II, 41-43).

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OF PERFECT

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feet k n o w l e d g e " ( p e r f e c t e scire) a n d b y a n e x p r e s s i o n that I t a k e to m e a n the same, v e r a & c e r t a s c i e n t i a . T h e s e l o c u t i o n s a r e used h e r e for the first t i m e in the M e d i t a t i o n s , a n d t h e r e are p r o b l e m s a b o u t w h a t exactly D e s c a r t e s m e a n s b y them. Since a confusion a r o s e a m o n g s o m e o f his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , I shall q u o t e the p a s s a g e in w h i c h he i n t r o d u c e s the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n p e r f e c t (or t ~ e a n d certain) k n o w l edge, o n the one hand, a n d u n s t a b l e a n d c h a n g e a b l e opinion, o n the other: Though m y nature is such that, while I a m perceiving something very clearly and distinctly, I cannot but believe Chat it is true, I a m also of such a nature that I cannot ke~p m y mind always fixed on the same thing so as to perceive it clearly. The m e m o r y of a judgment that I have previously m a d e often comes back to me when I a m no longer attending to the reasons on which I based the judgment, and other reasons can be brought to bear that would readily dislodge this opinion if I had no knowledge of God. I should never then have true and certain knowledge of anything, but only unstable and changeable opinions. When, for example, I consider the nature of the triangle, it seems most evident to m e - - f a m i l i a r as I a m with the principles of geom e t r y - t h a t its thre~ angles are equal to two right angles, and I cannot but believe that this is true while I a m attending to its demonstration; but, once I have t u r n ~ l,iy mind's eye from the demonstration, though I still remember having perceived it very clearly, I can readily come to doubt that it is true if indeed I have no knowledge of God. s

In this passage, Descartes distinguishes two states in which someone having no knowledge of D--for short, an agnostic-----canbe with respect to R: first,his state when he attends to the demonstration of R, which I shall call his state at tl, and a later statc,---Ishall call this .hisstate at t 2 m w h e n he is no longer attending to the demonstration but remembers having clearly perceived it. I n the account that Descartes gives here of an agnostic's state at tl, he makes it perfectly clear that, when at tl an agnostic attends to the demonstration of R, his state is one of clear and distinct perception.6 This point is worth noting because some of Descartes's contemporaries seem to have taken his remarks in the Fifth Meditation about an agnostic's lack of perfect knowledge to contain a denial that an agnostic can have a clear and distinct perception of propositions like R. v W h e n the objection was raised that an atheist can have a clear and distinct cognition of R though he is far AT VII, 69-70; HR II, 183-184. = The locution that Descartes uses at the beginning of the passage is aliquid valde clare & distincte percipio. He asserts that an agnostic "cannot but behove" (non possim non credere) that what he is perceiving very clearly and distinctly is true. In making this point, he reat~rms the view sot forth in the Fourth Meditation that, when an act of intellect is clear and distinct, there can be no hesitation or doubt, and the will is competlcd to assent. 7 A d d e A t h e u m clare & distinete eognoseere trianguli tree angulos aequales esse duobus reetis, quamvis tantum absit ut supponat existentiam Dei, quam plane negat . . . ("Second Set

of Objections," AT VII, 125; HR II, 26). Accusing Descartes of circular reasoning, Gassondi also attributes to him the view that a person's state cannot be one of clear and distinct perccption prior to knowing that a veracious God exists (Disquisitio Metaphysica, quoted in AT VII, 405).

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from acknowledging the existence of God, Descartes's reply is short and clear: "I do not deny the possibility of an atheist's cognition of R, but only that his cognition is true knowledge ..."; 8 and, dealing with objections like this, he expresses his exasperation by referring his critic to what he has clearly stated at the end of the Fifth Meditation. 9 It must have seemed to him that, in taking his denial that an agnostic has perfect knowledge to be a denial that he has clear and distinct perceptions, his critic had missed a point that he was especially concerned to make; namely, that clear and distinct perception is not the same as, nor is it a suiticient condition of, perfect knowledge. Although, in the Fifth Meditation, Descartes does not give a definition of what he means by "perfect", or "true and certain knowledge," the relation that he takes to hold between clear and distinct perception and perfect knowledge is made clear in the passage quoted. He contends that an agnostic lacks perfect knowledge of R because at t2, when he is no longer in a state of clear and distinct perception yet remembers having had such a perception, he can come to doubt R. "Other reasons," he says, "can be brought to bear that would readily dislodge this opinion . . . . " C o m menting on this passage, Descartes points out that, although an agnostic may not think of these reasons, he can be challer~ged; and, when these reasons are brought to his attention, his conviction about R will be unsettled, t~ From this account of why an agnostic fails to have perfect knowledge of R, it is clear what conditions must be satisfied if a person is to have perfect knowledge of propositions like R. (1) He must at some time, past of present, attend to a demonstration and have a clear and distinct perception. (2) If his clear and distinct perception is in the past, he must remember having had such a perception. Finally, (3) when he remembers having had a clear and distinct perception, there can be no reason for doubting that the proposition in question is true. This analysis does not, of course, completely explain what Descartes means by "perfect knowledge." There is, for one thing, no explanation of what he means by "dear and distinct perception"; for another, there axe problems about the interpretation of the second and third conditions. But the analysis does show the inter-relationship of his concepts of clear distinct perception and perfect knowledge; and, in terms of this analysis, what he is asserting in the passage quoted can be succinctly stated. He is not denying that the first condition can be satisfied; that is, he is not denying, as some of his .readers seem to have thought, that an agnostic can have clear and distinct perceptions of propositions like R. His contention in terms of this analysis is that the third condition cannot be satisfied: though an agnostic remembers having had a clear and distinct perceps A T VII, 141; H R H, 39. Cognitio (or clare & distincte cognoscere in the objection) is contrasted with vera scientia. In HR, the former is translated "knowledge" (or "knows clearly and distinctly"); the latter "true science." A T VII, 146; HR II, 43. x0 A T VII, 141'; H R II, 39.

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lion, there can be a reason or reasons for doubting that the proposition in question is true. The question that I want to raise is what precisely this reason or these reasons are. In the sentence fallowing those that I have quoted, Descartes goes on to give a brief account of how at t2 he can come to doubt R. Desoribing his state prior to perceiving D, he says: I can persuade myself of being so constituted by nature that I am sometimes mistaken in what I think I perceive most evidently, especially when I remember that I have often taken things to be true and certain which afterwards other reasons have made me judge to be false, xl Although the account that Descartes gives here is not unambiguous, part of what he is saying seems clear: an agnostic comes to doubt R by raising a question about the reliability of his facu.lties and in particular his faculty of drawing conclusions or reasoning. Remembering that in the past he has formed conflicting judgments about the truth and certainty of conclusions that he has reached, he comes to think that the faculty he used in reaching these conclusions is sometimes faulty; and he concludes that, though he exercised this faculty with due care in deducing R and attained a state of clear and distinct perception, his faculty of reasoning may have failed him, and what he clearly and distinctly perceived may not in fact be true. lz Although a question can be raised as to whether the doubt that Descartes attributes to an agnostic in this passage is in fact about his faculty of reasoning, it is quite clear that he does not think that a consideration of oonflicting j.udgments in the past in the only way in which an agnostic can come to doubt propositions like R. In the sentence quoted, after saying, "I can persuade myself of being so constituted by nature that I am sometimes mistaken in what I think I perceive most evidently . . . . " he adds, "especially (praesertim) when I remember that I have often taken things to be true and certain which afterwards other reasons have made me judge to be false," implying that, although a consideration of conflicting judgments is a persuasive way of coming to doubt propositions like R, there are other ways in which doubt can be induced; and two sentences before he refsrs to "reasons" that can be brought to bear to unsettle his conviction about R. It is also clear that Descartes does not think that a consideration of conflicting judgments is a 'logically coercive reason for doubting propositions like R. On his considered view, an agnostic, as well as someone who has perceived D, can claim in the case of confliting judgments that, on one or perhaps both occasions, he failed to distinguish what was really clear la AT VII, 70; HR II, 184. 1~ In the Discourse on Method, Descartes refers to mistakes in reasoning in questioning the certainty of mathematics (AT VI, 32; HR I, 101). Here he is more cautious, calling attention to conflicting judgments rather than the discovery of mistakes.

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and distinct from what only appeared so and can attribute his errors to a misuse of his faculties rather than to a defect; and, if he is inclined to question his ability to distinguish what is really clear and distinct from what only seems so, he can develop this capacity by following rules of the sort that Descartes proposes in the R e g u l a e for strengthening the natural light, a3 If, then, a consideration of conflicting judgments were the only basis for an agnostic's doubt about propositions like R, his doubt wotrld not be, as Descartes clearly implies that it is, irremediable---irremediable, that is, as long as he remains an agnostic. F o r a reason or reasons leading to the kind of doubt to which Descartes thinks an agnostic is subject, that is, a doubt that without theological enlightenment is inescapable, it seems that we must look elsewhere, and it is apparent where we are to look. In the First Meditation, Descartes gives reasons for doubting the simplest and most general matters, including such simple propositions as that two and three are five and that a square has four sides; and the .reasons that he gives there would seem to serve equally well as reasons for doubting more complex mathematical propositions ,like R. That he does not restate these reasons in the Fifth Meditation is understandable. They have already been stated in sul~icient detail in the First Meditation, and their relevance to the discussion in the Fifth Meditation would be apparent to the reader. Since the reasons given in the First Meditation are metaphysical and not of a kind that would naturally occur to a mathematician, it seems that, in his treatment of mathematical certainty in the Fifth Meditation, Descartes decided for tactical reasons to state a reason of a less metaphysical sort that would call to mind and perhaps reinforce the more abstruse reasons presented earlier. For an adequate account of Descartes's view about an agnostic's state at t2, it seems clear that we must interpose the metaphysical reasons for doubt stated in the First Meditation. The principal reasons given there for doubting what he has learned in mathematics are stated in the paragraphs in which he entertains, first. the possibility that he is a creature of a deceiving God and, then, the possibitity that he has come about by fate or chance or a succession of causes. TM If we interpose these reasons, an agnostic at t2 comes to doubt R by reflecting on various possibilities concerning his origin. Observing that, if he is a c~eature of a deceiving God or if he has come about by fate or chance or a succession of causes, his faculty of reasoning will not be entirely trustworthy and realizing that, for all he knows, he may have come about in one of these ways, he concludes that his faculty of reasoning may not be reliable and, though at t l he exercised this faculty with the la Replying to Gassendi's objection about conflicting opinions and errors concerning matters that seem to be perceived very clearly and distinctly, Descartes observes: Q u o d

denique addis, non tam de veritate regulae esse laborandum, quam de M e t h o d o ad dignoscend u m an fallamur necne, cure existimamus nos aliquid clare percipere, non inficior; sed hoc tpsum accurate a me praestitum fuisse contendo suis in locis, ubi primum abstuli omnia prae]udicia, & postea enumeravi omnes praeeipuas ideas, ac distinxi tiaras ab obscuris aut confusis (AT VII, 361-362; HR II, 214).

14 AT VII, 21; HR I, 147-148.

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utmost care and perceived R clearly and distinctly, nonetheless he cannot be certain that R is true. This is, I believe, a natu.rM way, and the most plausil~le way, of understanding Descartes's claim in the Fifth Meditation, about an agnostic's doubt about proposition like R. Yet, if we adopt this interpretation, it seems that we must also find Descartes guilty of an obvious inconsistency. In the paragraph following the one quoted, he contrasts an agnostic's plight with his own state after perceiving D. Since I understood at the time that everything else depends on him and that he is not deceitful, and from this inferred that whatever I perceive dearly and distinctly is of necessity true, then, even though I may no longer be attending to the reasons on account of which I judged this to be true---provided only that I recollect having had a clear and distinct perception--, no contrary reason can be brought forward to induce me to doubt it; and of this I have true and certain knowledge. My knowledge extends not only to this, but to everything else that I remember having at some time demonstrated, including truths of geometry and the like. t5 Descartes clearly implies here that someone who remembers having clearly and distinctly perceived D and the propositions alleged to follow from it does not have the same reasons for doubting D that a n agnostic h,as for doubting R. But, on the interpretation that has been given of an agnostic's reasons for doubting R, it seems that someone who remembers having clearly and distinctly perceived D, would have exactly the same reasons for doubting D. Recalling his clear and distinct perception of D at tl, it seems that he, too, can come to think that at t l his faculty of reasoning may have failed him and, though his state with respect to D was one of clear and distinct perception, it does not follow that D is true. It may be that a particularly gui~leful deity produced in him a clear and distinct perception of a non-deceiving God; or perhaps, having come about by fate or chance or a succession of causes, he has not been deceived but misled by a constitutionally defective faculty. That he has also come to perceive that everything he perceives clearly and distinctly is of necessity true would be of no avail in removing this doubt; for he would have the same reasons for questioning his perception of this proposition that he has for questioning his perception of D. There appears then to be no logically significant disparity between the state of an agnostic with .respect to R and that of someone who has clearly and distinctly perceived D with respect to D. Yet, with respect to D, Descartes says: "no contrary .reason can be brought forward to induce me to doubt i t . . . " ; and it seems, o n the interpretation that has been given, that Descartes has made an all too obvious mistake.

~5 A T VII, 70; H R I, 184.

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II To some commentators, it has seemed unlikely if not inoredible that Descartes should have made this mistake; 'and, in their attempts at exculpation, they have interpreted passages like these in the Fifth Meditation in such a way that the object of an agnostic's doubt is not his faculty of reasoning or his clear and distinct perceptions but something else. In the extensive literature on Descartes's procedure in the Meditations, there are essentially two proposals of alternative doubts. Both appear to have been made on the assumption that, if an agnostic's doubt is about his faculty of reasoning or his clear and distinct perceptions, there is clearly no way in which he can emerge from doubt and no way in which Descartes can be saved from a glaring inconsistency. (1) In Descartes's statement about the way in which an agnostic can come to doubt R, there is a possible ambiguity that has not gone unnoticed. When he says, "I can persuade myself of being so constituted by nature that I am sometimes m i s t a k e n . . . , " he does not go on to say, "in what I perceive most evidently." Instead, he says, "in what I think I perceive most evidently." It is possible to read this sentence in such a way that an agnostie's doubt at t2 is not about the retiabi~lity of his clear and distinct perception at tl, but about whether at t l he did in fact clearly and distinctly perceive what at t2 he thinks he clearly and distinctly perceived. In a recent discussion, George Nakhnikian, apparently reading the passage in this way, maintains that, in the Fifth Meditation, Descartes is concerned with a doubt that can be raised about memory and "offers an argument that purports to prove that God's veracity guarantees the truth of some of our memory impressions." ~6 According to this interpretation, an agnostic at t2 comes to think thai, though he has a memory impression that at tl he demonstrated R and that at tl his state was one of clear and distinct perception, his m e m o r y impression may be mistaken. Nakhnikian notes that the argument offered to remove this doubt does not, of course, purport to prove that all memory impressions are true. Some memory impressions clearly are not; and, according to Nakhnikian, the conclusion of Descartes's argument in the Fifth Meditation is that s o m e memory impressions, namely, those that axe "clear and distinct," are true. Attributing this view to Descartes, Nakhnikian places himself in a tradition of Cartesian interpretation that includes, among many others, Leibniz. ~7 Though some 1~ An lntroductiori to Philosophy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 101-104 and

168-172.

a7 Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorurn, comments on Part One, Sections 5 and 13 (Gerhardt edition, Vol. IV, pp. 356 and 358). Neither Leibniz nor Nakhnikian thinks that the only doubt that Descartes raises in the Meditations is about memory impressions, but both find this doubt in passages like those quoted from the "'Fifth Meditation." For versions of the thesis about the validation of memory impressions, see O. Hamelin, Le Systbme de Descartes (Paris: F~lix Alcan, 1911), pp. 136-151; A. K. Stout,

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commentators in this tradition do not claim to find the view clearly stated in the body of the Meditations, they do claim to find it in his replies to objections and in his later writings. Adopting what has been called the "developmental thesis," A. K. Stout maintains that, whon Descartes was made aware of objections to his procedure in the Meditation and in particular of the objection that his attempt to validate clear and distinct perceptions by means of clear and distinct perceptions involves circular reasoning, he "imperceptibly transferred the doubt f r o m clearness and distinctness to memory. ' ' i s In support of this interpretation, attention has been called to the passages in which Descartes replies to objections like .Arnauld's about a circtflar procedure in the Meditations. ~9 I n all of these passages, he is concerned to point out that his arguments for the existence of God can be grasped, so to speak, in one encompassing intuition a n d that an understanding of these arguments does not require the use of memory. Replying, for instance, to B u r m a n ' s charge that, in the Third Meditation, he commits the fallacy of circular reasoning, Descartes makes this observation: Since our thought can comprehend more than one thing at a time and does not take place instantaneously, it is clear that we can comprehend in its entirety the demonstration of the existence of God; and, while we do so, we are certain that we are not mistaken. Thus the whole difficulty is removed. 2~ In these passages he has been taken to be saying that, since we can grasp arguments for D without relying on our memory, we can be certain that we are not mistaken and to be implying that, though we can be confident about our clear and distinct perceptions prior to perceiving D, we cannot be sure of our memory. In proposing the view that Descartes impereeptibiy transfer.red the doubt that he was attributing to an agnostic from clear and distinct perceptions to memory, Stout does not claim that this was accomplished, or even attempted, i.n the Fifth Meditation. He points out that Descartes's statement there about an agnostic's reason for doubting R does not easily lend itself to this interpretation, and he "The Basis of Knowledge in Descartes," I and II, Mind, XXXVIII, No. 151, July 1929, 330342, and No. 152, Oct. 1929, 458-472; i~.tienne Gilson, Discours de la mdthode: Texte et commentaire (Paris: J. Vrin, 1925), pp. 360-362, and l~tudes sur le r~le de la pensde mddi3vale dans la formation du syst~me cart3sien (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951), pp. 234-244; S. V. Keeling, Descartes (London: Ernest Benn, 1934), pp. 73-82, 108-112; Willis Doney, "The Cartesian Circle," Journal of the History of Ideas, XVI, No. 2, (June 1955), 324-338; Martial Gu~roult, Descartes selon l'ordre des raisons (Paris: Aubier, 1953), Vol. I, pp. 154-159, and NouveUes R3flexlons sur la preuve ontologique de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1955), pp. 34-45, 60-63. as "The Basis of Knowledge in Descartes," reprinted in Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. W. Doney (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), p. 183.

19 "Reply to Fourth Set of Objections," AT VII, 245-246; HR II, 114-115; to Clerselier on the "Fifth Set of Objections," AT IX, 205-206; HR II, 130-131; "Reply to Seventh Set of Objections," AT VII, 460; HR II, 266; to Regius, AT III, 64-65; to "Hyperaspistes," AT III, 433-434; "Conversation with Burman," AT V, 147-149. 2o A T V, 149.

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assumes that Descartes had not as yet been forced to withdraw f o r m his original position, z~ But, even if we assume with Nakhnikian that, in the Fifth Meditation, the doubt that Descartes attributes to an agnostic is about his m e m o r y impression of having proved R, it seems that again there would be a fairly obvious inconsistency in the Fifth Meditation. If the agnostic's doubt about having proved R is a doubt about the accuracy of his m e m o r y impression, it seems that someone who has a m e m o r y impression of having proved D and the propositions that are supposed to follow from D wotfld have the same reason for doubting that he has proved them. T o allay this doubt, he cannot, of course, appeal to his m e m o r y impression of having proved that there is a non-deceiving God. T h a t would be like looking at the same copy of the morning p a p e r to m a k e sure that what it says is true. H e would presumably have to attend once again to his reasons for accepting D. Yet, in the Fifth Meditation, D e s c ~ t e s claims that "evon though I m a y no longer be attending to the reasons on account of which I judged this to be true,--provided only that I recollect having had a c l e ~ and distinct p e r c e p t i o n - - , no contrary reason can be brought forward to induce m e to doubt it . . . . " As a last defense of this interpretation, it might be argued that, on Descartes's view, someone who has dearly and distinctly perceived so evident a proposition as D cannot recall having d e a r l y and distinctly perceived D without at the same time clearly and distinctly perceiving D. A b o u t certain proposition, e.g., "I, while I am thinking, exist" and "What is once done cannot be undone," Descartes clearly implies that this is so.22 But this defense comes to grief on the fact that, in the sentence just quoted, Descartes makes it clear that he can recall having clearly and distinctly perceived D while, he says, "no longer attending to the reasons on account of which I judged this to be t r u e . . . " ; that is, when, on his view, his state is not one of clear and distinct perception. 2a (2) Though it seems that the doubi that Descartes imputes to an agnostic must either be about the reliability of his clear and distinct perception at t l or be about the accuracy of his m e m o r y impression at t2, this is not really so. In his account of Descartes's doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths, Emile Brdhier proposes an ingenious third alternative. 24 According to this interpretation, at t2 an agnostic

2~ Op. cir., pp. 175-176 and 18In. == AT VII, 145-146; HR II, 42. 23 For additional evidence against this intorpretation, see Harry G. Frankfurt, "Memory and the Cartesian Circle," The Philosophical Review, LXXI, No. 4 (Oct, 1962), 504-511. In Principia Philosophiae, "Part One," Principle XIII (AT VIII, 9-10; HR I, 224), Descartes stresses the same points that he makes in the Fifth Meditation. Since he was aware at the time of objections to his procedure in the Fifth Meditation, the virtual repetition of his earlier claims is strong evidence against Stout's developmental thesis. ffi4 "La Cr6ation des v6ritds dternelles darts le systbme de Descartes," Revue Philosophique de la France et de rEtranger, CXIII, Nos. 5-6, 7-8 (May-August 1937), 15-29. Reprinted in Brdhier's La Philosophic et son passd (Paris: Alcan, Presses Universitaires de France, 1940), pp. 103-124; and translated in Descartes: ,4 Collection of Critical Essays, pp. 192-208. This interpretation is suggested at one place in Norman Kemp Smith's New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes (London: Macmillan, 1952), pp. 272-273.

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does not doubt that at t l his state with respect to R was one of clear and distinct perception, nor does he come to think that, although at tl he had a clear and distinct perception, R may not have been true. Assuming that at t l R was true, heraises the question whether at t2 R is still true and comes to think that, for all he knows, R may no longer be true. His doubt rests on the suppositton that the truth value of propositions like R can change, and this supposition may strike us as extremely odd or unintelligible. Yet, to someone who is inclined to accept Descartes's view that the truths of mathematics are true as a matter of faet, it would seem less odd; for it might seem that the facts that make these propositions true can change, and, just as it can be true at one time that Peter is clothed and f~se at another, so R can be true at t l and false at t2. 2s Moreover, to someone who takes seriously the suggestion made in the First Meditation that he may be a creature of a deceiving God who can do anything, it might seem that such a God could deceive him by tampering with the nature of the triangle and changing the mathematical facts in such a way that, though at t l R was true, at t2 it no longer is. On this interpretation, an agnostic comes to think that, though he was fight in thinking at tl that R is true, he may have been mistaken in thinking at tl that R would always be true and hence mistaken at t2 in thinking that R is (or remains) true. He can, of course, allay his doubt at t2 that R is still true by attending once again to the principles of geometry and the nature of the triangle and deducing R. But the most that he can achieve in this way is knowledge that at t2 R is still true. He cannot come to know that R is what he is inclined to think it is, that is, a proposition that is .true at all times and in this sense necessarily true. No matter what he does, there is always the possibility that in the future the facts will change; and, unless he is assured that there is a God who will not deceive him, he cannot be certain that R is what it seems to him to b e - - a necessary truth. In this way he can persuade himself that, with respect to propositions like R, his state is one of unsteady and changeable opinion and not perfect knowledge, z6 In his papor Br~hier argues for this interpretation on the ground that, if we take this to be the doubt that Descartes attributes to an agnostic, we can understand why he thinks that an agnostic can emerge from doubt by coming to perceive D, whereas on the assumption that his doubt in about the truth of what he clearly and distinctly perceives, there is manifestly no escape, and Descartes's claim that there is is inexplicable. Referring to the strategems by which, on Descartes's view, an evil genius can deceive us, BrEhier says: 25 According to Descartes, the eternal truths, including truths of logic as well as mathematical truths, are true by divine fiat. This view is first stated in letters to Mersenne in 1630 (AT I, 145-146; 149-150; 151-153) and is reiterated in a letter to Arnauld (AT V, 223) in 1648, two years before Descartes's death. For an important discussion of this tenet of Descartes's philosophy, see Leonard G. Miller's "Descartes, Mathematics, and God," The Philosophical Review, L3qVI, No. 4 (Oct. 1957), 451-465. ~6 On this interpretation, there is perfect knowledge if, and only if, what is known is unchanging and eternal.

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They cannot consist in bringing about that I do not in fact see what I seem to see; for instance, in bringing about that I do not see that a square has four sides. For if this were so, there would be no way of emerging from doubt, and intuition would go no further than the cogito. T h e stratagem of the evil genius can consist only in changing the truths that we take to be eternal truths in such a way that we have no assurance that if we look again, we shah again find the sum of three plus two equal to five or a mountain with a valley,z7 But how, on this interpretation, can an agnostic rid himself of his doubt? Presumably he does so by clearly and distinctly perceiving D and the propositions alleged to follow from D. It seems, however, that, when he remembers having clearly and distinctly perceived D, he would again have the same reason for doubting D, that he had before for doubting R. At t l , when he had his clear and distinct perception of D, he did in fact establish that at t l D is ,true. But what assurance does he have that the facts have not ohanged and that at t2 D is still true? Br6hier does not raise this question, but we can conjecture how, on his interpretation, it might be answered. If someone has perceived D by following Descartcs's ontological argument, he would have perceived, as Descartes states the argument in his P r i n c i p l e s o f P h i l o s o p h y , that necessary and eternal existence is contained in the idea of a supremely perfect being. 28 The conclusion that he would have reached at tl is not just that at t l there is a God but that God exists forever; in other words, that D is rdways true. When at t2 he remembers having reached this conclusion, he would then have a reason for thinking that D is still true, viz., that at t l he proved that D is an eternal truth. It is not clear, however, that this would b c a good reason. When he remembers his perception at tl, he can be certain that at t l D is always true. But, in order to know that at t2 D is true, it seems that he needs to know more than this, namely, that at t2 D is always true. If he infers this from the fact that at t l D is always true, his inference is of a kind that, on this interpretation, is questionable; and his state with respect to D is, in the last analysis, no better than that of an agnostic with respect to R. I n favor of this interpretation, it can bc argued that an agnostics escape from doubt is less obviously impossib'le than it is if we suppose that his doubt is about his clear and distinct perceptions. This is the strongest reason that Br~hiex has to offer, for there is no direct evidence. T o account for the lack of direct evidence, he maintains that Descartes did not state this reason in his published works because he thought that he could not present it without reveal'rag his heterodox view about the Qrcation of the eternal truths, and, for prudential reasons, he chose to keep this view to himself. 29 This explanation is not entirely satisfactory, however, for, in his =T La Philosophie et son passe, p. 114; Descartes: .4 Collection of Critical Essays, p. 200

(my emphasis).

28 Principia Philosophiae, part One, Principle XIV (AT VIII, I0; HR I, 224-225). as La Philosophie et son paxs~, pp. 103-105; Descartes: .4 Collection oJ Critical F~ssays,

pp. 192-193.

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unpublished works, Descartes does reveal his thoughts about God's creation of the eternal truths, yet there is no suggestion of this reason for doubt. This would, at any rate, be surprising if, as t~rthier claims, Descartes thought of this reason as the most formidable and indeed the principal reason for doubting mathematical truths. Moreover, when he does expose his view about the eternal truths in his Replies to the Fifth and Sixth Sets of Objections, he does not relate this view to the problems about certainty and perfect knowledge raised in the body of the M e d i t a t i o n s . 3~ T h e latter omission is, on Brthier's interpretation, perhaps less surprising than the former. Since, however, his ease rests almost entirely on the assumption that, if we take an agnostic's doubt to be about his clear and distinct perceptions, escape is manifestly impossible, there would be little to be said in favor of his intexpretation if it can be shown that this assumption is false.

lII I believe that it can be shown to be false. On one view about assertions of possibility, it can be argued that an agnostic c a n emerge from doubt even though his doubt is about his olear and distinct perceptions; and, if we attribute this view to Descartes, it is reasonably d e a r why he would think that someone who has perceived D does not have the same reasons for doubting his perception that an agnostic has for doubting his perception of R. There is an objection to attributing this view to Descartes. But, before considering the objection, I shall say why I think he is inclined to accept it and why, accepting it, he thinks someone who has pereeived D can reject the arguments that undermine an agnostic's confidence in his clear and distinct perceptions. In the discussion of error in the Fourth Meditation, Descartes distinguishes the roles of i~xtetlect and will and contends that error results when, through an act of will, we assent to a perception that is obscure and confused. He implies in the Fou.rth Meditation, and asserts in a number of places, that, when a porception of the intellect is clear and distinct, the will is not indifferent, and we are compelled to assent. 3x In the Fifth Meditation, this view is reiterated in his description of an agnostic's state at tl with r e s p ~ t to R. He maintains that at tl an agnostic "cannot but believe" R. An important question is why Descartes thinks that this is so---why, that is, after distinguishing acts of intellect and acts of will, he thinks that, in the ease of d e a r and distinct perception, the one necessarily determines the other. 3z so R e p l y to the Fifth Set of Objections, AT VII, 380; HR II, 226; R e p l y to the Sixth Set of Objections, AT VII, 435-436; HR II, 250-251. at For instance, in Principia Philosophiae, "Part One," Principle XLI[I: Ita o m n i u m

animis a natura impressum est, ut quoties aliquid clare percipimus, ei sponte assentiamur, & nullo modo possimus dubitare quin sit verum (AT VIII, 21; HR II, 236).

a~ This question has been neglected in commentaries on Descartes. In his article on

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P a r t of the answer to this question seems clear. T h e reason that s o m e o n e c a n n o t but believe R when his state is one of clear and distinct perception is that he c a n n o t entertain the possibility that R is false. B u t w h y is he unable to entertain this possibility? T h e answer to this question is clear ff we attribute to Descartes the view that " I t is possible that n o t - R " means that there is n o conclusive reason ~ r believing R. O n this view, to entertain the possibility that R is false would be to think that there is no conclusive reason for believing R. Since someone w h o clearly and distinctly perceives R thinks that he does have a conclusive reason for believing R, and on the assumption that it is impossible for a p e r s o n ~o think b o t h that he has a conclusive reason for believing R a n d that there is n o conolusive reason for believing R, it follows that someone who clearly and distinctly perceives R c a n n o t entertain the possibility that R ,is false and hence " c a n n o t b u t believe" R. If we suppose that Descartes was inclined to interpret assertions of possibility in this way, we can also understand w h y he thinks that someone w h o has clearly and distinctly perceived D can reject the two arguments that, on his view, threaten the certainty of clear and distinct perceptions. These arguments are of the form: It is possible that P. If it is possible that P, then it is possible that Q. Therefore, it is possible that Q. W h e n an agnostic entertains the possibility of a deceiving God, the a r g u m e n t is: It is possible that I am a creature of a deceiving God. If it is possible that I am a creature of a deceiving God, then it is possible that m y faculty of reasoning is unreliable. Therefore, it is possible that my faculty of reasoning is unreliable. O n the less extravagant supposition that he m a y have c o m e a b o u t b y fate or c h a n c e or a succession of causes, he argues: It is possible that I have come about by fate or chance or a succession of causes. If it is possible that I have come about by fate or chance or a succession of causes, then it is possible that my faculty of reasoning is unreliable. Therefore, it is possible that m y faculty of reasoning is unreliable. Descartes in The Encyclopedia o/ Philosophy, Vol. II, pp. 344-354 (New York: Macmillan, 1957), Bernard Williams raises the question, but I believe he suggests the wrong answer. On p. 351, he says: "The sense of "clearly and distinctly perceiving' a proposition in which one ought to give one's assent only to propositions so perceived must also be the sense But, if this is so, there will in which what one clearly and distinctly perceives is true . . . . be no room for a separate function of assent . . . . " As I interpret Descartes's position in the Fourth Meditation, "clearly and distinctly perceiving a proposition" involves thinking that one has a conclusive reason for believing the proposition, which in turn precludes entertaining the possibility that the proposition is false; and, since a person cannot entertain the possibility that the proposition is false, he cannot but believe that it is true.

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On the view that, when we assert that it is possible that not-P, what we mean is that there is no conclusive reason for thinking that P, it can be argued that someone who has perceived D and the propositions alleged to follow from D can reject both arguments. Someone who has perceived these propositions thinks he has a conclusive reason for believing that he is the creature of a veracious and non-deceiving G o d - for short, V. On the interpretation proposed, he thinks that not-V is impossible. If his conviction is to be .unsettled, it must be shown that, despite his d e a r and distinct perception of V and his belief that not-V is impossible, t h e e is in fact a reason or reasons for thinking that not-V is possible. Armed with two principles, Descartes can maintain that no such reason or reasons can be given. The first principle is (1) that an argument to show that not-V is possible cannot contain as a premise the proposition that not-V is possible nor any proposition that is equivalent to the proposition that not-V is possible. This principle seems plausible enough. If the skeptic's argument contains as a premise the proposition to be proved, dearly the question is begged. It is plausible, moreover, to suppose that, if his argument contains a premise equivalent to the proposition to be proved, again the question is begged. The second principle is perhaps less plausible, yet there is good reason to think that Descartes accepted it. It is: (2) that a person's d e a r and distinct perceptions can be mistaken only if he has come about in some way other than by creation by a non-deceiving God. Employing the second principle, Descartes can maintain that any argument that a skeptic can propose to question his clear and distinct perception of V must contain a premise relating to how he may have come about. He can also maintain that all the skeptical considerations that can be adduced can be stated as a single argument containing the omnium gatherum premise: It is possible that I am the creature of a deceiving God, or have come about by fate or chance or a succession of eanses, or have come about in some way other than by creation by a non-deceiving God. This premise can be abbreviated: It is possible that F. Since F is logically equivalent to not-V, it follows that "It is possible that F " is equivalent to "It is possible that not-V'; and, according to the first principle, anyone proposing these considerations for doubting V would necessarily beg the question at issue. It is important to note exactly how, on this interpretation, a theist "rejects" the arguments available to a skepic. 33 He does not of course reject them on the ground that he cannot entertain the possibility of the falsehood of any proposition that he remembers having dearly and distinctly perceived. In the Fifth Meditation, Descartes makes it clear that an agnostic who ~emembers having clearly and distinctly perceived R can entertain the possibility that R is false; and the view to which he commits himself is that, if someone remembers having deaxly and disss I am greatly indebted to George Nakhnikian and Harry Frankfurt for criticisms of an earlier version of this section of the paper.

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tinctly perceived a proposition, he cannot but accept that proposition provided that he .has no reason for thinking that the proposition in question may be false. Nor does the theist reject the skeptic's arguments on the ~ o u n d that he has demonstrated that the first premises are false. Since the question at issue is whether any proposition can be demonstrated to be true or false, to reject the skeptic's arguments on this ground would be ignoratio elenchi on the theist's and Descartes's part. Instead, on the interpretation proposed, the theist rejects the skeptic's arguments on the ground that, presenting arguments of this sort, he necessarily begs the question. It is incumbent on the skeptic to give reasons for thinking that not-V is possible, but the only "reasons" available to him are not reasons at all but a set of propositions to be proved. On this interpretation, an objection that has often been raised against Descartes's procedure in the Meditations can be met. The objection is that someone who is in doubt about his faculty of reasoning cannot remove this doubt by employing the very faculty in question or, as the objection can also be stated, someone who is in doubt about his clear and distinct perceptions cannot come to know that they are true by means of a clear and distinct perception. In his commentary on Descaxtes's Principles, Spinoza provides Descartes with an answer to this objection. a4 Just as someone who is in doubt about his faculty of reasoning can come to have a clear and distinst perception of R, it is ;also possible for someone who is in doubt about his faculty of reasoning to come to have a clear and distinct perception of V. When someone who is in doubt about his faculty of reasoning comes to have a clear and distinct perception of R, he does not thereby know that R is true, for he can be presented with reasons for thinking that his faculty of reasoning may not be .reliable. But someone who comes to have a clear ad distinct perception of V does thereby know that V is true. His clear and distinct perception o f f provides him with what he lacked before, that is, a way of rejecting the only arguments that can be proposed to show that his faculty of reasoning may not be xeliable. In terms of the analysis that I have given of the conditions that, on Descartes's view, must be satisfied if there is to be perfect knowledge, someone who comes to perceive V satisfies both the first and third conditions of perfect knowledge at once. Not only does he clearly and distinctly perceive V, but .he is in a position to reject the only arguments that a skeptic can produce to question his certa'mty, and there can be no xeason for doubt. Although Spinoza thinks that the doubt Descartes attributes to an agnostic can be removed in this way, he does not attribute this v i e w q a view that, with certain modifications, he himself accepts--to Descartes. a5 This may have been because he s4 Prolegomenon to Part I, Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae Pars 1 & lI, in Spinoza Opera, edited by Carl Gebhaxdt (Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1925), Vol. I, pp. 147149.

,5 Tractatus de lntellectus Emendatione, Spinoza Opera, Gebhardt edition, Vol. II,

pp. 18 and

29.

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403

was aware of the passages in the Fifth and Sixth Se~s of Objections in which Descartes reveals his doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths. In these passages, Descartes seems to commit himself to a view about assertions of possibility that is incompatible with the view that I have attributed to him. Explaining this doctrine, he maintains that, though we cannot understand how this could be so, God could have brought it about that twice four is not eight and that a triangle does not have three sides; and he seems to imply that, even if we have clearly and distinctly perceived both that we are creatures of a non-deceiving God and that twice four is eight, we must still admit that the negation of the latter proposition is possible. 3~ But, if this is admitted, it seems that, to be consistent, he must also admit that the negation of the former proposition is possible and hence accept the first premises of the skeptie's arguments. It is not at all clear, however, that Deseartes's doctrine about the eternal truths does expose him to this objection. It is at any rate arguable whether, if a proposition is necessarily true, it is necessarily true that it is necessarily true. By denying that this is so, Descartes can maintain that, though twice four might not have equalled eight had God so willed, it is none the less necessarily true that twice four equals eight and that the negation of this proposition is not possible. If we attribute this view about possibility and necessity to Deseartes, we can understand why, in the Fifth Meditation, he claims that someone who has perceived V does not have the same reason for doubting V that an agnostic has for doubting R. If we do not, there is, I believe, no way in which we can account for this claim.

Dartmouth College ss

Reply to the Sixth Set of Objections, AT VII, 435-436; HR II, 250-251.

Zoroaster's Influence on Anaxagoras, the Greek Tragedians, and Socrates (review) Felix M. Cleve Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970, pp. 469-470 (Review) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

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Book Reviews Zoroaster's Influence on Anaxagoras, the Greek Tragedians, and Socrates. By Ruhi Muhsen Afnan. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1969. Pp. 162. $5.00) Of the author's Zoroaster's Influence on Greek Thought a striking flaw was the misleading rifle. In this earlier volume not one example of Zoroastrian impact was pointed out to corroborate the claim. Now, in the preface to the new work, the author discloses that the original title had merely been "Zoroaster and the Trend of Greek Thought" and that the publishers changed it into "Zoroaster's Influence" etc. "to give the book a more attractive heading" (p. 9). This fiat of the publishers, however, was then gratefully felt by the author a~ a "challenge .... prodding" him to the "venture" (cf. p. 10) of attempting to substantiate (what was before just his belief) "that the illumination vouchsafed by Zoroaster generated the Enlightenment attributed to the Periclean Age of Athens" (p, 12) and to demonstrate, for instance, an ostensible basic similarity between the pfiilosophy of Anaxagoras and the teachings of Zoroaster. This venturous attempt fills six long chapters supposed to show that "Medism," or Zoroastrianism, was the great spiritual power menacing the autochthonous Athenian values, and that Anaxagoras and his circle and Aeschylus, Euripides, Socrates, and Thucydides essentially were propagandists of Zoroastrianism who undermined the pagan culture of Athens. True, the general presentation of Medism and its role in the spiritual struggle of the Periclean Age is sometimes thrillingly interesting reading. Yet, for us the main question is: Has the author succeeded in his attempt? There are prerequisites of such an undertaking. Thorough and first-hand knowledge of both sides of the topic is indispensable, in the first place. To question the historical authenticity of a modern believer's presentation of Zoroastrianism might seem improper. But it should still be permitted sharply to distinguish between the official traditional version and the results of recent serious research. The other side of the topic is concerned with those who, according to the author's claim, were downright prophets of Zoroastrianlsm. Whether this holds true of Aeschylus and Euripides, whether, for instance, really all the dramatis personae of Euripides' Ion were meant as nothing, but symbolizations of the antagonistic spiritual powers of Medism and Athenianism, this to discuss, and perhaps to doubt, is up to literary analysts. But two of those alleged heralds are philosophers: Anaxagoras and Socrates. (Incidentally, what about Heraclitus and Empedocles?) Well, let us forget about Socrates. The "real" Socrates is such an intangible figure anyway that it would not make much sense to argue with any of the author's allegations about him. In the presentation and "analysis" of the philosophy of Anaxagoras, however, the decisive shortcomings come to the fore. The level of the author's general philosophical training is not quite equal to the task. Conceptual haziness, confusion [469]

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of fundamental notions (e.g., "creator" and "demiurge") are omnipresent. Sometimes even a confusion happens of Anaxagoras with Democritus when the "atom" is ascribed to Anaxagoras (p. 48). A n d the author does not seem to feel the fatal inadequacy of merely second-hand knowledge. While he in longura et latum argues with Aristotelian presentations and misrepresentations of Anaxagorean tenets, there is good reason for the suspicion that he might never have read even one authentic sentence written by Anaxagoras himself. For those interested in general cultural history, this book, the religious diatribe of a m o d e m Zoroastrian believer, is very worthwhile reading. For the historian of philosophy, it is of rather modest value. P-~LIX M. CLEVE New School for Social Research New York City

The Esthetics of the Middle Ages. By Edgar De Bruyne. Trans. Eileen B. Hennessy.

(New York: Frederick Uugar, 1969. Pp. viii+232. $6.50) This book has a very complex character. It is the English translation of a French work, L'Esth~tique du m o y e n dge,I which, in turn, is a one-volume abridged version by Edgar D e Bruyne of his o w n original three-volume work, I~tudes d'Esth~tique M~di~vale.2 Thus, one m a y evaluate this book either as a translation or, presupposing the faithfulness and correctness of the translation itself, as a relatively short work by E. D e Bruyne, or else in its relation to or as compared with the original three-volume work. I will confine myself here to the latter two considerations.3 First, considering this book in comparison with the three-volume original work, one of the principal writings of D e Bruyne and one of the most significant contemporary contributions to the history of medieval aesthetics, we can find both quantitative and qualitative differences between the original work and its abridged version. The quantitative difference is considerable. While the abridged work, at least in its English translation, is less than a quarter of a thousand pages in length, the original work includes altogether 1,224 pages 4 and is thus more than five times longer than thc translated abridged version of it. The qualitative or methodological difference is at least equally great. In the original work, each of the three volumes deals primarily with the various medieval authors of aesthetic works and doctrines in a chronological order.5 In contrast, the contents of the translated abridged version follow a topical arrangement with chronology playing only a subordinate role, if any at all, within Louvain. L'Institut Supdrieur de Philosophic, 1947. Brugge: De Tempel, 1946. s I have had no access to the abridged French original. 9 Vol. I, xiv+370; II, x-{-420; III, x-F400. 9 VoL I: Boethius to Erigena; II. "L'l~poque Romane," from the Carolingian period to the schools of Chartres and St. Victor; and Ill: the thirteenth century, from St. Bernard to Duns Scotus.

Agostino Nifo's Early Views on Immortality Edward P. Mahoney Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970, pp. 451-460 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

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Notes and Discussions AGOSTINO NIFO'S E A R L Y

V I E W S O N IMMORTALITY

Various historians of Renaissance philosophy have taken some notice of the prolific author and important philosopher o f the late 15th and early 16th centuries, A g o s t i n o Nifo (1470-1538), x but no one has yet studied his writings in a methodical and exhaustive fashion. 2 H e not only published philosophical works in logic, physics, psychology and metaphysics, b u t he also authored treatises on humanist t o p i c s ? R e c e n t scholars have tended to concentrate their attention o n h i s psychological doctrines, no d o u b t because he was one of the m a j o r opponents of Pietro P o m p o n a z z i (1462-1525) during the immortality controversy. 4 Nifo published his D e I m m o r t a l i t a t e A n i m a e in 1518 as a reply to the D e l m m o r t a l i t a t e A r d m a e , On the year of Nifo)s birth, see Bruno Nardi, Saggi sull'aristotelismo padovano dal secolo xav al xvl ('Florence, 1958), p. 284, n. 8. There is contemporary evidence that he

died on January 18, 1538. See Bartolommeo Capasso, "Le cronache de li antiqui ri del regno di Napoli di D. Gaspare Fuscolill0," Archivio storico per le province napoletane, I (1876), p. 538. The standard bio-bibliography still remains Pasquale Tuozzi, "Agostino Nifo 9 le s u e opere," Atti e memorie della R. Accademia di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti in Padova, Nuova scrie, XX (Padua, 1904), pp. 63-86. But see also Giuseppr Tommasino, Tra umanisti e filosoft (Maddaloni, 1921), Porte I, pp. 123-147; and Edward P. Mahoney, "A Note on Agostino Nifo," Philological Quarterly (forthcoming). z See Franeeseo Fiorentino, Pietro Pomponazzi; Studi storici su la scuola bolognese e padovana del secolo xvI (Florence, 1868); Carlo Giacon, La seconda scolastica: 1 grandi commentatori di San Tommaso (Milan, 1944); Etienne Gilson, "L'affaire de l'immortalit6 de l'fime ~t Venise at* d6but du xvI e si~ele," in Umanesirno europeo e uraanesimo veneziano, ed. Vittore Branea (Florence, 1963), pp. 31-61; Miehele Giorgiantonio, "Un nostro filosofo dimentieato dcl '400 (Luea Prassicio e Agostino Nifo)," Sophia, XVI (1948), pp. 212-214 and 303-312; Bruno Nardi, Saggi sulraristotelismo padovano dal secolo x]v al xvI (Florence, 1958); idem, Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del Rinascimento Italiano (Rome, 1945); Giovanni di NapoH, L'immortalitd delranima nel Rinascimento ('Turin, 1963); John Herman Randall, Jr., The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science (Padua, 1961); Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, I (Stuttgart, 1964); Eugenio Garin, La cultura [ilosofica del Rinascimento Italiano (Florence, 1961); idem, Storia della filosofia italiana, I I (Turin, 1966). See Nifo's De Armorum Literarumque Comparatione Commentariolus (Naples, 1526); De Pulchro et Amore (Rome, 1531); De Re Aulica (Naples, 1534); and Prima Pars Opusculorum (Venice, 1535). The second of these works has been studied by Jules Houdoy, La beaut~ des femmes dans la litt#rature et darts rart du xII" au xvI e si~cle; Analyse du livre de A. Niphus du Beau et de l'amour (Paris, 1876).

4 For recent discussion of the immortality controversy, see Etienne Gilson, "Autour de Pomponazzi, ProbMmatique de l'immortalit~ de l'~me en Italic au d~but du xvI e si~.cle," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litt~raire du moyen dge, Ann6e 1961, pp. 163-179; Giovanni di Napoli, op. cit., especially pp. 227-338; Paul Oskar Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (Stanford, 1964), pp. 72-90; Bruno Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi (Florence, 1965); Martin Pine, "Pomponazzi and the Problem of 'Double Truth'," Journal ot the History of Ideas, X X I X (1968), pp. 163-176; Harold Shulsky, "Paduan Epistemology and the Doctrine of the One Mind," lournal of the History of Philosophy, VI (1968), pp. 341-361. [451]

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(1516) of Pomponazzi, who had argued that personal immortality cannot be philosophically demonstrated, s But while these scholars correctly point out that Nifo abandoned an Averroist interpretation of Aristotle concerning the unity of the intellect and the immortality of the soul for the position which they assume to be Thomistic, they are not precise as to just when Nile made the shift. 6 They have not observed that in his first two printed works, namely, the commentary on Averroes' Destructio Destructionum (1497) and the early commentary on the De A n i m a (1503), Nifo explicitly accepts Averroes as the best guide to Aristotle and denies that personal immortality can be demonstrated. They have also failed to notice that in the same year that his D e A n i m a appeared, namely in 1503, Nile himself published his D e Intellectu, in which he rejects Averroes as a reliable interpreter of Aristotle and insists that one can give philosophical demonstrations of individual immortality. I n the present article, we shall examine these three works; show that Nile's radical change on the question of personal immortality occurred after he had learned Greek and could read Aristotle in his own language; and argue against Bruno Nardi that Nile's own protestation, that he did not want the D e A n i m a published, should be believed, given that he had changed his mind on the issue of demonstrating man's immortality. ~ Agostino Nile's first effort at publication was a two volume edition of the works of Aristotle and Averroes that appeared at Venice in 1495 and 1496. s The following year, in 1497, Nile published an edition of the medieval Latin version of Averroes' T a h ~ f u t A l - T a l ~ f u t , namely, the Destructio Destructionum, 9 along with

5 For a facsimile of the Bologna, 1516 edition and an English translation, see Petrus Pomponatius, Tractatus de Immortalitate Animae, trans. William Henry Hay II (Haverford, 1938). This translation was revised by John Herman Randall, Jr. and annotated by Paul Oskar Kristeller for its reprinting in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. Ernst Cassirer, P. O. Kristeller, and J. H. Randall, Jr. (Chicago, 1948), pp. 280-381. 6 See Di Napoli, pp. 203-206; Gilson, "Autour de Pomponazzi," p. 238; and Bruno Nardi, "Agostino Nile," Enciclopedia cattolica, VIII (Vatican City, 1952), col. 1876. 7 See Nardi, Saggi, p. 286, n. 13. He has been followed in this matter by di Napoli, p. 205, n. 41. s On this edition, see Ge.~amtkatalog der Wiegendrucke, II (Leipzig, 1926), no. 2340, col. 572-574; Catalogue of Books Printed in the xvth Century and Now in the British Museum, V (London, 1924), p. 348. Nicoletto Vernia had already published his own edition in 1483. On these editions, see Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, "Attivit~ filosofico-editoriale aristotelica dell'Umanesimo," in Umanesimo europeo e umanesimo veneziano, ed. Vittore Branca (Florence, 1963), pp. 251, 257-260; Eugenio Garin, Italian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance, trans. Peter Munz (New York, 1965), pp. 5-6; Ioscf Soudek, "Lvonardo Bruni and his Public: A Statistical and Interpretative Study of his Annotated Latin Version of the (Pseudo-) Aristotelian Economics," in Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, V (Lincoln, 1968), pp. 89-90. 9 Destructiones Destructionum Averrois cure Augustini Niphi de Suessa expositione; Eiusdem Augustini questio de sensu agente; Omnia Aristotelis opera tam in logica quam in philosophia naturali et morali et metaphysica cum sui futelissimi interpretis A verrois Cordubenais commentariis (Venice, 1497). The title page serves also for the already published

edition of Aristotle and Averroes. All were published by Octaviano Scoto. Bruno Nardi (Saggi, pp. 285-286) thus erred in attacking Eugenio Garin for saying that Nifo was the editor of the Physics which is included in the 1495-1496 edition. For Garin's reply, see his

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a commentary on the work and his opusculum entitled D e Sensu Agente. 1~ It is important to underscore the fact that Nifo attempted to establish a critical edition of the Latin translation of the T a l ~ f u t , which Calonymos ben Calonymos of Arles had made in 1328 at the c o m m a n d of Robert of Anjou, 11 since philosopbers of other persuasions at Padua were doing the same for the works of their intellectual m a s t e r s ) ~ T h e distinguished contemporary scholar, Maurice Bouyges, has praised Nifo's efforts as an editor. ~3 A t various points in his commentary, Nifo questions the readings of the manuscripts that he is using and attempts to establish what the meaning of the text d e m a n d s J 4 H e openly complains that no one has commented on the work before him; that the translation is poor; and that the Arabs express themselves in an obscure manner. All these considerations explain why so m u c h of the b o o k is difficult to understand, t5 Shortcomings in his commentary should also be ascribed to the short time in which he composed it. It was begun, .he tells us, in 1494 and was finished on January 22, 1497. t6 There can be little doubt that Nifo considered Averroes to be the most accurate guide to Aristotle when he published the Destructio in 1497. Throughout his commentary, Nifo constantly uses such phrases as "according to the principles of Aristotle and Avcrroes," "'according to the philosophy of Aristotle and Avertoes," and "this is the opinion of Aristotle and Averroes." The mind of Averroes is in perfect agreement with that of Aristotle) ~ Indeed, Averroes is the "priest of Aristotle" (sacerdos A r i s t o t e l i s ) : s But the most telling remark that Nifo makes is the following: And because the foundations of Avcrroes are in agreement with the principles of La cultura filosofica del rinascimento italiano (Florence, 1961), p. 300, n. I. Cf. Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke, [[ (Leipzig, 1926), no. 2340, coL 574; ibid., Ill. (Leipzig, 192g),

no. 3106, col. 217. 10 The problem of the agent sense was discussed by various philosophers during the late medieval period and the Renaissance. The issue is whether there is a power in the senses, comparable to the agent intellect, which renders sensible objects fit to be actually sensed. For further discussion, see Stuart MacClintock, Perversity and Error, Studies on the "Averroist" John of Jandun (Bloomington, 1956), pp. 10-50; Arrigo Pacchi, "Note sul commento 'De Anima' di Giovanni di Jandun; I: La teoria del senso agentc," Rivisita critica di storia della filosofia, XIII (1958), pp. 372-383; Leonard A. Kennedy, "Sylvester of Ferrara and the Agent Sense," The New Scholasticism, XL (1966), pp. 464-477; Edward P. Mahoney, "Agostino Nifo's De Sensu Agente," Archiv lilt Geschichte der Philosophic (forthcoming). u See Moritz Steinschneider, Die hebraeischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher (Berlin, 1893), pp. 330-333; Isaac Broyde, "Kalonymos Ben Kalonymos Ben Melt," in The Jewish Encyclopedia, VII (New York, 1904), pp. 426-429. Iz See for example the edition of Duns Scotus, Quaestiones subtilissimae Scoti in Aristotelis Metaphysicam (Venice, 1497), executed by the Franciscan theologian, Mauricc O'Fihely (Mauritius Hibernicus).

~s See Mauricc Bouyges. Averroes, Tahafot At-Taha/ot (Biblioteca Arabica $cholaaticorumo Serie Ar~be, III; Beyrouth, 1930), pp. xxiii-xxv. i( See Nifo, Deatructione$ Destructionum, I, dub. 19, f. 52v,2; III, dub. 13, f. 39v,1; IV,

dub. 6, f. 62v,2 and f. 63v,1; V, dub. 3, f. 70v,1; VI, dub. 2, f. 74,1. ts Ibid., III, dub. 2, s 75v. 16 IBM., XIV, dub. 3, f. 123v,2. 1T Ibid., V, dub. 3, f. 69v,1. la Ibid., I, dub. 18, f. 20v,2.

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Aristotle, I have therefore been accustomed to say to my students that Averroes is Aristotle transposed, for when a man considers the foundations of Averroes and will have gathered them together perfectly with the words of Aristotle, he will find disagreements only in an imaginative way. 19 The various doctrines of Averroes which run counter to Christian teachings are presented by Nifo without any effort to disassociate them from Aristotle. H e explicitly states that Aristotle and Averroes held to one intellect for all men, z~ thought that G o d does not know singulars, zl and denied the possibility of a multiplicity of human souls after death. 22 However, Nifo also remarks that philosophy and reason can only declare what they have in some way derived from the senses, whereas Christian revelation is based on the testimony of prophecy and therefore has true certitude. 2a Since the principles of Averroes are false for Christians, who have principles that are true and transcend the senses, his arguments against them are nothing. 24 Averroes' doctrine that the intellective soul is a separate being which is united to man only in an operational union, like that of a sailor and his ship, and which remains one in itself, is pure error according to Nffo. He points out that it is erroneous according to Christians and promises to give arguments agaln~t it in his D e I n t e l l e c t u . 25 In the early commentary on the D e A n i m a (1503), Nifo again maintains that what Averroes says agrees with Aristode and relates that it has been his custom to call Averroes the Arab Aristotle (arabs A r i s t o t e l e s ) . 26 He also admits that Aristotle and Averroes agree on the doctrine of the unity of the intellect. 27 The aim of his commentary is to assume Averroes' principles so that he can set forth the Commentator's thought. But while Nifo intends here to be solely a commentator, he is quick to add that he has composed a separate work, the D e I n t e l l e c t u , in which he shows that what Averroes says is opposed to p h i l o s o p h y and truth. 2s The D e l n t e l l e c t u will present the truth of the Catholic faith and wondrous argu-

~' "Et quia fundamvnta Averrois sunt convenientia principiis Aristotelis, ideo eonsuetus sum dicere meis seolaribus quod Averroes est Aristoteles transpositus. Quando enim homo considerat fundamenta Averrois r eolligaverit ca perfecte cum verbis Aristotelis, non inveniet discrepantia nisi fantastice." Ibid., VIH, dub. 1, f. 93v,1. 2 o Ibid., IV, dub. 7, f. 65,1. =t Ibid., XII, dub. 4, f. 111,2. 22 Ibid., IV, dub. 4, f. 61v,1. =~ Ibid., I, dub. 24, f. 23v,2. Nifo's remarks here resemble the terminology to be found in John of Jandun. Cf. MacClintock, op. cir., pp. 69-101; Armand Maurer, "John of Jandun and the Divine Causality," Mediaeval Studies, XVII (1955), pp. 185-189. 2, Ibid., I, dub. 14, f. 17v,1; II, dub. 1, f. 25,1. ~5 Ibid,, I, dub. 23, f. 23,2. =* "Proptcr quod dicta huius philosophi [that is, Avvrroes] semper invvniuntur convenientia cure verbis Aristotelis. Ideirco consuevi vobis dicere Averroem nihil afiud esse nisi arabem Aristotelem." Nile, In libros de anima, II, comm. 97, f. 122v,2. 2T Ibid., I, comm. 12, f. 21v,1. Cf. III, comm. 36, f. 65,1. 28 Ibid., III, comm. 5, f. 17v,1; comm. 36, f. 66v,1. It would seem that Nile has here separated Averroes and Aristotle from "philosophy," but his remark is too vague for us to b e c e r t a i n .

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ments against Averroes and the philosophers, z9 Although Nile does not reveal in any detail what these arguments were to be, he does promise that in the De I n t e l l e c t u he will attack Averroes' doctrine of the unity of the intellect and also Alexander of Aphrodisias' denial of immortality 30 on the grounds that both doctrines render good morals impossible, sx In the actually published version of that work, Nifo does in fact give special prominence to moral arguments against Averroes. 3z We shall now examine the published version of the De l n t e I l e c t u and see that Nifo has radically changed his views on the perfect agreement of Averroes and Aristotle and on the lack of demonstrative, philosophical arguments for personal immortality. At the very beginning of the De I n t e l l e c t u , Nif0 examines in detail the psychology of Alexander of Aphrodisias, citing at length passages from Girolamo Donato's translation of Alexander's De A n i m a . ss Nifo takes pains to prove, both from the passages that he quotes and also from the arguments that he summarizes, that Alexander did hold the rational soul to be the form of the body, inseparable from it and consisting in a harmony, s4 He then emphasizes that this position has great harm on morals, since it renders m a n worse than a beast, overturns all laws and moral philosophy, and denies the proper end of m a n ) 5 Later, when examining Averroes' doctrine of the unity of the intellect, Nifo pursues several lines of attack. One of them is to argue that Averroes' doctrine does great harm by undermining both religion and law. Nile cites Plato, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, Aristotle and Avicenna as having demanded that men worship God, and points out that if there were only one intellect for all men, there would be no purpose to prayers, vows, scourgings, commands of law and natural ordinances, s6 He concludes that 2~ Ibid., IIl, comm. 36, f. 69,1.

so Alexander taught that the soul is the form of the body and cannot exist separately from it. Since the soul is the form of a perishable body, it must perish with it. See his De Anima, in Alexandri Aphrodisiensi praeter commentaria scripta minora; De anima liber cure mantissa, ed. Ivo Bruns (Supplementum Aristotelicum, II, I; Berlin. 1887), p. 12, lines 7-10 and 1%24. 3x Nifo, In libros de anima, III, comm. 14, L 36,1-2. s~ Although other thinkers had stressed the moral harm of Averroes' doctrine of the unity of the intellect, none developed this argument in the detail that it is elaborated by Nifo. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Tractatus de unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, ed. Leo W. Keeler (Rome, 1957), par. 81, pp. 51-52; Marsilio Ficino, Theologia Platonica, I, ch. 1, in Opera Omnia (Basel, 1576), p. 79. ss Nifo, De lntellectu, I, tr. 1, ch. 5, L 3v, I. He explicitly mentions Donato's translation at I, tr. 2, ch. 21, f. 27v,1. For further details on Nifo's exegesis of Alexander in the De Intellectu, see my article, "Nicoletto Vemia and Agostino Nifo on Alexander of Aphrodisias: An Unnoticed Dispute," Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, XXIII (1968), pp. 268-296. On Donato's translation, see the important studies of F. Edward Cranz, "Alexander Aphrodisiensis," in Catalogus Translationum et Commentarlorum: Medieval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries, I, ed. Paul O. Kristeller (Washington, 1960), pp. 85-86; and, "The Prefaces to the Greek Editions and Latin Translations of Alexander of Aphrodisias, 1450 to 1575," American Philosophical Society: Proceedings, CII (1958), pp. 510-546. s' Nifo, De lntellectu, f. 3v,1-4,1. s5 Ibid., I, tr. 1, ch. 6, f. 4v,1. so Ibid., I, tr. 3, ch. 27, f. 35v,1, and ch. 28, f. 36v,I.

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if Averroes' doctrine were true, man would be more miserable than any of the animals, and he notes that he has found "our Ficino" to be of the same mind. 37 The man who believes that the intellect is one for all men is just as incapable of a life of virtue as the man who believes that the intenect is corruptible, "whatever that wretch Averrocs (ille pauper Averroes) might believe." 38 However, Nifo gives more than moral considerations for rejecting Alexander and Averroes. He notes that some outstanding L a t h s (LatinO, that is, medieval Christians, say that Aristotle holds nothing certain in regard to the question of the immorality of the soul, given that he appears to say opposite things in different texts. Consequently, they maintain that the immortality of the soul is a neutral problem (problema neutrum), since neither the arguments for immortality nor those against it are demonstrative; the immortality of the soul must therefore be accepted on faith in divine revelation, for it cannot be proven by natural reason. 39 This was, of course, the position of Duns Scotus and the arguments which Nifo lists for and against immortality match similar arguments in a work of Scotus. 4~ But what is most important for our purposes is Nile's declaration that he accepts immortality not only on faith, but also by demonstrative arguments (rationes demonstrativae) and by statements of the philosophers, especially Aristotle. 41 Nifo first presents what he considers to be Platonic arguments for immortality, then the arguments of various ancient philosophers and finally statements of Aristotle himself which appear to uphold immortality. The collection of Platonic arguments which Nile has gathered begins with what he takes to be four arguments of Plotinus for immortality. They are derived, without any mention of the fact, from Marsilio Ficino's commentary on the Enneads. 4z Nile expands on these four arguments by drawing on Albert the Great's De Natura et Origine s, Ibid., oh. 28, f. 36v,2-37,1. See Ficino, Theologia Platonica, I, oh. 1, cited in note 32 supra. Cf. Paul O. Kristeller, II pensiero [iloso[ico di Marsilio Ficino (Florence, 1953), pp. 344345 and 375-377. s8 Nifo, De Intellectu, I, tr. 1, cb. 4, f. 3,2. Cf. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros, ed. F. Stuart Crawford (Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, VI, 1; Cambridge, Mass., 1953), III, comm. 14, p. 433. s0 Nifo, De lntellectu, I, tr. 1, eh. 7, f. 4v,1-2. ,0 For the four arguments against Alexander (oh. 6, f. 4v,1) which Nifo says are those of excellentissimi lating see Duns Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, IV, dist. 43, q. 2 (Opera, XX; Paris, 1894), p. 44. The following four arguments against Alexander are also borrowed from Scotus (pp. 44-45). The replies that Nifo presents (oh. 7, f. 5,1-2) to these arguments are again taken from Scotus (pp. 46-49). 4~ "Pace tantorum dixerim animam non extingui secundum extinctionem corporis non tantum fide teneo, sed etiam rationibus demonstrativis, ac philosophorum et maxime Afistotelis confirmabo auctoritati.bus." Nifo, De Intellectu, I, tr. 1, oh. 8, f. 5v, l. However, elsewhere in the work N i l e states: " M o d e immortalitas apud philosophos repugnant-homini secundum esse individuum. Hoe enim est fide perspicuum tantum, non ratione naturali demonstratum." Ibid., II, tr. 2, oh. 35, L 69,2. I believe that this passage represents a vestigial remain of the earlier, never published version of the De lntellectu. It presents Nifo's position on the demonstrability of immortality as ~ound in the commentaries on the Destructie and the De Anima. (2 Ibid., I, tr. 1, ell. 8, f. 5v, l. Cf. Ficino, Argumentum to Ennead IV, book 7, epilogue, in Opera Omnia, p. 1754.

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A n i m a e , II, chapter 6, where Albert presents arguments against Alexander of Aphrodisias. a3 The further a r g u m e n t of Plato (alia Platonis ratio) which Nifo gives is also taken f r o m Albert, 44 as are the arguments f r o m A v i c e n n a and Plato's Phaedrus. 45 His dependence on Albert is also evident in the collection of arguments which he draws f r o m the authority of the ancients. 4~ T h e reference to Alpetragoras, Ptolemy and C o s t a ben L u c a are taken f r o m Albert's L i b e r de H o m i n e . 47 T h e suicides of Protinus the Stoic and Cleombrotus after hearing Plato's work are also related b y Albert. 4s Beside Albert, N i f o cites Cicero's Tusculan Disputations and quotes passages f r o m Ficino's translations of the T i m a e u s and Phaedo of Plato in order to indicate that Socrates and Plato held to immortality. 49 Finally, he gives various citations f r o m Aristotle to show that the "Philosopher" also accepted immortality and adds detailed analyses to establish the true meaning of the passages. 5~ Those who said that Aristotle was uncertain regarding the immortality of the soul are n o w subjected to d i r e c t attack. A s far as Nifo is concerned, Aristotle's o w n words leave no d o u b t that he held to immortality; those Who say that the immortality of the soul is a neutral issue are thus in error. I m m o r t a l i t y is not only believed on faith, it is also proven b y demonstrative arguments, both a priori and a posteriori, such as those given b y A v i c e n n a in V I N a t u r a l i u m , part 5. H o w ever, the proponents of the view that the immortality of the soul is a neutral issue correctly believe that the rational soul begins in our b o d y and proceeds directly f r o m God. Their error is to say that the soul comes to the b o d y b y w a y of animation and not by way of creation and that it therefore ceases at death. This would m e a n that the soul would return to the potency of matter at death and thus it could not have originated f r o m outside the body, that is, f r o m God. Moreover, if the soul ceases at the death of the body, it must depend on matter for its

,a Nifo, De lntellectu, I, tr. I, oh. 8, f. 5v,l-f. 6,1. See Albert, Liber de Natura et Origine Animae, ed. Bernhard Geyer (Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, XI; Asehendorff, 1955), II, oh. 6, pp. 25-29. Nifo here acknowledges his source: "Haee sunt argumenta quae eo21egi ex divo Alberto in libro de origine animae, tractatu secundo, capite sexto, quae videas, quoniam breviter hie posita sunt et sub strictiori formula" (f. 6,1). "' Nifo, De InteUectu, I, tr. 1, ell. 8, f. 6,1. See Albert, op. cir., II, oh. 6, p. 26, co2. I, line 88 to p. 27, col. 1, 2ine 52. Nifo quotes p. 27, lines 44-51 almost to the word and then adds: "Et haee ratio P2otini est in libro de immortalitate animae, licet non sit posita sic, quemadmodurn Albertus earn ponit." 9s Nifo, f. 6, 1-2. For the Avicenna argument, see Albert, II, oh. 2. p. 22; the argument from the Phaedrus is sketched by Albert in II, ell. 1. ,6 Nifo, De lntellectu, I, tr. 1, ch. 9, f. 6,2-6v,1. 9r See Albert, Summa de Creaturis, I1: Liber de Homine, ed. A. Borgnet (Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, XXXIII; Paris, 1896), q. 61, a. 2, p. 524. But see also Jaeobus Brutus, Corona Aurea (Venice, 1496), f. S7v. Other phrases in De lntellectu, I, tr. 1, oh. 9 appear to have been borrowed from Brutus (f. Tie). 9B Protinus is mentioned in De Natura et Origine Animae, II, ch. 3, p. 22 and Cleombrotus in Liber de Homine, q. 5, a. 3, ad 7, p. 80. ,9 Nifo, De lntellectu, I, tr. 2, oh. 9, f. 6v,2. See Opera Platonis, trans. Marsilio Ficino (Venice, 1491), f. 262v,2 for the Timaeus passage and f. 180,2-180v,I for the Phaedo passage. 60 Nifo, De lntellectu, I, tr. I, eh. 10, f. 6v,2-7,1.

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existence and conservation in being. All these consequences are opposed to Aristotle's clear statement to the contrary in his De Generatione Animalium. 5i The usefulness of philosophy is clear--it enables us to know the soul's immortality from statements of Aristotle and other ancients, as well as by means of demonstrative arguments. 52 The dramatic shift in Nffo's thought regarding the demonstrability of personal immortality and the reliability of Averroes as a guide to Aristotle raises one serious problem, namely, why did he hold contradictory views on these issues in two works published the same year, that is, in 15037 The answer is given by Nifo himself in a later work, his second commentary on the De Anima, which was finished during his Pisan period. In that work, he explicitly states that the early commentary on the De Anima was published without his consent and that he did not know that it was being printed? 3 Evidently Nifo had changed his mind on these issues between 1497, the year of the publication of his Destructio Oestruco tionum, and 1503, the year of publication of his De Intellectu, and was embarrassed by the unauthorized appearance in the latter year of a work which maintained his earlier position. However, Bruno Nardi has questioned Nifo's veracity concerning this matter, suggesting that Nifo further covered his tracks as to his "Averroism" and the actual date on which he rejected it. s4 The difficulty with Nardi's thesis is that he seems unaware of Nifo's dramatic shift regarding the demonstrability of personal immortality and the reliability of Averroes as a guide to Aristotle. Nifo simply did not want a work to be published which did not give his current position. Finally, some note should be given to Nifo's explanation of his abandonment of the Averroist interpretation of Aristotle. In his commentary on Averroes'

5~ Ibid., f. 7,2-7v,1. N i f o is obviously referring to Scotus, though he never mentions him by name. In his Opus Oxoniense, IV, dist. 43, q. 2, pp. 34-59, Scotus examines a priori and a posteriori proofs for the Resurrection. The former include arguments for the immortality of the soul which Scotus examines and finds to be inconclusive. He denies that Aristotle maintained t h e creation of the soul and says that he held that the soul is accidentally produced by the animation (animatio) of the body (p. 47). Scotus also states that it is doubtful (dubium) what Aristotle actually taught regarding immortality, since he said different things in different places (p. 46). For further details on Scotus' doctrine on immortality, see Etienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952), pp. 479-490; Franz Luger, Die Unsterblichkeits#age bei Johannes Duns Scotus (Vienna and Leipzig, 1933); Sofia Vanni Rovighi, L'immortalitfi delranima nei maestri francescani del secolo xni (Milan, 1936); Robert Greiner, Die metaphysiche Anthropololgie des Johannes Duns Scotus (Munich, 1962), pp. 49-58. s~ "Ex his perspicuum remanet quanta sit philosophiae utilitas cum ex ea non tantum rafionalis animae immortalitas sciri possit ex verbis Aristotelis, verum et aliorum antiquorum r demonstrationibus apertis." Nile, Delntettectu, I, tr. I, oh. 10, f. 7v,1. s~ "Haec sunt quae mihi videntur de tertio libro de ardma, ubi habes etiam quae in iuventa collegimus, quamquam me invite ac nesciente fuerint publicata, ut in prohemio diximus. Finis Pisis 1520, primo Maii, ad dei gloriosissimi laudem." Nile, In libros de anima, III, comm. 68 (Pisan), f. 91v,2. See also the dedicatory preface to the Piss commentary. Ibid., verso of title-page. ~4 Nardi, Saggi, p. 286, n. 13.

NOTES A N D DISCUSSIONS

459

D e Beatitudine A n i m a e (1508), Nile states that he had thought Averroes' concep-

tion of the intellect to be the same as Aristotle's until he read the Greek text: I have written many arguments against this in the Liber de lntellectu, although before I tasted the Greek language I believed that this was the position not only of Averroes, but also of Aristotle, and so I wrote in many places. But now I am forced to think otherwise concerning the mind of Averroes, Aristotle and all Greeks. ss A detailed discussion of the great impact that the knowledge of Greek had on Nile's later philosophical thought would take us beyond the scope of the present paper, s~ Nonetheless, it would certainly be in order to note that in his D e I m m o r talitate A n i m a e (1518) Nile uses the Greek text of Aristotle as a weapon both

against Averroes and also against Pomponazzi himself. In chapter 14 of that work, he says that Averroes has not understood Aristotle's views on the operations of the soul because he does not know G r e e k : 7 And later in chapter 44, he directs Pomponazzi's attention to Aristotle's remarks on the "intellect from without" voEg 06pa0ev) in the D e Generatione A n i m a l i u m , II, chapter 3. ss Then in chapter 49, Nile gives his own literal translation from the Greek and suggests, in 9 the following chapter, that Pomponazzi has not read the passage, s9 We thus s e e that he not only claimed to have learned from his knowledge of the Greek text of Aristotle that Averroes misinterpreted Aristotle, but he also used his ability to read the Greek text to discredit his old rival, Pomponazzi. This interest in reading Aristotle in his own language, which undoubtedly reflects the influence of Humanism on his intellectual interests, would culminate in the philological approach to Aristotle that dominates his late commentaries. 6~ While the later Aristotelians of the 16th century did not as a group pursue this philological route, ~ome of them did follow Nile's lead and learn Greek in order to reach a more ~5 "Ego plures rationes scrlpsi contra hoc in libro de intellcctu, licet antequam graecam linguam gustarcm, crediderim illam non tantum fuisse positionem Avcrrois, sed Aristotelis, et ita scripsi pluribus locis. Nunc vcro alitcr sentirc cogor et de mente Avcrrois et Aristotelis et omnium graccorum." Nile, In Averrois de Beatitudine Animae (Venice, 1508), I, comm. 16, f. 5v,1.

56 I am preparing a lengthy article on this matter. It will be a revised version of a paper which I read at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in December 1966 and again at the University of California at San Diego (I.~ Jolla) in October 1968. 5~ "Averroes "~ero ob ignorantiam graecarum literarum etiam pro se non bene intdligit." Nifo, De lmmortalitate Animae Libellus (Venice, 1518), ch. 14, f. 3v,1. 68 Ibid., ch. 44, f. 9v,2. See Aristotle, De Generatione Animalium, II, 3, 736b28-29. ~o Ibid., ch. 49, f. 10v,l-2, and ch. 50, f. 11,2. s0 This point was underscored by Professor F. Edward Cranz in his comments on my A.H.A. paper in December, 1966. Nifo's philological approach has als0 been noted by Wilhelm Risse, "Averroismo e alessandrinismo nella logica del Rinascimento," Filosofia, X V (1964), p. 19.

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accurate understanding of the mind of Aristotle. Nifo's shift on the question of Aristotle and immortality thus represents a noteworthy chapter in the history of Renaissance Aristotelianism.6x EDWAKD P. MAHONEY Duke University 6x I should like to thank the United States Government for a Fulbright fellowship during 1962-1963; the National Foundation for the Humanities for a fellowship during 1968-1969; and the Duke University Research Council for grants for microfilms.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF JACOB LOEWENBERG Compiled by Edwin S. Budge It is hoped that all of Professor Loewenberg's published writings, exclusive of his many book reviews, are listed herein. His unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Genesis of Hegel's Dialectical Method" (1911), is available on loan from Harvard University, although the "gist" of this, as Dr. Loewenberg has indicated, may be found in the introduction to the first item cited in the bibliography. Dr. Loewenberg, it might be added, also translated a short work by Gilbert Chinard, France for the Soldier (Berkeley: University of California, 1918), and quite likely was consulted by his wife Kate in the course of her translation of Emile Meyerson's Identity and Reality (New York: Macmillan Company, 1930; reprinted by Dover, 1962, and Peter Smith, 1963). Jacob Loewenberg's personal papers are in the possession of his daughter, Mrs. Jeannot Nyles, of Berkeley, California.

BIBLIOGRAPHYOF THE WRITINGS OF JACOBLOEWENBERG 1912 "Vorwort," pp. v-vi; "Einleitung: 'Die jugendlichen Denkversuche Hegels'," pp. vii-xxii; in Hegels Entwiir/e zur Enzyklopiidie und Propiideutik nach den Handschri/ten der Harvard-Universitiit. Mit einer Handschri[tprobe. By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Herausgegeben yon Dr. J. Ltwenberg. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, I912. xxiv, 59 pp. (Hegel-Archiv. Herausgegeben von Georg Lasson. Band I, Heft 1.) 1916 "Interpretation as a Self-Representative Process," The Philosophical Review, Vol. XXV, No. 3 (May, 1916), 420-423. "Mysticism and Idealism," University o/ California Chronicle, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (January, 1916), 72-91. "An address before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, December 10, 1915."

Books Received

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achievements of Dr. Corti, partly in his activities as a distinguished Swiss public leader, partly in connection with his work as director of the Archly fiir genetische Philosophie in Winterthur. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, California

BOOKS RECEIVED First Editions Adler, Mortimer. The Time of Our Lives: The Ethics of Common Sense. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, I970. Pp. xiii+361. $7.95. Allen, Gay Wilson. William lames. Pamphlets on American Writers, Number 88. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1970. Pp. 48. $.95. Bahm, Archie. Directory o[ American Philosophers. V 1970-71. Alburquerque: Archie I. Bahm, I970. Pp. 436. $I4.95. Brown, Peter. Augustine of Hippo: A Biography. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 463. Paper. $2.95. A review of this book appeared in the Journal, ~ 4, Vol. 6. Cailliet, Emile. Journey Into Light. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1968. Pp. 117. $3.95. Cantore, Enrico. Atomic Order: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Microphysics. (~mbridge (Mass.): The MIT Press, 1969. Pp. xi+334. $12.50. Caponigri, A. Robert. Philosophy from the Renaissance to the Romantic Age. A History of Western Philosophy. Volume III. Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1963. Pp. 582. $12. Deleuze, Gilles. Spinoza. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970. Pp. 126. FR 7. In the series of Handbooks for Students entitled: Les Precis des Classes Sup~rieures: Philosophes. Dennett, D. C. Content and Consciousness: An Analysis of Mental Phenomena. International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method. New York: Humanities Press, 1969. Pp. xii+ 198. $6. Eriekson, Stephen A. Language and Being: An Analytic Phenomenology. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1970. Pp viii+165. $6.50. Farm, K. T. Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, I969. Pp. xiv+ 178. $5. Fischer, J. L. The Case of Socrates. Prague: Academia Nakladatelstvi ~eskovenskd Akademie V~d, 1969. Pp. 91. Rozpravy (~eskoslovensk6 Akademie V~d. Rada Spole~ensk~ch V~d, 1969. Ro~nfk 79, Se~it 8. Gelven, Michael. A Commentary on Heidegger's "'Being and Time." New York: Harper Torehbooks (Harper & Row), 1970. Pp. xv+234. Paper, $2.95. Gosling, J. C. B. Pleasure and Desire: The Case for Hedonism Reviewed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969. Pp. 179. $4.95. Gotshalk, D. W. The Structure of Awareness. Introduction to a Situational Theory of Truth and Knowledge. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1969. Pp. ix+139. $5.95. Hadot, Ilsetraut. Seneca: Und die Griechisch-Ri~mische Tradition der Seelenleitung. Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophic. Band XIII. I969. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter & Co., 1969. Pp. 232. DM 38. Hamblin, C. L Fallacies. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1970. Pp. 326. $8.75. Hofstadter, Albert. Agony and Epitaph: Man, his art, and his poetry. New York: George Braziller, 1970. Pp. xv+267. $7.50.

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Horosz, William. The Promise and Peril of Human Purpose: The New Relevance of Purpose to Existence. St. Louis: Warren H. Green, 1970. Pp. xvq-334. $15. Hubscher, Arthur. LL Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch /fir dos Jahr 1970. Frankfurt: Verlag Waldemar K.ramer, 1970. Pp. x+221. James, E'. O. Creation and Cosmology: A Historical and Comparative Inquiry. Studies in the History of Religions (supplements to numen) XVI. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969. Pp. xi+ 148. James, William. The Meaning of Truth. A Sequel to "'Pragmatism." New intro. Ralph Ross. Ann Arbor: The Univ. of Michigan Press, 1970. Pp. xliii+298. Paper, $3.45. This is the first edition by Ann Arbor Paperbacks. Originally published in New York in 1909. Kauffman, Donald T. The Dictionary of Religious Terms. Westwood: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1967. Pp. 445. 11,000 definitions of religious terminology, etc. Kirk, G. S. Myth, Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures. gather Classical Lectures. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1970. Pp. xii+299. $7.95. La Libertd et l'Ordre Social Textes des conferences et des entretiens organis~s par les Rencontres Internationales de Gen~ve, 1969. Keba M'Baye; Paul Ric0eur; Raymond Aron; Ignacy Sachs; Herbert Marcuse; Cardinal Dani61ou. Boudry-Neuch[itel: Les Editions de la Baconni~re, 1969. Pp. 334. Paper. Histoire et Soci~t~ d'Aujourd'hui. II a ~t~ tir~ 20 exemplaires sur papier alfa volumineux sans bois, num~rot6s de 1 ~t 20. Lehmann, Gerhard. Beitriige zur Geschichte und Interpretation der Philosophie Kants. Berlin: Walter de Grnyter and Co., 1969. Pp. viii+427. DM 72. The Letters of Josiah Royce. Edited and intro. John Clendenning. Illus. Chicago and London: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970. Pp. 696. $15. Lucas J. R. The Concept o~ Probability. New York and Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. Pp. 220. $5.95. Malcolm X. By Any Means Necessary. Speeches, Interviews and a Letter by Malcolm X. Edited and foreword George Breitman. New York: Pathfinder Press (A Merit Book), 1970. Pp. viii+184. $5.95. Manson Richard. The Theory of Knowledge of Giambattista Vico. Hamden: Archon Books, 1969. Pp. xiii+83. $5. McInerny, Ralph M. From the Beginnings o/Philosophy to Plotinus. A History of Western Philosophy, Volume I. Intro. A. Robert Caponigri. Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1963. Pp. xvii+382. $10. Meyer, Hubert. Das Corollarium de Tempore des Simplikios und die Aporien des Aristotles zur Zeit. Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1969. Pp. 314. Paper. DM 48. Monographien zur Naturphilosophie, Band VIII. Moore, F. C. T. The Psychology o/Maine de Biran. New York and Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. Pp. 227. $6.25. Nisbet, Robert A. Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. x+335. $7. (Paper, $1.95). Passmore, John. Philosophical Reasoning. New York: Basic Books, 1969. Pp. 152+ix. $5.95. Paterson, Antoinette Mann. The Infinite Worlds of Giordano Bruno. A monograph in The Bannerstone Division o/ American Lectures in Philosophy. No. 760. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1970. Pp. xi+227. $14.50. Philosophy and Science as Modes of Knowing: Selected Essays. Alden L. Fisher and George B. Murray, eds. New York. Appleton-Century-Crofts (Educational Division of Meredith Corp.), 1969. Pp. xii+253. Paper, $3.95. Piaget, Jean. Genetic Epistemology. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970. Pp. 84. $5. Woodbridge Lectures delivered at Columbia Univ. in October of 1968. Number Eight. Lectures translated by Eleanor Duckworth. Plott, John C. and Paul D. Mays. Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha: A Bibliographical Guide to the Global History of Philosophy. Leiden: E. J. BriU, 1969. Pp. xxii+305. 48.- guilders.

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Ponzio, Augusto. La Relazione Interpersonale. Universit~ degli Studi di Bail, Faeolt~ di Lettere e Filosofia. Bad: Adriatiea Editriee, 1967. Pp. 103. L 1,200. It is provided with an analytical introduction by Antonio Corsano, Ginseppe Semarari, and Cesare Vasoli. Raju, P. T. Introduction to Comparative Philosophy. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois Univ. Press (Arcturus Books), 1970. Pp. ix+364. Paper, $2.85. Originally published by Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1962. This is the frst paperback edition, unaltered. Randall, John Herman, Jr. Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970. Pp. xiii+274. $7.50. Reghaby, Heydar. Philosophy and Freedom. New York: Philosophical Library, 1970. Pp. 87. $3.75. Ricceur, Paul. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. Translated from the author's manuscript of the French Lectures by Denis Savage. New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1970. Pp. xiii+573. $15. Rist, J. M. Stoic Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. x+300. $9.50. Sehutz, Alfred. Re[tections on the Problem of Relevance. Edited, annotated, and with intro. by Richard M. Zaner. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1970. Pp. xxiv+186. $6.75. Soil, Ivan. An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics. Foreword Walter Kaufmann. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. xvii+160. Start, Alden D., M.D. Rulers of the Mind: A History of Mental Process. New York: Philosophical Library, 1970. Pp. xvi+88. $4.95. Studies in Philosophy and in the History of Science: Essays in Honor of Max Fisch. Richard Tursman, ed. Preface D. W. Gotshalk. Pp. 320. $5. Symposium on J. L. Austin. International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method. K. T. Fann, ed. New York: Humanities Press, 1969. Pp. xii+486. $11. Thannb.~user, Klaus. Die "Erie-Doctrine" ira Spannungsfeld zwischen den Bundes- und Staatengerichten der Vereinigten Staaten. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter and Co., 1969. Pp. xxxviii+ll9. DM. 30. Neue K~Iner Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakult~t der Universi~t zu K/51n. Heft 60. Toth, Tihamer. Test Your Freedom: A Discourse of Man's Role in the Universe. New York: ExpoSition Press, 1969. Pp. 144. $5.50. "Futile, Howard Nelson. Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy of Historical Understanding: A Critical Analysis. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969. Pp. 115. 24 guilders. Weisenbeck, Jude D. Alfred North Whitehead's Philosophy of Values. Waukesha: Thomas Press, 1969. Pp. xiv+200. Weiss, Paul. The Making of Men. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1967. Paper. $2.25. (Cloth. $4.95). Pp. 157. Wolin, Sheldon S. Hobbes and the Epic Tradition of Political Theory. Intro. Richard E. Ashcraft. Foreword William E. Conway. Los Angeles: Univ. of California at LOS Angeles (William Andrews Clark Memorial Library), 1970. Pp. 61. Paper. Wood, Alien W. Kant's Moral Religion. Ithaca and London: Cornell Univ. Press, 1970. Pp. xii+283. $9. Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine. Synthese Library. D. Davidson and J. Hintikka, eds. New York: Humanities Press, 1969. Pp. 366. $14.50.

New Editions Ayer, A. J. Metaphysics and Common Sense. San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper and Co., 1970. Pp. xiq-267. $6.50. A Collection of previously published essays.

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Bergin, Thomas Goddard and Max Harold Fisch. The New Science o/ Giambattista Vice. Revised and Abridged. Trans. from the third edition by Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch. Intro. M.H.F. Ithaca and London: Comell Univ. Press, 1970. Pp. liii+384. Paper, $2.95. Originally published in 1948 by Cornell Univ. Press. Revised and abridged, 1961 by Doubleday (Anchor). Reissued 1970 by Cornell Univ. Press (paperback). Comte, Auguste. Introduction to Positive Philosophy. Edited, with revised trans, by Frederick Ferre. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill (Library of Liberal Arts), 1970. Pp. xiv +70. Paper. Fearing, Franklin. Reflex ,4ction: ,4 Study in the History e l Physiological Psychology. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1970. Intro. Richard Held. Pp. xii+395. $3.45. Originally published by Williams and Wilkins Co., 1930. Intro. copyright 1970 by MIT. (First paperback edition.) Gentile, Giovanni. Di[esa Della Filosofia. Opere XXXVIIL A Cura de La Fondazione Giovanni Gentile per Gli Studi Filosofici. Firenze: Casa Editrice G. C. Sansoni, 1969. Pp. 194. L 2,500. Third revised edition of the complete works. Hobbes, Thomas. Behemoth or The Long Parliament. Ferdinand Ttnnies, ed. Intro. M. M. Goldsmith. New York: Barnes and Nobles, 1969. Pp. xiv+xi+204. $8.75. Originally published in 1889 in London. Edited for the first time by Ferdinand Ttnnies from the original manuscript, with a new introduction for the second edition by M. M. Goldsmit~ This new and even more amended edition of Hobbes's survey of the civil wars and of his reflections on them is timely and useful. Since Ttnnies first published it in 1889 this work has received increasing importance for the interpretation of the career and theories of Hobbes. PrOfessor Goldsmith's new introduction opens up the discussion of some of the issues raised by this final attempt by Hobbes to justify his ideas. The introduction closes with the comment "It is Hobbes's triumphant vindication of the doctrines he had expounded since 1640 and of his proposal that Hobbism should be established by authority." The reader can guess that Charles II had other, more political reasons for refusing to permit its publication. HWS Hobbes, Thomas. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic. Edited, with preface and critical notes by Ferdinand Ttnnies. Second edition with new intro, by M. M. Goldsmith. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1969. Pp. xxi+xvi+226. $8. Originally published by Frank Cass and Co., London. First edition 1889, new impression 1928. Left, Gordon. Tyranny of Concepts: ,4 Critique of Marxism. University (Alabama): Univ. of Alabama Press, 1969. Revised edition. Pp. vii+256. $6.50. Originally published in 1961 by the Merlin Press, Ltd., London. The Myths of Plato. G. R. Levy, ed. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1970. Pp. 481. $16.50. Originally translated and introduced by 1. A. Stewart and now edited and newly introduced by G. R. Levy. First published in 1905. This edition originally published in 1960 by Centaur Press, Fontwell, Sussex. Mill: ,4 Collection of Critical Essays. J. B. Sehneewind, ed. Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1969. Pp. xxi+455. $7.95. Originally published by Doubleday and Co. (Anchor Books) 1968, Garden City. Copyright 1968 by L B. Schneewind. This is the first hardbound edition. Radnitzky, G. Contemporary Schools of Metascience. Vol. I. Anglo-Saxon Schools of Metascience. Vol. II. Continental Schools of Metascience. N e w York: Humanities Press and Gtteborg: Akademiftriaget, 1968. Second revised edition, 1970. Pp. xlviii+202, viii+200 (bound in one). Rieser, Max. An Analysis of Poetic Thinking. Trans. Herbert Schueller. Detroit: W a y n e State Univ. Press, 1969. Pp. 169. $6.50. Originally published in Vienna, 1954, in German.

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Rintelen, Fritz-Joachim von. Der Aufstieg im Geiste. Frankfurt; Metopen-Verlag, 1968. Pp. 160. DM 22. Von Dionysos zu Apollon. 2., durchgesehene Auflage. A second edition. Simmel, Georg, et al. Essays on Sociology, Philosophy, and Aesthetics. Kurt H. Wolff, ed. New York: Harper Torchbooks (The Academy Library), 1965. Pp. xiii+392. $2.25. Originally published in 1959 by Ohio State University Press under the title Georg Simmel, 1858-1918. WesffaH, Richard S. Science and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England. Hamden: The Shoe String Press (Archon Books), 1970. Pp. vii+235. $7.50. Originally published in 1958, Yale Univ. Press. Reprinted 1970 unaltered and unabridged. Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality. New York: The Free Press (Division of Macmillan Co.), 1969. Pp. xii+429. Paper, $3.95. Gifford lectures delivered in the Univ. of Edinburgh during the session 1927-28. Originally published in hard cover, 1929. Wisdom, John. Paradox and Discovery. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1970. Pp. 166. Paper. $2.25. This is a collection of essays. Original copyright Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1965. Wolfson, Abraham. Spinoza: A Life of Reason. Second enlarged edition. New York: Philosophical Library, 1969. Pp. xvi+347. $6. Illus. Originally published in 1932 by Modern Classics Publishers. Zeller, E. and R. Mondolfo. La Filosofia dei Greci: Nel suo Sviluppo Storico. Parte Prima, VoL V. A cura di Antonio Capizzi. Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1969. (Novembre). I Presocratici, Empedocle, Atomisti, Anassagora (If Pensiero Storico 57). Pp. 490. Paper. L 6,000. Trans. Domenico Musti. Originally published in 1892 by G. R. Reisland, Leipzig under title Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. This edition is based on the fifth German edition. It contains in addition to the revisions of Mondolfo, references and notes by the present editor, Prof. Capizzi, which brings the documentation up to date. Translations Boezio, A. M. Severino. De hypotheticis syllogismis. Preface Domenico Pesce. Trans. Luca Obertello. Brescia: Paideia Editrice, 1969. Pp. 476. L 5,000. Istituto di Filosofia dell'Universit~ di Parma. Logicalia. Tesfi Classici di Logica. Collana diretta da Domenico Pesce. Testo, traduzione, introduzione e commento di Luca Obertello. Bougl~, C. The Evolution of Values: Studies in Sociology (with special applications to teaching). Trans. and with intro, by Helen S. Sellars and new intro, to 1969 edition by Roy W. Sellars. New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1970. Pp. 277. $10. First edition published in 1926 by Henry Holt Co., New York. Caponigri, A. Robert. Tempo e IdecL" La Teoria della Storia in Giambattista Vieo. Traduzione di Giacomo Gava. Bologna: Casa Editrice Patron, 1969. Pp. 342. Paper. L 4,500. Centro di Studi Filosofici di Gallarate. Chung-Yuan, Chang. Original Teachings of Ch'an Buddhism. New York: Pantheon BooKs (Division of Random House), 1969. Selected from The Transmission of the Lamp. Trans. with intro, by Chang Chung-Yuan. Pp. xvi+333. $10. Hegel's Philosophy o/Nature. A. V. Miller, ed. Trans. from Nicolin and P~iggeler's edition (1959) and from the Zus~itze in Michelet's text (1847). Foreword J. N. Findlay. Oxford and New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. Pp. xxxi+450. $10.50. Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830).

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Heidegger, Martin. Hegel's Concept of Experience. New York: Harper and Row, 1970. Pp. 155. $5. With a section from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in the Kenley Royce Dove translation. English translation by Harper and Row. Ortega y Gasser. Jose. Some Lessons in Metaphysics. Trans. Mildred Adams. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969. Pp. 158. $5. Patzig, Gunther. Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism: A Logico-Philological Study of Book "A" of the Prior Analytica. New York: Humanities Press, 1969. Pp. xvii+215. Trans. Jonathan Barnes. Synthese Library, Donald Davidson, ed. Originally published under the title Die Aristotelische Syllogistik by Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Tottingen, 1963 (second edition), and in 1968 by D. Reidel Publishing, Dordrecht. Shcstov, Lee. Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy. Athens (Ohio): Ohio Univ. Press, 1969. English .trans. from original Russian by Elinor Hewitt. (Published in German also in 1949 under the title Kierkegaard und die Existenzphilosophie.) Pp. 314. $10. Stegmtlller, Wolfgang. Main Currents in Contemporary German, British, and American Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1970. Pp. xvii+567. $25. Originally published by Alfred Kr6ne~, Stuttgart, Germany in 1969 (fourth edition). Trans. from the German by Albert E. Blumberg. Hauptstr@mungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie, eine Kritische Einfiihrung. Styazhkin, N. I. History of Mathematical Logic from Leibniz to Peano. l~rans, from Russian. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1969. Pp. vili+333. $12~0. Originally published by Nauka, Moscow, 1964 as Stanovleniye idey matematicheskoy logikL Yukichi, Fukuzawa. An Encouragement of Learning. Trans. and intro. David A. Dilworth and Umeyo Hirano. Tokyo: Sophia Univ., 1969. Pp. x v + 128. A Monumenta Nipponica Monograph. Sophia University here makes available for the first time in English a complete translation of this nineteenth-century best-seller by Japan's most influential Meiji intellectual and reformer.

The Anatomy of Leviathan (review) P. J. Johnson Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970, pp. 478-482 (Review) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

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in accord with Thomas on certain important points, but his own theology is more in the spirit of Plato and Augustine. Professor Kristeller's vast learning is at the service of admirably balanced conclusions. Not everyone will agree with all his interpretations; Ficino perhaps did not imagine himself to be "constructing a system of philosophy" (p. 96) since the very title of his work, Theologia platonica, suggests that he continues, with new materials, the labor of mediaeval theolo#ans. And Ficino's doctrine of the continuity of the supernatural life of the soul in this world and the next (p. 120) seems to be completely in accord with Thomas. But the author's very careful scholarly method and sound general conclusions are beyond criticism. Two hitherto unpublished Latin texts are printed in critical edition at the end of the French lecture, the Opus aureum in Thomistas by Baptists Mantuanus, which is anti-Thomas, and the Opusculum ad Laurentium Medicem on beatitude, by Vincentius Bandellus, which is pro-Thomas. Like Professor Kristeller's fine lecture, these new texts are a permanent contribution to scholarship. PAUL J. W. MILLER University of Colorado

The Anatomy of Leviathan. By F. S. McNeilly. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968. Pp. 264. $8.50) The one thing about which Hobbes's commentators have agreed is the absence of any significant process of development in the several statements of his philosophic views. This has been most evident in their willingness to use the various texts as a common repository from which evidence for their interpretations could be drawn with little regard for its specific textual origin. Notoriously, no consensus has emerged from such endeavors and McNeilly believes this method of interpreting Hobbes far too indiscriminate. He contends that careful examination of the differing expressions and contexts of apparently recurrent arguments will show, in many cases, not the same argument repeated several times, but several different arguments. And these, properly discriminated, reveal a definite pattern of development culminating, in Leviathan, with a political theory substantially different from that of the earlier works. While the political theory of the Elements of Law and De Cive consists of a series of predictions founded on the known psychological tendencies of men, the theory of Leviathan, MeNeilly contends, is independent of any particular concept of human nature. Rather it is a "formal system of necessarily true propositions" (p. 213) constituting "a systematic analysis of value systems generally" (p. 245). Excepting two introductory chapters, the whole of McNeilly's argument is given over to substantiating this radical thesis, his point of departure being Hobbes's allegedly shifting views on method which are taken to vary somewhat inconsistently in the earlier works among self evidence, conventionalist and hypothetico-deductive theories and combinations of these. By contrast, in Leviathan, McNeilly argues, Hobbes expounds a conventionalist view with "clarity and persistence" (pp. 84-85). When this

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conventionalism is combined with the adoption of mathematics as the paradigm of sound science, it leads Hobbes to the view that pohtical theory can be constructed as a formal system of necessary propositions because he believes that mathematics is about the world and extends this mistake to formal systems generally. These methodological commitments then, render any concept of human nature irrelevant to political theory. McNeilly's task in the second main section of the book is to show that in contrast to the earlier works, and contrary to all appearances, the Leviathan's account of human nature is completely neutral with regard to any possible set of motives and hence, wholly formal. Specifically he argues that materialism and mechanism play no active role in Hobbes's account of the passions and that the psychological egoism characteristic of the Elements and the fourth part of De Corpore is abandoned. (Throughout it is assumed that De Corpore was substantially complete before Leviathan was composed; this may not be true of the fourth part, as McNeilly recognizes, but he is undeterred.) The formal account of the passions in Leviathan then is formally compatible with either egoistic or nonegoistic interpretations of human motivation. Similarly, it is argued that Hobbes gives up his pessimism about men as evidenced by his downgrading of the importance of power and glory in Leviathan. In the Ele. ments a man's power is "the excess of the power of the one above another" (English Works, I, viii, 4). This competitive concept disappears in Leviathan where the definition is "his present means to obtain some future apparent good" (E. W., III, 74). Since "good" is a relative term for Hobbes, "apparent good" is not tied to any specific content and power becomes a formal concept. In the Elements and De Cive men's desire for glory is the primary cause of human conflict, but in Leviathan competition for scarce goods and diffidence, both of which are open-ended so far as human nature is concerned, are given precedence in the account of the war of all against all. And so McNeilly concludes that Hobbes in Leviathan "does not attempt to describe the passions. He merely elaborates a conceptual framework for psychological concepts, by means of a series of interrelated definitions" (p. 152). Hobbes's standpoint in constructing the political theory of Leviathan is taken to be that of rational man deliberating in the face of the unknown. A man cannot predict that others will attack him as he might if he knew they were all gloryseekers, but he cannot be sure they won't do so should goods be scarce or should they feel so inclined. The resulting diffidence requires every man to consider anticipatory violence against others. Should he be tempted to live quietly hoping for the best, he would have to consider that others may be contemplating anticipatory violence against him thinking that he may be contemplating it against them and so on. Thus, McNeilly argues, the war of all against all would be generated inevitably in the state of nature regardless of what might be believed about the configuration of human motives. Just as man's quandary in the state of nature is not generated by any specific passion, neither does its solution stem from any specific aversion such as fear of death. Although the material notion of death as the painful cessation of one's life continually appears in Hobbes's arguments, McNeilly contends that it has no proper place there and cannot be supported in the formalized system Hobbes is constructing. What Hobbes actually uses is the formal aspect of this notion, namely the frustration of all one's desires--whatever they may be.

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The laws of nature then are not rules commanding men to avoid death and preserve their life; they are rather rational precepts "forbidding a m a n to do that which would lead to the frustration of all his desires (values) or would prevent him from realizing them, and to omit that which would permit him to realize them" (p. 185). So long as men live in a situation that requires each of them to a d o p t a firststrike strategy with regard to others, they can expect nothing but the continual frustration o f all their desires. A n y rational m a n will see, therefore, that peace and its supportive corollary practices are necessary values which he must seek to realize, for whatever he desires cannot be obtained in a state of sustained warfare. Thus, according to McNeilly, the Leviathan is a working out of the "structure of the reasonable calculations which an individual could make about relations with other beings such as himself when the specific nature of these others is left indeterminate, and even the guidelines of all elements of social order are removed" (p. 165). Although Hobbes does not use this language, Leviathan develops a distinction between necessary and contingent values. A necessary value is "some X which necessarily will be desired by any reasonable being, so far as he is reasonable, who also desires Y and Z. A contingent value is a value which is not a necessary value" (p. 191). McNeilly claims that Hobbes is right in identifying peace and its supportive practices as necessary values, but wrong in regarding self-preservation as one too since there are a great m a n y things for which a m a n will sacrifice his life if doing so will insure the state of affairs he desires. The remainder of the book is devoted to the articulation of this primary insight and its application to a wide range of political problems. All this is carried through with a breadth of detail, subtlety of argument, and degree of philosophical sophistication to which the foregoing sketch does littlejustice. Despite his disavowal of any attempt to treat the whole of Hobbes's thought, McNeilly covers an enormous variety of topics ranging from Hobbes's understanding of the copula to his position on censorship. The discussion of individual matters is almost always interesting and enlightening and will prove of value to anyone attracted by Hobbcs or the general run of political problems. In spite, however, of the considerable merits of the book, there are some serious objections that can be raised with respect to its overall thesis. In the first place, it is not clear that the distinction between necessary and contingent values is wholly independent of any conception of h u m a n nature. If it is derived from rational reflection, it presupposes at least that men are rational. Irrational men would hardly arrive at any such distinction. M o r e importantly however, if, as McNeilly claims, H o b b c s is right in designating peace a necessary value for all rational men, then some prescriptive limitations on the value constellations men can hold seem to get smuggled into the distinction under the rubric "rational." A n iibermensch (or perhaps Hobbes's vainglorious man) whose value structure is dominated by ideals of self-assertion, noble disdain for his own or other's suffering, courage and endurance in the face of adversity and so on, would not judge peace necessary to avoiding the frustration of all his desires. Peace enforced b y a powerful sovereign would most frustrate him. Unless such value configurations are tacitly ruled out of order then, we at best learn that there m a y b e a necessary-contingent distinction to be drawn among men's desires, but it hardly allows us to specify for any man, let alone for all men, which are which.

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Secondly, one m a y doubt whether McNeilly's Leviathan resembles Hobbes's very closely. It is not really clear that McNeRIy even intended it to. H e mentions three tasks an interpreter can legitimately carry out; (I) recapturing the intentions, the private views as McNeilly calls them, of the author, (2) expounding and explaining the author's public views as found in his writings, and (3) extracting from the author's works useful valid arguments. Disclaiming the historical sophistication required for the first task, McNcilly embraces the second and third. It is questionable, however, whether the second task can be accomplished in isolation from the first. Unless we can successfully recover an author's intentions we m a y very well read into his words meanings quite foreign to him and then there is no reason to call the creatively reconstructed utterances his at all. W h e n this inherent problem is combined with the desire to dredge up maximally useful arguments from the text, an interpreter m a y very well be tempted, more or less unconsciously, into salting his o w n mine. McNeilly succumbs to this temptation to an unfortunate extent. The developmental thesis would be stronger if McNeRly could establish development in the three main sections of Hobbes's thought independently. However, once he has decided that Hobbes adopts a conventionalist theory o f science in Leviathan, he uses this as a shibboleth to exorcize any passages of the text which do not fit his thesis. Thus statements in Leviathan like " . . . of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself' (E. W., III, 120) are explained away as o f "doubtful and uncertain" logical status since there would be an inconsistency "ff egoistic views were to be expressed in propositions which were presented as logically necessary" (p. 128). Similarly, of Hobbes's description of felicity in terms o f a contented life, we are told that " I t . . . has no business to be appearing in the pages of Leviathan" (p. 135). This tendency becomes ever more pronounced as the b o o k progresses until, as with the definition of natural law quoted above, refractory passages are literally rewritten in the interest o f making Hobbes consistent. McNeilly is aware that he takes liberties with the text. H e admits at one point that his interpretation o f Hobbes is "not a rendering of anything which he explicitly says . . . but an interpretation which I a m reading into Leviathan" (p. 154, author's emphasis), and on another occasion he excuses his formalization of a passage as "a very small liberty" since "so much of Hobbes's argument has been quite explicitly formalized" (pp. 181-182). But many small liberties can a d d up to a great deal of license. When so much conceptual tidying up is necessary, one m a y wonder if the original is not being considerably distorted. Hobbes certainly was not aware that he was constructing a purely formal analysis of value systems. A t least he claims in Leviathan that his intention is to "ground the civil right of sovereigns, and both the duty and liberty of subjects, on the known natural inclinations of m a n k i n d " (E. W., HI, 710), in order to "set before men's eyes the mutual relation between protection and obedience" (E. W., III, 711). H o w far McNeilly's Leviathan is from the one Hobbes consciously intended can be demonstrated in the way the relation between protection and obedience degenerates in his formalized theory. Hobbes's typical response to a political crisis was to compose a work o f political theory. Each of his political works was, as he said of Leviathan, "occasioned by the disorders of the present time" (E. W., III, 713). In England one fertile source of

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disorder was reLigious men's tendency to find in the Scriptures and their consciences justifications for rebelling against their sovereign. The last half of Leviathan is designed to refute these claims in detail, and this refutation is not merely tacked onto the first parts but is a logical extension of them. The argument for escaping the state of nature is that only through obedience to a common power can man escape the likelihood of an early death. Once that common power is established, and so long as it can carry out its protective function, obedience to it is obligatory. When a man enters civil society, the only right he retains is to defend himself against physical death, and consequently, the only time he is entitled to disobey the sovereign is when the sovereign directly threatens him. Thus excuses for rebellion are reduced to an absolute minimum. In McNeiily's formalization however, the concept of a man's death must be replaced by the formal concept of the frustration of all one's desires. And so "whatevvr [a man] regards as the complete frustration of all his desires . . . he will be entitled to resist, even if such resistance puts him at war with others, including lawful authority" (p. 193). Now the incredible range of things men have believed essential to avoiding the frustration of all their desires is amply testified to in the history of religious warfare. And clearly, under this formalized interpretation, men would be entitled to rebel over the form of baptism, church government, ministerial costume, prayer, or anything else if they are convinced it is essential to their salvation. It takes little knowledge of history to see that Hobbes's espousing of a theory with such consequences has a low degree of probability indeed. Hobbes complains in Leviathan of Scriptural exegetes who "by casting atoms of Scripture, as dust before men's eyes, make everything more obscure than it is." Rather, he claims, it is "not bare words, but the scope of the writer, that giveth the true light by which any writing is to be interpreted; and they that insist upon single texts, without considering the main design, can derive nothing from them clearly'" (E. W., III, 602). This last would be too harsh to apply to McNeiity's work generally, for his "atoms" are for the most part of considerable worth in themselves. But with regard to our understanding of Hobbes's Leviathan he raises a lot of dust. PAUL J. JOHNSON

CalifornM State College, San Bernardino

The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. By Peter Gay. VoL I, The Rise ol Modern Paganism. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. Pp. xviii+SSS+xv); VoL II, The Science ot Freedom. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. Pp. xx+70S+xviii) Le grand int~rSt port~ aux ~tudcs du xvm* si~cle au cours des deux derni~res d6cades et la remise en question des principes critiques encore en vigueur it y a une dizaine d'ann~,s ont fray~ la voie h de nouveaux efforts de synth~se dent la derni~re en date, et non la moins int~ressante, est celle de Peter Gay. Ses deux substantiels volumes sent destines ~ servir de guides ~ une nouvelle g~n~ration d'~tudiants et de chercheurs, ne ffit-ce que pour la bibliographie tr~s d6taill~e et accompagn~ d'obserrations personneUes qui forme un supplement tr~s pr6cieux ~ la Bibliographie de D. C. Cabeen de 1951 et de 1968. Lo travail de Peter Gay inspire confianc~ par

Bibliography of the Writings of Jacob Loewenberg Edwin S. Budge Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970, pp. 460-466 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

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accurate understanding of the mind of Aristotle. Nifo's shift on the question of Aristotle and immortality thus represents a noteworthy chapter in the history of Renaissance Aristotelianism.6x EDWAKD P. MAHONEY Duke University 6x I should like to thank the United States Government for a Fulbright fellowship during 1962-1963; the National Foundation for the Humanities for a fellowship during 1968-1969; and the Duke University Research Council for grants for microfilms.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF JACOB LOEWENBERG Compiled by Edwin S. Budge It is hoped that all of Professor Loewenberg's published writings, exclusive of his many book reviews, are listed herein. His unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Genesis of Hegel's Dialectical Method" (1911), is available on loan from Harvard University, although the "gist" of this, as Dr. Loewenberg has indicated, may be found in the introduction to the first item cited in the bibliography. Dr. Loewenberg, it might be added, also translated a short work by Gilbert Chinard, France for the Soldier (Berkeley: University of California, 1918), and quite likely was consulted by his wife Kate in the course of her translation of Emile Meyerson's Identity and Reality (New York: Macmillan Company, 1930; reprinted by Dover, 1962, and Peter Smith, 1963). Jacob Loewenberg's personal papers are in the possession of his daughter, Mrs. Jeannot Nyles, of Berkeley, California.

BIBLIOGRAPHYOF THE WRITINGS OF JACOBLOEWENBERG 1912 "Vorwort," pp. v-vi; "Einleitung: 'Die jugendlichen Denkversuche Hegels'," pp. vii-xxii; in Hegels Entwiir/e zur Enzyklopiidie und Propiideutik nach den Handschri/ten der Harvard-Universitiit. Mit einer Handschri[tprobe. By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Herausgegeben yon Dr. J. Ltwenberg. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, I912. xxiv, 59 pp. (Hegel-Archiv. Herausgegeben von Georg Lasson. Band I, Heft 1.) 1916 "Interpretation as a Self-Representative Process," The Philosophical Review, Vol. XXV, No. 3 (May, 1916), 420-423. "Mysticism and Idealism," University o/ California Chronicle, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (January, 1916), 72-91. "An address before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, December 10, 1915."

NOTES A N D DISCUSSIONS "The Spirit of Hegel's Philosophy," University of Vol. XVIII, No. 3 (July, 1916), 373-393.

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California Chronicle,

"The Teachings of Royce," The California Alumni Fortnightly, Vol. IX, No. 14 (September 30, 1916), 216-217. 1917 "Classic and Romantic Trends in Plato," The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. X, No. 3 (July, 1917), 215-236. "An address before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, February 23, 1917." "Josiah Royce: Interpreter of American Problems," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (January, 1917), 39-47. 1918 "The Prophetic Songs of Swinburne," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XX, No. 1 0 a n u a r y , 1918), 106-115. 1919 "Preface," pp. vii-xii in Lectures on Modern Idealism. By Josiah Royce. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919. Pp. 259. (Semicentennial Publications of the University of California, 1868-1918.) "Ethics and the War," Mills Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 4 0anuary, 1919), 6-9. "An address delivered at Mills College, October 18, 1918." "Multiplicity and the Social Order," The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. XII, No. 2 (April, 1919), 137-164. "President Wilson's Americanism," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XXI, No. 1 (January, 1919), 1-15. 1920 "Introduction," pp. 3-37 in Fugitive Essays; with an Introduction by Dr. J. Loewenberg. By Josiah Royce. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920. Pp. 429. (Semicentennial Publications of the University of California, 1868-1918.) 1921 "Philosophy and Humanism," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XXIH, No. 3 (July, 1921), 298-318. "Read before the Kosmos Club of the University of California, April 4, 1921." 1922 "The Apotheosis of Mind in Modern Idealism," The Philosophical Reviewj Vol. XXXI, No. 3 (May, 1922), 215-236. "A fragment of a larger essay." "The Idea of Mutability in Literature," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (April, 1922), 129-151. 1923 "The Metaphysics of Critical Realism," pp. 167-194 in Issues and Tendencies in Contemporary Philosophy. Edited by George P. Adams and J. Loewenberg.

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Berkeley: University of California, 1923, Pp. 224. (University of California Publieations in Philosophy, VoL IV.) Read before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, March 30, 1923. "'The Metaphysics of Modern Scepticism," The Philosophical Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 3 (May, 1923), 278-288. "Read at the twenty-second meeting of the American Philosophical Association, in New York City, December 27, 1922."

1924 "Critical Realism: Can the Difficulty of Affirming a Nature Independent of Mind be Overcome by the Distinction between Essence and Existence?" pp. 86-105 in Concepts of Continuity; the Papers and Symposia for Discussion at the XIVth Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, at University College, Reading, July 11th-14th, 1924. London: Williams and Norgate, 1924. Pp. vi+240. (Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume IV.) "Read July 12, 1924." "The Idea of the Ultimate," pp. 81-111 in Essays in Metaphysics. Edited by George P. Adams and J. Loewenberg. Berkeley: University of California, 1924. Pp. 220. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. V.) Read before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, February 29, 1924. 1925 "Is Metaphysics Descriptive or Normative?" pp. 141-180 in Studies in the Problem of Norms. Edited by George P. Adams, J. Loewenberg and Stephen C. Pepper. Berkeley: University of California, 1925. Pp. 207. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. VII.) 1926 "The Metaphysical Status of Things and Ideas," pp. 109-144 in The Nature of Ideas. Edited by George P. Adams, J. Loewenberg and Stephen C. Pepper. Berkeley: University of California. 1926. Pp. 213. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. VIII.) "Philosophical Federalism," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XMIII, No. 20 (September 30, 1926), 533-545. "An essay review of William Peppereil Montague's The Ways of Knowing." 1927 "Pre-Analytical and Post-Analytical Data," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (January 6, 1927), 5-14. "Read at the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, Mills College, November 26, 1926." "Subject and Substance," pp. 3-32 in The Problem of Substance. Edited by George P. Adams, ]. Loewenberg and Stephen C. Pepper. Berkeley: University of California, 1927. Pp. 198. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. IX.)

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1928 "The Comic Spirit," North American Review, Vol. 225, No. 4 (April, 1928), 485-491. "The Fourfold Root of Truth," pp. 209-241 in The Problem ol Truth. Edited by George P. Adams, I. Loewenberg and Stephen C. Pepper. Berkeley: University of California, 1928. Pp. 236. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. X.) "The Paradox of Judgment," The lournal of Philosophy, Vol. XXV, No. 8 (April 12, 1928), 197-205. "Read at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association at Chicago, December, 1927." 1929 "Introduction," pp. ix-xliii in Selections. By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Edited by J. Loewenberg. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929. Pp. xliii +468. (The Modem Student's Library.) "Address," pp. 22-32 i n James Sutton: A Tribute; Addresses Delivered at the James Sutton Memorial Meeting, March the Third, Nineteen Hundred and Twenty-Nine. Berkeley: University of California, 1929. Pp. 32. "The Propositional Nature Of Truth," pp. 1-32 in Studies in the Nature of Truth. Edited By George P. Adams, J. Loewenberg and Stephen C. Pepper. Berkeley: University of California, 1929. Pp. 232. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. XI.) 1930 "An Alleged Escape from the Paradox of Iudgment," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXVII, No. 20 (September 25, 1930), 544-553. "Reply to a criticism by D. W. Gotshalk of 'The Paradox of Judgment'." "Are Relations Effable?" The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXVII, No. 12 (June 5, 1930), 309-319.

"Fifty Years of Saint Thomas," The Commonweal, Vol. XI, No. 10 (January 8, 1930), 272-274. "With some changes, the manuscript of an address delivered at Saint Mary's College, California, at the meeting held in commemoration of the encyclical letter [of Leo XlII]." "Problematic Realism," Vol. II, pp. 55-81 in Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal Statements. Edited by George P. Adams and William PeppereU Monhague. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930. 2 Vols. Reissued: New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1962. 2 Vols. "The Question of Priority," pp. 37-69 in Studies in the Problem of Relations. Edited by George P. Adams, J. Loewenberg and Stephen C. Pepper Berkeley: University of California, 1930. Pp. 217. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. KILL)

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1931 "De Angelis," The Philosophical Review, Vol. XL, No. 2 (March, 1931), 124-151. "Presidential address to the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association at Berkeley, California, December 31, 1930." "Philosophy and Literature," University of California Chronicle, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3 (July, 1931), 267-292. 1932 "The Elasticity of the Idea of Causality," pp. 3-37 in Causality. Edited by George P. Adams, J. Loewenberg and Stephen C. Pepper. Berkeley: University of California, 1932. Pp. 231. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. XV.)

"'The Factitiousness of Qualified Factuality," pp. 31-59 in Studies in the Nature of Facts. Edited by George P. Adams, J. Loewenberg and Stephen C. Pepper. Berkeley: University of California, 1932. Pp. 232. (University of California Publieations in Philosophy, Vol. XIV.) "Meyerson's Critique of Pure Reason," The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLI, No. 4 (July, 1932), 351-367. "Read to the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, Stanford University, December 28, 1931." 1934 "The Exoteric Approach to Hegel's 'Phenomenology,"' Mind, New Series, Vol. XLIII, No. 172 (October, 1934), 424-445. Part I of a two-part article; see "The Comedy of Immediacy in Hegel's 'Phenomenology."' "Possibility and Context," pp. 79-105 in Possibility. Edited by George P. Adams, J. Loewenberg and Stephen C. Pepper. Berkeley: University of California, 1934. Pp. 223. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. XVII.) 1935 "The Comedy of Immediacy in Hegel's 'Phenomenology'." Mind, New Series, Vol. XLIV, No. 173 (January, 1935), 21-38. Reprinted in Cross Currents, Vol. VI, No. 4 (Fall, 1956), 345-357. Part II of a two-part article; see "The Exoteric Approach to Hegel's 'Phenomenology."' "The Nonspeeious Present," pp. 121-148 in The Problem o/ Time. Edited by George P. Adams, J. Loewenberg and Stephen C. Pepper. Berkeley: University of California, 1935. Pp. 225. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. XVIII.) 1936 "The Discernment of Mind," pp. 87-112 in The Nature of Mind. Edited by George P. Adams, J. Loewenberg and Stephen C. Pepper. Berkeley: University of California, 1936. Pp. 232. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. XIX.)

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1937 "The Remoteness of the Individual," pp. 3-28 in The Problem of the Individual. Edited by George P. Adams, J. Loewenberg and Stephen C. Pepper. Berkeley: University of California, 1937. Pp. 206. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. XX.) 1938 Knowledge and Society; A Philosophical Approach to Modern Civilization. By George P. Adams, William R. Dennes, L Loewenberg, Donald S. Mackay, Paul Marhenke, Stephen C. Pepper, and Edward W. Strong. New York: D. AppletonCentury Company, Inc., 1938. Pp. xiii+417. (The Century Philosophy Series, edited by Sterling P. Lamprecht.) 1939 "Artifacts of Reason," pp. 45-74 in Reason. Edited by George P. Adams, J. Loewenberg and Stephen C. Pepper. Berkeley: University of California, 1939. Pp. 228. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. XXI.) Selected Writings in Philosophy; ,4 Companion Volume to Knowledge and Society. Compiled by George P. Adams, William R. Dennes, J. Loewenberg, Donald S. Mackay, Paul Marhenke, Stephen C. Pepper, and Edward W. Strong. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1939. Pp. 355. (The Century Philosophy Series, edited by Sterling P. Lamprecht.) 1940 "What is Empirical?" The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXXVII, No. 11 (May 23, 1940), 281-289. "Read at the joint meeting of the Eastern and Western Divisions of the American Philosophical Association, Columbia University, December 28, 1939." 1941 "Judgments of Fact and of Value in Relation to the War," pp. 1-34 in The Meaning of the War to the Americas; Lectures Delivered under the Auspices of the Committee on International Relations on the Los Angeles Campus of the University of California, 1941. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1941. Pp. 172. "Lecture delivered April 1, 1941." "Reflections on Recovery," The American Scholar, Vol. X, No. 3 (Summer, 1941), 298-314. 1949 Dialogues from Delphi. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949. Pp. x + 304. "First read before the Arts Club of the University of California." "Emerson Hall Revisited," Harvard Alumni Bulletin, Vol. LI, 1'4o. 8 (January 29, 1949), 348-351. "Originally prepared as an informal talk at a reception for the graduate students in philosophy at Harvard and Radcliffe." 1950 "The Futile Flight from Interpretation," pp. 169-197 in Meaning and Interpretation. Edited by George P. Adams, William R. Denues and Donald S.

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1955 "Education as a Plastic Art," Wells College Bulletin, Vol. XLI, No. 6 (June, 1955), [8-12]. Commencement address, May 30, 1955. Royce's Synoptic Vision; Published /or the Department o/ Philosophy of the Johns Hopkins University, on the Occasion of the Centenniel o/Royce's Birth, November 20, 1955. Baltimore: Department of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, 1955. Pp. 31. 1956 "Royce's Synthetic Method," The Journal o/ Philosophy, Vol. LIU, No. 3 (February 2, 1956), 63-72. "Read at the Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences, 38th semi-annual meeting, held at the New School for Social Research in New York City, Sunday, November 20, 1955." 1959 Reason and the Nature of Things; Reflections on the Cognitive Function of Philosophy. La Salle, IIIinois: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1959. Pp. 382. (The Paul Car'as Lectures, Ninth Series.) "The first three chapters were presented as Carus Lectures at the general meeting of the American Philosophical Association held at the University of Rochester in Rochester, New York, in December, 1953." 1965 Hege~s "Phenomenology:" Dialogues on the Life of the Mind. La Salle, Illinois. The Open Court Publishing Company, 1965. Pp xv+377. (The Open Court Library of Philosophy, edited by Eugene Freeman.) 1968 Thrice-Born; Selected Memories of an Immigrant. New York: Hobbs-Dorman and Company, Inc., 1968. Pp. viii+202.

Franz Brentano and Intentional Inexistence Linda L. McAlister Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970, pp. 423-430 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

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Franz Brentano and Intentional Inexistence L I N D A L. McALISTER

FRANZBRnrCrXr~O,in his important early work Psychologie vom empirischen Stand, punkt (1874), maintains that all human experience is divided into two classes: mental phenomena and physical phenomena, x It is then incumbent upon him to show how these two classes of phenomena are to be distinguished one from another. In Book II, Chapter 1, of the Psychologie, he devotes him.self to this task, and in the course of the chapter he surveys several different ways of making out the distinction. After enumerating examples of men~l phenomena and of physical phenomena, he searches for defining characteristics of mental phenomena. He finds several charac, teristics which he thinks all mental phenomena have and all physical phenomena lack or vice versa, but far and away the most important of these, in Brentano's estimation, and the one whdch has aroused the most interest on the part of later philosophers, is what he calls "intentional inexistence," 2 (or merely "intentional existence"; the prefix "in-" does not indicate negation but rathor location, indicating existence in the mind). As examples of mental phenomena Brentano lists first ideas or presentations (Vorstellungen), whether sensory or issuing from the imagination, and by this he meam not the objects which are presented or which one has before one's mind, but rather the condition or, what Brentano; broadly speaking, calls the act of having such an idea or presentation. 3 Thus the acts of hearing something, or seeing or perceiving something would be mental phenomena regardless of whether the object which is, e. g., seen, ds perceived through the visual organs or seen in the mind's eye, so to speak. Other examples are acts of judgment, among which Brentano includes ~:emembering, inferring, believing, doubting; and emotions .such as being happy or sad, lovi~,g and hating, along with which Brentano includes such things as willing, intending, choosing, etc. 4

i Oskar Kraus, e.d., 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1924), I, 109. Psych. I, 137. Psych. I, 111. " Psych. I, 112. [423]

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ExamFles of physical phenomena which Brentano mentions are "a color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I perceive; as well as similar images which a p p e a r in the imagination." s It appears from the examFles, then, that mental p h e n o m e n a are all mental acts, in a broad sense, while physical phenomena are, strictly speaking, all instances of sensible qualities, the inclusion of "a landscape" being, apparently, a slip on Brentano's part, as his student, friend and editor Oskar K r a u s points out. 6 As mentioned above, Brentano thought that there is one partieula~ m a r k of mental p h e n o m e n a which characterizes them better than any other: Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (by which you should not take me to mean a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something in itself as an object, though they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affmned or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. 7 Commentators, perhaps not surprisingly, have disagreed as to the precise nature of the view which Brentano is enunciating in this passage, s Some have supposed that since you can think of, hate, or judge, etc., things which do not exist, e.g., Pegasus, then the immanent object of which Brentano speaks i,s not Pegasus but a "thoughtof Pegasus" (gedachtes Pegasus) which exists in one's mind whenever someone th'mks of Pegasus. Apparently H6fler interpreted the doctrine in this way in a paper which he presented to the Fifth International Psychology Congress in 1905. 9 .In the light of some passages from Brentano's early writings it appears to be a plausible interpretation. Consider, for example, the following passage: There cannot be anyone who contemplates an A unless there is a contemplated A; and conversely . . . . The two concepts are not identical but they are correlative. Neither one can correspond to anything in reality unless the other does as well. But only one of these is the concept of a thing--the concept of something which can act and be acted upon. The second is the concept of a being which is only a sort of accompaniment to the first; when the first thing comes into being, and when it ceases to be, then so too does the second. 1~ s Psych. I, 112. e Psych. I, 112. r Psych. I, 124-125. I follow Chisholm in translating "RealiSt" as "thing." See Brentano, The True and the Evident, trans. R. M. Chisholm and others (New York, 1966), p. vii. Hereafter cited as True and Evident.

s Apparently some people misunderstood this passage so thoroughly as to think that Brentano meant by "objects" purposes or ends, and by "acts" the impulses which strive toward those ends. See Psych. II, 8, and John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (London, 1966), p. 180. See True and Evident, pp. 77, 165-166. 20 True and Evident, p. 27.

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Such a passage might well lead one to think that Brentano would identify the mental act as "someone's contemplating A " and the immanent object as a "contemplated A," i.e., as a mental entity distinct from any A outside the mind. But this is a strange view on which it would seem to follow that one can only love, desire, think of, judge, etc. one's own mental contents and never anything exteraal to the mind to which those mental contents might correspond. Bxentano, however, explieity repudiates the interpretation just described, in a letter to his friend and student Anton Marty, dated March 17, 1905. Though written dttring Brentano's later philosophical period, the crucial parts of thi~ letter refer back to his earlier position which we are discussing. In an attempt to clarify this position he says: it has never been my view that the immanent object is identical with "thought-of object." What we think is the o b j e c t or t h i n g and not the "thought-of object." If, in our thought, we contemplate a horse, our thought has as its immanent object--not a "contemplated horse," but a horse. And strictly speaking only the horse---not the "contemplated horse"---can be called an object. 11 But the object need not exist. The person thinking may have something as the object of his thought even though that thing does not exist, x2 So Brentano is insisting that by "immanent object" he does not mean some mental entity which is distinct from the object outside the mind (if there is such an object); he meant only to ,indicate that the object need not actually exist in order to be the object of an intentional act; intentional existence suffices. H e goes on to say he allowed . . . [himself] the term "immanent object" in order to say, not that the object exists, but that it is an object whether or not there is anything which corresponds to it. Its being an object, however, is merely the linguistic correlate of the person having it as object, i.e. his thinking of it in his experience, x3 Now how can we reconcile these disclaimers o~ Brentano's part with the passage quoted above in which he s e e m e d to be saying that, e.g., a thought-of object was what he meant by "immanent" or "intentional" object? Could Brentano be mistaken when he says that he has never held such a view? Both Kraus and Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand seem to think so, for they say that by the time this 'letter to Marty was written, his earlier view had become so foreign to Brentano that he questioned whether he had ever even held it. x4 Roderick Chisholm follows 11 True and Evident, pp. 77-79; also reprinted in Die A b k e h r vom Nichtrealen, ed. Franziska Mayer'-Hillebrand (Bern, 1966), pp. 119-121. Hereafter citeXt as Abkehr. x~ True and Evident, pp. 77-78; translation altered sfightly by me. is True and Evident, p. 78. 1, True and Evident, p. 154; ,4bkehr, p. 407.

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Kraus in this interpretation of Brentano's position, although he, at least, seems to appreciate the awkwardness of attributing to Brentano a position which he quite explicitly says he never held. It is m y belief that one should m a k e every effort to avoid this conclusion if at all possible, on the grounds that it is unlikely, to say the 'least, that a philosopher would forget ever having held a view which, according to his interpreters, he is supposed to have held for twenty years or more. As far as I can see, the only point on which the letter to Marty specifically depnrts from the earlier passages is this: in the earlior passage Brentano maintained that "someone's contemplating A '1 and the "contemplated A " are correlative concepts; in the letter of 1905 he calls the "contemplated A " merely a linguistic, i.e., a grammatical, correlate. T h e reason for th~s change is that b y then he had come to believe that we can have concepts only of things, and while both A and the person contemplating A m a y be things in Brentano's sense, a contemplated A is a nonthing, a NiChtreale. In the letter to Marty, however, Bxentano xtowhere denies that he had once said that the two were conceptual correlates; he denies, rather, that he ever said that anything such as a "contemplated A " is the immanent or intentional object of a mental act. Hence I see no compelling reason for claiming that Brentano had forgotten his earlier view nor for saying he has changed his position on this matter. He gives us a further clue which seems to confirm that he saw no difficulty about saying simultaneously that there is a correlative concept of a perceived object whenevex there is an act of perceiving and that such an entity is not the immanent or intentional object of the perceptual act; he tells us that his view of the matter is the same as Aristotle's, 1~ and in the M e t a p h y s i c s we find Aristotle saying: Knowable and thinkable things are rdative because something else is referred to them. For something to be thinkable indicates that there is a thought to refer to it; but it is not the case that the thought is relative to what is being thought, for this would be saying the same thing twice. Similarly, seeing is seeing some thing, not just seeing what is seen, although it is of course true to say this; but seeing is relative to color or to some other thing of the sort, for it would be saying the same thing in two ways to say "seeing the seen." 17 Thus Brentano and Aristotle are in agreement here that whenever someone, e.g., thinks of x, it is true that there is a correlative thought-of x, but they view this as triviakly ,ta~ue, and they both deny that a thought-of x ~s the object of the act of thinking. The object is, rather, x. What Aristotle does not mention here, that Brentano adds, is that x can be referred to in this way even when it does not actually exist. 1~ " B r e n t a n o and Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional," in Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. Maurice H. Mandclbaum and Edward N. Leo (Baltimore, 1967), p. 11. ~s True and Evident, p. 79.

~7 1021 a 29-1021

b 4; m y

,translation.

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Brentano reiterates his affinity with Aristotle on this point elsewhere in the letter in an attempt to further elucidate his position. This xeference to Aristotle helps to explain how the object of a thought, for example, could at the same time be something which, if it exists at all, is external to the mind, and yet still be related to the mind which thinks it. H e notes that Aristotle says that in sense perception the form of the object is received by the senses without the matter, and likewise the intellect receives the intelligible form in abstraction from the matter. Bxentano here remarks to Marty, "Wasn't his thinking essentially the same as ours?" 18 As Brentano seems to have understood the doctrine, though the immanent object in the case of someone ,~eeirig or thinking of a horse ,is a horse, nonetheless, as immanent object it has a different "mode of being" than it has when it is completely unrelated to a mind as object of a mentai act. The similarity between Brentano's doctrine and the intentional inexistence of the Scholastics comes to mind here as well. Compare the following passage from St. Thomas Aquinas's commentary on the relevant passage in Aristotle's D e A n i m a : . . . sense receives the form without the matter since form has a different mode of being in sense perception than it has in the sensible thing. For in the sensible thing it has intentional being, x9 So we are dealing here with two different modes of being which objects may have: actual existence and intentional existence which is, as Chisholm puts it, "short of actuality, but more than nothingness . . . . ,, z0 I may, for example, think about a white horse and there may actually be a white horse which I am thinking about. If so, this horse has actual existence, but it also has intentional existence because when I think about the horse it acquires, in addition to its actual existence, a kind of existence in my mind which it did not have previous to anyone's thinking about it. And what is more, even if there were no actually existing white horses at all, a white horse could still be the object of my thought, for a white horse begins to exist intentionally the instant I begin to think of it. This interpretation of Brentano's doctrine of intentional inexistence differs from that of Kraus, H~ifler, Mayer-Hiltebrand, and that of Chisholm, who is inclined to follow them on this point. It is perhaps presumptous of me to disagree with those such as Kraus who had close personal contact with Brentano over a long period of years. On the other hand, it seems to rr/e even more presumptous to reject Brentano's own testimony as to what his position was in favor of theirs. Chisholm, who is aware of this dilemma, suggests an alternative interpretation in an attempt to a8 True and Evident, p. 78. Mayer-Hillebrand has deleted this remark, with no explanation whatsoever, from the text she published in A bkehr. ~9 Aristotlis Librum de Anima, ed. P. R. A. M. Pirotta (Taurini, 1948), 3rd ed., No. 553, p. 138; my translation. 20 "Intentionality," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York, 1967), IV, 201.

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reconcile Brentano's early writings with his later explications of them. This interpretation is as follows: (1) an actual intentionally inexistent unicorn is produced when one thinks about a unicorn; (2) one's thought, however, is not directed upon this actual intentionally inexistent unicorn; and yet (3) it is in virtue o / t h e existence of the intentionally inexistent unicorn that one's thought may be said to be directed upon a unicorn. 2x I do not believe that this interpretation wiil do, either, however, for though it is correct insofar as it says that the object of thought is a unicorn when one thinks of a unicorn, Chisholm still seems to assume that "intentionally inexistent unicorn" means "thought-of unicorn," and is somehow different from the unicorn which is thought. This then leaves Chisholm wondering, "What point would there be in supposing there is the inexistent unicorn?" 22 if the object of thought is the unicorn, simpliciter. The fact of the matter is that Brentano pointedly denied that "intentionally inexistent unicorn" means "thought-of unicorn": "It has never been my view that the immanent object is identical with the thought-of object," and he regarded such a view as utter foolishness. 23 The solution to this problem of interpretation and an explanation of why Brentano thought the view his students attributed to hi~a was so absurd is to be found in a consideration of his early views coaaeerui'ng relations. In the Psychologie, after all, Brentano is advancing the thesis that a defining characteristic of mental phenomena is that they are relational. What does this imply, according to Brentano? From a consideration of various kinds of relations he had become convinced that all relations share a certain characteristic, namely that in a relation such as "x R y," both x and y have to exist. As he puts it, If you consider a relation of comparison, for example, "larger than," or "smaller than," it must be the case that if the larger thing exists, the smaller thing exists as well. If a house is larger than another house, the other house must exist and have a size. And What is true for relations of comparison is true for all cause and effect relations as well. For there ~o be such a relation both that which causes as well as that which is caused must exist. 24 Whether or not his view is correct even for the sorts of relations mentioned may be debatable, but Brentano was convinced at the time that it was true, and then he reasoned by analogy that if mental acts are relations, they, too, must hold between two existent things. But Brentano had already noted that the object of a mental act need not actually exist. How then is Brentano able to maintain that mental 2x "Brentano on Descriptive Psych.," p. 11. 22 "Brentano on Descriptive Psych.," p. 11. ~ True and Evident, p. 77. 24 Psych. H, 134.

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phenomena are relational when it is patently obvious that we often think of centaurs, unicorns, etc., which do not exist? Kraus and the others have interpreted Brentano's early solution to this app~ent problem regarding the relational ch~aeter of mental phenomena to be as follows: If "y" stands for a centaur, then there can be no such relation "x R y," for the object term in the relation must stand for something which exists. It must be the case, therefore, that the mental act of thinking about a centaur is really a relation of the form "x R (thought-of y)," because although y does not exist, a thought-of y surely may. But Brentano could not have held such a view, even though he thought that there are entities such as "thought-of y's" because, on his account, a thought-of y comes into being as a correlate of the act of thinking of y. But if y itself does not exist, then, on his theory of relations, there could be no act of thinking of y to produce the correlative thought-of y. Chisholm's alternative interpretation also seems to fail to take into consideration the strictures Brentano's view of relations impose upon him, and would have him saying that "x R y" can be a relation even though y does not actually exist, somehow in virtue of an actually existing thought-of y. But he cannot explain what this "in virtue of" amounts to. Rather, what I believe Brentano means is this: in the case of, for example, someone thinking about a centaur, "x R y" is a genuine relation because, even though the centaur does not have actual existence, it does have another mode of existence, intentional existence, but existence nonetheless, and hence the requirement that relations obtain only between what exists is satisfied. I do not mean to deny that Brentano also thought, at this time, that entities such as "thought-of centaurs," do indeed exist. He believed that they do, as a matter of fact, acquire actual existence whenever centaurs, etc., are thought of, just as Aristotle claimed in the passage quoted above. But this fact has no bearing at al! on the present question. Confusion on the role played by such entities has been responsible, it seems to me, for the repeated misinterpretation of Brentano's intentionality thesis. Such entities certainly are thought by Brentano to be objects Of mental acts in some situations, but these are more complex cases and not simple, straightforward mental acts in which one subject thinks of, judges, or loves, etc., a single object. Rather, these entities play a part in cases, for example, in which I think of Jones thinking of a centaur. Then my objects of thought are Jones and a thought-of (by Jones) centaur. Furthermore, Brentano believed that once one has the concept of a thought-of centaur yon can think of a thought-of centaur without thinking of the person who is thinking about the centaur. But such cases are dependent upon someone's (for example, Jones') being able to have centaurs, simpliciter, as objects of mental acts, and this in turn depends upon centaurs and the like having intentional existence if mental acts are relational as claimed. In Brentano's later thought a transformation in his views about relations goes hand in hand with a transformation of his intentionality doctrine. So we see that what Brentano's early intentionality doctrine amounts tO is the

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claim that all m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a are acts which refer to objects whether those objects have both actual and intentional existence or intentional existence alone; they are acts which either bestow a m o d e of existence on an object which has n o actual existence, or add a second m o d e of existence to an object which does actually exist already. It is B r e n t a n o ' s contention that all mental p h e n o m e n a have this characteristic, and no non-mental, i.e., no physical p h e n o m e n o n shows anything like it. I n this paper, I have not been concerned with investigating whether or not this claim is true, but only trying to get straight a b o u t what it is B r e n t a n o was claiming. T h e historical importance of Brentano's suggestion is attested to by: the tremendous interest it has aroused a m o n g philosophers in the century which has followed. It is a live question today whether the notion of intentionality provides any adequate means of differentiating the mental f r o m the physical, but one which it is b e y o n d the scope of this paper to investigate. 25 B r o o k l y n College 01 the C i t y University o f N e w Y o r k

2~ For an outline of the issues which have been raised on this topic and a selected bibliography, see Chisholm, "Intentionality," Encyclopedia o/ Philosophy, IV, 201 If.

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Le origini del metodo analitico: il Cinquecento (review) Charles B. Schmitt Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970, pp. 475-477 (Review) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

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whereas in some texts Aquinas explicitly teaches that the higher senses of vision and hearing are the ones that mainly (praecipue, principaliter) lead to aesthetic experience. t5 Moreover, the statement that only in the thirteenth century was the question of the distinction between the higher and lower senses explicitly raised (p. l13f.), is true only if the author meant to exclude the pre-medieval or patristic as well as the ancient period of philosophy. 16 Finally, there is one technical weakness in this book that cannot be left unmentioned. The overwhelming majority of references are not to the original medieval texts treated and/or quoted in the three-volume edition, but to the number of volume and page in that edition. Thus the reader must be both familiar with French and in possession of the original three-volume work, or remain hopelessly frustrated every time he wishes to consult the original texts or at least know which texts are being mentioned. Yet, if one knows French, he does not need the English translation; and if he is also fortunate enough to have access to the original three-volume version, he will not need the abridged version of the original work at all. For this reason, should there be a second edition of this translation, the references should be changed from the l~tudes to the original medieval works. Although the negative remarks are more lengthy in this review than the positive evaluation is, it would be a grave mistake to conclude from this that the defects outweigh the value of the book. As a matter of fact, upon finishing the reading of this translation of De Bruyne's work, this reviewer was left with the conviction that, in the final balance, the reader can only greatly benefit from this work, and we all owe gratitude to the translator for having made this highly informative work available in the English language. FRANCIS J. KOVACH University of Oklahoma 1~ Summ. theol. I-II,27,1,ad 3; In Psalm. 44,2. ~6 Cf. Plato, Hipp. maL 298 A; Gorg. 474 D; Leg. XII, 961 D; Aristotle, De an. III,3, 429a 3; Augustine, De lib. arb. II,7, 16-19; 14,38; De ord. II, ll, etc.

L e origini del metodo analitico: il Cinquecento. By Angelo Crescini. (Udine: Del Bianco, 1965. Published by the Istituto di Filosofia, Facnlt~ di Lettere e Filosofia of the Universit~ degli Studi di Trieste. Pp. 340. L 5,000)

Professor Crescini has certainly picked a topic of great interest upon which to write. Recent students of Renaissance logic such as N. W. Gilbert, V. Mufioz Delgado, W. Ong, G. Papuli, W. Risse, and C. Vasoli have pointed out the vitality and significance associated with the development of the logical thought of the period. The general question of methodology has produced an enormous scholarly literature in recent years, I but much remains to be done before we fully understand how various methodologies have evolved and what relation philosophical discussions of method have had to the actual practice of science. Therefore, it would be most desirable to have a 1 For further information see Laurens Laudan, "Theories of Scientific Method from Plato to Mach: A Bibliographical Review," History of Science 7 (1968), 1-63.

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detailed, comprehensive, and accurate study of the evolution of analytic method during the sixteenth century, particularly in view of the significance taken on by such a methodology with the 'rise of modern science'. With such a background in view the reviewer comes to this volume in anticipation of being generally enlightened on various matters. Unfortunately, Crescini's book is on the whole disappointing, although nearly everyone will find the odd bit of information of which he was not previously aware. It definitely does not, however, establish a solid foundation for later studies. The book is organized into three principal parts, dealing with the development of the analytic method in logic (pp. 21-188), in the natural sciences (pp. 189-284), and in mathematics (vv. 285-328). The first section treats discussions of the topic among writers on logical subject, under which heading are included 'humanist' logicians such as Agricola, Vices, Ramus, and Nizolius, as well as logicians of the so-called School of Padua. Practitioners of the 'analytic method' in the natural sciences, according to Crescini, include such diverse figures as Paracelsus, Vesalius, Bruno, Copernicus, and Gilbert. The final section discusses the use of the method in mathematicians such as Tartaglia and Vi~te. Such categorization is, of course, not without its dangers; for example, it is not clear why Capivaeci should be considered under the section on logic, while Akakia is included under the section on the natural sciences. The latter's published works are all translations of Galen, one of which contains a commentary; Capivaeei wrote on a wide range of medical topics, including methodology. How do Francisco Sanches and Giordano Bruno fit into the discussion of analytic method in the natural sciences? 2 Moreover, one does not immediately see why Creseini's analysis of Sanches is confined to the well-known Quod nihil scitur and bypasses what would seem to be his more relevant medical and scientific writings. In short such categorization raises too many questions, although a few of the authors discussed, e.g., Fracastoro and Cardano, are considered under two of the headings. It is also unclear why certain figures, e.g., Vesalius, are included in the way they are. Although the great Flemish anatomist certainly championed direct and repeated observation, did he, strictly speaking, have much to say about analytic method, as the term is normally understood? Here, another shortcoming of Crescini's book becomes apparent. He consistently fails to consult much of the recent secondary literature on the figures he is discussing. Consequently, in the case of Vesalius the only secondary work cited is Thorndike's general History of Magic and Experimental Science, which, of course, plays down Vesalius' originality vis-a-vis earlier anatomists. O'Malley, who has studied the matter with care, makes a particular effort to place Vesalius in the proper context and it would seem more judicious to follow his findings unless one has reason to do otherwise. The volume is riddled through with things which cause surprise. Few contemporary logicians would agree with the characterization of Prantl as a 'grande logico tedesco' 2 It has recently been found that Bruno owned a copy of Sanches' Quod nihil scitur (Lyons, 1581), thus establishing a closer connection between them than has previously been possible. See Andrzej Nowicki, "Un autografo inedito di Giordano Bruno in Polonia," Atti dell'Accademia di $cienze morali e politiche della Soeiet~ Nazionale di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti in Napoli, 78 (1967), 3-9. This, however, does nothing to make Bruno a 'scientist', except in the vaguest of senses.

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(p. 32), although some might consider him to have been an important historian of logic. I am not certain that citing Carnap and Heideggar (p. 75) can do much to clarify Vires. When one reads 'Henrique Estienne' and "Hipotiposes pirronicas" (p. 266) in an Italian book he is a bit taken aback and wonders whether the author has done his homework. The writer missed a golden opportunity to connect Galileo to the tradition, for his still unpublished Quaestiones on logic and the De motu (both written before 1600) have many interesting comments which tie in directly with the material developed in this volume. This could have provided an excellent bridge to the next'century, when the analytic method began to take a more central role in scientific and methodological discussions. There is still room for a number of studies on the evolution of the analytic method during the Renaissance. Unfortunately Crescini's study barely scratches the surface of this immense subject. Let us hope that his book will at least have the effect of encouraging others to treat the matter with more care, in greater depth, and more exhaustively. The volume is provided with a preface by Giorgio Radetti, who claims more for it than it actually provides, as well as noting that it is the first part of a more comprehensive study by the same author on the formation of the analytic method in Cartesian philosophy (p. 5). The book has a useful index, but unfortunately no bibliography. CHARLES B. ScxiMrrr The University of Leeds

Le thomisme et la pens#e italienne de la Renaissance. By Paul Oskar Kristeller. Conference Albert-le-Grand 1965. (Montr6ah Institut d'~tudes m~di~vales, and Paris: Vrin, 1967. Pp. 287. $6) Surprisingly little is known about the later history of Thomism. This brief but very rich lecture by Professor Kristeller, renowned historian of Italian Renaissance philosophy, examines one period in the later career of St. Thomas' thought. This study, based chiefly on unpublished source material, shows that Thomas was very much present to both the humanists and to the academic philosophers during the Renaissance. Such leading humanists as Lorenzo Valla, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, and Marsilio Ficino, quote St. Thomas frequently and with approval. Even the unfavorable attitudes of Ermolao Barbaro or Baptista Mantuanus show that Thomas was already the most celebrated of mediaeval philosophers. The professors of philosophy at Italian universities, such as Pierre Pomponazzi, speak of Thomas with great respect and regard his theology as in conformity with the truths of faith, even when they reject his philosophy as being in disaccord with the authentic teaching of Aristotle. St. Thomas made a continuous contribution to the development of Renaissance theology and philosophy. Yet the principal Italian thinkers did not follow him strictly nor fall under his exclusive influence. Thomas is merely one of the most important sources, not the prevailing influence, in Renaissance thought. Ficino, for example, is

The Chicago Pragmatists (review) Van Meter, b. 1898 Ames Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970, pp. 496-501 (Review) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

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which all other, lesser people must either be annihilated or incorporated into this one authentic humanity which is destined to achieve its fulfillment as the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom of God is no otherworldly Kingdom, but is the ultimate goal of human history itseLf; the unification of the entire human race in one mind and heart. This goal of ultimate historical fulfillment of mankind is the true meaning of that which was expressed symbolically in the idea of the Universal Church, and it is that total communion of all things prefigured in the Eucharist. Christian society, qua-panEuropean society, is the historical vehicle of this new humanity. Toward this society Chaadayev can say, in all stark affront to his own native land and church: "in spite of all its incompleteness, vice and guilt, in European society as it is today, it is nonetheless true that the reign of God is realized in it to some extent, for it contains the principle of indefinite progress and it possesses the seeds and elements of all that is needed for this reign to one day be definitively established on earth" (lst letter, p. 48). For Russia to incorporate herself into the Western European soul is then, for Chaadayev, nothing less than an exhortation to join that progressive triumph of the new humanity which the divine Logos has initiated from the beginning, renewed and guides toward its final goal. ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER

Howard University

The Chicago Pragmatists. By Darnell Rucker. (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1969. Pp. 200. $6) Professor Rucker gives an excellent account of what the University of Chicago was in the beginning, under the leadership of the philosophy department. There will be nothing like it again without such cooperative inquiry; and "some aesthetic or ethical or scientific value will have to gain at least equal status with the profit motive." We must marvel at an "Institution that produced acknowledged schools of philosophy, psychology, education, religion, sociology, and political science." We see "what an intellectual community might be." What William James hailed in 1903 as the Chicago School had made its mark in the first ten years with Dewey and Mead, Tufts, Moore, and Ames, in close relation with psychology and education, originally in the same department with philosophy, all headed by Dewey. His ideas were disseminated especially through the University's Elementary School, where scholars from all over the campus came to watch and teach, and learn the new philosophy. As Rucker says, Chicago pragmatism was close to that of James in teaching the practical character of knowledge, but nearer Peirce in the "conception and use of the method of science." Activity was central, understood in psychological and ethical terms, but "directly connected to the biological concept of function, the notion of organic process." This meant emphasis on growth, tentative ends, and progressive change. Backing that philosophy were millions of dollars from John D. Rockefeller, much support from many Chicago citizens, and President Harper's tremendous drive. He started with eight ex-presidents of colleges and universities, fifteen top scientists taken from G. Stanley Hall's collection at Clark University (who never forgave the raid), and eminent figures

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from a dozen other institutions. Freedom to work in a university breaking from the past, in a city on the move, was the lure more than money. Diverse opportunities were provided for inquiry, and a "vast laboratory for-testing solutions." Though the University was founded primarily by and for Baptists, it was free of religious requirements, and Baptist control was gradually relinquished. Harper's original intention was to build up especially his own subject of Semitics, with classics and philosophy. The Clark windfall, in addition to Dewey in philosophy, after others had declined, led rather accidentally to a great center of science and science-oriented thought. "'On the other hand, Harper brought the first student of religion into the Department of Philosophy," Edward Scribner Ames, who received its first Ph. D. in 1895. His pioneering in the psychology of religion, with Harper's critical approach to Bible study, did much to develop liberal religion. Several thinkers outside the philosophy department, mostly in the Divinity School, were working in the same direction, for which the University became famous (and infamous). It is clear that Ames "really tested his ideas in the realm of religion" in his church, including his idea that "God is a functional concept growing out of the social development of a people," with nothing supernatural about it. Like his humanist friend and colleague. A. Eustace Haydon, he made religion natural while keeping it religious. Rucker remarks that the Ames congregation was unusual, but does not mention that among members from the University were T. V. Smith and Ellsworth Faris, also Robert Park who came more regularly and sometimes led a discussion after the sermon. Dewey, like Ames, accepted "the social origin of religion," and agreed that "the religious attitude should permeate a man's whole life." Dewey's saying, in keeping with his own thought that the term God might be used for the "active relation between ideal and actual" is similar to Ame's idea that men "use God to unify their highest values and to make those values more effective in their activities." But Dewey differed from Ames in disliking the noun "'religion," which to him meant churches, with dogmas including the supernatural. To him the adjective "religious" meant an experience of reverence for high ideals denoting "nothing in the way of a specifiable entity, either institutional or as a system of beliefs." He did not see what Ames found in his own church and in community churches: an openminded empirical association in the scientific spirit, involved in good causes. Dewey conceded the possibility that churches might be religious, but was afraid they would continue to turn the "religious" into "religion." James H. Tufts took religion seriously in a more orthodox way, but did not undertake a systematic treatment of it. "Mead shared Dewey's distrust of churches," yet appreciated the social function of religion in keeping alive the hope of better communities, in the midst of those we have, with the aid of symbols and ceremonials. It is strange that Dewey thought the values of the religious attitude could be sustained without embodiment--perhaps because he did not think this through. His major interests were elsewhere. He and Mead made early contributions to psychology, before that subject became a separate department in 1905. When the philosophers turned toward logical theory they assigned only one stage of the act to psychology. They no longer regarded psychology as the comprehensive science of reality, and spoke of "experience" rather than "consciousness" as reality, The psychical now was marked as the problematic phase

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of experience. For Mead, thought arises when activity is blocked and seeks a solution in a means of overcoming the diff~ulty. Inductive logic consists of setting up and verifying hypotheses for a solution. The elements in a situation of conflict become subjective or psychical when no longer functioning objectively as immediate stimuli, until they can become objective again, as the activity is enabled to move on. At the psychological stage, before a satisfactory universal is reached, the values involved may be enjoyed aesthetically, especially when an artist gives them sensuous form. When, instead of solving a particular problem, the concern is to consider the self as a whole, in relation to the whole context of the act, there is a shift to the ethical. Discussion of all the stages in the reflective process is the province of general theory of logic. So there is overlapping. Dewey and his colleagues in philosophy agreed in general with this analysis of Mead's. It meant a revolt against dualism as bad metaphysics, because such distinctions as mind and matter, subject and object, though useful in context, become false abstractions from experience when set up as absolutes. Mind or the mental is not set off as another kind of existence, but simply as the problem-solving aspect of activity. Rucker does not mention that, while Mead was away, the author of The Revolt Against Dualism, Arthur O. Lovejoy, came for a quarter to Chicago, and we students got him to agree to stay over a couple of days after his stint was over, for a confrontation with Mead before the .philosophy club. We were disappointed that Lovejoy left suddenly, on account of the illness of his mother. Brusque as his bristly pompadour, he was dubbed "the Little Torpedo," from his bee-lining into the lecture room, heading straight for the desk where he whirled to face us, firing off some of his fifty-seven definitions of "nature." There was consternation as well as amusement when he assigned term papers assuming as much familiarity with Latin if not Greek as with French and German. But the lonely bachelor was surprisingly unforbidding in the evening when he sought out students in their rooms and shared his detective stories. Mead, in developing his social psychology, saw the reflective act arising within an unconscious biological and social process, culminating in gestures whereby one form could take the attitude of another, so that language, human selves, and society were possible. His famous course in social psychology, given rather differently from year to year, drew not only students registered for the course but auditors from far and wide. The complaint of Elisworth Faris that Mind, Self and Society was not written by Mead need not be taken seriously, in view of the fact that it does give Mead's account of the genesis of the self, which is worthy of standing beside Darwin's Origin of Species. The Mead volume rests upon a stenographic record in addition to student notes of more than one season, much as the teaching of Aristotle and Hegel was preserved. Though Mead kept regarding his ideas as provisional, he warned his students not to follow his example but to put their ideas on paper and get them published, then revise them later. At the last he was often at the typewriter in his office, trying to make up for lost time. Chairing the department in his final year, he was fatally distracted by trouble from the young President Hutchins. Mead's Carus Lectures were written mostly on the train to San Francisco at Christmas time. He died in the following spring of 1931. The next fall he would have moved to Columbia. Tension in the Chicago philosophy department built up. When succeeding Tufts as chairman, Mead rejected a Hutchins

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appointment in philosophy and advised anyone dissatisfied with the Hutchins view of the department to look elsewhere. Ames, with his church, had reason to stay on and try to save the situation. Mead would have left, had he lived. Tufts went to UCLA. Moore had retired and died. Burtt, Murphy, and Hall went to other posts. So 1931 saw almost the end of the Chicago School. Like thinking was carried on by Dewey at Columbia, Hu Shih in China, Horace Kallen at the New School, C. I. Lewis at Harvard, Charles Morris, first at Chicago and then at Florida, A. P. Brogan, E. T. Mitchell, Clarence E. Ayres, and David L. Miller in Texas, George Geiger at Antioch. Ernest Nagd and Sidney Hook, both students of the unpragmafic Morris R. Cohen, became devoted exponents of Dewey's philosophy in contacts with him at Columbia. But Rucker is right that the example of the original Chicago group "serves mainly as a source of wonder." Tufts was the most erudite. Strong on history, he early translated Winddband. He may have stepped around pragmatism like a cat avoiding a pool of water, according to a crack that went around, but was more appreciative of his colleagues' work than this would suggest. His part of the Dewey and Tufts Ethics was substantial. A Tufts course on American political institutions led him to observe that, whereas Louis XIV left Versailles to show for his extravagant spending, what this country had to show was a school system attempting to educate everyone. In aesthetics Tufts had a sociological approach, in addition to Lipps and Volkelt. (Dewey confessed not having read the German aestheticians before writing on art himself.) A Tufts seminar in aesthetics, dominated by his rugged head like a New England rock smiling, included Charles Morris, then much concerned with the dance, and painter Agnes Potter van Rijn who invited the seminar to gather in her studio on Fifty-seventh Street. Kate Gordon's Esthetics shows the kind of thinking provoked in her. Flaming-haired Rayna Raphadson, whose candle burned at both ends, wrote a term paper for him in an ethics seminar which he published in 1922 in his International Journal of Ethics. She gave a spirited defense of hedonism against the social responsibility he taught while practicing it in civic affairs. Addison W. Moore introduced students in a refreshing manner to Greek philosophy, metaphysics, and instrumental logic. He entertained them genially at home. Despite frail health, he ably championed pragmatism against attacks, as in his book, Pragmatism and its Critics. After Dewey had left for Columbia in 1905, his influence continued at Chicago, especially through his friendship with Mead. Dewey and Mead are so linked that it would be impossible to say of much of their thinking that it originated with one rather than the other. Rucker notes that Human Nature and Conduct develops Mead's 1903 article on "The Definition of the Psychical;" also that points in Mead's 1926 "The Nature of Aesthetic Experience" are developed in Art as Experience. Dewey's emphasis upon recovering continuity between art and life is akin to Mead's view that under favorable conditions (which unfortunately are not normal) men will work freely at putting things together with a sustaining sense of the outcome. Dewey, if not Mead, put too much stress upon completing a creative process in order to achieve art. Dewey did not allow for the delight often found in the unfinished, or for a considerable change of direction during work in progress. His marking down of "found objects" as inherently inferior to man-made things, and failure to foresee the spread

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o f chance procedures and improvisation throughout the arts, put him o u t o f step with today's aesthetics. Perhaps because he was n o t enough at home in this field, Dewey made pronouncements out of keeping with his general openness to new insights a n d turns of experience. It might have helped if he had been as careful in Art as Experience, as he was in A Common Faith, to favor adjective and adverb over noun, Then he might have been more willing to accept what men actually do when they work artistically instead of allowing himself to separate art from non-art and thus from life, as in insisting upon wholeness, completeness, and singleness of quality. H o w We Think again is close to Mead. On education M e a d and Dewey were so near that the Meads edited The School and Society. There was entire agreement of the social nature Of learning, and upon inclusion of the m a n u a l arts, since intellect is n o t a detached faculty. M e a d was especially concerned with the education of immigrazits who were up against much the same barriers faced b y Negro and Puerto Rican children in Chicago today. R u c k e r brings out Mead's deep involvement in community problems, but his aloofness from Students is overdrawn. H e came late to class, because classes in the past had begun a quarter after the hour, and apparently he never learned of the change to meeting on the hour. H i s delayed arrival caused no impatience, since tlie students knew he would m a k e the remaining minutes worth while. Coming without notes, he might begin back of where he had left off, not quite in the same words. On a rare occasion he would bring a b o o k to refer to, but that was awkward on a bicycle without a basket, a n d he was always full of reflections o f his reading, enlivened by what his white bulldog had taught him. Instead of a n overcoat in cold weather, he wore under the jacket of his grey tweed suit a grey sweater which he did not bother to take off, though the r o o m was overheated. With chalk he began m a k i n g and erasing an M on the desk. Looking up now and then at the high window or down at the class, he rubbed his gr~771ed head and face, stroked his beard, shifted his a r m y shoes, and renewed the M. A question would elicit a careful explanation. Once in a while he would attempt classroom procedure, call on a couple of students, then go on thinking out loud, as if we were all seated in his inner forum. W e never tired o f hearing him present the origin o f the self with no appeal to the transcendental. It was possible to hear each year's version of this natural miracle and, thanks to the quarter system, to take a dozen different Mead courses, from Aristotle on. One in K a n t would back up for a running start through Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, but there was always another quarter coming. During a seminar in Hegel's Phiinomenologie, Einstein first came to this country a n d gave a lecture series in MandeI1 Hail. It was worth it even if one understood little m o r e than the opening sentence: "Meine D a m e n und Herren, es tut mir leid nicht Ihre gewthnliche Sprache zu brauchen." Hegel would wait in the following hour while Mr. Mead summarized and explained the lecture. In a course on retativity he found Whitehead more objective than Einstein, and saw sociality throughout the universe, with every thing what it is b y also being other things in different perspectives. Ph. D. was never thought missing after the n a m e of Mead. A string of Ph. D. candidates got ideas for dissertations from him, and found him ever generous with advice and encouragement, in his office or on the curb. It was a powerful stimulus to feel his blue gaze a n d hear his reply in a gentle tone. The M e a d hospitality was

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legendary. He and his wife helped a number of students financially and otherwise, even taking them in to live with them. At meals there was a long table full who would not forget the warmth and wealth of the experience, emanating especially from him at the head of the board. Rucker brings out that the towering figures who established the Chicago philosophy shared it with several disciplines, notably with psychology at first, and education; extensively with the world's first department of sociology, which responded to Mead in W. I. Thomas, Ellsworth Faris, Ernest Burgess, Robert Park, and later Louis Wirth. Albion Small was closer to Dewey. Clarence Ayres, after his Chicago degree in philosophy, carried Dewey into economics, along with Veblen's approach. Charles E. Metriam in political science was open to what was occurring in philosophy as well as in other fields. Though most of Merriam's distinguished Ph. D.'s came after the great clays of pragmatism, Lasswell had been an assiduous Mead auditor. Rucker lists the noted Chicago men of science sympathetic enough with the educational ferment of pragmatism to talk about their interests to the children in Dewey's Elementary School or help plan and guide experiments, anticipating today's enrichment programs. Chamberlin spoke on the solar system; Coulter on plant relations; Whitman on zoology; Loeb on physiology. Other speakers were Thomas, Vincent, and Small in sociology; Starr in anthropology; Salisbury in geography; Michdlson in physics; Alexander Smith in chemistry; Cowles in ecology. If there is to be such cooperation in a school program again, the spirit of pragmatism is needed. There are signs of revival of the only authentically American philosophy. Seven books were published by Dewey alone in the decade before World War II interfered. Then came the influx of logico-linguistic analysis, phenomenology and existentialism, and more influence of Marx and Freud. Now these foreign strains have been domesticated or appraised. Dewey has spread through thirty languages. The University of Southern Illinois is undertaking to get out all his writings afresh. Mead is in French, German and Italian, and on the way in Japanese. His Selected Writings are in demand in paperback, mostly by students of sociology; but pragmatism was never limited departmentally. The future is open. VAN METER

University o/ Cincinnati

Phenomenology in America: Studies in the Philosophy o/ Experience. Ed. with an intro, by James M. Edie. (Cmcago: Quadrangle Books, 1967. Pp. 309. $2.45) The concert of phenomcnological as opposed to other sorts of philosophy is at best difficult to untangle. Historically the phenomenological movement arose as a reaction to various strains of psychologism and neo-Kantianism inherent in late nineteenth century German philosophy. In its beginnings phenomenology was nothing more than a self-critical quest for a common method for doing philosophy. The method was to be ontologically neutral, certain in its results, and descriptive rather than explanatory. The concepts of intuition and essence became central to the working out of this method, and phenomenologists came to see their task as the description by intuitive

Phenomenology in America: Studies in the Philosophy of Experience (review) Stephen A. Erickson Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970, pp. 501-504 (Review) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

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legendary. He and his wife helped a number of students financially and otherwise, even taking them in to live with them. At meals there was a long table full who would not forget the warmth and wealth of the experience, emanating especially from him at the head of the board. Rucker brings out that the towering figures who established the Chicago philosophy shared it with several disciplines, notably with psychology at first, and education; extensively with the world's first department of sociology, which responded to Mead in W. I. Thomas, Ellsworth Faris, Ernest Burgess, Robert Park, and later Louis Wirth. Albion Small was closer to Dewey. Clarence Ayres, after his Chicago degree in philosophy, carried Dewey into economics, along with Veblen's approach. Charles E. Metriam in political science was open to what was occurring in philosophy as well as in other fields. Though most of Merriam's distinguished Ph. D.'s came after the great clays of pragmatism, Lasswell had been an assiduous Mead auditor. Rucker lists the noted Chicago men of science sympathetic enough with the educational ferment of pragmatism to talk about their interests to the children in Dewey's Elementary School or help plan and guide experiments, anticipating today's enrichment programs. Chamberlin spoke on the solar system; Coulter on plant relations; Whitman on zoology; Loeb on physiology. Other speakers were Thomas, Vincent, and Small in sociology; Starr in anthropology; Salisbury in geography; Michdlson in physics; Alexander Smith in chemistry; Cowles in ecology. If there is to be such cooperation in a school program again, the spirit of pragmatism is needed. There are signs of revival of the only authentically American philosophy. Seven books were published by Dewey alone in the decade before World War II interfered. Then came the influx of logico-linguistic analysis, phenomenology and existentialism, and more influence of Marx and Freud. Now these foreign strains have been domesticated or appraised. Dewey has spread through thirty languages. The University of Southern Illinois is undertaking to get out all his writings afresh. Mead is in French, German and Italian, and on the way in Japanese. His Selected Writings are in demand in paperback, mostly by students of sociology; but pragmatism was never limited departmentally. The future is open. VAN METER

University o/ Cincinnati

Phenomenology in America: Studies in the Philosophy o/ Experience. Ed. with an intro, by James M. Edie. (Cmcago: Quadrangle Books, 1967. Pp. 309. $2.45) The concert of phenomcnological as opposed to other sorts of philosophy is at best difficult to untangle. Historically the phenomenological movement arose as a reaction to various strains of psychologism and neo-Kantianism inherent in late nineteenth century German philosophy. In its beginnings phenomenology was nothing more than a self-critical quest for a common method for doing philosophy. The method was to be ontologically neutral, certain in its results, and descriptive rather than explanatory. The concepts of intuition and essence became central to the working out of this method, and phenomenologists came to see their task as the description by intuitive

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means of the essential structures of experience. In Husserl, however, phenomenology became first transcendental and then idealistic, employing a number of Cartesian categories in its philosophy of mind. Disavowing these categories the pnenomenologist Heidegger not only denied the validity of intuition but construed phenomenology as essentially outological. Claiming phenomenological status for his major philosophical work, Being and Nothingness, Sartre combined a modified Cartesian philosophy of mind with a number of the conceptual commitments of classical existentialism. In Merleau-Ponty phenomenology loses all pretence to certainty in its results and becomes closely related to contextualism pragmatically understood. Since phenomenology has in large measure been identified with these four philosophers, one can easily see the difficulties involved in defining its nature. H there is a common thread running through the development of phenomenology, however, it is probably a commitment to the concept of description as central to philosophical method. Since this commitment is shared by Wittgenstein and Austin, philosophers usually not classified as phenomenologists, this account of the nature of phenomenology is clearly insufficient. To distinguish phenomenology from other philosophical methods, I believe, two further things need to be said, one negative and one positive: (I) that the concept of description is bound up with a number of neo-idealistic doctrines inherent in the German metaphysical tradition, and (2) that descriptions of the extra-linguisflc order, construed as meaningful in a way not reducible to the meanings of the terms used to describe it, are viewed as central to the business of philosophy. Phenomenology in America is a set of essays "undertaken under the aegis of phenomenology in this country." The editor of the volume claims them to be the most important papers delivered at the meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy during the years 1964, 1965, and 1966. In this volume most of these papers appear in revised form. Given the cursory definition of phenomenology I have offered, not all of the fifteen contributions can be said to be phen?menological. In fact they exhibit virtually as many different methodologies and variances in concern and subject matter as do those Contintental philosophers, some phenomenological, some pre-phenomenological, from whom the contributors to this volume have in part derived their inspiration. This is by no means a criticism of the volume however. It may be a criticism of the title. Needless to say, of course, the significance of the volume does not reside in its title. What is important is that its contributions represent attempts to deal with philosophical problems independently of the methodological restrictions, style and commitments of linguistic analysis. Almost all of the contributions deal directly with philosophical problems, avoiding discussions of method and commentaries on what the classical phenomenologists have said on the topics being considered. I cannot discuss all of the essays and in fact shall limit myself to consideration of but a few, selecting certain philosophical doctrines from them which I believe to be deserving of mention. The first paper in the volume, "Phenomenology and Artificial Intelligence," was done by Hubert Dreyfus under the sponsorship of the Rand Corporation. Dreyfus argues against the view that "robots will eventually be built whose behavior will be indistinguishable from that of human beings" (p. 31)---a view he attributes to Scriven, Putnam, and Ziff. Dreyfus' argument is essentially this: though information about entities within one's world, understanding 'world' in the Heideggerian sense as an "in

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terms of which," can be fed into a computer, information about one's world itself cannot be c o m p u t e r i z e d - - a t least not b y the digital computer, "the only high-speed, all-purpose, information processing device that we know how to design or even conceive at present . . . " (p. 36). Dreyfus argues that the context, to use phenomenological terminology, the "horizon," in terms of which the relevance and significance of data is assessed simply cannot be duplicated by a digital computer. Since the "worldly" (horizonal) character of human cognition is its central characteristic, artifical intelligence cannot duplicate the intelligence functioning within the context of concrete human existence. In short, the distinction between persons and machines in ineradicable. In his essay Dreyfus does much to clarify the conception of a world phenomenologically understood. If his argument is not convincing to s o m e - - i t is to m e - - i t at least fo:uses attention on the "horizonal" character of h u m a n thought and opens up areas for further investigation. Richardson's paper, " K a n t and the late Heidegger," is perhaps the only truly historical study in the volume. A carefully reasoned, carefully documented paper, it attempts to show that Heidegger's interpretation of K a n t undergoes a transformation after the writing of Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Through an examination o f this transformation, Richardson thinks it can be demonstrated that K a n t i a n influence on Heidegger was extrinsic even from the beginning of Heidegger's philosophical work. That the influence is extrinsic after Heidegger's controversial Kehre is an easier thesis to argue, though even it is difficult to defend. Heidegger claims that his later writings are comprehensible only if they are seen as the working through of problems already inherent in Sein und Zeit. Thus, if an intrinsic connection between K a n t and Heidegger's thought can be found in Heidegger's magnum opus or in the Kantbuch, it would follow that even the later writings were, if only by way of negation or reconstruction, under K a n t i a n sway. Heidegger's remarks concerning K a n t ' s "most covert judgments of the common reason," his Kantianly transcendental account of the ;'phenomenon" in the early methodological section of Sein und Zeit, and his parallel treatment of categories and existentiaUa would all seem to indicate a K a n t i a n orientation to Heidegger's early thought. Ricbardson's arguments are plausible, however, if not altogether convincing, and his paper deserves very thoughtful study by those concerned to trace the development of Heidegger's philosophical positions, One of the major theses of American phenomenologists, such as Wild, is that phenomenology is peculiarly suited to the concerns of existentialism, in particular to the description of the structures constitutive of h u m a n existence. In his paper entitled "Ontological Autobiography" William Earle takes exception to this claim. If the prime concern of existential philosophy is truly the individual, Earle argues, phenomenological or any other attempts to articulate c o m m o n features of human life and experience must be rejected by existential thinkers as misguided and in fundamental opposition to "existentialism's" task: the preservation and confession of the integrity and uniqueness of the individual. Earle writes, Our present conclusion is that so long as human existence remains singular, free, and to any degree transcendental to its situation, there cannot possibly be any general, essential, phenomenological, or existential clarification of it; there is no possible conceptualization or theory which can at one and the same time express what is true of everybody and pertinent to anybody (p. 75).

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Earle's position, needless to say, is a radical one. If taken seriously it appears to commit him either to a private language doctrine or, more likely, to silence. If the concepts embodied in our language are public, intersubjective concepts, then either a minimal characterization of singular human existence is possible or Earle is stranded in a hopeless, speechless solipsism. I shall mention just one other paper, Natanson's "Alienation and Social Role." Natanson distinguishes role-taking from the more basic activity which he refers to as the intentionality of role-taking or, as he terms it, "role-action." He attempts to give a phenomenological grounding to the notion of role-taking, thereby showing the relevance of phenomenology to problems in social philosophy and sociology. Though a difficult paper, "Alienation and Social Role" is a helpful study of various structures presupposed in social interaction. Natanson's analyses go a long way toward dispelling the view that a phenomenological starting point commits one to subjectivism. I might have mentioned other, equally instructive essays. These, however, give some indication of the diversity of concerns inherent in the American phenomenological tradition. Phenomenology in America documents these concerns well. STEPHEN A, ERICKSON

Pomona College

Heimkehr ins Eigentliche. By Walter Robert Corti. (Amriswil, Switzerland, Amriswiler BiichereL 1969. Pp. 152. n.p.) This collection of essays written between 1935 and 1966 gives a fine example of the changes in the concern for the meaning of human existence during these thirty years both in the mind and emotions of an individual philosopher and in Western culture generally. The essay from which the title is taken dates from 1958. It is a charming, poetic autobiography, describing the growth of philosophic and scientific wonder from the author's childhood, when he was thrilled by the wonders of biology and chemistry, to his more general wonder at being in and of the world of wonders, culminating in a self-conscious wonder about the implications of a wondering being in a wonderful world. The early essay of 1935, entitled Zu den Dingen is a vivid statement of a Heidegger-inspired existentialism, which analyses the difference between the attempt of Husserl to understand Sachen by his search for the essence of an object ;rod his formulation of phenomenology, and the very different appreciation of things in nature, which demands a non-verbal familiarity or "communion" with another natural being in existential terms, not in terms of the concept of "essence." The later essay of 1958 contains a critical history of the relations between the theories of explication, evolution, and development as cosmologies. After the historical survey it describes the physiological and mental restlessness of man. In this context, the problem of the meaning of existence is explored, not as a question to be answered, but as a significant form of human restlessness which has implications for a kind of restlessness in nature and in cosmic process. Beside these essays which are contributions to the history of recent philosophy, there are several other essays related to the varied and remarkable interests and

The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (review) Robert Niklaus Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970, pp. 482-487 (Review) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

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disorder was reLigious men's tendency to find in the Scriptures and their consciences justifications for rebelling against their sovereign. The last half of Leviathan is designed to refute these claims in detail, and this refutation is not merely tacked onto the first parts but is a logical extension of them. The argument for escaping the state of nature is that only through obedience to a common power can man escape the likelihood of an early death. Once that common power is established, and so long as it can carry out its protective function, obedience to it is obligatory. When a man enters civil society, the only right he retains is to defend himself against physical death, and consequently, the only time he is entitled to disobey the sovereign is when the sovereign directly threatens him. Thus excuses for rebellion are reduced to an absolute minimum. In McNeiily's formalization however, the concept of a man's death must be replaced by the formal concept of the frustration of all one's desires. And so "whatevvr [a man] regards as the complete frustration of all his desires . . . he will be entitled to resist, even if such resistance puts him at war with others, including lawful authority" (p. 193). Now the incredible range of things men have believed essential to avoiding the frustration of all their desires is amply testified to in the history of religious warfare. And clearly, under this formalized interpretation, men would be entitled to rebel over the form of baptism, church government, ministerial costume, prayer, or anything else if they are convinced it is essential to their salvation. It takes little knowledge of history to see that Hobbes's espousing of a theory with such consequences has a low degree of probability indeed. Hobbes complains in Leviathan of Scriptural exegetes who "by casting atoms of Scripture, as dust before men's eyes, make everything more obscure than it is." Rather, he claims, it is "not bare words, but the scope of the writer, that giveth the true light by which any writing is to be interpreted; and they that insist upon single texts, without considering the main design, can derive nothing from them clearly'" (E. W., III, 602). This last would be too harsh to apply to McNeiity's work generally, for his "atoms" are for the most part of considerable worth in themselves. But with regard to our understanding of Hobbes's Leviathan he raises a lot of dust. PAUL J. JOHNSON

CalifornM State College, San Bernardino

The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. By Peter Gay. VoL I, The Rise ol Modern Paganism. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. Pp. xviii+SSS+xv); VoL II, The Science ot Freedom. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. Pp. xx+70S+xviii) Le grand int~rSt port~ aux ~tudcs du xvm* si~cle au cours des deux derni~res d6cades et la remise en question des principes critiques encore en vigueur it y a une dizaine d'ann~,s ont fray~ la voie h de nouveaux efforts de synth~se dent la derni~re en date, et non la moins int~ressante, est celle de Peter Gay. Ses deux substantiels volumes sent destines ~ servir de guides ~ une nouvelle g~n~ration d'~tudiants et de chercheurs, ne ffit-ce que pour la bibliographie tr~s d6taill~e et accompagn~ d'obserrations personneUes qui forme un supplement tr~s pr6cieux ~ la Bibliographie de D. C. Cabeen de 1951 et de 1968. Lo travail de Peter Gay inspire confianc~ par

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Fampleur des lectures auxquelles il s'est astreint et